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sources, and set them further thinking of divorce 
ment. Again, the Creoles were more intelligent, 
better informed, and far more numerous than the blue- 
blooded Spaniards; in view of which we can only 
wonder that the people of Mexico remained in such 
humiliating subjection so long. The Spaniards in 
America and their children were even better educated 
than the Spaniards in Spain, and the higher their 
station and the more inflated their pride, the more 
their minds were filled with prejudice and ignorance. 
The establishment of the university at Mexico afforded 
facilities to the Creoles superior to any enjoyed by 
their fathers, who for the most part, exclusive of those 
holding high positions, were of inferior birth and 
breeding, and without title to the superiority claimed. 
Students and graduates in Mexico by no means con 
fined themselves to the narrow curriculum prescribed 
by the university, and the prohibited works of French 
philosophers, of political and moral writers, and espe 
cially of Rousseau, found their way of late into the 
country. Proletarian principles, and the detestation 
of oppression which they breathed, were absorbed 
with avidity, and stimulated the longing for free 
dom. The very danger incurred by the study of 
these books, and the secrecy with which of necessity 
they were perused, only served to intensify insurrec 
tionary ideas and provoke conspiracy. 6 The liberal 
principles thus acquired by the educated class were 
gradually infused into the ignorant. 

Nevertheless, it seems a little strange to us. to whom 


the doctrine of right of revolution has become so clear, 
and so cherished as the highest prerogative of liberty, 
that it should have made its way so slowly among an 
educated and intelligent people. But the cause is 

6 It was the special province of the inquisition to guard against the im 
portation of books. As late as 1807, a Mexican named Jos6 Roxas was de 
nounced by his own mother for having a volume of Rousseau in his possession, 
and was confined for sevei-al years in the dungeons of the holy office. He 
finally made his escape, but died in 1811 at New Orleans. Ward's Mex., i. 


explained when we remember the powerful hold re 
ligion yet had upon these people. The first step 
toward freedom is to emancipate the mind from some 
of its superstitions. There can be no political liberty 
without some degree of religious liberty. It was 
primarily for religious liberty that the puritans had 
come from England to America; and the first step 
thus taken toward political liberty, they were prepared 
to throw off the yoke for slighter cause than were the 
people of Mexico, who were satisfied with their relig 
ion, and had no desire to change it. Thus while their 
religion, still the strongest sentiment possessing them, 
constrained them to loyalty, they were ready to en 
dure much by way of duty, and to escape damnation 
so much that it was rather Spain's weakness than 
Mexico's strength that secured independence, as we 
shall in due time see. 

But gradually reason, long dormant if not dethroned, 
began to show signs of vitality, first in other quarters, 
and finally in Mexico. It was a period of political 
turnings and over turn ings in Europe and America, 
and it were a pity if Mexico, ground into the very 
dust by the iron heel of despotism, should not find 
some relief. 

The downfall of monarchy in France, and the in 
dependence of the British colonies in North America, 
had established precedents of the successful uprising of 
peoples against the oppression of rulers. More espe 
cially was the acquisition of freedom by the United 
States regarded as a solution of the difficulty in re 
gard to the right of revolution, as Spain in 1783 had 
somewhat imprudently recognized the independence 
of the English colonies, thereby tacitly excusing re 
volt in her own. 7 

7 The reader is already aware that the conde de Aranda at this time pro 
posed to Cdrlos III. the independence of the Spanish colonies in Amer 
ica. See Hist. Mcx., iii. 388-90. Dr Luis Quixano, a prominent leader of 
the revolution in Quito, made prisoner when Toribio Montes entered that 
city, deemed it advisable to retract his views on the right of a colony to as 
sert its independence. He based his reconstructed argument on the principle 
that what is useful and convenient is not necessarily lawful and just. His ex- 















VOL. IV. 1804-1824. 



Entered according to Act of Congress in the Year 1885, by 

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 

All Rights Reserved. 

u. c, 






The Little Man from Corsica He Makes All the World Tremble Gen 
eral View of Politics and Society Attitude of England, Prussia, and 
Austria A Glance at Spain's History Rulers for Three Centuries 
Retrogressions and Reactions Prime Ministers Peace and War 
England and France will not let Spaniards be Free Position of the 
United States Chronic Braggadocio There are Soldiers and Heroes 
in Mexico as Well.. . 1 




Causes of the Revolution of Independence Arrival of the Viceroy His 
Antecedents and Comportment The Viceregal Family Sordidness 
of Iturrigaray His Visit to the Mines Public Improvements In 
troduction of Vaccination Sequestration cf Property Effect on 
the Land Owners Humboldt's Visit International Complications 
Demands for Treasure Difficulties with the United States War 
with England Military Preparations European Affairs Abdica 
tion of Carlos IV. Iturrigaray's Indifference Effects in Mexico of 
Events in Spain Power of the Inquisition Attitude of the Press 
Sparks of Revolution 12 



The Ayuntamiento Claims Sovereignty of the People A National Con 
gress Proposed Opposition of the Audiencia Glad Tidings from the 
Peninsula Four Memorable Juntas Rival Spanish Juntas Angry 
Debates Conspiracy to Depose the Viceroy Ycrmo Takes the 
Lead Iturrigaray's Apathy A Midnight Coup d'Etat The Vice- 



roy in Durance Garibay Appointed his Successor Fate of Iturri- 
garay's Supporters He is Sent to Spain His Rich Sweetmeats 
Indictment for Treason Acquittal R,esidencia Heavy Fines 
Change of Opinions The Sentence Annulled Iturrigaray's Inten 
tions Analyzed Bibliography 40 



Garibay's Character A Badge of Loyalty Reorganization of the Army 
Bonapartist Intrigues Lampoons and Seditious Sheets Effect of 
Reverses in Spain Establishment of a Junta Consultiva Preten 
sions to the Throne of Mexico Archbishop Lizana Appointed Vice 
roy Remittances to Spain Lizana's Character The Junta de Segu- 
ridad Revolution at Valladolid Spanish American Representation 
in the Cortes Lizana Removed from Office Weak Administration 
of the Audiencia French Emissaries Arrival of Viceroy Venegas 
His Antecedents, Character, and Personal Appearance Titles and 
Honors from Spain 67 



Development of Quert$taro Affairs in Guanajuato The Town of Do 
lores Its Cura, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla Secret Meetings of Rev 
olutionists Ignacio Allende Plotting at San Miguel General Plan 
of Uprising Hidalgo's Biography Arrests The Corregidor Im 
prisonedHis Acquittal His Biography El Grito de Dolores 
Hidalgo Marches to San Miguel A Tumultuous Array The Sacred 
Banner Success of the Insurgents at San Miguel Pillaging Hi 
dalgo Proclaimed Captain-general He Enters (Delay a He Ap 
points a New Ayuntamiento 96 



Local History of Ganajuato Alarm in the City Defensive Measures of 
Inteudente Riaiio The Alh6ndiga de Granaditas An Interesting 
Manuscript Riano Retires to the Alh6ndiga Hidalgo Summons 
Riafio to Surrender The Attack A Murderous Contest Riaiio's 
Death His Biography Confusion in the Alhondiga The Barri 
cades Won by the Insurgents They Gain Entrance Berzdbal's 
Fall His Biography Number of the killed Acts of Heroism 
Pillage and Devastation. . . 130 





Military Preparation of Venegas Action of the Church and Inquisi 
tion Hidalgo's Reply He Abolishes Slavery His Administrative 
Measures at Guanajuato A Refractory Ayuntamiento Hidalgo 
Establishes a Mint Marches against Valladolid Additional Rein 
forcements Hidalgo's Treasury The Insurgents Move toward 
Mexico Trujillo Despatched to Oppose their Advance Trujillo's 
Character Iturbide's Biography Trujillo's Movements The Battle 
of Las Cruces The Royalists Force their Way Out Their Defeat 
Regarded as a Triumph Alarm in the Capital Another Sacred 
Banner Hidalgo Perplexed 158 



Calleja's Preparations His Biography Engagement at Querdtaro Ca,- 
llcja Joins Forces with Flon Chavez Repulsed at Querdtaro Calle 
ja's Movements The Dispersion of the Insurgents at Aculco Calleja 
Returns to Querdtaro Character of Torres Defensive Measures of 
Abarca in Jalisco Insurgent Operations in Jalisco Engagement at 
La Uarca The Royalists Defeated at Zacoalco Guadalajara Surren 
ders to Torres Mercado Gains Possession of San Bias Revolution 
in Zacatecas Flight of the Europeans An Unfortunate Intendente 
Iriarte enters Zacatecas The Commission of Doctor Cos A 
Daring Scheme San Luis Potosi Won by an Insurgent Friar A 
Treacherous Visitor San Luis Sacked. . . 192 



Allende Returns to Guanajuato Preparations for Defence The First 
Attack Calleja's Plan He Takes Allende's Batteries Calleja, the 
Avenger His Proclamation An Execution Scene in the Alhondiga 
A General Pardon Extended The Government Reoganized 
Calleja Marches for Guadalajara Hidalgo at Valladolid And at 
the Cerro del Molcajete Hidalgo's Reception at Guadalajara 
Establishes a Government Rayon's Biography Letona's Mission 
and Death The ' Dispertador Americano ' and Printing-press Prep 
arations for War ... 216 






Hermosillo's Operations in Sinaloa Successes at Rosario His Defeat at 
San Ignacio Spread of the Revolution in Nuevo Santander Coa- 
huila and Nuevo Leon Revolt Villagran's Doings Biography of 
Cruz Plan of Calleja Tumult in Valladolid Cruz Enters Vallado- 
lid He Reorganizes the Government Engagement at Urepetiro 
Allende Joins Hidalgo at Guadalajara A Council of War Hidalgo 
Takes up a Position at the Bridge of Calderon Plan of Battle-field 
Calleja's Dispositions Flon's Impetuosity The Revolutionists 
Nearly Triumphant Their Final Defeat Death of Flon His Char 
acter... .. 237 



Cruz Joins Calleja at Guadalajara Humility of the Audiencia, Church, 
and University Calleja Establishes a Junta de Seguridad Cruz Re 
gains San Bias Death of Mercado Hidalgo Compelled to Surren 
der his Command The Insurgent Leaders Retire tc Saltillo They 
Decide to Go to the United States Operations in San Luis Potosi 
Death of Herrera Counter-revolution in Texas Capture and Exe 
cution of Ignacio Aldama Elizondo's Treacherous Plot Capture of 
Hidalgo and Revolutionary Chiefs Iriarte's Death The Captives 
are Sent to Chihuahua Their Trial Abasolo's Deposition Execu 
tions Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Hidalgo's Execution His Char 
acter... . 259 



State of the Revolution after Hidalgo's Capture Biography of Morelos 
His Character His Meeting with Hidalgo and Commission 
Morelos in Michoacan The Royalist Paris Defeated Morelos 
Marches to Chilpancingo The Family of the Bravos Capture of 
Tixtla Defeat of the Royalist Fuentes A Conspiracy Suppressed 
Rayon Retreats from Saltillo He Defeats Ochoa A Terrible 
March The Platform of the Insurgent Leader Rayon Evacuates 
Zacatecas Trujillo's Doings in Valladolid Retreat of the Insur 
gents .290 






Calleja's New System of Military Organization Suppression of the In 
surrection in Nuevo Santander Pacification of San Luis Potosi 
Defeat of Insurgents in Guanajuato Porlier's Operations in Nueva 
Galicia Torre's Activity and Severity His Defeat at Zitacuaro, 
and Death Rayon Fortifies Zitacuaro Emparan Returns to Spain 
Conspiracy to Seize the Viceroy Proclamation of Calleja Events 
in Michoacan Condition of Guanajuato Spread of the Revolution. 317 




, *- 


^ r 

Doctor Cos Joins Rayon The Revolutionary Press Perplexity of Vene- 
gas Bishop Campillo's Failure as a Mediator Second Campaign 
of Morelos Calleja Takes Zitacuaro Destruction of the City 
Reverses of Porlier Arrival of Spanish Troops Triumphal Entry 
of Calleja into Mexico Jealousy of Venegas Calleja Marches 
against Cuautla Description of the City Llano at Iziicar Calleja 
Repulsed Cuautla Invested Sufferings of the Besieged Morelos. 
Evacuates the City Calleja Returns to the Capital ............... 343 



Financial Distress and Arbitrary Measures Insurgents Sack Huamantla 
and Capture Trains The Suprema Junta's Movements and Acts 
Doctor Cos' Plans of Peace and War Viceregal Course Inde 
pendent Press Bad Guerrillas Rosains and his Troubles Cam 
paigns in Puebla, Michoacan, and Bajio de Guanajuato Operations 
of Garcia Conde, Negrete, and Iturbide against Albino Garcia Cap 
ture and End of This Leader Torres' Execution 111 Success of 
Liceaga and Cos in Guanajuato Raids in San Luis Potosi ......... 376 



Capture of Tehuacan Massacre of Prisoners Curates of Maltrata and 
Zongolica Join the Revolution Orizaba Captured and Retaken 
Revolutionary Plans at Vera Cruz and Perote Communication Re 
opened by Royalists Insurgent Operations Capture of Pachuca 
with Immense Booty Cruel Shooting of Prisoners Towns Recap- 



tured by Royalists Arrest of Leonardo Bravo and Companions 
Their Execution Noble Deed of Nicolas Bravo Venegas Offers 
Pardon to Penitent Rebels, and a Reward for Morelos' Capture 
Venegas and Calleja at Enmity Rayon's Unsuccessful Attack on 
Toluca Defeat at Tenango Dispersion of the Supreme Junta 397 




President Rayon at Tlalptijahua His Relations with the Villagranes 
Royalist Successes on the North of Mexico Affairs in Michoacan 
Father Salto and his Execution Venegas' Sanguinary Decree In 
surgent Priests Deprived of their Immunity Episcopal Indifference 
Excitement in Mexico Second Anniversary of Independence Cele 
bratedRamon Rayon's Profitable Movements Attack against Ix- 
iniquilpan a Failure Rayon's Arrangements with Royalist Traders 
Proposed Negotiations for Peace Assault of Yanhuitlan Siege 
of Huahuapan Trujano's Brilliant Defence; Morelos Comes to the 
Rescue and Wins a Victory Gates of Oajaca Opened to Him 420, 



Government of Spain The Cortes and National Sovereignty Character 
of the Members The Diputacion Americana and its Policy Its De 
mands and Character of Concessions Deputy Perez from Puebla 
Deputy Cisneros Asks for Mexican Autonomy and Eventual Inde 
pendence Arizpe Mier Forced Loan Representation of the Con- 
sulado of Mexico British Offers of Mediation National Constitu 
tion as Adopted Its Publication in Mexico The Press Election of 
Ayuntamientos Animosity of the Natives toward the Spaniards 
Constitution Practically Suspended 441 




Morelos' Third Campaign Chilapa Retaken Reoccupation of the Coun 
try to Acapulco Matamoros at Work in Izucar Nicolas Bravo's 
Victories Viceregal Tribulations Publication of Decrees of the 
Spanish Cortes Death of Trujano Morelos' Visit to Ozumba He 
Attacks a Royalist Convoy Takes Orizaba Defeat on the Heights 
of Aculcingo Captures Oajaca Enormous Booty Establishment of 
Government Victor and Miguel Bravo's Campaign to Jamiltepec 
Morelos' Plans Venegas Superseded Review of his Rule 408 





Calleja's Character and Appearance How the Appointment was Deceived 
Condition of Affairs Fresh Taxes and Loans Reforms Insur 
gent Heroine Constitution of 1812 Enforced Inquisition Disap 
pears Increase of Crime Protests and Counter-appeals Extent .of 
Insurrection Calleja's Campaign Plan Royalist Positions Verdus- 
co's Fiasco Rayon's Tour of Inspection Quarrel between the Lead 
ers Iturbide's Victory at Salvatierra 495 



Siege of Cerro del Gallo The Poisoned Well Insurgent Forces and 
their Tactics Movements in Guanajuato Sway of the Villagranes 
Their Sudden Fall Huasteca Campaign Osorno and his Terri 
tory Terrene's Military Promenade Osorno Irrepressible Admin 
istration of Cruz in New Galicia Frontier Operations Chapala Lake 
and its Rovers Division of Provincias Interims Lara's Exploits in 

Texas A Flicker in the Orient 513 



Morelos' March to Acapulco He Besieges and Captures It Royalist 
Reaction Piaxtla Guerrillas and their Doings Bravo's Opera 
tionsHis Repulse at Alvarado Siege of Coscomatcpec Orizaba 
Surprised Second Royalist Defeat at San Agustin del Palmar Its 
Consequences Discord in the Suprema Junta Congress of Chil- 
pancingo Rayon's Action Morelos the Generalissimo and Siervo 
de la Nacion Declaration of National Independence Constitution 
Jesuits 545 




Morelos Marches against Valladolid Calleja's Counter-movement Re 
pulse at the Gate of Zapote Brilliant Charge by Iturbide Defeat 
and Death of Matamoros The Congress Asserts Itself Armijo 
Overruns Tecpan Province Galeana Falls Maleadministration in 
Oajaca Alvarez's Triumphant Entry The Enchanted Mountain 



Speculations with Convoys Quarrel and Misconduct of Rayon and 
Rosains Expedition against Zacatlan and Flight of Rayon Man- 
hunting in the Central Provinces 569 




Changed Aspect of the Revolution Depression on Both Sides Pro 
posed Restriction of Passports and Export of Treasure Causes of 
the Exodus of the Spaniards Fresh Taxes Restoration of Fer 
nando VII. Constitution of 1812 is Annulled and Autocracy Rees 
tablished Feeling in New Spain Insurgent Constitution Its Pro 
visions and Analysis How it was Received Election of Officers 
under the New Constitution Liceaga President Commemorative 
Medal Constitution Ordered Read by the Curas Relations with 
the United States 592 




The Revolutionists on C6poro Hill Positions of the Insurgent Forces 
Determination of Calleja Siege of C6poro Repulse of Iturbide 
Attempted Surprise of Jilotepec Ramon Rayon is Shorn of his 
Triumph Claverino's Movement Southward Iturbide Chases the 
Congress Insubordination of Doctor Cos He is Arrested and Con 
demned to Death, but is Discharged Death of Doctor Cos His 
Character The Revolutionary Government Migrates It is Over 
taken at Tezmalaca Capture of Morelos His Trial Degradation 
and Penance The Last Auto-de-fd Execution of the Great Leader 
Reflections on his Character Two Mexican Writers on This 
Period 608 



Effect of Morelos' Fall Respective Strength of Insurgents and Royalists 
Intrigues and Overthrow of Rosains He Joins the Enemy Teran 
Rises in Fame and Influence Arrival of the Congress at Tehuacan 
It is Forcibly Dissolved The Goazacoalco Expedition First Naval 
Victory for the Mexican Flag The Mounted Raiders of Apam 
Plains Osorno's Last Campaign The Convoy Service in Vera Cruz 
Miyares' Measures for its Protection Operations under Victoria 
and his Associates Bravo and Guerrero on the South Coast.. . . . 626 






Causes Which Sustained the Revolution Review of Calleja's Rule 
Character of the New Viceroy Apodaca Measures to Gain Adhe 
sion Combined Movement against Tehuacan Its Siege and Surren 
der Deplorable Weakness of Teran Vera Cruz is Swept by the 
Royalists Their Successes in Mizteca The Council of Jaujilla 
Strife in Michoacan Tarnished Reputation of Ramon Rayon The 
Five Years' Siege of Mescala is Ended Treachery of Vargas- 
Movements in the North The Declining Insurrection Centres in 
Guanajuato Apodaca 's Success 645 




A Famous Navarrese Guerrilla Preparing for the Enterprise The Land 
ing at Soto la Marina Alarm of the Royalists The Victory at 
Peotillos Penetrating the Interior Traits of Mina Overthrow of 
Ordonez and Castanon Liberation of Prisoners Jealousy of Torres 
Character of Mexican Guerrillas Fall of Soto la Marina Siege of 
Fort Sombrero Ravages of Thirst and Sword The Bulwark of 
Independence Mina's Field Operations Repulse at Guanajuato 
Capture and Execution of Mina Reflections on his Undertaking 
Siege and Fall of Los Remedies Bibliography 659 




Capture of Insurgent Chiefs Fort of Jaujilla Dispersion of the Junta 
Pardon Accepted by Numerous Leaders A Flickering Light 
Affairs in Spain The Spanish Constitution Proclaimed in Mexico 
Election of Deputies Thoughts of Independence Iturbide Re 
appears Diversity of Political Opinions Plots to Overthrow the 
Constitution Iturbide in Command Well-disguised Designs 
Overtures to Guerrero Independence Proclaimed The Plan of 
Iguala Measures of the Viceroy 688 




Discouraging Prospects Independence Proclaimed at Guanajuato 
Valladolid Capitulates The Provincias Internas Revolutionized 
Iturbide at Qucre"taro Apodaca 's Doposal His Conduct Discussed 



His Successor Bravo Joins the Revolutionists Operations in 
Puebla and Vera Cruz Santa Anna Repulsed at Vera Cruz Vic 
toria's Reappearance Iturbide Enters Puebla Arrival of O'Donoju 
His Antecedents Treaty pf C6rdoba Novella Hesitates to Recog 
nize O'Donoju Iturbide Enters the Capital End of the Revolution. 712 




Installation of the Junta Appointment of a Regency Its Cabinet 
O'Donoju's Death Iturbide's Rewards Army Promotions Sur 
render of Perote, Acapulco, and Vera Cruz Murder of Colonel 
Concha Flight of Europeans The Press Political Factions 
Measures for Convoking Congress Iturbide's Interference Con 
spiracy Its Failure Condition of the Country The Revenue The 
Mining Industry A Forced Loan and Arbitrary Measures Reor 
ganization of the Army Union of Central America with the Em 
pire Measures for its Representation Reflections on the Adminis 
tration of the Junta 734 




The Installation Taking the Oath under Pressure The First Misunder 
standingPolitical Parties Measures for Relief of the Treasury 

Disagreements on the Army Question A Counter-revolution Gen 
eral Davila's Action Iturbide and Congress at Open War Progress 
of Republicanism Iturbide Proclaimed Emperor by a Popular 
Emeute A Stormy Congressional Session Agustin I. Recognized- 
Joy in the Provinces The Imperial Family and Household Diffi 
culties of the Treasury The Council of State The Coronation 757 




Inauguration of the Order of Guadalupe Padre Mier Short-lived Har 
monyArrest of Deputies Iturbide Attempts to Reorganize Con 
gressHis Preposterous Claims He Dissolves the Assembly A 
Junta Instituyente Established Appropriation of Spaniards' Money 
Affairs at Vera Cruz Santa Anna in Disgrace Iturbide Visits 
Jalapa Santa Anna Revolts Republicanism Proclaimed Progress 
of -the Insurrection Reverses Influence of the Masonic Order- 
Change of Tactics Plan of Casa Mata Iturbide's Conciliatory Ac 
tionCongress Reinstalled The Emperor Abdicates His Depart 
ure from Mexico His Return and Death. . 770 





AT the opening of the nineteenth century Europe 
was in a state of unusual commotion. There had 
come from Corsica to Paris a bow-legged, olive- 
cheeked little man who had set the rulers of the earth 
and their wise men by the ears. They were exceed 
ingly frightened, and knew not what to do. For this 
personage had set at work several hundred thousands 
of their subjects killing each other; to what purpose, 
it puzzled them to say, unless it was to show how to 
make dupes and donkeys of them all only donkeys 
are too sensible beasts to cut and mangle and murder 
each other in such a wholesale manner at the instiga 
tion of any one. 

Louis XVI. was guillotined in 1793. His prede 
cessor, after a life of debauchery with his Pompadours 
and Dubarrys, and under the intellectual libertinism 
of Voltaire and Rousseau, had died leaving a debt of 
four thousand millions of livres. After that was the 
tiers etat, followed by the storming of the Bastile 

VOL. IV. 1 


midst mobs and bloody revolution. Paper money was 
made. Hereditary titles were discontinued. Church 
property was seized. Christianity was abolished 
though reestablished before 1801 and reason was 
enthroned. The constitution was changed, and a 
species of bastard republicanism propagated. ^ As the 
head of Louis Capet rolled upon the scaffold, insulted 
royalty rose throughout Europe. But France was 
still mad, and it was not until Robespierre was brought 
beneath the guillotine that the reign of terror was 
ended. And thus was opened the way for Napoleon 

Taking the popular side in the revolution, and with 
the aid of his matchless military genius, Napoleon was 
general of the army at the age of twenty-five. In 
1796 he drove back the Austrians and conquered 
Italy. Venice fell the following year, and the cisal 
pine republic was formed out of the Milanese and 
Mantuan states. Egypt was attempted in 1798, but 
Nelson was in the Mediterranean and prevented the 
loss of India to Great Britain. The following year 
the First Consul's proposals of peace to England were 
decidedly rejected by George III. Austria's turn 
came again in 1800, and in 1801 the northern king 
doms were united in a league against England. In 
1802 France regained her islands in the West Indies 
lost by Louis XV. to the English. The Code Na 
poleon was formed. Notwithstanding the peace of 
Amiens, in 1803, Great Britain was pricked into fresh 
outbreaks. Made emperor of France and king of 
Italy in 1804, Napoleon, who was so sadly disturbing 
the time-honored balances of power, now found united 
against him, England, Russia, Austria, and Sweden. 
The game of 1805 was played off Trafalgar and at 

O it/ O 

Austerlitz, and at its close all Europe lay at the feet 
of the little man from Corsica. Prussia claimed his 
.attention in 1806, Russia in 1807, Spain in 1808, and 
Austria in 1809-10. Here marks the highest point 
attained. In 1812 came the Russian campaign; in 


1813 the French armies were driven from Spain; and 
in 1814 Napoleon was at Elba. Another flash of 
glory; then in 1815 Waterloo and St Helena, and in 
1821 death. 

Meanwhile England, having lost the fairest portion 
of her American provinces, and being deeply in debt 
from her many European complications and much 
fighting, was reduced to an unhappy condition. The 
tailors had great burdens to bear, which were placed 
upon them mercilessly by all the rest, manufacturers, 
land owners, and rulers. Everything was excessively 
taxed, while wages were reduced, sometimes one half. 
The "slave-trade obtained. Forty thousand negroes 
were annually taken on board by English ships for 
their West India colonies, half of them perishing by 
the passage. In a word, manners were coarse and 
usages cruel. Prussia was badly broken by the war, 
losing large parts of her domains. There was some 
disaffection among the German people, but it was 
checked without difficulty by the strong arm of roy 
alty. Francis and Prince Metternich ruled Austria 
with an iron despotism, preventing freedom of thought 
or speech, and holding over the press strict censor 

With the centuries Spain has continued to decline, 
until it is many times thought that the bottom has 
been reached, but only after a little rise to find a 
lower depth. Yet, during a portion of the three im 
becile reigns of the seventeenth century Felipe III., 
1598-1621; Felipe IV., 1621-1665; and Carlos II., 
1665-1700 we find continued for a time the brilliant 
age of literature and art, elating from the rule of 
their predecessor. There are Luis de Leon, Castilian 
Cervantes, Lope de Vega, and Quevedo; Calderon de 
la Barca, and other writers; and Ribera, Velazquez, 
and Murillo, painters. Meanwhile the army becomes 
greatly demoralized; the country is left almost de 
fenceless; the naval strength is reduced to nothing; 


the merchant marine is next to nothing, the art of 
ship-building being lost, Italy, France, and England 
doing Spain's carrying; while pirates and filibusters 
ravage colonial waters, and industries and trade fall 
into the hands of foreigners. 

The eighteenth century opens with a thirteen years' 
'war for the succession, when the house of Bourbon 
crowds out the house of Hapsburg. Of the Bourbon 
princes before Joseph Bonaparte, are Felipe V., 1700- 
1746; Fernando VI., 1746-1759; Carlos III., 1759- 
1788; Carlos IV., 1788-1808; and Fernando VII., 
the same year. Following Bonaparte, 18081814, is 
Fernando VII. till 1833, Isabel II. till 1868, a brief 
period of republicanism, 1868-9, Amadeoof the house 
of Savoy, 1871-3, then more republican dictatorships, 
and finally the house of Bourbon again restored in 
the person of Alfonso XII. 

Out of the necessary discipline incident to the war 
of the succession grows some improvement. Agri 
culture and industry are revived. Legislation is in 
some degree purified. The wings of the holy see are 
clipped, and the church stripped of part of its prop 
erty and influence. Fernando VI., being small in body, 
weak in mind, full of fear and hypochondria, and withal 
of a kind and benevolent disposition, the country re 
cuperates somewhat under his rule. Retrenchments 
are made. The inquisition is emptied. Some defences 
are restored, industry and commerce are cultivated, 
and other reforms instituted. 

Carlos III. is an abler man and makes more mis 
chief. Church and inquisition are still further checked 
and the Jesuits are expelled. Among the reformers 
of the period are Count Aranda, an Aragon grande 
of French proclivities and friend of Voltaire; Count 
Campomanes, a man of culture and literary activity, a 
patriot and friend of progress; and Count Florida- 
blanca, who in 1777 succeeds Campomanes as prime 
minister. The last named is less bigoted than his 
age, though opposed to French radicalism ; while re- 


straining the influence of the church, he protects it. 
lie is a man of talents and culture, less statesman 
than manager, and believing in autocracy and unques 
tioning obedience. But whatever the principles held 
in theory, put into practice through the agency of 
ignorant, indolent, and corrupt officials, they fall far 
short of their purpose. There is hostility with Eng 
land in 1779-83. In 1781-2 Spain puts down an 
insurrection of the inca, Tupac Amaru, in Peru, and 
the thousand years' war with the Mahometans is ter 
minated by the peace of Algiers in 1786. 

With the accession of Ca>los IV. ends the epoch of 
reform. Dismal indeed are the next thirty years, dur 
ing which occur the grand humiliation at the hand 
of Bonaparte, and the loss of nearly all the trans 
atlantic colonies. The king is a handsome, ignorant, 
good-natured imbecile; and his wife, Maria Luisa, an 
ambitious and passionate profligate, is the true ruler 
of Spain. Floridablanca and Aranda are alternately 
removed and recalled, finally to make way for Manuel 
Godoy, a young officer, and the queen's favorite, im 
pudent, incompetent, ambitious, and thoroughly im 
moral, sycophant or conspirator according to the tide, 
but always villain. If politics, war, or intrigue become 
tiresome, he seeks relief in dissipation. 

Under these baneful influences Spain sinks lower 
than ever. While the rulers are revelling in luxury 
and licentiousness, the poor throughout the land are 
crying for bread. Finances are wrecked, the army 
is rendered weak and worthless, and education and 
industry are again prostrated. Galicia and other prov 
inces revolt, and presently the French are upon them, 
and Spain is little better than vassal. 

The peace of Basel, 1795-6 as is called the friv 
olous farce which pretended to free the country of the 
French, while in reality placing the peninsula still 
more in their power, besides in its results completing 
the ruin of the navy, and preparing the way for the 
general revolt of the colonies gives Godoy the name 


of Prince of Peace, with rich domains and other sub 
stantial gifts. 

Spain still has many ships and regiments, but no 
sailors or soldiers. Off Portugal, in 1797, the Span 
iards are defeated by the English, who sweep the 

/ O ' L 

Mediterranean and Caribbean seas, and sow discord 
among the colonies. During the past three years 
there has been 2,445,000,000 reals income, and 8,714,- 
000,000 outgo. There is in circulation 1,980,000,000 
paper money current in 1799 at forty per cent dis 
count. Religion is everywhere present as the hand 
maid of vice. A peace is signed in 1801 between 
France and Spain, with Godoy as the creature of 
Napoleon. In thick succession other wars are fol 
lowed by other ignominious treaties. In 1808 the 
French are in Spain ; Carlos abdicates ; Godoy flees 
before the fury of the populace; and Fernando VII., 
idle, incompetent, and faithless, a coward and a hypo 
crite, base, tricky, and a debauchee these are some 
of the many epithets history applies to this monarch 
is named successor. 

After a royal puppet-play, with Murat as manager- 
general, during which Carlos is for a moment recalled, 
while Fernando abdicates, the English, thirty thou 
sand strong, are in the peninsula. At Aranjuez the 
supreme junta sits under the presidency of Florida- 
blanca. Then comes Napoleon to Spain; and fora 
time Joseph Bonaparte holds the reins of government. 
In 1810 Caracas, in Venezuela, breaking into revolt, 
and Buenos Aires shortly after the cortes assem 
ble at Cadiz. A constitution is drawn up in 1812, 
which, under the impulse of the universal progress of 
liberty, abolishes seignorial rights, torture, the inqui 
sition^ and most of the convents. It is almost repub 
lican in its tenor, too liberal for the place and the 
time, and so does not hold; and Spain still labors 
under the crushing weight of absolute monarchy. 

Fernando, reinstated in 1813, swears to the consti 
tution of 1812, intending never to keep it. There 


never was a Bourbon who was not a despot. Four 
epochs mark his reign : the transient tastes of power 
before and after Bonaparte; then to the Anclalusian 
revolution of 1820, during which period the Jesuits 
are recalled, the party of the liberal constitution pro 
scribed, certain notable Spaniards condemned to the 
galleys, and the power of the freemasons put forth in 
opposition to crown and clergy; the third from 1820 
when the Spaniards rebel, and Fernando is forced by 
popular clamor to convoke the cortes, call from the 

gilleys to the principal portfolios Herreros, Perez de 
astro, and the two Argiielles to the fall of Cddiz 
and the constitutional government in 1823, a congress 
of European powers at Verona having reestablished 
the authority of the king, the national militia being 
meanwhile organized, the press declared free, and the 
inquisition abolished; and lastly, the decade preced 
ing the king's death, during which despotism is re 
vived, and money matters demoralized, expenses 
amounting to 700,000,000 reals per annum to be met 
by a revenue of 400,000,000. 

But by this time America and Europe are pretty 
well separated politically, never again, thank God, to 
be united. What with conventionality, bigotry, des 
potism, and general decay in many quarters, the New 
World can do better alone, and after its own way. 
Upon the death of Fernando VII. in 1833, his 
daughter Isabel II. being but three years of age, 
the child's mother, Cristina, is named regent; but the 
late king's brother, Don Carlos, opposes with deso 
lating war. With British aid, however, the queen 
triumphs in 1840. Still Spain is torn by detestable 
strife. Millions of miserable wretches must starve 
and bleed over the issue to determine which shall 
rule of two of the vilest specimens of the dominating 
class ignorance, superstition, deceit, and incestuous, 
idiot-breeding marriages can produce. Now and then 
the people make a noble stand for their deliverance, 
when as often France or England would come with 


armies and drive them into base obedience. There 
is revolution in 1854, after which a national junta is 
established. Isabel is deposed in 1868, and Amadeo, 
second son of Victor Emanuel of Italy, is elected 
king. After vainly striving to reconcile contending 
factions, in 1872 conies the Carlist war, and the fol 
lowing year Arnadeo abdicates, when a republic is 
proclaimed. The failure of its forces against the 
Carlists, however, brings round monarchy again in 
the person of Alfonso, Isabel's son, in 1875. 

Altogether this Fernando presents one of the most 
contemptible characters of history. "The conspirator 
of the escurial," he has been called, "the rebel of 
Aranjuez; the robber of his father's crown; the worm 
squirming at the feet of his enemy at Bayonne; the 
captive of Valenay, begging bits of colored ribbon from 
Napoleon while his people were pouring out their 
blood and gold to give him back his crown; the jailer 
of the illustrious statesman to whom he owed the 
restoration of that crown; the perjured villain who 
spontaneously engaged to be true to the constitution 
of 1812, and then conspired to overthrow it the day 
after he had sworn ; the promoter of anarchy during 
the three years of constitutional government; the in- 
voker of the Holy Alliance and the intervention of 
France; the author of innumerable proscriptions; the 
coarse voluptuary; Ferdinand leaves no memory but 
that of a man worthy of our profoundest scorn." 

Thus we have seen how at the beginning of the 
present century all Europe was at war. The most 
intelligent, civilized, and Christian nations of the 
earth were hotly engaged in such senseless quarrels 
as would make a savage smile; and for lack of any other 
method of settlement, like savages they were falling 
on each other to kill, burn, or otherwise damage and 
destroy as best they were able. France in particular 
was pouring out her best blood and treasure at the 
caprice of a despot whose paramount aspiration was 


self-aggrandizement, and whose exploits were destined 
to plunge her in deep abasement. Even the pope 
himself about that time had been upon the war-path, 
sending out his armies with fire and sword where words 
failed, and all greatly to his discomfiture and humili 

To the principle of evil in human affairs mankind 
owes much. To war, a great evil, a beastly arbitrament, 
but the only ultimate appeal yet found by man with 
all his wisdom, America owes much. To the silly 
strifes of European powers America owes more than 
to any butchering done by her own hands. It was due 
to this preoccupation, and to the weakness thence aris 
ing, rather than to any extraordinary display of wis 
dom, patriotism, or power on the part of the colonists, 
English or Spanish, that their independence was 

There are foolish wars, and there are necessary 
wars: foolish sometimes on both sides, always foolish 
on one side. Hundreds of wars there have been, and 
will be, which leave the combatants, after tearing each 
other like wolves for a time, exactly as at the outset. 
Resorting to war for freedom or the integrity of the 
nation is not the same as war for the arrangement of 
differences which after any amount of fighting can only 
be settled upon some basis of equity which has to be 
determined upon other principles than those of arms. 
It is better to fight than to be a slave. It is not well 
to fight simply for power or aggrandizement, since 
the issue is based on injustice, and is sure to be tran 
sient. It is not worth while to fight purely for the 
mastery, as it is foreordained that no man shall be 
master on this planet. 

The United States had finished the war which gave 
them their freedom; and were now busy trying to 
raise money, frame a constitution, and organize a gov 
ernment, while turning an honest penny by furnishing 
supplies to the combatants who were still destroying 


themselves in Europe. When England and France 
each pronounced the ports of the other closed against 
commerce, and the former persisted in claiming; a risrtit 

' L O O 

to search American vessels for deserters, the United 
States forbid the shipment of American products to 
Europe, and declared war against England. After 
indulging in some foolish fightingf, uncalled for and 

O O O *^ ' 

resulting in no adequate benefit, though attended with 
much misery and loss of life, commissioners met at 
Ghent and adjusted their differences, which might 
just as well have been done before the war as after. 

It has been the fashion, in various quarters, be 
cause the northern confederation of states has pros 
pered more and reached a higher plane of distinc 
tion and power than the united provinces of Mexico, 
unduly to extoll the founders of the former, and 
ridicule the pretensions to patriotism, intelligence, and 
skill on the part of those who fought for the deliv 
erance of the latter. It is pleasing to tell stories to 
children, and talk among ourselves of the superior 
courage and self-denying heroism of those who fought 
on our side in the dark days of American revolution, 
above those who fought against us; but it is a form 
of egotism in which I cannot indulge, unless the 
assertions conform to the facts of history, which in 
this instance they do not. Fortunately for the repu 
tation of our early heroes, their associates and subor 
dinates, our history is written by men of our own 
nation, primarily to feed our vanity; to accomplish 
which purpose that which is damaging to our side- 
in so far as is politic and practicable is toned down 
or omitted, while that which is damaging on the other 
side is emphasized and exaggerated, and vice versa. 
If we would know the truth, we should sometimes 
look fairly into the character and deeds of some who 
were not citizens or soldiers of the United States. 

Those who fought for our independence; those who 
suffered unrewarded and died unknown, as well as 
those whoes names are remembered and honored, and 


who live to-day in our hearts, deserve all praise. But 
that as a class they were superior to their opponents; 
that they were so greatly superior to those who fought 
for the same object in Mexico, as we have been taught 
to believe, is not true. Lecky, with many others, 
holds that they have been " very unduly extolled," and 
that " the general aspect of the American people dur 
ing the contest was far from heroic or sublime;" 
while Washington himself writes in 1778 that " idle 
ness, dissipation, and extravagance seem to have laid 
fast hold of most of them; that speculation, pecula 
tion, and an insatiable thirst for riches seem to have 
got the better of every other consideration, and al 
most every order of men." 

Let us then learn to omit some portion of our self- 
adulation in speaking of ourselves, some portion of our 
spread-eagle and Fourth-of-July buncombe and bom 
bast in speaking of our country, to practise a little less 
hypocrisy and humbug in our politics, to say nothing 
of bribery and other corruption which is quite rank 
enough in our republic to-day. 

Europe was bad enough, as we have seen, without 
any accentuation; monarchies were bad enough, the 
chief recommendation of the rulers being that they 
made no pretensions to honesty or piety, or rather 
made their piety to suit their honesty. And now 
with this showing of the influence from which the 
people of the New World determined to free them 
selves, I will proceed to show how it was done. 





WHEN the subjects of Spain in America awoke to 
a realization of their position, they found present no 
lack of reason for revolt. Almost every form of op 
pression that ever a people had been called to undergo 
at the hand of despotism they had suffered. The worst 
that had come to England's colonies we find among 
the mildest of Mexico's wrongs so mild, indeed, that 
they were scarcely felt amidst the others weightier. 

Hitherto, they had expected, as a matter of course, 
that the king of Spain would make such laws for his 
provinces as suited him. He was to his people al 
mighty power, differing in degree rather than in es 
sence from the power of the almighty, and they had 
learned to obey the one as the other. And if at the 
first there had been no more than the English colonies 
had to complain of such as the interposition of au 
thority between the people and laws of their making, 
dissolving or forbidding representative bodies, restrict- 



ing migration and population, regulating the admin 
istration of justice, creating and sustaining unnecessary 
officers, keeping among them standing armies, imposing 
taxes, interference in commerce, and other likejittb [ 
J-.hipcypu there might have been to this day no separa 
tion from the mother country, except, indeed, it had 
been the falling-in-pieces from natural decay. I say 
such was the feeling before revolution was thought of; 
after the people began to consider, then certain of 
these minor wrongs seemed exceedingly exasperating. 
But behind all these, if not indeed one with them, 
were more serious evils. Looking well into the causes 
of Spanish American revolt, we find there the full 
catalogue of wrongs and injustice common to political 
subordinations of this nature, and in addition some of 
the blackest crimes within the power of tyranny to 
encompass. What were such matters as duties per 
cent, free coming and going, sumptuary regulations, 
or even local laws and legislation beside intellectual 
slavery, the enforcement of superstition, the subordi 
nation of soul, the degradation of both the mental and 
spiritual in man! 

In regard to material impositions, probably one of 
the most outrageous as well as most absurd within 
the range of European colonization was that which de 
naturalized the son of the Spaniard born in America. 
What ridiculous nonsense for reasonable beings to act 
upon, not to say believe in, that the blood of him of 
pure Spanish parentage who first saw the light under 
the clear skies of the New World should thereby be I 
politically and socially debased ! Such was the royal : ( 
edict, and to the end that ajl in Mexico might the 
more and forever be bound body and soul to Spain. 
Thus while pretending to parental care, the Spanish 
monarchs would reduce the colonists to the position 
of serfs. 

In New Spain the first Creoles 1 were identified 

1 The dictionary definition of Creole is a native of Spanish America, born 
of European parents, or descended from European ancestors, as distinguished 


with the European Spaniards, and for several suc 
ceeding generations the ties of parentage prevailed 
over the distinctions of nationality. It has been 
claimed that even when these bonds of consanguinity 
were loosened by the ever increasing numbers of the 
Creole population and the divergence of interests, 
union between the two classes was still maintained 
as a security against insurrection of the native races. 
Indeed, Humboldt assigns this as a reason for the 
passive tolerance which the Spanish Americans ex 
hibited during a long period of oppression. 

But this was not all the reason ; it was not in fact 
the chief or true reason. It had become so ingrained 
in their nature, the doctrine of loyalty, obedience to 
rulers, the divinity of kings, that to repudiate in any 
wise this idea was to defy the power of the almighty, 
and bring deserved death and the pains of hell. It 
was sin against God to disobey the king; and this 
rather than fear of uprisings held Mexico so long in 
servility. While such a state of things lasted, the 
Spaniards in Spain could deprive the Spaniards in 
America or rather their descendants of their le^it- 


imate political status, and aggrieve their rights with 
impunity; but none the less in due time did European 
pride and disdain provoke irritation and bitter jeal 
ousy. A mutual antipathy was thus gradually de 
veloped an antipathy which was fostered by the ac 
tion of the home government; for though by theory 
and law the privileges of all subjects of the crown 
were equal, in practice it was far otherwise. 

Three prominent causes of disrupture were ever 
actively at w r ork engendering hatred and thirst for 
independence. They were, in the inverse order of ef 
fect, social jealousies, exclusion from preferments, and 
the odious system of commercial monopoly enjoyed 

from a resident inhabitant born in Europe, as well as from the offspring of 
mixed blood, as of mulatto, born of a negro mother, or of mestizo, born of 
an Indian mother. To this definition as regards Creole I adhere; but in re 
gard to the word 'mestizo,' I apply it generally to any intermixture of native 
American and European blood. 


by the Spaniards. With regard to the first, it is un 
necessary to enlarge upon what has been said in the 
previous volume; 2 but the question of political, mili 
tary, and ecclesiastical preferments requires considera 
tion, inasmuch as the exclusion of Creoles from them 
is as strenuously denied by the advocates of the Span 
ish faction as it is emphatically asserted by those of 
the creole class. Although the Spanish American 
was eligible to all offices, from the lowest to the vice 
regal dignity, the higher were almost exclusively filled 
by men from Spain; 3 and in spite of the asseverations 
to the contrary, 4 it cannot be denied that promotion 
to important positions was practically closed to Amer 
ican Spaniards. No stronger evidence can be found 
than in the opposition to American representation in 
the Spanish government, and the public expressions 
of scorn and odium heaped upon the race in the Cadiz 
periodicals of that time. 

The Spanish rulers were determined that New Spain 
should be ruled exclusively by Spaniards, howsoever 
the published policy of the nation might be affected 
thereby; and their opportunities of obtaining political 

2 Hist. Mex., vol. iii. 742-4, this series. See also Cancelada, Tel. Amer., 

3 Walton, the author of Present State of the Spanish Colonies, London, 1810, 
secretary to the expedition which captured the city of Santo Domingo from 
the French, and resident British agent there, in his Expose on the Dimensions 
of Spanish America, London, 1814, states, on page 47, 'that on examining au 
thentic records, it results: that from the period of the first settlement up to 
the year 1810, out of 166 viceroys and 588 captain-generals, governors, and 
presidents who have governed in Spanish America, in all 754, only 18 have 
been Creoles, and these few merely in consequence of their having been edu 
cated in Spain.' Only three viceroys of Mexico down to 1813 were Creoles. 
Alaman, Mej., i. 12. 

4 Torrente, Hist. Rev. Hispano-Amer., i. 72-4, quotes observations made 
by ' un Americano delsur,'who stoutly maintains the generosity 'de una 
nacion que fiaba a americanos los Vireinatos, Capitanias generates, Presiden- 
cias, Magistraturas, Arzobispados i Opispados;' and gives a list of European 
and American officials for the year 1811, in which he shows that 338 were of 
the latter class and only 76 of the former. He moreover enumerates the 
political, military, and ecclesiastical positions held by the Creoles during the 
same year. But I must remark that the appointments conferred upon Creoles 
at the commencement of the nineteenth century afford no criterion of the pro- 
portion which prevailed during the two preceding centuries. Spain felt her 
self compelled to open the doors of promotion in the hope of allaying the 
gathering storm. Cancelada, Td. Amer. , 265-73, argues that the Creoles were 
more favored than the Spaniards in the matter of appointments. 


preferments being so much greater than those of the 
Creoles, they succeeded in securing for themselves all 
the higher offices. It is true that the Americans occu 
pied most of the subaltern grades, but this only tended 
to bring them into more jealous competition with the 
Europeans by inspiring them to seek the more impor 
tant. Although in the ecclesiastical preferments they 
were more favored than in political and military mat 
ters, during the last century of the colonial period 
they were gradually excluded from the high dignities 
of the church; and in 1808 all the bishoprics in New 
Spain, with one exception, and most of the rich bene 
fices, were held by the European clergy. In the clois 
ters also of the regular orders there w r as the same want 
of fairness which even the alternative system failed 
to correct. Thus it was that as generation after gen 
eration passed away, not only in social communications 
but in public careers and professions, envy and jeal 
ousy became more marked, and finally developed into 
a deadly hatred between the two classes. 

But after all, and toward the end, though not the 
most iniquitous, it was the commercial monopolies 
which caused the most wide-spread discontent. The 
entire control of trade by Spanish merchants, and 
the exorbitant prices charged by them for every com 
modity, the grinding restrictions upon such indus 
tries as interfered with the commerce of the mother 
country, and the limited amount of productions re 
ceived by her, were more sweeping in effect, since all 
classes suffered, and the poor people the more severely. 
A bond of union to a greater or less extent was thus 
initiated between the Creoles, mestizos, and native 
Indians, all of whom at an early date exhibited incli 
nations to acquire independence. The Englishman, 
Thomas Gage, who was in Mexico in 1625, correctly 
estimated the prevailing sentiment, and in his obser 
vations about the disturbances during the administra 
tion of Gelves thus prophetically expresses himself: 
"The chief actors were found to be the Criolians or 


Natives of the Country, who do hate the Spanish 
Government, and all such as come from Spain; and 
reason they have for it, for by them they are much 
oppressed, as I have before observed, and are and will 
be always watching any opportunity to free them 
selves from the Spanish yoak." 5 

But apart from these main causes of discontent, 
other aggravations, permanent or periodical, excited 
a spirit of antagonism. Excessive taxation galled 
and irritated; the venality of officials and the cor 
ruptness of the judicial courts caused indignation; 
while the expulsion in 1767 of the Jesuits, who had 
ingratiated themselves in the hearts of the lower or 
ders, insulted the people in their dearest affections. 
From that time conspiracy arose and became wide 
spread; and the attempt at Apatzingan, prematurely 
undertaken, and abortive though it proved, opened 
the eyes of the Spanish rulers to the fact that ideas 
of independence were abroad in New Spain. The 
measures adopted to suppress such wickedness only 
added fuel to the fire. Disdaining the further sup 
port of the church, the government determined to 
rely on military force, and organizing the army on a 
much larger scale, humiliated in a variety of ways 
the clergy, who thus alienated became a powerful 
element in working out the independence. 

While the industries of the country were cramped, 
the masses were unaware of the extraordinary resources 
of New Spain; but when certain restrictions were 
removed by the home government, and the war with 
England at the close of the eighteenth century almost 
annihilated trade with the peninsula, great impulse 
was given to the development of internal resources 
and commerce with foreign nations. While belief in 
the necessity of dependence on Spain w r as thus being 
weakened, Humboldt opened their eyes to their re- 

5 New Survey, 145. He, moreover, states that the Indians and mulattos 
'brooked not the severe and rigorous justice and judgment of the Viceroy, 
no, nor any Government that was appointed over them from Spain.' Id., 142. 


sources, and set them further thinking of divorce 
ment. Again, the Creoles were more intelligent, 
better informed, and far more numerous than the blue- 
blooded Spaniards; in view of which we can only 
wonder that the people of Mexico remained in such 
humiliating subjection so long. The Spaniards in 
America and their children were even better educated 
than the Spaniards in Spain, and the higher their 
station and the more inflated their pride, the more 
their minds were filled with prejudice and ignorance. 
The establishment of the university at Mexico afforded 
facilities to the Creoles superior to any enjoyed by 
their fathers, who for the most part, exclusive of those 
holding high positions, were of inferior birth and 
breeding, and without title to the superiority claimed. 
Students and graduates in Mexico by no means con 
fined themselves to the narrow curriculum prescribed 
by the university, and the prohibited works of French 
philosophers, of political and moral writers, and espe 
cially of Rousseau, found their way of late into the 
country. Proletarian principles, and the detestation 
of oppression which they breathed, were absorbed 
with avidity, and stimulated the longing for free 
dom. The very danger incurred by the study of 
these books, and the secrecy with which of necessity 
they were perused, only served to intensify insurrec 
tionary ideas and provoke conspiracy. 6 The liberal 
principles thus acquired by the educated class were 
gradually infused into the ignorant. 

Nevertheless, it seems a little strange to us, to whom 
the doctrine of right of revolution has become so clear, 
and so cherished as the highest prerogative of liberty, 
that it should have made its way so slowly among an 
educated and intelligent people. But the cause is 

6 It was the special province of the inquisition to guard against the im 
portation of books. As late as 1807, a Mexican named Jos< Roxas was de 
nounced by his own mother for having a volume of Rousseau in his possession, 
and was confined for several years in the dungeons of the holy office. He 
finally made his escape, but died in 1811 at New Orleans. Ward's Mex., i. 


explained when we remember the powerful hold re 
ligion yet had upon these people. The first step 
toward freedom is to emancipate the mind from some 
of its superstitions. There can be no political liberty 
without some degree of religious liberty. It was 
primarily for religious liberty that the puritans had 
come from England to America; and the first step 
thus taken toward political liberty, they were prepared. 
to throw off the yoke for slighter cause than were the 
people of Mexico, who were satisfied with their relig 
ion, and had no desire to change it. Thus while their 
religion, still the strongest sentiment possessing them, 
constrained them to loyalty, they were ready to en 
dure much by way of duty, and to escape damnation 
so much that it was rather Spain's weakness than 
Mexico's strength that secured independence, as we 
shall in due time see. 

But gradually reason, long dormant if not dethroned, 
began to show signs of vitality, first in other quarters, 
and finally in Mexico. It was a period of political 
turnings and over-turnings in Europe and America, 
and it were a pity if Mexico, ground into the very 
dust by the iron heel of despotism, should not find 
some relief. 

The downfall of monarchy in France, and the in 
dependence of the British colonies in North America, 
had established precedents of the successful uprising of 
peoples against the oppression of rulers. More espe 
cially was the acquisition of freedom by the United 
States regarded as a solution of the difficulty in re 
gard to the right of revolution, as Spain in 1783 had 
somewhat imprudently recognized the independence 
of the English colonies, thereby tacitly excusing re 
volt in her own. 7 

7 The reader is already aware that the conde do Aranda at this time pro 
posed to Cdrlos III. the independence of the Spanish colonies in Amer 
ica. See Hist. Mex., iii. 388-90. Dr Luis Quixano, a prominent leader of 
the revolution in Quito, made prisoner when Toribio Montes entered that 
city, deemed it advisable to retract his views on the right of a colony to as 
sert its independence. He based his reconstructed argument on the principle 
that what is useful and convenient is not necessarily lawful and just. His ex- 


While the proclivities of the people were thus be 
coming daily more dangerous, their anger was still fur 
ther aroused by one of those acts of tyranny which 
Spain periodically committed in order to raise money in 
the colonies to meet home expenses. I refer to the se 
questration of the funds of the benevolent institu 
tions, a measure which seriously affected the welfare of 
almost every land owner in the country. As the 
particulars of this proceeding will be given later, it is 
only necessary to state here that numbers of families 
were ruined or impoverished by its operation. Thus 
Spain kept on using the goad. It is, however, a ques 
tion how long the Creoles would have suffered had 
not political affairs in Spain, as we have seen, afforded 
an exceptional opportunity for throwing off the yoke. 
For nearly two centuries the watchfulness of the gov 
ernment had prevented serious outbreak; even during 
the war of succession the tranquillity of New Spain 
was undisturbed. The majesty of the king was so 
deeply impressed upon the masses that it is probable, 
had it not been for the occupation of Spain by Na 
poleon, a few salutary reforms would have secured 
the loyalty of Mexico. But when two Spanish mon- 
archs in succession, Carlos IV. and Fernando VII., 
were compelled to lay aside their crowns, the one in 
obedience to the will of a mob and the other at the 
dictation of a foreign parvenu, the glory of the Span 
ish throne had departed, and the awe with which the 
greatest earthly potentate had been venerated by his 
transatlantic subjects was seriously lessened. 

Nevertheless, when in 1808 the Spaniards rose 
against the French invaders, the demonstrations of 
feeling throughout New Spain showed patriotism on 
the part of the Creoles, though perhaps as much by 

ceedingly defective logic went no further, however, than to show that an op 
pressed colony has no more right to free itself from the mother country than 
has a slave to acquire freedom without the consent of his owner! 'Annque a 
un esclavo le sea litil gozar de su libertad, el no se la puede tomar por si mis mo 
contra la voluntad de su amo.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. Indep., v. 


reason of hatred for the French as of any lingering 
affection for the Spaniards; and this, notwithstand 
ing that the American deputies to the Spanish 
cortes, in their address on the 1st of August, 1811, 
represented that the Spaniards of America were so 
closely connected with the peninsula by the ties of 
interest and relationship, that leading men among 
them proclaimed the doctrine that the colonies ought 
to follow the fate of Spain, even if she succumbed to 
the power of Napoleon. 8 Some go so far as to at 
tribute outright the outbreak of the revolution to 
the fear of subjection to the French. 9 Be this as it 
may, the repeated defeats of the Spanish arms during 
the following year, the incompetency of the junta 
central in the peninsula, and still more its popular 
origin, destroyed any favorable impression which 
might have been created in the discontented ranks, 
and afforded an example to them of delegates, elected 
by the people, investing themselves with the supreme 
government. Thus revolutionary impressions became 
yet more strongly confirmed; for the Creoles could not 
recognize the right of a mob-appointed government 
claiming obedience from the subjects of a mighty mon 
arch v. 


And during this period, so critical to the existence 
of Spain's future hold upon the colonies, there was no 
viceroy in Mexico capable of appreciating the true 
condition of affairs; none who had the ability either 
to avert revolution or best serve Spain in accepting 
the situation. The incompetency and vacillation of 
the next three viceroys hastened the culmination of 
events, and during the years 1809 and 1810, the con 
spiracy to throw off the yoke of Spain spread fast and 
far throughout the land. It was on the 15th of Sep- 

8 Such a course would certainly relieve them from the persecution of Spain, 
though neither covert irony nor hibernicism were intended. ' Muchos de los 
mismos gefes y otros Europeos proi'erian d las claras, que la America debia 
seguir la suerte de la Peninsula,- y obedecer d, Bonaparte, si ella le obedecia. ' 
JHpntac. Amer. Represent., 1 de Agosto de 1811, 6. 

9 Id., 8; Guerra, Hint. Rev. N. Esp., i. 138. 


tember of the year last named that the strife began, 
and which was marked by reprisals as vindictive and 
cold-blooded as the annals of any Christian nation can 
record, as we shall see. 10 With these preliminary re 
marks on the political attitudes of the two classes, 
and on the origin of their divergence, I now proceed 
to narrate the historical events which preceded the 
final rupture. 

The fifty-sixth viceroy of Mexico, Jose de Iturri- 
garay, arrived with his family at Guadalupe, and took 
charge of the government on the 4th of January, 
1803. He held the rank of lieutenant-general in the 
royal army, as had nearly all those who filled this 
office during the rule of the house of Bourbon in 
Spain. A veteran soldier and sexagenarian, he still 
retained a youthful energy and vigor. 11 

Iturrigaray was a native of Cadiz, descending from 
a genteel but not illustrious family. With an honor- 
able record in the Spanish militia, he had served with 
some distinction as a colonel of carabineers in the cam 
paign of Roussillon, at the beginning of the French 
revolution in 1792. His reputation, however, as a 
military commander was not of the best; 12 and his 
elevation to the viceregal office was due to the favor 
of Godoy, the Prince of Peace, who still maintained 
influence over the weak and incompetent king. 13 
His reception at Guadalupe and in the capital was, 

The same causes were at work in all the Spanish colonies in America; 
and it is significant to note the unanimity of the feeling entertained everywhere 
by the Creoles, as well as the synchronism of their start for the goal of free 
dom. In this same year five revolutions broke out in South America: that, 
of Caracas on April 19, 1810; that of Buenos Aires on the 25th of May fol 
lowing; that of New Granada on the 3d of July; that of Bogota on the 20th 
of the same month; that of Cartagena on the 18th of August; and that of 
Chile on the 18th of September. Diputac. Amer. Rep. y 181 1, 2-3. 

11 As a Mexican writer says, 'Con el arrebatamiento y fuego de un franco's 
atolondrado. ' Medidas, Pad/., MS., 57. 

12 'Hombre de una mediana reputacion militar en su patria.' Ellndicador, 
111. 215. Compare also Dispositions Farias, i. 120; Bmtamante, Caad. Hist., 
i. 10-11; Ratzd, Aus. Mex., 344-5; Gazcla Mvx., xi. 222-3. 

; 'No fuel-on estos me~ritos los que lo elevaron al vireinato, sino el favor 
deD. Manuel Godoy.' Ataman, Hist. Mcj., i. 40. Tavorecido del principe 
de la Paz.' El Indkador, iii. 215. 


unlike that of Marquina, most flattering and obse 
quious. The festivities, begun in the former place, 
were continued in the latter with the customary pro 
cessions and bull-fights. This unchecked privilege of 
the populace, in such agreeable contrast with the un 
welcome prohibitions of the former viceory, combined 
with the gracious deportment of Iturrigaray and the 
affable demeanor of his stately spouse, gained him at 
once the favor of the people. Erelong, however, it 
was discovered that his condescension was but a cloak 
to less worthy traits of character. 14 Branciforte's cor 
ruption was barefaced; dissimulation under a fasci 
nating exterior was the prominent feature in Iturri 
garay 's character. 15 

The family of the viceroy consisted of his wife, 
Dona Ines de Jauregui y Aristegui, who although 
no longer young possessed many attractions, a grown 
up son, several younger children, and a numerous 
train of relatives, all bent on amassing fortunes. 
This was also the dominating passion of Iturrigaray, 
whose first act on taking charge of the government 
was to defraud the crown. Following the example of 
Branciforte, he had obtained a royal decree before his 
departure from the peninsula, permitting him to in 
troduce free of duty into New Spain unfinished fam 
ily apparel. 16 Under this pretence he landed a cargo 
of merchandise at Vera Cruz, which he sold in that 
port, netting an enormous profit. 17 Moreover, he at 
once began a system of sale of offices and employments 
on his own account, and by an abominable venality 
established for his benefit an impost on quicksilver, 

11 The character of Iturrigaray was ' estremaclamente popular.' Zavala, 
Rev. Mex., 30. The populace was 'complacida con el trato afable y popular 
de la Vireina, senora de regular figura, y de un comportamiento airoso y 
galan. ' C'avo, Tres Siglos, iii. 200. 

15 'Su caracter estremadamente popular disimulabasus sordidas ganancias.' 
Zavala, Rev. Alex., 30; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 47. 

1G According to Real Ordcn, Sept. 12, 1802. 

17 The sale amounted to 119,125 pesos, as attested by Rcl., Real Acuerdo, 
Nov. 9, 1808, in Arch. Gen'l Mex. This fraud was the first of many serious 
charges proven against him in his residencia, of which an account will be 
given later. 


by which he unjustly secured to himself large sums 
from the sales of that metal. 18 

Other frauds were perpetrated in contracts for 
paper used in the government cigar manufactories, 
the contractors charging fictitious prices and paying a 
bonus to Dona Ines. 19 The administration of Iturri- 
garay was modelled after that of his protector, Godoy, 
and it was believed that the king's favorite shared in 
the profits. 

Sumptuous entertainments, presided over by Dona 
Ines, were given at the palace, with the twofold ob 
ject of pleasure and profit. Thither assembled grave 
oidores, hypocritical inquisitors, venerable prelates, 
and members of the most distinguished families, who, 
to win the good favor of their viceregal hostess, vied 
with one another in their efforts to please, and in the 
costliness of their gifts. 20 

Marquina never gained the affection of the people, 
because of his restrictions on all kinds of excesses. 
Iturrigaray would try the opposite course, and make 
the capital the centre of pleasure and dissipation. 
To the discredit caused by the venality of the father 
were added the profligacy and vulgar passion for play 
of his son Jose, who was a constant visitor to the 

18 He received generally a gold ounce per quintal of quicksilver delivered. 
Represent. Mm. Gnan., in Cancelada, Conducta Iturr., 92-5. Alaman states 
that the traffic in offices was managed through one of the vice-queen's maids, 
an^ elderly person, named Joaquina Aranguren, wife of Gabriel Palacios. 
Hist. Mej., i. 47. Some few miners, with whom a secret compact was made, 
were greatly favored, while the majority suffered for want of mercury, result 
ing in immense profits to the viceroy. These frauds are given in detail with 
attestation, in Uepresentacion, Dip. Mm. Guan., Oct. 31, 1808. Compare also 
Cancelada, Conducta, Iturrigaray, 92-5; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. app. 43-4. 

19 SSe justifica el robo que hizo al rei argandole un peso mas en cada resma, 
con las cuentas misrnas de los que lo vendieron, que existen en autos de 
infidencia/ Cancelada, Conducta, 11. This author also charges Iturrigaray 
with shipping surreptitiously many millions of treasure out of the country, in 
English and neutral ships. This was the popular belief, but no proofs were 
brought forward. Id., 11-12. From the two contracts of 1806 and 1807 the 
viceroy's wife received 6,633 ounces of gold. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 47. Con 
sult also Hernandez ?/ Ddvalos, Col. Doc. Indep., i. 643-4. 

;0 'Hacia descender la corte hasta sobre el teatro, 6 subia el teatro d la 
corte por la aficion que tenia d esta clase de diversiones. La conducta de la 
de Madrid bajo Maria Luisa, era el ejemplo que se seguia.' Zarala, llev. 
Mcx., 30; Ellndicador, iii. 216-17. 


cock-pit. 21 Sucli conduct on the part of the viceroy 
and his family, though fascinating at first, could not 
fail to produce the same effect as the over-scrupulous 
proceeding of his predecessor; the halo of royalty 
which had protected viceregal authority for centuries 
was dimmed, and the respect formerly offered to Casa- 
fuerte, Revilla Gigedo, and others was now with 
held. 22 

All the same the viceroy managed to accumulate a 
large fortune, consisting of coin, jewels, and plate, 23 
which was a great comfort, and this notwithstanding 
his extravagance and the enormous expenses of his 
court, which far exceeded his salary of sixty thou 
sand pesos. 24 

The desire to visit the rich mines of Guanajuato 
was obviously natural; he wished to see whence came 
the wealth he coveted. 25 Without precedent in this 
respect, and without royal permission, Iturrigaray set 
out on this journey by way of Queretaro, Celaya, 
Salamanca, and Irapuato. The inhabitants of these 
regions, who had never Beheld a viceroy, were over 
awed by the magnificence of his appearance, and 
thousands assembled to pay their respects. His 
arrival at the city of Guanajuato was celebrated by a 
triumphal procession and festivities. Among the 
presents graciously accepted by him was one of a 
thousand ounces of gold, upon the occasion of his 
inspection of the Ray as and Valenciana mines. 
Mining operators soon discovered how to gain the 

21 ' La inclinacion de aquel al juego de gallos, concurriendo d la plaza 
piiblica en que se lidian.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 48. 

22 The avarice of this vicergal family was one of the chief causes of their 
downfall. Dispositions Varias, i. 120; Bustamante, Medidas, MS., 57; Id., 
Cuarl. Hist., L 10-11; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 46-9; Mora, Rev. Mex., iii. 

"And 400,000 pesos invested in the funds of the mining institute, the 
safest place of investment at the time. Further on, after the removal of the 
viceroy, an account of the treasures found in the palace will be given. 

a4 According to the subsequent declaration under oath of his mayordomo, 
Antonio Paul. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 48. 

25 ' En la larga serie de los vireyes que tuvo Nueva Espana, 6ste fiie* el 
iinico que conocio una parte del interior del reino.' Negrete, Mex. en Siglo 
XIX., i. 49. 


favor of this great man. 23 In return for homage re 
ceived, Iturrigaray magnificently granted the town 
of Celaya the privilege to celebrate occasional bull 
fights to defray the expenses of a bridge over the 
Laja. 27 

In the matter of material improvements, we find 
little during this administration not started under 
former viceroys. There was the completion of two 
roads to Vera Cruz; one of them, passing through 
Orizaba and Cordova, begun by Branciforte, was in 
charge of the consulado. Credit, however, must be 
given Iturrigaray for his exertions to secure the cap 
ital against inundation. To inspire zeal, he deigned 
occasionally to labor on the works with his own hands, 
and by his care the city was saved from inundation in 
1806. Yet this praiseworthy caprice eventually gained 
for him the enmity of the fiscal de lo civil, Zagarzurieta, 
as well as of Aguirre and the other oidores. Funds 
being required to carry on the works, Iturrigaray in 
creased the impost on cattle, and to this Zagarzurieta 
raised objections, to which the viceroy would not listen ; 
because, he said, Zagarzurieta was connected with the 
family of the greatest cattle-dealer in the country, and 
therefore was not disinterested. 28 

Existing literary and benevolent institutions were 
favored to some extent, not, however, in a manner 
sufficiently effective to reflect unusual credit on the 
viceroy. Mining, internal commerce, and agriculture 

26 'A poco tiempo se advirtib que no le era desagraclable recibir dones y 
regalos, y sucesivamente cantidades de dinero y alhajas por las provisiones 
que se llamaban de gracia.' Cancdada, Conducta, Iturrigaray, 10. See also 
Pena, Arenga Civic., 19-20. It is gratifying to us to learn from Bustamante, 
in Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 204, that 'the presents then received by the viceroy 
relieved partly the great necessities in which he stood.' 

27 In connection with bull-fig lits, Bustamante takes occasion to slur Mar- 
quina, congratulating the people that the government had passed into the 
hands of a man 'accesible, jovial y divertido,' from the 'ttitrico y adusto de 
un hombre anciano, que merecia estar en una porteria de capuchinos.' Cavo, 
Tres Siglos, iii. 201. 

28 ' Porquo su hija estd casada con el primogenito del Marque's de S. Miguel 
de Aguayo, que es el primer ganadero y de los principales abastecedores de 
Mexico.' /</., 244-5. 


continued to prosper, owing to the efficient measures 
of his predecessors. An important event during this 
period, which marked a new era in medical science, 
but iu which Iturrigaray merely complied with the 
royal orders, was the introduction of vaccination into 
New Spain. 29 In the course of this history the ter 
rible ravages of small-pox at different periods have 
been dwelt upon. Tenner's discovery, after having 
met with long opposition on the part of the medical 
faculty, finally overcame the prejudices of the age. 
In 1801 its value was recognized by the government 
of Spain, and its introduction in America intrusted 
to Alejandro Arboleya, professor of medicine, who 
came over with Iturrigaray. His method of preserv 
ing vaccine matter, however, was defective, and its 
application was not successful till two years later, 
when the home government sent out a special com 
mission of medical men under Francisco Javier do 
Balmis. 80 They arrived at Vera Cruz in July 1804. 
Some months previously Iturrigaray had imported 
vaccine matter from Habapa, but found the prejudice 
against it so strong that only ten soldiers could be 
induced to use it. After the arrival of Balmis, how 
ever, the remedy was soon introduced throughout 
the country, when of course the horrors of smallpox 
were greatly diminished. 31 

29 Jenner, the discoverer, was a native of Berkeley, England ; he was born 
May 17, 1749, and died January 24, 1823. For his biography, see the excel 
lent work of Dr Baron, of Gloucester, 2 vols., 1827, 1838. 

30 He was honorary physician to the king and honorary counsellor of the 
treasury. The other members of the expedition were Antonio Gutierrez, 
professor of medicine and surgery, Angel Crespo, secretary of the commis 
sion, Francisco and Antonio Pastor, Pedro Ortega, Dona Isabel Cendal, and 
lastly, 26 infants from a foundling-house, on whose bodies vaccine matter was 
preserved during the voyage. Lerdo de Tfjada, Apunt. Hist., pt v. 342-4. 
This author received the particulars from two members, Gutierrez and 
Crespo. See also Ilumboldt, Essai Pol. The first child vaccinated was that 
of the viceroy. Alaman, l)isert., iii. app. 87; Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 207; 
lilvcra, Gob. de Alex, i., 522; Zamacoi*, Hist. Mcf., vi. 15. 

al Balmis extended his labors to Manila. Some of the commission went 
to South America, and one to Guatamala. The historical infants were 
reared at the expense of the government, and finally adopted by respectable 
families. Lerdo de Tejada, Apunt. Hist., pt v. 344; Cavo y Tres Stylos, iii. 


During this period great increase of material wealth 
is noticeable. After the last peace with England, 
Spanish commerce revived; in 1805 one hundred and 
fifty thousand quintals of quicksilver were transported 
from Vera Cruz to Mexico for the mines, and during 
the same year more than twenty-seven millions of 
pesos were coined at the mint. But this epoch of 
opulence was soon to be terminated by fatal disasters, 
marked by bloodshed and ruin. A series of calami 
ties, caused by foreign convulsions and misrule at 
home, was approaching Spain. 

The Spanish government, involved under Godoy's 
rule in political difficulties, corruption, and extrava 
gance, and harassed by the exorbitant demands of 
Napoleon, brought fresh discontent to the colonies by 
the adoption of a new method to draw from them the 
necessary funds to save the mother country from ruin. 
Spain's plight was desperate, and desperate must be 
the remedy, if, indeed, there was any. And woe in 
consequence must fall on Mexico! 

It was decreed by royal order of December 26, 
1804, to sequestrate all the real estate belonging 
to benevolent institutions, 32 chiefly under control of 
the clergy, including the sums, by far the greater 
part of their wealth, invested by them as loans on city 
and rural property, the mortgages on which had lapsed. 
The amounts collected were to be appropriated by the 
crown for the amortization of government bonds, the 
obligation being recognized by the payment of inter 
est. 83 Though in Spain similar measures had been 
adopted, 34 the attendant circumstances were different 
from those in Mexico. In the Old World most of the 
church property consisted of real estate, which being 
sold, the clergy received a perpetual income from the 

32 Obras pias, or funclaciones piadosas. 

33 The sums were to be applied to the 'Caja de consolidacion de vales 
reales,' with interest to the respective benevolent institutions at 3 per cent, 
payable from the royal revenues. Cedulario, MS., i. 179-97. 

34 According to Heal Cedufa, Oct. 15, ISOo, the amount of ecclesiastical 
property permitted by the pope to be sold under bull of June 14th of the 
same year was such as to yield in interest 020,000. 


government equal to the interest on the capital rep 
resented, while the purchasers were obliged to con 
tribute to the royal treasury by the payment of taxes. 

Throughout New Spain the accumulation and in 
vestments of the funds of these institutions had be 
come enormous. There was scarcely a land owner, 
great or small, whose estate was not hypothecated to 
one or another of the benevolent institutions. 35 The 
loan once effected, restitution of the capital was not 
demanded as long as the interest was punctually paid; 
nor did the debtors ever prepare for such an event, 
although most of the mortgages had lapsed. 36 The 
sudden demand for the payment of these sums carried 
consternation throughout the country, and brought 
ruin on many proprietors. For all to raise money 
on short notice was impossible; so the sale of the 
property had to be forced not alone what belonged 
directly to the church, but that of the farmer, the 
merchant, the miner, and the mechanic. Thereby all 
industries suffered, while in the end the crown was no 
gainer, since the ruin of property holders cut down 
the revenue. 

The execution of the decree was intrusted to a 
junta presided over by the viceroy, and composed of 
the principal civil and ecclesiastic authorities, and of 
special commissioners appointed by the crown. 37 In 
order to stimulate the zeal of these functionaries, and 
to make the sequestration more productive, they 
were allowed a percentage of the sales. 38 Such an 
incentive with such men as Iturrigaray left little hope 

35 The value of the real estate and the funds so invested of the obras pias 
in New Spain amounted in 1804 to $44,500,000. Humloldt, Essai Pol., ii. 
476. In Soc. Mex. Geog. Boletm, ii. 3.3-6, the most moderate calculation of 
the value is, in the archbishopric of Mexico $20,000,000, and in the eight 
bishoprics, $30,000,000. 

30 These- loans, made for the term of nine years, were at the expiration suf 
fered to continue in force at the option of the contracting parties. See Ala- 
man, Hist. Mej., i. 138. 

37 'Qui porte le titre de Junta superior de Real Hacienda.' Iluniboldt, 
Ewai Pol., ii. 476. 

38 See the royal order in Cedulario, MS., i. 179-97; also Humboldt. Essai 
Pol, ii. 47G-7; Alaman, IJixt. Mcj., i. 139; Not. de N. Esp., in Soc. Mex. 
Geofj. Boletin, ii. 35-6; Zamacois, Hist. Mcj., vi. 16-19. 


for the people; and great was the clamor among all 
classes, especially the clergy, who were far from satis 
fied with this enforced investment. 39 

Formal protests were made by many, 40 and the per 
nicious effect of the measure was duly set forth; but 
no notice was taken of this action by the authorities. 
To make matters worse, Iturrigaray received orders 
from Spain that while steps were being taken to ac 
complish the sequestration, all funds belonging to cor 
porations and communities, deposits of Indian tributes, 
the treasures lodged in sacred shrines, and even 
moneys designed to ransom prisoners should be ap 
propriated. "Peace has been preserved at the cost 
of millions!" was the cry; "so pay! pay!" But the 
clay was fast approaching when Spain's peace would be 
of small moment to Mexico. Never had royal license 
to fleece the colonists been more barefaced ; never had 
the robbery of a people by their rulers been more 
merciless or infamous. And after all, only about ten. 
millions of pesos were secured, when in 1809 the 
order was rescinded. 41 Of this sum twenty-four mill 
ion francs were delivered to Napoleon in May 1806, 
by Eugenio Izquierdo, Godoy's special agent at Paris, 42 
after a large amount had gone as commissions to royal 
officials in Mexico. 43 

39 ' La resistance fut si forte de la part des proprie" taires, que depuis le 
mois de Mai 1805 jusqu'au mois de Juin 1806, la caisse d'amortissement ne 
percevoit que la somme 1,200,000 piastres.' Humboldt, Essai Pol., 
ii. 477. 

"'One by the merchants and laborers of Michoacan, under the direction 
of Abad y Queipo, afterward bishop elect; and another by the mining board, 
headed by Miguel Dominguez, corregidor of Quertitaro, for which presump 
tion he was removed from office by the viceroy. Bustamante, in Cavo, Trcs 
Stylos, iii. 222-3. 

41 'Toda esta trapala,' says a marginal note on the c^dula in Cedulario, 
MS., i. 179-97, 'del malvado Godoy, Soler, y sus sequaces se suspemlio p r 
R 1 Ord n 26 de En de 1809, pero ya no remedio los estragos incal- 
culables y desastrosos que aquellos malvados y sus sequaces hicieron, con 
esta infame trapala, sin el mas minimo provecho del erario. ' See also Hum 
boldt, Essai Pol., ii. 476-7. 

42 Toreno, Hist. Rev. Esp.,tom i. lib. ii. 12. 

43 The sum produced by the sequestrations, according to Cancdada, Tel. 
Mex., 29, was $10,509,537. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 140, and Bustamante. in 
Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 250, give $10,656,000. 8oc. Mex. Geocj. Boletin,' ii. 
35-6, gives productos $10,507,957, and reditos $524,904 pesos. Of the com- 


The merciless rigor with which the viceroy executed 
every oppressive decree, and the irritating fact that 
he and a host of officials profited by the ruin of others, 
gained him the odium of the sufferers. Any discus 
sions of a scientific or practical nature on the part of 
her subjects was at this juncture bad for Spain. Per 
mission had been granted Humboldt by the court to 
visit the New World, with the privilege of access to 
official archives. The result of his sojourn in Mexico 
was his famous treatise on New Spain, 44 containing 
abstracts of his political and economical observations. 
Some new ideas crept in upon the people concerning 
possibilities. With freedom, what might they not 
achieve! Such was the prevailing feeling which, min 
gled with the odium against the home government, 
increased by late acts of oppression, prepared Creoles 
and natives alike for revolution. 45 

When Carlos IV. ratified the humiliating treaty of 
1796, which made him a subject rather than an ally 
of France, he considered neither the money he would 
have to pay, nor what would be the attitude of Eng 
land. To annoy Napoleon, Great Britain offered the 
means of prolonging the war which broke out in 1803, 
while Spain, asserting her obligations to pay France 
former subsidies, maintained that she would be sub 
ject to far greater expense in case of further hostili 
ties. This led to rupture with England; for though 
that power at first manifested no desire to declare 
open war with Spain, in 1805 neutrality was broken 

missions known to have been paid to officials, who at the same time drew 
large salaries, the diputado principal Arrangoiz received $124,000; Iturri- 
garay, $72,000; the archbishop Lizana, who, according to Bustamante, was 
not a favorite with the Mexicans since his arrival in December 1803, $22,00,0; 
ministers of the treasury, $50,000; the secretary, $40,000; and so on to the 
amount of half a million. Cancelada hurls invectives against all connected 
with this wholesale robbery. 

il Essai Politique sur le Royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne, Paris, 1811. For 
biographical notice, see Hist. Mcx., iii. 513, this series. 

45 'Este proyecto fud, sin duda, la primera Jornada de los desastres de la 
America la, insurreccion fue" la segunda.' Marginal note on royal cedilla, in 
Cedulario, MS., i. 179-97. 


by the seizure by Nelson of four treasure-laden ships 
bound from America to Cadiz. 46 

And now commerce again wanes, being carried on 
in neutral vessels only, while free intercourse with 
Spain is greatly interrupted. Moreover, besides be 
ing pressed by Napoleon for prompt compliance with 
the treaty of 1796, Spain is beset with calamities. 
Famine and pestilence are decimating her population; 
earthquakes destroy several towns in Andalusia ; debts 
are enormous, and the exchequer empty; and lastly, 
England has lately seized her treasure-ships, and will 
probably capture others. More and more urgent, 
therefore, are the appeals to the viceroy for Mexican 
silver and gold. 

Iturrigaray seems in every respect equal to the 
emergency. The colonists are made to bleed. From 
corporations, from the clergy, and from private indi 
viduals, thirteen millions of dollars are secured at 
this juncture, and shipped in four frigates, some five 
millions more being retained for later transportation. 
To make up this amount, he has not only seized any 
deposits, however sacred, he could lay his hands on, 
and forced money from the poor, but he has resorted 
to a swindling system of lotteries. 47 It is true that in 
the matter of forced loans promises to pay are made, 
and a small annual interest promised. 48 

The French just now are as much feared in New 
Spain as the English. French ships anchored at 
Yera Cruz are jealously watched by the viceroy, who 
refuses to furnish supplies to French troops stationed 
at Santo Domingo. 

Difficulties, moreover, threaten with the United 

46 The vessels were seized in reprisal for the assistance alleged by England 
to have been rendered by Spain to France during the war; more subsidies 
having been paid the latter than those stipulated for in the treaty of 1796. 
Bustcimante, in Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 209. 

47 See Gaz. de Mex., from 1804 to 1810, passim. 

48 The viceroy was admonished, however, to come to some understanding 
with the archbishop and bishop, so as not to impede the process by preju 
dicial disputes with the clergy. This accounts for the $22,000 commissions 
to Lizana. See Cancelada, Tel. Mex., 29. 


States. In 1801 Philip Nolan makes an incursion 
into Mexican territory as far as Nuevo Santander, 
under the pretext of purchasing horses, and erects 
some small forts. He is, however, attacked on the 21st 
of March by a force sent against him by the viceroy, 
and slain, his followers being dispersed or made pris 
oners. A few years later Burr attempts the invasion 
of Texas. During this period the first cloud arises 
between the United States and Mexico on the ques 
tion of limits. Monroe's efforts at Madrid to arrange 
an amicable settlement are fruitless, and the Amer 
ican government orders troops to her southern fron 
tier. 49 

Having thus the United States to watch, the long 
coast lines to guard against the English, and the ever- 
present pirates to beat off, Iturrigaray is like a hyena 
at bay. It is no easy matter amidst the dissatisfaction 
attending the royal robberies to enlist the colonists to 
fight. Of what avail is this pouring-out of their treas 
ure if the old mother cannot protect them from her 

It is in 1805 when the news of this rupture of Spain 
with England reaches Mexico, and spreads consterna 
tion among the people. Besides orders to prepare for 

49 Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 145-6. In 1805 James Monroe, U. S. minister at 
London, and Mr Pinckney, minister at Madrid, failed to agree with the Prince 
of Peace as to the limits of Louisiana, Texas, and Florida; the relations be 
tween the two countries assumed a delicate nature, and Monroe asked for his 
passport and returned to London. Consult Amer. State Pap., xii. 1-327; ii. 
596-695, 798-804. On the feeling at this time in New Spain against the 
United States, I quote from the irascible Bustamante, who, in connection with 
the viceroy's military prepai-ations, thus gives vent to his ire: ' Esta nacion, 
si puede darsele tal nombre a un erijambre espesisimo de aventureros, emigra- 
dos de la Europa por la miseria 6 por sus crimenes, presenta la anomalia mas 
extraiia y ridicula en la historia.' 'She proclaimed,' the author continues, 
' the freedom of nations; developed the theories of Rousseau's social contract, 
which was followed by France and cost torrents of blood,' winding up with a 
pious exhortation against American slave-holders. See Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 
217-1 8. Rivera, Gobernantes, i. 525-6, limits himself to stamping the claims of 
the U. S. against New Spain as 'el colmo de la injusticia y de exhorbitantes 
pretensiones, hijas de la ambicion . . . inicua . . . absurda.' Of what the Spanish 
population in Mexico consisted at the time, a contemporary of Bustamante 
gives, us an idea in El Indicador, iii. 216-17: 'Unos hombres semi-salvages, 
como los espanoles avecindados en el pais, que nacidos los mas en su patria, 
en una condicion muy obscura, apenas habian podido medio civilizarse eu 
Nueva Espaiia ' 



defence, the viceroy is told to furnish Habana, Puerto 
Rico, and other exposed points with the necessary 
supplies. He is moreover authorized to increase the 
permanent forces by enlisting natives for service on 
the frontier, the veteran troops not being sufficient 
for that purpose. Two Spanish regiments stationed 
in Cuba are also ordered to Mexico. 

But the viceroy is more clever than his master. 
Notwithstanding the many difficulties in the organi 
zation of troops, he soon has nearly 18,000 men at 
his command. 50 Recruiting offices are established 
throughout the country; deserters are pardoned; the 
old militia, scattered or disbanded, are reunited and 
increased in number. The defences of San Juan de 
Ulua, where Lieutenant-colonel Juan Maria Soto is 
in command, are improved. To discipline the troops 
a camp is established at Jalapa. Command of the 
army is given to Garcia Davila, governor of Vera 
Cruz, efficient and experienced. Indeed, he is the 
only officer of rank in New Spain competent to fill 
the place. There are two other generals, Pedro Ruiz 
Davalos and Pedro Garibay, but both octogenarians 
and subject to consequent infirmities. 

The troops are exercised and drilled under the eye 
of the viceroy. There are reviews and manoeuvres 
which awaken a military spirit in the Mexicans, who 
have never before witnessed spectacles of the kind. 51 

In 1806 intelligence of two events is received 
which spreads alarm throughout the country the 
destruction of the combined Spanish and French 

50 Bustamante says 1 8,000 well disciplined troops. Medidas para la Pacif. , 
MS., 58. Queipo, in Pap. Far., 164, no. i., states that there were stationed 
in the canton of Jalapa, serving under the viceroy's orders, 11,000 men, and 
that there were 6,000 more elsewhere ready to march when called upon. 
Alaman gives the number as ' cosa de catorce mil hombres' in the year 1800. 
Hist. Mej., i. 146. 

61 Mex. Mem. Guerra, 10. On October 14, 1805, the spectacle of troops 
being landed and engaging in sham-fight with the enemy was witnessed by 
the inhabitants of Vera Cruz, the viceroy displaying great enthusiasm, taking 
part in the exhibition. 'No pudo el ingenio militar de Su Escia olvidar su 
aficion, y montando a caballo mando por esquadrones varies rnovimientos de 
exercicio a los lanceros.' Diario de Mex., i. 92. 


fleets at Trafalgar by Lord Nelson on the 21st of 
October, 1805, 52 and the attack on Buenos Aires by 
the English. It is thought that an attempt will 
presently be made on New Spain. Iturrigaray's 
friends begin to fall off. Several officers of high 
rank and merit withdraw from the encampment at 
Jalapa, among others Count Alcaraz, of the Spanish 
dragoons, Manuel Garcia Alonso, Manuel Garcia 
Queritana, and Lejarza, all commanders of high stand 
ing. He who becomes the most determined enemy, 
however, is the ex-corregidor of Queretaro, Miguel 
Dominguez. 53 

Meanwhile the star of Godoy, the scourge of Spain, 
is still in the ascendant. He puts on the titles 
of royalty, and holds compiunion with Napoleon, if 
indeed he does not conspire to sell Spain. At one 
time, all the strongholds of the peninsula being occu 
pied by French, Godoy advises the king to take his 
family to Mexico. The court is at Aranjuez, and the 
intended flight becoming known, the populace rise and 
cry vengeance on Godoy. The tumult is only allayed 
by the abdication of Carlos in favor of the prince of 
Asturias, who assumes the crown as Fernando VII. 
on the 19th of March, 1808. Godoy escapes popular 
fury by secreting himself, 54 but his house and those of 
his satellites are stripped, and everything in them is 

52 A subscription for the relief of the widows and orphans of those who 
fell in the engagement was raised in Mexico. The amount contributed up 
to Sept. 30, 1807, was 31,235 pesos. Gaz. Mex., xiii. xiv. xv., passim, and xvi. 

53 Dominguez was afterward reinstalled in his office by order of the king, 
dated September 11, 1807. Bustamante, in Cavo, Tres Stylos, iii. 223. When 
Iturrigaray's residencia was taken he was condemned to indemnify Domin 
guez for loss of salary, and pay him danos y perjuicios. This was not dona 
till 1824, when on Iturrigaray's death his heirs, after contesting the case in 
the courts, were compelled to pay 12,000 pesos to Dominguez. Alaman. Hist. 
Mej., i. 265-7. 

54 ' Fu6 confundido por la debil voz de un anciano Ministro. Ved aqui el tray- 
dor; el pueblo pide su cabeza: dijo Caballero 4 Carlos IV. seiialando a Godoy; 
y este cobarde como si oyera el estampido de un trueno, calla, teme, huye, y 
temblando se oculta del Cielo y de la tierra. Asi permanece dos dias ator- 
mentado de la sed, del hambre, por las imprecaciones de los hombres, y loa 
remordimientos de su consciencia. ' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., v. 841. 


delivered to the authorities. The fallen Prince of 
Peace is afterward placed under arrest by Fernando 
and his ill-gotten property confiscated. 

The downfall of Godoy was hailed in New Spain 
with universal satisfaction. Spaniards and Creoles 
were equally demonstrative in their loyalty to the 
king, confident that any change in the government 
which excluded the influence of Godoy must be for 
the better. On the arrival of the news of the abdi 
cation of Carlos and the decrees of Fernando/ 5 Iturri- 
garay was attending the cock-fights at San Agustin 
de las Cuevas, now Tlalpan, where the festivities of 
pentecost were being celebrated. He commanded 
the decrees ^to be read, and then went on with the 
games. Dona Ines was disgusted over the abdica 
tion, and the regidor Azcrate displayed his contempt 
by flinging aside the journal containing the news. 53 

The festivities at Tlalpan continued for three days, 
and not until they were concluded did the viceroy 
give orders for a public demonstration in honor of 
Fernando VII. This manifest indifference, which 
did not fail to create much bad feeling, was in truth 
owing to the fall of Godoy, his protector, and some 
began to suspect treasonable designs. 

On the 23d of June the departure of the royal 
family to Bayonne and the abdication of Fernando 
were known in Mexico. 57 Then my lord Iturriga- 
ray wore a pleasant countenance, and he was over- 

55 The abdication of Carlos IV. and accession of Fernando VII. were pub 
lished on the 9th of June, 1808, by an extra issue of the Gaz, de Me.x. t q. v. 

5G Cancelada, who was present during the occurrences at San Agustin de 
las Cuevas, says, in Iturrirjaray, Conducta, 14: 'La vireina, oida la abdica- 
cion y suerte del ex-principe de la Paz, dixo: Nos han puesto la ceniza en la 
f rente; y el regidor Azcarate al llegar con la lectura a los decretos del Senor 
Don Fernando VII. tir6 la gazeta con desprecio en ademan de quererla pisar.' 
Xegrete maintains that there is no proof of these assertions, although both 
Bustamante and Alaman accept them as true. They emanated, he says, 
from the statements of Cancelada, a bitter enemy of the viceroy, and should 
not be received as historical. Mex. Siglo XIX. , i. 78. 

57 The intelligence was brought by the ship Corza, which anchored in the 
harbor of Vera Cruz on the 21st of June. Gaz. de Mex., 1808, 424; Cancelada, 
Conducta, 15-16. Negrete commits an error in stating that this was theoccasion 
when Iturrigaray received the news of Fernanclo's accession to the throne while 
diverting himself in the cockpit. Mex. Siglo XIX., i. G9. 


heard to say that the king would never return to the 
throne. 58 

These tidings of the dethronement of the royal 
family, and the assumption of the crown by Joseph 
Bonaparte, arrived in the midst of preparations for 
the solemn festivities to be held on the occasion of 
swearing allegiance to the young monarch. The im 
pression which these events created in Mexico was at 
first painful. Creoles as well as Spaniards hated the 
French. Napoleon was their arch-enemy. They 
swore they would never be ruled by him, or any of 
his creatures. On the 14th of July, the viceroy re 
ceived copies of the Madrid official gazettes confirming 
the news, and on the following day he convoked a 
council of the real acuerdo, at which it was resolved 
neither to obey the decrees of Murat, then command 
ing at Madrid, nor those of any government other 
than that of the legitimate sovereign. 59 The official 

O O 

portions of the Madrid gazettes were, moreover, or 
dered to be published. 60 

But the first surprise over, very different and ve 
hement feelings began to spring up among the people. 
Their ideas were confounded at the possibility of being 
without a king. Those who had hitherto regarded a 
monarch as an infallible personage remembered the 
fate of Louis XVI., and beheld with consternation the 
sudden removal of their own kings, father and son. 
That a mob of his own subjects should effect the down- 

58 * Los oidores creyeron ver en esta vez en el semblante del virey pintado 
la alegria, y que se complacia en decir que el Hey no volveria al trono. ' Cavo, 
Tres &V//O.S-, iii. 227. This conduct and the occurrence at Tlalpan were sub 
sequently brought forward in the accusations of treason against the viceroy. 
Compare Cancelada, Conducta Jturr. , 15-16. 

69 The revisor Oidor Aguirre added the words: 'Que S. E. y el real Acuerdo 
estaban penetrados de unos mismos nobles y leales sentimientos. ' These Itur- 
rigaray tore off, objecting to their publication. Cancelada, Conducta Iturr., 
18-19; Verdad Sabida, 19. This action of the viceroy was considered by his 
enemies as a mark of disloyalty. The Verdad Sabida of Cancelada is severely 
criticised and the statements it contains denied by Lizarza in his Discurso vin- 
dicando Iturrigaray. For his reply on the above question, see p. 16. Much 
sympathy for Fernando was shown by the citizens of Mexico. Guerra, Rev. 
N. E*p., i. 3-18. 

60 They appeared on the 16th of July in the Gaz. de Mex.< 1808, xv. 465- 


fall of Carlos IV. was not likely to maintain that faith 
in the high majesty of the Spanish sovereigns which 
for ages it had been impious to hold in doubt. Re 
spect for monarchy was weakened, and the more re 
flective and enlightened recognized with satisfaction 
that these convulsions would augment the possibilities 
of independence for New Spain. The holy inquisition 
still maintained its power, and indeed we find it at 
this period more zealous than ever in attempting to 
stifle the progress of the age. Libertinism and im 
piety, as it was called, 61 were so great, that there were 
over a thousand cases pending before that tribunal. 62 
One of the victims of an auto de fe at this time was 
the presbyter Juan Antonio Olavarrieta, curate of 
Axuchitlan. In his possession was found a work writ 
ten by himself, entitled Man and Beast. On the fron 
tispiece was a representation of a tyrant king. The 
author had come well recommended from Spain to the 
chief inquisitor, Bernardo de Prado y Obejero,and great 
was the scandal. The auto was celebrated with more 
than ordinary solemnity in the presence of the secular 
and ecclesiastical authorities, the nobility, and principal 
persons of the city. Olavarrieta was sentenced and 
shipped to Spain, but managed to escape during the 
voyage. Soon after this the same ceremonies were re 
peated on the person of Jose Rojas, professor of math 
ematics in the college at Guanajuato. A man of ex 
traordinary talents and great learning, 63 he possessed 
but little knowledge of the world. Carrying on a corre 
spondence on philosophical and theological topics with 
a woman at Guanajuato, he was denounced by her and 
imprisoned. After sentence by the holy office, Hojas 
escaped to New Orleans. There he published in 
flammatory proclamations against the Spanish gov- 

u ltttrrigaray, in Carta dCaballero; Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 208. 

62 Bustamante remarks that a great number of these cases must have been 
of a political nature, 'pues este tribunal era el brazo derecho del despotismo.' 

63 ' Y de una memoria tan feliz, que aprendio literalmente las priucipales 
actuaciones de su causa, con solo habeiios oido leer.' Id., 207-8. 


eminent, which being clandestinely introduced into 
Mexico caused no little annoyance to the political 
authorities and the inquisition. This institution con 
sisted at the time of thirty-one officers, exclusive of a 
multitude of secret agents and spies, and their labors 
were so arduous and important that the inquisitors pe 
titioned for an increase of salary on that ground. 
Such was the powerful array of zealots, ever on the 
alert to persecute those whose religious and political 
views dared to pass the bounds prescribed by church 
and state. 

The deplorable condition of the press was another 
proof of the incessant endeavors on the part of the 
authorities to keep the people in intellectual bondage. 
It was not w r ell for subjects of Spain to know too 
much of what was going on in the world. Four daily 
papers appeared in Vera Cruz between 1804 and 1807; 
three of them were soon discontinued, and the other 
was prohibited from publishing any political news from 
foreign countries, that being a privilege granted only 
to the Gazeta de Mexico. 64 " In 1805 the Mexican writer 
Carlos Maria Bustamante, and the alcalde del crimen 
Jacobo de Villa Urrutia, established the Diario de 
Mexico with .but little better success. Being sup 
pressed at one time, this periodical was allowed to ap 
pear again only on condition that it should be subject 
to the personal revision of the viceroy. 

64 ' Escepto en casos muy estraordinarios, para no perjudicar a la Oaceta 
de Mexico, que era la que tenia el privilegio de publicarlas. ' Lerdo de Tejada, 
Apunt. Hist., pt v. 344. The editor of this gazette was Juan Lopez Cance- 
lada, author of several philippics against Iturrigaray, and whom Bustamante 
calls an 'espafiol irrequieto, atrevido y charlatan, que habia insultado al Virey.' 
Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 215. 





THUS stand matters in Mexico in 1808. The times 
are out of joint. Tradition is failing. Old maxims 
no longer hold good. The minds of men are dimmed 
by the dust arising from the clash and clatter of events. 
Born in ignorance; cradled amidst the occult forces of 
nature ; looking along the centuries for that power and 
protection from the creature found only in the creator 
it has taken all these thousands of years for man to 
find out his mistake, to find out that all men come into 
the world on terms of equality,^ that no man or class 
of men are born almighty, either by virtue of blood, 
inheritance, occupation, or wealth, and that all have 
equal rights. 

