The History Of Lord Lytton'S Indian Administration

HISTORY of LORD LYTTON'S
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION, 1876
to 1880: compiled from Letters and
Official Papers.

Lady Betty Balfour

LO NG MANS, GRKKN, AND CO.

in I'ATKKNOSTKK MOW, LONDON
NKW YORK AND I1OMISAV

All

PBEFACE

THIH History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration
has been drawn up in compliance, as fur as cin-.um-
stances permitted, witli the instructions in my fathers
will, which were as follows : c I request my wife to
endeavour to obtain the assistance of gome statesman
or writer, in whose* ability and character slm lias
confidence, for the production of :i roinplnff record
of my Indian Administration/ Wilh this rr»qu<jbl at.
heart jny mother first turned to Sir John Hlranlii-y,
my father's colleague and most loyal friend, vvlio
responded to her appeal with mrd'ml zeal. Into his
hands wer« placed all tho private and official ikKni-
ments of L-ord Lytton's Vic-eroyalty, and no msin
was more liighly q,ualified to deal with them than
he. Uufortntiately, illness interrupted his tuililnuint
of this task, and his medical adviscjrs ibrhiulc liis
undertaking aisy arduous work. Ills
however, in Uuv. preparation of this book IIOH
invsi]ual)le. Thtf /irst oliaptens owe* much to his
pen, and his advi<?^ throughout has been continually
sought, and ungrucj^ingly givon.

The materials (tylioutocl and preserved by my
fatluu- in connection \vitli l»is work in India were HO

\

vi LORI) \t\ ri'0\>

3 Ida tollers,
del ailed and runscm
almost ftomptoli* H-< <
Sir rlolni Hirarlii'y \\
of writing tins hisU.
s<'l"c!ions from Ilicsi
tin-in in clmmol.»}.'i
riMiTJil.iv^ in Lord 1^
\vri!li whirl) lif \\t-s
untljjrl.ook 1«.

il \\
links Fnon

the preli"
the inatcsriiil
neeineil mosl. swltjr|
the assiHL:Lnc(5 of
in

personal Tiit
appealed
effective help, IK
criticism, "but ;ils< '

Sir Alfred Lya!1
liis published wril , *
book, and in Lit
father's froiiliiir p ' ;
islan I have had 1,1 .
of all the circumsi • ,

Vlii LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

LordLytton's policy eighteen years ago, and which to
this day lias prevented it from receiving any measure
of fair play. The present narrative gives to the
public, for the first time, the true inner history of an
administration which lias been greatly criticised, yet
little understood. It is hoped that a knowledge
of the authentic facts may lead to a calm and just
appreciation, of an Englishman who, as he always
regarded above all other objects the welfare of his
country, devoted to that end in his various oflicfv*
the services of his whole working life.

HETTY UALI'OUIt

LOED LYTTON'S
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Tn« most important public post ever held by Lord
Lytton was offered to him at a time when he was
contemplating the immediate close of his official
career. He was then only forty-four years of ago, but
having two years previously succeeded, on the death
of his tat her, to the tide and family estate, his longing
desire was to retire from public life, and devote the
remainder of his days to the exclusive pursuit of
literature and his homo duties. In the spring of
1 875 he had been appointed Minister of Legation
at Lisbon, and this he intended to be his last
diplomatic post.

The Governorship of Madras had been offered
to him early in this year; this he had refused after
consulting his medical adviser, who solemnly assured
him that the constitutional dalicocy from which he
suffered was of a kind to be specially aggravated arid
increased by the climate and work in India, and that
he could not with safety accept such a post.

On November iiJJ, liST^, lie received the following
letter from the Prime Minister : *

2 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.I

Mr. Disraeli to Lord Lytton

' 2 Whitehall Gardens, S.W. : November 28, 1875.

fiMy dear LyUon, — Lord Northbrook has resigned
the Viceroyalty of India, for purely domestic reasons,
and will return to England in the spring.

6 If you be willing, I will submit your name to the
Queen as his successor. The critical state of affairs
in Central Asia demands a statesman, and I believe
if you will accept this high post you will have an
opportunity, not only of serving your country, but
of obtaining an enduring fame.

e Tours sincerely,

6 B. DISRAELI.'

To this letter Lord Lytton replied :
Lord Lytton to Mr. Disraeli

'Lisbon: December 1, 1875.

'My dear Mr. Disraeli, — No man was ever so
greatly or surprisingly honoured as I am by your
splendid offer, nor could any man possibly feel
prouder than I do of an honour so unprecedented, or
more deeply anxious to deserve it.

6 But I should ill requite your generous confidence
were I to accept the magnificent and supremely im-
portant post for which you are willing to recommend
me to the Queen, without first submitting to your
most serious consideration a circumstance which
cannot be already known to you, and in which you
will probably recognise a paramount disqualifica-
tion.'

He then went on to explain that the condition of
his health would, he feared, at times render him
incapable of prolonged mental labour coupled with

187S INTRODUCTION 3

unxiety, and, at any rate, prevent him from count-
ing on the enjoyment of that physical soundness
and strength which might otherwise have helped
to counteract his inexperionnfc of all adtn.hti*1mtirv
business and his ignorance at the outset of Indian
affairs. This consideration lie urged riot- upon private
hut upon public grounds : 6I assure you most
ciArnestly/ he wrote, 'that if, with the certainly of
leaving m}r lifts hahiml me. in India, 1 had a reasonable
uhance of also leaving there a reputation comparable
to Jjord Mayo's, I would still without a moment's
hesitation embrace the high destiny you place, wilhin
my grasp. Hut thft gratitude, inclunfry, ami icitt
which niiist help me to compensatfi all my other
deficiencies afford no guarantau against this physical
dilliculty. 1 am persuaded that you will not mis-
uuderstaTid the hesitation and anxiety it ('.auaos me.
... If there. IMS rejisons unknown to nw which,
upon ])iirnly public grounds (the only ones 1 would
u«k yon to consider), still dispose you to incur such
a risk, an intimation from you to that effiict will
rolitsva mo from all hesitation. En that case, and
in that case only, 1 shall regard your lultcry not as
an offer which 1. can decline, compatibly with my
intense appreciation of the, undeserved honour if.
involves, but as a high ami glorious command, which
if would be a dereliction of duty to disobey,'

The answer to this letter was telegraphed on
Dwe.mber 20 :

Mr. D'wmdi h> Lowf Lifttwi

'iraUicld: l)i>ec»iiibar 20, 1H7D.

fiWcj have carefully considered your l(ttt<*r, and
have not change! our opinion. We regard the
malter as settled.* *

» v

4 LOED LYTTOFS INDIAN ADMINISTRATION oil. i

On January 7, 1876, Lord Salisbury, then Secre-
tary of State for India, telegraphed to Lord Lyttou :

Announcement of your appointment has been
officially made and well received. Very important
that you should come home soon, as many pre-
parations to be made and much business to be trans-
acted.'

Lord Lytton prepared to leave Lisbon at oucu,
and was in England by the end of January. Tlis
wife and children followed him as soon as possible,
and he undertook to sail for India by March JJO.

Writing to an intimate friend on the eve of his
departure from Portugal, he said: *I have the
courage of the coward in front of battle, and shall
march on with an unflinching step/ The decision
he had taken was one, he knew, which involved llw
temporary farewell to all that was most cherished
and pleasant in the life he had laid out for himself;
but whatever the fate now before him, he could fact*
it with the knowledge that he had neither rashly
courted nor selfishly shirked it. In the first year
and a half of his sojourn in India few could know
or understand the extent of the physical misery which
he endured. But the breakdown which ho had
dreaded never came, and the often ailing condition,
of his health was not allowed to interrupt or inter-
fere with the work he had undertaken. From tho
moment that he accepted the appointment he sol,
himself to grapple with the subjects with whirh
in the future he would have to deal. lie began, as
he expressed himself to a friend, c knowing nothing
of India except its myths/ Shortly after his arrival
in England, after holding interviews with his friundH
of the Cabinet, Mr. Disraeli, Lord Salisbury, and
Lord Carnarvon, he writes: 'The work is uvw-

1876 INTRODUCTION 5

whelming, and most puzzling and strange to me, but
intensely interesting.'

Before entering upon the narrative of Lord
Lytton's Indian administration it is necessary to gives
some account of tlie situation, especially with regard
to the foreign policy of the Indian Government and
its relations with the frontier Stale of Afghanistan,
such as it was left by Lord Nortlibrook on his
retirement.

The importance of keeping I tu ssi a ul a distance*
from the. North- West Frontier of India, by establish-
ing barriers against the advance of her pownraiul (iu$
spread of her influence, has been recognised by «ue-
cessive Indian governments ever since the beginning
of the eentury. It is only with regard to the,
proper methods and measures for attaining these,
objects that opinions have difleml. This gradual
growth and recent Anvelopnujiit of two distith1,!
schools, representing two different, policies advocated
for dealing witli aflairs boyoud our frontier, have.
l)eoTi recont.ly snmm;irisod l>y Hir Allr<id Lyali in the.
following te.nns :

*U]> to tlio era of the Napoleonic, warn, and so
long a.s India was only acccwdble, j'roni Europe by
soo, the continental politics of Aria gav(t tli<*.
in India very little tsoncum. Tlio limits of 4)iir
sassionM were still far distant from tlm naiural or
geographical boundaries of the. country over whiHi
our dominion was gradually expanding. Mud from
the l)oginning of this <umtury, wlien it- be.came known
that Napoleon was seriously entertaining the projeel
of an expedition by land against British India, flu*
project of fortifying ourselves agninNl any sue.h
invasion from the* north-west by a Nyst.um of alHanees
with the Asiatic powers beyond the Indus iml the

6 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 1-11. i

Afghan mountains occupied successive Q-ovemorh-
QeneraL Tte first Afghan War was a rash and
premature attempt to carry out this system. The
disastrous result cooled for many years the ardour
of the party who insisted on the paramount necessity
of establishing, by friendly means if possible, other-
wise by the display of armed superiority, our influence*
over the rough, recalcitrant, liberty-loving people of
Afghanistan. Ten years later, when the English had
crossed the Indus and the Russians were hovering
about the Oxus, the prospect of a rapid approxima-
tion of the two rival empires grew much more,
distinct. But within India we had then much on our
hands. Nor was it until the country hart been finally
pacified after the Sepoy Mutiny that the question of
barring the further advance of Eussia a#ain took
shape, and prominence. The policy of selling up
barriers against a powerful neighbour is well known
in Europe ; it consists in establishing a preponderant;
diplomatic influence over intervening kingdoms, and
in placing the weaker States or petty princes under a
protectorate, or admitting them to an arrangement
for the common defence. That this system is Hound,
and peculiarly applicable to Afghanistan and th«
minor chiefships beyond our north-western frontier,
has never been seriously disputed ; and the loiitf con-
troversy (which is at this moment in full vigour) has
always turned entirely upon ways and means of
pursuing objects that are generally admitted to In-
desirable. One party has declared confidently in
favour of active overtures to the tribes and rulurw
beyond our borders ; of pressing upon them friendly
intercourse ; of securing the contact of tlieir external
relations ; of inducing them to receive missions, to
enter bto co-operative alliances, to acknowledge* our

1870

protection, and to admit British Resident s, and liritisli Hi
Agents. Xo time is to be lost, aiul no ellorts Apured, Huilimw'
in the resolute* employment of all those devices
whereby civiliwcul powers have, since the, days of the
Eomans, gradually imposed their supremacy upon
barbarous neighbours.

'Tho other party has never denied th« expediency
or poasibk* tu^cuRKityof tlmsc* inctttiurcs. Bu1 whereas
on tlio on<* sid(i there ha« Jwcn a constant demand for
the Hpucdy ^xtM'ntion of the.1 poliuy, for distiniit, steps
forward to br« taken without delay, for uiyenl, cnvr
turcs to Afghan Amirs, for operating by pressure
whnro persuasion Hoemud to work too slowly, for
intimating to suspicious chiefs that when friendly
ofler« wore* rejeeUnl the.r« ini^lit ]«• force in reserve,
on the other side thusi* denitMnds \vere, o]>poscd !>y
poliUe/ians of the. more cautious school as hasty and
undeniably hazardous. u Youreonrilialoryadv:iinvs,M
U»«y argunl, "'must UtexjMM'terl to fail among jenloiM
and hitraf.lable folk wh(» only \visJi to he left a.Ione,
and who know as well .-IK you do that protection means
in disguiac, and that intercourse wilh the
sjx'lls intervention. Wo thai tin* rejection of
your friendly overturn* will most probably hemme
munily the fornialitlos prcjliminary to Minus masterful
action wliieh will damagti your poptdarily, and will
entangle you in now responsibilities, military and
politieal, still furthor beyond your evu-r moving
fronUerM. If w<j really desin* so to gain tln^ ron
iid(iut«ii of the Afghans that they may in an emergency
titaiul by us and against our enemies, we must abstain
from forcing our friendship upon them, though our
relations with them ought to be civil and neighbourly.
And Uio surest way of prevent ing any misunderstand*
ing of our intunlioiiH is to keep within our own

8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTKATiON 011.1

Historical borders until we have just and necessary cause for a
ommaxy movement across them, or until the force of circum-
stances leads an Afghan ruler to seek or willingly
accept our assistance." ' 1

The attitude last described has grown to be as-
sociated with the name of Lawrence. The opposite
one has been represented with more or less difference
by all those ranking themselves on the side of thcj
Forward Policy. With the inauguration of this
policy Lord Lytton's name must ever be associated,
and despite the violent opposition it excited in his
time, it is the policy which has since been almost
continuously pursued by his successors.

It is one of the purposes of this book to set fort.li
Lord Lytton's own defence of this policy ; tho policy
of masterly inactivity having in his judgment failed
to achieve the objects at which it aimed.

The following historical summary of tliu events
which led to thti situation in 1870 is privem almost
entirely in Lord Lytton's own words, taken from
private notes written in the year 1880.

All schools of frontier policy are alike agru<*<l
that RuRftian influence should be excluded from
Afghanistan at any cost. Lord Lawrence never
doubted this. In a memorandum dated November li**,
1808, he said:

'No one, of course, can deny that the advamw
of Russia in Central Asia is a matter which may
gravely affect the interests of England in India. No
person can doubt that the approach of Kuswia
towards our North-West Frontier in India may
involve us in great difficulties; and this being UK*
case, it will be a wise and prudent policy to
endeavour to maintain a thoroughly friendly power

1 Sir Alfred Lyall,

1876 INT110DT7CTION

between India and the Itussian possessions in Central Historical
Asia. Nevertheless, it appears to me clear that ummiiry
it is quite out of our power to rfckon with .any
degree of certainty on the attainment of this
desirable end. And,' he added, 4I fed no shadow
of a doubt that, if a formidable invasion of India
from the west were imminent, the Afghans I/A w/<mf,
from the Amir of the (lay to the domestic slave of
the household, would readily join in it.'

These were the views expressed by Lord Law-
rence* in 1868, when the only clunker apprehended
was the establishment of .Russian infiui'Uco in
Afghanistan by forcible moans, and when the public,
presence of the Eussian power at Kabul, not- as the
foe, bnt as tho avowed friuiul and ally of I he Amir,
was a danger wholly mifonwwii. Xor did U>rd
Lawrence counsel passive flnt|inuscewe in such a
sitiuil/ion when it. jujtually ociniiTud. WhaUie e.on-
tended in 1878 wua, tliat'liiuwia rather than MHT All
.should have been oalltsi 1 by us to uwount. And in
this he was consistent; for what 1m had oAviwii in
J868 was, that Uutwia Hlioulrl bo plainly (old clluit
an advance towards India beyond a certain jwrnif,
would entail upon her war with Iftij&uul in every
part of the world.'

The relations botwwn llussia and Alghanisfan
may b« said to have co»nufenr*ed in tin* ywir IK70
with a complimentary letter from Owieral Kauiinauti
to tho Amir. It was <in(iroly <*<»lourless; and it.
was answered by the Amir in lurms siiyjriwicHl by
the Viceroy of India, who found in it no ground for
objection. But the letlorK of tin* Itussiati (Jovejrnor-
(ieneral gradually assumed n tonu morti prailioal
and more significant; and in the* miminw of 187a
ho addressed to Sher Ali a conimunicatio^ about

10 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION' CH.I

the boundaries of Bokhara which caused
Summary ^^ sensation in the Kabul Durbar. The Amir, wlio
was much alarmed by it, immediately fonvanleil
this letter to the Viceroy, with a confident iul
message, the terms of which were transmitted to
the Government of India through our native ajrcnl.
In this message the Amir drew attention to fin*
wish of the Eussian authorities to establish k;i
regular and frequent correspondence with the Kabul
Government/ and to the fact that they now styled
the Afghan State their 'neighbour,' *• oblivious of the
fact that Bokhara and Khiva intervened1 ; and I lie
message closed with an entreaty to the British
Government to * bestow more serious attention thrni
they have hitherto done on the establishment and
maintenance of the boundaries of Afghanistan/

This appeal was made to the Mritish Government
in 1872 ; and in reply to it the Amir was advised to
thank General Kaufmann for tho friendly sentiments of
a letterwhich had causedllis lEghneBB HO much uneasi
ness. For the purpose of reassuring him the Vii>ero\
expressed to the Amir his confident bi-Iiff that tlii*
assurances given by Eussia to Knglnml in re^anl lo
Afghanistaji would be strictly and faithfully mllii'ivi!
to.1 Nevertheless, General Kaufiusuni <jonlinue<! hi>
correspondence, and in the autumn of the same yenr
the Eussian officer acting for him at Tashkend In
formed the Afghan Governor of Malkh of the iles'in* ol
the Eussian Government ' that the relations hi'tui-i'ii
theEussians and Afghans shoiald Ijecorne jnore lirtn
and consolidated daily.' This whilo >,sithe
assurances 9 were being given by the liussian ( Jov

veni

1876 INTRODUCTION I [

ment to the English Foreign Office that the." Hnperial
Cabinet continue** to consider Afghanistan its entirely Summfiry
beyond its sphere of antion.'

Again the Amir \vas informed by the Vir-eroy
that the Jiritish (lovermnent in nowise .shared or
approved his dissatisfaction at the increasing fnsquHicy
and significance of these unsolicited comuiunimLlions,
His Highness consequently ceased to nonsuit tin-
British Government about ilium, and in I lie, winter uf
187S the acting Governor-OeneralofJtusrthinTurkc'Htsiii
appears to have considered himself in a pi Million (o
address Slier Ali as a subordinate ally of flu* Ittustiism
flovenimcnl. ' I entertain tho Uop«,' ho wrote, * that
th<» higli OovernoMfaneral will not rc'lnnc* ymir
niqmjst, and thai low will repreBonl. to Il.M/ tlu*
Emperor your endeavour to l>oru>nu) worthy of UK*
iui of my august Masttir.*

At tluj close; of that, year the AinirV* disn^anl.Ml
oiiH had Ixanu jusUlh-cl by llus Kuwiuii con-
of Khivu. From the fliwsriioMiirtH-ral of
Uritish Jndui, to whom hn Jjad so nsrrnlly c<»n(ul<ul
tluiBo upprehensionw, ho m-cived no isoininunicatioit
whatever on that rapid realiHation of ihi-ni whir-h
cloHtily coiKterntid his inlerests and deeply afliutttid
his feelings. But from the Oovwruor-CJcnctral of
Russian Turkestan lie recteived n lonjf r«oininiinii-at.ion,
frankly rcKH^niain^ in th<». fall of Khiva an cwnl
whi<;h Jlis Ilio'Iansss could not reasonably bet fxpcr.l^f I
to regard with intlifleroiw,o. Blw»r Ali diil not consul!
Hie Vusuroy sibout his reply to (iuu'nil Kaiifmunn.
And this WIIH only natural; for ho mum, huvct <*l«arly
|{atli«rad, lirHtfnjiu the lanjj;uacrti, and then from Hut
silcMihw of tlus Viceroy, that on this matter tlm VMIWH
and feelings of the Mritish (>rjv<»rinnunt \vct«» alto^eliM*r
dilfiwnt from his own. JJut it WUH imnu*diat<4ly after

12 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATE >N «IM

Sher All's receipt of General Kaufmann's rominum-
GBi^on about Khiva that tlie first significant ehan^e
occurred in the tone of his own communications with
the Viceroy. Till then no Amir of Kabul had ever
ventured to address the Viceroy of India in letters
not written in the Amir's own name and bearing the
Amir's'own signature. Disregarding this established
etiquette, Sher Ali now, for the first time, addressed
the Viceroy indirectly, through one of the, Afghan
Ministers, in a form for which there was absolutely
no precedent. While Sher Ali was thus beginning
to display his estrangement from the, fiove,rmnenf of
India, these are the terms in which he was addressed
by the Government of Kussian Turkusiun in tlie
spring of 1873 :

'I hope,' writes the Eussian aulhoril y al. Tashkent,
'that after your death Sirdar Abdullah Jan will
follow your example and make liiniftelf aii ally and
friend of the Emperor1 — the ally and friend, thai
is, of a Power pledged to treat Afghanistan as a
State entirely beyond the sphere of its influence)!
This letter was quickly followed by another from
General Kaufmann himself on the same subject. * I
hope,' writes the Eussian Govenior-ftuiutnil, M.hat
the chain of friendship now existing bcf,woen Russia
and Afghanistan will in future increase* and buctoinu
firm, owing to the recent alliance* between thu
Emperor of Eussia and the Queen of England ; ' and
he adds : 6I doubt not that this alliance of the two
Powers will be an omen for those countriew wtiir.h are,
under the protection of the Emperor of Ituswia and
the Queen of England,'

While appreciating the skill with which u
matrimonial alliance between two reigning houses is
here represented as a political alliance between two

1876 INTRODUCTION 13

empires, and the significant anxiety of the writer to Historical
convey assurances which would have come more uminary
naturally from the Yiceroy of India, European
readers might not be disposed to attach to the
phraseology of this letter any special importance.
But Asiatics are accustomed to weigh such utterances
with scrupulous attention; and its native agent at
Kabul reported to the Government of India that on
the receipt of this letter the Kabul Durbar observed :
* The Itussian Government has now made itself partner
in the protection of Afghanistan.'

An event now occurred which Lord Lytton con-
sidered to be the turning-point in our relations with
Afghanistan. Tu the year 1873 Sher Ali reviewed
his positiim. There was much in it which, rightly or
wrongly, had caused him increasing anxiety; and
finding in remit occurrences significant indications
of future contingencies, he appears to have then
wisely realised the inevitable necessity of accepting
cloHor and more subordinate relations with one or
other of liis two great European neighbours. To us
his preiureiuse was given. And in 1873 the Amir
made a lust uflbrt to obtain from the British Govern-
ment more definite and practical protection from the
unsolicited patronage of Kussia,

Tho Envoy sent by the Amir of Kabul to confer
with tiifl Viceroy of India at Simla in 1873 said lo
Lord Northbrook: 'Whatever specific assurances
the UusHituiH may give, and however often these may
bo repeated, the peoples of Afghanistan can place no
confidence in them, and will never rest satisfied
unless thuy are aswurcd of the aid of the British

The Vicwroy Udegraplieci home, and proposed to
assure him that the Government would help the Amir

14 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION r», i

Historical with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to repel
Summary ^ unprovoked invasion, if he unreservedly accept LH!
our advice in foreign aflairs. But the Duke of
Argyll entirely declined to sanction any such under-
taking; and the Viceroy could only promise Ilie
Envoy to assist him in any circumstances with advice.,
assure him that a Russian invasion of Afghanistan
was not apprehended, and offer to supply him wil.Ii
a certain quantity of arms. But the possibility of
direct invasion was by no means the only clnnjjur
anticipated by the Afghan Envoy, although the point
on which he desired to be satisfied was whether hu
might count on the English to defend him against
actual aggression. He said also, and ha said it, \cry
distinctly, that the Amir contemplated with serious
anxiety the inevitable result of those uiuieasin^ ami
increasing endeavours which, in the oircumsU'iwws
explained by the Envoy, the LuBHion auUinritu'H ;it
Tashkend, if not checked by our intervention, \\nro
certain to make for the acquisition and oxm-.isc of
some influence in his kingdom. To these ropremiiiln-
tions no direct reply was given; but the Amir wns
told that the Government of India thought it highly
desirable that a British officer should be (IrqmlcHl lo
examine the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, an< I
to communicate with His Highness at Kabul rejranl-
ing the measures necessary for the frontier'*! socuirify.
The Amir's reply, which plainly, though in rwrarvcMl
language, indicated disappointment at th<> JTuilnrH
of his negotiations for a defensive alii ai use a^ainsl,
Russia, merely stated that there wore jrc-neml
objections to European travellers in his country.

To those who look back, after the* lapse* of
twenty-five years, upon these transactions there can
be no dcjubt that the refusal of the Uritish Ministry

1 876 INTRODUCTION 1 5

to entertain Slier All's request for an assurance of Historical
protection was fraught with very serious consequences, ummaiy
and that the departure of the Afghan Envoy was
followed, in effect, by the rupture of friendly relations
at Kabul.

In 1873 Sher All had the sense to perceive in
time that Afghanistan could not permanently stand
alone, and that sooner or later she must openly
and practically throw in her lot with that Power
which might prove, not only best able, but also most
willing, to befriend and assist her. Itecent events,
to which the British Government appeared indifferent,
had convinced him that the time was at hand when
her final choice must be made ; and he was disposed
to give his alliance to the highest bidder for it.
Jlnssia was apparently the most willing, and she was
obviously the* best able, to make the highest bid.
Wlwm Hliur Ali found tlio ]Jritish Government so
nndisguiscdiy afraid of increasing its liabilities on
his behalf, and HO apparently disinclined to contract
with him any closer or more responsible relations, it
is not surprising that lie should have accepted Russia's
repeated assurance of her constant desire* to consoli-
date and tighten, what General Kaufmami correctly
called the djain of her friendship with him — that
chain which, to use the Amir's own expression,
ovcnlually dragged not only Afghanistan, but India
also, into a csea of troubles.'

At all events, after the return to Kabul of Sher
Mi's Envoy in 1873 there was a marked change for
thu worse in the Amir's attitude towards the Govern-
ment, of India, and less than two years later there
was a very important change in the character of Ids
relations with the Government of "Russian Turkestan.
Lu the second week of September 1875 a native

1 6 LOED LYTTOFS INDIAN ADMIXIRTRATrON

1 II. /

Eussian Envoy arrived for the first time at Kabul,
and was entertained there with marked consideration.
as the confidential bearer of verbal communication^
and a letter from General Kaufmann. From that linn-
forward the Eussian Governor-General was, for all
practical purposes, permanently represented at Kabul,
in the most efficacious manner, by relays of special
Envoys, the one arriving as the other left . ' The < iuvern
ment of India was informed by its officiating ( 'ommis
sioner at Peshawur that the busincssoftlie.se Knvo}s,
whatever it might be, could not be ascertained by our
native agent at Kabul, because it was corulneieil
directly and secretly with the Amir himself, and not
with the Durbar. 6 But/ he observed, « the. meaning
of these frequent communications from Russia i*
obviously to establish friendly relations with the
Afghans, and gain them over to an nllinnce with
Bussia. As soon as one agent is preparing fr> take
his departure another comes.'

In March 1874 there was a dian^o of Ministry
in England; Mr. Disraeli became Prime Minister,
Lord Salisbury became Secretary of State for India,
and Lord Derby Secretary of Slate, for Korean
Affairs.

While the Eussian Government yonUnned to
give our Foreign Office persistent assumnees that no
military movement in the Traiuwiwpiau uoimirii*
was contemplated or would be count onanwd, Russian
advance in the direction of Morv wan nevertheless
steadily pursued.

In the autumn of 1874 the submission of .several
of the Turkoman tribes to Russia was aiuimmnfi
and the Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported that
the whole of the country between Khiva ami (he
Attrekrwas regarded as annexed to Knx»in I,,

1876 INTRODUCTION 1 7

1875 a military c reconnaissance ' of the Turkoman Historical
steppe started from Krasnovodsk in July, in what ummary
was called 6 a most amicable spirit/ and although,
in consequence, it may be presumed, of the Emperor *a
orders, which had "been communicated to our Govern-
ment, no actual occupation of fresh territory in
the direction of Merv took place, the nominal sub-
mission to Bussia of the Akhal Tekke tribe was
reported to have been obtained ; and tlie movements
of General Lomakin, which continued for several
months, led to renewed rumours that a serious
expedition was contemplated. More important
events occurred in another quarter. Since the
occupation of Samarkand, in 1808, there had been
little interference with the Khanate of Khokaml,
lying to the east of Khojend and Tashkent! ; but in
the autumn of 1875, in consequence of aggressions
upon Hussion, territory, General Kaufmaim marched
on Khokand. The result of the operations that
followed was the formal declaration that the whole
of Khokand had been incorporated in the Russian
dominions under the name of the province of
Ferghana.

All these proceedings continued to convince th«
British Government that the advance of JiusKja
towards the Afghan frontier threatened to involve
us before long in dangerous difficulties; and the
matter had now become still more serious because the
outbreak of the insurrection in Bosnia and TTwrew-
govina in the summer of 1875 bid shown the
probability that the Eastern Question was again
about to be opened in Europe. This probability
became before, long a certainty.

Under these circumstances tho undisguised ill-
feeling towards us of the Amir Sh«r Ali. Khan, coin-

o

1 8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION on.r

Historical bined with the apparent certainty that the time was

Summary ^ nQW far ^stant when ^ frontiers of the Kussiau

Empire would be brought into close proximity with

those of Afghanistan, became a cause of the gravest

anxiety.

The most unsatisfactory and dangerous part of
the position was this — that while Eussian intercourse
with the Amir of Kabul grew daily more free and
frequent, we were in a condition of almost complete
ignorance regarding everything that was passing in
Afghanistan and in the countries immediately
beyond its borders. This ignorance had long been
admitted and regretted. Lord Dalhousie had made
it one of the stipulations of his Treaty with Dost
Mohammed, in 1857, that British officers should be
deputed, at the pleasure of the British Government,
to Kabul, Kandahar, and Balkh, to see that the
military subsidy given to the Amir was properly
expended. They were to be withdrawn when the
subsidy should have ceased ; and although the Amir
thought it undesirable that they should be sent to
Kabul, he entirely approved of their presence at
Kandahar. In 1859 our Government had come to
the conclusion, although it was not carried into
effect, that a "British agent ought to be established
at Herat, then independent of Kabul. Lord Lawrence4,
in 1868, recorded the opinion that one of the con-
ditions on which it was desirable to give assist-
ance to Sher Ali in consolidating his power was
that he should consent to our sending at any time
native agents to Kandahar, Herat, or other places
on the frontier, Lord Mayo recorded the opinion
that it was desirable that we should have an English
representative at Kabul, and that, although he found
it inexpedient to insist upon this measure, he did

1870 INTRODUCTION 19

not lliink that thr* difficulties in the way of carrying

it out were likely to lie permanent. Lastly, in Ib73, nnmilliy

the Government of Lord Rorthbrook proposed, as

we have seen, the temporary deputation of a British

officer to examine ilio boundaries of Afghanistan.

Althmijgh the importance of obtaining belter
means of information regarding the course of events
in Afghanistan and on its frontiers had thus been
repeatedly acknowledged, our Government had, never-
the.tasH, thought it undesirable to press Ihe matter
ou the. Amir.

An important Note on this subject was written
by Sir Iturtlo Krerc, who was then a member of the
Huurutary of Hi ale's (iounoil. He insisted strongly
on th«i dangers into which, as it appeared to him,
\vo were drifting, and pointed out the men-sums of
precaution which ho beliwe,d to be necessary. The,
most important nt these wore, the appointment of
11 r Irish officers on Lhu frontiers of Ai^hanistau and
Central Asia, and the, occupation of Quc.ttah. Tn
regard to thtt first nKwisure, Mr liartlo F'riTttV NolA
provtid I.liat it was v«ry AoHirable, but jjavo no aid
towards ove.re.omin^ the (liffic.tiltie.s. TJui latter stop
lit* reennnmttxlcd be,<;aus($ its adoption would j/ive
us a far .stronger frontier, and bwzutse lui looked
forward lo tho inevitables nmtinfrency r>f our having,
at some future timi*, to meet Russia on tho we,st<trn
borders of Afghanistan. Then* ean IM* no doubt
(hat Hir Itsirtlrt Krere's Noto had a jrreat efle.ist in
e.onvineinjj; Her Majesty's (rove.rnmcnt that the stato
of affairs had beromo extremely serious, and on
January Uii, 1H7">, a despatch exhibiting their
anxioty was addressed by Lord Salisbury to tlu*
Ooverinnent of Lord Northhrook.

In this (Iti^atcOi ho cotmneuted on the, sc«tntinosN

20 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. i

Historical

«aSfaBi875

Lord North-

of the information which the Viceroy received
through the Kabul Diaries, and remarked that for
knowledge of what passed in Afghanistan and upon
its frontiers the Government were compelled to rely
mainly upon the indirect intelligence which reached
them through the Foreign Office. Lord Salisbury

^leu wenl 011 to P°*Llt °ut *^at our Dative aueut,
ht)wever intelligent and honest, was in the nature
of thingb disqualified to collect the information
which the Government of India required. * One of t ho
principal qualifications/ he said, Mbr this fuur.lion
is the neutrality of feeling in respect to religious
controversies which mHy a Europe sail can POKHCMH.'

He therefore urged the Viceroy to lako muusim»s,
* with as much expedition a>s the uinmmstatu'os of
Ilia case permit, tor procuring thu uKu<fiiit of UK*
Amir to iJiCi eBlablisluueiit of a Hril-ish Agtiucy at
Iltirat,' adding, cwlien this iw acKJoniplisluul if, inuy
he desirable to take a similar slop with rc^nnl lo
Kandahar. 1 do not su^gc^st any similar step vvit.li
respecit to Kabul, aw I am sensible of ULU niffuMill.irs
wlurJi are iiiLerpOMed by the fanatic, viulenc-c of tlu*
poople.'

The importance attached to an Knglish A^ciiry a I.
Herat waw, primarily, for tlus sake of UK? information
an English officer might colled, ; but. it would also IK*
an indication of English fiolioiludu for tin* safety of
our allies, and might so tend to dimtouniifc1 notinsi*lH
dangerous to Hie peace of Asia,

^j0r(^ Nortlihrook'rt fiovenmioiil, rcpliud |,o 1-liis
dospatch on Junes 7, 1875. Thuy (ionsi<UT(r(L thsit
thi3 value of the reports rc5CUiiv<'d from tlu* nativr
agctut at Kalml had Ixwu und(»j;-tistimntc*<(; (Imt
it WUB prol>a])le lluit iiiibrmation n^nnlijin: the*
Turkoman JVijntior would he obtoiiu»d with

INTRODUCTION 2 1

promptness and accuracy through Persia than
through Afghanistan; that it was doubtless true that
the position uf the agent compelled him to be cautions
in communicating news to the British Government ;
but that, making due allowance for the difficulty of
his position, the information supplied by him was
fairly full and accurate. While it was thought that
either the Amir or his Minister, during the* conference
at Umballa, hud expressed, in confidential convoca-
tions, a readiness to accept at some future tinus
not far distant, the presence of British agents iu
Afghanistan, oxc.epling at Kabul itself, it was pointed
out thai no formal record of tho alleged admission
existed, and Iliad its scope, and intention wore un-
certain, and that Lord Mayo had dlslmc.tly informed
dhe Amir Mluid no European ollir.iirs would b« placed
iifl Residents in his cities/ IFmler these ciirimistuiiCMS
the (jovernmnnd of India held that tln*y would not
bo justified in founding any representation to the
Amir regarding UK* appointment of a British ;i^e,ud
at Herat upon the. assumption that ho had formerly
expressed his wiHingnoflB to agree to such an arnmge-
ment. It wus shown that, in the opinion of all t.Iie
offnutrw most likely to form a c.orrect judgment on
the sul)j(j<tt, the; Amir would certainly ho altogether
disinclined to receive a British agent, and if he
should tfivc; an unwilling consent, no ; id vantage would
be. ^ii'iTidd from the proposed measure. If, on the
other hand, he should re.fnse, his refusal would im-
pair the influence of UL« British Government in
Afghanistan, and would weaken the hands of Her
Alajesty's Oovernmend in any future negotiations
with UuHBia. * At the same time/ id w;is Haid, *• w«
ii^ru<» widli Her Majesdy's Govennnotit that-, having
regard to the present, aspect of aflaint in Tin'ke.stan,

22 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. i

it would be desirable that a British, officer should be
stationed at Herat.1 But for the successful realisa-
tion of this end it was essential that the proposed
arrangement should have the cordial consent of the
Amir. Believing that this consent could not possibly
be obtained, the Government of Lord Nbrtlibrook
concluded that e the present time and circumstances
are unsuitable for taking the initiative in such a
matter.'

They advised that no immediate pressure should
be put upon the Amir, or particular anxiety shown
upon the subject, but that advantage should be
taken of the first favourable opportunity that las own
action or other circumstances might present for the
purpose of sounding his disposition, and of repruHGiil-
ing to him the benefits which would be derived by
Afghanistan from the proposed arrangement,. The
object in view was, in their judgment, more likely to
be attained by taking this course than by assuming
the initiative at once.
Lord Bails- The Government at home was little disposed to

accePt thifl °Pinion of tlie Government of India, that
it was inexpedient to put any immediate prcissure
on the Amir of Afghanistan to induce him to unlctr
into new arrangements, and on November 1!), 1K75,
a further despatch was sent to India by Lord
Salisbury, containing a complete statement of the*
policy which Her Majesty's Government consiilcnnl
it essential to carry out. In this despatch tin* Secre-
tary of State recapitulated and emphasised the urgent,
and important grounds upon whidi Her Majesty's
Government desired the establishment of a British
agent in Afghanistan, and the Viceroy was infit.rucUid
to press upon the Amir the reception of a temporary

1876 INTRODUCTION 23

Embassy in his capital. Neither the desirability of
this object nor the strength of the reasoning in
demonstration of its importance was disputable, or
in fact disputed ; but Lord Northbrook's Government, Lord Noith-
in their reply, insisted on the improbability that the brook'fl reply
Amir would willingly agree to the location of British
officers in his country, on the impolicy of pressing
the demand against his will, and on the inutility, in
their opinion, of establishing agencies there without
his hearty consent. This correspondence fully
represents the differences of opinion which had arisen
between the Government of India and the Home
Government at the, time of Lord Northbrook's resigna-
tion in the spring of 1876 ; and it will be seen that
they all converge upon one main issue — whether an
immediate and strenuous attempt should be made to
induce* the Amir to receive a Mission at Kabul for
tlict pur | HMO of negotiating the establishment within
his cLominionti of a representative of the British
fiovc'Tmnunt. That the issue thus defined was one
of fLXtraordinary difficulty cannot in fairness be
AunuMl, The objections urged by Lord Northbrook's
Government were grave and substantial ; yet, on the
other hand, Lord Salisbury's despatches prove that he
had rightly appreciated the true situation, in treating
the. rcwption of a British, diplomatic agent by the
Amir as the first cwieiitial step towards improving
our reflations and rouloruig our influence with the
Afghan ruler. By no other pacific measure could we
hope to counteract the growth of Russian influence
at Kabul, to explain our policy, or to obtain the Amir's
cousistcmt adherence to and co-operatiou with it;
while even if the moment for beginning fresh over-
tures was not opportune, it was quite possible that

24 LOIO) LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cii r

the situation miglxt not improve, but the reverse, by
delay. It was at this juncture, when the difficulties
of the position and the conflict of opinions had
reached their climax, that Lord Lytton assumed
charge of the Viceroyalty in April 1876.

CHAPTEE II

L'RKFARAllONB tfOJft INDIA — JOUENJflY THITHER — VIBST
NEGOTIATIONS WITIT AFGHANISTAN

DuuiNn the time which elapsed between the nomi-
nation of Lord. Lytton as Viceroy of India and his
departure from England to assume charge of his
office he devoted himself to the work of increasing
his knowledge of Indian subjects. He studied
assiduously all books and papers on recent events
which the India OJIice could furnish, and he en-
deavoured to place himself in personal communica-
tion with everyone who he thought could speak with
authority on the more important questions with
which lie would soon have to deal. A few years
before he had made the acquaintance of Lord
Lawrence*. They had met at the house of their
common friend John Forster, and they had been
neighbours in Hertfordshire when Lord Lawrence
was living at Hrocket. They had at that time many
conversations, and Lord Lytton would afterwards
recall with interest much that Lord Lawrence had
said to him about India, his stories of the stirring
times through which he had passed, the adventures
and daring deeds of our officers, and how Lord
Lawrence had explained to him at length his views
on a multitude of subjects connected with Indian
C4overiuuent, our relations with Afghanistan uud the
tribes on the North-Western Frontier, and with the
advance of Uus»sia through Central Asia, * These

26 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTIfcATION m. u

conversations were renewed when Lord Lvtton
was appointed Yiceroy, but it had already bcronio
apparent that the policy towards Afghanistan which
the Government had resolved to carry out, and which
he himself believed to be right, would not have ljQ«l
Lawrence's approval, and it was difficult in nuuh
circumstances to discuss these matters freely, Lord
Lytton could say nothing regarding the instructions
which he knew that he was about to mwiv«% and
he could not attempt to controvert Lord IJIIWIVIUM-'H
opinions without seeming to himself to be wnnliiijj
in proper deference to one of the most illustrious
of Indian statesmen, for whose great actions and
noble character he always felt sincere admiral ion and
respect.1

1 The obituary notice of Lord Lawronoo'H death puMiHliciI in W
Gaxette of India, June 30, 1879, was written by Ixinl L,vlt<»n, JIIM! r.m
as follows : —

'The Governor-General in Council hau rcrc'iwl, with
concern, the announcement of the death of Lord UwruiM'. Iith*
Viceroy and Governor- General of India.

'No statesman, since Warren Hasting, hiiH nilminihlrwl tit*-
Government of India with a genius and an oxiNirlcnni N» <'xriiuiivi'l,v
trained and developed in her service m ihono of ilui illuMriowi IHUJI
whose hfe, now closed in the fulness of fwmo, t}it)rt;ih not, nf 14:0,
bequeaths to his country a bright enntylu of all tltaL fa uoMi*st in tin-
high qualities for which the Civil Sorvico of Jniliii lm» jiwllv ta-m
renowned; and in which, with sueh cxamplcH \wk\w if, it will WHIT
be deficient.

1 The eminent services rendered io India by Lord I.uwrnwc, fntlh
as ruler of the Punjab, in the heroic aofuueti of IlritiHli IKM IT. mid im
Vioeroy, in the pBaoeful adminiatration of a niHcmi'd Knijiin*,
be fitly aotaowledged in this sad rncorrt of ihct «n,,f w}jir), H1ii»
by lus death, and of the pnde with which rim diiTiNliin hi.s mu

'The Viceroy and Gorarnor-Gciiumd in (louuoil, howviT, cwiitf
to give some public exprossum to thoHO fodinKH mid fa* HIM! imtimml
gratitudB which is the best rewurd of national rnvbi* .llri'ri H »i,at Iho
flag of Port Walham shaU, during twiirww, fcho flnt «r July, |«,
lowered haJf-mast high j that thirty-ono iidimtci Kmm Hhull IN* Ami, in
sunset from the Port; and that tho U gmt Hhall bn flnnl, HIM| hi.
nag dropped, as the sun eota.

Oonnofl fnrlhor diroetx thai on HIIH Horn.wful

1876 PREPARATIONS FOU INDIA 27

From no one did Lord Lytton receive at this
time more wise and practically useful advice or
warmer sympathy than from Sir James Stephen,1 and
during the rest of his life no man could have had n
more constant or more affectionate friend. Indeed, this
friendship, which may truly be said to have sprung
up in a single night, became to Lord Lytton one of
the closest and most valued intimacies of his later life.
They first met at a dinner at Lord Arthur Russell's,
and went afterwards together to the 6 Cosmopolitan/
India was, of course, the subject of their talk. Lord
Lytton was not more eager to hear than Sir Jaino*
to tell all that he knew of the condition of that great
empire. They did not part till they had spent half
the night walking up and down, too absorbed in
their subject to feel fatigue or the wish to separate.

Sir James Stephen's knowledge on Indian aflhirs
was deep, and his views so int mating to Lord Lytton,
that he bogged to have, some, recorded expression of
them. Sir Jam CM wont home and wrote for him art
elaborate exposition of the Indian administrative*
system, which his friend compared to a c policeman's
bull's-eye.' 2

Prom the time of Lord LyUon'w departure till hiw
return Kir James Stephen wrote tn him by every mail.
These letters were a constant source of pleasure,
solace, and support. When he returned from his
four years ' rule of empire his othw chief friends were,

ocoanion tiro fuuito murkN of tiatiomil rcwpwt Hhall bo Bimultaiioously
Hhown Hi all thcs othrr HuatH of government in India; in onlor that,
throughout tho kntfth and breadth of tin; Mmpirn with whoKc hwtory
tho ftuikO of JjonI fjfiwiuMkcu JH huponHhably asHncintcil, honour ina.y b(a
mulcrofl to tho nioiuory of tlu» Strat^Hiuan who rulrd India with a
wiudom Htrou^thojiod in lu>r laborioiiH Ho»*vicji», and \vlmnn fortitndo,
Hovcroly tOHtcil, WUH Hplcmdidly dinplayod thrcm^KHit luir fioriuiut trinl*

1 At thin tiuici Air. Kit/JiLinoH Stophou.

« Life qf Sir J. tilcphtm, by his bmthtir, Ijcifdio Btophoiu*

28 LORD LETTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH it

nearly all either dead or alienated, but in Stephen
he never failed to find the most loyal, faithful, and
devoted friend to the day of his death. The contrast
between the two men could hardly have been greater.
Sir James was somewhat Johnsonian in appearance
and talk ; Lord Lytton singularly endowed with charm
and grace of manner. In mind Lord Lytton was
essentially a poet gifted with a romantic and creative
imagination; Sir James had little taste for poetry,
or sympathy with the c artistic temperament' in any
of its forms, but his intellectual force, his herculean
capacity for work, and the strength and loyalty with
which he defended his convictions and the friends
who shared them, gave to his personality an heroin
stamp. They had in common, despite tlio widest
differences, a certain rather rare and sturdy manli-
ness of thought, and an enthusiastic patriotism. I jurd
Lytton's admiration and sympathy for Mir Tamos
evoked in him a responsive tenderness awl ailc'cLion
which perhaps was all the deeper for having so rarely
found an outlet, while Stephen's mental altitude) on
all public questions, and his strong and uncompro-
mising way of expressing whatever he felt, were lo hi.s
friend a source of unending satisfaction and support.
During all this time Lord Lytton was in fn«|ii<!iit
communication with Mr. Disraeli and Lord Salisbury
in regard to the affairs of Central Asia and Afghani
stan. The Prime Minister strongly impressed upon
the new Viceroy his opinion that the policy of liuiwia
gave cause for extreme anxiety and walctlifulwHW, and
that it was essential, even at UIR risk of failure tin*
possibility of which could not bo denial, that an
attempt should be made to induce* Hie Amir of Kabul
to enter into more watiafactory rolalioiw with our
Government, or, if such a result proved impracticable,

1876 PREPARATIONS FOR INDIA 29

that he should at least be compelled to show clearly
the attitude which he intended to hold towards
Eussia and towards ourselves. Anything, Mr. Disraeli
thought, was better than the state of absolute uncer-
tainty and suspicion in which our relations with
Afghanistan were involved. This was the conviction
of Lord Lytton himself when he left England.
'Afghanistan,' he wrote a few months afterwards Btnalflghflm
in a confidential letter, * is a State far too weak
and barbarous to remain isolated and wholly unin-
fluenced botween two great military empires such
as England and liussia. The present difference be-
tween the policies of these two empires, as regards
the interests of I he Amir, is that the British
Government sincerely desires to promote his security
abroad and his stability at home. Tt is our policy
to cultivate on our north-western border a strong
bulwark, by aiding Afghanistan to become a power-
ful and prosperous Hiale, provided its power be
friendly to ourselves and Us prosperity in harmony
with that of those other frontier Slates whose wel-
fare and imlcpi'.iuienoe we are resolved to defend
against all aggression. It is our wish to see the
revenues of Afghanistan increased, the authority of
its ruler consolidated, the permanence of his dynasty
established, the pouce, and loyalty of the Amir's
subjoet« assured, the safety of law border guaranteed,
the efficiency of lii,s military force developed, his
independence placed above? all question, on the sole
condition that his loyul friendship and that of his
people for the Hritish Government be equally
indubitable,. Wo do riot covet one inch of his
territory, wo do not desire to diminish one iota of
his independence. Hut we cannot allow him to fall
under the influence of any power whoso interests are

30 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINlflTILVTIOX ni. it

antagonistic to our own, and thereby become llu1
tool of ambitions to which the whole energy of the
British Government will, in case of need, bo mso-
lutely opposed, On the other hand, the Puissiun
Government, although its real policy has not IHM-II
and cannot as yet be openly avowed, desires mid
would gladly effect the disarmament of Afghanistan
and the absorption of the Amir's dominions, r.itlirr
by Russia alone or by Eussia in conjunction with
England, each of the two European powers taking
by previous agreement, its own share of tho spoil.
This object could be best attained by tho assent and
connivance of the British Government, but, failing
that condition of success, its attainment will b<% and
indeed is already being, sought by nwans of admit ly
playing on the hopes and fears of the Amir, and I hi is
establishing a diplomatic influence at Kabul. Tin-
Amir, who appears to be tumbling lutadlonjjf into tho
trap thus skilfully laid for him, under tho illusion
that he is strong enough, or crafty enough, to |>l;iy
off Eussia against England and thereby maintain hi*
equilibrium between them, must now choose vvhirh of
his two powerful neighbours he will rely upon. Hut
one lesson he will have to learn, and that us that if
he does not promptly prove himself our loyal I'rirnd
We shall be obliged to regard him UK our enemy
and treat him accordingly. A tool in thu hands ill1
Eussia I will never allow him to become*. Hiuth ;» ( ool
it would be my duty to break before it could he
used/1

We have seen that Lord Northbrook Fully
recognised, like all his predecessor^ tins paramount,
importance of maintaining tho hulttpemleucu* nf

1 Letter to 0. Qirdloatono, August 27, 1H70, LrUrr*
vol. i. pf>427.

1870 PREPARATION*! FOlt INDIA 31

Afghanistan and of preventing the interference of

Itussia in its aflairs. But -we have also seen that, in

regard to the ways and means for giving effect to

these views, there had been found to be serious

divergence of opinion between the Government of

India and the Ministry at home, In these circum-

stands some embarrassment was felt in drawing for

tho new Viceroy tho instructions which were to define

our future policy in Afghan affairs, and to authorise

his acting upon it. The Prime Minister and Lord

Salisbury, in common with the rest of the Cabinet,

held more decidedly than ever the view — and it was

a view which had the complete concurrence of Lord

LyUon — that, it was urgently necessary that our

relations with Afghanistan should no longer be suffered

to remain in a condition which seemed to them full

of danger. But it was full that it would be neither

expedient nor courteous to issue orders for taking

Hteps to whieJh the weniberw of Lord Norlhbrook's

Council, who would also be Lord Lytlon's Councillors,

had already demurred, and, under the constitution of

the Indian Government, no action could be taken by

the* novernor-General on any instructions from home

until the.y had been communicated to his Council in

the manner prescribed by law. Instead, therefore,

of tin* instructions of HW Majesty's Government bein#

sent, to India in Ihw ordinary way, they were placed

by Ijnnl Salisbury in the hands of Lord Lytton when

hi- Ml Knjihuul, willx permission to choose, his own

time for laying I hum before his colleagues.

The most important passages of these instructions
relating lo Afghanistan will be found in a note at the
end of this chapter.

They nuy ho summarised here as follows :

The (iovermiu'iLl at home considered it of first-

32 LORD LYTTON'S INDJAN AD3VIINISTK VT10X 01. n

class importance to ascertain the true attiliuKof
the Amir towards the Government of Inclin, and us a
means to this end suggested that, after communicating
•with the Amir, a friendly mission, combined, pwhaps,
with one to the Khan of Khelat, should proceed to
Kabul by way of Quettah and Kandahar. In the
event of the Amir refusing to receive such a mission
the Government of India miplit find themselves
obliged to reconsider their whole policy towards
Afghanistan, but there would no longer he any
doubt as to the Amir's estrangement. Hlumld In-,
however, consent to receive it, the fiovcnnncnt
anticipated that certain questions would probably be,
raised upon which the Amir would ask lor more
definite assurances than h:nl ye.l hcttn inailo In hint,
These questions wen? divided under three hewis :
I. A fixed and an^nuMited suhsidy. II. A moh-
decided recognition than has yet been ammied hy
the Government of India to I he order of hiim*sHon
established by tlm Amir in favour of Hie ytnitt^er MHI
Abdullah Jan. III. An explicit pledge hy In-afy
or otherwise of material support in C;IM» of lorei«ftt
aggression.

With regard to the first of these questions (he
Government went prnpantil to leave the Viecmy a
freehand to deal- with il in such a manner as "lite
circumsLances and attitude oi% tlu* Amir
to his judgment.

With regard to tlie second question the (iovem
mentlaid down thai, while they did m>( <|»>irc Mo
renounce their traditional policy of ahslcniinn I'nmi
all unnecessary inUerfeivnce in i'hc intemal ,'iflidis nf
Afghanistan,' tliey yet consith-red iluif Mlic fhink
recognilioji of a //« j\t\tt* order in the succession
established by a cto/wfo (Government to the ihn»ne

1876 CONVERSATION WJTI] COUNT HHOUVALOW 33

of a foreign State ' did not * imply or necessitate auy
interference in the internal affairs of that State.9

With regard to the third question : c An explicit
pledge by treaty or otherwise of material support in
case of foreign aggression/ the Government,, while
admitting that Lord Northbrook's declaration in 1875
would justify the Amir in expecting support should
liis kingdom be subjected to unprovoked foreign ag-
gression, yet commented upon the fact that it was
iiewri heless too ambiguous to satisfy the Amir. They
therefore promised to support the Viceroy should he
find ilneofissary to make more definite declarations on
Ihis head, only reserving their right of judgment as to
the finiiunatances involving the obligation of material
assistance in sonifi dear case of unprovoked aggression.
Thcsu instructions are remarkable for two things.
"First, lor the latitude and freedom they leave to the
Viowoy ; secondly, for the manifest desire revealed
in (.hum to Karniru the friendship and good will of
thu Amir if by any means such a result were still
attainable.

A fci\v days before* Lord Lytton left London he
paid a visit to (fount Shouvalow, in accordance with
1he wish th« ambassador had expressed to him.
The conversation that followed was remarkable. It
was opcmodliy Count Shouvalow,* who informed Lord
Lytton that ho had made to Her Majesty's Govern-
ment, through Lord Derby, the proposal that some
puriiiammt moans of direct and confidential com-
imiiiiralioii Hhoulcl be established- between the
ItiiHBinu military forces in Central Asia and the
Virwoy of India. lie said that the Cabinet of St.
IH<'rsUiir# was seriously alarmed, by the critical
rendition of its rotations with England in regard
to ( Vntral Aflian affairs, that tlie Emperor was most

D

34 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION en, ir

anxious to keep on good terms with us, and to
restrain the greed of territory evinced by his military
officers, and it was in the hope of avoiding futnrn
misunderstandings that the Eussian Government had
made the present suggestion. Count Shouvalow had
already spoken privately to Lord Lytton on (his
subject, and had suggested to him that such com-
munications might conveniently be comnuuicvd
through a special agent accredited on a coniplimcu
tary mission to the new Viceroy by General Kaufnuinn.
Lord Lytton had replied that, so far as the accep-
tance or refusal of the proposal depended njion
himself, he at once declined it on the ground thai,
a mission from Tashkend could not reach (.'alrulfa
without passing through Afghanistan or Khclal..
Count Shouvalow had sent to Prince Gorlrhakow ;t
report of this conversation, and he now road to Lonl
Lytton the reply of the Eussiau Chancellor, aiul a
confidential letter from General Kaufiunim to flu-
Eussian Minister of War. The Chancellor's rlt»Kp;ii rh
authorised Count Shouvalow to assure Lord hyilon
thatEussia had no desire to approach Af»'htinislan
from any direction, and, least of all, by way ol' Mi TV.
Should her military forces, lie said, be unavoidalih
obliged to occupy Merv, their occupation would in
any case be only temporary. He aellocl iluii fhi»
Eussian occupation of Merv, or of any oihrr |»MS|,
equally close to the frontiers of Afghanistan, n-ally
depended less upon the Government of Russia iliaii
upon the Government of India, The* 'IVkki' trilii-,
which acknowledged the authority and claimi'il ihi*
protection of the Oxar, was ocmlinually harussnl
by Turkomans, whom the army of the t-aspian \\;IH
continually obliged to pursue and punish, Tin-*,'
marauders, when captured, always averred lhat thi'V

187ti CONVERSATION WITH COUNT SHOUVALOW 35

had been instigated to acts of hostility against the
Tekkes by the Turkoman tribes on the Afghan,
frontier and presumably under the influence of the
Amir of Kabul. Herein, the Chancellor wrote, lay
the increasing danger of the situation, and that
danger could only be averted by a more active and
friendly exercise of the paramount authority which
the Government of India must by this time have
acquired over the Amir of Kabul, whom it openly
pays and protects. It was, in short, for the Govern-
ment of India to command and compel its acknow-
ledged jwrtA/f, the Amir, to keep these troublesome
Turkomans quiet, and Merv would then be safe from
Russian occupation. The despatch concluded by
pointing out how the policy thus commended to the
('.oiiKidcratiiou of the Government of India might be
I'iirtililatud by the, ('.stabliwhment of direct communica-
tions will i (faiiGrul KsLiifmanu, and Count Hhouvaknv
\viw iiiAfrurtcrl to obtain the acquiescence of Her
Majesty's (iovcrumcuil in arrangements for that
purpose*. Th« umbiiHHiidor then read to Lord Lytton
the letter from General Kaufmann in which this
propoHaL appeared to have had its origin. It began
with a complaint that while the Russians in Central
Asia had novctr, du momst mfflnment, clone anything
to cmhurniHK or annoy England, the English Govern-
ment in India had boon sending arms and military
inKlruf'.tora to Yarkancl, with the deliberate purpose
ot' i-nabUiitf Ytiknb B<?g to be aggressive to Kuasia.
England ;uul ItuSNiu, General Kaufmaun said, *i ,mt/
fama ufiriut, hud iu Central Asia a coiunion intprest
and a common fin-. The irittireat was civilisation,
tluj fo(j was IfllamiHiu. The only rcjal danger wliich
thre;ilcn<ul Uus Hritish powor in India was Islamism.
Every otlior waw a bugbear, but this woultf, ere

36 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION en. n

long, reveal its formidable reality. The wise policy,
therefore, would be an alliance between England
and Kassia; the Government of India should aid
Eussia cordially and openly in effecting, as soon as
possible, the disarmament of Afghanistan and of the
Mohammedan populations of all the States interven-
ing between India and the liussian possessions in
Central Asia, and the division of those territories
between the two powers. The knowledge that there
existed between Itussia and England a complete
understanding, for this avowed purpose,, would suffice*
to render powerless the known disaffection of our
Mohammedan subjects in India, and should they
afterwards give us any trouble we should, at. least,
have close at hand, upon our North-Western Frontier,
a powerful and friendly Christian empires upon
whose prompt, co-operation we could at all times rely
for the suppression of revolt. Unfortunately, instead
of embracing the opportunities still open to il for
the prosecution of this great defensive policy, the
Government of India had hitherto been endeavouring1
in an underhand way to exclude Itussiau influence
from the frontier States, and to strengthen those
States against what was called Russian aggressioTi.
The fear of such aggression was caused by u mis-
conception of the whole situation, which direct com-
munications between Tashkeud and Calcutta would,
General Kaufmann trusted, suffice to rectify.
Animated by these convictions, he luul already
prepared a complimentary letter to the new Viceroy,
which ho proposed to despatch through Afghanistan to
the care of Sher AU Khan, with instructions to the
Amir of Kabul to forward it immediately to 1'cisluiwur,
so that Lord Lytton might find it at Calcutta on his
tirriv&l. Hut lie refrained from sending tlu1 letter

1876 CONVERSATION WITH COUNT SHOUVALQV 37

until he had ascertained, through the Russian
ambassador in London, how it would be received
by the Viceroy.

This letter from General Kaufmann was written
in Eussian, and Count Shouvalow translated it into
French as he read it to Lord Lytton, without
apparently suppressing any part of it. After hearing
the letter. Lord Lytton asked what were the means
at the disposal of General Kaufmann for sending a
letter to Mher Ali Khan, and what were his guarantees
for the Amir's obedience to his instructions. The
ambassador, who seemed a little embarrassed by the
question, replied : e I suppose that we must have, just
as you have, safe and easy means of private com-
munication with fcJhor Ali. But I don't know what
they are. That is Kaufmunn's affair.'

Count Bhonvalow then admitted that there was
no foundation for the statement tluit military support
had been {riven by the Government of India to
Yakut) Bog, and he laid groat stress upon the fact
that this absurd fiction had been seriously believed
at St. Petersburg as proving the importance of
the proposal for establishing direct communication
between General Kaufmann and the Viceroy. In
replying to these communications, Lord Lytton said
that as the ambassador wished for a frank statement
of his views IK* would state frankly that the British
Government would tolerate no attempt on the part
of General Knufmann to obtain an influence in
Afghanistan or in any of our frontier States, and that
we should absolutely refuse to co-operate with llusuhi
iu any wili-Mohammedan crusade such as that
which had boon suggested. We regarded, ho. said,
Afghanistan and BoloochLstanas the porches of British
India; we. should defend them with all our "power

38 LOBD LYrTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION en. n

against aggression by any foreign State; we would
never knowingly allow Eussia to enter into any
relations with those States which might have* the
effect of undermining our influence over their rulers
or their people, and would never become a party to
any injury to our Mohammedan allies or subjects.
General Kaufmann's proposed communications vrillx
the Viceroy of India could only be carried on through
Afghanistan, a territory with which Eussia had HO
right to interfere, and they were therefore inadmis-
sible and unwarrantable. To this Count. Hhouvulow
replied that General Kaufmaim was no politician,
that he was an honest soldier without political iiiuaH,
whose views must not be taken <tu w'rirt//.*1, or ron-
founded with those of the .Russian (Government,
and that he accepted without reserve, hi regard to
Afghanistan, the position us Lord LyUon had de-
fined it.

Although the ambassador thus disclaimed
sympathy with the policy advocated l>y (icncral
Kaufmaim, and only gave, on behalf of hu Govern-
ment,, approval to the suggestion that uroam of
communication might with advantage b«
between the Viceroy of India and the* Russian
authorities in Central Asia, this interview lufl on the
mind of Lord Lylton the couviction tliat linssin was
desirous of coming to an unclerataiuliijjfwi1.il Kt
which would have led to the absorption of lint
intervening between the British and Iluwsian pos-
sessions, to the partition of Afghanistan, and llic
establishment of a common frontier between the two
empires. His belief was strengthened BOO \ after vv a r<ls
by the publication, doubtless with the authority or
sanction of the Eussiau GoveriuncuiL, of an artiele
in tiitf 'Golos' containing the substance of (jc'iicral

1876 CONVERSATION WITH COUNT SHOUVALOW 39

Kaufmann's letter to the Minister of War. There
can now be no question that this opinion of Lord
Lytton was correct. It had become a fixed idea
with Eussian statesmen that in the interests of their
country the most satisfactory result that could be
arrived at in Central Asia would be one which
brought their borders into immediate contact with
our own. Nor is this view confined to those who
entertain ambitious expectations of future advances
upon India ; it is held equally by men who desire that
all existing causes of difference between Eussia and
England should be removed. Lord Lytton's com-
munications with Count Shouvalow completely satis-
fied him on another point, in regard to which his
conclusion received afterwards ample confirmation.
They wero thus described by him in a confidential
paper written immediately after his final interview
with the ambassador:

'The ltussian Government has established those TO Lord
means i if direct, convenient, and safe communication Fob.8 afla
which Hher Ali refuses to us, and which we are
afraid of proposing to him, although we openly
subsidise His Highness. At the same time the
KiiBtiisui Chancellor holds us responsible, as a matter
of courses for the exercise of an authority over the
Amir ivhir.li we neither possess nor know how to
acquire*. The Russian General confidentially avows
his object to be the disarmament of Afghanistan, yet
he has Acquired such influence at Kabul that he can
not only communicate with Sher Ali Khan whenever
he pluauea, but also reckon with confidence upon the
Amir's obedience to his instructions. England openly
declares her object to be the prosperity and indepen-
dence of Afghanistan, and for the furtherance of that
object she subsidises its ruler ; yet she has s& little

40 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ni a

influence at Kabul that she cannot induce Slier All
to receive an agent from her Viceroy, or tolerate Hie
passage of a British officer through his territories.
Comment on these facts is, I think, superfluous. I
cannot conceive a situation more fundamentally fulfil*
or more imminently perilous than the OIIB \vhieh they
reveal.'

Count Shouvalow had, as he staled to Lord LyU rm,
made to Lord Derby the proposal to establish direct
means of correspondence between the I Russian
authorities in Central Asia arid the Viceroy hi Iwliu.
The views of our Government agreed with those of
Lord Lytton, and the proposal was de<:lim;<l. These,
communiojilious were on both sides verbal only.
They took no official form and worn not. oflieially
rcwordud.

On March 1, 187(1, Lord Lytton left, Knghmd with
Lady Lyltou and their young daughters. Colonel
(afterwards Sir Owen) Humo aci'ompanii'fi him as
private secrcitary, an olficor of w«H tried ahilily and
Indian knowledge, who had servwl Ijonl Mayo in
the same capacity. Colonel Collcty, the hrilliiinl and
accomplished soldier who afterwards, tus hi.s eounlry
men bitterly reiuemlxer, found in Africa an unlmppy
death, was his military Hucsrotary; and ninoii^ \lw
other offir.cirs of his suite wus Hir Lcnvis Pelly, (<> whom
'Lord Lyltouhad dctterminc'd 1.o utitnmt, the fluty ui
conducting the nngoliatiouK wltidh he hnpud to f»pen
with the Amir of Afghanistan.

Egyptian affairs wtsro at this time in a ••rilie.'il
condition, the Khodiva \vaw on tho v(*r^<* of hank
ruptciy, and the Fre.iujh and Kngliwh Movernin*-nts
were diseussinji; tlio moasures to lw taken for pre
venting a probable oiittiHtroplw. Lord I.ytluu
retuaiUed in Taris for a few daya. lie luul

187*) JOl'lWKV TO IN1UA 41

friends and acquaintances amonj*' French statesmen,
and some of his conversations with them wen*,
extremely interesting to him. One observation made
lo him by Thiers deserves to IMJ repeated, for it shows
the foresight of one* of tins keenest, intellects of France
in regard to a transaction, which has had, and will
have in the future, no small political and financial
importune*'. Tin- purchase, of the Sue*/ f Vuml shares
by Mr. I Israeli's Government* had just b«en an-
nounced, and Tliiers said to Lord Lytton that hu
looked upon this as the cleverest tiling ever done by
an Knju'lish Minister, and that he envied the statesman
who had done it.

I'Yom Paris Lord Lytton travelled to Naples,
when* II.M.W. OriwIt'N was waiting to take, him to
Horn hay. He lialletl for a day at Bologna, and met
then* Sir Louis Mallet, who \\as on his way back
from I -aleutlJi, where lie had *»onc on a spectial mission
from the India OlHoe with the object of disriussintj;
with Lord Northhrook and his (iovernment fhc
question, which was (occiiin^ ininih iutnrcst in this
<u>nn1ry, of the duties levied in India on Knglish
cotton manufactures. There was no higher aul.hority
on economical subjects than Sir Louis Mallet, and
Lord Lytlon was {{lad of the opportunity to hear
from him his views on the trade :m<i customs tariff
and taxation of India, and OIL other questions of
financial and economical importance.

On March 21 Lord Lytton landed at Alexandria.
He \\vnt on at oune, to Cairo, where- he had an
interview with Ismail Pasha, the Khedive, then in
the midst of the fmanc.inl diflk'ulties which after-
wards led to his deposition, lu a letter writ-Urn at
this time to Lord Derby, lu* expressed in strong
turms this conviction, which all that he luul

42 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. ji

in Paris and in Cairo on this subject had im-
pressed upon him, that if we did nut immediately
take into our own hands the settlement of the
financial situation in Egypt our political hold upon
that country might perhaps be swiftly and irre-
trievably lost, with serious consequence's to us in
India.

impressions To his great regret only two days could be spared
of Cairo JOT Qa'r0j an^ there was litlle time for anything
but business. Western civilisation had been rapidly
carrying out in Egypt its beneficial and unsightly
work, but in 1876 Cairo was still nnc* of the most
characteristic and picturesque of oriental rities, and
the glimpses of its monument.*!, its streets, and its
people which Lord Lyttou was able to obtain filled
him with admiration. They were, the wore <h*li«/hl ful
because they foreshadowed to his minimal ion Uie
scenes that India was soon to show to him. lie fold
in his letters to England how charmed he had been
with the grace of gesture and the, dignity of tin* Arab
population, their flowing garments and Ktntuesijue
draperies, the rich colouring that uverywheiv wet
the eye, and the beauty and picturesi|m'ness of the
architecture, One corner of the jjreal. liaxiiar
especially delighted him, with *il« dim jrlow of
infinitely varied Imt harmonious colours, in the noon
light of an oriental Him solemn I by tint mellow
shade of fantastic awnings, while through tin* narrow
street, in front of the liMJte Moorish court where
• the carpet merchants sprcsad their w;mis, a quaint
crowd of men and women, in every variety of
costume, was escorting with llutcts and trumpets an
Arab Sheikh, who had just returned in triumph from
the pilgrimage to Mecca with the dignity of u I Iwlji,'
At* Suez interest of another sort awaited Lord

1876 JOURNEY TO INDIA 43

Lytton. M. de Lesseps was there to receive him
and to show him parts of the canal. He descanted
eloquently on a project of his own for establishing,
in the interests of peace and civilisation, railway
communication between India and the Eussian
possessions in Central Asia. The intervening countries
were to be divided between the two powers, and their
barbarous inhabitants, Afghans and the rest, were,
faute de mieux, to be swept away. He had been
speaking about this project, M. de Lesseps said, to
the Grand Duke Alexis of Eussia, who was then in
Egypt, and he had highly approved of it. The
scheme, Lord Lytton wrote, was 'the industrial
development of Kaufmann's recommendations.'

On the day after his arrival at Suez he met the Description of
Prince of Wales, who was returning from his visit to
India on the Serapis, and Lord Lytton was interested
in hearing from him and from the officers who
accompanied him the impressions they had formed
on a multitude of Indian subjects. The ship itself
was a striking object, a floating western palace
laden with the products of the East. 'As Noah's
Ark,' Lord Lytton wrote, 'was supposed by the
Eabbis to be a type of the whole world, the Serapis
may be regarded as a sort of picturesque epitome
of the Indian empire. But the two finest specimens
of Indian produce are human ones, a Sikh and an
Afghan, native officers of Probyn's Horse, who are
coming, for the first time of course, to England with
the Prince. They are fine soldier-like fellows, who
look as if they might have been born sword in hand
and cradled in a military saddle. I had a pleasant
thrill of patriotic pride, however, in comparing their
appearance with that of their General, Probyn, as he
stood before them in full uniform. You felt that the

44 I-ORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. n

Englishman was the finest man of the three, fitted in
all respects to command these stalwart men, not only
par droit de wntjMte, but also par droit de naismnce?
SirBartie Among the Prince'^ suite was Sir Rartle Frcrij.

He had much to say that was deeply interesting to
Lord Lytton, and he gave to him important papers
containing his views on some of the questions with
which the Government of India would soon have to
deal.

No man living possessed a more intimate know-
ledge of the questions connected with our relations
with Afghanistan and the other exmntries beyond the
north-western frontiers of India, and with the pro-
gress of Russia in Central Asia than Sir Bart.le Krere.
Not long before he met Lord Lybton he ha<l visited
the I'tmjal) and IVgliawur, and ho had r,ome away
with a strong (xmviutiun that our relations with
Sher Ali wore in the highest dtiprco unsa(isliL(*,lor\\
Personal observation and (lommiiiiiralion with tin*
most cjxpCiriejK'Cid ofl'uuirs of Uu* Indian Government
had entirely confirmed (ho wmdu.sions wlii^lt las I
have shown) hu liad pl'uunl on nse.onl in the previous
year. Tic was Hpeeially impressed with Uw lac-!, llial
even the ofltaurs through whom all diplomalir: <§oiTC4«
spondence with th<* Amir WOK Carried <m wt-re
completely ignorant of his ie.elin^H and wishes and
intentions, and had no means of obtaining informal ion
ou which reliance <iould bit planed. We went follow
ing, Sir Bartle.Frcre, Haiti, * a blind man's bufT system,'
and, while he ;uimit.led that it was impossihle to
Hpoak with any cert-uiuty, he, impressed upon Lord
Lytlou his own belief that the. Amir was in his In»art
l)itterly hostile, that it w;ts :i matter of urgent
neciessity thai- steps should be. takuit to efllal>lis!t ;L
1) titter- understanding and, if that, should prove

fK7tj JOUUXKV TD INDIA 45

impracticable, that we should at least satisfy our-
selves that we understood the fads with which we
hail to deal.

While he was at Lahore Sir ttartle Prere had
described, in a letter to Lord Salisbury, the measures
which he thought should be adopted. This letter
had not reached Kn^lnnd before Lord Lytton's
departure, and when Lord Lytton saw it he was
y really struck with the virtually complete identity of
the < (mansions of Sir Harlle Froro with those which
ha luid himself independently formal, and which had
been adopted in the iiiKlrurtions which he was taking
with him to India. 'There is,1 lie wrote, 'something
positively startling in the almost exact coincidence
of Kir Hurtle Krcjre's opinions with thoae which,
before leaving Kn^land, I put on paper confidentially
lor fXJuninatioiL l>y Lord ftiliHlmry and Mr- Disraeli,
who mtirt'ly coni'iirrcd with them.'

'Tin' objects/ Sir Hartle Knire wrote, cwhie,h

Her Msyi'Hl.yrK({ov<iriniienl have in vie\v are not to

(juarn*! with ttie. Amir of Kabul, but to be on the

best possible terms with him, using the Afghans as

a butter to avoid immediate contact betwecm our

frontier and that* of Russia as lon^ au possible, and

to prevent throwing on to the UUHHIHU side in

( Vntral Asiatu*. politico «urli near ncsi^hlMiurH of our

o\\n. * . . 1 would intimate lo the Amir that the

YiriTny's a*rent was (Jiar«/<»il with fominl nrefle.utials,

:ift«-r «l«*livt*rin^ which he would communicate the

Yii'iToy's viewK OH several important matters, and 1

would invite the. Amir to name* any time and place

for jfivmjjt an audie/ice !-<> the Kuvoy which would be

ugriTabfo lo him. If he re8ponde,<! cordially 1 would

not mind Home delay in arran^in^ the limiting. 1

would not hurry or show much anxmty about- it, but

46 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMIN JSTK ATI OX ru. 11

would consult the Amir's convenience and maku
Afghanistan allowance for his many difficulties with his o\vu
people and fanatical advisers, as well as with

influence, which will certainly be exerted to prevent
any greater intimacy in his relations with us. If, on
the other hand, the Amir showed obvious HIJJMS of
disinclination to improve his relations, I would luk**
it as clear proof that hostile influent ws hail worked
more effectually than we now suppose, thai it vv;is
useless to attempt to coax or cajole him info a i«<n«>r
frame of mind, that we must look for alliamv and
influence elsewhere than at Kabul, and must M»rk
them in Khelat, at Kandahar, at Ifaral, and in
Persia, and I would lose no time in looking out for
them. ... It is clear from the records thnt, up tn
a very late period, the anxiety of the* laic Amir and
his son to be on better terms, and mons <:lom*Iy allied
to us and our fortunes in India against, all I'IHIM-IS
from the north and west, was very marked. It i,>,
however, unfortunately equally true, that there 1m* of
late been a marked change in tho (Imposition of rh,.
reigning Amir in this respect. What is the (.X|,.nt
and what the cause of the chaii^n. Js not HKU-,
Whether the Amir has become convinwi that im has
more to hope for or fear from the UuwianM tlian from
us ; whether he believes we are in ,S<<<TK Wirm* w iih
the Eussians to divide liis khwlom, a i-omnion J^lit^f
m the bazaars of India BIIUW tlio iwirriajfi- of i|M.
Duke of Edinburgh; whether h<» is an-rv rtf our
contuiued refusal to pledge oamdvcw to simnort J,in
chosen heir ^whether ho is sulky at the- Hiimllniw ,.r
alarmed at the magnitude of our lab* tfitts, or ivallv
fears the fanaticism of hw own Mii>iJ<«ctN ; ;ill i],,^,
are guesses with more or 1m, to supporl I|H.,MI 1>uf
they are only guesses on a poinl, nwmliiw W|,i4,j,

lH7ti JOUltXJSY TO INDIA 47

cortainty is attainable atul of the highest importance.
The Envoy who is usually sent by the Amir to
communicate.' with thp. Commissioner at Peshawar
made use of a significant proverb which indicated
his view of the cause. It was to the effect that " the
cat uiul clog only ceases spitting and snarling when
they hear the* wolf at the door/' Hut as both know
that the, wolf is there this dons not account for the
cat still refusing to be friends with the dojr, unless
she thinks kersuif likely to be safer as tho ally of th«
wolf. Hut before, seeking from the Amir any diroctt
explanation of his rhsin^ed attitude towards us, I
would instruct thu Knvuy Lo lay before the Amir a
pftrfe.d-ly frank aucl full explanation of the English
vittw of thu present, situation. It is worses tiian use-
lass to tell him, .'is \vv havu so often told him before,
that, the llussims are our jLfond iriitiuls and have, no
de,si#iiK heyoiul llir proltteLion of their own frontier
and the. exh'nsion of eiviliKation and commerces; Iliad
we an* nod in I lie least disturbed by t.he,ir advances
and are prepared in cooperate with them in pro-
moling an era of peaw and goodwill. The Amir
knows that all this is humimfr, and that wo know it to
IK* so; that theltusxians are our friends as long UH \v«
leaves them to puwue their Hehemtts of cxnujueHt
uiK'hallenjfed aiul no longer; that they an* essen-
tially a i'oniiui*rwjj and ajr^ressive nation, and will
cou<|u*'r in our din»e,Uon unless t.Ii«ey niv convinced
Htat wr shall uetively (»ppose tlu'm; Ihnt wo and
our Indian HiihjeetK are grievously clisturbed by their
advances, thnt \ve wish fheiti no nonrer but havts
hitherto Ix'i'n afraid lt» say HO openly, or in any manner
that would plf<!«je, us to ohs«'rv<% them opitnly.'

There is one paragraph in this pap<tr which rails
for coniiiufnl, v If,' it says, l the* Amir showed aigny

48 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADM1NIRTJKATFON ni n

of disinclination to improve his relations, I would take
it as clear proof that hostile influences had worked
more effectually than we now suppose ; thai it was
useless to attempt to coax or cajole him into n better
frame of mind ; that we must look for alliance and
influence elsewhere than at Kabul, and must wtk t/wtH
in Khdat, at Kandahar^ at Herat, and in TfymVf, <uul
T would lose no time iu looking out for t/uiui.'

The biographer of this eminent Indian statesman
has taken upon himself to say that, e had JYere jaoiu*
to India as Viceroy in 187(5 ' ho would in all humziu
probability have converted Shpr All to tlio English
alliance, and thus prevented war. Lt. is, on the con-
trary, clear from the words quoted above, that had
Hit Jlartle JVere }>een able to carry out them views in
187G9 he would *iu all human probability' have
brought about the war of 1878 much earlier. To
have taken steps leading towards the disin ton-ration
of Afghanistan, by seeking alliances in (how* parts of
the Amir's kingdom known to bo mosl disuflected,
and with neighbouring States whose power might he
turned against him, before the Itussians hrul made
the false move of sending a mission to Kabul, and
while they still seemed to IK* on the eve of war with
England, could hardly have failed to throw the Amir
into their arms. And they might, then have assisted
him more effectively than afterwards, when, having
accomplished his alienation from the* British (iovern*
ment, they left him in thu lurch.
Arrival at On April 7 the; OruntM reached Bombay. * The

Bombay ^^ pjC||UreBqUe tif)WU J ],av(t (,V(,r mm^ (^jKM,jul|v

as regards its population,' Lord Lylton \vi-olx*. He
proceeded in oasy stages towards (Hal(uitta. At
Allahabad ho had an int^rviciw with Sir dohn
Strachey, then IjicHitcnanU-lovtirnor of the Korih-

1876 ARRIVAL IN INDIA 49

West Provinces. Their understanding and mutual
appreciation of each other dates from that iiitei'-
view, when Lord Lytton found that they agreed
upon every financial question, and subsequently he
was able to persuade Sir John Strachey to consent
to give up his Governorship and accept the post
of Financial Minister on the Indian Council at the
retirement of the then Minister, Sir William Muir.

Lady Lytton and her children left the Viceroy at
Allahabad and went straight to Simla on account of
the heat.

Lord Lytton reached Calcutta on April 1U, an<l
was there received at Government House by Lord
Northbrook. The out-going Viceroy led his suc-
cessor into the Council Chamber where the Members
of Council assembled. The officiating Home Secre-
tary read the 1 loyal Warrant of appointment and
Lord LyUou then made a short speech.

"It was not without coiuridurable hesitation/ ho
writes to Lord Salisbury, * that I decided at the last
mnmunt on breaking tli« customary rule of fiileuw
on such occasions by at once addressing to the
Council] in presence of the public a short speech.

* Frtrni day to day and hour to hour I found as I
approached Calcutta that the spirit of auticipativo
antagonism to the new Viceroy was so strong on tLw
part of the Council here that any appearance, of
scolding or lecturing them at starting would hnve
IKWTI fatal to our future relations. The choice, tliwe-
fore, lay hulwucn saying nothing, or saying something
studiously sedative to the quills of these fretful
porcupines ; and on reaching Allahabad I had fully
made up my mind to say nothing. My intention
was changed by Slrachey.9

Of the uffiust made on the audience by the speech

ll

50 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. n

Colonel Colley wrote to Lady Lytton. ' I confess I
had hoped he would not speak, for it is one of tin*
occasions when it is so difficult to avoid platitudes
on one side or saying too much on the other, and I
have hardly ever before heard that kind of atldross
without wishing half of it unsaid. But now I mn
very glad he did speak and that I was there to hear
him, and only wish you had been too. I hud 7io(
realised either the power or the modulation of his
voice before, nor, though I was prepared for beaul iful
language, was I quite prepared for such perffi't ;in<i
easy command. But it was the simple* carm'stm'ss
which carried home more tlian anything else*, ami
there was a sort of holding of the breath in tin* room
at some parts.

4 1 cannot but think that that speech will lu-lp him
greatly in his start ; that the general impimsion \M»S
much the same as mine I gather from the* remark* I
heard around me. A stranger standing near m<» I
heard say : " That was a treat indoed worth rominjr
to hear.'"

The intercourse between Lord Lytton and Lord
Northbrook was of the friendliest churur.Lcr.
TO Lady eLord Northbrook has been to me most kiwi,

Apriiie, 1876 frank, and friendly,' writes Lord Lytton, ' and we purl i*d
from each other not altogether without emotion/

The new Viceroy was now left tonu'ttt hisOonncil
alone. He was not well, the heat allec.Uid hint, and
he suffered from constant headache and mmwu. H«*
confided to his wife that he felt, as if hi* wttro
living under the weight of an increuHiiifr nightmans
and oppressed by a sense of forlornnuHa, isolation,
and discouragement.

Nothing, however, of this mood appeared in his
relations with those who now surrounded him.

1876 FIKST I>AYS IN INDIA 51

The improvement of our relations with Afghani-
stan was the ftrst matter of importance to which
Lord Lytton directed his attention after his arrival
in Calcutta, lie had anticipated much difficulty in
obtaining the support of his Council to the measures
which in the first instance he desired to take, but
his fears proved to be unfounded. For the reasons
thai have already been explained, he did not produce
the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, and
he had no difliculty in obtaining the assent of the
Council to the opinion that the appointment of a new
Viceroy and the proposed assumption by the Queen of
an imperial title which would proclaim unmistakably
to the Eastern world the fact of her supremacy
over the whole of India, afforded a favourable occa-
sion for endeavouring to re-open friendly communi-
cai-ions with the Amir of Kabul. The Comniander-
in-Ohicf, Kir Frederick Ilaines, had come to Calcutta
for this express purpose of giving Lord Lyltou his
support. He. was in complete accord., in regard to
this Afghan question, with his predecessor, that
c/Mr</Krr MM* jwnr et MUM ivfrndm, Lord Napier of
Magdala, who, when he was leaving India, had
written to Lord Lytton expressing in strong terms
his conviction that our position towards Afghanistan
was 'unsafe ami humiliating/ and that measures
ought no longer to be delayed for improving it.

The instructions of the Home Government had left
to Lord Lytton complete discretion in regard to the
mam&ur in which communications should be opened
with Slier All. The suggestion that a mission to the
Amir might perhaps be combined with one to the
Khan of Khelat, and proceed to Kabul by way of
Quetiah and Kandahar, could not be acted upon,
because an officer had been sent by the Government

52 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. n

of Lord Northbrook on a special mission to the Khan
a few days before the arrival of Lord Lytton in
India.1 The adoption of the further suggestion that
it would be desirable, in the first instance, to
communicate with the Amir through the Commis-
sioner of Peshawur seemed, however, open to no
objection. There could be no difference of opinion
in regard to the importance of improving our
relations with Bher Ali, and the members of Council
gave their unanimous consent to Lord Lytton's
proposal that while no letter should be sent by the
Viceroy himself, a less formal communication should
be made to the Amir by the Commissioner, telling
him that it was proposed to send either to Kabul or
to any other place which he might prt-for a BperJul
mission to announce to him the rcccml awession of
the Viceroy to office, and the assumption by the
Queen of the title of Empress of India, ami usmiring
him of the friendly disposition of the British Govern-
ment. The risk would thus be avoided of any em-
barrassing refusal on the part of {flier Ali to rcscwivu
the mission, a contingency which could not bn ignored
while his attitude towards UK was so little, satisfactory.
The mission thus proposed diJlbivd to some*
extent in its character from that contemplated in
the instructions of the Secretary of Hlalu, and was
more restricted in its immediate aim. It was not
only ostensibly but essentially c one of compliment
and courtesy.1 The primary object was tht* esta-
blishment of more friendly relations and tli« removal
of the feelings of anger and distrust wh'wh the* Amir

1 It was novortholoflfl aHHortcd by Lord Lytttm'H upjioncmlH in
England that tho negotiation* with tho Khan of Kholat ami tho HiKniiriK
of the Treaty ut Jucobabad wore* bo#un and curriiul out by him for
tho express puipoHo of irritating tho Amir of Kabul, anil forcing him into
an attitude of open hostility.

1870 FIRST NEGOTIATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 53

appeared to entertain. The mission might at least, it
was lioped,if nothingelse were gained, prepare the way
for future negotiations, and be the first step towards
a settlement of existing difficulties Lord Lytton did
not wish that any question likely to he unpleasant to
the Amir should be raised at all. It was only in the
event of the Amir receiving the Envoy with cordiality,
and showing an apparently sincere desire to improve
his relations with us, tha,t any subject of political
importance* need be discussed. It was possible that
in th« course of amicable communications the real
wishes of the Amir miyht be ascertained, but the
Mnvoy would volunteer no proposals on behalf of our

A few days lifter this decision had been arrived
at, Lord Lytton left, Calcutta for Northern India, and
on April 24 h(» mot tlui Commissioner of "Peshawar,
Sir i!ieli;ird Volloc-k, at Uml>alla, and gave to him the
draft of Uio Mter which was to ho Rent to the Amir.
A Mohammedan ollic:er, Itcssahlar-Major Khanan
Khan, Ai(l(Hl<- ramp to tlus Viooroy, was chosen to
rarry tlu^ ( V)mniissioiuir''s letter to Kabul. The letter First letter in
ww'to til*? ellect that the Coimnissioner desired to
:w'(i»amt Iho Amir that Lord Lytton had assumed
the Vinsroyalty of India, that 6TIis Excellency had
inquired very cordially after the Amir's health and
welfare and that ofllm Highness Abdnllali Jmu1 and
that it. was llu* Vicoro/K intention, as noon as the
neri'HHury arran^vnuints could )jo made, to depute
Kir Lewis iVlly to him as special Envoy. (Sir
Ix'wiH Pclly (ll«* l<rf-U«r stud) will ho accompanied
by Dr. Itelfnw and Major St. John, for the purpose of
delivering to your Highness in person at Khureeta,
a lett«r infonnhiK your llighncwH of His Excellency's
acx*eBtiioii to ollice,and formally atmouncititf to your

54 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINlSTItATJON OH. n

Highness the addition which Her Majesty the Queen
has been pleased to make to her sovereign titles
in respect to her Empire in India. I feel sure that
your Highness will fully reciprocate the friendly
feelings by which the Viceroy's intention is prompted,
and I beg the favour of an intimation of the place at
which it would be most convenient to your Higlnioss
to receive His Excellency's Envoy. Sir Lewis Pully,
who is honoured by the new Viceroy with If is
Excellency's fullest confidence, will be able to discuss
with your Highness matters of common interest to the
two Governments/
Amir j-eceivefl Some delay occurred in consequence of tlw
d May i? wwggfcy, of obtaining from Kabul a wifiMtowlimt for
the Kessaldar, and it was not until May J7 that he
was able to deliver the Commissioner's letter to the
Amir. It was impressed upon him that, he had no
political function of any kind, and thai he had heen
selected simply out of compliment to tlus Amir, as
the bearer of the letter. He was to make it, known,
however, that the proposed mission would be ol
the most friendly character, and that the probable,
result would be one highly favourable to the*. Amir's
interests.

Before the Commissioner's letter reached it a
destination some interesting informal ion rc^anling
the attitude of the Amir was renewed through a
pensioner of the British Government who, in the time
of Dost Mohammed, had taken a prominent part, in
Afghan politics. It strengthened the opinion which
Lord Lytton had formed regarding the feelings of
Slier A]i towards our Government, and rendered him
more doubtful than before of obtaining any satis-
factory reply to the overtures that were heintf marie.
This information was contained in a letter giving an

1876 AFGHANISTAN 55

account, which there was every reason to believe
trustworthy, of a durbar held by the Amir at
Kabul, at which all the principal Sirdars and officers
of the Court and the heads of the principal tribes
were present. A report had been received that an
English army was inarching through the Bolan Pass
with the intention of occupying Kandahar. This the
Amir declared to be perfectly groundless; he said
that Mr. Disraeli, who was then in favour in England
and who had appointed Lord Lytton, was the same
Minister who had previously appointed his true
friend Lord Mayo, that the new Viceroy had brought
with him Lord Mayo's Secretary, and would un-
doubtedly be his friend also. He then ordered the
Court to be cleared; his confidential officers were
alone allowed to remain, and the Amir told them
that he wished to learn their opinions. He said that
he believed that the English Government was
seriously disturbed by the approach of the Russians
towards Merv, and that they wished to send an Envoy
to Kabul or to obtain his consent to the establishment
of a permanent mission at Herat. If this were to
happen he was afraid that he would be involved in
difficulties, and that the Russian Governor-General
at Hamarkaud would declare that he had taken
measures hostile to the interests of Russia. The
Sirdars replied: 'We are in a dilemma which
require* dee]) deliberation to remove. The Amir
should Hoimnon or write to the Govenior of Balkh,
who IH in constant mnnmiimcation witli the Russians
and Will verscid in their affairs, for advice what to
do/ A letter was written to the Governor accord-
ingly. Various report* were then mentioned. One
of them from Bokhara was to the effect that it was
thu common talk in the Kuwsian camps at Samarkand

4

5 6 LOKD LYTTOire INDIAN ADMINISTKATIOX i<n. 11

and other places in Turkestan that the daughter of
the Emperor of Eussia, who was married to an
English Prince, had been offended, and had gone to
her father to complain, and that this had caused a
rupture between the two Powers. After a long
silence the Amir said that an English iwsort had
passed with a kafifa unmolested through thu Nolan
Pass, and that a complaint that the Khybor \va« not
kept similarly safe for trade would next In- made.
He was bewildered, he said, what to do. To this
the Prime Minister, Syud Noor Ahihomod Shah,
replied that so long as intercourse with the- lin^lihh
was prevented, the interests of the Amir and of the
Afghans would flourish and the friendship of lhn
Amir would be eagerly sought by Mie Russians OH
the side of the Oxus and by the English on the, side
of India. 'The lessons/ ho said, 'which had Iwi-n
learned by his frequent missions to tin* Kn<jfILsh
Government in India would never ellan* this im
pression from his heart.1

There can be no question that this df'rlaniliini
summed up very accurately the views of th<* Afghan
Minister. He, it will be renusmlxsrucl, had l«s«*u tlio
Envoy whose fruitless mission to Ixntl Norflilimok
in 1873 is well known. Jle hail rH.urm>il (o Kabul
with feelings anything but friendly to our (iovrrn-
ment, and with the conviction thai, mon* w;is to !«•
feared from Russia than from ountulvti*. Mi* was a
man of no little ability, his influence; was jrn*al, and
his constant hostility to (ho English pnxluml.
without any doubt, a most vinous impn^ion on fin*
suspicious mind of the Amir.
May aa,i87C On May 22 the Amir gave to the Itassaldar his
answer to the Commissioner's letter, and if rt'urhctl
Peshawur on June J, Lt was written in tin* usual

1876 AFGHANISTAN 57

style of oriental verbosity, and was full of the
ordinary commonplaces of politeness, but in sub-
stance it was vague and ambiguous and hardly
courteous. It was virtually a refusal to receive the
proposed mission. It was to the effect that all
questions affecting the two States had been sufficiently
discussed with the Amir's agent in 1873, and in the
correspondence between the Viceroy and Amir that
followed the Simla conferences, and that further
discussion was unnecessary. If, however, there
were any fresh subjects which the British Govern-
ment wished to bring forward, the Amir preferred to
make himself acquainted with them by sending to
the Viceroy a confidential agent of his own.1

On the same day on which tho Amir's letter was
despatched, the British agent, at Kabul sent to the

1 H is not iMuy tn #iv<- wlluir a traiwlation or a nummary of the
oliKeuri' vi'rbiiitfo of thu \niirY, I'urHjnn loiter, Thu following IB the
oiVu'ial litaral vi'nuoii of tho only pur lions of it which havo any im-
portance* :

' lit thi! patiitiiilar of iliu Routing r>P tho Sahibfl for tho purpose of
tiortitm inattisrH of tin* two (ioviiniiufliitH In tltiH, Lhat the Agemt of his
Jrinml formally pi'mmally lurid political pitrloyn tit tho station uf
Himla ; thoHO HiiliJontH, full of advisability 1'ov the exaltation ami
pormammco uf friwidly and political rolutioiw, linvinp; been conHidered
sullioiont nnd flVicu^it, wuro nntoirud iu two Intturn, dututl Thursday,
tho *JlHt of tlio innutli of lliuuxiin tho Kuerctl, hi tho your 1290 of the
Flight of tho I'rophnl,, and ilatod Kritlay, tho ^iul of tho month of
Hufnr tho VitttorioiiH, in tho year l^JI of tho Flight of tho Prophot,
anil Hoed riot l>n ri'iiratod now, L'loaHO God tho Motit High, the
and tint union of tho (Ujd-givnn nttitn of AfghnniRton in
to thti Ktato of lolly authority, tho Majfistie Govommonfc of
will remain Htron^ and iirin iw iiHiinl. At thin timu, if tlicre
ho un,\ now parluyH for thu jiurpnHo of fruHhrnin;* and bonolitting tho
(iotl-tfwu t.lalti of AijL;)iani»Lii.n cntiirtaincd in ihu thon^htH, then let
it bo hintftd, HO thiil. a con lido ntial Atfont of this friond, arriving in
that placi) and licin^ pnwjntod with tho thingH run coal oil in tho
f(t*iHT(>UJ4 heart ol tho Kn^liHli (lovurnnntiifi, Hlionld rr^^al to the
uuppliant at tlw Ihvino Throms in ordnr tliaf/ tho in at torn woi^hoil by
it i nil in to and n\a<'t investigation may bo <toti]initt(id to thn pou of
fiAmiiimuto writing.1 Nttmtfa* uf Mwul» in Afffhtmkltm,

58 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINIHTUATroX ni.n

Commissioner of Peshawur an interesting ammnl of
the consultations that had taken place between the
Amir and his advisers and of hi« reason for
to receive the mission. This account was
valuable, because it was undoubtedly \vril U*n with
the knowledge and approval of the Amir. Thrw
reasons were given. The first was that tlut Amir
could not guarantee the safety of the* Hritish oflittsrs
of the mission. The second reason was that if tin*.
British Envoy 6 should put forth any such weighty
matter of State that it« cmtortaiimiunl by His
Highness, in view of the demands of th<» time, should
prove difficult, and he should verbally nyw.l it, then*
would occur a Lreur.h of thu friendship of flu* I wo
Governments. Aiul then, for the* saki* n|' removing
that breach, it will bu necessary for 1ml h fio\<'W<
ments to endure troubles. It was by n-nitm of tluw
very consideratioriH,, at tlw time of inakin*/ ||M> Jirst
treaty between the English (Jovonnwnt and tin*
State of Kabul, that His TlifrhwsH Hir, 1,-ile Amir
objected to the csoming of ;in Kjin-lish Knvoy <*¥
European race. Moreover, from thai, limi* lo "lliis,
whenever occasions havt^ pn'Kftntcd vlifmm'lvpri tor
the coming of Bahibs, tlio Kabtd ( iovi*nnii«'»t» has
always objected to thorn from farKij/htwlnrsK. Now.
too, the coming or Sahibs, in view of tln< state of
affairs, is not desirable.1

The third reason for refiiHiiip Hue iniHHion wa.s the
most significant of all, and it. wa« umlouhfe<lly that
which had the greatest influence, on thf iIi-riMon
of the Amir. It is lutre riuot<ul in Mbwn from tin-
official translation of the i^nt'H rcp<irt ;

6 To us especially tlus point of Hu«.f i^artl is this
—that if simply, for the «aku of Hfckinj; Ihi*
will of the English Govunmioni., w(* conrnMil. to

AFGHANISTAN 59

of u European agent, and for his safety, let
us suppose, perfect arrangements are made, then
this firenl <liflic,uUy arises, tliat thn coining and going
of the Sahibs cannot be. concealed anyhow from the
"Russian H ov< -rumen t, which on my northern border
is conterminous with the frontier of the English
Government. Tim people of the llussian Govern-
ment an* extremely luarless. If any man of theirs,
by way of Knvoy, or in the name of speaking about
some other matter of State, should suddenly enter the
li-rrilory of Afghanistan, then it would be impossible
by any inifaim to stop him. Tn othfcr words, their
way too would be, opened; and in the, opening of
f liat road there is tuood ni'ithcr to tho Htate of Kabul
nor to tin1 Knglisli (lovcrnnii^it. (VniHctqiU'UtJy iu
tlus uiallor it is bHter thai llic roining and going of
ihc Sahihs Kiiouhl, according 1o the fomuT custom,
rciunin rinsed ; itnil first, thnt sr>mc con(id^u1uil agent
of ours jLfoiufr to flu* Kn^lish <JovcrnTn(*nt, and there
iH'commj/ an|iiainlt*fl with tint Statw r<i(juir(*ments,
should inform UH of \vha1 is in thci luind of the
Knglisli (ioverwucnt; ;iiul flic Kabul Oovfirnment,
courtiilcrinj/ the subject in il« own piano, give answer
to Urn Knglish (Sovernment regarding those objects,
whetlitir wriUeu or verbal. And if our nisui, iu
con \«TSKt i<»n Miens, a-^ree to or refuso any point,
then by nil pretexts the Amir can ,'irriuigft for its
M-iiIfinciil. Itul if in his presence it. devolve on His
to sutnmarily u<!<*.ept or rnjec,t some State
l, Ihw becomes a very hi\n\ matter, mid its
ultimate issue will not (urn out well.'

These communications from Kabul reached the Viceroy re-

MM i , i ' j - i eoivoB oom-

\ iccroy on Juiu* *>. They appeared to luni entirely
to confirm the opinions which hit and Jlcr Majesty's
Uuveruwent had ibniutcl, and to «how very plainly

60 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION on. n

the convictions and intentions of Sher AIL He
summed up his conclusions as follows in a private
TO Lord l^ter to Lord Salisbury: ' First, the Amir is
Salisbury satisfied that there is nothing more to be got out of
us ; second, that there is not much to be feared
from us. He is also under an impression that if we
are not positively pledged to passivity by some
understanding with Eussia, we are at least mortally
afraid of coming into collision with her by more
actively supporting him. He consequently looks
upon his northern neighbours as the more formidable
of the two. He argues that if we are obliged to
propitiate Eussia, a fortiori he must do so, and that
his only safe policy for the present is to treat, us both
as Penelope treated the suitors. Hut, as ho believes
us to be the most scrupulous and least offensive of
his two awkward customers, it is England that he is
least afraid of offending. The Government of a great
empire which, in a matter closely (Concerning its own
interests, suffers itself to be with impunity addressed
by a weak barbarian chief who is under accumu-
lated obligations to its protection and forbearance
in terms of contemptuous disregard, cannot be sur-
prised if its self-respect and powers of self-assertion
are under-rated by such a correspondent. The prac-
tical difficulty of the present situation is that I
have no means of verbal communication with the
-Amir. The native agent is not to be trusted. Many
things which it is absolutely necessary to make Sher
Ali understand and duly appreciate, and which could
be very effectively said to His Highness by an intel-
ligent agent, one hesitates to put into writing when
it is probable that the letter will be transmitted to
Eussian headquarters.'

When the Amir's letter was received, it was

1870 AFGHANISTAN 6 1

necessary to decide whether his answer should be
taken as final, It was Lord Lytton's conviction that
the reasons given by Sher Ali for refusing to receive
the proposed mission could neither be accepted by
the British Government with dignity nor be passed
over in silence. He thought that an opportunity
should be afforded to the Amir of reconsidering his
decision, and that this course was not only desirable
in our own interests, but was the fairest towards the
Amir himself. But he felt that a second communica-
tion, i enewiug an offer already rejected, would place
our Government in a false position if it failed to
show to the, Amir the serious responsibility that he
would incur by adopting a line of conduct which
would have the appearance of deliberate discourtesy,
or which omitted to show to him generally but
distinctly the views which we held regarding his
position and our own, The subject was discussed in
the Council, to which Lord Salisbury's instructions of
"February 28 wore now communicated. The majority
agreed with the opinion of the Viceroy, and the
(JommiHHUuutr of IVshuwur was directed to write to
the Amir in the* following terms :

After acknowledging the receipt of the Amir's
hitter, and once more explaining that in the suggested
mission the Viceroy was actuated only by friendship
towards the Amir, the letter went on : * The reluctance July e, IHTO
uvimiod by your Highness to the reception of this
friendly mission is much to be regretted,

fc Hut by a letter which I have received from the
British agent at your Highness' Court, I am induced
to believe that your [Ugliness1 advisors, in counselling
you not to receive the Viceroy's Envoy, may have
boon influenced by a misconception of the objects of
His Excellency, or may not have fully considered the

62 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION" HI u

light in which such a refusal mijjht be regarded by
the British Government. I have therefore, in accor-
dance with the Viceroy's instructions, explained at
length to the British agent the views of His Excellency
on the relations between the two Governments, and
on the causes to which he attributes the reluctance
of your Highness to receive the mission. These
views he has been instructed to communicate to your
Highness.

6 Tour Highness has indeed suggested that it would
answer all purposes worn you to dopute a coniidont.ial
agent to learn from the Viceroy the views of the.
British Government, My friuml, the Viceroy cannot,
receive an agent from your Highness when you have
declined to receive His Excellency'** trusted friend
and Envoy. The British agent at the Court of your
Highness will explain to you the reasons which
make it impossible for the Viceroy to accept such a
proposal.

"It is the Viceroy's Hincero desire not merely to
maintain, but also materially to strtmgthen, the bonds
of friendship arid confidence between the British
Government and the Government of AfglxaniHtan, so
that the interest of your UighnoHA, as th« sovereign
of a friendly and independent frontier State, may be
effectually guaranteed against all cause for future
anxiety. Hut the support of the British Government
cannot be effectual unless it is based on reciprocal
confidence and a clear recognition of the muanH
requisite for the protection of mutual interests.

4 1 am to repeat that in proposing to send a friendly
mission to your Highness, the Viceroy hat* been
actuated by a cordial desire, which it rests with your
Highness to reciprocate, for the continuance on closer
terms than heretofore of amicable relations between

1876 AFGHANISTAN 63

the two Governments, in view of common interests
more particularly affecting Afghanistan and the
personal welfare of your Highness and your dynasty.
It will for this reason cause the Viceroy sincere
regret if your Highness, by hastily rejecting the hand
of friendship now frankly held out to you, should
render nugatory the friendly intentions of His
Excellency, and oblige him to regard Afghanistan as
a State which has voluntarily isolated itself from the
alliance and support of the British Government/

The letter to the Amir was despatched on July 8,
and the British agent at Kabul was at the same time
instructed to give personally to the Amir additional
explanations and assurances. He was to point out,
with reference to the fears that had been expressed
regarding the safety of the proposed mission, that it
had never been thought essential that the Envoy should
go to Kabul itself, and that it. had been distinctly stated
that the Viceroy was prepared to send his Envoy to
any place which the Amir himself might prefer ; that
thfc apprehension that demands injurious to the Amir
might be made upon him was quite groundless, and
that so long as the Amir showed himself to be a loyal
friend and ally, the Viceroy would always regard the
interests of Afghanistan as identical with those of the
British Government. With regard to the objections
made in the Kabul Durbar, that if Jtritish missions
were received by the Amir he would be obliged to
receive Ituflsiau missions also, the agent was to
remind him that the Government of the Czar had
given to the British Government assurances that it
would not interfere, directly or indirectly, in the
affairs of Afghanistan, that consequently the reception
of a British Envoy could lead to no such consequences
as those that had been feared, for in declining to

64 LORD LYTTON'8 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.II

receive a Euesian Envoy the Amir would only be
acting in conformUy with the policy which had
already been solemnly agreed upon. * If,' the Amir
was told, c His Highness should on further reflection
recognise the expediency of learning the true nature
of His Excellency's views and dispositions in regard
to matters which materially concern the interests of
His Highness, Sir Lewis PeUy will still be authorised
to wait upon the Amir, at such place as lie. may
appoint, and should the interviews consequent cm
this meeting lead to a more cordial and reliable
understanding between the two Gioveriimenls, the*.
Viceroy will be happy to meet the Amir in person at,
lYwhawiir in November next, if His Highness should
so desire.'

