BANCROFT
LIBRARY
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
18 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
sources, and set them further thinking of divorce
ment. Again, the Creoles were more intelligent,
better informed, and far more numerous than the blue-
blooded Spaniards; in view of which we can only
wonder that the people of Mexico remained in such
humiliating subjection so long. The Spaniards in
America and their children were even better educated
than the Spaniards in Spain, and the higher their
station and the more inflated their pride, the more
their minds were filled with prejudice and ignorance.
The establishment of the university at Mexico afforded
facilities to the Creoles superior to any enjoyed by
their fathers, who for the most part, exclusive of those
holding high positions, were of inferior birth and
breeding, and without title to the superiority claimed.
Students and graduates in Mexico by no means con
fined themselves to the narrow curriculum prescribed
by the university, and the prohibited works of French
philosophers, of political and moral writers, and espe
cially of Rousseau, found their way of late into the
country. Proletarian principles, and the detestation
of oppression which they breathed, were absorbed
with avidity, and stimulated the longing for free
dom. The very danger incurred by the study of
these books, and the secrecy with which of necessity
they were perused, only served to intensify insurrec
tionary ideas and provoke conspiracy. 6 The liberal
principles thus acquired by the educated class were
gradually infused into the ignorant.
Nevertheless, it seems a little strange to us. to whom
O
the doctrine of right of revolution has become so clear,
and so cherished as the highest prerogative of liberty,
that it should have made its way so slowly among an
educated and intelligent people. But the cause is
6 It was the special province of the inquisition to guard against the im
portation of books. As late as 1807, a Mexican named Jos6 Roxas was de
nounced by his own mother for having a volume of Rousseau in his possession,
and was confined for sevei-al years in the dungeons of the holy office. He
finally made his escape, but died in 1811 at New Orleans. Ward's Mex., i.
110.
RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL LIBERTY. 19
explained when we remember the powerful hold re
ligion yet had upon these people. The first step
toward freedom is to emancipate the mind from some
of its superstitions. There can be no political liberty
without some degree of religious liberty. It was
primarily for religious liberty that the puritans had
come from England to America; and the first step
thus taken toward political liberty, they were prepared
to throw off the yoke for slighter cause than were the
people of Mexico, who were satisfied with their relig
ion, and had no desire to change it. Thus while their
religion, still the strongest sentiment possessing them,
constrained them to loyalty, they were ready to en
dure much by way of duty, and to escape damnation
so much that it was rather Spain's weakness than
Mexico's strength that secured independence, as we
shall in due time see.
But gradually reason, long dormant if not dethroned,
began to show signs of vitality, first in other quarters,
and finally in Mexico. It was a period of political
turnings and over turn ings in Europe and America,
and it were a pity if Mexico, ground into the very
dust by the iron heel of despotism, should not find
some relief.
The downfall of monarchy in France, and the in
dependence of the British colonies in North America,
had established precedents of the successful uprising of
peoples against the oppression of rulers. More espe
cially was the acquisition of freedom by the United
States regarded as a solution of the difficulty in re
gard to the right of revolution, as Spain in 1783 had
somewhat imprudently recognized the independence
of the English colonies, thereby tacitly excusing re
volt in her own. 7
7 The reader is already aware that the conde de Aranda at this time pro
posed to Cdrlos III. the independence of the Spanish colonies in Amer
ica. See Hist. Mcx., iii. 388-90. Dr Luis Quixano, a prominent leader of
the revolution in Quito, made prisoner when Toribio Montes entered that
city, deemed it advisable to retract his views on the right of a colony to as
sert its independence. He based his reconstructed argument on the principle
that what is useful and convenient is not necessarily lawful and just. His ex-
BANCROFT
LIBRARY
<
THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
THE WORKS
OF
HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT.
THE WORKS
OF
HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT,
-
VOLUME xn.
HISTOEY OF MEXICO.
VOL. IV. 1804-1824.
SAN FRANCISCO :
A. L. BANCROFT & COMPANY, PUBLISHERS.
1885.
Entered according to Act of Congress in the Year 1885, by
HUBERT H. BANCROFT,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
All Rights Reserved.
u. c,
CADBMY OF
ICIFIC COAST
HISTORY
CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.
CHAPTEK I.
EUROPE IN THE EARLY PART OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.
PAGE
The Little Man from Corsica He Makes All the World Tremble Gen
eral View of Politics and Society Attitude of England, Prussia, and
Austria A Glance at Spain's History Rulers for Three Centuries
Retrogressions and Reactions Prime Ministers Peace and War
England and France will not let Spaniards be Free Position of the
United States Chronic Braggadocio There are Soldiers and Heroes
in Mexico as Well.. . 1
CHAPTEK II.
ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
1803-1808.
Causes of the Revolution of Independence Arrival of the Viceroy His
Antecedents and Comportment The Viceregal Family Sordidness
of Iturrigaray His Visit to the Mines Public Improvements In
troduction of Vaccination Sequestration cf Property Effect on
the Land Owners Humboldt's Visit International Complications
Demands for Treasure Difficulties with the United States War
with England Military Preparations European Affairs Abdica
tion of Carlos IV. Iturrigaray's Indifference Effects in Mexico of
Events in Spain Power of the Inquisition Attitude of the Press
Sparks of Revolution 12
CHAPTER III.
ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
1808.
The Ayuntamiento Claims Sovereignty of the People A National Con
gress Proposed Opposition of the Audiencia Glad Tidings from the
Peninsula Four Memorable Juntas Rival Spanish Juntas Angry
Debates Conspiracy to Depose the Viceroy Ycrmo Takes the
Lead Iturrigaray's Apathy A Midnight Coup d'Etat The Vice-
vi CONTENTS.
P4.GH
roy in Durance Garibay Appointed his Successor Fate of Iturri-
garay's Supporters He is Sent to Spain His Rich Sweetmeats
Indictment for Treason Acquittal R,esidencia Heavy Fines
Change of Opinions The Sentence Annulled Iturrigaray's Inten
tions Analyzed Bibliography 40
CHAPTEE IV.
VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
1808-1810.
Garibay's Character A Badge of Loyalty Reorganization of the Army
Bonapartist Intrigues Lampoons and Seditious Sheets Effect of
Reverses in Spain Establishment of a Junta Consultiva Preten
sions to the Throne of Mexico Archbishop Lizana Appointed Vice
roy Remittances to Spain Lizana's Character The Junta de Segu-
ridad Revolution at Valladolid Spanish American Representation
in the Cortes Lizana Removed from Office Weak Administration
of the Audiencia French Emissaries Arrival of Viceroy Venegas
His Antecedents, Character, and Personal Appearance Titles and
Honors from Spain 67
CHAPTEE Y.
OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
1810.
Development of Quert$taro Affairs in Guanajuato The Town of Do
lores Its Cura, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla Secret Meetings of Rev
olutionists Ignacio Allende Plotting at San Miguel General Plan
of Uprising Hidalgo's Biography Arrests The Corregidor Im
prisonedHis Acquittal His Biography El Grito de Dolores
Hidalgo Marches to San Miguel A Tumultuous Array The Sacred
Banner Success of the Insurgents at San Miguel Pillaging Hi
dalgo Proclaimed Captain-general He Enters (Delay a He Ap
points a New Ayuntamiento 96
CHAPTEE VI.
THE ALHONDIGA OF GUANAJUATO TAKEN BY STORM.
1810.
Local History of Ganajuato Alarm in the City Defensive Measures of
Inteudente Riaiio The Alh6ndiga de Granaditas An Interesting
Manuscript Riano Retires to the Alh6ndiga Hidalgo Summons
Riafio to Surrender The Attack A Murderous Contest Riaiio's
Death His Biography Confusion in the Alhondiga The Barri
cades Won by the Insurgents They Gain Entrance Berzdbal's
Fall His Biography Number of the killed Acts of Heroism
Pillage and Devastation. . . 130
CONTENTS. vii
CHAPTER VII.
HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
1810.
PAGE
Military Preparation of Venegas Action of the Church and Inquisi
tion Hidalgo's Reply He Abolishes Slavery His Administrative
Measures at Guanajuato A Refractory Ayuntamiento Hidalgo
Establishes a Mint Marches against Valladolid Additional Rein
forcements Hidalgo's Treasury The Insurgents Move toward
Mexico Trujillo Despatched to Oppose their Advance Trujillo's
Character Iturbide's Biography Trujillo's Movements The Battle
of Las Cruces The Royalists Force their Way Out Their Defeat
Regarded as a Triumph Alarm in the Capital Another Sacred
Banner Hidalgo Perplexed 158
CHAPTER VIII.
PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
1810.
Calleja's Preparations His Biography Engagement at Querdtaro Ca,-
llcja Joins Forces with Flon Chavez Repulsed at Querdtaro Calle
ja's Movements The Dispersion of the Insurgents at Aculco Calleja
Returns to Querdtaro Character of Torres Defensive Measures of
Abarca in Jalisco Insurgent Operations in Jalisco Engagement at
La Uarca The Royalists Defeated at Zacoalco Guadalajara Surren
ders to Torres Mercado Gains Possession of San Bias Revolution
in Zacatecas Flight of the Europeans An Unfortunate Intendente
Iriarte enters Zacatecas The Commission of Doctor Cos A
Daring Scheme San Luis Potosi Won by an Insurgent Friar A
Treacherous Visitor San Luis Sacked. . . 192
CHAPTER IX.
THE ROYALISTS RECAPTURE GUANAJUATO.
1810.
Allende Returns to Guanajuato Preparations for Defence The First
Attack Calleja's Plan He Takes Allende's Batteries Calleja, the
Avenger His Proclamation An Execution Scene in the Alhondiga
A General Pardon Extended The Government Reoganized
Calleja Marches for Guadalajara Hidalgo at Valladolid And at
the Cerro del Molcajete Hidalgo's Reception at Guadalajara
Establishes a Government Rayon's Biography Letona's Mission
and Death The ' Dispertador Americano ' and Printing-press Prep
arations for War ... 216
viii CONTENTS.
CHAPTEK X.
SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION AND BATTLE OF CALDERON.
1810-1811.
PAGE
Hermosillo's Operations in Sinaloa Successes at Rosario His Defeat at
San Ignacio Spread of the Revolution in Nuevo Santander Coa-
huila and Nuevo Leon Revolt Villagran's Doings Biography of
Cruz Plan of Calleja Tumult in Valladolid Cruz Enters Vallado-
lid He Reorganizes the Government Engagement at Urepetiro
Allende Joins Hidalgo at Guadalajara A Council of War Hidalgo
Takes up a Position at the Bridge of Calderon Plan of Battle-field
Calleja's Dispositions Flon's Impetuosity The Revolutionists
Nearly Triumphant Their Final Defeat Death of Flon His Char
acter... .. 237
CHAPTER XI.
HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
1811.
Cruz Joins Calleja at Guadalajara Humility of the Audiencia, Church,
and University Calleja Establishes a Junta de Seguridad Cruz Re
gains San Bias Death of Mercado Hidalgo Compelled to Surren
der his Command The Insurgent Leaders Retire tc Saltillo They
Decide to Go to the United States Operations in San Luis Potosi
Death of Herrera Counter-revolution in Texas Capture and Exe
cution of Ignacio Aldama Elizondo's Treacherous Plot Capture of
Hidalgo and Revolutionary Chiefs Iriarte's Death The Captives
are Sent to Chihuahua Their Trial Abasolo's Deposition Execu
tions Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Hidalgo's Execution His Char
acter... . 259
CHAPTER XII.
MORELOS AND RAYON.
1811.
State of the Revolution after Hidalgo's Capture Biography of Morelos
His Character His Meeting with Hidalgo and Commission
Morelos in Michoacan The Royalist Paris Defeated Morelos
Marches to Chilpancingo The Family of the Bravos Capture of
Tixtla Defeat of the Royalist Fuentes A Conspiracy Suppressed
Rayon Retreats from Saltillo He Defeats Ochoa A Terrible
March The Platform of the Insurgent Leader Rayon Evacuates
Zacatecas Trujillo's Doings in Valladolid Retreat of the Insur
gents .290
CONTENTS. ix
CHAPTER XIII.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
1811.
PAGE
Calleja's New System of Military Organization Suppression of the In
surrection in Nuevo Santander Pacification of San Luis Potosi
Defeat of Insurgents in Guanajuato Porlier's Operations in Nueva
Galicia Torre's Activity and Severity His Defeat at Zitacuaro,
and Death Rayon Fortifies Zitacuaro Emparan Returns to Spain
Conspiracy to Seize the Viceroy Proclamation of Calleja Events
in Michoacan Condition of Guanajuato Spread of the Revolution. 317
CHAPTER XIV.
SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
-*
, *-
1811-1812.
^ r
Doctor Cos Joins Rayon The Revolutionary Press Perplexity of Vene-
gas Bishop Campillo's Failure as a Mediator Second Campaign
of Morelos Calleja Takes Zitacuaro Destruction of the City
Reverses of Porlier Arrival of Spanish Troops Triumphal Entry
of Calleja into Mexico Jealousy of Venegas Calleja Marches
against Cuautla Description of the City Llano at Iziicar Calleja
Repulsed Cuautla Invested Sufferings of the Besieged Morelos.
Evacuates the City Calleja Returns to the Capital ............... 343
CHAPTER XV.
WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
1812.
Financial Distress and Arbitrary Measures Insurgents Sack Huamantla
and Capture Trains The Suprema Junta's Movements and Acts
Doctor Cos' Plans of Peace and War Viceregal Course Inde
pendent Press Bad Guerrillas Rosains and his Troubles Cam
paigns in Puebla, Michoacan, and Bajio de Guanajuato Operations
of Garcia Conde, Negrete, and Iturbide against Albino Garcia Cap
ture and End of This Leader Torres' Execution 111 Success of
Liceaga and Cos in Guanajuato Raids in San Luis Potosi ......... 376
CHAPTER XVI.
PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
1812.
Capture of Tehuacan Massacre of Prisoners Curates of Maltrata and
Zongolica Join the Revolution Orizaba Captured and Retaken
Revolutionary Plans at Vera Cruz and Perote Communication Re
opened by Royalists Insurgent Operations Capture of Pachuca
with Immense Booty Cruel Shooting of Prisoners Towns Recap-
x CONTENTS.
PA3S
tured by Royalists Arrest of Leonardo Bravo and Companions
Their Execution Noble Deed of Nicolas Bravo Venegas Offers
Pardon to Penitent Rebels, and a Reward for Morelos' Capture
Venegas and Calleja at Enmity Rayon's Unsuccessful Attack on
Toluca Defeat at Tenango Dispersion of the Supreme Junta 397
CHAPTEE XVII.
BAYON PRESIDENT; MORELOS IN THE SOUTH.
1812.
President Rayon at Tlalptijahua His Relations with the Villagranes
Royalist Successes on the North of Mexico Affairs in Michoacan
Father Salto and his Execution Venegas' Sanguinary Decree In
surgent Priests Deprived of their Immunity Episcopal Indifference
Excitement in Mexico Second Anniversary of Independence Cele
bratedRamon Rayon's Profitable Movements Attack against Ix-
iniquilpan a Failure Rayon's Arrangements with Royalist Traders
Proposed Negotiations for Peace Assault of Yanhuitlan Siege
of Huahuapan Trujano's Brilliant Defence; Morelos Comes to the
Rescue and Wins a Victory Gates of Oajaca Opened to Him 420,
CHAPTEE XVIII.
AMERICAN AFFAIRS IN SPAIN.
1811-1812.
Government of Spain The Cortes and National Sovereignty Character
of the Members The Diputacion Americana and its Policy Its De
mands and Character of Concessions Deputy Perez from Puebla
Deputy Cisneros Asks for Mexican Autonomy and Eventual Inde
pendence Arizpe Mier Forced Loan Representation of the Con-
sulado of Mexico British Offers of Mediation National Constitu
tion as Adopted Its Publication in Mexico The Press Election of
Ayuntamientos Animosity of the Natives toward the Spaniards
Constitution Practically Suspended 441
CHAPTEE XIX.
SUCCESS OF MORELOS.
1812-1813.
Morelos' Third Campaign Chilapa Retaken Reoccupation of the Coun
try to Acapulco Matamoros at Work in Izucar Nicolas Bravo's
Victories Viceregal Tribulations Publication of Decrees of the
Spanish Cortes Death of Trujano Morelos' Visit to Ozumba He
Attacks a Royalist Convoy Takes Orizaba Defeat on the Heights
of Aculcingo Captures Oajaca Enormous Booty Establishment of
Government Victor and Miguel Bravo's Campaign to Jamiltepec
Morelos' Plans Venegas Superseded Review of his Rule 408
CONTENTS. xi
CHAPTER XX.
VICEROY CALLEJA AND HIS PLANS.
1813.
PAGE
Calleja's Character and Appearance How the Appointment was Deceived
Condition of Affairs Fresh Taxes and Loans Reforms Insur
gent Heroine Constitution of 1812 Enforced Inquisition Disap
pears Increase of Crime Protests and Counter-appeals Extent .of
Insurrection Calleja's Campaign Plan Royalist Positions Verdus-
co's Fiasco Rayon's Tour of Inspection Quarrel between the Lead
ers Iturbide's Victory at Salvatierra 495
CHAPTER XXI.
OPERATIONS AGAINST RAYON, VILLAGRAN, AND OSORNO.
1813.
Siege of Cerro del Gallo The Poisoned Well Insurgent Forces and
their Tactics Movements in Guanajuato Sway of the Villagranes
Their Sudden Fall Huasteca Campaign Osorno and his Terri
tory Terrene's Military Promenade Osorno Irrepressible Admin
istration of Cruz in New Galicia Frontier Operations Chapala Lake
and its Rovers Division of Provincias Interims Lara's Exploits in
Texas A Flicker in the Orient 513
CHAPTER XXII.
CONGRESS OF CHILPANCINGO.
1813.
Morelos' March to Acapulco He Besieges and Captures It Royalist
Reaction Piaxtla Guerrillas and their Doings Bravo's Opera
tionsHis Repulse at Alvarado Siege of Coscomatcpec Orizaba
Surprised Second Royalist Defeat at San Agustin del Palmar Its
Consequences Discord in the Suprema Junta Congress of Chil-
pancingo Rayon's Action Morelos the Generalissimo and Siervo
de la Nacion Declaration of National Independence Constitution
Jesuits 545
CHAPTER XXIII.
FALL OF MORELOS.
1813-1814.
Morelos Marches against Valladolid Calleja's Counter-movement Re
pulse at the Gate of Zapote Brilliant Charge by Iturbide Defeat
and Death of Matamoros The Congress Asserts Itself Armijo
Overruns Tecpan Province Galeana Falls Maleadministration in
Oajaca Alvarez's Triumphant Entry The Enchanted Mountain
xii CONTENTS.
PAGE
Speculations with Convoys Quarrel and Misconduct of Rayon and
Rosains Expedition against Zacatlan and Flight of Rayon Man-
hunting in the Central Provinces 569
CHAPTER XXIV.
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES.
1814.
Changed Aspect of the Revolution Depression on Both Sides Pro
posed Restriction of Passports and Export of Treasure Causes of
the Exodus of the Spaniards Fresh Taxes Restoration of Fer
nando VII. Constitution of 1812 is Annulled and Autocracy Rees
tablished Feeling in New Spain Insurgent Constitution Its Pro
visions and Analysis How it was Received Election of Officers
under the New Constitution Liceaga President Commemorative
Medal Constitution Ordered Read by the Curas Relations with
the United States 592
CHAPTER XXV.
DEATH OF MORELOS.
1815.
The Revolutionists on C6poro Hill Positions of the Insurgent Forces
Determination of Calleja Siege of C6poro Repulse of Iturbide
Attempted Surprise of Jilotepec Ramon Rayon is Shorn of his
Triumph Claverino's Movement Southward Iturbide Chases the
Congress Insubordination of Doctor Cos He is Arrested and Con
demned to Death, but is Discharged Death of Doctor Cos His
Character The Revolutionary Government Migrates It is Over
taken at Tezmalaca Capture of Morelos His Trial Degradation
and Penance The Last Auto-de-fd Execution of the Great Leader
Reflections on his Character Two Mexican Writers on This
Period 608
CHAPTER XXVI.
LAST CAMPAIGNS UNDER CALLEJA.
1815-1816.
Effect of Morelos' Fall Respective Strength of Insurgents and Royalists
Intrigues and Overthrow of Rosains He Joins the Enemy Teran
Rises in Fame and Influence Arrival of the Congress at Tehuacan
It is Forcibly Dissolved The Goazacoalco Expedition First Naval
Victory for the Mexican Flag The Mounted Raiders of Apam
Plains Osorno's Last Campaign The Convoy Service in Vera Cruz
Miyares' Measures for its Protection Operations under Victoria
and his Associates Bravo and Guerrero on the South Coast.. . . . 626
CONTENTS. xiii
CHAPTER XXVII.
VICEROY APODACA AND HIS VIGOROUS MEASURES.
1816-1817.
PAGE
Causes Which Sustained the Revolution Review of Calleja's Rule
Character of the New Viceroy Apodaca Measures to Gain Adhe
sion Combined Movement against Tehuacan Its Siege and Surren
der Deplorable Weakness of Teran Vera Cruz is Swept by the
Royalists Their Successes in Mizteca The Council of Jaujilla
Strife in Michoacan Tarnished Reputation of Ramon Rayon The
Five Years' Siege of Mescala is Ended Treachery of Vargas-
Movements in the North The Declining Insurrection Centres in
Guanajuato Apodaca 's Success 645
CHAPTER XXVIII.
MINA'S EXPEDITION.
1817.
A Famous Navarrese Guerrilla Preparing for the Enterprise The Land
ing at Soto la Marina Alarm of the Royalists The Victory at
Peotillos Penetrating the Interior Traits of Mina Overthrow of
Ordonez and Castanon Liberation of Prisoners Jealousy of Torres
Character of Mexican Guerrillas Fall of Soto la Marina Siege of
Fort Sombrero Ravages of Thirst and Sword The Bulwark of
Independence Mina's Field Operations Repulse at Guanajuato
Capture and Execution of Mina Reflections on his Undertaking
Siege and Fall of Los Remedies Bibliography 659
CHAPTER XXIX.
PLAN OF IGUALA.
1817-1821.
Capture of Insurgent Chiefs Fort of Jaujilla Dispersion of the Junta
Pardon Accepted by Numerous Leaders A Flickering Light
Affairs in Spain The Spanish Constitution Proclaimed in Mexico
Election of Deputies Thoughts of Independence Iturbide Re
appears Diversity of Political Opinions Plots to Overthrow the
Constitution Iturbide in Command Well-disguised Designs
Overtures to Guerrero Independence Proclaimed The Plan of
Iguala Measures of the Viceroy 688
CHAPTER XXX.
TRIUMPH OF THE REVOLUTION.
1821.
Discouraging Prospects Independence Proclaimed at Guanajuato
Valladolid Capitulates The Provincias Internas Revolutionized
Iturbide at Qucre"taro Apodaca 's Doposal His Conduct Discussed
xiv CONTENTS.
PAGE
His Successor Bravo Joins the Revolutionists Operations in
Puebla and Vera Cruz Santa Anna Repulsed at Vera Cruz Vic
toria's Reappearance Iturbide Enters Puebla Arrival of O'Donoju
His Antecedents Treaty pf C6rdoba Novella Hesitates to Recog
nize O'Donoju Iturbide Enters the Capital End of the Revolution. 712
CHAPTER XXXI.
THE SOVEREIGN PROVISIONAL JUNTA.
1821-1822.
Installation of the Junta Appointment of a Regency Its Cabinet
O'Donoju's Death Iturbide's Rewards Army Promotions Sur
render of Perote, Acapulco, and Vera Cruz Murder of Colonel
Concha Flight of Europeans The Press Political Factions
Measures for Convoking Congress Iturbide's Interference Con
spiracy Its Failure Condition of the Country The Revenue The
Mining Industry A Forced Loan and Arbitrary Measures Reor
ganization of the Army Union of Central America with the Em
pire Measures for its Representation Reflections on the Adminis
tration of the Junta 734
CHAPTER XXXII.
THE FIRST CONGRESS AND FIRST EMPEROR.
1822.
The Installation Taking the Oath under Pressure The First Misunder
standingPolitical Parties Measures for Relief of the Treasury
Disagreements on the Army Question A Counter-revolution Gen
eral Davila's Action Iturbide and Congress at Open War Progress
of Republicanism Iturbide Proclaimed Emperor by a Popular
Emeute A Stormy Congressional Session Agustin I. Recognized-
Joy in the Provinces The Imperial Family and Household Diffi
culties of the Treasury The Council of State The Coronation 757
CHAPTER XXXIII.
DETHRONEMENT AND DEATH OF ITURBIDE.
1822-1824.
Inauguration of the Order of Guadalupe Padre Mier Short-lived Har
monyArrest of Deputies Iturbide Attempts to Reorganize Con
gressHis Preposterous Claims He Dissolves the Assembly A
Junta Instituyente Established Appropriation of Spaniards' Money
Affairs at Vera Cruz Santa Anna in Disgrace Iturbide Visits
Jalapa Santa Anna Revolts Republicanism Proclaimed Progress
of -the Insurrection Reverses Influence of the Masonic Order-
Change of Tactics Plan of Casa Mata Iturbide's Conciliatory Ac
tionCongress Reinstalled The Emperor Abdicates His Depart
ure from Mexico His Return and Death. . 770
HISTORY OF MEXICO.
CHAPTER I.
EUROPE IN THE EARLY PART OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.
THE LITTLE MAN FROM CORSICA HE MAKES ALL THE WORLD TREMBLE
GENERAL VIEW or POLITICS AND SOCIETY ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND,
PRUSSIA, AND AUSTRIA A GLANCE AT SPAIN'S HISTORY RULERS FOR
THREE CENTURIES RETROGRESSIONS AND REACTIONS PRIME MINIS
TERSPEACE AND WAR ENGLAND AND FRANCE WILL NOT LET SPAN
IARDS BE FREE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES CHRONIC BRAG
GADOCIO THERE ARE SOLDIERS AND HEROES IN MEXICO AS WELL.
AT the opening of the nineteenth century Europe
was in a state of unusual commotion. There had
come from Corsica to Paris a bow-legged, olive-
cheeked little man who had set the rulers of the earth
and their wise men by the ears. They were exceed
ingly frightened, and knew not what to do. For this
personage had set at work several hundred thousands
of their subjects killing each other; to what purpose,
it puzzled them to say, unless it was to show how to
make dupes and donkeys of them all only donkeys
are too sensible beasts to cut and mangle and murder
each other in such a wholesale manner at the instiga
tion of any one.
Louis XVI. was guillotined in 1793. His prede
cessor, after a life of debauchery with his Pompadours
and Dubarrys, and under the intellectual libertinism
of Voltaire and Rousseau, had died leaving a debt of
four thousand millions of livres. After that was the
tiers etat, followed by the storming of the Bastile
VOL. IV. 1
2 EUROPE AT THE OPENING OF THE CENTURY.
midst mobs and bloody revolution. Paper money was
made. Hereditary titles were discontinued. Church
property was seized. Christianity was abolished
though reestablished before 1801 and reason was
enthroned. The constitution was changed, and a
species of bastard republicanism propagated. ^ As the
head of Louis Capet rolled upon the scaffold, insulted
royalty rose throughout Europe. But France was
still mad, and it was not until Robespierre was brought
beneath the guillotine that the reign of terror was
ended. And thus was opened the way for Napoleon
Bonaparte.
Taking the popular side in the revolution, and with
the aid of his matchless military genius, Napoleon was
general of the army at the age of twenty-five. In
1796 he drove back the Austrians and conquered
Italy. Venice fell the following year, and the cisal
pine republic was formed out of the Milanese and
Mantuan states. Egypt was attempted in 1798, but
Nelson was in the Mediterranean and prevented the
loss of India to Great Britain. The following year
the First Consul's proposals of peace to England were
decidedly rejected by George III. Austria's turn
came again in 1800, and in 1801 the northern king
doms were united in a league against England. In
1802 France regained her islands in the West Indies
lost by Louis XV. to the English. The Code Na
poleon was formed. Notwithstanding the peace of
Amiens, in 1803, Great Britain was pricked into fresh
outbreaks. Made emperor of France and king of
Italy in 1804, Napoleon, who was so sadly disturbing
the time-honored balances of power, now found united
against him, England, Russia, Austria, and Sweden.
The game of 1805 was played off Trafalgar and at
O it/ O
Austerlitz, and at its close all Europe lay at the feet
of the little man from Corsica. Prussia claimed his
.attention in 1806, Russia in 1807, Spain in 1808, and
Austria in 1809-10. Here marks the highest point
attained. In 1812 came the Russian campaign; in
FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 3
1813 the French armies were driven from Spain; and
in 1814 Napoleon was at Elba. Another flash of
glory; then in 1815 Waterloo and St Helena, and in
1821 death.
Meanwhile England, having lost the fairest portion
of her American provinces, and being deeply in debt
from her many European complications and much
fighting, was reduced to an unhappy condition. The
tailors had great burdens to bear, which were placed
upon them mercilessly by all the rest, manufacturers,
land owners, and rulers. Everything was excessively
taxed, while wages were reduced, sometimes one half.
The "slave-trade obtained. Forty thousand negroes
were annually taken on board by English ships for
their West India colonies, half of them perishing by
the passage. In a word, manners were coarse and
usages cruel. Prussia was badly broken by the war,
losing large parts of her domains. There was some
disaffection among the German people, but it was
checked without difficulty by the strong arm of roy
alty. Francis and Prince Metternich ruled Austria
with an iron despotism, preventing freedom of thought
or speech, and holding over the press strict censor
ship.
With the centuries Spain has continued to decline,
until it is many times thought that the bottom has
been reached, but only after a little rise to find a
lower depth. Yet, during a portion of the three im
becile reigns of the seventeenth century Felipe III.,
1598-1621; Felipe IV., 1621-1665; and Carlos II.,
1665-1700 we find continued for a time the brilliant
age of literature and art, elating from the rule of
their predecessor. There are Luis de Leon, Castilian
Cervantes, Lope de Vega, and Quevedo; Calderon de
la Barca, and other writers; and Ribera, Velazquez,
and Murillo, painters. Meanwhile the army becomes
greatly demoralized; the country is left almost de
fenceless; the naval strength is reduced to nothing;
4 EUROPE AT THE OPENING OF THE CENTURY.
the merchant marine is next to nothing, the art of
ship-building being lost, Italy, France, and England
doing Spain's carrying; while pirates and filibusters
ravage colonial waters, and industries and trade fall
into the hands of foreigners.
The eighteenth century opens with a thirteen years'
'war for the succession, when the house of Bourbon
crowds out the house of Hapsburg. Of the Bourbon
princes before Joseph Bonaparte, are Felipe V., 1700-
1746; Fernando VI., 1746-1759; Carlos III., 1759-
1788; Carlos IV., 1788-1808; and Fernando VII.,
the same year. Following Bonaparte, 18081814, is
Fernando VII. till 1833, Isabel II. till 1868, a brief
period of republicanism, 1868-9, Amadeoof the house
of Savoy, 1871-3, then more republican dictatorships,
and finally the house of Bourbon again restored in
the person of Alfonso XII.
Out of the necessary discipline incident to the war
of the succession grows some improvement. Agri
culture and industry are revived. Legislation is in
some degree purified. The wings of the holy see are
clipped, and the church stripped of part of its prop
erty and influence. Fernando VI., being small in body,
weak in mind, full of fear and hypochondria, and withal
of a kind and benevolent disposition, the country re
cuperates somewhat under his rule. Retrenchments
are made. The inquisition is emptied. Some defences
are restored, industry and commerce are cultivated,
and other reforms instituted.
Carlos III. is an abler man and makes more mis
chief. Church and inquisition are still further checked
and the Jesuits are expelled. Among the reformers
of the period are Count Aranda, an Aragon grande
of French proclivities and friend of Voltaire; Count
Campomanes, a man of culture and literary activity, a
patriot and friend of progress; and Count Florida-
blanca, who in 1777 succeeds Campomanes as prime
minister. The last named is less bigoted than his
age, though opposed to French radicalism ; while re-
DECADENCE OF SPAIN. 5
straining the influence of the church, he protects it.
lie is a man of talents and culture, less statesman
than manager, and believing in autocracy and unques
tioning obedience. But whatever the principles held
in theory, put into practice through the agency of
ignorant, indolent, and corrupt officials, they fall far
short of their purpose. There is hostility with Eng
land in 1779-83. In 1781-2 Spain puts down an
insurrection of the inca, Tupac Amaru, in Peru, and
the thousand years' war with the Mahometans is ter
minated by the peace of Algiers in 1786.
With the accession of Ca>los IV. ends the epoch of
reform. Dismal indeed are the next thirty years, dur
ing which occur the grand humiliation at the hand
of Bonaparte, and the loss of nearly all the trans
atlantic colonies. The king is a handsome, ignorant,
good-natured imbecile; and his wife, Maria Luisa, an
ambitious and passionate profligate, is the true ruler
of Spain. Floridablanca and Aranda are alternately
removed and recalled, finally to make way for Manuel
Godoy, a young officer, and the queen's favorite, im
pudent, incompetent, ambitious, and thoroughly im
moral, sycophant or conspirator according to the tide,
but always villain. If politics, war, or intrigue become
tiresome, he seeks relief in dissipation.
Under these baneful influences Spain sinks lower
than ever. While the rulers are revelling in luxury
and licentiousness, the poor throughout the land are
crying for bread. Finances are wrecked, the army
is rendered weak and worthless, and education and
industry are again prostrated. Galicia and other prov
inces revolt, and presently the French are upon them,
and Spain is little better than vassal.
The peace of Basel, 1795-6 as is called the friv
olous farce which pretended to free the country of the
French, while in reality placing the peninsula still
more in their power, besides in its results completing
the ruin of the navy, and preparing the way for the
general revolt of the colonies gives Godoy the name
6 EUROPE AT THE OPENING OF THE CENTURY.
of Prince of Peace, with rich domains and other sub
stantial gifts.
Spain still has many ships and regiments, but no
sailors or soldiers. Off Portugal, in 1797, the Span
iards are defeated by the English, who sweep the
/ O ' L
Mediterranean and Caribbean seas, and sow discord
among the colonies. During the past three years
there has been 2,445,000,000 reals income, and 8,714,-
000,000 outgo. There is in circulation 1,980,000,000
paper money current in 1799 at forty per cent dis
count. Religion is everywhere present as the hand
maid of vice. A peace is signed in 1801 between
France and Spain, with Godoy as the creature of
Napoleon. In thick succession other wars are fol
lowed by other ignominious treaties. In 1808 the
French are in Spain ; Carlos abdicates ; Godoy flees
before the fury of the populace; and Fernando VII.,
idle, incompetent, and faithless, a coward and a hypo
crite, base, tricky, and a debauchee these are some
of the many epithets history applies to this monarch
is named successor.
After a royal puppet-play, with Murat as manager-
general, during which Carlos is for a moment recalled,
while Fernando abdicates, the English, thirty thou
sand strong, are in the peninsula. At Aranjuez the
supreme junta sits under the presidency of Florida-
blanca. Then comes Napoleon to Spain; and fora
time Joseph Bonaparte holds the reins of government.
In 1810 Caracas, in Venezuela, breaking into revolt,
and Buenos Aires shortly after the cortes assem
ble at Cadiz. A constitution is drawn up in 1812,
which, under the impulse of the universal progress of
liberty, abolishes seignorial rights, torture, the inqui
sition^ and most of the convents. It is almost repub
lican in its tenor, too liberal for the place and the
time, and so does not hold; and Spain still labors
under the crushing weight of absolute monarchy.
Fernando, reinstated in 1813, swears to the consti
tution of 1812, intending never to keep it. There
AMERICA DIVORCED. 7
never was a Bourbon who was not a despot. Four
epochs mark his reign : the transient tastes of power
before and after Bonaparte; then to the Anclalusian
revolution of 1820, during which period the Jesuits
are recalled, the party of the liberal constitution pro
scribed, certain notable Spaniards condemned to the
galleys, and the power of the freemasons put forth in
opposition to crown and clergy; the third from 1820
when the Spaniards rebel, and Fernando is forced by
popular clamor to convoke the cortes, call from the
gilleys to the principal portfolios Herreros, Perez de
astro, and the two Argiielles to the fall of Cddiz
and the constitutional government in 1823, a congress
of European powers at Verona having reestablished
the authority of the king, the national militia being
meanwhile organized, the press declared free, and the
inquisition abolished; and lastly, the decade preced
ing the king's death, during which despotism is re
vived, and money matters demoralized, expenses
amounting to 700,000,000 reals per annum to be met
by a revenue of 400,000,000.
But by this time America and Europe are pretty
well separated politically, never again, thank God, to
be united. What with conventionality, bigotry, des
potism, and general decay in many quarters, the New
World can do better alone, and after its own way.
Upon the death of Fernando VII. in 1833, his
daughter Isabel II. being but three years of age,
the child's mother, Cristina, is named regent; but the
late king's brother, Don Carlos, opposes with deso
lating war. With British aid, however, the queen
triumphs in 1840. Still Spain is torn by detestable
strife. Millions of miserable wretches must starve
and bleed over the issue to determine which shall
rule of two of the vilest specimens of the dominating
class ignorance, superstition, deceit, and incestuous,
idiot-breeding marriages can produce. Now and then
the people make a noble stand for their deliverance,
when as often France or England would come with
8 EUEOPE AT THE OPENING OF THE CENTURY.
armies and drive them into base obedience. There
is revolution in 1854, after which a national junta is
established. Isabel is deposed in 1868, and Amadeo,
second son of Victor Emanuel of Italy, is elected
king. After vainly striving to reconcile contending
factions, in 1872 conies the Carlist war, and the fol
lowing year Arnadeo abdicates, when a republic is
proclaimed. The failure of its forces against the
Carlists, however, brings round monarchy again in
the person of Alfonso, Isabel's son, in 1875.
Altogether this Fernando presents one of the most
contemptible characters of history. "The conspirator
of the escurial," he has been called, "the rebel of
Aranjuez; the robber of his father's crown; the worm
squirming at the feet of his enemy at Bayonne; the
captive of Valenay, begging bits of colored ribbon from
Napoleon while his people were pouring out their
blood and gold to give him back his crown; the jailer
of the illustrious statesman to whom he owed the
restoration of that crown; the perjured villain who
spontaneously engaged to be true to the constitution
of 1812, and then conspired to overthrow it the day
after he had sworn ; the promoter of anarchy during
the three years of constitutional government; the in-
voker of the Holy Alliance and the intervention of
France; the author of innumerable proscriptions; the
coarse voluptuary; Ferdinand leaves no memory but
that of a man worthy of our profoundest scorn."
Thus we have seen how at the beginning of the
present century all Europe was at war. The most
intelligent, civilized, and Christian nations of the
earth were hotly engaged in such senseless quarrels
as would make a savage smile; and for lack of any other
method of settlement, like savages they were falling
on each other to kill, burn, or otherwise damage and
destroy as best they were able. France in particular
was pouring out her best blood and treasure at the
caprice of a despot whose paramount aspiration was
THE BLESSINGS OF WAR. 9
self-aggrandizement, and whose exploits were destined
to plunge her in deep abasement. Even the pope
himself about that time had been upon the war-path,
sending out his armies with fire and sword where words
failed, and all greatly to his discomfiture and humili
ation.
To the principle of evil in human affairs mankind
owes much. To war, a great evil, a beastly arbitrament,
but the only ultimate appeal yet found by man with
all his wisdom, America owes much. To the silly
strifes of European powers America owes more than
to any butchering done by her own hands. It was due
to this preoccupation, and to the weakness thence aris
ing, rather than to any extraordinary display of wis
dom, patriotism, or power on the part of the colonists,
English or Spanish, that their independence was
achieved.
There are foolish wars, and there are necessary
wars: foolish sometimes on both sides, always foolish
on one side. Hundreds of wars there have been, and
will be, which leave the combatants, after tearing each
other like wolves for a time, exactly as at the outset.
Resorting to war for freedom or the integrity of the
nation is not the same as war for the arrangement of
differences which after any amount of fighting can only
be settled upon some basis of equity which has to be
determined upon other principles than those of arms.
It is better to fight than to be a slave. It is not well
to fight simply for power or aggrandizement, since
the issue is based on injustice, and is sure to be tran
sient. It is not worth while to fight purely for the
mastery, as it is foreordained that no man shall be
master on this planet.
The United States had finished the war which gave
them their freedom; and were now busy trying to
raise money, frame a constitution, and organize a gov
ernment, while turning an honest penny by furnishing
supplies to the combatants who were still destroying
10 EUROPE AT THE OPENING OF THE CENTURY.
themselves in Europe. When England and France
each pronounced the ports of the other closed against
commerce, and the former persisted in claiming; a risrtit
' L O O
to search American vessels for deserters, the United
States forbid the shipment of American products to
Europe, and declared war against England. After
indulging in some foolish fightingf, uncalled for and
O O O *^ '
resulting in no adequate benefit, though attended with
much misery and loss of life, commissioners met at
Ghent and adjusted their differences, which might
just as well have been done before the war as after.
It has been the fashion, in various quarters, be
cause the northern confederation of states has pros
pered more and reached a higher plane of distinc
tion and power than the united provinces of Mexico,
unduly to extoll the founders of the former, and
ridicule the pretensions to patriotism, intelligence, and
skill on the part of those who fought for the deliv
erance of the latter. It is pleasing to tell stories to
children, and talk among ourselves of the superior
courage and self-denying heroism of those who fought
on our side in the dark days of American revolution,
above those who fought against us; but it is a form
of egotism in which I cannot indulge, unless the
assertions conform to the facts of history, which in
this instance they do not. Fortunately for the repu
tation of our early heroes, their associates and subor
dinates, our history is written by men of our own
nation, primarily to feed our vanity; to accomplish
which purpose that which is damaging to our side-
in so far as is politic and practicable is toned down
or omitted, while that which is damaging on the other
side is emphasized and exaggerated, and vice versa.
If we would know the truth, we should sometimes
look fairly into the character and deeds of some who
were not citizens or soldiers of the United States.
Those who fought for our independence; those who
suffered unrewarded and died unknown, as well as
those whoes names are remembered and honored, and
MODERATION IN SELF-PRAISE. 11
who live to-day in our hearts, deserve all praise. But
that as a class they were superior to their opponents;
that they were so greatly superior to those who fought
for the same object in Mexico, as we have been taught
to believe, is not true. Lecky, with many others,
holds that they have been " very unduly extolled," and
that " the general aspect of the American people dur
ing the contest was far from heroic or sublime;"
while Washington himself writes in 1778 that " idle
ness, dissipation, and extravagance seem to have laid
fast hold of most of them; that speculation, pecula
tion, and an insatiable thirst for riches seem to have
got the better of every other consideration, and al
most every order of men."
Let us then learn to omit some portion of our self-
adulation in speaking of ourselves, some portion of our
spread-eagle and Fourth-of-July buncombe and bom
bast in speaking of our country, to practise a little less
hypocrisy and humbug in our politics, to say nothing
of bribery and other corruption which is quite rank
enough in our republic to-day.
Europe was bad enough, as we have seen, without
any accentuation; monarchies were bad enough, the
chief recommendation of the rulers being that they
made no pretensions to honesty or piety, or rather
made their piety to suit their honesty. And now
with this showing of the influence from which the
people of the New World determined to free them
selves, I will proceed to show how it was done.
CHAPTER II.
ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
1803-1808.
CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION OF INDEPENDENCE ARRIVAL OF THE VICEROY
His ANTECEDENTS AND COMPORTMENT THE VICEREGAL FAMILY SOR-
DIDNESS OF ITURRIGARAY His VISIT TO THE MINES PUBLIC IMPROVE
MENTS INTRODUCTION OF VACCINATION SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY
EFFECT ON THE LAND OWNERS HUMBOLDT'S VISIT INTERNATIONAL
COMPLICATIONS DEMANDS FOR TREASURE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE
UNITED STATES WAR WITH ENGLAND MILITARY PREPARATIONS
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS ABDICATION OF CARLOS IV. ITURRIGARAY'S IN
DIFFERENCE EFFECTS IN MEXICO OF EVENTS IN SPAIN POWER OF THE
INQUISITION ATTITUDE OF THE PRESS SPARKS OF REVOLUTION.
WHEN the subjects of Spain in America awoke to
a realization of their position, they found present no
lack of reason for revolt. Almost every form of op
pression that ever a people had been called to undergo
at the hand of despotism they had suffered. The worst
that had come to England's colonies we find among
the mildest of Mexico's wrongs so mild, indeed, that
they were scarcely felt amidst the others weightier.
Hitherto, they had expected, as a matter of course,
that the king of Spain would make such laws for his
provinces as suited him. He was to his people al
mighty power, differing in degree rather than in es
sence from the power of the almighty, and they had
learned to obey the one as the other. And if at the
first there had been no more than the English colonies
had to complain of such as the interposition of au
thority between the people and laws of their making,
dissolving or forbidding representative bodies, restrict-
(12)
POSITION OF THE CREOLES. 13
ing migration and population, regulating the admin
istration of justice, creating and sustaining unnecessary
officers, keeping among them standing armies, imposing
taxes, interference in commerce, and other likejittb [
J-.hipcypu there might have been to this day no separa
tion from the mother country, except, indeed, it had
been the falling-in-pieces from natural decay. I say
such was the feeling before revolution was thought of;
after the people began to consider, then certain of
these minor wrongs seemed exceedingly exasperating.
But behind all these, if not indeed one with them,
were more serious evils. Looking well into the causes
of Spanish American revolt, we find there the full
catalogue of wrongs and injustice common to political
subordinations of this nature, and in addition some of
the blackest crimes within the power of tyranny to
encompass. What were such matters as duties per
cent, free coming and going, sumptuary regulations,
or even local laws and legislation beside intellectual
slavery, the enforcement of superstition, the subordi
nation of soul, the degradation of both the mental and
spiritual in man!
In regard to material impositions, probably one of
the most outrageous as well as most absurd within
the range of European colonization was that which de
naturalized the son of the Spaniard born in America.
What ridiculous nonsense for reasonable beings to act
upon, not to say believe in, that the blood of him of
pure Spanish parentage who first saw the light under
the clear skies of the New World should thereby be I
politically and socially debased ! Such was the royal : (
edict, and to the end that ajl in Mexico might the
more and forever be bound body and soul to Spain.
Thus while pretending to parental care, the Spanish
monarchs would reduce the colonists to the position
of serfs.
In New Spain the first Creoles 1 were identified
1 The dictionary definition of Creole is a native of Spanish America, born
of European parents, or descended from European ancestors, as distinguished
14 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
with the European Spaniards, and for several suc
ceeding generations the ties of parentage prevailed
over the distinctions of nationality. It has been
claimed that even when these bonds of consanguinity
were loosened by the ever increasing numbers of the
Creole population and the divergence of interests,
union between the two classes was still maintained
as a security against insurrection of the native races.
Indeed, Humboldt assigns this as a reason for the
passive tolerance which the Spanish Americans ex
hibited during a long period of oppression.
But this was not all the reason ; it was not in fact
the chief or true reason. It had become so ingrained
in their nature, the doctrine of loyalty, obedience to
rulers, the divinity of kings, that to repudiate in any
wise this idea was to defy the power of the almighty,
and bring deserved death and the pains of hell. It
was sin against God to disobey the king; and this
rather than fear of uprisings held Mexico so long in
servility. While such a state of things lasted, the
Spaniards in Spain could deprive the Spaniards in
America or rather their descendants of their le^it-
t^
imate political status, and aggrieve their rights with
impunity; but none the less in due time did European
pride and disdain provoke irritation and bitter jeal
ousy. A mutual antipathy was thus gradually de
veloped an antipathy which was fostered by the ac
tion of the home government; for though by theory
and law the privileges of all subjects of the crown
were equal, in practice it was far otherwise.
Three prominent causes of disrupture were ever
actively at w r ork engendering hatred and thirst for
independence. They were, in the inverse order of ef
fect, social jealousies, exclusion from preferments, and
the odious system of commercial monopoly enjoyed
from a resident inhabitant born in Europe, as well as from the offspring of
mixed blood, as of mulatto, born of a negro mother, or of mestizo, born of
an Indian mother. To this definition as regards Creole I adhere; but in re
gard to the word 'mestizo,' I apply it generally to any intermixture of native
American and European blood.
SPANIARDS ALONE SHALL RULE. 15
by the Spaniards. With regard to the first, it is un
necessary to enlarge upon what has been said in the
previous volume; 2 but the question of political, mili
tary, and ecclesiastical preferments requires considera
tion, inasmuch as the exclusion of Creoles from them
is as strenuously denied by the advocates of the Span
ish faction as it is emphatically asserted by those of
the creole class. Although the Spanish American
was eligible to all offices, from the lowest to the vice
regal dignity, the higher were almost exclusively filled
by men from Spain; 3 and in spite of the asseverations
to the contrary, 4 it cannot be denied that promotion
to important positions was practically closed to Amer
ican Spaniards. No stronger evidence can be found
than in the opposition to American representation in
the Spanish government, and the public expressions
of scorn and odium heaped upon the race in the Cadiz
periodicals of that time.
The Spanish rulers were determined that New Spain
should be ruled exclusively by Spaniards, howsoever
the published policy of the nation might be affected
thereby; and their opportunities of obtaining political
2 Hist. Mex., vol. iii. 742-4, this series. See also Cancelada, Tel. Amer.,
146-55.
3 Walton, the author of Present State of the Spanish Colonies, London, 1810,
secretary to the expedition which captured the city of Santo Domingo from
the French, and resident British agent there, in his Expose on the Dimensions
of Spanish America, London, 1814, states, on page 47, 'that on examining au
thentic records, it results: that from the period of the first settlement up to
the year 1810, out of 166 viceroys and 588 captain-generals, governors, and
presidents who have governed in Spanish America, in all 754, only 18 have
been Creoles, and these few merely in consequence of their having been edu
cated in Spain.' Only three viceroys of Mexico down to 1813 were Creoles.
Alaman, Mej., i. 12.
4 Torrente, Hist. Rev. Hispano-Amer., i. 72-4, quotes observations made
by ' un Americano delsur,'who stoutly maintains the generosity 'de una
nacion que fiaba a americanos los Vireinatos, Capitanias generates, Presiden-
cias, Magistraturas, Arzobispados i Opispados;' and gives a list of European
and American officials for the year 1811, in which he shows that 338 were of
the latter class and only 76 of the former. He moreover enumerates the
political, military, and ecclesiastical positions held by the Creoles during the
same year. But I must remark that the appointments conferred upon Creoles
at the commencement of the nineteenth century afford no criterion of the pro-
portion which prevailed during the two preceding centuries. Spain felt her
self compelled to open the doors of promotion in the hope of allaying the
gathering storm. Cancelada, Td. Amer. , 265-73, argues that the Creoles were
more favored than the Spaniards in the matter of appointments.
16 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
preferments being so much greater than those of the
Creoles, they succeeded in securing for themselves all
the higher offices. It is true that the Americans occu
pied most of the subaltern grades, but this only tended
to bring them into more jealous competition with the
Europeans by inspiring them to seek the more impor
tant. Although in the ecclesiastical preferments they
were more favored than in political and military mat
ters, during the last century of the colonial period
they were gradually excluded from the high dignities
of the church; and in 1808 all the bishoprics in New
Spain, with one exception, and most of the rich bene
fices, were held by the European clergy. In the clois
ters also of the regular orders there w r as the same want
of fairness which even the alternative system failed
to correct. Thus it was that as generation after gen
eration passed away, not only in social communications
but in public careers and professions, envy and jeal
ousy became more marked, and finally developed into
a deadly hatred between the two classes.
But after all, and toward the end, though not the
most iniquitous, it was the commercial monopolies
which caused the most wide-spread discontent. The
entire control of trade by Spanish merchants, and
the exorbitant prices charged by them for every com
modity, the grinding restrictions upon such indus
tries as interfered with the commerce of the mother
country, and the limited amount of productions re
ceived by her, were more sweeping in effect, since all
classes suffered, and the poor people the more severely.
A bond of union to a greater or less extent was thus
initiated between the Creoles, mestizos, and native
Indians, all of whom at an early date exhibited incli
nations to acquire independence. The Englishman,
Thomas Gage, who was in Mexico in 1625, correctly
estimated the prevailing sentiment, and in his obser
vations about the disturbances during the administra
tion of Gelves thus prophetically expresses himself:
"The chief actors were found to be the Criolians or
TAXATION, COMMERCE, AND INDUSTRIES. 17
Natives of the Country, who do hate the Spanish
Government, and all such as come from Spain; and
reason they have for it, for by them they are much
oppressed, as I have before observed, and are and will
be always watching any opportunity to free them
selves from the Spanish yoak." 5
But apart from these main causes of discontent,
other aggravations, permanent or periodical, excited
a spirit of antagonism. Excessive taxation galled
and irritated; the venality of officials and the cor
ruptness of the judicial courts caused indignation;
while the expulsion in 1767 of the Jesuits, who had
ingratiated themselves in the hearts of the lower or
ders, insulted the people in their dearest affections.
From that time conspiracy arose and became wide
spread; and the attempt at Apatzingan, prematurely
undertaken, and abortive though it proved, opened
the eyes of the Spanish rulers to the fact that ideas
of independence were abroad in New Spain. The
measures adopted to suppress such wickedness only
added fuel to the fire. Disdaining the further sup
port of the church, the government determined to
rely on military force, and organizing the army on a
much larger scale, humiliated in a variety of ways
the clergy, who thus alienated became a powerful
element in working out the independence.
While the industries of the country were cramped,
the masses were unaware of the extraordinary resources
of New Spain; but when certain restrictions were
removed by the home government, and the war with
England at the close of the eighteenth century almost
annihilated trade with the peninsula, great impulse
was given to the development of internal resources
and commerce with foreign nations. While belief in
the necessity of dependence on Spain w r as thus being
weakened, Humboldt opened their eyes to their re-
5 New Survey, 145. He, moreover, states that the Indians and mulattos
'brooked not the severe and rigorous justice and judgment of the Viceroy,
no, nor any Government that was appointed over them from Spain.' Id., 142.
HIST. HEX., VOL. IV. 2
18 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
sources, and set them further thinking of divorce
ment. Again, the Creoles were more intelligent,
better informed, and far more numerous than the blue-
blooded Spaniards; in view of which we can only
wonder that the people of Mexico remained in such
humiliating subjection so long. The Spaniards in
America and their children were even better educated
than the Spaniards in Spain, and the higher their
station and the more inflated their pride, the more
their minds were filled with prejudice and ignorance.
The establishment of the university at Mexico afforded
facilities to the Creoles superior to any enjoyed by
their fathers, who for the most part, exclusive of those
holding high positions, were of inferior birth and
breeding, and without title to the superiority claimed.
Students and graduates in Mexico by no means con
fined themselves to the narrow curriculum prescribed
by the university, and the prohibited works of French
philosophers, of political and moral writers, and espe
cially of Rousseau, found their way of late into the
country. Proletarian principles, and the detestation
of oppression which they breathed, were absorbed
with avidity, and stimulated the longing for free
dom. The very danger incurred by the study of
these books, and the secrecy with which of necessity
they were perused, only served to intensify insurrec
tionary ideas and provoke conspiracy. 6 The liberal
principles thus acquired by the educated class were
gradually infused into the ignorant.
Nevertheless, it seems a little strange to us, to whom
the doctrine of right of revolution has become so clear,
and so cherished as the highest prerogative of liberty,
that it should have made its way so slowly among an
educated and intelligent people. But the cause is
6 It was the special province of the inquisition to guard against the im
portation of books. As late as 1807, a Mexican named Jos< Roxas was de
nounced by his own mother for having a volume of Rousseau in his possession,
and was confined for several years in the dungeons of the holy office. He
finally made his escape, but died in 1811 at New Orleans. Ward's Mex., i.
110.
RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL LIBERTY. 19
explained when we remember the powerful hold re
ligion yet had upon these people. The first step
toward freedom is to emancipate the mind from some
of its superstitions. There can be no political liberty
without some degree of religious liberty. It was
primarily for religious liberty that the puritans had
come from England to America; and the first step
thus taken toward political liberty, they were prepared.
to throw off the yoke for slighter cause than were the
people of Mexico, who were satisfied with their relig
ion, and had no desire to change it. Thus while their
religion, still the strongest sentiment possessing them,
constrained them to loyalty, they were ready to en
dure much by way of duty, and to escape damnation
so much that it was rather Spain's weakness than
Mexico's strength that secured independence, as we
shall in due time see.
But gradually reason, long dormant if not dethroned,
began to show signs of vitality, first in other quarters,
and finally in Mexico. It was a period of political
turnings and over-turnings in Europe and America,
and it were a pity if Mexico, ground into the very
dust by the iron heel of despotism, should not find
some relief.
The downfall of monarchy in France, and the in
dependence of the British colonies in North America,
had established precedents of the successful uprising of
peoples against the oppression of rulers. More espe
cially was the acquisition of freedom by the United
States regarded as a solution of the difficulty in re
gard to the right of revolution, as Spain in 1783 had
somewhat imprudently recognized the independence
of the English colonies, thereby tacitly excusing re
volt in her own. 7
7 The reader is already aware that the conde do Aranda at this time pro
posed to Cdrlos III. the independence of the Spanish colonies in Amer
ica. See Hist. Mex., iii. 388-90. Dr Luis Quixano, a prominent leader of
the revolution in Quito, made prisoner when Toribio Montes entered that
city, deemed it advisable to retract his views on the right of a colony to as
sert its independence. He based his reconstructed argument on the principle
that what is useful and convenient is not necessarily lawful and just. His ex-
20 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
While the proclivities of the people were thus be
coming daily more dangerous, their anger was still fur
ther aroused by one of those acts of tyranny which
Spain periodically committed in order to raise money in
the colonies to meet home expenses. I refer to the se
questration of the funds of the benevolent institu
tions, a measure which seriously affected the welfare of
almost every land owner in the country. As the
particulars of this proceeding will be given later, it is
only necessary to state here that numbers of families
were ruined or impoverished by its operation. Thus
Spain kept on using the goad. It is, however, a ques
tion how long the Creoles would have suffered had
not political affairs in Spain, as we have seen, afforded
an exceptional opportunity for throwing off the yoke.
For nearly two centuries the watchfulness of the gov
ernment had prevented serious outbreak; even during
the war of succession the tranquillity of New Spain
was undisturbed. The majesty of the king was so
deeply impressed upon the masses that it is probable,
had it not been for the occupation of Spain by Na
poleon, a few salutary reforms would have secured
the loyalty of Mexico. But when two Spanish mon-
archs in succession, Carlos IV. and Fernando VII.,
were compelled to lay aside their crowns, the one in
obedience to the will of a mob and the other at the
dictation of a foreign parvenu, the glory of the Span
ish throne had departed, and the awe with which the
greatest earthly potentate had been venerated by his
transatlantic subjects was seriously lessened.
Nevertheless, when in 1808 the Spaniards rose
against the French invaders, the demonstrations of
feeling throughout New Spain showed patriotism on
the part of the Creoles, though perhaps as much by
ceedingly defective logic went no further, however, than to show that an op
pressed colony has no more right to free itself from the mother country than
has a slave to acquire freedom without the consent of his owner! 'Annque a
un esclavo le sea litil gozar de su libertad, el no se la puede tomar por si mis mo
contra la voluntad de su amo.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. Indep., v.
MISRULE IN NEW SPAIN. 21
reason of hatred for the French as of any lingering
affection for the Spaniards; and this, notwithstand
ing that the American deputies to the Spanish
cortes, in their address on the 1st of August, 1811,
represented that the Spaniards of America were so
closely connected with the peninsula by the ties of
interest and relationship, that leading men among
them proclaimed the doctrine that the colonies ought
to follow the fate of Spain, even if she succumbed to
the power of Napoleon. 8 Some go so far as to at
tribute outright the outbreak of the revolution to
the fear of subjection to the French. 9 Be this as it
may, the repeated defeats of the Spanish arms during
the following year, the incompetency of the junta
central in the peninsula, and still more its popular
origin, destroyed any favorable impression which
might have been created in the discontented ranks,
and afforded an example to them of delegates, elected
by the people, investing themselves with the supreme
government. Thus revolutionary impressions became
yet more strongly confirmed; for the Creoles could not
recognize the right of a mob-appointed government
claiming obedience from the subjects of a mighty mon
arch v.
t/
And during this period, so critical to the existence
of Spain's future hold upon the colonies, there was no
viceroy in Mexico capable of appreciating the true
condition of affairs; none who had the ability either
to avert revolution or best serve Spain in accepting
the situation. The incompetency and vacillation of
the next three viceroys hastened the culmination of
events, and during the years 1809 and 1810, the con
spiracy to throw off the yoke of Spain spread fast and
far throughout the land. It was on the 15th of Sep-
8 Such a course would certainly relieve them from the persecution of Spain,
though neither covert irony nor hibernicism were intended. ' Muchos de los
mismos gefes y otros Europeos proi'erian d las claras, que la America debia
seguir la suerte de la Peninsula,- y obedecer d, Bonaparte, si ella le obedecia. '
JHpntac. Amer. Represent., 1 de Agosto de 1811, 6.
9 Id., 8; Guerra, Hint. Rev. N. Esp., i. 138.
22 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
tember of the year last named that the strife began,
and which was marked by reprisals as vindictive and
cold-blooded as the annals of any Christian nation can
record, as we shall see. 10 With these preliminary re
marks on the political attitudes of the two classes,
and on the origin of their divergence, I now proceed
to narrate the historical events which preceded the
final rupture.
The fifty-sixth viceroy of Mexico, Jose de Iturri-
garay, arrived with his family at Guadalupe, and took
charge of the government on the 4th of January,
1803. He held the rank of lieutenant-general in the
royal army, as had nearly all those who filled this
office during the rule of the house of Bourbon in
Spain. A veteran soldier and sexagenarian, he still
retained a youthful energy and vigor. 11
Iturrigaray was a native of Cadiz, descending from
a genteel but not illustrious family. With an honor-
able record in the Spanish militia, he had served with
some distinction as a colonel of carabineers in the cam
paign of Roussillon, at the beginning of the French
revolution in 1792. His reputation, however, as a
military commander was not of the best; 12 and his
elevation to the viceregal office was due to the favor
of Godoy, the Prince of Peace, who still maintained
influence over the weak and incompetent king. 13
His reception at Guadalupe and in the capital was,
The same causes were at work in all the Spanish colonies in America;
and it is significant to note the unanimity of the feeling entertained everywhere
by the Creoles, as well as the synchronism of their start for the goal of free
dom. In this same year five revolutions broke out in South America: that,
of Caracas on April 19, 1810; that of Buenos Aires on the 25th of May fol
lowing; that of New Granada on the 3d of July; that of Bogota on the 20th
of the same month; that of Cartagena on the 18th of August; and that of
Chile on the 18th of September. Diputac. Amer. Rep. y 181 1, 2-3.
11 As a Mexican writer says, 'Con el arrebatamiento y fuego de un franco's
atolondrado. ' Medidas, Pad/., MS., 57.
12 'Hombre de una mediana reputacion militar en su patria.' Ellndicador,
111. 215. Compare also Dispositions Farias, i. 120; Bmtamante, Caad. Hist.,
i. 10-11; Ratzd, Aus. Mex., 344-5; Gazcla Mvx., xi. 222-3.
; 'No fuel-on estos me~ritos los que lo elevaron al vireinato, sino el favor
deD. Manuel Godoy.' Ataman, Hist. Mcj., i. 40. Tavorecido del principe
de la Paz.' El Indkador, iii. 215.
THE VICEREGAL FAMILY. 23
unlike that of Marquina, most flattering and obse
quious. The festivities, begun in the former place,
were continued in the latter with the customary pro
cessions and bull-fights. This unchecked privilege of
the populace, in such agreeable contrast with the un
welcome prohibitions of the former viceory, combined
with the gracious deportment of Iturrigaray and the
affable demeanor of his stately spouse, gained him at
once the favor of the people. Erelong, however, it
was discovered that his condescension was but a cloak
to less worthy traits of character. 14 Branciforte's cor
ruption was barefaced; dissimulation under a fasci
nating exterior was the prominent feature in Iturri
garay 's character. 15
The family of the viceroy consisted of his wife,
Dona Ines de Jauregui y Aristegui, who although
no longer young possessed many attractions, a grown
up son, several younger children, and a numerous
train of relatives, all bent on amassing fortunes.
This was also the dominating passion of Iturrigaray,
whose first act on taking charge of the government
was to defraud the crown. Following the example of
Branciforte, he had obtained a royal decree before his
departure from the peninsula, permitting him to in
troduce free of duty into New Spain unfinished fam
ily apparel. 16 Under this pretence he landed a cargo
of merchandise at Vera Cruz, which he sold in that
port, netting an enormous profit. 17 Moreover, he at
once began a system of sale of offices and employments
on his own account, and by an abominable venality
established for his benefit an impost on quicksilver,
11 The character of Iturrigaray was ' estremaclamente popular.' Zavala,
Rev. Mex., 30. The populace was 'complacida con el trato afable y popular
de la Vireina, senora de regular figura, y de un comportamiento airoso y
galan. ' C'avo, Tres Siglos, iii. 200.
15 'Su caracter estremadamente popular disimulabasus sordidas ganancias.'
Zavala, Rev. Alex., 30; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 47.
1G According to Real Ordcn, Sept. 12, 1802.
17 The sale amounted to 119,125 pesos, as attested by Rcl., Real Acuerdo,
Nov. 9, 1808, in Arch. Gen'l Mex. This fraud was the first of many serious
charges proven against him in his residencia, of which an account will be
given later.
24 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
by which he unjustly secured to himself large sums
from the sales of that metal. 18
Other frauds were perpetrated in contracts for
paper used in the government cigar manufactories,
the contractors charging fictitious prices and paying a
bonus to Dona Ines. 19 The administration of Iturri-
garay was modelled after that of his protector, Godoy,
and it was believed that the king's favorite shared in
the profits.
Sumptuous entertainments, presided over by Dona
Ines, were given at the palace, with the twofold ob
ject of pleasure and profit. Thither assembled grave
oidores, hypocritical inquisitors, venerable prelates,
and members of the most distinguished families, who,
to win the good favor of their viceregal hostess, vied
with one another in their efforts to please, and in the
costliness of their gifts. 20
Marquina never gained the affection of the people,
because of his restrictions on all kinds of excesses.
Iturrigaray would try the opposite course, and make
the capital the centre of pleasure and dissipation.
To the discredit caused by the venality of the father
were added the profligacy and vulgar passion for play
of his son Jose, who was a constant visitor to the
18 He received generally a gold ounce per quintal of quicksilver delivered.
Represent. Mm. Gnan., in Cancelada, Conducta Iturr., 92-5. Alaman states
that the traffic in offices was managed through one of the vice-queen's maids,
an^ elderly person, named Joaquina Aranguren, wife of Gabriel Palacios.
Hist. Mej., i. 47. Some few miners, with whom a secret compact was made,
were greatly favored, while the majority suffered for want of mercury, result
ing in immense profits to the viceroy. These frauds are given in detail with
attestation, in Uepresentacion, Dip. Mm. Guan., Oct. 31, 1808. Compare also
Cancelada, Conducta, Iturrigaray, 92-5; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. app. 43-4.
19 SSe justifica el robo que hizo al rei argandole un peso mas en cada resma,
con las cuentas misrnas de los que lo vendieron, que existen en autos de
infidencia/ Cancelada, Conducta, 11. This author also charges Iturrigaray
with shipping surreptitiously many millions of treasure out of the country, in
English and neutral ships. This was the popular belief, but no proofs were
brought forward. Id., 11-12. From the two contracts of 1806 and 1807 the
viceroy's wife received 6,633 ounces of gold. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 47. Con
sult also Hernandez ?/ Ddvalos, Col. Doc. Indep., i. 643-4.
;0 'Hacia descender la corte hasta sobre el teatro, 6 subia el teatro d la
corte por la aficion que tenia d esta clase de diversiones. La conducta de la
de Madrid bajo Maria Luisa, era el ejemplo que se seguia.' Zarala, llev.
Mcx., 30; Ellndicador, iii. 216-17.
GUANAJUATO MINES. 25
cock-pit. 21 Sucli conduct on the part of the viceroy
and his family, though fascinating at first, could not
fail to produce the same effect as the over-scrupulous
proceeding of his predecessor; the halo of royalty
which had protected viceregal authority for centuries
was dimmed, and the respect formerly offered to Casa-
fuerte, Revilla Gigedo, and others was now with
held. 22
All the same the viceroy managed to accumulate a
large fortune, consisting of coin, jewels, and plate, 23
which was a great comfort, and this notwithstanding
his extravagance and the enormous expenses of his
court, which far exceeded his salary of sixty thou
sand pesos. 24
The desire to visit the rich mines of Guanajuato
was obviously natural; he wished to see whence came
the wealth he coveted. 25 Without precedent in this
respect, and without royal permission, Iturrigaray set
out on this journey by way of Queretaro, Celaya,
Salamanca, and Irapuato. The inhabitants of these
regions, who had never Beheld a viceroy, were over
awed by the magnificence of his appearance, and
thousands assembled to pay their respects. His
arrival at the city of Guanajuato was celebrated by a
triumphal procession and festivities. Among the
presents graciously accepted by him was one of a
thousand ounces of gold, upon the occasion of his
inspection of the Ray as and Valenciana mines.
Mining operators soon discovered how to gain the
21 ' La inclinacion de aquel al juego de gallos, concurriendo d la plaza
piiblica en que se lidian.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 48.
22 The avarice of this vicergal family was one of the chief causes of their
downfall. Dispositions Varias, i. 120; Bustamante, Medidas, MS., 57; Id.,
Cuarl. Hist., L 10-11; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 46-9; Mora, Rev. Mex., iii.
296-350.
"And 400,000 pesos invested in the funds of the mining institute, the
safest place of investment at the time. Further on, after the removal of the
viceroy, an account of the treasures found in the palace will be given.
a4 According to the subsequent declaration under oath of his mayordomo,
Antonio Paul. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 48.
25 ' En la larga serie de los vireyes que tuvo Nueva Espana, 6ste fiie* el
iinico que conocio una parte del interior del reino.' Negrete, Mex. en Siglo
XIX., i. 49.
23 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
favor of this great man. 23 In return for homage re
ceived, Iturrigaray magnificently granted the town
of Celaya the privilege to celebrate occasional bull
fights to defray the expenses of a bridge over the
Laja. 27
In the matter of material improvements, we find
little during this administration not started under
former viceroys. There was the completion of two
roads to Vera Cruz; one of them, passing through
Orizaba and Cordova, begun by Branciforte, was in
charge of the consulado. Credit, however, must be
given Iturrigaray for his exertions to secure the cap
ital against inundation. To inspire zeal, he deigned
occasionally to labor on the works with his own hands,
and by his care the city was saved from inundation in
1806. Yet this praiseworthy caprice eventually gained
for him the enmity of the fiscal de lo civil, Zagarzurieta,
as well as of Aguirre and the other oidores. Funds
being required to carry on the works, Iturrigaray in
creased the impost on cattle, and to this Zagarzurieta
raised objections, to which the viceroy would not listen ;
because, he said, Zagarzurieta was connected with the
family of the greatest cattle-dealer in the country, and
therefore was not disinterested. 28
Existing literary and benevolent institutions were
favored to some extent, not, however, in a manner
sufficiently effective to reflect unusual credit on the
viceroy. Mining, internal commerce, and agriculture
26 'A poco tiempo se advirtib que no le era desagraclable recibir dones y
regalos, y sucesivamente cantidades de dinero y alhajas por las provisiones
que se llamaban de gracia.' Cancdada, Conducta, Iturrigaray, 10. See also
Pena, Arenga Civic., 19-20. It is gratifying to us to learn from Bustamante,
in Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 204, that 'the presents then received by the viceroy
relieved partly the great necessities in which he stood.'
27 In connection with bull-fig lits, Bustamante takes occasion to slur Mar-
quina, congratulating the people that the government had passed into the
hands of a man 'accesible, jovial y divertido,' from the 'ttitrico y adusto de
un hombre anciano, que merecia estar en una porteria de capuchinos.' Cavo,
Tres Siglos, iii. 201.
28 ' Porquo su hija estd casada con el primogenito del Marque's de S. Miguel
de Aguayo, que es el primer ganadero y de los principales abastecedores de
Mexico.' /</., 244-5.
VACCIXATIOX. 27
continued to prosper, owing to the efficient measures
of his predecessors. An important event during this
period, which marked a new era in medical science,
but iu which Iturrigaray merely complied with the
royal orders, was the introduction of vaccination into
New Spain. 29 In the course of this history the ter
rible ravages of small-pox at different periods have
been dwelt upon. Tenner's discovery, after having
met with long opposition on the part of the medical
faculty, finally overcame the prejudices of the age.
In 1801 its value was recognized by the government
of Spain, and its introduction in America intrusted
to Alejandro Arboleya, professor of medicine, who
came over with Iturrigaray. His method of preserv
ing vaccine matter, however, was defective, and its
application was not successful till two years later,
when the home government sent out a special com
mission of medical men under Francisco Javier do
Balmis. 80 They arrived at Vera Cruz in July 1804.
Some months previously Iturrigaray had imported
vaccine matter from Habapa, but found the prejudice
against it so strong that only ten soldiers could be
induced to use it. After the arrival of Balmis, how
ever, the remedy was soon introduced throughout
the country, when of course the horrors of smallpox
were greatly diminished. 31
29 Jenner, the discoverer, was a native of Berkeley, England ; he was born
May 17, 1749, and died January 24, 1823. For his biography, see the excel
lent work of Dr Baron, of Gloucester, 2 vols., 1827, 1838.
30 He was honorary physician to the king and honorary counsellor of the
treasury. The other members of the expedition were Antonio Gutierrez,
professor of medicine and surgery, Angel Crespo, secretary of the commis
sion, Francisco and Antonio Pastor, Pedro Ortega, Dona Isabel Cendal, and
lastly, 26 infants from a foundling-house, on whose bodies vaccine matter was
preserved during the voyage. Lerdo de Tfjada, Apunt. Hist., pt v. 342-4.
This author received the particulars from two members, Gutierrez and
Crespo. See also Ilumboldt, Essai Pol. The first child vaccinated was that
of the viceroy. Alaman, l)isert., iii. app. 87; Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 207;
lilvcra, Gob. de Alex, i., 522; Zamacoi*, Hist. Mcf., vi. 15.
al Balmis extended his labors to Manila. Some of the commission went
to South America, and one to Guatamala. The historical infants were
reared at the expense of the government, and finally adopted by respectable
families. Lerdo de Tejada, Apunt. Hist., pt v. 344; Cavo y Tres Stylos, iii.
207.
28 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
During this period great increase of material wealth
is noticeable. After the last peace with England,
Spanish commerce revived; in 1805 one hundred and
fifty thousand quintals of quicksilver were transported
from Vera Cruz to Mexico for the mines, and during
the same year more than twenty-seven millions of
pesos were coined at the mint. But this epoch of
opulence was soon to be terminated by fatal disasters,
marked by bloodshed and ruin. A series of calami
ties, caused by foreign convulsions and misrule at
home, was approaching Spain.
The Spanish government, involved under Godoy's
rule in political difficulties, corruption, and extrava
gance, and harassed by the exorbitant demands of
Napoleon, brought fresh discontent to the colonies by
the adoption of a new method to draw from them the
necessary funds to save the mother country from ruin.
Spain's plight was desperate, and desperate must be
the remedy, if, indeed, there was any. And woe in
consequence must fall on Mexico!
It was decreed by royal order of December 26,
1804, to sequestrate all the real estate belonging
to benevolent institutions, 32 chiefly under control of
the clergy, including the sums, by far the greater
part of their wealth, invested by them as loans on city
and rural property, the mortgages on which had lapsed.
The amounts collected were to be appropriated by the
crown for the amortization of government bonds, the
obligation being recognized by the payment of inter
est. 83 Though in Spain similar measures had been
adopted, 34 the attendant circumstances were different
from those in Mexico. In the Old World most of the
church property consisted of real estate, which being
sold, the clergy received a perpetual income from the
32 Obras pias, or funclaciones piadosas.
33 The sums were to be applied to the 'Caja de consolidacion de vales
reales,' with interest to the respective benevolent institutions at 3 per cent,
payable from the royal revenues. Cedulario, MS., i. 179-97.
34 According to Heal Cedufa, Oct. 15, ISOo, the amount of ecclesiastical
property permitted by the pope to be sold under bull of June 14th of the
same year was such as to yield in interest 020,000.
FORCED LOANS. 29
government equal to the interest on the capital rep
resented, while the purchasers were obliged to con
tribute to the royal treasury by the payment of taxes.
Throughout New Spain the accumulation and in
vestments of the funds of these institutions had be
come enormous. There was scarcely a land owner,
great or small, whose estate was not hypothecated to
one or another of the benevolent institutions. 35 The
loan once effected, restitution of the capital was not
demanded as long as the interest was punctually paid;
nor did the debtors ever prepare for such an event,
although most of the mortgages had lapsed. 36 The
sudden demand for the payment of these sums carried
consternation throughout the country, and brought
ruin on many proprietors. For all to raise money
on short notice was impossible; so the sale of the
property had to be forced not alone what belonged
directly to the church, but that of the farmer, the
merchant, the miner, and the mechanic. Thereby all
industries suffered, while in the end the crown was no
gainer, since the ruin of property holders cut down
the revenue.
The execution of the decree was intrusted to a
junta presided over by the viceroy, and composed of
the principal civil and ecclesiastic authorities, and of
special commissioners appointed by the crown. 37 In
order to stimulate the zeal of these functionaries, and
to make the sequestration more productive, they
were allowed a percentage of the sales. 38 Such an
incentive with such men as Iturrigaray left little hope
35 The value of the real estate and the funds so invested of the obras pias
in New Spain amounted in 1804 to $44,500,000. Humloldt, Essai Pol., ii.
476. In Soc. Mex. Geog. Boletm, ii. 3.3-6, the most moderate calculation of
the value is, in the archbishopric of Mexico $20,000,000, and in the eight
bishoprics, $30,000,000.
30 These- loans, made for the term of nine years, were at the expiration suf
fered to continue in force at the option of the contracting parties. See Ala-
man, Hist. Mej., i. 138.
37 'Qui porte le titre de Junta superior de Real Hacienda.' Iluniboldt,
Ewai Pol., ii. 476.
38 See the royal order in Cedulario, MS., i. 179-97; also Humboldt. Essai
Pol, ii. 47G-7; Alaman, IJixt. Mcj., i. 139; Not. de N. Esp., in Soc. Mex.
Geofj. Boletin, ii. 35-6; Zamacois, Hist. Mcj., vi. 16-19.
30 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
for the people; and great was the clamor among all
classes, especially the clergy, who were far from satis
fied with this enforced investment. 39
Formal protests were made by many, 40 and the per
nicious effect of the measure was duly set forth; but
no notice was taken of this action by the authorities.
To make matters worse, Iturrigaray received orders
from Spain that while steps were being taken to ac
complish the sequestration, all funds belonging to cor
porations and communities, deposits of Indian tributes,
the treasures lodged in sacred shrines, and even
moneys designed to ransom prisoners should be ap
propriated. "Peace has been preserved at the cost
of millions!" was the cry; "so pay! pay!" But the
clay was fast approaching when Spain's peace would be
of small moment to Mexico. Never had royal license
to fleece the colonists been more barefaced ; never had
the robbery of a people by their rulers been more
merciless or infamous. And after all, only about ten.
millions of pesos were secured, when in 1809 the
order was rescinded. 41 Of this sum twenty-four mill
ion francs were delivered to Napoleon in May 1806,
by Eugenio Izquierdo, Godoy's special agent at Paris, 42
after a large amount had gone as commissions to royal
officials in Mexico. 43
39 ' La resistance fut si forte de la part des proprie" taires, que depuis le
mois de Mai 1805 jusqu'au mois de Juin 1806, la caisse d'amortissement ne
percevoit que la somme modique.de 1,200,000 piastres.' Humboldt, Essai Pol.,
ii. 477.
"'One by the merchants and laborers of Michoacan, under the direction
of Abad y Queipo, afterward bishop elect; and another by the mining board,
headed by Miguel Dominguez, corregidor of Quertitaro, for which presump
tion he was removed from office by the viceroy. Bustamante, in Cavo, Trcs
Stylos, iii. 222-3.
41 'Toda esta trapala,' says a marginal note on the c^dula in Cedulario,
MS., i. 179-97, 'del malvado Godoy, Soler, y sus sequaces se suspemlio p r
R 1 Ord n ...de 26 de En de 1809, pero ya no remedio los estragos incal-
culables y desastrosos que aquellos malvados y sus sequaces hicieron, con
esta infame trapala, sin el mas minimo provecho del erario. ' See also Hum
boldt, Essai Pol., ii. 476-7.
42 Toreno, Hist. Rev. Esp.,tom i. lib. ii. 12.
43 The sum produced by the sequestrations, according to Cancdada, Tel.
Mex., 29, was $10,509,537. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 140, and Bustamante. in
Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 250, give $10,656,000. 8oc. Mex. Geocj. Boletin,' ii.
35-6, gives productos $10,507,957, and reditos $524,904 pesos. Of the com-
MORE MONEY REQUIRED. 31
The merciless rigor with which the viceroy executed
every oppressive decree, and the irritating fact that
he and a host of officials profited by the ruin of others,
gained him the odium of the sufferers. Any discus
sions of a scientific or practical nature on the part of
her subjects was at this juncture bad for Spain. Per
mission had been granted Humboldt by the court to
visit the New World, with the privilege of access to
official archives. The result of his sojourn in Mexico
was his famous treatise on New Spain, 44 containing
abstracts of his political and economical observations.
Some new ideas crept in upon the people concerning
possibilities. With freedom, what might they not
achieve! Such was the prevailing feeling which, min
gled with the odium against the home government,
increased by late acts of oppression, prepared Creoles
and natives alike for revolution. 45
When Carlos IV. ratified the humiliating treaty of
1796, which made him a subject rather than an ally
of France, he considered neither the money he would
have to pay, nor what would be the attitude of Eng
land. To annoy Napoleon, Great Britain offered the
means of prolonging the war which broke out in 1803,
while Spain, asserting her obligations to pay France
former subsidies, maintained that she would be sub
ject to far greater expense in case of further hostili
ties. This led to rupture with England; for though
that power at first manifested no desire to declare
open war with Spain, in 1805 neutrality was broken
missions known to have been paid to officials, who at the same time drew
large salaries, the diputado principal Arrangoiz received $124,000; Iturri-
garay, $72,000; the archbishop Lizana, who, according to Bustamante, was
not a favorite with the Mexicans since his arrival in December 1803, $22,00,0;
ministers of the treasury, $50,000; the secretary, $40,000; and so on to the
amount of half a million. Cancelada hurls invectives against all connected
with this wholesale robbery.
il Essai Politique sur le Royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne, Paris, 1811. For
biographical notice, see Hist. Mcx., iii. 513, this series.
45 'Este proyecto fud, sin duda, la primera Jornada de los desastres de la
America la, insurreccion fue" la segunda.' Marginal note on royal cedilla, in
Cedulario, MS., i. 179-97.
32 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
by the seizure by Nelson of four treasure-laden ships
bound from America to Cadiz. 46
And now commerce again wanes, being carried on
in neutral vessels only, while free intercourse with
Spain is greatly interrupted. Moreover, besides be
ing pressed by Napoleon for prompt compliance with
the treaty of 1796, Spain is beset with calamities.
Famine and pestilence are decimating her population;
earthquakes destroy several towns in Andalusia ; debts
are enormous, and the exchequer empty; and lastly,
England has lately seized her treasure-ships, and will
probably capture others. More and more urgent,
therefore, are the appeals to the viceroy for Mexican
silver and gold.
Iturrigaray seems in every respect equal to the
emergency. The colonists are made to bleed. From
corporations, from the clergy, and from private indi
viduals, thirteen millions of dollars are secured at
this juncture, and shipped in four frigates, some five
millions more being retained for later transportation.
To make up this amount, he has not only seized any
deposits, however sacred, he could lay his hands on,
and forced money from the poor, but he has resorted
to a swindling system of lotteries. 47 It is true that in
the matter of forced loans promises to pay are made,
and a small annual interest promised. 48
The French just now are as much feared in New
Spain as the English. French ships anchored at
Yera Cruz are jealously watched by the viceroy, who
refuses to furnish supplies to French troops stationed
at Santo Domingo.
Difficulties, moreover, threaten with the United
46 The vessels were seized in reprisal for the assistance alleged by England
to have been rendered by Spain to France during the war; more subsidies
having been paid the latter than those stipulated for in the treaty of 1796.
Bustcimante, in Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 209.
47 See Gaz. de Mex., from 1804 to 1810, passim.
48 The viceroy was admonished, however, to come to some understanding
with the archbishop and bishop, so as not to impede the process by preju
dicial disputes with the clergy. This accounts for the $22,000 commissions
to Lizana. See Cancelada, Tel. Mex., 29.
THREATENING DANGERS. 33
States. In 1801 Philip Nolan makes an incursion
into Mexican territory as far as Nuevo Santander,
under the pretext of purchasing horses, and erects
some small forts. He is, however, attacked on the 21st
of March by a force sent against him by the viceroy,
and slain, his followers being dispersed or made pris
oners. A few years later Burr attempts the invasion
of Texas. During this period the first cloud arises
between the United States and Mexico on the ques
tion of limits. Monroe's efforts at Madrid to arrange
an amicable settlement are fruitless, and the Amer
ican government orders troops to her southern fron
tier. 49
Having thus the United States to watch, the long
coast lines to guard against the English, and the ever-
present pirates to beat off, Iturrigaray is like a hyena
at bay. It is no easy matter amidst the dissatisfaction
attending the royal robberies to enlist the colonists to
fight. Of what avail is this pouring-out of their treas
ure if the old mother cannot protect them from her
enemies?
It is in 1805 when the news of this rupture of Spain
with England reaches Mexico, and spreads consterna
tion among the people. Besides orders to prepare for
49 Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 145-6. In 1805 James Monroe, U. S. minister at
London, and Mr Pinckney, minister at Madrid, failed to agree with the Prince
of Peace as to the limits of Louisiana, Texas, and Florida; the relations be
tween the two countries assumed a delicate nature, and Monroe asked for his
passport and returned to London. Consult Amer. State Pap., xii. 1-327; ii.
596-695, 798-804. On the feeling at this time in New Spain against the
United States, I quote from the irascible Bustamante, who, in connection with
the viceroy's military prepai-ations, thus gives vent to his ire: ' Esta nacion,
si puede darsele tal nombre a un erijambre espesisimo de aventureros, emigra-
dos de la Europa por la miseria 6 por sus crimenes, presenta la anomalia mas
extraiia y ridicula en la historia.' 'She proclaimed,' the author continues,
' the freedom of nations; developed the theories of Rousseau's social contract,
which was followed by France and cost torrents of blood,' winding up with a
pious exhortation against American slave-holders. See Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii.
217-1 8. Rivera, Gobernantes, i. 525-6, limits himself to stamping the claims of
the U. S. against New Spain as 'el colmo de la injusticia y de exhorbitantes
pretensiones, hijas de la ambicion . . . inicua . . . absurda.' Of what the Spanish
population in Mexico consisted at the time, a contemporary of Bustamante
gives, us an idea in El Indicador, iii. 216-17: 'Unos hombres semi-salvages,
como los espanoles avecindados en el pais, que nacidos los mas en su patria,
en una condicion muy obscura, apenas habian podido medio civilizarse eu
Nueva Espaiia '
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 3
34 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
defence, the viceroy is told to furnish Habana, Puerto
Rico, and other exposed points with the necessary
supplies. He is moreover authorized to increase the
permanent forces by enlisting natives for service on
the frontier, the veteran troops not being sufficient
for that purpose. Two Spanish regiments stationed
in Cuba are also ordered to Mexico.
But the viceroy is more clever than his master.
Notwithstanding the many difficulties in the organi
zation of troops, he soon has nearly 18,000 men at
his command. 50 Recruiting offices are established
throughout the country; deserters are pardoned; the
old militia, scattered or disbanded, are reunited and
increased in number. The defences of San Juan de
Ulua, where Lieutenant-colonel Juan Maria Soto is
in command, are improved. To discipline the troops
a camp is established at Jalapa. Command of the
army is given to Garcia Davila, governor of Vera
Cruz, efficient and experienced. Indeed, he is the
only officer of rank in New Spain competent to fill
the place. There are two other generals, Pedro Ruiz
Davalos and Pedro Garibay, but both octogenarians
and subject to consequent infirmities.
The troops are exercised and drilled under the eye
of the viceroy. There are reviews and manoeuvres
which awaken a military spirit in the Mexicans, who
have never before witnessed spectacles of the kind. 51
In 1806 intelligence of two events is received
which spreads alarm throughout the country the
destruction of the combined Spanish and French
50 Bustamante says 1 8,000 well disciplined troops. Medidas para la Pacif. ,
MS., 58. Queipo, in Pap. Far., 164, no. i., states that there were stationed
in the canton of Jalapa, serving under the viceroy's orders, 11,000 men, and
that there were 6,000 more elsewhere ready to march when called upon.
Alaman gives the number as ' cosa de catorce mil hombres' in the year 1800.
Hist. Mej., i. 146.
61 Mex. Mem. Guerra, 10. On October 14, 1805, the spectacle of troops
being landed and engaging in sham-fight with the enemy was witnessed by
the inhabitants of Vera Cruz, the viceroy displaying great enthusiasm, taking
part in the exhibition. 'No pudo el ingenio militar de Su Escia olvidar su
aficion, y montando a caballo mando por esquadrones varies rnovimientos de
exercicio a los lanceros.' Diario de Mex., i. 92.
PRIXCE OF PEACE. 35
fleets at Trafalgar by Lord Nelson on the 21st of
October, 1805, 52 and the attack on Buenos Aires by
the English. It is thought that an attempt will
presently be made on New Spain. Iturrigaray's
friends begin to fall off. Several officers of high
rank and merit withdraw from the encampment at
Jalapa, among others Count Alcaraz, of the Spanish
dragoons, Manuel Garcia Alonso, Manuel Garcia
Queritana, and Lejarza, all commanders of high stand
ing. He who becomes the most determined enemy,
however, is the ex-corregidor of Queretaro, Miguel
Dominguez. 53
Meanwhile the star of Godoy, the scourge of Spain,
is still in the ascendant. He puts on the titles
of royalty, and holds compiunion with Napoleon, if
indeed he does not conspire to sell Spain. At one
time, all the strongholds of the peninsula being occu
pied by French, Godoy advises the king to take his
family to Mexico. The court is at Aranjuez, and the
intended flight becoming known, the populace rise and
cry vengeance on Godoy. The tumult is only allayed
by the abdication of Carlos in favor of the prince of
Asturias, who assumes the crown as Fernando VII.
on the 19th of March, 1808. Godoy escapes popular
fury by secreting himself, 54 but his house and those of
his satellites are stripped, and everything in them is
52 A subscription for the relief of the widows and orphans of those who
fell in the engagement was raised in Mexico. The amount contributed up
to Sept. 30, 1807, was 31,235 pesos. Gaz. Mex., xiii. xiv. xv., passim, and xvi.
641.
53 Dominguez was afterward reinstalled in his office by order of the king,
dated September 11, 1807. Bustamante, in Cavo, Tres Stylos, iii. 223. When
Iturrigaray's residencia was taken he was condemned to indemnify Domin
guez for loss of salary, and pay him danos y perjuicios. This was not dona
till 1824, when on Iturrigaray's death his heirs, after contesting the case in
the courts, were compelled to pay 12,000 pesos to Dominguez. Alaman. Hist.
Mej., i. 265-7.
54 ' Fu6 confundido por la debil voz de un anciano Ministro. Ved aqui el tray-
dor; el pueblo pide su cabeza: dijo Caballero 4 Carlos IV. seiialando a Godoy;
y este cobarde como si oyera el estampido de un trueno, calla, teme, huye, y
temblando se oculta del Cielo y de la tierra. Asi permanece dos dias ator-
mentado de la sed, del hambre, por las imprecaciones de los hombres, y loa
remordimientos de su consciencia. ' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., v. 841.
33 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURBIGAKAY.
delivered to the authorities. The fallen Prince of
Peace is afterward placed under arrest by Fernando
and his ill-gotten property confiscated.
The downfall of Godoy was hailed in New Spain
with universal satisfaction. Spaniards and Creoles
were equally demonstrative in their loyalty to the
king, confident that any change in the government
which excluded the influence of Godoy must be for
the better. On the arrival of the news of the abdi
cation of Carlos and the decrees of Fernando/ 5 Iturri-
garay was attending the cock-fights at San Agustin
de las Cuevas, now Tlalpan, where the festivities of
pentecost were being celebrated. He commanded
the decrees ^to be read, and then went on with the
games. Dona Ines was disgusted over the abdica
tion, and the regidor Azcrate displayed his contempt
by flinging aside the journal containing the news. 53
The festivities at Tlalpan continued for three days,
and not until they were concluded did the viceroy
give orders for a public demonstration in honor of
Fernando VII. This manifest indifference, which
did not fail to create much bad feeling, was in truth
owing to the fall of Godoy, his protector, and some
began to suspect treasonable designs.
On the 23d of June the departure of the royal
family to Bayonne and the abdication of Fernando
were known in Mexico. 57 Then my lord Iturriga-
ray wore a pleasant countenance, and he was over-
55 The abdication of Carlos IV. and accession of Fernando VII. were pub
lished on the 9th of June, 1808, by an extra issue of the Gaz, de Me.x. t q. v.
5G Cancelada, who was present during the occurrences at San Agustin de
las Cuevas, says, in Iturrirjaray, Conducta, 14: 'La vireina, oida la abdica-
cion y suerte del ex-principe de la Paz, dixo: Nos han puesto la ceniza en la
f rente; y el regidor Azcarate al llegar con la lectura a los decretos del Senor
Don Fernando VII. tir6 la gazeta con desprecio en ademan de quererla pisar.'
Xegrete maintains that there is no proof of these assertions, although both
Bustamante and Alaman accept them as true. They emanated, he says,
from the statements of Cancelada, a bitter enemy of the viceroy, and should
not be received as historical. Mex. Siglo XIX. , i. 78.
57 The intelligence was brought by the ship Corza, which anchored in the
harbor of Vera Cruz on the 21st of June. Gaz. de Mex., 1808, 424; Cancelada,
Conducta, 15-16. Negrete commits an error in stating that this was theoccasion
when Iturrigaray received the news of Fernanclo's accession to the throne while
diverting himself in the cockpit. Mex. Siglo XIX., i. G9.
EUROPEAN POLITICS. 37
heard to say that the king would never return to the
throne. 58
These tidings of the dethronement of the royal
family, and the assumption of the crown by Joseph
Bonaparte, arrived in the midst of preparations for
the solemn festivities to be held on the occasion of
swearing allegiance to the young monarch. The im
pression which these events created in Mexico was at
first painful. Creoles as well as Spaniards hated the
French. Napoleon was their arch-enemy. They
swore they would never be ruled by him, or any of
his creatures. On the 14th of July, the viceroy re
ceived copies of the Madrid official gazettes confirming
the news, and on the following day he convoked a
council of the real acuerdo, at which it was resolved
neither to obey the decrees of Murat, then command
ing at Madrid, nor those of any government other
than that of the legitimate sovereign. 59 The official
O O
portions of the Madrid gazettes were, moreover, or
dered to be published. 60
But the first surprise over, very different and ve
hement feelings began to spring up among the people.
Their ideas were confounded at the possibility of being
without a king. Those who had hitherto regarded a
monarch as an infallible personage remembered the
fate of Louis XVI., and beheld with consternation the
sudden removal of their own kings, father and son.
That a mob of his own subjects should effect the down-
58 * Los oidores creyeron ver en esta vez en el semblante del virey pintado
la alegria, y que se complacia en decir que el Hey no volveria al trono. ' Cavo,
Tres &V//O.S-, iii. 227. This conduct and the occurrence at Tlalpan were sub
sequently brought forward in the accusations of treason against the viceroy.
Compare Cancelada, Conducta Jturr. , 15-16.
69 The revisor Oidor Aguirre added the words: 'Que S. E. y el real Acuerdo
estaban penetrados de unos mismos nobles y leales sentimientos. ' These Itur-
rigaray tore off, objecting to their publication. Cancelada, Conducta Iturr.,
18-19; Verdad Sabida, 19. This action of the viceroy was considered by his
enemies as a mark of disloyalty. The Verdad Sabida of Cancelada is severely
criticised and the statements it contains denied by Lizarza in his Discurso vin-
dicando Iturrigaray. For his reply on the above question, see p. 16. Much
sympathy for Fernando was shown by the citizens of Mexico. Guerra, Rev.
N. E*p., i. 3-18.
60 They appeared on the 16th of July in the Gaz. de Mex.< 1808, xv. 465-
75.
S3 ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.
fall of Carlos IV. was not likely to maintain that faith
in the high majesty of the Spanish sovereigns which
for ages it had been impious to hold in doubt. Re
spect for monarchy was weakened, and the more re
flective and enlightened recognized with satisfaction
that these convulsions would augment the possibilities
of independence for New Spain. The holy inquisition
still maintained its power, and indeed we find it at
this period more zealous than ever in attempting to
stifle the progress of the age. Libertinism and im
piety, as it was called, 61 were so great, that there were
over a thousand cases pending before that tribunal. 62
One of the victims of an auto de fe at this time was
the presbyter Juan Antonio Olavarrieta, curate of
Axuchitlan. In his possession was found a work writ
ten by himself, entitled Man and Beast. On the fron
tispiece was a representation of a tyrant king. The
author had come well recommended from Spain to the
chief inquisitor, Bernardo de Prado y Obejero,and great
was the scandal. The auto was celebrated with more
than ordinary solemnity in the presence of the secular
and ecclesiastical authorities, the nobility, and principal
persons of the city. Olavarrieta was sentenced and
shipped to Spain, but managed to escape during the
voyage. Soon after this the same ceremonies were re
peated on the person of Jose Rojas, professor of math
ematics in the college at Guanajuato. A man of ex
traordinary talents and great learning, 63 he possessed
but little knowledge of the world. Carrying on a corre
spondence on philosophical and theological topics with
a woman at Guanajuato, he was denounced by her and
imprisoned. After sentence by the holy office, Hojas
escaped to New Orleans. There he published in
flammatory proclamations against the Spanish gov-
u ltttrrigaray, in Carta dCaballero; Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 208.
62 Bustamante remarks that a great number of these cases must have been
of a political nature, 'pues este tribunal era el brazo derecho del despotismo.'
Id.
63 ' Y de una memoria tan feliz, que aprendio literalmente las priucipales
actuaciones de su causa, con solo habeiios oido leer.' Id., 207-8.
POSITION OF THE PRESS. 39
eminent, which being clandestinely introduced into
Mexico caused no little annoyance to the political
authorities and the inquisition. This institution con
sisted at the time of thirty-one officers, exclusive of a
multitude of secret agents and spies, and their labors
were so arduous and important that the inquisitors pe
titioned for an increase of salary on that ground.
Such was the powerful array of zealots, ever on the
alert to persecute those whose religious and political
views dared to pass the bounds prescribed by church
and state.
The deplorable condition of the press was another
proof of the incessant endeavors on the part of the
authorities to keep the people in intellectual bondage.
It was not w r ell for subjects of Spain to know too
much of what was going on in the world. Four daily
papers appeared in Vera Cruz between 1804 and 1807;
three of them were soon discontinued, and the other
was prohibited from publishing any political news from
foreign countries, that being a privilege granted only
to the Gazeta de Mexico. 64 " In 1805 the Mexican writer
Carlos Maria Bustamante, and the alcalde del crimen
Jacobo de Villa Urrutia, established the Diario de
Mexico with .but little better success. Being sup
pressed at one time, this periodical was allowed to ap
pear again only on condition that it should be subject
to the personal revision of the viceroy.
64 ' Escepto en casos muy estraordinarios, para no perjudicar a la Oaceta
de Mexico, que era la que tenia el privilegio de publicarlas. ' Lerdo de Tejada,
Apunt. Hist., pt v. 344. The editor of this gazette was Juan Lopez Cance-
lada, author of several philippics against Iturrigaray, and whom Bustamante
calls an 'espafiol irrequieto, atrevido y charlatan, que habia insultado al Virey.'
Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 215.
CHAPTER III.
ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
1808.
THE AYUNTAMIENTO CLAIMS SOVEREIGNTY or THE PEOPLE A NATIONAL
CONGRESS PROPOSED OPPOSITION OF THE AUDIENCIA GLAD TIDINGS
FROM THE PENINSULA FOUR MEMORABLE JUNTAS RIVAL SPANISH
JUNTAS ANGRY DEBATES CONSPIRACY TO DEPOSE THE VICEROY
YERMO TAKES THE LEAD ITURRIGARAY'S APATHY A MIDNIGHT COUP
D'ETAT THE VICEROY IN DURANCE GARIBAY APPOINTED HIS SUCCES
SOR FATE OF ITURRIGARAY'S SUPPORTERS HE is SENT TO SPAIN
His RICH SWEETMEATS INDICTMENT FOR TREASON ACQUITTAL RE-
SIDENCIA HEAVY FINES CHANGE OF OPINIONS THE SENTENCE AN
NULLED ITURRIGARAY'S INTENTIONS ANALYZED BIBLIOGRAPHY.
THUS stand matters in Mexico in 1808. The times
are out of joint. Tradition is failing. Old maxims
no longer hold good. The minds of men are dimmed
by the dust arising from the clash and clatter of events.
Born in ignorance; cradled amidst the occult forces of
nature ; looking along the centuries for that power and
protection from the creature found only in the creator
it has taken all these thousands of years for man to
find out his mistake, to find out that all men come into
the world on terms of equality,^ that no man or class
of men are born almighty, either by virtue of blood,
inheritance, occupation, or wealth, and that all have
equal rights.
At length the time has come. All the world is
astir, and Mexico must be moving. Three centuries
back there had been a grand awakening, one of those
spasms of progress in which intellect is wont to disiri-
thrall itself; now there is at hand another. Half the
UO)
ATTITUDE OF AFFAIRS. 41
world are in arms. The few are fighting to be mas
ter; the many are struggling to be free. The result
is predetermined.
In Mexico opinion is becoming somewhat clarified;
ideas are coalescing and action concentrating, particu
larly in the capital. And yet all is dim and indistinct
enough. The leaven of liberty is- working; but be
ware the fangs of superstition, beware the sword of
Spain, beware the dungeons of the inquisition and
tortures beyond the grave ! And where shall be found
a leader? Here is opportunity; where is the man?
Perhaps through Iturrigaray's brain run ambitious
dreams. As likely there as anywhere. He is none
too good to play the part of traitor to his king; though
if successful revolution makes of him a thing for popu
lar worship, he is indeed in a dilemma, for nature has
not endowed him with one spark of nobility or patri
otism. Most justly upon the head of this vile repre
sentative of a vile monarchy has fallen the curse of the
colonists. He and his associates, like their master,
have made themselves rich over the ruin of the most
industrious and worthy of Spain's subjects. Yet he
may be deemed useful. A bad man is sometimes
better for the furtherance even of a good cause than
a good man. But Iturrigaray is a coward and a
hypocrite a man not the best either for traitor or
patriot. He has no thought of self-sacrifice; on the
contrary, should he perchance make Mexico free, he
must be well paid for it. Mexico may be freed from
France, from Spain perchance; but not from him, not
from Spain's officials. If he can save Mexico to
Spain, of course Fernando, or whoever may be at
Madrid to draw and spend the revenues, will remem
ber it. So day after day this dog waits to see which
way the French cat will jump.
When the intelligence reaches Mexico that the
Spanish crown has slipped from the fingers of Span
ish kings, it seems to the people as if the earth was
loosened from its orbit. Groups of anxious men,
42 ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
greatly concerned about their fate, gather in the
streets and discuss the situation. Public meetings
a rare occurrence in that quarter begin frequently
to be held, at which much is said and nothing done.
Placards are posted by the several factions of city
government, cautiously hinting their own views, or
feeling for the views of others. There is manifest
every phase of feeling from loyalty, wholly or partially,
to independence, wholly or partially. Pasquinades
are sent to high officials, and some even propose a
crown for Iturrigaray. 1
On the 19th of July, at the suggestion of the regi-
dor Azcarate, the municipal authorities presented to
the viceroy a memorial, 2 claiming that as the throne
of Spain was not occupied by the lawful sovereign,
the government devolved upon the people, and that
the city of Mexico, as the metropolis and representa
tive of all New Spain, would sustain the rights of the
deposed house. The address concluded with the
request that the viceroy would assume provisionally
the government of the kingdom, and that he would
surrender it neither to any foreign power, nor to
Spain herself while under foreign rule; and that he
would not receive any other viceroy or accept a new
appointment from the usurping power. 3
1 On the 9th of August the consulado of Mexico addressed a petition to
Iturrigaray requesting him to adopt measures for the suppression of these
seditious demonstrations. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 511.
2 "Bajo de mazas y en coches.' Bustamante, Suplemento, in Cavo, Tres
Siglos, iii. 228.
3 ' Pidiendose al Exmo. Senor Virrey que interin llega el momento felis de
que saiga de Francia S. M. y Altesas, 6 el Reyno elije persona de la Keal
familia para que lo mande y govierne como su Key y Senor natural, permanesca
de Virrey Gobernador y Capitan General de esta Nueva Espafia, entendien-
dose con la calidad de provicional, sin poderlo entregar a Potencia alguna
extrangera, ni a la misma Espana aun quando para ello se le presenter, ordenes
o del Serior Carlos quarto 6 del Principe de Asturias bajo la deriominacion tie
Fernando Septimo antes de salir de Espana,. . .que no entregue tampoco el
Virreynato y Govierno del Reyno a ningun Virrey que hayan iiombrado el
inismo Sefior Carlos quarto 6 Principe de Asturias: . . .Que aun quando S. E.
inismo sea continuado en el Virreynato por Real orden de S. M. 6 de Prin
cipe de Asturias. . .no la obedesca ni cumpla, sino que continue encargado
provicionalmente en el mando del Reyno.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc.
i. 477-8. Such were the expressions contained in the address of the ayunta-
EVOLUTION OF OPINION. 43
Iturrigaray received the address graciously, affirm
ing that he would shed the last drop of his blood in
the protection of the country, and that he was ready
to take the oath of loyalty. 4 A crowd had gathered,
for all was done openly, and when the viceroy dis
missed the regidores the people shouted, and among
them largess was liberally flung by supporters of the
project. The audiencia did not like it, and their wrath
waxed hot when, during the day, Iturrigaray laid the
address before the real acuerdo and asked their vote
upon the matter. 5 The ayuntamiento was presump
tuous; further, the members were mostly Creoles. So
the audiencia rejected the proposition, as contrary to
law and the public weal, 6 thereby bringing chagrin
upon Iturrigaray, who of course regarded with favor
a change which would have secured him in power,
whatever turn affairs might take. 7
As nearly as we can interpret ideas so vague as
were these in the minds of those who held them,
the several shades of opinion, of inclination, hope,
fantasy, were somewhat as follows : The viceroy
miento to the viceroy, the whole of which interesting document is supplied
by Davalos, who expresses his thanks to Jose' Maria Andrade for his kindness
in furnishing him with a copy of it.
4 ' Termin6 pues esta escena, en la que todo estaba convenido, de antema,no
entre el virey y Azcarate.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 170.
5 Copy of note to the real acuerdo will be found in Hernandez y Davalos,
CoL Doc., i. 486.
6 In the reply of the real acuerdo, these words are used: 'Aquel nombra-
miento provisional y juramento, debilitarian mas bien que afirmarian aquellos
sagrados inalterables vinculos y constituirian un gobierno precario expuesto
a variaciones, y tal vez d, caprichos ahora 6 en lo venidero, y por tanto seria
ademas de ilegal, impolftico este paso.' The viceroy is advised .to assure the
ayuntamiento 'que cuando convenga y nos hallemos en circunstancias que lo
eidjan, no se desentenderci V. E. ni este Real Acuerdo de convocar 6 al cuerpo
entero 6 a sus representantes. ' Hernandez y Davalos, CoL Doc., i. 487,
7 On the occasion of the ayuntamiento having sent two commissioners to
the viceroy a few days afterward, one, the marque's de Uluapa, as affirmed by
the alcalde Fagoaga, reported to the corporation that he had protested to the
viceroy 'que el ayuntamiento no descansaria hasta colocarlo sobre el trono.'
Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 173. A short time later, in the disposal of civil and
military positions Iturrigaray's assumption of prerogatives never before exer
cised by any viceroy caused grov/ling. 'Tales disposiciones se citaban como
ejemplares del poder soberano que empezaba d ejcrcer el virey y como esca-
lones para el trono a que intentaba subir.' Id., 233-4. Jose" Lnis Alconedo,
a silversmith, was charged with making a crown for Iturrigaray's coronation.
Id., 295. Guerra disbelieves in Iturrigaray's aspirations to a throne. Hist,
fav. N. Esp., i. 70.
44 ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
thought that almost any change would be beneficial
to him so long as he remained at the head of affairs.
O
If the people desired him to hold the country for
Spain well; Spain would hardly object to that. If
France was to rule, then he could be for France par
ticularly if Godoy was on good terms with Napoleon.
And even if New Spain broke into full rebellion, de
clared absolute independence, and he could be their
king or president why, that would be well too; and
if afterward France or Spain should prove too much
for Mexico, then he had only done his best for
France or Spain.
The audiencia, the church, the inquisition, all sus
pected the viceroy, and regarded with contempt the
ayuntamiento. If there was to be a change, each of
these powers desired to be at the head; they were
each determined at the least not to lose what influ
ence they had, and to gain as much more as possible.
In regard to the people, the military, officers of the
government, ecclesiastics, and the rest, there was
held every phase of ideas. The sympathies of some
were with Fernando; many prided themselves in
their loyalty to Spain; all hated France; the bolder
dreamed of actual independence. The Creoles and
the viceroy acted together in favor of a national con
gress, but for widely different ends: the former being
for the liberty of the nation, the latter for personal
aggrandizement. One looked to the representative
body as the first movement toward securing that
quality of self-government so lately secured by the
United States ; the other regarded it only as an agent
to do him service perhaps to place upon his head a
crown, either in his own name or in the name of Spain.
Out of these several phases of opinion arose several
factions. But the two great final divisions, of course,
were the royalists, who would have America always
ruled by Europe, and the independents, who would
have America always free. In the main, the Span
iards in America belonged to the former faction, and
HATRED OF THE FRENCH. 45
tlie Creoles to the latter. Yet, when it came to im
portant ecclesiastical, political, or commercial bodies,
whose pecuniary or other interests were paramount
to those of birth and blood, this distinction did not
hold good. Thus it was that at each step in march
ing events, new issues divided anew people and opin
ion; and so matters progressed until principles and
positions could be more defined.
The feeling between the audiencia and the ayunta-
miento increasing, Iturrigaray threatened to resign;
but he was easily dissuaded by his friends. Peace
was not restored, however, and finally the alcalde de
corte, Villa Urrutia, suggested that, the infante Don
Pedro be invited to assume the government as regent.
This proposal did not, however, meet with approval,
whereupon he proposed to call a representative junta
of the kingdom, the supreme authority remaining
with the viceroy when necessary. The audiencia re
jected this proposition also. But Urrutia's scheme
was submitted to the authorities of several places, and
was not unfavorably received. Even the ayunta-
mierito of Vera Cruz, whose members and policy were
almost wholly European, saw no objection to it; while
the authorities of Jalapa and Queretaro expressed
their willingness to send deputies at once to the pro
posed congress.
Meanwhile a vessel had arrived at Vera Cruz, with
information that Spain had risen against Napoleon.
The news reached the capital on the night of the 28th
of July, and at daylight guns were fired, bells were
rung, and all was joy. The enthusiasm was universal,
for Napoleon was much hated, as I have said. 8 Alle-
8 To illustrate the detestation in which Napoleon was held, it will be suffi
cient to quote from the dedication in a published exhortation of the cura of
Pure"pero in Michoacan to his flock on the 15th of August of this same year.
'A Napoleon Bonaparte ex ecracion delos pueblos espanoles,'and after inform
ing the 'infame corzo ' that this small and remote parish had proclaimed for
Fernando VII. , he concludes: ' Desiste pues, desisto, oh monstruo de ambicion,
de tus delirios, porque la America espanola esta bien penetrada de tu caracter
impio, feroz y sanguinario: y te aborrece como a furia desatada del abismo,
que solo espira a destriur la religion verdadera, la moral sana, y la f elicidad tern-
43 ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
glance to Fernando VII. was proclaimed, and volun
teer corps were ready to aid him in escaping from the
meshes in which he was entangled, 9 while Godoy and
Napoleon were burnt in effigy. 10
Thus it would seem that the first cry for indepen
dence is smothered by hatred of an invader and loyal
sympathy for a fallen' monarch. But we may see now
how a bad man may help a good cause. Iturrigaray
hates Fernando, though he pretends to serve him. If
he does not secretly favor the French, he is easily
reconciled to their success so long as his patron Go
doy is permitted to worship before Napoleon. Nev
ertheless, the viceroy puts on a smiling face, and is
wheeled in a chariot of state through the city, accom
panied by over two thousand horsemen, who publicly
offer their services in defence of the Spanish sover
eign. The viceroy is gracious, and praises their
horsemanship and their steeds; nevertheless, he does
not fail to reiterate soon after that Spain could not
resist the arms of France. Such speech and conduct
on the part of the chief ruler is the surest road to
revolution, and the viceroy is well aware of it. 11
The question now arose whether to recognize the
junta governing at Seville in the name of Fernando.
The viceroy convoked a general council, composed of
the audiencia, the ayuntamiento, the different tribu
nals, the archbishop, and the most prominent members
of the community. On the 9th of August the junta
poral de los pueblos. Tu mas mortal enemigo. Filopatro Angelopolitano.'
Diario de Mex., xii. 219.
9 Id., ix. 165-8, 343-4; Orizava, Libra Cur., MS., 2-3; Pap. Var.. xxxvi.,
no. Ixviii., ii. 21-2. The sindico procurador proposed that $12,000,000 be em
ployed in effecting the escape of Fernando from France; six million to be
paid to the commander of the fortress in which he was confined if he would
conduct him to Vienna and thence to England ; and six million to that nation
for his safe conveyance to Vera Cruz. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 489-
90. El real cuerpo de mineria, or mining corporation, offered to provide at
its own expense 100 pieces of field artillery and equip and maintain eight
companies to work them. Id., i. 505-6.
10 'En 1 de Agosto del afio de 1808 quemaron en estatuas al traidor de
Godoi, y al intruso Emperador de los franceses Bonaparte.' Orizaba, Libro
Cur., MS., 1.
11 JBustamante. Suplemento Hist. Hex., in Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 230; Ala-
man, Hist. Mex., i. 181.
LOYALTY TO SPAIN. 47
met. The discussions were warm, the viceroy being
somewhat ill-tempered. Verdad, the syndic of the
ayuntamiento, proposed the establishment of a provi
sional government, still maintaining the previous the
ory that in the absence of a legitimate monarch the
sovereignty reverted to the people. These views were
strenuously opposed by the audiencia, which repre
sented the Spanish faction, arid regarded Verdad's ex
pressions as seditious. 12 Allegiance to Fernando was
agreed upon, and he was proclaimed king of Spain
and the Indies; an oath was taken to obey no orders
proceeding from the emperor of the French or his rep
resentatives; and the viceroy was recognized as the
king's lieutenant in New Spain, the audiericia and
other royal tribunals retaining their authority. These
decisions were drawn up in the form of an act, which
was signed by those present. 13
A disturbance occurred at Vera Cruz, occasioned
by the arrival of a French vessel bearing despatches
from Joseph Bonaparte. The ship was fired upon
from Ulua, and was not allowed to enter port until
she had lowered her colors and hoisted a white flag.