At length the time has come. All the world is 
astir, and Mexico must be moving. Three centuries 
back there had been a grand awakening, one of those 
spasms of progress in which intellect is wont to disiri- 
thrall itself; now there is at hand another. Half the 



world are in arms. The few are fighting to be mas 
ter; the many are struggling to be free. The result 
is predetermined. 

In Mexico opinion is becoming somewhat clarified; 
ideas are coalescing and action concentrating, particu 
larly in the capital. And yet all is dim and indistinct 
enough. The leaven of liberty is- working; but be 
ware the fangs of superstition, beware the sword of 
Spain, beware the dungeons of the inquisition and 
tortures beyond the grave ! And where shall be found 
a leader? Here is opportunity; where is the man? 

Perhaps through Iturrigaray's brain run ambitious 
dreams. As likely there as anywhere. He is none 
too good to play the part of traitor to his king; though 
if successful revolution makes of him a thing for popu 
lar worship, he is indeed in a dilemma, for nature has 
not endowed him with one spark of nobility or patri 
otism. Most justly upon the head of this vile repre 
sentative of a vile monarchy has fallen the curse of the 
colonists. He and his associates, like their master, 
have made themselves rich over the ruin of the most 
industrious and worthy of Spain's subjects. Yet he 
may be deemed useful. A bad man is sometimes 
better for the furtherance even of a good cause than 
a good man. But Iturrigaray is a coward and a 
hypocrite a man not the best either for traitor or 
patriot. He has no thought of self-sacrifice; on the 
contrary, should he perchance make Mexico free, he 
must be well paid for it. Mexico may be freed from 
France, from Spain perchance; but not from him, not 
from Spain's officials. If he can save Mexico to 
Spain, of course Fernando, or whoever may be at 
Madrid to draw and spend the revenues, will remem 
ber it. So day after day this dog waits to see which 
way the French cat will jump. 

When the intelligence reaches Mexico that the 
Spanish crown has slipped from the fingers of Span 
ish kings, it seems to the people as if the earth was 
loosened from its orbit. Groups of anxious men, 


greatly concerned about their fate, gather in the 
streets and discuss the situation. Public meetings 
a rare occurrence in that quarter begin frequently 
to be held, at which much is said and nothing done. 
Placards are posted by the several factions of city 
government, cautiously hinting their own views, or 
feeling for the views of others. There is manifest 
every phase of feeling from loyalty, wholly or partially, 
to independence, wholly or partially. Pasquinades 
are sent to high officials, and some even propose a 
crown for Iturrigaray. 1 

On the 19th of July, at the suggestion of the regi- 
dor Azcarate, the municipal authorities presented to 
the viceroy a memorial, 2 claiming that as the throne 
of Spain was not occupied by the lawful sovereign, 
the government devolved upon the people, and that 
the city of Mexico, as the metropolis and representa 
tive of all New Spain, would sustain the rights of the 
deposed house. The address concluded with the 
request that the viceroy would assume provisionally 
the government of the kingdom, and that he would 
surrender it neither to any foreign power, nor to 
Spain herself while under foreign rule; and that he 
would not receive any other viceroy or accept a new 
appointment from the usurping power. 3 

1 On the 9th of August the consulado of Mexico addressed a petition to 
Iturrigaray requesting him to adopt measures for the suppression of these 
seditious demonstrations. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 511. 

2 "Bajo de mazas y en coches.' Bustamante, Suplemento, in Cavo, Tres 
Siglos, iii. 228. 

3 ' Pidiendose al Exmo. Senor Virrey que interin llega el momento felis de 
que saiga de Francia S. M. y Altesas, 6 el Reyno elije persona de la Keal 
familia para que lo mande y govierne como su Key y Senor natural, permanesca 
de Virrey Gobernador y Capitan General de esta Nueva Espafia, entendien- 
dose con la calidad de provicional, sin poderlo entregar a Potencia alguna 
extrangera, ni a la misma Espana aun quando para ello se le presenter, ordenes 
o del Serior Carlos quarto 6 del Principe de Asturias bajo la deriominacion tie 
Fernando Septimo antes de salir de Espana,. . .que no entregue tampoco el 
Virreynato y Govierno del Reyno a ningun Virrey que hayan iiombrado el 
inismo Sefior Carlos quarto 6 Principe de Asturias: . . .Que aun quando S. E. 
inismo sea continuado en el Virreynato por Real orden de S. M. 6 de Prin 
cipe de Asturias. . .no la obedesca ni cumpla, sino que continue encargado 
provicionalmente en el mando del Reyno.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. 
i. 477-8. Such were the expressions contained in the address of the ayunta- 


Iturrigaray received the address graciously, affirm 
ing that he would shed the last drop of his blood in 
the protection of the country, and that he was ready 
to take the oath of loyalty. 4 A crowd had gathered, 
for all was done openly, and when the viceroy dis 
missed the regidores the people shouted, and among 
them largess was liberally flung by supporters of the 
project. The audiencia did not like it, and their wrath 
waxed hot when, during the day, Iturrigaray laid the 
address before the real acuerdo and asked their vote 
upon the matter. 5 The ayuntamiento was presump 
tuous; further, the members were mostly Creoles. So 
the audiencia rejected the proposition, as contrary to 
law and the public weal, 6 thereby bringing chagrin 
upon Iturrigaray, who of course regarded with favor 
a change which would have secured him in power, 
whatever turn affairs might take. 7 

As nearly as we can interpret ideas so vague as 
were these in the minds of those who held them, 
the several shades of opinion, of inclination, hope, 
fantasy, were somewhat as follows : The viceroy 

miento to the viceroy, the whole of which interesting document is supplied 
by Davalos, who expresses his thanks to Jose' Maria Andrade for his kindness 
in furnishing him with a copy of it. 

4 ' Termin6 pues esta escena, en la que todo estaba convenido, de antema,no 
entre el virey y Azcarate.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 170. 

5 Copy of note to the real acuerdo will be found in Hernandez y Davalos, 
CoL Doc., i. 486. 

6 In the reply of the real acuerdo, these words are used: 'Aquel nombra- 
miento provisional y juramento, debilitarian mas bien que afirmarian aquellos 
sagrados inalterables vinculos y constituirian un gobierno precario expuesto 
a variaciones, y tal vez d, caprichos ahora 6 en lo venidero, y por tanto seria 
ademas de ilegal, impolftico este paso.' The viceroy is advised .to assure the 
ayuntamiento 'que cuando convenga y nos hallemos en circunstancias que lo 
eidjan, no se desentenderci V. E. ni este Real Acuerdo de convocar 6 al cuerpo 
entero 6 a sus representantes. ' Hernandez y Davalos, CoL Doc., i. 487, 

7 On the occasion of the ayuntamiento having sent two commissioners to 
the viceroy a few days afterward, one, the marque's de Uluapa, as affirmed by 
the alcalde Fagoaga, reported to the corporation that he had protested to the 
viceroy 'que el ayuntamiento no descansaria hasta colocarlo sobre el trono.' 
Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 173. A short time later, in the disposal of civil and 
military positions Iturrigaray's assumption of prerogatives never before exer 
cised by any viceroy caused grov/ling. 'Tales disposiciones se citaban como 
ejemplares del poder soberano que empezaba d ejcrcer el virey y como esca- 
lones para el trono a que intentaba subir.' Id., 233-4. Jose" Lnis Alconedo, 
a silversmith, was charged with making a crown for Iturrigaray's coronation. 
Id., 295. Guerra disbelieves in Iturrigaray's aspirations to a throne. Hist, 
fav. N. Esp., i. 70. 


thought that almost any change would be beneficial 
to him so long as he remained at the head of affairs. 


If the people desired him to hold the country for 
Spain well; Spain would hardly object to that. If 
France was to rule, then he could be for France par 
ticularly if Godoy was on good terms with Napoleon. 
And even if New Spain broke into full rebellion, de 
clared absolute independence, and he could be their 
king or president why, that would be well too; and 
if afterward France or Spain should prove too much 
for Mexico, then he had only done his best for 
France or Spain. 

The audiencia, the church, the inquisition, all sus 
pected the viceroy, and regarded with contempt the 
ayuntamiento. If there was to be a change, each of 
these powers desired to be at the head; they were 
each determined at the least not to lose what influ 
ence they had, and to gain as much more as possible. 
In regard to the people, the military, officers of the 
government, ecclesiastics, and the rest, there was 
held every phase of ideas. The sympathies of some 
were with Fernando; many prided themselves in 
their loyalty to Spain; all hated France; the bolder 
dreamed of actual independence. The Creoles and 
the viceroy acted together in favor of a national con 
gress, but for widely different ends: the former being 
for the liberty of the nation, the latter for personal 
aggrandizement. One looked to the representative 
body as the first movement toward securing that 
quality of self-government so lately secured by the 
United States ; the other regarded it only as an agent 
to do him service perhaps to place upon his head a 
crown, either in his own name or in the name of Spain. 

Out of these several phases of opinion arose several 
factions. But the two great final divisions, of course, 
were the royalists, who would have America always 
ruled by Europe, and the independents, who would 
have America always free. In the main, the Span 
iards in America belonged to the former faction, and 


tlie Creoles to the latter. Yet, when it came to im 
portant ecclesiastical, political, or commercial bodies, 
whose pecuniary or other interests were paramount 
to those of birth and blood, this distinction did not 
hold good. Thus it was that at each step in march 
ing events, new issues divided anew people and opin 
ion; and so matters progressed until principles and 
positions could be more defined. 

The feeling between the audiencia and the ayunta- 
miento increasing, Iturrigaray threatened to resign; 
but he was easily dissuaded by his friends. Peace 
was not restored, however, and finally the alcalde de 
corte, Villa Urrutia, suggested that, the infante Don 
Pedro be invited to assume the government as regent. 
This proposal did not, however, meet with approval, 
whereupon he proposed to call a representative junta 
of the kingdom, the supreme authority remaining 
with the viceroy when necessary. The audiencia re 
jected this proposition also. But Urrutia's scheme 
was submitted to the authorities of several places, and 
was not unfavorably received. Even the ayunta- 
mierito of Vera Cruz, whose members and policy were 
almost wholly European, saw no objection to it; while 
the authorities of Jalapa and Queretaro expressed 
their willingness to send deputies at once to the pro 
posed congress. 

Meanwhile a vessel had arrived at Vera Cruz, with 
information that Spain had risen against Napoleon. 
The news reached the capital on the night of the 28th 
of July, and at daylight guns were fired, bells were 
rung, and all was joy. The enthusiasm was universal, 
for Napoleon was much hated, as I have said. 8 Alle- 

8 To illustrate the detestation in which Napoleon was held, it will be suffi 
cient to quote from the dedication in a published exhortation of the cura of 
Pure"pero in Michoacan to his flock on the 15th of August of this same year. 
'A Napoleon Bonaparte ex ecracion delos pueblos espanoles,'and after inform 
ing the 'infame corzo ' that this small and remote parish had proclaimed for 
Fernando VII. , he concludes: ' Desiste pues, desisto, oh monstruo de ambicion, 
de tus delirios, porque la America espanola esta bien penetrada de tu caracter 
impio, feroz y sanguinario: y te aborrece como a furia desatada del abismo, 
que solo espira a destriur la religion verdadera, la moral sana, y la f elicidad tern- 


glance to Fernando VII. was proclaimed, and volun 
teer corps were ready to aid him in escaping from the 
meshes in which he was entangled, 9 while Godoy and 
Napoleon were burnt in effigy. 10 

Thus it would seem that the first cry for indepen 
dence is smothered by hatred of an invader and loyal 
sympathy for a fallen' monarch. But we may see now 
how a bad man may help a good cause. Iturrigaray 
hates Fernando, though he pretends to serve him. If 
he does not secretly favor the French, he is easily 
reconciled to their success so long as his patron Go 
doy is permitted to worship before Napoleon. Nev 
ertheless, the viceroy puts on a smiling face, and is 
wheeled in a chariot of state through the city, accom 
panied by over two thousand horsemen, who publicly 
offer their services in defence of the Spanish sover 
eign. The viceroy is gracious, and praises their 
horsemanship and their steeds; nevertheless, he does 
not fail to reiterate soon after that Spain could not 
resist the arms of France. Such speech and conduct 
on the part of the chief ruler is the surest road to 
revolution, and the viceroy is well aware of it. 11 

The question now arose whether to recognize the 
junta governing at Seville in the name of Fernando. 
The viceroy convoked a general council, composed of 
the audiencia, the ayuntamiento, the different tribu 
nals, the archbishop, and the most prominent members 
of the community. On the 9th of August the junta 

poral de los pueblos. Tu mas mortal enemigo. Filopatro Angelopolitano.' 
Diario de Mex., xii. 219. 

9 Id., ix. 165-8, 343-4; Orizava, Libra Cur., MS., 2-3; Pap. Var.. xxxvi., 
no. Ixviii., ii. 21-2. The sindico procurador proposed that $12,000,000 be em 
ployed in effecting the escape of Fernando from France; six million to be 
paid to the commander of the fortress in which he was confined if he would 
conduct him to Vienna and thence to England ; and six million to that nation 
for his safe conveyance to Vera Cruz. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 489- 
90. El real cuerpo de mineria, or mining corporation, offered to provide at 
its own expense 100 pieces of field artillery and equip and maintain eight 
companies to work them. Id., i. 505-6. 

10 'En 1 de Agosto del afio de 1808 quemaron en estatuas al traidor de 
Godoi, y al intruso Emperador de los franceses Bonaparte.' Orizaba, Libro 
Cur., MS., 1. 

11 JBustamante. Suplemento Hist. Hex., in Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 230; Ala- 
man, Hist. Mex., i. 181. 


met. The discussions were warm, the viceroy being 
somewhat ill-tempered. Verdad, the syndic of the 
ayuntamiento, proposed the establishment of a provi 
sional government, still maintaining the previous the 
ory that in the absence of a legitimate monarch the 
sovereignty reverted to the people. These views were 
strenuously opposed by the audiencia, which repre 
sented the Spanish faction, arid regarded Verdad's ex 
pressions as seditious. 12 Allegiance to Fernando was 
agreed upon, and he was proclaimed king of Spain 
and the Indies; an oath was taken to obey no orders 
proceeding from the emperor of the French or his rep 
resentatives; and the viceroy was recognized as the 
king's lieutenant in New Spain, the audiericia and 
other royal tribunals retaining their authority. These 
decisions were drawn up in the form of an act, which 
was signed by those present. 13 

A disturbance occurred at Vera Cruz, occasioned 
by the arrival of a French vessel bearing despatches 
from Joseph Bonaparte. The ship was fired upon 
from Ulua, and was not allowed to enter port until 
she had lowered her colors and hoisted a white flag. 
When the documents were read they were found to 
contain orders of Joseph, confirming in their several 
positions the Mexican authorities in that port, and 
extending to them various favors. The despatches 

12 Rev. Verdadero Origan, no. ii. 34-7. 

13 See copy of the act in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. Indep., i. 513-16. 
There are eighty-two signatures, comprising those of the viceroy, archbishop, 
oidores, and principal authorities. It was declared null by the audiencia of 
Guadalajara, Id., i. 534; while Riano, the intendente of Guanajuato, consid 
ered that certain expressions might be improperly interpreted, ' pueden mo- 
tivar alguna siuiestra inteligencia que conviene evitar.' Id., i. 529. On the 
llth of August Iturrigaray proclaimed the result. The document was se 
verely criticised by Fray Melchor de Talamantes, of whose political tenden 
cies mention will be made later. Talamantes charges the viceroy with having 
his own interest more at heart than those of the kingdom. ' Qu< debe espe- 
rarse de vos,' he asks, ' que habeis velado hasta ahora sobre vuestras propios 
intereses y no sobre los del reino y en su organizacion; que no habeis tenido 
otra ley que vuestros caprichos, que solo habeis consultado a vuestras diver- 
siones y paseos mirando con indiferencia la administracion piiblica. ' Id. , i. 
510-7, where see copy of the proclamation with Talamantes' annotations. On 
the 13th of August allegiance to Fernando was expressed by a celebration in 
his honor, solemnized by religious ceremonies, and enlivened by processions 
and illuminations. Id., i. 518-19; Gaz. de Mej., 1308, xv. 508-70. 


were burned in the plaza. A rumor having spread 
that two commissioners by this vessel were secreted 
in the house of Ciriaco Ceballos, the comandante of 
the port, a mob broke into and plundered it. The 
host was taken to the house to allay the tumult, but 
the crowd was only dispersed by a heavy fall of rain. 14 
Iturrigaray heard of it on the 13th of August, the 
day on which the oath of allegiance to Fernando was 
taken, and it ought to have been a warning. 15 

On the 30th two commissioners from the junta of 
Seville arrived at Mexico demanding recognition of 
its sovereignty over New Spain. 16 They were Juan 
Gabriel Jabat, a naval commander, and bitter enemy 
of Iturrigaray, 17 and Colonel Tomds de Jauregui, a 
brother of the viceroy's wife. They were instructed 
to arrest the viceroy in case he refused compliance. 
A junta was convened on the following day, at which 
Iturrigaray expressed his dissatisfaction at the tone 
and want of courtesy of the despatch. 13 The debate 
which ensued was warm and lengthy, and tended in 
no way to procure harmony. Oidor Aguirre pro- 

14 ' Lo que realmente resfri6 a los amontinados, y los disolvi6, fu un fuer- 
tfsimo aguacero, que hubo en aquella liora.' Lacunza, Discursos Hist., no. 
xxxvi. 535. Bustamante states that the tumult was occasioned by the indis 
creet action of Ceballos, who prohibited under pain of death any one from 
visiting the French ship. This gave offence to the sailors in Vera Cruz, and 
led to the sacking of Ceballos' house: 'la chusma marinera. . .arrojd sus 
muebles a la calle, quem6 su quitrin, y rob<5 sus pianos de la comision hidro- 
grafica que habia levantado, y juntamente una porcion de instrumentos de 
marina. ' Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 232-3. 

15 ' El modo facil con que se inici6 la asonada, y que manifestaba el grado 
de exaltacion en que se hallaban los animos, indico al virey lo predispuesto 
que estaba el pueblo a lanzarse a la revolucion. ' Negrefp, Mex. Si/jlo XIX. , i. , 
89. This author states that it was believed in Vera Cruz that Jose" Miguel 
de Azanza, formerly viceroy, and at this time minister of war of Joseph 
Bonaparte, had arrived on the French vessel. 

18 Three days before, Iturrigaray had deemed it advisable to issue a proc 
lamation exhorting the people to maintain allegiance to Fernando and unite 
in resisting Napoleon. Diario, Mex. , ix. 239-42. 

17 i p or q ue es te le habia hecho salir mal de su grado dos auos antes para 
Espana, porque queria percibir los sueldos sin trabajar.' Cavo, Tres Siglos, 
iii. 233. 

18 Villa Urrutia thus expresses himself: 'Celebr6se la junta, se vieron los 
papeles de aquella' the junta of Seville 'reducidos a una proclama, y a 
dos ordenes en tono soberano, confirmando la una a todos en sus respectivos 
empleos, y mandando por la otra qe se embiasen los caudales qe ubiese.' 
Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 535-6. 


posed that in all matters belonging to the war and 
treasury departments, the sovereignty of the Seville 
junta should be acknowledged, but not in those of 
patronage and justice. These views were opposed by 
the Marques de Rayas and Villa Urrutia,on the ground 
that the sovereignty was indivisible. Although the 
plurality of votes was in favor of Aguirre's motion, 
the result was ineffective, owing to further complica 
tions caused by the arrival that same niodit of de- 

/ O 

spatches from deputies of the junta of Oviedo, which, 
like that of Seville, claimed royal authority, as holders 
of the crown for the lawful king of Spain. 19 On Sep 
tember the 1st the viceroy summoned another coun 
cil, at which he stated that Spain was in a state of 
anarchy, since all juntas wished to be supreme. The 
complication caused by the claim of two separate 
Spanish juntas to the supreme power led to a sus 
pension of action, and a resolution to wait for further 
news was passed. But the indiscreet language of the 
viceroy was construed into a hint that he intended to 
depose Aguirre and Bataller and other oidores, 2a and 
it was suspected that he was fully aware of nightly 
meetings which were now being held by the faction 
opposed to him, and at which were discussed plans 
of overthrowing him. 

Again and for the last time Iturrigaray convened a 
junta on the 9th of September. The main point dis 
cussed was the convocation of a general congress and 
the establishment of a provisional government. Great 
confusion marked the proceedings. Villa Urrutia was 
the main promoter of the idea, and to him were 

19 Id., i. 536; Negrete, Mex. Siylo XfX., i. 102-104. Called by Villa 
Urrutia 'la junta de Asturias.' Pap. Var., clvii., no. xxxiv. 7. 

20 Cancelada, Verdad Sabida, 30-7. The fiscal Borbon, in a long address, 
made use of expressions highly flattering to Iturrigaray, whom he called the 
vicegerent of the king. 'Bien, bien,' replied the viceroy, 'pues si yo lo soy, 
cada uno de V. SS. guarde su puesto, y no extraue si con alguno, 6 algunoa 
tomo providencias. ' 13ustama>/te,in.Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 235; Rev. Verdadero 

., ii. 38. Guerra ascribes still stronger language to Iturrigaray. 'Cada 
uno guarde su puesto, que yo hare" que todas lo guarden, y si se viere que 
hago alguna demostracion con algunos Senores, no sera extraiio porque 
habra fundamento para ello.' Rev. de N. Esp., i. 93. 


opposed the three fiscales, Francisco Xavier Borbon, 
Ambrosio Zagarzurieta, and Francisco Robledo, all 
of whose opinions and votes were read before the 
junta. The eldest inquisitor denounced the pro 
posed convention as seditious. 21 The oider Miguel 
Bataller looked to Villa Urrutia to reply to the 
objections, upon which the oidor Aguirre proposed 
that those favoring the junta should confine them 
selves to the discussion of five points, namely: the 
authority to convoke it; the necessity of so doing; 
the benefit to be derived; the persons who should 
compose the congress; and whether their votes should 
be decisive. The city procurator-general, Agustin 
Rivero, then boldly stated that although the syndic 
could only represent the plebeian element, he him 
self, from the nature of his appointment, could be 
the representative of the other classes. This caused 
additional commotion. The archbishop at once ex 
pressed his utter disapproval of such a claim, while 
others also vociferously denounced it. And he said 
further: "If such dissension is occasioned by the 
simple suggestion, to what extent will matters go if 
it be realized?" He then declared himself opposed 
to a convocation, although he had previously been in 
clined to favor it. While discussion was at its height, 
a voice was heard: "If the municipalities are not 
convoked they will assemble of their own accord." 
By some this bold speech was attributed to Rivero. 22 
Meanwhile the viceroy maintained an affable de 
meanor toward all. He even condescended to ex 
plain that he had been informed that some of his 
expressions at the last junta had caused offence, had 
been regarded as a threat against certain members; 
and thereupon he declared that his language was only 

!l ' SostendreV he said, ' que tales juntas son por su naturaleza 
b k lo me"nos peligrosas y del todo inutiles.' Rev. Verdadero Origen, no. ii. 

22 ' Pero como el senor fiscal de lo civil, Zagarzurieta, redarguyera al in- 
stante aquella proposicion sediciosa. . .y siguiera el confuso murmullo, quedo 
sin apurarse.' lb.; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. C32. 


directed against the authors of certain pasquinades 
of a seditious character. 

During this session the rumored intention of the 
viceroy to resign was brought forward. The regidor 
Antonio Mendez Prieto 23 arose; and having stated 
that such a report had reached the ayuntamiento, 
requested Iturrigaray, if he had such intention, to 
reconsider the matter and remain at the head of 
affairs, since grievous evils would be certain to follow 
at such a critical time, if the country were left with 
out a chief so capable of defending it. The viceroy 
said he wished to resign; he was getting old and diffi 
culties were thickening all the same he had no in 
tention of laying aside sweet authority. Then Ver- 
dad spoke in support of the representations of Prieto, 
and after a few words from Rivero and Uluapa, a pro 
found silence reigned while they were waiting to hear 
from the opposition. Not a word came from them, 
however, and Iturrigaray finally ordered the business 
of the junta to proceed. 24 The debate continued, but 
with no other result than to increase feeling between 
the two factions. 

Had the viceroy at this crisis exhibited a prudent re 
straint the storm might have passed ; but he persisted 
in a congreso consultivo, and had indeed already on 
the 1st of the month issued circulars to the ayunta- 
mientos of the principal cities, instructing them to 
send deputies to the capital. His assumption of pre 
rogatives, moreover, his failure to seek the approval 
of the acuerdo, and his order for troops to move from 
Jalapa and Nueva Galicia to the capital, confirmed 

23 Called by Zainacois, Hist. Mej., vi. 48, Antonio Mendez Cano. 

2 'The viceroy was at this time 60 years of age. The silence of the other 
members of the junta was held as indicating their wish that he should resign. 
That he never had any intention of doing so may be drawn from the fact that 
a few days later, assuming a prerogative never claimed by preceding viceroys, 
he appointed Garcia Davila mariscal de campo, and Jose" Maria Laso to be 
Superintendent of the real aduana, besides granting a subsidy of 400,000 
pesos from the royal treasury to the consulado of Vera Cruz for the continu 
ation of the road to that port. This administrative act was done independ 
ently of the approval of the junta superior as required by law. Rev. Verda- 
duro Oriyen, no. ii. 39. 


opinion that his intention was ultimately to govern 
without dependence on the crown. The party op 
posed to him, therefore, determined to hasten their 
plans. There was organized against him what the 
viceroy would probably call a conspiracy. 25 Those 
composing it were mostly European Spaniards, and 
were supported by the commercial class. Believing 
that the convocation of a national congress, deter 
mined upon by the viceroy, would bring to a conclu 
sion Spanish rule in Mexico, they resolved to stifle 
all tendency to what they might call disloyalty to 
Spain, by the seizure of the viceroy and his principal 
supporters. Gabriel de Yermo, a native of Vizcaya, 
and warmly attached to the party of the oidores, was 
selected as their leader. Nor was the choice ill made. 
Courageous, energetic, possessed of ability and cau 
tion, Yermo was in every respect the man to take 
the lead. Moreover, he had at his command wealth, 
and the affection of liberated slaves and other de 
pendents on his large estates. 26 Though he con 
sidered that the condition of affairs required a des 
perate remedy, he did not immediately accept the 
invitation of the conspirators to put himself at their 
head. Having, however, consulted with his confessor, 
he at last expressed his willingness to act as their 
leader, and as no time was to be lost, he acted prompt 
ly. 27 At a close meeting it was determined that the 

z5 Negrete, Hex. Siglo XIX., i. 108. 

M GabrielJoaquin de Yermo was born in the neighborhood of Bilbao on 
the 10th of September, 1757. He married his cousin Maria Joscfa Yermo in 
Mexico, who had inherited from her father valuable sugar-cane haciendas in the 
valley of Cuernavaca. On the birth of his son Jfose" Maria in 1790, he liber 
ated his negro and mulatto slaves to the number of more than 400, and again 
in 1797, when he purchased the estate of Jalmolonga, he enfranchised '200 
more who belonged to it. The freedmen ever afterward exhibited underrating 
fidelity and affection for him and the cause of the king of Spain. His success as 
an agriculturist was well known in New Spain. Speaking in defence of his ac 
tion in this conspiracy, he thus alludes to this occupation: 'He sido y soy 
puramente un agricultor industrioso, cuya riqueza tal cual es, dimana exclu- 
sivamente de los frutos de mis haciendas, mcjoradas en mi poder extraordi- 
nariamente, como sabetoda la Nueva Espana.' Pap. Far., xxxvi., no. Ixviii., 
ii. 54-9; Cancelada, in Id., ccxv., no. iii., xliv.-l. ; Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 238. 
He died in Mexico on the 7th of September, 1813, being nearly 56 years of 
age. Id., i. 503. 

27 Iturrigaray's defenders assert that Yermo's decision was influenced by 


person of the viceroy should be seized, and the govern 
ment of the country held for Spain. Yerrno told his 
associates that if he took the lead the affair must be 
conducted without display of any rancorous feelings, 
that bloodshed must be avoided, and the proposed 
coup d'etat accomplished in a single night. 

Assembling in the city a force composed of faithful 
laborers on his estate, 28 he next proceeded to gain over 
the officers of the palace guard. This force was com 
posed of a company drawn from the infantry regiment 
organized and paid by the merchants of the capital, 29 
who moreover had the appointment of the officers. 
These, being selected from the commercial class, were 
with few exceptions devoted to the European faction, 
and it would not be difficult to win over the officers of a 
single company. The troops of the viceroy were al 
ready drawing near to the city, and the active conspira 
tors, who numbered three hundred, appointed the 
night of the 14th of September. The viceroy had 
been several times warned of the plot, and had it not 
been for his egotism, apathy, and obstinacy, he might 
have prevented it. 30 

resentment against the viceroy for interfering with his interests as a contrac 
tor for meat for the city, and because the viceroy was active in prompting the 
sequestration of the estates of the benevolent institutions to which his own 
property was mortgaged in the sum of 400,000 pesos. Yermo, moreover, had 
taken an active part in a suit brought by the producers of aguardiente to pro 
tect themselves against a heavy and irregularly imposed tax upon that liquor. 
By the extreme and free opinions which he expressed on the subject, he in 
curred the anger of the viceroy, who ordered his imprisonment, from which 
ho wao only saved by the influence of one of his countrymen, who was a friend 
of Iturrigaray. Alaman defends Yermo against the charge that personal mo 
tives influenced him in the action he took against the viceroy. Id., i. 239-43. 
NcgrcuG takes a different view. Hex. Siglo XIX., i. 118-19; Rev. N. E$p. t Ver- Origen, no. ii. 53-6. 

23 Hustamante, in making mention of this fact, apologizes to Yermo's family 
for doing so. ' Protesto . . . no es mi animo ofender en nada a la virtuosa 
famil a do aquel ciudadano, justamenteapreciada hoy en Mexico.' Cavo, Tres 
Si'jh*, iii. 238. 

' 'ailed cl regimiento del comercio. Each day a company of this regi 
ment formed the guard of the viceregal palace. 

au ' Conduciase en toclo como un hombre narcotizado. ' B ustamante, Cuadro 
7/i.sf., i., carta l a , 5. A month before Bustamante had informed Iturrigaray 
thr.t a conspiracy was on foot to seize his person and depose him, but the 
viceroy paid no heed to him. A woman, also, presented a paper to him one 
d.:y ai3 he was leaving the palace and implored him to read it, as it revealed 
a plot to make him captive. Others warned him to no purpose. Cavo, Tres 


Plans for the 14th were frustrated by the fears of 
Juan Gallo, captain of the guard, who, while sympa 
thizing with the movement, refused to join in such 
arbitrary measures, though he promised not to betray 
them. They therefore tried Santiago Garcia, who 
would be in command on the following day. He also 
at first refused to admit them into the palace, but was 
finally won over by the arguments of his lieutenant, 
Luis Granados, the captain of the artillery, who ac 
cepted a bribe of eight thousand pesos. 31 

Thus all was made ready. The oidores 32 were ad 
vised of the meditated attack, and the conspirators, 
who had assumed the name of Volunteers of Fernan 
do VII., and were afterward distinguished by the 
appellation of Cbaquetas, 33 cautiously assembled in the 
portal de las Flores at 12 o'clock on the night of the 
15th. 34 Yermo placed himself at the head, and they 
proceeded silently to the palace gates. The guard 
had been locked up in their quarters, and the senti 
nels at the entrance stood mute and motionless. 35 
Connected on the north side with the palace stood 
the court prison, and the sentinel on guard there, not 

Siglos, iii. 236-7. Iturrigaray states in his defence that at the commence 
ment of the conspiracy a youth unknown to him informed him that the oidorea 
were forming a design to seize him. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 244-5. 

31 This, according to the statement of Iturrigaray. Alaman discredits the 
assertion. Granados was afterward banished by Garibay to Acapulco, where 
he died shortly after. Id., i. 240. Bustamante accepts Iturrigaray 's state 
ment. * Captain D. Luis Granados estaba vendido d la faccion, y en la tarde 
liabia mandado al mismo Palacio ochenta artilleros para que hiciesen cartuchos 
y tuviesen la artilleria d punto. ' Sup. Cavo, Tres Siglos, \ iii. 236. 

32 With regard to previous and final communications with the oidores, con 
sult Yermo, in Amigo del Pueblo, ii., no. vii. , 211-24. 

33 Referring to the jackets worn as part of their uniform. 

31 The portal de las Flores was opposite the palace; but the conspirators 
were screened by the parian which intervened. Bustamante states that mauy 
of them went to the archbishop 'd recibir su bendicion, les deseo buen suceso, 
y exhort6 como si fuesen d guerra de moros.' Sup. Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 237. 
Alaman denies this. Negrete considers that the conspirators actually did re 
ceive the archbishop's benediction. Mex. Siglo XIX., i. 117. 

35 The mayor de plaza, Coroiiel Juan de Noriega, was afterward charged 
with having been bribed, and having cooperated with the conspirators by 
giving orders that the troops should not leave their quarters on that night. 
Noriega defended himself by depositions taken from a number of the princi 
pal actors. lu 1821 his family caused this vindication of his character to be 
printed and published, a copy of which is to be found in Pap. Var., clvii., 
no. xxxiii. Consult Yermo, in Amigo del Pueblo, ii. 218-19. 


being in the secret, challenged them as they ap 
proached. Receiving no reply, he fired on them, and 
was preparing to reload when he was shot down. 36 
Recovering from this mishap, they entered the palace 
without further opposition; and notwithstanding the 
two shots which had been fired without, they found 
Iturrigaray asleep in his chamber. Aroused, the 
viceroy found himself a prisoner, and having given up 
the keys of his cabinets, he was conducted with his 
two eldest sons in a carriage to the inquisition, and 
lodged in the house of the inquisitor Prado. His 
wife and two children of tender age were at the same 
time conveyed to the nunnery of San Bernardo. 37 

Thus fell this vacillating viceroy, whose medioc 
rity of character, courage, and ability rendered him 
signally unfit to govern during this most critical pe 
riod. Intriguing but feeble in design, ambitious 
but timid, he could neither skilfully plan nor boldly 
execute, while his temporizing policy encouraged his 
enemies and disappointed his friends. Had he at the 
first adopted with decision the views of either faction, 
and supported them by positive measures, he would 
doubtless have retained control of affairs. Although 
the arbitrariness of his final acts, and his intention to 
concentrate forces in the capital, seem to indicate that 
at last he had determined to support the Creole party 
with a view to independence, his want of caution in 
allowing his action to outstrip his power to maintain 
it by the presence of troops which he could rely upon 
was his ruin, and he was seized in the viceregal palace 

36 Bustamante makes the strange assertion that this sentinel, whose name 
was Miguel Garrido, after having fired, attacked them with his bayonet, and 
that they fled ' como timidas palomas;' but that they afterward attacked him 
from behind as he was returning, and wounded and disarmed him. But Busta 
mante is here strongly partisan, and not to be trusted. 

37 A few days later Iturrigaray was removed to the convent of the Bethle- 
hemites. His fall, without tho effusion of blood, was considered by many as 
miraculous. 'Muchos acaso los mas de estos habitantes atribuyen tan feliz 
suceso a la milagrosisima Madre de Dios Guadalupana, cuya No vena en su 
Sautuario, acaba de verificarse, y en la que las almas devotas derramaron 
muchas lagrimas pidie"ndole el remedio de los males que nos amenazaban.' 
Gaz. Mex., xv. 688-9. 


when his regiments were almost at its gates, by a 
band of civilians led by a wealthy farmer. 33 

No sooner had the successful chaquetas lodged their 
prisoner within the walls of the inquisition, than they 
summoned the archbishop, oidores, and other author 
ities to council, and demanded the deposal of the 
viceroy. By six o'clock in the morning of the 16th 
their decision had been given. Iturrigaray had been 
deposed, and the mariscal de campo, Pedro Garibay, 
appointed as his successor ad interim. At seven 
o'clock a proclamation to that effect was posted on all 
the corners of the capital by order of the archbishop as 
president of the council. 39 Then followed arrests of 
the ex-viceroy's principal partisans, and other individ 
uals suspected of revolutionary tendencies. Yerdad, 

38 For a concise outline of Iturrigaray's administration, and the course of 
action which led to his downfall, see Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. Indep., 
i. 043-52. The document here used was published Nov. 9, 1808, and com 
mented upon by the oidor Aguirre. Cancelada, the editor of the Gaz. Alex., 
xv. 687, thus holds up to praise the action of the merchants and their de 
pendents: 'La Nueva Espaua sabra con el tiempo lo mucho que debe a todo 
el Comercio de Mexico por esta accion, la cual se execut6 sin efusion de san- 
gre:. . .Asi se sabe portar la Juventad (sic) espniiola reunida para exterminar 
los malvados y proteger los hombres de bien.' Cancelada published this extra 
number of his gazette without having submitted it to the revision of the oidor 
decano as required by law. Garibay reprimanded him, and ordered him to 
call in all the copies issued. Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 222-6. Consult 
Yermo's account of the viceroy's deposition addressed by him to the Spanish 
junta. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 655-60. 

39 A copy of the proclamation is found in Gaz. Hex., xv. 679-80. It in 
forms the inhabitants of Mexico that ' El Pueblo se ha apoderado de la Persona 
del Exmo Sefior Virrey: ha pedido imperiosamente su separacion por razones 
de utilidad y conveniencia general: han convocado en la noche precedente a 
este dia al Real Acuerdo, Illmo Sefior Arzobispo, y otras autoridades: se ha 
cedido a la urgencia, y dando por separado del mando a dicho Virrey, ha re- 
caido conforme a la Real Orden de 30 de Octubre de 1806, en el Mariscal de 
Campo Don Pedro Garibay, interin se precede a la abertura de los pliegos de 
Providencia. ' At eleven o'clock Garibay, according to this government or 
gan, was recognized by all the government authorities. Id. The oidores in 
their report to the junta de Sevilla, dated the 24th of September, represented 
that on the 17th preceding the people demanded that the pliego de provi- 
dencia should not be opened, but that Garibay should continue at the head 
of the government. In accordance with this wish, the opening of the pliego 
was deferred. In Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 239-42, is a copy of this report, 
Lizarza gives a very different reason. He states that it was presumed that 
the successor to Iturrigaray appointed in the pliego was the Marqu6s de Some- 
ruelos, the governor of Habana; but that the audiencia were anxious to have 
at their head Garibay, an octogenarian, to direct in such a crisis, and who 
would offer no opposition to their views and measures. Discurso, 6-7. 


Azcdrate, and Rafael Ortega were imprisoned in the 
archiepiscopal jail, and shortly afterward Francisco 
Cisneros, 40 the abbot of Guadalupe, the canon Jose 
Mariano Beristain, Jose Antonio Cristo, and Fray 
Melchor Talamantes of the order of la Merced. 41 

The new government at once proceeded to take pre 
cautions to secure itself in its position. Despatches 
were sent to all the principal cities with news of the 
occurrences in the capital. Instructions were given 
to the colonels of the regiments from Jalapa and 
Nueva Galicia to fall back. Garcia Davila was 
removed from his command as mariscal de campo, 4 ' 2 
and the conde de Alcaraz appointed in his place. 

40 Called by Alaman, Jos6 Cisceros. Hint. Mej., i. 250. 

41 Talamantes was a native of Peru, and a strong advocate for independence, 
as is proved by papers in his own handwriting which were seized at the time 
of his capture, and among which was found the sketch of a plan of indepen 
dence. It begins: ' El congreso nacional Americano debe cjercer todos los 
derechos de la soberania;' and then the duties and power of the congress are 
laid down in 13 items, which include extensive reforms in political, ciyil, and 
ecclesiastical administrations, the regulation of commerce, and the promotion 
of agricultural, mining, and manufacturing industries, 'quicandoles las tra- 
bas. ' The last item in this interesting document is to the effect that an am 
bassador should be sent to the U. S. 'a tratar de alianza y pedir auxilios.' 
In another paper he uses these words: 'Aproximandose ya el tiempo de la in- 
dependencia de este reino, debe procurarse que el congreso que se forme lleve 
en si mismo, sin que pueda percibirse de los inadvertidos la semilla de esta 
independeucia: pero de una independencia solida, durable, y que pueda sos- 
tenerse sin dificultad y sin efusion de sangre.' Cancelada, Conducta IturrJr/a~ 
ray, 119-22. Alaman compared the above quoted documents with the origi 
nals of Talamantes, which exist in the general archives. The friar was also 
the author of a work entitled Hepresentacion de las Colonias, which he dedi 
cated to the ayuntamiento of Mexico under the nom de plume of Irza, verda- 
dero patriota. In this, the most important of his productions, he establishes 
twelve cases in which a colony can with justice free itself from the molher 
country. Hist, Mej., i. app. 36. Talamantes was conveyed on the Gth of April 
to the fortress of San Juan de Ulua, where he was confined in irons. He died 
shortly afterward of yellow fever, his jailers not having the compassion even 
to remove his fetters during his sickness. Rivera, Hist. Jala/>a, i. 231. Za- 
macois does not believe such unnecessary inclemency credible. /list. Mrj., vi. 
63; Guerra states that <le aiiadieron otro par de grilles.' Rev. N . Esp., i. 230. 
Bustamante asserts: 'No se le quitaron los grilles. . .hasta el momento de cn- 
terrarlo. ' Sup. Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 238. Verdad died in prison on the 4th 
of October, 19 days after his capture, not without suspicions of having been 
poisoned, while Azcarate was seized with an attack of epilepsy, induced, it 
was also believed, by poison. He however recovered, and having vindicated 
himself, was afterward set at liberty by Viceroy Venegas. Cisneros, Beristain, 
and Cristo were liberated soon after their incarceration. Ib.; Kamacois, Hist. 
Mcj., vi. 62-3; Rosa, Diwurso en la Alamcda, 11. 

42 Davila, having obtained his appointment from Iturrigaray, had offered 
to resign if the authorities deemed it advisable under the new order of 
things. Gaz. Mex., xv. 700. 


The dragoon regiment of Mexico was ordered in all 
haste to the capital, and measures were taken to pre 
serve public order and tranquillity. Nor were these 
precautions unnecessary. Confusion and tumult pre 
vailed in the city. Armed bodies of Creoles and 
natives thronged the streets with threatening demon 
strations, while fears were entertained that an attempt 
at rescue would be made by a division of the Jalapa 
regiment, whose captain, Joaquin Arias, and his 
brother officers declared that they would liberate 
Iturrigaray or perish in the attempt. They were 
finally, however, dissuaded from their purpose. For 
greater security Iturrigaray was removed to the fort 
ress of San Juan de Ulua, 43 being conducted thither 
on the 21st by a guard of sixty soldiers of the volun 
teers of Fernando VII. and fifty dragoons. A few 
days later he was joined by his wife and family, and 
on the 6th of December embarked with them on 
board the San Justo for Cadiz. On his arrival at 
that port he was confined in the castle of San Sebas 
tian, whence he was removed to that of Santa Cata- 
lina. There, impeached for treason, and accused of 
extortion and maladministration, he awaited his trial. 
Meanwhile, all the hoarded wealth in his palace be 
sides other property was sequestrated, 44 and the oidor 

43 At attempt at rescue was made, of which Vicente Acufia was the insti 
gator. Acufia was sent prisoner to Spain, where he was acquitted. Return 
ing to Mexico three years later, he was arrested at Perote, 'and shot under 
sentence of the council of war stationed there. Bustamante, Sup., Tres Sighs, 
iii. 243-4. 

44 His accumulations were immense. In three apartments of the palace 
were found, besides a great quantity of diamonds, snuff-boxes, ornamental 
bouquets, breakfast services, knives, forks, and spoons, all of solid gold, a 
gold writing-desk, gold cigar-cases, and costly ornaments, trinkets, and 
bric-a-brac almost without number. The silver ware was hardly less valuable; 
no fewer than 50 dozen sets of plates, knives, forks, and spoons were found, 
with corresponding dinner-services and table ornaments. Behind his cabinet 
a box was discovered, labeled 'Dulce de Querdtaro.' The sweetmeats it con 
tained were 7,383 gold ounces. In another chest was a massive circular ingot 
of gold and a great variety of rare trinkets of the same metal, ' quo no serd, 
muy comun hallarlas en los palacios de los monarcas.' In the corners of these 
apartments were found more than 30,000 duros in bags. Moreover, among 
the spoil were four interest-paying bonds of 100,000 duros each. (The cluro 
was the same coin as the peso fuerte. ) Vcracruzano, i. 76-7. The editor of 
this periodical states that the document from which the above particulars 
are taken is a copy of the original manuscript. The same is to be found 


Bataller was commissioned to draw up indictments. 
The first process despatched to Spain, being hastily 
prepared, was not couched in legal terms, 45 and the 
proceedings instituted were delayed until an instru 
ment in proper form, supported by the necessary docu 
ments, was obtained from New Spain, and it was not 
until August 1809 that the trial proceeded. 46 The ac 
cusations were then divided into two classes, forming 
two distinct suits, the prosecution for treason and the 
residencia of the accused. On the 9th of November 
following, Iturrigaray submitted his defence to the 
council of the Indies, in which he claimed acquittal of 
the charge of treason, on the ground that he had 

tD * O 

cleared himself of the accusations before the Spanish 
junta central. With regard to his residencia, he main 
tained that it ought not to be taken while he was in 
captivity, with his salary suspended, his property se 
questered, and his honor aspersed. He then petitioned 
that he might be permitted to reside in the neighbor 
hood of Cddiz, that the arrears of his salary should be 
paid, or the income of his sequestrated capital be al 
lowed him, and that the documents necessary for the 
proof of his innocence be obtained. 

Before any decision was arrived at, Iturrigaray ad 
dressed a similar petition to the regency created by 
the c6rtes January 29, 1810, and installed on the 
island of Leon, requesting, moreover, permission to 
reside with his family in Habana. This met with a 
more speedy result, and his trial for treason was sus 
pended and leave was granted him to reside in any 
province of Spain which he might select, or in the 

almost verbatim in Cancelada, Conducta fturrigaray, 88-91, and in Alaman 
Hist. Mej. , i. app. 41-3, copied from Cancelada. Before the wife of Iturri 
garay left Mexico she petitioned that the jewelry of which she had been de 
prived, and the bonds of her children, might be returned to her, and also that 
her husband's plate and ornaments be restored to him. The audiencia ac 
ceded to her request as regarded the jewelry and plate, but refused to surren 
der the bonds. Id., i. 260-1. 

45 Pedimento del fiscal del consejo de Indias en la causa de Iturrigaray, in 
Hernandez y Duvalos, Col. Doc., i. G93-4. 

46 Id., i. G93-6. 


Balearic Islands. 47 Two days later, on February 12th, 
a royal order was issued still more favorable to the 
unfortunate man, now broken in health. By it the 
sequestration of his property was removed, with the 
exception of forty thousand pesos to be left on deposit 
as a bond for his residencia. To this clemency the coun 
cil of the Indies was strongly opposed, as being incon 
sistent with the gravity of the case, and the fiscal, sup 
ported by all the members of the council, requested the 
regency to revoke the orders. 43 No notice was taken 
of this address, and Iturrigaray was released, when 
he retired to Algeciras. On the 28th of October, 
1810, however, the second regency having been elected, 
orders were issued therefrom that he should again be 
placed under arrest, his property sequestrated, and his 
case proceeded with in the most expeditious manner. 
It was, however, too late for this action to have any 
effect. Iturrigaray 's property had already been re 
turned to him, and apprehensive of the result if he 
should again be arrested and put on trial, he crossed 
over to Africa, leaving it to his wife and friends to 
fight the case. These so successfully conducted mat 
ters that after much debating he was allowed, by or 
der of the cortes, on the 26th of November, the 
benefit of the general pardon, which in the mean time 
had been extended to the revolutionists in New Spain, 
and the impeachment for treason was removed. 

In the matter of his residencia, Iturrigaray did not 
so fortunately escape. Ramon Oses, alcalde de corte 
in the Mexican capital, was appointed his judge, and 
as he was a man of high integrity, and had not been 
a member of the audiencia when Iturrigaray was de 
posed, Alaman is doubtless correct in concluding that 
the investigation was conducted with fairness. Yet 

* 7 Copy of the decree of the consejo de regencia, dated February 10, 1810, 
is given in Rev. Verdadero Oriyen, no. ii. 47-8. 

48 The fiscal advanced numerous reasons in support of the objection raised, 
and concludes: 'Vuestro fiscal en su respuesta, qne apoya enteramente el 
consejo, dice cuanto se halla de repugnante en derecho y politica a que se 
lleve a efecto lo mandado en las Reales ordenes de diez y doce del corriente. ' 
Id., 49-50. 


the late viceroy was mulcted in the sum of $435,413, 
$119,125 of which he was condemned to pay as 
the value of the invoice of goods which he illegally 
introduced into New Spain on his arrival there in 
1803. The other amount was for money fraudulently 
obtained from the distribution of quicksilver, and sales 
of offices and contracts, to each of which original sums 
was added a fine of equal amount. 49 To secure pay 
ment, Iturrigaray's interests in the mining tribunal of 
Mexico, amounting to $400,000, were attached. 50 He 
appealed to the council of the Indies, but the sentence 
was confirmed by it in February 1819, and later by 
the supreme tribunal of justice. 51 Its execution, how 
ever, was interrupted by the declaration of inde 
pendence in 1821, and Iturrigaray having died a 
short time before, his widow 52 and family went to 
Mexico and petitioned that the sentence might not 
be carried out. The arguments now employed were 
exactly opposite to those advanced by Iturrigaray, 
who maintained that he had ever remained loyal to 
Fernando. 53 The family claimed that the deceased 

49 He received from his quicksilver frauds $36,816. In 1806 and 1807 
his receipts from illegal contracts for the manufacture of cigarette paper 
amounted to $106,128. The legal price of this paper as sold from the factory 
was $12 a ream. During the year mentioned it was raised to $13, one dollar 
being paid by -the manufacturers to the viceroy for their monopoly. Id., 24-5; 
Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. app. 45-7. Zamacois, who copied extensively from 
Alaman, has given in app. no. 7 of his Hist. Mej., vi., a verbatim duplicate of 
the latter's appendix, but has failed to detect certain errors of Alaman. 
Iturrigaray's wife was his principal agent in these nefarious transactions, and 
into her hands most of the sums were paid. He feebly attempted to defend 
his conduct by the support of precedents supplied by the action of his pre 

50 Bustamante states that the total amount in which Iturrigaray was con 
demned was 384,241 pesos. Cuadro, Hist., i. 9; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 265; 
Sup. Cavo, Tres Sirjlos, iii. 245. 

51 For copy of sentence, see Ateneo, Mej., i. 234. 

52 Bustamante writing in 1821 says: 'Con la muerte de dicho Gefe, su 
f amilia se ha acabado de arruinar, y a la sazon en que escribo, yace su esposa 
paralitica en una cama en Jae"n.' Cuadro, Hint., ed. 1823, i., carta l a , 16. 
Iturrigaray died in 1821, at the age of nearly 80 years. Neyreie, Hex. Siglo 
XIX., i. 134. 

53 Alaman met and conversed with Iturrigaray in Madrid in 1814. The 
ex-viceroy was then 72 years old, and on all occasions when Mexican events 
were the topic, he assured Alaman that he had never entertained the thought 
of effecting the independence of New Spain. Indeed, it was impossible to 
prove the charge of treason against him, as the only ground for supposing 


viceroy had really been the first promoter of inde 
pendence, and had fallen a victim to the cause I And 
further, the claim was respected. The Mexican con 
gress in 1824 stopped proceedings, and restored to 
Iturrigaray's heirs the $400,000 invested in the rain 
ing tribunal. Such was the result of one of the 


most important and memorable investigations made 
during the whole period of viceregal administration. 54 

The trial of Iturrigaray, while exposing his grasping 
avarice and nefarious transactions, throws little light 
upon his political pretensions. It is only by a consid 
eration of the discussions carried on by his supporters 
and opponents, by an impartial estimate of the effect 
of his administrative acts, 55 and by a close study of 
his character that we may reasonably expect any light 
on his secret intentions or expectations. Not only 
did his enemies directly accuse him of treasonable 
designs, but even insinuated that he was not unwilling 
at one time to recognize Murat, Napoleon's representa 
tive in Madrid. 56 But this is far fetched ; and in regard 

that he meditated the independence of New Spain was his intention of con 
voking a national congress. Hist. Mej., i. 270. 

54 Alaman states that the heirs surreptitiously obtained from the audiencia 
archives the original process against the ex-viceroy. Proceedings were insti 
tuted against Guiol, who abstracted them. Alaman received his information 
from Senator Olaguibcl, who defended Guiol at his trial, and authorized Ala- 
man to use his name in proof of the fact. Hist. Mej. , i. 267. 

55 Nothing gained for him more hostile feeling than the strictness with 
which he conducted the consolidation of the funds of the Obras Has: 'In- 
teres61e en este maldito negociado en un tanto por ciento el Ministerio 
Espanol, y asi procure hacer efectivas sus proviclencias con un rigor, que le 
atrajo el odio del Reyno.' Thus writes Bustamante, one of his principal 
defenders. Cuadro, Hist., ed. 1823, i., carta l a , 15. 

56 At the junta held on the 9th of August, 1808, according to Martinena, 
the viceroy used these words : 'Seiiores, aim estamos en tiempo de reconocer 
al duque de Berg, jque dicen V. SS.?' and when all exclaimed, *No Seuorf 
no &e/lor/ f Iturrigaray, observing that the oidor decano Ciriaco Gonzalez 
Carvajal was conspicuously emphatic, asked him. ' Y quo dira V. S. si lo ve 
autorizado con la firma del Seuor Porlier?' Rev. Verdadero Origen, ii. 36. 
Bustamante's version is very different. He states that when the question 
of submission to the orders of Murat was put, the oidores turned pale, 'mas 
el virey con animo denodado la decidi6, diciendo, que no lo obedeceria 
inientras mandase un ejercito.' He afterward cast this timidity in their 
teeth : 'Eiciendoles a los mismos oidores. . .Que. . .solo despues que han visto 
mejorarse las cosas era cuando estaban valientes.' Sup. Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 


to the independence of Mexico, whatever he thought 
of it, I am sure he did not look much beyond present 
issues. Independence as a principle was with him a 
small matter; independence as a means of profit de- 
.pended greatly upon relations between France and 
Spain. Hence his anxiety to provide against the con 
tingency of being thrown over by a new power on 
the convocation of a national congress; for he doubt 
less believed that Spain would be unable to cope suc 
cessfully with the arms of Napoleon. Under such 
circumstances, if New Spain declared herself inde 
pendent, there would be no special disloyalty on his 
part to the mother country. 

But Iturrigaray had not the sagacity to recognize 
that the Creole faction which he favored was laying 
deeper plans, and would not be satisfied with only 
temporary freedom. He was not aware that beneath 
his feet was a political vortex, a fact which the Span 
ish element appreciated more clearly. His want of 
tact, moreover, and his intemperate language, 57 had 
given great offence, and he was cordially hated by 
the oidores and their party. During the latter days 
of his administration every expression of his counte 
nance was watched by his opponents; every syllable 
that fell from his lips was caught up, and, if possible, 
interpreted as significant of his want of loyalty to 
Spain. That the European party were fully per 
suaded that he was aiming at the independence of 
Mexico, there is no doubt, giving as proof his dis 
mantling the seaward battery of Ulua, and convey 
ing its guns into the interior, the changes made by 

57 At the session held on the 9th of August, when the archbishop, perceiv 
ing that the discussions were becoming interminable, proposed that they 
should be contined to essential matters, Iturrigaray rudely and angrily 
replied: 'Quo alii cada uno tenia libertad de hablar lo que quisiese, y que si 
le parecia larga la junta, desde luego se podria marchar & su casa.' .Alanian, 
Hist. Mej.j i. 196. On the same occasion Oidor Aguirre rose and said: 
'Senor Exmo. La resolucion de defender estos dominioa necesita alguna ex- 
plicacion.' The viceroy immediately answered: 'No hay nccesidad de ex- 
plicacion: <5l que no lo entienda que se vaya, abierta tiene la puerta.' Rev. Ori/jen, ii. 36. 


him in military chiefs, and his intended establishment 
of a national congress. 58 

These arguments were combated by his supporters, 
who noted the fact that Iturrigaray had taken the 
oath of allegiance to Fernando, and denied any inten 
tion to establish an independent government. The 
removal of the artillery from San Juan de Ulua was 
done, they asserted, for the purpose of avoiding the 
mortality which prevailed among the troops stationed 
at Vera Cruz 59 by placing them in more healthy local 
ities. While they thus repudiated the accusations of 
treasonable designs, they nevertheless acknowledged 
many grave defects in his administration. 60 

58 How strongly opposed the European party was to such a congress may 
be seen from Bishop Qucipo's views expressed on the 2Gth of September: 
' Una junta nacional. . .es una verdadera rebelion.' Col. Doc., 29; Pap. Var. t 
62, no. 19, 28-34. 

5a 'Que en Veracruz perecerlan, como siempre, a millares.' Rev. de N. 
Esp., Ctnsura Particular, 3. Lerdo de Tejada, Apunt. Hist., 362, makes the 
strange statement that Iturrigaray entertained such an infatuated belief in 
his military skill that he dismantled the battery for the purpose of enticing 
the English to make an attack on Vera Cruz, being confident of victory. 
'pero afortunadamente para el virey, no sucedi6 asi, y a esto debio el que su 
reputacion militar no quedase tan perdida como la de gobernante.' Lacunza, 
Doc. Hist. Museo Mex., 534, makes the same statement. 

60 Bustamante, one of his stanches b defenders, remarks: 'Conozco los 
graves defectos de su administracion; uno de ellos es la venta escandalosa de 
los empleos que hizo.' Sup., Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 245. The deposal of Itur 
rigaray was the subject of various works and the theme of innumerable dia 
tribes which rancorously discussed the cause of his fall, and its bearing on the 
future destiny of Mexico. These writings embrace productions of every di 
mension, from the size of a volume to small pamphlets or a couple of leaves in 
a periodical. _ They were issued during a period which extended from the 
time of Iturrigaray's trial before the council of the Indies till long after the 
declaration of independence. A large proportion of the pamphlets and smaller 
essays are anonymous. Their style, which is usually virulent, shows the 
bitterness with which the two chief factions regarded each other. By far the 
most important of these productions are published by Cancelada, Lizarza, 
Mier y Guerra, and Martifiena. Juan Lopez Cancelada, the editor of the 
Gazeta de Mexico, represented in Spain the interests of the commercial com 
munity of Mexico which endeavored to obtain a revocation of the decision 
which liberated Iturrigaray, released him from the accusation of treason, and 
restored his ill-gotten wealth. Cancelada proved himself an inveterate enemy 
of the fallen viceroy, and probably was influenced by personal feeling. In the 
Gaz. de Mex., xv. 522, of the 2d of August, 1808, the editor published a rumor 
that Fernando had been restored to the throne. This incensed Iturrigaray, 
who summoned Cancelada before him and banished him. By the intercession 
of the vice-queen, however, the order was withdrawn, and Cancelada allowed 
to remain in Mexico, but was made to retract his assertion. After the de 
posal of Iturrigaray, Cancelada assailed Villa Urratia by petitioning the audi- 
encia to pronounce him a traitor, and punish him as such; but his language 
was so malignant that he was condemned in a fine of 500 pesos for calumny, 


or to imprisonment for two months. Ho later addressed the archbishop, then 
viceroy, in such discourteous and unmeasured terms that he was arrested and 
tried before the junta de seguridad y buen orden. Numerous persons brought 
against him charges of insults and grievances, and his fractious and turbulent 
tendencies being well known, the junta condemned him to banishment to 
Spain. Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. xix.-xxiv. There he occupied himself 
in writing on the political affairs of New Spain, displaying therein a vicious 
enmity toward tho Creole and revolutionary party. In 1811 he published in 
Cadiz La Verdad Sabida y Buena Fe Guardada, in which he maintains that 
the revolution which broke out in Mexico in 1810 originated in Iturrigaray 
and his treasonable designs. He asserts that a revolutionary tendency did 
not exist at the time when Humboldt was in New Spain, as affirmed hy 'el 
Espanol escritor en Londres,' and said that Humboldt's travels in Mexico 
were too limited to admit of his understanding the spirit of the people. The 
Verdad Sab/da gave great offence to the ayuntamiento of Mexico, and the 
regidores petitioned the supreme council of the Spanish regency to order his 
arrest on the charge of abominable libels principally directed against that 
municipality. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 725. In Mexico Cance- 
lada for some years followed the avocation of a pedler. He was of a quar 
relsome and rancorous disposition, and is described by the ayuntamiento of 
Mexico as 'hombre bien conocido en este reyno por su cavilosidad, estupidez 
y audacia.' Id. Of low origin and uneducated, it is a matter of surprise that 
he obtained the position as editor of the Gazeta de Mexico, the official organ 
of the government, which was under his direction for some years. Fernando, 
on his return to Spain, caused him to be placed in a convent, from which, 
however, he was liberated in 1820. He died a few years afterward. Besides 
the Verdad Sabida, he was the author of many other works, among which 
may be mentioned Ruina de la Nuera Espana si se declara cl comercio libre 
con los eztrangeros, Cadiz, 1811, 4to, pp. 84; Conducta. del Excelentisimo Seilor 
Don Jos6 Iturr/cjaray, Cadiz, 1812, 4to, 2 1. pp. 135; and the TeUcjrnfo Ame 
ricano, a periodical which he published in Spain, and which was opposed 
in the Censor by Alcocer of Tlascala. In reply to the Verdad Sabida, 
appeared in the same year the Discurso que Publica Don Facundo de Lizarza 
Vindicando. . .Iturrifjaray. It handles Cancelada with great severity, and 
frequently gives him the lie direct. Lizarza, who was Iturrigaray 's law 
yer, was not the author of the Discurso, but Jose Beye de Cisneros, the 
brother of the abbot of Guadalupe, who was imprisoned on the downfall of 
the viceroy and at that time Mexican deputy to the c6rtes at Cadiz. 
Alaman, Hist. RIej., i. 268. The work displays considerable acumen in the 
refutation of Cancelada, and supplies many facts favorable to Iturrigaray 
purposely ignored in the Verdad Sabida. Although Cisneros is not sparing 
in severe animadversions upon the dissertation, describing it as a texture of 
lies, falsifications, and fiction, he has the good taste to retrain from the gross 
vituperation so noticeable in the writings of that time. Cancelada in reply 
published his Conducta del Exmo. Sefior. . .Iturrigaray, Cadiz, 1812, which 
is valuable as being composed mainly of transcripts of official documents bear 
ing upon Iturrigaray's fall and trial. Among these appear the report of his 
administration and conduct from the time of his arrival to his deposal, drawn 
up by the real acuerdo of Mexico, November 9, 1808; official accounts of the four 
memorable juntas convoked by him on the 9th and 31st of August, and the 
1st and 9th of September, 1808; the royal orders issued by the regency of 
the isla de Leon; and other official papers quoted in this chapter. With re 
gard to the report of the real acuerdo, to which Cancelada triumphantly ap 
peals as conclusive evidence 'of Iturrigaray's aspirations to the sovereignty of 
New Spain, I have only to remark that the members of that court were bit 
terly hostile to the viceroy, and that their representations cannot be accepted 
as impartial. Historia de la Revolucion de Nueva Espana, etc., Escribia fa Dn 
Jose Guerra, Londres, 1813, 2 vols, 8vo. This work was first undertaken by 
Jose" Servando de Mier y Guerra, with the object of defending Iturrigaray 
against the defamatory attacks of Cancelada, but the author, being supplied 


with a great quantity of material for the history of subsequent events, carried 
it forward and included the iirst years of the revolution in Mexico. The first 
volume is almost entirely devoted to the vindication of Iturrigaray ; in the 
second the progress of the revolution is narrated clown to the year 18i"2. 
Guerra in his preface supplies us with a biographical sketch of Cancelada's 
life down to the date of the publication of the Historia, and exposes his 
career with most contemptuous irony. His work is largely taken up with 
extracts from official documents, of which he possessed a great number. 
For the insertion of so much of such material lie excuses himself upon the 
plea that having been far from the scene of events, and having undertaken 
to refute the false representations of one who professed to have been present 
at them, he was compelled to support his arguments by documentary evi 
dence. Guerra, after the fall of the viceroy, narrowly escaped arrest, and 
fleeing from Mexico took up his residence in London. There he became the 
most able defender of Iturrigaray, who, according to Alaman, Hist. Mfj., 
i. 2G8-1), supported him in London until his tendencies inclined to the sup 
port of the involution. His work displays great talent and skill. While 
the style is elegant, the author had at his command a sarcasm that could 
bite. Alaman speaks highly of this work, which, party spirit aside, will, 
he says, be ever appreciated for the amount of information which it contains. 
Verdadero Origen. . .dela Revolution de Nueva Espaila, etc., Mexico, 1820, fol. 
pp. 17. (Followed by) Manijiesto a Todas las Nadones por el Superior Gold- 
erno de Nueva Etpaila. The author of this angry treatise was Juan Martin 
de Juan Martinena, who in 1816 took up the gauntlet in defence of Iturriga 
ray 's deposers. Martinena quotes extracts from Lizarza, Cisneros, Busta- 
mante, and other supporters of Iturrigaray, and condemns these writers with 
vehement asperity. ' How degrading it is, 'he exclaims, 'to find in them the 
same language, the same ideas, object, and even vulgar outcry voces materialcs 
as in the rebel leaders with respect to Iturrigaray and the faithful patriots 
who put a stop to his criminal proceedings, the only difference being that 
the former affect peace, harmony, and fidelity, which the latter do not, being 
in a position to explain frankly their true sentiments!' The historian has, 
however, to thank Juan Martin de Juan Martinena for his transcript of the 
Manifesto, but particularly for the large number of interesting documents 
appended thereto. The publication of the Verdadero Origen, etc., immediate 
ly brought out a number of anonymous replies, from among which I will make 
mention of C en sura Particular e Impartial del Cuaderno Titulado: Verdadero 
origen, etc. ; Breves Reflexiones que pneden anadirse por via de impunnation 
at, id.; and Conwjos al Sr Autor, Editor y A notador del Cuaderno en Folio 
Titulado, id. With regard to the Manifiesto above mentioned, it was issued 
on the 16th of January, 1816, by the government of New Spain, in refutation 
of the ' falsehoods, calumnies, and errors which the rebels of Mexico have 
given utterance to in a paper entitled El Supremo Congreso Mexicano d todas 
las Naciones, escrito en Puruarun a 28 de junio de 1815.' 





WHEN the chaquetas conceived the design of seizing 
and deposing the viceroy, they imagined that they 
would thus be cutting off the hydra's head, that by 
one bold stroke they would annihilate the monster of 
disloyalty. But they erred in their calculations. 
The Creole party, disappointed that their hope should 
fail in a season so fair for its accomplishment, were 
doubly embittered. They believed that as matters 
stood in the mother country, they, and not the Span 
iards, were the power in the land. Rivalry and hatred 
between the two factions increased, and henceforward 
the revolutionary spirit spread silently and far with 
rapidity. 1 

At a time so fraught with difficulties, arising from 
violent political change, no more incompetent man 

1 In 1811 the Mexican deputies to the Spanish c6rtes represented that the 
imprisonment of Iturrigaray had provoked the rivalry between the Spaniards 
and Creoles, ' difundiendose sordamente por el Reyno, y creciendo de dia en 
dia.' Diputac., Amer. Hep., 1 de Agosto de 1811, 3. 



could have been placed at the head of affairs than 
Pedro Garibay, field marshal of the royal armies. 
Infirm of body 2 and weak of will ; of meagre resources, 
lacking ability, and wanting in authority even in his 
own household; a victim, moreover, to the anxiety 
attending poverty he was undergoing the penalties 
which those must pay who by reason of great strength 
arrive at the age of fourscore years. 3 Nevertheless, 
he eagerly accepted the high position offered him. 
In the early part of his life lie had served in the wars 
in Italy and Portugal, and in 1764 went to Mexico 
with General Villalva. By slow promotion he at- . 
tained the grade of brigadier in 1789, and at a later 
date was allowed to retire on account of his infirmities, 
with the rank of mariscal de campo de los reales 
ejercitos. His poverty was such that he was fre 
quently compelled to borrow small sums from his 
acquaintances. 4 He was honorable, and well liked by * 
high and low. Such as he was, however, his insuf 
ficiency was the reason of his election. The oidores, 
whom he regarded as his protectors, 6 were not desir 
ous that a strong man should be at the head of affairs; 
and during Garibay's short administration, in all acts 
of government he was but the mouth-piece of the 
audiencia. 6 

As soon as the coup d'etat in the case of I turn-, 
garay was accomplished, the new government, with 
out formally recognizing either of the Spanish juntas, 
proceeded to rule in the name of Fernando VII. ; and 

2 'Padecia una enfermedad de est6mago. . .teniendo que apoyarse en un 
criado cuando salia d la calle.' Rivera, Gob. Mcx., i. 545. 

3 Bustamante states that he was over 80. Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 250. Ala- 
man says, 'era un anciano de mas de setenta aiios.' Hist. Mcj., i. 279. But 
as he entered his military career in 1742, the former's statement must be 
nearer the truth. He was unable from his infirmities to sign documents, and 
was compelled to use a stamp. Disposic. V arias, i. f. 134. 

*Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 280. 

5 ' Vio su exaltacion como un gran beneficio, y en los oidores unos pro- 
tectores, cuyo titulo no les negaba en sus contestuciones secretas. ' Bustamante, 
ut cit. 

6 ' Era todo de ellos, y haciaprecisamenteloque le mandaba Aguirre, capa- 
taz de la Andiencia.' 76. ' Pero este era el hombre que convenia al Acuerdo 
y a sus miras.' Mora, Mcj. y sus Rev., iii. 347. 


an order was issued that the inhabitants of the capi 
tal, in token of their loyalty, should wear on their 
persons a badge bearing his name. 7 The tribunal del 
consulado . was instructed to communicate the same 
order to all corporations within the jurisdiction of 
that court. 8 The first important step which the new 
government took in order to insure its stability was 
the reorganization of the army. Neither the vol 
unteers of Fernando VII. nor the forces at Jalapa 
were regarded as supports free from objection. The 
party from which the former were drawn seemed to 
expect their own political views adopted in the new 
order of affairs which they had created, and the 
oidores feared that the freedom of their own action 
would thereby be impeded. Accordingly the chaque- 
tas were disbanded by Garibay, who would no longer 
detain such loyal and self-denying persons from their 
commercial occupations. He thanked them in the 
name of Fernando for their patriotism, for the ever 
memorable services they had rendered, and informed 
them that he should not fail to place a memorial of 
their merits at th>: feet of his majesty. 9 In breaking 
up the encampment at Jalapa the oidores were in 
fluenced by still more forcible reasons. The regiments 
which composed the army stationed there were drawn 
from the different provinces, and the ranks filled by 
Mexicans, whose loyalty could not be safely relied 
upon if the flag of independence should be raised. 
Orders were therefore issued that each corps should 
return to its respective district; the reason assigned 
being that, in view of the alliance which had been 
formed between Spain and England, 10 the concentra 
tion of so large a force for defence was no longer nec 
essary. It was further urged that the government, 

7 Gaz. deMex., xv. 687. Many persons had gold medals made, and wore 
them on their coat collars. Alainan possessed a collection of them, and states 
that they were of poor workmanship. Hist. Afej., i. 282. 

8 Gaz. de Mcx., xv. G99. 

9 Id., 804. The order was given on the 15th of October. Hernandez y Da- 
valos, Col. Doc., i. G1G-17. 

10 England had made peace with Spain in July 1808. 


in its efforts to send pecuniary aid to the peninsula, 
could not afford the expense of maintaining a stand 
ing army. 11 A regiment of grenadiers was organized, 
and this with the dragoons of Mexico constituted the 
military force in the capital. 

During Garibay's rule the revolutionary tendency 
advanced apace. Secret meetings were held at pri 
vate houses. 12 A society known as the Racionales 
Caballeros was organized at Vera Cruz, Jalapa, and 
Mexico, which by its machinations greatly aided the 
cause of independence. 13 Further than this, the secret 
agents of Joseph Bonaparte were actively at work 
inciting the inhabitants to rebellion. 14 


11 Manuel Abad y Queipo condemns this action of Garibay, stating that he 
did so 'por habcr entendido quo, entre algunos oiicialcs se hablaba con lib- 
ertad sobre independencia, y por remediar este mal. . .incurrio en otro mayor, 
que fue" poner en contacto a los rnilicianos con sus vecinos, sus parientes y 
amigos, en que es imposible que el contacto de los unos deje do contauiinarse 
con los otros. ' The bishop says that he ought to have punished these free- 
spoken officers, and placed others in command who could have been relied 
upon. Inform?, dirig. alrey., in Zamacois, Hi$t. -3/e/., ix. 8678. 

12 A prominent personage now was the marques de Rayas, who was a 
stanch adherent of Iturrigaray, and espoused the cause of independence 
after his fall. The proofs of disloyalty against him were so strong that he 
w r as sent prisoner to Spain, but was detained at Vera Cruz by sickness. In 
1821 he returned to Mexico. Refutac. Artie, de Fondo, 19-21. 

13 Their mode of operation was to work on the government so to act as to 
foment discontent. The efforts of this society were particularly successful 
with Viceroy Iturrigaray, according to Queipo, who states that by flattery 
and cajoling they so influenced him that ' lo hizo titubear en la fidelidad de 
tal modo, que su conducta ambigua hizo creer d los sediciosos que estaba de- 
cidido en su favor, y con esto arrojaron la mascara y atacaron cara descubi- 
erta los derechos de la monarquia.' Informe dirlg. al rcy., in Zctmacois, Hist. 
Mcj., ix. 802. 

14 'Pcro no olvidando tampoco Napoleon el objeto interesante de las Ame'- 
ricas, envi6 comisionados d, seducir y comprar los virreyes, gobernadores y 
demas personas que por la fuerza 6 por su influxo pudiesen clominar el pue 
blo.' 6'2. de Mcx., xv. 933. In August 1808, among other seditious papers 
seized at Vera Cruz was a despatch from Champani, the French minister 
of foreign affairs, officially recommending a system of operations to pro 
mote rebellion. Arrillaya, Informe, in Ce;iulario, iv. f. 59, no. 1. The same 
year General Octaviano d'Alvimar, having been authorized to expend large 
sums of money with this object, entered Mexican territory from the U. 8. 
He was arrested at Nacodoches, in Texas, in August 1808, and proceedings 
were instituted against him as an agent of Napoleon. Garibay sent him 
prisoner to ISpain in 1809, and after the independence D'Alvimar attempted 
to recover damages for his imprisonment and loss of personal effects. Gaz. de 
Jlex., ut sup.; L'iwra, Gob. de Mcx., i. 549; fiwtamantp, in Caro, Trex Sighs, 
iii. 259-01. D'Alvimar, while being conducted to the capital, passed through 
Dolores, and had several interviews with Hidalgo, whom he earnestly en 
couraged, it is asserted, in revolutionary designs. Diaz ('alvitlo. Sermon, 
107-8. Hidalgo, however, at his trial asserted that his conversations with 


Lampoons and scurrilous pasquinades were posted 
on the walls; insulting caricatures of the leading mem 
bers of the government and loyalist party disfigured 
the public buildings; and seditious sheets in print 
were scattered on the floors of the cathedral and 
churches. 15 The image of his majesty, moreover, was 
grossly disfigured on the coinage/ 6 and the supreme 
junta of Spain ridiculed. And all these seeds of 
insurrection were so secretly and warily sown that 
no efforts of the government were effective in sup- 

D'Alvirnar had no political significance. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 359-60. 
Monsieur Desmolard was Joseph Bonaparte's agent at Baltimore, and the 
French usurper issued instructions to him which disclosed the plan to excite 
revolt in Spanish America. The main points were to declare to the Creoles 
that his imperial majesty had solely in view to give liberty to Spanish Amer 
ica, the only return expected being the friendship of the people and com 
merce with the country. To effect their independence, his majesty offered 
all necessary troops and stores. The emissaries were further instructed to 
point out the advantages which would accrue by suspending the heavy re 
mittances to Spain, and by the acquirement of freedom from commercial and 
agricultural restrictions. The good-will of the ecclesiastics especially was 
to be gained, with the object that at the confessional they should urge the 
necessity of independence. The injustice to which the Creoles were subject 
in the disposal of public appointments was to be dwelt upon. At the same 
time the agents were to be careful not to declaim against the inquisition or 
the church, and on the insurrectional standards the motto 'Viva la Religion 
catolica, apostolica y romana! Perezca el mal gobierno!' was to be inscribed. 
The servants of governors and high officials were to be won over, and sub- 
agents were to keep the principal agents duly informed of the progress made, 
and these in turn were to communicate with Joseph Bonaparte's envoy in 
the U. S. A copy of these instructions was found in Caracas, in the office 
of the secretary to the suprema junta, and forwarded by the junta to the 
English admiral at the Barbadoes station. Rev. in Span. Amer., 80-7; Wal 
ton's Espost, app. 2-7; Calvo, Annales Hist., i. 43-5. The Spanish govern 
ment warned the colonial authorities of Bonaparte's machinations. A royal 
address, dated May 10, 1809, exhorting the inhabitants of New Spain to main 
tain their loyalty, and be on guard against French intrigues, says ' para que 
haciendolo publico,' that is, the address, 'en esos Dominios se precavan sus 
naturales de las impresiones siniestras que podrian causarles las maquinacioncs 
d intriguas que iiuestros feroces enemigos emplean ahora con mas arte que 
nunca.' Disposic. Varias, i. f. 141. Garibay on April 18, 1809, published a 
proclamation forbidding the landing of Frenchmen at the ports, whether 
they had passports or not. All French settlers also were ordered to appear 
within eight days before the alcaldes, by whom they were examined. If sus 
picion attached to any of them, such were to be imprisoned. Gaz. de Mex. , 
xvi. 337-40. 

15 On the 6th of October, 1808, Garibay published a decree with the object 
of suppressing these papers. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 608-9. 

16 Garibay on the 19th of May, 1809, issued a proclamation offering 2,000 
pesos for the discovery of the mutilators of the coins. Ho says: 'Prctenden 
ven gar el mal dxito de sus maquinaciones en el real busto de las monedas, de 
las que han llegado a mis manos varias piezas senaladas cle modos diferentes, 
todos enormemente ofensivos a la magestad, y en odio de la dinastia rey~ 
nante.' Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 423. 


pressing the hostile demonstrations. In vain the use 
and sale of hand printing-presses were prohibited/ 7 
and in vain rewards were offered for the detection of 
the authors of these treasonable acts. 

In April 1809 news of reverses sustained by Span 
ish arms in the peninsula reached Mexico, and Gari- 
bay issued a proclamation on the 20th, 18 exhorting the 
public to show their loyalty by contributions in aid of 
the mother country, by sentiments expressing a closer 
union in mind and heart, 19 and above .all, by refusing 
to be influenced by the secret operations of those 
who were endeavoring to seduce them from their al 
legiance. But this proclamation had no effect in 
arresting the steady advance of the revolutionary 
party. Its adherents were jubilant, and did not re 
frain from openly expressing their joy at the news. 
They greeted with delight the intelligence of disas 
ters suffered by the Spanish forces; and while they 
exaggerated their defeats, they underrated and derided 
the advantages which they gained. 

Day by day the government was losing its influ 
ence over the public mind, and becoming more and 
more an object of ridicule on the part of the disaf 
fected. In the hope of changing the current, Gari- 
bay, or rather his advisers, established a junta con- 
sultiva, composed of three oidores, before which all 
cases of treason were to be tried instead of in the 
criminal court. This tribunal was formed in June 

17 On the 27th of April, 1809, the viceroy published a proclamation order 
ing that all such presses should be delivered up to the judge of the tribunal 
de la Acordada within three days. Diario de Max., x. 508. Yet on the 20th 
of May following he found it necessary to offer a reward of 2,000 pesos for 
the discovery of the persons who had scattered treasonable sheets in the 
churches during holy week. Gaz. de Mcx. , ut cit. These sheets \vere di 
rected against the Spanish junta central, and invited the people to assert their 
independence. The junta central of Spain was recognized by the viceroy by 
decree of March 16, 1809. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Cot. Doc., i. 680-3. 

18 Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 365-8. 

9 ' Olvidad descle ahora para siempre esos apodos de cri olios y gachupines, 
de que haceis una aplicacion odiosa 6 ideal, supuesto que todoa los miembros 
de una nacion no deben ser conocidos sino por el nombre mismo que lleva la 
nacion de que son parte: ademas de que es tan ridiculo como absurdo hacer 
inerito de una cosa que no esta en nuestra mano: es decir de nacer aqui 6 del 
lado- de alia del mar.' Id., 368. 


1809, and some arrests were made, but instead of 
tending toward suppressing sedition, its creation was 
turned to advantage by the independents, and sup 
plied additional means of fomenting discontent. The 
innovation made by transferring the prerogatives of 
the sala del critnen to an extraordinary court arbi 
trarily established, and employing a great number of 
spies, was seized upon as an illustration of despotism, 
on the part of the government. A rumor was spread 
that the prisons were crowded with innocent victims; 
households were filled with fear of arrests, and the 
public were taught to believe that the mere suspicion 
of free opinions being entertained by a man was suffi 
cient to cause his being sent prisoner to Spain. 20 
Outward demonstrations were, it is true, for the time 
suppressed; but none the less did the cause of indepen 
dence gain ground under the more cautious and se 
cret operations of its promoters. 

Illustrative not alone of the anomalous position in 
which New Spain stood with regard to the mother 
country during this period, but also of the unsettled 
and somewhat incongruous ideas as to government 
and succession, was a claim in 1808 of an Indian to 
the throne of Mexico. This personage alleged that 
he was a descendant of the emperor Montezuma, 
and maintained that in view of the downfall of the 
Spanish monarchy he had a right to the crown of the 
Aztec royal line. Had the native population been as 
well prepared for revolt as they were two years later, 
such a claim might have caused much alarm, and 
probably bloodshed. As it was, ridicule was the 

20 Alaman attempted to trace the grounds for these reports, but could only 
discover the names of the following persons arrested : The Franciscan padre 
Sugasti, the silversmith Jose Luis Alconedo, charged with making a crown 
for Iturrigaray, the escribano Peimbert, Antonio Calleja, the cura Palacios, 
and the licentiates Vicente Acuna and Julian Castillejos, 'todos acusados 
y muchos convencidos de ser autores de papeles 6 maquinaciones sediciosas. ' Id. 
Compare Bustamante, in L'avo, Tre.s Siylos, iii. 253. Negrete agrees with Busta- 
mante's statement that the jails were filled with prisoners. Hex. Stylo XIX., 
i. 181. 


only weapon employed, and the pretender came to be 
regarded by many as a madman.' 21 

On the 13th of March, 1809, the English brig 
Sapplio arrived at Vera Cruz from Rio Janeiro, bear 
ing despatches from the infanta Dona Maria Carlota 
Joaquina, the sister of Fernando, The letter was 
addressed to the viceroy, audiencias, governors, and 
municipalities of New Spain, and contained her wishes 
and expectations that her son, the infante Don Pedro, 
would be received and acknowledged . as regent and 
lieutenant of the king. Such pretensions caused the 
viceroy and audiencia much inquietude, and they en 
deavored, though in vain, to keep the matter secret. 
In their reply to the infanta they confined themselves 
to expressions of courtesy, reporting that tranquillity 
reigned in the country. 22 Not long after, the viceroy 
received a letter from the junta central of Spain, in 
forming him that it had become aware that Napoleon 
meditated sending Carlos IV. to reign in New Spain, 
with the object of creating a division in the Spanish 
monarchy, 23 and instructions were given him to pro 
hibit the landing of Carlos, and arrest him if he per 
sisted. With the approval of the real acuerdo, the 
viceroy issued the corresponding orders to the authori 
ties at the ports. 

21 'Los Europeos hicieron la mas alta burla de esta solicitud y su apoyo.' 
His pretensions were finally crushed by a poetical burlesque, one of the lines 
of which ran thus: 'Y treinta mil Indies guerreros vestidos a su usanza 
esto es cencueros,' etc. Cancelada, Venlad Sabida, xx. The whole story ia 
denied in Lizarza, Discurso Vind. Iturr., 1617. 

22 Bustamante furnishes a copy of a portion of the infanta's despatch, the 
tone of which is somewhat assuming. She thanks the members of the au 
diencia and the archbishop for their zeal and wachfulness in having saved 
the country; urges the viceroy to be vigilant in maintaining order and the 
prosperity of the country; and wishes to be supplied with an exact account 
of all notable events in the capital and kingdom, 'y si posible es de toda esa 
America Septentrional.' Bustamante remarks: 'Su Alteza sin duda estaba 
inuy ociosa cuando escribio dicha carta, y al tenor de ella otras muclias ; pudo 
haber, ocupado el tiempo en hacer calzeta para sus hijos.' Cavo, TresSiglos, iii. 
261-2. The letter is dated Rio de Janeiro, May 11, 1809. 

23 Bustamante discredits any such idea on the part of Napoleon. 'La 
Junta de Sevilla' he means the junta central, which had withdrawn to 
Sevilla 'teniatan anchas tragaderas para engullir las mentiras mas absurdas, 
como las tenia Garibay y su Cousejo de Oidores ; ' but was coniident that if 
the attempt had been made Carlos would have triumphantly entered Mexico. 
Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 2G2-3. 


During the first six months of Garibay's rule no 
formal recognition of the Spanish juntas had been 
made. The decrees of the junta de Se villa had been 
published and acted upon, but no oath of allegiance 
to it as representative of the king was ever taken. 
After the defeat of the French at Baylen, by Cas- 
tanos, and their evacuation of Madrid, the juntas of 
the different provinces came to an understanding, and, 
the suprema junta central was installed at Aranjuez 
on the 25th of September 1808. In March 1809 its 
authority was recognized in Mexico, and the viceroy, 
audiencia, municipality, and tribunals took the oath 
of allegiance. The occasion was celebrated with sal 
voes of artillery and illuminations. 24 

The mental and physical incompetency of Garibay, 
who possessed neither bodily activity nor intellectual 
vigor, soon made it apparent to the Yermo party that 
the political situation was daily becoming critical. Un 
der the misrule of the oidores they observed that revo 
lutionary principles were spreading instead of being 
suppressed, and there were those who foresaw the 
coming struggle. 25 Warnings were whispered to the 
oidores, but passed unheeded, and the party which had 
overthrown Iturrigaray represented the true state of 
affairs to the junta central, urging the appointment of 
an able and energetic viceroy without delay. By 
such a measure only could the tranquillity of the coun 
try be maintained. 26 The Spanish junta accordingly 

2i Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 207, 205-70, 294-5; Disposlc. Varlas, i. f. 135-6; Di- 
ario Mex., ix. G32. On April 5th the bishop of Oajaca delivered an oration 
in support of this recognition. Id., x. 451-5. 

25 Manuel Abad y Queipo in March 180D addressed the real acuerdo, urging 
the necessity of augmenting the military force in order to insure internal 
tranquillity and protection against invasion. With regard to the danger 
threatened by the prevailing discord, he remarks in a note that at the time 
when he wrote the representation 'no se podia entonces ponderareste peligro 
sin aumentarlo en realidad por cuya razon solamente lo indique, en concepto 
de quo esto era bastante para unos majistrados sabios e ilustrados en el asun- 
to.' Represent, al Real Acuerdo, in Mora, Obras Sueltas, i. 119-26, and Col. 
Escritos Import., 124-31. 

2li Bustamante assisted in drawing up the ' instruccion, clamando por el 
justo castigo de unos oidores revoltosos que nos iban orillando a la revolu- 
cion.' Cavo, TresSlglos, iii. 204. 


appointed Francisco Javier de Lizana y Beaumont, 
archbishop of Mexico, to be viceroy in the place of 
Garibay, whose election had riot been confirmed by 
the home government, and whose elevation could not 
be deemed legal. On the 19th of July Garibay sur 
rendered the place, having been nominally the head 
of the government for a period of ten months, but in 
reality the political tool of Oidor Aguirre, who, in 
some alarm at the change, requested leave to retire 
from office four days previous to Lizana's installation. 
Garibay returned to private life and poverty. From 
the latter, however, he was relieved by the generosity 
of Yermo, who made him a monthly allowance of five 
hundred pesos. He was afterward decorated with 
the grand cross of Carlos III., and granted a pension 
often thousand pesos a year. 27 Pie died on the 17th 
of July, 1815, at the age of eighty-six. 

During his brief administration he exerted himself 
in raising remittances for Spain, and when news of 
the victory at Baylen arrived, he issued a proclama 
tion, on October 4, 1808, asking for war contributions. 
His call in the general enthusiasm was liberally re 
sponded to, and the subscriptions, headed by the arch 
bishop with 30,000 pesos, amounted to 716,346 pesos 
by the end of the year. 28 A few days after its publi 
cation the Spanish man-of-war San Justo arrived at 
the port of Vera Cruz in command of the marques 
del Real Tesoro, who had been commissioned by the 
junta of Seville to obtain all the funds that could 
be raised in New Spain and other American colonies. 
At this time there were fourteen and a half millions 
pesos in the treasury, nine millions of which, together 
with two millions more contributed by wealthy indi 
viduals, were at once transported to Vera Cruz for 
shipment to Spain. 29 

27 Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 301; Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 765. 

28 By the end of June 1809 these donations reached the sum of 1,482,131 
pesos. /-/., xvi. 580. 

89 Eight millions were put on board the San Justo, and the remaining three 
millions were shipped on two English frigates which entered the port at that 


The new viceroy was no better than the old one. 
Had Spain specially desired to throw away Mexico, 
the appointment of Archbishop Lizana was the very 
thing to do. Old, sickly, as feeble in mind as in body, 
he was fitter for a hospital than for the viceregal 
palace. 33 In one sense he was too good for the place. 
Spain wanted there a mean man, a hypocritical, lying 
trickster; one who could be false to all the world except 
Spain particularly one who would be false to Mexico. 
Now Lizana was none of these. He was passably 
honest. He had a good heart, and a benign disposi 
tion; he lacked altogether the force of will to hold 
down insubordination, or regulate contending factions. 
Yet it was a lucky choice for the cause of indepen 
dence. The policy of such a ruler must necessarily 
be timid, and his purpose vacillating. 31 Episcopal 
pastorals were employed where viceregal orders should 
have been presented on the point of the sword. Frank 
and sincere, he had no insight into human character, 32 
and he allowed himself to be entirely swayed by the 
oidor Manuel de la Bodega and his cousin, the in 
quisitor Alfaro, to whose charge he committed the 
administration of his archiepiscopal government. Al 
faro, spurred by ambition but blinded by his vanity, 
soon fell into the toils of the racionales caballeros; and 
Lizana, under his guidance, adopted administrative 
measures which, while they excited the spirit of re 
time. Alaman, Hist. M?j., i. 286. Ncgrete makes no mention of the $2,000,- 
000 contributed by private subscriptions. Mex. Siylo XIX., i. 156. 

30 His state of health frequently compelled him to transact the public 
business in bed. Alaman, 1 1 lit. Afej., i. 303. 

31 As already related, the archbishop was at first favorably disposed to the 
convocation of a general congress; but alarmed at the angry disputes on the 
question, he suddenly changed his opinions, and took part with the deposers 
of Iturrigaray. He as quickly, however, repented of his action, ' confes6 d 
la Junta Central que habia sido enganado en la separacion de Iturrigaray, y 
que estaba arrepentido de haber cooperado a la ejecucion cle tan horrenda mal- 
dad.' Bustamante, in Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 265, also 244. Henceforth he 
favored the party which had advocated the convocation of a general congress. 

32 Bustamante describes him as 'eandoroso como ttno nino,'and Abad y 
Queipo says: 'Este virtuoso prelado era un hombre muy sencillo, que no cono- 
cia el corazon humano, ni tenia luces en materias politicas ni de gobierno.' 
Informe diriy. al rey., in Zamacois* ix. 863, 


bellion, conduced even more directly to the advance 
ment of the intriguers' designs. 

Thus led bv the craft and machinations which were 
brought to bear upon his adviser, Alfaro, he entered 
upon a system of opposition to the Yermo party and 
the stan chest loyalists. Their dissatisfaction at his 
official action was so marked that the intriguers had 
no difficulty in persuading the guileless archbishop 
that a plot was hatching among the gachupines to 
capture or assassinate him; whereupon he fortified the 
viceregal palace with artillery and increased the 
guard. He placed all that portion of the city under 
martial law. The patrol force w r as augmented, and 
detachments were stationed at all important points. 
Orders were issued that the patrols should arrest 
after eleven o'clock at night all persons on whom arms 
were found; and should more than six men in one party 
be met, they were all to be arrested. 33 Military offi 
cials of unquestionable loyalty to the mother country 
were removed. Aguirre arid other prominent Span 
iards were threatened with banishment, 34 and Lizana, 
abhorring the Yermo party, and hoodwinked by the 
racionales caballeros, who about that time were loud 
in their protestations of loyalty, identified himself with 
the Creole faction, which so eagerly had advocated the 
convocation of a national congress. He could not see 

33 Ib. A copy of this brilliant 6rden de la plaza, dated November 3, 1809, 
is supplied by Martinena and JJernandez y Ddvalos, Col. JJoc., i. 715- 
16. I copy the instructions given to the palace guard as indicating the extent 
to which the fears of Lizana had been worked upon. 'La guardia del arzo- 
bispado y casa de Moneda, no abriran las puertas principales de la calle aun 
cuando oigan tiros de fusil 6 canon durante la noche, a menos que no vaya 
mandarlo personalmente uno do los ayudantes de S. E. I.' Rev., Vcrdadcro 
Orirjen, no. 1, 78-9. Consult Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 254. Mora, how 
ever, states that a formal plot against his government and person actually 
existed, the conspirators being of the Yermo faction, with Aguirre at their 
head. M?j. y sus Rev., iii. 364-5. 

34 Aguirre was ordered to Puebla, and it was rumored that he would be 
sent to Spain. The excitement was so great that Lizana recalled him, and 
Aguirre returned to the capital in triumph, 'con gran discre'dito del arzobispo, 
quien con esta facilidad en dictar providencias contrarias, daba a conocer que 
6 no meditaba debidamente lo que hacia, 6 que despues de hecho no tenia 
firmezaparasostenerlo.' Alaman, Hist. Mej.,i. 312; Biistamante, in Cavo, Tres 
Sirjlos, iii. 2G8-9. 


that it was identical with the independents, and the 
partiality which he displayed, far from appeasing the 
spirit of discontent, only served to fan the flames by 
undesigned encouragement. It was as cunning a by 
play as the age can boast, and most successful withal. 35 
And all the while the good old prelate was thus un 
wittingly playing into the hands of independence, he 
was in truth intensely loyal to Spain. Money he sent 
without stint, and money was always Spain's most 
chronic desire. Besides obtaining large donations, he 
surrendered all the surplus funds of his ecclesiastical 
revenue, and even threw in his salary. 36 

On the 26th of July an Englishman, Andrew 
Cochrane, arrived in Mexico, the bearer of an order 
from the junta central of Spain for the sum of three 
million pesos, on behalf of the British government. 
The treasury was empty, and again the colonists were 
asked to give, give ! 37 The viceroy appealed for a loan; 
the call was answered with astonishing promptness, and 
by the 7th of August $2,955,435 had been subscribed 
by the commercial class and other persons of wealth. 
The remainder was soon made up; and the commis 
sioner, after being royally entertained, returned to his 
vessel, bearing with him the three million pesos, and a 
high appreciation of the wealth of Mexico 33 and the 

35 Lizana was by no means a supporter of independence, except by acci 
dent, and without knowing it. 'Este prelado en ningun sentido podia lla- 
marse amigo de la independencia; pero testigo de los escesos cometidos en 
muclios meses por los Espafioles, aprensores de Iturrigaray, habia concebido 
por ellos una conocida aversion.' Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.> iii. 303. 

36 ' He cedido gustosamente para las urgencias de la corona el sobrante de 
mi renta episcopal; y cedo gustosisimo para el mismo efecto los sueldos del 
virreynato.' Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 700. 

37 Cancdada, Tel. Mex., 32. Consult also Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 619-20, 703; 
Diario de Mex., xi. 119-20. 

38 Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 7G1-4. Among the subscribers of large sums to the 
loan, I notice the names of Antonio Bassoco, $200,000, Domingo de Acha, 
$150,000, and Prior Francisco Alonso Teran and his brother Antonio, $200,000. 
The total, as given by Cancelada, Tel. Mex., 36, was $3,210,435. Cochrane 
was entertained with great hospitality. At Puebla he was presented with 
two valuable paintings by Murillo! Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 304. This last 
author states that $400,000 of the above contribution were forcibly taken 
from the house of the duke of Terranova, marques del Valle, and a descend 
ant of Cortes. Id. , 3056. Bustamante, however, informs us that Lizana had 
received orders to confiscate the property of Terranova, who had attached 
himself to the party of Joseph Bonaparte. The sum which was seized, as 


senseless stupidity of the people in thus spending 
their lives and substance to minister to the follies of 
Spain's licentious and imbecile rulers. 

In regard to his government, the viceroy fully be 
lieved that his conciliatory policy toward the discon 
tented would allay any spirit of revolt that might 
exist; nevertheless, he deemed it right to carry out 
the measure adopted by his predecessor for the main 
tenance of public tranquillity, and on the 21st of 
September, 1809, permanently established the court 
initiated by Garibay, under the name of junta con- 
sultiva. This court, which Lizana named the junta 
de seguridad y buen orden, was composed at first of 
three members of the audiencia and a fiscal, 39 and its 
jurisdiction extended to all cases of French tendencies 
and infidelity to the crown of Spain. 40 

Hitherto the independent party had formed no con 
certed plan of operation. The arguments, however, 
which had been employed by the partisans of Iturri- 
garay, and their opponents, suggested ideas which led 
to the belief in the possibility of independence. The 
former, in defending Iturrigaray's character from the 
aspersion of disloyalty, urged that had he established 
an independent nation, it could not long have con 
tinued as such. Whether Spanish or French arms 
prevailed, an invincible force would quickly be sent 
against the revolted colony. Their opponents in reply 
imprudently endeavored to prove that Mexico could 
well sustain her independence. The force of their ar 
guments was such that the more eager of the revolu- 

given by this author, was 700,000 pesos. Cavo, Tres Sifjlos, iii. 2G5-6. On 
March 23, 1809, the Spanish government ordered the confiscation of the prop 
erty of French partisans. Gaz. Mex., xvi. 769-70; Disposic. Varies, i. f. 140. 
The repayment of these loans was commenced in the following September, a 
date earlier than that promised by the viceroy as the time for their liquida 
tion. Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 826-7. 

39 The members appointed by the viceroy were the regent of the audiencia, 
Pedro Catani, the oidor Tomas Gonzalez Calderon, the alcalde del crimen of 
the audiencia, Juan Collado, and the fiscal of the criminal court, Francisco 
Robledo. (Jaz. de Mex., xvi. 867. 