Three members of the Council, Sir William Mnir,
Hir Henry Norman, ami »Sir Arthur Mobhouse, rfis-
flunled from the views of Lord Iiyllon and the
majority of their colleagues. They were of opinion
that Blusr Ali was acting within his ri^hl in refusing
to reocuve an Kiifflitih mission, that, the, reasons
assigned by him were substantial, and thai, the pro*
posed loiter was almost equivalent to a threat of war.
They held that although stress had been laid on
the temporary and complimentary character of the
mission, its real objctcsl was, as the Amir well knew,
to enforce the, reception of permanent KnjrlLsh a«H>nK
that we were not dealing fairly with the Amir if \ve'
oiuitted t,<> btato diBtiiustly the* object, at which \vi»
ww* aiming that if the loinponiry mission were
a<ie,e])ted and this lutrmamiiil mission n-fused our
position would be oml>arniHHing, and that \vc oiij/ht
to resolve Ixiforoliand whether in such a rase we
«hould accept tht% refusal or ntHorl to force. It wn<
better, tlioy thought, to wait until the; Amir was in

1876 AFGHANISTAN 65

want of our assistance to help him out of difficulties,
when we could make terms with him.

Lord Lytton's reasons for thinking it essential
that this further communication should be made to
the Amir were recorded by him in an official note
from which the following extract may be made :

CI am anxious to take this opportunity, the
earliest in my power, of noticing the arguments urged
against the course which, after anxious reflection,
I still deem it my duty to pursue, in the conduct of
our relations with the Amir of Kabul. I understand
the policy of those of my colleagues who are unable
to adopt my own point of view to have been correctly
described, by those whose description of it is most
authoritative, as "a waiting policy." But a policy
of waiting is, by the essential nature of it, a policy
destined and intended to merge, at some period in
the course of events, into a policy of action, or at
least of attainment ; and, for this reason, at every
point in the prosecution of such a policy, as time
goes on without bringing us any nearer to the attain-
ment of its avowed object, it behoves us to consider
whether the inadequate result of our waiting be due
to our not having yet waited long enough, or to our
having already waited too long.

6 It is obvious that a policy of waiting for ever on
the course of events, without the slightest attempt to
control it, would be no policy at all ; and I am per-
suaded that such a simulacrum of a policy has no
advocate in this Council. The only practical ques-
tion, therefore, for present consideration is, whether
we have waited long enough, or too long.

* The policy of passive expectation has been tried
with great patience for many years past ; and I
cannot find that it has been productive of a single

66 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINlSTItATTON ru. n

result that is not eminently unsatisfactory. Not in
nute, June ajj ^ offt^ correspondence to which it has givem
rise is there one solitary expression of opinion that
this policy has improved the character of our inter-
course with the Afghan Government, or increased
our control over its conduct. Any such opinion is,
indeed, forbidden by indisputable, facta. Whilst lh<*
avenging current of uncontrolled events has bewi
rapidly deepening the danger and sfcrongthonin^ the
pressure from without, which aupttoiif the dcftaroivc
importance to us of a strong hold upon AfgluiniHtan,
our relations with that country haw steadily deterio-
rated; until at last the Amir, whose* disposition
towards the British Government was in 18(10 unmis-
takably cordial, now rejor.tK our jjiflH and advii**,
with an apparently profound iruliffrrumw to tlu*
periodical expressions of our mwkly passive r<>#n*l,
6 Judging the tree by its fruits, tlicrcd'on-, I CMI
come to no other conclusion than that the waiting
policy has failed after a singularly fair trial of it.
Is there any valid ground for hoping thai, by a pro-
longed and more assiduous r.ultivatinn of* it, (his
policy will now, within any calonlabht period of time
or at any time at all, be middc-idy productive of
results essentially different from thorn it ham already
produced? I think not. Tin* anticipation has,
indeed, been expressed with some* Konfufancr' liy two
or three of my colleagues that, if wu only Miill go on
waiting long enough, the Amir will vary mem bit
spontaneously sorry for hie conduct towards us and
eagerly solicitous of our favour^ that nwnitH, if loft
entirely to themselves, will before long bring him to
our feet, or drive him into our arms. Could 1 share
this anticipation, I should raooguiiw in it a conclusive
argument for maintaining the policy of passive

1876 AFGHANISTAN 67

expectation, undeterred by the experience of the viceroy's
past. I have, therefore, examined with care the only uj7J?tB| J
grounds on which such an hypothesis can rest.

'Virtually they resolve themselves into a single
assumption, viss. the early probability of one or other
of two event 8, pressure on the Amir by Eussia from
without or by his own subjects from within. It is
certainly probable that Slier All would spontaneously
stic* fi >r < air assistance, and accept it on our own terms,
if lie- went attacked, by llussia. But that is precisely
the ronlhifftmry which it is our interest to prevent.
The alliance of the Amir will have lost much of the
value we may wcni still accord to it when, instead
of enabling us lo make better provision for the
(Ic'fcnet* of our territory, it obliges us to rush.,
unprepared, to the. rescue, of his. Russian statesmen,
however, are, to Kay the least, as wary and sagacious
ius wu. I foresee no probability of such a mistake on
Uii'ir part ; and the most, dangerous of all policies is
that wliieh reckons exclusively for its success upon
the faults or blunders of others. Oar present object,
UH I uiulcrHlaml it, must be, not war for the defence
of our frunliur, but the security of our frontier for
the prevention of war. If Eussia ever attacks
Afghanistan, it will be with the intention of attack-
ing the British Empire in India, and in the belief
that, the* HritiHh Empire cannot efficiently defend
itiwlf , If wu passively await such an event, it is not
HO much Musr Ali who will then help us, as we who
Hhall have to help him, under conditions which his
previous disregard of our advice and our own neglect
of timely precautions may have rendered seriously
(ViBadvantageoiiH,

4 Hut, if Russia does not attack Afghanistan, she
cau do nothing else which will have the effect of

68 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. 11

viceroys driving the Amir, "before long," into our arms.

Minute, June j^^ successful attempt, secretly made by her, to
establish a pacific political influence at Kabul, or a
moral ascendency over the mind of the Amir, must
surely have the effect, not of driving him into our
arms, but of still further detaching him from us.
And if, in the meanwhile, we are to make no effort
to avert such a result ; if the Amir is to remain
perfectly independent of our influence, and absolutely
unpledged to our Government, so that, wlum the
critical moment arrives, he may be eonvenkmtly free
to choose between the alliance of England and the
alliance of Kussia, we must not. take it for jrnuitcjd
that he will then throw himself into our anus rather
than into those of our great rival. To me* the
possibilities seem all the other way ; for, if evor aiwh
a moment does arrive (and who c.nu even 1M sure
that it is far distant?), the most wo <**m tluw ofli»r the
Amir will be less than the least that HUHHUL ran offer
him — viz. a share in her anticipated conquest of the
rich plains of British India.

'The importance of being Iwforuhund, with Russia
by establishing a dominant Hritish inflncncie at
Kabul was fully appreciated by Lord I'almcrHton as
early as 1847. In a letter thon written 1o Fx>rd
Russell, he observed that "a llufuuaii forro in
occupation of Afghanistan might not ?><t able to
march to Calcutta, but it might convert Afghanistan
into the advanced post of Russia, instead of that
advanced post being in Persia; ami, whatever
Hardinge may say of the security of the rent of our
frontier, you would find in such ease a very restless
spirit displayed by the BurmpHo, by the* Nopaulese,
and by all the unincorporated States scattered about
the surface of our Indian possessions. These things

1*71! AFGHANISTAN 69

would lead to great expense, would require great viceroy'*
efforts, and might create considerable damage. The Minute, June
Ijust. method of preventing these embarrassments
HfU'iiiH to be to take up such a position, not in posse,
but /// >w.sv, as would make it plain to everybody that
we could not be, taken by surprise."

" I am of opinion that llu-re is no sufficient reason
to aniiripate from thu " waiting policy" in the future
an}* belter results than those whereby it. must bo
condemned if judged by the past.

" Nevertheless, if this great empire, for the safety
of wliirli so large* a share of personal responsibility
has been laid upon me, had now no neighbour more
formidable ihnu the Amir of Kabul, 1 think that,
HoiiMiileriiig flie weakness of tmrh a neighbour, the
turbulent HtsuwliT of his suhj^rts, the geographical
configuration of his country, and the wrutdiod
remlli'rtion of former ill advised :uid ill exee.uted
mlerlerenee in I he allairn t»f Afghanistan, it might
possibly be prmli-iit to tn*at wilh passivt' imViflert-uce
tlu* ehurlishness of ^her Ali; and actual, without
n*moiiHfrunrr, all that is unsatisfactory in our rela-
tions with him, so long us he almtuined from ae,ls of
aggression, to whieh he, is not likely to resort and
whirl* we eould easily punish. In oilier words, I
think that much mighl, perhaps, be urge-d with
elleet in favour of the "waiting policy," if the. wilua-
liuti we have now lo deal with were not nmfpriully
diflerent from thu siluntion to whieh thai policy was
first applied,

* Hut, AW/<vw MHjttH'htt t/u/n <lcjl>uit UUIIUN, While
w<* wait upon the bank, thu 8in«Hiti in bearing from
us what, we wish to keep, and to UH what we wish to
avoid. The nrimmHtanoeH of 1870 are essentially
nt from tho«e of 180U. The neighbour we

' 70 LOED LTTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ni. if

^ave now to ^ear *s not Afghanistan but Russia.
Minute, June And the danger with which we are most immediately
menaced by Eussia is not the loss of territoiy, hut
the loss of that political influence or prestige which
is the most pacific safeguard of territory. Slier All
may wish to remain stationary; but the KnsfiinTi
power in Central Asia cannot remain stationary. Tfs
position is too weak. Small bodies gravitate, to preat
ones. If Afghanistan does not gravitate Inwards
the British, it must gravitate towards lh<s Russian
Empire. And between bodies of equivalent gravity
the attractive force of the one that is in movement
will always exceed that of the one which i« tnotionlesH.
6 In 1853 Lord Palmerston, writing In Lord
Clarendon, recorded an opinion which (if I may
venture to speak of myself in connection with so
eminent a statesman) completely expresses tlm con-
viction I have formed from nearly twenty years'
practical study of IluHHian diplomacy in Humpc.
" The policy and practice of the Itiuwian G< ivernmenl,"
he says, "have always kwn to push forward ilH
encroachments as fast, and us far, as the apathy, or
want of firmness, of otli«r dovonmients would allow
it to go, but always to stop and rotire whuu it wa8
met with decided resistance, and then to wait for
the next favourable opportunity to make another
spring on its intended victim, In furtherance of
this policy, the Bussian Govornnumt hag nlwayH hod
two strings to its bow — moderate language and
disinterested professions at Petersburg ami Iiomlon ;
active aggression by its agents on th<* mwiut of
operations. If the aggrcsHions succeed locally, Uie
Petersburg Government adopts them as a fait ac-
compli which, it did not intend, but cannot, in honour,
recede from. If the local agents fail, they arcs

1876 AFGHANISTAN 7 1

disavowed and recalled, and the language previously
held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have 41'1 tlutlH
overstepped their instructions. This was exemplified
in the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and in the exploits
of Simonivitch and Vikovitch in Persia* Orloff
succeeded in extorting the Treaty of Unkmr-Skelcssi
from the Turks, and it was represented as a snddon
thought suggested by the circumstances erf Lho time
and place, and not the result of any previous in-
structions; but, having boon dom*, it rould not, bt»
undone. On tlie other hand, Simonivitch mid Viko-
vitch failed in getting possession of Herat in conse-
quence of our vigorous measures of resistance; and
as they failed, and whm lliwy had failud, they were
disavowed and recalled and the language previously
held at Potersburg was appealed to as a proof of the*
sincerity of Lhu disavowal, although no human being
with two ideas in his liwul could for a moment doubt
that they had ac.tud under .specific instrurfionN."

c()ur own position, as rogjtrds Hhor All, stjeniH,
at the present moment., to be* this — that, whilst his
Highness Is in no wise hound to help nx against
Russia, we art* undur an admitted obligation to Imlp
him against lior; that ho is practically frc«i 1o
negotiate with Uussia whenever he pbases; and that.
m are practically unable to negotiate wilh MM.
Such a position is not only uudignilicd ; it is, in
our present circumstances, positively ilang^roiiH. It
suggests the*, following quetttion, to which, during the*
last few months, my most anxious atid constant, con-
sideration IULB been given: l-iiu \vu now \wMw it,
and, if we fail in any ntUtmpt to htatcr it, may we
not make it worse F It is not a riuiiHt.iou of It'ttin^
well alone, but of letting bad ulonc ; and there are, no
doubt, situations in politics, as in life, when, for

72 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION ni. n

viceroy's who are the victims of them, it is " better to hear
Minute, June faz ills we have, than fly to others thai, we know

1876

not of."

6 Now, nobody can recognise more seriously than
I do, that there is considerable risk in whatever we
do as well as in whatever we do not do j it is a risk
bequeathed to us by the inexorable XomewH of
neglected opportunities. Fortune is a fair player,
and never checkmates a man, or a nation, without
first crying check; but we have grc*a1ly incmiHod
the difficulty of our game by not moving our pi<»<-«8
when there was still time to cover (he King.

6 Hie arguments in favour of Lilting bad alone,
for fear of making bad worse — or, in olW words, of
meeting the Amir's rejection of our pnwnt. proposals
by reversion to a waiting policy — art* all nfliipriKcti, J
think, in the three following propositions :

cl. The position in which wo an* tints Ifft, m
regards our relations with Afghanis! an, though not,
indeed, all that could bo wished, is quid1 gi««i
enough. We haw endured it without Hcrioim incon-
venience for the last five yuarH, and thi-ri1 i« no muum
why we should not as csonvtmic'iitly wulun* it for the*
next five years ; since, in fact, wo have? obtained from
Eussia the recognition of our (•xrlumvc right to hold
diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, and that is
• really all we need.

C2. Whatever maybe the intrhiHir wcakium of
tliis position, the native population of India in ntill
fortunately under the im])rosHion that it in a strong
one, and that our relations with Afghnnwtan an-
thoroughly satisfactory. Any proowling, thc&n»furc.
on our part which might disturl) this wilutary faith
by revealing the hollownees of iU fpundatiou would
prejudicially weaken the ooniidimcc <if our native

Ai-'CSllAXIHTAX 73

subjects in the plenitude of our power and the viceroy's
wisdom of < mr policy.

fc o. I5e tin* situation <»ood or bad, any attempt to
improve or e.scape from it must infallibly land us in
a worse position; for practically there is no alter-
native between the passive toleration of the Amir's
present attitude towards us, and a declaration of
hostilities against Afghanistan. ft> that any step to
ri#ht or left out of the false position in which we
now find ourselves mu>l be deprunaled its a first step
towards war. Such a step would be specially nnwiwe
at the present moment; because the: mind of our
Mohammedan population is, in all probability, miwli
excited just now by the news which daily reaches
UH from ('nnMiinlinoplc, find their sympathies would
IM* a^fainht us in any net of {ijrjjn'ssion on a Moham-
medan Wale.

* Now nil these |irt»|fuMlmiiH appear to IIH* to rest
nn falljK'ious pre,inis>efs. As rc^unls tin* first, it is
unhappily not to be denial that (lie situation we. have
accepted during the last live years has been steadily
dutcrioriitin*/; and I cannot c-onleniplatu without
alarm its continued deterioration during the next five
years. I rf Hiking n(< what has recently ha}>])ened in
(Vnt.rai Asia, nnd at what- is now happening in ,
Kurnpc, ! am persitadedthat, if our influence declines,
that of liussiu mimt increase at Kabul.

• ••«»•

fc AH rej/ar<lH the secoiui of l.lu* a})ove»inentioned
propositionst I have been at Home )mins to ascertain
tin* impression made by rtwent and present, events on
those native chiefs and prince -with whom I have as
yd, come into {wwomil contact; and 1 have myself
bc.cu serirmsly impressed by tin* apparent unanimity
of their opinion as to the reality of the rivalry between

7+ LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH, n

viceroy's England and .Russia in the East and tlie weakness of our
Minute, June p0ijticaj[ influence in Afghanistan. But even if I could
believe that the natives of India are under any illusion
as to the true character of our actual position in re-
gard to Afghanistan, I should still consider it unwise
to refrain from all attempt to rectify that position
for fear of dispelling an illusion which cannot last for
ever.

6 With regard to the third proposition, I neither
desire a war with Afghanistan nor contemplate any
step likely to provoke it. Hut everyone who lias
had the slightest experience in the manago-ment of
international relations must be aware that there are
a thousand ways of influencing the conduct of your
neighbours without Ktung to war with them ; and of
augmenting, or enforcing, the external power of a
State without recourse to arm». Nor is reckless
action the only alternative to reckless inactivity.

*T entirely share the opinion that a frank and
straightforward policy is generally llxo best on all
occasions. Hut tlio above-mcuilioiwcl remarks appear
to have been BUgtfUHtecl by a misapprehension of fact.
I have alwayw thought, and Htill think, that a per-
manent British Envoy at Kabul would be both
unnecessary and unwise,; for if the Amir can be
induced to recognise his true inlemsUj, Hiilmfactory
intercourse between the two Government*} can bo
better secured by other means. Therefore, the
establishment of a permanent British mission at
Kabul is not amongst the objects I have in view.
Hut here I must further explain that, in the event of
Slier Ali's absent, on further reflection, to the recep-
tion of a special Kuvoy from the Viceroy, it IH not,
and never was, my intention to instruct or permit
the, Envoy to make to the Amir a singha proposal of

1H7*» AFOUAXISTAN 75

any kind or on any subject, in the name of the Viceroy's
Viceroy, or the (lovcrmneut. All I desire and
inland is that if this Amir should, on Itinpart, make
any proposals to the Knvoy, the Envoy may bo in a
position to answer 11 mm with perfect frankness and
derision, HO far as they can be anticipated ; explaining
c.lcarly to the Amir the terms HIM! conditions on,
which the, Krilixh (Jovcnimeut. is prepared lo accede
to such and such demands on his part, and the
rrnHou why Mirh uud such others must be
declined.

* If, therefore, the Amir makes no proposals to our
Knvoy, I In* mission will retain to the last its purely
complimentary ehanicter; and wtt shall be neither
hotter nor worse oil" for it, exempt in so fur us it will
have served to tcM the disposition of the Amir, as to
which, ill present, we can only make* guesses, more
or (ess plausible ; awl possibly to furnish us with
some intelligent and intelligible information about
the actual stale of a flairs at Kabul, as to which we
are now for all practical purposes in profound
ignorance. If, on the othur hand, tiro Amir does make
any overture* to our agent, or any demands upon
our < Joverninent, they will at least 1w answered
whether affirmatively or negatively without ambiguity,
and iu a manner consistent with th« dignity of a
great empire. , , ,

* A» it in, unfortunately, one of our chief difficulties,
in any pujutihlu negotiation with Hlwr Ali, is the
|in»iiahittty dial he may make, deiuandH upon m «o
exorbitant that now* of them can be* accepted. But
if wo. formally invitii him beforehand to make all the
demands which we are Heerolly disposed to amspt, it
HUuuIn to reanon that li<* will tokn it for granted that
our iirat won! h not our last; tliat lies will greatly

76 LOW) LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cii. n
viceroy's overrate the importance we attach to his alliance.

Minute, June -j , •/?

!876 and the sacrifices we must accept to secure it ; and

that he will raise his pretensions accordingly. . . .

* When I received Sher All's letter rejecting the
proposed mission, I had to consider whether his
rejection of it was tentative or final. Had I come to
the conclusion that it must be regarded as final, I
should have felt it my duty to lose no time in
informing my colleagues of the steps which, in antici-
pation of such an event, I had considered, and was
prepared to take, for the protection of JJritish
interests without further reference to those of the
Amir. But, bearing in mind the reiiocmco of the
letter written by Sir Richard Pollock under my
instructions to Sher Ali, and all the curoumstawies
which might have reasonably induced the Amir to
believe that he has nothing more to hope and nothing
more to fear from us, I came to the conclusion that
it was fairer to His Highness, and more advantageous
to ourselves, to regard his reply as a tentative ow, and
to give him the opportunity of reconsidering Iiifi
decision. The occasion, therefore, for acting on the
Amir's rejection of the mission had not, JIH it HeemKto
me, yet arisen/

The Ami* Tlie Commissioner's letter was delivered to the

replies Sept. s j^n* On July 17, but it was not until ftoptexuber 8 that
any answer was sent to it. Meanwhile Out attitude
of the Amir was extremely doubtful, anil the Diaries
of the British agent showed that, much excitement
had been aroused in Kabul by reports that a religious
war against the infidels was to be proclaimed. ' The
Mulla, Mushk-i-Alam of Ghuziii, who waa held in
special honour, was consulted, and all the corre-
spondence of the Amir with the Britiah and llnmm
Governments was placed before him. lie was

1876 AFGHANISTAN 77

*

received at a special durbar, at which Sher All
described to him the situation in which he was
placed between the two great Powers. * It is desi-
rable/ the Amir said, * that you should, in compliance
with my wishes, summon all the Mullas and learned
men of all grades from time to time, and direct them
to advise and exhort the people occasionally, so that
by your exertions the gem of the promotion of the
strength of Islam may fall as desired into the palm
of success. Though hitherto the friendship existing
between the Governments has not been disturbed, it
is evident that if a more powerful bird catches a
little one in his claws, the small bird does not refrain
from using its claws for its release until it is killed.
It is a matter for thousands of congratulations that
the Mohammedans of Afghanistan have from ancient
times stood against the depredations of foreign races.
Under these circumstances it is incumbent on me and
on you to consider it one of your most important
objects to direct the people of Islam to make efforts
for their safely and to provide for or guard against
the evil day.'

In accordance with the desire of the Amir, the
Mulla Mushk-i- Alam summoned the Mullas of Kabul
and the neighbourhood, and, after consulting them,
pronounced his opinion that the first decision to
refuse to receive the British mission had been right
and should be maintained.

While the Amir was hesitating regarding the
answer to be sent to the letter from the Commissioner
of Peshawur, he received with much cordiality a
Mohammedan Envoy bearing a letter from the
Itussian Governor-General. Another Envoy from
General Kaufmaun had arrived in June, and he still
remained at Kabul. A copy of the letter brought by

78 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.II

one of these Envoys was given by the Durbar to the
British agent and sent by him to the Government of
India, but with this exception nothing transpired
regarding the communications between General
Kaufmann and the Amir, General Kaufmanu's lei lor
was a very long one, giving minute details regarding
the late annexation of Khokand. It was sent, General
Kaufmann said, in continuation of previous com-
munications, because it was duo to the Amir as the.
friend of Eussia that he should be made acquainted
with the events that had occurred. Although it
professed to be a letter of more, courtesy, it was
obviously intended to impress on th<« mind of Hher
Ali the hopelessness of any opposition to the,
military power of Eussia and the danger of pro-
voking it-1

These proceedings of General Kaiiftnaun were
reported by Lord Lytton'fl Government to the,
Secretary of State, and diplomatic j corrcKpoiuleticct
between the British and Itumiui Governments fol-
lowed. It led, as usual, to no practical numlt. The
Russian Government declared thai they 'had not
endeavoured to conclude* any arrangement, com-
mercial or political, with the Amir of Kabul, and
that the rare relations of their authorities in Central
Asia had never borne any other character than one
of pure courtesy, in conformity with loral lurngtus in
the East. While now receiving thr.Hti assurances the
Imperial Government hoped that the British Govern-
ment would recognise that practically they had never
swerved from them, whatever may have been the
erroneous interpretations placed by the native
Asiatic Governments on the communications of

1 The letter will be found in Parliamentary Papon Ho* 1, 1881,
Central Asia, pp. 12-14.

1876 AFGHANISTAN 79

General Kaufmann, and whatever false importance
may have been attributed to the method of trans-
mission adopted by him.1 Some months afterwards,
the correspondence closed with the following per-
fectly just and accurate comments of Lord Lytton's
Government: 'There can be no doubt that the
communications between General Kaufmann and
Slier Ali exceed the requirements of mere exchanges
of courtesy, and are regarded as something much
more than complimentary by the person to whom
they are addressed. The messages from General
Kaufmuun to the Ainir have not been despatched,
as stated by the General, only " once or twice a year."
During the past year they have been incessant. The
bearers of them are regarded and traitod by the
Amir as agents of tho "Russian Government* and, on
one prel.uxt or another, some peraoiL rooognised by
the Afghan CtovGrmuc'nt as a Jlussuin agent is now
almost constantly at Kabul. Wo dcsiru to submit to
your Lnnlslup's ronsidenition whethor our own
conduct would be viewed with ituliffcreucu by the
Cabinet of St. Petersburg, were the Government of
India to open similarly friendly relations with the
Khans of Khiva and liokhara, and if, without
actually making to them overtures of alliance*, we
addressed to those princes frequent letters containing
assurances of friendship, coupled with explanations
of the policy wo deem it desirable to pursue towards
the States upon our own frontier.9

At this time a remarkable proposal was made
privately to the Viceroy by Sir Jung Bahadur, the i>roposaiB <
Vrimw Minister and virtual master of Nepaul. His
loyal friendship towards our Government was
undoubted ; lie understood that our rolatious with
1 Note by M, do Giora to tho British amlawaador, March 6, 1877.

80 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.JI

the Amir were in a most unsatisfactory position and
that the growing influence of Eussia in Afghanistan
was causing us anxiety, and he fancied tliat if he
were himself to visit Kabul as our recognised repre-
sentative he would be able to convince Slier Ali that
we had no designs hostile to his interests, and that he
would act wisely in entering into the closest and
most loyal alliance with our Government. The pro-
posals of Sir Jung Bahadur could not be entertained,
but they were declined with an expression of sincere
and cordial thanks, and the Resident at Khatmaiulu
was authorised to explain confidentially to the
Minister the Viceroy's views of the whole situation.

The news of the constant and intimate corre-
spondence which was now curried on between the
Eussian General and the Amir of Kabul Imd one
salutary effect. It finally convinced the members of
the Viceroy's Council that the time for a purely
inactive policy was over, and that one of mores aolive
interference must now be iiuuHlud upon, 'The
neck of the opposition on this subject haw been
broken/ writes the Viceroy to Lord Salisbury, *and T
anticipate no further difficulty in marrying out my
own views/

Amir'H reply, On September 3 the Commissioner of T'enhawnr

BSd received the Amir's reply to the* letter which had

AmirpropoBGs been addressed to him on July 8. This roply ccm-

Britishnativo tained the suggestion that our native* agent at

agont to India Kabul, who had long been acquainted with the

wishes of the Amir, should be summoned to JUH own

Government, to expound to them the stato of affaire

at Kabul, and hear from them all their dosirus and

projects, returning then to Kabul to repeat to the

Amir the result of such intercourse.

Tliis was rnurJi what Lord Lyttou had anticipated,

7876 AFGHANISTAN 8 1

and he decided without hesitation to accept the viceroy
Amir's proposal, _ £JJ£

An answer accordingly was immediately sent to
the Amir, to the effect that his proposal was accepted
by the Government of India, as being 'altogether
advantageous to the realisation of their chief object,
which was to ascertain the actual sentiments of his
Highness.'

Atta Mahomed Khan, the British native agent, British native
reached Simla on October 6, Sffit

After being closely cross-examined by Sir Lewis
Telly, Colonel Burnc, the Viceroy's Private Secretary,
and Captain Gray, a personal friend of the Amir's
Prime Minister, the agent had two interviews with
the Viceroy himself. The substance of these several
conversations ban already been made public, and it is
therefore only necessary to give a short summary of
them, The agent, after first denying that there
existed any grievance in the miwl of this Amir, was
inducted to make a full confession of the complaints
which he nourished against us and of the demands
wlucli lie still had at heart. The Viceroy then con-
fided to thu agent how far he was prepared to accede
to these demands, and upon what tftrms.

The a^ent represented the Amir as chiefly
alienated and disappointed by the results of the
mission in 1878 of his Minister Syud Noor Mahomed
to Lord Northbrook. The principal object of that
mission, on the part of the Amir, had bocm to secure
a definite treaty of alliance with the Jiritish Govern-
ment ; a guarantee tliat he would receive support in
tho ahapc of amis and money in every caso of
external a^ruwiion; that tlia Jtaitiah Government
should disclaim connection with any pretender to the
throne of Kit) ml, and agruc to recognise ami support

G

82 LOKD LYTTON'S IKDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. n
Conference only his declared heir ; finally, that he should receive

with native , . n * \ . . . , .

agent at a permanent subsidy to enable him to support his

Siml* troops.

These demands the British Government of Lord
Northbrook's time had refused to grant, and from
that time the .Amir had distrusted us, and had
derived the impression that our policy and action in
his regard had been for our own self-interest, irre-
spective of the interests of Afghanistan ; that while
we desired to depute political agents into Afghanistan
and induce the Amir to guide his policy by our
advice, we were unprepared to bind ourselves to any
future course in regard to him. He had tlm« come
to question our consistency and good faith; while
his counsellors were habitually seeking hidden mean-
ings in our communications,

As regards the Amir's objections to receiving the
mission which the Viceroy had proposed Konding to
Kabul, the agent stated that His Highness entarl siined
no hope of an improvement in our mutual relations,
and thought therefore no practical result would
follow from the mission; that his presence iniffht.
create excitement, and be attended by personal risk ;
that if a British mission were received at Kabul, a
pretext would be afforded the Russians for wmling
a similar one. Recent political history in Europe
showed that the English were unable to cornel the
Russians to adhere to treaties, and were equally
impotent to arrest Russian aggressions. The Amir
was well aware that, sooner or later, Jtumia would
attack Afghanistan, and this with ulterior olijwttH;
but his Highness also knew that in smili u m^K the
British would defend him in tluur own iutwHte.
Finally, the agent averred, and this greatly int<-rcHlCNl
the Viceroy, that the Amir'B reluctance to admit

187<i AFGHANISTAN 83

British officers within his territory arose out of a conference
fear not that they would be murdered, hut that in 2£entnat va
the present unfriendly state of his relations with us Simla
they would b« regarded by his subjects as persons
deputed, not to support, but to control or check, his
authority, and in that case the Afghans would make
of such a«rents the confidants of all their grievances,
and claim from them the protection and goodwill of
the Uritish Government wrwui the Amir,

Privately to Captain Gray the agent mentioned
flu- matters which the Amir and his advisers had
most at heart.

I . That no Englishman should reside in Afghani-

stan, at any rate at Kabul.

iJ. That tlie British Government should ajLfree to

wo^nifie and support the declared heir

Abdullah Jan, and should disclaim connec-

tion with Mahomed Yakub or any pretender.

!!, That we. should agree to support the Amir

with troops and money against all external

I. That we «hould grant tlutm some permanent
subsidy. At present tli« treasury of the
Amir was empty, the revenue quite in-
adequate to the maintenance of hm force
of some 75,000 troops. Consequently the.
forctt was underpaid, ill found, and hu*f!i<-ient,
The Amir was also anxious to obtain a /M
fi twt! in British territory, whither to M*W!
li'm family and property wluai ho rleurcd
lor nrliou witli th(s HuHHiaiw.

5. Tlwit the Hrilish («ovennn<*nt should refrain
from mtarmil interfen^tiee in Affj[hanistati,

(J. Thai w<^ should enter into an oflenHive and
duftriiuvo alliaiicu9 etitially biuding to both
parties. *« a

84 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. 11
Conference Having fully heard these complaints and demands,

with native w. B J „ , „ -*, , , ^

agent at the Yiceroy personally informed the agent what coii-
cessions he was prepared to make to the Afghan
ruler, and upon what terms.

1. He was willing to enter into an alliance such

as had been demanded— namely, that the
friends and enemies of either State should
be those of the other.

2. That in the event of unprovoked external

aggression, assistance should be afforded the
Amir in men, money, and arms. Also that
the British Government were willing to
assist him in fortifying his frontier.
8. That Abdullah Jan should be recognised as the

Amir's successor.

4, That a yearly subsidy should be offered the
Amir, the amount of which and other detail
to be settled by Plenipotentiaries.
These concessions amounted to a promise to grant
all the requests which had been denied to the Amir
at the Simla Conference of 1873, and which, had
they then been granted, might perhaps have secured
Sher Ali as a firm and friendly ally to the British
Government.

The conditions attached to the proposed conces-
sions were as follows :

That the Amir held no external relations without
our knowledge, and refrained from provoking his
neighbours.

That he declined all communication with Russia,
referring the agents of that Power to us. That
British agents should reside at Herat, or elsewhere
on the frontier.

That a mixed Commission of British and Afghan
officers should determine and demarcate the Amir'n

1876 AFGHANISTAN 85

frontier. That arrangements should be made for the conference
free circulation of trade along the principal trade
routes of Afghanistan and for the establishment of a
line of telegraph.

Finally, the Viceroy would forego the establish-
ment of a permanent Envoy at Kabul on condition
that the Amir deputed an envoy to the Viceroy's
headquarters and that he received special missions
whenever requested.

If the Amir was prepared to treat on the above
basis he might at once send his minister Syud Noor
Mahomed Shah to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur,
Jellalabael, or wherever might be preferred. The
Viceroy, however, clearly explained to the British
agent that unless the Amir gave his consent to the
establishment of a British agency on the frontier as
t\ basis of negotiation it would be needless for him
to depute, his minister to meet the Viceroy's Envoy,
juxrt the Viceroy would Ihen be free to adopt his
own course in his re-arrangement of frontier relations
without regard to Afghan interests.

Sir Lewis Pelly regretted this conditional stipu-
lation, having been alarmed by the agent's strong
expression of opinion that the Amir would not
consent to the establishment of British agencies on
his frontier. The Viceroy, however, held firmly that
negotiations entered into without any accepted
basis of principle would after protracted discussions
end iu a public failure and increased misunder-
stawlingN.

A remark made by the Vitieroy iu the course of
thfiso iutarviuwH with the native agent became the
subject of attack by the Opposition at home as if it
had boon made to the Amir himself or to his repre-
sentative, whereas it must be remembered that this

86 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTIi \TIUST m.ii

conference agent was a confidential servant of the Government of
IS^Ufc176 India, usually resident at Kabul, but bound fo ad in
Simla our interests and to represent our views thuru. Lord

Lytton wrote of this matter after his return tn England :
6 1 said to the agent that the position of the Amir \\ ;is
that of an earthen pipkin between two iron pots l ; but
I never addressed those words directly to the Amir.
or to any agent of his. My motive lor usinjr swli
an expression in conversation with our own nntuv
agent was that I found him under a totally fata*
and exaggerated impression as to this power of llu-
Amir, and it was necessary to make him uiulcnituiiri
the real character of the situation. Hal' th<» wonls
I did deliberately address to tho Amir through tlii^
agent I was careful to write down, in onl<*r that lh«*y
might be accurately conveyed to Ills Hiphiu'*.*.' As
the short Memorandum which the agent \\ as inst nu-l iil
by the Viceroy to communicsate to "the Amir for this
purpose contains a complete refutation of tho char^i*
that he attempted either to bully or ck-mvi* WWT Al'u
it may be quoted here.

authorise the agent to tell tho Amir thtit, if

a warm and a true, a firm and a fast (Hi-mi to hint,
doing all that is practically in my poivor 1o Htniul ]>y
him in his difficulties, to cordially nimpurt him, to
strengthen his throne, establish life clyiiatfty, «UH!
confirm his succession in the person of IUH m^Ioctoc!

m • *

heir.

CI am willing to give him, if h<? wi«i«'H it, a
treaty of friendship aiul alliance, to afTonl him
assistance in arms, men, and money, and to tfivi* to
his heir the public recognition and support of tin*

l This simUo was flrHtuuoaiiy Sir B. Fraro in hln Mtur to Lonl
Salisbury, March 3, 1870.

1876 AFGHANISTAN 87

British Government. But we cannot do these things viceroy's
unless the Amir is, on his part, equally willing to
give us the means of assisting him in the protection
of his frontier, by the residence of a British agent
at Herat, or such other parts of the frontier most
exposed to danger from without as may hereafter
be mutually agreed upon. I do not wish to em-
barrass the Amir, with whose difficulties I fully
sympathise, by carrying out any surh arrangement
until aftw the signature of a treaty of alliance on
terms wliich ought to satisfy His Highness of the
perfect loyalty of our friendship, nor until after he
has had the means of satisfying his people that the
prcwnre of a British agent on his frontier signifies
our linn support of himself and his Heir Apparent
with all the power and influence of the British
Government. Nor have I any wish to urge upon the
Amir the reception of a pormunent British Envoy at
his Court, if llisHiglmeKs thinks if, would be a source
of ombarniHsment to him.

*Tu short, it is my object and desire* that our
alliance and the presence of our agents on the
Afghan frontier ishould be a great strength and
support to the Amir at homo and abroad — not a
source of weakness or embarrassment to him/

Deferring to this Memorandum in a paper
written in 1880, Lord Lytton wrote: * Neither to
Slier Ali nor to Yukub Khun did I even* propose,
much less did I ever urge on cither of thorn, the
establishment of a Kesidont Itritish Mission at Kabul.
I Binwwly believe that such an arrangement would
have been extremely beneficial to th« two Govern-
ments, had they mutually tlwrnul it. IJut it could
not bo advantageously preHwscl on a reluctant prince.
Our view was that if Hhor Ali no longer desired to

88 LORD LOTION'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.U

M°eiorandum ^^ c^oser to *^e British Government, there was
nothing to be done. But if he were still as solicitous
as he professed to be in 1872 that we should pay
greater attention to his boundaries and increase our
liabilities on his behalf, then we might reasonalily
claim his cordial acquiescence in the only means which
could practically enable us to satisfy his wishes.*

At the end of October the apent returned to
Kabul, carrying with him a letter from the Vicc-roy
to the Amir, and an aidv-mfanoire, which lu* wa« au-
thorised to communicate to Ilia TTi^lmcjss containing
a summary of the conversations lie had recently held
with the Viceroy, concerning the concowsicms ho w.aa
prepared on certain conditions to oflor the -Amir.

To those communications uo direct reply wus
made for several months. In the meantime, events
in Europe were not without their cfler.t upon (lie
Amir. Throughout India and Asia there, wus u pre-
valent expectation that hostilities belweeti Itusnia
and Turkey were imminent and must lead to war
between Russia and England, and on the eve of Htieh
an event the Amir had no intention of committing
himself to an English alliance; MB policy was to
stand aloof till the latest possible moment, and then,
when a strict neutrality was no longer powwible, 1o sell
his alliance to the highest bidder.

Tlie most important passages of the instructionw
relating to Afghanistan which Lord Lytton look out
with him were as follows :

They began by suggesting that the boat couwo of praci-clnrn might
be— after previous communication with tho Amir, thnmf(h tho Com-
iniRsionor of Peahawur— to send a ruiwHion to Kabul by way of limilUh,
They then went on as follows :

1 Tho ostensible function of mich a minHiim would, In oilier cawo, bo
ono of oompHment and oourtouy, and tlio Ajnir'B frioiuily wo|itlon of

187CJ LOUD LYTTOS'8 INSTRUCTIONS 89

it might, in the first instance, be taken for granted. But you will, of Lord Lytttm's

course, be careful not to expose the dignity of your Government to the IafltruetiBn&

affront of a publicly rejected courtesy, and should the Amir express to

the Commissioner of Feshawur an insurmountable objection to the

reception of the proposed mission, you will, perhaps, deem it expedient

to limit its destination to Xhelat. In that case you may have to

reconsider your whole line of policy as regards Afghanistan ; but you

will, at loabl, bo enabled lo do this with diminished uncertainty as to

the porHonal HentimimlH or political tendencies which determine the

valno now net by Hlior Ali upon the friendship and support of the

Government of India. . . .

( To invite tho confidence of the Amir will bo the primary purpose
of your agonfc. To secure that confidence must bo the ultimate object
of yonr Government. But to invite confidence is to authorise the
Trunk utterance of hopes which it may be impoftsible to satisfy, and
iuai'H which it may be dangerous to confirm. Whether these hopes
luitl fours bo reasonable or tho reverse, their open avowal is, in the
opinion of Ilor Majefity's Government, preferable to their concealment.

1 It is nocoHflttry, howovor, that you should bo prepared for demands
or inquiries which cannot bo altogether unanticipated in the course of
I'imiidoiilial mkicrumio with tho Amir, In tho conduct of such inter-
(wnrHuyou will bo, above all things, careful to avoid evasions orombigui-
tU'H ctUcuIittiul to leave upon tho uiind of u. prince* whom temperament
littH ma<lt> mmplcioiiH, uuil uvuutH mifltruptful, any legitimate doubt as
lo the plonitndu of yonr powrr or tho firuinaw of yonr policy.

'Tho mniniionanco in Afghanistan of a strong and friendly power
haH at all tiiuuH boon tho objoct of 3iritiflh pohcy. The attainment of
titiB object IH now tu be cuimiclurod with due reference to the situation
(•.rciatwl by tho ractmt and rapid advmicu of thu Etinsiun army in
Contrtd Aunt towurtla tho northorn frontiora of JSritish India,

1 Her Alt^oHty'H Government cunnot viuw with cumploto indillerenoo
tho prcbublo inflttonco of that Hituation upon the uncertain character
<tf an Oriental Chiuf, whoso ill-doliuod dominioim nro thus brought
witliiti ii Htoadily narrowing circle, between the conilictiug pressures of
two ^roat xmliLory oinpiroa, one of which expostulates and remains
IIHBHIVO, whilst tho othor apolo^iHCH and conthiucfl to inovo forward.

1 It IK woll known lliat nob only the ^In^lisli now^apors, but also
ull worlcH jntbliHhml in England upon Indian rj[U(iHtionti, arc rapidly
ior tho inforniation of tho Amir and carofully studied by His

of irritation and alarm at the advancing power of
in Central AHIU find froquont oxprcHBion tiirough tho English
in Inn^uiigti which, if taken by fc3hor Ali for a revelation of the
mind i)flho Mn^liHli (iov<rmnout, must havo bn^ boon ac<juinulating
in hiH mind inAproBHWUH unftivonrablo to ittf coniidoneo in British
jmwor. Whothcr Iho jiaaHivity of that ]iowor, in proHonoo of a situa-
tion HULK utiolliciully diHOUHHtid with ainquiotiulo, bo attributed by tho

90 LOPJ) LYTTON'S INDIAN ADUOTAT NATION ni. u

Lord Lytton's Amir to connivance with the political designs or ft* ir of blip military

Instructions force Of ^ Bussian neighbours, the inference, although rrrom-.mn, 1*

in either case prejudicial to our influence in Afghanistan,

'The Bassian ambassador at tho Court of St. J ILIUM lia-i bwn
officially informed by Her Majesty's Principal Bccrotiiry of Hlnto fur
Foreign Affairs that the objects of British policy an rt*XJtr^H AQjliniiirftiin
are:

c 1st. To secure that State against aggression.
( 2nd, To promote tranquillity on the bordora of that eimm r.y, I»>
giving such moral and material Biippori to tho Amir,
without interforing in tho Internal ufftbirtf of hit emintri ,
as may enable Her Majesty's Government in ]irp\rnl u
recurrence of tho dwturbancon and conflict* hc'twi'i'ii rivitl
candidates for po\ver among IUH own family, or the Mirt-
of the different Provincch,

•Her Majesty's Government would not, thorofoJMs vinw with in-
difference any attempt on tho part of UUHHIU to compote with Itrin'uli
influence in Afghanistan ; nor could tho Auiir'H jrcoptitui nf A ltriu»ih
agent (whatever bo tho oilicial rank or function of thai niji'iiti In RII>
port of the doniinimw belonging to Hifl IIig!uwHH affuri! fur \\\A w\\\ w
quent reception of a Kuasian agont ftiitnlarly nc(4»>diti*(i nny jinttnxL tn
which the Government of Her WiyoHty would not bit tmlflli'd to i«w|»i
as incompatible with tho a»«iirrvncoH niMMituuwnnly cil1i*rf *! l»» it hy iln*
Cabinet of St PetorNbnrg.

( You will bear in mind thoso foots, wlunfauuiiiff w*M in .
for your Minister to Kabul. . . .

*To doiuands which you havo no intention ofctMiriMliiiif ,„,„ ,W-IU
wiU oppofio a frank and firm rofiwal. You will Kimtruc-t him to pn^MK
such demands from becoming sulyoctH of difleiiHHicm. Olhi-ni whirli.
under certain conditions, you may bo willing to fitturtaiii, hit wiU
undertake to rofor to your Oovcrnuiont, with mieh (kvoiiralihi imMiirjuiri-i
W may induce the Amir to rocogniao tho ailvnntagoH of fm-ilit,itin« »>>
compliance with your wuhov tho fulfilment of Inn own.

1 If the language and doiuoauotir of tho Aurir Lu iiurh ^ hi jinmiiM
no satisfactory result of the nagotiatioiiH thnn oi^tiiul, HIM iliKhiii'M
should be difltinotly reminded that ho IK Elating hiitmlf, nt liU out.
peril, &om the friendship and protection it in hin intiTiM tu n.<ifk an*!
deserve.

«The reguests whioli way bo mndo by 8hcr Ali in ronmninM with
his reception of permanent JiritiHh iigontn in AfghttntHtiui vsill |,rolmb!s
raise the tiuestion of granting to Hh II IghuouM :
' 1st. A fixed and augmented Nubnhly.

1 2nd, A more decided reoognitiim than him yot lu-i-n mmw \*
the Oovornmont of India to the o*il«r of hurnmnimi HHIII

«« ^ 4 t..iinn.
«Jrd. An explicit plodgo, by treaty or otherwi«% ui' utat,i<ri>l
support in auo of foroijfji

1870 LORD LYTTOX'S INSTRUCTIONS 91

1 The first of thcao questions is of secondary magnitude. Ton will Lord Lytton'0
probably deem it inexpedient to commit your Government to any Instructions
permanent pecuniary obligation on behalf of a neighbour whose
conduct and character havo hitherto proved uncertain. On the other
hand, yon may postubly find it wurth while to increase from time to
time the amount of pecuniary assistance which up to the present
moment the Amir has been receiving. But your decision on thin
point can only bo dutorminoil by circumstances which have not arisen,
and considerations which must bo loft to your appreciation of such
circumstances,

* With regard to the recognition of Abdullah Jan, whoso selection
as legitimate successor to the throne of Ins father has boon mado with
much solemnity by Shor Ali, and ortcnsibly acquiesced in by the most
influential of tho Afghan chief's,

'Hor Majesty's Government, in considering this question, have
boforo thorn tho solid and deliberate declarations mado in 1809 by
Lord Northlirank'fl prcilocoHHor to tho present Amir, viz. " that the
British Govorumoiit docs not ilusiro to interfere in the internal affairs
of AfglianiHlau, yet, considering that thp bonds of friendship between
that Government und your TlighncHH havo boon lately more closely
drawn than horolofows it will viow with Hovero flispleasuro any
ttttomjrtK on tho jmrt of yuur rivals to disturb your position as rulur of
Kabul anil rckmdlo civil war ; and it will further endeavour from time
to til 1 10, by Huuh moanH aH ciroumntanoort may require, to Htren«then
ilia Uovortiuuml of your IlighuoHK to unable you to nxcrcwo with
equity and with juwtioo your rightful rulo, and to transmit to your
all tho dignitiim and honours of which you are tho lawful

* Tho Govctriimont of India having in 1800 made that declaration,
which WUH approval by 11 or Majesty's advinerH, have not livwod upon
it Any poMitivo mi-aHuroKj whilo to the Amir, who had received that
declaration undw oircuiUHtanccH of some solemnity and parade, it
appear* to havo convoyed a pledge of definite action in his favour.

* It IH itdt HnritriHuitf that thoHO conflicting iiitcrprotationK of an
auibitfuouH formula nhould havo occasioned mutual disappointmunt to
Ills Hi^hitoHs and tho Government of India.

<llor MajuHty'K Oovornmont tlo not desire to renounce their
traditional policy of abstention from ail unnecessary interference in
the internal ufTulrs of Afghanistan, lint tho frank recognition of a
<lefucto order in tho HucscoBsion ostabliblicd by a ( If, far, to Govommart
to tho throno of a foreign Stato docs not, in thoiv opinion, imply or
nocctuftitatu any intervention in tho internal affairs of that tttutu. Tho
order of HiiceosHion In AfKhauintan lias always boeu dictated by the
incumbent of tho throno, though it has generally beon diKputud by
ottch aspirant to tho vacated position of that incumbent,

4 It romaintt to conHidor tho quoHtbu of giving to tho Amir a
dofinito OBSunuico of material support iu case of internal aggression

92 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION rn.ii

Lord Lvtton's upon those territories over which Her Majesty's Government has
Instructions publicly recognised and officially maintained his right of sovereignty.

' With or •without any such assurance, England would be iiupelltMl
by hex own interests to assist His Highness in repelling tho invasion
of his territory by a foreign Power. It is therefore on all accounts
desirable that the Government of India should have at its diwpowil
adequate means for the prevention of a catastrophe which may yet
be averted by prudence and the fulfilment of on obligation which,
should it ever arise, could not be evaded with honour. Tho want of
such means constitutes the weakness of the present situation,

1 In the year 1875 Lord Northbrookgave to the Envoy of tho Amir
the personal assurance that, in the event of any aggression upon tho
territories of His Highness which the British Government had lailod
to avert by negotiation, that Government would bo prepared to
assure the Amir that they will afford him assistance in tho Hlmpo of
arms and money, and will also, in case of necessity, assist him with
troops.

' The terms of this declaration, however, although snllieifiit to
justify reproaches on the part of Sher Ali if, in tho contiiitft'iicy to
which it referred, he should be left unsupported by tho JUrittali
Government, were unfortunately too ambiguous to scenru
or inspire gratitude on the part of His Highness,

1 The Amir, in fact, appears to have remained undor
impression that his Envoy had been trifled with, and JHH
towards the Government of India has ever since boon chumc'lci'iKi'd by
ambiguity and reserve.

'Her Majesty's Government are therefore prepared to Mincrtion
and support any more definite declaration which may in .your
judgment secure to their unaltered policy tho advantage'*! of which
it has been hitherto deprived by an apparent dnnbt of its Hincurity.
But they must reserve to themselves entire freedom of judgment tin
to foe character of circumstances involving tho obligation »f iiiutnrml
support to the Amir, and it must be distinctly undorBtooil that only in
some dear case of unprovoked aggression would such *m uUigulinw
arise.

' In the next place, they cannot secure tho integrity of tlui Auur*H
dominions unless His Highness be willing to afford them i-vory
reasonable^ facility for such precautionary nuMMnrai an thoy may
deem requisite. These precautionary uibamires by no iimaiiH involve
the establishment of British garrisons iu any part of Afyhanwtan, nor
do Her Majesty's Government entertain thu slightest dohiro lo ijimrtor
British soldiers upon Afehftn soU; but thoymn«t havo Air tlmir own
agents undisputed access to its frontier positions. They must aim*
have adequate means of confidentially conforiiiitf with tho Amir ujxm
all matters as to which the proposed declaration would rooaffiilmi it
community of interests. They must be entitled to caiwrft booming
attention to their friendly counsels ; and tho Amir mum Lo mailo to

187G LOl'tD LYTTON'S INSTRUCTIONS 93

understand that, subject to all fair allowance for tile condition of the Lord Lytton'g
country and the character of the population, territories ultimately Instructions
dependent upon British power for their defence must not be closed to
those of the Queen's officers or subjects who may be duly authorised
to enter thorn.

' Her Majesty's Government are also of opinion that the establish-
ment, if possible, of a telegraph from some point on the Indian
frontier to Kabul, via tho Kiinim Valley, is an object deserving of
consideration, and the permanent presence at the Viceregal Court of
a properly accredited Afghan Envoy is much to be desired, as a
guarantee for the due fulfilment of counter obligations on the part of
the Atnir and the uninterrupted facility of your confidential relations
with His Highness. Subject to these general conditions, Her Majesty's
Government can see no objection to your compliance with any
reasonable demand on tho part of Sher Ali for more assured respect
anil protection, such as pecuniary assistance, the advice of British
oflicoi'H in the improvement of his military organisation, or a promise,
not vague, but strictly guarded and clearly circumscribed, of adequate
aid against actual and unprovoked attack by any foreign power.

SSnch a promwo personally givon to tho Amir will probably
flattery His IfighnesH, if tho terms of it be unequivocal. But Her
MajoHty'a Government do nob wish to fetter your discretion in consider-
ing tho advantages of a Rt»crot treaty on the basis above dictated.

•Tim conduct of Khor AH han been more than once characterised,
by HO flignifieant a disregard of tho winlicM and interests of the
Government of India that tho alienation of his confidence in tho
Hinoority and power of that Government is a contingency which
cannot be dififfliBscd UK impossible,

' Should Hiich a fear bo confirmed by tho result of tho proposed
negotiation, no time nniHt bo lowt in reconsidering from a new point
of view tho policy to bo pun-mod in reference to Afghanfatan.

1 On tho othor hand, tho HWCOUHH of those offorta (which, if they be
made at all, cannot bo Hafoly delayed) will bo pregnant with results
HO nilvantagoouH to tho HritiHh powor in India that Hor Majesty's
Government willingly loitvo to tho exorcise of your judgment every
reasonable froodom in carrying out tho present instructions.'

These instructions Lord Lytton took out with
him. It will be seen from them that tho Government
at home, while suggesting the lines on which negotia-
tions with the Amir might be conducted and a new
treaty framed, practically left the Viceroy free to
choose the time and manner in which these in-
should be carried out.

94 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINI8TEATION CH.IH

CHAPTER

TREATY WITH THE KHAN OF KIIBLAT

WIHLK the overture to Slier Ali had so far been
fruitless of good result, negotiations with the Khan
of Khelat were most satisfactorily terminated in
a treaty signed by the Khan and his Sirdars with the
Viceroy 'and Government of India at Jacobabad on
Ducmber 8.

The dominion over which the Khan of Khelat
cslamiB chief authority embraces the whole province
of Belooohistan, being bounded on the north by
Afghanistan, on the south by the Arabian Sea, on
the wc-Kt by Persia, and on the east by the British
provinces of Sindh and the Punjab.

In a confidential Memorandum submitted to his
Council on the subject of our relations with Khelat

the Viceroy wrote : * The history of this country is
lhat of all feadal StateSt It is a 0^0^^ Of turbll,

lent ambitions and barbaric intrigues engendered by
a social chaos out of which no cosmical order has
yet been evolved ; a sanguinary narrative of incessant
defections and revolts, incessant submissions and
rooouquests ; the barons fighting for their cherished
liberty to be lawless; the titular ruler unable to
cotiHolidate or develop his theoretical authority, and
bandy able- to secure his personal safety by adroitly
playing off this chief or that tribe against some other
Irilx* or chief.*

1876 KIIELAT 95

Up to the year 1872 it had been the policy of History of
successive agents at the Court of the Khan to uphold
the authority of the exist ing ruler, while endeavouring
to interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs
of the counfay; but in the years 1870 and 1871 an
unfortunate rivalry sprang up between the Punjab
and Sindh systems of policy and their official repre-
sentatives. Colonel Hiayre, political superintendent
at Khelat, took up the cause of 1he disaffected
Sirdars, and was supported by Captain Sandemnn,
the official representative of the Punjab Government.
Sir William Merewether, however, Commissioner of
Sindh, strongly opposed this policy. These three
gentlemen were authorised by the supreme Govern-
ment to meet at Jacobabad, invmtigata the com-
plaints of the Sirdars, and mediate between thum and
the Khan. To this conference Lord Lyttmi trace- » the
origin of all the subsequent (liftiunllinH in Kliulat. It
resulted in the removal of Colonel l*lmyr« and the
recall of Captain tiaudemun. Sir William Mennvelher
was left to conclude the mediation alone, but though
his decision was in the main against the Sirdars it left
the Khan 6 deeply incensed and offended by a media-
tion which admitted his rebellious Sirdars to Ixt heard
and treated by the British Government an his equals*'
6 The Troj an war/ wrote* Lord Ly 1 ton, * would prol ml >ly Mim(a- Md
have been of brief duration had the conduct of it Note,
been left to the craft and cruelty of ordinary mortal**.
But certain bellicose divinities espoused the rival
claims of Arrives and Trojans, and took a pleasure
of their own iu prolonging the conflict. In the Mime
way our Sindh and Punjab officers transferred to the
Olympian, altitudes of the fmprrme Government a
series of miserable quarrels only appropriate to
their barbarian birthplace/

96 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CII.IJT

From this time forward matters grew worse and

Minutes and worse. 'Outrage followed outrage, and no satis-

Notes, faction could be obtained by the British Govern-

ment.' A daring inroad was made by some Ilralioou

tribes on British territory ; it remained unredressed.

The Khan's subsidy was stopped and our agent with-

drew from his Court, bringing with him thn ox-

minister Wullee Mahomed. Sir William Merewolher

then recommended an armed intervention in Kholat.

and deposition of the present Khan.

This proposal was not looked upon wich favour
by the Britisl1 Government, and it waw dtuctal to

1875 send Captain Sandeman into the Murree T Tills for the*

settlement of some of our disputes with the tribes in
that district. He started on November 22, 1875.

Lord Lytton remarks that in reading through the
official papers on the subject of our relatiorw with
Khelat he has often found cause to apprwrntit the
wisdom of a maxim attributed to the King of Huriwih.
' There is to everything/ says His Majesty,' a ! winning,
a middle, and an end. You, should nnve-r go beyonil
the beginning until you are sure of tin* middle ; when
you get to the middle, you should never for^t th«<
beginning; and neither at the beginning nor (he
middle should you ever lose sight of the* end/ * It
appears to me,' he adds, ' that in tluj middle of our
relations with Khelat we have acnnotimeH forgotten
the beginning; at least between our policy at one
time and our policy at another thore seeina to b« a
complete solution of continuity, and I groally fuar
that at the present moment wo are m Home dangar
of being hurried, or beguiled, towanln an MM! not
clearly foreseen or deliberately desired/

The general results of Major Bawleman'B first
mission were, that after hearing the compla'mts of (lift

1876 KHELAT 97

chiefs he had ascertained from them that they would Jp?nte? £a

Th • • i i* • n i JMOWB, loft)

welcome British mediation, and that they were
willing to become peaceable subjects of the Khan on
certain conditions, that moreover they had been
induced to make a conditional submission to the
Khan. Further, that the Khan himself was willing to
submit to British mediation, and was prepared to
submit his case directly to the Government.

The Government of India, on receipt of Major
Sandemau's report (of February 1876), decided in
accordance with the advice given it by Colonel
Munro and the Punjab Government, that it was
worth while to take advantage of the opening thus
offered and allow Major Sandeman to make another
attempt al mediation ; with the advantage, this time,
of enlarged instructions and a recognised position.
The ' instructions,' however, were again of a vague
character, and, ranch to Lord Lytton's surprise*, tlu*y
were not conveyed ILL writing.

Major Sandnman started OIL this aooond mission ^0J
three days before Lord Lyttou himself landed in mSion
India. The* news was convoyed io Lord Lytton at Apl1M
Bombay, and entirely upset his original intention —
approved by the Government at homo— of Bonding a
confidential mission first of all to KkulaL, and thcnrr,
after the satisfactory settlement of our relations \vitU
the Khan, to Kabul vid Kandahar.

The character of Major Sandeman's mission was -so
much at variance wit li tho principle which J jonl 1 -ytton
desired to adopt as 1 1m basis of his foreign policy — vise.
'that of treating all frontier questions as parts of a
whole riuostion, and not as separate questions having
no relation to each otliwr1 — that ho telugrapliwl and
wrote to Lord Northbrook on his way to OulcuMa,
'urging him to suspend the mission of Major

n

98 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADUINIRTUATRIN rn, in

Minutes and Sandeman3 who had not then entered Kholnt lerri t < try „'
Notes,i876 untft his assumption of office, which look plare a fi»w
days later, in order that he might * have, an oppor*
tunity of reconsidering, and if necessary re, vising,
Major Sandeman's instructions in coniutclion with th*>
views and plans' he had already formed with regard
to his whole frontier policy, and of ansoe,ialin# hi**
mission, if possible, more directly with tin* attainment
of the object he had in vifrtv.

This suggestion, however, was not accepted by
Lord Northbrook, who was ignorant of the grounds
on which it had been urged, and Lord Lylfon was
forced, therefore, to recast th« arrangements In* had
contemplated in a form, ho thought, J<*m favourable
to their success,

Major Sandeman in the nuniii while ivi-civvd itt
first answers botlx from the cliiefn and from I IIP Khan
that were not encouraging. On June ft, how«*vrr*
he was able to telegraph that tho Khan, after rereivtn^
the Viceroy's (Lord Northbrook'«) letter, waw willing
to consent to the mediation of (he- Uriti«h (loverti
ment, that he had overcome his objiwtiona to Ii'avinjr
Khelat, and that he consented to meet hin rh'wfa and
Major Sandeman at Mastung. On June 1(! Major
Sandeman further telegraphed the terms of wf !li»im*nL
proposed by the Klian and arsociptulile to the Sirdaiu
These terms as they were firHl drawn up did not
meet with the Viceroy's approval They wi-n% he
thought, too humiliating to the dignity of the Khan
and too favourable to the rebellioiiH <*hfafn. The*
effect of such a treaty would, he belhwd, ureatlv
impede his negotiations with th« Amir of Afyhmiimati.
Although it subsequently became inevitable t<i
dissociate our policy in JMooehiiitui from thai
adopted towards Afghanistan, the Vie^roy ut this

187U KHKLAT 99

timu was anxious not to deal with the one frontier
Statw without carefully <.'onsiderin# how his action
would aflertthe other, and he* felt that the import anew
of all frontier qu<;Mions was enhanced by the struggle
which mi^ht be pending hetwwn ourselves and
Russia, 011 our side fur the maintenance, on theirs fur
the acquisition, of imperial power and mfhutncu in
tho Kasl.

The. Viceroy in a long lc,lt*T to Major iSatideinan
indic;Ltc.d (he objects wlueii should he )>onuj in mind
in drafting (ht* new Treaty with (he Khun.

I. Tlut niainfenunre of a eoinmandin^ i

in Khelat.

li, The support of a strong uiul settl<4tl
ineut there.

II. friie freedom and seeurity of thu Itolan Paw,

and iitlter trade routes*
•1. The paeiliralion of Kutehec, and tli<4 spe«'dy

development of its ^n-af natural vvealtlu
ft. With regard to <iuettah, the importuae-e, <»f
wlurh si at it »n in the evunl of a frontier war
he fully realiHO<!Jte was in favour of plaein^
them a British oflieer attd hoKpitat an a
uieaim of inrn'UHing the tso<*ial and politieal
of the Kn^tisli over the surrounding
, without at pmsent availing
of a tnfaly rifjht to omjpy that

Tli« Viceroy's military seeretary, Colonel (!olley,
wan dinputehed to Major Saiuleman with full powers
to explain to that oilieer the views of the (iovern*
mcnt, and !>earittf{ letters from the Viceroy to Major
Saudomati and the Khan, In (his lultur the Vice-
roy proposed to mine himndf to *Ia<*obahad for
the signature of the iu*w Treaty, and invited

If !J

100 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION1 OIL in

The Viceroy
starts for
Jacobabad

Letter to the
Queen,
November 15

Khan to follow him afterwards to Delhi on the
occasion of the proclamation of the Queen as
Empress.

Colonel Colley reached Khelat on October 14,
and on the 18th, at a grand Durbar, presented to the
Khan the Viceroy's letter and invitation. The invi-
tation was accepted, and the Khan at onc*c made
arrangements for meeting the Vicei'oy fit the time
and place appointed.

Early in November the Viceroy, urtcuimpamccl by

Lady Lytton and suite, commenced Ids march from

Simla towards the frontier. On November 1 fi he iml OH

from Camp Dalhousie to the Querm : ' I muHt now

ask your Majesty's permission to say n few words on

the subject of our frontier relation**, whfch derive

special importance from the present c.riljcsil condition

of the Eastern Question. To bftgin with Khelal.

Through the territories of this State your Majesty's

Indian Empire is most open to attack, either from

the Eussian army of the Caspian, or from Afghanistan

if the Amir of Kabul were to outer into any alliance

hostile to us. The assured co-operation or allpfriaucu*

of this State in case of war is therefore eanential to

our means of defence or aggression. Six months

ago Klielat was seething with civil war ; the 4'omluut

of the Khan had been so unsatisfactory that wee had

broken off relations with His Highness, and no power

remained in the State strong miouph, or friendly

enough, to control the predatory bordor tribes, who

had rendered all the trade routes hnpaawable, and

were with impunity incessantly devastating our own

territory and plundering our own subjects. Hoim* of

the most experienced political officer** of your

Majesty's Indian Government advised the Wovcrn-

ment to depose the Khan and take forcible

1876 KHELAT IOI

of his country ; others proposed that we should enter
into separate relations •with the tribes, and purchase
their good behaviour (as the Romans of the lower
empire purchased that of the Barbarians) by paying
them subsidies. The first of these two proposals
appeared to me injudicious, and indeed impracticable.
The second proposal also seemed to me pusillanimous
and unworthy of a great empire. I have now, how-
ever, the satisfaction of being able to inform your
Majesty that the Khan of Khelat has agreed to sign
with me a Treaty, the terms of which will make us
virtually the masters of Khelat, not by annexing the
country, but by re-establishing the Khan's authority
on conditions which secure Ids implicit allegiance.
This Treaty puts an end to rivil war in Khelat, and
provides, I think, adequate guarantees against its
recurrence. It is hailed with satisfaction by the
Sirdars and the tribes, as woll as by the prince him-
self; and it secures for ever to the Hriiish riovcrumrait
the right and the power to place British troops at any
time in any part of the khanate. In anticipatiojx of
the conclusion of the Treaty, and in view of the
uncertain character of our present, relations with
Kussia, I have, with the full assent — and indeed at the
express request —of the Khan, already thrown a small
British force into Queltah, a post of great* strategical
iiupor lance iu the event of war. The trade route**
have been re-opened, and commerce has peaceably
manned its customary course. The Khan agrees to
meet me on my march round the frontier for the
purpose of signing this Treaty, and afterwards to
attend the Imperial assemblage at Delhi, accompanied
by all his principal Sirdars, for the purpose of there
publicly doing homage to your Majesty as his
Suzerain. I anticipate from this arrangement a

102 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN APMINISTRATmX r'H.ni

great increase to our influence and prestige beyond

the frontier/

Treaty of On the evening of December 7 the Vireroy

Jacobabad an(j ^ ^y j^^a Jacobabad, and the Treaty with

the Khan and all his Sirdars was executed on
December 8. A description of the ceremony is
given in a letter from the Viceroy to Sir Henry
Norman, dated 'Biver Indus m twit? for Knrrarhre,
December 12.'

6 Now I must, I fear, be more bricjf than I rould
wish in my narration of the (feneral results of my
exceedingly interesting visit to Jacobabad, Marly in
the morning after rny arrival, T received, in a jjreat
public durbar, the Khan (who had previously
telegraphed to me en rtHit?, offering to inert me nn
the road, an offer which I declined with thanks) and
all his Sirdars, not one of whom was alwut, The
little Khan was obviously very nervous or very
much alarmed, and trembled violently when 1 h»Il
him to his seat. The durbar waw most pirtnreH(|itt*
and uncouth. Imniediatcily itfte.r\vanls I made him a
return visit, which was purely complimentary ;
after luncheon, as soon as the Kn^Ii/sli Irm* w;is
I had a private interview with the Khan, hi* rhji-f
Sirdars and Ministers, Thornton, Munrri, Kanclriimit,
Burne, and Oolley only. Tlu? Treaty was then Ni|nii«fl
quite privately, without anysalvoon or puhlir detmui
strations, as I think it best not to puhliKh it innnedi
atdy; and I addressed both the Klmii and the Hininm
at some length in explanation of their mutual oMipii
tions to each other and to us, under Liu* lemw of it,
To these injunctions and warning the renponne from
both sides was all that could 1m wished. Uoth Khan
and Sirdars appeared to understand every '•laumsof tin*
Treaty thoroughly, and to be equally cii!liphf*c! with it .

1876 KHELAT 103

They left me about sunset, and, this being the hour
of prayer, they all knelt down together outside the
house before mounting their horses, and offered
thanks to Allah for the day's event. Khan and
Sirdars are now on their way to Delhi. . . . [The
Khan] has the furtive face and restless eye of a little
hunted wild beast which has long lived in daily
danger of its life. But his manners are good, and as
soon as it loses its expression of alarm and mistrust
his countenance is not unpleasing.'

Major Sandeman, to whose tact and ability the
success of the Treaty was largely due, was appointed
the representative of the British Government at the
Court of the Khan, with an agent under him at
Quettah. He was henceforth to correspond direct with
the Government of India.

Lord Lytton communicated to him this news in
the following letter of congratulation :

'My dear Major Sauclainon, — I must congratulate To Mftj0r
you cordially on the complete success of your difficult
and anxious mission, and auk you to accept my thanks
for the services you have rendered to my Govern-
ment, and to India, by enabling us to effect a satis-
factory re-organisation of our relations with Khelat,
which I think likely to become ere long murh more
important than they have ever been before). I have
recommended you to the Secretary of State for a
C.S.I., and shall take an early opportunity of officially
acknowledging the good work you have clono.

* The conclusion of the Treaty signed yestwday
between myself and the Khan virtually terminates
your mission, and thus raises the question of redistri-
buting your escort and fixing your future position
and duties, &c,

' I am not surprised to learn from Colonel Burne

104 L0]ai) LOTION'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. in

that after your trying labours of the last nine months,
you feel the need of rest ; and I need not say that on
this point I am most anxious to meet your own
wishes, whatever they may be, or the consideration of
any arrangement that is safe and practicable. But I
feel so strongly that just at present, and, indeed, so
long as our relations with Russia and Afghanistan
remain in their present ambiguous and critical
position, your continued presence and influence in
Khelat are so absolutely necessary to secure and
confirm the results of the re cent Treaty, that I anxiously
trust it may be compatible with your convenience
not to withdraw them till matters are a little more
settled. I think that you should have under your
orders a very intelligent and trustworthy a^ent in
whose tact, adroitness, and loyalty you ran place
implicit confidence. I anticipate that Ciuettah will
henceforth be the seat of our most important Intelli-
gence Department in regard to trans-frontier politics ;
and, indeed, as soon as the pacification of Khelat is
completely assured, the main work of your diplomacy
in that Khanate will be to extend our influence
quietly, peacefully, but, if pofloiblc*, rapidly from
Quettah iu the direction of Kandahar. These con-
siderations I cannot attempt to develop, or discuss in
the present letter, It is desirable that you uhould
now address your official correspondence) dhwt to my
Foreign Department.

6 Tours, my dear Major Bimdcuuan,

c Very sincerely,

Writing in 1880 of this Treaty Lord Lytton says :
* The Bolan Pass, then re-opened, has never since
been closed. During the Afghan campaign of 1878
not a single British soldier was maintained or a

1876 KIIELAT JO5

* *•* .

single robbery committed in that pass. Throughout
the country villages have been rebuilt, and trade
and agriculture not only restored but powerfully
stimulated. The revenues of the Khan and the
wealth of his subjects have been largely increased ;
they are still rapidly increasing ; both the sovereign
and the people iire contented; and our Khelat
border is perfectly quiet. ... I am at a loss to
understand how our intervention in Khcdal could
injuriously alfeot the Amir of Kabul liut be lLat
as it may, the propriety of a policy which vraa
intended to rescue, and which actually did rescue,
Helouchislan from horrible anarchy, and restore it
not only to peace but prosperity, was a matter to be
conducted on its own merits without refiranw to the
light in which it wight be viewed by Bhcr AIL The
occupation of (iuettah was indispensable to the
success of Lluit policy, for tlm Klmn rould not be
adequately supported without it. Tlio measure was
adopted at the mjuriHl of His Highness and his
Sirdars, and carried out in accordance with treaty
rights of lotig standing There ia only one word I
wish to add on the subject of Khelat , . . Oonwidor
how terribly the difficulties, the anxieties, und the
expense; of the Government of India would haves been
augmented if the condition of that country, and our
relations with it, had bp.eii in 78 or in 980 such ii« 1
found them in 7(J !'

The close of Lin* year 387(» found the Viceroy
and his 8ititc in camp at Delhi for thu ])roc:hunatkm
of tli(^ (hweiL-KinpruHH. This historical ceremony will
be describod in thc^ next chapter.

106 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.JV

CHAPTER IV

DELHI ASSEMDLAfiK

the administration of India was transferred
from the East India Company to the Sovereign, it
seemed in the eyes of her Indian subjects and feuda-
tories that the impersonal power of an administrative
abstraction had been replaced by the; direct personal
authority of a human being. This was a change
thoroughly congenial to all their traditional senti-
ments, but without some appropriate; title tho Queen
of England was scarcely leas of an abstraction than
the Company itself. The only Indian word corro-
spondingtothe English Queen — namely, Malikn — was
one commonly bestowed on the wife of an Indian
prince and therefore entirely inapplicable to the true
position of the British Sovereign in India. The, title*
of Empress or Pddshdh could alone adequately repre-
sent her relations with the states and kingdoniH of
India, and was moreover a title familiar to the natives
of the country, and an impressive and Migniflrauit one
in their eyes.

Embarrassments inseparable from the want of
some appropriate title had lon# Ixscm experienced
with increasing force by successive Indian adminis-
trations, and were brought, as it were, to a urim
by various circumstances incidental to the Prin«e
of Wales's visit to India in 1875-70, and by a
recommendation on the part of Lord Nbrthbrook'tt

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 1 07

Government that it would be in accordance with
fact, with the language of political documents,
and with that in ordinary use, to speak of Her
Majesty as the Sovereign of India — that is to say, the
paramount power over all, including Native States.

It was accordingly announced in the speech from
the throne in the session of 187C, that whereas when
the direct government of the Indian Empire was
assumed by the Queen no formal addition was made
to the style and titles of tho Sovereign, Tier Majesty
deemed that moment a fitting one for supplying the
omission, and of giving thereby a formal and emphatic
expression of the favourable sentiments which she
had always entertained towards the princes and
people of India.

Lord Lytton, on his arrival in India, found that
this aiinountsomont, following directly upon the visit
of the Prince of Wales, had 4sot tho whole native
population on the <yw ?u'?v,' thoir prevailing sentiment
being one of 6 anxious curiosity, with a little flutter
of hopo,' a hope winch it might be dangerous to
disappoint, and not only beneficial but easy to satisfy,
and * iu so doing to convert popular satisfaction into
a national enthusiasm, the force of which will be
felt far beyond our frontier, and more than justify
every argument * used for the defence of the measure.

The feeling of favourable expectation and satis*
faction first excited by the prospect of the Queen's
assumption of the new title was troubled and chilled
by tin* unfortunate opposition to tho lloyal Titles Hill
in itft passage through Parliament. Tho title required
to be rehabilitated in native imagination, and the final
effect of its adoption would now depend on the
manner and oircumstn,nco,s of its proclamation.

To the Vineroy this presented an opportunity of

Opportunity
tor enlisting
sympathies
of native
aristocracy

1 08 LORD LYTTON'S IN])IAN ADMINISTRATION OH. IT

inaugurating a new policy by virtue of which, the
Crown of England should henceforth be identified
with the hopes, the aspirations, the sympathies and
interests of a powerful native aristocracy. To do
this would, he felt, materially diminish the dangers
with which the Empire of India was then threatened
by the condition of affairs in Central Asia.

In a letter to Mr. Disraeli, on April 30, he wrote :
* Nothing has struck me more in my intercourse
thus far with Indian Rajas and Maharajas than the
importance they attach to their family pedigrees and
ancestral records. Here is a great feudal aristocracy
which we cannot #et rid of, which we are avowedly
anxious to conciliate and command, but which we
have as yet done next to nothing to rally round the
Jiritisli Crown as ita feudal head. Every JRaja I have
yet conversed with has been curiously ami amusingly
anxious to convince me of the antiquity of his family,
and the extent to which its importance has been
recognised by the Suzerain Power at various times.
Many of them have pr rented me wil.li printed and
illustrated genealogies and family records, lovingly
edited by themselves and publi«lictl at their own
expense. Hcveral of Ihcwu ^emjalogujs are composed
and priutad in Rnglfok Hut what, !H worthy of notice
is that in all of thorn I iinduviiluiusc* that small favours
and marks of lumuur besttnvecl from time to time by
the British Government on the Iioacl of the family
(such as an additional #uu to IHH salute, the right to
artiturn visit from the Yin-roy, or a more honourable
place in durbar, Ac,.) are quilt* as highly prized and
appreciated a» the more Kubslanliai benefits (of
augmented territory or revenue) conferred in earlier
times upon their family by an Aurwigzebe or an
Akbar.9

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 1 09

Writing to Lord Salisbury, on May 11, lie again
enforces his view as to the importance of this appeal
to sentiment. ' T am convinced that the fundamental
political mistake of able and experienced Indian
officials is a belief that we can hold India securely by
what lhe}r call good government ; that is to say, by
improving the condition of the ryot, strictly ad-
ministering j u si ioe, spending immense sums on irri-
gation works, &u. Politically speaking, the Indian
peasantry is an inert mass. If it ever moves at
all, it will move in obedience, not to its British bene-
factors, but to its native chiefs and princes, however
tyraimioul they may be. The only political repre-
sentatives of native opinion are the Baboon, whom we
have educated to write somi-soelitious articles in the
native, Press, and who really represent nothing but
the social anomaly of their own position. Look at
the mistake wlii<ili Austria made in the government
of her Italian provinces. They wore the, bust
governed portions of Italy ; she studied and protected
the interests of the native peasantry; but, fearing the
iitttivo 7wWdww, shft snubbed and repressed it; when
that M'Mruw, having nothing to gain or to hope from
the continuation of her rule, conspired against it,
the, peasantry cither remained passive or else followed
the l'*ad of UH national superiors in attacking its alum
benefactors. Hut the Indian chiefs and princes are-
not a niero iwbltim. They are a powerful aristocracy.
To secure completely, and efliciently utilise., the
Indian aristocracy is, I am convinced, the most
important problem now before us. 1 admit, that it
js not easy of immediate solution. For whilst, on
the one hand, wo rcM]iiire their cordial and willing
i'Jlogianiic, which is dependent on their sympathies
un<l intcr«HlH being in some way associated with the

1 10 LOBD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMLNISTIIATJO?? <*H, iv

interests of the British Power, ou the other hand we
certainly cannot afford to give them any increased
political power independent of our own. Fortunately
for us, however, they are easily affected bysentinmnt,
and susceptible to the influence of symbols to which
facts very inadequately correspond.' ±

By August 1870 the proposed" scheme for the
proclamation of the new title had been drawn up
and had received the cordial support of the Viceroy's
Council in India.

The translation of the new title* in Out vcrnuuular
was a matter for cardul consideration and rorwulla-
t*on' ^ie G°venmusnt of Tiulia finally decided to
adopt the term Kaisar-i-l find. It wan whorl,, H< m< >r< HIK,
expressive of the Imperial eharac;f,er whirh it VSUH
intended to convey, and a title, moreover, of ehuwic-ai
antiquity, the term Kaisar-i-Uoom beiii|r that p*iuk
rally applied in Oriental literature to the Human
emperors, and still representing the title* of emperor
throughout Central Asia.
Plans for It was, moreover, due.ided (hut the new till«

Dolhi Aasem I^HT •,' . ,,

should be announced at a </re<'tt iiKNemhlaj^ on

liistorical plain near Delhi, on January i, 1S77— in
the presence of the howls of every tfoveramenl in
India; of 1,200 of MU; noble Inuid of oivll aervantft;
of 14,000 splendidly (Miui]ip(scl and diHeiplinecl ItriliNli
and native troops; of wsventy-seven of th« ruling
chiefs and princes of India, rcprew*ntin<{ (erritorii'M
as large as Great Britain, Kranre and Oenmuty com-
bined; and of 300 native n<»hleinen and ^entieinen
besides. Altogether 08,000 wiTtt invited and tlitl
actually reside in Delhi :utfl in its Hitrroumliii^ camps
during the fourteen days of the Assemblage.

Had Lord Lytton been able wliolly to rarry otu
his policy with regard to the Delhi Assemblage UMI

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE III

acts of grace which accompanied the proclamation
would have been of a more substantial and less formal
character than they actually were.

He had desired to take this opportunity to esta- Proposed
blish an Indian Privy Council, forming a distinct and 1SSSS3Sf
separate institution, restricted, at all events in the J*h D^u
first instance, to the great chiefs, and empowered to BSem age
consult with and advise the Viceroy from time to
time on general matters of State. Occasions might
arise on which such sympathy and counsel would be
of extreme importance.

The Viceroy proposed at the same time to initiate
a Native Peerage for the Empire of India and establish
a Herald's College at Calcutta. Such an institution
might, he considered, receive important development,
not only as a matter of sentiment, but as a material
addition to the forces of the Empire. The opposition,
howevur, of certain authorities at home proved too
strong for the schemes to be carried out in the way
the Viceroy had planned them, and they were finally
reduced to an association of some of the leading
native princes, with the principal advisers of the
Indian Government as ' Councillors of the Empress,9
thus forming a nucleus for a future Indian Privy
Council.

The further acts which were actually carried out
In connection with the proclamation were as follows :

Services hitherto inadequately recognised were Measures
rewarded; pensions enjoyed by ancient native families
whose unquestioned loyally had rendered them
deserving of assistance were increased; numerous
increased salaries for life were granted to the principal
native chief** ; and to each chief entitled to a salute
was presented, in the name of the Queen and with all
due ceremony, a large silken banner bearing on one

112 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. iv

side the Royal Arms and on the other his own. The
banners were of diverse colours, varying according
to the rank of the chief, and were to be carried
henceforth at all State ceremonials in front of those
to whom they were given. Gold and silver medals
commemorative of the day were also struck and
delivered respectively to each chief and to other
selected persons from Her Majesty. Honorary titles
were conferred — a reward very dear to the native
mind — on more than 200 native* nobleman and
gentlemen ; a large mimbur of certificates of honour
were presented to native und other gentleman through-
out India holding such offices *is honorary magis-
trates and members of municipal councils; the. puj
and allowances to the commissioned anil non-com-
missioned officers and men of the native army in
India wore, increased, and a largo number of appoint-
ments were made to the Order of British India.

There remained the more difficult taflknf
some appropriate recognition on tin* part of
ment of the claims of tin* British portion of (he
community, representing th« power by which the
Empire had been won and maintained in the part,
and on which it depended for its consolidation and
advancement in the present. The question M§UH lonjir
and carefully considered, more* especially OH Lord
Lytton was personally anxious that HOIIU* Much
recognition should bo made. Insuperable objeol ions,
however, were raised to some* of the more, material
suggestions made by the Viceroy und it proved
impossible finally to do mon* than #iw some sq>-
pointmentH to the Ord«r of the Star of India; to
create an order specially open to non-ofliowl classes,
now known as the cMoat Kmincnt Order of the
Indian Empire;' to improve in some degree tlu*

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 113

position of British, officers serving in native regiments ;
and to give a day's pay to the seamen and soldiers
serving the Queen-Empress within Indian limits on
the day of the proclamation.

On the day of the proclamation of the new title
nearly 10,000 prisoners were released throughout
British India, carrying the feeling of rejoicing to a
vast number of individuals in remote districts, who
hut for this act of grace would probably never have
heard of the occasion. It is creditable to the judg-
ment with which the selections for release wore made,
that out of this number only two casus were brought
to notice, after a considerable interval of time, in
which prisoners so released were re-committed on
criminal charges.

On September 1J, the news of the proclamation
having them boon made public, Lord Lyltou writes to viceroy to
the Queen: *A11 the principal chiefs have responded
with enthusiasm to my appeal, including even the
Nizam, who was considered the most doubtful. 1
now reckoji ou the attendance of seventy-nine ruling
chiefs, besides a vast number of minor chiefs Our
only difficulty, indeed, is now to restrain the size of
the assemblage within reasonable limits. I iK&cl not
say that the sanitary and other arrangements, us vvuil
as the supply of food for so large a concourse of
human beings, besides Ixorses, camols, and elephants,
require much cure and forethought. Tim whole
Press of this country, English and native, hay received
the announcement of the assemblage in (lie most loyal
and satisfactory spirit. Even those Anglo-Indian
journals which, as habitual supporters of the Opposi-
tion at home, were most hostile in their antagonism
to the Titles Hill, have completely changed
their tone, and now write in warmly approving

I

114 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.IV

Threatened
famine in
Bombay and
Madras

terms of the policy of giving to the announcement
of your Majesty's Imperial Title in this country
the utmost possible splendour and importance. I
have thought it well to invite to Delhi, for this
occasion, the editors of all the respectable newspapers
in India, both the native and the English, and to
entertain them in their separate camp. This step,
which was never before taken in connection with
any similar ceremonial, has had the happiest efleoi
upon the tone of the whole Press. I have also invited
all the Members of Council, with their wives and
daughters, to be my personal guests during the week's
festivities at Delhi, and I propose to invite the
attendance of the French and Portuguese (-Jovernors/

Writing to Lord Beaconsfield, on Outobur 8, he
says: *I am afraid I may have seemed fussy or
frivolous about the decorative details of the Delhi
assemblage. . . . The decorative details of an
Indian pageant are like those parts of an animal
which are no use at all for butcher's meat, and are
even unfit for scientific dissection, but from which
augurs draw the omens that move armies and
influence princes/

All went well till late in the autumn, when news
of a threatened famine in Bombay and Madras started
hostile criticism on the proclamation scheme on the
ground that it was ' spending money on pageants '
when the people were starving. Lord Lytton, how-
ever, writes: *I am strongly of opinion that the
Delhi meeting has become more important than ever.
In the first place, if we are on the eve of a war,1 it
is of vital importance to rouse the enthusiasm and
secure the loyalty of all our great feudatories ; and
no such opportunity of doing this has ever occurred

1 With Russia*

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 115

before, or is likely to occur again. . . . Again, if we
are really threatened with a serious famine, necessi-
tating additional imperial taxation and upsetting
all our present financial calculations, the same
opportunity will most advantageously enable the
Government of India to enter into timely and personal
consultation with the heads of local administrations
OD the subject of the financial policy required to
meet the situation/

Early in November 3870 the Viceroy, accom-
panied by Lady Lytton and his staff, left Simla for
a tour round the frontier, to which reference has
already been made in connection with the affairs of
Khelat. After visiting Peshawur, Lahore, Multan,
Bhawulporo, Jacobabad, and Kurrachee, they arrived
at Ddlii on December 2.3. The complctest and most
picturesque account of the great functions which then
took place then* is given by Lord Lyttou in his letter
to the (iueim dated January JO, 1877.

From Lord Lytttw to the Quern

<I>olh!, Pattinl*, Uinballft, Alignrh, Agm ;

Dccoinbw 2tt, 1870, to January 10, 1877.

'Madam, — I have so much to report to your
Majesty, and so little time to write, that I should
scarcely know where to begin this letter, if personal
gratitude did not claim precedence even over public
business. Yesterday was rendered eventful to Lady
Lytton and myself by our receipt of the splendid and
beautiful cup which your Majesty has deigned to
confer upon our favoured baby boy,1 It i» impos-
sible for me to express to your Majesty the pride wo
feel in being honoured by this exquisite gift from the

1 Born on August 9, 1870, at Simla.

Il6 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION on. IT

Letter to the beloved and revered hand of "Our Queen and
gracious Lady," nor how greatly we admire the
beauty and perfect taste of it as a work of art. This
beautiful tassa will be an heirloom, cherished, I hope,
for generations in a family to which your Majesty's
godson, if his life be spared, will bequeath those
sentiments of grateful and devoted loyalty which it
is now his father's privilege to express on his behalf.
6 The day before yesterday (December 23), I
arrived, with Lady Lytton and all my staff, at Delhi,
punctually to the hour which was fixed three months
ago. I was received at the station by all the native
chiefs and princes, and, before alighting from the
train, I addressed to them a few words of welcome to
Delhi, and thanks for the cordiality with which they
had responded to the Viceroy's invitation. These
were translated by Mr. Thornton, the Officiating
Foreign Secretary ; and then, after shaking hands
with Kashmir, Sindiah, Holkar, the Nizam, Jeypore,
and others, I immediately mounted my elephant,
accompanied by Lady Lytton, our two little girls
following us on another elephant. The procession
through Delhi to the camp, which we only readied
towards sunset, lasted upwards of three hours. It
was a magnificent and most successful pageant. Tho
Viceroy and staff were followed by the chief
functionaries, civil and military, of your Majesty's
Indian Government, mounted on elephants spendidly
caparisoned. The streets were lined for many miles
by the troops ; those of the native princes being
brigaded with those of your Majesty. The crowd
along the whole way, behind the troops, was dense,
and apparently enthusiastic; the windows, walls,
and housetops being thronged with natives, who
salaamed, and Europeans, who cheered as we

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 117

passed along. . . . The infiuite variety of tlie non- Letter to the
British native troops presented a most striking and §e5dn
peculiar appearance. Those who saw it will pro- blage
bably never again behold in one spot so vivid and
various a display of strange arms, strange uniforms,
and strange figures. „ . . Your Majesty's Highlanders
were the admiration of all who beheld them, and
your Majesty may well be proud of these splendid
troops. . . .

'My reception by the native princes at the
station was most cordial. The Maharaja of
Jeypore (who has lighted the Viceroy's camp with
gas of his own manufacture) informed Sir John
Htratthey that India had never seen such a gathering
as this, in which not only all the great native princes
(many of whom havo never met before), but also
chiefs and envoys from Khelat, Jiurmah, Sunn, and
the remotest parts of the; East', arc assembled to do
homage to your Majesty* He himself, he said, could
hardly realise the difficulties which had been over-
come, or the success which had been achieved, by
this assemblage; and, indeed, up to the present
moment there is, so far a.s I can ascertain, only one
opinion on the part of Europeans, as well as natives,
that our great undertaking has commenced most
successfully with every promise of a no less success-
ful conclusion. . . .

*T began this letter to your Majesty on the
evening of my arrival at Delhi ; but my time since
then has been so incessantly occupied by other duties
to your Majesty that I have only been able to continue
it interruptedly «at rare interval!* of time. I will now
endeavour to #ive your Majesty a short ucuouut of
all that has happened up to (late, without breaking
the narralive by dating the interruptions in it.

Il8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cn.iv

Latter to the 4 Sunday and Christmas Day were clays of rest.
- Divine Service was peformed in the Viceroy's camp

Wage by the Bishop of Madras and Archdeacon Baly : and

special prayers were offered up for your Majesty in

reference to the event we were about to celebrate

Our Christmas Day was saddened hy a sudden anc1

deeply felt bereavement. Captain Clayton of your

Majesty's 9th Lancers, who was attached lo my stafl'

as an extra aide-de-camp at Delhi, broke his neck by

a fall from his pony, whilst playing at polo, anil

expired in the course of the night. This excellent

and most efficient officer was warmly beloved by all

who knew him. ITis untimely death is a great los,«

to your Majesty's service and a lasting sorrow in

his fellow-officers and many friends* To poor Lord

William Ueresford, who, from boyhood, had known and

loved him as a brother, the shock and grief of it- have

been quite heartrending to witness. T have written to

express my deep sympathy lo the officers and men of

his regiment. He has been buried in Ilia ramp at Delhi.

6 On Tuesday (December 20) from 10 A.M. till

past 7 P.M., I was, without a moment's intermission,

occupied in receiving visits from native chiefs, and

bestowing on those entitled to them the banners,

medals, and other honours jriven by your Majesty.

The durbar, which lasted all day and lonjf after

dark, was most successful. The order of the chiefs'

visits to the Viceroy had been carefully arranged on

a new principle, which completely obviated Jill

difficulties and heartburnings about precedence, and

each of them left my tout radiant with pleasure

and surprise, and profuse in protestations of the

most grateful and devoted loyalty. The medals are

most artistic. They are universally admired. Their

recipients seem to be exceedingly proud of them ;

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 119

and there is already a growing competition amongst **«« j£
both. Europeans and natives to obtain even the sih er noihi
ones; whirh, I may sa}-, have been particularly blage
useful, by enabling- me, in your Majesty's name, to
distinguish many minor services for which no other
decoration, or honour of any kind, was available.
The banners, which are splendidly embroidered by
hand on the, finest Chinese satins of every colour (the
colours chosen for eaeh being those most appropriate
to the ruling princ'i* to which it was givoii), have had
a great efleot. Their only fault* which I had not
anticipated, is that, Ilia brass polos, which an*
elaborately worked, niako them NO heavy that it
requires Ilium lilfwlefllirtB of two stalwart Highlanders
to carry ono of them; and, consequently, the* native,
chiefs who Iwvu received them will, in future pro-
cessions, he, obliged, 1 aiitieipjile, 1o lioisl them on
the bucks of elephants. This is what they did on the?
first occasion of their use in profession at. the, review
I held OIL tin* dsiy of my de|Kirlarcj from Delhi*
Tour Majesty's port rail., which was placed over the
Vicarial thnwin in the great durbar tent, was
thought l>y all who saw it, to l>u a very ^ood copy,
and JLU oxrellent likenoHH of your Majesty. The
native chiefs examined it with Kpemal interest-,

*()n Wednesday, I ho liTtli, L reee.ived visits from
native ehiefs, as before, from 10 A.M. till I P.M., and
from ,1 ^ P.M. to 7^ P.M., was passed in returning visits.
I forgot to mention that on Tuesday and Wednesday
evenings I, fjfave. gn-at HtuUe dinners t,o tJie Governors
of Bombay and Madras. Kvery HuliHe({iieut evt»ninji
ofmyHtayal Delhi was similarly otir.upied hy Mate
bampiets and rereptions lotlu; Lieutenant^ iovernora.
the Comnian<l<'rs«in-(!hief, and the Uovi'rnor-d'eneni;
of Goa. To t heso dinncirs Lho ^iaineso, Ncpault^se, am'

120 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION un.iv

Letter to the Tarkand ambassadors were invited, besides many

DeihTAssem. distinguished natives. After dinner on Thursday, t

Wage held a levee, which lasted till one o'clock at night,

and is said to have been attended by 2,500 persons —

the largest, I believe, ever held by any Viceroy or

Governor-General in India.'

After referring to the spontaneous expressions of
loyal enthusiasm uttered by Sincliah at the gre:il pro-
clamation, and to the gratitude of llolkar for flu*
promised rectification of the Kharideusli boundary in
his favour — a gratitude which took the practical form
of an immediate subscription of SOU/, to the famine
expenses of thn British Government — tin* letter J^CM-H
on to say :

6 Tho satisfactory and cordial assuram'eH received
from Kashmir are, perhaps, less important, IM-CUUM*
his loyalty was previously assured. Hut your
Majesty will, perhaps, allow im« to mention, In
connection with the name of this prim'*-, one liltli*
circumstanec which appears to ma very illustrative
of the effect which the assemblage has Itad on him
and others. In tho first intarvicwH whicli took \Anni
months ago botwocvi myself and Kashmir, and which
resulted in my securing hit* assent to the appointment,
of a British officer at flilgil, T noticed that, though
perfectly courteous, he was extremely miHtniAlftii of
the British Government and of myself. 1 let weeined
to think that every word I hud said to him must havct
a hidden meaning against which he wuu bound to lx;
on his guard. During our negotiation lut wa« careful
to keep all his councillors round him, and lie referred
to them before answering any question I put to him :
and, although he finally agreed to my propOHaK ha
did so with obvious reluctance? and nuHpicioti, afu-r
taking a night to think them over. On tho day

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 121

following the Imperial assemblage, I had another Letter to the

private interview with Kashmir for the settlement of

some further details. His whole manner and language

on this last occasion were strikingly different. He

spontaneously dismissed all his councillors, no one

besides ourselves remaining in the room, except

Mr. Thornton, my own Foreign Secretary, and

Colonel Burne, and when I began to explain to him

the reasons why I wished him to do certain things,

he stopped in e at once by saying, "Tt is unnecessary

to explain all that. I am now convinced that you

mean nolliing that is not Tor the gooil of me and mine.

Our interests are identical with those of the empire.

Give me your orders and they shall be obeyed."

< I have already men ti omul to your Majesty that
one of the. sons of Kashmir acted as my page at
tlio nUHcnnbliijjr"'1 1 ran truly a [firm that all the
native princes, great. and small, with whom I was
previously aeciuarntetl viwt with each other in doing
honour to the onusiou, and L sincerely believe that
this tfrcuit jpiHii.rinjf has iilso enabled me to establish
thcs most cordial and confidential personal relations
with a groat many others whom I then met for the
first time.

6 Thursday, the 28th, was jniss* ul» like tlio preceding
days, in receiving and returning the visits of the
native primes, with a dinner and levee in thuci veiling.
This lrree was so numerously ail ended, and the
diflwnlty of making* .'irraiifjciuHitHfor tlic; convenience
aiul gcxjd order of so l;ir#e a <*rowd under canvas,
and in touts, to which 11 uj enLries and modes of egress
arc noce.sKarily somewhat small in KJKO and limited in
number, was so ^rrfut that the erowd Intcamc almost

* Tho Vicoroy*H other j>a^o wan a ^'ouxi^ juidHlupman in H.M.'
Navy. >

122 LORD LYTTOH'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.IV

Letter to the •unmanageable and, as many persons thus suffered
Jti^lsaem- from the crush, some Europeans who had come to
Mage Delhi resolved to find there a pretext for grumbling,

being able to find no other, complained that proper
arrangements had not been made for their comfort
in connection with this levee. But really I know not
what more could have been done than was done by the
members ofmy staff, who, though their number hadbeeu
largely increased for the occasion, had been working
day and night for more than a week at the complicated
arrangements necessary for the entertainment of the
Viceroy's numerous guests, and the count lew other
details connected with the assemblage. For my own
part I cannot express too warmly my admiral ion of
the intelligence arid foresight of all tlioir arrange-
ments, nor my gratitude for the cheerful devotion
with which they have borne all their fatiguing
labours; especially are my thanks due* to Colonel
Burne and Colonel Colley, who, during the last
fortnight, cannot have slept more than two hours out
of the forty-eight, and to whose indefatigable, exertions
the complete success of the assemblage is mainly due,
If the vast number of persons collected together at
Delhi, and all almost entirely under canvas, bo fairly
taken into consideration — a number including thu
highest executive officers of your JHajesty'a adminis-
tration from every part of India, each with his own
personal staff; all the members of my own Council,
with their wives and families, who were entertained
as the Viceroy's personal guests ; all the representa-
tives of the Press, native and European ; upwards of
16,000 British troops, besides about 450 native
princes and nobles, each with n following of from
2 to 500 attendants ; the foreign ambassadors with
their suites ; the foreign consuls ; a large number of

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 123

the rudest and most unmanageable trans-frontier Letter to the
chieftains with their horses and camels, &c. ; and then SeuS1 Axem-
an incalculably large concourse of private persons bl*se
attracted by curiosity from every corner of the
country — I say if all this be fairly remembered, no
candid person will, I think, deny that to bring
together, lodge, and feed so vast a crowd without a
single case of sickness, or a single accident due to
defective arrangements, without a moment's con-
fusion or an hour's failure in the provision of supplies,
and then to have sent them all away satisfied and
loud in their expressions of gratitude for the muni-
ficent hospitality with which they had been enter-
tained (at an expenditure of public money scrupu-
lously modcirate), was an achievement highly
credit able to all concerned in carrying it out. Sir
Dinkur Tao (Smdiah'a »roat Minister) said to one of
my colleagues : " If any man would understand why
it is that the English are, and must necessarily
remain, the masters of Itulia, he need only #o up
to the Flagstaff Tower, and look down upon this
marvellous oarap. Let him notice the method, the
order, the cleanliness, the discipline, the perfection
of its whole organisation, and he will recognise in it
at once the epitome of every title to command and
govern which one race can possess over others."
This anecdote reminds me of another which may
perhaps please your Majesty. Holkar said to me
when I took leave of him : " India has been till now
a vast heap of stones, some of them big, some of
them small Now the house is built, and from roof
to basement each stone of it is in the right place."

* The Khan of Klielat and his wild Sirdars were,
I think, the chief objects of curiosity and interest to
our Europeans. . . On the Khan himself and all his

124 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH iv

letter to the Sirdars, the assemblage seems to have made an
Sei^ABBein- impression more profound even than I had antici-
blafie pated. Less than a year ago they were aU at war

with each other, but they have left Delhi with
mutual embraces, and a very salutary conviction
that the Power they witnessed there is resolved that
they shall henceforth keep the peace and not dis-
turb its frontiers with their squabbles. The Khan
asked to have a banner given to him. It was
explained to His Highness that banners were only
given to your Majesty's feudatories, and that he,
being an independent prince, could not receive one
without compromising his independence. He replied :
" But I am a feudatory of the Empress, a feudatory
quite as loyal and obedient as any other. I don't
want to be an independent prince, and I do want to
have my banner like all the rest. Pray let me
have it."

* I anticipate an excellent effect by and by from
the impressions which the yet wilder envoys and
Sirdars of Chitral and Tassin will carry with them
from Delhi, and propagate throughout that important
part of our frontier where the very existence of the
British Government has hitherto been almost un-
realised, except as that of a very weak power,
popularly supposed in Kafhstan to be exceedingly
afraid of Russia. Two Burmese noblemen, from the
remotest part of Burmah, said to me : " The King
of Burmah fancies he is the greatest prince upon
earth. When we go back, we shall tell aU his people
that he is nobody. Never since the world began
has there been in it such a power as we have witnessed
here." These Burmese are writing A journal or
memoir of their impressions and experiences at Delhi,
of which they have promised me a copy. 1 have

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 125

no doubt it will be very curious and amusing. Letter to the
Kashmir and some other native princes have expressed SSST
a wish to present your Majesty with an imperial blase
crown of great value; but as each insists upon it
that the crown shall be exclusively his own gift, I
have discouraged an idea which, if carried out, would
embarrass your Majesty with the gift of half a dozen
different crowns, and probably provoke bitter heart-
burnings amongst the donors. The Eajpootana Chiefs
talk of erecting a marble statue of the Empress on
the spot where the assemblage was held ; and several
native noblemen have already intimated to me their
intention of building bridges, or other public works,
and founding charities, to be called after your
Majesty in commemoration of the event.
1 Hut I must resume my narrative.
* Friday, the 29th, was passed in receiving native
noblemen and decorating them, and in presenting
banners to the Governors and Lieutenant-Governors,
and medals to the Members of Council and others
entitled to receive them. On Saturday, the 30th, I
received the Khan of Khdat, paid some final return
visits, had interviews with the Nizam, the ladies of
the Gaekwar's family, the Begum of Bhopal, and the
Princess of Tanjore. In the afternoon I held a long
and very important Council, at which we settled
various arrangements for the administration of the
famine districts, about which we could not possibly
have effected a satisfactory understanding with the
local governments had it not been for the Imperial
assemblage, which afforded us the means of taking
the Governors of Madras and Bombay into personal
conference. I think it fair to Sir Philip Wodehouse
to inform your Majesty that he appears to me to be
dealing with the scarcity in Bombay on sound prin-

126 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION GH. IT

Wage

Letter to the ciples and with great efficiency. But we have been
obliged to send Sir Bichard Temple to Madras to
stop an alarming waste of money which would, in
our opinion,, if unchecked, eventually lead to a great
waste of life in that Presidency. The Imperial
assemblage, which has brought together all the
principal Talukdars of Oudh, has also enabled me
to complete, with their concurrence, arrangements
for the early annexation of Oudh to the North-West
Provinces. In fact, the great pageant at Delhi, so
far from being a mere empty show, has enabled me
to settle promptly and satisfactorily a great many
important administrative questions.

* Sunday, the 31st. — The accumulation of famine
and other business obliged me to work hard all the
morning. But in the afternoon I was able to visit
the beautiful Kutub (one of the wonders of Delhi),
where the Duke of Buckingham, with his daughters
(and Lord and Lady Downe, who are now staying
with us, and whose visit is the greatest comfort to
Lady Lytton and the greatest joy to us both),
picnicked with us among the ruins.

ceremony of ' Monday was the day of the assemblage, which I
cannot attempt to describe to your Majesty. The
weather was fortunately most fine. Everyone who
witnessed it is unanimous in the opinion that it was
the grandest spectacle and the most impressive they
had ever seen. I have the honour to enclose here-
with to your Majesty the text of my address to the
princes. The afternoon was passed in the transaction
of business ; and at a State banquet during the even-
ing it was my privilege to propose the health of
your Majesty as Empress of India. I humbly ask
permission to enclose a report of the words I used in
discharging this honourable and most welcome duty/

1877

1877 ])ELHI ASSEMBLAGE 127

The letter, which does not attempt to describe the
assemblage, may here be supplemented by a short
account of the actual ceremony.

Three large pavilions had been specially erected Description
for the occasion,, at some distance outside, and over-
looking an extensive plain to the north of the city of
Delhi The largest of those pavilions, which was
somi-rircular in form, about 800 feet long, facing the
Yinerotfal throne, was occupied by the governors of
Madnis and Donihny, the ruling chiefs present at
Ttallii, with their principal attendants, and the various
high nfOnern of Government, all of whom were seated
in such a manner that the* native chiefs were inter-
mingled with Ilio high officials. The two other
pavilions urartud to ihr nsar, right and left, of the
Vicwoy'H throne wore oiscupiocl by a large concourse
of Kprostalorfl, including the Governor-General of the
Portuguese* setlloincsntK in, India, Iho Khan of Khelat,
the Kortugn Envoys and OoiiKiils, and European and
Native noblemen and fruutlcimai from all parts of
India. The British troops, European and Native,
wore drawn up in a vast circle in the plain around.

The, Yittcroy arrived at the place of assemblage a
little after noon, and was received with a royal salute
from the troops assembled. On arriving at the grand
entrance (lie Vicieroy, accompanied by Lady Lytton
and the members of his personal Staff, alighted from
his carriage and, preceded by his Staff, advanced in
procession to the dais.

Ilia Excellency, wearing the collar, badge, and
robes of the Star of India, was received by the whole
assembly standing, the massed bands drawn up close by
playing the* National Anthem until he had taken his seat
on the da'fs. The proclamation, formally declaring Her
Majesty the Queen to be Empress of India was then

1 28 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.IV

inscription read in English by the chief Herald and afterwards
in Urdu by the Foreign Secretary. At its conclusion
jQl salvos of artillery, intermingled with/aw dejoie
from the assembled troops, were fired ; the Eoyal
Standard was hoisted, and the bands again played the
National Anthem. After a brief pause the Viceroy
then rose and addressed the assemblage. At the
close of his address he read aloud the telegraphic*
message which the Queen-Empress had that day sent
in her [Royal and Imperial name.

At the conclusion of this address the whole
assembly spontaneously rose and joined the troops
iii giving repeated dicers. Many of tho chiefs pre-
sent attempted to offer their congratulation*!, but were
unable to make themselves heard. The Maharaja
Shuliah was the first to rise. lie said : * Shali-in-Shah
lYulslulh (Monarch of Monarchs), may God, bless you !
Tho Princes of India bless you and pray that your
sovereignty and power may remain steadfast for ever/
Commenting upon this spontaneous speech, Lord
IjyMnn writes to Tier Majesty: *ITis words have a
very special significance, which is recognised through-
out India, though it is not apparent in the translation
of them, and cannot be adequately rendered in Eng-
lish. The word lurod by Sindiah to express your
Majesty's position in reference to himself and brother
princes is a word which the princes of India have
hitherto been careful to avoid using ; for it signifies
in the original the power of issuing absolute orders
which must be obeyed. Coming, therefore, from the
lips of Siadiah, on such an occasion, an the spokesman
of all the native princes then and there assembled, it
permanently and publicly fixes your Majesty's suzerain,
and more thau suzerain, power in India beyond all
possibility of future question/

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 129

The Viceroy's letter to Her Majesty continues : Letter to the
6 Tuesday9 the 2nd, was passed in receiving depu-
tations and addresses, with a visit to the Imperial Wage
races, which were numerously attended by the native
princes, one of whom (His Highness the Maharajah
of Jodhpore) won the Empress Cup.