When the documents were read they were found to
contain orders of Joseph, confirming in their several
positions the Mexican authorities in that port, and
extending to them various favors. The despatches
12 Rev. Verdadero Origan, no. ii. 34-7.
13 See copy of the act in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. Indep., i. 513-16.
There are eighty-two signatures, comprising those of the viceroy, archbishop,
oidores, and principal authorities. It was declared null by the audiencia of
Guadalajara, Id., i. 534; while Riano, the intendente of Guanajuato, consid
ered that certain expressions might be improperly interpreted, ' pueden mo-
tivar alguna siuiestra inteligencia que conviene evitar.' Id., i. 529. On the
llth of August Iturrigaray proclaimed the result. The document was se
verely criticised by Fray Melchor de Talamantes, of whose political tenden
cies mention will be made later. Talamantes charges the viceroy with having
his own interest more at heart than those of the kingdom. ' Qu< debe espe-
rarse de vos,' he asks, ' que habeis velado hasta ahora sobre vuestras propios
intereses y no sobre los del reino y en su organizacion; que no habeis tenido
otra ley que vuestros caprichos, que solo habeis consultado a vuestras diver-
siones y paseos mirando con indiferencia la administracion piiblica. ' Id. , i.
510-7, where see copy of the proclamation with Talamantes' annotations. On
the 13th of August allegiance to Fernando was expressed by a celebration in
his honor, solemnized by religious ceremonies, and enlivened by processions
and illuminations. Id., i. 518-19; Gaz. de Mej., 1308, xv. 508-70.
48 ITURKIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
were burned in the plaza. A rumor having spread
that two commissioners by this vessel were secreted
in the house of Ciriaco Ceballos, the comandante of
the port, a mob broke into and plundered it. The
host was taken to the house to allay the tumult, but
the crowd was only dispersed by a heavy fall of rain. 14
Iturrigaray heard of it on the 13th of August, the
day on which the oath of allegiance to Fernando was
taken, and it ought to have been a warning. 15
On the 30th two commissioners from the junta of
Seville arrived at Mexico demanding recognition of
its sovereignty over New Spain. 16 They were Juan
Gabriel Jabat, a naval commander, and bitter enemy
of Iturrigaray, 17 and Colonel Tomds de Jauregui, a
brother of the viceroy's wife. They were instructed
to arrest the viceroy in case he refused compliance.
A junta was convened on the following day, at which
Iturrigaray expressed his dissatisfaction at the tone
and want of courtesy of the despatch. 13 The debate
which ensued was warm and lengthy, and tended in
no way to procure harmony. Oidor Aguirre pro-
14 ' Lo que realmente resfri6 a los amontinados, y los disolvi6, fu un fuer-
tfsimo aguacero, que hubo en aquella liora.' Lacunza, Discursos Hist., no.
xxxvi. 535. Bustamante states that the tumult was occasioned by the indis
creet action of Ceballos, who prohibited under pain of death any one from
visiting the French ship. This gave offence to the sailors in Vera Cruz, and
led to the sacking of Ceballos' house: 'la chusma marinera. . .arrojd sus
muebles a la calle, quem6 su quitrin, y rob<5 sus pianos de la comision hidro-
grafica que habia levantado, y juntamente una porcion de instrumentos de
marina. ' Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 232-3.
15 ' El modo facil con que se inici6 la asonada, y que manifestaba el grado
de exaltacion en que se hallaban los animos, indico al virey lo predispuesto
que estaba el pueblo a lanzarse a la revolucion. ' Negrefp, Mex. Si/jlo XIX. , i. ,
89. This author states that it was believed in Vera Cruz that Jose" Miguel
de Azanza, formerly viceroy, and at this time minister of war of Joseph
Bonaparte, had arrived on the French vessel.
18 Three days before, Iturrigaray had deemed it advisable to issue a proc
lamation exhorting the people to maintain allegiance to Fernando and unite
in resisting Napoleon. Diario, Mex. , ix. 239-42.
17 i p or q ue es te le habia hecho salir mal de su grado dos auos antes para
Espana, porque queria percibir los sueldos sin trabajar.' Cavo, Tres Siglos,
iii. 233.
18 Villa Urrutia thus expresses himself: 'Celebr6se la junta, se vieron los
papeles de aquella' the junta of Seville 'reducidos a una proclama, y a
dos ordenes en tono soberano, confirmando la una a todos en sus respectivos
empleos, y mandando por la otra qe se embiasen los caudales qe ubiese.'
Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 535-6.
JUNTAS CONVENED. 49
posed that in all matters belonging to the war and
treasury departments, the sovereignty of the Seville
junta should be acknowledged, but not in those of
patronage and justice. These views were opposed by
the Marques de Rayas and Villa Urrutia,on the ground
that the sovereignty was indivisible. Although the
plurality of votes was in favor of Aguirre's motion,
the result was ineffective, owing to further complica
tions caused by the arrival that same niodit of de-
/ O
spatches from deputies of the junta of Oviedo, which,
like that of Seville, claimed royal authority, as holders
of the crown for the lawful king of Spain. 19 On Sep
tember the 1st the viceroy summoned another coun
cil, at which he stated that Spain was in a state of
anarchy, since all juntas wished to be supreme. The
complication caused by the claim of two separate
Spanish juntas to the supreme power led to a sus
pension of action, and a resolution to wait for further
news was passed. But the indiscreet language of the
viceroy was construed into a hint that he intended to
depose Aguirre and Bataller and other oidores, 2a and
it was suspected that he was fully aware of nightly
meetings which were now being held by the faction
opposed to him, and at which were discussed plans
of overthrowing him.
Again and for the last time Iturrigaray convened a
junta on the 9th of September. The main point dis
cussed was the convocation of a general congress and
the establishment of a provisional government. Great
confusion marked the proceedings. Villa Urrutia was
the main promoter of the idea, and to him were
19 Id., i. 536; Negrete, Mex. Siylo XfX., i. 102-104. Called by Villa
Urrutia 'la junta de Asturias.' Pap. Var., clvii., no. xxxiv. 7.
20 Cancelada, Verdad Sabida, 30-7. The fiscal Borbon, in a long address,
made use of expressions highly flattering to Iturrigaray, whom he called the
vicegerent of the king. 'Bien, bien,' replied the viceroy, 'pues si yo lo soy,
cada uno de V. SS. guarde su puesto, y no extraue si con alguno, 6 algunoa
tomo providencias. ' 13ustama>/te,in.Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 235; Rev. Verdadero
., ii. 38. Guerra ascribes still stronger language to Iturrigaray. 'Cada
uno guarde su puesto, que yo hare" que todas lo guarden, y si se viere que
hago alguna demostracion con algunos Senores, no sera extraiio porque
habra fundamento para ello.' Rev. de N. Esp., i. 93.
HIST. HEX., VOL. IV. 4
50 ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
opposed the three fiscales, Francisco Xavier Borbon,
Ambrosio Zagarzurieta, and Francisco Robledo, all
of whose opinions and votes were read before the
junta. The eldest inquisitor denounced the pro
posed convention as seditious. 21 The oider Miguel
Bataller looked to Villa Urrutia to reply to the
objections, upon which the oidor Aguirre proposed
that those favoring the junta should confine them
selves to the discussion of five points, namely: the
authority to convoke it; the necessity of so doing;
the benefit to be derived; the persons who should
compose the congress; and whether their votes should
be decisive. The city procurator-general, Agustin
Rivero, then boldly stated that although the syndic
could only represent the plebeian element, he him
self, from the nature of his appointment, could be
the representative of the other classes. This caused
additional commotion. The archbishop at once ex
pressed his utter disapproval of such a claim, while
others also vociferously denounced it. And he said
further: "If such dissension is occasioned by the
simple suggestion, to what extent will matters go if
it be realized?" He then declared himself opposed
to a convocation, although he had previously been in
clined to favor it. While discussion was at its height,
a voice was heard: "If the municipalities are not
convoked they will assemble of their own accord."
By some this bold speech was attributed to Rivero. 22
Meanwhile the viceroy maintained an affable de
meanor toward all. He even condescended to ex
plain that he had been informed that some of his
expressions at the last junta had caused offence, had
been regarded as a threat against certain members;
and thereupon he declared that his language was only
!l ' SostendreV he said, ' que tales juntas son por su naturaleza
b k lo me"nos peligrosas y del todo inutiles.' Rev. Verdadero Origen, no. ii.
38.
22 ' Pero como el senor fiscal de lo civil, Zagarzurieta, redarguyera al in-
stante aquella proposicion sediciosa. . .y siguiera el confuso murmullo, quedo
sin apurarse.' lb.; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. C32.
INDISCRETION OF THE VICEROY. 51
directed against the authors of certain pasquinades
of a seditious character.
During this session the rumored intention of the
viceroy to resign was brought forward. The regidor
Antonio Mendez Prieto 23 arose; and having stated
that such a report had reached the ayuntamiento,
requested Iturrigaray, if he had such intention, to
reconsider the matter and remain at the head of
affairs, since grievous evils would be certain to follow
at such a critical time, if the country were left with
out a chief so capable of defending it. The viceroy
said he wished to resign; he was getting old and diffi
culties were thickening all the same he had no in
tention of laying aside sweet authority. Then Ver-
dad spoke in support of the representations of Prieto,
and after a few words from Rivero and Uluapa, a pro
found silence reigned while they were waiting to hear
from the opposition. Not a word came from them,
however, and Iturrigaray finally ordered the business
of the junta to proceed. 24 The debate continued, but
with no other result than to increase feeling between
the two factions.
Had the viceroy at this crisis exhibited a prudent re
straint the storm might have passed ; but he persisted
in a congreso consultivo, and had indeed already on
the 1st of the month issued circulars to the ayunta-
mientos of the principal cities, instructing them to
send deputies to the capital. His assumption of pre
rogatives, moreover, his failure to seek the approval
of the acuerdo, and his order for troops to move from
Jalapa and Nueva Galicia to the capital, confirmed
23 Called by Zainacois, Hist. Mej., vi. 48, Antonio Mendez Cano.
2 'The viceroy was at this time 60 years of age. The silence of the other
members of the junta was held as indicating their wish that he should resign.
That he never had any intention of doing so may be drawn from the fact that
a few days later, assuming a prerogative never claimed by preceding viceroys,
he appointed Garcia Davila mariscal de campo, and Jose" Maria Laso to be
Superintendent of the real aduana, besides granting a subsidy of 400,000
pesos from the royal treasury to the consulado of Vera Cruz for the continu
ation of the road to that port. This administrative act was done independ
ently of the approval of the junta superior as required by law. Rev. Verda-
duro Oriyen, no. ii. 39.
52 ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
opinion that his intention was ultimately to govern
without dependence on the crown. The party op
posed to him, therefore, determined to hasten their
plans. There was organized against him what the
viceroy would probably call a conspiracy. 25 Those
composing it were mostly European Spaniards, and
were supported by the commercial class. Believing
that the convocation of a national congress, deter
mined upon by the viceroy, would bring to a conclu
sion Spanish rule in Mexico, they resolved to stifle
all tendency to what they might call disloyalty to
Spain, by the seizure of the viceroy and his principal
supporters. Gabriel de Yermo, a native of Vizcaya,
and warmly attached to the party of the oidores, was
selected as their leader. Nor was the choice ill made.
Courageous, energetic, possessed of ability and cau
tion, Yermo was in every respect the man to take
the lead. Moreover, he had at his command wealth,
and the affection of liberated slaves and other de
pendents on his large estates. 26 Though he con
sidered that the condition of affairs required a des
perate remedy, he did not immediately accept the
invitation of the conspirators to put himself at their
head. Having, however, consulted with his confessor,
he at last expressed his willingness to act as their
leader, and as no time was to be lost, he acted prompt
ly. 27 At a close meeting it was determined that the
z5 Negrete, Hex. Siglo XIX., i. 108.
M GabrielJoaquin de Yermo was born in the neighborhood of Bilbao on
the 10th of September, 1757. He married his cousin Maria Joscfa Yermo in
Mexico, who had inherited from her father valuable sugar-cane haciendas in the
valley of Cuernavaca. On the birth of his son Jfose" Maria in 1790, he liber
ated his negro and mulatto slaves to the number of more than 400, and again
in 1797, when he purchased the estate of Jalmolonga, he enfranchised '200
more who belonged to it. The freedmen ever afterward exhibited underrating
fidelity and affection for him and the cause of the king of Spain. His success as
an agriculturist was well known in New Spain. Speaking in defence of his ac
tion in this conspiracy, he thus alludes to this occupation: 'He sido y soy
puramente un agricultor industrioso, cuya riqueza tal cual es, dimana exclu-
sivamente de los frutos de mis haciendas, mcjoradas en mi poder extraordi-
nariamente, como sabetoda la Nueva Espana.' Pap. Far., xxxvi., no. Ixviii.,
ii. 54-9; Cancelada, in Id., ccxv., no. iii., xliv.-l. ; Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 238.
He died in Mexico on the 7th of September, 1813, being nearly 56 years of
age. Id., i. 503.
27 Iturrigaray's defenders assert that Yermo's decision was influenced by
YERMO AS LEADER. 53
person of the viceroy should be seized, and the govern
ment of the country held for Spain. Yerrno told his
associates that if he took the lead the affair must be
conducted without display of any rancorous feelings,
that bloodshed must be avoided, and the proposed
coup d'etat accomplished in a single night.
Assembling in the city a force composed of faithful
laborers on his estate, 28 he next proceeded to gain over
the officers of the palace guard. This force was com
posed of a company drawn from the infantry regiment
organized and paid by the merchants of the capital, 29
who moreover had the appointment of the officers.
These, being selected from the commercial class, were
with few exceptions devoted to the European faction,
and it would not be difficult to win over the officers of a
single company. The troops of the viceroy were al
ready drawing near to the city, and the active conspira
tors, who numbered three hundred, appointed the
night of the 14th of September. The viceroy had
been several times warned of the plot, and had it not
been for his egotism, apathy, and obstinacy, he might
have prevented it. 30
resentment against the viceroy for interfering with his interests as a contrac
tor for meat for the city, and because the viceroy was active in prompting the
sequestration of the estates of the benevolent institutions to which his own
property was mortgaged in the sum of 400,000 pesos. Yermo, moreover, had
taken an active part in a suit brought by the producers of aguardiente to pro
tect themselves against a heavy and irregularly imposed tax upon that liquor.
By the extreme and free opinions which he expressed on the subject, he in
curred the anger of the viceroy, who ordered his imprisonment, from which
ho wao only saved by the influence of one of his countrymen, who was a friend
of Iturrigaray. Alaman defends Yermo against the charge that personal mo
tives influenced him in the action he took against the viceroy. Id., i. 239-43.
NcgrcuG takes a different view. Hex. Siglo XIX., i. 118-19; Rev. N. E$p. t Ver-
dade.ro Origen, no. ii. 53-6.
23 Hustamante, in making mention of this fact, apologizes to Yermo's family
for doing so. ' Protesto . . . no es mi animo ofender en nada a la virtuosa
famil a do aquel ciudadano, justamenteapreciada hoy en Mexico.' Cavo, Tres
Si'jh*, iii. 238.
' 'ailed cl regimiento del comercio. Each day a company of this regi
ment formed the guard of the viceregal palace.
au ' Conduciase en toclo como un hombre narcotizado. ' B ustamante, Cuadro
7/i.sf., i., carta l a , 5. A month before Bustamante had informed Iturrigaray
thr.t a conspiracy was on foot to seize his person and depose him, but the
viceroy paid no heed to him. A woman, also, presented a paper to him one
d.:y ai3 he was leaving the palace and implored him to read it, as it revealed
a plot to make him captive. Others warned him to no purpose. Cavo, Tres
54 ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
Plans for the 14th were frustrated by the fears of
Juan Gallo, captain of the guard, who, while sympa
thizing with the movement, refused to join in such
arbitrary measures, though he promised not to betray
them. They therefore tried Santiago Garcia, who
would be in command on the following day. He also
at first refused to admit them into the palace, but was
finally won over by the arguments of his lieutenant,
Luis Granados, the captain of the artillery, who ac
cepted a bribe of eight thousand pesos. 31
Thus all was made ready. The oidores 32 were ad
vised of the meditated attack, and the conspirators,
who had assumed the name of Volunteers of Fernan
do VII., and were afterward distinguished by the
appellation of Cbaquetas, 33 cautiously assembled in the
portal de las Flores at 12 o'clock on the night of the
15th. 34 Yermo placed himself at the head, and they
proceeded silently to the palace gates. The guard
had been locked up in their quarters, and the senti
nels at the entrance stood mute and motionless. 35
Connected on the north side with the palace stood
the court prison, and the sentinel on guard there, not
Siglos, iii. 236-7. Iturrigaray states in his defence that at the commence
ment of the conspiracy a youth unknown to him informed him that the oidorea
were forming a design to seize him. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 244-5.
31 This, according to the statement of Iturrigaray. Alaman discredits the
assertion. Granados was afterward banished by Garibay to Acapulco, where
he died shortly after. Id., i. 240. Bustamante accepts Iturrigaray 's state
ment. * Captain D. Luis Granados estaba vendido d la faccion, y en la tarde
liabia mandado al mismo Palacio ochenta artilleros para que hiciesen cartuchos
y tuviesen la artilleria d punto. ' Sup. Cavo, Tres Siglos, \ iii. 236.
32 With regard to previous and final communications with the oidores, con
sult Yermo, in Amigo del Pueblo, ii., no. vii. , 211-24.
33 Referring to the jackets worn as part of their uniform.
31 The portal de las Flores was opposite the palace; but the conspirators
were screened by the parian which intervened. Bustamante states that mauy
of them went to the archbishop 'd recibir su bendicion, les deseo buen suceso,
y exhort6 como si fuesen d guerra de moros.' Sup. Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 237.
Alaman denies this. Negrete considers that the conspirators actually did re
ceive the archbishop's benediction. Mex. Siglo XIX., i. 117.
35 The mayor de plaza, Coroiiel Juan de Noriega, was afterward charged
with having been bribed, and having cooperated with the conspirators by
giving orders that the troops should not leave their quarters on that night.
Noriega defended himself by depositions taken from a number of the princi
pal actors. lu 1821 his family caused this vindication of his character to be
printed and published, a copy of which is to be found in Pap. Var., clvii.,
no. xxxiii. Consult Yermo, in Amigo del Pueblo, ii. 218-19.
CHARACTER OF ITURRIGARAY. 55
being in the secret, challenged them as they ap
proached. Receiving no reply, he fired on them, and
was preparing to reload when he was shot down. 36
Recovering from this mishap, they entered the palace
without further opposition; and notwithstanding the
two shots which had been fired without, they found
Iturrigaray asleep in his chamber. Aroused, the
viceroy found himself a prisoner, and having given up
the keys of his cabinets, he was conducted with his
two eldest sons in a carriage to the inquisition, and
lodged in the house of the inquisitor Prado. His
wife and two children of tender age were at the same
time conveyed to the nunnery of San Bernardo. 37
Thus fell this vacillating viceroy, whose medioc
rity of character, courage, and ability rendered him
signally unfit to govern during this most critical pe
riod. Intriguing but feeble in design, ambitious
but timid, he could neither skilfully plan nor boldly
execute, while his temporizing policy encouraged his
enemies and disappointed his friends. Had he at the
first adopted with decision the views of either faction,
and supported them by positive measures, he would
doubtless have retained control of affairs. Although
the arbitrariness of his final acts, and his intention to
concentrate forces in the capital, seem to indicate that
at last he had determined to support the Creole party
with a view to independence, his want of caution in
allowing his action to outstrip his power to maintain
it by the presence of troops which he could rely upon
was his ruin, and he was seized in the viceregal palace
36 Bustamante makes the strange assertion that this sentinel, whose name
was Miguel Garrido, after having fired, attacked them with his bayonet, and
that they fled ' como timidas palomas;' but that they afterward attacked him
from behind as he was returning, and wounded and disarmed him. But Busta
mante is here strongly partisan, and not to be trusted.
37 A few days later Iturrigaray was removed to the convent of the Bethle-
hemites. His fall, without tho effusion of blood, was considered by many as
miraculous. 'Muchos acaso los mas de estos habitantes atribuyen tan feliz
suceso a la milagrosisima Madre de Dios Guadalupana, cuya No vena en su
Sautuario, acaba de verificarse, y en la que las almas devotas derramaron
muchas lagrimas pidie"ndole el remedio de los males que nos amenazaban.'
Gaz. Mex., xv. 688-9.
56 ITURKIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
when his regiments were almost at its gates, by a
band of civilians led by a wealthy farmer. 33
No sooner had the successful chaquetas lodged their
prisoner within the walls of the inquisition, than they
summoned the archbishop, oidores, and other author
ities to council, and demanded the deposal of the
viceroy. By six o'clock in the morning of the 16th
their decision had been given. Iturrigaray had been
deposed, and the mariscal de campo, Pedro Garibay,
appointed as his successor ad interim. At seven
o'clock a proclamation to that effect was posted on all
the corners of the capital by order of the archbishop as
president of the council. 39 Then followed arrests of
the ex-viceroy's principal partisans, and other individ
uals suspected of revolutionary tendencies. Yerdad,
38 For a concise outline of Iturrigaray's administration, and the course of
action which led to his downfall, see Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. Indep.,
i. 043-52. The document here used was published Nov. 9, 1808, and com
mented upon by the oidor Aguirre. Cancelada, the editor of the Gaz. Alex.,
xv. 687, thus holds up to praise the action of the merchants and their de
pendents: 'La Nueva Espaua sabra con el tiempo lo mucho que debe a todo
el Comercio de Mexico por esta accion, la cual se execut6 sin efusion de san-
gre:. . .Asi se sabe portar la Juventad (sic) espniiola reunida para exterminar
los malvados y proteger los hombres de bien.' Cancelada published this extra
number of his gazette without having submitted it to the revision of the oidor
decano as required by law. Garibay reprimanded him, and ordered him to
call in all the copies issued. Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 222-6. Consult
Yermo's account of the viceroy's deposition addressed by him to the Spanish
junta. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 655-60.
39 A copy of the proclamation is found in Gaz. Hex., xv. 679-80. It in
forms the inhabitants of Mexico that ' El Pueblo se ha apoderado de la Persona
del Exmo Sefior Virrey: ha pedido imperiosamente su separacion por razones
de utilidad y conveniencia general: han convocado en la noche precedente a
este dia al Real Acuerdo, Illmo Sefior Arzobispo, y otras autoridades: se ha
cedido a la urgencia, y dando por separado del mando a dicho Virrey, ha re-
caido conforme a la Real Orden de 30 de Octubre de 1806, en el Mariscal de
Campo Don Pedro Garibay, interin se precede a la abertura de los pliegos de
Providencia. ' At eleven o'clock Garibay, according to this government or
gan, was recognized by all the government authorities. Id. The oidores in
their report to the junta de Sevilla, dated the 24th of September, represented
that on the 17th preceding the people demanded that the pliego de provi-
dencia should not be opened, but that Garibay should continue at the head
of the government. In accordance with this wish, the opening of the pliego
was deferred. In Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 239-42, is a copy of this report,
Lizarza gives a very different reason. He states that it was presumed that
the successor to Iturrigaray appointed in the pliego was the Marqu6s de Some-
ruelos, the governor of Habana; but that the audiencia were anxious to have
at their head Garibay, an octogenarian, to direct in such a crisis, and who
would offer no opposition to their views and measures. Discurso, 6-7.
THE NEW GOVERNMENT. 57
Azcdrate, and Rafael Ortega were imprisoned in the
archiepiscopal jail, and shortly afterward Francisco
Cisneros, 40 the abbot of Guadalupe, the canon Jose
Mariano Beristain, Jose Antonio Cristo, and Fray
Melchor Talamantes of the order of la Merced. 41
The new government at once proceeded to take pre
cautions to secure itself in its position. Despatches
were sent to all the principal cities with news of the
occurrences in the capital. Instructions were given
to the colonels of the regiments from Jalapa and
Nueva Galicia to fall back. Garcia Davila was
removed from his command as mariscal de campo, 4 ' 2
and the conde de Alcaraz appointed in his place.
40 Called by Alaman, Jos6 Cisceros. Hint. Mej., i. 250.
41 Talamantes was a native of Peru, and a strong advocate for independence,
as is proved by papers in his own handwriting which were seized at the time
of his capture, and among which was found the sketch of a plan of indepen
dence. It begins: ' El congreso nacional Americano debe cjercer todos los
derechos de la soberania;' and then the duties and power of the congress are
laid down in 13 items, which include extensive reforms in political, ciyil, and
ecclesiastical administrations, the regulation of commerce, and the promotion
of agricultural, mining, and manufacturing industries, 'quicandoles las tra-
bas. ' The last item in this interesting document is to the effect that an am
bassador should be sent to the U. S. 'a tratar de alianza y pedir auxilios.'
In another paper he uses these words: 'Aproximandose ya el tiempo de la in-
dependencia de este reino, debe procurarse que el congreso que se forme lleve
en si mismo, sin que pueda percibirse de los inadvertidos la semilla de esta
independeucia: pero de una independencia solida, durable, y que pueda sos-
tenerse sin dificultad y sin efusion de sangre.' Cancelada, Conducta IturrJr/a~
ray, 119-22. Alaman compared the above quoted documents with the origi
nals of Talamantes, which exist in the general archives. The friar was also
the author of a work entitled Hepresentacion de las Colonias, which he dedi
cated to the ayuntamiento of Mexico under the nom de plume of Irza, verda-
dero patriota. In this, the most important of his productions, he establishes
twelve cases in which a colony can with justice free itself from the molher
country. Hist, Mej., i. app. 36. Talamantes was conveyed on the Gth of April
to the fortress of San Juan de Ulua, where he was confined in irons. He died
shortly afterward of yellow fever, his jailers not having the compassion even
to remove his fetters during his sickness. Rivera, Hist. Jala/>a, i. 231. Za-
macois does not believe such unnecessary inclemency credible. /list. Mrj., vi.
63; Guerra states that <le aiiadieron otro par de grilles.' Rev. N . Esp., i. 230.
Bustamante asserts: 'No se le quitaron los grilles. . .hasta el momento de cn-
terrarlo. ' Sup. Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 238. Verdad died in prison on the 4th
of October, 19 days after his capture, not without suspicions of having been
poisoned, while Azcarate was seized with an attack of epilepsy, induced, it
was also believed, by poison. He however recovered, and having vindicated
himself, was afterward set at liberty by Viceroy Venegas. Cisneros, Beristain,
and Cristo were liberated soon after their incarceration. Ib.; Kamacois, Hist.
Mcj., vi. 62-3; Rosa, Diwurso en la Alamcda, 11.
42 Davila, having obtained his appointment from Iturrigaray, had offered
to resign if the authorities deemed it advisable under the new order of
things. Gaz. Mex., xv. 700.
58 ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
The dragoon regiment of Mexico was ordered in all
haste to the capital, and measures were taken to pre
serve public order and tranquillity. Nor were these
precautions unnecessary. Confusion and tumult pre
vailed in the city. Armed bodies of Creoles and
natives thronged the streets with threatening demon
strations, while fears were entertained that an attempt
at rescue would be made by a division of the Jalapa
regiment, whose captain, Joaquin Arias, and his
brother officers declared that they would liberate
Iturrigaray or perish in the attempt. They were
finally, however, dissuaded from their purpose. For
greater security Iturrigaray was removed to the fort
ress of San Juan de Ulua, 43 being conducted thither
on the 21st by a guard of sixty soldiers of the volun
teers of Fernando VII. and fifty dragoons. A few
days later he was joined by his wife and family, and
on the 6th of December embarked with them on
board the San Justo for Cadiz. On his arrival at
that port he was confined in the castle of San Sebas
tian, whence he was removed to that of Santa Cata-
lina. There, impeached for treason, and accused of
extortion and maladministration, he awaited his trial.
Meanwhile, all the hoarded wealth in his palace be
sides other property was sequestrated, 44 and the oidor
43 At attempt at rescue was made, of which Vicente Acufia was the insti
gator. Acufia was sent prisoner to Spain, where he was acquitted. Return
ing to Mexico three years later, he was arrested at Perote, 'and shot under
sentence of the council of war stationed there. Bustamante, Sup., Tres Sighs,
iii. 243-4.
44 His accumulations were immense. In three apartments of the palace
were found, besides a great quantity of diamonds, snuff-boxes, ornamental
bouquets, breakfast services, knives, forks, and spoons, all of solid gold, a
gold writing-desk, gold cigar-cases, and costly ornaments, trinkets, and
bric-a-brac almost without number. The silver ware was hardly less valuable;
no fewer than 50 dozen sets of plates, knives, forks, and spoons were found,
with corresponding dinner-services and table ornaments. Behind his cabinet
a box was discovered, labeled 'Dulce de Querdtaro.' The sweetmeats it con
tained were 7,383 gold ounces. In another chest was a massive circular ingot
of gold and a great variety of rare trinkets of the same metal, ' quo no serd,
muy comun hallarlas en los palacios de los monarcas.' In the corners of these
apartments were found more than 30,000 duros in bags. Moreover, among
the spoil were four interest-paying bonds of 100,000 duros each. (The cluro
was the same coin as the peso fuerte. ) Vcracruzano, i. 76-7. The editor of
this periodical states that the document from which the above particulars
are taken is a copy of the original manuscript. The same is to be found
TRIAL OF ITURRIGARAY. 59
Bataller was commissioned to draw up indictments.
The first process despatched to Spain, being hastily
prepared, was not couched in legal terms, 45 and the
proceedings instituted were delayed until an instru
ment in proper form, supported by the necessary docu
ments, was obtained from New Spain, and it was not
until August 1809 that the trial proceeded. 46 The ac
cusations were then divided into two classes, forming
two distinct suits, the prosecution for treason and the
residencia of the accused. On the 9th of November
following, Iturrigaray submitted his defence to the
council of the Indies, in which he claimed acquittal of
the charge of treason, on the ground that he had
tD * O
cleared himself of the accusations before the Spanish
junta central. With regard to his residencia, he main
tained that it ought not to be taken while he was in
captivity, with his salary suspended, his property se
questered, and his honor aspersed. He then petitioned
that he might be permitted to reside in the neighbor
hood of Cddiz, that the arrears of his salary should be
paid, or the income of his sequestrated capital be al
lowed him, and that the documents necessary for the
proof of his innocence be obtained.
Before any decision was arrived at, Iturrigaray ad
dressed a similar petition to the regency created by
the c6rtes January 29, 1810, and installed on the
island of Leon, requesting, moreover, permission to
reside with his family in Habana. This met with a
more speedy result, and his trial for treason was sus
pended and leave was granted him to reside in any
province of Spain which he might select, or in the
almost verbatim in Cancelada, Conducta fturrigaray, 88-91, and in Alaman
Hist. Mej. , i. app. 41-3, copied from Cancelada. Before the wife of Iturri
garay left Mexico she petitioned that the jewelry of which she had been de
prived, and the bonds of her children, might be returned to her, and also that
her husband's plate and ornaments be restored to him. The audiencia ac
ceded to her request as regarded the jewelry and plate, but refused to surren
der the bonds. Id., i. 260-1.
45 Pedimento del fiscal del consejo de Indias en la causa de Iturrigaray, in
Hernandez y Duvalos, Col. Doc., i. G93-4.
46 Id., i. G93-6.
60 ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
Balearic Islands. 47 Two days later, on February 12th,
a royal order was issued still more favorable to the
unfortunate man, now broken in health. By it the
sequestration of his property was removed, with the
exception of forty thousand pesos to be left on deposit
as a bond for his residencia. To this clemency the coun
cil of the Indies was strongly opposed, as being incon
sistent with the gravity of the case, and the fiscal, sup
ported by all the members of the council, requested the
regency to revoke the orders. 43 No notice was taken
of this address, and Iturrigaray was released, when
he retired to Algeciras. On the 28th of October,
1810, however, the second regency having been elected,
orders were issued therefrom that he should again be
placed under arrest, his property sequestrated, and his
case proceeded with in the most expeditious manner.
It was, however, too late for this action to have any
effect. Iturrigaray 's property had already been re
turned to him, and apprehensive of the result if he
should again be arrested and put on trial, he crossed
over to Africa, leaving it to his wife and friends to
fight the case. These so successfully conducted mat
ters that after much debating he was allowed, by or
der of the cortes, on the 26th of November, the
benefit of the general pardon, which in the mean time
had been extended to the revolutionists in New Spain,
and the impeachment for treason was removed.
In the matter of his residencia, Iturrigaray did not
so fortunately escape. Ramon Oses, alcalde de corte
in the Mexican capital, was appointed his judge, and
as he was a man of high integrity, and had not been
a member of the audiencia when Iturrigaray was de
posed, Alaman is doubtless correct in concluding that
the investigation was conducted with fairness. Yet
* 7 Copy of the decree of the consejo de regencia, dated February 10, 1810,
is given in Rev. Verdadero Oriyen, no. ii. 47-8.
48 The fiscal advanced numerous reasons in support of the objection raised,
and concludes: 'Vuestro fiscal en su respuesta, qne apoya enteramente el
consejo, dice cuanto se halla de repugnante en derecho y politica a que se
lleve a efecto lo mandado en las Reales ordenes de diez y doce del corriente. '
Id., 49-50.
THE FAMILY ESTATE. 61
the late viceroy was mulcted in the sum of $435,413,
$119,125 of which he was condemned to pay as
the value of the invoice of goods which he illegally
introduced into New Spain on his arrival there in
1803. The other amount was for money fraudulently
obtained from the distribution of quicksilver, and sales
of offices and contracts, to each of which original sums
was added a fine of equal amount. 49 To secure pay
ment, Iturrigaray's interests in the mining tribunal of
Mexico, amounting to $400,000, were attached. 50 He
appealed to the council of the Indies, but the sentence
was confirmed by it in February 1819, and later by
the supreme tribunal of justice. 51 Its execution, how
ever, was interrupted by the declaration of inde
pendence in 1821, and Iturrigaray having died a
short time before, his widow 52 and family went to
Mexico and petitioned that the sentence might not
be carried out. The arguments now employed were
exactly opposite to those advanced by Iturrigaray,
who maintained that he had ever remained loyal to
Fernando. 53 The family claimed that the deceased
49 He received from his quicksilver frauds $36,816. In 1806 and 1807
his receipts from illegal contracts for the manufacture of cigarette paper
amounted to $106,128. The legal price of this paper as sold from the factory
was $12 a ream. During the year mentioned it was raised to $13, one dollar
being paid by -the manufacturers to the viceroy for their monopoly. Id., 24-5;
Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. app. 45-7. Zamacois, who copied extensively from
Alaman, has given in app. no. 7 of his Hist. Mej., vi., a verbatim duplicate of
the latter's appendix, but has failed to detect certain errors of Alaman.
Iturrigaray's wife was his principal agent in these nefarious transactions, and
into her hands most of the sums were paid. He feebly attempted to defend
his conduct by the support of precedents supplied by the action of his pre
decessors.
50 Bustamante states that the total amount in which Iturrigaray was con
demned was 384,241 pesos. Cuadro, Hist., i. 9; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 265;
Sup. Cavo, Tres Sirjlos, iii. 245.
51 For copy of sentence, see Ateneo, Mej., i. 234.
52 Bustamante writing in 1821 says: 'Con la muerte de dicho Gefe, su
f amilia se ha acabado de arruinar, y a la sazon en que escribo, yace su esposa
paralitica en una cama en Jae"n.' Cuadro, Hint., ed. 1823, i., carta l a , 16.
Iturrigaray died in 1821, at the age of nearly 80 years. Neyreie, Hex. Siglo
XIX., i. 134.
53 Alaman met and conversed with Iturrigaray in Madrid in 1814. The
ex-viceroy was then 72 years old, and on all occasions when Mexican events
were the topic, he assured Alaman that he had never entertained the thought
of effecting the independence of New Spain. Indeed, it was impossible to
prove the charge of treason against him, as the only ground for supposing
62 ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
viceroy had really been the first promoter of inde
pendence, and had fallen a victim to the cause I And
further, the claim was respected. The Mexican con
gress in 1824 stopped proceedings, and restored to
Iturrigaray's heirs the $400,000 invested in the rain
ing tribunal. Such was the result of one of the
O
most important and memorable investigations made
during the whole period of viceregal administration. 54
The trial of Iturrigaray, while exposing his grasping
avarice and nefarious transactions, throws little light
upon his political pretensions. It is only by a consid
eration of the discussions carried on by his supporters
and opponents, by an impartial estimate of the effect
of his administrative acts, 55 and by a close study of
his character that we may reasonably expect any light
on his secret intentions or expectations. Not only
did his enemies directly accuse him of treasonable
designs, but even insinuated that he was not unwilling
at one time to recognize Murat, Napoleon's representa
tive in Madrid. 56 But this is far fetched ; and in regard
that he meditated the independence of New Spain was his intention of con
voking a national congress. Hist. Mej., i. 270.
54 Alaman states that the heirs surreptitiously obtained from the audiencia
archives the original process against the ex-viceroy. Proceedings were insti
tuted against Guiol, who abstracted them. Alaman received his information
from Senator Olaguibcl, who defended Guiol at his trial, and authorized Ala-
man to use his name in proof of the fact. Hist. Mej. , i. 267.
55 Nothing gained for him more hostile feeling than the strictness with
which he conducted the consolidation of the funds of the Obras Has: 'In-
teres61e en este maldito negociado en un tanto por ciento el Ministerio
Espanol, y asi procure hacer efectivas sus proviclencias con un rigor, que le
atrajo el odio del Reyno.' Thus writes Bustamante, one of his principal
defenders. Cuadro, Hist., ed. 1823, i., carta l a , 15.
56 At the junta held on the 9th of August, 1808, according to Martinena,
the viceroy used these words : 'Seiiores, aim estamos en tiempo de reconocer
al duque de Berg, jque dicen V. SS.?' and when all exclaimed, *No Seuorf
no &e/lor/ f Iturrigaray, observing that the oidor decano Ciriaco Gonzalez
Carvajal was conspicuously emphatic, asked him. ' Y quo dira V. S. si lo ve
autorizado con la firma del Seuor Porlier?' Rev. Verdadero Origen, ii. 36.
Bustamante's version is very different. He states that when the question
of submission to the orders of Murat was put, the oidores turned pale, 'mas
el virey con animo denodado la decidi6, diciendo, que no lo obedeceria
inientras mandase un ejercito.' He afterward cast this timidity in their
teeth : 'Eiciendoles a los mismos oidores. . .Que. . .solo despues que han visto
mejorarse las cosas era cuando estaban valientes.' Sup. Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TIMES. 63
to the independence of Mexico, whatever he thought
of it, I am sure he did not look much beyond present
issues. Independence as a principle was with him a
small matter; independence as a means of profit de-
.pended greatly upon relations between France and
Spain. Hence his anxiety to provide against the con
tingency of being thrown over by a new power on
the convocation of a national congress; for he doubt
less believed that Spain would be unable to cope suc
cessfully with the arms of Napoleon. Under such
circumstances, if New Spain declared herself inde
pendent, there would be no special disloyalty on his
part to the mother country.
But Iturrigaray had not the sagacity to recognize
that the Creole faction which he favored was laying
deeper plans, and would not be satisfied with only
temporary freedom. He was not aware that beneath
his feet was a political vortex, a fact which the Span
ish element appreciated more clearly. His want of
tact, moreover, and his intemperate language, 57 had
given great offence, and he was cordially hated by
the oidores and their party. During the latter days
of his administration every expression of his counte
nance was watched by his opponents; every syllable
that fell from his lips was caught up, and, if possible,
interpreted as significant of his want of loyalty to
Spain. That the European party were fully per
suaded that he was aiming at the independence of
Mexico, there is no doubt, giving as proof his dis
mantling the seaward battery of Ulua, and convey
ing its guns into the interior, the changes made by
57 At the session held on the 9th of August, when the archbishop, perceiv
ing that the discussions were becoming interminable, proposed that they
should be contined to essential matters, Iturrigaray rudely and angrily
replied: 'Quo alii cada uno tenia libertad de hablar lo que quisiese, y que si
le parecia larga la junta, desde luego se podria marchar & su casa.' .Alanian,
Hist. Mej.j i. 196. On the same occasion Oidor Aguirre rose and said:
'Senor Exmo. La resolucion de defender estos dominioa necesita alguna ex-
plicacion.' The viceroy immediately answered: 'No hay nccesidad de ex-
plicacion: <5l que no lo entienda que se vaya, abierta tiene la puerta.' Rev.
Vtrdadc.ro Ori/jen, ii. 36.
64 ITUKRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.
him in military chiefs, and his intended establishment
of a national congress. 58
These arguments were combated by his supporters,
who noted the fact that Iturrigaray had taken the
oath of allegiance to Fernando, and denied any inten
tion to establish an independent government. The
removal of the artillery from San Juan de Ulua was
done, they asserted, for the purpose of avoiding the
mortality which prevailed among the troops stationed
at Vera Cruz 59 by placing them in more healthy local
ities. While they thus repudiated the accusations of
treasonable designs, they nevertheless acknowledged
many grave defects in his administration. 60
58 How strongly opposed the European party was to such a congress may
be seen from Bishop Qucipo's views expressed on the 2Gth of September:
' Una junta nacional. . .es una verdadera rebelion.' Col. Doc., 29; Pap. Var. t
62, no. 19, 28-34.
5a 'Que en Veracruz perecerlan, como siempre, a millares.' Rev. de N.
Esp., Ctnsura Particular, 3. Lerdo de Tejada, Apunt. Hist., 362, makes the
strange statement that Iturrigaray entertained such an infatuated belief in
his military skill that he dismantled the battery for the purpose of enticing
the English to make an attack on Vera Cruz, being confident of victory.
'pero afortunadamente para el virey, no sucedi6 asi, y a esto debio el que su
reputacion militar no quedase tan perdida como la de gobernante.' Lacunza,
Doc. Hist. Museo Mex., 534, makes the same statement.
60 Bustamante, one of his stanches b defenders, remarks: 'Conozco los
graves defectos de su administracion; uno de ellos es la venta escandalosa de
los empleos que hizo.' Sup., Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 245. The deposal of Itur
rigaray was the subject of various works and the theme of innumerable dia
tribes which rancorously discussed the cause of his fall, and its bearing on the
future destiny of Mexico. These writings embrace productions of every di
mension, from the size of a volume to small pamphlets or a couple of leaves in
a periodical. _ They were issued during a period which extended from the
time of Iturrigaray's trial before the council of the Indies till long after the
declaration of independence. A large proportion of the pamphlets and smaller
essays are anonymous. Their style, which is usually virulent, shows the
bitterness with which the two chief factions regarded each other. By far the
most important of these productions are published by Cancelada, Lizarza,
Mier y Guerra, and Martifiena. Juan Lopez Cancelada, the editor of the
Gazeta de Mexico, represented in Spain the interests of the commercial com
munity of Mexico which endeavored to obtain a revocation of the decision
which liberated Iturrigaray, released him from the accusation of treason, and
restored his ill-gotten wealth. Cancelada proved himself an inveterate enemy
of the fallen viceroy, and probably was influenced by personal feeling. In the
Gaz. de Mex., xv. 522, of the 2d of August, 1808, the editor published a rumor
that Fernando had been restored to the throne. This incensed Iturrigaray,
who summoned Cancelada before him and banished him. By the intercession
of the vice-queen, however, the order was withdrawn, and Cancelada allowed
to remain in Mexico, but was made to retract his assertion. After the de
posal of Iturrigaray, Cancelada assailed Villa Urratia by petitioning the audi-
encia to pronounce him a traitor, and punish him as such; but his language
was so malignant that he was condemned in a fine of 500 pesos for calumny,
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL. 65
or to imprisonment for two months. Ho later addressed the archbishop, then
viceroy, in such discourteous and unmeasured terms that he was arrested and
tried before the junta de seguridad y buen orden. Numerous persons brought
against him charges of insults and grievances, and his fractious and turbulent
tendencies being well known, the junta condemned him to banishment to
Spain. Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. xix.-xxiv. There he occupied himself
in writing on the political affairs of New Spain, displaying therein a vicious
enmity toward tho Creole and revolutionary party. In 1811 he published in
Cadiz La Verdad Sabida y Buena Fe Guardada, in which he maintains that
the revolution which broke out in Mexico in 1810 originated in Iturrigaray
and his treasonable designs. He asserts that a revolutionary tendency did
not exist at the time when Humboldt was in New Spain, as affirmed hy 'el
Espanol escritor en Londres,' and said that Humboldt's travels in Mexico
were too limited to admit of his understanding the spirit of the people. The
Verdad Sab/da gave great offence to the ayuntamiento of Mexico, and the
regidores petitioned the supreme council of the Spanish regency to order his
arrest on the charge of abominable libels principally directed against that
municipality. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 725. In Mexico Cance-
lada for some years followed the avocation of a pedler. He was of a quar
relsome and rancorous disposition, and is described by the ayuntamiento of
Mexico as 'hombre bien conocido en este reyno por su cavilosidad, estupidez
y audacia.' Id. Of low origin and uneducated, it is a matter of surprise that
he obtained the position as editor of the Gazeta de Mexico, the official organ
of the government, which was under his direction for some years. Fernando,
on his return to Spain, caused him to be placed in a convent, from which,
however, he was liberated in 1820. He died a few years afterward. Besides
the Verdad Sabida, he was the author of many other works, among which
may be mentioned Ruina de la Nuera Espana si se declara cl comercio libre
con los eztrangeros, Cadiz, 1811, 4to, pp. 84; Conducta. del Excelentisimo Seilor
Don Jos6 Iturr/cjaray, Cadiz, 1812, 4to, 2 1. pp. 135; and the TeUcjrnfo Ame
ricano, a periodical which he published in Spain, and which was opposed
in the Censor by Alcocer of Tlascala. In reply to the Verdad Sabida,
appeared in the same year the Discurso que Publica Don Facundo de Lizarza
Vindicando. . .Iturrifjaray. It handles Cancelada with great severity, and
frequently gives him the lie direct. Lizarza, who was Iturrigaray 's law
yer, was not the author of the Discurso, but Jose Beye de Cisneros, the
brother of the abbot of Guadalupe, who was imprisoned on the downfall of
the viceroy and at that time Mexican deputy to the c6rtes at Cadiz.
Alaman, Hist. RIej., i. 268. The work displays considerable acumen in the
refutation of Cancelada, and supplies many facts favorable to Iturrigaray
purposely ignored in the Verdad Sabida. Although Cisneros is not sparing
in severe animadversions upon the dissertation, describing it as a texture of
lies, falsifications, and fiction, he has the good taste to retrain from the gross
vituperation so noticeable in the writings of that time. Cancelada in reply
published his Conducta del Exmo. Sefior. . .Iturrigaray, Cadiz, 1812, which
is valuable as being composed mainly of transcripts of official documents bear
ing upon Iturrigaray's fall and trial. Among these appear the report of his
administration and conduct from the time of his arrival to his deposal, drawn
up by the real acuerdo of Mexico, November 9, 1808; official accounts of the four
memorable juntas convoked by him on the 9th and 31st of August, and the
1st and 9th of September, 1808; the royal orders issued by the regency of
the isla de Leon; and other official papers quoted in this chapter. With re
gard to the report of the real acuerdo, to which Cancelada triumphantly ap
peals as conclusive evidence 'of Iturrigaray's aspirations to the sovereignty of
New Spain, I have only to remark that the members of that court were bit
terly hostile to the viceroy, and that their representations cannot be accepted
as impartial. Historia de la Revolucion de Nueva Espana, etc., Escribia fa Dn
Jose Guerra, Londres, 1813, 2 vols, 8vo. This work was first undertaken by
Jose" Servando de Mier y Guerra, with the object of defending Iturrigaray
against the defamatory attacks of Cancelada, but the author, being supplied
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 5
G6 ITURRIGABAY'S DEPOSAL.
with a great quantity of material for the history of subsequent events, carried
it forward and included the iirst years of the revolution in Mexico. The first
volume is almost entirely devoted to the vindication of Iturrigaray ; in the
second the progress of the revolution is narrated clown to the year 18i"2.
Guerra in his preface supplies us with a biographical sketch of Cancelada's
life down to the date of the publication of the Historia, and exposes his
career with most contemptuous irony. His work is largely taken up with
extracts from official documents, of which he possessed a great number.
For the insertion of so much of such material lie excuses himself upon the
plea that having been far from the scene of events, and having undertaken
to refute the false representations of one who professed to have been present
at them, he was compelled to support his arguments by documentary evi
dence. Guerra, after the fall of the viceroy, narrowly escaped arrest, and
fleeing from Mexico took up his residence in London. There he became the
most able defender of Iturrigaray, who, according to Alaman, Hist. Mfj.,
i. 2G8-1), supported him in London until his tendencies inclined to the sup
port of the involution. His work displays great talent and skill. While
the style is elegant, the author had at his command a sarcasm that could
bite. Alaman speaks highly of this work, which, party spirit aside, will,
he says, be ever appreciated for the amount of information which it contains.
Verdadero Origen. . .dela Revolution de Nueva Espaila, etc., Mexico, 1820, fol.
pp. 17. (Followed by) Manijiesto a Todas las Nadones por el Superior Gold-
erno de Nueva Etpaila. The author of this angry treatise was Juan Martin
de Juan Martinena, who in 1816 took up the gauntlet in defence of Iturriga
ray 's deposers. Martinena quotes extracts from Lizarza, Cisneros, Busta-
mante, and other supporters of Iturrigaray, and condemns these writers with
vehement asperity. ' How degrading it is, 'he exclaims, 'to find in them the
same language, the same ideas, object, and even vulgar outcry voces materialcs
as in the rebel leaders with respect to Iturrigaray and the faithful patriots
who put a stop to his criminal proceedings, the only difference being that
the former affect peace, harmony, and fidelity, which the latter do not, being
in a position to explain frankly their true sentiments!' The historian has,
however, to thank Juan Martin de Juan Martinena for his transcript of the
Manifesto, but particularly for the large number of interesting documents
appended thereto. The publication of the Verdadero Origen, etc., immediate
ly brought out a number of anonymous replies, from among which I will make
mention of C en sura Particular e Impartial del Cuaderno Titulado: Verdadero
origen, etc. ; Breves Reflexiones que pneden anadirse por via de impunnation
at, id.; and Conwjos al Sr Autor, Editor y A notador del Cuaderno en Folio
Titulado, id. With regard to the Manifiesto above mentioned, it was issued
on the 16th of January, 1816, by the government of New Spain, in refutation
of the ' falsehoods, calumnies, and errors which the rebels of Mexico have
given utterance to in a paper entitled El Supremo Congreso Mexicano d todas
las Naciones, escrito en Puruarun a 28 de junio de 1815.'
CHAPTER IV.
VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
1808-1810.
GARIBAY'S CHARACTER A BADGE or LOYALTY REORGANIZATION OF THE
ARMY BOXAPARTIST INTRIGUES LAMPOONS AND SEDITIOUS SHEETS
EFFECT OF REVERSES IN SPAIN ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUNTA CONSUL-
TIVA PRETENSIONS TO THE THRONE OF MEXICO ARCHBISHOP LIZANA
APPOINTED VICEROY REMITTANCES TO SPAIN LIZANA'S CHARACTER,
THE JUNTA DE SEGURIDAD REVOLUTION AT VALLAPOLID SPANISH
AMERICAN REPRESENTATION IN THE CORTES LIZANA REMOVED FROM
OFFICE WEAK ADMINISTRATION OF THE AUDIENCIA FRENCH EMIS
SARIES ARRIVAL OF VICEROY VENEGAS His ANTECEDENTS, CHARAC
TER, AND PERSONAL APPEARANCE TITLES AND HONORS FROM SPAIN.
WHEN the chaquetas conceived the design of seizing
and deposing the viceroy, they imagined that they
would thus be cutting off the hydra's head, that by
one bold stroke they would annihilate the monster of
disloyalty. But they erred in their calculations.
The Creole party, disappointed that their hope should
fail in a season so fair for its accomplishment, were
doubly embittered. They believed that as matters
stood in the mother country, they, and not the Span
iards, were the power in the land. Rivalry and hatred
between the two factions increased, and henceforward
the revolutionary spirit spread silently and far with
rapidity. 1
At a time so fraught with difficulties, arising from
violent political change, no more incompetent man
1 In 1811 the Mexican deputies to the Spanish c6rtes represented that the
imprisonment of Iturrigaray had provoked the rivalry between the Spaniards
and Creoles, ' difundiendose sordamente por el Reyno, y creciendo de dia en
dia.' Diputac., Amer. Hep., 1 de Agosto de 1811, 3.
(67)
68 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
could have been placed at the head of affairs than
Pedro Garibay, field marshal of the royal armies.
Infirm of body 2 and weak of will ; of meagre resources,
lacking ability, and wanting in authority even in his
own household; a victim, moreover, to the anxiety
attending poverty he was undergoing the penalties
which those must pay who by reason of great strength
arrive at the age of fourscore years. 3 Nevertheless,
he eagerly accepted the high position offered him.
In the early part of his life lie had served in the wars
in Italy and Portugal, and in 1764 went to Mexico
with General Villalva. By slow promotion he at- .
tained the grade of brigadier in 1789, and at a later
date was allowed to retire on account of his infirmities,
with the rank of mariscal de campo de los reales
ejercitos. His poverty was such that he was fre
quently compelled to borrow small sums from his
acquaintances. 4 He was honorable, and well liked by *
high and low. Such as he was, however, his insuf
ficiency was the reason of his election. The oidores,
whom he regarded as his protectors, 6 were not desir
ous that a strong man should be at the head of affairs;
and during Garibay's short administration, in all acts
of government he was but the mouth-piece of the
audiencia. 6
As soon as the coup d'etat in the case of I turn-,
garay was accomplished, the new government, with
out formally recognizing either of the Spanish juntas,
proceeded to rule in the name of Fernando VII. ; and
2 'Padecia una enfermedad de est6mago. . .teniendo que apoyarse en un
criado cuando salia d la calle.' Rivera, Gob. Mcx., i. 545.
3 Bustamante states that he was over 80. Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 250. Ala-
man says, 'era un anciano de mas de setenta aiios.' Hist. Mcj., i. 279. But
as he entered his military career in 1742, the former's statement must be
nearer the truth. He was unable from his infirmities to sign documents, and
was compelled to use a stamp. Disposic. V arias, i. f. 134.
*Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 280.
5 ' Vio su exaltacion como un gran beneficio, y en los oidores unos pro-
tectores, cuyo titulo no les negaba en sus contestuciones secretas. ' Bustamante,
ut cit.
6 ' Era todo de ellos, y haciaprecisamenteloque le mandaba Aguirre, capa-
taz de la Andiencia.' 76. ' Pero este era el hombre que convenia al Acuerdo
y a sus miras.' Mora, Mcj. y sus Rev., iii. 347.
DISBANDMENT OF THE CHAQUETAS. 69
an order was issued that the inhabitants of the capi
tal, in token of their loyalty, should wear on their
persons a badge bearing his name. 7 The tribunal del
consulado . was instructed to communicate the same
order to all corporations within the jurisdiction of
that court. 8 The first important step which the new
government took in order to insure its stability was
the reorganization of the army. Neither the vol
unteers of Fernando VII. nor the forces at Jalapa
were regarded as supports free from objection. The
party from which the former were drawn seemed to
expect their own political views adopted in the new
order of affairs which they had created, and the
oidores feared that the freedom of their own action
would thereby be impeded. Accordingly the chaque-
tas were disbanded by Garibay, who would no longer
detain such loyal and self-denying persons from their
commercial occupations. He thanked them in the
name of Fernando for their patriotism, for the ever
memorable services they had rendered, and informed
them that he should not fail to place a memorial of
their merits at th>: feet of his majesty. 9 In breaking
up the encampment at Jalapa the oidores were in
fluenced by still more forcible reasons. The regiments
which composed the army stationed there were drawn
from the different provinces, and the ranks filled by
Mexicans, whose loyalty could not be safely relied
upon if the flag of independence should be raised.
Orders were therefore issued that each corps should
return to its respective district; the reason assigned
being that, in view of the alliance which had been
formed between Spain and England, 10 the concentra
tion of so large a force for defence was no longer nec
essary. It was further urged that the government,
7 Gaz. deMex., xv. 687. Many persons had gold medals made, and wore
them on their coat collars. Alainan possessed a collection of them, and states
that they were of poor workmanship. Hist. Afej., i. 282.
8 Gaz. de Mcx., xv. G99.
9 Id., 804. The order was given on the 15th of October. Hernandez y Da-
valos, Col. Doc., i. G1G-17.
10 England had made peace with Spain in July 1808.
70 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
in its efforts to send pecuniary aid to the peninsula,
could not afford the expense of maintaining a stand
ing army. 11 A regiment of grenadiers was organized,
and this with the dragoons of Mexico constituted the
military force in the capital.
During Garibay's rule the revolutionary tendency
advanced apace. Secret meetings were held at pri
vate houses. 12 A society known as the Racionales
Caballeros was organized at Vera Cruz, Jalapa, and
Mexico, which by its machinations greatly aided the
cause of independence. 13 Further than this, the secret
agents of Joseph Bonaparte were actively at work
inciting the inhabitants to rebellion. 14
o
11 Manuel Abad y Queipo condemns this action of Garibay, stating that he
did so 'por habcr entendido quo, entre algunos oiicialcs se hablaba con lib-
ertad sobre independencia, y por remediar este mal. . .incurrio en otro mayor,
que fue" poner en contacto a los rnilicianos con sus vecinos, sus parientes y
amigos, en que es imposible que el contacto de los unos deje do contauiinarse
con los otros. ' The bishop says that he ought to have punished these free-
spoken officers, and placed others in command who could have been relied
upon. Inform?, dirig. alrey., in Zamacois, Hi$t. -3/e/., ix. 8678.
12 A prominent personage now was the marques de Rayas, who was a
stanch adherent of Iturrigaray, and espoused the cause of independence
after his fall. The proofs of disloyalty against him were so strong that he
w r as sent prisoner to Spain, but was detained at Vera Cruz by sickness. In
1821 he returned to Mexico. Refutac. Artie, de Fondo, 19-21.
13 Their mode of operation was to work on the government so to act as to
foment discontent. The efforts of this society were particularly successful
with Viceroy Iturrigaray, according to Queipo, who states that by flattery
and cajoling they so influenced him that ' lo hizo titubear en la fidelidad de
tal modo, que su conducta ambigua hizo creer d los sediciosos que estaba de-
cidido en su favor, y con esto arrojaron la mascara y atacaron cara descubi-
erta los derechos de la monarquia.' Informe dirlg. al rcy., in Zctmacois, Hist.
Mcj., ix. 802.
14 'Pcro no olvidando tampoco Napoleon el objeto interesante de las Ame'-
ricas, envi6 comisionados d, seducir y comprar los virreyes, gobernadores y
demas personas que por la fuerza 6 por su influxo pudiesen clominar el pue
blo.' 6'2. de Mcx., xv. 933. In August 1808, among other seditious papers
seized at Vera Cruz was a despatch from Champani, the French minister
of foreign affairs, officially recommending a system of operations to pro
mote rebellion. Arrillaya, Informe, in Ce;iulario, iv. f. 59, no. 1. The same
year General Octaviano d'Alvimar, having been authorized to expend large
sums of money with this object, entered Mexican territory from the U. 8.
He was arrested at Nacodoches, in Texas, in August 1808, and proceedings
were instituted against him as an agent of Napoleon. Garibay sent him
prisoner to ISpain in 1809, and after the independence D'Alvimar attempted
to recover damages for his imprisonment and loss of personal effects. Gaz. de
Jlex., ut sup.; L'iwra, Gob. de Mcx., i. 549; fiwtamantp, in Caro, Trex Sighs,
iii. 259-01. D'Alvimar, while being conducted to the capital, passed through
Dolores, and had several interviews with Hidalgo, whom he earnestly en
couraged, it is asserted, in revolutionary designs. Diaz ('alvitlo. Sermon,
107-8. Hidalgo, however, at his trial asserted that his conversations with
PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION". 71
Lampoons and scurrilous pasquinades were posted
on the walls; insulting caricatures of the leading mem
bers of the government and loyalist party disfigured
the public buildings; and seditious sheets in print
were scattered on the floors of the cathedral and
churches. 15 The image of his majesty, moreover, was
grossly disfigured on the coinage/ 6 and the supreme
junta of Spain ridiculed. And all these seeds of
insurrection were so secretly and warily sown that
no efforts of the government were effective in sup-
D'Alvirnar had no political significance. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 359-60.
Monsieur Desmolard was Joseph Bonaparte's agent at Baltimore, and the
French usurper issued instructions to him which disclosed the plan to excite
revolt in Spanish America. The main points were to declare to the Creoles
that his imperial majesty had solely in view to give liberty to Spanish Amer
ica, the only return expected being the friendship of the people and com
merce with the country. To effect their independence, his majesty offered
all necessary troops and stores. The emissaries were further instructed to
point out the advantages which would accrue by suspending the heavy re
mittances to Spain, and by the acquirement of freedom from commercial and
agricultural restrictions. The good-will of the ecclesiastics especially was
to be gained, with the object that at the confessional they should urge the
necessity of independence. The injustice to which the Creoles were subject
in the disposal of public appointments was to be dwelt upon. At the same
time the agents were to be careful not to declaim against the inquisition or
the church, and on the insurrectional standards the motto 'Viva la Religion
catolica, apostolica y romana! Perezca el mal gobierno!' was to be inscribed.
The servants of governors and high officials were to be won over, and sub-
agents were to keep the principal agents duly informed of the progress made,
and these in turn were to communicate with Joseph Bonaparte's envoy in
the U. S. A copy of these instructions was found in Caracas, in the office
of the secretary to the suprema junta, and forwarded by the junta to the
English admiral at the Barbadoes station. Rev. in Span. Amer., 80-7; Wal
ton's Espost, app. 2-7; Calvo, Annales Hist., i. 43-5. The Spanish govern
ment warned the colonial authorities of Bonaparte's machinations. A royal
address, dated May 10, 1809, exhorting the inhabitants of New Spain to main
tain their loyalty, and be on guard against French intrigues, says ' para que
haciendolo publico,' that is, the address, 'en esos Dominios se precavan sus
naturales de las impresiones siniestras que podrian causarles las maquinacioncs
d intriguas que iiuestros feroces enemigos emplean ahora con mas arte que
nunca.' Disposic. Varias, i. f. 141. Garibay on April 18, 1809, published a
proclamation forbidding the landing of Frenchmen at the ports, whether
they had passports or not. All French settlers also were ordered to appear
within eight days before the alcaldes, by whom they were examined. If sus
picion attached to any of them, such were to be imprisoned. Gaz. de Mex. ,
xvi. 337-40.
15 On the 6th of October, 1808, Garibay published a decree with the object
of suppressing these papers. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 608-9.
16 Garibay on the 19th of May, 1809, issued a proclamation offering 2,000
pesos for the discovery of the mutilators of the coins. Ho says: 'Prctenden
ven gar el mal dxito de sus maquinaciones en el real busto de las monedas, de
las que han llegado a mis manos varias piezas senaladas cle modos diferentes,
todos enormemente ofensivos a la magestad, y en odio de la dinastia rey~
nante.' Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 423.
72 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
pressing the hostile demonstrations. In vain the use
and sale of hand printing-presses were prohibited/ 7
and in vain rewards were offered for the detection of
the authors of these treasonable acts.
In April 1809 news of reverses sustained by Span
ish arms in the peninsula reached Mexico, and Gari-
bay issued a proclamation on the 20th, 18 exhorting the
public to show their loyalty by contributions in aid of
the mother country, by sentiments expressing a closer
union in mind and heart, 19 and above .all, by refusing
to be influenced by the secret operations of those
who were endeavoring to seduce them from their al
legiance. But this proclamation had no effect in
arresting the steady advance of the revolutionary
party. Its adherents were jubilant, and did not re
frain from openly expressing their joy at the news.
They greeted with delight the intelligence of disas
ters suffered by the Spanish forces; and while they
exaggerated their defeats, they underrated and derided
the advantages which they gained.
Day by day the government was losing its influ
ence over the public mind, and becoming more and
more an object of ridicule on the part of the disaf
fected. In the hope of changing the current, Gari-
bay, or rather his advisers, established a junta con-
sultiva, composed of three oidores, before which all
cases of treason were to be tried instead of in the
criminal court. This tribunal was formed in June
17 On the 27th of April, 1809, the viceroy published a proclamation order
ing that all such presses should be delivered up to the judge of the tribunal
de la Acordada within three days. Diario de Max., x. 508. Yet on the 20th
of May following he found it necessary to offer a reward of 2,000 pesos for
the discovery of the persons who had scattered treasonable sheets in the
churches during holy week. Gaz. de Mcx. , ut cit. These sheets \vere di
rected against the Spanish junta central, and invited the people to assert their
independence. The junta central of Spain was recognized by the viceroy by
decree of March 16, 1809. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Cot. Doc., i. 680-3.
18 Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 365-8.
9 ' Olvidad descle ahora para siempre esos apodos de cri olios y gachupines,
de que haceis una aplicacion odiosa 6 ideal, supuesto que todoa los miembros
de una nacion no deben ser conocidos sino por el nombre mismo que lleva la
nacion de que son parte: ademas de que es tan ridiculo como absurdo hacer
inerito de una cosa que no esta en nuestra mano: es decir de nacer aqui 6 del
lado- de alia del mar.' Id., 368.
AX AZTEC MONARCH. 73
1809, and some arrests were made, but instead of
tending toward suppressing sedition, its creation was
turned to advantage by the independents, and sup
plied additional means of fomenting discontent. The
innovation made by transferring the prerogatives of
the sala del critnen to an extraordinary court arbi
trarily established, and employing a great number of
spies, was seized upon as an illustration of despotism,
on the part of the government. A rumor was spread
that the prisons were crowded with innocent victims;
households were filled with fear of arrests, and the
public were taught to believe that the mere suspicion
of free opinions being entertained by a man was suffi
cient to cause his being sent prisoner to Spain. 20
Outward demonstrations were, it is true, for the time
suppressed; but none the less did the cause of indepen
dence gain ground under the more cautious and se
cret operations of its promoters.
Illustrative not alone of the anomalous position in
which New Spain stood with regard to the mother
country during this period, but also of the unsettled
and somewhat incongruous ideas as to government
and succession, was a claim in 1808 of an Indian to
the throne of Mexico. This personage alleged that
he was a descendant of the emperor Montezuma,
and maintained that in view of the downfall of the
Spanish monarchy he had a right to the crown of the
Aztec royal line. Had the native population been as
well prepared for revolt as they were two years later,
such a claim might have caused much alarm, and
probably bloodshed. As it was, ridicule was the
20 Alaman attempted to trace the grounds for these reports, but could only
discover the names of the following persons arrested : The Franciscan padre
Sugasti, the silversmith Jose Luis Alconedo, charged with making a crown
for Iturrigaray, the escribano Peimbert, Antonio Calleja, the cura Palacios,
and the licentiates Vicente Acuna and Julian Castillejos, 'todos acusados
y muchos convencidos de ser autores de papeles 6 maquinaciones sediciosas. ' Id.
Compare Bustamante, in L'avo, Tre.s Siylos, iii. 253. Negrete agrees with Busta-
mante's statement that the jails were filled with prisoners. Hex. Stylo XIX.,
i. 181.
74 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
only weapon employed, and the pretender came to be
regarded by many as a madman.' 21
On the 13th of March, 1809, the English brig
Sapplio arrived at Vera Cruz from Rio Janeiro, bear
ing despatches from the infanta Dona Maria Carlota
Joaquina, the sister of Fernando, The letter was
addressed to the viceroy, audiencias, governors, and
municipalities of New Spain, and contained her wishes
and expectations that her son, the infante Don Pedro,
would be received and acknowledged . as regent and
lieutenant of the king. Such pretensions caused the
viceroy and audiencia much inquietude, and they en
deavored, though in vain, to keep the matter secret.
In their reply to the infanta they confined themselves
to expressions of courtesy, reporting that tranquillity
reigned in the country. 22 Not long after, the viceroy
received a letter from the junta central of Spain, in
forming him that it had become aware that Napoleon
meditated sending Carlos IV. to reign in New Spain,
with the object of creating a division in the Spanish
monarchy, 23 and instructions were given him to pro
hibit the landing of Carlos, and arrest him if he per
sisted. With the approval of the real acuerdo, the
viceroy issued the corresponding orders to the authori
ties at the ports.
21 'Los Europeos hicieron la mas alta burla de esta solicitud y su apoyo.'
His pretensions were finally crushed by a poetical burlesque, one of the lines
of which ran thus: 'Y treinta mil Indies guerreros vestidos a su usanza
esto es cencueros,' etc. Cancelada, Venlad Sabida, xx. The whole story ia
denied in Lizarza, Discurso Vind. Iturr., 1617.
22 Bustamante furnishes a copy of a portion of the infanta's despatch, the
tone of which is somewhat assuming. She thanks the members of the au
diencia and the archbishop for their zeal and wachfulness in having saved
the country; urges the viceroy to be vigilant in maintaining order and the
prosperity of the country; and wishes to be supplied with an exact account
of all notable events in the capital and kingdom, 'y si posible es de toda esa
America Septentrional.' Bustamante remarks: 'Su Alteza sin duda estaba
inuy ociosa cuando escribio dicha carta, y al tenor de ella otras muclias ; pudo
haber, ocupado el tiempo en hacer calzeta para sus hijos.' Cavo, TresSiglos, iii.
261-2. The letter is dated Rio de Janeiro, May 11, 1809.
23 Bustamante discredits any such idea on the part of Napoleon. 'La
Junta de Sevilla' he means the junta central, which had withdrawn to
Sevilla 'teniatan anchas tragaderas para engullir las mentiras mas absurdas,
como las tenia Garibay y su Cousejo de Oidores ; ' but was coniident that if
the attempt had been made Carlos would have triumphantly entered Mexico.
Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 2G2-3.
WEAK RULERS. 75
During the first six months of Garibay's rule no
formal recognition of the Spanish juntas had been
made. The decrees of the junta de Se villa had been
published and acted upon, but no oath of allegiance
to it as representative of the king was ever taken.
After the defeat of the French at Baylen, by Cas-
tanos, and their evacuation of Madrid, the juntas of
the different provinces came to an understanding, and,
the suprema junta central was installed at Aranjuez
on the 25th of September 1808. In March 1809 its
authority was recognized in Mexico, and the viceroy,
audiencia, municipality, and tribunals took the oath
of allegiance. The occasion was celebrated with sal
voes of artillery and illuminations. 24
The mental and physical incompetency of Garibay,
who possessed neither bodily activity nor intellectual
vigor, soon made it apparent to the Yermo party that
the political situation was daily becoming critical. Un
der the misrule of the oidores they observed that revo
lutionary principles were spreading instead of being
suppressed, and there were those who foresaw the
coming struggle. 25 Warnings were whispered to the
oidores, but passed unheeded, and the party which had
overthrown Iturrigaray represented the true state of
affairs to the junta central, urging the appointment of
an able and energetic viceroy without delay. By
such a measure only could the tranquillity of the coun
try be maintained. 26 The Spanish junta accordingly
2i Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 207, 205-70, 294-5; Disposlc. Varlas, i. f. 135-6; Di-
ario Mex., ix. G32. On April 5th the bishop of Oajaca delivered an oration
in support of this recognition. Id., x. 451-5.
25 Manuel Abad y Queipo in March 180D addressed the real acuerdo, urging
the necessity of augmenting the military force in order to insure internal
tranquillity and protection against invasion. With regard to the danger
threatened by the prevailing discord, he remarks in a note that at the time
when he wrote the representation 'no se podia entonces ponderareste peligro
sin aumentarlo en realidad por cuya razon solamente lo indique, en concepto
de quo esto era bastante para unos majistrados sabios e ilustrados en el asun-
to.' Represent, al Real Acuerdo, in Mora, Obras Sueltas, i. 119-26, and Col.
Escritos Import., 124-31.
2li Bustamante assisted in drawing up the ' instruccion, clamando por el
justo castigo de unos oidores revoltosos que nos iban orillando a la revolu-
cion.' Cavo, TresSlglos, iii. 204.
76 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
appointed Francisco Javier de Lizana y Beaumont,
archbishop of Mexico, to be viceroy in the place of
Garibay, whose election had riot been confirmed by
the home government, and whose elevation could not
be deemed legal. On the 19th of July Garibay sur
rendered the place, having been nominally the head
of the government for a period of ten months, but in
reality the political tool of Oidor Aguirre, who, in
some alarm at the change, requested leave to retire
from office four days previous to Lizana's installation.
Garibay returned to private life and poverty. From
the latter, however, he was relieved by the generosity
of Yermo, who made him a monthly allowance of five
hundred pesos. He was afterward decorated with
the grand cross of Carlos III., and granted a pension
often thousand pesos a year. 27 Pie died on the 17th
of July, 1815, at the age of eighty-six.
During his brief administration he exerted himself
in raising remittances for Spain, and when news of
the victory at Baylen arrived, he issued a proclama
tion, on October 4, 1808, asking for war contributions.
His call in the general enthusiasm was liberally re
sponded to, and the subscriptions, headed by the arch
bishop with 30,000 pesos, amounted to 716,346 pesos
by the end of the year. 28 A few days after its publi
cation the Spanish man-of-war San Justo arrived at
the port of Vera Cruz in command of the marques
del Real Tesoro, who had been commissioned by the
junta of Seville to obtain all the funds that could
be raised in New Spain and other American colonies.
At this time there were fourteen and a half millions
pesos in the treasury, nine millions of which, together
with two millions more contributed by wealthy indi
viduals, were at once transported to Vera Cruz for
shipment to Spain. 29
27 Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 301; Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 765.
28 By the end of June 1809 these donations reached the sum of 1,482,131
pesos. /-/., xvi. 580.
89 Eight millions were put on board the San Justo, and the remaining three
millions were shipped on two English frigates which entered the port at that
FROM BAD TO WORSE. 77
The new viceroy was no better than the old one.
Had Spain specially desired to throw away Mexico,
the appointment of Archbishop Lizana was the very
thing to do. Old, sickly, as feeble in mind as in body,
he was fitter for a hospital than for the viceregal
palace. 33 In one sense he was too good for the place.
Spain wanted there a mean man, a hypocritical, lying
trickster; one who could be false to all the world except
Spain particularly one who would be false to Mexico.
Now Lizana was none of these. He was passably
honest. He had a good heart, and a benign disposi
tion; he lacked altogether the force of will to hold
down insubordination, or regulate contending factions.
Yet it was a lucky choice for the cause of indepen
dence. The policy of such a ruler must necessarily
be timid, and his purpose vacillating. 31 Episcopal
pastorals were employed where viceregal orders should
have been presented on the point of the sword. Frank
and sincere, he had no insight into human character, 32
and he allowed himself to be entirely swayed by the
oidor Manuel de la Bodega and his cousin, the in
quisitor Alfaro, to whose charge he committed the
administration of his archiepiscopal government. Al
faro, spurred by ambition but blinded by his vanity,
soon fell into the toils of the racionales caballeros; and
Lizana, under his guidance, adopted administrative
measures which, while they excited the spirit of re
time. Alaman, Hist. M?j., i. 286. Ncgrete makes no mention of the $2,000,-
000 contributed by private subscriptions. Mex. Siylo XIX., i. 156.
30 His state of health frequently compelled him to transact the public
business in bed. Alaman, 1 1 lit. Afej., i. 303.
31 As already related, the archbishop was at first favorably disposed to the
convocation of a general congress; but alarmed at the angry disputes on the
question, he suddenly changed his opinions, and took part with the deposers
of Iturrigaray. He as quickly, however, repented of his action, ' confes6 d
la Junta Central que habia sido enganado en la separacion de Iturrigaray, y
que estaba arrepentido de haber cooperado a la ejecucion cle tan horrenda mal-
dad.' Bustamante, in Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 265, also 244. Henceforth he
favored the party which had advocated the convocation of a general congress.
32 Bustamante describes him as 'eandoroso como ttno nino,'and Abad y
Queipo says: 'Este virtuoso prelado era un hombre muy sencillo, que no cono-
cia el corazon humano, ni tenia luces en materias politicas ni de gobierno.'
Informe diriy. al rey., in Zamacois* ix. 863,
78 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
bellion, conduced even more directly to the advance
ment of the intriguers' designs.
Thus led bv the craft and machinations which were
brought to bear upon his adviser, Alfaro, he entered
upon a system of opposition to the Yermo party and
the stan chest loyalists. Their dissatisfaction at his
official action was so marked that the intriguers had
no difficulty in persuading the guileless archbishop
that a plot was hatching among the gachupines to
capture or assassinate him; whereupon he fortified the
viceregal palace with artillery and increased the
guard. He placed all that portion of the city under
martial law. The patrol force w r as augmented, and
detachments were stationed at all important points.
Orders were issued that the patrols should arrest
after eleven o'clock at night all persons on whom arms
were found; and should more than six men in one party
be met, they were all to be arrested. 33 Military offi
cials of unquestionable loyalty to the mother country
were removed. Aguirre arid other prominent Span
iards were threatened with banishment, 34 and Lizana,
abhorring the Yermo party, and hoodwinked by the
racionales caballeros, who about that time were loud
in their protestations of loyalty, identified himself with
the Creole faction, which so eagerly had advocated the
convocation of a national congress. He could not see
33 Ib. A copy of this brilliant 6rden de la plaza, dated November 3, 1809,
is supplied by Martinena and JJernandez y Ddvalos, Col. JJoc., i. 715-
16. I copy the instructions given to the palace guard as indicating the extent
to which the fears of Lizana had been worked upon. 'La guardia del arzo-
bispado y casa de Moneda, no abriran las puertas principales de la calle aun
cuando oigan tiros de fusil 6 canon durante la noche, a menos que no vaya
mandarlo personalmente uno do los ayudantes de S. E. I.' Rev., Vcrdadcro
Orirjen, no. 1, 78-9. Consult Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 254. Mora, how
ever, states that a formal plot against his government and person actually
existed, the conspirators being of the Yermo faction, with Aguirre at their
head. M?j. y sus Rev., iii. 364-5.
34 Aguirre was ordered to Puebla, and it was rumored that he would be
sent to Spain. The excitement was so great that Lizana recalled him, and
Aguirre returned to the capital in triumph, 'con gran discre'dito del arzobispo,
quien con esta facilidad en dictar providencias contrarias, daba a conocer que
6 no meditaba debidamente lo que hacia, 6 que despues de hecho no tenia
firmezaparasostenerlo.' Alaman, Hist. Mej.,i. 312; Biistamante, in Cavo, Tres
Sirjlos, iii. 2G8-9.
HATH A DOG MONEY ? 79
that it was identical with the independents, and the
partiality which he displayed, far from appeasing the
spirit of discontent, only served to fan the flames by
undesigned encouragement. It was as cunning a by
play as the age can boast, and most successful withal. 35
And all the while the good old prelate was thus un
wittingly playing into the hands of independence, he
was in truth intensely loyal to Spain. Money he sent
without stint, and money was always Spain's most
chronic desire. Besides obtaining large donations, he
surrendered all the surplus funds of his ecclesiastical
revenue, and even threw in his salary. 36
On the 26th of July an Englishman, Andrew
Cochrane, arrived in Mexico, the bearer of an order
from the junta central of Spain for the sum of three
million pesos, on behalf of the British government.
The treasury was empty, and again the colonists were
asked to give, give ! 37 The viceroy appealed for a loan;
the call was answered with astonishing promptness, and
by the 7th of August $2,955,435 had been subscribed
by the commercial class and other persons of wealth.
The remainder was soon made up; and the commis
sioner, after being royally entertained, returned to his
vessel, bearing with him the three million pesos, and a
high appreciation of the wealth of Mexico 33 and the
35 Lizana was by no means a supporter of independence, except by acci
dent, and without knowing it. 'Este prelado en ningun sentido podia lla-
marse amigo de la independencia; pero testigo de los escesos cometidos en
muclios meses por los Espafioles, aprensores de Iturrigaray, habia concebido
por ellos una conocida aversion.' Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.> iii. 303.
36 ' He cedido gustosamente para las urgencias de la corona el sobrante de
mi renta episcopal; y cedo gustosisimo para el mismo efecto los sueldos del
virreynato.' Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 700.
37 Cancdada, Tel. Mex., 32. Consult also Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 619-20, 703;
Diario de Mex., xi. 119-20.
38 Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 7G1-4. Among the subscribers of large sums to the
loan, I notice the names of Antonio Bassoco, $200,000, Domingo de Acha,
$150,000, and Prior Francisco Alonso Teran and his brother Antonio, $200,000.
The total, as given by Cancelada, Tel. Mex., 36, was $3,210,435. Cochrane
was entertained with great hospitality. At Puebla he was presented with
two valuable paintings by Murillo! Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 304. This last
author states that $400,000 of the above contribution were forcibly taken
from the house of the duke of Terranova, marques del Valle, and a descend
ant of Cortes. Id. , 3056. Bustamante, however, informs us that Lizana had
received orders to confiscate the property of Terranova, who had attached
himself to the party of Joseph Bonaparte. The sum which was seized, as
80 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZ AN A.
senseless stupidity of the people in thus spending
their lives and substance to minister to the follies of
Spain's licentious and imbecile rulers.
In regard to his government, the viceroy fully be
lieved that his conciliatory policy toward the discon
tented would allay any spirit of revolt that might
exist; nevertheless, he deemed it right to carry out
the measure adopted by his predecessor for the main
tenance of public tranquillity, and on the 21st of
September, 1809, permanently established the court
initiated by Garibay, under the name of junta con-
sultiva. This court, which Lizana named the junta
de seguridad y buen orden, was composed at first of
three members of the audiencia and a fiscal, 39 and its
jurisdiction extended to all cases of French tendencies
and infidelity to the crown of Spain. 40
Hitherto the independent party had formed no con
certed plan of operation. The arguments, however,
which had been employed by the partisans of Iturri-
garay, and their opponents, suggested ideas which led
to the belief in the possibility of independence. The
former, in defending Iturrigaray's character from the
aspersion of disloyalty, urged that had he established
an independent nation, it could not long have con
tinued as such. Whether Spanish or French arms
prevailed, an invincible force would quickly be sent
against the revolted colony. Their opponents in reply
imprudently endeavored to prove that Mexico could
well sustain her independence. The force of their ar
guments was such that the more eager of the revolu-
given by this author, was 700,000 pesos. Cavo, Tres Sifjlos, iii. 2G5-6. On
March 23, 1809, the Spanish government ordered the confiscation of the prop
erty of French partisans. Gaz. Mex., xvi. 769-70; Disposic. Varies, i. f. 140.
The repayment of these loans was commenced in the following September, a
date earlier than that promised by the viceroy as the time for their liquida
tion. Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 826-7.
39 The members appointed by the viceroy were the regent of the audiencia,
Pedro Catani, the oidor Tomas Gonzalez Calderon, the alcalde del crimen of
the audiencia, Juan Collado, and the fiscal of the criminal court, Francisco
Robledo. (Jaz. de Mex., xvi. 867.
40 ' Sobre el delito de adhesion al partido frances, y sobre papeles, conver-
saciones, 6 m urmuraciones sediciosas 6 seductivas con todas sus conexiones
< incidencias.' Id., 868.
PLAN OF REVOLUTION. 81
tionists decided to act, and in September a formal plot
was laid at Valladolid in Michoacan for the overthrow
of the government. 41 The principal persons in the
scheme were Jose Maria Obeso, captain of the militia
regiment of Valladolid; a Franciscan friar, Vicente
de Santa Maria; Manuel Ruiz de Chavez, cura of
Huango; Jose Mariano de Michelena, lieutenant of
the Spanish infantry, and at this time engaged at Va
lladolid in recruiting for his regiment; his brother, the
licentiate Jose Nicolas Michelena; Mariano Quevedo,
lieutenant of the regiment of New Spain, also present
on recruiting business ; and the licentiate Soto Saldafia.
These and some others met and discussed a plan of
action. With great caution they endeavored to ^con
fine discussion to two questions: whether they would
be able successfully to resist the French in case Spain
succumbed, and thereby preserve the dominion for
Fernando; and whether, such being their object, they
ought to maintain their ground if opposed. Adher
ents to the cause were despatched to Piitzcuaro,
Queretaro, Zitacuaro, and other places to promulgate
the scheme; and by the middle of December their
operations had been so successful, that the 21st of that
month was appointed as the day on which to raise the
standard of revolt; their intention being first to seize
the asesor of the intendencia, Jose Alonso de Teran,
and the comandant Lejarza, and then proclaim the
revolution in the intendencia of Guanajuato. The
regiment of native infantry, commanded by Obeso,
could be relied upon, as also the detachments with
Michelena and Quevedo; and it was confidently ex
pected that with the promise of release from the pay
ment of tribute, eighteen or twenty thousand Indians
would immediately join their standard. Hitherto the
plans of the reA^olutionists had been conducted with
such caution that the government officials appear to
have been wholly unaware of the movement; but on the
41 See Michelena's account of the influence which these arguments had upon
in
G
the independent party. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 5.
HIST. HEX., VOL. IV. '
82 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
14th of December Francisco de la Concha, cura of the
cathedral parish, warned Teran of the impending dan
ger. One of the revolutionists, Luis Correa, had com
municated particulars of the scheme to the cura of
Celaya, who in turn revealed them in confidence to
Concha. Teran acted with wariness and circumspec
tion, and instead of proceeding to make arrests, was
contented for the time silently to watch the persons ac
cused. On the morning of the 21st, however, Concha
again visited him and urged the necessity of immedi
ate action ; whereupon he caused the padre Santa
Maria to be arrested. This was immediately known
by the principal revolutionists, who met to plan his
rescue, while Correa in alarm for his safety hurried to
Teran and divulged all that he knew. Summoned by
the comandante Lejarza to appear before him, the
revolutionists, deeming it prudent to obey, were made
prisoners. Soto Saldaiia, who was not with the ar
rested party, rashly attempted to rouse the native
population, but was discovered; he escaped, however,
and hid himself. 42
Teran now proceeded to prosecute the accused with
activity, and with a vigor which eventually was the
cause of his assassination. 43 But the viceroy, more
inclined to mercy, and believing that severity would
only fan the revolutionary flame, listened to the rep
resentations made to him in favor of the prisoners. 44
He ordered in January following the proceedings to
42 This account has been mainly derived from Michelena's narrative, sup
plied by him to Bustamante, a copy of which is furnished by that author in
his work Cuadro Hist., i. 12-16. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 314-17, has also been
consulted, and his version of the denunciation been adopted.
43 His severity 'le atrajo el 6dio publico, por lo que en la revolucion del
ano 1810 fu4 cruelmente asesinado. ' Bustamante, in Cavo, Tres Sirjlos, iii. 268.
44 Bustamante, counsel for the accused, pleaded for them personally with
Lizana. ' El oidor Aguirre, ' he said, ' opina que el dia que se ahorque el primer
insurgente, Espaua debe perder la esperanza de conservar esta America.'
'Yo soy de la inisma opinion,' replied the viceroy, 'vuya V. seguro de que
mandare sobreseer en esta causa.' Cuadro Hist., i. 17. Abaci y Queipo re
presented to Lizana that 'cste primer movimiento se debia tratar, 6 con
munho vigor, 6 con muohoindulgencia,' but remarks, 'Laenormidad deldelifco
exigia la enormidad de la peaa.' Informe dirig. alrey., in Zamacois, Hist.
Mcj., ix. 865-6.
ALARM IN THE CAPITAL. 83
be stopped. Obeso was sent to serve in the military
camp at San Luis Potosi, and Michelena in that at
Jalapa; the rest were released from prison, but con
fined to the limits of Valladolid and its suburbs. 45
This affair thus nipped in the bud, in spite of the
failure to prove its connection with Hidalgo's later in
surrection, was in fact the initiation of active move
ments in the revolution. The views and intentions
of the leaders had been widely spread; numbers of
their associates having escaped zealously carried on
the work, and in nine months after the failure at
Valladolid the battle-cry of freedom was raised at
Dolores.
In order to allay the excitement caused by the dis
covery of the affair at Valladolid, the viceroy, on the
22d of January, 1810, proclaimed that there was no
reason for alarm, as the late occurrences had only
arisen from a difference of opinions relative to the re
sult of affairs in Spain. He himself was wholly free
from anxiety, and the public were exhorted to rest
without dread of popular commotion. 411
45 When the revolution headed by Hidalgo broke out in September 1810,
these conspirators were again placed under arrest, and their case continued
by the junta de seguridad. No connection, however, between the Valladolid
conspiracy and that at Dolores could be proved against them, and in 1813
they were released under the pardon granted to revolutionists by tho Span
ish c6rtes on the 15th of October, 1810. Copy of decree in Dublan and Lo-
zano, L^fjis. Mex., i. 336. Michelena on the occasion of his second arrest was
treated with great severity by Viceroy Venegas, who imprisoned him in the
fortress of Ulua. There he was cruelly dealt with, though suffering from
rheumatism, and was finally shipped in a helpless condition to Spain where
he served as a captain in the regiment of Burgos. Padre Santa Maria hav
ing escaped from the convent of S. Diego where he had been confined, died
of fever at Acapulco, whither he had gone to join Morclos, who was besieging
the castle. Obeso died soon afterward, having been imprisoned for more thau
two years. Few of these early patriots lived to see the day of independence.
Michelena says: 'Casi todos murieron ysolo vimos realizada la independencia
D. Antonio Cumplido, D. Antonio Castro, D. Jose" Maria Izazaga, D. Jose"
Maria Abarca, D. Lorenzo Carrillo, yo, y no s6 si alguno otro.' JJustamante,
Cnad. Hitf,, i. 16. The same authority states that both Allende and Aba-
solo, so conspicuous at a later date as leaders in the revolution, were con
nected with this affair. Bustamante is of opinion that Iturbide was the
informer, offended at not being given a high command by the revolutionists
whose meetings he attended. Alaman, however, advances arguments to dis
prove this. Hint. Mej., i. 317-19.
46 'Y pucs vuestro virey estd tranquilo, vivid vosotros tambien seguroa.'
Mex. Proc. del Virey, 12.
84 VICEROYS GAEIBAY AND LIZANA.
While thus blindly affording every encouragement
to rebellion at home, Lizana took great precaution
against the less imminent danger of foreign invasion.
Out of the scattered companies formed by Iturrigaray
in various towns, he organized battalions; 47 the regi
ment of Yera Cruz was increased, and arms were or
dered to be purchased in London and the United
States. In the exhausted condition of the treasury,
the viceroy once more appealed for money to pay for
these weapons, and considerable sums were contrib
uted. A cannon foundry was established in the
capital, Francisco Dimas Rangel engaging to furnish
the government weekly with one piece of artillery.
The cost of the establishment was $8,000, which
amount was contributed by the dean and chapter of
Valladolid. 48
Meanwhile disaster attended the Spanish arms!
After the battle of Talavera, Wellington had retired
into Portugal, leaving the Spaniards to cope with
the French as best they could; and Venegas, the fu
ture viceroy of New Spain, rashly giving battle at
Almonacid was routed on the 9th of August, 1809.
Then followed the defeat at Osana, and the retirement
of the junta central from Seville to the island of Leon.
The unpopularity of the junta was so great, however,
that the members recognized the necessity of dissolv
ing, and their last official act was the creation, on the
O *
29th of January, 1810, of a regency composed of five
members, the bishop of Orense, Pedro de Quevedo y
Quintano, who had firmly opposed the projects of
Napoleon at the congress of Bayonne; Francisco de
Saavedra, president of the junta de Se villa; Fran-
47 This was the origin of the battalions of Tula, Cuautitlan, Tulaucingo,
and others. Alaman, Hist. Alej., i. 321.
**Gaz. de. Mex. t 1310, i. 247-8; Diario, Mex., xii. 535-6. The celebrated
sculptor Manuel Tolsa was also engaged at this time in casting 100 cannon at
the expense of the tribunal de mincria, the cost of which was ...00,003. These
cannon as already mentioned had been offered l>y that tribunal to Iturrigaray,
and Tolsa commenced work at the close of Garibay's administration. Ataman,
Hint. Mcj., i. 300, 321.
AFFAIRS IN SPAIN. 85
cisco Javier Castaiio, the victor at Baylen; Antonio
de Escano, a distinguished naval officer; and Fernan
dez de Leon, a member of the council of the Indies.
On the 14th of February this change in the gov
ernment was communicated to the viceroy of New
Spain, and on the 7th of May following the oath of
allegiance to the regency was taken by Lizana and
all the royal officials, the occasion being celebrated for
three days in the usual manner. 49 In the same decree
by which the junta central appointed the regency, it
was ordered that the members, when they took the
oath of office, should also swear to convoke the c6rtes
at the earliest opportunity. As the American colonies
were for the first time represented in the cdrtes when
they finally assembled, it will be necessary to give
some account of the admission of colonial deputies into
the legislature.
The critical position of Spain at the close of 1808
induced the junta central which had been compelled
to withdraw from Aranjuez to Seville to consider
by what means it might hope to secure the fidelity of
the colonies. To admit them to a share in the national
government appeared the most pacifying offer; and on
the 22d of January, 1809, a decree was passed recog
nizing the Spanish dominions in America as no longer
colonies but an integral part of the nation, 50 and de
claring their right to representation in the Spanish
cortes. It is then ordered that the viceroys of New
Spain, Peru, New Granada, Buenos Aires, and the
captain-generals of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Chile, Vene
zuela, and the Philippines proceed to the election of
one deputy for each of those dominions. 51 On the
* 9 Dispos. Varias, ii. f. 2; Diario de Mex., xii. 511-12; Gaz. de Mex.,
1810, i. 378-84, The oath was also ordered to be taken in all other places of
the kingdom. New Spain was the only Spanish colony which recognized
the consejode regencia. Rivera, Hist. Jal., i. 273.
50 Considerando que los vastos y preciosos dominios que Espana posee en
las Indias no son propiamente colonias 6 factorias como los de otros naciones,
sine una parte esencial 6 integrante de la monarquia Espaiiola.' Gaz. de Mex.,
xvi. 326.
51 New Granada expostulated against this small concession, and Mier y
Guerra comments upon such inadequate representation in the cortes, which
86 VICEROYS GAUIBAY AND LIZANA.
14th of April following, this regulation was pro
claimed by Viceroy Garibay; but the concession had
been granted grudgingly and under the pressure of
circumstances, and the junta central was in no haste
to see the cortes assembled. Although on the 22d
of May following it proclaimed the establishment
of the old form of representation, and convoked the
cortes to meet on March 1, 1810, it took no prepara
tory steps for such an event. 52
When, however, the junta central was compelled to
resign the affairs of the nation to the care of a re
gency, it required the new government, as already
narrated, to convoke the cortes at the earliest oppor
tunity. This could not be immediately accomplished,
since there were difficulties which rendered it no easy
matter to readopt the ancient mode of government,
and assemble in one congressional body the cortes of
the various kingdoms of Spain. While these king
doms respectively retained their cortes, the general
assembly of them for purposes of government had
during the dynasty of the Bourbons been neglected,
and they were seldom convoked except to do homage,
or sanction a succession to the crown. The cortes
formerly had been composed of three classes repre
senting the nobility, church, and burghers; and the
would be composed of 36 European members, 9 American, and one from the
Philippines. Rev. de N. Esp., i. 253, ii. 638-9. The election of an American
deputy was to be thus conducted : The ayuntamiento of the capital town in
each province of a viceregal kingdom was to nominate three competent persons,
one of whom was then to be elected by casting lots as the representative
of his province. When all such representatives were elected, the viceroy and
real acuerdo wefe to select by vote three of them, from whom the deputy to
Spain was finally appointed by lot. Gaz. de Mex. , xvi. 325-8. In New Spain
the ayuntamientos which sent up candidates to Mexico were those of Puebla,
Vera Cruz, Me"rida de Yucatan, Oajaca, Valladolid, Guanajuato, San Luis
Potosi, Guadalajara, Zacatecas, Tabasco, Queretaro, Tlascala, Nuevo Leon,
and Nuevo Santander. Id., 1810, i. 420.
62 This decree was published in Mexico on the 14th of August, 1809. Di*-
pos. Varias, i. f. 139; Interfer. Brit. Gov., MS., in Mayer MS., no. 27, p. 2.
On the 4th of October the deputy for New Spain was appointed, the lots
having decided the election in favor of Miguel Lardizabal, a Creole of Tlas
cala resident in Spain. Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 901 (Gaz. Ex.); Alaman, Hist.
Mej., i. 308. He was afterward appointed member of the regency for the
American colonies in place of Fernandez de Leon, who suffered from ill
health. BustamanteinCavo, Trcs Slylos, iii. 269; Cortes, Diario, 1810, i. 8.
AMERICAN REPRESENTATION. 87
junta central bad decided that the cortes convoked by
them on the 22d of May should be divided into two
houses, the one formed by the deputies popularly
elected, and the other by the church and nobility.
Just before its dissolution 53 it modified its former de
cree relative to American representation, and for the
speedy assembly of the cortes ordered that forty sub
stitutes should be selected by lot from the number of
American Creoles resident in Spain, out of which num
ber twenty-six were to be finally elected to the cortes,
also by lot. This decree was not published, however,
and the regency being in no greater haste to assemble
the cortes than the junta central had been, published
one on the 14th of February, 1810, ordering the elec
tion of American deputies to be proceeded with, and
extending their number to representation of each dis
trict, 54 instead of each dominion. But this increase
was virtually no nearer an approach to equality in
representation than the first concession had been, since
the number of Spanish deputies was proportionately
increased, by allowing a member for each fifty thou
sand souls. In fact, though both the junta central
and the regency acknowledged equality of rights,
they could not admit Creoles to be represented in con
gress in the same ratio as the inhabitants of the pe
ninsula. The unjust disparity again caused dissatis
faction in the colonies, which was still further excited
by an order of the 28th of June limiting the total
number of American representatives to twenty-eight,
without designating how many should pertain to each
province. The consequence was that in some districts
no elections were held, while in other cases the for-
53 On the 31st of January 1810, Ataman, Hist. Mej., i. 334. The regency
was installed on the 2d of February. Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 380.
4 ' Estos diputados seran uno por cada capital cabeza de partido de estas
diferentes provincias.' Id., 419. The decree was published in Mexico on the
16th of May following, and no less than 17 deputies elected, representing
Mexico, Guadalajara, Valladolid, Puebla, Veracruz, Me"rida, Guanajuato,
San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, Tabasco, Queretaro, Tlascala, Nuevo Leon, Oajaca,
Sonora, Durango, and Coahuila. They were all natives of the districts in
which they were elected with one exception, and were nearly all ecclesias
tics. For a list of their names see Alaman, Hist Mej., i. app. 49-50.
88 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
mally elected deputies declined going to Spain in the
expectation that some new order would exclude them
from the cortes on their arrival.
Such treatment of the colonies did not tend to pro
mote more loyal feelings toward the mother country, 55
in spite of the regency's proclamation that Spanish
Americans were raised to the dignity of free men, and
the extraordinary admission that hitherto they had
been crushed by an oppressive yoke, regarded without
consideration, and made the victims of avarice. 56
Eventually on the 24th of September, 1810, without
waiting for the arrival of the American deputies, the
c6rtes were installed in the theatre of the island of
Leon, and in the list of members I find New Spain
represented by seven substitutes. 57 But it is time to
consider how affairs were progressing meanwhile in
that country, and narrate the events which immedi
ately preceded the revolution of independence.
Great as had been the sums of money contributed
by the inhabitants of New Spain in the form of
loans and donations for the support of the mother
country, they seemed only to encourage further de
mands. On the 12th of March, 1809, the junta cen
tral issued a royal cedula for the negotiation of a loan
, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., ii. 640. The regency had been stimulated to
action by the representations of some provincial juntas which had assembled
iu Cadiz; and on the 18th of June a decree was issued to hasten the appoint-
ment of deputies, who were to meet in the island of Leon during the month
of August, and hold sessions as soon as a sufficient number had assembled.
Those provinces of Spain which were occupied by the French were represented
by substitutes selected from natives of such districts resident in Cadiz, while
28 substitutes for the deputies of American and Asiatic colonies who could not
arrive in time were also provided from American Creoles residing in the same
city. Ib.; Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 33G; Diario de Mex., xiii. 385-6.
56 '0sveis elevados a la dignidad ' are the words used in the regency's
proclamation of the 14th of February. Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 418 'de hom-
brcs libres: no sois ya los mismos que antes encorbados baxo un yugo mucho
mas duro mientras mas distantes estabais del centro del poder, mirados con
indiferencia, vexados por la codicia, y destruidos por la ignorancia.'
57 Their names were Andre's Savariego, Francisco Munilla, Jos6 Maria
Gutierrez de Teran, Jos6 Maria Couto, Salvador Samartin, Octaviano Obregon,
and Maximo Maldonado. Cortes, Diario, 1810, i. 2. By decree of August
20, 1810, Indians and Spanish-Indian offspring were made eligible to the rank
of deputies. Diario de Mex., xiii. 689.
A NEW LOAN ASKED. 89
in New Spain for twenty millions of pesos. This
demand was published in Mexico on the 9th. of August
following, at the very time when three millions were
being so cheerfully contributed to meet the order pre
sented by Cochrane. The colonists were disgusted at
old Spain's avarice. This incessant drainage of specie
was crippling commerce and impoverishing the peo
ple. They were neither able nor willing to respond. 58
A second attempt to raise this amount made in 1810
by Viceroy Venegas was equally unsuccessful. 59
In addition to the discontent thus created, and
naturally tending to independent thought and action,
the defeats sustained by the Spanish forces at the
close of 1809 still further influenced the colonists,
who now regarded the cause of the mother country
as lost. The news of these disasters was received at
Vera Cruz on the 25th of April, 1810; and so fully
convinced were the viceroy and oidores of the irre
trievable prostration of Spain by France, that in
secret sessions they discussed their future course of
action, and had already decided to invite the infanta
Dona Carlota Joaquina, previously mentioned, to as
sume the government as regent of her brother Fer
nando, 60 when intelligence of the installation of the
regency caused them to abandon their intention.
But the administration of Lizana was drawing to
a close. The commercial class, thoroughly conserva
tive in principles, and unyielding opponents of the
Creoles, was disgusted with his conciliatory system;
and informed the junta of Cd/diz, 61 composed of lead-
58 Abaci y Queipo pointed out to the viceroy the impracticability of effect
ing it, and suggested plans for the relief of the junta central by increasing
the alcabala duty two per cent, and the price of tobacco from ten reals to
twelve or even fourteen reals as the urgencies of the nation might call for.
Col. Eficritos Import., 132-48; fiivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 272; Bustamante, in
Cavo, Tres Stylos, iii. 2G6.
&Gaz. de Hex., 1810, i. 797-801.
60 Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 324-5, asserts that he derived this information
from manuscript notes of his brother Dr Arechederreta, who was an intimate
friend of the oidor Tomas Gonzalez Calderon, from whom Arechederreta
must have heard these particulars, which were kept very secret.
01 This junta had been established by popular demand for the protection
90 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZ ANA.
ing merchants in accord with those of Mexico, of the
direction affairs were taking under his management.
The pressure brought to bear by this junta upon the
regency caused that council to issue a decree on the
22d of February, 1810, 62 relieving the archbishop, in
consideration of his advanced a^e and failing health,
from the labors of administration, and placing the
audiencia in charge of the government until the arrival
of a new viceroy. Lizana immediately obeyed the
command, and on the 8th of May following surrendered
the viceregal power to the audiencia, and retired to
his archiepiscopal palace. 63
Though Lizana's rule tended to foster the revolu
tionary spirit, it was not owing to any infidelity on
his part, but to a mistaken principle and a childlike
trust in men. A few days before his retirement, he
issued an exhortation to loyalty, denouncing a procla
mation of Joseph Bonaparte which he publicly burned
in the principal plaza of the capital. 64 He recognized
later some of his mistakes, and endeavored with the
ecclesiastical weapons of excommunication and pasto
ral circulars to rectify the evil which he had uninten
tionally fomented. The Spanish regency decorated
Lizana with the grand cross of Carlos III., an
honor conferred upon him a few months before his
death, which occurred on the 6th of March, 18 II. 65
The removal of Lizana in no way improved matters.
There was want of harmony among the oidores ; when
unanimous accord was the only road to successful ad
ministration, the audiencia was divided into two fac
tions. The regent Catani was influenced by the same
ideas and the same advice which had so ill directed
of the city; but its influence soon became greater than that of the regency.
Id., 226-7; Junta Sup. de Cadiz, d la Amer. Esp., 3.
62 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 21.
Gaz. de Hex., 1810, i. 391-2.
^Prodama del Arzob. Virey, 24 de Abril de 1810; Bustamante, in Cavo,
TresSiglos, iii. 272; Diario de Mex., xii. 674; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col.
Doc., ii. 28-32.
6 *Sosa, Episcop. Mex., 206-13.
RULE OF THE AUDIENCIA. 91
the archbishop, and was, moreover, at enmity with
the oidor decano Aguirre. These members were the
heads of the two parties, Aguirre being recognized as
the enemy of the Creoles and Catani as their supporter.
On the 9th of May the audiencia organized its gov
ernment, by declaring that to it as a body pertained
the superior administration and the captain-general
ship of the kingdom, while Regent Catarii wa.s in
vested with the presidency and superintendence of the
royal treasury. The oidores Blaya and Calderon,
in view of their increased duties, were removed from
the junta de seguridad, and their places supplied by
the governor and the two eldest alcaldes of the crim
inal court. The ordinary business in the different
departments of the government was to be despatched
by respective oidores commissioned for the purpose; a
council of military chiefs was to supply all necessary
information and advice relative to the condition of
the army; and in all the more important cases of the
tribunal de la Acordada the regent was to be con
sulted and his approval obtained for the execution
of the heavier sentences. 68
During the administration of the audiencia, exhibi
tions of natural phenomena occurred, presaging dis
aster. On the 20th of May, the church of Nuestra
Senora de los Remedies was struck by lightning; and
a great portion of the edifice being destroyed, it was
found necessary to remove to the cathedral the sacred
image, which was greatly venerated by the native
Mexicans. It was afterward borne in solemn proces
sion to the different churches of the capital, and the
demonstrations of devotion were noticed as being ex
traordinarily earnest. When on the 10th of August
the image was returned to its sanctuary, it was accom
panied by an immense concourse, who in tears chanted
prayers for divine protection. 67 But in the night
de Mex., 1810, i. 411-13.
6T Bustamante, who was an eye-witness of these religious observances,
92 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
which preceded this auspicious day, a furious hurri
cane had spread desolation in Acapulco, no less than
124 houses being torn down, while orchards and plan
tations were destroyed. On the 18th Vera Cruz was
visited by a terrible storm which wrecked and dam
aged much shipping. 63
The discord in the audiencia was favorable to the
development of revolution. Apart from the absence
of secrecy which want of unity naturally entailed, the
annoyance which each party experienced by the oppo
sition of the other created a feeling of indifference,
and a consciousness that efforts to arrest the public
will would be unavailing. Consequently apathy and
toleration marked the sluggish proceedings of the au
diencia, affording an unwonted freedom of discussion
on political topics. The spirit of revolt was further
aggravated at this time by the unjust illiberality dis
played by the regency in the matter of colonial rep
resentation at the forthcoming congress of the cortes.
If the mother country in her apparent death agony
refused to do justice to her American colonies which
in the past had so loyally aided her, and in which she
seemed to rest her only hope for the future no relief
from her oppression could be expected in case her
arms triumphed. 69 Moreover, the continued procla
mations of Joseph Bonaparte, and seditious papers
issued by his agents, gave additional impetus in the
direction of independence. 70
wrote a detailed account of them bearing the title : Memoria piadosa que re-
cordard d la posteridad, la piedad de (os Mexicanos manifestada en la venida
de Ntra Sra de los Remedies, y contiene dos paries. Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 274-5.
Gz. de Mex., 1810, i. 686-7.
Mora, Mej. y mis Rev., iii. 372-4.
70 Bonaparte in 1809 openly announced: 'Qne era ya llegado el tiempo de
cjue las Americas espauoles quedasen independientes, y que el gobierno fran
cos no se opondria a este paso necesario.' Mora, Mej. y sits Rev., iii. 368.
The inquisition in vain attempted to suppress the circulation of such sheets.
In the months of April, June, and September, 1810, it published proclama
tions against King Joseph, and under threats of excommunication ordered all
papers of the kind to be delivered up that they might be publicly burnt by
the executioner. Diario Mex., xii. 463-8; Dispos. Varias, iii. f. 153, vi. f.
58, 60. French emissaries were a constant source of alarm, and measures to
VICEROY VENEGAS. 93
On the 25th of August, 1810, the frigate Atocha
dropped anchor in the port of Vera Cruz. The ves
sel brought to the shores of New Spain her fifty-
ninth viceroy, Francisco Javier de Venegas, knight
of the order of Calatrava. 71 Venegas was in no haste
to reach the seat of his government, but journeying
slowly from Vera Cruz to the capital, made himself
conversant with the state of affairs, and formed
friendly relations with persons whose services he con
sidered useful. For Campillo, the bishop of Puebla,
and Flon, the intendente of that city, he contracted a
sincere attachment. On the 13th of September the
audiericia surrendered the government to him at
Guadalupe, and on the following day he made his
public entry into the capital with the customary
pomp and ceremonies.
Venegas, who had retired from the army with the
rank of lieutenant-colonel, returned to active service
in 1808, on the invasion of Spain by the French, and
won distinction in the memorable battle of Baylen.
Henceforth his promotion was rapid, and he soon
obtained the grade of lieutenant-general. Although
he suffered defeat at Almonacid 72 by imprudent self-
confidence, he enjoyed a high reputation in New
Spain as a courageous military chief. Birstamante,
in somewhat disparaging and ill-measured language,
thus describes his personal , appearance : "Tall and
robust of frame, the expression of his countenance
was sour, and his glance angry and threatening; his
lips were thick, and his head, which he held inclined
prevent their operations and destroy their influence were taken both in Spain
and Mexico. For copies of instructions given to these agents, their procla
mations, and descriptions of their intrigues, consult Gonzalez, Col. N. Leon,
153-8; Manificsto contra las Iiistruc. Emperador; Calvilio, Discurso; and
Diario Alex., xiii. 43-4.
71 For a list of his names, titles, and decorations, see Cedulario, i. f. 92,
and Dispos. Farias, ii. f. 3. In the latter document appears his rubrica.
72 Guerra states that he lost the army of the centre at the two battles of
Tarancon and Ucles, 'que di6 y perdio por su ineptitud, como consta del
Manifesto del Duque del Infantado. ' Cuesta went so far as to state that Vene
gas 'by gross ignorance, want of skill, envy, or malice, lost, perhaps forever,
the only opportunity of saving Spain.' Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 296.
94 VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.
over the left shoulder, was of enormous size. His
whiskers were of the same cut and shape as those of
the myrmidons of the acordada, desperadoes, and bull
fighters; and his impetuous gait was similar to that
of an ill-tempered corporal." 73 Venegas was, how
ever, honest and disinterested, an indefatigable worker,
and energetic and quick in the despatch of business.
Distrustful when in security, he was calm and self-
possessed in danger, but displayed a sanguinary and
cruel disposition. 74
On the 18th of September the new viceroy con
voked an assembly composed of the audiencia, all the
principal civil and military authorities, the dignitaries
of the church, prelates of the regular orders, the
nobility, and prominent land owners and members of
the commercial class. To this numerous attendance
a proclamation addressed by the regency to the Ameri
cans on the 5th of May was read. In it the condi
tion of Spain was set forth, and an appeal made for
still further contributions in order to continue the
war. A list also of patriotic individuals on whom had
been conferred titles of nobility and honors was also
read. A plan for the collection of donations suggested
73 His dress and personal appearance were the subject of numerous pas
quinades which were posted on the corners of the principal streets. One
quoted by Bustamante was as follows: ' De patilla, botas y pantalon, hechura
de Napoleon.' Cavo, Tres Si(jlos, iii. 277. Another which was posted on the
palace gate aggravated the viceroy to make reply. It ran thus:
' Tu cara no es de excelencia
Ni tu trage de virey,
Dios ponga tiento en tus manos
No destruyas nuestra ley.'
Venegas caused the following lines to be posted in the same place:
' Mi cara no es de excelencia,
Ni mi trage de virey,
Pero represento al rey,
Y obtengo su real potcncia.
Esta sencilla advertencia
Os hago, por lo que importe :
La ley ha de ser el norte
Que dirija mis acciones.
j Cuidado con las traiciones
Quo se ban hecho en esta Cortel*
Rivera, Gob. de Hex., i. 564.
74 Opinions with regard to the abilities of Venegas are diametrically oppo
site according as they are regarded by his friends or opponents. Abad y Queipo
describes him as a talented, learned, and upright man, Informe, in Zamacois,
Hist. Mf-j., ix. 867-8; while Zavala states that he possessed neither political
nor military talent. Rev. Hex., i. 43. Consult Adalid, Causa, MS., i. 134-6.
FURTHER DISCONTENT. 95
by the fiscals was then discussed and approved, many
of those present subscribing at once, the archbishop
heading the list with thirty thousand pesos. Among
the recipients of honors were Garibay and the arch
bishop, both of whom were decorated with the grand
cross of Carlos III., while Gabriel de Yermo, Diego
de Agreda, Sebastian de las Heras Soto, and Jose
Mariano Fagoaga were raised to the dignity of tftulos
de Castilla. 75 Other honors were conferred upon a
number of individuals corresponding to their positions
and the services rendered by them, and it was observed
that many of the recipients had been principal actors
in the deposal of Iturrigaray.
Both the demands for money and the awards of
honor were offensive to the Spanish Americans. The
appeal to them for more gold and silver in the same
breath that bestowed titles and distinctions upon
their opponents was an insult, and their indignation
drove them in still greater numbers to the ranks of
the revolutionists who were already in the field. 76 For
Hidalgo had given the signal for revolt; the grito de
Dolores was already echoing throughout the land, and
thousands were rising in arms to do battle for liberty
and the rights of man.
73 Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 764-5, 776-86; Diario de Mex., xiii. 347-8. The
titulo de Castilla was a title of nobility intermediate between those of the
grandees and hidalgos of Spain. Salvd, Nuevo Dice. , 1054. Yermo and Fagoaga
declined the honor. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 343-4.
76 The Mexican deputation to Spain stated in August 1811 that 'las gra-
cias que Ilev6 el Virey Don Francisco Venegas para los autores complices de
la faccion' carried alarm through the country. Diputac. Amer. Hep., 3.
CHAPTER V. *;
OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
1810.
DEVELOPMENT OF QUERETARO AFFAIRS IN GUANAJUATO THE TOWN OF
DOLORES ITS CURA, MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA SECRET MEETINGS
OF REVOLUTIONISTS IGNACIO ALLENDE PLOTTING AT SAN MIGUEL-
GENERAL PLAN OF UPRISING HIDALGO'S BIOGRAPHY ARRESTS THE
CORREGIDOR IMPRISONED HlS ACQUITTAL HlS BIOGRAPHY EL GRITO
DE DOLORES HIDALGO MARCHES TO SAN MIGUEL A TUMULTUOUS
ARRAY THE SACRED BANNER SUCCESS OF THE INSURGENTS AT SAN
MIGUEL PILLAGING HIDALGO PROCLAIMED CAPTAIN-GENERALHE
ENTERS CELAYA HE APPOINTS A NEW AYUNTAMIENTO.