40 ' Sobre el delito de adhesion al partido frances, y sobre papeles, conver- 
saciones, 6 m urmuraciones sediciosas 6 seductivas con todas sus conexiones 
< incidencias.' Id., 868. 


tionists decided to act, and in September a formal plot 
was laid at Valladolid in Michoacan for the overthrow 
of the government. 41 The principal persons in the 
scheme were Jose Maria Obeso, captain of the militia 
regiment of Valladolid; a Franciscan friar, Vicente 
de Santa Maria; Manuel Ruiz de Chavez, cura of 
Huango; Jose Mariano de Michelena, lieutenant of 
the Spanish infantry, and at this time engaged at Va 
lladolid in recruiting for his regiment; his brother, the 
licentiate Jose Nicolas Michelena; Mariano Quevedo, 
lieutenant of the regiment of New Spain, also present 
on recruiting business ; and the licentiate Soto Saldafia. 
These and some others met and discussed a plan of 
action. With great caution they endeavored to ^con 
fine discussion to two questions: whether they would 
be able successfully to resist the French in case Spain 
succumbed, and thereby preserve the dominion for 
Fernando; and whether, such being their object, they 
ought to maintain their ground if opposed. Adher 
ents to the cause were despatched to Piitzcuaro, 
Queretaro, Zitacuaro, and other places to promulgate 
the scheme; and by the middle of December their 
operations had been so successful, that the 21st of that 
month was appointed as the day on which to raise the 
standard of revolt; their intention being first to seize 
the asesor of the intendencia, Jose Alonso de Teran, 
and the comandant Lejarza, and then proclaim the 
revolution in the intendencia of Guanajuato. The 
regiment of native infantry, commanded by Obeso, 
could be relied upon, as also the detachments with 
Michelena and Quevedo; and it was confidently ex 
pected that with the promise of release from the pay 
ment of tribute, eighteen or twenty thousand Indians 
would immediately join their standard. Hitherto the 
plans of the reA^olutionists had been conducted with 
such caution that the government officials appear to 
have been wholly unaware of the movement; but on the 

41 See Michelena's account of the influence which these arguments had upon 


the independent party. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 5. 


14th of December Francisco de la Concha, cura of the 
cathedral parish, warned Teran of the impending dan 
ger. One of the revolutionists, Luis Correa, had com 
municated particulars of the scheme to the cura of 
Celaya, who in turn revealed them in confidence to 
Concha. Teran acted with wariness and circumspec 
tion, and instead of proceeding to make arrests, was 
contented for the time silently to watch the persons ac 
cused. On the morning of the 21st, however, Concha 
again visited him and urged the necessity of immedi 
ate action ; whereupon he caused the padre Santa 
Maria to be arrested. This was immediately known 
by the principal revolutionists, who met to plan his 
rescue, while Correa in alarm for his safety hurried to 
Teran and divulged all that he knew. Summoned by 
the comandante Lejarza to appear before him, the 
revolutionists, deeming it prudent to obey, were made 
prisoners. Soto Saldaiia, who was not with the ar 
rested party, rashly attempted to rouse the native 
population, but was discovered; he escaped, however, 
and hid himself. 42 

Teran now proceeded to prosecute the accused with 
activity, and with a vigor which eventually was the 
cause of his assassination. 43 But the viceroy, more 
inclined to mercy, and believing that severity would 
only fan the revolutionary flame, listened to the rep 
resentations made to him in favor of the prisoners. 44 
He ordered in January following the proceedings to 

42 This account has been mainly derived from Michelena's narrative, sup 
plied by him to Bustamante, a copy of which is furnished by that author in 
his work Cuadro Hist., i. 12-16. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 314-17, has also been 
consulted, and his version of the denunciation been adopted. 

43 His severity 'le atrajo el 6dio publico, por lo que en la revolucion del 
ano 1810 fu4 cruelmente asesinado. ' Bustamante, in Cavo, Tres Sirjlos, iii. 268. 

44 Bustamante, counsel for the accused, pleaded for them personally with 
Lizana. ' El oidor Aguirre, ' he said, ' opina que el dia que se ahorque el primer 
insurgente, Espaua debe perder la esperanza de conservar esta America.' 
'Yo soy de la inisma opinion,' replied the viceroy, 'vuya V. seguro de que 
mandare sobreseer en esta causa.' Cuadro Hist., i. 17. Abaci y Queipo re 
presented to Lizana that 'cste primer movimiento se debia tratar, 6 con 
munho vigor, 6 con muohoindulgencia,' but remarks, 'Laenormidad deldelifco 
exigia la enormidad de la peaa.' Informe dirig. alrey., in Zamacois, Hist. 
Mcj., ix. 865-6. 


be stopped. Obeso was sent to serve in the military 
camp at San Luis Potosi, and Michelena in that at 
Jalapa; the rest were released from prison, but con 
fined to the limits of Valladolid and its suburbs. 45 

This affair thus nipped in the bud, in spite of the 
failure to prove its connection with Hidalgo's later in 
surrection, was in fact the initiation of active move 
ments in the revolution. The views and intentions 
of the leaders had been widely spread; numbers of 
their associates having escaped zealously carried on 
the work, and in nine months after the failure at 
Valladolid the battle-cry of freedom was raised at 

In order to allay the excitement caused by the dis 
covery of the affair at Valladolid, the viceroy, on the 
22d of January, 1810, proclaimed that there was no 
reason for alarm, as the late occurrences had only 
arisen from a difference of opinions relative to the re 
sult of affairs in Spain. He himself was wholly free 
from anxiety, and the public were exhorted to rest 
without dread of popular commotion. 411 

45 When the revolution headed by Hidalgo broke out in September 1810, 
these conspirators were again placed under arrest, and their case continued 
by the junta de seguridad. No connection, however, between the Valladolid 
conspiracy and that at Dolores could be proved against them, and in 1813 
they were released under the pardon granted to revolutionists by tho Span 
ish c6rtes on the 15th of October, 1810. Copy of decree in Dublan and Lo- 
zano, L^fjis. Mex., i. 336. Michelena on the occasion of his second arrest was 
treated with great severity by Viceroy Venegas, who imprisoned him in the 
fortress of Ulua. There he was cruelly dealt with, though suffering from 
rheumatism, and was finally shipped in a helpless condition to Spain where 
he served as a captain in the regiment of Burgos. Padre Santa Maria hav 
ing escaped from the convent of S. Diego where he had been confined, died 
of fever at Acapulco, whither he had gone to join Morclos, who was besieging 
the castle. Obeso died soon afterward, having been imprisoned for more thau 
two years. Few of these early patriots lived to see the day of independence. 
Michelena says: 'Casi todos murieron ysolo vimos realizada la independencia 
D. Antonio Cumplido, D. Antonio Castro, D. Jose" Maria Izazaga, D. Jose" 
Maria Abarca, D. Lorenzo Carrillo, yo, y no s6 si alguno otro.' JJustamante, 
Cnad. Hitf,, i. 16. The same authority states that both Allende and Aba- 
solo, so conspicuous at a later date as leaders in the revolution, were con 
nected with this affair. Bustamante is of opinion that Iturbide was the 
informer, offended at not being given a high command by the revolutionists 
whose meetings he attended. Alaman, however, advances arguments to dis 
prove this. Hint. Mej., i. 317-19. 

46 'Y pucs vuestro virey estd tranquilo, vivid vosotros tambien seguroa.' 
Mex. Proc. del Virey, 12. 


While thus blindly affording every encouragement 
to rebellion at home, Lizana took great precaution 
against the less imminent danger of foreign invasion. 
Out of the scattered companies formed by Iturrigaray 
in various towns, he organized battalions; 47 the regi 
ment of Yera Cruz was increased, and arms were or 
dered to be purchased in London and the United 
States. In the exhausted condition of the treasury, 
the viceroy once more appealed for money to pay for 
these weapons, and considerable sums were contrib 
uted. A cannon foundry was established in the 
capital, Francisco Dimas Rangel engaging to furnish 
the government weekly with one piece of artillery. 
The cost of the establishment was $8,000, which 
amount was contributed by the dean and chapter of 
Valladolid. 48 

Meanwhile disaster attended the Spanish arms! 
After the battle of Talavera, Wellington had retired 
into Portugal, leaving the Spaniards to cope with 
the French as best they could; and Venegas, the fu 
ture viceroy of New Spain, rashly giving battle at 
Almonacid was routed on the 9th of August, 1809. 
Then followed the defeat at Osana, and the retirement 
of the junta central from Seville to the island of Leon. 
The unpopularity of the junta was so great, however, 
that the members recognized the necessity of dissolv 
ing, and their last official act was the creation, on the 

O * 

29th of January, 1810, of a regency composed of five 
members, the bishop of Orense, Pedro de Quevedo y 
Quintano, who had firmly opposed the projects of 
Napoleon at the congress of Bayonne; Francisco de 
Saavedra, president of the junta de Se villa; Fran- 

47 This was the origin of the battalions of Tula, Cuautitlan, Tulaucingo, 
and others. Alaman, Hist. Alej., i. 321. 

**Gaz. de. Mex. t 1310, i. 247-8; Diario, Mex., xii. 535-6. The celebrated 
sculptor Manuel Tolsa was also engaged at this time in casting 100 cannon at 
the expense of the tribunal de mincria, the cost of which was ...00,003. These 
cannon as already mentioned had been offered l>y that tribunal to Iturrigaray, 
and Tolsa commenced work at the close of Garibay's administration. Ataman, 
Hint. Mcj., i. 300, 321. 


cisco Javier Castaiio, the victor at Baylen; Antonio 
de Escano, a distinguished naval officer; and Fernan 
dez de Leon, a member of the council of the Indies. 
On the 14th of February this change in the gov 
ernment was communicated to the viceroy of New 
Spain, and on the 7th of May following the oath of 
allegiance to the regency was taken by Lizana and 
all the royal officials, the occasion being celebrated for 
three days in the usual manner. 49 In the same decree 
by which the junta central appointed the regency, it 
was ordered that the members, when they took the 
oath of office, should also swear to convoke the c6rtes 
at the earliest opportunity. As the American colonies 
were for the first time represented in the cdrtes when 
they finally assembled, it will be necessary to give 
some account of the admission of colonial deputies into 
the legislature. 

The critical position of Spain at the close of 1808 
induced the junta central which had been compelled 
to withdraw from Aranjuez to Seville to consider 
by what means it might hope to secure the fidelity of 
the colonies. To admit them to a share in the national 
government appeared the most pacifying offer; and on 
the 22d of January, 1809, a decree was passed recog 
nizing the Spanish dominions in America as no longer 
colonies but an integral part of the nation, 50 and de 
claring their right to representation in the Spanish 
cortes. It is then ordered that the viceroys of New 
Spain, Peru, New Granada, Buenos Aires, and the 
captain-generals of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Chile, Vene 
zuela, and the Philippines proceed to the election of 
one deputy for each of those dominions. 51 On the 

* 9 Dispos. Varias, ii. f. 2; Diario de Mex., xii. 511-12; Gaz. de Mex., 
1810, i. 378-84, The oath was also ordered to be taken in all other places of 
the kingdom. New Spain was the only Spanish colony which recognized 
the consejode regencia. Rivera, Hist. Jal., i. 273. 

50 Considerando que los vastos y preciosos dominios que Espana posee en 
las Indias no son propiamente colonias 6 factorias como los de otros naciones, 
sine una parte esencial 6 integrante de la monarquia Espaiiola.' Gaz. de Mex., 
xvi. 326. 

51 New Granada expostulated against this small concession, and Mier y 
Guerra comments upon such inadequate representation in the cortes, which 


14th of April following, this regulation was pro 
claimed by Viceroy Garibay; but the concession had 
been granted grudgingly and under the pressure of 
circumstances, and the junta central was in no haste 
to see the cortes assembled. Although on the 22d 
of May following it proclaimed the establishment 
of the old form of representation, and convoked the 
cortes to meet on March 1, 1810, it took no prepara 
tory steps for such an event. 52 

When, however, the junta central was compelled to 
resign the affairs of the nation to the care of a re 
gency, it required the new government, as already 
narrated, to convoke the cortes at the earliest oppor 
tunity. This could not be immediately accomplished, 
since there were difficulties which rendered it no easy 
matter to readopt the ancient mode of government, 
and assemble in one congressional body the cortes of 
the various kingdoms of Spain. While these king 
doms respectively retained their cortes, the general 
assembly of them for purposes of government had 
during the dynasty of the Bourbons been neglected, 
and they were seldom convoked except to do homage, 
or sanction a succession to the crown. The cortes 
formerly had been composed of three classes repre 
senting the nobility, church, and burghers; and the 

would be composed of 36 European members, 9 American, and one from the 
Philippines. Rev. de N. Esp., i. 253, ii. 638-9. The election of an American 
deputy was to be thus conducted : The ayuntamiento of the capital town in 
each province of a viceregal kingdom was to nominate three competent persons, 
one of whom was then to be elected by casting lots as the representative 
of his province. When all such representatives were elected, the viceroy and 
real acuerdo wefe to select by vote three of them, from whom the deputy to 
Spain was finally appointed by lot. Gaz. de Mex. , xvi. 325-8. In New Spain 
the ayuntamientos which sent up candidates to Mexico were those of Puebla, 
Vera Cruz, Me"rida de Yucatan, Oajaca, Valladolid, Guanajuato, San Luis 
Potosi, Guadalajara, Zacatecas, Tabasco, Queretaro, Tlascala, Nuevo Leon, 
and Nuevo Santander. Id., 1810, i. 420. 

62 This decree was published in Mexico on the 14th of August, 1809. Di*- 
pos. Varias, i. f. 139; Interfer. Brit. Gov., MS., in Mayer MS., no. 27, p. 2. 
On the 4th of October the deputy for New Spain was appointed, the lots 
having decided the election in favor of Miguel Lardizabal, a Creole of Tlas 
cala resident in Spain. Gaz. de Mex., xvi. 901 (Gaz. Ex.); Alaman, Hist. 
Mej., i. 308. He was afterward appointed member of the regency for the 
American colonies in place of Fernandez de Leon, who suffered from ill 
health. BustamanteinCavo, Trcs Slylos, iii. 269; Cortes, Diario, 1810, i. 8. 


junta central bad decided that the cortes convoked by 
them on the 22d of May should be divided into two 
houses, the one formed by the deputies popularly 
elected, and the other by the church and nobility. 
Just before its dissolution 53 it modified its former de 
cree relative to American representation, and for the 
speedy assembly of the cortes ordered that forty sub 
stitutes should be selected by lot from the number of 
American Creoles resident in Spain, out of which num 
ber twenty-six were to be finally elected to the cortes, 
also by lot. This decree was not published, however, 
and the regency being in no greater haste to assemble 
the cortes than the junta central had been, published 
one on the 14th of February, 1810, ordering the elec 
tion of American deputies to be proceeded with, and 
extending their number to representation of each dis 
trict, 54 instead of each dominion. But this increase 
was virtually no nearer an approach to equality in 
representation than the first concession had been, since 
the number of Spanish deputies was proportionately 
increased, by allowing a member for each fifty thou 
sand souls. In fact, though both the junta central 
and the regency acknowledged equality of rights, 
they could not admit Creoles to be represented in con 
gress in the same ratio as the inhabitants of the pe 
ninsula. The unjust disparity again caused dissatis 
faction in the colonies, which was still further excited 
by an order of the 28th of June limiting the total 
number of American representatives to twenty-eight, 
without designating how many should pertain to each 
province. The consequence was that in some districts 
no elections were held, while in other cases the for- 

53 On the 31st of January 1810, Ataman, Hist. Mej., i. 334. The regency 
was installed on the 2d of February. Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 380. 

4 ' Estos diputados seran uno por cada capital cabeza de partido de estas 
diferentes provincias.' Id., 419. The decree was published in Mexico on the 
16th of May following, and no less than 17 deputies elected, representing 
Mexico, Guadalajara, Valladolid, Puebla, Veracruz, Me"rida, Guanajuato, 
San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, Tabasco, Queretaro, Tlascala, Nuevo Leon, Oajaca, 
Sonora, Durango, and Coahuila. They were all natives of the districts in 
which they were elected with one exception, and were nearly all ecclesias 
tics. For a list of their names see Alaman, Hist Mej., i. app. 49-50. 


mally elected deputies declined going to Spain in the 
expectation that some new order would exclude them 
from the cortes on their arrival. 

Such treatment of the colonies did not tend to pro 
mote more loyal feelings toward the mother country, 55 
in spite of the regency's proclamation that Spanish 
Americans were raised to the dignity of free men, and 
the extraordinary admission that hitherto they had 
been crushed by an oppressive yoke, regarded without 
consideration, and made the victims of avarice. 56 
Eventually on the 24th of September, 1810, without 
waiting for the arrival of the American deputies, the 
c6rtes were installed in the theatre of the island of 
Leon, and in the list of members I find New Spain 
represented by seven substitutes. 57 But it is time to 
consider how affairs were progressing meanwhile in 
that country, and narrate the events which immedi 
ately preceded the revolution of independence. 

Great as had been the sums of money contributed 
by the inhabitants of New Spain in the form of 
loans and donations for the support of the mother 
country, they seemed only to encourage further de 
mands. On the 12th of March, 1809, the junta cen 
tral issued a royal cedula for the negotiation of a loan 

, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., ii. 640. The regency had been stimulated to 
action by the representations of some provincial juntas which had assembled 
iu Cadiz; and on the 18th of June a decree was issued to hasten the appoint- 
ment of deputies, who were to meet in the island of Leon during the month 
of August, and hold sessions as soon as a sufficient number had assembled. 
Those provinces of Spain which were occupied by the French were represented 
by substitutes selected from natives of such districts resident in Cadiz, while 
28 substitutes for the deputies of American and Asiatic colonies who could not 
arrive in time were also provided from American Creoles residing in the same 
city. Ib.; Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 33G; Diario de Mex., xiii. 385-6. 

56 '0sveis elevados a la dignidad ' are the words used in the regency's 
proclamation of the 14th of February. Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 418 'de hom- 
brcs libres: no sois ya los mismos que antes encorbados baxo un yugo mucho 
mas duro mientras mas distantes estabais del centro del poder, mirados con 
indiferencia, vexados por la codicia, y destruidos por la ignorancia.' 

57 Their names were Andre's Savariego, Francisco Munilla, Jos6 Maria 
Gutierrez de Teran, Jos6 Maria Couto, Salvador Samartin, Octaviano Obregon, 
and Maximo Maldonado. Cortes, Diario, 1810, i. 2. By decree of August 
20, 1810, Indians and Spanish-Indian offspring were made eligible to the rank 
of deputies. Diario de Mex., xiii. 689. 


in New Spain for twenty millions of pesos. This 
demand was published in Mexico on the 9th. of August 
following, at the very time when three millions were 
being so cheerfully contributed to meet the order pre 
sented by Cochrane. The colonists were disgusted at 
old Spain's avarice. This incessant drainage of specie 
was crippling commerce and impoverishing the peo 
ple. They were neither able nor willing to respond. 58 
A second attempt to raise this amount made in 1810 
by Viceroy Venegas was equally unsuccessful. 59 

In addition to the discontent thus created, and 
naturally tending to independent thought and action, 
the defeats sustained by the Spanish forces at the 
close of 1809 still further influenced the colonists, 
who now regarded the cause of the mother country 
as lost. The news of these disasters was received at 
Vera Cruz on the 25th of April, 1810; and so fully 
convinced were the viceroy and oidores of the irre 
trievable prostration of Spain by France, that in 
secret sessions they discussed their future course of 
action, and had already decided to invite the infanta 
Dona Carlota Joaquina, previously mentioned, to as 
sume the government as regent of her brother Fer 
nando, 60 when intelligence of the installation of the 
regency caused them to abandon their intention. 

But the administration of Lizana was drawing to 
a close. The commercial class, thoroughly conserva 
tive in principles, and unyielding opponents of the 
Creoles, was disgusted with his conciliatory system; 
and informed the junta of Cd/diz, 61 composed of lead- 

58 Abaci y Queipo pointed out to the viceroy the impracticability of effect 
ing it, and suggested plans for the relief of the junta central by increasing 
the alcabala duty two per cent, and the price of tobacco from ten reals to 
twelve or even fourteen reals as the urgencies of the nation might call for. 
Col. Eficritos Import., 132-48; fiivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 272; Bustamante, in 
Cavo, Tres Stylos, iii. 2G6. 

&Gaz. de Hex., 1810, i. 797-801. 

60 Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 324-5, asserts that he derived this information 
from manuscript notes of his brother Dr Arechederreta, who was an intimate 
friend of the oidor Tomas Gonzalez Calderon, from whom Arechederreta 
must have heard these particulars, which were kept very secret. 

01 This junta had been established by popular demand for the protection 


ing merchants in accord with those of Mexico, of the 
direction affairs were taking under his management. 
The pressure brought to bear by this junta upon the 
regency caused that council to issue a decree on the 
22d of February, 1810, 62 relieving the archbishop, in 
consideration of his advanced a^e and failing health, 
from the labors of administration, and placing the 
audiencia in charge of the government until the arrival 
of a new viceroy. Lizana immediately obeyed the 
command, and on the 8th of May following surrendered 
the viceregal power to the audiencia, and retired to 
his archiepiscopal palace. 63 

Though Lizana's rule tended to foster the revolu 
tionary spirit, it was not owing to any infidelity on 
his part, but to a mistaken principle and a childlike 
trust in men. A few days before his retirement, he 
issued an exhortation to loyalty, denouncing a procla 
mation of Joseph Bonaparte which he publicly burned 
in the principal plaza of the capital. 64 He recognized 
later some of his mistakes, and endeavored with the 
ecclesiastical weapons of excommunication and pasto 
ral circulars to rectify the evil which he had uninten 
tionally fomented. The Spanish regency decorated 
Lizana with the grand cross of Carlos III., an 
honor conferred upon him a few months before his 
death, which occurred on the 6th of March, 18 II. 65 

The removal of Lizana in no way improved matters. 
There was want of harmony among the oidores ; when 
unanimous accord was the only road to successful ad 
ministration, the audiencia was divided into two fac 
tions. The regent Catani was influenced by the same 
ideas and the same advice which had so ill directed 

of the city; but its influence soon became greater than that of the regency. 
Id., 226-7; Junta Sup. de Cadiz, d la Amer. Esp., 3. 

62 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 21. 

Gaz. de Hex., 1810, i. 391-2. 

^Prodama del Arzob. Virey, 24 de Abril de 1810; Bustamante, in Cavo, 
TresSiglos, iii. 272; Diario de Mex., xii. 674; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. 
Doc., ii. 28-32. 

6 *Sosa, Episcop. Mex., 206-13. 


the archbishop, and was, moreover, at enmity with 
the oidor decano Aguirre. These members were the 
heads of the two parties, Aguirre being recognized as 
the enemy of the Creoles and Catani as their supporter. 
On the 9th of May the audiencia organized its gov 
ernment, by declaring that to it as a body pertained 
the superior administration and the captain-general 
ship of the kingdom, while Regent Catarii wa.s in 
vested with the presidency and superintendence of the 
royal treasury. The oidores Blaya and Calderon, 
in view of their increased duties, were removed from 
the junta de seguridad, and their places supplied by 
the governor and the two eldest alcaldes of the crim 
inal court. The ordinary business in the different 
departments of the government was to be despatched 
by respective oidores commissioned for the purpose; a 
council of military chiefs was to supply all necessary 
information and advice relative to the condition of 
the army; and in all the more important cases of the 
tribunal de la Acordada the regent was to be con 
sulted and his approval obtained for the execution 
of the heavier sentences. 68 

During the administration of the audiencia, exhibi 
tions of natural phenomena occurred, presaging dis 
aster. On the 20th of May, the church of Nuestra 
Senora de los Remedies was struck by lightning; and 
a great portion of the edifice being destroyed, it was 
found necessary to remove to the cathedral the sacred 
image, which was greatly venerated by the native 
Mexicans. It was afterward borne in solemn proces 
sion to the different churches of the capital, and the 
demonstrations of devotion were noticed as being ex 
traordinarily earnest. When on the 10th of August 
the image was returned to its sanctuary, it was accom 
panied by an immense concourse, who in tears chanted 
prayers for divine protection. 67 But in the night 

de Mex., 1810, i. 411-13. 
6T Bustamante, who was an eye-witness of these religious observances, 


which preceded this auspicious day, a furious hurri 
cane had spread desolation in Acapulco, no less than 
124 houses being torn down, while orchards and plan 
tations were destroyed. On the 18th Vera Cruz was 
visited by a terrible storm which wrecked and dam 
aged much shipping. 63 

The discord in the audiencia was favorable to the 
development of revolution. Apart from the absence 
of secrecy which want of unity naturally entailed, the 
annoyance which each party experienced by the oppo 
sition of the other created a feeling of indifference, 
and a consciousness that efforts to arrest the public 
will would be unavailing. Consequently apathy and 
toleration marked the sluggish proceedings of the au 
diencia, affording an unwonted freedom of discussion 
on political topics. The spirit of revolt was further 
aggravated at this time by the unjust illiberality dis 
played by the regency in the matter of colonial rep 
resentation at the forthcoming congress of the cortes. 
If the mother country in her apparent death agony 
refused to do justice to her American colonies which 
in the past had so loyally aided her, and in which she 
seemed to rest her only hope for the future no relief 
from her oppression could be expected in case her 
arms triumphed. 69 Moreover, the continued procla 
mations of Joseph Bonaparte, and seditious papers 
issued by his agents, gave additional impetus in the 
direction of independence. 70 

wrote a detailed account of them bearing the title : Memoria piadosa que re- 
cordard d la posteridad, la piedad de (os Mexicanos manifestada en la venida 
de Ntra Sra de los Remedies, y contiene dos paries. Cavo, Tres Siylos, iii. 274-5. 

Gz. de Mex., 1810, i. 686-7. 

Mora, Mej. y mis Rev., iii. 372-4. 

70 Bonaparte in 1809 openly announced: 'Qne era ya llegado el tiempo de 
cjue las Americas espauoles quedasen independientes, y que el gobierno fran 
cos no se opondria a este paso necesario.' Mora, Mej. y sits Rev., iii. 368. 
The inquisition in vain attempted to suppress the circulation of such sheets. 
In the months of April, June, and September, 1810, it published proclama 
tions against King Joseph, and under threats of excommunication ordered all 
papers of the kind to be delivered up that they might be publicly burnt by 
the executioner. Diario Mex., xii. 463-8; Dispos. Varias, iii. f. 153, vi. f. 
58, 60. French emissaries were a constant source of alarm, and measures to 


On the 25th of August, 1810, the frigate Atocha 
dropped anchor in the port of Vera Cruz. The ves 
sel brought to the shores of New Spain her fifty- 
ninth viceroy, Francisco Javier de Venegas, knight 
of the order of Calatrava. 71 Venegas was in no haste 
to reach the seat of his government, but journeying 
slowly from Vera Cruz to the capital, made himself 
conversant with the state of affairs, and formed 
friendly relations with persons whose services he con 
sidered useful. For Campillo, the bishop of Puebla, 
and Flon, the intendente of that city, he contracted a 
sincere attachment. On the 13th of September the 
audiericia surrendered the government to him at 
Guadalupe, and on the following day he made his 
public entry into the capital with the customary 
pomp and ceremonies. 

Venegas, who had retired from the army with the 
rank of lieutenant-colonel, returned to active service 
in 1808, on the invasion of Spain by the French, and 
won distinction in the memorable battle of Baylen. 
Henceforth his promotion was rapid, and he soon 
obtained the grade of lieutenant-general. Although 
he suffered defeat at Almonacid 72 by imprudent self- 
confidence, he enjoyed a high reputation in New 
Spain as a courageous military chief. Birstamante, 
in somewhat disparaging and ill-measured language, 
thus describes his personal , appearance : "Tall and 
robust of frame, the expression of his countenance 
was sour, and his glance angry and threatening; his 
lips were thick, and his head, which he held inclined 

prevent their operations and destroy their influence were taken both in Spain 
and Mexico. For copies of instructions given to these agents, their procla 
mations, and descriptions of their intrigues, consult Gonzalez, Col. N. Leon, 
153-8; Manificsto contra las Iiistruc. Emperador; Calvilio, Discurso; and 
Diario Alex., xiii. 43-4. 

71 For a list of his names, titles, and decorations, see Cedulario, i. f. 92, 
and Dispos. Farias, ii. f. 3. In the latter document appears his rubrica. 

72 Guerra states that he lost the army of the centre at the two battles of 
Tarancon and Ucles, 'que di6 y perdio por su ineptitud, como consta del 
Manifesto del Duque del Infantado. ' Cuesta went so far as to state that Vene 
gas 'by gross ignorance, want of skill, envy, or malice, lost, perhaps forever, 
the only opportunity of saving Spain.' Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 296. 


over the left shoulder, was of enormous size. His 
whiskers were of the same cut and shape as those of 
the myrmidons of the acordada, desperadoes, and bull 
fighters; and his impetuous gait was similar to that 
of an ill-tempered corporal." 73 Venegas was, how 
ever, honest and disinterested, an indefatigable worker, 
and energetic and quick in the despatch of business. 
Distrustful when in security, he was calm and self- 
possessed in danger, but displayed a sanguinary and 
cruel disposition. 74 

On the 18th of September the new viceroy con 
voked an assembly composed of the audiencia, all the 
principal civil and military authorities, the dignitaries 
of the church, prelates of the regular orders, the 
nobility, and prominent land owners and members of 
the commercial class. To this numerous attendance 
a proclamation addressed by the regency to the Ameri 
cans on the 5th of May was read. In it the condi 
tion of Spain was set forth, and an appeal made for 
still further contributions in order to continue the 
war. A list also of patriotic individuals on whom had 
been conferred titles of nobility and honors was also 
read. A plan for the collection of donations suggested 

73 His dress and personal appearance were the subject of numerous pas 
quinades which were posted on the corners of the principal streets. One 
quoted by Bustamante was as follows: ' De patilla, botas y pantalon, hechura 
de Napoleon.' Cavo, Tres Si(jlos, iii. 277. Another which was posted on the 
palace gate aggravated the viceroy to make reply. It ran thus: 
' Tu cara no es de excelencia 
Ni tu trage de virey, 
Dios ponga tiento en tus manos 
No destruyas nuestra ley.' 

Venegas caused the following lines to be posted in the same place: 

' Mi cara no es de excelencia, 
Ni mi trage de virey, 
Pero represento al rey, 
Y obtengo su real potcncia. 
Esta sencilla advertencia 
Os hago, por lo que importe : 
La ley ha de ser el norte 
Que dirija mis acciones. 
j Cuidado con las traiciones 
Quo se ban hecho en esta Cortel* 

Rivera, Gob. de Hex., i. 564. 

74 Opinions with regard to the abilities of Venegas are diametrically oppo 
site according as they are regarded by his friends or opponents. Abad y Queipo 
describes him as a talented, learned, and upright man, Informe, in Zamacois, 
Hist. Mf-j., ix. 867-8; while Zavala states that he possessed neither political 
nor military talent. Rev. Hex., i. 43. Consult Adalid, Causa, MS., i. 134-6. 


by the fiscals was then discussed and approved, many 
of those present subscribing at once, the archbishop 
heading the list with thirty thousand pesos. Among 
the recipients of honors were Garibay and the arch 
bishop, both of whom were decorated with the grand 
cross of Carlos III., while Gabriel de Yermo, Diego 
de Agreda, Sebastian de las Heras Soto, and Jose 
Mariano Fagoaga were raised to the dignity of tftulos 
de Castilla. 75 Other honors were conferred upon a 
number of individuals corresponding to their positions 
and the services rendered by them, and it was observed 
that many of the recipients had been principal actors 
in the deposal of Iturrigaray. 

Both the demands for money and the awards of 
honor were offensive to the Spanish Americans. The 
appeal to them for more gold and silver in the same 
breath that bestowed titles and distinctions upon 
their opponents was an insult, and their indignation 
drove them in still greater numbers to the ranks of 
the revolutionists who were already in the field. 76 For 
Hidalgo had given the signal for revolt; the grito de 
Dolores was already echoing throughout the land, and 
thousands were rising in arms to do battle for liberty 
and the rights of man. 

73 Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 764-5, 776-86; Diario de Mex., xiii. 347-8. The 
titulo de Castilla was a title of nobility intermediate between those of the 
grandees and hidalgos of Spain. Salvd, Nuevo Dice. , 1054. Yermo and Fagoaga 
declined the honor. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 343-4. 

76 The Mexican deputation to Spain stated in August 1811 that 'las gra- 
cias que Ilev6 el Virey Don Francisco Venegas para los autores complices de 
la faccion' carried alarm through the country. Diputac. Amer. Hep., 3. 






FROM the time when Viceroy Velasco made grants 
of town lots arid agricultural lands to settlers in Quere- 
taro, 1 the progress of that place was rapid. Beauti 
fully situated in a sheltered valley, the fertility of the 
soil and the pureness of the air invited immigrants 
from the capital and other populous towns Iving to 
the south. In 1592 municipal books were opened, 
and henceforward its prosperity was such that in 1655 
Felipe IV. elevated it to the rank of city, with the 
appellation of Santiago de Queretaro, and the hon 
orable title of muy noble y real ciudad. A coat of 
arms was also granted, significant of the miraculous 
manifestation witnessed by the opposing armies in 
that strange battle which was fought in 153 1. 2 The 

Consult Hist. Mex., vol. ii. 544-5, this series. 

2 See Id., 540-4. The arms consisted of a cross with the sun for its 
pedestal and a bright star on either side. The figure of Santiago on horse 
back occupies the dexter base, and a palm tree and other plants the sinister 
base. The whole is surmounted by the royal arms of Castile and Leon. I 
give herewith a plan of the city from Quere.taro, Orden. que para la Division. 
See also Zdaa 6 Hidalgo Glorias de Quer., 2-3, containing plan of city, p. 243. 



position of Queretaro on the borders of the uncon 
verted Chichimecs attracted at an early date the at 
tention of the regular orders. The first monastic 
establishment was the Franciscan convent of Santa 
Cruz, the date of the founding of which is, however, 
uncertain, although its origin w r as the humble her 
mitage which was constructed at the time when the 


miraculous stone cross was erected on the Sangremal. 
The first convent and its church were in time re- 


placed by larger buildings, and in 1666, when the 
new edifices were completed, the convent was made 
the casa de recoleccion of the pro vine ia under the 
name of San Buenaventura. In 1683 it was con 
verted into the apostolic college of propaganda fide, 
founded by Fray Antonio Linaz de Jesus Maria 
the first establishment of the kind in the Indies. 3 

3 Id., 38-40. Linaz was born at Arta, in the island of Majorca, in January 
1635, became a friar in 1653, and presbitero in 1659. His name, Jesus JMaria, 
was derived from the convent in which he was novitiate. In 10(54 he arrived 
HIST. ME*. , VOL. IV. 7 


By the enthusiastic members social reforms were 
introduced, which, however beneficial to the poorer 
classes, grievously interfered with public and private 
amusements. Balls, comedies, and public games were 
discontinued; certain feasts in which bulls, Moors, 
and Christians were represented in procession, were 
also done away with. These festivities were so attrac 
tive to the lower orders that in order to participate 
in them with appropriate display they would sell their 
household chattels. Another abuse corrected was the 
promiscuous bathing of the sexes in the river, to the 
sound of music, and midst the noise of feasting on the 
banks. Henceforth the inhabitants of Queretaro 
were, doubtless, a devout and moral community, 
though much against their will. 4 

o o 

After the surrender of their convent of Santa Cruz, 
the Franciscans erected what may be considered the 
third monastery of the order built in Queretaro, and 
which was the capitular convent of the province. 
Annexed to it is a sumptuous church, which was 
greatly embellished by Fray Jose de Soria, who died 
in Mexico in December 1734. Within the limits of 
its cemetery various other sacred edifices were erected, 
among which may be mentioned the church of the 
Venerable Orden Tercera de Penitencia, in which 
the noble and the wealthy performed their devotions 
and penitential vows. 

in Michoacan from Spain and was elected guardian of the convent of Valla- 
dolid in 1C71, and in 1074 was appointed custodio to attend the general 
chapter held in Spain in 1G82. He returned in 1083 to found the colegio de 
propaganda fide. Linaz fasted much, and at times fell into ecstatic trancus 
while at prayer. Miraculous virtues are attributed to him, which he con 
tinued to manifest after his death, which occurred at Madrid on the 29th of 
June, 1093. Etpinosa, Cron. Apost., i. 93-251, 320-1, 80-4. 

4 Espinosa, after describing the reforms, speaks of a citizen, who having 
been absent for some time, on his return as he approached the city inquired 
of one whom he met on the road what news there was in Quere" taro. ' Seuor, ' 
replied the man, ' Quer6taro is no more Quere"taro; some priests have come, 
and no longer are there fandangos as before; sadness prevails, no harp or gui 
tar is heard; there is nothing but praying and preaching, so that the place 
has lost its mirth.' Id., 54-5. Consult also Arricivita, Cron. Seraf., 8-9, 
34-5, 174-82, 201-6. The miraculous cross was removed from its original 
site in 1701 and placed in the crucero of the church of this convent, 
no*a, Cron. Apost., i. 19; Glorias de Quer., 39. 


Numerous other convents added to the sanctity and 
embellishment of the city, but special notice must be 
taken of the convent and royal hospital of the Puri- 
sima Concepcion. This hospital was founded by Diego 
cle Tapia, son of Fernando de Tapia, the conqueror, 
about the year 1586. The same benefactor founded 
the Franciscan nunnery of Santa Clara, which was 
transferred to a new site in 1633, and thither were 
conveyed the same year to their final repose the 
bones of the founder. Other religious establishments 
were the monasteries of the Franciscan order of 
barefooted friars and the barefooted Carmelites; the 
Jesuit church and college of San Ignacio de Loyola 
founded in 1625; the Dominican convent of San Pedro 
y San Pablo; the royal college of Santa Rosa and 
its magnificent church; the Capuchin, Austin, and 
Carmelite nunneries, and other religious institutions. 
By royal cedula of October 10, 1671, permission 
was granted to the congregation of our lady of 
Guadalupe founded in 1669 to erect a church in San 
tiago de Queretaro; and in 1680, owing to the mu 
nificence of Juan Caballero y Osio, 5 by whom the 
greater part of the expenses were defrayed, the build 
ing was so far advanced as to admit of its being dedi 
cated. The ceremony took place on the 12th of May, 
and was conducted with a solemnity and splendor 
never before witnessed in the city. Visitors from all 
parts of New Spain assembled on the occasion, and the 
festivities which followed were continued for eight 
days. The church is the most sumptuous in Quere 
taro. 6 

The success of the religious orders in the conver- 

6 Oslo had previously proved himself a munificent benefactor by his liberal 
donations to numerous religious institutions, in several instances defraying the 
entire cost of the erection of chapels and convents. He was a captain of in 
fantry, became alcalde mayor of Quer6taro, and was finally ordained priest. 
He possessed a large fortune which he devoted to such purposes and charity. 
He died in Quer6taro on the llth of April, 1707, at the age of 73, ' y fue" sepul- 
tado en la Santa Casa de Loreto, dentro de una caxa de hierro, mandando poner 
por epitafio solo estas breves palabras. Hcec requies mea.' Sigiienza y G6>i- 
gara, Glorias de Quer., 19; fg/esias, AW., 157-8. 

6 Id., 95-171; Medina, Chron., S. Diego Hex., 254; Diario, Mex., 117. 


sion of the Chichi mecs was signal, and the missions 
they founded in the Sierra Gorda had more effect 
in reducing them to submission than the steel and 


gunpowder of the military. In time, however, the 
missions became secularized, and in 1785 only two out 
of the twenty established remained under the con 
trol of the friars, namely San Miguel de las Palm as, 
administered by the Dominicans, and Concepcion 
Soriano, or Bucareli, by the barefooted friars of San 
Diego. 7 

Although the Indians of Sierra Gorda were occa 
sionally troublesome during the eighteenth century, 
their insubordination did not interfere with the growth 
of the city or the development of industrial interests. 
In the architectural beauty of its churches, religious 
establishments, and public buildings, Queretaro is 
equal to any city in Mexico, except the capital. In, 
1796 it had 272 streets with twenty-one public foun 
tains and six plazas. Its length from east to west at 
this date was nearly two miles and three quarters, and 
its w r idth from north to south over one mile and a quar 
ter. 8 The water supply of Queretaro, obtained at a dis 
tance of two leagues, is conveyed into the city by its 
celebrated aqueduct, a structure of singular solidity and 
architectural beauty. The arches are supported on 
seventy-two pillars of hewn stone, eighteen varas apart, 
and twenty-seven varas high. The work was begun in 
January 1726, and completed in October 1735, at an 
expense of $124,800, $82,000 of which were donated 
by Juan Antonio Urrutia y Arana, marques del Vi- 
llar de la Aguila. 9 But the pride of the place is La 
Canada, a beautiful glen penetrating for two leagues 
the mountains which surround the city, and affording 
views of such exquisite loveliness that no city in the 

ipinart, Col. "Doc. Hex., MS., 271-3, 457-8. In 1740 the number of mis 
sions was 17, ten of which were founded by Franciscans and seven by Domi 
nicans. Orozco y Berra, Carta Etnog., 260-1; Arricivita, Cron. Scrdf., 169- 
71; Sigiienza y Gongara, Carta al Almir, MS., 10-11. 

^Queretaio, Ordenanzaque jiarala Division. 

9 For an account of the festivities held in celebration of the completion of 
the aqueduct see JSavurrcte, lleiac. Peregrin., no. i. 03-163. 


world can surpass them, or offer suburban recreation 
grounds more attractive. 10 About five leagues to the 
south-east of the city are the hot mineral springs of 
San Bartolome, situated about a mile from the 
pueblo of that name, the medicinal properties of which 
both as a beverage and for the bath have proved effi 
cacious in a variety of diseases. 11 Although Queretaro 
is signally exempt from epidemics and physical catas 
trophes, 12 it has occasionally been visited by disasters. 
The year 1786 was noticeable for the severity of a 
famine which caused much suffering, and in 1806 
great mortality of children occurred from an epidemic 
lung disease. 13 

The agricultural and manufacturing industries in 
dicate great prosperity when compared with those of 
larger and more populous provinces. The cotton and 
woollen factories in 1793 worked up 200,000 pounds 
'of the first-mentioned staple and 63,900 arrobas of 
wool, equivalent to 1,597,500 pounds, affording em 
ployment to three thousand operatives. The tobacco 
factory also employed three thousand workmen and 
women, producing annually cigars and cigarettes to 
the amount of $2^200,000. 14 

Such was the city of Santiago de Queretaro at the 
time when the spirit of Mexican independence broke 
out. The reader will recollect that Miguel Domin- 

10 Navarrete says: 'Esta Canada es para Queretaro lo q^^e Aranjuez para 
Madrid, Versallas para Paris, Frascati para Roma, y la Favorita para Viena. ' 
Relac. Peregrin., 6. 

11 A full account of these springs is given by Beaumont, Trat. de la Aqua 
Mineral. Mexico, 1772. 

12 ' Goza el grande, raro y apreciable privilegio de que jamas se ha experi- 
mentado en ella temblor alguno de tierra.' Zelaa 6 Hidalgo, Glorias de Quer., 

13 Queretaro, Dos Palabras, 4-5; Diar. Mex., ii. 167. 

14 Humboldt, Essai Pol, G66-9; Raso in Soc. Mex. Geog., iii. 198-9. In all 
the manufacturing industries 9,216 persons were employed, of whom 2,700 were 
women. In commercial and agricultural pursuits 2,234 persons were occupied. 
From this date to 1810 an increase in industries of one fifth is observable. Id., 
200. In 1803 the population of the city was 50,000 souls. Its ayuntamiento 
was composed of a corregidor, two ordinary alcaldes, twelve regidores, two hon 
orary regidores, a procurador, syndic, and escribano mayor y de cabildo. 
Glorias de Quer., 5-6. 


guez had been reinstated in the office of corregidor of 
Queretaro, after having been deprived of it by Itur- 
rigaray. From that time forward he was a secret sup 
porter of the independence party. After the collapse 
of the Valladolid plot, meetings of the chief revolu 
tionists were held at Queretaro in houses of the pres 
byter Jose Maria Sanchez and the licentiate Parra, 
The corregidor attended the assemblies at the first- 
mentioned house, which passed under the name of a 
literary academy, while his wife Dona Maria Josefa 
Ortiz took still more earnest interest in the suc 
cess of the undertaking. In Parra's house secret 
meetings were held and plans of operations discussed. 
Here met the principal promoters of the revolution, 
the licentiates Laso and Altamirano, captains Allende 
and Aldama of the queen's regiment, Joaquin Arias, 
captain of the , Zelaya regiment, Francisco Lanza- 
gorta, lieutenant of the dragoons of San Miguel, the 
two brothers Epigmenio and Emeterio Gonzalez and 
others of less note. 

While these preliminary matters were in progress 
in Valladolid and Queretaro, the leaven of liberty was 
working in Guanajuato; and indeed to this province 
may be more specially given the proud distinction of 
cradle of Mexican independence. And forever famous 
above all must remain the town of Dolores, situated 
in the higher level of the sierra de Guanajuato, eleven 
leagues from the provincial capital. Its beginning 
dates from the sixteenth century, when viceroys En- 
riquez and Velasco exerted themselves in uniting the 
Indians in municipal communities called congrega- 
ciones, Dolores receiving the name of Congregacion de 
Nuestra Senora de los Dolores, and being included 
in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the curato of San 
Miguel el Grande. In 1717 it was elevated to the 
dignity of a pueblo, and somewhat later became an 
independent curacy. 

As usual in places of this kind, the parish church 


overshadowed the other buildings, being an extensive 
structure, and completed about the middle of the 
eighteenth century. The exterior presented quite an 
imposing appearance, the front having two towers and 
an ornamented entrance. At the close of the eight 
eenth century a church of the third order of San Fran 
cisco was erected which, though small, was of beauti 
ful design and construction. There were also several 
smaller churches or chapels. In 1826 the constituent 
congress of Guanajuato bestowed upon the town the 
title of villa. It contained later about 9,000 inhabi 
tants, while the number of those within its civil and 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction was between 35,000 and 40,- 
000, scattered over a territory of sixty-eight square 
leagues. Agriculture constitutes the chief occupation 
of the people, a few only being engaged in retail traf 
fic, and in the manufacture of common woollen goods, 
of 'bricks, and in tanning. The district of Dolores is 
better adapted for the culture of the vine than any 
other part of Guanaj uato. Though silver deposits ex 
ist in many places, the mining interest is not large. 

The cura of this parish was Miguel Hidalgo y Cos- 
tilla, a name forever to be honored as one who gave 
his life to his country, who sacrificed himself for the 
right as against injustice and oppression. Past mid 
dle age, as he was now approaching fifty-eight, he had 
reached the period when most men are ready to lay 
aside some portion of life's burdens ; yet he was about 
taking upon his shoulders the most vital issues of his 
country, and that before his country was ready fully 
to respond to his efforts. 

Rather above than below medium height, of some 
what stout proportions, large lirnbs and ruddy-brown 
complexion, he presented altogether a robust constitu 
tion. The head was large and well modelled, bald and 
shining on the top, with many brain-compelling bumps ; 
hair, what there was of it, nearly white; massive 
features; forehead of course high, neck slightly twisted 
to the left, nose straight, lips thin, eyebrows pronri- 


nent, and as usual with the cloth, face clean-shaven. 
He wore at this time short black trousers and stock 
ings of the same color, leathern shoes with buckles, 
and a long gown with cape. His heart was kind and 
sympathetic; his manner soft and winning; his voice 
sonorous, vibrating, and most pleasing to the ear; and 
his deportment was natural and attractive. He had 
the true scholarly stoop; and in all his features, air, 
and attitude a profoundly meditative expression a 
fitting incarnation of a great soul bathed in settled 
calm. Yet the clear, black, brilliant eyes betrayed 
the activity of the mind, and through them shone the 
light from the burning fires within. 

It does not appear that Hidalgo attended the early 
meetings of the revolutionists with regularity. In 
deed, from his own statements I conclude that he 
visited Queretaro only on one occasion for that 
purpose, although he frequently held conversations 
elsewhere with Ignacio Allende and others on the 
subject of independence. 15 

Allende was certainly one of the moving spirits of 
the revolution ; and although his fame as a patriot has 
been eclipsed by that of Hidalgo, it is only justice 
that his merits and patriotism should be fully recog 
nized. He was born on the 21st of January, 1779, 16 
in San Miguel el Grande, his father being a Spanish 
merchant and estate owner, named Domingo Narciso 
de Allende. When Don Domingo died, which was 
while Ignacio was of tender years, his affairs were 
greatly embarrassed, and had it not been for the high 
character of his executor, Domingo de Berrio, the 

15 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 9. At these conferences with Allen 
de, Hidalgo continually and prophetically expressed his opinion that 'the 
authors of such enterprises never enjoyed the fruits of them.' Ib. Negrete, 
however, states that he went several times to Quer6taro. ' Varios viajes aunque 
de una manera occulta, hizo a Queretaro Hidalgo, con el objeto de f omen tar la 
revolucion. ' Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX. , i. 83. 

16 Copies of his baptismal certificate can be seen inLiceaga, Adlc. y E^ctific. , 
210-11, and in Alaman, Hist. Mcj., iii.,app. 75-6. Liceaga, ut sup. 15, 17, 
however, and Zamacois make the mistake of assigning 1769 as the year of hi3 


house would have been bankrupt. The creditors, 
however, were tolerant, and in some years the debts 
were paid, and the means of livelihood saved to the 
family. 17 

Being passionately fond of dangerous sports and 
martial exercises from early youth, Ignacio was con 
spicuous for his boldness and skill as a horseman, and 
frequently signalized himself in the bull-ring, from 
which he did not always escape unharmed, being crip 
pled in the left arm from injuries received there. His 
strength was so great that he could hold back a bull 
by the horns, 18 and he was ever ready to employ it 
in defence of the weak. Before he had attained the 
age of seventeen he was appointed provisionally a 
lieutenant in the queen's dragoons, was confirmed in 
the appointment in the following year, and in 1807 
promoted to the rank of captain. He was present 
with his company at the military encampment estab 
lished by Iturrigaray at Jalapa, and won for himself 
the marked approbation of the viceroy by his soldier 
ly bearing and ability. 19 According to Mier y Guerra, 
his regard for the viceroy was such that he took an 
oath to avenge his deposal on the Europeans, and 
thenceforth began to form a definite plan of indepen 
dence. Allende was an extremely handsome man, 
of engaging manners and captivating address. To 
resolution he united a perseverance which never 
yielded to obstacles or opposition. His daring both 
in the field arid in the expression of his opinions 

17 Ignacio had two brothers, Domingo and Jose" Marfa, the former dying 
before the reN^olution, the latter taking no part ia it. Id., 355. There were 
also three sisters, Josef a, Mariana, and Manuela. Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 

18 ' Era un sugeto bien educado, insinuante y fino, de tal f uerza que deteuia 
un toro por las hastas. ' Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp. , i. 290. See also Zerecero, 
Mem. Rev. Hex. , 27. Pedro Jose" Sotelo, an eye-witness, speaking of a bull 
fight in which Allende took part, says: 'En esta corrida tore6 D. Ignacio 
Allende, y lucho con un toro, con cuya accion dej6 admirados a los especta- 
dores.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 322. 

19 'Habia merecido los elogios del virey Iturrigaray, principalmeute porque 
adiestrando este el ex<3rcito acantonado en las maniobras y ardides de guerra 
aquel le sorprehendi6 en una noche con toda su guardia.' Guerra, Hist. Rev. 
N. Esp., i. 290. 


exposed him to unnecessary dangers. 20 At an early 
age he entered the marriage state, and betrothed in 
April 1802 Dona Maria de la Luz Agustina de las 
Fuentes. 21 

When the encampment at Jalapa was broken up, 
at the close of 1808, Allende with all the determina 
tion of his nature put his shoulder to the work. Hav 
ing returned with his command to San Miguel, he 
gradually associated himself with a number of con 
federates 22 who were leading inhabitants of the town. 
To avert suspicion and cloak their proceedings, balls 
were frequently given at the house of his brother Do 
mingo, in the festivities of which they joined, different 
members occasionally retiring from the dancing-hall 
to a room below to hold consultation. Ramifications 
of the plan were extended to the principal neighbor 
ing towns, where branch societies were established by 
Allende and Aldama, who were appointed commis 
sioners for- that purpose. 23 

The general plan of the uprising was the simul 
taneous seizure of the rich Spaniards and authorities 
in the important towns and then to raise the stand 
ard of independence. This was to be accomplished 
with as little violence as possible, and the captives 
were to be allowed the privilege of remaining with 
their families in the country, 24 or returning to the 
peninsula, in which case their property was to be confis 
cated and appropriated for the public treasury. In 
case the government, after this coup de main, should 
be able to offer resistance, Allende acting as generalis- 

20 Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 9. 

21 A copy of the marriage document is supplied by Liceaga, ut sup. 211- 
12. 'Alauian,' Hist. Mej., i. 356, 'anade con su bondad acostumbrada, que 
era muy inclinado al juego, a las mujeres y a toda clase de disipaciones; pero 
no he encontrado hecho alguno que justifique estas aseveraciones. ' GaMo, 
11 ombres llust. Mex., iii. 351. 

w Liceaga on p. 18 gives a list of 22 of his principal associates. 
^ 23 Liceaga argues forcibly that the San Miguel meetings were organized 
prior to those held in Quer6taro, and that Allende was the first promoter of 
the revolution. Adic. y Rectijic., 21-7. 

24 Mora makes no mention of this intention of mild treatment. Mej. y sus 
Rev., iv. 13. 


si mo would organize the forces in different districts 
and maintain the struggle. The government proposed 
to be established was a senate of representatives ap 
pointed by the provinces, which should rule in the 
name of Fernando VII., ignoring all submission to 

To accomplish their designs, Alleride and Aldama 
visited Mexico, Puebla, and other important places in 
New Spain, while Hidalgo assisted in the cities of 
Valladolid and Guanajuato, his efforts being espe 
cially directed to gaining over the clergy. During 
1810, Queretaro appears to have been the centre 
of action, and Allende and Aldama frequently at 
tended the meetings there. 25 More than half the 
year had gone and the plans of the revolutionists 
were almost ripe. There were as yet no signs of dis 
covery or treachery. Then the day was appointed on 
which the cry of independence should be sounded. 
The great fair held at San Juan de los Lagos, com 
mencing on the 8th of December, offered a good op 
portunity. Amidst the gathering crowds their move 
ments would escape observation, and enable them to 
concentrate their forces without detection. 26 It was 
accordingly decided that Allende and Aldama should 
meet there by different routes on the 1st of that 
month, and prepare matters for the proclamation of 
independence on a concerted day of the fair. Events, 
however, occurred which frustrated this design. 

As the cura Hidalgo will presently become the 
principal leader and most prominent character in the 

K Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 348; Zamacois, Hist. Mej., vi. 160-1. Mora, 
however, states that ' Sun Miguel el Grande . . . se constituy6 el centro y f oco 
de la revoiucion.' Ut sup., 15. 

'^Liceaya, ut sup., 19-20. Mora states, however, 'se fijo el dia 1 de 
octubrepara hacerel prommciamieuto en Queretaro, Guanajuato, San Miguel, 
y otros lugares.' Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 16. Again from an official document in 
the national archives it is reported to the government that 'segun dijo Laiiza- 
gorta a Galvan, el proyecto debia tener efecto en todo Septiembre.' Zerecero, 
Disc. Civ., 21. Guerra gives November 1st as the date. Rev. N. Esp.. i. 291. 
Hidalgo states that October 2d was the day finally appointed for the upris 
ing. Hernandez y Ddvcdos, Col. Doc., i. 14. 


early revolution, a better acquaintance will aid our 
purpose. His father, Cristobal Hidalgo y Costilla, 
was a native of Tejupilco in the intendency of Mex 
ico, and established himself in Penjamo in the province 
of Guanajuato. There he betrothed and married 
Ana Maria Gallaga, 27 and in May 1753, Miguel Hi 
dalgo y Costilla was born. 28 Don Cristobal presently 
removed to the hacienda of Corralejo with his wife 
and four children, of whom Miguel was the second. 
Their father afterward sent them to Valladolid to be 
educated, and there Miguel distinguished himself in 
philosophy and ecclesiastical studies at the college of 
San Nicolas, where his fellow-collegiates gave him the 
name of The Fox, an appellation intended as compli 
mentary by reason of his sagacity. 29 

So highly did the ecclesiastical chapter of Vallado 
lid estimate his theological acquirements, and the 
ability he displayed in the public discussion of cer 
tain themes, that it gave him $4,000 to enable him to 
go to Mexico and obtain his degree of doctor of the 
ology. Hidalgo, however, spent the money some 
say at play and in dissipation before accomplishing 
his journey. 30 Nevertheless, in 1778 and 1779 he 
went to the capital and was there ordained, receiving 
the degree of bachelor of theology. On his return 
to Valladolid he obtained successive appointments as 
cura to two of the richest benefices in the diocese, 31 

27 Tradition affirms that Ana Maria was an orphan in the house of Gallaga, 
and that while waiting at table, on the occasion of Don Cristobal's first visit, 
her grace and beauty won his heart. Gallo, Hombres Illust. , iii. 240. 

28 A copy of his baptismal registry will be found in Alaman, Hist, Mcj., 
iii. app. 75. Documents establishing the place and date of his birth are 
supplied by Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , i. 455-72. 

'^Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 351. Montana, Caracter Pollt. y Martial, in a 
metrical fable published shortly after the battle of Aculco represents Hidalgo 
as a fox, and Allende as a serpent, leading their followers, 'una lucida tropa 
polla,' to destruction. The closing lines are: 

' Lector, si tu no entiendea 
Lo quo quiere decir la fabulilla: 
No importa: entenderAlo la gabilla 
Quo a log Hidalgos siguo y los Allendes.' 

z Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 291. 'Los perdi6 al juego enMaravatio, 
al hacer el viaje & Mexico para solicitarlo.' Alaman, ut sup., 352. 

31 1 have in my possession an original autograph letter of Hidalgo written 
while he was the cura of Colima. It is dated Colima, July 20, 1792, and signed 


and eventually on the death of his elder brother Joa- 
quin succeeded him as cura of Dolores, a town at that 
time of 18,000 souls, yielding him a stipend of from 
10,000 to $12,000. 32 Here he devoted himself to a 
variety of occupations, independent of his clerical du 
ties, and congenial with tastes acquired in his boyhood 
on his father's hacienda. He established a porcelain 
factory, improved the cultivation of the vine, planted 
mulberry trees, and grew silk-worms. But his mind 
was not satisfied with industrial pursuits and experi 
ments alone. The seclusion of his library often won 
him from more practical life, and there he studied the 
sciences and political economy, 33 perused French phil 
osophical works, 34 and investigated .the doctrines pro 
pounded in unorthodox books. 35 It was during these 
years of self-education that he acquired those en 
lightened views which enabled him to recognize the 
injustice which marked both the ecclesiastical and 
temporal governments, and caused him to look with 
indignation upon the warped tenets and proceedings 
of the church, and with detestation upon the despot 
ism exercised by the state. 

Hidalgo was a brave and determined man; he was 
a pleasant conversationalist, and, though quick-tem 
pered, had an obliging and kindly disposition. The 
interest which he took in the welfare of his flock by 
the development of industries and his lavish expen 
diture of money on such enterprises gained for him 

'Migl Hidalgo y Costilla,' with his rubrica affixed to the signature. It is ad 
dressed to the cura of the pueblo de Elagualulco, and relates to ecclesiastical 
formalities required to be observed with respect to the second marriage of an 
Indian named Pascual de los Santos with a free mulatto woman. 

32 Gucrra, loc. cit. Negrete says $8,000 or $9,000 'un afio con otro.' He 
generously divided this stipend with a clergyman named Francisco Iglesias, 
whom he employed in assisting him in his clerical duties. Hist. Mil. Sig. 
XIX., I 79. 

33 This study attracted his attention while at the college of San Nicolas, 
of which he was appointed rector, 'y la desarrolld cuando fud cura en la villa 
de S. Felipe y congregacion de Dolores.' JBustamante. Cuadro Hint., i. 264. 

34 Hidalgo knew French well, 'cosa bastante rara en aquel tiempo en es 
pecial entre los eclesiasticos. ' Alaman, loc. cit. 

35 'Leia y tenia algunas _obras literarias y politicas proibidas severamente 
por la inquisition y desconocidas para el comun de loa Mejicanos.' Mora, 
Mej. y sun Rev., iv. 8. 


the lasting affection of the Indians, in whose languages 
he was proficient. Extremely enterprising, he was, 
however, too precipitate in action. With regard to 
his moral character, many vices are laid at his door, 33 
which were made the most of by the opposite party 
after he raised the standard of revolt. From the fact 
that as early as 1800 accusations of immorality were 
preferred against him before the inquisition by two 
women, it ma}^ be concluded that his life was not of 
that purity which his clerical calling would seem to 
demand; but as the inquisition did not at the time 
proceed against him, although the accusations in 
cluded charges of heresy, it may be inferred that 
proofs were wanting, or that his derelictions were not 
of a flagrant nature. 37 

As early as the llth of August the government 
had intimation of a plot. 33 One Mariano Galvan, an 
official in the post-office, gave information about the 
secret meetings to Joaquin Quintan a, chief of the 
department, who communicated with the postmaster- 
general of Mexico. By him Aguirre was made ac 
quainted with the danger. He, however, contented 
himself with giving orders that the revolutionists 
should be watched, without bringing the matter to 
the notice of the government. Meanwhile Hidalgo 

36 'Poseido del abominable vicio de laluxuria.' Diaz Calvillo, Sermon (1811), 

37 Consult Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 78, et seq. Afterward the 
inquisition continued the charges with additional ones, and proceeded against 
Hidalgo with every severity, publishing a memorable edict on the 13th of 
October, 1810. In it heresy, blasphemy, and profession of the doctrines of 
Luther were charged. On the score of morality it contains this extraordinary 
accusation: 'Teneis por inocente y licita la polucion y fornicacion, como efecto 
necesario y consiguiente al mecanismo de la naturaleza, por cuyo error habeis 
sido tan libertino, que hicisteis pacto con vuestra manceba de que os buscase 
mugeres para fornicar, y que para lo mismo le buscariais a ella hoinbres, asegu- 
randola que no hay infierno, ni Jesucristo.' Dispos. Varias, iii. f. 152. Con 
sult also Mora, Mcj. ysus Rev., iv. 60-1. This author considers that the early 
inaction of the inquisition was partly due to the fact that Bishop Abad y 
Queipo, in matters of opinion, was somewhat implicated with Hidalgo. The 
fact that these charges were brought against an excommunicated and rebel 
priest renders them unworthy serious consideration. 

38 For minute particulars consult extracts from documents in the Mexican 
archives supplied by Neyrete, Mex. Si/jlo XIX., i. 286-97. 


was endeavoring to gain over the provincial infantry 
battalion of Guanajuato, and to that end opened his 
plan to several of the subaltern officers. One of these, 
Garrido, the band-master, exposed the affair on the 
13th of September to his captain, Francisco Busta- 
mante, who lost no time in informing his superior 
officer, Diego Berzabal, who communicated the mat 
ter to the intendente Riailo, and offered to arrest 
Hidalgo. Riano, however, preferred to watch affairs, 
and instructed Francisco Iriarte, who was going to 
San Felipe, to report occurrences in Dolores, and sent 
orders to San Miguel to arrest Allende and Aldama. 


The despatch was, however, intercepted by Allende, 
who received timely warning of the denouncement 
made by Garrido, and thus gained some little time to 
deliberate with his associates at San Miguel 39 as to 
their proper course. 

While this was taking place in Guanajuato, Cap 
tain Arias turned traitor in Queretaro, and to secure 
his own safety denounced the plot on the 10th of 
September to the alcalde Juan de Ochoa. 40 This of 
ficer immediately despatched a courier with a written 
account drawn up by the escribano Juan Fernando 
Dorninguez to the viceroy, who was already on his 
way from Yera Cruz. Again, on the 13th, a man 
named Francisco Bueras informed Padre Gil, cura of 

S9 Mora, Mej. ysus Rev., iv. 18-9. Alaman states that he was playing at 
cards in the house of Camufiez, the major of his corps, when he received the 
advice from Guanajuato. Hist. Hej., i. 373. Riaiio's action with regard to 
Hidalgo was probably influenced by friendship, as the cura was a frequent 
visitor at his house. See JSustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., iii. 42. 

40 Such is Alaman's account of the discovery of the plot. Hi*t. Mej. , i. 
361-6. Guerra says: 'Pero abort6 el plan por la confesion en el articulo cle 
la muerte del Can6nigo de Valladolid Iturriaga, c6mplice en la conspiracion, 
al cura de Queretaro Gil.' Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 292. Bustamante states 
simply that an ecclesiastic denounced the plot at 10 o'clock of the night of 
the 14th of September. Cuadro Hist., i. 31. Liceaga considers it probable 
that Arias first gave information. Adiciones y Rectif., 43. Consult also Zere- 
cero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 52-58, for copies of documents addressed to the audi- 
encia on the llth of September; and the same author, Discur*o Civic., 19-25, 
for information conveyed to the capital from August llth to the above named 
date. Ochoa, on the 10th and llth of September, sent despatches to Aguirre 
and the viceroy informing them of the meditated revolution, and forwarded 
a list of the principal persons concerned in it. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. 
Doc., ii. G4-8. 


Queretaro, that there was a plot to assassinate all the 
Spaniards, and that a quantity of arms were stored 
in the houses of one Samano and Epigmenio Gonza 
lez. He also stated that the corregidor knew of it. 
The cura , being a friend of Dominguez, at once placed 
the facts before him, advising him either to proceed 
against Epigmenio Gonzalez or share imprisonment 
with him. Whereupon the corregidor went to con 
sult with the escribano, who, already aware of the 
corregidor's complicity, dissimulated by declaring that 
he did not believe a word of the statement. Corre 
gidor Dominguez, however, persisted that his infor 
mation was correct, and Juan Fernando suggested 
that he should ask assistance of the cornandante Ig- 
nacio Garcia Rebollo, and search Gonzalez's house. 
This was done, and forty men placed under arms, 
twenty of whom under the corregidor surrounded the 
house of Gonzalez while the comandante, with the 
remaining twenty, invested that of Samano. 

Had the corregidor been fortunate enough to avoid 
communication with the escribano, all might have gone 
well with the revolutionists and himself; but the es 
cribano displayed such zeal, and instituted so thorough 
a search of the house, that the escape of the inmates 
was rendered impossible, and a quantity of ammuni 
tion and weapons was discovered. The corregidor, 
however unwilling, was now compelled to arrest 
Epigmenio, his brother, and all the household. While 
he was thus occupied, his wife, faithful to the cause, 
devised means 41 to communicate with Allende at San 

41 Alaman says that Dominguez locked the entrance gates of the house on 
his departure, and that Dona Josefa signalled to Ignacio Perez, the prison al 
caide, whose room was immediately beneath her recamara, by tapping thrice 
on the floor. Perez, being an ardent supporter of the revolution, considered 
the intelligence which she communicated through the wicket-grating so 
important that he undertook to convey the message himself. Not finding 
Allende at San Miguel, where he arrived at daylight on the 15th, he sought 
Aldama and informed him of what was taking place. Hist. Mej., i. 3G8-9. 
Liceaga states on the authority of a manuscript that two messengers, Fran 
cisco Lopez and Francisco Anaya, were also sent by the corregidora, the for 
mer alone arriving at the destination, and as late as five in the evening of the 
loth. That Allende, however, should have already left for Dolores on the 
arrival of Perez, being informed of danger by the intercepted order for his 


Miguel, informing him of the serious position of af 
fairs. She also informed Arias, but received a reply 
so unsatisfactory as to cause her much anxiety. 42 

On the following morning the corregidor began 
proceedings against the accused, but conducted them 
in so procrastinating a manner that evidently his heart 
was not in the work. Probably Arias was right in 
representing to the alcalde Ochoa that Dominguez 
was endeavoring to gain time, and that the plot was 
rapidly approaching its denouement. A little by-play 
was enacted: the traitor, with his own connivance, 
was arrested on the evening of the 15th, and on his 
person were discovered papers implicating Hidalgo 
and Allende. But this was not enough. The letters 
spoke of friends who could be relied on; and when 
closely questioned Arias admitted that these friends 
were the corregidor, his wife, and a number of others 
who were wont to assemble at the revolutionary meet 
ings. The subordinate officer, the alcalde Ochoa, 
supported by the Spanish faction, now proceeded to 
act. The comandante Rebollo, who hitherto appears 
t;> have been quite unaware of the magnitude of the 
revolution, placed under Ochoa's directions three hun 
dred soldiers; 43 and Dominguez, his wife and family, 
with a number of other suspected persons, were 
arrested and imprisoned during the night. 44 The 
corregidor was closely confined in a cell in the college 

arrest, he considers not probable, since his inactivity under the circumstances 
for 24 hours would be inexplicable. Moreover, citizens of San Miguel affirmed 
that he was in that town on the morning of the loth, attending with his 
troops a religious ceremony, and was seen there as late as 5 o'clock in the af 
ternoon. From the evidence, therefore, this author concludes that Hidalgo 
and Allende acted immediately upon receipt of the news from Quere"taro, and 
did not waste a day in indecision. Adiciones y Rectific., 44-5. Liceaga's con 
clusion is proved to be correct by the statements of Sotelo, a participator in 
the proceedings. --He asserts that Allende arrived at Dolores at ten on the 
night of the loth of September. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 322. 

42 ' Pero aquel contesto de una manera desabrida, diciendo quo se veia en 
aquel compromiso por haberse fiado de quienes no debiera y que ya tenia 
tornado su partido.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 309. 

43 ' La manana de 15 al 16 una faccion de europeos regentados por el alcalde D. Juan Ochoa, y como trescientos soldados del regimiento de Cclaya, 
auxiliados por Garcia Rebollo, sorprendieron al Lie. Dominguez. ' Bustamante, 
Cttadro Hist. , i. 31. 

** Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 74-5. 
Hisx. HEX., VOL. IV. 8 


of Santa Cruz, without being allowed to communicate 
with any one. His wife was conveyed to the convent 
of Santa Clara, and although enceinte, was deprived 
of the company of her friends, and even of her children, 
who were separately imprisoned. 45 

It is difficult to account for the subsequent proceed 
ings of the government against Dominguez, unless 
they can be explained by the contemptuous regard 
with which Oidor Aguirre viewed the political atti 
tude of the Creoles. Information of the corregidor's 
arrest was conveyed without loss of time to Venegas, 
who consulted with Aguirre. That minister expressed 
such disdain for any attempt that could be made by 
'Americans' to overthrow Spanish rule, that he as 
sured the viceroy that at an official piece of parchment 
on a stick they would be frightened like asses. 46 He 
concluded by suggesting that Juan Collado, the al 
calde del crimen, should be sent, with an escribano 
and minor officials, to investigate the matter. 47 The 
viceroy acted upon this advice, and Collado briefly 
dismissed the charge against Dominguez and rein 
stated him in office. 48 

45 Bustamante states that her daughters were not allowed to speak with 
the servants who attended on her. Cuadro Hist., i. 32. 

46 Throughout this war the Mexican people, Creoles, Indians, and mestizos, 
are often called 'Americanos,' and sometimes 'gente del pais. ' 

47 Bustamente regards this exhibition of authority with great contempt. 
He ironically represents Aguirre as suggesting, ' que en el caso, lo que con- 
venia hacer, seria mandar al alcalde de crimen D. Juan Collado a Querdtaro 
con un escribano y algunos porquerones,' and adds that the viceroy accepted 
the advice and Collado the office, the latter appointing Jose" Maria Moya his 
escribano, and 'corchete mayor a D. Antonio Acuua que en Mexico desempe- 
naba la plaza de capitan de sala. ' Ib. 

48 Venegas disapproved Collado's action and removed him from the audicn- 
cia. Id., 36. Dominguez was a man of great literary ability and acquire 
ments. As a magistrate, both his talents and integrity were justly appre 
ciated by the public. Having occupied in the Mexican capital an official 
position of importance and trust with regard to both public and private 
business of the viceroy, his strict attention to his duties and his fidelity 
gained him the favor of Marquina, who appointed him to the corregimiento 
of Quer6taro, an office so important and lucrative that it was regarded as 
equal to an intendencia. The salary was 4,000 pesos, and other sources of in 
come amounted to as much more. Under the administration of Iturrigaray, 
Dominguez was instructed to reform the abuses which existed in the clouh 
factories at Quer^taro. The system under which these were conducted 
reduced a large proportion of the operatives to actual slavery a pecuniary 
advance making them subject to thraldom remorselessly exacted by their 


No sooner had Allende received news of the arrest 
of the Gonzalez family and household than he hast 
ened to Dolores, being now aware that his purposes 
were widely known to the authorities. 49 His inter 
view with Hidalgo was marked by rapid deliberation 
and prompt decision. When Allende and his com 
panions arrived at Dolores the cura was entertaining 
visitors, and the revolutionists remained outside until 
they had departed. When admitted, they informed 
Hidalgo of the arrests which had been made, and the 
discovery of their plans. The cura, who had listened 
to their statements with imperturbable calmness, ex 
claimed, "Action must be taken at once; there is no 
time to be lost; we shall yet see the oppressors' yoke 
broken and the fragments scattered on the ground!" 50 
He then ordered the street watchmen who were at 
tached to the cause to be called in, and sent them to 
summon the workmen in his* pottery and silk factories. 
These soon assembled to the number of fifteen or six 
teen, to whom Hidalgo communicated his intention of 
immediately raising the cry of liberty. 

employers. Dominguez effected the necessary reforms, and drew upon him 
self the enmity of the owners, who were mostly Europeans. Nevertheless, 
his public conduct, and the faithfulness with which he managed the large 
estate and fortune left in his charge by Dona Josefa Vergara for beneficent 
purposes, won for him the regard of the inhabitants of Quere'taro. Zamacois 
attributes the easy acquittal of Dominguez either to policy on the part of Col- 
lado, who considered it might be prudent to show generosity when the revolu 
tion had already commenced, or to the pressure of a threat expressed by the 
Indian inhabitants of the Canada that they would rise in revolt if the corre- 
gidor were not released. Hist. Mej., vi. 324. That the corregidor was 
enabled to maintain bis position at such a crisis speaks loudly to his credit as 
possessing a strong hold on the regards of both parties or as a consummate 
political craftsman. 

49 Guerra states that Allende ' conocio su peligro por este murmurio piiblico, 
6 tal vez, por que su mismo gefe Canal le avis6 de la orden que habia recibiilo 
de Mexico para prenderle.' Hist. Rev. N. Esp., i. 292. As 'este murmurio' 
has reference to the arrest of Dominguez on the night of the 15th, Guerra is 
in error, since Allende was at that time on his way to Dolores. 

50 This is the statement of Sotelo, an eye-witness. Hernandez y Ddvalos, 
Col. DOC.+ ii. 322. Alaman gives a different account, derived from state 
ments made1?frth.e trials of Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and others. He 
states that Allende went to Dolores on the 14th, and that the news of the ar 
rests at Queretaro was brought by Aldama, who only arrived at Dolores at 
two o'clock in the morning of the IGth; that the cura was roused from his 
bed, and exclaimed: 'Gentlemen, we are lost; the only resource left is to seize 
gachupines.' Hist. Mej., i. 373-4. In view of the narration of Sotelo, who 
was present on the occasion, and taking into consideration the statements 
made in the trials, I follow Sotelo's version. 


A rumor of what was transpiring had, however, 
spread, and a number of the populace assembled be 
fore the cura's gate, ready to take part in the enter 
prise. Weapons, which had been secretly made and 
hidden, were now brought out, and Hidalgo distrib 
uted them with his own hand. The first step taken 
was to secure the person of Padre Bustamante, the 
sacristan mayor of the parish, who was a Spaniard. 
Hidalgo then addressed a few animating words to 
those assembled, raising in loud voice as he concluded 
the cry, " Viva Nuestra Senora de Guadalupel Viva 
la independencia!" 

The revolutionists now sallied forth, 51 and having 
first liberated the prisoners in the town jail, 52 thus 
swelling their numbers, they made captive the princi 
pal Spaniards. 53 Dawn was now approaching. It 
was Sunday. Hidalgo caused the church bell which 
summoned his flock to mass to be rung at an earlier 
hour than usual. The townspeople came forward and 
gathered in groups before the church door, and from 
the neighboring haciendas countrymen on foot and 
mounted were seen flocking in and congregating in 

51 Accounts differ -as to their number. Sotelo gives a list of twenty-one 
names, without including any of the leaders and others whose names were 
not known. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 330. Negrete supplies a 
list of 43 names, only two of which appear in that of Sotelo. Hist. Mil. S'uj. 
XIX., i. 134-5. The number in all must have been far in excess of that given 
by many Mexican historians, the smallness of which is incompatible with the 
success attained. Alaman states that Hidalgo, supported by his brother 
Mariano, Jos6 Santos Villa, Allende, Aldama, and ten armed men whom he 
retained in his house, 15 in all, proceeded to execute the design of seizing 
the Spanish residents. Hist. Mej., i. 375. Liceaga maintains that there were 
only ten engaged in the undertaking. Rectific. y Adic., 53. Mora, who incor 
rectly mentions Abasolo as being present, as also does Negrete in his list, says: 
' Con diez hombres pues, de los cuales cinco eran forzados, so procedio a 
prender los Espafioles del lugar.' Mej. y sus Rev., 20. Guerra's statement 
that Allende left San Miguel with 50 soldiers of his company on the 13th of 
September for Dolores, and increased his force to 800 men on his march by de 
claring that' he was going to liberate the corregidor Dominguez, is utterly at 
variance with facts. 

02 Liceaga disputes this fact, but the evidence is conclusive. Consult Her 
nandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 17, 40; ii. 323. 

53 On page 55 of his Adic. y Rectific., Liceaga gives a list of 13 names of 
Spaniards made prisoners. Bustamante states that only seven were seized. 
Cuad. Hist., i. 22. Alaman says the number was seventeen. Hist. Mej., i. 


the sanctuary. 54 But it was the matters of this 
world rather than those of the next that were now 
to claim their attention. Deliverance was demanded, 
and from the evil one; but it was from Satan in the 
flesh, from devils incarnated as temporal masters, in 
flicting wrongs and injuries and infamies without 
number time enough left when men are free from 
the tyraraiies of their fellows to continue the eternal 
battle with the powers of darkness ! 

There was no mass that day. The cura entered 
his pulpit and looked abroad upon the sea of upturned 
anxious faces with deep and yearning solicitude. 
"My children," he said, "this day comes to us a new 
dispensation. Are you ready to receive it? Will 
you be free? Will you make the effort to recover 
from the hated Spaniards the lands stolen from your 
forefathers three hundred years ago?" Thus the 
great project of independence was laid before them, 
and they were called upon to prove their devotion to 
their country. For the last time Hidalgo addressed 
his flock as cura of Dolores. Henceforth he would 
be their guide to liberty; they would fight for it; 
they would die for it; he would lead them himself 
to battle and to victory! "To-day," he continued, 
"we must act. The Spaniards are bad enough them 
selves, but now they are about to surrender us and our 
country to the French. Danger threatens our religion, 
and oppression our homes. Will you become Napo 
leon's slaves? or will you as patriots defend your relig 
ion and your rights ? " " We will defend them ! " shouted 
the people. "Viva Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe, 
muera el mal gobierno, mueran los gachupines!" 55 
" Live, then, and follow your cura, who has ever watched 
over your welfare," was Hidalgo's answer. The Grito 
de Dolores has gone forth! The poor and ignorant 

54 During the morning a message was sent to Mariano Abasolo, inviting him 
to join the cause, which he did without hesitation, according to Sotelo's state 
ment. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 323. 

55 Long live our lady of Guadalupe, perish the bad government, perish the 
Spaniards ! 


and down-trodden of this little Indian town proclaim 
the future independence of a great nation! Enthusi 
asm rises to religious height, and unarmed as they 
are, they will follow no matter where, and fight and 
die no matter how. 

It is somewhat strange that independence should 
be born in such a quarter and of such parentage; yet 
perhaps not more wonderful here and thus than else 
where and in some other way. Its days were now 
fully come, and it must be brought forth. We know 
after what manner religions have come to man; we 
have seen great spasms of enlightenment fall at vari 
ous epochs on the race; we have seen the intellect 
awaken as from a dream, and re-awaken again and 
again but what it all is, or how, or why, no man can 
tell, howsoever hard our teachers may try. 

In the evolution of human affairs two elements are 
essential to progress, the opportunity and the agent. 
There may be and often is one condition without the 
other. Opportunity may be ripe arid no one at hand 
to act; or the individual may be present and lack op 
portunity; or the agent may be before his time, act 
prematurely, and so spoil all. Under such conditions 
there can be no great bririging-forth. 

It was a question how far such auxiliaries could be 
of service in the coming crusade. Hidalgo maintained 
that the display of numbers would be beneficial to 
their cause. Allende, however, entertained grave 
doubts, but he finally acquiesced. To provide their 
followers with arms was the great difficulty. The 
houses of the Spaniards were ransacked; lances which 
Hidalgo had already provided were brought forth; 
the Indian seized his machete^ and those who could 
obtain no better weapon supplied themselves with 
clubs, slings, and bows and arrows. Fire-arms they 
had few; but San Miguel would furnish them some 

56 An implement for cutting grass, sugar-cane, brush, etc., in the shape of 
a broadsword without hilt, and sometimes slightly curved, the sharpened 
edge being in that case on the convex curve. 


munitions of war, and thither Hidalgo and Allende 
led their rabble, which soon numbered nearly 4,000 
men. 57 

Some attempt at military order was made. The 
mounted herdsmen of the haciendas, carrying lances, 
were formed into a troop of cavalry, while the better 
armed Indians on foot represented the infantry. Then 
followed a promiscuous crowd, in which women and 
children joined. The die was cast; and the aroused 
people hastened onr The maize was in full ear, and 
haciendas abounding in cattle lay on their line of 
march. There was no lack of food, and they took 
w r hat they wanted. As they passed through the vil 
lages volunteers swelled their ranks, and other Span 
iards were added to the number of the captives. On 
their arrival at Atotonilco, Hidalgo halted in order 
that he might surprise San Miguel at nightfall. 
Here a picture of the virgin of Guadalupe was ob 
tained, 58 and raised on high above the throng, amidst 
shouts of "Viva Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe, y 
mueran los gachupinesl" Henceforth it became the 
banner of the crusade; and while it waved on high, 
emblem of peace and intercession, many a brave deed, 
many a bloody deed, was done for those rights and 
liberties which on no other ground than violence and 
force would ever be vouchsafed to them. 59 

57 J/ora, Mej. y sus. Rev., iv. 21. Negrete states that Hidalgo marched 
ont of Dolores with only about 80 men, which number as he advanced was 
increased to 300. Mex. Siglo XIX., ii. 19-20. Sotelo says: 'Mirando que ya 
se contaba con un numero considerable de gente adicta, resolvio organizarla 
en forma cle tropa. ' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 323. 

58 Alaman states that Hidalgo took it from the sacristy and raised it on a 
lance in order to support his enterprise by the religious devotion which his 
followers entertained for the sacred emblem. This is refuted by Liceaga, 
who explains that one of the insurgents procured a copy of the picture from 
'Dona Ramona N. que vivia alii como otras, con el nombre de beatas,' and 
that it was hoisted upon a clothes-pole. The enthusiasm it roused caused 
the leaders to adopt it as a banner. A die. y Rectijic., 58. Zamacois supports 
Alaman 's statement on the strength of Hidalgo's declaration. Hist. Mej.,\ 7 i. 
253; Hernadez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 13. 

59 Other banners with a like design were in time procured and borne along 
in all parts of Hidalgo's army. 'Ami existe en poder del hi jo del denodado 
insurgente Victor Resales, el diseno original de la primera bandera de Hidalgo 
que tenia la forma de un estandarte, que fue hecho con uno de los palios de la 
parroquia de Dolores, y sobre el cual se puso un escudo muy parecido ai adop- 


Meanwhile intelligence of the uprising had reached 
San Miguel, 60 and the Spanish residents, aware that 
they could not rely upon any Creole or native servant, 
and informed by Colonel Canal that no dependence 
could be placed on the regiment, assembled in arms at 
the municipal buildings for self-defence. As the dusk 
of evening fell, Hidalgo entered the town. The ex 
citement was intense, the population cheering the in 
surgents and hurling bitter denunciations against the 
Spaniards. Allende placed the prisoners brought from 
Dolores in the college of San Francisco de Sales, un 
der the guardianship of Aldama, while he proceeded 
to arrest the Spaniards of the town. Through the 
representations of Canal, after some parley the latter 
were induced to yield without opposition and surren 
der their arms. Allende assured them that while he 
lived no harm should befall them, and thereupon they 
were removed to the college. 


The Spaniards having thus been secured without 
bloodshed, no difficulty was found in winning over 
the soldiers of the garrison. The officers and troops 
of the queen's regiment of provincial dragoons were 
already predisposed to support Allende. In vain Ma 
jor Camunez endeavored at the barracks to hold them 
to their loyalty by representing that the rebels were 
partisans of the French. His words were received 
with an ominous silence, and when two of the officers 
raised a cheer for Allende and independence, Carnunez 
was made captive, 61 and the whole regiment joined 
the insurgents. A portion of the Celaya infantry 

tado despues de la independencia y era de papel negro recortado.' Gallo, Horn- 
Ires I I mt., 272. 

60 Authors differ with regard to this statement. Mora asserts that the 
authorities were completely surprised, and knew nothing of the movement 
until Hidalgo was at their door; but Liceaga more reasonably affirms that 
news of what had taken place in Dolores reached San Miguel early. I have 
accepted his version as being the more probable. He gives a list of the prin 
cipal Spanish residents in San Miguel. Adic. y Rcctific., 58-60. 

61 Colonel Canal, if he did not actually favor the movement, was indiffer 
ent. He had, however, been succeeded in the command by Caimiuez that 
morning. Liceaf/a, ut sup., 61. 


stationed there also declared for the cause of inde 

During the night and on the following morning the 
populace began to exhibit symptoms of violence, which 
afterward became uncontrollable. Having liberated 
the prisoners in the jail, with much uproar and cries 
of "Death to the gachupines!" they assembled in 
dense throngs before the houses of the Spanish resi 
dents, intent on pillage and destruction. Stores and 
private dwellings shared a like fate. Doors were 
battered in and the rabble ransacked and robbed ad 
libitum. 62 .Hidalgo endeavored to moderate these wild 
passions, and Allende, sword in hand, rode through 
the crowds threatening their death, until the disorder 
was stopped. 

Our standpoint of morality depends on our teach 
ing, if we still hold to our teachings, or to our line of 
independent thought, if we have any. The merchant's 
morality is different from that of the doctor, the priest's 
from that of the military man. While Hidalgo had 
as much conscience, as much heart and humanity, as 
Allende, whose profession was that of man-killer, he 
was now out on the work of an avenging angel, in so 
far as it was necessary for his work to assume that 
form. The Spaniards had robbed and insulted these 
many years. This was now to be stopped, whatever 
the cost. If the permission of pillage would add to 
the power of his cause, it were but small difference 
when the demon of murder was abroad. Our most 
refined and Christian civilization will kill human be 
ings in battle by the hundred thousand, will commit 
horrible and wholesale butcheries without justice and 
without mercy, employing all the arts and advantages 
the mind can invent to injure and destroy the enemy 
all for the cause, killing to prevent further killing; 
but over some few minor and comparatively insig- 

62 According to Torrente, 77is. J&IL+ i. 143, not-even Creoles' houses were 
spared. ' Se lanzaron como lobos rabiosos contra todos los europeos i contra 
sus propiedades, sin perdonara sus mismos compatriutas. ' 


nificant injuries it raises its hands in holy horror, 
and cries out against them as barbaric and savage. 
Stuff and humbug! Savage warfare is no worse than 
civilized warfare, no less necessary, no less righteous. 
It may be a little less decent and refined; but what 
are refinement and decency beside butchery and body- 
mangling machines ! All is as bad as it can be ; the 
civilized men are the more to blame, however, for they 
should know better. 

Hidalgo was a far more self-sacrificing, honorable, 
and humane man than the average military leader. 
But he was not hypocrite or fool enough to pretend that 
it was worse to take a dead man's goods than a living 
man's life. But the killing in war is done for the 
cause. True; and now pillage is permitted for the 
cause. It was not that he was in favor of robbery. 
But sacking a town he regarded as no worse than kill 
ing the people; and in his present emergency he 
deemed one as much a matter of necessity as the other. 
In any event, he would win this cause if within his 
power to do so. 

Allende thought differently. He was a man of nar 
rower mind, of more restricted ideas; he was a soldier, 
and felt bound by conventional rules and the regu 
lations of his craft. He urged that they ought 
not to rely upon the common people, who were ad 
dicted to pillage, but upon disciplined troops. The 
discussion was continued with considerable warmth, 
until it became evident that two leaders at discord 
might prove fatal to the cause. Hidalgo, therefore, 
suggested that his own and Allende's authority should 
be defined, in order that each should act within the 
limits of his own powers, and Allende at once offered 
to surrender the supreme command to the cura, 
whose ability and influence he very sensibly deemed 
superior to his own. He expressed the determi 
nation, however, to separate himself from him if 
they should be unable to act in harmony. But all 
thought of independent action on the part of Allende 


was set at rest by the arrival somewhat later of a de 
spatch from Riano, the intendente of Guanajuato, ad 
dressed to the subclelegado Bellogin, who was a prison 
er at the time, and ordering the immediate arrest of 
Allende, Aldama, and, if possible, of Hidalgo, " because 
his talents, character, and reputation would render the 
revolution more vigorous and formidable." The post 
master having been also made captive, the letter was 
delivered to Allende, who, recognizing the truth of its 
comments on Hidalgo, insisted that the cura should 
retain supreme command, which he did. 63 

The suddenness with which the insurgents had been 
compelled prematurely to proclaim their purpose had 
entirely overthrown their previous plans, and their fu 
ture operations would in a great measure have to be 
guided by circumstances. To discipline overwhelm 
ing numbers, provide their followers with arms, and 
institute some degree of military tactics was now their 
object. In order to provide for public tranquillity, a 
conference was held in the evening, to which the prin 
cipal citizens were convoked, and a junta, presided over 
by Aldama, was established. 64 On the following day 
the work of organizing the forces was commenced. 
Officers from the grade of corporal to that of colo 
nel were appointed; recruits were obtained from the 
surrounding haciendas, and lances constructed with 
the greatest diligence. A quantity of gunpowder, 
also, which was being conveyed from Mexico to the 
mines of Guanajuato, fell into the hands of the in 

On the morning of the 18th Hidalgo led his forces, 
now counted by tens of thousands, out of San Miguel, 
after having appropriated what money there was in 
the treasury, and some belonging to the Spanish cap 
tives. 65 Marching through the towns of San Juan 

e3 Liceaya, Adic. y Recti/ic., 65-7. 

64 The other members were, Padre Manuel Castilblanque, Felipe Gonzalez, 
Miguel Vallejo, Domingo Unzaga, and Vicente Umaran. The administra 
tion of the aduana and of the tobacco monopoly was given to Antonio Aga- 
ton de Lartiendo, and that of the post-office to Francisco Rebelo. Id., 68. 

65 Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., 22. Mariano Hidalgo, brother of the cura, was 



cle la Vega and Chamacuero, 66 he moved toward Ce- 
kya, and approached the town on the evening of the 
1 9th. The officers in command of the troops stationed 
there, deeming resistance useless, retired at night with 
some companions of the provincial regiment to Que- 
retaro, accompanied by the European residents. On 
the night of the 19th, Hidalgo and Allende conjointly 
addressed a letter to the ayuntamiento, summoning 
the town to surrender, and threatening to put to death 


their prisoners to the number of seventy-eight if op 
position was offered. 67 

appointed treasurer. One dollar a day was paid a cavalryman and half that 
sum to a foot-soldier. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 381. 

60 At this last place he made captive the cura, who was a European. Gaz. 
deMex., 1810, 811. 

67 The captive Spaniards had been brought with them, surrounded by the 
dragoons of the queen's regiment. The following is a translation of the doc 
ument, a copy of which is to be found in Alaman, Hint. Mej., i. app. 50-1: 
'We have approached this city with the object of securing the persons of all 
the European Spaniards. If they surrender at discretion, their persons will 
be treated with humanity; but if on the contrary resistance should be made, 


A man is never so old as to cease to be an enigma 
to himself, provided he continues to place himself in 
new and untried fields, and has sense and patience 
enough fully and fairly to regard himself. The bur 
glar does not know how he would behave as a banker ; 
the merchant does not know what his price would be 
were he a politician. So the lately humane man may 
become a bloody fanatic, and the soft radiance of char 
ity may make tender the heart of the cruel. Men 
pride themselves upon their character as something 
adamantine, when all the time it may be but putty, 
never having been tried; were it so, it would change 
to white or black twenty times under as many and 
weighty influences. 

The man of God behaves badly in the livery of the 
devil. He behaves worse than the devil. War is 
Satan's enginery, and he is the only one worthy to 
employ it, the only one who seems to win at it. God 
lights his enemies, we are told, and yet his enemies 
everywhere abound; he does not wholly overcome 
them. The sterner qualities of the soldier, resolved 
to win at all cost, were being developed in the parish 
priest of Dolores. Happily for these unfortunate 
Spaniards, no event occurred to cause the leaders to 
put their dreadful threat in execution. A copy of the 
despatch was sent by the ayuntamiento three hours 
after midnight on the 20th to the municipality of 
Queretaro, and on the same day Hidalgo was informed 
that no resistance would be offered to his entrance. 

On the 21st the insurgents marched into the city. 
At the entrance of the plaza a spectator had stationed 
himself on a house-top to witness the marshalling of 
this motley army. The man was shot dead; 63 and as 

and the order to fire upon us be given, they will be treated with a correspond 
ing rigor. May God protect your honors many years. Field of battle, Sep 
tember 19, 1810. Miguel Hidalgo, Ignacio Allen cle. P. S. The moment that 
the order is given to open fire upon our troops, the seventy-eight Europeans 
whom we have in our power will be beheaded. Hidalgo, Allende. Sres. del 
Ayuntamiento de Celaya. ' 

68 Alaman states that he was the coachman of Manuel Gomez Linares, and 
denies Abasolo's statement during his trkl that the man first fired at the in- 


if the report of this murderous gun were the precon 
certed signal for onslaught, the work of violence be 
gan. 69 Joined by the populace, the insurgents rushed 
in excited bands through the city, and erelong the 
houses of the Europeans were broken into, their fur 
niture battered to pieces and cast into the streets, 
and every article of clothing, of common requirement, 
or of use in war, was carried off, and the rest was 
wantonly destroyed. Again remonstrances were laid 
before Hidalgo; but he maintained his previous views 
that numbers would insure success, and that a sys 
tem of plunder would both weaken their foes and at 
tract partisans to their own cause. 70 

In taking this ground Hidalgo, as patriot and rev 
olutionist for he was both has been severely cen 
sured. But there is much to be said in extenuation. 
Hidalgo claimed that the Indians had been wrong 
fully dispossessed of their lands, property, and rights 
in the first instance, and consequently the wealth the 
Spaniards and their descendants had thereby acquired 
was not theirs, but belonged to the aboriginal occu 
pants of the soil and their descendants. Robbery 
and murder had been employed by the Spaniards in 
wresting the country from the Indians, and they 
would adopt the same measures to win it back. Fur 
ther than this, he argued, it was his only resource. 
He had but few trained soldiers, and he had no money 
to pay these except what he could take from the en 
emy. If war is ever justifiable, this one was; there 
is no more sacred cause man can fight for than per 
sonal and political independence. If it is right to 
wage war and afterward force the losing side to pay 
the cost of all, as the great nations of the earth seem 
agreed, it is equally right to rob and plunder as hostil- 

surgent troops, fd., 384. This incident is not accepted by some authors. 
Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., ii. 24. 

09 Mora says: 'La senal de posesion que se di6 al vecindario file" una cles- 
carga general de todas las annas de fuego verificada en la plaza, y que fue el 
toque de llamamiento para el destrozo y el saqueo.' Max. y sus Rev., iv. 20. 

70 Zamacois, Hist. Mej., vi. 288; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc.,\. 10. 


ities proceed. All war is murder and robbery; it is 
in order to murder and rob each other that men go 
to war. I do not attempt to justify this course ; I 
only say that such were the opinion and custom, to a 
great extent, in Mexico at this time, arid were held 
and practised alike by both sides throughout the war 
for independence. 

Before Hidalgo's entrance into Celaya his follow 
ers, who now amounted to fifty thousand, proclaimed 
him Captain-general of America, 71 and he had con 
ferred the rank of lieutenant-general on Allende, and 
corresponding grades on Aldama, Abasolo, 72 and other 
leaders. Here also he was joined by Captain Arias, 
whom the reader has lately seen playing the role of in 
former, while cautiously scheming for his self-protec 
tion. 73 

The recognition of Hidalgo's rank and authority by 
the ayuntamiento might be beneficial; he therefore 
called a session of its members and the principal citi 
zens on the 22d. Only two regidores presented 
themselves, the rest, being Europeans, having fled to 
Queretaro, whereupon the captain-general appointed 
others to the vacant offices, nominating Carlos Camar- 
go subdelegado. 7 * The new municipality acknowledged 

71 Id. , ii. 107, 109. See his summons to surrender, addressed to the inten- 
dente of Guanajuato, in Alaman, ut sup., 421. Mora comments on the ab 
surdity of this title. True, it smacks somewhat of worldly vanity; but after 
all, I do not see why it is not as good as another. Mex. y sus Rev., iv. 27. 
Two companies of the Celaya regiment, which had failed to unite with the 
troops that retired to Queretaro, joined the insurgents. 

72 Mariano Abasolo was at this time 27 years of age. He was a native of 
Dolores, and the son of a wealthy Spaniard who left him a large fortune, 
which was still further increased by marriage with the heiress Dona Maria 
Manuela Taboada. At his trial, some months later, he deposed that he had not 
been connected with the revolt previous to the grito de Dolores. The influ 
ence of Hidalgo, and his friendship for Allende, being a captain in the same 
regiment with him, appear to have induced him to join their cause. His ser 
geant, Jose' Antonio Martinez, afterward executed in Mexico, declared that 
Abasolo commanded him to deliver tip to Hidalgo the arms in the barracks 
at San Miguel. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 356-7; Dice. Univ. Hist., i. 12-13. 

73 Alaman states that Arias was always regarded with suspicion by the in 
surgent leaders, while Zamacois affirms that he was received by Hidalgo with 
delight, and repudiates the charge brought against Arias of having given in 
formation about the revolt. Hist. Mej., vi. 292. 

74 Camargo did not sympathize with the movement; and he advised the 
viceroy of the circumstances, protesting his iidelity. Venegas ordered him to 


the authority of Hidalgo/ 5 who, having thus arranged 
matters in Celaya, and fearing that Queretaro was too 
well defended to be successfully assailed under the 
present condition of his troops, inarched on the morn 
ing of the 23d in the direction of Guanajuato. 76 

remain in the position, with the full consent of the government. The insur 
gents in Celaya, however, discovered this sicle-play, and Camargo escaped 
to Quere'taro, pursued by a troop of cavalry. The exertion and agitation 
threw him into a fever, and he died a few days afterward. Liceaga, Adic. y 
Rectific., 100. Liceaga obtained his information from Abasolo's family, which 
was intimate with Camargo. 