'Wednesday, the 3rd, was chiefly occupied
by private interviews with Sir Salar Jung and
various political officers. But I and Lady Lytton
visited the soldiers' games, and attended the fire-
works in the evening, at which the crowd was
enormous. After the fireworks I gave a farewell
dinner to the Governor-General of Goa, followed by
a large reception. On Friday morning (the 5th) I
reviewed all the British troops, the review being
preceded by a march past of the troops of all the
native princes at Delhi. The appearance of your
Majesty's troops was really magnificent, and the
whole review, as a spectacle, scarcely less imposing
than the Imperial assemblage itself. Sindiah and
Kashmir (your Majesty's two honorary Generals)
were present, as also the Khan of Khelat and a large
number of native princes. But the sun was so
powerful that my Aide-de-camp, Lord William
Beresford (who had been terribly shaken by the sad
death of his friend, Captain Clayton), fainted in his
saddle ; and, indeed, I cannot feel too thankful that
I was able to go through the fatigue of it without
any worse contretemps than the loss of my gold medal,
which fell off its riband into the dust as I was canter-
ing home, and which the police have not yet been
able to recover. At the close of the review I rode
up to the lines, and addressed to the commanding
officers a few words, of which I have also the honour
to submit the report herewith to your Majesty.

130 LOIWD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADM INlSTIt AT10X CH.IV

Letter to the <I think I have forgotten to mention that the
nei^AsHem- whole of the previous Thursday had been passed by
blaffe me in receiving the farewell visits of the native

princes. On Thursday, I also presided tit a small
conference of the native princes who are interested
in the maintenance of the Mayo College. A report
of our proceedings accompanies this letter. (hi
Friday evening we left Delhi. On the following
Saturday I reached Pattiala, and there installed the
young Maharaja on the throne. lie is only five
years old, and I could not help pitying the poor
child (a very promising lit tie fellow), for HO premature
a commencement of thcs tedious ccrumoniulfl of a
public life. The town was beautifully dcroralwl,
and the whole population Hcutmwl to have- poured
into the streets of it. Sunday wo halted af. llmliallti,
and, reaching Aligurh on Monday, tin* Nth, I tliero
opened the Mohammedan Collt»#«. 1 I'tudow* a report,
of the proceedings. In a fc$w days I shall be* ajruiu
at Calcutta, and able to romniaucu wifh Kir John
fitra<'.hey(wTho is anininitiiiHO strength to <mr (Vivtucilj
our ]iudg(^t for next March.

*It now only remains for me to solicit your
Majesty*H grncious acceptaiu-.^ of my deeply grateful
thanks for the generoiiH and valiiKl oitfotini^'iueiit
•with which T havo liecn honoured by your MajeHty
in roferen<!« totlie gruat undertaking whiehis happily
over, and to crave your MiijeHty's iadulgentp ]>ardon
of thiH very imperfect aecoiuit of the Imperial
assemblage. To Hay the trutli, I am he^iinunpf to
feel sensible of the physical olIectH of tlw si ruin which
has been upon me during the lant fortnight, and
I fear that I have failed u> rouvey to your Majesty,
by this long and unavoidably rambling luttor, any
adequate idea of the complf'tcrncm* of it HIU'COHH upon

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 131

which T would humbly ask permission to offer the Letter to the
congratulations of her devoted subject to our beloved DS^
and revered Queen-Empress. I hope, however, that blag*
descriptions of the event by pens less wearied, and
more graphic, than my own will be written, and that
proofs of its success, indirect but significant, will
long continue to reach the throne of our Empress
from all parts of her great empire,

6 The™ is but one other piece of news which T
wish to convey to your Majesty before cloring this
long (and I foar tedious) letter. The Amir of '
Kabul has, at last, agreed to my proposals for an
alliance, and lias already sent two of his ministers to
Peshawur, Llujre to negotiate the details of it with my
Envoy. . . .

* With lioarlfult prayers for all that can prolong
.and increase the happiness of your Majesty's life and
the fflory and prosperity of your great reign,

* T have* the honour to bu, Madam, your MnjcwtyV
devoted and faithful humble servant,

(Higned) * LYTTON.'

The new til la was welcomed throughout India by
the people, as w«ll as by the, chiefs ; its proclamation
was received with every possible demonstration of
loyalty. Throng >ut the whole of the British districts
food and clothing were gratuitously distributed to
thousand* of poor, whilst many of tlw wealthy
zemindars and Municipalities gave liberal grants
towards works of public utility- Tho dnrban* held
simultaneously at the, capitals of Urn native chiefs and
princes were equally characterised by unmistakable
evidences of #ood finding.

Letters from public bodies and private individuals
written in divers languages and dialects, poured in upon

132 LOUD I/mOWS INDIAN ADM IN ISTll \TIOX cu.ii,

Effect of Government, One chief wrote : * Tlie event of to-day
proclamation -g ft refl4etter flay mllL the annals of modern India, <»f

which not only we ourselves but our children and
children's children may well be proud,' * This is tlw
third time,' wrote another, * that India is going to In*
ruled by an Empress. The first was the widow of
the Hindu King Agniborna; the second was the*
Bizia Begum, the daughter of the Mohammedan
Emperor Altamash ; the third is the Queen Victoria,
the English Sovereign. But something groatur ban
been achieved. Such a powerful Hovoreijrn of HO va«t
a territory never ruled India. This proclamation may
consequently be considered superior to all its kiml/

Another address exclaimed: *0 Mother, O
Beloved, 0 residing in the Palace of London, the
descendants of the great Emporor of Delhi ant burnt
in the fire of your might. Surely to-day angels will
sing your Majesty's glory in the heavenly regions
where Yadhish Ua, the Son of Justiro, who performed
the great, Eajasuya festival of Pandaras 3,000 yearn
ago at Delhi, now resides/

The ' Empress Day' is still ke,pt in India UH oiu*of
the great days of the year. Shops an* shut,, <lirmern
are given, parades are held, salutes are fired.

Enormously cacagfpjratud statements were matin in
the English papers as to the, cost of the asseml ilngo. lit
the Viceroy's opinion a groat saving was noeompliRhed
through the poli<jy of enlisting the hearty ci i-opwut ion
of the native princes, who all attended ihw pvat
ceremony at their own expanse, Most of the Kn^lteli
troops came in the ordinary course, of relief move-
ments. The Viceroy entertained all tlw membcrw of
his own council at his per«onal expense, and the
heads of local administrations similarly entertained
their own guests.

1877 DELHI ASSEMBLAGE 133

In the opinion of the best judges in India, after
some years' experience, the assumption by the Queen
of the title of Empress has had political results of
far-reaching importance. The supremacy of the
British Government had of course been long admitted
as a practical fact by all the native States of India,
but in many cases their chiefs gave themselves, when
opportunity offered and it seemed safe to do so, the
airs of independent powers. Treaties, made perhaps
nearly a hundred years before and still in force,
anight be quoted to show that the native prince,
although not so strong, was equal in dignity and
rightful position 1o the* Viceroy, The Nizam, the
(liiokwar, and the Viceroy had all the same salutes,
than which to native imaginations there could be
nothing more Kignificant. The twenty-one guns
ceased after the l)olhi Aflwinbly to be a «igu of
equality willi the representative of the Sovereign.
There can indeed be no doubt of the, fact, now
universally acknowledged in India, that the pro-
clamation of the paramount superiority of the JJritish
drown was an act of political wisdom and foresight
which lias not only strengthened our position
throughout the vast territories of India proper, but
lias Lad no small effect also beyond the frontier of
the Indian Empire.

134

LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.V

LettertoLorcl

Salisbury.

SherAli

Peshawur
Conference,
December 1<

Ooflittiuxitf of
PeRhftwur
Oontorenoo,
Jan. 27

CHAPTER V

FESIlAWUlb CONFERENCE AND FRONTIER NEGOTIATIONS

OF 1877

THE news that Sher Ali had at last consented to
enter into negotiations with the British Government
by sending his Minister to meet our Envoy on the
frontier reached the Viceroy on December 18, 1876.
The members of the Amir's durbar, after lengthy and
frequent consultation, had voted for the rejection of
our proposals, but our agent had then urged the
Amir to decide the matter himself. He agreed to
do so, and after some hesitation intimated his inten-
tion of sending two of his principal ministers to
discuss with our Envoy at Peshawur the conditions
on which the permanent location of British officers
on his frontier would be accepted.

This appeared to be a virtual, though reluctant,,
acceptance of the Viceroy's proposals, but the Amir
did not reply to the Viceroy's letters, and took no
notice of the invitation which had been sent him to
the Imperial assemblage at Delhi*

On January 27, 1877, the Kabul Envoy, Syud Noor
Mahomed Shah, accompanied by the Mir Akhor
Ahmed Khan, arrived at Peshawur, where Sir Lewis
Telly, to whom Dr. Bellew was attached as secretary,
awaited him.

The first meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly and

132 LOUD LOTION'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. IT

Effect of m Government. One chief wrote : e The event of to-day
proclamation is a red-letter day in the annals of modern India, of
which not only we ourselves but our children and
children's children may well be proud.' ' This is the
third time,' wrote another, ' that India is going to bo
ruled by an Empress. The first was the widow of
the Hindu King Agniborna; the second was the
Rizia Begum, the daughter of the Mohammedan
Emperor Altamash ; the third is the Queen Victoria,
the English Sovereign. But something greater has
been achieved. Such a powerful Sovereign of so vast.
a territory never ruled India. This proclamal ion may
consequently bo considered superior to all its kind.'

Another address exclaimed: ef> Mother, 0
Beloved, 0 residing in the 1'nlar.o of London, the
descendants of the great Emperor of Delhi are burnt,
in the iire of your might. Surely to-day angels will
sing your Majesty's glory in the* lwav«rily regions
where Yadhiyh lla, tho firm of Just-ire, who per formed
the great Ttajasnya festival of I'audarus 3,000 years
ago at Delhi, now resides,*

The * Empress Bay ' is still kept in India as one of
the great days of th« year. Shops are* shut, dinners
are givon, parados ar« held, salutes aw fired.

Enormously oxa^ciratcd fl1atmm»nlR were made in
the English papcro as to tlw oont of tho assemblage. Tn
the Viceroy's opinion a ^r«at saving was uwomplished
through the polity of enlisting the lifarty rMHiporatioTi
of the native princes, who all attended this prcsat
ceremony at their own dxp^iwe. Most uf the English
troops came in the ordinary course* of relief move-
ments. Th« Viceroy ent.ortainful all lln> nuinherB of
liis own council at liiw poraonal oxpcnsc,, and tin*
heads of local admiiuHi rations similarly
their own

1877 PESIIAWUR CONFERENCE 135

Syud Noor Mahomed took place on January 30, the
last interview was held on February 19. Erom the
very beginning it was doubtful whether the envoy
was authorised to arcept the sine-qud-non condition
that British officers should reside on the frontier of
Afghanistan to watch outside events. Ultimately,
after much fencing, he rejected it. Sir Lewis Felly
then brokii off the conference on the ground that if
this basis on which alone any discussions were to
take pbw,« was not accepted, he had no authority to
open negotiations. He consented, however, to refer
to the Viceroy what the Envoy had said, and to await
His Excellency's reply.

In the* course, of the conference three successive
nuwtingH Intel IMWII occupied with a long statement of
the. Amir's fjrievuiuws. This statement repeated and
confirmed the information previously given by our
native ageul, Atta Mahomed Khan, to the Viceroy at
Simla. The Amir was represented as having lost con-
fulunrc* in the British Government, and amongst the
rwiHoiiH assigned for liifl mistrust the Envoy referred to
the interference of the Viceroy on behalf of the Amir's
imprisoned won, Yakut) Khan, and the complimentary
giftH and messages sent to the Mir of Wakhar with-
out previously asking the Amir's permission to deal
thus climtlly with one of his responsible governors.
Both tlie.se rnnseH of complaint occurred during the
Viecroyalty of Lord Northbrook. The Envoy repre-
Mpntt'd I he Amir u» having, before that time, had
'perfect coniiik'iwr* * in the British Government;
having, however, refused to comply with the, request
that he nhould release, his wm Yakub, and restore
him to Ili-ral, Hher AH ootwiduml the friendship
hetwtwn Uit1 two (lovtirnnumtB was no longer intact,
Lyttoit'n reply to Sir Lewis Telly, conveyed in

136 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMlNISTKATiaN aii.iv

a letter dated March 3, refers to these grievances as
follows :

viceroy's *I sincerely regret to learn that the Amir has

Lm BdS? been for years Secretl7 Harbouring in his mind a
March s sentiment of resentment towards the British Govern-
ment, in consequence of three or four incidents in
the conduct of its relations with His Highness;
which caused him, at the time of their unnoticed
occurrence, feelings of annoyance, only now for the
first time made known to the Viceroy. I am con-
fident that the causes of annoyance enumerated by
the agent were not occasioned by any (lulibcrafu or
intentional, or even conscious, diwejAircl of flic
Amir's feelings on the part of the British (lnv<-rn-
ment. I have no doubt whatever that most nf (hem
might, and would, have been prevented by the
presence of a discreet and intelligent British oflirer
at Kabul, had such an officer been admit twl to that
unrestricted intercourse with the Government of Jlis
Highness which an experience tested by ctonluruiS,
and gratefully acknowledged by every civilised
State in the world, lias proved to be* (1m only
practical means of maintaining amicable; and mu1 ually
advantageous relations between neighbouring Staffs.
Such States must always have many in! rivals in
common, on which misumlorstanrtings can hardly
fail to arise if their Governments have no adequately
confidential and authoritative medium of communi-
cation with each other.'

With regard to the question of admitting British
officers to Afghanistan, the Envoy, in an informal
conversation with Dr. Bellew, had stated that this
subject, so constantly pressed upon the rimfriduratiQn
of the Amir, had aroused his suspicions, and Iir« waft
now ' convinced that to allow British ofllcttro to remclo

1877 PBfOIAWUR CONFERENCE 137

in his country' would 6be to relinquish his own Viceroy's
authority ' ; ' and the lasting disgrace thus brought LeJrtB Poi
on the Afghan people' would be * attached to his March 3
name, and he would sooner perish than submit to
this. The British nation is great and powerful, and
the Afghan people, cannot resist its power, hut the
people1 are self-willed and independent, and prize
their honour above life.' In the subset [uont inter-
views with Sir Lewis Telly this view was repeated in
diHercnt words again, and again,

Ixird Lytton comments upon this:

6 In the communications made by the Viceroy to
His Highness from Simla in the month of October
last. Hie, Amir was distinctly informed Iliat unless he
was prepared, to recognise, in principles lh« expedi-
ency of appointing British officers to reside in certain
part H of the Afghan frontier, it would be useless to
appoint Knvoys for the. negotiation of a Trnaty
entirely conditional upon that arrangement. His
Highness wan, at, the name time, earnestly requested
to consider very carefully tho expediency of the
proposal then made, to him before committing himself
to a decision, Jle did take many woelw to consider
it; ami when, after having thua deliberately csou-
Kid(»n*(l it, he. uppoiuted his Minister to nogoUate
with you the best moans of carrying it out, we wera
entitled to aHtmmu, a« \w, naturally tlid assume, that
the principle* clearly explained by IIH to ln« the only
poHKible basis (;f negi^tiation on our part had bccm
duly and fully nowpled by Ilia Highness, and that
the expediency of carrying it out. was no longer open
to discussion. The Knvoy'tt present at tempt to ignore
tho recognition of that principle, and to discuHH thq
expediency of it as an open question, 18 a bnuich
(which ahould be pointed out, to him) of the under-

Viceroy's
Letter to Sir
Lewis Felly,
March 3

138 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION on. v

standing on which we agreed to receive him as the
Amir's representative in this negotiation.

* If, however, as would seem to be the case, the
Amir, influenced by circumstances or considerations
still unknown to us, has completely changed his mind
since he entered upon the negotiation (which, in its
present form, was originated by His Highness), the
very last thing desired, or attempted, by the British
Government would be to pin His Highness pedantic-
ally to the fulfilment of an understanding from
which he now wishes to withdraw, or to the adoption
of an arrangement which he does not regard with
satisfaction,

6 .... But in that case there is nothing left to
negotiate about, and consequently no reason why the
Afghan Minister should not immediately return to
Kabul. You have rightly pointed this out to the
Envoy ; and I entirely approve the terms in which
you have done so/

Finally, the Envoy had contended that by Lord
Mayo's written assurance at Umballa, and Lord
Northbrook's verbal one at Simla, the British
Government were already bound to protect the Amir,
not only against foreign aggression, but also against
internal revolt ; that if this was admitted the Amir
had nothing to gain by the re-statement of our
obligation in any new form ; that if this was denied
then the British Government were chargeable with
breach of faith. Lord Lytton emphatically repudi-
ated this false position.

'The [Envoy's] argument would be perfectly
sound if its premisses were true. But, unfortunately
for the Amir, they are fundamentally erroneous.
The only obligations ever contracted on behalf of
each other by the British and Afghan Governments

1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 139

are embodied in two treaties, of which the first was Viceroy's
signed in 1855 and the second in 1857.

6 The Treaty of 1855 contains only three articles. Maroh
The first stipulates that there shall be perpetual
peace and friendship between the East India Com-
pany (to whose treaty rights and obligations tho
British Government has succeeded) and the Amir
of Kabul, his heirs and successors. The second
binds the British Government to respect the
territories possessed by the Amir at the time when
the Treaty was signed, that is to say in 1855, and not
to interfere with them. The third article binds the
Amir, his heirs and successors, not only to respect
the territories of the British Government, but also to
be the friend of its friends, and the enemy of its
enemies. It is to be observed that this Treaty con-
tains no corresponding obligation on the part of the
British Government. The British Government is
not without cause to complain that the Amir's
conduct of late years has been inconsistent with
the obligations contracted by the Government of
His Highness under the terms of Article I. of this
Treaty of 1855. Friendship between neighbouring
States does not necessarily involve liabilities on the
part of either State to furnish the other with material
assistance; but it does necessarily involve the
uninterrupted maintenance of friendly intercourse,
and the fairly reciprocal recognition and discharge
of all the customary duties of good neighbour-
hood.

•Now, not only are all the territories of Uu*
British Government freely open at all times to all
the subjects of the Amir, but His Highness has
received from the British Government repeated gifts
of anus and of money, as well as a consistent moral

140 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.

Viceroy's
Letter to Sir
Lewis Felly,
March 3

support both at home and abroad. In return for
these advantages to His Highness, what has the
British Government received from the Amir ?
The territories of His Highness have been, and con-
tinue to be, churlishly closed to all the subjects
of the British Government; with whom the Amir
forbids his own subjects to hold any kind of friendly
intercourse. Trade, traffic, travel, — all the custom-
ary bonds of union between neighbouring and
friendly States, have been systematically discouraged
and practically prohibited to British subjects in
Afghanistan, by His Highness.

6 The Amir has refused permission to the Envoy
of the British Government, bound on a peaceful
mission to another neighbouring State, to pass through
his territory ; and the determination of His Highness
to withhold from the British Government all such
natural good offices has been conveyed to it in terms
scarcely consistent with courtesy, and certainly not
consistent with friendship. Colonel Macdonald, a
British subject, was barbarously murdered on the
borders of the Amir's territory, by a person subject
to the authority of the Amir, and for whose punish-
ment His Highness was, therefore, responsible. But
instead of cordially and efficiently co-operating to
avenge this crime, the Amir has allowed the
murderer to remain at large ; and not only unmo-
lested, but actually, I believe, iu receipt of a pension
from His Highness. I forbear to dwell upon the
Amir's discourtesy in leaving wholly unanswered
the proposal made to llis Highness by the late
Viceroy for the demarcation of his boundaries, in
refusing to receive a complimentary mission from the
present Viceroy, and hi taking no notice whatever of
the friendly invitation to Delhi which was aubse-

1877 PESHAWUIl CONFERENCE 141

quently addressed to His Highness. More serious viceroy's
grounds of complaint exist in the fact that the Lew^Pcii
closing of the Xhyber Pass for the last two years Mftroh 8
appears to be mainly attributable to the hostile
influence of the Amir ; that His Highness has
openly received at Kabul in an authoritative manner,
and subsidised, the heads of frontier tribes, who are
in the pay, and under the control, of the British
Government ; that he has, for some time past, been
speaking and acting in such a manner as to indicate
hostile designs upon territories beyond his own, and
in the neighbourhood of the British frontier; and that
even since the commencement of the present negotia-
tions, he has been openly and actively endeavouring to
excite against us the religious animosities of his own
subjects, and of the neighbouring tribes, by misre-
presenting the policy, and maligning the character,
of the British Government.

c In short, the whole conduct and language of the
Amir during the last four years has been one
chronic infraction, or evasion, of the first Article of
the Treaty of 1855. But this Treaty cannot be
abrogated without the mutual consent of the two
contracting parties to it ; and, so long as it remains
valid, the Amir is legally bound by it to co-operate
with the British Government, if called upon to do so,
in attacking its enemies and defending its friends;
although the Treaty does not place the British
Government under any reciprocal obligation on
behalf of the Amir, His Highness, indeed, was
so conacious of this fact when he met the Earl of
Mayo at Uraballa, that he then vehemently wim-
plaiuecl of the Treaty of 1 850 as a " one-sided, Treaty,"
and earnestly solicited from the UritLsh Government
a new Treaty based upon the termw which tlw present

142 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. v

Viceroy's Viceroy was prepared to ofler the Amir in the

Lewis Peiiy month of October last.

6 It is clear, therefore, that, under the terms of
the Treaty of 1855, the British Government has
contracted no liabilities whatever on behalf of the
Amir. Moreover, although the British Government
has assuredly no desire, or intention, to take advan-
tage of the fact, it nevertheless is a fact, that the
territories recognised by that Treaty as belonging
to the Amir did not include Afghan Turkist^n.

* I now turn to the consideration of the subsequent
Treaty signed in 1857. This Treaty consists of
thirteen Articles. The first of them recites the cir-
cumstances, arising out of the war then being
waged between the British and Persian Govern-
ments, which induced the British Government
to " agree, out of friendship, to give the Amir *
of Kabul one lakh of rupees monthly during
the continuation of that war, upon certain condi-
tions. The second, third, fourth, and fifth Articles
specify these conditions : whereby in return for the
pecuniary assistance guaranteed to him by Article I,
the Amir undertakes to maintain Iris army at a
certain strength,, to appoint and maintain a Vakeel at
Peshawur, and to receive at Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar,
and other places in Afghanistan, British officers with
suitable establishments, whose duty shall be to
insure the subsidy granted the Amir bein# devoted
to the purpose for which it was given. The sixth
Article stipulates that this subsidy shall ceaue at the
conclusion of the war between England and Persia,
or at any previous date preferred by the British
Government. The seventh Article, to which the
Envoy has made special reference, with an emphasis
and iteration apparently superfluous, stipulate!* that,

1S77 PESHAWUB CONFERENCE 143

on the cessation of the subsidy, the British officers viceroy's
shall be withdrawn from Afghanistan, but that the
Amir shall continue, during the pleasure of the
British Government, not only to receive at Kabul a
permanent resident Vakeel appointed by the British
Government, but also to appoint, and keep on
behalf of the Afghan Government, a permanent
resident Vakeel at Peshawur. The Envoy says that
the Amir has scrupulously adhered to the terms of
this seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857 ; but, so
far as I am aware, His Highness has not for many
years fulfilled the last-mentioned condition of the
Article. All the remaining Articles of the Treaty
refer exclusively either to the preceding stipulations,
or else to special circumstances, considerations, and
conditions, occasioned by, and ceasing1 with, the
war between England and Persia, which led to the
signature of the Treaty of 1857.

6 1 should not have thought it worth while to say
anything at all about this Treaty of 1857, if the
Afghan Envoy had not laid such special stress upon
its seventh Article ; which is indeed the only one of
all its articles that has reference to the conduct of
general relations between the two Governments. It
is obvious, however, that no treaty stipulation was
required to oblige the British Government not to
appoint a resident British officer at Kabul without
the consent of the Amir, It is equally obvious that
the seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857 was not
intended to bind, and could not possibly bind, the
Amir, never, under any oircnmstancas, or at any
future time1., to assent to the appointment of a
resident British officer at Kabul ; for such a stipula-
tion would have been clearly inconsistent with the
freedom and dignity of the two controlling Powers.

144 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH, v

viceroy's m It is, therefore, certain that there is in the seventh
La^peiiy, Article of the Treaty of 1857 absolutely nothing
March whatever to preclude the British Government from

pointing out, at any time, to the Amir the advan-
tage, or propriety, of receiving a British officer as
its permanent representative at Kabul ; nor even from
urging such an arrangement upon the consideration
and adoption of His Highness, in any fair and
friendly manner. But it so happens that the British
Government has not proposed, and does not propose,
or intend to propose, that arrangement. Consequently,
the Envoy's remarks on the Treaty of 1857 are not to
the point, and need not be further noticed.

* Now, these two Treaties, of 1855 and 1857, are
the only ones which, up to the present moment, the
British Government has ever contracted with the
Government of Afghanistan; and it is as clear as
anything can be that neither the one nor the other
imposes on the British Government, either directly
or indirectly, the least obligation, or liability, what-
ever, to defend, protect, or support, the Amir, or
the Amir's dynasty, against any enemy, or any dan-
ger, foreign or domestic.

6 The Envoy, however, appears to be under an
impression that obligations and liabilities of this
kind, though not contracted under any Treaty,
have been, none the leas, incurred by the British
Government through certain written and verbal
assurances received by the Amir in 18G9 from
Lord Mayo, and by His Highness' Envoy in 1873
from Lord Northbrook. This impression is entirely
erroneous ; and I, therefore, proceed to examine in
detail the facts and circumstances referred to Ly the
Envoy in support of his assumption that the Amir
of Kabul has, at the present moment, any claim upon

1877 MBHAWOll CONFERENCE 145

the unconditional support of the British Govern-

WIOTf letter to Sir

D&ent. Lewis Pelly,

'The -words, referred to by the Envoy as having Maloh8
been addressed by Lord Mayo to the Amir on
March 81, 1809, were as follows :

'"Although, as already intimated to you, the
British Government does not desire to interfere in
the internal offhim of Afghanistan, yet, considering
that the bonds of friendship between that Govern-
ment and your Highness have lately been more
closely drawn Hum heretofore, it will view with
severe, displeasure, any attempts on the part of your
rivals 1o disturb your position as Euler of Kabul, and
rekindle civil war ; and it will further endeavour,
from time to time, by such means as circumstances
may require, to strengthen the Government of your
in#lmt*BH, to c.nablu you to exorcise, with equity and
with justice your rightful rule*., and to transmit to
your dcwendantH all the dignities and honours of
wliitjh you are the lawful possessor."

* Now, what wm* the dmimstancus in which these
words were utterud ? Only just established on a
throne, to which he had fought his way through a
long and bloody civil war, the Amir had come to
Umballa, anxious for the* support and protection of
the British Government, and hopeful of obtaining
from it a Treaty of Alliance, Disappointed in that
hope, he eagerly besought the Viceroy to give him
aonin written asHiiranco of the good will and friendship
of the, British Government ; which might serve to
strengthen IUH position when he returned to Kabul,
by convincing both his subject* and his rivals that
}m relations with that Govurnmwnt wore of a
thoroughly ctordiul and satisfactory character, In
compliance with this request, the words above

L

146 LOED LYTTON'8 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION uu. v

quoted were addressed to His Highness, by the
Viceroy. Such were the circumstances in which
March 3 jj^y were utterecl. What, then, were the meaning,
purpose, and intention of their utterance ? Tt is
self-evident, in the first place, that whatever their
meaning, and whatever their purpose, they were not
intended to have the force of a Treaty; for the
British Government had just declined the Amir's
request for a Treaty of Alliance with it, and it could
have had no possible reason for (l(*alinin<; the Tmity,
if it were prepared to accept on his Ixjhiilf, in a
form equally conclusive, all the luibilitu'tf of an
alliance.

'The moaning and purpose of tli« Viwroy's as-
surance to the Amir in 1809, however, arc, dearly
indicated and explained, beyond all possibility of
question, by the context, as well as the circumstances,
of His Excellency's address to Ills Higlmomt at
ITmballa. In that paragraph of Urn acMivss which
immediately precedes the one I havts quoted (because
"it is the one to which the Envoy has rderred), the
Viceroy expressed his confidence (a confidence
founded on the assurance of His Highness) thai the
Amir was about "to create a linn and merciful
administration/' and "to promote the interests of
commerce in every province of Afghanistan/* In
encouraging recognition of these excellent intentions
(never fulfilled by the Amir) and of the closeness
with which the bonds of friendship were then drawn
between the British Government and Ilia Highness
(whose subsequent conduct has relaxed them), the
Viceroy assured the Amir that the British Govern-
ment would view with severe displeasure any attempt
to disturb his throne. It is perfectly clear, however,
that the Yiceroy did not, and could not, thereby

3877 PESEIAWUR CONFERENCE 147

commit the British Government to an unconditional
protection of the Amir, or to any liabilities on behalf
of His Highness which were not dependent on his Mwfcl
future conduct towards the British Government and
his own subjects. In short, the plain meaning of the
Viceroy's statement was neither more nor less than
an assurance that so long as the Amir continued to
govern his people justly and mercifully, and to main-
tain frank, uortlial, and confidential rotations with
the British Government, that Government would, on
its part, also continue to protect His Highness;
using every legitimate endeavour to confirm his in-
dependence and consolidate his power.

6 In precisely lh« same .spirit., aiul from the some
point of view, the present Viceroy authorised the
Kabul Agent to assure tfher Ali, lust October, that
if Ilia UigluitiHH winu-rely desired to deserve (he
friendship, and thereby secure, the protection, of the
British novernmonl, they would be cordially and un-
reservedly accorded !o him. But Ills Highness has
evinced no such desire, ; and it is a puerile absurdity
to uBsnnui tli at, because the British Govormnent
would have viewed wit/h severe displeasure in 1809
any attempt to disturb tlu< throne of a loyal and
trusted ally, it is, ihuroforc, bound in 1877 lo protuot,
from flaugurs incurred rc'gnrdlcw of ilH advices (.lie
flaniagitd powor of a mi«t,nitrtful and uiil.rust worthy
neighbour.

fc You will tell the Envoy plainly tliut. tli<i HrilitiU
uiiuiut uoithor r«(«>gitiHcs, nor has ever re.<-.og-
uistid, any such obligation, Brit-wli in(hutni:c» i« so
paramount throughout. lh<t l^ast thai the novcm-
nient of India nml rarely have recxjurse, to anus
in order to protect tlu* frionds wlio an*. faiUiful to
it, or to ])iimsh thoso who are iuillileBH. Tluire

148 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION me. v

is no neighbouring State which is not strengthened
Lewis Peiiy, by the bestowal, and weakened by the withdrawal,
of its friendship.

6 The same observations apply to the statement
made by Lord Northbrook in 1873 to the Amir's
Envoy at Simla. The Envoy, on that occasion,
represented and explained to the Viceroy the
apprehensions and anxieties occasioned to the Amir
by the recent advance of the Eussian Power in
Central Asia. His Highness fearing that, without
the declared alliance and material support of llin
British Government, his independence might, ere long
be exposed to dangers with which he could not cope
single-handed, had instructed his Envoy to solicit
once more from the British Government a (Infinite1
Treaty of Alliance on the basis of rociproruty, as well
as material assistance in arms and money. Ixml
Northbrook declined to give tho Amir this Treaty
which His Highness asked for. And, llmn-loro, as
in the previous case at Umballa in 18(5!), it Ls d<«ar
that any subsequent verbal assurances given by Lord
Kbrthbrook to the Envoy wore not intend™] to
commit, and could not possibly commit, the British
Government to any of those, liabilities wlueh it would
have contracted on behalf of the. Amir liatl thn
Viceroy felt able to comply with the rajuest of His
Highness by signing with liim a Troalyof Alliance,
The Envoy then endeavoured, JIH ho has ujyain
endeavoured on the preHont occasion, u> niuiniain
that the British Gtevernnumt had already eontrneted
such liabilities by virtue, of afltmrfuuiuK re.tteived in
time past from Lord Lawi-oucc and the Karl of Mayo.
In reply to this assertion Lord Northbrook laid before
the Envoy the whole of the* correspondence, \vliieli
had passed between Ills Excollewjy's

1877 PESHAWTTJB CONFERENCE 149

and tlie Amir, and requested him to point out in it a vioeroy's m
single word confirming or justifying the statement he 1^*^11
had made, " that the British Government was bound March 8
to comply with every request preferred by the Amir."
The Envoy, however, was unable to do so, and
acknowledged the fact. Lord Northbrook then gave
the Envoy the following assurance: — That in the
event of any imminent aggression upon the territories
of His Highness, "should the endeavours of the
Hritish Government to bring about an amicable
settlement prove fruitless, the British Government
vere prepared to assure the Amir that they would
iillbrcl him assistance in the shape of arms and money,
and would also, in ease of necessity, aid him with
troops ; " adding, however, that u the British Govern-
ment held itHulf perfectly free to decide us to the
orcuyiou wlum such assistance should be rendered,
mul also aa to its nature and extent : moreover, the
ttHrfiBtsuic'e would be conditional upon the Amir him-
wlf abstaining from aggression, uudou his unreserved
amtplauce of thu advice of the British Government
in regard to his external relations/'

6 It i>s Hulficiently apparent that this personal
insurance committed the British Government to no
piuc1j$!H which were not carefully guarded on every
side by positive conditions with which the Amir has
of late evinced no disposition to comply. On receipt
of it tlits Knvoy luft Simla, apparently disappointed,
and olwrving that the Amir was not likely to derive
from it. much comfort or Hupport.

4 1 Lruttt, thttreibre, tliafc, on reflection, the Envoy
will pentuivti and ocknowlcxl^ that, iu intimating to
tlui Amir, lasl October, his willingness to ^rant Ixim
not only money, anns, and, should he require It, the
services of British officers, but alno a definite Treaty

150 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. v

Viceroy's
letter to Sir
Lewis Pally*
March 3

of Alliance, such as the Amir had twice vainly
solicited from the British Government — once in 1869
and once again in 1873 — the present Viceroy was
offering His Highness altogether new, and very
substantial, advantages. It appeared to the Yiceroy
that relations of mutual reserve and mistrust between
neighbouring States so closely contiguous, and having
in common so many interests, as Afghanistan and the
Empire of India, were much to be deplored ; more
specially in the interests of the weaker State. An
attentive study of the correspondence, to which the
Envoy has referred, induced him to think that, in
judging of the unfriendly attitude which, during the
last few years, the Amir has thought fit to assume
and maintain towards the British Government, it
would be ungenerous not to make great allowances
for the disappointment and mortification with which
His Highness appeared to have regarded the reiterated
failure of all his previous efforts to enter into closer
relations with that Government ; the extent to which
the increasing weakness and isolation of his position
might have aggravated this feeling ; and the fact that
the unfortunate imperfection of the hitherto existing
means of communication between the two Govern-
ments afforded to neither of them any adequate
opportunity of avoiding, or removing, those causes of
irritation which might be solely attributable to their
ignorance of each other's motives and interests. The
Viceroy, therefore, came to the conclusion that, if
the Amir still sincerely desired the open alliance and
protection of the British Government, and was pre-
pared to prove the sincerity of that desire by taking
practical steps for placing his relations with us on
a thoroughly cordial and satisfactory footing, the
wishes of His Highness in regard to the Treaty of

1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 151

Alliance, and any other reasonable evidence of our viceroy's
confidence and friendship, should receive from us a J^rs pe?iy.
similarly frank and cordial response. Her Majesty's Maroh 3
Government concurred in that conclusion: and it
was in all sincerity that the Viceroy authorised Atta
Mahomed to say to the Amir — "If you really desire
to secure and reciprocate our friendship, you shall
have it without reserve, and find in us a firm and
faithful ally."

6 It would appear, however, from the whole tone
of the Envoy's language to you, and from the state-
ment so carefully made by His Excellency (at whosii
request it has been submitted to me), of the Amir's
present views and sentiments, that His Highness now
no longer desires our alliance and protection. The
British Government does not press its alliance and pro-
tection upon those who neither seek nor apprnciato
them. This being the case, it only remains for the
Viceroy to withdraw, at once, the ofTum made to the
Amir in the month, of October last; and, in so doing,
to cxpmss his deep regret that these offers, and the
spirit in which they were made, should have been so
completely misunderstood, and so grossly and publicly
misrcprenen ted, by H is IJ igliness- Such unwarrantable
misrepresentations of our recent policy, however,
render it necessary to guard against similar misre-
presentation of our present position. I must, there-
fore, request you to explain distinctly to the Envoy,
and to place on record, in langungu not Riisccptihlo
of misi Construction, that, in withdrawing from the
Amir (hose, offers of material assisUinofc, in re-ply to
which His IliglmoHH has instructed the Envoy to
inform us thai lio neither required, nor is disposed to
accept, 111 cm, the British Government harbour» no
hostile designs against Afghanistan. This Govern-

152 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. v

Viceroy's ment repudiates all liabilities on behalf of the Amir
Le^8*p diy, and his dynasty. It does not indeed withdraw from
March 3 any obligations previously contracted by it ; but it
absolutely and emphatically denies that it has ever
incurred any such obligations as those imputed to
it by the Envoy of His Highness ; and it, further,
affirms that it will never, in any circumstances,
undertake such obligations without adequate gua-
rantees for the satisfactory conduct of the Amir.
But, at the same time, it will scrupulously continue,
as heretofore, to respect the Amir's independence
and authority throughout those territories which, up
to the present moment, it has recognised as being in
the lawful possession of His Highness ; and will duly
abstain from interference therein, so long as the
Amir, on his part, no less scrupulously abstains
from every kind of interference with tribes or
territories not his own. The Amir, therefore, so
long as he remains faithful to those treaty stipula-
tions which the Envoy has invoked on behalf of His
Highness, and which the British Government fully
recognises as still valid, and, therefore, binding upon
the two contracting parties, need be under no
apprehension whatever of any hostile action on the
part of the British Government.

' It must also be placed on record, in a form to
which authoritative and public appeal can be made,
should the policy thus frankly explained be again
misrepresented by the Kabul Durbar, that the
British Government has no sort or kind of quarrel
with the people of Afghanistan. It sincerely desires
their permanent independence, prosperity, and
peace. It has no conceivable object, and certainly
no desire, to interfere in their domestic affairs. It
will unreservedly respect their independence; and,

152 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION on. v

Viceroy's ment repudiates all liabilities on behalf of the Amir

lo+fav ^ft Qiv

Lewis Peiiy, and his dynasty. It does not indeed withdraw from
March 3 any obligations previously contracted by it ; but it
absolutely and emphatically denies that it has ever
incurred any such obligations as those imputed to
it by the Envoy of His Highness ; and it, further,
affirms that it will never, in any circumstances,
undertake such obligations without adequate gua-
rantees for the satisfactory conduct of the Amir.
But, at the same time, it will scrupulously continue,
as heretofore, to respect the Amir's independence
and authority throughout those territories which, up
to the present moment, it has recognised as being in
the lawful possession of His Highness ; and will duly
abstain from interference therein, so long as the
Amir, on his part, no less scrupulously abstains
from every kind of interference with tribes or
territories not hia own. The Amir, therefore, so
long as he remains faithful to those treaty stipular
tioius which the Envoy Las invoked on behalf of His
Highness, and which the British Government fully
recognises as still valid, and, therefore, binding upon,
the two contracting parties, need be under no
apprehension whatever of any hostile action on the
part of the British Government.

fi It must also be placed on record, in a form to
which authoritative rind public appeal can be made,
should the policy thus frankly explained be again
misrepresented by the Kabul Durbar, that the
British Government has no sort or kind of quarrel
with the people of Afghanistan. It sincerely desires
their permanent independence, prosperity, and
peace. It has no conceivable object, and certainly
HO desire, to interfere in their domestic affairs. It
will unreservedly respect their independence ; and,

1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 153

should they at any time be united in a national viceroy's
appeal to its assistance, it will doubtless be disposed,
and prepared, to aid them in defending that hide-
pendence from aggression. Meanwhile, the Afghan
people may rest fully assured that so long as they
are not excited by their ruler, or others, to acts of
aggression upon the territories or friends of the
British Government, no British soldier will ever be
permitted to enter Afghanistan uninvited.1

6 With these explanations and assurances you are The viceroy
now authorised to close those conferences with the
Afghan Envoy which, up to the present moment, you
have conducted with so much judgment and ability,
The felicitous combination of firmness and concilia-
tion, of frankness and caution, which has characterised
your language to the Envoy, and nil your official
intercourse with His Excellency, commands thu cordial
approval of the Viceroy, and will doubtless receive
that of tho Secretary of Stale. I do not consider
that your exertions have boen in vain. Ou the
contrary, they have, hi my opinion, been prolific in
useful results. For, four years the Government of
India has been acting, or abstaining from action, in
profound and perilous ignorance of the actual con-
dition of its relations wilh the Amir of Kabul, and

1 Nor WKB this assurance forgotten ia 1B7K. When (.ha Amir
in«nltcd iho British Government by receiving in full Durlmr i\ HiiFwian
Minnion, after having refused to receive it liritifih one, tht> Oovornmcnt
oi* Jndia requoHtttd him equally to receive a Jirilinh tmo, iml<<HH ho
wmlicd \w to Bonsider him opouly hoRtilo. IIo i-ofimotl to rucui\ o our
MiflBuut. Wo tlicni eDTifli(lorc;d ho had committncl an net of «in«rt'KHion
agaitiHl UB, ttiidmaHHud tmrtroopHon tho frontier. Wo did not, lunvuvor,
tlmn firo a ninglo Hliut or invader Im territory till wo hud given him
another cluuico of retracting this act of luiHtility. When, howovor
wo had warned him that we should consider hiw Hiluiicu us u ileclara-
tion of war on hin pitrt, tuid no tuwwer caino, thero WUH no oourmi left
but to march into his country.

154

LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. v

viceroy's

Lewis Peiiy,
March 3

the real sentiments and dispositions of His Highness.
The information you have now obtained, partly in
tjie course of negotiation, and partly by other means,
and the completeness with which you have enabled
the Government of India to verify that information,
have torn aside the impenetrable veil which has so
long concealed from us the increasing, and now
apparently complete, extinction of British influence
at Kabul. Your reports have also enabled the
Government of India, whose policy in regard to
Afghanistan lias hitherto been based upon the merest
guesswork, to form, for the first time since the Amir
visited Umballn, n sufficiently definite and accurate
notion, not only of the personal sentiments of Ilia
Highness, but iilso of his actual position, and the*
influences by which it is affected. I attack much
valuo to these salutary revelations; and I am, my
dear Sir Lewis,

6 Yours faithfully,

(Signed) ' LYTTOJS'.'

Hyud Noor Mahomed, who had been suffering
^rom s°v«ru illness throughout the proceedings, died
on March 20, before lie had attempted tiny reply k>
this communiciiLion.

Lord Lytton's « Thus,' wrote Lord Lytton, c after months of fruit-
March°iH77 less discussion, Miduvcd with great palienre by the
British Government, tliis couferenco was closed by the
death of the Kabul Kn voy. The re-opening of the con-
ference was rendered imposHible by the declaration
of that Envoy's surviving colleague that lie had no
powers authorising him to continue it/

'While these protracted discussions with Bynd
Noor Mahomed were in progress, intelligence
reached India from Kabul .that the Amir was

Death o(

lf-77 PESILAWO CONFEIIEXrK 155

straining every effort to increase his militarv force ; Vi«roy'*

A-L i. i * • • • / r i • M™* o

that he was massing troops on various points oi his ci0«eoi'
frontier; that he was publicly exhorting all his
subjects and neighbours to make immediate pre-
paration for a religious war, apparently directed
against his English rather than his Russian neigh-
bours, both of whom he denounced, however, as the
traditional enemies of Islam ; that, on behalf of this
Jehad, he was urgently soliciting the authoritative
support of the Akhoond of Swat and the armed
co-operation of the chiefs of Dir, Bajour, and other
neighbouring Khanates; that he was, by means of
bribes, promises, and menaces, endeavouring to
bring those chiefs under personal allegiance to
himself; that he was tampering with the tribes
immediately on the frontier, and inciting them to
acts of hostility against us ; and that for the pro-
secution of these objects he was in correspondence
with Mohammedan border chiefs openly subsidised
by the Indian Government.' l

The Viceroy commented upon this intelligence :
*The Amir throughout the whole course of
the conference displayed, and subsequently con-
tinued to manifest without the slightest provoca-
tion, a marked hostility towards the British
Government. "Whilst his representative was carry-
ing on friendly negotiations with the British Envoy
at Peshawur, the Amir himself was publicly and
falsely informing his subjects that the British
Government had broken its engagements, and
threatened the independence of his kingdom. On
this mendacious pretext His Highness proclaimed a
religious war against the British Government, and
actively endeavoured, by every means in his power,

1 Narrative of Events in Afghanistan.

Viceroy's
Minute on
close of
Peshawar
Conference

156 LOBD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. v

not only to incite the border tribes against us, but
also to tamper with the loyalty of our own subjects.
All the letters addressed to him by the British
Government calling for an explanation of this con-
duct have been left unanswered. Whilst continuing
military preparations avowedly directed against this
Government, His Highness has arbitrarily stopped the
transmission of ordinary intelligence between Kabul
and Peshawur. He has barbarously killed, mutilated,
or expelled persons suspected by himself or his
informants of holding even the most legitimate and
inoffensive intercourse with the authorities or sub-
jects of the British Government, and his whole
conduct continues to be characterised by undisguised
animosity. Such is the return made by the present
Amir of Kabul for nine years of friendship and
support on the part of the British Government.
His authority over the outlying districts to the
north of his present kingdom has been acknow-
ledged by Eussia solely in consequence of the firm-
ness with which the British Government has, in his
interests, insisted on that acknowledgment. From
the commencement of our relations with the present
Amir up to this moment no attempt has at any
time been made by the British Government to
disturb the peace of his dominions, no injury has
ever been inflicted by this Government on himself or
his subjects.

E In return for all this generosity and forbearance,
the British Government has received from the Amir
nothing but discourtesies, only rendered insignificant
by his absolute impuissance. Our latest offers to
protect his dominions and his dynasty, with much
expense and trouble to ourselves but with no inter-
ference in his authority, have been answered by an

1877 PESEAWUR CONFERENCE 157

attempt to stir up open hostility against us. We are Viceroy's
even led to believe, from the best information at our JS^d™
command, that in order to injure the Government £ed;awur

i>ii n -.«•.._ - Conference

which has for years befriended and protected him,
the Amir, in violation of his engagements with it,
has not scrupled to enter into secret intrigues with a
power which is now openly attacking Islam, and
menacing the independence of his co-religionists and
neighbours.

'The only pretext which has been put forward
in justification of this conduct is that His Highness
considers the recent stationing of a British garrison
at Quettah detrimental to his own relations with the
Khanate of Khelat and an indirect menace to him-
self.

'But it must here be observed that the hostile
attitude assumed towards the British Government by
the Amir of Kabul preceded, instead of following,
the event in which His Highness now attempts to
find a pretext for having assumed it.

* No such pretext, therefore, can be admitted by
the British Government. For more than twenty
years this Government has held direct relations with
the Khanate of Khelat by virtue of Treaty stipula-
tions which secure to it the right, not only of placing
its own troops in the Khanate whenever it may have
occasion to do so, but also of permanently excluding
and opposing all interference on the part of any
other Power in the affairs of the Khanate.

'The establishment of the present garrison at
Quettah is in strict accordance with these pre-exist-
ing Treaty rights ; as also with the terms of a new
convention, recently signed, between the British
Government and the Government of Khelat. It
is, moreover, considered by the Khan and Sirdars of

158 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN AJDMINISTRA.TION OH, v

Khelat to be absolutely necessary for the peace of the
close of Khanate, for the protection of trade, and for the
security of our own frontier.

'The step thus imposed on us was obviously
uncharacterised by any hostile design against the
Amir, with whom we were at that moment con-
ducting friendly negotiations, on a basis extremely
advantageous to His Highness.

6 Throughout the recent negotiations, as also
throughout the whole of the previous connection
between the two States since the accession of the
present Amir of Kabul to the throne, the British
Government has manifested the most scrupulous
regard for the independence of Afghanistan and the
most patient goodwill towards its ruler.

6 The independence of Afghanistan is still desired
by the British Government, although the British
Government cannot undertake to secure it if the
unfriendly and unwise conduct of the present Afghan
ruler remains unchanged. The British Government,
moreover, is still, as it has always been, sincerely
animated by an unselfish, interest in the general
welfare of the Afghan population, and will view with
great regret any suffering inflicted on that population
by the errors of the present Amir.

' But if His Highness persists in the prosecution
of his present faithless and unfriendly proceedings,
all responsibility for the inevitable consequence of
those proceedings must rest upon his own head. In
any case the British Government now considers
itself free to withdraw from the present Amir of
Kabul, if further provoked by him, the support of its
friendship and protection.

* The Government of India takes this opportunity
of warning all the chiefs and tribes upon its frontier

1877 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 159

to beware liow they place themselves in the power of Viceroy's
the Amir of Kabul, or become involved in the
heavy responsibility which will be incurred by all
who aid or abet that prince in any act of aggression
on British territory or British subjects.

' By listening to the false statements or trusting to
the deceptive assurances of His Highness they willonly
prepare for themselves many future calamities. The
British Government desires to cultivate their friend-
ship and to respect and uphold their independence :
but this it will be unable to do if they participate in
hostile demonstrations against it.'

It subsequently became known to the Viceroy
that Sher Ali would never have acquiesced in our
proposals, even had he made a temporary pretence
of accepting them, for he was already too far com-
mitted to the Eussian Alliance. But there is little
doubt that he was anxious to prolong the conference
to the latest possible moment, whilst actively push-
ing forward his own warlike preparations.

He sent instructions to the surviving Envoy to
prolong the conference by every means in his power,
and despatched a fresh Envoy, who was reported to
have authority to accept all the conditions of the
British Government. In the opinion of the Viceroy,
however, the concessions which it might have been
well for the British Government to offer to the Amir
had he shown any eagerness for our friendship could
no longer be safely offered in the face of the situa-
tion revealed by Sir Lewis Felly's investigations, and
he decided that under these circumstances the pro-
longation of the conference could only lead to em-
barrassments and entanglements best avoided by the
timely termination of it. On April 2 Sir Lewis Pelly
left Peshawur. Aprilfl

l6o LORD LTTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. v

Native agent
reoaUed

The Indian

acquire*} now

60QTOOH of

infonnatiun

Our native agent at Kabul was also at this time
withdrawn.

For purposes of information he had been proved
worthless. He was nothing more than a tool in
the hands of the Amir, and during the Peshawur
Conference he was kept virtually as a prisoner at
Kabul, all power of action being taken from him and
all his movements carefully watched and controlled.

For long past the Government of India had been
solely dependent for information on the reports of
the agent at Kabul and those of the Commissioner
of Peshawur 5 thus living in c profound and perilous
ignorance of actual facts and true causes' of all
that went on in Kabul, while the Bussian authori-
ties were working most energetically and successful!}7-
against us.

Now, however, other and more effective methods
were inaugurated for obtaining authentic informa-
tion. In establishing any new system of frontier
organisation, the Viceroy had to contend with the
opposition of all the old frontier officials, who objected
to any radical changes, and looked with suspicion
upon any system of diplomacy which required
secrecy and dexterity. Amongst the Punjab frontier
officers, there was one, however, who in the opinion of
the Viceroy appeared to possess the requisite qualities
of open-niindedness and intellectual quickness for
carrying on such a work as the political management
of the Peshawur frontier, this man being Captain
Cavagnari. It was a cause of great satisfaction to
Lord Lyttou when, towards the end of May, this
officer was moved to Peshawur to act as Deputy
Commissioner. Before he actually started for Pesha-
wur, he received a letter from the Viceroy promising
him unreserved confidence on the subject of the

1877 TESHAWUR CONFERENCE l6l

frontier policy he was anxious to inaugurate, and
demanding from Captain Cavagnari in return a
similar freedom of communication. The letter then
goes on as follows :

4 As regards our present relations with Sher Ali, viceroy to
the one thing to bear constantly in mind is the
importance of maintaining towards him an attitude
of the most complete indifference and unbroken
reserve.

* .... I do not intend to send Atta Mahomed ] back
to Kabul at all : and, if I eventually permit Bukhtiar
Khan to return there in a private capacity, it will
not be yet a while. In the meantime, therefore, it is
expedient that through Mr. Christie, or by any and
every other means in your power, you should obtain,
from all available sources, information of what is
going on in Kabul or elsewhere throughout Afghani-
stan, and keep the Government regularly and fully
furnished with such information. Hitherto our
intelligence from Afghanistan has been more constant,
complete, and trustworthy since the withdrawal of
the native agent than it was before. This is partly
due to the Khelat telegraph and the communications
opened by Sandeman with Kandahar. We get a fair
amount of news, however, from Peshawur also. In
working this Intelligence Department, I feel sure you
will be careful to abstain from any word or sign
which, if reported to the Amir, would convey to his
mind the impression that we care three straws about
what he may now do or not do, or that we have the
least desire to re-open negotiations with him. I doubt
if our present relations with His Highness will ever
be satisfactory ; but the only chance of improving
them is to let him first thoroughly realise the diffi-

1 Our native agent.

M

1 62 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. v

Viceroy to culties of the position in which he has now placed
himself. JUejwKct, the radical defect in the conduct
of our past relations with Sher Ali is that the tone of
it has never been in wholesome accordance with the
realities of our relative positions — the weakness of
his position and the strength of our own. Thus,
induced by our own conduct to believe himself a
political necessity to us, and consequently a great
political catch to the Russians, he has naturally
sought his personal advantage in playing his two
great neighbours off against each other. A few
months, possibly a few weeks, will, I think, suffice to
show him that he is not strong enough to play this
game successfully. I trust we shall never allow
Afghanistan to fall into the hands of any other
Power. But between Afghanistan and the present
Amir there is a practical distinction. We can get
on without Sher Ali ; he cannot get on without us.
Ere long he must either go to shipwreck altogether,
or else return to his old moorings on the Feshawur
side in a temper chastened by sharp experience. In
the former case our hands will be completely free to
deal promptly with the new situation which will then
arise. In the latter case we shall be able to replace
both the Amir and ourselves in what is our true, and
should always be our permanent, relative position
towards each other. The wrecks come to the shore :
the shore does not go to the wrecks.

* Tours, dear Captain Oavagnari, very faithfully,

( Signed) * LYTTON.'

A mission from the Sultan of Turkey was sent this
year to the Mohammedans of India atid Afghanistan,
and it was thought that his influence over the Amir
might induce the latter once more to come to a better

1877 MISSION FEOM THE SULTAN 163

understanding with the British Government. But it
had no such effect. The mission was received by the
Amir with great pomp and an obvious desire to
impress the Envoy by a strong display of military
power. Eeports first reached the Viceroy to the
effect that the Amir seemed really anxious to avail
himself of this opportunity of escape from his present
difficulties by renewing friendly relations with the
Indian Government and rupture with the Eussians.
This rumour was so far confirmed by the fact that
the troops intended for the jehad against us had been
removed from our frontier to Maimema. Then,
again, the Amir reverted to his old policy of trying
to gain time. He was indisposed, and could not
grant the Turkish Envoy an interview for fifteen days.
When the interview took place the Envoy found
His Highness very badly disposed towards the
English and his sympathies strongly Eussian,
Eussian influence he found predominant at Kabul,
where the Eussian Government had established an
active agency supplied from different parts of
Khokand. The Turkish Envoy was a 6 pious Mulla
without guile/ and in all his interviews with Sher
Ali the Amir had the best of the argument. At all
events the Envoy departed having totally failed to
establish better relations between the Governments
of India and Afghanistan.

All these negotiations had broken down upon the
essential point, which was indeed the keystone
defined by Lord Salisbury's despatch of February
1876. Her Majesty's Government had authorised
Lord Lytton to conclude a treaty with the Amir,
guaranteeing the integrity of his dominions, but
stipulating that for the effective performance of this
guarantee, the Amir should permit British agents to

1 64 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH v

have undisputed access to frontier positions upon the
North-West border of Afghanistan. This was, there-
fore, necessarily insisted upon in the negotiations of
1877, as the preliminary "basis, and when the Afghan
Envoy declined to admit it, the proceedings iiievitably
came to an end. The rupture of these negotiations
undoubtedly widened the breach between the Amir
and the Indian Government, Sher Ali began now
more openly to listen to friendly overtures from
beyond the Oxus, while the Viceroy of India, re-
cognising that the Amir was completely estranged,
regarded him henceforth rather as a dangerous and
untrustworthy neighbour than as a ruler whose power
it would be well to strengthen, and whose dominions
should be guaranteed.

The importance he attached to the newly acquired
position at Quettah and his negotiations with the
Maharaja of Kashmir concerning the tribes of
Ohitral and Yassin were prompted by the idea of
widening the influence of the British power over the
frontier tribes, and of loosening that of the Amir
beyond the boundary of his own little kingdom.
From this point of view, also, he discusses in a
correspondence with Oavagnari the advisability of
openly befriending some of the more important of
the tribes whose territory lay between that of the
Aniir of Kabul and the North-West Frontier of India.

Captain Oavagnari heartily agreed that the
independence of these tribes of the Amir of Afghan-
istan was a fact which had not been sufficiently
taken into account by the British Government, but
at the same time he warned the Viceroy that any
active steps on the part of the British Government to
secure their independence by the gift of arms or
money would at once be resented by the Amir as

1877 DEALINGS WITH FEONTIER TRIBES 165

an act offensive towards him, and should not, there-
fore, be resorted to while there was still any chance
of patching up differences with Sher All.

The Viceroy in his reply gives his reasons why, in Viceroy to
his opinion, a complete change of policy with regard
to these intermediate tribes has become necessary.
4 Our original Afghan policy,' he wrote, 4 was to
regard these tribes as the political property of the
Amir of Kabul, with a view to making him re-
sponsible for the control of them. I think that policy
was a very reasonable one ; for it is always convenient
to simplify your external relations as much as possible,
and unify the authority you have to deal with on
your border, whenever that can be practically done.
But, owing to various causes, the policy has failed,
and failed so irremediably that we cannot now set it
on its legs again. The Amir has never been able to
exercise authority over these intervening tribes in
the sense contemplated by those who laid down the
lines of the old policy; what influence he does
exercise over them is distinctly prejudicial and per-
manently inconvenient to us ; and meanwhile we, on
our part, have never been able to exercise authority
or influence over their Amir. Practically, therefore,
the result is that already Eussian influence can
approach the Amir through an open door, which it
is not even in his power to close ; while we can only
get at him across a hedge of thorns. . . . Our rela-
tions with the Amir of Kabul, instead of being to us
a source of increasing security, are a cause of incessant
anxiety. It is not, and cannot be, in our interests to
promote the consolidation of a border power whose
friendship we have no means of securing, and whose
enmity we cannot punish save by a war in which
success would not be free from embarrassment.

1 66 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION en. r

Viceroy to Therefore I conceive that it is rather the gradual
disintegration and weakening, than the consolidation
and the establishment3 of the Afghan power at which
we must now begin to aim.1 To Gavagnari's objection
that thfe conclusion of satisfactory relations between
the British Government and the independent frontier
chiefs would render impossible a reconciliation with
the Amir, the Viceroy's reply was this : c Sher All
has irrevocably slipped out of our hands ; and it is
therefore inadvisable to neglect any opportunity of
strengthening or improving our position by means
independent of his goodwill for fear that by so doing
we should provoke his resentment.' Oavagnari had
farther objected that any such relations established
with border chiefs would be as distasteful to Sher
Ala's successors as to himself. To this again the
Viceroy replied that if the aim of British policy was
not to consolidate but to disintegrate the Kabul
power, this did not matter. 4 We can never satisfy
their national ambition, because many of its natural
objects are not compatible with our own interests.
They will never greatly value such help as we are
able and willing to give them, and the more
confidently they can reckon on it the less they will
appreciate it. But they will always be more or less
influenced by our practical power of hurting them ;
and it is this which we should now endeavour to
develop and confirm.'

The system of government and organisation of
the North-West Frontier of India has been the subject
of discussion and controversy now for generations.

Writing in the spring of 1877, Lord Lytton
comments upon the * overwhelming concurrence of
opinion ' then existing on three points. Firstly c that
our frontier administration was in need of adjustment/1

1877 DEALINGS WITH FRONTIER TRIBES 167

secondly that the Government of Sindh should be
severed from that of Bombay, and thirdly that c the
line of demarcation between the Sindh or lower
frontier and the Punjab or upper frontier should be
readjusted according to the distribution of the races
on the border ; so that the Belooch tribes [might] all
come within one district and administration, and the
Pathan tribes within the other.'

In a minute dated April 22, 1877, Lord Lytton
examined the various propositions of reform which
were then before the Government of India, and
sketched in outline a scheme which embodied his
own views as to the best policy to be pursued.

He was in favour of forming a new frontier Viceroy's ^
district beyond the Indus, and separate from Sindh Frontier re-
and the Punjab. This district should be placed under orsanifla1ion
a Chief Commissioner or Governor-General's agent,
having the management directly under the Govern-
ment of India of all frontier business and trans-
frontier relations. * The Viceroy would, by means of
this arrangement, command the services of his own
specially selected agent, in whose hands the threads
of all our border politics and tribal relations would
be concentrated. The time of such an agent could
be devoted almost entirely to purely frontier duties ;
and he would be better able than any Lieutenant-
Governor of the Punjab can possibly be to visit with
adequate frequency, freedom of mind, and singleness
of interest all parts of the frontier; thus making
himself personally and thoroughly familiar with the
social facts, individual characters, and local senti-
ments which claim incessant and concentrated
attention in the successful administration of border
politics. The political and administrative conduct
of the frontier would be in the same hands and pass

1 68 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cu. v

Viceroy's through the same channels. All division of respon-
Frontier re- sibility and all antagonism of schools and systems

organisation WQuld thus ^ eliminated/

Objections to such a system were expressed on the
grounds, first, that these frontier districts naturally
formed an integral part of the Punjab, and should
not, therefore, be separated from it ; secondly, that
their internal administration would suffer by separa-
tion; thirdly, that our frontier relations are best
carried on through the Punjab Government.

With regard to the first of these objections Lord
Lytton's inquiries led him to an exactly opposite
conclusion. ' The frontier districts,' he writes, * are
separated from the Punjab by almost every possible
kind of distinction. They are separated geographi-
cally, historically, by race, by institutions, and by
customs. The Indus, for a great part of its course,
forms a natural and little traversed boundary between
two essentially distinct territories. The trans-Indus
districts were only conquered and annexed to the
Sikh kingdom late in the reign of Eunjeet Singh ; and
the tribal system prevalent throughout the greater
portion of them differs widely from the institutions of
the cis-Indus population.9

The second objection, namely, that the internal
administration of these frontier districts would suffer
by their separation from the Punjab, came chiefly
from those officers directly connected with the
Government of the Punjab. While acknowledging
that such men were undoubtedly * the best qualified
judges on certain points,' Lord Lytton pointed out
that ' they were yet hardly in a position to form the
soundest or most impartial opinion ' on the general
merits of an arrangement involving c some reduction
in the scope and power ' of the particular Govern-

1877 DEALINGS WITH FRONTIER TRIBES 169

inent with whose e achievements and traditions they viceroy's
were justly proud to be associated.' Frontier re-

The last objection was that our frontier relations organisation
were best carried on through the Punjab Govern-
ment. With regard to this Lord Lytton wrote:
'So long as our relations with the trans-frontier
States are carried on by an officer of comparatively
subordinate position, there may be reasons why he
should communicate through the local Govern-
ment rather than directly with the Government of
India. But if the conduct of these relations be trans-
ferred to an officer whose official rank is little below
that of the Lieutenant-Governor himself, it is in that
case difficult to imagine what advantage could be
gained by reserving to the Punjab Government any
share in the conduct of them. All unnecessary links
in an administrative chain admittedly weaken the
strength of it. The frontier officer has all the local
knowledge necessary to enable him to form and
submit an opinion, or to frame a line of policy for
the consideration of the Government of India The
Government of India reviews the information and
opinions thus submitted to it with a knowledge of
British and Imperial interests, as also of the military
and financial conditions of India, wider and more
accurate than that of any local administration. But
what new light can the Punjab Government throw on
the matter P It has not the local knowledge of the
Chief Commissioner on the spot, and it has no know-
ledge of Imperial policy and political conditions
which the Commissioner does not equally possess/

With regard to the military portion of the
Viceroy's scheme it was his intention to amalgamate
the Punjab Frontier Force and the Sindh Frontier
"Force, placing the whole under the orders of the

1 70 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. v

Viceioy's
Minute on
Frontier re-
organi Ration

Commander-in-Chief. 'The time had come/ he
thought, 'for the military force to take its proper
place with the rest of the troops under the immediate
orders of the Commander-in-Chief ; and for the civil
Government to rely more directly under ordinary
circumstances on its own force — the police. The
intermixture of commands which has been so often
pointed out as the great blot in our frontier military
system would thus cease ; and Peshawur, instead of
being a separate command interposed between and
interrupting the continuity of the frontier chain of
ports, would take its national position as the military
headquarters of the northern division.

'Though amalgamated and placed under the
Commissioner-in-Ohief the force should still be
localised and retain its character of a frontier force ;
that is to say, the regiments should serve only
within the frontier military districts, though inter-
changeable within these.

6 For the immediate security of the frontier
against petty raids, &c., it is essential that it should
possess a picked and most efficient police force, com-
manded by picked officers. For the Sindh frontier
the money saved by the reduction of one regiment of
Sindh horse might suffice to increase and improve
the police force ; the existing Belooch Guides form-
ing part of the police organisation. ... I am
hopeful that the force thus formed may eventually
become an admirable school for frontier work, and
a promising and popular field of distinction for young
men of energy and character/

This Minute on frontier organisation closes with
some general remarks on frontier administration,
which are quoted in full :

6 1 think it desirable that I should take this

I«7 DEALINGS WITH FRONTIER TRIBES i;i

opportunity of indicating broadly the views I per-
sonally hold regarding frontier administration. Very
broad the sketch must necessarily be, when so much
depends on conditions constantly changing ; on the oipies of
prejudices and passions of races with whom we are mmistmtion
as yet but imperfectly acquainted ; and on the indi-
vidual judgment and special qualifications of the
officers on whom so much depends. If, in the views
I am about to express, I have the concurrence of our
frontier officers, and they claim to have been en-
deavouring to act on the lines here set forth, I shall
feel myself strengthened and encouraged by their
support. If, on the other hand, they differ on some
points from the conclusions I have arrived at, I can
only say that these .conclusions are not "evolved
from my inner consciousness/' and that I claim no
supernatural insight into frontier politics. My
views on this subject have been derived from long
and careful study of masses of correspondence,
reports, minutes, &c., containing the opinions of the
most competent judges, both actors and spectators.
By the recorded experience of others I have en-
deavoured to test and correct all a priori impressions
of my own; and the conclusions thus gradually
matured are confirmed by such knowledge of the
facts they refer to as I have been able to acquire
from a year's tenure of office, during which several
important frontier questions have forced themselves
prominently on my notice. It is well to bear in mind
that in policy, as in other games of skill, the obser-
vant spectator is often a better judge than the player
absorbed in the chances of the game.

1 In the first place, then, I think it should be our
aim to cultivate more direct and frequent intercourse
than at present exists between ourselves and the

172 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. v

tribes on our borders. I have already had occasion
re- to observe more than once, what I cannot too often

organisation repeat in reference to this subject, that it is to the
effect of the straightforward, upright, and disinterested
action of English gentlemen, and to the influence
which higher mental power and culture never fail to
exert over those who are brought much in contact
with them, rather than to superiority in fighting
power and appliances, that I attribute British su-
premacy in India, as well as the exceptional success
of British rule in all quarters of the globe. If per-
sonal character and influence be the powerful engines
I believe them to be, it is desirable that their force
should be exercised as constantly and directly as
possible. For this, among other reasons, I propose
the appointment of a Ohief Commissioner at Feshawur,
invested with exceptionally high powers, who can
represent to the native mind more directly and per-
sonally than either the Lieutenant -Governor at
Lahore, or the still more distant Viceroy at Calcutta,
the embodied power and dignity of the British
Government. For this reason also I propose to in-
crease the administrative staff of divisions and dis-
tricts ; so that the Commissioners and Deputy Com-
missioners, relieved of much purely routine work,
may have more time for visiting, and becoming
personally acquainted with, their troublesome, but
not hopelessly unmanageable, neighbours. I have
before me now a Minute by Major James, formerly
Commissioner of Peshawur ; in which, as the result
of thirteen years' frontier experience, he expresses
himself most strongly as to the absolute impossibility
of combining a proper intercourse with the border
tribes with the execution of his ordinary civil duties.
The then Lieutenant-Governor, and Lord Lawrence,

1877 DEALINGS WITH FRONTIER TKIBES 173

hinted, indeed, that this incompatibility of functions Viceroy's
was Major James's own fault ; yet from all quarters Frwatier're-
I hear Major James spoken of as one of the ablest organisation
and most active administrators the frontier has
known, and one who, but for his untimely death, had
a brilliant career before him.

6 Again, for the reasons given above, I think that
the employment of Arbabs, or middlemen, should be
discontinued as much as possible. I do not myself
believe that it strengthens our hold even upon the
small class we thus employ. For every man gratified
by employment, a host of jealousies are raised against
him and ourselves. ... I admit, however, that there
are many occasions on which the services of Arbabs
have been, and may again be, most valuable to us,
especially in opening communication with frontier
tribes ; but I think that whenever their services can
be dispensed with, and direct communication opened,
or maintained, by our own authorities, this should
be done. Even if we could always depend on the
absolute loyalty of Arbabs, these men cannot convey
to the Native the same clear idea of our views and
character that he would gain by personal intercourse
with British officers.

'For the same reasons, I would be inclined to
relax somewhat the restrictions now placed on dis-
trict officers corresponding with Chiefs beyond the
border, and on officers crossing the border. I am
aware that this is a matter which will require very
careful and delicate handling ; and that any relaxation
of the present restrictions may be attended with con-
siderable risk. But it seems to me that, in our anxiety
to avoid present risk and complications, we have
somewhat sacrificed future influence and security. I
think there is no one who considers our present

174 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. v

relati°ns with the trans-frontier tribes to be altogether
frontier re- satisfactory. Ibelievethat our North-Western Frojitier
organisation presents at this moment a spectacle unique in the
world : at least, I know of no other spot where, after
twenty-five years of peaceful occupation, a great
civilised Power has obtained so little influence over
its semi-savage neighbours, and acquired so little
knowledge of them9 that the country within a day's
ride of its most important garrison, is an absolute
terra incognita ; and that there is absolutely no
security for British life a mile or two beyond our
border. I can see no force in the oft-repeated
argument that the Sikh and other kingdoms were no
more successful than ourselves in their intercourse
with these hill tribes ; unless, indeed, it be assumed
that English civilisation and rule are no better than
those of a Sikh or Persian kingdom ; that an English
officer represents no higher type of character than
the servant of an eastern king ; and that our power
and military resources and appliances are not
immeasurably superior to those of the kingdoms
which were crushed by a mere fraction of the force
now at our command.

6 Next, as regards our general system of fron-
tier defence, and the punishment of offences com-
mitted by the independent tribes; I think, as
already stated, that the time has come when the
military force should pass under the Commander-in-
Chief, losing somewhat of its police character, while
the civil power should be more directly responsible
for the protection of life and property. I propose,
therefore, to increase somewhat the police force,
giving it as good an organisation as possible, and
placing it directly under the district officers. The
local militia also should be under the district officers ;

1877 DEALINGS WISH FRONTIER TRIBES 175

and ordinarily these civil forces should be sufficient Viceroy's
to meet and punish any attempts from over the
border. With a picked police force, composed of
men of the same stamp, and as inured to hill work
as the tribes whom they have to act against, but
better armed, organised, and disciplined, under
picked officers, and with a proper system of espionage
and intelligence, I see uo reason why the security of
the frontier should not be maintained, in ordinary
times, without the assistance of troops. But when
once the troops are called out, then the control of
all armed forces, military, police, or militia, should
pass into the hands of the officer commanding the
troops ; and he alone, acting of course in concert
and communication with the civil authorities,
should be responsible for the protection of the
frontier.

6 1 have already, on several occasions, expressed
my strong disapproval of the system of small
punitive military expeditions; and I have twice,
within my short tenure of office, refused to sanction
them when they have been recommended. I do not
for a moment suppose that these turbulent and
savage tribes can be managed without occasional
displays of power, and severe punishment ; but I object
to this particular form of punishment. I object
to it because it perpetuates a system of semi-bar-
barous reprisal, and because we lower ourselves tu
the ideas of right and might common to our barbarous
neighbours, rather than endeavour to raise them to
our own ideas; — because it seldom really touches
the guilty, and generally falls most heavily on the
innocent ; because its natural tendency is to perpe-
tuate animosity rather than lead up to good relations ;
because, as a rule, it leaves no permanent mark, and

176 LOBD LYTTON'B INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH v

Viceroy's the tribes assailed by us can point triumphantly
FronUei°re- to our having evacuated their country after all;
organisation because there can be no more trying fighting for our
own troops than that which obliges them ultimately
to retire before an enemy increasing in strength and
boldness : and it appears from the records of these
expeditions, which are not always successes even in
the most limited sense, that the losses suffered by
ourselves often exceed the losses we inflict. Finally,
I object to this system because I think the confidence
of the hill tribes and their warlike spirit are quite as
likely to be raised as lowered by contests in which
they generally fire the last shot at a retreating foe.
I am aware that the expeditions I thus deprecate are
defended by a large number of our most experienced
frontier administrators, on the grounds, so far as
I understand them — 1st, that they are the only
means of dealing with barbarous races; and, 2nd,
that their success has been proved by results.
With regard to the first argument, I cannot find that
any other system has ever been tried with sufficient
persistence to give it a chance ; and, with regard to
the second, I cannot at all admit the results that have
been obtained, after twenty five years' frontier adminis-
tration, as evidence of successful dealings with these
tribes, seeing that European life is as insecure as ever
beyond our immediate border ; that we have recently
been exposed to a series of successful raids and
outrages from one tribe; and that in my short
tenure of office I have twice had to consider the
necessity of military operations against offending
sections. I maintain that, under ordinary circum-
stances, the police should be able to cope with
offences committed within our border, and, if
necessary, follow up and inflict punishment beyond it.

1877 DEALINGS WITH FRONTIER TRIBES 177

I also maintain that when troops are used, the expe- Viceroy's
ditions should be on a considerable scale, and pro- Frontier°ro-
ductive of permanent results. At any rate, under no OI8amaBtion
circumstances should the troops be withdrawn until
all opposition has absolutely ceased : they should
never be required to turn their backs to an enemy
who is still firing at them. And I think these expe-
ditions, in which, while doing little to put our
relations permanently on a better footing, we injure
a whole tribe for the vicarious punishment of an
individual, are particularly inapplicable where (as is
so repeatedly and strongly represented to us by the
Punjab authorities) there really is little or no tribal
responsibility or control. In the Punjab Eeport of
October 1876 it is pointed out that the Belooch
system of tribal responsibility cannot be applied to
the Pathan tribes, because " every tribe is divided
and sub-divided into numerous clans, each indepen-
dent of the others, and yielding but small obedience
to its own petty headmen." These tribes, it is
stated, " only unite against a common enemy. Con-
trol exercised over suet tribes through their chiefs
would be impossible, for the chiefs do not exist ,lf Yet
it is to these very tribes that the system is applied of
burning certain villages because other members of
the tribe have committed outrages.

filn dealing with barbarous tribes, our object
should be either to support and enforce tribal re-
sponsibility to the utmost wherever it already exists,
or to reduce tribal cohesion to a minimum where no
recognised authority can be found and used. The
worst system of all is that which, while it gives us
none of the advantages of tribal responsibility, yet
unites the tribe against us when we seek to exact
reparation for injuries inflicted. If, therefore, as we

Mr

178 LOBD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH, v

Viceroy's
Minute on
Frontier re-
organisation

are repeatedly assured by the Punjab authorities, the
heads of these tribes cannot be held answerable for
the actions of individuals, it should be an object to
trace the offence, and bring home the punishment to
the individual and his immediate abettors, rather
than to punish the tribe itself for the acts of the
one or more of its members.

6 It is hardly necessary to say that in reference
to this, as to other points which I have indicated, I
am fully alive to the difficulties of execution; but
I think it none the less important to lay down general
lines for guidance in our action.

6 The last point to which I attach special impor-
tance, is the gradual disarmament of the popula-
tion immediately within our frontier. The old
reasons for allowing and encouraging them to carry
arms, namely, that they were required to participate
actively in the defence of the frontier, have almost
disappeared ; and, in any case, I would entrust the
protection of the frontier against violence to the
police and military, rather than to the inhabitants
themselves. One of the first steps towards civilisa-
tion and social progress is the separation of the
military from the agricultural and trading classes ;
and the sooner our subjects can be taught to confine
themselves to peaceful pursuits, looking to the
authorities for protection and redress instead of
taking the law into their own hands, the better it
will be for all concerned. Such a measure would
require care and time for its execution ; but when-
ever the inhabitants of a village or district have
shown themselves troublesome, or specially quarrel-
some, or slow to render assistance when called upon,
the opportunity should be taken to deprive them of
their arms. Meanwhile all who do carry arms

1877 DEALINGS WITH FHONTEEK TRIBES 179

should be to some extent organised ; and the carry- Viceroy's
ing of arms be clearly understood to carry with it
certain responsibilities. The number of able-bodied
men carrying arms, and the nature of their arms,
should, as far as possible, be registered, and all armed
villages required to furnish assistance to the police
or civil power, or supply escorts, watchmen, &c.3 in
proportion to their armament.

6 These are my general views on the subject of
border policy. The re-organisation of the frontier
districts, which is here proposed, will doubtless
afford great facilities and advantages for giving
practical effect to the principles on which I am
anxious to see the management of frontier affairs con-
ducted. But I need scarcely point out that the
necessity for a speedy and complete re-organisation
of the present system of Frontier Government is
entirely independent of any administrative theories,
or political principles, peculiar to myself. This
measure is absolutely and urgently requisite for the
efficient execution of the policy of the Government
of India, whatever that policy may be, or howsoever
that Government may be composed now, or here-
after.

LYTTON.

' NAINI TAL : April 22, 1877,'

This Minute was written in April of 1877. In
the autumn of this year the Viceroy authorised a
small expedition against the Jowaki tribes who had
perpetrated incessant raids upon the Peshawux
border. In authorising a punitive expedition against
them, however, the Viceroy endeavoured to carry out
as far as possible the principles which he had laid
down in the Minute. His difficulties were great,

N2

l8o LOED LOTION'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. y

owing to the multiplicity of authorities with whom
he had to deal, and the first expedition was a
failure. The Viceroy had explicitly urged a ' night
surprise.' Nevertheless it was carried out in broad
daylight.

Viceroy to ' The tribes were thus made aware in good time

October8!8*8' °^ ^ *kat our authorities flattered themselves they

were keeping secret ; the expedition was ludicrously

ineffectual, and has of course done more harm than

good.'

In despair of otherwise coming to a satisfactory
understanding with the frontier authorities, the
Viceroy sent his military secretary, Colonel Colley,
unofficially to Peshawur to ascertain the real facts
of the situation there and to assist the Viceroy in
arriving at some practical decision on the various
proposals which had been submitted to him. The
principles which were laid down at this conference of
officers were as follows :

viceroy to * ^st- ^° avo^ as ^ as poss^e operations ne-

Seo. of state, cessitating the ultimate retirement of the

November 23 British troops under pursuit and fire of

the enemy.

2nd. To hold all positions once taken until the
absolute submission of the tribe has been
secured.

3rd. To make the loss and suffering fall as
heavily as possible on the enemy's fighting
men, and as lightly as possible on the
non-combatants.'

Under the new system advocated by the Viceroy
operations were begun against the Jowaki tribes
under General Keyes, who advanced into their
country on November 9, with a force about 2,000
strong. Pains were taken to isolate this tribe, which

1877 JOWAKI EXPEDITION l8l

had caused the disturbances, from the surrounding
and neighbour tribes, thus reducing the strength
of the enemy to be quelled to some 1,200 or 1,500
men. This was successfully accomplished. The
other tribes refused the appeal for help from the
Jowakis, and continued to trade actively and peace-
fully in British territory.

On November 23 the Viceroy wrote to Lord TO Lord
Salisbury : * I have made every effort to keep the November 23
present operations (which in some form or other
were absolutely unavoidable) within the narrowest
possible bounds; first, by confining them to the
Jowakis and taking every security for the isolation
of that tribe before we attacked it; secondly, by
rejecting every plan of operations which was not so
devised as to enable us to employ the minimum of
force with the maximum of effect ; and thirdly, by
steadily resisting the pressure put upon me by the
Punjab authorities, both civil and military, as well
as by the Commander-in-Chief, for permission to
employ a force greatly in excess of what is admitted
to be necessary for the purposes to which the present
expedition is confined.'

On December 7 he was able to write as follows : TO: tea
fi Our operations against the Jowakis have thus far December 7
been an unprecedented success. Our troops are now
masters of nearly the whole Jowaki country. The
tribe seems to be quite bewildered and cowed by
the new tactics which I have at last succeeded in
getting our frontier authorities to adopt. The Jowakis
have shown hardly any fight, but, considering the
small amount of fighting there has been, the losses
of the enemy have been unusually large and our own
unusually small. None of the other tribes have
shown the slightest disposition to join the Jowakis,

1 82 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION ML V

who, being thus completely isolated, with all their
strongholds destroyed and all their cultivated land
in our hands, have already sent in headmen to sue
for terms. All that is now necessary is that the
terms imposed on them be sufficiently precautionary
as well as punitive. We must secure guarantees for
the future, as well as inflict punishment for the past.
I anticipate from the success of this expedition the
permanent establishment in India of a whole set of
new and better principles of warfare. I do not think
it likely that our frontier officers, having once recog-
nised the ease, safety, and superior result of the new
system, will ever again revert to the old one, which
its most inveterate advocates of a year ago now
admit to have been justly condemned ; and I think
we have heard the last of the old "British Raid."
Our frontier authorities, both civil and military, write
me word that not only has the new system of
operations been signally successful against the Jowakis
themselves, but that it has also made a profound
impressyjpn on all the surrounding tribes, who now
for the first time perceive that war with the British
Government may be to them a much more serious
matter than it hitherto has been.'

The Viceroy had from the beginning settled the
terms which he would deem it expedient to enforce :
(1) the surrender of arms, and, if possible, of ring-
leaders ; (2) the opening up of the country byroads,
which, if the Jowakis behaved peacefully in the
future, would be extremely beneficial to their own
trade, whilst if they mean mischief their power of
doing it will thus be crippled.

These conditions were unconditionally accepted
early in the following year, and the expedition
was most satisfactorily concluded. A well planned

1878 JOWAKI EXPEDITION 183

and well executed surprise movement under Major
Oavagnari upon the village of Sapi resulted in the
killing of one ringleader and the capture of four
others concerned in the outrage on the Swat Canal
in the autumn of 1877.

Writing to Sir Mountstuart Grant Duff (then
Mr. Grant Duff), on February 24, 1878, Lord Lytton
refers to the success which had attended the adoption
of the new system of dealing with the constantly
recurring frontier raids.

* When I came to India I found that our officials TO Mr. Grant
on the Punjab frontier were profoundly ignorant of xsre FGb' 24|
the geography of the country five miles beyond their
border* No map of it existed. Within our border
raids were constantly perpetrated with perfect im-
punity by the same tribes. The raiders, though a
mere handful of men, invariably found our frontier
authorities totally unprepared for their visitations
and invariably escaped unharmed, after cutting the
throats, and plundering the property, of the Queen's
subjects, . . . Now, at least, the whole Jowaki country
has been accurately surveyed and mapped from end
to end ; practicable roads have been made through
it in all directions ; every one of its strongholds have
boon destroyed; the fighting power of the whole
tribe haw been broken ; the fighting men of the tribe
have surrendered all their European a,nns, and have
acqnioAced in the expulsion of all the ringleaders
concerned in recent raids. Not another tribe, or
section of a tribe, has ventured to stir hand or fool,
in support of thorn, though I was confidently assured,
of course, by those very experienced gentlemen (of
whom Gesortf e flolwyn once said that, had thcdr advice
been always listened to, " Gad, sir, we should still
be champing acorns") that all the Afridi tribes

184 LOED LYTTCOTS INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. v

Lord Lytton would unite to support the Jowakis in resisting the
D^iS^l outrageous conditions prescribed by the Viceroy;
1878 that in the course of a few months we should have

the whole frontier seething with fire ; that the much-
offended and all-powerful Amir of Kabul would
then descend upon us like a wolf on the fold with
his ' gleaming cohorts/ and that all sorts of other
terrible things would happen. The successful result,
however, of the new system, which I have had such
difficulty in getting applied (and for the application
oi which I must say I am much indebted to the
loyalty and good sense of the present Lieutenant-
Governor), has established several things. It has
established the fact that no Afridi tribe can resist
the action of British troops (with their present arms)
if these troops be employed in accordance with
rational principles. It has established the perfect
practicability of night surprises (if properly organised
in connection with such a system), as preferable to
the old system of cumbrous and protracted military
operations ; and, finally, it has established throughout
all the border tribes such a salutary fear of our power,
will, and patience that I think I can safely predict
that, during my own tenure of office at least, the peace
of the Punjab frontier will not again be troubled by
any mere tribal attacks. I am persuaded that, under
a decent system of frontier administration, occasion
for recourse to military expeditions ought never to
occur.'

While matters remained in a state of expec-
tation and immobility on the Afghan border, the
Viceroy was engaged in arrangements for occupying
a fresh position on the extreme northern frontier of
India. He carried through negotiations with the
Maharaja of Kashmir for the establishment of a

1878 NEGOTIATIONS WITH KASHMIR 185

British political agent at Gilgit, a small semi-inde-
pendent district beyond Kashmir upon the slopes of
the range of the Hindu Kush mountains. In writing
an account of these proceedings to Lord Cranbrook, Lord Lytton
he says : 1 c Kafristan consists of a smaJl loose group
of independent chiefdoms, very weak, and, so far as
I can judge, destined to be absorbed ere long by one
or other of their four more powerful neighbours —
Kabul, Kashgar, Kashmir, and ourselves. They are
greatly coveted by the present Amir of Kabul. His
absorption of them would weaken the security of our
frontier by strengthening a frontier State which
already commands some of the most important
passes into it — a State always unreliable, at present
openly unfriendly. This consideration is all the
more serious because, so long as we command not
a single one of its external debouches, our " mountain
frontier," on which the " Lawrentians " profess to
place such reliance, is simply a fortress with no
glacis — in other words, a military mouse-trap. The
absorption of the Mirs of Kafristan by any Power
holding Kashgar would probably make them the
political appendages of the Russian or Chinese
empire (to one of which it seems probable that
Kashgar must eventually belong), thus bringing
either of those empires into direct contact with our
own. Their absorption by ourselves is impossible,
because the British public has vetoed annexation.
And, moreover, so long as we can prevent them from
being annexed by Kabul or the future Kashgar
Power, it would certainly not be worth our own
while to annex these poor and barren territories.
The country of the two northernmost of these small
chiefdoms (Chitral and Yassin) contains two passes,
1 April 9, 1878.

1 86 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION- OH. v

of wllich at present we know very little. But, if
of state, either of these passes (the Baroghil and the Iskoman)
pr be practicable for troops, it would enable an in-

vading force, with a fine base at Tarkand, to
reach our frontier (its weakest point) by a route
quicker than any other. Just before my arrival in
Lidia, Lord Northbrook, whose attention had been
turned to the obvious importance of clearing up the
doubt as to the character of these passes, instructed
Major Biddulph (an officer on his staff, well qualified
for such a task) to explore them. Owing to various
unforeseen circumstances, Major Biddulph was only
able to explore very imperfectly a portion of one of
them. From his report it would appear that this
pass is not practicable, and of the other we still
know next to nothing.

6 Subsequently, when it became apparent that we
could no longer, rationally or safely, rest our whole
frontier policy on the fiction of an Afghan alliance
which does not exist and which we have no means
of securing, Lord Salisbury authorised me to do
what I could, quietly, to make the security of our
North-West Frontier as far as possible independent of
any such alliance. To the attainment of this object
my efforts have been directed in various directions,
and one result of them is the present more or less
confidential arrangement with the Maharaja of
Kashmir - . . whose loyalty can, I think, be
thoroughly relied upon. If there be one thing more
than another which every Indian Prince is ambitious
of, it is extension of territory or rule. By the
present arrangement, Kashmir is authorised to enter
into treaty relations with these neighbouring chiefs,
with a view to obtaining their recognition of his
suzerainty in return for a small subsidy. In return

1878 NEGOTIATIONS WITH KASHMIR 187

for this permission, the Maharaja assents to the The viceroy
establishment of a British agency at Gilgit to watch of atS?"*
the frontier at that point, and the construction, at A*ril 9
his own expense, of a telegraph from Gilgit to British
territory. The Maharaja is not to use force for the
purpose of extending his authority over Ohitral,
Yassin, or any of the other neighbouring chiefdoms ;
but should he at any time hereafter be obliged to
resort to it for the maintenance of rights acquired
by his treaties with them, he is assured of our
support and assistance, if he requires them for that
purpose. This arrangement was approved some
time ago by Lord Salisbury, and is now in force.
One of the Mirs has already signed a treaty with
Kashmir, pledging his allegiance, and has sent
hostages to the Maharaja's Court. I am hopeful
that his example will be followed by others in due
course of time. If so, we shall have secured a
vicarious but virtual control over the chiefdoms of
Kafristan (which will have cost us nothing) by their
absorption under the suzerainty of Kashmir, our
vassal. As it is, the Baroghil and Iskoman passes
(quantum valeaf) are already brought within that
suzerainty. But the arrangement can only bear
fruit slowly ; first, because Kashmir is forbidden to
use force, and the diplomacy of native Courts is
always slow; and, secondly, because Kashmir is a
Hindu dynasty, and these Mirs and Khans are all
Mohammedan. That fact will not prevent them from
placing themselves under Kashmir's protection, if
they find it to their interests to do so ; but it would
probably throw them into the hands of the Amir of
Kabul (whom they now dread and mistrust), if any
attempt were made by Kashmir at forcible inter-
ference with their independence. Meanwhile the

1 88 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. T

TO Secretary telegraphic cable from Gilgit to Srinuggur is already
'm course of construction, and, I believe, nearly
completed. Major Biddulph, whom I selected for
the new post of observation at Qilgit, arrived there
not long ago ; and this is how matters now stand.9

189

CHAPTER YI

FAMINE OF 1877

THE most serious anxiety which pressed upon the Famine
Government of India this year, however, was not in
connection with frontier affairs, but with the famine
in the southern provinces of India.

In October of the year 1876 signs of scarcity
appeared in the neighbourhood of Bombay, owing to
the failure of the food crops. These were the first
symptoms of a famine, which in the following year
proved to be 6in respect of area and population Famine Com-
affected, and duration and intensity, one of the most mission
grievous calamities of its kind experienced in British
India since the beginning of the century. The failure
of the summer rains of 1876 extended over about
half of the Madras Presidency, the distress being
most intense in the same tract (that lying above the
Eastern Ghats) which suffered in 1853 and 1854.
The scarcity was felt with great severity over the
whole of Mysore (except the hilly tracts that lie along
the Western Ghats), the southern half of the Hyder-
abad State, and all the Deccan districts of the Bom-
bay Presidency. The area thus affected was about
200,000 square miles, containing a population of
thirty-six millions.'

In the earliest stages of the famine considerable
difference of opinion existed as to whether the relief
measures should be mainly based on the system of

Different
systems of
famine relief

Viceroy to
Sir B. Tern;
Nov. SO, 1

190 LORD JETTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. vi

employing the people on large or on small works.
Small works are easily started, with little previous
preparation, require little expert skill in their super-
vision, and offer employment to people close to their
own homes ; they are therefore suitable for a slight
and temporary scarcity, and for the earlier stages,
when it is still uncertain whether scarcity will develop
into famine ; but they are liable to break down when
very large numbers have to be provided for, andit soon
becomes impossible to apply a strict labour test to the
disorganised masses collected on such works. More-
over, the character of these works (the cleaning out
and digging of tanks, repairs or embankment of old
roads, &c.) is such that it is hardly possible that the
money laid out on them should be remuneratively
employed. On the other hand, large works, carried
out under experienced officers of the Public Works
Department, require much previous preparation, sur-
veys and estimates, and involve careful organisa-
tion of the staff, housing of the labourers, provision
for food and water, with sanitary and medical
arrangements. But when thus started they form the
best means of utilising the labour for permanent and re-
munerative objects. Sir Philip Wodehouse, Governor
of Bombay, taking a serious view of the extent of the
disaster which had befallen the country, advocated
from the first the commencement of large public
works. The Government of Madras, on the other
hand, adopted the system of opening small and
scattered works, which would not involve a large
expenditure if the anticipated famine should not
turn out to be very severe, and their views were at
first supported by the Supreme Government.

Writing on November 30 from Multan to Sir
Eichard Temple, the Viceroy said : 6 This calamity is an

1876-77 FAMINE igi

unforeseen and serious embarrassment. As the first
intimation of it only reached me on the eve of my
departure from Simla, and my reasons for visiting
the frontier were urgent, I have left the conduct of
all correspondence with the local Governments on
this subject entirely to Norman and my colleagues,
whose experience of such matters is, of course, much
greater than my own. We are all of us agreed, how-
ever, firstly, not to sanction the commencement,
for purely relief purposes, of large, long, and costly
undertakings unless the public works of that kind
proposed by the local Governments have been
previously approved by the Supreme Government, as
advantageous or necessary in themselves and com-
patible with the present state of our finances ; and,
secondly, not to sanction3 except on very clearly
proved necessity, any interference with the natural
course of trade. I am afraid that these principles
are not in favour with either of the two Governments
chiefly concerned in carrying them out ; and, indeed,
Madras has, without any reference to us, bought
large quantities of grain at what seem to me high
prices, and without any adequate cause.'

Lord Lytton, however, soon perceived that tenta-
tive measures were unsuitable when the certainty
of having to deal with a great and widespread famine
became established, and he disapproved of sending
instructions to the Bombay Government to confine
its operations.

This was how matters stood when the Viceroy
himself reached Bombay, and his interviews with the
Governor, Sir Philip Wodehouse, and the other local
authorities sufficed to satisfy him that the Bombay
Government was dealing with the difficulty on sound
principles, and with great discretion as well as energy.

1 92 LORD LYTTOtt'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. vi

Bombay ays- The Bombay system became, before the year was out,
the universally accepted plan of dealing with labour
on relief works.

After acknowledging, in a private letter, this change
of opinion as to the justification of the management
of the Bombay Government, the Viceroy adds :

To Sir Louis ' In answering the various addresses I received
n, is?? at Bombay, I thought it only fair to give public
expression to this opinion.1 He went on to explain
that, considering the gravity of the case, he had
thought it desirable to invite the two Governments
of Bombay and Madras to meet him at Delhi, and
discuss the condition of affairs and the future policy
in a personal conference. 6 This, I think, has been
quite satisfactory. We had a long conference
attended by the two Governors, and I think it has
effectually removed all misunderstanding between the
Government of Bombay and the Government of
India ; my colleagues having agreed to modify their
last despatch in a sense acceptable to the Bombay
Government.' Writing to Lord George Hamilton 1 on
January 22, he said : G I think you can truly affirm,
I certainly assert it myself, that as regards the famine
difficulties the Imperial assemblage has been a god-
send. Had it not enabled me to bring the two
Governors into personal conference with my own
Council, I really believe that we should at this
moment have found ourselves in an inextricable mess.
The opportunity thus afforded furnished me with the
only possible means of removing what threatened to
be a serious misunderstanding between the Govern-
ment of India and the Bombay Government on
questions of vital importance.' The presence of the

1 Lord George TTn.miit.nTi was then Tender-Secretary of State for
India.

1877 FA3IINE 1 93

Duke of Buckingham at Delhi revealed a state of
things at Madras which excited the gravest appre-
hensions in the mind of the Viceroy. The notion of
dealing with the scarcity in that Presidency was
apparently to keep down prices artificially by huge
purchases of grain, 'not perceiving,' writes the
Viceroy, c that the high prices, by stimulating import
and limiting consumption, were the natural saviours
of the situation. The result is that the Madras Mistaken
Government has not only shaken the confidence of Madras"
a trade already shy enough, but has also created a
pauper population, whose numbers are no test of
the actual scarcity and whom it will be very difficult
to get rid of.

6 We were unanimous that this must be stopped
at once, and we have come to the conclusion that
our best course is to send Sir Eichard Temple l in the
character of our Commissioner, and with adequate
power, to Madras. He will go there vid Bombay, in sitmc1'
order to strengthen his hands in dealing with the
Madras Council by having first inspected some of the
Bombay districts where similar phenomena are being
successfully treated in accordance with the policy we
have laid down. In the meanwhile we have forbidden
the Madras Government to buy more grain 'as a
trader, whilst authorising it in cases of necessity to
purchase grain for grain wages, just as any Com-
missioner might do/

At the earliest stage there was some excuse to
be made for the policy of the Madras Government.
They pleaded that the precedent of the famine in 1874 ,
the management of which (entrusted to Sir Richard
Temple) had not at that time been officially over-
ruled, justified the purchase of grain, and they also

1 On account of his experience in the Behar famine of 1874

•0

1*94 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTBATION CH. TI

argued on the merits of the case, that the knowledge
of the fact that Government possessed stores of grain
which they could throw on the market or lay down
at places out of the way of trade would prevent the
absolute withholding of stocks or prohibitive prices,
and so tend to avoid panics, one of the greatest
dangers in the early days of famine. They did not
appreciate the fact that Lord Northbrook and Sir
Eichard Temple had for the most part to deal with
an isolated area badly connected with the trade
centres, and that in that area the Government under-
took practically to supersede private trade, and did
so, but at an expense which, if applied to the area
over which the famine of 1877 extended, would
have brought speedy bankruptcy*

Famine Com- In the instructions given to Sir Eichard Temple
mission ^ ^3 Government of ludia the principle was re-
affirmed that the Government would spare no efforts
to save the population of the distressed districts
from starvation or from an extremity of suffering
dangerous to life ; but they would not attempt the
task of preventing all suffering and of giving general
relief to the poorer classes of the community.
Everyone, it was said, admits the evils of indis-
criminate private charity, but the indiscriminate
charity of a Government is far worse. The Govern-
ment held that the task of saving life irrespective
of the cost was one which it was beyond their
power to undertake, but from the history of past
famines rules of action might be learned which
would enable them in the future to provide efficient
assistance for the suffering people without incurring
disastrous expenditure.

In the opinion of the Viceroy, Sir Eichard Temple
carried out his instructions at Madras with admirable

1877 FAMINE 195

tact, judgment, and energy, and for the time being
exerted a much-needed check on the expenditure
of the Madras Government. He found that vast
numbers were in receipt of relief who, for a time
at any rate, could support themselves. Under his
influence the wage rate was lowered and the super-
vision of relief labour was increased.

Unfortunately there was a relapse to the original
condition of excessive extravagance soon after Sir
Eichard Temple's departure.

The grain transactions of the Madras Govern-
ment continued so to alarm the Government of
India that they finally gave vent to their anxiety in
a despatch on the subject, the publication of which
caused the Duke of Buckingham some annoyance.
The Viceroy thus defended it in a letter to Lord
Salisbury : ' The whole action of the Calcutta grain Viceroy to
trade was on the point of being paralysed by the gJSe!1*17 °f
conduct of the Madras Government and its pertina- Mar 17» 1877
cious reticence on matters demanding the utmost and
most prompt publicity. Complaints and expostula-
tions from the trade were pouring in to us daily.

* The greatest distrust and uncertainty prevailed
where it was of essential importance to establish
confidence. All our representations to Madras on
this subject had been ignored and disregarded. All
the principal mercantile houses in Calcutta concurred
in assuring us that so great was the mistrust that
unless this impression were promptly removed all
shipments of grain from Bengal would immediately
cease. That would have landed us in a huge
disaster, which neither we nor the local Government
could cope with. ...

' The case was extremely urgent, and had we not
instantly made the publication of which the Duke

o 2

196 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADM1NISTBATION OH, vi

complains I think you would at this moment have
been under the obligation of instructing us how to
deal with a situation entirely beyond our own power
of managing it. If there be one thing to which more
than any other, in the history of this famine, I look
back with unshaken satisfaction, it is the patient,
persistent, and hitherto successful efforts made by
the Government of India to prevent the Madras
Government from stopping, by its most unwise "
proceedings, the action of the private trade in grain.
I am also confident that if the present famine has not
yet become altogether unmanageable this is mainly
due to the resolute and unremitting publicity given
by the Government of India to every fact connected
with it.'

Bain fell throughout the famine districts of
Madras in May and June 1877, but the hopes then en-
tertained that the worst period of scarcity was over
were subsequently disappointed. The state of things
at Madras grew from bad to worse. The Madras
Government raised their scale of relief wages. This,
in the opinion of the Viceroy, was unwise, but he
considered it a matter in which the Supreme Govern-
ment was not justified in interfering. In Bombay,
where the scarcity was the same, a much lower rate
of wages was found to work successfully, and in that
presidency there had been far less famine mortality.
The mortality in Madras was terrible, and in the
Viceroy's opinion was not a little attributable to
the defective management and unsound principles of
the local Government.

viceroy to Writing to the Duke of Buckingham on July 6

MadSSr0 the Viceroy expressed his distress at the great

July 6 increase in the numbers receiving charitable relief in

Madras without any prospect of diminution till the

1877 FAMINE 197

next crop should be reaped, and attributed this state
of things to the recent increase of relief wage, adding :
' So long as a pinched population, not habitually
or by temperament very self-helpful, can live at
Government expense, on high wages for light work,
I greatly fear you will experience serious difficulty in
forcing such a population to revert to dependence
on its own unaided resources, however sufficient those
resources may be. But would it not be a sound
principle in such cases that Government relief should
cease, as far as regards cultivators, as soon as crops
have been sown under fairly favourable circum-
stances. For when this happens the cultivator can
at once obtain credit for his property.'

Towards the end of July drought was so wide-
spread as to threaten a general scarcity, and the
Viceroy informed the Governor of the Straits Settle-
ments of the failure of the crops, requesting him to
communicate the information to the Governments of
Cochin China and Siam, where there was abundant
grain for export.

The condition of affairs at Madras by the end of
July was so deplorable that the Viceroy decided to
go there himself without delay. The following letter
to Lord Salisbury gives a vivid picture of the exist-
ing state of things.

To the Marquis of Salisbury

[Private.] ' Simla : July 29, 1877,

' My dear Lord Salisbury, — I fear it is impossible
to exaggerate the gravity of the situation we have
now to recognise, and, if possible, to deal with, in
Madras and Mysore. I have briefly recorded the
main facts of this situation in my telegram of
yesterday, and I need not now repeat what I have

198 LOKD LYTTOira INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. TI

TO Lord said in that telegram. When Temple inspected the
JuiyS29ry' relief works in Madras, he reported that the popula-
tion employed upon them was a mere mob for want
of adequate supervision. The total number of the
population on relief work, or in receipt of charitable
aid, was then, 1 think, within half a million It has
now increased to one million and three-quarters
(probably owing, in no slight degree, to the measures
which have simultaneously lowered the rate of labour
and raised the rate of wages), but the means of
supervision have not been augmented in proportion ;
nor, indeed, so far as I can make out, have they been
appreciably augmented at all. If the relief gangs,
when Temple inspected them, were an unregulated
rabble, what must now be their condition? But,
supposing the public works staff to be adequately
strengthened, all relief labour to be brought under
its supervision, and that supervision to be as com-
plete as possible, there is really, so far as I can
discover, nothing to supervise. By far the greater
portion of the relief labour throughout Madras seems
to consist of scraping mud off a road, or out of a tank,
andscraping.it back again, or chopping prickly pears.
According to the weekly despatch from the Madras
Government to you, the grants for famine relief
amounted, on the llth instant, to two millions and
a half. This, of course, is irrespective of loss of
revenue, and enhanced military and other charges.
So far as I can judge, this enormous expenditure will
bequeath to the presidency little or no permanent
benefit in the shape of any important public works.
Some few works of lasting utility will no doubt have
been completed or commenced, but none of which
the importance will render any appreciable return
for the vast outlay already incurred. But we have

1877 FAMINE 199

now to contemplate another unexpected year of TO Lord
famine, with increased and increasing expenditure for
an indefinite period ; and I am sure you will share
my anxiety that this enormous, and apparently
inevitable, outlay should not, at least, be altogether
wasted ; that it should contribute to the permanent
improvement of the presidency, and bequeath to the
population some increased insurance against future
famine.

* Of village relief throughout Madras there is, so
far as I can ascertain, no organised system, nor at
present any means of establishing or working such
a system. The Public Works Department staff is
notoriously inadequate. . . . The district officers
complain that they can get no practical instructions,
no practical assistance, from their Government. I
notice that one of them, Mr. Oldham, reported the
other day that, with the assistance of only one Europ ean,
he was left to inspect upwards of 70,000 labourers.
The Madras Government has recently issued an
instruction to its district officers ordering them to
give to persons applying for gratuitous relief practi-
cally just whatever they ask for. Some of the officers
to whom this circular was addressed pointed out, and
protested against, the absurdity of it ; and, reluctant
as I am to interfere with the proceedings of the local
Government, however deplorable they may seem to
me, I felt constrained to request the withdrawal oi
this instruction.

* In Mysore the state of things, though fortu-
nately on a smaller scale, is even worse, so far as it
goes. The returns given in last Saturday's " Gazette "
are startling —

On relief work under revenue officers . . . 26,158

„ „ Public Works Department . 24,275

Gratuitously relieved , ... 120,251

200 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAJST ADMINISTRATION OH. vi

1 Thus, the number employed on public works,
which was very small last May, has considerably
diminished since then, whilst the number of persons
in receipt of gratuitous relief has largely increased.

e Compare the corresponding returns from
Bombay :

On relief works 295,514

Gratuitously relieved 66,399

'In Bombay, moreover, of all the persons em-
ployed on relief work, only 27,000 are under civil
agency. All the others are employed, under an
admirably organised Public Works Department
supervision, on works of real and permanent utility.
I suspect the radical vice of the Mysore system to
be the multiplication of petty useless works, which
cannot be properly supervised, and which are supple-
mented by food kitchens where (as in Madras) it
is practically " ask and have." Only two or three
months ago there were in Mysore actually more than
2,000 petty works going on, with an average of about
30 persons upon each. For want of more recent and
complete information, I cannot positively affirm, but
I think it may be presumed, that since then the
number of these petty works, like the area of gratui-
tous relief, has increased. The famine expenditure
in Mysore is certainly increasing ; and I anticipate
that hereafter Mysore will be in no wise permanently
benefited by it.