FROM the time when Viceroy Velasco made grants
of town lots arid agricultural lands to settlers in Quere-
taro, 1 the progress of that place was rapid. Beauti
fully situated in a sheltered valley, the fertility of the
soil and the pureness of the air invited immigrants
from the capital and other populous towns Iving to
the south. In 1592 municipal books were opened,
and henceforward its prosperity was such that in 1655
Felipe IV. elevated it to the rank of city, with the
appellation of Santiago de Queretaro, and the hon
orable title of muy noble y real ciudad. A coat of
arms was also granted, significant of the miraculous
manifestation witnessed by the opposing armies in
that strange battle which was fought in 153 1. 2 The
Consult Hist. Mex., vol. ii. 544-5, this series.
2 See Id., 540-4. The arms consisted of a cross with the sun for its
pedestal and a bright star on either side. The figure of Santiago on horse
back occupies the dexter base, and a palm tree and other plants the sinister
base. The whole is surmounted by the royal arms of Castile and Leon. I
give herewith a plan of the city from Quere.taro, Orden. que para la Division.
See also Zdaa 6 Hidalgo Glorias de Quer., 2-3, containing plan of city, p. 243.
(96)
HISTORY OF QUERfiTARO. 97
position of Queretaro on the borders of the uncon
verted Chichimecs attracted at an early date the at
tention of the regular orders. The first monastic
establishment was the Franciscan convent of Santa
Cruz, the date of the founding of which is, however,
uncertain, although its origin w r as the humble her
mitage which was constructed at the time when the
O
miraculous stone cross was erected on the Sangremal.
The first convent and its church were in time re-
PLAH OF QUERETARO, 1796.
placed by larger buildings, and in 1666, when the
new edifices were completed, the convent was made
the casa de recoleccion of the pro vine ia under the
name of San Buenaventura. In 1683 it was con
verted into the apostolic college of propaganda fide,
founded by Fray Antonio Linaz de Jesus Maria
the first establishment of the kind in the Indies. 3
3 Id., 38-40. Linaz was born at Arta, in the island of Majorca, in January
1635, became a friar in 1653, and presbitero in 1659. His name, Jesus JMaria,
was derived from the convent in which he was novitiate. In 10(54 he arrived
HIST. ME*. , VOL. IV. 7
98 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
By the enthusiastic members social reforms were
introduced, which, however beneficial to the poorer
classes, grievously interfered with public and private
amusements. Balls, comedies, and public games were
discontinued; certain feasts in which bulls, Moors,
and Christians were represented in procession, were
also done away with. These festivities were so attrac
tive to the lower orders that in order to participate
in them with appropriate display they would sell their
household chattels. Another abuse corrected was the
promiscuous bathing of the sexes in the river, to the
sound of music, and midst the noise of feasting on the
banks. Henceforth the inhabitants of Queretaro
were, doubtless, a devout and moral community,
though much against their will. 4
o o
After the surrender of their convent of Santa Cruz,
the Franciscans erected what may be considered the
third monastery of the order built in Queretaro, and
which was the capitular convent of the province.
Annexed to it is a sumptuous church, which was
greatly embellished by Fray Jose de Soria, who died
in Mexico in December 1734. Within the limits of
its cemetery various other sacred edifices were erected,
among which may be mentioned the church of the
Venerable Orden Tercera de Penitencia, in which
the noble and the wealthy performed their devotions
and penitential vows.
in Michoacan from Spain and was elected guardian of the convent of Valla-
dolid in 1C71, and in 1074 was appointed custodio to attend the general
chapter held in Spain in 1G82. He returned in 1083 to found the colegio de
propaganda fide. Linaz fasted much, and at times fell into ecstatic trancus
while at prayer. Miraculous virtues are attributed to him, which he con
tinued to manifest after his death, which occurred at Madrid on the 29th of
June, 1093. Etpinosa, Cron. Apost., i. 93-251, 320-1, 80-4.
4 Espinosa, after describing the reforms, speaks of a citizen, who having
been absent for some time, on his return as he approached the city inquired
of one whom he met on the road what news there was in Quere" taro. ' Seuor, '
replied the man, ' Quer6taro is no more Quere"taro; some priests have come,
and no longer are there fandangos as before; sadness prevails, no harp or gui
tar is heard; there is nothing but praying and preaching, so that the place
has lost its mirth.' Id., 54-5. Consult also Arricivita, Cron. Seraf., 8-9,
34-5, 174-82, 201-6. The miraculous cross was removed from its original
site in 1701 and placed in the crucero of the church of this convent,
no*a, Cron. Apost., i. 19; Glorias de Quer., 39.
DESCRIPTION OF QUERETARO. 99
Numerous other convents added to the sanctity and
embellishment of the city, but special notice must be
taken of the convent and royal hospital of the Puri-
sima Concepcion. This hospital was founded by Diego
cle Tapia, son of Fernando de Tapia, the conqueror,
about the year 1586. The same benefactor founded
the Franciscan nunnery of Santa Clara, which was
transferred to a new site in 1633, and thither were
conveyed the same year to their final repose the
bones of the founder. Other religious establishments
were the monasteries of the Franciscan order of
barefooted friars and the barefooted Carmelites; the
Jesuit church and college of San Ignacio de Loyola
founded in 1625; the Dominican convent of San Pedro
y San Pablo; the royal college of Santa Rosa and
its magnificent church; the Capuchin, Austin, and
Carmelite nunneries, and other religious institutions.
By royal cedula of October 10, 1671, permission
was granted to the congregation of our lady of
Guadalupe founded in 1669 to erect a church in San
tiago de Queretaro; and in 1680, owing to the mu
nificence of Juan Caballero y Osio, 5 by whom the
greater part of the expenses were defrayed, the build
ing was so far advanced as to admit of its being dedi
cated. The ceremony took place on the 12th of May,
and was conducted with a solemnity and splendor
never before witnessed in the city. Visitors from all
parts of New Spain assembled on the occasion, and the
festivities which followed were continued for eight
days. The church is the most sumptuous in Quere
taro. 6
The success of the religious orders in the conver-
6 Oslo had previously proved himself a munificent benefactor by his liberal
donations to numerous religious institutions, in several instances defraying the
entire cost of the erection of chapels and convents. He was a captain of in
fantry, became alcalde mayor of Quer6taro, and was finally ordained priest.
He possessed a large fortune which he devoted to such purposes and charity.
He died in Quer6taro on the llth of April, 1707, at the age of 73, ' y fue" sepul-
tado en la Santa Casa de Loreto, dentro de una caxa de hierro, mandando poner
por epitafio solo estas breves palabras. Hcec requies mea.' Sigiienza y G6>i-
gara, Glorias de Quer., 19; fg/esias, AW., 157-8.
6 Id., 95-171; Medina, Chron., S. Diego Hex., 254; Diario, Mex., 117.
100 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
sion of the Chichi mecs was signal, and the missions
they founded in the Sierra Gorda had more effect
in reducing them to submission than the steel and
O
gunpowder of the military. In time, however, the
missions became secularized, and in 1785 only two out
of the twenty established remained under the con
trol of the friars, namely San Miguel de las Palm as,
administered by the Dominicans, and Concepcion
Soriano, or Bucareli, by the barefooted friars of San
Diego. 7
Although the Indians of Sierra Gorda were occa
sionally troublesome during the eighteenth century,
their insubordination did not interfere with the growth
of the city or the development of industrial interests.
In the architectural beauty of its churches, religious
establishments, and public buildings, Queretaro is
equal to any city in Mexico, except the capital. In,
1796 it had 272 streets with twenty-one public foun
tains and six plazas. Its length from east to west at
this date was nearly two miles and three quarters, and
its w r idth from north to south over one mile and a quar
ter. 8 The water supply of Queretaro, obtained at a dis
tance of two leagues, is conveyed into the city by its
celebrated aqueduct, a structure of singular solidity and
architectural beauty. The arches are supported on
seventy-two pillars of hewn stone, eighteen varas apart,
and twenty-seven varas high. The work was begun in
January 1726, and completed in October 1735, at an
expense of $124,800, $82,000 of which were donated
by Juan Antonio Urrutia y Arana, marques del Vi-
llar de la Aguila. 9 But the pride of the place is La
Canada, a beautiful glen penetrating for two leagues
the mountains which surround the city, and affording
views of such exquisite loveliness that no city in the
ipinart, Col. "Doc. Hex., MS., 271-3, 457-8. In 1740 the number of mis
sions was 17, ten of which were founded by Franciscans and seven by Domi
nicans. Orozco y Berra, Carta Etnog., 260-1; Arricivita, Cron. Scrdf., 169-
71; Sigiienza y Gongara, Carta al Almir, MS., 10-11.
^Queretaio, Ordenanzaque jiarala Division.
9 For an account of the festivities held in celebration of the completion of
the aqueduct see JSavurrcte, lleiac. Peregrin., no. i. 03-163.
QUERETARO OFFICIALS. 10.1
world can surpass them, or offer suburban recreation
grounds more attractive. 10 About five leagues to the
south-east of the city are the hot mineral springs of
San Bartolome, situated about a mile from the
pueblo of that name, the medicinal properties of which
both as a beverage and for the bath have proved effi
cacious in a variety of diseases. 11 Although Queretaro
is signally exempt from epidemics and physical catas
trophes, 12 it has occasionally been visited by disasters.
The year 1786 was noticeable for the severity of a
famine which caused much suffering, and in 1806
great mortality of children occurred from an epidemic
lung disease. 13
The agricultural and manufacturing industries in
dicate great prosperity when compared with those of
larger and more populous provinces. The cotton and
woollen factories in 1793 worked up 200,000 pounds
'of the first-mentioned staple and 63,900 arrobas of
wool, equivalent to 1,597,500 pounds, affording em
ployment to three thousand operatives. The tobacco
factory also employed three thousand workmen and
women, producing annually cigars and cigarettes to
the amount of $2^200,000. 14
Such was the city of Santiago de Queretaro at the
time when the spirit of Mexican independence broke
out. The reader will recollect that Miguel Domin-
10 Navarrete says: 'Esta Canada es para Queretaro lo q^^e Aranjuez para
Madrid, Versallas para Paris, Frascati para Roma, y la Favorita para Viena. '
Relac. Peregrin., 6.
11 A full account of these springs is given by Beaumont, Trat. de la Aqua
Mineral. Mexico, 1772.
12 ' Goza el grande, raro y apreciable privilegio de que jamas se ha experi-
mentado en ella temblor alguno de tierra.' Zelaa 6 Hidalgo, Glorias de Quer.,
10.
13 Queretaro, Dos Palabras, 4-5; Diar. Mex., ii. 167.
14 Humboldt, Essai Pol, G66-9; Raso in Soc. Mex. Geog., iii. 198-9. In all
the manufacturing industries 9,216 persons were employed, of whom 2,700 were
women. In commercial and agricultural pursuits 2,234 persons were occupied.
From this date to 1810 an increase in industries of one fifth is observable. Id.,
200. In 1803 the population of the city was 50,000 souls. Its ayuntamiento
was composed of a corregidor, two ordinary alcaldes, twelve regidores, two hon
orary regidores, a procurador, syndic, and escribano mayor y de cabildo.
Glorias de Quer., 5-6.
102 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
guez had been reinstated in the office of corregidor of
Queretaro, after having been deprived of it by Itur-
rigaray. From that time forward he was a secret sup
porter of the independence party. After the collapse
of the Valladolid plot, meetings of the chief revolu
tionists were held at Queretaro in houses of the pres
byter Jose Maria Sanchez and the licentiate Parra,
The corregidor attended the assemblies at the first-
mentioned house, which passed under the name of a
literary academy, while his wife Dona Maria Josefa
Ortiz took still more earnest interest in the suc
cess of the undertaking. In Parra's house secret
meetings were held and plans of operations discussed.
Here met the principal promoters of the revolution,
the licentiates Laso and Altamirano, captains Allende
and Aldama of the queen's regiment, Joaquin Arias,
captain of the , Zelaya regiment, Francisco Lanza-
gorta, lieutenant of the dragoons of San Miguel, the
two brothers Epigmenio and Emeterio Gonzalez and
others of less note.
While these preliminary matters were in progress
in Valladolid and Queretaro, the leaven of liberty was
working in Guanajuato; and indeed to this province
may be more specially given the proud distinction of
cradle of Mexican independence. And forever famous
above all must remain the town of Dolores, situated
in the higher level of the sierra de Guanajuato, eleven
leagues from the provincial capital. Its beginning
dates from the sixteenth century, when viceroys En-
riquez and Velasco exerted themselves in uniting the
Indians in municipal communities called congrega-
ciones, Dolores receiving the name of Congregacion de
Nuestra Senora de los Dolores, and being included
in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the curato of San
Miguel el Grande. In 1717 it was elevated to the
dignity of a pueblo, and somewhat later became an
independent curacy.
As usual in places of this kind, the parish church
MANUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA. 103
overshadowed the other buildings, being an extensive
structure, and completed about the middle of the
eighteenth century. The exterior presented quite an
imposing appearance, the front having two towers and
an ornamented entrance. At the close of the eight
eenth century a church of the third order of San Fran
cisco was erected which, though small, was of beauti
ful design and construction. There were also several
smaller churches or chapels. In 1826 the constituent
congress of Guanajuato bestowed upon the town the
title of villa. It contained later about 9,000 inhabi
tants, while the number of those within its civil and
ecclesiastical jurisdiction was between 35,000 and 40,-
000, scattered over a territory of sixty-eight square
leagues. Agriculture constitutes the chief occupation
of the people, a few only being engaged in retail traf
fic, and in the manufacture of common woollen goods,
of 'bricks, and in tanning. The district of Dolores is
better adapted for the culture of the vine than any
other part of Guanaj uato. Though silver deposits ex
ist in many places, the mining interest is not large.
The cura of this parish was Miguel Hidalgo y Cos-
tilla, a name forever to be honored as one who gave
his life to his country, who sacrificed himself for the
right as against injustice and oppression. Past mid
dle age, as he was now approaching fifty-eight, he had
reached the period when most men are ready to lay
aside some portion of life's burdens ; yet he was about
taking upon his shoulders the most vital issues of his
country, and that before his country was ready fully
to respond to his efforts.
Rather above than below medium height, of some
what stout proportions, large lirnbs and ruddy-brown
complexion, he presented altogether a robust constitu
tion. The head was large and well modelled, bald and
shining on the top, with many brain-compelling bumps ;
hair, what there was of it, nearly white; massive
features; forehead of course high, neck slightly twisted
to the left, nose straight, lips thin, eyebrows pronri-
104 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
nent, and as usual with the cloth, face clean-shaven.
He wore at this time short black trousers and stock
ings of the same color, leathern shoes with buckles,
and a long gown with cape. His heart was kind and
sympathetic; his manner soft and winning; his voice
sonorous, vibrating, and most pleasing to the ear; and
his deportment was natural and attractive. He had
the true scholarly stoop; and in all his features, air,
and attitude a profoundly meditative expression a
fitting incarnation of a great soul bathed in settled
calm. Yet the clear, black, brilliant eyes betrayed
the activity of the mind, and through them shone the
light from the burning fires within.
It does not appear that Hidalgo attended the early
meetings of the revolutionists with regularity. In
deed, from his own statements I conclude that he
visited Queretaro only on one occasion for that
purpose, although he frequently held conversations
elsewhere with Ignacio Allende and others on the
subject of independence. 15
Allende was certainly one of the moving spirits of
the revolution ; and although his fame as a patriot has
been eclipsed by that of Hidalgo, it is only justice
that his merits and patriotism should be fully recog
nized. He was born on the 21st of January, 1779, 16
in San Miguel el Grande, his father being a Spanish
merchant and estate owner, named Domingo Narciso
de Allende. When Don Domingo died, which was
while Ignacio was of tender years, his affairs were
greatly embarrassed, and had it not been for the high
character of his executor, Domingo de Berrio, the
15 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 9. At these conferences with Allen
de, Hidalgo continually and prophetically expressed his opinion that 'the
authors of such enterprises never enjoyed the fruits of them.' Ib. Negrete,
however, states that he went several times to Quer6taro. ' Varios viajes aunque
de una manera occulta, hizo a Queretaro Hidalgo, con el objeto de f omen tar la
revolucion. ' Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX. , i. 83.
16 Copies of his baptismal certificate can be seen inLiceaga, Adlc. y E^ctific. ,
210-11, and in Alaman, Hist. Mcj., iii.,app. 75-6. Liceaga, ut sup. 15, 17,
however, and Zamacois make the mistake of assigning 1769 as the year of hi3
birth.
IGXACIO ALLENDE. 105
house would have been bankrupt. The creditors,
however, were tolerant, and in some years the debts
were paid, and the means of livelihood saved to the
family. 17
Being passionately fond of dangerous sports and
martial exercises from early youth, Ignacio was con
spicuous for his boldness and skill as a horseman, and
frequently signalized himself in the bull-ring, from
which he did not always escape unharmed, being crip
pled in the left arm from injuries received there. His
strength was so great that he could hold back a bull
by the horns, 18 and he was ever ready to employ it
in defence of the weak. Before he had attained the
age of seventeen he was appointed provisionally a
lieutenant in the queen's dragoons, was confirmed in
the appointment in the following year, and in 1807
promoted to the rank of captain. He was present
with his company at the military encampment estab
lished by Iturrigaray at Jalapa, and won for himself
the marked approbation of the viceroy by his soldier
ly bearing and ability. 19 According to Mier y Guerra,
his regard for the viceroy was such that he took an
oath to avenge his deposal on the Europeans, and
thenceforth began to form a definite plan of indepen
dence. Allende was an extremely handsome man,
of engaging manners and captivating address. To
resolution he united a perseverance which never
yielded to obstacles or opposition. His daring both
in the field arid in the expression of his opinions
17 Ignacio had two brothers, Domingo and Jose" Marfa, the former dying
before the reN^olution, the latter taking no part ia it. Id., 355. There were
also three sisters, Josef a, Mariana, and Manuela. Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.,
15-16.
18 ' Era un sugeto bien educado, insinuante y fino, de tal f uerza que deteuia
un toro por las hastas. ' Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp. , i. 290. See also Zerecero,
Mem. Rev. Hex. , 27. Pedro Jose" Sotelo, an eye-witness, speaking of a bull
fight in which Allende took part, says: 'En esta corrida tore6 D. Ignacio
Allende, y lucho con un toro, con cuya accion dej6 admirados a los especta-
dores.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 322.
19 'Habia merecido los elogios del virey Iturrigaray, principalmeute porque
adiestrando este el ex<3rcito acantonado en las maniobras y ardides de guerra
aquel le sorprehendi6 en una noche con toda su guardia.' Guerra, Hist. Rev.
N. Esp., i. 290.
106 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
exposed him to unnecessary dangers. 20 At an early
age he entered the marriage state, and betrothed in
April 1802 Dona Maria de la Luz Agustina de las
Fuentes. 21
When the encampment at Jalapa was broken up,
at the close of 1808, Allende with all the determina
tion of his nature put his shoulder to the work. Hav
ing returned with his command to San Miguel, he
gradually associated himself with a number of con
federates 22 who were leading inhabitants of the town.
To avert suspicion and cloak their proceedings, balls
were frequently given at the house of his brother Do
mingo, in the festivities of which they joined, different
members occasionally retiring from the dancing-hall
to a room below to hold consultation. Ramifications
of the plan were extended to the principal neighbor
ing towns, where branch societies were established by
Allende and Aldama, who were appointed commis
sioners for- that purpose. 23
The general plan of the uprising was the simul
taneous seizure of the rich Spaniards and authorities
in the important towns and then to raise the stand
ard of independence. This was to be accomplished
with as little violence as possible, and the captives
were to be allowed the privilege of remaining with
their families in the country, 24 or returning to the
peninsula, in which case their property was to be confis
cated and appropriated for the public treasury. In
case the government, after this coup de main, should
be able to offer resistance, Allende acting as generalis-
20 Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 9.
21 A copy of the marriage document is supplied by Liceaga, ut sup. 211-
12. 'Alauian,' Hist. Mej., i. 356, 'anade con su bondad acostumbrada, que
era muy inclinado al juego, a las mujeres y a toda clase de disipaciones; pero
no he encontrado hecho alguno que justifique estas aseveraciones. ' GaMo,
11 ombres llust. Mex., iii. 351.
w Liceaga on p. 18 gives a list of 22 of his principal associates.
^ 23 Liceaga argues forcibly that the San Miguel meetings were organized
prior to those held in Quer6taro, and that Allende was the first promoter of
the revolution. Adic. y Rectijic., 21-7.
24 Mora makes no mention of this intention of mild treatment. Mej. y sus
Rev., iv. 13.
MEETINGS OF REVOLUTIONISTS. 107
si mo would organize the forces in different districts
and maintain the struggle. The government proposed
to be established was a senate of representatives ap
pointed by the provinces, which should rule in the
name of Fernando VII., ignoring all submission to
Spain.
To accomplish their designs, Alleride and Aldama
visited Mexico, Puebla, and other important places in
New Spain, while Hidalgo assisted in the cities of
Valladolid and Guanajuato, his efforts being espe
cially directed to gaining over the clergy. During
1810, Queretaro appears to have been the centre
of action, and Allende and Aldama frequently at
tended the meetings there. 25 More than half the
year had gone and the plans of the revolutionists
were almost ripe. There were as yet no signs of dis
covery or treachery. Then the day was appointed on
which the cry of independence should be sounded.
The great fair held at San Juan de los Lagos, com
mencing on the 8th of December, offered a good op
portunity. Amidst the gathering crowds their move
ments would escape observation, and enable them to
concentrate their forces without detection. 26 It was
accordingly decided that Allende and Aldama should
meet there by different routes on the 1st of that
month, and prepare matters for the proclamation of
independence on a concerted day of the fair. Events,
however, occurred which frustrated this design.
As the cura Hidalgo will presently become the
principal leader and most prominent character in the
K Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 348; Zamacois, Hist. Mej., vi. 160-1. Mora,
however, states that ' Sun Miguel el Grande . . . se constituy6 el centro y f oco
de la revoiucion.' Ut sup., 15.
'^Liceaya, ut sup., 19-20. Mora states, however, 'se fijo el dia 1 de
octubrepara hacerel prommciamieuto en Queretaro, Guanajuato, San Miguel,
y otros lugares.' Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 16. Again from an official document in
the national archives it is reported to the government that 'segun dijo Laiiza-
gorta a Galvan, el proyecto debia tener efecto en todo Septiembre.' Zerecero,
Disc. Civ., 21. Guerra gives November 1st as the date. Rev. N. Esp.. i. 291.
Hidalgo states that October 2d was the day finally appointed for the upris
ing. Hernandez y Ddvcdos, Col. Doc., i. 14.
108 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
early revolution, a better acquaintance will aid our
purpose. His father, Cristobal Hidalgo y Costilla,
was a native of Tejupilco in the intendency of Mex
ico, and established himself in Penjamo in the province
of Guanajuato. There he betrothed and married
Ana Maria Gallaga, 27 and in May 1753, Miguel Hi
dalgo y Costilla was born. 28 Don Cristobal presently
removed to the hacienda of Corralejo with his wife
and four children, of whom Miguel was the second.
Their father afterward sent them to Valladolid to be
educated, and there Miguel distinguished himself in
philosophy and ecclesiastical studies at the college of
San Nicolas, where his fellow-collegiates gave him the
name of The Fox, an appellation intended as compli
mentary by reason of his sagacity. 29
So highly did the ecclesiastical chapter of Vallado
lid estimate his theological acquirements, and the
ability he displayed in the public discussion of cer
tain themes, that it gave him $4,000 to enable him to
go to Mexico and obtain his degree of doctor of the
ology. Hidalgo, however, spent the money some
say at play and in dissipation before accomplishing
his journey. 30 Nevertheless, in 1778 and 1779 he
went to the capital and was there ordained, receiving
the degree of bachelor of theology. On his return
to Valladolid he obtained successive appointments as
cura to two of the richest benefices in the diocese, 31
27 Tradition affirms that Ana Maria was an orphan in the house of Gallaga,
and that while waiting at table, on the occasion of Don Cristobal's first visit,
her grace and beauty won his heart. Gallo, Hombres Illust. , iii. 240.
28 A copy of his baptismal registry will be found in Alaman, Hist, Mcj.,
iii. app. 75. Documents establishing the place and date of his birth are
supplied by Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , i. 455-72.
'^Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 351. Montana, Caracter Pollt. y Martial, in a
metrical fable published shortly after the battle of Aculco represents Hidalgo
as a fox, and Allende as a serpent, leading their followers, 'una lucida tropa
polla,' to destruction. The closing lines are:
' Lector, si tu no entiendea
Lo quo quiere decir la fabulilla:
No importa: entenderAlo la gabilla
Quo a log Hidalgos siguo y los Allendes.'
z Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 291. 'Los perdi6 al juego enMaravatio,
al hacer el viaje & Mexico para solicitarlo.' Alaman, ut sup., 352.
31 1 have in my possession an original autograph letter of Hidalgo written
while he was the cura of Colima. It is dated Colima, July 20, 1792, and signed
LIFE AND CHARACTER OF HIDALGO. 109
and eventually on the death of his elder brother Joa-
quin succeeded him as cura of Dolores, a town at that
time of 18,000 souls, yielding him a stipend of from
10,000 to $12,000. 32 Here he devoted himself to a
variety of occupations, independent of his clerical du
ties, and congenial with tastes acquired in his boyhood
on his father's hacienda. He established a porcelain
factory, improved the cultivation of the vine, planted
mulberry trees, and grew silk-worms. But his mind
was not satisfied with industrial pursuits and experi
ments alone. The seclusion of his library often won
him from more practical life, and there he studied the
sciences and political economy, 33 perused French phil
osophical works, 34 and investigated .the doctrines pro
pounded in unorthodox books. 35 It was during these
years of self-education that he acquired those en
lightened views which enabled him to recognize the
injustice which marked both the ecclesiastical and
temporal governments, and caused him to look with
indignation upon the warped tenets and proceedings
of the church, and with detestation upon the despot
ism exercised by the state.
Hidalgo was a brave and determined man; he was
a pleasant conversationalist, and, though quick-tem
pered, had an obliging and kindly disposition. The
interest which he took in the welfare of his flock by
the development of industries and his lavish expen
diture of money on such enterprises gained for him
'Migl Hidalgo y Costilla,' with his rubrica affixed to the signature. It is ad
dressed to the cura of the pueblo de Elagualulco, and relates to ecclesiastical
formalities required to be observed with respect to the second marriage of an
Indian named Pascual de los Santos with a free mulatto woman.
32 Gucrra, loc. cit. Negrete says $8,000 or $9,000 'un afio con otro.' He
generously divided this stipend with a clergyman named Francisco Iglesias,
whom he employed in assisting him in his clerical duties. Hist. Mil. Sig.
XIX., I 79.
33 This study attracted his attention while at the college of San Nicolas,
of which he was appointed rector, 'y la desarrolld cuando fud cura en la villa
de S. Felipe y congregacion de Dolores.' JBustamante. Cuadro Hint., i. 264.
34 Hidalgo knew French well, 'cosa bastante rara en aquel tiempo en es
pecial entre los eclesiasticos. ' Alaman, loc. cit.
35 'Leia y tenia algunas _obras literarias y politicas proibidas severamente
por la inquisition y desconocidas para el comun de loa Mejicanos.' Mora,
Mej. y sun Rev., iv. 8.
110 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
the lasting affection of the Indians, in whose languages
he was proficient. Extremely enterprising, he was,
however, too precipitate in action. With regard to
his moral character, many vices are laid at his door, 33
which were made the most of by the opposite party
after he raised the standard of revolt. From the fact
that as early as 1800 accusations of immorality were
preferred against him before the inquisition by two
women, it ma}^ be concluded that his life was not of
that purity which his clerical calling would seem to
demand; but as the inquisition did not at the time
proceed against him, although the accusations in
cluded charges of heresy, it may be inferred that
proofs were wanting, or that his derelictions were not
of a flagrant nature. 37
As early as the llth of August the government
had intimation of a plot. 33 One Mariano Galvan, an
official in the post-office, gave information about the
secret meetings to Joaquin Quintan a, chief of the
department, who communicated with the postmaster-
general of Mexico. By him Aguirre was made ac
quainted with the danger. He, however, contented
himself with giving orders that the revolutionists
should be watched, without bringing the matter to
the notice of the government. Meanwhile Hidalgo
36 'Poseido del abominable vicio de laluxuria.' Diaz Calvillo, Sermon (1811),
107.
37 Consult Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 78, et seq. Afterward the
inquisition continued the charges with additional ones, and proceeded against
Hidalgo with every severity, publishing a memorable edict on the 13th of
October, 1810. In it heresy, blasphemy, and profession of the doctrines of
Luther were charged. On the score of morality it contains this extraordinary
accusation: 'Teneis por inocente y licita la polucion y fornicacion, como efecto
necesario y consiguiente al mecanismo de la naturaleza, por cuyo error habeis
sido tan libertino, que hicisteis pacto con vuestra manceba de que os buscase
mugeres para fornicar, y que para lo mismo le buscariais a ella hoinbres, asegu-
randola que no hay infierno, ni Jesucristo.' Dispos. Varias, iii. f. 152. Con
sult also Mora, Mcj. ysus Rev., iv. 60-1. This author considers that the early
inaction of the inquisition was partly due to the fact that Bishop Abad y
Queipo, in matters of opinion, was somewhat implicated with Hidalgo. The
fact that these charges were brought against an excommunicated and rebel
priest renders them unworthy serious consideration.
38 For minute particulars consult extracts from documents in the Mexican
archives supplied by Neyrete, Mex. Si/jlo XIX., i. 286-97.
TREACHERY AND EXPOSURE. Ill
was endeavoring to gain over the provincial infantry
battalion of Guanajuato, and to that end opened his
plan to several of the subaltern officers. One of these,
Garrido, the band-master, exposed the affair on the
13th of September to his captain, Francisco Busta-
mante, who lost no time in informing his superior
officer, Diego Berzabal, who communicated the mat
ter to the intendente Riailo, and offered to arrest
Hidalgo. Riano, however, preferred to watch affairs,
and instructed Francisco Iriarte, who was going to
San Felipe, to report occurrences in Dolores, and sent
orders to San Miguel to arrest Allende and Aldama.
O
The despatch was, however, intercepted by Allende,
who received timely warning of the denouncement
made by Garrido, and thus gained some little time to
deliberate with his associates at San Miguel 39 as to
their proper course.
While this was taking place in Guanajuato, Cap
tain Arias turned traitor in Queretaro, and to secure
his own safety denounced the plot on the 10th of
September to the alcalde Juan de Ochoa. 40 This of
ficer immediately despatched a courier with a written
account drawn up by the escribano Juan Fernando
Dorninguez to the viceroy, who was already on his
way from Yera Cruz. Again, on the 13th, a man
named Francisco Bueras informed Padre Gil, cura of
S9 Mora, Mej. ysus Rev., iv. 18-9. Alaman states that he was playing at
cards in the house of Camufiez, the major of his corps, when he received the
advice from Guanajuato. Hist. Hej., i. 373. Riaiio's action with regard to
Hidalgo was probably influenced by friendship, as the cura was a frequent
visitor at his house. See JSustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., iii. 42.
40 Such is Alaman's account of the discovery of the plot. Hi*t. Mej. , i.
361-6. Guerra says: 'Pero abort6 el plan por la confesion en el articulo cle
la muerte del Can6nigo de Valladolid Iturriaga, c6mplice en la conspiracion,
al cura de Queretaro Gil.' Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 292. Bustamante states
simply that an ecclesiastic denounced the plot at 10 o'clock of the night of
the 14th of September. Cuadro Hist., i. 31. Liceaga considers it probable
that Arias first gave information. Adiciones y Rectif., 43. Consult also Zere-
cero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 52-58, for copies of documents addressed to the audi-
encia on the llth of September; and the same author, Discur*o Civic., 19-25,
for information conveyed to the capital from August llth to the above named
date. Ochoa, on the 10th and llth of September, sent despatches to Aguirre
and the viceroy informing them of the meditated revolution, and forwarded
a list of the principal persons concerned in it. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col.
Doc., ii. G4-8.
112 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Queretaro, that there was a plot to assassinate all the
Spaniards, and that a quantity of arms were stored
in the houses of one Samano and Epigmenio Gonza
lez. He also stated that the corregidor knew of it.
The cura , being a friend of Dominguez, at once placed
the facts before him, advising him either to proceed
against Epigmenio Gonzalez or share imprisonment
with him. Whereupon the corregidor went to con
sult with the escribano, who, already aware of the
corregidor's complicity, dissimulated by declaring that
he did not believe a word of the statement. Corre
gidor Dominguez, however, persisted that his infor
mation was correct, and Juan Fernando suggested
that he should ask assistance of the cornandante Ig-
nacio Garcia Rebollo, and search Gonzalez's house.
This was done, and forty men placed under arms,
twenty of whom under the corregidor surrounded the
house of Gonzalez while the comandante, with the
remaining twenty, invested that of Samano.
Had the corregidor been fortunate enough to avoid
communication with the escribano, all might have gone
well with the revolutionists and himself; but the es
cribano displayed such zeal, and instituted so thorough
a search of the house, that the escape of the inmates
was rendered impossible, and a quantity of ammuni
tion and weapons was discovered. The corregidor,
however unwilling, was now compelled to arrest
Epigmenio, his brother, and all the household. While
he was thus occupied, his wife, faithful to the cause,
devised means 41 to communicate with Allende at San
41 Alaman says that Dominguez locked the entrance gates of the house on
his departure, and that Dona Josefa signalled to Ignacio Perez, the prison al
caide, whose room was immediately beneath her recamara, by tapping thrice
on the floor. Perez, being an ardent supporter of the revolution, considered
the intelligence which she communicated through the wicket-grating so
important that he undertook to convey the message himself. Not finding
Allende at San Miguel, where he arrived at daylight on the 15th, he sought
Aldama and informed him of what was taking place. Hist. Mej., i. 3G8-9.
Liceaga states on the authority of a manuscript that two messengers, Fran
cisco Lopez and Francisco Anaya, were also sent by the corregidora, the for
mer alone arriving at the destination, and as late as five in the evening of the
loth. That Allende, however, should have already left for Dolores on the
arrival of Perez, being informed of danger by the intercepted order for his
ARRESTS AND IMPRISONMENTS. 113
Miguel, informing him of the serious position of af
fairs. She also informed Arias, but received a reply
so unsatisfactory as to cause her much anxiety. 42
On the following morning the corregidor began
proceedings against the accused, but conducted them
in so procrastinating a manner that evidently his heart
was not in the work. Probably Arias was right in
representing to the alcalde Ochoa that Dominguez
was endeavoring to gain time, and that the plot was
rapidly approaching its denouement. A little by-play
was enacted: the traitor, with his own connivance,
was arrested on the evening of the 15th, and on his
person were discovered papers implicating Hidalgo
and Allende. But this was not enough. The letters
spoke of friends who could be relied on; and when
closely questioned Arias admitted that these friends
were the corregidor, his wife, and a number of others
who were wont to assemble at the revolutionary meet
ings. The subordinate officer, the alcalde Ochoa,
supported by the Spanish faction, now proceeded to
act. The comandante Rebollo, who hitherto appears
t;> have been quite unaware of the magnitude of the
revolution, placed under Ochoa's directions three hun
dred soldiers; 43 and Dominguez, his wife and family,
with a number of other suspected persons, were
arrested and imprisoned during the night. 44 The
corregidor was closely confined in a cell in the college
arrest, he considers not probable, since his inactivity under the circumstances
for 24 hours would be inexplicable. Moreover, citizens of San Miguel affirmed
that he was in that town on the morning of the loth, attending with his
troops a religious ceremony, and was seen there as late as 5 o'clock in the af
ternoon. From the evidence, therefore, this author concludes that Hidalgo
and Allende acted immediately upon receipt of the news from Quere"taro, and
did not waste a day in indecision. Adiciones y Rectific., 44-5. Liceaga's con
clusion is proved to be correct by the statements of Sotelo, a participator in
the proceedings. --He asserts that Allende arrived at Dolores at ten on the
night of the loth of September. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 322.
42 ' Pero aquel contesto de una manera desabrida, diciendo quo se veia en
aquel compromiso por haberse fiado de quienes no debiera y que ya tenia
tornado su partido.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 309.
43 ' La manana de 15 al 16 una faccion de europeos regentados por el alcalde
ordi.na.rio D. Juan Ochoa, y como trescientos soldados del regimiento de Cclaya,
auxiliados por Garcia Rebollo, sorprendieron al Lie. Dominguez. ' Bustamante,
Cttadro Hist. , i. 31.
** Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 74-5.
Hisx. HEX., VOL. IV. 8
114 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
of Santa Cruz, without being allowed to communicate
with any one. His wife was conveyed to the convent
of Santa Clara, and although enceinte, was deprived
of the company of her friends, and even of her children,
who were separately imprisoned. 45
It is difficult to account for the subsequent proceed
ings of the government against Dominguez, unless
they can be explained by the contemptuous regard
with which Oidor Aguirre viewed the political atti
tude of the Creoles. Information of the corregidor's
arrest was conveyed without loss of time to Venegas,
who consulted with Aguirre. That minister expressed
such disdain for any attempt that could be made by
'Americans' to overthrow Spanish rule, that he as
sured the viceroy that at an official piece of parchment
on a stick they would be frightened like asses. 46 He
concluded by suggesting that Juan Collado, the al
calde del crimen, should be sent, with an escribano
and minor officials, to investigate the matter. 47 The
viceroy acted upon this advice, and Collado briefly
dismissed the charge against Dominguez and rein
stated him in office. 48
45 Bustamante states that her daughters were not allowed to speak with
the servants who attended on her. Cuadro Hist., i. 32.
46 Throughout this war the Mexican people, Creoles, Indians, and mestizos,
are often called 'Americanos,' and sometimes 'gente del pais. '
47 Bustamente regards this exhibition of authority with great contempt.
He ironically represents Aguirre as suggesting, ' que en el caso, lo que con-
venia hacer, seria mandar al alcalde de crimen D. Juan Collado a Querdtaro
con un escribano y algunos porquerones,' and adds that the viceroy accepted
the advice and Collado the office, the latter appointing Jose" Maria Moya his
escribano, and 'corchete mayor a D. Antonio Acuua que en Mexico desempe-
naba la plaza de capitan de sala. ' Ib.
48 Venegas disapproved Collado's action and removed him from the audicn-
cia. Id., 36. Dominguez was a man of great literary ability and acquire
ments. As a magistrate, both his talents and integrity were justly appre
ciated by the public. Having occupied in the Mexican capital an official
position of importance and trust with regard to both public and private
business of the viceroy, his strict attention to his duties and his fidelity
gained him the favor of Marquina, who appointed him to the corregimiento
of Quer6taro, an office so important and lucrative that it was regarded as
equal to an intendencia. The salary was 4,000 pesos, and other sources of in
come amounted to as much more. Under the administration of Iturrigaray,
Dominguez was instructed to reform the abuses which existed in the clouh
factories at Quer^taro. The system under which these were conducted
reduced a large proportion of the operatives to actual slavery a pecuniary
advance making them subject to thraldom remorselessly exacted by their
ENFORCED ACTION. 115
No sooner had Allende received news of the arrest
of the Gonzalez family and household than he hast
ened to Dolores, being now aware that his purposes
were widely known to the authorities. 49 His inter
view with Hidalgo was marked by rapid deliberation
and prompt decision. When Allende and his com
panions arrived at Dolores the cura was entertaining
visitors, and the revolutionists remained outside until
they had departed. When admitted, they informed
Hidalgo of the arrests which had been made, and the
discovery of their plans. The cura, who had listened
to their statements with imperturbable calmness, ex
claimed, "Action must be taken at once; there is no
time to be lost; we shall yet see the oppressors' yoke
broken and the fragments scattered on the ground!" 50
He then ordered the street watchmen who were at
tached to the cause to be called in, and sent them to
summon the workmen in his* pottery and silk factories.
These soon assembled to the number of fifteen or six
teen, to whom Hidalgo communicated his intention of
immediately raising the cry of liberty.
employers. Dominguez effected the necessary reforms, and drew upon him
self the enmity of the owners, who were mostly Europeans. Nevertheless,
his public conduct, and the faithfulness with which he managed the large
estate and fortune left in his charge by Dona Josefa Vergara for beneficent
purposes, won for him the regard of the inhabitants of Quere'taro. Zamacois
attributes the easy acquittal of Dominguez either to policy on the part of Col-
lado, who considered it might be prudent to show generosity when the revolu
tion had already commenced, or to the pressure of a threat expressed by the
Indian inhabitants of the Canada that they would rise in revolt if the corre-
gidor were not released. Hist. Mej., vi. 324. That the corregidor was
enabled to maintain bis position at such a crisis speaks loudly to his credit as
possessing a strong hold on the regards of both parties or as a consummate
political craftsman.
49 Guerra states that Allende ' conocio su peligro por este murmurio piiblico,
6 tal vez, por que su mismo gefe Canal le avis6 de la orden que habia recibiilo
de Mexico para prenderle.' Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 292. As 'este murmurio'
has reference to the arrest of Dominguez on the night of the 15th, Guerra is
in error, since Allende was at that time on his way to Dolores.
50 This is the statement of Sotelo, an eye-witness. Hernandez y Ddvalos,
Col. DOC.+ ii. 322. Alaman gives a different account, derived from state
ments made1?frth.e trials of Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and others. He
states that Allende went to Dolores on the 14th, and that the news of the ar
rests at Queretaro was brought by Aldama, who only arrived at Dolores at
two o'clock in the morning of the IGth; that the cura was roused from his
bed, and exclaimed: 'Gentlemen, we are lost; the only resource left is to seize
gachupines.' Hist. Mej., i. 373-4. In view of the narration of Sotelo, who
was present on the occasion, and taking into consideration the statements
made in the trials, I follow Sotelo's version.
116 OPENING OF THE WAB OF INDEPENDENCE,
A rumor of what was transpiring had, however,
spread, and a number of the populace assembled be
fore the cura's gate, ready to take part in the enter
prise. Weapons, which had been secretly made and
hidden, were now brought out, and Hidalgo distrib
uted them with his own hand. The first step taken
was to secure the person of Padre Bustamante, the
sacristan mayor of the parish, who was a Spaniard.
Hidalgo then addressed a few animating words to
those assembled, raising in loud voice as he concluded
the cry, " Viva Nuestra Senora de Guadalupel Viva
la independencia!"
The revolutionists now sallied forth, 51 and having
first liberated the prisoners in the town jail, 52 thus
swelling their numbers, they made captive the princi
pal Spaniards. 53 Dawn was now approaching. It
was Sunday. Hidalgo caused the church bell which
summoned his flock to mass to be rung at an earlier
hour than usual. The townspeople came forward and
gathered in groups before the church door, and from
the neighboring haciendas countrymen on foot and
mounted were seen flocking in and congregating in
51 Accounts differ -as to their number. Sotelo gives a list of twenty-one
names, without including any of the leaders and others whose names were
not known. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 330. Negrete supplies a
list of 43 names, only two of which appear in that of Sotelo. Hist. Mil. S'uj.
XIX., i. 134-5. The number in all must have been far in excess of that given
by many Mexican historians, the smallness of which is incompatible with the
success attained. Alaman states that Hidalgo, supported by his brother
Mariano, Jos6 Santos Villa, Allende, Aldama, and ten armed men whom he
retained in his house, 15 in all, proceeded to execute the design of seizing
the Spanish residents. Hist. Mej., i. 375. Liceaga maintains that there were
only ten engaged in the undertaking. Rectific. y Adic., 53. Mora, who incor
rectly mentions Abasolo as being present, as also does Negrete in his list, says:
' Con diez hombres pues, de los cuales cinco eran forzados, so procedio a
prender los Espafioles del lugar.' Mej. y sus Rev., 20. Guerra's statement
that Allende left San Miguel with 50 soldiers of his company on the 13th of
September for Dolores, and increased his force to 800 men on his march by de
claring that' he was going to liberate the corregidor Dominguez, is utterly at
variance with facts.
02 Liceaga disputes this fact, but the evidence is conclusive. Consult Her
nandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 17, 40; ii. 323.
53 On page 55 of his Adic. y Rectific., Liceaga gives a list of 13 names of
Spaniards made prisoners. Bustamante states that only seven were seized.
Cuad. Hist., i. 22. Alaman says the number was seventeen. Hist. Mej., i.
376-7.
GRITO DE DOLORES. 117
the sanctuary. 54 But it was the matters of this
world rather than those of the next that were now
to claim their attention. Deliverance was demanded,
and from the evil one; but it was from Satan in the
flesh, from devils incarnated as temporal masters, in
flicting wrongs and injuries and infamies without
number time enough left when men are free from
the tyraraiies of their fellows to continue the eternal
battle with the powers of darkness !
There was no mass that day. The cura entered
his pulpit and looked abroad upon the sea of upturned
anxious faces with deep and yearning solicitude.
"My children," he said, "this day comes to us a new
dispensation. Are you ready to receive it? Will
you be free? Will you make the effort to recover
from the hated Spaniards the lands stolen from your
forefathers three hundred years ago?" Thus the
great project of independence was laid before them,
and they were called upon to prove their devotion to
their country. For the last time Hidalgo addressed
his flock as cura of Dolores. Henceforth he would
be their guide to liberty; they would fight for it;
they would die for it; he would lead them himself
to battle and to victory! "To-day," he continued,
"we must act. The Spaniards are bad enough them
selves, but now they are about to surrender us and our
country to the French. Danger threatens our religion,
and oppression our homes. Will you become Napo
leon's slaves? or will you as patriots defend your relig
ion and your rights ? " " We will defend them ! " shouted
the people. "Viva Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe,
muera el mal gobierno, mueran los gachupines!" 55
" Live, then, and follow your cura, who has ever watched
over your welfare," was Hidalgo's answer. The Grito
de Dolores has gone forth! The poor and ignorant
54 During the morning a message was sent to Mariano Abasolo, inviting him
to join the cause, which he did without hesitation, according to Sotelo's state
ment. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 323.
55 Long live our lady of Guadalupe, perish the bad government, perish the
Spaniards !
118 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
and down-trodden of this little Indian town proclaim
the future independence of a great nation! Enthusi
asm rises to religious height, and unarmed as they
are, they will follow no matter where, and fight and
die no matter how.
It is somewhat strange that independence should
be born in such a quarter and of such parentage; yet
perhaps not more wonderful here and thus than else
where and in some other way. Its days were now
fully come, and it must be brought forth. We know
after what manner religions have come to man; we
have seen great spasms of enlightenment fall at vari
ous epochs on the race; we have seen the intellect
awaken as from a dream, and re-awaken again and
again but what it all is, or how, or why, no man can
tell, howsoever hard our teachers may try.
In the evolution of human affairs two elements are
essential to progress, the opportunity and the agent.
There may be and often is one condition without the
other. Opportunity may be ripe arid no one at hand
to act; or the individual may be present and lack op
portunity; or the agent may be before his time, act
prematurely, and so spoil all. Under such conditions
there can be no great bririging-forth.
It was a question how far such auxiliaries could be
of service in the coming crusade. Hidalgo maintained
that the display of numbers would be beneficial to
their cause. Allende, however, entertained grave
doubts, but he finally acquiesced. To provide their
followers with arms was the great difficulty. The
houses of the Spaniards were ransacked; lances which
Hidalgo had already provided were brought forth;
the Indian seized his machete^ and those who could
obtain no better weapon supplied themselves with
clubs, slings, and bows and arrows. Fire-arms they
had few; but San Miguel would furnish them some
56 An implement for cutting grass, sugar-cane, brush, etc., in the shape of
a broadsword without hilt, and sometimes slightly curved, the sharpened
edge being in that case on the convex curve.
ON THE MARCH. 119
munitions of war, and thither Hidalgo and Allende
led their rabble, which soon numbered nearly 4,000
men. 57
Some attempt at military order was made. The
mounted herdsmen of the haciendas, carrying lances,
were formed into a troop of cavalry, while the better
armed Indians on foot represented the infantry. Then
followed a promiscuous crowd, in which women and
children joined. The die was cast; and the aroused
people hastened onr The maize was in full ear, and
haciendas abounding in cattle lay on their line of
march. There was no lack of food, and they took
w r hat they wanted. As they passed through the vil
lages volunteers swelled their ranks, and other Span
iards were added to the number of the captives. On
their arrival at Atotonilco, Hidalgo halted in order
that he might surprise San Miguel at nightfall.
Here a picture of the virgin of Guadalupe was ob
tained, 58 and raised on high above the throng, amidst
shouts of "Viva Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe, y
mueran los gachupinesl" Henceforth it became the
banner of the crusade; and while it waved on high,
emblem of peace and intercession, many a brave deed,
many a bloody deed, was done for those rights and
liberties which on no other ground than violence and
force would ever be vouchsafed to them. 59
57 J/ora, Mej. y sus. Rev., iv. 21. Negrete states that Hidalgo marched
ont of Dolores with only about 80 men, which number as he advanced was
increased to 300. Mex. Siglo XIX., ii. 19-20. Sotelo says: 'Mirando que ya
se contaba con un numero considerable de gente adicta, resolvio organizarla
en forma cle tropa. ' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 323.
58 Alaman states that Hidalgo took it from the sacristy and raised it on a
lance in order to support his enterprise by the religious devotion which his
followers entertained for the sacred emblem. This is refuted by Liceaga,
who explains that one of the insurgents procured a copy of the picture from
'Dona Ramona N. que vivia alii como otras, con el nombre de beatas,' and
that it was hoisted upon a clothes-pole. The enthusiasm it roused caused
the leaders to adopt it as a banner. A die. y Rectijic., 58. Zamacois supports
Alaman 's statement on the strength of Hidalgo's declaration. Hist. Mej.,\ 7 i.
253; Hernadez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 13.
59 Other banners with a like design were in time procured and borne along
in all parts of Hidalgo's army. 'Ami existe en poder del hi jo del denodado
insurgente Victor Resales, el diseno original de la primera bandera de Hidalgo
que tenia la forma de un estandarte, que fue hecho con uno de los palios de la
parroquia de Dolores, y sobre el cual se puso un escudo muy parecido ai adop-
120 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Meanwhile intelligence of the uprising had reached
San Miguel, 60 and the Spanish residents, aware that
they could not rely upon any Creole or native servant,
and informed by Colonel Canal that no dependence
could be placed on the regiment, assembled in arms at
the municipal buildings for self-defence. As the dusk
of evening fell, Hidalgo entered the town. The ex
citement was intense, the population cheering the in
surgents and hurling bitter denunciations against the
Spaniards. Allende placed the prisoners brought from
Dolores in the college of San Francisco de Sales, un
der the guardianship of Aldama, while he proceeded
to arrest the Spaniards of the town. Through the
representations of Canal, after some parley the latter
were induced to yield without opposition and surren
der their arms. Allende assured them that while he
lived no harm should befall them, and thereupon they
were removed to the college.
O
The Spaniards having thus been secured without
bloodshed, no difficulty was found in winning over
the soldiers of the garrison. The officers and troops
of the queen's regiment of provincial dragoons were
already predisposed to support Allende. In vain Ma
jor Camunez endeavored at the barracks to hold them
to their loyalty by representing that the rebels were
partisans of the French. His words were received
with an ominous silence, and when two of the officers
raised a cheer for Allende and independence, Carnunez
was made captive, 61 and the whole regiment joined
the insurgents. A portion of the Celaya infantry
tado despues de la independencia y era de papel negro recortado.' Gallo, Horn-
Ires I I mt., 272.
60 Authors differ with regard to this statement. Mora asserts that the
authorities were completely surprised, and knew nothing of the movement
until Hidalgo was at their door; but Liceaga more reasonably affirms that
news of what had taken place in Dolores reached San Miguel early. I have
accepted his version as being the more probable. He gives a list of the prin
cipal Spanish residents in San Miguel. Adic. y Rcctific., 58-60.
61 Colonel Canal, if he did not actually favor the movement, was indiffer
ent. He had, however, been succeeded in the command by Caimiuez that
morning. Liceaf/a, ut sup., 61.
PILLAGE AND MURDER. 121
stationed there also declared for the cause of inde
pendence.
During the night and on the following morning the
populace began to exhibit symptoms of violence, which
afterward became uncontrollable. Having liberated
the prisoners in the jail, with much uproar and cries
of "Death to the gachupines!" they assembled in
dense throngs before the houses of the Spanish resi
dents, intent on pillage and destruction. Stores and
private dwellings shared a like fate. Doors were
battered in and the rabble ransacked and robbed ad
libitum. 62 .Hidalgo endeavored to moderate these wild
passions, and Allende, sword in hand, rode through
the crowds threatening their death, until the disorder
was stopped.
Our standpoint of morality depends on our teach
ing, if we still hold to our teachings, or to our line of
independent thought, if we have any. The merchant's
morality is different from that of the doctor, the priest's
from that of the military man. While Hidalgo had
as much conscience, as much heart and humanity, as
Allende, whose profession was that of man-killer, he
was now out on the work of an avenging angel, in so
far as it was necessary for his work to assume that
form. The Spaniards had robbed and insulted these
many years. This was now to be stopped, whatever
the cost. If the permission of pillage would add to
the power of his cause, it were but small difference
when the demon of murder was abroad. Our most
refined and Christian civilization will kill human be
ings in battle by the hundred thousand, will commit
horrible and wholesale butcheries without justice and
without mercy, employing all the arts and advantages
the mind can invent to injure and destroy the enemy
all for the cause, killing to prevent further killing;
but over some few minor and comparatively insig-
62 According to Torrente, 77is. J&IL+ i. 143, not-even Creoles' houses were
spared. ' Se lanzaron como lobos rabiosos contra todos los europeos i contra
sus propiedades, sin perdonara sus mismos compatriutas. '
122 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
nificant injuries it raises its hands in holy horror,
and cries out against them as barbaric and savage.
Stuff and humbug! Savage warfare is no worse than
civilized warfare, no less necessary, no less righteous.
It may be a little less decent and refined; but what
are refinement and decency beside butchery and body-
mangling machines ! All is as bad as it can be ; the
civilized men are the more to blame, however, for they
should know better.
Hidalgo was a far more self-sacrificing, honorable,
and humane man than the average military leader.
But he was not hypocrite or fool enough to pretend that
it was worse to take a dead man's goods than a living
man's life. But the killing in war is done for the
cause. True; and now pillage is permitted for the
cause. It was not that he was in favor of robbery.
But sacking a town he regarded as no worse than kill
ing the people; and in his present emergency he
deemed one as much a matter of necessity as the other.
In any event, he would win this cause if within his
power to do so.
Allende thought differently. He was a man of nar
rower mind, of more restricted ideas; he was a soldier,
and felt bound by conventional rules and the regu
lations of his craft. He urged that they ought
not to rely upon the common people, who were ad
dicted to pillage, but upon disciplined troops. The
discussion was continued with considerable warmth,
until it became evident that two leaders at discord
might prove fatal to the cause. Hidalgo, therefore,
suggested that his own and Allende's authority should
be defined, in order that each should act within the
limits of his own powers, and Allende at once offered
to surrender the supreme command to the cura,
whose ability and influence he very sensibly deemed
superior to his own. He expressed the determi
nation, however, to separate himself from him if
they should be unable to act in harmony. But all
thought of independent action on the part of Allende
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. 123
was set at rest by the arrival somewhat later of a de
spatch from Riano, the intendente of Guanajuato, ad
dressed to the subclelegado Bellogin, who was a prison
er at the time, and ordering the immediate arrest of
Allende, Aldama, and, if possible, of Hidalgo, " because
his talents, character, and reputation would render the
revolution more vigorous and formidable." The post
master having been also made captive, the letter was
delivered to Allende, who, recognizing the truth of its
comments on Hidalgo, insisted that the cura should
retain supreme command, which he did. 63
The suddenness with which the insurgents had been
compelled prematurely to proclaim their purpose had
entirely overthrown their previous plans, and their fu
ture operations would in a great measure have to be
guided by circumstances. To discipline overwhelm
ing numbers, provide their followers with arms, and
institute some degree of military tactics was now their
object. In order to provide for public tranquillity, a
conference was held in the evening, to which the prin
cipal citizens were convoked, and a junta, presided over
by Aldama, was established. 64 On the following day
the work of organizing the forces was commenced.
Officers from the grade of corporal to that of colo
nel were appointed; recruits were obtained from the
surrounding haciendas, and lances constructed with
the greatest diligence. A quantity of gunpowder,
also, which was being conveyed from Mexico to the
mines of Guanajuato, fell into the hands of the in
surgents.
On the morning of the 18th Hidalgo led his forces,
now counted by tens of thousands, out of San Miguel,
after having appropriated what money there was in
the treasury, and some belonging to the Spanish cap
tives. 65 Marching through the towns of San Juan
e3 Liceaya, Adic. y Recti/ic., 65-7.
64 The other members were, Padre Manuel Castilblanque, Felipe Gonzalez,
Miguel Vallejo, Domingo Unzaga, and Vicente Umaran. The administra
tion of the aduana and of the tobacco monopoly was given to Antonio Aga-
ton de Lartiendo, and that of the post-office to Francisco Rebelo. Id., 68.
65 Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., 22. Mariano Hidalgo, brother of the cura, was
124
OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
cle la Vega and Chamacuero, 66 he moved toward Ce-
kya, and approached the town on the evening of the
1 9th. The officers in command of the troops stationed
there, deeming resistance useless, retired at night with
some companions of the provincial regiment to Que-
retaro, accompanied by the European residents. On
the night of the 19th, Hidalgo and Allende conjointly
addressed a letter to the ayuntamiento, summoning
the town to surrender, and threatening to put to death
PROVINCE OF GUANAJUATO.
their prisoners to the number of seventy-eight if op
position was offered. 67
appointed treasurer. One dollar a day was paid a cavalryman and half that
sum to a foot-soldier. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 381.
60 At this last place he made captive the cura, who was a European. Gaz.
deMex., 1810, 811.
67 The captive Spaniards had been brought with them, surrounded by the
dragoons of the queen's regiment. The following is a translation of the doc
ument, a copy of which is to be found in Alaman, Hint. Mej., i. app. 50-1:
'We have approached this city with the object of securing the persons of all
the European Spaniards. If they surrender at discretion, their persons will
be treated with humanity; but if on the contrary resistance should be made,
ENTRY INTO CELAYA. 125
A man is never so old as to cease to be an enigma
to himself, provided he continues to place himself in
new and untried fields, and has sense and patience
enough fully and fairly to regard himself. The bur
glar does not know how he would behave as a banker ;
the merchant does not know what his price would be
were he a politician. So the lately humane man may
become a bloody fanatic, and the soft radiance of char
ity may make tender the heart of the cruel. Men
pride themselves upon their character as something
adamantine, when all the time it may be but putty,
never having been tried; were it so, it would change
to white or black twenty times under as many and
weighty influences.
The man of God behaves badly in the livery of the
devil. He behaves worse than the devil. War is
Satan's enginery, and he is the only one worthy to
employ it, the only one who seems to win at it. God
lights his enemies, we are told, and yet his enemies
everywhere abound; he does not wholly overcome
them. The sterner qualities of the soldier, resolved
to win at all cost, were being developed in the parish
priest of Dolores. Happily for these unfortunate
Spaniards, no event occurred to cause the leaders to
put their dreadful threat in execution. A copy of the
despatch was sent by the ayuntamiento three hours
after midnight on the 20th to the municipality of
Queretaro, and on the same day Hidalgo was informed
that no resistance would be offered to his entrance.
On the 21st the insurgents marched into the city.
At the entrance of the plaza a spectator had stationed
himself on a house-top to witness the marshalling of
this motley army. The man was shot dead; 63 and as
and the order to fire upon us be given, they will be treated with a correspond
ing rigor. May God protect your honors many years. Field of battle, Sep
tember 19, 1810. Miguel Hidalgo, Ignacio Allen cle. P. S. The moment that
the order is given to open fire upon our troops, the seventy-eight Europeans
whom we have in our power will be beheaded. Hidalgo, Allende. Sres. del
Ayuntamiento de Celaya. '
68 Alaman states that he was the coachman of Manuel Gomez Linares, and
denies Abasolo's statement during his trkl that the man first fired at the in-
126 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
if the report of this murderous gun were the precon
certed signal for onslaught, the work of violence be
gan. 69 Joined by the populace, the insurgents rushed
in excited bands through the city, and erelong the
houses of the Europeans were broken into, their fur
niture battered to pieces and cast into the streets,
and every article of clothing, of common requirement,
or of use in war, was carried off, and the rest was
wantonly destroyed. Again remonstrances were laid
before Hidalgo; but he maintained his previous views
that numbers would insure success, and that a sys
tem of plunder would both weaken their foes and at
tract partisans to their own cause. 70
In taking this ground Hidalgo, as patriot and rev
olutionist for he was both has been severely cen
sured. But there is much to be said in extenuation.
Hidalgo claimed that the Indians had been wrong
fully dispossessed of their lands, property, and rights
in the first instance, and consequently the wealth the
Spaniards and their descendants had thereby acquired
was not theirs, but belonged to the aboriginal occu
pants of the soil and their descendants. Robbery
and murder had been employed by the Spaniards in
wresting the country from the Indians, and they
would adopt the same measures to win it back. Fur
ther than this, he argued, it was his only resource.
He had but few trained soldiers, and he had no money
to pay these except what he could take from the en
emy. If war is ever justifiable, this one was; there
is no more sacred cause man can fight for than per
sonal and political independence. If it is right to
wage war and afterward force the losing side to pay
the cost of all, as the great nations of the earth seem
agreed, it is equally right to rob and plunder as hostil-
surgent troops, fd., 384. This incident is not accepted by some authors.
Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., ii. 24.
09 Mora says: 'La senal de posesion que se di6 al vecindario file" una cles-
carga general de todas las annas de fuego verificada en la plaza, y que fue el
toque de llamamiento para el destrozo y el saqueo.' Max. y sus Rev., iv. 20.
70 Zamacois, Hist. Mej., vi. 288; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc.,\. 10.
CAPTAIN-GEXERAL OF AMERICA. 127
ities proceed. All war is murder and robbery; it is
in order to murder and rob each other that men go
to war. I do not attempt to justify this course ; I
only say that such were the opinion and custom, to a
great extent, in Mexico at this time, arid were held
and practised alike by both sides throughout the war
for independence.
Before Hidalgo's entrance into Celaya his follow
ers, who now amounted to fifty thousand, proclaimed
him Captain-general of America, 71 and he had con
ferred the rank of lieutenant-general on Allende, and
corresponding grades on Aldama, Abasolo, 72 and other
leaders. Here also he was joined by Captain Arias,
whom the reader has lately seen playing the role of in
former, while cautiously scheming for his self-protec
tion. 73
The recognition of Hidalgo's rank and authority by
the ayuntamiento might be beneficial; he therefore
called a session of its members and the principal citi
zens on the 22d. Only two regidores presented
themselves, the rest, being Europeans, having fled to
Queretaro, whereupon the captain-general appointed
others to the vacant offices, nominating Carlos Camar-
go subdelegado. 7 * The new municipality acknowledged
71 Id. , ii. 107, 109. See his summons to surrender, addressed to the inten-
dente of Guanajuato, in Alaman, ut sup., 421. Mora comments on the ab
surdity of this title. True, it smacks somewhat of worldly vanity; but after
all, I do not see why it is not as good as another. Mex. y sus Rev., iv. 27.
Two companies of the Celaya regiment, which had failed to unite with the
troops that retired to Queretaro, joined the insurgents.
72 Mariano Abasolo was at this time 27 years of age. He was a native of
Dolores, and the son of a wealthy Spaniard who left him a large fortune,
which was still further increased by marriage with the heiress Dona Maria
Manuela Taboada. At his trial, some months later, he deposed that he had not
been connected with the revolt previous to the grito de Dolores. The influ
ence of Hidalgo, and his friendship for Allende, being a captain in the same
regiment with him, appear to have induced him to join their cause. His ser
geant, Jose' Antonio Martinez, afterward executed in Mexico, declared that
Abasolo commanded him to deliver tip to Hidalgo the arms in the barracks
at San Miguel. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 356-7; Dice. Univ. Hist., i. 12-13.
73 Alaman states that Arias was always regarded with suspicion by the in
surgent leaders, while Zamacois affirms that he was received by Hidalgo with
delight, and repudiates the charge brought against Arias of having given in
formation about the revolt. Hist. Mej., vi. 292.
74 Camargo did not sympathize with the movement; and he advised the
viceroy of the circumstances, protesting his iidelity. Venegas ordered him to
123 OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
the authority of Hidalgo/ 5 who, having thus arranged
matters in Celaya, and fearing that Queretaro was too
well defended to be successfully assailed under the
present condition of his troops, inarched on the morn
ing of the 23d in the direction of Guanajuato. 76
remain in the position, with the full consent of the government. The insur
gents in Celaya, however, discovered this sicle-play, and Camargo escaped
to Quere'taro, pursued by a troop of cavalry. The exertion and agitation
threw him into a fever, and he died a few days afterward. Liceaga, Adic. y
Rectific., 100. Liceaga obtained his information from Abasolo's family, which
was intimate with Camargo.
75 See Hidalgo's letter, Doc. 3, in Liceaga, Adic. y Rectiftc., 212. Alaman
erroneously states that the municipality conferred the rank of captain-general
upon Hidalgo. Liceaga corrects this mistake. The municipality had no
power to appoint military commanders: it was by the proclamation of his
troops that Hidalgo was made captain-general.
76 Additional authorities consulted for the preceding chapters are: Busta-
mante, Defensa, 27; Ouad. Hist., i. 1-11, 33, and iv. 40, 87-111, 138-40;
Gampanas de Callejd, 1-8; Martirologio, 4; Mcdidas Pacification, MS., ii.
45-59; Mem. pa. la Hist. Mex., MS., i. 47-9; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i., passim;
Diaertacion, iii., ap. 86-7; Zavala, Rev. Mex., passim; Torrente, R. Hisp.-Am.,
i. 58-64; Zerecero, Rev. Mex., passim; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i.,
passim; also ii. 5-42, and v. 60-3, 837-38, 853-60; Cancelada, Verdad Sabida,
passim; Conducta Iturrigaray, 27-135; Tel. Mex., 415-20; Ruina de la N.
Espan., passim; Gaz. Mex., x'i.-xvi., passim; Diar. Mex., i. 91-2; iv. 65; also
v. 149, 533; vi.-ix., passim; xi. 119-20, 350, and xii. 185-6, 219; Cedidarlo,
MS., iv. 25; Guerra, Rev. de N. Mex., i., passim; Mayer, Mex. Azt., i. 127-
281; Mora, Mex. y Sus Rev., i. 284-8; iii. 193-369; iv. 10-17; Rev. N. Ep.
Censura, passim; Consejos, passim; Breves Reflex, passim; Fisiologia Cosa
Pub., 35-6; Rosa, Discurso, 11; Lizarza, Discurxo Vind. Iturrigaray, passim;
Queipo, Canon. Peniten., passim; Col. Eacritos, 70-131; Lull, Refutation, 21;
Rev. Verdad. Orig., no. i. 67-84; no. ii., passim; Lizana y Beaumont, Cart.
Past., passim; Pradt, Hist. Revol. Espan., 40-1; Pretensiones Anglo- Amer., 2;
Noriega, Vindication, passim; Urrutia Jacobo, Voto, passim; Represent, al
Virey, no. i. 6; no. ii. 5-8; Frost, Pict. Hist. Mex., 149; Indicador, iii. 221-
73; Calvillo, Oration, passim; Entrada, Representation, passim; Fernand<-z t
Engatios que a los Insurgentes, passim; Lastarria, La America, passim; Lnfond,
Voyage autour du Monde, i. 217-24; Galiano, Hist. Espana, vi. 337-8; Gon
zalez, Hist. Est. Aguascal, 496; Guiridi y Alcocer, Sermones, passim; Presets
Juicio Impartial, passim; Kottenkamp, Unabhangig., 1-45; Kennedy, Texas,
i. 270-1; Rev. N. Espana, passim; Perez, Proclama, passim; Orizava, Ocurr.,
MS., 1-3; Michelena, Relation, ii. 7; Martinez, Rev. Mex., i. 215-17; Mofras,
Exploration de V Oregon, i. 1-38; Modern Travels, Mex. and Gnat., i. 101-2;
Lerdode Tejada, Apunt. Hist., no.v. 362-4; Las Clases Pro-l. Guadalaj., Sept.
15, 1878, 3; Mosaico Mex., ii. 462; Mendibil, Resumen, 1-6, 93; Mex. Album,
Fotog., i. 14-15; Mex. Scraps, ii. 60; Lacunza, Discursos, xxxvi. 535; Arran-
g6iz, Mej., i., passim; Hidalgo, Biog. Cura, 30-1; Humboldt, Essai Pol, ii.
763-9; ix. 864-5; x. 1335-84, 1422-8; xi. 649; Dublan y Lozano, Ley' Mex.,
i- .326-7; piiverr<pis,_Franz6. Inierven. Mex., 18-21; Domeiiech, Hist. Mex., i.
AUTHORITIES. 129
no. 7, 206-24, 236-55; no. 8, 236-55; Annals Congress, 1806-7, 913-26; Aizer.
State Pap,, ii. 596-695, 798-804; xii. 1-327, 388-434; Amer. Register, i. 71-3;
ii. 79-83; Bib. Mex. Trat., i. 496; Beulluch, Mex., i. xx.-xxxv. ; Campillo,
Manifesto, 7; Carbro, Proclama, passim; Chevalier, Exped. Mex., 4-5, 17-40;
Mexique, 331-8; Chateaubriand, Congress de Ver., ii. 230-43; Carson, State
Register; Calvo, Annales Hist., vi. 11-34; Yucatan, Diccion. Hist., i. 295;
Young, Hist. Mex., 73; Walton's Expose, app. 7-10; Ward, Mex., vi. 155-6;
Veracruzano, i. 76-7; Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Mcj., 3; Strieker, Bibliothek,
36-40; Squier, Travels C. A., ii. 371-5; Soc. Mex. Geog., ii. 62-7, 566-75; Salo,
Diar. Ofic., 5; Sosa, Episcop. Mex., 212; Rivera, Gob., i. 127-8; Hist. Jalapa,
i. 198-268; Revilla, Dice. Univer., v. 429; Mayer, MS., no. 11, passim;
Quarty. Review, vii. 248-9, 257; xvii. 530-40; xxx. 171-2; Portilla, Expana en
Mex., 117-98; Pike, Explor. Travels, 370-1, 386-436; Pinkerton, Mod. Geog.,
iii. 159-60, 174-6; Qu'mones, Descripcion, passim; Palafox, Iturriqaray, 21-2;
Campillo, Exhortacion, passim; Tapia, Exhortacion, passim; Perez, Orar.
Funeb., nos. ii. and iii., passim; Robertson, Reminiscences, 1-45; Robinson,
Mex., 11-29; Iturrigaray, i. 18-20; Rev. des Deux Mondes, 1862, 516-32;
Ordenes Corona, MS., iii'. 141, 155; v. 60, 128.
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 9
CHAPTER VI.
THE ALH6NDIGA OF GUANAJUATO TAKEN BY STORM.
1810.
LOCAL HISTORY OF GUANAJUATO ALARM IN THE CITY DEFENSIVE MEAS
URES OF INTENDENTB BJANO THE ALH6NDIGA DE GRANADITAS AN IN
TERESTING MANUSCRIPT RIANO RETIRES TO THE ALHONDIGA HIDALGO
SUMMONS RIANO TO SURRENDER THE ATTACK A MURDEROUS CONTEST
RIANO'S DEATH His BIOGRAPHY CONFUSION IN THE ALHONDIGA
THE BARRICADES WON BY THE INSURGENTS THEY GAIN ENTRANCE
BERZABAL'S FALL His BIOGRAPHY NUMBER OF THE KILLED ACTS OF
HEROISM PILLAGE AND DEVASTATION.
THE province of Guanajuato was the theatre of
the first tragic events of the revolution, and no city
in the kingdom of New Spain suffered more cruelly
in loss of life and ruin of prosperity than its capital,
Santa Fe de Guanajuato, from which the province
derived its name. 1 At the time of the conquest this
territory was inhabited by barbarous tribes living on
the produce of the chase, and the first Spaniards who
penetrated it were the conquerors of Acdanbaro, in
which exploits joined the cacique of Jilotepec, Nico
la's Montanez de San Luis, a near relative of Mon-
tezuma. In 1526 these adventurers apportioned out
among themselves the districts of Acambaro, Jere-
cuaro, and Coroneo. 2
1 The word is of Tarascan origin, and corrupted from Quanashuato, mean
ing cerro de ranas, or froghill, a name given to the site, because of a rock
shaped like a frog which was an object of worship to the natives. Medina,
Chron. de S. Dieyo, 257-8. The capital at an early date was known by tho
single appellation of Guanajuato.
2 'Segun aparece de la relacion ine'dita escrita por Montauezque copia in-
tegra el P. Fr. Pablo de la Concepcion Beaumont en su historia manuscrita de
la provincia de Franciscanos de Michoacan, que existe en el archivo general.'
Romero, Mich., 149-50.
(130)
GUANAJUATO HISTORY. 131
In 1531 ISTuno de Guzman passed through Penjamo
to the vicinity of the site of Guanajuato, and added
the territory to his conquests. For seventy years the
Chichimecs disputed with persistent bravery their
right to the soil, until in 1598 peace was established
by Rodrigo del Rio, who, in the name of the king of
Spain, promised to supply the Indians with food and
clothing on the conditions that they should tender alle
giance and keep in subjection the refractory. At the
same time the viceroy caused to settle there some Tlas-
caltecs and Aztecs, who instructed the Chichimecs in
agricultural and mechanical industries, all under the
guidance of missionaries. The first settlements in this
province grew out of the establishment by Viceroy
Yelasco the first, of the presidios at the places now
known as San Felipe and San Miguel, as a frontier
protection against the Chichimecs; but on the discov
ery of the Guanajuato mines, as narrated in a previous
volume, 3 a small fort was erected in 1554 on the site
where Marfil stands, and was called a real de minas.
A few years later another real de minas 4 was estab
lished at Tepetapa, which is the name of one of the
wards of Guanajuato city. For many years this lat
ter settlement was a place of little importance and few
inhabitants, and was under the jurisdiction of the al
calde mayor of Celaya. At the close of the sixteenth
century a curacy was founded, the population at that
time being about four thousand. From this date, ow
ing to the richness of the mines in the vicinity, the
prosperity of Guanajuato increased rapidly, and in
1679 the king of Spain granted it the title of villa y
real de minas de Santa Fe de Guanajuato. 5
3 Hist. Mex., iii. 588, this series.
4 In the times of the conquest, the site on which a Spanish army encamped
was called 'real,' and not ^infrequently was partially fortified. Real de
minas, therefore, means a military station in a mining district.
5 The name of Santa F6 had been given to the place in 1658 by the oidor
Antonio de Lara y Mogrovejo, who had been commissioned by Viceroy Albur-
Suerque to preside over the elaboration of the silver accruing to the crown in
lat district. Medina, Ib.; Romero, Mich., 157. ' Elle re9tit le privilege royal
de villa in 1C19.' Humboldt, Essal Pol., i. 247. This date must be a misprint.
COAT OF ARMS OF THE CITY OF GUANAJUATO.
132 TAKING OF THE ALH6NDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
From this time the district remained under the rule
of the ayuntamiento and
subdelegados, subject to
the audiencia of Mexico,
until 1786, when the in-
tendencias were estab
lished, 6 of which Guana
juato became one of the
principal. In the mean
time the town had been
raised in 1741 to the dig
nity of city, an appro
priate coat of arms being
granted it. 7 At the open
ing of the nineteenth cen
tury, the progress made
by Guanajuato and its
prosperity were almost
unprecedented.
The reader will be able to form some idea of the
wealth and activity of the district at the time when
the revolution broke out from the fact that in the
year 1800 the mines, including those worked and those
exhausted, numbered 1,816, employing 1.16 mills, 1,898
arrastras, and 366 establishments for the elaboration
of the metal. There were crushed daily 11,500 quin-
tales of ore, and 9,000 operatives employed. At this
time the population of the city, including those occu
pied in the mines, was 66,000. Nor were the agricul
tural industries of the province, which embraced about
1,750 square leagues, less thriving; the numerous pop
ulous towns were surrounded by rich pastures and
lands covered with maize and other grain. But now,
like a flail of destruction, war falls on the unhappy city,
and at its conclusion the population has diminished to
six thousand souls, the unfrequented streets are cov-
6 Consult Hist. Hex. , iii. 452, this series.
7 The coat of arms consists of a draped female figure blindfolded, holding
in her right hand a chalice, and supporting a cross with her left arm. The
design is" symbolical of faith.
TIDINGS OF REVOLUTION. 133
ered with grass, and the abandoned houses are offered
rent free. 8
The first church established in the city was the edi
fice known to-day as the chapel of the college of La
Purisima Concepcion, and in it Rivera placed the im
age of the santisima virgen in 1557. A few years later
another chapel was erected near by, and these two
buildings were used as hospitals, the first one for the
Tarascans and the second for the torn is, a third
being built for the benefit of the Mexican settlers. In
1671 was commenced the parish church, which was
completed and dedicated in 1696, and thither was con
veyed in the same year the image of our lady from
the church of the hospital. The parish church of
Guanajuato is one of the finest edifices of the kind in
the Mexican republic. The ecclesiastical government
of the province is under the bishopric of Michoacan.
In 1663 Viceroy Serda and Bishop Ramirez del Prado
granted permission to found the Franciscan convent
of San Diego, but the work was stopped by order of
the council of the Indies in the following year, because
it had been begun without royal license. In 1667,
however, the king's permission was granted, and the
convent was erected into a guardiama in 1679. This
church and convent were almost destroyed by the in
undation of 1780, but were restored by the conde de
Valenciana and some members of the brotherhood of
el Cordon. 9
On the 18th of September, Intendente Riano re
ceived intelligence from Iriarte of the occurrences in
Dolores and San Miguel. He immediately ordered
the call to arms to be sounded, believing that Hidalgo
was already on his march against the city. The
8 After the independence Guanajuato again rapidly advanced, and in 1825
the city had a population of over 33,000, according to the census taken by the
governor, Carlos Montesdeoca. Soc. Mc,x. Geog., ix. 93.
9 According to Fernando Navarro y Noriega, the intendencia of Guanajuato
comprised in 1810 three cities, four villas, and G2 towns, the total population
amounting to 576,600 souls. Soc. Mex. Geoy., 2 a ep., i. 290-1.
134 TAKING OF THE ALH6NDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
guards and battalion of provincial infantry were has
tily formed into line, while the principal citizens and
the commercial class, hurriedly seizing their weapons,
rushed with crow r ds of the populace to the buildings
of the intendencia. All was confusion and terror;
the stores were closed and house doors barred; the
plazas were deserted by the hucksters; frightened
women hurried along the thoroughfares for their
homes; while horsemen at full speed spread wider the
consternation as they galloped in different directions
through the streets with orders from headquarters. 10
Hiano explained to the assembled throng the cause of
the alarm, and the populace expressed a desire to en
gage the enemy, 11 believing that the insurrection was
a demonstration in favor of the French. 12 At two
-o'clock in the afternoon the intendente convoked a
junta of the ayuntamiento, the prelates of the relig
ious orders, and the principal citizens, at which he
expressed his apprehension that the danger was great,
but declared that he was determined to take every
defensive measure possible. 13
After some consultation it was decided to defend
the city, and during the day barricades were thrown
up at the entrances of the principal streets. Spaniards
and Americans as the Creoles and Indians are now
called 14 - were assembled in arms, and outlying de-
10 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 277.
11 ' Los que segun el general entusiasmo si entraron en aquel dia hubieran
perecido sin remedio. ' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 23.
12 Liceaga, Adic. y Eectific., 73-4.
13 The ayuntamiento of Guanajuato in February 1811 states to the viceroy
that several of its members proposed to Biaiio that he should immediately
march against Hidalgo with the provincial battalion, which numbered more
than 400 men, and with such armed citizens as could be mustered; and that
had this measure been adopted the revolution would have been nipped in the
bud. Ouan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 10-11. Brigadier Miguel Costansd, the com
missioner appointed to report on the matter, approved of Eiano's action in
refusing to accede to the proposal, by doing which he would have left the
capital of his province defenceless. Id., 71-2. Liceaga, with tedious length,
also supports the intendente. Adic. y Rtctific., 71-89. Alaman, on the con
trary, considers that the proposed movement would have been the best that
could be adopted, and supplies the additional information that Major Ber-
zabal was one of those who proposed it. Hist. Mej., i. 407.
14 We have here the most proper use, except as applied to the aborigines,
of the many-sided and generally misappropriated word Americans. In treat-
ACTION OF RIAftO. 135
tachments posted on the Santa Rosa and Yillalpando
highways which lead to Dolores and San Miguel.
A third body of troops was stationed on the Marfil
road. Squadrons of the cavalry regiment del Prin
cipe were ordered in, and advice asking for aid sent
to Brigadier Feliz Calleja, in command of the troops
at San Luis Potosi. On the following morning a
fylsQ alarm was raised that the enemy was approach
ing on the Marfil road; and the tardiness of the
lower orders to assemble for defence amounted almost
to indifference a state of things significant of im
pending misfortune. For six days these defensive
measures were maintained, and still no enemy ap
peared. 15 The intendente displayed an energy and
endurance which only the conviction of his perilous
position could have called forth; but day by day he
became more certain of the disaffected inclination of
the lower classes. "The seeds of rebellion spread,"
he writes to Calleja on the 26th, "security and confi
dence are gone. I have neither rested nor undressed
myself since the 17th, and for the last three days
have not slept an hour at a time." Indeed, he could
no longer rely upon the fidelity even of his own
troops. The responsibility of saving, if possible, the
royal treasury and archives increased Riano's anxiety;
and deeming his present arrangements defective, since
he could avail himself neither of the barracks, the
plaza, nor any of the churches, owing in part to the
threatening attitude of the populace, 16 on the 23d he
decided to retire to the alhondiga de granaditas, or
government granary a building which from its size
and strength would afford the advantages of a fortifica
tion.
ing of the aborigines the term properly fits all races indigenous to America.
Next it may be employed, as in the present case, to designate a mixed mass
of Indians, Creoles, and mestizos as distinguished from European Spaniards
with whom they are at war. But when we come to use the word Americans
as opposed to Canadians, or still worse as in California to Mexicans, it is
reduced to an absurdity.
15 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 277-8.
16 ' Manifestandose con chistes y con burlas contrario & la causa de gobierno
espanol.' Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 89.
136 TAKING OF THE ALH0XDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
The Alh6ndiga de Granaditas, as famous in the
history of Mexico as is the Bastile in that of France,
had been erected by Kiafio for the purpose of storing
in it a quantity of corn sufficient for one year's con
sumption as a provision against failure of the crop.
During such periods of scarcity not only did the lower
orders suffer, but the mining industry was seriously
interrupted through want of food for the mule-trails
employed at the mines. The building was begun in
January 1798, and finished in August 1809. It is a
massive oblong two-story structure, 80 by 54 varas,
and cost $2 18, 263. 17 The exterior is void of ornament,
and its lofty solid walls pierced by windows opening
into the numerous store-rooms give to it quite a for
midable appearance. In the interior a portico of two
stories surrounds the spacious patio, or open court,
the lower columns being of Tuscan architecture, and
the upper ones, between which a balustrade of stone
extends, of Doric. Two magnificent flights of stairs
connect the stories, which consist of independent store
rooms.
On the northern side is the principal gateway, and
another opens at the eastern end of the building,
adorned with two columns and a Tuscan entablature.
It stands at the south-western entrance of the city, on
a rising ground which terminates the height called the
cerro del Cuarto by which it is dominated. Stored
17 Liceaga, followed by Zamacois, here falls into several errors; but I am
enabled to rectify their mistakes from the original statement of March 1810
passed by the intendente and audiencia. This document, which is in my pos
session, is particularly interesting as bearing the autograph signature of the
unfortunate Riafio, as well as those- of the members of the ayuntamientos for
1809 and 1810. Among these I may mention Maranon, Septiem, Jose" Ignacio
Rocha, Martin Coronel, and Ginori, all of whom signed the Publica Vindica
tion del Ilustre Ayuntamiento de Santa Fe de Guanajuato Justificando ftu Con-
dncta Moral y Politica, a representation addressed to the viceroy in January,
1811, relative to the occurrences at Guanajuato, and printed by permission
the same year. The intendente's and above mentioned names, with the ex
ception of Ginori's, appear twice. The building accounts occupy nine folios,
and are preceded by the order of the municipal junta on sealed paper for
their examination by Martin Coronel. The document is inclosed in and at
tached to a portfolio of native leather on which is engrossed : Tomo 5, 1809,
Contiene la Cuenta General de la Fdbrica de la Famosa Alhondlga de Grana
ditas.
DEFENSIVE MEASURES. 137
with maize and supplied with water, the alhondiga 18
was the only place where the intendente could hope
to hold out till the arrival of Calleja, whom he ex
pected within a week. Anticipating that the move
ment would meet with opposition, on the night of the
24th he caused secretly to be conveyed thither all
the royal and municipal treasures, amounting to over
$620,000 in money, bars of silver, and gold ounces, 19
the archives of the government and ayuntamiento,
and eventually the treasures of many private persons,
estimated at three million pesos. 20 Thither, also,
were removed the arms and ammunition of the bar
racks, sacks of flour, and other provisions. Ln the
dead of the night, too, the barricades were taken down
and the material carried to the alhondiga. Then the
troops were withdrawn from the barracks and out
lying posts, numbers of the Europeans mustered to
gether, and soldiers and civilians, in one common lot,
took refuge within the walls of this building.
When morning dawned and the city was astir the
news spread. The unguarded streets, the disappear
ance of the barricades, and the silent barracks pro
claimed to the populace that their reluctant allegiance
had been recognized, and that they were left to choose
between loyalty and rebellion. Fear fell on all. The
ayuntamiento in great excitement requested the in
tendente to preside over a junta composed of its own
members, the curas, prelates of the religious orders,
18 An anonymous correspondent in a letter to the in tendente's brother,
dated Guanajuato, October 2, 1810, says: 'Este edificio es una verdadera for-
taleza, y acaso la unica que hay en el reino. El Sr Riauo cuando la hizo se
propuso formar un Castillo para defensa del lugar, dandole el nombre de Al
hondiga.' Zerecero, Disc. Civic., 30.
19 'Se pasaron de las reales caxas a la alh6ndiga trescientas nueve barras de
plata, ciento setenta y quatro mil pesos efectivos, treinta y dos mil en onzas
de oro, treinta y ocho mil de la ciudad, que estaban en las areas de provincia,
y treinta y tres mil que se hallaban en las del cabildo; veinte mil de la miu-
erfa y depositos, catorce mil de la renta de tabacos, y mil y pico do correos. '
Guan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 14-15. A bar of silver weighed 135 marcs and its
standard value was 1,100 pesos.
23 Bustamante states the value of property in the precious metals, jewelry,
and valuable merchandise that was removed into the alh6ndiga during the
night and following days amounted to 5,000,000 pesos. There were also 700
quintales of quicksilver deposited there. Cuad. Hist., i. 25.
138 TAKING OF THE ALHONDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
and principal citizens, in the municipal hall. Riano
declined on the plea of weariness, but expressed his
willingness to attend a junta in the afternoon; but it
must be held in the alhondiga de granaditas, and not
in the municipal hall. The meeting took place; but
civil officers, priests, and prelates in turn vainly en
deavored to induce Riano to change his purpose.
The intendente was inflexible, and according to the
representation of the ayuntamiento to the viceroy a
few months later, he bluntly dismissed them with the
assurance that, in the interest of the king, he should
remain with the troops where he was, and that as for
the city it might defend itself as best it could. 21
During that and the two following days the inten
dente devoted all his energies to the defence of his
position. Additional provisions were introduced into
the alhondiga; strong barricades were thrown up at
the only three points by which attacks could be made
through the streets; the eastern gateway was closed
with solid masonry; the iron quicksilver flasks, charged
with gunpowder, were converted into grenades, and
further information was despatched to Calleja, 22 set
ting forth his want of arms, and the doubtful fidelity
of his troops. 23
In order that the reader may understand Riano's
position, and the mode of attack adopted by the in
surgents in the ensuing engagement, a brief descrip
tion of the city of Guanajuato will be necessary.
zl Guan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 17-20. Bustamante also affirms that the in
tendente thus expressed himself. Cuad. Hist., i. 24. Consult also Hernandez
y Ddvalos, Col. l)oc., ii. 278.
22 This was sent on the 26th. The bearer of the first despatch left Guana
juato at 1 P. M. on the 23d, and on his return left San Luis at 11 P. M. of the
24th with Calleja's reply enjoining Riano to hold Guanajuato, and promising
to be before the city during the next week. With regard to the speed of the
courier Bustamante remarks: ' Que activos andaban estos hombres por sal-
varse!' Cuad. Hist., i. 25. The distance from Guanajuato to San Luis
Potosi is some 52 leagues.
23 ' Tengo poca polvora porque no la hay absolutamente, y la caballeria mal
montada y armada sin otra arma que espadas de vidrio, ' that is swords brit
tle as glass, 'y la infanterfa con fusiles remendados, no sieiido imposible el
que estas tropas sean seducidas.' Id., 24-5.
SITUATION AND SURROUNDINGS. 139
Situated at the bottom of a deep and narrow hollow,
round which on all sides rise lofty mountains, its po
sition in a military point of view is one of the worst.
On the south side rises the hill of San Miguel, while
from the north the cerro del Cuarto 24 extends like
a wedge into the city. So irregular is the site that
it might well be described by crumpling a sheet of
paper. On the plaza itself but few level spots can be
found, and few of the streets accommodate carriages.
Most of the houses occupy slopes so steep that in
many cases the floor of one is on a level with the roof
of another. An extension of this rugged hollow runs
off in the form of a rocky valley south-westerly to
Marfil, a league distant, and known by the name of
the canada de Marfil. Its whole length was occupied
by workshops, mills, and other buildings connected
with mining. Formerly the only carriage entrance
into the city lay through this glen. 25 To the east
of the city rises the river Guanajuato, here a mere
mountain torrent, which sweeping in a winding course
through the city unites with the Rio de la Cata flow
ing from the north-west. Although situated on a
rising ground, the alhondiga was so close to the cerro
del Cuarto that the houses built on the steep of that
height were only separated from it by a narrow street
arid a small plaza, not more than twenty-five yards
wide. On the south-east of the alhondiga was the
convent of Belen, from which it was separated by the
descent of Mendizdbal, and on the south and west
were the extensive workshops and premises of the
hacienda de Dolores where the precious metals were
treated. On the north, extending east and west, was
the street of los Pozitos in a straight line with the
descent to the Rio de la Cata, which was spanned
24 So called because on it was exposed in early times one portion of the
body of a malefactor who had beeu quartered. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 403.
25 The difficulties of this road were such that in 1822 a new one was com
menced over the hills, and this required a fine bridge to be built across the
river Cata. It was completed in 1835. Liceaya, Adic. y jRectific., 7-8.
140 TAKING OF THE ALHONDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
by a wooden bridge. Herewith I give a plan of the
alhondiga and vicinity with explanation. 26
From this description the reader will observe that
the only three directions from which an assault could
be made upon the alhondiga were from the street of
los Pozitos; up the cuesta de Mendizabal; and up the
ascent from the Rio de la Cata. These approaches
were obstructed by the barricades, already mentioned.
Riafio did not confine his defence to the alhondiga,
but included in his lines of fortification the house
owned by Mendizdbal and the hacienda de Dolores,
which were surrounded by strong walls and separated
from the alh6ndiga by two narrow streets.
*"": ^3 T^N' --- = ^ ^ f \ . Pi n'\^
PLAN OF
26 A. The Alh6ndiga. B. Convent of Belen. C. House of the hacienda
de Dolores. DDD. Premises and work-shops of the same. E. The well. F.
Barricade at the foot of the hill of Mendizabal. G. Hill of Mendizabal. H.
House of Mendizabal whence the hill derived its name. I. Barricade in the
street of los Pozitos. J. Street of los Pozitos. K. Ascent to the mines. L L.
Entrances to streets which Riauo closed with masonry. M. Descent to the
Rio de la Cata. N. Barricade preventing approach from the river. 0. Prin
cipal entrance of the alhondiga, the only one not closed. P. Eastern entrance
closed with masonry. Q. Opening on to the flat roof. B. Window from
which Riaflo was shot. S. Cemetery of Belen. T. Street of Belen. U U.
Bridge and causeway of Our Lady of Guanajuato. V. Bio de Guanajuato.
X. Rio de la Cata. Y. The wooden bridge, Z. Workshop of Granaditas
and ward of Tepetapa. Z' Z'. The cerro del Cuarto covered with houses com
manding the alhondiga. * Spot where Berzabal fell.
ADVANCE OF HIDALGO. 141
Meanwhile, Hidalgo, marching through Salamanca,
Irapuato, and other places which voluntarily joined
his cause, approached Guanajuato in the early morn
ing of the 28th. He was well informed of the position
of affairs in the city. Arrived at the hacienda of
Burras he sent forward Ignacio Camargo and Mari
ano Abasolo 27 with a communication to Kiafio inform
ing him of the proclamation of independence, and
urging a peaceable surrender. The letter terminated
with a declaration of war to the uttermost in case of
refusal. 28
27 Liceaga was a relative of Abasolo, and being in Guanajuato at the
time tried to see him, but was prevented by the dense crowds. Adic. y Rec-
ti/ic., xi. and 103.
28 1 translate the document and a private letter which accompanied it;
also Biano's reply. The originals remained in possession of Ignacio Carnargo,
and were given by him to Liceaga, who was his school-fellow. The official
communication of Hidalgo is the more important as it refutes Alaman,
who misleads regarding the proclamation of independence. He erroneously
charges Bustamante with interpolating expressions, claiming that he himself
had been supplied with a correct version by Benigno Bustamante, one of the
Europeans present in the alhondiga, and remai'king: 'La sola palabra inde-
pendencia basta para demonstrar la inexactitud de este relato, pues Hidalgo
ocultaba este intento cuidadosamente, y nunca tomaba en boca piiblicamente
esta voz.' Hist. Mej., i. 421. Liceaga rightly points out the impossibility of
Benigno Bustamante being able to obtain a correct copy of the communica
tion. Adic. y Rectific. , 103-4.
Hidalgo's despatch to Riafio. ' Headquarters at the Hacienda de Burras,
28th of September, 1810. The numerous army which I command elected me
Captain General and Protector of the nation in the fields of Celaya. The
same city in the presence of fifty thousand men ratified this election, as have
also all the places through which I have passed; which will make your honor
cognizant that I am legitimately authorized by my nation to undertake the
beneficent projects which have appeared necessary to me for its welfare.
These projects are of equal utility and advantage to the Americans and those
Europeans who are disposed to reside in this kingdom, and they are reduced to
the proclamation of the independence and liberty of the nation. Consequently
I do not regard the Europeans as enemies, but only as an obstacle which em
barrasses the successful issue of our enterprise. Your honor will be pleased to
inform the Europeans who have united together in the alhondiga of these ideas,
in order that they may decide whether to declare themselves as enemies, or
agree to remain in the quality of prisoners, meeting with humane and kind
treatment, such as those whom we bring with us have experienced, until the
liberty and independence indicated shall be acquired, in which case they will
be included in the class of citizens with the right to the restitution of their
property, which for the time being we shall make use of for the urgencies of
the nation. If on the contrary they do not accede to this demand I shall use
all force and stratagem to destroy them, without leaving them the hope of
quarter. May God protect your Honor. Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, Captain
General of America.'
The private letter from Hidalgo to Rlaiio runs as follows: 'The esteem
which I have ever expressed for you is sincere, and I believe due to the high
qualities which adorn you. The difference in our ways of thinking ought not
142 TAKING OF THE ALH6NDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
Before nine o'clock the messengers reached the bar
ricade at the foot of the cuesta de Mendizabal, arid
Camargo was conducted blindfolded into the alhon-
diga. Riano on receiving Hidalgo's communication
assembled the Europeans on the flat roof of the build
ing, apart from the troops, and having read it to them
asked their decision. For some moments there was
a mournful silence, till finally their captain, Bernardo
del Castillo, after a few brief remarks declared for
war. He would fight till he died in maintaining the
right; and thereupon raised the cry of "Death or vic
tory!" in which the Europeans now joined. 29 Riano
then descended to discover the intentions of the troops.
"And my children of the battalion," he asked, "can
I doubt about their resolution to do their duty?"
Whereupon Berzabal raised the cry of "Viva el rey!"
and the soldiers vociferously responded. Neverthe
less, before sending his reply, Riaiio considered it right
to communicate with the ayuntamiento, and sent by
the procurator Pedro Cobo, who being a Spaniard had
taken refuge in the alhondiga, copies of Hidalgo's let
ter and his intended reply. 30 Much delay was occa-
to diminish it. You will follow the course which may seem most right and
prudent to you, but that will not occasion injury to your family. We shall
tight as enemies, if so it shall be decided; but I herewith offer to the Senora
Intendenta an asylum, and assured protection, in any place she may select
for her residence, in consideration of the ill health to which she was subject.
This offer does not spring from fear, but from a sensibility which I cannot
discard from me.'
Riaiio's reply: ' Sr Cura of the town of Dolores, D. Miguel Hidalgo. I
recognize no other authority, nor is it evident to me that any such has been
established, nor other Captain General in the kingdom of New Spain, than
His Excellency Sr Don Francisco Xavier de Venegas, its Viceroy; nor more
legitimate reforms than those which the Nation at large may adopt at the
general Cortes to be held. My duty is to fight as a soldier, which noble senti
ment animates all those around me. Guanajuato, 28th of September, 1810.
Juan Antonio Riaiio. ' And to the private letter: 'The exercise of arms is
not incompatible with sensibility; this demands of my heart the gratitude
due to your offers for the benefit of my family, whose lot does not disturb me
on the present occasion.' Id., 212-14.
29 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 279-80. Mora, who gives a
slightly different version of this proceeding, insinuates that the Europeans
were inclined to yield, and passes a reflection upon the indiscretion of Cas
tillo, whom he describes as ' uno de aquellos raptos indiscretos y compromete-
dores que no faltan en semejantes ocasiones.' Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 32. This
author states that Camargo read Hidalgo's communication to the troops, a
most improbable proceeding.
z y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 117.
DISPOSITIONS FOR DEFENCE. 143
sioned in assembling the members, who had retired to
their houses, and when they met they had no advice
to offer. Calling attention to the fact that they had
neither troops, arms, nor funds any longer at their
disposal, they said that it remained with the inten-
dente to act under the circumstances as it seemed best
to him. Riafio's reply was at last written and Ca-
margo sent back, but the long delay had caused Aba-
solo to return, and Hidalgo was already approaching
up the Marfil road. The intendente then wrote Ca-
lleja: "I am about to fight, for I shall be attacked
immediately. I shall resist to the uttermost, because
I am honorable. Fly to my succor."
Riano now disposed his forces, which consisted of
four companies of the provincial infantry, commanded
by Captain Manuel de la Escalera, in the absence of
the lieutenant-colonel, Quintana, 31 and scarcely num
bering 300 men. Besides these was a company of
armed Europeans, which raised the number to about
500, and two troops of dragoons, not mustering more
than seventy, under the command of Captain Jose
Castilla. 32 A portion of the infantry and of the
European company was stationed on the roof of the
alhondiga, and detachments of the provincial battal
ion were posted at the three barricades. The cavalry
were drawn up inside the barrier at the descent to the
Rio de la Cata; to the remaining armed Europeans
was assigned the defence of the hacienda de Dolores,
while a body of reserves was retained within the al-
hondiga. 33 While these preparations were going on,
it was noticed that the surrounding heights were oc-
81 Liceaga states that Quintana, the Conde de Perez Galvez, colonel of the
dragoon regiment del Principe, and a number of Europeans had suddenly
left the city, while others did not cooperate with those in the alhondiga, but
remained in their houses. He gives a list of 20 names cf these latter. Adic.
y Rectlfic., 79. This is confirmed in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 279.
82 Mora says six hundred in all. Ut sup., 29.
33 Alaman conjectures that Biano intended to sally with the reserves and
cavalry, and attack the enemy at the most assailable points, ' plan cicrta-
mente de muy aventurada ejecucion, con el corto mimero de tropa de que se
podia disponer.' Ut sup., 424.
144 TAKING OF THE ALH6NDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
cupied by crowds of the populace, who seated on the
ground calmly looked on as if at a bull-fight.
Shortly before midday, Hidalgo's army appeared in
sight, approaching by the Marfil road. 34 Advancing
along the causeway of Nuestra Senora de Guanajuato,
the van, composed of a strong body of Indians armed
with lances, clubs, and bows and arrows, crossed the
bridge and arrived in front of the barricade at the
foot of the cuesta de Menclizabal. Gilberto de Riano,
son of the intendente, 35 who was in command at this
point, opened fire on them as they continued to ad
vance, when ordered, in the name of the king, to halt.
Several Indians fell; the rest retreated, and guided by
a native of the place, took up a position on the cerro
del Cuarto. The main body now formed into two
divisions, one of which, making a detour, approached
by the cerro de San Miguel, and entering the city by
the causeway of las Carreras, 36 liberated the jail pris
oners, and then occupied the cerro del Venado. The
other division made a detour by the hacienda de
Flores in order to occupy the cerro del Cuarto.
The city was now in possession of the insurgents,
and, as they marched through the streets, thousands
of voices raised the dreadful battle-cry, while they
waved hundreds of different colored banners, on which
was depicted the sacred emblem. The miners, a brave
34 The number of armed men in Hidalgo's force is not exactly known.
Robinson, Mem. Max. Rev., i. 27, says that he left Celaya with nearly 20,000.
Bustamante, Torrente, Alaman, and others also place the number at 20,000.
Liceaga, Adic. y Rectijic. , 82, raises it to 25,000 men of all classes, 2,000 of
whom were regular troops of the San Miguel regiment of dragoons de la Ileina,
and of the provincial infantry regiment, companies of which joined the in
surgents at Celaya, Salamanca, and Irapuato. Mora, on the contrary, gives
14,000 as the estimated number, besides 400 regulars, 'sin con tar con la
tropa reglada que no pasaban de cuatrocientos, y se hallaban como perdi-
dos y absolutamente embarazados para obrar entre esta multitud disordenada.'
Mej. y sus Rev. , iv. 33-4.
35 Gilberto was a lieutenant of the line regiment of Mexico, and was staying
with his father on leave of absence. He was a young man of considerable
military ability. The construction of the barricades was intrusted to his
direction, and he devised the plan of converting the quicksilver flasks into
grenades. Alaman, flist. Mej., i. 417.
36 On the summit of the cerro de San Miguel was a small plain where the
people were wont to attend horse-races on days of festivity. Hence its name
of las Carreras. Id., 408.
THE ATTACK. t 145
and hardy class, and the populace joined Hidalgo,
and soon all the heights which commanded the al-
hondiga were occupied. Soldiers of the Celaya regi
ment, armed with muskets, and a host of Indian
slingers were posted on the cerro del Cuarto ; a simi
lar disposition was made on the cerro del Venae 1 o.
The houses in front of the alhondiga on the north skle
were filled with sharp-shooters, and swarms of In
dians in the river bed broke stones for the slingers,
others carrying them up the heights. Hidalgo, pis
tol in hand, at the head of about two thousand
mounted men, among whom were the dragoons of the
regiment de la Reina, hastened from point to point,
encouraging his men, giving instructions, and making
his dispositions for the assault. 37
At length the performance begins. Hidalgo's sol
diers open fire on the besieged, while from the heights
and house roofs a furious discharge of stones is rained
down on the alhondiga. Dense masses of Indians
assault the barricades, and though the slaughter from
the enemy's volleys, fired at close range into the com
pact mass, is terrific, it fails to repel the assailants.
As the front ranks fall, others supply their places,
pressed onward by those behind; and thus over the
bodies of the dead and dying the contest rages unin
terruptedly. For the besieged the position is terrible.
The reports of the muskets, the hiss of bullets, the
hoarse hum of the jagged stones as they whirl through
the air and fall on the roof as from an emptying
volcano is worse than the infernal din of Satan's en
ginery. 38
For half an hour the battle rages. The assailants
show no intention of ceasing their efforts to storm
the barricades. The carnage among the assailants is
37 Liceaga points out a flagrant misstatement of Alaman's, to the effect that
Hidalgo remained during the whole of the contest in the cavalry barracks at
the farther end of the city. Adic. y Retific., 108-10.
38 So furious and continuous was the discharge of stones that after the
action the floors of the alhondiga roof and the open court were found! to be
raised eight or nine inches above their proper level by the accumulation.
Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 37.
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 10
146 TAKING OF THE ALHONDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
fearful, but to see their comrades shot down by their
side only the more enrages them. The defenders of
the barrier at the street of los Pozitos are being hard
pressed, and Riafio sallies with twenty men to their
support. His courage outstrips his prudence; yet,
si itioning the men, he returns to the alhondiga un
scathed through a storm of missiles. He mounts the
steps of the entrance and turns round to see how the
battle goes then he drops dead, struck through the
brain by a bullet. A soldier of the Celaya regiment
had marked him for his own. The body is dragged
within, 39 and the hearts of those present sink as they
gaze on their commander's lifeless form.
Thus fell the first man of note in the revolutionary
war, a man whose death was much lamented. Riafio
was an incorruptible and just but merciful magistrate.
He was headstrong and rash, yet he was honest and
humane. The beneficent measures adopted while he
was intendente of Guanajuato raised the province to
its highest prosperity. It is claimed for him that
liberal and enlightened views led him to recognize the
blessings of independence; and to his friends, of whom
Hidalgo was one, he did not hesitate to express liberal
opinions. It is further urged that, had the declara
tion of independence come from a more legitimate
source, had it been proclaimed by the constituted au
thorities, as might have been the case if Iturrigaray
had not been deposed, Riano would unhesitatingly
89 Bustamante gives a different version of the intend ente's fall. He states
that Riano, having observed that the sentinel at the gate had abandoned his
post and musket, took up the piece and commenced firing at the enemy, and
that he was killed while so occupied, CuacL Hist. , i. 38. Mora gives a simi
lar account, Mcj. y sus Rev., iv. 34-5; and so does an anonymous narration
in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 281. Alarnan with reason points out the
improbability of the intendente acting thus when the serious duties of a
commander required his attention. Moreover, Bustamante states that a cor
poral who was standing close by was wounded in the head by the same bullet
which passed through Kiailo's skull, proving that if the sentinel had deserted
his post there was another to take his place. Alaman asserts that the shot was
fired from the window of one of the houses opposite the alhondiga. Hist. Mcj. ,
i. 42G-7. Liceaga, followed by Zamacois, considers that it was fired from the
cerro del Cuarto. Adic. y Bectific., 114-15.
DEATH OF RIA$0. 147
have supported it; but he could not countenance
what he deemed a lawless movement, a movement
whose origin was so humble, and whose agents were
so ignoble. But we may well doubt, if the independ
ence of Mexico had been left wholly to Spanish offi
cials, the corrupt and mercenary minions of a corrupt
and mercenary monarch, that it would ever have been
achieved. New Spain was in no sense a confederation
of states, like the English colonies in America, with
men at the helm native-born and of independent
thought and action. Conditions were different here,
and the desired results must come through different
means. I believe this uprising of the native and mixed
races to have been one of the inexorable dispensations
in the case. It was meet that a remnant of that peo
ple, who had suffered so gross and long-continued
wrongs at the hands of Europeans, should be the first
to rise in rebellion against them, when onco opportu
nity offered a reasonable hope of success.
Riaiio was a better man than the average Spanish
official in America; but it was not at the individual
the blow w r as aimed, We all recognize his simple and
modest deportment, his kindness and accessibility to
the poor, his pleasant companionship and literary at
tainments, which made him alike popular with high
and low. 40
The death of the intendente carries confusion and
disorder among the besieged. A dispute arises be
tween Manuel Perez Valdes, asesor of the intenden-
cia, and Major Berzdbal, each claiming the right to
the chief command. There is no time to settle it;
the assault is continued with increased obstinacy, and
for hours the fierce contest rages. Heavier falls the
stone deluge, and fiercer is the rush at the barricades.
All discipline is lost; as first one and then another
40 He was born on the 16th of May, 1757, in the town of Lierganes, in
Santander, Spain, being in his tifty-fourth year when he met his death. Ala-
mem, Hist. Mej., i. 427.
148 TAKING OF THE ALH6NDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
issues orders, the soldiers of the line only obeying
their respective officers. The defenders of the barri
cades can hold their positions no longer, and are or
dered to abandon them and retreat to the alhondiga.
The ponderous doors are then hastily closed, leaving
the cavalrymen outside, and cutting off from place of
refuge those in the hacienda de Dolores. The former
are instantly surrounded, and Cast-ilia, their captain,
and many others slain; of the rest, some few escape
in the crowd, and some take part with the insurgents.
The roof of the alhondiga is no longer tenable, and
those posted on it retire below. Surrender, however,
is not thought of; and in the dense masses of the
revolutionists as they throng in front of the building
the slaughter caused by the fire of the besieged from
the windows is fearful. Presently miners, partially
protected by huge earthen vessels/ 1 creep up to the
building and work with crow-bars at the wall, trying
to effect a breach. But the walls are thick arid
strong, and Hidalgo, seeing that the door, though of
massive wood, can be more quickly broken through,
orders crow-bars. A more ready way is found, how
ever, by a young mirier standing near, who offers, if
provided with pitch and combustibles, to set fire to
it. 42 These are procured from a neighboring store,
and the intrepid youth, under cover of one of the
earthen vessels, makes his way up to the entrance
and accomplishes the daring feat.
41 'Cubiertos con cuartones de lozas, como los romanos con la testudo.' Al
aman, ut sup. , 430.
42 Bustamante's account, which is repudiated by Alaman, is that Hidalgo
addressed one of the crowd standing near him, and asked him if he had the
courage to set the gate on fire. The man said 'Yes,' and did it. 'Este Idpero
comparable con el carbonero que atac6 la Bastida en Francia. . .sin titubear
dijo que si.' Ut sujJ., 39. In the text I have followed Liceaga's version, who
took great pains to arrive at the true account of this event. See his pages
112-14. He states that this young hero, well known in Guanajuato, was a
miner 18 or 20 years of age, and named Mariano. He left Guanajuato the
same evening, in the direction of Mellado, where he lived, accompanied by
several others, carrying bags of money, and under the guard of some insurgent
soldiers. As he was never seen again, Liceaga conjectures that he was mur
dered for his money. Bustamante gives to this youth the appellation of
Pi'pila, a name unknown in Guanajuato according to Alaman and Liceaga.
ROAR AND RAGE OF BATTLE. 149
When they see their barrier yielding to the flames,
consternation falls on the besieged. As the fire eats
its way into the wood, the impatient assailants rush
at the door. It does not yet yield. Berzabal draws
up in line before the entrance such soldiers as he can
collect, to resist the attack. The deadly grenades are
brought into play, and the havoc they cause is terrible.
Gilberto Riano, maddened at his father's death, 43
thinks only of revenge, and the infernal engines
which he had contrived are hurled rapidly through
the windows upon the multitude. Each bomb as it
explodes sows the ground with dead and mangled
bodies. But like the rushing-in of mighty waters,
every space thus cleared is quickly filled.
The European civilians in the building are demoral
ized by panic fear. Some shower down among their
foes money from the windows. Vain effort! As well
throw crumbs to hungry wolves. Are not all the treas
ures of the alhondiga theirs? Some throw aside their
arms in despair and seek to disguise themselves; others
wildly shout out that they will capitulate, and others
betake themselves to prayer. A few, brave to the last,
resolve to die rather than yield. Finally, confusion
increasing and all hope abandoned, the asesor Valdes
causes a white handkerchief to be hoisted as a signal
of surrender. In denser crowds the besiegers surge
forward. But Gilberto Riano and others, ignorant
of what Valdes has done, still cast their destructive
bombs. 44 Whereat the besiegers in fury are beside
themselves. The roar of the multitude as they raise the
cry of Treachery ! treachery! is heard all over the city,
43 Bustamante relates that Gilberto, having embraced his father's body,
seized a pistol with the intention of taking his own life. Those present, how
ever, caused him to desist, by offering to post him at the most dangerous
point, that he might have an opportunity of avenging his father's death. Ut
sup., 38.
il Both Mora and Bustamante state that the mistake was caused by the
firing from the hacienda de Dolores, the defenders of which could not possibly
see the signal. But as Alaman and Liceaga were both in Guanajuato at the
time, I prefer to follow the account adopted in the text, and in which they
agree.
150 TAKING OF THE ALHOXDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
and the order is issued to kill and spare not. 45 Against
the burning door, although not yet consumed, they
throw themselves until it yields, and the maddened
crowd rush like a torrent of flame over the burning
debris through the entrance. A deadly volley at
point-blank range is poured into them by Bcrzabal and
his men, strewing the ground with the dead. But
their impetus is irresistible. Surging onward over
the fallen, the human wave overwhelms or drives be
fore it the defenders at the entrance, and Berzabal
with a few survivors makes his last stand in a corner
of the court.
The struggle is brief. His soldiers are soon
stretched upon the pavement; the standard-bearers
fall; but Berzdbal, supporting the colors with his left
arm, for a while defends himself with his sword, till
pierced by a dozen lances he sinks lifeless on the
ground, 46 still clinging to the standard in his death
agony. The victors now rush forward into every part
of the building, killing without mercy and without dis
crimination. Surrendered soldiers are cut down, and
45< Gritaron todos como si los inflamase un mismo espiritu, traicion! trai-
cion! y los gefes dieron 6rden de no otorgar la vida a nadie!' Bustamante,
Cuad. Hist., i. 40. ' La algazara era espantosa, y se oia en todo Guanajuato,
multiplicandose su e"co por las quiebras y canadas.' Ib.
46 According to Bustamante, Berzabal fell before the alh6ndiga was gained,
his death being attributed to one of his soldiers, who shot him because of a
reprimand. Ib. The father of Diego Berzabal, Don Baltasar, arrived in Mexico
in 1743 and married Dona Juana Duarte, a lady of noble family. Four sons
and two daughters were the result, Diego being born in Oajaca in November
17G9, thus being a Creole. At the age of twelve he was sent to Spain as a
cadet in the regiment of Granada. Having returned to Mexico in 1789, he
received an appointment in the regiment of Nueva Espafia, and served in
Santo Domingo during the revolution in that island. Having obtained the
grade of captain, he was promoted to the rank of sargento-mayor of the pro
vincial battalion of Guanajuato. As already noticed in the last chapter, it
was to Major Berzabal that Garrido denounced Hidalgo's conspiracy. Ber
zabal was forty-one years of age at the time of his death, twenty-eight of
which he passed in exemplary military service; 'sin haber sufrido jamas un
arresto iii tenido una nota en sus hojas de servicio.' Alaman, Hist. Mej.,i.
app. 51-2. He left one son and three daughters. Berzabal was a zealous,
loyal, and well educated officer. In 1811 his widow caused two official inves
tigations to be made of her late husband's conduct as a military officer, the
depositions in which constituted high testimonials of his merits, and en
tirely refute Bustamante's account of his death as given above. Alaman ob
tained the particulars from the documents in possession of Berzabal's family,
and which were placed at his disposal. Id., app. 51-4.
SPOILS OF WAE,. lol
civilians who have secreted themselves among the
stores are dragged forth and ruthlessly butchered.
Above the din, shots still are heard in different parts
of the alhondiga, as here and there some one still un
daunted dearly sells his life and kills as he dies. But
fainter and fainter grow these sounds, which presently
cease ; then for a brief space the dull, heavy thud of
the death-blow is heard; and then all is still; resist
ance is at an end.
Pillage is next in order. From the living, the dy
ing, and the dead, the clothes are torn. The store
rooms are ransacked and the treasures carried off, the
plunderers fighting among themselves for the spoils.