75 See Hidalgo's letter, Doc. 3, in Liceaga, Adic. y Rectiftc., 212. Alaman 
erroneously states that the municipality conferred the rank of captain-general 
upon Hidalgo. Liceaga corrects this mistake. The municipality had no 
power to appoint military commanders: it was by the proclamation of his 
troops that Hidalgo was made captain-general. 

76 Additional authorities consulted for the preceding chapters are: Busta- 
mante, Defensa, 27; Ouad. Hist., i. 1-11, 33, and iv. 40, 87-111, 138-40; 
Gampanas de Callejd, 1-8; Martirologio, 4; Mcdidas Pacification, MS., ii. 
45-59; Mem. pa. la Hist. Mex., MS., i. 47-9; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i., passim; 
Diaertacion, iii., ap. 86-7; Zavala, Rev. Mex., passim; Torrente, R. Hisp.-Am., 
i. 58-64; Zerecero, Rev. Mex., passim; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i., 
passim; also ii. 5-42, and v. 60-3, 837-38, 853-60; Cancelada, Verdad Sabida, 
passim; Conducta Iturrigaray, 27-135; Tel. Mex., 415-20; Ruina de la N. 
Espan., passim; Gaz. Mex., x'i.-xvi., passim; Diar. Mex., i. 91-2; iv. 65; also 
v. 149, 533; vi.-ix., passim; xi. 119-20, 350, and xii. 185-6, 219; Cedidarlo, 
MS., iv. 25; Guerra, Rev. de N. Mex., i., passim; Mayer, Mex. Azt., i. 127- 
281; Mora, Mex. y Sus Rev., i. 284-8; iii. 193-369; iv. 10-17; Rev. N. Ep. 
Censura, passim; Consejos, passim; Breves Reflex, passim; Fisiologia Cosa 
Pub., 35-6; Rosa, Discurso, 11; Lizarza, Discurxo Vind. Iturrigaray, passim; 
Queipo, Canon. Peniten., passim; Col. Eacritos, 70-131; Lull, Refutation, 21; 
Rev. Verdad. Orig., no. i. 67-84; no. ii., passim; Lizana y Beaumont, Cart. 
Past., passim; Pradt, Hist. Revol. Espan., 40-1; Pretensiones Anglo- Amer., 2; 
Noriega, Vindication, passim; Urrutia Jacobo, Voto, passim; Represent, al 
Virey, no. i. 6; no. ii. 5-8; Frost, Pict. Hist. Mex., 149; Indicador, iii. 221- 
73; Calvillo, Oration, passim; Entrada, Representation, passim; Fernand<-z t 
Engatios que a los Insurgentes, passim; Lastarria, La America, passim; Lnfond, 
Voyage autour du Monde, i. 217-24; Galiano, Hist. Espana, vi. 337-8; Gon 
zalez, Hist. Est. Aguascal, 496; Guiridi y Alcocer, Sermones, passim; Presets 
Juicio Impartial, passim; Kottenkamp, Unabhangig., 1-45; Kennedy, Texas, 
i. 270-1; Rev. N. Espana, passim; Perez, Proclama, passim; Orizava, Ocurr., 
MS., 1-3; Michelena, Relation, ii. 7; Martinez, Rev. Mex., i. 215-17; Mofras, 
Exploration de V Oregon, i. 1-38; Modern Travels, Mex. and Gnat., i. 101-2; 
Lerdode Tejada, Apunt. Hist., no.v. 362-4; Las Clases Pro-l. Guadalaj., Sept. 
15, 1878, 3; Mosaico Mex., ii. 462; Mendibil, Resumen, 1-6, 93; Mex. Album, 
Fotog., i. 14-15; Mex. Scraps, ii. 60; Lacunza, Discursos, xxxvi. 535; Arran- 
g6iz, Mej., i., passim; Hidalgo, Biog. Cura, 30-1; Humboldt, Essai Pol, ii. 

763-9; ix. 864-5; x. 1335-84, 1422-8; xi. 649; Dublan y Lozano, Ley' Mex., 
i- .326-7; piiverr<pis,_Franz6. Inierven. Mex., 18-21; Domeiiech, Hist. Mex., i. 


no. 7, 206-24, 236-55; no. 8, 236-55; Annals Congress, 1806-7, 913-26; Aizer. 
State Pap,, ii. 596-695, 798-804; xii. 1-327, 388-434; Amer. Register, i. 71-3; 
ii. 79-83; Bib. Mex. Trat., i. 496; Beulluch, Mex., i. xx.-xxxv. ; Campillo, 
Manifesto, 7; Carbro, Proclama, passim; Chevalier, Exped. Mex., 4-5, 17-40; 
Mexique, 331-8; Chateaubriand, Congress de Ver., ii. 230-43; Carson, State 
Register; Calvo, Annales Hist., vi. 11-34; Yucatan, Diccion. Hist., i. 295; 
Young, Hist. Mex., 73; Walton's Expose, app. 7-10; Ward, Mex., vi. 155-6; 
Veracruzano, i. 76-7; Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Mcj., 3; Strieker, Bibliothek, 
36-40; Squier, Travels C. A., ii. 371-5; Soc. Mex. Geog., ii. 62-7, 566-75; Salo, 
Diar. Ofic., 5; Sosa, Episcop. Mex., 212; Rivera, Gob., i. 127-8; Hist. Jalapa, 
i. 198-268; Revilla, Dice. Univer., v. 429; Mayer, MS., no. 11, passim; 
Quarty. Review, vii. 248-9, 257; xvii. 530-40; xxx. 171-2; Portilla, Expana en 
Mex., 117-98; Pike, Explor. Travels, 370-1, 386-436; Pinkerton, Mod. Geog., 
iii. 159-60, 174-6; Qu'mones, Descripcion, passim; Palafox, Iturriqaray, 21-2; 
Campillo, Exhortacion, passim; Tapia, Exhortacion, passim; Perez, Orar. 
Funeb., nos. ii. and iii., passim; Robertson, Reminiscences, 1-45; Robinson, 
Mex., 11-29; Iturrigaray, i. 18-20; Rev. des Deux Mondes, 1862, 516-32; 
Ordenes Corona, MS., iii'. 141, 155; v. 60, 128. 





THE province of Guanajuato was the theatre of 
the first tragic events of the revolution, and no city 
in the kingdom of New Spain suffered more cruelly 
in loss of life and ruin of prosperity than its capital, 
Santa Fe de Guanajuato, from which the province 
derived its name. 1 At the time of the conquest this 
territory was inhabited by barbarous tribes living on 
the produce of the chase, and the first Spaniards who 
penetrated it were the conquerors of Acdanbaro, in 
which exploits joined the cacique of Jilotepec, Nico 
la's Montanez de San Luis, a near relative of Mon- 
tezuma. In 1526 these adventurers apportioned out 
among themselves the districts of Acambaro, Jere- 
cuaro, and Coroneo. 2 

1 The word is of Tarascan origin, and corrupted from Quanashuato, mean 
ing cerro de ranas, or froghill, a name given to the site, because of a rock 
shaped like a frog which was an object of worship to the natives. Medina, 
Chron. de S. Dieyo, 257-8. The capital at an early date was known by tho 
single appellation of Guanajuato. 

2 'Segun aparece de la relacion ine'dita escrita por Montauezque copia in- 
tegra el P. Fr. Pablo de la Concepcion Beaumont en su historia manuscrita de 
la provincia de Franciscanos de Michoacan, que existe en el archivo general.' 
Romero, Mich., 149-50. 



In 1531 ISTuno de Guzman passed through Penjamo 
to the vicinity of the site of Guanajuato, and added 
the territory to his conquests. For seventy years the 
Chichimecs disputed with persistent bravery their 
right to the soil, until in 1598 peace was established 
by Rodrigo del Rio, who, in the name of the king of 
Spain, promised to supply the Indians with food and 
clothing on the conditions that they should tender alle 
giance and keep in subjection the refractory. At the 
same time the viceroy caused to settle there some Tlas- 
caltecs and Aztecs, who instructed the Chichimecs in 
agricultural and mechanical industries, all under the 
guidance of missionaries. The first settlements in this 
province grew out of the establishment by Viceroy 
Yelasco the first, of the presidios at the places now 
known as San Felipe and San Miguel, as a frontier 
protection against the Chichimecs; but on the discov 
ery of the Guanajuato mines, as narrated in a previous 
volume, 3 a small fort was erected in 1554 on the site 
where Marfil stands, and was called a real de minas. 
A few years later another real de minas 4 was estab 
lished at Tepetapa, which is the name of one of the 
wards of Guanajuato city. For many years this lat 
ter settlement was a place of little importance and few 
inhabitants, and was under the jurisdiction of the al 
calde mayor of Celaya. At the close of the sixteenth 
century a curacy was founded, the population at that 
time being about four thousand. From this date, ow 
ing to the richness of the mines in the vicinity, the 
prosperity of Guanajuato increased rapidly, and in 
1679 the king of Spain granted it the title of villa y 
real de minas de Santa Fe de Guanajuato. 5 

3 Hist. Mex., iii. 588, this series. 

4 In the times of the conquest, the site on which a Spanish army encamped 
was called 'real,' and not ^infrequently was partially fortified. Real de 
minas, therefore, means a military station in a mining district. 

5 The name of Santa F6 had been given to the place in 1658 by the oidor 
Antonio de Lara y Mogrovejo, who had been commissioned by Viceroy Albur- 

Suerque to preside over the elaboration of the silver accruing to the crown in 
lat district. Medina, Ib.; Romero, Mich., 157. ' Elle re9tit le privilege royal 
de villa in 1C19.' Humboldt, Essal Pol., i. 247. This date must be a misprint. 



From this time the district remained under the rule 

of the ayuntamiento and 
subdelegados, subject to 
the audiencia of Mexico, 
until 1786, when the in- 
tendencias were estab 
lished, 6 of which Guana 
juato became one of the 
principal. In the mean 
time the town had been 
raised in 1741 to the dig 
nity of city, an appro 
priate coat of arms being 
granted it. 7 At the open 
ing of the nineteenth cen 
tury, the progress made 
by Guanajuato and its 
prosperity were almost 
The reader will be able to form some idea of the 
wealth and activity of the district at the time when 
the revolution broke out from the fact that in the 
year 1800 the mines, including those worked and those 
exhausted, numbered 1,816, employing 1.16 mills, 1,898 
arrastras, and 366 establishments for the elaboration 
of the metal. There were crushed daily 11,500 quin- 
tales of ore, and 9,000 operatives employed. At this 
time the population of the city, including those occu 
pied in the mines, was 66,000. Nor were the agricul 
tural industries of the province, which embraced about 
1,750 square leagues, less thriving; the numerous pop 
ulous towns were surrounded by rich pastures and 
lands covered with maize and other grain. But now, 
like a flail of destruction, war falls on the unhappy city, 
and at its conclusion the population has diminished to 
six thousand souls, the unfrequented streets are cov- 

6 Consult Hist. Hex. , iii. 452, this series. 

7 The coat of arms consists of a draped female figure blindfolded, holding 
in her right hand a chalice, and supporting a cross with her left arm. The 
design is" symbolical of faith. 


ered with grass, and the abandoned houses are offered 
rent free. 8 

The first church established in the city was the edi 
fice known to-day as the chapel of the college of La 
Purisima Concepcion, and in it Rivera placed the im 
age of the santisima virgen in 1557. A few years later 
another chapel was erected near by, and these two 
buildings were used as hospitals, the first one for the 
Tarascans and the second for the torn is, a third 
being built for the benefit of the Mexican settlers. In 
1671 was commenced the parish church, which was 
completed and dedicated in 1696, and thither was con 
veyed in the same year the image of our lady from 
the church of the hospital. The parish church of 
Guanajuato is one of the finest edifices of the kind in 
the Mexican republic. The ecclesiastical government 
of the province is under the bishopric of Michoacan. 
In 1663 Viceroy Serda and Bishop Ramirez del Prado 
granted permission to found the Franciscan convent 
of San Diego, but the work was stopped by order of 
the council of the Indies in the following year, because 
it had been begun without royal license. In 1667, 
however, the king's permission was granted, and the 
convent was erected into a guardiama in 1679. This 
church and convent were almost destroyed by the in 
undation of 1780, but were restored by the conde de 
Valenciana and some members of the brotherhood of 
el Cordon. 9 

On the 18th of September, Intendente Riano re 
ceived intelligence from Iriarte of the occurrences in 
Dolores and San Miguel. He immediately ordered 
the call to arms to be sounded, believing that Hidalgo 
was already on his march against the city. The 

8 After the independence Guanajuato again rapidly advanced, and in 1825 
the city had a population of over 33,000, according to the census taken by the 
governor, Carlos Montesdeoca. Soc. Mc,x. Geog., ix. 93. 

9 According to Fernando Navarro y Noriega, the intendencia of Guanajuato 
comprised in 1810 three cities, four villas, and G2 towns, the total population 
amounting to 576,600 souls. Soc. Mex. Geoy., 2 a ep., i. 290-1. 


guards and battalion of provincial infantry were has 
tily formed into line, while the principal citizens and 
the commercial class, hurriedly seizing their weapons, 
rushed with crow r ds of the populace to the buildings 
of the intendencia. All was confusion and terror; 
the stores were closed and house doors barred; the 
plazas were deserted by the hucksters; frightened 
women hurried along the thoroughfares for their 
homes; while horsemen at full speed spread wider the 
consternation as they galloped in different directions 
through the streets with orders from headquarters. 10 
Hiano explained to the assembled throng the cause of 
the alarm, and the populace expressed a desire to en 
gage the enemy, 11 believing that the insurrection was 
a demonstration in favor of the French. 12 At two 
-o'clock in the afternoon the intendente convoked a 
junta of the ayuntamiento, the prelates of the relig 
ious orders, and the principal citizens, at which he 
expressed his apprehension that the danger was great, 
but declared that he was determined to take every 
defensive measure possible. 13 

After some consultation it was decided to defend 
the city, and during the day barricades were thrown 
up at the entrances of the principal streets. Spaniards 
and Americans as the Creoles and Indians are now 
called 14 - were assembled in arms, and outlying de- 

10 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 277. 

11 ' Los que segun el general entusiasmo si entraron en aquel dia hubieran 
perecido sin remedio. ' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 23. 

12 Liceaga, Adic. y Eectific., 73-4. 

13 The ayuntamiento of Guanajuato in February 1811 states to the viceroy 
that several of its members proposed to Biaiio that he should immediately 
march against Hidalgo with the provincial battalion, which numbered more 
than 400 men, and with such armed citizens as could be mustered; and that 
had this measure been adopted the revolution would have been nipped in the 
bud. Ouan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 10-11. Brigadier Miguel Costansd, the com 
missioner appointed to report on the matter, approved of Eiano's action in 
refusing to accede to the proposal, by doing which he would have left the 
capital of his province defenceless. Id., 71-2. Liceaga, with tedious length, 
also supports the intendente. Adic. y Rtctific., 71-89. Alaman, on the con 
trary, considers that the proposed movement would have been the best that 
could be adopted, and supplies the additional information that Major Ber- 
zabal was one of those who proposed it. Hist. Mej., i. 407. 

14 We have here the most proper use, except as applied to the aborigines, 
of the many-sided and generally misappropriated word Americans. In treat- 


tachments posted on the Santa Rosa and Yillalpando 
highways which lead to Dolores and San Miguel. 
A third body of troops was stationed on the Marfil 
road. Squadrons of the cavalry regiment del Prin 
cipe were ordered in, and advice asking for aid sent 
to Brigadier Feliz Calleja, in command of the troops 
at San Luis Potosi. On the following morning a 
fylsQ alarm was raised that the enemy was approach 
ing on the Marfil road; and the tardiness of the 
lower orders to assemble for defence amounted almost 
to indifference a state of things significant of im 
pending misfortune. For six days these defensive 
measures were maintained, and still no enemy ap 
peared. 15 The intendente displayed an energy and 
endurance which only the conviction of his perilous 
position could have called forth; but day by day he 
became more certain of the disaffected inclination of 
the lower classes. "The seeds of rebellion spread," 
he writes to Calleja on the 26th, "security and confi 
dence are gone. I have neither rested nor undressed 
myself since the 17th, and for the last three days 
have not slept an hour at a time." Indeed, he could 
no longer rely upon the fidelity even of his own 
troops. The responsibility of saving, if possible, the 
royal treasury and archives increased Riano's anxiety; 
and deeming his present arrangements defective, since 
he could avail himself neither of the barracks, the 
plaza, nor any of the churches, owing in part to the 
threatening attitude of the populace, 16 on the 23d he 
decided to retire to the alhondiga de granaditas, or 
government granary a building which from its size 
and strength would afford the advantages of a fortifica 

ing of the aborigines the term properly fits all races indigenous to America. 
Next it may be employed, as in the present case, to designate a mixed mass 
of Indians, Creoles, and mestizos as distinguished from European Spaniards 
with whom they are at war. But when we come to use the word Americans 
as opposed to Canadians, or still worse as in California to Mexicans, it is 
reduced to an absurdity. 

15 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 277-8. 

16 ' Manifestandose con chistes y con burlas contrario & la causa de gobierno 
espanol.' Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 89. 


The Alh6ndiga de Granaditas, as famous in the 
history of Mexico as is the Bastile in that of France, 
had been erected by Kiafio for the purpose of storing 
in it a quantity of corn sufficient for one year's con 
sumption as a provision against failure of the crop. 
During such periods of scarcity not only did the lower 
orders suffer, but the mining industry was seriously 
interrupted through want of food for the mule-trails 
employed at the mines. The building was begun in 
January 1798, and finished in August 1809. It is a 
massive oblong two-story structure, 80 by 54 varas, 
and cost $2 18, 263. 17 The exterior is void of ornament, 
and its lofty solid walls pierced by windows opening 
into the numerous store-rooms give to it quite a for 
midable appearance. In the interior a portico of two 
stories surrounds the spacious patio, or open court, 
the lower columns being of Tuscan architecture, and 
the upper ones, between which a balustrade of stone 
extends, of Doric. Two magnificent flights of stairs 
connect the stories, which consist of independent store 

On the northern side is the principal gateway, and 
another opens at the eastern end of the building, 
adorned with two columns and a Tuscan entablature. 
It stands at the south-western entrance of the city, on 
a rising ground which terminates the height called the 
cerro del Cuarto by which it is dominated. Stored 

17 Liceaga, followed by Zamacois, here falls into several errors; but I am 
enabled to rectify their mistakes from the original statement of March 1810 
passed by the intendente and audiencia. This document, which is in my pos 
session, is particularly interesting as bearing the autograph signature of the 
unfortunate Riafio, as well as those- of the members of the ayuntamientos for 
1809 and 1810. Among these I may mention Maranon, Septiem, Jose" Ignacio 
Rocha, Martin Coronel, and Ginori, all of whom signed the Publica Vindica 
tion del Ilustre Ayuntamiento de Santa Fe de Guanajuato Justificando ftu Con- 
dncta Moral y Politica, a representation addressed to the viceroy in January, 
1811, relative to the occurrences at Guanajuato, and printed by permission 
the same year. The intendente's and above mentioned names, with the ex 
ception of Ginori's, appear twice. The building accounts occupy nine folios, 
and are preceded by the order of the municipal junta on sealed paper for 
their examination by Martin Coronel. The document is inclosed in and at 
tached to a portfolio of native leather on which is engrossed : Tomo 5, 1809, 
Contiene la Cuenta General de la Fdbrica de la Famosa Alhondlga de Grana 


with maize and supplied with water, the alhondiga 18 
was the only place where the intendente could hope 
to hold out till the arrival of Calleja, whom he ex 
pected within a week. Anticipating that the move 
ment would meet with opposition, on the night of the 
24th he caused secretly to be conveyed thither all 
the royal and municipal treasures, amounting to over 
$620,000 in money, bars of silver, and gold ounces, 19 
the archives of the government and ayuntamiento, 
and eventually the treasures of many private persons, 
estimated at three million pesos. 20 Thither, also, 
were removed the arms and ammunition of the bar 
racks, sacks of flour, and other provisions. Ln the 
dead of the night, too, the barricades were taken down 
and the material carried to the alhondiga. Then the 
troops were withdrawn from the barracks and out 
lying posts, numbers of the Europeans mustered to 
gether, and soldiers and civilians, in one common lot, 
took refuge within the walls of this building. 

When morning dawned and the city was astir the 
news spread. The unguarded streets, the disappear 
ance of the barricades, and the silent barracks pro 
claimed to the populace that their reluctant allegiance 
had been recognized, and that they were left to choose 
between loyalty and rebellion. Fear fell on all. The 
ayuntamiento in great excitement requested the in 
tendente to preside over a junta composed of its own 
members, the curas, prelates of the religious orders, 

18 An anonymous correspondent in a letter to the in tendente's brother, 
dated Guanajuato, October 2, 1810, says: 'Este edificio es una verdadera for- 
taleza, y acaso la unica que hay en el reino. El Sr Riauo cuando la hizo se 
propuso formar un Castillo para defensa del lugar, dandole el nombre de Al 
hondiga.' Zerecero, Disc. Civic., 30. 

19 'Se pasaron de las reales caxas a la alh6ndiga trescientas nueve barras de 
plata, ciento setenta y quatro mil pesos efectivos, treinta y dos mil en onzas 
de oro, treinta y ocho mil de la ciudad, que estaban en las areas de provincia, 
y treinta y tres mil que se hallaban en las del cabildo; veinte mil de la miu- 
erfa y depositos, catorce mil de la renta de tabacos, y mil y pico do correos. ' 
Guan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 14-15. A bar of silver weighed 135 marcs and its 
standard value was 1,100 pesos. 

23 Bustamante states the value of property in the precious metals, jewelry, 
and valuable merchandise that was removed into the alh6ndiga during the 
night and following days amounted to 5,000,000 pesos. There were also 700 
quintales of quicksilver deposited there. Cuad. Hist., i. 25. 


and principal citizens, in the municipal hall. Riano 
declined on the plea of weariness, but expressed his 
willingness to attend a junta in the afternoon; but it 
must be held in the alhondiga de granaditas, and not 
in the municipal hall. The meeting took place; but 
civil officers, priests, and prelates in turn vainly en 
deavored to induce Riano to change his purpose. 
The intendente was inflexible, and according to the 
representation of the ayuntamiento to the viceroy a 
few months later, he bluntly dismissed them with the 
assurance that, in the interest of the king, he should 
remain with the troops where he was, and that as for 
the city it might defend itself as best it could. 21 

During that and the two following days the inten 
dente devoted all his energies to the defence of his 
position. Additional provisions were introduced into 
the alhondiga; strong barricades were thrown up at 
the only three points by which attacks could be made 
through the streets; the eastern gateway was closed 
with solid masonry; the iron quicksilver flasks, charged 
with gunpowder, were converted into grenades, and 
further information was despatched to Calleja, 22 set 
ting forth his want of arms, and the doubtful fidelity 
of his troops. 23 

In order that the reader may understand Riano's 
position, and the mode of attack adopted by the in 
surgents in the ensuing engagement, a brief descrip 
tion of the city of Guanajuato will be necessary. 

zl Guan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 17-20. Bustamante also affirms that the in 
tendente thus expressed himself. Cuad. Hist., i. 24. Consult also Hernandez 
y Ddvalos, Col. l)oc., ii. 278. 

22 This was sent on the 26th. The bearer of the first despatch left Guana 
juato at 1 P. M. on the 23d, and on his return left San Luis at 11 P. M. of the 
24th with Calleja's reply enjoining Riano to hold Guanajuato, and promising 
to be before the city during the next week. With regard to the speed of the 
courier Bustamante remarks: ' Que activos andaban estos hombres por sal- 
varse!' Cuad. Hist., i. 25. The distance from Guanajuato to San Luis 
Potosi is some 52 leagues. 

23 ' Tengo poca polvora porque no la hay absolutamente, y la caballeria mal 
montada y armada sin otra arma que espadas de vidrio, ' that is swords brit 
tle as glass, 'y la infanterfa con fusiles remendados, no sieiido imposible el 
que estas tropas sean seducidas.' Id., 24-5. 


Situated at the bottom of a deep and narrow hollow, 
round which on all sides rise lofty mountains, its po 
sition in a military point of view is one of the worst. 
On the south side rises the hill of San Miguel, while 
from the north the cerro del Cuarto 24 extends like 
a wedge into the city. So irregular is the site that 
it might well be described by crumpling a sheet of 
paper. On the plaza itself but few level spots can be 
found, and few of the streets accommodate carriages. 
Most of the houses occupy slopes so steep that in 
many cases the floor of one is on a level with the roof 
of another. An extension of this rugged hollow runs 
off in the form of a rocky valley south-westerly to 
Marfil, a league distant, and known by the name of 
the canada de Marfil. Its whole length was occupied 
by workshops, mills, and other buildings connected 
with mining. Formerly the only carriage entrance 
into the city lay through this glen. 25 To the east 
of the city rises the river Guanajuato, here a mere 
mountain torrent, which sweeping in a winding course 
through the city unites with the Rio de la Cata flow 
ing from the north-west. Although situated on a 
rising ground, the alhondiga was so close to the cerro 
del Cuarto that the houses built on the steep of that 
height were only separated from it by a narrow street 
arid a small plaza, not more than twenty-five yards 
wide. On the south-east of the alhondiga was the 
convent of Belen, from which it was separated by the 
descent of Mendizdbal, and on the south and west 
were the extensive workshops and premises of the 
hacienda de Dolores where the precious metals were 
treated. On the north, extending east and west, was 
the street of los Pozitos in a straight line with the 
descent to the Rio de la Cata, which was spanned 

24 So called because on it was exposed in early times one portion of the 
body of a malefactor who had beeu quartered. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 403. 

25 The difficulties of this road were such that in 1822 a new one was com 
menced over the hills, and this required a fine bridge to be built across the 
river Cata. It was completed in 1835. Liceaya, Adic. y jRectific., 7-8. 


by a wooden bridge. Herewith I give a plan of the 
alhondiga and vicinity with explanation. 26 

From this description the reader will observe that 
the only three directions from which an assault could 
be made upon the alhondiga were from the street of 
los Pozitos; up the cuesta de Mendizabal; and up the 
ascent from the Rio de la Cata. These approaches 
were obstructed by the barricades, already mentioned. 
Riafio did not confine his defence to the alhondiga, 
but included in his lines of fortification the house 
owned by Mendizdbal and the hacienda de Dolores, 
which were surrounded by strong walls and separated 
from the alh6ndiga by two narrow streets. 

*"": ^3 T^N' --- = ^ ^ f \ . Pi n'\^ 


26 A. The Alh6ndiga. B. Convent of Belen. C. House of the hacienda 
de Dolores. DDD. Premises and work-shops of the same. E. The well. F. 
Barricade at the foot of the hill of Mendizabal. G. Hill of Mendizabal. H. 
House of Mendizabal whence the hill derived its name. I. Barricade in the 
street of los Pozitos. J. Street of los Pozitos. K. Ascent to the mines. L L. 
Entrances to streets which Riauo closed with masonry. M. Descent to the 
Rio de la Cata. N. Barricade preventing approach from the river. 0. Prin 
cipal entrance of the alhondiga, the only one not closed. P. Eastern entrance 
closed with masonry. Q. Opening on to the flat roof. B. Window from 
which Riaflo was shot. S. Cemetery of Belen. T. Street of Belen. U U. 
Bridge and causeway of Our Lady of Guanajuato. V. Bio de Guanajuato. 
X. Rio de la Cata. Y. The wooden bridge, Z. Workshop of Granaditas 
and ward of Tepetapa. Z' Z'. The cerro del Cuarto covered with houses com 
manding the alhondiga. * Spot where Berzabal fell. 


Meanwhile, Hidalgo, marching through Salamanca, 
Irapuato, and other places which voluntarily joined 
his cause, approached Guanajuato in the early morn 
ing of the 28th. He was well informed of the position 
of affairs in the city. Arrived at the hacienda of 
Burras he sent forward Ignacio Camargo and Mari 
ano Abasolo 27 with a communication to Kiafio inform 
ing him of the proclamation of independence, and 
urging a peaceable surrender. The letter terminated 
with a declaration of war to the uttermost in case of 
refusal. 28 

27 Liceaga was a relative of Abasolo, and being in Guanajuato at the 
time tried to see him, but was prevented by the dense crowds. Adic. y Rec- 
ti/ic., xi. and 103. 

28 1 translate the document and a private letter which accompanied it; 
also Biano's reply. The originals remained in possession of Ignacio Carnargo, 
and were given by him to Liceaga, who was his school-fellow. The official 
communication of Hidalgo is the more important as it refutes Alaman, 
who misleads regarding the proclamation of independence. He erroneously 
charges Bustamante with interpolating expressions, claiming that he himself 
had been supplied with a correct version by Benigno Bustamante, one of the 
Europeans present in the alhondiga, and remai'king: 'La sola palabra inde- 
pendencia basta para demonstrar la inexactitud de este relato, pues Hidalgo 
ocultaba este intento cuidadosamente, y nunca tomaba en boca piiblicamente 
esta voz.' Hist. Mej., i. 421. Liceaga rightly points out the impossibility of 
Benigno Bustamante being able to obtain a correct copy of the communica 
tion. Adic. y Rectific. , 103-4. 

Hidalgo's despatch to Riafio. ' Headquarters at the Hacienda de Burras, 
28th of September, 1810. The numerous army which I command elected me 
Captain General and Protector of the nation in the fields of Celaya. The 
same city in the presence of fifty thousand men ratified this election, as have 
also all the places through which I have passed; which will make your honor 
cognizant that I am legitimately authorized by my nation to undertake the 
beneficent projects which have appeared necessary to me for its welfare. 
These projects are of equal utility and advantage to the Americans and those 
Europeans who are disposed to reside in this kingdom, and they are reduced to 
the proclamation of the independence and liberty of the nation. Consequently 
I do not regard the Europeans as enemies, but only as an obstacle which em 
barrasses the successful issue of our enterprise. Your honor will be pleased to 
inform the Europeans who have united together in the alhondiga of these ideas, 
in order that they may decide whether to declare themselves as enemies, or 
agree to remain in the quality of prisoners, meeting with humane and kind 
treatment, such as those whom we bring with us have experienced, until the 
liberty and independence indicated shall be acquired, in which case they will 
be included in the class of citizens with the right to the restitution of their 
property, which for the time being we shall make use of for the urgencies of 
the nation. If on the contrary they do not accede to this demand I shall use 
all force and stratagem to destroy them, without leaving them the hope of 
quarter. May God protect your Honor. Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, Captain 
General of America.' 

The private letter from Hidalgo to Rlaiio runs as follows: 'The esteem 
which I have ever expressed for you is sincere, and I believe due to the high 
qualities which adorn you. The difference in our ways of thinking ought not 


Before nine o'clock the messengers reached the bar 
ricade at the foot of the cuesta de Mendizabal, arid 
Camargo was conducted blindfolded into the alhon- 
diga. Riano on receiving Hidalgo's communication 
assembled the Europeans on the flat roof of the build 
ing, apart from the troops, and having read it to them 
asked their decision. For some moments there was 
a mournful silence, till finally their captain, Bernardo 
del Castillo, after a few brief remarks declared for 
war. He would fight till he died in maintaining the 
right; and thereupon raised the cry of "Death or vic 
tory!" in which the Europeans now joined. 29 Riano 
then descended to discover the intentions of the troops. 
"And my children of the battalion," he asked, "can 
I doubt about their resolution to do their duty?" 
Whereupon Berzabal raised the cry of "Viva el rey!" 
and the soldiers vociferously responded. Neverthe 
less, before sending his reply, Riaiio considered it right 
to communicate with the ayuntamiento, and sent by 
the procurator Pedro Cobo, who being a Spaniard had 
taken refuge in the alhondiga, copies of Hidalgo's let 
ter and his intended reply. 30 Much delay was occa- 

to diminish it. You will follow the course which may seem most right and 
prudent to you, but that will not occasion injury to your family. We shall 
tight as enemies, if so it shall be decided; but I herewith offer to the Senora 
Intendenta an asylum, and assured protection, in any place she may select 
for her residence, in consideration of the ill health to which she was subject. 
This offer does not spring from fear, but from a sensibility which I cannot 
discard from me.' 

Riaiio's reply: ' Sr Cura of the town of Dolores, D. Miguel Hidalgo. I 
recognize no other authority, nor is it evident to me that any such has been 
established, nor other Captain General in the kingdom of New Spain, than 
His Excellency Sr Don Francisco Xavier de Venegas, its Viceroy; nor more 
legitimate reforms than those which the Nation at large may adopt at the 
general Cortes to be held. My duty is to fight as a soldier, which noble senti 
ment animates all those around me. Guanajuato, 28th of September, 1810. 
Juan Antonio Riaiio. ' And to the private letter: 'The exercise of arms is 
not incompatible with sensibility; this demands of my heart the gratitude 
due to your offers for the benefit of my family, whose lot does not disturb me 
on the present occasion.' Id., 212-14. 

29 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 279-80. Mora, who gives a 
slightly different version of this proceeding, insinuates that the Europeans 
were inclined to yield, and passes a reflection upon the indiscretion of Cas 
tillo, whom he describes as ' uno de aquellos raptos indiscretos y compromete- 
dores que no faltan en semejantes ocasiones.' Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 32. This 
author states that Camargo read Hidalgo's communication to the troops, a 
most improbable proceeding. 

z y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 117. 


sioned in assembling the members, who had retired to 
their houses, and when they met they had no advice 
to offer. Calling attention to the fact that they had 
neither troops, arms, nor funds any longer at their 
disposal, they said that it remained with the inten- 
dente to act under the circumstances as it seemed best 
to him. Riafio's reply was at last written and Ca- 
margo sent back, but the long delay had caused Aba- 
solo to return, and Hidalgo was already approaching 
up the Marfil road. The intendente then wrote Ca- 
lleja: "I am about to fight, for I shall be attacked 
immediately. I shall resist to the uttermost, because 
I am honorable. Fly to my succor." 

Riano now disposed his forces, which consisted of 
four companies of the provincial infantry, commanded 
by Captain Manuel de la Escalera, in the absence of 
the lieutenant-colonel, Quintana, 31 and scarcely num 
bering 300 men. Besides these was a company of 
armed Europeans, which raised the number to about 
500, and two troops of dragoons, not mustering more 
than seventy, under the command of Captain Jose 
Castilla. 32 A portion of the infantry and of the 
European company was stationed on the roof of the 
alhondiga, and detachments of the provincial battal 
ion were posted at the three barricades. The cavalry 
were drawn up inside the barrier at the descent to the 
Rio de la Cata; to the remaining armed Europeans 
was assigned the defence of the hacienda de Dolores, 
while a body of reserves was retained within the al- 
hondiga. 33 While these preparations were going on, 
it was noticed that the surrounding heights were oc- 

81 Liceaga states that Quintana, the Conde de Perez Galvez, colonel of the 
dragoon regiment del Principe, and a number of Europeans had suddenly 
left the city, while others did not cooperate with those in the alhondiga, but 
remained in their houses. He gives a list of 20 names cf these latter. Adic. 
y Rectlfic., 79. This is confirmed in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 279. 

82 Mora says six hundred in all. Ut sup., 29. 

33 Alaman conjectures that Biano intended to sally with the reserves and 
cavalry, and attack the enemy at the most assailable points, ' plan cicrta- 
mente de muy aventurada ejecucion, con el corto mimero de tropa de que se 
podia disponer.' Ut sup., 424. 


cupied by crowds of the populace, who seated on the 
ground calmly looked on as if at a bull-fight. 

Shortly before midday, Hidalgo's army appeared in 
sight, approaching by the Marfil road. 34 Advancing 
along the causeway of Nuestra Senora de Guanajuato, 
the van, composed of a strong body of Indians armed 
with lances, clubs, and bows and arrows, crossed the 
bridge and arrived in front of the barricade at the 
foot of the cuesta de Menclizabal. Gilberto de Riano, 
son of the intendente, 35 who was in command at this 
point, opened fire on them as they continued to ad 
vance, when ordered, in the name of the king, to halt. 
Several Indians fell; the rest retreated, and guided by 
a native of the place, took up a position on the cerro 
del Cuarto. The main body now formed into two 
divisions, one of which, making a detour, approached 
by the cerro de San Miguel, and entering the city by 
the causeway of las Carreras, 36 liberated the jail pris 
oners, and then occupied the cerro del Venado. The 
other division made a detour by the hacienda de 
Flores in order to occupy the cerro del Cuarto. 

The city was now in possession of the insurgents, 
and, as they marched through the streets, thousands 
of voices raised the dreadful battle-cry, while they 
waved hundreds of different colored banners, on which 
was depicted the sacred emblem. The miners, a brave 

34 The number of armed men in Hidalgo's force is not exactly known. 
Robinson, Mem. Max. Rev., i. 27, says that he left Celaya with nearly 20,000. 
Bustamante, Torrente, Alaman, and others also place the number at 20,000. 
Liceaga, Adic. y Rectijic. , 82, raises it to 25,000 men of all classes, 2,000 of 
whom were regular troops of the San Miguel regiment of dragoons de la Ileina, 
and of the provincial infantry regiment, companies of which joined the in 
surgents at Celaya, Salamanca, and Irapuato. Mora, on the contrary, gives 
14,000 as the estimated number, besides 400 regulars, 'sin con tar con la 
tropa reglada que no pasaban de cuatrocientos, y se hallaban como perdi- 
dos y absolutamente embarazados para obrar entre esta multitud disordenada.' 
Mej. y sus Rev. , iv. 33-4. 

35 Gilberto was a lieutenant of the line regiment of Mexico, and was staying 
with his father on leave of absence. He was a young man of considerable 
military ability. The construction of the barricades was intrusted to his 
direction, and he devised the plan of converting the quicksilver flasks into 
grenades. Alaman, flist. Mej., i. 417. 

36 On the summit of the cerro de San Miguel was a small plain where the 
people were wont to attend horse-races on days of festivity. Hence its name 
of las Carreras. Id., 408. 

THE ATTACK. t 145 

and hardy class, and the populace joined Hidalgo, 
and soon all the heights which commanded the al- 
hondiga were occupied. Soldiers of the Celaya regi 
ment, armed with muskets, and a host of Indian 
slingers were posted on the cerro del Cuarto ; a simi 
lar disposition was made on the cerro del Venae 1 o. 
The houses in front of the alhondiga on the north skle 
were filled with sharp-shooters, and swarms of In 
dians in the river bed broke stones for the slingers, 
others carrying them up the heights. Hidalgo, pis 
tol in hand, at the head of about two thousand 
mounted men, among whom were the dragoons of the 
regiment de la Reina, hastened from point to point, 
encouraging his men, giving instructions, and making 
his dispositions for the assault. 37 

At length the performance begins. Hidalgo's sol 
diers open fire on the besieged, while from the heights 
and house roofs a furious discharge of stones is rained 
down on the alhondiga. Dense masses of Indians 
assault the barricades, and though the slaughter from 
the enemy's volleys, fired at close range into the com 
pact mass, is terrific, it fails to repel the assailants. 
As the front ranks fall, others supply their places, 
pressed onward by those behind; and thus over the 
bodies of the dead and dying the contest rages unin 
terruptedly. For the besieged the position is terrible. 
The reports of the muskets, the hiss of bullets, the 
hoarse hum of the jagged stones as they whirl through 
the air and fall on the roof as from an emptying 
volcano is worse than the infernal din of Satan's en 
ginery. 38 

For half an hour the battle rages. The assailants 
show no intention of ceasing their efforts to storm 
the barricades. The carnage among the assailants is 

37 Liceaga points out a flagrant misstatement of Alaman's, to the effect that 
Hidalgo remained during the whole of the contest in the cavalry barracks at 
the farther end of the city. Adic. y Retific., 108-10. 

38 So furious and continuous was the discharge of stones that after the 
action the floors of the alhondiga roof and the open court were found! to be 
raised eight or nine inches above their proper level by the accumulation. 
Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 37. 

HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 10 


fearful, but to see their comrades shot down by their 
side only the more enrages them. The defenders of 
the barrier at the street of los Pozitos are being hard 
pressed, and Riafio sallies with twenty men to their 
support. His courage outstrips his prudence; yet, 
si itioning the men, he returns to the alhondiga un 
scathed through a storm of missiles. He mounts the 
steps of the entrance and turns round to see how the 
battle goes then he drops dead, struck through the 
brain by a bullet. A soldier of the Celaya regiment 
had marked him for his own. The body is dragged 
within, 39 and the hearts of those present sink as they 
gaze on their commander's lifeless form. 

Thus fell the first man of note in the revolutionary 
war, a man whose death was much lamented. Riafio 
was an incorruptible and just but merciful magistrate. 
He was headstrong and rash, yet he was honest and 
humane. The beneficent measures adopted while he 
was intendente of Guanajuato raised the province to 
its highest prosperity. It is claimed for him that 
liberal and enlightened views led him to recognize the 
blessings of independence; and to his friends, of whom 
Hidalgo was one, he did not hesitate to express liberal 
opinions. It is further urged that, had the declara 
tion of independence come from a more legitimate 
source, had it been proclaimed by the constituted au 
thorities, as might have been the case if Iturrigaray 
had not been deposed, Riano would unhesitatingly 

89 Bustamante gives a different version of the intend ente's fall. He states 
that Riano, having observed that the sentinel at the gate had abandoned his 
post and musket, took up the piece and commenced firing at the enemy, and 
that he was killed while so occupied, CuacL Hist. , i. 38. Mora gives a simi 
lar account, Mcj. y sus Rev., iv. 34-5; and so does an anonymous narration 
in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 281. Alarnan with reason points out the 
improbability of the intendente acting thus when the serious duties of a 
commander required his attention. Moreover, Bustamante states that a cor 
poral who was standing close by was wounded in the head by the same bullet 
which passed through Kiailo's skull, proving that if the sentinel had deserted 
his post there was another to take his place. Alaman asserts that the shot was 
fired from the window of one of the houses opposite the alhondiga. Hist. Mcj. , 
i. 42G-7. Liceaga, followed by Zamacois, considers that it was fired from the 
cerro del Cuarto. Adic. y Bectific., 114-15. 

DEATH OF RIA$0. 147 

have supported it; but he could not countenance 
what he deemed a lawless movement, a movement 
whose origin was so humble, and whose agents were 
so ignoble. But we may well doubt, if the independ 
ence of Mexico had been left wholly to Spanish offi 
cials, the corrupt and mercenary minions of a corrupt 
and mercenary monarch, that it would ever have been 
achieved. New Spain was in no sense a confederation 
of states, like the English colonies in America, with 
men at the helm native-born and of independent 
thought and action. Conditions were different here, 
and the desired results must come through different 
means. I believe this uprising of the native and mixed 
races to have been one of the inexorable dispensations 
in the case. It was meet that a remnant of that peo 
ple, who had suffered so gross and long-continued 
wrongs at the hands of Europeans, should be the first 
to rise in rebellion against them, when onco opportu 
nity offered a reasonable hope of success. 

Riaiio was a better man than the average Spanish 
official in America; but it was not at the individual 
the blow w r as aimed, We all recognize his simple and 
modest deportment, his kindness and accessibility to 
the poor, his pleasant companionship and literary at 
tainments, which made him alike popular with high 
and low. 40 

The death of the intendente carries confusion and 
disorder among the besieged. A dispute arises be 
tween Manuel Perez Valdes, asesor of the intenden- 
cia, and Major Berzdbal, each claiming the right to 
the chief command. There is no time to settle it; 
the assault is continued with increased obstinacy, and 
for hours the fierce contest rages. Heavier falls the 
stone deluge, and fiercer is the rush at the barricades. 
All discipline is lost; as first one and then another 

40 He was born on the 16th of May, 1757, in the town of Lierganes, in 
Santander, Spain, being in his tifty-fourth year when he met his death. Ala- 
mem, Hist. Mej., i. 427. 


issues orders, the soldiers of the line only obeying 
their respective officers. The defenders of the barri 
cades can hold their positions no longer, and are or 
dered to abandon them and retreat to the alhondiga. 
The ponderous doors are then hastily closed, leaving 
the cavalrymen outside, and cutting off from place of 
refuge those in the hacienda de Dolores. The former 
are instantly surrounded, and Cast-ilia, their captain, 
and many others slain; of the rest, some few escape 
in the crowd, and some take part with the insurgents. 
The roof of the alhondiga is no longer tenable, and 
those posted on it retire below. Surrender, however, 
is not thought of; and in the dense masses of the 
revolutionists as they throng in front of the building 
the slaughter caused by the fire of the besieged from 
the windows is fearful. Presently miners, partially 
protected by huge earthen vessels/ 1 creep up to the 
building and work with crow-bars at the wall, trying 
to effect a breach. But the walls are thick arid 
strong, and Hidalgo, seeing that the door, though of 
massive wood, can be more quickly broken through, 
orders crow-bars. A more ready way is found, how 
ever, by a young mirier standing near, who offers, if 
provided with pitch and combustibles, to set fire to 
it. 42 These are procured from a neighboring store, 
and the intrepid youth, under cover of one of the 
earthen vessels, makes his way up to the entrance 
and accomplishes the daring feat. 

41 'Cubiertos con cuartones de lozas, como los romanos con la testudo.' Al 
aman, ut sup. , 430. 

42 Bustamante's account, which is repudiated by Alaman, is that Hidalgo 
addressed one of the crowd standing near him, and asked him if he had the 
courage to set the gate on fire. The man said 'Yes,' and did it. 'Este Idpero 
comparable con el carbonero que atac6 la Bastida en Francia. . .sin titubear 
dijo que si.' Ut sujJ., 39. In the text I have followed Liceaga's version, who 
took great pains to arrive at the true account of this event. See his pages 
112-14. He states that this young hero, well known in Guanajuato, was a 
miner 18 or 20 years of age, and named Mariano. He left Guanajuato the 
same evening, in the direction of Mellado, where he lived, accompanied by 
several others, carrying bags of money, and under the guard of some insurgent 
soldiers. As he was never seen again, Liceaga conjectures that he was mur 
dered for his money. Bustamante gives to this youth the appellation of 
Pi'pila, a name unknown in Guanajuato according to Alaman and Liceaga. 


When they see their barrier yielding to the flames, 
consternation falls on the besieged. As the fire eats 
its way into the wood, the impatient assailants rush 
at the door. It does not yet yield. Berzabal draws 
up in line before the entrance such soldiers as he can 
collect, to resist the attack. The deadly grenades are 
brought into play, and the havoc they cause is terrible. 
Gilberto Riano, maddened at his father's death, 43 
thinks only of revenge, and the infernal engines 
which he had contrived are hurled rapidly through 
the windows upon the multitude. Each bomb as it 
explodes sows the ground with dead and mangled 
bodies. But like the rushing-in of mighty waters, 
every space thus cleared is quickly filled. 

The European civilians in the building are demoral 
ized by panic fear. Some shower down among their 
foes money from the windows. Vain effort! As well 
throw crumbs to hungry wolves. Are not all the treas 
ures of the alhondiga theirs? Some throw aside their 
arms in despair and seek to disguise themselves; others 
wildly shout out that they will capitulate, and others 
betake themselves to prayer. A few, brave to the last, 
resolve to die rather than yield. Finally, confusion 
increasing and all hope abandoned, the asesor Valdes 
causes a white handkerchief to be hoisted as a signal 
of surrender. In denser crowds the besiegers surge 
forward. But Gilberto Riano and others, ignorant 
of what Valdes has done, still cast their destructive 
bombs. 44 Whereat the besiegers in fury are beside 
themselves. The roar of the multitude as they raise the 
cry of Treachery ! treachery! is heard all over the city, 

43 Bustamante relates that Gilberto, having embraced his father's body, 
seized a pistol with the intention of taking his own life. Those present, how 
ever, caused him to desist, by offering to post him at the most dangerous 
point, that he might have an opportunity of avenging his father's death. Ut 
sup., 38. 

il Both Mora and Bustamante state that the mistake was caused by the 
firing from the hacienda de Dolores, the defenders of which could not possibly 
see the signal. But as Alaman and Liceaga were both in Guanajuato at the 
time, I prefer to follow the account adopted in the text, and in which they 


and the order is issued to kill and spare not. 45 Against 
the burning door, although not yet consumed, they 
throw themselves until it yields, and the maddened 
crowd rush like a torrent of flame over the burning 
debris through the entrance. A deadly volley at 
point-blank range is poured into them by Bcrzabal and 
his men, strewing the ground with the dead. But 
their impetus is irresistible. Surging onward over 
the fallen, the human wave overwhelms or drives be 
fore it the defenders at the entrance, and Berzabal 
with a few survivors makes his last stand in a corner 
of the court. 

The struggle is brief. His soldiers are soon 
stretched upon the pavement; the standard-bearers 
fall; but Berzdbal, supporting the colors with his left 
arm, for a while defends himself with his sword, till 
pierced by a dozen lances he sinks lifeless on the 
ground, 46 still clinging to the standard in his death 
agony. The victors now rush forward into every part 
of the building, killing without mercy and without dis 
crimination. Surrendered soldiers are cut down, and 

45< Gritaron todos como si los inflamase un mismo espiritu, traicion! trai- 
cion! y los gefes dieron 6rden de no otorgar la vida a nadie!' Bustamante, 
Cuad. Hist., i. 40. ' La algazara era espantosa, y se oia en todo Guanajuato, 
multiplicandose su e"co por las quiebras y canadas.' Ib. 

46 According to Bustamante, Berzabal fell before the alh6ndiga was gained, 
his death being attributed to one of his soldiers, who shot him because of a 
reprimand. Ib. The father of Diego Berzabal, Don Baltasar, arrived in Mexico 
in 1743 and married Dona Juana Duarte, a lady of noble family. Four sons 
and two daughters were the result, Diego being born in Oajaca in November 
17G9, thus being a Creole. At the age of twelve he was sent to Spain as a 
cadet in the regiment of Granada. Having returned to Mexico in 1789, he 
received an appointment in the regiment of Nueva Espafia, and served in 
Santo Domingo during the revolution in that island. Having obtained the 
grade of captain, he was promoted to the rank of sargento-mayor of the pro 
vincial battalion of Guanajuato. As already noticed in the last chapter, it 
was to Major Berzabal that Garrido denounced Hidalgo's conspiracy. Ber 
zabal was forty-one years of age at the time of his death, twenty-eight of 
which he passed in exemplary military service; 'sin haber sufrido jamas un 
arresto iii tenido una nota en sus hojas de servicio.' Alaman, Hist. Mej.,i. 
app. 51-2. He left one son and three daughters. Berzabal was a zealous, 
loyal, and well educated officer. In 1811 his widow caused two official inves 
tigations to be made of her late husband's conduct as a military officer, the 
depositions in which constituted high testimonials of his merits, and en 
tirely refute Bustamante's account of his death as given above. Alaman ob 
tained the particulars from the documents in possession of Berzabal's family, 
and which were placed at his disposal. Id., app. 51-4. 


civilians who have secreted themselves among the 
stores are dragged forth and ruthlessly butchered. 
Above the din, shots still are heard in different parts 
of the alhondiga, as here and there some one still un 
daunted dearly sells his life and kills as he dies. But 
fainter and fainter grow these sounds, which presently 
cease ; then for a brief space the dull, heavy thud of 
the death-blow is heard; and then all is still; resist 
ance is at an end. 

Pillage is next in order. From the living, the dy 
ing, and the dead, the clothes are torn. The store 
rooms are ransacked and the treasures carried off, the 
plunderers fighting among themselves for the spoils. 
What a sight is here, oh God ! and all for liberty, all for 
tyranny ; liberty or tyranny among some, with others, 
glory, gold, or plunder among all with more or less 
of that horrid gratification a bloodhound feels as it 
tears its victim limb from limb and scatters around 
the bloody fragments. Blood ! blood and mangled 
humanity everywhere. Nude, distorted forms lay 
stretched on heaps of maize saturated with blood, 
and on piles of silver bars dyed crimson; blood-stained 
pillagers bear off their blood-bespattered plunder over 
the pavements slippery with gore; while the wild ges 
ticulations, the exultant shouts, and the savage oaths 
of the frenzied victors, would put to shame hell's 
banqueters ! 

When the Europeans who were in the hacienda de 
Dolores saw that the revolutionists had possession of 
the alhondiga, they meditated escape by a side door 
on the north-west, which opened to the wooden bridge 
over the Rio de la Cata. It had, however, already 
been broken open by the insurgents, who were pour 
ing in in overwhelming numbers. The doomed band 
among whom was Francisco Iriarte, who, as the 
reader is aware, had been commissioned by the inten- 
dente to report to him Hidalgo's proceedings at Do 
lores then retired to the well, which was situated in 
an elevated position. There they defended them- 


selves till their last cartridge was spent, inflicting 
heavy loss upon their assailants, Iriarte alone killing 
eighteen. But the crowd now closed in upon them 
in overpowering numbers, and the ground was quickly 
covered with the slain. It is said that some, to avoid 
death by the hands of the merciless victors, threw 
themselves into the well. 

By five o'clock in the afternoon the contest, which 
had lasted for four hours, ceased, and orders were 
given to take the prisoners to the jail from which the 
criminals had been released. Naked and wounded 
and bound with cords, the wretched survivors were 
dragged and driven along with insults, blows, and 
threats of death, many of them dying on the way. 
Others perished in the prison. Gilberto Riano and 
Bernabe Bustamante, both badly wounded, were per 
mitted to go into a private house, but died a few days 
afterward. Among the slain were sons of the first 
families of Guanajuato, and many of the principal citi 
zens. With regard to the number killed no certainty 
can be arrived at, but it probably amounted to over 
six hundred men, soldiers and civilians. 47 

Of the insurgents, exclusive of the regular soldiers 

47 According to Bustamante, 105 Spaniards and an equal number of soldiers 
perished. Id., 41. Alaman says about 200 soldiers and 105 Spaniards, follow 
ing Bustamante, but remarking in a note, ' Creo que muri6 mayor numero de 
espaibles.' Hist. Mej., i. 434-5. Zamacois considers that more than 200 
soldiers were slain, and not less than 150 Spaniards. Hist. Mej., vi. 394. 
But Liceaga examines the question with some closeness. He argues that 
the number of Europeans as given by Bustamante only included known in 
habitants of the city whose deaths were noticed at the time. A large num 
ber of Europeans, estimated by him at not less than 300, had, however, flocked 
into the city as a place of refuge from the surrounding towns as soon as the 
news of the rebellion reached them. The greater part of these were unknown, 
their arrival even being unnoticed. Most of them perished; and he considers 
that 400 Europeans fell as well as nearly all the soldiers. Adic. y Rectiftc., 117. 
Although Liceaga has, perhaps, overestimated the number of Europeans, 
bearing in mind the exterminating character of the contest, I think it proba 
ble that the survivors bore a comparatively small numerical proportion to the 
slain; and as there were many Europeans in the alh6ndiga other than those 
who bore arms, I think the numbers given by the three first named authors 
underrated. I may add that Torrente, whose unmitigated partiality to 
Spanish domination in the colonies leads him to make assertions which can 
only be classed as mendacious, boldly states that 2,000 loyal victims were 
killed and 2,000 more cast into dungeons. Hist. Rev. Hisp. Am., i. 145. 
Robinson says: 'The unfortunate' Spaniards, and all who adhered to them, 
were sacrificed by the infuriated Indians.' Mem. Hex. Rev., i. 28. 


who fell on their side, at least two thousand Indians 
perished, the wounded being in small proportion to 
the dead, having been trampled to death by their in 
furiated comrades as they rushed forward to avenge 
them. 43 

The victory was dearly purchased, the loss sus 
tained being so heavy that the revolutionary leaders 
deemed it prudent to conceal it. During the night 
great trenches were dug in the dry bed of the river 
and into them the dead were thrown. Some of the 
slain royalists were draped bv their arms and legs from 

c/ OO / c"5 

the alhondiga on the following morning and cast naked 

48 * Seguramente pasaron de tres mil muertos los que hubo, aunque procu- 
raron ocultar esta pordida, enterrandolos secretamente en zanjones one hicie- 
ron en el rio.' Gnan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 22. Liceaga considers that the 
3,000 slain as reported by the ayuntamiento to the viceroy represent nearly 
accurately the total number killed on both sides. Alaman regards the num 
ber as greatly exaggerated. Bustamante states that it was not known, on ac 
count of the Indians having buried their dead in the channel of the river by 
night. Zamacois places the number of victims at not less than 2,500. 

The action of Riafio in withdrawing to the alhondiga and leaving the 
city defenceless lias been severely censured by some, who regard it as the 
cause of the disaffection of the populace and the future disasters which be 
fell. The ayuntamiento, in its Publlca Vindication. . .already quoted in 
note 13, urges that but for the abandonment of the city the populace would 
have remained loyal; but that when they perceived that the troops and Euro 
peans had retired to the alhondiga, they considered themselves deserted by 
them, 'comenzo a decir publicamente: que los gachupines y sefiores. . .que- 
rian defenderse solos y dexarlos entregados a el enemigo, y que aun los viveres 
les quitaban para que perecieran de hambre.' Guan., ut sup., 16. There is, 
however, little doubt that the lower orders would have joined the insurgents 
in any case as soon as they appeared, and Riano was well aware of this. Com 
missioner Constans6 in his report, already mentioned in note 13 of this chap 
ter, entirely exonerates Riauo from blame, considering his action 'conforme 
al dictamen de la sana razon y a la maxima cle sabios militares. ' Id. , 74-5. 
Liceaga also argues in exculpation of the intendente, and asserts that it is 
falsely stated by the ayuntamiento that the populace only exhibited symp 
toms of disaffectation after the removal to the alhondiga. One of the prin 
cipal causes which influenced Riafio in his decision was the contemptuous 
manner in which the abolishment of tributes, published by him on the 21st, 
had been received; the proclamation being made a subject of ridicule, and 
the unfavorable feeling toward the government being apparent. The same 
author refutes both Alaman and Bustamante, who state that the abolishment 
of tribute was proclaimed 011 the 2Gth. Adlc. y Rectlfic. , 74-5. Bearing in 
mind the responsibility of Riafio for the protection of the royal treasures and 
archives, his knowledge that the populace of all towns which Hidalgo had 
approached had enthusiastically declared for the revolution, his doubt about 
the fidelity of his own troops who had already been tampered with; and 
bearing in mind, also, the insolent bearing of the populace of Guanajuato, and 
the intendente's conviction that Calleja within a week would arrive to his 
support, I cannot but indorse Liceaga's views, and consider that the repre 
sentations of the ayuntamiento were warped for the purpose of palliating 
the political outbreak which involved a fearful chastisement. 


into the burial-ground of Belen, the body of the in- 
tendente alone being covered with a miserable shroud 
supplied by the friars of the convent. 49 Any mani 
festation of pity for the dead was dangerous." 

The capture of the alhondiga was accomplished by 
no regular military tactics. Hidalgo's dispositions 
were only general, and confined to directions given to 
occupy the commanding heights. After the first at 
tack the leaders had little control over their followers, 
who were little better than a mob of ill-armed and 
unorganized Indians. Yet there was courage among 
them, and love of country, self-sacrifice, and true 
heroism. With all the valor of veteran warriors, 
they here fought for the first time in their lives. 
Hidalgo's followers, united with the populace of the 
city, once launched against their oppressors, moved 
onward with irresistible force. At the sight of blood, 
their own blood, that of their comrades and of their 
enemies, they became demons infuriate. Bustamante 
relates that an Indian seized a bomb thrown at 
him and vainly strove to tear out the fuse with his 
teeth. The bomb exploded, blowing him to pieces. 
"It matters not/' cried his comrades, "there are others 

Such were the first men who shed their blood 
in the cause of independence. On the side of the 
loyalists also individual acts of bravery were fre 
quent, which bring to mind the dauntless bearing of 
the conquerors. Conspicuous among the cavalrymen, 
when they were surrounded, was Jose Francisco Va- 
lenzuela, who three times charged up and down the 
hill alone, clearing his way with his sabre. When 

49 Alaman relates that the body of Riaflo was exposed for two days, to 
satisfy the curiosity of the populace as to whether he had a tail. It is said 
that the belief prevailed among some of the lower orders that all Spaniards 
had tails. Hist. Mcj., i. 435. Jews were thought to have tails, and as the 
Indians were taught to believe that the Spanish authorities were imbued 
with the anti-catholic doctrines of the French, they placed them in the cate 
gory with the Jews. Zamacois, Hist. Mcj., vi. 394-5. 

50 'A imamuger le dieron una cuchillada en la cara, tan solo porque a la 
vista de uu cadaver grito despavorida. . .\Ay \ ; pobrecito !' Bustamante, Cuad. 

., i, 44. 


dragged at last from his saddle on the points of lances, 
he still fought and slew his foes, shouting with his 
dying breath, Viva Espana! 51 

When victory had declared for the insurgents, those 
who had remained inactive on the surrounding heights 
swarmed into the city to join in the plunder. As 
soon as the alhondiga had been stripped of its treas- 
"ures, a general assault was made on the shops and 
houses of the Europeans. During that night and for 
several succeeding days, pillage, devastation, and riot 
reigned. Above the noise of human voices were heard 
the hollow sounds of axe-blow and crow-bar on the 
doors, the rending of timbers, and the crashing of fur 
niture wantonly destroyed. From the commercial 
stores merchandise of every description was seized. 
Bales of cambric and of cloth, sacks of cacao, and bar 
rels of spirituous liquors were rolled into the streets, 
and sold to any who would buy for anything that 
could be obtained. 52 

Drunken Indians arrayed themselves in stolen 
clothing, and staggered along barefooted in bright 
uniforms and embroidered coats. The iron railings of 
the balconies were torn from the houses and the grat 
ings from the windows. At night the streets were 
illumined by smoking torches, around which weird 
human forms, in every stage of drunkenness, yelled 
and gesticulated. The mining establishments in the 
city and neighborhood were ransacked, the precious 
metals, quicksilver, and implements carried off, and 
the machinery destroyed. In vain Hidalgo sought 
to arrest the depredation and disorder. A proclama- 

51 Valenzuela was a native of Irapuato and lieutenant of the cavalry troop 
of that town. Members of his family still lived there when Alaman wrote. 
Hist. My., i. 429, and app. 77. 

52 Aguardiente was sold for five dollars a barrel, a sack of cacao or al 
monds for two dollars, a bale of cambric for four dollars, and bars of silver 
brought from the alhondiga for five dollars. So ignorant of values were the 
country Indians that they sold their gold ounces for three or four reales to the 
men of Guanajuato, who told them that they were copper medals. 'Nothing,' 
says Robinson, 'can more strongly elucidate the wretched ignorance and pov 
erty of the great mass of Indians. ' Mem. Mex. Rev. , i. 29. Consult Ltceaya, 
Adlc. y Ilectific., 121. 


tion issued by him to that effect on the 30th was un 
heeded, and the rioters only ceased when their work 
was finished. The scene in Guanajuato was pitiahle. 53 

53 Hidalgo lias been greatly blamed for the frightful excesses, as if it had 
been in his power to prevent them. Robinson holds that it was not extraor 
dinary he should permit the Indians to enjoy the first fruits of their exer 
tions. He considered it politic to let them have palpable proofs that they 
would profit by the revolution; and with regard to the slaughter of the Span 
iards, it was impossible for him to prevent it. Nevertheless, many Euro 
peans and Creoles owed their lives to his protection, members of these latter 
incurring the same danger and violence as the former, their houses being 
sacked and their persons exposed to continual peril. The historian Alanian 
narrowly escaped ill treatment if not death, and Hidalgo, in person, with the 
sacred banner went to the succor of him and his family. Even his authority 
failed to disperse the crowd bent upon plundering the wealth of a Spaniard 
that had been secreted in Alaman's house, and it was only by Allende freely 
using his sword that the mob was driven back. Hist. Mej., i. 438-41. The 
main authorities consulted for the above account of the taking of the alhon- 
diga de granaditas have been Alaman, Liceaga, and Bustamaiite. The testi 
mony of Liceaga is of especial value, since he was a witness of the whole af 
fair from the balcony of a house which commanded a view of the alh6ndiga, 
and which he gained at the risk of his life. The object of his work Adi- 
ciones y Rectificadones d la Historla de Mexico que escribiti D. Lucas A laman, 
published in Guanajuato in 1868, was, as its name implies, to correct mis 
takes which appear in Alaman's history, and fill up vacancies in the sequence 
of events by information which Alaman could not obtain. Liceaga, while 
complimenting Alaman for his diligence, close research, good judgment, and 
learning, and pronouncing his history the most complete of the kind and 
worthy of all appreciation, points out that in many portions of his work ho 
had to depend upon the accounts of previous writers, which he himself asserts 
to be full of errors arising from the want of knowledge of some authors and 
the prejudiced views of others. Alaman consequently, with all his care, 
could not avoid falling into mistakes which Liceaga felt himself able to cor 
rect from personal observation and contact with eye-witnesses. The additions 
and corrections supplied by Liceaga do not form a connected history of the 
revolution, but they constitute a valuable supplement to Alaman's work, and 
throw light upon many points previously obscure. Many of his details, how 
ever, are of minor importance. His comments are generally sound, and his 
arguments commonly lead to correct conclusions, though more lately ob 
tained evidence shows that occasionally his deductions have not hit the mark. 
With regard to the author himself, he was born in the city of Guanajuato on 
the 4th of July, 1785, his parents being Ramon Guillermo de Liceaga and 
J >ofia Ana Catarina de Espinosa. His early education was received in the 
college of la Purisima Concepcion and the convent of San Francisco in that 
city. In 1803 he entered the college of San Ildefonso in the city of Mexico, 
where he studied jurisprudence until 1806, when he commenced practical 
work under the licenciado Josd Domingo Lazo. In 1810 he received his di 
ploma from the colegio de Abogados, and during the period of the revolution 
followed the legal profession. After the independence, he filled several high 
offices in his State, being appointed magistrado decano of the Suprema Tri 
bunal de justicia del Estado in 1824, and district judge in 1827. In 1864, af 
ter several changes of position in office, owing to his advanced age and 
infirmities, he retired from public life in the nominal enjoyment of his full 
salary, but of which he succeeded in obtaining only a small portion. Liceaga's 
volume covers the historical epoch of 1808 to 1824, and the work which he 
performed in its production extended over a period of fifteen years. He 
penned his final remarks on the 27th of June, 1870, exactly one week before 
the completion of his 85th birthday. 


The streets were cumbered with the wrecks of furni 
ture, debris, and destroyed goods. Hundreds of fam 
ilies were hopelessly ruined. Silence reigned within 
the bare walls of the deserted houses, and the curse 
of the destroying angel seemed to have fallen on the 
so lately thriving city. 




WHEN Viceroy Venegas discovered how rapidly the 
rebellion was spreading, as day after day intelligence 
came of Hidalgo's progress and the defection of pro 
vincial troops, he saw that the affair was of a more se 
rious nature than he had supposed possible. Without 
any definite knowledge of the country and its inhabi 
tants, he had not the experience of even a few months 
of quiet administration to enable him to gain an in 
sight into affairs. His position was a difficult one; 
but he applied himself with energy to the task of 
holding New Spain to its allegiance. The dispersal 
of the army concentrated by Iturrigaray now proved 
prejudicial to his purpose. Scattered as the troops 
were in provincial towns widely separated, it was not 
only a difficult matter to collect on the moment any 
considerable force, but an opportunity of spreading 
disaffection in the ranks had been afforded the insur 
gents, and the military were already widely infected 
with revolutionary sentiments. 



At this period there were no European troops in 
New Spain; and though at a later date Spanish forces 
were sent into the country, their number was always 
greatly exceeded by that of the native regiments. 
Thus the combatants on either side were sons of the 
soil; and it is necessary to bear this in mind in order 
to appreciate the critical position in which the viceroy 
found himself at the outbreak of the rebellion, as well 
as the political division which existed in the ranks of 
the oppressed portion of the population. The total 
number of men which Venegas could count upon did 
not exceed ten or twelve thousand, the ranks and 
lower-grade officers of which were drawn almost exclu 
sively from the mestizos, mulattoes, and other castes, 
the Indian element being small, since that race was ex 
empt from military service. These troops, composed 
of regiments of the line and the provincial militia, al 
though commanded by Spanish-European chiefs, were 
officered to a great extent by Creoles. It is not, there 
fore, a matter of surprise that the viceroy's anxiety 
was extreme, in view of the doubtful loyalty of the 
military and the smallness of their number; although 
in this latter respect less fear was entertained by rea 
son of the excellence of their organization and arms. 

The first measure adopted by Yenegas was to es 
tablish at Queretaro a force sufficient for the protec 
tion of that city. For this purpose, he ordered the 
provincial dragoon regiment of Puebla to hasten to 
the capital by forced marches; and on the 2Gth of 
September the Mexican infantry regiment of la Co 
rona, under the command of Manuel Flon, conde de 
la Cadena and intendente of Puebla, was despatched 
from Mexico for Queretaro. A battery of four can 
non, under the direction of Colonel Ramon Diaz de 
Ortega, was sent with these troops, who were joined 
a few days afterward by the Mexican dragoons of the 
line and those lately arrived from Puebla, with two 
battalions of grenadiers, each seven companies strong. 
The grenadiers were commanded by Jose J-alon, an 


officer who had accompanied Venegas from Spain, the 
whole force being under the direction of Flon as corn- 
mander-in-chief. In order to provide for the security 
of the capital, now almost without garrison, the in 
fantry regiments of Puebla, Tres Villas, and Toluca 
were withdrawn from those towns, and two battalions 
formed from the crews of the frigate Atocha and oth 
er vessels at Vera Cruz, and placed under the com 
mand of the naval captain Rosendo Porlier. 1 Several 
battalions also of the volunteers of Fernando VII. 
were again raised in the city; 2 and Yermo, in his 
patriotic zeal for the mother country, equipped and 
maintained at his own expense five hundred cavalry 
men drawn from the laborers on his estates. 3 More 
over, Colonel Diego Garcia Conde was appointed 
comandante of Valladolid and sent thither without 
delay in company with Manuel Merino, the intendente 
of that province, and the conde de Rul, colonel of 
the provincial infantry. Meanwhile the comandantes 
Felix Maria Calleja and Roque Abarca, of San Luis 
Potosi and Guadalajara respectively, were getting 
their brigades into efficient condition. 

But military operations were not the only means 
employed to crush the rebellion. Prices were put 
upon the heads of Hidalgo, Allende, and Aldama by 
the government; 4 the church excommunicated them, 5 

1 These troops caused general disgust by their uncleanliness and want of 
soldierly deportment, and especially by their obscene and blasphemous lan 
guage. The contrast between them and the provincial troops was marked. 
Sufstamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 35; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 387. 

2 Caz. de Mex., 1810, i. 838-40; Diario Hex., xiii. 890-2. 

3 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Cot. Doc.,ii. 165. Jose" Maria Manzano also sup 
plied from his haciendas horsemen to the number of fifty. Ib. 

4 Viceroy Venegas, by proclamation of September 27th, offered a reward 
of 10,000 pesos for the capture or death of these leaders. Dispos. Varias, 
ii. f. 5; Gaz. de Mex., 1810, 796-7. At a later date this sum was offered for 
the head of any one of them ; and Guerra states that money and arms were 
advanced to a gambling officer who engaged to assassinate Hidalgo, 'pues 
este lo recibiria sin recelo como que era su compadre.' Hist. JRev. N. Esp., i. 
301-2; Dispos. Farias, ii. f. 8. 

5 Manuel Abad y Queipo, bishop elect of Michoacan, published his excom 
munication by edict of September 24th. Abasolo was also included in it. 
The excommunicated were declared to be 'sacrilegos, perjures, y que han 
incurrido en la excomunion mayor del Canon, Siquis suadente Diabolo.' All 
who aided or succored them were threatened with the same punishment- of 


adding the usual anathemas; the inquisition cited 
Hidalgo to appear before it, charging him with 
heresy and apostasy, and raking up old accusations 
brought against him ten years previously. 6 From 
the pulpit he was described as a demon of impiety, a 
monster of bane; and the royal university of Mexico 
gloried in the fact that he had never acquired the 
degree of doctor in that institution! 7 

Every means, in fact, which would tend to prejudice 
the cause of independence was employed. The bish 
ops and the higher clergy issued exhortations to loy 
alty, representing, in the darkest colors, the object of 
the insurgents as selfish, and their intentions as im 
pious. The archbishop published edicts and pasto 
rals; 8 politicians and officials, barristers, learned doc 
tors of theology, and scribblers, heaped execrations on 
the authors of the revolution, and the press teemed 
with loyal productions in prose and doggerel verse, 
heaping abuse upon Hidalgo, and printed by per 
mission of the supreme government. 9 The viceroy 

greater excommunication. The validity of this excommunication was ques 
tioned by many, on the ground that Queipo had not yet been consecrated 
bishop. In order to terminate these doubts, Archbishop Lizana y Beaumont 
ratified it by edict of the llth of October following. Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.* 
iv. 52-8, supplies a copy of these edicts. Guerra maintains that Queipo had 
no power to excommunicate. Hist. Rev. N. Esp., L 311-16. The bishops of 
Puebla and Guadalajara also fulminated excommunications. Zerecero, Hem. 
Rev, Mex., 64-5. 

G Dispos. Varias, iii. fol. 152; vi. fol. 59; Diario de Mex., xiii. 425-7. 
The edict of the inquisition was issued on the 13th of October. 

7 The rector of the university addressed an official communication to the 
viceroy, requesting him to make public the fact that Hidalgo's name did not 
appear in any of the books in which were registered the higher degrees con 
ferred on its members. The request was made because the title of doctor 
was being constantly given to Hidalgo in the papers and public sheets of the 
day. Id., 386-7. According to the citation of the inquisition, the cura of 
Dolores entertained a supreme contempt for the university faculty, which 
he regarded as a body of ignoramuses, 'y finalmente, que sois tan soberbio 
que decis, que no os habeis graduado de Dr en esta universidad, por ser su 
claustro una quadrilla de ignorantes.' 

8 Consult Id., 433-6; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 100-4, 167-9; 
Dispos. Varias, ii. fol. 7; Lizana y Beaumont, Exhortation, . . . Mex. 1810; 
Id., Carta GratuL, Mex. 1810; Queipo, Edict. Instruct., Sep. 30, 1810; Id., 
Edict., Oct. 8, 1810; Leon, El cura... a sus fieles habit., Quere"taro, 1810; 
Mendizdbal, Sermon, Mex. 1810. 

9 Consult a series of letters written by a Mexican doctor, as a specimen of 
the style of abuse. They are thus addressed to Hidalgo: 'Carta primera De 
un DrMexic'mo al Br. D. Miguel Hidalgo Costilla, ex-Curade Dolores, ex-Sa- 
HIST. MKX., VOL. IV. 11 


issued proclamations, and denounced the rumors which 
prevailed of the cession of Mexico to France as 
groundless, attributing their origin to Hidalgo. 10 At 
the same time, town officers, governors, and other au 
thorities were urged to express their fidelity to Spain, 
and their detestation of the revolution; while in order 
to conciliate the Indians they were relieved from the 
payment of tribute, 11 and measures taken for the im 
provement of their condition. 

This action at first was not without effect, and the 
capital and many other cities remained loyal. The 
heaviest blow sustained by the revolutionists was that 
dealt by the church and inquisition. The awful de 
nouncement of the leaders as heretics, their terrible 
punishment of greater excommunication, and the dread 
of the same appalling fate falling on them, working 
upon an -ignorant and superstitious people, decided 
for a time the vacillating and deterred the disaffected. 
Hidalgo fully recognized that he had to fight with 

cerdote de Cristo, ex-Cristiano, ex- Americano, ex- ff ombre, y Generalislmo Ca- 
pataz de Salteadores y Asesinos.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 625- 
95. Out of the innumerable publications issued during the first months of the 
revolution, I refer to the few following, anonymous and otherwise, all bearing 
the date of 1810: San Salvador, Reflex. Pat. Am.; Id., Mem. Crist. Pol; Id., 
Carta de un padre d sus hijos; Calvillo, Discurso sobre los males, etc. ; Garcia 
y Garcia, Prosper. Union; Comoto, Discurso Patri.; Belderrain, Exhort. In 
struct.; Campo y Rivas, Manif. Filant.; Monterde, Proclamaque el Intendente, 
etc.; Rivera, Manif.; Exhort. Diputac. Cortes; Montana, Reflex. Alborotos; 
Mex. Alocuc. Real Col. Abogados; Exhort. Col. Abogados; Criollo Sensible, 
Proc.; Proclama (signed L. B. J. G. ); Exhort. Patriot. Am.; Centinela con 
tra los Seductores. Among such expressions of loyalty, I find an appeal made 
to Hidalgo by one of his fellow- collegians in the Real y Primitivo Colegio de 
San Nicolas Obispo de Valladolid. It is signed Dr Bias Abadiano y Jasso. 
After briefly calling to mind Hidalgo's collegiate success, the high reputation 
he had acquired, and his preferments to the benefices of San Felipe and Do 
lores, the writer brings to notice his backsliding from the church, and in 
dorses the action of the inquisition. 'Ah y con quanta razon el Santo Tribu 
nal de la Inquisicion os ha declarado por herege formal ! pues esta es una 
prueba nada equivoca de que pretendeis apagar la luz del Evangelic.' He 
then points put the irreparable harm done by Hidalgo, and implores him to 
cast aside his apostasy and rely upon the mercy of the inquisition. Carta de 
un Concolega d Don Miguel Hidalgo. 

10 Venerjas, Manifesto, 27 Oct.' 1810. 

11 The order for the remission of tribute had been issued by the regency on 
the 20th of May preceding, negroes and mulattoes being included with Ind 
ians. Venegas published it on the 5th of October. Dispos. Varian, ii. fol. 
6-,Zerecero, Rev. Mcx., 173, 180-1; Negref.e, Hist. Mil. 8 iff. XIX., i. 195- 
205. The proclamation was published in the Spanish and Aztec languages. 
Hernandez y Ddvalos,, Col. Doc., ii. 137-41. 


weapons other than those used on the battle-field; 
and some weeks later he caused to be published in 
Guadalajara, which had fallen into his power, a reply 
to the citation of the inquisition and its charges 
against him. In this proclamation he solemnly de 
clares that he had never departed from the holy cath 
olic faith; he rebuts the accusations of heresy by call 
ing attention to flagrant contradictions in them; 12 
points out the evils with which the people of New 
Spain were oppressed, and calls on them to burst their 
bonds and establish a congress that shall dictate be 
neficent and discriminating laws suited to the several 
requirements of the different districts. 

But other measures, also, were adopted by Hidalgo 
which inspired confidence in the uprightness of his 
motives, and afforded palpable illustrations of the 
benefits to be derived from independence. He ordered 
the emancipation of slaves, under penalty of death 
to their owners; he released Indians and persons of 
all castes from the payment of tributes; 13 and on the 

12 ' Se me acusa de que niego la existencia del infierno, y un poco antes se 
me hace cargo de haber asentado que algun pontifice de los canonizados por 
santo esta. en este lugar. i Como, piies, concordar que un pontifice esta. en el 
infierno, negando la existencia de este.' And again: 'Se me imputa tambien 
el haber negado la autenticidad de los sagrados libros, y se me acusa de se- 
guir los perversos dogmas de Lutero: si Lutero deduce sus errores de los 
libros que cree inspirados por Dios, c6mo el que niega esta inspiracion sos- 
tendra. los suyos deducidos de los mismos libros que tiene por fabulosos? Del 
mismo modo son todas las acusaciones. ' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist,, i. 439. 
This writer obtained an original copy of this document from the licentiate 
Mariano Otero, who assured him that it was one of very few which had been 
saved in the town of Tizapam in Jalisco. Hidalgo's reply was so convincing 
that the inquisition felt compelled to issue another edict in defense of the 
glaring contradictions contained in the first. In this it was stated that al 
though the heresies imputed to Hidalgo were contradictory in themselves, 
they had not been developed in him at the same time, but in distinct epochs. 
Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 65. By the detractors of Hidalgo, his defence of 
his reputation is regarded as the admission of weakness. It was, however, a 
political necessity. Personally he cared nothing either for the inquisition or 
the bishops, but lie well knew their power over the people, and it was in the 
highest degree important to refute their statements, especially as in August 
1808 the inquisition had condemned as heretical the principle of the sover 
eignty of the people. Copy of edict in Diario de Mex., ix. 271-3, 275. 

13 See Ansorena's proclamation at Valladolid Oct. 19,^ 1810, issued iu 
compliance with Hidalgo's orders. Hernandez y Ddvalo's, Col. Doc., ii. 
1C9-70. On the 29th of Nov. Hidalgo published a decree commanding the 
manumission of slaves within ten days. This was confirmed by another of 
the 16th of Dec. Both these documents exist in the collection of Hernandez 


5th of December ordered the restoration of their 
lands to the Indians of the district of Guadalajara. 14 
By this policy Hidalgo succeeded in greatly counter 
acting the expedients to which his opponents resorted. 

When some degree of order had been arrived at in 
Guanajuato, Hidalgo proceeded to make arrangements 
for the further progress of his enterprise. The more 
grievously wounded of the European prisoners were 
removed to the alh6ndiga, where they were duly cared 
for; others were confined in the infantry barracks, 
while some few were allowed to return to their homes. 
At a later date all the European captives, including 
those brought from the different towns which the in 
surgents had passed through, were collected in the 
alhondiofa to the number of 247. Those who were 


allowed their liberty were, however, required to sign 
a written engagement not to take up arms against the 
independent cause, under penalty of death. 15 Spanish 
ecclesiastics of both the secular and regular orders 
were also left free, and Hidalgo issued especial com 
mands that they should in no way be molested. 

Having secured for administrative expenses but a 
small proportion of the treasures deposited inHthe al- 
hondiga, he appropriated, as an unavoidable necessity, 
considerable sums belonging to private individuals. 16 
He next proceeded to organize the civil government 
of the province. Having summoned the ayuntamiento, 
he demanded to be recognized as captain-general of 

y Davalos; copies of them are to be found in Soc. Mex. Geog., 2 a ep., iii. 54-6. 
Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 88, finds fault with Hidalgo for abolishing slavery 
without compensation to the owners. Alfredo Chavero remarks that Alamaii 
considered the question in a financial point of view, like the abolition of a 
tobacco privilege, whereas Hidalgo only regarded the emancipation of his 
brethren. Soc. Mex. Geog., utsup., 56. 

14 Copy of order is supplied in Hex. Refut. Art. de, Fondo, 26. 

15 A distinction was made between Spaniards who had offered resistance in 
the alhondiga and those who had remained in their houses, the latter being 
allowed to remain at liberty under the condition mentioned in the text. 
Liceacja, Adic. y Recti/ic., 124-5. 

16 From the house of Bernab6 Bustamante he took 40,000 pesos which had 
been concealed in the water-cistern, the secretion of which a faithless servant 
revealed. Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 442. 


America, as had been clone at Celaya, and stated that 
as it was his prerogative he should proceed at once to 
the appointment of alcaldes ordinaries. Thereupon he 
named Jose Miguel de Rivera Llorente and Jose Maria 
Hernandez Chico. A few days later he called an as 
sembly of the ayuntamiento, the clergy, and principal 
citizens, for the purpose of appointing officers of the 
civil government. The ayuntamiento, however, was 
not well disposed to the new order of things; and when 
Hidalgo nominated the regidor Fernando Perez Ma- 
rauon intendente, he declined the position, as also did 
the regidores Jose Maria Septiem, Pedro de Otero, and 
Martin Coronel. Hidalgo now became irritated, and 
when the regidores endeavored to explain that they 
could not reconcile ideas of independence with their 
oath of allegiance to Fernando VII., or the motto on 
his own standard, he angrily exclaimed: " There is no 
longer a Fernando VII. !" 17 Finding the ayuntami 
ento thus intractable, without further delay Hidalgo 
appointed Jose Francisco Gomez, who had been ad 
jutant major of the provincial infantry regiment of 
Valladolid, intendente of the province, with the rank 
of brigadier, Carlos Montesdeoca his asesor ordinario, 
and Francisco Robledo prornotor fiscal, giving them 
to understand that they must accept the appointments 
without demur. 

The captain-general now turned his attention to the 
organization and equipment of his army. The cavalry 
was quartered in the mining establishments which had 
been sacked, and for the future protection of which he 
appointed Pedro Marino as overseer, charged with the 
care of them. Two additional infantry regiments were 
raised; one at Valenciana, of which he appointed Ca- 
simiro Chovell colonel, 13 and the other in Guanajuato, 
the command of which Hidalgo gave to Bernardo 

17 Guan., Pub. Vinci. Ayunt., 37. According to the same authority, the 
standard bore the words: ' Viva la Religion, viva Fernando VII., y viva la 
America. ' 

18 Chovell was the superintendent of the Valenciana mine. Alaman, ut sup., 


Chico. 19 These troops were armed only with lances, 
an attempt made to convert quicksilver flasks into 
hand-mortars having failed. Hidalgo also endeavored, 
with but partial success, not only to cast cannon, but 
t6 fabricate them of wood, both kinds proving unser 
viceable. Numerous were the military appointments 
made by revolutionary leaders, among which may be 
mentioned that of Jose Maria Liceaga as lieutenant- 
colonel of the last-named regiment, 23 who played a 
prominent part during the course of the revolution. 
Although Hidalgo's treasury now contained more than 
half a million pesos, inconvenience arose because so 
much of it was in silver bars. The establishment of 
a mint was therefore necessary, and on the 5th of 
October the work of constructing the machinery and 
dies was commenced, Jose Mariano de Robles being 
made superintendent. The establishment was almost 
completed by the 25th of November, when the Span 
ish army under Calleja entered Guanajuato and took 
possession of it. 21 

Hidalgo was fully informed of the preparations for 
the suppression of the rebellion which were being 
made by Calleja at San Luis Potosi, 22 as well as of 
the measures that had been taken for the protec 
tion of Queretaro, and therefore decided, to u march 
against Valladolid. On the 8th of October he sent 
forward a detachment of three thousand men under 
the command of Mariano Jimenez, whom he had made 
colonel, and on the 10th followed with the main body, 

19 Son of a European of the same name, ' unico de las^Tamilias respetables 
de Guanajuato que tomo parte en la revolucion.' Ib. 

20 This Liceaga was a cousin of the author of the Adlc. y Rectific., already 
frequently quoted. Their Christian and surnames being -the same has caused 
some confusion. See note 2 on pages 131-3 of Liceaga 's work. 

21 The artisans displayed great skill in the construction of the machinery 
and implements and in the engraving of the dies. These were so perfect as 
to rival those in the mint at Mexico. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 47; Ala- 
man, Hist. Mej., i. 448-9. 

22 Much alarm was caused in Guanajuato Oct. 2d by the report that Ca 
lleja was marching on the city, and had already arrived at Valenciana. Hi 
dalgo sent out troops to verify the statement, Aklama going to San Miguel 
and Celaya, but the report proved false. Liceaga, Adic. y Itctijic., 127-9; 
Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 47-8; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 449-50. 


leaving the European prisoners still in the alhondiga 
under guard. 23 

The reader will recollect that when the bishopric 
of Michoacan was established in 1536, Tzintzuntzan 
was elected as the cathedral town. 24 In 1554, how 
ever, the episcopal seat was removed to Patzcuaro, 25 
whence it was finally transferred in 1580 to the city of 
Valladolid, in conformity with a bull issued by Pius 
V. in 157 1. 26 This city was originally founded by 
Cristobal Olid in the valley of Guayangareo, which 
name was bestowed upon the town and retained until 
1540, when it was refounded and formally settled by 
Viceroy Mendoza, who changed the name to that of 
Valladolid in honor of his birthplace in Spain. For 
the purpose of insuring its stability and prosperity, 
Mendoza sent several noble Spanish families from 
Mexico to the revived settlement, and among the first 
settlers mention must be made of Juan de Villasenor 
Cervantes, from whose family Iturbide was descended. 
In 1553 Charles V. ennobled the city and granted it 
a coat of arms. 27 

23 Hidalgo's route lay through the valley of Santiago and Acumbaro. 

2 *See Hist. Mex., ii. 392, this series. Tzintzuntzan is Tarascan for hum 
ming-bird, a name which the town derived from the great numbers found in 
the vicinity, the capture of which and the use of the plumage in ornamenting 
mosaic and hieroglyphical designs constituted an important occupation of the 
inhabitants. Romero, Notic. Mich., 78. 

* 5 N. Esp. Brev. lies., MS., ii. 247. Romero states that the removal took 
place in 1540. Notic. Mich., 71. Patzcuaro, before the conquest, was a sub 
urban ward of Tzintzuntzan, and became the pleasure resort of the Michoacan 
monarchs who built their court there. According to some linguists, the 
meaning of the word is 'the place of joy.' Ib. 

N. Esp. Brev. Res., MS., ii. 247. 

27 /Z>.; Villasenor, Teat., ii. 8-9; Gonzalez Ddvila, Teat. Ecles., i. 107; 
Romero, Notic. Mich., 40. In Gonzalez Davila, page 136, is given a wood-cut 
of the arms. The shield, which is surrounded by a crown, is divided in 
three parts, two occupying the upper portion and the third the lower. In 
each division is the representation of a crowned king holding a sceptre in 
his right hand, the left being extended with the palm open. The field ia 
surrounded by a scrolled border. The arms first granted in 1553 were dif 
ferent. They consisted of a plain unoruamented shield, surmounted by a 
crown and divided horizontally. In the upper half is a lake with a penol in 
the centre, on the summit of which stands a church of St Peter. Three 
smaller eminences rise from the lake at the base. In the lower half is a rep 
resentation of the cathedral, which was dedicated to San Salvador. I(L, 110. 
The three kings according to Romero were intended to represent Carlos V., 
his brother Maximiliano, and Philip II. 



From the time of the removal of the episcopal seat 
to Yalladolid the progress of the city was steady; and 
though not situated near any of the great commercial 
highways, its population so increased, owing to the 
general prosperity of the province, that at the be 
ginning of the eighteenth century the number of fam 
ilies there was some five thousand. At this time 
Michoacan had become one of the largest and most 
important divisions of New Spain, its principal wealth 
being derived from its prolific soil, which yielded two 
crops annually. 28 It was during this century that the 



province underwent a great physical convulsion. In 
the department of Ario, in the southern portion of 
the territory, extends a vast plain of wonderful fruit- 
fulness, occupied by rich plantations of cotton, indigo, 
and sugar-cane. Here was situated the hacienda of 
San Pedro de Jorullo, famous throughout Michoacan 
for its size, value, and productiveness. On this estate 

28 It is related that a farmer named Francisco de Torres harvested on one 
occasion GOO fanegas of wheat in return for four fanegas sown, or 150 fold. 
Santos Cron. , ii. 400-7. 


immense herds of cattle were raised, and extensive 
tracts planted with sugar-cane and indigo. 29 

Toward the end of June 1759, the people on the 
hacienda were thrown into great alarm by the sound 
of subterranean rumblings and heavy, dull reports. 
Later these noises were accompanied by shocks of 
earthquake, which kept increasing in number and in 
tensity. A prediction was current among the labor 
ers that the hacienda would be destroyed by fire issu 
ing from the bowels of the earth on San Miguel's 
day, and wild consternation now prevailed. In Sep 
tember great numbers of them abandoned their work 
and fled to the mountains for safety. Spiritual aid was 
sought, and on the 21st a no vena of masses was com 
menced and confessions were heard. But these cere 
monies were ineffectual to quell the subterranean thun- 
derings, or allay the agitation of the Indians, who 
continued to take refuge on the neighboring heights. 
On the 29th, San Miguel's day, with fearful uproar 
the laboring earth burst open at about a mile from the 
buildings of the hacienda, belching forth flames and 
hurling burning rocks to prodigious heights through 
a dense cloud of ashes rendered lurid by volcanic fire. 
A new volcano had arisen. The ground to the ex 
tent of three or four square miles swelled up like 
a bladder, the centre of which burst, exhibiting a 
fiery abyss, surrounded by thousands of small cones 
or earth-bubbles. 33 Into the chasms the waters of 
Cuitamba and San Pedro were precipitated, increasing 
the commotion. Deluges of hot mud were hurled 
over the surrounding land, while columns of flame 
blazed upward to such a height that they were visible 
at Patzcuaro. The houses of Queretaro, distant more 
than forty-eight leagues in a straight line, were cov- 

_ 29 The possessor of this magnificent estate was J. Andre's de Pimentel, a 
citizen and regidor of Patzcuaro, according to an official report of the occur 
rence in Soc. Max. Geog., 2 a ep., ii. 561. 

30 Called by the natives hornifos, or ovens. Humboldt visited the scene of 
this catastrophe in 1803, and found that the thermometer when inserted into 
crevices in these ovens rose to 202. For his account of the occurrence, see 
Easai Pol, 248-54. 


ered with ashes. The beautiful hacienda of Jorullo 
was destroyed, as well as other plantations, by the 
volcanic deposits of sand and mud and stones. 31 Great 
numbers of live-stock perished, and hundreds of fami 
lies were reduced to want. In the centre of the ovens 
six enormous masses were projected to the height of 
from 1,300 to 1,650 feet above the old level of the plain. 
The most elevated of these is the volcano of Jorullo. 
The limits of Michoacan were not distinctly defined 
till 1787, when the intendencias were founded, previous 
to which time the political government had been in 
vested in alcaldes mayores and corregidores, and gov 
ernors. 82 The extent of the ancient province was much 
larger than the state of the present day-, since it com 
prised the territory of the modern state of Guerrero. 
Besides this reduction, minor variations have been 
made in its boundary lines, and its present area con 
tains about 3,620 square leagues, its greatest length 
being 94 and its greatest width 66 leagues. On the 
south-west it is bounded by the Pacific, its coast line 
being thirty-nine leagues in length. Michoacan is 
abundantly watered by rivers abounding in fine fish 
of many varieties, from the quantity and excellence 
of which the state derives its name, which means in 
the Tarascan tongue the land of fish. 33 

When the authorities at Yalladolid became aware of 
the danger w r hich threatened their city, they were 
greatly disturbed, the more so because they found 
themselves without a governor or military chief. They 
nevertheless made some show of preparations for de 
fence, beginning to cast cannon and enlist soldiers un 
der the direction of the bishop Abad y Queipo and 
the prebendado Agustin Ledos. News, however, 

31 The value of the buildings and working establishments on the hacienda 
de Jorullo were alone valued at $150,000. Soc. Mex. Geog., 2 a ep., ii. 563. 

3 - Gonzalez Ddvila, Teat. Edes., i. 107. The first governor of the prov 
ince was Colonel Martin Reinoso, who arrived from Spain in December 1755. 
Castro, Dlario, 193. Juan Antonio de Riafio y Burcena was the first in ten- 
dente. Cedulario, MS., iii. f. 2. 

, Hist. Prov. Comp. Jesus, 212; Romero Notic. Mich., 33. 


presently arrived of the capture near Acdmbaro of the 
intendente Merino, the cornandante Garcia Conde, and 
Colonel Rul by the guerrilla chief Luna, 34 and this so 
disheartened them that, on the approach of Hidalgo, all 
thought of resistance was laid aside, and the bishop, 
most of the chapter, and many Europeans hastily left 
the capital and proceeded by different routes to 
Mexico. 35 

In following the career of a great personage, we 
cannot but note how easily and naturally genius falls 
into any position, and adapts the man to the circum 
stances. So it was with Hidalgo: lately a humble 
priest, now at the head of a large army, fighting 
battles, making and unmaking rulers, and all with 
calmness and facility as if he had been accustomed to 
the work from his youth. Not that the cura was by 
any means a proficient soldier; on the contrary, he 
was no soldier at ail, did not pretend to be one, and 
would have been filled with joy unbounded were there 
any other means at hand to secure his sacred cause. 
He was not even a cunning man of the world. He 
was not working for greatness of name or ambition, 
or for money or power. He would have his country 
move toward independence. The full glory of it he 
never expected to see. Yet he would do what he 
could; his life he would cheerfully give. Such was 
the quality of his greatness, patriotic, pure, amiable, 
ethereal, not crafty, not subtle, and not always the 
most successful. 

On the 15th of October the van of the insurgents 
arrived at the suburbs of Yalladolid without opposition; 

34 For an account of their capture, see Garcia Conde, Informe, in Hernan 
dez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 208. It was during this period that the guer- 
rilleros sprung into existence in Mexico. Bold and lawless men, when 
Hidalgo's army became dispersed, carried on hostilities against the royal 
ists independently, yet they rendered important services for the revolu 
tionists during the whole course of the war, and many of their leaders were 
conspicuous for their heroism and noble qualities. Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mcx., 

35 The asesor, Jose" Alonso do Teran, with many others, was detained at 
Hue" tamo by the cura, who roused the people of the town. They were sent 
back to Valladolid and delivered up to Hidalgo. 


and on the 17th Hidalgo came up in person, the num 
ber of his forces now amounting to sixty thousand. 36 
His reception was not wholly to his liking; for al 
though a commission came out to meet him, and the 
bells sounded a welcome, when he found that the 
cathedral was closed on dismounting in front of it to 
render thanks for his successful entry, he was very 
indignant. Nor was his anger allayed when, the gates 
having been at last opened by the servants of the sac 
risty, he was received only by the chaplains of the 
choir, and the te deum was badly chanted to peals of 
the organ abominably played. 37 He resented the slight 
by forthwith pronouncing vacant all the canonical 
seats except three. 38 

On the departure of the bishop, the canon, conde de 
Sierra Gorda, had been left in charge of the mitre, and 
Hidalgo intimated to him that it would be well to re 
move the excommunication fulminated against himself 
and his followers by the fugitive prelate. The obsequi 
ous canon complied; the proclamation was taken from 
the doors of the churches, and circulars sent to the 
curas in the diocese, informing them that the leaders 
of the revolutionists had incurred no ecclesiastical cen 
sure, and instructing them to read to their flocks on a 
feast day the removal of the excommunication. 39 

Before entering the city, Hidalgo had promised a 
commission sent out to receive him that rights of 
property should be respected, and during the entry 
no violence was attempted. But the taste for spoils 

36 According to Bustamante. Mora, however, places the number at 40,000. 
Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 68. Hidalgo had with him two bronze cannon and two 
wooden ones. 

87 For these particulars and antecedent events, consult Canon Betancourt's 
report in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 406 et seq., and the manifesto 
of the ayuntamiento of Valladolid, in Id. , v. 86-7. 

38 According to Betancourt, those of the conde de Sierra Gorda, Gomez 
Limon, and his own, 'porquefueal Parlamento.' The ayuntamiento states 
that Hidalgo said, 'dare por vacantes todas las prebendas por la impolitica 
con que se ha portado el Cabildo en mi recibimiento. ' /&., and Id., iii. 411. 