6 Mysore is easier to deal with than Madras ; not
only because the field of operations is smaller, but
also because the Government of India has, at least,
some power of control and direction over the local
authorities, who cannot disregard its instructions
with complete impunity. In Mysore I am hopeful

1877 FAMINE 201

that it may still be possible to effect a timely rescue TO Lord
by the appointment of a Special Commissioner, care- j^*^'
fully selected and furnished with adequate powers.
But in Madras what can we do? ... I believe
that Temple's mission saved us from a great cata-
strophe ; and nothing but the conviction that a great
catastrophe was impending, and could not other-
wise be averted, induced me, most reluctantly, to
resort to that measure. . . . But the good results of
his mission were chiefly negative ; and, as soon as his
back was turned, everything relapsed into the old bad
groove. . . . The situation in which we are now landed,
with the prospect all around as black as night, is one
of such difficulty that the boldest man might shrink
from dealing with it. You suggested in a former Need tea,
letter the propriety of a famine dictatorship on future tatorship
occasions. There never has been yet, and I doubt
if there ever will be again, in India an occasion so
urgently needing such a dictatorship, but no one in
India is able to give the word of command. It is, I
am convinced, not in the power of the Madras
Government to cope unaided with the present diffi-
culties and dangers ; which, though partly due to its
own mistakes, are also in a great degree the inevitable
results of a famine which now threatens to be unpre- •
cedented in duration, extent, and intensity. The
adequate management of such a famine urgently
requires all the ability and experience which can be
found in India. We are fighting a desperate battle
with nature, and our line of battle has been com-
pletely broken at Madras, It is there, therefore, that
we should at once concentrate our reserves. But 1
cannot, of course, force upon the Madras Government
assistance which it will neither invite nor accept.
6 My own position in reference to this situation is

202 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. YI

Difficulty of

with Madras
Government

extremely embarrassing. The famine department of
my own Government is not a strong one. But, if the
Supreme Government were composed of the ablest
and most experienced famine administrators in all
India, what could we do, so long as we are practically
powerless to control the action or change the system
of the local Government ? I fully recognise the diffi-
culty of any adequate intervention at Madras, even
by yourself, if you thought our efforts deserving of
support. For, unfortunately for us, the local Govern-
ments are more strongly represented than the Supreme
Government, not only in your Council, but through-
out the whole region of retired Anglo-India. . . .
I fully and painfully recognise all the danger and
embarrassment of provoking the Bute's resignation,
and the clamour it would raise ; and, what is more, I
have little doubt that this would be the result of the
slightest pressure on my part. But, on the other
hand, let the Duke and his Government alone, and
how are we to deal with the danger to India, and the
embarrassment to our own finances, which in that
case are inevitable ? You see I am between Scylla
and Oharybdis. So long as there was a fair prospect
of the worst of the Madras famine being over shortly,
I have thought it best to refrain from visiting
Madras ; for, since it was decided not to interfere
with a system I thoroughly mistrusted and disap-
proved of, I could do no good by going to the seat
of its operations, and should only have placed the
Duke and myself in an awkward position. Now,*
however, the situation is so alarming that (although
I anticipate no practical good from the result), I
feel that, " for appearance sake " alone, I ought to
proceed at once to Madras ; and, in order to do this,
I have submitted to an operation winch will, I hope,

1877 FAMINE 203

enable me to undertake the journey. ... I may
possibly be able, -\yith the assistance of Arbuthnot, July 29
who is a Madrassee and knows the members of the
Duke's Government, to persuade them to make some
slight ameliorations in their present system. But
these will be wholly insufficient to avert the cata-
strophe I fear ; for their system is rotten to the core,

fi Tours, &c.

(Signed) 6 LYTTON.'

The Duke of Buckingham had published a famine
minute, in which he laid down a doctrine of village
relief which filled the Viceroy with 6 profound
distrust.' The Duke, moreover, had appealed to the
public for subscriptions in aid of the famine — a step
which Lord Lytton considered of very doubtful
wisdom at that stage of affairs. Lord Salisbury had
suggested that a dictator should be appointed for the
management of famine affairs. It now occurred to.*
the Viceroy that the Duke of Buckingham himself
might be induced to occupy such a position, that in
that case he might be persuaded to act independently
of his Council, that the famine business could then
be rescued from the circumlocution of the Eevenue
Board, followed by the circumlocution of the Council,
and the advice and assistance secured of one or
two first-rate men employed in any capacity that
the Duke might please. If the Duke proved willing
to fall in with such a proposal — one certainly not
derogatory to his dignity — there would be no need
for intervention on the part of the Government of
India. The Viceroy would trust the opinions of the
experts to guide the Duke, and believed that matters
would then be well managed. ' I would leave him 1
the freest possible play, suppress my own personality, August 12

204 ^°BD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEA.TION OH. vi

suspend all interference on the part of the Supreme
Government, and return to Simla as soon as the
arrangement was concluded. If the Bute accepts
my proposal he will have a very good chance of
greatly distinguishing himself, and converting an
enormous administrative failure into a remarkable
success. If he rejects it, the inevitable fiasco of his
administration will be the smallest of the evils which
must be anticipated/

In the despatch addressed to the Duke of
Buckingham, in which the Viceroy announced his
intention of visiting the famine districts of Madras
and Mysore, the general principles for the manage-
ment of famine affairs were once more laid down.

After stating that the Government of India, with
the approval of Her Majesty's Government and of the
people of India, were resolved to avert death by
starvation by the employment of all means available,
*^e Viceroy first expressed his conviction that
Absolute non-interference with the operations of
private commercial enterprise must be the foundation
of their present famine policy.' This on the ground
that ( free and abundant private trade cannot co-exist
with Government importation,' and that more food
will reach the famine-smitten districts if private
enterprise is left to itself (beyond receiving every
possible facility and information from the Govern-
ment) than if it were paralysed by State compe-
tition.

With regard to the population out of work and
unable to buy food at famine prices, he explains that
it is the policy of Government to employ such people
on relief works, but that such relief employment, at
a subsistence rate of wage, should be provided on
large, fully supervised works of permanent benefit to

1877 FAMINE

205

the country. 6 The advantage of large works of this
kind over petty local works is twofold — firstly, the
obligation to do a full day's work, at a low rate
of wage, and to go some distance to work, keeps
from seeking relief people who can support themselves
otherwise ; and secondly, the money expended on
such works bequeaths permanent benefits to the
country '

For people who, from infirmity or social custom,
or other reasons, are unable to work, * the State must,
when the sources of private benevolence run dry,
provide gratuitous relief.' But such relief imposes
upon the State a task of peculiar difficulty and
delicacy, 'for it is the inevitable tendency of all
gratuitous relief afforded by the State, if it be not
supervised and restricted with the most scrupulous
exactitude, to intrude injuriously on the field of relief
labour, and thus demoralise large masses of the
population.' Then follows a description of the forms
in which such relief may be given.

Finally, two main objects are put forward towards
which the endeavours, and all the available power, of
the Indian Government and local Government should
be directed. * Firstly, the framing and working of
a scheme whereby 4,500 to 5,000 tons of food may
be carried daily into the famine country; and,
secondly, the selection and commencement of large
public works of lasting utility, on which all the able-
bodied relief recipients of either sex and any age
should at once be employed.'

The Minute closes with these words: 6 Nothing
could be further from my intention than to inter-
fere unduly with the local authorities, and the de-
voted officers, who have so long and zealously been
combating the growth of a gigantic catastrophe.

206 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.YI

The Viceroy
starts for
Madras,
Aug. 17

Although, up to the present moment, the result has
not equalled the assiduity of their untiring efforts,
yet the energy and devotion of the district officers
throughout Madras, during the protracted and
increasing strain upon their physical and mental
faculties, cannot, I think, be too highly or gratefully
appreciated. It is not to inadequate energy or
intelligence, but to inadequate numbers and in-
adequate executive powers, that I attribute the
incompleteness of their success.

6 My journey, therefore, to the famine-stricken
districts of Southern India, and more especially my
journey to Madras, is prompted by the hope that it
may enable me to strengthen and augment the means
on which His Grace the Governor of that presidency
is now dependent for the satisfactory solution of a
problem as serious as any which has ever occupied
the mind or taxed the abilities of an Indian states-
man.9

It was now settled that the Viceroy should leave
Simla on August 17, atcompanied by his private
secretary, Sir Owen Burne, his military secretary,
Colonel Oolley, his famine secretary 3 Mr. Bernard,1
and Mr. Arbuthnot,2 his minister in council for
famine affairs. The Duke of Buckingham was
to join them at Bellary and proceed with them
to Madras. A few days before his departure
Lord Lytton wrote to his friend, Sir James
Stephen :

* I start for Madras next Thursday with but very
little hope of being able to avert what threatens to
be an unprecedented catastrophe. . . . The weather
is hideously hot, and I start on my journey with a

1 Now Sir Charles Bernard.
3 Now Sir Alexander ArbutJmot.

1877 FAMINE 207

profound sense of discouragement, having little
assistance here, nor, in short,

" hope, nor healthj
Nor that content, surpassing wealth,
The sage in meditation found."

If I survive this adventure3 you will doubtless hear
from me at Madras.'

Lord Lytton's despondency at this crisis was
greatly increased by the illness of Sir John Strachey
— the colleague and friend upon whose help and
counsel he most relied. Sir John was suffering from
a serious affection of the eyes, and the doctors feared
that he would have to choose between resigning his
office and losing his eyesight.

To Lady Lytton

*

c Dhurmpore : August 17, 1897.

6 .... The journey thus far has not been at all
intolerably hot. The tonga afforded abundance of
shade, and being in the van of the tonga train I and
Colley escaped most of the dust we raised for the
benefit of those who followed us. Of these I think
my jemadar came worst off, arriving here like an
old man with perfectly white hair, or a marquis of
the days of Louis XV. We came at a tearing pace ;
but this during the latter part of the drive involved
a good deal of shaking and jolting. We stopped for
ten minutes at Solen, where we had tea, and shook
hands with the Eana. Here we were met by
Pattiala's people, who have provided me with a table-
cloth and a quilt so beautiful that I long to steal
them. After dinner we were treated to a masked
dance by the " folk of the place." But Colley and I

208 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CTLTI

viceroy's being agreed that no one above the age of four could

IOQXQ6V to •

Famine appreciate this amusement we speedily adjourned to

Districts whist. Our whist table was set in the open air, our

party consisted of the Commissioner W. Nisbet, Colley,

and George.1 I left off at 11 P.M., having lost five

points.

6 At dinner I sat next to Stuart Bayley, in whom
I found a most agreeable companion. We talked of
metaphysics, philosophy, Darwin, Herbert Spencer,
&c., and for a while forgot the famine — of which,
however, I received reports this morning that are
most discouraging, except as regards Madras, where
apparently light showers still continue/

Jubbulpore,

Aug. 19 £ . . . We have now got over the hottest parts

of our journey, and really the reported excessive
heat has been a mere bugbear — none of us have
suffered from it — and as for myself, I was never
better in my life. I have received here a very
satisfactory letter from Salisbury approving my pro-
posed plan of operations with the Duke, and
promising to support it. . . . If the Duke accepts my
suggestions readily I see no reason why we should
not be all back at Simla very soon. But, in spite of
Lord Salisbury's support, I anticipate a good deal of
difficulty and resistance. However " time and the
hour wear out the longest day." '

In writing to Lord Salisbury from Jubbulpore
Lord Lytton, after* thanking him for his promised
support, tells him other members of his Council are
opposed to his scheme, and prefer to it a proposal
that no plan of action should be devised till the

1 Colonel Q. Villiers.

1877 FAMINE 209

Viceroy has arrived at Madras and inquired for
himself into the details of famine administration
there. Such a course, however, appeared to him
to involve endless embarrassment and conflict.
6 Virtually we should be sitting as a committee of
inquiry on the Madras Government. Every man's
back would be up and every man's hand against us,
and we should have to fight every inch of ground.
It is, I am convinced, impossible that we could con-
scientiously arrive at a final verdict favourable to
the Madras Government, and any other would, of
course, be bitterly resented and probably appealed
against. The only objection that I can see to my
own plan is that the Madrassees will, I am told,
resent the introduction of even a single officer,
however eminent, into their presidency. But do
what we will we cannot avoid some difficulty and
soreness.7

At Jubbulpore Lord Lytton found 24,000 tons Failure of
of grain (only a comparatively small portion of it
under cover) ready and waiting for transport south,
but the communicating line of railway was only able
to carry one thousand tons per week. Not only was
the * carrying power insufficient on the line, but the
pressure of famine traffic began seriously to impede
foreign export traffic.' This, the Viceroy feared, if
not remedied, might lead to a commercial crisis at
Bombay, involving an immediate rise in exchange,
with serious loss of national credit and wealth.

While at Poona, Lord Lytton took steps in com-
munication with the managers of the railway lines,
and with the assistance of the Department of Public
Works, to relieve the block by borrowing, buying,
and increasing in all possible ways the available
rolling stock.

p

210 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH,YI

Aug. 20

First inter-
view with
Duke of
Buckingham

To Lady Lytton

' Poona : Aug. 21.

6 We reached Poona at 11 P.M. last night, all of us
in excellent condition. This house9 the famous Fitz-
gerald one, is really most beautiful and luxurious — by
far the most civilised official residence I have yet seen
in India, with a very pretty garden. I am told it is
unusually hot here, but I don't find it hotter than
Simla, and I think the climate agrees with me better.
I have written to-day a hurried letter to Strachey on
business.'

The Viceroy's plan of campaign was to explain
to the Duke what must be done, and, if he succeeded
in convincing him of the wisdom of his proposals, to
leave the entire management of the scheme in his
own hands. Failing this, however, and in the event
of it being found that he did not possess the legal
power to act the part of famine dictator himself, the
Viceroy was prepared to appeal to the Secretary of
State to choose between the Duke and himself. The
day before his arrival at Bellary and his first meeting
with the Duke, Lord Lytton wrote, 6 My legal powers
are much feebler and fewer than I supposed. Nothing
left but sheer diplomacy. I go to battle as Louis
Napoleon went to Sedan — without hope. But we
must do our best/

On August 26 they reached Bellary, and the first
interview between the Viceroy and the Duke took
place.

Two days later Lord Lytton writes to his wife :
6 1 am thankful to say I feel much relieved in mind
by my conversation of yesterday with the Duke,
which was, I think, on the whole decidedly satisfac-
tory.

6 1 reached Bellary about six, and remained in my

1877 FAMINE 2 1 1

room till dinner-time. There was a large dinner (in TO Lady

T irtfion

the house of the collector, Mr. Masters, who put us
up) and reception afterwards. No business was
discussed that day, but as I was bidding him good-
night, the Duke (who was to have remained here two
days with me) informed me he was obliged to return
to Madras to hold a Council in the afternoon of the
following day. It struck me that this meant stealing
a march on me. So after talking over with Oolley
(who has been most helpful to me) our plan of
campaign, I sat down at once and wrote the Duke a
letter of twelve pages fully explaining my views and
intentions, and leaving him only the alternative
between the removal of the seat of the Supreme
Government to ( Madras, and the plan originally
devised by Strachey with some modifications, and I
think improvements, tsuggested by subsequent reflec-
tion and information. It was a quarter to 3 A.M. when
I had finished my letter, which I delivered to the
jemadar, to be handed to the Duke early next
morning, as the Duke was to meet me after breakfast
and I tliought it best to have it all clown in black and
white before we met.

* I then went to bed, but was too restless to sleep
sound, and was waked at six by the guns of my own
salute. My plan, I think, succeeded well, as it pre-
pared the Duke for what he was to hear, and I found
him more tractable than I had expected. I think the
neck of the difficulty is HOW broken. It is quite
astonishing how well 1 coutinue to keep. If I get
through my week at Madras successfully, I shall fliutf
up my hat and sing, " lo Paoau ! " *

Leaving IHlary on Auguat Ii8, the Viceroy
reached Madras on the 29th. On the 30th he wrote
to Lady Lyttou : * Hurrah! [ think that I may now

212 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vr

safely inform you that everything has been satis-
factorily settled between the Duke and myself.
Aug. so ' Briefly, these are the details of the arrangement

Details of now concluded.

with the Duke 6 1st. Principles laid down in Viceroy's minute

are to be carried out, all relief operations
being transferred to Public Works super-
vision.

6 2nd. Duke takes famine management into his
own hands.

6 3rd. An officer selected by Government of India
to represent its views will be attached
to the Duke as "personal assistant" for
famine affairs.

6 4th. This officer to be General Kennedy.

6 5th. All famine papers to be submitted to Duke
by local famine secretary, through General
Kennedy. Duke's orders upon these to
have force of Orders in Council without
consultation of Council.

6 6th. Members of Board of Eevenue to act as
travelling commissioners in the interior,
reporting direct to Duke. Famine corre-
spondence to be only communicated to
Board for record, after action has been
taken on it by Duke.

6 7th. Circles for supervision of gratuitous relief
to be greatly strengthened by imported
officers.

6 8th. Ditto. Public Works staff.

6 9th. All relief to be subsidiary and conducive
to main object of getting people on big
works with proper task.'

In another letter he expresses his thankfulness at
the success of his mission, adding : 6 The more I think

1877 FAMINE 213

over what must have happened if I had failed to
settle matters amicably with the Duke on their present
footing . . . the more I am convinced that we have
very narrowly escaped a very dangerous and dis-
creditable situation. . . . My plan of campaign with viceroy attn-

^1-1^1 i_- T. -L T- * -i i -ji b*tes success

the Duke, which has been so successful, was laid toCoiiey
out by Colley, and owes its success to his military
genius.9

On September the 6th the Viceroy received the
following telegram from the Secretary of State :

' I have heard with great satisfaction of judicious sept. 6
arrangements concluded between you and the Duke Telegram
of Buckingham. I believe that concentration of
famine management in his hands will be of greatest
advantage. The appointment of General Kennedy,
in whom you repose well grounded confidence, will
also be very beneficial. I approve generally of your
arrangements, reserving any observations I may have
to make in matters of detail. Greater stringency in
confining relief to those unable to work is no doubt
in many places necessary, but every precaution
should be taken that consequent requirement of task
work is not allowed to press dangerously on those
who by privation have become partially incapacitated
for labour/

In acknowledging this telegram in a private letter
the Viceroy writes :

To the Marquis of Salisbury

' Bangalore : Sept. 9, 1877.

'My dear Lord Salisbury, — I feel relieved of a
great anxiety by your welcome telegram approving
of the arrangements concluded with the Duke of
Buckingham at Madras. I think I can assure you

214 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.VI

fiuubu t*iat eveI7 provision has been made, and every pre-
Sept 9 ' caution taken, on behalf of those who have fallen out
of condition and are quite unfit for work. Of such
persons (putting aside the aged, the infirm, and the
diseased) there is undoubtedly a large number ; and
the care of these should, I conceive, be the special
function of the relief camps. All the officers in
charge of these camps aver that wanderers, picked
up in an advanced stage of emaciation, recover flesh
and strength after about a fortnight of the diet they
receive in camp, and that in less than a month ail
who are not diseased become perfectly fit for work ;
but at present there is no work to put them on to,
and all the camps I inspected were swarming with
fat, idle, able-bodied paupers, who had been living
for months in what is to them unusual luxury at
the expense of Government. The main difficulty I
now experience will be to get these demoralised
masses on to real work of any kind, even when the
work has been provided for them. The Duke showed
me, on the day I left Madras, a letter from the
collector of one of the largest Madras districts com-
plaining that his camps were beginning to get flooded
with immigrants from other parts of the presidency
where minor works " near the homes of the people "
had already been started, and where agriculture
itself was not yet entirely arrested. Though many
of these persons, who had come from a considerable
distance, arrived in an emaciated condition, it had
been proved on inquiry that aH of them were able to
support themselves. But they positively refused to
do any kind of work, or to return to their own farms
and villages, having heard that plenty of food was to
be had for nothing elsewhere.

* The despatches I send you by this mail report

1877 FAMINE 215

in detail not only the arrangements concluded at TO Lord
Madras, but also the chief facts which have come
under my personal notice as regards the condition of
the people and the crops. I will therefore confine
this letter to the private particulars of what I have
seen and done. In the first place, the alarming
financial and social results of the famine management
(or mismanagement) in Madras are clearly not
attributable to the cause I had supposed. I expected
to find there a bad system at work; but what I
found everywhere was the total absence of any
system at all. It is equally certain that this must
be attributed to radical defects in the organisation
of the existing administrative machinery — the ideal
of a circumlocution office. Every one, from the
highest to the lowest — the Duke himself, the Govern-
ment secretaries, the collectors, the Department of
Public Works officers — acknowledged the evil, de-
plored it, and dwelt on the urgent necessity of
administrative reform. I need not now trouble you
with illustrations of this particular evil (which will,
I hope, be remedied by the measures adopted at
Madras), but some few which came prominently
under my own notice were very startling/

Of the Governor himself the Viceroy writes in the Popuiarity^of
same letter : ' I must, however, bear witness to the
general esteem and affection with which, so far as I
can judge, he is regarded by his subjects in Madras.
These feelings are justly due to the Duke's thorough
straightforwardness, benevolence, and honesty. He
is an exceedingly hardworking man, with an astonish-
ingly omnivorous appetite for detail and a remarkable
aptitude for dealing with it. But this I think he
indulges too much. He seems to be very slow in
taking in a general principle and seeing how it should

216 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. YI

be applied, or why it must be applied. Herein lies
the only cause for anxiety I feel about his personal
administration of the famine portfolio. Already he
does too much, and thus not enough is done. I am
hopeful, however, that General Kennedy's influence
will gradually be able to rectify the present method
of conducting famine business at Madras. I have
been greatly struck by Kennedy's tact, ingenuity,
and address in the conduct of personal intercourse
with other men, his quickness in recognising, and his
skill in managing, their idiosyncrasies. These qualities
are rare in Indian officials, so far as my experience
of them goes, and he seems to possess them all in a
high degree.

'Belief camps. Of the relief camp I visited at
Bellaiy there is not much to be said. It is a bona-
fide relief camp, though not, I should say, so well
organised as it might be. The relief camps in and
around Madras are simply huge popular picnics,
whose inmates are at present thoroughly enjoying
themselves at the Government expense.
Conversation ' The following is a faithful summary of my con-
versation with the officer in charge of the Palaveram
camp, when I visited it :

6 Self. — All these men and women seem in splendid
condition for work.

'Officer. — Yes. Unluckily we have no work to
give them, and if we did not keep them here they
would soon drop out of condition again. It is the
future population that we are saving.

6 Self. — Then you have stringent precautions,
of course, for the prevention of wandering from the
camp ? I see none, but I presume they exist.

* Officer. — Oh dear, no. None are required. The
people know when they are well off; and they

1877 FAMINE 217

have never been before, and will never be again, so TO Lord
well off as they are here. The famine has been a
godsend to all the people you see here, and there is
not a man, woman, or child in this camp who will
not bitterly regret the cessation of scarcity. Look
at our sleeping and feeding arrangements! This
class of the population are never so comfortably
lodged or so highly fed at home. In addition to the
rations you have seen, those who are in delicate health
receive fish and meat twice a week, and all receive
sundry little condiments and spices to season their
rice and dal. This prevents the diet from being
monotonous, and keeps up a healthy appetite. You
see we have no need of precaution against wandering
from the camp. Our difficulty will be, by and by,
to get the people out of it. .

* We pass to the huts containing the women and
children.

6 Self. — I notice that, whilst all these children
are in a genuine famine condition, the women they
seem to belong to are uncommonly fat. What is the
reason of this?

* Another Official (interposing). — Ah I This is
one of the saddest facts we have to deal with.
Though all these miserable mothers are apparently
in such fair condition, their milk has run dry. We
are now providing milk for all these poor infants.
Allow me to draw your attention to another very
curious fact. You will probably have noticed that,
whereas the majority of the children have red hair,
all their mothers have black hair. Now this is one
of the most mysterious, but general, effects of famine
on the constitution of infants. It turns their hair
red.

6 Self (to First Officer privately a,s we leave the

2l8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTBATION OH. 71

ward). — Do you believe those fat women are the
ieJrt-T*' mothers of all those lean babies ?

'Officer. — Of course not. All the babies are
hired, borrowed, or stolen. Famine babies are now
at a premium, as the presentation of them obliges us
to admit their supposed mothers.

6 1 compliment on the great cleanliness of

the camp. "Yes," he replies, "we have now got
our organisation well in hand, and have not had
a single case of fire in the camp." "No," I say,
"I noticed that your kitchens are well away from
the huts.7 " Oh, it is not that. But you see all the
men smoke in their huts. Tobacco is one of the
little luxuries we allow them, poor fellows, and if
we did not look sharp the whole camp might be
burnt down."

'Here we rejoin who has been con-
versing through an interpreter with a portly old
native almost entirely nude, who has been on
gratuitous relief for the last three months, and whom
has discovered to be " a fine old farmer."

6 (to fine old farmer). — And do you find

more flavour in the vegetables now than last month ?

* Fine old farmer says, he does ; and explains

to me that among the sad phenomena of the famine
is the tastelessness of the vegetables given in relief
food to season the rice with, owing to the recent hot
dry winds.

6 The above, which is not an imaginary converse
tion, will suffice to illustrate the manner in which
relief operations are treated in Madras. All the
camps I have seen are splendidly organised as regards
sanitary and conservancy arrangements. But they
are treated like " model farms," regardless of expense.

' Before leaving the subject of Madras, I may

1877 FAMINE 219

mention that I offered the Duke, if he wished it, to TO Lord
take the famine business of the Government of India
into my own hands, and also to attach to it any
Madras officer in whom he had confidence. The
Duke did not seem to think that these arrangements
would make any material difference to him; and
there was no Madras officer whom he felt able to
recommend. But as regards the first of my two
proposals, I have decided on other and general
grounds to take the Famine Department into my own
hands, and have already informed you of this by
telegraph. . . .

6 And now, my dear Lord Salisbury, I must end
this long letter with many apologies for the length of
it. Temple has behaved exceedingly well, and greatly
helped me by assisting all my arrangements, at some
sacrifice, I fear, to his own convenience and the
strength of his famine staff.

4 1 start to-night for Ootacamund, where I meet
the Duke again; thence to Mysore itself. From
Mysore back here, when the above-mentioned arrange-
ments for the management of the Mysore famine
will be published in an extraordinary gazette ; and,
on the same night, I shall return to Simla without
stopping.

'Arbuthnot, having surrendered to me all the
famine business, returns to Simla to-night. With
the exception of the North-Western Provinces, from
which the weather reports are still bad, I am sanguine
that the rain, which has now begun to fall every-
where else, will have broken the neck of the famine
and materially reduced its duration and intensity.
But in this province the severity of the famine has
thrown everything out of gear, and so greatly changed
for the worse the financial condition and prospects

Sept. 9

Alj undant
rainfall in

Madras

220 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION oarr

that I fear it will be absolutely necessary to postpone
the restoration of the province to native rule beyond
the date hitherto contemplated.

6 Yours, dear Lord Salisbury, very faithfully,

(Signed) fi LYTTON.'

The new arrangement between the Viceroy and
the Madras Government had hardly been completed
when the long expected rain fell abundantly. The
hearts of the people revived, and they dispersed so
rapidly that the numbers which in September were
2,218,000, by December had fallen to 444,000.

The people in Madras connected the advent of
the rain with the Viceroy's visit, which they looked
upon as a most propitious omen.

To Lady Lytton

1 Nedfoevettam ! Sunday, September 16, 1877.

Sept. 16 'The Duke drove me in his pony carriage this

morning to the first stage of our little journey hither.
The morning was fine, and for the first time I have

Ootaoamund seen Ootacamund. Having seen it, I affirm it to be
a paradise, and declare without hesitation that in
every particular it far surpasses all that its most
enthusiastic admirers and devoted lovers have said
to us about it. The afternoon was rainy and the
road muddy, but such beautiful English rain, such
delicious English mud. Imagine Hertfordshire
lanes, Devonshire downs, Westmoreland lakes, Scotch
trout-streams, and Lusitanian views ! I write from a
cinchona plantation which I have been visiting and
where I pass the night.'

In the province of Mysore a partial failure of
the rains in 1875 had been followed by an almost
complete failure in 1876, and severe famine set in

1877 FAMINE 221

in December 1876. When the Viceroy visited Banga-
lore in September 1877 the famine was at its height,
the number of people on relief was very large, and Famine in
much the larger portion of them were in receipt of Ban8ftlor8
gratuitous relief. The conflict between large and
small works had gone on here as elsewhere, but had
taken a peculiar form. The engineers of the Public
Works Department had an abundance of large
schemes in hand, suited for the employment of great
masses of labourers, but they contended that their
business was only to take on able-bodied labourers
who could perform the usual task at the usual rate
of pay, and that all persons who were unaccustomed
to labour or weakened by famine should be employed
by the civil officers on local, small works. They
refused to alter the system of petty contract, or to
introduce that of daily payment for work done, and
they asserted that whatever work was done under
their department must be done according to strict
departmental rules, and that they must not be turned
into relief officers. The result was that in September
1877 less than the usual number of labourers was
employed on departmental works, a nearly equal
number was employed under civil officers on small,
scattered works all over the country, and the great
majority were suffering under the most demoralising
form of public charity — gratuitous relief distributed
in the form of cooked food to paupers herded
together in poor houses. Even the personal authority Major Soott-
of the Viceroy failed to break down the Chief
Engineer's objections to the wiser policy or to con-
vince him of his error, and Lord Lytton had to Engineer
remove him elsewhere, replacing him by Major (now
Colonel Sir Colin) Scott-Moncreiff, E.E., whom he
brought down from the North-West Provinces. At the

222 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.VI

Mr. Charles
Elliott

missioner
of Mysore

Viceroy
returns to
Simla,
Sept. 27

New Famine

A^Trt

tion

same time lie placed the administrative charge of the
famine in the hands of Mr. (now Sir) Charles Elliott
(also from the North-West Provinces), to whom
he gave the title of Famine Commissioner of Mysore,
and he appointed as his secretary Mr. A. Wingate, of
the Bombay Civil Service, who had earned much
credit by his management of famine relief in one of
the Bombay districts.

By September 27 the Viceroy had accomplished
his personal tour through the famine districts and
was once more back at Simla.

Writing to General Kennedy, on October 3, he
congratulates him on the admirable orders which he
had just issued ' for the general guidance of relief
operations at Madras/ and which he anticipated
would be equally useful for the guidance of the
famine officers at Mysore.

The principal changes made by the new Famine
Administration in Mysore were to transfer all the
paupers who were able to do any work, however slight,
from the ' kitchens ' to relief works, to remodel the
kitchens as hospitals for the sick, and to establish a
system of village relief in their own homes for those
who were unfit to be employed on works, These efforts
were greatly aided by the bountiful rain which fell in
September and October, filling the tanks, securing
the rice harvest, and affording abundant employment
to agriculturists in the fields. The number on
gratuitous relief, which stood at 220,100 in September
1877, had fallen in June to 11,000, and the number
employed in relief works, after rising from 49,000 to
86,000, fell in June to 37,000. Mr. Elliott left the
province in May 1878, making over the post of
Famine Commissioner to Major Moncreiff, who, with
Mr. Wingate, remained in Mysore till August, by

1877 FAMINE 223

which time hardly any need of famine relief continued
to exist. In May, Lord Lytton imposed on Mr. Elliott
the duty of drawing up the Mysore Famine Beport,
and wrote a minute on it (November 1878) when it
was completed, from which the following extracts
have been made : —

"The first step taken, in September 1877, was to re- LordLytton's
inforce the Mysore staff with trained Civil officers and
officers from Her Majesty's Army, whose duty was to
direct relief operations; with engineers to man age relief
works and to organise famine labour ; with medical
officers to arrange famine hospitals and tend the sick.
The next step was to gather all the threads of famine
administration into one hand, and to lay down
detailed rules for the guidance of famine officers
of all frraden And the last step, which followed
close upon the others, was to effect a thorough and
intelligent inspection of all the famine operations
throughout the country. It is only too clear that all
this ought io have been done in Dorember 1876.
The report tells of the many difficulties which were
met in the management of the relief works ; in getting
the people to come to these works; in employing
persons in different stages of weakness so as not to
overtask them, while giving them some incentive to live
and work ; in clearing the relief kitchens and (tarrying
the inmates with their own consent to the works, if they
were fit to labour, or to their own homes 'if they were
past work ; in establishing and working a system
whereby houdo-riddcui folk were relieved in their
homos; in preventing peculation; in .semiring to the
province* a moderate out-turn of useful work in
exchange for rulief giv&n to the able-bodied; and,
lastly, iu helping the ryots to re.covcjr their position
and independence* by a judicious distribution of the

224 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION OH. TI

Minute on

Elliott's

Beport

Bain in the
North-West

alms sent from Great Britain, Ireland and the
Colonies for the aid of the famine-stricken people of
Southern India. . . .

6 1 am deeply indebted to Mr. Elliott for his
excellent report, which tells truthfully and graphi-
cally the story of much human suffering, borne with
the patient endurance characteristic of the people
of India, and gives a faithful account of the early
failure and subsequent success in relieving a great
population from the dreadful effects of prolonged
famine. . . .

* The thanks of the Government of India are due
to Mr. Elliott for the ability and energy with which
he carried out their famine policy in Mysore.
Though the province and its people were new to him,
he promptly mastered the position. He organised
and directed relief operations with a patience and
good sense which overcame all difficulties, and with
the fullest tenderness to the people in dire calamity.
To Major Scott-Moncreiff, the Chief Engineer, and to
Mr. Wingate, the famine secretary, I tender the
hearty acknowledgments of the Government for the
skill, knowledge, and zeal which they brought to
bear on the difficult questions connected with the
conduct of relief work and the organisation of gratui-
tous relief.9

Eain now began to fall in the north-west as well
as in the southern provinces of India, thus saving
only just in time the Punjab and North-West
Provinces from a famine worse and more widespread
than any which had yet been known. Writing to
the Queen, on October 11, the Viceroy was able to
send a favourable report of the result of his journey.
6 The measures in which I was so fortunate as to
secure the Duke of Buckingham's co-operation in

1877 FAMINE 22$

Madras, and those which before leaving Bangalore I viceroy to
set on foot throughout the Mysore provinces, are
already producing excellent results, and the weekly
reports, both from Madras and Mysore, now show a
steadily increasing diminution in the number of
persons gratuitously supported by the State, as well
as a marked improvement in the health of those put
upon works and a reduction in the death rate, This
improvement in prospects so anxious and almost
desperate a few weeks ago is no doubt partly due to
the recent rains and the partial revival of agriculture ;
but the rains could have effected no appreciable
change for the better, for many months to come at
least, had no change been previously effected in the
system of famine relief, and as regards Madras I
think the improved condition of that presidency is
mainly attributable to the ability with which
General Kennedy is discharging his very difficult and
delicate task there. This officer is certainly one of
the ablest of your Majesty's public servants in India.
It is entirely owing to his great foresight and energy
that whilst the Madras famine has cost the Govern-
ment of India over ten millions, the Bombay famine,
under his management, has cost only four millions,
although a much larger saving of human life has
been effected in Bombay than in Madras.'

Whilst admitting that private subscription had its
use and place, the Viceroy continued to hold the view
that any appeal to private charity in England was * a
dangerous folly' unless by previous arrangement a
sphere of operation could be marked out for it which
should not overlap the field already occupied by the
Government's organisation. Ultimately, in accord-
ance with Lord Lytton's views, the sums collected
were profitably us§d in helping the farmers, who in

Q

226 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.VI

the time of famine had been forced to sell their
agricultural implements, to buy them back, thus
saving them from degenerating from the condition of
peasant proprietors to that of coolie labourers. His
own subscription of 1,OOOZ. towards the Madras
Charitable Belief Committee was a practical answer
to the report propagated by some persons that the
Viceroy was personally averse to private subscrip-
tions.

November i Writing to Lord Salisbury on November 1 the
Viceroy says : 6 Kennedy has really done wonders in

Madras Madras, and the enormous reductions he has effected
in the numbers gratuitously relieved (especially at
Salem) convincingly demonstrate, I think, the waste
and mismanagement of the old system, against which I
have been in vain protesting ever since January last.
For these reductions, which have afforded the
greatest relief to our Treasury, have been effected
without loss of life or health in a single instance/

Mysore In Mysore the results of the famine operations

were equally successful, and here also the Viceroy's
visit had been followed by an abundant rainfall.
The mortality in that district had been more patent
and terrible than anywhere else, and compared to
Madras the state of things did not seem to improve
so rapidly — but, considering the state of exhaustion
in which the people were, and that famine adminis-
tration had to be organised from the very foundation
— the Viceroy declares to Lord Salisbury that he is
6 really startled at the complete and rapid success
with which the efforts of the responsible Mysore
officers in the execution of the new system had been
attended.'

187S During the following year (1878) all relief opera-

tions were finally wound up. At the close of 1877

1877 FAMINE 227

a measure was introduced at the Legislative Assem-
bly of the Indian Government, by Sir John Strachey, Legislation to
which, supplemented by the Acts previously passed
in that year, was designed to provide for the future
cost of famines.1

In a work published by Sir John Strachey and
his brother on 6 The Finances and Public Works of
India,' it is written: eA nobler, more humane, or
wiser programme was never devised by any Govern-
ment for the benefit of a country than that put forth
by the Government of India in 1878 for the protection
of India against this most terrible and ruinous and
far-reaching of all natural calamities ; and until it is
brought into far more complete operation than has
hitherto been permitted, the most urgent of the duties
of the British rulers of India to the vast population
they have undertaken to govern will be left unful-
filled.'3

It was Lord Lytton's conviction, a conviction
shared by all the leading men in India, that the
wisest policy was, by the construction of a network
of cheap railways and carefully planned works of
irrigation, to do all that it was in the power of a
Government to do to prevent the frightful calamities
of famine to which India is still exposed, and he
believed this could be done not only without finan-

1 The first new taxation was the Public Works cess of 1877, imposed
on the land in Bongal, which yielded about 855,0002. New cesses were
also imposed in 1878 on the land in the North- West Provinces, Oudh,
Punjab, and Central Provinces, yielding about 170,0002. A license tax
on traders was first levied in the North-West Provinces in 1877, and
was afterwards extended to all India, and developed so as to include
officials and professional men, thus becoming to all intents and pur-
poses a lax on all incomes except those derived from land ; its maximum
yield was estimated at 820,0007. The total amount of what has been
called the Famine Insurance Taxation was therefore about 1,345,0007.

» Page 170.

228 LU1SD LYTTON'S INDIAN AJDMINISTEAT10N OH.VI

cial risk, but with certain financial advantage. This
policy was set forth in a speech delivered by Lord
Lytton at the close of the Legislative Council held on
December 27, 1877, a speech which Sir John Strachey
has characterised as worthy 'to be remembered
among the wisest utterances of Indian Governors.'
The principles therein laid down may be understood
from the following extracts.

' ^f *ke coimtless suggestions made from time to
time, and more especially during the present year,
f°r rendering less bitterly ironical than it still seems,
when read by the sinister light of recent events, that
famous inscription on the huge granary built at
Patna for " the perpetual prevention of famine in thesa
provinces" there are only three which merit seriou«
consideration. They are,/r5%9EMiGEATiON; secondly,
RAILWAYS ; and thirdly, IREIQATION WORKS. Unfor-
tunately for India, however, the first of these three
material factors in the practical solution of problems
similar to those we are now dealing with is inappli-
cable, or only very imperfectly applicable, to the
actual conditions of this country. The first con-
dition requisite to render emigration available as a
precaution against famine is a normal excess of the
population as compared with the food-produce of
the country ; the second condition is sufficient energy,
on the part of the surplus population, to induce it to
seek a higher standard of material comfort than that
to which it is accustomed ; and the third condition
is a foreign field of labour in which this higher
standard may be reached. Now, none of these con-
ditions are sufficiently developed in India to justify
reliance upon emigration as an efficient auxiliary in
our struggles with famine. Of our whole population
only a small portion as yet exceeds its food-producing

1877 FAMINE 229

power. The possible increase of this proportion of
the population will undoubtedly augment our future
difficulties, if, in the meanwhile, no adequate cor-
rectives be applied to them. But in those parts of
India which, during the last two years, have most
suffered from scarcity, the population only averages
at 250 inhabitants to every square mile ; and, since
those districts comprise large areas of uncultivated
land, this average cannot be regarded as at all exces-
sive. In the next place, there is no contesting the
fact that, in spite of the inducements offered to
emigration by this Government, in spite of the
widespread organisation for the recruitment of it
established by Colonial Governments, and in spite of
the encouraging example furnished by that small
number who, having tried the experiment of
temporary emigration, return, after a few years'
absence, in possession of savings which they could
not otherwise have stored by the labour of a life-
time— in spite of all these things the people of India
will not emigrate. The uncomplaining patience of
the Indian ryot has a profoundly pathetic claim upon
our compassionate admiration. In no country of the
Western world could a national calamity, so severe
and prolonged as that which has now for more than
twenty-four months affected one-half of this empire,
have Listed so long without provoking from the
sufferings of an ignorant and starving population
agrarian ami social disturbances of the most for-
midable character. But for this very reason we
cannot safely frame any plans for improving the
condition of the Indian ryot in exclusive reliance on
his spirit, of adventure. And, although the exporta-
tion to foreign countries of large numbers of the
people, without reference to their feelings and in

230 LOIID LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.VT

LordLytton's opposition to their known inclination, is a policy
which might possibly have been enforced by a Moghul
Emperor, it is certainly not a policy which can be
adopted by a British Government. It is a very
significant fact that those of our native subjects who
do occasionally emigrate belong to the least, rather
than the most, densely populated parts of the
country. Finally, it must be borne in mind that if
to-morrow all the native races of Hindustan were
animated by a simultaneous impulse to emigrate,
there is at present no field of foreign labour capable
of absorbing a proportion of the enormous population
of this continent sufficiently large to make any appre-
ciable difference in the general condition of tin*
remainder. Our colonies take from India, annually,
a few thousand labourers. Multiply that number by
ten, or even twenty, and the percentage of Indian emi-
gration would still bear but an insignificant relation
to the number of the whole non-emigrant community.
For all these reasons, although emigration un-
questionably claims our fostering encouragement, T
fear that for many years to come we must practi-
cally exclude this expedient from the list of thowo on
which we mainly rely as a means of insuring the
population of India against the calamities of
periodical famine. The conclusion thus arrived at
forcibly confines our immediate efforts to the most
rapid development, by the cheapest methods, com-
bined with the most appropriate and efficient appli-
cation, of the only two remaining instruxmmts for
increasing the produce of the Roil, facilitating UH
circulation, and thereby improving the general
social condition, and augmenting tlio (»ollc»r,tiw
wealth, of the whole community, Those instruments
are railroads and irrigation works. . , .'

1877 FAMINE 231

After examining in detail the principles on which LordLytton's
the development of railroads and irrigation works
should be carried out, he summed up the Government
policy in the following words : 6 The Government of
India is convinced, upon a careful review of its finan-
cial position and prospects, that the heavy obligations
imposed upon it by the calamitous circumstances of
recent years can only be discharged without serious
risk to its financial stability by a strict and patient
adherence to the principle affirmed in the financial
measures we introduced last year, and developed in
those which are now before the Council. That prin-
ciple involves the enlargement, with adequate pre-
cautions, of the financial, and consequently also of the
administrative, powers and responsibilities of the local
Governments. In the next place, we believe that, if
this principle be fairly carrier! into eflect, the new
imposts which the Council is now asked to sanction
will, when added to the* resources already created,
provide the State with sufficient means for the
permanent maintenance of a national insurance
against famine, without heavily increasing the
pecuniary burdens of its subjects. For the attain-
ment of this object the material appliances we
intend to promote, by means of additional revenue,
are cheap railroads and extensive irrigation works.
Wo are conscious of the reproach we should justly
incur if, after such a declaration as I liave now made,
tiro prosecution of tlieae necessary works wcro cora-
muruutd, suspended, or relinquished according to the
increased or relaxed pressure of annual circumstance
or lh<* intermittent activity of spasmodic; effort. We
tlutrcfori* propose* to entrust, In the first iiiBtauce, to
the local f JovornmeutH the duty of framing a 8uffick»nt
and carefully considered scheme of local railroad and

232 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH n

irrigation works. We are prepared to provide them

speech on .,? ,, . , .1 i ±

with the means whereby they may, from year to

Deo!S27? 1877 year> wor^ systematically forwards and upwards to
the completion of such a scheme. The funds locally
raised for this purpose will be locally applied, But
provincial Governments will have to meet the cost of
provincial famines out of- provincial funds, to the
fullest extent those funds can bear. They will find
that thriftless expenditure in one year may involve
the risk of diminished allotments in subsequent years ;
and I cannot doubt that the unavoidable recognition
of this fact will make them wisely eager to spend the
requisite proportion of their annual income upon
well planned and carefully estimated railway and
irrigation works, which will be their best insurance
against the losses of famine, and the postponement of
all administrative progress which famine generally
entails. It will be the special duty of the Public
Works Department of this Government to keep those
objects constantly in view of the local Governments,
and to assist them no less constantly in their
endeavours to give a rational preference to really
useful and remunerative works over those more
captivating, but less compensating, subjects of expen-
diture which in all comparatively small communities
so powerfully appeal to provincial pride, professional
proclivities, or popular pleasure.

'The specific projects now announced to this
Council I have not presumed to put forward as the
enunciation of any new policy. On the contrary, I
should have spoken with much more hesitation if I
imagined myself to be treading upon ground not long
since surveyed by experienced authorities ; and the
strongest recommendation I can claim for the views
I have expressed is that they differ in no important

isrr

233

particular from those of the eminent statesmen who
have preceded me in the office I now hold. But
between the present and all previous occasions on
which the Government of India has declared its
policy and principles in reference to the prevention
of famine, there is one essential difference which I
am anxious to impress upon your attention. I can
well imagine that many of those I am now addressing
may be disposed to say to me: "Your good in-
tentions are possibly sincere; but the path to the
nethermost pit is already paved with good intentions.
Promise is a good dog, but Performance is a better ;
we have often heard the bow-wow of the first; we
have yet to see the tail of the second. We have
been told over and over again by the highest
authorities that India is to be insured against famine
in this way, or in that, but when famines come
upon us we find that the promised way is still
wanting. The current claims upon the activities
and resources of the Government of India are so
numerous, so pressing, so important, official forces
and imperial funds so necessarily limited, that when
once the daily, hourly strain of a great famine has
been removed from a wearied administration and
impoverished treasury, its fearful warnings are
soon forgotten; its disquieting ghosts are quickly
exorcised by the conventional declaration of some un-
exceptionable principle ; its bitter memories decently
interred beneath the dull hie jacet of a blue book ;
and there, for all practical purposes, is an end of the
matter."

6 Well, then, I think I am entitled to point out
to the Council that we are not now fairly open to
this customary criticism. We do not speak without
having acted: and we promise nothing which we

234 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. TI

LordLytton's have not, after long and anxious consideration, pro-
speech on -JT i .Ti f n -r x

Famine vided ourselves with means of performing. I must
Sec! 2?fiB77 ^ave Vel7 imperfectly explained myself thus far, if I
have failed to make it clearly understood that I am
not now speaking of what we ought to do, or would
do, to insure this country against the worst effects of
future famine had we only the means of doing it :
but of what we can do, and will do, with the means
already provided for in the measures now before the
Council. I do not mean to say that the construction
of such an extensive system of local railroads and
irrigation works as we propose to undertake will
not be the gradual task of many years. Jiut I <A>
mean to say that, in Iho manner and, on the prin-
ciples already explained, we aro now providing for
the prompt commencement and uninterrupted
continuation of this great and noceasary tawk. Wts
are systematising a policy the, principles of which
have been repeatedly approved and proclaimed by
our predecessors. We are associating with it. tin*
interests, the powers, and the duliuB of our local
administrations. We are providing thorn witli the
means of permanently prosonutiny and devolopiiijjf it,
not without reference to our financial control, l>u<
exempt from the distressing uncertainty which has
hitherto been inseparable, from the practical tsxttcu-
tion of this policy, in consequence* of the obligation
which till now has rested on the. Government of
India, with the very limited funds at its disposal for
the prosecution of public, works, to cluxwc from
year to year between the conflicting claims upon
its purse of the various and dissimilar localities of
this spacious empire. . . .

4 If you look back over a wider and a longer Irani
of experience than that which is covered by Lhu

1877 FAMINE 235

history of India, if you embrace in one view our
own history with the past history of other countries
in other climates, you will find that the principles on
which we have lately acted, and on which I trust
we shall continue to act, in dealing with seasons of
calamitous drought have been found no less appli-
cable, no less efficient, in other countries similarly
affected than they have proved to be in this country,
wherever they have been intelligently understood
and loyally carried out. There is, I venture to think,
no more striking illustration of this truth than the
history of the scarcity that occurred in central
Prance during the year 1770-71. That great
statesman, If. Turgot, was then Minister. His
administrative ability was equalled by his philo-
sophical power of thought; and, fighting with diffi-
culties, in many respects almost identical with those
which \vo ourselves haw lately hacl to deal with —
difficulties partly material, but greatly aggravated
by the prevalence of extremely erroneous economical
conceptions, Turgot conceived, developed, and, in
the face of groat opposition, carried into effect views
no lews identical with those which have guided our
own action as to the essential importance of guarding
the perfect freedom of inland trade in grain ; of im-
proving the internal conununicatious of the country ;
and of providing relief works of permanent utility
upon which to employ the suffering population.
Here, to-day, in India, those views are as sound and
as applicable as they were in the Limousin a century
ago. Tf, then, from the past we look forward into
the future, why, let me ask, may we not hope that
under improved conditions of administration, and
with increased development of those material appli-
ances which civilisation creates for the provision of

236 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. vi

national wealth, India will eventually enjoy as com-
plete an immunity from the worst results of scarcity
De2! 27^1877 as t*La* which now exists throughout those regions
of France where but a century ago such a result
might have seemed as difficult of attainment as it
now appears to be in many of our own provinces ? '

These plans, however, were destined not to be
carried out, at least at that time. The English
Government had taken alarm at the apparent in-
crease of expenditure in India, and a Committee of
the House of Commons decided that a large reduc-
tion should be made in the outlay on Productive
Public Works, and that the borrowing of the Govern-
ment of India for this purpose should be curtailed
so as not to exceed for the present the amount of
2,500,000?. a year. It was not till the Eeport of the
Famine Commission had restored public confidence
in the really productive and remunerative character
of these works that Parliament allowed the Govern-
ment to increase its annual borrowing up to the
limits of 3,500,OOOZ. a year.

Lord Lytton was not content with the active
steps he took to make jljinfl^f acquainted wilh nil

the details of famine distress and to supervise and
direct the measures of relief. He saw that famine
must be treated as a periodically recurring calamity,
and that the time had come for collecting and
handing down to posterity, not only the experience
which had been gained as to the most efficient
way of dealing with famine when it occurs, 1ml also
the knowledge which had been accumulated as to
how to forecast its imminence, and lho mcogunw
bust calculated to obviate or to lessen its Bttvorily.
Accordingly, he proposed and obtained sanction to
the appointment of the Tudhui Famine Commission,

1677 FAMINE 237

and in May 1878 he laid down the principles which Famine

A ,, * A-I • • • • rrn Commission

were to govern the scope of their inquiries. They
were directed to investigate the effect of famine
on the vital statistics, and to report how far ' local
influences, peculiarities of administration or tenure,
climate, soil, water, density of population, system of
cultivation, &c., have tended to mitigate or intensify
its inevitable effects.' The character of the works
on which relief was to be given, the need of a special
system of village inspection, the restrictions under
which gratuitous relief oan safely be given; the
duty of the Government in respect of the supply,
importation and distribution of food; the benefit
which might be expected from the extension of irri-
gation canals and railways, or from improvement in the.
system of iigrumlture, from encouragement of emi-
gration, and from suspension or remission of tho
laud revenue, and the relations to bo observed, with
Native HlateA in famine management, wore among
thn chief topics expressly brought to their notice.

The Famine Oommission completed its labours
in July 1880, and their report, whicih embodied the
principles hereafter to be adopted for famine adminis-
tration, was at once accepted.

The great famine of 1870-78 was followed by a
lonjr period of fairly prosperous years, during which
local scarcities occurred from tuna to time, but no
widely apraad catastrophe overtook the agricultural
population. This period was utilised in carrying
out. tint recommendations of the Commission, and
whoii i ami no a#am visited the land, in 1890, the Meet of
Government and the country were* found in a very
different state of preparation from lhal whidi had $
existed in 1870. A Famine Codo had been drawn
up in every province, comprising in tin* fullest detail

238 LOBD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vi
Famine the rules under which every branch of the Adminis-

Commission. ,

tration was to act, and the manner in which the
services of every agent were to be utilised in carry-
ing out the measures for relief. An Agricultural
Department had been created, whose special charge
it was to bring together a comprehensive and
exact record of the agricultural, vital, and economic
condition of the people, and to co-ordinate the
machinery necessary for combating the disaster.
Lists of works were drawn up for every district, on
which the masses of men deprived of their usual field
occupations would be employed. Eules were framed
for utilising the existing staff and creating additional
impromptu establishments for the supervision of these
works and for the distribution of gratuitous relief
to non-workers in their homes. The principle was
established, that unless under certain peculiar local
conditions. Government ought not to intervene in
order to control or aid the activity of private trade
in the supply of food to the distresseii tracts, and
that its functions should be confined to the improve-
ment of communications, and especially to the con-
struction of railways by which the requisite supplies
could be brought in. Accordingly, when the famine
of 1896 broke out, it was found that in every tract
to which the Commission had pointed as both liable
to the occurrence of drought and insufficiently pro-
vided with the means of obtaining food, the necessary
railways had been constructed, and the whole length
of railway communication had risen from 8,200
miles in 1876 to 19,600 in 1896. With one or two
exceptions, all the irrigation canals recommended
by the Commission, and several not suggested by
them, have been carried out, and the area irrigated
in this way and rendered completely independent

1878 FAMINE 239

of the accidents of the season has risen from 7,000 Famine
square miles in 1876 to about 129000 in 1896. CommiBBi011
Everything possible has been done at the same time
to increase the area protected, though less securely
protected, by tanks and wells. There has been
much legislative activity, directed to the improve-
ment of the relations between the Government and
the landlords, and between the landlords and their
tenants, and facilities have been granted for re-
mission or suspension of the land dues and the
granting of loans from the public treasury.
Universal testimony is borne to the success with
which the recent famine of 1896-7 has been met,
both as regards the prevention of mortality, and
disorganisation of native society, the useful objects
on which famine labour has been employed, and the
economy with which the work has been carried out.
This success is largely due to the far-seeing policy
of Lord Lytton, in his determination that the ex-
perience gained under his Administration should
not be wasted or forgotten.

Of the financial measures for providing for the
cost of recurring famine, which have been so mis-
described and misunderstood under th6 name of
'The Famine Insurance Fund,' more will be said
in another chapter dealing with the various financial
reforms of Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty,

240 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER VIE

RUSSIAN MISSION TO KABUL. WAR OF 78.
FLIGHT OF SEER ALI

ALL communications with the Amir of Kabul having
ceased with the termination of the Peshawur Confer-
ence in March 1877, there followed an interval of
suspense and inaction on the Afghan frontier. But
in April 1877 war broke out between Eussia and
Turkey, and in January 1878 the Eussian army
had passed the Balkans and encamped before Con-
stantinople; whereupon the English Government
had made overt preparations for armed intervention,
and a body of Indian troops had been summoned
to Malta. The reverberation of these great events
had been felt throughout Asia, for the Eussians had
taken measures to counteract English intervention
in Europe by moving troops towards the Afghan
frontier and by sending a mission to the Amir. The
the Amir mission seems to have left Samarkand on June 14,
the day after the first meeting of the Congress of
Berlin. In the meantime Lord Salisbury had, in
March 1878, become Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and Lord Qranbrook succeeded him as Secretary of
State for India.

On receipt of this news Lord Lytton wrote to his
first chief:

April 3, 1878.

6 My dear Lord Salisbury, — It is with a real pang
that I read your telegram informing me of the change

1878 LOED CRA.NBE.OOK SUCCEEDS LORD SALISBURY 241

which, deprives me of the chief to whom I am TO Lord
indebted for great forbearance, generous support, Aprils"7
and considerate guidance. I shall ever recall with
grateful feelings the support you have given me in
every principal episode of the time during which I
have had the honour to serve under you. The
cessation of our direct official relations is a sad
event in my life, nor are my regrets wholly selfish,
for the withdrawal from the India Office, especially
at this moment, of your long experience of Indian
administration and intimate knowledge of the char-
acter of the men engaged in it will be a real loss
to India. On behalf, however, of the highest public
interests, on behalf of the character of the Govern-
ment and the honour of the nation, I must con-
fess that I unfeignedly rejoice to know that the
conduct of foreign affairs has now passed into your
hands.

c Notwithstanding the innumerable obstacles to a
" bold foreign policy " which you mentioned in your
letter, and which I keenly recognise, I feel confident
that our foreign policy will now be at least a strong
and intelligible one, though prudent not pusil-
lanimous, and if flexible, as every foreign policy must
be, still not aimless. Assuredly never did an English
Minister assume the seal of the Foreign Office at a
time more pregnant with difficulty and anxiety, nor
can the blunders and jfleglect of twenty years be
rapidly repaired. But your courage is the herald
of your success, and if only you are adequately
supported by the Cabinet and the country I feel
sure you are destined to be one of England's great-
est Foreign Ministers, Such a Minister she never
needed more than now. I cannot sufficiently express

242 LOBD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.VJI

the deep sympathy and affectionate interest in your
most anxious but beneficent task with, which I am,
8 Dear Lord Salisbury,

6 Yours ever obliged and faithfully,

Erom Lord Salisbury he received the following

letter :

'April 5, 1878.

6 My dear Lord Lytton, — I have passed from the
quiet haven ot India to the stormy sea of foreign
politics, and Lnow write no longer, alas! in official
relations, but merely to say good bye. I shall retain
long a very pleasant recollection of my association
with the earlier years of your Viceroyalty and with
your vigorous famine, financial, and political adminis-
tration, and shall watch, so far as I have the oppor-
tunity, the development of your policy with the
keenest interest. A great career of activity and
fame, during the three years of your official tenure
yet remaining, lies before you, and I earnestly hope
you may have health to fulfil the bright promise of
its beginning. I have- to thank you very cordially
for your hearty and loyal co-operation during a
period that has been always full of difficulty, and
often of anxiety. The two offices are so placed
towards each other that they tend naturally to
friction, and it is only by such friendly and con-
siderate conduct as you have shown that it can be
avoided. I am sure that you will find in my
successor a character with which you will sym-
pathise, and that he will heartily appreciate you.
Pray convey to Lady Lytton our kindest remem-
brances and regards, and

* Believe me ever, yours very sincerely,

c SALISBUEY.'

1878 AFGHANISTAN 243

At the time Lord Cranbrook succeeded Lord
Salisbury at the India Office the situation in Europe
still seemed likely to lead to war between England
and Eussia, and it was not till the result of the
Berlin Conference was known in the following
July that the fear of such an event could be
dispelled. The Viceroy's letters, therefore, at this time
go fully into the preparations which should be made
in India in anticipation of an attack by Eussia in
Central Asia at the same time that war was declared
between the two Powers in Europe.

Writing to Lord Cranbrook on April 8, 1878, he
says :

* Indian statesmen, however widely they may viceroy to
differ as to the right policy for securing it, have
always, I believe, agreed in regarding as supremely
important the alliance and co-operation of Afghan-
istan in the event of India being involved in hostilities
between England and Eussia. . . . Lord Lawrence
and his disciples, who are numerously represented
in your Council, believed that the alliance of
Afghanistan in the event of war between us and
Eussia was infallibly guaranteed by the "Masterly
Inactivity Policy," which I need not here discuss.
It is enough to observe that the practical failure
of that policy has been complete, and, I fear, irre-
mediable. The efforts which, as you know, I was
authorised to make for improving our relations with
the present Amir of Kabul have also failed com-
pletely; and thus Afghanistan remains, as it has
been for the last six or seven years, impenetrably
closed to British intercourse and alienated from
British influence ; whilst, in violation of the pledges
repeatedly given us by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg,
constant and confidential communication with the

E2

244 LOBD LYTTOITO INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.TH

To Lord Amir is now maintained by the Eussian Governor
April 8°° ' of Turkestan, who has at the present moment two
agents at Kabul The neutrality or hostility of
-Afghanistan are contingencies which I will presently
discuss ; but the first fact it behoves us to recognise
as absolutely certain is that, in the event of hostili-
ties with Eussia, we shall assuredly not have the
alliance of Afghanistan.'

Lord Lytton fully realised that fi from the
moment when Eussia resolved to play gros jeu for a
stake at Constantinople which there was even the
merest chance of our disputing, her diplomacy in
Central Asia would naturally be exerted with more
than usual activity to secure every preliminary
political point likely to embarrass our action, or im-
prove her position, in case of collision with us in this
part of the world. And Kaufinann would not scruple
to address to the Amir more promises and menaces
than he had the means of fulfilling.' The policy of
the Amir would always be to play off the two great
Powers against each other as long as he possibly
could, without willingly yielding to either the smallest
recognised footing in any part of his dominions.
But his neutrality towards us would not be a
'benevolent' one, and the duration of it was
doubtful.

eSher All is not only a savage, but he is a
savage with a touch of insanity ; and his action is,
therefore, at all times liable to be dictated by a
coup de t$te. However much he may dislike, or mis-
trust, the Eussians, there can be no doubt that his
feelings towards us are those of bitter personal
animosity. He has never forgiven us our arbitration
about Seistan. During the last twelve months he has
been arming to the teeth, and during the same time

1878 AFGHANISTAN 245

has been in constant communication with Russia. TO Lord
Though our attitude towards him has been one of
scrupulous abstention, yet, more slavonico, he declares
that it is our policy which obliges him to arm. At
the beginning of the Turko-Eussian war he openly
declared a jehad, not against the Russians, but
against us ; and he still proclaims that this jehad
is only postponed to a more favourable oppor-
tunity. ... He is arrogant, and overrates his own
military strength. He is an Asiatic, and our attitude
during the Turko-Russian war has led him to under-
rate ours. Finally, the taxation and confiscation to
which he has resorted for the purpose of increasing
his ill-paid army has exposed him to such widespread
unpopularity, and his troops are so untrustworthy,
that, unless he can ere long justify to his subjects
the strain he has put upon them by finding foreign
employment for his army, he is threatened with
rebellion and assassination. Moreover, it must be re-
membered that Russia's retention of Abdul Rahman,
a candidate for the throne, enables her at any
moment to put a strong screw upon Sher All.

' The situation I have thus sketched seems to point
to the following conclusions as regards our action
here in the event of war with Russia : We cannot
attempt any aggressive operations against the
Russians ; and we cannot, without considerable pre-
paration, which will require time, attempt any
operations beyond our own frontier of a defensive, or
retaliatory, character. But I think we ought at once
to commence such preparations as will enable us, in
case of need, to punish promptly any act of aggression
by the Amir of Kabul. . . .

6 There are some facts which it seems to me very
important to bear always in mind. The dangers

246 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.TII

To Lord with which we are permanently threatened by
Eussia's presence in Central Asia come, not from
the strength, but the weakness of her present posi-
tion there. It seems to me so weak that I doubt
if she can permanently hold it without extending
it. Her position on this continent so far differs
from ours that extension of territory will increase,
not only her military strength, but also her financial
resources. Extension of territory, however, must
eventually bring her into contact with us. ...
Diplomacy is the natural weapon of weak Powers,
and it is the diplomacy, rather than the arms, of
Eussia we have to fear in Central Asia. But,
unfortunately for us, diplomacy is a weapon with
which we cannot fight Eussia on equal terms. And
she knows it. The diplomacy of Parliamentary
Governments is always heavily handicapped. It
seems to me, therefore, that we should be unwise
to neglect any opportunity which circumstances may
offer us of settling scores with her by means of that
weapon in the use of which we are strongest and
she weakest. This weapon is the sword. (Of course,
I am only speaking with reference to our relative
positions and resources in India and Central Asia.)
* So long as peace lasts, we cannot use the sword;
| and our diplomacy is impotent. The declaration
of war, therefore, would be an opportunity, which
may never recur if we neglect it, for India to make
safe all those outworks of her empire which must
otherwise fall, sooner or later, into the hands or
under the influence of Eussia. . . .

4 One last word. I am persuaded that the policy
of building up in Afghanistan a strong and indepen-
dent State, over which we can exercise absolutely
no control, has been proved by experience to be a

1B78 AFGHANISTAN 247

mistake. If by war, or the death, of the present TO Lord
Amir, which will certainly "be the signal for conflict
between rival candidates for the musnud, we should
hereafter have the opportunity (and it is one which
may at ary moment occur suddenly) of disinte-
grating ana breaking up the Kabul Power, I sincerely
hope that opportunity will not be lost by us. I
believe that this is also the opinion of Lord Salisbury.
The best arrangement for Indian interests would be,
mejudice,tih.& creation of a Western Afghan Khanate,
including Merv, Maimena, Balkh, Kandahar, and
Herat, under some prince of our own selection, who
would be dependent on our support. With Western
Afghanistan thus disposed of, and a small station of
our own, close to our frontier, in the Kurum Valley,
the destinies of Kabul itself would be to us a matter
of no importance.'

The first authentic news of the Russian move-
ments, political and military, in Central Asia had
reached the Government of India across Afghanistan
by the month of June, 1878. During this month
various warnings were received that Eussian Envoys
were expected at Kabul, and by the end of July it
was positively ascertained that they had arrived.

General Stoletoff and his staff left Tashkend on
June 13 — that is to say, on the day when the European
Congress was holding its first sitting at Berlin — and Kabui,Juiy22
he reached Kabul on July 22, with a letter from
General Kaufmann, informing the Amir that General
Stoletoff was empowered by the Emperor, whose full
confidence he enjoyed, to make to His Highness certain
important communications with reference to the then
existing condition of the relations between Eussia and
England, and their bearing on the position of Afghani-

248 LOUD LOTION'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH, TO

stan: 'When the Eussian agent at Kabul informed
the Amir that a European officer of high rant was on
his way to Kabul, as ambassador from the Czar to His
Highness, the .Amir, in dire alarm, wrote to Kaufinann
declining to receive such an ambassador, on the
ground that he could not possibly answer for any
European officer in Afghanistan owing to the turbu-
lent, barbarous, and fanatical character of the
Afghans ; and, in short, recapitulating to the Bussian
Governor-General all the arguments he has used to
us, in justification of his flat refusal to receive an
English officer. To this letter (our informants say)
Kaufmann replied that the ambassador had already
been despatched from St. Petersburg with the Czar's
instructions, which could not now be recalled, that
he was far advanced on his way to Kabul, and that
the Amir would be held responsible, not only for his
safety, but his honourable reception, withiu Afghan
territory. The Amir had said in his letter that if the
Russian Government had anything important to say to
him, raiher than receive a Eussian (European) Envoy
at Kabul, he would at once send one of his ministers
to Tashkend, to receive the communication on his
behalf, and to this Kaufmann replied that the Amir's
proposal to accredit a permanent representative at
Tashkend was accepted, and could not now be
withdrawn without offending Eussia; but that this
arrangement could not supersede the special mission
of the Eussian Embassy to Kabul, &c. The report
continues that on receipt of this reply Sher Ali,
after great hesitation, has made up his mind to
submit to the Eussian Embassy, and has issued orders
for its safe conduct to Kabul; but that he is in
great trepidation, and is being pressed by his advisers
to appeal to us for protection against Eussian

1878 AFGHANISTAN 249

demands, &c ' Pending the further development of
this situation, the Viceroy held that the Government
of India should remain c vigilantly but imperturbably
passive.' 1

Major Cavagnari, writing at this time from
Peshawur, reported that the Amir complained
frequently of the unseemly haste with which the
Russian authorities wished to hurry matters ! Further
that his rule became daily more unpopular in his
own dominions, and * that the cry throughout the
length and breadth of Afghanistan ' was 6 for some
change of any kind to take place as speedily as
possible.'

As soon as the news reached Simla of the recep-
tion of the Eussian Envoy at the Amir's Court, the
Viceroy wrote as follows to the Secretary of State :

6 It is now almost exactly a year since we ad- TO Viscount
dressed to your predecessor ' a 6 despatch about ^mtsf'
Herv,2 which elicited from the India Office a some- 1878 •• Simla
what sarcastic reply. We were then told that our
warnings were witless ; our anxieties, nightmares ;
our calculations, the crude excursions of an un-
tutored fancy ; our conclusions, airy fabrics, raised
by unreasonable fears, from a foundation which,
whilst we were building on it, had already vanished
from the region of fact. High authorities at that
time impressed on me that "the complete collapse
of Eussia as a great military power" rendered
practically impossible any serious danger to the land-
frontier of India from that quarter.

6 1 venture to think that our political foresight will
stand comparison with that of our critics, and that
subsequent events have better justified our alarm

1 Narrative of Events in Afgltanistan.
3 Despatch to Secretary of State, No. 21, July 2, 1877.

250 LOBD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. TII

To Lord
Crantrook,
August 3

Scientific
frontier

than their confidence. Within the year now closing,
Kussia, though temporarily checked by the excep-
tional and unprecedented strain of her severe struggle
in European and Asiatic Turkey, has made greater
strides towards India than were then " dreamed of in
our " repudiated " philosophy." ...

6 Now the Eussian outposts are actually 150 miles
nearer than they were then. Now the Eussian officers
and troops have been received with honour at
Kabul, within 150 miles of our frontier and of our
largest military garrison. And this is a distance
which, even on the large-scale maps recommended to
us, looks very small indeed. . . .

c It is because I attach supreme importance to the
basement of our Indian frontier policy upon definite
guiding principles, and the direction of it to an in-
telligible practical object, in complete and constant
accordance with the deliberate conclusions of the
Cabinet, that I venture once more, and most earnestly,
to urge upon the practical consideration of Her
Majesty's Government a question which is vital to
India

'With some slight modifications, which I will
explain in the course of this letter, the views formed
and put forward, even before I reached India, have
been strengthened by subsequent local knowledge
and two years' active experience of Indian frontier
administration ,

e These views may, I think, be thus formulated :

6 1. Although, undoubtedly/ a small, friendly, and
comparatively weak Asiatic State would be to us a
more convenient neighbour than a great European,
military, and rival Power, yet it is almost absolutely
certain that in the ordinary uncorrected, and
probably incorrigible, course of events all inter-

1878 AFGHANISTAN 2 5 1

mediate States between our own Asiatic Empire and
that of Eussia must ere long be absorbed by one or
other of the two rival Powers ; and we shall then find
ourselves conterminous with Eussia along our North-
West Frontier.

6 II. We must, therefore, carefully consider, and
decide beforehand, while there is yet time for con-
sideration and scope for decision, where such contact
can be admitted with the least inconvenience and
injury to ourselves.

6 III. The line of contact selected by us, while
we have still the power of selection, must be a strong
military line.

*IV. But our present frontier line, which, if
closely approached, would leave in the hands of our
great and energetic rival all the outer debouches of
the passes leading into India is a hopelessly bad
line. The great natural boundary of India to the
north-west is the watershed formed by the range of
the Hindu-Kush and its spurs ; and that range, with
such outposts as may be necessary to secure the
passes, ought to be our ultimate boundary.

6 1 am told, by persons more conversant than I am
with modern military science, that the theory of
standing on the defensive behind a mountain range
is a pre-Napoleonic idea ; that it was exploded by
Napoleon; and that, in modern times, whenever it
has been attempted the result has in every instance
been disastrous. ... I think it possible to give to
India a magnificent defensive line — perhaps the
finest in the world. To the left, our flank rests on
the Persian Ghilf, of which we have the command,
and is covered by the sandy deserts of Western
Beloochistan. Our occupation of Quettah fulfils all the
requisites of a strong military position on that side.

252 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTItATION an, ra
TO Lord For, while we can thence debouch at any moment on

Oranbrook, ^ ,. i • / i <• • • j

Augusts to the open plains (where our arms of precision and
superior drill and organisation would tell with vast
effect), any adversary trying to enter India from this
direction would first be obliged to besiege and
capture Quettah, giving us ample time to prepare for
his reception, and then to force the long gorges of
the Bolan Pass. In fact, I look upon our frontier
from Multan to the sea as now so well guarded by
our position at Quettah that it leaves almost nothing
to be desired ; and, from a 'military point of view,
should certainly much regret any circumstance

im ortaueeof W^C''1 compelled us to advance to Kandahar.

Kandahar Politically, however, it would be inconvenient to let
Kandahar fall into the hands of any rival Power ;
and, in certain conceivable contingencies, there
would also, I doubt not, be military reasons for
holding this point, and so stopping the roads which
lead northward to Khelat-i-Qhilzai, Ghuzni, and
thence, by various passes, to our frontier above
Multan.

e Turning now to our extreme right, we are there
protected by the great Himalayan ranges and the
deserts of Thibet. I originally advocated, though
hesitatingly and with avowed ignorance of the
precise geographical conditions, an occupation of
the deboucMs to the passes leading on to Kashgar
and the Pamir Steppes. Further knowledge of the
country, however, has somewhat modified that view.
I can hardly imagine any circumstances in which we
ought to think of engaging a force in the long and
difficult passes of Kashmir for the sake of debouch-
ing on Kashgar and striking at Russia in that
direction. And except for this purpose, there would
be little use in holding the dgbouchfe of those passes.

1878 AFGHANISTAN 2 5 1

mediate States between our own Asiatic Empire and TO Lord
that of Eussia must ere long be absorbed by one or August's" '
other of the two rival Powers ; and we shall then find
ourselves conterminous with Eussia along our North-
West Frontier.

6 II. We must, therefore, carefully consider, and
decide beforehand, while there is yet time for con-
sideration and scope for decision, where such contact
can be admitted with the least inconvenience and
injury to ourselves.

6 in. The line of contact selected by us, while
we have still the power of selection, must be a strong
military line,

TV. But our present frontier line, which, if
closely approached, would leave in the hands of our
great and energetic rival all the outer debouches of
the passes leading into India is a hopelessly bad
line. The great natural boundary of India to the
north-west is the watershed formed by the range of
the Hindu-Kush and its spurs ; and that range, with
such outposts as may be necessary to secure the
passes, ought to be our ultimate boundary. Inaia

' I am told, by persons more conversant than I am
with modern military science, that the theory of
standing on the defensive behind a mountain range
is a pre-Napoleonic idea ; that it was exploded by
Napoleon; and that, in modern times, whenever it
has been attempted the result has in every instance
been disastrous. ... I think it possible to give to
India a magnificent defensive line — perhaps the
finest in the world. To the left, our flank rests on
the Persian Gulf, of which we have the command,
and is covered by the sandy deserts of Western
Beloochistan. Our occupation of Quettah fulfils all the
requisites of a strong military position on that side.

252 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. TO
TO Lord For, while we can thence debouch, at any moment on

Cranbrook. 1 i • / i /••• i

Augusts to the open plains (where our arms of precision and
superior drill and organisation would tell with vast
effect), any adversary trying to enter India from this
direction would first be obliged to besiege and
capture Quettah, giving us ample time to prepare for
his reception, and then to force the long gorges of
the Bolan Pass. In fact, I look upon our frontier
from Multan to the sea as now so well guarded by
our position at Quettah that it leaves almost nothing
to be desired ; and, from a military point of view,
should certainly much regret any circumstance

im ortanceof wkich compelled us to advance to Kandahar.

Kandahar Politically, however, it would be inconvenient to let
Kandahar fall into the hands of any rival Power ;
and, in certain conceivable contingencies, there
would also, I doubt not, be military reasons for
holding this point, and so stopping the roads which
lead northward to Khelat-i-Ghikai, Ghuzni, and
thencej by various passes, to our frontier above
Multan.

6 Turning now to our extreme right, we are there
protected by the great Himalayan ranges and the
deserts of Thibet. I originally advocated, though
hesitatingly and with avowed ignorance of the
precise geographical conditions, an occupation of
the debouches to the passes leading on to Kashgar
and the Pamir Steppes. Further knowledge of the
country, however, has somewhat modified that view.
I can hardly imagine any circumstances in which we
ought to think of engaging a force in the long and
difficult passes of Kashmir for the sake of debouch-
ing on Kashgar and striking at Eussia in that
direction. And except for this purpose, there would
be little use in holding the debouches of those passes.

1878 ' APGHANISTAN 253

I have also satisfied myself that it would be extremely o
difficult to cross the ridge, and establish ourselves Augusts
in the valleys leading to Kashgaria, without being
gradually drawn further down into regions where we
have no real interests to defend. Moreover, beyond
those mountains we should meet the Eussians at a
considerable disadvantage; and the passes leading
through them into India are so few and so difficult
that I think they could be easily stopped if occasion
required. For all these reasons I conceive that, in
this direction, our ultimate boundary should be the
great mountain range, or watershed, dividing the
waters of the Indus from those which run north-
wards ; and I have accordingly instructed our officers
in Kashmir, whilst endeavouring to extend our in-
fluence over the petty chiefdoms along the southern
slopes of this ridge, to avoid most carefully the least
appearance of interference with the tribes and races
beyond it.

6 The question of our central line of defence, or Frontier from
ultimate boundary from Quettah to Chitral, is a much
more difficult problem.

6 1 had advocated the continuation of the Hindu-
Kush, and its spurs, to Herat, as our main line, with
outposts at Balkh, Maimena and Herat, and the Oxus
as our visible boundary, in accordance with the
understanding arrived at between the British and
Eussian Governments. But I am led to believe that
the people of Badakshan are much less united with
Afghanistan, and much more closely connected with
the Usbegs of Bokhara, Darwar, and countries under
Kussian influence than I had supposed ; and that the
Oxus, so far from forming a distinct demarcation o
nationalities, is really a bond of union between the
populations of the upper and lower banks of it. The

254 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.TH

TO Lord
Auftust°3 '

ater and

-Merv

same consideration applies, though in a minor degree,
to the Afghan provinces of Balkh, &c. It has also to
be considered that Russia's rapid progress and our
own quiescence have rendered it extremely doubtful
whether we can now bring under our influence the
provinces on the left bank of the Oxus. It seems to
me, therefore, that although perhaps we need not
prematurely and definitely abandon all pretension to
influence or self-assertion along the line of the Oxus,
there are many arguments in favour of confining our
views and efforts to the nearer mountain line ; thus
leaving Badakshan, Balkh, &c., to fall undisputed
under Eussian influence, and ultimately under
Eussian dominion. In that case, however, it would
be absolutely necessary to secure for ourselves, and
betimes, Bamian and other posts commanding the
northern debouckis of the Hindu-Kush.

' The choice thus seems to lie between znouter line
TOth the Oxus for ultimate boundary, and Balkh,
Maimena, Herat, for its main outposts ; and an inner
line following the mountains, with only posts like
Bamian, occupied at the debouches of the passes. If
we chose this inner line, it might trend southward
from the angle a little west of Bamian, and follow
the course of the Helmund to Girishk. Here, I am
considering the question exclusively in its military
aspect ; and, from this point of view, I think that
for my own part I should prefer the inner line. But
our ultimate decision will have to be made on
political grounds.

' Merv is altogether beyond our sphere of prac-
tical action, even were it not now plainly too late
to interfere with Eussian progress at that point;
although in reference to other points more vital to
the existence of our Indian Empire it would doubtless

1878 AFGHANISTAN 255

be advantageous to us to delay if possible, and by all ^° L°rd
practically available means, the occupation of Merv August s
byBussia.

1 Between us and Eussia the really crucial point
is Herat. Whilst military considerations, though Herat
almost evenly balanced, preponderate in favour of
taking up a line of virtual resistance nearer home, all
political considerations are strongly against the aban-
donment of Herat to any other Power, Persian or
Eussian.

* Finally, there are three, and only three, courses
of action still open to us if we still desire to secure
the effective command of a suitable northern frontier.

6 1 state these three courses in a sequence which Frontier
indicates what seems to me their relative merits; po I0y

6 (1) To secure, by fear or hope, such an alliance
with the present Amir as will effectually and per-
manently exclude Eussian influence from Afghanistan.

fi (2) Failing this, to withdraw, promptly and
publicly, all countenance from the present Amir ; to
break up the Afghan kingdom (which I think we
can do, if so minded, without much difficulty), and
to put in the place of its present ruler a sovereign
more friendly to our interests and more dependent
on our support.

'(3) To conquer and hold so much of Afghan
territory as will, in the failure of the two above-
mentioned precautions, be absolutely requisite for the
permanent maintenance of our North-West Frontier.
As a military operation, this will not, I think, be so
formidable as it has often been represented ; but, as
a political measure, I should contemplate it with,
great reluctance only as a pis-aller9 rendered impe-
rative by the failure of the two preceding guaran-
tees. . „ ,

To Lord
Oranbrool:,
August 8

Proposed
British
mission to
Kabul

256 LOBD LYTTOITO INDIAN ADMINISTEATION OH, TH

c It is now useless to recall the history of Slier
All's long-growing hostility to us, nurtured under
our "Masterly Inactivity " system, and significantly
revealed by the failure of the Peshawur negotiations
in 1876. The present most injudicious action of
Eussia fortunately affords us a convenient opportunity
for making, without loss of dignity and under some-
what more favourable conditions, another — and, as I
conceive it must "be, a last — attempt to establish more
satisfactory relations with the present Amir.

6 1 propose, therefore, in accordance with your
sanction, to send a British Mission to Kabul as soon
as it can be properly organised ; and to precede it by
a message, through a native agent, informing the
Amir that it is on its way to him, and that he is
expected to receive it (like the Russian one) with all
becoming honours, &c. Our British Envoy, whilst
instructed to use every endeavour to conciliate and
convince the Amir, will be armed with a formidable
bill of indictment against His Highness ; setting forth
all his inimical and hitherto unpunished acts towards
us, his attempts to stir up a holy war against us,
his systematic maltreatment of our subjects, &c., and
the culminating insult of his reception of Eussian
officers at his capital after his flat refusal to receive
there our own officers, &c, The precise instructions
to this mission will require very careful consideration.
But the terms I should deem it necessary to insist on
(by making the Amir distinctly understand that, if
lie rejects them, we shall openly break with him
altogether) are :

6 1st. A treaty binding him not to enter into
negotiations with, or receive agents from,
any other State or nation, without our
permission.

1878 AFGHANISTAN 257

6 2nd. The right to send British officers to Kabul TO Lord
for special conference with the Amir
whenever we see adequate occasion for
such special missions, on matters affecting
our joint interests.

' 3rd. The permanent location of a British agent
at Herat. It might be useful to secure
the right to send British officers to Balkh
and Kandahar, but I would certainly
not break off negotiations on such a point
as this,

*I do not now propose to offer the Amir any
dynastic guarantees or subsidy. The latter, however,
will perhaps afterwards be considered if he acts
loyally towards us. Meanwhile, I would confine our
promises to efficient support against any unprovoked
aggression on the part of other Powers. I think that
our Envoy should insist strongly on our grievances,
and make the Amir distinctly understand that, if he
does not now come to terms with us, we shall find it
necessary to take material guarantees for the preven-
tion of mischief or danger to ourselves from his
recognised hostility.

* The precise measures which in that case I should
propose to take — and which should, I think, be
shadowed forth to Tn'm by our Envoy if Sher All
proves callous to other considerations — would be:
(1) an armed occupation of the Kurum Valley, with
the establishment of a cantonment near the head of
it, and (2) the temporary occupation of Kandahar.
The Amir knows as well as we do that he is
absolutely powerless to oppose either of these two
measures, which will not give him even such chances
of resistance as might be offered by the conditions of
rough hill-fighting in the Afghan mountains.

To Lord
Cranbrook,
August 3

Conditions
f&yourable
for coercing
the Amir

258 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMIOTSTRATJON en. va

6 The Kurum Valley is comparatively open. It is
peopled by an agricultural population who have no
close sympathies with the Afghans, and who hate the
Amir, by whom they have been worried and oppressed.
It is close to our own frontier, easily, quickly, and
quite safely accessible from Thul ; and a cantonment at
thehead of this valley would turn the Khyber Pass and
Jellalabad; bringing us within a few days' march of
Kabul, at Ghuzni. I believe that the Amir could
not live a week at Kabul in known hostility to us,
and with our hands so close to his throat. Nor was
there ever a time so favourable as the present for
bringing pressure to bear upon His Highness. The
conclusion of peace in Europe has freed our hands
and destroyed, at the same time, all hopes on his part
of complications to us, or active assistance to hiiuRulf,
from Kussia. The intervening tribes have become,
sick of his cries for help and his abortive* attempts
to raise a religious war, which they now thoroughly
understand to have been only a political experiment.
They will not now rise, as they might, perhaps, have
risen a year ago. The fame of the deadly effect H of
our breech-loaders in the Jowaki and other rcMwnl
expeditions has spread far and wide through the
country, and will make its inhabitants very careful
henceforth how they expose themselves to these
weapons. Nor is the Amir under any illusion or
doubt as to the cogent fact that, from our command-
ing position at Quettah, we could now at any moment
lay our hands swiftly upon Kandahar ; where our
superior weapons and organisation would sweep away
like flies the badly armed, badly drilled, and badly
disciplined troops he could oppose to us.

* I do not pretend to say that I am confident about
the success of the contemplated mission. It is quite

1878 AFGHANISTAN 259

impossible to feel confidence in the result of any TO Lord

dealings with Sher Ali But I feel no doubt what- Angnat s '

ever that such a mission is the best measure we can

adopt in dealing with the present situation. We

cannot afford to leave wholly unnoticed the public

reception of the Eussian mission now at Kabul. I

think we are bound to take this step before taking

any other ; and I think there axe reasonable grounds

for anticipating from it a satisfactory result. More

than this I cannot say. We must, of course, be

prepared for failure. Much will depend on the man

selected as our envoy. I am still considering this

selection, but at present I am strongly inclined to

choose Sir Neville Chamberlain. There is, I think,

very much to be said in favour of such a choice.

Sir Neville is an able, resolute man, of exceptional

experience in all frontier matters. He is personally

acquainted with the Amir. He knew the Amir's late

father, Dost Mahomed, and he knows many of the

present Afghan notables. He is thoroughly familiar

with native character, and has had long intercourse

with Afghans and Fathans of all kinds. He is a man

of striking presence and address, and one whose

name would carry great weight with the public at

home. He has been to Kabul before, he knows the

country well. His military experience and ability

would be invaluable if Sher Ali (which is most

improbable, however) attempted to place any obstacle

in the way of the mission's return to Peshawur. His

selection would, I think, be agreeable to Lawrence

and the whole Punjab school, whose favourite hero

he is; and would probably tend to conciliate, or

impose moderation on, those members of your

Council who are most likely to write disagreeable

minutes about the mission or its results if they can

260 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADmNISTIJATTUN on. VH

o° Lbr * k

August's '

Summary th

policy

a C^iance °^ doing so. Moreover, his official rank
and status, and his reputation along and beyond our
Afghan frontier, would give special authority and
influence to his presence at Kabul. I am not sure
whether he would care to undertake this mission,
or whether his health would enable him to do MO.
But I shall have telegraphed to you full informa-
tion on the subject long before you receive this
letter.

* Failing our efforts thus to effect some satisfactory
understanding with the Amir (in consequence either
of the non-reception or the abortive resxilt of th<*
proposed mission), we must, I think, without hesita-
tion adopt the second of the three courses 1 Iwvo
already indicated. That is to say, we must upset.
Sher Ali or pare his claws. The measures I would
then advocate are those I have stated in the previous
part of this letter — viz. occupation of the Kuruxu
Valley and Kandahar. I am having these two
operations carefully considered and planned out,
without, however, making any outward preparations
or doing anything that could indicate the contem-
plation of them. . . /

The question has often been asked of tlic advo-
cates of the Forward Policy, *IIow far would you
go ? ' Lord Lytton in this letter defines dourly the
possibility he conceived of giving to India * u nmgni-
ficent frontier line — perhaps the finest in tlw world/
Therangeof thcnindu-Kush he slates distil ir.tly should
be <<)Hr ultimate boun&try.* If a military point ol
view alone is considered he is in favour of abiiiHloninjj'
all pretensions to influence along the line of (lit* < >xns,
leaving the provinces on its lf*ft, bank to fall untlfr
Russian influenoe, and adopting an inner i'ronlirr
line following the IliiKlu-ICiisli momilninw, \vilh certain

1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 26 1

posts such as Bamian occupied at the debouches of
the passes. On political grounds, however, he con-
templated the necessity of retaining influence over an
e outer line ' with the Oxus for ultimate boundary,
and Balkh, Maimena, and Herat for its main outposts.
Merv he regarded as altogether beyond our sphere of
action. It was too late to prevent it falling into the
hands of Russia.

It will also be seen from this letter that Lord
Lytton regarded the appearance of the Eussians at
Kabul as an opportunity of once more entering into
negotiations with Sher Ali3 and of making another
attempt — though he recognised it must be the last —
of securing his alliance.

Writing on August 8 to Sir John Strachey the
Viceroy said: 6I have obtained telegraphic per-
mission to insist now on the Amir's immediate
reception of a British mission, the charge of which I
have offered to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who has just
accepted it.1

When the news was received at Kabul that the
British Government was also about to send a mission.
General Stoletoff departed, promising, however, to
return shortly, and urging on the Amir the desi-
rability of preventing if possible the arrival of the
British mission. On August 23 the A-rynr informed
the Eussian Governor-General of General StoletofFs
approaching return to Tashkend with written
arrangements 6 for the purpose of strengthening the
friendly relations previously established between
their respective Governments.' f I attach great im-
portance to this expression,1 Lord Lytton comments,
* because it shows that General Stoletoffs mission
was not an impromptu mission, and that the object
of it was merely to carry into practical effect a long-

262 LORD LYTXOK'S 1XDIAS ADMINISTBATIOX CH.YII

previously established understanding with Sher All/
Similar evidence was furnished by Sher Ali's sub-
sequent letters both to General Kaufmann and to
the Emperor of Eussia. But of these more will be
said later on.

Minute on *n a ^nute dated September 4, 1878, the Viceroy

Buflsian wrote : 'Neither the withdrawal of the Eussian
September i mission nor any assurances on the part of Eussia
will cancel the fact that a Eussian mission has been
well received at Kabul, after one from us had been
refused; and that Eussian officers have had full
opportunities of instilling into the minds of the Amir
and his councillors distrust and dislike towards
England, belief in Eussia's power and destiny,
and hopes of assistance against us from that
country. . . .

6 War with Eussia is not a thing to be lightly
undertaken. The obligation to undertake it for an
object which might have been attained by other
means would be most discreditable to our states-
manship. A British statesman, remembering the
American war, and the lasting effect which a few
hostile cruisers have had on America's commercial
prosperity, may well hesitate before exposing British
commerce to the same risks. The contemplation of
war with Eussia in Central Asia has been forced on
my mind in the study of the anxious question
now under consideration. But the more closely I
contemplate such a catastrophe, the greater is the
repugnance with which I regard it — a repugnance
amounting almost to horror. ... I conceive, there-
fore, that our first object should be to use every
endeavour to re-establish such relations with the
Amir as will give us due influence in Afghanistan
and for ever exclude Eussia therefrom ; and that to

1878 SIR NEVILLE OHA.MBEKLAIN S MISSION 263

effect this we must appeal both to his fears and his
hopes. ... If it appears that we cannot find in mission,
a friendly alliance with the Amir the necessary
security for our North-West Frontier, we must then
be prepared to take immediate steps for making
the security of that frontier independent of him.
The military measures proposed for this purpose
have already been indicated. . . . But as it is
indispensable, both for the security of the mission
and for the full trial of the pacific policy which is
its object, that nothing should now be done which
could in any way be interpreted to indicate hostile
intentions on our part, I have withheld my sanction
from any active preparations.

1 It will be seen from what has already been said,
as well as from the smallness of the proposed
military preparations, that no invasion and subju-
gation of Afghanistan is contemplated- ... I view
an invasion of Afghanistan, like a war with Bussia,
as a measure which may become unavoidable, and
must therefore be taken into consideration in our
forecast, but which is only to be resorted to in case
of absolute necessity, when all others have failed. . . .
I earnestly hope and trust that we shall be able to
attain, by peaceable means, a settlement of the
questions considered in this Minute which shall be
alike becoming to the dignity of the great British
Empire, conducive to the security of that part of it
specially committed to our charge, and beneficial to
the neighbouring States concerned.'

The British mission was to consist of Sir Neville
Chamberlain, Major Cavagnari, Major St. John,
Captain Hammick, and Kazi Syud Ahmed, with an
escort of 250 sabres, under the command of Lieute-
nant Colonel Jenkins, of the Guide Corps. Two

264 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.VII

native noblemen, one Hindu, the other Moham-
medan, the Maharaja Purtab Sing of Jodhpur, and
Sirdar Obed Allan Khan of Tonk were also attached
to it.

The Government of India decided to announce
the arrival of the mission through a special native
emissary (the Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan), who
was to leave Feshawur on August 23. On the 21st,
Death of however, news was received of the death of Sirdar
Abdulla Jan, the Amir's heir-apparent.

The Nawab's departure was accordingly delayed
until August 30, when he leftPeshawur charged with
a second letter from the Viceroy to the Amir con-
doling with His Highness's bereavement.

Writing of this event to the Viceroy on August 23,
Major Cavagnari said :

' The Amir's embarrassments have been so great
of late that I should not be at all surprised to hear
that the death of the heir-apparent has produced the
same mental derangement he suffered from after the
death of his eldest and favourite son, Md. Ali Khan.
In that case he was stricken with excessive grief on
account of his real affection for his son. In the
present instance he will not feel the death of Abdulla
Jan. in the same way, but will be overwhelmed by
the reflection that all the trouble he has caused both
himself and the nation has been of no purpose, and
that he will once more have to decide the question of
appointing a successor. It will be regarded as a very
bad omen, for people have already been drawing
comparisons between the present state of affairs in
Kabul and that which immediately preceded the
dissolution of the Sikh power/

The progress of the native Envoy towards Kabul
was stopped at Jellalabad by a letter from the Amir

1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 265

telling him to remain at Peshawur, that His Highness
was unfit to attend to business, and that the matter
must be deferred until after Eamazan, the month of
mourning.

It was conjectured that the true cause of this
delay lay in the Amir's desire to receive some com-
munication from Eussia before sanctioning the
British mission.

The Commissioner of Peshawur, under instructions
from the Government of India, then wrote to the
Amir's minister to the effect that the date of depar-
ture of the British mission was fixed for September
16 or 17,1 and would not be postponed whether the
native Envoy had or had not by that time waited
upon His Highness the Amir.

Ther object of the mission was friendly, and the
refusal of free passage to it, or interruption or injury
to its friendly progress, would be regarded as an act
of hostility. It would not in any case enter Kabul
till after the expiry of the month of Eamazan.
Similar letters were sent to the Afghan authorities at
Ali Musjid, Dakka, and Jellalabad.

To these letters there was no direct reply, but, The Amir
while declaring he saw no good in the visit of the
native Envoy, the Amir gave pel mission to his Council
to do as they thought best, and thereupon the Afghan
authorities along the road were instructed not to
prevent the Envoy passing, but not to say he had
permission.

2 c The Eussian Envoy is said to have taunted the
Mustaufi with acting otherwise than in the interests
of Kabul, and the Mustaufi retaliated. This was in
open durbar. The Eussian Envoy then left for

1 It was afterwards delayed till the 21st.
* Ntvrratrwe of Events in

266 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CM.YII

Tashkend with an escort of one hundred Kabul
Sowars, saying that he would return in forty days.

6 His subordinates remained behind him. . . . The
Council advised the Amir to see the English Envoy,
and to decide afterwards what should be done (with
regard to the British mission), saying that it would
not be polite to refuse to receive him.'

Thus while the Amir had attempted to delay the
arrival of the British native Envoy at Kabul on
account of his ill health and sorrow, he was receiving
in Council members of the Russian mission and con-
sulting them as to his conduct towards us.

The Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, acting upon
instructions from the Commissioner of Pesliawur,
pushed on his journey as fast as he could and jirrrwd
at Kabul on September 10. lie had been well
treated during the journey, and was hospitably
September 12, received at Kabul. On the 12th he saw the Amir, to
A^reoeiveB wjlom ^ delivered the Viceroy's letters,
letter Qn September 17, 18, and 19 letters were

received from him at Peshawur. These all described
the Amir as in a bad humour, irritated at the lan-
guage used towards his officials to the effect that the
British mission would be forced upon him whether
he would or not, but implying that if his pleasure
was consulted and the departure of the Russians
awaited he might be disposed to receive it. He
further said ' that the Eussians had come with his
permission though not at his request, and that his
country being exposed, and he quite estranged from
the English, he was obliged to let them come on after
they had crossed the Oxus ; that if the British mission
advanced at once it would be resisted, but that, if
conciliatory letters were sent to the Amir and his

1 Narrative of Jfovnto in Afghanistan*

1878 HLU XEVILLi: CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 267

dignity studied, all might be arranged.' The Envoy
contrived to send a separate letter in which he stated
that his official letters had been dictated by the
Amir, and that no one was allowed to communicate
with him.

The following extract from a letter to the Secre-
tary of State gives an interesting account of the dis-
cussions at Kabul between the Amir and his ministers
relative to the reception of the British mission :

' A man sent by Hukhtiar Khan has just returned
from Kabul with the following information. The
early arrival of the British mission has been an-
nounncd to the Amir by the Mir Akhor ; who asked
for immediate orders, adding that lie was continuing,
under .previous orders, to do all in his power to
obstruct the mission. The Amir sent for the
MuHtauli tiiwl Wall Mahomed Khan, and consulted
them privately. The Mustauli wairl " he had long
been tn iiitf to pursuadc* Fas Ifi^luicHS that the alliance
with Enjrhnd was more profitable than one with
Huswia could be ; thai no Tower had ever stopped
an Envoy even during war; and that it would be
better to send for the mission and hear what it has
to say, than bear the blame of refusing it,"

6 Sirdar Wall Mahomed Khan supported, the
Mustuufi, The Amir said " he was so disgusted with
the British Government that lie could not bear to
«e<4 anyone connected with it, not even this mission."
The Mustauli asked the Amir to give him a certi-
ficate that such and .such an official of his had repre-
sented to him the impropriety of stopping the mission,
but that he (the Amir) had not agreed with them.
Such a <'(trtiii(satG, hu said, " might be of use to him
in the day of adversity, and they, his well-wishers,
should not be held responsible by the people, for not

268 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. TO:

having understood the state of affairs." The Amir
of stS£,ary replied " very angrily and bitterly" : " Perhaps you

October 3 want tyg certificate from me to show the English."
The Mustaufi said : " He had nothing to do with the
British Government, and had asked nothing from any
Government, but that he spoke with a view to the
welfare of the Amir, who must do as he thought
best." The Amir remarked that "to allow the
mission to come just as the British Government
wished it to come, was the same to fri™ as if it came
against his own wishes." At this moment a letter
arrived from Mir Afzul Khan (of Kandahar) to the
effect that, in his opinion, after hearing what was
going on at Kabul, the Amir had better allow the
mission to come and receive it with honour, and that
the Amir should well weigh the demands of both
the British and Russian Governments before choos-
ing between them. The Amir remarked that "this
Sirdar was too old to understand political matters."
The Mustaufi returned home in anxiety, remarking
" that it was strange that the Amir neither had any
assurance from Eussia, nor any disposition to settle
his differences with the British Government. Perhaps
the days of adversity had arrived." The messenger
adds : " The Amir is daily, and most anxiously, expect-
ing the return of the Eussian Envoy. The remainder
of the Eussian mission under two European officers
is still at Kabul."'

Lord Lytton comments upon this : c I cannot, of
course, vouch for the complete accuracy of the
above information, but I think it was given to our
messenger by the Mustaufi himself, who is obviously
unwilling to pull and sink in the same boat with the
Ainir. According to recent information, of slightly
earlier date, the Sirdar who took my (still unan-

1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBEHLAIX'S MISSION 269

swered) letters to the Amir, Nawab Ghulam Hasan,
was received at Kabul without any of the customary
honours, by special order from the Amir.'

In the meantime Sir Neville Chamberlain and the
other officers of the British mission had reached
Peshawur on September 12. Major Cavagnari had g 12

been negotiating with the independent Khyber
tribesmen for the safe conduct of the mission, and all
had gone well till, on September 14, the commandant
of the Amir's troops at AJi Musjid sent to Peshawur to
summon back to the pass all the Khyberi headmen,
and they feared to disobey lest their allowance from
the Amir should be stopped. Sir Neville Chamberlain
wrote to the Afghan commander, Faiz Mahomed,
that a friendly mission from the British Government
was about to proceed to Kabul vid the Khyber Pass,
that any negotiations which had been carried on with
the independent tribesmen were for the sole object of
arranging with them for the safe conduct through
the Khyber Pass, and that they had been given
clearly to understand that such negotiations were in
no way intended to prejudice their relations with His
Highness the Amir and the people of Afghanistan.
He therefore trusted the assurance would speedily
reach In'm that the mission would be safely conducted
to Dakka, but that if the answer proved other than
he expected, he would have no alternative but to
make whatever arrangements might seem to him best
for carrying out the instructions he had received
from his Government.

Paiz Mahomed replied on September 16 that
the mission could not be allowed to pass without the
Amir's consent, but that the Mir Akhor was expected
from Kabul with further orders.

News of the Mir Akhor's arrival was received on

270 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.VII

the 18th of September, but it was reported that his
object, instead of being of a friendly character, was
to see that Faiz Mahomed did not flinch from the
execution of his orders.

In the opinion of the Viceroy, the time had now
come to bring the situation to a decisive issue. In
a letter written to the Secretary of State early in
October he recapitulates the circumstances which led
to the advance of Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission
Lord Lytton as far as Jamrud. ' In submitting to you proposals
o?statBtary f°r tke immediate despatch of a British mission to
Kabul as a preliminary measure, and the least
aggressive of those rendered necessary by the Amir's
reception of a Eussian mission after the repeated
rejection of an English one, I dwelt specially on the
necessity of my having authority to insist upon the
reception of this mission as a sine qud non condition
of sending it at all. That condition you sanctioned
officially, giving me the requisite authority early in
August. Your telegram was sent on August 3.
Again, on the 13th of the same month, when tele-
graphing to you further details about the organisation
and movements of the mission, I took special occasion
to repeat " I cannot propose it unless I have authority
to insist on it." To this reiteration of the under-
standing on which I was acting no objection was
made or suggested by Her Majesty's Government.
The well-understood object of the mission was to
bring the Amir's relations with the British and
Eussian Governments to the earliest and most
decisive test. Meanwhile, as time went on and my
letters to the Amir demanding his reception of the
mission remained unanswered, it became as clear as
anything could possibly be to Sir Neville Chamberlain,
to myself, to our frontier authorities, to the Punjab

1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 271

Government, and to nxy own Council that the Amir TO Seeretaiy

rrf

was resolved to prevent our bringing matters to a
test with him, and that for this purpose he would
neither receive, nor refuse to receive, our mission ;
neither say no nor yes to the Viceroy's request for
its immediate reception on business declared to be
urgent and serious, but keep it waiting indefinitely
on the threshold of his dominions, without any answer
at all, while the Russian mission still remained at
his capital as a studiously insolent and significant
advertisement to all India, and all Central Asia, of
the impunity with which he could slight the friendly
overtures and brave the long restrained resentment
of the British Government, Such a position we
could not possibly accept with either dignity or
safety. It was rapidly undermining, all along our
frontier, the confidence of our subjects in our power
and self-respect. I consequent^ informed you by
telegraph, on September 8, that the mission would
leave Peshawur on September 16. On September 13
(at a time when I knew by your letters that you
were absent from the India Office), I received the
following telegram from the India Office : ' Official
reply to remonstrance from St. Petersburg on way
London. Important to receive this before Chamber-
lain starts.' It was perfectly obvious that no
communication from St. Petersburg (especially if it
were the sort of reply that might be confidently
predicted to the sort of remonstrance which had
been made there) could have the smallest practical
effect upon the previously recognised necessity for
the mission we were sending the Amir, or the con-
ditions requisite for maintaining the dignity of that
mission and our own. It was equally obvious that
if the expected Bussian answer contained a single

272 i-OED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.TH

To Secretary word that could render expedient any modification
of state oj ^ jngtructjons given to Sir Neville Chamberlain

for his guidance at Kabul, the modified instructions
could reach him without difficulty long before his
mission reached Kabul, if it were allowed to proceed,
whilst on the other hand they would be useless if
the mission were not allowed to proceed. Never-
theless, on receipt of this telegram of September 13,
and in compliance with it, I delayed the departure
of the mission from Peshawur from September 16
till the 21st. But by that time the negotiations
with the Khyberis (reported in my telegram of the
17th, and opened with the knowledge of Her
Majesty's Government) had reached a point which
rendered further delay seriously dangerous, and
indeed practically impossible. Matters stood thus :
My letter to the Amir, requesting in civil terms
that he would issue immediate orders for the proper
reception of Sir Neville's mission, had been, as you
know, accompanied by a friendly letter of condolence
on the death of the heir-apparent. And this was
well known. Now, according to native etiquette,
letters of condolence are rarely written previous to
the receipt of letters announcing the bereavement to
which they refer. But whenever they are so written,
it is considered as a very special mark of courtesy
and friendship. On the other hand, to leave un-
answered, or without an immediate answer, any
letter of condolence under any circumstances is
regarded by all Indian and Afghan Mohammedans as
an unpardonable affront. No grief, no pressure of
business, is considered as sufficient to justify such
a discourtesy, especially on the part of a reigning
prince or any person of high rank. So long as the
Viceroy's letter of condolence remained unanswered

1878 SIB NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 273

(after reasonable time had been allowed for a reply to TO Secretary
it), so long did the British Government and its Envoy °
remain in the eyes of our native subjects and neigh-
bours suffering under a tolerated affront. But it was
well known all along the border that, whilst the
Amir still left the Viceroy's letters unanswered, His
Highness was actively sending imperative orders of
some kind to his frontier authorities. It was as
clear to our subjects and neighbours as it was to
ourselves, that if these orders were not to receive the
British mission they must be to oppose it. And no
further room was left for doubt as to the nature of
the orders issued by the Amir when, after receipt of
them, the first act of Paiz Mahomed and the Mir
Akhor was to summon away from Peshawur, under
threats of the Amir's instant displeasure, the friendly
Khyberis who were there in negotiation with us^
Placed in this position, the Khyberis said to us —
" What do you wish us to do ? We don't wish to
break with you, or desert, or betray you, if you really
mean business. We are ready, in proof of our good
faith, to escort you at once to AJi Musjid, where the
power of our section ceases, but where you can
promptly test the real character of the Amir's orders ;
and we also undertake to escort you safely back
again. We know that by so doing we shall incur
the Amir's resentment, but we confide in your subse-
quent protection. What we cannot possibly do,
however, after the summons we have received, is to
remain any longer at Peshawur doing nothing, not
knowing whether you are going to do anything, and
serving neither you nor the Amir, whilst our families
and properties remain, in our absence, undefended
from his authorities." . . .'

In these circumstances Lord Lytton felt that if he

274 LOIiD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. vu

To Secretary
of State

The mission
moves to

September 21

Major
Cavagnari
confers with
the Ehyberi
Pass-men

did not authorise the mission to advance, and give the
necessary guarantee to the friendly tribes, we should
irretrievably lose the Khyberis. c I consequently,' he
continues, 6 after further consultation with Sir Neville
Chamberlain, authorised him to advance the mission
on the 21st as far as Jamrud, which is in British
territory, and thence to send forward an officer under
Ehyberi escort to ascertain distinctly from the Amir's
authorities at Ali Musjid whether they would allow
the mission to pass, returning at once to Jamrud if
he received a negative answer. Of this arrangement
I simultaneously informed you by my detailed tele-
gram of September 21, which explained that any
subsequent instructions (should they be necessitated
by the Eussian reply) would reach the mission if it
advanced beyond Jamrud, any time within the
following fifteen days before its arrival at Kabul.*

The Khyberis having agreed to escort the
mission to Ali Musjid., or any nearer point, until it
came into contact with the Amir's authorities, the
Envoy's camp moved out from Peshawur to Jamrud
early in the morning of September 21. As all
reports agreed that resistance was intended, it was
decided that the mission should stand fast, while
Major Cavagnari, with a small escort, proceeded to
AJi Musjid and demanded passage. The object of
this arrangement was to minimise the loss of prestige
which a repulse must entail, as, in the words of Sir
Neville Chamberlain, 6 after long warning and con-
siderable preparation, we could not now move for-
ward out of our territory and be openly turned back
without being disgraced in the eyes of India.'