What a sight is here, oh God ! and all for liberty, all for
tyranny ; liberty or tyranny among some, with others,
glory, gold, or plunder among all with more or less
of that horrid gratification a bloodhound feels as it
tears its victim limb from limb and scatters around
the bloody fragments. Blood ! blood and mangled
humanity everywhere. Nude, distorted forms lay
stretched on heaps of maize saturated with blood,
and on piles of silver bars dyed crimson; blood-stained
pillagers bear off their blood-bespattered plunder over
the pavements slippery with gore; while the wild ges
ticulations, the exultant shouts, and the savage oaths
of the frenzied victors, would put to shame hell's
banqueters !
When the Europeans who were in the hacienda de
Dolores saw that the revolutionists had possession of
the alhondiga, they meditated escape by a side door
on the north-west, which opened to the wooden bridge
over the Rio de la Cata. It had, however, already
been broken open by the insurgents, who were pour
ing in in overwhelming numbers. The doomed band
among whom was Francisco Iriarte, who, as the
reader is aware, had been commissioned by the inten-
dente to report to him Hidalgo's proceedings at Do
lores then retired to the well, which was situated in
an elevated position. There they defended them-
152 TAKING OF THE ALH6NDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
selves till their last cartridge was spent, inflicting
heavy loss upon their assailants, Iriarte alone killing
eighteen. But the crowd now closed in upon them
in overpowering numbers, and the ground was quickly
covered with the slain. It is said that some, to avoid
death by the hands of the merciless victors, threw
themselves into the well.
By five o'clock in the afternoon the contest, which
had lasted for four hours, ceased, and orders were
given to take the prisoners to the jail from which the
criminals had been released. Naked and wounded
and bound with cords, the wretched survivors were
dragged and driven along with insults, blows, and
threats of death, many of them dying on the way.
Others perished in the prison. Gilberto Riano and
Bernabe Bustamante, both badly wounded, were per
mitted to go into a private house, but died a few days
afterward. Among the slain were sons of the first
families of Guanajuato, and many of the principal citi
zens. With regard to the number killed no certainty
can be arrived at, but it probably amounted to over
six hundred men, soldiers and civilians. 47
Of the insurgents, exclusive of the regular soldiers
47 According to Bustamante, 105 Spaniards and an equal number of soldiers
perished. Id., 41. Alaman says about 200 soldiers and 105 Spaniards, follow
ing Bustamante, but remarking in a note, ' Creo que muri6 mayor numero de
espaibles.' Hist. Mej., i. 434-5. Zamacois considers that more than 200
soldiers were slain, and not less than 150 Spaniards. Hist. Mej., vi. 394.
But Liceaga examines the question with some closeness. He argues that
the number of Europeans as given by Bustamante only included known in
habitants of the city whose deaths were noticed at the time. A large num
ber of Europeans, estimated by him at not less than 300, had, however, flocked
into the city as a place of refuge from the surrounding towns as soon as the
news of the rebellion reached them. The greater part of these were unknown,
their arrival even being unnoticed. Most of them perished; and he considers
that 400 Europeans fell as well as nearly all the soldiers. Adic. y Rectiftc., 117.
Although Liceaga has, perhaps, overestimated the number of Europeans,
bearing in mind the exterminating character of the contest, I think it proba
ble that the survivors bore a comparatively small numerical proportion to the
slain; and as there were many Europeans in the alh6ndiga other than those
who bore arms, I think the numbers given by the three first named authors
underrated. I may add that Torrente, whose unmitigated partiality to
Spanish domination in the colonies leads him to make assertions which can
only be classed as mendacious, boldly states that 2,000 loyal victims were
killed and 2,000 more cast into dungeons. Hist. Rev. Hisp. Am., i. 145.
Robinson says: 'The unfortunate' Spaniards, and all who adhered to them,
were sacrificed by the infuriated Indians.' Mem. Hex. Rev., i. 28.
THE FIRST VICTORY. 153
who fell on their side, at least two thousand Indians
perished, the wounded being in small proportion to
the dead, having been trampled to death by their in
furiated comrades as they rushed forward to avenge
them. 43
The victory was dearly purchased, the loss sus
tained being so heavy that the revolutionary leaders
deemed it prudent to conceal it. During the night
great trenches were dug in the dry bed of the river
and into them the dead were thrown. Some of the
slain royalists were draped bv their arms and legs from
c/ OO / c"5
the alhondiga on the following morning and cast naked
48 * Seguramente pasaron de tres mil muertos los que hubo, aunque procu-
raron ocultar esta pordida, enterrandolos secretamente en zanjones one hicie-
ron en el rio.' Gnan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 22. Liceaga considers that the
3,000 slain as reported by the ayuntamiento to the viceroy represent nearly
accurately the total number killed on both sides. Alaman regards the num
ber as greatly exaggerated. Bustamante states that it was not known, on ac
count of the Indians having buried their dead in the channel of the river by
night. Zamacois places the number of victims at not less than 2,500.
The action of Riafio in withdrawing to the alhondiga and leaving the
city defenceless lias been severely censured by some, who regard it as the
cause of the disaffection of the populace and the future disasters which be
fell. The ayuntamiento, in its Publlca Vindication. . .already quoted in
note 13, urges that but for the abandonment of the city the populace would
have remained loyal; but that when they perceived that the troops and Euro
peans had retired to the alhondiga, they considered themselves deserted by
them, 'comenzo a decir publicamente: que los gachupines y sefiores. . .que-
rian defenderse solos y dexarlos entregados a el enemigo, y que aun los viveres
les quitaban para que perecieran de hambre.' Guan., ut sup., 16. There is,
however, little doubt that the lower orders would have joined the insurgents
in any case as soon as they appeared, and Riano was well aware of this. Com
missioner Constans6 in his report, already mentioned in note 13 of this chap
ter, entirely exonerates Riauo from blame, considering his action 'conforme
al dictamen de la sana razon y a la maxima cle sabios militares. ' Id. , 74-5.
Liceaga also argues in exculpation of the intendente, and asserts that it is
falsely stated by the ayuntamiento that the populace only exhibited symp
toms of disaffectation after the removal to the alhondiga. One of the prin
cipal causes which influenced Riafio in his decision was the contemptuous
manner in which the abolishment of tributes, published by him on the 21st,
had been received; the proclamation being made a subject of ridicule, and
the unfavorable feeling toward the government being apparent. The same
author refutes both Alaman and Bustamante, who state that the abolishment
of tribute was proclaimed 011 the 2Gth. Adlc. y Rectlfic. , 74-5. Bearing in
mind the responsibility of Riafio for the protection of the royal treasures and
archives, his knowledge that the populace of all towns which Hidalgo had
approached had enthusiastically declared for the revolution, his doubt about
the fidelity of his own troops who had already been tampered with; and
bearing in mind, also, the insolent bearing of the populace of Guanajuato, and
the intendente's conviction that Calleja within a week would arrive to his
support, I cannot but indorse Liceaga's views, and consider that the repre
sentations of the ayuntamiento were warped for the purpose of palliating
the political outbreak which involved a fearful chastisement.
154 TAKING OF THE ALH6NDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
into the burial-ground of Belen, the body of the in-
tendente alone being covered with a miserable shroud
supplied by the friars of the convent. 49 Any mani
festation of pity for the dead was dangerous."
The capture of the alhondiga was accomplished by
no regular military tactics. Hidalgo's dispositions
were only general, and confined to directions given to
occupy the commanding heights. After the first at
tack the leaders had little control over their followers,
who were little better than a mob of ill-armed and
unorganized Indians. Yet there was courage among
them, and love of country, self-sacrifice, and true
heroism. With all the valor of veteran warriors,
they here fought for the first time in their lives.
Hidalgo's followers, united with the populace of the
city, once launched against their oppressors, moved
onward with irresistible force. At the sight of blood,
their own blood, that of their comrades and of their
enemies, they became demons infuriate. Bustamante
relates that an Indian seized a bomb thrown at
him and vainly strove to tear out the fuse with his
teeth. The bomb exploded, blowing him to pieces.
"It matters not/' cried his comrades, "there are others
behind."
Such were the first men who shed their blood
in the cause of independence. On the side of the
loyalists also individual acts of bravery were fre
quent, which bring to mind the dauntless bearing of
the conquerors. Conspicuous among the cavalrymen,
when they were surrounded, was Jose Francisco Va-
lenzuela, who three times charged up and down the
hill alone, clearing his way with his sabre. When
49 Alaman relates that the body of Riaflo was exposed for two days, to
satisfy the curiosity of the populace as to whether he had a tail. It is said
that the belief prevailed among some of the lower orders that all Spaniards
had tails. Hist. Mcj., i. 435. Jews were thought to have tails, and as the
Indians were taught to believe that the Spanish authorities were imbued
with the anti-catholic doctrines of the French, they placed them in the cate
gory with the Jews. Zamacois, Hist. Mcj., vi. 394-5.
50 'A imamuger le dieron una cuchillada en la cara, tan solo porque a la
vista de uu cadaver grito despavorida. . .\Ay \ ; pobrecito !' Bustamante, Cuad.
., i, 44.
PILLAGE AND DRUNKENNESS. 153
dragged at last from his saddle on the points of lances,
he still fought and slew his foes, shouting with his
dying breath, Viva Espana! 51
When victory had declared for the insurgents, those
who had remained inactive on the surrounding heights
swarmed into the city to join in the plunder. As
soon as the alhondiga had been stripped of its treas-
"ures, a general assault was made on the shops and
houses of the Europeans. During that night and for
several succeeding days, pillage, devastation, and riot
reigned. Above the noise of human voices were heard
the hollow sounds of axe-blow and crow-bar on the
doors, the rending of timbers, and the crashing of fur
niture wantonly destroyed. From the commercial
stores merchandise of every description was seized.
Bales of cambric and of cloth, sacks of cacao, and bar
rels of spirituous liquors were rolled into the streets,
and sold to any who would buy for anything that
could be obtained. 52
Drunken Indians arrayed themselves in stolen
clothing, and staggered along barefooted in bright
uniforms and embroidered coats. The iron railings of
the balconies were torn from the houses and the grat
ings from the windows. At night the streets were
illumined by smoking torches, around which weird
human forms, in every stage of drunkenness, yelled
and gesticulated. The mining establishments in the
city and neighborhood were ransacked, the precious
metals, quicksilver, and implements carried off, and
the machinery destroyed. In vain Hidalgo sought
to arrest the depredation and disorder. A proclama-
51 Valenzuela was a native of Irapuato and lieutenant of the cavalry troop
of that town. Members of his family still lived there when Alaman wrote.
Hist. My., i. 429, and app. 77.
52 Aguardiente was sold for five dollars a barrel, a sack of cacao or al
monds for two dollars, a bale of cambric for four dollars, and bars of silver
brought from the alhondiga for five dollars. So ignorant of values were the
country Indians that they sold their gold ounces for three or four reales to the
men of Guanajuato, who told them that they were copper medals. 'Nothing,'
says Robinson, 'can more strongly elucidate the wretched ignorance and pov
erty of the great mass of Indians. ' Mem. Mex. Rev. , i. 29. Consult Ltceaya,
Adlc. y Ilectific., 121.
156 TAKING OF THE ALHONDIGA OF GUANAJUATO.
tion issued by him to that effect on the 30th was un
heeded, and the rioters only ceased when their work
was finished. The scene in Guanajuato was pitiahle. 53
53 Hidalgo lias been greatly blamed for the frightful excesses, as if it had
been in his power to prevent them. Robinson holds that it was not extraor
dinary he should permit the Indians to enjoy the first fruits of their exer
tions. He considered it politic to let them have palpable proofs that they
would profit by the revolution; and with regard to the slaughter of the Span
iards, it was impossible for him to prevent it. Nevertheless, many Euro
peans and Creoles owed their lives to his protection, members of these latter
incurring the same danger and violence as the former, their houses being
sacked and their persons exposed to continual peril. The historian Alanian
narrowly escaped ill treatment if not death, and Hidalgo, in person, with the
sacred banner went to the succor of him and his family. Even his authority
failed to disperse the crowd bent upon plundering the wealth of a Spaniard
that had been secreted in Alaman's house, and it was only by Allende freely
using his sword that the mob was driven back. Hist. Mej., i. 438-41. The
main authorities consulted for the above account of the taking of the alhon-
diga de granaditas have been Alaman, Liceaga, and Bustamaiite. The testi
mony of Liceaga is of especial value, since he was a witness of the whole af
fair from the balcony of a house which commanded a view of the alh6ndiga,
and which he gained at the risk of his life. The object of his work Adi-
ciones y Rectificadones d la Historla de Mexico que escribiti D. Lucas A laman,
published in Guanajuato in 1868, was, as its name implies, to correct mis
takes which appear in Alaman's history, and fill up vacancies in the sequence
of events by information which Alaman could not obtain. Liceaga, while
complimenting Alaman for his diligence, close research, good judgment, and
learning, and pronouncing his history the most complete of the kind and
worthy of all appreciation, points out that in many portions of his work ho
had to depend upon the accounts of previous writers, which he himself asserts
to be full of errors arising from the want of knowledge of some authors and
the prejudiced views of others. Alaman consequently, with all his care,
could not avoid falling into mistakes which Liceaga felt himself able to cor
rect from personal observation and contact with eye-witnesses. The additions
and corrections supplied by Liceaga do not form a connected history of the
revolution, but they constitute a valuable supplement to Alaman's work, and
throw light upon many points previously obscure. Many of his details, how
ever, are of minor importance. His comments are generally sound, and his
arguments commonly lead to correct conclusions, though more lately ob
tained evidence shows that occasionally his deductions have not hit the mark.
With regard to the author himself, he was born in the city of Guanajuato on
the 4th of July, 1785, his parents being Ramon Guillermo de Liceaga and
J >ofia Ana Catarina de Espinosa. His early education was received in the
college of la Purisima Concepcion and the convent of San Francisco in that
city. In 1803 he entered the college of San Ildefonso in the city of Mexico,
where he studied jurisprudence until 1806, when he commenced practical
work under the licenciado Josd Domingo Lazo. In 1810 he received his di
ploma from the colegio de Abogados, and during the period of the revolution
followed the legal profession. After the independence, he filled several high
offices in his State, being appointed magistrado decano of the Suprema Tri
bunal de justicia del Estado in 1824, and district judge in 1827. In 1864, af
ter several changes of position in office, owing to his advanced age and
infirmities, he retired from public life in the nominal enjoyment of his full
salary, but of which he succeeded in obtaining only a small portion. Liceaga's
volume covers the historical epoch of 1808 to 1824, and the work which he
performed in its production extended over a period of fifteen years. He
penned his final remarks on the 27th of June, 1870, exactly one week before
the completion of his 85th birthday.
A PICTURE OF WOE. 157
The streets were cumbered with the wrecks of furni
ture, debris, and destroyed goods. Hundreds of fam
ilies were hopelessly ruined. Silence reigned within
the bare walls of the deserted houses, and the curse
of the destroying angel seemed to have fallen on the
so lately thriving city.
CHAPTER VII.
HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
1810.
MILITARY PREPARATION OF VENEGAS ACTION or THE CHURCH AND INQUI
SITION HIDALGO'S REPLY HE ABOLISHES SLAVERY His ADMINISTRA
TIVE MEASURES AT GUANAJUATO A REFRACTORY AYUNTAMIENTO
HIDALGO ESTABLISHES A MINT MARCHES AGAINST VALLADOLID ADDI
TIONAL REINFORCEMENTS HIDALGO'S TREASURY THE INSURGENTS
MOVE TOWARD MEXICO TRUJILLO DESPATCHED TO OPPOSE THEIR AD
VANCE TRUJILLO'S CHARACTER ITURBIDE'S BIOGRAPHY TRUJILLO 's
MOVEMENTS THE BATTLE OF LAS CRUCES THE ROYALISTS FORCE THEIR
WAY OUT THEIR DEFEAT REGARDED AS A TRIUMPH ALARM IN THE
CAPITAL ANOTHER SACRED BANNER HIDALGO PERPLEXED.
WHEN Viceroy Venegas discovered how rapidly the
rebellion was spreading, as day after day intelligence
came of Hidalgo's progress and the defection of pro
vincial troops, he saw that the affair was of a more se
rious nature than he had supposed possible. Without
any definite knowledge of the country and its inhabi
tants, he had not the experience of even a few months
of quiet administration to enable him to gain an in
sight into affairs. His position was a difficult one;
but he applied himself with energy to the task of
holding New Spain to its allegiance. The dispersal
of the army concentrated by Iturrigaray now proved
prejudicial to his purpose. Scattered as the troops
were in provincial towns widely separated, it was not
only a difficult matter to collect on the moment any
considerable force, but an opportunity of spreading
disaffection in the ranks had been afforded the insur
gents, and the military were already widely infected
with revolutionary sentiments.
(158}
VICEREGAL MEASURES. 159
At this period there were no European troops in
New Spain; and though at a later date Spanish forces
were sent into the country, their number was always
greatly exceeded by that of the native regiments.
Thus the combatants on either side were sons of the
soil; and it is necessary to bear this in mind in order
to appreciate the critical position in which the viceroy
found himself at the outbreak of the rebellion, as well
as the political division which existed in the ranks of
the oppressed portion of the population. The total
number of men which Venegas could count upon did
not exceed ten or twelve thousand, the ranks and
lower-grade officers of which were drawn almost exclu
sively from the mestizos, mulattoes, and other castes,
the Indian element being small, since that race was ex
empt from military service. These troops, composed
of regiments of the line and the provincial militia, al
though commanded by Spanish-European chiefs, were
officered to a great extent by Creoles. It is not, there
fore, a matter of surprise that the viceroy's anxiety
was extreme, in view of the doubtful loyalty of the
military and the smallness of their number; although
in this latter respect less fear was entertained by rea
son of the excellence of their organization and arms.
The first measure adopted by Yenegas was to es
tablish at Queretaro a force sufficient for the protec
tion of that city. For this purpose, he ordered the
provincial dragoon regiment of Puebla to hasten to
the capital by forced marches; and on the 2Gth of
September the Mexican infantry regiment of la Co
rona, under the command of Manuel Flon, conde de
la Cadena and intendente of Puebla, was despatched
from Mexico for Queretaro. A battery of four can
non, under the direction of Colonel Ramon Diaz de
Ortega, was sent with these troops, who were joined
a few days afterward by the Mexican dragoons of the
line and those lately arrived from Puebla, with two
battalions of grenadiers, each seven companies strong.
The grenadiers were commanded by Jose J-alon, an
160 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
officer who had accompanied Venegas from Spain, the
whole force being under the direction of Flon as corn-
mander-in-chief. In order to provide for the security
of the capital, now almost without garrison, the in
fantry regiments of Puebla, Tres Villas, and Toluca
were withdrawn from those towns, and two battalions
formed from the crews of the frigate Atocha and oth
er vessels at Vera Cruz, and placed under the com
mand of the naval captain Rosendo Porlier. 1 Several
battalions also of the volunteers of Fernando VII.
were again raised in the city; 2 and Yermo, in his
patriotic zeal for the mother country, equipped and
maintained at his own expense five hundred cavalry
men drawn from the laborers on his estates. 3 More
over, Colonel Diego Garcia Conde was appointed
comandante of Valladolid and sent thither without
delay in company with Manuel Merino, the intendente
of that province, and the conde de Rul, colonel of
the provincial infantry. Meanwhile the comandantes
Felix Maria Calleja and Roque Abarca, of San Luis
Potosi and Guadalajara respectively, were getting
their brigades into efficient condition.
But military operations were not the only means
employed to crush the rebellion. Prices were put
upon the heads of Hidalgo, Allende, and Aldama by
the government; 4 the church excommunicated them, 5
1 These troops caused general disgust by their uncleanliness and want of
soldierly deportment, and especially by their obscene and blasphemous lan
guage. The contrast between them and the provincial troops was marked.
Sufstamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 35; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 387.
2 Caz. de Mex., 1810, i. 838-40; Diario Hex., xiii. 890-2.
3 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Cot. Doc.,ii. 165. Jose" Maria Manzano also sup
plied from his haciendas horsemen to the number of fifty. Ib.
4 Viceroy Venegas, by proclamation of September 27th, offered a reward
of 10,000 pesos for the capture or death of these leaders. Dispos. Varias,
ii. f. 5; Gaz. de Mex., 1810, 796-7. At a later date this sum was offered for
the head of any one of them ; and Guerra states that money and arms were
advanced to a gambling officer who engaged to assassinate Hidalgo, 'pues
este lo recibiria sin recelo como que era su compadre.' Hist. JRev. N. Esp., i.
301-2; Dispos. Farias, ii. f. 8.
5 Manuel Abad y Queipo, bishop elect of Michoacan, published his excom
munication by edict of September 24th. Abasolo was also included in it.
The excommunicated were declared to be 'sacrilegos, perjures, y que han
incurrido en la excomunion mayor del Canon, Siquis suadente Diabolo.' All
who aided or succored them were threatened with the same punishment- of
HIDALGO ANATHEMATIZED. 161
adding the usual anathemas; the inquisition cited
Hidalgo to appear before it, charging him with
heresy and apostasy, and raking up old accusations
brought against him ten years previously. 6 From
the pulpit he was described as a demon of impiety, a
monster of bane; and the royal university of Mexico
gloried in the fact that he had never acquired the
degree of doctor in that institution! 7
Every means, in fact, which would tend to prejudice
the cause of independence was employed. The bish
ops and the higher clergy issued exhortations to loy
alty, representing, in the darkest colors, the object of
the insurgents as selfish, and their intentions as im
pious. The archbishop published edicts and pasto
rals; 8 politicians and officials, barristers, learned doc
tors of theology, and scribblers, heaped execrations on
the authors of the revolution, and the press teemed
with loyal productions in prose and doggerel verse,
heaping abuse upon Hidalgo, and printed by per
mission of the supreme government. 9 The viceroy
greater excommunication. The validity of this excommunication was ques
tioned by many, on the ground that Queipo had not yet been consecrated
bishop. In order to terminate these doubts, Archbishop Lizana y Beaumont
ratified it by edict of the llth of October following. Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*
iv. 52-8, supplies a copy of these edicts. Guerra maintains that Queipo had
no power to excommunicate. Hist. Rev. N. Esp., L 311-16. The bishops of
Puebla and Guadalajara also fulminated excommunications. Zerecero, Hem.
Rev, Mex., 64-5.
G Dispos. Varias, iii. fol. 152; vi. fol. 59; Diario de Mex., xiii. 425-7.
The edict of the inquisition was issued on the 13th of October.
7 The rector of the university addressed an official communication to the
viceroy, requesting him to make public the fact that Hidalgo's name did not
appear in any of the books in which were registered the higher degrees con
ferred on its members. The request was made because the title of doctor
was being constantly given to Hidalgo in the papers and public sheets of the
day. Id., 386-7. According to the citation of the inquisition, the cura of
Dolores entertained a supreme contempt for the university faculty, which
he regarded as a body of ignoramuses, 'y finalmente, que sois tan soberbio
que decis, que no os habeis graduado de Dr en esta universidad, por ser su
claustro una quadrilla de ignorantes.'
8 Consult Id., 433-6; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 100-4, 167-9;
Dispos. Varias, ii. fol. 7; Lizana y Beaumont, Exhortation, . . . Mex. 1810;
Id., Carta GratuL, Mex. 1810; Queipo, Edict. Instruct., Sep. 30, 1810; Id.,
Edict., Oct. 8, 1810; Leon, El cura... a sus fieles habit., Quere"taro, 1810;
Mendizdbal, Sermon, Mex. 1810.
9 Consult a series of letters written by a Mexican doctor, as a specimen of
the style of abuse. They are thus addressed to Hidalgo: 'Carta primera De
un DrMexic'mo al Br. D. Miguel Hidalgo Costilla, ex-Curade Dolores, ex-Sa-
HIST. MKX., VOL. IV. 11
162 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
issued proclamations, and denounced the rumors which
prevailed of the cession of Mexico to France as
groundless, attributing their origin to Hidalgo. 10 At
the same time, town officers, governors, and other au
thorities were urged to express their fidelity to Spain,
and their detestation of the revolution; while in order
to conciliate the Indians they were relieved from the
payment of tribute, 11 and measures taken for the im
provement of their condition.
This action at first was not without effect, and the
capital and many other cities remained loyal. The
heaviest blow sustained by the revolutionists was that
dealt by the church and inquisition. The awful de
nouncement of the leaders as heretics, their terrible
punishment of greater excommunication, and the dread
of the same appalling fate falling on them, working
upon an -ignorant and superstitious people, decided
for a time the vacillating and deterred the disaffected.
Hidalgo fully recognized that he had to fight with
cerdote de Cristo, ex-Cristiano, ex- Americano, ex- ff ombre, y Generalislmo Ca-
pataz de Salteadores y Asesinos.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 625-
95. Out of the innumerable publications issued during the first months of the
revolution, I refer to the few following, anonymous and otherwise, all bearing
the date of 1810: San Salvador, Reflex. Pat. Am.; Id., Mem. Crist. Pol; Id.,
Carta de un padre d sus hijos; Calvillo, Discurso sobre los males, etc. ; Garcia
y Garcia, Prosper. Union; Comoto, Discurso Patri.; Belderrain, Exhort. In
struct.; Campo y Rivas, Manif. Filant.; Monterde, Proclamaque el Intendente,
etc.; Rivera, Manif.; Exhort. Diputac. Cortes; Montana, Reflex. Alborotos;
Mex. Alocuc. Real Col. Abogados; Exhort. Col. Abogados; Criollo Sensible,
Proc.; Proclama (signed L. B. J. G. ); Exhort. Patriot. Am.; Centinela con
tra los Seductores. Among such expressions of loyalty, I find an appeal made
to Hidalgo by one of his fellow- collegians in the Real y Primitivo Colegio de
San Nicolas Obispo de Valladolid. It is signed Dr Bias Abadiano y Jasso.
After briefly calling to mind Hidalgo's collegiate success, the high reputation
he had acquired, and his preferments to the benefices of San Felipe and Do
lores, the writer brings to notice his backsliding from the church, and in
dorses the action of the inquisition. 'Ah y con quanta razon el Santo Tribu
nal de la Inquisicion os ha declarado por herege formal ! pues esta es una
prueba nada equivoca de que pretendeis apagar la luz del Evangelic.' He
then points put the irreparable harm done by Hidalgo, and implores him to
cast aside his apostasy and rely upon the mercy of the inquisition. Carta de
un Concolega d Don Miguel Hidalgo.
10 Venerjas, Manifesto, 27 Oct.' 1810.
11 The order for the remission of tribute had been issued by the regency on
the 20th of May preceding, negroes and mulattoes being included with Ind
ians. Venegas published it on the 5th of October. Dispos. Varian, ii. fol.
6-,Zerecero, Rev. Mcx., 173, 180-1; Negref.e, Hist. Mil. 8 iff. XIX., i. 195-
205. The proclamation was published in the Spanish and Aztec languages.
Hernandez y Ddvalos,, Col. Doc., ii. 137-41.
LIBERAL MEASURES OF HIDALGO. 163
weapons other than those used on the battle-field;
and some weeks later he caused to be published in
Guadalajara, which had fallen into his power, a reply
to the citation of the inquisition and its charges
against him. In this proclamation he solemnly de
clares that he had never departed from the holy cath
olic faith; he rebuts the accusations of heresy by call
ing attention to flagrant contradictions in them; 12
points out the evils with which the people of New
Spain were oppressed, and calls on them to burst their
bonds and establish a congress that shall dictate be
neficent and discriminating laws suited to the several
requirements of the different districts.
But other measures, also, were adopted by Hidalgo
which inspired confidence in the uprightness of his
motives, and afforded palpable illustrations of the
benefits to be derived from independence. He ordered
the emancipation of slaves, under penalty of death
to their owners; he released Indians and persons of
all castes from the payment of tributes; 13 and on the
12 ' Se me acusa de que niego la existencia del infierno, y un poco antes se
me hace cargo de haber asentado que algun pontifice de los canonizados por
santo esta. en este lugar. i Como, piies, concordar que un pontifice esta. en el
infierno, negando la existencia de este.' And again: 'Se me imputa tambien
el haber negado la autenticidad de los sagrados libros, y se me acusa de se-
guir los perversos dogmas de Lutero: si Lutero deduce sus errores de los
libros que cree inspirados por Dios, c6mo el que niega esta inspiracion sos-
tendra. los suyos deducidos de los mismos libros que tiene por fabulosos? Del
mismo modo son todas las acusaciones. ' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist,, i. 439.
This writer obtained an original copy of this document from the licentiate
Mariano Otero, who assured him that it was one of very few which had been
saved in the town of Tizapam in Jalisco. Hidalgo's reply was so convincing
that the inquisition felt compelled to issue another edict in defense of the
glaring contradictions contained in the first. In this it was stated that al
though the heresies imputed to Hidalgo were contradictory in themselves,
they had not been developed in him at the same time, but in distinct epochs.
Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 65. By the detractors of Hidalgo, his defence of
his reputation is regarded as the admission of weakness. It was, however, a
political necessity. Personally he cared nothing either for the inquisition or
the bishops, but lie well knew their power over the people, and it was in the
highest degree important to refute their statements, especially as in August
1808 the inquisition had condemned as heretical the principle of the sover
eignty of the people. Copy of edict in Diario de Mex., ix. 271-3, 275.
13 See Ansorena's proclamation at Valladolid Oct. 19,^ 1810, issued iu
compliance with Hidalgo's orders. Hernandez y Ddvalo's, Col. Doc., ii.
1C9-70. On the 29th of Nov. Hidalgo published a decree commanding the
manumission of slaves within ten days. This was confirmed by another of
the 16th of Dec. Both these documents exist in the collection of Hernandez
164 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
5th of December ordered the restoration of their
lands to the Indians of the district of Guadalajara. 14
By this policy Hidalgo succeeded in greatly counter
acting the expedients to which his opponents resorted.
When some degree of order had been arrived at in
Guanajuato, Hidalgo proceeded to make arrangements
for the further progress of his enterprise. The more
grievously wounded of the European prisoners were
removed to the alh6ndiga, where they were duly cared
for; others were confined in the infantry barracks,
while some few were allowed to return to their homes.
At a later date all the European captives, including
those brought from the different towns which the in
surgents had passed through, were collected in the
alhondiofa to the number of 247. Those who were
&
allowed their liberty were, however, required to sign
a written engagement not to take up arms against the
independent cause, under penalty of death. 15 Spanish
ecclesiastics of both the secular and regular orders
were also left free, and Hidalgo issued especial com
mands that they should in no way be molested.
Having secured for administrative expenses but a
small proportion of the treasures deposited inHthe al-
hondiga, he appropriated, as an unavoidable necessity,
considerable sums belonging to private individuals. 16
He next proceeded to organize the civil government
of the province. Having summoned the ayuntamiento,
he demanded to be recognized as captain-general of
y Davalos; copies of them are to be found in Soc. Mex. Geog., 2 a ep., iii. 54-6.
Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 88, finds fault with Hidalgo for abolishing slavery
without compensation to the owners. Alfredo Chavero remarks that Alamaii
considered the question in a financial point of view, like the abolition of a
tobacco privilege, whereas Hidalgo only regarded the emancipation of his
brethren. Soc. Mex. Geog., utsup., 56.
14 Copy of order is supplied in Hex. Refut. Art. de, Fondo, 26.
15 A distinction was made between Spaniards who had offered resistance in
the alhondiga and those who had remained in their houses, the latter being
allowed to remain at liberty under the condition mentioned in the text.
Liceacja, Adic. y Recti/ic., 124-5.
16 From the house of Bernab6 Bustamante he took 40,000 pesos which had
been concealed in the water-cistern, the secretion of which a faithless servant
revealed. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 442.
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. 165
America, as had been clone at Celaya, and stated that
as it was his prerogative he should proceed at once to
the appointment of alcaldes ordinaries. Thereupon he
named Jose Miguel de Rivera Llorente and Jose Maria
Hernandez Chico. A few days later he called an as
sembly of the ayuntamiento, the clergy, and principal
citizens, for the purpose of appointing officers of the
civil government. The ayuntamiento, however, was
not well disposed to the new order of things; and when
Hidalgo nominated the regidor Fernando Perez Ma-
rauon intendente, he declined the position, as also did
the regidores Jose Maria Septiem, Pedro de Otero, and
Martin Coronel. Hidalgo now became irritated, and
when the regidores endeavored to explain that they
could not reconcile ideas of independence with their
oath of allegiance to Fernando VII., or the motto on
his own standard, he angrily exclaimed: " There is no
longer a Fernando VII. !" 17 Finding the ayuntami
ento thus intractable, without further delay Hidalgo
appointed Jose Francisco Gomez, who had been ad
jutant major of the provincial infantry regiment of
Valladolid, intendente of the province, with the rank
of brigadier, Carlos Montesdeoca his asesor ordinario,
and Francisco Robledo prornotor fiscal, giving them
to understand that they must accept the appointments
without demur.
The captain-general now turned his attention to the
organization and equipment of his army. The cavalry
was quartered in the mining establishments which had
been sacked, and for the future protection of which he
appointed Pedro Marino as overseer, charged with the
care of them. Two additional infantry regiments were
raised; one at Valenciana, of which he appointed Ca-
simiro Chovell colonel, 13 and the other in Guanajuato,
the command of which Hidalgo gave to Bernardo
17 Guan., Pub. Vinci. Ayunt., 37. According to the same authority, the
standard bore the words: ' Viva la Religion, viva Fernando VII., y viva la
America. '
18 Chovell was the superintendent of the Valenciana mine. Alaman, ut sup.,
446.
166 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
Chico. 19 These troops were armed only with lances,
an attempt made to convert quicksilver flasks into
hand-mortars having failed. Hidalgo also endeavored,
with but partial success, not only to cast cannon, but
t6 fabricate them of wood, both kinds proving unser
viceable. Numerous were the military appointments
made by revolutionary leaders, among which may be
mentioned that of Jose Maria Liceaga as lieutenant-
colonel of the last-named regiment, 23 who played a
prominent part during the course of the revolution.
Although Hidalgo's treasury now contained more than
half a million pesos, inconvenience arose because so
much of it was in silver bars. The establishment of
a mint was therefore necessary, and on the 5th of
October the work of constructing the machinery and
dies was commenced, Jose Mariano de Robles being
made superintendent. The establishment was almost
completed by the 25th of November, when the Span
ish army under Calleja entered Guanajuato and took
possession of it. 21
Hidalgo was fully informed of the preparations for
the suppression of the rebellion which were being
made by Calleja at San Luis Potosi, 22 as well as of
the measures that had been taken for the protec
tion of Queretaro, and therefore decided, to u march
against Valladolid. On the 8th of October he sent
forward a detachment of three thousand men under
the command of Mariano Jimenez, whom he had made
colonel, and on the 10th followed with the main body,
19 Son of a European of the same name, ' unico de las^Tamilias respetables
de Guanajuato que tomo parte en la revolucion.' Ib.
20 This Liceaga was a cousin of the author of the Adlc. y Rectific., already
frequently quoted. Their Christian and surnames being -the same has caused
some confusion. See note 2 on pages 131-3 of Liceaga 's work.
21 The artisans displayed great skill in the construction of the machinery
and implements and in the engraving of the dies. These were so perfect as
to rival those in the mint at Mexico. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 47; Ala-
man, Hist. Mej., i. 448-9.
22 Much alarm was caused in Guanajuato Oct. 2d by the report that Ca
lleja was marching on the city, and had already arrived at Valenciana. Hi
dalgo sent out troops to verify the statement, Aklama going to San Miguel
and Celaya, but the report proved false. Liceaga, Adic. y Itctijic., 127-9;
Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 47-8; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 449-50.
VALLADOLID ANNALS. 167
leaving the European prisoners still in the alhondiga
under guard. 23
The reader will recollect that when the bishopric
of Michoacan was established in 1536, Tzintzuntzan
was elected as the cathedral town. 24 In 1554, how
ever, the episcopal seat was removed to Patzcuaro, 25
whence it was finally transferred in 1580 to the city of
Valladolid, in conformity with a bull issued by Pius
V. in 157 1. 26 This city was originally founded by
Cristobal Olid in the valley of Guayangareo, which
name was bestowed upon the town and retained until
1540, when it was refounded and formally settled by
Viceroy Mendoza, who changed the name to that of
Valladolid in honor of his birthplace in Spain. For
the purpose of insuring its stability and prosperity,
Mendoza sent several noble Spanish families from
Mexico to the revived settlement, and among the first
settlers mention must be made of Juan de Villasenor
Cervantes, from whose family Iturbide was descended.
In 1553 Charles V. ennobled the city and granted it
a coat of arms. 27
23 Hidalgo's route lay through the valley of Santiago and Acumbaro.
2 *See Hist. Mex., ii. 392, this series. Tzintzuntzan is Tarascan for hum
ming-bird, a name which the town derived from the great numbers found in
the vicinity, the capture of which and the use of the plumage in ornamenting
mosaic and hieroglyphical designs constituted an important occupation of the
inhabitants. Romero, Notic. Mich., 78.
* 5 N. Esp. Brev. lies., MS., ii. 247. Romero states that the removal took
place in 1540. Notic. Mich., 71. Patzcuaro, before the conquest, was a sub
urban ward of Tzintzuntzan, and became the pleasure resort of the Michoacan
monarchs who built their court there. According to some linguists, the
meaning of the word is 'the place of joy.' Ib.
N. Esp. Brev. Res., MS., ii. 247.
27 /Z>.; Villasenor, Teat., ii. 8-9; Gonzalez Ddvila, Teat. Ecles., i. 107;
Romero, Notic. Mich., 40. In Gonzalez Davila, page 136, is given a wood-cut
of the arms. The shield, which is surrounded by a crown, is divided in
three parts, two occupying the upper portion and the third the lower. In
each division is the representation of a crowned king holding a sceptre in
his right hand, the left being extended with the palm open. The field ia
surrounded by a scrolled border. The arms first granted in 1553 were dif
ferent. They consisted of a plain unoruamented shield, surmounted by a
crown and divided horizontally. In the upper half is a lake with a penol in
the centre, on the summit of which stands a church of St Peter. Three
smaller eminences rise from the lake at the base. In the lower half is a rep
resentation of the cathedral, which was dedicated to San Salvador. I(L, 110.
The three kings according to Romero were intended to represent Carlos V.,
his brother Maximiliano, and Philip II.
168
HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
From the time of the removal of the episcopal seat
to Yalladolid the progress of the city was steady; and
though not situated near any of the great commercial
highways, its population so increased, owing to the
general prosperity of the province, that at the be
ginning of the eighteenth century the number of fam
ilies there was some five thousand. At this time
Michoacan had become one of the largest and most
important divisions of New Spain, its principal wealth
being derived from its prolific soil, which yielded two
crops annually. 28 It was during this century that the
ARMS OF VALLADOLID.
ARMS GRANTED IN 1553.
province underwent a great physical convulsion. In
the department of Ario, in the southern portion of
the territory, extends a vast plain of wonderful fruit-
fulness, occupied by rich plantations of cotton, indigo,
and sugar-cane. Here was situated the hacienda of
San Pedro de Jorullo, famous throughout Michoacan
for its size, value, and productiveness. On this estate
28 It is related that a farmer named Francisco de Torres harvested on one
occasion GOO fanegas of wheat in return for four fanegas sown, or 150 fold.
Santos Cron. , ii. 400-7.
NOTABLE EARTHQUAKE. 169
immense herds of cattle were raised, and extensive
tracts planted with sugar-cane and indigo. 29
Toward the end of June 1759, the people on the
hacienda were thrown into great alarm by the sound
of subterranean rumblings and heavy, dull reports.
Later these noises were accompanied by shocks of
earthquake, which kept increasing in number and in
tensity. A prediction was current among the labor
ers that the hacienda would be destroyed by fire issu
ing from the bowels of the earth on San Miguel's
day, and wild consternation now prevailed. In Sep
tember great numbers of them abandoned their work
and fled to the mountains for safety. Spiritual aid was
sought, and on the 21st a no vena of masses was com
menced and confessions were heard. But these cere
monies were ineffectual to quell the subterranean thun-
derings, or allay the agitation of the Indians, who
continued to take refuge on the neighboring heights.
On the 29th, San Miguel's day, with fearful uproar
the laboring earth burst open at about a mile from the
buildings of the hacienda, belching forth flames and
hurling burning rocks to prodigious heights through
a dense cloud of ashes rendered lurid by volcanic fire.
A new volcano had arisen. The ground to the ex
tent of three or four square miles swelled up like
a bladder, the centre of which burst, exhibiting a
fiery abyss, surrounded by thousands of small cones
or earth-bubbles. 33 Into the chasms the waters of
Cuitamba and San Pedro were precipitated, increasing
the commotion. Deluges of hot mud were hurled
over the surrounding land, while columns of flame
blazed upward to such a height that they were visible
at Patzcuaro. The houses of Queretaro, distant more
than forty-eight leagues in a straight line, were cov-
_ 29 The possessor of this magnificent estate was J. Andre's de Pimentel, a
citizen and regidor of Patzcuaro, according to an official report of the occur
rence in Soc. Max. Geog., 2 a ep., ii. 561.
30 Called by the natives hornifos, or ovens. Humboldt visited the scene of
this catastrophe in 1803, and found that the thermometer when inserted into
crevices in these ovens rose to 202. For his account of the occurrence, see
Easai Pol, 248-54.
170 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
ered with ashes. The beautiful hacienda of Jorullo
was destroyed, as well as other plantations, by the
volcanic deposits of sand and mud and stones. 31 Great
numbers of live-stock perished, and hundreds of fami
lies were reduced to want. In the centre of the ovens
six enormous masses were projected to the height of
from 1,300 to 1,650 feet above the old level of the plain.
The most elevated of these is the volcano of Jorullo.
The limits of Michoacan were not distinctly defined
till 1787, when the intendencias were founded, previous
to which time the political government had been in
vested in alcaldes mayores and corregidores, and gov
ernors. 82 The extent of the ancient province was much
larger than the state of the present day-, since it com
prised the territory of the modern state of Guerrero.
Besides this reduction, minor variations have been
made in its boundary lines, and its present area con
tains about 3,620 square leagues, its greatest length
being 94 and its greatest width 66 leagues. On the
south-west it is bounded by the Pacific, its coast line
being thirty-nine leagues in length. Michoacan is
abundantly watered by rivers abounding in fine fish
of many varieties, from the quantity and excellence
of which the state derives its name, which means in
the Tarascan tongue the land of fish. 33
When the authorities at Yalladolid became aware of
the danger w r hich threatened their city, they were
greatly disturbed, the more so because they found
themselves without a governor or military chief. They
nevertheless made some show of preparations for de
fence, beginning to cast cannon and enlist soldiers un
der the direction of the bishop Abad y Queipo and
the prebendado Agustin Ledos. News, however,
31 The value of the buildings and working establishments on the hacienda
de Jorullo were alone valued at $150,000. Soc. Mex. Geog., 2 a ep., ii. 563.
3 - Gonzalez Ddvila, Teat. Edes., i. 107. The first governor of the prov
ince was Colonel Martin Reinoso, who arrived from Spain in December 1755.
Castro, Dlario, 193. Juan Antonio de Riafio y Burcena was the first in ten-
dente. Cedulario, MS., iii. f. 2.
, Hist. Prov. Comp. Jesus, 212; Romero Notic. Mich., 33.
PHASES OF CHARACTER. 171
presently arrived of the capture near Acdmbaro of the
intendente Merino, the cornandante Garcia Conde, and
Colonel Rul by the guerrilla chief Luna, 34 and this so
disheartened them that, on the approach of Hidalgo, all
thought of resistance was laid aside, and the bishop,
most of the chapter, and many Europeans hastily left
the capital and proceeded by different routes to
Mexico. 35
In following the career of a great personage, we
cannot but note how easily and naturally genius falls
into any position, and adapts the man to the circum
stances. So it was with Hidalgo: lately a humble
priest, now at the head of a large army, fighting
battles, making and unmaking rulers, and all with
calmness and facility as if he had been accustomed to
the work from his youth. Not that the cura was by
any means a proficient soldier; on the contrary, he
was no soldier at ail, did not pretend to be one, and
would have been filled with joy unbounded were there
any other means at hand to secure his sacred cause.
He was not even a cunning man of the world. He
was not working for greatness of name or ambition,
or for money or power. He would have his country
move toward independence. The full glory of it he
never expected to see. Yet he would do what he
could; his life he would cheerfully give. Such was
the quality of his greatness, patriotic, pure, amiable,
ethereal, not crafty, not subtle, and not always the
most successful.
On the 15th of October the van of the insurgents
arrived at the suburbs of Yalladolid without opposition;
34 For an account of their capture, see Garcia Conde, Informe, in Hernan
dez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 208. It was during this period that the guer-
rilleros sprung into existence in Mexico. Bold and lawless men, when
Hidalgo's army became dispersed, carried on hostilities against the royal
ists independently, yet they rendered important services for the revolu
tionists during the whole course of the war, and many of their leaders were
conspicuous for their heroism and noble qualities. Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mcx.,
109-11.
35 The asesor, Jose" Alonso do Teran, with many others, was detained at
Hue" tamo by the cura, who roused the people of the town. They were sent
back to Valladolid and delivered up to Hidalgo.
172 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
and on the 17th Hidalgo came up in person, the num
ber of his forces now amounting to sixty thousand. 36
His reception was not wholly to his liking; for al
though a commission came out to meet him, and the
bells sounded a welcome, when he found that the
cathedral was closed on dismounting in front of it to
render thanks for his successful entry, he was very
indignant. Nor was his anger allayed when, the gates
having been at last opened by the servants of the sac
risty, he was received only by the chaplains of the
choir, and the te deum was badly chanted to peals of
the organ abominably played. 37 He resented the slight
by forthwith pronouncing vacant all the canonical
seats except three. 38
On the departure of the bishop, the canon, conde de
Sierra Gorda, had been left in charge of the mitre, and
Hidalgo intimated to him that it would be well to re
move the excommunication fulminated against himself
and his followers by the fugitive prelate. The obsequi
ous canon complied; the proclamation was taken from
the doors of the churches, and circulars sent to the
curas in the diocese, informing them that the leaders
of the revolutionists had incurred no ecclesiastical cen
sure, and instructing them to read to their flocks on a
feast day the removal of the excommunication. 39
Before entering the city, Hidalgo had promised a
commission sent out to receive him that rights of
property should be respected, and during the entry
no violence was attempted. But the taste for spoils
36 According to Bustamante. Mora, however, places the number at 40,000.
Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 68. Hidalgo had with him two bronze cannon and two
wooden ones.
87 For these particulars and antecedent events, consult Canon Betancourt's
report in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 406 et seq., and the manifesto
of the ayuntamiento of Valladolid, in Id. , v. 86-7.
38 According to Betancourt, those of the conde de Sierra Gorda, Gomez
Limon, and his own, 'porquefueal Parlamento.' The ayuntamiento states
that Hidalgo said, 'dare por vacantes todas las prebendas por la impolitica
con que se ha portado el Cabildo en mi recibimiento. ' /&., and Id., iii. 411.
39 Ihe conde de Sierra Gorda exculpated himself to the viceroy by declar
ing that he had acted under compulsion, 'desdiciendose de lo que habia ejecu-
tatlo con prudencia, imputandolo d coaccion, terror y violencia.' Bustamante,
Cuad. Hint., i. 72; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 166-7, 313-4.
DISCIPLINE REQUIRED. 173
among the natives once gratified was not easily con
trolled. Next day several Spanish houses were as
saulted and sacked. Hard as it was to learn, a lesson
of discipline must be given. Allende opened fire on
his men. Several were killed and wounded ; the crowds
dispersed and the disorder was stopped. 40 It had
hardly ceased, however, before a more serious trouble
occurred. The Indians, accustomed to simple diet,
had given themselves up to gluttony and drunkenness,
gorging themselves with sweetmeats and fruits, and
pouring down spirituous liquors like water. The con
sequence was that a deadly sickness broke out, carry
ing off many in a few hours. The cry was raised
that the aguardiente had been poisoned. Allende,
by his presence of mind, however, suppressed the
tumult. Drinking in the presence of the multitude
a cup of the condemned liquor, he proved to the
Indians that their fears were groundless. 41
At Valladolid Hidalgo's force was increased by the
important addition of well armed and well disciplined
troops. They consisted of the regiment of provin
cial infantry, the regiment of the Michoacan dra
goons, more generally known by the name of the Patz-
cuaro regiment, and eight companies of recruits lately
raised and equipped by the bishop and chapter. Ad
ditional cannon were also added to his artillery, a
means of warfare which the first leaders of the revo
lution regarded with too high an estimation, direct
ing their principal attention to the casting of as many
and as large pieces as possible. Experience taught
them their mistake; for to unskilled gunners artillery
was of little service.
Having concluded his military preparations, and
placed Jose Maria Anzorena at the head of the gov-
40 Ansorena, Defensa, 10. Bustamante makes the assertion that the artil
leryman fired without orders, killing and wounding 14 of the Indians. Cuad.
Hi*t., i. 75.
41 Betancourt narrates that dining with Hidalgo he was compelled by
Allende to drink a glass of the liquor supposed to be poisoned. Hernandez
y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 413-14.
174
HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
ernment, 42 Hidalgo, who had already decided to march
against the capital without delay, left Valladolid on
the 20th of October, 43 taking with him nearly all the
church funds, and those of private individuals de
posited for security in the coffers of the cathedral.
Besides these funds, which amounted to $200,000,
he obtained other large sums from the residents of
Valladolid. Aware that Calleja's preparations would
soon be completed, Hidalgo hurried forward. At
Acd,mbaro he held a review of his forces, now num
bering 80,000, an unwieldy, disorderly mass, which
HIDALGO'S MARCH AGAINST MEXICO.
he divided into regiments of infantry and cavalry,
each 1,000 strong. Here he was proclaimed generali-
simo 44 at a council of the chiefs, and he conferred
42 Anzorena, as the sequel will show, proved himself a stanch partisan of
the revolutionists.
43 This is the date given positively by Betancourt. Bustamante gives the
19th of Oct. as the day of Hidalgo's departure.
^Garcia Conde, Informe, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 270-1.
Hidalgo's uniform was a blue coat with red cuffs and collar bordered with
gold and silver galloon, his shoulder belt being of black velvet similarly
bordered. Suspended from his neck he wore a large gold medal bearing the
image of the virgin of Guadalupe. The uniform of Allende consisted of a
jacket of blue cloth with red cuffs and collar, the seams being covered with
silver galloon. Around each shoulder was a silver cord with pendent button.
The lieutenant-general's uniforms were distinguished from his by having only
TEUJILLO'S ADVANCE. 175
on Allende the rank of captain-general; Aldama,
Ballerza, Jimenez, and Joaquin Arias being ap
pointed lieutenant-generals. From Acdmbaro the
generalising directed his march by way of Mara-
vatio, Tepetongo, and Ixtlahuaca, and rapidly ap
proached the capital.
When intelligence was received in Mexico of Hi
dalgo's coming, Venegas laid his plans to oppose him.
He had already at his disposal forces amounting to
7,000 men, 45 and despatched Lieutenant-colonel Tor-
cuato Trujillo with a portion of them to watch Hidal
go's movements, and, if possible, arrest his advance. 48
Trujillo had accompanied Venegas from Spain, and
the viceroy, who as yet had but little confidence in
Mexican commanders in spite of their protestations,
deemed it prudent to place one of his own men at the
head of so important an undertaking. It was not
altogether a happy choice. Trujillo, indeed, was
faithful enough; but he had one fault, he was a fool.
Conceited, shallow-headed, he soon succeeded in ex
citing the profound disgust of all around him. As a
man, his followers hated him ; as a soldier, they held
him in contempt. His conduct as a military corn-
one shoulder cord, that on the right. Ib.; Guerra, Hist. Rtv. N. Esp., L 305-6;
Resum. Hist. Insurr. N. Esp., 8.
4:> Bustamante says the force consisted of the infantry regiment of New
Spain, a battalion of infantry of Mexico, another called the Cuahutitlan bat
talion, a battalion del fijo de Mexico, the provincial militia regiment of Pu-
ebla, the city bakers' dragoons, two infantry battalions of merchants, three
of the patriots of Fernando VII., a section of artillery, in addition to the
veteran artillery, a troop of cavalry of the patriots, the militia infantry regi
ment of Toluca, and the Tulancingo, and various other pickets in all 7,000
men. Cuad. Hist., i. 76.
40 The forces placed under Trujillo's command were the infantry regiment
of Tres Villas, which had lately arrived, a battalion of the provincial militia
of Mexico, and a portion of the dragoons of Spain. These were afterward re-
enforced by 50 volunteers with two cannon, commanded by Juan Batitista do
Ustariz, a lieutenant of the navy, and about 330 men drawn from the haci
endas of Yermo and a Mexican named Manzano. Authors differ as to the
total number. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 475, states that it barely reached
1,400; the author of Inwrrec. Resum. Hist., 9, makes it amount to 2,000; Mora,
Mex. y susRev., iv. 73, raises it to 2, 500; while Torrente, Hist. Rev. llisp. Am.,
i. 151, places the number at about 1,200. Guerra makes it 1,500. Hist. Rev.
N. Esp., i. 325. Negrete considers that the number may be safely estimated
at 2,500. Hint. Mil. Sig. XIX., i. 354.
176 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
mander was marked by cruelty and treachery. In
after days the sound of his name did not ring pleas
antly in the ears of the revolutionists.
There was at this time in the city of Mexico a
young lieutenant, who had lately come from Valla
dolid flying before Hidalgo. His name was Agus-
tin Iturbide. The first historical mention of him is
found in the official journal of September 21, 1808/ 7
where he is commended for his zeal in offering sup
port to the new government after the deposal of Itur-
rigaray. At this time he was a lieutenant of the
provincial infantry regiment of Valladolid. He was
born in that city on the 27th of September, 1783,
his father, Joaquin de Iturbide, being a native of
Pamplona, in the kingdom of Navarre. The fami
lies of both his father and mother, whose maiden
name was Josefa de Aramburu, were distinguished.
Agustin while a child narrowly escaped death by
fire, being rescued almost miraculously from his burn
ing home. His school education was limited, he
having applied himself to the management of one of
his father's haciendas when only fifteen years of age;
at which time also he entered the regiment of pro
vincial infantry of Valladolid as ensign, and hence
forth adopted the military profession. In 1805 he
espoused Dona Ana Maria Huarte, a creole of good
family. He was present with his command at the
military encampment at Jalapa, and in 1809 assisted
in suppressing the premature attempt at revolution
in his native city.
When Hidalgo took the field he invited Iturbide to
join him, offering him the rank of lieutenant-general.
The latter, however, refused; 48 and when Hidalgo
drew near Valladolid, Iturbide, seeing no prospect of
,xv. 702.
48 Hidalgo sent this invitation while he \vas approaching Valladolid, ac
cording to Iturbide in his manifiesto. Alaman points out that this evidence
refutes Rocafuerte's statement published in his pamphlet directed against
Iturbide under the title of El Picjmalion Americano that he declined to take
part in the revolution because he could not obtain the same grade as in the
royalist army. Hist. Mej., i. 463.
MEETING OF THE ARMIES.
177
a successful defence, repaired to the capital with
seventy soldiers of his regiment who remained loyal
to the service. When Trujillo was sent to oppose
Hidalgo's advance, Iturbide obtained permission to
accompany him, and thus he found himself afloat on
his ambitious career.
Meanwhile the two armies approach, and one must
give way before the other. But first it is destined
that they fight. Trujillo, having arrived at Toluca, 49
sent forward a detachment to occupy the bridge of
Don Bernabe over the River Lerma and intermediate
between Toluca and Ixtlahuaca whither Hidalgo had
arrived. On the 27th the royalist leader moved for
ward his troops with the intention of attacking the
insurgents at the latter place, distant nine leagues, but
PLAN OF BATTLE-FIELD OF LAS CRUCES.
49 Explanation of the plan.
A. Infantry of the royal army.
B. Infantry of the insurgents.
C. Cavalry of royal army.
D. Cavalrj 7 of the insurgents.
E. Royal troops on the march.
F. Insurgent troops on the march.
HIST. HEX., VOL. IV. 12
178 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
meeting his advance guard in full flight, and learning
that Hidalgo was approaching with all his forces, he
fell back to the small town of Lerrna, where he hoped
to hold the enemy in check by barricading arid de
fending the bridge. On the 28th, as no enemy ap
peared, Trujillo suspected that Hidalgo had directed
his march to the bridge of Atengo, with the object
of occupying the Santiago road and attacking the
royalists in the rear, at the same time cutting off their
retreat to the capital. He therefore sent a detach
ment to defend that point, and gave orders to the
subdelegado of Santiago Tianguistengo to destroy the
bridge. This order, however, was not carried out,
and on the 29th Allende, with a large body of troops,
forced the defenders from their position and gained
the Santiago road.
Meanwhile Hidalgo with the rest of his forces
marched toward Lerrna; and Trujillo, as soon as he
learned that the bridge of Atengo, had been lost, saw
the necessity of retreating toward the capital, and
accordingly withdrew to the mountain pass called the
monte de las Cruces, 60 leaving Jose de Mendivil with
* O
one of the two battalions of which the regiment of
Tres Villas was composed, and Francisco Bringas
with a troop .of cavalry, to hold the Lerma bridge
until the different sections of the army had united at
las Cruces. At five o'clock in the afternoon, Mendi
vil, supported in the rear by Bringas, commenced his
retreat, leaving only a small force under Captain Pino
to defend the bridge; and so well did this officer per
form his duty that he did not retire until late at night.
The position to which Trujillo had withdrawn was a
strong one, but it had the disadvantage of being com
manded on the south by neighboring hills covered
with forest, and by other heights on the north side of
the Toluca road. Allende well knew the importance
50 So called because of the numerous crosses erected there to mark the
places where travellers had been murdered by bandits; that hill being a fa
vorite resort of robbers.
BATTLE OF LAS CRUCES. 179
of the situation, and had made all haste to occupy it
from the Santiago road; but Trujillo's march had
been equally rapid, and the royalists gained the emi
nence first, anticipating, however, the insurgent force
only by half an hour.
At eight o'clock on the morning of the 30th, the
action commenced by light skirmishing between the
royalist cavalry and guerrilla bands in advance of the
main body of insurgents. Opportunely for Trujillo,
he received at this time a reenforcernent of two can
non, with an escort of fifty Spanish volunteers, under
Captain Antonio Bringas, and 330 mounted lancers
from the haciendas of Yermo and Jose Maria Man-
zano, 51 the whole force being placed under the com
mand of Juan Bautista de Uzt^riz, a lieutenant of the
royal navy. About eleven o'clock the attacking col
umn of the insurgents, with the artillery in front,
came in sight on the road from Toluca. It consisted
o
of the infantry provincial regiment of Valladolid, the
Celaya companies, and the Guanajuato battalion, which
were flanked by the provincial dragoons of Patzcuaro
and la Reina, the rear being brought up by the dra
goons of el Principe a force in itself greatly superior
to that of Trujillo, but which being without efficient
officers had already lost much of its discipline. These
were preceded on the front and flanks by crowds of
ill-armed Indians, and numerous bands of horsemen,
who streamed along the Toluca road or wound round
the sides of the hills wherever the ground was practi
cable for horses. Trujillo now made preparations to
receive the coming attack. His two field-pieces were
placed in position so as to enfilade the road and ad
jacent ground, and were hidden from sight with
51 The stanch loyalist Gabriel Yermo, who had displayed such tact in the
deposal of Iturrigaray, supplied at his own cost 400 lancers from his hacien
das, while his brother Juan Antonio furnished 100 more. These troops were
known by the name of the negros de Yermo, and did good service during the
war. Of these lancers 279 were sent to Trujillo, according to Yermo's
statement of services rendered, Rev. N. Esp. Verdad. Orig., 110. ii. 56-7, al
though Trujillo in his official report to the viceroy states that there were only
150. Gaz. deMex., 1810, i. 923.
180 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
branches of trees, in order to increase the confidence
of the enemy. The cavalry was ordered to fall back
upon the line without engaging in action, and the fifty
volunteers lately arrived, with the lancers of Yermo
commanded by Captain Antonio Bringas, supported
by two companies of the Tres Villas regiment under
the command of Lieutenant Ramon Reyes, were
placed in ambush on a wooded height at some distance
from the left flank. Trujillo commanded the centre
in person, occupying the level summit which over
looks the pass, and on which was planted one of the
field-pieces, while Mendivil with the other occupied
the front, covering the main approach.
Hidalgo had left the formation of the plan of bat
tle to Allende, and that officer made preparations to
surround Trujillo while the main attack was being
made in front. For this purpose strong detachments
of the better armed Indians, both of foot and horse,
were sent by long detours to take possession of vari
ous heights commanding Trujillo's flanks, and a force
of 3,000 foot and horse was despatched to occupy the
road to Mexico in the rear of the enemy. Moreover,
a select body of 1,200 of the best disciplined men of
all arms was thrown out on the right flank, and took
up a position out of range of Trujillo's artillery, and
opposite to the place where Bringas was ambushed.
The command of the infantry was given to Juan Al-
clama and Luis Malo, and that of the artillery to
Mariano Jimenez, while Allende himself commanded
the cavalry. 52
At eleven o'clock the attacking column, preceded
by the four pieces of artillery already mentioned, ap-
52 Licearja, Adic. y Rectific., 139. According to Mora, Allende thought
the undisciplined masses should not take part in the general action, but
should be posted as rear-guards to the different divisions, where they might
pi-ove of service as occasion offered. The Indians, however, were offended at
being so placed, and Hidalgo insisted that Allende should assign to them places
in the front. Though Allende represented strongly the danger of so doing,
Hidalgo so pressed the matter that Allende was obliged to yield. Mex. y
sus Rev., iv. 27. Mora's statements, however, must be taken with allow
ance.
DEATH OF EPJXGAS. 181
preached within close range. Trujillo now opened
fire with grape and canister from his masked batteries
with such deadly effect upon the crowded masses in
front, that they were soon thrown into confusion and
driven back, causing some disturbance to the disci
plined troops. These, however, held their ground, and
replied with their artillery, while a brisk fire was main
tained all along the fronts, with no little loss on both
sides, the insurgents suffering most. Trujillo, perceiv
ing that he could hold the enemy's centre in check,
now ordered Bringas to engage their right wing, and
sent a detachment of three companies of the Tres
Villas infantry under the command of Iturbide to oc
cupy an almost inaccessible height covered with pine
trees, at a considerable distance on his right flank.
Bringas now charged with great impetuosity, and
engaged with the 1,200 picked men opposed to him.
The contest was long and fierce, but eventually ter
minated in favor of the insurgents. These, encour
aged by the bravery and example of Aldama and
Malo, who commanded in person in that part of the
field, maintained their ground with unflinching firm
ness, in spite of the heavy loss inflicted by the loyal
ists; but it was not until Bringas fell mortally wound
ed that they succeeded in repulsing his troops. 53 Nor
was Trujillo more successful in his manoeuvre on the
right. Allende also had marked the importance of
the position which Iturbide had been sent to occupy,
and, unnoticed by the royalists, had already proceeded
in person with 300 of the infantry and one piece of
artillery to take possession of it, approaching unseen
53 Bringas after being wounded was lifted upon his horse, and with great
intrepidity still encouraged his men, effecting his retreat in good order. Tru
jillo, in Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 925. He died on the 3d of Nov. in the city of
Mexico, and was honored by command of the viceroy with a magnificent fu
neral. A few days after a Creole officer died of the wounds he had received,
and was buried without display. As Bringas was a Spaniard, this was not
unnoticed, and the viceroy was satirized by the following epigram:
i Bringas era gachupin?
Su cntierro fuj un S. Quintin.
iN. era amcricano?
Su entierro fue liso y llano.
Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 482.
182 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
in a direction opposite to Iturbide's line of march.
When the royalist officer had pushed forward half
way up to the summit, he suddenly came in contact
with Allende's force, and a brisk engagement followed,
which resulted in the repulse of Allende. The disas
ter sustained by Bringas, however, and the exposure
to the enemy of Trujillo's manoeuvre by this skirmish,
caused the royalist leader to recall Iturbide. Where
upon the insurgents rallied and took possession of the
height. 54
Trujillo's position was now hopelessly exposed ; in
fact, he was completely surrounded. On his right the
piece of artillery planted by Allende on the aban
doned height was in a position to enfilade his ranks;
a large force of the enemy lay between him and the
capital ; on his left was Aldarna now strongly reen-
forced, and with tw r o pieces of artillery mounted in a
commanding position; while in front Mendivil was
not only himself severely wounded, but many of his
most efficient men were slain or hors de combat, and
his artillery ammunition was exhausted. 55 It was
now about three o'clock in the afternoon, and the in
surgents had pushed on down the heights on Trujillo's
left so near that the combatants were at speaking dis
tance. At this juncture the royalist leader perpe
trates an act which places him before the world for
ever in his true character of villain, and enshrouds
his memory with lasting infamy. The insurgents,
masters of the position as they feel themselves to be,
invite the royalist troops to join their cause; and so
54 Liceaga attempts to show that Iturbide did not engage with the enemy;
but due weight must be given to Trujillo's own statement. 'Se encoiitraron
con los enemigos que subian y rompieron el fuego contra ellos, rechazaiido-
los;' and after recounting the repulse of Bringas, clearly explains the reason
of Iturbide's recall. 'Las demas compafrias de mi derecha se volvieron a re-
plegar a la linea, pues el gran mimero de enemigos y lo dilatado del cerro,
hacia entrasen hasta mi centre, por lo qiie me vi en la precision de reconcen-
trar mi linea en el pequeno piano que hay sobre el camino real a donde te-
nia colocado tin canon giratorio.' Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 924-5.
53 Mendivil defended his post with exemplary bravery, and after his field-
piece was no longer of service, held his ground with the infantry under his
command. His wounds were so serious that it was long before he recovered.
Mora, Mcj. y sus Rev., iv. 80.
TREACHERY OF TRUJILLO. 183
favorably are their proposals regarded by some of
Trujillo's officers, that they induce him no less than
three times to hold a parley with the enemy in front
of his line of infantry. Hostilities, meanwhile, have
ceased. Friendly and specious are the words which
Trujillo uses, and at each conference the insurgents,
gathering in crowded ranks about their spokesman,
draw nearer and nearer. At the third parley he has
enticed the unsuspecting revolutionists close up to
his bayonets; then he throws off the mask and orders
his men to fire. 56 The volley which follows stretches
more than sixty victims to his perfidy dead upon the
ground. 57
This treacherous act infuriated the insurgents, and
the battle was renewed with increased vigor. Trujillo,
however, maintained his position until half-past five
in the evening, when, having lost one third of his
force in killed and wounded, among whom were many
of his best officers, his ammunition, moreover, be
ing wellnigh exhausted, he decided to force his way
through the enemy in his rear. His position was
indeed no longer tenable. His ranks were being deci
mated by the insurgents' artillery, his troops, worn
out with fatigue, were without provisions; while num
bers of the enemy were hastening to reenforce those
who were waiting to intercept his retreat. Abandon
ing his cannon, therefore, he put himself at the head
56 His own words are: 'Los acerque hasta bien inmediato de mis bayo-
netas, y recogiendo el teniente coronel D. Juan Antonio Lopez un estandarte
de N. 8. de Guadalupe que venia en las sacrilegas manos de estos infames,
mandc la voz de fuego & la infanteria que tenia.' Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 926.
57 Bmtamante, CuacL Hist., i. 82. According to Liceaga, a kind of armis
tice had been established, during which Aldama and Jimenez sent in pro
posals to the native-born soldiers and officers to join the independent cause,
at the same time guaranteeing the lives of Trujillo and the Spaniards who
were with him. Whether this was done with the approbation of Allende or
rot the author does not know. Adic. y Rectlfic., 140. Trujillo, as is
sometimes the case with base natures, instead of seeing anything disgrace
ful in his act, glories in it. It was, however, severely condemned even in
the Semanario Patriotico de Cadiz, no. 45, of Feb. 14, 1811, in the follow
ing words: 'Hacer fuego sobre estos rebeldes al tiempo de estar parlamen-
tando con ellos, . . .111 file" justo, ni honesto, ni politico.' The defence urged is
that the insurgents were not sincere in their offers, which were made only for
the purpose of hemming in the royalists, which is pure subterfuge. Gaz. de
Hex., 1811, ii. 348-9.
184 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
of two companies of the Tres Villas regiment, and
followed by the remainder of his forces in closed col
umns, successfully fought his way way out, and ar
rived at Cuajimalpa with some little loss. Here he
was compelled to make a stand in order to repel a
body of cavalry which was harassing his march and
tampering with his men. This effected, with the loss
of some killed on the part of the insurgents, he pur
sued his way unmolested to Santa Fe, where he took
up quarters for the night, and on the following day
entered the capital. 58 Then, having no one to dispute
him, he made his defeat appear a victory; and a
medal was struck off in commemoration of his glori
ous achievements, and the success of the royal arms. 59
58 Bustamante states that Trujillo's retreat was conducted in the greatest
disorder as far as Cuajimalpa, and that thence 'escap6 como pudo en dispersion
para Mexico,' Quad. Hist., 82; that Trujillo entered the capital with only 51
soldiers, 'resto unico de toda la fuerza que sac6 de esta capital;' and intimates
that the regiment of Tres Villas had almost ceased to exist. Mora also as
serts that the greater portion of the soldiers deserted on the retreat, so that
when Trujillo left Santa Fe" he had little over 40 men. Mej. y sus .Rev., iv.
81. Now, although it is probable that some of his men deserted, since he
himself mentions that attempts were made to seduce them from their allegiance
while retreating, it is not possible that the retreat was conducted in disorder;
had such been the case, none would have escaped, much less the wounded,
who were brought to Mexico, as Alaman reasonably observes. But the author
who advances the most incredible conjectures as to what was probably Tru
jillo's ability as commander and his deportment in the field is the licenciado
Don Anastasio Zerecero. He gravely relates that Trujillo, after having given
the order to fire upon those with whom he was holding parley, disappeared
disguised, as it was said, in the habit of a friar and hastened to Santa F6; and
then, because Trujillo, in his report dated Nov. 6th that is, seven days
after the battle says that he cannot state the exact loss sustained, and be
cause, moreover, he admits that he was the first to leave the field, Zerecero
comes to the conclusion that everything tends to justify the opinion that
Trujillo fled at the very first, and did not even see the battle, writing his
official despatch from the account supplied him by Iturbide. The same au
thor asserts that Trujillo had 3,000 troops, only 500 of which returned to
Mexico. Mem. Rev. Mex., 86-7, 107-8. Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., 330,
states that 200 royalists escaped to the capital. Though a coxcomb, a liar,
and a villain, Trujillo was no coward on the field of battle. Negrete reason
ably concludes that the viceroy and Trujillo were of accord that it would
not be safe in the excited state of the community to publish at once the
official account of the action, which had been reported as a victory; when,
however, the insurgents had retreated, there was no danger in doing so. Hist.
Mil. Sig. XIX., i. 361-2, 364.
69 The medal was presented on the'Sd of Feb., 1811, on which elate the vice
roy issued a proclamation in praise of the gallant conduct of the regiment of
Tres Villas, and tells them to assume Monte de las Cruces ! as their future
battle-cry. 'Os remito,' he says, 'los escudos de distincion que mere-cisteis
el dia 30 de octubre por vuestra brillante conducta en el monte de las Cruces
. . . que el monte de las Cruces sea vuestro grito guerrero en el momento de
A COSTLY VICTORY. 185
Although Hidalgo thus remained master of the
field, his victory had been dearly bought. The Ind
ians were terror-stricken over the dreadful slaughter
which had been inflicted upon them by the fire of the
artillery, the deadly effect of which they had witnessed
for the first time; 60 while the disciplined troops were
dismayed at the long resistance which so small a force
had been able to make against such overwhelming
numbers. Thus on the following morning the insur
gent army, instead of being flushed with victory, were
despondent; and Hidalgo when he arrived at Cuaji-
malpa halted, although Allende urgently pressed upon
him the necessity of marching upon Mexico at once. 61 '
The capital was filled with foreboding. From the
time intelligence arrived of Hidalgo's departure from
"Valladolid, fear had fallen on the people. And now
when Trujillo returned with but a remnant of his force,
notwithstanding his braggadocio, many gave up all
hope. Guanajuato had fallen; Valladolid had sur
rendered; it was Mexico's turn next! Treasures and
jewelry were carefully concealed or confided to the
sacred protection of convents. Women sought asy
lum in nunneries; and the city, which for years had
been free from popular outbreak, presented a scene of
confusion and panic. Even Venegas, taking into con
sideration the numbers of the enemy, the distant po-
vuestros futures combates, y la voz quo os conduzca a la victoria. ' Gaz. de
Mex., 1811, ii. 123-4. It bore the names of Trujillo, Bringas, and Mendivil.
Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp. t i. 330.
co Trujillo estimated the number of insurgents killed and wounded at
2,000; Liceaga says that on the two sides more than 4,000 were killed: *Se
calcula haber quedado en el campo, mas de cuatro mil caddveres de uno y
otro bando, siendo sin comparacion mayor el numero de los que pertenecian
d los invasores.' Adic. y Rectific., 148. Again, Diego Garcia Conde in his re
port to the viceroy after his release from captivity states that the loss to the
insurgents in killed, wounded, and deserters was more than 20,000. Hernan
dez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 273. For more than five years after the engage
ment, on either side of the pass of Monte de las Cruces, both on the ascent
and descent, for the distance of over a league, great heaps of human bones
could be seen piled underneath the trees. Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 109.
C1 The difference of opinion which not unfrequently occurred between these
leaders terminated in unfriendly relations. Speaking of this dispute, Busta-
mante says: 'Desde esta <3poca comenz6 (Allende) a desabrirse con 61 (Hi
dalgo) desazon que se aumento cada dia mas, y que termin6 con la desgracia
personal de entrambos gefes.' Cuad. Hist., i. 87.
186 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
sition of Calleja, and the want of spirit observable in
his own troops, at first meditated flight to Vera Cruz.
The earnest appeals of the Spaniards and royalists,
however, induced him to change his mind, and take
measures for the defence of the city. 62 Such forces as
he had were placed on the causeway of la Piedad and
the paseo de Bucareli. Cannon were planted at Cha-
pultepec, 63 and troops of cavalry detached to watch
the movements of the enemy. Internal defence was
intrusted to the regiment of the Cornercio, the city
squadron, and some newly levied bodies of patriots. 64
When the news of Trujillo's failure reached the capi
tal, Venegas had immediately despatched a courier to
Calleja, ordering him to hasten by forced marches to
the defence of the capital. He also sent instructions
to Captain Rosendo Porlier, directing him to unite the
crews of the vessels at Vera Cruz, and march them
up the country to his aid.
To inspire the fainting hearts of the people with
some confidence, Yenegas caused the sacred image of
los Remedies 65 to be conveyed from its shrine to the
cathedral. These were the days of signs and wonders,
be it remembered, and this was a time of great tribu
lation. The viceroy was ready to act, and was well
up in his part. Betaking himself to the cathedral,
he threw himself upon his knees, and devoutly ad
dressing the image, meanwhile invoking its aid, Yene-
Negrete, Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX., 357, 363; Zerecero, Rev. Hex., 88-9.
63 Venegas' dispositions in a military point of view were extremely bad,
and placed his troops in a position where it was impossible for them to ma-
nceuvre. Bustamante states that on the 39th, in company with a military
friend, he visited the encampment, and that the officer pointed out to him
the want of military skill displayed by Venegas in thus placing his troops.
* Muy luego me hizo notar la ignorancia del que lo habia situado en aquel
punto.' Cuad. Hist., i. 78.
6l Alaman, basing his estimation on the enumeration of available forces
given by Bustamante see note 45, this chapter calculates that there were
only 2,000 efficient troops. But he does not include those stationed in the in-
terior of the city, which he considers to have been of little use. Hist. Mej. ,
i. 485.
65 This image belonged in the sanctuary of Totoltepec; and on several oc*
casions had been conveyed to the capital, during which visits miraculous pow
ers had been displayed. It was greatly venerated, as we know. Calv'dlo, Ser
mon. 69-106.
MEXICO FRIGHTENED. 187
gas placed in its hands his viceregal staff of office, and
solemnly hailed it as lady captain-general of the army.
The religious fervor of the assembled multitude was
unrestrained, and tears of thankfulness from a thou
sand eyes watered the cathedral floor. 66 The presence
of this protecting image greatly allayed the panic,
while the soldiery, confident of victory with the queen
of heaven on their side, begged for medals stamped
with her likeness. 67 The royalists, after the example
of Hidalgo, erected a sacred banner, which bore the
venerated form of Nuestra Senora de los Remedies.
Thus on the future battle-fields during the war of in
dependence, opposing armies fought under emblems
of the same divine interceder for mercy before the
heavenly throne.
The excitement and apprehension on the 31st of
October was intense throughout the city, and every
cloud of dust seen on the road from Toluca was thought
to presage the coming of the foe. But the day passed
and no enemy appeared. Hidalgo remained inactive,
and on the following day sent commissioners with
an official communication to the viceroy. Having
arrived at Chapultepec, the envoys sent the despatch
to Venegas, who was near by. but he peremptorily
refused any answer; and in language by no means
refined ordered the commissioners to take their de
parture immediately, under pain of being shot. 68
66 Mora, Max. y sus Rev., iv. 84. Calvillo gives a detailed account of
the way in which the image was brought from Totoltepec. It being the vice
roy's design to have it introduced secretly into the city, he sent a carriage
for it; but the Indians in the neighborhood of the shrine became aware of the
intention to remove their adored protectress, and assembled in great crowds
with demonstrations of sorrow. With much persuasion they were calmed,
and then in their veneration accompanied the carriage to the capital, causing
no little apprehension to those who were conducting the image, that they
would be mistaken for Hidalgo's army and fired on. Id., 115-22.
67 A private individual, whose name Calvillo does not mention, distributed
5,930 such medals among the officers and soldiers of the line regiments of
New Spain, the provincial regiments of Mexico, Toluca, Quautitlan, Tres
Villas, and Tulancingo, and the city squadron. Id., 121-2.
68 Lull, Rpfutac., 11. This writer states that the contemptuous bearing of
Venegas increased the hatred of tyranny. With regard to the language of
the viceroy, Bustamante, in describing it, expresses himself in his usual ran
corous way: 'Se desato en palabrotas tan groseras y torpes, que no estarian
bien ni en la boca de un grumete 6 carromatero despechado.' Cuad. Hist., i.
188 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.
Hidalgo's position was now becoming serious. Up
to this time his success had been brilliant. Forced
prematurely into action, into the promulgation and de
fence of long-cherished principles, his people had gath
ered round him, and after that a large army had come
to his support. They were unlettered, untrained, but
they were trustful. Thousands of them had already
laid down their lives for their country ; thousands more
were ready to die rather than relinquish their hope of
liberty. Here were many, but why were there not
more ? Why were the men of America so slow to move
in this matter? Here was the priceless boon held out
to them; why would they not stretch forth their hand
and take it ? True, fifty thousand had come forward
eighty thousand; but why do not they all come five
hundred thousand, five millions why do not they
come and be free ? Oh, base apathy, offspring of iron-
bound ignorance!
He had sent agents into the capital, and to the
neighboring towns, to stir up the people and make
them ashamed of their bonds. Not hearing from
them, he had sent others, and these found the first
fallen away from the cause. Some of his emissaries
had been captured. 69 Evidently the country here
about was not ripe for revolt. His warmest adher
ents a little distance away from him became cold.
He had no helper, no one with whom to share his
heavy load of responsibility. Allende was a good man,
a brave soldier, a faithful adherent ; but he was noth
ing more than a fighting man, and like fighting men
frequently, he was inclined at times to be rash and
reckless, and then to be angry if checked.
The capital city was the tempting prize, the city of
Montezunia, of Cortes, a city classic in the annals of
America ; and it was so near. But he well knew that
he was in no condition to march on Mexico. He has
87. The envoys were General Jimenez, Abasolo, Montemayor, and another
insurgent officer.
t9 Centeno was one of those captured, and was hanged in Mexico in Feb
ruary following.
AFTEE THE BATTLE. 189
been blamed for his three days of inactivity here ; he has
been called too slow, too careful, too fearful, a dreamer
and no soldier, and, when advised, too obstinate;
some think Allende should have had supreme com
mand. It is easy to criticise. A man must be judged
according to means and conditions. His associates
urged that the inhabitants would arise and assist them.
Some had so arisen, it is true, but there were few hopes
held out thus far from the direction of the capital,
and these very officers, who were loudest in their desire
to advance, railed most contemptuously of all against
Hidalgo's rabble army, as worse than none. In the
capital were men, money, arms, and ammunition ; even
if they had few soldiers just then, the whole city
would fight before they would see it sacked. He had
few real soldiers, few men who could be relied upon ;
he had few and poor arms, and his store of ammunition
was wellnigh exhausted. He was still further dis
couraged by the contents of a despatch intercepted by
his followers. It was the duplicate of Venegas' in
structions to Calleja to hasten to his support. He
was now fearful of being caught between two opposing
armies. In vain Allende advocated an immediate ad
vance on the city. Hidalgo, with cooler and truer
judgment, knew that it would not do. Better find
more soldiers, drill his men, and practise for a time on
a less formidable foe; and so after lingering another
day at Cuajimalpa, Hidalgo moved away. 70
70 Herewith I give fuller reference to authorities on this early epoch of
Mexican independence: Diar. M<'X., ii. 167, v. 217, 228, vi. 117, ix. 326,
371-4, 632, x. 451-5, 48o^8T497-8, 508, xi. 80, 86, 125-7. 199-200, 681-3,
xii. 120, 271-2. 288, 403-92, 511-55, 602-94, xiii. 13-70, 245-7, 272, 300-386,
414-16, 629-31, 689-90; Gaz. Mex^ 1810, i. 39-114, 210-91, 313-84, 404-39,
530, 717-801, 871-3, 906-54, 1088; Id., 1811, ii. 13-254, 274-393; Id., 1789,
iii. 18-397; Id., 1790, iv. 9-25, 120-89, 245-6, 313-81, 425-33; Id., 1792, v.
9-10, 81, 261-2, 341-2; Id., 1794, vi. 1-2, 313, 341-2, 442; Id., 1795, vii. 17-
18, 153-4; Id., 1796-7, viii. 10, 51, 85, 109-90, 238-301, 365-81; Id., 1798, ix.
1-51, 138-86, 329; Id., 1800-1, x. 2, 49-209, 235, 242, 329-30, 369; Id., 1802-
3, xi. 2, 9, 105-194, 220-6, 285-350; Id., 1804-5, xii. 17-81, 153-63, 230-54,
317, 342-4; xiii. 638, 656-9, 779; Id., 1806, xiv. 47, 56; Id., 1807, xv. 363,
416, 623-6, 699, 707-40, 1010-12; Id., 1807, xvi. passim; Dj&Qtt&&e*J%3&2>
i. 134-44, ii. 2-10, iii. 153, vi. 58, 60; Cortes, Diario, 1810-11, i. y ii. 10, 12-
13, 24-5, 45, vii. 7, 1812, xiv. 205-9; Diario Congreso, ii. no. 31, 460-1, 465-
8; 470-3, vi. no. 143, 2804-5; Col. J)pc, t i.. 40^1; Cavo, Tres Siglos, 258-72 j
190 HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL
Calle, Mem. y Not., 77; Hernan. y Ddv. , Col. Doc., i. 9-14, 17, 39-40, 455-72,
ii. 63-84, 92-4, 107-11, 110-25, 142-57, 172-92, 207-14, 244, 276-91, 320-30,
387-402, 593-4, 695-739, iii. 905-11, vi. 35; Espinosa, Chron., 12-259, 286-308,
320-1, 530-4; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 12-20, 30-6, 44-5, iv. 35-136,
308; Mem. Hist. Hex., MS., iii. 42; Matirologio, 44-5, in Soc. Alex. Geog.,
vii. 535-8; Defensa, 15-16; Gonzales Ddvila, Teat. Ecles., i. 108; Gomez,
Diario, in Doc. Hist. Mex., ser. 2, vii. 434-5; Beaumont, Tratado Agua.
Min., passim; Cr6n. Mich., iv. 541-84; Alegre, Hist. Comp., ii. 163, iii. 242-3,
284-0; Arevalo, Compend., 109, 149, 198-9, 253-5; Arricivita, Cr6n. Sera/.,
38-9, 109-71, 245-312, 317-20, 431-49, 579-82; Humboldt, Essai Pol, i. 246-
7, ii. 6GG-7, GG9; Tablets Estadis., MS., 42-3; Guerra, Rev. N. Espana, i.
138-56, 187-95, 209-13, 253, 288-329, ii. 564-778; Iglesias, Ed., 154-63, 245-
64; Calvillo, Sermon., 107-14; Liceaga, Adic. y Rect., 2-187, 212-18; Medina,
Chron. S. Diego Mex., 53-4, 58-62, 200-6, 254, 257-8; Navarrete, Eelac.
Peregrin., no. i. 4-29, 66-103, ii. 14-25, 28, 31-4, 243, iii. 3-53, 96-7, 347,
358-70, iv. 8-9, 18-19, 38-51; Negrete, Hist. Mil. Mex., 75-156, 205-252,
258-GO; Torrente, Rev. Hisp.-Am., i. 51-105, 72-80, 140-61; Romero, Mich.,
150, 157, 159-61, 167-9, 188-199; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 235, 239-40, 259-
68, 271-3, 275, 278-357; Soriano, Prologo, MS., 4-7, 14-19, 23; Pinart, Col.
Doc. Mex., 271-3; Villasenor y Sanchez, Teatro, i. 90-7, ii. 35-47, 105-
10, 2GO-1, iii. 34-47; Soc. Mex. Geog., i. 63-4, ii. 8, 18, iii. 198-200, 205-6,
viii. 404-5, ix. 130-1, 140, 151, 107; Santos, Chron. Hisp., ii. 470, vii. 470-
72; Diar. d<l Imper., 18G6, 509; Salazar, Serm. Funeb., passim; Semmes, Ser
vice Afloat, 9-10; Semanario Politico, ii. 149-64; Siguenzay Gdngara, Gloria,
deQuer., pp. 235; Carta al Almirante, MS., 10-11 ;Shepard, Land of the Aztec,
83-100; Sosa, Episcop. Mex., 207-13; Strieker, Bibliothek, 41-9; Thompson,
Recoil. Mex., 55-7; Texeda, Rep. Mex., passim; Tornel y Mendoil, Heros de
Dolores, pp. 16; Velasquez, Carta al Regente Roma, MS. , orig. ; Venegas, Prog.
Felic. Amer., pp. 11; Valdovinos, Contest., 15-17; Viagero Univ., xxvii. 107-
10; Wadd y Thompson, Recoil. Mex., 55; Walton, Exposed, ap. 2-7; Ward,
Hist. Mex., 105, vi. 120, 126-30, 134-50, 156, 160-3, vii. 58; Ximenez, In-
quisidor Fiscal. . .Contra, MS., pp. 281; Young, Hist. Mex., 75-8; Zelaa,
Gloria de Quer., 125-33, 171-235, 241; Zavala, Rev. Mex., 43; Yen. Cong. S.
Felipe Neri, pp. 137; Pap. Derecho, 3; Disc. Civic., 19-2D; Rev. Mex., 26, 43-
58, 89, 129, 143-6; Hassel, Mex. y Gnat., 99-100, 135-40; Hidalgo, Exped.
Lugar Nacim., pp. 47; Id., Biog. del Cura, 39-177; Holley, Texas, 302; Insur
rection, Resum. Hist., pp. 32; Instruc. Vireyes, 148; Junta Sup. Cadiz, pp. 8;
Kollonitz, Court of Mex., 253-4; Kotteml-amp, Unabhangigkeitskampf, 58-67;
Navarro, Soc. Mex., i. 291; Niles, S. Am. y Mex., i. 129-42; Norman, Ram-
lies, 185-08; Over, Mex., 406-20; Ordenes Corona, MS., vi. 113; Otero-Mari-
ano, Oi'acion Civ., pp. 21; Ocios, Espan. Emigrad., vii. 95-6; Calvo, Annales
Hist., vi. 43-5; Orozcoy Berra, Carta Etnog. , 260-1; OlaguiM, Arcnga Civ.,
pp. 16; Oraciones, no. 3; Chevalier, Mexique, 339-47; Cancelada, Cond. Itur-
rigaray, 67, 98-100; Verdad Sabida, ix.-xii.; Col. Diarios, MS., 240; Pinart
Col.; Cerlif. de las Mercedes, MS., 13-14; Pinart Col.; Reales Cedulas, MS., i.
f. 8, 73-4; Id., MS., ii. f. 167; Cedulario, i. f. 92; Campillo, Edicto, pp. 8;
Castaiieda, Oration Civ., pp. 16; Chijnoweth, Max., 3-6; Carlos III., Solemne
Action, pp. 47; Perez, Dice. Geog., i, 356-9; Proclama, Arzob. V. Rey, pp. 22;
Id., pp. 16; Poinsett, Mex., ap. 30-1; Pan. Star and Herald, Sept. 29, 1866;
Proyecto Monarq., 3-13; Doc. sobre Mex., no. iv. ; Pedraza., Oration Encom.,
pp. 15; Quintana Roo, Dtscurso, pp. 17; Queretaro, Orden., pp. 14; Id., Dos
Palabras, 4-5; Id., Not. Estad., 73-4; Quarterly Rev., vii. 240-54, xvii. 540-
2, xxx. 172; Recop. de Ind., i. 565; Roux de Rochelle, Etats Unis, ii. 385-6;
Robinson, Mex., 13-29; Id., i. 21-7; Ramirez, Lecturas Hist., in Mex. Soc.
Geog. Bol, iii. 231-33; Roblas, Diario, in Doc. Hist., Mex., ser. i. iv. 117;
Raso, in Soc. Mex. Geog., iii. 208; Robles, Diario, in Doc. Hist. Mex., i. ser.
iii. 493-4; Rep. Mex. Ligera Resefia, 2, 51-2; Rev. Span. Amer., 80-7, 290-
311; Rafut. Artie. Fondo, pp. 32; Refutation de un Espauol-Am., Mex. 1810,
12pp.; Diaz, Sermon, pp. 32; Diputac. Amer. Repres., pp. 17; Democ. Rev.,
i. 272; Del Mar, Hist. Prec. Metals, 146; Dill, Hist. Mex., 2G3-91: Dillon,
FURTHER REFERENCES. 191
viii. 151, 206, 300, 513-16, 643-4; Id., ix. 288, 372-3, 377, 414, 429, 446-8
577, 606, 800-10, 862; Id., x. 82; 284-6, 373, 798, 815-16, ap. i. 56, 410-12;
Escatera y Liana, Mex. Hist. Descrip., 1-6; Escudero, Not. Estad. Son., 43;
Fonte, Pastorales, no. i.; Frost. Pictl. Hint. Mex., 148-64; Fossey, Mex., 139-
46; Zamacols, Hist. Mex., i. 641, v. 315-16, 573-6, 641-2, 645, vi. passim, vii.
passim, viii. 25-7, 40-8, 55, 89-92, 400-4, 448-59, 464, 474, 488, 514-20, 524,
532-3, 547, ix. 33-9, x. 57, 63-5, 905-22, 969, 1364, 1387-9, 1392-6, 1402, xi.
265, 545, 649; Alaman, Mex., i. passim, ii. 45, 57, 81-4, 89-90, 104, 110-14
186-7, 208-26, 548-9, 583, ap. 19-20, 24-6, iii. 1-58, 69, 9G-8, 101-3, 213-20,
250, ap. 3-5, 75-6, iv. 480, 701-3, 724, ap. 19-25; Id., Disert., iii. 382, 391,
no. i.; Abbott, Mex. and U. S., 42, 243-6; Arroniz, Hist, y Cron., 161-80,
383-6; Armin, Heutige Mex., 32-40, 108-9; Arellano, Oration Civ., pp. 26;
Arronis, Biog. Mex., 12-15, 188-95, 232-5; Arrangoiz, Max., i. ap. 101;
Arrillaga, Recop., Enero-Junio 1S3G, 51; Alvares, Estudios, iii. 459; Diario
Mex., 432-4; Bazancourt, Mex., 35-71; Berghes, Zac., 3; Bell, Geog., 527-35;
Beavfoy, Mex. Illus., 81-90; Beaumont, Cron. Mich., v. 154; Bolet, Geog.
Estad. Mex., ii. 8, 19, 23; Id., Institut., i. 63; Basil, Mex., 233-43; Barcena,
Cal. Hist., 81-213; Id., in Mex. Mem. Sec. Just., 1873, 227; Bergosa y Jordan,
Sermon, pp. 34; Barreda, Oration Civ., pp. 11; Gleeson, Hist. Oath. Church,
ii. 104; Gregory, Hist. Mex., 41-2; Gallo, Hombres Ilustres, 231-6, 347-92;
Gac. Mex., ser. ii., in Doc. Hist. Mex., ser. ii., iv. 159-60, 209, 287-8, 342-3,
504-8; Guijo, Diario, in Doc. Hist. Mex., ser. i., pt i. 4, 335; Galvez, Informe.
Visitad, MS., 11-35, 54-63; Gonzales, Col. N. Leon, 155-213; Gomez, Vida
Antonio de S. Jacinto, pp. 62; Garcia y Garcia, Prosperid. Union, pp. 11;
Mich. Prov. S. Nic., 115, 145-6; Mex. Zast. Jahren, 1830-2, vi.-xxxii. ; Mar
tinez, Sermon Paneg., 1785, pp. 23; Marmier, Voyag. Nouv., iii. 295-348;
Interfer. of Brit. Gov. between Spain and her Am. Col., MS., in Mayer MSS.,
Mayer, Mex. Aztec, 237, 276, 279-91; Mexico in 1842, 12-13; Macgregor,
Prog, of Am., i. 305-9; Mex. Bosquejo Revol., 8; Moreno, Vida y Mem., 131-
40; Mex. Scraps, ii. 61; Museo, Mex., iii. 32-7, iv. 206-10; Halliard, Hist.
Texas, 12-17; Modern Trav. Mex. Guat., i. 84-99, 102-8; Lopez (J.), Dis-
curso, pp. 7; Lopez (S.), Despcrt. Chris.-Pol, pp. 38; Lizana y Beaumont,
Exhortation, pp. 10; Morelli, Fast. Nov. Orb., 415; Laharpe, Abreg6 Hist.
Voy., x. 2534; Laris, Discurso Civ., pp. 15; Garibay, V. Ray, Proclam., pp.
7; Lancaster-Jones, Oration Civ., pp. 4; Lafond, Voy. aut. du Monde, i. bk.
i. 225-04; Lazcano, Vida Oviedo, 273-5; Lacunza, Discur. Hist., no. xxxvii.
536-9; Lempriere, Notes on Mex. 423-4; La Cruz, v. 207-15.
CHAPTER VIII.
PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION".
1810.
CALLEJA'S PREPARATIONS His BIOGRAPHY ENGAGEMENT AT QUERETARO
CALLEJA JOINS FORCES WITH FLON CHAVEZ REPULSED AT QUERETARO
CALLEJA'S MOVEMENTS THE DISPERSION or THE INSURGENTS AT ACULCO
CALLEJA RETURNS TO QUERETARO CHARACTER OF TORRES DEFENSIVE
MEASURES OF ABARCA IN JALISCO INSUPVGENT OPERATION^ IN JALISCO
ENGAGEMENT AT LA BARCA THE ROYALISTS DEFEATED AT ZACOALCO
GUADALAJARA SURRENDERS TO TORRES MERCADO GAINS POSSESSION OP
SAN BLAS REVOLUTION IN ZACATECAS FLIGHT OF THE EUROPEANS AN
UNFORTUNATE INTENDENTE IRIARTE ENTERS ZACATECAS THE COM
MISSION OF DOCTOR Cos A DARING SCHEME SAN Luis POTOSI WON BY
AN INSURGENT FRIAR A TREACHEROUS VISITOR SAN' Luis SACKED.
-\
WHILE the events narrated in the two preceding
chapters were taking place, Calleja in San Luis Po-
tosi was making preparations, with extraordinary ac
tivity, to take the field; but at the same time with
that avoidance of unprofitable haste which character
ized all his movements. 1 The cornandante of San
Luis was first apprised of the occurrences at Dolores
on the 19th of September. He had a few days before
received warning of Hidalgo's meditated insurrection,
through information supplied to him by Jose Gabriel
de Armijo, and conveyed through the subdelegado
Pedro Garcia. At that time he was at the hacienda
de Bledos, a property belonging to his wife. While
returning to San Luis he narrowly escaped capture
by a troop of horsemen sent by Hidalgo to make him
1 Abad y Queipo, in his report to Fernando VII. in 1815, says of Calleja:
'Sicmpre obro con lentitud, dando mucho lugar a los enemigos para aumentar
BUS reuniones y defensas.' In forme, in Zamacois, Hist. Mej., ix. 871.
(192,
FELIX MAPJA CALLEJA DEL KEY. 193
prisoner, the soldiers arriving at the hacienda only two
hours after his departure. Without waiting for in
structions from the viceroy, Calleja issued orders to
place the two provincial dragoon regiments of San
Luis and San Carlos under arms, and to draw recruits
from the different towns and haciendas of his district.
This could not be very quickly done, scattered as the
troops were in different localities; nor was it a matter
of small difficulty to convert into an efficient force
men drawn from their agricultural pursuits. Calleja,
however, was ably seconded by the authorities and
proprietors of estates, as he had their full confidence.
Felix Maria Calleja del Hey, the future viceroy of
New Spain, was a native of Medina del Campo in old
Castile, and a member of a distinguished family. He
commenced his military 1 career as an ensign in the
i/ O
disastrous expedition against Algiers conducted by
the conde de O'Reily in the reign of Cdrlos III. At
a later date, he was appointed captain and instructor
of one hundred cadets at the military school in the
port of Santa Maria. In 1789 he came to New Spain
with the viceroy Revilla Grigedo; and with the rank of
lieutenant-colonel, served in the frontier states, suc
cessfully levying and organizing troops in Nuevo
Santander and Nuevo Leon, the defence of which ter
ritories was intrusted to him by the viceroy Branci-
forte. 2 When the government at Madrid adopted the
system of dividing the provincial militia into ten brig
ades, 3 the command of that of San Luis Potosi was
bestowed by Viceroy Azanza upon Calleja, with the
corresponding rank of brigadier. 4 During his resi-
* Brand forte, Instruc., MS., 31, in Linares, Tnstruc., MS.
3 Consult Hist. Mex., iii. 415, this series.
4 /(/. , 491. Calleja's military services were such as to gain for him the rec
ommendation of the six viceroys who preceded Venegas, one of whom says:
'Calleja era nno de los pocos oficiales de graduacion, de quienes podria valerse,
con seguridad, por las ocasiones dificiles que presentasen, por su inteligeucia,
actividad y conocimiento. ' Prov. Intern., Meal tfrden, in Mayer MS., no. 7.
In 1794 he was selected by the viceroy for important work. N. Esp. Acuer-
dos, MS., 185.
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 13
194 PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
dence in that city he espoused Dona Francisca de la
Gdndara, daughter of the alferez real, who possessed
considerable wealth. His personal influence over the
country people was great, and his abilities and cul
ture gained admiration; but he had an inordinate
love of flattery, and was obstinate, hard-hearted, and
remorselessly cruel.
In order to drill and place upon an efficient war
footing the new levies, Calleja established a camp at
the hacienda de la Pila, situated in the vicinity of San
Luis; and so ably was he seconded by the authorities
and leading men, that he soon had more recruits than
he could furnish with arms and equipments. 5 Various
urban companies were raised for the protection of the
city; officers were appointed; and the Europeans who
were flying from Guanajuato to the coast were de
tained and pressed into the service. 6 As the troops
consisted principally of cavalry, a battalion of light
infantry, six hundred strong, was organized; 7 cannon
were ordered to be cast; in the camp at la Pila a
portrait of Fernando VII. was put up, and Calleja
issued a proclamation to his troops, 8 from whom the
oath of allegiance was again exacted. 9 Calleja's money
was a great help to him, as he was enabled to meet
preliminary expenses, as well as those of the ensuing
campaign,, for a considerable time. 10
"Conspicuous among those who rendered him aid was Juan Moncada,
marque's del Jaral de Berrio, who armed and took command as colonel of a
considerable body. According to Alaman, Allende had reported to Hidalgo
that Moncada was disposed to support the revolution. Hist. Mej., i. 453.
6 Many afterward became distinguished leaders, among them Meneso,
Armijo, Orrantia, Aguirre, Barragan, the Beistiguis, and Bustamante. Id.,
454.
7 Known by the name of los Tamarindos, from the color of their uniform,
which was similar to that of the tamarind fruit. Id. , 455. They were com
manded by Juan Nepomuceno Oviedo. Id., ap. 78.
8 The proclamation, which is given in full by Bustamante, Camp. Cullcja^
13-15, is an exhortation to allegiance; it attributes the revolutionary move
ment to the machinations of Napoleon. It is dated the 2d of Oct.
9 A Carmelite friar with a crucifix in his hand administered the oath to
each soldier. Of the influence which these religious exercised over the
soldiery, Bustamante remarks: 'Prevalido del ascendiente que gozan alii
estos religiosos sobre el bajo pueblo, logrd entusiasmarlos de tal manera, que
cuando march6 con sus tropas creian cstas que iban d, medirselas con hereges
y & defender la religion de Jesucristo. ' Cuad. Hist., i. 48.
10 The intendente of San Luis Potosi placed at his disposition 382,000
MEASURES AGAINST HIDALGO, 195
Venegas, before he was aware of the outbreak of
Dolores, and without knowing the extent of the rev
olution, had by despatch of the 17th of September
ordered Calleja to hasten to Queretaro for the pur
pose of preventing an uprising in that city. Calleja,
however, replied that he had already discovered a
concerted plot in San Luis, and that it would be im
possible to leave until he had completed his arrange
ments; at the same time explaining to the viceroy his
proposed plan to raise a considerable force and take
the field against Hidalgo, after having put San Luis
in a state of defence. Upon receiving this informa
tion, Venegas, perceiving the prudence with which
Calleja was acting under the new aspect of affairs, per
mitted him to continue his operations, and instructed
him to unite his forces when in readiness with those
of Flon, now on his march to Queretaro.
No sooner had Flon arrived at Queretaro than an
engagement took place between a detachment of his
men and a body of three thousand insurgents in the
vicinity of that city. When the enemy appeared in
sight on the road from San Miguel, Flon sent out a
force of six hundred under the command of Major
Bernardo Tello, all of whom except one hundred and
eighty, with the single officer, Captain Linares, hastily
dispersed when they found the enemy to be much
more numerous than they had supposed. Linares,
however, made a resolute stand, and the division re
covering itself, attacked and inflicted great slaughter
upon the Indians with their artillery, the effect of
which they were so ignorant of, that they attempted
to protect themselves by putting their straw hats
pesos from the royal coffers. Besides this, as soon as he heard of the up
rising he ordered a conducta of silver which had been detained at Santa
Maria del llio by the subdelegado Garcia, to be sent to San Luis. This con
sisted of an ingot of gold and 315 bars of silver. In addition to this, he
received as a loan from wealthy mining speculators of Zacatecas 225,000
pesos en reales, 94 bars of plata quintada, and 2,800 marks of plata pasta,
Id., 5G-7; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 450.
106 PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
over the mouth of the cannon. 11 The result was not
long doubtful; the insurgents were dislodged from
their favorable position with heavy loss, the royalists
losing only one man. 12
On the 24th of October, Calleja broke camp and
proceeded to Dolores, where he had arranged with the
conde de la Cadena to unite their forces on the 28th.
This was accordingly done, the latter having left Que
retaro on the 22d. 13 After leaving an efficient garri
son in San Luis, 14 Calleja's force, nevertheless, mus
tered 3,000 cavalry and 600 infantry, with four cannon.
These united with Flon's troops formed an army of
about 7,000 men, with eight pieces of artillery, and
which henceforth assumed the name of Ejercito de
operaciones sobre los insurgentes. As Flon passed
through San Miguel el Grande, he had the satisfac
tion of permitting his soldiers to sack the houses of
Colonel Canal, Allende, and Aldama, while a similar
gratification was indulged in by Calleja in Dolores by
the sacking of Hidalgo's house and the ill treatment
of the inhabitants.
The project of Calleja had been to proceed to the
capital by way of Celaya, Acambaro, and Toluca, fol
lowing, in fact, Hidalgo's line of march; but while at
Dolores he received a despatch from the comandante
of Queretaro, Garcia Rebollo, stating that the city
was threatened with the whole force of Hidalgo's
11 Alaman remarks: ' Este heclio apenas creible, me ha sido asegurado por
todos los que han tenido conocimiento del suceso.' Hist. Mej., i. 459.
12 According to Tello's version, 200 Indians were killed; the royalist slain
met his death by accident while passing in front of a cannon. Gaz. de Me.x. ,
1810, i. 850. Tello does not say anything about his own hurried depart
ure from the field. The most reliable particulars are those given in the text,
being the statements of Linares in a representation setting forth his services,
and addressed to Viceroy Apodaca. Alaman obtained a copy of this docu
ment. Hist. Mej., i. 459.
ia Before leaving Querdtaro Flon addressed a proclamation to the inhabi
tants, describing to them in sanguinary terms the manner in which he intended
to suppress the insurrection, and concluding by threatening to make the streets
of Queretaro flow with blood if, during liis absence, they acted disloyally.
Id., 469; Negrete, Hist. Mil. S'KJ. XIX., i. 292; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc.,
ii. 173-4.
14 This consisted of 350 foot, 110 horse, and three companies of the urban
troops. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 55.
CALLEJA AT QUERETARO. 197
army. Calleja accordingly marched to Queretaro, but
found that an insignificant attack on the city by a
band of ill-armed Indians had been all. 15 One Miguel
Sanchez had raised the cry of insurrection on the ha
cienda de San Nicolas, belonging to the augustinians
of Michoacan, occupied Huichapan and the neighbor
ing towns, and being joined by Julian Villagran,, a
captain of the militia of Huichapan, attempted in the
absence of Flon to gain possession of Queretaro.
Leading his rabble into the town, they broke and fled
at the first cannon-shot, which killed a considerable
number of them, 16 while their opponents lost not a
single man. This futile movement of Sanchez was
attended, however, with most important results; for,
as will be seen, it saved Queretaro from being occu
pied by Hidalgo, and was the indirect cause of the
insurgent leader's later defeat.
Calleja arrived at Queretaro on the 1st of Novem
ber, the engagement having taken place on the 30th
of October, the same day on which was fought the
battle of the monte de las Cruces. Finding himself
obliged to approach Mexico by a different route, he
now directed his course by way of Estancia, San Juan
15 Calleja's report in Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 965.
16 By some this defeat of Sanchez was considered one of the reasons for
Hidalgo's retreat. ' Se tuvo por cierto entonces qiie habia recibido la noticia
de la derrota del general Sanchez en Queretaro. ' Insurrec. JV. Esp. Res. Hint. ,
10. Bustamante's account of this affair, deemed improbable by Alaman, is
as follows : Brigadier Sanchez, after raising the standard of revolt, marched
to San Juan del Rio, where he captured the oidor Juan Collado, who, having
concluded his commission, was returning to Mexico. He also made prisoner
Antonio Acufia, 'Teniente de corte de la sala del crimen,' who beguiled San
chez into believing that if he would allow him to return to Queretaro he could
by his influence succeed in winning over the garrison for him, the signal to
be the firing of a cannon from the fort de la Cruz. Sanchez consented, but
Acuf.a disclosed the plot, so that the city might be put in defence. The sig
nal was given, nevertheless, and the credulous Sanchez entered the city with
the result narrated in the text. The same author states that their whole force
was only 500 men, who had only 14 muskets amongst them, and that 31 were
killed on the spot, without counting the wounded and others killed in the
pursuit. Cuad. Hist., i. 88-9. The version of Comandante Rebollo is, how
ever, very different. He states in his report to the viceroy that there were
4,000 or 5,000 of the insurgents; that the engagement lasted from half-past
nine in the morning till half-past seven in the evening, and that 300 of the
enemy were killed and as many more taken prisoners. Gaz. de Mex. (1810),
i. 929-30.
198 PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
del Rio, and San Antonio, arriving at Arroyozarco
on the 6th of November. Meanwhile Hidalgo, re
treating by the same way by which he had approached
the capital, arrived at Ixtlahuaco. Unaware of Ca-
lleja's last movement, and confident that Queretaro
could now be taken possession of with little difficulty,
he directed his march toward the city, and the two
opposing commanders were thus approaching each
other without either of them knowing it. Hidalgo's
force was reduced to one half its previous number,
thousands of his followers, who had been attracted by
the prospect of sacking the capital, having returned
to their homes. 17 But what is more significant of the
waning star of the first leaders of the revolution is
the disagreement which existed among themselves,
and the growing jealousy which Allende and his
friends, the Aldamas, began to entertain for Hidalgo. 18
Where there was so much fighting to be done, these
military men did not like to be led by a priest; they
were determined to submit to him no longer than was
necessary.
On the 6th of November the advance guard of
Calleja's army came in contact with a detachment of
Hidalgo's forces at Arroyozarco, and after a sharp
skirmish put the enemy to flight, killing some and
taking others prisoners. From the captives, and
from Colonel Ernpdran, whom Calleja at once sent
forward with a strong force to reconnoitre, it was
discovered that the insurgents were at the neighbor
ing town of Aculco. Calleja at once made his ar
rangements for battle, taking up a military position
two leagues distant from that of Hidalgo. The in-
17 The captive Garcia Conde afterward stated to the viceroy that although
Hidalgo's loss after the battle of las Cruccs amounted to 40,000 in killed,
wounded, and deserters, there still remained to him 40,000 followers. Her
nandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 274. Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. E*p., i. 339,
thinks this an exaggeration although confirmed by Calleja. Gaz. de Mex.
(1810), i. 9G7-8.
15 According to Garcia Conde, when speaking of Hidalgo, they used to call
him ' el bribon del cura,' that knave of a priest. Alaman, Hist. Hcj, , i. ap. 66.
AFFAIR AT ACULCO.
109
surgents were drawn
of
a
up in two lines on the summit
rectangular hill which overlooked the town 13
and was almost surrounded by barrancas and gullies.
Within the lines numbers were drawn up in the form
of an oblong, the artillery being stationed in the front
and on the right flank, while the rear was occupied
by disorderly crowds. The encounter which followed
was not properly an engagement, but rather a feint
on the part of the revolutionary leaders, who had dc-
^%iii;|
= 15 = :**&
''- ***** ~ . ..- -> ======* ~
PLAN OF BATTLE-FIELI> AT AOULCO.
19 A
B
1
Line of battle of the royalist army.
Park of artillery in position.
Cavalry on the left.
Cavalry on the right.
Body of cavalry covering the flank of the infantry.
Bodies of infantry.
Reserve of cavalry.
6, 6 Cavalry on left and right in column.
Company of volunteers.
Cavalry on left flank of infantry columns.
Reserve cavalry of same columns.
Columns of infantry.
Park of artillery in second position.
12, 12 Park of artillery opening fire.
13 Columns of infantry mounting the hill to attack.
14 Cavalry in reserve.
15, 15 Position of the insurgent army.
16 Insurgent artillery.
17 Equipage, ammunition, and carriages.
18 Companies of patriots of Sail Luis doing service as light troops.
200 PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
cided not to give battle, but effect a retreat under cover
of a show of resistance. 20 Calleja, undeterred by the
difficulties presented by the enemy's position, com
menced the attack with three columns of infantry, 21
on the morning of the 7th of November. For some
twenty minutes the royalists pushed on, 22 exposed to
the sluggish fire of the insurgents, whose cannon-balls
flew high above their heads. Unscathed they reached
the foot of the steep on which the enemy was posted,
but when the stormed columns had scaled the heights,
the foe had fled. Meanwhile Calleja had marked the
disorder in the revolutionary ranks, caused, as he sup
posed, by his well directed fire; and thereupon or
dered the cavalry on his right flank to attack the en
emy's left, which could only be done by a long detour, y
Doubtless it would have pleased him as he affirmed
that he did 23 to commit great slaughter by his caval
rymen who pursued the enemy two and a half leagues
over the hills and through the glen; but the truth is,
they did not kill a hundred. 24 He lost, however, only
580 Hidalgo published at Celaya on the 13th of Nov. a circular giving an
account of the affair, assigning as a reason for his not engaging the enemy
his want of ammunition. He says: 'Solo se entretubo un fuego lento ya
mucha distancia, entro tanto se daba lugar a que se retirara la gente sin ex-
perimentar quebranto, como lo verifico.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc.
ii. 221. A quantity of cannon-balls and grape-shot and 120 cans of powder
were left on the field. Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 22. Zerecero re
gards the sudden flight of the insurgents as a skilfully executed retreat,
which the leaders considered necessary in the present condition of their
troops, and to effect which they were willing to sacrifice their artillery.
Mem. Rev. Mex., 114, 117.
21 Calleja boasts of the coolness and precision displayed by his well drilled
troops. Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 90S. At the same time Zerecero was informed
by his uncle, Jose Azpeitia, an officer in the regiment of la Corona, that
those troops, and a part of the second battalion of la Columna, were wavering
in their allegiance when the order was given to advance. Mem. Rev. Mex.,
115. Bustamante inclines to this opinion. 'He hablado,' he says, 'con per
sona presencial de este suceso, la cual me ha asegurado que los cuerpos prin-
cipales del ejercito real estuvieron vacilantes y a punto de pasarse. ' C'uad.
Hist., i. 91-2.
22 Garcia Conde timed the duration of the firing, and states: 'En veinte y
dos minutos seso el fuego. ' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. Indep. , ii. 275.
23 Calleja estimated the entire loss to the insurgents in killed, wounded,
and prisoners at 10,000. 'Pasa de cinco mil,' he says, 'el niimero de los ten-
didos en el campo.' And he adds this pious reflection: ' Dexando el campo
lleno de cadaveres, y el espectaculo horrible que presentaba, y de que son
responsables ante Dios y los hombres, los traidores Hidalgo, Allende y sus
sequaces.' Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 909.
21 Manuel Perfecto Chavez, the justice of Aculco, in an official despatch
NEW COMBINATIONS. 201
one man killed and one wounded, while he captured all
of Hidalgo's cannon, 25 ammunition, and baggage, a large
number of cattle, sheep, and horses, and a quantity
of merchandise, 26 besides rescuing the captives Garcia
Conde, Rul, and Merino. Thus terminated the af
fair at Aculco, which, trivial as it was, regarded as a
martial achievement, was important as effecting the
dispersion of Hidalgo's forces and frustrating his de
sign against Queretaro. Had the insurgents not
abandoned their position, they would probably have
gained a victory. But the leaders were at variance;
the soldiers were disheartened; the Indians were dis
appointed at not having been led to the capital ; and
all were affected by the demoralizing consequences of
a retreat. As it was, a great victory was celebrated
by the royalists in the capital, and solemn thanksgiving
offered to their divine general, our lady of los Reme-
>dios. 27
About the movements of the revolutionary chiefs
during the ten days following their departure from
Aculco, historians are strangely silent; but one fact
is certain, namely, that they effected their retreat to
Celaya with insignificant loss. 23 Here Hidalgo and
Allende formed new combinations, and it was decided
that the latter should inarch with the forces to Guana
juato, while the former, accompanied by a few fol
lowers, should return to Valladolid, and there repair
losses by the manufacture of arms and the levying of
fresh troops.
of the 15th, reports to Calleja that the killed at Aculco, together with those
slain in the skirmish of the clay before, were 85 'y nada mas;' and that of
53 wounded, ten died subsequently. Bustamante, Campauas de Calleja, 23.
25 Twelve, including the two abandoned by Trujilloat las Cruces. Id., 22.
20 ' Equipages, ropa, papeles, y...ocho muchachas bieii parecidas (quo
Calleja llama el serrallo de los insurgentes).' Jb.