39 Ihe conde de Sierra Gorda exculpated himself to the viceroy by declar 
ing that he had acted under compulsion, 'desdiciendose de lo que habia ejecu- 
tatlo con prudencia, imputandolo d coaccion, terror y violencia.' Bustamante, 
Cuad. Hint., i. 72; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 166-7, 313-4. 


among the natives once gratified was not easily con 
trolled. Next day several Spanish houses were as 
saulted and sacked. Hard as it was to learn, a lesson 
of discipline must be given. Allende opened fire on 
his men. Several were killed and wounded ; the crowds 
dispersed and the disorder was stopped. 40 It had 
hardly ceased, however, before a more serious trouble 
occurred. The Indians, accustomed to simple diet, 
had given themselves up to gluttony and drunkenness, 
gorging themselves with sweetmeats and fruits, and 
pouring down spirituous liquors like water. The con 
sequence was that a deadly sickness broke out, carry 
ing off many in a few hours. The cry was raised 
that the aguardiente had been poisoned. Allende, 
by his presence of mind, however, suppressed the 
tumult. Drinking in the presence of the multitude 
a cup of the condemned liquor, he proved to the 
Indians that their fears were groundless. 41 

At Valladolid Hidalgo's force was increased by the 
important addition of well armed and well disciplined 
troops. They consisted of the regiment of provin 
cial infantry, the regiment of the Michoacan dra 
goons, more generally known by the name of the Patz- 
cuaro regiment, and eight companies of recruits lately 
raised and equipped by the bishop and chapter. Ad 
ditional cannon were also added to his artillery, a 
means of warfare which the first leaders of the revo 
lution regarded with too high an estimation, direct 
ing their principal attention to the casting of as many 
and as large pieces as possible. Experience taught 
them their mistake; for to unskilled gunners artillery 
was of little service. 

Having concluded his military preparations, and 
placed Jose Maria Anzorena at the head of the gov- 

40 Ansorena, Defensa, 10. Bustamante makes the assertion that the artil 
leryman fired without orders, killing and wounding 14 of the Indians. Cuad. 
Hi*t., i. 75. 

41 Betancourt narrates that dining with Hidalgo he was compelled by 
Allende to drink a glass of the liquor supposed to be poisoned. Hernandez 
y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 413-14. 



ernment, 42 Hidalgo, who had already decided to march 
against the capital without delay, left Valladolid on 
the 20th of October, 43 taking with him nearly all the 
church funds, and those of private individuals de 
posited for security in the coffers of the cathedral. 
Besides these funds, which amounted to $200,000, 
he obtained other large sums from the residents of 
Valladolid. Aware that Calleja's preparations would 
soon be completed, Hidalgo hurried forward. At 
Acd,mbaro he held a review of his forces, now num 
bering 80,000, an unwieldy, disorderly mass, which 


he divided into regiments of infantry and cavalry, 
each 1,000 strong. Here he was proclaimed generali- 
simo 44 at a council of the chiefs, and he conferred 

42 Anzorena, as the sequel will show, proved himself a stanch partisan of 
the revolutionists. 

43 This is the date given positively by Betancourt. Bustamante gives the 
19th of Oct. as the day of Hidalgo's departure. 

^Garcia Conde, Informe, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 270-1. 
Hidalgo's uniform was a blue coat with red cuffs and collar bordered with 
gold and silver galloon, his shoulder belt being of black velvet similarly 
bordered. Suspended from his neck he wore a large gold medal bearing the 
image of the virgin of Guadalupe. The uniform of Allende consisted of a 
jacket of blue cloth with red cuffs and collar, the seams being covered with 
silver galloon. Around each shoulder was a silver cord with pendent button. 
The lieutenant-general's uniforms were distinguished from his by having only 


on Allende the rank of captain-general; Aldama, 
Ballerza, Jimenez, and Joaquin Arias being ap 
pointed lieutenant-generals. From Acdmbaro the 
generalising directed his march by way of Mara- 
vatio, Tepetongo, and Ixtlahuaca, and rapidly ap 
proached the capital. 

When intelligence was received in Mexico of Hi 
dalgo's coming, Venegas laid his plans to oppose him. 
He had already at his disposal forces amounting to 
7,000 men, 45 and despatched Lieutenant-colonel Tor- 
cuato Trujillo with a portion of them to watch Hidal 
go's movements, and, if possible, arrest his advance. 48 
Trujillo had accompanied Venegas from Spain, and 
the viceroy, who as yet had but little confidence in 
Mexican commanders in spite of their protestations, 
deemed it prudent to place one of his own men at the 
head of so important an undertaking. It was not 
altogether a happy choice. Trujillo, indeed, was 
faithful enough; but he had one fault, he was a fool. 
Conceited, shallow-headed, he soon succeeded in ex 
citing the profound disgust of all around him. As a 
man, his followers hated him ; as a soldier, they held 
him in contempt. His conduct as a military corn- 
one shoulder cord, that on the right. Ib.; Guerra, Hist. Rtv. N. Esp., L 305-6; 
Resum. Hist. Insurr. N. Esp., 8. 

4:> Bustamante says the force consisted of the infantry regiment of New 
Spain, a battalion of infantry of Mexico, another called the Cuahutitlan bat 
talion, a battalion del fijo de Mexico, the provincial militia regiment of Pu- 
ebla, the city bakers' dragoons, two infantry battalions of merchants, three 
of the patriots of Fernando VII., a section of artillery, in addition to the 
veteran artillery, a troop of cavalry of the patriots, the militia infantry regi 
ment of Toluca, and the Tulancingo, and various other pickets in all 7,000 
men. Cuad. Hist., i. 76. 

40 The forces placed under Trujillo's command were the infantry regiment 
of Tres Villas, which had lately arrived, a battalion of the provincial militia 
of Mexico, and a portion of the dragoons of Spain. These were afterward re- 
enforced by 50 volunteers with two cannon, commanded by Juan Batitista do 
Ustariz, a lieutenant of the navy, and about 330 men drawn from the haci 
endas of Yermo and a Mexican named Manzano. Authors differ as to the 
total number. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., i. 475, states that it barely reached 
1,400; the author of Inwrrec. Resum. Hist., 9, makes it amount to 2,000; Mora, 
Mex. y susRev., iv. 73, raises it to 2, 500; while Torrente, Hist. Rev. llisp. Am., 
i. 151, places the number at about 1,200. Guerra makes it 1,500. Hist. Rev. 
N. Esp., i. 325. Negrete considers that the number may be safely estimated 
at 2,500. Hint. Mil. Sig. XIX., i. 354. 


mander was marked by cruelty and treachery. In 
after days the sound of his name did not ring pleas 
antly in the ears of the revolutionists. 

There was at this time in the city of Mexico a 
young lieutenant, who had lately come from Valla 
dolid flying before Hidalgo. His name was Agus- 
tin Iturbide. The first historical mention of him is 
found in the official journal of September 21, 1808/ 7 
where he is commended for his zeal in offering sup 
port to the new government after the deposal of Itur- 
rigaray. At this time he was a lieutenant of the 
provincial infantry regiment of Valladolid. He was 
born in that city on the 27th of September, 1783, 
his father, Joaquin de Iturbide, being a native of 
Pamplona, in the kingdom of Navarre. The fami 
lies of both his father and mother, whose maiden 
name was Josefa de Aramburu, were distinguished. 
Agustin while a child narrowly escaped death by 
fire, being rescued almost miraculously from his burn 
ing home. His school education was limited, he 
having applied himself to the management of one of 
his father's haciendas when only fifteen years of age; 
at which time also he entered the regiment of pro 
vincial infantry of Valladolid as ensign, and hence 
forth adopted the military profession. In 1805 he 
espoused Dona Ana Maria Huarte, a creole of good 
family. He was present with his command at the 
military encampment at Jalapa, and in 1809 assisted 
in suppressing the premature attempt at revolution 
in his native city. 

When Hidalgo took the field he invited Iturbide to 
join him, offering him the rank of lieutenant-general. 
The latter, however, refused; 48 and when Hidalgo 
drew near Valladolid, Iturbide, seeing no prospect of 

,xv. 702. 

48 Hidalgo sent this invitation while he \vas approaching Valladolid, ac 
cording to Iturbide in his manifiesto. Alaman points out that this evidence 
refutes Rocafuerte's statement published in his pamphlet directed against 
Iturbide under the title of El Picjmalion Americano that he declined to take 
part in the revolution because he could not obtain the same grade as in the 
royalist army. Hist. Mej., i. 463. 



a successful defence, repaired to the capital with 
seventy soldiers of his regiment who remained loyal 
to the service. When Trujillo was sent to oppose 
Hidalgo's advance, Iturbide obtained permission to 
accompany him, and thus he found himself afloat on 
his ambitious career. 

Meanwhile the two armies approach, and one must 
give way before the other. But first it is destined 
that they fight. Trujillo, having arrived at Toluca, 49 
sent forward a detachment to occupy the bridge of 
Don Bernabe over the River Lerma and intermediate 
between Toluca and Ixtlahuaca whither Hidalgo had 
arrived. On the 27th the royalist leader moved for 
ward his troops with the intention of attacking the 
insurgents at the latter place, distant nine leagues, but 


49 Explanation of the plan. 

A. Infantry of the royal army. 

B. Infantry of the insurgents. 

C. Cavalry of royal army. 

D. Cavalrj 7 of the insurgents. 

E. Royal troops on the march. 

F. Insurgent troops on the march. 

HIST. HEX., VOL. IV. 12 


meeting his advance guard in full flight, and learning 
that Hidalgo was approaching with all his forces, he 
fell back to the small town of Lerrna, where he hoped 
to hold the enemy in check by barricading arid de 
fending the bridge. On the 28th, as no enemy ap 
peared, Trujillo suspected that Hidalgo had directed 
his march to the bridge of Atengo, with the object 
of occupying the Santiago road and attacking the 
royalists in the rear, at the same time cutting off their 
retreat to the capital. He therefore sent a detach 
ment to defend that point, and gave orders to the 
subdelegado of Santiago Tianguistengo to destroy the 
bridge. This order, however, was not carried out, 
and on the 29th Allende, with a large body of troops, 
forced the defenders from their position and gained 
the Santiago road. 

Meanwhile Hidalgo with the rest of his forces 
marched toward Lerrna; and Trujillo, as soon as he 
learned that the bridge of Atengo, had been lost, saw 
the necessity of retreating toward the capital, and 
accordingly withdrew to the mountain pass called the 
monte de las Cruces, 60 leaving Jose de Mendivil with 

* O 

one of the two battalions of which the regiment of 
Tres Villas was composed, and Francisco Bringas 
with a troop .of cavalry, to hold the Lerma bridge 
until the different sections of the army had united at 
las Cruces. At five o'clock in the afternoon, Mendi 
vil, supported in the rear by Bringas, commenced his 
retreat, leaving only a small force under Captain Pino 
to defend the bridge; and so well did this officer per 
form his duty that he did not retire until late at night. 
The position to which Trujillo had withdrawn was a 
strong one, but it had the disadvantage of being com 
manded on the south by neighboring hills covered 
with forest, and by other heights on the north side of 
the Toluca road. Allende well knew the importance 

50 So called because of the numerous crosses erected there to mark the 
places where travellers had been murdered by bandits; that hill being a fa 
vorite resort of robbers. 


of the situation, and had made all haste to occupy it 
from the Santiago road; but Trujillo's march had 
been equally rapid, and the royalists gained the emi 
nence first, anticipating, however, the insurgent force 
only by half an hour. 

At eight o'clock on the morning of the 30th, the 
action commenced by light skirmishing between the 
royalist cavalry and guerrilla bands in advance of the 
main body of insurgents. Opportunely for Trujillo, 
he received at this time a reenforcernent of two can 
non, with an escort of fifty Spanish volunteers, under 
Captain Antonio Bringas, and 330 mounted lancers 
from the haciendas of Yermo and Jose Maria Man- 
zano, 51 the whole force being placed under the com 
mand of Juan Bautista de Uzt^riz, a lieutenant of the 
royal navy. About eleven o'clock the attacking col 
umn of the insurgents, with the artillery in front, 
came in sight on the road from Toluca. It consisted 


of the infantry provincial regiment of Valladolid, the 
Celaya companies, and the Guanajuato battalion, which 
were flanked by the provincial dragoons of Patzcuaro 
and la Reina, the rear being brought up by the dra 
goons of el Principe a force in itself greatly superior 
to that of Trujillo, but which being without efficient 
officers had already lost much of its discipline. These 
were preceded on the front and flanks by crowds of 
ill-armed Indians, and numerous bands of horsemen, 
who streamed along the Toluca road or wound round 
the sides of the hills wherever the ground was practi 
cable for horses. Trujillo now made preparations to 
receive the coming attack. His two field-pieces were 
placed in position so as to enfilade the road and ad 
jacent ground, and were hidden from sight with 

51 The stanch loyalist Gabriel Yermo, who had displayed such tact in the 
deposal of Iturrigaray, supplied at his own cost 400 lancers from his hacien 
das, while his brother Juan Antonio furnished 100 more. These troops were 
known by the name of the negros de Yermo, and did good service during the 
war. Of these lancers 279 were sent to Trujillo, according to Yermo's 
statement of services rendered, Rev. N. Esp. Verdad. Orig., 110. ii. 56-7, al 
though Trujillo in his official report to the viceroy states that there were only 
150. Gaz. deMex., 1810, i. 923. 


branches of trees, in order to increase the confidence 
of the enemy. The cavalry was ordered to fall back 
upon the line without engaging in action, and the fifty 
volunteers lately arrived, with the lancers of Yermo 
commanded by Captain Antonio Bringas, supported 
by two companies of the Tres Villas regiment under 
the command of Lieutenant Ramon Reyes, were 
placed in ambush on a wooded height at some distance 
from the left flank. Trujillo commanded the centre 
in person, occupying the level summit which over 
looks the pass, and on which was planted one of the 
field-pieces, while Mendivil with the other occupied 
the front, covering the main approach. 

Hidalgo had left the formation of the plan of bat 
tle to Allende, and that officer made preparations to 
surround Trujillo while the main attack was being 
made in front. For this purpose strong detachments 
of the better armed Indians, both of foot and horse, 
were sent by long detours to take possession of vari 
ous heights commanding Trujillo's flanks, and a force 
of 3,000 foot and horse was despatched to occupy the 
road to Mexico in the rear of the enemy. Moreover, 
a select body of 1,200 of the best disciplined men of 
all arms was thrown out on the right flank, and took 
up a position out of range of Trujillo's artillery, and 
opposite to the place where Bringas was ambushed. 
The command of the infantry was given to Juan Al- 
clama and Luis Malo, and that of the artillery to 
Mariano Jimenez, while Allende himself commanded 
the cavalry. 52 

At eleven o'clock the attacking column, preceded 
by the four pieces of artillery already mentioned, ap- 

52 Licearja, Adic. y Rectific., 139. According to Mora, Allende thought 
the undisciplined masses should not take part in the general action, but 
should be posted as rear-guards to the different divisions, where they might 
pi-ove of service as occasion offered. The Indians, however, were offended at 
being so placed, and Hidalgo insisted that Allende should assign to them places 
in the front. Though Allende represented strongly the danger of so doing, 
Hidalgo so pressed the matter that Allende was obliged to yield. Mex. y 
sus Rev., iv. 27. Mora's statements, however, must be taken with allow 



preached within close range. Trujillo now opened 
fire with grape and canister from his masked batteries 
with such deadly effect upon the crowded masses in 
front, that they were soon thrown into confusion and 
driven back, causing some disturbance to the disci 
plined troops. These, however, held their ground, and 
replied with their artillery, while a brisk fire was main 
tained all along the fronts, with no little loss on both 
sides, the insurgents suffering most. Trujillo, perceiv 
ing that he could hold the enemy's centre in check, 
now ordered Bringas to engage their right wing, and 
sent a detachment of three companies of the Tres 
Villas infantry under the command of Iturbide to oc 
cupy an almost inaccessible height covered with pine 
trees, at a considerable distance on his right flank. 

Bringas now charged with great impetuosity, and 
engaged with the 1,200 picked men opposed to him. 
The contest was long and fierce, but eventually ter 
minated in favor of the insurgents. These, encour 
aged by the bravery and example of Aldama and 
Malo, who commanded in person in that part of the 
field, maintained their ground with unflinching firm 
ness, in spite of the heavy loss inflicted by the loyal 
ists; but it was not until Bringas fell mortally wound 
ed that they succeeded in repulsing his troops. 53 Nor 
was Trujillo more successful in his manoeuvre on the 
right. Allende also had marked the importance of 
the position which Iturbide had been sent to occupy, 
and, unnoticed by the royalists, had already proceeded 
in person with 300 of the infantry and one piece of 
artillery to take possession of it, approaching unseen 

53 Bringas after being wounded was lifted upon his horse, and with great 
intrepidity still encouraged his men, effecting his retreat in good order. Tru 
jillo, in Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 925. He died on the 3d of Nov. in the city of 
Mexico, and was honored by command of the viceroy with a magnificent fu 
neral. A few days after a Creole officer died of the wounds he had received, 
and was buried without display. As Bringas was a Spaniard, this was not 
unnoticed, and the viceroy was satirized by the following epigram: 

i Bringas era gachupin? 
Su cntierro fuj un S. Quintin. 

iN. era amcricano? 
Su entierro fue liso y llano. 

Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 482. 


in a direction opposite to Iturbide's line of march. 
When the royalist officer had pushed forward half 
way up to the summit, he suddenly came in contact 
with Allende's force, and a brisk engagement followed, 
which resulted in the repulse of Allende. The disas 
ter sustained by Bringas, however, and the exposure 
to the enemy of Trujillo's manoeuvre by this skirmish, 
caused the royalist leader to recall Iturbide. Where 
upon the insurgents rallied and took possession of the 
height. 54 

Trujillo's position was now hopelessly exposed ; in 
fact, he was completely surrounded. On his right the 
piece of artillery planted by Allende on the aban 
doned height was in a position to enfilade his ranks; 
a large force of the enemy lay between him and the 
capital ; on his left was Aldarna now strongly reen- 
forced, and with tw r o pieces of artillery mounted in a 
commanding position; while in front Mendivil was 
not only himself severely wounded, but many of his 
most efficient men were slain or hors de combat, and 
his artillery ammunition was exhausted. 55 It was 
now about three o'clock in the afternoon, and the in 
surgents had pushed on down the heights on Trujillo's 
left so near that the combatants were at speaking dis 
tance. At this juncture the royalist leader perpe 
trates an act which places him before the world for 
ever in his true character of villain, and enshrouds 
his memory with lasting infamy. The insurgents, 
masters of the position as they feel themselves to be, 
invite the royalist troops to join their cause; and so 

54 Liceaga attempts to show that Iturbide did not engage with the enemy; 
but due weight must be given to Trujillo's own statement. 'Se encoiitraron 
con los enemigos que subian y rompieron el fuego contra ellos, rechazaiido- 
los;' and after recounting the repulse of Bringas, clearly explains the reason 
of Iturbide's recall. 'Las demas compafrias de mi derecha se volvieron a re- 
plegar a la linea, pues el gran mimero de enemigos y lo dilatado del cerro, 
hacia entrasen hasta mi centre, por lo qiie me vi en la precision de reconcen- 
trar mi linea en el pequeno piano que hay sobre el camino real a donde te- 
nia colocado tin canon giratorio.' Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 924-5. 

53 Mendivil defended his post with exemplary bravery, and after his field- 
piece was no longer of service, held his ground with the infantry under his 
command. His wounds were so serious that it was long before he recovered. 
Mora, Mcj. y sus Rev., iv. 80. 


favorably are their proposals regarded by some of 
Trujillo's officers, that they induce him no less than 
three times to hold a parley with the enemy in front 
of his line of infantry. Hostilities, meanwhile, have 
ceased. Friendly and specious are the words which 
Trujillo uses, and at each conference the insurgents, 
gathering in crowded ranks about their spokesman, 
draw nearer and nearer. At the third parley he has 
enticed the unsuspecting revolutionists close up to 
his bayonets; then he throws off the mask and orders 
his men to fire. 56 The volley which follows stretches 
more than sixty victims to his perfidy dead upon the 
ground. 57 

This treacherous act infuriated the insurgents, and 
the battle was renewed with increased vigor. Trujillo, 
however, maintained his position until half-past five 
in the evening, when, having lost one third of his 
force in killed and wounded, among whom were many 
of his best officers, his ammunition, moreover, be 
ing wellnigh exhausted, he decided to force his way 
through the enemy in his rear. His position was 
indeed no longer tenable. His ranks were being deci 
mated by the insurgents' artillery, his troops, worn 
out with fatigue, were without provisions; while num 
bers of the enemy were hastening to reenforce those 
who were waiting to intercept his retreat. Abandon 
ing his cannon, therefore, he put himself at the head 

56 His own words are: 'Los acerque hasta bien inmediato de mis bayo- 
netas, y recogiendo el teniente coronel D. Juan Antonio Lopez un estandarte 
de N. 8. de Guadalupe que venia en las sacrilegas manos de estos infames, 
mandc la voz de fuego & la infanteria que tenia.' Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 926. 

57 Bmtamante, CuacL Hist., i. 82. According to Liceaga, a kind of armis 
tice had been established, during which Aldama and Jimenez sent in pro 
posals to the native-born soldiers and officers to join the independent cause, 
at the same time guaranteeing the lives of Trujillo and the Spaniards who 
were with him. Whether this was done with the approbation of Allende or 
rot the author does not know. Adic. y Rectlfic., 140. Trujillo, as is 
sometimes the case with base natures, instead of seeing anything disgrace 
ful in his act, glories in it. It was, however, severely condemned even in 
the Semanario Patriotico de Cadiz, no. 45, of Feb. 14, 1811, in the follow 
ing words: 'Hacer fuego sobre estos rebeldes al tiempo de estar parlamen- 
tando con ellos, . . .111 file" justo, ni honesto, ni politico.' The defence urged is 
that the insurgents were not sincere in their offers, which were made only for 
the purpose of hemming in the royalists, which is pure subterfuge. Gaz. de 
Hex., 1811, ii. 348-9. 


of two companies of the Tres Villas regiment, and 
followed by the remainder of his forces in closed col 
umns, successfully fought his way way out, and ar 
rived at Cuajimalpa with some little loss. Here he 
was compelled to make a stand in order to repel a 
body of cavalry which was harassing his march and 
tampering with his men. This effected, with the loss 
of some killed on the part of the insurgents, he pur 
sued his way unmolested to Santa Fe, where he took 
up quarters for the night, and on the following day 
entered the capital. 58 Then, having no one to dispute 
him, he made his defeat appear a victory; and a 
medal was struck off in commemoration of his glori 
ous achievements, and the success of the royal arms. 59 

58 Bustamante states that Trujillo's retreat was conducted in the greatest 
disorder as far as Cuajimalpa, and that thence 'escap6 como pudo en dispersion 
para Mexico,' Quad. Hist., 82; that Trujillo entered the capital with only 51 
soldiers, 'resto unico de toda la fuerza que sac6 de esta capital;' and intimates 
that the regiment of Tres Villas had almost ceased to exist. Mora also as 
serts that the greater portion of the soldiers deserted on the retreat, so that 
when Trujillo left Santa Fe" he had little over 40 men. Mej. y sus .Rev., iv. 
81. Now, although it is probable that some of his men deserted, since he 
himself mentions that attempts were made to seduce them from their allegiance 
while retreating, it is not possible that the retreat was conducted in disorder; 
had such been the case, none would have escaped, much less the wounded, 
who were brought to Mexico, as Alaman reasonably observes. But the author 
who advances the most incredible conjectures as to what was probably Tru 
jillo's ability as commander and his deportment in the field is the licenciado 
Don Anastasio Zerecero. He gravely relates that Trujillo, after having given 
the order to fire upon those with whom he was holding parley, disappeared 
disguised, as it was said, in the habit of a friar and hastened to Santa F6; and 
then, because Trujillo, in his report dated Nov. 6th that is, seven days 
after the battle says that he cannot state the exact loss sustained, and be 
cause, moreover, he admits that he was the first to leave the field, Zerecero 
comes to the conclusion that everything tends to justify the opinion that 
Trujillo fled at the very first, and did not even see the battle, writing his 
official despatch from the account supplied him by Iturbide. The same au 
thor asserts that Trujillo had 3,000 troops, only 500 of which returned to 
Mexico. Mem. Rev. Mex., 86-7, 107-8. Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp., 330, 
states that 200 royalists escaped to the capital. Though a coxcomb, a liar, 
and a villain, Trujillo was no coward on the field of battle. Negrete reason 
ably concludes that the viceroy and Trujillo were of accord that it would 
not be safe in the excited state of the community to publish at once the 
official account of the action, which had been reported as a victory; when, 
however, the insurgents had retreated, there was no danger in doing so. Hist. 
Mil. Sig. XIX., i. 361-2, 364. 

69 The medal was presented on the'Sd of Feb., 1811, on which elate the vice 
roy issued a proclamation in praise of the gallant conduct of the regiment of 
Tres Villas, and tells them to assume Monte de las Cruces ! as their future 
battle-cry. 'Os remito,' he says, 'los escudos de distincion que mere-cisteis 
el dia 30 de octubre por vuestra brillante conducta en el monte de las Cruces 
. . . que el monte de las Cruces sea vuestro grito guerrero en el momento de 


Although Hidalgo thus remained master of the 
field, his victory had been dearly bought. The Ind 
ians were terror-stricken over the dreadful slaughter 
which had been inflicted upon them by the fire of the 
artillery, the deadly effect of which they had witnessed 
for the first time; 60 while the disciplined troops were 
dismayed at the long resistance which so small a force 
had been able to make against such overwhelming 
numbers. Thus on the following morning the insur 
gent army, instead of being flushed with victory, were 
despondent; and Hidalgo when he arrived at Cuaji- 
malpa halted, although Allende urgently pressed upon 
him the necessity of marching upon Mexico at once. 61 ' 

The capital was filled with foreboding. From the 
time intelligence arrived of Hidalgo's departure from 
"Valladolid, fear had fallen on the people. And now 
when Trujillo returned with but a remnant of his force, 
notwithstanding his braggadocio, many gave up all 
hope. Guanajuato had fallen; Valladolid had sur 
rendered; it was Mexico's turn next! Treasures and 
jewelry were carefully concealed or confided to the 
sacred protection of convents. Women sought asy 
lum in nunneries; and the city, which for years had 
been free from popular outbreak, presented a scene of 
confusion and panic. Even Venegas, taking into con 
sideration the numbers of the enemy, the distant po- 

vuestros futures combates, y la voz quo os conduzca a la victoria. ' Gaz. de 
Mex., 1811, ii. 123-4. It bore the names of Trujillo, Bringas, and Mendivil. 
Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp. t i. 330. 

co Trujillo estimated the number of insurgents killed and wounded at 
2,000; Liceaga says that on the two sides more than 4,000 were killed: *Se 
calcula haber quedado en el campo, mas de cuatro mil caddveres de uno y 
otro bando, siendo sin comparacion mayor el numero de los que pertenecian 
d los invasores.' Adic. y Rectific., 148. Again, Diego Garcia Conde in his re 
port to the viceroy after his release from captivity states that the loss to the 
insurgents in killed, wounded, and deserters was more than 20,000. Hernan 
dez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 273. For more than five years after the engage 
ment, on either side of the pass of Monte de las Cruces, both on the ascent 
and descent, for the distance of over a league, great heaps of human bones 
could be seen piled underneath the trees. Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 109. 

C1 The difference of opinion which not unfrequently occurred between these 
leaders terminated in unfriendly relations. Speaking of this dispute, Busta- 
mante says: 'Desde esta <3poca comenz6 (Allende) a desabrirse con 61 (Hi 
dalgo) desazon que se aumento cada dia mas, y que termin6 con la desgracia 
personal de entrambos gefes.' Cuad. Hist., i. 87. 


sition of Calleja, and the want of spirit observable in 
his own troops, at first meditated flight to Vera Cruz. 
The earnest appeals of the Spaniards and royalists, 
however, induced him to change his mind, and take 
measures for the defence of the city. 62 Such forces as 
he had were placed on the causeway of la Piedad and 
the paseo de Bucareli. Cannon were planted at Cha- 
pultepec, 63 and troops of cavalry detached to watch 
the movements of the enemy. Internal defence was 
intrusted to the regiment of the Cornercio, the city 
squadron, and some newly levied bodies of patriots. 64 
When the news of Trujillo's failure reached the capi 
tal, Venegas had immediately despatched a courier to 
Calleja, ordering him to hasten by forced marches to 
the defence of the capital. He also sent instructions 
to Captain Rosendo Porlier, directing him to unite the 
crews of the vessels at Vera Cruz, and march them 
up the country to his aid. 

To inspire the fainting hearts of the people with 
some confidence, Yenegas caused the sacred image of 
los Remedies 65 to be conveyed from its shrine to the 
cathedral. These were the days of signs and wonders, 
be it remembered, and this was a time of great tribu 
lation. The viceroy was ready to act, and was well 
up in his part. Betaking himself to the cathedral, 
he threw himself upon his knees, and devoutly ad 
dressing the image, meanwhile invoking its aid, Yene- 

Negrete, Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX., 357, 363; Zerecero, Rev. Hex., 88-9. 

63 Venegas' dispositions in a military point of view were extremely bad, 
and placed his troops in a position where it was impossible for them to ma- 
nceuvre. Bustamante states that on the 39th, in company with a military 
friend, he visited the encampment, and that the officer pointed out to him 
the want of military skill displayed by Venegas in thus placing his troops. 
* Muy luego me hizo notar la ignorancia del que lo habia situado en aquel 
punto.' Cuad. Hist., i. 78. 

6l Alaman, basing his estimation on the enumeration of available forces 
given by Bustamante see note 45, this chapter calculates that there were 
only 2,000 efficient troops. But he does not include those stationed in the in- 
terior of the city, which he considers to have been of little use. Hist. Mej. , 
i. 485. 

65 This image belonged in the sanctuary of Totoltepec; and on several oc* 
casions had been conveyed to the capital, during which visits miraculous pow 
ers had been displayed. It was greatly venerated, as we know. Calv'dlo, Ser 
mon. 69-106. 


gas placed in its hands his viceregal staff of office, and 
solemnly hailed it as lady captain-general of the army. 
The religious fervor of the assembled multitude was 
unrestrained, and tears of thankfulness from a thou 
sand eyes watered the cathedral floor. 66 The presence 
of this protecting image greatly allayed the panic, 
while the soldiery, confident of victory with the queen 
of heaven on their side, begged for medals stamped 
with her likeness. 67 The royalists, after the example 
of Hidalgo, erected a sacred banner, which bore the 
venerated form of Nuestra Senora de los Remedies. 
Thus on the future battle-fields during the war of in 
dependence, opposing armies fought under emblems 
of the same divine interceder for mercy before the 
heavenly throne. 

The excitement and apprehension on the 31st of 
October was intense throughout the city, and every 
cloud of dust seen on the road from Toluca was thought 
to presage the coming of the foe. But the day passed 
and no enemy appeared. Hidalgo remained inactive, 
and on the following day sent commissioners with 
an official communication to the viceroy. Having 
arrived at Chapultepec, the envoys sent the despatch 
to Venegas, who was near by. but he peremptorily 
refused any answer; and in language by no means 
refined ordered the commissioners to take their de 
parture immediately, under pain of being shot. 68 

66 Mora, Max. y sus Rev., iv. 84. Calvillo gives a detailed account of 
the way in which the image was brought from Totoltepec. It being the vice 
roy's design to have it introduced secretly into the city, he sent a carriage 
for it; but the Indians in the neighborhood of the shrine became aware of the 
intention to remove their adored protectress, and assembled in great crowds 
with demonstrations of sorrow. With much persuasion they were calmed, 
and then in their veneration accompanied the carriage to the capital, causing 
no little apprehension to those who were conducting the image, that they 
would be mistaken for Hidalgo's army and fired on. Id., 115-22. 

67 A private individual, whose name Calvillo does not mention, distributed 
5,930 such medals among the officers and soldiers of the line regiments of 
New Spain, the provincial regiments of Mexico, Toluca, Quautitlan, Tres 
Villas, and Tulancingo, and the city squadron. Id., 121-2. 

68 Lull, Rpfutac., 11. This writer states that the contemptuous bearing of 
Venegas increased the hatred of tyranny. With regard to the language of 
the viceroy, Bustamante, in describing it, expresses himself in his usual ran 
corous way: 'Se desato en palabrotas tan groseras y torpes, que no estarian 
bien ni en la boca de un grumete 6 carromatero despechado.' Cuad. Hist., i. 


Hidalgo's position was now becoming serious. Up 
to this time his success had been brilliant. Forced 
prematurely into action, into the promulgation and de 
fence of long-cherished principles, his people had gath 
ered round him, and after that a large army had come 
to his support. They were unlettered, untrained, but 
they were trustful. Thousands of them had already 
laid down their lives for their country ; thousands more 
were ready to die rather than relinquish their hope of 
liberty. Here were many, but why were there not 
more ? Why were the men of America so slow to move 
in this matter? Here was the priceless boon held out 
to them; why would they not stretch forth their hand 
and take it ? True, fifty thousand had come forward 
eighty thousand; but why do not they all come five 
hundred thousand, five millions why do not they 
come and be free ? Oh, base apathy, offspring of iron- 
bound ignorance! 

He had sent agents into the capital, and to the 
neighboring towns, to stir up the people and make 
them ashamed of their bonds. Not hearing from 
them, he had sent others, and these found the first 
fallen away from the cause. Some of his emissaries 
had been captured. 69 Evidently the country here 
about was not ripe for revolt. His warmest adher 
ents a little distance away from him became cold. 
He had no helper, no one with whom to share his 
heavy load of responsibility. Allende was a good man, 
a brave soldier, a faithful adherent ; but he was noth 
ing more than a fighting man, and like fighting men 
frequently, he was inclined at times to be rash and 
reckless, and then to be angry if checked. 

The capital city was the tempting prize, the city of 
Montezunia, of Cortes, a city classic in the annals of 
America ; and it was so near. But he well knew that 
he was in no condition to march on Mexico. He has 

87. The envoys were General Jimenez, Abasolo, Montemayor, and another 
insurgent officer. 

t9 Centeno was one of those captured, and was hanged in Mexico in Feb 
ruary following. 


been blamed for his three days of inactivity here ; he has 
been called too slow, too careful, too fearful, a dreamer 
and no soldier, and, when advised, too obstinate; 
some think Allende should have had supreme com 
mand. It is easy to criticise. A man must be judged 
according to means and conditions. His associates 
urged that the inhabitants would arise and assist them. 
Some had so arisen, it is true, but there were few hopes 
held out thus far from the direction of the capital, 
and these very officers, who were loudest in their desire 
to advance, railed most contemptuously of all against 
Hidalgo's rabble army, as worse than none. In the 
capital were men, money, arms, and ammunition ; even 
if they had few soldiers just then, the whole city 
would fight before they would see it sacked. He had 
few real soldiers, few men who could be relied upon ; 
he had few and poor arms, and his store of ammunition 
was wellnigh exhausted. He was still further dis 
couraged by the contents of a despatch intercepted by 
his followers. It was the duplicate of Venegas' in 
structions to Calleja to hasten to his support. He 
was now fearful of being caught between two opposing 
armies. In vain Allende advocated an immediate ad 
vance on the city. Hidalgo, with cooler and truer 
judgment, knew that it would not do. Better find 
more soldiers, drill his men, and practise for a time on 
a less formidable foe; and so after lingering another 
day at Cuajimalpa, Hidalgo moved away. 70 

70 Herewith I give fuller reference to authorities on this early epoch of 
Mexican independence: Diar. M<'X., ii. 167, v. 217, 228, vi. 117, ix. 326, 
371-4, 632, x. 451-5, 48o^8T497-8, 508, xi. 80, 86, 125-7. 199-200, 681-3, 
xii. 120, 271-2. 288, 403-92, 511-55, 602-94, xiii. 13-70, 245-7, 272, 300-386, 
414-16, 629-31, 689-90; Gaz. Mex^ 1810, i. 39-114, 210-91, 313-84, 404-39, 
530, 717-801, 871-3, 906-54, 1088; Id., 1811, ii. 13-254, 274-393; Id., 1789, 
iii. 18-397; Id., 1790, iv. 9-25, 120-89, 245-6, 313-81, 425-33; Id., 1792, v. 
9-10, 81, 261-2, 341-2; Id., 1794, vi. 1-2, 313, 341-2, 442; Id., 1795, vii. 17- 
18, 153-4; Id., 1796-7, viii. 10, 51, 85, 109-90, 238-301, 365-81; Id., 1798, ix. 
1-51, 138-86, 329; Id., 1800-1, x. 2, 49-209, 235, 242, 329-30, 369; Id., 1802- 
3, xi. 2, 9, 105-194, 220-6, 285-350; Id., 1804-5, xii. 17-81, 153-63, 230-54, 
317, 342-4; xiii. 638, 656-9, 779; Id., 1806, xiv. 47, 56; Id., 1807, xv. 363, 
416, 623-6, 699, 707-40, 1010-12; Id., 1807, xvi. passim; Dj&Qtt&&e*J%3&2> 
i. 134-44, ii. 2-10, iii. 153, vi. 58, 60; Cortes, Diario, 1810-11, i. y ii. 10, 12- 
13, 24-5, 45, vii. 7, 1812, xiv. 205-9; Diario Congreso, ii. no. 31, 460-1, 465- 
8; 470-3, vi. no. 143, 2804-5; Col. J)pc, t i.. 40^1; Cavo, Tres Siglos, 258-72 j 


Calle, Mem. y Not., 77; Hernan. y Ddv. , Col. Doc., i. 9-14, 17, 39-40, 455-72, 
ii. 63-84, 92-4, 107-11, 110-25, 142-57, 172-92, 207-14, 244, 276-91, 320-30, 
387-402, 593-4, 695-739, iii. 905-11, vi. 35; Espinosa, Chron., 12-259, 286-308, 
320-1, 530-4; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 12-20, 30-6, 44-5, iv. 35-136, 
308; Mem. Hist. Hex., MS., iii. 42; Matirologio, 44-5, in Soc. Alex. Geog., 
vii. 535-8; Defensa, 15-16; Gonzales Ddvila, Teat. Ecles., i. 108; Gomez, 
Diario, in Doc. Hist. Mex., ser. 2, vii. 434-5; Beaumont, Tratado Agua. 
Min., passim; Cr6n. Mich., iv. 541-84; Alegre, Hist. Comp., ii. 163, iii. 242-3, 
284-0; Arevalo, Compend., 109, 149, 198-9, 253-5; Arricivita, Cr6n. Sera/., 
38-9, 109-71, 245-312, 317-20, 431-49, 579-82; Humboldt, Essai Pol, i. 246- 
7, ii. 6GG-7, GG9; Tablets Estadis., MS., 42-3; Guerra, Rev. N. Espana, i. 
138-56, 187-95, 209-13, 253, 288-329, ii. 564-778; Iglesias, Ed., 154-63, 245- 
64; Calvillo, Sermon., 107-14; Liceaga, Adic. y Rect., 2-187, 212-18; Medina, 
Chron. S. Diego Mex., 53-4, 58-62, 200-6, 254, 257-8; Navarrete, Eelac. 
Peregrin., no. i. 4-29, 66-103, ii. 14-25, 28, 31-4, 243, iii. 3-53, 96-7, 347, 
358-70, iv. 8-9, 18-19, 38-51; Negrete, Hist. Mil. Mex., 75-156, 205-252, 
258-GO; Torrente, Rev. Hisp.-Am., i. 51-105, 72-80, 140-61; Romero, Mich., 
150, 157, 159-61, 167-9, 188-199; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 235, 239-40, 259- 
68, 271-3, 275, 278-357; Soriano, Prologo, MS., 4-7, 14-19, 23; Pinart, Col. 
Doc. Mex., 271-3; Villasenor y Sanchez, Teatro, i. 90-7, ii. 35-47, 105- 
10, 2GO-1, iii. 34-47; Soc. Mex. Geog., i. 63-4, ii. 8, 18, iii. 198-200, 205-6, 
viii. 404-5, ix. 130-1, 140, 151, 107; Santos, Chron. Hisp., ii. 470, vii. 470- 
72; Diar. d<l Imper., 18G6, 509; Salazar, Serm. Funeb., passim; Semmes, Ser 
vice Afloat, 9-10; Semanario Politico, ii. 149-64; Siguenzay Gdngara, Gloria, 
deQuer., pp. 235; Carta al Almirante, MS., 10-11 ;Shepard, Land of the Aztec, 
83-100; Sosa, Episcop. Mex., 207-13; Strieker, Bibliothek, 41-9; Thompson, 
Recoil. Mex., 55-7; Texeda, Rep. Mex., passim; Tornel y Mendoil, Heros de 
Dolores, pp. 16; Velasquez, Carta al Regente Roma, MS. , orig. ; Venegas, Prog. 
Felic. Amer., pp. 11; Valdovinos, Contest., 15-17; Viagero Univ., xxvii. 107- 
10; Wadd y Thompson, Recoil. Mex., 55; Walton, Exposed, ap. 2-7; Ward, 
Hist. Mex., 105, vi. 120, 126-30, 134-50, 156, 160-3, vii. 58; Ximenez, In- 
quisidor Fiscal. . .Contra, MS., pp. 281; Young, Hist. Mex., 75-8; Zelaa, 
Gloria de Quer., 125-33, 171-235, 241; Zavala, Rev. Mex., 43; Yen. Cong. S. 
Felipe Neri, pp. 137; Pap. Derecho, 3; Disc. Civic., 19-2D; Rev. Mex., 26, 43- 
58, 89, 129, 143-6; Hassel, Mex. y Gnat., 99-100, 135-40; Hidalgo, Exped. 
Lugar Nacim., pp. 47; Id., Biog. del Cura, 39-177; Holley, Texas, 302; Insur 
rection, Resum. Hist., pp. 32; Instruc. Vireyes, 148; Junta Sup. Cadiz, pp. 8; 
Kollonitz, Court of Mex., 253-4; Kotteml-amp, Unabhangigkeitskampf, 58-67; 
Navarro, Soc. Mex., i. 291; Niles, S. Am. y Mex., i. 129-42; Norman, Ram- 
lies, 185-08; Over, Mex., 406-20; Ordenes Corona, MS., vi. 113; Otero-Mari- 
ano, Oi'acion Civ., pp. 21; Ocios, Espan. Emigrad., vii. 95-6; Calvo, Annales 
Hist., vi. 43-5; Orozcoy Berra, Carta Etnog. , 260-1; OlaguiM, Arcnga Civ., 
pp. 16; Oraciones, no. 3; Chevalier, Mexique, 339-47; Cancelada, Cond. Itur- 
rigaray, 67, 98-100; Verdad Sabida, ix.-xii.; Col. Diarios, MS., 240; Pinart 
Col.; Cerlif. de las Mercedes, MS., 13-14; Pinart Col.; Reales Cedulas, MS., i. 
f. 8, 73-4; Id., MS., ii. f. 167; Cedulario, i. f. 92; Campillo, Edicto, pp. 8; 
Castaiieda, Oration Civ., pp. 16; Chijnoweth, Max., 3-6; Carlos III., Solemne 
Action, pp. 47; Perez, Dice. Geog., i, 356-9; Proclama, Arzob. V. Rey, pp. 22; 
Id., pp. 16; Poinsett, Mex., ap. 30-1; Pan. Star and Herald, Sept. 29, 1866; 
Proyecto Monarq., 3-13; Doc. sobre Mex., no. iv. ; Pedraza., Oration Encom., 
pp. 15; Quintana Roo, Dtscurso, pp. 17; Queretaro, Orden., pp. 14; Id., Dos 
Palabras, 4-5; Id., Not. Estad., 73-4; Quarterly Rev., vii. 240-54, xvii. 540- 
2, xxx. 172; Recop. de Ind., i. 565; Roux de Rochelle, Etats Unis, ii. 385-6; 
Robinson, Mex., 13-29; Id., i. 21-7; Ramirez, Lecturas Hist., in Mex. Soc. 
Geog. Bol, iii. 231-33; Roblas, Diario, in Doc. Hist., Mex., ser. i. iv. 117; 
Raso, in Soc. Mex. Geog., iii. 208; Robles, Diario, in Doc. Hist. Mex., i. ser. 
iii. 493-4; Rep. Mex. Ligera Resefia, 2, 51-2; Rev. Span. Amer., 80-7, 290- 
311; Rafut. Artie. Fondo, pp. 32; Refutation de un Espauol-Am., Mex. 1810, 
12pp.; Diaz, Sermon, pp. 32; Diputac. Amer. Repres., pp. 17; Democ. Rev., 
i. 272; Del Mar, Hist. Prec. Metals, 146; Dill, Hist. Mex., 2G3-91: Dillon, 


viii. 151, 206, 300, 513-16, 643-4; Id., ix. 288, 372-3, 377, 414, 429, 446-8 
577, 606, 800-10, 862; Id., x. 82; 284-6, 373, 798, 815-16, ap. i. 56, 410-12; 
Escatera y Liana, Mex. Hist. Descrip., 1-6; Escudero, Not. Estad. Son., 43; 
Fonte, Pastorales, no. i.; Frost. Pictl. Hint. Mex., 148-64; Fossey, Mex., 139- 
46; Zamacols, Hist. Mex., i. 641, v. 315-16, 573-6, 641-2, 645, vi. passim, vii. 
passim, viii. 25-7, 40-8, 55, 89-92, 400-4, 448-59, 464, 474, 488, 514-20, 524, 
532-3, 547, ix. 33-9, x. 57, 63-5, 905-22, 969, 1364, 1387-9, 1392-6, 1402, xi. 
265, 545, 649; Alaman, Mex., i. passim, ii. 45, 57, 81-4, 89-90, 104, 110-14 
186-7, 208-26, 548-9, 583, ap. 19-20, 24-6, iii. 1-58, 69, 9G-8, 101-3, 213-20, 
250, ap. 3-5, 75-6, iv. 480, 701-3, 724, ap. 19-25; Id., Disert., iii. 382, 391, 

no. i.; Abbott, Mex. and U. S., 42, 243-6; Arroniz, Hist, y Cron., 161-80, 
383-6; Armin, Heutige Mex., 32-40, 108-9; Arellano, Oration Civ., pp. 26; 
Arronis, Biog. Mex., 12-15, 188-95, 232-5; Arrangoiz, Max., i. ap. 101; 
Arrillaga, Recop., Enero-Junio 1S3G, 51; Alvares, Estudios, iii. 459; Diario 
Mex., 432-4; Bazancourt, Mex., 35-71; Berghes, Zac., 3; Bell, Geog., 527-35; 
Beavfoy, Mex. Illus., 81-90; Beaumont, Cron. Mich., v. 154; Bolet, Geog. 
Estad. Mex., ii. 8, 19, 23; Id., Institut., i. 63; Basil, Mex., 233-43; Barcena, 
Cal. Hist., 81-213; Id., in Mex. Mem. Sec. Just., 1873, 227; Bergosa y Jordan, 
Sermon, pp. 34; Barreda, Oration Civ., pp. 11; Gleeson, Hist. Oath. Church, 
ii. 104; Gregory, Hist. Mex., 41-2; Gallo, Hombres Ilustres, 231-6, 347-92; 
Gac. Mex., ser. ii., in Doc. Hist. Mex., ser. ii., iv. 159-60, 209, 287-8, 342-3, 
504-8; Guijo, Diario, in Doc. Hist. Mex., ser. i., pt i. 4, 335; Galvez, Informe. 
Visitad, MS., 11-35, 54-63; Gonzales, Col. N. Leon, 155-213; Gomez, Vida 
Antonio de S. Jacinto, pp. 62; Garcia y Garcia, Prosperid. Union, pp. 11; 
Mich. Prov. S. Nic., 115, 145-6; Mex. Zast. Jahren, 1830-2, vi.-xxxii. ; Mar 
tinez, Sermon Paneg., 1785, pp. 23; Marmier, Voyag. Nouv., iii. 295-348; 
Interfer. of Brit. Gov. between Spain and her Am. Col., MS., in Mayer MSS., 

Mayer, Mex. Aztec, 237, 276, 279-91; Mexico in 1842, 12-13; Macgregor, 
Prog, of Am., i. 305-9; Mex. Bosquejo Revol., 8; Moreno, Vida y Mem., 131- 
40; Mex. Scraps, ii. 61; Museo, Mex., iii. 32-7, iv. 206-10; Halliard, Hist. 
Texas, 12-17; Modern Trav. Mex. Guat., i. 84-99, 102-8; Lopez (J.), Dis- 
curso, pp. 7; Lopez (S.), Despcrt. Chris.-Pol, pp. 38; Lizana y Beaumont, 
Exhortation, pp. 10; Morelli, Fast. Nov. Orb., 415; Laharpe, Abreg6 Hist. 
Voy., x. 2534; Laris, Discurso Civ., pp. 15; Garibay, V. Ray, Proclam., pp. 
7; Lancaster-Jones, Oration Civ., pp. 4; Lafond, Voy. aut. du Monde, i. bk. 
i. 225-04; Lazcano, Vida Oviedo, 273-5; Lacunza, Discur. Hist., no. xxxvii. 
536-9; Lempriere, Notes on Mex. 423-4; La Cruz, v. 207-15. 





WHILE the events narrated in the two preceding 
chapters were taking place, Calleja in San Luis Po- 
tosi was making preparations, with extraordinary ac 
tivity, to take the field; but at the same time with 
that avoidance of unprofitable haste which character 
ized all his movements. 1 The cornandante of San 
Luis was first apprised of the occurrences at Dolores 
on the 19th of September. He had a few days before 
received warning of Hidalgo's meditated insurrection, 
through information supplied to him by Jose Gabriel 
de Armijo, and conveyed through the subdelegado 
Pedro Garcia. At that time he was at the hacienda 
de Bledos, a property belonging to his wife. While 
returning to San Luis he narrowly escaped capture 
by a troop of horsemen sent by Hidalgo to make him 

1 Abad y Queipo, in his report to Fernando VII. in 1815, says of Calleja: 
'Sicmpre obro con lentitud, dando mucho lugar a los enemigos para aumentar 
BUS reuniones y defensas.' In forme, in Zamacois, Hist. Mej., ix. 871. 



prisoner, the soldiers arriving at the hacienda only two 
hours after his departure. Without waiting for in 
structions from the viceroy, Calleja issued orders to 
place the two provincial dragoon regiments of San 
Luis and San Carlos under arms, and to draw recruits 
from the different towns and haciendas of his district. 
This could not be very quickly done, scattered as the 
troops were in different localities; nor was it a matter 
of small difficulty to convert into an efficient force 
men drawn from their agricultural pursuits. Calleja, 
however, was ably seconded by the authorities and 
proprietors of estates, as he had their full confidence. 

Felix Maria Calleja del Hey, the future viceroy of 
New Spain, was a native of Medina del Campo in old 
Castile, and a member of a distinguished family. He 
commenced his military 1 career as an ensign in the 

i/ O 

disastrous expedition against Algiers conducted by 
the conde de O'Reily in the reign of Cdrlos III. At 
a later date, he was appointed captain and instructor 
of one hundred cadets at the military school in the 
port of Santa Maria. In 1789 he came to New Spain 
with the viceroy Revilla Grigedo; and with the rank of 
lieutenant-colonel, served in the frontier states, suc 
cessfully levying and organizing troops in Nuevo 
Santander and Nuevo Leon, the defence of which ter 
ritories was intrusted to him by the viceroy Branci- 
forte. 2 When the government at Madrid adopted the 
system of dividing the provincial militia into ten brig 
ades, 3 the command of that of San Luis Potosi was 
bestowed by Viceroy Azanza upon Calleja, with the 
corresponding rank of brigadier. 4 During his resi- 

* Brand forte, Instruc., MS., 31, in Linares, Tnstruc., MS. 

3 Consult Hist. Mex., iii. 415, this series. 

4 /(/. , 491. Calleja's military services were such as to gain for him the rec 
ommendation of the six viceroys who preceded Venegas, one of whom says: 
'Calleja era nno de los pocos oficiales de graduacion, de quienes podria valerse, 
con seguridad, por las ocasiones dificiles que presentasen, por su inteligeucia, 
actividad y conocimiento. ' Prov. Intern., Meal tfrden, in Mayer MS., no. 7. 
In 1794 he was selected by the viceroy for important work. N. Esp. Acuer- 
dos, MS., 185. 

HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 13 


dence in that city he espoused Dona Francisca de la 
Gdndara, daughter of the alferez real, who possessed 
considerable wealth. His personal influence over the 
country people was great, and his abilities and cul 
ture gained admiration; but he had an inordinate 
love of flattery, and was obstinate, hard-hearted, and 
remorselessly cruel. 

In order to drill and place upon an efficient war 
footing the new levies, Calleja established a camp at 
the hacienda de la Pila, situated in the vicinity of San 
Luis; and so ably was he seconded by the authorities 
and leading men, that he soon had more recruits than 
he could furnish with arms and equipments. 5 Various 
urban companies were raised for the protection of the 
city; officers were appointed; and the Europeans who 
were flying from Guanajuato to the coast were de 
tained and pressed into the service. 6 As the troops 
consisted principally of cavalry, a battalion of light 
infantry, six hundred strong, was organized; 7 cannon 
were ordered to be cast; in the camp at la Pila a 
portrait of Fernando VII. was put up, and Calleja 
issued a proclamation to his troops, 8 from whom the 
oath of allegiance was again exacted. 9 Calleja's money 
was a great help to him, as he was enabled to meet 
preliminary expenses, as well as those of the ensuing 
campaign,, for a considerable time. 10 

"Conspicuous among those who rendered him aid was Juan Moncada, 
marque's del Jaral de Berrio, who armed and took command as colonel of a 
considerable body. According to Alaman, Allende had reported to Hidalgo 
that Moncada was disposed to support the revolution. Hist. Mej., i. 453. 

6 Many afterward became distinguished leaders, among them Meneso, 
Armijo, Orrantia, Aguirre, Barragan, the Beistiguis, and Bustamante. Id., 

7 Known by the name of los Tamarindos, from the color of their uniform, 
which was similar to that of the tamarind fruit. Id. , 455. They were com 
manded by Juan Nepomuceno Oviedo. Id., ap. 78. 

8 The proclamation, which is given in full by Bustamante, Camp. Cullcja^ 
13-15, is an exhortation to allegiance; it attributes the revolutionary move 
ment to the machinations of Napoleon. It is dated the 2d of Oct. 

9 A Carmelite friar with a crucifix in his hand administered the oath to 
each soldier. Of the influence which these religious exercised over the 
soldiery, Bustamante remarks: 'Prevalido del ascendiente que gozan alii 
estos religiosos sobre el bajo pueblo, logrd entusiasmarlos de tal manera, que 
cuando march6 con sus tropas creian cstas que iban d, medirselas con hereges 
y & defender la religion de Jesucristo. ' Cuad. Hist., i. 48. 

10 The intendente of San Luis Potosi placed at his disposition 382,000 


Venegas, before he was aware of the outbreak of 
Dolores, and without knowing the extent of the rev 
olution, had by despatch of the 17th of September 
ordered Calleja to hasten to Queretaro for the pur 
pose of preventing an uprising in that city. Calleja, 
however, replied that he had already discovered a 
concerted plot in San Luis, and that it would be im 
possible to leave until he had completed his arrange 
ments; at the same time explaining to the viceroy his 
proposed plan to raise a considerable force and take 
the field against Hidalgo, after having put San Luis 
in a state of defence. Upon receiving this informa 
tion, Venegas, perceiving the prudence with which 
Calleja was acting under the new aspect of affairs, per 
mitted him to continue his operations, and instructed 
him to unite his forces when in readiness with those 
of Flon, now on his march to Queretaro. 

No sooner had Flon arrived at Queretaro than an 
engagement took place between a detachment of his 
men and a body of three thousand insurgents in the 
vicinity of that city. When the enemy appeared in 
sight on the road from San Miguel, Flon sent out a 
force of six hundred under the command of Major 
Bernardo Tello, all of whom except one hundred and 
eighty, with the single officer, Captain Linares, hastily 
dispersed when they found the enemy to be much 
more numerous than they had supposed. Linares, 
however, made a resolute stand, and the division re 
covering itself, attacked and inflicted great slaughter 
upon the Indians with their artillery, the effect of 
which they were so ignorant of, that they attempted 
to protect themselves by putting their straw hats 

pesos from the royal coffers. Besides this, as soon as he heard of the up 
rising he ordered a conducta of silver which had been detained at Santa 
Maria del llio by the subdelegado Garcia, to be sent to San Luis. This con 
sisted of an ingot of gold and 315 bars of silver. In addition to this, he 
received as a loan from wealthy mining speculators of Zacatecas 225,000 
pesos en reales, 94 bars of plata quintada, and 2,800 marks of plata pasta, 
Id., 5G-7; Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 450. 


over the mouth of the cannon. 11 The result was not 
long doubtful; the insurgents were dislodged from 
their favorable position with heavy loss, the royalists 
losing only one man. 12 

On the 24th of October, Calleja broke camp and 
proceeded to Dolores, where he had arranged with the 
conde de la Cadena to unite their forces on the 28th. 
This was accordingly done, the latter having left Que 
retaro on the 22d. 13 After leaving an efficient garri 
son in San Luis, 14 Calleja's force, nevertheless, mus 
tered 3,000 cavalry and 600 infantry, with four cannon. 
These united with Flon's troops formed an army of 
about 7,000 men, with eight pieces of artillery, and 
which henceforth assumed the name of Ejercito de 
operaciones sobre los insurgentes. As Flon passed 
through San Miguel el Grande, he had the satisfac 
tion of permitting his soldiers to sack the houses of 
Colonel Canal, Allende, and Aldama, while a similar 
gratification was indulged in by Calleja in Dolores by 
the sacking of Hidalgo's house and the ill treatment 
of the inhabitants. 

The project of Calleja had been to proceed to the 
capital by way of Celaya, Acambaro, and Toluca, fol 
lowing, in fact, Hidalgo's line of march; but while at 
Dolores he received a despatch from the comandante 
of Queretaro, Garcia Rebollo, stating that the city 
was threatened with the whole force of Hidalgo's 

11 Alaman remarks: ' Este heclio apenas creible, me ha sido asegurado por 
todos los que han tenido conocimiento del suceso.' Hist. Mej., i. 459. 

12 According to Tello's version, 200 Indians were killed; the royalist slain 
met his death by accident while passing in front of a cannon. Gaz. de Me.x. , 
1810, i. 850. Tello does not say anything about his own hurried depart 
ure from the field. The most reliable particulars are those given in the text, 
being the statements of Linares in a representation setting forth his services, 
and addressed to Viceroy Apodaca. Alaman obtained a copy of this docu 
ment. Hist. Mej., i. 459. 

ia Before leaving Querdtaro Flon addressed a proclamation to the inhabi 
tants, describing to them in sanguinary terms the manner in which he intended 
to suppress the insurrection, and concluding by threatening to make the streets 
of Queretaro flow with blood if, during liis absence, they acted disloyally. 
Id., 469; Negrete, Hist. Mil. S'KJ. XIX., i. 292; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., 
ii. 173-4. 

14 This consisted of 350 foot, 110 horse, and three companies of the urban 
troops. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 55. 


army. Calleja accordingly marched to Queretaro, but 
found that an insignificant attack on the city by a 
band of ill-armed Indians had been all. 15 One Miguel 
Sanchez had raised the cry of insurrection on the ha 
cienda de San Nicolas, belonging to the augustinians 
of Michoacan, occupied Huichapan and the neighbor 
ing towns, and being joined by Julian Villagran,, a 
captain of the militia of Huichapan, attempted in the 
absence of Flon to gain possession of Queretaro. 
Leading his rabble into the town, they broke and fled 
at the first cannon-shot, which killed a considerable 
number of them, 16 while their opponents lost not a 
single man. This futile movement of Sanchez was 
attended, however, with most important results; for, 
as will be seen, it saved Queretaro from being occu 
pied by Hidalgo, and was the indirect cause of the 
insurgent leader's later defeat. 

Calleja arrived at Queretaro on the 1st of Novem 
ber, the engagement having taken place on the 30th 
of October, the same day on which was fought the 
battle of the monte de las Cruces. Finding himself 
obliged to approach Mexico by a different route, he 
now directed his course by way of Estancia, San Juan 

15 Calleja's report in Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 965. 

16 By some this defeat of Sanchez was considered one of the reasons for 
Hidalgo's retreat. ' Se tuvo por cierto entonces qiie habia recibido la noticia 
de la derrota del general Sanchez en Queretaro. ' Insurrec. JV. Esp. Res. Hint. , 
10. Bustamante's account of this affair, deemed improbable by Alaman, is 
as follows : Brigadier Sanchez, after raising the standard of revolt, marched 
to San Juan del Rio, where he captured the oidor Juan Collado, who, having 
concluded his commission, was returning to Mexico. He also made prisoner 
Antonio Acufia, 'Teniente de corte de la sala del crimen,' who beguiled San 
chez into believing that if he would allow him to return to Queretaro he could 
by his influence succeed in winning over the garrison for him, the signal to 
be the firing of a cannon from the fort de la Cruz. Sanchez consented, but 
Acuf.a disclosed the plot, so that the city might be put in defence. The sig 
nal was given, nevertheless, and the credulous Sanchez entered the city with 
the result narrated in the text. The same author states that their whole force 
was only 500 men, who had only 14 muskets amongst them, and that 31 were 
killed on the spot, without counting the wounded and others killed in the 
pursuit. Cuad. Hist., i. 88-9. The version of Comandante Rebollo is, how 
ever, very different. He states in his report to the viceroy that there were 
4,000 or 5,000 of the insurgents; that the engagement lasted from half-past 
nine in the morning till half-past seven in the evening, and that 300 of the 
enemy were killed and as many more taken prisoners. Gaz. de Mex. (1810), 
i. 929-30. 


del Rio, and San Antonio, arriving at Arroyozarco 
on the 6th of November. Meanwhile Hidalgo, re 
treating by the same way by which he had approached 
the capital, arrived at Ixtlahuaco. Unaware of Ca- 
lleja's last movement, and confident that Queretaro 
could now be taken possession of with little difficulty, 
he directed his march toward the city, and the two 
opposing commanders were thus approaching each 
other without either of them knowing it. Hidalgo's 
force was reduced to one half its previous number, 
thousands of his followers, who had been attracted by 
the prospect of sacking the capital, having returned 
to their homes. 17 But what is more significant of the 
waning star of the first leaders of the revolution is 
the disagreement which existed among themselves, 
and the growing jealousy which Allende and his 
friends, the Aldamas, began to entertain for Hidalgo. 18 
Where there was so much fighting to be done, these 
military men did not like to be led by a priest; they 
were determined to submit to him no longer than was 

On the 6th of November the advance guard of 
Calleja's army came in contact with a detachment of 
Hidalgo's forces at Arroyozarco, and after a sharp 
skirmish put the enemy to flight, killing some and 
taking others prisoners. From the captives, and 
from Colonel Ernpdran, whom Calleja at once sent 
forward with a strong force to reconnoitre, it was 
discovered that the insurgents were at the neighbor 
ing town of Aculco. Calleja at once made his ar 
rangements for battle, taking up a military position 
two leagues distant from that of Hidalgo. The in- 

17 The captive Garcia Conde afterward stated to the viceroy that although 
Hidalgo's loss after the battle of las Cruccs amounted to 40,000 in killed, 
wounded, and deserters, there still remained to him 40,000 followers. Her 
nandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 274. Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. E*p., i. 339, 
thinks this an exaggeration although confirmed by Calleja. Gaz. de Mex. 
(1810), i. 9G7-8. 

15 According to Garcia Conde, when speaking of Hidalgo, they used to call 
him ' el bribon del cura,' that knave of a priest. Alaman, Hist. Hcj, , i. ap. 66. 



surgents were drawn 


up in two lines on the summit 
rectangular hill which overlooked the town 13 
and was almost surrounded by barrancas and gullies. 
Within the lines numbers were drawn up in the form 
of an oblong, the artillery being stationed in the front 
and on the right flank, while the rear was occupied 
by disorderly crowds. The encounter which followed 
was not properly an engagement, but rather a feint 
on the part of the revolutionary leaders, who had dc- 


= 15 = :**& 

''- ***** ~ . ..- -> ======* ~ 


19 A 



Line of battle of the royalist army. 
Park of artillery in position. 
Cavalry on the left. 
Cavalry on the right. 

Body of cavalry covering the flank of the infantry. 
Bodies of infantry. 
Reserve of cavalry. 

6, 6 Cavalry on left and right in column. 
Company of volunteers. 
Cavalry on left flank of infantry columns. 
Reserve cavalry of same columns. 
Columns of infantry. 
Park of artillery in second position. 
12, 12 Park of artillery opening fire. 

13 Columns of infantry mounting the hill to attack. 

14 Cavalry in reserve. 

15, 15 Position of the insurgent army. 

16 Insurgent artillery. 

17 Equipage, ammunition, and carriages. 

18 Companies of patriots of Sail Luis doing service as light troops. 


cided not to give battle, but effect a retreat under cover 
of a show of resistance. 20 Calleja, undeterred by the 
difficulties presented by the enemy's position, com 
menced the attack with three columns of infantry, 21 
on the morning of the 7th of November. For some 
twenty minutes the royalists pushed on, 22 exposed to 
the sluggish fire of the insurgents, whose cannon-balls 
flew high above their heads. Unscathed they reached 
the foot of the steep on which the enemy was posted, 
but when the stormed columns had scaled the heights, 
the foe had fled. Meanwhile Calleja had marked the 
disorder in the revolutionary ranks, caused, as he sup 
posed, by his well directed fire; and thereupon or 
dered the cavalry on his right flank to attack the en 
emy's left, which could only be done by a long detour, y 

Doubtless it would have pleased him as he affirmed 
that he did 23 to commit great slaughter by his caval 
rymen who pursued the enemy two and a half leagues 
over the hills and through the glen; but the truth is, 
they did not kill a hundred. 24 He lost, however, only 

580 Hidalgo published at Celaya on the 13th of Nov. a circular giving an 
account of the affair, assigning as a reason for his not engaging the enemy 
his want of ammunition. He says: 'Solo se entretubo un fuego lento ya 
mucha distancia, entro tanto se daba lugar a que se retirara la gente sin ex- 
perimentar quebranto, como lo verifico.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. 
ii. 221. A quantity of cannon-balls and grape-shot and 120 cans of powder 
were left on the field. Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 22. Zerecero re 
gards the sudden flight of the insurgents as a skilfully executed retreat, 
which the leaders considered necessary in the present condition of their 
troops, and to effect which they were willing to sacrifice their artillery. 
Mem. Rev. Mex., 114, 117. 

21 Calleja boasts of the coolness and precision displayed by his well drilled 
troops. Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 90S. At the same time Zerecero was informed 
by his uncle, Jose Azpeitia, an officer in the regiment of la Corona, that 
those troops, and a part of the second battalion of la Columna, were wavering 
in their allegiance when the order was given to advance. Mem. Rev. Mex., 
115. Bustamante inclines to this opinion. 'He hablado,' he says, 'con per 
sona presencial de este suceso, la cual me ha asegurado que los cuerpos prin- 
cipales del ejercito real estuvieron vacilantes y a punto de pasarse. ' C'uad. 
Hist., i. 91-2. 

22 Garcia Conde timed the duration of the firing, and states: 'En veinte y 
dos minutos seso el fuego. ' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. Indep. , ii. 275. 

23 Calleja estimated the entire loss to the insurgents in killed, wounded, 
and prisoners at 10,000. 'Pasa de cinco mil,' he says, 'el niimero de los ten- 
didos en el campo.' And he adds this pious reflection: ' Dexando el campo 
lleno de cadaveres, y el espectaculo horrible que presentaba, y de que son 
responsables ante Dios y los hombres, los traidores Hidalgo, Allende y sus 
sequaces.' Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 909. 

21 Manuel Perfecto Chavez, the justice of Aculco, in an official despatch 


one man killed and one wounded, while he captured all 
of Hidalgo's cannon, 25 ammunition, and baggage, a large 
number of cattle, sheep, and horses, and a quantity 
of merchandise, 26 besides rescuing the captives Garcia 
Conde, Rul, and Merino. Thus terminated the af 
fair at Aculco, which, trivial as it was, regarded as a 
martial achievement, was important as effecting the 
dispersion of Hidalgo's forces and frustrating his de 
sign against Queretaro. Had the insurgents not 
abandoned their position, they would probably have 
gained a victory. But the leaders were at variance; 
the soldiers were disheartened; the Indians were dis 
appointed at not having been led to the capital ; and 
all were affected by the demoralizing consequences of 
a retreat. As it was, a great victory was celebrated 
by the royalists in the capital, and solemn thanksgiving 
offered to their divine general, our lady of los Reme- 
>dios. 27 

About the movements of the revolutionary chiefs 
during the ten days following their departure from 
Aculco, historians are strangely silent; but one fact 
is certain, namely, that they effected their retreat to 
Celaya with insignificant loss. 23 Here Hidalgo and 
Allende formed new combinations, and it was decided 
that the latter should inarch with the forces to Guana 
juato, while the former, accompanied by a few fol 
lowers, should return to Valladolid, and there repair 
losses by the manufacture of arms and the levying of 
fresh troops. 

of the 15th, reports to Calleja that the killed at Aculco, together with those 
slain in the skirmish of the clay before, were 85 'y nada mas;' and that of 
53 wounded, ten died subsequently. Bustamante, Campauas de Calleja, 23. 

25 Twelve, including the two abandoned by Trujilloat las Cruces. Id., 22. 

20 ' Equipages, ropa, papeles, y...ocho muchachas bieii parecidas (quo 
Calleja llama el serrallo de los insurgentes).' Jb. 

27 Salvador, Action de Gracias, 1-8. The accounts of the battle of Aculco, 
as it is called, are extremely contradictory; but I have no hesitation in ac 
cepting the version of it given by Nescrete, Hist. MIL Sig. XIX., i. 375-8, as 
correct, and, in the main, I have followed it in the text. 

28 Hidalgo, in his circular dated Celaya, Nov. 13th, states that his forces 
had been reunited, and that he had more than 40 pieces of artillery already 
mounted, and was well provided with ammunition. Hernandez y Dc^alos, 
Col. Doc., ii. 221. 


Meanwhile Calleja retraced his steps and marched 
toward Queretaro. As he repassed through San 
Juan de los Bios he made proclamation offering ten 
thousand pesos for the head of any one of the five 
leaders, Hidalgo, Allende, the two Aldamas, and 
Abasolo. 29 

Though the revolution had apparently received a 
deadly blow 7 at Aculco, and the royalists confidently 
expected its near termination, the end was not yet. 
Hidalgo's agents had not been idle. Though often dis 
appointed, they were not wholly cast down. In the 
northern provinces, and in those bordering on the 
Pacific, the revolution had widely spread. At the 
time of the disaster at Aculco, the arms of the inde 
pendents had triumphed in Nueva Galicia, Zacatecas, 
and San Luis Potosi, and those provinces were wholly 
in their power. In the south the star of Morelos, 
Hidalgo's worthy successor, was just rising above the 
horizon. At Huichapan a body of insurgents, headed 
by Julian Villagran, 30 interrupted communication on 
the highway between the capital and Queretaro, cap 
turing convoys, killing royalists, and when threat 
ened with capture, escaping to the mountains. Thus 
it was that a movement, regarded by the government 
as an affair of two short months, now about ended, 
was indeed but begun, and was practically never to 
be extinguished. As the future operations of Hidalgo 

29 The offer was ratified by the viceroy. Calleja on previously passing 
through San Juan de los Rios, which had been held for a time by Sanchez, 
demanded all arms to be delivered up within six hours, extending on those 
conditions a pardon to those who had aided the insurgents, adding that in 
case of further disobedience the inhabitants 'seran tratadossiii conmiseracion 
alguna, pasados a cuchillo, y el pueblo reducido a cenizas. ' The viceroy ap 
proved of the edicts of Calleja, and extended the indulto to all towns in New 
Spain, promising that if one of the leaders would deliver up the rest he should 
benefit by the pardon. JDispos. Farias, ii. f. 8; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. 
Due., ii. 206, 219-21. 

30 This movement was initiated, as before stated, by Miguel Sanchez. Villa- 
gran, who was of a ferocious character and addicted to drunkenness and all 
other vices, murdered Sanchez for some slight offence soon after his repulse 
at Queretaro. His son Francisco, known by the name of Chito, and as noto 
rious for his crimes as his father, was also one of these insurgents. Busttmu&Ue, 
Cuad. Hist., 135-C. 



and Allende will be more particularly confined to the 
provinces of Nueva Galicia, Zacatecas, and San Luis 
Potosi, it will be necessary to give some account of 
the events there occurring during these same two 


While Hidalgo was in Guanajuato, Jose Antonio 
Torres, who had joined the revolutionary standard 
with a few followers at Irapuato, asked for and ob 
tained authority from Hidalgo to occupy Guadalajara, 
Torres was an honest, conscientious man, without ed 
ucation, being a peasant of San Pedro Piedragorda 
in Guanajuato; but he was not without talent, and 


possessed unbounded enthusiasm in the cause of inde 
pendence. Energetic, intelligent, brave, and honor 
able, he was nevertheless modest and had good com 
mon sense. When he entered Guadalajara as victor 
he molested no one, and interfered with the adminis 
tration of affairs no more than was necessary. 

At this time Brigadier Roque Abarca governed in 
Guadalajara, holding the three-fold office of coman- 
dante, president of the audiencia, and intendente. As 
soon as he received intelligence of the grito de Dolores, 
he took measures to exclude revolution from his prov 
ince; but not being well regarded by either the audi 
encia or the European commercial class, on account 
of his disapproval of Iturrigaray's deposal, he was 
fettered in his operations. Finally, instead of assert 
ing his authority, he consented to the establishment 
of a junta composed of lawyers, ecclesiastics, and 
others, 31 which styled itself the auxiliary of the gov 
ernment, 32 though it seemed satisfied with little less 
than supreme power. By order of this junta a con 
siderable military force was collected. The divisions 
from Tepic, Colima, and Colotlan were called in and 
the provincial militia got under arms, while two com 
panies of volunteers were raised from the commercial 
class in the city. 33 In a short time Abarca, by levy 
ing recruits, had no less than 12,000 men under arms; 
but being of weak resolution, and wanting in military 
ability as well as in courage, his action benefited the 
revolutionists rather than the royalists. In truth, 

3l Carta de Abarca; Bustamanle Campanas de Calleja, 97-8. 

32 ' Junta Superior auxiliar de Gobierno, seguridad y defensa. ' See Tier- 
nandez y Duvalos, CoL Doc. Indep., iii. 693-4, where will be found the names 
of the members who composed it. 

33 The bishop, Juan Cruz Ruiz Cabanas, in his zeal against the heretical 
insurgents, raised a regiment composed of both the secular and regular 
clergy, and any others who might wish to join. The name given to this ex 
traordinary body was La Cruzada, and each member wore a red cross on his 
breast. Morning and evening this band of church militants issued from the 
episcopal palace on horseback, sword in hand, and, as they paraded through, 
the streets, the staring rabble raised the cry, Viva la f6 catolica! Busta- 
mante calls the regiment ' una piadosa compafiia de asesinos.' Cuad. Hint., i. 


all of his newly levied troops soon deserted to the 

In the mean time Torres had raised in revolt the 
towns of Colima, Sayula, Zacoalco, and those of the 
districts of the tierra caliente, 34 while other revolu 
tionary chiefs, Gomez Portugal, Godinez, Alatorre, 
and Huidrobo, were no less active among the pueblos 
on the Rio Grande, 35 so that by the end of October 
all the districts bordering upon Guanajuato and Mi- 
choacan were in insurrection. Though day by day 
the danger became more imminent, the want of har 
mony in the city of Guadalajara still prevailed. In 
vain Abarca, in view of the continued desertion of 
troops, represented to the Europeans that they should 
take arms and defend themselves. They would not 
listen to him, and would neither fight nor pay. 36 Nor 
was the action of the junta auxiliar any more favor 
able to the success of the royalist cause in Jalisco. 
Regarding as traitors efficient officers in whom Abarca 
had confidence, the members of the junta appointed 
the oidor Reeacho, and Villasenor, a rich landed pro 
prietor, commanders of two divisions to be sent against 
the insurgents. Guadalajara was by this time threat 
ened on the south by Torres, who had occupied Za 
coalco, and on the east by Huidrobo, Godinez, and 
Alatorre, who were at La Barca. Villasenor com 
manded the division despatched against Torres, and 
Recacho that opposed to Huidrobo, each detachment 
being five hundred strong. Recacho, on arriving at 
La Barca, discovered that the enemy had abandoned 
the town, and on the 1st of November entered it with 
out resistance. On the 3d, however, Huidrobo at 
tacked the royalists with a large body of Indians, but 
was repulsed with some loss, Recacho having taken 
up a position in the plaza. On the following day the 

34 Thus it was charged against him in the sentence of death pronounced 
on the 12th of May, 1812. Id., 144. 

3j Known as the Rio de Santiago de Lerma. 

S6 Carta de Abarca; jBuatamante, Campailas de Calleja, 99-100. 


insurgents again assailed the royalist forces with great 
intrepidity, but with no better success. 37 Recaeho, 
however, having lost several of his best officers, deemed 
it prudent to retreat to Sula and wait for reinforce 
ments. There he received orders to return to Guada 
lajara, and the expedition ended without any serious 
blow having been inflicted upon the insurgents. 38 

Still more unsuccessful was Villasenor in his opera 
tions at Zacoalco. Torres was a military man by in 
stinct. It is stated that before the engagement he 
showed the Indians, with a stick on the ground, how 
to deploy, in order to surround the enemy. 39 Be this 
as it may, his manoeuvres were so successful that Vi- 
llasefior's division was shortly overthrown and almost 
destroyed, no less than 276 being slain. 40 So great 
was the shower of stones discharged by the Ind 
ians that the enemy's muskets were badly battered. 
The flower of the youth of Guadalajara who formed 
the newly recruited volunteer companies, deficient in 
training and unaccustomed to hardship, perished. 
Villasenor and the captains of two companies were 
made prisoners, and Gariburu, a lieutenant of the 
regiment of la Corona, was killed. 41 

37 Recacho, in his report to the viceroy, says that the enemy marched up 
to the cannon's mouth, and when fired upon with grape and canister closed 
their ranks and boldly charged again, 'avauzando con una temeridad increi- 
ble.' Gaz. de Mex. (1811), ii. 159. 

38 'El destacamento de la Barca volvio lleno de terror.' Carta de Abarca, 
tit sup., 100. Mora's account of this engagement is incorrect. He states that 
Torres was commander of the insurgents, and that Recacho was completely 
beaten. Mej. y sus Rev.,iv. 92. 

39 Buitamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 142. 

40 Of these, 100 were Europeans, the remainder Creoles pressed in the 
service. Oftcio de Torres, Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 59-60. In an account of 
this engagement, obtained by J. Hernandez in January 1867 from three natives 
who were present at the action, the number of killed is stated to have been 
257. Torres instructed the Indians to throw themselves upon the ground at 
each discharge of the artillery, and then keep closing in as quickly as possible. 
These tactics were so successful that the insurgents lost only two killed and 
thirteen wounded. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 202-3. 

41 During the action, which took place on the same day that Calleja dis 
persed the insurgents at Aculco, the militia of Colima passed over to the 
enemy. Bustamante relates that before the battle, Torres proposed to Villa 
senor that the Americans should retire and leave the Europeans to engage 
with him if they wished. Villasenor's reply was that if he had Torres in 
his power he would hang him, ' que era un indecente mulato.' Cuad. lli-st., i. 
142, 145. 


After this tragical defeat, consternation prevailed 
in Guadalajara. There was no thought of further re 
sistance. The bishop, in spite of his previous military 
ardor, ignominiously fled to the port of San Bias, fol 
lowed by most of the Europeans, who carried with 
them what they could. The junta hastily dissolved, 
and the warlike Recacho, with the oidor Alva, hur 
ried with all speed to the same port, not forgetting, 
- however, to collect on their way the royal revenues. 
Abarca endeavored to reanimate the Europeans who 
remained, and induce them to take up arms in defence 
of the city. "We are not soldiers," they said, "and 
our only duty is to take care of ourselves." 42 The 
only force left at his disposal was 110 raw recruits. 
In this hopeless condition he fell grievously ill, and 
while on his bed the ayuntamiento surrendered the 
city to Torres. 43 The insurgent forces entered Guada 
lajara on the llth of November. Torres kept faith 
fully the terms of the capitulation. Both the prop 
erty and persons of the citizens were respected; the 
malefactors in the jails were not released, and to pre 
vent violence he would not allow his troops to quarter 
themselves in the city. 44 

With the exception of San Bias, the whole prov 
ince of Nueva Galicia was now in possession of the 
insurgents; and the ease with which that port fell 
into their power is somewhat remarkable. Jose Ma 
ria Mercado, the cura of Ahualulco, obtained from 
Torres a commission to go in pursuit of the fugitive 
Europeans; and raising forces in the villages on his 
way to the port, he entered Tepic without opposition, 
and was there joined by the garrison of the town. 
Mercado then hastened to lay siege to San Bias, and 
sent in to the comandante de la plaza, Jose de Lava- 

42 Carta de Abarca, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., in. 401. 

43 The ayuntamiento petitioned the insurgent chiefs to grant Abarca re 
lease from confinement in consideration of his ill health and advanced age. 
Id., ii. 228-9. 

** liespuesta al Papel, 19. The property of Spaniards was, however, em 
bargoed, and commissioners were appointed to attend to the matter. Her 
nandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 229-30. 


lien, a formal summons to surrender, accompanied with 
a threat to burn the town in case of refusal. His 
whole force did not exceed three thousand Indians 
and a few hundred mounted lancers, while all of his 
artillery were six cannon brought from Tepic. The 
position of San Bias was such as to render it most 
difficult of assault. It was defended, as well as com 
manded, by a castle mounted with twelve 24-pound 
guns. In the harbor lay a frigate, two brigantines, 
a schooner, and two gunboats; the place was well sup 
plied with provisions; there were forty mounted pieces 
of artillery and 800 able men in the place, and yet 
such was Mercado's cool impudence 45 that Lavallen 
sent Agustin Bocalan, alferez de fragata of the royal 
navy, to capitulate. This was on the 29th of Novem 
ber, and Bocalan so reported the numbers and strength 
of the enemy on his return, that the comandante sur 
rendered without further parley, 46 and the royalists 
had no longer a foothold in the intendencia of Gua 
dalajara. 47 

In Zacatecas the news of the revolt at Dolores was 
known on the 21st of September, and the intendente 
Francisco Rendon at once took the same precaution 
ary measures as those employed by Calleja and 
Abarca, He, moreover, applied for aid to those in- 
tenderites, but without success. From the governor 
of Colotlan, however, he obtained two companies of 
the militia dragoons, which he stationed at Aguasca- 
lientes, and shortly afterward the same governor 

45 ' Por tanto,' he says in his ultimatum to the comandante, ' esta es la iil- 
tima intimacion, y la falta de respuesta a ella sera la seiial segura del rompi- 
miento; pero en la inteligencia de que cuando peleen de esa parte los niiios y 
las mugeres, les tocaraii cliez soldados a cado uno; pero diez soldados decididos 
a veneer y a avanzar hasta la misma boca de los caiiones. ' Bustamante. Cuad. 
Hist., 150. 

_ 46 The military bishop, Recacho, Alva, and the Europeans went on board the 
brigantine San Carlos, and steered for Acapulco. 

47 Lavallen, Bocalan, and other officers who signed the capitulation were 
afterward tried for treasonable surrender. After a tedious trial they were 
acquitted. An almost complete copy of the proceedings as well as other docu 
ments is supplied by Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 236-427. 


arrived at Zacatecas with four additional companies. 
But Rendon's position was even worse than that of 
Abarca. The province was almost entirely without 
arms, and he had to provide with lances even the 
horsemen who arrived. His call, also, upon the dif 
ferent districts for recruits was almost unheeded. 43 
While in this strait he received some partial relief 
by the arrival of the conde de Santiago de la Laguna 
with 200 mounted men and some arms. 49 These the 
count placed at the disposal of Rendon, and offered 
to use all his influence to maintain order among the 


populace. On the 6th of October the intendente re 
ceived a despatch from Calleja informing him of the 
capture of Guanajuato by the insurgents, and of the 
immediate danger which threatened Zacatecas, proba 
bly the next place to be attacked. Rendon convoked 
a general junta, at which it was declared that the city 
was not defensible, surrounded as it was by command 
ing hills. 

That same afternoon the Europeans, the members 
of the municipality, and the employes in the different 
government offices fled; and on the following morning 
the governor of Colotlan verbally informed the inten 
dente that his troops had intimated to him that they 
had only followed him because he was a Creole, but 
that they would take no action in the cause of the 
Europeans. Rendon allowed the governor to depart, 
but himself remained. The same day the populace 
rose in revolt, and only by the exertions of Laguna 
were they prevented from sacking stores and murder 
ing objectionable residents. So violent were their 
demonstrations, that the cura implored Rendon to save 

48 ' Las demas cabeceras de partido,' he says in his report to the viceroy of 
the 27th of Jan. 1811, 'no me remitieron tin solo liombre, y hasta el G de 
octubre solo me llegaron 21 de a caballo, a quienes armd con otros (sic) taut 
as lanzas.' Expowc. Rendon, Buttamante, Campailas de Calleja, 46. 

49 The conde Santiago de la Laguna was the most opulent hacendado of 
the province, arid much respected by the lower orders, over whom 'he had 
great control. After the death of Hidalgo, Laguna, who had been accused 
of treason, owing to his action during the events about to be related, was 
allowed the benefit of the indulto. Zamacois, Hist. Mej. , vii. 10, 253. 
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 14 


himself. Laguna offered to escort him beyond reach 
of danger, and on the morning of the 8th the inten- 
dente and his family left Zacatecas for Guadalajara. 
On the following morning Laguna returned to Zacate 
cas, having been appointed, by a popularly elected 
ayuntamiento, intendente ad interim of the province, 
which office he deemed it his duty to accept in the hope 
of preventing excesses. He left an escort of twenty 
men for Rendon, who continued his journey. On the 
29th, although reenforced by a troop of twenty-five 
lancers and four dragoons sent to his assistance by 
Abarca, Rendon and his family were captured by a 
body of insurgents, who after appropriating their 
clothes, conducted them to Guadalajara, where they 
arrived after thirty-three days, and were delivered to 
Hidalgo, who in the mean time had reached that city. 50 
The revolt in Zacatecas was spontaneous, and not 
allied with the insurrection in other provinces. The 
latter were directed by the leaders either in person or 
by agents, to whom Hidalgo extended commissions of 
various grades. No such commissioner, however, had 
appeared in Zacatecas, and the outbreak was due to 
the excitement produced by news of the grito de 
Dolores. The people, after the first agitation, were 
moderate and tractable, and the conde Santiago de 
Laguna succeeded in suppressing pillage. About the 
middle of October, Rafael Iriarte, 51 styling himself 
lieutenant-general, appeared at Aguascalientes at the 

50 Rendon escaped the massacre of Europeans at Guadalajara in December 
following; and when Calleja entered that city after the battle of Calderon, 
he appointed him intendente del eje"rcito del centro. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 

51 Of Iriarte's antecedents but little is known. According to Mora, he had 
previously at different times been known by the names of Martinez and 
Laiton. Mej. y sus Rev. iv. 96. Zerecero and Liceaga state that in San 
Luis he went by the name of Cabo Leyton, and had been a scrivener in the 
secretary's office of the comandancia. Mem. Rev. Mex., 385; Adic. y Rectific., 
151. His first commission as an insurgent officer, from evidence given later 
by Pedro de Aranda at his own trial, was to arrest and appropriate the prop 
erty of the Europeans in the villa of Leon, situated between Guanajuato and 
Aguascalientes. In the execution of this commission he acted with great 
cruelty, 'prendia d los europeos de aquella villa, devoraba sus bienes y de- 
jaba dperecer sus familias.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. app. 60. 


head of a large body of insurgents, and having been 
joined by the dragoons stationed there, proceeded to 
take possession of Zacatecas, which he occupied with 
out opposition. 

It was while Iriarte was at Aguascalientes that 
Laguna took action which brought his loyalty under 
suspicion. He convoked a junta for discussing the 
propriety of communicating with Iriarte. At that 
session it was decided to send Jose Maria Cos, cura of 
San Cosme, to inquire of the insurgent leader whether 
the war then waging was without prejudice to re 
ligion, king, and country; and whether any ex 
ceptions would be made in case they succeeded in 
expelling the Europeans ; and if so, what. These ques 
tions were asked with a view to uniting the provinces 
under an alliance in peace or war. Laguna, in a letter 
dated the 26th of October, reported this to Manuel 
Acebedo, intendente of Durango, who forwarded it 
to Calleja. The mere fact that Laguna entertained 
doubts was enough for Calleja, and he cautioned 
Acebedo in his reply to avoid all expressions show 
ing want of confidence which might drive Laguna to 
espouse the insurgent cause. 52 Cos, who will appear 
prominently later, was received by Iriarte with marked 
demonstration, but greatly against his will was com 
pelled to carry the insurgent standard on his entrance 
into the town. The explanation given by Iriarte of 
the object and plan of the revolution was equally un 
satisfactory to Cos, and deeming himself compromised 
by the part he had been obliged to play, instead of re 
turning to Zacatecas, he proceeded to San Luis and 
informed Calleja, who listened to his statement, and 
advised him to present himself before the viceroy. 
While on his way to the capital, Cos was arrested at 
Queretaro by the commander Rebollo and imprisoned 
in the convent of San Francisco. 

52 Bnstamante supplies copies of the correspondence on this matter in 
Companas de Calleja, 51-7. 


Although Calleja took every possible precaution 
before his departure from San Luis Potosi to insure 
the preservation of that province, his efforts were un 
availing. When Hidalgo at the opening of his career 
passed through Celaya, he was joined by Luis de Her- 
rera, a lay friar of the order of San Juan de Dios of 
the province of Mexico. For some time this man 
followed the army in the capacity of chief surgeon; 
but being compelled to go to San Luis on private 
business, he was arrested as a suspicious person, and 
imprisoned in the jail, it not being known that he was 
a friar. Heavily fettered and with no prospect of re 
lease, he disclosed himself in order to escape from du 
rance, and was removed to the Carmelite convent, in 
which Calleja had imprisoned suspected persons. Ere 
long Herrera prevailed on the comandante, Cortina, 
to allow him to retire to the convent of his order in 
San Luis, the prior and other conventuals becoming 
his sureties. Having thus secured comparative free 
dom, he conceived, in conjunction with Juan Villarias, 
a lay brother of the same convent, the daring scheme 
of getting possession of the city during a single night. 
With this intent they instigated Joaquin Sevilla y 
Olmedo, an officer of the San Carlos lancers, to place 
at their disposal a few troops, and some arms which 
he had in his house. Sevilla entered into their de 
signs, and on the night of the 10th of November, 
meeting a patrol of his own corps and another of the 
cavalry, he called on them to assist him in the execu 
tion of an order of the commander. With this small 
force he proceeded to the convent of San Juan de 
Dios, where he was joined by the two friars. The 
revolutionists then went to the Carmelite convent, 
and ringing the night-bell, 53 requested that a priest 
might be sent with them to confess a prominent citi 
zen who was dying. The door-keeper opened the gate, 

53 In every convent was a door-bell called the campana de miserieordia, 
which was rung by those who, during the night, sought the assistance of con 
fessors for persons dangerously ill. 



and the insurgents rushing in seized and disarmed the 
guard. They then released the prisoners, many of 
whom daily expected death, and supplying them 
with the weapons thus obtained, proceeded with the 
utmost caution to the city jail, having first secured 
the Carmelite friars, all of whom were Spaniards. 
With equal success they surprised the guard at the 
jail, and their numbers being now greatly increased 
y the prisoners whom they liberated, they directed 
their course to the artillery barracks. Here they met 
their first mishap. Opposite the barracks stood the 
house of the comandante, Cortina; and the guard, 
more vigilant than those hitherto encountered, fired 
on them, killing four. Undeterred, they rushed for 
ward and quickly made themselves masters of the 
barracks. Ten cannon were immediately brought out 
and planted at the entrances of the plaza, one being 
trained upon Cortina's house. 

The desperate design of Herrera was now all but 
accomplished. The remaining barracks of the city 
were soon in the power of the insurgents, and Cor 
tina alone continued to offer resistance. Beinof 


wounded at last in the jaw, he was made prisoner by 
his own guard, who had hitherto kept up a vigorous 
fire, killing sixteen of the assailants and wounding 
many more. After the insurgents had thus gained 
possession of the comandante's house, it was delivered 
over to pillage; likewise his store and storerooms; 54 
but this appears to have been the only excess com 
mitted. By seven o'clock in the morning the affair 
was over. The usual arrest of Europeans to the 
number of forty followed their triumph, but order 
and tranquillity were maintained. 53 Miguel Flores, 
one of the principal citizens of San Luis, was ap- 

54 Cortina was one of the principal merchants in San Luis. 

55 The only violence occurred on the night of the 12th, when a patrol 
guard was fired on from the house of a European named Ger6nimo Berdiez. 
This so incensed the officer in command that he forcibly entered the house 
and mortally wounded Berdiez with his sword. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 


pointed political chief and intendente, and the absence 
of popular commotion is sufficient evidence of the 
prudence which guided the revolutionists. 

But the spirit of discord was at hand. Iriarte, 
who was at this time in possession of Zacatecas, and 
had been apprised of the successful coup d'armes at 
San Luis, despatched a courier to Herrera, proposing 
to recruit his forces at San Luis on his march to 
Guanajuato to join Allende. No objection to the 
reception of a brother-in-arms could be made, and 
Iriarte, with a disorderly rabble of several thousand 
Indians, armed, as usual, with clubs, slings, and bows 
and arrows, entered Sari Luis. The arrival was 
hailed with demonstrations of joy. The bells were 
rung and cannon fired. Festivities and balls for 
three days celebrated the meeting between these 
champions of the cause of independence. 

In return for all this kindness, Iriarte deemed it 
his duty to give an entertainment, and do honor to 
those w T ho had done honor to him. So he invited 
Herrera, Villarias, and Se villa to a great ball, and 
when the merriment was at its highest a troop of 
soldiers rushed in and arrested them. Villarias man 
aged to escape, and with fifty men fled to Guanajuato 
to inform Allende of the treachery. Herrera and 
Sevilla were thrown into prison; the barracks were 
taken by surprise; the artillery was seized, and 
Iriarte was master of the town. At dawn the cry 
was raised, "Death to the San Luis traitors!" Sack 
and pillage were proclaimed. The public treasury was 
ransacked, and the houses and stores of private per 
sons were broken open and emptied. 

One more turn of the wheel comes with the celebra 
tion of the occasion by a banquet to which Iriarte in 
vites his captives. At first he gave them to understand 
that they were to die ; even now they were going to ex 
ecution. After thus amusing himself for a while, he 
embraced the victims of his sport, and seating them at 
the table, informed them that their imprisonment had 


been effected only for the purpose of insuring their 
safety, as they would have proved an impediment to 
his intention of sacking the city. He then appointed 
Herrera field-marshal, and raised Sevilla to the rank of 
colonel. During his occupation of San Luis the wife 
of Calleja fell into his power, and Iriarte, the treach 
ery of whose future action makes it reasonable to sup 
pose that he entertained no serious intention of aiding 
Allende, after loitering till it was too late to do so, 
returned to Zacatecas. 66 

56 The above account of the revolution in San Luis Potosi is derived from 
Bustamante,. Cuad. Hint., i. 95-9. That author's information was supplied to 
him by a report of the affair obtained in the city. Alaman states that he was 
careful to verify the facts. Hist. Mej., ii. 23. 




WHEN Allende arrived at Celaya he found there a 
body of two thousand insurgent horsemen under Tori- 
bio Huidrobo, and about thirty dragoons of the regi 
ment of la Reina. These troops were almost desti 
tute of arms; but the importance of defending 
Guanajuato was so great that, uniting them with his 
other forces, he hastened thither. He took with him 
eight pieces of artillery; and as a number of cannon 
had been cast in the mean time, he hoped, by erecting 
batteries in commanding positions, to frustrate any 
attempt upon the city by Calleja, who would doubt 
less make its capture his first object. Allende, with 
all the forces he could muster, entered Guanajuato on 
the evening of the 13th of November, accompanied 
by the principal leaders, who preferred to follow his 
fortunes rather than cast their lot with Hidalgo, whose 
popularity with them was diminishing daily. 1 His 

1 Those who accompanied Allende were Juan and Ignacio Aldama, Ma 
riano Jimenez, Joaquiii Arias, Mariano Abasolo, and Juan Ocon. Liceaga, 



arrival was celebrated by the intendente Gomez with 
enthusiastic demonstrations. The bells were rungc and 


guns fired ; but as in formal procession the authorities 
and principal citizens entered the municipal hall to 
receive the insurgent leader a ghastly spectacle pre 
sented itself. Allende's horsemen dashed into the 
plaza, and drawing up in front of the building, exposed 
to view a hacked and blood-stained corpse lashed to 
the back of a mule. An unfortunate Creole, named 
Manuel Salas, a native of Dolores, had taken part 
with Calleja when he passed through that town, and 
having fallen into the hands of the insurgents had been 
brought by them to Guanajuato and put to death at 
the entrance of the city. Having given the mem 
bers of the ayuntarniento ample time to reflect upon 
the significance of this portentous exhibition, the 
body was paraded through the streets as a warn 
ing. 2 The ayuntamiento felt conscious that this ac 
tion of Allende was intended to intimidate them, but 
although, in conjunction with the other authorities, 
its members sallied forth to meet him, they claim to 
have preserved their dignity and allegiance by not 
giving to their procession the character of an official 

Allende then made his preparations to engage 
Calleja. According to despatches written by him 
to Hidalgo on the 19th and 20th of November, I 
gather that when those leaders separated they made 
an agreement that they should support each other 
against Calleja. It was now no longer doubtful that 
the latter would march against Guanajuato, and 
Allende strongly urged Hidalgo to come to his aid 
as soon as possible. He, moreover, sent instructions 
to Iriarte, who was now at San Luis Potosi, to join 
him at once. The forces at Allende's disposal were 
in all respects inadequate to cope with the royalists, 

Adic. y Rectific., 149. Negrete, however, doubts that there existed at this 
time any ill feeling between Hidalgo and Allende. Alex. Slglo XIX., ii. 313. 
2 Guan.Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 43-4. 



and deficient as they were in discipline and arms, he 
could only hope to maintain his position by means of 
his artillery if no assistance arrived. 3 But both Hi 
dalgo and Iriarte neglected to come, and Allende's 

; - 



3 A. Positions occupied by the insurgents. 

B. The royalist army before the attack. 

March of column led by Calleja. 

March of column led by Flon. 

This plan is obtained from that formed b Calleja's staff according to his 
orders, and published by Torrente, being reproduced by Bustamante in his 
Cund. Hist., i. 100. 


letters to the former show bitterness. His last com 
munication even charges Hidalgo with the intention 
of collecting money at Guadalajara and escaping with 
it by way of San Bias. But Hidalgo, informed of 
the successes in Nueva Galicia, had determined to 
go to Guadalajara, and had left Valladolid before 
Allende had written him. 

Meanwhile batteries were placed by Allende on no 
less than ten different heights commanding the Marfil 
road, besides two outlying points which occupied hills 
on its left at a place known by the name of Rancho 
Seco. In the narrowest part of the road, with infinite 
labor, fifteen hundred holes were drilled for blasts. 
These were connected by a single fuse, the intention 
being to fire it as Calleja's troops passed. The de 
sign, however, became known to the royalist leader 
and proved ineffectual. 