Accordingly Major Cavagnari, with Lieutenant-
Colonel P. H. Jenkins, in command of the escort,
Captain W. Battye, of the Guides Cavalry, and twenty-

1878 SIB NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 275

four men, with certain of the Border Khans, advanced
to within a mile of Ali Musjid. The ridges beyond
were held by the Amir's levies, who threatened to fire
if anyone approached. Eventually a message was
received from Paiz Mahomed Khan to the effect that
he was about to come to a ruined tower in the bed
of the stream just below where the party were halted,
and that on his arrival there he would send for
Major Oavagnari and three others, and would hear
anything he had to communicate.

What followed may best be given in the terms of
Major Cavagnari's report of September 22 :

6 As it appeared to me that it would have been an
indignity to have remained and waited until Paiz
Mahomed Khan would send for me, as well as to be September 2
dictated to as to the number of men that should
accompany me (it would have been different if I had
been permitted to proceed with my escort to the fort
of Ali Musjid, when, of course, I would only have
entered the post with as many men as the officers in
command chose to admit), I determined to advance
at once, with as many men as I thought fit to take,
and endeavour to meet Faiz Mahomed Khan before
he should reach the spot named by him.

6 Accordingly, Colonel Jenkins, myself, and one or
two of the Guide Cavalry, with some of the Khyber
headmen and the native gentlemen marginally
noted, descended without much delay into the bed of
the stream and advanced to meet Faiz Mahomed Khan.
A party of Afridis, headed by Abdulla Nur, a Kuki
Khel, Afridi Malik, in receipt of special allowances
from the Amir, attempted to stop me, saying that
only four persons should advance. I rode past him,
telling h™ that my mission concerned the Kabul
officials and that I desired to have no discussion with

T*

276 LOED LOTION'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. TO

Report of the Afridis. The Malik made no further opposition. —
Cavagnari, i& fact, he knew that most of his tribe were with me,
September 22 3.^ fa himself wafi orjy acting a part to save his
allowances.

6 After meeting Faiz Mahomed Khan and ex-
changing salutations, I pointed to what I considered
a suitable place for an interview ; it was a watermill,
with some trees close by it, and on the opposite side
of the stream to the spot originally named for the
place of meeting. Faiz Mahomed Khan was accom-
panied by the Naib, or deputy, of the Mir Abhor, a
considerable number of the All Musjid levies, and
some of the Afridi headmen of the upper villages of
the Khyber and their respective followers.

6 When we had seated ourselves, I commenced
the interview by pointing out to Faiz Mahomed
Khan that he and myself were servants of our
respective Governments, and had met to carry out
whatever orders we had received ; so that, whatever
the result of our meeting might be, there need be
nothing personal between rhim and myself. After the
Khan had fully reciprocated this friendly sentiment,
I proceeded to state that he was well aware that the
British Government had decided on sending a friendly
mission of European British officers, accompanied
by a suitable escort, to His Highness the Amir of
Kabul, that the mission was encamped at Jamrud,
and intended to proceed through the Khyber on
the following day ; that, in consequence of various
reports received, I had been deputed by the Govern-
ment to ascertain from the Amins officials at Ali
Musjid whether they had received instructions or
were prepared to guarantee the safe passage and
proper treatment of the mission during its journey
to Kabul or not ; and I hoped that, if there was any

1878 SIB NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 277

latitude for independent action in the orders he had Report of
received from Kabul, he would do all he could cavagnarf,
towards an amicable adjustment of affairs between the SePtember
two Governments. Faiz Mahomed Khan replied
that he had every desire to act in a friendly manner,
and that, actuated by such motives, he had allowed
Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan to proceed without
any detention, but that his action in this respect had
met with disapproval from the Kabul Durbar ; that if
he had not been friendly disposed he would not have
consented to the present interview or have restrained
his levies from firing on my party; that he had
received no orders from the Amir to let the mission
pass his post; and that, without such orders, he
could not let it proceed; but that if the mission
would only wait for a few days he would commu-
nicate with. Kabul and ask for orders. I replied
that my orders were distinct, and that I was in-
structed to say that the mission would advance on
the next day unless I received a reply from the
Amir's officials that its advance would be opposed ;
and I begged the Khan not to take upon himself
such a heavy responsibility as to say he would
oppose the advance of the British mission, unless
his orders were clear and distinct in the matter ; for,
whatever his reply was, it would be considered as
that of the Amir of Kabul. Faiz Mahomed Khan
replied that he was only a sentry, and had no
regular troops but only a few levies ; but that such
as his orders were he would carry them out to the
best of his ability, and that, unless he received orders
from Kabul, he could not let the mission pass his
post. I rejoined to this, that it did not signify what
the actual strength of his post was, as the mission
was a friendly one and bent on peaceful objects ;

278 LORD LOTION'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vu

Beportof and I again urged him not to take such, a grave
Cavagnan, responsibility if he had any option in the matter.
September 22 jje repiie(:i j^ ft was a very heavy matter for him

to decide upon ; as, on the one hand, he could not
act without orders from Kabul, while, on the other
hand, he was told that his reply would be considered
as that of the Amir of Kabul. He then began with
much warmth to question the friendly intentions of
the British Government, by stating that it was not
a sign of friendship for the British authorities to
negotiate direct with the Khyber tribes, who were
subjects of the Amir of Kabul and in receipt of
allowances from that ruler, and induce them to
escort Nawab Ghulam Hasan and also some
British officers (meaning my party), without the
Amir's permission. I replied that there was no
cause for dissatisfaction in what had been done in
the matter. It was never anticipated that a friendly
mission would have met with any opposition, as such
missions are never opposed in any civilised country ;
and that the arrangements made with the Afridis
were merely to induce them to undertake the safe
conduct ('badragga'} of a peaceably disposed
mission, which every independent Pathan tribe has a
right to undertake in its own country.

c Faiz Mahomed Khan continued with increasing
warmth to allude to the subject, and there was an
uneasy sort of murmuring amongst the people around,
which appeared to me — and, as I afterwards ascer-
tained, the same idea occurred to Colonel Jenkins and
to some of the native gentlemen with me — to indicate
that if the discussion was any longer prolonged the
movement alluded to might assume a more decided
form, which might possibly be one which our small
party could not deal with in a suitable manner. I

1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 279

therefore interrupted the Khan by saying that the Eepoit of
subject was one which it did not behove subordinates ^avagnari,
to discuss, and that, if the Amir considered what had September i
been done as a grievance, I had no doubt that the
British Government would give him a suitable answer.
I then asked the Khan for the last time if I correctly
understood him to say that, if the British mission
advanced as intended on the following day, he would
oppose it by force ; and he replied that such would
be the case. I then got up and shook Faiz
Mahomed by the hand, and assured him that I had
no unfriendly feelings against him personally, and
that I hoped to meet him again on some future occa-
sion. I then turned to the native gentlemen who
were with me, and asked them if they did not con-
sider a clear and decisive answer had been given ;
and they replied that it was so.

* In fact, there was scarcely any necessity for an
interview to settle this point, as the hostile prepara-
tions made by the Ali Musjid garrison on seeing my
party approach — notwithstanding that my object in
coming and the small strength of my escort had
been communicated to and received by the com-
mandant of the fort and the Amir's representative,
Mir Akhor — would ordinarily have been quite suf-
ficient to indicate predetermined affront and insult ;
and, I believe, that with any other of the Amir's
officials but Faiz Mahomed Khan, who from first
to last has behaved in a most courteous manner and
very favourably impressed both Colonel Jenkins and
myself, a collision of some kind would have taken
place. The general belief is that Faiz Mahomed
Khan was acting under the direct orders of the Mir
Akhor, who had been purposely deputed by the Amir
to supervise Faiz Mahomed Khan's management of

2 So LORD LtfTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. vn

Bepoit of
Major
Cavagnan,
September 22

The dose of
the interview

The British

mission

repulsed

the Khyber affairs, and to see that, without orders to
the contrary, lie checked the advance of the British
mission. I have no doubt that Faiz Mahomed
Khan softened down a great deal of the insult that
was intended, though, short of actual collision, it is
impossible to imagine what more could be done to
effect the Amir's object.'

Colonel Jenkins, in his report to the military
secretary of the Envoy, thus described the close of the
interview :

6 Major Cavagnari said to the Sirdar : " We are
both servants, you of the Amir of Kabul, I of the
British Government. It is no use for us to discuss
these matters. I only came to get a straight answer
from you. Will you oppose the passage of the
mission by force ? "

' The Sirdar said : " Tes, I will ; and you may
take it as kindness, and because I remember friend-
ship, that I do not fire upon you for what you have
done already." After this we shook hands and
mounted our horses ; and the Sirdar said again, " You
have had a straight answer." ' 1

The advance party at once rejoined the camp at
Jamrud, and the mission returned to Peshawur. A
letter was sent to Faiz Mahomed intimating that his
reply was understood to be dictated by the Amir of
Kabul, and instructions were despatched (September
22) to the Nawab Ghulam Hasan immediately to
take leave of His Highness. Sir Neville Chamberlain's
mission was formally dissolved, full aid and protec-
tion, if necessary, being guaranteed to the Khyberi
tribes who had given a passage to Major Oavagnari.
The Punjab Government was at the same time
directed to instruct the frontier officers to lose no time

1 Narrative of Events in Afghamstan.

1878 ' SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 281

and spare no efforts to detach from all political con-
nection with the Afghan Government those indepen-
dent tribes lying outside the northern portion of the
border, whom it was most important, either upon poli-
tical or military grounds, to bring permanently under
our influence, to the exclusion of that of the Amir.

The view taken by Sir Neville Chamberlain of what
had passed was expressed with emphasis. Writing
to the Viceroy immediately afterwards, he said :

'No man was ever more anxious than I to
preserve peace and secure friendly relations, and it
was only when I plainly saw the Amir's fixed inten-
tion to drive us into a corner that I told you we
must either sink into the position of merely obeying
his behests on all points or stand on our rights and
risk a rupture. Nothing could have been more dis-
tinct, nothing more humiliating to the dignity of the
British Crown and nation ; and I believe that, but for
the decision and tact of Cavagnari, at one period of
the interview the lives of the British officers and
native following were in considerable danger.1

There can be no doubt, indeed, that the British
officer was in some danger, for the Afghan soldiers
had begun to pull back their sleeves in the peculiar
manner that goes before handling of swords.

No precaution had been neglected to ensure Defence of
the success of this mission. c Our Envoy,' writes the the "a*88""*
Viceroy, cwas specially selected with a view to his of°ste£,etal
conciliatory character, his pacific principles, his 0ctobBr3
personal acquaintance and sympathy with the Amir.
The Envoy's escort was carefully confined to the
minimum of troops absolutely necessary to protect
through a wild intervening tract of country the
baggage of the Envoy and the costly gifts he was
charged to present to the Amir.

282 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. ra

viceroy's ' The total number was only 200 men. It was

Emission therefore numerically weaker than the escort attri-
To Secretary buted by our information to the Eussian mission,
October's and certainly weaker than the customary escort of
any Asiatic prince or minister proceeding on a
similarly peaceful mission of State to a friendly
Court. It was neither preceded nor accompanied
by any hostile demonstration or military preparation.
So anxious was I to avoid even the faintest appear-
ance of a military threat, that pending the ascertained
result of the mission I stopped the customary relief
movement, necessary at that season for the health of
our troops at frontier stations, and would not even
allow a baggage animal to stir. In adopting and
following out this course, however, one great practical
difficulty (which had been clearly foreseen from the
first) was how to counteract the Amir's invariable
policy of evasion and delay. The waiting game
was one which, unless some check was put upon it,
he could continue to play against us ad infinitum.
Unless we could bring matters to a definite issue,
the situation which our mission was to represent as
intolerable might have been prolonged, and the
settlement of affairs my letter to the Amir had
declared to be urgent might have been with impunity
evaded ad libitum; while the British Government
remained with all India and Central Asia the specta-
tors of its ludicrous and discreditable performance,
dancing attendance on the will and pleasure of a
weak and insolent barbarian prince. It was for this
reason that I represented to Lord Oranbrook the
futility of sending to Kabul any mission at all, unless
I was permitted to insist on its reception. The
mission, however, never advanced an inch beyond
British territory. Nor was it until after repeated

1878 SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 283

delays, which stretched patience to the verge of not viceroy's
merely pusillanimity, but of imprudence, and which the mission
if prolonged would have alienated from us the Budni TO Secretary
tribes, whose friendship had been secured, and October's
rendered practically impossible the peaceful advance
of the mission to the Amir's frontier, whilst seriously
increasing the difficulty and extent of any subsequent
military measures for the protection of our own
frontier, that matters were at last brought to a
definite issue at AM Musjid, a small fort not in
Afghan territory, as the English Press seems to
suppose, but in independent Afridi territory, which
has been quite recently occupied by the Amir's
authorities under the conditional permission of the
Government of India, and in virtue of pecuniary
arrangements with the independent tribes.9

After the repulse of his mission at All Musjid
Sir Neville Chamberlain asked some native notables
(old friends of his) at Peshawur what they and the
natives on the border thought of it. They replied :
' It is doubtless a studied and great affront to the TO Secretary
British Government, but not greater than the October's
Amir's omission to answer the Viceroy's letter of con-
dolence, for amongst us (natives) such an omission
is one of the greatest insults one man can offer
another.'

Sir N. Chamberlain. — 6 Well, what do the people
about here say, and what do you t.hrnfr we shall now
do?'

The Notables (after much hesitation and press-
ing)— c Well, Sahib, to say the truth, the people say
and we think that you will do nothing ! '

In the telegram acknowledging the receipt of
the information of the repulse of the mission the
Secretary of State raised no objection to the course

284 LOED LYTTOira INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. TO

which, the Government of India had deemed it
necessary to take under his previous sanction of its
proposals.

On September 23 the Viceroy wrote to Lord
Cranbrook of the measures which he now proposed
to adopt.

To Lord 'I fully understand and personally sympathise

Sept^to1 23 Trifli- Sir Neville Chamberlain's irritation at the
humiliating position in which he has been placed.
But the sacrifice of his personal dignity was essentially
necessary pro bono publico. Ever since the Peshawur
Conference, I have been convinced that, even long
previous to that date, the Amir (thanks to the un-
corrected prosecution of the Lawrence-Gladstone
policy) was irretrievably alienated from us. But no
one else shared that conviction, nor was I permitted
to act on it. The mot d'ordre was to describe and
treat the Amir as an honoured friend, whose humours,
however capricious and inconvenient, were to be
scrupulously respected. When action of some kind
was at last forced upon us by his reception of the
Eussian mission, had I entrusted the conduct of our
own mission to anyone in India except Sir Neville
Chamberlain the failure of that mission would have
been universally ascribed to my own rash departure
from the principles of the established Punjab policy,
or to the ineptitude of my selected agent. This, I
trust, is now impossible. The affront offered to the
British Government, in. the person of Sir Neville
Chamberlain, is certainly not greater than any of the
numerous affronts tacitly accepted from the Amir by
The Amir's the British Government during the last seven years.
The only difference is that this particular affront is
the first of the series which it has been impossible
to conceal from the British public. You will observe

1878 SIB NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION 285

in the enclosed correspondence that Chamberlain, TO Lord
naturally reluctant to participate conspicuously in September
the reception of an apparently inevitable affront,
wanted to break off negotiations with the Amir with-
out leaving Feshawur ; and that I instructed him to
move his mission to Jamrud, an advanced post
within our frontier, which I knew to be safe in any
eventuality as soon as Oavagnari had secured the
Khyberi escort. My motive for this instruction is
obvious. Had relations with the Amir been broken
off without any overt act of hostility on his part, our
public would never have understood the cause of the
rupture, and we should have been placed in a very
embarrassing position. The Amir's policy was to
make fools of us in the sight of all Central Asia and
all India, without affording us any pretext for active
resentment. My object was naturally to force the
Amir either to change his policy, or to reveal it in
such a manner as must make the public a partner
with the Government in the duty of counteracting it.
And I feel thankful to have effected this object with-
out loss of life.

' Thus far I think we have made no false move in
the game, and if Cavagnari succeeds in his negotia-
tions with the Khyberis, we have taken, and the
Amir will (by bad play) have lost, the first trick.

6 The second rubber now opens ; and I think we
begin it with the odd trump in our hands. Ordinary
diplomatic action is, of course, exhausted, and we
must immediately adopt other measures.9

For those other measures Lord Ly tton was fully Mihtary am
prepared; he had already stated what they should SSSSiio
be. His aim was 6by means of immediate com- be adopted
bined political and military pressure, simultaneously
exerted at every point* to secure 'with the least

286 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. TO

possible cost and inconvenience to ourselves, one or
other of the two following results: — (1) The un-
conditional submission of the Amir; or (2) his
deposition and the disintegration of his kingdom.'
Military operations of a certain kind were, he now
recognised, 6 absolutely necessary,' and he at once
sanctioned their immediate preparation. But he
laid stress on the point that ' military preparations
should be undertaken only in support, and not in
supersession of political pressure, for which all the
conditions were now peculiarly favourable.' He
moreover considered ' that we should spare no effort
to convince the Afghan people that our quarrel was
with the Amir, who had deliberately forced it on us,
and not with them-, thus, if possible, isolating the
Amir from his people, instead of uniting his people
with him in a national opposition to our movements.9
He proposed within a month to reinforce Quettah
with 6,300 men and twenty-seven guns, but not to
move a man beyond it in the direction of Kandahar
till experience had shown that the political effect of
so large a force at Quettah itself was not adequate
to effect the requisite pressure in the direction of
Western Afghanistan. While Kandahar was thus
threatened from Quettah, a force of 4,000 men with
twelve guns would assemble at Thull, and from
thence advance and take up a strong position in the
Kurum Valley, thus indirectly threatening Kabul and
Jellalabad. These lines of attack were selected as
including all the advanced positions which the
Government were determined to hold permanently.

The Viceroy proposed that certain political
measures should accompany these military operations.
Major Cavagnari was actively engaged in nego-
tiations with all the Khyber' tribes and with the

1878 PREPARATIONS FOR TVAB 287

Mohmunds with the object of 'promptly and perma-
nently detaching them from the Amir/ With regard
to other tribes, the Punjab Government, under orders
from the Viceroy, instructed its frontier officers to
prepare for the appearance of a British force at Thull
and its immediate advance into the Kurum Valley, by
completing arrangements with the Kururn tribes, as
well as with the Waziris. Lord Lytton also instructed
Major Sandeman to ascertain from the Ghilzais what
they were prepared and able to do ; and ' if proper
hostages were given, and he deemed it safe, to
authorise Major Browne to return with the chief of
the disaffected clan now at Quettah to the Ghilzai
country, and thence report on the conditions under
which this important tribe can be further utilised '
Major Sandeman was simultaneously instructed to
lose no time in concluding arrangements with the
Kakar Pathans for placing under our complete
control the shortest arid most important of the
alternative routes to Quettah which runs through
their country. The Viceroy also proposed to open
direct and indirect communications with the influen-
tial Sirdars at Kabul, for the purpose of convincing
them that our quarrel was with the Amir, and not
with his Sirdars or subjects.

These proposals were telegraphed to the Secretary Policy sanc-
of State on September 26, and acknowledged by Lord secretary of
Cranbrook on October 1 in a telegram despatched September ae
after consultation with the Prime Minister and con-
taining these words :

* Measures proposed in your telegram of Sep-
tember 26 are approved. Further proposals, if any,
should be reported by telegraph.'

It was due to the assistance and courage of the
Khyberis that the British Mission ever reached All

288 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN APMINISTEATJON OH. TO

Musjid, or returned from it in. safety. They thereby,
however, incurred the resentment of the Amir, and
consequently appealed to us to afford them protection
against his revenge.

Sir Neville Chamberlain had assured them ' that
the British Government would send its last soldier
and spend its last rupee before it would allow any
one of them to suffer unavenged the smallest injury
from the Amir or his authorities/ Ali Musjid, in
the meantime, in the heart of their pass, was in the
hands of the Amir's troops, and they offered, as proof
of good faith, to attack it themselves on condition
that we came to their assistance if they were repulsed.
While negotiations were proceeding the garrison of
Ali Musjid was reinforced by the Amir's troops, and
thus placed beyond the power of capture by the
unassisted tribesmen. At the same time the house
of the head Malik of the tribe was burnt by the
Amir's people.

Dealings with The Viceroy considered that this was an injury
which we were pledged to avenge promptly ; that,
moreover, if we hesitated to expel the Afghans from
the Khyber with the tribesmen, the pass would be
irretrievably lost to us, for that the Khyberis m
masse, disgusted at our want of faith, would go over
to the Amir.

He was therefore in favour of placing a regiment
of Guides and a mountain battery from Kohat at
Major Cavagnari's and Colonel Jenkins' disposal, and
intrusting to TIITTI the task of surprising A^ Musjid
and taking it by storm.

Sir Neville Chamberlain, who was in Government
House at Simla and suffering from an attack of
Peshawur fever, was opposed to this scheme, and
on hearing that the Viceroy had sanctioned it the

1878 PREPARATIONS FOE WAR 289

Government at home telegraphed a somewhat alarmed
and reluctant assent. The Viceroy's object was to
convince the tribes of the Khyber at once of our loyal
support, and to expel the Afghans from the fort
rapidly by a coup de main, not as part of our general
military operations, but in order to restore it into the
hands of the tribesmen, who would hold it themselves
against the Amir. The execution of the scheme,
however, was stopped by news of the still stronger
reinforcements of the fort by the Amir, and as
soon as it became clear that it could no longer be
taken by a small force the Viceroy abandoned the
attempt.

With reference to this, in a letter to Major
Oavagnari, the Viceroy wrote: CI feel that the
only awkwardness of our position is in reference to
the Khyber tribes, which your able and successful
negotiations have detached from the Amir ; and that
upon yon must unavoidably fall the delicate and
difficult daily task of minimising to the utmost the
awkwardness of this position.

*I think, first, that you may tell the friendly
Khyberis, without hesitation, that the course of our
quarrel with the Amir may be long or short
according to circumstances, but that the end of it is
certain, and that when the score is finally settled
the Khyber Pass will most certainly not be allowed
to remain in the hands of His Highness, or ever
again to fall into them. It is, therefore, for the
Khyberis to consider betimes their future interests in
reference to this settled determination on the part of
the Kritish Government, even though the enforcement
of it may be long delayed. The result is not a question
of power, for our power as compared with that of
the Amir is overwhelming; it is merely a question

290 LORD LYTTWS INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.YH

of time and convenience. Second, for any injury
meanwhile suffered by individual Khyberis full
compensation should of course be promptly given
them. I should hardly think such individual injuries
to be numerous, for I cannot think the Amir's
authorities will find it in their interests to harass the
Khyberis systematically, nor is it probable that they
will venture far beyond Ali Musjid in any direction
for that purpose.'

Amir's reply On October 19 the Nawab Grhulam Hasan
Octoblr°i90y' returned from Kabul, bringing with him the reply
of the Amir to the Viceroy's letter of August 14.

c From the Amir's answer to my letter announcing
the mission,' writes Lord Lytton, 'which lias now
at last been received (and which, whilst expressing
no desire and fixing no time to receive the mission,
leaves wholly unnoticed the insult publicly offered to
the British Government in the person of its Envoy),
it is clear that, had we boon content to await this
answer at Peshawur, it would have left us precisely
as we were two months before, and still obliged us
either to go on waiting for further answers to further
uninvited communications or else advance without*
permission and be repulsed. In llu* former cam the
mission must have been postponed till the spring,
and during the whole of the present winter the only
practical facts placed palpably before Hie eyes of all
our Asiatic subjects and neighbours would have been
the Amir's public alliance with llussia, his public
hostility to us, and our publicly passives acceptation
of both/

The Viceroy at tliiw time* saw much of the Nawab,
who had arrived from Kabul. According to him
the Amir described the Viwroy an the rn«n* servant
of half a dozen Sahibn in London who coiiHlituto the

The Amir's
view of tho
British
Government

1878 AFGHANISTAN 2 9 1

durbar of a woman, and are themselves practically
the mere servants of a large number of small Sirdars
who call themselves a Parliament, whereas, he added,
6 1 and the Czar of Eussia are kings and can do what
we like.'

Lord Lytton waited with the utmost anxiety the
consent of the Government at home to commence
military operations, for if our troops did not cross
the border before the end of November, the passes
would become impracticable for six months.

Mr. (now Sir) Alfred Lyall was then Foreign
Secretary. He wrote on this subject to the Viceroy
with emphasis. 6 The strongest motives for im-
mediate action appear to be political, and these I
think irresistible, so irresistible that I can hardly
believe any natural impediments could possibly
justify our deferring action until the spring. To sit
idle on the threshold of Afghanistan until next spring
would in my opinion be almost too ruinous a policy
to be even mentioned ; we should lose the tribes, lose
our reputation, and give the Amir the immense
prestige of having defied us for a whole season of
campaigning I cannot believe that the Cabinet
would be even thinking of such a policy.'

The Government of India now asked the sanction
of the Government at home to the following
measures :

1. The immediate issue of a manifesto defining
our cause of offence, declaring our friendly disposi-

tion towards the Afghan people and our reluctance to Government
interfere in their internal affairs, and fixing the sole
responsibility on the Amir.

2, The immediate expulsion of the Amir's troops
from the Khyber, and the permanent occupation of
the entire pass up to Dakka.

ITS

LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH TH

Opinion of

Home

Government

3. The simultaneous occupation of the Kurum
Valley far enough to threaten Kabul and Jellalabad
in that direction also.

4. An advance from Quettah to the neighbourhood
of Kandahar and the annihilation of any force the
Amir can be tempted to oppose to us at that point.

The Government at home, however, did not con-
sider that matters were ripe for taking all the above
steps. They were of opinion that a locus poenitentice
should be allowed to the Amir ; that, before crossing
the frontier, a demand, in temper ate language, should
be made for an apology and acceptance of a per-
manent British mission within the Afghan territory ;
that a reply should be demanded within a time
sufficient for the purpose ; and that, meanwhile, the
massing of troops should be continued.

Accordingly, on November 2 the following ulti-
matum, of which the terms were first approved
by the Home Government, was delivered to l?aiz
Mahomed, at Ali Musjid, a duplicate being scut by
post:

Ultimatum 6 1 have received and read the letter which you

Amir, Novom- have sent me by the hands of my Sirdar. It will be
ber 2 in your recollection that immediately on my arrival iu

India I proposed to send you a friendly mission, for
the purpose of assuring you of the good will of the
British Government, and of removing those pant mis-
understandings to which you have frequently alluded.
* After leaving this proposal long unanswered,
you rejected it, on the grounds that you could not
answer for the safety of any European Envoy hi your
country, and that the reception of a Jlritisli mission
might afford Eussia n pretext for forcing you to
receive a Russian mission. Such refusal to receives a
friendly mission was contrary to the practice of allied

1878 ULTIMATUM SENT TO THE AMIR 293

States, yet the British Government, unwilling to ultimatum

, ' J . ! * b to the Amir

embarrass you, accepted your excuses.

6 Nevertheless you have now received a Bussian,
Envoy at your capital, at a time when a war was
believed to be imminent in which England and
Russia would have been arrayed on opposite sides,
thereby not only acting in contradiction to the
reasons asserted by you for not receiving a British
mission, but giving to your conduct the appearance
of being actuated by motives inimical to the British
Government.

* In these circumstances the British Government,
remembering its former friendship with your father
and still desiring to maintain with you amicable
relations, determined to send, after such delay as the
domestic affliction you had suffered rendered Jitting,
a mission to you under the charge of Sir Neville
Chamberlain, a trusted and distinguished officer of
the Oovennnenl who is personally known to you ; the
escort attached to his mission, not exceeding 200 men,
was much less numerous than that which accompanied
you into British territory, and was not more than
was necessary for the dignity of my Envoy. Such
missions are customary between friendly neighbouring
States, and are never refused except when hostility is
intended.

6 1 despatched, by a trusted messenger, a letter
informing you that tho mission credited to you was
of a friendly character, that its business was urgent,
and that it must prncrocl without delay.

* Nevertheless you, having received my letter,
did not heHitaliO to instruct your antlioriliuB on tlio
frontier to repol the mission by force. For this act
of enmity and indignity to th« Emprc'ftB of India, in
the person of her Envoy, your Liter affords no

294 J-OJRD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vi

Ultimatum explanation or apology, nor does it contain any
to the* Amir angwer to my proposal for a full and frank under-
standing between our two Governments.

cln consequence of this hostile action on your
part, I have assembled Her Majesty's forces on
your frontier, but I desire to give you a last oppor-
tunity of averting the calamities of war.

c For this it is necessary that a full and suitable
apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered
on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank.

* Furthermore, us it has been found impossible
to maintain satisfactory relations between the two
States unless the British Government is adequately
represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that
you should consent to receive a permanent British
mission within your territory.

* It is further essential that you .should undurtako
that HO injury shall be done to the tribes who acted
as guides to my mission, and that reparation shall li?
made for any damage they have suffered from you;
and if any injury be done by you to them, the British
Government will at, owte take steps to protect them.

* Unless these conditions are accepted fully and
plainly by you, and your accnptunce received by me
not later than November 20, f shall be compelled to
consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you
as a declared enemy of the British Oiovernment/ l

On November 5 instructions were sent from
Englandto the Viceroy to the effect that in the event
of no answer, or an unfavourable answer, being re-
ceived to the above message, the Amir must be treated
as had been threatened, and that operations were to-
be commenced on November 21.

of Ifowto in Afglianfatan.

1878 BRITISH TROOPS CROSS THE FRONTIER 295

To Viscount Cranbrook
[Private.] ' Lahore : November 21, 1878.

6 My dear Lord Cranbrook, — Jacta est alea ! The
Amir has not condescended to make any reply at
all to our ultimatum. The latest hour fixed for the
duration of the time within which his answer to it
would be awaited, and if received considered,
expired, strictly speaking, at sunset yesterday, the
20th. For the Mohammedan day ends at sundown.
It was not, however, till 10 P.M. last night that I
received from Peshawur, by telegraph, a message —
which had been delayed in its transmission from
Jamrud by the darkness and defective signalling —
that no communication from the Amir had been
received at our outposts. On receipt of this message,
orders were issued to the generals commanding the Military
Khyber,1 Kurum, 2 and Quettah 3 columns to cross be^lonfl
the frontier and advance at daybreak this morning. I November 21
have since heard from Peshawur of the commencement
of operations in the Khyber, and probably before the
mail leaves Lahore this evening I shall receive some
further information as to their progress. Meanwhile
the delay of the last month has not been wasted,
For last night the negotiations in which I have-
employed it were satisfactorily closed by the signa-
ture of a written agreement between Major Cavagnari
and the representatives of all the Zhyber tribes, in
which the tribes, detaching themselves from the
Amir's authority, bind themselves to place the con-
trol of the pass under the management of the
Government of India, on terms similar to those of
the Mackeson Pass administration. The Mir Akhov
has sent word to the Amir that, if the British forces

1 Browne. 9 Roberts. 3 Biddulph.

Viceroy's
proclamation
to people of
Afghanistan

Viceroy's
despatch,
June 1879

Taking of
All Muajid

296 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION «i. vn

move9 his position in Ali Musjid will be untenable,
and lie and his whole garrison must be massacred
unless promptly withdrawn or reinforced. J3ut, so
far as I can ascertain, the Amir has not made any
response to this appeal/

On the day that our troops crossed the frontier
a proclamation was issued by the Viceroy to the
Sirdars and people of Afghanistan, referring to the
history of the past which had led to the present crisis,
and declaring that the British Government had no
quarrel and desired none with the Sirdars and people
of Afghanistan, and that upon the Amir Sher Ali
alone rested the responsibility of having exchanged
the friendship for the hostility of the Empress of
India.

The campaign is described in a despatch to
the Secretary of State from which extracts are
quoted : —

'The force operating on the Khyber line was
commanded by General Sir Samuel Browne ; whose
instructions were to capture Ali Musjid, expel the
Amir's garrisons from the Khyber, and occupy Lundi
Kotal, Dakka, or such other point as might be found
most convenient at the head of the Pass. . . . ' On
the morning of November 21 he entered the Khyber
and attacked the fort of Ali Musjid.

6 The fire of the fort was well sustained and
directed ; and the defence made by the garrison of
Ali Musjid for several hours was creditable to its
spirit. But the position, having been turned during
the night, was precipitately abandoned by the enemy
with the loss of all his guns, stores and camp
equipage. Several of the fugitives were captured by
our troops, and the remainder were plundered and
dispersed by the Afridis. Sir Samuel Browne met

1878 STORY OF CAMPAIGN 297

•with no further resistance on his inarch to Dakka,
which he held unmolested for some weeks ; but, this
position being found inconvenient for the lengthened
occupation of so large a force, the General pushed
beyond it in the month of December, and occupied
Jellalabad, without resistance; receiving there the
unconditional submission of the local officials, and oocupied
their request for British protection. No attempt was
made by the Amir's army, at any subsequent period,
to resist the advance of the British troops on this line
of operations.'

In a private letter to Lord Cranbrook1 the
Viceroy tells how in the captured camp of Ali Musjid
were found * numerous proclamations by the Amir
calling on all Mussulmans in our service to desert
and oppose us in the cause of their religion. The
prisoners taken in the Khyber had also each a
small pocket Koran, with all the ferocious passages
officially marked for their daily study by order
of the Amir. The Afghan officer taken at Ali
Musjid was by my orders sent to Lahore, where
he is being very well cared for. Sir Neville
Chamberlain interrogated him yesterday. He is
very young — barely twenty years of age ; says his
regiment was entirely composed of boys, being one
of four different regiments recently raised for the
late heir-apparent, Abdullah Jan. He declares that
the Amir's troops in the Khyber were nearly starved.
Asked to what the sudden death of Abdullah Jan
was commonly attributed in Afghanistan, he replied :
" God's judgment on the Amir for forcing every
youth in the country to do military service, to the
great affliction of his parents." It is reported that
most of the other Afghan officers who, escaping

i December 12.

298 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTBATION CH.YII

from All Musjid, returned to Kabul, have been blown
away from guns by the Amir. Overtures from
many quarters have already been made to Cavagnari
for the deposition of Sher Ali. But I have warned
him by telegraph to be most careful to discourage
promptly all such suggestions, as I gather that it is
the possible wish of Her Majesty's Government io
come to terms with the Amir if possible.9

The line to which the Government attached most
importance was that of the Kurum. c The Amir/
Despatch wrote Lord Lytton, * could scarcely fail to percmive
Jane, 1879 ^^ jf ke aUOWed a British force, advancing on this
line, to reach the Shutargardan in full strength,
both Kabul and Ghuzni would remain complutely
at its mercy. It was, therefore, probable thai 1li<*
strongest resistance to our advance would be made
by His Highness at some point in the Upper Kurum
Valley, where his troops would command positionw
of great strength, easy to hold, and very difficult to
attack- It was equally probable that, if Slier Alif«
army were thoroughly beaten here, its defeat would
immediately be felt in the very heart of his* powur,
which must be more severely shaken by the IOHH of a
battle in the Kurum than by a similar disaster in
any other part of his dominions. Our object, there-
fore, in despatching a force to the Kurum, was
to defeat and disperse any Afghan army which
might be found there, and to seize with the utmost
rapidity a position directly menacing Kabul and
Ghuzni, but without advancing beyond the Shutar-
gardan. This force was entrusted to the command
of General Eoberts.'

On the same day that General Sir Samual
Browne entered the Khyber, General Roberta entente!
the Lower Kurum Valley, arid occupied, without

f

1878 STOEY OF CAMPAIGN 299

opposition, the headquarters of the district, replac- Occupation of
ing the Amir's officials by his own He found the urum ey
people of this district willing to submit to his
authority and furnish provisions for the supply of
his troops. Continuing his advance into the Upper
Eurum Valley, General Eoberts there encountered a
large Afghan force, established in a position of great
strength, strongly armed with well-posted artillery,
on the ridge of the Peiwar Khotal, which commands
the valley on one side of it, and the road on the
other, towards the Shutargardan.

English readers are already familiar with the
story of the engagement which then took places but,
for the sake of its great narrative interest, the
following account may be quoted.

1 It was,' wrote Lord Eoberts himself,1 c indeed a formi- Account of
dable position — a great deal more formidable than I had the engage-
expected — on the summit of a mountain rising abruptly up
2,000 feet above us, and only approachable by a narrow, Va
steep and rugged path, flanked on either side by pre-
cipitous spurs jutting out like huge bastions, from which
an overwhelming fire could be brought to bear on the
assailants. The mountain on the enemy's right did not
look much more promising for moving troops, and I could
only hope that a way might be found on their left by which
their flank could be turned. The country, however, in
that direction was screened from view by spurs covered
with dense forests of deodar.'

c The British force was now in a situation
resembling that of Marmont's army at the foot of the
Busaco heights, with the difference that Marmont
had made his first attack and had failed utterly.
Eoberts sent out officers to explore the hills in search
of a path by which the enemy's left might be turned

1 Forty-one Years in India, vol. ii. p. 188.

300 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. ra

and when, to his great relief, it was found, he made
a night march through stony watercourses and over
rough hills to another point upon the ridge occupied
by the Afghans, whence he could outflank their
defences.

' The track (for there was no road) led for two miles
due east, and then, turning sharp to the north, entered a
wide gorge and ran along the bed of a mountain stream.
The moonlight lit up the cliffs on the eastern side of the
ravine, but made the darkness only the more dense in the
shadow of the steep hills on the west, underneath which
our path lay, over piles of stones and heaps of glacier
dvlris. A bitterly cold wind rushed down the gorge,
tixtremely trying to all, lightly clad as we were in anticipa-
tion of the climb before us. Onwards and upwards we
slowly toiled, stumbling over great boulders of rock,
dropping into old water-channels, splashing through icy
streams, and halting frequently to allow the troops in the
rear to close up/

fc Just when everything depended on silence and
secrecy two shots were fired by men of a Pathan
company, whether through accident or as a warning
to tlieir Afghan countrymen lias not been indubitably
proved. The Sikhs whispered that there was treachery
among the Mohammedans ; the pickets in front might
have taken alarm ; yet there was no alternative to
pushing on, and by good fortune Eoberts surprised
the enemy at the first streak of dawn. There was
much trouble in bringing up the regiments before the
Afghans could rally, for it is not easy to handle troops
upon the rugged shoulder of a mountain range, among
ravines and pino forests, at an altitude of 9,000 feet ;
and the nature of the ground can best be appre-
ciated by reading Lord Boberts's description of it.
But when the Afghans perceived that the English had

1878 STOR1" OF OAJkTPAIGN 301

crossed the ridge at a point which, threatened their
retreat, they hastily evacuated a position of
"enormous natural strength," abandoning guns,
waggons, and baggage/ l

6 The limit,' wrote Lord Lytton, 6 assigned to the
advance of our Kurum force was thus speedily
reached and secured without further resistance.

6 In the month of January 1879, General Eoberts
entered the adjoining valley of Khost, where he com-
pletely routed an assemblage of hostile tribes. But,
as the permanent occupation of Khost formed no
part of our political programme, this effectual
chastisement of the inimical tribes, who had col-
lected in that district, was promptly followed by the
withdrawal of our troops after the accomplishment
of the reconnaissance to which the movements of
General Eoberts were restricted by his original
instructions,

6 General Biddulph, entering Peshin on Nov. 26,
found it already evacuated by the Amir's troops.
The small, but important, district of Sibi, lying upon
our line of communications close to the Belooch
border, had, in the meanwhile, been occupied by a
British detachment on the 23rd of the same month.
Much political inconvenience had been caused by
the interposition of this small Afghan district in the
midst of Belooch territory, with which it is almost
entirely surrounded ; and we had, therefore, deter-
mined upon its permanent withdrawal from the
jurisdiction of the Kabul authority. In December,
General Stewart reached Peshin, and, assuming com-
mand of the Kandahar Expeditionary Force, crossed
the Khojak Eange with considerable difficulty, owing
to the want of roads. On January 9 he entered

1 Sir Alfred LyaJL

302 LOETD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH vn

Viceroy's
Despatch,
Jane 1879

Surrendei of
Kandahar,
January 9,
1879

Success of

military

operations

Kandahar. The town surrendered quietly. On
January 21, his cavalry had pushed as far as
Khelat-i-Ghilzai, while Girishk, on the Helmund, was
occupied by a force under General Biddulph. There
was one cavalry skirmish at Taktapul on the road to
Kandahar ; and the marauding clans in this neigh-
bourhood have given some trouble. But otherwise
it may be said that Kandahar and all the adjacent
districts passed into our hands without resistance,
and with little or no appearance of national resent-
ment at their occupation by British troops.

c Thus,, within two days after the declaration of
hostilities, the affront received by Sir Neville
Chamberlain's mission at Ali Musjid was appro-
priately avenged on the spot where it had been
offered. "Within two weeks after the same date, the
passes of the Khyber and the Kurum were completely
in our hands, and the Amir's troops swept clean
beyond the range of our operations. Not long after-
wards, Jellalabad and Kandahar were occupied with-
out resistance ; and before the end of January (that
is to say, in less than three months from the com-
mencement of the campaign) the greater part of
Southern Afghanistan, from the Helmund to Khelat-
i-Ghilzai, had passed into the possession of the British
Government. The rapid success of our military
operations completely confirmed the calculations on
which they had been based, The Amir's standing
army was defeated and dispersed beyond all
possibility of recovery; yet not a single one of his
Sirdars or subjects had risen to the rescue of his
power. His towns opened their gates without
remonstrance to our summons ; their authorities
readily responded to our requirements ; and their
inhabitants evinced no disposition to forfeit the

1878 STOEY OF CAMPAIGN 303

pecuniary advantages they derived from the presence viceroy's
of our troops. Nor was the neutrality of the inde-
pendent tribes less satisfactory than the indifference
of the Afghan people. Prom these tribes our con-
voys and outposts, especially along the Khyber Pass,
were exposed to occasional annoyance : but, gene-
rally speaking, all the long lines of communication
between our advanced positions and their bases in
British India were far more facilitated by the
friendly co-operation, than impeded by the occasional
thefts and assaults, of the tribes along the tracts they
traversed. Three years ago no European British
subject could approach the Khyber Pass without
serious personal danger. But, during the greater
part of the recent campaign, telegraphic communica-
tion from Peshawur to Jellalabad was maintained
along the entire length of this Pass with but little
trouble and few interruptions.

6 In the meanwhile the anticipations of the Govern-
ment as to the probable political effects of successful
Tm'1it-.fl.ry operations on the Kurum line had been
justified with startling rapidity and completeness/

On November 30, a messenger from the Amir
arrived at All Musjid and delivered a letter from the
Amir in reply to the Viceroy's ultimatum. It was The Amir's
reported that the letter, dated the 19th, had been
brought as far as Bosawal (on the road from Kabul
to Jellalabad), when the bearer, hearing of the fall
of All Musjid and the dispersion of the Amir's force
in the Khyber, had returned with the letter to
Kabul. The Amir was very angry with him for
bringing back the letter, which he then dispatched
to the care of his postmaster at Jellalabad with
instructions to forward it to our outposts. Major
Cavagnari had the impression that the letter finally

304 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.TII

received by him had been written by the Amir
subsequent to his knowledge of the fall of Ali Musjid,
and in substitution of the original letter given to the
messenger, which had been written in a haughtier tone.
The letter as it was received, however, was a virtual
rejection of all the three conditions specified in the
ultimatum. It contained no apology for the affront
given to the mission of Sir Neville Chamberlain.
With regard to the question of a permanent British
mission the Amir gave a grudging consent to a
temporary British mission, the numbers of which
should be dictated by himself, and he did not under-
take to abstain from injuring the Khyberis who had
been friendly to us, but alluded to this condition in
terms of complaint and criticism.

The letter was regarded by the Home Grovern-
ment as evading all the requirements of the Viceroy's
letter to him, and as impossible of acceptance even
if it had been received before November 20. The
Viceroy was accordingly authorised, if a suitable
opportunity occurred, to reply to the following effect :
That the British Government had every desire to
be on terms of peace and intimate friendship with
the Government and people of Afghanistan, but
that there could be no cessation of hostilities or
negotiation for terms of peace until a clear and
unequivocal submission was tendered by the Amir.
The military operations already begun were not
interrupted.1

On December 19 the Viceroy moved from Lahore
to Calcutta. It was there that he heard of the
flight of Sher Ali, and the release by him of his
imprisoned son, Yakub Khan.

Writing on the 24th Lord Lytton says: cMy

1 Narrative of Events in Afg7iamistan.

1878 STORY OF CAMPAIGN 305

latest information received, three days ago, on my Flight of
way is that on receipt at Kabul of the news of
General Roberta's victory at the Peiwar Khotal, the
Amir's authority instantly collapsed, and the re-
mainder of his army began to desert en masse.
Thereupon he apparently decided to release Takub
Khan ("that ill-starred wretch," as he calls him in
his last letter) and to fly into Russian territory, in
company of the three remaining officers of StoletofTs
mission. With this information a pensioned Ressaldar
has reached Jellalabad, now in our hands. The
Ressaldar had been furnished by the Amir with a
letter stating that, on the advice of his Sirdars, he
(Sher All) was proceeding to St Petersburg to lay
his case before " Congress '' ! and that any com-
munication we might desire to address to him would
be considered there (at St. Petersburg) . . . The
Ressaldar adds that he asked Yakub also to give
him a letter, but that Takub replied, " The letter
given you by my father will suffice."'

Between the time when General Stoletoff left
Kabul in the middle of August and the flight of the
unfortunate Amir after the fall of Ali Musjid and the
storming of the Peiwar Khotal in December, the cor-
respondence between Afghanistan and the Russian
authorities had been constant.

Soon after leaving Kabul, Stoletoff wrote from
Tashkend to the Amir's foreign minister a letter
designed to strengthen the Amir's resolution to hold
out against British influence : ' I hope that those who
want to enter the gate of Kabul from the east will see
that the door is closed, then please God they will
tremble.' In October he wrote again, asserting that
he was ' busy day and night ' in the Amir's affairs,
and that his € labours were not without result/ c The

306 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. TH

great Emperor is a true friend of the Amir's and of
Afghanistan, and His Majesty will do whatever he
may think necessary.'

Sher Ali himself wrote to General Kaufmann
after the refusal of passage to Sir Neville Chamberlain's
mission, asking for Eussian help in the approaching
crisis. With this letter was enclosed one to the Czar
appealing for c friendly assistance.'

The Bussians These letters were acknowledged on November 4

refuse to help by General Kaufmann in a spirit which must have

sher Ali cauae(j gher AH bitter disappointment. He had heard

that the English wanted to come to terms, and he

advised the Amir as a friend to make peace with them.

Letter from On November 26 General Kaufmann wrote to

general fa& Eussian General Eazgonoff at Kabul: 'The

Kaufmann, n -i i *•

November 26 Amir knows perfectly well that it is impossible for
me to assist him with troops in winter, therefore it
is necessary that war should not be commenced at
this unseasonable time. If the English, in spite of
the Amir's exertions to avoid the war, commence it,
you must then take leave of the Amir and start for
Tashkend, because your presence in Afghanistan in
winter is useless, Moreover at such a juncture as
the commencement of war with Afghanistan you
ought to come here and explain the whole thing to
me, so that I may communicate it to the Emperor.
This will be of great benefit to Afghanistan and
Eussia.'

On December 8 the Amir addressed to General
Kaufmann a renewed appeal on the ground 6 of the
old friendship, and the recent alliance concluded
through General Stoktoff on the part of His Imperial
Majesty. . . . Should any harm or injury, which
God forbidj befall the Afghan Government, the dust
of blame will certainly settle on the skirt of His

Amir to
General

1878 PLIGHT OF SHER AL1 307

Imperial Majesty's Government/ A simultaneous Amir to
letter was sent to Mirza Muhammad Hassan Khan, KaSSwnn
who had been deputed with General Stoletoff, in
which the Amir begged that 32,000 troops of Tash-
kend should be sent to Afghan Turkestan, troops
6 which General Stoletoff told me in your presence
were ready and would be despatched whenever I
required them '

Before leaving Kabul, on December 13, the Amir
addressed a letter to the officers of the British
Government in which he informed them that he
departed with a few attendants to lay the whole
history of the transactions with the British Govern-
ment before the Czar of Eussia at St. Petersburg.

He also proclaimed the cause and purpose of his T^ Amir's
departure to his own subjects in a firman dated
December 22, addressed to the Governor of Herat
and other notables there : ' We have received/ said
the Amir in his firman, c letters from the Governor-
General and from General Stoletoff, who, being with
the Emperor at Livadia, writes to us as follows:
" The Emperor considers you as a brother, and you
also, who are on the other side of the water (that is
to say the Oxus), must display the same sense of
friendship and brotherhood. The English Govern-
ment is anxious to come to terms with you through
the intervention of the Sultan, and wishes you to take
his advice and counsel. But the Emperor's desire is
that you should not admit the English into your
country ; and, like last year, you are to treat them
with deceit and deception until the present cold
season passes away ; then the will of the Almighty
will be made manifest to you — that is to say, the
Russian Government having repeated the Bismillah,
the Bismillah will come to your assistance." '

308 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. vn

LordLytton's Lord Lytton comments upon this document : ' I
the fiman have seen the letter from General Stoletoff to which
this firman refers. I have read it not once or twice
only, but several times, with the greatest of care ; and,
incredible as it must seem, I am bound to say that
the firman accurately reproduces the substance of it,
though the firman does not do full justice to its
remarkable phraseology. I distinctly remember the
advice given in that letter by General Stoletoff to
Sher Ali, and it was this. That Sher Ali should,
if possible, incite to rebellion against the Queen's
authority Her Majesty's subjects on the other side
of the Indus ; but that, if he were unable to do this,
then he should send to the Government of India an
emissary possessing the tongue of a serpent and full
of deceit, who might with sweet words perplex our
minds and induce us to suspend hostilities till the
spring, as Bussia could not send troops into Afghani-
stan during the winter. The firman, therefore, is a
true statement. But, if it be a true statement, what
then is the true meaning of its allusion to "last
year " ? cc Like last year, you are to treat them with
deceit and deception until the present cold season
passes away." What does this mean ? Why, it can
have but one meaning, and that meaning is plain.
It means this. " The advice we give you now is the
same as the advice we gave you last year, and on
which you then acted so successfully at the Peshawar
Conference. You must do now what you did then —
engage the British Government in a deceptive and
abortive negotiation in order to gain time." '

Eecapitulating the conclusions which the evidence
of Eussian intrigue with Afghanistan had left on his
mind Lord Lytton says, * I affirm that Eussian inter-
ference in Afghan affairs did not commence with the

1878 CAUSE OF THE WAB 309

Russian mission to Kabul, and that it did not cease
with the withdrawal of that mission. I affirm that
Sher Ali had ceased to be the friend and ally of the
British Government, and that for all practical purposes
he had become the friend and ally of the Russian
Government, at least three years before I had any
dealings with His Highness or any connection with
the Government of India, And, finally, I affirm that
the real and the only cause of the Afghan war was
an intrigue of long duration between Sher Ali and
the Russian authorities in Central Asia, an intrigue
leading to an alliance between them for objects
which, if successfully carried out, would have broken
to pieces the empire of British India.'

310 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER VIE

HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KHAN.
KABUL MASSACRE. WAR OF 1879

THE situation of affairs, military and political, at the
beginning of the year 187*9 was uncertain and
obviously inconclusive. The Amir, Sher All, had
fled across the Oxus into Eussian territory, where the
Eussian Government found his presence embarrassing,
and where he received from General Kaufmann a
series of letters which must have finally dispelled
any hope he may still have retained of receiving
Eussian aid. He was dissuaded from continuing his
journey to St. Petersburg, and advised to make
friends with the English and return to his own
kingdom. His unhappy life, however, was drawing
Death ,ot to a close. He never left Mazar-i-sharif. and died

Sher All,

February 21, there on February 21.

Tn the meantime the English armies were station-
ary at the points up to which they had advanced, at
or near Jellalabad on the line towards Kabul ; on the
Shutargardan ; and at Kandahar. To push on further
into the interior of Afghanistan would have necessi-
tated the occupation of a wider area than was neces-
sary for the policy that the Viceroy had now adopted
under instructions from the Government at home,
with which, on the whole, he concurred. His per-
sonal opinion inclined towards the expediency of
disintegrating Afghanistan; but he was aware of

1879 DEATH OF SHEK ALi 311

the grave reasons that existed for terminating the
war speedily, and he was willing to persevere in
attempting to carry out the established programme
of maintaining a strong independent kingdom. In
writing on the subject to Lord Cranbrookhe noticed,
however, one argument against this policy, which
may here be mentioned in his own words, because it
has even now force and applicability :

c The primary condition of a strong independent objections to
Afghanistan is a strong independent Afghan ruler
Granting a perennial supply of such rulers, it is im-
probable that an energetic, able, Asiatic prince of
independent character will be free from ambition.
The ambition common to all energetic Asiatic princes
is of a military, territorial, and not very scrupulous
character. Would the aspirations of such a ruler be
in harmony with the necessarily conservative char-
acter of our own position and policy in the East?
Would he not always be a disturbing element?
Would not Afghanistan, administered by such a ruler,
tend more and more to become a nfri1it.fl.Ty State,
held together by armed power ? Would not the
ambitious, energetic, and not over-scrupulous ruler
of such a military State find, in the long run, his
best account in alliance with the ambitious, energetic,
and not over-scrupulous Government of such a
military empire as Russia, rather than in alliance with
a Power so essentially pacific and sensitively scrupu-
lous as our own.' l

Lord Lytton nevertheless spared no pains in
directing all his efforts towards reconstituting the
country under some successor of Sher All upon the
plan which he described in another letter :

c First,' he said, c we want to effect a permanent

1 To Lord Cranbrook, January 10, 1879.

312 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vin
i

Conditions on settlement of our relations with Afghanistan on such
relations with conditions as will adequately secure the three main

fftSay objects of the war, namely (a) the punishment of
established Sher Ali5 (6) the permanent improvement of our
present frontier, and (c) the establishment of para-
mount political influence over all the Afghan terri-
tories and tribes between our present frontier and
the Oxus. Secondly, we want to do this as speedily
as we possibly can, so as to avoid the indefinite
prolongation, and possible extension, of hostilities,
with all their attendant military risks, political
embarrassments, and financial difficulties.9 . . . 'But,'
he added, 'we cannot close the Afghan War satis-
factorily, or finally, without an Afghan Treaty ; we
cannot get an Afghan Treaty without an Afghan
Government willing to sign, and fairly able to maintain
it. It is only, therefore, in the early establishment
of such a Government that we can find a satisfactory
solution to our present difficulties. Its early esta-
blishment mainly depends on our own policy ; and we
must, I think, be prepared to do whatever may be
necessary on our part to promote and maintain the
existence of such a Government at Kabul.9 1

The Viceroy's main object, therefore, was to find
some capable ruler with whom he might treat. The
heir-apparent to Sher All's kingdom was his son
Takub Khan, who had as yet made no reply to some
tentative overtures from the British Government ;
he naturally assumed so long as his father was alive
an attitude of hostility towards the English invaders,
and his power to conciliate the powerful Afghan
tribes and to establish his authority was at the time
exceedingly questionable. Under these circumstances
his abdication and flight seemed for the moment not

1 January 30. 1879.

1879 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KHAN 313

improbable ; and Lord Lytton contemplated, in such
a contingency, the alternative of opening corre-
spondence with Wali Mahomed Khan, brother of Sher
Ali, who was supposed to be a man of personal
influence and capacity. It was hardly to be expected,
however, that Wali Mahomed, as the English nominee,
could be strong enough to bring back under his
authority at Kabul either Herat or Kandahar, and in
submitting this project to the Secretary of State, by
whom it was provisionally approved. Lord Lytton
warned the Ministry that it might lead to the dis-
integration of Afghanistan. But before any step
had been taken to act upon this alternative, it was
thrown aside upon the receipt by Major Oavagnari
of letters in which Takub Khan acknowledged and
amicably responded to the overtures that had been
made to him, and announced his father's death in
the following terms :

6 1 write in accordance with former friendship, to Latter ir«a
inform you that to-day, Wednesday the 4th of Eabi- *£*^
ul-awal (February 26, 1879), a letter was received by j^gj* of
post from Turkestan announcing that my worthy and
exalted father had, upon Friday, 29 Safar, obeyed
the call of the Sununoner, and throwing off the
dress of existence, hastened to the region of the
divine mercy. Since every living being must relin-
quish the robe of life, and must drink the draught
of death, I remain resigned and patient under this
heavy calamity and misfortune. As my exalted father
was an ancient friend of the illustrious British Govern-
ment, I have out of friendship sent you this
intimation." 1

This letter was suitably acknowledged, 'and
Major Oavagnari was authorised to communicate

1 Narrative of Events in Afghcwistm.

314 I'OBD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. TOT

the conditions on which the British Government were
willing to make peace,

These conditions the Viceroy had borne in mind
from the beginning of the campaign, and as soon as
the flight of Sher All had left Yakub Khan in posses-
sion of the throne of Kabul, Lord Lytton had referred
them to the Secretary of State as the basis of a treaty
of peace, should Yakub Khan make any advances in
the direction of a settlement with the British Govern-
ment ' Were negotiations opened with Yakub,' he
wrote on December 24, 1878, 6I would offer to
restore Kandahar at once, and eventually Jellalabad,
on condition of a Treaty giving formal recognition to
tlie permanent withdrawal from the Kabul authority
Khan Of peshin and Sibi, which I would give to Khelat,

the Kurum, the Khyber and all the Mohammedan
and Shinwari tribes of the other passes debouching
about Dakka. The Peshin Valley is important,
because it is the great granary of Quettah, and also
because it commands the Khojak and is the debouch
of the Thull Ohetiali, the best alternative route to
Quettah. The Khyber we are pledged to retain, and
its importance is obvious. But the tribes would
remain independent, our relations to them being
similar to those we now hold with the other tribes
along the Derajat. The Peiwar Khotal is of supreme
importance, commanding, as it does, the approaches
to Kabul, Jellalabad, and Ghuzni, and in my opinion
it should never pass out of our hands. These
territorial arrangements (which would add nothing
to actual British territory), coupled with the admis-
sion of British and the exclusion of foreign agents,
would I think suffice for a satisfactory settlement/
It was on these lines that Major Oavagnari was
authorised to treat with Yakub Khan in January 1879 .

1879 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KI-IAN 315

To the * mtorial condition Yakub demurred :
6 As this is beyond the strength and capacity of the Yakub 's reply
officers of this God-granted Government and is
opposed to magnanimity and friendship, you should
out of magnanimity and friendship depart from this
condition and relinquish the territories of the Afghan
State which you have taken possession of recently ;
you should positively not interfere with them.' *

To the condition of British control of his foreign
relations he submitted willingly.

On the question of British agents he replied :
6 In the event of strong and firm friendship and
harmony always existing between the Government of
Afghanistan and the British Government, the Afghan
Government out of friendship agrees that, in accord-
ance with the desire of the British Government,
several officers of rank, with a proper escort, should
reside on the part of the British Government in the
capital only, which is Kabul, but they must not
interfere in any of the affairs of Afghanistan. This
to last until such time as the British Government
obtains complete confidence in the constancy and
faithful friendship of the Afghan Government. After
that they have the right either to withdraw the
officers, or appoint them permanently, whichever they
choose.' 2

It will be observed that while Takub Khan made
strenuous objection to the cession of any Afghan
territory, he assented at once to the demand, which
his father had at all costs resisted, that he should
receive British agents within his dominions, stipulat-
ing only that their place of residence should be
Kabul. Herein, as it appeared from subsequent in- -
formation, he acted upon the advice of his councillors,

1 Nwrraiwe of Events in 4fghant8t<m. 9 Ibid.

316 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTBATION OH. Tin

Yakut) Khan
invites
Cavagnari
to Kabul,
March 29

who argued that territory once ceded could never be
recovered, whereas the residence of a British Envoy
at his capital might be temporary, and terminable
by a change of policy or circumstances. But Takub
Khan's prompt acceptance of a condition of peace
which contained one of the main causes and objects
of the war may be now thought to have inspired
the Indian Government with too much confidence in
his power to observe it, and to have withdrawn in
some degree their attention from the inevitable risks
which surrounded the position of an Envoy at the
capital of an Amir whose authority could at first
be only unstable and precarious, in the midst of an
armed population unsettled and irritated by foreign
invasion.

The territorial cessions, however, were held by
the Viceroy to be essential to the conclusion of any
treaty., and by his instruction Major Oavagnari
proceeded to insist upon them. In his reply to Yakub
Khan, after stating that his letter had been trans-
mitted to the Viceroy, our representative added that
he regretted to find His Highness, having accepted
two of the preliminary conditions, had substituted
for the third a proposal which his Government was
not likely to accept. This letter was sent by the
hand of Bukhtiar Khan, who was instructed if pos-
sible to obtain from Takub a written invitation to
Oavagnari to come to Kabul and explain the
situation. As soon as this letter was despatched
Major Oavagnari repaired to Lahore to meet the
Viceroy, and discuss with him what language he
should hold to Yakub should the meeting take place.

Yakub Khan's answer to Major Oavagnari's letter,
dated March 29, contained the desired invitation to
the British Envoy to go to Kabul, that 6the real

18?9 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAZUB KHAN 317

concord on both sides might be declared and proved
face to face,' but he still held out on the question of
ceding territory.

On April 9 Major Oavagnari replied that the
British Government would appoint a mission of rani
to proceed to Kabul, with a suitable escort, on receipt
of information from the Amir that the necessary
arrangements for its journey and reception had been
made.

In anticipation of the negotiations, the question
of terms was again discussed between the Govern-
ment of India and the Government at home. On
April 4 the Viceroy telegraphed that, before Takub
Khan accepted in full the bases, he would almost
certainly stipulate for protection and guarantee of
his territory as the treaty would leave it, and
would probably ask for recognition of his heir when
declared, and that, if absolutely necessary for suc-
cess, it was proposed to make the concessions which
Sir Neville Chamberlain had been authorised to offer
to Sher Ali.

The Secretary of State replied, next day, that
Sir Neville Chamberlain's terms were never accepted
by the Cabinet nor communicated to the Amir ; that
circumstances had entirely changed, and that we had
protected ourselves ; that the Government agreed to
a subsidy and qualified recognition of Yakub's heir,
but that they were entirely adverse to any guarantee
of Afghan territory.1

On April 6, the Viceroy telegraphed to the
Secretary of State as follows :

6 Please telegraph views of Cabinet on following Terms of
substance of treaty to be negotiated with Takub
First two articles formal. Third, amnesty for assis-

1 Nwratwe of Events m Afghanistan.

318 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cH.vni

tance to us during the war. Fourth, Amir agrees
to conduct his foreign relations in accordance with
advice and wish of British Government, will enter
into no engagements or war with foreign States
without concurrence of British Government. Fifth,
qualified recognition of heir. Sixth, permanent
British Eesident at Kabul (according to Yakub's
suggestion) and right to depute agents to Herat and
other frontier places. Seventh, their safety and
honourable treatment guaranteed by Amir. Eighth,
right to garrison Herat whenever we deem it neces-
sary for frontier protection. Ninth and tenth, com-
mercial facilities, protection of traffic, adjustment
of duties, selection of open routes. Eleventh, tele-
graph, line. Twelfth, restoration of Kabul territory
now in our possession excepting Kurum, Fishin, and
Bibi, as in draft proclamation. Amir renounces
authority over tribes and passes mentioned in
proclamation. Thirteenth, secures payment by
Amir of customary allowances to certain special
Sirdars. Fourteenth, subsidy to Amir, amount not
yet Nettled.'

All the foregoing articles were approved by the
Cabinet except the eighth as to Herat, the prudence of
which was questioned; on the other hand, the in-
clusion of power to occupy Kandahar was suggested.

The Viceroy continued to urge, with regard to
the fourth article, that if the Amir was willing to place
his foreign relations entirely in our hands he should
in return be guaranteed protection from foreign
aggression.

c If there is to be permanent peace and mutual
Crimbrook, confidence between native States, it must be on some

April 10,1871) fu-r |jasis of give am| tafe^ w]xich aoes not leave aH

the advantages wholly on one side, especially if that

1879 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KHAN 319

side be the side of the stronger power. . . . The

i i i n n * or Cranbiook,

increasingly bold and frequent attacks on our Apniio
communications and outposts, to which we are
already exposed by the suspension of our advance ;
the growing impression that we shall in no circum-
stances venture to advance further, and the continued
uncertainty of our future relations with Takub Khan,
are significant warnings of what would certainly
happen if we leave in power at Kabul a Prince un-
reconciled to the results of the war. . . . Our chief
difficulties with the late Amir were due to the
inopportune ambiguity and reserve of the language
held to him by previous administrations on the
subject of guarantees But for such ambiguity there
was then, at least, an excuse which no longer exists.
The British Government might with some reason
hesitate to guarantee frankly and boldly against
foreign aggression a State over whose foreign
relations it has practically no control. But Takub
has already agreed to place his foreign relations
unreservedly in our hands, and the territorial
results of the war will have given us an effectual
material guarantee for the due fulfilment of this
engagement.'

The telegrams which preceded the arrival of this
letter produced their effect, and on April 13 the
following telegram was received from the Secretary
of State :

6 If Takub faithfully conducts his foreign policy Telegram
under our direction, we shall be prepared to support
him against any foreign aggression which may result April is
from such conduct with money, arms, and troops, to
be employed at our discretion, when and where we
think fit/

On April 21 the Viceroy writes : 6 Takub Khan

320 LORD LYTTCXN'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vni

c° nhrd k *s hanging ^re rather vexatiously. Bukhtiar Khan
21 reports that His Highness makes great difficulties
about Oavagnari's reception at Kabul, and that the
batch of councillors whom he lately summoned from
Herat are urging him not to make peace with us on
any terms but those of a reversion to the status quo
ante. All this is quite possible; and if, failing a
satisfactory settlement with Takub, we do not march
to Kabul, the bad effect of our inaction in such
circumstances will, I am persuaded, destroy all the
good effect of our action thus far. I do not, however,
at all despair of a satisfactory settlement with Yakub ;
and my impression is that Buklitiar is exaggerating
the difficulties of it ptiw fte fitire valtrir.9

The continued inactivity of the British force upon
the Zhyber line produced restlessness and howlile
combinations among the tribes. Letters, moreover,
were intercepted from Yakub, inciting the tribesmon
to attack us and promising them support. Partly
on these grounds, and partly for sanitary reasons, it
was decided to advance a portion of the force from
Jellalabad to the higher ground of Gundamuk on
the Kabul road. That place was occupied about
April 14.

On April 24, Bukhtiar Khan, whose reportw
from Kabul had been discouraging, returned to the
British camp . He brought with him two letters dated
April 20 from Yakub Khan to Major Oavagnari. One
of these was merely formal. The other announced
the Amir's intention to proceed himself to the British
camp.

According to the Munshi, Yakub feared to
receive a British mission lest it should undermine his
authority at Kabul, and so compel him to accept such
conditions as the British Government might choose

1879 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKUB KEAN 321

to dictate. There was, moreover, a strong military
party at Kabul averse to peace, and it was doubtful
whether Takub would be able to protect the mission
from insult; even when Bukhtiar Khan arrived at
Kabul, a hostile crowd assembled and urged a holy
war.

The reception of Takub in the British camp
being considered in all respects a preferable arrange-
ment to the deputation of a British mission to Kabul,
as had been proposed, assurances were at once
(April 25) sent to the Amir, promising the most
honourable treatment for himself, escort, and retinue
during such period as he might remain the guest of
the British Government.

This time Bukhtiar Khan was received with great
honour and cordiality at Kabul, and the Amir
himself left his capital on May 3 and arrived at
Gnndainuk on the 8th. He had a following of about
400 persons, and was accompanied by eight notables, May 8
amongst them the Mustaufi and General Daod Shah,
who were to be taken into council, the chief place
being given to the former.

On May 10 Major Cavagnari had his first inter-
view with the Amir, only Mr. W. Jenkins being
present as secretary and interpreter. The discussions
on the essential points of the treaty continued until
May 17. The Amir was very unwilling to give way
about retention or occupation of any part of Afghan
territory, arguing that, because he had come to
negotiate for peace, the British Government should
revert to the status guo ante leWum, and trust entirely
to his promise of friendship without requiring any
material guarantee for good faith. At last, on
May 17, after much fencing, he agreed to the manage-
ment of the Michni and Khyber Passes by the British

322 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION cn.vm

from
Cavagnari,
May 23

Gavagnari's
impressions
rf Yakub

Government, and that the districts of Pishin, Sibi,
and Kurum should be treated as assigned to that
Government, the surplus revenues, after deducting
civil charges, being paid to the Amir of Kabul. In
Kurum the Amir requested, as a personal favour, that
the British administration might only extend to Ali
Khel This was agreed to under limitations deemed
necessary to secure control over the Jaji tribe.'

On May 23, three days before the signing of the
treaty, Major Cavagnari wrote to the Viceroy :

6 Your Lordship will have learned from my late
telegrams that negotiations with Yakub have taken a
favourable turn We shall get a satisfactory treaty
out of him, and the future must decide what sort of
an Amir he will turn out. I am inclined at times to
believe that he is likely to submit to the influence of
the British Eesident at Kabul, but sometimes I fancy
that his intellect is weak, and he certainly is of a
changeable temperament. The Mustaufi has not a
very high opinion of him, though he admits that he
is the best of the Barakzai family. I have found the
Mustaufi very well disposed towards us, but although
he is in. some respects a shrewd fellow, I can't say that
he is very brilliant as regards intelligence. In fact, I
found the whole lot to be pretty much of the ordinary
Afghan stamp, and that avarice and suspicion were
their leading qualities. Their arguments were so
feeble and far from the point that I at once made up
my mind to deal with the case as if it concerned an
ordinary affair connected with border Pathan tribes.
I accordingly arranged that I would visit the Amir
or send for his ministers whenever I thought it
necessary to do so, and that I would only have one
formal meeting at which would be recorded the final

1879 NEGOTIATIONS WITH YAKTJB KHAN 323

decision, whatever it should be. This has saved
much time and unprofitable discussion, and I think
the result will be as satisfactory as could have been
brought about by any other means at our disposal.
. . . Some of the (Amir's) proposals indicate such
a want of knowledge of State business that it is
impfissible not to feel anxious about his ability to
manage the affairs of his kingdom in future. For a
few days I thought he was disposed to feel grateful
for the lenient terms granted him, but the more I see
of him the fainter becomes my hope that this idea
will be realised. . . . The idea that prevailed in
England that Takub Khan is everything that could
be desired has of course made me most anxious to
bring about a settlement with him, and this I may
almost say is an accomplished fact. But I hold to
the opinion that I have always held, that our true
policy is to see Afghanistan broken up into petty
States. I told Yakub Khan that it would be owing
to him that Afghanistan continued on the map, and
that if anyone demanded from him what good he had
gained by throwing himself into an alliance with the
English, he could reply to the above effect.

6 He has a very contemptuous opinion of Persia,
and says that if England would permit him to do
so he will attack Persia and annex the Khorassan
province! , . .

CI doubt whether, even if he wished to do so,
Takub Khan could reach Kabul if he failed to arrange
a settlement with us. This, however, he has from
first to last stated that he will never do. His line
has been that he will either return to Kabul with a
settlement that will please his countrymen, or else
that he will go to India as our pensioner.

6 1 have been able to ascertain that the reception

T 2

324 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH, vni

by the late Amir of Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission
was more nearly coming ofi than many people are
inclined to credit ; especially those who asserted that
it ought to have been well known that the mission
would be rejected, or that with the foregone conclu-
sion that this would be so it was persisted in.

* Sher Ali put the question to Stoletoff, 'who
graphically and pointedly replied, " Two swords can-
not go into one scabbard." *

Signing of On May 26 the Treaty of Gundamuk was signed,

a having "been first explained to the Amir that the
withdrawal of our troops from Kandahar and other
points of Afghan territory to be evacuated could not,
for sanitary reasons, be immediate, an intimation that
was very distasteful to Yakub Khan, who stipulated
that his governors should nevertheless be at once
placed in charge of the administration, and that inter-
ference by British officers should be prohibited.

Telegraphic congratulations were exchanged
between the Amir and the Viceroy on the signature
of the Treaty. His Highness also, in a letter dated
May 30, expressed his satisfaction with the treatment
he had received at Gundamuk and his desire to visit
the Viceroy, to which, however, he could not give
immediate effect, owing to the heat, to the cholera,
and to the anarchy in the interior of Afghanistan to
which he must attend.1

On May 28 Cavagnari wrote to the Viceroy : —

6 It was a great relief to me the being able to
telegraph that the Treaty had been signed, for I
never felt certain what any twenty-four hours might
produce. . . .

* My task now is to endeavour to bring about a

1 Narrative of Events in Afghanistan.

1879 TREATY OF GUNDAMUK 325

satisfactory understanding with the Sirdars who are
in our camp and the Amir. I am now reaping the
benefit of not permitting more chiefs to openly com-
mit themselves to our interests than was absolutely
necessary for our immediate purposes. The conse-
quence is that there are very few that I am concerned
about. In the same way the not having interfered in
revenue matters, and allowing things to continue as
in the old regime, will now be an advantage to us,
for as no change has been made there are no people
howling at us for going back and leaving them once
more to the mercies of the Durani Government. . . .
' In working matters at Kabul, the main object to
achieve will be to convince Takub Khan that he need
have no suspicions about us. I have told him that
our object is to make him strong, and that he never
need fear that the British officers will be intriguing
with disaffected Sirdars, &c., as this would be working
in an opposite direction to that of our avowed object.
Englishmen are no match for Asiatics in intrigue, and
our only chance is by straightforward dealing, and in
showing everyone that we consider Yakub Khan our
friend and are prepared to meet him. Natives, of
course, pronounce this to be a mistake, and say that
we must keep up a faction in Afghanistan in order to
retain a firm hold over the Amir. I doubt whether
there would be much advantage in acting on this
principle. We should endeavour to get on friendly
footing with as many persons as possible, but so long
as our alliance with the Amir lasts everyone should
be openly and discreetly given to understand that we
desire to see our ally's authority strengthened and
consolidated, and not weakened by there being a
faction throughout the country, whose opportunity
for benefiting themselves depended on the rupture

326 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION OH. vm

of our friendly relations with the ruler. Should it
unfortunately happen that Takub Khan breaks his
engagement at any future time, I don't think that the
mere fact of our not having in the meantime kept up
a faction ready for this contingency would ever be
felt to be a disadvantage to us, for so long as we are
believed to have wealth and strength on our side we
shall always be able to count on having plenty of
supporters. It is the knowledge that we possess this
wealth and power that makes Afghans, especially,
join us, and not that they have any feeling of friend-
ship for us or any gratitude for past favours.
Whether Takub Khan can be made to appreciate and
reciprocate the amount of confidence we may desire
to place in him remains to be seen, but I believe the
principle is one worth trying to establish, and I think
there is a better chance of its success than may at
first sight appear likely.9

The Amir left Qundamuk not apparently merely
submissive but satisfied, trustful, and friendly.
Despatch on ' The several articles of this Treaty/ wrote the
GandS0* Viceror> ' were framed in the belief that they fully
July 7, 1879 secure all the objects of the war3 which have already
been explained. The 3rd Article establishes our
exclusive influence throughout Afghanistan, and our
paramount control over the Amir's external relations.
Our obligation to assist His Highness against foreign
aggression is the legitimate consequence of this con-
dition ; and it is required of us not less imperatively
for the security of India than for the independence of
Afghanistan. . But the British Government could not
have undertaken such an obligation if the means of
fulfilling it had not been secured by the 4th Article
of the Treaty, which provides for the residence at
Kabul of a British representative, and for the right to

1879 TREATY OF QUNDAMUK 327

depute British agents, as occasion may require, to Despatch on
all parts of the Afghan frontier. The Amir himself ^SSSf
had requested that our permanent representative July7>1879
should reside at his capital ; and from the opening
of the negotiations he has evinced no disinclination
to the admission of British officers within his do-
minions. . . .

6 Under the 6th and 7th Articles of the Treaty
His Highness engages to take measures for the pro-
tection and encouragement of commerce between
India and Afghanistan. . . . Afghanistan itself is a
country of no great productive resources, but it com-
mands the routes which penetrate into Central and
Western Asia ; and the commercial classes, not only
of that country, but also of those immediately
beyond the Upper Oxus, are largely Indian, or of
Indian descent. The trade of Afghanistan is
principally in Indian hands. . . . The route by
Herat and Kandahar runs through the more open
and fertile parts of Afghanistan, connecting the
important towns of Herat and Kandahar. The
treaty signed with His Highness the Khan of Khelat
towards the close of the year 1876 effected the
pacification of Beloochistan, and re-opened the great
trade route through the Bolan Pass, which has not
since been interrupted. By that arrangement the
commerce of Central Asia, after reaching Kandahar,
is already placed in safe connection with the railway
system of India and the rising sea-port of Kurrachi.
There is already a noticeable tendency to increase in
the number of kafilas now annually passing the
Bolan ; and the merchants of Sindh have always been
among the most industrious and enterprising of our
foreign traders. With proper management,, therefore,
and under a judicious system of transit duties, con-

328 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN AD^NISTRATION CH. YHI
Despatch on siderable expansion may be reasonably expected in

the Treaty of .. , _r or T Ai- • *. j.

Ghmdamuh, the external commerce of India upon this important

My 7, 1879

'The territorial concessions imposed upon the
Amir by the Treaty of Gundamuk are light, and
involve no permanent alienation of any part of the
dominions claimed by his Government. The Khyber
Pass has never formed part of those dominions ; while
the districts of Pishin, Sibi, and Kurum are retained
by the British Government under an assignment. For
the better protection and security of our frontier,
and for the proper maintenance of communications
with our advanced garrisons, which will observe and
command the three principal passes into India, it was
essential that these three districts should remain in
our hands. But we have entertained no projects
for establishing ourselves permanently in the interior
of the country, or for occupying any posts not
absolutely required for the defensive purposes ex-
plained. . . . Accordingly the towns of Kandahar
and Jellalabad are restored by the Treaty of Gunda-
muk to the Amir of Kabul. . . .

c The engagements thus concluded, at Gundamuk,
with the Amir Yakub Khan represent and attest an
important change in the whole condition of Central
Asian affairs. The magnitude of this change will be
best appreciated when our present position and in-
fluence beyond the frontier are compared with what
they were during the greater portion of the preceding
period between the Umballa Conferences and the recent
Afghan War. We do not, however, profess to ascribe
any talismanic virtue to written engagements on the
part of Afghan princes. The late Amir Sher Ali,
throughout the whole period of his reign, was under
a formal treaty obligation to be the friend of the

1879 TREATY OF GUCNTDAMUK 329

friends, and the enemy of the enemies, of the British Despatch ou
Government ; but that engagement in no wise pre- aundanmk,0
vented his adoption of a course which led him into July 7' 1879
inevitable rupture and open hostility with this
Government. We regard the present Treaty rather
as the commencement, than as the confirmation, of a
new and better era in our relations with Afghanistan.
It provides for, and facilitates, the attainment of •
results incalculably beneficial to the two countries
concerned. The character of those results, however,
will, to a great extent, be determined by the steadi-
ness with which the British Government maintains,
and the intelligence with which its local agents
carry out, the policy that has dictated this Treaty :
a policy which has for its object to substitute co-
operation for isolation, and to replace mutual mis-
trust by mutual confidence. Nor do we disguise
from ourselves that the practical value of the Treaty
mainly depends on the character and disposition of
the Amir and his successors. Relations established
with Afghanistan under the most favourable condi-
tions, and with the most promising prospects, may,
of course, be again impaired either by the disloyalty
of Afghan princes or by the alienation of their un-
requited confidence. In either case complications
may arise against which no present precautions on
our part can completely guarantee our successors in
the Government of India. But, though anxious to
deal considerately with the Amir's susceptibilities,
and to take into the fullest account all the reasonable
requirements and legitimate interests of his Govern-
ment, we deem it absolutely requisite that, in
countries like Afghanistan, the power of the British
Government to punish its enemies and protect its
friends should be so generally recognised as to

330 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH, TOI

Despatch on render unnecessary the frequent assertion of it. We
0 have, therefore, been careful to secure, for British.

July 7, 1879 interegts an(j influence in Afghanistan, a position
substantially independent of the personal caprices of
any Afghan ruler ; and for the effectual maintenance
of that position the Treaty provides strong material
guarantees, by the territorial conditions which place
the British Power in permanent command of the
main avenues from India to Kabul.'

Some military authorities regretted that the
territorial conditions of the Treaty had not included
the occupation of Kandahar and Jellalabad. The
Viceroy, however, considered that the means had
been secured for occupying these places without
difficulty at any moment that it might seem to be
necessary, since from the Khojak range beyond
Quettah we were within striking distance of Kandahar ;
while the Kurum Valley up to the Shutargardan Pass
brought us far on our route towards Kabul, and the
direct line through Jellalabad was held by our pos-
session of the Khyber Pass and its eastern outlet at
Lundi Kotal.

General Stewart warmly advocated the abandon-
ment of Kandahar, as did also Major Sandeman,
our political agent at Quettah. According to the
arrangements, however, made with the Amir, our
troops were to remain at Kandahar till the autumn.

From. Lord Lord Salisbury, writing on May 23 to the Viceroy,

***& ' 'I cannot allow the conclusion of this affair
to pass without warmly congratulating you on the
great success you have achieved and the brilliant
qualities you have displayed. To my eyes the wise
constraint in which you have held the eager spirits
about you is not the least striking of your victories.
. . . The great military success has done us yeoman's

1879 TREATY OF GUNDAMJK 331

service in negotiating with Eussia ; and I tope that
the moderation of your terms will be of no small
utility at Constantinople.'

The approval of the Prime Minister was not less
warmly expressed. Lord Beaconsfield wrote at the
close of the parliamentary session this year: 6I From Lord
write to you now at the end of a long and laborious
campaign, which has terminated triumphantly for
Her Majesty's Government. It is not merely that
our external affairs figure well in the Queen's Speech,
that not a single Russian soldier remains in the
Sultan's dominions, that, greatly owing to your
energy and foresight, we have secured a scientific
and adequate frontier for our Indian Empire, and
that our South African anxieties are virtually closed ;
but we have succeeded in passing some domestic
measures in spite of factious obstruction of first-
class interest and importance — notably our Army
Discipline Act, a measure of magnitude and gravity
equal in range to these great measures, and our
Irish University Act, a question which had upset
two administrations. Although we had entered " the
sixth year of our reign," our parliamentary majority,
instead of diminishing, has increased, and, notwith-
standing the rumours which may reach you, I see
no reason, scarcely a right, to dissolve Parliament,
though this, of course, must depend on circum-
stances.

c . . . Whatever happens it will always be tome a
source of real satisfaction that I had the opportunity
of placing you on the throne of the Great Mogul,'

This letter affords a curious illustration of the
instability of Oriental politics and of Parliamentary
Governments. Before it reached Lord Lytton the
whole framework of the political settlement of

August 7

332 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. Tin

Afghanistan, as ratified by the Gundamuk Treaty,
had been dislocated by the massacre of Cavagnari,
his staff and escort; and six months later the
majority in the House of Commons had been trans-
ferred from the Conservative to the Liberal party,
who came into office upon a triumphant denunciation
of Lord Beaconsfield's entire foreign policy, particu-
larly in Turkey and Afghanistan.

Approval of The despatch from the Government of India on
Government, the terms of the Gundamuk Treaty was acknow-
ledged by the Secretary of State on August 7, 1879.
Her Majesty's Government cordially approved the
whole convention, with especial advertence to the
clause providing for a British Eesident at Kabul, as
an important point of policy that had been finally
gained, and as a measure full of promise for the con-
solidation of friendship between the two countries.

Acknowledgment having been made of the
loyalty manifested by the native princes of India
throughout the crisis, of the valuable aid rendered
by the Khan of Khelat, and of the services of the
various political officers, and of Major Cavagnari
and Major Sandeman in particular, the despatch
ended in these words :

6 1 have only, in conclusion, to express the deep
interest with which Her Majesty's Government have
perused the clear and able exposition of the policy
of the Government of India in connection with
recent Afghan affairs which is contained in your
letter, No. 160, of July 7, and their cordial approval
of the proceedings of your Excellency in Council
throughout the critical period which is now closed.
In carrying out, from time to time, their wishes and
instructions, your Excellency and your colleagues
have displayed uniform discretion and judgment, and

1879 TREATY OF GUNDAMHE 333

an accurate appreciation of the object essential to be From?e£e:
attained- Her Majesty's Government confidently August 7 * e§
believe that the policy embodied in the Treaty of
Gundamuk, to which your Excellency personally has
so eminently contributed, will, if pursued consistently,
secure both British and Afghan interests, and pro-
mote the stability and peace of the Empire.'

The policy of the Indian Government was
warmly supported by the Government at home, not
only in private letters and despatches, but also on
the public platform and in the House of Commons.

As soon as the Treaty of Ghindamuk was con-
cluded, the Amir Yakub Khan returned to Kabul,
there to prepare for the reception of the British
Envoy,, while Major, now Sir Louis, Oavagnari, who
had been appointed as Her Majesty's 'Envoy and
Minister Plenipotentiary' at the Court of Kabul,
joined the Viceroy at Simla, there to confer with him
as to the character and functions of the mission.

The following letter to Lord Cranbrook shows
how confidently both the Viceroy and the appointed
Envoy looked forward to the success of the mission :

To Viscount Cranbrook

(Private.) ' Simla : June 23, 1879.

My dear Lord Oranbrook, — A thousand thanks
for your letter of May 27. Major Cavagnari is now
with me ; and from all I learn from him and other
sources of information, I think you need be under
no anxiety about the satisfactory execution and
results of the Kabul Treaty, or any troubles in
Afghanistan consequent on the withdrawal of our
troops. I think the Kabul Treaty must be regarded,
not as a conclusion but as a commencement. I
would not say this, and do not mean it, in any

334 W>KD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. Tin
To Lord alarming sense, But the new Treaty is rather the

Gronbrook, . ax. A- ^ . J,J n

June 23 inauguration than the crowning result of a sound
and rational policy. Persistence in this policy
ought, amongst other good results, to relieve India
for many years to come from the curse of incessant
Eussian panics, and give to us all round our im-
mediate border a degree of quiet and security
hitherto unknown. But for all this we must look,
not to any talismanic value in a piece of paper
signed with Kabul, but to the steadiness of the
Government and the intelligence of its agents in
developing, day by day, the good relations now
established with the Amir, confirming the confidence
and training the character of His Highness, and
convincing his people and himself that their best
interests are inseparable from ours. For this the
opportunity is open and the facilities are great. The
Afghans will like and respect us all the more for the
thrashing we have given Sher Ali and the lesson we
have taught to Russia. Throughout this part of the
world, and I dare say throughout the rest of it, a
generous enemy is preferred to a frigid or sneaking
friend. . . . The Afghan people certainly do not view
us with any ill will; whilst, so far as can be judged
from deeds as well as words, Yakub thoroughly
realises the advantage of our alliance and is re-
solved not to forfeit it by misbehaviour. He has at
Cavagnari's suggestion restored to favour and office
theMustaufi who had been disgraced and imprisoned
by his father, and whom he has now appointed his
finance minister. It is also on Oavagnari's recom-
mendation that he has appointed General Daod
Shah his Oommander-in-Ohief, and this he has done
with a graceful alacrity which appears to have made
a most favourable effect upon all concerned. As these

1879 TREATY OF G¥NDAMUK 335

two men now attribute their appointments to our TO Lord
influence, we may reasonably assume that their own
influence at Kabul will not be anti-English. To
Wall Mohamed, whom he had threatened to impale
whenever he caught him, the Amir has frankly
reconciled himself; and altogether he is carrying
out with a good grace and complete loyalty his
obligations under the amnesty clause, which of all
his treaty obligations must have been those most
distasteful to an Afghan prince. Yakub, by the way,
told Cavagnari that his father had been much misled
by an impression that Lord Lawrence was omni-
potent in England on Indian affairs, and would
never allow us to go to war with him. Cavagnari
improved the occasion by reading to the Amir some
choice bits of Bright's speeches about the c Barbarous
Afghan.9 Altogether I feel no doubt that in the
work now before us solid progress will be made
during the next two years. But the further result
will of course depend upon our successors, both
here and at home; and if they relax their efforts
or reverse our policy, with them must rest the
responsibility of an inexcusable failure/

Sir Louis Cavagnari started on his hazardous
mission with the knowledge that he possessed the starts for
entire confidence, not only of the Viceroy, but of
the Secretary of State, and that in Lord Lytton
he had a warm and appreciative friend. On July 5
he wrote :

6 Dear Lord Lytton, I trust your Lordship will ^om
accept this imperfect attempt on my part to express Cavag
the gratitude I feel for all the favours conferred upon
me since I have had the honour of serving under
your immediate orders.

336 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. ym

From

Oavagnari,

JulyS

Viceroy's
dBSpatoh on
Kabul
mission,
Jan. 1880

'Lord Cranbrook's letter, together with your
Lordship's forwarding it, are prizes which seldom
fall to the lot of Indian, officials, more especially to
one of such comparatively short service as myself,
and they will be valued by myself and my family
more than anything that could be bestowed upon me.'

It was decided that the total number of Sir Louis
Cavagnari's staff and escort should be as small as
possible. The reasons for this decision were given
in a despatch from the Government of India dated
January 7, 1880.

6 It had not been our intention to propose Kabul
for the residence of our representative ; but when
the capital was expressly selected by the Amir him-
self, there were many motives for deferring to the
choice of His Highness and there was no tenable
ground for opposing it. If the Amir felt reluctance
to the establishment of a British embassy at Kabul,
he certainly exhibited no sign of it; he raised no
difficulties, he suggested no impediments, and, while
strenuously combating some clauses of the Treaty, he
expressed, from first to last, no disinclination to
receive the Envoy nor any mistrust of his power to
protect him.

' In these circumstances we deemed it desirable
that the British Besident should proceed without
delay to take up his appointment at Kabul.
Assuming the Amir to be dealing with us in good
faith, the advantage to both parties of early action
under the Treaty was incontestable, while hesitation
or inactivity appeared likely to operate adversely, not
only to our own interests, but to those of the Amir.
This view of the situation was strengthened by
reports received by Bukhtiar Khan, whose letters
warned Sir Louis Cavagnari that the party opposed

1879 CAVAGNAKI'S MISSION 337

to the British alliance were making open overtures Viceroy's
to neutralise the effect of our recent successes3 and jSSJjf011
to render the Amir averse to a liberal treatment of ?iaai?!?'

, , T • *&• 1B*J

those persons in whose interests the amnesty clause
had been framed, and in whose protection the honour
of the British Government was specially concerned.
The Amir himself had expressed to Bukhtiar Khan
his desire for an early meeting with Sir Louis
Cavagnari; and the impression produced by these
letters and messages was that the mission should be
organised as speedily as possible, and that it should
proceed to Kabul without loss of time. This was
undoubtedly the view of Sir Louis Cavagnari
himself, who was at the time at Simla, and whose
opinion on such a point necessarily carried great
weight.

6 The constitution of the Envoy's staff and of
his escort was carefully considered with Sir Louis
Cavagnari at Simla. A strong military escort had
been attached to Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission,
but the duties which this escort was intended to
perform, and the contingencies against which it was
meant to provide, were of a wholly different character.
Sir Neville Chamberlain, carrying with him valuable
gifts for Sher AU, was about to enter the country of
predatory and probably hostile tribes, while the dis-
position of the Kabul Government towards ^ his
mission was very uncertain. Sir Louis Cavagnari, on
the other hand, entered Afghan territory under the
safe-conduct and public guarantee of the Amir, who
had recently been a guest in our camp- Moreover, the
strength of Sir Neville Chamberlain's escort, although
for the reasons above mentioned it was in our opinion
absolutely requisite, had furnished the late Amir
with a pretext for attributing an unfriendly purpose

Viceroy's
deapr+cli on
Kabul
mission,
Jan. 1880

33$ LORD LYTTCXKTS INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vni

to the mission which, that escort accompanied. It
had also been criticised by others, on the ground that
whilst too great for an escort it was too small for an
army, and calculated to provoke an opposition which
no mere escort could overcome. Such criticism,
though inapplicable to the condition of Sir Neville
Chamberlain's mission, would have been relevant
to those which the Government of India had to con-
sider in connection with the embassy of Sir Louis
Cavagnari. If our original plan of .placing British
officers at some points in Afghanistan other than the
capital had not been overruled by the Amir's ex-
press stipulation regarding Kabul, it might have been
expedient to attach to the Envoy a force that would
have rendered him independent of the Afghan
Government for protection against sudden attacks
or local outbreaks. But Sir Louis Oavagnari went9
at the special desire of the Amir, to reside at the
capital of the Amir's country, within the Amir's own
stronghold, and in the closest proximity to the Amir's
own residence. It was well known that the Bala
Hissar was always occupied by the household troops
upon whom the actual ruler believed he could best
rely, and it was recollected that at previous periods
of extreme anarchy and revolt the fort had afforded
a secure refuge to those officers who succeeded in
reaching it. To have required the Amir to entertain
within the Bala Hissar a British escort sufficient for
ensuring the safety of the Envoy in all eventualities,
or to have demanded that these troops should be
allowed to occupy an entrenched position within the
Amir's own fortifications, would have been inconsis-
tent with the whole character of the relations which
Sir Louis Cavagnari's embassy represented; and
compliance with such a demand would have relieved

1879 CAVAGNABTS MISSION 339

the Amir from the greater part of the responsibility Viceroy's

which his treaty guarantees had solemnly affirmed. It 11 nn

is probable, indeed, that a force of this strength and
character would not have been admitted within the
fortress, whilst the objections against placing our
•embassy thus guarded upon the confines of the city
would have been found to be very serious. All
-experience shows that in such .situations the risk of
collisions and misunderstandings is multipled in pro-
portion to the number of British soldiers and camp
followers that are brought into contact with an armed
and excitable population. The dangers to which Sir
Louis Oavagnari considered himself and those who
accompanied him most liable were those of assassina-
tion by the hand of a fanatic, or assault provoked by
•some street quarrel between the soldiers of his escort
and those of the Aniir, and he was therefore
personally desirous that his staff and escort should
be reduced to the most moderate and manageable
dimensions. In accordance with these considerations
the Envoy's suite was restricted to a secretary (Mr.
Jenkins), a medical officer (Dr. Kelly), and a military smte
attache (Lieutenant Hamilton) in charge of a
•carefully picked escort of twenty-five Cavalry and
fifty Infantry of the Guide Corps/

The mission thus constituted left All Khel, in
the Upper Kurum Valley, on July 18, and from the
moment of passing the British border was treated
with the utmost cordiality by the Afghan officials.1

On July 21 Sir Louis Cavagnari received a letter
from Takub Khan announcing the death of Bukhtiar Khan
Khan, who was to have acted as minister to the
mission. This event was unfortunate. Bukhtiar
Khan had an intimate knowledge of c all the threads

1 Noontime of Events *» Afghanistan, p. 78.

340 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.

and shuttles of the Kabul loom,' and his death closed
a valuable channel of information. Considerable
evidence was brought forward later to prove that he
was poisoned by the Amir.

General Kaufmann had sent a special messenger
to the Amir informing him of his return to St
Petersburg, and begging him to communicate with
him fully and freely on all affairs. The Eussian
messenger was detained at Kabul till the arrival of
Gavagnari, who was instructed to advise the Amir,
in a brief but civil reply, to intimate that as corre-
spondence with the agents or representatives of foreign
Governments was incompatible with his present treaty
arrangements, he must request General Kaufmann to
discontinue these communications.

The history of the recent Afghan war includes

two distinct periods, of which the first closed with

the Treaty of Gundamuk. Sher All's dealings with

the Eussian embassy to Kabul had led to his speedy

ruin ; he had been driven from his throne by the

English, disowned by the Eussians, and had died a

fugitive. His son Yakub Khan reigned in his stead,

with a British Envoy at the capital The assignment

of Sibi and Pishin to the British Government brought

our dominion up to the frontier of South Afghanistan,

within striking distance of Kandahar; the cession

of Kurum and of the Khyber and Michim passes

secured for us access, when necessary, into North

Afghanistan. All our troops had withdrawn from

their positions beyond the Khyber on the line of

advance towards Kabul: and General Stewart was

preparing to evacuate Kandahar.

The Government of India hoped that the war
had been successfully ended : instead of which they
were really on the brink of longer, more extensive, and

1879 CAVAGNABI'S MISSION 341

far more difficult operations. For whereas in the
former period the political aim and object of the
invasion of Afghanistan was clear and definite — to
compel the Amir to renounce the Bussian alliance
and to accept specific terms ; in this second period,
now about to begin, we were forced to depose the
ruler with whom, we had just made a friendly Treaty,
to throw the whole of North Afghanistan into con-
fusion by our occupation of the capital, and to stir
up against ourselves the jealous animosity of the
Afghan people. No one regretted the necessity of
this second campaign more than Lor dLytton himself;
it involved all that he had hitherto most strenuously
desired to avoid, and against which he had fought
most persistently in opposition to many of his military
advisers. But the event which brought about this
change was not one which human foresight could
have guarded against or prevented, if the policy oi'
introducing a British Envoy into Afghan territory and
attempting a friendly alliance with the Amir was to
be adopted at all. Had we insisted on the Envoy
being sent to Kandahar or elsewhere in Afghan
territory, the Amir's consent would not have been
obtained, and had we failed at Gundamukto conclude
a Treaty with Takub we should only have been
forced to do then what had to be done four months
later, namely to invade his territory and march upon
his capital.

On July 24 the embassy entered the Afghan
capital and was assigned quarters in the Bala Hissar. M"!* ul*
Its reception was brilliant, while the large crowd
which assembled was most orderly and respectful.

342 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.VHI

From
Cavagnari,
July 24

Proposed
railway from
Bawalpiudi
to the Peiwar

From Sir Louis Cavagnari to Lord Lytton

•Ealul: July 24, 1879.

'Dear Lord Lytton,— My telegram of to-day will
have announced to your Lordship the arrival of the
British embassy at Kabul. Nothing could have ex-
ceeded the hospitable treatment we have experienced
since we left the Kurum frontier, and our reception
here was all that could be desired. I left it to
General Boberts to describe our departure from
Kharatiza, Our marches were very uneventful, and
there is nothing to say about them, except to describe
the various features of the country we passed through.
This my assistants are drawing up, and it will be
submitted in a day or two. I may briefly say that
there is nothing whatever to check the march of
troops from the Shutargardan to Kabul' After
further dwelling on the character of the country, he
adds : ' But it is to be hoped that before we have
another rupture with the Amir of Afghanistan these
tribes will have become good neighbours of ours and
be more likely to side with us than with the Kabul
ruler.

4 What is essential to the perfecting of the Kurum
line is a railway from Rawalpindi to the Peiwar, and
then the line would not only from military and
political points of view be a good one, but it would
become a great commercial route, and quite cut out
the Khyber line.

* Yesterday afternoon, Shahgassi Mahomed Yusaf
Khan (brother of Kushdil Khan, who has been
escorting us) came out to our camp bringing a letter
from the Amir, to congratulate me on the additional
honours I have received, and to inform me of the
arrangements for the reception of the embassy,

1879 CAVAGNASI AT KABUL 343

'At about four miles from the city he met me From
this morning with a troop of cavalry, and shortly
afterwards Sirdar Abdullah Jan (son of Sultan Jan
of Herat) and Moolah Shah Mahomed, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, with some more cavalry, met us.
Two elephants with gilt and silver howdahs were
brought, and the Sirdar and I got into one, while
Mr Jenkins and the Foreign Minister took possession
of the other. I don't occupy much sitting room3 but
the Sirdar was a very fat man and somewhat asthmatic,
and as I had to sit cross-legged I began to think that
the position was not one in which to spend a happy
day, and an hour of it was quite enough for me.

6 Nine regiments of infantry and two batteries of
artillery with some cavalry were drawn up in column
and saluted as the procession passed. As we entered
the gates of the city, the 18-pounder battery (the
Government of India's present in former days to Sher
Ali) fired a salute of seventeen guns. There was not
room in front of our residence, so a guard of honour
of a regiment of infantry was drawn up in a street
at straight angles to the one we passed along, and
saluted. The bands on each occasion that they
played made an attempt at 6 God Save the Queen/
Shortly after we alighted at the residence appointed
for us, the Mustaufi and Daod Shah came and paid
their respects, and conveyed inquiries after our
health on the part of the Amir.

' I paid a formal visit to His Highness at six. He
asked after your Lordship's health, and after Her
Majesty and the Eoyal Family, and expressed con-
dolence about the death of the Prince Imperial. He
showed a fairly good knowledge about French affairs,
and said he supposed the republic would have a
good chance of lasting.

344 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. TUT

Prom 'None of our late friends amongst the Afghan

Sirdars appeared to-day, and I think Bukhtiar Khan
was right in saying that they are treated with scant
politeness. The crowd was numerous but most
orderly and I did not hear an uncivil remark. Many
salaamed as we passed. The soldiers have frequently
asked our people if it is true that they will now
be relieved from forced soldiering. The Persian
(Kashilbach) element have expressed their regret
that we did not take and keep Kabul, and stated
that had our troops advanced to JagdaldSk they
would have risen and killed every Barakzai Sirdar
at Kabul.

6 The pessimists prophesied that we were going to
have trouble between Ali Khel and the Shutargardan,
and that the Amir had not the power, even if he
had the will, to pass us through the territory of the
Ahiaedz^e Ghilzais (i.e. from Kharatiza to Dobandi).
Baclshah l£han, the Ghilzai chief, accompanied us, and
was very friendly,

c To-morrow I intend getting the dismissal of the
Eussian letter bearer, and will talk over (cautiously)
Persian affairs, without disclosing the Cabinet's
wishes until I receive further instructions.

c Tours very faithfully,

6L. OAVAGNABI.'

Three days before the attack on the British em-
bassy Sir Louis Oavagnari wrote : —

From c Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan will arrive here on

the 3rd. It is to be regretted that he does not caxe
to remain any longer from his home, but he is now
rather old for active employment. I doubt whether
he will be of much use, as it is some years since
he has had anything to do with Kabul politics, and

1879 OAVAGNAItt AT KABUL 345

things and people have much changed since he was From
our agent.

6 What I require is a Mohammedan gentleman of
social influence who can be trusted to say and do
what he is told. There are many matters on which
an assistant of this kind can procure information
from sources to which the ordinary news reporters
have no access. If he has local experience he can
weigh the information he receives and give an opinion
worth having as to its value. My difficulty here
has been the loss of Bukhtiar "Khan, who, though not
by any means a pattern of virtue, was just the man
that would have been most useful for the next
six months, and he knew that on the carrying out
of my wishes depended the accomplishment of his
own personal objects. . . .

6 My principal anxiety up to the present has been
regarding the amnesty clause. The Amir has done
nothing and will do nothing opposed to the letter of
the Treaty, but lie shows no disposition to conciliate
or treat generously those persons who had com-
munication with us during the war. There can be
no question as to his perfect right to grant these
men whatever allowances he thinks proper, or to
give or withhold lucrative appointments they are
desirous of obtaining. All that we can properly
contend for is that their persons and private property
shall not be subject to molestation on account of
their connection with us. As a matter of policy, it
would be to the Amir's own interests to treat them
generously, and my efforts are being directed to that
end ; but if he does not follow my advice in this
respect, the strict wording of the amnesty clause
will not enable us to demand what alone will please
these people. On the other hand, if the persons who

346 LOBD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.VIII

, held communication with us, although they were all
Aug. so without exception the 6 out ' party and made over-
tures to us to benefit themselves, are excluded from
the high offices they once held or their personal
allowances are reduced, we shall get the reputation
of having deserted our friends.

'When advising these Sirdars at Gundamuk to
make their peace with the- Amir I gave them the
option of acting according to my suggestions, or else
to become pensioners in India. This is the most
that we can do for them, unless we can insist on
special allowances and appointments being conferred
on them — a course which the Amir would rightly
declare to be interference in his domestic affairs.

'The course your Lordship has pointed out as
the policy to be followed by the British Envoy at
Kabul is precisely what I have been doing. Free
intercourse with the embassy, though not interdicted
by the Amir, has not been encouraged, and people
are consequently afraid to come. I did not expect
it to be otherwise at first, and as the persons most
anxious to come and see me are those who feel
themselves aggrieved, I am by no means in a hurry
to receive them. I spoke to the Amir on this
subject shortly after my arrival, and he assured me
that no prohibition to visit the embassy had ever
been given. I have subsequently spoken on several
occasions to his ministers, telling them that free
intercourse with British officers will be viewed by
the people at large as an indication of thorough
confidence on the part of the Amir. I pointed out
to them that if I wished to carry on intrigue I could
do so in spite of all their precautions, but that the
object of the British Government was to strengthen
the Amir, and that any conversation I should ever

1879 OAVAGNABI AT KABUL 347

hold with his subjects would be to give them advice
calculated to further this object. I argued with Aug. so
them that too frequent or too early intercourse with
Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan and others who are
known to be not too friendly to the Amir might be
misinterpreted by the public of Kabul, and that
therefore I was in no hurry to press the matter,
though I informed them that after a reasonable lapse
of time I should consider it indicative of a want of
trust if some change for the better did not take place.
I also remarked to them that whenever I visited the
Amir no one was ever present in durbar but the
principal officers that he trusts — viz. Sirdar Tahiya
Khan, the Mustaufi, General Daod Shah, and Moolah
Shah Mahomed, the Foreign Minister — and that this
looked as if the Amir did not wish me to even know
by sight the other Sirdars of Kabul. I have no
doubt that in time some improvement will take place.
It is more than likely that the real reason is that the
Amir distrusts his own countrymen a great deal more
than he does us, and fears that they might use to
their own advantage the fact that they were on
intimate terms with the British officers, and make
out that they were no longer dependent on him.

6 When we first came here there was an Afghan
guard over the embassy premises. A few days after
this was removed after a reference to me, but a small
guard was left at the outer gate, and its duty was to
report the names of all visitors and the length of time
they remained at the embassy. I took no notice of
this, but one day I laughingly remarked to the
Foreign Minister that I had heard that the sentry
had to make such reports, but that if this was true
the returns sent in by him to the War Office could
not possibly be correct, as many men who came to

JjTOZQ,

Cavagnari,
Aug. 30

The Amir's
authority
vary weak

348 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMTNISTRATTON oH.vm

see me had to wait a considerable time before I
could see them, and occasionally I had to ask them
to call another day, so that if it was supposed that
the length of time a man remained within the walls
of the embassy indicated that he was closeted with
me, it was a great mistake. The other day the
sentry did attempt to stop a Hindu, coming to see
the doctor, and I made this an excuse for requesting
the removal of this guard. My request was at once
complied with.