27 Salvador, Action de Gracias, 1-8. The accounts of the battle of Aculco,
as it is called, are extremely contradictory; but I have no hesitation in ac
cepting the version of it given by Nescrete, Hist. MIL Sig. XIX., i. 375-8, as
correct, and, in the main, I have followed it in the text.
28 Hidalgo, in his circular dated Celaya, Nov. 13th, states that his forces
had been reunited, and that he had more than 40 pieces of artillery already
mounted, and was well provided with ammunition. Hernandez y Dc^alos,
Col. Doc., ii. 221.
202 PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
Meanwhile Calleja retraced his steps and marched
toward Queretaro. As he repassed through San
Juan de los Bios he made proclamation offering ten
thousand pesos for the head of any one of the five
leaders, Hidalgo, Allende, the two Aldamas, and
Abasolo. 29
Though the revolution had apparently received a
deadly blow 7 at Aculco, and the royalists confidently
expected its near termination, the end was not yet.
Hidalgo's agents had not been idle. Though often dis
appointed, they were not wholly cast down. In the
northern provinces, and in those bordering on the
Pacific, the revolution had widely spread. At the
time of the disaster at Aculco, the arms of the inde
pendents had triumphed in Nueva Galicia, Zacatecas,
and San Luis Potosi, and those provinces were wholly
in their power. In the south the star of Morelos,
Hidalgo's worthy successor, was just rising above the
horizon. At Huichapan a body of insurgents, headed
by Julian Villagran, 30 interrupted communication on
the highway between the capital and Queretaro, cap
turing convoys, killing royalists, and when threat
ened with capture, escaping to the mountains. Thus
it was that a movement, regarded by the government
as an affair of two short months, now about ended,
was indeed but begun, and was practically never to
be extinguished. As the future operations of Hidalgo
29 The offer was ratified by the viceroy. Calleja on previously passing
through San Juan de los Rios, which had been held for a time by Sanchez,
demanded all arms to be delivered up within six hours, extending on those
conditions a pardon to those who had aided the insurgents, adding that in
case of further disobedience the inhabitants 'seran tratadossiii conmiseracion
alguna, pasados a cuchillo, y el pueblo reducido a cenizas. ' The viceroy ap
proved of the edicts of Calleja, and extended the indulto to all towns in New
Spain, promising that if one of the leaders would deliver up the rest he should
benefit by the pardon. JDispos. Farias, ii. f. 8; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col.
Due., ii. 206, 219-21.
30 This movement was initiated, as before stated, by Miguel Sanchez. Villa-
gran, who was of a ferocious character and addicted to drunkenness and all
other vices, murdered Sanchez for some slight offence soon after his repulse
at Queretaro. His son Francisco, known by the name of Chito, and as noto
rious for his crimes as his father, was also one of these insurgents. Busttmu&Ue,
Cuad. Hist., 135-C.
AFFAIRS IN GUADALAJARA.
203
and Allende will be more particularly confined to the
provinces of Nueva Galicia, Zacatecas, and San Luis
Potosi, it will be necessary to give some account of
the events there occurring during these same two
months.
INTENDEXCIA OF GUADALAJARA.
While Hidalgo was in Guanajuato, Jose Antonio
Torres, who had joined the revolutionary standard
with a few followers at Irapuato, asked for and ob
tained authority from Hidalgo to occupy Guadalajara,
Torres was an honest, conscientious man, without ed
ucation, being a peasant of San Pedro Piedragorda
in Guanajuato; but he was not without talent, and
204 PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
possessed unbounded enthusiasm in the cause of inde
pendence. Energetic, intelligent, brave, and honor
able, he was nevertheless modest and had good com
mon sense. When he entered Guadalajara as victor
he molested no one, and interfered with the adminis
tration of affairs no more than was necessary.
At this time Brigadier Roque Abarca governed in
Guadalajara, holding the three-fold office of coman-
dante, president of the audiencia, and intendente. As
soon as he received intelligence of the grito de Dolores,
he took measures to exclude revolution from his prov
ince; but not being well regarded by either the audi
encia or the European commercial class, on account
of his disapproval of Iturrigaray's deposal, he was
fettered in his operations. Finally, instead of assert
ing his authority, he consented to the establishment
of a junta composed of lawyers, ecclesiastics, and
others, 31 which styled itself the auxiliary of the gov
ernment, 32 though it seemed satisfied with little less
than supreme power. By order of this junta a con
siderable military force was collected. The divisions
from Tepic, Colima, and Colotlan were called in and
the provincial militia got under arms, while two com
panies of volunteers were raised from the commercial
class in the city. 33 In a short time Abarca, by levy
ing recruits, had no less than 12,000 men under arms;
but being of weak resolution, and wanting in military
ability as well as in courage, his action benefited the
revolutionists rather than the royalists. In truth,
3l Carta de Abarca; Bustamanle Campanas de Calleja, 97-8.
32 ' Junta Superior auxiliar de Gobierno, seguridad y defensa. ' See Tier-
nandez y Duvalos, CoL Doc. Indep., iii. 693-4, where will be found the names
of the members who composed it.
33 The bishop, Juan Cruz Ruiz Cabanas, in his zeal against the heretical
insurgents, raised a regiment composed of both the secular and regular
clergy, and any others who might wish to join. The name given to this ex
traordinary body was La Cruzada, and each member wore a red cross on his
breast. Morning and evening this band of church militants issued from the
episcopal palace on horseback, sword in hand, and, as they paraded through,
the streets, the staring rabble raised the cry, Viva la f6 catolica! Busta-
mante calls the regiment ' una piadosa compafiia de asesinos.' Cuad. Hint., i.
138-9.
MOVEMENTS OF TORRES. 205
all of his newly levied troops soon deserted to the
enemy.
In the mean time Torres had raised in revolt the
towns of Colima, Sayula, Zacoalco, and those of the
districts of the tierra caliente, 34 while other revolu
tionary chiefs, Gomez Portugal, Godinez, Alatorre,
and Huidrobo, were no less active among the pueblos
on the Rio Grande, 35 so that by the end of October
all the districts bordering upon Guanajuato and Mi-
choacan were in insurrection. Though day by day
the danger became more imminent, the want of har
mony in the city of Guadalajara still prevailed. In
vain Abarca, in view of the continued desertion of
troops, represented to the Europeans that they should
take arms and defend themselves. They would not
listen to him, and would neither fight nor pay. 36 Nor
was the action of the junta auxiliar any more favor
able to the success of the royalist cause in Jalisco.
Regarding as traitors efficient officers in whom Abarca
had confidence, the members of the junta appointed
the oidor Reeacho, and Villasenor, a rich landed pro
prietor, commanders of two divisions to be sent against
the insurgents. Guadalajara was by this time threat
ened on the south by Torres, who had occupied Za
coalco, and on the east by Huidrobo, Godinez, and
Alatorre, who were at La Barca. Villasenor com
manded the division despatched against Torres, and
Recacho that opposed to Huidrobo, each detachment
being five hundred strong. Recacho, on arriving at
La Barca, discovered that the enemy had abandoned
the town, and on the 1st of November entered it with
out resistance. On the 3d, however, Huidrobo at
tacked the royalists with a large body of Indians, but
was repulsed with some loss, Recacho having taken
up a position in the plaza. On the following day the
34 Thus it was charged against him in the sentence of death pronounced
on the 12th of May, 1812. Id., 144.
3j Known as the Rio de Santiago de Lerma.
S6 Carta de Abarca; jBuatamante, Campailas de Calleja, 99-100.
236 PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
insurgents again assailed the royalist forces with great
intrepidity, but with no better success. 37 Recaeho,
however, having lost several of his best officers, deemed
it prudent to retreat to Sula and wait for reinforce
ments. There he received orders to return to Guada
lajara, and the expedition ended without any serious
blow having been inflicted upon the insurgents. 38
Still more unsuccessful was Villasenor in his opera
tions at Zacoalco. Torres was a military man by in
stinct. It is stated that before the engagement he
showed the Indians, with a stick on the ground, how
to deploy, in order to surround the enemy. 39 Be this
as it may, his manoeuvres were so successful that Vi-
llasefior's division was shortly overthrown and almost
destroyed, no less than 276 being slain. 40 So great
was the shower of stones discharged by the Ind
ians that the enemy's muskets were badly battered.
The flower of the youth of Guadalajara who formed
the newly recruited volunteer companies, deficient in
training and unaccustomed to hardship, perished.
Villasenor and the captains of two companies were
made prisoners, and Gariburu, a lieutenant of the
regiment of la Corona, was killed. 41
37 Recacho, in his report to the viceroy, says that the enemy marched up
to the cannon's mouth, and when fired upon with grape and canister closed
their ranks and boldly charged again, 'avauzando con una temeridad increi-
ble.' Gaz. de Mex. (1811), ii. 159.
38 'El destacamento de la Barca volvio lleno de terror.' Carta de Abarca,
tit sup., 100. Mora's account of this engagement is incorrect. He states that
Torres was commander of the insurgents, and that Recacho was completely
beaten. Mej. y sus Rev.,iv. 92.
39 Buitamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 142.
40 Of these, 100 were Europeans, the remainder Creoles pressed in the
service. Oftcio de Torres, Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 59-60. In an account of
this engagement, obtained by J. Hernandez in January 1867 from three natives
who were present at the action, the number of killed is stated to have been
257. Torres instructed the Indians to throw themselves upon the ground at
each discharge of the artillery, and then keep closing in as quickly as possible.
These tactics were so successful that the insurgents lost only two killed and
thirteen wounded. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 202-3.
41 During the action, which took place on the same day that Calleja dis
persed the insurgents at Aculco, the militia of Colima passed over to the
enemy. Bustamante relates that before the battle, Torres proposed to Villa
senor that the Americans should retire and leave the Europeans to engage
with him if they wished. Villasenor's reply was that if he had Torres in
his power he would hang him, ' que era un indecente mulato.' Cuad. lli-st., i.
142, 145.
IN NUEVA GALICIA. 207
After this tragical defeat, consternation prevailed
in Guadalajara. There was no thought of further re
sistance. The bishop, in spite of his previous military
ardor, ignominiously fled to the port of San Bias, fol
lowed by most of the Europeans, who carried with
them what they could. The junta hastily dissolved,
and the warlike Recacho, with the oidor Alva, hur
ried with all speed to the same port, not forgetting,
- however, to collect on their way the royal revenues.
Abarca endeavored to reanimate the Europeans who
remained, and induce them to take up arms in defence
of the city. "We are not soldiers," they said, "and
our only duty is to take care of ourselves." 42 The
only force left at his disposal was 110 raw recruits.
In this hopeless condition he fell grievously ill, and
while on his bed the ayuntamiento surrendered the
city to Torres. 43 The insurgent forces entered Guada
lajara on the llth of November. Torres kept faith
fully the terms of the capitulation. Both the prop
erty and persons of the citizens were respected; the
malefactors in the jails were not released, and to pre
vent violence he would not allow his troops to quarter
themselves in the city. 44
With the exception of San Bias, the whole prov
ince of Nueva Galicia was now in possession of the
insurgents; and the ease with which that port fell
into their power is somewhat remarkable. Jose Ma
ria Mercado, the cura of Ahualulco, obtained from
Torres a commission to go in pursuit of the fugitive
Europeans; and raising forces in the villages on his
way to the port, he entered Tepic without opposition,
and was there joined by the garrison of the town.
Mercado then hastened to lay siege to San Bias, and
sent in to the comandante de la plaza, Jose de Lava-
42 Carta de Abarca, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., in. 401.
43 The ayuntamiento petitioned the insurgent chiefs to grant Abarca re
lease from confinement in consideration of his ill health and advanced age.
Id., ii. 228-9.
** liespuesta al Papel, 19. The property of Spaniards was, however, em
bargoed, and commissioners were appointed to attend to the matter. Her
nandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 229-30.
208 PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
lien, a formal summons to surrender, accompanied with
a threat to burn the town in case of refusal. His
whole force did not exceed three thousand Indians
and a few hundred mounted lancers, while all of his
artillery were six cannon brought from Tepic. The
position of San Bias was such as to render it most
difficult of assault. It was defended, as well as com
manded, by a castle mounted with twelve 24-pound
guns. In the harbor lay a frigate, two brigantines,
a schooner, and two gunboats; the place was well sup
plied with provisions; there were forty mounted pieces
of artillery and 800 able men in the place, and yet
such was Mercado's cool impudence 45 that Lavallen
sent Agustin Bocalan, alferez de fragata of the royal
navy, to capitulate. This was on the 29th of Novem
ber, and Bocalan so reported the numbers and strength
of the enemy on his return, that the comandante sur
rendered without further parley, 46 and the royalists
had no longer a foothold in the intendencia of Gua
dalajara. 47
In Zacatecas the news of the revolt at Dolores was
known on the 21st of September, and the intendente
Francisco Rendon at once took the same precaution
ary measures as those employed by Calleja and
Abarca, He, moreover, applied for aid to those in-
tenderites, but without success. From the governor
of Colotlan, however, he obtained two companies of
the militia dragoons, which he stationed at Aguasca-
lientes, and shortly afterward the same governor
45 ' Por tanto,' he says in his ultimatum to the comandante, ' esta es la iil-
tima intimacion, y la falta de respuesta a ella sera la seiial segura del rompi-
miento; pero en la inteligencia de que cuando peleen de esa parte los niiios y
las mugeres, les tocaraii cliez soldados a cado uno; pero diez soldados decididos
a veneer y a avanzar hasta la misma boca de los caiiones. ' Bustamante. Cuad.
Hist., 150.
_ 46 The military bishop, Recacho, Alva, and the Europeans went on board the
brigantine San Carlos, and steered for Acapulco.
47 Lavallen, Bocalan, and other officers who signed the capitulation were
afterward tried for treasonable surrender. After a tedious trial they were
acquitted. An almost complete copy of the proceedings as well as other docu
ments is supplied by Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 236-427.
IK ZACATECAS. 209
arrived at Zacatecas with four additional companies.
But Rendon's position was even worse than that of
Abarca. The province was almost entirely without
arms, and he had to provide with lances even the
horsemen who arrived. His call, also, upon the dif
ferent districts for recruits was almost unheeded. 43
While in this strait he received some partial relief
by the arrival of the conde de Santiago de la Laguna
with 200 mounted men and some arms. 49 These the
count placed at the disposal of Rendon, and offered
to use all his influence to maintain order among the
O
populace. On the 6th of October the intendente re
ceived a despatch from Calleja informing him of the
capture of Guanajuato by the insurgents, and of the
immediate danger which threatened Zacatecas, proba
bly the next place to be attacked. Rendon convoked
a general junta, at which it was declared that the city
was not defensible, surrounded as it was by command
ing hills.
That same afternoon the Europeans, the members
of the municipality, and the employes in the different
government offices fled; and on the following morning
the governor of Colotlan verbally informed the inten
dente that his troops had intimated to him that they
had only followed him because he was a Creole, but
that they would take no action in the cause of the
Europeans. Rendon allowed the governor to depart,
but himself remained. The same day the populace
rose in revolt, and only by the exertions of Laguna
were they prevented from sacking stores and murder
ing objectionable residents. So violent were their
demonstrations, that the cura implored Rendon to save
48 ' Las demas cabeceras de partido,' he says in his report to the viceroy of
the 27th of Jan. 1811, 'no me remitieron tin solo liombre, y hasta el G de
octubre solo me llegaron 21 de a caballo, a quienes armd con otros (sic) taut
as lanzas.' Expowc. Rendon, Buttamante, Campailas de Calleja, 46.
49 The conde Santiago de la Laguna was the most opulent hacendado of
the province, arid much respected by the lower orders, over whom 'he had
great control. After the death of Hidalgo, Laguna, who had been accused
of treason, owing to his action during the events about to be related, was
allowed the benefit of the indulto. Zamacois, Hist. Mej. , vii. 10, 253.
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 14
210 PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
himself. Laguna offered to escort him beyond reach
of danger, and on the morning of the 8th the inten-
dente and his family left Zacatecas for Guadalajara.
On the following morning Laguna returned to Zacate
cas, having been appointed, by a popularly elected
ayuntamiento, intendente ad interim of the province,
which office he deemed it his duty to accept in the hope
of preventing excesses. He left an escort of twenty
men for Rendon, who continued his journey. On the
29th, although reenforced by a troop of twenty-five
lancers and four dragoons sent to his assistance by
Abarca, Rendon and his family were captured by a
body of insurgents, who after appropriating their
clothes, conducted them to Guadalajara, where they
arrived after thirty-three days, and were delivered to
Hidalgo, who in the mean time had reached that city. 50
The revolt in Zacatecas was spontaneous, and not
allied with the insurrection in other provinces. The
latter were directed by the leaders either in person or
by agents, to whom Hidalgo extended commissions of
various grades. No such commissioner, however, had
appeared in Zacatecas, and the outbreak was due to
the excitement produced by news of the grito de
Dolores. The people, after the first agitation, were
moderate and tractable, and the conde Santiago de
Laguna succeeded in suppressing pillage. About the
middle of October, Rafael Iriarte, 51 styling himself
lieutenant-general, appeared at Aguascalientes at the
50 Rendon escaped the massacre of Europeans at Guadalajara in December
following; and when Calleja entered that city after the battle of Calderon,
he appointed him intendente del eje"rcito del centro. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii.
138.
51 Of Iriarte's antecedents but little is known. According to Mora, he had
previously at different times been known by the names of Martinez and
Laiton. Mej. y sus Rev. iv. 96. Zerecero and Liceaga state that in San
Luis he went by the name of Cabo Leyton, and had been a scrivener in the
secretary's office of the comandancia. Mem. Rev. Mex., 385; Adic. y Rectific.,
151. His first commission as an insurgent officer, from evidence given later
by Pedro de Aranda at his own trial, was to arrest and appropriate the prop
erty of the Europeans in the villa of Leon, situated between Guanajuato and
Aguascalientes. In the execution of this commission he acted with great
cruelty, 'prendia d los europeos de aquella villa, devoraba sus bienes y de-
jaba dperecer sus familias.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. app. 60.
JOSS MARI'A COS. 211
head of a large body of insurgents, and having been
joined by the dragoons stationed there, proceeded to
take possession of Zacatecas, which he occupied with
out opposition.
It was while Iriarte was at Aguascalientes that
Laguna took action which brought his loyalty under
suspicion. He convoked a junta for discussing the
propriety of communicating with Iriarte. At that
session it was decided to send Jose Maria Cos, cura of
San Cosme, to inquire of the insurgent leader whether
the war then waging was without prejudice to re
ligion, king, and country; and whether any ex
ceptions would be made in case they succeeded in
expelling the Europeans ; and if so, what. These ques
tions were asked with a view to uniting the provinces
under an alliance in peace or war. Laguna, in a letter
dated the 26th of October, reported this to Manuel
Acebedo, intendente of Durango, who forwarded it
to Calleja. The mere fact that Laguna entertained
doubts was enough for Calleja, and he cautioned
Acebedo in his reply to avoid all expressions show
ing want of confidence which might drive Laguna to
espouse the insurgent cause. 52 Cos, who will appear
prominently later, was received by Iriarte with marked
demonstration, but greatly against his will was com
pelled to carry the insurgent standard on his entrance
into the town. The explanation given by Iriarte of
the object and plan of the revolution was equally un
satisfactory to Cos, and deeming himself compromised
by the part he had been obliged to play, instead of re
turning to Zacatecas, he proceeded to San Luis and
informed Calleja, who listened to his statement, and
advised him to present himself before the viceroy.
While on his way to the capital, Cos was arrested at
Queretaro by the commander Rebollo and imprisoned
in the convent of San Francisco.
52 Bnstamante supplies copies of the correspondence on this matter in
Companas de Calleja, 51-7.
212 PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.
Although Calleja took every possible precaution
before his departure from San Luis Potosi to insure
the preservation of that province, his efforts were un
availing. When Hidalgo at the opening of his career
passed through Celaya, he was joined by Luis de Her-
rera, a lay friar of the order of San Juan de Dios of
the province of Mexico. For some time this man
followed the army in the capacity of chief surgeon;
but being compelled to go to San Luis on private
business, he was arrested as a suspicious person, and
imprisoned in the jail, it not being known that he was
a friar. Heavily fettered and with no prospect of re
lease, he disclosed himself in order to escape from du
rance, and was removed to the Carmelite convent, in
which Calleja had imprisoned suspected persons. Ere
long Herrera prevailed on the comandante, Cortina,
to allow him to retire to the convent of his order in
San Luis, the prior and other conventuals becoming
his sureties. Having thus secured comparative free
dom, he conceived, in conjunction with Juan Villarias,
a lay brother of the same convent, the daring scheme
of getting possession of the city during a single night.
With this intent they instigated Joaquin Sevilla y
Olmedo, an officer of the San Carlos lancers, to place
at their disposal a few troops, and some arms which
he had in his house. Sevilla entered into their de
signs, and on the night of the 10th of November,
meeting a patrol of his own corps and another of the
cavalry, he called on them to assist him in the execu
tion of an order of the commander. With this small
force he proceeded to the convent of San Juan de
Dios, where he was joined by the two friars. The
revolutionists then went to the Carmelite convent,
and ringing the night-bell, 53 requested that a priest
might be sent with them to confess a prominent citi
zen who was dying. The door-keeper opened the gate,
53 In every convent was a door-bell called the campana de miserieordia,
which was rung by those who, during the night, sought the assistance of con
fessors for persons dangerously ill.
i;
IN SAN LUIS POTOSI. 213
and the insurgents rushing in seized and disarmed the
guard. They then released the prisoners, many of
whom daily expected death, and supplying them
with the weapons thus obtained, proceeded with the
utmost caution to the city jail, having first secured
the Carmelite friars, all of whom were Spaniards.
With equal success they surprised the guard at the
jail, and their numbers being now greatly increased
y the prisoners whom they liberated, they directed
their course to the artillery barracks. Here they met
their first mishap. Opposite the barracks stood the
house of the comandante, Cortina; and the guard,
more vigilant than those hitherto encountered, fired
on them, killing four. Undeterred, they rushed for
ward and quickly made themselves masters of the
barracks. Ten cannon were immediately brought out
and planted at the entrances of the plaza, one being
trained upon Cortina's house.
The desperate design of Herrera was now all but
accomplished. The remaining barracks of the city
were soon in the power of the insurgents, and Cor
tina alone continued to offer resistance. Beinof
o
wounded at last in the jaw, he was made prisoner by
his own guard, who had hitherto kept up a vigorous
fire, killing sixteen of the assailants and wounding
many more. After the insurgents had thus gained
possession of the comandante's house, it was delivered
over to pillage; likewise his store and storerooms; 54
but this appears to have been the only excess com
mitted. By seven o'clock in the morning the affair
was over. The usual arrest of Europeans to the
number of forty followed their triumph, but order
and tranquillity were maintained. 53 Miguel Flores,
one of the principal citizens of San Luis, was ap-
54 Cortina was one of the principal merchants in San Luis.
55 The only violence occurred on the night of the 12th, when a patrol
guard was fired on from the house of a European named Ger6nimo Berdiez.
This so incensed the officer in command that he forcibly entered the house
and mortally wounded Berdiez with his sword. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i.
97.
214 PROGRESS OF TBE REVOLUTION.
pointed political chief and intendente, and the absence
of popular commotion is sufficient evidence of the
prudence which guided the revolutionists.
But the spirit of discord was at hand. Iriarte,
who was at this time in possession of Zacatecas, and
had been apprised of the successful coup d'armes at
San Luis, despatched a courier to Herrera, proposing
to recruit his forces at San Luis on his march to
Guanajuato to join Allende. No objection to the
reception of a brother-in-arms could be made, and
Iriarte, with a disorderly rabble of several thousand
Indians, armed, as usual, with clubs, slings, and bows
and arrows, entered Sari Luis. The arrival was
hailed with demonstrations of joy. The bells were
rung and cannon fired. Festivities and balls for
three days celebrated the meeting between these
champions of the cause of independence.
In return for all this kindness, Iriarte deemed it
his duty to give an entertainment, and do honor to
those w T ho had done honor to him. So he invited
Herrera, Villarias, and Se villa to a great ball, and
when the merriment was at its highest a troop of
soldiers rushed in and arrested them. Villarias man
aged to escape, and with fifty men fled to Guanajuato
to inform Allende of the treachery. Herrera and
Sevilla were thrown into prison; the barracks were
taken by surprise; the artillery was seized, and
Iriarte was master of the town. At dawn the cry
was raised, "Death to the San Luis traitors!" Sack
and pillage were proclaimed. The public treasury was
ransacked, and the houses and stores of private per
sons were broken open and emptied.
One more turn of the wheel comes with the celebra
tion of the occasion by a banquet to which Iriarte in
vites his captives. At first he gave them to understand
that they were to die ; even now they were going to ex
ecution. After thus amusing himself for a while, he
embraced the victims of his sport, and seating them at
the table, informed them that their imprisonment had
IRIARTE'S FACETIOUSNESS. 215
been effected only for the purpose of insuring their
safety, as they would have proved an impediment to
his intention of sacking the city. He then appointed
Herrera field-marshal, and raised Sevilla to the rank of
colonel. During his occupation of San Luis the wife
of Calleja fell into his power, and Iriarte, the treach
ery of whose future action makes it reasonable to sup
pose that he entertained no serious intention of aiding
Allende, after loitering till it was too late to do so,
returned to Zacatecas. 66
56 The above account of the revolution in San Luis Potosi is derived from
Bustamante,. Cuad. Hint., i. 95-9. That author's information was supplied to
him by a report of the affair obtained in the city. Alaman states that he was
careful to verify the facts. Hist. Mej., ii. 23.
CHAPTER IX.
THE ROYALISTS RECAPTURE GUANAJUATO.
1810.
ALLENDE RETURNS TO GUANAJUATO PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE THE
FIRST ATTACK CALLEJA'S PLAN HE TAKES ALLENDE'S BATTERIES
CALLEJA, THE AVENGER His PROCLAMATION AN EXECUTION SCENE IN
THE ALH6NDIGA A GENERAL PARDON EXTENDED TlIE GOVERNMENT
REORGANIZED CALLEJA MARCHES FOR GUADALAJARA HIDALGO AT
VALLADOLID AND AT THE CERRO DEL MOLCAJETE HIDALGO'S RE
CEPTION AT GUADALAJARA ESTABLISHES A GOVERNMENT RAYON'S..
BIOGRAPHY LETONA'S MISSION AND DEATH THE * DISPERTADOR AME
RICANO ' AND PRINTING-PRESS PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
WHEN Allende arrived at Celaya he found there a
body of two thousand insurgent horsemen under Tori-
bio Huidrobo, and about thirty dragoons of the regi
ment of la Reina. These troops were almost desti
tute of arms; but the importance of defending
Guanajuato was so great that, uniting them with his
other forces, he hastened thither. He took with him
eight pieces of artillery; and as a number of cannon
had been cast in the mean time, he hoped, by erecting
batteries in commanding positions, to frustrate any
attempt upon the city by Calleja, who would doubt
less make its capture his first object. Allende, with
all the forces he could muster, entered Guanajuato on
the evening of the 13th of November, accompanied
by the principal leaders, who preferred to follow his
fortunes rather than cast their lot with Hidalgo, whose
popularity with them was diminishing daily. 1 His
1 Those who accompanied Allende were Juan and Ignacio Aldama, Ma
riano Jimenez, Joaquiii Arias, Mariano Abasolo, and Juan Ocon. Liceaga,
(216)
APPROACH OF CALLEJA. 217
arrival was celebrated by the intendente Gomez with
enthusiastic demonstrations. The bells were rungc and
O
guns fired ; but as in formal procession the authorities
and principal citizens entered the municipal hall to
receive the insurgent leader a ghastly spectacle pre
sented itself. Allende's horsemen dashed into the
plaza, and drawing up in front of the building, exposed
to view a hacked and blood-stained corpse lashed to
the back of a mule. An unfortunate Creole, named
Manuel Salas, a native of Dolores, had taken part
with Calleja when he passed through that town, and
having fallen into the hands of the insurgents had been
brought by them to Guanajuato and put to death at
the entrance of the city. Having given the mem
bers of the ayuntarniento ample time to reflect upon
the significance of this portentous exhibition, the
body was paraded through the streets as a warn
ing. 2 The ayuntamiento felt conscious that this ac
tion of Allende was intended to intimidate them, but
although, in conjunction with the other authorities,
its members sallied forth to meet him, they claim to
have preserved their dignity and allegiance by not
giving to their procession the character of an official
reception.
Allende then made his preparations to engage
Calleja. According to despatches written by him
to Hidalgo on the 19th and 20th of November, I
gather that when those leaders separated they made
an agreement that they should support each other
against Calleja. It was now no longer doubtful that
the latter would march against Guanajuato, and
Allende strongly urged Hidalgo to come to his aid
as soon as possible. He, moreover, sent instructions
to Iriarte, who was now at San Luis Potosi, to join
him at once. The forces at Allende's disposal were
in all respects inadequate to cope with the royalists,
Adic. y Rectific., 149. Negrete, however, doubts that there existed at this
time any ill feeling between Hidalgo and Allende. Alex. Slglo XIX., ii. 313.
2 Guan.Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 43-4.
218
THE ROYALISTS RECAPTURE GUANAJUATO.
and deficient as they were in discipline and arms, he
could only hope to maintain his position by means of
his artillery if no assistance arrived. 3 But both Hi
dalgo and Iriarte neglected to come, and Allende's
; -
EredK^IHS^
PLAN or BATTLE-FIELD.
3 A. Positions occupied by the insurgents.
B. The royalist army before the attack.
March of column led by Calleja.
March of column led by Flon.
This plan is obtained from that formed b Calleja's staff according to his
orders, and published by Torrente, being reproduced by Bustamante in his
Cund. Hist., i. 100.
ALLENDE AND HIDALGO. 219
letters to the former show bitterness. His last com
munication even charges Hidalgo with the intention
of collecting money at Guadalajara and escaping with
it by way of San Bias. But Hidalgo, informed of
the successes in Nueva Galicia, had determined to
go to Guadalajara, and had left Valladolid before
Allende had written him.
Meanwhile batteries were placed by Allende on no
less than ten different heights commanding the Marfil
road, besides two outlying points which occupied hills
on its left at a place known by the name of Rancho
Seco. In the narrowest part of the road, with infinite
labor, fifteen hundred holes were drilled for blasts.
These were connected by a single fuse, the intention
being to fire it as Calleja's troops passed. The de
sign, however, became known to the royalist leader
and proved ineffectual.
Calleja, whose movements were never marked by
rapidity, left Queretaro on the 15th of November, and
passing through Celaya, Salamanca, and Irapuato, re
established obedience in those towns, and reorganized
their governments. On the 23d he arrived at the
rancho de Molineros, distant four leagues from Guana
juato, and on the following morning advanced to the
entrance of the Canada de Marfil, intending to recon
noitre; but being interrupted by the batteries at
Rancho Seco, he decided to attack at once. Accord
ingly he threw out on his left a strong body of cavalry
and infantry under General Empdran, with the two
fold object of occupying the Silao road and executing
a flank attack, while Captain Linares charged the
positions from the front. The assault was successful.
Ill served and badly directed, the artillery of the in
surgents did no execution; indeed, so miserably had
the cannon been mounted that they could only be fired
in the one direction pointed; and the royalists, charg
ing up the slope at places out of the line of fire, quickly
routed the insurgents, capturing four pieces of artillery
and a number of prisoners. The facility with which
220 THE EOYALISTS RECAPTURE GUANAJUATO.
this success had been accomplished induced Calleja
to follow up his advantage the same day, it being as
yet only eleven o'clock.
His plan was to assault in detail the ten positions
occupied by the enemy on each side of the Marfil
road, upon which they had trained their artillery. For
this purpose he divided his army into two columns,
one of which was placed under the command of Flon,
who was instructed to dislodge the insurgents from
the heights on the right of the road; while the other
was led by Calleja in person against the batteries on
the left. Both generals were successful, and one after
the other the enemy's positions were taken with little
loss to the assailants. Flon, though severely bruised
in the left shoulder by a slung stone, gained the heights
on the right, and finally drew up his forces on the
hill of San Miguel and the height of las Carreras,
both of which positions commanded the city. Mean
while Calleja, advancing up the Marfil road some
little distance, turned off to the left by that leading
to the real de minas of Santa Ana, thus avoiding; the
defile where the blasts had been prepared.* While
his infantry dislodged the enemy from their positions
the cavalry scoured the glens and more level ground,
cutting off the retreat of the insurgents, slaughtering
them without mercy, and driving them in their panic
over the precipices. 5 This series of assaults lasted for
more than six hours; the difficulties encountered by
the loyalists being from the steepness of the heights,
rather than from opposition of the enemy, whose
4 Bustamante states that information of this plan of the insurgents was
given by a regidor of Guanajuato 'que merecia el mejor concepto entre sus
conciudadanos, ' and that his correspondence with Venegas was intercepted
by Villagran, but too late to be of any benefit to Allende. Cuad. Hist., i. 100.
Alaman reasonably assumes that the regidor intimated at was Fernando Perez
Maranon; but throws considerable doubt upon the statement of Bustamante,
remarking that, 'Sus noticias cuando no espresa de qu6 origen las toma mere-
cen muy poca confianza. ' Hist. Mej. , ii. 47. Negrete considers it improbable
that Maranon gave the information. Mex. Siglo XIX., ii. 320.
5 ' La caballeria . . . cortaba a los enemigos en las canadas y los persequia en
su huida pereciendo muchos a sus manos, quedando el campo lleno de cadd-
veres, y otros precipitados en las barrancas de este pielago de mon tafias.'
Calleja, in Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 1057.
RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. 221
want of arms rendered them incapable of making a
stand. Shortly after five o'clock, Calleja encamped
for the night on the hill of Yalenciana.
The result of the day's fighting was the capture of
twenty-two pieces of artillery, 6 the dispersion of a body
variously estimated at 10,000 to 70,000 Indians, 7 and
the investment of the city on the north and south.
Of the number of revolutionists slain it is impossible
to form any estimate with certainty. The ayuntami-
ento places it at 8,000, 8 but this is doubtless an exag
geration, and Alaman's estimate of 1,500 is probably
not wide of the mark. 9 The loss on the side of the
royalists was insignificant; according to Calleja's first
report to the viceroy it was limited to four killed and
seven wounded; 10 the casualties in the column led by
Flon raised the number of wounded to about a score,
a convincing proof of the want of forethought dis
played by the insurgent leaders in presuming that
Calleja would necessarily inarch up the Marfil road,
and in mounting their cannon so as to be immovably
directed.
Had Allende been supported by Hidalgo and
Iriarte, and had Calleja been assailed in the rear ac-
6 According to the detailed report of Calleja, dated December 12th. In a
previous report, written at 12 o'clock on the night of the 25th, he states that
25 pieces of artillery were taken. These cannon were made by order of Hi
dalgo during his campaign in the direction of Mexico; they were cast by the
engineer Rafael Davalos, who also assisted Casimiro Chovell, superintendent
of the Valenciana mines and works, in sinking the blasts on the Marfil road.
Alatoian, Hist. Mej., ii. 29.
7 Calleja states that the inhabitants of Guanajuato estimated their num
ber at 70,000. Gaz. de Hex. (1810), i. 1059. Alaman considers this a great
exaggeration, remarking that there could not have been even half the number,
' pues no concurri6 d la accion mas que la gente reunida en algunos puntos
comarcanos, y una parte de la plebe de la ciudad y de las minas. ' Hist. Mcj. ,
ii. 48. Liceaga conjectures that the insurgents did not number more than
10,000. Adic. y Rectific., 154.
*Guan. Pui). Vind. Ayunt., 54.
9 The bodies of a considerable number of the fallen were never recovered
from the barrancas, the shafts of old mines, and other inaccessible places.
The cura of Marfil, who was charged with the collection and burial of the re
mains, reports on the 10th of December that the total number interred was
246, but thinks he succeeded in collecting only a small proportion. Busta-
mante, Cuad. Hist, i. 108-9. Liceaga considers that scarcely 400 insurgents
fell. Adic. a Rectific., 154.
10 Oa&. de Max. (1810), i. 994.
222 THE ROYALISTS RECAPTURE GUANAJUATO.
cording to the plan proposed to Hidalgo, 11 it is not
improbable that the royalists would have been de
feated. As it was, Allende despaired of success
from the first, and with unusual apathy assigned the
direction of the batteries and troops to Jimenez, re
maining himself in the city. 12 When the news ar
rived of the capture of the outlying batteries at
Kancho Seco, he endeavored to arouse the inhab
itants by ordering sounded the general call to arms;
but this had the effect only to increase the consterna
tion. The more respectable families took refuge in
the churches and convents, or barricaded themselves
in their houses, while a large portion of the populace
betook themselves to the hills. Allende was helpless
to awaken resistance. As height after height was
stormed by the victorious royalists, and aware that
all was lost, accompanied by his brother officers and
a few horsemen, he fled from the city in the direc
tion of San Luis Potosi, taking with him what treas
ure he had remaining/
13
And now the Alhondiga de Granaditas is again
brought forward in the history of this unfortunate
city as the scene of another appalling massacre. No
longer restrained by the interference of military chiefs,
early in the afternoon the populace throng the streets
with demonstrations of mingled fear and anger. They
collect in dense crowds about the alhondiga, and with
1 'No puede ni debe V. ni nosotros pensar en otra cosa, que en esta preciosa
ciudad. . .y asi sin pe>dida de momentos ponerse en marcha. . .y atacarlo con
valor por la retaguardia, dandonos aviso oportuno de su situacion para hacer
nuestra salida, y que cerrado por todas partes, quede destruido y aniquilado,
y nosotros con un complete triunfo.' Allende, Garta, in Alaman, Hist. Alej.,
ii. 37-8.
12 According to Alaman; Id., ii. 49. Negrete, on the other hand, asserts
that Allende during the engagement passed from point to point as they were
attacked, with the greatest activity. Mex. Siglo XIX., ii. 321.
13 According to Liceaga he left about two o'clock in the afternoon. Adic.
y Rectijic., 153. Bustamante states that Allende remained in the city till the
following morning, directing the fire of a heavy piece of artillery placed on
the cerro del Cuarto. This is denied by both Liceaga, Ib., and Alaman,
Hist. Mej., ii. 49. Calleja states that he left with about 40 followers. Gaz.
de Mex. (1810), 994. Negrete says that he could not have had more than
2,COO. Mex. 8ifjlo XIX., ii. 405.
ANOTHER MASSACRE. 223
threatening gestures and inflamed eyes regard the
building in which the Spaniards left by Hidalgo are
imprisoned, and for whose blood they are athirst.
As yet, however, they are restrained by the presence
of the guard commanded by Captain Mariano Covar-
rubias. But as Allende and his party turn the corner
to take the road leading to the mines, 14 one of them
cries out, "Why do you not finish with them?" in
dicating the captives. The words act on the mob
like fire on saltpetre. 15 Under apprehension that
Calleja is already at hand, they think only of ven
geance, and with wild yells, and clubs and bran
dished knives, they rush toward the gateway. All
efforts to oppose them are useless. The soldier's
sword and the priest's entreaty alike fail. Mariano
Liceaga, after wounding several of them with his
sabre, is stretched senseless on the ground; the cura
Juan de Dios Gutierrez and other ecclesiastics are
thrust aside; the guard is overpowered; 16 and the
maddened crowd throw themselves upon their victims.
The work begins, and the alh6ndiga again becomes
hideous with mutilated corpses, stripped of every
shred of clothing. A few of the captives barricade
themselves in some of the storerooms, and manage to
escape during the temporary dispersion of their assail-
u See plan of the alh6ndiga and surroundings in previous chapter.
15 Alaman is the authority for the statement that the crowd received this
encouragement. He refers to the evidence in the trial of Covarrubias, whose
cousin, Benign o Bustamante, supplied him with the above particulars. Allen
de, Aldama, and Chico, however, in the declarations taken at their trials,
imputed the massacre exclusively to the voluntary action of the populace,
which tends to prove that they were unaware of the fury incited by their
comrade, who was probably riding in their rear. Hist. Mej., ii. 50. Busta-
maiite, Cuad. Hist.,L 100-1, followed by Liceaga, records that a negro named
Lino, a native of Dolores, incited the people to commit the deed by represent
ing to them that Calleja had gained the victory, and was advancing upon the
town with the intention of putting them all to death. Abad y Queipo states
that Allende gave the order for the massacre which is contrary to Allende's
persistent efforts to suppress outrages accusing him also of never placing
himself within reach of a bullet. He forgets his own cowardly flight and de
sertion of his flock. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 839. Compare Anso-
rena, Dcfensa, 17.
16 Liceaga states that a portion of the guard took part with the assailants.
Utsup., 155.
224 THE ROYALISTS HECAPTUBE GUANAJUATO.
ants from a cry raised that the royalists are upon
them. 17
While Calleja halted at Valenciana he confirmed
the magistrate of that town in his office, although he
had received his appointment from Hidalgo. He also
supplied him with copies of the proclamation extend
ing pardon to those who returned to their allegiance,
and of the edict of the inquisition issued against Hi
dalgo, instructing him to publish them. Chovell and
other residents, fearing for their lives, were meditating
flight, but learning of these measures, they remained
in their houses. At daylight on the following morn
ing Calleja resumed his march against the city, but
before doing so he had received intelligence of the
massacre in the alh6ndiga, 18 and had caused the imme
diate arrest of Chovell and other persons living in
Valenciana. The insurgents had planted a heavy can
non on the cerro del Cuarto, 19 and during the even
ing of the 24th and early hours of the following day
had maintained a vigorous fire with Flon, who replied
from the hill of San Miguel. As Calleja advanced,
the insurgents' gun was trained on his line of march,
but the royalists, having placed two cannon in a
favorable position, succeeded in dismounting it at the
first discharge. This was the last effort at resistance;
and Calleja and Flon entered the city simultaneously.
17 Those who thus escaped took refuge in the convent of Belen and private
bouses. The number of those slain is not accurately known. There were
in the alh6ridiga at the time 247 captives, many of them being Creoles who
favored the royalist cause. Of these, Bustamante states that a few over 30
escaped. Cuad. Hist. , i. 101. According to the report supplied afterward by
Marafion to Calleja, only 138 recognized bodies received burial, 'habiendo
muchos quo habiendoseles visto entre los presos, no se supo despues de ellos ;
por la que se supuso estar entre los muchos eadaveres que se sepultaron sin ser
conocidos.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. app. 6-7. A list of the principal victims,
as \vell as of those who escaped, is given in Liceaga, Adic. y Itectific., 156-7.
Pedraza states that more than 200 were slain. Cdeb. N. Indep., 1.
18 Captain Linares on the previous evening, fearing that some such catas
trophe might occur, had urged Calleja to march at once upon the city; Linares
made this statement frequently to Alaman, Hist. Mcj., ii. 53, believing that
the lives of the captives might have been saved. But the massacre was per
petrated in the afternoon of the 24th, and Calleja did not arrive at Valen
ciana until after five o'clock.
la This battery is said to have been directed by a man from the U. S.,
' estaba servido por un uorte americano. ' Liceaga, Adic. y Itectific. , 161-2.
CALLEJA'S RETALIATION. 225
So enraged was Calleja at the barbarous murder of
the Spaniards that he issued orders to his troops to
put the city to fire and sword, and numbers of the
inhabitants were slaughtered in the streets. He
soon, however, countermanded the order, 20 recogniz
ing that many innocent persons would be put to
death. 21 He did not, however, intend that vengeance
for the dead should terminate with this first ebulli
tion of wrath; he would proceed with the punishment
in a more deliberate and formal manner. During the
day he made proclamation, 22 setting forth that al
though, influenced by humanity, he had suspended his
order of extermination, such an atrocious crime could
not be left without expiation, and he demanded all
arms to be delivered up on the following day, under
pain of death. Other items of the proclamation were
to the effect that all persons were expected to give
information of secreted weapons, and of those known
to have favored the insurgent cause; persons congre
gating in the streets in greater number than three
would be dispersed by shot, and those who engaged
in seditious speech would be punished with death
without respect of person.
But while this proclamation might leave the inhab
itants to suppose themselves exempt from further pun
ishment, Calleja was planning merciless retaliation.
There should now be a srand massacre on the royalist
O /
side, wide-extended and direful, such as would do
honor to the cause. On the morning of the 26th the
carpenters of Guanajuato were employed in erecting
gallows in all the principal thoroughfares of the city,
and in the plazas of the neighboring mining towns. 23
20 'Me obligaron h mandar a las tropas que entrasen a sangre y fuego en la
ciudad, y en efocto muchos fueron acuchillados en las primeras calles; pero
movido de sentimientos de hurnanidad. . .y que no pereciese una multitucl de
personas honradaa que en confusion salieron a favorecerse del exdrcito, mande*
suspenderlo.' Callc ja, in Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 994.
' n Among others, Agustin Calderon, an uncle of Alaman's, and by no
means a partisan of the revolutionists, was killed in the calle de los Pozitos.
Ataman, Hist. Mej., ii. 54.
22 A copy of it is found in Gaz. de, Mex. (1810), i. 997-8.
23 'Horcas que hizo poner (a mas do la que esta en la plaza mayor) en frente
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 15
226 THE ROYALISTS RECAPTURE GUANAJUATO.
While this was being done, from those arrested
the previous day between sixty and seventy were
drawn for examination. 24 These were sent to Flon,
who had occupied the alh6ndiga, and who was in
structed to pass sentence upon them. Twenty-three
were sentenced to death, among whom were the in-
tendente Gomez, the unfortunate Rafael Ddvalos,
under whose directions the insurgents' cannon had
been constructed, 25 and three military officers who had
espoused the revolutionary cause. The examinations
were of the briefest, and the executions immediate,
the place being within the walls of the alhondiga.
The description of the scene as given by Manuel Go
mez Pedraza, an eye-witness, is harrowing. After the
sentence of death had been passed by the conde de la
Cadena, the condemned were hurriedly shrived by a
priest in one of the storerooms, then led to the door
way which had been bricked up by Riana, and there
blindfolded and shot. As victim after victim fell,
their dead bodies being dragged aside to make room
for their companions, the pavement became covered
with fragments of skulls, scattered brains, entrails,
and blood. By this human debris, progress was im
peded, and before the horrible work was done the floor
had to be cleared of its slippery and loathsome cov
ering. 20 The gallows came into play next.
de Granaditas, en la plazuela de S. Fernando, en la de la Compauia, en la de S.
Diego, en la de S. Juan, en la de Mcxiamora, y una en cada plaza de las minaa
principales. ' The plazas in Guanajuato were little more than streets, some
what wider than the ordinary tortuous thoroughfares. Buslarnante, Cuad.
Hist., i. 104.
21 Manuel Gomez Pedraza, who was captain of a company, states that Ca-
lleja placed under his charge, with instructions to deliver them to Flon, GO or
more prisoners, 'no hago memoria del niimero.' Celeb. N. Jndepend., 1.
25 The temerity of Gomez and others implicated in the revolution in not
effecting their escape is inexplicable. Davaloa carried his rashness to such
an extent as to walk in the street among the troops. He was arrested, and
would have escaped but that, after having had the good fortune to obtain
his release, a paper was discovered secreted in the sleeve of his coat, by the
soldier who was untying the cord with which his arms were bound. The doc
ument was taken to a commanding officer, and proved to be an account of
the cannon cast by Davalos. This discovery decided his fate. Alaman, Hist.
Mej., ii. 56.
26 'Para ejecutar esta operacion, se trajeron de la calle algunos hombres, y
con sus mismas manoa echaron la sangre y las eatranas despedazadas de los fusi-
FURTHER EXECUTIONS. 227
But in the economy of revenge, it will not do to
ignore the benefits of spectacular exhibitions. So
at nightfall following, eighteen prominent men are
dragged out and hanged by torchlight in the plaza.
It seems as if the curse of Sodom has fallen on the
place. Round this plaza, like an amphitheatre, the
houses stand tier above tier on the surrounding hills,
so that the people can sit in them and look down
upon the tragedy as at a play. Are these cattle or
swine, that are being butchered for the market? Or
has the old Aztec rite been revived among these chris-
tians? No, it is no mediaeval or barbaric slaughter,
but a nineteenth-century sacrifice of human beings
on the altar of liberty! The air is thick with tyranny
and blood. The stillness of an unpeopled world per
vades the scene, there being heard only the low- voiced
exhortation of the priest, or the cry of some faint
hearted wretch for mercy. 27 On the 28th eight
more persons, among whom was the hapless Chovell,
met the same fate in the plazuela in front of the al-
hondiga, and on the following day four more were
doomed to die. But tbe gloorn of despair which had
settled upon the city, the. spiritless state of abjection
to which the population had been reduced, and the
meek surrender of every article of use that might
serve as a weapon pacified at^ last the avenger; and
in the afternoon the ringing of the bells announced
that Calleja had proclaimed a general pardon. Too
late, however, was the mercy extended for two of the
four last condemned, who had suffered but a few min
utes before; the remaining two, in the very act of
taking as they supposed their last look at earth and
sky, with the halters round their necks, were allowed
the benefit of the pardon, and released.
These executions have been regarded by writers of
lados en grandes bateas, hasta desembarazar el lugar de aquellos estorbos para
seguir la horrible matanza. ' Celeb. N. Independ., 3.
27 Alaman says: 'Muchos afios han trascurrido desde ent6nces, y nunca se
ha podido debilitar en mi espiritu la profunda impresion que en <1 hizo aque-
lla iioche de horror.' Hist. Mej., ii. 59.
228 THE ROYALISTS RECAPTURE GUANAJUATO.
the independent party as acts of unmitigated bar
barity, but I see little to choose between them and
the doings of the revolutionists. If we condemn the
massacres of one, we must those of the other. Even
though Hidalgo fights for liberty and Calleja for tyr
anny, if we are disposed to overlook the barbarity of
the former in letting loose his Indians on the Spaniards,
we must not expect otherwise in regard to the lattei
than that he will retaliate as opportunity offers. Men
are so made. It is idle to argue the point on which
side of this war the greatest cruelty was displayed.
So far there is riot difference enough apparent to talk
about; both sides were about as blood-thirsty as they
could be.
The extension of the pardon was hailed by the peo
ple with demonstrations of joy. Crawling forth from
their houses and hiding-places, they crowded into the
plaza in front of the royal buildings in which Calleja
had made his abode. 23 The royalist leader addressed
them from the balcony, enlarging upon the great clem
ency which had been extended to them ; the subjugated
populace meanwhile sending forth loud acclamations
of allegiance to the king and obedience to his general.
In reorganizing the government of the province, Ca
lleja appointed Fernando Perez Marafion intendente
ad interim; 29 he reinstated Miguel Arizmende in his
office of alcalde, from which he had been deposed by
Hidalgo, and caused a new election for another to be
held. All other offices which had become vacant were
provisionally filled by Calleja's nominees. This clone,
Calleja decided to march against Guadalajara, and
w fuan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 56-7.
29 The appointment of Marafion, approved by the viceroy, Gaz. de Mex,,
1810, i. 1001, and the high terms in which Calleja speaks of him, led some to
think that he was in communication with Venegas. Alaman does not see suffi
cient reason for such conclusion. Calleja thus recommends Marafion to the
viceroy: 'A sus notorias circunstancias de honrade'z, fidelidad y patriotismo,
agrega la de obtener la aceptacion y confianza de este insolente y atrevido
pueblo. ' These expressions seem to indicate that Maraiion gave information
to Calleja of the insurgents' operations, as stated by Bustamante. Consult note
4 of this chapter.
CALLEJA'S MANIFESTO. 229
left Guanajuato with all his forces on the 9th of De
cember, having previously despatched a convoy to
Mexico with the king's silver and that of private per
sons, amounting in all to six hundred bars. He also
sent the machinery and dies of Hidalgo's mint, and,
as a trophy of his victory, the heavy piece of artillery
taken on the cerro del Cuarto, which the insurgents
had vainly named El defensor de la America. With
this convoy went most of the principal families of
Guanajuato, deeming their future residence in that
city unsafe, from the fact that no garrison or other
protection was left in the place, except a company of
armed citizens. This abandonment of Guanajuato by
the more wealthy inhabitants completed its ruin. The
mortality occasioned by war and typhus fever, which
raged in the city during this period, the departure of
great numbers of the populace with the insurgent
leaders and the flight of others, caused within a few
months a depopulation amounting to over 25,000.
The mining and agricultural industries were for years
next to nothing, and stillness and stagnation reigned
in the once busy and thriving city. 30
At Silao, a town five leagues from Guanajuato,
Calleja halted his army for several days. While at
this place, on the 12th of December, with the object
of preventing further atrocities, he published a singu
lar edict. After exhorting all to unite with the author
ities, clergy, and honest citizens in preserving the peace,
he declared that in every town in which soldiers, ser
vants of the government, municipal and other author
ities, or honest citizens, whether Creole or European,
should be assassinated, four of the inhabitants, with
out distinction of person, should be selected by lot
for each man murdered, and without further formal
ity be put to death. 31 It was but an idle threat, how
ever, no attempt being made to carry it out. From
30 Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 177-
81 Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 10C3.
230 THE ROYALISTS RECAPTURE GUANAJUATO.
Silao, Calleja advanced to Leon, and proceeded by
way of Lagos toward Guadalajara.
Except that Hidalgo was at Celaya on the 13th of
November, nothing is known of his movements after
the flight from Aculco until we find him at Valladolid,
where he arrived on the 14th or 15th of the same
month. 32 On the 14th he received intelligence of the
late successes of Torres. The importance of this
news, and the disagreements which had arisen between
Torres and the other insurgent leaders, relative to
priority of command, were undoubtedly the reasons
which induced Hidalgo to abandon the arrangements
made with Allende. During the few days that he
remained in Valladolid, he published his reply to the
citation of the inquisition already mentioned, and
issued a proclamation exhorting sons of the soil to
desert the European cause and take part with the
independents. 33 On the 17th he left Valladolid for
Guadalajara. But before his departure he issued or
ders which show how far the gentle priest was car
ried away by the spirit of his purpose. The royalists
had glutted their vengeance; it was now his turn.
At dead of night on the 13th of November, forty of
the European prisoners, who were told that they were
to be sent to Guanajuato, were marched to the bar
ranca de las Bateas, three leagues from Valladolid, 34 and
after being butchered, their stripped bodies were cast
into the depths, and left as food for beasts and birds
of prey. On the 18th another band of victims was
under similar circumstances conducted to the cerro
del Molcajete, and there met with the same fate. 35
, Mex. Siqlo XIX., ii. 396.
33 'Si querns ser felices, desertad de las tropas de los europeos, y venid d
uniros con nosotros; dejad que se defiendan solos los ultramarinos y vereis
esto acabado en un dia.' Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., ii. 259.
34 This barranca was in the gaping crater of an extinct volcano. It was
also called 'cerro pelon,' because destitute of trees. In that country hills
reft with the cavity of an extinct volcanic crater were called cerro de la Batea,
or cerro del Molcajete. Alaman, Hist. Mrj., ii. 40.
35 According to Alaman, 44 Europeans were massacred on this occasion.
Among the first victims was the asesor and acting intendente Jose" Alonzo
TRIUMPHAL MARCH^OF HIDALGO. 231
Notwithstanding late reverses, Hidalgo was en
thusiastically received wherever he went. The hope
of liberty, once having been harbored in the breasts
of the people, could never be relinquished. The
march to Guadalajara was triumphal; and at every
town the .people sallied forth to welcome the apostle
of independence and do him honor. At Zamora,
solemn mass was held, thanksgivings were offered, and
contributions poured into his coffer. During the few
days he remained in Valladolid he displayed a won
derful energy. Besides the writing he had to do, and
the political matters to regulate, he organized a force
of 7,000 cavalry and 250 infantry, with several pieces
of artillery. With these troops he approached the
capital of Nueva Galicia. On the 24th of November
he arrived at the hacienda of Atequiza, a few leagues
from the city. Here all the authorities, municipal
corporations, and distinguished citizens had made
preparations to meet him. These, in twenty-two
carriages, arrived at the hacienda, and a duly ap
pointed commission offered him congratulations, placed
all Nueva Galicia at his disposal, and invited him to
Gutierrez de Teran, who displayed great fortitude. Id., 41. Hidalgo states
that the total number was about 60. Hern, y Ddvalos, CoL Doc., i. 14. The
two men under whose command the orders were executed were Manuel Muuiz,
captain of the provincial infantry regiment of Valladolid, and Padre Luciano
Navarrete, who acquired an infamous notoriety for his cruelty. Id., i. 839.
It was an ecclesiastic also who made out the death lists, and thereby obtained
the name of Padre Chocolate, because he said the victims were going to take
chocolate that night. The intendente Ansorena, it is asserted by Alaman,
who gained his information from Mucio Valdovinos, conducted the arrange
ment for the departure and execution of the two bodies of Spaniards. See
Doc. i., in Hist. M<y., ii. ap. Alaman's statements were replied to by the son
of Ansorena, the licentiate Jos< Ignacio de Ansorena. In this pamphlet,
published in 1850, he defends his father's memory by maintaining that he was
ignorant of the purpose for which the prisoners were removed. He assails
Mucio Valdovinos with some acerbity, but his arguments amount to simple
personal statements without the production of any evidence. Ansorena,
Defensa. This met with a retort from Valdovinos, who produces some evi
dence, but hardly to more effect than that the popular opinion was that An
sorena was fully implicated. Valdovinos, Content., pp. 55. This provoked a
second pamphlet, written by Josd Mariano Ansorena; and with it the tedious
and inconclusive controversy ends. Ansorena, Respuesta. Negrete points out
the contradictions observable between Alaman's account and that of Valdo
vinos, and believes that the butcheries were committed on one day, or two con
secutive days, the 17th and 18th, and that Hidalgo was not in Valladolid at
the time. ilex. Slg. XIX., ii. 271.
232 THE ROYALISTS RECAPTURE GUANAJUATO.
the capital. Thence he proceeded to San Pedro
Analco, about a league from Guadalajara, and was
entertained with a sumptuous dinner. His entry into
the city was arranged to take place on the 26th, and
the joyful demonstrations and formal expressions of
honor on that occasion soothed his greatly harassed
mind and revived his hopes. Had he been a crowned
monarch, his reception could not have been more
brilliant. The streets, crowded with the inhabitants,
were adorned with hangings and devices of bright
colors; the troops of Torres were drawn up in two
long lines reaching to the gateway of the cathedral,
in the atrium of which was stationed the battalion of
provincial infantry to salute the chief with military
honors.
As the cortege entered the city and passed along
the dense lines of people on either side, from thou
sands of voices rang the welcoming Viva! mingled
with salvoes of artillery, the reports of soaring rock
ets, and the silvery sound of bells arid soft-toned
marimbas. 36 At the door of the cathedral an altar
had been placed, beside which stood Dean Escandon
in canonical robes to present Hidalgo with holy water.
This ceremony being performed, accompanied by many
of the chapter, the revolutionary leader proceeded to
the presbytery, where a solemn te deum was chanted.
Thence he went in state to the palace, and, in the
grand saloon, beneath a richly ornamented dorsel, re
ceived the authorities, civil corporations, and ecclesi
astical communities. 37
Hidalgo, thus installed, proceeded to decide exist
ing differences between the military leaders, and to
organize a formal government. The first having been
arranged, he appointed two ministers to take charge
3(5 For a description of this musical instrument, see my Native Races, i.
664. To defray the expenses of Hidalgo's reception, the ayuntamiento appro
priated 1,000 pesos of the fondo de Propios. This sum the regidores were
compelled by Calleja to refund. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 492-9.
37 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col, Doc., i. 123-4.
IGNACIO LOPEZ RAYON. 233
of public affairs, Jose Maria Chico, 33 with the title of
minister of grace and justice, and Ignacio Lopez
Rayon, with that of secretary general. 39
Ignacio Lopez Rayon, who became a prominent
revolutionary general at a later date, was born at the
mining town of Tlalpujahua, Michoacan, in the year
1773. At an early age he displayed a studious turn
of mind, and his parents, who were in moderate cir
cumstances, were enabled to cultivate his taste for
learning. His early education he received at the
college of Valladolid, where he concluded a course of
philosophy. He thence removed to the college of
San Ildefonso in Mexico city, where he studied juris
prudence and took his lawyer's degree. Having suc
cessfully practised his profession for some time in the
capital, the death of his father recalled him home; he
then devoted himself to mining operations. In August
1810 he betrothed Maria Ana Martinez de Rulfo, a
member of one of the principal families in that dis
trict. When Hidalgo entered the province in Octo
ber 1810, Rayon espoused the revolutionary cause,
and on the 24th issued a proclamation in Tlalpujahua,
inviting Americans to join the just and holy enter
prise. 40 After the first events at Guanajuato and
Valladolid, he proposed to Hidalgo a plan for the
avoidance of similar excesses. His purpose had be
fore this been reported to Yenegas, and a detach
ment of soldiers was sent to arrest him, but he escaped
as they came in sight. Hidalgo was at this time at
Maravatio, at no considerable distance from Tlalpu
jahua, and Rayon immediately repaired thither, openly
joined his standard, and was appointed his secretary -
in-chief. He accompanied Hidalgo to the monte de
38 He was also made president of the audiencia of Guadalajara. Chico
was a native of Guanajuato, his father, although a European, being a sup
porter of the revolution. Hidalgo made him his secretary, and was accompa
nied by him from Guanajuato all through the campaign. Alaman, Hist. Alej.,
ii. 81-2.
39 ' Secretario de estado y del despacho, lo que parece que le daba las facul-
tades de un ministro universal.' Ib.
Gaz. de Alex., 1811, ii. 103.
234 THE EOYALISTS EECAPTUEE GUANAJUATO.
Las Graces, Aculco, and in the remainder of his move
ments to Guadalajara. 41
Hidalgo's object was to establish a national inde
pendent government; and besides the appointment of
ministers of state, he reorganized the audiencia by the
appointment of oidores, 42 and nominated Pascasio Le-
tona as envoy plenipotentiary to the United States,
with the object of making, if possible, a treaty of
alliance and commerce with that republic. 43 But
these efforts were doomed to failure. The unfor
tunate Letona, having proceeded on his journey as
far as Molango in la Huasteca, Vera Cruz, excited
suspicion by trying to change a gold ounce, and was
arrested. His baggage was examined, his credentials
as a revolutionary ambassador were discovered se
creted in his saddle, and the justice of the town sent
him with his papers to Mexico. Letona, well know
ing the fate awaiting him, took poison before arriv
ing at the capital, and was buried at Guadalupe. It
was indeed dangerous to serve Mexico at this juncture.
While Hidalgo remained in Guadalajara he issued
several edicts which he deemed essential to the cause.
He proclaimed the emancipation of slaves, the restora
tion of their lands to the Indians, 44 and prohibited
pillage and all excess on the part of his followers 45
all wise and humane measures, and proving that he
did not delight in robbery and murder, as his ene
mies have charged.
il Gallo y Horn. Ilust. Hex., in. 395-8; Biistamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 146-7.
42 The new audiencia was composed of Chico, president, and Jose" Ignacio
Ortiz de Salinas, Pedro Alcantara de Avendafio, Francisco Solorzano, and
Ignacio Mestas, oidores. Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 172.
43 A copy of Letona's credentials, dated Dec. 13, 1810, can be found in
Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 79-81, and in many other works. Pas
casio Ortiz de Letona was a native of Guatemala, and was a devoted student of
the natural sciences, especially of botany. He was residing in Guadalajara
as protege" of the royal official Salvador Batres, and was made a mariscal de
campo by Hidalgo. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 83.
44 Already mentioned in chap, v., this volume.
45 In this proclamation he points out that these robberies were carried on
without discrimination, the property of Americans, 'mis amados americanos,'
being frequently appropriated. Copy of document in Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.,
ii. 399; Mex. Ifefut. Art. de Fondo, 25-6.
THE PRINTING-PRESS. 235
The possession of Guadalajara supplied Hidalgo
with a powerful means of advancing the cause of the
revolution by extending more widely and generally
the principles upon which it was based, and by plac
ing within reach of the reading public his replies to
proclamations of the royalists, and his refutations of
attacks upon himself. For there was in this city
a printing-press. When the revolution broke out
there were but few printing-presses in all New Spain,
one at each of the cities of Mexico, Puebla, Guadala
jara, and Vera Cruz; 46 and all being under the control
of the government, the independents not only found
great difficulty in publishing accounts of their opera
tions, but were also unable to contradict false repre
sentations, issue appeals, or counteract the exhorta
tions to loyalty widely spread by Venegas. This
obstacle was now removed, and Hidalgo established a
periodical which he called the Despertador Americano,
and caused it widely to be circulated. 47 Replies to
numerous proclamations, pamphlets, and other papers
that had been issued by the opposite party were now
published, and among them Hidalgo's memorable one
to the citation of the inquisition which he had lately
penned in Yalladolid. 48
All the while his attention was closely given to mili
tary preparations. The arsenal at San Bias supplied
him with cannon and munitions of war, and he caused
no less than forty-four pieces of artillery to be trans
ported thence with incredible labor over a most diffi
cult road to Guadalajara. He ordered a large num
ber of men to be recruited; and to supply the want of
fire-arms, quantities of grenades and iron-pointed rock-
46 The one at Vera Cruz was worked but a short time. Bustamante, Cuad.
Hist., i., iii. preface.
47 A copy of the first number is given in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc.,
ii. 309-12. It was issued on the '20th of Dec. 1810.
48 Hidalgo states in his deposition taken at his trial that only two manifests
published in the Despertador Americano were written by him, the reply men
tioned in the text and another 'cuyo objeto es probar que el ^me'ricano debe
gobernarse por Americano, asi como el Aleman por Aleman, etc. Hernan
dez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 12.
236 THE ROYALISTS RECAPTURE GUANAJUATO.
ets were manufactured. Every preparation to meet
Calleja in the field was energetically made; but there
was still lacking the one great element of success, dis
cipline. While the father-patriot is here striving to
strengthen himself as best he is able with poor officers
and worse soldiers, let us glance at the progress of
the revolution in other parts.
CHAPTER X.
SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION AND BATTLE OF CALDERON.
1810-1811.
HERMOSILLO'S OPERATIONS IN SINALOA SUCCESSES AT ROSARIO His DEFEAT
AT SAN IGNACIO SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION IN NUEVO SANTANDER
COAHUILA AND NUEVO LEON REVOLT VlLLAG RAN 'S DOINGS BIOGRAPHY
OF CRUZ PLAN OF CALLEJA TUMULT IN VALLADOLID CRUZ ENTERS
VALLADOLID HE REORGANIZES THE GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT AT
UREPETIRO ALLENDE JOINS HIDALGO AT GUADALAJARA A COUNCIL OF
WAR HIDALGO TAKES UP A POSITION AT THE BRIDGE OF CALDERON
PLAN OF BATTLE-FIELD CALLEJA'S DISPOSITIONS FLON'S IMPETUOSITY
THE REVOLUTIONISTS NEARLY TRIUMPHANT THEIR FINAL DEFEAT
DEATH OF FLON His CHARACTER.
ON receiving intelligence of the occupation of Gua
najuato by Calleja, Venegas regarded the suppression
of the insurrection as almost accomplished, 1 when in
reality it was more widely spread than ever. We
have seen how completely the provinces of Nueva
Galicia, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosi were now in
the power of the independents ; and it was not likely
that they would relax their efforts at this juncture.
An expedition into the provinces of Sinaloa and Sonora
was planned by Gomez Portugal, and placed under
the command of Jose Maria Gonzalez Heraiosillo,
accompanied by the clominican father, Francisco de
la Parra, in the character of director and adviser. 2
1 In a letter to Calleja, dated Dec. 16, 1810, in reply to the brigadier's
request that a medal might be presented to his soldiers, the viceroy, speaking
of their toil, says: 'Contemplo proximo el fin y la coronacion do ellas, y en
los pocos dias que probablemente se terminarun, se arreglaran con aquella de-
tencion que hace apreciables los premios, los que deban concederse. ' Busta-
mante, Quad. Hist., i. 118.
2 Parra rendered the revolutionary cause great assistance. The charge of
the printing-press was intrusted to him by Hidalgo, and its expenses were
238 SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.
It set out with a force of about 2,500 men, and ar
rived at Tepic on the llth of December, where it was
still further augmented by volunteers.
On the 15th Hermosillo reached Acaponeta, the
border town, distant 115 leagues from Guadala
jara; and on the 18th engaged with Colonel Pedro
Villaescusa, who was in command of the troops at the
real del Rosario. The royalists were defeated, and
the town remained in possession of the independents. 3
Herrnosillo gave Villaescusa a letter of safe-conduct
to rejoin his family, exacting from him an oath not to
take up arms against the independents. Villaescusa,
taking advantage of this clemency, retired from the
town with more than seventy of his troops, and hav
ing recruited on his march all whom he could induce
to join the royalist cause, reached San Ignacio de Pi-
astla. He now sent information to the intendente of
Sinaloa, Alejo Garcia Conde, who resided at Arizpe,
and who hastened to his aid with a company of Ind
ians. 4 Meanwhile Hermosillo entered San Sebastian
on the 27th of December without opposition, having
been previously joined by the garrison of Mazatlan.
His army now numbered nearly 5,000 men, 5 and on
the 29th he took up a position on an eminence which
commanded the town of San Ignacio de Piastla, a
considerable river intervening. Misfortune here
temporarily defrayed by him. Hidalgo appointed him as leader of the expe
dition, with the rank of brigadier, Hermosillo being nominally the commander,
as Parra did not wish this appointment to be made public, it not being in
conformity with his position as a friar. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i.
379.
3 Padre Parra relates that the alcabalero, a European, had made a final
but unsuccessful stand with a piece of artillery and been slain, 'y para
suciar mas los indios su corage, al Europeo artillero le cortan los genitales,
quo pendientes de una cuerda los paseaban por toda la poblacion, lo que in-
fundio tan to terror a aquellos habitantes, y a los soldados realistas, que en
uii momento quedaron las calles limpias de toda gente enemiga.' Hernandez y
Ddvnlos, Col. Doc,., i. 380. Hidalgo promoted Hermosillo to the rank of
colonel for this victory, and promised him a brigadiership if he captured
Cosala. Id., 24-28.
4 ' Con refuerso de cuatrocientos indios Opatas de caballeria armados de
fusil, lanza, rodela y pistolas, y iin canon de a seis.' Id., 382.
5 ' Se contaron 4, 125 infantes, 470 caballos, OOOfusiles, algunas escopetas y
carabinas. 200 pares de pistolas y mucho numcro de lanzas. . ,sc condugcron
tambien los seis cauones que se le quitaron a Villaescusa.' Id. t 381.
REVOLUTIONARY SUCCESSES. 239
awaited the insurgent chief. On the 2d of January,
1811, Padre Parra, having discovered a ford, while
crossing it in company with five soldiers was taken,
prisoner. 6 On the 8th Hermosillo, after fording the
river, fell into the hands of 400 royalists secreted in
the brush on either side of his line of march. So
deadly was the fire opened upon him, that in less than
ten minutes more than 300 of the insurgents were
slain, and the rest fled panic-stricken. Hermosillo lost
all his cannon, baggage, and munitions of war, and
the expedition so successfully begun was thus sud
denly ended. 7
But in another direction success attended the revo
lution. In the eastern provinces it spread with ra
pidity. After San Luis Potosi had thrown off the
yoke, the neighboring district of Nuevo Santander
was awakened by the spirit of independence. The
governor, Lieutenant-colonel Manuel de Iturbe, 8
was compelled to retreat to Altarnira by the revolt of
troops which he had raised under the same delusive
expectation indulged in by Abarca and Rendon. The
country was now overrun by revolutionists. Span
iards were dragged from their homes and cast into
dungeons from which the vilest criminals had been
released ; their wealth was appropriated and their prop
erty destroyed. The mines were deserted and enter-
6 One of the soldiers was killed, the other four escaped. Padre Parra
went through great hardships. He was afterward sent to Durango and de
livered to the asesor Pinilla Perez, who 'habia jurado no dejaren este suelo
gota de sangre Americano.' Id., 383. Parra, knowing that he had little hope
of life, contrived to escape, ' contrahaciendo en el pasaporte que fingio la firma
de Bonavia.' Ib. Bonavia was the intendente of Durango.
7 This account of the Sinaloa expedition is taken from the narrative of
Parra, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 378-83, and given in brief by
Bustamante, in Cuad. Hist., i. 176-81, and in Campanas de Calleja, 62-8.
The original document belonged to Bustamante, and Hernandez y Davalos is
indebted for it to Jos<5 Maria Andrade. Alaman is inclined to discredit Bus-
tamante's account relative to the dishonorable action of Villaescusa. Hist.
Mej., ii. 93. But the statements of Parra copied by Bustamante are corrobo
rated by another document, a despatch written by Jos6 Lopez, an officer
under Hermosillo, and who makes the same statements. Hernandez y Ddva
los, Col. Doc., i. 376-7. The total dispersion of Hermosillo's army may be
gathered from Oaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 173-4. Negrete omits all mention of
Hermosillo's defeat. Mex. Sig. XIX., iii. 82-3.
8 This officer married a sister of the historian Alaman. Hist. Mej., ii. 94.
240 SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.
prises abandoned. Many sought escape to the sea-
coast, or a refuge in some principal town. Great
numbers flocked to Saltillo from the mining district
of Catorce and neighboring places. Colonel Antonio
Cordero was at that time governor of Coahuila, and
was organizing a body of troops for the purpose of
marching against San Luis Potosi, according to the
plan formed by Calleja. 9 The arrival of so many
Spaniards at a time so critical might have been turned
to good account by an able and energetic commander;
but Cordero was not such a man. He was unable to
harmonize differences, or secure unity of action, and
his attempt to organize them proved a failure.
Hidalgo now appointed his lieutenant-general, Jime
nez, to the command of San Luis Potosi and the ad
joining provinces. At the close of 1810, Jimenez, at
the head of some 10,000 men, marched against Sal
tillo, and met Cordero on the 6th of January, 1811,
on the field of Aguanueva at no great distance from
Saltillo. Cordero's force, which was well organized
and armed, numbered 2,000; and had his troops re
mained faithful, he would probably have dispersed
the army of Jimenez; but they deserted as soon as
they came in sight of the enemy, and Cordero, who
sought safety in flight, was made prisoner on the
following day. Jimenez next morning entered Sal
tillo without opposition, and like Hermosillo at
Acaponeta, he treated the captive enemy with every
consideration. 10
This bloodless acquisition of Coahuila was followed
by the declaration of the governor of Nuevo Leon,
9 The instructions Calleja submitted to the approval of the viceroy rela
tive to the movements of Cordero's troops were the following; 'Las tropas de
Cordero que se hallan, seguii las ultimas noticias, en las inmediaciones de
Matehuala, distautes 35 leguas de San Luis Potosi, deberan bajar & esta ciu-
dad a restablecer el orden y castigar los pueblos de Dolores, San Luis de la
Paz, Sichii, etc., y manteniendose en las inmediaciones de San Miguel, Guana
juato y Queretaro.' Calleja, in Ncyrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., ii. 408. The date
of Calleja's despatch is Dec. 16, ISlO.
l Parte de Jimenez, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 332-4; Ala-
man, Hist. Mej., ii. 94-6.
VILLAGRAN. 241
Manuel Santa Maria, in favor of the revolution, 11 and
the whole of that province acquiesced in his action.
In Texas, also, the royalist party for a time suc
cumbed to the independents. On the 22d of Janu
ary, Juan Bautista Casas made himself master of San
Antonio de Bejar, the capital, capturing the governor,
Manuel de Salcedo, the lieutenant-colonel, Simon
Herrera, commander of the frontier militia, and a
number of officers and Europeans. 12 Thus without
much bloodshed the whole of that portion of New
Spain which extends from San Luis Potosi to the
borders of United States declared for independence.
The sufferings and indignities, however, to which the
fallen Spaniards were subjected were in many cases
very great, not even priests 13 escaping by reason of
their cloth. 14
Shortly after the grito de Dolores, Villagran, as the
reader will recollect, established himself at Huichapan,
and proved extremely troublesome to the royalists by
interrupting their communication between the capital
and Queretaro. With him two others later associated,
11 Santa Maria was a native of Seville, but having arrived in New Spain
when quite a child, was regarded as a Mexican. Id., 96.
"Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1087-8. Western Florida, the present state of
Louisiana, had declared its independence on the 26th of Sept. previously, and
Salcedo informed the vicero}^ of this event on the 21st of Nov., at the same
time begging for reenforceinents, since he feared to be invaded from the re
volted province. Salcedo considered the movement at Baton Roiige, where
the insurrection broke out as a sequence to the conspiracy of Burr, and the
effect of French emissaries acting upon his suggestions, Burr having been in
Paris during the previous year. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 121-4.
13 Jimenez at Saltillo not only left the Spaniards at liberty, but extended
to them letters of safe conduct. Many availed themselves of this opportunity
to seek the protection of Calleja; contrary to promise, when near Cedral they
were seized, beaten, and stripped. Amid the maledictions and curses of the
populace they were then conducted to Cedral, where they were kept impris
oned for a month, whence they were eventually conveyed to San Luis Potosi,
and confined, to the number of eleven, in the jail. By order of Herrera, they
were put to death with one exception, in March 1811, Juan Villarguide only
escaping, having been left for dead. Villarguide, in Hernandez y Ddvaios, Col.
Doc., ii. 913-22.
14 The cura of San Sebastian, Jose" Mateo Braceras, a Franciscan friar, and
a secular priest Francisco Fraga were submitted to every kind of ill treat
ment on their attempting to go from San Luis to Queretaro. They were sent
back to San Luis, where they were imprisoned by Herrera, but were eventually
released. Alum<m, Hist. Mej., ii. 100-2.
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 16
242 SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION".
Cayetano and Mariano Anaya. On one occasion Venc-
gas despatched under a strong escort a quantity of
stores to Queretaro, and with it travelled the newly
appointed auditor de guerra, Ignacio Velez de la
Campa. The insurgents, however, attacked it in the
narrow defile of Calpulalpan, and killing the passengers
and part of the escort, carried off the stores. A huge
rock was rolled down upon the carriage of Velez, crush
ing his head, after which he was despatched. Venegas
decided to send a force to Huichapan for the se
curity of the highway. The brigadier Jose de la Cruz
had just arrived from Spain, and to him the viceroy
gave the command of the expedition, with Torcuato
Trujillo, of Las Cruces renown, as his second.
Jose de la Cruz does not appear to have begun his
military career before 1808, 15 when owing to the in
vasion of Spain by the French, he like many others
abandoned his university for the profession, of arms.
His rise was rapid; and after two years' service under
General Gregorio cle la Cuesta he was made brigadier.
His success in New Spain was no less conspicuous than
it had been in the peninsula, but it must be attributed
to accident rather than ability. He was truculent
and cruel. His rapid promotion was owing to the
jealousy with which the viceroy came to regard the
successes of Calleja; and such was the influence of
Venegas in Spain, that after his return thither and the
accession of Calleja to the viceroyalty he maintained
Cruz in the high position to which he had elevated
him, 16 in order to mortify one whom he could never
pardon for having succeeded him in his role of vice-king.
On the 16th of November, Cruz marched out of
Mexico, his force constisting of the infantry regiment
15 According to Fray Tomds Blasco, howe\ T er, he was in active military
service against the French during the years 1793-5. Hernandez y Ddvalos,
Col. Doc., iii. 246.
16 As the sequel will show, Venegas appointed him comandante general of
Nueva Galicia and president of that audiencia in fact, made him a second
viceroy. Mora, Mcj. ysus Rev.,iv. 1 10-11, 231, 437, 440-2; Bustamante, Cuad.
Hist., i. 133, and Campanas de Calleja, 58-9, 96, 107.
JOSE DE LA CRUZ. 243
of Toluca, 250 dragoons, and two pieces of artillery,
afterward reenforced by the provincial infantry regi
ment of Puebla, and a battalion of marines com
manded by Captain Porlier, of the frigate AtocJia.
Arriving at Nopala on the 20th, he proceeded on the
following day to Huichapan, hoping to come in con
tact with the insurgents; but Villagran, timely in
formed of the danger, had retreated with all his follow
ers to the sierra of the Real del Doctor and taken up
a position on the inaccessible heights of Nasteje or
the Muneca. Cruz on arriving at the town recovered
the merchandise and ammunition which had lately
been taken by the insurgents in the Calpulalpan de
file. His reception by those of the inhabitants who
had not fled was joyful; but in order to prevent any
further insurrectionary acts, he deprived them of every
article of use that could be converted into a weapon,
sparing neither the housewife's scissors, the laborer's
implements, nor the artisan's tools. 17 He gave im
perative orders to the commander of a detachment
which he sent out in quest of the Anayas, to put to
death the inhabitants of every town or hacienda in
which insurgents might be found, or where they had
received shelter, reducing the places to ashes. 18 Be
fore his departure from Huichapan, Cruz amply
avenged the death of Velez; pendent from the trees
on the roadsides all through the defile where the
deed was perpetrated swung the corpses of victims
hanged in reprisal. 19 On the 14th of December, in
17 In a letter to Calleja, dated Huichapan, 23d of 'Nov., he says: 'Los cu-
chillos de la mesa, las tijeras y todo cuanto pueda ser ofensivo recojo; instru-
mentos de herreros, cerrajeros, etc., estoy encajonando.' Alaman, Hi.tt. Mej.,
ii. ap. 17. Negrete states that this letter, as well as the one mentioned in the
following note, was addressed to the viceroy. Mex. 8ig. XIX., ii. 250.
l8 Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 18. The date of this letter is the 29th of
Nov. On the previous day the Anayas had killed seven Europeans, and Cruz
suspects that his correspondence had been intercepted, as he had received no
despatches from Mexico for four days, whereas he expected daily communi
cation. The expression he uses, ' Supongo que me han interceptado la cor-
respondencia, pues que hace cuatro dias que no tengo pliegos de Mexico, que
debia recibir toclos los dias, 'and the tone of the letters, lead me to agree
with Aiaman that they were addressed to Calleja, and not to the viceroy.
19 Alaman, who saw the bodies hanging in Dec., does not mention the nuin-
244 SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.
pursuance of the plan of military operations proposed
by Calleja, 20 he left Huichapan for Queretaro on his
march for Valladolid, having been joined by the re-
enforcement above mentioned.
Calleja at this time was at Leon, and the plan he
had formed for conducting the campaign was such as
would, he hoped, confine the insurgents to the province
of Nueva Galicia. Cruz was instructed to march to
Valladolid, reducing to obedience the disaffected towns
on his way, and so regulate his movements that he
would arrive at the bridge of Tololotlan near Guada
lajara on the 15th of January, on which date Calleja,
approaching by way of Lagos, expected to reach the
same important point. Meanwhile Cordero, the gov
ernor of Coahuila, who was supposed to be at Mate-
huala, was to advance against San Luis Potosi, re
store order in that district, punish the towns of
Dolores, San Luis de la Paz, and others, and remain
in the neighborhood of Guanajuato and Queretaro;
and lastly, Bonavia, the intendente of Durango, at
this time in Sombrerete or Fresnillo, was to descend
upon Zacatecas and Aguascalientes, and keep in sub
jection the districts extending southward as far as
Leon and Silao. The design was well conceived, and
would enable Calleja and Cruz with their united forces
to assail Hidalgo at Guadalajara with a larger and
better appointed army than had yet been sent into
the field by the royalists; but, as the reader has
already been informed, Cordero's troops joined the in
surgents; the projected movement from Coahuila upon
San Luis Potosi was reversed; and the cordon around
Hidalgo was rendered incomplete.
ber, but they were scattered at intervals from the hacienda de la Goleta to
the pueblo of San Miguelito, and one of them was that of the Indian gov
ernor. San Miguelito was burned. Hist. Mej., ii. 71. Bustamante says: 'Cruz
marc6 muy luego sus pasos con torrentes de sangre, el rastro de esta y los
cadaveres que dejaba a su transito senalaban al viagero la ruta que Hevaba.'
C'uad. Hist.., i. 137.
20 Calleja submitted his plan to the viceroy by despatch elated Leon, Dec.
10, 1810, and it was approved. A copy of the plan is supplied by Hernandez
y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 304-5.
LOXG LIVE THE KING I 245
Having remained a few days at Queretaro, Cruz
left on the 20th for Valladolid. His march was un
eventful; for although a hostile force threatened to
oppose his progress in the neighborhood of Acdmbaro,
it retreated to Valladolid as he approached. 21 Pedro
Celestino Negrete, a naval officer, was sent with a
detachment in pursuit, but was unable to overtake
the retreating enemy. I mention this apparently
trivial circumstance because the name of Negrete,
who afterward greatly signalized himself and contrib
uted to the success of Cruz by his victories, appears
for the first time in history on this occasion. On the
27th, passing through Indaparapeo, Cruz approached
Valladolid and bivouacked for the night on the
heights above the city.
As the royalists drew near, the revolutionary inten
dente, Ansorena, convinced that the forces which he
had at his disposal would be unable to cope with those
of Cruz, on the night of the 2Gth and 27th secretly
left the city for Guadalajara, escorted by fifty chosen
men; and on the following morning the officials ap
pointed by Hidalgo also left, taking with them such
treasures and archives as were under their charge. 22
On the 27th, as soon as the flight of the intendente
became public, the populace rose in tumult, and led
by a blacksmith of Toluca, who was from the United
States, 23 raising the cry of death to the gachupines,
broke into the college formerly belonging to the Jes
uits, in which a number of Europeans were con
fined, 24 and put three of them to death before they
21 The insurgents numbered 3,000 or 4,000 horse and foot, and had six can
non. Gas,, de Mex., 1811, ii. 17-19.
22 A nsorena, Defensa, 16.
23 Described by the viceregal government as an * anglo-americano de na*
cion,' Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 19; and by Ansorena as 'un toluqueno, a quien
llamaban el anglo-americano.' Defensa, 16.
24 After the massacres at the Bateas and cerro del Molcajete the remain
ing Spanish captives, to the number of 170, were distributed at the interces
sion of ecclesiastics in the convents and colleges. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 19.
Ansorena's son, however, makes a different statement. His version is that
on the 25th of Dec. the intendente convoked a junta, and stating that the
forces in the city were inadequate to oppose Cruz, declared his intention of
retiring to Guadalajara. He then proposed for the safe custody of the pris-
246 SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.
were restrained by the canon, the conde de Sierra
Gorda, and other ecclesiastics, who, at the risk of
their lives, quelled the tumult by elevating the liost.
Cruz entered "Valladolid on the morning of the
28th, having given orders to the officer in command
of his advance guard to put all the male inhabitants
to death, and set fire to the city if any further at
tempt should be made to take the lives of Euro
peans. 25 His entrance was signalized by the usual
expression of welcome extended to either royalist or
revolutionist when in power. The cathedral chapter,
the ayuntamiento, and different corporations escorted
him into the city, and in the cathedral te deum was
chanted. The municipal and ecclesiastic cabildos vied
with each other in representations of their past fidel
ity, and in the expression of their future zeal for the
royalist cause. 26 The conde de Sierra Gorda, who
two months before had removed the excommunica
tion fulminated against Hidalgo and his followers,
now gracefully annulled his former action, explained
the reason of his unorthodox proceeding, and ordered
the validity of the excommunication to be proclaimed
throughout the diocese. 27 In order not to be behind
hand in offering a sop to the royalists, the rector of
the college of San Nicolas petitioned the bishop
that Hidalgo's name might be struck off the books of
O O
that institution. Thus, as blew the political breeze,
so turned like a weather-cock the civil and ecclesias
tical authorities of Valladolid.
One of the first acts of Cruz after his entrance into
oners that they should be removed to the convents and clerical college.
This proposal was carried out, though strongly opposed by the military offi
cers. Ansorena, Defensa, 15.
25 'Si la infame plebe intentase de nuevo quitar la vida a los europeos,
entre V. en la ciudad, pase a cuchillo a todas sus habitantes, exceptuando
solo las mugeres y niilos, y pegdndole fuego por todas partes. ' Such are his
instructions, a copv of which he forwarded to Calleja. timtamante, Campanas
de Calleja, 59.
2(5 See the alcalde Ramon de Huarte's proclamation to the inhabitants, and
the address of the cathedral chapter to the viceroy, dated respectively Dec.
30, 1810, and Jan. 2, 1811. Gas. d Mex., 1811, ii. 28, 31-3.
27 A copy of his circular is given in Id., 20-8.
RUPERTO MIER. 247
the city was the extension of the general pardon, of
which many availed themselves. In reorganizing the
administration, he appointed Torcuato Trujillo co-
mandante general of the province, 28 whose associate,
the brigadier Garcia Davila, presently arrived in com
pany with the bishop elect, Abad y Queipo, Merino,
the intendente ad interim, and other officials, who,, as
the reader will recollect, had fled from the city at the
first approach of Hidalgo.
Calleja in his plan of operations had calculated that
Cruz would be able to leave Valladolid on the 1st of
January; he was however detained in that city until
the 7th. This delay necessarily interfered with the
carrying-out of Calleja's arrangements, but in addi
tion to this, Hidalgo was forming plans for the pur
pose of preventing the union of Cruz's forces with
those of Calleja, and had instructed Colonel Ruperto
Mier, who was stationed at Zamora, to oppose the
former's advance. Mier, therefore, at the head of
10,000 or 12,000 men, with twenty-seven pieces of
artillery, took up an almost impregnable position on
the heights commanding the mountain gorge of
Urepetiro, about four leagues to the south-east of
Zamora, and through which Cruz would necessarily
have to pass.
On the 14th of January Cruz, whose force num
bered 2,000, principally infantry, with eight pieces of
artillery, approached the mountain pass, which he
found occupied by the revolutionary army. He forth
with ordered his advance guard to open attack by
moving against the enemy's position along the banks
of a stream flowing down the gorge. The insurgents'
batteries, however, commanded the approach, and a
well-sustained fire being opened upon the assailants,
28 Trujillo had accompanied Cruz from Mexico as far as Huichapan, whence
he returned to the capital and rejoined Cruz at Valladolid Jan. 2, 1811. The
viceroy associated with him in his command the aged brigadier Garcia Ddvila,
'paraque contuvierasu juvenil ardor.' Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 59.
Calleja described Trujillo as a madman with a sword. Alaman, Hist. Mej.,
ii. 78.
248 SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.
the officer in command, in view of the extreme diffi
culty of the ascent, retreated. Cruz now threw out
detachments on his right and left, with the object of
occupying commanding heights above the road, send
ing two cannon with the troops directed against the
enemy's right, and planting his remaining six pieces
in the most advantageous position at the foot of the
gorge. In spite of the ruggedness of the ground,
both movements were successful. Meanwhile Mier,
regarding the retreat of the advance guard as a flight,
unwisely made preparations to pursue, and exposing
his left, one of his batteries was assaulted and taken
by Negrete, and the insurgent force in that part of
the field dispersed. While Negrete was thus en
gaged, a vigorous attack, supported by the two
pieces on Cruz's left, was made upon the insurgents'
centre and right, which resulted in the total rout of
Mier's forces and the capture of his artillery and am
munition. 29
Although this attempt to arrest the advance of
Cruz was unsuccessful, it contributed to the causes
which prevented his taking part in the momentous
battle fought on the 17th at the bridge of Calderon.
At Zamora he was detained some time in repairing
his gun-carriages; and when he arrived at the rio
Grande de Lerma, although he met with no opposi
tion, the transportation of his army was tediously
slow, from the fact that at the crossing there was
only one boat available for the purpose. When he
arrived at the point of rendezvous the important bat
tle had been fought and won.
Allende, after his flight from Guanajuato, hastened
to Zacatecas, whither Iriarte had proceeded after his
departure from San Luis. Although this city was
occupied by a large body of insurgents, the command
29 The insurgents lost 600 men, while the royalists had only two killed and
one wounded. For a full account of this engagement, see the reports of Crua
in Gaz. de Max., 1811, ii. 53, 81-8.
ALLENDE AND IRIARTE. 249
of which Allende could rightly assume in his position
of captain-general, he perceived that the assertion of
his superiority over Iriarte would in all probability
provoke a mutiny. Of Iriarte's good faith he was
more than doubtful; and his own prestige and popu
larity had seriously diminished, owing to his late dis
comfiture, as was indicated by the unsuppressed mur-
murings of the troops. He therefore decided to join
Hidalgo at Guadalajara, and on the 12th of December
arrived at the city. Hidalgo went out to meet him,
with every demonstration of friendship.
That night a band of captive Spaniards was led out
into the darkness, marched a few miles from the city
to a lonely spot, and there butchered. And on other
occasions the same ceremony was repeated. 30
Meanwhile Calleja was rapidly approaching. The
army which Hidalgo now had under his command
was far superior to any force which the insurgents had
hitherto brought into the field. It numbered no less
than 80,000 men, 31 20,000 of whom were cavalry, with
ninety-five pieces of artillery, many of them of heavy
calibre. 32 No exertion was spared by the revolutionary
leaders to render this large force as effective as possi-
30 Marroquin, in his testimony at the trial of Hidalgo, states that he assisted
at one, and one only, of these massacres, on which occasion 48 victims, more
or less, were put to death. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , i. 41 . Abad y
Queipo in his pastoral of September 26, 1812, says: 'Luego que se entronizo en
Guadalajara comenzd a degollar en la misma forma, esto es, en partidas diarias
de 60, 80 y 100,J^s muchos europeos y algunos criollos.' Id., 839. Says Jose"
Maria Chico: 'Mand6 varios asesinatos, y lo mismo es publico y notorio que
mando en Guadalajara, sin embargo de haberlo hecho con tal reserva.' Id., 41.
These are the instructions Hidalgo gives to Hermosillo Jan. 3, 1811: 'Depon-
ga U. todo cuidado a cerca de los indultos y libertad de europeos, recogiendo
U. todos los que alia (sic) por esa parte para quedar seguro, y al que fuere
inquieto, perturbador y seductor, 6 se conosca otras disposiciones, los sepultara
en el olvido ddn^oles muerte con las precauciones necesarias en partes ocultas
y solitarias para que nadie lo entienda.' Id., 24. In his own declaration he
says: 'Se, ejecutaban en el campo a horas deshusadas y lugares solitaries.'
Id., 14. '
31 This is the number given by Jose" Maria Zabalza in a letter dated Jan.
18, 181 1, and addressed to Mercado. Id., i. 386. Calleja, followed by Alaman,
states that the insurgent army numbered 100,000, an estimate which I con
sider less reliable. Id., ii. 338, 342, 355; Id., iv. 180. Calvillo raises the num
ber to 103,000. Sermon, 138.
32 Besides 44 brought from San Bias, a large number had been cast in
Guadalajara, many of them very inferior.
250 SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.
ble. The enthusiasm of the troops was stimulated
by encouraging addresses; the necessity of discipline
urgently pressed upon them ; and drills and manoeuvres
were daily practised on the plains outside the city.
Though their arms were far inferior to those of the
royalists, they were better than on former occasions;
most of them were still only the sling and bow, but
for the former great quantities of small grenades
had been manufactured missiles much more de
structive than rough stones. A great improvement
had also been effected in ridding the camp of hordes
of unarmed hangers-on, who followed merely with a
view to pillage.
With regard to the plan of operations, a diversity of
opinion prevailed among the leaders. At a council
of war Hidalgo expressed his conviction that the
whole army ought to take up a position at the bridge
of Tololotlan, and there engage Calleja, while Iriarte
with his forces moving from Zacatecas should assail
the royalists in the rear. Allende disapproved of
this plan, and bearing in mind the disastrous results
at Las Graces and Guanajuato, expressed his want of
confidence in directing their whole force against the
enemy, arid exposing their fortunes to the hazard of
a single battle. He proposed that several divisions
should be formed out of the army, that Guadalajara
should be evacuated, and that Calleja should be
attacked by these corps d'armee consecutively, thus
avoiding the risk of a general rout. The debate was
long and warm, but eventually Hidalgo's plan was
adopted. 33
On the 13th of January, Hidalgo was advised that
Calleja was advancing by forced marches toward
Guadalajara; and he immediately made preparations
to occupy the bridge of Calderon, eleven or twelve
leagues from the city. On the following day Hidal
go led out his host. As he compared his now com-
83 Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 185; Alaman, Ilisl. Mej., ii. 114; Neyrete,
Hex. Sig. XIX., ii. 413.
BRIDGE OF CALDERON.
251
paratively well organized force with the rabble he had
lately led, he felt confident of victory. 34 At sunset
he halted at the bridge of Tololotlan, six leagues from
the city, and having received fresh information of
Calleja's advance, he again convoked a council, at which
the same questions were discussed with the same re
sult. Proceeding on the following morning, he occu
pied the bridge of Calderon, and took up a strong
position commanding the approach to Guadalajara.
On a steep height on the left side of the river a bat
tery of sixty-seven guns was planted. This position
FLON'S ATTACK
BATTLE-FIELD OF THE BRIDGE OF CALDERON. 35
was almost inaccessible in front, was protected in the
rear by a deep barranca, and nearly surrounded the
open ground on which Calleja would have to advance
his troops. Flanking this main battery, minor ones
S4 'Repiti6 muchas veces que iba a almorzar enj^^pjiente de Calderon, a
comer en Queretaro, y a ceiiar en Mexico.' C^c'-f'o, Mention, ISO. Negrete in
making mention of this boast remarks: 'Creo que esto no pasa de una vulga-
ridad.' Mex. Sifj. XIX., iii. 4. See also Ca'lcja, in Hernandez y Ddvalos,
Col. Doc., ii. 300. This bridge is over a small affluent of the rio Grande
de Lerma, about five leagues to the north-east of the bridge of Tololotlan.
35 This plan is taken from the work of Torrente, who copied ifcfrom a draft
which was in the war department at Madrid. Bustamante reproduced it in
his Cuad. Hist., i. 188-9. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 584.
252 SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.
were established on heights to the right and left of
it, the latter one being on the other side of the river,
the access to each being up steep and rocky ascents.
On the 16th the royalist army appeared in sight,
and Calleja, finding this almost impregnable position
occupied by the enemy, sent forward a reconnoitring
detachment, which, becoming engaged with the out
lying insurgent troops, succeeded in gaining possession
of the bridge. Calleja thereupon ordered reenforce-
ments to advance to its support in order to hold the
point, and it being now nightfall, both armies en
camped without farther movements on either side.
As the small army of the royalists bivouacked on the
ground, the vast number of their foes was made ap
parent by the fires on the opposite heights, which Hi
dalgo caused to be built along the whole extent of his
line, three quarters of a league in length.
Calleja's force consisted of 6,000 men, 86 one half of
whom were cavalry; but although his army bore no
numerical comparison with that of the revolutionists,
it was perfectly equipped and disciplined. He had
also ten pieces of artillery admirably served, and a
magnificent supply of war material; while the insur
gents had but few muskets, and many of their cannon
were of no service, some being fastened to clumsy carts,
and others being manufactured of no better material
than wood bound with iron hoops.
Calleja decided to attack without waiting for Cruz.
In the morning he formed his army into two divisions,
one of which he placed under Flon, who was to assail
the enemy's right, while he with the other attacked
their left. The assaults were to be made simultane
ously, in order that the two commands might fall at
the same time on the insurgents' centre. A ford
some little distance above the bridge had been found
the night before, and Flon leading his force across it
36 Verdla, Apunt. Moy., in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iv. 180. Cal-
villo, however, says: 'Nuestro pequeuo exe'rcito. . .no pas6 de quatro mil y
quinientos hombres. ' Sermon, 135.
FLOX'S IMPETUOSITY. 253
immediately began to ascend the heights. Such was
his impetuosity that he would not wait for his artillery,
which consisted of four field-pieces, and which owing
to the extreme ruggedness of the ground had to be
dragged up by hand. Perceiving that it could not be
brought with the infantry, he led his men at once
against the first insurgent battery, consisting of four
guns, and guarded by a strong body of the enemy.
Hash as was the deed, he was so ably supported by
his troops that he drove the insurgents from their po
sition and captured their guns. Pursuing his advan
tage, as soon as his artillery arrived, he succeeded in
dislodging the revolutionists from the minor batteries
on the right of their main position, compelling them
to fall back upon their centre. 37
Meanwhile Calleja advanced with the rest of the
army toward the bridge, supporting Flon's move
ments with the fire of his advance guns, and sending
him a reinforcement of pioneers of the grenadiers of
la Columna. When Calleja arrived near the bridge,
and could survey the whole position of the enemy, he
recognized the danger of attempting an assault by
that direction, and, wheeling to the right, occupied
with four cannon and a considerable portion of his
troops a small eminence, from which he opened fire
upon the enemy's nearest left battery. At the same
time he sent forward on the old road, on the right-
hand side of the stream, Colonel Empdran with a
squadron of dragoons of Spain and the cavalry regiment
of San Carlos, with the object of assailing the enemy in
the rear. Colonel Jalon, moreover, was sent to assault
a battery of seven guns situated lower down the
stream.
While these movements were being made by Ca
lleja, Flon, urged by his uncontrollable desire to win
the glory of the day, exceeded his instructions, 38 and
37 Callrja, in Hernandez y Ddvalo*, Col. Doc., ii. 356-7.
SB p arece q ue Flon traspaso las ordenes de Calleja, para llevarse el solo
la gloria cle la batalla. ' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 342. 'El resultado
dc la accion. . .habria sido mas feliz, si el Sr Conde de la Cadena, llevado de
254 SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.
without waiting until Calleja was prepared to act in
concert with him, attacked the main battery of the
insurgents with his division. The attempt was un
successful. The enemy was able to concentrate over
whelming numbers at the point assailed, and twice
his troops were repulsed. His artillery ammunition
at this crisis gave out; his men lost confidence, and
began to retreat 'in great disorder.
At this moment victory inclined to the insurgents.
The detachment under Emparan on the right had
also sustained two repulses, he himself was severely
wounded in the head, his horse killed, and the regi
ment of Sari Carlos was already in flight. 39 Nothing
but the ascendency of Calleja's presence, his coolness
and military skill, saved the day. Jalon, who had suc
cessfully forded the river and captured the revolution
ists' battery, hastened to the assistance of Emparan;
and interposing his troops between him and the dense
masses of the enemy in pursuit, restored this part of the
field, resulting in great slaughter of the independents.*
To restore the left was more difficult, and required im
mediate attention. A strong column of infantry, sup
ported by two squadrons of horse with two field-pieces,
was sent over the bridge to the support of Flon. This
movement had some effect in arresting the disor
der, but it was obvious to the leader of the royal
ists that his left division held their ground in
front of the great battery with difficulty, and that
an extraordinary and decisive effort must be made
in order to dislodge the enemy. He therefore
marched with all the available troops of his divi
sion over the bridge, and deploying into line, as soor*
su ardiente espiritu, no se hubiese apartado del plan que me propuse y le fija.'
Calleja, in Id., ii. 339.
"" Owing, according to Calleja's report, to the want of courage of the col
onel, Ramon Cevallos, 'siendo causa de que su regimiento retrocediese por dos
veccs, y empezase d huir siguiendo el ejemplo de su coronel y poniendo en
desorden d los demas.' Bustamanle^ Cuad. Hist., i. 1GO.
40 'Me asegura,' says Calleja, 'su comaiidante no haber bayoneta alguna en
todo el primer batallon que no este* tenida en sangre de insurgentes. ' Her
nandez y Ddvaios, Col. Doc., ii. 358. Jalon's report is found in Id., 361.
DEATH OF FLON. 255
as the ground allowed his doing so, joined his forces
with those of Flon. He then caused his ten pieces
of artillery to be collected on one point, and directed
against the main battery of the insurgents. While
these were playing vigorously upon the enemy at half
musket shot, a general charge along the royalist line
was ordered.
And now occurred an accident which overruled the
power of battle, and held back the cause of indepen
dence, it may be, for eleven tedious and bloody years.
A bomb from the well directed artillery of the royal
ists struck an ammunition wagon of the enemy, and a
terrific explosion occurred, scattering the dead and dy
ing in all directions. But this was not all. The
ground at that season of the year was covered with
a thick matting of dry grass, and this taking fire a fear
ful conflagration ensued. The wind blew full in the
face of the revolutionists, and the fire spreading with
awful rapidity, they were soon enveloped in dense clouds
of smoke and roaring flames. Before the fiery blast
they could not stand. Some fell asphyxiated; others
were horribly burned. Flight was inevitable. 41 The
disorder caused by this catastrophe and the firm ad
vance of the royalists, who were now encouraged by the
presence and intrepid bearing of Calleja, struck panic
41 Calleja makes no mention of this conflagration so favorable to his move
ments; and Alaman Hist. Mej., ii. 132-3 generally partial to the royalists,
receives the statement with such expressions of doubt as to leave the im
pression on the reader's mind that he did not wish to believe in it. He does
not even accept the testimony of Colonel Villamil, who was sent with two
field-pieces to the assistance of Flon, and who says: 'Se empeso el fuego con
los dos cailones que llevaba hasta que este ces6 por haberse incendiado cl
campo.' Hernandez yDdvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 361. But this royalist testimony
is strongly corroborative of statements more particularized. In the Bosqwjo
de la BatcdlcC de Calderon, I find this account: 'Una granada del calibre de a
4 tirada contra la ordeii de que no se hiciese fuego, pego en su carro de
municiones de los enemigos, lo inflamo y se observo una grande explosion.'
And further on: 'Se encontro con muchos cadaveres asi por el fuego de ioa
ataques de Flon como por el de la esplosion del carro y de los cajones de
polbora que abia disperses en varies puntos.' Id., ii. 342. Verdia, in Id., iv.
180-1, attributes in a great measure the disaster of the day on the side of
the independents to the explosion of some ammunition wagons, caused by a
grenade discharged by the royalists and the spread of fire thereby through the
camp. Bustamante and Ncgrete take the view given in the text. Mora
attributes the fire in the camp to the simultaneous discharge of the C7 guns
by order of Allende. Max. y sun Rev., iv. 135.
256 SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.
into the insurgents. All along the royalist lines the
charging troops pressed upward with but little loss,
and cavalry, infantry, and artillery at last gained the
height together. 42 But the enemy was in full flight,
and their abandoned guns were found still loaded with
grape-shot. A solitary battery of six heavy pieces,
situated on the summit of an eminence on the in
surgents' left, still maintained its fire. Thither had
congregated great numbers of the dispersed army,
but a detachment of the triumphant troops being
sent against it, it was captured with little difficulty;
and after a contest of six hours the royalist victory
at the bridge of Calderon was complete.
Then followed the pursuit. Over the charred
ground the horsemen urged their steeds after the flying
bands. Foremost amongst the pursuers was Flon.
Enraged at the unsuccessful part which he had played
in the late battle, and eager for revenge, or determined
not to survive his disgrace/ 3 he outstripped them all,
and plunging among the insurgents, fell covered with
wounds. At night his absence was noticed and a party
was sent in search of him, but it was not until the fol
lowing day that his mutilated body was found. 4 *
Of the military antecedents of Colonel Manuel de
Flon, conde de la Cadena, little is known. His repu
tation as a public man was, however, well established
in New Spain, and his character for honest}^ and in
tegrity, as well as his ability in the performance of
political and magisterial duties, universally recognized.
42 'Siendo obra de pocos minutos el acometer la bateria y apoderarse de
ella, no obsfcante el inmenso mimero de insurgentes que la defendian y la
resistencia que opusieron sostenie'ndose hasta el te"rmino de que las tres armas
llegaron d, un tieinpo, y la artilleria misma a tiro de pistola.' Calleja, in Her
nandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 358.
* 3 ' Parece se fue a buscar la muerte entre enemigos para no sobrebir (sic) &
aquella desgracia.' Id., ii. 342.
41 Alaman states that a soldier of the provincial regiment of Valladolid
slew him, remarking, as evidence in a foot-note, that this soldier produced in
Guadalajara a pocket-book belonging to Flon, which he had taken from his
dead body. Hist. Mej., ii. 130. But the condition of the corpse, covered with
wounds and contusions inflicted by every kind of weapon, is sufficient evidence
that he was overpowered by numbers, and that he did not fall by the hand of
a single man.
RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. 257
His impetuosity and strong passions, it is true, not un-
frequently led him into errors, causing him to over
look individual rights and disregard law. He held
the same political opinions as his brother-in-law Riano.
Flon was about sixty years of age when he met his
death at Calderon. Pedraza, who witnessed his ac
tion in the alhondiga, says that he "was of ordinary
height, with broad and arched shoulders. His coun
tenance was of a dark brown and wrinkled, the ex
pression of it being frowning and severe; his eyes
were sunken, penetrating, and fierce, and his look proud
and disdainful, while his long, heavy, gray eyebrows
gave to his features an imposing and unpleasing as
pect." 45 The portrait is not a pleasing one. His re
mains were temporarily deposited in the neighboring
parish church of Zapotlanejo, whence they were trans
ferred to the cathedral of Guadalajara and there in
terred with solemn obsequies. 46
Calleja on the following day rested his troops on the
battle-field, and then pursued his march to Guadala
jara, taking with him all the serviceable cannon of the
insurgents, after having destroyed and buried the rest.
The revolutionary leaders fled by different routes to
Zacatecas, Rayon succeeding in carrying off the army
funds, which amounted to $800,000. 47
The loss on the side of the insurgents, as on previ
ous occasions, is unknown, but that it was very con
siderable may be inferred from the fact that in the
part of the field alone where Jalon went to the support
of Ernparan more than 1,200 fell. 48 That sustained by
the royalists was 49 killed, 134 wounded, and ten miss-
45 Celebridad Independ. , 2; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 45-6.
46 ' Con los huesos de los espaiioles degollados en las barrancas cercanas & la
ciudad.' This occurred on the llth of Feb. folio wing. Ataman, Hist. Mej.,
ii. 130.
47 Zabaha, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , i. 386. Alaman says about
300,000 pesos. Hist. Mej., ii. 127.
48 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 361. According to a letter addressed
by Navarre to Mercado, 4,000 were calculated to have fallen, 'aunque sobre
esto no hay dato cierto.' Id., i. 390.
Hisx. HEX., VOL. IV. 17
258 SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.
ing. 49 This insignificant loss in the achievement of so
great a victory was due first of all to the accident, and
secondly, to the superiority in arms and discipline of
the royalists. Henceforth the royalist cause was for
some time ascendent, but the principles of indepen
dence were too deeply rooted ever again to be wholly
eradicated.
49 Id. , ii. 364. Calleja says 50 killed and 125 wounded. Id. , 359. Alaman
erroneously gives the numbers as 41 killed and 71 wounded. Hist. Mej., ii.
129-30. Those given in the text are taken from the official returns.
CHAPTER XL
HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
1811.
CRUZ JOINS CALLEJA AT GUADALAJARA HUMILITY OF THE AUDIENCIA,
CHURCH, AND UNIVERSITY CALLEJA ESTABLISHES A JUNTA DE SEGU-
RIDAD CRUZ REGAINS SAN BLAS DEATH OF MERCADO HIDALGO
COMPELLED TO SURRENDER HIS COMMAND THE INSURGENT LEADERS
RETIRE TO SALTILLO THEY DECIDE TO Go TO THE UNITED STATES
OPERATIONS IN SAN Luis POTOSI DEATH OF HERRERA COUNTER
REVOLUTION IN TEXAS CAPTURE AND EXECUTION OF IGNACIO ALDAMA :
ELIZONDO'S TREACHEROUS PLOT CAPTURE OF HIDALGO AND REVOLU
TIONARY CHIEFS IRIARTE'S DEATH THE CAPTIVES ARE SENT TO
CHIHUAHUA THEIR TRIAL ABASOLO'S DEPOSITION EXECUTIONS EC
CLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION HIDALGO'S EXECUTION His CHARACTER.
CALLEJA entered Guadalajara on the 21st of Janu
ary. His reception was similar to that of Hidalgo a
few weeks before. With wonderful facility these peo
ple could be royalists or revolutionists as occasion de
manded. In their principles they were governed
greatly by the weather. If Hidalgo rained his rabble
upon them in the morning, the town all that were
left in it was for the country; if Calleja's sun shone
bright, it was for the king. And luckily so; else
by this time, between the several retaliatory leaders,
there had been few left. Yet there were many in
Mexico firm enough in espousing the cause, and nobly
enduring, pledging themselves irrevocably to it, know
ing that such action was almost certain death.
The demonstrations on this occasion were unusually
prolonged, from the fact that in the afternoon of the
same day Cruz unexpectedly arrived. This leader,
(259)
260 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
after the delays which embarrassed his advance until
he had crossed the Lerma, had hastened forward by
forced marches to join Calleja. Personally these two
commanders .were unknown to each other, but al
though latent feelings of jealousy might exist, their
meeting was cordial in the extreme. Nor did Cruz's
seniority of rank as a brigadier interfere with an ami
cable arrangement as to their respective positions; he
waived his right to take the chief command in favor
of Calleja. 1 It was afterward agreed that each should
retain command of his own division, and that Cruz
should march at once to San Bias to recover possesion
of that port, while Calleja remained in Guadalajara to
reform the government.
On the 22d and 23d Calleja issued two proclama
tions: the one congratulating his troops upon their
late victory and exhorting them to abstain from ex
cesses; the other was addressed to the inhabitants of
Nueva Galicia, and was of the usual tenor, containing
threats of death in case of future disobedience, and
to all caught with arms in their hands. 2 Moreover,
he caused ten of the prisoners taken at Calderon
to be shot as traitors. 3
The late action taken by the audiencia and the ec
clesiastical powers on the entrance of Hidalgo into
Guadalajara was not likely to win favor for them in
the eyes of the viceroy; and they now hastened to
send to him protestations of fidelity and explanations
of their conduct. The former expressed its unbounded
joy at the late victory, and the restitution of its func-
1 This action of Cruz was highly approved by the viceroy, who writes: * Con
lo que ha dado V. S. la prueba mas convincente de su conducta, y de que
nada ama tan to como el buen servicio del rey.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 137.
a Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 345, 349-50; Gaz. de Hex., 1811, ii.
107-9.
3 One of these, Simon Fletcher, was from the U. S. He was one of Hi
dalgo's captains of artillery, and had commanded a battery at Calderon. Al
though severely wounded, Calleja caiised him to be taken from the hospital
and shot. 'Era tal el deseo de Calleja de fusilar a alguno de los de aquella
nacion que andabanfomentando la revolucion.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 154-5j
Bustamante, Campafias de Calleja, 104. The latter gives the names of those
executed. They were all shot with their backs to the firing platoons.
CALLEJA IN GUADALAJARA. 261
tions, which had been interrupted during the occupa
tion of the city by the "insurgent monster, Miguel
Hidalgo;" while the ecclesiastical chapter drew a
pitiable picture of the degradation its members had
been subjected to in having been compelled to repress
any utterance of their sincere loyalty and fidelity.
The university, moreover, in all humility, declared
that it had made no demonstration in favor of Hidalgo
such as was offered to a legitimate government, in
formed the viceroy that a donation of $1,510 had been
contributed by the members of the faculty for the
benefit of the army, and said that certain of them had
been commissioned to preach and write in refutation
of the proclamations and pamphlets printed by the
insurgents. The faculty, moreover, petitioned the
viceroy to appoint Calleja president, governor, and
captain-general of Nueva Galicia. 4 Venegas gra
ciously received these explanations, and in his reply to
the ecclesiastics, expresses the hope that time will
prove that he has not been deceived in forming the
high opinion which he entertained for them.
When Hidalgo departed from Guadalajara, the
audiencia and other authorities had reestablished
themselves. President Abarca and others, who had
lain concealed, as soon as Calleja's victory became
known, issued from their hiding places and reassumed
their previous positions. Nevertheless Calleja closely
investigated the conduct of those oidores and other
officials who had remained in the city, 5 and consider
ing that the weak and vacillating character of Abarca
*Gaz. de Hex., 1811, ii. 109-^12, 246-8; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc.,
ii. 377. The viceroy, Jan. 19th, ordered Hidalgo's proclamations, his reply
to the inquisition, and other seditious publications to be burned by the execu
tioner in the plaza of Mexico. On the 26th the inquisition issued an edict
pronouncing the greater excommunication against all who should keep such
papers in their possession. Copies of both documents can be found in Nearete,
Mex. Sirj. XIX., iii. 85-97.