Calleja, whose movements were never marked by 
rapidity, left Queretaro on the 15th of November, and 
passing through Celaya, Salamanca, and Irapuato, re 
established obedience in those towns, and reorganized 
their governments. On the 23d he arrived at the 
rancho de Molineros, distant four leagues from Guana 
juato, and on the following morning advanced to the 
entrance of the Canada de Marfil, intending to recon 
noitre; but being interrupted by the batteries at 
Rancho Seco, he decided to attack at once. Accord 
ingly he threw out on his left a strong body of cavalry 
and infantry under General Empdran, with the two 
fold object of occupying the Silao road and executing 
a flank attack, while Captain Linares charged the 
positions from the front. The assault was successful. 
Ill served and badly directed, the artillery of the in 
surgents did no execution; indeed, so miserably had 
the cannon been mounted that they could only be fired 
in the one direction pointed; and the royalists, charg 
ing up the slope at places out of the line of fire, quickly 
routed the insurgents, capturing four pieces of artillery 
and a number of prisoners. The facility with which 


this success had been accomplished induced Calleja 
to follow up his advantage the same day, it being as 
yet only eleven o'clock. 

His plan was to assault in detail the ten positions 
occupied by the enemy on each side of the Marfil 
road, upon which they had trained their artillery. For 
this purpose he divided his army into two columns, 
one of which was placed under the command of Flon, 
who was instructed to dislodge the insurgents from 
the heights on the right of the road; while the other 
was led by Calleja in person against the batteries on 
the left. Both generals were successful, and one after 
the other the enemy's positions were taken with little 
loss to the assailants. Flon, though severely bruised 
in the left shoulder by a slung stone, gained the heights 
on the right, and finally drew up his forces on the 
hill of San Miguel and the height of las Carreras, 
both of which positions commanded the city. Mean 
while Calleja, advancing up the Marfil road some 
little distance, turned off to the left by that leading 
to the real de minas of Santa Ana, thus avoiding; the 
defile where the blasts had been prepared.* While 
his infantry dislodged the enemy from their positions 
the cavalry scoured the glens and more level ground, 
cutting off the retreat of the insurgents, slaughtering 
them without mercy, and driving them in their panic 
over the precipices. 5 This series of assaults lasted for 
more than six hours; the difficulties encountered by 
the loyalists being from the steepness of the heights, 
rather than from opposition of the enemy, whose 

4 Bustamante states that information of this plan of the insurgents was 
given by a regidor of Guanajuato 'que merecia el mejor concepto entre sus 
conciudadanos, ' and that his correspondence with Venegas was intercepted 
by Villagran, but too late to be of any benefit to Allende. Cuad. Hist., i. 100. 
Alaman reasonably assumes that the regidor intimated at was Fernando Perez 
Maranon; but throws considerable doubt upon the statement of Bustamante, 
remarking that, 'Sus noticias cuando no espresa de qu6 origen las toma mere- 
cen muy poca confianza. ' Hist. Mej. , ii. 47. Negrete considers it improbable 
that Maranon gave the information. Mex. Siglo XIX., ii. 320. 

5 ' La caballeria . . . cortaba a los enemigos en las canadas y los persequia en 
su huida pereciendo muchos a sus manos, quedando el campo lleno de cadd- 
veres, y otros precipitados en las barrancas de este pielago de mon tafias.' 
Calleja, in Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 1057. 


want of arms rendered them incapable of making a 
stand. Shortly after five o'clock, Calleja encamped 
for the night on the hill of Yalenciana. 

The result of the day's fighting was the capture of 
twenty-two pieces of artillery, 6 the dispersion of a body 
variously estimated at 10,000 to 70,000 Indians, 7 and 
the investment of the city on the north and south. 
Of the number of revolutionists slain it is impossible 
to form any estimate with certainty. The ayuntami- 
ento places it at 8,000, 8 but this is doubtless an exag 
geration, and Alaman's estimate of 1,500 is probably 
not wide of the mark. 9 The loss on the side of the 
royalists was insignificant; according to Calleja's first 
report to the viceroy it was limited to four killed and 
seven wounded; 10 the casualties in the column led by 
Flon raised the number of wounded to about a score, 
a convincing proof of the want of forethought dis 
played by the insurgent leaders in presuming that 
Calleja would necessarily inarch up the Marfil road, 
and in mounting their cannon so as to be immovably 

Had Allende been supported by Hidalgo and 
Iriarte, and had Calleja been assailed in the rear ac- 

6 According to the detailed report of Calleja, dated December 12th. In a 
previous report, written at 12 o'clock on the night of the 25th, he states that 
25 pieces of artillery were taken. These cannon were made by order of Hi 
dalgo during his campaign in the direction of Mexico; they were cast by the 
engineer Rafael Davalos, who also assisted Casimiro Chovell, superintendent 
of the Valenciana mines and works, in sinking the blasts on the Marfil road. 
Alatoian, Hist. Mej., ii. 29. 

7 Calleja states that the inhabitants of Guanajuato estimated their num 
ber at 70,000. Gaz. de Hex. (1810), i. 1059. Alaman considers this a great 
exaggeration, remarking that there could not have been even half the number, 
' pues no concurri6 d la accion mas que la gente reunida en algunos puntos 
comarcanos, y una parte de la plebe de la ciudad y de las minas. ' Hist. Mcj. , 
ii. 48. Liceaga conjectures that the insurgents did not number more than 
10,000. Adic. y Rectific., 154. 

*Guan. Pui). Vind. Ayunt., 54. 

9 The bodies of a considerable number of the fallen were never recovered 
from the barrancas, the shafts of old mines, and other inaccessible places. 
The cura of Marfil, who was charged with the collection and burial of the re 
mains, reports on the 10th of December that the total number interred was 
246, but thinks he succeeded in collecting only a small proportion. Busta- 
mante, Cuad. Hist, i. 108-9. Liceaga considers that scarcely 400 insurgents 
fell. Adic. a Rectific., 154. 

10 Oa&. de Max. (1810), i. 994. 


cording to the plan proposed to Hidalgo, 11 it is not 
improbable that the royalists would have been de 
feated. As it was, Allende despaired of success 
from the first, and with unusual apathy assigned the 
direction of the batteries and troops to Jimenez, re 
maining himself in the city. 12 When the news ar 
rived of the capture of the outlying batteries at 
Kancho Seco, he endeavored to arouse the inhab 
itants by ordering sounded the general call to arms; 
but this had the effect only to increase the consterna 
tion. The more respectable families took refuge in 
the churches and convents, or barricaded themselves 
in their houses, while a large portion of the populace 
betook themselves to the hills. Allende was helpless 
to awaken resistance. As height after height was 
stormed by the victorious royalists, and aware that 
all was lost, accompanied by his brother officers and 
a few horsemen, he fled from the city in the direc 
tion of San Luis Potosi, taking with him what treas 
ure he had remaining/ 


And now the Alhondiga de Granaditas is again 
brought forward in the history of this unfortunate 
city as the scene of another appalling massacre. No 
longer restrained by the interference of military chiefs, 
early in the afternoon the populace throng the streets 
with demonstrations of mingled fear and anger. They 
collect in dense crowds about the alhondiga, and with 

1 'No puede ni debe V. ni nosotros pensar en otra cosa, que en esta preciosa 
ciudad. . .y asi sin pe>dida de momentos ponerse en marcha. . .y atacarlo con 
valor por la retaguardia, dandonos aviso oportuno de su situacion para hacer 
nuestra salida, y que cerrado por todas partes, quede destruido y aniquilado, 
y nosotros con un complete triunfo.' Allende, Garta, in Alaman, Hist. Alej., 
ii. 37-8. 

12 According to Alaman; Id., ii. 49. Negrete, on the other hand, asserts 
that Allende during the engagement passed from point to point as they were 
attacked, with the greatest activity. Mex. Siglo XIX., ii. 321. 

13 According to Liceaga he left about two o'clock in the afternoon. Adic. 
y Rectijic., 153. Bustamante states that Allende remained in the city till the 
following morning, directing the fire of a heavy piece of artillery placed on 
the cerro del Cuarto. This is denied by both Liceaga, Ib., and Alaman, 
Hist. Mej., ii. 49. Calleja states that he left with about 40 followers. Gaz. 
de Mex. (1810), 994. Negrete says that he could not have had more than 
2,COO. Mex. 8ifjlo XIX., ii. 405. 


threatening gestures and inflamed eyes regard the 
building in which the Spaniards left by Hidalgo are 
imprisoned, and for whose blood they are athirst. 
As yet, however, they are restrained by the presence 
of the guard commanded by Captain Mariano Covar- 
rubias. But as Allende and his party turn the corner 
to take the road leading to the mines, 14 one of them 
cries out, "Why do you not finish with them?" in 
dicating the captives. The words act on the mob 
like fire on saltpetre. 15 Under apprehension that 
Calleja is already at hand, they think only of ven 
geance, and with wild yells, and clubs and bran 
dished knives, they rush toward the gateway. All 
efforts to oppose them are useless. The soldier's 
sword and the priest's entreaty alike fail. Mariano 
Liceaga, after wounding several of them with his 
sabre, is stretched senseless on the ground; the cura 
Juan de Dios Gutierrez and other ecclesiastics are 
thrust aside; the guard is overpowered; 16 and the 
maddened crowd throw themselves upon their victims. 
The work begins, and the alh6ndiga again becomes 
hideous with mutilated corpses, stripped of every 
shred of clothing. A few of the captives barricade 
themselves in some of the storerooms, and manage to 
escape during the temporary dispersion of their assail- 

u See plan of the alh6ndiga and surroundings in previous chapter. 

15 Alaman is the authority for the statement that the crowd received this 
encouragement. He refers to the evidence in the trial of Covarrubias, whose 
cousin, Benign o Bustamante, supplied him with the above particulars. Allen 
de, Aldama, and Chico, however, in the declarations taken at their trials, 
imputed the massacre exclusively to the voluntary action of the populace, 
which tends to prove that they were unaware of the fury incited by their 
comrade, who was probably riding in their rear. Hist. Mej., ii. 50. Busta- 
maiite, Cuad. Hist.,L 100-1, followed by Liceaga, records that a negro named 
Lino, a native of Dolores, incited the people to commit the deed by represent 
ing to them that Calleja had gained the victory, and was advancing upon the 
town with the intention of putting them all to death. Abad y Queipo states 
that Allende gave the order for the massacre which is contrary to Allende's 
persistent efforts to suppress outrages accusing him also of never placing 
himself within reach of a bullet. He forgets his own cowardly flight and de 
sertion of his flock. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 839. Compare Anso- 
rena, Dcfensa, 17. 

16 Liceaga states that a portion of the guard took part with the assailants. 
Utsup., 155. 


ants from a cry raised that the royalists are upon 
them. 17 

While Calleja halted at Valenciana he confirmed 
the magistrate of that town in his office, although he 
had received his appointment from Hidalgo. He also 
supplied him with copies of the proclamation extend 
ing pardon to those who returned to their allegiance, 
and of the edict of the inquisition issued against Hi 
dalgo, instructing him to publish them. Chovell and 
other residents, fearing for their lives, were meditating 
flight, but learning of these measures, they remained 
in their houses. At daylight on the following morn 
ing Calleja resumed his march against the city, but 
before doing so he had received intelligence of the 
massacre in the alh6ndiga, 18 and had caused the imme 
diate arrest of Chovell and other persons living in 
Valenciana. The insurgents had planted a heavy can 
non on the cerro del Cuarto, 19 and during the even 
ing of the 24th and early hours of the following day 
had maintained a vigorous fire with Flon, who replied 
from the hill of San Miguel. As Calleja advanced, 
the insurgents' gun was trained on his line of march, 
but the royalists, having placed two cannon in a 
favorable position, succeeded in dismounting it at the 
first discharge. This was the last effort at resistance; 
and Calleja and Flon entered the city simultaneously. 

17 Those who thus escaped took refuge in the convent of Belen and private 
bouses. The number of those slain is not accurately known. There were 
in the alh6ridiga at the time 247 captives, many of them being Creoles who 
favored the royalist cause. Of these, Bustamante states that a few over 30 
escaped. Cuad. Hist. , i. 101. According to the report supplied afterward by 
Marafion to Calleja, only 138 recognized bodies received burial, 'habiendo 
muchos quo habiendoseles visto entre los presos, no se supo despues de ellos ; 
por la que se supuso estar entre los muchos eadaveres que se sepultaron sin ser 
conocidos.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. app. 6-7. A list of the principal victims, 
as \vell as of those who escaped, is given in Liceaga, Adic. y Itectific., 156-7. 
Pedraza states that more than 200 were slain. Cdeb. N. Indep., 1. 

18 Captain Linares on the previous evening, fearing that some such catas 
trophe might occur, had urged Calleja to march at once upon the city; Linares 
made this statement frequently to Alaman, Hist. Mcj., ii. 53, believing that 
the lives of the captives might have been saved. But the massacre was per 
petrated in the afternoon of the 24th, and Calleja did not arrive at Valen 
ciana until after five o'clock. 

la This battery is said to have been directed by a man from the U. S., 
' estaba servido por un uorte americano. ' Liceaga, Adic. y Itectific. , 161-2. 


So enraged was Calleja at the barbarous murder of 
the Spaniards that he issued orders to his troops to 
put the city to fire and sword, and numbers of the 
inhabitants were slaughtered in the streets. He 
soon, however, countermanded the order, 20 recogniz 
ing that many innocent persons would be put to 
death. 21 He did not, however, intend that vengeance 
for the dead should terminate with this first ebulli 
tion of wrath; he would proceed with the punishment 
in a more deliberate and formal manner. During the 
day he made proclamation, 22 setting forth that al 
though, influenced by humanity, he had suspended his 
order of extermination, such an atrocious crime could 
not be left without expiation, and he demanded all 
arms to be delivered up on the following day, under 
pain of death. Other items of the proclamation were 
to the effect that all persons were expected to give 
information of secreted weapons, and of those known 
to have favored the insurgent cause; persons congre 
gating in the streets in greater number than three 
would be dispersed by shot, and those who engaged 
in seditious speech would be punished with death 
without respect of person. 

But while this proclamation might leave the inhab 
itants to suppose themselves exempt from further pun 
ishment, Calleja was planning merciless retaliation. 
There should now be a srand massacre on the royalist 

O / 

side, wide-extended and direful, such as would do 
honor to the cause. On the morning of the 26th the 
carpenters of Guanajuato were employed in erecting 
gallows in all the principal thoroughfares of the city, 
and in the plazas of the neighboring mining towns. 23 

20 'Me obligaron h mandar a las tropas que entrasen a sangre y fuego en la 
ciudad, y en efocto muchos fueron acuchillados en las primeras calles; pero 
movido de sentimientos de hurnanidad. . .y que no pereciese una multitucl de 
personas honradaa que en confusion salieron a favorecerse del exdrcito, mande* 
suspenderlo.' Callc ja, in Gaz. de Mex. (1810), i. 994. 

' n Among others, Agustin Calderon, an uncle of Alaman's, and by no 
means a partisan of the revolutionists, was killed in the calle de los Pozitos. 
Ataman, Hist. Mej., ii. 54. 

22 A copy of it is found in Gaz. de, Mex. (1810), i. 997-8. 

23 'Horcas que hizo poner (a mas do la que esta en la plaza mayor) en frente 

HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 15 


While this was being done, from those arrested 
the previous day between sixty and seventy were 
drawn for examination. 24 These were sent to Flon, 
who had occupied the alh6ndiga, and who was in 
structed to pass sentence upon them. Twenty-three 
were sentenced to death, among whom were the in- 
tendente Gomez, the unfortunate Rafael Ddvalos, 
under whose directions the insurgents' cannon had 
been constructed, 25 and three military officers who had 
espoused the revolutionary cause. The examinations 
were of the briefest, and the executions immediate, 
the place being within the walls of the alhondiga. 
The description of the scene as given by Manuel Go 
mez Pedraza, an eye-witness, is harrowing. After the 
sentence of death had been passed by the conde de la 
Cadena, the condemned were hurriedly shrived by a 
priest in one of the storerooms, then led to the door 
way which had been bricked up by Riana, and there 
blindfolded and shot. As victim after victim fell, 
their dead bodies being dragged aside to make room 
for their companions, the pavement became covered 
with fragments of skulls, scattered brains, entrails, 
and blood. By this human debris, progress was im 
peded, and before the horrible work was done the floor 
had to be cleared of its slippery and loathsome cov 
ering. 20 The gallows came into play next. 

de Granaditas, en la plazuela de S. Fernando, en la de la Compauia, en la de S. 
Diego, en la de S. Juan, en la de Mcxiamora, y una en cada plaza de las minaa 
principales. ' The plazas in Guanajuato were little more than streets, some 
what wider than the ordinary tortuous thoroughfares. Buslarnante, Cuad. 
Hist., i. 104. 

21 Manuel Gomez Pedraza, who was captain of a company, states that Ca- 
lleja placed under his charge, with instructions to deliver them to Flon, GO or 
more prisoners, 'no hago memoria del niimero.' Celeb. N. Jndepend., 1. 

25 The temerity of Gomez and others implicated in the revolution in not 
effecting their escape is inexplicable. Davaloa carried his rashness to such 
an extent as to walk in the street among the troops. He was arrested, and 
would have escaped but that, after having had the good fortune to obtain 
his release, a paper was discovered secreted in the sleeve of his coat, by the 
soldier who was untying the cord with which his arms were bound. The doc 
ument was taken to a commanding officer, and proved to be an account of 
the cannon cast by Davalos. This discovery decided his fate. Alaman, Hist. 
Mej., ii. 56. 

26 'Para ejecutar esta operacion, se trajeron de la calle algunos hombres, y 
con sus mismas manoa echaron la sangre y las eatranas despedazadas de los fusi- 


But in the economy of revenge, it will not do to 
ignore the benefits of spectacular exhibitions. So 
at nightfall following, eighteen prominent men are 
dragged out and hanged by torchlight in the plaza. 
It seems as if the curse of Sodom has fallen on the 
place. Round this plaza, like an amphitheatre, the 
houses stand tier above tier on the surrounding hills, 
so that the people can sit in them and look down 
upon the tragedy as at a play. Are these cattle or 
swine, that are being butchered for the market? Or 
has the old Aztec rite been revived among these chris- 
tians? No, it is no mediaeval or barbaric slaughter, 
but a nineteenth-century sacrifice of human beings 
on the altar of liberty! The air is thick with tyranny 
and blood. The stillness of an unpeopled world per 
vades the scene, there being heard only the low- voiced 
exhortation of the priest, or the cry of some faint 
hearted wretch for mercy. 27 On the 28th eight 
more persons, among whom was the hapless Chovell, 
met the same fate in the plazuela in front of the al- 
hondiga, and on the following day four more were 
doomed to die. But tbe gloorn of despair which had 
settled upon the city, the. spiritless state of abjection 
to which the population had been reduced, and the 
meek surrender of every article of use that might 
serve as a weapon pacified at^ last the avenger; and 
in the afternoon the ringing of the bells announced 
that Calleja had proclaimed a general pardon. Too 
late, however, was the mercy extended for two of the 
four last condemned, who had suffered but a few min 
utes before; the remaining two, in the very act of 
taking as they supposed their last look at earth and 
sky, with the halters round their necks, were allowed 
the benefit of the pardon, and released. 

These executions have been regarded by writers of 

lados en grandes bateas, hasta desembarazar el lugar de aquellos estorbos para 
seguir la horrible matanza. ' Celeb. N. Independ., 3. 

27 Alaman says: 'Muchos afios han trascurrido desde ent6nces, y nunca se 
ha podido debilitar en mi espiritu la profunda impresion que en <1 hizo aque- 
lla iioche de horror.' Hist. Mej., ii. 59. 


the independent party as acts of unmitigated bar 
barity, but I see little to choose between them and 
the doings of the revolutionists. If we condemn the 
massacres of one, we must those of the other. Even 
though Hidalgo fights for liberty and Calleja for tyr 
anny, if we are disposed to overlook the barbarity of 
the former in letting loose his Indians on the Spaniards, 
we must not expect otherwise in regard to the lattei 
than that he will retaliate as opportunity offers. Men 
are so made. It is idle to argue the point on which 
side of this war the greatest cruelty was displayed. 
So far there is riot difference enough apparent to talk 
about; both sides were about as blood-thirsty as they 
could be. 

The extension of the pardon was hailed by the peo 
ple with demonstrations of joy. Crawling forth from 
their houses and hiding-places, they crowded into the 
plaza in front of the royal buildings in which Calleja 
had made his abode. 23 The royalist leader addressed 
them from the balcony, enlarging upon the great clem 
ency which had been extended to them ; the subjugated 
populace meanwhile sending forth loud acclamations 
of allegiance to the king and obedience to his general. 

In reorganizing the government of the province, Ca 
lleja appointed Fernando Perez Marafion intendente 
ad interim; 29 he reinstated Miguel Arizmende in his 
office of alcalde, from which he had been deposed by 
Hidalgo, and caused a new election for another to be 
held. All other offices which had become vacant were 
provisionally filled by Calleja's nominees. This clone, 
Calleja decided to march against Guadalajara, and 

w fuan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 56-7. 

29 The appointment of Marafion, approved by the viceroy, Gaz. de Mex,, 
1810, i. 1001, and the high terms in which Calleja speaks of him, led some to 
think that he was in communication with Venegas. Alaman does not see suffi 
cient reason for such conclusion. Calleja thus recommends Marafion to the 
viceroy: 'A sus notorias circunstancias de honrade'z, fidelidad y patriotismo, 
agrega la de obtener la aceptacion y confianza de este insolente y atrevido 
pueblo. ' These expressions seem to indicate that Maraiion gave information 
to Calleja of the insurgents' operations, as stated by Bustamante. Consult note 
4 of this chapter. 


left Guanajuato with all his forces on the 9th of De 
cember, having previously despatched a convoy to 
Mexico with the king's silver and that of private per 
sons, amounting in all to six hundred bars. He also 
sent the machinery and dies of Hidalgo's mint, and, 
as a trophy of his victory, the heavy piece of artillery 
taken on the cerro del Cuarto, which the insurgents 
had vainly named El defensor de la America. With 
this convoy went most of the principal families of 
Guanajuato, deeming their future residence in that 
city unsafe, from the fact that no garrison or other 
protection was left in the place, except a company of 
armed citizens. This abandonment of Guanajuato by 
the more wealthy inhabitants completed its ruin. The 
mortality occasioned by war and typhus fever, which 
raged in the city during this period, the departure of 
great numbers of the populace with the insurgent 
leaders and the flight of others, caused within a few 
months a depopulation amounting to over 25,000. 
The mining and agricultural industries were for years 
next to nothing, and stillness and stagnation reigned 
in the once busy and thriving city. 30 

At Silao, a town five leagues from Guanajuato, 
Calleja halted his army for several days. While at 
this place, on the 12th of December, with the object 
of preventing further atrocities, he published a singu 
lar edict. After exhorting all to unite with the author 
ities, clergy, and honest citizens in preserving the peace, 
he declared that in every town in which soldiers, ser 
vants of the government, municipal and other author 
ities, or honest citizens, whether Creole or European, 
should be assassinated, four of the inhabitants, with 
out distinction of person, should be selected by lot 
for each man murdered, and without further formal 
ity be put to death. 31 It was but an idle threat, how 
ever, no attempt being made to carry it out. From 

30 Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 177- 
81 Gaz. de Mex., 1810, i. 10C3. 


Silao, Calleja advanced to Leon, and proceeded by 
way of Lagos toward Guadalajara. 

Except that Hidalgo was at Celaya on the 13th of 
November, nothing is known of his movements after 
the flight from Aculco until we find him at Valladolid, 
where he arrived on the 14th or 15th of the same 
month. 32 On the 14th he received intelligence of the 
late successes of Torres. The importance of this 
news, and the disagreements which had arisen between 
Torres and the other insurgent leaders, relative to 
priority of command, were undoubtedly the reasons 
which induced Hidalgo to abandon the arrangements 
made with Allende. During the few days that he 
remained in Valladolid, he published his reply to the 
citation of the inquisition already mentioned, and 
issued a proclamation exhorting sons of the soil to 
desert the European cause and take part with the 
independents. 33 On the 17th he left Valladolid for 
Guadalajara. But before his departure he issued or 
ders which show how far the gentle priest was car 
ried away by the spirit of his purpose. The royalists 
had glutted their vengeance; it was now his turn. 
At dead of night on the 13th of November, forty of 
the European prisoners, who were told that they were 
to be sent to Guanajuato, were marched to the bar 
ranca de las Bateas, three leagues from Valladolid, 34 and 
after being butchered, their stripped bodies were cast 
into the depths, and left as food for beasts and birds 
of prey. On the 18th another band of victims was 
under similar circumstances conducted to the cerro 
del Molcajete, and there met with the same fate. 35 

, Mex. Siqlo XIX., ii. 396. 

33 'Si querns ser felices, desertad de las tropas de los europeos, y venid d 
uniros con nosotros; dejad que se defiendan solos los ultramarinos y vereis 
esto acabado en un dia.' Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., ii. 259. 

34 This barranca was in the gaping crater of an extinct volcano. It was 
also called 'cerro pelon,' because destitute of trees. In that country hills 
reft with the cavity of an extinct volcanic crater were called cerro de la Batea, 
or cerro del Molcajete. Alaman, Hist. Mrj., ii. 40. 

35 According to Alaman, 44 Europeans were massacred on this occasion. 
Among the first victims was the asesor and acting intendente Jose" Alonzo 


Notwithstanding late reverses, Hidalgo was en 
thusiastically received wherever he went. The hope 
of liberty, once having been harbored in the breasts 
of the people, could never be relinquished. The 
march to Guadalajara was triumphal; and at every 
town the .people sallied forth to welcome the apostle 
of independence and do him honor. At Zamora, 
solemn mass was held, thanksgivings were offered, and 
contributions poured into his coffer. During the few 
days he remained in Valladolid he displayed a won 
derful energy. Besides the writing he had to do, and 
the political matters to regulate, he organized a force 
of 7,000 cavalry and 250 infantry, with several pieces 
of artillery. With these troops he approached the 
capital of Nueva Galicia. On the 24th of November 
he arrived at the hacienda of Atequiza, a few leagues 
from the city. Here all the authorities, municipal 
corporations, and distinguished citizens had made 
preparations to meet him. These, in twenty-two 
carriages, arrived at the hacienda, and a duly ap 
pointed commission offered him congratulations, placed 
all Nueva Galicia at his disposal, and invited him to 

Gutierrez de Teran, who displayed great fortitude. Id., 41. Hidalgo states 
that the total number was about 60. Hern, y Ddvalos, CoL Doc., i. 14. The 
two men under whose command the orders were executed were Manuel Muuiz, 
captain of the provincial infantry regiment of Valladolid, and Padre Luciano 
Navarrete, who acquired an infamous notoriety for his cruelty. Id., i. 839. 
It was an ecclesiastic also who made out the death lists, and thereby obtained 
the name of Padre Chocolate, because he said the victims were going to take 
chocolate that night. The intendente Ansorena, it is asserted by Alaman, 
who gained his information from Mucio Valdovinos, conducted the arrange 
ment for the departure and execution of the two bodies of Spaniards. See 
Doc. i., in Hist. M<y., ii. ap. Alaman's statements were replied to by the son 
of Ansorena, the licentiate Jos< Ignacio de Ansorena. In this pamphlet, 
published in 1850, he defends his father's memory by maintaining that he was 
ignorant of the purpose for which the prisoners were removed. He assails 
Mucio Valdovinos with some acerbity, but his arguments amount to simple 
personal statements without the production of any evidence. Ansorena, 
Defensa. This met with a retort from Valdovinos, who produces some evi 
dence, but hardly to more effect than that the popular opinion was that An 
sorena was fully implicated. Valdovinos, Content., pp. 55. This provoked a 
second pamphlet, written by Josd Mariano Ansorena; and with it the tedious 
and inconclusive controversy ends. Ansorena, Respuesta. Negrete points out 
the contradictions observable between Alaman's account and that of Valdo 
vinos, and believes that the butcheries were committed on one day, or two con 
secutive days, the 17th and 18th, and that Hidalgo was not in Valladolid at 
the time. ilex. Slg. XIX., ii. 271. 


the capital. Thence he proceeded to San Pedro 
Analco, about a league from Guadalajara, and was 
entertained with a sumptuous dinner. His entry into 
the city was arranged to take place on the 26th, and 
the joyful demonstrations and formal expressions of 
honor on that occasion soothed his greatly harassed 
mind and revived his hopes. Had he been a crowned 
monarch, his reception could not have been more 
brilliant. The streets, crowded with the inhabitants, 
were adorned with hangings and devices of bright 
colors; the troops of Torres were drawn up in two 
long lines reaching to the gateway of the cathedral, 
in the atrium of which was stationed the battalion of 
provincial infantry to salute the chief with military 

As the cortege entered the city and passed along 
the dense lines of people on either side, from thou 
sands of voices rang the welcoming Viva! mingled 
with salvoes of artillery, the reports of soaring rock 
ets, and the silvery sound of bells arid soft-toned 
marimbas. 36 At the door of the cathedral an altar 
had been placed, beside which stood Dean Escandon 
in canonical robes to present Hidalgo with holy water. 
This ceremony being performed, accompanied by many 
of the chapter, the revolutionary leader proceeded to 
the presbytery, where a solemn te deum was chanted. 
Thence he went in state to the palace, and, in the 
grand saloon, beneath a richly ornamented dorsel, re 
ceived the authorities, civil corporations, and ecclesi 
astical communities. 37 

Hidalgo, thus installed, proceeded to decide exist 
ing differences between the military leaders, and to 
organize a formal government. The first having been 
arranged, he appointed two ministers to take charge 

3(5 For a description of this musical instrument, see my Native Races, i. 
664. To defray the expenses of Hidalgo's reception, the ayuntamiento appro 
priated 1,000 pesos of the fondo de Propios. This sum the regidores were 
compelled by Calleja to refund. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 492-9. 

37 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col, Doc., i. 123-4. 


of public affairs, Jose Maria Chico, 33 with the title of 
minister of grace and justice, and Ignacio Lopez 
Rayon, with that of secretary general. 39 

Ignacio Lopez Rayon, who became a prominent 
revolutionary general at a later date, was born at the 
mining town of Tlalpujahua, Michoacan, in the year 
1773. At an early age he displayed a studious turn 
of mind, and his parents, who were in moderate cir 
cumstances, were enabled to cultivate his taste for 
learning. His early education he received at the 
college of Valladolid, where he concluded a course of 
philosophy. He thence removed to the college of 
San Ildefonso in Mexico city, where he studied juris 
prudence and took his lawyer's degree. Having suc 
cessfully practised his profession for some time in the 
capital, the death of his father recalled him home; he 
then devoted himself to mining operations. In August 
1810 he betrothed Maria Ana Martinez de Rulfo, a 
member of one of the principal families in that dis 
trict. When Hidalgo entered the province in Octo 
ber 1810, Rayon espoused the revolutionary cause, 
and on the 24th issued a proclamation in Tlalpujahua, 
inviting Americans to join the just and holy enter 
prise. 40 After the first events at Guanajuato and 
Valladolid, he proposed to Hidalgo a plan for the 
avoidance of similar excesses. His purpose had be 
fore this been reported to Yenegas, and a detach 
ment of soldiers was sent to arrest him, but he escaped 
as they came in sight. Hidalgo was at this time at 
Maravatio, at no considerable distance from Tlalpu 
jahua, and Rayon immediately repaired thither, openly 
joined his standard, and was appointed his secretary - 
in-chief. He accompanied Hidalgo to the monte de 

38 He was also made president of the audiencia of Guadalajara. Chico 
was a native of Guanajuato, his father, although a European, being a sup 
porter of the revolution. Hidalgo made him his secretary, and was accompa 
nied by him from Guanajuato all through the campaign. Alaman, Hist. Alej., 
ii. 81-2. 

39 ' Secretario de estado y del despacho, lo que parece que le daba las facul- 
tades de un ministro universal.' Ib. 

Gaz. de Alex., 1811, ii. 103. 


Las Graces, Aculco, and in the remainder of his move 
ments to Guadalajara. 41 

Hidalgo's object was to establish a national inde 
pendent government; and besides the appointment of 
ministers of state, he reorganized the audiencia by the 
appointment of oidores, 42 and nominated Pascasio Le- 
tona as envoy plenipotentiary to the United States, 
with the object of making, if possible, a treaty of 
alliance and commerce with that republic. 43 But 
these efforts were doomed to failure. The unfor 
tunate Letona, having proceeded on his journey as 
far as Molango in la Huasteca, Vera Cruz, excited 
suspicion by trying to change a gold ounce, and was 
arrested. His baggage was examined, his credentials 
as a revolutionary ambassador were discovered se 
creted in his saddle, and the justice of the town sent 
him with his papers to Mexico. Letona, well know 
ing the fate awaiting him, took poison before arriv 
ing at the capital, and was buried at Guadalupe. It 
was indeed dangerous to serve Mexico at this juncture. 

While Hidalgo remained in Guadalajara he issued 
several edicts which he deemed essential to the cause. 
He proclaimed the emancipation of slaves, the restora 
tion of their lands to the Indians, 44 and prohibited 
pillage and all excess on the part of his followers 45 
all wise and humane measures, and proving that he 
did not delight in robbery and murder, as his ene 
mies have charged. 

il Gallo y Horn. Ilust. Hex., in. 395-8; Biistamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 146-7. 

42 The new audiencia was composed of Chico, president, and Jose" Ignacio 
Ortiz de Salinas, Pedro Alcantara de Avendafio, Francisco Solorzano, and 
Ignacio Mestas, oidores. Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 172. 

43 A copy of Letona's credentials, dated Dec. 13, 1810, can be found in 
Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 79-81, and in many other works. Pas 
casio Ortiz de Letona was a native of Guatemala, and was a devoted student of 
the natural sciences, especially of botany. He was residing in Guadalajara 
as protege" of the royal official Salvador Batres, and was made a mariscal de 
campo by Hidalgo. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 83. 

44 Already mentioned in chap, v., this volume. 

45 In this proclamation he points out that these robberies were carried on 
without discrimination, the property of Americans, 'mis amados americanos,' 
being frequently appropriated. Copy of document in Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., 
ii. 399; Mex. Ifefut. Art. de Fondo, 25-6. 


The possession of Guadalajara supplied Hidalgo 
with a powerful means of advancing the cause of the 
revolution by extending more widely and generally 
the principles upon which it was based, and by plac 
ing within reach of the reading public his replies to 
proclamations of the royalists, and his refutations of 
attacks upon himself. For there was in this city 
a printing-press. When the revolution broke out 
there were but few printing-presses in all New Spain, 
one at each of the cities of Mexico, Puebla, Guadala 
jara, and Vera Cruz; 46 and all being under the control 
of the government, the independents not only found 
great difficulty in publishing accounts of their opera 
tions, but were also unable to contradict false repre 
sentations, issue appeals, or counteract the exhorta 
tions to loyalty widely spread by Venegas. This 
obstacle was now removed, and Hidalgo established a 
periodical which he called the Despertador Americano, 
and caused it widely to be circulated. 47 Replies to 
numerous proclamations, pamphlets, and other papers 
that had been issued by the opposite party were now 
published, and among them Hidalgo's memorable one 
to the citation of the inquisition which he had lately 
penned in Yalladolid. 48 

All the while his attention was closely given to mili 
tary preparations. The arsenal at San Bias supplied 
him with cannon and munitions of war, and he caused 
no less than forty-four pieces of artillery to be trans 
ported thence with incredible labor over a most diffi 
cult road to Guadalajara. He ordered a large num 
ber of men to be recruited; and to supply the want of 
fire-arms, quantities of grenades and iron-pointed rock- 

46 The one at Vera Cruz was worked but a short time. Bustamante, Cuad. 
Hist., i., iii. preface. 

47 A copy of the first number is given in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., 
ii. 309-12. It was issued on the '20th of Dec. 1810. 

48 Hidalgo states in his deposition taken at his trial that only two manifests 
published in the Despertador Americano were written by him, the reply men 
tioned in the text and another 'cuyo objeto es probar que el ^me'ricano debe 
gobernarse por Americano, asi como el Aleman por Aleman, etc. Hernan 
dez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 12. 


ets were manufactured. Every preparation to meet 
Calleja in the field was energetically made; but there 
was still lacking the one great element of success, dis 
cipline. While the father-patriot is here striving to 
strengthen himself as best he is able with poor officers 
and worse soldiers, let us glance at the progress of 
the revolution in other parts. 







ON receiving intelligence of the occupation of Gua 
najuato by Calleja, Venegas regarded the suppression 
of the insurrection as almost accomplished, 1 when in 
reality it was more widely spread than ever. We 
have seen how completely the provinces of Nueva 
Galicia, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosi were now in 
the power of the independents ; and it was not likely 
that they would relax their efforts at this juncture. 
An expedition into the provinces of Sinaloa and Sonora 
was planned by Gomez Portugal, and placed under 
the command of Jose Maria Gonzalez Heraiosillo, 
accompanied by the clominican father, Francisco de 
la Parra, in the character of director and adviser. 2 

1 In a letter to Calleja, dated Dec. 16, 1810, in reply to the brigadier's 
request that a medal might be presented to his soldiers, the viceroy, speaking 
of their toil, says: 'Contemplo proximo el fin y la coronacion do ellas, y en 
los pocos dias que probablemente se terminarun, se arreglaran con aquella de- 
tencion que hace apreciables los premios, los que deban concederse. ' Busta- 
mante, Quad. Hist., i. 118. 

2 Parra rendered the revolutionary cause great assistance. The charge of 
the printing-press was intrusted to him by Hidalgo, and its expenses were 


It set out with a force of about 2,500 men, and ar 
rived at Tepic on the llth of December, where it was 
still further augmented by volunteers. 

On the 15th Hermosillo reached Acaponeta, the 
border town, distant 115 leagues from Guadala 
jara; and on the 18th engaged with Colonel Pedro 
Villaescusa, who was in command of the troops at the 
real del Rosario. The royalists were defeated, and 
the town remained in possession of the independents. 3 
Herrnosillo gave Villaescusa a letter of safe-conduct 
to rejoin his family, exacting from him an oath not to 
take up arms against the independents. Villaescusa, 
taking advantage of this clemency, retired from the 
town with more than seventy of his troops, and hav 
ing recruited on his march all whom he could induce 
to join the royalist cause, reached San Ignacio de Pi- 
astla. He now sent information to the intendente of 
Sinaloa, Alejo Garcia Conde, who resided at Arizpe, 
and who hastened to his aid with a company of Ind 
ians. 4 Meanwhile Hermosillo entered San Sebastian 
on the 27th of December without opposition, having 
been previously joined by the garrison of Mazatlan. 
His army now numbered nearly 5,000 men, 5 and on 
the 29th he took up a position on an eminence which 
commanded the town of San Ignacio de Piastla, a 
considerable river intervening. Misfortune here 

temporarily defrayed by him. Hidalgo appointed him as leader of the expe 
dition, with the rank of brigadier, Hermosillo being nominally the commander, 
as Parra did not wish this appointment to be made public, it not being in 
conformity with his position as a friar. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 

3 Padre Parra relates that the alcabalero, a European, had made a final 
but unsuccessful stand with a piece of artillery and been slain, 'y para 
suciar mas los indios su corage, al Europeo artillero le cortan los genitales, 
quo pendientes de una cuerda los paseaban por toda la poblacion, lo que in- 
fundio tan to terror a aquellos habitantes, y a los soldados realistas, que en 
uii momento quedaron las calles limpias de toda gente enemiga.' Hernandez y 
Ddvnlos, Col. Doc,., i. 380. Hidalgo promoted Hermosillo to the rank of 
colonel for this victory, and promised him a brigadiership if he captured 
Cosala. Id., 24-28. 

4 ' Con refuerso de cuatrocientos indios Opatas de caballeria armados de 
fusil, lanza, rodela y pistolas, y iin canon de a seis.' Id., 382. 

5 ' Se contaron 4, 125 infantes, 470 caballos, OOOfusiles, algunas escopetas y 
carabinas. 200 pares de pistolas y mucho numcro de lanzas. . ,sc condugcron 
tambien los seis cauones que se le quitaron a Villaescusa.' Id. t 381. 


awaited the insurgent chief. On the 2d of January, 
1811, Padre Parra, having discovered a ford, while 
crossing it in company with five soldiers was taken, 
prisoner. 6 On the 8th Hermosillo, after fording the 
river, fell into the hands of 400 royalists secreted in 
the brush on either side of his line of march. So 
deadly was the fire opened upon him, that in less than 
ten minutes more than 300 of the insurgents were 
slain, and the rest fled panic-stricken. Hermosillo lost 
all his cannon, baggage, and munitions of war, and 
the expedition so successfully begun was thus sud 
denly ended. 7 

But in another direction success attended the revo 
lution. In the eastern provinces it spread with ra 
pidity. After San Luis Potosi had thrown off the 
yoke, the neighboring district of Nuevo Santander 
was awakened by the spirit of independence. The 
governor, Lieutenant-colonel Manuel de Iturbe, 8 
was compelled to retreat to Altarnira by the revolt of 
troops which he had raised under the same delusive 
expectation indulged in by Abarca and Rendon. The 
country was now overrun by revolutionists. Span 
iards were dragged from their homes and cast into 
dungeons from which the vilest criminals had been 
released ; their wealth was appropriated and their prop 
erty destroyed. The mines were deserted and enter- 

6 One of the soldiers was killed, the other four escaped. Padre Parra 
went through great hardships. He was afterward sent to Durango and de 
livered to the asesor Pinilla Perez, who 'habia jurado no dejaren este suelo 
gota de sangre Americano.' Id., 383. Parra, knowing that he had little hope 
of life, contrived to escape, ' contrahaciendo en el pasaporte que fingio la firma 
de Bonavia.' Ib. Bonavia was the intendente of Durango. 

7 This account of the Sinaloa expedition is taken from the narrative of 
Parra, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 378-83, and given in brief by 
Bustamante, in Cuad. Hist., i. 176-81, and in Campanas de Calleja, 62-8. 
The original document belonged to Bustamante, and Hernandez y Davalos is 
indebted for it to Jos<5 Maria Andrade. Alaman is inclined to discredit Bus- 
tamante's account relative to the dishonorable action of Villaescusa. Hist. 
Mej., ii. 93. But the statements of Parra copied by Bustamante are corrobo 
rated by another document, a despatch written by Jos6 Lopez, an officer 
under Hermosillo, and who makes the same statements. Hernandez y Ddva 
los, Col. Doc., i. 376-7. The total dispersion of Hermosillo's army may be 
gathered from Oaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 173-4. Negrete omits all mention of 
Hermosillo's defeat. Mex. Sig. XIX., iii. 82-3. 

8 This officer married a sister of the historian Alaman. Hist. Mej., ii. 94. 


prises abandoned. Many sought escape to the sea- 
coast, or a refuge in some principal town. Great 
numbers flocked to Saltillo from the mining district 
of Catorce and neighboring places. Colonel Antonio 
Cordero was at that time governor of Coahuila, and 
was organizing a body of troops for the purpose of 
marching against San Luis Potosi, according to the 
plan formed by Calleja. 9 The arrival of so many 
Spaniards at a time so critical might have been turned 
to good account by an able and energetic commander; 
but Cordero was not such a man. He was unable to 
harmonize differences, or secure unity of action, and 
his attempt to organize them proved a failure. 

Hidalgo now appointed his lieutenant-general, Jime 
nez, to the command of San Luis Potosi and the ad 
joining provinces. At the close of 1810, Jimenez, at 
the head of some 10,000 men, marched against Sal 
tillo, and met Cordero on the 6th of January, 1811, 
on the field of Aguanueva at no great distance from 
Saltillo. Cordero's force, which was well organized 
and armed, numbered 2,000; and had his troops re 
mained faithful, he would probably have dispersed 
the army of Jimenez; but they deserted as soon as 
they came in sight of the enemy, and Cordero, who 
sought safety in flight, was made prisoner on the 
following day. Jimenez next morning entered Sal 
tillo without opposition, and like Hermosillo at 
Acaponeta, he treated the captive enemy with every 
consideration. 10 

This bloodless acquisition of Coahuila was followed 
by the declaration of the governor of Nuevo Leon, 

9 The instructions Calleja submitted to the approval of the viceroy rela 
tive to the movements of Cordero's troops were the following; 'Las tropas de 
Cordero que se hallan, seguii las ultimas noticias, en las inmediaciones de 
Matehuala, distautes 35 leguas de San Luis Potosi, deberan bajar & esta ciu- 
dad a restablecer el orden y castigar los pueblos de Dolores, San Luis de la 
Paz, Sichii, etc., y manteniendose en las inmediaciones de San Miguel, Guana 
juato y Queretaro.' Calleja, in Ncyrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., ii. 408. The date 
of Calleja's despatch is Dec. 16, ISlO. 

l Parte de Jimenez, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 332-4; Ala- 
man, Hist. Mej., ii. 94-6. 


Manuel Santa Maria, in favor of the revolution, 11 and 
the whole of that province acquiesced in his action. 
In Texas, also, the royalist party for a time suc 
cumbed to the independents. On the 22d of Janu 
ary, Juan Bautista Casas made himself master of San 
Antonio de Bejar, the capital, capturing the governor, 
Manuel de Salcedo, the lieutenant-colonel, Simon 
Herrera, commander of the frontier militia, and a 
number of officers and Europeans. 12 Thus without 
much bloodshed the whole of that portion of New 
Spain which extends from San Luis Potosi to the 
borders of United States declared for independence. 
The sufferings and indignities, however, to which the 
fallen Spaniards were subjected were in many cases 
very great, not even priests 13 escaping by reason of 
their cloth. 14 

Shortly after the grito de Dolores, Villagran, as the 
reader will recollect, established himself at Huichapan, 
and proved extremely troublesome to the royalists by 
interrupting their communication between the capital 
and Queretaro. With him two others later associated, 

11 Santa Maria was a native of Seville, but having arrived in New Spain 
when quite a child, was regarded as a Mexican. Id., 96. 

"Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1087-8. Western Florida, the present state of 
Louisiana, had declared its independence on the 26th of Sept. previously, and 
Salcedo informed the vicero}^ of this event on the 21st of Nov., at the same 
time begging for reenforceinents, since he feared to be invaded from the re 
volted province. Salcedo considered the movement at Baton Roiige, where 
the insurrection broke out as a sequence to the conspiracy of Burr, and the 
effect of French emissaries acting upon his suggestions, Burr having been in 
Paris during the previous year. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 121-4. 

13 Jimenez at Saltillo not only left the Spaniards at liberty, but extended 
to them letters of safe conduct. Many availed themselves of this opportunity 
to seek the protection of Calleja; contrary to promise, when near Cedral they 
were seized, beaten, and stripped. Amid the maledictions and curses of the 
populace they were then conducted to Cedral, where they were kept impris 
oned for a month, whence they were eventually conveyed to San Luis Potosi, 
and confined, to the number of eleven, in the jail. By order of Herrera, they 
were put to death with one exception, in March 1811, Juan Villarguide only 
escaping, having been left for dead. Villarguide, in Hernandez y Ddvaios, Col. 
Doc., ii. 913-22. 

14 The cura of San Sebastian, Jose" Mateo Braceras, a Franciscan friar, and 
a secular priest Francisco Fraga were submitted to every kind of ill treat 
ment on their attempting to go from San Luis to Queretaro. They were sent 
back to San Luis, where they were imprisoned by Herrera, but were eventually 
released. Alum<m, Hist. Mej., ii. 100-2. 

HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 16 


Cayetano and Mariano Anaya. On one occasion Venc- 
gas despatched under a strong escort a quantity of 
stores to Queretaro, and with it travelled the newly 
appointed auditor de guerra, Ignacio Velez de la 
Campa. The insurgents, however, attacked it in the 
narrow defile of Calpulalpan, and killing the passengers 
and part of the escort, carried off the stores. A huge 
rock was rolled down upon the carriage of Velez, crush 
ing his head, after which he was despatched. Venegas 
decided to send a force to Huichapan for the se 
curity of the highway. The brigadier Jose de la Cruz 
had just arrived from Spain, and to him the viceroy 
gave the command of the expedition, with Torcuato 
Trujillo, of Las Cruces renown, as his second. 

Jose de la Cruz does not appear to have begun his 
military career before 1808, 15 when owing to the in 
vasion of Spain by the French, he like many others 
abandoned his university for the profession, of arms. 
His rise was rapid; and after two years' service under 
General Gregorio cle la Cuesta he was made brigadier. 
His success in New Spain was no less conspicuous than 
it had been in the peninsula, but it must be attributed 
to accident rather than ability. He was truculent 
and cruel. His rapid promotion was owing to the 
jealousy with which the viceroy came to regard the 
successes of Calleja; and such was the influence of 
Venegas in Spain, that after his return thither and the 
accession of Calleja to the viceroyalty he maintained 
Cruz in the high position to which he had elevated 
him, 16 in order to mortify one whom he could never 
pardon for having succeeded him in his role of vice-king. 

On the 16th of November, Cruz marched out of 
Mexico, his force constisting of the infantry regiment 

15 According to Fray Tomds Blasco, howe\ T er, he was in active military 
service against the French during the years 1793-5. Hernandez y Ddvalos, 
Col. Doc., iii. 246. 

16 As the sequel will show, Venegas appointed him comandante general of 
Nueva Galicia and president of that audiencia in fact, made him a second 
viceroy. Mora, Mcj. ysus Rev.,iv. 1 10-11, 231, 437, 440-2; Bustamante, Cuad. 
Hist., i. 133, and Campanas de Calleja, 58-9, 96, 107. 


of Toluca, 250 dragoons, and two pieces of artillery, 
afterward reenforced by the provincial infantry regi 
ment of Puebla, and a battalion of marines com 
manded by Captain Porlier, of the frigate AtocJia. 
Arriving at Nopala on the 20th, he proceeded on the 
following day to Huichapan, hoping to come in con 
tact with the insurgents; but Villagran, timely in 
formed of the danger, had retreated with all his follow 
ers to the sierra of the Real del Doctor and taken up 
a position on the inaccessible heights of Nasteje or 
the Muneca. Cruz on arriving at the town recovered 
the merchandise and ammunition which had lately 
been taken by the insurgents in the Calpulalpan de 
file. His reception by those of the inhabitants who 
had not fled was joyful; but in order to prevent any 
further insurrectionary acts, he deprived them of every 
article of use that could be converted into a weapon, 
sparing neither the housewife's scissors, the laborer's 
implements, nor the artisan's tools. 17 He gave im 
perative orders to the commander of a detachment 
which he sent out in quest of the Anayas, to put to 
death the inhabitants of every town or hacienda in 
which insurgents might be found, or where they had 
received shelter, reducing the places to ashes. 18 Be 
fore his departure from Huichapan, Cruz amply 
avenged the death of Velez; pendent from the trees 
on the roadsides all through the defile where the 
deed was perpetrated swung the corpses of victims 
hanged in reprisal. 19 On the 14th of December, in 

17 In a letter to Calleja, dated Huichapan, 23d of 'Nov., he says: 'Los cu- 
chillos de la mesa, las tijeras y todo cuanto pueda ser ofensivo recojo; instru- 
mentos de herreros, cerrajeros, etc., estoy encajonando.' Alaman, Mej., 
ii. ap. 17. Negrete states that this letter, as well as the one mentioned in the 
following note, was addressed to the viceroy. Mex. 8ig. XIX., ii. 250. 

l8 Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 18. The date of this letter is the 29th of 
Nov. On the previous day the Anayas had killed seven Europeans, and Cruz 
suspects that his correspondence had been intercepted, as he had received no 
despatches from Mexico for four days, whereas he expected daily communi 
cation. The expression he uses, ' Supongo que me han interceptado la cor- 
respondencia, pues que hace cuatro dias que no tengo pliegos de Mexico, que 
debia recibir toclos los dias, 'and the tone of the letters, lead me to agree 
with Aiaman that they were addressed to Calleja, and not to the viceroy. 

19 Alaman, who saw the bodies hanging in Dec., does not mention the nuin- 


pursuance of the plan of military operations proposed 
by Calleja, 20 he left Huichapan for Queretaro on his 
march for Valladolid, having been joined by the re- 
enforcement above mentioned. 

Calleja at this time was at Leon, and the plan he 
had formed for conducting the campaign was such as 
would, he hoped, confine the insurgents to the province 
of Nueva Galicia. Cruz was instructed to march to 
Valladolid, reducing to obedience the disaffected towns 
on his way, and so regulate his movements that he 
would arrive at the bridge of Tololotlan near Guada 
lajara on the 15th of January, on which date Calleja, 
approaching by way of Lagos, expected to reach the 
same important point. Meanwhile Cordero, the gov 
ernor of Coahuila, who was supposed to be at Mate- 
huala, was to advance against San Luis Potosi, re 
store order in that district, punish the towns of 
Dolores, San Luis de la Paz, and others, and remain 
in the neighborhood of Guanajuato and Queretaro; 
and lastly, Bonavia, the intendente of Durango, at 
this time in Sombrerete or Fresnillo, was to descend 
upon Zacatecas and Aguascalientes, and keep in sub 
jection the districts extending southward as far as 
Leon and Silao. The design was well conceived, and 
would enable Calleja and Cruz with their united forces 
to assail Hidalgo at Guadalajara with a larger and 
better appointed army than had yet been sent into 
the field by the royalists; but, as the reader has 
already been informed, Cordero's troops joined the in 
surgents; the projected movement from Coahuila upon 
San Luis Potosi was reversed; and the cordon around 
Hidalgo was rendered incomplete. 

ber, but they were scattered at intervals from the hacienda de la Goleta to 
the pueblo of San Miguelito, and one of them was that of the Indian gov 
ernor. San Miguelito was burned. Hist. Mej., ii. 71. Bustamante says: 'Cruz 
marc6 muy luego sus pasos con torrentes de sangre, el rastro de esta y los 
cadaveres que dejaba a su transito senalaban al viagero la ruta que Hevaba.' 
C'uad. Hist.., i. 137. 

20 Calleja submitted his plan to the viceroy by despatch elated Leon, Dec. 
10, 1810, and it was approved. A copy of the plan is supplied by Hernandez 
y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 304-5. 


Having remained a few days at Queretaro, Cruz 
left on the 20th for Valladolid. His march was un 
eventful; for although a hostile force threatened to 
oppose his progress in the neighborhood of Acdmbaro, 
it retreated to Valladolid as he approached. 21 Pedro 
Celestino Negrete, a naval officer, was sent with a 
detachment in pursuit, but was unable to overtake 
the retreating enemy. I mention this apparently 
trivial circumstance because the name of Negrete, 
who afterward greatly signalized himself and contrib 
uted to the success of Cruz by his victories, appears 
for the first time in history on this occasion. On the 
27th, passing through Indaparapeo, Cruz approached 
Valladolid and bivouacked for the night on the 
heights above the city. 

As the royalists drew near, the revolutionary inten 
dente, Ansorena, convinced that the forces which he 
had at his disposal would be unable to cope with those 
of Cruz, on the night of the 2Gth and 27th secretly 
left the city for Guadalajara, escorted by fifty chosen 
men; and on the following morning the officials ap 
pointed by Hidalgo also left, taking with them such 
treasures and archives as were under their charge. 22 

On the 27th, as soon as the flight of the intendente 
became public, the populace rose in tumult, and led 
by a blacksmith of Toluca, who was from the United 
States, 23 raising the cry of death to the gachupines, 
broke into the college formerly belonging to the Jes 
uits, in which a number of Europeans were con 
fined, 24 and put three of them to death before they 

21 The insurgents numbered 3,000 or 4,000 horse and foot, and had six can 
non. Gas,, de Mex., 1811, ii. 17-19. 

22 A nsorena, Defensa, 16. 

23 Described by the viceregal government as an * anglo-americano de na* 
cion,' Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 19; and by Ansorena as 'un toluqueno, a quien 
llamaban el anglo-americano.' Defensa, 16. 

24 After the massacres at the Bateas and cerro del Molcajete the remain 
ing Spanish captives, to the number of 170, were distributed at the interces 
sion of ecclesiastics in the convents and colleges. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 19. 
Ansorena's son, however, makes a different statement. His version is that 
on the 25th of Dec. the intendente convoked a junta, and stating that the 
forces in the city were inadequate to oppose Cruz, declared his intention of 
retiring to Guadalajara. He then proposed for the safe custody of the pris- 


were restrained by the canon, the conde de Sierra 
Gorda, and other ecclesiastics, who, at the risk of 
their lives, quelled the tumult by elevating the liost. 
Cruz entered "Valladolid on the morning of the 
28th, having given orders to the officer in command 
of his advance guard to put all the male inhabitants 
to death, and set fire to the city if any further at 
tempt should be made to take the lives of Euro 
peans. 25 His entrance was signalized by the usual 
expression of welcome extended to either royalist or 
revolutionist when in power. The cathedral chapter, 
the ayuntamiento, and different corporations escorted 
him into the city, and in the cathedral te deum was 
chanted. The municipal and ecclesiastic cabildos vied 
with each other in representations of their past fidel 
ity, and in the expression of their future zeal for the 
royalist cause. 26 The conde de Sierra Gorda, who 
two months before had removed the excommunica 
tion fulminated against Hidalgo and his followers, 
now gracefully annulled his former action, explained 
the reason of his unorthodox proceeding, and ordered 
the validity of the excommunication to be proclaimed 
throughout the diocese. 27 In order not to be behind 
hand in offering a sop to the royalists, the rector of 
the college of San Nicolas petitioned the bishop 
that Hidalgo's name might be struck off the books of 

O O 

that institution. Thus, as blew the political breeze, 
so turned like a weather-cock the civil and ecclesias 
tical authorities of Valladolid. 

One of the first acts of Cruz after his entrance into 

oners that they should be removed to the convents and clerical college. 
This proposal was carried out, though strongly opposed by the military offi 
cers. Ansorena, Defensa, 15. 

25 'Si la infame plebe intentase de nuevo quitar la vida a los europeos, 
entre V. en la ciudad, pase a cuchillo a todas sus habitantes, exceptuando 
solo las mugeres y niilos, y pegdndole fuego por todas partes. ' Such are his 
instructions, a copv of which he forwarded to Calleja. timtamante, Campanas 
de Calleja, 59. 

2(5 See the alcalde Ramon de Huarte's proclamation to the inhabitants, and 
the address of the cathedral chapter to the viceroy, dated respectively Dec. 
30, 1810, and Jan. 2, 1811. Gas. d Mex., 1811, ii. 28, 31-3. 

27 A copy of his circular is given in Id., 20-8. 


the city was the extension of the general pardon, of 
which many availed themselves. In reorganizing the 
administration, he appointed Torcuato Trujillo co- 
mandante general of the province, 28 whose associate, 
the brigadier Garcia Davila, presently arrived in com 
pany with the bishop elect, Abad y Queipo, Merino, 
the intendente ad interim, and other officials, who,, as 
the reader will recollect, had fled from the city at the 
first approach of Hidalgo. 

Calleja in his plan of operations had calculated that 
Cruz would be able to leave Valladolid on the 1st of 
January; he was however detained in that city until 
the 7th. This delay necessarily interfered with the 
carrying-out of Calleja's arrangements, but in addi 
tion to this, Hidalgo was forming plans for the pur 
pose of preventing the union of Cruz's forces with 
those of Calleja, and had instructed Colonel Ruperto 
Mier, who was stationed at Zamora, to oppose the 
former's advance. Mier, therefore, at the head of 
10,000 or 12,000 men, with twenty-seven pieces of 
artillery, took up an almost impregnable position on 
the heights commanding the mountain gorge of 
Urepetiro, about four leagues to the south-east of 
Zamora, and through which Cruz would necessarily 
have to pass. 

On the 14th of January Cruz, whose force num 
bered 2,000, principally infantry, with eight pieces of 
artillery, approached the mountain pass, which he 
found occupied by the revolutionary army. He forth 
with ordered his advance guard to open attack by 
moving against the enemy's position along the banks 
of a stream flowing down the gorge. The insurgents' 
batteries, however, commanded the approach, and a 
well-sustained fire being opened upon the assailants, 

28 Trujillo had accompanied Cruz from Mexico as far as Huichapan, whence 
he returned to the capital and rejoined Cruz at Valladolid Jan. 2, 1811. The 
viceroy associated with him in his command the aged brigadier Garcia Ddvila, 
'paraque contuvierasu juvenil ardor.' Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 59. 
Calleja described Trujillo as a madman with a sword. Alaman, Hist. Mej., 
ii. 78. 


the officer in command, in view of the extreme diffi 
culty of the ascent, retreated. Cruz now threw out 
detachments on his right and left, with the object of 
occupying commanding heights above the road, send 
ing two cannon with the troops directed against the 
enemy's right, and planting his remaining six pieces 
in the most advantageous position at the foot of the 
gorge. In spite of the ruggedness of the ground, 
both movements were successful. Meanwhile Mier, 
regarding the retreat of the advance guard as a flight, 
unwisely made preparations to pursue, and exposing 
his left, one of his batteries was assaulted and taken 
by Negrete, and the insurgent force in that part of 
the field dispersed. While Negrete was thus en 
gaged, a vigorous attack, supported by the two 
pieces on Cruz's left, was made upon the insurgents' 
centre and right, which resulted in the total rout of 
Mier's forces and the capture of his artillery and am 
munition. 29 

Although this attempt to arrest the advance of 
Cruz was unsuccessful, it contributed to the causes 
which prevented his taking part in the momentous 
battle fought on the 17th at the bridge of Calderon. 
At Zamora he was detained some time in repairing 
his gun-carriages; and when he arrived at the rio 
Grande de Lerma, although he met with no opposi 
tion, the transportation of his army was tediously 
slow, from the fact that at the crossing there was 
only one boat available for the purpose. When he 
arrived at the point of rendezvous the important bat 
tle had been fought and won. 

Allende, after his flight from Guanajuato, hastened 
to Zacatecas, whither Iriarte had proceeded after his 
departure from San Luis. Although this city was 
occupied by a large body of insurgents, the command 

29 The insurgents lost 600 men, while the royalists had only two killed and 
one wounded. For a full account of this engagement, see the reports of Crua 
in Gaz. de Max., 1811, ii. 53, 81-8. 


of which Allende could rightly assume in his position 
of captain-general, he perceived that the assertion of 
his superiority over Iriarte would in all probability 
provoke a mutiny. Of Iriarte's good faith he was 
more than doubtful; and his own prestige and popu 
larity had seriously diminished, owing to his late dis 
comfiture, as was indicated by the unsuppressed mur- 
murings of the troops. He therefore decided to join 
Hidalgo at Guadalajara, and on the 12th of December 
arrived at the city. Hidalgo went out to meet him, 
with every demonstration of friendship. 

That night a band of captive Spaniards was led out 
into the darkness, marched a few miles from the city 
to a lonely spot, and there butchered. And on other 
occasions the same ceremony was repeated. 30 

Meanwhile Calleja was rapidly approaching. The 
army which Hidalgo now had under his command 
was far superior to any force which the insurgents had 
hitherto brought into the field. It numbered no less 
than 80,000 men, 31 20,000 of whom were cavalry, with 
ninety-five pieces of artillery, many of them of heavy 
calibre. 32 No exertion was spared by the revolutionary 
leaders to render this large force as effective as possi- 

30 Marroquin, in his testimony at the trial of Hidalgo, states that he assisted 
at one, and one only, of these massacres, on which occasion 48 victims, more 
or less, were put to death. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , i. 41 . Abad y 
Queipo in his pastoral of September 26, 1812, says: 'Luego que se entronizo en 
Guadalajara comenzd a degollar en la misma forma, esto es, en partidas diarias 
de 60, 80 y 100,J^s muchos europeos y algunos criollos.' Id., 839. Says Jose" 
Maria Chico: 'Mand6 varios asesinatos, y lo mismo es publico y notorio que 
mando en Guadalajara, sin embargo de haberlo hecho con tal reserva.' Id., 41. 
These are the instructions Hidalgo gives to Hermosillo Jan. 3, 1811: 'Depon- 
ga U. todo cuidado a cerca de los indultos y libertad de europeos, recogiendo 
U. todos los que alia (sic) por esa parte para quedar seguro, y al que fuere 
inquieto, perturbador y seductor, 6 se conosca otras disposiciones, los sepultara 
en el olvido ddn^oles muerte con las precauciones necesarias en partes ocultas 
y solitarias para que nadie lo entienda.' Id., 24. In his own declaration he 
says: 'Se, ejecutaban en el campo a horas deshusadas y lugares solitaries.' 
Id., 14. ' 

31 This is the number given by Jose" Maria Zabalza in a letter dated Jan. 
18, 181 1, and addressed to Mercado. Id., i. 386. Calleja, followed by Alaman, 
states that the insurgent army numbered 100,000, an estimate which I con 
sider less reliable. Id., ii. 338, 342, 355; Id., iv. 180. Calvillo raises the num 
ber to 103,000. Sermon, 138. 

32 Besides 44 brought from San Bias, a large number had been cast in 
Guadalajara, many of them very inferior. 


ble. The enthusiasm of the troops was stimulated 
by encouraging addresses; the necessity of discipline 
urgently pressed upon them ; and drills and manoeuvres 
were daily practised on the plains outside the city. 
Though their arms were far inferior to those of the 
royalists, they were better than on former occasions; 
most of them were still only the sling and bow, but 
for the former great quantities of small grenades 
had been manufactured missiles much more de 
structive than rough stones. A great improvement 
had also been effected in ridding the camp of hordes 
of unarmed hangers-on, who followed merely with a 
view to pillage. 

With regard to the plan of operations, a diversity of 
opinion prevailed among the leaders. At a council 
of war Hidalgo expressed his conviction that the 
whole army ought to take up a position at the bridge 
of Tololotlan, and there engage Calleja, while Iriarte 
with his forces moving from Zacatecas should assail 
the royalists in the rear. Allende disapproved of 
this plan, and bearing in mind the disastrous results 
at Las Graces and Guanajuato, expressed his want of 
confidence in directing their whole force against the 
enemy, arid exposing their fortunes to the hazard of 
a single battle. He proposed that several divisions 
should be formed out of the army, that Guadalajara 
should be evacuated, and that Calleja should be 
attacked by these corps d'armee consecutively, thus 
avoiding the risk of a general rout. The debate was 
long and warm, but eventually Hidalgo's plan was 
adopted. 33 

On the 13th of January, Hidalgo was advised that 
Calleja was advancing by forced marches toward 
Guadalajara; and he immediately made preparations 
to occupy the bridge of Calderon, eleven or twelve 
leagues from the city. On the following day Hidal 
go led out his host. As he compared his now com- 

83 Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 185; Alaman, Ilisl. Mej., ii. 114; Neyrete, 
Hex. Sig. XIX., ii. 413. 



paratively well organized force with the rabble he had 
lately led, he felt confident of victory. 34 At sunset 
he halted at the bridge of Tololotlan, six leagues from 
the city, and having received fresh information of 
Calleja's advance, he again convoked a council, at which 
the same questions were discussed with the same re 
sult. Proceeding on the following morning, he occu 
pied the bridge of Calderon, and took up a strong 
position commanding the approach to Guadalajara. 
On a steep height on the left side of the river a bat 
tery of sixty-seven guns was planted. This position 



was almost inaccessible in front, was protected in the 
rear by a deep barranca, and nearly surrounded the 
open ground on which Calleja would have to advance 
his troops. Flanking this main battery, minor ones 

S4 'Repiti6 muchas veces que iba a almorzar enj^^pjiente de Calderon, a 
comer en Queretaro, y a ceiiar en Mexico.' C^c'-f'o, Mention, ISO. Negrete in 
making mention of this boast remarks: 'Creo que esto no pasa de una vulga- 
ridad.' Mex. Sifj. XIX., iii. 4. See also Ca'lcja, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, 
Col. Doc., ii. 300. This bridge is over a small affluent of the rio Grande 
de Lerma, about five leagues to the north-east of the bridge of Tololotlan. 

35 This plan is taken from the work of Torrente, who copied ifcfrom a draft 
which was in the war department at Madrid. Bustamante reproduced it in 
his Cuad. Hist., i. 188-9. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 584. 


were established on heights to the right and left of 
it, the latter one being on the other side of the river, 
the access to each being up steep and rocky ascents. 

On the 16th the royalist army appeared in sight, 
and Calleja, finding this almost impregnable position 
occupied by the enemy, sent forward a reconnoitring 
detachment, which, becoming engaged with the out 
lying insurgent troops, succeeded in gaining possession 
of the bridge. Calleja thereupon ordered reenforce- 
ments to advance to its support in order to hold the 
point, and it being now nightfall, both armies en 
camped without farther movements on either side. 
As the small army of the royalists bivouacked on the 
ground, the vast number of their foes was made ap 
parent by the fires on the opposite heights, which Hi 
dalgo caused to be built along the whole extent of his 
line, three quarters of a league in length. 

Calleja's force consisted of 6,000 men, 86 one half of 
whom were cavalry; but although his army bore no 
numerical comparison with that of the revolutionists, 
it was perfectly equipped and disciplined. He had 
also ten pieces of artillery admirably served, and a 
magnificent supply of war material; while the insur 
gents had but few muskets, and many of their cannon 
were of no service, some being fastened to clumsy carts, 
and others being manufactured of no better material 
than wood bound with iron hoops. 

Calleja decided to attack without waiting for Cruz. 
In the morning he formed his army into two divisions, 
one of which he placed under Flon, who was to assail 
the enemy's right, while he with the other attacked 
their left. The assaults were to be made simultane 
ously, in order that the two commands might fall at 
the same time on the insurgents' centre. A ford 
some little distance above the bridge had been found 
the night before, and Flon leading his force across it 

36 Verdla, Apunt. Moy., in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iv. 180. Cal- 
villo, however, says: 'Nuestro pequeuo exe'rcito. . .no pas6 de quatro mil y 
quinientos hombres. ' Sermon, 135. 


immediately began to ascend the heights. Such was 
his impetuosity that he would not wait for his artillery, 
which consisted of four field-pieces, and which owing 
to the extreme ruggedness of the ground had to be 
dragged up by hand. Perceiving that it could not be 
brought with the infantry, he led his men at once 
against the first insurgent battery, consisting of four 
guns, and guarded by a strong body of the enemy. 
Hash as was the deed, he was so ably supported by 
his troops that he drove the insurgents from their po 
sition and captured their guns. Pursuing his advan 
tage, as soon as his artillery arrived, he succeeded in 
dislodging the revolutionists from the minor batteries 
on the right of their main position, compelling them 
to fall back upon their centre. 37 

Meanwhile Calleja advanced with the rest of the 
army toward the bridge, supporting Flon's move 
ments with the fire of his advance guns, and sending 
him a reinforcement of pioneers of the grenadiers of 
la Columna. When Calleja arrived near the bridge, 
and could survey the whole position of the enemy, he 
recognized the danger of attempting an assault by 
that direction, and, wheeling to the right, occupied 
with four cannon and a considerable portion of his 
troops a small eminence, from which he opened fire 
upon the enemy's nearest left battery. At the same 
time he sent forward on the old road, on the right- 
hand side of the stream, Colonel Empdran with a 
squadron of dragoons of Spain and the cavalry regiment 
of San Carlos, with the object of assailing the enemy in 
the rear. Colonel Jalon, moreover, was sent to assault 
a battery of seven guns situated lower down the 

While these movements were being made by Ca 
lleja, Flon, urged by his uncontrollable desire to win 
the glory of the day, exceeded his instructions, 38 and 

37 Callrja, in Hernandez y Ddvalo*, Col. Doc., ii. 356-7. 

SB p arece q ue Flon traspaso las ordenes de Calleja, para llevarse el solo 
la gloria cle la batalla. ' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 342. 'El resultado 
dc la accion. . .habria sido mas feliz, si el Sr Conde de la Cadena, llevado de 


without waiting until Calleja was prepared to act in 
concert with him, attacked the main battery of the 
insurgents with his division. The attempt was un 
successful. The enemy was able to concentrate over 
whelming numbers at the point assailed, and twice 
his troops were repulsed. His artillery ammunition 
at this crisis gave out; his men lost confidence, and 
began to retreat 'in great disorder. 

At this moment victory inclined to the insurgents. 
The detachment under Emparan on the right had 
also sustained two repulses, he himself was severely 
wounded in the head, his horse killed, and the regi 
ment of Sari Carlos was already in flight. 39 Nothing 
but the ascendency of Calleja's presence, his coolness 
and military skill, saved the day. Jalon, who had suc 
cessfully forded the river and captured the revolution 
ists' battery, hastened to the assistance of Emparan; 
and interposing his troops between him and the dense 
masses of the enemy in pursuit, restored this part of the 
field, resulting in great slaughter of the independents.* 
To restore the left was more difficult, and required im 
mediate attention. A strong column of infantry, sup 
ported by two squadrons of horse with two field-pieces, 
was sent over the bridge to the support of Flon. This 
movement had some effect in arresting the disor 
der, but it was obvious to the leader of the royal 
ists that his left division held their ground in 
front of the great battery with difficulty, and that 
an extraordinary and decisive effort must be made 
in order to dislodge the enemy. He therefore 
marched with all the available troops of his divi 
sion over the bridge, and deploying into line, as soor* 

su ardiente espiritu, no se hubiese apartado del plan que me propuse y le fija.' 
Calleja, in Id., ii. 339. 

"" Owing, according to Calleja's report, to the want of courage of the col 
onel, Ramon Cevallos, 'siendo causa de que su regimiento retrocediese por dos 
veccs, y empezase d huir siguiendo el ejemplo de su coronel y poniendo en 
desorden d los demas.' Bustamanle^ Cuad. Hist., i. 1GO. 

40 'Me asegura,' says Calleja, 'su comaiidante no haber bayoneta alguna en 
todo el primer batallon que no este* tenida en sangre de insurgentes. ' Her 
nandez y Ddvaios, Col. Doc., ii. 358. Jalon's report is found in Id., 361. 


as the ground allowed his doing so, joined his forces 
with those of Flon. He then caused his ten pieces 
of artillery to be collected on one point, and directed 
against the main battery of the insurgents. While 
these were playing vigorously upon the enemy at half 
musket shot, a general charge along the royalist line 
was ordered. 

And now occurred an accident which overruled the 
power of battle, and held back the cause of indepen 
dence, it may be, for eleven tedious and bloody years. 
A bomb from the well directed artillery of the royal 
ists struck an ammunition wagon of the enemy, and a 
terrific explosion occurred, scattering the dead and dy 
ing in all directions. But this was not all. The 
ground at that season of the year was covered with 
a thick matting of dry grass, and this taking fire a fear 
ful conflagration ensued. The wind blew full in the 
face of the revolutionists, and the fire spreading with 
awful rapidity, they were soon enveloped in dense clouds 
of smoke and roaring flames. Before the fiery blast 
they could not stand. Some fell asphyxiated; others 
were horribly burned. Flight was inevitable. 41 The 
disorder caused by this catastrophe and the firm ad 
vance of the royalists, who were now encouraged by the 
presence and intrepid bearing of Calleja, struck panic 

41 Calleja makes no mention of this conflagration so favorable to his move 
ments; and Alaman Hist. Mej., ii. 132-3 generally partial to the royalists, 
receives the statement with such expressions of doubt as to leave the im 
pression on the reader's mind that he did not wish to believe in it. He does 
not even accept the testimony of Colonel Villamil, who was sent with two 
field-pieces to the assistance of Flon, and who says: 'Se empeso el fuego con 
los dos cailones que llevaba hasta que este ces6 por haberse incendiado cl 
campo.' Hernandez yDdvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 361. But this royalist testimony 
is strongly corroborative of statements more particularized. In the Bosqwjo 
de la BatcdlcC de Calderon, I find this account: 'Una granada del calibre de a 
4 tirada contra la ordeii de que no se hiciese fuego, pego en su carro de 
municiones de los enemigos, lo inflamo y se observo una grande explosion.' 
And further on: 'Se encontro con muchos cadaveres asi por el fuego de ioa 
ataques de Flon como por el de la esplosion del carro y de los cajones de 
polbora que abia disperses en varies puntos.' Id., ii. 342. Verdia, in Id., iv. 
180-1, attributes in a great measure the disaster of the day on the side of 
the independents to the explosion of some ammunition wagons, caused by a 
grenade discharged by the royalists and the spread of fire thereby through the 
camp. Bustamante and Ncgrete take the view given in the text. Mora 
attributes the fire in the camp to the simultaneous discharge of the C7 guns 
by order of Allende. Max. y sun Rev., iv. 135. 


into the insurgents. All along the royalist lines the 
charging troops pressed upward with but little loss, 
and cavalry, infantry, and artillery at last gained the 
height together. 42 But the enemy was in full flight, 
and their abandoned guns were found still loaded with 
grape-shot. A solitary battery of six heavy pieces, 
situated on the summit of an eminence on the in 
surgents' left, still maintained its fire. Thither had 
congregated great numbers of the dispersed army, 
but a detachment of the triumphant troops being 
sent against it, it was captured with little difficulty; 
and after a contest of six hours the royalist victory 
at the bridge of Calderon was complete. 

Then followed the pursuit. Over the charred 
ground the horsemen urged their steeds after the flying 
bands. Foremost amongst the pursuers was Flon. 
Enraged at the unsuccessful part which he had played 
in the late battle, and eager for revenge, or determined 
not to survive his disgrace/ 3 he outstripped them all, 
and plunging among the insurgents, fell covered with 
wounds. At night his absence was noticed and a party 
was sent in search of him, but it was not until the fol 
lowing day that his mutilated body was found. 4 * 

Of the military antecedents of Colonel Manuel de 
Flon, conde de la Cadena, little is known. His repu 
tation as a public man was, however, well established 
in New Spain, and his character for honest}^ and in 
tegrity, as well as his ability in the performance of 
political and magisterial duties, universally recognized. 

42 'Siendo obra de pocos minutos el acometer la bateria y apoderarse de 
ella, no obsfcante el inmenso mimero de insurgentes que la defendian y la 
resistencia que opusieron sostenie'ndose hasta el te"rmino de que las tres armas 
llegaron d, un tieinpo, y la artilleria misma a tiro de pistola.' Calleja, in Her 
nandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , ii. 358. 

* 3 ' Parece se fue a buscar la muerte entre enemigos para no sobrebir (sic) & 
aquella desgracia.' Id., ii. 342. 

41 Alaman states that a soldier of the provincial regiment of Valladolid 
slew him, remarking, as evidence in a foot-note, that this soldier produced in 
Guadalajara a pocket-book belonging to Flon, which he had taken from his 
dead body. Hist. Mej., ii. 130. But the condition of the corpse, covered with 
wounds and contusions inflicted by every kind of weapon, is sufficient evidence 
that he was overpowered by numbers, and that he did not fall by the hand of 
a single man. 


His impetuosity and strong passions, it is true, not un- 
frequently led him into errors, causing him to over 
look individual rights and disregard law. He held 
the same political opinions as his brother-in-law Riano. 

Flon was about sixty years of age when he met his 
death at Calderon. Pedraza, who witnessed his ac 
tion in the alhondiga, says that he "was of ordinary 
height, with broad and arched shoulders. His coun 
tenance was of a dark brown and wrinkled, the ex 
pression of it being frowning and severe; his eyes 
were sunken, penetrating, and fierce, and his look proud 
and disdainful, while his long, heavy, gray eyebrows 
gave to his features an imposing and unpleasing as 
pect." 45 The portrait is not a pleasing one. His re 
mains were temporarily deposited in the neighboring 
parish church of Zapotlanejo, whence they were trans 
ferred to the cathedral of Guadalajara and there in 
terred with solemn obsequies. 46 

Calleja on the following day rested his troops on the 
battle-field, and then pursued his march to Guadala 
jara, taking with him all the serviceable cannon of the 
insurgents, after having destroyed and buried the rest. 
The revolutionary leaders fled by different routes to 
Zacatecas, Rayon succeeding in carrying off the army 
funds, which amounted to $800,000. 47 

The loss on the side of the insurgents, as on previ 
ous occasions, is unknown, but that it was very con 
siderable may be inferred from the fact that in the 
part of the field alone where Jalon went to the support 
of Ernparan more than 1,200 fell. 48 That sustained by 
the royalists was 49 killed, 134 wounded, and ten miss- 

45 Celebridad Independ. , 2; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 45-6. 

46 ' Con los huesos de los espaiioles degollados en las barrancas cercanas & la 
ciudad.' This occurred on the llth of Feb. folio wing. Ataman, Hist. Mej., 
ii. 130. 

47 Zabaha, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , i. 386. Alaman says about 
300,000 pesos. Hist. Mej., ii. 127. 

48 Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 361. According to a letter addressed 
by Navarre to Mercado, 4,000 were calculated to have fallen, 'aunque sobre 
esto no hay dato cierto.' Id., i. 390. 

Hisx. HEX., VOL. IV. 17 


ing. 49 This insignificant loss in the achievement of so 
great a victory was due first of all to the accident, and 
secondly, to the superiority in arms and discipline of 
the royalists. Henceforth the royalist cause was for 
some time ascendent, but the principles of indepen 
dence were too deeply rooted ever again to be wholly 

49 Id. , ii. 364. Calleja says 50 killed and 125 wounded. Id. , 359. Alaman 
erroneously gives the numbers as 41 killed and 71 wounded. Hist. Mej., ii. 
129-30. Those given in the text are taken from the official returns. 




CALLEJA entered Guadalajara on the 21st of Janu 
ary. His reception was similar to that of Hidalgo a 
few weeks before. With wonderful facility these peo 
ple could be royalists or revolutionists as occasion de 
manded. In their principles they were governed 
greatly by the weather. If Hidalgo rained his rabble 
upon them in the morning, the town all that were 
left in it was for the country; if Calleja's sun shone 
bright, it was for the king. And luckily so; else 
by this time, between the several retaliatory leaders, 
there had been few left. Yet there were many in 
Mexico firm enough in espousing the cause, and nobly 
enduring, pledging themselves irrevocably to it, know 
ing that such action was almost certain death. 

The demonstrations on this occasion were unusually 
prolonged, from the fact that in the afternoon of the 
same day Cruz unexpectedly arrived. This leader, 



after the delays which embarrassed his advance until 
he had crossed the Lerma, had hastened forward by 
forced marches to join Calleja. Personally these two 
commanders .were unknown to each other, but al 
though latent feelings of jealousy might exist, their 
meeting was cordial in the extreme. Nor did Cruz's 
seniority of rank as a brigadier interfere with an ami 
cable arrangement as to their respective positions; he 
waived his right to take the chief command in favor 
of Calleja. 1 It was afterward agreed that each should 
retain command of his own division, and that Cruz 
should march at once to San Bias to recover possesion 
of that port, while Calleja remained in Guadalajara to 
reform the government. 

On the 22d and 23d Calleja issued two proclama 
tions: the one congratulating his troops upon their 
late victory and exhorting them to abstain from ex 
cesses; the other was addressed to the inhabitants of 
Nueva Galicia, and was of the usual tenor, containing 
threats of death in case of future disobedience, and 
to all caught with arms in their hands. 2 Moreover, 
he caused ten of the prisoners taken at Calderon 
to be shot as traitors. 3 

The late action taken by the audiencia and the ec 
clesiastical powers on the entrance of Hidalgo into 
Guadalajara was not likely to win favor for them in 
the eyes of the viceroy; and they now hastened to 
send to him protestations of fidelity and explanations 
of their conduct. The former expressed its unbounded 
joy at the late victory, and the restitution of its func- 

1 This action of Cruz was highly approved by the viceroy, who writes: * Con 
lo que ha dado V. S. la prueba mas convincente de su conducta, y de que 
nada ama tan to como el buen servicio del rey.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 137. 

a Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 345, 349-50; Gaz. de Hex., 1811, ii. 

3 One of these, Simon Fletcher, was from the U. S. He was one of Hi 
dalgo's captains of artillery, and had commanded a battery at Calderon. Al 
though severely wounded, Calleja caiised him to be taken from the hospital 
and shot. 'Era tal el deseo de Calleja de fusilar a alguno de los de aquella 
nacion que andabanfomentando la revolucion.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 154-5j 
Bustamante, Campafias de Calleja, 104. The latter gives the names of those 
executed. They were all shot with their backs to the firing platoons. 


tions, which had been interrupted during the occupa 
tion of the city by the "insurgent monster, Miguel 
Hidalgo;" while the ecclesiastical chapter drew a 
pitiable picture of the degradation its members had 
been subjected to in having been compelled to repress 
any utterance of their sincere loyalty and fidelity. 
The university, moreover, in all humility, declared 
that it had made no demonstration in favor of Hidalgo 
such as was offered to a legitimate government, in 
formed the viceroy that a donation of $1,510 had been 
contributed by the members of the faculty for the 
benefit of the army, and said that certain of them had 
been commissioned to preach and write in refutation 
of the proclamations and pamphlets printed by the 
insurgents. The faculty, moreover, petitioned the 
viceroy to appoint Calleja president, governor, and 
captain-general of Nueva Galicia. 4 Venegas gra 
ciously received these explanations, and in his reply to 
the ecclesiastics, expresses the hope that time will 
prove that he has not been deceived in forming the 
high opinion which he entertained for them. 

When Hidalgo departed from Guadalajara, the 
audiencia and other authorities had reestablished 
themselves. President Abarca and others, who had 
lain concealed, as soon as Calleja's victory became 
known, issued from their hiding places and reassumed 
their previous positions. Nevertheless Calleja closely 
investigated the conduct of those oidores and other 
officials who had remained in the city, 5 and consider 
ing that the weak and vacillating character of Abarca 

*Gaz. de Hex., 1811, ii. 109-^12, 246-8; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., 
ii. 377. The viceroy, Jan. 19th, ordered Hidalgo's proclamations, his reply 
to the inquisition, and other seditious publications to be burned by the execu 
tioner in the plaza of Mexico. On the 26th the inquisition issued an edict 
pronouncing the greater excommunication against all who should keep such 
papers in their possession. Copies of both documents can be found in Nearete, 
Mex. Sirj. XIX., iii. 85-97. 

5 The regent Antonio Villa Urrutia, feigning sickness, attended no session 
of the audiencia during the time that the city was occupied by Hidalgo, who, 
however, frequently visited him. He was reinstalled in his office, as also 
\vas Oidor Sousa, who had attended only once, and then under a public pro 
test before the escribano Arroyo de Anda. Adrade was another member who 
had refused to join the sessions. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 140; iv. ap. 63-4. 


rendered him unfit to fill the position he had held, made; 
corresponding representations to Venegas. Abarca 
asked for a formal investigation, which, however, 
was denied him; 6 and his petition that he might be 
allowed to return to Spain having been granted, he 
departed, but died at Panama" some time afterward, 
on his journey thither. Besides reestablishing the 
royalist authorities, Calleja formed a junta de seguri- 
dad, with Velasco de la Vara 7 as president, the pre 
rogatives of which consisted in the right to try all 
persons suspected of treason. He also instituted a 
junta de caridad y requisicion de bienes europeos, the 
object of which was to protect the property arid in 
terests of Europeans who had fled or been put to 
death, and administer aid to their families. This court 
was also charged with the duty of collecting and in 
terring the remains of the Spaniards lately slain. 8 

Having thus arranged affairs in Guadalajara, with 
out waiting for the return of Cruz, who in the mean 
time had been appointed president in place of Abarca, 
and military commander of Nueva Galicia and Zaca- 
tecas, Calleja left for San Luis Potosi. His army 
was at this time much reduced in numbers by sick 
ness, desertion, and excessive venery; 9 and when in 
forming the viceroy of his departure from Guadala 
jara, he felt it necessary to remark that he observed a 
want of enthusiasm in his troops, and little inclination 
to engage in fresh campaigns. 10 His march to San 
Luis was conducted with all possible pomp, and with 
such assumption of almost courtly display as greatly 
to disgust the viceroy. 11 But while outriders pre- 

6 'Es natural,' writes Calleja to the viceroy, 'que intente justificarse ante 
nif; pero yo no piensooirle.' Bustamante, Campauas de Calleja, 102. 

7 Abarca had married one of the daughters of Velasco. Alaman, Hist. Mej., 
ii. 138. 

8 On the same day on which these obsequies were held, viz., Feb. llth, 
the executions previously mentioned in the text took place. Id. , 1 54. 

9 In a confidential letter to Cruz he says that 'las putas y el calor le aca- 
baban su tropa.' Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 105. 

10 Id., 102. He moreover, in a letter to the viceroy dated January 28, 
1811, accuses the Spaniards of want of patriotism and of criminal indifference. 
Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 354. 

11 His action in this respect was the subject of conversation in Mexico, 


ceded his carriage, and military music entertained the 
company at his table and evening receptions, want of 
provisions and pasturage made his march slow; and 
his long straggling line, composed of soldiers, women, 
camp-followers, and hungry beggars, presented an 
array far from military in appearance. 12 On the 5th 
of March he arrived at San Luis, which place had 
been in the power of Herrera until his approach. 

During this time Cruz, who had left Guadalajara 
on the 26th of January, was successfully engaged in 
reducing the north-western portion of the province to 
subjection. On the 28th he entered Ahualulco, and 
there proclaimed the general pardon extended to all 
who returned to their allegiance. 13 With regard to 
Mercado, he even intimated that he would restore his 
benefice to him if he would avail himself of it. 14 " As to 
whether it was the intention of Cruz to carry out to 
the letter these fair promises, I leave it to the reader 
to judge. Mercado had evidently no confidence in them. 
The disastrous news of the loss of the battle at Cal- 
deron did not deter him from making further efforts. 
He ordered the concentration of troops; issued a proc 
lamation exhorting Americans to join his standard 
and fight for the cause of independence ; and gave in 
structions to Captain Ibarra to scour the district and 
seize the funds and all available property belonging 
to Europeans. As Cruz approached, Mercado took 
up a strong position commanding the difficult pass at 
the barranca of Maninalco. But the royalist victory 

and Venegas used to remark that 'Calleja corria con batidores toda la tierra 
dentro como si fuera un virey.' Bustamante, Campafias de Ca/leja, 1059. 

12 ' Pudiendo decirse que caminaban tres eje'rcitos d un tiempo, a saber : uno 
de soldados, otro de meretrices y perros, y otro de vivanderos, mendigos, y 
arrimados.' Id., 105. 

13 The pardon was extended to the inhabitants of Nueva Galicia by the 
viceroy on the 31st of Dec. 1810. Hernandez y Ddvalos, GoL Doc., ii. 315. 
The acceptance of the general pardon was vehemently protested against by 
the independent leaders, and proclamations were issued exhorting Mexicans 
not to avail themselves of it. Id., ii. 133-4. 

11 Manuel Alvarez, a friend of Mercado's, writes to him to this effect, and 
strongly urges him to accept Cruz's clemency. The original document is in 
the possession of Hernandez y Ddvalos. See his Col. Doc., i. 394. 


at Calderon, and the offer of pardon, had a bad effect 
upon his men. His troops broke and fled after firing 
some cannon-shots, and Mercado betook himself with 
a few followers to San Bias. Both in that port and 
in Tepic a reaction had set in. Francisco Valdes, who 
had been temporarily placed by Mercado in command 
of the first division of the coast militia, took the op 
portunity of exciting a counter-revolution at Tepic 
in favor of the government, and immediately apprised 
Cruz of the state of affairs. Cruz sent a detachment 
thither at once, and that important town fell into his 
hands without a blow. 15 Captain Salas, the com 
mander of the troops sent to Tepic, was instructed to 
proceed thence to San Bias and occupy that port, 
where he was to make every effort to secure the per 
sons of Mercado and other insurgent leaders, as well 
as to arrest Lavallen, Bocalan, arid others implicated 
in the surrender of the port to Mercado. 16 But that 
town had already been lost to the revolutionists, and 
Mercado killed. 

When, after his failure to arrest the advance of Cruz, 
Mercado had returned to San Bias, Padre Nicolas 
Santos Verdin, cura of the town, formed a plot with 
the royalists to seize him and the comandante Ko- 
mero. On the night of the 31st of January they 
made the attack. Romero, however, with barred 
doors defended himself by firing from a window until 
he, Estevan Matemala, commander of the artillery, 
arid one other were killed; the assailants having two 
of their party slain and four wounded. The particu 
lars of Mercado's death are not known. On the fol 
lowing morning his body was found at the foot of a 
precipice, down which it was conjectured he had fallen 
during flight. But there is reason to suppose that he 
was killed while defending himself; and that those 

l "Oaz. de Max., 1811, ii. 129-32. Cruz received the communication of 
Valdes on the 3d of Feb. , being then at Iztlan. 

16 A copy of the original instruction is to be found in Hernandez y Ddvalos, 
Col. Doc., i. 398. 


who slew him, in order to avoid the opprobrium at 
tached to priest-killers, threw his body over the cliff. 17 
Cruz, who had hitherto remained at Iztlan, having 
sent his officers in advance to conduct his military op 
erations wherever any show of danger appeared, now 
fearlessly proceeded to Tepic, which he entered on the 
8th of February. Here he remained for three days; 
during which time he issued a proclamation, unusually 
mild in expression, reorganized military and civil af 
fairs, and hanged several adherents of the indepen 
dent party, leaving their bodies suspended as a warn 
ing to others. On the 12th he marched to San Bias, 
where he arrived late at night. The activity he dis 
played here as elsewhere was surprising. Whatever 
his faults, he cannot be accused of indolence or want 
of administrative ability. The civil government was 
reorganized, the offices for the collection of the reve 
nue were re-established, maritime and military mat 
ters put in order, artillery was mounted sufficient for 
the defence of the place the superfluous guns being 
placed on board the frigate Princesa and numerous 
directions were issued by him for the future guidance 
of officers left in command. He, moreover, convoked 
a council of war, at which the father of Mercado was 
-condemned to be hanged, which sentence was carried 
into execution on the 14th. 18 The same day Cruz re 
turned to Tepic, where he remained two days. On 
the 1 7th, having sent forward detachments to Say ula, 

17 Negrete says that a reliable witness testifies that he saw the wounds on 
the body, and that they were like those of a sword, or similar pointed weapon; 
and that a relative of Mercado is still in possession of the undershirt worn 
by him when he met his death. Mex. Sig. XIX. , iii. 77. Mercado was born 
in Tcul and educated in Guadalajara, where he devoted himself to the study 
of theology and was ordained priest. He was afterward appointed cura of 
Ahualulco. When Torres gained possession of Guadalajara he joined the 
revolutionary party with enthusiasm. Mercado possessed both ability and 
determination, as is evidenced by his career, brief though it was, as an insur 
gent leader. Verdin, in Id., iii. 383-93. Consult Verdin's account in Gaz. t(e 
Mex., 1811, ii. 142-4. 

18 It does not appear that any other of the captured insurgents was exe 
cuted at this town. Cruz says to the viceroy, ' Todos los deinas curas, f rayles 
y demas cabecillas, no pudieron ser sentenciados, y vienen marchando hacia 
Guadalaxara para ser alii juzgados.' Id., 181. 


Zapotlan, Zacoalco, and other places threatened by 
the insurgents, and having arranged that the different 
divisions of his army should arrive at Guadalajara on 
the 27th and 28th, he resumed his march to that city. 

After the dispersion of the insurgents at Calderon, 
Hidalgo continued his flight to Zacatecas, whither 
Iriarte had retired with a considerable force 19 and a 
large sum of money. But before reaching that city 
he was deposed. Overtaken by Allende, Arias, and 
other leaders at the hacienda del Pabellon, he was 
compelled by them to resign his position as general 
issimo in favor of Allende. From the first, Allende 
had not been fully in accord with Hidalgo; he had 
constantly disagreed with him as to the conduct of 
the war. But Allende and the others could not draw 
people to the standard like Hidalgo. They were bet 
ter soldiers, perhaps, but were not necessarily better 
men. Allende was a strict disciplinarian, a humane 
man as the times went, and honorable far above the 
average leader on either side. He and his fellow-offi 
cers were dependent on Hidalgo at the first more than 
now; at all events, they now conspired against his 
authority, and threatened him with death if he de 
clined to surrender his command. 20 Henceforth he 
was little more than a prisoner in their hands. He 
was used as a figure-head; his presence was deemed 
necessary, but he was allowed no voice in the move 
ment he had been the first to take part in. His 
presence with the army was still deemed necessary, 
but his influence with regard to future action was 
gone, his advice was not sought, and his authority 
a mere show. His movements, moreover, were 
closely watched, and he understood that orders were 

19 Bustamante, followed by Alaman, incorrectly states that Hidalgo joined 
Iriarte a b Aguascalientes. Iriarte had retired to Zacatecas when Calleja passed 
through Lagos. Calleja, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 355. 

20 The surrender was made only verbally in the presence of the chiefs. 
This informal action caused Negrete to disbelieve the whole statement, Hex. 
Sly. XIX., iii. 53-4. But Hidalgo himself so stated it at his trial. Hernandez 
y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 8. 



given to kill him if he attempted to separate himself 
from the army. 21 In all this Hidalgo cared less for 
himself than for the cause. Personal fame had never 



been his object. If they could better carry forward 
the revolution alone, he was content. But from the 

21 The same order applied to Iriarte and Abasolo. Ib. Of the former's 
conduct and supposed intentions Allende appears to have formed a most un> 
favorable opinion, and the latter hud fallen under grave suspicion. 


sequel we should judge that they could not, for de 
struction falls quickly upon them. 

From Zacatecas Allende decided to retire with his 
forces to Saltillo, where, united with Jimenez, his posi 
tion would be more secure than elsewhere. At this 
time a royalist force under the command of Melgares 
was threatening to attack Saltillo; 22 and Allende hav 
ing received a letter from Jimenez dated the 17th of 
February, hastened to his assistance with a portion of 
his forces, leaving Hidalgo at Matehuala. Jimenez, 
however, had already engaged with the enemy and 
defeated them when Allende arrived. 23 The Europe 
ans who fell into his power were put to death. 24 

The situation of the revolutionary leaders, how 
ever, daily became more desperate. Of all the host 
routed at Calderon only an insignificant number fol 
lowed their chiefs, and the whole force that could be 
mustered at Saltillo did riot exceed four or five thou 
sand ill-armed men. Allende had hardly marched out 
of Zacatecas when it was assaulted and taken by 
Captain Ochoa, 25 and Calleja shortly afterward en 
tered San Luis Potosi. Under these circumstances 
further action here would be useless. But they would 
not abandon the cause. The northern provinces were 
still in the hands of the independents, as they sup 
posed, and they would go to the United States with 
their treasures, purchase weapons there, and solicit 
aid of that new and patriotic republic. Then they 
would return and meet the royalists in the field with 

22 Ochoa's despatch to Calleja, in Gaz. de Hex., 1811, ii. 183. 

23 The battle, of which no particulars are to be found, was probably 
fought on the 18th of Feb., since Jimenez says in his letter to Allende: 'Me 
hallo d seis leguas del enemigo con quien me vatir6 mailana seguramente. ' 
Hernandez y Ddvalo*, Col. Doc., i. 233. 

24 Villarguide states that the Spaniards in Matehuala and Cedral had their 
heads sawn off. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 150. Hidalgo supposes of course that 
the Spaniards thus disposed of on the march to Saltillo were executed by or 
der of Allende, 'quien tenia yd todo el mando.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. 
Doc., i. 14. 

25 On the 17th of Feb., according to Ochoa's despatch to Calleja. Gaz. de 
Mex., 1811, ii. 182. Ochoa had three days after the battle of Calderon 
been defeated by Jimenez at the mountain gorge of Carnero. Bustamanie, 
Cuad. Hist., i. 198. 


equal arms and superior numbers. Delusive dreams! 
Far different was the fate in store for them. Al 
ready death had them in its horrible toils. 