* In fact, I have nothing whatever to complain of
on the part of the Amir or his ministers that I can
really lay hold of, though there are many matters I
wish I could influence him about. There is no doubt
that his authority is most weak throughout the whole
of Afghanistan. This is not to be wondered at after
the years of misrule and oppression on Sher Ali
Khan's part. But if he keeps straight with us he
will pull through it, as he derives the same support
from the prestige of an alliance as his father did — a
fact which the British nation never properly appre-
ciated. The difference, however, is that the people
of Afghanistan axe inclined to look to the British
Envoy more than to their own ruler. The Amir and
his advisers, knowing this, wiU not be in too great a
hurry to accept our advice as to administrative
reforms that will benefit the people, lest they should
consider themselves more indebted to the English
than to their own Government. The agriculturists
were always praying for the annexation of the
country by the English, as they had heard of our
light assessments and just rule. But once the late
Amir introduced the system of compulsory enlist-
ment which resulted in the increased numbers of the
standing army which the revenues of the country

1879 CAVAGNARI AT KABUL 349

could not pay, the soldiery also hailed our approach
in the hopes that they would be allowed to return to
their homes. The Sirdar class feel that since the
abolition of the feudal system the Amir is less depen-
dent on them than used to be the case, and there-
fore they never feel safe in their position for twenty-
four hours. The hill tribes, I imagine, are pretty
much as they used to be. The religious element at
Kabul is wonderfully quiet At none of the mosques
has a single word disapproving of the English
alliance been uttered. I cannot hear that there is
any really anti-English party, though there is a very
strong anti-Takub one. I have been quite bewildered
sometimes with the stories that have been brought BUmoUrs
me hinting that no trust should be placed in Yakub
Khan, and that he is only temporising with us.
Though he is not to be thoroughly trusted, any more
than any other Oriental, still if he has any game
in hand I must confess to having not the slightest
conception as to what it can be. His conduct of his
foreign relations is apparently all that could be
desired. His letter to Kaufmann was altered to suit
my wishes, and the most trifling paper relating to
the Oxus frontier is submitted for my information.
It seems almost impossible for him to be carrying on
any secret arrangements with the Kussians, for after
his experience of their late perfidy he can have no
trust in them. . . . Anyhow, whether there is any-
thing in the reports which reach me or not, I have
found nothing tangible in Yakub's conduct to lay
hold of, and I therefore put them down to his enemies'
invention.'

Early in August six regiments of infantry had
arrived from Herat, and alarming reports had reached

350 LORD LYTTOira INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.VIII

From Cavagnari as to their mutinous behaviour. Beferrmg

2ig!1£ari' to this, he continues in the same letter :

6 It was asserted that the Amir got up the ex-
citement about the Herat regiments, but if he did
he did not gain much, for I told his Foreign Minister
that either the troops were in hand and could be
checked in their present conduct, or else that the
Amir had no authority over them. The test I put
to him was that I should go out at once in his
company in the direction where the troops are en-
camped, and that if he would not undertake this
responsibility I would stay within the walls of the
embassy and report that the Amir had no authority
over his soldiers. The result was that the Mulah
went to the Amir, and shortly afterwards returned
and took me out as usual. The next occasion on
which I had to speak plainly was on account of a
fracas which took place between the Afghan soldiery
and some of my escort, when I told the Foreign
Minister that if the Amir could not restrain his men I
would keep mine in their quarters, and I and my staff
would remain at home also, Since then there have
been no more complaints. I must say that whenever
I go out the conduct of the populace is most orderly.
6 1 can't say there is much foundation in the
report that Yakub Khan has been influenced by
Yahiya Khan not to go to the provinces in company
with British officers, except the fact that he con-
templates putting off his trip until his return from
India, as he says he has yet a great deal to do at
Kabul. As I telegraphed, he would like to visit
India towards the end of December or the beginning
of January, and on one occasion when I talked to
him he himself said he would like to see Calcutta.
He frequently alludes to his intended visit, and I

3879 OAVAGNARI AT KABUL 351

hope nothing will occur to make VMTTI change his From
mind. If there is any necessity for it, I don't antici-
pate that there would be any difficulty in my going
to Turkestan or Herat, or sending one of my staff.
I hardly think the Amir has time to make the trip
and get back here before the snows commence ; but
rumour occasionally says he intends going on tour at
the close of the East.

£ There is growing distrust between the Amir and
Daod Shah, but it will be dangerous for Takub at
present to attempt to press the latter too severely, as
the Oommander-in-Chief has a very strong party to
support him.

* Prom what I have seen at Kabul I can quite
understand why Takub Khan preferred to go to
Gundamuk than to receive a British mission here.
He did not wish us to see the rottenness of the state
of affairs for fear that we should increase our
demands. Even now there is a strong desire to
intrigue to overthrow him, but no one will move in
the matter without being sure that we were with them.
A report the other day from the Kohistan (even if
untrue it shows the line of people's thoughts) stated of
that some defaulters of revenue assaulted the col-
lectors, and said that if they brought a letter from
me that they would pay up. I have no doubt that
when these disaffected persons see that they get no
encouragement from us things will settle down, and
if Takub Khan will only adopt a little more con-
ciliation and show his subjects that he is not
going to use our support as a means of grinding
them down, all will go well. I was glad to receive
your Lordship's cipher telegram about pecuniary
assistance, as I have always thought we shall have
to start him clear of his financial difficulties ; but it

352 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH vnr

will be as well to wait until lie fully recognises the
necessity for our assistance, and we can then help
him on conditions favourable to the interests in this
country. Though we do not wish to interfere in the
internal administration of Afghanistan, it would be
well if through our influence the condition of the
people is ameliorated, and that they recognise that it
is owing to us that good times have come. This is,
as I have already remarked, what the Amir does not
want to get into people's minds, as he is particularly
sensitive about being left to rule his country after
his own fashion.'

The letter goes on to say that the Amir was dis-
turbed at the question of the payment of the
Kandahar revenues during the recent administration
of that province under British occupation. Accord-
ing to the wording of the Ghindamuk Treaty,
Cavagnari thought it would be hard to expect the
Amir to pay the cost of the administration during
war out of the revenues realised after peace. He
also adds that the Amir had no wish to maintain the
telegraph line from Kandahar to Pishin, that all he
needed was the existence of a telegraphic communi-
cation between Kabul and India. The letter endw
thus:

6 "We are much too crowded at the embassy, and
if sickness did break out I would request the Amir's
permission to go into camp. I think that a residence
more on European principles of comfort and sanita-
tion should be built, though we are far from being
uncomfortable and have a better residence than the
Amir himself.

'I was a trifle disappointed to see that the
" Times " took no notice of the entry of the embassy
into Kabul, though it printed the telegram sent from

1879 CAVAGNARI AT KABUL

353

the India Office. I am afraid there is no denying the
fact that the British public require a blunder and a
huge disaster to excite their interest! I was sur-
prised at the " Times," as during the campaign and
the negotiations it behaved well.

c Our doctor here has a great deal to do, and I
have recommended the establishment of a dispensary,
which, besides being a great civiliser, provides a
decent excuse for visitors. . . .

' Having now exhausted all my news, I will con-
clude this I fear very long letter by assuring your
Lordship that, notwithstanding all people say against
him, I personally believe Yakub Khan will turn out
to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to
keep him to his engagements.

6 Tours very faithfully,

' L. CAVAGNARL'

This letter gives a vivid picture of the atmosphere
of intrigue and mutual distrust which surrounded the
Afghan Court. The reports that Yakub Khan was
not to be trusted; the growing division between him
and General Daod Shah— the only Afghan who was
wounded in defence of the British residents when
they were attacked ; the suggestion that the hostile
attitude of the Herati troops was in some way
brought about by the Ainir's influence ; his outspoken
discontent at the amnesty clause ; his exclusion so far
as was possible, while holding to the letter of the
treaty, of all those who had befriended us in the war ;
the suspicion shown of any free intercourse on the
part of the people with the British residents — all
these points, read in the light of what followed, seem
to indicate danger ; but they were probably no more
than the natural outcome of the situation, and with

A A

354 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION oH.vm

good luck might have led to nothing. That they
excited no alarm in the mind of Oavagnari himself is
evident. His last sentence is one of confident hope
and good courage, and the whole tone of the letter
is sanguine and cheerful.

On August 31 the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary
of State :

TO the Secre- ' Hearing lately from Oavagnari that the Amir's
August 31 tBl affairs were in a bad way and his position critical, I
telegraphed to him that if the Amir were in serious
difficulties from which he thought His Highness
might be extricated by prompt pecuniary assistance
he should let me know at once, and the money would
not be grudged, conditional on adequate guarantees
for the Amir's right use of it. This is the reply
I have just received by telegraph from Cavagnari :
"Kabul, August 29. Personal. Tour Lordship's
telegram of 26th. Takub Khan will sooner or later
require some pecuniary aid from us. But I would
wish to see him recognise and admit his helplessness
before offering such aid, and then, as a quid pro quo,
obtain from him administrative reforms without
which his Government cannot last."

' Oavagnari is quite right. His telegram, however,
is significant, and I think we must be on the look out
for rocks ahead.9

On September 2 Oavagnari sent his last telegram,
which contained the words ' AH well.' On the follow-
ing day was perpetrated the massacre of this gallant
officer and all his escort.

6 The first news of the catastrophe came to
General Eoberts, who was awakened 'in' his Simla
house between one and two o'clock in the morning
by his wife telling him that a telegraph messenger
had been calling outside for some time with a

1879 MASSACRE OF BRITISH EjSTVOY 355

telegram which, when read, said that three mutinous
Afghan regiments had attacked the Kabul Besidency,
where the Englishmen were defending themselves.
Of all the rumours and stirring news sent up to
Simla during the last fifty years, from the various
fields of war and politics surveyed by an Indian
Viceroy, none have been more startling or more
important than this message flashed from the army
outposts beyond Kurum to the Himalayas.' *

The political officer in the Kurum received two
letters from the Amir., the text of which he telegraphed
to the Viceroy. The telegram reached Simla very
early in the morning of the 5th. ' Kabul, September 3,
8 A.M. Troops who had assembled for pay at Bala
Hissar suddenly broke out and stoned their officers,
and then all marched to the Besidency and stoned
it, receiving in return a hail of bullets. Confusion
and disturbance reached such a height that it was
impossible to quiet it. People from Sherpur and
country round Bala Hissar and city — people of all
classes — pouredinto Bala Hissar, and began destroying
workshops, artillery park, and magazine, and all
troops and people attacked Besidency. Meanwhile,
I send Daod Shah to help Envoy. On reaching
Eesidency he was unhorsed by stones and spears, and
is now dying. I then sent Sirdar Yahiya Khan and
my own son, the heir-apparent, with the Koran to the
troops ; but no use. I then sent well-known Syuds
and Mullahs of each clan, but of no avail. Up till
now, evening, the disturbance continues. It will be
seen how it ends. I am grieved by this confusion. It
is almost beyond conception.* The second telegram
reached Simla on the afternoon of the 6th, announc-
ing that the Besidency had been set on fire, and

1 Sir Alfred Ly all.

A A. 2

356 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION CH.VIII

ending up with the words : c I have lost my friend the
Envoy, and also my kingdom. Am terribly grieved
and perplexed.' These letters were addressed to
General Eoberts. The Kurum agent telegraphed that
the dead bodies of Sir Louis Oavagnari, his staff,
and his escort, had been seen by one of the prin-
cipal Ghilzai chiefs, who described their defence of
the Eesidency till it was destroyed by fire as almost
miraculous.

In a letter written by the Amir at the same time
to his uncle, the Governor of Zemindawar, he gave
a very different account of the affair. Only two
regiments, both of the body guard, were said to have
mutinied. Nothing was mentioned of any attempt
at rescue, or participation of the people, and it was
expressly stated no other injury was done, and that
by evening everything was quiet.1

A secret Memorandum on the Kabul massacre
was received by the Indian Government on October G,
1879, from Sirdar Wall Mahomed Khan. In this
Memorandum it was stated : —

'From the very first day the Amir arrived at
Kabul from Gundamuk he preached to the people,
and counselled them that he and they being Moham-
medans and the faithful, should night and day
endeavour to keep in view the policy of religious
war. He sent letters on the subject in all directions.
6 When the Herat troops were one march from
Kabul they were instructed to raise a cry, on arrival
at the capital, that they would wage a religious war,
and that they would not allow the English officers
to remain in the town. In accordance with these
instructions, they raised cries in the city on their
arrival there. They quarrelled with the servants of

1 Nairatiwo of Events in AfglianMam.

1879 MASSACRE OP BRITISH ENVOY 357

Major Cavagnari in the streets of the town on one or
two occasions. I reported this to the Major, and he
remarked in reply that it was the habit of a rabid
dog to bite, be the person bit however innocent, and
that no one could touch his hair. . . . On Wednesday,
the 15th of Bamazan (September 3), three of these
six regiments asked for their pay. They were offered
one month's wages, but they refused to take the
money, and said that they would take nothing short
of three months' salary. The Amir told them that
they did not perform any service, or any religious
act, or protect the honour of their country, and so
were not entitled to three months' wages. On hearing
this they broke out, and proceeded towards the
residence of Major Oavagnari, saying that they would
now engage in a religious conflict. Daod Shah came
out to prevent them in their design, but was not
successful in his attempt. He was disgraced, and
was wounded in three or four places. At this junc-
ture Saif-ud-din Khan (a general) presented himself
before the Amir, and remarked that if His Highness
gave permission he would aid and save Major
Oavagnari. But he was rebuked, and was dismissed
from service with the remark that he had no concern
in the matter.'

The Viceroy, commenting on this information,
pointed out * that all accusations against Yakub made
by Wall Mahomed and the other Sirdars whom
Yakub had been ill-treating must be taken cum grano.
But,' he adds, ' what staggers me in Wali Mahomed's
statement is that it elucidates, and confirms, similar
sinister assertions as to Yakub's treachery made by
two or three other informants, who apparently can
have no personal motive for incriminating the Amir.
The majority of the survivors, and spectators, of the

358 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. YIII

Boberts starts

Lord Lytton
to Lord

September 4

assault of September 3rd all express a conviction
that Takub could have rescued the Embassy had he
chosen to do so; and all aver that he positively
prohibited General Saif-ud-din Khan from going to
the assistance of the Envoy . - . These informants
also imply that Takub permitted or ordered Daod
Shah to go to the relief of the Embassy with the
intention of getting him killed, as Uriah was put in
front of the battle. It is certainly noteworthy that
General Daod Shah, who professed strong attachment
to the British alliance, was out of favour with Takub ;
that he was very severely wounded in his efforts to
quell the mutiny ; and that, of all to whom Takub
entrusted that task, he is the only one who received
any injury at all.1

On receipt of the first intelligence brought by the
Ghilzai messenger, the Viceroy telegraphed orders to
General Massy to move at once to the Shutargardan
and crown it. General Eoberts, who was at Simla on
the Army Commission, started within twenty-four
hours of the receipt of the news for the Peiwar, with
instructions to march upon Kabul, with every possible
expedition compatible with safety, with a force of
5,000 men of all arms. General Stewart at once
re-occupied Kandahar, where the Amir's authorities
willingly replaced themselves under his protection.
The troops along the Khyber line were rapidly re-
inforced, and the Yiceroy informed the Amir that a
strong British force would march as speedily as
possible from the Shutargardan to his assistance,
and that he must do all in his power to facilitate its
progress through his country.

The day after the news of the disaster, Lord Lytton
wrote to the Prime Minister : c The web of policy
so carefully and patiently woven has been rudely

1879 GENERAL ROBERTS STARTS FOR KABUL 359

shattered. We have now to weave a fresh, and I fear TO Lori
a wider one, from undoubtedly weaker materials.
All that I was most anxious to avoid in the conduct
of the late war and negotiations has now been
brought about by the hand of fate, the complete
collapse of all the national conditions of independent
government in Afghanistan, the obligation to occupy
Kabul, and the great difficulty of evacuating it with-
out risk of renewed disaster to Yakub Khan, or any
other puppet ruler, on whose behalf we must now be
content to undertake the virtual administration of the
country, for the present at any rate.

6 These conditions, now unavoidable, involve the
further vexation of increased military expenditure
and political uncertainty. ... I feel most keenly
how heavy must be the weight with which this sore
and sudden blow will fall upon Her Majesty's Govern-
ment. On the other hand, however, the great
advantages of our new frontier will be revealed in
the comparative alacrity and freedom from serious
danger with which its possession enables us to reach
Kabul in a crisis, and generally to deal with the
serious difficulty which we certainly have not pro-
voked. ... I do not disguise from myself that we
may now be forced to take in hand the permanent
disintegration of the national fabric it was our object
to cement in Afghanistan, and that, in any case,
we shall probably be compelled to intervene more
widely and actively than we have ever desired to
do in that country. Still, the renewed, and perhaps
extended, efforts now imposed upon us can have ng
other result, if rightly directed, than the firmer
establishment of the undisputed supremacy of the
British Power from the Indus to the Oxus . . . But On th*
meanwhile and for ever, alas, we suffer one grievous of Cft

360 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vin

TO Lord bereavement, which to all concerned is irreparable,
an^ whkk v^- ^e to niyaelf an abiding sorrow and
bitter pain all the rest of my life. India has lost,
when she most needed him, one of her greatest men,
the Queen one of Her Majesty's ablest and most
devoted servants. I have lost a beloved friend and
more I He has perished heroically, in the faithful
discharge of a dangerous service to his chief and
his country. It is the duty of his country to avenge
his death. My hope is, that in the recognition and
performance of that duty his country will not fail,
and that some sense of its solemnity may perhaps
mitigate, for a while at least, the reckless malignity
of party passion and spite.'
Support from The Government at home warmly supported the
Viceroy in this dark hour. He received an official
te^egram telling him that the Government were pre-
pared to leave everything unconditionally in his hands,
and warmly assuring him of unreserved support in
taking vigorous measures. From the Queen he also re-
ceived a letter which he described as ckind, patriotic,
and manly,' adding : ' She is really a better English-
man than anyone of her subjects, and never falls
short in a national crisis when the interests or honour
of her empire are at stake.'

The story of the famous march to Kabul has been
fully told by the hero of it, and no detailed account
of it here need be given.

It will be remembered that after various attempts
to delay the progress of the march on one pretext
md anotlier> ** Amir himself finally took refuge in
^e British camp. General Biker had advanced as
27 fax.as Kushi, *id there, on September 27, the Amir
arrived with his father-in-law, Tahiya Khan, the
heir-apparent,1 all his ministers, including General

1 MnzaEhan.

1879 MAEOH TO KABUL 361

Daod Shah, and about sixty other followers. Lord
Lytton described what followed in a letter to Sir
James Stephen : —

1 October 12.

1 General Roberts proceeded to Kushi on the

Q^ATili an

following day to meet the Amir, and in the meanwhile oetoberia
the Amir's rival, Wall Mahomed, and all the Sirdars
who had been out of favour with Takub ever since
the Gundamuk Treaty for having been on friendly
terms with the British during the late war, had also
arrived in the camp of General Baker, The Amir
represented to Eoberts that he had left ladies of his
family in the Bala Hissar, besides several regiments,
who would probably rise and massacre them all
if the British force advanced any further. He was
told that, although our advance could not be delayed
a day or an hour, ample time would be given to all
non-combatants and women to place themselves in
safety. In accordance with an instruction I had
recently sent him, Eoberts simultaneously issued
and forwarded to Kabul a proclamation warning
non-combatants to clear out, and announcing that all
persons found armed in and around Kabul would be
treated as enemies. The Amir, his ministers, and all
Sirdars then avowed there was a universal conviction
at Kabul that it would be simply impossible for us to
advance there in any force before the spring of next Boberts's
year, that he, they, and all concerned had been acting KabS°e °n
on this conviction, and that they were quite be-
wildered by the rapidity and mass of our movement.
They might well be so. Eoberts was advancing on
the direct line to Kabul with a force of between
6,000 and 7,000 men, leaving another force of equal
/strength to hold the Kurum in his rear. General
Bright was simultaneously advancing up the Khyber

362 LORD LYTTOWS INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. Tin

To Stephen, with a force of upwards of 16,000 men, which would
October 12 ^e ^ communication with Roberts almost as soon as
he reached Kabul ; and the large force under General
Stewart, having re-occupied Kandahar and Khelat-i-
Ghilzai, was threatening Ghuzni. On hearing of the
Amir's arrival in our camp, my first inclination was
to regard this step as a conclusive and conspicuous
proof of his loyalty. It appears, however, that the
step was by no means a spontaneous or a willing
one. This is what Eoberts writes about it: "The
Amir left Kabul secretly and rode to Kushi in
haste, not bringing with Trim even a single tent. He
had become aware that Wall Mahomed and other
Sirdars intended to join the British, and thought it
best to be beforehand with them; especially when
he found from my letter of September 25 that our
advance was inevitable." He was evidently much
disappointed at finding the Sirdars had been before-
hand with him, and expressed a wish to be reconciled
with them. But General Eoberts rightly considered
" the time and place inopportune for reconciliations."
General Baker made the best arrangements he could
for the Amir's tent accommodation, and placed him
in the centre of the camp. On the second day His
Highness* own tents arrived, and he asked to have
them pitched outside the camp limits. To this
Eoberts assented, knowing that if he wished to
escape he could do so even from the middle of the
camp ; but suggested that for his safety and honour
he should have a guard similar to the General's own.
He agreed to this, " and so now," writes Eoberts on
October 1, " there is a Highlander standing sentry in
front and a Goorkha in rear of his tent."

'Meanwhile General Eoberts's force continued
its advance towards Kabul. Somewhere, in time,

1879 MARCH TO KABUL 363

between the 2nd and the 6th. instant, and, in place, TO Stephen

f"lf»tnViAT 1 9

between Kushi and Charasiab, a certain Sirdar,
Nek Mahomed, said to be an uncle of the Amir's (but Nek
of whom I have hitherto heard nothing), rode out
from Kabul and asked permission to see the Amir,
with whom he had a long and secret interview of
some hours. He then rode rapidly back to Kabul
On the 6th instant the reconnoitring parties sent
out by Eoberts reported that "the enemy" was
advancing in great force from the city; and soon
afterwards the high range of hills intervening'
between Oharasiab and Kabul were crowded with
Afghan troops and people from the city; while
parties of Ghilzais appeared on the hills running
along both flanks of the camp, and the road along
which General Macpherson was advancing (to
Zahidabad) with large convoys of stores and reserve
ammunition was reported to be threatened. Mac-
pherson was immediately warned, and some cavalry
sent to his assistance. But Eoberts wisely recognised
the absolute necessity of carrying the heights on his
front before nightfall. This difficult task was en-
trusted to Baker, who commanded the advanced
guard. Baker at once sent Major White (an excel- Baker
lent pfficer), with a wing of the 92nd Highlanders,
three guns, and some native infantry to take
the right of the position ; from which the enemy was
dislodged, after an obstinate resistance, leaving
twenty Afghan guns in possession of Major White's
small force. Baker, meanwhile, making a turning
movement to the left, was soon hotly engaged ; but,
carrying height after height, completely scattered
the enemy in great confusion, capturing two
standards. Our total loss was small— three officers
wounded, but none killed. Enemy's loss not yet

364 LORD LYTTOX'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. TIII

TO Stephen, known, but believed to be very great, Nek
er 12 jjahon^ Wh0 ^^ go shortly before had an inter-
view with the Amir, was the leading spirit of this
resolute and well-planned opposition to our advance.
His horse was shot under him in the engagement,
but he seems to have escaped. Eoberts has no
doubt that the whole thing has been planned and
carefully prepared by the Amir, whose instructions
were carried back to Kabul by Nek Mahomed. The
enemy's position was admirably chosen and held in
very great strength. All that has since happened
convinces me that had he not been immediately
expelled from it he would have been powerfully
reinforced and his fortifications well pushed forward
during the night, in which case the stand made at
Oharasiab would probably have been much more
formidable and prolonged. It is equally apparent
now that the Amir's urgent pleas for delaying our
advance were made with the object of gaining time
for the organisation of a strong resistance to it, and
the reinforcement of the positions, both at Oharasiab
and the Bala Hissar, by regiments which he has
hastily recalled from Kohistan and other localities.

General Eoberts, continuing his advance, arrived
before Kabul in the afternoon of October 8. He
found the Afghan troops who had just returned

Position out- from Kohistan entrenching themselves on a high hill

BlQi6 A&DUii * 11 •« i t ^ o

October s beyond the Bala Hissar, and immediately command-
ing the city of Kabul. He at once sent General
Massy with eight squadrons of cavalry round by the
north of the city to watch the roads leading to
Bamian and Kohistan, and thus cut off their retreat.
Up till sunset General Eoberts was in heliographic
communication with Generals Massy and Baker,
and this was then the general condition of the

1879 MAEOH TO KABUL 365

situation before Kabul. General Baker was just TO Stephen,
about to attack the enemy from the heights above Ootober 12
the Bala Hissar. General Massy had reached
Aliabad on the Bamian road. He had found the
Sherpur cantonment deserted, and in it no less than
seventy-eight guns, many of them Armstrongs and
48-pounders, given to Sher Ali by Lord Northbrook
All of these guns he secured. General Macpherson
had joined General Eoberts with stores and reserve
ammunition, and was hastening forward with a
strong force to strengthen, before daybreak, the
position of General Baker; whilst three of the
Afghan regiments from Ghuzni were simultaneously
hastening to join the force opposed to Baker, and
this force was every moment being swelled by armed
bands from the city. This was the state of things
before Kabul when General Eoberts's telegram of the
8th reached me during the night of the 10th. I am
writing on the afternoon of the 12th, and have not
since then had any further news from Eoberts. But
I am not anxious. The telegraph now does not
work beyond the Shutargardan. Messages from
Eoberts must reach that place by runners or by
heliograph, and he would doubtless be too busily
engaged to establish heliographic communication all
at once. My only fear is that the scoundrels may
escape during the night,'

* Camp Naldera : Ootober 12, 6.80 P.M.

'My dear Stephen, — The news I was awaiting
when I interrupted my letter this afternoon has come
sooner than I expected. During my walk I received
the following telegram from Eoberts :

6 " Outside Kabul, October 10. — General Baker was
unable to deliver his attack on the evening of the

366 LOED LOTION'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.YITI

8th on account of the darkness. Before daybreak
yesterday General Macpherson joined him with
67th Foot, 28th Native Infantry, and four Horse
Artillery guns on elephants. Enemy, however3 fled
during the night, leaving on their very strong posi-
tion twelve guns (six field and six mountain).
Cavalry pursued for several miles, in two detach-
ments, under Generals Massy and Hugh Gough.
But the enemy had so completely dispersed that they
only overtook a few small parties. We have now
in our possession 110 guns. There are some thirty
more in the Bala Hissar, and a few, I hear, in the
city. Our camp is pitched on the Siah Sung ridge,
immediately overlooking and within 1,300 yards of
the Bala Hissar and city. I shall make public entry
into, and take possession of, the Bala Hissar to-
morrow or next day. The troops have worked splen-
didly. For several days we have been without tents,
and rations had to be carried for want of transport." f
Roberta Thus, in a little over a month from the day he

left Simla, General Roberts 'made his triumphal
entry into Kabul at the head of as fine a force as was
ever put in the field, after having given the Afghans
a severe thrashing at Charasiab, and captured two
of their standards and 150 of their guns without the
loss of a single European officer.' l

On October 12, accompanied by the Amir's eldest
son, he made his public entry into the city. Early
that morning Takub Khan had < walked to General
Koberts's camp, accompanied by only two attendants,
and expressed his determination to resign the Amir-
ship. He said he had intended doing so before
going to Kushi, but had allowed himself to be over-
persuaded. He was in very low spirits ; said his life

1 Written by Lord Lytton in a letter dated October 14, 1879.

1879 ABDICATION OF YAKUB KHAN 367

had been a miserable one ; that he would rather be
a grasscutter in the English camp than ruler of
Afghanistan, and begged that he might live in the
camp till he could be sent to India or London or
wherever the Viceroy might desire to send him.' l

At the close of the Durbar held on the same day
the Mustaufi, the Wazir Shah Mahommed, Tahiya
Khan (the Amir's father-in-law), and Zakaria Khan,
were by the orders of General Eoberts placed under
arrest on the ground that they were the most influential
men in the country and that all their influence had
been exerted against us, as had been clearly proved
by the resistance offered to the advance on Kabul.
When Yakub Khan heard of these arrests, his look was viceroy to
described as that ' of a hunted beast, terror unmis- broo
takably imprinted on his features.' He said he had 1B79
come to regard his countrymen with unspeakable
hatred, loathing, and fear ; that every hour which pro-
longed his residence in Afghanistan was a burden and a
horror to him : that his sole remaining wish was for
safety, repose, and obscurity under British protection
anywhere out of his own country. ( The Afghans,'
he said9 6 know that I put my father on his throne ;
and while I was fighting here and there for a pre-
carious cause, they loved and admired me : when my
father imprisoned me, they forgot me. When I
made peace with you in their interests, they hated me
and conspired against me. There is no trusting them,
they are dogs and serpents, and I have done with
them for ever.1

The Viceroy and Indian Government regarded the
spontaneous and unexpected abdication of the Amir
as likely to facilitate the immediate settlement of
the main lines of our future policy. Even before full

1 Namative ofEvmtg in AfgJianistan, p. 95.

368 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION GH.TOI

inquiries had been made into the authorship of the
massacre of the British Envoy his guilty participation
in the crime appeared so far probable as to make
the continuance of his rule a matter of doubtful
expediency.

On receipt of the first telegram from Kabul Lord
Lytton personally inclined to a speedy declaration of
policy on the lines of disintegration. There can be
no doubt that any definite pronouncement would have
facilitated General Koberts's task, but the Govern-
ment at home were opposed to any premature or
hasty decisions with regard to the future administra-
tion of the country, and Lord Lytton himself readily
agreed that the proclamation to be issued by General
Eoberts should leave the future undefined. It ran as
follows :

General 't General Eoberts, on behalf of the British

Sui^onpl0 ®overmnentJ hereby proclaim that the Amir, having
October 28 by his own free will abdicated, has left Afghanistan
without a Government.

'In consequence of the shameful outrage upon its
Envoy and suite the British Government has been
compelled to occupy by force of arms Kabul, the
capital, and to take military possession of other parts
of Afghanistan.

'The British Government now commands that
all authorities, chiefs, and sirdars do continue their
functions in maintaining order, referring to me when
necessary.

* The British Government desire that the people
shall be treated with justice and benevolence, and
that their religious feelings and customs be re-
spected.

8 The services of such sirdars and chiefs as assist
in preserving order will be duly recognised, but all

1879 GKENEKAL BOBBETS AT KABUL 369

disturbers of the peace, and persons concerned in
attacks upon the British authority will meet with
condign punishment,

6 The British Government, after consultation with
the principal sirdars, tribal chiefs, and others repre-
senting the interests and wishes of the various pro-
vinces and cities, will declare its will as to the
future permanent arrangements to be made for the
good government of the people/

This proclamation was published at Kabul on
October 28, and on the same day Takub Khan was
informed that his resignation was accepted.

General Roberts, being convinced that no good
would result from the introduction of any Afghan
element into the Government pending final orders as
to the disposal of the country, decided to carry on
the administration without the declared aid of any
Afghan chiefs. He assumed possession of the State
Treasury, and announced that for the future the
collection of revenue and expenditure would be
under his control. •

* Previous to the acceptance of his resignation,
Yakub Khan in a private interview with General
Roberts had volunteered some interesting state-
ments with regard to the circumstances that led to
Sher ALi's estrangement from the Government of
India and adherence to Bussia.

'In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw
in his lot with you. He had suffered many reverses regarding
before making himself secure on the throne of sher M
Afghanistan; and he had come to the conclusion
that his best chance of holding what he had won lay
in an alliance with the British Government. He did
not receive from Lord Mayo as large a supply of
arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but never-

B B

370 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vm

theless lie returned to Kabul fairly satisfied, and so
he remained until the visit of Noor Mahomed Shah
to India in 1873. This visit brought matters to a
head. The diaries received from NOOT Mahomed
Shah during his stay in India, and the report which
he brought back on his return, convinced my father
that he could no longer hope to obtain from British
Government all the aid that he wanted, and from that
time he began to turn his attention to the thought of
a Russian alliance.' 1

The terms of the Treaty between Sher Ali and
the Eussians, written out from memory, were handed
to General Eoberts by the two Afghan ministers
who had personally participated in the negotiation of
it. One of them was Sher All's Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and the other was the minister deputed by
His Highness to accompany the Eussian Plenipo-
tentiary on his return to Tashkend with the Treaty in
Buabud its ^na^ f°rm- The statements separately made by
Afghanistan these ministers were corroborated by Yakub Khan,
who declared that the Treaty had been concluded by
his father, that it had remained for months in his own
possession, and that he had destroyed it with some
other important papers on the eve of our entry into
Kabul. According to these informants, the Treaty
was one of close alliance between Eussia and Afghani-
stan. It gave to Eussia complete control over the
Amir's foreign relations, with free and exclusive
commercial access to all parts of the country. And
it gave to the Amir and his selected heir the promise
of Eussian assistance in the suppression of domestic
rebellion or dynastic rivals, and the Eussian co-
operation for the reconquest of the Peshawur Valley
in the event of war between Eussia and England.

of

1879 GENERAL ROBERTS AT KABUL 37!

The following is a passage from General Boberts's
report to the Government of India, dated Novem-
ber 22, 1879.

6 The magnitude of Sher Ali's military prepara-
tions is in my opinion a fact of peculiar significance.
Before the outbreak of hostilities last year, the Amir November 22
had raised and equipped with arms of precision
sixty-eight regiments of infantry and sixteen of
cavalry. The Afghan artillery amounted to near
300 guns. Numbers of skilled artisans were
constantly employed in the manufacture of rifles,
cannon, and breech-loading small-arms. More than
a million pounds of powder, and I believe several
million pounds of home-made Snider ammunition,
were in the Bala Hissar at the time of the late
explosion. Swords, helmets, uniforms, and other
military equipments were stored in proportionate
quantities. Finally, Sher Ali had expended on the
construction of Sherpur cantonments an astonishing
amount of labour and money. The extent and cost
of this work may be judged of from the fact that the
whole of the troops under my command will find
cover during the winter within the cantonment and its
outlying buildings, and the bulk of them in the main
line of rampart itself, which extends to a length of
nearly two miles under the southern and western
slopes of the Bemaru hills. Sher All's original design
was, apparently, to carry the wall round the hills, a
distance of five miles, and the foundations were laid
for a considerable portion of this length. All these
military preparations were quite unnecessary except
as a provision for contemplated hostilities with
ourselves. And it is difficult to understand how
their entire cost could have been met from the
Afghan treasury, the gross revenue of the country

BB

General

Eaberta'a

report,
November 22

instructions

Government
September 29

372 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH YHI
amounting only to about eighty lacs of rupees per

„«-,„«. >

annum.

Qn the 28th of October General Eoberts had
written to the Viceroy: 'It is surprising to see
how much more Russian than English Kabul is.
Eussian money, Eussian crockery, Eussian — or,
as they call it, Bokhara — silk, Eussian-cut clothes,
&c. The roads leading to Central Asia are not
better, perhaps, than those towards India, but the
Eussians have certainly taken more advantage of
their position than we have and have had apparently
much more to do with the commerce of the country
than we have had/

The instructions, dated September 29, which
General Eoberts received from the Government of
India before starting for Kabul were purposely very
general in their character. The Viceroy desired that
he should be as little fettered as possible by regula-
tions which might prove inapplicable to the situation
he would find at Kabul. But, though general, these
instructions were very comprehensive. They ran as
follows :

' As soon as you shall have established yourself
at Kabul 7otl w^ institute a close investigation into
gji the causes and circumstances of the outrage
which has compelled the British Government to
occupy the capital of His Highness the Amir. Upon
the question of the punishment which, after due
inquiry, it will be your duty to inflict as speedily as
possible upon those who have abetted or participated
in the perpetration of this outrage, His Excellency the
Governor-General in Council desires me to commend
to your careful attention the following observations.

6 1 am to point out, in the first place, that for an
offence of this character the Afghan nation must be

1879 GENERAL ROBERTS AT KABUL 373

held to be collectively responsible. It was a totally instructions
unprovoked and most barbarous attack by the Amir's BoblS?"1
soldiery, and by the people of his capital, upon the September 29
representative of an allied State, who was residing
under the Amir's protection in the Amir's fortress,
in very close proximity to the Amir himself, and
whose personal safety and honourable treatment had
been solemnly guaranteed by the ruler of Afghanistan.
In the second place, I am to observe that the nature
and magnitude of the outrage leave no room for
doubt that it had its leaders and its instigators — that
certain persons must have taken a prominent part in
the attack on the Eesidency and in the murder of its
inmates; while there is a strong presumption that
such an outbreak must have been fomented and
encouraged by persons of rank and influence,
Towards this latter conclusion aJl our present infor-
mation points, and it is corroborated by expressions
used in the letters written by the Amir himself after
the occurrence of the catastrophe.

6 The retribution to be exacted must accordingly
be adapted to the twofold character of the offence.
It must be imposed upon the Afghan nation in pro-
portion as the offence was national and as the
responsibility falls upon any particular community,
while it must also involve condign punishment of
those individuals who may be found guilty of any
participation in the crime. In regard to the penalties
to bo borue by the State, by the city, or by the people
generally, it would be premature in the present stage
of your operations to issue to you any specific direc-
tions. The imposition of a fine upon the city of
Kabul would be in accordance with justice and
precedent. The military precautions required for the
security of your position may necessitate the demoli-

374 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. Tin
instructions tion of fortifications, and possibly the removal of

to General , .--. , . T ,. ... . ,, -

Hoberts, buildings wnicn may lie within the range of your
September 29 defeilceg or may interfere with your control over the
city. In forming your plans for works of this kind
required by military exigencies, you will have the
opportunity of considering whether they can be com-
bined with any measures, compatible with justice and
humanity, for leaving a memorial of the retribution
exacted from the city in some manner and by some
mark that will not be easily obliterated.1

'In regard to the punishment of individuals, it
should be swift, stern, and impressive, without being
indiscriminate or immoderate. Its infliction must
not be delegated to subordinate officers of minor re-
sponsibility acting independently of your instructions
or supervision ; and you cannot too vigilantly main-
tain the discipline of the troops under your orders,
or superintend their treatment of the unarmed popular
tion, so long as your orders are obeyed and your
authority is unresisted. You will deal summarily in
the majority of cases with persons whose share in the
murder of anyone belonging to the British embassy
shall have been proved by your investigations ; but
while the execution of justice should be as public and
striking as possible, it should be completed with all
practicable expedition, since the indefinite prolonga-
tion of your proceedings might spread abroad un-
founded alarm.

1 It does not appear that anything of the kind was eventually done,
or that tha fine, threatened in General Boberts'a proclamation of
October 12, was levied. A. violent explosion occurred in the Bala
ffissar on October 16, in consequence of which it was decided to move
the troops into the Sherpttr cantonment, . . . The removal to Sherpnr
was effected on November 9, but there is no record of the Bala Hissar
having been destroyed, either then or latQr.— Narrative of Events in

1879 GENERAL ROBERTS AT KABUL 375

'Although nothing can now be said in regard instructions
to the future internal administration of Afghanistan, Botot^
the Government of India cannot ignore the possi- September 29
bility of being forced to exercise over that administra-
tion a closer and more direct control than has
hitherto been contemplated or desired, It is,
therefore, especially important that during the period
of difficulty and disorganisation which must, it is
feared, be passed before a better and more settled
system of administration can be established the
people should learn from the strict discipline of our
army, and from the wise and upright proceedings of
our military and political officers, to look to the
strength and justice of the British Government as
their best guarantee for the future tranquillity of
their country.'

The military tribunal appointed by General
Roberts to investigate the causes and circumstances
which led to the outbreak of September 3, and
further to undertake the actual trial of accused
persons, did not close their sittings till the end of
November, when eighty-seven persons had been tried
for complicity in the massacre or disobedience to
Lord Eoberts's proclamation, and had been executed.

The evidence collected by the Kabul Commission
for the purpose of determining whether, and to what
extent, the outbreak was premeditated, and the
responsibility which attached to the Amir Takub
Khan in connection with it, was carefully considered
ami analysed by a committee appointed by the
Viceroy, and composed of gentlemen possessing long
aud varied experience in judicial investigation and
in dealing with the testimony of Asiatics.

Their conclusions were as follows: *(1) That
the massacre was not instigated by the Amir, or by

Conclusions
of the Com-
mittee of In-
quiry on
Kabul Com-
mission

Viceroy to
Secretary of
State,
October 28

376 LORD LYTTOira INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. Tin

his enemies, or by anyone else ; but that its actual
perpetrators proceeded altogether of their own
motion ; (2) that though the regiments that attacked
the Eesidency had, like other regiments in the Amir's
service, for some little time, and at all events since
the arrival of the troops from Herat, entertained
feelings of hostility towards the mission, the attack
was in no way premeditated by them, but was the
result of what may in a certain sense be termed
accidental circumstances; and (3) that, though the
Amir and his JTpTnp.fKa.tR advisers must be acquitted
of complicity in the attack on the Eesidency, they
were in a position to interpose effectively, when the
attack began, and while it was going on, for the
protection or rescue of the embassy; that they were
at least culpably indifferent to the fate of the Envoy and
his companions; and that they totally disregarded
the solemn obligations which they had undertaken
to protect the British embassy at Kabul.' While
accepting these conclusions, the Viceroy considered
that they erred on the side of leniency to the Amir,
and that they constituted sufficient grounds for
regarding the restoration of Takub Khan to the
throne of Kabul as for ever out of the question.

With regard to our future policy Lord Lytton
wrote to Lord Oranbrook on October 23 :

' October 23.

*I entirely agree with you that nothing has
occurred, or is occurring, to justify a frightened
departure from the lines of a policy carefully con-
sidered and deliberately adopted and followed thus
far. The Treaty of Ghindamuk was undoubtedly the
result, the first definite result, of such a policy, and
I am confident that any violent deviation from that
policy in either direction would be a fatal error.

1879 DISCUSSION OF FUTURE POLICY 377

But the policy did not grow out of the Treaty, the TO Secretary
Treaty grew of the policy, which always looked and '

saw far beyond it ; and in our despatch reviewing
the situation created by it, the Treaty was distinctly
recognised as the commencement, not the conclusion, of
a new era in our relations with Afghanistan. The
object of the policy which led up to the Treaty was
to secure with the minimum of effort, liability, and
cost to ourselves, but in any case to secure, a recog-
nised hold over Afghanistan sufficiently strong to
protect India from the serious dangers to which she
must be exposed by the hostility of any Afghan
ruler over whom she has no effectual control, by the
anarchy of the Afghan provinces upon our border, or
by their subjection to foreign influence other than
our own. The method of the policy was to prosecute
the attainment of this object steadily, unswervingly,
but without precipitancy, taking prompt advantage
of every favourable opportunity as it arose, fore-
stalling before it had arisen every danger that could
be foreseen within that period of time to which, in
the conduct of practical politics, the future is neces-
sarily limited, and opposing a firm front to every
difficulty which could- not be averted; doing, in
short, in each phase of the situation as time might
develop it, no more than was strictly necessary to
maintain the ground previously won and facilitate
progress to the goal not yet reached ; but never in
any phase of the situation doing less than this.
Unreservedly adopting that method, which I still
hold sound, I pointed out in all my letters written
before and during the late war, that all we required
for the present (which if secured would go far to
secure all our requirements in the future) could be
allowed at very moderate expenditure of military

378 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.VUI

TO Secretary and financial effort by arrangements similar to those
subsequently embodied in the Treaty of Gundamuk ;
but that the point we must always keep steadily in
view was the establishment of a firm hold upon that
portion of Afghan territory which lies within our
immediate reach up to the Hindu Kush and its
passes, along the line of the Hehnund. For these
lines constitute the outer wall of our natural fortress.
It was, I considered, and still consider, most inex-
pedient to seize this position prematurely by force
so long as there was any reasonable prospect of
gradually securing it by other means ; but it was, I
thought, absolutely necessary that if other means
failed, or if events beyond our control precipitated
the crisis we were anxious to avert, it should find
us ready and resolved to take up that position
without hesitation and delay. It appears to me that
this is precisely the situation in which we are now
placed. The object of the Treaty of Gundamuk
was to prevent nearly everything which has now
happened in spite of that Treaty, and which would
infallibly have happened sooner had we failed in
the negotiation of it— complete anarchy throughout
Afghanistan, the imminent necessity of forcibly
suppressing that anarchy, and the absolute impos-
sibility of doing so, or of exercising any peaceable
indirect control over its turbulent elements, by the
mere support of an independent or ^osi-independent
Afghan ruler. The Treaty was very carefully
considered and very carefully framed. I am con-
vinced that of the problem we were then dealing
with it was the wisest, safest, and soundest solution
that coulci have been adopted; and to a situation
necessarily and notoriously pregnant with risks and
Uncertainties, it opened at least the fairest possible

1879 DISCUSSION OF FUTURE POLICY 379

prospects. But the Treaty was, from the very nature To Secretary
of the conditions which alone rendered it possible, ottotoia
a somewhat delicate and artificial political structure
of a tentative character, avowedly dependent on
time and favourable chance for the gradual con-
solidation of it. If, under conditions apparently
favourable to its stability, the Treaty could not avert
the blow which has shattered it to fragments, and
suddenly let in upon us that deluge of embarrass-
ments which it was devised to keep^ out, is it not
idle to attempt to cope with those embarrassments
by clinging to the fragments of the Treaty? Before
the confusion of tongues begins, we should hasten
to build Babylon from the bricks of Babel, otherwise
I fear we shall be pelted with stones taken from the
supposed ruins of our own policy. Of course we
caimot recede. But neither can we stand still. We
mitst advance if we would be safe.

'As regards Kabul and the Northern Afghan
provinces, it is quite premature, quite impossible, to
propound now a permanent programme. Our action
in this direction must be provisional ; but, though
provisional, it must also, I think, be prompt, plain,
and very firm, so far as it goes. In the complete
collapse and disappearance of the Amir's authority,
the first instinct of every Afghan chief and tribe will
be to consider what and where is the strongest
power within reach— that is to say, the power best
able to hurt or help them quickly— and then to shape
their course in direct reference to the apparent
attitude and purpose of that power. In. the con-
fusion, already general throughout Afghanistan, it is
the authority whose first utterance or action is free
from confuaion that will inspire confidence or com-
mand obedience, and thus acquire support. If tlje

380 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vin

S°stcateetaly P°Pulations a-*4 Sirdars of Northern Afghanistan are
October as promptly impressed with a conviction that the power
of the British Government is stronger, its purpose
more definite, and its action more likely to be swift
and decisive, than those of all the other forces which
will soon be rushing into every vacuum created by
the collapse of authority, then the British Govern-
ment will, without difficulty, "ride the whirlwind and
direct the storm." But if, on the other hand, their
first impression, however erroneous, is that the
British Government is as much embarrassed as they
are themselves by the surrounding chaos, that it is
waiting for the independent evolution of some politi-
cal nucleus not struck into being by its creative fiat,
and that, its policy being dubious, its action is likely
to be dilatory, then I think the British Government
may have a very hot time of it in Afghanistan.
For this reason I think we should instantly take
public possession of the authority which falls from
the hand of the Amir into our own, and. promptly 3
although provisionally, enforce that authority, so far
as our practical power of enforcing extends, in every
direction. This, I think, is the first thing we have
to do in Northern Afghanistan, and we cannot do it
too soon for our own safety. The next step will be
either to proclaim our permanent retention of that
authority, or to transfer it, with very careful and
copious restrictions, to some sort of native govern-
ment/

A suggestion was made to the Secretary of State
by Sir John McNeil to transfer the capital of Afghani-
stan from Kabul to Kandahar. Lord Lytton was
TO General averse to the idea. ' If we permanently hold the
^ole of Afghanistan . . . then Kabul will always be
a point of the highest strategic value to ourselves,

1879 DISCUSSION OF FUTURE POLICY 381

and if we attempt to retain the whole of Afghanistan
under the rule of any single authority Kabul would
probably be a stronger political centre than Kandahar.'
While strongly advocating the separation of Kan-
dahar from Kabul as part of a policy of disintegra-
tion, he was not in favour of our direct annexation
of that province except under certain conditions.
The political and military importance of Kandahar
had always seemed to him somewhat over-estimated
by Sir H. Eawlinson and other eminent authorities,
and the only circumstance which in his opinion
would make our occupation of Kandahar an imme-
diate and imperative necessity would be the handing
over to Persia or any other Power the districts of
Herat and Seistan.

Writing of this to Lord Oranbrook on Novem-
ber 5 Lord Lytton says :

CI hope that the main question of our future

Afghan policy will be deliberately settled before we November's

deal with its details. If we decide to remain within

our present lines, I do not think it would be safe or

wise to give an inch of Afghan territory to Persia.

If we decide to annex Kandahar, I think that in that

r;ase Seistan may be safely given to Persia. But I

should be sorry to see it given to Persia, unless we

iuluiul to give her Herat also. . , . If Her Majesty's

Govorument does not decide to annex Kandahar,

th<m I should extremely regret, and much fear, the

cession of Seistan to Persia.'

Although the Government at home did not
formally sanction the announcement of a policy of
tlwinU'grttliou for many weeks after our military
occupation of Kabul, Lord Oranbrook from the first
tthanxl Lord Lytton's view that e Afghanistan as a
wliole could no longer exist.' It was in reply to this

382 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION" OH. Tin

expressed conviction that Lord Lytton wrote on
November 10.

TO Lord * I do not think you have come a day too soon

Oranbiook, to fae conclusion (in which I entirely concur) that
the administrative union of Afghanistan under one
central authority is no longer practically possible,
and that all our future action must be guided by this
conclusion. Taking that point as settled, however,
what I mean by adhesion to the lines of the Gundamuk
Treaty is the policy of endeavouring to secure the
objects of that Treaty by relations with the disin-
tegrated Afghan provinces, not involving further
annexation on our part, or admitting annexation on
the part of any other Power ; and what I mean by
advancing beyond these lines is the policy of seeking
the same objects by a partition of Afghanistan,
resulting from early negotiations with one or both of
the two neighbouring Powers — Persia and Eussia.'
To this he was opposed.

6 With regard to Kandahar, General Stewart
and Major St. John are of opinion that Sher Ali
Khan, to whom we have temporarily given over the
government of Kandahar (where he represents the
rule of that branch of the old Durani race still
popular apparently in that part of Afghanistan), is
well able to hold his own and entirely subject to our
control. They, therefore, advise us to place under
his authority as large a portion of Western Afghani-
stan as that authority is competent to cover, with a
British cantonment at Peshin, close enough always
to support or control his Government whenever
necessary. Under this arrangement the Afghan
Governor of Kandahar would be not only our
nominee but also our tributary ; that is to say, he
would pay us tribute for the authority delegated to

1879 VICEROY'S PROGRAMME 383

him, and thus Western Afghanistan would, without TO Lord
annexation, become one of the tributary States of N™mber 10
the Indian Empire. It might, perhaps, be advisable Policy of an
that it should be so called in our State Papers, and western*8*1*
so marked upon our maps. It certainly seems pre- Afstamatan
ferable that we should receive tribute from any Afghan
authority capable of maintaining our interests in
Afghanistan, than that he should receive from us
a subvention for the support of his own interests.
But, in the details of the Kandahar administration,
General Stewart and Major St. John would recom-
mend complete non-interference so long as the
tribute is paid. They would, therefore, place no
British Eesident at Kandahar, where they would have
only a British dispensary, and the number of British
employes necessary for the requirements of the
telegraph and railway when completed. The
political officer, who would be our local medium of
communication with the Kandahar Government, they
would locate, where our cantonment is located, at
Peshin. They agree in affirming that our military
position would be in no wise strengthened by the
annexation or permanent occupation of Kandahar,
whilst our current expenditure would be perhaps
increased, and our political control over Western
Afghanistan weakened, by any such step. I give
their conclusions without troubling you in detail
with all the arguments on which they are based.
These conclusions seem to me sensible and well
considered, but they rest on the assumption that no
large cession of Afghan territory will be made to
Persia in the immediate neighbourhood of Kanda-
har. . . . Assuming that we do not permanently
occupy or administer Kabul, I think it will be
advisable to establish a fairly strong British canton-

384 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. Tin

TO Lord ment at some point rather nearer to Kabul than the
Shutargardan, which is at present our most advanced

military station on that line. . . .

e If we decide not to annex Kabul, I presume
that our object will be to reduce to the utmost,
rather than augment, the importance of that place,
and assuming the establishment of an advanced
British cantonment, say at Kushi, perhaps our best
course would be to entrust the administration of
Kabul to the most competent and least untrustworthy
Sirdar Eoberts can recommend for that purpose.
His Government, which would have its seat at Kabul,
might be advantageously, and I should think without
difficulty, extended to Ghuzni and Bamian. These
places would thus be brought under an authority
subject to our immediate control. . . . With British
garrisons within close striking distance of Kabul and
Kandahar, their respective Governments would be
permanently dependent upon our own, and practically
unable to disregard our commands. It is obviously
impossible to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan
withdrawal ^s ^in*61"' I* would be very inadvisable to withdraw
b0b4?baiQaubd *^em next SP™& w^en ^d* presence beyond the
mission frontier, after the melting of the snows, will enable us
to deal quicHy and effectually with those tribes against
whom we have long standing scores to pay off. I
unreservedly share your conclusion that these tribes
will never be good neighbours till they have been
well thrashed. However strong their conviction of
the reality of our power and the necessity of sub-
mission to it, it is with them a point of tribal honour
not to submit without compulsion; after which I
have little doubt that they will, in course of time,
prove just as sensible as other savages have hitherto
proved in all other parts of the world of the profits

1879 VICEROY'S PROGRAMME 385

and pleasures, when once tasted, of more peaceable TO Lord
pursuits. We can afford to pay them when we have S552351
punished them, but not to pay them instead of Future policy
punishing them, and at the bottom of our present tni»B*lutter
relations with them still lies the old question of
mastery which precedes the alliance between the
man and the horse — a question which once settled,
and well settled, is generally settled for ever. The
sooner, therefore, that the necessary preliminary
thrashings are got over, the better will it be for all
concerned. Hitherto our dealings with the tribal
question have been unavoidably checked and re-
strained by the paramount importance of not
disturbing the Afghan question which lay beyond it.
That hindrance to effectual action is now withdrawn ;
and we shall have, next spring, a golden opportunity
of thoroughly completing, in two or three months,
what may otherwise be the desultory work of as
many years and more. For this reason I trust that
it will not be necessary to withdraw our troops next
spring, But if they are not then withdrawn, it will
be impossible to withdraw them next summer without
risk of serious injury to their health. I therefore
assume that the shortest period within which we can
complete the evacuation of Afghanistan will not
expire before the autumn of next year. Long ere
then General Eoberts will, I trust, have visited
Bamian, and possibly either he or General Stewart
may also be able to visit Ghuzni. I am told that
there already exists a short route, susceptible of
easy development, from Shutargardan straight to
Bamian, which leaves Kabul entirely on one side.
Should this turn out to be the case, the establishment
of that route would probably bring the great main
outpost of the Hindu Kush well within our military

cc

386 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION OH. vni

TO Lord
'

Programme

tether, and thus reduce Kabul to almost complete
insignificance. ... In any case, independently of
the information we still require about the resources
and conditions of some parts of the country, and
on other points similar to those already indicated,
I should anticipate very valuable permanent results
from our present occupation of Northern and
Western Afghanistan if it be prolonged till the
autumn of nest year. I believe that, when then
evacuating the country, we shall probably leave the
populations of all the occupied districts not only
under a very wholesome sense of the irresistible
character of our power, and the folly and danger of
trifling with it, but also with a lively and suggestive
recognition of the practical benefits derived from the
settled order, social security, and commercial fair
dealing which everywhere accompany the presence
of the British Power. It has been strongly urged
upon me, in favour of the annexation or permanent
occupation of Kabul, that, whatever construction we
ourselves may put upon our evacuation of the
captured city, our withdrawal from it will infallibly
be regarded by the Afghans as a proof of our
inability or fear to retain possession of their capital.
I fully admit that if the evacuation of Kabul were an
isolated step, and if it were taken prematurely or
clumsily, it would most probably have this effect.
But if it is taken deliberately, as part of a previously
enforced re-settlement of Northern and Western
Afghanistan, after our troops have visited Bamian
and moved freely about the country in all directions,
after that country has been allotted to small separate
local Governments, subject to our authority, after
Kabul itself has ceased to be the capital of Afghani-
stan, and when its population will have been dis-

1879 POLICY OF DISINTEGRATION SANCTIONED 387

armed and its fortifications destroyed, then, I cannot TO Lord
think that our prestige will in any wise require the
permanent occupation of a town which, our policy
will have reduced to insignificance and which, our
Generals already consider unsuitable for permanent
occupation. . . . The programme thus far indicated
would, I think, if successfully carried out give us
practical supremacy over Afghan territory up to the
Hindu Kush and the Helmund. It would do this,
moreover, without any appreciable annexation of
Afghan territory, or addition to our present military
establishment, and with some slight increase of
revenue/

Pending the decision of the Government with
regard to the future of Afghanistan Lord Lytton felt
the urgent necessity of improving as speedily as
possible our railway communication with Afghanistan.
Work was at once set on foot, designed as part of
a general system of frontier railways, and destined,
it was hoped, to secure our hold on Kandahar, and to
be also of great commercial advantage. This was the
construction of a railway from Eukh, on the Indus
Yalley line, towards Pishin and the Durani capital.
The prosecution of the work was supervised with
auch energy by Sir E. Temple, the Governor of
Bombay, that by the middle of November it had
been carried forty-five miles beyond Eukh, and on
January 14 following the line was opened to Sibi,
beyond the Kachi desert, 140 miles from the Indus.1

It was not till December 11 that the Secretary of
State communicated to the Viceroy the conviction of
the Cabinet that the establishment of one Government
for the whole of the late kingdom of Afghanistan
was no longer possible, and would give no promise

1 Nwratiw& of Events im. Afghamataari^

oo 3

388 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vni

of permanence. But while contemplating the estab-
lishment of independent native States at Kabul and
Kandahar, necessarily under our control, they had
seriously to consider the future of the more distant
and outlying provinces.

Correspon. The correspondence which this year was con-

ducted between the English Foreign Office and the
Government of Persia with regard to Herat and
Seistan, and to which allusion has been made in the
Viceroy's letters, had an important bearing on the
policy adopted by the Indian Government concerning
Kandahar and the Western States of Afghanistan.
These negotiations eventually came to nothing, and
need not, therefore, be here detailed ; but it is necessary
to point out that it was in view of the probability of
Herat and Seistan being handed over to the in-
dependent power of Persia that Lord Lytton first
held it essential for Kandahar to be secured to British
control.

While these questions of general policy were
under discussion the situation at Kabul was growing
more difficult. It has already been stated that upon
the report of the committee of inquiry into the
Kabul massacres, the Government had decided that
Takub Khan's restoration was impossible. After this
decision his continued residence in General Robertas
camp became embarrassing, and the necessary
instructions were issued for his removal to India.
YakubKhan Yakub Khan, who was himself anxious to depart
left K^ul for India on December 1. He arrived at
Meerut on December 14, where he was placed under
honourable surveillance. He was Mowed on
December 7 by all the sirdars save one, who had
been arrested on October 12. They were sent to
Lahore as State prisoners. The Mustaufi, however,

1879 TRIBAL RISING ROUND KABUL 389

was released by General Eoberts, being credited
with a favourable disposition towards the British
Government, while it was hoped that his knowledge
and influence might be of use in the management of
the country. The departure of the Amir and his
ministers was followed by a general rising of the
tribes round Kabul. The danger of this had from
the first been contemplated by Lord Lytton. On
October 21 he had written to Lord Eoberts, 'My
fear is that when the Afghan people and tribes have
fully realised all that is involved in the Amir's abdi-
cation they may begin to form hostile combinations,
likely ere long to increase our troubles.' By the
time the Government had openly resolved to break
up the kingdom of Afghanistan into separate states,
a ruler for Kandahar had been found in the shape of
Sher Ali Tnisyn3 but no such figure had as yet appeared
in the Northern provinces, and Lord Lytton held, as
has been shown, that no peaceful settlement for those
provinces could be expected till fresh evidence had
been given of the force of our military supremacy.
He was not therefore unprepared for the events which
now took place.

* Throughout the districts round Kabul the mullahs, 3.^ ro?nd
or religious teachers, headed by one influential and
patriotic preacher (Mushk-i-Alam), proclaimed war
against the infidel; and early in December there
was a great mustering of the tribes, who threatened
Kabul from various points, while true intelligence
of their movements became ominously scarce. The
clear account given by Eoberts of his dispositions
for meeting the impending attack, and of the pre-
liminary skirmishing with the converging bodies of
the enemy that were gradually surrounding him,
will interest all students of British warfare; the

Fighting in
the Chardeh
Valley

Jfroxn Lord

Boberts's

Narrative

(Farty-mie

Years in

India)

390 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. Yin

explosive collision occurred in the Chardeh Valley,
where a party of cavalry and horse artillery was un-
expectedly attacked, while making a reconnaissance,
by overwhelming numbers, and forced to retire with
some loss upon the entrenchments at Sherpur. The
' officer in command found himself closely pressed on
his left flank9 which was also his line of retreat, by a
determined enemy who was closing in upon him in
such loose order that the fire of his four guns was
quite ineffectual.

"It was at this critical moment that I appeared on
the scene. Warned by the firing that an engagement was
taking place, I galloped across the Chardeh Valley as fast
as my horse could carry me, and on gaining the open
ground beyond Bhagwana an extraordinary spectacle was
presented to my view. An unbroken line, extending for
about two miles, and formed of not less than between
9,000 and 10,000 men, was moving rapidly towards me, all
on foot save a small body of cavalry on their left flank — in
fact, the greater part of Mahomed Jan's army."

'The various groups of clansmen were arrayed
under their different banners, like the army of Lars
Porsena with its thirty tribal standards at the battle
of Lake Regillus ; and, to save his guns, Eoberts
ordered the cavalry to charge.

"But the ground, terraced for irrigation purposes
and intersected by dykes, so impeded our cavalry that the
charge, heroic as it was, made little or no impression
upon the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, now flushed
with the triumph of having forced our guue to retire."

6 The Afghans rushed on, drawing their kiiives
for close quarters ; one gun had to be spiked and
abandoned in a water cut, and the artillery fell back,
after another stand, until they were stopped "by a

1879 GENERAL ROBERTS WITHDRAWS TO SHBRPUR 391

ditch fully twelve feet deep, narrowing towards the Fighting in
bottom/' when one gun stuck fast, blocking the others, 1'6*1

so that all four guns were for the time lost, and the
cavalry could only retire slowly, with great steadi-
ness, by alternate squadrons. The consequence
might have been more serious if Macpherson, who
was out with a force not far distant, and who
marched back at full speed toward the sound of
cannon, had not arrived just in time to stop the
enemy by throwing the 72nd Highlanders into a gap
by which the road passed through the Trills immedi-
ately overhanging Kabul city.

'This affair, and the handling of overmatched
troops in a most perilous predicament, led to much
subsequent discussion, but for details we must refer
military critics to Lord Boberts's ample narrative.
As the Afghans had now seized and fortified the
heights above Kabul, which was in their hands, it
was resolved to dislodge them from their most
formidable position on the crest of the Takht-i-Shar.
But the slopes leading up the hillside " were covered
with huge masses of jagged rocks, intersected by
perpendicular cliffs, while its natural strength was
increased by breastworks and stockades ; " so that
our best troops only drove off the obstinate defenders
after a very severe and deadly struggle. Meanwhile,
large masses of Afghans were seen coming up in such
numbers that the young officer whose station com-
manded a view of the open valley signalled that the
crowd reminded him of Epsom on the Derby Day.
Eoberts found himself reluctantly compelled to
evacuate all his isolated positions, and to withdraw
his whole force within the great walled enclosure
which he had carefully fortified and provisioned
beforehand at Sherpur.

392 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH, TOI

* A retreat before Afghans, to whom any symptom
withdraws Ma of wavering is a signal for charging home, is always
afaupor a hazardous operation; and on this occasion the
British General had every reason for anxiety.

" The ground was all in favour of the Afghans, who,
unimpeded by impedimenta of any kind, swarmed down
upon the mere handful of men retreating before them,
shouting cries of victory and brandishing their long knives ;
but our brave men, inspired by the undaunted bearing of
their officers, were absolutely steady. They took up position
after position with perfect coolness ; every movement was
carried out with as much precision as if they were man-
oeuvring on an ordinary field-day; and the killed and
wounded were brought away without the slightest hurry
or confusion."

6 Within Sherpur the British force remained com-
paratively untroubled for some days, until the dawn
of a festival religiously observed by Mohammedans,
which fell on December 23.

" The night of the 22nd was undisturbed, save by the
songs and cries of the Afghans outside the walls, but just
before day the flames of the signal-fire, shooting upwards
from the topmost crag of the Asmai range, were plainly to
be seen, followed on the instant by a burst of firing."

Final effort o£ 6The enemy, advancing through the dim half-
racwwSiy tt&kt in heavy masses, was received with volleys of
repelled cannon and rifles, until, after the failure of repeated •
assaults, a flank attack completed his discomfiture.
The defence was admirable; nor is it possible to
withhold our sympathy and admiration for the
devoted gallantry of the Afghans, who, though they
were ill armed, undisciplined, and unprotected by
artillery, persevered for hours in the hopeless enter-
prise of storming formidable entrenchments under the

1879 GENERAL EGBERTS AGAIN AT KABUL 393

deadly fire that swept the open ground in front, and
spent their lives by hundreds in endeavouring to
scale the abattis. They perished bravely in their
patriotic resolve to dislodge, by one supreme effort,
the foreign invader who had fixed himself in the
heart of their country.

* When that effort failed, the backbone of the tribal
insurrection was broken, and the country round
Kabul subsided into sullen tranquillity, although
parties sent into the outlying tracts had to fight
their way.' l

The city of Kabul was re-occupied by the British Amnesty pro
troops, and on the 26th the amnesty conditional De£^ber2B
on submission was proclaimed to aU concerned in
the late events, with the exception of a few speci-
fied individuals, whose cases would be reserved for
instructions from the Government of India.

Arrangements were made for the temporary
administration of the Kabul Province, pending the
final orders of Government, by Sirdar Wall Ma-
homed, and on January 15 he was placed in charge
of the city and district of Kabul, when martial law
in that district was declared to be at an end.2

The Viceroy wrote on December 9 to Lord TO Lord
Cranbrook: 6I have always fully reckoned, as a
certainty, upon a general rising of the country about
Kabul next spring ; and what has .sow occurred is
only unforeseen in so far as it has occurred much
sooner than I expected, with less warning, and on
a larger scale. . . . However difficult the situation
may be, and however heavy the losses which may-
be inevitably involved in it, I have now implicit
confidence that under the present commands things

* Sir Alfred Lyall

» Narrative of Events in AfffJiamstm.

To Lord
Cranbrook,
December 9

Danger of
wearing out
Native Anriy

December 31
Viceroy
resists the
demand for
big battalions

394 LOTH) LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vrn

cannot go radically wrong, that our forces will be well
handled, and that with such forces under such officers
there is no chance of any irreparable disaster. . . .
Meantime what we really want is not more British
troops, but a timely addition to the strength of our
native army, on which we must at all times mainly
depend for military operations or garrison duty in
Afghanistan.

'I consider that our greatest danger at the
present moment (and it is, I think, a very real and
imminent one) is the danger of wearing out our native
army. I do not think we can employ native troops
for lengthened periods beyond the North- West
Frontier without serious risk of injury to their spirit.
While they are actually fighting they will keep in
fairly good heart, but what tries and disgusts them is
picket and escort duty during the long dead seasons
of trans-frontier service, and the unpopularity of such
duty amongst the native troops is aggravated by the
fact that the burden of it must unavoidably fall ou
them more heavily than on the Europeans, who
are not so well able to stand exposure to the
climate.1

On December 31 he writes : ' The Anglo-Indian
Press has behaved throughout the crisis ignobly. In
a paroxysm of panic, it has been for the last woek
daily predicting (with an apparently enthusiastic
satisfaction at the prospect) irreparable disasters;
and now that all its silly predictions are falsified by
the event it systematically ignores our success. I do
hope that our military authorities will not encourage
the foolish cry (which always re-arises on occasions
lite this) for "big battalions" in a country where it
is almost impossible to feed even small ones. Had I
given in to this cry at the outset of the campaign,

1879 VICEROY'S COMMENTS 395

i

what would have been the position of General Eoberts TO
during the last week? Absolutely untenable. I
should have thought that the disasters of the
Russians in the Attrek might have convinced the
believers in "big battalions/' here and at home, of
the irrational character of their clamour as regards
warfare in a barren and barbarous country, The
Duke of Wellington, I think, said of his Peninsular
campaign : " Any General can fight an army, few
can feed one." And the supply difficulties of a
Spanish campaign were as nothing to those of an
Afghan one. ... I regard the quiet, methodical
rapidity with which, under inconceivably difficult
conditions, Eoberts has collected at Sherpur five
months' food and three months' forage, with abundant
firewood for his whole force, and the foresight with
which, from the first day of his arrival at Kabul, he
has been steadily fortifying that position for defence,
as his two greatest military achievements, although
doubtless the importance of them will never be fully
appreciated by the public. ... I wish I could
strengthen his political staff, and I am trying to do
so ; but the worst of it is that Afghanistan is a terra
incognita to all our present politicals. The best of
them is comparatively useless in a country which he
enters for the first time, and with whose influential
people he has not previously established personal
relations. What we sorely need is a small picked
political service, specially trained for Afghan work —
a service of natives as well as Europeans. For in
Afghanistan subordinate native agents more or less
belonging to the country are invaluable — indeed
indispensable — and I cannot find even these native
agents fit for employment there.'

The state and prospect of affairs in Afghanistan

Necessity for
ending
British
occupation
of Kabul

Yakub Khan's
abdication
proclaimed
irrevocable

396 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.VIII

at this time presented to the Indian Government
some difficult, and possibly dangerous, problems.
Kabul and Kandahar, with their lines of communica-
tion towards India, were held in strength by British
garrisons and posts ; and the districts adjoining these
two cities were under the control of British officers.
But the range of our effective administration or
influence went no further; so that the country at
large was without a Government, except at Herat,
where Ayub Khan, one of Sher Ali's sons, had
managed to maintain himself in power. In short,
as we held only the ground that was more or less
under military occupation, and as we could neither
consolidate nor extend our position, the whole course
of operations, military and political, was coming to a
standstill — a condition that was clearly to our dis-
advantage, as it inspired no confidence and seemed
to invite attack. The Government of India was there-
fore under the imperative necessity of finding some
definite issue from this attitude of pause and
uncertainty. The first point of importance was to
take some final decision on the case of Yakub Khan,
then a political detenu in India. After the dispersion
of the tribal combination in December, General
Eoberts had received letters from the leaders, con-
taining a demand for Yakub Khan's restoration, or
for the recognition of his son, Musa Elian ; and other
similar letters had been sent to him from Qhuzui,
including one from Musa Khan himself.

The Viceroy, with the approval of the Secretary
of State, instructed General Eoberts to proclaim in
Kabul that Yakub Khan's abdication was irrevocable,
and this was accordingly done. The opportunity
was taken to declare to the Afghans that no large
territorial annexations were contemplated, ami that

1880 THE RECALL OF YAKUB IMPOSSIBLE 397

the British Government were quite willing to recog-
nise a friendly ruler at Kabul selected by the people
themselves.

In a private letter to Lord Granbrook, dated
January 20, 1880, the Viceroy explained the reasons
for which Yakub Khan had been set aside, and
also sketched out the lines upon which he desired to
proceed in dealing with the general question of the
future constitution of a Government or Governments
in Afghanistan : —

c As regards Yakub Khan. I consider his restore TO Lord
tion to be out of the question. The reasons which,
in my opinion, render it impossible are twofold. The 188°
main one is that the blood of Cavagnari is on his
hands. The committee appointed by me at Calcutta
under the presidency of Mr. Eivers Thompson has
taken, as you will have seen, a lenient view of the
Amir's case; but it does not, and cannot, absolve
him from all responsibility for the death of those
whose lives it is certain he might have preserved
had he chosen to do so. For my part, I sympathise
with those officers at Peshawur who refused to shake
hands with Yakub Khan when he arrived there on
his way to India; and, as Oavagnari's personal friend,
nothing on earth will ever induce me to aid in
restoring to power the man whose hand is imbued
in Oavagnari's blood. If Her Majesty's Government
think otherwise on this point — and it is one on
which I anticipate that our decision will be de-
nounced by the Opposition— I must resign. There
will be no help for it. But I am confident that Her
Majesty's Government will not think otherwise.
Putting aside all personal feelings, it seems to me
that every consideration of policy and common sense
is conclusive against the restoration of Yakub Khan.

To Lord
Cranbrook,
January 20,
1830

Arguments
against the
restoration of
Yakub Khan

398 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vni

In the first place, you will notice that the insurgent
leaders treat the massacre of the whole British
embassy as an unfortunate, but natural and rather
trivial, accident which could not be helped9 and about
which it is absurd to make such a fuss. The
suddenly altered language of Yakub Khan himself is
also pitched in this key, Now, I am sure you will
agree with me that the first duty of the Government
of India in this matter is to make the Afghan people
understand once for all, and for ever, that the
murder of British Envoys is not a trivial accident, but
a most heinous crime, for which all concerned in it
will suffer severely. It is to effect this object that
our forces have re-entered Afghanistan. It is the
complete attainment of this object which seems to
me the first guarantee for any better understanding
or relation with the Afghan people, and assuredly
this object will never be attained if the British
Government by its action in restoring the Amir, under
whose protection our Envoy was murdered, were to
acquiesce in the view taken of that murder by the
writers of these letters, and apparently more or less
by the ex-Amir himself. In the next place, the basis
on which we have now deliberately settled our
present Afghan policy is the disintegration of the late
Afghan kingdom. ... But if Takub Khan either
could not or would not loyally carry out the mild
terms of the Treaty of Gundamuk ; if he and his friends
now say that we were fools to expect from him the
loyal fulfilment of such terms, although, when he
signed them, he was a free agent ; if he now repudiates
the abdication which he was thrice asked to withdraw
at the time when he made it ; if he declares, as he
has declared, that this abdication was extorted from
him by ungenerous and cruel pressure, and that wo

1880 THE RECALL OF YUKUB IMPOSSIBLE 399

have no right to hold him to it and no reason to TO Lord
expect him to abide by it : is it conceivable that he,
now virtually a State prisoner at Meerut, should, if 188°
restored by us to the throne of Kabul, abide one
moment longer than he can possibly help by the
terms of any agreement with us, however solemnlv
ratified, that is based on the dismemberment of his
kingdom, the permanent alienation of two of its
fairest provinces,1 and the gift of one of them, by a
foreign Power, to such an hereditary and hated rival
as Persia ? He might be treacherous enough, perhaps,
to sign such an agreement, but it could not last. If
he adhered to it, his Sirdars would rightly despise
him as the representative of an unprecedented series
of national humiliations. They would soon cabal
against him ; and, if we were not prepared once
more to intervene and support in arms this worthless
creature against the contempt and indignation of all
his subjects, he would swiftly be swept away by
them. On the other hand, if, as soon as restored by
us to the throne of a diminished kingdom, he openly
repudiated, or practically evaded, the conditions on
which we had restored him, we should have again
to intervene for the vindication of a violated treaty
against a sovereign who might, perhaps, be enthusi-
astically supported by the whole fighting power of
the country, and in a cause for which we could not
possibly expect any sympathy from any party in
Afghanistan. Every one of the arguments now put
forth to excuse the disregard of the Gundamuk en-
gagement, and the withdrawal of the Kabul abdica-
tion, could then be urged against us with infinitely
greater truth and justice ; and the British Govern-
ment would, in my opinion, be deservedly covered

1 Kandahar and Herat.

4OO LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vin

To iiord with derision and contempt as the threefold dupe of
its own stupidity, the betrayer of its own cause,

1880 and the renegade of its most sacred duty to the dead

as well as to the living. Assuming, therefore, the
absolute impossibility of restoring Takub Khan to
power at the demand of those who have signed the
letters to General Koberts, and recognising also the
impossibility of keeping him at Meerut without
needlessly vexatious restrictions on his liberty and
that of his household, I propose to remove him as
soon as possible to Ootacarnund, or to some station
in the Neilgherries, where I think he would be out of
harm's way. ... I think that if Takub is removed
to the furthest possible distance from the Afghan fron-
tier, no avoidable restrictions should be placed on his
liberty. Precautions should be taken to prevent his
escape; but, subject to such precautions, I would
propose to allow him every possible comfort and
personal liberty/ 1

In South Afghanistan, the news of the insurrection
around Kabul and the general feeling of suspense in
regard to our eventual policy, had alarmed Sirdar
Sher Ali Khan, who governed with our support at
Kandahar, and some clear declaration of our inten-
tions became urgently required. Accordingly, with
the approval of the Secretary of State, the Govern-
ment of India now decided publicly to announce to
Sirdar Sher Ali Khan that the province of Kandahar
would be permanently detached from Kabul, and
placed under his hereditary rulership, and that we
would pledge ourselves to give him military
support. This decision was communicated by
General Stewart to the Sirdar, who accepted with

1 Takub Khan is living under surveillance at Mussouiie in India.—
B.B. May 20, 1899,

1880 KANDAHAR 401

gratitude the arrangement, but earnestly desired Treaty *it
that the British auxiliary force should be can- AH of
toned within the immediate neighbourhood of the k
city. On April 1, 1880, Six Donald Stewart, who
had commanded at Kandahar since its occupation
in 1879, started for Kabul; and it was left for
Colonel St. John, the political Resident, to deliver
to the Sirdar a letter from the Viceroy, an-
nouncing to him that he had been recognised as
the independent ruler of the province of Kandahar.
This important State paper was afterwards formally
presented to him in the presence of a large assemblage
of notables. In the speech which Colonel St. John
then made he used these words : 6 In order that this
condition of peace and prosperity may continue, and
that it may not return to its former state of poverty
and wretchedness, the Government of England has
decided to restore it to its ancient independence under
the most worthy and capable descendant of its former
Governor, the Sirdar of Kandahar, whose rule only
ceased twenty-five years ago. Under the just govern-
ment of Wall Sher AJi Khan, and under the pro-
tection of England, Kandahar will, if it pleases God,
remain for ever free from foreign oppression, and
will rise to such a height of wealth and prosperity
that it will be the envy of the whole of Islam/

The Wali made a short speech in reply, expres-
sive of his own unworthiness and his gratitude to the
English Government. The Viceroy's presents were
then brought forward and uncovered. The first,
consisting of a sword mounted in blue velvet and
silver with a heavy gold embroidered belt, was
buckled round the Wall's waist by General Primrose,
upon which His Highness said that he trusted he might
have an opportunity of showing his readiness to draw

D D

Treaty of
Wall Sher
Aliof
Kandahar

Mr. Lepe!
Griffin goes to
Kabul, the end
-of March

402 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CU.TIII

it in the cause of the British Government. Colonel
St. John then placed a diamond-studded repeater
watch and gold chain round His Highness's neck, and
presented him with the rest of the gifts. The Guard
of Honour presented arms, and a salute of twenty-one
guns was fired by the artillery. His Highness then re-
ceived the congratulations of all present, and the Kazi
and Mullahs offered a prayer in Pushtu, expressive of
thanks to God and exhortation to the Wali to govern
justly. To this he replied in the same language,
exhorting them also to do their duty in keeping the
people in the right way. The ceremony then ended.
In public everything had gone off well, but in the
new ruler's domestic circle matters were not quite HO
harmonious. It subsequently transpired that after
leaving the assemblage the Wali retired to his private
apartments, where he took off his dress of ceremony,
and, after placing a black rag (expressive of humility)
on his head, offered up open prayers to God for
having elevated him to so exalted a position, vowing
at the same time to be faithful to the British Go-
vernment which had so honoured him. This pro-
duced an outburst of wrath from his niece and
from one of his father's widows, who abused him for
joining the infidels and for daring to compare himself
with his ancestors. The Wall's favourite wife took
his part, and there was a violent quarrel.1

In North Afghanistan, the prospect of any definite
settlement seemed, at the beginning of ] 880, to be
still distant and unpromising, and the Viceroy's
anxiety to terminate a provisional military occupation
was increasing. As one step towards a solution
of the complications at Kabul, he deputed Mr.
(now Sir) Lepel Griffin to undertake the whole

1 Jforafm of Events in AfgUawwtrn.

1880 POLICY OF DISINTEGRATION 403

diplomatic and administrative superintendence of
affairs and negotiations, in subordinate consultation
with the military commander. Mr. Griffin reached
Kabul at the end of March, where he was cordially
welcomed by Sir Frederick Eoberts ; and the Viceroy
embodied in a Minute the lines which he was to
follow and the objects at which he was to aim in
assuming this most important political charge.

In this Minute the Viceroy stated that in the
main the frontier acquired by the Treaty of Ghinda- P0hcyeto be
muk was satisfactory, and that further extensions of ^^m
territory were not desired, but that our principle Afghanistan
of future policy in Afghanistan must be based on
the disintegration of that country and its division
into three or more separate provinces. It would
be necessary to retain a British garrison at or near
Kandahar, but no alteration of our frontier line on
this aide was contemplated, Before attempting any
political settlement of Northern Afghanistan it had
been thought necessary to assert our military
powers beyond all possibility of question, and for
this purpose arrangements were then in progress
for the early concentration around Kabul of a
military force sufficient, it was believed, to establish
our military command. The Viceroy was afraid of
the general harvest, and he felt it most important
that the political situation in Northern Afghanistan
should be finally settled before the crops had been
gathered in and the cultivators set free, or the
restless spirits had grown tired of inaction.

Four courses were now open to the Government :
(t) annexation, (2) military occupation, (3) temporary
occupation until the secure establishment of a friendly
ruler, and (4) withdrawal from the country as soon
as circumstances permitted. Of these the fourth

DD 2

404 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH, Tin

Viceroy's
Minute to
Mr. Lapel

griffin,

March 1880

Viceroy's
views on

seemed to the Viceroy the only one in accordance
with our previous declarations, and likely to produce
a safe and comparatively speedy settlement without
greatly irritating the people of the country, entailing
enormous additional cost to the finances of India,
and placing a heavy strain on her army.

6 It is true,' he went on to say, c that we contemplate
the permanent retention of a garrison at Kandahar.
But the conditions of the two provinces are very
different. The Kandahar population is a less turbu-
lent, warlike, and fanatical one, and that country is
less favourable to guerilla warfare. With only the
moral support of our presence, the Governor, Slier
Ali, has hitherto found no difficulty in preserving
the peace of the province and maintaining his
authority there, and we may reasonably hope that
this authority will be strengthened rather than
weakened as time goes on. Moreover, on this side
our present lines of communication run through a
friendly country, whose inhabitants have shown that
they appreciate the ties of interest by which they
are bound to us ; and we may hope shortly to see
the long and difficult road connecting Kandahar
with the Indus replaced, for most of its course at
least, by a railway which will alike secure our
hold on the districts it traverses and develop their
resources. For these reasons neither the location
of our small garrison at Quettah in 1876, nor the
maintenance now of a permanent military force at
Kandahar, can afford any measure of the task
involved in a military occupation of Kabul.'

While admitting that much might be said in
to be favour of the course of continuing our military
d occupation at Kabul until we ourselves had firmly
established on the throne a friendly ruler, whom we

1880 POLICY OF DISINTEGRATION 405

should not leave till he could reign safely without
our support, this policy had to his mind one fatal
objection — want of finality. It would be impossible
to foresee how long our troops would have to remain
there, and he doubted whether a time would ever
come when their withdrawal would not be followed
by a temporary period of anarchy. The course,
therefore, which he now advocated over all other
courses was c to effect the withdrawal of our forces
from Afghanistan by next autumn at the latest,
making the best political arrangements that circum- Mr. Lepei
stances admit for carrying out this withdrawal and for '
the future administration of the country.' This was
assuming that no change would take place in the rela-
tive positions of England and Russia in Central Asia.
Help other than purely military, he thought,
might safely be given to a successful candidate for
the throne of Kabul. Giving money and arms to a
powerful ruler of United Afghanistan was simply to
feed with fuel the fire of an enemy and enable him
the more effectively to rule independently of British
influence, but to give such help to the ruler of the
comparatively small and poor province which was
all that would be left to Kabul when Kandahar,
Herat, and Turkestan were separated from it would
have the effect of binding him to our interests, since
his success as a ruler would be dependent upon such
help. f Such a subsidy, too, while binding the chief
to our interests, would not tend to raise up enemies
against him, as any more active interference un-
doubtedly would, and, if accompanied by gifts or
allowances from us to those chiefs who show them-
selves favourably disposed, it might do something
to strengthen our influence concurrently with his
authority.'

Viceroy's
Minute to
Mr. Lepel

MarchlBSO

406 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.

In relation to the withdrawal of our forces, the
most important question to be decided was where
the permanent cantonment should be placed. His
own opinion was strongly in favour of returning to
the positions taken up in the Treaty of Ghmdamuk.
Now that Kabul was to be reduced to a comparatively
insignificant province the necessity no longer existed
for the maintenance at or near Kabul of an Envoy with
a garrison, and he considered that our ends would
be best served by withdrawing to some suitable point
from which it would be possible to strike at Kabul
when required. For this purpose the old Kurum
cantonment seemed to him better than any other
site. He doubted whether the obstacles to this
route in winter were greater than the obstacles to
the Jellalabad route in summer.

He added: 6As regards communications, I
understand from the competent engineer by whom it
has been inspected that it would be impossible to
carry a railway through the Khyber, except at a cost
which practically puts it out of the question.1 If,
therefore, a cantonment were established at Gunda-
muk, the long and difficult communication with
Peshawur would always have to be maintained by
road. On the other hand, I am informed that a line
will actually be opened to Kushalghur by July or
August of this year; and from there to Kurum,
excepting the bridging of the Indus, there is no
serious engineering difficulty. I do not undervalue
the political importance of Jellalabad, but I cannot
but see that the retention of that district not only
entails very great additional political responsibilities,
but also the permanent occupation in strength of the
most deadly line of posts that we have yet occupied

1 This is not the present view,

1880 POLICY OF DISINTEGRATION 407

in India — Peshawar, the Khyber, Dakka, and Jella- viceroy's

Tin Minute to

labad. Mr. Lepel

filn reviewing the results of an early withdrawal
from Kabul if undertaken as a measure independent
of the stability of the political settlement effected
there, it is necessary to take into consideration the
probable effect of such a course on the public mind
in India and at home. In India I do not think it
would be misunderstood; it would be generally
recognised that our presence at Kabul was forced on
us, not sought, and that our mission was rather one
of retributive vindication than of conquest, and any
ill effect produced by apparent evidence of weakness
would, I think, be neutralised by the evidence given
of our earnest desire to abstain from annexation.
At home it would be less favourably viewed; and
our retirement without having established a settled
Government, or left a strong and friendly ruler at
Kabul, would be treated by all opponents of our
policy as a confession of failure. That it would not
be an altogether satisfactory termination I admit.
But while critics of the present judge generally by
what has not been done, future critics will judge
more fairly by what has been done. In 1876 the
two great passes of the Bolan and the Khyber, as
well as the minor one of Kohat, were closed to us
At a time of nominal peace, no European's life was
safe a mile beyond our border, Kutchi was a devas-
tated desert,Beloochistan a scene of continued anarchy
and bloodshed, Kandahar suffering under the tyranny
of Kabul, whither its revenue was obtained for the
maintenance of an excessive army ; and immediately
opposite us was growing up a great hostile military
power, daily drawing further from us and nearer to
Russia.

Viceroy's
Minute to
Mi. IiepeL
Gxiffln,
March 1880

To Mr.

Griffin,
February 16

408 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vm

6 Now the passes are open, and daily traversed by
numbers ; our officers move freely over parts of the
border. Kutchi is becoming a rich agricultural
district traversed by a railway; Beloochistan is
peaceful, prosperous and friendly ; Kandahar thriving
under the Governorship of its own natural chief, and
likely soon to be connected with India by railway ;
and that great threatening military power on our
northern border is utterly broken up and dispersed.
Some time must yet elapse before the full benefit
of our exertions and of our expenditure of blood and
money can be reaped, and during this time our
efforts cannot be relaxed. But a consideration of
what has already been effected may well make us
confident of the ultimate results of a policy steadily
adhered to through difficulties abroad, and mis-
representation and party opposition at home.'

On February 16 the Viceroy wrote to Mr. Griffin :
1 1 see no reason why you should not, as soon as you
reach Kabul, set about the preparation of a way for
us out of that rat-trap, by making known to all
whom such knowledge chiefly concerns the cardinal
points of our policy, viz :

c 1st. Non-restoration of the ex-Amir,

'2nd. Permanent severance of Western from

North-West Afghanistan.

' 3rd. Neither annexation nor permanent occupa-
tion of the latter.

• c 4th. Willingness to recognise any ruler (except

Yakub) whom the Afghans themselves

will empower to arrange with us on their

behalf, for the restoration of their

country and its evacuation by our troops.'

In the same letter he informs Mr. Griffin that it

was intended that Sir Donald Stewart, when replaced

1880 ABDUL ItAHMAN

409

at Kandahar from Bombay, should with the whole of
his present force return to India through Ghuzni.
He was not to occupy Ghuzni or linger there, but,
passing through it and overcoming all opposition
by the way, to march as rapidly as he could upon
Kabul. *

Writing to Lord Cranbrook on February 18, the TO Lord
Viceroy says: 'The sole object of all the military
operations I have sanctioned for this spring is to
facilitate the early evacuation of the country. But
to retire in the presence of the powerful hostile
forces now actually holding the field against us
would be a shameful and dangerous folly, and I do
not think any Viceroy could take the responsibility
of giving or carrying out such an order. It is of
Bourse impossible to speak with complete confidence
or positiveness about a situation so uncertain as that
with which we are still dealing in Northern Afghani-
stan, but I still reckon on the evacuation of the
country about the autumn of this year, and I hope
to effect the withdrawal of Stewart's force by the
Shutargardan before the end of the spring.'

While the Viceroy was thus deliberating over the
difficulty of leaving North Afghanistan masterless and Rah»aai
unsettled, the prospect of a new and unforeseen
solution of these complications was offered by the
appearance at Balkh, on the Oxus frontier, of Abdul
llahman. The father of this Sirdar was Mahomed
AfzulKhan, Amir Sher All's elder half-brother, who had
actuallyruledinKabulfromMayl866 to Octoberl867.
After his death the civil war for succession in
Afghanistan had broken out again, and after some
vicissitudes Sher All succeeded in establishing his
authority; whereupon Abdul Rahman retired, first to
the Turkestan districts, and eventually took refuge,

410 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. YHI

in 1870, with the Bussians at Taslikend. He made
several attempts to obtain their aid and countenance
for another campaign against Sher Ali, but ineffec-
tually, and he was compelled to reside as a political
refugee, in receipt of an allowance, beyond the Oxus
till 1880, when he seems to have obtained permis-
sion from the Eussian Government to try his chances
once more in Afghanistan. His own account of the
matter is as follows :

Abdul Tor the first seven years of iny stay with the

Eussians they insisted on my absolutely holding no
communication with Afghanistan, on the plea that
they were under treaty obligations with the Eujrlbli
to abstain from interference in Afghanistan. After
that they told me that Sher Ali Khan had formed
friendship with them, and consequently they could
not permit me to disturb the equanimity of their
friend. When Sher Ali attacked Maimena I again
begged permission to leave, but was refused. Tit UK
treated, at the death of Slier Ali Khan I contem-
plated making my escape secretly. Heforc my plans
were matured, the Eussians heard of my intentions
and forcibly removed me and my family to Tashkent.
When telegraphic news of the deportation of Yakuli
Khan by the English was received, General Kaufmaun
was at Orenburg. His secretary at Taslikend se.ui
for me and said :

' " You have always been anxious to return to your
country. The English have removed Yakub Khan to
Hindustan; the opportunity is favourable. If yon
wish to go, you are at liberty to do so." Bemarking
that I would think over tho matter, I came away.
Some three days later, the secretary again flout for
me and said :

6 "What are you thinking about? Why do yon

ABDUL RAHMAN 41 1

not go ? If you fail it does not matter much, you can AI
return to us and your present allowances. You will Oi
not again get such an opportunity ; if you wish to go,
go now. You surely will be able to drive out General
Ghulam Haidar, and establish yourself in Turkestan.'

6 1 represented that I had no arms, horses,
trappings, or money It was finally arranged, after
communication by wire with General Kaufmann, that
I should be supplied with 200 breech-loading rifles
and 100 rounds of ball ammunition per rifle, trap-
pings and accoutrements for 100 foot and 100
mounted men. When leaving I was presented with
5,000 Bokhara tillas. This sum and the money I
originally had, together with what I had managed to
save out of my allowance, is all that I started with.

6 The Russians pressed me most strongly to leave.
They said I could not leave soon enough. I have
entered into no written or secret engagement witl
the Eussians. I am bound to them by no oath 03 TO secretary
promise, but simply by feelings of gratitude, am9 Ip
consequently I should never like to be obliged tn
fight them. I have eaten their salt and was fol
twelve years dependent on their hospitality, ane
during that time, though often annoyed, I nevie
misconducted myself or forgot my duty to theitr
The assistance given to me in arms, animalss mone
&c., has been considered as a loan, which I will hats
fco repay. The rifles have been valued at twenty-fiul
roubles each. If I am fortunate enough to be maid
Amir, I will desire nothing better than to be allowis
to pass the remainder of my days in peace. I Jar
Tashkend with 100 followers, and travelled 3d
Oratippa, Karategin, ffissar, Kolab, and crosag
the Oxus at Eustack.' l

» Nwrabwo of Evwita w A/gJumistan.

412 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH. vm

The earliest rumours of Abdul Kahman's arrival
in Afghanistan came to the British authorities in the
first days of March J880 ; and almost simultaneously
it was found that his mother, then living at Kandahar,
had received letters indicating that he might not be
unfavourably disposed towards negotiations with the
English Government. The project of treating with
Abdul Eahman for the restoration of government in
North Afghanistan is understood to have originated
Abdul ^ with Major St. John, who was at the moment in
India with the Viceroy ; and Lord Lytton, perceiving
its advantages, immediately acted upon the suggestion.
On March 6 he wrote to Mr. Griffin at Kabul,
referring to the letters received by the Sirdar's
family at Kandahar, saying, 'This communication
ndicates possibilities, and in any case suggests
considerations which may, I think, have the most
mportant practical bearing on the early solution of
ue very difficult problem you are about to deal with
n North Afghanistan.' He proceeded to point out that
ibdul Eahman fulfilled all the conditions required in
chief to whom might be transferred the rulership
C the country, from which it was eminently desirable
lat our troops should speedily withdraw, and
1* accordingly decided that conciliatory messages
%uld be sent to the Sirdar, both from Kabul and
fym Kandahar, as soon as it should be certain that
was in Afghan territory. These instructions were
cicjtioned by the Home Government, although not
Bihout some hesitation and misgivings as to the
disability of treating with a chief who had been
g connected with Eussia, and accordingly on
1 a letter from Kabul was addressed to the

pr and sent by a confidential messenger.

y<fore his arrival several documents addressed

1880 ABDUL RAHMAN" 413

by Abdul Eahman to different persons came into the
hands of the British authorities at Kabul. One of
these, addressed to the principal chiefs of Kohistan,
took very high ground. It appealed to the honour
and glory of Islam and the dignity of the Kingdom
of Afghanistan, and stated that the Sirdar had ar-
rived to save it from the misery and degradation into
which it had fallen, and was ready with this object to
head a religious war and march on Kabul, although
he was content to be at peace with the English if
only they would accede to his representations.

The Afghan troops generally rose in favour of
the new comer, and Lord Lytton began to fear that
the time might slip by when we were in a position to
dictate terms to him, rather than to listen to his
requests backed up by a strong national party.

Writing to the Secretary of State on April 12 he
said:

* You will remember that more than a month ago TO Secretary
I urged the expediency of sending to (Abdul Eahman), f
while his strength was still weak and his position
still uncertain, a public deputation from the Kabul
Sirdars to offer him, with the open connivance of the
British Government, the throne of Kabul, which we
were then in a position to assign to him upon our
own terms.

'The situation Jias within the last three weeks
changed very considerably in favour of Abdul
Eahman, and my present fear is that the wrecks and
refuse of the Ghuzni faction will ere long rally to his
standard, placing him in a position to appear
suddenly before Kabul at the head of a united
nation, «'ind dictate terms to us, instead of accepting
th m from us.'

Sir Donald Stewart and his force left Kandahar

414 LORD LYTTOJSTS INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. vii

Sir Donaia on April 1, and occupied Ghuzni on the 21st, after a
Ei£9 severe action on the 19th with the tribesmen, a
brforeGhuzm jarge foody Of whom charged the British troops with
great gallantry, but without success. The division
only remained three days at Ghuzni, leaving Sirdar
Mahomed Alam Khan, the uncle of Musa Khan, in
charge of a provisional Government. A force was
sent from Kabul to co-operate with the Kandahar
force, the main body of which under General Boss en-
countered no serious opposition A small contingent,
however, under Colonel Jenkins was attacked, but un-
successfully, by a formidable gathering at Oharasiab.
The Kabul and Kandahar forces joined on April 28,
and Sir Donald Stewart arrived at Kabul on May 2,
and as senior officer assumed from Sir P. Roberts
the chief command, as well as political control,
ro Lord c Stewart/ wrote Lord Lytton, chas gained two

jrantorook, victories before Ghuzni, one of them a very brilliant
pn and decisive one, and Jenkins lias had a most

successful engagement at Oharasiab. These military
successes leave us masters of the political position, if
we do not hastily throw away our advantages.'

On April 21 our messenger to Abdul Ealmuiu
returned to Kabul with a letter from thai Sirdar
which the Viceroy characterised as very friendly
and very clever. Writing to Lord Oranbrook on
April 27 lie says : e We have found in Abdul Rahman
a ram caught in the thicket/ His letter, obviously
dictated by Eussian advisers, professed warm friend-
ship with us, provided we did not impose on him
conditions which he could not accept without
apparent ingratitude to Bussia, ' whose salt he had
eaten,9 and proposed that 'Afghanistan should be
neutralised and placed under the joint protectorate
of the British and Eussian Empires.1 Lord Lyttou

1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN 415

comments upon this, ' I feel sure that Abdul Eahman's TO Lord

letter was composed for him in the belief that we

should, according to our invariable custom, reply to it

by indicating conditions which, if contested, would

furnish matter for lengthened negotiation, and that

we should haggle and barter about the terms of our

future relations with him. This would have ended

in his dictating his own terms and remaining master

of the situation. Our position would have been

that of gamblers sitting down at 10 o'clock to break

the bank with the knowledge that, whether they

win or lose, they must leave off playing at 12 o'clock.'

Lord Lytton, therefore, was in favour of immediately

informing Abdul Eahman that whilst, ' if he would

not share the fate of Sher Ali, he must put out of

his head both the acquisition of Kandahar, which

we would never restore, and the Anglo-Eussian

protectorate, which we would never tolerate in a

country acknowledged by Eussia to be beyond the

legitimate sphere of her action ; on the other hand,

we were ready to hand over to him at once, without

any provisions at all, Kabul and all the rest of the

country if he would come and receive it from us.

But that our troops would in any case be withdrawn

not later than October,' when Kabul would probably

be c jumped ' by the leader of the Ghuzni party if

he were not previously on the spot to secure the

reversion of it with our assistance.

These views were communicated to Mr. Griffin Letter from
in a letter from Mr. Lyall, the Foreign Secretary to
the Indian Government, dated April 27. *The Aprils?
single object/ this letter stated, * to which the Afghan
policy of this Government has at all times been
directed and limited is the security of the North-
Western Frontier of India.' The intrusion of any

41 6 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. Tin

Mr. Lyaiito foreign influence into the great border State of
April 27 n' Afghanistan had always been held, and must always
be held, incompatible with that security. For long
our endeavour had been to find in the friendship and
strength of the rulers of Afghanistan the requisite
guarantee for the security of our own frontier.
Failing in that endeavour, our object must be to
establish the security of our frontier independently
of such conditions. The letter continues :

c This conclusion was not accepted without reluc-
tance. Not even when forced into hostilities by
the late Amir Sher Ali Khan's espousal of a Eussiau
alliance proposed by Eussia in contemplation of a
rupture with the British Government, did we
relinquish our desire for the renewal of relations with
a strong and friendly Afghan power ; and when the
sons of Sher Ali subsequently sought our alliance and
protection, they were at once accorded to him on
conditions of which His Highness professed to appre-
ciate the generosity. The crime, however, which
dissolved the Treaty of Ghmdamuk, and the disclosures
which followed that event, finally convinced the
Government of India that the interests committed to
its care could not but be gravely imperilled by
further adhesion to a policy dependent for its fruition
on the gratitude, the good faith, the assumed self-
interest, or the personal character of any Afghan
prince.

* When, therefore, Her Majesty's troops re-entered
Afghanistan in September last, it was with two well
defined and plainly avowed objects. The first was
to avenge the treacherous massacre of the British
mission at Kabul; the second was to maintain the
safeguards sought through the Treaty of Gundamuk,

1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHJMAN 417

by providing for their maintenance guarantees of a Mr. Lyaii to
more substantial and less precarious character.

6 These two objects have been attained — the first
by the capture of Kabul and the punishment of the
crime committed there, the second by the severance
of Kandahar from the Kabul power.

6 Satisfied of their attainment, the Government of
India has no longer any motive or desire to enter into
fresh treaty engagements with the ruler of Kabul.
The arrangements and exchange of friendly assurance
with the Amir Sher Ali, though supplemented on the
part of the Government by subsidies and favours of
various kinds, wholly failed to secure the object of
them, which was nevertheless a thoroughly friendly
one, and no less conducive to the security and
advantage of the Afghan than to those of the British
power. The treaty with Yakub Khan, which secured
to him our friendship and material support, was
equally ineffectual. Moreover, recent events and
arrangements have fundamentally changed the situa-
tion to which our correspondence and engagements
with the Amir of Afghanistan formerly applied. Our
advanced frontier positions at Kandahar and Kurum
have so materially diminished the political importance
to the paramount objects of our policy, that we no
longer require to maintain British agents in any part
of his dominions.'

The letter then goes on to say that the victory
over the armed gatherings near Ghuzni, and the
appearance of Abdul Bahman as a candidate for the
throne of Kabul, whose claim the Government of
India has no cause to oppose, and the majority of the
population seemed willing to support, removed the
only two reasons which had prevented an even earlier

Mr. Griffin
to Abdul
Rahman,
April 30

Viceroy to
Sir Donald
Stewart,
May 18

418 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTBATION OH. via

withdrawal of our troops. The answer to be sent to
Abdul Eahman is then dictated in the sense of Lord
Lytton's letter already quoted.

Mr. Griffin thereupon addressed a letter to Abdul
Eahman, on April 30, in general accordance with
these instructions, but specific reference to Kandahar
or to a fixed date for the evacuation of Kabul was
omitted on the suggestion of Sir Frederick Eoberts
and Mr. Griffin — in the one case because mention of
Herat would also be necessary, in the other lest the
Sirdar should be induced to temporise.

The letter urged upon Abdul Eahman the impor-
tance of a prompt decision, and added that at no
place but Kabul could final arrangements be satis-
factorily and quickly made.

The terms of this letter were not thought altogether
satisfactory by the Viceroy, who wrote to Sir Donald
Stewart at Kabul on May 16 : —

'Our position is really a very simple and
perfectly plain one — it requires no finessing, and,
as I understand and have stated it, it distinctly
excludes not only all negotiations or bargaining with
Abdul Eahman, but also all pretence of establishing
a friendly Amir at Kabul. It is not our business or
function to establish any Amir at all ; arid it would
be sheer folly to rely upon his friendship, or any
arrangements for rendering our interest dependent
on such friendship, or any arrangements devised for
the purpose of securing it. Our position is, that
having now completed our own arrangements for
rendering our interests independent of such friend-
ship, and having defeated every attack upon us, we
are about to evacuate Northern Afghanistan without
delay; and we give notice of this intention to -Abdul
Eahman, not because we have any bargain to drive

1880 CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT AT HOME 419

•with him about it, but in order that, if he wishes to
take advantage of it in any manner not inimical to
us, he may lose no time in doing so.

c The above mentioned arrangements are of course
the irrevocable separation of Kandahar from the
Kabul Power, and the permanent retention and
strengthening of the frontier positions secured to us
by the Treaty of Gundamuk. Though these are
doubtless known to Abdul Rahman, I think that the
irrevocable nature of them should be in fairness
distinctly explained to him. I consented with re-
luctance to Griffin's strong recommendation sup-
ported by Lyall to omit from his first letter to that
Sirdar all reference either to these arrangements or
to the date of our evacuation ; but I cannot approve
his allusions to the " establishment of a friendly Amir
at Kabul." Our position is a strong one so long as
we avow it plainly and act on it firmly. Otherwise
it may become a very false one.'

These negotiations, however, were not to be
carried to their conclusion under Lord Lytton's
administration, which was now drawing to a close.

The arrival of Sir Donald Stewart at Kabul
coincided with a change of administration in England.
On April 28 the Government of Lord Beaconsfield Mr. Gladstone
was succeeded by that of Mr. Gladstone, Yiscount
Oranbrook being replaced as Secretary of State for
India by the Marquess of Hartington. Lord Lytton's
policy in India had been made the subject of bitter
attack by the party who now came into power, and
he therefore resigned office with his political friends.
The Marquis of Eipon was appointed his successor
as Yiceroy of India.

On April 7 Lord Lytton wrote to Lord Oran-
brook :

BB2

420 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH, vm

From Lord Lytton to Viscount Craribrook

[Private] ' Calcutta : April 7, 1880.

TO Lord My dear Lord Cranbrook, — It seems scarcely

Or^brook, worth while to ^e to yoll by this mail about

affairs. I know not in what circumstances my letter
will find you ; but it seems probable that before you
get it you will have ceased to be Secretary of State
and I shall have ceased to be Viceroy. What an
unaccountable collapse. ... I suppose that my
successor, whoever he be, can scarcely reach India
before June, which will be a very trying season for
his journey as well as for mine. But it is extremely
desirable that he should relieve me without any
avoidable delay. For the safe solution of the Afghan
question now seems likely to depend on the manage-
ment during the next two months of arrangements
at Kandahar and negotiations at Kabul, which can
neither be suspended nor postponed with impunity,
nor yet satisfactorily conducted by a Viceroy noto-
riously destitute of the confidence and support of the
Queen's constitutional advisers. If the new ministry
breaks the pledges we have given Sher Ali Khan, or
swallows the bait likely to be laid for it by Abdul
Eahman of a neutralised Afghanistan under joint
guarantees, it will be an evil day for India and for
England too. But I will not paint the devil on
the wall, I trust, dear Lord Oranbrook, that those
personal relations between us which to me have
been such pleasant ones may survive their official
ties, and that on my return to England you will
still allow me to regard you as a political, though no
longer an official, chief. I assure you I shall always
recall with the liveliest gratitude the encouraging
confidence and generous support with which you

1880 CHANGE OF MINISTRY AT HOME 42!

have honoured me during a very critical and anxious
period of my Indian administration.

To Sir James Stephen he wrote :
From Lord Lytton to Sir James Fitzjames Stephen

[Prwate] ' Calcutta : April 7, 1880.