5 The regent Antonio Villa Urrutia, feigning sickness, attended no session
of the audiencia during the time that the city was occupied by Hidalgo, who,
however, frequently visited him. He was reinstalled in his office, as also
\vas Oidor Sousa, who had attended only once, and then under a public pro
test before the escribano Arroyo de Anda. Adrade was another member who
had refused to join the sessions. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 140; iv. ap. 63-4.
262 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
rendered him unfit to fill the position he had held, made;
corresponding representations to Venegas. Abarca
asked for a formal investigation, which, however,
was denied him; 6 and his petition that he might be
allowed to return to Spain having been granted, he
departed, but died at Panama" some time afterward,
on his journey thither. Besides reestablishing the
royalist authorities, Calleja formed a junta de seguri-
dad, with Velasco de la Vara 7 as president, the pre
rogatives of which consisted in the right to try all
persons suspected of treason. He also instituted a
junta de caridad y requisicion de bienes europeos, the
object of which was to protect the property arid in
terests of Europeans who had fled or been put to
death, and administer aid to their families. This court
was also charged with the duty of collecting and in
terring the remains of the Spaniards lately slain. 8
Having thus arranged affairs in Guadalajara, with
out waiting for the return of Cruz, who in the mean
time had been appointed president in place of Abarca,
and military commander of Nueva Galicia and Zaca-
tecas, Calleja left for San Luis Potosi. His army
was at this time much reduced in numbers by sick
ness, desertion, and excessive venery; 9 and when in
forming the viceroy of his departure from Guadala
jara, he felt it necessary to remark that he observed a
want of enthusiasm in his troops, and little inclination
to engage in fresh campaigns. 10 His march to San
Luis was conducted with all possible pomp, and with
such assumption of almost courtly display as greatly
to disgust the viceroy. 11 But while outriders pre-
6 'Es natural,' writes Calleja to the viceroy, 'que intente justificarse ante
nif; pero yo no piensooirle.' Bustamante, Campauas de Calleja, 102.
7 Abarca had married one of the daughters of Velasco. Alaman, Hist. Mej.,
ii. 138.
8 On the same day on which these obsequies were held, viz., Feb. llth,
the executions previously mentioned in the text took place. Id. , 1 54.
9 In a confidential letter to Cruz he says that 'las putas y el calor le aca-
baban su tropa.' Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 105.
10 Id., 102. He moreover, in a letter to the viceroy dated January 28,
1811, accuses the Spaniards of want of patriotism and of criminal indifference.
Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 354.
11 His action in this respect was the subject of conversation in Mexico,
CRUZ AND MERCADO. 263
ceded his carriage, and military music entertained the
company at his table and evening receptions, want of
provisions and pasturage made his march slow; and
his long straggling line, composed of soldiers, women,
camp-followers, and hungry beggars, presented an
array far from military in appearance. 12 On the 5th
of March he arrived at San Luis, which place had
been in the power of Herrera until his approach.
During this time Cruz, who had left Guadalajara
on the 26th of January, was successfully engaged in
reducing the north-western portion of the province to
subjection. On the 28th he entered Ahualulco, and
there proclaimed the general pardon extended to all
who returned to their allegiance. 13 With regard to
Mercado, he even intimated that he would restore his
benefice to him if he would avail himself of it. 14 " As to
whether it was the intention of Cruz to carry out to
the letter these fair promises, I leave it to the reader
to judge. Mercado had evidently no confidence in them.
The disastrous news of the loss of the battle at Cal-
deron did not deter him from making further efforts.
He ordered the concentration of troops; issued a proc
lamation exhorting Americans to join his standard
and fight for the cause of independence ; and gave in
structions to Captain Ibarra to scour the district and
seize the funds and all available property belonging
to Europeans. As Cruz approached, Mercado took
up a strong position commanding the difficult pass at
the barranca of Maninalco. But the royalist victory
and Venegas used to remark that 'Calleja corria con batidores toda la tierra
dentro como si fuera un virey.' Bustamante, Campafias de Ca/leja, 1059.
12 ' Pudiendo decirse que caminaban tres eje'rcitos d un tiempo, a saber : uno
de soldados, otro de meretrices y perros, y otro de vivanderos, mendigos, y
arrimados.' Id., 105.
13 The pardon was extended to the inhabitants of Nueva Galicia by the
viceroy on the 31st of Dec. 1810. Hernandez y Ddvalos, GoL Doc., ii. 315.
The acceptance of the general pardon was vehemently protested against by
the independent leaders, and proclamations were issued exhorting Mexicans
not to avail themselves of it. Id., ii. 133-4.
11 Manuel Alvarez, a friend of Mercado's, writes to him to this effect, and
strongly urges him to accept Cruz's clemency. The original document is in
the possession of Hernandez y Ddvalos. See his Col. Doc., i. 394.
264 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
at Calderon, and the offer of pardon, had a bad effect
upon his men. His troops broke and fled after firing
some cannon-shots, and Mercado betook himself with
a few followers to San Bias. Both in that port and
in Tepic a reaction had set in. Francisco Valdes, who
had been temporarily placed by Mercado in command
of the first division of the coast militia, took the op
portunity of exciting a counter-revolution at Tepic
in favor of the government, and immediately apprised
Cruz of the state of affairs. Cruz sent a detachment
thither at once, and that important town fell into his
hands without a blow. 15 Captain Salas, the com
mander of the troops sent to Tepic, was instructed to
proceed thence to San Bias and occupy that port,
where he was to make every effort to secure the per
sons of Mercado and other insurgent leaders, as well
as to arrest Lavallen, Bocalan, arid others implicated
in the surrender of the port to Mercado. 16 But that
town had already been lost to the revolutionists, and
Mercado killed.
When, after his failure to arrest the advance of Cruz,
Mercado had returned to San Bias, Padre Nicolas
Santos Verdin, cura of the town, formed a plot with
the royalists to seize him and the comandante Ko-
mero. On the night of the 31st of January they
made the attack. Romero, however, with barred
doors defended himself by firing from a window until
he, Estevan Matemala, commander of the artillery,
arid one other were killed; the assailants having two
of their party slain and four wounded. The particu
lars of Mercado's death are not known. On the fol
lowing morning his body was found at the foot of a
precipice, down which it was conjectured he had fallen
during flight. But there is reason to suppose that he
was killed while defending himself; and that those
l "Oaz. de Max., 1811, ii. 129-32. Cruz received the communication of
Valdes on the 3d of Feb. , being then at Iztlan.
16 A copy of the original instruction is to be found in Hernandez y Ddvalos,
Col. Doc., i. 398.
FLIGHT TO ZACATECAS. 265
who slew him, in order to avoid the opprobrium at
tached to priest-killers, threw his body over the cliff. 17
Cruz, who had hitherto remained at Iztlan, having
sent his officers in advance to conduct his military op
erations wherever any show of danger appeared, now
fearlessly proceeded to Tepic, which he entered on the
8th of February. Here he remained for three days;
during which time he issued a proclamation, unusually
mild in expression, reorganized military and civil af
fairs, and hanged several adherents of the indepen
dent party, leaving their bodies suspended as a warn
ing to others. On the 12th he marched to San Bias,
where he arrived late at night. The activity he dis
played here as elsewhere was surprising. Whatever
his faults, he cannot be accused of indolence or want
of administrative ability. The civil government was
reorganized, the offices for the collection of the reve
nue were re-established, maritime and military mat
ters put in order, artillery was mounted sufficient for
the defence of the place the superfluous guns being
placed on board the frigate Princesa and numerous
directions were issued by him for the future guidance
of officers left in command. He, moreover, convoked
a council of war, at which the father of Mercado was
-condemned to be hanged, which sentence was carried
into execution on the 14th. 18 The same day Cruz re
turned to Tepic, where he remained two days. On
the 1 7th, having sent forward detachments to Say ula,
17 Negrete says that a reliable witness testifies that he saw the wounds on
the body, and that they were like those of a sword, or similar pointed weapon;
and that a relative of Mercado is still in possession of the undershirt worn
by him when he met his death. Mex. Sig. XIX. , iii. 77. Mercado was born
in Tcul and educated in Guadalajara, where he devoted himself to the study
of theology and was ordained priest. He was afterward appointed cura of
Ahualulco. When Torres gained possession of Guadalajara he joined the
revolutionary party with enthusiasm. Mercado possessed both ability and
determination, as is evidenced by his career, brief though it was, as an insur
gent leader. Verdin, in Id., iii. 383-93. Consult Verdin's account in Gaz. t(e
Mex., 1811, ii. 142-4.
18 It does not appear that any other of the captured insurgents was exe
cuted at this town. Cruz says to the viceroy, ' Todos los deinas curas, f rayles
y demas cabecillas, no pudieron ser sentenciados, y vienen marchando hacia
Guadalaxara para ser alii juzgados.' Id., 181.
266 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
Zapotlan, Zacoalco, and other places threatened by
the insurgents, and having arranged that the different
divisions of his army should arrive at Guadalajara on
the 27th and 28th, he resumed his march to that city.
After the dispersion of the insurgents at Calderon,
Hidalgo continued his flight to Zacatecas, whither
Iriarte had retired with a considerable force 19 and a
large sum of money. But before reaching that city
he was deposed. Overtaken by Allende, Arias, and
other leaders at the hacienda del Pabellon, he was
compelled by them to resign his position as general
issimo in favor of Allende. From the first, Allende
had not been fully in accord with Hidalgo; he had
constantly disagreed with him as to the conduct of
the war. But Allende and the others could not draw
people to the standard like Hidalgo. They were bet
ter soldiers, perhaps, but were not necessarily better
men. Allende was a strict disciplinarian, a humane
man as the times went, and honorable far above the
average leader on either side. He and his fellow-offi
cers were dependent on Hidalgo at the first more than
now; at all events, they now conspired against his
authority, and threatened him with death if he de
clined to surrender his command. 20 Henceforth he
was little more than a prisoner in their hands. He
was used as a figure-head; his presence was deemed
necessary, but he was allowed no voice in the move
ment he had been the first to take part in. His
presence with the army was still deemed necessary,
but his influence with regard to future action was
gone, his advice was not sought, and his authority
a mere show. His movements, moreover, were
closely watched, and he understood that orders were
19 Bustamante, followed by Alaman, incorrectly states that Hidalgo joined
Iriarte a b Aguascalientes. Iriarte had retired to Zacatecas when Calleja passed
through Lagos. Calleja, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 355.
20 The surrender was made only verbally in the presence of the chiefs.
This informal action caused Negrete to disbelieve the whole statement, Hex.
Sly. XIX., iii. 53-4. But Hidalgo himself so stated it at his trial. Hernandez
y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 8.
ALLENDE'S MOVEMENTS.
267
given to kill him if he attempted to separate himself
from the army. 21 In all this Hidalgo cared less for
himself than for the cause. Personal fame had never
S.LUIS POTOSI
HIDALGO'S FLIGHT TO MONCLOVA.
been his object. If they could better carry forward
the revolution alone, he was content. But from the
21 The same order applied to Iriarte and Abasolo. Ib. Of the former's
conduct and supposed intentions Allende appears to have formed a most un>
favorable opinion, and the latter hud fallen under grave suspicion.
268 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
sequel we should judge that they could not, for de
struction falls quickly upon them.
From Zacatecas Allende decided to retire with his
forces to Saltillo, where, united with Jimenez, his posi
tion would be more secure than elsewhere. At this
time a royalist force under the command of Melgares
was threatening to attack Saltillo; 22 and Allende hav
ing received a letter from Jimenez dated the 17th of
February, hastened to his assistance with a portion of
his forces, leaving Hidalgo at Matehuala. Jimenez,
however, had already engaged with the enemy and
defeated them when Allende arrived. 23 The Europe
ans who fell into his power were put to death. 24
The situation of the revolutionary leaders, how
ever, daily became more desperate. Of all the host
routed at Calderon only an insignificant number fol
lowed their chiefs, and the whole force that could be
mustered at Saltillo did riot exceed four or five thou
sand ill-armed men. Allende had hardly marched out
of Zacatecas when it was assaulted and taken by
Captain Ochoa, 25 and Calleja shortly afterward en
tered San Luis Potosi. Under these circumstances
further action here would be useless. But they would
not abandon the cause. The northern provinces were
still in the hands of the independents, as they sup
posed, and they would go to the United States with
their treasures, purchase weapons there, and solicit
aid of that new and patriotic republic. Then they
would return and meet the royalists in the field with
22 Ochoa's despatch to Calleja, in Gaz. de Hex., 1811, ii. 183.
23 The battle, of which no particulars are to be found, was probably
fought on the 18th of Feb., since Jimenez says in his letter to Allende: 'Me
hallo d seis leguas del enemigo con quien me vatir6 mailana seguramente. '
Hernandez y Ddvalo*, Col. Doc., i. 233.
24 Villarguide states that the Spaniards in Matehuala and Cedral had their
heads sawn off. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 150. Hidalgo supposes of course that
the Spaniards thus disposed of on the march to Saltillo were executed by or
der of Allende, 'quien tenia yd todo el mando.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col.
Doc., i. 14.
25 On the 17th of Feb., according to Ochoa's despatch to Calleja. Gaz. de
Mex., 1811, ii. 182. Ochoa had three days after the battle of Calderon
been defeated by Jimenez at the mountain gorge of Carnero. Bustamanie,
Cuad. Hist., i. 198.
OFFER OF PARDON. . 269
equal arms and superior numbers. Delusive dreams!
Far different was the fate in store for them. Al
ready death had them in its horrible toils.
About this time Hidalgo received a letter from
Cruz, 26 enclosing a copy of the general pardon extend
ed to insurgents by the Spanish cortes, 27 and exhort
ing him to accept the clemency offered, 28 and avoid
the further shedding of blood. But this was not for
a moment to be thought of, and for two reasons : Hi
dalgo would not trust him. or his promises, and he
would never abandon the cause. Let him now recant,
and what hope would there be for another? Perhaps
his death would better serve the revolution than any
action of his while living; if so, he would cheerfully
die. He therefore not only emphatically declined to
accept the present offer, but kept the matter secret
among the leaders. 29
Previous to the arrival of Calleja at San Luis Po-
tosi, that city had been held by the insurgents under
the leadership of Herrera. By directions of Iriarte,
he had successfully attacked two royalist officers,
Reyes and Ilagorri, at the hacienda of San Pedro
26 Dated the 28th of Feb. Qaz. de Hex., 1811, ii. 322-3.
27 Decree of Oct. 15, 1810. Cortes, Col. Dec., i. 10; I>ublan y Lozano, Leg.
- 336.
23 Cruz prophetically remarks: ' Y quiza linico instante de piedad que la
suerte le prepara.' Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 322.
29 His not having made public the indulto, of which his followers might
have availed themselves, constituted one of the charges against Hidalgo. He
answered, even if he had been so inclined, ' Ya no tenia autoridad ni carac-
ter.' Hernandez y Duvalos, Col. Doc.,1. 11. The question was discussed by
the other leaders, but rejected on the ground of restrictions in regard to
themselves with which the offer came. Ib. Hidalgo wrote in answer at
least, so it is said 'In the discharge of our duty we will not lay aside our arms
until we have wrested the jewel of liberty from the hands of the oppressor.
"We are resolved to enter into no arrangement which has not for its basis the
liberty of the nation, and the enjoyment of those rights which the God of
nature has given to all men rights inalienable, and which must be sustained
by the shedding of rivers of blood if necessary. . .Pardon, your Excellency,
is for criminals, not for defenders of their country. Let not your Excellency
be deluded by the ephemeral glories of Calleja; they are only so many light
ning-flashes which blind rather than enlighten . . .The whole nation is in a fer
ment; these commotions have roused those who lay in lethargy. . .The agita
tion is general, and Mexico erelong will discover her mistake if these evils
are not opportunely ended.' Jjustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 237-8.
270 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
Piedra Gorda. Their force consisted of 700 men
with eleven pieces of artillery. The two leaders were
slain, and the Europeans captured were shot. Her-
rera then returned to San Luis, where the house of
the intendente Flores was sacked, it being believed
that he was in collusion with the royalists. On the
approach of Calleja he abandoned the city, taking the
direction of Rio Verde and Yalle del Maiz. Under
Garcia Conde, Calleja sent a detachment in pursuit,
and Herrera sustained an overthrow at the latter place,
losing seventeen pieces of artillery, and a great quantity
of ammunition, baggage, and plunder. 30 He however
took revenge by ordering twelve Spanish captives
put to death, one of whom miraculously escaped to
tell the tale. 31 After this defeat Herrera retired to
Agayo, 32 where he expected to be joined by the re
volted troops of Iturbe. Venegas had, however, in
the mean time despatched Colonel Arredondo with a
force via Vera Cruz into the disaffected district; and
his approach, together with the offer of pardon,
caused a counter-movement in favor of the royalists.
Herrera and other chiefs were seized in their quar
ters and delivered up to Arredondo, who summarily
executed them. 83 Thus terminated the career of the
lay-friar Herrera, charged by some with more than
ordinary cruelty, yet whose high courage and ability
in the field were second only to his love of country
and devotion to the cause of independence. 34
80 Garcia Conde, in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 332-7. This action took place
on the 22d of March, though Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 196, carelessly
gives the 25th as the date. Garcia Conde after his liberation at Aculco fol
lowed Calleja, and proved one of his most efficient officers.
31 Mariano Calderon, the subdelegado of Valle del Maiz appointed by the
insurgents, on the entrance of Garcia Conde into the town, was shot, having
been proved, according to Garcia Conde's statement, to have given his con
sent to the massacre. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 334.
32 The present city of Victoria, in Tamaulipas.
33 Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 356-7, 414.
31 Alaman indulges in some rather severe strictures upon Herrera's charac
ter. ' biendo su conducta una de las mas feas manchas de la insurreccion y
tanto, que el congreso de Tamaulipas, que en 1824 cambi6 los nombres de
casi todas las antiguas poblaciones del Nuevo Santander. . .no se atrevio por
respeto & la decencia publica, a poner el de Herrera a ninguno de aquellos
pueblos.' Hist. Mej. t ii. 163.
REVOLUTION IN TEXAS. 271
While these events were taking place in San Luis
Potosi and Nuevo Santander, changes, unfavorable to
the independent cause, were also occurring in Texas
and Coahuila. About the beginning of February,
Ignacio Aldama had been elected by the revolutionary
leaders as minister plenipotentiary to the United
States, 35 Padre Juan Salazar being commissioned to
accompany him and act in his stead in case of accident,
sickness, or death. He took with him no less than one
hundred bars of silver, besides a large sum of money for
the purpose of purchasing arms and procuring the as
sistance of 30,000 auxiliaries. At the time when Al
dama arrived at Bejar the action of Captain Casas was
causing general dissatisfaction : and a counter-revolu
tion was already in secret operation, headed by the
subdeacon Juan Manuel Zambrano. Zambrano and
his confederates took occasion to spread suspicions
about the object of Aldama's mission. He was repre
sented to be an emissary of Napoleon, as evidenced
by his uniform, which was ornamented like those of
French officers. If, indeed, he brought auxiliaries
from the United States, would they not probably
avail themselves of the opportunity to gain posses
sion of the province which was regarded with such
covetous eyes? On the night of the 1st of March
Casas was made prisoner, while Aldama, Salazar, and
their escort were detained under the pretence that
their passports were not in order. A new govern
ment was then formed, with Zambrano as president.
This at once proceeded to establish itself as firmly as
possible ; troops were organized, partisans of the revo
lutionists were deposed from office, and the imprisoned
Europeans released. The unfortunate Aldama and
Salazar were afterward conveyed to Monclova in
Coahuila, condemned to death by a court-martial, and
executed. 38
35 The certificate of the authenticity of the signatures on his appointment
is signed on the 6th of Feb. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 231-2.
Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1087-^j Id., 1811, it 741; Hernandez y
272 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
^ These momentous matters were wholly unknown to
Allende, as well as to the revolutionists at Monclova,
which were destined to prove most fatal to himself and
his associates. Lieutenant-colonel Ignacio Elizondo
had at first favored independence; but having taken of
fence at Allende's refusal to promote him to the grade
of lieutenant-general in reward for his services, he
secretly became disaffected, and cast about him in
search of means of revenge. When Zambrano had
gained control at Bejar he sent two commissioners,
captains Munoz and Galan, to communicate with Ca-
lleja and the viceroy; and these finding the conspir
acy ripe at Monclova, disclosed to Elizondo Allende's
intentions. He therefore determined to delay mat
ters no longer, but seize the persons of the revolution
ary leaders on their arrival. Accordingly, on the
night of the 17th of March, at the head of two hun
dred troops and armed citizens, he made the revolu
tionary governor Aranda prisoner, surprised such
soldiers of the garrison as had not entered into his
designs, and possessed himself of the artillery. He
then proceeded to establish a government council,
which appointed Simon Herrera provisional governor
of the province on the 25th of March. 37 Measures
were now adopted for the seizure of Allende and his
associates. Guile and perfidy were brought into play
without scruple. The regulations of the more refined
civilizations have proper murder and improper mur
der, righteous and unrighteous robbery, holy and
unholy treachery, and the like; but these Spanish
royalists paid little attention to such rational and be
neficent rules. The utmost precaution was taken that
Allende should receive no intelligence of what had
occurred at Monclova, and remarkable as it may seem,
that leader entertained not the slightest suspicion of
the trap which was being laid for him. Advised that
pdvalos. Col. Doc., i. 198-226. The first authority supplies a copy of amani-
repentance.
lo XIX., iii. 137-9.
fest published by Aldama expressing his repentance.
37 Cai'ta de Vela, in Nejrete, Mex. Siglc
ELIZONDO'S PLOT. 273
the revolutionists would arrive at the wells of
on the morning of the 21st, Elizondo arranged to
meet them with all due honors; and on the 19th sal
lied forth with 342 well appointed troops, having in
formed Jimenez that he would welcome them on the
road.
Previous to starting on their ill-starred journey,, a
council was held by the revolutionary leaders in order
to arrange about the chief command and the manage
ment of the cause during their absence. This was on
the 16th, and in turn both Abasolo and Arias who,
as the reader will recollect, played a somewhat du
bious role at Queretaro declined to accept the re
sponsibility. The command was finally given to
Ignacio Rayon, the licentiate Arrieta being his sec
ond, and Jose Maria Liceaga his third officer.
All was now ready for their departure from Saltillo.
Their road lay through a rugged desert in which
water could only be obtained at long intervals and in
small quantities, even when the occasional wells were
not dry. 33 The thirsty men and animals would hast
en to the wells of Bajan to refresh themselves; and
there Elizondo waited for them. The ground was
favorable for his design. Concealed in a recess, he
left in his rear fifty of his men, and in his front placed
an equally well hidden ambush. At nine o'clock on
the morning of the .21st, Allende appeared in sight.
He had left Saltillo with a force of nearly 2,000 men,
twenty-four pieces of artillery, a great quantity of
jewelry, and more than half a million of money. He
was accompanied by all the principal leaders, who, to
the number sixty, travelled in fourteen carriages.
The march across the desert was most toilsome, and
such was Allende's confidence that no military order
was preserved, and a long straggling line enveloped
in dust revealed to Elizondo how easily his design
would be accomplished. The carriages and horsemen
38 Mora, Mcx. y sus Rev., iv. 145, states that the wells were filled up by
Elizondo's order. I see no ground for the assertion.
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 18
274 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
in different groups were far in advance of the main
body, 33 the artillery being slowly dragged along in
the rear.
Fray Pedro Bustamante with five soldiers was the
first to approach. Passing through files drawn up by
Elizondo to receive the chiefs, they were saluted and
unsuspiciously continued their way till they arrived at
the ambush in the rear, where they were compelled to
surrender. Then followed a troop of sixty men, who
were similarly made captive and safely bound. Hith
erto no opposition was met. Presently the first car
riage arrived, escorted by about a dozen soldiers. 40
These attempted to resist, but were overpowered,
and three of them killed. And thus fell into Eli-
zondo's hands the occupants of carriage after carriage,
till all the chiefs were captured with the exception of
Hidalgo, who was far in the rear. Allende, however,
had not yielded without a struggle. . Elizondo called
upon him to surrender. "Traitor!" cried Allende,
and fired. But the shot was without effect. Elizondo
then ordered his men to fire into the carriage. Allende
was accompanied by one of his sons, who was a lieu
tenant-general; also by Jimenez and Arias. By the
discharge his son was shot dead and Arias mortally
wounded. 41 Thereupon Jimenez surrendered him
self, and Allende was overpowered. Both were se
curely bound and conveyed to the rear. The last
to arrive was Hidalgo, who might still have escaped
had any suspicion of these occurrences been excited;
but even the firing created no alarm. When called
upon to surrender, the stout old hero prepared to de
fend himself, pistol in hand ; but his escort, composed
39 This order of march had been suggested by Elizondo. He had sent to
Jimenez a soldier of Monclova, named Pedro Bernal, who said that on account
of the scarcity of water it would be better for the carriages and all the prin
cipal officers to go well in advance of the main body. If all inarched together
the supply in the wells would be quickly exhausted, while by this arrange
ment the wells would be replenished by the time those in the rear came up.
Jimenez replied: 'Pues bien, asi lo hard, me parece muy bien lo que vd. dice.'
Relation, in Hernandez y Ddcalos, Col. Z>oc., ii. 417.
40 It was occupied by women. Cavillo, Sermon, 144.
41 He died a few hours afterward. Ib.; Aeyrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., iii. 146.
FALL OF THE ARMY. 275
of a score of horsemen, intervened and entreated him
to surrender, representing that resistance would be
useless. Finding himself unsupported by his men, he
laid aside his weapon, and with undisturbed serenity
yielded himself a prisoner. Well might he have
cursed Allende, and the want of watchfulness and
generalship that brought them all to such a pass,
after wresting the management from his hands.
So Elizondo's treachery triumphed. In his power
were now all the great chiefs and originators of
the revolution. 42 Never was plot more perfidiously
planned, or more successfully accomplished. Leaving
his prisoners securely bound and in charge of a strong
force, Elizondo at the head of 150 men now marched
against the main body, consisting of some 1,500, a
league behind. The fiofhtin^ was all on one side. The
o o o
artillerymen in the van were slain, a portion of the
troops which followed passed over to Elizondo, and
the rest were dispersed. About forty of the revolu
tionists were slain, 893 taken prisoners, and all their
guns, equipage, and treasure fell into the hands of the
victors. 43
The only person of note who escaped was Iriarta, 44
who fled at the first attack upon the artillery. This,
42 The captured leaders consisted of four members of regular orders, eight
of the secular clergy, and 49 officers of all grades. An official list can be
found in Net/rete, Mex. Sig. XIX., iii. 144-5, and Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col.
Doc., ii. 418-9.
43 This account is mainly from the report of the provisional governor Her-
rera, in Gaz. d$ Mex., 18.11,. ii. 360-3, the same source which supplied Cal-
villo, Alaman, "and Negrete. According to Vela, the amount of treasure
captured in silver bars and coin was about 2,000,000 dollars. Gaz.de Mex.,
ISllj ii. 321. Important documents in lJ^ymajide2 L ^Ddj^a]b^Col^MQC.j^
416-24, 489-90,'-;517-18, have also been consulted /"TsTizoiido met withnw
death not long after. In 1813 he went on an expedition to Texas, and in
Sept. was mortally wounded while in bed by one of his lieutenants, who, it is
asserted, was losing his reason by witnessing the executions ordered by
Elizondo. The name of this avenger of Hidalgo was Serrano. Elizondo died
on the bank of the river San Marcos, and was there buried. Bastamante,
Cuad. Hist. , i. 349-50.
**(>'(&. de Mex., 1811, ii. 320. Negrete, however, considers it doubtful
whether Iriarte accompanied the retreating chiefs. ' Es punto, pues, que no
se puede resolver con datos fehacientes si iria 6 no.' Mex. Sig. XIX., iii.
136-7. Bayon's statement, however, that Allende took Iriarte with him, and
that the latter returned, removes all doubt. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. y
v. 588.
276 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
however, only hastened his doom, for Allende, con
vinced of his perfidy, had left orders with Rayon to
have him beheaded if he returned, which was prompt
ly done. 45 The prisoners were conveyed to Monclova,
and every precaution taken to prevent their escape.
The principal chiefs were lodged in a house provided
for the purpose by Herrera, the others being confined
in the public jail. Great excitement prevailed in the
city, and Elizondo, not considering his captives in
safe keeping, sent to Ochoa, who was approaching
Saltillo, requesting of him a reinforcement of 500 men,
which was immediately despatched to Monclova by
forced marches.
As the capture had been made on territory under
the government of the comandante general of the
interior provinces, it was necessary to send them to
Chihuahua for trial, where resided the brigadier Ne-
mesio Salcedp, who then held that position. On the
26th of March the principal prisoners, 46 including Hi
dalgo, Allende, Jimenez, and Abasolo, as also the reg
ular and secular ecclesiastics, were led forth on their
long journey to that city. Shackled hand and foot,
mounted on miserable beasts of burden, and escorted
by a strong guard, these unhappy men painfully
travelled the two hundred leagues of rough road
which connected the two cities. 47 Their sufferings
were painful in the extreme; even their halt by night
afforded little relief to their strained muscles, as their
45 Manifesto de CallejapublicadoporJuanMartiiiena; Alaman, Hist. Mej.,
ii. 246; Bu*tainantc y Cuad. Hist., i. 199. According to this last author, the
reason for Allende's order was 'porque era seilal dc que habia jugadole otra
nueva perfidia sobre las anteriores. ' Ib. Negrete states that Iriarte'a death
was determined upon because he had failed to attack the royalist army in the
rear during the engagement at Calderon as ordered. Rayon distinctly states
why he was put to death: neglect to render aid in the engagements at Guana
juato and Calderon, though summoned by both Allende and Hidalgo; his
waste of the great treasure which he obtained at San Luis and Zacatecas; and
the grave suspicions of treachery with which his conduct was regarded.
Rayon adds: * Y volvi6 inniciado (sic) de haber influido en la prision de loa
generales.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., v. 588-9.
4(5 Official list of names is given in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 3G5-6.
47 At Parras the commander of the escort, Manuel Salcedo, the governor
of Texas deposed by Casas, sent all the ecclesiastics with the exception of Hi
dalgo to Durango. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 48.
ACCUSATIONS AND DEPOSITIONS. 277
fetters were never for a moment removed. On the
23d of April they reached their destination. The
comandante Salcedo had already made ready for
the occasion. It was not every day Chihuahua of
fered such a spectacle as Hidalgo and his generals
conducted in chains through her streets! So on the
21st Salcedo issued a proclamation granting permis
sion to all the inhabitants of the city to witness the
entrance of the prisoners, and prescribing rules to be
observed on the occasion, the infringement of which
would be visited with severe punishment. Any ex
pression of either sympathy or hate was forbidden. 48
Having passed through this ordeal, the prisoners
were incarcerated without removal of their fetters, in
the places assigned for that purpose. 49
On the 25th Juan Jose liuiz de Bustamante was ap
pointed to draw up the preliminary proceedings for
their trial; and on the Gth of May following a mili
tary court was established, composed of a president,
auditor, secretary, and four voting members. The
prosecution rested entirely upon the declarations of
the prisoners, special judges being appointed to ex
amine them and take their depositions. These were
then submitted to the above-mentioned tribunal, which
pronounced its verdict in accordance, and passed sen
tence. The members of the court were Manuel Sal
cedo,^ president; Rafael Bracho, auditor; and captains
Pedro Nolasco Carrasco, Jose Joaquin Ugarte, and
Simon Elias Gonzalez, three of the voting members. 51
Angel Abella, the director of the postal service at
Zacatecas, 52 was appointed on the same day on which
48 No groups were allowed to be formed nor any weapons carried ; the in
habitants were to take position in files, two or three deep, on each side of
the streets, and return to their occupations as soon as the prisoners were in
carcerated. Sliced-"), Bci;ido, in Id., i. 5-6.
49 Hidalgo, Alleiide, Jiuui Aldania, and Jimenez were confined in separate
apartments of the college of the expelled Jesuits. The other chiefs were
lodged in the Franciscan convent. Ncyrete, Max. Si.<j. XIX., iii. 143-30.
50 The late governor of Texas, who conducted the prisoners to C.iihuahua.
51 1 have nob been able to discover the names of the secretary and fourth
voting member.
52 He escaped with difficulty, through the assistance of the conde de San-
278 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
the court was formed to take the depositions of Hi
dalgo, Allende, Juan Aldama, and Jimenez. On the
7th he commenced his duties. It would be out of place
to enter into the details of the numerous depositions.
Hidalgo and Allende, instead of favoring, rather op
posed each other.
Allende had met with much to trouble him since
his seizure of the general management and his fail-
o O
ure. 53 It had been a fearful responsibility, for he well
knew that failure was almost certain death. Hidalgo
was mild and moderate in all his actions and expres
sions. He could make allowances for the temper of
the soldier, and for so good a soldier as Allende, and
one engaged in so noble a cause; he could even forgive
the unjust reproaches of a friend, but he could not
forget the sad failure, the lost cause no! it was not
lost. As sure as the sun continued to rise and set,
the grito de Dolores would never cease ringing
throughout the land till Mexico was free !
The deposition of Abasolo displayed the character
of that leader as one of the most pusillanimous. He
never had been greatly trusted by his associates.
)uring the latter days of disaster his lukewarm-
ness had been apparent, and now, in peril of his
life, he left no means untried, however dastardly, to
save it, accusing everybody while shielding himself.
He had known nothing, he testified, about the revo
lution until the grito de Dolores had gone forth; he
had attempted to give Colonel Canal at San Miguel
information; he had wished at the commencement to
separate himself from the rebellion every one of
which statements was a lie. Though he had been
made colonel, and after that major-general, he was
withal a coward. When Hidalgo attacked Guana-
tiago de la Laguna, from that city, when it fell into the hands of the insur
gents. Alaman, J/iftl. Mcj., ii. 19.
53 Hidalgo claimed that it was by order of Allende that the Europeans at
Matehuala and oilier places were killed, and Allende charged Hidalgo with
being the cause of all the evils which had befallen them; he confessed that
he wished. to poison him. llernandtz y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 14-15, 39.
TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS. 279
juato, he remained in the house of his friend Pedro
Otero during the contest, and though he was present
at the battle of Calderon, it was not with a willing
heart, he said, and he was one of the first to flee!
His accusations against the leaders of the insurgents
were villanous; he brought unjustly on Hidalgo's
minister, Chico, a doom which otherwise he would
have escaped. 54 Between Abasolo's inherent base
ness and the high-minded conduct of his wife. Dona
Maria Manuda cle Rojas y Taboada, his worthless life
was spared to him. Of all the principal promoters of
the revolution, he alone did not hesitate to crawl away
from a death which posterity will forever proclaim
glorious. His property was confiscated, his offspring
was attainted, and he was condemned to ten years im
prisonment. He was sent to Cadiz and incarcerated
in the castle of Santa Catarina, where he ended his
days, attended and consoled to the last by his faith
ful wife. 55
The trials were conducted with every possible de
spatch, and on the 10th of May three of the cap
tives were led forth to execution. 56 On the llth two
more met the same fate, and on the 6th of June five
others, among whom was Mariano Hidalgo, brother of
the general. Allende suffered on the 26th of the
same month, in company with Jimenez, Juan Aldama,
arid Manuel Santa Maria, the governor of Monterey ;
54 Cbico Lad been regarded as a prisoner of minor importance, and was left
in Moiiclova. When Abasolo testified that he transacted Hidalgo's cabinet
business, and had been appointed by him in Guadalajara minister of grace
and justice, orders to send him to Chihuahua were despatched to the author
ities at Monclova. This sealed his fate; he was condemned and executed.
Ala-man, Hist. Mej., ii. 18G-7.
55 He died in 1819. Mora, Mex.-y.ms Rev., iv. 152. Negrete states that
he was imprisoned for life, although producing an official document in which
the term of his imprisonment is given as ten years. Mcx. Sir/. XIX., iii. 203.
See also Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 48, and Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii.
190-1. Abasolo's wife after his death returned to New Spain, where she de
voted herself to the benevolent assistance of the unfortunate, and the educa
tion of her son JRafael. Ib.
56 Ignacio Camargo, who had carried to Biaiio Hidalgo's summons to sur
render; Juan Bautista Carrasco, brigadier; and Agustin Marroquin, a crim
inal liberated at Guadalajara, and employed by Hidalgo to conduct the mas
sacre of Spaniards there. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 76, 41.
280 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
and on the following day the unfortunate Chico and
three others were put to death. 57 All these victims
to the cause of independence were shot with their
backs to the firing platoons as traitors, and their prop
erty confiscated.
With regard to the prisoners who had been left in
Monclova and those -who had been sent to Durango,
the more prominent of the former were shot, the
common soldiers being condemned to imprisonment.
In the case of the friars and clergy, more formality
had to be observed out of respect to ecclesiastical ju
risdiction. Six of them were condemned to death,
but their clerical degradation was necessary before
they could be executed according to established form.
Doctor Olivares, the bishop of Durango, however, re
fused to degrade them, and angry passages were inter
changed between him and the intenderite Bonavia on
the matter. The prelate was inflexible, but the in-
tendente was not to be defeated. By his command
the condemned priests were brought from their cells
without" their ecclesiastical robes, and so executed.
Their bodies were then dressed in the habiliments of
their respective orders and delivered to the cura for
burial. 53
The execution of Hidalgo was for some time de
layed by these ecclesiastical formalities. On the 14th
of May the bishop of Durango commissioned Fran
cisco Fernandez Valentin, canon of that cathedral, to
act as ecclesiastical judge in the case; and to him had
been submitted by the military court the declarations
taken by Abella. On the 14th of June they were
approved by him and ordered to be returned to the
auditor Bracho. The arrival of additional evidence,
however, still protracted Hidalgo's trial, and it was
not until the 3d of July that Bracho presented to
57 Six others were sentenced to imprisonment for ten years, with one excep
tion, Andre's Molano being sentenced for life. Jd. , 70.
'^Negrete, Mex. Sly. XIX., iii. 323-4. This author supplies a copy of
Bonavia 's order for the execution, which contains an injunction that the pla
toons were not to lire at their heads.
COURAGE AND CALMNESS. 281
the court his opinion, advocating sentence of death. 59
But before this sentence could be either pronounced
or executed, civil and canonical law required, as in
the case before mentioned, that the prisoner should be
degraded and formally handed over by the ecclesi
astical judge to the secular authorities. Bishop Oli-
vares was unable from age and infirmity to undertake
the tedious journey in order to perform these cere
monies in person, 63 and a further delay was caused
by the demurs of Dr Valentin, who hesitated to act
upon the authorization first extended him by the
bishop, 61 and suggested that Hidalgo should be sent
to Durango. The prelate, however, explained his
right to delegate his powers under certain difficul
ties to another, and confirming Valentin's previous
commission, expressed the expectation that he would
at once proceed in the matter. 62 Accordingly, on
the 27th of July, with the cura, the chaplain of
the army, and the local superior of the Franciscan
convent as his associates, he pronounced the sentence
of degradation against Hidalgo, 63 and on the 29th
proceeded to carry it into execution by divesting him
of his sacerdotal robes, according to the prescribed
form of the church.
In clerical habit Hidalgo was conducted into the
presence of the ecclesiastical commissioner judge, and
for the first time since the day of his capture was re
leased from the fetters which oppressed him. Then
he was robed in the sacred vestments of his priestly
59 A copy of Bracho's dictamen is supplied in Id., iii. 192-8. No dis
graceful death he considers would be too severe a punishment for the atroci
ties committed by Hidalgo. But he respects his priestly calling, 'pero es
Ministro del Altisimo, marcado con el indeleble caracter de Sacerdote de la
ley de gracia,' and as there was neither hangman nor gallows, he proposed
that he should bo shot.
60 The ceremony of degradation of a priest could only be performed by the
bishop, according to canonical law.
C1 ' Autorizo a U. en debida forma, para cuanto se le ofrezca en la caiisa del
espresado cura Hidalgo hasta llegar en caso urgente y necesario a degradarlo.'
Zcf.,iii. 199.
6 - His letter is dated July 18th. Id., 214-16.
63 A copy of the sentence is supplied in Id., iii. 229-30, and Hernandez y
JDuvalos, Col. Doc., i. 5o-7.
282 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
calling, and, on his knees before the judge, heard him
explain to the assembled witnesses of the ceremony
the cause of his degradation. The sentence was now
read to him, after which his sacerdotal garments were
taken from him, and he was handed over to the secu
lar authorities, an earnest appeal being made by the
ecclesiastical judge that his punishment might be miti
gated, so that neither the death penalty nor mutila
tion should be imposed. 64 When the ceremony was
ended, Hidalgo was again fettered and conducted to
his cell.
Before daybreak on the morning of the 31st of
July, 63 Hidalgo was led forth from the prison in which
he had been confined for more than three months.
With his usual perfect tranquillity, he had received
those sent to take him to the place of execution, and
having finished his last breakfast, 66 he rose and indi
cated that he w r as prepared to accompany them. The
place selected was an enclosed court in the rear of the
hospital ; and as he slowly proceeded thither, impeded
by his shackles, his fortitude and serenity did not for
a moment desert him. Remembering that he had left
some sweetmeats under his pillow, he stopped and re
quested that they might be brought to him. These
he distributed among the soldiers that composed the
firing platoons, assuring them of his forgiveness.
Aware that orders had been given not to fire at his
head, and as it was not yet light, he told them that in
order to guide their aim he would place his hand over
his heart. After being bound upon the seat of execu
tion, raising his hand without a tremor to his breast,
he reminded the soldiers that it was the mark at which
64 Id., i. 57-S. This ceremony was called the degradacion verbal y real.
65 This is the date given by Negrete. Max. Sifj. XIX., iii. 339. The 27th,
as reported in the official document supplied to Cruz and bearing date of Sept.
5, 1811, is obviously a mistake, since Hidalgo was degraded on the 29th.
Id., 268. Bustamante, followed by Alaman, states that Hidalgo was ex
ecuted 'al tercero dia de haberse verificado la llamada degradacion.' Ouad.
Hist., i. 262.
66 Observing that less milk than usual had been supplied him, he requested
that he might have the same quantity as previously, observing that though it
was his last, he ought not on that account to drink less of it. Ib.
ANALYSIS OF CHARACTER. 283
they were to aim. Then the signal was given and the
platoon fired. Though one bullet pierced his hand, it
failed to touch the heart, and Hidalgo still remained
erect in his seat, uttering words of prayer. A second
volley was discharged, cutting the cords which secured
him. He now fell upon the ground, but life was not
yet extinct; and it was only after three more shots
were fired, the muskets being held close to his breast,
that he breathed his last. 67
The heads of Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and Jime
nez were sent to Guanajuato, and suspended in iron
cages at the four corners of the alhondiga. Their
bodies were interred in the chapel of the third order
of Franciscans in Chihuahua, where they remained
till 1823, when, by order of congress, the remains
were transferred with the skulls to the cathedral of
Mexico, where they were deposited with solemn hon
ors in the chapel of los Reyes, the former burial-place
of the viceroys, and later that of the presidents of
the republic. 63
67 Excu dero, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 603-4; Neyrete, Mex.
Sifj. XIX., iii. 335-6; Bustamante, CuaL Hist., i. 262-3. During his incar
ceration Hidalgo had been attended by a corporal named Ortega and Melchor
Guaspe, a Spaniard of Majorca. These men treated him with great consider
ation, and in token of his gratitude, the evening before he was executed he
wrote on his prison walls with a piece of charcoal two stanzas, which were
preserved, with the exception of one line. They are as follows:
Ortega, tn criun^a fina,
Tu hulolo y o.st.lo ainable
* Siempro to liar 11 aprt-ciable
Aun con jronto peregriua.
Tionc proti-ccion Divuia
La piedad quo has ejorcido
Con uu pobre desvalido
Quo manana va .\ niurir,
Y no puedo rc'tribuir
Kingun favor rccibido.
Melchor, tu buen corazon
Ha adunado ion pericia
Lo quc pidu la.justicia
Y exijo la companion ;
Das consticlo al dcsvalido
En cuanto to os penniiido %
Partes cl postro con ^1
Y agradecido Miyut-l
To da las gracias rcndido.
Id., 270-1. This apophthegm was also found written on a wall of his cell:
'La lengua guarda el pescuezo' The tongue ia guardian of the breast. Ala-
man, Hint. Mej., ii. 206.
68 Consult official documents in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii.
605-11.
284 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
Since the beginning in 1810 of Hidalgo's short ca
reer, he has been held in varying esteem, at different
times and by different persons and classes. He has
been placed in about every category of humanity, and
adjudged to be of every order of being, every shade
of quality, from an angel of light to a bloody-minded
and revengeful monster. A brief analysis of his char
acter, from a standpoint intended to be impartial,
brings the following results:
We will take it for granted that the cause in which
he engaged was just, that the impulses prompting to
it were noble; for it is not necessary to say at -this
day that it is right to overthrow tyranny, to achieve
liberty, to deliver one's country, or that his memory
should be held in holy repute who lays down his life
for these things.
Before embarking in his high enterprise, Hidalgo
was an humble priest, of more than ordinary gentle
ness of nature, and refinement of intellect and culture.
Some have sought to besmear his fair fame with
o
charges of conduct not consistent with strict morality;
but nothing of moment has ever been proved against
him in this direction; and were it so, those who hold
such matters in such serious esteem will have little
to say if they will examine into the state of society
in the place and at the time he lived. It shows a
small mind to attempt thus to belittle great men;
and it is still worse when the charges brought forward
are palpably false.
Almost without knowing it, and surely before he
intended it, 69 this gentle priest found himself at the
head of his people crying aloud to heaven for liberty,
swearing to heaven that his country should be free I
It has been said of him that he was not a great gen
eral; he never pretended to be one. He has been
charged with extreme cruelty. From some stand-
69 In his declaration he states that he decided to join the revolutionary
party very suddenly, 'y que su inclinacion a la Independencia fue" lo que le
oblig6 4 decidirse con tanta ligereza 6 lliimase frenesi.' Hernandez y l)dva-
los, Col. Doc., i. 10.
THE NATION'S HONORS. 285
points this, no doubt, is true; but the time and place
must be remembered, and also that it was the cruelty
of the surgeon to save the body rather than that of
the savage who delights in torture. Hidalgo had his
work to do ; if cruelty could not be avoided, then there
must be cruelty. He would purchase the highest bene
faction within the reach of humanity; if robbery and
murder were part of the price, still it must be paid.
Yet for all this, judging the man fairly, passing under
review his past life and his present purpose, his mind,
heart, and disposition, and I do not think he can be
called cruel, revengeful, and bloody-minded, as some
would stamp him. War is a great wickedness; and
if this species of robbery and murder may ever be
justified, there is so little difference between the
orthodox article arid the quality of reprisal as prac
tised in the present crusade that it is not worth dis
cussing.
Some have said that Hidalgo's intention was to es
tablish a republic; it may have been so, but it is no
where shown. Zavala holds to the contrary opinion.
There appears to have been no political or military
plan adopted by the leaders of the revolution, hurried
along as they were upon a tide of events which they
could hardly control.
The large class in Mexico, of those who ever since
the grito de Dolores have seemed to delight in gath
ering evidence and making charges damaging to the
fair name of Hidalgo, is gradually becoming less.
I would hide nothing in any historical character. I
would not be blind to the faults of my hero. Neither
would I magnify flaws of character until a little fault
is made to appear larger than a great principle.
Moreover, there has been much speculation as to
what would have been the result had he pursued a
different course, His firmness of purpose and opinion
has been called obstinacy, because he would not yield
to Allende and the others. Had he marched on Mex
ico; had he retired part of his force to the mountains
286 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.
and drilled them, dismissing the great rabble and his
army of pillagers; had he proclaimed a system of
liberal institutions; had he been slower to rob and
butcher Spaniards; had he better protected the Creoles;
had he done 'differently in a hundred other ways the
result would have been different. Doubtless. But the
question is not what might have come to pass if the
prime mover in Mexican independence had been a
different man and acted differently. As it is, though
not without his faults, Mexico may well be proud of
her hero. Let his memory be honored! Let his
name be enrolled among the world's champions of lib
erty!
His countrymen, grateful to one who, in the gloomi
est hour of hope, stood forth so fearlessly as their de
fender, have rightly embalmed his memory; and his
name, growing brighter and brighter as the ages
pass, will be handed down unsullied to remotest
generations. 70
70 On the 19th of July, 1823, a congressional decree was passed, declaring
Hidalgo and the other principal leaders in the struggle for independence to
be ' benemdritos de la patria en grail o her6ico,' and ordered a monument in
their honor to be erected in Chihuahua. Gaz. de Mex., 5 de Agosto, 1823;
Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 005. In 1863 Benito Juarez, having re
tired with the government to Dolores on account of the French invasion,
passed a decree elevating the town to the rank of city, and ordering that a
monument bearing a statue of Hidalgo should be erected in the principal
plaza. He pronounced the house in which Hidalgo had lived to be the prop
erty of the nation, and provided that it should be protected and preserved in
its original state so far as possible, at the expense of the government. Id., ii.
611. In 1873 the congress decreed that the national flag should be annually
hoisted on the 8th of May, Hidalgo's birthday, and raised half-mast high on
the 30th of July in commemoration of his death. Id., ii. 614-15. President
Porfirio Diaz in 1878 ordered that the monument at Dolores, which had
hitherto not been erected, should be built. The estimate of its cost was
$40,000, which amount was covered by pro rata contributions levied upon
the states. In the same year General Diaz decreed that a monument should
also be erected in Hidalgo's honor on the spot where he was executed in Chi
huahua. Id., ii. 615-19. In the Gazeta de Mexico of August 3, 1811, was
published an alleged copy of a declaration professed to be Hidalgo's solemn
recantation of his errors, made some weeks before his death, and dated Chi
huahua, May 18, 1811. This spurious statement was probably promulgated
in order to turn independents against the cause. It is superfluous to deny
such an assertion. No attempt which can properly be called such was ever
made to establish its truth. He who for a moment could hold to such an
opinion totally misconceives the character of the man. To death Hidalgo was
indifferent; and he would be the last man on earth to uphold to his followers,
according to the tenor of this declaration, the enormity of their crime in re-
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 87
belling against the government, and to entreat them to return to their duty.
But this artifice was commonly employed by the royalists; to almost every
prominent patriot chief who was executed during the war of independence
such a recantation was attributed and published.
The documents which contain the alleged proceedings at the trial of Hi
dalgo, a copy of which is supplied by Hernandez y Davalos in his Col, Doc.,
i. 7-01, aro open to grave doubts as to the authenticity of all the tes
timony produced. Much of the evidence is warped and garbled so as to
represent Hidalgo in the most odious light possible. Many of the admissions
appearing in the documents were never uttered by him, and most of the
statements attributed to other declarants are not to be relied upon as genu
ine. I cannot, however, agree with Negrete, who endeavors to show that
these documents are wholly apocryphal, and 'que esos documentos no pueden
hacer f<3 en ningun sentido, ni considerarse como aute~ntico lo en ellos con-
tenidp.' Mex. Siylo XIX., iii. 274. I have found many of the statements
therein contained corroborated or supported by other authorities of reliabil
ity, and to ignore entirely the Declaration del cura Hidalgo and the accom
panying papers would scarcely be wise.
The official organs of the government naturally magnified the successes
of the royalists and the reverses of the revolutionists. Pompous reports
from generals narrating victories were invariably published, but many of
their despatches which represented the true conditions of affairs were con
signed to the secrecy of the government archives, from which they have
been brought to light by different researchers, as Bustamante, Hernandez y
Davalos, and Negrete, and used by numerous authors. With regard to
those published during the war, they are valuable and reliable in so far as
they represent the movement of armies, the general results of engagements,
and a broad view of the condition of the country. But in regard to the re
spective numbers of opposing forces, of insurgents killed and casualties sus
tained by the government troops, they are untrustworthy; while from the
documents that were shelved a true picture of the position is obtained.
The press being under the control of the government during Hidalgo's career,
it teemed with productions laboring to advance the royalist cause and hold
up to detestation that of the independents. Learned men printed heavy
essays attempting to prove on philosophical and political grounds the illegal
ity and want of justice in the movement; bishops issued pastorals and long
dissertations arguing on the iniquity of the insurrection and proclaiming the
perdition of the leaders; and poets sang the praises of the royalist command
ers, comparing them with the heroes of antiquity and renowned Roman gen
erals. Calleja was superior to Fabius Maximus, and Cruz the supporting
pillar of the tottering nation. The adulation was truly affecting ! In honor
of Calleja Dr Jose Mariano Beristain composed a drinking-song drawing a
parallel between him and Fabius; to which the oider Melchor de Foncerrada
replied with the following decastich, supplied by Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.,
iv. 394-5:
Fabio gano retirando,
Calleja acometiendo,
El Fubio triunfj cansando;
Pero Calleja venciendo :
Y ti lo poco quo yo cntiendo
En cl arte militar,
No so puedo comparar
Un Fabio con un Callcjas,
All'i hubo accioncs porplexas;
Todo aqul puro triuniar.
Effusions of minor geniin, too, swarmed, scurrilous in abuse, vile in vitupera
tion, against the one side, and sickening with flattery and sycophant hom
age offered to the other. But no language, however shameful, however fal
lacious, was unpalatable to government, if it brought odium upon the
revolution.
General list of authorities for the last four chapters: Bustamante, Cam-
paftas de Calleja, 1-103, passim; Id., Cuad. Hist., i. 20-292, 437-42, iv. 53-
288 HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH,
61, 74-87, 526-7, ap. 1-4; Id., in Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 333; Id., Gdbinete
Mex., i. 114; Id., Voz Patria, v. sup. no. 3; Alaman,_Hi& Hex., L 75-6,
124-5, 224, 259, 350-4, 392-3, 44G-7, 504, ap. 77, ii.~2-77, 114-72", 182-282,
438-9, 544-8, ap. 31-4, iii. ap.75, iv. 77, 724, ap. 60-2; Mora, Rev. Mex., iv.
3_4, 49_SO, 114-60, 217-34, 440-2; Id., Obras Sueltas, i. 145-56; Zerecero,
Rev. Mex., 28-95, 109-92, 207-93, 299-303, 3GS, 384; Id., Discxrso Civ., 29-
34; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. and ii.. passim, iii. 246-7, 291, 339,
399-401, 404-23, 618-20, 693-4, 705-22, 733-47, 762-4, 873-903, 911-26, iv.
176-81, 672-3, 882-90, v. 87-9, 588-9, 801-4, 886; Dispos. Variat, ii. f. 5-10,
iii. f. 152, vi. f. 59, 61; Diario Mex., v. 210, xii. 447-8, xiii. 340, 38G-7, 390-
6, 425-7, 453-6, 471-2, 709-10; Ncgrete, Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX., i. 103, 169-
205, 255-3, 280-312, 319-32, 336-67, 372-404; Gaz. Mex., i. 1764-5, 17-288,
313-80, 431-8, 474-82, 488, 507-14, 556-8, 565-6, 593-6, 012-10, 624, 656-60,
675-6, 681, 705-30, 746-74, 785-94, 814-66, 873-4, 881-2, 008-28, 943, 955-6,
991-2, 1039-34, 1049-72, 1082-6, ii. 1811, 1-281, passim, 309, 453-4, 467-8,
684-8, 763-70, 969-70, iii. 1788-9, 217-18, 247, 366, 405, 415, iv. 1793-1, 25-
85, 117-19, 141, 174-5, 295-6, 301-8, 337-8, 389-413, v. 1792-3, 141, 181-3,
245, vi. 1794, 9, 397, 417, 637, vii. 1795, 9-10, 25-0, 121, 154, 335, viii. 1796-
7, 9, 33, 165, 197, 237,. ix. 1800-1, 1, 58, 81-2, 137-8, 18J, 231-2, 241, xi.
1802-3, 1, 17, 177, 217, 253, xii. 1804-5, 117-20, 164-5, 221, xiv. 1807, 46-7,
xv. 1808, 75, 673, 734; Cortes, Col. Decret., i. 6-7, 10, 20-4, 23-33: Id., Diario,
1811, v. 175; Id., 1811-12, xi. 282-3; Id., 1813, xx. 205-C; Id., Diario Extr.,
1822-3, viii. 18-19; Cavo, Tres Sig., ii. 172, iii. 194-5, 272-33; Guerra, Rev.
N. Espana, i. 291, 301-6, 312-15, 317-19, 325-64; Romero, Soc. Mex., viii.
532-5, 543, 555, 610, 621; Id., Noticias, Mich., 34-5, 200-7; / ., in tfoc. Mex.
Geog., viii. 610; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 278-357, 234-8; Lireaga, Adiciones y
Rect., 188-209, 218-19; Robinson, Mex., 29-42; Zavala, Rev. Alex., 48-70;
Alegre, Hist. Comp., i. 88-93, ii. 195; Gaz. Mex., Feb.-Dec. 1728 and 1730, in
Arevalo, Compend., 13-104, 205, 236-7, 283; Vitla-Senor y Sanchez, Teatro
Am., 1-110; Gonzales Ddvila, Teatro Ecles., i. 107-30; Viagero Universal,
xxvii. 87-92; Ward, Hist. Mex. in 1827, i. 158-80; Cancdxda, Tel. Am., 9-15,
26-9, 193-6; Id., RuinaN. Esp., passim; Escakro y Liana, Mex. Hist., 9-10;
Estado de Sinaloa, June 29, 1873, 4; Ilumboldt, Essai Polit., i. 218-56;
Hidalgo, Biog. Cura, 9-18, 135-43; Defeusadel Cura, pp. 8; Exhortation Pat.,
pp. 4; Exhort. Diputados, pp. 16; Exhort. Hob. Mex., pp. 15; Gourdes, Col.
N. Leon, 153, 213-40; Id., Hist. Aguas C., 77-88; Venegas, Manifesto, pp.
10; Id., Ordenanza, 7; Id., Manifiesto, pp. 10; Abad y Queipo, Informe, in
Zamacois, Mex., ix. 857-93; Id., Pastorales, pp. 118, and 8; Id., Edictos
Instruc., pp. 8, 24, and 24; Arroniz, Hist, y Cron., 164-5; Id., fiiog. Mex.,
185; Monglave, Resume Vllist., 133-213; Mendib'd, Resum. Hist., 7-G3, 373-5;
Mex. Rej'ut. Art. de Fondo., 3-18, 25-7; Mnseo, ii. 121-G, 182-9, 529-37, iv.
203-4; Niles, Register, i. 270, ii. 59-60; Perez, Dice. Geog. Estad., i. 117-20,
284-6, 321-6; Pinart, Col. Mex. Doc., 269; Bustamante, in Alegre, Hist.
Comp., iii. 178; Id., in Cavo, Tres Sig., iii. 326-9; Brancifcrte, luxtrucc., MS.,
31, in Linares, Instrucc., MS.; Quarterly Review, vii. 254-7, xxx. 172-4;
Quiros, Voz Imperiosa, pp. 14; Valdovino, Contestation, 1-55; Walton, Expose",
356-64; Ximeno, Declaration, pp. 30; Young, Hist. Mex., 20, 86; Zaftiga,
Calendario, 114, 118; Zamacoi*, Hist. Mex., i. 129, 513, ii. 105, v. 533, 718,
vi. 63, 115-341, passim, 419, 439, vii. 29-337, passim, 650, GG3-77G, 789-800,
viii. 110, ix. 737; Reygadas, Discurso, pp. 35; Luli, Refutation, pp. 24; Bury,
Exodus, ii. 363-4; Beltrami, Mex., i. 384-6; British Quart. Rev., vii. 254-7;
Bincjley, Travels, 240-2; Bolet. Geog. Estad., ii. 17-19; Soc. Mex. Geog., i.
229-30, ii. 561-5, 624-9, 54, 56, 190, 201, v. 160, viii. 306-8, ix. 49; Santos,
Chron., ii. 466-7, 486; Salo, Diar. Ofic., 26 Jan. 1875, 5; Hamox, Derrota
Cruces, iii. passim; Robinson, Mex. and Mil., 29-43; Id., Mex. R< j v., i. 43-1;
Rev. in Span.- Am., 63-4; Rev. des Deux Mondes, Apl. 1, 18G2, 532-48; Pino,
Nuev. Mex., 44; Puerto, Convite, pt iii. 2-3; Payne, 302-4; Ponton, Earth
quakes and Vol., 279-82; Pan. Star and Herald, Sept. 29, 1866; Ponsett,
Notes on Mex., ap. 32; Pedroza, Biog. Caudillos, 3-20; Ponce de Leon, in
Medena, VidaS. F. de Jesus, pp. 147; Nouo. Annales, Voy., xxxii. 93; Niles,
FURTHER REFERENCES. 289
S. Am. and Alex., i. 134-42; Nevares, Memoria, pp. 71; Nuev. Esparia, Acuer-
dos, MS., 185; Id., Brev. Res., ii. 247-50; Moreno, Fragments, 89; Mich. Prov.
S. Nic., 102-5, 182-4, 188-91, 189-96, 200-6; Mateo, Sacerdote, 22; Monaico
Mex., ii. 345; Muller, Reisen in Mex., 227; Montiel y Duarte, Discurso, 18;
Mills, Hist. Mex., 145-9; Mayer, Mex. Aztecs, i. 283-6, ii. 286-7; Martinez,
tiinop. Hist. Mex. Rev., i. 31-58; Id., de los Rios Apuntes, pp. 18; Mex. hi-
formes, in Pacheco Doc., xv. 451-2; Mex., Mem. Guerra, 1834, pp. 4; Mex.,
Col. de Ley. D. C., 63-7, i. 27; Ramos, El Puente de Calderon, pp. 214; Al-
zate, Gazetas, iv. 163; Gac. 2?ic., 27 Jan:. 1866, 30; Apunt. Hist., in Pan. BoL
Ojic., 27 May, 1868; Pinart, Col.; A.liren, Mex. and Mex. Indians, 5-11;
Abbott, Mex. and U. S., 41-2; Ansorena, Defensa, pp. 31; Id., Respuesta, pp.
54; Valladolid, Exhortacion, pp. 19; Vdasco, Observations, pp. 17; Verdia,
Apuntes Biog., in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iv. 180-1; Ortiz, Mex. In-
dep. Libre, 9-49; Gomez del Campa, Apuntes Hist., from La Sombra de Zara-
(joza, in La Estrella de Occidents, Sept. 4, 1868, 3; Gregory, Hist. Mex., 48-
51; Gallo, Hornbres Ilustres, iii. 237-392; Garcia Conde, in Soc. Mex. Geog.,
v. 279; Garcia y Garcia, Prosperidades, pp. 11; Guerra, Doc., vi. 161-7; Gaz.
de Mex., ser. 2, in Doc. Hist. Mex., ser. 2, iv..!70; Gregg, Commerce of the
Prairies, ii. 116-17; Findlay, Directory, i. 254; Florencia, Hist. Prov. Comp.
Jesus, 212-14; Ferry, Scenes de la Vie, 1-27; Ferri, Escenas de Vid. Mil. Mex.,
4-12, 82-4, 95-6, 192-5; Frost, Hist. Mex., 148, 152-3; Convite Catdlicos Am.,
pp. 12; Mex. Fiel y Valiente, pp. 7; Montana, Reflexiones, pp. 22; Calvillo,
JJiscurso, pp. 16; Monterde, Proclama, pp. 11; Criollo Sensible, Proclama, pp.
4; Mex., A locution del Real Colegio de Abogados, pp. 34; Carta de un Con-
colega, pp. 8; Belderrain, Exhortacion, pp. 20; Mendizdbal, Sermon, pp. 11;
L. B. F. G., Proclama, pp. 9; Campo y Rivas, Manifiesto Filantrdp., pp. 20;
Campillor, Manifiesto, pp. 20; La Erudita, Dialogo, pp. 7; Plausible Gozo, pp.
4; Celebridad Nues. Independ., pp. 8; Beristain, Nos el Presidente, pp. 15;
"; /te
Mex., Parto Of.cial del Gefe Realista, pp. 38; Collado, Informe, pp. 12;
esta al Papel, pp. 20; Cor. Fed. Mex., 18 Ener. 1827, 2-3; Pleitos, no. i.; An
sorena, Defensa, 17; Ctirdova, Hist. Elemental, passim; Cuevas, Porvenir M ex. ,
19-28; Conder, Mex. and Guat., 120; Calle, Mem. y Not., 70, 72-3, 75; Romero,
in Soc. Mex. Geog., viii. 610-11; Sanchez, Villa Pueb. Sagrad. Prof., 124;
Scrope on Volcanoes, 261-70; Son. Libro Hacienda, 1770, MS., 92; S. Amer. and
M(>X., i. 148-56; San Salvador (A. P. F. de), Action de Gracias, pp. 8; Id.,
Carta de un Padre, pp. 4; Id., Mem. Christ. -ffolit. , pp. 30; San Salvador (F.
F.), Reflexiones, pp. 17; Toral, Desengano de Falsas Imposturas, pp. 35;
Fossey, Mex., 502; Torrente, Rev. Hispan.-Am., i. 230-4; Iglesias ReL, 239;
Ilurribania, in Soc. Mex. Geog., vii. 291; Igl.esias, Intervention, ii. 7-8; Illust.
Mex., 219-28; Provincias Intern., in Mayer, MS., no. 7; Derecho, i. 13-264;
ii. 10-456, iii. 31-396, iv. 60-531, v. 13-313; Cmdadde Mex., Proclama, pp.
10; Centinela contra los Seductores, nos. i. ii. aiid iii. pp. 12; Diar. de Mex.
Jueves, 8 Agos. 1811, pp. 4; Diar. Ofic., Mch. 12 and 13, 1879; Id., Sept. 15,
1883; Dice. Univ. Hist. Geog., i. 8-9, 12-13, 19, ii. 34-9, 62-3, iv. 453-8, v.
335-70, x. 694; Derecho Intern. Mex., pt iii. 118; Dunbar. Mex. Papers, 220;
Rios, Hist. Mex., 237-51; D'Avity, De*crip. Gentrale Amer., 80-1; Diaz Cal
villo, Sermon, 135-40; Dufey, Resume, ii. 190-232; Descrip. Valladolid, in Col.
dcDiarios, MS., 239; Pinart Col; Discurso, Prelimin., Madrid, 1820, pp. 120,
in Constitutions, ii. ; Hassel, Mex. and Gnat., 146-55; Kennedy, Texas, i. 271;
Hernandez, Estad. Mej., 18; Kendall, Nar., ii. 69-75; Las Clases Produc-
toras, Sept. 15, 1878; Lizana y Beaumont, Exhortacion, pp. 10; Id., Carta
Gratulatoria, pp. 5; Last Amer. Descript., 263, 268-71; Lowenstern, 346-8;
Sammlung, Reisebesch., xiii. 481-2; La Ilust. Mex., iv. 212, 271; Lefevre, Doc.
Maxim., i. 13-22; Leon, Cura de Sant. de Queret., pp, 3; Linares, Cuadro
Sinoptico, in Mex. Soc. Geog. BoL, 2 a ep. iv. 637-8.
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 19
CHAPTER XII.
MORELOS AND RAYON.
1811.
STATE or THE REVOLUTION AFTER HIDALGO'S CAPTURE BIOGRAPHY OF Mo-
RELOS His CHARACTER His MEETING WITH HIDALGO AND COMMISSION"
MORELOS IN MlCHOACAN THE ROYALIST PARIS DEFEATED MORELOS
MARCHES TO CHILPANCINGO THE FAMILY OF THE BRAVOS CAPTURE OF
TIXTLA DEFEAT OF THE ROYALIST FUENTES A CONSPIRACY SUPPRESSED
RAYON RETREATS FROM SALTILLO HE DEFEATS OCHOA A TERRIBLE
MARCH THE PLATFORM OF THE INSURGENT LEADER RAYON EVACUATES
ZACATECAS TRUJILLO'S DOINGS IN VALLADOLID RETREAT OF THE IN
SURGENTS.
WITH the heads of the leaders cut off, many thought
that the revolution was forever at an end. ' And so it
might have been had the movement rested in man's
hand that is, had it originated solely with those men,
or with any one set of men, or had it been dependent
for its final success on aught else than the mighty power
of progress. Independence was not an accident. It
had waited its full development in the womb of time,
and now its bringing-forth was certain. The birth of
freedom in America had long been predetermined.
Cut off the head of every revolutionist twenty times,
and twenty times new armies would arise until the
great dragon was slain.
When tidings of the capture of Hidalgo, Allende,
and their army reached Mexico, the rejoicing of the
royalists was great, as we may imagine. The first re
port was conveyed without particulars in a despatch
from Ochoa; and though the viceroy could rely upon
(29J)
ROYALIST REJOICINGS. 291
the statement, 1 and caused the bells to be rung, and
salvoes of artillery to be fired, the independent party
in the absence of details was loath to accept it as true.
Later information, however, confirmed the intelligence,
and despondency prevailed among its ranks. Venegas,
on the contrary, was jubilant, and regarded the suppres
sion of the rebellion as essentially accomplished. But
he did not recognize the extent and degree to which
independent principles had pervaded the lower classes.
It is true that from the sweeping disasters which had
lately been sustained, the ordinary observer might won
der that the cause was not already abandoned. But
during the year 1811, thus far, the insurrection had
spread with surprising rapidity, which had carried it
over the greater portion of New Spain. The aspect of
the revolution was, however, materially changed since
its incipiency, and the struggle had now assumed more
the color of individual and predatory warfare. With
out any form of government, or even a recognized head
after Hidalgo's capture for Rayon's commission as
commander-in-chief was not generally acknowledged
each provincial leader acted independently accord
ing to his pleasure. Arms and money were wanting,
as w r ell as leaders ; and owing to this lack of plan and
principle, and the absence of cohesion, the successes
which they repeatedly gained were but temporary.
Too often, moreover, their chiefs knew little of the
art of war, and many of them were wholly unlettered.
On the other hand, the royalists had among them
leaders not only trained to the military profession, but
of practical experience in warfare. They were in pos
session of nearly all the arms in the country; their
troops were well disciplined; and above all, they held
the ports, and could therefore supply themselves from
abroad. Nevertheless, over a vast area detached
bodies of insurgents sprung into existence, led some
times by noble and patriotic men, but too often by
desperadoes and escaped criminals, who carried on
l Gaz. dellex., 1811, ii. 301-2.
292 MORELOS AND RAYON.
little better than a guerrilla warfare in their vicinity.
Such bands generally kept themselves in impregna
ble positions, making descents upon unprotected towns,
and desolating the surrounding country. Although
the royalist forces occupied all the most important
towns and the immediate vicinities, the revolutionists
gradually gained control over the country at large.
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Zacatecas, and large
portions of Puebla, Vera Cruz, San Luis Potosi, and
Mexico at the close of 1811, were almost completely
in possession of the insurgents; and their enemies,
confined to the fortified cities, were not sufficiently
numerous to assail in all parts the numerous hordes
which infested the country. The main efforts of the
royalists being directed against the better organized
armies of the independents, they could send out only
detachments against such guerrilla bands, as, gather
ing strength, made themselves, from time to time, the
terror of particular districts. In these cases the in
surgents were generally routed and temporarily dis
persed with heavy loss, no mercy being shown to those
taken with arms in their hands. 2 It was, perhaps,
the very best policy the revolutionists could have pur
sued, although adopted without policy these incessant
diversions w T hich weakened the efforts of the royalists,
and rendered useless the concentration of their forces.
There was at this time one man only who stood
forth conspicuous among the revolutionists as an ad
mitted chief, a leader round whom they might with
some degree of confidence rally, a fit successor of Hi-
clalgo; and somewhat strange to say, this new man
was the friend and disciple of Hidalgo, like him an
2 On the 30th of July, 1811, Venegas issued a proclamation to the effect
that the period for which the induito had been extended was expired, and
that such as had not availed themselves of it were to consider themselves ex
cluded, especially those who still continued to excite or aid insurrection. Id.,
690. Nevertheless, it was still not refused to those who begged that it might
be granted to them. Many of those thus pardoned again took part with the
revolutionists when the temporary peril in which they found themselves was
passed. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., ii. 231.
JOSE MARlA MORELOS Y IAVOST. 293
ecclesiastic, and like him a devoted lover of his coun
try. His name was Jose Maria Morelos y Pavon. .
He was born on the 30th of September, 1765, on the
ranch o Tahuejo el Chico, near Apatzingan. 3 His
parents were honest and respectable people, the father,
Manuel Morelos, being a carpenter, and the mother,
Juana Pavon, the daughter of a school-master in
Valladolid. Jose's education was the most element
ary, and on the death of his father, his widowed
mother was in so straitened circumstances that she
gave the care of her son to his uncle Felipe More
los, who owned a mule train, and trafficked between
Mexico and Acapulco. The young man sometimes fol
lowed the train, and sometimes looked after the stock
on the rancho; 4 although his ambition, supported by
his mother's wishes, had ever been a place in the
church. At the age of thirty-two, by great effort
and self-denial, he succeeded in gaining admission into
the college of San Nicolas as a sizar, or servitor. 5
Here he studied natural and moral philosophy under
the guidance of Hidalgo, who was at that time the
rector, and for whom Morelos ever afterward enter
tained the greatest regard and veneration. Having
been ordained, he was appointed temporarily to the
cures of Churumuco and Huacana ; and later the ben
efice of the towns of Caracuaro and Nucupetaro, in
the department of Tacd-mbaro, was conferred upon
him. The stipend of this curato was small, but the
hardships of his early life had instilled into Morelos
habits of frugality, and he managed to save enough
3 Bustamante, Cuad. Hist. , ii. 408. It was generally believed that Valla
dolid was the birthplace of Morelos, and the name of that city was conse
quently changed in 1828 to Morelia, in honor of the patriot. Alaman, how
ever, supports Bustamante. Hist. Mcj., iii. ap. 85. In Id., iv. ap. 47-8, will
be found a copy of Morelos' registry of baptism at Valladolid. The full
name given to him was Jose 1 Maria Teclo.
4 On one occasion, while pursuing a bull, he was thrown senseless from his
horse by coming in contact with the branch of a tree. The blow caused
a permanent scar on his face. Id., ii. 316.
5 The Spanish expression for this grade of collegiate is capense. Some au
thors state that he entered the college at the age of twenty-five. Negrete,
Hist. Mil. Mex. Sig. XIX., i. 313.
294 MOEELOS AND RAYON.
of his income to purchase a modest house in Valla-
dolid in 1801. This dwelling was the only private
property he ever owned.
At the date of the grito de Dolores, Morelos was
about forty-five years of age. He was strong phys
ically, with plenty of brain power. Not above me
dium height, thick-set and solid, he was capable at this
time of great endurance. His complexion was of a
healthy dark brown; eyes clear, dark, and brilliant,
with a glance now quick, searching, magnetic, now
stern and meditative, and again lapsing into profound
reverie. Yet he was no dreamer; he was more man
of the world than Hidalgo, though in regard to learn
ing he would be almost called illiterate beside the sage
of Dolores. But he had sufficient education to an
swer every purpose of his genius, which must ever
be regarded as among the greatest of his age.
There was a whirlwind of energy in his face; the
very atmosphere about him seemed impregnated with
the latent force emanating from his form and presence.
The eyebrows were heavy, and met, giving the coun
tenance an expression of invincible determination.
The shape and size of the head also showed great men
tal power. About the mouth and lower jaw the char
acter lines were deeply traced, features generally well
chiselled, the chin being rounded like Caesar's on a
Roman medal, here again displaying the presence of
an indomitable will. He was grave and gay at once;
if you would dwell upon the former phase of his dis
position, let your eyes rest on the upper part of the
face; if upon the latter, then look at the lower part.
There was about the mouth an expression at times of
almost repulsive firmness, yet tempered always by
frankness; there was about the whole face a harmony
and equilibrium always present in some form and de
gree in great men. His energy was of the devouring
type. In battle his eyes flashed with a sinister light;
his voice assumed a depth of tone which his soldiers
thought was like the thunder of a gocl; and he some-
CHARACTER OF MORELOS. 235
times became so hungry when thus aroused that he
would pause in the heat of fighting and call for some
thing to eat. He thought no more of danger there
than when reciting prayers in the cloister. And not
withstanding all this, in the ordinary affairs of life he
displayed a decided impassiveness, a countenance so
serene as never in the slightest degree to reveal the
workings of the mind. Nor was he lacking in con
versational powers, in courtesy, or even in sprightly
good humor. Nature made him master of all her
varying moods, and gave him the discretion to use them
to good purpose as occasion demanded.
He wore various uniforms during his military ca
reer; before he became a soldier his dress was the
usual habit of a cura, not the extreme priestly robe,
but a long black frock coat, black vest, knee-breeches,
stockings, and buckled shoes. He suffered constantly
from headache, which was greatly relieved by a ker
chief always worn wound round the head, and usually
supplying the place of hat or hood.
The character of Morelos will stand the most
searching scrutiny. Under closest analysis, its strength
and beauty shine brightest. His originality and
sound judgment command our highest admiration.
Together with great military ability, which enabled
him to design wise combinations, he possessed excel
lent discrimination. He knew how to select his offi
cers and agents. Uneducated though he was both in
the arts of war and policy, his marvellous instinct and
prevision, united with sound common sense, gained for
him high renown, not only as war commander, but as
political chief. The most minute affairs and matters
of apparently insignificant importance never escaped
his watchful eye. He recognized the importance of
attention to trifles. It seemed as if everything re
ceived his attention. A rigid catholic, he always con
fessed himself before going into action ; and his relig
ious scruples were such that after his first engagement
he never personally celebrated mass, but delegated
296 MORELOS AND EAYOX.
the performance of that ceremony to an army chap
lain. Like Hidalgo, he has been charged with cruelty;
but reiterated accusations of this kind seem silly as
brought against one who makes it his business to kill
and damage his fellow-creatures for the time as much
as possible. The difference drawn between the kind
man-killer and the cruel one is little else than con
ventional subterfuge. 6 Here in particular it was the
exterminating system of warfare pursued which im
posed upon revolutionary leaders severity and a rig
orous system of death-sentences. The devotion of
Morelos to the cause was unbounded, and his firmness
of soul held him to whatsoever course his judgment
marked out as the best. He was thoroughly consis
tent; for the attainment of independence he spared
neither himself nor his enemies. Serene withal and
impassive, alike in prosperity and disaster, he neither
gave way to arrogant self-assertion nor yielded to
dejection. But conspicuous among all his great qual
ities was his perfect disinterestedness. No personal
motive influenced him in his valiant struggle for lib
erty. His own aggrandizement was what he least
thought of. To decorations and titles earned by his
victories he was wholly indifferent; he preferred the
simple appellation of 'Servant of the Nation.' 7
When Hidalgo moved toward Valladolid after his
capture of Guanajuato, Morelos, whom the news of
the insurrection had already reached, hastened thither
to learn what it all really meant. Hidalgo, however,
had left the city; Morelos followed the army toward
the capital, and overtook Hidalgo at the town of
Charo. Thence he accompanied him to Indaparapeo.
6 'Aquella crueldad calculada, con que friamente volvio sangre por sangre,
y pag6 a sus enemigos centuplicados los males que de ellos recibio.' Such
is Alaman's unfair appreciation of him ! Hist. Mex., ii. 342.
''Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 284-9; jBmtamante, Elogio Morelos; Alarnan,
Hist. Mej., ii. 315-16, 342-4, 423-4; Mex. Refat. Art. Fondo, 12-15; Zere-
cero, Rev. Mex., 154, 401; Zavala, Rev. Mex., 56-8, 63-4, 68-9; GcUlo, Horn-
bresllust.,iv. 7-16.
FAREWELL TO HIDALGO. 297
The cura told him that the only object he had was
the independence of the country, which decided More-
los at once upon his course of action. He offered his
services, and received a commission from Hidalgo to
levy troops as his lieutenant on the southern coast,
and further the cause of independence in conformity
with verbal instructions. 8
The preliminaries for the expedition having been
concluded, Morelos bade farewell to Hidalgo and re
turned to his cure bade him farewell for the last
time, for these two friends and fellow-patriots never
again met I When he arrived at his parish, Morelos,
with all the stern enthusiasm of his nature, applied
himself to the work in which he had engaged. Call
ing to him twenty-five followers, he armed 1 them with
lances and a few muskets, and then directed his steps
to Zacatula. It was an humble beginning, but it led
to mighty results. The want of military organiza
tion in the territory he was invading was favorable
to his designs. The militia companies of the different
towns were wholly undisciplined, were never assem
bled for the purpose of drill or other military instruc
tion, and their arms were stored in the residences of
the commanding officers, most of whom obtained
their positions as a mark of honor, and had never
seen the soldiers they commanded. On the arrival
of Morelos at Zacatula, he was joined by Marcos
8 These instructions were to the effect that Morelos in the towns through
which he might pass should collect the arms and assume and reestablish the
government, reinstating under suitable guaranties those who had previously
held office, provided they were not Europeans; in such cases, he was empowered
to appoint others. Europeans were to be captured by him, and their property
confiscated and used in the payment of his troops. The captives were to be
sent to the nearest intendencia. Opportunity was to be given to such Euro
peans as were married to unite their respective families, in order that they
might retire to their own country, or be removed to some island which would
be selected for their destination. The main object of this expedition to the
south was the capture of the port of Acapulco. Declaration de Morelos, in
Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., vi. 18. Negrete, who evidently never saw
the declaration of Morelos, quotes a long passage out of Alainan, who very
clearly, and almost in Morelos' own words, recounts the particulars of this
interview between the two leaders. The language of Alaman is mystery and
confusion, however, to Negrete, who naively confesses that he does not under
stand him. Hist. Mil. Mex. Sig. XIX., i. 317.
298
MORELOS AND RAYON.
Martinez, captain of the militia cavalry of that port,
with fifty men well provided with arms. 9 Thence
Morelos marched to Petatlan. Success again attended
him. Gregorio Valdeolivar, the captain in command,
was in the city of Mexico at the time, and Morelos,
having surprised and captured his wife, compelled her
to deliver up the keys of the quarter in which the
arms were stored. By this procedure he obtained
possession of fifty additional muskets, and as many
lances. His forces were also increased by more than
100 men. Henceforward the progress of Morelos
was rapid; and on his march to Acapulco followers
daily flocked to his standard. Passing through Tec-
pan, Zanjon, and Coyuca, he arrived at Aguacatillo,
his forces now numbering 3,000, all well armed with
muskets, swords, and lances. Unlike Hidalgo, Mo
relos would not permit the rabble to follow him; he
would not have an army of undisciplined and re
fractory men; he confined himself to a small but
efficient force. At Tecpan he won to the cause the
Galeana family, whose chief members soon distin-
9 Martinez accompanied Morelos during the first five months of the cam
paign, and was then sent back to Zacatula with the title of comandante of
that port, to which the prisoners taken in future were sent. Declaration de
Morelos, 19.
ADVANCE ON ACAPULCO. 299
guished themselves by their bravery and abilities,
and were selected by Morelos as his principal officers.
There were three brothers of them, Juan Jose, An
tonio, and Hermenegildo, and they proved devoted
followers of Morelos, and greatly assisted him with
men and arms.
From Aguacatillo, Morelos advanced against Aca-
pulco, whither Captain Antonio Fuentes, coman-
dante of Tecpan, had fled on the approach of the in-
surcrents. Sending forward a detachment of 700 or
O O
800 men under Cortes and Rafael Valdovinos to
occupy the height of Yeladero, which commands the
port, they engaged on the 13th of November, 1810,
with a force of 400, which Carreiio, the governor of
Acapulco, despatched against them under the com
mand of Luis Calatayud. The affair took a some
what ludicrous turn. Neither royalists nor revolu
tionists had ever been in action before, and after some
desultory firing, both threw down their arms, turned
simultaneously, and fled from the field. 10 The dispersed
royalists with others from Acapulco joined Morelos
during the three following days to the number of 600.
Meanwhile, the rise of this new leader and the
spread of the revolution southward caused the viceroy
much uneasiness, the more so because all his best
troops and officers were with Calleja and Cruz, and
it was difficult for him to place in the field an
adequate force. However, he ordered the Oajaca
brigade to be got in readiness and the fifth coast
division, under Captain Francisco Paris, to inarch
against the insurgents. The first operations of Paris
were successful. On the 1st of December he dis
persed at the arroyo Moledor a body sent against
him by Morelos, under Valdovinos, and succeeded in
10 General Nicolas Bravo says that a drummer boy of the insurgents, in his
effort to conceal himself, climbed a tree, and noticing the flight of the royal
ists reported it to the fleeing revolutionists, who thereupon rallied, and col
lected the arms of their opponents, which had been cast away in the panic.
Bustamante asserts that the insurgents rallied at the cry of a parrot perched
on a tree-top, shouting, 'Fuego! fuego!' when they began to run. Ataman,
Hist. Mej. t ii. 319.
303 MORELOS AND RAYON.
uniting his force with the sixth division of the coast,
commanded by Jose Sanchez Pareja. At Tepango,
also, the insurgents suffered a reverse, a detachment
under Corte's and Martinez, who had been sent to at
tack the royalists at Chilapa, being defeated with
some loss by Guevara. 11 With better fortune, how-*
ever, Miguel de Avila gained on November 23d a
slight success over Fuentes, who had landed at the
harbor of Marquez with 300 men from Acapulco;
and on the 13th of December the same officer re
pulsed at a place called the Sabana, the united forces
of Paris and Pareja, who in conjunction with Fuentes
were advancing against Aguacatillo.
Hitherto the operations of Morelos in the field had
been neither important nor brilliant; and piqued at
the insignificant results, he determined to anticipate
Paris' meditated assault upon Aguacatillo. The royal
ist leader had fallen back to Tres Palos, arid Morelos
decided to surprise his camp by night. Accordingly
on the 4th of January, 1811, he secretly despatched
Avila with 600 men, who defeated the royalists, nearly
1,000 strong, with the trilling loss of five killed. 12
The result was most important to the revolutionists;
600 muskets, five pieces of artillery, including a howit
zer and a large quantity of ammunition, and other
war stores fell into their hands, while the reputation
of their chief spread far and wide.
Morelos now directed his attention to Acapulco, in
the expectation of gaining possession of the fort with
out difficulty, Carrefio's assistant, an artillery officer
named Gago, having secretly made offers to surrender
it to him. With 600 men he marched in person from
the Sabana, and on the night of the 7th of February
secretly took up a position on the eminence of las
Iguanas in front of the fort. Early next morning the
11 Guevara was the father of General Nicolas Bravo's wife. /(/., ii. 321.
12 Declaration de Morelos, 20. Venegas, in his attempt to mislead the
public, published a garbled account, saying among other things that the loss
of the royalists was next to nothing, while that of the insurgents amounted
to 200 killed. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 61-2.
MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS. 301
preconcerted signal was seen at the appointed hour, 13
and Morelos, dividing his force into two divisions,
placed one under a man from the United States
named Elias Bean, 14 and the other under Avila.
These officers were directed to approach the castle
from different points. But Gago's overtures were all
a feint; and when one of the divisions had advanced
within favorable range, the fort and vessels in the
harbor simultaneously opened fire upon it. Morelos,
realizing the treachery, quickly withdrew his men.
He then concentrated his forces on the Iguanas hill,
and laid siege to the fort. For nine clays he kept up
a steady fire with four pieces of artillery of light cali
bre, and a howitzer. Carreno, however, by a success
ful sortie on the 19th gained possession of the artillery
with the exception of one gun. 15
After this loss, and being threatened by Nicolds
Cosio, who had been appointed by the viceroy com
mander in the south and had already joined Paris,
Morelos raised the siege and retired to the Sabana,
where he remained for a month, after which time,
prostrated with sickness, he was conveyed to Tecpan,
having left Francisco Hernandez in charge , of the
troops. 16
During the two following months no operations of
importance were undertaken. The insurgents, how
ever, firmly held their position against Cosio, who,
having approached the Sabana, was compelled by
Herrnenegildo Galeana, who assailed him at daylight
13 A light was shown on the fort at 4 o'clock A. M. Declaration de More-
los, 20-1.
11 This man, called simply Elias by Morelos, with three others of his
countrymen, whose names were David, Colle, and William Alendin, had been
detected in mapping the country, and were imprisoned at Acapulco, whence
they effected their escape, and assisted the insurgents in their night attack
upon Paris at Tres Palos. Bnstamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 9.
15 Negrete says that Morelos mentions that only one piece was captured.
The words of Morelos were: ' Quitado toda su artilleria, excepto una sola
pieza.' See Max. Sig. XIX., iv. 195. See Orozon's account, in Hernandez y
Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 285.
16 The forces left under Hernandez numbered about 2,200. Of these, 1,000
were stationed in an intrenched position on the Sabana. the remainder occu
pying in detachments posts at Aguacatillo, Veladero, las Cruces, and a point
at the foot of the cuesta. Declaration de Morelos, 21.
302 MORELOS AND RAYON.
on the 4th of April, 17 to retire to las Graces, which
had been occupied by Fuentes. The viceroy, in dis
gust at Cosio's want of success, and perhaps of loyalty,
being a Mexican, placed Fuentes in command. Again
on the 30th of April and the 1st of May, Avila suc
cessfully repelled an attack made by Fuentes, who fell
back upon las Cruces and Aguacatillo, from which the
insurgents had been compelled to withdraw.
In the mean time, Morelos, reestablished in health,
had returned; and finding his position on the Sabana
no longer tenable, owing to the difficulty in obtaining
provisions, which were intercepted by detachments of
the enemy, he abandoned it on the 3d of May. De
termined to extend the field of his operations, he left
Avila well fortified on the Veladero, and at the head
of no more than 300 men marched toward Chilpan-
cingo. With this small force Morelos entered upon
a campaign which shook Spain's power in Mexico to
its foundation. After a march attended with much
labor and suffering, during which he overcame all re
sistance offered by the royalists, he entered Chilpan-
cingo without opposition on the 24th of May, his
forces being now increased to 600 men well provided
with muskets and arms taken from the enemy. But
he received still more important support from the
Bravos, one of the first families of that city. 18 These
devoted patriots henceforth shared with the Galeanas
the highest confidence of Morelos.
The royalist troops whom he had come in contact
17 Hernandez had the cowardice to flee when Cosio drew near his position,
and his soldiers selected Galeana to lead them. Ib.
18 There were three brothers, Leonardo, Miguel, and Victor. Nicolas
Bravo was the son of Leonardo, and had lately married the daughter of Gue
vara. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 334. Bustamaiite states that these brothers, in
order to escape from the importunities of the comandantes of Tixtla and Chi-
lapa, who persisted in requiring their services against the revolutionists, re
tired to their hacienda at Chichihualco, and secreted themselves in a cave
called Michapa, where they remained for seven months. While here they
received a letter forwarded to them from Morelos, describing the sufferings
of his troops from hunger, and soliciting aid. They responded, and their
help contributed greatly to the victory which a detachment of Morelos under
Hermenegildo Galeana gained over the royalists in an action at the hacienda,
of Chichihualco. Uuad. Hist., ii. 15-10.
GALEANA AND BRAVO. 303
with, and who were under the direction of G-arrote,
had retreated to Tixtla; and Morelos, without allow
ing Garrote time to repair his losses, followed with all
speed. On the 26th of May the insurgents arrived
before the town, and although the royalists were well
protected by fortifications and provided with artillery,
the attack w r as commenced without delay. The con
test was long and obstinate, but after six hours hard
fighting, during which a portion of the town was set
on fire, the royalists were driven from the fortified
points, and retreated to the church, where most of
them were made prisoners. 19 Besides the prestige
gained by this victory, the material results were of
high importance; eight cannon, 200 muskets, and 600
prisoners being captured. During the two following
months Morelos was actively employed in repairing
and strengthening the fortifications of Tixtla, in aug
menting the number of his forces, and above all in
attention to their military instruction and discipline.
When these successes became known to Fuentes,
he recognized that it was of paramount importance to
arrest the progress of Morelos; and stopping prepara
tions to attack Avila at the Veladero, he concen
trated his forces in his pursuit. Taking up a position
at Chilapa, an important town four leagues distant
from Tixtla, he made his dispositions for the recapture
of the latter town. Meantime Morelos, having com
pleted the defences at Tixtla, leaving there a garrison
of 104 men under the command of Hermenegildo
C5
Galeana and Nicolas Bravo, returned to Chilpancingo,
and on the 15th of August celebrated the virgin's
ascension. Fuentes, duly informed of this division of
the enemy's forces, and the diversion caused at Chil
pancingo, hastened to avail himself of the opportunity,
and vigorously assaulted Tixtla on the same day.
Galeana and Bravo, however, resisted the attack with
19 The cura of Tixtla delayed for some little time the entrance of the vic
tors into the church by the elevation of the host at the entrance. Id., ii. 17.
Th is afforded an opportunity to the leading officers and a portion of the troop3
to effect their escape. Mora, Maj. y sun Rev. , iv. 301.
304 MORELOS AND RAYOX.
unflinching bravery, and firmly maintained themselves
in their positions. The assault was continued during
the whole of the following day, and the garrison,
whose ammunition was almost exhausted, was now in
a critical position. Morelos, however, was already
hastening to their assistance, and on the 17th assailed
the rear of Fuentes' force with 300 cavalry and 100
infantry, supported by three cannon. Galeana and
Bravo immediately availed themselves of this diversion
and sallied from the town. Fuentes, thus attacked
in front and rear, ordered a retreat, which at first was
conducted with order and deliberation. A drenching
rain-storm, however, commenced, impeding the move
ments of the royalists, and rendering their ammuni
tion unserviceable. Morelos now ordered Galeana
and Bravo to come to close quarters with sword
and bayonet, while he swepb down upon them with
the cavalry. The charge threw the royalists into
confusion; completely routed, they fled in all direc
tions, leaving on the field 200 killed, more than 300
muskets, two guns, and a quantity of other arms, as
the spoil of the victors, who, moreover, captured
366 prisoners. 20 Three days later Morelos marched
into Chilapa, whither Fuentes with a remnant of his
scattered force had fled. The insurgent army was
now over 1,500 strong, and the defeated royalist, as
well as the Oajaca troops stationed there, abandoned
the town on its approach, leaving two pieces of artil
lery and a quantity of ammunition. At Chilapa, the
artilleryman Gago, whose perfidious design had so
nearly involved Morelos in disaster at Acapulco, was
captured, together with Jose Toribio Navarro, who
after having received from Morelos $200 with, which
to raise troops for the independent cause, had passed
over to the royalists. The unfortunate men were sum
marily executed. 21
20 Parte de Morelos, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col Doc., iii. 337. The fig
ures in this despatch addressed to Rayon the day after the battle differ some
what from those given by Morelos in his declaration, four years later.
21 Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 330-9; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 17-18;
GROWING POWER OF MORELOS. 305
The position of Morelos was in the highest degree
satisfactory. Venegas had immediately at hand nei
ther troops nor an efficient leader to send against
him, and the rainy season now approaching would
assure him freedom from molestation for some time
to come. He would thus be able to devote himself
to the organization of his forces, while, whenever he
chose to advance, Oajaca, Puebla, and Mexico, only
defended by a few companies, lay open before him.
But while all was thus bright overhead, the horizon
was not without clouds. A conspiracy directed against
his life and cause was at work in his own ranks,
which but for his energy might have been attended
with fatal consequences. His method of suppressing
it was characteristic.
The first information received by Morelos of the
capture of Hidalgo was by intercepted letters. Fear
ing the effect on his followers, he kept the matter to
himself, but commissioned David 22 and Tabares, both
of whom had rendered him good service in the attack
upon Paris at Tres Palos, as his agents to solicit the
aid of the United States. 23 On their journey thither
they met Rayon, who informed them of his appoint
ment by Hidalgo and Allende as captain-general of
the revolutionary forces and ordered them to return,
having conferred upon Tabares the rank of brigadier,
and that of colonel upon David. Morelos, however,
on their arrival at Chilapa, refused to recognize their
commissions, arid deeply offended they withdrew to
Chilpancingo on the pretence of attending to private
Declaration de Morelos, 21-2; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 301-3. Both Bus-
tamante and Mora differ with the statements of Morelos as regards the num
ber of his forces and those of the prisoners and guns captured. On the 10th
of Sept. Morelos issued a burlesque proclamation, announcing the disappear
ance on the 18th of Aug. of the junta patriotica, which had been established
by Fuentes in Chilapa. He exhorts the viceroy and intendentes of the prov
inces to publish this announcement, in order that the whereabouts of the
junta may be discovered and reported to him. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Cot.
Doc., iii. 358.
2a One of the four men from the U. S. who had escaped from Acapulco
and joined Morelos.
23 ' Para negociar la alianza con los Estados vnidos. ' Declaration de More
los, 43.
HIST. HEX., VOL. IV. 20
306 MORELOS AND RAYON.
business. Thence they betook themselves to the
coast, and in conjunction with one Mayo, who was
serving under Avila at the Veladero, fomented an in
surrection, the aim of which was the killing of the
landed proprietors and all persons belonging to the
white race. The populace of the coast towns eagerly
joined in the project. Ignacio Ayala, who had been
appointed intendente by Morelos, was seized and con
fined at^Tecpan, but succeeded in effecting his escape.
While Avila was absent from Veladero for the purpose
of disarming David and Tabares, Mayo surprised the
officer left in charge, made him and others captive, and
attached the troops to the iniquitous undertaking.
The news of these proceedings soon reached Mo
relos, who hastened with an escort of 100 men to the
scene of danger. His presence sufficed to overawe
the mutineers. The troops returned to their alle-
S'ance, Avila was reinstated in his command, and
avid and Tabares were disarmed. With the prom
ise of placing them in charge of an expedition into
Oajaca, he brought them back to Chilapa, where by
his orders they were secretly beheaded. 24 He also
instructed Avila to execute Mayo, who was accord
ingly shot.
When news of the capture of the revolutionary
leaders at las Noriasde Bajan reached Rayon, 25 aware
that Ochoa was marching against him, and that Eli-
zondo was making a similar hostile movement from
Monclova, he determined to abandon Saltillo and di-
<24 /&. Morelos feared a public execution might cause disturbance, as the
conspirators had many adherents in the army. Bmtamante, Cuad. Hist., ii.
20-2. This author omits to make mention of the deception practised on
them by Morelos, who himself makes the admission in his declaration : ' Re-
snlto la muerte de aquellos dos que se les mando dar en Chilapa hasta donde
los condujo con el pretesto de darles una expedicion para Oaxaca.' p. 23.
He moreover seems to have been unaware that David and Tabares had
been despatched as commissioners to the U. S., asserting that they had been
sent to Rayon to inform him of the situation in the south.
25 Bustamante states that at this time Rayon received an order, bearing
the signature of Allende, to place at the disposal of Elizondo the troops un
der his command. Cuad. Hist., i. 199. Rayon could only conclude that such
a command was a fabrication of the royalists, and paid no heed to it.
RAYON'S MARCH TO ZACATECAS. 307
rect his course to Zacatecas, which was only defended
by a small garrison. During the latter days of March
he accordingly evacuated that town, his forces amount
ing to about 4,000 men. 26 Ochoa, duly informed of this
movement, hastened to intercept him, and on the 1st
of April an engagement was fought at the defile of
Pillories. The action lasted six hours, and ended in
favor of the independents, Ochoa retreating to Agua-
nueva. 27 This success, in the achievement of which
the troops behaved exceedingly well, gained prestige
for the cause. Rayon, without further molestation,
continued his march to Zacatecas, but the difficulties
with which he had to contend were so great, that had
a more energetic commander been opposed to him he
would have been overwhelmed. At Pifiones a larofe
cT*
portion of his pack-mules and provision and water-
wagons fell into the hands of the royalists. The coun
try was destitute of food and water, and the suffer
ings of his troops were fearful. Sickness broke out
among them ; many died, others went mad, and most
of the animals perished. Maguey and cactus juice
was drunk, producing burning pains. 28 If a well or
insignificant stream was found, the men fought like
wild beasts over it. At a place called Las Animas
there were symptoms of mutiny. A council of war
was held, at which it was resolved to petition for the
grace extended by the general pardon. Rayon, com
pelled outwardly to acquiesce, nevertheless postponed
taking the necessary action in the matter, and many
deserted.
26 According to Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 168. Ochoa in his report of
the 3d of April states that Rayon's army amounted to 6,000 men, 2,000 of
whom were cavalry. He had also 24 pieces of artillery and six culverins.
Gaz. de Max., 1811, ii. 1220.
27 Id., 1811, ii. 1200-3, 1218-22, contains a copy of Ochoa's detailed re
port of this engagement. The brigadier Ponce, who with four soldiers had
separated from the main body of the revolutionists in order to observe the
retreat of the enemy, was made captive after being mortally wounded. Be
fore his death he communicated to Ochoa the plans of Rayon. Id., 1220.
28 Jose Maria Ansorena, who had been made intendente of Valladolid by
Hidalgo, died in great suffering from the effects of this juice, at the colegio
de misioneros de Guadalupe, about a league from Zacatecas. Alaman, Jlivt.
Mej., ii. 262.
303 MORELOS AND RAYON.
The captain-general, however, bravely pushed for
ward. Aware that there was abundance of water at the
hacienda of San Eustaquio, which was occupied by a
royalist force under Larrainzar, he sent forward a
detachment under the direction of Anaya to attack
the place. Anaya succeeded in surprising the enemy
and dispersed them. From this time the sufferings
of the independents were mitigated. At San Eusta
quio Rayon halted for two days, in order to refresh
his exhausted men. 29 On the llth of April he ad
vanced to the hacienda of Pozo Hondo, whence he
detached 500 men under Sotomayor to take possession
of Fresnillo, which was done. As Rayon approached
Zacatecas, he sent forward another detachment of
equal number, under Anaya and Victor Rosales, to re
connoitre. They were attacked, and Rayon sent Jose
Antonio Torres to their assistance, while he took up
a position on the cerro de la Bufa, about a league dis
tant from the city, with the rest of his forces, which
amounted to little over 1,000. The royalist comman
der, Colonel Juan Zambrano, deeming his position in
Zacatecas untenable, withdrew to the cerro del Grillo,
and there intrenched himself. He was, however, sur
prised by a night attack conducted by Torres, with
whose previous successes in Nueva Galicia the reader
is already acquainted. The defeat of Zambrano was
complete; his camp, artillery, ammunition, and bag
gage, with 500 bars of silver, fell into the hands of
the assailants. Zambrano fled to Jerez, ten or twelve
leagues distant, and on the following day, the 15th
of April, Rayon entered Zacatecas without opposi
tion. 30 Thus terminated the retreat from Saltillo,
29 Bustamante gives a detailed account of Rayon's march from Saltillo,
having obtained it personally from Rayon. Cuad. 11 1st., i. 200-4. Alaman, to
whom Rayon also narrated the events, corroborates Bustamaute in all main
particulars. Hist. Mej., ii. 261.
30 Id., ii. 262; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 170-2; Bustamante, quoting
from the Abispa de Ckilpancinyo, no. 19, relates that in the attack on the
royalist camp a small cannon was brought into play by the revolutionists.
The gun-carriage being broken, a soldier voluntarily supplied its want by
placing himself on his hands and knees and supporting the piece on his back.
The recoil of the piece shattered his spine at the first discharge; this did not,
RAYON'S POSITION. 309
which the constancy of the generals and the fortitude
of the soldiers who remained faithful have rendered
famous.
During the time which Rayon remained in Zacate-
cas, which was less than a month, he occupied himself
with indefatigable industry in augmenting and drilling
his forces. He made cannon and wagons; and all the
resources of the place in clothing, munitions of war,
and money were put in requisition. The rich mine of
Quebradilla 31 was thrown open to all who chose to
work, one third of the metal to go to the laborers.
With this incentive, thousands toiled night and day,
and a large amount of metal was secured. 82 As far as
it was possible, Rayon also organized the government
of the province, retaining in their offices all those em
ployes who gave satisfactory guarantees of their ad
herence to the cause. Moreover, having convoked a
general junta of the municipal corporations, he laid
before them his plans for the establishment there of a
provisional representative government of the nation,
independent of Spain.
At the same time he sent a communication to
Calleja, who was already on his march against him
from San Luis Potosi. This address, which reached
Calleja's hands at the hacienda of Carro, sets forth
Rayon's explanation of the cause and object of the
revolution. The treacherous imprisonment of the
Spanish monarch, he states, was no impediment to
the establishment of a junta central or of provincial
however, deter one of his comrades from following his example, who being
well covered with sacking sustained little injury. When the camp was
taken, the first soldier, then at the point of death, asked if the shot which
had been fired from his back had taken effect. Being answered in the affirm
ative, he exclaimed, ' Pues bien, ahora muero con gusto ! ' and soon after ex
pired. Cuad. Hist., i. 205-6.
31 The owners were Spaniards, the chief being Fermin de Apezechea, who
had retired to Mexico. Ataman, Hist. Mej., ii. 263.
32 Ray on caused it to be coined. Although the coins were of inferior work
manship, they were preferred at Vera Cruz, their value being at the rate of
nine reales to the peso fuerte. They bore the initials L. V. 0., which accord
ing to Bustamante meant, Labor vincit omxia. Cuad. Hist., i. 217. Negrete
suggests another interpretation of the letters, namely, Levantaos vivientes
oprimidos. Mex. Sig. XIX. , iv. 86.
310 MORELOS AND RAYON.
juntas in the peninsula; and the design of New Spain
was also to instal a national junta, or congress, after
the precedents established in the peninsula. While
Spain was being treasonably delivered up to the
dominion of Napoleon, the rights of the crown being
alienated and the holy religion prostituted, the ob
ject of this congress would be to put an end to the
systems of appropriation of the property of corpora
tions, and the exaction of so-called patriotic loans
and donations which were ruining the country, the
rights of Fernando, however, and the ecclesiastical
government being maintained; and finally, to pre
vent the surrender of New Spain to the French. 33
This address was signed conjointly by Rayon and Li-
ceaga, and dated the 22d of April. On the 29th
Calleja despatched his answer, in which, after com
menting upon the cruel and desolating system of war
fare adopted by the insurgents, and the outside dan
ger to which it has exposed the nation, states that
the government will hold no further correspondence
with them, and concludes by offering them for the
last time the benefit of the general pardon, on the
condition that all arms, ammunition, and funds be
delivered up. 34
On the receipt of this reply, Rayon, conscious of his
inability to resist the attack of Calleja, who continued
his march without interruption, abandoned Zacatecas
with the intention of proceeding to Michoacan. In
33 Rayon y Liceaga, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 279-80. This
manifest was forwarded to Calleja by a commission composed of Rayon's
brother Jose" Maria, a Franciscan padre named Gotor, who had formerly been
Calleja's chaplain and had some ascendency over him, and three Spaniards,
the only ones who had remained in Zacatecas, and whom Rayon generously sent
in order that they might escape from insult or outrage at hands of his troops.
Calleja responded to this liberality by causing Rayon's brother to be arrested:
He was, however, liberated by the influence of the conde de Casa Rul, who
took this opportunity of showing his gratitude for the kind treatment he had
received during the time he was a captive of Hidalgo with Garcia Conde and
Merino. Buntamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 207, 210.
3 ' Contestation de Calleja, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 280-1.
Bustainante makes the strange statement that Calleja offered to main tain
Rayon in possession of the funds in his power, which amounted to over
$1,000,000. Cuad. Hist, i. 210. Not one word of such a proposal appears in
Calleja's reply.
PURSUIT BY EMPARAK 311
order to retard Calleja, he left Resales in the city,
with instructions to hold out to the last extremity,
and then effect his retreat by way of Jerez. On the
night of the 1st of May Calleja, who had advanced
to Ojocaliente, received information of Rayon's retreat,
and immediately despatched Colonel Emparan with a
strong division and six cannon to intercept him. On
the 3d of May Calleja entered Zacatecas without op
position, Resales having availed himself of the benefit
of the pardon which was granted at his request to
him arid his troops. 35
Meantime Emparan marched with great rapidity in
pursuit of Rayon, and on the same day on which
Calleja entered Zacatecas overtook him at the
hacienda de Maguey. The engagement which fol
lowed was most disastrous to the revolutionists.
Though occupying a strong position on the adjacent
ridge, they were routed on all sides, the artillery of
the enemy opening upon them with telling precision.
Rayon's troops were dispersed, his demoralized officers
carrying off a great part of the treasure. 36 Twenty
pieces of artillery, and a quantity of muskets and am
munition, fell into the hands of the victors. 37 More
than 100 prisoners were captured, all of whom Empd-
ran released except five, who were executed. 38
After this defeat Rayon, still maintaining his inten-
35 Parte de Calleja, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 282; Gaz. de
Mex., 1811, ii. 424-5. Calleja, however, caused 13 of the insurgents to be
shot. Bustamante, Gaud. Hist., i. 216.
36 Emparan gives an exaggerated account of the number slain: 'Se vieron,'
the insurgents, ' precisados a ceder el Campo con mil y ochocientos a dos mil
Cadnberes.' Hernandez y Davalos, Col. Doc., iii. 283. Alaman, who received
his information from the lieutenant-colonel, Jose" Maria Bustarnante, attached
to the artillery of the revolutionists, states that the ammunition wagons being
cased with tin, the glitter afforded an excellent mark for the enemy's gun
ners. One of the wagons struck by a shot caused great disorder. Hist. Mcj. ,
ii. 269. Negrete adds that the shot caused the explosion of the ammunition.
Mex. Siff. XIX., iv. 51.
31 Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 471-2. The ammunition was of such inferior
quality that the greater portion of it was useless. This explains the insigni
ficant loss sustained by the royalists, who had only four wounded. Ib. Bus-
tamante's account intimates that Rayon only made a show of resistance in
order to secure the retreat of his main body. Cuad. Hint., i. 214. This ver
sion, in view of the disastrous result, is not credible.
38 Id., Campafiasde Calleja, 112-13.
SI 2 MORELOS AND RAYON.
tion of entering Michoacan, retired to La Piedad
unpursued by Emparan, who, little inclined to be
subservient to Calleja's orders, under some pretext
directed his course toward Guanajuato. At La Pie-
dad Rayon could not collect more than about 200 of
his scattered troops and $30,000 in money. Not dis
heartened, however, and having obtained in that town
a few arms and three cannon, he proceeded to Zamora,
where he organized a force of over 400 men, whom
he placed under the command of Torres, with instruc
tions to proceed to Pdtzcuaro and unite his division
with the troops under the revolutionary chiefs Padre
Navarrete and Manuel Muniz. 89 In the neighbor
hood of Patzcuaro Torres was vigorously attacked by
a royalist force. The contest lasted nearly the whole
day without the enemy being able to dislodge the
insurgents from the position which they taken up on
the eminence of la Tinaja. Torres, however, was
severely wounded in the arm, and his troops were so
hard pressed that their defeat was imminent. At
this moment Rayon arrived with reinforcements; the
royalists were soon routed, even losing their baggage,
which they had left at Huiramba.
The conjunction of the insurgent leaders being thus
accomplished, Rayon prepared to attack Valladolid.
After Cruz's departure from that city in January,
only a small force remained for its defence. Torcuato
Trujillo, who, as the reader will recollect, had been
appointed military commander of the province, was so
arrogant and tyrannical that he brought upon him
the hatred of the inhabitants. His conduct was not
conducive to the pacification of Michoacan; in fact, the
whole province, with the exception of its capital and
the immediate vicinity, revolted. After the fatal day
at the bridge of Calderon, Muniz, and a number of
other chiefs who had sustained defeat there or else-
39 These leaders were respectively the revolutionary commanders in the
departments of Putzcuaro and Tacambaro in Michoacan. Id., Cuad. JJist.,
i. 215.
ATTACK ON VALLADOLID. 313
where, took refuge in the rugged districts of Michoa-
can, 40 where even the insalubrity of the climate in
a large portion of the province served as protection.
Here they soon gathered strength, and finally, by the
cooperation of their forces, found themselves in a po
sition to assume the offensive. Rayon, therefore,
formed his plans, in concert with the other leaders,
for a combined attack on Yalladolid, and on the 29th
of May the heights adjacent to the city were occupied
by large bodies of insurgents, whose numbers were esti
mated by Trujillo at seven or eight thousand. 41
The besiegers without delay opened fire on the city
with their artillery, which consisted of twenty-five
pieces of different calibre. The effect, however, was
insignificant, owing to the long range and poor gun
nery. On the following day Antonio Linares, who
had been sent from Guanajuato to the assistance of
Trujillo, succeeded in entering the city before day
light. The royalists now attacked the enemy and
inflicted some loss, capturing two cannon and dislodg
ing them from one of their positions. With this suc
cess Trujillo began preparations for a general assault,
but the insurgent leaders, aware of the reenforcement,
and disappointed at the absence of any demonstration
in their favor on the part of the inhabitants, secretly
retreated on the night of the 1st of June to Tacam-
baro. 42
In the mean time events of great moment, which
will be narrated in the following chapter, had oc-
40 Trujillo, in a letter to the viceroy dated June 2, 1811, reports 'la reun
ion de mas de doce cabecillas, que por haberlos echado de todas partes las
armas del Rey se ban refugiado a esta provincia al abrigo de sus montes y
recursos. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 502.
41 ' Su total muchos lo hacen subir d, doce mil enemigos, pero yo creo no
pasaba, de siete d ocho mil, sin que sea exagerado.' He also mentions the
names of the chiefs opposed to him: el cldrigo Navarrete and others of the re
ligious order, and the captain-generals Muuiz, Torres, Rayon, Liceaga, Hui-
drobo, Salto, Carrasco, and Ramos, ' con otros de inferior jaez. ' On their
approach against the city the division under Torres was vigorously attacked,
May 27th, by Captain Felipe Robledo, who after a contest of three hours was
compelled to retreat with loss. Id., 499-506. In this engagement the left
arm of Torres was shattered by a grape-shot. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 284.
42 (?az. de Mex., 1811, ii. 500-6.
314 MORELOS AND RAYON.
curred at Zitdcuaro, and Rayon with a small escort
had already proceeded thither. Previous to his de
parture, he organized the military government of the
various districts. To Torres he assigned Pdtzcuaro
and Uruapan; to Navarrete, Zacapo; to Mariano
Caneiga, Panindicuaro ; to Muniz, Tacambaro; and to
the guerrilla chief Luna, Acambaro and Jerecuaro.
The insurgents now for some time confined their
operations against Valladolid to a mere blockade,
which though maintained at a distance effectually cut
off Trujillo's communication with the capital. This
inaction lasted nearly two months, during which
Muiiiz occupied himself in increasing his forces and
armament. Cannon were cast, muskets were con
structed of bronze, 43 and every preparation made for a
more determined effort. On the 19th of July the inde
pendent leaders, again reunited, appeared before the
city, their forces now amounting to 10,000 or 12,000
men, with forty pieces of artillery. 44 On the 20th
Muniz sent to Trujillo a peremptory summons to sur
render if he would not see the city put to fire and
sword. 45 To this communication Trujillo vouchsafed
no reply. On the 21st the insurgents opened fire, but
with little effect; 46 and on the following day, the city
being invested on all sides, the attack commenced.
The principal assault was directed against the southern
entrance, under the immediate command of Muniz.
Trujillo, however, successfully repulsed it, driving the
enemy back upon their lines with heavy loss, and cap
turing eight cannon.
43 ' Que corao los arcabuces del tiempo de la conquista, eran muy pesados y
se disparaban con media necesitando dos hombres para su manejo.' Alaman,
Hist. Mej., ii. 304; Bmtamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 284.
44 Gaz. de Mex., 181 1, ii. 670-1. Bustamante states that the artillery con
sisted of 22 guns. Cuad. Hist., i. 284.
^Oaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 807.
46 Bustamante states that a soldier of Trujillo, named Pelayo, observing
that the elevation of the insurgents' guns was too great, sent a note to Muniz
informing him of the error. The messenger intrusted with the letter de
nounced Pelayo, who was immediately shot at the gallows, where his body
was left hanging with the letter attached to his back. Cuad. Hist., i. 285;
Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 306.