About this time Hidalgo received a letter from 
Cruz, 26 enclosing a copy of the general pardon extend 
ed to insurgents by the Spanish cortes, 27 and exhort 
ing him to accept the clemency offered, 28 and avoid 
the further shedding of blood. But this was not for 
a moment to be thought of, and for two reasons : Hi 
dalgo would not trust him. or his promises, and he 
would never abandon the cause. Let him now recant, 
and what hope would there be for another? Perhaps 
his death would better serve the revolution than any 
action of his while living; if so, he would cheerfully 
die. He therefore not only emphatically declined to 
accept the present offer, but kept the matter secret 
among the leaders. 29 

Previous to the arrival of Calleja at San Luis Po- 
tosi, that city had been held by the insurgents under 
the leadership of Herrera. By directions of Iriarte, 
he had successfully attacked two royalist officers, 
Reyes and Ilagorri, at the hacienda of San Pedro 

26 Dated the 28th of Feb. Qaz. de Hex., 1811, ii. 322-3. 

27 Decree of Oct. 15, 1810. Cortes, Col. Dec., i. 10; I>ublan y Lozano, Leg. 

- 336. 

23 Cruz prophetically remarks: ' Y quiza linico instante de piedad que la 
suerte le prepara.' Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 322. 

29 His not having made public the indulto, of which his followers might 
have availed themselves, constituted one of the charges against Hidalgo. He 
answered, even if he had been so inclined, ' Ya no tenia autoridad ni carac- 
ter.' Hernandez y Duvalos, Col. Doc.,1. 11. The question was discussed by 
the other leaders, but rejected on the ground of restrictions in regard to 
themselves with which the offer came. Ib. Hidalgo wrote in answer at 
least, so it is said 'In the discharge of our duty we will not lay aside our arms 
until we have wrested the jewel of liberty from the hands of the oppressor. 
"We are resolved to enter into no arrangement which has not for its basis the 
liberty of the nation, and the enjoyment of those rights which the God of 
nature has given to all men rights inalienable, and which must be sustained 
by the shedding of rivers of blood if necessary. . .Pardon, your Excellency, 
is for criminals, not for defenders of their country. Let not your Excellency 
be deluded by the ephemeral glories of Calleja; they are only so many light 
ning-flashes which blind rather than enlighten . . .The whole nation is in a fer 
ment; these commotions have roused those who lay in lethargy. . .The agita 
tion is general, and Mexico erelong will discover her mistake if these evils 
are not opportunely ended.' Jjustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 237-8. 


Piedra Gorda. Their force consisted of 700 men 
with eleven pieces of artillery. The two leaders were 
slain, and the Europeans captured were shot. Her- 
rera then returned to San Luis, where the house of 
the intendente Flores was sacked, it being believed 
that he was in collusion with the royalists. On the 
approach of Calleja he abandoned the city, taking the 
direction of Rio Verde and Yalle del Maiz. Under 
Garcia Conde, Calleja sent a detachment in pursuit, 
and Herrera sustained an overthrow at the latter place, 
losing seventeen pieces of artillery, and a great quantity 
of ammunition, baggage, and plunder. 30 He however 
took revenge by ordering twelve Spanish captives 
put to death, one of whom miraculously escaped to 
tell the tale. 31 After this defeat Herrera retired to 
Agayo, 32 where he expected to be joined by the re 
volted troops of Iturbe. Venegas had, however, in 
the mean time despatched Colonel Arredondo with a 
force via Vera Cruz into the disaffected district; and 
his approach, together with the offer of pardon, 
caused a counter-movement in favor of the royalists. 
Herrera and other chiefs were seized in their quar 
ters and delivered up to Arredondo, who summarily 
executed them. 83 Thus terminated the career of the 
lay-friar Herrera, charged by some with more than 
ordinary cruelty, yet whose high courage and ability 
in the field were second only to his love of country 
and devotion to the cause of independence. 34 

80 Garcia Conde, in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 332-7. This action took place 
on the 22d of March, though Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 196, carelessly 
gives the 25th as the date. Garcia Conde after his liberation at Aculco fol 
lowed Calleja, and proved one of his most efficient officers. 

31 Mariano Calderon, the subdelegado of Valle del Maiz appointed by the 
insurgents, on the entrance of Garcia Conde into the town, was shot, having 
been proved, according to Garcia Conde's statement, to have given his con 
sent to the massacre. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 334. 

32 The present city of Victoria, in Tamaulipas. 

33 Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 356-7, 414. 

31 Alaman indulges in some rather severe strictures upon Herrera's charac 
ter. ' biendo su conducta una de las mas feas manchas de la insurreccion y 
tanto, que el congreso de Tamaulipas, que en 1824 cambi6 los nombres de 
casi todas las antiguas poblaciones del Nuevo Santander. . .no se atrevio por 
respeto & la decencia publica, a poner el de Herrera a ninguno de aquellos 
pueblos.' Hist. Mej. t ii. 163. 


While these events were taking place in San Luis 
Potosi and Nuevo Santander, changes, unfavorable to 
the independent cause, were also occurring in Texas 
and Coahuila. About the beginning of February, 
Ignacio Aldama had been elected by the revolutionary 
leaders as minister plenipotentiary to the United 
States, 35 Padre Juan Salazar being commissioned to 
accompany him and act in his stead in case of accident, 
sickness, or death. He took with him no less than one 
hundred bars of silver, besides a large sum of money for 
the purpose of purchasing arms and procuring the as 
sistance of 30,000 auxiliaries. At the time when Al 
dama arrived at Bejar the action of Captain Casas was 
causing general dissatisfaction : and a counter-revolu 
tion was already in secret operation, headed by the 
subdeacon Juan Manuel Zambrano. Zambrano and 
his confederates took occasion to spread suspicions 
about the object of Aldama's mission. He was repre 
sented to be an emissary of Napoleon, as evidenced 
by his uniform, which was ornamented like those of 
French officers. If, indeed, he brought auxiliaries 
from the United States, would they not probably 
avail themselves of the opportunity to gain posses 
sion of the province which was regarded with such 
covetous eyes? On the night of the 1st of March 
Casas was made prisoner, while Aldama, Salazar, and 
their escort were detained under the pretence that 
their passports were not in order. A new govern 
ment was then formed, with Zambrano as president. 
This at once proceeded to establish itself as firmly as 
possible ; troops were organized, partisans of the revo 
lutionists were deposed from office, and the imprisoned 
Europeans released. The unfortunate Aldama and 
Salazar were afterward conveyed to Monclova in 
Coahuila, condemned to death by a court-martial, and 
executed. 38 

35 The certificate of the authenticity of the signatures on his appointment 
is signed on the 6th of Feb. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 231-2. 

Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 1087-^j Id., 1811, it 741; Hernandez y 


^ These momentous matters were wholly unknown to 
Allende, as well as to the revolutionists at Monclova, 
which were destined to prove most fatal to himself and 
his associates. Lieutenant-colonel Ignacio Elizondo 
had at first favored independence; but having taken of 
fence at Allende's refusal to promote him to the grade 
of lieutenant-general in reward for his services, he 
secretly became disaffected, and cast about him in 
search of means of revenge. When Zambrano had 
gained control at Bejar he sent two commissioners, 
captains Munoz and Galan, to communicate with Ca- 
lleja and the viceroy; and these finding the conspir 
acy ripe at Monclova, disclosed to Elizondo Allende's 
intentions. He therefore determined to delay mat 
ters no longer, but seize the persons of the revolution 
ary leaders on their arrival. Accordingly, on the 
night of the 17th of March, at the head of two hun 
dred troops and armed citizens, he made the revolu 
tionary governor Aranda prisoner, surprised such 
soldiers of the garrison as had not entered into his 
designs, and possessed himself of the artillery. He 
then proceeded to establish a government council, 
which appointed Simon Herrera provisional governor 
of the province on the 25th of March. 37 Measures 
were now adopted for the seizure of Allende and his 
associates. Guile and perfidy were brought into play 
without scruple. The regulations of the more refined 
civilizations have proper murder and improper mur 
der, righteous and unrighteous robbery, holy and 
unholy treachery, and the like; but these Spanish 
royalists paid little attention to such rational and be 
neficent rules. The utmost precaution was taken that 
Allende should receive no intelligence of what had 
occurred at Monclova, and remarkable as it may seem, 
that leader entertained not the slightest suspicion of 
the trap which was being laid for him. Advised that 

pdvalos. Col. Doc., i. 198-226. The first authority supplies a copy of amani- 

lo XIX., iii. 137-9. 

fest published by Aldama expressing his repentance. 
37 Cai'ta de Vela, in Nejrete, Mex. Siglc 


the revolutionists would arrive at the wells of 

on the morning of the 21st, Elizondo arranged to 

meet them with all due honors; and on the 19th sal 

lied forth with 342 well appointed troops, having in 

formed Jimenez that he would welcome them on the 


Previous to starting on their ill-starred journey,, a 
council was held by the revolutionary leaders in order 
to arrange about the chief command and the manage 
ment of the cause during their absence. This was on 
the 16th, and in turn both Abasolo and Arias who, 
as the reader will recollect, played a somewhat du 
bious role at Queretaro declined to accept the re 
sponsibility. The command was finally given to 
Ignacio Rayon, the licentiate Arrieta being his sec 
ond, and Jose Maria Liceaga his third officer. 

All was now ready for their departure from Saltillo. 
Their road lay through a rugged desert in which 
water could only be obtained at long intervals and in 
small quantities, even when the occasional wells were 
not dry. 33 The thirsty men and animals would hast 
en to the wells of Bajan to refresh themselves; and 
there Elizondo waited for them. The ground was 
favorable for his design. Concealed in a recess, he 
left in his rear fifty of his men, and in his front placed 
an equally well hidden ambush. At nine o'clock on 
the morning of the .21st, Allende appeared in sight. 
He had left Saltillo with a force of nearly 2,000 men, 
twenty-four pieces of artillery, a great quantity of 
jewelry, and more than half a million of money. He 
was accompanied by all the principal leaders, who, to 
the number sixty, travelled in fourteen carriages. 
The march across the desert was most toilsome, and 
such was Allende's confidence that no military order 
was preserved, and a long straggling line enveloped 
in dust revealed to Elizondo how easily his design 
would be accomplished. The carriages and horsemen 

38 Mora, Mcx. y sus Rev., iv. 145, states that the wells were filled up by 
Elizondo's order. I see no ground for the assertion. 
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 18 


in different groups were far in advance of the main 
body, 33 the artillery being slowly dragged along in 
the rear. 

Fray Pedro Bustamante with five soldiers was the 
first to approach. Passing through files drawn up by 
Elizondo to receive the chiefs, they were saluted and 
unsuspiciously continued their way till they arrived at 
the ambush in the rear, where they were compelled to 
surrender. Then followed a troop of sixty men, who 
were similarly made captive and safely bound. Hith 
erto no opposition was met. Presently the first car 
riage arrived, escorted by about a dozen soldiers. 40 
These attempted to resist, but were overpowered, 
and three of them killed. And thus fell into Eli- 
zondo's hands the occupants of carriage after carriage, 
till all the chiefs were captured with the exception of 
Hidalgo, who was far in the rear. Allende, however, 
had not yielded without a struggle. . Elizondo called 
upon him to surrender. "Traitor!" cried Allende, 
and fired. But the shot was without effect. Elizondo 
then ordered his men to fire into the carriage. Allende 
was accompanied by one of his sons, who was a lieu 
tenant-general; also by Jimenez and Arias. By the 
discharge his son was shot dead and Arias mortally 
wounded. 41 Thereupon Jimenez surrendered him 
self, and Allende was overpowered. Both were se 
curely bound and conveyed to the rear. The last 
to arrive was Hidalgo, who might still have escaped 
had any suspicion of these occurrences been excited; 
but even the firing created no alarm. When called 
upon to surrender, the stout old hero prepared to de 
fend himself, pistol in hand ; but his escort, composed 

39 This order of march had been suggested by Elizondo. He had sent to 
Jimenez a soldier of Monclova, named Pedro Bernal, who said that on account 
of the scarcity of water it would be better for the carriages and all the prin 
cipal officers to go well in advance of the main body. If all inarched together 
the supply in the wells would be quickly exhausted, while by this arrange 
ment the wells would be replenished by the time those in the rear came up. 
Jimenez replied: 'Pues bien, asi lo hard, me parece muy bien lo que vd. dice.' 
Relation, in Hernandez y Ddcalos, Col. Z>oc., ii. 417. 

40 It was occupied by women. Cavillo, Sermon, 144. 

41 He died a few hours afterward. Ib.; Aeyrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., iii. 146. 


of a score of horsemen, intervened and entreated him 
to surrender, representing that resistance would be 
useless. Finding himself unsupported by his men, he 
laid aside his weapon, and with undisturbed serenity 
yielded himself a prisoner. Well might he have 
cursed Allende, and the want of watchfulness and 
generalship that brought them all to such a pass, 
after wresting the management from his hands. 

So Elizondo's treachery triumphed. In his power 
were now all the great chiefs and originators of 
the revolution. 42 Never was plot more perfidiously 
planned, or more successfully accomplished. Leaving 
his prisoners securely bound and in charge of a strong 
force, Elizondo at the head of 150 men now marched 
against the main body, consisting of some 1,500, a 
league behind. The fiofhtin^ was all on one side. The 

o o o 

artillerymen in the van were slain, a portion of the 
troops which followed passed over to Elizondo, and 
the rest were dispersed. About forty of the revolu 
tionists were slain, 893 taken prisoners, and all their 
guns, equipage, and treasure fell into the hands of the 
victors. 43 

The only person of note who escaped was Iriarta, 44 
who fled at the first attack upon the artillery. This, 

42 The captured leaders consisted of four members of regular orders, eight 
of the secular clergy, and 49 officers of all grades. An official list can be 
found in Net/rete, Mex. Sig. XIX., iii. 144-5, and Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. 
Doc., ii. 418-9. 

43 This account is mainly from the report of the provisional governor Her- 
rera, in Gaz. d$ Mex., 18.11,. ii. 360-3, the same source which supplied Cal- 
villo, Alaman, "and Negrete. According to Vela, the amount of treasure 
captured in silver bars and coin was about 2,000,000 dollars. Mex., 
ISllj ii. 321. Important documents in lJ^ymajide2 L ^Ddj^a]b^Col^MQC.j^ 
416-24, 489-90,'-;517-18, have also been consulted /"TsTizoiido met withnw 
death not long after. In 1813 he went on an expedition to Texas, and in 
Sept. was mortally wounded while in bed by one of his lieutenants, who, it is 
asserted, was losing his reason by witnessing the executions ordered by 
Elizondo. The name of this avenger of Hidalgo was Serrano. Elizondo died 
on the bank of the river San Marcos, and was there buried. Bastamante, 
Cuad. Hist. , i. 349-50. 

**(>'(&. de Mex., 1811, ii. 320. Negrete, however, considers it doubtful 
whether Iriarte accompanied the retreating chiefs. ' Es punto, pues, que no 
se puede resolver con datos fehacientes si iria 6 no.' Mex. Sig. XIX., iii. 
136-7. Bayon's statement, however, that Allende took Iriarte with him, and 
that the latter returned, removes all doubt. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. y 
v. 588. 


however, only hastened his doom, for Allende, con 
vinced of his perfidy, had left orders with Rayon to 
have him beheaded if he returned, which was prompt 
ly done. 45 The prisoners were conveyed to Monclova, 
and every precaution taken to prevent their escape. 
The principal chiefs were lodged in a house provided 
for the purpose by Herrera, the others being confined 
in the public jail. Great excitement prevailed in the 
city, and Elizondo, not considering his captives in 
safe keeping, sent to Ochoa, who was approaching 
Saltillo, requesting of him a reinforcement of 500 men, 
which was immediately despatched to Monclova by 
forced marches. 

As the capture had been made on territory under 
the government of the comandante general of the 
interior provinces, it was necessary to send them to 
Chihuahua for trial, where resided the brigadier Ne- 
mesio Salcedp, who then held that position. On the 
26th of March the principal prisoners, 46 including Hi 
dalgo, Allende, Jimenez, and Abasolo, as also the reg 
ular and secular ecclesiastics, were led forth on their 
long journey to that city. Shackled hand and foot, 
mounted on miserable beasts of burden, and escorted 
by a strong guard, these unhappy men painfully 
travelled the two hundred leagues of rough road 
which connected the two cities. 47 Their sufferings 
were painful in the extreme; even their halt by night 
afforded little relief to their strained muscles, as their 

45 Manifesto de CallejapublicadoporJuanMartiiiena; Alaman, Hist. Mej., 
ii. 246; Bu*tainantc y Cuad. Hist., i. 199. According to this last author, the 
reason for Allende's order was 'porque era seilal dc que habia jugadole otra 
nueva perfidia sobre las anteriores. ' Ib. Negrete states that Iriarte'a death 
was determined upon because he had failed to attack the royalist army in the 
rear during the engagement at Calderon as ordered. Rayon distinctly states 
why he was put to death: neglect to render aid in the engagements at Guana 
juato and Calderon, though summoned by both Allende and Hidalgo; his 
waste of the great treasure which he obtained at San Luis and Zacatecas; and 
the grave suspicions of treachery with which his conduct was regarded. 
Rayon adds: * Y volvi6 inniciado (sic) de haber influido en la prision de loa 
generales.' Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., v. 588-9. 

4(5 Official list of names is given in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 3G5-6. 

47 At Parras the commander of the escort, Manuel Salcedo, the governor 
of Texas deposed by Casas, sent all the ecclesiastics with the exception of Hi 
dalgo to Durango. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 48. 


fetters were never for a moment removed. On the 
23d of April they reached their destination. The 
comandante Salcedo had already made ready for 
the occasion. It was not every day Chihuahua of 
fered such a spectacle as Hidalgo and his generals 
conducted in chains through her streets! So on the 
21st Salcedo issued a proclamation granting permis 
sion to all the inhabitants of the city to witness the 
entrance of the prisoners, and prescribing rules to be 
observed on the occasion, the infringement of which 
would be visited with severe punishment. Any ex 
pression of either sympathy or hate was forbidden. 48 
Having passed through this ordeal, the prisoners 
were incarcerated without removal of their fetters, in 
the places assigned for that purpose. 49 

On the 25th Juan Jose liuiz de Bustamante was ap 
pointed to draw up the preliminary proceedings for 
their trial; and on the Gth of May following a mili 
tary court was established, composed of a president, 
auditor, secretary, and four voting members. The 
prosecution rested entirely upon the declarations of 
the prisoners, special judges being appointed to ex 
amine them and take their depositions. These were 
then submitted to the above-mentioned tribunal, which 
pronounced its verdict in accordance, and passed sen 
tence. The members of the court were Manuel Sal 
cedo,^ president; Rafael Bracho, auditor; and captains 
Pedro Nolasco Carrasco, Jose Joaquin Ugarte, and 
Simon Elias Gonzalez, three of the voting members. 51 
Angel Abella, the director of the postal service at 
Zacatecas, 52 was appointed on the same day on which 

48 No groups were allowed to be formed nor any weapons carried ; the in 
habitants were to take position in files, two or three deep, on each side of 
the streets, and return to their occupations as soon as the prisoners were in 
carcerated. Sliced-"), Bci;ido, in Id., i. 5-6. 

49 Hidalgo, Alleiide, Jiuui Aldania, and Jimenez were confined in separate 
apartments of the college of the expelled Jesuits. The other chiefs were 
lodged in the Franciscan convent. Ncyrete, Max. Si.<j. XIX., iii. 143-30. 

50 The late governor of Texas, who conducted the prisoners to C.iihuahua. 
51 1 have nob been able to discover the names of the secretary and fourth 

voting member. 

52 He escaped with difficulty, through the assistance of the conde de San- 


the court was formed to take the depositions of Hi 
dalgo, Allende, Juan Aldama, and Jimenez. On the 
7th he commenced his duties. It would be out of place 
to enter into the details of the numerous depositions. 
Hidalgo and Allende, instead of favoring, rather op 
posed each other. 

Allende had met with much to trouble him since 
his seizure of the general management and his fail- 

o O 

ure. 53 It had been a fearful responsibility, for he well 
knew that failure was almost certain death. Hidalgo 
was mild and moderate in all his actions and expres 
sions. He could make allowances for the temper of 
the soldier, and for so good a soldier as Allende, and 
one engaged in so noble a cause; he could even forgive 
the unjust reproaches of a friend, but he could not 
forget the sad failure, the lost cause no! it was not 
lost. As sure as the sun continued to rise and set, 
the grito de Dolores would never cease ringing 
throughout the land till Mexico was free ! 

The deposition of Abasolo displayed the character 
of that leader as one of the most pusillanimous. He 
never had been greatly trusted by his associates. 
)uring the latter days of disaster his lukewarm- 
ness had been apparent, and now, in peril of his 
life, he left no means untried, however dastardly, to 
save it, accusing everybody while shielding himself. 
He had known nothing, he testified, about the revo 
lution until the grito de Dolores had gone forth; he 
had attempted to give Colonel Canal at San Miguel 
information; he had wished at the commencement to 
separate himself from the rebellion every one of 
which statements was a lie. Though he had been 
made colonel, and after that major-general, he was 
withal a coward. When Hidalgo attacked Guana- 

tiago de la Laguna, from that city, when it fell into the hands of the insur 
gents. Alaman, J/iftl. Mcj., ii. 19. 

53 Hidalgo claimed that it was by order of Allende that the Europeans at 
Matehuala and oilier places were killed, and Allende charged Hidalgo with 
being the cause of all the evils which had befallen them; he confessed that 
he wished. to poison him. llernandtz y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 14-15, 39. 


juato, he remained in the house of his friend Pedro 
Otero during the contest, and though he was present 
at the battle of Calderon, it was not with a willing 
heart, he said, and he was one of the first to flee! 

His accusations against the leaders of the insurgents 
were villanous; he brought unjustly on Hidalgo's 
minister, Chico, a doom which otherwise he would 
have escaped. 54 Between Abasolo's inherent base 
ness and the high-minded conduct of his wife. Dona 
Maria Manuda cle Rojas y Taboada, his worthless life 
was spared to him. Of all the principal promoters of 
the revolution, he alone did not hesitate to crawl away 
from a death which posterity will forever proclaim 
glorious. His property was confiscated, his offspring 
was attainted, and he was condemned to ten years im 
prisonment. He was sent to Cadiz and incarcerated 
in the castle of Santa Catarina, where he ended his 
days, attended and consoled to the last by his faith 
ful wife. 55 

The trials were conducted with every possible de 
spatch, and on the 10th of May three of the cap 
tives were led forth to execution. 56 On the llth two 
more met the same fate, and on the 6th of June five 
others, among whom was Mariano Hidalgo, brother of 
the general. Allende suffered on the 26th of the 
same month, in company with Jimenez, Juan Aldama, 
arid Manuel Santa Maria, the governor of Monterey ; 

54 Cbico Lad been regarded as a prisoner of minor importance, and was left 
in Moiiclova. When Abasolo testified that he transacted Hidalgo's cabinet 
business, and had been appointed by him in Guadalajara minister of grace 
and justice, orders to send him to Chihuahua were despatched to the author 
ities at Monclova. This sealed his fate; he was condemned and executed. 
Ala-man, Hist. Mej., ii. 18G-7. 

55 He died in 1819. Mora, Rev., iv. 152. Negrete states that 
he was imprisoned for life, although producing an official document in which 
the term of his imprisonment is given as ten years. Mcx. Sir/. XIX., iii. 203. 
See also Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 48, and Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 
190-1. Abasolo's wife after his death returned to New Spain, where she de 
voted herself to the benevolent assistance of the unfortunate, and the educa 
tion of her son JRafael. Ib. 

56 Ignacio Camargo, who had carried to Biaiio Hidalgo's summons to sur 
render; Juan Bautista Carrasco, brigadier; and Agustin Marroquin, a crim 
inal liberated at Guadalajara, and employed by Hidalgo to conduct the mas 
sacre of Spaniards there. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. 76, 41. 


and on the following day the unfortunate Chico and 
three others were put to death. 57 All these victims 
to the cause of independence were shot with their 
backs to the firing platoons as traitors, and their prop 
erty confiscated. 

With regard to the prisoners who had been left in 
Monclova and those -who had been sent to Durango, 
the more prominent of the former were shot, the 
common soldiers being condemned to imprisonment. 
In the case of the friars and clergy, more formality 
had to be observed out of respect to ecclesiastical ju 
risdiction. Six of them were condemned to death, 
but their clerical degradation was necessary before 
they could be executed according to established form. 
Doctor Olivares, the bishop of Durango, however, re 
fused to degrade them, and angry passages were inter 
changed between him and the intenderite Bonavia on 
the matter. The prelate was inflexible, but the in- 
tendente was not to be defeated. By his command 
the condemned priests were brought from their cells 
without" their ecclesiastical robes, and so executed. 
Their bodies were then dressed in the habiliments of 
their respective orders and delivered to the cura for 
burial. 53 

The execution of Hidalgo was for some time de 
layed by these ecclesiastical formalities. On the 14th 
of May the bishop of Durango commissioned Fran 
cisco Fernandez Valentin, canon of that cathedral, to 
act as ecclesiastical judge in the case; and to him had 
been submitted by the military court the declarations 
taken by Abella. On the 14th of June they were 
approved by him and ordered to be returned to the 
auditor Bracho. The arrival of additional evidence, 
however, still protracted Hidalgo's trial, and it was 
not until the 3d of July that Bracho presented to 

57 Six others were sentenced to imprisonment for ten years, with one excep 
tion, Andre's Molano being sentenced for life. Jd. , 70. 

'^Negrete, Mex. Sly. XIX., iii. 323-4. This author supplies a copy of 
Bonavia 's order for the execution, which contains an injunction that the pla 
toons were not to lire at their heads. 


the court his opinion, advocating sentence of death. 59 
But before this sentence could be either pronounced 
or executed, civil and canonical law required, as in 
the case before mentioned, that the prisoner should be 
degraded and formally handed over by the ecclesi 
astical judge to the secular authorities. Bishop Oli- 
vares was unable from age and infirmity to undertake 
the tedious journey in order to perform these cere 
monies in person, 63 and a further delay was caused 
by the demurs of Dr Valentin, who hesitated to act 
upon the authorization first extended him by the 
bishop, 61 and suggested that Hidalgo should be sent 
to Durango. The prelate, however, explained his 
right to delegate his powers under certain difficul 
ties to another, and confirming Valentin's previous 
commission, expressed the expectation that he would 
at once proceed in the matter. 62 Accordingly, on 
the 27th of July, with the cura, the chaplain of 
the army, and the local superior of the Franciscan 
convent as his associates, he pronounced the sentence 
of degradation against Hidalgo, 63 and on the 29th 
proceeded to carry it into execution by divesting him 
of his sacerdotal robes, according to the prescribed 
form of the church. 

In clerical habit Hidalgo was conducted into the 
presence of the ecclesiastical commissioner judge, and 
for the first time since the day of his capture was re 
leased from the fetters which oppressed him. Then 
he was robed in the sacred vestments of his priestly 

59 A copy of Bracho's dictamen is supplied in Id., iii. 192-8. No dis 
graceful death he considers would be too severe a punishment for the atroci 
ties committed by Hidalgo. But he respects his priestly calling, 'pero es 
Ministro del Altisimo, marcado con el indeleble caracter de Sacerdote de la 
ley de gracia,' and as there was neither hangman nor gallows, he proposed 
that he should bo shot. 

60 The ceremony of degradation of a priest could only be performed by the 
bishop, according to canonical law. 

C1 ' Autorizo a U. en debida forma, para cuanto se le ofrezca en la caiisa del 
espresado cura Hidalgo hasta llegar en caso urgente y necesario a degradarlo.' 
Zcf.,iii. 199. 

6 - His letter is dated July 18th. Id., 214-16. 

63 A copy of the sentence is supplied in Id., iii. 229-30, and Hernandez y 
JDuvalos, Col. Doc., i. 5o-7. 


calling, and, on his knees before the judge, heard him 
explain to the assembled witnesses of the ceremony 
the cause of his degradation. The sentence was now 
read to him, after which his sacerdotal garments were 
taken from him, and he was handed over to the secu 
lar authorities, an earnest appeal being made by the 
ecclesiastical judge that his punishment might be miti 
gated, so that neither the death penalty nor mutila 
tion should be imposed. 64 When the ceremony was 
ended, Hidalgo was again fettered and conducted to 
his cell. 

Before daybreak on the morning of the 31st of 
July, 63 Hidalgo was led forth from the prison in which 
he had been confined for more than three months. 
With his usual perfect tranquillity, he had received 
those sent to take him to the place of execution, and 
having finished his last breakfast, 66 he rose and indi 
cated that he w r as prepared to accompany them. The 
place selected was an enclosed court in the rear of the 
hospital ; and as he slowly proceeded thither, impeded 
by his shackles, his fortitude and serenity did not for 
a moment desert him. Remembering that he had left 
some sweetmeats under his pillow, he stopped and re 
quested that they might be brought to him. These 
he distributed among the soldiers that composed the 
firing platoons, assuring them of his forgiveness. 
Aware that orders had been given not to fire at his 
head, and as it was not yet light, he told them that in 
order to guide their aim he would place his hand over 
his heart. After being bound upon the seat of execu 
tion, raising his hand without a tremor to his breast, 
he reminded the soldiers that it was the mark at which 

64 Id., i. 57-S. This ceremony was called the degradacion verbal y real. 

65 This is the date given by Negrete. Max. Sifj. XIX., iii. 339. The 27th, 
as reported in the official document supplied to Cruz and bearing date of Sept. 
5, 1811, is obviously a mistake, since Hidalgo was degraded on the 29th. 
Id., 268. Bustamante, followed by Alaman, states that Hidalgo was ex 
ecuted 'al tercero dia de haberse verificado la llamada degradacion.' Ouad. 
Hist., i. 262. 

66 Observing that less milk than usual had been supplied him, he requested 
that he might have the same quantity as previously, observing that though it 
was his last, he ought not on that account to drink less of it. Ib. 


they were to aim. Then the signal was given and the 
platoon fired. Though one bullet pierced his hand, it 
failed to touch the heart, and Hidalgo still remained 
erect in his seat, uttering words of prayer. A second 
volley was discharged, cutting the cords which secured 
him. He now fell upon the ground, but life was not 
yet extinct; and it was only after three more shots 
were fired, the muskets being held close to his breast, 
that he breathed his last. 67 

The heads of Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and Jime 
nez were sent to Guanajuato, and suspended in iron 
cages at the four corners of the alhondiga. Their 
bodies were interred in the chapel of the third order 
of Franciscans in Chihuahua, where they remained 
till 1823, when, by order of congress, the remains 
were transferred with the skulls to the cathedral of 
Mexico, where they were deposited with solemn hon 
ors in the chapel of los Reyes, the former burial-place 
of the viceroys, and later that of the presidents of 
the republic. 63 

67 Excu dero, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 603-4; Neyrete, Mex. 
Sifj. XIX., iii. 335-6; Bustamante, CuaL Hist., i. 262-3. During his incar 
ceration Hidalgo had been attended by a corporal named Ortega and Melchor 
Guaspe, a Spaniard of Majorca. These men treated him with great consider 
ation, and in token of his gratitude, the evening before he was executed he 
wrote on his prison walls with a piece of charcoal two stanzas, which were 
preserved, with the exception of one line. They are as follows: 

Ortega, tn criun^a fina, 
Tu hulolo y ainable 

* Siempro to liar 11 aprt-ciable 

Aun con jronto peregriua. 
Tionc proti-ccion Divuia 
La piedad quo has ejorcido 
Con uu pobre desvalido 
Quo manana va .\ niurir, 
Y no puedo rc'tribuir 
Kingun favor rccibido. 

Melchor, tu buen corazon 
Ha adunado ion pericia 
Lo quc pidu la.justicia 
Y exijo la companion ; 

Das consticlo al dcsvalido 

En cuanto to os penniiido % 

Partes cl postro con ^1 

Y agradecido Miyut-l 

To da las gracias rcndido. 

Id., 270-1. This apophthegm was also found written on a wall of his cell: 
'La lengua guarda el pescuezo' The tongue ia guardian of the breast. Ala- 
man, Hint. Mej., ii. 206. 

68 Consult official documents in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 


Since the beginning in 1810 of Hidalgo's short ca 
reer, he has been held in varying esteem, at different 
times and by different persons and classes. He has 
been placed in about every category of humanity, and 
adjudged to be of every order of being, every shade 
of quality, from an angel of light to a bloody-minded 
and revengeful monster. A brief analysis of his char 
acter, from a standpoint intended to be impartial, 
brings the following results: 

We will take it for granted that the cause in which 
he engaged was just, that the impulses prompting to 
it were noble; for it is not necessary to say at -this 
day that it is right to overthrow tyranny, to achieve 
liberty, to deliver one's country, or that his memory 
should be held in holy repute who lays down his life 
for these things. 

Before embarking in his high enterprise, Hidalgo 
was an humble priest, of more than ordinary gentle 
ness of nature, and refinement of intellect and culture. 
Some have sought to besmear his fair fame with 


charges of conduct not consistent with strict morality; 
but nothing of moment has ever been proved against 
him in this direction; and were it so, those who hold 
such matters in such serious esteem will have little 
to say if they will examine into the state of society 
in the place and at the time he lived. It shows a 
small mind to attempt thus to belittle great men; 
and it is still worse when the charges brought forward 
are palpably false. 

Almost without knowing it, and surely before he 
intended it, 69 this gentle priest found himself at the 
head of his people crying aloud to heaven for liberty, 
swearing to heaven that his country should be free I 
It has been said of him that he was not a great gen 
eral; he never pretended to be one. He has been 
charged with extreme cruelty. From some stand- 

69 In his declaration he states that he decided to join the revolutionary 
party very suddenly, 'y que su inclinacion a la Independencia fue" lo que le 
oblig6 4 decidirse con tanta ligereza 6 lliimase frenesi.' Hernandez y l)dva- 
los, Col. Doc., i. 10. 


points this, no doubt, is true; but the time and place 
must be remembered, and also that it was the cruelty 
of the surgeon to save the body rather than that of 
the savage who delights in torture. Hidalgo had his 
work to do ; if cruelty could not be avoided, then there 
must be cruelty. He would purchase the highest bene 
faction within the reach of humanity; if robbery and 
murder were part of the price, still it must be paid. 
Yet for all this, judging the man fairly, passing under 
review his past life and his present purpose, his mind, 
heart, and disposition, and I do not think he can be 
called cruel, revengeful, and bloody-minded, as some 
would stamp him. War is a great wickedness; and 
if this species of robbery and murder may ever be 
justified, there is so little difference between the 
orthodox article arid the quality of reprisal as prac 
tised in the present crusade that it is not worth dis 


Some have said that Hidalgo's intention was to es 
tablish a republic; it may have been so, but it is no 
where shown. Zavala holds to the contrary opinion. 
There appears to have been no political or military 
plan adopted by the leaders of the revolution, hurried 
along as they were upon a tide of events which they 
could hardly control. 

The large class in Mexico, of those who ever since 
the grito de Dolores have seemed to delight in gath 
ering evidence and making charges damaging to the 
fair name of Hidalgo, is gradually becoming less. 
I would hide nothing in any historical character. I 
would not be blind to the faults of my hero. Neither 
would I magnify flaws of character until a little fault 
is made to appear larger than a great principle. 
Moreover, there has been much speculation as to 
what would have been the result had he pursued a 
different course, His firmness of purpose and opinion 
has been called obstinacy, because he would not yield 
to Allende and the others. Had he marched on Mex 
ico; had he retired part of his force to the mountains 


and drilled them, dismissing the great rabble and his 
army of pillagers; had he proclaimed a system of 
liberal institutions; had he been slower to rob and 
butcher Spaniards; had he better protected the Creoles; 
had he done 'differently in a hundred other ways the 
result would have been different. Doubtless. But the 
question is not what might have come to pass if the 
prime mover in Mexican independence had been a 
different man and acted differently. As it is, though 
not without his faults, Mexico may well be proud of 
her hero. Let his memory be honored! Let his 
name be enrolled among the world's champions of lib 

His countrymen, grateful to one who, in the gloomi 
est hour of hope, stood forth so fearlessly as their de 
fender, have rightly embalmed his memory; and his 
name, growing brighter and brighter as the ages 
pass, will be handed down unsullied to remotest 
generations. 70 

70 On the 19th of July, 1823, a congressional decree was passed, declaring 
Hidalgo and the other principal leaders in the struggle for independence to 
be ' benemdritos de la patria en grail o her6ico,' and ordered a monument in 
their honor to be erected in Chihuahua. Gaz. de Mex., 5 de Agosto, 1823; 
Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 005. In 1863 Benito Juarez, having re 
tired with the government to Dolores on account of the French invasion, 
passed a decree elevating the town to the rank of city, and ordering that a 
monument bearing a statue of Hidalgo should be erected in the principal 
plaza. He pronounced the house in which Hidalgo had lived to be the prop 
erty of the nation, and provided that it should be protected and preserved in 
its original state so far as possible, at the expense of the government. Id., ii. 
611. In 1873 the congress decreed that the national flag should be annually 
hoisted on the 8th of May, Hidalgo's birthday, and raised half-mast high on 
the 30th of July in commemoration of his death. Id., ii. 614-15. President 
Porfirio Diaz in 1878 ordered that the monument at Dolores, which had 
hitherto not been erected, should be built. The estimate of its cost was 
$40,000, which amount was covered by pro rata contributions levied upon 
the states. In the same year General Diaz decreed that a monument should 
also be erected in Hidalgo's honor on the spot where he was executed in Chi 
huahua. Id., ii. 615-19. In the Gazeta de Mexico of August 3, 1811, was 
published an alleged copy of a declaration professed to be Hidalgo's solemn 
recantation of his errors, made some weeks before his death, and dated Chi 
huahua, May 18, 1811. This spurious statement was probably promulgated 
in order to turn independents against the cause. It is superfluous to deny 
such an assertion. No attempt which can properly be called such was ever 
made to establish its truth. He who for a moment could hold to such an 
opinion totally misconceives the character of the man. To death Hidalgo was 
indifferent; and he would be the last man on earth to uphold to his followers, 
according to the tenor of this declaration, the enormity of their crime in re- 


belling against the government, and to entreat them to return to their duty. 
But this artifice was commonly employed by the royalists; to almost every 
prominent patriot chief who was executed during the war of independence 
such a recantation was attributed and published. 

The documents which contain the alleged proceedings at the trial of Hi 
dalgo, a copy of which is supplied by Hernandez y Davalos in his Col, Doc., 
i. 7-01, aro open to grave doubts as to the authenticity of all the tes 
timony produced. Much of the evidence is warped and garbled so as to 
represent Hidalgo in the most odious light possible. Many of the admissions 
appearing in the documents were never uttered by him, and most of the 
statements attributed to other declarants are not to be relied upon as genu 
ine. I cannot, however, agree with Negrete, who endeavors to show that 
these documents are wholly apocryphal, and 'que esos documentos no pueden 
hacer f<3 en ningun sentido, ni considerarse como aute~ntico lo en ellos con- 
tenidp.' Mex. Siylo XIX., iii. 274. I have found many of the statements 
therein contained corroborated or supported by other authorities of reliabil 
ity, and to ignore entirely the Declaration del cura Hidalgo and the accom 
panying papers would scarcely be wise. 

The official organs of the government naturally magnified the successes 
of the royalists and the reverses of the revolutionists. Pompous reports 
from generals narrating victories were invariably published, but many of 
their despatches which represented the true conditions of affairs were con 
signed to the secrecy of the government archives, from which they have 
been brought to light by different researchers, as Bustamante, Hernandez y 
Davalos, and Negrete, and used by numerous authors. With regard to 
those published during the war, they are valuable and reliable in so far as 
they represent the movement of armies, the general results of engagements, 
and a broad view of the condition of the country. But in regard to the re 
spective numbers of opposing forces, of insurgents killed and casualties sus 
tained by the government troops, they are untrustworthy; while from the 
documents that were shelved a true picture of the position is obtained. 
The press being under the control of the government during Hidalgo's career, 
it teemed with productions laboring to advance the royalist cause and hold 
up to detestation that of the independents. Learned men printed heavy 
essays attempting to prove on philosophical and political grounds the illegal 
ity and want of justice in the movement; bishops issued pastorals and long 
dissertations arguing on the iniquity of the insurrection and proclaiming the 
perdition of the leaders; and poets sang the praises of the royalist command 
ers, comparing them with the heroes of antiquity and renowned Roman gen 
erals. Calleja was superior to Fabius Maximus, and Cruz the supporting 
pillar of the tottering nation. The adulation was truly affecting ! In honor 
of Calleja Dr Jose Mariano Beristain composed a drinking-song drawing a 
parallel between him and Fabius; to which the oider Melchor de Foncerrada 
replied with the following decastich, supplied by Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., 
iv. 394-5: 

Fabio gano retirando, 

Calleja acometiendo, 

El Fubio triunfj cansando; 

Pero Calleja venciendo : 

Y ti lo poco quo yo cntiendo 

En cl arte militar, 

No so puedo comparar 

Un Fabio con un Callcjas, 

All'i hubo accioncs porplexas; 

Todo aqul puro triuniar. 

Effusions of minor geniin, too, swarmed, scurrilous in abuse, vile in vitupera 
tion, against the one side, and sickening with flattery and sycophant hom 
age offered to the other. But no language, however shameful, however fal 
lacious, was unpalatable to government, if it brought odium upon the 

General list of authorities for the last four chapters: Bustamante, Cam- 
paftas de Calleja, 1-103, passim; Id., Cuad. Hist., i. 20-292, 437-42, iv. 53- 


61, 74-87, 526-7, ap. 1-4; Id., in Cavo, Tres Siglos, iii. 333; Id., Gdbinete 
Mex., i. 114; Id., Voz Patria, v. sup. no. 3; Alaman,_Hi& Hex., L 75-6, 
124-5, 224, 259, 350-4, 392-3, 44G-7, 504, ap. 77, ii.~2-77, 114-72", 182-282, 
438-9, 544-8, ap. 31-4, iii. ap.75, iv. 77, 724, ap. 60-2; Mora, Rev. Mex., iv. 
3_4, 49_SO, 114-60, 217-34, 440-2; Id., Obras Sueltas, i. 145-56; Zerecero, 
Rev. Mex., 28-95, 109-92, 207-93, 299-303, 3GS, 384; Id., Discxrso Civ., 29- 
34; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., i. and ii.. passim, iii. 246-7, 291, 339, 
399-401, 404-23, 618-20, 693-4, 705-22, 733-47, 762-4, 873-903, 911-26, iv. 
176-81, 672-3, 882-90, v. 87-9, 588-9, 801-4, 886; Dispos. Variat, ii. f. 5-10, 
iii. f. 152, vi. f. 59, 61; Diario Mex., v. 210, xii. 447-8, xiii. 340, 38G-7, 390- 

6, 425-7, 453-6, 471-2, 709-10; Ncgrete, Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX., i. 103, 169- 
205, 255-3, 280-312, 319-32, 336-67, 372-404; Gaz. Mex., i. 1764-5, 17-288, 
313-80, 431-8, 474-82, 488, 507-14, 556-8, 565-6, 593-6, 012-10, 624, 656-60, 
675-6, 681, 705-30, 746-74, 785-94, 814-66, 873-4, 881-2, 008-28, 943, 955-6, 
991-2, 1039-34, 1049-72, 1082-6, ii. 1811, 1-281, passim, 309, 453-4, 467-8, 
684-8, 763-70, 969-70, iii. 1788-9, 217-18, 247, 366, 405, 415, iv. 1793-1, 25- 
85, 117-19, 141, 174-5, 295-6, 301-8, 337-8, 389-413, v. 1792-3, 141, 181-3, 
245, vi. 1794, 9, 397, 417, 637, vii. 1795, 9-10, 25-0, 121, 154, 335, viii. 1796- 

7, 9, 33, 165, 197, 237,. ix. 1800-1, 1, 58, 81-2, 137-8, 18J, 231-2, 241, xi. 
1802-3, 1, 17, 177, 217, 253, xii. 1804-5, 117-20, 164-5, 221, xiv. 1807, 46-7, 
xv. 1808, 75, 673, 734; Cortes, Col. Decret., i. 6-7, 10, 20-4, 23-33: Id., Diario, 
1811, v. 175; Id., 1811-12, xi. 282-3; Id., 1813, xx. 205-C; Id., Diario Extr., 
1822-3, viii. 18-19; Cavo, Tres Sig., ii. 172, iii. 194-5, 272-33; Guerra, Rev. 
N. Espana, i. 291, 301-6, 312-15, 317-19, 325-64; Romero, Soc. Mex., viii. 
532-5, 543, 555, 610, 621; Id., Noticias, Mich., 34-5, 200-7; / ., in tfoc. Mex. 
Geog., viii. 610; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 278-357, 234-8; Lireaga, Adiciones y 
Rect., 188-209, 218-19; Robinson, Mex., 29-42; Zavala, Rev. Alex., 48-70; 
Alegre, Hist. Comp., i. 88-93, ii. 195; Gaz. Mex., Feb.-Dec. 1728 and 1730, in 
Arevalo, Compend., 13-104, 205, 236-7, 283; Vitla-Senor y Sanchez, Teatro 
Am., 1-110; Gonzales Ddvila, Teatro Ecles., i. 107-30; Viagero Universal, 
xxvii. 87-92; Ward, Hist. Mex. in 1827, i. 158-80; Cancdxda, Tel. Am., 9-15, 
26-9, 193-6; Id., RuinaN. Esp., passim; Escakro y Liana, Mex. Hist., 9-10; 
Estado de Sinaloa, June 29, 1873, 4; Ilumboldt, Essai Polit., i. 218-56; 
Hidalgo, Biog. Cura, 9-18, 135-43; Defeusadel Cura, pp. 8; Exhortation Pat., 
pp. 4; Exhort. Diputados, pp. 16; Exhort. Hob. Mex., pp. 15; Gourdes, Col. 
N. Leon, 153, 213-40; Id., Hist. Aguas C., 77-88; Venegas, Manifesto, pp. 
10; Id., Ordenanza, 7; Id., Manifiesto, pp. 10; Abad y Queipo, Informe, in 
Zamacois, Mex., ix. 857-93; Id., Pastorales, pp. 118, and 8; Id., Edictos 
Instruc., pp. 8, 24, and 24; Arroniz, Hist, y Cron., 164-5; Id., fiiog. Mex., 
185; Monglave, Resume Vllist., 133-213; Mendib'd, Resum. Hist., 7-G3, 373-5; 
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"; /te 

Mex., Parto Of.cial del Gefe Realista, pp. 38; Collado, Informe, pp. 12; 
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335-70, x. 694; Derecho Intern. Mex., pt iii. 118; Dunbar. Mex. Papers, 220; 
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Gratulatoria, pp. 5; Last Amer. Descript., 263, 268-71; Lowenstern, 346-8; 
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Maxim., i. 13-22; Leon, Cura de Sant. de Queret., pp, 3; Linares, Cuadro 
Sinoptico, in Mex. Soc. Geog. BoL, 2 a ep. iv. 637-8. 
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 19 




WITH the heads of the leaders cut off, many thought 
that the revolution was forever at an end. ' And so it 
might have been had the movement rested in man's 
hand that is, had it originated solely with those men, 
or with any one set of men, or had it been dependent 
for its final success on aught else than the mighty power 
of progress. Independence was not an accident. It 
had waited its full development in the womb of time, 
and now its bringing-forth was certain. The birth of 
freedom in America had long been predetermined. 
Cut off the head of every revolutionist twenty times, 
and twenty times new armies would arise until the 
great dragon was slain. 

When tidings of the capture of Hidalgo, Allende, 
and their army reached Mexico, the rejoicing of the 
royalists was great, as we may imagine. The first re 
port was conveyed without particulars in a despatch 
from Ochoa; and though the viceroy could rely upon 



the statement, 1 and caused the bells to be rung, and 
salvoes of artillery to be fired, the independent party 
in the absence of details was loath to accept it as true. 
Later information, however, confirmed the intelligence, 
and despondency prevailed among its ranks. Venegas, 
on the contrary, was jubilant, and regarded the suppres 
sion of the rebellion as essentially accomplished. But 
he did not recognize the extent and degree to which 
independent principles had pervaded the lower classes. 
It is true that from the sweeping disasters which had 
lately been sustained, the ordinary observer might won 
der that the cause was not already abandoned. But 
during the year 1811, thus far, the insurrection had 
spread with surprising rapidity, which had carried it 
over the greater portion of New Spain. The aspect of 
the revolution was, however, materially changed since 
its incipiency, and the struggle had now assumed more 
the color of individual and predatory warfare. With 
out any form of government, or even a recognized head 
after Hidalgo's capture for Rayon's commission as 
commander-in-chief was not generally acknowledged 
each provincial leader acted independently accord 
ing to his pleasure. Arms and money were wanting, 
as w r ell as leaders ; and owing to this lack of plan and 
principle, and the absence of cohesion, the successes 
which they repeatedly gained were but temporary. 
Too often, moreover, their chiefs knew little of the 
art of war, and many of them were wholly unlettered. 
On the other hand, the royalists had among them 
leaders not only trained to the military profession, but 
of practical experience in warfare. They were in pos 
session of nearly all the arms in the country; their 
troops were well disciplined; and above all, they held 
the ports, and could therefore supply themselves from 
abroad. Nevertheless, over a vast area detached 
bodies of insurgents sprung into existence, led some 
times by noble and patriotic men, but too often by 
desperadoes and escaped criminals, who carried on 

l Gaz. dellex., 1811, ii. 301-2. 


little better than a guerrilla warfare in their vicinity. 
Such bands generally kept themselves in impregna 
ble positions, making descents upon unprotected towns, 
and desolating the surrounding country. Although 
the royalist forces occupied all the most important 
towns and the immediate vicinities, the revolutionists 
gradually gained control over the country at large. 
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Zacatecas, and large 
portions of Puebla, Vera Cruz, San Luis Potosi, and 
Mexico at the close of 1811, were almost completely 
in possession of the insurgents; and their enemies, 
confined to the fortified cities, were not sufficiently 
numerous to assail in all parts the numerous hordes 
which infested the country. The main efforts of the 
royalists being directed against the better organized 
armies of the independents, they could send out only 
detachments against such guerrilla bands, as, gather 
ing strength, made themselves, from time to time, the 
terror of particular districts. In these cases the in 
surgents were generally routed and temporarily dis 
persed with heavy loss, no mercy being shown to those 
taken with arms in their hands. 2 It was, perhaps, 
the very best policy the revolutionists could have pur 
sued, although adopted without policy these incessant 
diversions w T hich weakened the efforts of the royalists, 
and rendered useless the concentration of their forces. 

There was at this time one man only who stood 
forth conspicuous among the revolutionists as an ad 
mitted chief, a leader round whom they might with 
some degree of confidence rally, a fit successor of Hi- 
clalgo; and somewhat strange to say, this new man 
was the friend and disciple of Hidalgo, like him an 

2 On the 30th of July, 1811, Venegas issued a proclamation to the effect 
that the period for which the induito had been extended was expired, and 
that such as had not availed themselves of it were to consider themselves ex 
cluded, especially those who still continued to excite or aid insurrection. Id., 
690. Nevertheless, it was still not refused to those who begged that it might 
be granted to them. Many of those thus pardoned again took part with the 
revolutionists when the temporary peril in which they found themselves was 
passed. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., ii. 231. 


ecclesiastic, and like him a devoted lover of his coun 
try. His name was Jose Maria Morelos y Pavon. . 
He was born on the 30th of September, 1765, on the 
ranch o Tahuejo el Chico, near Apatzingan. 3 His 
parents were honest and respectable people, the father, 
Manuel Morelos, being a carpenter, and the mother, 
Juana Pavon, the daughter of a school-master in 
Valladolid. Jose's education was the most element 
ary, and on the death of his father, his widowed 
mother was in so straitened circumstances that she 
gave the care of her son to his uncle Felipe More 
los, who owned a mule train, and trafficked between 
Mexico and Acapulco. The young man sometimes fol 
lowed the train, and sometimes looked after the stock 
on the rancho; 4 although his ambition, supported by 
his mother's wishes, had ever been a place in the 
church. At the age of thirty-two, by great effort 
and self-denial, he succeeded in gaining admission into 
the college of San Nicolas as a sizar, or servitor. 5 
Here he studied natural and moral philosophy under 
the guidance of Hidalgo, who was at that time the 
rector, and for whom Morelos ever afterward enter 
tained the greatest regard and veneration. Having 
been ordained, he was appointed temporarily to the 
cures of Churumuco and Huacana ; and later the ben 
efice of the towns of Caracuaro and Nucupetaro, in 
the department of Tacd-mbaro, was conferred upon 
him. The stipend of this curato was small, but the 
hardships of his early life had instilled into Morelos 
habits of frugality, and he managed to save enough 

3 Bustamante, Cuad. Hist. , ii. 408. It was generally believed that Valla 
dolid was the birthplace of Morelos, and the name of that city was conse 
quently changed in 1828 to Morelia, in honor of the patriot. Alaman, how 
ever, supports Bustamante. Hist. Mcj., iii. ap. 85. In Id., iv. ap. 47-8, will 
be found a copy of Morelos' registry of baptism at Valladolid. The full 
name given to him was Jose 1 Maria Teclo. 

4 On one occasion, while pursuing a bull, he was thrown senseless from his 
horse by coming in contact with the branch of a tree. The blow caused 
a permanent scar on his face. Id., ii. 316. 

5 The Spanish expression for this grade of collegiate is capense. Some au 
thors state that he entered the college at the age of twenty-five. Negrete, 
Hist. Mil. Mex. Sig. XIX., i. 313. 


of his income to purchase a modest house in Valla- 
dolid in 1801. This dwelling was the only private 
property he ever owned. 

At the date of the grito de Dolores, Morelos was 
about forty-five years of age. He was strong phys 
ically, with plenty of brain power. Not above me 
dium height, thick-set and solid, he was capable at this 
time of great endurance. His complexion was of a 
healthy dark brown; eyes clear, dark, and brilliant, 
with a glance now quick, searching, magnetic, now 
stern and meditative, and again lapsing into profound 
reverie. Yet he was no dreamer; he was more man 
of the world than Hidalgo, though in regard to learn 
ing he would be almost called illiterate beside the sage 
of Dolores. But he had sufficient education to an 
swer every purpose of his genius, which must ever 
be regarded as among the greatest of his age. 

There was a whirlwind of energy in his face; the 
very atmosphere about him seemed impregnated with 
the latent force emanating from his form and presence. 
The eyebrows were heavy, and met, giving the coun 
tenance an expression of invincible determination. 
The shape and size of the head also showed great men 
tal power. About the mouth and lower jaw the char 
acter lines were deeply traced, features generally well 
chiselled, the chin being rounded like Caesar's on a 
Roman medal, here again displaying the presence of 
an indomitable will. He was grave and gay at once; 
if you would dwell upon the former phase of his dis 
position, let your eyes rest on the upper part of the 
face; if upon the latter, then look at the lower part. 
There was about the mouth an expression at times of 
almost repulsive firmness, yet tempered always by 
frankness; there was about the whole face a harmony 
and equilibrium always present in some form and de 
gree in great men. His energy was of the devouring 
type. In battle his eyes flashed with a sinister light; 
his voice assumed a depth of tone which his soldiers 
thought was like the thunder of a gocl; and he some- 


times became so hungry when thus aroused that he 
would pause in the heat of fighting and call for some 
thing to eat. He thought no more of danger there 
than when reciting prayers in the cloister. And not 
withstanding all this, in the ordinary affairs of life he 
displayed a decided impassiveness, a countenance so 
serene as never in the slightest degree to reveal the 
workings of the mind. Nor was he lacking in con 
versational powers, in courtesy, or even in sprightly 
good humor. Nature made him master of all her 
varying moods, and gave him the discretion to use them 
to good purpose as occasion demanded. 

He wore various uniforms during his military ca 
reer; before he became a soldier his dress was the 
usual habit of a cura, not the extreme priestly robe, 
but a long black frock coat, black vest, knee-breeches, 
stockings, and buckled shoes. He suffered constantly 
from headache, which was greatly relieved by a ker 
chief always worn wound round the head, and usually 
supplying the place of hat or hood. 

The character of Morelos will stand the most 
searching scrutiny. Under closest analysis, its strength 
and beauty shine brightest. His originality and 
sound judgment command our highest admiration. 
Together with great military ability, which enabled 
him to design wise combinations, he possessed excel 
lent discrimination. He knew how to select his offi 
cers and agents. Uneducated though he was both in 
the arts of war and policy, his marvellous instinct and 
prevision, united with sound common sense, gained for 
him high renown, not only as war commander, but as 
political chief. The most minute affairs and matters 
of apparently insignificant importance never escaped 
his watchful eye. He recognized the importance of 
attention to trifles. It seemed as if everything re 
ceived his attention. A rigid catholic, he always con 
fessed himself before going into action ; and his relig 
ious scruples were such that after his first engagement 
he never personally celebrated mass, but delegated 


the performance of that ceremony to an army chap 
lain. Like Hidalgo, he has been charged with cruelty; 
but reiterated accusations of this kind seem silly as 
brought against one who makes it his business to kill 
and damage his fellow-creatures for the time as much 
as possible. The difference drawn between the kind 
man-killer and the cruel one is little else than con 
ventional subterfuge. 6 Here in particular it was the 
exterminating system of warfare pursued which im 
posed upon revolutionary leaders severity and a rig 
orous system of death-sentences. The devotion of 
Morelos to the cause was unbounded, and his firmness 
of soul held him to whatsoever course his judgment 
marked out as the best. He was thoroughly consis 
tent; for the attainment of independence he spared 
neither himself nor his enemies. Serene withal and 
impassive, alike in prosperity and disaster, he neither 
gave way to arrogant self-assertion nor yielded to 
dejection. But conspicuous among all his great qual 
ities was his perfect disinterestedness. No personal 
motive influenced him in his valiant struggle for lib 
erty. His own aggrandizement was what he least 
thought of. To decorations and titles earned by his 
victories he was wholly indifferent; he preferred the 
simple appellation of 'Servant of the Nation.' 7 

When Hidalgo moved toward Valladolid after his 
capture of Guanajuato, Morelos, whom the news of 
the insurrection had already reached, hastened thither 
to learn what it all really meant. Hidalgo, however, 
had left the city; Morelos followed the army toward 
the capital, and overtook Hidalgo at the town of 
Charo. Thence he accompanied him to Indaparapeo. 

6 'Aquella crueldad calculada, con que friamente volvio sangre por sangre, 
y pag6 a sus enemigos centuplicados los males que de ellos recibio.' Such 
is Alaman's unfair appreciation of him ! Hist. Mex., ii. 342. 

''Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 284-9; jBmtamante, Elogio Morelos; Alarnan, 
Hist. Mej., ii. 315-16, 342-4, 423-4; Mex. Refat. Art. Fondo, 12-15; Zere- 
cero, Rev. Mex., 154, 401; Zavala, Rev. Mex., 56-8, 63-4, 68-9; GcUlo, Horn- 
bresllust.,iv. 7-16. 


The cura told him that the only object he had was 
the independence of the country, which decided More- 
los at once upon his course of action. He offered his 
services, and received a commission from Hidalgo to 
levy troops as his lieutenant on the southern coast, 
and further the cause of independence in conformity 
with verbal instructions. 8 

The preliminaries for the expedition having been 
concluded, Morelos bade farewell to Hidalgo and re 
turned to his cure bade him farewell for the last 
time, for these two friends and fellow-patriots never 
again met I When he arrived at his parish, Morelos, 
with all the stern enthusiasm of his nature, applied 
himself to the work in which he had engaged. Call 
ing to him twenty-five followers, he armed 1 them with 
lances and a few muskets, and then directed his steps 
to Zacatula. It was an humble beginning, but it led 
to mighty results. The want of military organiza 
tion in the territory he was invading was favorable 
to his designs. The militia companies of the different 
towns were wholly undisciplined, were never assem 
bled for the purpose of drill or other military instruc 
tion, and their arms were stored in the residences of 
the commanding officers, most of whom obtained 
their positions as a mark of honor, and had never 
seen the soldiers they commanded. On the arrival 
of Morelos at Zacatula, he was joined by Marcos 

8 These instructions were to the effect that Morelos in the towns through 
which he might pass should collect the arms and assume and reestablish the 
government, reinstating under suitable guaranties those who had previously 
held office, provided they were not Europeans; in such cases, he was empowered 
to appoint others. Europeans were to be captured by him, and their property 
confiscated and used in the payment of his troops. The captives were to be 
sent to the nearest intendencia. Opportunity was to be given to such Euro 
peans as were married to unite their respective families, in order that they 
might retire to their own country, or be removed to some island which would 
be selected for their destination. The main object of this expedition to the 
south was the capture of the port of Acapulco. Declaration de Morelos, in 
Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., vi. 18. Negrete, who evidently never saw 
the declaration of Morelos, quotes a long passage out of Alainan, who very 
clearly, and almost in Morelos' own words, recounts the particulars of this 
interview between the two leaders. The language of Alaman is mystery and 
confusion, however, to Negrete, who naively confesses that he does not under 
stand him. Hist. Mil. Mex. Sig. XIX., i. 317. 



Martinez, captain of the militia cavalry of that port, 
with fifty men well provided with arms. 9 Thence 
Morelos marched to Petatlan. Success again attended 
him. Gregorio Valdeolivar, the captain in command, 
was in the city of Mexico at the time, and Morelos, 
having surprised and captured his wife, compelled her 
to deliver up the keys of the quarter in which the 
arms were stored. By this procedure he obtained 
possession of fifty additional muskets, and as many 
lances. His forces were also increased by more than 
100 men. Henceforward the progress of Morelos 
was rapid; and on his march to Acapulco followers 

daily flocked to his standard. Passing through Tec- 
pan, Zanjon, and Coyuca, he arrived at Aguacatillo, 
his forces now numbering 3,000, all well armed with 
muskets, swords, and lances. Unlike Hidalgo, Mo 
relos would not permit the rabble to follow him; he 
would not have an army of undisciplined and re 
fractory men; he confined himself to a small but 
efficient force. At Tecpan he won to the cause the 
Galeana family, whose chief members soon distin- 

9 Martinez accompanied Morelos during the first five months of the cam 
paign, and was then sent back to Zacatula with the title of comandante of 
that port, to which the prisoners taken in future were sent. Declaration de 
Morelos, 19. 


guished themselves by their bravery and abilities, 
and were selected by Morelos as his principal officers. 
There were three brothers of them, Juan Jose, An 
tonio, and Hermenegildo, and they proved devoted 
followers of Morelos, and greatly assisted him with 
men and arms. 

From Aguacatillo, Morelos advanced against Aca- 
pulco, whither Captain Antonio Fuentes, coman- 
dante of Tecpan, had fled on the approach of the in- 
surcrents. Sending forward a detachment of 700 or 

O O 

800 men under Cortes and Rafael Valdovinos to 
occupy the height of Yeladero, which commands the 
port, they engaged on the 13th of November, 1810, 
with a force of 400, which Carreiio, the governor of 
Acapulco, despatched against them under the com 
mand of Luis Calatayud. The affair took a some 
what ludicrous turn. Neither royalists nor revolu 
tionists had ever been in action before, and after some 
desultory firing, both threw down their arms, turned 
simultaneously, and fled from the field. 10 The dispersed 
royalists with others from Acapulco joined Morelos 
during the three following days to the number of 600. 
Meanwhile, the rise of this new leader and the 
spread of the revolution southward caused the viceroy 
much uneasiness, the more so because all his best 
troops and officers were with Calleja and Cruz, and 
it was difficult for him to place in the field an 
adequate force. However, he ordered the Oajaca 
brigade to be got in readiness and the fifth coast 
division, under Captain Francisco Paris, to inarch 
against the insurgents. The first operations of Paris 
were successful. On the 1st of December he dis 
persed at the arroyo Moledor a body sent against 
him by Morelos, under Valdovinos, and succeeded in 

10 General Nicolas Bravo says that a drummer boy of the insurgents, in his 
effort to conceal himself, climbed a tree, and noticing the flight of the royal 
ists reported it to the fleeing revolutionists, who thereupon rallied, and col 
lected the arms of their opponents, which had been cast away in the panic. 
Bustamante asserts that the insurgents rallied at the cry of a parrot perched 
on a tree-top, shouting, 'Fuego! fuego!' when they began to run. Ataman, 
Hist. Mej. t ii. 319. 


uniting his force with the sixth division of the coast, 
commanded by Jose Sanchez Pareja. At Tepango, 
also, the insurgents suffered a reverse, a detachment 
under Corte's and Martinez, who had been sent to at 
tack the royalists at Chilapa, being defeated with 
some loss by Guevara. 11 With better fortune, how-* 
ever, Miguel de Avila gained on November 23d a 
slight success over Fuentes, who had landed at the 
harbor of Marquez with 300 men from Acapulco; 
and on the 13th of December the same officer re 
pulsed at a place called the Sabana, the united forces 
of Paris and Pareja, who in conjunction with Fuentes 
were advancing against Aguacatillo. 

Hitherto the operations of Morelos in the field had 
been neither important nor brilliant; and piqued at 
the insignificant results, he determined to anticipate 
Paris' meditated assault upon Aguacatillo. The royal 
ist leader had fallen back to Tres Palos, arid Morelos 
decided to surprise his camp by night. Accordingly 
on the 4th of January, 1811, he secretly despatched 
Avila with 600 men, who defeated the royalists, nearly 
1,000 strong, with the trilling loss of five killed. 12 
The result was most important to the revolutionists; 
600 muskets, five pieces of artillery, including a howit 
zer and a large quantity of ammunition, and other 
war stores fell into their hands, while the reputation 
of their chief spread far and wide. 

Morelos now directed his attention to Acapulco, in 
the expectation of gaining possession of the fort with 
out difficulty, Carrefio's assistant, an artillery officer 
named Gago, having secretly made offers to surrender 
it to him. With 600 men he marched in person from 
the Sabana, and on the night of the 7th of February 
secretly took up a position on the eminence of las 
Iguanas in front of the fort. Early next morning the 

11 Guevara was the father of General Nicolas Bravo's wife. /(/., ii. 321. 

12 Declaration de Morelos, 20. Venegas, in his attempt to mislead the 
public, published a garbled account, saying among other things that the loss 
of the royalists was next to nothing, while that of the insurgents amounted 
to 200 killed. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 61-2. 


preconcerted signal was seen at the appointed hour, 13 
and Morelos, dividing his force into two divisions, 
placed one under a man from the United States 
named Elias Bean, 14 and the other under Avila. 
These officers were directed to approach the castle 
from different points. But Gago's overtures were all 
a feint; and when one of the divisions had advanced 
within favorable range, the fort and vessels in the 
harbor simultaneously opened fire upon it. Morelos, 
realizing the treachery, quickly withdrew his men. 
He then concentrated his forces on the Iguanas hill, 
and laid siege to the fort. For nine clays he kept up 
a steady fire with four pieces of artillery of light cali 
bre, and a howitzer. Carreno, however, by a success 
ful sortie on the 19th gained possession of the artillery 
with the exception of one gun. 15 

After this loss, and being threatened by Nicolds 
Cosio, who had been appointed by the viceroy com 
mander in the south and had already joined Paris, 
Morelos raised the siege and retired to the Sabana, 
where he remained for a month, after which time, 
prostrated with sickness, he was conveyed to Tecpan, 
having left Francisco Hernandez in charge , of the 
troops. 16 

During the two following months no operations of 
importance were undertaken. The insurgents, how 
ever, firmly held their position against Cosio, who, 
having approached the Sabana, was compelled by 
Herrnenegildo Galeana, who assailed him at daylight 

13 A light was shown on the fort at 4 o'clock A. M. Declaration de More- 
los, 20-1. 

11 This man, called simply Elias by Morelos, with three others of his 
countrymen, whose names were David, Colle, and William Alendin, had been 
detected in mapping the country, and were imprisoned at Acapulco, whence 
they effected their escape, and assisted the insurgents in their night attack 
upon Paris at Tres Palos. Bnstamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 9. 

15 Negrete says that Morelos mentions that only one piece was captured. 
The words of Morelos were: ' Quitado toda su artilleria, excepto una sola 
pieza.' See Max. Sig. XIX., iv. 195. See Orozon's account, in Hernandez y 
Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 285. 

16 The forces left under Hernandez numbered about 2,200. Of these, 1,000 
were stationed in an intrenched position on the Sabana. the remainder occu 
pying in detachments posts at Aguacatillo, Veladero, las Cruces, and a point 
at the foot of the cuesta. Declaration de Morelos, 21. 


on the 4th of April, 17 to retire to las Graces, which 
had been occupied by Fuentes. The viceroy, in dis 
gust at Cosio's want of success, and perhaps of loyalty, 
being a Mexican, placed Fuentes in command. Again 
on the 30th of April and the 1st of May, Avila suc 
cessfully repelled an attack made by Fuentes, who fell 
back upon las Cruces and Aguacatillo, from which the 
insurgents had been compelled to withdraw. 

In the mean time, Morelos, reestablished in health, 
had returned; and finding his position on the Sabana 
no longer tenable, owing to the difficulty in obtaining 
provisions, which were intercepted by detachments of 
the enemy, he abandoned it on the 3d of May. De 
termined to extend the field of his operations, he left 
Avila well fortified on the Veladero, and at the head 
of no more than 300 men marched toward Chilpan- 
cingo. With this small force Morelos entered upon 
a campaign which shook Spain's power in Mexico to 
its foundation. After a march attended with much 
labor and suffering, during which he overcame all re 
sistance offered by the royalists, he entered Chilpan- 
cingo without opposition on the 24th of May, his 
forces being now increased to 600 men well provided 
with muskets and arms taken from the enemy. But 
he received still more important support from the 
Bravos, one of the first families of that city. 18 These 
devoted patriots henceforth shared with the Galeanas 
the highest confidence of Morelos. 

The royalist troops whom he had come in contact 

17 Hernandez had the cowardice to flee when Cosio drew near his position, 
and his soldiers selected Galeana to lead them. Ib. 

18 There were three brothers, Leonardo, Miguel, and Victor. Nicolas 
Bravo was the son of Leonardo, and had lately married the daughter of Gue 
vara. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 334. Bustamaiite states that these brothers, in 
order to escape from the importunities of the comandantes of Tixtla and Chi- 
lapa, who persisted in requiring their services against the revolutionists, re 
tired to their hacienda at Chichihualco, and secreted themselves in a cave 
called Michapa, where they remained for seven months. While here they 
received a letter forwarded to them from Morelos, describing the sufferings 
of his troops from hunger, and soliciting aid. They responded, and their 
help contributed greatly to the victory which a detachment of Morelos under 
Hermenegildo Galeana gained over the royalists in an action at the hacienda, 
of Chichihualco. Uuad. Hist., ii. 15-10. 


with, and who were under the direction of G-arrote, 
had retreated to Tixtla; and Morelos, without allow 
ing Garrote time to repair his losses, followed with all 
speed. On the 26th of May the insurgents arrived 
before the town, and although the royalists were well 
protected by fortifications and provided with artillery, 
the attack w r as commenced without delay. The con 
test was long and obstinate, but after six hours hard 
fighting, during which a portion of the town was set 
on fire, the royalists were driven from the fortified 
points, and retreated to the church, where most of 
them were made prisoners. 19 Besides the prestige 
gained by this victory, the material results were of 
high importance; eight cannon, 200 muskets, and 600 
prisoners being captured. During the two following 
months Morelos was actively employed in repairing 
and strengthening the fortifications of Tixtla, in aug 
menting the number of his forces, and above all in 
attention to their military instruction and discipline. 
When these successes became known to Fuentes, 
he recognized that it was of paramount importance to 
arrest the progress of Morelos; and stopping prepara 
tions to attack Avila at the Veladero, he concen 
trated his forces in his pursuit. Taking up a position 
at Chilapa, an important town four leagues distant 
from Tixtla, he made his dispositions for the recapture 
of the latter town. Meantime Morelos, having com 
pleted the defences at Tixtla, leaving there a garrison 
of 104 men under the command of Hermenegildo 


Galeana and Nicolas Bravo, returned to Chilpancingo, 
and on the 15th of August celebrated the virgin's 
ascension. Fuentes, duly informed of this division of 
the enemy's forces, and the diversion caused at Chil 
pancingo, hastened to avail himself of the opportunity, 
and vigorously assaulted Tixtla on the same day. 
Galeana and Bravo, however, resisted the attack with 

19 The cura of Tixtla delayed for some little time the entrance of the vic 
tors into the church by the elevation of the host at the entrance. Id., ii. 17. 
Th is afforded an opportunity to the leading officers and a portion of the troop3 
to effect their escape. Mora, Maj. y sun Rev. , iv. 301. 


unflinching bravery, and firmly maintained themselves 
in their positions. The assault was continued during 
the whole of the following day, and the garrison, 
whose ammunition was almost exhausted, was now in 
a critical position. Morelos, however, was already 
hastening to their assistance, and on the 17th assailed 
the rear of Fuentes' force with 300 cavalry and 100 
infantry, supported by three cannon. Galeana and 
Bravo immediately availed themselves of this diversion 
and sallied from the town. Fuentes, thus attacked 
in front and rear, ordered a retreat, which at first was 
conducted with order and deliberation. A drenching 
rain-storm, however, commenced, impeding the move 
ments of the royalists, and rendering their ammuni 
tion unserviceable. Morelos now ordered Galeana 
and Bravo to come to close quarters with sword 
and bayonet, while he swepb down upon them with 
the cavalry. The charge threw the royalists into 
confusion; completely routed, they fled in all direc 
tions, leaving on the field 200 killed, more than 300 
muskets, two guns, and a quantity of other arms, as 
the spoil of the victors, who, moreover, captured 
366 prisoners. 20 Three days later Morelos marched 
into Chilapa, whither Fuentes with a remnant of his 
scattered force had fled. The insurgent army was 
now over 1,500 strong, and the defeated royalist, as 
well as the Oajaca troops stationed there, abandoned 
the town on its approach, leaving two pieces of artil 
lery and a quantity of ammunition. At Chilapa, the 
artilleryman Gago, whose perfidious design had so 
nearly involved Morelos in disaster at Acapulco, was 
captured, together with Jose Toribio Navarro, who 
after having received from Morelos $200 with, which 
to raise troops for the independent cause, had passed 
over to the royalists. The unfortunate men were sum 
marily executed. 21 

20 Parte de Morelos, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col Doc., iii. 337. The fig 
ures in this despatch addressed to Rayon the day after the battle differ some 
what from those given by Morelos in his declaration, four years later. 

21 Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 330-9; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 17-18; 


The position of Morelos was in the highest degree 
satisfactory. Venegas had immediately at hand nei 
ther troops nor an efficient leader to send against 
him, and the rainy season now approaching would 
assure him freedom from molestation for some time 
to come. He would thus be able to devote himself 
to the organization of his forces, while, whenever he 
chose to advance, Oajaca, Puebla, and Mexico, only 
defended by a few companies, lay open before him. 
But while all was thus bright overhead, the horizon 
was not without clouds. A conspiracy directed against 
his life and cause was at work in his own ranks, 
which but for his energy might have been attended 
with fatal consequences. His method of suppressing 
it was characteristic. 

The first information received by Morelos of the 
capture of Hidalgo was by intercepted letters. Fear 
ing the effect on his followers, he kept the matter to 
himself, but commissioned David 22 and Tabares, both 
of whom had rendered him good service in the attack 
upon Paris at Tres Palos, as his agents to solicit the 
aid of the United States. 23 On their journey thither 
they met Rayon, who informed them of his appoint 
ment by Hidalgo and Allende as captain-general of 
the revolutionary forces and ordered them to return, 
having conferred upon Tabares the rank of brigadier, 
and that of colonel upon David. Morelos, however, 
on their arrival at Chilapa, refused to recognize their 
commissions, arid deeply offended they withdrew to 
Chilpancingo on the pretence of attending to private 

Declaration de Morelos, 21-2; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 301-3. Both Bus- 
tamante and Mora differ with the statements of Morelos as regards the num 
ber of his forces and those of the prisoners and guns captured. On the 10th 
of Sept. Morelos issued a burlesque proclamation, announcing the disappear 
ance on the 18th of Aug. of the junta patriotica, which had been established 
by Fuentes in Chilapa. He exhorts the viceroy and intendentes of the prov 
inces to publish this announcement, in order that the whereabouts of the 
junta may be discovered and reported to him. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Cot. 
Doc., iii. 358. 

2a One of the four men from the U. S. who had escaped from Acapulco 
and joined Morelos. 

23 ' Para negociar la alianza con los Estados vnidos. ' Declaration de More 
los, 43. 

HIST. HEX., VOL. IV. 20 


business. Thence they betook themselves to the 
coast, and in conjunction with one Mayo, who was 
serving under Avila at the Veladero, fomented an in 
surrection, the aim of which was the killing of the 
landed proprietors and all persons belonging to the 
white race. The populace of the coast towns eagerly 
joined in the project. Ignacio Ayala, who had been 
appointed intendente by Morelos, was seized and con 
fined at^Tecpan, but succeeded in effecting his escape. 
While Avila was absent from Veladero for the purpose 
of disarming David and Tabares, Mayo surprised the 
officer left in charge, made him and others captive, and 
attached the troops to the iniquitous undertaking. 

The news of these proceedings soon reached Mo 
relos, who hastened with an escort of 100 men to the 
scene of danger. His presence sufficed to overawe 
the mutineers. The troops returned to their alle- 

S'ance, Avila was reinstated in his command, and 
avid and Tabares were disarmed. With the prom 
ise of placing them in charge of an expedition into 
Oajaca, he brought them back to Chilapa, where by 
his orders they were secretly beheaded. 24 He also 
instructed Avila to execute Mayo, who was accord 
ingly shot. 

When news of the capture of the revolutionary 
leaders at las Noriasde Bajan reached Rayon, 25 aware 
that Ochoa was marching against him, and that Eli- 
zondo was making a similar hostile movement from 
Monclova, he determined to abandon Saltillo and di- 

<24 /&. Morelos feared a public execution might cause disturbance, as the 
conspirators had many adherents in the army. Bmtamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 
20-2. This author omits to make mention of the deception practised on 
them by Morelos, who himself makes the admission in his declaration : ' Re- 
snlto la muerte de aquellos dos que se les mando dar en Chilapa hasta donde 
los condujo con el pretesto de darles una expedicion para Oaxaca.' p. 23. 
He moreover seems to have been unaware that David and Tabares had 
been despatched as commissioners to the U. S., asserting that they had been 
sent to Rayon to inform him of the situation in the south. 

25 Bustamante states that at this time Rayon received an order, bearing 
the signature of Allende, to place at the disposal of Elizondo the troops un 
der his command. Cuad. Hist., i. 199. Rayon could only conclude that such 
a command was a fabrication of the royalists, and paid no heed to it. 


rect his course to Zacatecas, which was only defended 
by a small garrison. During the latter days of March 
he accordingly evacuated that town, his forces amount 
ing to about 4,000 men. 26 Ochoa, duly informed of this 
movement, hastened to intercept him, and on the 1st 
of April an engagement was fought at the defile of 
Pillories. The action lasted six hours, and ended in 
favor of the independents, Ochoa retreating to Agua- 
nueva. 27 This success, in the achievement of which 
the troops behaved exceedingly well, gained prestige 
for the cause. Rayon, without further molestation, 
continued his march to Zacatecas, but the difficulties 
with which he had to contend were so great, that had 
a more energetic commander been opposed to him he 
would have been overwhelmed. At Pifiones a larofe 


portion of his pack-mules and provision and water- 
wagons fell into the hands of the royalists. The coun 
try was destitute of food and water, and the suffer 
ings of his troops were fearful. Sickness broke out 
among them ; many died, others went mad, and most 
of the animals perished. Maguey and cactus juice 
was drunk, producing burning pains. 28 If a well or 
insignificant stream was found, the men fought like 
wild beasts over it. At a place called Las Animas 
there were symptoms of mutiny. A council of war 
was held, at which it was resolved to petition for the 
grace extended by the general pardon. Rayon, com 
pelled outwardly to acquiesce, nevertheless postponed 
taking the necessary action in the matter, and many 

26 According to Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 168. Ochoa in his report of 
the 3d of April states that Rayon's army amounted to 6,000 men, 2,000 of 
whom were cavalry. He had also 24 pieces of artillery and six culverins. 
Gaz. de Max., 1811, ii. 1220. 

27 Id., 1811, ii. 1200-3, 1218-22, contains a copy of Ochoa's detailed re 
port of this engagement. The brigadier Ponce, who with four soldiers had 
separated from the main body of the revolutionists in order to observe the 
retreat of the enemy, was made captive after being mortally wounded. Be 
fore his death he communicated to Ochoa the plans of Rayon. Id., 1220. 

28 Jose Maria Ansorena, who had been made intendente of Valladolid by 
Hidalgo, died in great suffering from the effects of this juice, at the colegio 
de misioneros de Guadalupe, about a league from Zacatecas. Alaman, Jlivt. 
Mej., ii. 262. 


The captain-general, however, bravely pushed for 
ward. Aware that there was abundance of water at the 
hacienda of San Eustaquio, which was occupied by a 
royalist force under Larrainzar, he sent forward a 
detachment under the direction of Anaya to attack 
the place. Anaya succeeded in surprising the enemy 
and dispersed them. From this time the sufferings 
of the independents were mitigated. At San Eusta 
quio Rayon halted for two days, in order to refresh 
his exhausted men. 29 On the llth of April he ad 
vanced to the hacienda of Pozo Hondo, whence he 
detached 500 men under Sotomayor to take possession 
of Fresnillo, which was done. As Rayon approached 
Zacatecas, he sent forward another detachment of 
equal number, under Anaya and Victor Rosales, to re 
connoitre. They were attacked, and Rayon sent Jose 
Antonio Torres to their assistance, while he took up 
a position on the cerro de la Bufa, about a league dis 
tant from the city, with the rest of his forces, which 
amounted to little over 1,000. The royalist comman 
der, Colonel Juan Zambrano, deeming his position in 
Zacatecas untenable, withdrew to the cerro del Grillo, 
and there intrenched himself. He was, however, sur 
prised by a night attack conducted by Torres, with 
whose previous successes in Nueva Galicia the reader 
is already acquainted. The defeat of Zambrano was 
complete; his camp, artillery, ammunition, and bag 
gage, with 500 bars of silver, fell into the hands of 
the assailants. Zambrano fled to Jerez, ten or twelve 
leagues distant, and on the following day, the 15th 
of April, Rayon entered Zacatecas without opposi 
tion. 30 Thus terminated the retreat from Saltillo, 

29 Bustamante gives a detailed account of Rayon's march from Saltillo, 
having obtained it personally from Rayon. Cuad. 11 1st., i. 200-4. Alaman, to 
whom Rayon also narrated the events, corroborates Bustamaute in all main 
particulars. Hist. Mej., ii. 261. 

30 Id., ii. 262; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 170-2; Bustamante, quoting 
from the Abispa de Ckilpancinyo, no. 19, relates that in the attack on the 
royalist camp a small cannon was brought into play by the revolutionists. 
The gun-carriage being broken, a soldier voluntarily supplied its want by 
placing himself on his hands and knees and supporting the piece on his back. 
The recoil of the piece shattered his spine at the first discharge; this did not, 


which the constancy of the generals and the fortitude 
of the soldiers who remained faithful have rendered 

During the time which Rayon remained in Zacate- 
cas, which was less than a month, he occupied himself 
with indefatigable industry in augmenting and drilling 
his forces. He made cannon and wagons; and all the 
resources of the place in clothing, munitions of war, 
and money were put in requisition. The rich mine of 
Quebradilla 31 was thrown open to all who chose to 
work, one third of the metal to go to the laborers. 
With this incentive, thousands toiled night and day, 
and a large amount of metal was secured. 82 As far as 
it was possible, Rayon also organized the government 
of the province, retaining in their offices all those em 
ployes who gave satisfactory guarantees of their ad 
herence to the cause. Moreover, having convoked a 
general junta of the municipal corporations, he laid 
before them his plans for the establishment there of a 
provisional representative government of the nation, 
independent of Spain. 

At the same time he sent a communication to 
Calleja, who was already on his march against him 
from San Luis Potosi. This address, which reached 
Calleja's hands at the hacienda of Carro, sets forth 
Rayon's explanation of the cause and object of the 
revolution. The treacherous imprisonment of the 
Spanish monarch, he states, was no impediment to 
the establishment of a junta central or of provincial 

however, deter one of his comrades from following his example, who being 
well covered with sacking sustained little injury. When the camp was 
taken, the first soldier, then at the point of death, asked if the shot which 
had been fired from his back had taken effect. Being answered in the affirm 
ative, he exclaimed, ' Pues bien, ahora muero con gusto ! ' and soon after ex 
pired. Cuad. Hist., i. 205-6. 

31 The owners were Spaniards, the chief being Fermin de Apezechea, who 
had retired to Mexico. Ataman, Hist. Mej., ii. 263. 

32 Ray on caused it to be coined. Although the coins were of inferior work 
manship, they were preferred at Vera Cruz, their value being at the rate of 
nine reales to the peso fuerte. They bore the initials L. V. 0., which accord 
ing to Bustamante meant, Labor vincit omxia. Cuad. Hist., i. 217. Negrete 
suggests another interpretation of the letters, namely, Levantaos vivientes 
oprimidos. Mex. Sig. XIX. , iv. 86. 


juntas in the peninsula; and the design of New Spain 
was also to instal a national junta, or congress, after 
the precedents established in the peninsula. While 
Spain was being treasonably delivered up to the 
dominion of Napoleon, the rights of the crown being 
alienated and the holy religion prostituted, the ob 
ject of this congress would be to put an end to the 
systems of appropriation of the property of corpora 
tions, and the exaction of so-called patriotic loans 
and donations which were ruining the country, the 
rights of Fernando, however, and the ecclesiastical 
government being maintained; and finally, to pre 
vent the surrender of New Spain to the French. 33 
This address was signed conjointly by Rayon and Li- 
ceaga, and dated the 22d of April. On the 29th 
Calleja despatched his answer, in which, after com 
menting upon the cruel and desolating system of war 
fare adopted by the insurgents, and the outside dan 
ger to which it has exposed the nation, states that 
the government will hold no further correspondence 
with them, and concludes by offering them for the 
last time the benefit of the general pardon, on the 
condition that all arms, ammunition, and funds be 
delivered up. 34 

On the receipt of this reply, Rayon, conscious of his 
inability to resist the attack of Calleja, who continued 
his march without interruption, abandoned Zacatecas 
with the intention of proceeding to Michoacan. In 

33 Rayon y Liceaga, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 279-80. This 
manifest was forwarded to Calleja by a commission composed of Rayon's 
brother Jose" Maria, a Franciscan padre named Gotor, who had formerly been 
Calleja's chaplain and had some ascendency over him, and three Spaniards, 
the only ones who had remained in Zacatecas, and whom Rayon generously sent 
in order that they might escape from insult or outrage at hands of his troops. 
Calleja responded to this liberality by causing Rayon's brother to be arrested: 
He was, however, liberated by the influence of the conde de Casa Rul, who 
took this opportunity of showing his gratitude for the kind treatment he had 
received during the time he was a captive of Hidalgo with Garcia Conde and 
Merino. Buntamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 207, 210. 

3 ' Contestation de Calleja, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 280-1. 
Bustainante makes the strange statement that Calleja offered to main tain 
Rayon in possession of the funds in his power, which amounted to over 
$1,000,000. Cuad. Hist, i. 210. Not one word of such a proposal appears in 
Calleja's reply. 


order to retard Calleja, he left Resales in the city, 
with instructions to hold out to the last extremity, 
and then effect his retreat by way of Jerez. On the 
night of the 1st of May Calleja, who had advanced 
to Ojocaliente, received information of Rayon's retreat, 
and immediately despatched Colonel Emparan with a 
strong division and six cannon to intercept him. On 
the 3d of May Calleja entered Zacatecas without op 
position, Resales having availed himself of the benefit 
of the pardon which was granted at his request to 
him arid his troops. 35 

Meantime Emparan marched with great rapidity in 
pursuit of Rayon, and on the same day on which 
Calleja entered Zacatecas overtook him at the 
hacienda de Maguey. The engagement which fol 
lowed was most disastrous to the revolutionists. 
Though occupying a strong position on the adjacent 
ridge, they were routed on all sides, the artillery of 
the enemy opening upon them with telling precision. 
Rayon's troops were dispersed, his demoralized officers 
carrying off a great part of the treasure. 36 Twenty 
pieces of artillery, and a quantity of muskets and am 
munition, fell into the hands of the victors. 37 More 
than 100 prisoners were captured, all of whom Empd- 
ran released except five, who were executed. 38 

After this defeat Rayon, still maintaining his inten- 

35 Parte de Calleja, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 282; Gaz. de 
Mex., 1811, ii. 424-5. Calleja, however, caused 13 of the insurgents to be 
shot. Bustamante, Gaud. Hist., i. 216. 

36 Emparan gives an exaggerated account of the number slain: 'Se vieron,' 
the insurgents, ' precisados a ceder el Campo con mil y ochocientos a dos mil 
Cadnberes.' Hernandez y Davalos, Col. Doc., iii. 283. Alaman, who received 
his information from the lieutenant-colonel, Jose" Maria Bustarnante, attached 
to the artillery of the revolutionists, states that the ammunition wagons being 
cased with tin, the glitter afforded an excellent mark for the enemy's gun 
ners. One of the wagons struck by a shot caused great disorder. Hist. Mcj. , 
ii. 269. Negrete adds that the shot caused the explosion of the ammunition. 
Mex. Siff. XIX., iv. 51. 

31 Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 471-2. The ammunition was of such inferior 
quality that the greater portion of it was useless. This explains the insigni 
ficant loss sustained by the royalists, who had only four wounded. Ib. Bus- 
tamante's account intimates that Rayon only made a show of resistance in 
order to secure the retreat of his main body. Cuad. Hint., i. 214. This ver 
sion, in view of the disastrous result, is not credible. 

38 Id., Campafiasde Calleja, 112-13. 


tion of entering Michoacan, retired to La Piedad 
unpursued by Emparan, who, little inclined to be 
subservient to Calleja's orders, under some pretext 
directed his course toward Guanajuato. At La Pie- 
dad Rayon could not collect more than about 200 of 
his scattered troops and $30,000 in money. Not dis 
heartened, however, and having obtained in that town 
a few arms and three cannon, he proceeded to Zamora, 
where he organized a force of over 400 men, whom 
he placed under the command of Torres, with instruc 
tions to proceed to Pdtzcuaro and unite his division 
with the troops under the revolutionary chiefs Padre 
Navarrete and Manuel Muniz. 89 In the neighbor 
hood of Patzcuaro Torres was vigorously attacked by 
a royalist force. The contest lasted nearly the whole 
day without the enemy being able to dislodge the 
insurgents from the position which they taken up on 
the eminence of la Tinaja. Torres, however, was 
severely wounded in the arm, and his troops were so 
hard pressed that their defeat was imminent. At 
this moment Rayon arrived with reinforcements; the 
royalists were soon routed, even losing their baggage, 
which they had left at Huiramba. 

The conjunction of the insurgent leaders being thus 
accomplished, Rayon prepared to attack Valladolid. 
After Cruz's departure from that city in January, 
only a small force remained for its defence. Torcuato 
Trujillo, who, as the reader will recollect, had been 
appointed military commander of the province, was so 
arrogant and tyrannical that he brought upon him 
the hatred of the inhabitants. His conduct was not 
conducive to the pacification of Michoacan; in fact, the 
whole province, with the exception of its capital and 
the immediate vicinity, revolted. After the fatal day 
at the bridge of Calderon, Muniz, and a number of 
other chiefs who had sustained defeat there or else- 

39 These leaders were respectively the revolutionary commanders in the 
departments of Putzcuaro and Tacambaro in Michoacan. Id., Cuad. JJist., 
i. 215. 


where, took refuge in the rugged districts of Michoa- 
can, 40 where even the insalubrity of the climate in 
a large portion of the province served as protection. 
Here they soon gathered strength, and finally, by the 
cooperation of their forces, found themselves in a po 
sition to assume the offensive. Rayon, therefore, 
formed his plans, in concert with the other leaders, 
for a combined attack on Yalladolid, and on the 29th 
of May the heights adjacent to the city were occupied 
by large bodies of insurgents, whose numbers were esti 
mated by Trujillo at seven or eight thousand. 41 

The besiegers without delay opened fire on the city 
with their artillery, which consisted of twenty-five 
pieces of different calibre. The effect, however, was 
insignificant, owing to the long range and poor gun 
nery. On the following day Antonio Linares, who 
had been sent from Guanajuato to the assistance of 
Trujillo, succeeded in entering the city before day 
light. The royalists now attacked the enemy and 
inflicted some loss, capturing two cannon and dislodg 
ing them from one of their positions. With this suc 
cess Trujillo began preparations for a general assault, 
but the insurgent leaders, aware of the reenforcement, 
and disappointed at the absence of any demonstration 
in their favor on the part of the inhabitants, secretly 
retreated on the night of the 1st of June to Tacam- 
baro. 42 

In the mean time events of great moment, which 
will be narrated in the following chapter, had oc- 

40 Trujillo, in a letter to the viceroy dated June 2, 1811, reports 'la reun 
ion de mas de doce cabecillas, que por haberlos echado de todas partes las 
armas del Rey se ban refugiado a esta provincia al abrigo de sus montes y 
recursos. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 502. 

41 ' Su total muchos lo hacen subir d, doce mil enemigos, pero yo creo no 
pasaba, de siete d ocho mil, sin que sea exagerado.' He also mentions the 
names of the chiefs opposed to him: el cldrigo Navarrete and others of the re 
ligious order, and the captain-generals Muuiz, Torres, Rayon, Liceaga, Hui- 
drobo, Salto, Carrasco, and Ramos, ' con otros de inferior jaez. ' On their 
approach against the city the division under Torres was vigorously attacked, 
May 27th, by Captain Felipe Robledo, who after a contest of three hours was 
compelled to retreat with loss. Id., 499-506. In this engagement the left 
arm of Torres was shattered by a grape-shot. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 284. 

42 (?az. de Mex., 1811, ii. 500-6. 


curred at Zitdcuaro, and Rayon with a small escort 
had already proceeded thither. Previous to his de 
parture, he organized the military government of the 
various districts. To Torres he assigned Pdtzcuaro 
and Uruapan; to Navarrete, Zacapo; to Mariano 
Caneiga, Panindicuaro ; to Muniz, Tacambaro; and to 
the guerrilla chief Luna, Acambaro and Jerecuaro. 

The insurgents now for some time confined their 
operations against Valladolid to a mere blockade, 
which though maintained at a distance effectually cut 
off Trujillo's communication with the capital. This 
inaction lasted nearly two months, during which 
Muiiiz occupied himself in increasing his forces and 
armament. Cannon were cast, muskets were con 
structed of bronze, 43 and every preparation made for a 
more determined effort. On the 19th of July the inde 
pendent leaders, again reunited, appeared before the 
city, their forces now amounting to 10,000 or 12,000 
men, with forty pieces of artillery. 44 On the 20th 
Muniz sent to Trujillo a peremptory summons to sur 
render if he would not see the city put to fire and 
sword. 45 To this communication Trujillo vouchsafed 
no reply. On the 21st the insurgents opened fire, but 
with little effect; 46 and on the following day, the city 
being invested on all sides, the attack commenced. 
The principal assault was directed against the southern 
entrance, under the immediate command of Muniz. 
Trujillo, however, successfully repulsed it, driving the 
enemy back upon their lines with heavy loss, and cap 
turing eight cannon. 

43 ' Que corao los arcabuces del tiempo de la conquista, eran muy pesados y 
se disparaban con media necesitando dos hombres para su manejo.' Alaman, 
Hist. Mej., ii. 304; Bmtamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 284. 

44 Gaz. de Mex., 181 1, ii. 670-1. Bustamante states that the artillery con 
sisted of 22 guns. Cuad. Hist., i. 284. 

^Oaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 807. 

46 Bustamante states that a soldier of Trujillo, named Pelayo, observing 
that the elevation of the insurgents' guns was too great, sent a note to Muniz 
informing him of the error. The messenger intrusted with the letter de 
nounced Pelayo, who was immediately shot at the gallows, where his body 
was left hanging with the letter attached to his back. Cuad. Hist., i. 285; 
Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 306. 


On the other side of the city affairs went otherwise. 
Robledo was unable to maintain his position at the 
Santa Catalina Gate, and Trujillo hastened to his as 
sistance. On his entrance into the city he was filled 
with consternation at the confusion which prevailed. 
Men, women, and children in wild alarm were rushing 
through the streets, shrieking and wailing, and pro 
claiming that the city was in the power of the insur 
gents. Soldiers were flying from their posts, and all 
seemed lost. Trujillo, however, displayed rare cour 
age and presence of mind. Raising the cry of victory, 
and that Calleja was approaching, he succeeded in al 
laying the panic, and hurried forward to the Santa 
Catalina gate. 

There the greatest disorder prevailed; the artillery 
was dismounted or in the hands of the enemy; the 
soldiers were fleeing, casting down their arms, and 
throwing off their uniforms. Arresting the flight with 
orders to kill all who did not rejoin their ranks, Tru 
jillo sallied on to the plain and attacked the enemy. 
He was, however, compelled to retire; and although 
in a second charge he gained some slight advantage, 
his position was desperate. His troops were giving 
way at other points, and all was apparently lost. At 
this crisis, when the victory of the insurgents was no 
longer doubtful, to the inexpressible amazement of the 
royalists, the besiegers retired from the contest, re 
treating in good order, but abandoning twenty-two 
cannon to the enemy. Divers reasons are assigned as 
the cause of this extraordinary movement. Some at 
tribute it to the miraculous interposition of the image 
of the saviour in the sacristy of the cathedral. Tru 
jillo claimed that the valor displayed by a portion of 
his troops caused the insurgents to withdraw ; but the 
more probable explanation is that advanced by Busta- 
mante, namely, the failure of ammunition and the 
envy and jealousy of Muniz, who, being the only one 
who had sustained repulse during the day, refused to 
furnish the other chiefs with cartridges when their 


own supply became exhausted. 47 With criminal self 
ishness he refused to others the success in which he 
could not share. The insurgents pursued their way 
unmolested to Acuicho, while Trujillo, bewildered 
with astonishment, in the exuberance of his joy, was 
so far forgetful of himself as to liberate more than 300 
prisoners from the jails and dungeons of the city. 48 

47 'No quiso dar a los comandantes Anaya y otros ni un cartuchode mas de 
treinta cargas que salv6 cuando fu<$ derrotado: quo se mantuvo espectador 
. . .por no contribuir a la gloria de las columnas. . .que tuvier6n mejor direc- 
cion, 6 mejor suerte que la de Muniz.' Bustamante, CuacL Hist., i. 286. 

48 The particulars of the operations against Valladolid have been derived 
from Trujillo's and other officers' reports published as quoted in the official 
gazette of Mexico, and from Bustamante. Other authors, as Mora, Mex. y 
sus Rev., iv. 235-9; Alaman, flint. Mej. y ii. 300-8; Torrente, Rev. Hist. Am., 
i. 242-3; and Negrete, Hex. Sig. XIX., iv. 114-25, 151-2, 155-6, 159-75, sup 
ply no additional information, although in minor details some discrepancies 
are observable in their several narrations. 