6 My dear Stephen, — Were you ever in the Forest TO sir James
of Arden? I have always fancied it must be^the
most charming place in the world, more especially
in summer time. I shall shortly be on my way to
it, I think, and I hasten to give you rendezvous at
the Court of the Banished Duke. If you meet our
friend, the melancholy Jacques, greet him from me
most lovingly, and tell him — Ducdamet — that all
the fools are now in the circle and he need pipe to
them no more. Tell h™ 'tis found to be a magic
circle, which works wonders. Once in it the fools
become the wise, whilst out of it wisdom is labelled
folly, Tell him that young jade, Democracy, has
borrowed from Fortune her wheel and bandage;
and that out of Arden Wood the game now in
fashion is chuck-farthing with empires for counters.
If that fool Touchstone has not already joined the
others now dancing in motley to the tune of Dwc-
dame! ducdamel let him know that I bring him
the end of the tale he found hanging by that " pro-
digious pippin " which rots when it ripens ; tell
him he must sell his old dial, get himself a brand new
watch from Birmingham, and so be up to the time
of day, if he would not be trampled by all the
acorned hogs when they cry Oh ! and mount. And
tell your own great heart, dear and true friend, that
the joy I take from the prospect of seeing you is
more precious to me than all that Providence has

422 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. Tin

taken from the fancy prospect I had painted on
the blank wall of the Future of bequeathing to India
the supremacy of Central Asia and the revenues of
a first-class Power.'

From Lord Lytton to Viscount Cranbrook

'Simla: April 20, 1880.

TO Lord * My dear Lord Cranbrook, — I fear that this reply

Aprnbao°k' to y°ur Ver7 welcome letter of the 21st ultimo will
find you functus officio. As for myself, I am still
waiting for the fiat of the new Downing Street
divinities ; but, like Falstaff, " I would it were bed-
time, and all were over." In these circumstances
our official correspondence becomes rather anoma-
lous, but by force of habit I shall continue the
thread, or rather "the tape," of it, till I receive
authentic information that your resignation and my
own have been accepted by the Queen. I do not think
that my successor could, without serious risk to his
health, come out earlier than next autumn, for till
then the plains of India will be hotter than the
furnaces of Nebuchadnezzar ; and if Her Majesty's
new ministers wish me to carry on this Government
till I can personally transfer it to the new Viceroy
I shall deem it a public duty to do so, provided only
that during the interval, which must be virtually a
sort of interregnum, I am not required to carry out
measures to which it would be obviously impossible
for me to set my hand. Certainly there could
scarcely be a worse or more dangerous moment than
the present for any radical change of Government in
India ; and, as in the conduct of this Government I
have never had any other feeling than a most earnest
desire to do my best and utmost for the interests of

1880 LORD LYTT03NT RESIGNS 423

India and the service of the Crown, so I trust I should TO Lord
be sustained by the same motive if required to carry
on the Government of India till the cool season is suffi-
ciently advanced to enable my successor to relieve
me of it without risking his life. But, in that case,
my position will not only be a personally painful one :
what is far more important is that it will, I fear,
be powerless for good and injurious to the dignity
and authority of the viceregal office. For I shall
be working on sufferance under a ministry whose
members have publicly proclaimed that I possess
neither their confidence nor their esteem, and who
have, indeed, omitted no opportunity of casting ridi-
cule and discredit on my character and that of my
administration. If, on the other hand, Her Majesty's
new advisers are of opinion that the disadvantages
would exceed the conveniences of such an arrange-
ment, Sir John Strachey, as Senior Member of my
Council, would take charge of the Government, pend-
ing tlie arrival at Calcutta of the Duke of Bucking-
ham, by whom, as senior Presidency Governor, it
must, by law, be conducted till transferred to the
new Yiceroy. This arrangement would, I believe,
oblige all the members of the Government to return
to Calcutta for the Duke's installation ; and I think
I should also take sail from Calcutta at the same
time, so as to avoid the terrible journey to Bombay ;
but, as I could not bring Lady Lytton and my
children across the plains of India in this deadly
Reason, even as far as Calcutta, I shall be obliged to
leave thorn somewhere at Simla till they can rejoin
me hi England next autumn. Enough of these
personal matters.'

Early in May Lord Lytton heard that he had

424 LOUD LYTTON>S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.TOI

been recommended by Lord Beaconsfield for an
Earldom.

To the Earl of Beawnsfield

[Private] 'Simla: May 4, 1880.

TO Lord '^y ^ear ail<* Honoured Chief, — You will not

Beaoonsfieia, have doubted the sincerity of my thanks, and those

ay of Lady Lytton, for your valued recommendation of

the Earldom, which I specially value as a public

mark of your sympathy and the Queen's approval

now that I have fallen, not only upon evil times, but

also upon evil tongues.

6 In discharging the duties of the important office
for which you selected me more than four years ago,
it has been my constant endeavour to justify, and if
possible requite, the great and courageous confidence
which entrusted the duties of it to hands so untried
as mine. In now resigning it, therefore, with every
sentiment of personal gratitude and fidelity, allow me
to assure you that the continuance of your confidence
has been my chief sustainment and encouragement
throughout four years of much mental anxiety and
physical fatigue. I now long for rest and even
obscurity. My conception of beatitude is procul
negotiis. And even under conditions far more
favourable than those to which I can look forward,
I feel that I have already survived the age at which
any man can, without previous training for it,
commence a parliamentary career with reasonable
prospects of success. Too old to court failure, I am
still too inexperienced to escape it in any new field
of public exertion. But although these are the
feelings with which I contemplate my early return
to England, I am, believe me, neither destitute of
gratitude nor indifferent to its duties. And should

1880 EARLDOM BESTOWED UPON LORD LYTTON 425

it ever be your opinion that I can, by word or deed,
speech or pen, in or out of Parliament, render the
smallest service to the great cause which history
will identify with your name, to the chief who
commands my unreserved allegiance, or to the
party which has stood by me during the last four
troubled years, need I assure you that I feel
bound to you by every tie of personal gratitude,
political sympathy, and public duty. It is at least
in the fullest recognition of all these ties, that I remain,
dear Lord Beaconsfield,

6 Tour affectionately devoted friend and servant,

'LYTTON/

426 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH, ix

CHAPTER IX

NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL BAHMAN. CHANGE OF
ENGLISH MINISTRY. CONCLUSION

IT has been seen that at the time of the change
of ministry at home military operations in Af-
ghanistan had practically been completed. The
Government of India were determined that our troops
should retire from Northern Afghanistan by the
autumn of the year. The objects of the war had
been achieved. The murder of the British Envoy
had been avenged ; the disintegration of the country
had been secured by the severance of Western from
Northern Afghanistan, and such a position had been
gained by our troops as to render the Government of
India independent henceforth of the good or ill will
of the Amir of Kabul. Nothing, therefore, was to be
gained by a continued military occupation of a
country we had decided not to annex, and much
might be lost thereby in lives and money. Lord
Lytton, holding this view of the situation very strongly,
urged that our withdrawal should be unconditional.
That having chosen a date convenient to our troops for
their evacuation of Kabul, their movements should not
be hindered or precipitated by any arrangements which
the people of Kabul were free to make with Abdul
Eahman orany other Sirdar. It has already been shown
that he strongly disapproved of such language being
used by our officers in command at Kabul as could lead
Abdul Eahman or any other chief to suppose that we

1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN 427

were willing to enter into treaty arrangements for situation in

_ , m m ft * m A ^Pn B^^ffttW

the maintenance or support of any chief aspiring atthatime
to the throne of Kabul. The policy of establishing
friendly relations with the Amir, and supporting the
integrity of his kingdom, on conditions of reciprocal
goodwill had failed. We had now made ourselves inde-
pendent of the alliance of any Amir, and although we
desired, for the restoration of internal order, to leave
the government in the hands of a capable ruler, it was
otherwise a matter of indifference to us who was
chosen, and we did not desire to interfere in the
matter of his election. Abdul Rahman had appeared
to Lord Lytton a hopeful candidate for the Amirship
from the first moment he was known to have set
foot in Afghan territory, but the Viceroy held most
strongly that no negotiations with him should be
entered into without the clearest definition of our
position in the sense here stated.

This view was accepted by those in authority
at Kabul with some difference of opinion. They
were anxious not to evacuate the country without
leaving it in the hands of some settled govern-
ment, and with this object their communications
with Abdul Eahman were so worded as to en-
courage that Sirdar to assume the position of one
able and willing to bargain. His reply to NX. Griffin's
letter of April 30 was to the effect that his further
progress towards Kabul would depend upon whether ^pl ^ g0
he could obtain satisfactory assurances on such
questions as (1) the retention of Kandahar, (2) the
presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan, and (3)
the conditions we would exact with regard to his
attitude towards Eussia. Lord Lytton felt that the
principles which should govern any reply to this
letter were of vital importance and could hardly be

428 LORD LTTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH ix

laid down by 6 a moribund Government.' It was a
matter which must be left for the consideration of
the new Viceroy. Lord Lytton could do no more
than place on record in a Minute to be put before
Lord Eipon and his Council, so soon as he should
reach India, the course which, in his opinion, it
would be best to pursue. In this Minute he advised
that General Stewart should receive very definite
and precise instructions respecting not only his reply
to Abdul Rahman, but also his own movements.
General Stewart in answer to Lord Lytton's inquiries
had wired from Kabul : c The force under my com-
mand is so strong that it can withdraw at any moment
without serious risk. ... A precipitate withdrawal
would be impolitic, but it would not be attended with
any dangerous risk, whether a friendly ruler has or
has not been found.' Lord Lytton therefore con-
sidered that the instructions to General Stewart
should express the desire of the Government * that
the evacuation of Kabul should be commenced at
the earliest possible date which in the opinion of
the General commanding in the field may be com-
patible with his military and political appreciation
of the situation, for which he is responsible ; that it
should be carried out, not with precipitation (which
must be the case if it is deferred till the last moment
fixed by the Government of India, some months ago,
for the complete retirement of our forces from
Northern Afghanistan), but in a leisurely deliberate
manner, and that every care should be taken to
avoid all appearance of mystery or uncertainty in
regard to the intentions of Government on this
important point. Furthermore, that the evacuation
of Kabul should be effected by the gradual, but early,
and, if possible, immediately commenced retirement

1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN 429

of the army of Northern Afghanistan on the two
commanding positions of Ghindamuk and the Kurum laat Minut8'
headlands. In the meanwhile the situation in
Northern Afghanistan will have greatly developed ;
and during the intervening period our forces will
hold military positions sufficiently commanding for
their support of any political purpose which can
possibly arise out of that situation.

6 As regards the political instructions to General
Stewart, I strongly disapprove of any ultimatum to
Abdul Bahman, for an ultimatum implies terms and
conditions ; it is, in fact, the ordinary result of an
abortive negotiation. But with Abdul Eahman we
should carefully avoid all negotiation. I would
instruct General Stewart to write briefly to the Sirdar
in the following sense :

c (a) That the Sirdar has misunderstood the object

of the mission sent to him.

' (&) That the Government of India does not desire to
select or appoint any ruler for that portion
of the Afghan provinces which it is about to
unite.

*(c) That in regard to any such selection it is
willing to recognise the choice of the people
concerned.

'(d) That, though also willing to accept, and ready
to reciprocate, the friendship of the ruler
thus selected, it has been constrained to take
steps for rendering the maintenance of its
own interests practically independent of the
friendship or hostility of any such ruler,
experience having proved to it that no
reliance can be placed upon treaty or other
engagements with the Kabul Power ; and
all treaties concluded with the last legitimate

430 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH, is

and recognised rulers of Kabul having
last Minute been, dissolved by war.

6(0) That the measures which have thus been
imposed on the Government of India, in
defence of its own interests, are — the per-
manent maintenance of the frontier positions
acquired by it under the Treaty of Gundamuk,
and which, without seeking to renew that
treaty, will certainly be retained as con-
quered territory; and also the permanent
severance of the whole province of Kandahar
from the Kabul Power.

6 (/) That these territorial arrangements are irrevo-
cable ; that they have been made, and will
be maintained, without regard to the assent
or dissent of any Amir of Kabul ; and that
any attempt on the part of such a ruler
to disturb them will involve him in open
enmity with the British Government.

* (g) That the Government of India, having com-

pleted these arrangements, and beaten all its
enemies in Northern Afghanistan, is about to
evacuate the country.

'(A) That our object in communicating with the
Sirdar was to give him timely information
of these decisions, in order that he might, in
his own interests, take such advantage of
them as appeared to him desirable.

s(z) That we were induced to take that step,
because he appeared to be one of the most
capable and promising of the numerous
candidates for the vacant throne.

* (j) But that the Government of India is not con-

cerned to espouse or oppose the personal
cause of such candidates, so long as their

1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN 431

political or military action does not infringe Lord Lytton's
its rights or threaten its interests ; and that tafc Mmute
in no case can it sign treaties, or enter into
alliances, with rulers who do not yet exist.

6 (k) It has consequently no conditions to make
with Abdul Eahman ; no negotiations to
open with him.

6 (Z) It retains in its own hands, permanently, the
military means of promptly punishing any
Kabul ruler who, whether under foreign or
domestic influence, fails in any of those
commonly recognised duties of good neigh-
bourhood which every great Power is
entitled to expect and demand from the
Government of a contiguous State, and it
seeks no other guarantee for the good
behaviour of the future ruler of those pro-
vinces which, having secured that guarantee,
it is about to evacuate.

6(m) If Abdul Eahman, who will meet with no
opposition from us unless he provokes it,
succeeds in procuring the position to which
he aspires, it will be for him to shape his
future conduct as Amir of Kabul, according
to his appreciation of his own interests,
under the conditions thus explained to him.
If, in his endeavours to confirm that position
he decides to rely upon Eussian aid, — he
will do so with a full knowledge of the
dangers to which such a decision may expose
him. If, on the other hand, he requires,
and prefers to seek, our aid, — his application
for it will be fairly considered in reference
to the circumstances under which it is
made.

432 MED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. EC

c(n) He must understand, however, that, as we
have nothing to ask from him, it is out of
Ms power to dictate terms to us. We do
not require his assistance. If he requires
ours, he must ask for it, and prove to us
that it will "be worth our while to accede to
his request. We do not offer it to "him.
6 (o) With regard to Herat, he should be told that
we shall not oppose any endeavour on his
part to take and keep it; and that, if his
endeavour is successful, it will be recognised
by us.

6 1 think it very desirable that measures for the
evacuation of Kabul itself should be openly com-
menced simultaneously with the despatch of some
such letter to Abdul Uahman.

6 1 would offer to, and provide for, Abdul Eahman
the earliest possible opportunity of entering Kabul
without finding in it any British troops. I would
leave to him, on his entry there, a free field for a
trial of strength between his own party and that of
the partisans and representatives of the ex- Amir.
I am convinced that without such a trial of strength,
no solid Government can be established at Kabul;
and that the British Government cannot advantage-
ously interfere with this preliminary process of
natural selection. I would scrupulously abstain
from any action which could commit us even to the
apparent espousal of either cause; leaving to the
surviving victor in the conflict the apparently un-
avoidable necessity of suing to us for assistance or
support, which we could then give on our own terms
or conditions, to enable him to maintain his victory
and consolidate the authority acquired by it. I
would act, in short, consistently, and persistently, on

1880 INEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN 433

the only principle which seems to me appropriate to LordLytton'a
the great strength, and solidity, of our position, if Mt Minute
we do not fritter its strength and solidity away by
a nervous, fussy, and futile diplomacy.

6 1 have not thought it necessary in this Minute
to deal with any of the incidental questions con-
nected with the duty of making adequate provision
for the protection of any Sirdars or tribes whose
relations with our authorities at Kabul during the
occupation of that place may have been such as to
establish a claim on our protection, which, when
finally examined, is admitted by those authorities to
be valid. Unless our representatives at Kabul have,
in their confidential communications with such tribes
or Sirdars, committed the Government to an extent
of which we are not at present aware, it is primA
fade extremely improbable that there can be any
large number of these claims that will stand impartial
examination arising out of our temporary relations
with the population of which almost every man has
been either an open enemy or a secret traitor to our
authority. Whatever claims of this kind may be
hereafter fairly established by local investigation
should be frankly recognised and substantially satis-
fied at any cost. But these are questions on which
the Government of India can, I consider, express no
opinion without further information and advice from
General Stewart, to whom a final examination of all
such claims may, I think, be safely entrusted.

'But, whatever happens, I sincerely trust that
the Government of India will never be induced to
assent to the restoration of Yakub Khan. The hands
of that Prince are deeply stained in the innocent
blood of Sir Louis Oavagnari and his brave com-
panions. Subsequent secret correspondence and in-

F F

434 LOKD LYTTOFS INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.IX

formation has, in my opinion, fully confirmed the
unanimous verdict of the Kabul Commission as to the
deliberate guilt of Takub Khan ; and I would here
remind my colleagues in the Government of India
that, without reference to such further information,
which the Foreign Secretary will be able to lay before
my successor, the Advocate-General and the Chief
Justice of the High Court at Calcutta have substan-
tially endorsed the verdict of the Kabul Commission.
.... But, if such a question is hereafter raised by
the action of the Government of India, in restoring
Takub Khan to the throne of Kabul, or otherwise
condoning his participation in the massacre of the
British Embassy, I think it only due to my successor
that I should here place on record my firm determina-
tion, as a personal friend of the murdered men, to
omit no means or opportunities available to me of
opposing and publicly condemning any such action.

6 LYTTON.'

1 SIMLA: 5th June, 1880.1

Loni Bipon's This Minute maybe said to contain LordLytton's
amval last words as Viceroy of India. They were written
on June 5. On June 8 Lord Bipon arrived at Simla
and received from Lord Lytton the charge of govern-
Lord Lytton'a ment. On June 28 Lord Lytton left Simla, and set
sail for England from Bombay on July 3.

A few days after Lord Eipon's arrival at Simla
he received news that letters had been intercepted
from Abdul Eahman to the Afghan chiefs urging
them to assemble their forces and make ready to
join him in a united march upon Kabul.

These letters appeared to betray hostile intentions
towards the British Government, and the advisability
of at once breaking off negotiations with Abdul
Eahman was considered.

18BO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN 435

LordBipon, however, and the Government of India
considered that before such correspondence was
finally closed it would be reasonable that the Sirdar
should receive definite answers upon the points he
had raised, to which he no doubt attached chief
importance.

Accordingly, on June 14 the authorities of Kabul, Abdul Baii-
acting upon instructions from the Indian Government,
addressed a communication to Abdul Rahman in
which these replies were clearly stated.

In the first place, with regard to the position of
the ruler of Kabul to foreign powers, he was assured
that 6the British Government admit no right of
interference by foreign powers in Afghanistan,' that
since both Eussia and Persia were pledged to abstain
from all political interference with the affairs of
Afghanistan, it was plain the Kabul ruler could
4 have no political relations with any foreign power
except the English.' If any such foreign power
attempted to interfere in Afghanistan 'and such
interference should lead to unprovoked aggression
on the Kabul ruler,' then the British Government
would * aid him if necessary to repel it,' provided
that he followed their advice.

With regard to the limits of territory he was told
that the province of Kandahar had been placed under
a separate ruler, that Fishin and Sibi were retained
in British possession, and the arrangements concluded
with the ex-Amir Takub Khan with regard to the
North-Western Frontier held good. These matters
did not admit of discussion, but with these reserva-
tions the British Government were willing that he
should establish over Afghanistan and Herat, though
Ms possession of Herat could not be guaranteed to

FP 2

436 LOBD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH ix

Mm, as complete and extensive authority as had been
exercised by any Amir of his family.

Finally, he was assured that the British Govern-
ment did not desire to interfere in the internal
government of these territories, and would not
require the admission of an English Eesident any-
where in Afghanistan, although for * convenience of
ordinary friendly intercourse between two contiguous
States it may be advisable to station by agreement a
Mohammedan agent of the British Government at
Kabul/

c If you should,1 the letter went on to say, t after
clearly understanding the wishes and intentions of
the British Government, as stated in former letters,
and now further explained, desire these matters to be
stated in a formal writing, it is necessary that you
should first intimate plainly your acceptance or
refusal of the invitation of the British Government,
and should state your proposals for carrying into
effect friendly arrangements.' 1
Abdul Bah- The Sirdar's reply to this communication was

vm wpbes, receive(j at Kabul On June 26. In it he expressed
satisfaction at the terms of Mr. Griffin's letter, but
made no direct allusion to the retention of Kandahar.
In a circular which at the same time Abdul Rahman
issued to the tribes he gave a misleading version of the
nature of the communication he had received from the
British Government. But his position was a difficult
one. However really anxious to make peace with the
English, he had also to impress the powerful and
hostile tribes of Afghanistan with the conviction that
he came with power to seize and retain authority as
ruler at Kabul. His object, therefore, was to accept
the best terms possible from the British Government,

1 Narrative of Events in Afghanistan,

1880 NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDCIL RAHMAN 437

and appear in the eyes of the Afghans to have
dictated those terms.

Our Envoy to Abdul Rahman, while treated with
outward respect and courtesy, was in fact kept a close
prisoner in his camp, and never left his tent from
the day he arrived to the day he left, except when
summoned to formal interviews with the Sirdar

After considering the terms of Abdul Rahman's
letter, the report of the Envoy as to his general im-
pressions of the Sirdar, and the tone of his circular
to the tribesmen, the Government decided to com-
municate with him once more. Mr. Griffin was
instructed to reply to his letter, directing his atten-
tion to the territorial reservations previously made,
desiring him to move at once towards Kabul with a
force not larger than necessary for his own protection,
and calling upon him to prevent armed gatherings in
Kohistan. In the event of Abdul Rahman failing to
comply without delay, and satisfactorily with the
requisitions addressed to him, General Stewart was
instructed to break off all negotiations with him, and
in that case to assemble the Sirdars and leaders
of the party of Sher Ali's family and state ' openly
that our correspondence with Abdul Rahman was
closed ; that we should withdraw from Kabul at our
earliest convenience ; that they must consult and
establish a Government for themselves ; that we were
prepared to recognise any Government so established,
and to transfer Kabul to it, and that if not molested
in the positions we might provisionally take up, we
intended to retire shortly within our own frontier.
These instructions, it will be seen, were drawn up in
general accordance with Lord Lytton's advice. They
were approved by Lord Hartington, the new Secretary
of State.

43 8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.IX

Durbar held
to proclaim
Abdul Bah-
•man Amir of
Kabul

On July 10 Abdul Eahman replied that he would
speedily arrive in Kohistan, lout could not proceed
to Kabul till he had consulted the people of
Afghanistan. He evaded the demand that he should
disperse the armed gatherings of the tribes. On
July 14 he arrived at Kohistan and there received a
native deputation from Kabul. From this time the
situation improved. On July 17 he wrote in a much
more friendly spirit intimating that in five days he
would proceed to Kabul, members of the Ghuzni
and Ghilzai party having now joined him.

On July 19 the British authorities at Kabul sent
to inform Abdul Bahman that a durbar would be
held on July 22 for the purpose of recognising him
formally and publicly before the Sirdars and people
of Kabul and the neighbouring country as their
future Amir. On July 20 he replied in a friendly
letter dated from Gharikar, expressing his intention of
sending a deputation to attend the durbar.

This deputation arrived on July 22 and the
durbar was held in the afternoon of the same day.

It was attended by all the principal chiefs and
residents of Kabul and its neighbourhood. Most of
the officers of the garrison at Kabul were also present.

After a short opening address by Sir Donald
Stewart, the wishes and intentions of Government were
explained by Mr. Griffin inaPersian speech, and Sirdar
Abdul Eahman was formally acknowledged and recog-
nised by the British Government as 6 Amir of Kabul.'

A few days later a meeting took place at Zimma,
about sixteen miles north of Kabul, between Mr. Lepel
Griffin and the Sirdar himself. At this interview the
questions of assistance in money and arms, the
conclusion of a treaty, and the Amir's position in
respect to Herat and Kandahar were discussed. With

1880 ABDUL RAHMAN PROCLAIMED AMIR OF KABUL 439

regard to the first question the Amir was informed
that the money found in the Treasury (9,65,731
rupees) when the British army arrived at Kabul
would be handed to him ; that he would be given, in
addition, ten lacs of rupees ; and that the Afghan
guns remaining in Sherpur and in the Bala Hissar
would be left for his use. These conditions by no
means satisfied the Amir.

With regard to the second point, he was informed
that no treaty could be granted him with the British
Government till he had established and consolidated
his own Government, but that after a reasonable
delay it would no doubt be possible to negotiate a
treaty with him.

"With regard to the territorial question, he ex-
pressed comparative indifference provided he was
not held responsible for what happened in territories
not under his control.

Mr. Lepel Griffin wrote of the Amir after this
interview : ( Amir Abdul Eahman Khan is a man of
about forty, of middle height and rather stout. He
has an exceedingly intelligent face, brown eyes, a
pleasant smile, and a frank courteous manner.
The impression that he left on me and the officers
who were present at the interview was most
favourable. He is by far the most prepossessing
of all the Barakzai Sirdars whom I have met in
Afghanistan, and in conversation showed both good
sense and sound political judgment. He kept
thoroughly to the point under discussion, and his
remarks were characterised by shrewdness and ability.
He appeared animated by a sincere desire to be
on cordial terms with the English Government, and
although his expectations were, as might have been
anticipated, larger than Government is prepared to

440 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.TX
Aug. 4, 1880 satisfy, yet he did not press them with any discour-

To Govern- • -A j ,.-. i,. j? ^ • A -

ment of India teous insistence, and the result of the interviews may
be considered on the whole to be highly satisfactory.'1

The scene shifts again from Kabul to Kandahar.
Four days after the proclamation of the new Amir an
event happened which led to the reopening of the
question of the severance of the Western from the
Northern Provinces of Afghanistan, and finally to
the reversal of this part of Lord Lytton's policy.

The circumstances which led up to the defeat
of the British troops by Ayub Khan of Herat at
Maiwand need not here be detailed, and the following
short summary by Sir Alfred Lyall of the disaster
and consequent relief of Kandahar will suffice.

'Ayub Khan, Sher All's younger son, who had
been holding Herat during our operations at Kabul and
Kandahar, set out towards Kandahar with a small
army in June 1880, and a brigade under General
Burrows was detached from Kandahar to oppose
him. Neither upon the manoeuvres of this brigade,
nor upon the tactical disposition of our troops when
they met the enemy, does Lord Eoberts trust himself
to make any observation; he confines himself to
a bare statement of the facts that the Afghans
outflanked the British, that our artillery soon
expended their ammunition, that the native troops
got out of hand and pressed back upon the few
European infantry, that " our troops were completely
routed, and had to thank the apathy of the Afghans
in not following them up for escaping total annihila-
tion." No such indisputable victory over British
forces in the open field had been gained by an Asiatic
leader in all our long Indian wars ; and for that very
reason the study of this short but most instructive

1 Ncarratwe of Events in Afghtmwton.

1B80 BATTLE OF MAIWA.ND 441

campaign may be commended to all Anglo-Indian
soldiers, since it serves as a lighthouse to illustrate
the ways leading straight to destruction.

6 The relief of Kandahar, which was now invested Roberta's
by Ayub Khan's army, became a matter of urgent
necessity. With the consent of Sir Donald Stewart,
Boberts telegraphed at once to Simla a proposal that
he should lead a relieving force straight from Kabul ;
and the Viceroy (Lord Eipon) agreed promptly. Ten
thousand picked men, inured to Afghan warfare by
their Kabul experiences, armed and equipped up to
the highest degree of efficiency, with their tents and
baggage reduced to the lowest possible scale, and
transported entirely upon beasts of burden, without
even wheeled artillery, could probably have marched,
like Xenophon's 10,000 Greeks, across half Asia and
over any enemy in their path. Their chief anxiety
was in regard to the scarcity of supplies upon certain
sections of their route ; and their main concern on
the march was about stragglers, for the long rapid
marches wearied out the camp followers, not one of
whom could lag or stray without being killed by the
Afghans. Here, again, is another example of methods
and resource in difficulties, to be studied this time as
a model by those who may be hoping that England
has not yet closed her long annals of Asiatic adven-
ture- Between August 11 and 31 the force traversed
the 313 miles that separate Kabul from Kandahar,
where Roberts, prostrate with fever, halted under the
city walls. The place was impregnable, except by
scaling-ladders, for Ayub Khan had no siege train,
yet the spirits of the garrison seemed to Boberts
somewhat below the standard of moral elevation that
inspires heroic resistance ; and undoubtedly he was
made welcome in all sincerity. A strong reconnais-

442 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.IX

sance drew the Afghan fire, disclosed their position,
and Koberts made Ids arrangements to attack it by a
turning movement on the next morning.

6 For an excellent and well-handled force of nearly
15,000 men (including the Kandahar garrison), with
thirty-six guns, the business of taking in flank the
ridge upon which Ayub Khan had entrenched himself
against a front attack was no hard matter. After
some very creditable fighting on both sides Ayub
Khan was duly routed, and his army followed the
example of their chief by a speedy flight, leaving a
large standing camp entirely deserted, with the whole
of the Afghan artillery. The British cavalry made a
vain and somewhat inglorious pursuit ; but the work
had been done thoroughly in masterly style, and
Boberts, who had led his men to this brilliant termina-
tion of their labours, had good excuse for recording
that never had a commander been better served/ l

The withdrawal of General Eoberts's force from

Kabul made the speedy evacuation of Kabul by the

remaining troops a matter of imperative necessity.

General Independently of this, however, all the objects

^thSa^ai which had hitherto detained them there were ac-

trom Kabul complished, their supplies, which had been admirably

calculated almost to a day, were now nearly exhausted,

and it was possible and natural to withdraw from

Kabul on the day which had been fixed for that

purpose two months ago. On political and sanitary

grounds it was decided to make no halt at Ghindamuk,

but to retire at once within the limits of our new

frontier. This feat was accomplished under General

Stewart with masterly skill, and by September 7 he

had marched his troops out of Afghanistan without

1 Sir Alfred LyalL

1880 EEVEESAL Of LYTTON POLICY 443

firing a single sliot. Adequate garrisons were left
at Lundi Kotal and Ali Musjid.

The future of Kandahar, now occupied by
General Eoberts after his successful march and
defeat of Ayub Khan, had next to be considered.
The openly avowed desire of the Home Govern-
ment of 1880 was to reverse as completely as
possible the policy of the Government which preceded
them, and which they had openly denounced and
condemned. The failure of Sher Ali Khan to keep his
hold over Kandahar without military assistance from
us gave them the looked for opportunity of casting
aside the solemn pledges which had been made in
the name of the British Government to him and to
his heirs, of persuading him to resign and retire to
India, and of handing over to the Amir of Kabul
once more these provinces of a different race, who
had hitherto detested the oppressive yoke which
Kabul rule placed upon their necks.

The question of the evacuation of Kandahar was
mooted four days after our defeat at Maiwand, and by
the end of November the Secretary of State announced
in a dispatch the final decision of the Home Govern-
ment to withdraw from this post. By the end of that
month Sher Ali Khan publicly announced his resigna-
tion and its acceptance by the British Government.
He left Kandahar in December and retired to Karachi,
where he lives to this day. At the same time Amir
Abdul Eahman was invited to take possession of the
provinces of Kandahar thus left without a Government.

It was announced in the Queen's Speech on the
reassembling of Parliament, January 1881, that Her
Majesty had been advised to abandon the possession
of Kandahar. In the Debate on the Address which
followed this announcement Lord Lytton rose, for the

Jan. 1881
Lord Lytton's
speech in the
House of
Lords on
the evacua-
tion of Kan-
dab ax

444 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.IX

first time in the House of Lords, to oppose this policy
and to make a personal statement with reference to
his own action as Yiceroy of India in regard to
the late Afghan war. In this speech he said : —

6 1 do not know, and the House does not know,
what are the reasons which have induced the present
Government to come to the decision that Kandahar
ought to be abandoned, and to advise Her Majesty to
this effect ; but I do say that such a decision ought
not to be carried out without a fair, an impartial,
and, if necessary, a repeated reference to the reasons
which induced the late Government to come to the
precisely opposite conclusion that Kandahar ought to
be retained, and to advise Her Majesty to that effect.
My Lords, these reasons were numerous, they were
serious, and they were carefully considered. But,
for the present, they may all be summed up in the
conviction, to which the late Government was led by
them, upon a full review of the whole condition of
those affairs with which you are now dealing in
Afghanistan — that the permanent maintenance of the
British Power at Kabul — I do not say necessarily by
means of annexation, though neither do I shrink from
saying by means of annexation should that become
necessary ; but, at any rate, in some form or other,
direct or indirect, which, for aH practical purposes,
will be a substantial reality — is now the only effectual
safeguard against a recurrence, and possibly a con-
stant recurrence, of the dangers so conspicuously
brought into light, and so forcibly pressed on our
attention, by our experience of the late Afghan War,
and our knowledge of the circumstances which gave
rise to it. "Whatever may have been the merits or
demerits of that war, it has conclusively established,
beyond all possibility of reasonable or honest ques-

1881 REVERSAL OF LYTTON POLICY 445

tion, one fact of supreme importance. That fact is Lord Lytton's
the facility with which Eussia — if she has established ^SSt the
her influence in Afghanistan, or if she can establish ^a™*10Jl of
her influence there — will always be able, whenever she Jan. IBBI'
desires, to cripple the action or embarrass the policy
of England in Europe, by disturbing the security of
England in India. And to do this, moreover, without
even employing her own troops for the purpose, but
simply by creating a diversion on the North-West
Frontier of India, through an alliance with the Kabul
Power. This, I say, is the one great fact you have
now to deal with, and which, whatever be your policy,
you must always bear in mind. It is established on
evidence of the most formidable character. It cannot
be disputed, and it ought not to be shirked. My
Lords, the Eussian Mission to Kabul, which was the
immediate occasion of the Afghan War, is a proceed-
ing of which the morality has been justified on the
ground that it was virtually a war measure legiti-
mised by the fact that our European relations with
Eussia were, at that time, strained to the very verge
of imminent hostilities. But we are not concerned
to discuss the morality of that proceeding. What
does practically concern us is the danger of it. And
from this point of view it matters nothing to us
whether the mission was the result of sudden impulse
or long premeditation. If it was the result of sudden
impulse, it clearly shows us how close is the peril to
which we shall at all times be exposed from the
establishment in Afghanistan of any foreign influence
more powerful, or more energetically exerted, than
our own. If, on the other hand, it was the result of
careful preparation, it shows us, no less clearly, how
great is the value attached by Eussia to the acquisi-
tion of such an influence, and what is the purpose to

446 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

OH.IX

Lord Lytton's which she will put it if she acquires it. In the one
agaiQBfc the 'Oase' yoT1 must 1°°^ upon Afghanistan as a loaded
evacuation of pistol iying on your doorstep, ready to be exploded
lea?' in the full front of your power whenever Eussia, upon
a sudden impulse, stretches out a hasty hand to seize
it. In the other case, you are fully warned of the
mischief which such a weapon may inflict on you, if
you ever relax your own firm grasp upon the butt end
of it. In both cases the danger is the same ; and in
either case the magnitude of such a danger can
scarcely be exaggerated. And in connection with this
consideration there is another, which must always be
taken into account. I do not suppose there exists in
Europe a man whose mind is loaded with weightier
or more constant cares, arising out of wider interests,
than the Sovereign who personally administers the
vast Empire of Eussia, It is practically impossible
for the Russian Government at St. Petersburg to be
incessantly watching and controlling the detailed
action of its local authorities in a region so remote
as Central Asia. The Eussian Governor- General at
Tashkend thus occupies, in his great Satrapy as the
Eepresentative of a distant and despotic Government,
a position of great practical independence ; and, if he
be an able, energetic, and ambitious man, anxious to
extend the influence, or the territory, of his Sovereign,
he will naturally do a great many things which he
has not been instructed to do — at the risk of being
disapproved if he fails, but in the hope of winning
honour and reward if he succeeds. This considers
tion leads me to the point of what I have to say
about the object and origin of that Eussian Mission.
It was not an unpremeditated mission. It was not
an impromptu act of retaliation or precaution. But
it was the carefully prepared result of three years'

1881 . REVERSAL OF LYTTON POLICY 447

preliminary correspondence, and three years' direct LordLytton's
negotiation — in all, six years of patient preparation.
I affirm this briefly, but positively. It would take
me all night to prove in detail what I affirm ; but the J&n- 1881
proofs of it are to be found by those who care to
search for them, obscurely buried and inconveniently
dispersed through numerous Blue Books, all of which
are accessible to your Lordships. And, in one word,
this is what they prove. From the year 1872 to the
year 1875 the Governor-General of Eussian Turk-
estan was in constant communication with the Amir
of Kabul ; and his communications were regarded — I
must say most reasonably regarded — by the Amir
and his advisers as having no other conceivable
object than that of establishing Eussian influence
in Afghanistan. The Amir was at first seriously
alarmed, and afterwards dangerously attracted, by
the increasing significance of these communications ;
and, in the year 1873, he made to the British Govern-
ment a strong appeal on the subject of them. With
the result of that appeal he was, as your Lordships
well know, dissatisfied. . . .

6 1 have thus briefly indicated the position of the
Kabul Power, between the now no longer distant
bounds of the Eussian and British Empires in Asia.
Thus situated, no Amir of Kabul can practically
stand alone and aloof from the influence of one
or other of the two great European Empires with
which Afghanistan is contiguous. He must in-
evitably fall under the control either of the British
or of the Eussian Power ; and, if he does not fall
under British control, it is obvious that he will
fall under Eussian control. To deny this appears to
me as extravagant a proposition as it would be to
assert that a stick, balanced on its end and left to

448 LORD LYTTON>S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH ix

LordLytton's itself, will not fall in one direction or another. And
agaiMt the I1OW5 ^et us suppose for a moment that Afghanistan
Donation of fa]js under the control of Kussia. Can any one of your
Jan. 1881 ' Lordships doubt for a moment that the establishment
of Eussian influence in Afghanistan would be prac-
tically incompatible with the untroubled maintenance
of the British Power in India P My Lords, it does
not lie in the mouth of any responsible statesman to
maintain such an opinion. And, certainly, no such
opinion was entertained by the late Lord Lawrence,
whose authority on this subject was so frequently
invoked in your discussions of two years ago. Ten
years previous to the event of which I am now
speaking, the only danger beyond our North-West
Frontier anticipated by Lord Lawrence, or by anyone
else, was from the establishment of Eussian influence
in Afghanistan by forcible means. Lord Lawrence
could not then discuss, for no one then foresaw, the
danger which actually did arise ten years later from
the public presence of the Eussian Power at Kabul —
not as the foe, but as the avowed friend and ally of
the Amir of Kabul, at a time when that prince had
ceased to be the avowed friend and ally of the British
Government. Yet even then, in a valuable Minute
dated 1868, Lord Lawrence recorded his opinion
that it is so necessary to exclude Eussian influence
from Afghanistan — ay, and to exclude it at any cost
— that Eussia, he said, ought to be plainly told that
any further advance upon her part beyond a given
point towards India — and9 my Lords, her Asiatic
frontiers were then far less close to ours than they
are now — would entail upon her war with England
in all parts of the world. War in all parts of the
world ! Such was the importance attached by Lord
Lawrence to the efficacious and permanent exclusion

1881 EEVEESAL OF LYTTON POLICY 449

of Russian influence from Afghanistan ; and I think
the leading members of the present Cabinet are all
equally committed to this principle, ... If , then, all SS3E
responsible British statesmen and all practical Indian Jan- 1881
administrators are agreed as to the importance of
maintaining British, and excluding Russian, influence
in Afghanistan, it surely follows that the only
practical question we have to consider is how is this
to be done P Now, there are two ways in which you
may endeavour to effect this object. You may seek
the attainment of it by the exercise of a recognised
control over the foreign relations of the Kabul Euler
by means of competent British Eepresentatives or
Agents in his dominions. This was the plan first
tried by the late Government of India, and which led
to the Treaty of Gundamufc. So long as that plan
was possible, we were anxious not to weaken, but to
strengthen the Kabul Power ; and in its despatch of
July 1879, the late Government of India, reviewing
the terms and objects of that Treaty, recorded its
opinion that, so long as the Treaty was loyally
observed by the Amir of Kabul, the annexation of
Kandahar would not only be unnecessary, but also
undesirable. The case, however, was essentially altered
by the atrocious massacre of our Mission at Kabul,
which defeated the main object of the Treaty of
Gundamuk. And, my Lords, I do not deny for a
moment that this is an event which I recall, and
shall always recall, with the keenest affliction. I do
not think that even his nearest relations can mourn
with a deeper grief than mine the dastardly murder
of my dear and truly gallant friend, Sir Louis
Oavagnari. I will not obtrude upon this House my
great private sorrow' for that irreparable loss. Apart,
however, from that great sorrow, my opinion as to

G a

450 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.IX

LordLytton's the propriety of the course we pursued by acquiescing
a|ainatthe i11 ^e Amir's strongly expressed, and apparently
grafl^om oi sincere, request for the support of a British Mission
Jan, i88i' at his Court, is an opinion entirely unchanged by the
abominable crime with which it was so ill requited.
But, although, I think it was right, and even neces-
sary, in the interests of all concerned, to make
that humane experiment, undeterred by the risks it
involved, and of which we were not unconscious, I
admit, my Lords, that the experiment has failed.
That being the case, the failure of it leaves open only
one course practically conducive to the attain-
ment of those objects which all responsible statesmen
have hitherto approved, desired, and insisted on ; and
this is the course adopted by the late Government
in reference to Kandahar. For if you cannot have
moral guarantees for the adequate control of the
Kabul Power, then you must have material guaran-
tees. The failure of the Ghindamuk Treaty has
proved the impossibility of moral guarantees ; and
what will be your material guarantees if you abandon
Kandahar and the Kurum headlands? As long as
you retain possession of these, the position we have
to assert, and the interest we have to safeguard, upon
our Afghan Frontier will be practically independent
of the good or ill will of any Kabul Euler. My Lords,
the possession of Kandahar and the surrounding
country, when brought into railway connection with
the Valley of tibe Indus, will give us in Afghanistan
the only kind of influence which is now possible for
us to exercise over the people of that country. It
will enable us to compel them, when necessary, to
keep the peace ; and it will render comparatively
unimportant to us the condition of their relations
with Russia. The possession of Kandahar would lay

1881 KEVER8AL OF LYTTON POLICY 451

open the whole of Afghanistan to our armies in case

of need. It would most effectually secure the against the

Empire's only vulnerable frontier against both attack
and intrigue ; and it would open the means of bringing Jan- 18S1
by rail all the trade of Central Asia to Karachi on
the one hand and Calcutta on the other. I beseech
Her Majesty's Ministers — most earnestly I beseech
them — not to neglect the warning given them by
General Boberts, or the example set them by Eussia,
in reference to the importance of cultivating their
trade routes between India and Central Asia. It is
not to war, but to commerce, that you must look for
the extension of your legitimate influence in Asia.
And, my Lords, pray remember that the loss of
legitimate influence really means the loss of peace,
the loss of security, the loss of freedom, the loss of
all that renders possible the existence of the Indian
Empire. And then there is another point which
must not be lost sight of. The question of Kandahar
does not stand alone. Beyond Kandahar there is
Herat, beyond Herat there is Merv. My Lords, Herat
is a position which England has twice fought to
preserve from foreign domination. It has been
called the key of India ; and Liberal statesmen have
at all times attached great importance to it. My own
opinion is that the importance of Herat is entirely
relative ; and that if the British power were firmly
established at Kandahar, you could afford to regard
with indifference what happens at Herat. ]?or you
would then be in a position both to prevent any
arrangements about Herat of which you did not
approve, and also to enforce the observance of arrange-
ments of which you did approve. But do not
flatter yourselves that this is now your position. You
are at present utterly powerless to exercise the

G a 2 «

45* LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. is

LordLytton'g smallest influence over the destinies of Herat, and
against the so you w^ continue to be till you are firmly
evacuation of established at Kandahar. And now let us see what

Kandahar,

Jan. 1881 are the objections to this policy. The most practical
of them all lies in the assumption that the annexation
of Kandahar will be expensive. My Lords, this is a
very debatable proposition. I do not think it can be
denied or affirmed with any degree of certainty;
for the rude phenomena of Afghan rule furnish no
data from which to estimate correctly the probable
financial results of British Administration. I do not
think that any Indian Administrator could have
possibly predicted before the annexation of the
Punjab, whether that great addition to Empire
would most increase the expenses or the revenues of
the Indian Government. Much must necessarily
depend upon the manner in which the province is
administered ; much also on the selection of the man
to whom the administration of it is first entrusted.
The opinion I was led to form, as Viceroy of India,
upon the best information which could then be ob-
tained, is that Kandahar, if judiciously administered,
will, when connected by rail with the Valley of the
Indus, at once pay its expenses ; and that, in a short
while, it will pay them twice over, and much more
than twice over. I should think less highly than I
do of the administrative capacity of our Indian
Services if it turned out otherwise ; but I admit that
this is only a personal anticipation — a guess, if you
will. Let us assume it to be over sanguine — what
then? My Lords, national security, and that
permanent immunity from external danger which is
the essential condition of national security; these
are blessings not to be enjoyed without paying the
full price for them. The possession of Empire must

1881 EEVEESAL OF LYTTON POLICY 453

always be an expensive privilege. But the loss of LordLytton's
Empire may be a ruinous disgrace ; and the safety of
lAdiais worth more than a few pieces of silver. We
cannot haggle with destiny. I feel not a shadow of a Jan- 1881
doubt that any re-settlement of the North-West
Frontier of India which leaves that frontier exposed
to a recurrence of the dangers that gave rise to the
Afghan war will inflict, and at no distant date, upon
the Government of India far heavier financial
burdens than any which can be incurred on account
of the administration of Kandahar. . . .

€ I come to what may be called the moral objec-
tions. We are told that annexation is very immoral ;
and that we have no right to annex Kandahar unless
the Kandaharis specially request us to be so good as
to do so, or unless, on the other hand, they commit
some abominable crime, for which their conquest is
the only fitting punishment. This objection was
mentioned by the noble Marquess who is now
Secretary of State for India (the Marquess of
Hartington), in reply to a deputation urging him
not to relinquish Kandahar. But the noble Marquess
is a statesman whose mind is not swayed by impulsive
sentiment; and I earnestly hope that the noble
Marquess will not allow his calm and manly judg-
ment to be confused by a mere word. What is
conquest ? It has many different meanings, It may
mean such an operation as the conquests of Attila —
massacre, confiscation, the sack of cities, the sale of
their inhabitants into slavery ; and this is probably
the greatest of all evils. It may mean such an
operation as the conquests of some Mohammedan
Princes; the imposition of a grinding tribute, the
degradation of the national religion, the violation of
national traditions, and the outrage of national

454 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.IX

Lord Lytton'a sentiment. This also is a great calamity for the
conquered. But when it means only that good

g°vemment is to be substituted for anarchy, that
Jan. i88i' security for life and property is to supersede robbery
and murder, and that a few English officials, with
a limited number of English troopss who all pay
liberally for everything they get, are to replace law-
less Sirdars, who, owning a doubtful allegiance to a
distant and alien despot, are in the habit of taking
whatever they want without paying for it at all —
then, my Lords, I really cannot see that conquest is
a terrible thing, although you may please to give it
a terrible name. The British Power, if established
in Kandahar, would interfere with no man's religion.
It would bring much money into the country, and so
far from augmenting, it would greatly diminish the
burden of taxation by increasing the wealth of the
population. Under British rule the Kandaharis would
quickly learn, as others have learnt before them,
that law and order mean wealth ; and there are no
people in the world so greedy of wealth as the
Afghans. As to national sentiments and traditions,
British rule would not disturb them, for the simple
reason that they do not exist To suppose that the
Kaudaharis have any sort of loyalty to Kabul or any
liking for the rule of a Kabul Amir, is to evince
complete ignorance of their history and way of life.
If ever there was a merely geographical entity, it is
Afghanistan. It is as idle to talk of the national
sentiments of the Afghans as it would be to talk of the
corporate feeling of the parish of Marylebone, or to
suppose that because Westminster and Athens are
both of them cities, therefore the city of Westminster
is regarded by its inhabitants with feelings like those
with which Athens inspired the Athenians. My

1G81 REVERSAL OF LYTTON POLICY 455

Lords, if any man was competent to judge of the
normal natural condition of Afghanistan, that man
was surely Lord Lawrence. Well, this is what Lord evacuation of
Lawrence wrote of it in 1868 : —

6 " It appears to me that it will always be found
exceedingly difficult, for any extended period, to
maintain a united and strong government in
Afghanistan. The genius of the chiefs and people,
as evinced in the independent Pathan communities
of the Border, is evidence to this effect. A chief
may now and then arise who may for a time unite
the different provinces under one rule ; but when he
has passed away, the tendency again will be to
separation. With the single exception of the pressure
of a common enemy, and even this circumstance will
not always avail, there appear to be no ties to bind
the Afghans together."

1 My Lords, I do not believe that the people of
Kandahar would regard themselves as humiliated in
the smallest degree by annexation to British India. I
am confident that such annexation would be of im-
mense and permanent benefit to them; and I am
disposed to doubt rather whether they deserve such
a favour than whether they have merited such a
punishment. Of any policy, however, which in-
volves annexation, it may justly be asked, What is
to be the practical limit of it ? How far will you go
with such a policy P How far can you go ? " Are
we," it maybe said, "to go on conquering and annex-
ing one barbarous wilderness after another, till we
reach, at last, the Dardanelles in one direction and
the boundaries of Eussian Turkestan in another?"
If not, where will you stop ? Where will you draw
the line ? My Lords, I think it is very right to ask,
and very necessary to answer, these questions. I do

456 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.IX

LoxdLytton's not underrate, and to a great extent I share, the
agrinst the sentiment with, which, by so many of our country-

SSSSaa °f men> war an(* coll(luest are regarded in the light of
Jan. 1881 ' public crimes. I will yield to no man in the con-
demnation of wars undertaken for no better object
than the gratification of personal ambition, the in-
dulgence of national vanity, or the provision of active
service for an army. But I must observe that no
one can denounce war and conquest in the absolute
unmeasured terms so frequently employed for that
purpose without denouncing, at the same time, one
of the most potent agents of civilisation. The
greater part of Europe consists of the fragments of
the Eoman Empire, an Empire created by wars
which rendered possible the diffusion of Christianity
and the development of law. The whole of America,
North and South, has been conquered from its original
owners, who were savages, chiefly by Englishmen
and Spaniards. The enormous Bussian Empire has
been formed by a series of obscure wars waged
against barbarians impenetrable to any other civilis-
ing process ; and the whole fabric of the British
Empire in India is an additional illustration of the
same thing. Upon those, therefore, who have con-
demned my Afghan policy, solely on the ground that,
in one form or another, it involves conquest, I am
entitled, I think, to retort their own questions.
Where, I ask, do they draw the line? Can they
justify our present possession of the Peshawur Valley ?
Have we any right to Lahore ? What is our tide to
Delhi, to Allahabad, to Benares, to Calcutta ? My
Lords, I believe that the most consistent and candid
of my critics would answer all these questions plainly
and directly enough. They would say, and indeed
some of them have said, we have no business in India

1881 REVERSAL OF LYTTON POLICY 457

at all. It was by crime that we acquired our power
in India. The only justification for its maintenance agnst the
is that its downfall would be injurious to the natives; SSSffi
and the only attitude that befits us in that country Jan- 18ei
is one of penitence Tor the sins of our forefathers,
with an anxious desire to expiate, if possible, their
fault. But, surely, the first remark suggested by
this view of the case is, that those who hold it are,
for that very reason, disqualified to form a trust-
worthy opinion on the policy best calculated to
maintain and uphold the Empire of British India,
No one should try to administer an institution of
which he entirely disapproves. The man who does
not value life and health ought not to practise as a
physician ; and a man who condemns the Indian
Empire in principle is disqualified to judge of the
measures necessary for its defence and security. I
shall not attempt to refute these views ; but I cannot
pass them by without a few words of energetic con-
tradiction. Whatever may be said by those who
maintain them, I cannot believe, and I do not think
the English nation will believe, that an Empire can
have been founded on robbery and fraud ; when we
are also told in the same breath by those who make
this assertion that the Empire thus founded must,
nevertheless, be maintained, because its fall would
involve 200,000,000 people in anarchy and bloodshed
and relegate them to the barbarism from which they
are slowly emerging. Grapes do not grow on thorns,
nor figs on thistles ; and it is surely not under the
protection of thieves and robbers that men sit beneath
their own vines and fig-trees in undisturbed enjoy-
ment of the peaceful fruits of honest labour.

fc My Lords, if I seem to have been asserting
truisms I am sorry for it ; but it seems to me that

458 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.IX

the alleged moral obligation to retire from Kandahar
cannot be stated in any terms which do not imply
the proposition that we ought to retire from India
altogether. And, therefore, to the question, " How
far would you go, and where would you draw the
line?" I reply without hesitation, that, for the
present, I would go as far as Kandahar, and there I
would draw the line. Because I am convinced that
if the line be promptly drawn there, and, when
drawn, firmly maintained, then you may look upon
the permanent security of the North-West Frontier
of India as a question practically closed — I will not
say for ever, but closed at least for a period of
time so long that the present generation need no
longer be practically concerned about it/

CONCLUSION

It may here be stated, in order to complete the
story of the Afghan war, that Ayub Khan, after his
defeat at Kandahar, made his way back with a few
horsemen to Herat, where he vigorously restored
his power, put down his enemies, and recruited his
forces. As soon as he heard that the English had
evacuated Kandahar, he marched down again to
take possession of it ; and one of his generals, after
defeating Abdul Eahman's troops on the way, re-
occupied the city in July 1881. The situation was
now full of anxiety for the Government of India, for
AbdulBahmanwasleading an army from Kabul against
Ayub at Kandahar, and if the fortune of a battle
should turn against him it was evident that all
Afghanistan would again be thrown into confusion,
and that the policy of establishing in the country
a strong and friendly ruler would be very seriously

1881 REVEESAL OP LYTTON POLICY 459

compromised. As Abdul Bahman had not up to this
time shown any remarkable energy or military
capacity, the general opinion was that he would
be beaten. Nevertheless, after some indecisive
manoeuvres, he met Ayub's force close to Kandahar
on September 22, where he gained a complete
victory, taking all the enemy's guns and camp
equipage ; and when Ayub fled back to Herat he
found the town seized by the Amir's adherents, so
that he was forced to take refuge in Persia.

From that time Abdul Rahman's ruler ship over
Afghanistan has been undisputed except by one or
two insurrections, which were speedily quelled, and
by the resistance of some of the highland tribes
who fought to maintain their independence of the
central government. Aided by a constant supply
from India of money and arms, he has succeeded in
establishing a powerful sovereignty, and he has
enforced order by a fierce and relentless use of
his despotic authority. His relations with the
Government of India have been occasionally troubled
by the difficulty of dealing with the independent
tribes who occupy the belt of mountainous country
lying between Afghanistan proper and the frontier
of British India. And the approach of the Eussian
dominion to his northern frontier raised similar
difficulties in that quarter. For the purpose of
settling the tribal question, Mr. (now Sir Henry)
Durand was deputed to Kabul in 1894, where a
convention was concluded for the demarcation of the
Afghan boundary on the east. A few years earlier
the Eussian boundary had been marked out, by
agreement with Eussia, on the north-west ; and it has
since been completely settled up to the Chinese
Frontier. The policy of building up Afghanistan

460 LOED LYTTON'H INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.IX

into a strong independent kingdom has thus been
consummated ; so completely, indeed, that it is be-
coming perceptible that this policy3 like all others,
may have its drawbacks and possibly disadvantages.
The old system of non-interference with Afghan
affairs had at least this effect, that it kept the
country weak and disunited ; if Afghanistan was of
little use as an ally, its hostility could never be
formidable, while the mountains and the fighting
tribes would always, for the sake of their own
liberties, resist any foreign invader. But the
intrigues of Eussia with the Amir Sher Ali ren-
dered this policy impracticable, and the second
Afghan war was the result. Then came Lord Lytton's
second plan of breaking up the kingdom by the
separation of Kandahar under a ruler protected by
the British, with the object of relieving the British
Government from any dependence upon the good-
will or ill-will of future Amirs at Kabul. Strong
reasons may be adduced for holding that this policy
might have succeeded in spite of evident risks and
difficulties ; but the course of events, and the change
of views in England, frustrated any trial of it. How far,
on the other hand, the consolidation of Afghanistan as *
an armed power, under an able ruler governing a
fanatical people, will have operated for the peace and
security of British India, and as a trustworthy barrier
against external aggression, has yet to be seen. For
the present therefore impartial observers can only con-
clude that after many vicissitudes of policy, and a
large expenditure of men and money by the Indian
Government, the problem of our permanent relations
with Afghanistan is still awaiting a durable and
satisfactory solution.

461

CHAPTER X

INTEENAL ADMINISTRATION. FINANCE

IT has been thought advisable not to interrupt the
account of events in Afghanistan by any other
matter dealt with during Lord Lytton's administra-
tion. The questions of internal administration are
therefore reserved for this and the following chapters,
which relate to Finance, to the question of the
inclusion of Natives in the Indian Civil Service, and
to the passing of an Act for repressing seditious
writings published in the vernacular.

The measures carried out by Lord Lytton's
Government for the improvement of the Finances and
the financial system of India have had a great and
lasting influence on the prosperity of the country.
In this department Lord Lytton had the good fortune
of 6 seeing what he foresaw,' of carrying out during
his tenure of office all, or almost all, the reforms at
which he aimed from the beginning of his Viceroy alty.
In a letter to Lord Salisbury of September 24, 1876,
he thus summed up the four chief heads of his
financial policy :

*L Equalisation of salt duties throughout India
with a view to their early reduction, and abolition
of the sugar duty.

c 2. Extension of the system of provincial assign-
ments, and its application to sources of income.

*3. Immediate and final abandonment of the

462 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.X

LordSaiia- Present system of constructing extraordinary public
bury, Sept. works out of capital annually borrowed in England,
24 >1876 and transfer from Imperial to provincial resources
of ^e responsibility of carrying out works of acknow-
ledged local utility.

c 4. Abolition of the import duty on coarse
cottons, with a distinct declaration that the duty on
the finer cottons is to go also as soon as ever the
condition of the finances will permit ; and enuncia-
tion of the policy of endeavouring to make India
one great free port, open to the commerce of the
whole world.'

It was not, indeed, given to him to carry out
these great projects in a single year ; but before he
left India all his aims had been achieved, together
with the measures needed to place the finances of
the country in a secure position against the periodical
recurrence of famine. The success of the finan-
cial policy he had in view would, Lord Lytton
knew, depend upon his securing a first-rate Finance
Minister to the Indian Government. That post,
when he first arrived in India, was occupied by
Sir William Muir, who resigned in the course of that
year to accept a vacancy offered him on the India
Council at home. Lord Lytton felt that, of all men
in India, the one most qualified for such a post was
Sir John Strachey, then Governor-General of the
North-West Provinces. The post of Financial
Member of Council was offered to him, and it was
to Lord Lytton a source of never-ending gratitude
that Sir John, c under a high sense of personal
obligation to public duty, consented to exchange
a very comfortable and easy post for a very
anxious and laborious one.' To the discharge of
its difficult duties during a difficult period it was

1877 FINANCE 463

the Yiceroy's opinion that 'few men could have
brought greater courage and capacity.'

Speaking at Manchester in the year 1882 on the LprdLytton'a
subject of Indian Finance Lord Lytton referred to sir John°
Sir John Strachey in the following terms : — ' I cannot S
mention the name of that truly great Indian States-
man without expressing my admiration of his genius
as well as my lasting gratitude for his generous and
courageous assistance in the government of India
during a very critical and difficult period. Long
distinguished in almost every branch of Indian
administration. Sir John Strachey has now closed a
career of laborious and far-reaching public usefulness
by a remarkable series of financial measures with
which his name will be permanently associated in the
annals of Indian history as one of the most sagacious
and beneficent financiers that India has ever had.'

SALT DUTIES

The conditions under which salt was produced
and taxed in India at the commencement of Lord
Lytton's Viceroyalty are thus described by Sir John
Strachey, in his speech of March 15, 1877, intro-
ducing the Budget of 1877-8 :

6 The circumstances under which the salt duties straohey's
are levied vary greatly in different parts of India.
Bengal and Assam, with sixty-seven millions of
people, get nearly the whole of their supply from
Cheshire. . . . Almost the only local source within easy
reach from which Bengal can obtain salt is the sea ;
and the natural facilities for making salt on the
northern coasts of the Bay of Bengal are not great.
The climate is so damp that salt cannot easily be
obtained by the cheap process of solar evaporation ;

464 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

OH. X

Salt Duties and, owing to the vast quantities of fresh water

strachey's poured in by the Ganges and Brahmaputra, the sea

Speech, is less salt than on the other shores of India. In

Muoh is, Madras and Bombay, on the other hand, containing

together about forty-seven millions of people, the

manufacture of salt from the sea is cheap and easy,

and for these Presidencies, as well as for the greater

part of the Central Presidency and the Native States

of Southern India, the sea is the great source of

supply.

c Coming to Northern India, we find that the
Punjab possesses inexhaustible supplies of rock
salt, which is consumed by about fourteen millions
of people. Throughout the North-West Provinces
and OucUi, and a portion of the Central Presidency
and of the Punjab, on the other hand, although
there are many places where more or less impure
salts can be produced, the home sources for the
supply of good salt can never be sufficient. Forty-
seven millions of our own subjects depend almost
entirely for their salt on the Native States of
Rajputana, or on places on the confines of those
States.

6 The system under which the duty is levied, and
the rate of duty, vary in the different provinces. In
Madras and Bombay the rate of duty is Us. 1-13
per maund; in Lower Bengal the rate is Es. 3-4
per maund, and is levied chiefly in the form of a
sea-Customs import duty. In the Upper Provinces
the rate is Es. 3 per maund. In the Punjab this
is included in the selling price of the rock salt,
which is the property of Government. In the rest
of the Upper Provinces the duty is levied when the
salt is imported from Eajputana.

' "For this purpose, and to prevent the ingress of

1877 FINANCE 465

salt taxed at lower rates, a Customs line is maintained Salt Duties
extending from a point north of Attock to near straohey's
the Berar frontier, a distance of more than 1,500
miles. Similar lines some hundreds of miles in
length are established in the Bombay Presidency, to
prevent untaxed salt from Native States entering
British territory. Along the greater part of this
enormous system of inland Customs lines, which, if
they were put down in Europe, would stretch from
London to Constantinople, a physical barrier has
been created comparable to nothing that I can think ^
of except the Great Wall of China. It consists
principally of an impenetrable hedge of thorny trees
and bushes, supplemented by stone walls and ditches,
across which no human being or beast of burden
or vehicle can pass without being subjected to
detention and search. It is guarded by an army
of some 8,000 men, the mass of whom receive as
wages Es. 6 or 7 a month. The bare statement of
these facts is sufficient to show the magnitude of
the evil.

6 Although I believe that everything is done which
can be done under such circumstances to prevent
abuses, it may be easily imagined what inevitable
and serious obstruction to trade and annoyance and
harassment to individuals must take place. I
remember a graphic account of Sir George Campbell,
in which he described the evils of the system and
the instruments, of the nature of cheese-tasters, which
are thrust into the goods of everyone whose business
takes him across the line. The interference is not
confined to the traffic passing into British territory ;
for, owing to the levy of the export duty on sugar,
the same obstructions are offered to the traffic pass-
ing in the other direction. In spite, however, of the

EH

466 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.X

Salt Duties evils inseparable from the existence of a Customs
straohey's line, it is practically impossible to dispense with it

SpwSh, so l°ng as we levy our sa^* *ax a* different rates in

Mwroh 15, different provinces, and have no means of controlling

the manufacture and taxation of salt produced in

Native States until the salt reaches the British

frontier.

* The great object at which the Government ought
to aim is to give to the people throughout India the
means of obtaining, with the least possible incon-
venience and at the cheapest rate consistent with
financial necessities, a supply of salt, the quantity
of which shall be limited only by the capacity of the
people for consumption.

' I have a strong belief that more than a hundred
millions of people fail now to obtain a full supply
of salt. I do not for a moment assert, nor do I
believe, that the actual supply is insufficient for the
preservation of health. Nor do I at all agree with
those who maintain that the salt tax presses with
extreme severity on the poorer classes. But, how-
ever this may be, it is a great evil that the supply
of this necessary of life should be restricted. . . .
With the existing means of communication it was a
physical impossibility to bring from Eajputana the
salt required for some fifty millions of people. That
task was one that could not be performed by any
number of carts and camels and ponies which it was
possible for the country to furnish ; and these were the
only means of transport. Therefore it was that I have
sometimes asserted that there was a salt famine
in Northern India; meaning thereby not only that
salt was dear, but that sufficient salt could not be pro
vided. For such a condition of things reduction of
duty would no more afford a remedy than it would

1877 FINANCE 467

be a remedy in a food famine to give money to the Bait Duties
people when no food existed in the markets. Lord straohey's
Mayo saw that there were two essential conditions
to be fulfilled before relief could be found. It was
necessary to provide cheap means of transport to a
practically unlimited extent between the salt of
Bajputana and our own markets ; and also to make
arrangements by which the price of salt to our people
should be freed from influences outside our territory.
The first condition could only be provided by making
railways into Eajputana. The second condition
rendered it necessary that our Government should
obtain complete control over the manufacture and
supply of salt at the chief places of production.'

It is clear from this speech that there "were two
conditions precedent to the carrying out of the
desired reform : first, the completion of the treaties
with the Native States within whose territory salt
was produced on a large scale ; and, secondly, the
improvement of the general financial position of the
country, which just then was entering on the season
of trial and distress caused by the great famine in
Madras and Bombay.

In order to carry out the first of these objects
Mr. A. 0. Hume, O.B., was placed on special duty to
negotiate with the Native States concerned. It is
interesting to read some extracts from a note written
by Lord Lytton to convey his instructions to Mr.
Hume in August 1876. They show how thoroughly he
had grasped the details, and what care he evinced in
thinking out all the steps needed for carrying out this
complicated inquiry.

After quoting Mr. George Batten's note, to the
effect that the immediate business was to ascertain
the situation and capabilities of the different salt

HH 3

468 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.X

Salt Duties sources in the Native States, the amount of revenue
they derived from their salt works, and the nature
and rate of transit duties levied on salt on its
journey into British territory, he goes on as follows :

LordLytton's 'With regard to the salt works already in exist-

Note to Mr. . &_, . . J*

Hume, ence, it should be ascertained what is the annual

August 1876 Qu^t^jj^ wixat is the cost per maund of production,
what is the selling price, how the realisations are
divided, that is, the share of the manufacturer, the
proprietor of the works, and the State ; what duty
is levied by the State ; what is the course of trade
and area of consumption; what transit duties are
levied on salt, and generally what interests would
be affected by the works being placed under the
control of the British Government — the assumption
being that Excise duties would be levied at the works
before the salt was permitted to be removed, and
that all other duties on salt of every description,
including transit duties, would be abolished.'

Similar inquiries were to be made with regard
to the smaller areas of production which it might be
proposed to close, and to potential sources not now
worked, but which might spring into activity when
other salt was excised. c It should, further, be
ascertained who are the persons of local influence,
if any, who would be able to help on or to obstruct
the measures of the Government, and the best way of
enlisting their interests, without in any way bringing
them into opposition to the Durbar to which they
are subordinate, or in any way interfering with the
authority of the Native States, with whom alone the
British Government can negotiate/ c Having ascer-
tained as nearly as possible the value, present and
prospective, of the various salt sources in the hands
of the Native States, the British Government will be

1878 FINANCE 469

in a position to determine the amount of compensation Salt Duties
which might be paid to those States for the sur-
render of complete control over the manufacture
of salt, and for aiding in the suppression of illicit
manufacture. The necessary result of putting an
excise duty on all salt manufactured in Eajputana
will be to make the people of Eajputana and
Central India contribute to the British salt revenue,
as the people of Hyderabad and Mysore and nearly
every other Native State in India do already. IVom
this source ample funds would be available for the
liberal treatment of the Native States concerned,
and the British Government would be able to pay
them more than they have ever received from their
salt, and possibly leave a considerable margin for
other purposes.'

By October 1, 1878, these inquiries and negotiar
tions had been completed. All the principal sources
of salt production had been taken over on lease
and the minor sources closed. Liberal compensation,
amounting to 54,000?., was paid to manufacturers
and others interested in the salt works which had
been suppressed. Annual payments of 84,000£. were
secured by treaty to the Native States — these pay-
ments being equivalent to the duty realised — and a
liberal compensation to the chiefs for the salt and
transit duties which they and their feudatories would
forego. In some cases also large quantities of salt
were allowed to be passed free of duty to the people
of those States.

The cjoor was now open for the equalisation of
the salt duties throughout India, and for the accom-
plishment of the object which Lord Lytton and Sir
John Strachey had so ardently desired. The rate of
taxation was raised in Madras and Bombay, and

470 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.X

Salt Duties lowered in Northern India to Es. 2-8 per maund
Equalisation (82 Ib.) ; only, in Bengal it was thought impossible
oLried out,iM on financial grounds to allow the full reduction, and
Oct. ISTS ' the rate was kept at Es. 2-14, as against 3-4 before.
In this way, while the duty on salt was raised for
47 millions of people, it was lowered for 130
millions. The Customs hedge, so eloquently stigma-
tised by Sir John Strachey, 2,000 miles in length,
was removed, and the sugar duty was abolished,
at a financial sacrifice of 155,0007. This wise
and liberal treatment of so important a necessary
of life produced the effects which might naturally
have been expected. The consumption of salt
in 1879-80 had risen by 12-J per cent, above
the consumption of 1876-7. The net salt revenue
which in 1876-7 had been less than six millions,
rose in 1879-80 to over seven -millions.

At the same time the price of salt throughout
Northern India was greatly cheapened by the
opening of railway communication and the removal
of hindrances to the trader. At Agra, where a
maund (82 Ib.) of salt had cost Es. 5-8 and 6
in 1868 and 1869, the price of the same salt had
fallen in 1879 to Es. 3-B ; so that while the duty had
been lowered 16J per cent., the cost to the consumer
was reduced by 40 per cent. The wisdom of the
measures taken by the Government of India to
cheapen this important article of consumption was
thus effectively established.

In the debate on the Budget of 1878-79, Lord
Lytton devoted a large portion of his speech
(February 9, 1878) to a history of the salt tax from
early times and an exposition of his views on the
equalisation of the duty, the abolition of the Customs
line, and the justifiability of the tax as a source of

1878 .FINANCE 471

revenue. The following quotations from this speech Salt Duties
will be read with interest :

6 1 would now ask permission to state to the LordLytton'
Council, in a general way, what we have actually Speech,
done and what we hope to do in this matter. Our Feb< 9' 1878
first step was to enter into friendly communication
with the Native States I have already mentioned, for
the purpose of obtaining their acquiescence in our
control over the salt sources in their territories, and
thus enabling us to tax all salt at the places of pro-
duction, and so abolish our present barbarous inland
Customs cordon, upon conditions equitable, and
indeed liberal, as regards the financial interests of the
Native States concerned and the social interests of
their subjects . . .

6 1 venture to maintain . , . that an equalisation
of the salt duties in British territory surrounding the
salt-producing Native States is a necessary preliminary
to the abolition of the inland Customs line ; that, in
the advanced stage of our negotiations with those
States, it was incumbent on us to lose no time in
making an appreciable approach towards the esta-
blishment of such an equalisation in our own salt
duties, and that no measure adopted for that purpose
could practically be confined to the territories I have
mentioned. The Madras duty must be on the same
level as the Bombay duty, and the duty in Lower
Bengal must not be very much higher than the duty
in the Upper Provinces ; for, otherwise, the dearer
salt would be entirely displaced by the cheaper salt,
to the great disturbance and injury of trade. Now, I
grieve to say that in the present state of our finances
it was simply impossible for us to lower the rates m
Northern India down to the level of the rates in
Southern India. Such a measure would have

472 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.Z

Bait Duties involved the loss of at least one and a -half million
LordLytton'a sterling of revenue. "We had, therefore, to choose
between raising the rates in Southern India, without
. 9, 1878 making any simultaneous reduction in 'the rates of
Northern India, or making an addition to the rates
in Southern India considerably larger than the simul-
taneous reduction effected in Northern India. It is
the last of these two courses that we have now
adopted, in the belief that it is the fairest. We have
not raised the rates in Southern India without effect-
ing at least some simultaneous reduction in the rates
of Northern India ; and I assert that this is more
than any previous Government of India has done
towards the establishment of an equilibrium in the
salt duty upon equitable principles, and at a level
which, if high in the first instance, will, I trust, be
found susceptible of gradual reduction to a minimum
uniform rate. We have raised the Madras and
Bombay duties to Es. 2-8 ; that is to say, we have
increased them by 11 annas per maund; but we
have simultaneously lowered the salt duties in the
Upper Provinces of Northern India by 4 annas per
maund, and in the Lower Provinces by 2 annas per
maund ; so that at the present moment the salt duty
in the Southern Presidencies stands at Es. 2-8, in
Lower Bengal at Es. 3-2, and in the Northern Provinces
at Es. 2-12 per maund. , . .

6 Sincerely as I desire to see the price of salt
not only equalised, but cheapened throughout India,
"Earnestly as I hope that it may be the privilege of
this Administration to accelerate the arrival of the
day when such a result may be attainable, still, I
must frankly own that I feel unable to accept
the dictum of those who assert that the present
salt duties are a grievous burden to the long

1878 . FINANCE 473

suffering back of the poor ryot. It may be in the Salt Duties
power of the Government of India, and I hope, indeed,
it may be in the power of the present Government
of India, to lighten that burden, such as it is ; but it Feb. 9, 1878
is my own belief that it will never be in the power of
any Government of India to devise a substitute for
it which will weigh less heavily on the poorer classes
or be less sensibly felt by them. A salt tax of B.S. 2-8
per maund is a tax of less than three farthings per
pound. It would be absurd to represent the pressure
of such a tax as oppressive. The manner in which
the tax is levied renders the pressure of it almost in-
appreciable. It is an indirect impost, distributed, in
minute daily instalments, over vast masses of popu-
lation, and in all probability the majority of the
millions who pay it are not even conscious of its
existence.

filt is the only obligatory tax imposed by this
Government 'upon the masses ; and the total amount
of its proceeds, when compared with the numbers
from whom it is collected, shows how small is the
contribution of each individual. The gross esti-
mated revenue of a salt tax assessed at Es. 2-8
per maund is about six millions sterling ; and this
revenue would be collected from a population of not
less than 200,000,000 of consumers On this point I
shall again venture to quote the words of Sir William
Muir : " If," he said, " there were any form of indirect
taxation which could be brought to bear upon the
rich rather than upon the poor, and on the luxuries
rather than on the necessaries of life, I would at
once agree to such a tax ; but I know of none that
is practicable." And then, after dwelling on the
dissatisfaction occasioned by all attempts to extract
national revenue from the wealthier classes by direct

474 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMIJHSTBATION CH.X

Salt Duties taxes specially imposed on those classes, as compared

Lord Lytton'a with the ascertained social results of incjirect taxation

Speech, levied on a commodity which is consumed by rich and

Feb. 9/1878 poor, and equally necessary for all classes in the

community, Sir William Muir concludes by this

emphatic record of his own experience : "In the one

case," he says, " we stir up angry feelings in every

class throughout the country ; in the other case we

peaceably realise what we require without affecting

the contentment and tranquillity of any class "

6 1 trust, then, I have shown that the recent action
of the present Government of India in reference to
the salt duties of Madras and Bombay is in complete
accordance with the consistent, continuous and
repeatedly avowed aim of its predecessors during the
last ten years and more. I trust I have shown that
of the sincerity of its devotion to the prosecution of
that aim the present Government of India has given
conspicuous proof by taking, for the attainment of it,
bolder and wider steps than any which have been
taken by previous Administrations. I trust I have
shown that these steps have been taken without
deviation from the course prescribed to us by our
predecessors. And if I have succeeded in this
endeavour, then I think I am entitled to claim from
all who have questioned our policy a complete
acquittal from the charge that in what we have done
we have sacrificed the interests of the poorer classes
to those of the richer, with a view to a mere increase
of revenue. The point at which we have now arrived
is this : the salt duty in Madras, Bombay, Siridh,
and the Central Provinces has been equalised at
the rate of Es. 2-8 per maund. In the North-
Western Provinces, Oudh, the Punjab and Lower
Bengal it still varies between higher rates. The

1878 FINANCE 475

aim of the present Government will be to reduce
those higher rates to the level already reached by the LordLytton's
salt duties of Southern India. Nor shall we relax ^f^
our endeavours to cheapen the price of salt through- E^b- 9/1878
out the whole Empire, by improving our means of
communication with the sources of supply. I trust
that our Administration may last long enough to
achieve these long-deferred results; and that my
honourable friend, Sir John Strachey, may still be a
member of it when we attain the Promised Land to
which he first guided our progress, and thus fulfil
his eloquent prophecy of the day when the Govern-
ment of India will have given to the people of India
"the means of obtaining, with the least possible
inconvenience, and at the cheapest rate consistent
with financial necessities, a supply of salt only limited
by the people's capacity of consumption." '

In March 1882, Lord Eipon's Government, which
had succeeded to the benefits of the financial re-
forms initiated in Lord Lytton's time, was able to
complete this great work by lowering the rate of the
salt duty throughout the whole of India, and thereby
reducing taxation to the amount of 1,400,OOOZ.

COTTON DUTIES AND FEEE TBADB

There had been for many years a growing feeling
in England that the duty of 5 per cent, ad valorem
levied on the import of cotton goods was a serious
hindrance to the trade of Manchester, and protected
the Indian manufacturer in a manner subversive
of the principles of political economy. Lord
Northbrook, in 1875, had said on this subject:
6 Indian statesmen have never regarded Customs
duties as desirable for the purpose of protecting

476 LOBD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.X

Cotton Duties the products or manufactures of India. In India,
equally as in England, Protection has been regarded
as an exploded dtfctrine, contrary to the general
interests of the country which imposes protection
duties.' And in 1876 the discussion was closed

• Financial ^ by the Secretary of State, who wrote, ' that the
jnterests of India imperatively require the timely
removal of a tax which is at once wrong in principle,
injurious in its practical effect, and self-destructive
in its operation.' Lord Lytton came to India fully
imbued with the wisdom of this policy, and he took
the earliest possible opportunity of making known
his opinion on the subject and the limitations under
which he felt himself bound to carry it out. On
April 20, 1876, addressing the Calcutta Trades
Association,, he said: c So far as I am aware, nobody
in or out of India seriously desires to see the cotton
duties maintained for purely protective purposes.
It is, therefore, only as an item of revenue that their
maintenance can be properly advocated. . . . Were
our finances in such a condition as to admit of any
reduction in those sources of revenue which are
derived from taxes on consumption, I must frankly
say I would gladly see our tariff purged not only of
these cotton' duties, but also of some others. . . .
Starting, as we do this year, with a surplus unavoidably
reduced to the very narrowest limits ... I think no
one responsibly for the administration of this Empire
would at present venture to make even the smallest
reduction in any of its limited sources of revenue.'

When the time came for framing the Budget of
1877-78, it became evident that in the face of the
famine then impending in Madras and Bombay it was
impossible to carry out the desired abolition, or even
reduction, of the duties. Lord Lytton said in his

1877 FINANCE 477

speech of March 28, 1877 : 6 The Secretary of State Cotton Duties
has distinctly affirmed and established the principle LordLytton's
by which he intends our action to be guided, and the
discretion he has left to us extends only to the time
and mode which we may deem most suitable and most
efficacious for carrying that principle into practical
effect. In the exercise of that discretion we have
reluctantly recognised . . . the practical impossibility
of any present reduction of the import duty on cotton

Sir John Strachey, in his speech on the same
occasion, emphatically declared, on behalf of the
Viceroy and himself, their determination to carry out
this reform at the earliest opportunity which the state
of the finances might admit, and also looked forward to
the possible abolition of all Customs duties in India :

6 1 altogether disbelieve that there is in this
matter any conflict between Indian and English
interests; I am satisfied that these interests are Speech,
identical, and that they alike require the abolition
of this tax. I will not speculate on what ought to
have been done if the case had been different ; but
there is one thing which I wish to take this oppor-
tunity of saying. We are often told that it is the
duty of the Government of India to think of Indian
interests alone, and that if the interests of Manchester
suffer it is no affair of ours. Tor my part, I utterly
repudiate such doctrines. I have not ceased to be an
Englishman because I have passed the greater part
of my life in India, and have become a member of
the Indian Government. The interests of Manchester,
at which foolish people sneer, are the interests not
only of the great and intelligent population engaged
directly in the trade in cotton, but of millions of
Englishmen. . .

478 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. x

Cotton Duties

Sir John
Strachey's

1877

Action of
House

* Financial

Statement*;,'
p. 324

c It is important, in my opinions not only on its
own account, but for the results which, may follow
hereafter. The net sea-Customs revenue proper of
India amounted in 1875-76 to 2,475,5302., of which
the duties on cotton goods yielded 850,000?. When
the cotton duties are removed there will remain ex-
port duties on rice, indigo, and lac yielding together
620,OOOZ., and import duties on a multitude of
articles yielding 930,OOOZ. Excluding the duties on
cotton goods, tie export and import duties together
give 1,550,OOOZ. Many of these duties are so objec-
tionable that it is impossible that they can last ; and
can it be supposed that we should long continue to
maintain huge establishments for the purpose of
levying the small remnant of revenue that might
survive ? The truth is that cotton goods are the
sole article of foreign production which the people
of India largely consume, and there is no possibility
of deriving a large Customs revenue from anything
else. I do not know how long a period may elapse
before such a consummation is reached ; but, whether
we see it or not, the time is not hopelessly distant
when the ports of India will be thrown open freely
to the commerce of ,the world.' l

On July 11, 1877, the House of Commons adopted
without a division the following important resolution :
{ That, in the opinion of this House, the duties now
levied upon cotton manufactures imported into India,
being protective in their nature, are contrary to sound
commercial policy, and ought to be repealed with-
out delay, so soon as the financial condition of India
will admit.' The stimulus of this resolution, though
not needed to induce Lord Lytton to take the pre-

1 Sir John Strachey's speech before Council: Financial Statements,
p. 157.

1877 FINANCE 479

scribed steps, helped to remove public opposition to Cotton Duties
the reform. Indian cotton being coarser and shorter • Financial
in staple than American, imported goods were mostly p*!^™811*8''
finer in quality than those locally manufactured, and
such goods were hardly subject to competition. But
those made of yarns whose numbers, in technical
language, was below 30, were of the same charac-
ter as Indian goods, and therefore were handicapped
by having to pay a 5 per cent. duty. Accordingly,
the duty on certain coarse goods, as to which there
could be no doubt that they were of the kinds with
which Indian manufactures competed successfully,
was removed; and the opportunity was taken to
purge the tariff of twenty-six other heads which either
produced very small amounts or affected the food of
the poorer classes, leaving only thirty-five out of
the sixty-two tariff numbers of the Tariff Act of
1875.

This partial reduction, however, failed to satisfy
the demands of Manchester, and created new and
unforeseen embarrassments in the operations of trade.
As to the former, the Secretary of State wrote : c The
impost is too much at variance with the declared
policy of this country to be permanently upheld ;
but if the task of dealing with it be long post-
poned, it will be the subject of controversy between
interests far more powerful and embittered than those
which are contending over it at the present moment.
... I need hardly insist further on the danger of
keeping open between two great communities of Her
Maiestv's subjects an irritating controversy which « Financial

,, 11 i i i A- TA • Statements,

can be closed by one and only one solution. It is p. 337
difficult to overstate the evil of permitting an industry
so large as the cotton manufacture in India is certain
to become to grow up under the influence of a system

480 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.X

Cotton Duties which a wide experience has proved to be unsound,
and which is opposed to the deliberate policy of
England.' As to the second point, the embarrass-
ment to trade was caused by the fact that there was
little essential difference between the cloths which
have been exempted and large classes of cloths,
otherwise styled, which have not. A Commission was
appointed, of which Sir T. 0- Hope was the leading
'Financial a member^ to look into the question, and they reported
statements,' ^^ « ^ Q^ effective remedy is to treat similarly,
whether by exemption or taxation, all cloths of the
same texture, irrespective of the lengths and widths
in which they happen to be made up or the names by
which people may choose to call them/ Accordingly,
the Financial Statement for 1879-80 declared that
6 the Governor-General in Council considers that the
facts reported by the Commission . . . show con-
clusively that adherence to the tentative measures of
last year is not possible. It is not reasonable that
certain goods should be admitted free, while large
. quantities of goods of almost precisely the same
character in everything but name remain liable to
duty. No measure falling short of the exemption
from duty of all cotton goods containing no yarn
finer than 30's can be defended ; and this measure
can no longer be delayed- Its adoption will for
the present, at least, remove the directly protective
character of these duties. ... A Notification has
accordingly now been published, exempting from
import duty all cotton goods containing no yarn of
a higher number than 30's.' This exemption was
estimated to cost 150,OOOJ., in addition to the loss
incurred by the previous year's reductions ; and the
following paragraphs explain the grounds on which
the Government thought it right to incur this sacrifice

1879-n80 FINANCE 481

of revenue, in spite of the financial difficulties Cotton Duties
caused by the Afghan war :

6 The pledges given from time to time in regard to 'Financial
the gradual removal of the duties on cotton goods
have always been made subject to the condition that
their fulfilment must depend on the position of the
Indian finances. It certainly cannot now be asserted,
in the face of the great and increasing loss occasioned
by the fall in the value of silver in relation to gold,
that the financial condition of India is satisfactory,
although every branch of the public revenue is
prosperous, and, with the exception which has been
mentioned, no fresh causes for financial anxiety are
apparent. . . <

6 The real question which the Governor-General in
Council has had to consider is this: Ought the
Government to look upon the fresh financial difficulties
arising from the fall in the exchange as a sufficient
reason for refusing to sanction any further remission
in the duty on cotton goods ? And this question, his
Excellency in Council considered, must be answered
in the negative. The injury and loss which these
duties are causing both to the English producer and
to the Indian consumer, and to the true interests of
Indian commerce and manufactures, are certain.
Measures which, for the present at least, will almost
completely remove the protective, and therefore the
most objectionable, feature in these duties can be
taken without surrendering any very considerable
amount of revenue. The difficulties caused by the
increased loss by exchange are great, but they wiU
not practically be aggravated to an appreciable
extent by the loss of 200,OOOZ. If the fresh fall in
the exchange should prove to be temporary, such a
loss will possess slight importance. If, on the other

1 1

482 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTBATION CH. x

Cotton Duties hand, the loss by exchange does not diminish, and

* Financial ^ no other remedies can be applied, it will become

a omen a necesgary £0 J^Q measures of a most serious nature

for the improvement of the financial position ; but

the retention of the import duties on cotton goods

will not thereby be rendered possible. On the

contrary, such retention will become more difficult

than ever.'

The objections urged by members of the Indian
Government to the remission of duty on all so-called
grey-cotton goods were without doubt honourably
and conscientiously formed, but the popular oppo-
sition which the measure excited in India arose in
part from a suspicion that because the abolition of
Custom's duties would be favourable to English
manufacturers, therefore it was advocated for the
sake of obtaining political support in Lancashire,
and not out of regard for the interests of India.
Lord Lytton, however, having convinced himself that
the essential interests of India required the measure,
was not to be deterred by the imputation of such
motives. He saw that the case must either be met
then and there by a bold and sufficient policy, or
must be allowed to drift on to the serious discredit
of the Government and the injury of the country.
He accordingly had tibe courage to bring forward
a measure exempting certain cotton goods from
Customs duty on March 13, 1879, and carried it in
opposition to the majority of his Oouncil3 but on
the advice of the Financial Member, Sir John
Strachey. This step was constitutionally possible
under a well-known Act of 1870 authorising the
Governor-General to overrule a majority of his
Council.

Pew things caused Lord Lytton greater regret

1880 FINANCE 483

than that he was unable in his last year of office, by Ootton Datie
reason of financial difficulties, to carry further his
policy of abolishing the remains of the cotton duties,
as well as all import duties, except those on salt,
alcoholic liquor, and arms. In his speech in the
Budget debate of 1880-81 (March 2, 1880) he said:
6 1 must remind the Council that in every one of our
Financial Statements for the last three years the j^^1011'
complete abolition of the cotton duties has been Speech,
openly avowed as the ultimate aim of the policy we Marolia'1880
have been pursuing, in accordance with the repeated
resolutions of the House of Commons and repeated
instructions from the Secretary of State. Every step
taken by myself toward the attainment of this object
has been restrained only by considerations of time,
opportunity and expediency, never by disapproval of
the goal to which, at every stage, those steps were
tending, and to which from the outset they were
addressed. ... I will not stop to discuss whether
the consumers of the goods we have already cheapened
are Englishmen or Indians. But what is the present
practical effect upon Indian interests of the continued
duty upon English cotton? Why, they are tempting
or driving the English manufacturer in one direction,
and the Indian manufacturer in another direction,
to the manufacture of cloths which neither of them
would wish to make, were it not that one desires to
escape the duty, whilst the other desires to produce
goods protected by it. From those who still suppose
that the pressure of a 5 per cent, duty on cotton
imports is too light to have any appreciable effect
let me solicit consideration of the serious extent to
which the whole character of the trade has already
been actually changed by it.9

To the same effect Sir John Strachey said on the

II 2

484 LOKD LTTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.X

Cotton Duties same occasion : * The measures taken during the last
•Financial two years . . have at least effected the particular
SMMHIOT °bject for which they were declared necessary. They
Budget 1880 ^ave ^or ^e Present removed all ground for the com-
plaint that we were levying protective duties in favour
of the Indian mills in their competition with English
manufacturers. , . . When, last year, your Excellency
decided that it was impossible to defend the main-
tenance of the duty on certain classes of cotton goods
because it had a distinctly protective character, it
was thought right to make a considerable sacrifice
of revenue for its immediate removal . . . ; but the
Government feels that it cannot at the present
moment go further, or submit to loss of revenue
beyond that which the measures of the last two years
have rendered unavoidable.' . . . ' It is impossible
to deny that the present state of things is anomalous*
and objectionable. The Government will give to
this question in the future that constant attention
which its importance demands, but it cannot at the
present moment make the large sacrifice of revenue
which its ^ complete solution would involve, and
as a provisional arrangement meanwhile it doow
not seem possible to draw any line better than that
drawn last yeax. The abolition of the remaining
duties on cotton goods would cost us 600,00()f
m addition to the 250,000*. which we have riven up
already.' " l

As in the case of the salt duties, so in the casu of
the cotton duties, it was the good fortune of Lord
ftpcm to complete easily in 1882 what had buen
thus laboriously begun in 1878 and 1879 The
estimates for 1882-83 showed a surplus of over three
millions and Major Baring (now Lord Oromer) was
thus enabled, acting on the same principles and using

1877 FINANCE 485

almost the same arguments as those of Lord Lytton cotton Duties
and Sir John Strachey, to abolish the cotton duties Trade ee
and all import duties, except those on wines and
spirits, arms and salt, thereby remitting taxation
to the amount of

PROVINCIAL CONTRACTS

The third of the heads of the financial reform
which Lord Lytton placed before himself as one of
the chief objects to be attained during his Vice-
royalty was the development of the system of pro-
vincial assignments. It is a rather technical matter,
but the importance he attached to it is illustrated
by the terms in which he wrote of it in a letter to
H.M, the Queen on March 10, 1877: 'The new
principles of financial decentralisation and provincial
responsibility which, with the valuable aid of Sir John
Strachey, I have been able to introduce and carry into
partial effect this year, will eventually, I trust, afford
considerable relief to the Imperial Treasury.'

The nature of the measures referred to will be
best understood by quoting some extracts from the
Budget speech of Sir John Strachey (March 15, 1877),
under whose advice the first steps in this direction
had been taken by Lord Mayo in 1870. Up to that
time the central Government had retained in its own
hands the entire control of the finances and the
distribution of funds to the provincial Governments.
* Tho ordinary financial condition of India had been

1 Unfortunately, under the pressure of financial difficulties, it was
mibtKHpontly found necessary to abandon, it may be hoped for a time
only, a policy so enlightened and so beneficial to the people of India.
Tho tax upon flalt was increased, and import duties are now levied,
for revenue purposes, upon almost every article of commerce.

486 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION CH.X

Provincial one of chronic deficit, and one of the main causes
Contracts Q£ ^ gtate Qf g^^g ^fl been the impossibility of

resisting the constantly increasing demands of the
local Governments for the means of providing every
kind of improvement for their respective provinces.
Their demands were practically unlimited because
there was no limit to their legitimate wants ; they
had a purse to draw on of unlimited, because un-
known, depth ; they saw on every side the necessity
for improvement, and their constant and justifiable
desire was to obtain for their own provinces and
people as large a share as they could persuade the
Government of India to give them out of the general
revenues of the Empire.' . . . * The distribution of
public income,' writes General Eichard Strachey,
c degenerates into something like a scramble, in whirl i
the most violent has the advantage, with little atten-
tion to reason. As local economy tends to no local
advantage, the stimulus to avoid waste is reduced to
a minimum ; as no local growth of the income leads
to an increase of the local means of improvement,
interest in developing the public revenue is also
brought down to the lowest level.' Adopting lliuse
views, Lord Mayo selected eight heads of expenditure
in which the increase had been largest and most,
constant, and transferred them to the local Govern-
ments, with a fixed grant of money, out of which to
meet all demands, and with power to utilise any
savings which could be effected on other improve-
ments of which the province stood most in need.

The effect of the new system had been, found, after
six years' experience, to be thoroughly satisfactory,
not only^in preventing the growth of expenditure,
but also in diminishing correspondence and friction
between the local and supreme Governments, and

3877 FINANCE 487

enabling the local Governments to carry out Provincial

• T-- -L u i • i_ Contraota

many improvements which would otherwise have
been impracticable. It now remained to develop
the system and to extend it to an assignment of such
sources of revenue as depend for their productiveness
on good administration, and thus to bring the self-
interest of the provincial Governments to bear on
such improvements in administration. slt may be S^jjjjj1,
very wrong,' said Sir John Strachey, * but it is true. Budget
and will continue to be true while human nature re- ni^is,
mains what it is, that the local authorities take little 1877
interest in looking after the financial affairs of that
abstraction, the supreme Government, compared
with the interest which they take in matters which
immediately affect the people whom they have to
govern.' In making all these transfers, whether of
revenue or expenditure, a small margin was retained,
on the assumption that the local Government would
be able to recoup it by stricter attention to finance,
and the normal annual rise in the revenue heads was to
be shared between the local and supreme Governments
in fixed proportions. In this way the original measures
taken in 1870 had produced a saving of 330,OOOZ.S and
the new arrangements made with the Governments of
Uengal and of the North-West Provinces and Oudh,
which alone had been completed when the Budget of
1877-78 was brought in, were estimated to effect a
saving to the Imperial Treasury of 145,700Z. ; and in
1878-79 the completed arrangements were estimated
to improve the financial position of the Government of
India by 400,000?. In spite of this saving the trans-
action was calculated on so liberal a scale that in 1880,
when the treasury of the supreme Government was
depleted by the cost of the Afghan war and the loss
by the fall in exchange, the provincial treasuries were

488 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.X

Contacts1 so overfl°^ng ^at they were able to supply a con-
tribution of C703OOOZ. to the general needs of the
Empire. Notwithstanding this large contribution, as
the Viceroy pointed out in his speech in the Budget
debate of 1880-81, fi the provincial balances of the
local Governments will be actually larger by nearly
half a million than the sum at which, they were
estimated at the beginning of the year.'

Thus, with equal advantage to the supreme and to
the provincial Governments, was carried out this great
and far-reaching reform, which more than any financial
measure of the time has set its mark on the adminis-
tration of the country. Initiated by Lord Mayo, it
received its full development at the hands of Lord
Lytton. Since then more than twenty years have
elapsed ; contract after contract has been made, with
little or no variation of system ; but no voice has
been raised against the grand principle of decentrali-
sation, and everyone is agreed that it has been the
most fruitful and seminal reform which has been
introduced within the knowledge of the living
generation.

BXTJEtAOKDINARY PUBLIC WOBKS

The remaining financial reform which Lord
Lytton proposed to himself in 1876 was the revision
of the system under which the cost of the so-called
'Extraordinary Public Works' was defrayed from
borrowed money, and became an addition to the
public debt, being kept outside the ordinary Budget.
The works thus treated were railway and irrigation
works. A programme was drawn up in 1873 of the
most important projects of these two classes, the esti-
mated cost of which was over thirty-six millions ster-

1877-78 FINANCE 489

ling ; and it was held that it was safe to borrow this
sum, because the revenue arising from them would
be equal to the interest on the debt incurred. The
amount to be borrowed annually was fixed at four and
a half millions up to 1875, and was reduced to four
millions in that year. Sir John Strachey, however,
showedinhisBudget speech of 1877-78 thatthe scheme
required modification and revision. The revenue
produced by the works had not increased as fast as
the interest on the money borrowed. Some of the
works included in the programme — e.g. the railways on
the Punjab and Sindh frontier — were not, and could
uot be expected to be, remunerative. They were, no
doubt, very beneficial to the country through which
they passed, but were undertaken, not on financial
grounds, but because they were considered for 'Financial

S+B.+ amenta *

political and military reasons to be essential to the p iso
service of the Empire. Works of this kind were to
be classed as ordinary, not as extraordinary works, and
were to be paid for out of revenue. The remaining
works, which were expected to be really remunerative,
were divided into two classes. The first were those
undertaken for objects of such general utility that
they might fairly be called Imperial. Such were the
great trunk lines of railway, which not only confer
immense benefits on the provinces through which
they pass, but are essential to the wealth and pros-
perity of the Empire. The cost of constructing them
might therefore fairly fall on the Empire at large.
The second class were those great works of improve-
ment which are primarily of provincial or local
utility, undertaken for the special benefit of certain
districts or places, with. the object of increasing their
wealth or protecting them against famine ; the irri-
gation canals in Orissa, Behar, and the North-West

490 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTEATION CH.X

Extra-

Debate on

March 28,

Provinces, or the Northern Bengal and Tirhoot rail-
ways, may be cited as instances. It was shown that the
interest on the capital sunk in these works exceeded
the return by 100,OOOJ. in the North-West Provinces,
and by 275,OOOZ. in Bengal ; and the new principle laid
down was that the inhabitants of these provinces, and
not the general taxpayer, should provide these sums.
In many cases, no doubt, the loss would in a few years
be turned into a profit, and then that profit would ho
shared between the provincial and Imperial Trea-
suries ; but for the present the loss was to be met
by provincial taxation. In closing the debate which
followed this speech, Lord Lytton (March 28, 1877)
referred to this question in the following terms :

6 There is one of the announcements made by my
honourable colleague in his Financial Statement whiuh
no honourable member has yet noticed, but on wlii< ih T
wi'8 congratulate myself, and on which I think the public
Dn 8 may also be congratulated. I allude to the announce
ment that although, indeed, we cannot at presort!,
apply the new rule to existing works, yet the ex-
penditure on all unremunerative public works which
may hereafter be undertaken will be carefully ex-
cluded from extraordinary account, This is a
change of policy decided on by the Secretary of
State when Lord Northbrook was Viceroy; but it
has never before been publicly announced as the
rule we intend to follow. Now, it may be said that
this rule is a mere reform in book-keeping; in fact,
that it is a very small matter. I admit that it in a
small matter if it goes no further; but it will
certainly not be my fault, nor that of my honourable
colleague, if it does not go a great deal further ; and
if it only goes fax enough, I maintain that it is a very
great matter. So far as it does go, it is a step in the

1877 FINANCE

491

right direction ; for I share the doubt expressed by
Sir John Strachey, whether our extraordinary Budgets p
have not been altogether a mistake. In the course
of an official life which at least began early, it has
frequently been my hard lot to grope my way with
the greatest difficulty through the financial accounts 1877
of Continental Governments, in order to place before
my own Government an accurate estimate of their
financial situation. And a system which I have more
than once officially described as vicious and mis-
leading— a system which has, I confess, sorely tried
my temper when adopted by other Governments — is
certainly not one which I can regard without reluc-
tance as the system to be permanently pursued by
the Government of India. The French Government,
to its credit, has already abandoned that system. I
have heard it said that our own system is exempt
from the objections which apply to the extraordinary
Budgets of Continental States, since we do not put
into our Extraordinary Budget any expenditure
which ought properly to be carried to ordinary
account. But I do not think we are entitled to lay
that flattering unction to our souls. As a matter of
fact, we have put into our extraordinary account
many charges which ought to have been carried to
ordinary account. However Spartan may be our
financial virtue, still we are but human ; and, in my
opinion, the whole system of extraordinary account
is a perilous temptation to human weakness. . - . No
man who has studied intelligently the past history of
Indian finance will regard as unfounded the fears
expressed by ray honourable colleague, that the system
hitherto followed, of jumbling up together remunera-
tive and unremunerative public works in an account,
to which the term * extraordinary ' is extremely

492 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRA.TION CH.S

Extra- applicable, has tended to make us less chary than we
jffi^ada should otherwise have been in spending money upon
T JT-W » them. For my own part, I am not at all afraid of

jjord. Juytton s J -in 11

Budget the deficits which we might have to show by a
ibnb'flB, change of system. What I do regard with fear and
1877 distrust is everything which may tend to conceal

those deficits unduly from our own eyes or from
those of the public. The first step towards getting
rid of deficit is to look it frankly in the face. Nature
abhors a vacuum ; and the recognition of a financial
vacuum is so revolting to ordinary human nature,
that our best chance of filling it up consists in never
losing sight of it. My honourable colleague has shown
that during the last seven years, while our expendi-
ture has remained stationary, our income has steadily
increased; and I am convinced that our financial
character has everything to gain, and nothing to
fear, if only public criticism be furnished with
accurate data for the guidance of impartial judg-
ments.9

In the course of this year the orders of the
Secretary of State were received abolishing the title
of ' Extraordinary Public Works,' and substituting
that of ' Productive Public Works/ in order to em-
phasise the principle that works not expected to be
productive of revenue sufficient to cover their working
expenses and the interest on capital outlay should be
constructed in future out of ordinary revenue, and
not out of loans. A new table was attached to the
Financial Statement, in order to show on one side the
working expenses and interest due on all productive
works, on the other side the revenue derived from
them : and for the year 1877-78 this table showed oil
the one side 7,359,2042. as the expenditure, while on
the other the yield of revenue was 7,319,35GZ. This

1877 FINANCE 493

statement was justly characterised as ' encouraging,
for much of the expenditure was, necessarily, at the
time unproductive, and the direct revenue produced
to the State is but a small part of the advantages . .
which result from these works to the country. isr? 28'

FAMINE INSURANCE TAXATION

The foregoing account shows the manner in which
the four great problems in financial administration
which presented themselves to Lord Lytton at the
commencement of his Viceroyalty were effectively
solved. A brief description remains to be given of
another series of measures, the necessity of which he
had not, and could not have, anticipated, but which
were forced upon him by the occurrence of the great
famine in the southern part of the peninsula, Up to
this time the Government of India had treated famines
empirically, as they occurred, not on a settled prin-
ciple ; but it now became clear that they were not to
be looked upon as exceptional calamities, but as events
liable and certain to recur, and that provision must be
made for their prevention and relief out of the or-
dinary revenue, and not by borrowing, The famine
expenditure during the last five years had been
16,000,000^. Such a period of extreme calamity was
believed to be exceptional, but it was held that the
cost of famine relief must be estimated at fifteen
millions every ten years, or 1,500,0002. a year on an
average. Omitting famine, the revenue and exoendi-

O a ' JT

ture had, during the seven years preceding 1877, been
in equilibrium, leaving no margin for contingencies.
It was shown by Sir J, Strachey, in Ms speech of
December 27, 1B77, that a margin of about half
a million ought to be secured, so that the total

494 LOKD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTBATION OH. x

improvement required in the finances amounted to
two millions. Of the 1,500,000*. required for famine
charges 400,000£ had been provided by the measures
of provincial decentralisation already described, and
there remained 1,100,OOOJ. to be raised. For this
purpose new taxation was necessary, and it took llu1
form of cesses on the land in Bengal and the upper
provinces, estimated to bring in 500,000/., and a
license tax on trades (an extension of the tax already
levied in the North- West Provinces), whir.Ii was to
realise 700,000?., and which fell on every tnulur having
an income above Es. 100 a year. The //rounds for
this taxation were explained and defended by Lord
Lytton in his speech in the Legislative Coiinc.il on
February 9, 1878: 'Undoubtedly the ISIXPH whidi
™ ™n come into operation by the passing of (Jin Hilln
before iis must, to be successful, luiw a wide
incidence. ... But Sir J. Strachey hux alrviuly
shown that it would be a gross misroprwienlalion (if
the present license tax to say that it fulls only on
the very poor; and, indeed, as a matter of ftuO/tluM
tax touches no section of the community whidi <;uii l>c

regarded or rated as other than a well-to-do daw

'We have felt that the two great classes of I ho
community from whom we could rnml equitably
collect our Famine Insurance Fund arc the, trudin.r

and agricultural classes The ne<«'.s«i|,y of a

Famine Insurance Fund, and the duty of flovwmuwil
to provide such a fund, have been generjilly acknow-
ledged But equally general must be, 1 think, the
acknowleagment that in our selection of i]M, Hciur«»
not^/r^ ^ T necessari]y Haitol. wo amid

SrfVB7^"r,°f reaSOn °r jus
tamed Je agricultural cess in Itoiiiml

shrunk from subjecting to a simaar

1878 FINANCE

495

agricultural classes in other provinces in Northern Famine
India. Nor is it less undeniable that, from the same
point of view and for the same reason, we could not
justly maintain the license tax upon the trading'
classes of the other provinces if we did not impose
it also on the trading classes of Lower Bengal. I
think, then, I may fairly claim for the measures now
before the Council at least the modest merit of an
equitable distribution of famine charges between the
two great classes of the community best able to bear
them, and on whom such charges most reasonably
fall.'

The remaining half-million needed to provide
a margin against other exceptional expenditure was
provided by the equalisation of the salt tax, already
described, which was estimated to produce 300,000£,
and by the normal growth of the ordinary revenue.

Thus was created the famous Famine Insurance
Fund, respecting which more misunderstanding has
existed and more misrepresentations have been
uttered than about any other question connected
with the often misunderstood and misrepresented
subject of Indian finance. It has frequently been
supposed that the Government undertook to earmark
this particular sum of 1-J million, and to apply it
only to famine relief, or to the construction of pro-
ductive works ; and that if in any year it could be
shown that a less sum than 1£ million had been so
applied, then the Government might be held to have
failed to perform its pledges. Sir J. Strachey, in his
speech in the Legislative Council onFebruary 9, 1878,
set himself to prevent this error : ' We start with the

hypothesis that in every ten years the Government p. 268
of India will have to spend 15 millions on the relief
of famine. If we provide for this purpose a bona-fide

4Q6 LOED LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. x

Famine surplus of 1-Jf million a year for ten years we shall
have obtained our 15 millions. As we cannot keep
our annual savings locked up in a separate box,
it is inevitable that when the actual necessity for
spending the 15 millions arises we shall have to
borrow the money, so that what we have practically
to do is this: we must reduce our debt by 1J
million year by year during the whole period.
Then, when the necessity for spending the 15 millions
arises we can borrow that amount, and be no worse
off than we were ten years before.' He then went on
to explain that the Government was pledged to
borrow every year at least 2^ millions for the con-
struction of productive public works : c It would bo
obviously absurd to pay off every year debt to the
amount of 1,500,0002., and simultaneously to incur
fresh debt to the same extent. What, therefore, wo
have to do in the actual circumstances of tho case
is9 by applying to the construction of these workw tho
proceeds of the new taxes, to reduce by J,500,()0(U.
a year the sum which we might otherwise have
borrowed.'