RETREAT OF THE REVOLUTIONISTS. 315
On the other side of the city affairs went otherwise.
Robledo was unable to maintain his position at the
Santa Catalina Gate, and Trujillo hastened to his as
sistance. On his entrance into the city he was filled
with consternation at the confusion which prevailed.
Men, women, and children in wild alarm were rushing
through the streets, shrieking and wailing, and pro
claiming that the city was in the power of the insur
gents. Soldiers were flying from their posts, and all
seemed lost. Trujillo, however, displayed rare cour
age and presence of mind. Raising the cry of victory,
and that Calleja was approaching, he succeeded in al
laying the panic, and hurried forward to the Santa
Catalina gate.
There the greatest disorder prevailed; the artillery
was dismounted or in the hands of the enemy; the
soldiers were fleeing, casting down their arms, and
throwing off their uniforms. Arresting the flight with
orders to kill all who did not rejoin their ranks, Tru
jillo sallied on to the plain and attacked the enemy.
He was, however, compelled to retire; and although
in a second charge he gained some slight advantage,
his position was desperate. His troops were giving
way at other points, and all was apparently lost. At
this crisis, when the victory of the insurgents was no
longer doubtful, to the inexpressible amazement of the
royalists, the besiegers retired from the contest, re
treating in good order, but abandoning twenty-two
cannon to the enemy. Divers reasons are assigned as
the cause of this extraordinary movement. Some at
tribute it to the miraculous interposition of the image
of the saviour in the sacristy of the cathedral. Tru
jillo claimed that the valor displayed by a portion of
his troops caused the insurgents to withdraw ; but the
more probable explanation is that advanced by Busta-
mante, namely, the failure of ammunition and the
envy and jealousy of Muniz, who, being the only one
who had sustained repulse during the day, refused to
furnish the other chiefs with cartridges when their
316 MORELOS AND RAYON.
own supply became exhausted. 47 With criminal self
ishness he refused to others the success in which he
could not share. The insurgents pursued their way
unmolested to Acuicho, while Trujillo, bewildered
with astonishment, in the exuberance of his joy, was
so far forgetful of himself as to liberate more than 300
prisoners from the jails and dungeons of the city. 48
47 'No quiso dar a los comandantes Anaya y otros ni un cartuchode mas de
treinta cargas que salv6 cuando fu<$ derrotado: quo se mantuvo espectador
. . .por no contribuir a la gloria de las columnas. . .que tuvier6n mejor direc-
cion, 6 mejor suerte que la de Muniz.' Bustamante, CuacL Hist., i. 286.
48 The particulars of the operations against Valladolid have been derived
from Trujillo's and other officers' reports published as quoted in the official
gazette of Mexico, and from Bustamante. Other authors, as Mora, Mex. y
sus Rev., iv. 235-9; Alaman, flint. Mej. y ii. 300-8; Torrente, Rev. Hist. Am.,
i. 242-3; and Negrete, Hex. Sig. XIX., iv. 114-25, 151-2, 155-6, 159-75, sup
ply no additional information, although in minor details some discrepancies
are observable in their several narrations.
CHAPTER XIII.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
1811.
CALLEJA'S NEW SYSTEM or MILITARY ORGANIZATION SUPPRESSION OF THE
INSURRECTION IN NUEVO SANTANDER PACIFICATION OF SAN Luis POTO-
sf DEFEAT OF INSURGENTS IN GUANAJUATO PORLIER'S OPERATIONS IN
NUEVA GALICIA TORRE'S ACTIVITY AND SEVERITY His DEFEAT AT
ZITACUARO, AND DEATH RAYON FORTIFIES ZITACUARO EMPARAN RE
TURNS TO SPAIN CONSPIRACY TO SEIZE THE VICEROY PROCLAMATION
OF CALLEJA EVENTS IN MICHOACAN CONDITION OF GUANAJUATO
SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.
ON the day of his entrance into Zacatecas, Calleja
proclaimed the usual pardon, adding the customary
threats in case of non-compliance. All stragglers and
strangers were ordered to return to their homes within
twenty-four hours, under pain of being treated as insur
gents. 1 Then, having purged the city by an appropri
ate slaughter of patriots, the royalist leader once more
remodelled the government. For its future security
he organized five companies of infantry, one of cavalry,
and an artillery corps, and appointed Martin de Medina
the governor of Colotlan, comandante and intendente
of the province. On the 16th of May Calleja pro
ceeded to Aguascalientes with an army greatly re
duced in numbers. The separation of Emparan's
division, and of another detachment under Miguel
del Campo sent to operate against the insurgents
in the Bajio of Guanajuato, had left him with lit
tle more than 1,000 men, while the revolutionists
were again increasing in strength. This dismember-
l Gazde Hex., 1811, ii. 425-31.
(317)
318 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
ment of his famous army of the centre was a grievous
trouble to Calleja, the more so because he could see
that no durable results would be thereby attained.
In the abilities of his captains he had little confidence;
plan as he might, he foresaw under the present system
only failure. While at Aguascalientes, he therefore
submitted to the viceroy a plan of military organiza
tion which he thought might hasten peace. 2 He
would arm all the towns in the kingdom for their own
defence, and thereby avoid the crippling effect of di
viding and subdividing the standing army into sections.
The troops would likewise be relieved from long and
fatiguing marches from one point to another. By
a judicious disposal of the regular troops in suita
ble localities, assistance could quickly arrive at any
point attacked. Both Calleja and the viceroy recog
nized the risk incurred in placing arms in the hands
of the people, and thus establishing a power which
might turn against the government. Nevertheless,
Calleja believed that such danger could be avoided, and
the viceroy adopted the plan. Henceforth this system
was pursued by the royalists to the close of the war.
The system was put into immediate practice as far
as possible, and was methodically developed and
extended as circumstances allowed. In each town,
companies of infantry and cavalry and batteries of
artillery were raised, the strength of which was pro
portionate to the number of inhabitants. All house
holders were compelled to take service in these corps,
which were placed under the direction of a coman-
dante de armas, in whom were also vested, wherever
practicable, the judicial functions. At each town
from 100 to 150 of such troops were to be in constant
service and daily drilled. Arms were at first sup
plied by collecting weapons in possession of the
inhabitants. All persons not enrolled in these mil
itary corps were forbidden to keep any kind of arms.
2 See copy of the plan, dated June 8, 1811, in Hernandez y Davalos, Col.
Doc., iii. 289-90.
ATTITUDE OF AFFAIRS. 310
Only muleteers and others whose occupations so re
quired it were allowed a hatchet, and knife without
a point. In the country haciendas and ranches,
moreover, armed squadrons were organized, composed
of members varying from six or eight to fifty, accord
ing to the relative importance of the places. This
system, afterward adopted with some modifications by
Morelos and the other independent leaders, resulted
in placing all Mexico on a war footing; but it did not
accomplish at this time exactly what Calleja desired.
Practically it arrayed the nation against itself. At
the commencement of the strife the Creole regulars
even could not be relied upon, and in the first engage
ments great misgivings had been entertained by the
viceroy in regard to them. Their conduct at Las
Cruces, and the subsequent skilful management by
Calleja of the troops under his command, had greatly
relieved this anxiety, and now by enforcing armed
resistance in the towns against the attacks of the in
surgents, friends and brothers were sometimes brought
face to face as enemies.
Well aware that Zacatecas was still far from secure,
and that Guanajuato was exposed to invasion at any
time by the insurgent forces in Michoacan, Calleja
made such dispositions for the protection of those prov
inces as the circumstances of his position admitted.
As the northern and eastern provinces, called the
provincias interims, 3 were now free from insurrec
tionary movements, the troops in those regions could
be advantageously employed in securing Zacatecas
and Guanajuato against hostile inroads, and at the
same time protecting the frontier of Durango. Ca
lleja accordingly addressed a letter to Governor Sal-
cedo, urging him to instruct Lopez and Ochoa to
occupy with their divisions the defiles of Colotlan,
Tlaltenango, and Juchipila; at the same time he
3 In May 1811 the provincias internas were divided into two comandancias
generales, subject to the viceroy's authority, by an order of the Spanish gov
ernment, which was confirmed by the regency in July 1812. Prov. Inter.
Carta del Ministro, and Id., Reed orden Mayer, MS., nos. G y 7.
320 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
made arrangements with Cruz to send a portion of
his forces in the same direction for the purpose of
cooperating with Emparan, whom it was his inten
tion to despatch to Lagos. 4 Calleja's plan was to
occupy with the main divisions of his army the dis
trict extending from Lagos to Queretaro, thus keep
ing in subjection the most important part of the
country, and being in a position to hasten quickly
to the assistance of the forces operating on the
north and south of this line. The carrying-out of
this plan was, however, frustrated to some extent by
the development of events which necessitated the
employment of the heavy divisions of Emparan and
Linares at other points, the latter being despatched
to the relief of Yalladolid, as already related, and
the former being sent to Zitacuaro. The departure
of these forces from Guanajuato exposed that prov
ince, and even Queretaro, to imminent risk; and
Calleja, ordering Diego Garcia Conde to move to
San Felipe with the division he commanded at San
Luis Potosi, and Miguel de Campo to station him
self at Salamanca, hastened to Leon, whence he pro
ceeded to Guanajuato, entering the city on the 20th
of June.
When Calleja returned to San Luis Potosi after
his victory at Calderon, he found himself in a vortex
of insurrection. No sooner had the army of the
centre marched from Guanajuato for Guadalajara
than a number of insurgent bands sprung into exist
ence in various parts of the province. The most
prominent among their leaders was Albino Garcia,
commonly called El Manco, 5 who in the neighborhood
of Salamanca and Santiago carried on hostilities with
such daring and skill that he became one of the most
celebrated guerrilla .chiefs of the revolution. In the
*See Calleja's despatch of July 31, 1811, in GazdeMex., 1811, ii. 747-8.
5 Garcia was a native of Salamanca, a town situated in the southern part
of the province. He derived this sobriquet of Manco from being crippled
in one arm by a fall from his horse. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 249.
IN NUEVO SANTANDER. 321
district between Huichapan and Queretaro, Villagran
was still harassing convoys and interrupting commu
nication with the capital. The hilly region of the
Huasteca, the mountains of the Sierra Gorda, and the
plains of Apam to the north of the Mexican capital
swarmed with predatory hordes. Nuevo Santander
was in open insurrection; portions of San Luis Po-
tosi were still unpacified; while the forces left in Zaca-
tecas and Aguascalientes were inadequate, as the
reader is aware, for the security of those cities.
While the events narrated in the preceding chap
ter were occurring in Zacatecas and Michoacan, the
insurrection in Nuevo Santander, under the leader
ship of Villerias, was successfully suppressed by Ar-
redondo. Having been invited by that chief to es
pouse the independent cause, Arredondo caused the
communication to be burned by the hangman, and on
the 4th of May marched from Agayo against the in
surgents. Villerias, having sustained several succes
sive defeats, fled toward Matehuala, where he was
overcome and slain by a royalist force sent against
him by the junta de seguridad of Catorce, under the
direction of the cura Semper, Padre Duque, and
Nicanor Sanchez. 6 The insurrection in Nuevo San
tander was now confined to Tula and its vicinity.
On the 21st Arredondo approached the town, and
having routed the insurgents with considerable slaugh
ter, entered Tula the following day with little opposi
tion. All the leaders and principal men were hanged,
and their bodies left suspended from trees. 7 Although
the insurrection in this province was thus thoroughly
crushed, Venegas, fearing that assistance to the rev
olutionists might arrive from the United States, dare
not reduce the number of troops, the efficiency of
& Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 493-7, 509-10. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, a
cadet of the Santa Cruz regiment, was commended by Arredondo for his gal
lant conduct in one of the engagements alluded to in the text. Id., 496.
This is the first time that Santa Anna's name appears in print.
7 /c/., 507-8. Arredondo tells the viceroy that at the mission of Ola
shortly before his arrival an unfortunate prisoner was slowly roasted alive,
from the feet upwards, by the Indians, and eaten !
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. ui
322 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUAEO.
which he even increased by supplying them with a
considerable train of artillery. Iturbe was transferred
to the governorship of Colotlan and Arredondo ap
pointed to that of Nuevo Santander, which was
shortly afterward increased in territory by the addi
tion of the Huasteca. 8
At this time, Matehuala again became the scene of
an insurgent defeat. In June the unfortunate town
was taken possession of by Bernardo Gomez de Lara,
better known by the sobriquet of Huacal. Lara, by
birth an Indian, was the most ferocious of the insur
gent chiefs who infested portions of San Luis Potosi.
Captain of a band of half-savage Indians, he directed
his hostilities not only against Spaniards, but against
all who were not of his race. At Matehuala and in
the vicinity he put to death a number of victims, and
by compelling the inhabitants to join his band, raised
his force to more than a thousand men. On the 21st
of June he was simultaneously attacked by a company
of Arredondo's troops under Antonio Elostia, and a
force brought up by Semper, the cura of Catorce. u
Assailed on opposite sides, Huacal was routed with
slaughter, between two and three hundred of his fol
lowers being slain and a large number taken prison
ers. 10 He himself, though wounded, effected his
escape and retired to the Bajio of Guanajuato. Some
what later he entered San Miguel el Grande; but the
inhabitants recovering from their first panic, surprised
and captured him, with a number of his principal fol
lowers. Huacal was put to death in his prison, and
his body exposed on the gibbet. This occurred about
the end of the year. 11 By this success the northern
8 ' Hasta la Sierra Gorda, confinando con el Mezquital y los llanos de
Apan y las costas de Tuxpan en el seno mejicano.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii.
282.
9 The combined attack was unpremeditated, as the royalist leaders were
not aware of each other's movements. This nearly led to a disaster, as the
soldiers of Elosiia fired upon those of Semper before they discovered that they
were friends. Gaz. de Max., 1811, ii. 1235-6.
10 Id., 1811, ii. 744-6, 1234-6 ; Rurribarria, Mem., in Soc. Max. Geog., vii.
291-2.
n u8tamant, Cttad. Hist., i. 292; Liceaga, Adic. y Rect., 196.
IN NUEVA GALICIA. 323
portion of San Luis Potosi was reduced to obedience,
and during August the operations of the royalists in
the district of Rio Verde and the southern part of the
province completed the pacification.
In Guanajuato and Michoacan the condition of
affairs was far different, and the revolution was assum
ing alarming proportions. Calleja was fully alive to
the grave difficulties of his position. In a letter
addressed to Venegas from Guanajuato on the 20th
of August, he describes to him in strong colors the
inextinguishable vitality of the insurrection and its
strong recuperative power; 12 and again on the 2 6th of
September he reports that the forces of his division
occupying the district between Lagos and Queretaro
were insufficient to keep under control the ubiquitous
guerrilla bands. Meantime, however, Garcia Conde
and Miguel del Campo were rendering good service
in their respective localities. Jose do la Luz Gutierrez,
at the head of 4,000 men well provided with arms,
was signally routed at San Luis de la Paz, 13 and
Albino Garcia sustained a similar defeat in the val
ley of Santiago. 14
When Cruz returned to Guadalajara after his suc
cessful recovery of Tepic and San Bias, he applied
himself with his natural activity to the suppression
of the rebellion in other portions of the province. The
principal districts disaffected were those represented
by the important towns of Zacoalca, Sayula, and Za-
potlan, and on the 26th of February, Cruz despatched
Captain Porlier with the greater portion of the troops
12 'La insurreccion esta todavia muy le"jos de calmar; ella retofia como la
hidra, d proporcion que se cortan sus cabezas.' Bustamatite, Campanas de
Calleja, 127.
13 The action took place on the llth of July. Francisco Guizarn6tegui,
the officer in command of the royalists, received Calleja's highest commenda,-
tion on this occasion. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 750. In subsequent operations
several leading insurgent chiefs were captured and shot. Among them was
Luz Gutierrez.
14 On the 26th of June. Garcia lost five cannon, and was prevented by this
defeat from approaching Salamanca, where he had great influence. Gaz. de
1811, ii. 749.
324 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
against that region, instructing him to execute most
exemplary punishment upon the rebels. 15 At Zaco-
alco and Sayula Porlier met with no opposition, the
insurgents retreating before him in the direction of
Zapotlan; but on the 3d of March he fought them
at some little distance from that town and defeated
them. No difficulty was experienced by him in re
ducing to subjection the other towns which had
shown symptoms of revolt in that region. 16 Porlier
now intended to advance farther southward, and sent
forward Manuel del Rio to Colima, but the hostile
attitude of the Indians in the territory of Colotlan
and Nayarit forced Cruz to recall the larger portion
of the troops. Calleja had despatched from Zacate-
cas the cura of Matehuala, Jose Francisco Alvarez,
with a division of the troops of the provincias internas,
against the revolted district; but on the 27th of March
the belligerent padre was repulsed near the town, be
ing badly wounded, and effecting his retreat with dif
ficulty. Negrete was therefore sent with a force from
Nueva Galicia, and more successful than Alvarez,
soon reduced all the towns in the region between
Colotlan and Juchipila. 17 Zapotlan, however, on the
withdrawal of the royalist troops, again revolted, and
Negrete proceeding thither inflicted a severe defeat
upon the insurgents on the 6th of May. 18 Neverthe
less, the revolution in Nueva Galicia was not easily
eradicated, and Cruz and his officers were kept in con
stant occupation in one part or other of the province.
On the 25th of June, hoping to strike an effective blow
at the ringleaders, he issued a proclamation offering
15 Cruz in his instructions to Porlier says: 'No deve perdonarse la vida a
ningun revelde sea de la clase, coudicion, y edad que fuere. ' Hernandez y
Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 224.
16 See his correspondence with Cruz during Feb. and March of this year.
Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col Doc., iii. 224-35, 249-07.
17 Gaz. de Mcx., 1811, ii. 411; Parte de Negrete, in Hernandez y Ddvalos,
Col. Doc., iii. 270-2.
18 Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 467-8. The leader of the insurgents was the
'infame lego Gallaga,' who retired with a few followers to Tomatlan. About
the end of August he was there taken prisoner and shot. Alaman, Hist. Alcj.,
ii. 299-30.
PROVINCE OF MEXICO. 325
rewards for the delivery of insurgent chiefs, dead or
alive. 19 These stringent measures, however, were not
effectual. In order to correspond with Calleja's wishes,
and cooperate with him in the protection of Zacate-
cas and Aguascalientes, Negrete and Colonel Manuel
del Rio were despatched with considerable detach
ments against different bodies of the insurgents.
These officers defeated the enemy in a number of en
gagements fought during the months of June to Sep
tember, while two other divisions, respectively under
the commands of Angel Linares and Colonel Pastor,
did good service. 20
During this period the rebellion developed to a
great extent in the province of Mexico, and the prox
imity of the insurgent bands which soon infested it
not only caused the viceroy increased anxiety, but
exposed the weakness of the government in being
unable to suppress hostilities carried on almost in
sight of the capital. Although Hidalgo had been
unsuccessful in rousing much enthusiasm during his
brief inroad into Mexico, he had sowed well the seeds
of revolution. His departure did not allay the agi
tation in the towns of the Toluca Valley, and it spread
rapidly to those of Temascaltepec, Sultepec, and Zita-
cuaro. Although authority was quickly reestablished
in the city of Toluca, the country was soon overrun
by guerrilla bands. Haciendas and the smaller towns
were attacked and pillaged, communication between
the outlying cities and the capital was almost closed,
travel on the highways was impossible without strong
escorts, and sentinels were lassoed at the very gates
of the city. 21 The viceroy at first attempted the or-
19 The rewards offered were proportionate to the military grades, the
leaders being rated at $500 a head, their colonels at $300, sub-officers at
$100, and an ordinary individual at $50. Cruz in the same proclamation en
acted that in every town which had lapsed into revolt after the extension of
the indulto to it, all the rebellious inhabitants should be put to death. Gaz.
deMex., 1811, ii. 715-18.
20 Id., ii. 759, 763-6, 811-14, 836-8, 967-70; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col.
Doc., iii. 287-9, 295-6, 324-5, 328-9, 330-1, 338-9, 368, 370-1.
21 Ward, Hex. in 1827, i. 180.
326 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
ganization of volunteer troops of horse supported by
subscription; but this force proved a failure. 22 He
then appointed Juan Bautista de la Torre, a captain
of the regiment of Tres Villas, military commander
of Toluca, and assigned to him a strong body of regu
lars. 23
To describe all the operations of Torre would be
entering into monotonous details of similar events.
He proceeded against the rebels early in January,
and during that and the three succeeding months
gained a number of victories, 24 by which he reduced
the valleys of Toluca and Temascaltepec. About the
beginning of April, however, the inhabitants of Joco-
titlan again rose in revolt. The viceroy ordered Torre
to chastise them and clear the highway to Valladolid
of guerrilla bands. On the 15th,. after two hours
and a half of incessant firing, Torre entered Joco-
titlan, "having had the particular pleasure of leaving
four hundred dead upon the field," which he believed
would act as a restraint upon "the enemies of God, 25
the king, and the country."
Zitacuaro, in Michoacan, still remained in the power
of the insurgents under Benedicto Lopez, who had sus
tained various defeats at the hands of Torre. The
town, surrounded by lofty hills on all sides, can only
be approached by three deep and narrow canons,
namely, those of San Mateo, Tuxpan, and los Lau-
reles; 26 and Lopez, driven from place to place in
the less rugged valley of Toluca, had taken refuge
22 The name of guerrilla volante was given to this force. According to
Mora, the outrages committed by it were worse than those of the insurgents.
Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 182.
23 Torre was a native of Spain, being born in the mountains of Santander.
21 Consult Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 43, 212-10, 221-7, 232-8, 265-75.
25 Torre displayed a strange mixture of merciless severity and religious
faith in a merciful saviour. He persecuted the insurgents, not only as
rebels, but as wretches cast outside the pale of the church by excommuni
cation. His cruelty and fanatical piety are well illustrated in a proclama
tion which he addressed to the inhabitants of Temascaltepec on the llth of
March. While offering them the choice of the indulto or death, he con
cludes by wishing them, with the lord's grace, all happiness. Id., 1811, ii.
238.
'^Uustamante, Companas de Callcja, 137. See map previously given.
DEATH OF TORRE. 327
in the mountain wilds of Zitacuaro. Torre, having
O
advanced during the night up the San Mateo canon,
at daylight on the 22d of April attacked the town,
his force consisting of 700 men provided with artil
lery. At the opening of the engagement the in
fantry led by Ventura Mora, second in command,
gained some advantage. By a gallant charge they
made themselves masters of the hill of the Calvario,
which commanded the town; but though they cap
tured the enemy's guns, they were unable to hold
their position against the immense numbers by
which they were in turn assailed. Mora and Cap
tain Pinera were slain, and the soldiers broke and
ran to the artillery for refuge. Pursuers and pur
sued, however, were so intermingled that the artil
lerymen could not fire without inflicting heavy loss
upon their own men; and the crowd rushing in
among the ranks of the main body threw it into
confusion. Finding it impossible to arrest the panic,
Torre tried a retreat by the way he had corne.
When he had reached the narrow entrance to the
canon, however, he found that a breastwork of loose
stones had been thrown up, behind which a host
had collected to cut him off. His destruction was
now certain. The soldiers lost all hope. A few
only escaped to tell the tale. Torre prepared for
death. He confessed to Padre Arevalo, the cura of
Tlalpujahua, who accompanied him, and then under
his guidance endeavored to escape from the trap he
had entered. Accompanied by a few horsemen, he
succeeded in extricating himself, and on the follow
ing day even .passed Tuxpan without harm. On
arriving at the hacienda of Xaripeo, however, he
was captured with his companions by Benedicto Lo
pez and taken back to Tuxpan. As they crossed the
bridge of that town Torre was killed by the natives,
who showered stones upon him until his dead body
was covered. The fruits of this victory were the
328 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
capture of all the enemy's arms, ammunition,, guns,
and baggage, and more than 300 prisoners.
Rayon was at this time at Tusantla; and on receipt
of the important news hastened to Zitacuaro, where
he assumed command. With considerable skill he
proceeded to put the town in a state of defence, recog
nizing the importance of its position as a central
point of operation. A ditch was cut round it five
varas wide and a league in circumference, which could
be converted at will into a moat by inundating it
from an extensive dam with which Zitacuaro was pro
vided. Behind the ditch a concentric barricade three
varas in width was erected, all the assailable portions
of it being covered with cannon, the number of which
was increased as rapidly as guns could be turned out
of the foundry which Rayon had established. The
roads also leading into the town were closed against
hostile approach by ditches and breastworks of tim
ber.
The defeat of Torre and destruction of his division
almost neutralized the previous advantages gained by
him. Communication between Yalladolid and the
capital was entirely closed, and the valley of Toluca
left open to the insurgents. Venegas, in this extremity,
being unable to detach any more forces from those
retained in the capital, had recourse to those under
the command of Emparan, who, contrary to the orders
of Calleja, had approached toward Valladolid. That
commander was, therefore, instructed to unite his
division with the forces under the lieutenant-colonel
Jose Castro, then at Tultenango, and proceed with
all possible despatch against Zitacuaro. This separa
tion of Emparan's important division from the army
of the centre caused Calleja great annoyance, and
from this time date the differences which arose
between him and the viceroy, and which afterward
developed into personal enmity. Empdran, who
estimated more correctly than the viceroy the diffi
culty of the undertaking, was not inclined to engage
DEFEAT OF EMPARAN. 329
in it without having first made every reasonable
preparation. With this object he occupied himself
for some time at Maravatio in putting in good order
his artillery trains and arms, in collecting supplies
of provisions, by informing himself through spies of
the strength and position of the enemy, and making
himself acquainted with the topography of the dis
trict. This prudent delay gave umbrage to Vene
gas, who, in face of Torre's late disaster, blindly
regarded the capture of Zitdcuaro as presenting little
difficulty; 27 and in his communications with Calleja he
expressed his dissatisfaction at Ernpdran's dilatori-
ness, wrongly attributing it to want of energy and
inclination. 28
Although Venegas was anxious to place the expedi
tion under some other leader, circumstances prevented
his doing so, and he ordered Emparan to advance
against Zitacuaro without further delay. Emparan
accordingly, though suffering in health, led out his
division, composed of 2,000 of the best troops of Ca-
lleja's army, and by forced marches under drenching
rains arrived on the 19th of June within six leagues
of the town. Entering by the same canon as that
followed by Torre, for two days the royalist army
with great difficulty pursued its march up the narrow
and rugged bed, continually impeded by obstructions
thrown in the way by the insurgents. Emerging
from the gloomy ravine on to the more open ground
of the glen in which Zitdcuaro was situated, Empa
ran took up a position on the 21st, in front of the
gently rising elevation of Los Manzanillos near the
27 'Siendo indudable,' he writes Calleja, 'que la reunion de Zitacuaro es
despreciable, y quo el suceso desgraciado, ' that is, of Torre, 'fue efecto de
haberse dirigido mal.' Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 123-4.
28 Calleja had already forwarded complaints to the viceroy injurious to
Emparan. Venegas thus influenced was not sparing of him, and told Calleja
that it would be necessary for him to come and take charge of the expedition.
Calleja, however, explained to the viceroy how impossible it would be for him
to do so at the present time, and suggested that the command be given to
Trujillo. Id., 123-5. As the reader is aware, Trujillo's position at this time
precluded the possibility of his leaving Valladolid.
SCO ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
town. 20 On the following day the royalists took pos
session of the hill without difficulty, and also routed
a strong body of insurgents, estimated at 10,000 or
12,000, which assailed their rear; but all attempts
to take the town were prevented by the ditch, which
was filled with water and defended by well trained
infantry under cover of the barricade. 3 ^ After nine
hours' fighting, during which the troops suffered
heavy loss, Emparan withdrew to Lcs Manzanillos,
where his soldiers bivouacked, comfortless and dis-
spirited. 31
When the dull morning came with its leaden, rain-
charged sky, the royalist leader recognized the . hope
lessness of any further attempt against Zitacuaro.
The ground on which they had fought on the preced
ing day was inundated and was, indeed, an impassable
swamp. Lacking means of crossing the moat, and
without provisions or ammunition, Emparan cursed
in his heart the viceroy who had forced him for
ward against his better judgment. Retreat was the
only course left; and mustering into line, he retired
through the canon to Toluca, his force reduced one
half. 32 Here, prostrated by fatigue and exposure, the
wound received on his head at the battle of Calderon
29 Bustamante says that Empdran sent out two detachments to forage, one
in the direction of San Mateo, and the other toward the town of San Fran
cisco, and that the first was entirely destroyed by the Indians, while the
other only saved itself by flight. Cuad. Plist., i. 224. Mora also follows this
account. Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 186. Emparan, in his report to the viceroy,
makes no mention of these reverses. Gaz. de Hex., 1811, ii. 598; nor does
Alaman.
30 Among the infantry were 200 soldiers of the regiment of Tres Villas and
100 deserters from the garrison at Valladolid. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 3G5.
31 Bustamante states that during the night great alarm was caused by a
stratagem of Rayon's, vrho fastened paper lanterns to droves of donkeys,
which were then driven toward the royalist camp. Cuad. Hist., i. 225. Mora
enlarges upon this story, and says that Emparan's soldiers were thus thrown
into panic. Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 188. Emparan, in his report, however, af
firms, 'en la noche no se advirtib cosa que mereciera atencion.' Gaz. de Mez.,
1811, ii. C01.
z * Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 225. 'Logro por fin llegar a Toluca con
poco menos de quinientos hombres, como consta de la revista que por 6rden
del virey le pas6 en esta ciudad el conde de Alcaraz.' Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.,
iv. 188. The accounts given by Alaman and Bustamante of this disaster
differ considerably. The former follows in the main the report of Calleja
given in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 597-004.
THE VICEROY IN DANGER. 331
breaking out again, Empdran lay at the point of
death. His condition did not, however, prevent Vene-
gas from venting his wrath upon the unfortunate chief.
The fault was altogether his own, but he, being ruler,
must have some one to throw the blame upon. He
sent the conde de Alcaraz to Toluca to investigate.
Disgusted at the treatment, as soon as his health per
mitted, Empdran asked permission to return to Spain,
although the result of the in Destination left him with-
O O
out prejudice. His request was granted. On his ar
rival in the peninsula he retired from military service,
and died shortly afterward. Thus ended the career
of one of the few royalist chiefs who, while no less
brave than competent, was able to temper success
with mercy.
While these reverses which were the more pro
nounced by reason of the coincident successes of
Morelos in the south, and the aggressive operations
of the insurgents at Valladolid were causing Vene-
gas great anxiety, an unforeseen peril was threaten
ing him in the capital. As early as April a plot was
formed to seize the person of the viceroy, and force
him to give orders for the release of Hidalgo and his
fellow-captives. The prime mover was Dona Mariana
Rodriguez de Lazarin, a woman of great daring and
devotion to the cause, 53 and with such energy and
tact did she manage the matter that the plans of the
conspirators were already arranged and the day ap
pointed. On the evening before this day, however,
one of them, Jose Maria Gallardo, mindful that he
might lose his life in the coming adventure, bethought
him to provide for the saving of his soul by confessing .
to Padre Camargo of la Merced, divulging therein
the particulars of the conspiracy. Camargo imme
diately informed the viceroy, and Gallardo, who was
33 When the ranks of the independent party were in despair at the news
of the capture of Hidalgo, Dona Mariana at a meeting in her house proposed
to seize the viceroy, and obtain the release of the captives or hang him. Z
ccro, Mem. Rev. J\lex., 359. This was the origin of the April conspiracy.
332 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
apprehended without loss of time, in abject terror dis
closed the names of all concerned. A number were
arrested that night; and as further information w r as
gained, a great many persons of high position were
found to be implicated. 34 Dona Mariana and her hus
band were confined in a dungeon till December 1820,
when they were liberated by the exertions of Zere-
cero. Although it does not appear that any execu
tions followed the discovery of this plot, many of
those arrested languished for a long time in prison. 05
The failure of this conspiracy did not, however, de
ter others. Plots thickened in the capital, and when
the failure of Emparan's attack upon Zitacuaro became
known, the bolder conspirators, hoping to deal a fin
ishing blow at royalist power in New Spain, again
formed a plot to seize the viceroy. Their plan was to
attack his escort on the 3d of August, while he was
taking his customary evening ride, in the paseo cle la
Viga, and having secured his person, to conduct him
to Zitacuaro, and deliver him into the power of Rayon.
There he would be coerced to issue orders consigning
the government of the kingdom to Rayon. 38 But
again a traitor marred the plot on the eve of its ac
complishment. On the night of the 2d, one Cristo
bal Morante, who had attended the last meeting of
the conspirators when their plans were finally arranged,
denounced the proceedings to Venegas, 37 who imme
diately gave orders for necessary precautions to be
taken. On the following morning the principal con
spirators were arrested, and in order to allay the agi
tation caused by the discovery and the military meas
ures taken, the viceroy on the same day issued a
proclamation informing the public of whathad occurred.
34 Among them Padre Belaunzaran, afterward bishop of Monterey, the
marquis of Rajas, the counts of Santiago, Regla, and Medina, and sev
eral high officials in the service of the government.
35 Consult Bustamante, MartiroL, pp. 51; and Mex. Refut. Artie. Fondo,
12. Zerecero was the author of the work quoted in note 33.
^Gazde Mex., 1811, ii. 780.
37 Bustamante erroneously states that it was a woman who divulged the
plot. Cuad. Hist., i. 299.
CONSPIRACY CRUSHED. 333
Proceedings were at once brought against the prison
ers, and their trials conducted with the utmost haste.
Six of them were condemned to death, and executed
on the 29th of the same month. 33
Among those arrested were three Augustinian fri
ars, Juan Nepomuceno de Castro, Vicente Negreiros,
and Manuel Rosendi. Castro was degraded by the
ecclesiastical court, and handed over to the secular
power; the other two were deposed from their relig
ious dignities, and sentenced to confinement in the
convents of their order in Manila. The criminal
court, however, demanded the surrender of all three.
This gave rise to disputes between the two jurisdic
tions, and the viceroy, deeming it impolitic to exhibit
the spectacle of an ecclesiastic's execution in Mexico,
finally sent them all to Habana, to be there confined.
Castro, however, died on his way thither in the castle
of Ulua, where so many others under similar circum
stances had been released from durance by death. 39
38 These were the licenciado Antonio Ferrer, Ignacio Cataiio and Jose"
Mariano Ayala, subalterns of the commercial regiment, Antonio Rodriguez
Dongo, in whose house the conspirators held their meetings, and Felix Pineda
and Jose" Mariano Gonzalez. The execution of Ferrer was little less than
murder. The only evidence against him was the denunciation of one Manuel
Teran, an official of the secretaria de camara de vireinato, who stated that
Ferrer on the morning of the 3d of August had invited him to go armed and
on horseback that afternoon to the paseo de la Viga, and made him acquainted
with the plans formed for the execution of the design. No other witness ap
peared against him, and he strenuously denied Teran's assertions, maintain
ing in his declaration that he knew nothing of the plot before that morning.
&o weak was the charge that the fiscal, Jose" Ramon Oses, only ventured to
propose the punishment of six years imprisonment. The Spanish party, how
ever, were loud in their demands for his death. Ferrer was a lawyer, and too
many of that class were attached to the cause of independence. The viceroy
was importuned so urgently that he declared if the criminal court did not
impose capital punishment upon Ferrer he would do so himself. The presi
dent of that court, the oidor Bataller, a Spaniard, wished to save his life, but
the two alcaldes, Yafiez and Torres Torija, both Americans, pronounced
the sentence of death, and Bataller unwillingly signed the death-warrant.
"When Ferrer heard the sentence read to him, he fell senseless in the court,
overwhelmed with the injustice to which he was victim. Alaman, Hist. Mej.,
ii. 370, 372-3; Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 424-8; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i.
300. A declaration asserted to be written by him 'sin sugestion ni seduccion
de nadie,' before his death and recognizing the justice of his sentence, was
published in the official gazette two days after his execution. Gaz. de Mex.,
1811, ii. 784-5.
sa Besides Alaman, Bustamante, and Zerecero, already quoted, consult
Rivera, II 1st. Jed., i. 338-9; Hex. Oablldo Metrop., pp. 14, in Doc. Edes.
Mex., MS., ii. no. 4; and Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. 2)oc., iii. 435-6.
3C4 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
Notwithstanding the triumphs obtained by the in
dependents at Zitacuaro, and the successful progress
of Morelos in the south, Rayon recognized the want
of cooperation among the revolutionary leaders. By
a union only could permanent advantage be gained
over an enemy who could concentrate an overpower
ing force at any point and destroy them in detail.
With a view of centralizing authority, Kay on formed
the plan of a national junta, under some show of pop
ular election, and he corresponded with Morelos, who
indorsed his views. Then he convoked an assembly
of as many of the principal inhabitants of Zitdcuaro
and land owners in the district as could be collected,
and laid the matter before them. This meeting was
held on the 19th of August, and an act was passed,
establishing a supreme national junta consisting of
three members, to be increased to five as occasion
might require, and nominating for election Rayon,
Jose Maria Liceaga, and Jose Sixto Verdusco, the
cura of Tusantla. 40 For the installation of this junta,
and the election of the members, the principal chiefs
were convoked the same day to give their votes on
the matter. 41 The act of the general junta was con
firmed by them ; the nominees were elected by a large
majority, 42 and took oath to maintain the rights of
the church and the king, 43 and shed the last drop of
blood for liberty. The electors then swore to obey
the decrees and enactments of the newly created coun-
40 Bando, in Hernando y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. . iii. 340.
41 The names of those assembled were: Ignacio Rayon, minister of the
nation; Lieutenant-general Jos<5 Maria Liceaga; Josd Sixto Verdusco, as rep
resentative of General Morelos; the mnriscales de campo Ignacio Martinez
and Benedicto Lopez; Brigadiers Jos< Maria Vargas and Juan Albarran; Re-
mijio Yarza, as representative of General Jos6 Antonio Torres; Colonel Mi
guel Serrano, as representative of General Toribio Huidrobo; Captain Manuel
Manzo, for the commissioner Mariano Ortiz; the commissioner Tomds Ortiz;
the quartermaster Ignacio Ponce de Leon; and sub-inspector Vicente Iza-
guirre. Id., iii. 403.
42 Rayon naturally had great preponderance in this assembly, which at
most was only a partial representation of the independent leaders. A few
other persons present gained votes to the number of four, and two; and one
was cast for Morelos ! Jb. Alaman says of Rayon's intentions, 'siendo su plan
que la autoridad recayese en el mismo.' Hist. Mej., ii. 397.
43 Even now they were not able to act wholly independent of royalty.
SUPREMA JUNTA NACIOXAL. 335
cil, which was styled the Suprema Junta Nacional,
and a circular copy of the proceedings w r as sent to the
different chiefs, calling upon them to take the oath of
allegiance and exact the same from the troops and in
habitants in their respective districts.
The news of the establishment of a government
was received with great joy by the revolutionists, and
they now indulged in the most sanguine hopes of the
accomplishment of their high aspirations. The result,
however, fell far short of their expectations. The
suprema junta failed to receive general recognition;
many of the military leaders refused obedience to it ; 44
others only acknowledged its authority when conven
ient, while the Villagranes even placed themselves in
hostility to it. But what contributed most to its in
efficiency was disagreement among its members. Some
said it had no title to obedience, not having been con
vened by the nation. Morelos and some others did
not like the idea of still holding on to the skirts of
royalty; they thought it a species of deception ruling
in the name of Fernando, when pure independence
alone would satisfy them. 45 The members of the
junta tried to soothe his scruples, and in a letter
dated the 4th of September, defended their action
on the ground of expediency. Although they aspired
to independence with no less ardor than their col
leagues, they found it advantageous to the cause to
proclaim Fernando, inasmuch as many Europeans as
well as wavering Spanish Americans had thereby
been induced to join them. 48 But Morelos could not
countenance a measure which he foresaw would lead
to complications, and although he was appointed the
** Albino Garcia, remarked, 'No hay mas rey que Dios, ni mas alteza que
un cerro, ni mas junta que la de dos rios. ' Bustamante, Ouad. Hist. , i. 298.
45 'No era razon,' says Morelos at his trial, 'engaiiar a las gentes haciendo
una cosa y siendo otra, es decir, pelear por la independencia y supouer que se
haci<\ por Fernando VII.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 381.
4(5 #az. de Mex., 1812, iii. 489. This letter fell into the possession of Ca-
lleja, at the capture of Cuautla in May 1812, together with others papers of
Morelos. Guerra maintains that this document was a fabrication of the roy
alists. Rev. N. Esp., ii. 420-1.
326 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUABO.
fourth member of the junta of Zitacuaro, he held
aloof. 47
The establishment of this junta, however, caused
Venegas considerable alarm. He could not close his
eyes to the fact that even the mere semblance of a
government would give impulse to the revolution, and
afford a dangerous opportunity to the insurgent lead
ers of uniting under the direction of rulers who were
no more illegitimately constituted than had been the
junta of Seville. Its destruction, therefore, was of
the first importance; and Calleja, who had already
been ordered to proceed against Zitacuaro after
Emparan's repulse, was again urged to use all possi
ble despatch. In order to counteract the effect from
the use of the name of Fernando VII. by the newly
organized junta, 48 Calleja proclaimed in Guanajuato
on the 28th of September that no junta was here
recognized except the national congress of the cortes
in Spain, nor any authority as legitimate except that
of the viceroy. He moreover placed a price of
$10,000 on the head of Rayon and those of his prin
cipal associates.
While Calleja was making his preparations to
assault Zitacuaro with that unhurried leisurely sys
tem always pursued by him, and which in this case
detained him till the end of the year, a variety of
events occurred. The danger to which Valladolid
had been exposed during July caused Venegas, as
soon as Emparan's troops had recovered from their
fatigue, to despatch Colonel Joaquin Castillo y Busta-
mante with his battalion to the assistance of Trujillo.
This officer, having joined Linares in Valladolid, pro-
47 Consult Zerece.ro, Re.v. Mex., 399-403; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., I 293-6;
Mora, Mcj. y sus Rev., iv. 308-10; Guerra, JRev. N. Esp., ii. 402-10. More-
los, in a letter to Rayon dated August 13, 1811, had previously sanctioned the
proposed establishment of a supreme junta, and appointed Verdusco as his
representative. Zamacois, Hist. Mej. , vii. 559-02, supplies a copy of it.
48 The proclamations and enactments of the junta bore this heading: El
Sr Don Fernando Septimo y en su Real Nombrc la Suprema Junta Nacional
Americana, etc. Hernandez y Da valos, Col. Doc., in. 392.
IXSUIIGEXT DEFEAT. 337
ceeded on the Gth of September against Mufiiz, who
was posted at Acuitzio with 8,000 men and thirteen
pieces of artillery; and on the following day defeated
him and captured .his guns and ammunition. He
then marched to Patzcuaro, which was occupied by
Torres, who, however, did not await his attack, but
retired to Zacapo, and uniting his forces with those
of Navarrete, took up a position on the hills near
Zipimeo, where he gave battle to the royalists.
Torres was as unsuccessful as Muniz; he was routed
with great slaughter and the loss of twenty-one can
non. Extreme severity was exercised by Castillo
after these victories; at Zipimeo more than 300
prisoners were put to death. And Castillo seemed
to regard other kinds of butchery with favor, as he
commended to the favorable notice of Trujillo a
dragoon who, in the pursuit at Acuitzio, slew with his
own hand a brother, saying, as the latter pleaded for
his life, that he knew no brother who was a rebel.
On the departure of Castillo from Toluca with a con
siderable portion of the troops stationed there, Rayon
determined to extend his operations into the province
of Mexico, and sent detachments in the direction
of Ixtlahuaca and Tenango. These made inroads
to the gates of Toluca, and Venegas despatched Cap
tain Porlier, who had returned to Mexico, 49 to take
command of the force in that city. On the 16th of
September Porlier marched from Toluca against the
insurgents, and on the 21st made an unsuccessful
attempt to dislodge them from a strong position on
the hill of Tenango. The loss of the royalists was
considerable, and Toluca being threatened, Porlier
retraced his steps thither. Before his arrival, on the
10th of October, the city had been assaulted by the
enemy, and was cannonaded for the five following
days. Meanwhile the viceroy had despatched a force
49 Porlier had passed through Guanajuato in August on his way from
Guadalajara to Vera Cruz, and conducted to the capital a convoy of 1422 bars
of silver placed under his charge by Calleja. Ataman, Hist. M?j. t ii. 310;
Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 129.
HIST. HEX., VOL. IV. 22 -
338 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
of 500 men from the capital to the assistance of the
besieged. Porlier, on the arrival of this detachment,
assumed the offensive, arid drove the insurgents from
their positions with the loss of their artillery, arms,
and ammunition. Of 100 Indians taken prisoners all
were drawn up in file arid shot, except one who was
dismissed to bear the tidings to his countrymen. 50
The viceroy now peremptorily ordered Calleja to
march against Zitacuaro. 51 Calleja, aware of the peril
in which Guanajuato would be placed by his depart
ure, was nevertheless compelled to obey these instruc
tions, and unwillingly left that city on the llth of
November, having been frustrated in his attempts to
provide for the safety of the province by arrangements
with Arredondo and Cruz, who, indeed, were fully
occupied in protecting their own territories. Thus
abandoned to its own resources of defence, the city of
Guanajuato lay exposed to the attack of numerous
bands of guerrillas who gathered round as soon as
Calleja was out of sight. On the 26th that indefati
gable chief Albino Garcia occupied the hill of San
Miguel with some 12,000 men, and opened fire on the
city. An attempt made by a party of royalists to
capture the enemy's cannon by assailing their rear
failed, nearly every man being killed; and the insur
gents, taking advantage of their success, pushed for
ward into the town, and attacked the plaza. Here,
however, they lost a cannon which they had placed
in the plazuela of San Diego, and Albino Garcia, aware
that reinforcements were approaching from Leon and
Silao to the relief of the besieged, hurriedly with
drew to the hacienda of Cuevas, where a great num
ber of his followers dispersed. 52 But although the
insurgents failed in their attempts against the capital
50 Gaz. deMex., 1811, ii. 957-60, 977-80, 1006-10; Alaman, Hist. Mej.,
ii. 392.
51 The despatch of Venegas was concluded in such terms as to cause Ca
lleja additional offence. Buxtamante, Campanas de Calleja, 132-3.
52 Id., Cuad. Hist., i. 424-7; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col Dot:, iii. 447-9.
Cruz had, moreover, instructed Captain Angel Linares, then at Lagos, to hold
himself in readiness to assist Guanajuato. Id., iii. 429-30.
IJsT QUERETARO. 339
and the principal towns, which were attacked in turn,
the province was overrun by fierce bands of guer
rillas and subjected throughout its length and breadth
to the scourge of predatory warfare. In the neigh
boring province of Michoacan the aspect of affairs
underwent no material change. Although the capi
tal was relieved from immediate danger, it was the
only place held absolutely in possession by the royal
ists. During the last three months of the year, vari
ous expeditions were sent into the districts of Patz-
cuaro, Tacambaro, Ario, and Uruapan, but though
the government forces succeeded in driving Muniz
and other chiefs from place to place, destroying the
founderies which they established and burning their
camps, they made no permanent progress. In Nueva
Galicia, Cruz was more successful. On the principle
of Calleja's new system, military companies were or
ganized in most of the towns, and by their cooperation
in resisting the predatory attacks of the revolutionists,
the province was gradually reduced to tranquillity.
The city, of Queretaro, well fortified and garrisoned,
was secured against attack, but the surrounding ter
ritory was no more exempt from civil strife than the
neighboring provinces, and the comandante Rebollo
sent frequent expeditions against the rebels, 53 who in
terrupted the communication between the capital and
Queretaro to such an extent that only immense con
voys strongly escorted could pass through the infested
district. 54 In communication with the insurgent lead-
53 These expeditions were generally commanded by Fernando Romero Mar
tinez and Ilclefonso de la Torre, both European Spaniards, and whose ferocity
gained for them an infamous notoriety. The former indulged his blood-
thirstiness by putting bound captives to death with his own hand, and the lat
ter respected neither sex nor age in the butcheries which he perpetrated.
Alaman, Jlist. Mej., ii. 405-6. Particulars of the engagements in Queretaro
will be found in Gaz. deMex., 1811, ii. 149-51, 381-4, 594-6, 69D-702, 707-11,
719-21, 760-1, 1022-4, 1192-3, 1195-6; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii.
336-7.
51 On the 14th of November a convoy consisting of 2,000 pack mules, iin-
der the conduct of Colonel Andrade, entered Mexico. Besides 600 bars of sil
ver, it conveyed a great quantity of articles of consumption, and its safe ar
rival was a matter of rejoicing to the inhabitants of the capital. Andrade left
Mexico some days later with a return convoy six leagues Ln length, escorted
340 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
ers in Queretaro were those operating in the Huas-
teca and Mexico. The progress made by the revolu
tion in the eastern part of the latter province was
rapid and alarming. During August and the succeed
ing months of 1811, the insurrection spread southward
EASTERN DISTRICTS.
by a body of troops 400 strong. On the 23d he was attacked by the Villa-
granes, Anayas, and Correa, the cura of Nopala, who had declared for the rev
olution and had been made brigadier by the junta of Zitdcuaro, and appointed
comandante of Huichapan and Jilotepec. Although the insurgents were re
pulsed, they succeeded in driving off some pack mules, and the action was so
brisk that the bishop of Guadalajara, who was returning to his diocese, was in
danger of being captured. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 407-8; Gaz. deMex., 1811,
ii. 1108-11.
IN TLASCALA. 341
through the plains of Apam and extended across Pue-
bla to the confines of Oajaca. Toward the close of the
year the territory of Tlascala was invaded, the city
attacked, and many of its towns and their districts
devastated. The highway between the capital and
Orizaba was almost closed to the royalists, and com
munication with Vera Cruz interrupted.
The first impulse to the revolutionary movement in
the plains of A.pam was given by Jose Francisco
Osorno, a highwayman by profession, and so illiterate
that he only succeeded in learning to scrawl his
name when he became prominent as a leader. 55 Hav
ing collected a band of 600 or 700 men, he entered
Zacatlan on the 30th of August without opposition.
Here he was presently joined by Mariano Aldama
a relative of the Aldamas who had been the associates
of Hidalgo with the rank of major-general; and their
rapid progress soon caused inconvenience in the capi
tal by the stoppage of supplies from the haciendas sit
uated in the plains. Venegas accordingly despatched
an expedition against Zacatlan under the command of
a naval captain named Ciriaco del Llano. 58 This offi
cer gained a series of successes over the insurgents,
but his sanguinary and oppressive proceedings, instead
of extinguishing the insurrectionary spirit, only served
to inflame it. 67 Thus Osorno, though repeatedly de
feated and his followers dispersed, ever reappeared at
55 Such is the statement of Calleja in his manifiesto supplied by Martinena
in his Verdadcro Origen de la Rev. enN. Esp., 16-7. Osorno was convicted in
Puebla for robbery about the year 1790. He attained to the rank of major
general and lieutenant general in the revolutionary service. Bustamante
glosses over the criminal antecedent of this leader. Ctiad. Hist. , i. 358.
56 At the beginning of the revolution the governor of Habana had sent to
Mexico a number of naval officers who wished to take service in the royalist
army. Id., i. 359.
5T An order which he issued to the effect that no one except a public char
acter might ride on horseback caused great and general discontent, and many
joined Osorno in order to save their horses, which were regarded with affec
tion, from being taken for military work. Still more oppressive was Llano's
system of burning the homes of the country people on the ranches scattered
through the plains, in order to compel the inhabitants to congregate in the
larger towns and oppose the insurgents. Id., i. 360-1; Gaz. de Mex.. 1811.
ii. 932.
342 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITACUARO.
some point distant from the scene of his late reverse
at the head of his reunited men, 58 and his name became
as celebrated in the plains of Apam as that of Albino
Garcia in the Bajio of Guanajuato. 59
b8 Aldama had been treacherously murdered by one Jose" Maria Casalla,
who received him into his house under the guise of friendship and assassinated
him while asleep. Bustamaiite, Cuad. Hist., i. 363. By his death Osorno suc
ceeded to the chief command.
59 Details of the royalist operations in the plains of Apam will be found in
Gaz. deMex., 1811, ii. 871-8, 931-6, 987-91, 1056-8.
CHAPTER XIY.
SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
1811-1812.
DOCTOR Cos JOINS RAYON THE REVOLUTIONARY PRESS PERPLEXITY OF
VENEGAS BISHOP CAMPILLO'S FAILURE AS A MEDIATOR SECOND CAM
PAIGN OF MORELOS CALLEJA TAKES ZITACUARO DESTRUCTION OF THE
CITY REVERSES OF PORLIER ARRIVAL OF SPANISH TROOPS TRIUMPHAL
ENTRY OF CALLEJA INTO MEXICO JEALOUSY OF VENEGAS CALLEJA
MARCHES AGAINST CUAUTLA DESCRIPTION OF THE CITY LLANO AT
IZUCAR CALLEJA REPULSED CUAUTLA INVESTED SUFFERINGS OF THE
BESIEGED MORELOS EVACUATES THE CITY CALLEJA RETURNS TO THE
CAPITAL.
WHEN Morelos returned to Chilapa, after the sup
pression of the conspiracy formed by Tabares and
David, he found himself in a most favorable position
to make at leisure and without interruption his prepa
rations for another campaign. By the dispersion of
the royalist troops sent against him, he held possession
of the country about him. Protected from attack on
the north by the river Mescala, and the deep pestifer
ous valley through which it ran, he was equally se
cure from molestation in the direction of Oajaca. The
recent defeats of troops from that province had left it
in alarm for its own safety, without either the incli
nation or means again to assume the offensive. Dur
ing the next three months, therefore, Morelos devoted
himself with untiring activity to the more thorough
organization of his forces, and especially to the estab
lishment of systematic order and harmony between
castes, the correction of the abuses practised upon
(313)
344 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
Spaniards, 1 and to the collection, proper management,
and legitimate application of public rents and church
tithes within the territory under his control. 2 In
order to facilitate matters, early in October he formed
a new province, which he named Tecpan, out of the
southern portion of the territory which at that time
comprised the intendencia of Mexico, and erected
Tecpan as the capital, with the title of the city of
Nuestra Seiiora de Guadalupe, while at the same
time, as a punishment for the pertinacious opposition
of the inhabitants of Acapulco, that port was degraded
from its rank and title of Ciudad delos Reyes to that
of la Congregacion de los Fieles, the lowest grade of
municipal communities in the Indies. 3
The preeminence displayed by Morelos in ability
to direct the revolutionary movement, continually ex
posed his life to other dangers than those of open war.
Dark and secret plans were formed for his destruc
tion by poison or capture. In September 1811 he
received a letter from one Padre Alva, 4 warning him
of a plot to poison him, and informing him that two
men were already on their way from Mexico with
that object. As Alva had minutely described them,
they were arrested on their arrival at Chilapa, and
sent to Zacatula. About a year later a similar design
was meditated, of which Calleja seems to have been
aware; 5 and still later Rayon apprised him of the
1 0n the 13th of October he published a decree to this effect: 'Que aim
siendo culpados algunos ricos Europeos 6 criollos, no se heche mano de sus
bienes sino con orden Expresa del Superior de la Expedicion. ' Hernandez y
Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , iii. 402, 450.
2 At the beginning of his career Morelos appointed commissioners to at
tend to these matters. See Id., ii. 227-8; Ataman, Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 41.
These commissioners were instructed 'a reconocer las existencias de los
estancos, alcabalos, como tambien las de bulas y nuevo indulto de carne, to-
mando cuenta de ellos a las personas que los manejan.' Ib. On the 15th of
Sept. he established postal communication with other independent centres,
and between the revolutionary armies, by the organization of a sendee of
mounted couriers. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 376.
3 Alaman supplies a copy of this enactment. Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 44-6.
The territory thus constituted a province by Morelos was afterward made,
with an addition, the province of Guerrero.
*'Con destino de Capellan de Coro 6 otra ingerencia en la Colegiata de
Guadalupe. ' Declaration de Morelos, 38-9.
5 Such is Alaman's opinion: 'En la declaracion muy especial que por 6rden
DOCTOR COS. 345
presence of a traitor among his most confidential as
sociates, whose intention was to deliver him to the
viceroy. 6 Morelos received these unpleasant commu
nications with extreme indifference.
The rapid extension of the rebellion, despite his ut
most efforts to arrest its progress, kept Venegas in
embarrassment; and to add to his perplexity, the popu
larity of the cause was daily gaining ground in the
capital and other large cities in possession of the
Spaniards. Fostered by the circulation of periodicals
and publications the distributors of which the gov
ernment in vain endeavored to discover the princi
ples of independence were being more widely dissemi
nated and better understood. Prominent among the
authors of these sheets was Doctor Cos, whom the
imprudent action of the viceroy had driven to the
ranks of the insurgents. Cos, as the reader will re
member, on his departure from Aguascalientes had
been detained in confinement at Queretaro. Having
addressed a representation to the viceroy giving an
account of the occurrences at Aguascalientes, and in
forming him of the instructions which he had received
from Calleja to proceed to Mexico, Cos was released by
order of Venegas and presented himself at the vice
regal palace. The viceroy expressed himself satisfied
with his explanations ; but after a delay of many days,
during which no notice was taken of him, Cos was
peremptorily ordered to return immediately to his
parish. Such a journey could not be undertaken by
him at that time without imminent risk; two days
after his departure he was captured by Correa's band
and conducted to Zitacuaro, where, disgusted with
the treatment he had received and the want of con
fidence in him shown by the viceroy, he offered his
del virey Calleja se le tomo en su causa, sobre otro conato posterior tie cnve-
nenamiento, que da idea que Calleja tenia noticia previa del heclio.' Hist.
Mej., ii. 425.
6 Ray 011 described the man as stout and big-bellied. Morelos' reply was
'no hay aqui otro barrigon que yo, la que en mi eufermedad queda desbas-
tada.' Id., ii. 425-6.
346 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
services to the junta. Rayon willingly received him,
and henceforth Cos devoted heart and soul to the
cause. Conscious of the power exercised by the press
as an engine of defence against misrepresentation, and
for the diffusion of enlightened ideas on the subject
of independence, with infinite labor he fashioned out
of wood with his own hands sufficient type to enable
him to print five pages of matter, and for some months
issued from Zitacuaro a weekly publication which he
styled the Ilustrador Americano. 1 The effect produced
by this sheet was soon felt by the steady emigration
from the cities of young men of energy and ability,
who joined the ranks of the revolutionists and aided
the cause with sword or pen.
The perplexity of Veriegas increased daily ; and so
forlorn did his position appear to him that at times
he even meditated opening communications with the
rebel leaders to induce them to lay down their arms
by offers of personal favors, and by concessions which
would win back the multitude to their allegiance with
out prejudice to the essential principle of Spanish
domination. But such a step would be deeply hu
miliating to the dignity of the government, and doubly
so in the event of failure. Sorely pressed though he
was, he hesitated to adopt a plan so uncertain. It
was therefore a relief to his mind when Manuel Igna-
cio Gonzalez del Campillo, bishop of Puebla, 8 offered
"Mora says: 'El Ilustrador Americano, se leia por todos partes con avidez
y con aprecio, en las grancles ciudades sometidas a los Espaiiolcs, cspecialmente
en Mcjico, circulaba de mano en raano, y aunque cl gobierno vireiual sabia cl
hccho, no podia dar con las personas que lo leian y teniau. ' Mcj. y sus Rev. ,
iv. 197. See Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 40G. Somewhat later Cos obtained a
quantity of type by the assistance of Jos6 Rebelo, an official in the printing-
office of Arizpe, in which the government printing was done. Ilebclo pur
chased the type without suspicion, and it was conveyed at great risk through
the gates of the capital packed in gourds, which to appearance contained fruit.
Having joined the insurgents forthwith, Rebelo served for some years with
great zeal for the cause. He was eventually captured by the royalists while
conveying some revolutionary sheets from Zacatlan to Apazingan, and shot.
Id., i. 407-9.
8 Campillo, though a Creole, had been appointed bishop of Puebla on ac
count of eminent services rendered the church. Previous to his election he
had frequently been engaged in disputes with the Spaniards and the govern
ment. Disagreements were then laid aside, and when the revolution broke
out Campillo used his utmost efforts to promote the cause of Spain. His lino
PROPOSED MEDIATION. 347
to open negotiations in his own name with Rayon and
Morelos, and submitted a plan of proceeding. He
would address a manifesto to the two leaders, and
appeal to them to aid in putting a stop to the war.
Commissioners were to be sent to them with instruc
tions of both a public and private nature. By the
first they would be authorized to offer full pardon
to Rayon and Morelos if they would stop proceed
ings and recognize the Spanish government. By the
second, promises were to be privately given to the
insurgent leaders, on the word of the bishop and with
his guarantee, of their reception into favor. If these
offers were accepted, it was to be understood that the
insurgent forces, their fortified places, arms, and all
resources of war, should be placed at the disposal of
the government. 9
Yenegas gladly accepted the bishop's proposal;
whether his mediation were successful or not, it
would solve the question which perplexed him with
out compromising the viceregal dignity. . The com
missioners 10 were received by the revolutionary chiefs
with becoming deference. But the design failed.
Neither the bishop's manifesto nor private arguments
and promises had any weight with either Rayon or
Morelos, who refused to enter into any negotiations
of conduct was, however, marked by freedom from the rancor displayed by
his brother prelates, and the coarse vituperation which too often disfigured
their exhortations was never resorted to by him. He moreover frequently
interposed his influence with the viceroy to save the lives of unfortunate in
surgent captives. He was, therefore, regarded with less aversion by the
revolutionists than his ecclesiastical colleagues. Mora, Alej. y sus Rev., iv.
198-2DO.
9 The bishop's manifest and his correspondence with the viceroy and the
insurgent leaders, together wich the report of the cura Antonio Palafox one
of the commissioners of the failure of the. plan, was published by him in
August 1812. Campillo, Manif., 11 3, pp. 103. Negrete claims to bo the first
hiscorian who published a copy of these interesting documents, Bustamante
having only produced the bishop's correspondence with Morelos. Mcx. Siy,
XIX. , v. 103-76. This last author is of opinion that Campillo did not initiate
the mediation, but that it was secretly arranged by Venegas. Cuad. Hist.,
ii. 102-3. Consult Mora, MPJ. y stts Rev., iv. 197-201.
10 The cura Antonio Palafox to Rayon, and the presbitero Josd Maria
Llave to Morelos. The latter, however, was prevented reaching his destina
tion ' porque so lo impcdieron unas calenturas, ' Dustamante, Cuad. Hi>,t. , ii.
103, or, as Mora says, 'no quiso encargarsc de este negocio.' Mej. y sus Rev.,
iv. 201. A substitute was therefore sent in his stead.
348
SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
except on the basis of the establishment in Mexico of
a national government. Indeed, even their influence
would have been unavailing to stay the current of in
dependent principles now so deeply ingrafted in the
minds of their followers, and an attempt to do so
would have endangered their own lives. 11 The com
missioners, therefore, returned with the tidings of
their failure, and the two governments continued
their preparations for future hostilities.
SECOND CAMPAIGN OF MOBELOS.
About the middle of November Morelos again took
the field and entered upon his second campaign. Pro
ceeding to Tlapa, he entered that town without oppo
sition, the royalist garrison having retreated to Oajaca
on his approach. Here he was joined by Padre Tapia,
11 The commissioner Palafox, in his report to the bishop describing the
public feeling in that part of the country which he visited, says : 'Ni se piensa,
ni se habla, ni se obra, sino de la insurreccion : . . .todos, pero mas los intlios,
estan resucltos a morir, y con hechos practices han probado quo lo estan tam-
bien a matar aun a los supremos gefes quo han puesto el dia quo se vuclvan
como ellos dicen "revelados."' Canrpillo, Manif., 112-13. Rayon's reply to
MOVEMENTS OF MORELOS. 349
and Victoriano Maldonado, an Indian of great reso
lution and intelligence. From Tlapa he inarched to
Chautla de la Sal, where Mateo Musitu, a rich Span
iard, had organized and armed at his own expense a
considerable force, fortifying himself in a strong build
ing which had formerly been the convent of the Au-
gustinians. Morelos, however, despite the vigorous
defence made, carried the place by storm, and cap
tured Musitu and 200 of his men. Although Musitu
offered fifty thousand dollars for his life, he was
treated with the severity dealt to belligerents, and
shot with other Spaniards who were taken prisoners
with him. 12
At Chautla, Morelos divided his force into three
divisions, one of which he placed under the command
of Miguel Bravo, with instructions to march against
Oajaca; with the second Galeana was sent to attack
Tasco; at the head of the remaining division Morelos
advanced to Izucar, which he entered on the 10th of
December without opposition, and was there joined by
Mariano Matamoros, the acting cura of Jantetelco,
who afterward figured as a prominent revolutionary
chief. On the 17th, however, he was attacked by a
force of over 500 men under the command of Mi
guel de Soto y Maceda, a lieutenant of the navy, sent
against him by Llano who, in recognition of his ser-
Campillo is dated Zitacuaro, October 10, 1811, that of Morelos, Tlapa, 'Nov.
24, 1811. The latter chief, irritated perhaps by the upbraiding tone and
somewhat acrimonious style of the bishop's letter, forwarded to him a sarcas
tic note which he had appended to two letters received by him from the curas
of Tixtla and Chilapa relative to the protection of their flocks from abuses by
insurgents! The following is a translation of the document: 'Tlapa, Nov.
24, 1811. I certify in due form that those curas of the people who have de
clared in favor of the gachupines can kill and perform their religious func
tions without being liable to the charge of irregularity and to excommunica
tion, and that only the cura Morelos and the other American curas will be
considered irregular, excommunicated, etc. Let the original be remitted to
the bishop of Puebla for his information. Morelos.' Id., 97-8.
l2 Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 429-30; Cavo, Tres Sighs, iii. 382. Morelos
while here attached to his service Jose" Manuel de Herrera, cura of Huamux-
titian, who was found secreted in the church and brought before him over
whelmed with terror. Morelos appeased his fears, and he was afterward
admitted into his closest confidence, and made a chaplain of his army. Cavo
says : ' Este es el famoso Ministro de relaciones de Iturbide, que tanto daiio
hizo a la nacion. ' /&.
350 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
vices in the plains of Apam, had meantime been made
colonel, and afterward appointed military commander
of the province of Puebla. 13
The assault was sustained with great vigor for five
hours, but the royalists could make no impression
upon the plaza, the entrances to which were closed
by barricades. Soto, mortally wounded, at last gave
orders to retreat, delegating the command to Captain
Mariano Ortiz. The retreat was equally disastrous.
Ortiz was killed at the head of his men while endeav
oring to repulse the pursuing revolutionists, and the
remnant of the division, amounting to less than two
hundred men, entered Puebla on the 19th, the rest
being killed, captured, or dispersed. 14
Puebla now lay almost at the mercy of Morelos,
dependent as it was for its defence only upon the dis-
spirited remnant of Soto's force. But he chose rather
to sweep clean the territory as he advanced, and leave
no hostile force ; i his rear. He therefore proceeded
to Cuautla, and entered it without resistance on the
25th of Ij^cember, the cornandante Garcilaso having
fled at his approach. From Cuautla Morelos con
tinued his triumphal march to Tasco in order to unite
with Galeana, who had been equally successful in his
expedition against that town, which he took after a
vigorous defence maintained by the comandante Ma
riano Garcia Rios. Rios, after sustaining himself for
two days, capitulated on the condition that the lives
of himself ^and his troops should be spared, but More
los, on hij,. Arrival on the 31st, pronounced the capit
ulation nuii, n. the ground that Rios had continued
firing after n '^a^l^een concluded, and he, with fif-
Gaz. de Hex., 1811, 11. VX3, 1214.
11 Soto died the same day rand was buried on the 20th, in the cathedral
at Puebla. His attack on Izucar was regarded as rash by the government.
See the report of the alfe"rez cle navio, Pedro Micheo, who brought off the de
feated troops, in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 1209-14; also, Cavo, Trcs Sif/los,
iii. 382-3; Alaman, Hist. Me; . ii. -131-4. From a fragment of a communi
cation of the viceroy, dated i>ecember 20, 1811, it appears that on the 18th
the royalists collected at Atlixco to the number of 150 only, //ernamfez y
Ddvcdos, Col. Doc., iii. 4,36. About 70 prisoners were taken, neai'ly all of
whom were set at liberty. Id. , vi. 22.
JUNTA DE ZITACUARO. 351
teen other prisoners, Spaniards and Creoles, was shot
on the 4th of January following. 15 Thus terminated
the second campaign of Morelos, by which he became
master of the territory extending from Chilapa to the
mountain range which separates the valley of Mexico
from the tierra caliente of the south.
Meantime the junta of Zitacuaro was experiencing
that opposition to its authority already foreshadowed.
Tom as Ortiz, a nephew of Hidalgo, and who had been
appointed by him comandante of that district, made
himself particularly obnoxious, both on account of
his want of deference and his rapacity, which drew
angry complaints from Morelos. In order to sustain
the authority of the new government, the junta there
fore caused Ortiz to be arrested, as well as several of
its own commissioners who had displayed a similar
disposition, and to whom Rayon himself applied the
epithet of voracious. 16 Ortiz and two other delin
quents were condemned to death.; biiiHn consideration
of their services, execution of the sentence was sus
pended. When Calleja, however, approached Zitd-
cuaro the junta, apprehensive that they might cause
future trouble in case the royalists should prove suc
cessful, gave orders for their execution, and they were
shot on the 31st of December. 17 Nor did Rayon meet
with that subserviency to his wishes which he had ex
pected from his colleagues, who soon began to regard
his ambitious views of self-aggrandizement with jeal
ousy. In his correspondence with Morelo^ he speaks
of the disgust which he had experienced ? leir differ
ences, of the puerile disposition which ' .y displayed,
and of their weakness of chara r." Thus enmity
15 Morelos, Declar., 23. Rios had made himself an especial object of hate
by his cruelty. Bustamante describes him as 'hoinbre pequenito de unas
entrauas diabolicas.' Cuad. Hist., ii. 28.
l6 Oftclode Hay on a Morelos, Enero 18 de 1812; Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii.
444.
17 Oficin de Liceaga d Morelos, Enero 13 Je iS12.
18 It was through Rayon's influence that Liceaga and Verdusco had been
elected members of the junta. Mora says of them: 'Eran personas oscuras
352 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
sprung up between them; and though an apparent
reconciliation occurred in the face of a danger common
to all, mutual confidence was never restored.
On the 1st of January, 1812, Calleja appeared be
fore Zitacuaro, the doomed city. He had left Guana
juato on the llth of November, and the slowness of
his movements marks at once the repugnance with
which he undertook the enterprise and his care to se
cure a successful issue. 19 Proceeding to Acambaro,
O '
he there conferred with Trujillo, who met him for that
purpose, and was joined by Castillo y Bustamante,
Garcia Conde, Meneso and other chiefs with their
divisions, according to previous instructions. From
Aciknbaro he leisurely continued his march, 23 and ar
rived at Ixtlahuaca toward the middle of December,
in order to open communication with Toluca and
combine his operations with these of Porlier. 21 Here
he received some reinforcements, and his army now
amounted to 4,900 combatants, 22 with twenty-three
pieces of artillery of different calibre.
On the 22d of December Calleja marched from San
Felipe del Obraje, where he had concentrated his
troops, and on the following day entered the rugged
defile of San Mateo. The difficulties which he en-
y desconoeidas en la mayor parte de las divisiones insnrjentes. . .y se acusa
Rayon de haber intentado apoderarse de la autoridad suprema a la sombra
de personas insignificantes y nombres desconocidos.' Mej. y sus Rev. , iv. 190-1.
19 After his departure from Guanajuato he received Venegas' instructions
of October 31st, couched in such peremptory terms as to cause him much an
noyance. He replied to the viceroy that 'no necesitaba usar de terminos tan
estrechantes, pues bastaban las anteriormente recibidas para obedecer.' Bus
tamante, Campanas de Calleja, 133.
20 Calleja was 10 days passing from Acambaro to Maravatio, expecting to
receive instructions from the viceroy, which failed to arrive. Gaz de Mex.,
1812, iii. 136.
al Calleja, considering that the previous failures to take Zitacuaro were
caused by the attacks being directed through the difficult canon of San
Mateo, had intended to make his approach by that of Tuxpan, while Porlier
secured the San Mateo road against the retreat of the insurgents. He was,
however, compelled to alter his plan and march through the San Mateo
canon, while Porlier directed his attention against Tenango. Ib.
22 Consisting of 2,761 infantry and 2,134 cavalry. His original force had,
however, been reduced by 1,543 men from sickness and desertion. Alaman,
Hist. Mej., ii. 451-2.
FALL OF ZITACUARO, 353
countered in his approach to the city were so great
that he was eight days in accomplishing twelve leagues,
sometimes advancing not more than half a league in
twenty-four hours. In many places entirely new roads
had to be opened at the cost of immense labor, and the
sufferings of the soldiers were excessive as they toiled
under pitiless storms of rain, snow, and pelting hail
which alternately descended upon them from the sun
less sky. Had the royalists been assailed in this pass,
it is probable that they would never have reached
Zitticuaro, but the insurgent leaders too confidently
relied upon their strong position, and their fortifica
tions, which had been elaborately completed under
the direction of Ramon Rayon, brother of Ignacio.
Having surmounted all obstacles, Calleja, on the 1st
of January, 1812, encamped before the town on a
rising ground just beyond reach of the enemy's bat
teries. Having personally reconnoitred the enemy's
lines of defences, 23 he made his dispositions for attack
on the following day. His plan was to assail the
insurgents' fortifications in the rear, while he threat
ened them with attack in front. With this object, he
placed a division of his forces under the command of
Garcia Conde, who was directed to move round to
the left toward the road leading from Los Laureles,
while Calleja with the main body made a detour along
the heights toward the right. A strong reserve force
was placed in charge of the conde de Casa Rul. At
ten o'clock in the morning the royalist commanders had
taken up their respective positions, and having placed
their artillery on commanding eminences, opened fire.
For a short half-hour the revolutionists replied vigor
ously; but their fire then slackened before the superior
23 It is narrated by Diaz Calvillo, that while Calleja was making his ob
servations the figuration of a very perfect palm tree appeared in the sky, and
that he exclaimed to Jose* Maria Echagaray, who commanded the cavalry
escort which accompanied him: 'Vea V. la palma; nuestra es la victoria.'
Sermon, 154. Calvillo, moreover, gives a wood-cut of the miraculous appear
ance, which has so little resemblance to a palm that it has been thus criticised
in a marginal note: 'En verdad q! parece a la Palma, como un burro a una
chinchi (sic).' Ib.
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 23
354 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
gunnery of the royalists, arid disorder was observed
in their lines. Calleja had already made his dis
positions for the assault, three attacking columns hav
ing been placed respectively under the commands of
Castillo, Colonel Jose Maria Jalon, and Oroz and
Meneso, the latter leaders being instructed to cover
the right of the other columns, and occupying the Tux-
pan road, connect with Garcia's division on that of
Los Laureles, thus closing retreat in those directions. 24
These columns were now ordered to advance, while
Garcia Conde, having crossed the moat by means of
a portable bridge provided for the purpose, was at
the same time forcing his way into the town. The
simultaneous attack was successful at all points. In
deed, the defence appears to have been lamentably
weak in comparison with the great preparations made,
and by two o'clock in the afternoon the insurgents
had fled from Zitacuaro as best they could, plunging
into the ditches and escaping by the barrancas and
mountain gullies. 25 The junta fled to Sultepec, where
it established a new seat of government.
The loss sustained in killed and wounded was
inconsiderable in proportion to the importance of
the fall of Zitcicuaro. 26 Forty-three cannon fell into
the possession of the victors, besides a great quan-
24 A deep barranca intervened between the position which Calleja took
up and the town. He caused three mountain paths leading to this to be
well opened for the advance of his attacking columns under cover of his
artillery. Castillo moved along the one to Calleja's left ; Jalon advanced on
the central one; and Oroz and Meneso, whose forces were composed of cav
alry, on the one extending to Calleja's right. Gaz. de Mcx., 1812, iii. 138-9.
25 'A las dos de la tarde ya no habia en el recinto un solo enemigo vivo. ' Id. ,
iii. 140. The account of the capture of Zitacuaro has been derived from
Calleja's report to the viceroy in Id., iii. 17-18, 135-42; Bustamante, Cam-
panas de Calleja, 132-51; Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 413-19; Mora, Mcj. y
SILS Rc.v., iv. 270-82; Torrente, Rev. Hisp. Amer., i. 310-13; Diaz Calvillo,
Sermon, 152-59.
26 Though Calleja in his report wishes to give the idea that great numbers
fell, he only vaguely states that many hundreds of the rebels perished. A
Spaniard, however, writing from Zitacuaro on the 5th of January, says:
'Apenas moririan 200 y en el pueblo no pasarian de 20, porque estaba y aun
permanece solo.' Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 419. Negrete says: 'La pdrdida
de los independientes . . . f ue* corta: no pas6 de cincuenta hombres, siendo
mucho mayor la de los realistas.' Mex. Sicj. XIX., iv. 389. Calleja esti
mated the number of the defenders at 35,000, of whom 12,000 were cavalry,
' mimero sin duda muy exajerado,' as Alaman remarks. Hist. Mej., ii. 455.
DEGRADATION OF THE CITY. 355
tity of other arms and an immense store of ammuni
tion. 27 The casualties of the victors were insignificant.
Exemplary punishment must necessarily be inflicted
upon a city which had twice witnessed the disgrace
of the royalist arms. Most of the belligerents had
escaped and the prisoners were few. Of these, eigh
teen were shot on the following day; 28 too small an
offering to appease the royalist gods; so the destruc
tion of the city was determined upon, and on the
5th Calleja published a proclamation, declaring that
the Indians of Zita"cuaro and its district were de
prived of their property, all their immunities and
privileges forfeited, and that every building would be
razed to the ground or destroyed by fire. Six days
were given for the unfortunate inhabitants to leave
the town. 29 The conde de Casa Rul was charged
with the execution of the sentence, which was rigor
ously carried out, after the place had been well sacked
by the royalist troops, the churches and convents
only being spared. 30 On the 13th Calleja departed
from Maravatio by the Tuxpan road, while in his
rear ascended the flames and smoke from the burning
town, which had been dignified by the revolutionists
with the high title of Villa Imperial. 31
Porlier in the mean time sustained a reverse in his
operations. According to the first plan formed by
Calleja, he was to have occupied the San Mateo road
27 <7az. deMex., 1812, iii. 155.
23 Seventy were set at liberty, ' miserables seducidos que tambien se hici-
eron prisioneros.' Id., iii. 140.
29 The capital of the department was transferred to Maravatio. The lands
and all except movable property were to be sold and the proceeds placed in
the royal treasury. Id., iii. 156-8.
30 Ward says: 'I saw this unfortunate town in 1826. The situation is
lovely, but the place is still in ruins.' Hex. in 1837, i. 189. Diaz Calvillo
defends Calleja from the charge of having allowed the churches and religious
houses to be pillaged. An inventory was taken of all ecclesiastical effects,
and they were sent to the bishop at Valladolid. Calvillo also reproduces an
order of Calleja of the 13th of January, prohibiting his soldiers from sacking
any other towns, or haciendas and ranches. Sermon, 173-4. Besides Zitd-
cuaro, Calleja reduced to ashes twelve pueblos in the vicinity. Bustamante
supplies a list of most of their names. Guad. Hist., i. 323.
31 Calleja in his report speaks of it as 'la llamada Imperial Zitdquaro.'
Gaz. de Hex., 1812, iii. 140.
356 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
leading to Zitacuaro ; but having received orders from
Venegas to move from Toluca against Tenango, he
directed his inarch thither, and occupied the place dur
ing the 29th and 30th of December, meeting with
little opposition except that offered by its mountain
ous position. Porlier then proceeded to Tenancingo,
which the revolutionists abandoned on his approach,
concentrating themselves in the barranca of Tecua-
loya. On the 3d of January he drove the enemy
from their position and took possession of the pueblo.
But the troops of Morelos were approaching in force,
and about the middle of January the barranca was
again occupied, Galeana having arrived with the ad
vance division. On the 17th Porlier attacked the
insurgents, who had taken up the same position from
which they had previously been driven. Though, the
royalists gained some advantage at first, and advanced
to the pueblo which had been occupied by the enemy,
they finally sustained a repulse with considerable loss,
and retreated to Tenancingo. Here Porlier was as
sailed by the combined forces of Morelos, who con
ducted the operations in person. 32 The attack began
on the 22d, and the firing continued all through the
night and the following day. Portions of the town
were set on fire, and the royalists, having lost several
of their principal officers, were driven to their last
position in the plaza with no hope of maintaining it.
On the night of the 23d Porlier abandoned the place,
effecting his retreat with great difficulty and with the
loss of eleven cannon to Tenango, whence he returned
to Toluca, with the remnant of his force in mis
erable plight and thoroughly dispirited. 33 Morelos
"His forces numbered about 3,200 men, commanded by Galeana, Nicolas
Bravo, and Matamoros. M&relos, Declar., 23.
33 The account of Porlier's operations has been mainly derived from His
despatches in Gas. de M<x. y 1811, ii. 1231; Id., 1812, iii. 1S-19, 61-70, 159-61.
Consult also Alamcm, Hist. Mej., ii. 460-7; Torrente, JRev. Hist. Amer., i. 314-
10; Bmtamante, Companas de Ccdleja y 166; and Citad. Hist., ii. 10-32, in
which last narration the author gives a very incorrect version. Alaman
remarks that had Calleja obeyed the orders of the viceroy to march against
Morelos as he approached the valley of Toluca, Porlier would not have sus-
SANTIAGO IRISARRI. 357
Living remained Umv days in Tcnancingo, returned
by way of Cuernavara to Cuautla, where he arrival
on the 9th of February.
The continued successes of Morelos had so alarmed
Venegas, that he reiterated orders which he had pre
viously given to Cnlh-ja, enjoining him (o march south
ward against that leader. So peremptory were his
last instructions that Oallejahad no alternative but to
comply; and on the 23d of January he left Maravatfo
and proceeded to Ixtlahuaca, having, ho\\v\ , -, piv\ i
ously requested permission to resign his command.
Venegas refused his consent, and Calleja again on tlio
26th pressed him in urgent terms to accept his resig
nation. The viceroy at this date felt himself less de
pendent than heretofore on the victorious general. On
the 14th and 16th of the month two Spanish battalions
had arrived at Vera Cruz, 84 and others were following.
So Vonegas, who would soon have over 3,000 penin
sular troops at his disposal, 85 proceeded to appoint as
Calleja's successor Santiago Irisarri, a Spanish com
modore. Irisarri was unknown in the army of New
Spain; and the dissatisfaction at the appointment was
expressed l.v a representation addressed to Venegaa
by the principal officers, stating their unwillingness to
serve under any other commander than Calleja. The
viceroy was now in a dilemma; but he deemed it pru
dent to retract under such pressure, and by despatch
of the 31st conjured Calleja not to retire. 80 To avoid
tainrd this reverse. But Calleja was bent upon returning to the Bajio of
Guanajuato and opposed tin-. movement /'/ >/., -Iti7. -170 _'.
** Namely, the third lut ialin of the regiment of Aaturius, and the first of
that of Lo vera, (fat. de Jf <&., isi-j. iii. ii'i. Tiu-s,. \\vtv th.- \\\- ,
from Spain. . I /.//MOM, Jfit. Mej., ii. 400. On the 29th tlu- But battalion of tli.t
Americano Infantry rcgimenl arrived t'n.in ( fa .i/..r.. i
81 'So recibierou :. ; mil lunubres
initiifi-, (\tn>i>. (l,'<'(tftfjn t 158.
N Thii deipatoh cli, !(<. I a rr|>l\- tVom Oaueja, in wliich ho enumerates his
. ami the s irrtiirr t IK- had made for his roil n try. VenOgUH I
closed a copy of UK- representation in- bad received from the omoen of <h.>
;irmy. It. \vustheroin osaertrd thai, tin- ill h.-alth of Cftlleja, \\hi.-Ii h
his plea for resigning, originated in disparaging remarks passed upon his
t. Alaman t lR*t.M<:
358 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
further difficulties of the kind, Calleja was instructed
to march with his army to the capital, and the 5th of
February was appointed as the day for his entrance.
The reception given to the victorious general, and
the army of the centre, was an imposing one. His
triumphal entry presented a spectacle never before
witnessed in the capital on so grand a scale. 37 As the
van approached the gates of the city, a salvo of ar
tillery announced the arrival to the immense multi
tudes which thronged the streets, eager to gaze with
hate or admiration upon the soldiers of whose victo
ries they had heard so much. The city was gay with
decorations; 38 salutes were fired, and the te deum
chanted with unusual sublimity in the cathedral. 39
But this display was attended with an accident to the
hero of the occasion, which in the eyes of some was
foreboding of disaster to him. When near the gate of
Mercaderes the horse of the mariscal de campo, Judas
Tadeo Tornos, who was riding by the side of Calleja,
became restive, and rearing struck the general on the
head, bringing him to the ground. Calleja was carried
into a house near by, and only recovered some hours
later sufficiently to be conveyed in a carriage to the
palace to present himself to the viceroy, having been
unable to attend the joyful ceremony at the cathe
dral. 40
Although the viceroy and Calleja maintained an
outward appearance of friendship, their sentiments
toward each other were none of the kindest. The
jealousy with which Venegas had for some time
regarded his general was increased by the flattering
reception now given him. The applause with which
37 His forces consisted of 2,150 infantry, 1,832 cavalry, accompanied by a
train of 1,500 loads of provisions and over 400 of munitions of war. Busta-
mantc. Camp, de Calleja, 107.
38 The day was that of San Felipe de Jesus, on which a festal procession
was made from the cathedral to San Francisco.
* 9 Gaz.deMcx., 1812, iii. 133-4.
*Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 477. Bustamante states that the horse which
Calleja rode was a stolen one, and recognized by its owner, Dona Maria Ger-
trudis Bustos, sister of the marquesa de Rayas. Cuad. Hist., i. 324.
AFFAIRS IN THE CAPITAL. 359
his deeds were rehearsed in prose and verse, and
the enthusiasm with which his appearance at the
theatre and in public was greeted, plainly indicated
how high in royalist favor Calleja stood, and Venegas
henceforth could only regard him in the light of a
rival. The feelings, also, so lately displayed in the
army in no way tended to lessen his uneasiness; nor
did the conferring of rewards and promotions which
he could no longer withold 41 improve matters. Medals
were distributed to the officers and troops; 42 and
Calleja having been previously promoted by the vice
roy to the rank of major-general, a corresponding
advance in grade was extended to all officers in the
army. 43 As this promotion was not confined to the
army of the centre, but was extended to the officers
of other divisions, and even to those of the marine
who had arrived from Habana, and whose services
had been very inferior, it did not meet with general
satisfaction. The loyal Americans felt aggrieved; a
party spirit was developed in the army, and it was
said that the Mexican-born officers were even begin
ning to show signs of indecision in regard to their
political faith, influenced by the revolutionary papers
which had been issued from Zitdcuaro. During the
few days that Calleja remained in the capital the mis
understanding between him and Venegas increased;
and had the stay of the army been prolonged, it is
doubtful whether they could have kept up even a sem
blance of friendly intercourse.
41 Venegas had always been sparing in his acknowledgment of the services
of Calleja's army, though pressed by him to reward the troops with medals
and promotions. See his letters to the viceroy of Dec. 12, 1810, and Jan.
18, 1811, in Id,, i. 118-19, 159-60. By despatch of May 30, 1811, the Span
ish regency instructed Venegas to bestow upon the officers and troops such
rewards as he might deem fitting. Jlernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 514.
But nothing appears to have been done until this occasion.
J2 The medal bore the name of Fernando VII., supported by a dog and a
lion, symbolical of faithfulness and courage, and on the border the words
' Vencid en Aculco, Guanajuato y Calderon.' Alaman says: ' Este escudo dio
motivo a mil chistes graciosos, por parte de los afectos a la revolucion. ' Hist.
Mej., ii. 480.
43 The names and grades of the officers promoted will be found in Gaz.
Hex., 1812, iii. 143-53.
360 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
But the proximity of Morelos afforded the viceroy
a pretext for hastening the departure of the troops;
and on the 8th he issued orders for the army to march,
at the same time explaining why he was compelled to
act with such promptness. The position of the royal
ists as described by Venegas 44 was, indeed, serious.
The capital was surrounded by bands of revolutionists;
commerce with the interior was destroyed; communi
cation with Yera Cruz and Oajaca was closed; trans
portation of quicksilver and gunpowder to the mines
was no longer possible; and all intercourse with the
port of Acapulco was cut off, causing additional com
mercial distress and a loss to the revenue of 1,000,000
pesos in duties payable on goods brought by the ves
sel from Manila. Scarcity of provisions and other
commodities was severely felt in the capital, and the
viceroy feared that even the roads to Texcoco and
Toluca, the only ones left open, would shortly be
closed. It was therefore indispensable that a deci
sive blow should be struck at Morelos, whom he
regarded as the present head and front of the revolu
tion. 45 The plan of operations which he gave to
Calleja was based on the latest information. It
arranged for simultaneous attacks on Izucar and
Cuautla, conducted respectively by Llano and Calleja.
The necessary instructions having been sent to
Llano at Puebla, on the 10th of February Calleja's
advance left for Chalco, whither troops of Morelos
had already arrived, and on the 12th the main body
moved forward. Pursuing the line of march indi
cated in his instructions, 46 Calleja encamped on the
17th at Pasulco, two leagues from Cuautla. Here
Morelos, duly informed of the movements of the
4t See copy of his instructions in Bustamante, Campanasde Calleja, 159-65.
45 The viceroy's words are: 'Principal corife"o de la insurreccion en la
actualidad, y podemos decir que ha sido en ella el geiiio de mayor firmeza,
recursos y astucias.' Id., 161-2.
46 The army passed through Chalco, Tenango, Ameca, Ozumba, and Atla-
tlauca. This route was selected as offering few obstacles to the passage of the
artillery. Id., 163-4.
CUAUTLA, NOW MORELOS. 361
royalists, had determined to make his stand, and ac
cordingly had united the divisions of his forces dis
tributed in the neighboring towns. He made every
endeavor to render his position as impregnable as pos
sible. Without attempting to erect exterior fortifica
tions, he confined his attention to a limited line of
defences within the city.
Cuautla de Amilpas, 47 distant about twenty-two
leagues from the city of Mexico, is situated on a ris
ing ground in a level plain. Its position, though not
so strong as that of Zitacuaro, is suitable for defence,
being commanded by no adjacent heights. At this
date the town was an open one, surrounded by plan
tations of fruit trees and plantain patches growing
close up to the houses. Its extent from north to
south was about half a league, the main street run
ning in a straight line in that direction, and connect
ing the plazas of the convents of San Diego and
Santo Domingo. At the northern extremity is the
chapel of the Calvario; on the east rise the hills of
Zacatepec, between which and the town flows a rapid
river in a channel 200 varas wide at the top, but con
tracting to twelve or fifteen varas in its bed. The
portion of the town fortified by Morelos included the
plazas and convents of San Diego and Santo Do
mingo, and was surrounded by trenches and ramparts,
with embrasures and merlons. 48 The outside doors
and lower windows of the houses on the line of de
fence were walled up, and communication between
the interiors opened by breaking through the parti
tion walls. Deep trenches were cut across the streets,
and batteries placed in suitable positions. 49 The ac-
47 The modern name of the city is Morelos. The Mexican word 'quauh'
means eagle, and 'tlan' place. Cuautla therefore signifies 'place of the
eagle.' Molina, Vocabvlario.
48 This description is taken from Calleja's report of April 28, 1812, to the
viceroy. Gaz. cleMex., 1812, iii. 445-6.
49 Calleja states that the revolutionists had 30 pieces of artillery. Busta-
mantc, Campanas de Calleja, 169. Morelos, in his declaration, says that he
had one mortar and 15 serviceable cannon. Declaration, 24.
362
SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
companying plan will enable the reader to recognize
the relative positions of the opposing forces.
CUAUTLA AND VlCINITY.
Positions of besiegers:
1 Headquarters and camp of Calleja on the estate of Buena vista.
2 Batteries and intrencliments.
3 Positions occupied by Llano's troops.
4 Redoubts.
5 Battery of Juchitengo.
6 Redoubt of the Calvario.
Positions of besieged:
7 Plaza of San Diego.
8 Plaza of Santo Domingo.
9 Premises of hacienda of Buenavista.
10 Redoubt at spring of Juchitengo.
11 Plantations and redoubt of the Platanar.
12 Highway to Mexico.
Morelos' force at this time amounted to 3,300 men,
of whom 1,000 were infantry and the remainder cav
alry, 50 and 100 Indians collected from the neighboring
50 The cavalrymen also served on foot during the siege, their horses being
pastured outside the town; 300 of them had arrived from Huetamo under
Cano and Francisco Ayala. Morelos, Declar., 24. Ayala had joined Morelos
at Chilapa under peculiar circumstances. He was a lieutenant of the acor-
dada in the valle de las Amilpas, and resided at the hacienda de Mapaxtlan,
near Cuautla. Being favorably disposed toward the revolution, he had de
clined to enroll himself in the troops levied by Garcilaso, the subdelegado of
Cuautla, and had thereby incurred suspicion. Some time afterward an insur
gent w r as killed in that neighborhood, and on his body was found a letter
from Ignacio Ayala, who had been appointed intendeiite by Morelos of the
new province of Tecpan. The comandante Moreno, believing that Francisco
GALEANA AND THE BRAVOS. 363
villages. During the progress of the siege, however,
his forces were increased to the number of 5,550 by
the arrival of different commanders. 51 On the 18th
of February Calleja moved forward his forces and
encamped on the rising ground of Cuautlixco, after
reconnoitring the defences of the revolutionists.
During the day Morelos imprudently exposed him
self to danger of being killed or captured, having
gone out with only a small escort. He was attacked
by a troop of cavalry, and was brought off with
difficulty by Galeana, who sallied out to his rescue. 52
At dawn on the following day Calleja advanced his
troops in four columns to the assault, directed prin
cipally against the intrenchments of the plaza of San
Diego. The defence of this important point was in
trusted to Hermenegildo Galeana, and that of Santo
Domingo to Leonardo Bravo; while to Victor Bravo
and the cura Matamoros was assigned the defence of
the Buenavista buildings.
Galeana, at the post of danger, well sustained his
reputation for cool judgment and personal bravery.
The front column of the royalists was allowed to
approach near to the parapet; but then so deadly a
fire was opened upon it that it retreated in confusion ;
and Galeana, perceiving an officer endeavoring to rally
his men, sallied out alone, engaged with him in single
combat, and killed him. The act perhaps was rash,
but it raised the spirits of his men to enthusiasm.
Ayala was the author, attacked his house, and opening fire upon it wounded
Ayala's wife, who died a few days afterward. Ayala, believing his wife
dead, and his house having been set on fire, effected his escape by great
prowess, and offered his services to Morelos, who conferred on him the rank
of colonel. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 35-7. Alaman verified this author's
account by statements of reliable persons in Cuautla. Hist. Mej., ii. 428.
51 Miguel Bravo, who had been unsuccessful in his expedition against
Oajaca, came with 400 men and three cannon; Anaya with 300 out of 700
sent by the junta at Sultepec, the rest having deserted; from Chautla the
cura Tapia brought 300, instead of 1,000 expected by Morelos; and 250 arrived
f rom Yautepec. Morelos, Dedar., 24-5. Calleja reported that the place was
defended by 12,500 armados de fusil. Bustamante, C'ampanas de Calleja, 169.
5>J Jos6 Maria Fernandez, afterward General Victoria, first signalized him
self on this occasion. The skirmish was a severe one, and he saved Galeana 's
life at the expense of a severe wound, which he received in protecting him.
Ward's Mex. in 1827, i. 190-1.
364 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
Two lateral columns, by creeping from house to house
along the street, now fought their way close up to
the intrenchments, causing some disturbance among
the defenders, whose confidence their leader, how
ever, soon restored. The enemy was repulsed, and
though again and again they returned to the charge,
their efforts to storm the defences were vain. For six
hours the combat continued. Many of the royalist
officers were struck down ; the conde de Casa Rul was
mortally wounded, and the greater part of the ammu
nition was spent. The attempts against the plaza of
Santo Domingo and the Buenavista buildings, though
these points were poorly fortified, proved equally un
successful. 53 Troops accustomed to victory, and who
rushed up to the trenches in full confidence, quailed
at last; and though Calleja, in the final charge, led
them in person, 54 his presence did not mend matters.
Convinced of the impossibility of taking Cuautla by
assault with his present force, for the first time in
his victorious career he withdrew crestfallen. 55 That
night he held a council of war, the result of which
was that he determined to reduce the place by siege;
and a despatch was sent on the following day to Vene-
gas, informing him of the position of affairs. Cuautla,
he says, must be destroyed, and its defenders buried
in its ruins, so that in future no insurgent will find
escape from death except by laying down his arms. 53
To effect this he shows the viceroy the necessity of
an increased force, of large supplies of provisions and
53 Calleja assaulted at four different points. In a letter to the viceroy
dated April 18th, he says: ' El 19 de febrero asalte" por cuatro diferentes
puntos a Cuautla, que no estaba ni de mucho fortificada como en el dia.'
Jlustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 63.
54 * En la ultima fu6 necesario que yo mismo condujese d los granaderos
acobardados. ' Id., ii. 64.
53 Besides the conde de Casa Rul, who died shortly after his removal from
the field, Colonel Itfepomuceno Oviedo, of the patriots of San Luis, fell with
four captains and eleven other officers of his corps. The loss of the royalists
was over 300 men. Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 342-3. Ward says 500 royal
ists were left dead on the spot. Mex. in 1827, i. 192. Calleja reported four
officers killed and 18 wounded, and of the ranks 15 killed and 95 wounded.
Neyrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., iv. 409. The loss of the revolutionists was insig
nificant.
50 Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 170.
ATTACK AND REPULSE. 365
munitions of war, and above all of mortars and siege
artillery of heavy calibre. In pursuance of his de
sign, Calleja took up a position on the western side of
the town at about a league distant, and began his
preparations for a regular siege.
While Calleja was undergoing the mortification
which attended his first defeat, a similar reverse was
sustained by Llano in his attempt against Iziicar.
That commander, in obedience to instructions, had
marched from Puebla by way of Cholula and Atlixco,
arriving about the 22d of February in front of Iziicar,
distant sixteen leagues. His force consisted of about
2,000 men, 540 of whom were cavalry, 57 with eight
pieces of artillery. On the 23d, having taken pos
session of the hill of the Calvario, he opened fire with
his artillery upon the town, and under cover of it ad
vanced two attacking columns composed respectively
of the battalions of Lovera and Asturias, under
Colonel Antonio de Andrade. The revolutionists
who had fortified themselves in the plaza, and were
commanded by Padre Sanchez, seconded by Vicente
Guerrero and Sandoval, repulsed all attempts to storm
their position, and Llano ordered Andrade to retire.
The assault was again tried on the following day with
no better result. The "invincible conquerors of the
victors at Austerlitz" 53 were beaten by rustics fighting
for their rights. 59 Llano was now in an unenviable
57 It was composed of 631 of the infantry of Puebla, 400 posted at Atlixco,
and the battalions lately arrived from Spain numbering 500. His cavalry,
which only amounted to 240 dragoons, was increased by 300 horse detached
from Calleja's army. Id., 163.
58 These troops on their arrival were called in the Mexican papers of the
day 'los invencibles vencedores de los vencedores de Austerliz,' which words
were printed in large type. Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 449.
59 Morelos after his capture of Izucar left Sanchez there with 200 men.
Guerrero at that time was a captain in the revolutionary army. Alaman,
Hist. Mej., ii. 434. Ward narrates that Guerrero during the bombardment
had a miraculous escape. While asleep, exhausted with fatigue, a shell
came through the roof and rolled under his bed, where it exploded, killing
or wounding every one in the room except himself. Mex. in 1827, i. 193.
Llano states that the insurgents mustered 1,500 men armed with muskets,
besides a multitude of Indians. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 523-4.
366 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
position, from which he was, however, unexpectedly
relieved. Venegas had received Calleja's report with
undisguised displeasure, but recognized t]ie fact that
Cuautla must be taken. He therefore despatched
immediately all the munitions of war which could be
spared from the capital, and ordered Llano to raise
the siege of Iziicar and join Calleja. Accordingly
on the 26th Llano retired from the scene of his fail
ure and marched to Cuautla, harassed incessantly in
his rear by the insurgents. 60
Every preparation was now made for a determined
siege. Llano took up a position opposite to that of
Calleja; redoubts were throw r n up, batteries erected,
and the place invested as closely as possible. Morelos
also improved his line of fortifications. The premises
of the hacienda de Buenavista were strengthened, and
a redoubt was erected in the platanar on the east side
to defend the approach to the river. The revolu
tionary leader, encouraged by his late success, not
only felt confident of maintaining his position but
anticipated victory, with the capital itself as the ob
jective point.
The bombardment began on the 10th of March,
and for four days the iron shower fell upon the city.
But the bursting shells and hurtling shot as they tore
through parapet or house wall could not break the
spirit of the defenders. Even the townspeople soon
lost alarm as their children at play began collecting
and making piles of the cannon-balls strewed about
the streets. 61 Breaches in the defences made by day
were repaired by night, and each morning the roy
alist general must begin anew. As the water supply
was cut off, wells were sunk. Every privation was
60 He was compelled to abandon an 8-pounder, the gun-carriage having
become unserviceable. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 531-4.
61 Morelos, whose stock of ammunition was not very plentiful, paid them
so much a dozen for them. Ward, Mex. in 1827, i. 194. 'Pagaba a peso cada
bomba, granadas d cuatro reales, bala de fusil d medio la docena.' Buata-
mante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 51.
HEROISM OF TEE BESIEGED. 367
borne with such a cheerful fortitude that Calleja soon
saw that there was here no thought of surrender.
And he dreaded to risk another assault. The un
yielding attitude of the besieged made him fear for
the result; and again he urged the viceroy to send
him quickly more and heavier cannon, for there was
work here which would tax his utmost endeavor. 62
But it was all of no use. The place was not to be
captured by cannonade ; and recognizing this, or at least
that to effect a breach with artillery of so light a cal
ibre was not possible, Calleja reduced the siege to a
mere blockade, and week after week passed by. The
supply from the wells proved insufficient, and the be
sieged made daily sallies and fought for water at the
springs and conduits outside the city. To stop even
the supply thus dearly obtained, the watercourse of
the Juchitengo spring was turned into another chan
nel, and sixty varas of the old ditch filled in. But
Galeana in broad day took possession of it, threw up
a strong square redoubt around the spring, and con
nected it by intrenchments with the defences of the
city. An attempt made the same night to take this
fortification failed, and henceforth the besieged were
in no want of water. 63
Outside the line of circumvallation, too, the be
siegers were continually harassed. Miguel Bravo and
the cura Tapia hovered around with troops of cavalry ;
fierce skirmishes were fought, and convoys of provi
sions and ammunition intercepted or brought in with
great difficulty. But hunger, a foe more terrible
than musket or sword, began to press the beleaguered
revolutionists. Morelos had not had time to provi
sion the city for a lengthened siege, nor had he expected
that Calleja would adopt so slow a method of warfare.
62 He wanted the heavy artillery from Perote. In April the brigadier,
Juan Jos6 de Olazabal, lately arrived from Spain, was ordered to bring it up.
He was intercepted at Nopalucan by the revolutionists and compelled to re
turn to Perote, losing a rich convoy, and with difficulty saving the artillery.
Alaman, Hist. J\fej.,ii. 513. See Calleja's letter to Venegas of March 13th.
Bmtamante, Cuad. Hist.,ii. 58.
63 This occurred on the 3d of April. Id., ii. 61.
363 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
There was no help for it, however, and so day by day
the situation of his people became more distressing
as the scarcity of food increased. But, as I have said,
they bore their sufferings with heroic fortitude, and
with every manifestation of unyielding purpose. The
soldiers on their return from battle, whatever might
be the result of their sally, were greeted with loud
cheers; those who fell were buried to the sound of
pealing church bells rung in celebration of their glori
ous death; enthusiastic joy marked any success, how
ever slight; and death was proclaimed against him
who dared to speak of surrender. Even Calleja could
not suppress his wonder and admiration at such high-
souled fortitude. " These people are heroes," he writes
the viceroy, "and they would merit a distinguished
place in history if their cause were just"! Morelos
he declared to be a second Mahomet. 64
Nor was the situation of the royalists by any means
an enviable one. The troops, reared in the temperate
and cool regions of the table-land, suffered under the
fervid sky of the tierra caliente. They broke down
under their heavy fatigues by night and day; sick
ness came upon them, and toward the end of April
800 men were in hospital. The rainy season too was
fast approaching ought already to have come; then
fever would strike them down by files, and the enemy,
inured to the deadly climate, would fall upon them
and complete their ruin. It was a question between
time and nature which would win. Nature was this
time on the side of oppression, to her shame be it said.
The rains were unusually late this year. Day after
day the fiery sun rose and set, and still no cloud ap
peared to the wistful eyes of the famished crowds in
the beleaguered city. Their sufferings were awful. 65
When all else was wellnigh consumed, old, time-worn,
64 See his letter to the viceroy of April 24th. Id. , ii. 59.
65 'A cat sold for six dollars, a lizard for two, and rats or other vermin for
one. An ox which was seen one day feeding between the Spanish camp
and the town nearly brought on a general engagement. ' Ward, Mex. in 1S27,
i. 196-7.
EVACUATION. 369
weather-beaten hides, stripped from doors to which
they had been nailed for years, were macerated and
eaten; foul grubs and crawling insects were devoured; 68
and pest, the companion of famine, followed in her
footsteps. The church of San Diego was converted
into a hospital; from twenty to thirty died daily;
gaunt, spectral forms moved wearily along the streets,
and the children no longer, as heretofore, marshalled
their bands in mimic warfare. 67 But still they yielded
not, and still Calleja dared not risk a second assault. 63
And all this time the junta at Sultepec remained
inactive, the leaders in Michoacan with their numer
ous forces came not to the aid of these brave, long-
enduring patriots. Morelos vainly endeavored to
break through the besiegers' lines and introduce pro
visions. On the open plain the enemy was superior. 69
On the 27th of April a desperate effort was made,
but failed. 70 After this an unusual stillness and inac
tivity was observed by the besiegers to prevail in the
city. The last hostile sally had been made. No
hope was left except to evacuate the town. Calleja's
bloody intentions were too well known, and capitula-
66 The house doors in Cuautla were protected with strong hides nailed to
them, instead of sheets of tin. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., ii. 519. 'La espantosa
escasez que la rednxo al te"rmino de comer insectos, cueros y quantas inmundi-
cias se les presentaba,' are Calleja's own words. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 479.
67 For an account of the children organizing themselves into companies,
and of their capture on one occasion of a royalist dragoon outside the walls,
see Bustamante, CuacL Hist., ii. 55-6.
68 He says to the viceroy: 'No convenia asaltar a un enemigo que lo de-
seaba.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 513-14.
69 In one of these attempts directed by night against the redoubt on the
Calvario, Gil Biafio, a son of the intendente who fell at the alhondiga of
Guanajuato, was killed on the side of the royalists. Id., ii. 515.
70 Matamoros and Colonel Perdiz sallied with 100 men on the night of the
21st and forced the enemy's lines on the Santa Inesroad, Perdiz, however, and
many others being killed. Matamoros succeeded in joining Miguel Bravo, who
was stationed at Tlayacac near the Zacatepec range with a strong force and a
large convoy of provisions. The design was to introduce it by the barranca He-
dionda and the town of Amelcingo, and on the 27th, signals having been ex
changed with Matamoros during the preceding night, Morelos attacked with
the greater portion of his forces the royalists at several points. Calleja had,
however, intercepted a letter which informed him of the plans of the besieged.
He accordingly made his preparations. A sanguinary contest took place, the
assailants being repulsed. Bravo and Matamoros were driven back with the
loss of the convoy and their artillery. Id., ii. 516-18; Gaz. de Hex., 1812, iii.
447-52.
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 24
370 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA,
tion would be certain death. And still, reduced as
they were to the direst extremity, Calleja dared not
attack them; and had he not been made aware of
their dreadful condition by the numerous fugitives
who daily left the city, he would probably have
raised the siege. But they were his; he would have
their blood, as he thought, if only the rains would
hold off a little longer. So with redoubled vigilance
O O
he waited for his prey. On the 1st of May he sent
to Morelos copies of the general pardon lately pub
lished by the viceroy. 71 As far as appearances went,
this offer of mercy was received with joy by the be
sieged troops, and hostilities ceased on both sides. 72
It was but a ruse, however; Morelos had made his
preparations to evacuate the town. His influence
over his followers was unbounded, and whithersoever
he went, or to whatever fate, they were ready to ac
company him and die for him. That night the troops
were silently marshalled in the plaza of San Diego,
and at two o'clock on the morning of the 2d the
march began, the lights being left burning on the ram
parts.
Galeana led the van, consisting of over 1,000 infan
try armed with muskets; then followed 250 cavalry,
and a large number of troops whose weapons were
slings and lances; after these followed a mixed crowd
of both sexes and all ages. The rear was brought up
by another body of infantry, with the baggage and
two small pieces of artillery in its centre. 73 Morelos
commanded in the centre with the Bravos, and Cap
tain Anzures in the rear.
Calleja lay stretched in sickness on his bed, and
71 The Spanish c6rtes had decreed on the 9th of November, 1811, a sec
ond general indulto. This was published by the viceroy on the 1st of April
following, and appeared in the D'mrio de Mex. of April 3, 1812.
72 Bustamante states that the indulto was brought by a royalist officer and
was confined to Morelos, Galeana, and Bravo. The reply of Morelos was to
the effect that he extended similar mercy to Calleja and his officers. Cuad.
Hist., ii. 71.
73 Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 522, supplies a copy of the original of Morelos'
instructions as to the order of march, which differs somewhat from that given
in the text and taken from Calleja's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 479-80.
PURSUIT AND SLAUGHTER. 371
heartily wished himself away from the infernal place,
as he called it. 74 He little imagined what the enemy
were doing. With all his vigilance he was deceived;
nor did he know till more than two hours afterward
that he was being outwitted, so skilfully had Morelos
made his arrangements. Directing its course to the
river, so silently did the column move, that unper-
ceived it approached the earth- works running north
ward from the Calvario redoubt, drove back the
guard, and demolishing a part of the intrenchments
advanced to the river, which was crossed by means of
hurdles provided for the purpose.
But now the enemy was upon them. Llano's forces
assailed them on the flank; their rear was attacked
as the royalist troops rapidly came up. For a time
the revolutionists sustained themselves under cover
of the stone walls that surrounded the country
haciendas, and for an hour a fierce contest raged. Out
flanked at last, the order was given to disperse and
fly, 75 but not before more than 800 had fallen. More
los, after having two of his ribs crushed by falling
with his horse into a ditch, 76 fled by way of Zacatepec
to Ocuituco hotly pursued. Here, while changing
horses, the enemy overtook him. To save their
leader's life, those around him fought until they died,
almost to a man, 77 and he escaped wellnigh alone. Pur
suing his flight to Izucar he there met Victor Bravo,
O O '
and thence proceeded to Chautla. Here, in safety at
last, he remained for a month, and unbroken in spirit,
74 He wrote a letter to the viceroy that same morning at half -past four, in
which he says: 'Conviene mucho que el ejercito saiga de este infernal pais,'
and adds that his own health is such that if he does not attend to it at once
all aid will be too late. Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., iv. 438-9.
73 Ward says that this was done with such promptitude that the Spanish
troops which were advancing from opposite directions fired upon each other
before they discovered their mistake. Mex. in 1827, i. 199. Bustamante
makes the same statement.
70 He was saved by Jose" Maria Franco, who assisted him out. Mex. Refni.
Artie. Fondo, 13.
77 ' Opusieron alguna resistencia d las nuestras con sacrificio de sus vidas
que casi todos perdieron,' is Calleja's testimony to their self-sacrifice. Gaz.
deMcx., 1812, iii. 480-1.
372 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
hastened to repair his fortune, collecting his scattered
troops and preparing for a new campaign. 78
Meantime the slaughter of the unarmed crowd was
horrible. Men, women, and children, old and young,
were indiscriminately butchered by the royalists, 70 an J
for seven leagues the bodies of the slain lay strewn
upon the road. 80 This cowardly vengeance of Calle-
ja's was among the most dastardly doings in the war.
Villanous as it was, and vengeance-satisfying, it was
but poor comfort after all to the leader so long sure of
his prey. This priest had worsted him and baffled him,
had finally eluded his grasp not a very happy reflec
tion for so proud a soldier. Calleja's sickness was a
serious bilious attack, and we may be sure that his
temper was not improved thereby. Of the dreadful
punishment which he inflicted upon the heroic inhab
itants of that wretched city I shall give no further
details. Let a veil be drawn over the frightful scenes
of cruelty. " I have heard officers, who were present
at the siege, speak of them," says Ward, " after a lapse
of ten years, with horror." 81
Having destroyed the fortifications of Cuautla
the siege of which cost the government 564,426 pesos,
exclusive of munitions of war and other expenses
Calleja, with his military reputation by no means im
proved, and his troops in miserable plight, returned
to the capital, which he entered on the 16th of May,
there to meet the ridicule of the inhabitants who well
knew that he had been outwitted, despite his glowing
accounts. 82
78 He states that at Chautla 800 of the troops of Bravo and Galeana were
reunited; that during the siege of 7*2 days he only lost about 50 men by the
enemy's fire and 150 by the pest; that with regard to the number who fell on
the evacuation of the town he could only say that Captain Yanez told him
that he had counted 147 dead on one half of the road from Ocuituco to
Cuautla. Morelos, Declar. , 25.
7S) Est6van Montezuma, afterward a general of the republic, on his return
from the pursuit, killed with his lance the wounded women whom he came
across on his road! Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 524.
80 Calleja's words are 'Las siete leguas estan tan sembradas de cadaveres
enemigos que no se da un paso sin que se encuentren muchos. ' Gaz. de Mex. ,
1812, iii. 481.
81 Mex. in 1827, i. 199.
82 'A comedy was acted a few nights afterward, in which a soldier was
REVOLUTIONARY BIBLIOGRAPHY. 373
introduced, who, on his return from battle, presents his general with a tur
ban, and tells him in a very pompous manner, 'Here is the turban of the
Moor, whom I took prisoner!' "And the Moor himself?' '0, he unfortu
nately escaped!' The passage was received with bursts of laughter, and the
application readily made by the audience.' Id. 199-200.
The siege of Cuautla was a subject of public conversation in Cadiz.
Wellington, at a banquet which was given to him in that city, asked the
deputy for Mexico, Beye de Cisneros, what kind of a place Cuautla was.
'It is a place,' replied Cisneros, 'open on all sides, situated in a plain or val
ley.' 'That,' answered Wellington, 'is a proof both of the ignorance of the
general attacking it, and of the wisdom and valor of the general who is de
fending it.' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. Ind. viii.
The material for the history of the revolution is abundant, and the details of
some parts of it have been fairly well presented by Mexican authors, though
seldom without more or less bias, for and against persons and parties. Promi
nent among writers on this episode is Anastasio Zerecero, Memorias para la
Historia de las Revolutions de Mexico. Mexico, 1869, 1 vol. 608 pages. It is
confined mostly to affairs during the time of Hidalgo, a brief sketch of the
conquest being given as introductory. As the city of Mexico was occupied
by the French at the time of his writing, the author pursued his labors at
San Luis Potosf, and \diether so intended or not, the result was little more
than a series of recollections, the author evidently intending to carry them
through the war for independence. Only one volume, however, was pub
lished. Zerecero was a strong revolutionary partisan. Thus while excusing
the cruelties committed by the rebels, he denounces in strongest terms those
indulged in by the royalists. He quotes freely from Alaman, and sparingly
from Bustamante and Mendivil. The style is for the most part clear, yet
without many distinctive characteristics. The last 150 pages are devoted to
the biographies of Indians prominent since the conquest, and credited to An
tonio Carrion.
Bustamante, Martirolocjio de Alnunos de los Primeros Insurgentes por la
libertad e independencia de la America Mexicana. Mexico, 1841, pp. 51. This
short work gives a summary of the legal proceedings against those implicated
in the plots of April and August 1811 to seize the viceroy. The particulars
connected with the case of each ecclesiastic and layman are given, Bustamante
having obtained them from the original documents of the junta de seguridad
presided over by the oidor Miguel Bataller y Vasco. To these are added bio
graphical notices of the subsequent fate of many of the conspirators. The
names are given in alphabetical order, and among them appears that of Calleja.
Bustamante deems it necessary to enter into an explanation of the reasons
why he inserted the royalist general's name in a list of martyrs to the cause
of independence and which he published to their honor. He, therefore, states
that he did so in order that the indecent conduct of Calleja might be held up
to view, who tried to pass over to the side of the insurgents when he found
himself in disgrace with Venegas. Under such circumstances he ought to be
regarded as one of the so-called insurgents. See also Bustamante, Cuad. Hi^t. ,
i. passim; Id., ii. 3-428; Id., iv. 309; Bustamante, Campailas de Galleja, 89-
178, passim; Bustamante, Elogio, Mordos, passim.
Diaz Calvillo, Sermon que en el aniversario solemne de gracias d Maria
Santisima de los Remedios. . .Mexico, 1811; followed by Nol/idas para la His
toria deNuestra Senora de los Rf.medios. . .Mexico, 1812. The sermon which
precedes the historical matter in this volume, was preached in the cathedral
of Mexico on the 10th of October, 1811, by Juan Bautista Diaz Calvillo, at
the anniversary celebration of the royalist victory at the monte de las Graces!
The author was prefect of the oratory of San Felipe Neri, and was apparently
as credulous a believer in the marvellous and as unmitigated a denouncer of
the revolution as can well be found among the ranks of the churchmen of
that time. With regard to the sermon it is a fair specimen of the discourses
delivered from the pulpit during the first years of the revolution. Abuso is
plentifully heaped upon Hidalgo; the so-called victory of Las Cruces and
374 SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.
Hidalgo's retreat are attributed to the miraculous intervention of the virgin,
and, as a consequence, the events which led to his capture. In the Noticias
para la Historia, which has been frequently quoted, an account of the image
of the lady of los Remedies is given. Then follows a historical narration of
events down to the escape of Morelos from Cuautla, supplemented with sub
sequent occurrences during the same years. Castillo, resolutely blind to the
true causes of the revolution, attributes its origin solely to French intrigues
and Hidalgo's wicked readiness to listen to Napoleon's agents. In his per
sistency to hold up Hidalgo as the author of the rebellion, he unblushingly
states page 108 that his short interview with d'Alvimar was so satisfactory
to the latter as to stimulate the activity of the French in their intrigues in
other Spanish American countries. The historical portion of this volume of
2C9 pages is but an emphasized rescript of the versions of events given in the
Gazeta de Mexico.
I add by way of general reference: Alaman, Mcj., ii. passim; Id., iii. 11-
12, 58-60, 137-41, 170-86, 327, 335, app. 80-2, 85; Id., iv. 724, 727, app.
47-8; Ilernany Dav..i. 492-3, 874; Id., ii. 227-8, 415-16, 424-30, 467-70,
512-15; Id., iii. 223-315, 326, 328-95, 401-6, 424-530; Id., v. 245-7,865-7,
876-903, 906-8, 919; Id., vi. 18-25; 35, 38-9, 77-81, 274-5, 280-2, 288, 981-8,
1045-6; Gas. de Mex., 1784-5, i. 35; Id., 1810, i. 54, 802; Id., 1811, ii. passim;
Id., 1812, iii. 6-490, passim; Id., 1790-1, iv. 361-2, 441-3; Id., 1792-3, v.
349; Id., 1794, vi. 709; Id., 1802-3, xi. 166; Id., 1808, xv. 140; Id., 1809, xvi.
793-4; Id., xxiii. 423-7; Id., xxiv. 1235-6; Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii.
335-430, 448-91, 544-7; Cortes, Diar., 1811, iii. 354, 360; Id., iv. 192,397;
Id., v. 175, 240-1, 269; Id., vii. 4, 17, 177, 199, 214; Id., 209, 220, 373;
Id., 1812, xiv. 248; Id., 1820, xxiv. app. 40-53; Cortes, Col. Dec., i. 181-2;
Id., ii. 26, 85-7; Cortes, Diar. Cong., ii. 405; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iii.
358; Id., iv. passim; Mosaico Mex., ii. 197, 270, 341, 461-2; Ward, Mex.
in 1827, i. 175, 225, 330, app. 483-9; Cancelada, Tel. Mex., 15-16, 23-8, 39-
40, 48, 52-3, 58-60, 67-72, 177-81, 186-91, 216-21; Id., Ruina, N. Esp., 23,
59, 62-3, 77; Cavo, Tre* Sig., iii. 382-3; Id., iv. 1-55; Cedulario, i. fol.
236; Chevalier, Le Mex., 348-65; Collado, Juan, Inform., 4-8; Negrete, Mex.
Sig., xix. iv. passim, v. 104-76, and Hist. Mil., i. 312-18; Liceaga, Adlc. y
Rectific., 183-4, 188, 191, 199-200, 227-8. Other authorities consulted are:
Conejares, Virtud Vengada; Cumplido Album Mex., ii. 97; Torrente, Rev.
Hisp. Arner., i. 46-7, 73, 229-51, 310-37; Calderon, Life in Mex., ii. 179-89;
ConsejodeHegene.ro, Espan. elnd. Amer. Esp., Cadiz, 1811, passim; Prov. Int..
Carta Minis. 24 de Jid. 1812, in Mayer M8S., no. 6; Prov. Int. Real Orden., 2J,
Jul. 1812, in Mayer MSS., no. 7; Rivera, Gob. deMex., ii. 8, 33-46; Id., Hist.
Jalapa, i. 305-8, 338-9, 394, 437; Revllla Gigedo, Bandas, no. 31, passim;
Iturribarria, in Soc. Mex. Geog., vii. 291-2; Villasenor, in Id., iii. 71; Zamo-
ra, iii. 188-9; Zamacois, Hist. Mex., v. 618, 657; Id., vii. passim; Id., viii.
passim, ap. 737-8, 740-7, 749-50, 757-85; Id., 563, 820-1, 913-16; Zavala,
Rev. Mex., 55-8, 61-4, 68-9; Id., Venerable Congreg. Neri, passim; Dipu-
tac. Amer. Represent., passim; Juzgados de Hac., MS., passim, in Doc. Ecles.
Mex., MS., ii. no. 5; Colcgio, etc., passim, in Id., v. no. 2; Chilpantzingo, in
Id., ii. no. 3; Sumario Criminal contra Tres Relig., MS., 1811, in Disturbios
de Frailes, ii. 341-48, no. 9; Disposic. Varias, vi. 61-71; Ximenez y Frias,
El Fenix, passim; Mex., Cuad. de Formul., passim; Diez y Seis, passim; Vega,
J. S. G., Exhortacion, passim; Acapulco, Provision, 6-31, in Virey de Mex.
Instruc., MS., 2d ser. no. 2; Villasenor, Theat. Amer., i. 178-90, 233-4,
237-40, 315-17; Id., ii. 30-4; Young, Hist. Mex., 89; Walton, Expose, 281,
app. 26-30; Rebelion, Origen de la, passim; Rev. Span. Amer., 178-209, 318-
21; Revue Amer., ii. 552; Romero in Soc. Mex., viii. 547; Robinson, Mex.,
44-56; Id., Mex. Rev., i. 47; Romero, in Soc. Mex. , viii. 621; Zdaa 6 Hidalgo,
Queretaro Agrad., passim; Pap. Far., ii. 36-68; Exhort. Patriot, dinting.
Fenian. Sept., passim; Payne, Hitt. Europ. Col., 305-6; Pcdraza, Biog. Can-
dittos, 38-50; Perez, Dice. Geog. y Estad., i. 31-7, 114-15; Prov. Mich.,
111-25, 143-202; Puerto Convite, passim; Sastre, Constitut., pt ii. passim;
Quart. Review, vii. 257; Id., xxx. 175-7; Reladon Christ., passim; J3ergosa
FURTHER REFERENCES. 375
y Jordan, Exhort., passim; Id., Carta Pastoral, passim; Obcr, Mex., 417;
Cnmpillo, Edicto, passim; Id., Manifesto, passim; Olavarriay Ferrari, Junta,
dc. Zitdcuaro, ix. passim; Orizava, Ocurr., 3; Tournon, Proceso, passim;
Puebla, Mario Fiedo, passim; Inquisicion, Apol., passim; Mex. Bosq. Rev.,
10, 29, 34; Mex. Cabildo Metrop., 1-14, in Doc. Ecles. Mex., MS., ii. no. 4;
Museo, Mex., i. 133; Id., ii. 163-76; Modern Travel. Mex. Guat., i. 109-15;
La Ilustr. Mex., iv. 229, 273-5; Las Closes Product., Set re . 15, 1878, in
Pi ii art Coll.; Lezama, Exhort de Paz, passim; Mayer, Mex. Aztec, 256-7,
287-90; Martinez, Sinop. Hist. Rev., i. 58-66; Id., Parabien, passim; Mani
festo contra las Instrucc., passim; Maillard, Hist. Tex., 17-19; Linati,
Costumes, passim; Diar. Imper., June 8, 1866, 559; Gonzales, Col. N. Leon,
213-28, 238-48; Pasatiempo Militar, passim; Borricon, Exhort., passim;
Alvarez, Estud., iii. 459-61; Aim. Calend. Man. y Guia, 1811, 45-102, 173-
206; Apunt. Hist., passim, in Pan. Bol. Ofic., June 4, 1868; Pinart Col; Gaz.
Mex., Arevalo Compend., 7-104, passim; Arrangoiz, Mej., i. 129-55, 161-70;
Arroniz, Hist, y Cron., 184-7, 387-9; Azanza, Instrucc., MS., 92-4, 171;
Gallo, Hombres Ilustres, iv. 7-171, 221-6; Robles, Diar., in Doc. Hist. Mex.,
Istser. ii. 70; Domenech, Hist. Mex., ii. 16-21; Dill, Hist. Mex., 292-329;
Descripcion de Amer., 119 et seq. ; Foote, Tex., i. 94-9; Conder, Mex. Guat.,
109-10; Chynoweth,Max., 6-9; Mendibil, Res. Hist., 51-5, 61-72, 79-98, 103-
19, 141-60, ap. vii. 391-4; ix. 396-7; Narte, Clamores, passim; Niks' Register,
11. 238, 365; Niles, S. Amer. Mex., i. 142-54; Notidoso Gen., Aug. 28, 1815,
1-2; Mex. Refut. Art. Fondo, 3-15; Dice. Univ. Hist. Geog., i. 102; Id., ii.
666-8; Id., viii. 27; Id., ix. 44-5, 68, 602-3; Id., x. 77-80, 141, 474-5, 482-4,
522, 616, 636-7, 911-12, 1102, 1120-8, ap. i. 57, 300-1; Fronterizo, Dec. 5,
1880, 1.
CHAPTER XV.
WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
1812.
FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND ARBITRARY MEASURES INSURGENTS SACK HUA-
MANTLA AND CAPTURE TRAINS THE SUPREMA JUNTA'S MOVEMENTS AND
ACTS DOCTOR Cos' PLANS or PEACE AND WAR VICEREGAL COURSE
INDEPENDENT PRESS BAD GUERRILLAS ROSAINS AND HIS TROUBLES
CAMPAIGNS IN PUEBLA, MICHOACAN, AND BAJIO DE GUANAJUATO
OPERATIONS OF GARCIA CONDE, NEGRETE, AND ITURBIDE AGAINST AL
BINO GARCIA CAPTURE AND END OF THIS LEADER TORRES' EXECU
TION ILL SUCCESS OF LICEAGA AND Cos IN GUANAJUATO RAIDS IN SAN
Luis POTOSI.
DURING the siege of Cuautla the viceregal govern
ment had to resort to extraordinary measures to carry
on the war. Public loans, voluntary and forced, were
long since an old story; yet one more attempt was made
to borrow two million dollars from the church and the
wealthy men and merchants of Mexico, Puebla, and
Yera Cruz, but without success. Then it was ordered
that all persons should surrender their plate and jew
elry, a promise in return being given that their value
should be paid in one year with interest. As it was
customary at that time to invest largely in valuables
of the kind, many were stripped of their all, and a
considerable sum was raised, but the people never
received any pay. Another infliction was a tax of
ten per cent on rents of urban property. In order to
provide the army with horses, and prevent their fall
ing into the hands of the insurgents, this quixotic
viceroy ordered bought all in the country, except
those of the troops, guards, dependents of the acor-
(376J
SECRET SOCIETIES. 377
dada, and mail carriers, and such as might be found
useless for military service. 1 This brilliant scheme
failed, for when Venegas came to pay for the beasts,
like Simple Simon, he had not the money. All this
tended to the further disgust of the people, and to the
advancement of the revolutionary cause. Nor were
the continued offers of pardon emanating from the
Spanish c6rtes sufficient to hold forever the good
will of the Spanish Americans. 2
There were several secret clubs in the capital at
this time, one claiming special attention, called Los
Guadalupes, 3 whose members, like others before men
tioned, labored to spread discontent in regard to the
viceregal government.
One of the richest towns of that period, now within
the state of Tlascala, was Huamantla, situated on the
line of trade between Vera Cruz and Mexico. The
place was garrisoned by forty infantry of the line, 200
royalist auxiliaries, also infantry, most of them armed
with lances, there being but few muskets among them,
and sixty cavalrymen. Of artillery there were only
three small guns. The commandant, Antonio Garcia
del Casal, having been apprised that a large force of
insurgents meditated an attack upon the town, opened
ditches and erected barricades. The insurgents, 2,000
strong, assailed the place on the 18th of March, 1812,
and though repulsed at first, carried it next day, after
nearly all the regulars and a number of officers had
1 The owners of the last class were required to have a written license.
And any one found riding a horse, unprovided with the license, fifteen days
after the publication of the edict at the head town of his district was to be
shot. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 174-7.
2 This became evident in the reception given to the amnesty law of Nov. 8,
1811, published in Mexico in the Diario of April 3, 1812. In fact, decrees
purporting to be for the general good were looked on, not as springing from
a desire to benefit the colony, but as so many rights forced from the Spanish
rulers. Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 136-41.
3 Established for securing independence, when and by whom has not been
ascertained; but it existed prior to 1808; it was said that Viceroy Iturrigaray
had relations with them; and that in the differences between Venegas and
Calleja they made proposals to the latter which were not looked upon with
displeasure. The labors of these clubs were very important. They were in
constant correspondence with the independent chiefs. Negrete, Mex. Siy.
XIX., v. 14.
378 WAR, MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
been slain. Captain Casal and the rest of the garri
son were made prisoners. The victors abandoned the
town on the 20th, after having sacked it. 4 Death
without quarter frequently awaited the prisoners in
this war, as we have seen ; but thanks to the influence
of some priests, their lives in this instance were spared,
and they were set at liberty a few days later. The
same force of insurgents afterward made several as
saults against Nopalucan, but were repulsed by the
garrison under Captain Antonio Conti, finally losing
three guns, a number of mules, and a quantity of sup
plies.
Shortly afterward, at Nopalucan, a train of imported
merchandise valued at two million dollars fell into the
hands of the independents, 5 under Osorno, Arroyo,
Bocardo, Ramirez, and others. It was a rich prize,
from which, however, the captors derived but little
benefit, as it was quickly dissipated. 6
When the revolutionary junta suprema, after its
flight from Zitdcuaro, had gathered its dispersed
4 ' Han clestrozado el pueblo. . .llevandose una cuerda de prisoneros.' Gaz.
de Mex., 1812, iii. 206, 337-42. Mendibil, Resumen Hist., 95, states that
Casal escaped; the insurgent chief celebrated the victory, never thinking of
affording aid to Morelos at Cuautla. Huamantla became a very important
place for the Americans, a mart for the free sale of tobacco being established
there. The profits that might have been obtained, sufficient to meet the war
expenses, were, however, squandered by the chiefs of guerrilla parties.
5 It happened thus: The brigadier Juan Jose" de Olazabal, a recent arrival,
started for Perote on the 18th of April with 325 men, of whom 25 were cav
alry, escorting a large train of merchandise belonging to the merchants, two
pieces of siege artillery, and ammunition to be used against Cuautla. When
near Nopalucan he sent forward for assistance, the place being beset by in
surgents, who after a fight retired, and Olazabal entered the town. The
mules of the merchandise teams, being then taken out of the town to water,
were cut off by the enemey. All his despatches to Puebla had been inter
cepted; and the brigadier, leaving the merchandise in the town, returned to
Perote with the artillery and ammunition, arriving there on the 30th of
April. Meantime the independents captured Nopalucan and made a prize of
the merchandise. Gaz. de Mcx., 1812, iii. 505-7; Alaman, Hist. AJej., ii.
570-3; Negrete^ Mex. Sly. XIX., v. 183-5. Bustamante says that Olazabal
spent his time in Nopalucan reflecting on the audacity of the 'citoyones de
gcunuza y rueda de cuerda,' as he called the men that wore buckskin and used
the lasso. That author gives him the worst of characters, accusing him of
ingratitude and scandalous theft. Cuad. Hist., i. 415-7.
6 No account was ever rendered of it. Among the spoils were some beau
tiful diamond rings, a pectoral for the bishop of Puebla, and a necklace of
fine stones which was sent as a present to Morelos. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.,
i. 417-8.
COS' PLANS OF PEACE AND WAR. 379
forces and established itself at Sultepec, matters on
the whole for a time looked well for the indepen
dent cause. Calleja had suffered a signal repulse
at Cuautla; near Izucar were the forces which had
placed Llano in so compromised a position; Atlixco
was threatened, the provinces were overrun by revolu
tionary troops, and Calleja was at a standstill. Abouti
this time an idea became prevalent that the struggle
would soon be terminated by a compromise favorable
to independence, and it was even hinted at by an arti
cle in the government organ, which announced with
satisfaction an arrangement entered into by Francisco
Xavier Elio, viceroy of the provinces of Rio de la
Plata, with the revolutionary junta in Buenos Aires. 7
This was the first time that the possibility of a com
promise was broached; for hitherto, to speak of affairs
in the other Spanish American possessions, was but to
tell of royalist victories. 8 Some thought the viceroy
leaned that way, but that was not so. No one knew
better than he that in the present war there was no
possibility of compromise. There must be either
freedom or bondage. But the junta at Sultepec, un
der the impression that the time had come for making
some such proposal, approved two plans or projects
devised by Doctor Cos, which he respectively named
Plan of peace and Plan of war. These, accompanied
with a manifesto entitled "de la nacion americana a
los europeos habitantes de este continente," were sent
in the name of the junta to the viceroy, together with
a letter dated March 16th. At the same time copies
of the documents were distributed to the corporations
and chief authorities in the country. 9
7 The arrangement was signed October 20, 1811, at Montevideo, with the
view of establishing peace iu those provinces. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 223-4;
Negrete, Mex. Sir,. XIX., v. 43.
8 The fiscal of the tribunal de mineria, at the meeting of that body in
March, endeavored to prove that the only efficacious means to revive the min
ing industry was peace, such as had been made in Buenos Aires. Arechcder-
r<ta, Apuni. Hist., in Alaman, Hist. Mcj., ii. 555-6.
9 Doctor Cos' ideas produced so strong an impression on Venegas that it
was said he would allow no one to see the letter. It may be found entire in
Reyrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 88-90. Both plans were based on the principle
380 WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
The corporations and authorities placed Cos' pro
ductions, unread by many of them, in the hands of
the viceroy. The latter, though pretending to look
entertained by the ayuntamiento of Mexico in 1808, adopted by Hidalgo and
followed by Rayon and the junta, of using the name of Fernando VII. only
to aid in achieving independence. On that ground Cos founded his plan of
peace; in the preamble he maintained that the sovereignty resided in the body
of the nation; that Spain and America were integral parts of the monarchy,
subject to the king, which parts possessed equal rights and were independent
of one another; that in the absence of the monarch, America, having kept her
self loyal to him, had a better right to convoke c6rtes, and to call thereto the
few Spanish patriots who had not stained themselves with treason, than
Spain to summon deputies from America; that the inhabitants of Spain had
no right to assume the supreme power in the colonies, and authorities sent by
them were illegally constituted, and that Americans, as a natural consequence,
had the right to conspire against them; such action, instead of being treason
able, was on the contrary meritorious; and the king, if present, would certainly
commend them. To reduce his principles to practice, Cos proposed in the plan
of peace the creation of a national congress, independent of Spain, representing
Fernando VII. and affirming his right. The European officials and the armed
force were to resign their offices and powers into the hands of the congress, and
remain as private citizens, with their lives and estates guaranteed; the employes
retaining their honors and fueros, and a portion of their pay if they continued
residing in the country. Past grievances should be forgotten, and the Mexi
can congress would then, as a token of fraternity, afford some pecuniary
assistance to the Spaniards fighting in Spain against the foreign usuper and
his allies. If that plan were not accepted, then the alternative of war
should be recognized, and under it hostilities carried on according to the laws
of nations, prisoners being treated as belligerents, and not as traitors, for
both would be fighting for their national rights under the common banner of
Fernando VII.
The doctor made a re'sume' of charges for violence, atrocities, and griev
ances, real or supposed, said to have been committed by the royalists, and
concluded by trying to prove that it was in the interests of the Europeans,
whom he called 'brethren, friends, and fellow-citizens,' to accept the plan
of peace, and thus contribute to the general welfare. His plans acquired
great celebrity. The difficulty with them was that the principles supposed to
be therein established were the very gist of the trouble, about which there
could be no compromise; for one party wanted an independent government,
though under the name of Fernando, which the other party well understood
the meaning of. As to the war plan, the insurgent junta was pledging
more than it could fulfil, its authority not being recognized by all the chiefs
at war with the viceregal government. El Ilustrador Am., nos 2-6, in Her
nandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iv. 189-90, 193-5, 207-8, 222-4, 230; Ne-
grete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 15-32; Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 548-63; Zerecero,
Rev. Mex., 133; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 389-406; Mendibil, Res. Hist.,
app. ii. 375-83; iii. 384-5; iv. 385; Ward, Mex., i. 183-5; Mora, Revol.
Mex., iv. 202-14. The pretended allegiance to Fernando was a deception, a
mere matter of policy, and so considered by Cos and the junta. Alaman, Hint.
Mej., ii. 556-61. This was an undeniable fact, recognized by Bustamante as
such, and fully confirmed in a confidential letter of the junta to Morelos,
dated Sept. 4, 1811, which contains these words: ' Habrd sin duda reflexado
V. E. que hemos apellidado en nuestra junta el nombre de Fernando VII.
que hasta ahora no se habia tornado para iiada. . .nos surte el mejor efecto. . .
Nuestros planes en efecto, son de independencia, . . .no nos ha de dauar el
nombre de Fernando.' Bustamante, Cuad. Hit., i. 405-6; Oaz. de Mex., 1812.
iii. 489-90; Mendibil, Resumen Hist., app. 5, 385-G.
ROSAINS AXD IRISARRI. 381
on the manifesto with contempt, in reality gave it the
greatest importance by decreeing on the 8th of April
that the document should be burned in the public plaza
by the common executioner, thus awakening in the
people a desire to know its contents. 10 Another edict
required that all copies should be gathered in; and the
reading of the documents, except by special govern
ment sanction, was strictly forbidden. 11
The sovereign junta continued the policy of giving
publicity to its views by means of the printing-press. 12
The viceroy did what he could to counteract this in
fluence by edicts and ecclesiastical injunctions. The
circulation and reading of such productions were for
bidden, and every copy called in. Priests at the con
fessional and from the pulpit were directed to enjoin
upon the faithful obedience to these commands. 13
During the siege of Cuautla a number of persons
occupying good social standing hastened to join the
revolution. Among them was a distinguished law
yer, Juan Nepornuceno Rosains, who had been de
terred for a year past from such action by the bad
character of some of the insurgent leaders. 14
10 He said that he could find no better means of showing the horror and
abomination inspired by those proposals. Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 90-2;
Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 373-4.
H Beristain, archdeacon of Mexico and influential with the viceroy, and
Friar Diego Miguel Bringas y Eucinas, guardian of Santa Cruz de Quere"taro,
undertook to defend the despotic order, and to impugn Cos' plan. Busta-
mante believed it beneficent. Of Bringas' character he speaks in high terms
of praise, giving him credit for honesty of purpose in his effort, though based
on wrong impressions. Cu adro Hist. , i. 401. Be ristaiii gave his arguments in
the journal El Filopatro. and in a pamphlet of Go numbers, ending 15th Octo
ber, 1812, dedicated to the tribunal of the inquisition. Bringas confutes the
charges made against the royalists, and specifies the acts of atrocity by the
insurgents which he saw or heard of. If he did not vindicate the royalists,
he made it appear that the insurgents had excelled them in cruelty. Bringas,
Impugn, del pap. sedic., 176 and 143 pp. issued from the press of Maria Fer
nandez de Jaurequi, in Mex., 1812.
12 Owing to the acquisition of the type as already narrated at this time, the
Ilustrador Americano and the Semanario Patriotico had freer course, and exer
cised no small influence. Rivera, Gob. Mex. , ii. 39.
13 The edicts were dated June 1st and 3d respectively. The ecclesiastical
chapter said that the newspapers of the independents were 'una maquina in
fernal inventada por el padre de la discordia para desterrar del pais la paz. '
Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 509-001.
11 Such men had justly won the name of 'devorantes' given them by
Morelos. Maximo Machorro, Arroyo, and Antonio Bocardo were of the
382 WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
On the 3d of April Rosains raised the revolution
ary standard, but with the resolve that all his acts
should bear the stamp of order and true patriotism.
He soon placed himself in contact with others hold
ing like views, and within a fortnight there was thus
gathered a force 800 strong, enlisted about San Andres
and Nopalucan, and between Quichula and Tepeya-
hualco.
Insurrection becoming thus rank throughout Pue-
bla, the viceroy gave command of the province to Brig
adier Santiago Irisarri, already mentioned, and sent
him the first battalion of the Americano infantry regi
ment/ 5 Major Gomendio, which with a small body of
cavalry and the royalist auxiliaries, were all the
troops at his command to defend that section. Every
loyal town hereabout was in turn assailed, 16 including
Atlixco, which was attacked on the 23d of April by
a strong force from Iziicar, and saved from capture only
by the arrival of troops under Colonel Ordonez. At
the end of April the viceregal authority, whose forces
were all engaged in front of Cuautla, was recognized
only in the city of Puebla, and a few towns, includ-
number. Machorro was like a wild beast, having plenty of physical courage,
and indulging it in the way of murder and robbery without limit. Morelos
tried to bring him under discipline, but failed. Bocardo was a little less
brutal, a little more amenable to reason. Bustamante., Cuad. Hist., ii. 132.
This author uses similar language respecting other leaders whom he person
ally knew, and with whom he had to associate even at the peril of his life,
men who were no better than bandits. His lamantations are touching.
But on the other hand, he was inclined to judge more favorably of other
leaders that he was not acquainted with, such as Albino Garcia, the Villa-
grans, Osorno, and others, whom Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 5G3-6, stamps with
the same stripe. Such men gave Morelos and other respectable chiefs much
trouble, and were the bane of the revolution.
15 Arrived at Vera Cruz, from Spain, January 29, 1812. The second bat-
> lion remained at Habana. A little later the Castilla regiment came out.
fourth expedition arrived August 25, 1812, consisting of the Zamora
in i an try regiment, Colonel Rafael Bracho, a company of flying artillery,
and the rest of the men to complete the Castilla and Lovera regiments. Ala-
-i <n, Hist. Mej., ii. 469-70; iii. 237; Guerra, Rev. Mej., ii. 447; Mendibil,
jJtes. Hist., 94; Bustamante, Camp, de Calleja, 158-9; Niles' Reg., ii. 71; Zama-
cois, Hist. Mex., viii. 86-8, 236; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 349-50.
16 At the foot of Popocatapetl was posted an insurgent party led by a mon
ster called Vicente Gomez, nicknamed El Capador, recognizing no authority.
As late as 1850, there was in Mexico, begging his daily food, an old soldier
of the Asturias battalion, whom Gomez had mutilated. Alaman, Hist. Mej.,
ii. 568.
GUANAJUATO, VALLADOLID, AND QUERETARO. 383
ing the ever faithful Tlascala, and even this city was
seriously threatened. Communication was so much in
terrupted that for several months Mexico knew not
what occurred in Jalapa and Vera Cruz. Neverthe
less, Rosains and his party had no faith in their ability
to withstand an attack from the royalists at Puebla;
and upon news of danger reaching them, the priest
Jose Rafael Tarelo, who had prevailed on Rosains to
join the revolution, wrote to Bishop Campillo that he
and his companions would accept the royal amnesty if
they were not required to perform humiliating acts.
The bishop returned a letter of acceptance, and Tarelo
with another priest, Amador, began their prepara
tions, when, the affair reaching Rosains, he had the
latter arrested and summoned a meeting, before which
he laid the bishop's letter and signified his intention,
now more confirmed than ever, of fighting for the
national independence. On the same day came Ra
fael Argiielles, a lawyer from Orizaba, commissioned
by a meeting called a few days before by the curate
Montezuma, at Zongolica, to arrange cooperation
with Rosains and Osorno. Tarelo's negotiations with
Bishop Campillo caused much trouble, and almost
brought about the destruction of himself, Rosains,
Argiielles, and others. 17
During the same period revolution raged in the
provinces of its birth, left scantily garrisoned when
Calleja abandoned Guanajuato. The chief towns were
fortified, but had no available troops for distant ex-
17 The report got out that Rosains and his friends intended to apply for
amnesty. A rough, unbridled rabble, led by Machorro and the Francis-
friar Ibargiien, fell upon Rosains and Argiielles, severely maletreated them 1
confined Tarelo, who, however, escaped. Ibargiien was of Arroyo's stamp, a,nd
even worse if possible. No arguments availed with such men, and Rosains and
Argiielles were on the point of being sacrificed, but after much trouble f c-
ceeded in escaping and fled toward San Andre's Chalchicomula. Tarelo, who
had joined the revolution for the sake of plunder and had taken a large share
of the two million conducta captured at Nopalucan, sent men in pursuit.
Rosains was taken and in shackles conveyed to Tepeaca, where he was saved
only by the prayers of the people. But he was confined in a dungeon, and
was in peril of his life till he escaped. Rosains, JReL, in Alaman, Hist. Mci. t
ii. 575-6; Negrete, Hex. Sig. XIX., v. 186-7.
384 WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
peditions. Calleja, after taking Zitdcuaro, sent a di
vision of the central army against the parties over
running the Bajio or plains of Guanajuato. 18 Colonel
Diego Garcia Conde, the chief commander, displayed
great activity. He fortified his headquarters at
Maravatio, a central point between Valladolid, Guana
juato, and Queretaro, and organized royalist compa
nies. 19 His chief aims were to destroy Albino Garcia,
and to secure communication with Mexico and the
safe passage of trains. Yillalba went against Cafias
and Ramon Rayon, and destroyed the artillery and
foundry at Santa Maria Tismade. Oroz and Iturbide
were sent with a force as far as Indaparapeo to relieve
Valladolid, and Garcia Conde, after visiting Celaya,
hastened to Acambaro to be at convenient distance
from Valladolid. Albino Garcia kept the garrisons of
small towns constantly alarmed, and forced other in
surgent leaders to obey him. 20 At this time he formed '
a combination with Muniz and Father Navarrete to
assail Valladolid, on the 3d of February, which had a
most disastrous result. 21 Trujillo defeated them in de
tail, captured their artillery, and destroyed their foun
dry at Tacambaro. This, however, did not improve
18 It consisted of one battalion of the Corona, lieut-col. Villalba, another
made up from several regiments under Captain Agustin de Iturbide, the
Puebla cavalry regiment, and two squadrons of frontier troops, with some
pieces of artillery.
19 His report of Feb. 17th, from Salamanca. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 218-
22, 225-8.
20 As he acted with entire freedom from control, the junta, when at Zitd-
cuaro, sent a certain Cajigas with troops and artillery to bring him under
subjection; but he, caring no more for the junta than for the government at
Mexico, fell upon Cajigas, taking his cannon and other arms, and sent him
back to the junta. Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 430. The junta on the 18th of
March, 1812, declared Albino Garcia an outlaw, ' por su crueldad, y embria-
guez, lascivia, latrocinios, escandalos y despotismo coiiciliandose el odio y de-
testacion general.' Ner/rete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 198-200.
21 The plan was for Garcia to attack on the north; Navarrete on the west;
Muniz on the south; and Piedra with 400 men from his hacienda El Canario
was to render aid. Trujillo and his subordinate, Captain Antonio Linares,
made short work of the matter. The latter, with 100 foot, 200 cavalry, and 3
pieces, charged upon Garcia, who had about 4,000 or 5,000 men, mostly
mounted, and six pieces, on the heights of Tarimbaro, and after some fighting
dispersed them and captured their artillery. Linares returned to Valladolid
with the cannon and upward of 600 horses and mules, most of them saddled,
and other spoils. Muniz, not knowing what had befallen Garcia, appeared be
fore the city, and occupied the heights of Santa Maria with 10 pieces. Trujillo
ALBINO GARCIA.
385
matters for the royal cause in Michoacan. Muuiz
soon managed to make more cannon; and though the
insurgent guerrilla parties were not formidable, they so
multiplied that Valladolid was for eight months with
out news from Mexico. 22 Albino Garcia seemed to
derive greater resolution and power of resource from
every reverse. He soon gathered his dispersed forces,
and returned to his headquarters in the valley of
Santiago. He was joined there by the parties under
i* a CasasA'iejas
' 5 o ./> Tollman
jn GaravatilWT
.Miguel H Grande
BAJIO OF GUANAJUATO.
and Linares together made a dash against him and signally defeated him, cap-
taring all his artillery. Linares went in pursuit as far as Tacambaro, burned
the town after removing nine cannon, and thereby destroyed the factory of
arms that Muuiz had there. Navarrete, receiving timely advice, kept away
and returned to his old position. Thus Trujillo in three days broke up, with
out losing a man, a combination of 8,000 or 10,000, taking besides about 25
pieces of artillery, and large quantities of supplies. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii.
589-95; Mora, Revol Mex., iv. 426-8.
22 Arechederreta saw a letter from the bishop elect, Abad y Queipo, to a
friend of his in Mexico, which so stated. The official reports of Trujillo and
Linares, dated Feb. 8th, of the actions opposite Valladolid, did not reach
Mexico till the latter part of May or beginning of June, and they were the
triplicates.
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 25
386 WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
Escandon, the Gonzales, Tomas Baltierra Salmeron,
Cleto Camacho, the negro Valero, and others. Gar
cia Conde resolved to attack them in the valley, and
succeeded in penetrating as far as the plaza of Santi
ago on the 13th of February, but was compelled to
retreat in haste. He made a second attempt with
all his forces on the 15th, with no better result, and
then withdrew to Celaya. 23 It would be useless at
tempting to follow the repeated movements and coun
ter-movements of the belligerents, as they reached no
result other than to keep the country in a state of
disturbance and suffering.
In March and April Guanajuato was reduced to
the last extremity for the want of specie. 24 By re
quest of the civil authority Garcia Conde, now a
brigadier, escorted the bullion on hand to Queretaro.
On the 8th of April he started on his return with
specie and merchandise, about 1,000 mule loads, for
Guanajuato and interior towns; but encountering in
surgents, he lost one load of specie and a large quan
tity of merchandise. He succeeded in taking to
Guanajuato on the 17th only the specie of the royal
treasury. The specie of private individuals and the
merchandise that escaped capture he was forced to
leave in Irapuato. However, Colonel Jose Castro
started from this place soon after with the effects, and
leaving in Silao those for Guadalajara and Zacatecas,
inarched on with the rest to Guanajuato, which he
reached safely on the 21st. 25 Garcia Conde now re
ceived orders from the viceroy to convey to Mexico
23 He had to abandon the place on hearing that Pedro Garcia had taken
and sacked the villa de Leon, and slain its comandante, Manuel Gutierrez de
la Concha. Mora, Kevol. Mex., iv. 428.
24 Silver bullion was selling at very low prices, and work in the mines
suffered accordingly. A deputation of the ayuntamiento went with a letter
from the intendente to Garcia Conde, then at Silao, requesting him to escort
to Quere'taro the bullion belonging to private persons the royal treasury
officials would not send the silver of the crown without orders from the
viceroy and bring back the coin and goods detained there. Alaman, Hist.
Mej., iii. 176-81.
25 Garcia Conde's official report to the viceroy from Silao, April 24th.
Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 741-4; Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 181-2; Bustamante,
Cuad Hist., ii. 299-301.
NEGRETE AND TORRES. 387
all the silver bullion in Guanajuato, together with
that left at Queretaro, and a large flock of sheep;
mutton being very scarce in the capital. To the
people dwelling in the towns of the Bajio this news was
anything but pleasing, and petitions poured upon him
not to leave them at the mercy of the insurgent ma
rauders. On the other hand, Cruz, deeming his own
province in danger, also requested Garcia Conde not
to start with the trains till Albino Garcia was put out
of the way. The latter having overcome the insur
gent chiefs, Escandon, Rubi, Gonzalez, and others
who had been acting too independently of him, had
increased his own force and become more dangerous.
Under the circumstances, Garcia Conde delayed his
departure and decided to combine a plan of operations
with the comandante general of Nueva Galicia. 26 The
troops of this province since the opening of the year
had been engaged in keeping at bay insurgent parties
on the confines of Michoacan and Guanajuato; and if
any of them set foot in Nueva Galicia territory they
were forthwith destroyed. In these repeated encoun
ters a number of notable guerrilla chiefs had perished,
some of them killed in action, and some captured and
shot. 27
Among the most noted royalist commanders, both
for activity and severity, was Pedro Celestino Negrete.
Haughty and inflexible, he never spoke of the insur
gents without applying to them some blackening
epithet, 28 and not one that was captured by him
escaped death. On the other hand, he did not spare
his officers and men from hard work, though he looked
afi He despatched Captain Iturbide with 60 Silao royalists to confer with
Cruz and Negrete. With this small escort Iturbide traversed the region in
fested by insurgent parties, fulfilled his commission in a satisfactory manner,
and in six days was back again at Garcia Conde's headquarters. The time
occupied by him was hardly more than the postman employed in time of
peace. These facts and future operations appear in his report of May 18th.
Gaz. tie Mcx., 1812, iii. 733-9.
27 Such was the fate of Colonel Vargas, Francisco Pifia, El Seguidillo,
Maldonado, Tomas Rodriguez, and others.
28 Monsters, infamous rebels, wretches, cowardly assassins, vile canaille,
and such like, were words constantly occurring in his official reports; and
yet that man lived to serve the republic, and so did Garcia Conde.
388 WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
after their interests with the utmost care, and they
had accustomed themselves to look up to him as a
father as well as an invincible commander. His tena
cious persecution of rebels had put an end to many
obscure leaders, till at last there remained in the
province only one insurgent chief who had acquired
any considerable distinction. This was Jose Anto
nio Torres, generally called El viejo Torres, who
had rendered good service to the cause in Nueva
Galicia. His fate was a sad one. With his later
operations against Valladolid the reader is already
acquainted. From his stronghold in Michoacan he
was wont to invade the region of Rio Grande, and in
February 1812 he attacked Negrete near Tlasasalca.
Torres was repulsed and, assailed in turn, was utterly
routed. From the time of this reverse he was ac
tively pursued from place to place, and on the 4th of
April was surprised and captured at Palo Alto, near
Tupataro, by Lopez Merino, one of Negrete's subor
dinates. It was no small matter this capture of so
noble a patriot, and the royalists made the most of it
after their fashion. He was taken to Guadalajara
and his arrival made a public spectacle. Wishing to
heap every indignity upon him, his foes were about to
fasten him by the neck to a wooden prop that his face
might be well seen, but the old man told them to
have no fear, he would carry his head high enough.
He was tried by the oidor Yelasco, and sentenced on
the 12th of May to be hanged and quartered. The
execution was carried into effect on the 23d. In the
presence of the assembled crowd the head was severed
from the body and raised upon a pole. One quarter
of the body was sent to Zacoalco, the scene of his vic
tory over Villasenor; another was placed at the Mexi-
calcingo gate, by which he had made his triumphal
entry into Guadalajara, and the remaining two at the
gates of El Carmen and San Pedro. 29
29 At each place were posted these words: 'Jose" Antonio Torres, traidor al
rey y a la Patria, cabecilla rebelde e" invasor de esta Capital.' The remains
GARCIA CONDE. 389
Negrete's division could now be employed in the
pursuit of Albino Garcia. Orders were brought him
from Cruz by Iturbide to march at once. It was
arranged that on the 15th of May at ten o'clock in
the morning he should attack Albino Garcia, cover
ing the roads leading from Parangues and Yurira to
the valley of Santiago; and that Garcia Conde should
at the same hour come upon the enemy's camp from
the Celaya side, thus cutting off escape. In order
not to awaken suspicion, Garcia Conde tarried in
Silao, 33 where on the 1st of May he received infor
mation from Captain Esquivel, commanding at Ira
puato, that he was surrounded by numerous parties of
Albino Garcia's. Conde at once despatched Villalba
with one battalion, 100 dragoons, and two cannon.
The rebel chief, who had been all day assailing the
town with 4,000 cavalry and seven pieces of artillery,
on learning of their approach retired to the hacienda
de las Animas, a league distant, whence two of his
lieutenants kept up a skirmish with Villalba's force. 31
Meantime Albino Garcia marched against Celaya, and
was repulsed. 32
were incinerated forty days after. His house in San Pedro Piedra Gorda was
razed to the ground and sown with salt. Thus we see what it was to be a
patriot in those days. It must be confessed that in the city of Mexico more
decency was shown. The execution took place the 23d of May, all the garri
son being out under arms to see it. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 639-40; Castillo,
Negrcte, Mex., v. 57-63, 78; Bustamante, Guadro Hist., i. 145; Zerecero, Rev.
Mex., 185-90; Alaman, Hi*t. Mej., iii. 185-6; Mora, M^x. y xus Rev., iv. 439-
43. At the time of his capture Torres had 400 men with him, all of whom
perished, many of them being burned alive, Merino having ordered some
barns in which they had sought refuge to be set on fire. Hernandez y Ddvalos,
Col. Doc., iv. 147-8.
30 Official reports of May llth and 16th. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 733-9,
769-71.
31 Villalba, being told by Esquivel that the people of the San Jacinto rancho
were friendly to the insurrection, ordered Lieut. Gutierrez to put them all
to the sword, an order which he afterward modified by sparing the women
and children; but as all the men but one had fled, on him alone must fall the
vengeance of the realm. Alaman, Hist. Mex., iii. 188.
32 The vccinos of Celaya, Irapuato, and other towns, instead of making
so strenuous a resistance, would have joined the 1'evolution if the junta
soberana had been able to keep in check the guerrilla chiefs. The coman-
dante at Irapuato, Jose" M a Esquivel, was decidedly in favor of independence.
In after years he was several times a member of the legislature, and once
vice-governor of Guanajuato, and died as one of the justices of her supreme
court. Id., iii. 189-90.
390 WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
Garcia Conde departed with the conducta of silver
bullion from Guanajuato to escort it to Mexico,
and conveyed it as far as Irapuato. From this place,
where he incorporated into his force Villalba's com
mand, without divulging his destination, he started
at two o'clock in the morning of May 15th, so as to
reach the valley of Santiago by ten, and occupy the
points agreed upon with Negrete. But Albino Gar
cia, if unlettered, was a shrewd military man. He
well understood the royalists' movements, and easily
disconcerted them. Not finding Negrete where he
expected to meet him, and hearing a brisk firing from
the direction of Parangues, Garcia Conde inferred
that Albino Garcia had attacked Negrete, which was
true. On Garcia Conde's approach, t"ie enemy re
tired, and, pursued by the cavalry, lost some men. 33
33 Among the slain was one of the most efficient officers of the guerrilla
band. Conde and Negrete marched into the valley in three sections, one of
which was under Iturbide, with the view of pursuing Albino if he returned.
They failed to find him, however, only priests, women, and children being
left in the town. Conde wanted to form other combinations with Negrete,
but the latter had to return to his former positions to protect the Nueva
Galicia frontier from possible invasion by Albino Garcia. It was, however,
agreed that Negrete should march by the Pe"njamo road, Conde taking
that of Yuriria, so as to place the enemy between two fires; but the latter
eluded the hot pursuit of Conde and Iturbide, though owing to the fact of his
being afflicted with gout, Albino had to journey in a carriage or on a bed.
When the pursuers came near he would quickly mount a horse and escape
by some side road, after hiding his artillery. Once his artillery carriages
were captured and destroyed. At the end of this unsuccessful pursuit the
royalists were completely exhausted. Conde gave up the chase, and re
turning to the valley of Santiago, took the sacred vessels and paraments and
the priests of that town and of Yuriria to Irapuato. Conde, in his report
of May 31st, speaks of Albino's force being all dispersed, arid states that the
chief had only 100 men with him; but, of course, that is a part of guerrilla war
fare. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 749-55; Alaman, Hist. Mcj., iii. 191-3; Mora,
liC-vol. Mex., iv. 431-2. Albino Garcia's bands consisted of large masses of
mounted men, mostly mestizos and mulattoes, some armed with spears,
others with muskets and swords, ready for attack and still readier for run
ning away. Their chief was the most active and dreaded guerrilla that the
war produced. When he intended to assault a town or hacienda, a large num
ber of Indian slingers assembled in the neighboring villages and fields, and with
a few badly made and worse served pieces of artillery, rendered aid. The
attack was made by surrounding the town with cavalry, which was, of course,
useless against a fortified place. The most abusive epithets were hurled at
the besieged, and a brisk fire of artillery and musketry sustained for hours,
discharging perhaps GOO or 700 cannon-shots, which did little or no harm, the
royalists returning the fire from behind their intrenchments. Finally, after
having some men killed and wounded, the foiled assailants would retire either
because their ammunition had given out, or some royalist force was approach
ing to relieve the town. In the retreat the guerrillas would sack every hacienda
LOYALIST TRIUMPH. 391
The brigadier again started on the 4th of June
with the conducta for Mexico; but hearing at Sala
manca that the guerrilla chiefs were reorganizing in
the valley of Santiago, he thought that as they be
lieved him occupied with the conducta, it would be a
good opportunity to take them unawares and even
capture Albino Garcia. The same evening he de
spatched his most efficient officer, Agustin Iturbidc,
with about 160 mounted men with orders to reach
Santiago at moonrise. Iturbide was there at two in
the morning of the 5th, surprised the guard at the
entrance of the town, and pretending to be Pedro
Garcia, who had been called by Albino to join him,
obtained the pass and countersign, and took pos
session of the place without arousing the sleeping
revolutionists. At length they were purposely awak
ened by orders loudly issued for the grenadiers of
la Corona to occupy a certain position, the battalion
of Mixto another, and so on, several organizations
being named, to each of which a few of Iturbide's men
belonged. The insurgents believed the whole division
of Garcia Conde was upon them; they attempted,
however, to defend the barracks which were taken
by force. Some soldiers took possession of the
roof of the house occupied by Albino Garcia. This
chief, his brother Francisco, known as El brigadier
Don Pachito, his secretary, Jose Maria Rubio who
on presenting himself said he had been held in the
insurgent quarters by force, which plea saved his life-
en their way, and then disperse, to meet again at some other place agreed upon.
The good fortune of towns that thus escaped being plundered and destroyed
was attributed to a miracle, and the te deum was chanted. If any prisoners
had been taken on either side they were forthwith shot. In a field of battle
the insurgents generally placed their artillery on some height, the infantry
behind it, and the large masses of cavalry at the wings. The cavalry would
charge upon the royalists, who easily drove them away with a few discharges
of grape; they would then flee in all directions, throw their ill-disciplined and
poorly armed infantry into confusion, and the artillery would fall into the
royalists' hands after the first discharge. Albino Garcia complained that his
men were always more disposed to plunder than to fight. But this kind of
warfare was excessively fatiguing for the royalist troops, constantly deprived
of rest and food, marching and countermarching without being able to catch
or strike the foe.
392 WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
and a man named Pineda, a deserter from the royal
service, were taken alive, together with some 100 or
150 more. About 150 guerrillas were killed; while
Iturbide's only casualty, by his report, was the death
of one grenadier. As Iturbide had to traverse on
his return a region teeming with insurgents, and
his force was too small to guard so many prisoners,
he ordered them to be shot, excepting only the two
Garcias, Rubio, and Pineda, whom he conveyed to
Celaya. Three days later, after certain empty judi
cial proceedings, the Garcias and Pineda were pub
licly executed. 34
The capture of Albino Garcia was a great triumph
for the royalists, none of whom had ever gained much
advantage over him. It must be confessed that like
the other side he was something of a scourge, the Bajio
region having suffered greatly at his hands. Garcia
Conde could now proceed with his conducta. One of
the Villagrans, however, attacked him in the sierra of
Capulalpan, but was routed by Iturbide with heavy
loss. 35 The same division on its return escorted from
Mexico a large train of European and other merchan
dise and passengers to Queretaro. 36
Meantime Liceaga had been sent by the stiprema
junta to assume the government of the northern
34 Garcia Conde's conduct toward his prisoner, according to his own re
port was dastardly, even for that day and place. He pretended to pay him
honors as captain-general by bringing his troops out on parade, ringing bells,
and firing salvoes of artillery. Albino and his brother being placed in the
plaza opposite the brigadier's residence, the latter used insulting words to the
chief prisoner, and then made a ribald speech to the crowd who had come to
see the fallen hero. Notified of his death-sentence, Albino Garcia wrote his
parents, who were royalists and had formerly rendered service to Garcia
Conde himself on his expeditions, asking their pardon and blessing, and or
dering the restoration of all property he had seized to the owners. His head
was elevated in Celaya at the crossing of San Juan de Dios street, where he
made his greatest effort to capture the city. The crippled hand, which made
him known as El Manco, was taken to Guanajuato, and the other to Irapuato.
Years after, when the country became independent, the skull was buried.
Gaz. deMex., 1812, iii. 640-4; Liceaya, Adic. y Rect., 237-8; Alarnan, Hist.
Mej., iii. 196-203; Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 435-6; Mej. Bosquejo Ligeris, 14,
257-8; MendiUl, Res. Hist., 132.
35 Conde's report of June 16th. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 645-6.
. 36 7,706 bales, 79 coaches with passengers, 632 mules, and 130 asses laden.
Numbers of persons, including troops, passengers, and muleteers, 5,920.
Negrete, Mex. Siy. XIX., v. 85-6.
LICEAGA AND COS. 393
provinces, and, accompanied by Doctor Cos, had en
tered the Bajio of Guanajuato. On the 24th of July
the insurgents, who had again collected in the valley
of Santiago, were defeated by Iturbide, sent in advance
from Queretaro. Liceaga and Cos saved themselves by
flight, and Garcia Conde now proceeded with the con
voy, but was attacked near Salamanca on the 7th of
August, and lost 400 mule loads. Iturbide actively pur
sued the insurgents, and in September defeated them on
several occasions, Liceaga and Cos narrowly escaping
capture. 87 Cos, having been appointed his second in
command by Liceaga, retired to Dolores, which place
he made the centre of his future operations, while the
latter remained in the vicinity of Yuriria. The lake,
on the southern side of which this town is situated,
has two islets or cays, the larger being about 1,000 va-
ras in circumference, and the other somewhat smaller.
They were 180 varas apart, and Liceaga joined them
by a causeway three varas wide, protecting the
cays as well as the bridge with a stone wall six feet
in height, a moat, and a stockade made of prickly
plants. In the larger cay there were 71 merlons,
and 64 in the other. 38 To this fortress, which Liceaga
deemed impregnable, he gave his own name, and it is
called in the official reports Isla Liceaga. He estab
lished factories there for making cannon and ammu
nition, and a mint. Garcia Conde deemed it unnec
essary, and even imprudent, to undertake the capture
of the place by main force, inasmuch as, holding
possession of the shores of the lake, it must sooner or
later surrender. But Iturbide resolved to attack it;
and to this end he first cleared the surrounding coun
try of insurgents. He allowed the enemy no rest
from the 9th of September till he pitched his camp
in Santiaguillo opposite the fortress. 39 His position
s 'Gaz. deMex., 1812, iii. 1014-17, 1095-1110.
38 Iturbide's detailed report in Gaz. de Max., 1813, iv. 25-39. The town
and lake have different names assigned to them by different writers; namely,
Yurira, Yuriria, Yurirapandaro, Yuririapundaro, and Yurirapundaro.
39 In ID actions during 40 days he killed many, some of whom were chiefs
394 WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
was within cannon-shot, but was protected by a small
rise of ground. Liceaga, who never bore the palm
for bravery, on seeing the approach of danger, left the
island, the command of which, together with 200 men,
was intrusted to Father Jose Mariano Hamirez. 40
Iturbide, having made eight rafts and brought two
canoes from a long distance, attacked during the
night of October 31st at four different points, placing
Captain Vicente Enderica in command. A powder-
magazine that caught fire disheartened the garrison,
and the place was taken without resistance. Father
Kamirez, Jose Maria Santa Cruz, the town major,
Tomas Moreno, commandant of the artillery, Nelson,
an English engineer under whose direction the forti
fications were built, and Felipe Amador, who had
received one of the minor orders of priesthood, were
captured, conveyed to Irapuato with others, and shot.
The royalist loss was small. Of the defenders none
escaped; such as did not fall into the victors' hands
perished in the lake. 41 The small number of arms
found indicates clearly that the fortress, when assailed,
was almost abandoned, and the garrison had been
mostly removed. 42
of renown, and took prisoners Colonel Francisco Ruiz, and lieutenant-colonel
of artillery, Francisco Valle, known as the 'negro habanero,' both of whom
it is hardly necessary to say were executed at once. Liceaga, A die. y Recti-
fic., 241.
40 Bustamante, calling him a sub-deacon, says: 'En quien siempre admire*
buenas disposiciones para puntear una guitarra y divertio un estrado de da-
mas, y no tenia otras.' Cuad. Hist., ii. 240.
41 Iturbide, whose pedantry in his reports equalled his bravery and cru
elty, broke out on this occasion into one of his peculiar bursts: 'Miserables,
ellos habran conocido su error en aquel lugar terrible en que no podnln reme-
diarlo. j Quizd su catastrofe triste servird de escarmieuto a los que estaii aun
en tiempo de salvarse!' Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 27.
42 Bustamante has it that Liceaga had taken out the troops, leaving his
prisoners, who found ways to plot with Iturbide to secure their freedom.
The latter says: 'Fu6 preciso valerse de nrachos ardides, cuyorelacion no con -
templo interesante para este lugar, y el resultado lo hard infcrir a los cnten-
dimientos claros, imparciales y sin preocupacion.' For all that, Iturbidc or
dered many military executions there, and sent hundreds hence of whom he
made no mention. It was his chief delight in this world to consign to hell
the excommunicated. Ramon Rayon occupied the island several months
later, and exhumed the bones of about 600 persons, whom he caused to be in
terred with funeral honors in the parish church, which Iturbide looked upon
as a crime, prosecuting the priest that officiated, and holding much corre
spondence with Rayon on the subject. Iturbide put himself up for a sage, and
THE REFULGENT PALM. 395
Doctor Cos at Dolores engaged himself in organiz
ing and bringing together the armed parties of that
region. With him was Rafael Rayon, one of the
president's brothers, and Matias Ortiz, who from this
time began with his brothers to acquire distinction,
and were generally known as Los Pachones. With
the force he had organized, Cos marched on the 27th
of November against Guanajuato; but his movement
was attended with no result, and he had to return to
Dolores. He did not remain there permanently, how
ever, as that town was on the line of transit for pro
duce and other merchandise to and from the inland
provinces; and when trains approached he usually
abandoned the place for the purpose of attacking
them. It often happened that reinforcements had
to be sent from Queretaro to save the trains from
capture. 43
On the opposite side of the sierra of Guanajuato,
separating on the north the bajio from the plains of
Dolores and the province of San Luis Potosi, the
operation of escorting live-stock from the latter place
to Queretaro, and transporting merchandise from
Mexico, furnished opportunities for repeated hostile
encounters. One of the hottest of these took place
on the 3d of February, at the Santuario de Atoto-
nilco near San Miguel el Grande, on which occasion
Ildefonso de la Torre, the royalist commander, who
had advanced to that place to receive 500 silver bars
from Zacatecas, saw a refulgent palm in the sky. 44
Another train was convoyed by the royalist priest
a loyal vassal of Fernando VII. Cuadro Hist., ii. 246-7. Thus far in this
history we find him both fanatical and murderous.
43 Bustamante, Guad. Hist., ii. 295-8, cannot reconcile Cos' statement on
his attack against Guanajuato, appearing in Diariode Operac., in Hernandez y
Ddvtdos, Col. Doc., v. 626, with the report of Intendente Maranon inserted in
Gaz. de Hex., 1813, iv. 207-9; Mendibil, Resumen Hist., 167-8. The same
difficulty occurs in comparing the false accounts of insurgent and royalist
commanders. Liceaga, Adic. y Rectijic., 23S-9, says that the invading force
was repulsed.
44 Torre's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 257-9. The palm phenomenon
had become fashionable since Calleja pretended to have seen one at Zitacuaro.
Alaman, Hist. Alej., iii. 205.
396 WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.
Diego Bear with 250 men, who corning upon a small
party of insurgents near Dolores on the 22d of March,
killed a number and dispersed the rest. On that
same side of the sierra the independents with three
guns assaulted the hacienda of Villela on the 7th of
April, but were repulsed with the loss of the guns.
Colonel Nunez and Major Molleda perished in the
action, and Colonel Gutierrez was taken prisoner and
subsequently shot by order of Colonel Tovar, coman-
dante at San Luis Potosi. Father Zimarripa was
also captured ; he had once before been taken in Aculco
and pardoned; now he was retained in irons pending
orders from the viceroy. 45 About this time, owing to
the defeat of the royalist Bengoa on the 16th of Feb
ruary, three leagues from Rio Verde, this place was
at the mercy of the insurgents, who, according to the
official reports, plundered it, and also the rancho
Jabali. Tovar despatched Captain Sanz with a force
on the 23d of February, who recovered the town and
the artillery the insurgents had possessed themselves
of, but could not overtake the assailants. The latter
were, however, defeated and dispersed by Arredondo,
who pursued the governor of Sierra Gorda as Colo
nel Felipe Landaverde was called, being represented
to have been an honorable man so hotly that to es
cape he threw himself down a precipice, abandoning
his arms and horse. 46
45 Tovar's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 626-7, 669-75.
46 Tovar's report and annexes, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 615-18, 625-7;
Arredondo's report in Id., 1812, 1111-15; Mora, Mex. Rev., iv. 445-8.
CHAPTER XVI.
PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
1812.
CAPTURE OF TEHUACAN MASSACRE or PRISONERS CURATES OF MALTRATA
AND ZONGOLICA JOIN THE REVOLUTION ORIZABA CAPTURED AND RE
TAKEN REVOLUTIONARY PLANS AT VERA CRUZ AND PEROTE COMMUNI
CATION REOPENED BY ROYALISTS INSURGENT OPERATIONS CAPTURE OF
PACHUCA WITH IMMENSE BOOTY CRUEL SHOOTING OF PRISONERS
TOWNS RECAPTURED BY ROYALISTS ARREST OF LEONARDO BRAVO AND
COMPANIONS THEIR EXECUTION NOBLE DEED OF NICOLAS BRAVO
VENEGAS OFFERS PARDON TO PENITENT REBELS, AND A REWARD FOR
MORELOS' CAPTURE VENEGAS AND CALLEJA AT ENMITY RAYON'S UN
SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON TOLUCA DEFEAT AT TENANGO DISPERSION OP
THE SUPREME JUNTA.
MILITARY operations had resulted more favorably
for the royalist arms in the interior than in the east
ern and southern provinces, owing, it would seem, to
the fact that in the former locality the insurrectionary
forces were in independent parties, more or less nu
merous, but nearly always acting without combina
tion, which, though obstructing the public highways,
interrupting traffic, and living by plunder, rarely at
tempted to assail fortified towns, or to confront their
royalist foe in an open field. To the east and south
of Mexico military affairs had been more skilfully
conducted by the insurgent chiefs, who acted more in
concert, and whose troops had been kept well in to
gether and were better disciplined. Hence the rapid
progress made by the revolution in these regions, and
its strong and menacing attitude at the end of Septem
ber 1812 toward the viceregal government. Prior to
(397)
HO* PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
his departure from Chilapa for Ouautla and Izticar in
thu latter end of 1811, Morelos diroctod bin active liou-
I- luuit, Trujano, to spread tlio insurrection through-
<il, tlio Mi/toe country, and partion wore accordingly
despatched in all direction**, appropriating to tbojr
own uses tho grain, live-stock, and every other avail
able tiling belonging to tbe Spaniards or to those of
i yalist proolivitiei, Ono of those parties, commanded
by Colonel Figuoroa, paid a visit to Tohuacan, a rich
nty and the commercial centre of the provinces of Pue-
U;i , ( )ajaca, and Vera ( Jrux, Tho place bad been aban
doned by tho Spaniards and authorities, and Figueroa
r.ntorod it unopposed; but having no force to bold it,
he went harvesting in tho hacienaas and farms of the
lurroundinff country; upon which the Spaniards re
turned with seventy-five soldiers and two pieces of
artillery, erected intrenohments, and organized volun
teer companion. Tho insurgents, however, again made
their nppoaranco, and in February surrounded the city.
Tho number of the besieger** increased rapidly, and the
beleaguered in the latter part of April and beginning
of May found themselves reduced to the last extrem
ity. Their water supply had been cut off, and most of
the garrison had perished. Despairing of any relief,
the city capitulated under a guarantee that the lives of
tho Spaniards and other royalists would be spared; to
Which stipulation, according to custom, not the Blight-
tit attention wan subsequently paid. 1
! Tlio litNiirunnb <ililofn csowtrmnillntf fclm linnitwirN wnro Jort Hnnaluw do 1ft
\ ' i. vn-.n u! I 'lii--Mh-|ii-c, Uin ttiiliH' wild t'opillwnil tlin foyn lint hri^/ulitU', LlllllO,
' rn, Titpln, ihn i
nt) l/,i'i"nr, ilm iMirn, Titpln, ihn i ...,.,.-,, in.. IhiicgUon, Hivuioit
MMhOffOi Arroyo, nml (ilJidt'M. Tim |iii,rif(li pi'ii'Mti niitl other t'tmpoutuhlo
uuloMlnNl'lN worn ttt-oMntit at ilio Nluiilnu of Mm Nti[iiilii.iioiiN, A I' tor iho ^uiTi-
'"i 'liiwii fchflir ii.i'iiiM, on l.lio (HJi of Mny, Mm Bpanltirdi \vi (lonllniMl in
Hi' |.M|-|I,- jnil, nint thtif ihopi ftttd dwelling! MtolMdi lliiinli'n<ls of it)tnili<iN
tlniN rtdttOtd lo In^id'y, Noxfc du.y iho SpiMiinrdrt wuro ntrippiMl of
111111 l"ilicM, bound in j/ronpM of ihrcin, iuid liy Mm ^nci'i'lllii Arroyo 0011-
I on I'nol, I., 'l 1 .-, niini.i'luilco, \vln<r Mirnn of Mioin WITH ftlioi, ilin NOI'I "I 1 Mio
loltgnb Sinohoi, nun of Mm viutlniM, lining cotitprlltMl to Im pfcwnt, ui hid
I'lii"!- 1 * rxodutloii, UnM,rlug thftt) Mi-> pcopli ol 'I ..... iiM'hnli'o \\ i "n Mm
...... i "i rjrtiii^ to oppoNtt tiieio oxoautionii Ari"\" i'-"i HH "H>"i (>n .Min,
"I I V I III ''" U ....... I!M I | ,| , , ..... | ,,,,,) I,,, | , ...... | | | ,,' III! I Ml I IN I.I I : \\ .1 ! .'I,
I ..... I. III. I I ......... I Kill \| , || M, M. 1 1 III II III ill < I I'M llIM lll'lfl III I--IM -\..l< II. '> /I III I
uhtti'lty, A fow duyx bofui-o, Mm SirnulurU* wlo ca^ltitlntod in Hau Andrtfi
OKl/AKA TAKKN.
\Vhilo Mio iihlrpnuli'Mts \\-iT. dMim;;- M
Mn. M .11 i.m. !r IMS l-'urut.-. \ l.uv<>:i. mnito of
Maltrata,* raised a force and declared for independence,
having east a cannon with the metal of the largo
rhmvh U'll. I'r-hK > IMV|MU;'; M \\;\trh on Ori/^lha,
lh> rMpdnvJ c\rr\ j li. un \\-.\\ ;:i-, nuMvliMlhliso
for the royalists, lie put men under Miguel Moreno,
V
\\P S,M nn-KN Vru v i'ui .
who with groat activity began to plunder and desolate
the neighboring haciendas, daily augmenting his force.
Lieutenant-colonel Miguel FOB, comandanto at Ori-
; .,MHU1., h:,.| Ivru ,!.,( M ,M.l,'i ,( (ho
i ^ til, 774-7} j&H^imml*, (?<tot7. //i M il 130-1 j
i/a, itl asw,
. > iv tho l.illof tl.o
\\M\w (onuinalos, u umtnl d( (imottlimtst (looulv p.-. ..-, - r l-rtu-vu
. .^ tho roftd ovtr Aouloingo not h*v*
s , ,1
400 PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
zaba, on being apprised of these doings, despatched a
force to bring away from Aculcingo the church para-
ments and the frightened priest. His force was at
tacked by the insurgents, who dispersed the cavalry
and compelled the infantry to retreat to Orizaba. 3
Before long the villa of Orizaba found itself seri
ously menaced by the united forces of the curate of
ZoDgolica, Juan Montezuma y Cortes, 4 and Alarcon.
The place had a garrison of 400 or 500 men under
Lieutenant-colonel Jose Manuel Panes. Its only
defence was a stockade on the Santa Catalina bridge,
half a league from the villa, manned by 100 infantry,
thirty cavalry, and a few artillerymen to manage one
gun. The independents attacked on the 22d of May,
and again on the 28th. They had no difficulty in en
tering the villa by the Angostura gate. Panes at
first concentrated in the Carmen convent, but having
neither provisions nor water he evacuated the place
and went to Cordoba, after destroying the ammuni
tion he could not carry away, the Carmelites, who
were mostly Spaniards, and the rest of the Europeans
accompanying him. 5 The curate of Zongolica, now
having the rank of colonel, tried to intercept the
royalists on the Escamela bridge; but being attacked
by the major of the Tlascala regiment, he fled to
the Tuxpango sugar-mill, leaving with the custom
house guards his baggage. Marching by night, Panes
reached Cordoba early next morning.
At 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th Alarcon
and Moreno entered Orizaba. Their men were poorly
armed and had but little ammunition, which they
consumed that night in salutes to the virgin of Gua-
3 Paz's report to General Carlos Urrutia, commander at Vera Cruz, on the
24th of March, Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 417-20.
4 He held as a descendant of Montezuma a cacicazgo in Tepeji de las Sedas.
Bustamante, who knew him well, says he was a perfect image of the emperor,
but would make a better preacher than soldier. Guadro Hist., ii. 135-6.
Alaman did not know how the descent came. Hist. Mcj., iii. 226. It was he
who sent the lawyer Argiielles to confer with Rosains and Osorno.
5 Panes' reports, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 781-8, 794-6; Orizava, Ocur-
rencias, 4-15; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 386.
CAPTURE OF CORDOBA. 401
clalupe. They were soon joined by Montezuma, Fran
cisco Leiva, Padre Sanchez, and Arroyo, the total
force being now 1,500 men. Hoping to capture C6r-
doba, a demand for its surrender was sent to Panes,
and refused. Presently, however, the independents
learned that a large force of royalist regular troops
was coming upon them. A general retreat then set
in, the curate of Zongolica, who was the first to
move, returning to his town. The viceroy had ordered
Llano, 6 on his return from Cuautla, to march from
Puebla with 2,265 men, and attack the insurgents
intrenched at Tecamachalco and Tepeaca, being spe
cially desirous of securing 52,000 bales of tobacco
which were at Orizaba and Cordoba. 7 In the morn
ing of May 30th the independents tried to check
Llano's advance at the town of Amozoque but were
repulsed. 8 They made a second attempt on the Aca-
tlan and Santiago hills, and a third on the parapets
of Tepeaca, but were defeated with the loss of six
guns. From Tepeaca, Llano advanced rapidly upon
Orizaba, and took it on the llth of June. 9 At first
he resolved to put the population to the sword, but
was prevented through the intercession of the friars
of San Jose de Gracia. Without loss of time he
advanced on Cordoba, and Paries returned to Ori
zaba, but being suspected of insurgent proclivities was
superseded by Colonel Andrade.
On the 25th Llano started on his return to Puebla,
having in charge 4,098 bales of tobacco. Several
6 In order that Llano might attend to the campaign, the viceroy appointed
the mariscal de campo, conde de Castro Terreno, a grandee who had come to
Mexico for other purposes, military and civil governor of Puebla, a position
that he accepted out of consideration for the viceroy. Arechederreta, Apunt.
Hist., May 25, 1812; Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 164.
7 This was about all the viceroy had to raise revenue from at this time.
The number of the royalist force as given in the text was found in the office
of the viceroy's secretary. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 136.
8 Llano's report to the viceroy is dated June 3d. Gaz. de Mex., 1812. iii.
711-16.
9 June 10th he assaulted the batteries placed by the curate Alarcon on the
hills of Huilapa, and dislodged the insurgents. The next day he met with
the same success at the entrance of La Angostura. Bustamante, Cuad. Jlist.,
ii. 137; Mcndibil, Res. Hist., 131-2; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 387.
HIST. HEX., VOL. IV. 2o
402 PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
parties of independents, commanded by Father San
chez, Osorio, El Beridito, Manchorro, and others, took
up positions on the heights of Aculcingo to interrupt
his passage and to capture the tobacco. Llano, how
ever, dislodged them from every place, and arrived
at Puebla without loss on the 28th. The tobacco
reached Mexico on the 5th of July under a strong
escort.
There were many thrilling adventures, many sad
episodes, during the war for independence. In March
of this year there was lodged in the castle of San Juan
de Ulua Jose Mariano de Michelena, who, though
holding only the rank of captain, had much politi
cal influence, and in later years became a promi
nent statesman. At first he was immured in a dark
cell dug out of the rock, arid was given only a board
for his bed; but his health becoming thereby greatly
impaired, the comandante of the fort asked General
Urrutia to allow him to be removed to the adjutant's
quarters, the petitioner being responsible for his safety.
The request was granted; and thus the prisoner came
to be placed in relations with the officers of the garri
son and with his friends. Among his visitors was a
popular young treasury clerk, Cayetano Perez, an
enthusiast on behalf of his country's freedom. Put
ting their heads together, Michelena and Perez soon
hit upon a plan to get possession of the castle, and
of the men-of-war. They would take a day when a
heavy norther was blowing, so that the other ships
could not get at them, but they could get at the
other ships. 10 The plan appeared well conceived, and
promised success; but alas! in the execution all was
10 Michelena detailed on the 2d of Oct. 1830, the plan to Alaman, who also
obtained a narrative from Manuel Perez, a brother of Cayetano. The scheme
was to win over the most reliable officers of the Vera Cruz regiment, being
sure of the artillery detachment, who would do what they were asked to by
their commander, Pedro Nolasco Valde"s, he being interested in the success
of the plan. Perez's part was to seize the bastions and gate of the pier, for
which he had made arrangements beforehand. The undertaking at this part
was deemed practicable. Ataman, Hint. Jlej., iv. 88-90, ap., 3-5.
CAYETANO PEREZ. 493
lost. Being detected, Perez and several others were
arrested on the 18th of March, and hurriedly tried.
Perez and five others were sentenced to death, and
executed on the 29th of July. 11 One Molina, to save
his own life, accused Michelena, but was unable to
prove his words, as Perez, the only one having knowl
edge of the details, had refused to divulge them.
Michelena, Merino, and others, however, being sus
pected, were sent to Spain, where the first named
continued his military career, and rose to be a lieu
tenant-colonel.
While the royalists were recovering Tepeaca, Tecam-
achalco, and Orizaba, the independents had been in
tent on some important places garrisoned by viceregal
forces. A conspiracy was planned by a sergeant in
Perote where Olazabal had remained after his loss
of the train at Nopalucan to surrender the fortress.
All the leading officers, with Castro Terreno and
Olazdbal at their head, were to be killed. The plot
was detected on the 8th of June, and the conspir
ators being arrested and tried by court-martial, all
were sentenced to death and eight days afterward
shot in the castle moat. 12
It was now midsummer, and at the capital no news
had come from Vera Cruz for three months. Even
the ingenuity of the merchants could not invent
means to get a letter through. 13 Further than this,
smokers were suffering. Paper was getting scarce at
the cigar factory; and the viceroy finally ordered
Llano to march with his division to Jalapa, escorting
11 The five others were Jos6 Evaristo Molina, Josd Ignacio Murillo, Barto-
lome" Flores, Josd Nicasio Arizmendi, and Jos6 Prudencio Silva. Six years
after the independence was secured, the state congress had a tablet placed in
the town hall, commemorative of the event, and containing the names of tho
six victims.
12 Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 144-5, gives the text of a letter found in
the correspondence of the conde de Castro Terreno with Venegas, supposed
to have been written in Jalapa to Gen. .Davila in Vera Cruz. Among those
executed was Vicente Acuiia, who had been banished by the junta de
seguridad, and had returned under the general amnesty. Alaman, Hist. Mcj. ,
ii. 233.
13 Arechederreta, Apunt. Hist., said early in July that the last advices
were of April 10th.
404 PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
a consignment of flour to Vera Cruz, and bringing
back some paper. Llano deemed a small detachment
sufficient for the merchandise service; and he would
occupy himself meanwhile in bringing under viceregal
subjection the towns in the vicinity of Jalapa. 14 Leav
ing Puebla on the 3d of July, on the way to Perote
Llano was attacked at Tepeyahualco by insurgents,
who were defeated and put to flight with the loss of five
guns, by Lieutenant-colonel Jose Moran of the cavalry.
Llano found Jalapa beset by the enemy, and provisions
scanty. The whole province was in a state of insur
rection, and communications so interrupted that in
Jalapa, as in Mexico and Puebla, nothing was known
of affairs in Vera Cruz. From some insurgent pris
oners he learned that Vera Cruz was surrounded by
foes, who swarmed up to its very suburbs; that a regi
ment of the Castilla infantry from Spain and another
from Campeche had been unable to cut their way
through to the interior, though they had made several
sallies; and that a permanent court-martial had been
established under Colonel Daoiz, recently arrived from
Spain. Llano saw at once that he had to abandon his
original plans, and in spite of the deadly season he must
go on to the much infected seaport. Taking troops
native to that region that he found in Jalapa, 15 he
set out with the flour on the 24th of July, and after
some fighting reached Vera Cruz the 30th. He
found the once famous Castilla regiment reduced to
a few dying men. 16 On his return to Jalapa, Llano
escorted 2,000 mules laden with merchandise, a large
number of passengers in vehicles, and forty boxes of
mail matter from Spain. At Perote he was joined
by Olazabal with a few detachments. From Ojo de
14 Llano's reports of his expedition to Vera Cruz are in Gaz. de Mex., 1812,
iii. 831-2, 921, 925-9; Bustamante, Cuadro Hist., ii. 142-6.
15 Before setting out he marched against a rebel junta at Naulingo, which
hurried away at his approach, on the 18th of July, leaving live guns and
some other arms.
10 It originally had 1,300 men, 500 of whom perished of the black -vomit;
the other 800 reached Jalapa. From Campeche came also 1,300, of whom
500 reenforced the garrison of Orizaba, and the rest remained at Vera Cruz.
APAM PLAINS. 405
Agua, near Puebla, he sent to Castro Terreno on the
27th of August triplicates of his reports to the vice
roy, nothing having been hitherto known of his move
ments owing to his despatches having been inter
cepted. 17 The expedition arrived in Mexico on the
5th of September.
The plains of Apam, common to the provinces of
Mexico and Puebla, had been but scantily garrisoned
since Soto's division marched to Izucar in December
1811. Owing to this, Tulancingo was assailed, about
the middle of February, by 3,000 cavalry and 300
infantry under generals Anaya, Canas, and Serrano,
and colonels Osorno, Olvera, and Guarneros; but the
assailants were beaten off by Captain Las Piedras with
his small force of a little over 100 men of regular
troops, and the royalist auxiliaries. 18 The hostile par
ties extended their raids to the city of Tezcuco, whose
small garrison made several sallies and prevented their
capturing the place. Of all other places, however,
most desired was Pachuca, a mining centre, having
Spaniards to kill and silver bars to capture. On the
23d of April Serrano undertook the attack with 500
men, and two pieces of artillery managed by Vicente
Beristain, a brother of the archdeacon of Mexico. 10
They soon had possession of all the houses but three,
which were held by Madera, and the conde de Casa
Alta, who commanded the royalist forces. During the
whole of that day the three houses were under fire,
particularly the one owned by Villaldea, a rich miner.
Night came on, when some of the houses caught
fire, and altogether the people were badly frightened.
The religious of the apostolic college finally mediated
to obtain terms of capitulation, which the insurgents
17 His despatches were intercepted at El Cdrmen, and out of revenge he
now burned the town. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 921.
15 Olvera was shot dead by the chaplain. It is noticed that several priests
joined hotly in the fighting. Gaz. de Max., 1812, iii. 207-11.
19 The place was in charge of Lieutenant-colonel Madera, who had brought
a few men from Tulancingo. From the capital had been sent 25 dragoons
under Sub-lieutenant Juan Jose" Andrade, but he went over to the enemy.
fliojrio, MS., in Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 577.
406 PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
granted. 20 Next day news came that Vicente Fer
nandez with a force from Tlahuelilpan was approach
ing to relieve Pachuca. With some difficulty Madera
satisfied the insurgents that there had been no treach
ery on his part; and to convince them, he went with a
priest of the apostolic college to request Fernandez
to retire. But during the conference the latter chief
noticed that insurgents were occupying positions in
his rear; indeed, they had opened fire on his men.
He therefore beat a retreat, and the insurgents used
this as a pretext to arrest all the Spaniards and convey
them to Sultepec. 21 The viceroy, in ignorance of the
occurrences at Pachuca, on the 25th of April de
spatched 300 men with two howitzers to bring away
the silver bars, and provide the place with coin and
tobacco ; but the force only reached San Cristobal and
returned on the 27th.
The repeated losses thus sustained by the royalists in
the last two months greatly troubled Venegas, who
in his correspondence with Calleja clearly intimated
that the capture of Cuautla was a question of life
or death. Had the insurgents acted together un
der one or more leaders, and on some uniform plan,
20 The terms of capitulation were: All arms and valuables of the royal
treasury, including upwards of 200 bars of silver, were to be surrendered,
and in consideration thereof the lives of the soldiers and Spaniards were
guaranteed, and passports were to be given the latter to go where they pleased.
The troops were left free to join the revolution if they desired; many of the
men and one Spaniard, named Videgaray, did so. J3ustamante, Cuadro Hist.,
i. 369-73.
21 Madera was left free and joined Las Piedras at Tulancingo. He was
never again trusted with a command. The conde de Casa Alta, though car
ried to Sultepec, was suspected of having gone there not unwillingly because
lie was of the family of the late viceroy Iturrigaray, and had been his master
of the horse. His subsequent conduct strengthened the suspicion. The
count certainly remained with the independents till his death, which occurred
shortly after from disease in a small town of Michoacan. The insurgents
divided the booty; a portion of the bars were sent to Rayon, and a portion
reserved for Morelos; some were coined by Osorno under Beristain's direction,
at Zacatlan. It was stated that Serrano paid one silver bar for a pair of fancy
shoes of the kind used by the country people at their feasts. The infringe
ment of the capitulation at Pachuca, sustained by the junta at Sultepec, was
an evidence that Doctor Cos' plan de guerra really had no weight with the
existing powers. The Spaniards, with the exception of three who escaped,
were shot. It was alleged that they had attempted to escape. Alaman, Hist.
Mej., ii. 577-81; iii. 152-3; Zamacois, Hist. Mcj., viii. 348-52; Gaz. de Mex.,
1812, iii. 717-20.
MEXICO AND PUEBLA. 407
while the government troops were kept so fully
occupied by Morelos, the triumph of the cause
would have been at once assured. But the men
were not at hand for the emergency; that is, men
capable of bringing that too watery mass into a
state of concretion, such as to make it serviceable;
and the result was that Calleja w r as allowed to take
the place, dispersing the forces engaged in its de
fence, and leaving the royalist army free to operate
in various directions, and to recover the lost towns.
All this time that Morelos was nobly struggling for
high principles, for liberty, humanity, freedom of
thought, and independence of country, large numbers
of so-called revolutionists were occupying themselves
in labors little better than those of banditti, robbing,
murdering, drinking, and gambling. The govern
ment was thus enabled to extricate itself from the
painful situation late events had placed it in, and
again to resume the offensive.
A few days after the siege of Cuautla had begun,
there was a movement against the independent cause
in the region known as tierra caliente del Sur, in the
provinces of Mexico and Puebla. That part of the
country had been occupied by Morelos after he de
feated a number of royalist commanders, but his
control of it was not continuous or assured. There
were many towns still recognizing the viceregal au
thority; and as soon as Morelos found himself pent
up in Cuautla, unable to detach any portion of his
forces, his agents were soon expelled from the places
where he had appointed them. 22
The commander of the fifth division of southern
militia, Francisco Paris, when on his way to reoccupy
22 Most of the sugar estates in that country were owned by Spaniards,
who, besides affording to a large number of inhabitants the means of earning a
livelihood, had attached them by continued acts of kindness. Morelos had
caused the seizure of estates, and placed in them overseers to receive the prod
uce, whose value was applied to the support of the independent forces. Bub
the employe's and servants, when they saw that Morelos could send no support
to the overseers, forthwith expelled them, and the control of the estates re
verted to their owners. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 534-5.
408 PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
the district of Tlapa toward the end of March 1812,
was requested by Brigadier Bonavia, commanding at
Oajaca, to keep within call, as the city was in danger,
a large force of insurgents having entered the Miz-
teca country. That trouble being over, he again be
gan his march, when a second detention occurred,
caused by the insurgents having besieged Regales at
Yanhuitlan. Caldelas was despatched to Regules' aid,
but as the insurgents raised the siege and went to
Huajuapan, those officers invested that town. March
and April having passed, it was too late for the ex
pedition to Tiapa, and Paris, aware that Regules and
Caldelas had met at Huajuapan, concluded to take
up a position at Ayutla, to watch the departure
or flight of Morelos, who on being pursued must
go by way of Tlapa if he retreated to the coast of
Tecpan. He must pass, too, through Ayutla, and
there Paris hoped to place him in check. 23 While
there, the inhabitants of Chilapa, said to have been
intensely loyal to the crown, on hearing of the ap
proach of a royalist party from Ayutla, with the
giant Martin Salmeron leading, struck a blow for the
royal cause, seizing Francisco Montezuma, the sub-
delegado, and others of insurgent antecedents, and
sent them as prisoners to Paris at Ayutla. Their
example was followed at Tixtla, Mochitlan, Peta-
quillas, Quechultenango, and other neighboring towns ;
in consequence of which the independent chief Mdxi-
ino Bravo, finding his position at Chilparicingo unten
able, after the artillery and a few muskets had been
taken to El Veladero, took refuge at the hacienda of
Chichihualco, belonging to his family. 24 Paris placed
Captain Manuel del Cerro in command at Chilapa,
and Captain Anorve was also ordered there with a
force to support him. Both officers at once organized
123 See his report from Ometepec, April llth, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii.
898-904.
24 See Calleja's letter to the viceroy enclosing one of Maximo Bravo to his
brother, the brigadier Miguel Bravo, of April 29, 1812, from Zumpango. Gaz.
de Mtx., 1812, iii. 491-4.
THE BRAVOS. 409
volunteer companies armed with the muskets that
had been hidden when Morelos came. The same
measures were adopted at Chilpancingo; indeed, im
mediately after Morelos escaped from Cuautla and
his army became dispersed, there was a general move
ment throughout all that country in favor of the royal
cause.
Among the officers thus dispersed were Leonardo
Bravo, Jose Mariano de la Piedra, and Colonel Man
uel Sosa with twenty men, whose whole armament con
sisted of seven muskets, three fowling-pieces, two pairs
of pistols, and five sabres. Journeying south through
the valley of Cuernavaca, they arrived, worn out
with fatigue, on the 5th of May, three days from
Cuautla, at the hacienda of San Gabriel, the property
of the archroyalist Gabriel de Yermo, the greater
portion of whose laboring men had been serving as
teamsters and otherwise to Calleja's army. But the
few left to take care of the hacienda were neither
less loyal to the crown nor less attached to their
employer. They had kept concealed, to meet an
emergency, a four-pounder, some muskets, and ammu
nition for a few days' defence. Led by a Philippine
Islander named Domingo Perez, or El Chino, they
disarmed the few soldiers and fell upon Bravo and
his companions. Bravo and Sosa attempted to de
fend themselves; the former was thrown down and
bound and the latter killed on the spot. Piedra
quietly surrendered. 25 The three were taken to the
city of Mexico and there tried, their judge being that
bitter enemy of the Creoles, Oidor Bataller. Indeed,
25 Calleja in his despatch of May 6th speaks of the capture of Piedra,
Bravo, and Perez, the last named a lieutenant-colonel who with a small
party of twelve, also fugitives from Cuautla, fell into the hands of the Sail
Gabriel men a few days after the others. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 488, 722-4;
Ncgrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 13; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 73. An ex
tract of the proceedings at the trial of Bravo and Piedra, published in the
Diario de Mejico, Sept. 24th, shows the former to have been only a brigadier,
and the latter to have had no military rank, though he had been employed col
lecting tithes under authority of Morelos, whose compadre he was. All the
prisoners were sent to a place of safety in the barranca of Tilzapotla. Ala-
many Hist. Alej., ii. 53o-7.
410 PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
once consigned to his merciless justice, their fate was
sealed; all three were shot on the 14th of September,
in the campo del ejido.
Bravo's son Nicolas \vas the pride of his life. And
the father was no less worshipped by the son. They
were both men of a generous nature, no less lofty in
their aims than self-sacrificing and brave in their
methods of achieving them. Had they been anciently
of Rome, they would have outdone all the Romans in
deeds of true nobility. They were on the side of in
dependence because they loved liberty, and would see
their country delivered from this most hateful oppres
sion. Gladly would the viceroy have showered on
them his richest gifts had they been willing to serve
Spain; but they preferred death with their country
delivered, for they knew that some must die, and that
thereby deliverance would come.
The viceroy desired specially to win to his side the
chivalrous Nicolas, for there was no fairer specimen
of youthful manhood to be found on the planet. He
had already risen high as an insurgent leader, and en
joyed the fullest confidence and affection of Morelos.
Venegas even offered Leonardo Bravo his life if he
would prevail upon his son and brothers to abandon
the revolution arid accept amnesty. 28 But the Bravos
were not the stuff slaves are made of. Leonardo
spurned the offer. And so he died. 27
It happened at this time that Nicolas Bravo had
well secured in his camp three hundred Spaniards
who were his prisoners. Some of them were officers
26 Nicolas Bravo, though authorized by Morelos to save his father's life by
accepting the proffered boon, declined, saying that he had lost faith in vice
regal pledges, for he remembered the brothers Orduua at Tepecuacuilco.
The viceroy on his part refused the exchange tendered him by Morelos of a
number of Spanish prisoners for Leonardo Bravo. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., iii.
250-01; Mendibil, Rcsumen Hist., 140-1; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 1G1-2;
Nerjrete, Max. Sig. XIX., v. 191-5, 312-3.
21 The Mexican government on the 19th of July, 1823, ordered a monu
ment erected to the memory of the old patriot. The governor and ayunta-
miento of the district of Mexico decreed Sept. 14, 1827, that the monument
should be paid for out of the public funds; and the corner-stone was laid two
days later by the junta patriotica of the capital. Mex. Col. Ord. y Dec., ii.
149-51; Cor. Fed. Hex. (1812, Sept. 21), 2-3.
A NOBLE REVENGE. 411
from Spain; some were wealthy hacendados; all of
them loved life, as indeed had Leonardo Bravo.
Nicolds Bravo's power over these prisoners was abso
lute. The humane Morelos, even, had told the young
chieftain to have them shot, and so avenge his father's
death. Venegas expected no less; and it shows at
once the value placed upon a Bravo by the viceroy,
and his indifference to human life, when he refused
any number of captured Spaniards in exchange for
Leonardo, as Morelos had offered.
But Nicolas could now have his just revenge; the
custom of the war allowed it, and his general awarded
it. Three hundred for one; and these not Indians or
serfs, but good and pure blue-blooded Spaniards; after
all, it was not such a mean price the cause would have
for his dear old father's life. Calling them before
him, he said:
"Your lives are forfeit. Your master, Spain's
minion, has murdered my father, murdered him in
cold blood for choosing Mexico and liberty before
Spain and her tyrannies. Some of you are fathers,
and may imagine what my father felt in being thrust
from the world without one farewell word from his
son ay! and your sons may feel a portion of that
anguish of soul which fills my breast, as thoughts
arise of my father's wrongs and cruel death.
"And what a master is this you serve! For one
life, my poor father's, he might have saved you all,
and would not. So deadly is his hate that he would
sacrifice three hundred of his friends rather than
forego this one sweet morsel of vengeance. Even I,
who am no viceroy, have three hundred lives for my
father's. But there is yet a nobler revenge than all.
Go, you are free! Go find your vile master, and
henceforth serve him, if you can!"
The inhabitants of Tasco, who were royalists, fol
lowing the example of the Chilapans, roused them
selves to action for the king; those of Iguala and
412 PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
Tepecuacuilco did the same. Royalist companies
were hurriedly organized in the haciendas and towns
of the canada de Cuernavaea, who engaged in a hot
war on the independents. Thus the whole country
from La Cruz del Marques to the approaches of the
port of Acapulco now recognized the viceregal gov
ernment. The Indians dwelling in the towns near
Cuautla, after the place was occupied by Calleja,
presented themselves with their curas, petitioning for
amnesty, which was granted them.
Viceroy Venegas, with the view of winning the
inhabitants of the south to the royal cause, proclaimed
on the llth of May that the course of Morelos at
Cuautla, in preferring to suffer misery rather than
surrender, was an inhuman act. He depicted him as
a cruel man, who had forced the people of Cuautla to
perish from famine. These and many other things
did he say to blacken Morelos' character. The proc
lamation ended with a tender of general pardon and
forgetfulness of the past to all who would forsake
the independent ranks, together with a reward for
the capture of Morelos. 28 It carried with it likewise
the threat of certain and pitiless punishment to all
who refused. The offer of amnesty was accompanied
for greater effect with a pastoral letter of the eccle
siastical chapter ruling the diocese of Mexico after
Archbishop Lizana's death. After the fall of Cuau
tla, there being no further need in this vicinity for
Calleja and his army, he returned to Mexico, Llano's
division going to Puebla. Fourteen days after his
victory, on the 16th of May, Calleja, being quite ill,
entered Mexico in a carriage. The artillery, stand
ards, and other military trophies taken at Cuautla
were carried in triumph. The prisoners were in the
centre of the division. Notwithstanding the appar
ent satisfaction with the result of the Cuautla cam-
28 'Si hubiese alguno de vosotros que logre aherrojar la fugitiva fiera. . .el
gobierno os ofrece una recompensa lionrosa, util, y proporcionada,' for liber
ating the world of 'uno de los may ores monstruos quo ha abortado.' Gaz. de
Mex., 1812, iii. 503-5.
RAYON BEFORE TOLUCA. 413
paign and the air of triumph given it, the acerbity
existing between Yenegas and Calleja became still
more imbittered with the fiasco of Morelos' escape;
and the former did not miss the opportunity to wound
his rival's feelings. 29 The army of the centre was
dissolved, and Calleja resigned. The troops were in
corporated in the garrison of the capital, and there
after were under the immediate orders of the mayor
general, Conde cle Alcaraz, 30
Venegas now set himself about recovering the
places the independents had seized; and to that end
he formed a plan of campaign from which he ex
pected brilliant results. But the point about which
he felt particular anxiety at this time was Toluca.
Soon after the supreme junta settled in Sultepec,
leaving his colleagues Liceaga and Verdusco there,
the president, Rayon, had placed himself at the head
of a respectable number of troops, with his headquar
ters at the hacienda of La Huerta, and early in April
appeared before Toluca with the view of taking the
city. The coinandante, Porlier, having only 700 men
was forced to concentrate them in the town to meet
the emergency, also putting the citizens under arms
to aid in the defence. Rayon fortified the surround
ing positions, cut off communications with Mexico,
and constantly threatened the town, against which
he made several vigorous though unsuccessful as
saults. 31 The viceroy, as before stated, had not lost
29 Venegas, answering Calleja's confidential letter wherein he exaggerated
his victory at Cuautla, thus slurs him: 'Let us be thankful to that good-
natured clergyman for having spared us the shame of raising the siege.'
Among the imputations against Calleja, perhaps not the least well grounded
was that of the enormous expenditures he incurred on his expeditions. The
expenses of the Cuautla siege, according to official documents, amounted to
two million dollars, an enormous sum, obtained in the usual way by exactions.
Meridibil, Resumen HisL, 118-19.
30 The viceroy, with the double view of utilizing the troops, and of de
priving Calleja of their support, diminished the garrison, despatching many
parties into the country. He was well informed of what was taking place in
Calleja's house. Negrete, Mex. Sly. XIX., v. 13-14.
31 On the 18th of April Rayon lost in one of his failures a portion of his
artillery, and had to retire to Amatepec, between Toluca and Lerma, and set
fire to the hacienda La Garcesa. Negrete, Mex. Sly. XIX., v. 41-2.
414 PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
sight of the place, and after allowing the army of
the centre two days' rest, despatched about 1,500
men of whom a number were taken out of jail, and
others from among the insurgent prisoners under
Colonel Joaquin del Castillo y Bustamante, with seven
guns. Castillo tried on the 19th of May to force the
pass of Lerma, and failed. The city of Lerma was
situated in the middle of the lake formed by the Rio
Grande, communicating with Toluca on one side and
with the road to Mexico on the other by means of
two narrow causeways, one of which w r as defended by
cuts and parapets supported by artillery. Throwing
a bridge over the first cut, the assailants captured the
parapets, when they encountered other intrenchinents
that Castillo had no knowledge of; and the consequence
was a precipitate retreat with heavy loss to their en
campment in the hacienda of Jajalpa. 32
The insurgents gave this affair an undue importance,
and Rayon was much censured for not taking advan
tage of his victory. 33 Castillo being reenforced with
400 men, two field-guns, and a howitzer, made a second
attack, when Rayon abandoned the position in the
night of the 22d of May, retreating with his force and
artillery to the strong position of Tenango. Castillo
tarried in Lerma only long enough to destroy its
defences, reaching Toluca on the 26th of May. After
driving away the prowling bands that kept supplies
from the town, and having increased his force from
the garrison, he marched against Tenango, camping
on the 2d of June in the hacienda of San Agustin,
32 This reverse was attributed to lack of skill on Castillo's part, his occu
pation prior to the war having been that of a trader. Poiiier had written
that the reinforcements should be sent him by another route, but his letters
had been intercepted. Afaman, Hist. Mcj., iii. 142-5; Mendib'd, Eesum. Hist.,
121-8; El Iluatrador Americano, no. 1, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc.,
iv. 174-5.
33 The defenders of the pass were commanded by Juan Manuel Alcantara,
a man who could neither read nor write, and who, according to Bustamante,
Cuad. Hist., ii. 99, 122-8, sold to Canon Velasco for two horses the glory
of having his name inserted in the newspapers of Sulfcepec as the hero of that
action; evidently a false story that of the sale, Velasco's report to Rayon,
giving Alcantara full credit for his defence of the position.
INSURGENT DEFEATS. 415
from which he could see the hill surmounted with
artillery and defended by a large army. Castillo then
moved his camp opposite the town. During the night
of June 5th he directed Enriquez with the cazadores
de Lovera and the grenadiers and cazadores de Mejico
and Tres Villas to ascend the hill by the Tenancingo
road, while Calvillo distracted the enemy's attention
by threatening to assail the town, and Aguirre feigned
an attack on the Veladero, a point defended by the
cura Correa. No precautions against surprise had
been taken by the insurgents, and the first intimation
they had of an attack was when they saw close upon
their batteries Enriquez with his troops guided by
Vicente Filisola at the head of the cazadores de
Mejico. At the sound of the trumpets of the caza
dores de Lovera, which the insurgents heard for the
first time, a panic seized them, and without making
the slightest resistance they turned and fled. Calvillo
then occupied the town, and Aguirre captured the
Veladero. 34 The insurgents sustained a heavy loss.
Among the killed were colonels Camacho and Anaya.
The royalist casualties were only a few wounded.
The defeat at Tenango deeply affected the friends
of the revolution in the cities occupied by the vicere
gal government, and greatly lowered the prestige of
the cause. Indeed, the members of the secret clubs
had expected the forces at Tenango to march on the
capital, and so end the struggle. Now all was bitter
disappointment.
The victorious Castillo hastened to take advan
tage of the enemy's defeat, despatching next day Jose
3i The insurgent account, not entitled to credence, says that only 500 men
defended the hill and town, and that they lost barely 60 men from the 2d to
the Gth. El Ilustrador Am., 1812, June 13, no. 6; Hernandez y Ddvalos,
Col. Doc., iv. 232. The royalists found much war material and provisions;
also a quantity of printed matter, and Rayon's correspondence. The latter
fled down a ravine; but the young men, among them two lawyers that left
Mexico to join him and had not yet learned to run away, were taken, and
together with the other prisoners were shot. Among those thus put to death
was the vicar of the place, Father Tirado, who being fond of hunting had a
fowling piece in his house. Bustamante, Cuadro Hist., ii. 125; Alaman, Hist.
Ifr/., iii. 145-C; Rivera, Gob. Mex., ii. 41.
416 PROGRESS OF THE WAR,
Calafat to occupy the fortified towns of Tenancingo
and Tecualoya. Calafat found them both abandoned,
and was met by the curates and inhabitants, who
manifested great joy at his coining. 35
Other heavy blows the cause of independence suffered
at this time, not the least of which was the discovery
by the viceregal government that there were persons
in the capital laboring against it. An insignificant
party of royalist lancers, thirty-six in number, return
ing from Lerma to Cuajimalpa, encountered in the
monte de las Cruces an insurrectionary party of 500
infantry and cavalry with two guns, commanded by a
Frenchman named Laylson and three priests. The
royalists made a dash and dispersed the party, slaying
several and taking five prisoners, besides the guns,
several muskets, ammunition, six mules laden with
clothing, twenty saddled horses, and Laylson's papers,
among which was Rayon's correspondence with the
Guadalupe club. 38 Among Rayon's captured letters
were a number revealing the political relations be
tween members of that society and the chiefs of the
revolution. Several persons were arrested on the
30th of June, but were released after a few days'
imprisonment.
The royalist commander, Castillo y Bustamante,
after taking Tenango rested a few days, and then re
turned to Toluca, where he began active preparations
for a campaign against Sultepec, hoping to capture
the members of the revolutionary junta. The dis
trict affording large resources, and the junta having
no reason to fear surprise from the viceroy's troops,
Liceaga and Verdusco had busied themselves in pro
viding war material, while indulging in the formulas
35 The Indians aided his men in taking down the intrenchmerits. Gaz. de
Hex., 1812, iii. no. 250, 665-8.
36 The gallantry of the victors was highly appreciated in government cir
cles, and a subscription of $2,793 was raised to give them a substantial re
ward. The lieutenant got $260; the ensign, $224; the sergeant, $108; the
corporal, $88; each private, $57; two wounded privates, $87^ each. Gaz. de
Mex., 1812, iii. 571, 596, 618-20, 668.
OFFICIAL DISSENSION. 417
of government. 37 There was much dissension among
the members, Rayon's failure at Toluca contributing
to bad feeling; for Rayon laid the responsibility of
the failure on Liceaga for not keeping him supplied
wi'th ammunition. Liceaga, on his side, in a letter
to Rayon, showed much displeasure at the appoint
ment of Cos as vicario castrense. 38 Rayon's defeat at
Tenango still more increased the ill feeling, and tended
toward the dispersion of the junta, which soon fol
lowed. Rayon, foreseeing that Castillo would soon
come against them, prevailed on his colleagues at
Tiripitio to separate, Liceaga going to Guanajuato
as general of the northern provinces, and Verdusco
to Michoacan as general of the western division,
while Morelos should have command of the south,
and Rayon himself retire to his own home, Tlalpuja-
hua, to fortify it, and carry on thence operations in
the province of Mexico. 39 All were to raise as many
troops as possible.
These measures accomplished, they were again to
meet at such place as should be agreed upon. In
formed that Castillo had begun his march from Toluca
on the 1.6th of June, Rayon departed next day for
Tlalpujahua, taking with him the printing materials,
artillery, and everything of value that could be traris-
37 Padre Bringas, in his arguments against Doctor Cos' plans, says that
Liceaga and Verdusco during the holy week observed the same ceremonial
as the viceroy at the cathedral of Mexico; and that Verdusco presented him
self to receive the communion in a general's imiform with a clergyman's
stole. Alaman, on the authority of Father Jose Maria Salazar, a friar of
San Diego, denies the statement, saying that Verdusco appeared simply in
his ecclesiastical robe. Hist. Mej., iii. 150. Among the junta's acts was one
appointing Doctor Cos vicario castrense, who removed several priests from
their parishes, arrested and sentenced to the chain-gang some ecclesiastics,
and granted marriage dispensations. This brought out an energetic decree
of the diocesan chapter of Mexico, declaring his acts null, and fulminating
censures. This same body recommended to the viceroy the removal of Father
Correa from Nopala, and the deprivation of his prebend in the colegiata of
Guadalupe from Doctor Velasco. Both priests were excommunicated for hav
ing joined the insurgents. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 709, 711.
38 Bmtamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 122; Bringas, Impugn.; Alaman, Hist.
Mej., ii. 443-5.
39 An act to that effect was adopted on the 16th of June, and published by
edict, arid in El Ilustrador Americano of the 20th of June. Hernandez y
Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iv. 280-1; Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 260-2; Alaman,
Hist. Mej., iii. 149-53; Rivera, Gob. Mex., ii. 4L
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 27
418 PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
ported. Liceaga and Verdusco did the same soon
after, the former bound to the bajio of Guanajuato,
as before stated, and the latter to Huetamo. The
enemy used every effort to capture them, but the
natural difficulties of a march in the sierra, ren
dered still worse by heavy rains, greatly favored the
revolutionists, as it took the royalists four days to
travel forty-eight miles, the distance between Toluca
and Sultepec; so that when they reached the latter
place on the 20th of June, it was found abandoned.
Several priests and a few citizens who had previously
kept in concealment, fearing persecution, reported
themselves to the royalists, and through their influ
ence the population of the town returned. Castillo
destroyed the factories of cannon and gunpowder;
granted amnesty to all insurgents who petitioned for
it; organized a military court; and had all prisoners
sentenced by it shot. He reestablished the local gov
ernment; gathered a considerable quantity of artil
lery and other arms and ammunition that the inde
pendents had left, and sent them to Mexico. The
trophies, showing the advantages lately gained, which
included thirty-one pieces of artillery captured at
Tenango and found in Sultepec, were conveyed in
triumph through the capital. 40 Castillo then divided
his force into several columns, one of which under
Enriquez was sent in pursuit of the revolutionary
junta, which having had so much the start could not
9} O
be overtaken. Enriquez, however, succeeded in com
ing up with Rayon's artillery and capturing five guns.
One party under Jose Calafat went to Zacualpan,
placed itself in communication with troops at Tasco,
and kept that mining district well provided. Rafael
Calvillo, acting with great activity, sent detach
ments to Tejupilco and places near Zitdcuaro, and
brought under subjection all the towns of the sierra.
Aguirre and Pardo with other parties kept up an
40 Particulars are given in the commander's report from Toluca, August
8th. Gaz. dejlex., 1812, iii. 905-20.
COMMUNICATION OPEN. 419
active warfare against insurgents. Castillo himself
extended operations in the direction of Ixtlahuaca,
left garrisons in the important places, and returned
to Toluca. Several unimportant encounters followed.
It may be said, however, that from this time the
whole valley of Toluca for thirty leagues as far as
Ixtlahuaca, was subject to the viceroy's authority, and
communication was open with Mexico.
CHAPTER XVII.
RAYON PRESIDENT; MORELOS IN THE SOUTH.
1812.
PRESIDENT RAYON AT TLALPUJAHUA His RELATIONS WITH THE VILLA-
GRANES ROYALIST SUCCESSES ON THE NORTH OF MEXICO AFFAIRS IN
MICHOACAN FATHER SALTO AND HIS EXECUTION VENEGAS' SANGUIN
ARY DECREE INSURGENT PRIESTS DEPRIVED OF THEIR IMMUNITY-
EPISCOPAL INDIFFERENCE EXCITEMENT IN MEXICO SECOND ANNIVER
SARY OF INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATED RAMON RAYON'S PROFITABLE
MOVEMENTS ATTACK AGAINST IXMIQUILPAN A FAILURE RAYON'S AR
RANGEMENTS WITH ROYALIST TRADERS PROPOSED NEGOTIATIONS FOR
PEACE ASSAULT OF YANHUITLAN SIEGE OF HUAJUAPAN TRUJANO'S
BRILLIANT DEFENCE MORELOS COMES TO THE RESCUE AND WINS A
VICTORY GATES OF OAJACA OPENED TO HIM.
THE president of the supreme junta, Ignacio Ra
yon, had meanwhile established his headquarters at
Tlalpujahua, upon a hill called El Gallo, and fortified
it. He raised troops, and extended his authority to
the districts near and surrounding the province of Mex
ico, as well as to those on the east. 1 The town of Ixtla-
huaca, to which the viceroy's sway extended, as be
fore stated, became thus the frontier of the territory
ruled over by Rayon from Tlalpujahua.
Having described the military operations which cul
minated with the restoration of the viceregal author
ity in the valley of Toluca and the regions near,
as well as to the south-west of Mexico, I will now
1 The Nad6 hill, near Aculco, deemed impregnable, was further strengthened
and a factory of arms established there. The president's four brothers greatly
aided him. Ramon Lopez Rayon not only established another manufactory
of arms in El Gallo, a position chosen by himself, at which many men were
at work, but also constructed and set up a new war engine of his own inven
tion. Mora, Revol Mex., iv. 419-20; Busiamantt, Cuad. Hist., ii. 19D-201.
( 420 )
ROYALIST MOVEMENTS. 421
speak of those on the north of the capital. 2 Various
columns of royalist troops having been concentrated
under Domingo Clavarino, 3 he retook Pachuca with
out resistance on the 10th of May, 1812; after which
he resolved to recover the neighboring places, such as
Real del Monte, El Chico, and Atotonilco el Grande,
after placing himself in communication with Colonel
Piedras commanding at Tulancingo. Accompanied
by Madera, former commander of Pachuca, he marched
on Atotonilco the 21st of May, arid broke up the in
surgent force assembled there, capturing eleven guns,
of which six were of brass, taken from the royalists at
Pachuca and Real del Monte, one culverin made in
Seville, and four of lead. 4 Clavarino published and
granted the amnesty; and after destroying a factory
of artillery at Real del Monte, established there by the
tribunal de mineria under the skilful Flemish machin
ist, La Chaussee, returned to Pachuca, where a gar
rison was placed. Meantime, while Piedras was
aiding Clavarino in his operations against Atoto
nilco, the insurgents under Villagran, Serrano, Osorno,
Canas, Anaya, Espinosa, and Gonzalez attacked Tu
lancingo, and kept up a fire on the town for six days,
causing much damage. But owing to the successful
sallies made by the garrison, and to the approach
of Clavarino, the assailants retired. A portion of
them were overtaken, however, on the plain of Zaca-
tepec by Llorente's cavalry, and a large number
killed. 5 In Mexico Tulancingo had been considered
2 The viceroy's authority was now in these regions paramount everywhere
except in Zimapan and Izucar; the latter protected from attack more by fear
on the part of the royalists, who had been so often defeated there, than by the
insurgent force existing in the place.
3 Before this, one of his officers, Captain Rafael Casasola, on Palm-Sunday,
March 21st, marched to Alfajayucan, where the people, whom he qualifies as
rebels, were assembled on market-day, entered the place unresisted, killed
150 peaceable persons, took possession of all the coin and other effects which
he distributed among his men, and then returned to Ixmiquilpan. See Casa-
sola's report of March 24th, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 334-6.
* Clavarino's report of May 22d, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 557-61.
5 Llorente's report says that the plain to the extent of two leagues was
strewn with the slain; 164 prisoners were taken, among them many wounded;
only 15 or 20 horsemen escaped. His casualties were, two privates wounded
422 KAYON PRESIDENT; MORELOS IN THE SOUTH.
as lost, and the viceroy hastened to send Clavarino
the Guanajuato battalion to render that place and
Pachuca secure. With this force Clavarino extended
his operations to the plains of Apam, dislodged the
insurgents from Calpulalpan, and defeated them at
Irolo on the 24th of June. These advantages were
counterbalanced by the defeat of Samaniego at Zaca-
tlan, where he ran great risk of being completely
undone. The insurgents were beaten in several other
petty encounters; yet in the latter part of September,
notwithstanding the loss of Pachuca, they were mas
ters of the plains of Apam, and Osorno held Zacatlan,
whence his soldiers overran the country in various
directions.
Now, more than ever before, perhaps, this revolu
tion, begun at Dolores by Hidalgo and Allende, and
continued by Morelos, Rayon, and others, was as
suming the form of a continual succession of minor
battles and skirmishes. There was a fight in one
province or another almost every day, and often in
several provinces at the same time. As long as the
revolutionists could not or would not concentrate, the
royalists were obliged to scatter themselves through
out the land. And so all over Mexico war became
chronic. In Michoacan the insurrectionary forces
had become greatly increased, and frequently advanced
to the gates of Valladolid, committing hostilities and
stopping supplies as heretofore. The royalist com
mander, bent on their destruction, had detached sev
eral bodies of troops from the garrison to pursue them.
Two of these detachments were commanded respec
tively by Manuel de la Concha and Juan Pesquera.
Concha on the 17th of April occupied Cocupao, captur
ing there Father Vicente Ochoa, a mariscal de campo,
whom he took to Valladolid. He also found in the
place Colonel Caballero and fifteen other insurgents,
and four patriots contused: 'No habiendo quedado un solo individuo que no
haya tefiido en sangre enemiga su sable, lanza 6 bayoneta.' Gaz. de Mex.,
1812, iii. 687-8.
FIGHTING PRIESTS. 423
wliom he shot; after which he marched on to Tzin-
tzuntzan and Patzcuaro, where he ordered other
executions. 6 Captain Pesquera approached the line
of Guanajuato, where the combination was made
for the capture of Albino Garcia; and later, on the
7th of May, was directed to look after and bring in
as a prisoner the clergyman Jose Guadalupe Salto,
ex-vicar of Teremendo, who had found refuge in a
cave/ at the entrance of which he was overtaken by
Pesquera's soldiers. It is said that he then cried out,
"Do not kill me; I am a minister of Christ," at the
same time thrusting a lance into one of the soldiers,
and began defending himself from the inside of the
cave. The soldiers fired; and entering the cave found
Salto on the ground with a bullet through his body,
and by his side two women whom he had been hold
ing as prisoners. Pesquera had the wounded man
conveyed on a bed to Valladolid, where, by order of
Trujillo, he was executed the next day. 8
The revolution, having been begun by an ecclesias
tic, had from its incipiency many members of the
clergy, both secular and regular, among its leaders;
and it may be said that at this time the war was kept
up almost wholly by them. 9 There was hardly a bat-
6 Concha's report, May 4th, to Col. Trujillo. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. G04-G.
7 Father Salto bore the reputation of a man of exemplary virtue, who
was persecuted by the government because he had a brother who was a
colonel among the independents, and early in April 1811 imprisoned. He
was afterward pardoned and released, but fearing re-arrest concealed him
self. At the end of five months he appealed in writing to Bishop-elect Abad y
Queipo for protection, pleading his innocence and sufferings, which petition
was unheeded. Salto was then commissioned as a colonel of the indepen
dent forces on the 1st of April, 1812. He was accused of horrid crimes, among
them the murder by his instigation of forty wounded royalists, together with
their attendants, in the hacienda del Tecacho. Arechederreta, Apunt. Hist., in
Alaman, Hist. Mcj.,\\\. 211. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 155, denies that
Salto ever committed any offence ' no era criminal, ni habia motivo para
perseguirlo como a una fiera ' and charges Abad with sacrificing him to curry
favor with Venegas and Trujillo.
8 Trujillo notified Bishop Abad, and said that on no account would he ex
tend the time. The bishop waived the formal degradation. Gaz. de Mex.,
1812, iii. 607-14. The prisoner was carried on a bed to the scaffold, and
garro ted, and then shot. Castillo Neyrete, Mex., v. 47-57; Alaman, Hist. Mej.,
iii. 213.
9 Some of them bore nicknames significant of habits not the most exem
plary; one was called Padre Chingmrito, or dram of rum; another, Padre
Caballo flaco; a third, Padre Chocolate. Zamacois, Hist. Hex., viii. 400.
424 RAYON PRESIDENT; MORELOS IN THE SOUTH.
tie in which priests were not found acting as leading
officers. Notwithstanding this well established fact,
Viceroy Venegas had hitherto abstained from pub
licly issuing any decree regarding them, though he
had circulated orders to the commanders of royal
troops to shoot all priests that fell prisoners into their
hands. But these orders had rarely been carried out.
In the case of Father Hidalgo, we have seen that his
execution was pursuant to a regular sentence, after
he had been tried and all ecclesiastical formalities
observed. Some leaders, however, exasperated at
encountering hostile priests everywhere, had disre-
regarded their cloth, and without ado despatched them
to their long home. 10 Others, among them Tovar at
San Luis Potosi with respect to Father Zimarripa,
had with their reports placed the viceroy under the
necessity of decisive action. After consulting the real
acuerdo, fourteen of whose fifteen members had ex
pressed the same opinion, at the petition of the
crown's counsel and with the concurrence of the mil
itary and naval auditores, the viceroy published an
edict on the 25th of June, declaring amenable to the
military jurisdiction all persons who had made or
should thereafter make resistance to the king's troops,
whatever might be their rank, status, or condition;
and ordering that such offenders should be tried by
the ordinary courts-martial composed of officers of
the division or detachment that effected the capture,
and referring the case with the proceedings had
thereon to the viceroy for his final decision. This
restriction, if faithfully carried out, would have
averted many arbitrary acts; unfortunately it was
nullified by the freedom allowed commanders to exe
cute sentences without first obtaining the viceregal
sanction, when roads were intercepted or circum
stances demanded a prompt example. 11
10 Calvillo shot Padre Tirado at Tenango; and recently Trujillo did the
same with Salto.
11 The penalty of being shot to death was, according to this decree, t