The system thus established by the Govern-
ment of Lord Lytton for protecting the country
against the financial consequences of famine has been
from time to time modified, but it has been substan-
tially followed ever since. It has fulfilled financially
the designs of its authors, and its maintenance lxn«
from the time of its establishment until now been
treated as essential to a sound administration of the
finances of India. The sum of 1,500,QOO/. is now set
aside every year from revenue under the head of
* Famine Belief and Insurance/

When properly understood it is evident in tint
nature of things that a malversation or misappro-

1878 FINANCE 497

priation of this fund is impossible. Whatever Famine
calamity may arise to sweep away the surplus and
land the Government of India in deficit, the amount
of that deficit must be less than it would otherwise
have been by exactly the amount brought into the
Treasury by the taxes imposed in 1877-78 to create
the Famine Insurance Fund.

Necessary, however, as was the taxation for Insur-
ance against Famine, its imposition embittered a section
of the native community, and has often been charged
against Lord Lytton as a source of unpopularity and
a blot on his general administration. But those who
bring such charges are apt to forget how much was
done, on the other hand, to reduce taxation and to
relieve its incidence on the general population. In
March 1880 it was ascertained that the actual receipts
from the new taxes had been — from the cesses on land, « Financial
525,000?. ; from the license tax, 820,OOOZ. ; making
a total of 1,345,0002. This amount was diminished
in that year by exempting from the license tax
all incomes below Bs. 500 a year, a reduction of
Rs. 340,000 leaving the total sum of famine
insurance' taxation at almost exactly 1,000,0002.
On the other hand, the Government during the same
period gave up 150,0002. from salt, 150,0002. from the
inland sugar duties, and 300,0002. from import duties
on cotton goods and a multitude of other articles,
and the export duties on indigo and lac; besides
enforcing measures which practically killed the
remaining cotton duties and all import duties except
those on salt, alcoholic liquors and arms ; so that
they were abandoned, and a further remission of
1,100,0002. was secured within the next two years,
[f, therefore, the gratitude of the country to a Viceroy
is founded on the narrow basis of calculating the

K K

498 LOBD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.X

balance of taxation imposed and removed, Lord
Lytton fully deserves that gratitude.

EEROE IN WAR ESTIMATES

The close of Lord Lytton's Indian administration
was clouded by the discovery of an error in the estir
mates of the cost of the Afghan war. It is probable
that the important and far-reaching financial
reforms carried during his Viceroyalty are less
widely known to the public than this unfortunate
error in accounts. It was discovered at a time
when the Viceroy's opponents were only too glad
to make political capital out of any blunder which
they could lay at his door, and they even stooped
to accuse those responsible for the Indian Govern-
ment of wilful concealment and deception. Suffi-
cient time, however, has now elapsed for the matter
to be considered dispassionately, and while acknow-
ledging that the error was a singularly unfortunate*
one at the moment at which it occurred, a statement
of the facts is enough to show that its effect on
the finances of the country was not a lasting one.
The very next year the Government of India realised
a surplus. It cannot therefore detract from the
honour and credit due to Lord Lytton and Iris
Finance Minister, Sir John Strachey, for the states-
manship and far-seeing wisdom of their general finan-
cial administration. The history of this blunder is
as follows :

In March 1880 the war expenditure was calcu-
lated to be likely to stand at nine and a half millions,
of which nearly four millions were the cost of the
frontier railways leading to Quettah. It was, indeed,
stated that cthe estimates must be to a great extent

1880 FINANCE 499

speculative/ but they had been prepared with great Error in Ww
care by the Accountant-General of the Military Efltimates
Department, and their accuracy up to that time was
supposed to have been highly creditable to him. In
other words, Sir John Strachey and the Government of
India, though the Finance Department were not the
authors of the estimate, made themselves responsible
for it. It was felt, therefore, as a crushing blow to
the credit of the Government when it was discovered,
at the end of 1880, that the expense of the war had
been greatly under-estimated. By the end of March
five millions of actual outlay had occurred of whict
the Government was not aware at the time the
Budget was prepared and published ; and the total
cost of the war (partly through its prolonged
duration) was found ultimately to be seventeen and
a half million pounds, or twelve millions in excess
of the estimate. That the estimate of future expendi-
ture should have been falsified was neither unusual
nor surprising. No one anticipated in March 1880
that the operations beyond the frontier would continue
till nearly the end of 1880 ; but the error made in
failing to obtain even approximate information as to
the expenditure which had actually occurred caused
a widespread want of confidence in the soundness of
the Indian financial system. The explanation of the
mistake was that the Military Accounts Department,
following an old and faulty system, took note only
of the classified and audited accounts, not of the
actual outgoings from the treasuries. In ordinary
times the audit keeps pace fairly with the expendi-
ture ; but in war large disbursements have to be made
under great pressure, and with little regard to form
and technicalities, and the Audit Department falls
into arrears and toils painfully behind. Thus it

KE3

500 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.X

Error in War happened that the Military Accountant-General pre-
sented to the Financial Department of the Govern-
ment figures which were altogether incorrect, and,
the system which they trusted having failed them,
the Government were left in ignorance of facts of
essential importance. But though the error was
lamentable, a simple set of departmental orders
sufficed to correct the system and to prevent the
possibility of the recurrence of any similar mistake ;
and no evil results actually followed from the mis-
calculation. No item in the policy of the Govern-
ment would have been altered had the cost of the
war been more accurately gauged and foreseen.
Aided by the timely contribution of five millions
from the English Treasury, the finances of India
showed a wonderful power of resisting the unexpected
strain, There were deficits of about a million in
1879-80, and four millions in 1880-1 ; these wore
entirely due to the wara but for which those years
would have returned surpluses of over four and six
millions respectively. But in 1881 there was a surplus
of one and a half million, and in 1882-83 a surplus
of over three millions, which enabled the Government
to carry out the large reductions in taxation which I
have mentioned. This prosperity may faii-ly be attri-
buted to the sound basis upon which Lord Lytton's
administration had placed the finances of India.

Although the magnitude of this error in the
war estimates was not known before Lord Lyttou
left India, the fact that such an error existed "waa
realised. Lord Lytton wrote to Lord Oranbrook on
May 11, 1880 :

'All other revelations sink into insignificance
before the tremendous discovery now made by the
Financial Department, that the war estimates pre-

1880 FINANCE 501

pared by the Military Department, confidently re- Error in War
commended by it to the Financial Department, and E8timates
adopted by the latter without misgiving, were utterly
worthless and will be indefinitely exceeded. . . . The
public scandal and reproach of it must, I fear, fall
directly upon myself, and indirectly upon Sir John
Strachey; and although I hold that we are both of
us blameless — for I am unable to conceive how either
of us could have anticipated or prevented it — yet
I can scarcely complain of the popular verdict I
anticipated, for of course the external responsibility of
the Government of India cannot be subdivided. . . .
Ever since the commencement of the first campaign
in Afghanistan I have laboured without ceasing and
under great difficulties to keep down military expen-
diture. . . But I have always carefully refrained
from questioning or interfering with the final esti-
mates framed and passed by the responsible depart-
ments for sanctioned charges. Any other course
would have involved tampering with the public
accounts by the head of the Government, and been
destructive of that established sense of personal and
departmental responsibility which is the best, and
indeed the only, guarantee for the conscientious pre-
paration and verification of estimates by the authori-
ties properly charged with that task. ... I cannot
help feeling, with considerable bitterness, that the
powers of military darkness, against whom I have
been maintaining single-handed for four years such
a fatiguing, and till now not unsuccessful, struggle,
have in ths last hours of my administration contrived
to give me a oroc aux jamles which no vigilance
on my part could have prevented, and which no-
explanations on their part or on mine can now solve/

502 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION AII.XI

CHAPTER XI

VERNACULAR PBKSS BILL

IN the Spring of 1878 an important measure was
passed by Lord Lytton's Government to deal with
seditious publications in the vernacular press. This
measure was reversed by his successor only to bet
brought back in a different form by forua of t-wnlH,
after twenty years of deliberate refusal to lacs*1 ;j
growing evil had led to the murders at Poomi, tlu*
prosecution of Tiluk, and the incarceration of flu*
Natus. Then the policy was reconsidered and (h<*
law altered in a direction differing from Lord
Lytton's scheme, in so far as that aimed at prevout-
ing while the new law aims at punishing wulitious
writings.

Since 1835 the law on the subject of the prisss
required tiiat every printer and publisher should
register himself, and that on every iawuo of a paper
the ^name of printer and publisher should appear.
During the Mutiny of 1857 a short-lived Ar-t WIN
passed placing restrictions on the pirns, but them
were, as a matter of fact, directed against the pnpum
published in English ; the vernacular journals did not
at that time attract attention. Some live or BIX year*
afterwards the Lieutenant-Governor of Jtougal (Sir
Cecil Beadon) arranged for a weekly ab«traet to 1>«
prepared of the more important article in tho native
press and caused them to be circulated aiuoi »W official*

1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 503

and made available to the English press. The
growing license of the vernacular press was pro- theAe*
bably the cause, while the revision in 1870 of the
Penal Code afforded the opportunity of inserting in
the law a section directed against seditious writing.
The section had originally been drafted by Macaulay
and his co-operators, but had for some reason, appa-
rently through inadvertence, found no place in the
code when first passed into law.

The section, however, introduced in the Penal Code
of 1870 to the effect that writers attempting to excite
feelings of disaffection to the Government should be
punished was so hedged round by legal definitions of
what could or could not be called disaffection, that
both before and after Lord Lytton's time the Govern-
ment of India were advised by their law officers not to
prosecute, even in very flagrant cases, because the view
which might be taken of the law was uncertain, and
the law therefore practically remained a dead letter.

We find Lord Northbrook's Government issuing a
warning (unofficial and outside the law) in 1872 to a
Bengali paper the c Som Prakdsh.' The next year the
Lieuteuaut-Governor of Bengal(Sir G. Campbell) called
attention to the growth of the evil and urged on Lord
Northbrook a much more stringent law. In the par-
ticular case the ' registered ' printer and c registered '
proprietor of the offending newspaper were college
students of eighteen and twenty years respectively,
so that a successful prosecution would have been of
little value as an example, but Lord Northbrook's
Government saw no necessity at that time for altering
the law. The correspondence, however, had two
useful results.. It showed the position of registered
printers and proprietors, and it led to the weekly
abstract of the native press being made henceforth

History of
the Act

Lord Ly tton
takes up the
subjeot,
September
1877

504 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.XI

a confidential document, at which, the vernacular
press exclaimed that it was oppressed and its influ-
ence seriously curtailed. The next move came from
London. In 1875 the Secretary of State (Lord
Salisbury) informed the Government of India that his
attention had been drawn by writings in the * Pall
Mall Gazette ' and another paper to various articles in
the native press ' which are not only calculated to bring
the Government into contempt, but which paltiata,
if they do not absolutely justify as a duty, the assas-
sination of British Officers.' He added that the
unchecked dissemination amongst the natives of
articles of this character could not be allowed with-
out danger to individuals and to the interewtK of
Government. The Advocate-General was coiumllad.
He advised that in his opinion there was an ofltauw
under Sec. 124 A. of the Penal Code, but * a conviction
will depend so much on the tribunal charged with tlu*
trial of the case and the view which th« presiding
judge may take of a law not yet judicially inter-
preted, that I feel myself unable to predict the result,
of a trial.'

On the strength of this the Government of Jxjrd
Nbrthbrook replied to the Secretary of Stale thai in
the present state of law it was not desirable for the*
Government to prosecute except in the cam of
systematic attempts to excite hostility against the
Government.

^ It was left to Lord Lytton's Government to clml
with this difficult question, and it was not till Septem-
ber 1877 that Lord Lytton himself took it in hand,

As an illustration of Lord Lytlon'w methods it IB
worth while to trace the steps by which lie xviichul
and gave effect to his final decision.

First in 1876 he had an historical note pruparad

1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL

*

in the Secretariat, the writer of which i

Irish Act 1 as a possible guide. This Act allows' tie*
executive authority, after warning given, to confiscate
the plant &c. of the offending paper, biit it allows the
proprietor to sue for damages if he can show that his
publication was not seditious. The question was
reviewed by the then legal member of Council, who,
partly on the ground that the English press in India
was as violent as the vernacular press, and partly on
general grounds of the value of a free press, advised
against any action being taken. So for a year more
things remained as they were. In the autumn of 1 877,
when Lord Lytton was planning his famine inspection
journey to Southern India, Mr. Eden, the Lieutenant-
Q-overnor of Bengal, dealt with the subject in a speech
and subsequently wrote to the Viceroy strongly
urging legislation. Lord Lytton prepared a Minute
giving the recent history of the matter, dwelling upon
the obvious futility of the existing control by registra-
tion, showing what was thought by experienced
officers on the danger of the spread of sedition, but
dwelling not less strongly upon the injury done by
the use which the press made of its power to intimi-
date native officers, and to blackmail native chiefs.

This Minute, together with an appendix containing
the sample extracts from the Bengali vernacular press
which Mr. Eden had sent up, was forwarded for the
consideration of the members of the Council and of
each Local Government and Chief Commissioner.

The result was to show that every member of the
Council, and, with the single exception of Madras,
every one of the ten different Local Governments
and administrations consulted, was in favour of the
principle of taking legislative action. The prepon-

1 83 & 84 Viet. c. 9 s. 30.

506 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN AHMINISTEATION OH.XI

derance of opinion was in favour of preventive rather
than remedial action. No great desire was shown to
amend Sec. 124 A. about which discussion had in
the first instance principally turned, but official
opinion looked to warnings and confiscation on lines
similar to the Irish Act, and in a minor degree to
the effect of demanding security, as likely to be ef-
fective ; but it was pointed out that the demand for
security would at once put a stop to a large proportion
of the ephemeral journals started without capital,
edited by boys, and printed on credit. It was on the
receipt of these opinions that Lord Lytton decided
to act.

The Bill being prepared and approved by his
colleagues, Lord Lytton telegraphed to the Secretary
of State for permission to introduce it. The intro-
ductory part of the telegram ran thus : —

'The increasing seditious violence of the native*
Press> now directly provocative to rebellion, has boon
of state for some time pressed on our attention by the Local
Governments, who, except Madras, which haw no
vernacular press of any importance, all concur as to
necessity of early and stringent legislation. This is
also the unanimous opinion of Council We have for
some months been contemplating repressive action,
but, in opinion of my own and the other Govormeuis,
the language of the vernacular press, at all timou
mischievous, is specially dangerous now, when native
community believes our power seriously weakened by
events elsewhere. It is thus essentially necessary for
Government in interest of public safety to take early
steps for checking spread of seditious writing. While
need for legislation is urgent owing to feeling of
native community, opportunity is also peculiarly
favourable owing to feeling of European community ;

1878 VERNACULAR PKESS BILL 507

generally felt that seditious efforts of vernacular press.
if not promptly repressed, will, under peculiar
circumstances of present time, continue rapidly to
increase. But if legislation did not take place imme-
diately it would not be carried out this year ; for,
although Government will not break up so soon, I
myself am obliged to leave Calcutta on 18th March,
and we could not legislate on such a matter at Simla.
We have accordingly prepared a Bill, and I propose
to pass it at a single sitting on the plea of urgency,
which is not fictitious, afterwards reporting to you
our proceedings in detail.

'If measure becomes an accomplished fact,
declared by us urgently necessary in interests of
public safety9 it will probably be accepted with far
less obj ection than if it had formed subject of previous
discussion.'

As the telegram gives in brief form the substance
of the Act as it was finally passed, it may be as well
to explain its provisions here by a further extract
from this telegraphic despatch : —

6 Our Bill is restricted in its operation to publica-
tions in Oriental languages ; its chief provisions will
take effect only in those parts of British India to
which they may be specially extended by the
Governor-General in Council, and Will cease to have
effect in those parts whenever the Governor-General
in Council so directs. Its object is preventive rather
than punitive. The system of check it establishes in
the case of newspapers in Oriental languages published
in British India is as follows : —

* First , — The magistrate may, with the previous
sanction of the Local Government, require the printer
or publisher of any such newspaper to enter into a
bond, binding himself not to print or publish in such

508 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTllATIOiV 011.11

LordLytton's newspaper anything likely to excite feelings of clis-
t^searetary satisfaction to the Government, or antipathy between
of state persons of different races, castes, religions, or sods,
and not to use such paper for purposes of extortion
The magistrate may further require the amount, of
this bond to be deposited in money or securities.

'Second. — If any newspaper, whether a bond has
been taken in respect of it or not, at any time con
tains any matter of the description just mentioned,
or is used for purposes of extortion, the Lonal
Government may warn such newspaper by a notifinu
tion in the " Gazette," and if, in spite of sudi warning
the offence is repeated, the Local Government may
then issue its warrant to seize the plant &«. of such
newspaper, and when any deposit has bwn made
may declare such deposit forfeited.

' Third.— As the provisions regarding the deposit
of security and the forfeiture of the dopnsii would
perhaps be found to press unduly on som<* of UK*
less wealthy newspaper proprietors, clauses have*
been inserted enabling the publisher of a uewspapiT
to take his paper out of the operation of tins portion
of the Act, for such time as he pleases, by undertak-
ing to submit his proofs to an officer appointed I>v
the Government before publication, and to publish
nothingwhich sucii officer objects to. Any publish^'
smay, if he chooses, do this at the time whcm ho is
called upon to deposit security, arid, if lie cloou so,
no security can be demanded from him. Agmn, if
he does not choose to avail himself of this provision
at that stage, he may subsequently, in tfao immt of it
warning being issued against him, offer Hiich an
undertaking, and if the magistrate accept* it the
proceedings are at an end.

6 An appeal is given to the Goveruor-0<merui in

1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 509

Council against anything done by a Local Govern- LordLytt<m's
ment or any inferior authority. SftSrtLy

c Declarations of forfeitures and other proceedings of State
under the Act are made final and conclusive, subject
only to such appeal.

6 This procedure seems to us the most suitable,
as it precludes the publicity and idat which would
attach to a trial in a court of justice.

6 We trust this will meet with your Lordship's
approval.'

The permission thus asked for was readily ac-
corded by Lord Salisbury subject to observations on
details when the text should be received.

The Bill was introduced into Council by Sir
A.. Arbutlmot, was passed and became Law as Act IX.
of 78 on the 14th of March 1878.

Nine members of the Legislative Council spoke Act passed,
on tho Bill, and among those nine were all the non- i"
official members and the only native member of the
Council then present. All spoke in favour of the
Bill, which they said was necessary, though all
regretted the necessity for such a law in a British
dependency. Lord Lytton abstained from speaking
till the debate had run its course — the singular but
officially-prescribed course which involves, after the
movor has spoken, a succession of speeches, proceed-
ing in regular order, round the table, commencing
from the junior member, who sits on the Viceroy^
loft, ami following in the order of seniority up to die
lji<*iile»iuiHt-QovonLor, who has his seat on the Viceroy's
right. Finally the Viceroy as President sums up the
clolHilo, if he lias anything to say upon it. On this
occasion Lord Lytton had a good deal to say : —

6 \ cannot 1ml regret the necessity which, by some
irony of fate, has imposed on me the duty of under-

510 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN , ADMINISTRATION OH.XI

taking legislation for the purpose of putting restric-
tions on a portion of the press of this country. By

Much 14, association, by temperament, by conviction, I should
naturally find my place on the side of those to whom
the free utterance of thought and opinion is an
inherited instinct and a national birthright. I should
have rejoiced had it fallen to my lot to be able to
enlarge, rather than restrict, the liberty of the press
in India ; for neither the existence nor the freedom
of the press in this country is of native origin or
growth. It is an exotic which especially claims and
needs, from the hands that planted it in a foreign
soil and clime, protecting shelter and fostering care.
It is one of the many peculiarly British institutions
which British rule has bestowed upon a population
to whom it was previously unknown, in the belief
that it will eventually prove beneficial to the people
of India, by gradually developing in their character
those qualities which have rendered it beneficial to
our own countrymen. For this reason the British
, rulers of India have always, and rightly, regarded
with exceptional tolerance the occasional misuse of
an instrument confided to unpractised hands. But
all the more is it incumbent on the Goveniment of
India to take due care that the gift for which it is
responsible shall not become a curse instead of a
blessing, a stone instead of bread, to its recipients.
• ' Under a deep sense of this great responsibility,
I say distinctly, and without hesitation, that in my
deliberate and sincere conviction, the present measure
> is imperatively called for by that supreme law— the
safety of the State.

on

justice, uprightness, progressive enlightenment, and

1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 511

and it is at least a plausible postulate, which at first Lord
sight appears to be a sound one, that, so long as these
are the characteristics of our rule, we need fear no
disaffection on the part of the masses.

6 It must, however, be remembered that the
problem undertaken by the British rulers of India
(a political problem more perplexing in its conditions
and, as regards the results of its solution, more far-
reaching than any which, since the dissolution of the
Pax Eomana, has been undertaken by a conquering
race) is the application of the most refined principles
of European government, and some of the most
artificial institutions of European society, to a vast
Oriental population, in whose history, habits and
traditions they have had no previous existence.
Such phrases as " Religious toleration," " Liberty of
the press," "Personal freedom of the subject,"
" Social supremacy of the Law," and others, which
in England have long been the mere catchwords of
ideas common to the whole race, and deeply impressed
upon its character by all the events of its history, and
all the most cherished recollections of its earlier life,
are here in India, to the vast mass of our native
subjects, the mysterious formulas of a foreign, and
more or less uncongenial, system of administration,
which is scarcely, if at all, intelligible to the greater
number of those for whose benefit it is maintained.
It is a fact which, when I first came to India, was
strongly impressed on my attention by one of India's
wisest and most thoughtful administrators ; it is a fact
which there is no disguising ; and it is also one which
oatmotbetoo constantly or too anxiously recognised,
that by enforcing these principles, and establishing
these institutions, we have placed, and must per-
manently maintain ourselves at the head of a gradual

512 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.XI

Lord Lytton's but gigantic revolution — the greatest and most
momentous social, moral, and religious, as well as
political, revolution which, perhaps, the world haw
ever witnessed. Now, if the public interpreters and
critics of our action were only European journalists,
capable of understanding and criticising it from a
European point of view, in reference to the known
principles of European polity, and in accordance
with the commonly accepted rules of European
reasoning, then, I think, we might rationally anticipate
nothing but ultimate advantage to the country, as
well as to its Government, from the unrestricted
expression of their opinion, however severely they
might criticise, from time to time, this or that
particular detail in the action of this or that particular
administration. But this is not the case as regards
those journals which are published in the vernacular
languages. Written, for the most part, by pert-ions
very imperfectly educated, and altogether inex-
perienced ; written, moreover, down to the level of
the lowest intelligence, and with an undisguised
appeal to the most disloyal sentiments and mis-
chievous passions — these journals are read only, or
chiefly, by persons still more ignorant, still more
uneducated, still more inexperienced than the writers
of them ; persons wholly unable to judge for them-
selves, and entirely dependent for their interpretation
of our action upon these self-constituted and incom-
petent teachers. Not content with misrepresenting
the Government and maligning the character of the
ruling race in every possible way and on every
possible occasion, these mischievous scribblers have
of late been preaching open sedition ; and, as shown
by some of the passages which have to-day been
quoted from their publications, they have begun to

1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 513

inculcate combination on the part of the native LordLytton's
subjects of the Empress of India for the avowed 1

purpose of putting an end to the British Eij. This
is no exaggeration. I have here under my hand a
mass of such poisonous matter, extracted from the
various organs of the vernacular press.'

Lord Lytton then went on to comment on various
extracts, but it is noticeable that, unlike former
speakers, who had laid stress mainly on those
extracts which in their virulent abuse gave expression
to the race hatred against Europeans as a whole, the
Viceroy made almost exclusive use of those extracts
which deal with the English as afraid of Bussia, as
defeated without a fight by Eussia, as rapidly to
be driven out of India by Eussia. The selection of
these extracts indicates that danger to the Empire
was the dominant thought in his mind ; it was on this
that he insisted as the justification for his method of
passing this law with less than the usual formalities ;
the danger he had in view was the diffusion of the
idea that England was an effete power unable to
stand before Eussia, and destined to see her power
in India crumble to pieces at the first contact with
the enemy. It will be remembered that these months
were a critical period as to the peace of Europe, and
the progress of the Eusso-Turkish war had been
carefully watched in India. Lord Lytton, writing
about this time elsewhere, remarked 'Hindus and
Mohammedans alike have from the first instinctively
regarded the Ottoman Empire as a counter in a great
game for power in which both England and Eussia
had a tremendous stake to win or lose. They uni-
versally believe that Eussia has won her stake and
that we have lost ours. Already their imagination
associates her image with the future of their own

L L

LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.J.I

lord Lytton's destinies &c.' All this may have been an exaggerated
^ew °* na*ive feeling, but it explains the urgency
which he felt in regard to the passing of the Act, and
the importance which he attached in the circumstances
of the moment to the danger of allowing this par-
ticular seed to be sown all over India.

He went on in his speech to dwell on the juslifir-a-
tion for interference and the expediency of pnwentiiijj
rather than punishing.

' It is not in the spirit of resentment for injuries
that we propose to legislate. It is in the firm convic-
tion that the maintenance of our RAj is for tlus good
of the people, that we seek to save the pp,opl« from
the ruin in which they would involve thuiiiHulvPH bv
seditious agitations against it. We have no dosin; lo
resort to fine or imprisonment; but wlmt w« <lo
desire, and what we regard as the plain duty of tliu
Government, is to prevent the open pi-uaHiing of
sedition and rebellion amongst the most ipiumutl,
excitable, and helpless portion of its subject.

' Within the last few weeks I have refused appli-
cations from two different Local Government* to
permit the prosecution of local vernacular newspapers
for obvious and rank sedition ; and I will state my
reasons for so doing. The law, as explained by 1,!u-
honourable mover of this Bill, is in its premnit, Utah-
a very questionable instrument. The explanation of
disaffecfaon" may be taken to explain away ntiuoKt,
any incitement to disaffection that is not followed bv
actual rebellion; so that the probability <rf socurinj
a convxctipn would always be doubtful. Brt, tl,0m,h
these ^derations might weU justify mo in hcuiutinj,

osanctzonaprosecutionunder existing cinMunstancoH,
it was not solely, nor indeed mainlv, on them
conaderamons that I have acted. Had the law , m

1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 515

certain, and the temper of the jury such as would LordLytton's
have rendered a conviction secure, still I should not
have considered a prosecution desirable. What I
desire is to prevent, not to punish, seditious appeals.
A successful prosecution, even should it in some cases
have a deterrent effect, would still invest the pro-
secuted journal with a mischievous notoriety, and an
artificial importance, calculated to give to its seditious
teaching the very publicity which, in the interests
of good government, we should desire to prevent.
Every such victory would be a virtual defeat.

c It is for these reasons that I came to the con-
clusion that legislation was necessary, and that it
behoved us to direct such legislation to methods of
prevention rather than of punishment. This conclusion
has been adopted, after the most anxious consideration,
with the unanimous approval of every member of my
Executive Council, and every Local Government in
India except one, within whose jurisdiction the
vernacular press is wholly insignificant and un-
heeded.

* It may, and by some persons it probably will, be
regarded as an objection to this measure that it draws
a distinction, and apparently an invidious distinction,
between the native and the English press. It may be
said, with perfect truth, that the very words which
we regard as innocuous in an English paper will be
deemed seditious in a vernacular journal, and that
the native editor may be ruined for repeating what
the English editor has published with impunity.
Well, this seems a very strong indictment against the
Bill ; but the briefest examination of the circumstances
for which we are legislating will suffice to dissipate
the force of it. In the first place, let the real
distinction be observed. The distinction is not

I L 2

51 6 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION in ix

Lord Lytton's between Englishmen and natives, or between the
Council, English press and the native press ; for many natives
utTB11 14> publish the newspapers in English, and in very good
English too. Some of the native newspapers thus
published contain excellent and valuable comments
on public affairs. Some of them are also edited by
men of acknowledged ability and culture, who
certainly do not hesitate to criticise the English
Government with an asperity and hostility which no
other foreign Government in the world would tolerate
for a moment. With these papers we do not inter-
fere, Being written in English, they are ex m frmifni
addressed to a more or less educated audienrse, and a
class that has at least the power, even if it has not
always the will, to choose between the false and the,
true, between the evil and the good, From them wo
apprehend no political danger ; and we can trust to
their improving education, as time goes on, to rendtu-
their criticism fairer, and their judgment more,
according to knowledge. It is not, then, against
native papers, as such, that our legislation is directed,
We confine our measures of restriction purely to the,
papers written in vernacular languages ; and we do
so because, as I have said before, they are addressed
solely to an ignorant, excitable, helpless class— a elm
whose members have no other means of information,
no other guide as to the action and motives of tlicir
rulers; and who, if such action and motives Ix*
persistently misrepresented to them, are likely to
give vent to their excited feelings in acts of (liftafiec-

-

tion, which cannot but be fraught with disaster to
themselves.'

The rest of the speech dealt with the abuses incident
to the vernacular press as a weapon of extortion and
intimidation, to Indian chiefs and native officials—an

1878 VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 517

aspect of the question, which, clearly appealed with Lord Lytton's
much force to his sympathy, and he wound up in the
following words : —

6 We must of course expect that by those people
whose minds are governed by phrases, and who loot
upon the liberty of the press as a fetish to be wor-
shipped, rather than as a privilege to be worthily
earned and rationally enjoyed, this measure will be
received with dislike, and the authors of it assailed
with obloquy. It is my hope, however, that the
gradual spread of education and enlightenment in
India may ensure and expedite the arrival of a time
when the restrictions we are now imposing can with
safety be removed. I am unwilling to hamper the
free influence of honest thought ; but I recognise in
the present circumstances of this country, and the
present condition of the populations committed to
our charge, a clear and obvious duty to check the
propagation of sedition and prevent ignorant, foolish,
and irresponsible persons from recklessly destroying
the noble edifice which still generously shelters even
its vilest detractors. That edifice has been slowly
reared by the genius of British statesmanship out of
the achievements of British valour. It was founded
by English enterprise; it has been cemented by
English blood; it is adorned with the brightest
meiuorials of English character. The safe preserva-
tion of this great Imperial heirloom is the first and
highest duty of those to whose charge it is entrusted
— a duty owed to the memory of our fathers, as well
aw to the interests of our children ; to the honour of
our Sovereign, no less than to the welfare of all her
subjects in India.' +s

The results of this measure and its subsequent
fate may now be told.

5l8 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.XI

Besuit of First, it had to run the gauntlet of the Secretary

of State and his Council The Secretary of State who
had approved its introduction and, indeed, the method
of dealing with it, was Lord Salisbury, but the
Secretary of State who had to consider it after it was
passed was Lord Oranbrook.

On May 31, 1878 Lord Cranbrook addressed a long
despatch to the Government of India reviewing the
history of the Act, sharing the regret expressed by
the Viceroy and his Council at having to fetter the
press, but, having regard to the overwhehning weight
of authority in favour of it in India, and to the
soundness and sufficiency of the reasons put forth in
support of such an Act, he could not but leave it to
its operation. One section of the Act, that which
allowed editors to contract themselves out of the
security clause by consenting to come under a
censorship, was objected to, and the Ticeroy was
further advised that the Act should be executed in
accordance with the spirit of the explanation attached
to Sect. 124 A. of the Penal Code, to the effect that
'no criticism of Government or its measures should
be dwcouraged if there is reason to think that it has
been dictated by an honest desire for improvement '
rafter than with the object of spreading disaffection',
and he wound up with a hope that the vernacular
newspapers might so improve that ' special legislation
for any cl*sB of publication ' might be found in no

£5 SI *' ^ I""808""* ^ acceptance of
Lord Lyttons work was not, however, arrived at by
a unanimous council. Three members of the

1878 VERNACULAR PfeESS BFLL 519

approval on the part of the Indian authorities to
their own over-sensitiveness to attack, fastened on the
distinction between the English and the vernacular
press as an unpardonable flaw, objected strongly to
the hurried manner in which the Bill had been passed
into law, and most of all to the fact that the Secretary
of State's Council had had no opportunity previously
of considering the proposals. The voting, however,
was 3 against, and 10 for the measure ; giving a
majority of 7, so the Act was left to its operation.
Its existence, however, was still threatened. In
July 1878 Mr. Gladstone introduced into the House of
Commons a motion which in its terms was singularly
mild. It proposed that Her Majesty should 'give
directions that all proceedings which may be taken
by the authorities under the Indian Vernacular
Press Act be reported to the Secretary ofJState and
laid before Parliament from time to time.'.. ]

This resolution, which the Government did not
think fit to accept (and though harmless in itself it
might have afforded an awkward precedent), led to a
debate in which, as was natural, the action of the
Government of India was unsparingly censured by the
opposition on the same grounds as those enumerated in
the dissents above mentioned. Indeed, these dissents
and the minutes of 1835, when Sir Charles Met calf e
freed the press from its previous disabilities, were the
great armoury from which the weapons of attack
were borrowed. The outcome of the debate was a
majority of 56 against Mr. Gladstone's resolution.

It has been mentioned above that the Secretary
of State objected to so much of the Act as allowed
the editor of a vernacular paper to avoid the
necessity of providing security by submitting to a
censorship. The ground of objection taken was that,

Result of
Measure

Bureau ol
Press Corn-
mis sioner
established

520 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH.XI

looking to the variety of dialects the censors would
have to be natives of India, and that the censors
would in fact have to write the newspaper. To give
effect to this decision of the Secretary of State a fresh
Bill was introduced in September. The opportunity
was then taken of reviewing the operation of the Act
during the seven months of its existence and of
replying to some of the strictures passed upon it in
the Secretary of State's Council and the Parliament.
The main point brought out by the speakers was
that the Act had really proved itself preventive and
not punitive ; that during the seven months of its
existence there had been no necessity to put it into
force ; that the criticism on particular measures such
as the license tax and the Arms Act, remained as
vigorous as ever, but the preaching of general sedition
had ceased. Lord Lytton in his remarks explained
the attitude which he desired to adopt no less to the
vernacular than to the European press in India, to the
effect that the Government should in a country where
there was no authentic source of political information
other than the Government, c keep the press fully and
impartially furnished with accurate current informa-
tion in reference to such measures or intentions oil
the part of the Government as are susceptible of
immediate publication without injury to the interests
for which the Government is responsible.'

It was to give effect to these proposals that
Lord Lytton established the bureau of a Press
Commissioner, an arrangement which might have
succeeded in improving the relations of Government
with the vernacular press, but which was not con-
tinued under succeeding Viceroys.

The Act of 1878 itself had but a brief life of less
than four years. Up to the time when Lord Lyttou

187S VERNACULAR PRESS BILL 521

left in 1880, only on one occasion had the Act been
resorted to. In March 1879 the ' Som Prak&sh,' a
Bengali journal, published a seditious article which
attracted the attention of the Government of India
and the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal- Sir A. Eden
was directed to apply the Act. The publisher of the
4 SomPrakish' was called upon to give security that
he would not again publish seditious writings. He
gave the bond, but he closed his paper. In the follow-
ing year he applied for permission to re-issue his
paper without security,, and undertook to be more
careful in future. On the recommendation of Sir A
Eden this permission was given and the bond was
withdrawn.

On December 7th, 1881, under Lord Eipon's
Government a Bill was introduced to repeal Act IX.
of 1878 together with its amending Act XVI. of the
floma year. The introducer, Mr. Gibbs, gave as the
reason for repealing the legislation that since its
passing it had never been fully put into operation
against any vernacular publication in British India,
and that there was not at that time existing a state
of circumstances sufficiently serious to justify the
law being 6 placed in full operation,' So far as ver-
nacular publications in British India were concerned
the Government proposed to rely on the sections of
the Penal Code dealing with the subject ; and with
regard to the introduction of seditious matter from
abroad, their reliance would be placed on the Customs
Aejt and the Post Office Act, which gave power to
prowmb the entry of objectionable publications
issued in foreign countries. The Bill was passed
into law with very few comments on January 19,
1882,

From that time the vernacular press had a free

522 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION CH.XJ

hand unchecked save by the uncertainty whether
Sec. 124 A. might not be applied to their writings,
and the various Local Governments watched the
increasing venom and audacity of the press with
profound anxiety, but with equal uncertainty as to
whether Sec. 124 A. could be relied on. In Bengal
an attempt was made in 1892 to prosecute the
* Bangobdshi,' a Calcutta newspaper, and the Chief
Justice in his summing up interpreted the section in
a manner favourable to the prosecution, but the jury
disagreed, the judge did not express his agreement
with the verdict of the majority, and the prosecution
fell through. Not till the murders of Messrs. Kami
andAjrerst at Poona in 1897, murders which the
Government attributed to the violent inflammatory
articles of the vernacular press, was the subject again
seriously dealt with. It was felt by the Government
that after the disastrous reversal of Lord Lytton's
endeavour to grapple with the evil, it would be
necessary to avoid if possible the two stumbling
blocks of offence which caused the failure of his
labours. The High Court of Bombay, equally with
that of Calcutta (and supported on appeal by tho
Privy Council), had by their interpretation of the
explanation to Sec. 124 A. shown that, though
clumsily worded, it was in substance a HufficusiiUy
punitive weapon. The Government of India writin"
m these circumstances in 1897 proposed, ttarnfimi,
while maintaining in substance the old punitive
section, to make no distinction between the Uiudiflh
and the vernacular press, and to leave all action to
be uken through the Courts in the ordinary course
of law After some correspondence with Ute Sem<-
tary of State, and much discussion in the legislature,
the law has now been strengthened in the following

1878 VERNACULAR PKESS BILL 523

manner. The wording of the old Sec. 124 A, has been
made so clear as to leave no room for doubt, and dis-
affection towards Her Majesty has become equally
punishable with disaffection towards Her Majesty's
Government. A new clause has been added making
punishable the attempt to promote feelings of hatred
or enmity between different classes of Her Majesty's
subjects, and the law which deals with the circulation
of nimours with the intention of causing mutiny or
rioting, or of disturbing public tranquillity, has been
amplified ; moreover, a new power has been given to
superior magistrates to take security from any person
circulating seditious matter or matter likely to pro-
mote enmity between classes, or intended to intimidate
or defame public officers, and in case the security is
not given to commit to prison for a year.

Lastly, cases of seditious publication can now be
prosecuted in the court of the superior magistrates
instead of having to be committed to the Sessions
where, as a set-off to the risk of heavier punishment
there is the certainty of the higher dclat, greater pub-
licity, and a more notable advertisement.

It is at least permissible to doubt whether Lord
Lytton's method of dealing with the vernacular press
would not have been found in practice a lighter and
less galling yoke than that to which after the lapse
of fifteen years it has been found necessary to
subject it.

524 L01ID LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION oil. xii

CHAPTEE XII

INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE

IN order that the following account of Lord LyttonV
efforts to solve the problem of a native civil service
may be made intelligible to the English reader, it
will be well in a few preliminary words to explain
the lines on which the civil administration was
organised. For present purposes this may be taken
as divided into two main branches, the executive* and
judicial.1 The executive branch covers sucli f must ions
as the supervision of the police, the work of the
magistrates, the collection of revenue, the assessment
and settlement of land, The judicial branch (whirh
in all the older provinces is separate from the execu-
tive) deals with the trial of all civil cases and of the
more serious criminal offences, and the work is carried
on by a hierarchy of judicial officers, culminating in
the High Courts of Justice. In both branches fJw
superior posts, administrative or appellate, are
manned almost exclusively by Europeans, and (save
as to a proportion of seats in the High Court) are
reserved by statute for members of what was

wV*™ ai! * **titudfl of other special departments, r.iblic
Works, Education, Police, Opium, Forests, &c., in regard to which the
same essential problem of admitting natives to the higher ranlw him
long engaged attention, and was to some extent dealt with in Lord
Iffttons fan* But these departments were outsulo tho scope of ilio
special administrative Acuity in regard to appointments belong

•

mav *»• o

mainly directed, and are not consequently diHcusHed in thw chapter

1879 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 525

called the covenanted civil service. In practice this
meant that while the district officer and all above
him, with perhaps two or three officers below him in
the executive line, would be covenanted civilians,
the great bulk of the magisterial and revenue work
lay in the hands of what was known as the un-
covenanted service, consisting mainly of educated
natives, with a small sprinkling of Europeans and
Eurasians, earning salaries ranging from 200 Es. to
800 Es. per mensem, and numerous in the proportion
of perhaps six uncovenanted to one covenanted
civilian. Similarly in the judicial branch the district
judge was by law a covenanted civilian, but his was
almost exclusively the supervising work of an appellate
court and a court of sessions ; the great bulk of the
civil causes of the district would be tried by his
native subordinate judges, or munsiffs, whose salaries
ranged very much between the same limits as those of
the executive service, and the numerical proportions
of the superior and subordinate services respectively
did not greatly vary in the two branches. The
problem which Lord Lytton had to solve was how to
secure for the natives of India a proportion of the
higher appointments exclusively reserved for the
covenanted civil service. This service is recruited
by competition, and any British subject, including, of
course, natives of India, may compete. As a matter
of fact, natives of India have been in the habit of
competing, and a certain proportion have been suc-
cessful.1 But the fact that the examination was held
in London, and held, moreover, on lines speciaUy
designed to test the results of English school or

> The last civil list shows some thirty-three natives of India in
the covenanted civil service, and about forty-five so-caJled statutory
civilians.

526 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMIN1STKATION on.xji

college education, was held to handicap Indian com-
petitors too severely, and another open door was
required. Two legislative enactments had been
designed at different times to deal with this question.
The first was the Act of William IV., which maruly
amounted to a pious opinion that birth or colour did
not disqualify anyone from holding any appointment,
but left the question for practical purposes vury
much where it was ; the other was adopted nearly
forty years later, and was aimed by the Duke of
Argyll directly at the legal difficulty involved by the
fc statutory reservation of the appointments in question
to the covenanted civil service. The matter had been
urged on Lord Lawrence's attention as far back as
1867, but with little practical result. Lord Mayo
took it up, but pointed out the necessity of legislation
to remove the legal obstacles, and iu 1870 the Dukn
of Argyll accordingly introduced and passed an Act
(33 Viet. c. 3), by which the Indian authorities ana
enabled, notwithstanding any previous law, to ap-
point natives of India to any office in the civil service,
but subject always to such rules as might from time,
to time be prescribed by the Governor-General in
Council, and sanctioned by the Secretary of Slate.
' Subject always to such rules.' The Act would not
work without the rules, and it was for the, Govern-
ment of India to make the rules. The Secretary of
State waited meekly for two years, and then ventured
to inquire if any rules had been passed. In October
1872 he wrote again more urgently, suggesting that
the rules should fix a definite proportion of appoint-
ments to be given to natives of India, that these
should be mainly judicial rather than executive posts,
the Indian mental character adapting itself better to
the former than to the latter duties, and finally that

1870 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 527

the salary should be less in the case of Indians so
appointed than in the case of covenanted civilians, on
the ground that though the duties were the -same, yet
that men working in their own country and among
their own surroundings did not require the same high
salaries as were needed to induce first-class men to
adopt a life of exile in the tropics.

Rules were accordingly passed in 1873, but these
rules, being based on the assumption that c proved
merit and ability * would best, if not exclusively, be
shown by previous service in subordinate offices,
wero disallowed. The law officers had advised that '
merit and ability need only be proved or established
to the satisfaction of the authorities making the ap-
pointinenl, and no particular method of establishing
proof is enjoined. To limit discretion by requiring
previous service under Government was opposed to
the, spirit of the Act. So at the end of five years
thhifZH remained where they were when the law was
passoil in 1870.

Lord Northbrook, however, in 1875 drew up
rules in wide terms, making no restrictions save
that the nominee was to be appointed provisionally
and to undergo a term of probation. These rules,
howowr, which were enabling rather than enacting
rules, remained practically inoperative, only one or
at the most two appointments having been made
lliort'inuler until Lord Lytton's Government reopened
flu* subject in 1878. Lord Lytton had indeed per-
sonally Bel the ball rolling a year previously in an
elaborate Note dated May 30, 1877. He had per-
reived that though the legal claims of the covenanted
ftivil service, no longer interfered with the freer em-
]iloyimml. of natives, thoir moral claims remained
they wiav, These men had through the door

528 LOHD LITTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. xn

of competitive examination entered a close service,
which was their profession for life. They had reason
to expect a certain definite rate of promotion to in-
creased salaries and higher position. Every native
that was appointed under the law of 1870 would
pro tanto diminish those prospects, and disappoint
reasonable expectations. To reconcile these conflict-
ing claims was still a problem which had to be solved,
and the first step towards solving it was taken in the
exhaustive Note above mentioned. In that Note the
Viceroy explained the position in which his Govern-
ment was placed between the pressure of two ant-ago-
nistic responsibilities. On the one hand, the pledges
implied in the action of Parliament, and the hopes
and expectations which have grown out of them in
the native mind; on the other hand, the imperial
necessity of maintaining the safely and welfare of the
Empire by restricting th.3 most important executive
posts to Europeans, and the undoubted claims of the
existing covenanted service to a maintenance of the
reasonable expectations and prospects under which
they were induced to compete for entry into that
service.

The overpowering necessity of more largely em-
ploying native agency in the civil administration was
justified in the Note, apart from the question of
pledges, by the political advantage of associating the
subject races in the government of the country, and
by the financial duty of employing the cheapest
agency available.

The solution to which Lord Lytton pointed in
the Note was to be found in the reduction for tho
future of the number of admissions to the covenanted
civil service, and in the establishment of a dose native
civil service which should have a monopoly of the

1879 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 529

appointments removed from the list of those hitherto
reserved to the covenanted service, together with
a portion of those now held by the uncovenanted ser-
vice. It proposed that appointments should be made
not by competition but by nomination, and that the
new service should be remunerated on rates of pay
less than those of the covenanted service, but should
be equal to it in status and position.

Lord Lytton in this Note acknowledged his in- May BO, 1877
debtedness to Mr. Eden for his forcible contributions
to the discussion. It was his view that the cove-
nanted civil service should be strictly a corps d'elite,
and should be confined to those appointments which
could not safely be entrusted to natives, and from
this he argued that the solution of the problem was
to be found in the direction of reducing the recruit-
iiieut for the covenanted civil service paripassu with
the substitution of a native civil service. This idea
Lord Lytton expanded and worked out in his ex-
haustive Note. He dwelt with much insistence on the
necessity of making the new native service a close one
which should have the practical monopoly of the
appointments allotted to it, and in which nominees
should enter at the bottom and work their way up
through the grades ; only in this way, he thought,
could they receive adequate training, and their com-
petence be secured. He threw out suggestions also
that the entrance to this service should be through a
special college, and that opportunity should also be
taken of devising some scheme by which properly
qualified natives of birth and position might enter
the army OH a level, more or less, with their English
(Comrades. Neither of these suggestions has com-
manded practical acceptance ; the former was nega-
tived at the time on financial grounds ; the latter has

MM

530 LORD LYTT02TB INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH xii

been found by successive military chiefs, even when
good will has certainly not been wanting, to bristle
with difficulties too numerous and too serious to be
tackled without grave misgivings. At the same time
the question is one which cannot be indefinitely left
alone.

To revert to the history of the native civil service,
Lord Lytton's Note, after being circulated and dis-
cussed by local Governments, councillors, and high
officials generally, resulted in the scheme which was
sent home a year later in the Government of India's
despatch of May 2, 1878. This scheme was very
much that foreshadowed in the Note. After justify-
ing the expediency from a political point of view of
associating with us in the work of government the
more influential classes of natives, the despatch
pointed out that it was essential that such men should
be trained for the work from the beginning, and should
find therein an influential and honourable career.
All this led up to the necessity of making the native
service a close one, and it was proposed to assign
to it fifteen per cent, of covenanted and twenty
per cent of uncovenanted appointments. The can-
didates were to be nominated by the local govern-
ments, but appointed on probation by the Govern-
ment of India. The new service was to be regarded
as a branch of the covenanted civil service, no dis-
tinction being made in the duties or responsibilities
of those particular posts which were to be open alike
to both branches ; and the status and position of the
two branches, though not the pay, were to be the
same. The despatch suggested that if this scheme
were carried out it would be expedient to exclude
natives of India from the competitive examination
for the covenanted civil service in London ; but thin,

1*7!) INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 531

it was pointed out, would require legislation, and the
Government of India did not insist on it as an essential
part of their scheme. It was also pointed out that a
close native civil service would conflict with the
words of the Act of William IV. from one point of
view, and from another with the scheduled list of the
Act of 24 & 25 Viet., while it would also involve
modification of the Act of 1870. The need for legis-
lation was fatal to the scheme. The Secretary of
Stale would not face it, even though Lord Lytton
expressly recommended that the ugly part of the
scheme (the proposal to exclude natives from the
fiompetitive examination for the civil service) should
be dropped. In the correspondence which went on
while the scheme was under the consideration of the
Secretary of State, Lord Lytton, in a letter to Lord
Onuibruok, wrote a full defence of it in July 187 9.
llrt says: blJp to the present moment not a single
cH'ort has been made to modify the regulations which
everybody perceives to be incompatible with the
fulfilment of these promises-' He then shows that
hiw scheme will not involve any financial responsi-
bilities, and that there was no danger of alienating the
existing <ila«y of native officials. 6 Such a danger might
l>u incurred if we offered this class, in exchange for all
it, now gets, something else and something different.
Hut what we propose is to continue to it aH it now
"irtB, with the addition of a great deal more which it
ramiul now get. You ask me if I really think the
(BlItaullit-H of employing natives are at present such
that a revolution ia needed. ... My reply to this
question is that the present system has had m un-
limited trial with increasingly unsatisfactory results,
and that no oiie has yet been able to show any reason
why it should succeed better in the future than it has

M U 2

532 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTI1ATION en, xn

succeeded in the past. Under the present system we
are practically bound by law and custom to appoint
Europeans to all the higher posts. To appoint a
native to any such post is an altogether exceptional
act, for which we are obliged to show very special
reasons or obtain special authority. What I say is —
shift this condition, at least in regard to a certain
number of high appointments which have betm
ascertained and are acknowledged cummwii runfitum
to be safely open to natives. The number of such
posts must always be comparatively small, but it is
sufficient for the fair discharge of our unredeemed
pledges. In regard to these particular appointments,
let the general rule be laid down that jtrimtt, fmw
natives only are to hold them. ' In short, transpose*
the onus probandi, and we shall have obtained all
that is necessary.' He goes on in his summing-up to
say : c The principal cause of the acknowledged failure
to fulfil fairly the promises given lies in the va^uo-
ness of the promises themselves. . . . The result is thai,
the pettiness of the prizes open to them, and the;
extreme uncertainty of their prospects in our service,
prevent that service from offering any attraction to
the class of natives whom we most desire to associate
with it. Thus we remain in the vicious circle round
which we have been wandering just half aa loiur as
the Hebrews wandered in the wilderness. We don't
employ natives more largely because they are not
well qualified; and they are not well qualified
because we do not employ them enough. . . I am
myself convinced (and so far as I can judge this i«
also the conviction of all our best arid most experienced
local administrators), that there is only one safe prac-
tical issue from it. Define more clearly the promises

1879 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 533

which have been given so vaguely and indeed so
rashly. Cautiously circumscribe them, but then
make them realities within their necessary limits.
Don't hold out to the native vague hopes of filling
every appointment now filled by Europeans, but give
him that reasonable certainty to which he is entitled,
of reaching a respectable position in the service you
invite him to enter.'

Lord Cranbrook, while complimenting the Viceroy
and the Government on their endeavours to deal with
this question, declined to sanction anything which in-
volved legislation, and thus extinguished the proposal
for a close native civil service ; he directed, however,
that a smaller scheme should be drawn up, nonfined
to appointing every year to the civil service of India
any such number of natives as may be determined on,
and proportionately decreasing the number of recruits
for the covenanted civil service.

In May 1879 the amended rules were sent home
with a despatch regretting that the scheme had been
shorn of the features that seemed to make for per-
manence and stability, but explaining that the
Government had done the best they could within the
limitations laid down. The rules provided (1) that a
proportion not exceeding one-fifth of die total number
of civilians appointed by the Secretary of State to the
civil service in any one year should be natives selected
by the local Governments ; that each selection should
be subject to the approval of the Governor-General
in Council, and that the selected candidates should
ordinarily be on probation for two years. These rides
were sanctioned by Lord Oranbrook in August , 1B7».
Tiiev were followed up by a Government resolution,
issued in December 1879, enjoining that appointments

534 LOEU Li'TTcws INDIAN ADMINISTRATION OH. xn

under the rules should generally be confined to young
men of good family and social position, possessed of
fair abilities and education, to whom the offices open
to them in the inferior ranks or uncovenanted service
have not proved a sufficient inducement to come
forward for employment. (2) That the appointment
of persons already in the employment of Government
should be exceptional. Thus was the Statutory service
constituted, and though its success was incomplete
owing partly to its not being a service at all, but ;t
fortuitous concourse of atoms, selected by each local
Government on different principles, the conditions of
whose employment, moreover, were constantly being
varied, yet during the eight years of its existence, tho
scheme did succeed in giving effect to Lord Lytton's
main object. Under it during these eight years,
jtari passu with a constant decrease in the recruit-
ment of the covenanted civil service in England,
fifty-seven natives of India were appointed to posts
ordinarily held by that service. An agitation sprang
up against it in 1884, mainly on the ground that the
young men of good family were either not forthcoming
or not efficient, and looking to the traditional habits of
the class and to the novelty of the experiment, which
hac^not really had time to be fairly tested ou the
original lines, this deficiency was not to be wondered
at. Local Governments were accordingly allowed 1o
make their selections on other principles, and there
was a tendency for the pendulum to swing in favour
of competition as a substitute for nomination. The
favoured position of ' Statutories ' gave rise also to
some grumbling in the subordinate native services,
and after an ineffectual attempt to deal willi the
questzon on other lines by Lord Bipon's Government,
the Public Service Commission appointed by Lord

1879 INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE 535

Dufferin, under the presidency of Sir Charles
Aitchison, ended by sweeping away the statutory
service in favour of a c provincial ' service which in
one point — that of occupying posts held both by the
covenanted and uncovenanted branches — practically
reverts to Lord Lytton's original plan.

INDEX

RAHMAN (SherAli'scousin),
his claim to the Afghan throne,
245 ; in Russian protection, 245 ;
at Taahkend, 410; his account
of his experiences in Bussian
territory, 410, 411; suggested
as Amir of Kabul, 412 ; appeals
to tho chiefs of Kohistan, 413 ;
negotiates with Lord Lytton
concerning the Amirship, 414 ;
suggests an Anglo-Bussian
protectorate, 414, 415; Lord
Lytton's policy towards him,
dH,428,4'29-4B4; LprdBipon's
oxpOHition of his policy regard-
ing him, 485, 438 ; his reply to
Lord llipon, 436; recognised
au Amir of Kabul, 438 ; meets
Mr. Lapel Griffin to settle
conditions of Amirship, 438;
IUH personality, 489; obtains
Kandahar, 448, defeats Ayub
Khan's forces near Kandahar,
450 ; relations with the G-overn-
mimt of India, 459
Abdullah Jan (son of Sher Ali),
IUH HueeesHion to the Amirship

recognised, 12, 82, 53, 83, 84,
01; (loath of, 264; assumed

caiiflo of death, 297
Abdullah Jan, Sirdar (son of

Hultun Ton of Herat), 843
Abdullah Nur at All Muajid, 275
A&lifinlHtnn, alTairs of, &eo ' Sher

Ali,' 'Yakub Khan,' and

•Lytton, Earl of
Afridi tribes, tho, 188, 1B43 273,

274, 2H7, 814
Afzul Khan, Mir, of Kandahar,

ooimsels Bher Ali to receive u

British minion, 2GB

Agra, salt duties in, 470
Aitchison, Sir Charles, president
of the Public Service Commis-
sion, 534

AJchal Telike tribe, thoir sub mis-
sion to Russia, 17; use made
of, by Bussia, 85
Akhor Ahmed Khan, Mir, 184
Alexis, Grand Diike, of Russia,

and M. da Lesseps, 43
All Musjid, where the Nsville-
Ghamberlain mission was
checked, 275, 279, 283, 288;
captured by the British, 296
Alignrh, Mohammedan College

at, 180

Anglo-Indian Press, ignoble con-
duct of the, 894

Arbabs (middlemen), their
employment discouraged by
Lord Lytton, 173
Arbnthnot, Mr. (now Sir Alex-
ander), Lord Lytton's minister
in council for famine affairs,
206, 219; introduces a Ver-
nacular Press Bill, 509
Argyll, Puke of, refuses the
sanction of British aid to Sher
Ali, 14; his Indian Civil
Service Act of 1870, 526
Assam, its salt supply from

Cheshire, 468

Atta Mahomed Khan (British
native agent), at Kabul, SI, 135,
151, 161
Ayerst, Mr., murder of, at Poona,

322

Ayub Khan (son of Sher Ali), in
power at Herat, 396; defeats
the British at Maiwand, 440;
besieges Kandahar, 441; de-

538

LYT1WS INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

feated by General Roberts,
442; defeats Abdul Bahman's
troops and occupies Kandahar,
438; defeated by Abdul Rah-
man, 459; takes refuge in
Persia, 459

BADAKSHAN, 253

Badshah Khan (Ghilzai chief),
friendly to the Cavaenari Mis-
sion, 344

Baker, G-eneral, jouied by Yakub
Khan at Kushi, 360, 361, 362,
in action before Kabul, 36*8, 364,
303

Bala Hissar, the, Kabul, 333, 341,
350, 361, 364, 366, 371, 374 note

Balkh, 18, 254

Baly, Archdeacon, at the Delhi
Assemblage, 118

Bamian, 254

Bangalore, famiue in, 221

'Bangobaahi,' the (Calcutta news-
paper^, prosecution of, for sedi-
tion, 522

abolishes cotton and other duties
in India,. 484, 485
Baroghil Pass, the, 186, 187
Batten, Mr. George, cited, 467
Battye, Captain W , on theNeville-

Chamberlain mission, 274
Beaconsfield, Earl of (then Mr.
Disraeli), Prune Minister, 2, 16;
selects Lord Lytton as Viceroy
of India, 2, 3, his opinion of
the policy of Russia, 28; on
the Aighan question, 31 ; his
purchase of Suez Canal shares,
41 ; letter to him from Lord

of India, 108; congratulates
Lord Lytton on the success of
his Indian policy, 331 ; fell of his
Government in 1880, 419 ; letter

taB fcom Lord

Beadon, Sir Cecil (Lieut-Gov. of
Bengal), and the vernacular
press, 502

Bellary iamine relief camp, 216

Bellew, Dr. (Sir Lewis Pelly's
secret^), 53, 134,1^ r

Eelooch Guides, the, 170

Beloochistan, 408

Bengal, its salt supply from

Cheshire, 463 ; duty on salt in,

464, 471, 472, 474
Beresford, Lord William, his grief

at the death at polo of Captain

Clayton, 118; illness at the

Delhi Assemblage, 129
Bernard, Mr. (now Sir Charles;,

secretary to Lord Ljtton, 206
Bhopal, Begum of, at tho Delhi

^Assemblage, 125
Biddulph, Major, his exploration

of N.-W. frontier passeu, 180;

(General), his expedition against

the Afghans, aOl, occupies

Ginshk, 302
Bolan Pass, tho, 104
Bombay Presidency, famine in,

114, 180; relief worlw, 1<M),

191, 200; system of famine
relief superior to that of Madn,,:<,

192, 200 ; rehof wa^OH ui, 100 ,
salt production and chiticH In,
464, 4C9, 471, 47a, 474

Bright, General, in adwtnce on
Kabul after tlto Cavagnuri
massacre, 361

Browne, Major, 287

Browne, Sir Hamuel, captuvcK Ali
Musjiil, 296; oecupiuK rleUak-
bad, 297

Buckingham, Duke of, Govovnoi-

of Madras, 120, 193, 105; coui-

plains of Lord Lytton'a doHpatr ill

on famine relief, 105 ; hit* nuninc

minute,203,- sugffeHtedaHfiuuino

dictator, 203, aO« ; interview

with Lord Lytton at llellary,

210 ; details of his agreoiuMU

with Lord Lytton on niana^o-

msnt of iamine, 212, ^24 ; law

I popularity in Madras, 215

| Bukhtiar Khan (Uritish native

• agent), 161, 267; at Xubul with

Yakub, 307, 316, 820, 321, 336,

837,344,345;donthof,3:}9

Burmese, at tho Delhi Assemblage,
1«4

Burne, Colonel (Sir) Owen, privato
seci-etery to Lord Lytton, 4ll,
81, 103, 121, ^jinMadraH
m the famine, 206
Burrows, General, defeated by
Ayub Khan at Maiwuaid, 410

INDEX

539

CAIRO, Lord Lytton's description

of, 42

Calcutta, its grain tiafle paralysed
by Madras Government's con-
duct of faminQ relief, 195
Campbell, Sir George, on the salt
customs, 465 ; (Lieut.-Gov. of
Bengal), and the seditious
\crnacular press, COS
Ca\ agnari, Major, Deputy Coin-
iiiiusumcL' at Peshawui, 160 ;
letter to him from Lord Lytton
indicating line of frontier policy,
161 , 165 ; his opinion on that
policy, 164, 166 ; chastises ring-
luadors in the Swat Canal
outrage, 183 , on the difficulties
o£ Sher All's position, 249, 264 ;
negotiateH with the Khyber
tnboH, 269,286,295; report of the
ohnck of the Neville-Chamber-
lain Mission, at AliMusjul, 275, '
280; in negotiation withYakub
Klmn, 313-817 ; first interview
withYakub, Ml; opinion of the
Amir, B25J, his task after the
Treaty of Uundainuk, 324; ser-
vices acknowledged by Govern- |
ment, 332; appointed Envoy
jit Kabul, 333 ; starts for Kabul,
IKJ5 , letter of thanks to Lord
fiytton, 335 ; constitution of his
Htaff and escort, 887, 338, 339 ;
recoivoH newB of the death of
llukhtiar Khan, »39, eniers
Kabul, 341 ; liiw account of his
recaption, 342 844 ; thinks
(jhiilam Hasan Khan uusuited
ti» bo native agent at Kabul,
iU4; hw viuws on his own and
on YuknL'H policy, 345 ; reRtric-
tiuriH placed r«n his intercourse
with Afghan notables, 346, B47,
»4«; considorHYakub'santliority
very weak, 348 ; receives hints
HH tu Yoltub's treachery, anil
controlw his intercourse with
UuMiu, 349 ; on the mutinous
Herat xqgbuontB, 350 ; hiw iaith
tn Ydcub, »5',J ; hifl last Weff nuii,
t*r»4 ; juaHHtiorccL at Kabul, JJ-"jl>,
»57; Ijorcl Lyttcui'H tribute to
hiH worth, JMiO

Chaiubwlain, Sir Neville, pro-
posed UH Envoy on a mission to

Afghanistan, 259; accepts the
post, 261 ; at Peahawur, 269 ;
at Jamrud, 274 ; checked by
Faiz Mahomed at Ah Musjid,
275 ; Cavagnan's report of the
affair, 275-280 ; return of his
mission to Peshawnr, 280 ;
011 the result of the mission,
281, 283 , guarantees the
Khyberis protection from Sher
Ah, 288; ill at Simla, 288,
strength of his escort on his mis-
sion, 337

Charasiab, nghts at, 364, 414
Ghardeh Valley, fight w the, 390
Ghitral, the frontier from Qnettah

to, 253; 185,187
Ghitral, Sirdar of, at the Delhi

Assemblage, 124

Christie, Mr., his share in the nego-
tiations with Sher Ali, 161
Clayton, Captain ^9th Lancers),
death of, whilst playing at polo,
118

Oolloy, Colonel, military secretary
to Lord Lytton, 40 ; on Lord
Lytton's first speech before the
Indian Council, 50 ; in Khelat,
99, 100, 102; at the Delhi
Assemblage, 122 , at Peshawar,
180 ; at Madras in the famine,
206, 207, 208
Cotton duties, 475 et sqq.
Cranbrook, Lord, 185; made
Seeretaryfor India, 240; letter to
him from Lord Lytton on policy
towards Afghanistan, 243 ; from
the same on Russia's advance
in Central Asia, 249; Lord
Lytton's letter to him on
resigning Vioeroyship, 422 ;
on the Vernacular Press Bill,
018 ; against a close Indian Civil
Service, 533
Ci'omor, Lord, see Baring

DALHOTTWIE, Lord, his treaty with
Dost Mahomed, 18

Daod Shah (Afghan general),
IJ21; appointed Yakub'a Com-
mander-in-chief, 334, S43, 847,
85!) ; endeavours to present the
massacre of the British mission,
3GG, 357, 858, 361

540 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

Delhi Assemblage, details of the,
on tliB proclamation of Her Ma-
JBBty as Kaisar i-Hind. 110-183

Derby, Lord, Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, 16; Count
Shouvalow's proposals to, on
direct communication between
Russian and English forces in
Central Asia, 83

Dinkur Bao, Sir^ (Sindiah's
minister), on British, adminis-
tration, 123

Disraeli, Benjamin, see Beacons-
field

Dost Mahomed, his treaty with
the British,] 8

Downe, Lord and Lady, at Delhi,
126

Dufferin, Lord, appoints the
Public Service Commission,
534

Durand, Sir Henry, demarcates the
Eastern Afghan boundary, 459

EDEN, Mr. (afterwards Sir A.,
Lieutenant-Govern or of Ben-
gal), urges legislation against
the vernacular press, 605 ; pro-
secutes a Bengali journal for a
seditious article, 521 ; on the
Covenanted Civil Service, 529

Elliott, Mr Charles (now Sir),
Famine Commissioner of My-
sore, 222 ; the Viceroy's minute
on his Mysore famine report,
223

1 Empress day ' in India, 132

Extraordinary Public Works,
India, 488 et so£.

FAIZ MAHOMED (Afghan general),
dealing "with the Chamberlain
mission, 269, 270, 278, 275, 276,
277, 279, 280

Famine, in Bombay and Madras,
114; in the southern provinces
of India, 189 et sqq. ; insurance
taxation, 493 et s^q..

Foreter, John, a personal friend
of Lord Lytton, 25

Frere, Sir Bartle, advocates the
appointment of British officers
on the frontiers of Afghanistan,

19 ; on English policy towards
Sher All, 44-48

Frontier administration, Lord
Lytton's views on, 171 et sqq.

GHILZAIS, the, 287

Ghulam Haidar, General, 411

Ghulam Hasan Ehan, Nawab,
emissary to Sher All, 264, 265,
266, 269, 277, 278, 280, 290

Ghuzm, 414, 417

Gibbs, Mr , his Bill repealing the
Vernacular Press Act, 521

Qiers, M. de, on Russian dealings
with Sher Ali, 78

Qilgit, British political agent at,
135, 187 ; telegraph at, 187, 188

Gladstone, Mr., succeeds Lord
Beaconsueld in 1880, 419 ; his
motion on the Indian Ver-
nacular Press Act, 519

Goa, the Portuguese Governor-
General of, at the Delhi Assem-
blage, 119, 129

Gortchakow, Prince, on Busaiau
policy in Afghanistan, 34

Gough, General Hugh, at Kabul,
366

Grant Duff, Sir Mountstuart,
letter to hfrr* from Lord Lytton
on nontier raids, 188

Gray, Captain, 81, 83

Griffin, Mr. Lepel (now Sir),

, appointed to diplomatic and

' administrative superintendence
at Kabul, 403; minute from
Lord Lytton, 404-408; further
instructions of policy from the
Viceroy, 408; Abdul Bahman
suggested to him as possible
Amir of Kabul, 412; com-
municates to Abdul Lord
Lytton's views, 418 ; and those
of Lord Bipon, 437 ; negotiates
with Abdul personally the
terms of Amirship, 438; his
sketch of Abdul, 439

Gundarnuk, Treaty of, 324, 876-
378, 382, 398, 408, 406, 416, 419,
449, 450

HAINES, Sir Frederick, com-
monder-in-chief in India, 51

INDEX

541

Hamilton, Lieutenant (attache" to

Sir Lotus Cavagnari), 339;

massacred at Kabul, 354
Hamilton, Lord George, receives

letter from Lord Lytton on the

famine, 192
T-faminiDk, Captain, member of

Sir N. Chamber Itun's mission,

263
TIarlington, Marquess of (present

Duke of Devonshire), becomes

Secretary of State for India,

419 ; his pokey towards Abdul

Rahman, 437
Herat, 253, 254, 255, 257, 381,

SBH, 390, 405, 451
Hindu.KuBh, the, India's natural

boundary, 251, 253, 2GO, 378,

SHfi, 3B7
Hobhouse, Sir Arthur, member oi

Council, his views on Afghani-
stan, 64
Holkar, fit the Delhi Assemblage,

120 ; on British administration,

128

Hope, Sir T. d, 480
llumo, Mr. A. 0 , O.B., 467
Hyderabad, famine in, 189

Civil Service, legislation
concerning natives in, 524 et 344.

Indian Famine Commission, ap-
pointment of, 236; results of
its labours, 237-239

Indian Vernacular Tress Act, the,
800 et still.

Instructions furnished by the
Home Government to Lord
Lytton on his assumption of
the Yieeroyalty, 68-93

Iskoman Pass, the, 186, 187

Ismail Pasha, Khedive of Egypt,
in financial difficulties, 40, 41

JAOOBABAD, Treaty of, 102
Jauios, Major (Commissioner of

PeHhfliWur), on frontier admin-

istration, 172
Jauirud, British mission at, 270,

#74

Jolklabad, 330, 400
Jenkins, Lieut.-Colonel F. H.

(Guida Corps), with Sir Neville

Chamberlain's mission, 263,
274, 275, 278, 279, 280, 288; in
action at Charasiab, 414

Jenkins, Mr. "W., interpreter
between Takub and Cavaguari,
321; secretary to Sir Louis
Cavagnari, 839, 348 ; massacred
at Kabul, 354

Jeypore, Maharaja of, 117

Jodhpore, Maharaja of, at the
Delhi Assemblage, 129

Jowakis, the, expedition against,
General Keyes in command,
179, 180 ; subjugation of, 181 ;
conditions of peace, 182

Jubbulpore, failure of transport
at, in the Madras famine, 209

Jung Bahadur, Sir, prime minis-
ter of Nepa.nl, 79; his pro-
posal to visit Sher Ali as our
representative, 80

^ constitution of, 185

Kaisar-i-Hind, the title assumed
by Her Majesty as Queen-
Empress, 110

Kakar Pathans, the, Major Sand-
man's negotiations -with, 287

Kandahar, events relating to,
286, 330, 381, 382, 883, 404,
405, 408, 441, 442, 443, 444-
458

Kashmir, Maharaja of, at the
Delhi Assemblage, 120 ; desires
to present the Queen-Empress
with an Imperial crown, 125 ;
negotiates with Lord Lyttpn
concerning Chitral and "STassin*
164 ; and for a British political
agent at Gilgit, 185 , ,his con-
vention -with the Indian Go-
vernment, 186

Kaufmann, General, intrigues with
Sher All, 9-12, 15, 16, 36, 37 ;
annexes Khokand, 17; pro-
poses direct communication
with the Indian Government,
85; his views ^ on British and
Russian aims in Central Asia,
36-87; Lord Lytton's com-
ments thereon, 89 ; his envoys
at Kabul, 77, 78, 347, 248;
declines to give Russian aid to
Sher Ali on his fall, 306; re-

542 LOUD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

quests Yakub to comnrauicate
with him, 8-AO , his treatment
of Abdul Rahman, 410, 411

Kazi Syud Ahmed, member of
Sir !N. Chamberlain's mission,
263

Kelly, Dr. (of the suite of Sir
Louis Cavagnari), 339 ; mas-
sacied at Kabul, 354

Kennedy, General, peisonal assis-
tant to the Duke of Bucking-
ham, 212, 218, 210 ; ably super-
intends famine relief in Madras,
222, 225, 226

Keyes, General, subdues the
Jowakis, 180

Khanan Khan, Ressaldor Ma] or,
bearer of Lord Lytton's first
letter to Sher All, 58

Khelat, Khan of, tjuorrBls with
his Sirdars, 95; stoppage of
his subsidy, 96; submits to
British mediation, 97, 98,
meets Lord Lytton at jacoba-
bad, and signs a treaty accept-
able to his Sirdars, 102 ; with
his Sirdars at the Delhi
Assemblage, 123 ; declares him-
self a feudatory of the Queen-
Empress, 124

Khiva, Russian conquest of, 11,
16

Khokand, annexation of, by
Eussia, 17

Khost, General Roberts routs the
tribes at, 301

Khyber tribes, friendliness of, to
the NeviUe-Chainbeilain mis- !
sion,273,274, 287,288,314 |

Kohistan, the chiefs of, 413 j

Kurum Valley, the, 257, 258, 260, !
297, 292, 298, 330 '

Kushdil Khan (escort to Major
Cavagnari on his mission), 342

Kutohi, 407, 408

LAWRKscK,Lord, Viceroy of India,
on the dangers of the Hussion
advance in Central Asia, 8 ; on
English support of Slier All,
18 ; views on Indian policy, 25,
26; Lord Lytton's obituary
notice of him, 26 note ; and the
1 masterly inactivity policy,'

248; Sher All's opinion of his
power, 335 ; on the exclusion of
Russian influence from Afghan-
istan, 448 ; on the difficulties of
Afghan rule, 455

Lesseps, M. QB, his scheme pi'
communication between India
and Eusaian Central Asia, 4tt
Lomakin, General, action of, in

the Khanates, 17

Lyall, Sir Alfred, his summary «1'
British policy in India, 5 ; urges
immediate action against tiher
All, 291 ; quoted, on tribal riniiitf
round Kabul, 389; communi-
cates British policy regarding
Abdul Rahman to Mr. Grifnn,
415-417 , his account of tin*
disaster at Maiwmid, 440-442
Lytton, Lady, accompanies !»er
husband to India, 40 ; at Smila,
49, 115, at the Delhi Assem-
blage, 115

Lytton, Earl of (Edward Kobert
Bulwer-Lytton), accepts tlin
Indian Viceroyalty, 2 ; a sum-
mary of events in India pro-
ceding that acceptance, 5-144;
his preparations for his ajyoint-
ment, 25 ; writes an obituary
notice of Lord Lawrence, 2fi
note, Sir Jam BS Stephen's \VIKU
counsel to him, 27 , on Afghan-
istan, 29; poncurs with Mr.
Disraeli's and Lord Salisbury^
views on Afghan affairs, 81 ;
receives Government instruc-
tions on his policy, 81-33 ; in-
terview with Count ShouvjJow
on Bussian policy, 3B~#9 ; com-
municates with' Lord tialisLmry
on the matter, 39 ; leaves Eng-
land for India with lim family,
40 , impressions of Cairo, 42 ; in-
terview with M. de Lessepw, 4;} ;
on the Serapia, 43 ; moots ihu
Prince of Wales and Sir B;irtlo
Frere, 44, reaches Calcutta, 4i»;
speech to the Council, >l(l;
Lord Northbrook's friendliness
to him, 60 ; sets himself to tlio
improvement of British rela-
tions with Aifehanwtan, 51 ;
proposes a mission to Kabul,
52; writes to Sher Ali on DIG

INDEX

543

Lytton, Earl of— (continued)
subject, 53; the Amir's
declining a mission, 56 , ™
a second latter to the Amir on l
the subject, 01 ; dissontient i
members of the Council pro-
pose a h waiting policy,' 64 ; his
minute controverting then
views, 155-76 ; comments on the
intercourse between General
Kaufinann and the Amir, 79;
tfher All's reply to his second
letter, tit); conference with
native agent at Simla, 82-
K6; his memorandum to the
Amir, R6, 87, remarks on
his own memorandum, 87 ;
intttr notions from the Home
Government on his departure
from England, 88-93 ; _ his
memorandum on our relations
with Khelat, 94; successful
treaty negotiations with the
Khun of Khelat, 99-103 ; sum-
mary of thoresults of that treaty,
104,' on the passion of the
native aristocracy for rank,
titles, ami genealogies, 108;
urges the utilisation of this
paflfiion, 109; proposed mea-
fluroa in oonneotion with the
Delhi Assemblage, 111 ; mea-
Hurog actually adopted, 111 ;
proclaims Her Majesty as
KaiMar-i-Hmd or Queen-Em-
press, 118; writes to Her
Majesty from Delhi describing
Ms reception "by the native
ohipfrt and giving details of the
coroiuoruefl, 116-181 ; criticism
on Sindiah's speech, 128;
Hocures a conference at Pesha-
war with BherAli, 134; views,
in Litters to Sir Lewis Pelly,
on past British relations with
AfehaniHtftn, and schemes for
a HQttledunderatandingbetween
the two Powers, 136-164 ; his
Mimito on the close of the
PaHhnwnz Conference, 155-159;
twtautH Captain Cavagnori for
the political management of
tho rotihawur frontier, 160
dixonwB with Cavagnari the
policy of winning over the

Lytton, Earl ot— (continued)
tribes intervening between
Kabul and the N-\V. frontier,
165 ; his minute on frontier re-
organisation and administra-
tion, 167-179 ; authorises a
punitive expedition against the
Jowakis, 179 ; differences with
the frontier authorities on tbe
plan of campaign, 180; suc-
cessful issue of his own
views, 181 ; conditions of peace
to the Jowakis, 182; on the
repression of frontier raids, 183 ;
arranges with the Maharaja of
Kashmir for the establishment
of a political agent at Gilgit,
185 ; on the importance of
securing the control of the Mirs
of Kafristan, 185-188; dealing
with the famine of 1877, 191,
et sqq. ; alarmed at the method
of famine relief in Madras, 193 ;
he appoints Sir B. Temple as
Commissioner, 193 ; increasing
distrust with Madras famine re-
lief, 196 ; description of relief
labour throughout Madras, 198;
on the relief of famine in
Mysore, 199 ; on a famine dic-
tatorship, 201 ; recognises the
difficulty of intervention with
the Madras Government, 202 :
suggests the Duke of Bucking-
ham as famine dictator, 208;
his general principles for the
management of famine affairs,
204; journey to Madras, 207;
on the failure of transport at
Jubbulpore, 209 ; interview with
the Duke of BtioMnffham at

Eellary, 210; details of his agree-
ment with the Duke, 212; letter
to Lord Salisbury on the evils
of the Madras Government's
dealings with the famine, 214 ;
testifies to the popularity of the
Duke of Buckingham, 215; con-
versation with an officer on a
relief camp, 216; decides to
take the Famine Department
into his own hands, 219;
opinion of Ootaoamund, 220; at
Bangalore, 221; appoints Major
Scott-Monor Biff Chief Engineer,

544 L0m) LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINESTIIATIOK

Lytton, Earl of— (continued)
221; nominates Mr. Charles
Elliott Famine Commissioner
of Mysore, 222; returns to
Simla, 222; his Minute on Mr.
Elliott's Mysore Famine Report,
223 ; on the famine operations in
Madras and Mysore, 220, 226;
legislation favoured* by him to
provide for future famine ex-
penses, 227; his speech on
famine legislation, 226-236;
appoints a Famine Commission,
236; letter to Lord Salisbury
on his relinquishing the Secre-
taryship of State for India, 240 :
letter from Lord Salisbury in
reply, 242 ; his policy in prepara-
tion for an attack by Russia in
Central Asia, 243 ; his opinion of
Sher Ali, 244 ; letter to Viscount
Cranbroolc on ths Afghanistan
problem and Bussian advance,
250 ; proposes a scientific fron-
tier, 200; suggests the Hindu-
Kush as the natural boundary
of India, 251 ; on the frontier
fromQuettah to Chitrol, 258 ; on
an outer and inner frontier line,
254; his general frontier policy,
255 ; would send a British Mis-
sion to Kabul, 256 ; his terms
to Sher Ah, 257; thinks condi-
tions favourable for coercing
the Amir, 258; proposes Sir
Neville Chamberlain as Envoy
to Afghanistan, 259 ; summary
of his frontier policy, 260, his
proposed mission sanctioned by
the Home Government, 261 ; his
Minute on the Russian Mission,
262 ; account of the discussions
at Kabul relative to the recep-
tion of a British Mission, 267 ;
reiterates his insistence on the
despatch of a mission, 270;
letter of condolence to Sher AH
on the death of Abdullah Jan,
272 ; authorises the advance of
Sir Neville Chamberlain to Jam-
rud, 247 ; his defence of the mis-
sion after its check, 281; dwells
on the Amir's open hostility,
284; the political and military
measures favoured by him in

Lyttoii, Earl of— (continued)
return, 285 ; dealings with the
Khybor tribes, 288; urged to
immediate action agaiiiHt tho
Amir, 291 ; ultimatum to Shor
Ali, 292, orders military
operations to bo begun, 295;
proclamation to tho Afghau-
istans, 296 , his account of the
subsequent successful can ipaign,
296-303; the Amir's reply to
hiu ultimatum, 80;*; rocuivoK
news of the flight of fiber Ali,
305 ; comments on tho Jiiiuan
issued by the Amir to his
subjects, -1J08; expos OH tho du-
plicity of Itufifliu and of Shrr
Ali, UOti; his objections to tho
independence of Afghanistan,
311; formulates condition* of
ro-establiflhment of relations
with that Htate, 31 B; toriiih
of peiwso offered to Yakut*
Khan, 314; clfocUAHos with
Major Cavagnari longnngo to
be held with Yakiib If nonl
to Kabul, 310; his tornm of
treaty with Yakut, ;J17;
Cavagnari acmOs him IUH im-
pressions of Yoknb and Afghans
generally, U22; oougmtiilab-H
Yalcnb on the Treaty of Cumin-
mnk, 324; despatch on thnfc
Treaty, ^26-880; oongriiinlatoil
by Lords EUbbury and
Beacoustield on the anaeom of
his Afghan policy, vfft>, 3,'H;
approval by the Bc-crotftry of
Bteto, JJ32; his own view <if
the Treaty, 8»8 ; despatch cm
Cavagnari's misflion to Kabul,
336-330 ; letter from Cavugnari
describing his reception nt
Kabul, 342-844; lettw from
Cavagnari disclosing the diill-
culties met with m doaling with
Yaknb and the intriguo and
distrust of an A%han Court,
345-351 ; adviseR monetary aid
to Yakub, 304; Amir's account
of the massacre of Oavagnari
and his mission forwarded to
him, 355; comment a on \YaIi
Mahomed's assertion of YakuL'H
treachery, 357; orders Brltwh

INDEX

545

Lytton, Earl of— (continued)
advance on Kabul, 358; letter
to Lord Beaconsfield on future
British policy towards Afghan-
istan, 359; on the death of
Cavagnari, 360, receives fall
support from the Home Govern-
ment and Her Majesty, 360;
letter to Sir James Stephen on
events in Afghanistan after
flight of Yakub to British camp,
361-366 ; regards the proposed
abdication of Yakub as ad-
vantageous, 367 ; his proclama-
tion issued by General Roberts |
at Kabul after its occupation,
366 , instructions furnished by
him to General Eoberts on the
punishment of leaders in Kabul
massacre and conduct during
occupation of Kabul, 372-376 ;
letter to Lord Oranbrook re-
viewing past and sketching
future policy towards Afghan-
istan, 376-380; averse from
transferring the capital from
Kabul to Kandahar, 380, on
the proposition of establishing
an independent Western
Afghanistan, 382; proposed
future policy with frontier
tribes, 335; programme for
future of Afghanistan, 38f>;
urges construction of frontier
railways, 387; foresees tribal
risings on the departure of
Yakub, 389, 393 ; on the em-
ployment of native army in
frontier service, 394; deprecates
big battalions, 394 ; on the need
of native political agents, 395 ,
proclaims Yakub1 s abdication
irrevocable, 396 ; believes
Yakub to be concerned in the
Kabul massacre, 397; argues
against Yokub's restoration,
398-400 ; selects Sher All Khan
as governor of Kandahar, 400,
401; appoints Mr. Lepel Griffin
administrator at Kabul, 403 ,
on policy in Northern Afghan-
istan, 403; on subsidising a
ruler at Kabul, 405, on the
withdrawal of our forces from
Kabul, 406, 407 ; terms of with-

Lytton, Earl of— (continued)
drawal, 408; treats with Abdul
Batman, 412, 413, 414, 415,
418; resigns Yiceroysliip on
Mr. Gladstone's accession to
power, 419; letter to Lord
Granbrook on quitting office,
420 ; and to Sir James Stephen
on then* prospective meeting,
421; suggestions of conduct
till arrival of his successor,
422, 423 ; his thanks to Lord
Beaconsfield for his recom-
mendation to an Earldom, 424 ;
his last Minute of Afghan policy
to be submitted to Lord Bipon,
428-434; departure from India,
434; his speech in the House
of Lords on the evacuation of
Kandahar, 444-458; four chief
heads of his financial policy,
461, his tribute to Sir John
Strachey, 463; note to Mr. A.
0. Hume on salt and its duties,
468; his Budget speech of 1878-
79 on the salt duties, 471-475 ,
on the cotton duties, 478-488 ;
deals with provincial contracts
485-488; and with 'extra-
ordinary public works,' 488-
493; establishes a famine
insurance fund, 494-497, his
responsibility for the error in
war estimates, 498-501; takes
action against the seditious
native press, 504 ; his Minute
on the subject, 505 ; introduces
a Vernacular Press Bill, 506-
509; speech in the Legislative
Council on its introduction,
509-518 ; result of the measure,
518-520 ; establishes the bureau
of a press commissioner, 520 ;
engaged in securing to the
natives of India higher ap-
pointments in the Civil Service
524 et so^q.

MACDONALD, Colonel, murder of

140
McNeil, Sir John, suggests the

transference of the capital of

Afghanistan from Kabul to

Kandahar, 380

NN

546 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

Macpherson, General, on the
niaroh to Kabul, 368; joins
General Roberts, 365, 366 ; at
the Ohordeh VaUoy fight, 391

Madras, Bishop of, at the Delhi
Assemblage, 118

Madras Presidency, famine in,
114, 189; relief works, 190,
191 ; Sir Richard Temple sent
there as Commissioner, 193 ;
relief wages in, 196; nature of
relief labour in, 198; abundant
rainfall in, 220 ; General Ken-
nedy superintending famine
relief, 222, 225, 226; salt
proiuotion anil duties m, 4154,
469, 471, 472, 474

Mahomed Afzul Khan (Shor Mi's
half-brother), 409

Mahomed Alain Khan (uncle of
MnsaK1iaii),iJ14

Mahomcfl Jan (Afghan general),
»<JO

Mahomed Yakub, 83

Mairnona, 20;*, 254

Haiwand, dofoaL of tho British at,
440

Mullet, Hie Louis, 41 ; letter to
him from Lord Lytton onfiuuino
rolief , 192

Massy, Gen oral, or derod to occupy
the filhutargardan, 808 ; boforo
Kabul, 864, 305, 1360

Masters, Mr. (Golloctor, Madras),
211

Mayo College, the, 130

Mayo, Lord, dowres an ISnglwh
roprosentati\c at Kabul, IB ;
guarantees to Hhor All that no
Resident nhould bo placed in
his townH, 21 ; hiR negotiation*!
with Sher AH, 141, 144, 148 ;
oitocl,4C7, 485, 48G, 488 ; on the
Indian Civil Service, 520

Morowother, Sir William (Coin-
miasioner of SiniUi), his polioy
in Kholat, OC, 9G

Morv, BnsBiau advance on, 10, iM,
;i5, 254

Motcalfo, Sir ClharloH, 519

Mir Akhor, tho, Shor Ali'K com-
mander, at All Miwjid, 267, 209,
273,271); 295

Mii'Ma Muhammad irawnan Khun,
HuBBiun native agent, 307

Moolah Shah Mahomed (Yokub's
Minister of Foreign Affairs),
343, 347

Most Eminent Order of the
Indian Empire, tho, institution
of, 112

Muir, Sir "William, Financial
Minister on the Indian Council,
49 ; views on Afghanistan, 04 ;
Finance Minister to Indian
Government, 402 ; on the salt
tax, 478, 474; disapproves of
repressive legislation for tho
vernacular press, 518

Munro, Colonel, 97, 102

Musa Khan (son of Yakuli and
heir apparent), MO note, 396

Mushk-i-Alam, Mnlln, of GhuKid,
70 ; adviues Sher All to rcfuHO
the British mission to Kabul,
77 ; preaches war against1 thu
British at Kabul, 380

MuntftUD, tho, Afghiui MiruHtor,
coiuiRols Slier Aii to roiioivo a
llritisli mission, 265, 207, 208;

citod,«2i, «2a, JJ;M, :«»f ;t47;

arrested by llobortu at Kalml,

307 ; released, :JBi)
Mutiny of 1857, pruBH rowtrictiionB

at tho time of, rm
Mysore, famine m, 189; roliof

workK, 190, 200, 222, 22(S

NAI-IMU of Magdala, Lord, on

Afghanistaii, 51
Native Indian itriHtocnmy, 108 ot

Mill.

Kcsk MahoiiKid (Vakub's undo),
hiHHiibtlccoiiforcmtio with Yakub
Khan in t,hu Untiflh camp, «4i(ili;
oppoHos tJio JJritiHh in battlo at
Chtirawnl), IM

Ninbcit, Mr. \V. (CuiiiuiiHHionor),
20H

Noriuuii, Kir Henry, member of
Council, liiu viowH on Afghan-
itttan, U4; lottor fruiu Lord
Lytton to him cm 11 m Kholat
kunty, 302

NorLlibrouk, Lord, r/mi^nu tho
VicoroyaHy ol1 India, U, 2JJ;
approached by Shor Ali on tho
mibjuct of I^itiHh protuistion,
lii ; oppoHOH the policy of lore-

INDEX

547

OXIIH, Urn, II,H a boundary lino, 0,
£54, iiliO, 201

PALAVM&AM famine rclirjf camp,

SSlrt

PuliaorHton, Lord, LIH VIOWH of
TUritinh policy tovvanlH Afghan-
iatan, OH ; on Hmniau policy, 70
Tarry, Sir lUrnkino, diwHoutn from
vcrnueulat* pruus
, .OIK

l^ Maharaja <»rjiiH infitidla-
tmu by html Lytton, l:i()
Toiwar Khottbl, Griuiral ItobortH'H

victory at, 2UO itOl
rolly,Hir twin, «10, r.ft, 04,81 ; at
tho L'cflliawur oouforouco, i;M,
litr>; Lord Lyt.ton'H letter to,
on Hhor Ali, KM, ot Kijq.; hin
conduct of th« Ptishawur can-
approved by

ing a British agent on Afghan-
istan, 20, 23, til ; receives Lord
Lytton in Calcutta, 49; friendly
intercourse with Lord Lytton,
flO ; declines to suspend Major
Sandeman's mission to Khelat,
98 ; negotiates with Sher AH,
148, 149; appoints Ma] or
Biddulph to explore Kafristan
pathos, ISO; on tho cotton I
duties, 473; deals with the |
seditions voriiaculai* press, fiOtf, |
504, 518; IcpiHlatcB ou native
employment in tho Indian Civil
Survieo, 527

OHKI» Allan Khun, of Tonk, on

Sir Kovillo Chamberlain's iuiy-

«i<>n, 204
Oltlham, Mr. (district oillcor in

Madras), his fumino report, 1U9
Ootacamnud, S&O
OrloIT, Ucuinral, anil the Treaty of

IJnkiar-Hkeilwn, 71
Orontcx, tho, Lori I Lytton on

board, 41, 4H
Onrlh, annexation of, to NortJi-

Peshawnr conference, the, 134 et

Porma, YaKub Klian'K tipiiiioii of,
»2tt; Hii^mltMl n-HHion to, of
tuui Wointan, ;)H1, ItHK

Peslnn, British cantonment re-
commended at, 882

Phayre, Colonel, political superin-
tendent at Ehclat, 95

Pollock, Sir Bichard, Commis-
sioner of Peshawur, letters to
Sher Ali, dictated by Lord
Lytton, 53, 71, 76

Primrosfe, General, at the invest-
inuiit of Wall b)her Ali Khan, 401

Prisoners role&scd on tho day of
the proclamation of the now
title of tho QnuGn-ExnpreHB, 113

Probyn, General, Lord Lytton's
miproasioiirt of him, 43

Productive Public Works, Iiidin,
492

Punjab, tho, 167, IBS, 169 ; rock
salt in, 464; duty on fialt in,
464, 474

Punjab Frontier Porco, 169

Pnrtab Sin^, Maharaja of Joilhpnr,
on Sir Novillo OhamburJam's

QUKKN, Ifcr Majnnty tho, her as-
Hiiinptiou of the bitlo of Kmpreus
of India, £2, £4, 1U0, 107 ; letter
from Lord Lyltou on title
Truaty with tho Khan of
Khiilat, 100, 101; title of
KaiHar-MIiml cliOHen for her,
110 ; Jjord LyUon'B lottors to
her doHcribin^ tho JJdlu AHSGUI-
bla^o and hor ]>rc»clainatiou IIH
K-tuwar-i-ilina, 1JJJ, 115, ot eqq. ;
native opininn thonton, IUV2;
Lord Lytton to hur on tho
Indian faminu, 2f^1, ±2-"); her
lottor to Lord Lytton uflcr tliu
Kabul maHHuero, tKiO

Quottah, 10L, 104, 105, 104, 20H,
U80, 287, »j*(), 404; J^'ilinh
^arrinoti at, 157 ; military viUtio
of, £252 ; frontier 1'ruiia, to Ohitral,

KA,rj»U'rANAt Hitlt production iw,

404, 41JO, 407, <J(>0
Hand, Mr., murder of, at 1'oona,

LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

Rawalpindi, railway from, to the
Pciwar Khotal, 842

Rawlinson, Sir H., on Kandahar,
381

Hazgonoff, General, Russian
Envoy at Kabul, 306

Ihpon, Marquis, becomes Viceroy
of India, 419; receives charge
of Government from Lord
Lytton at Simla, 434 ; reverses
Lord Lytton's Afghan policy,
444 et sqji. ; carries out his
predecessor's scheme of salt
and cotton dnties, 484

Roberts, General, occupies the
Kurum Valley, 298; defeats
the Afghans at the Peiwar
Khotal, 299-801 ; routs the
tnbes of Khost, 301 ; receives
news of the massacre of the
British Mission, 854. 356;
starts for Kabul, 358 ; at Kushi
\uth Yakab, 361; issues a
proclamation to the Afghans,
361; defeats the Afghans at
Gharasiab, 363, 364; confronts
them outside Kabul, 864 ; takes
possession of Kabul, < 366;
Y&kub announces to him his
resignation of the Anurship,
86b ; arrests notables at Kabul,
367 , proclamation at Kabul
after Yakub's resignation, 368;
statement made to him by
Yakub concerning his father,
369 ; terms of a treaty between
Sher Ali and Russia placed in
his hands, 370; his report on
Sher All's military preparations
at Kabul, 371; instructions
received by him on his investi-
gation of the causes of the
Kabul massacre, 372-876 ;
attacked by tribes in Chardeh
Valley, 890, 391; withdraws to
Sherpur, 391 ; repulses Afghan
assault, 392; proclaims am-
nesty, 393; declares Yakub's
abdication irrevocable, 396 ;
Mr> Jjepel Griffin deputed to
assist him, 403 ; marches from
Kabul to the relief of Kandahar
after the battle of Maiwand,
441; defeats Ayub
442

Boss, General, in command of a
force to relieve Kandahar, 414

Royal Titles Bill, the, 107

Eukh, railway from, to Sibi, 387

Russell, Lord Arthur, 27

Russia, establishes her relations
with Afghanistan, 9 , in spite
of her assuionoes that that
State is bej-ond her sphere of
action, 11; her envoys at
Kabul, 16; advance on Merv,
16 , and reduction of the
Khanates, 17 , propositions
thiough Count Shouvalow to
the British Government, 33,
4.0, her policy and practice in
Central Asia, 70 ; intiiguing at
Kabul, 78, 79 , war with Tur-
key, and English action, 240;
mission to Sher Ali, 240;
further violation of pledges to
Great Britain concerning Af-
ghanistan, 243; her diplo-
macy pitted against that of
Great Britain, 246; advance
toward the Indian frontier,
250 ; preference by Sher AH of
a Russian to an English mission,
262; refuses aid to Sher Ali on
his fall, 306; disclosure of n
treaty with Sher All, 370, 372;
Abdul Rahmans account ot ^fl
residence at Tashkent! under
Russian protection, 410 ;
Abdul's gratitude to, 414 , her
influence m Afghanistan pre-
judicial to British interests,
448, her Afghan, boundary
marked out, 459

SAIF-tTD-DXK Tvl mil (AJEghan

general), proposes to Yakub to
save Gavagnan, 357, 858

St. John, Major, 58; member of
Sir N. Chamberlain's mission,
263 , believes the Wall Sher Ali
Khan competent to govern
Kandahar, 882, 883; (Colonel,
and Resident at Kandahar),
announces to the *Wali hm ap-
pointment as ruler of Kandahar,
401, 402; suggests Abdul Khan
as Amir of Kabul, 412

Salar Jung, Sir, 129

INDEX

549

Salisbury, Lord, Secretary for
India, 4, 16 ; urges Lord North-
brook to establish a British
agency at Herat, 20, 22, 23 ; his
instructions to Lord Lytlon on
Afghanistan, 31-33, 88-93;
receives letter from Lord
Lytton, on the native aristo-
cracy of India, 109, authorises
Lord Lytton to guard the
North-West frontier without
Afghan aid, 186 ; becomes Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs, 240 ;
congratulates Loid Lytton on
the success of his Indian policy,
330; policy with regard to the
seditious vernacular prfiss, 504

Salt duties, 463, et so^.

Sundemon, ?rlajoi, his policy in
Khelat, 95 , in the Murree hills,
96 ; second mission to Khelat,
97, 98 ; appointed British repre-
sentative at Khelat, 108; letter
of congratulation from Lord
Lytton, 103 ; his dealings -with
the frontier tribes, 287 , recom-
mends the abandonment of
Kandahar, 330; services ac-
kuowledgedby Government, 832

Scott- Monoreiff, Major (now Sir
Colin), E.E., appointed Chief
Engineer in famine relief in
Madras, 221, 222, 224

Seditious native press in India,
502, et sqq.

Seistan, 381, 388

Sercypw, the, description of, 43

Shahgassi Mahomed Tusuf THum
(brother of Kushdil Khan), 342

Sher Ali, Amir of Afghanistan,
Bussian intrigues with, 9-12 ;
failure of his efforts to obtain
assurance of British support
against Bussia, 13, 14, 15;
welcomes Bussian Envoys, 16 ;
pressure put upon ™™ to
receive an English embassy,
22 , dealings with Russian
agents, 37, 39 ; Sir B. Pollock's
first letter to, 53 ; holds a Dur-
bar, 55 ; his reply to the letter,
56, 57 note ; reasons for refusing
an English mission, 58-60;
second letter to him from Sir B.
Pollock, 61; consults the Mulla

of Grhuzni, 70, proposes that
the native British agent at
Kabul should go to India as
the exponent of his views, 80 ;
his mind revealed to Lord
Lytton by that agent, 81-83 ;
in negotiation with the British,
131, 134; his grievances, 135,
136 ; Lord Lytton's allegations
against linn, 140, 155, 156; his
obligations under the treaty of
1857, 142; marked hostility to
the British during the Feshawur
Conference, 155; objects to a
British garrison at Quettah, 157 ;
receives a mission from the
Sultan of Turkey m 1877, 162 ;
open to Bussian overtures, 164 ;
covets Kafristan, 185 ; his cha-
racter as conceived by Lord
Lytton, 244, 245 ; reception of
a Bussian Mission at Kabul,
248, 262; death of his son
Abdullah Jan, 2G4; notified that
a British Mission under Sir
Neville Chombeilain will wait
upon him, 265 ; counselled by
his ministers to receive it,
267, 266 ; his obstructive tactics
to the reception of the mission,
271 ; his dislike of the English
revealed, 284; reply to Lord
Lytton and view of the British
Government, 290; receives an
ultimatum from the British,
292 ; "bfo hostile proclamations
to Mussulmans in our service,
297 ; crushing defeat of his
forces, 302; his reply to the
Viceroy's ultimatum, 303 ;
flight into Bussian territory,
305; releases his son Yakub,
305 ; his firman to his subjects,
307 ; death, 310 ; magnitude of
MB military preparations at
Kabul, 871

Sherpnr cantonment, its construc-
tion, 371; retreat of General
Boberts to, 390; Afghan at-
tempt to capture, 392; stores
at, 395

Shouvalow, Count, Bussian
ambassador in London, 33 ;
his negotiations with Lord
Lytton, 38-39

550 LORD LYTTON'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

Shutargardan, the, 385, 409

Sindh, 167

Sindh Frontier Force, 169, 170

Sindiah, Maharaja, at the Delhi
Assemblage, 120; his blessing
on the Queen-Empress, 128

c Soui Prakash ' (Bengali journal),
503; prosecuted for seditious
articles, 521

Star of India, order of the, 112

Stephen, Sir James Fitziames,
his exposition of the Indian
administrative system, 27 ;
friendship with Lord Lytton,
27, 28 ; Lord Lytton's letters to
him on events in Kabul after
flight of Yakub, 361-366, and
on resigning Yiceroyship, 421

Stewart, General, occupies Kan-
dahar, 302; advocates its
abandonment, 330 ; re-occupies
Kandahar after the Kabul mas-
sacre, 358 ; threatens Ghuzm,
362 , believes the Wall Sher Ali
Khan competent to govern
Kandahar, 3S2, 383 ; ports for
Kabul, 401, 409, 418; his
victories at Charasiab, 414 ; at
Kabul hi supreme command,
414; Lord Lytton's latter to
him on the true policy in deal-
ing with Abdul Bahman, 418 ;
followed by his last Minute on
same subject, 428, 429-434;
presides at a durbar, recognising
Abdul Bahman as Amir, 438 ;
withdraws from Kabul, 442

StoletoSi General, on a mission
to Sher Ah, 247, 261, 305, 306,
307, 308, 324

Straohey, General Biehard, on
Indian finance, 486

Strachey, Sir John, Lieut enant-
Governor of the North-west
Provinces, 48, 49, 117 ; illness,
207; his scheme for providing
future famine expenses, 227;
issues a work on India, 227;
his opinion of Lord Lytton's
famine legislation, 228; be-
comes Financial Member of
Council, 462, 463; on the salt
duties, 463-470, 475; on the
cotton duties, 477, 478, 482,
483,484; on provincial contracts,

485, 487, on 'extraordinary
public works,' 489, 491 ; and on
famine insurance, 493, 494,
495 ; bis share in the error m
the Indian war estimates, 498-
501

Stuart Bayley, Mr., Lord Lytton's
impression of, 208

Suez Canal, British purchase of
shares in, 41

Swat Canal outrage, the, 188

Synd Noor Mahomed Shah (Sher
Ah' s minister), on Afghan
56, 81, 85, 134, 185;
of, 154

TANJORE, Princess of, at the Delhi
Assemblage, 125

Tashkeml, 10,12, Abdul Bahinan
at, 410

Temple, Sir Richard, controlling
expenditure on the famine in
Madras, 12G, 193, 194, 195, 198 ;
engaged in railway construc-
tion, 387

Thiers, M,, on the English pur-
chase of Suez Canal shares, 41

Thompson, Mr. Rivers, president
of committee investigating the
massacre of the Cavagnari Mis-
sion, 897

Thornton, Mr. (officiating Foreign
Secretary), 116, 121

Tiluk (Indian editor), Government
prosecution of, 502

Turgot, M., his administration in
the scarcity in France in 1770,
235

Turkey, Sultan of, his mission to
Afghanistan m 1877, 162

Turkomans, submission of, to
Russia, 16

I UNKIAE-SKELESSI, Treaty of, 71
VILLIEES, Colonel G., 208

* WAITING POLICY,' definition of a,

by Lord Lytton, 65-70
I Wakhar, Mir of, 135
1 Wales, Prince of, his visit to India,
1 48, 44, 106, 107
l Wali Mahomed Tn»*n (Sher All's
| brother), counsels Sher Ali to

INDEX

SSI

receive a British Mission, 267 ,
suggested English nominee,
313 ; reconciled with Yakub,
335; unfriendly to him, 347;
secret TH sm QT HintiTiT^ on tin 8
Cavagnari Mission massacre
856 ; in the British camp, 361,
362; administers Kabul pro-
vince, 893

Wall Sher Ali Khan, governor of
Kandahar, 382, 383, 389 ; made
hereditary ruler of the province,
400, 401 ; his domestic difficul-
ties after his appointment, 402 ;
resigns and goes to Karachi, 443

War estimates, error in the, 498,
501

Wazir Shah Mahommel, arrested
at Kabul, 367

Wellington, Duke of, cited, 395

Western Afghanistan, policy of
an independent, 382, 383

White, Major (92nd Highlanders),
in action at Gharasiab, 368

Wingate, Mr. A. (Bombay Civil
Service), 222, 224

Wodehouse, Sir Philip, dealing
with the famine in Bombay,
125, 190, 191

Wullee Mahomed (the Khan of
Khelat's minister), 96

TAHIYA Khan, Sirdar, 347, 350,
355, 360; arrested by General
Roberts at Kabul, 367

Yakub Beg, 35, 37

Takub Khan (son of Sher Ali), 87, {
135; becomes Amur of Kabul,
312; his letter to Cavagnari
announcing his father's death,
313 ; terms of peace offered to
him by Lord Lytton, 314;
agrees to an English Mission ,
at Kabul, 315; invites the '
Cavagnari Mission, but ob-
jects to territorial cessions,
316 ; terms of treaty offered to
him by the British, 817-319 ; in
the English camp at Ghmda-

muk, 321 ; his opinion of
Persia., 323 ; signs the Treaty of
Gundamuk, 324; his obliga-
tions under that Treaty, 327,
328; returns to Kabul, 333;
appoints Daod Shah com-
maxuLer-in-ehief, 334; recon-
ciled with Wall Mahomed,
335; suspected of poisoning
Bukhtiar Khan, 839, 340 ; re-
ception of Ma] or Cavagnari
at Kabul, 342-344 ; places re-
strictions on Cavagnaii's inter-
course -with Afghan notables,
346, 347 ; wishes to visit
India, 351; his unpopularity,
351; offered pecuniary assis-
tance by the Viceroy, 354 ; his
account of the massacre of
Cavagnari's Mission, 355; an-
other account of the same by
him, 356; Wall Mahomed's
secret memorandum on the
massacre, 35G ; refuses to pay
the Hera-fci regiments, 357;
seeks refuge in the British
camp, 360, 361; reasons for
delaying the British advance
on Kabul, 364; determines to
relinquish the Amirahip, 366,
conduct on the arrest of Afghan
notables by General Boberts,
367 ; his resignation accepted,
369 ; his statements regarding
Sher Ah, 869 ; conclusions of
the Committee of Inquiry on
his complicity in the Kabul
massacre, 375, 376; removed
to Meemt, 388 ; his abdication
declared irrevocable, 396, 397;
reasons against his restoration,
398,899,400

Yassin, Sirdar of, at the Delhi
Assemblage, 124, 185, 187

Yule, Colonel, dissents from the
necessity for suppression of
vernacular press, 518

ZAZARIA Khan, arrested at Kabul,
367

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