ON the day of his entrance into Zacatecas, Calleja 
proclaimed the usual pardon, adding the customary 
threats in case of non-compliance. All stragglers and 
strangers were ordered to return to their homes within 
twenty-four hours, under pain of being treated as insur 
gents. 1 Then, having purged the city by an appropri 
ate slaughter of patriots, the royalist leader once more 
remodelled the government. For its future security 
he organized five companies of infantry, one of cavalry, 
and an artillery corps, and appointed Martin de Medina 
the governor of Colotlan, comandante and intendente 
of the province. On the 16th of May Calleja pro 
ceeded to Aguascalientes with an army greatly re 
duced in numbers. The separation of Emparan's 
division, and of another detachment under Miguel 
del Campo sent to operate against the insurgents 
in the Bajio of Guanajuato, had left him with lit 
tle more than 1,000 men, while the revolutionists 
were again increasing in strength. This dismember- 

l Gazde Hex., 1811, ii. 425-31. 



ment of his famous army of the centre was a grievous 
trouble to Calleja, the more so because he could see 
that no durable results would be thereby attained. 
In the abilities of his captains he had little confidence; 
plan as he might, he foresaw under the present system 
only failure. While at Aguascalientes, he therefore 
submitted to the viceroy a plan of military organiza 
tion which he thought might hasten peace. 2 He 
would arm all the towns in the kingdom for their own 
defence, and thereby avoid the crippling effect of di 
viding and subdividing the standing army into sections. 
The troops would likewise be relieved from long and 
fatiguing marches from one point to another. By 
a judicious disposal of the regular troops in suita 
ble localities, assistance could quickly arrive at any 
point attacked. Both Calleja and the viceroy recog 
nized the risk incurred in placing arms in the hands 
of the people, and thus establishing a power which 
might turn against the government. Nevertheless, 
Calleja believed that such danger could be avoided, and 
the viceroy adopted the plan. Henceforth this system 
was pursued by the royalists to the close of the war. 
The system was put into immediate practice as far 
as possible, and was methodically developed and 
extended as circumstances allowed. In each town, 
companies of infantry and cavalry and batteries of 
artillery were raised, the strength of which was pro 
portionate to the number of inhabitants. All house 
holders were compelled to take service in these corps, 
which were placed under the direction of a coman- 
dante de armas, in whom were also vested, wherever 
practicable, the judicial functions. At each town 
from 100 to 150 of such troops were to be in constant 
service and daily drilled. Arms were at first sup 
plied by collecting weapons in possession of the 
inhabitants. All persons not enrolled in these mil 
itary corps were forbidden to keep any kind of arms. 

2 See copy of the plan, dated June 8, 1811, in Hernandez y Davalos, Col. 
Doc., iii. 289-90. 


Only muleteers and others whose occupations so re 
quired it were allowed a hatchet, and knife without 
a point. In the country haciendas and ranches, 
moreover, armed squadrons were organized, composed 
of members varying from six or eight to fifty, accord 
ing to the relative importance of the places. This 
system, afterward adopted with some modifications by 
Morelos and the other independent leaders, resulted 
in placing all Mexico on a war footing; but it did not 
accomplish at this time exactly what Calleja desired. 
Practically it arrayed the nation against itself. At 
the commencement of the strife the Creole regulars 
even could not be relied upon, and in the first engage 
ments great misgivings had been entertained by the 
viceroy in regard to them. Their conduct at Las 
Cruces, and the subsequent skilful management by 
Calleja of the troops under his command, had greatly 
relieved this anxiety, and now by enforcing armed 
resistance in the towns against the attacks of the in 
surgents, friends and brothers were sometimes brought 
face to face as enemies. 

Well aware that Zacatecas was still far from secure, 
and that Guanajuato was exposed to invasion at any 
time by the insurgent forces in Michoacan, Calleja 
made such dispositions for the protection of those prov 
inces as the circumstances of his position admitted. 
As the northern and eastern provinces, called the 
provincias interims, 3 were now free from insurrec 
tionary movements, the troops in those regions could 
be advantageously employed in securing Zacatecas 
and Guanajuato against hostile inroads, and at the 
same time protecting the frontier of Durango. Ca 
lleja accordingly addressed a letter to Governor Sal- 
cedo, urging him to instruct Lopez and Ochoa to 
occupy with their divisions the defiles of Colotlan, 
Tlaltenango, and Juchipila; at the same time he 

3 In May 1811 the provincias internas were divided into two comandancias 
generales, subject to the viceroy's authority, by an order of the Spanish gov 
ernment, which was confirmed by the regency in July 1812. Prov. Inter. 
Carta del Ministro, and Id., Reed orden Mayer, MS., nos. G y 7. 


made arrangements with Cruz to send a portion of 
his forces in the same direction for the purpose of 
cooperating with Emparan, whom it was his inten 
tion to despatch to Lagos. 4 Calleja's plan was to 
occupy with the main divisions of his army the dis 
trict extending from Lagos to Queretaro, thus keep 
ing in subjection the most important part of the 
country, and being in a position to hasten quickly 
to the assistance of the forces operating on the 
north and south of this line. The carrying-out of 
this plan was, however, frustrated to some extent by 
the development of events which necessitated the 
employment of the heavy divisions of Emparan and 
Linares at other points, the latter being despatched 
to the relief of Yalladolid, as already related, and 
the former being sent to Zitacuaro. The departure 
of these forces from Guanajuato exposed that prov 
ince, and even Queretaro, to imminent risk; and 
Calleja, ordering Diego Garcia Conde to move to 
San Felipe with the division he commanded at San 
Luis Potosi, and Miguel de Campo to station him 
self at Salamanca, hastened to Leon, whence he pro 
ceeded to Guanajuato, entering the city on the 20th 
of June. 

When Calleja returned to San Luis Potosi after 
his victory at Calderon, he found himself in a vortex 
of insurrection. No sooner had the army of the 
centre marched from Guanajuato for Guadalajara 
than a number of insurgent bands sprung into exist 
ence in various parts of the province. The most 
prominent among their leaders was Albino Garcia, 
commonly called El Manco, 5 who in the neighborhood 
of Salamanca and Santiago carried on hostilities with 
such daring and skill that he became one of the most 
celebrated guerrilla .chiefs of the revolution. In the 

*See Calleja's despatch of July 31, 1811, in GazdeMex., 1811, ii. 747-8. 

5 Garcia was a native of Salamanca, a town situated in the southern part 
of the province. He derived this sobriquet of Manco from being crippled 
in one arm by a fall from his horse. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 249. 


district between Huichapan and Queretaro, Villagran 
was still harassing convoys and interrupting commu 
nication with the capital. The hilly region of the 
Huasteca, the mountains of the Sierra Gorda, and the 
plains of Apam to the north of the Mexican capital 
swarmed with predatory hordes. Nuevo Santander 
was in open insurrection; portions of San Luis Po- 
tosi were still unpacified; while the forces left in Zaca- 
tecas and Aguascalientes were inadequate, as the 
reader is aware, for the security of those cities. 

While the events narrated in the preceding chap 
ter were occurring in Zacatecas and Michoacan, the 
insurrection in Nuevo Santander, under the leader 
ship of Villerias, was successfully suppressed by Ar- 
redondo. Having been invited by that chief to es 
pouse the independent cause, Arredondo caused the 
communication to be burned by the hangman, and on 
the 4th of May marched from Agayo against the in 
surgents. Villerias, having sustained several succes 
sive defeats, fled toward Matehuala, where he was 
overcome and slain by a royalist force sent against 
him by the junta de seguridad of Catorce, under the 
direction of the cura Semper, Padre Duque, and 
Nicanor Sanchez. 6 The insurrection in Nuevo San 
tander was now confined to Tula and its vicinity. 
On the 21st Arredondo approached the town, and 
having routed the insurgents with considerable slaugh 
ter, entered Tula the following day with little opposi 
tion. All the leaders and principal men were hanged, 
and their bodies left suspended from trees. 7 Although 
the insurrection in this province was thus thoroughly 
crushed, Venegas, fearing that assistance to the rev 
olutionists might arrive from the United States, dare 
not reduce the number of troops, the efficiency of 

& Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 493-7, 509-10. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, a 
cadet of the Santa Cruz regiment, was commended by Arredondo for his gal 
lant conduct in one of the engagements alluded to in the text. Id., 496. 
This is the first time that Santa Anna's name appears in print. 

7 /c/., 507-8. Arredondo tells the viceroy that at the mission of Ola 
shortly before his arrival an unfortunate prisoner was slowly roasted alive, 
from the feet upwards, by the Indians, and eaten ! 
HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. ui 


which he even increased by supplying them with a 
considerable train of artillery. Iturbe was transferred 
to the governorship of Colotlan and Arredondo ap 
pointed to that of Nuevo Santander, which was 
shortly afterward increased in territory by the addi 
tion of the Huasteca. 8 

At this time, Matehuala again became the scene of 
an insurgent defeat. In June the unfortunate town 
was taken possession of by Bernardo Gomez de Lara, 
better known by the sobriquet of Huacal. Lara, by 
birth an Indian, was the most ferocious of the insur 
gent chiefs who infested portions of San Luis Potosi. 
Captain of a band of half-savage Indians, he directed 
his hostilities not only against Spaniards, but against 
all who were not of his race. At Matehuala and in 
the vicinity he put to death a number of victims, and 
by compelling the inhabitants to join his band, raised 
his force to more than a thousand men. On the 21st 
of June he was simultaneously attacked by a company 
of Arredondo's troops under Antonio Elostia, and a 
force brought up by Semper, the cura of Catorce. u 
Assailed on opposite sides, Huacal was routed with 
slaughter, between two and three hundred of his fol 
lowers being slain and a large number taken prison 
ers. 10 He himself, though wounded, effected his 
escape and retired to the Bajio of Guanajuato. Some 
what later he entered San Miguel el Grande; but the 
inhabitants recovering from their first panic, surprised 
and captured him, with a number of his principal fol 
lowers. Huacal was put to death in his prison, and 
his body exposed on the gibbet. This occurred about 
the end of the year. 11 By this success the northern 

8 ' Hasta la Sierra Gorda, confinando con el Mezquital y los llanos de 
Apan y las costas de Tuxpan en el seno mejicano.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 

9 The combined attack was unpremeditated, as the royalist leaders were 
not aware of each other's movements. This nearly led to a disaster, as the 
soldiers of Elosiia fired upon those of Semper before they discovered that they 
were friends. Gaz. de Max., 1811, ii. 1235-6. 

10 Id., 1811, ii. 744-6, 1234-6 ; Rurribarria, Mem., in Soc. Max. Geog., vii. 

n u8tamant, Cttad. Hist., i. 292; Liceaga, Adic. y Rect., 196. 


portion of San Luis Potosi was reduced to obedience, 
and during August the operations of the royalists in 
the district of Rio Verde and the southern part of the 
province completed the pacification. 

In Guanajuato and Michoacan the condition of 
affairs was far different, and the revolution was assum 
ing alarming proportions. Calleja was fully alive to 
the grave difficulties of his position. In a letter 
addressed to Venegas from Guanajuato on the 20th 
of August, he describes to him in strong colors the 
inextinguishable vitality of the insurrection and its 
strong recuperative power; 12 and again on the 2 6th of 
September he reports that the forces of his division 
occupying the district between Lagos and Queretaro 
were insufficient to keep under control the ubiquitous 
guerrilla bands. Meantime, however, Garcia Conde 
and Miguel del Campo were rendering good service 
in their respective localities. Jose do la Luz Gutierrez, 
at the head of 4,000 men well provided with arms, 
was signally routed at San Luis de la Paz, 13 and 
Albino Garcia sustained a similar defeat in the val 
ley of Santiago. 14 

When Cruz returned to Guadalajara after his suc 
cessful recovery of Tepic and San Bias, he applied 
himself with his natural activity to the suppression 
of the rebellion in other portions of the province. The 
principal districts disaffected were those represented 
by the important towns of Zacoalca, Sayula, and Za- 
potlan, and on the 26th of February, Cruz despatched 
Captain Porlier with the greater portion of the troops 

12 'La insurreccion esta todavia muy le"jos de calmar; ella retofia como la 
hidra, d proporcion que se cortan sus cabezas.' Bustamatite, Campanas de 
Calleja, 127. 

13 The action took place on the llth of July. Francisco Guizarn6tegui, 
the officer in command of the royalists, received Calleja's highest commenda,- 
tion on this occasion. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 750. In subsequent operations 
several leading insurgent chiefs were captured and shot. Among them was 
Luz Gutierrez. 

14 On the 26th of June. Garcia lost five cannon, and was prevented by this 
defeat from approaching Salamanca, where he had great influence. Gaz. de 

1811, ii. 749. 


against that region, instructing him to execute most 
exemplary punishment upon the rebels. 15 At Zaco- 
alco and Sayula Porlier met with no opposition, the 
insurgents retreating before him in the direction of 
Zapotlan; but on the 3d of March he fought them 
at some little distance from that town and defeated 
them. No difficulty was experienced by him in re 
ducing to subjection the other towns which had 
shown symptoms of revolt in that region. 16 Porlier 
now intended to advance farther southward, and sent 
forward Manuel del Rio to Colima, but the hostile 
attitude of the Indians in the territory of Colotlan 
and Nayarit forced Cruz to recall the larger portion 
of the troops. Calleja had despatched from Zacate- 
cas the cura of Matehuala, Jose Francisco Alvarez, 
with a division of the troops of the provincias internas, 
against the revolted district; but on the 27th of March 
the belligerent padre was repulsed near the town, be 
ing badly wounded, and effecting his retreat with dif 
ficulty. Negrete was therefore sent with a force from 
Nueva Galicia, and more successful than Alvarez, 
soon reduced all the towns in the region between 
Colotlan and Juchipila. 17 Zapotlan, however, on the 
withdrawal of the royalist troops, again revolted, and 
Negrete proceeding thither inflicted a severe defeat 
upon the insurgents on the 6th of May. 18 Neverthe 
less, the revolution in Nueva Galicia was not easily 
eradicated, and Cruz and his officers were kept in con 
stant occupation in one part or other of the province. 
On the 25th of June, hoping to strike an effective blow 
at the ringleaders, he issued a proclamation offering 

15 Cruz in his instructions to Porlier says: 'No deve perdonarse la vida a 
ningun revelde sea de la clase, coudicion, y edad que fuere. ' Hernandez y 
Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 224. 

16 See his correspondence with Cruz during Feb. and March of this year. 
Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col Doc., iii. 224-35, 249-07. 

17 Gaz. de Mcx., 1811, ii. 411; Parte de Negrete, in Hernandez y Ddvalos, 
Col. Doc., iii. 270-2. 

18 Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 467-8. The leader of the insurgents was the 
'infame lego Gallaga,' who retired with a few followers to Tomatlan. About 
the end of August he was there taken prisoner and shot. Alaman, Hist. Alcj., 
ii. 299-30. 


rewards for the delivery of insurgent chiefs, dead or 
alive. 19 These stringent measures, however, were not 
effectual. In order to correspond with Calleja's wishes, 
and cooperate with him in the protection of Zacate- 
cas and Aguascalientes, Negrete and Colonel Manuel 
del Rio were despatched with considerable detach 
ments against different bodies of the insurgents. 
These officers defeated the enemy in a number of en 
gagements fought during the months of June to Sep 
tember, while two other divisions, respectively under 
the commands of Angel Linares and Colonel Pastor, 
did good service. 20 

During this period the rebellion developed to a 
great extent in the province of Mexico, and the prox 
imity of the insurgent bands which soon infested it 
not only caused the viceroy increased anxiety, but 
exposed the weakness of the government in being 
unable to suppress hostilities carried on almost in 
sight of the capital. Although Hidalgo had been 
unsuccessful in rousing much enthusiasm during his 
brief inroad into Mexico, he had sowed well the seeds 
of revolution. His departure did not allay the agi 
tation in the towns of the Toluca Valley, and it spread 
rapidly to those of Temascaltepec, Sultepec, and Zita- 
cuaro. Although authority was quickly reestablished 
in the city of Toluca, the country was soon overrun 
by guerrilla bands. Haciendas and the smaller towns 
were attacked and pillaged, communication between 
the outlying cities and the capital was almost closed, 
travel on the highways was impossible without strong 
escorts, and sentinels were lassoed at the very gates 
of the city. 21 The viceroy at first attempted the or- 

19 The rewards offered were proportionate to the military grades, the 
leaders being rated at $500 a head, their colonels at $300, sub-officers at 
$100, and an ordinary individual at $50. Cruz in the same proclamation en 
acted that in every town which had lapsed into revolt after the extension of 
the indulto to it, all the rebellious inhabitants should be put to death. Gaz. 
deMex., 1811, ii. 715-18. 

20 Id., ii. 759, 763-6, 811-14, 836-8, 967-70; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. 
Doc., iii. 287-9, 295-6, 324-5, 328-9, 330-1, 338-9, 368, 370-1. 

21 Ward, Hex. in 1827, i. 180. 


ganization of volunteer troops of horse supported by 
subscription; but this force proved a failure. 22 He 
then appointed Juan Bautista de la Torre, a captain 
of the regiment of Tres Villas, military commander 
of Toluca, and assigned to him a strong body of regu 
lars. 23 

To describe all the operations of Torre would be 
entering into monotonous details of similar events. 
He proceeded against the rebels early in January, 
and during that and the three succeeding months 
gained a number of victories, 24 by which he reduced 
the valleys of Toluca and Temascaltepec. About the 
beginning of April, however, the inhabitants of Joco- 
titlan again rose in revolt. The viceroy ordered Torre 
to chastise them and clear the highway to Valladolid 
of guerrilla bands. On the 15th,. after two hours 
and a half of incessant firing, Torre entered Joco- 
titlan, "having had the particular pleasure of leaving 
four hundred dead upon the field," which he believed 
would act as a restraint upon "the enemies of God, 25 
the king, and the country." 

Zitacuaro, in Michoacan, still remained in the power 
of the insurgents under Benedicto Lopez, who had sus 
tained various defeats at the hands of Torre. The 
town, surrounded by lofty hills on all sides, can only 
be approached by three deep and narrow canons, 
namely, those of San Mateo, Tuxpan, and los Lau- 
reles; 26 and Lopez, driven from place to place in 
the less rugged valley of Toluca, had taken refuge 

22 The name of guerrilla volante was given to this force. According to 
Mora, the outrages committed by it were worse than those of the insurgents. 
Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 182. 

23 Torre was a native of Spain, being born in the mountains of Santander. 
21 Consult Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 43, 212-10, 221-7, 232-8, 265-75. 

25 Torre displayed a strange mixture of merciless severity and religious 
faith in a merciful saviour. He persecuted the insurgents, not only as 
rebels, but as wretches cast outside the pale of the church by excommuni 
cation. His cruelty and fanatical piety are well illustrated in a proclama 
tion which he addressed to the inhabitants of Temascaltepec on the llth of 
March. While offering them the choice of the indulto or death, he con 
cludes by wishing them, with the lord's grace, all happiness. Id., 1811, ii. 

'^Uustamante, Companas de Callcja, 137. See map previously given. 


in the mountain wilds of Zitacuaro. Torre, having 


advanced during the night up the San Mateo canon, 
at daylight on the 22d of April attacked the town, 
his force consisting of 700 men provided with artil 
lery. At the opening of the engagement the in 
fantry led by Ventura Mora, second in command, 
gained some advantage. By a gallant charge they 
made themselves masters of the hill of the Calvario, 
which commanded the town; but though they cap 
tured the enemy's guns, they were unable to hold 
their position against the immense numbers by 
which they were in turn assailed. Mora and Cap 
tain Pinera were slain, and the soldiers broke and 
ran to the artillery for refuge. Pursuers and pur 
sued, however, were so intermingled that the artil 
lerymen could not fire without inflicting heavy loss 
upon their own men; and the crowd rushing in 
among the ranks of the main body threw it into 
confusion. Finding it impossible to arrest the panic, 
Torre tried a retreat by the way he had corne. 
When he had reached the narrow entrance to the 
canon, however, he found that a breastwork of loose 
stones had been thrown up, behind which a host 
had collected to cut him off. His destruction was 
now certain. The soldiers lost all hope. A few 
only escaped to tell the tale. Torre prepared for 
death. He confessed to Padre Arevalo, the cura of 
Tlalpujahua, who accompanied him, and then under 
his guidance endeavored to escape from the trap he 
had entered. Accompanied by a few horsemen, he 
succeeded in extricating himself, and on the follow 
ing day even .passed Tuxpan without harm. On 
arriving at the hacienda of Xaripeo, however, he 
was captured with his companions by Benedicto Lo 
pez and taken back to Tuxpan. As they crossed the 
bridge of that town Torre was killed by the natives, 
who showered stones upon him until his dead body 
was covered. The fruits of this victory were the 


capture of all the enemy's arms, ammunition,, guns, 
and baggage, and more than 300 prisoners. 

Rayon was at this time at Tusantla; and on receipt 
of the important news hastened to Zitacuaro, where 
he assumed command. With considerable skill he 
proceeded to put the town in a state of defence, recog 
nizing the importance of its position as a central 
point of operation. A ditch was cut round it five 
varas wide and a league in circumference, which could 
be converted at will into a moat by inundating it 
from an extensive dam with which Zitacuaro was pro 
vided. Behind the ditch a concentric barricade three 
varas in width was erected, all the assailable portions 
of it being covered with cannon, the number of which 
was increased as rapidly as guns could be turned out 
of the foundry which Rayon had established. The 
roads also leading into the town were closed against 
hostile approach by ditches and breastworks of tim 

The defeat of Torre and destruction of his division 
almost neutralized the previous advantages gained by 
him. Communication between Yalladolid and the 
capital was entirely closed, and the valley of Toluca 
left open to the insurgents. Venegas, in this extremity, 
being unable to detach any more forces from those 
retained in the capital, had recourse to those under 
the command of Emparan, who, contrary to the orders 
of Calleja, had approached toward Valladolid. That 
commander was, therefore, instructed to unite his 
division with the forces under the lieutenant-colonel 
Jose Castro, then at Tultenango, and proceed with 
all possible despatch against Zitacuaro. This separa 
tion of Emparan's important division from the army 
of the centre caused Calleja great annoyance, and 
from this time date the differences which arose 
between him and the viceroy, and which afterward 
developed into personal enmity. Empdran, who 
estimated more correctly than the viceroy the diffi 
culty of the undertaking, was not inclined to engage 


in it without having first made every reasonable 
preparation. With this object he occupied himself 
for some time at Maravatio in putting in good order 
his artillery trains and arms, in collecting supplies 
of provisions, by informing himself through spies of 
the strength and position of the enemy, and making 
himself acquainted with the topography of the dis 
trict. This prudent delay gave umbrage to Vene 
gas, who, in face of Torre's late disaster, blindly 
regarded the capture of Zitdcuaro as presenting little 
difficulty; 27 and in his communications with Calleja he 
expressed his dissatisfaction at Ernpdran's dilatori- 
ness, wrongly attributing it to want of energy and 
inclination. 28 

Although Venegas was anxious to place the expedi 
tion under some other leader, circumstances prevented 
his doing so, and he ordered Emparan to advance 
against Zitacuaro without further delay. Emparan 
accordingly, though suffering in health, led out his 
division, composed of 2,000 of the best troops of Ca- 
lleja's army, and by forced marches under drenching 
rains arrived on the 19th of June within six leagues 
of the town. Entering by the same canon as that 
followed by Torre, for two days the royalist army 
with great difficulty pursued its march up the narrow 
and rugged bed, continually impeded by obstructions 
thrown in the way by the insurgents. Emerging 
from the gloomy ravine on to the more open ground 
of the glen in which Zitdcuaro was situated, Empa 
ran took up a position on the 21st, in front of the 
gently rising elevation of Los Manzanillos near the 

27 'Siendo indudable,' he writes Calleja, 'que la reunion de Zitacuaro es 
despreciable, y quo el suceso desgraciado, ' that is, of Torre, 'fue efecto de 
haberse dirigido mal.' Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 123-4. 

28 Calleja had already forwarded complaints to the viceroy injurious to 
Emparan. Venegas thus influenced was not sparing of him, and told Calleja 
that it would be necessary for him to come and take charge of the expedition. 
Calleja, however, explained to the viceroy how impossible it would be for him 
to do so at the present time, and suggested that the command be given to 
Trujillo. Id., 123-5. As the reader is aware, Trujillo's position at this time 
precluded the possibility of his leaving Valladolid. 


town. 20 On the following day the royalists took pos 
session of the hill without difficulty, and also routed 
a strong body of insurgents, estimated at 10,000 or 
12,000, which assailed their rear; but all attempts 
to take the town were prevented by the ditch, which 
was filled with water and defended by well trained 
infantry under cover of the barricade. 3 ^ After nine 
hours' fighting, during which the troops suffered 
heavy loss, Emparan withdrew to Lcs Manzanillos, 
where his soldiers bivouacked, comfortless and dis- 
spirited. 31 

When the dull morning came with its leaden, rain- 
charged sky, the royalist leader recognized the . hope 
lessness of any further attempt against Zitacuaro. 
The ground on which they had fought on the preced 
ing day was inundated and was, indeed, an impassable 
swamp. Lacking means of crossing the moat, and 
without provisions or ammunition, Emparan cursed 
in his heart the viceroy who had forced him for 
ward against his better judgment. Retreat was the 
only course left; and mustering into line, he retired 
through the canon to Toluca, his force reduced one 
half. 32 Here, prostrated by fatigue and exposure, the 
wound received on his head at the battle of Calderon 

29 Bustamante says that Empdran sent out two detachments to forage, one 
in the direction of San Mateo, and the other toward the town of San Fran 
cisco, and that the first was entirely destroyed by the Indians, while the 
other only saved itself by flight. Cuad. Plist., i. 224. Mora also follows this 
account. Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 186. Emparan, in his report to the viceroy, 
makes no mention of these reverses. Gaz. de Hex., 1811, ii. 598; nor does 

30 Among the infantry were 200 soldiers of the regiment of Tres Villas and 
100 deserters from the garrison at Valladolid. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 3G5. 

31 Bustamante states that during the night great alarm was caused by a 
stratagem of Rayon's, vrho fastened paper lanterns to droves of donkeys, 
which were then driven toward the royalist camp. Cuad. Hist., i. 225. Mora 
enlarges upon this story, and says that Emparan's soldiers were thus thrown 
into panic. Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 188. Emparan, in his report, however, af 
firms, 'en la noche no se advirtib cosa que mereciera atencion.' Gaz. de Mez., 
1811, ii. C01. 

z * Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 225. 'Logro por fin llegar a Toluca con 
poco menos de quinientos hombres, como consta de la revista que por 6rden 
del virey le pas6 en esta ciudad el conde de Alcaraz.' Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., 
iv. 188. The accounts given by Alaman and Bustamante of this disaster 
differ considerably. The former follows in the main the report of Calleja 
given in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 597-004. 


breaking out again, Empdran lay at the point of 
death. His condition did not, however, prevent Vene- 
gas from venting his wrath upon the unfortunate chief. 
The fault was altogether his own, but he, being ruler, 
must have some one to throw the blame upon. He 
sent the conde de Alcaraz to Toluca to investigate. 
Disgusted at the treatment, as soon as his health per 
mitted, Empdran asked permission to return to Spain, 
although the result of the in Destination left him with- 

O O 

out prejudice. His request was granted. On his ar 
rival in the peninsula he retired from military service, 
and died shortly afterward. Thus ended the career 
of one of the few royalist chiefs who, while no less 
brave than competent, was able to temper success 
with mercy. 

While these reverses which were the more pro 
nounced by reason of the coincident successes of 
Morelos in the south, and the aggressive operations 
of the insurgents at Valladolid were causing Vene- 
gas great anxiety, an unforeseen peril was threaten 
ing him in the capital. As early as April a plot was 
formed to seize the person of the viceroy, and force 
him to give orders for the release of Hidalgo and his 
fellow-captives. The prime mover was Dona Mariana 
Rodriguez de Lazarin, a woman of great daring and 
devotion to the cause, 53 and with such energy and 
tact did she manage the matter that the plans of the 
conspirators were already arranged and the day ap 
pointed. On the evening before this day, however, 
one of them, Jose Maria Gallardo, mindful that he 
might lose his life in the coming adventure, bethought 
him to provide for the saving of his soul by confessing . 
to Padre Camargo of la Merced, divulging therein 
the particulars of the conspiracy. Camargo imme 
diately informed the viceroy, and Gallardo, who was 

33 When the ranks of the independent party were in despair at the news 
of the capture of Hidalgo, Dona Mariana at a meeting in her house proposed 
to seize the viceroy, and obtain the release of the captives or hang him. Z 
ccro, Mem. Rev. J\lex., 359. This was the origin of the April conspiracy. 


apprehended without loss of time, in abject terror dis 
closed the names of all concerned. A number were 
arrested that night; and as further information w r as 
gained, a great many persons of high position were 
found to be implicated. 34 Dona Mariana and her hus 
band were confined in a dungeon till December 1820, 
when they were liberated by the exertions of Zere- 
cero. Although it does not appear that any execu 
tions followed the discovery of this plot, many of 
those arrested languished for a long time in prison. 05 
The failure of this conspiracy did not, however, de 
ter others. Plots thickened in the capital, and when 
the failure of Emparan's attack upon Zitacuaro became 
known, the bolder conspirators, hoping to deal a fin 
ishing blow at royalist power in New Spain, again 
formed a plot to seize the viceroy. Their plan was to 
attack his escort on the 3d of August, while he was 
taking his customary evening ride, in the paseo cle la 
Viga, and having secured his person, to conduct him 
to Zitacuaro, and deliver him into the power of Rayon. 
There he would be coerced to issue orders consigning 
the government of the kingdom to Rayon. 38 But 
again a traitor marred the plot on the eve of its ac 
complishment. On the night of the 2d, one Cristo 
bal Morante, who had attended the last meeting of 
the conspirators when their plans were finally arranged, 
denounced the proceedings to Venegas, 37 who imme 
diately gave orders for necessary precautions to be 
taken. On the following morning the principal con 
spirators were arrested, and in order to allay the agi 
tation caused by the discovery and the military meas 
ures taken, the viceroy on the same day issued a 
proclamation informing the public of whathad occurred. 

34 Among them Padre Belaunzaran, afterward bishop of Monterey, the 
marquis of Rajas, the counts of Santiago, Regla, and Medina, and sev 
eral high officials in the service of the government. 

35 Consult Bustamante, MartiroL, pp. 51; and Mex. Refut. Artie. Fondo, 
12. Zerecero was the author of the work quoted in note 33. 

^Gazde Mex., 1811, ii. 780. 

37 Bustamante erroneously states that it was a woman who divulged the 
plot. Cuad. Hist., i. 299. 


Proceedings were at once brought against the prison 
ers, and their trials conducted with the utmost haste. 
Six of them were condemned to death, and executed 
on the 29th of the same month. 33 

Among those arrested were three Augustinian fri 
ars, Juan Nepomuceno de Castro, Vicente Negreiros, 
and Manuel Rosendi. Castro was degraded by the 
ecclesiastical court, and handed over to the secular 
power; the other two were deposed from their relig 
ious dignities, and sentenced to confinement in the 
convents of their order in Manila. The criminal 
court, however, demanded the surrender of all three. 
This gave rise to disputes between the two jurisdic 
tions, and the viceroy, deeming it impolitic to exhibit 
the spectacle of an ecclesiastic's execution in Mexico, 
finally sent them all to Habana, to be there confined. 
Castro, however, died on his way thither in the castle 
of Ulua, where so many others under similar circum 
stances had been released from durance by death. 39 

38 These were the licenciado Antonio Ferrer, Ignacio Cataiio and Jose" 
Mariano Ayala, subalterns of the commercial regiment, Antonio Rodriguez 
Dongo, in whose house the conspirators held their meetings, and Felix Pineda 
and Jose" Mariano Gonzalez. The execution of Ferrer was little less than 
murder. The only evidence against him was the denunciation of one Manuel 
Teran, an official of the secretaria de camara de vireinato, who stated that 
Ferrer on the morning of the 3d of August had invited him to go armed and 
on horseback that afternoon to the paseo de la Viga, and made him acquainted 
with the plans formed for the execution of the design. No other witness ap 
peared against him, and he strenuously denied Teran's assertions, maintain 
ing in his declaration that he knew nothing of the plot before that morning. 
&o weak was the charge that the fiscal, Jose" Ramon Oses, only ventured to 
propose the punishment of six years imprisonment. The Spanish party, how 
ever, were loud in their demands for his death. Ferrer was a lawyer, and too 
many of that class were attached to the cause of independence. The viceroy 
was importuned so urgently that he declared if the criminal court did not 
impose capital punishment upon Ferrer he would do so himself. The presi 
dent of that court, the oidor Bataller, a Spaniard, wished to save his life, but 
the two alcaldes, Yafiez and Torres Torija, both Americans, pronounced 
the sentence of death, and Bataller unwillingly signed the death-warrant. 
"When Ferrer heard the sentence read to him, he fell senseless in the court, 
overwhelmed with the injustice to which he was victim. Alaman, Hist. Mej., 
ii. 370, 372-3; Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex., 424-8; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 
300. A declaration asserted to be written by him 'sin sugestion ni seduccion 
de nadie,' before his death and recognizing the justice of his sentence, was 
published in the official gazette two days after his execution. Gaz. de Mex., 
1811, ii. 784-5. 

sa Besides Alaman, Bustamante, and Zerecero, already quoted, consult 
Rivera, II 1st. Jed., i. 338-9; Hex. Oablldo Metrop., pp. 14, in Doc. Edes. 
Mex., MS., ii. no. 4; and Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. 2)oc., iii. 435-6. 


Notwithstanding the triumphs obtained by the in 
dependents at Zitacuaro, and the successful progress 
of Morelos in the south, Rayon recognized the want 
of cooperation among the revolutionary leaders. By 
a union only could permanent advantage be gained 
over an enemy who could concentrate an overpower 
ing force at any point and destroy them in detail. 
With a view of centralizing authority, Kay on formed 
the plan of a national junta, under some show of pop 
ular election, and he corresponded with Morelos, who 
indorsed his views. Then he convoked an assembly 
of as many of the principal inhabitants of Zitdcuaro 
and land owners in the district as could be collected, 
and laid the matter before them. This meeting was 
held on the 19th of August, and an act was passed, 
establishing a supreme national junta consisting of 
three members, to be increased to five as occasion 
might require, and nominating for election Rayon, 
Jose Maria Liceaga, and Jose Sixto Verdusco, the 
cura of Tusantla. 40 For the installation of this junta, 
and the election of the members, the principal chiefs 
were convoked the same day to give their votes on 
the matter. 41 The act of the general junta was con 
firmed by them ; the nominees were elected by a large 
majority, 42 and took oath to maintain the rights of 
the church and the king, 43 and shed the last drop of 
blood for liberty. The electors then swore to obey 
the decrees and enactments of the newly created coun- 

40 Bando, in Hernando y Ddvalos, Col. Doc. . iii. 340. 

41 The names of those assembled were: Ignacio Rayon, minister of the 
nation; Lieutenant-general Jos<5 Maria Liceaga; Josd Sixto Verdusco, as rep 
resentative of General Morelos; the mnriscales de campo Ignacio Martinez 
and Benedicto Lopez; Brigadiers Jos< Maria Vargas and Juan Albarran; Re- 
mijio Yarza, as representative of General Jos6 Antonio Torres; Colonel Mi 
guel Serrano, as representative of General Toribio Huidrobo; Captain Manuel 
Manzo, for the commissioner Mariano Ortiz; the commissioner Tomds Ortiz; 
the quartermaster Ignacio Ponce de Leon; and sub-inspector Vicente Iza- 
guirre. Id., iii. 403. 

42 Rayon naturally had great preponderance in this assembly, which at 
most was only a partial representation of the independent leaders. A few 
other persons present gained votes to the number of four, and two; and one 
was cast for Morelos ! Jb. Alaman says of Rayon's intentions, 'siendo su plan 
que la autoridad recayese en el mismo.' Hist. Mej., ii. 397. 

43 Even now they were not able to act wholly independent of royalty. 


cil, which was styled the Suprema Junta Nacional, 
and a circular copy of the proceedings w r as sent to the 
different chiefs, calling upon them to take the oath of 
allegiance and exact the same from the troops and in 
habitants in their respective districts. 

The news of the establishment of a government 
was received with great joy by the revolutionists, and 
they now indulged in the most sanguine hopes of the 
accomplishment of their high aspirations. The result, 
however, fell far short of their expectations. The 
suprema junta failed to receive general recognition; 
many of the military leaders refused obedience to it ; 44 
others only acknowledged its authority when conven 
ient, while the Villagranes even placed themselves in 
hostility to it. But what contributed most to its in 
efficiency was disagreement among its members. Some 
said it had no title to obedience, not having been con 
vened by the nation. Morelos and some others did 
not like the idea of still holding on to the skirts of 
royalty; they thought it a species of deception ruling 
in the name of Fernando, when pure independence 
alone would satisfy them. 45 The members of the 
junta tried to soothe his scruples, and in a letter 
dated the 4th of September, defended their action 
on the ground of expediency. Although they aspired 
to independence with no less ardor than their col 
leagues, they found it advantageous to the cause to 
proclaim Fernando, inasmuch as many Europeans as 
well as wavering Spanish Americans had thereby 
been induced to join them. 48 But Morelos could not 
countenance a measure which he foresaw would lead 
to complications, and although he was appointed the 

** Albino Garcia, remarked, 'No hay mas rey que Dios, ni mas alteza que 
un cerro, ni mas junta que la de dos rios. ' Bustamante, Ouad. Hist. , i. 298. 

45 'No era razon,' says Morelos at his trial, 'engaiiar a las gentes haciendo 
una cosa y siendo otra, es decir, pelear por la independencia y supouer que se 
haci<\ por Fernando VII.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 381. 

4(5 #az. de Mex., 1812, iii. 489. This letter fell into the possession of Ca- 
lleja, at the capture of Cuautla in May 1812, together with others papers of 
Morelos. Guerra maintains that this document was a fabrication of the roy 
alists. Rev. N. Esp., ii. 420-1. 


fourth member of the junta of Zitacuaro, he held 
aloof. 47 

The establishment of this junta, however, caused 
Venegas considerable alarm. He could not close his 
eyes to the fact that even the mere semblance of a 
government would give impulse to the revolution, and 
afford a dangerous opportunity to the insurgent lead 
ers of uniting under the direction of rulers who were 
no more illegitimately constituted than had been the 
junta of Seville. Its destruction, therefore, was of 
the first importance; and Calleja, who had already 
been ordered to proceed against Zitacuaro after 
Emparan's repulse, was again urged to use all possi 
ble despatch. In order to counteract the effect from 
the use of the name of Fernando VII. by the newly 
organized junta, 48 Calleja proclaimed in Guanajuato 
on the 28th of September that no junta was here 
recognized except the national congress of the cortes 
in Spain, nor any authority as legitimate except that 
of the viceroy. He moreover placed a price of 
$10,000 on the head of Rayon and those of his prin 
cipal associates. 

While Calleja was making his preparations to 
assault Zitacuaro with that unhurried leisurely sys 
tem always pursued by him, and which in this case 
detained him till the end of the year, a variety of 
events occurred. The danger to which Valladolid 
had been exposed during July caused Venegas, as 
soon as Emparan's troops had recovered from their 
fatigue, to despatch Colonel Joaquin Castillo y Busta- 
mante with his battalion to the assistance of Trujillo. 
This officer, having joined Linares in Valladolid, pro- 

47 Consult, Re.v. Mex., 399-403; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., I 293-6; 
Mora, Mcj. y sus Rev., iv. 308-10; Guerra, JRev. N. Esp., ii. 402-10. More- 
los, in a letter to Rayon dated August 13, 1811, had previously sanctioned the 
proposed establishment of a supreme junta, and appointed Verdusco as his 
representative. Zamacois, Hist. Mej. , vii. 559-02, supplies a copy of it. 

48 The proclamations and enactments of the junta bore this heading: El 
Sr Don Fernando Septimo y en su Real Nombrc la Suprema Junta Nacional 
Americana, etc. Hernandez y Da valos, Col. Doc., in. 392. 


ceeded on the Gth of September against Mufiiz, who 
was posted at Acuitzio with 8,000 men and thirteen 
pieces of artillery; and on the following day defeated 
him and captured .his guns and ammunition. He 
then marched to Patzcuaro, which was occupied by 
Torres, who, however, did not await his attack, but 
retired to Zacapo, and uniting his forces with those 
of Navarrete, took up a position on the hills near 
Zipimeo, where he gave battle to the royalists. 
Torres was as unsuccessful as Muniz; he was routed 
with great slaughter and the loss of twenty-one can 
non. Extreme severity was exercised by Castillo 
after these victories; at Zipimeo more than 300 
prisoners were put to death. And Castillo seemed 
to regard other kinds of butchery with favor, as he 
commended to the favorable notice of Trujillo a 
dragoon who, in the pursuit at Acuitzio, slew with his 
own hand a brother, saying, as the latter pleaded for 
his life, that he knew no brother who was a rebel. 

On the departure of Castillo from Toluca with a con 
siderable portion of the troops stationed there, Rayon 
determined to extend his operations into the province 
of Mexico, and sent detachments in the direction 
of Ixtlahuaca and Tenango. These made inroads 
to the gates of Toluca, and Venegas despatched Cap 
tain Porlier, who had returned to Mexico, 49 to take 
command of the force in that city. On the 16th of 
September Porlier marched from Toluca against the 
insurgents, and on the 21st made an unsuccessful 
attempt to dislodge them from a strong position on 
the hill of Tenango. The loss of the royalists was 
considerable, and Toluca being threatened, Porlier 
retraced his steps thither. Before his arrival, on the 
10th of October, the city had been assaulted by the 
enemy, and was cannonaded for the five following 
days. Meanwhile the viceroy had despatched a force 

49 Porlier had passed through Guanajuato in August on his way from 
Guadalajara to Vera Cruz, and conducted to the capital a convoy of 1422 bars 
of silver placed under his charge by Calleja. Ataman, Hist. M?j. t ii. 310; 
Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 129. 
HIST. HEX., VOL. IV. 22 - 


of 500 men from the capital to the assistance of the 
besieged. Porlier, on the arrival of this detachment, 
assumed the offensive, arid drove the insurgents from 
their positions with the loss of their artillery, arms, 
and ammunition. Of 100 Indians taken prisoners all 
were drawn up in file arid shot, except one who was 
dismissed to bear the tidings to his countrymen. 50 

The viceroy now peremptorily ordered Calleja to 
march against Zitacuaro. 51 Calleja, aware of the peril 
in which Guanajuato would be placed by his depart 
ure, was nevertheless compelled to obey these instruc 
tions, and unwillingly left that city on the llth of 
November, having been frustrated in his attempts to 
provide for the safety of the province by arrangements 
with Arredondo and Cruz, who, indeed, were fully 
occupied in protecting their own territories. Thus 
abandoned to its own resources of defence, the city of 
Guanajuato lay exposed to the attack of numerous 
bands of guerrillas who gathered round as soon as 
Calleja was out of sight. On the 26th that indefati 
gable chief Albino Garcia occupied the hill of San 
Miguel with some 12,000 men, and opened fire on the 
city. An attempt made by a party of royalists to 
capture the enemy's cannon by assailing their rear 
failed, nearly every man being killed; and the insur 
gents, taking advantage of their success, pushed for 
ward into the town, and attacked the plaza. Here, 
however, they lost a cannon which they had placed 
in the plazuela of San Diego, and Albino Garcia, aware 
that reinforcements were approaching from Leon and 
Silao to the relief of the besieged, hurriedly with 
drew to the hacienda of Cuevas, where a great num 
ber of his followers dispersed. 52 But although the 
insurgents failed in their attempts against the capital 

50 Gaz. deMex., 1811, ii. 957-60, 977-80, 1006-10; Alaman, Hist. Mej., 
ii. 392. 

51 The despatch of Venegas was concluded in such terms as to cause Ca 
lleja additional offence. Buxtamante, Campanas de Calleja, 132-3. 

52 Id., Cuad. Hist., i. 424-7; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col Dot:, iii. 447-9. 
Cruz had, moreover, instructed Captain Angel Linares, then at Lagos, to hold 
himself in readiness to assist Guanajuato. Id., iii. 429-30. 


and the principal towns, which were attacked in turn, 
the province was overrun by fierce bands of guer 
rillas and subjected throughout its length and breadth 
to the scourge of predatory warfare. In the neigh 
boring province of Michoacan the aspect of affairs 
underwent no material change. Although the capi 
tal was relieved from immediate danger, it was the 
only place held absolutely in possession by the royal 
ists. During the last three months of the year, vari 
ous expeditions were sent into the districts of Patz- 
cuaro, Tacambaro, Ario, and Uruapan, but though 
the government forces succeeded in driving Muniz 
and other chiefs from place to place, destroying the 
founderies which they established and burning their 
camps, they made no permanent progress. In Nueva 
Galicia, Cruz was more successful. On the principle 
of Calleja's new system, military companies were or 
ganized in most of the towns, and by their cooperation 
in resisting the predatory attacks of the revolutionists, 
the province was gradually reduced to tranquillity. 

The city, of Queretaro, well fortified and garrisoned, 
was secured against attack, but the surrounding ter 
ritory was no more exempt from civil strife than the 
neighboring provinces, and the comandante Rebollo 
sent frequent expeditions against the rebels, 53 who in 
terrupted the communication between the capital and 
Queretaro to such an extent that only immense con 
voys strongly escorted could pass through the infested 
district. 54 In communication with the insurgent lead- 

53 These expeditions were generally commanded by Fernando Romero Mar 
tinez and Ilclefonso de la Torre, both European Spaniards, and whose ferocity 
gained for them an infamous notoriety. The former indulged his blood- 
thirstiness by putting bound captives to death with his own hand, and the lat 
ter respected neither sex nor age in the butcheries which he perpetrated. 
Alaman, Jlist. Mej., ii. 405-6. Particulars of the engagements in Queretaro 
will be found in Gaz. deMex., 1811, ii. 149-51, 381-4, 594-6, 69D-702, 707-11, 
719-21, 760-1, 1022-4, 1192-3, 1195-6; Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 

51 On the 14th of November a convoy consisting of 2,000 pack mules, iin- 
der the conduct of Colonel Andrade, entered Mexico. Besides 600 bars of sil 
ver, it conveyed a great quantity of articles of consumption, and its safe ar 
rival was a matter of rejoicing to the inhabitants of the capital. Andrade left 
Mexico some days later with a return convoy six leagues Ln length, escorted 


ers in Queretaro were those operating in the Huas- 
teca and Mexico. The progress made by the revolu 
tion in the eastern part of the latter province was 
rapid and alarming. During August and the succeed 
ing months of 1811, the insurrection spread southward 


by a body of troops 400 strong. On the 23d he was attacked by the Villa- 
granes, Anayas, and Correa, the cura of Nopala, who had declared for the rev 
olution and had been made brigadier by the junta of Zitdcuaro, and appointed 
comandante of Huichapan and Jilotepec. Although the insurgents were re 
pulsed, they succeeded in driving off some pack mules, and the action was so 
brisk that the bishop of Guadalajara, who was returning to his diocese, was in 
danger of being captured. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 407-8; Gaz. deMex., 1811, 
ii. 1108-11. 


through the plains of Apam and extended across Pue- 
bla to the confines of Oajaca. Toward the close of the 
year the territory of Tlascala was invaded, the city 
attacked, and many of its towns and their districts 
devastated. The highway between the capital and 
Orizaba was almost closed to the royalists, and com 
munication with Vera Cruz interrupted. 

The first impulse to the revolutionary movement in 
the plains of A.pam was given by Jose Francisco 
Osorno, a highwayman by profession, and so illiterate 
that he only succeeded in learning to scrawl his 
name when he became prominent as a leader. 55 Hav 
ing collected a band of 600 or 700 men, he entered 
Zacatlan on the 30th of August without opposition. 
Here he was presently joined by Mariano Aldama 
a relative of the Aldamas who had been the associates 
of Hidalgo with the rank of major-general; and their 
rapid progress soon caused inconvenience in the capi 
tal by the stoppage of supplies from the haciendas sit 
uated in the plains. Venegas accordingly despatched 
an expedition against Zacatlan under the command of 
a naval captain named Ciriaco del Llano. 58 This offi 
cer gained a series of successes over the insurgents, 
but his sanguinary and oppressive proceedings, instead 
of extinguishing the insurrectionary spirit, only served 
to inflame it. 67 Thus Osorno, though repeatedly de 
feated and his followers dispersed, ever reappeared at 

55 Such is the statement of Calleja in his manifiesto supplied by Martinena 
in his Verdadcro Origen de la Rev. enN. Esp., 16-7. Osorno was convicted in 
Puebla for robbery about the year 1790. He attained to the rank of major 
general and lieutenant general in the revolutionary service. Bustamante 
glosses over the criminal antecedent of this leader. Ctiad. Hist. , i. 358. 

56 At the beginning of the revolution the governor of Habana had sent to 
Mexico a number of naval officers who wished to take service in the royalist 
army. Id., i. 359. 

5T An order which he issued to the effect that no one except a public char 
acter might ride on horseback caused great and general discontent, and many 
joined Osorno in order to save their horses, which were regarded with affec 
tion, from being taken for military work. Still more oppressive was Llano's 
system of burning the homes of the country people on the ranches scattered 
through the plains, in order to compel the inhabitants to congregate in the 
larger towns and oppose the insurgents. Id., i. 360-1; Gaz. de Mex.. 1811. 
ii. 932. 


some point distant from the scene of his late reverse 
at the head of his reunited men, 58 and his name became 
as celebrated in the plains of Apam as that of Albino 
Garcia in the Bajio of Guanajuato. 59 

b8 Aldama had been treacherously murdered by one Jose" Maria Casalla, 
who received him into his house under the guise of friendship and assassinated 
him while asleep. Bustamaiite, Cuad. Hist., i. 363. By his death Osorno suc 
ceeded to the chief command. 

59 Details of the royalist operations in the plains of Apam will be found in 
Gaz. deMex., 1811, ii. 871-8, 931-6, 987-91, 1056-8. 




WHEN Morelos returned to Chilapa, after the sup 
pression of the conspiracy formed by Tabares and 
David, he found himself in a most favorable position 
to make at leisure and without interruption his prepa 
rations for another campaign. By the dispersion of 
the royalist troops sent against him, he held possession 
of the country about him. Protected from attack on 
the north by the river Mescala, and the deep pestifer 
ous valley through which it ran, he was equally se 
cure from molestation in the direction of Oajaca. The 
recent defeats of troops from that province had left it 
in alarm for its own safety, without either the incli 
nation or means again to assume the offensive. Dur 
ing the next three months, therefore, Morelos devoted 
himself with untiring activity to the more thorough 
organization of his forces, and especially to the estab 
lishment of systematic order and harmony between 
castes, the correction of the abuses practised upon 



Spaniards, 1 and to the collection, proper management, 
and legitimate application of public rents and church 
tithes within the territory under his control. 2 In 
order to facilitate matters, early in October he formed 
a new province, which he named Tecpan, out of the 
southern portion of the territory which at that time 
comprised the intendencia of Mexico, and erected 
Tecpan as the capital, with the title of the city of 
Nuestra Seiiora de Guadalupe, while at the same 
time, as a punishment for the pertinacious opposition 
of the inhabitants of Acapulco, that port was degraded 
from its rank and title of Ciudad delos Reyes to that 
of la Congregacion de los Fieles, the lowest grade of 
municipal communities in the Indies. 3 

The preeminence displayed by Morelos in ability 
to direct the revolutionary movement, continually ex 
posed his life to other dangers than those of open war. 
Dark and secret plans were formed for his destruc 
tion by poison or capture. In September 1811 he 
received a letter from one Padre Alva, 4 warning him 
of a plot to poison him, and informing him that two 
men were already on their way from Mexico with 
that object. As Alva had minutely described them, 
they were arrested on their arrival at Chilapa, and 
sent to Zacatula. About a year later a similar design 
was meditated, of which Calleja seems to have been 
aware; 5 and still later Rayon apprised him of the 

1 0n the 13th of October he published a decree to this effect: 'Que aim 
siendo culpados algunos ricos Europeos 6 criollos, no se heche mano de sus 
bienes sino con orden Expresa del Superior de la Expedicion. ' Hernandez y 
Ddvalos, Col. Doc. , iii. 402, 450. 

2 At the beginning of his career Morelos appointed commissioners to at 
tend to these matters. See Id., ii. 227-8; Ataman, Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 41. 
These commissioners were instructed 'a reconocer las existencias de los 
estancos, alcabalos, como tambien las de bulas y nuevo indulto de carne, to- 
mando cuenta de ellos a las personas que los manejan.' Ib. On the 15th of 
Sept. he established postal communication with other independent centres, 
and between the revolutionary armies, by the organization of a sendee of 
mounted couriers. Hernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iii. 376. 

3 Alaman supplies a copy of this enactment. Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 44-6. 
The territory thus constituted a province by Morelos was afterward made, 
with an addition, the province of Guerrero. 

*'Con destino de Capellan de Coro 6 otra ingerencia en la Colegiata de 
Guadalupe. ' Declaration de Morelos, 38-9. 

5 Such is Alaman's opinion: 'En la declaracion muy especial que por 6rden 


presence of a traitor among his most confidential as 
sociates, whose intention was to deliver him to the 
viceroy. 6 Morelos received these unpleasant commu 
nications with extreme indifference. 

The rapid extension of the rebellion, despite his ut 
most efforts to arrest its progress, kept Venegas in 
embarrassment; and to add to his perplexity, the popu 
larity of the cause was daily gaining ground in the 
capital and other large cities in possession of the 
Spaniards. Fostered by the circulation of periodicals 
and publications the distributors of which the gov 
ernment in vain endeavored to discover the princi 
ples of independence were being more widely dissemi 
nated and better understood. Prominent among the 
authors of these sheets was Doctor Cos, whom the 
imprudent action of the viceroy had driven to the 
ranks of the insurgents. Cos, as the reader will re 
member, on his departure from Aguascalientes had 
been detained in confinement at Queretaro. Having 
addressed a representation to the viceroy giving an 
account of the occurrences at Aguascalientes, and in 
forming him of the instructions which he had received 
from Calleja to proceed to Mexico, Cos was released by 
order of Venegas and presented himself at the vice 
regal palace. The viceroy expressed himself satisfied 
with his explanations ; but after a delay of many days, 
during which no notice was taken of him, Cos was 
peremptorily ordered to return immediately to his 
parish. Such a journey could not be undertaken by 
him at that time without imminent risk; two days 
after his departure he was captured by Correa's band 
and conducted to Zitacuaro, where, disgusted with 
the treatment he had received and the want of con 
fidence in him shown by the viceroy, he offered his 

del virey Calleja se le tomo en su causa, sobre otro conato posterior tie cnve- 
nenamiento, que da idea que Calleja tenia noticia previa del heclio.' Hist. 
Mej., ii. 425. 

6 Ray 011 described the man as stout and big-bellied. Morelos' reply was 
'no hay aqui otro barrigon que yo, la que en mi eufermedad queda desbas- 
tada.' Id., ii. 425-6. 


services to the junta. Rayon willingly received him, 
and henceforth Cos devoted heart and soul to the 
cause. Conscious of the power exercised by the press 
as an engine of defence against misrepresentation, and 
for the diffusion of enlightened ideas on the subject 
of independence, with infinite labor he fashioned out 
of wood with his own hands sufficient type to enable 
him to print five pages of matter, and for some months 
issued from Zitacuaro a weekly publication which he 
styled the Ilustrador Americano. 1 The effect produced 
by this sheet was soon felt by the steady emigration 
from the cities of young men of energy and ability, 
who joined the ranks of the revolutionists and aided 
the cause with sword or pen. 

The perplexity of Veriegas increased daily ; and so 
forlorn did his position appear to him that at times 
he even meditated opening communications with the 
rebel leaders to induce them to lay down their arms 
by offers of personal favors, and by concessions which 
would win back the multitude to their allegiance with 
out prejudice to the essential principle of Spanish 
domination. But such a step would be deeply hu 
miliating to the dignity of the government, and doubly 
so in the event of failure. Sorely pressed though he 
was, he hesitated to adopt a plan so uncertain. It 
was therefore a relief to his mind when Manuel Igna- 
cio Gonzalez del Campillo, bishop of Puebla, 8 offered 

"Mora says: 'El Ilustrador Americano, se leia por todos partes con avidez 
y con aprecio, en las grancles ciudades sometidas a los Espaiiolcs, cspecialmente 
en Mcjico, circulaba de mano en raano, y aunque cl gobierno vireiual sabia cl 
hccho, no podia dar con las personas que lo leian y teniau. ' Mcj. y sus Rev. , 
iv. 197. See Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 40G. Somewhat later Cos obtained a 
quantity of type by the assistance of Jos6 Rebelo, an official in the printing- 
office of Arizpe, in which the government printing was done. Ilebclo pur 
chased the type without suspicion, and it was conveyed at great risk through 
the gates of the capital packed in gourds, which to appearance contained fruit. 
Having joined the insurgents forthwith, Rebelo served for some years with 
great zeal for the cause. He was eventually captured by the royalists while 
conveying some revolutionary sheets from Zacatlan to Apazingan, and shot. 
Id., i. 407-9. 

8 Campillo, though a Creole, had been appointed bishop of Puebla on ac 
count of eminent services rendered the church. Previous to his election he 
had frequently been engaged in disputes with the Spaniards and the govern 
ment. Disagreements were then laid aside, and when the revolution broke 
out Campillo used his utmost efforts to promote the cause of Spain. His lino 


to open negotiations in his own name with Rayon and 
Morelos, and submitted a plan of proceeding. He 
would address a manifesto to the two leaders, and 
appeal to them to aid in putting a stop to the war. 
Commissioners were to be sent to them with instruc 
tions of both a public and private nature. By the 
first they would be authorized to offer full pardon 
to Rayon and Morelos if they would stop proceed 
ings and recognize the Spanish government. By the 
second, promises were to be privately given to the 
insurgent leaders, on the word of the bishop and with 
his guarantee, of their reception into favor. If these 
offers were accepted, it was to be understood that the 
insurgent forces, their fortified places, arms, and all 
resources of war, should be placed at the disposal of 
the government. 9 

Yenegas gladly accepted the bishop's proposal; 
whether his mediation were successful or not, it 
would solve the question which perplexed him with 
out compromising the viceregal dignity. . The com 
missioners 10 were received by the revolutionary chiefs 
with becoming deference. But the design failed. 
Neither the bishop's manifesto nor private arguments 
and promises had any weight with either Rayon or 
Morelos, who refused to enter into any negotiations 

of conduct was, however, marked by freedom from the rancor displayed by 
his brother prelates, and the coarse vituperation which too often disfigured 
their exhortations was never resorted to by him. He moreover frequently 
interposed his influence with the viceroy to save the lives of unfortunate in 
surgent captives. He was, therefore, regarded with less aversion by the 
revolutionists than his ecclesiastical colleagues. Mora, Alej. y sus Rev., iv. 

9 The bishop's manifest and his correspondence with the viceroy and the 
insurgent leaders, together wich the report of the cura Antonio Palafox one 
of the commissioners of the failure of the. plan, was published by him in 
August 1812. Campillo, Manif., 11 3, pp. 103. Negrete claims to bo the first 
hiscorian who published a copy of these interesting documents, Bustamante 
having only produced the bishop's correspondence with Morelos. Mcx. Siy, 
XIX. , v. 103-76. This last author is of opinion that Campillo did not initiate 
the mediation, but that it was secretly arranged by Venegas. Cuad. Hist., 
ii. 102-3. Consult Mora, MPJ. y stts Rev., iv. 197-201. 

10 The cura Antonio Palafox to Rayon, and the presbitero Josd Maria 
Llave to Morelos. The latter, however, was prevented reaching his destina 
tion ' porque so lo impcdieron unas calenturas, ' Dustamante, Cuad. Hi>,t. , ii. 
103, or, as Mora says, 'no quiso encargarsc de este negocio.' Mej. y sus Rev., 
iv. 201. A substitute was therefore sent in his stead. 



except on the basis of the establishment in Mexico of 
a national government. Indeed, even their influence 
would have been unavailing to stay the current of in 
dependent principles now so deeply ingrafted in the 
minds of their followers, and an attempt to do so 
would have endangered their own lives. 11 The com 
missioners, therefore, returned with the tidings of 
their failure, and the two governments continued 
their preparations for future hostilities. 


About the middle of November Morelos again took 
the field and entered upon his second campaign. Pro 
ceeding to Tlapa, he entered that town without oppo 
sition, the royalist garrison having retreated to Oajaca 
on his approach. Here he was joined by Padre Tapia, 

11 The commissioner Palafox, in his report to the bishop describing the 
public feeling in that part of the country which he visited, says : 'Ni se piensa, 
ni se habla, ni se obra, sino de la insurreccion : . . .todos, pero mas los intlios, 
estan resucltos a morir, y con hechos practices han probado quo lo estan tam- 
bien a matar aun a los supremos gefes quo han puesto el dia quo se vuclvan 
como ellos dicen "revelados."' Canrpillo, Manif., 112-13. Rayon's reply to 


and Victoriano Maldonado, an Indian of great reso 
lution and intelligence. From Tlapa he inarched to 
Chautla de la Sal, where Mateo Musitu, a rich Span 
iard, had organized and armed at his own expense a 
considerable force, fortifying himself in a strong build 
ing which had formerly been the convent of the Au- 
gustinians. Morelos, however, despite the vigorous 
defence made, carried the place by storm, and cap 
tured Musitu and 200 of his men. Although Musitu 
offered fifty thousand dollars for his life, he was 
treated with the severity dealt to belligerents, and 
shot with other Spaniards who were taken prisoners 
with him. 12 

At Chautla, Morelos divided his force into three 
divisions, one of which he placed under the command 
of Miguel Bravo, with instructions to march against 
Oajaca; with the second Galeana was sent to attack 
Tasco; at the head of the remaining division Morelos 
advanced to Izucar, which he entered on the 10th of 
December without opposition, and was there joined by 
Mariano Matamoros, the acting cura of Jantetelco, 
who afterward figured as a prominent revolutionary 
chief. On the 17th, however, he was attacked by a 
force of over 500 men under the command of Mi 
guel de Soto y Maceda, a lieutenant of the navy, sent 
against him by Llano who, in recognition of his ser- 

Campillo is dated Zitacuaro, October 10, 1811, that of Morelos, Tlapa, 'Nov. 
24, 1811. The latter chief, irritated perhaps by the upbraiding tone and 
somewhat acrimonious style of the bishop's letter, forwarded to him a sarcas 
tic note which he had appended to two letters received by him from the curas 
of Tixtla and Chilapa relative to the protection of their flocks from abuses by 
insurgents! The following is a translation of the document: 'Tlapa, Nov. 
24, 1811. I certify in due form that those curas of the people who have de 
clared in favor of the gachupines can kill and perform their religious func 
tions without being liable to the charge of irregularity and to excommunica 
tion, and that only the cura Morelos and the other American curas will be 
considered irregular, excommunicated, etc. Let the original be remitted to 
the bishop of Puebla for his information. Morelos.' Id., 97-8. 

l2 Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 429-30; Cavo, Tres Sighs, iii. 382. Morelos 
while here attached to his service Jose" Manuel de Herrera, cura of Huamux- 
titian, who was found secreted in the church and brought before him over 
whelmed with terror. Morelos appeased his fears, and he was afterward 
admitted into his closest confidence, and made a chaplain of his army. Cavo 
says : ' Este es el famoso Ministro de relaciones de Iturbide, que tanto daiio 
hizo a la nacion. ' /&. 


vices in the plains of Apam, had meantime been made 
colonel, and afterward appointed military commander 
of the province of Puebla. 13 

The assault was sustained with great vigor for five 
hours, but the royalists could make no impression 
upon the plaza, the entrances to which were closed 
by barricades. Soto, mortally wounded, at last gave 
orders to retreat, delegating the command to Captain 
Mariano Ortiz. The retreat was equally disastrous. 
Ortiz was killed at the head of his men while endeav 
oring to repulse the pursuing revolutionists, and the 
remnant of the division, amounting to less than two 
hundred men, entered Puebla on the 19th, the rest 
being killed, captured, or dispersed. 14 

Puebla now lay almost at the mercy of Morelos, 
dependent as it was for its defence only upon the dis- 
spirited remnant of Soto's force. But he chose rather 
to sweep clean the territory as he advanced, and leave 
no hostile force ; i his rear. He therefore proceeded 
to Cuautla, and entered it without resistance on the 
25th of Ij^cember, the cornandante Garcilaso having 
fled at his approach. From Cuautla Morelos con 
tinued his triumphal march to Tasco in order to unite 
with Galeana, who had been equally successful in his 
expedition against that town, which he took after a 
vigorous defence maintained by the comandante Ma 
riano Garcia Rios. Rios, after sustaining himself for 
two days, capitulated on the condition that the lives 
of himself ^and his troops should be spared, but More 
los, on hij,. Arrival on the 31st, pronounced the capit 
ulation nuii, n. the ground that Rios had continued 
firing after n '^a^l^een concluded, and he, with fif- 

Gaz. de Hex., 1811, 11. VX3, 1214. 

11 Soto died the same day rand was buried on the 20th, in the cathedral 
at Puebla. His attack on Izucar was regarded as rash by the government. 
See the report of the alfe"rez cle navio, Pedro Micheo, who brought off the de 
feated troops, in Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 1209-14; also, Cavo, Trcs Sif/los, 
iii. 382-3; Alaman, Hist. Me; . ii. -131-4. From a fragment of a communi 
cation of the viceroy, dated i>ecember 20, 1811, it appears that on the 18th 
the royalists collected at Atlixco to the number of 150 only, //ernamfez y 
Ddvcdos, Col. Doc., iii. 4,36. About 70 prisoners were taken, neai'ly all of 
whom were set at liberty. Id. , vi. 22. 


teen other prisoners, Spaniards and Creoles, was shot 
on the 4th of January following. 15 Thus terminated 
the second campaign of Morelos, by which he became 
master of the territory extending from Chilapa to the 
mountain range which separates the valley of Mexico 
from the tierra caliente of the south. 

Meantime the junta of Zitacuaro was experiencing 
that opposition to its authority already foreshadowed. 
Tom as Ortiz, a nephew of Hidalgo, and who had been 
appointed by him comandante of that district, made 
himself particularly obnoxious, both on account of 
his want of deference and his rapacity, which drew 
angry complaints from Morelos. In order to sustain 
the authority of the new government, the junta there 
fore caused Ortiz to be arrested, as well as several of 
its own commissioners who had displayed a similar 
disposition, and to whom Rayon himself applied the 
epithet of voracious. 16 Ortiz and two other delin 
quents were condemned to death.; biiiHn consideration 
of their services, execution of the sentence was sus 
pended. When Calleja, however, approached Zitd- 
cuaro the junta, apprehensive that they might cause 
future trouble in case the royalists should prove suc 
cessful, gave orders for their execution, and they were 
shot on the 31st of December. 17 Nor did Rayon meet 
with that subserviency to his wishes which he had ex 
pected from his colleagues, who soon began to regard 
his ambitious views of self-aggrandizement with jeal 
ousy. In his correspondence with Morelo^ he speaks 
of the disgust which he had experienced ? leir differ 
ences, of the puerile disposition which ' .y displayed, 
and of their weakness of chara r." Thus enmity 

15 Morelos, Declar., 23. Rios had made himself an especial object of hate 
by his cruelty. Bustamante describes him as 'hoinbre pequenito de unas 
entrauas diabolicas.' Cuad. Hist., ii. 28. 

l6 Oftclode Hay on a Morelos, Enero 18 de 1812; Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 

17 Oficin de Liceaga d Morelos, Enero 13 Je iS12. 

18 It was through Rayon's influence that Liceaga and Verdusco had been 
elected members of the junta. Mora says of them: 'Eran personas oscuras 


sprung up between them; and though an apparent 
reconciliation occurred in the face of a danger common 
to all, mutual confidence was never restored. 

On the 1st of January, 1812, Calleja appeared be 
fore Zitacuaro, the doomed city. He had left Guana 
juato on the llth of November, and the slowness of 
his movements marks at once the repugnance with 
which he undertook the enterprise and his care to se 
cure a successful issue. 19 Proceeding to Acambaro, 

O ' 

he there conferred with Trujillo, who met him for that 
purpose, and was joined by Castillo y Bustamante, 
Garcia Conde, Meneso and other chiefs with their 
divisions, according to previous instructions. From 
Aciknbaro he leisurely continued his march, 23 and ar 
rived at Ixtlahuaca toward the middle of December, 
in order to open communication with Toluca and 
combine his operations with these of Porlier. 21 Here 
he received some reinforcements, and his army now 
amounted to 4,900 combatants, 22 with twenty-three 
pieces of artillery of different calibre. 

On the 22d of December Calleja marched from San 
Felipe del Obraje, where he had concentrated his 
troops, and on the following day entered the rugged 
defile of San Mateo. The difficulties which he en- 

y desconoeidas en la mayor parte de las divisiones insnrjentes. . .y se acusa 
Rayon de haber intentado apoderarse de la autoridad suprema a la sombra 
de personas insignificantes y nombres desconocidos.' Mej. y sus Rev. , iv. 190-1. 

19 After his departure from Guanajuato he received Venegas' instructions 
of October 31st, couched in such peremptory terms as to cause him much an 
noyance. He replied to the viceroy that 'no necesitaba usar de terminos tan 
estrechantes, pues bastaban las anteriormente recibidas para obedecer.' Bus 
tamante, Campanas de Calleja, 133. 

20 Calleja was 10 days passing from Acambaro to Maravatio, expecting to 
receive instructions from the viceroy, which failed to arrive. Gaz de Mex., 
1812, iii. 136. 

al Calleja, considering that the previous failures to take Zitacuaro were 
caused by the attacks being directed through the difficult canon of San 
Mateo, had intended to make his approach by that of Tuxpan, while Porlier 
secured the San Mateo road against the retreat of the insurgents. He was, 
however, compelled to alter his plan and march through the San Mateo 
canon, while Porlier directed his attention against Tenango. Ib. 

22 Consisting of 2,761 infantry and 2,134 cavalry. His original force had, 
however, been reduced by 1,543 men from sickness and desertion. Alaman, 
Hist. Mej., ii. 451-2. 


countered in his approach to the city were so great 
that he was eight days in accomplishing twelve leagues, 
sometimes advancing not more than half a league in 
twenty-four hours. In many places entirely new roads 
had to be opened at the cost of immense labor, and the 
sufferings of the soldiers were excessive as they toiled 
under pitiless storms of rain, snow, and pelting hail 
which alternately descended upon them from the sun 
less sky. Had the royalists been assailed in this pass, 
it is probable that they would never have reached 
Zitticuaro, but the insurgent leaders too confidently 
relied upon their strong position, and their fortifica 
tions, which had been elaborately completed under 
the direction of Ramon Rayon, brother of Ignacio. 
Having surmounted all obstacles, Calleja, on the 1st 
of January, 1812, encamped before the town on a 
rising ground just beyond reach of the enemy's bat 
teries. Having personally reconnoitred the enemy's 
lines of defences, 23 he made his dispositions for attack 
on the following day. His plan was to assail the 
insurgents' fortifications in the rear, while he threat 
ened them with attack in front. With this object, he 
placed a division of his forces under the command of 
Garcia Conde, who was directed to move round to 
the left toward the road leading from Los Laureles, 
while Calleja with the main body made a detour along 
the heights toward the right. A strong reserve force 
was placed in charge of the conde de Casa Rul. At 
ten o'clock in the morning the royalist commanders had 
taken up their respective positions, and having placed 
their artillery on commanding eminences, opened fire. 
For a short half-hour the revolutionists replied vigor 
ously; but their fire then slackened before the superior 

23 It is narrated by Diaz Calvillo, that while Calleja was making his ob 
servations the figuration of a very perfect palm tree appeared in the sky, and 
that he exclaimed to Jose* Maria Echagaray, who commanded the cavalry 
escort which accompanied him: 'Vea V. la palma; nuestra es la victoria.' 
Sermon, 154. Calvillo, moreover, gives a wood-cut of the miraculous appear 
ance, which has so little resemblance to a palm that it has been thus criticised 
in a marginal note: 'En verdad q! parece a la Palma, como un burro a una 
chinchi (sic).' Ib. 

HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 23 


gunnery of the royalists, arid disorder was observed 
in their lines. Calleja had already made his dis 
positions for the assault, three attacking columns hav 
ing been placed respectively under the commands of 
Castillo, Colonel Jose Maria Jalon, and Oroz and 
Meneso, the latter leaders being instructed to cover 
the right of the other columns, and occupying the Tux- 
pan road, connect with Garcia's division on that of 
Los Laureles, thus closing retreat in those directions. 24 
These columns were now ordered to advance, while 
Garcia Conde, having crossed the moat by means of 
a portable bridge provided for the purpose, was at 
the same time forcing his way into the town. The 
simultaneous attack was successful at all points. In 
deed, the defence appears to have been lamentably 
weak in comparison with the great preparations made, 
and by two o'clock in the afternoon the insurgents 
had fled from Zitacuaro as best they could, plunging 
into the ditches and escaping by the barrancas and 
mountain gullies. 25 The junta fled to Sultepec, where 
it established a new seat of government. 

The loss sustained in killed and wounded was 
inconsiderable in proportion to the importance of 
the fall of Zitcicuaro. 26 Forty-three cannon fell into 
the possession of the victors, besides a great quan- 

24 A deep barranca intervened between the position which Calleja took 
up and the town. He caused three mountain paths leading to this to be 
well opened for the advance of his attacking columns under cover of his 
artillery. Castillo moved along the one to Calleja's left ; Jalon advanced on 
the central one; and Oroz and Meneso, whose forces were composed of cav 
alry, on the one extending to Calleja's right. Gaz. de Mcx., 1812, iii. 138-9. 

25 'A las dos de la tarde ya no habia en el recinto un solo enemigo vivo. ' Id. , 
iii. 140. The account of the capture of Zitacuaro has been derived from 
Calleja's report to the viceroy in Id., iii. 17-18, 135-42; Bustamante, Cam- 
panas de Calleja, 132-51; Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 413-19; Mora, Mcj. y 
SILS Rc.v., iv. 270-82; Torrente, Rev. Hisp. Amer., i. 310-13; Diaz Calvillo, 
Sermon, 152-59. 

26 Though Calleja in his report wishes to give the idea that great numbers 
fell, he only vaguely states that many hundreds of the rebels perished. A 
Spaniard, however, writing from Zitacuaro on the 5th of January, says: 
'Apenas moririan 200 y en el pueblo no pasarian de 20, porque estaba y aun 
permanece solo.' Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 419. Negrete says: 'La pdrdida 
de los independientes . . . f ue* corta: no pas6 de cincuenta hombres, siendo 
mucho mayor la de los realistas.' Mex. Sicj. XIX., iv. 389. Calleja esti 
mated the number of the defenders at 35,000, of whom 12,000 were cavalry, 
' mimero sin duda muy exajerado,' as Alaman remarks. Hist. Mej., ii. 455. 


tity of other arms and an immense store of ammuni 
tion. 27 The casualties of the victors were insignificant. 
Exemplary punishment must necessarily be inflicted 
upon a city which had twice witnessed the disgrace 
of the royalist arms. Most of the belligerents had 
escaped and the prisoners were few. Of these, eigh 
teen were shot on the following day; 28 too small an 
offering to appease the royalist gods; so the destruc 
tion of the city was determined upon, and on the 
5th Calleja published a proclamation, declaring that 
the Indians of Zita"cuaro and its district were de 
prived of their property, all their immunities and 
privileges forfeited, and that every building would be 
razed to the ground or destroyed by fire. Six days 
were given for the unfortunate inhabitants to leave 
the town. 29 The conde de Casa Rul was charged 
with the execution of the sentence, which was rigor 
ously carried out, after the place had been well sacked 
by the royalist troops, the churches and convents 
only being spared. 30 On the 13th Calleja departed 
from Maravatio by the Tuxpan road, while in his 
rear ascended the flames and smoke from the burning 
town, which had been dignified by the revolutionists 
with the high title of Villa Imperial. 31 

Porlier in the mean time sustained a reverse in his 
operations. According to the first plan formed by 
Calleja, he was to have occupied the San Mateo road 

27 <7az. deMex., 1812, iii. 155. 

23 Seventy were set at liberty, ' miserables seducidos que tambien se hici- 
eron prisioneros.' Id., iii. 140. 

29 The capital of the department was transferred to Maravatio. The lands 
and all except movable property were to be sold and the proceeds placed in 
the royal treasury. Id., iii. 156-8. 

30 Ward says: 'I saw this unfortunate town in 1826. The situation is 
lovely, but the place is still in ruins.' Hex. in 1837, i. 189. Diaz Calvillo 
defends Calleja from the charge of having allowed the churches and religious 
houses to be pillaged. An inventory was taken of all ecclesiastical effects, 
and they were sent to the bishop at Valladolid. Calvillo also reproduces an 
order of Calleja of the 13th of January, prohibiting his soldiers from sacking 
any other towns, or haciendas and ranches. Sermon, 173-4. Besides Zitd- 
cuaro, Calleja reduced to ashes twelve pueblos in the vicinity. Bustamante 
supplies a list of most of their names. Guad. Hist., i. 323. 

31 Calleja in his report speaks of it as 'la llamada Imperial Zitdquaro.' 
Gaz. de Hex., 1812, iii. 140. 


leading to Zitacuaro ; but having received orders from 
Venegas to move from Toluca against Tenango, he 
directed his inarch thither, and occupied the place dur 
ing the 29th and 30th of December, meeting with 
little opposition except that offered by its mountain 
ous position. Porlier then proceeded to Tenancingo, 
which the revolutionists abandoned on his approach, 
concentrating themselves in the barranca of Tecua- 
loya. On the 3d of January he drove the enemy 
from their position and took possession of the pueblo. 
But the troops of Morelos were approaching in force, 
and about the middle of January the barranca was 
again occupied, Galeana having arrived with the ad 
vance division. On the 17th Porlier attacked the 
insurgents, who had taken up the same position from 
which they had previously been driven. Though, the 
royalists gained some advantage at first, and advanced 
to the pueblo which had been occupied by the enemy, 
they finally sustained a repulse with considerable loss, 
and retreated to Tenancingo. Here Porlier was as 
sailed by the combined forces of Morelos, who con 
ducted the operations in person. 32 The attack began 
on the 22d, and the firing continued all through the 
night and the following day. Portions of the town 
were set on fire, and the royalists, having lost several 
of their principal officers, were driven to their last 
position in the plaza with no hope of maintaining it. 
On the night of the 23d Porlier abandoned the place, 
effecting his retreat with great difficulty and with the 
loss of eleven cannon to Tenango, whence he returned 
to Toluca, with the remnant of his force in mis 
erable plight and thoroughly dispirited. 33 Morelos 

"His forces numbered about 3,200 men, commanded by Galeana, Nicolas 
Bravo, and Matamoros. M&relos, Declar., 23. 

33 The account of Porlier's operations has been mainly derived from His 
despatches in Gas. de M<x. y 1811, ii. 1231; Id., 1812, iii. 1S-19, 61-70, 159-61. 
Consult also Alamcm, Hist. Mej., ii. 460-7; Torrente, JRev. Hist. Amer., i. 314- 
10; Bmtamante, Companas de Ccdleja y 166; and Citad. Hist., ii. 10-32, in 
which last narration the author gives a very incorrect version. Alaman 
remarks that had Calleja obeyed the orders of the viceroy to march against 
Morelos as he approached the valley of Toluca, Porlier would not have sus- 


Living remained Umv days in Tcnancingo, returned 
by way of Cuernavara to Cuautla, where he arrival 
on the 9th of February. 

The continued successes of Morelos had so alarmed 
Venegas, that he reiterated orders which he had pre 
viously given to Cnlh-ja, enjoining him (o march south 
ward against that leader. So peremptory were his 
last instructions that Oallejahad no alternative but to 
comply; and on the 23d of January he left Maravatfo 
and proceeded to Ixtlahuaca, having, ho\\v\ , -, piv\ i 
ously requested permission to resign his command. 
Venegas refused his consent, and Calleja again on tlio 
26th pressed him in urgent terms to accept his resig 
nation. The viceroy at this date felt himself less de 
pendent than heretofore on the victorious general. On 
the 14th and 16th of the month two Spanish battalions 
had arrived at Vera Cruz, 84 and others were following. 
So Vonegas, who would soon have over 3,000 penin 
sular troops at his disposal, 85 proceeded to appoint as 
Calleja's successor Santiago Irisarri, a Spanish com 
modore. Irisarri was unknown in the army of New 
Spain; and the dissatisfaction at the appointment was 
expressed l.v a representation addressed to Venegaa 
by the principal officers, stating their unwillingness to 
serve under any other commander than Calleja. The 
viceroy was now in a dilemma; but he deemed it pru 
dent to retract under such pressure, and by despatch 
of the 31st conjured Calleja not to retire. 80 To avoid 

tainrd this reverse. But Calleja was bent upon returning to the Bajio of 
Guanajuato and opposed tin-. movement /'/ >/., -Iti7. -170 _'. 

** Namely, the third lut ialin of the regiment of Aaturius, and the first of 
that of Lo vera, (fat. de Jf <&., isi-j. iii. ii'i. Tiu-s,. \\vtv th.- \\\- , 

from Spain. . I /.//MOM, Jfit. Mej., ii. 400. On the 29th tlu- But battalion of tli.t 

Americano Infantry rcgimenl arrived t' ( fa .i/..r.. i 

81 'So recibierou :. ; mil lunubres 

initiifi-, (\tn>i>. (l,'<'(tftfjn t 158. 

N Thii deipatoh cli, !(<. I a rr|>l\- tVom Oaueja, in wliich ho enumerates his 

. ami the s irrtiirr t IK- had made for his roil n try. VenOgUH I 

closed a copy of UK- representation in- bad received from the omoen of <h.> 
;irmy. It. \vustheroin osaertrd thai, tin- ill h.-alth of Cftlleja, \\hi.-Ii h 
his plea for resigning, originated in disparaging remarks passed upon his 
t. Alaman t lR*t.M<: 


further difficulties of the kind, Calleja was instructed 
to march with his army to the capital, and the 5th of 
February was appointed as the day for his entrance. 

The reception given to the victorious general, and 
the army of the centre, was an imposing one. His 
triumphal entry presented a spectacle never before 
witnessed in the capital on so grand a scale. 37 As the 
van approached the gates of the city, a salvo of ar 
tillery announced the arrival to the immense multi 
tudes which thronged the streets, eager to gaze with 
hate or admiration upon the soldiers of whose victo 
ries they had heard so much. The city was gay with 
decorations; 38 salutes were fired, and the te deum 
chanted with unusual sublimity in the cathedral. 39 
But this display was attended with an accident to the 
hero of the occasion, which in the eyes of some was 
foreboding of disaster to him. When near the gate of 
Mercaderes the horse of the mariscal de campo, Judas 
Tadeo Tornos, who was riding by the side of Calleja, 
became restive, and rearing struck the general on the 
head, bringing him to the ground. Calleja was carried 
into a house near by, and only recovered some hours 
later sufficiently to be conveyed in a carriage to the 
palace to present himself to the viceroy, having been 
unable to attend the joyful ceremony at the cathe 
dral. 40 

Although the viceroy and Calleja maintained an 
outward appearance of friendship, their sentiments 
toward each other were none of the kindest. The 
jealousy with which Venegas had for some time 
regarded his general was increased by the flattering 
reception now given him. The applause with which 

37 His forces consisted of 2,150 infantry, 1,832 cavalry, accompanied by a 
train of 1,500 loads of provisions and over 400 of munitions of war. Busta- 
mantc. Camp, de Calleja, 107. 

38 The day was that of San Felipe de Jesus, on which a festal procession 
was made from the cathedral to San Francisco. 

* 9 Gaz.deMcx., 1812, iii. 133-4. 

*Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 477. Bustamante states that the horse which 
Calleja rode was a stolen one, and recognized by its owner, Dona Maria Ger- 
trudis Bustos, sister of the marquesa de Rayas. Cuad. Hist., i. 324. 


his deeds were rehearsed in prose and verse, and 
the enthusiasm with which his appearance at the 
theatre and in public was greeted, plainly indicated 
how high in royalist favor Calleja stood, and Venegas 
henceforth could only regard him in the light of a 
rival. The feelings, also, so lately displayed in the 
army in no way tended to lessen his uneasiness; nor 
did the conferring of rewards and promotions which 
he could no longer withold 41 improve matters. Medals 
were distributed to the officers and troops; 42 and 
Calleja having been previously promoted by the vice 
roy to the rank of major-general, a corresponding 
advance in grade was extended to all officers in the 
army. 43 As this promotion was not confined to the 
army of the centre, but was extended to the officers 
of other divisions, and even to those of the marine 
who had arrived from Habana, and whose services 
had been very inferior, it did not meet with general 
satisfaction. The loyal Americans felt aggrieved; a 
party spirit was developed in the army, and it was 
said that the Mexican-born officers were even begin 
ning to show signs of indecision in regard to their 
political faith, influenced by the revolutionary papers 
which had been issued from Zitdcuaro. During the 
few days that Calleja remained in the capital the mis 
understanding between him and Venegas increased; 
and had the stay of the army been prolonged, it is 
doubtful whether they could have kept up even a sem 
blance of friendly intercourse. 

41 Venegas had always been sparing in his acknowledgment of the services 
of Calleja's army, though pressed by him to reward the troops with medals 
and promotions. See his letters to the viceroy of Dec. 12, 1810, and Jan. 
18, 1811, in Id,, i. 118-19, 159-60. By despatch of May 30, 1811, the Span 
ish regency instructed Venegas to bestow upon the officers and troops such 
rewards as he might deem fitting. Jlernandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., ii. 514. 
But nothing appears to have been done until this occasion. 

J2 The medal bore the name of Fernando VII., supported by a dog and a 
lion, symbolical of faithfulness and courage, and on the border the words 
' Vencid en Aculco, Guanajuato y Calderon.' Alaman says: ' Este escudo dio 
motivo a mil chistes graciosos, por parte de los afectos a la revolucion. ' Hist. 
Mej., ii. 480. 

43 The names and grades of the officers promoted will be found in Gaz. 
Hex., 1812, iii. 143-53. 


But the proximity of Morelos afforded the viceroy 
a pretext for hastening the departure of the troops; 
and on the 8th he issued orders for the army to march, 
at the same time explaining why he was compelled to 
act with such promptness. The position of the royal 
ists as described by Venegas 44 was, indeed, serious. 
The capital was surrounded by bands of revolutionists; 
commerce with the interior was destroyed; communi 
cation with Yera Cruz and Oajaca was closed; trans 
portation of quicksilver and gunpowder to the mines 
was no longer possible; and all intercourse with the 
port of Acapulco was cut off, causing additional com 
mercial distress and a loss to the revenue of 1,000,000 
pesos in duties payable on goods brought by the ves 
sel from Manila. Scarcity of provisions and other 
commodities was severely felt in the capital, and the 
viceroy feared that even the roads to Texcoco and 
Toluca, the only ones left open, would shortly be 
closed. It was therefore indispensable that a deci 
sive blow should be struck at Morelos, whom he 
regarded as the present head and front of the revolu 
tion. 45 The plan of operations which he gave to 
Calleja was based on the latest information. It 
arranged for simultaneous attacks on Izucar and 
Cuautla, conducted respectively by Llano and Calleja. 

The necessary instructions having been sent to 
Llano at Puebla, on the 10th of February Calleja's 
advance left for Chalco, whither troops of Morelos 
had already arrived, and on the 12th the main body 
moved forward. Pursuing the line of march indi 
cated in his instructions, 46 Calleja encamped on the 
17th at Pasulco, two leagues from Cuautla. Here 
Morelos, duly informed of the movements of the 

4t See copy of his instructions in Bustamante, Campanasde Calleja, 159-65. 

45 The viceroy's words are: 'Principal corife"o de la insurreccion en la 
actualidad, y podemos decir que ha sido en ella el geiiio de mayor firmeza, 
recursos y astucias.' Id., 161-2. 

46 The army passed through Chalco, Tenango, Ameca, Ozumba, and Atla- 
tlauca. This route was selected as offering few obstacles to the passage of the 
artillery. Id., 163-4. 


royalists, had determined to make his stand, and ac 
cordingly had united the divisions of his forces dis 
tributed in the neighboring towns. He made every 
endeavor to render his position as impregnable as pos 
sible. Without attempting to erect exterior fortifica 
tions, he confined his attention to a limited line of 
defences within the city. 

Cuautla de Amilpas, 47 distant about twenty-two 
leagues from the city of Mexico, is situated on a ris 
ing ground in a level plain. Its position, though not 
so strong as that of Zitacuaro, is suitable for defence, 
being commanded by no adjacent heights. At this 
date the town was an open one, surrounded by plan 
tations of fruit trees and plantain patches growing 
close up to the houses. Its extent from north to 
south was about half a league, the main street run 
ning in a straight line in that direction, and connect 
ing the plazas of the convents of San Diego and 
Santo Domingo. At the northern extremity is the 
chapel of the Calvario; on the east rise the hills of 
Zacatepec, between which and the town flows a rapid 
river in a channel 200 varas wide at the top, but con 
tracting to twelve or fifteen varas in its bed. The 
portion of the town fortified by Morelos included the 
plazas and convents of San Diego and Santo Do 
mingo, and was surrounded by trenches and ramparts, 
with embrasures and merlons. 48 The outside doors 
and lower windows of the houses on the line of de 
fence were walled up, and communication between 
the interiors opened by breaking through the parti 
tion walls. Deep trenches were cut across the streets, 
and batteries placed in suitable positions. 49 The ac- 

47 The modern name of the city is Morelos. The Mexican word 'quauh' 
means eagle, and 'tlan' place. Cuautla therefore signifies 'place of the 
eagle.' Molina, Vocabvlario. 

48 This description is taken from Calleja's report of April 28, 1812, to the 
viceroy. Gaz. cleMex., 1812, iii. 445-6. 

49 Calleja states that the revolutionists had 30 pieces of artillery. Busta- 
mantc, Campanas de Calleja, 169. Morelos, in his declaration, says that he 
had one mortar and 15 serviceable cannon. Declaration, 24. 



companying plan will enable the reader to recognize 
the relative positions of the opposing forces. 


Positions of besiegers: 

1 Headquarters and camp of Calleja on the estate of Buena vista. 

2 Batteries and intrencliments. 

3 Positions occupied by Llano's troops. 

4 Redoubts. 

5 Battery of Juchitengo. 

6 Redoubt of the Calvario. 
Positions of besieged: 

7 Plaza of San Diego. 

8 Plaza of Santo Domingo. 

9 Premises of hacienda of Buenavista. 

10 Redoubt at spring of Juchitengo. 

11 Plantations and redoubt of the Platanar. 

12 Highway to Mexico. 

Morelos' force at this time amounted to 3,300 men, 
of whom 1,000 were infantry and the remainder cav 
alry, 50 and 100 Indians collected from the neighboring 

50 The cavalrymen also served on foot during the siege, their horses being 
pastured outside the town; 300 of them had arrived from Huetamo under 
Cano and Francisco Ayala. Morelos, Declar., 24. Ayala had joined Morelos 
at Chilapa under peculiar circumstances. He was a lieutenant of the acor- 
dada in the valle de las Amilpas, and resided at the hacienda de Mapaxtlan, 
near Cuautla. Being favorably disposed toward the revolution, he had de 
clined to enroll himself in the troops levied by Garcilaso, the subdelegado of 
Cuautla, and had thereby incurred suspicion. Some time afterward an insur 
gent w r as killed in that neighborhood, and on his body was found a letter 
from Ignacio Ayala, who had been appointed intendeiite by Morelos of the 
new province of Tecpan. The comandante Moreno, believing that Francisco 


villages. During the progress of the siege, however, 
his forces were increased to the number of 5,550 by 
the arrival of different commanders. 51 On the 18th 
of February Calleja moved forward his forces and 
encamped on the rising ground of Cuautlixco, after 
reconnoitring the defences of the revolutionists. 
During the day Morelos imprudently exposed him 
self to danger of being killed or captured, having 
gone out with only a small escort. He was attacked 
by a troop of cavalry, and was brought off with 
difficulty by Galeana, who sallied out to his rescue. 52 
At dawn on the following day Calleja advanced his 
troops in four columns to the assault, directed prin 
cipally against the intrenchments of the plaza of San 
Diego. The defence of this important point was in 
trusted to Hermenegildo Galeana, and that of Santo 
Domingo to Leonardo Bravo; while to Victor Bravo 
and the cura Matamoros was assigned the defence of 
the Buenavista buildings. 

Galeana, at the post of danger, well sustained his 
reputation for cool judgment and personal bravery. 
The front column of the royalists was allowed to 
approach near to the parapet; but then so deadly a 
fire was opened upon it that it retreated in confusion ; 
and Galeana, perceiving an officer endeavoring to rally 
his men, sallied out alone, engaged with him in single 
combat, and killed him. The act perhaps was rash, 
but it raised the spirits of his men to enthusiasm. 

Ayala was the author, attacked his house, and opening fire upon it wounded 
Ayala's wife, who died a few days afterward. Ayala, believing his wife 
dead, and his house having been set on fire, effected his escape by great 
prowess, and offered his services to Morelos, who conferred on him the rank 
of colonel. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 35-7. Alaman verified this author's 
account by statements of reliable persons in Cuautla. Hist. Mej., ii. 428. 

51 Miguel Bravo, who had been unsuccessful in his expedition against 
Oajaca, came with 400 men and three cannon; Anaya with 300 out of 700 
sent by the junta at Sultepec, the rest having deserted; from Chautla the 
cura Tapia brought 300, instead of 1,000 expected by Morelos; and 250 arrived 
f rom Yautepec. Morelos, Dedar., 24-5. Calleja reported that the place was 
defended by 12,500 armados de fusil. Bustamante, C'ampanas de Calleja, 169. 

5>J Jos6 Maria Fernandez, afterward General Victoria, first signalized him 
self on this occasion. The skirmish was a severe one, and he saved Galeana 's 
life at the expense of a severe wound, which he received in protecting him. 
Ward's Mex. in 1827, i. 190-1. 


Two lateral columns, by creeping from house to house 
along the street, now fought their way close up to 
the intrenchments, causing some disturbance among 
the defenders, whose confidence their leader, how 
ever, soon restored. The enemy was repulsed, and 
though again and again they returned to the charge, 
their efforts to storm the defences were vain. For six 
hours the combat continued. Many of the royalist 
officers were struck down ; the conde de Casa Rul was 
mortally wounded, and the greater part of the ammu 
nition was spent. The attempts against the plaza of 
Santo Domingo and the Buenavista buildings, though 
these points were poorly fortified, proved equally un 
successful. 53 Troops accustomed to victory, and who 
rushed up to the trenches in full confidence, quailed 
at last; and though Calleja, in the final charge, led 
them in person, 54 his presence did not mend matters. 
Convinced of the impossibility of taking Cuautla by 
assault with his present force, for the first time in 
his victorious career he withdrew crestfallen. 55 That 
night he held a council of war, the result of which 
was that he determined to reduce the place by siege; 
and a despatch was sent on the following day to Vene- 
gas, informing him of the position of affairs. Cuautla, 
he says, must be destroyed, and its defenders buried 
in its ruins, so that in future no insurgent will find 
escape from death except by laying down his arms. 53 
To effect this he shows the viceroy the necessity of 
an increased force, of large supplies of provisions and 

53 Calleja assaulted at four different points. In a letter to the viceroy 
dated April 18th, he says: ' El 19 de febrero asalte" por cuatro diferentes 
puntos a Cuautla, que no estaba ni de mucho fortificada como en el dia.' 
Jlustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 63. 

54 * En la ultima fu6 necesario que yo mismo condujese d los granaderos 
acobardados. ' Id., ii. 64. 

53 Besides the conde de Casa Rul, who died shortly after his removal from 
the field, Colonel Itfepomuceno Oviedo, of the patriots of San Luis, fell with 
four captains and eleven other officers of his corps. The loss of the royalists 
was over 300 men. Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 342-3. Ward says 500 royal 
ists were left dead on the spot. Mex. in 1827, i. 192. Calleja reported four 
officers killed and 18 wounded, and of the ranks 15 killed and 95 wounded. 
Neyrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., iv. 409. The loss of the revolutionists was insig 

50 Bustamante, Campanas de Calleja, 170. 


munitions of war, and above all of mortars and siege 
artillery of heavy calibre. In pursuance of his de 
sign, Calleja took up a position on the western side of 
the town at about a league distant, and began his 
preparations for a regular siege. 

While Calleja was undergoing the mortification 
which attended his first defeat, a similar reverse was 
sustained by Llano in his attempt against Iziicar. 
That commander, in obedience to instructions, had 
marched from Puebla by way of Cholula and Atlixco, 
arriving about the 22d of February in front of Iziicar, 
distant sixteen leagues. His force consisted of about 
2,000 men, 540 of whom were cavalry, 57 with eight 
pieces of artillery. On the 23d, having taken pos 
session of the hill of the Calvario, he opened fire with 
his artillery upon the town, and under cover of it ad 
vanced two attacking columns composed respectively 
of the battalions of Lovera and Asturias, under 
Colonel Antonio de Andrade. The revolutionists 
who had fortified themselves in the plaza, and were 
commanded by Padre Sanchez, seconded by Vicente 
Guerrero and Sandoval, repulsed all attempts to storm 
their position, and Llano ordered Andrade to retire. 
The assault was again tried on the following day with 
no better result. The "invincible conquerors of the 
victors at Austerlitz" 53 were beaten by rustics fighting 
for their rights. 59 Llano was now in an unenviable 

57 It was composed of 631 of the infantry of Puebla, 400 posted at Atlixco, 
and the battalions lately arrived from Spain numbering 500. His cavalry, 
which only amounted to 240 dragoons, was increased by 300 horse detached 
from Calleja's army. Id., 163. 

58 These troops on their arrival were called in the Mexican papers of the 
day 'los invencibles vencedores de los vencedores de Austerliz,' which words 
were printed in large type. Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 449. 

59 Morelos after his capture of Izucar left Sanchez there with 200 men. 
Guerrero at that time was a captain in the revolutionary army. Alaman, 
Hist. Mej., ii. 434. Ward narrates that Guerrero during the bombardment 
had a miraculous escape. While asleep, exhausted with fatigue, a shell 
came through the roof and rolled under his bed, where it exploded, killing 
or wounding every one in the room except himself. Mex. in 1827, i. 193. 
Llano states that the insurgents mustered 1,500 men armed with muskets, 
besides a multitude of Indians. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 523-4. 


position, from which he was, however, unexpectedly 
relieved. Venegas had received Calleja's report with 
undisguised displeasure, but recognized t]ie fact that 
Cuautla must be taken. He therefore despatched 
immediately all the munitions of war which could be 
spared from the capital, and ordered Llano to raise 
the siege of Iziicar and join Calleja. Accordingly 
on the 26th Llano retired from the scene of his fail 
ure and marched to Cuautla, harassed incessantly in 
his rear by the insurgents. 60 

Every preparation was now made for a determined 
siege. Llano took up a position opposite to that of 
Calleja; redoubts were throw r n up, batteries erected, 
and the place invested as closely as possible. Morelos 
also improved his line of fortifications. The premises 
of the hacienda de Buenavista were strengthened, and 
a redoubt was erected in the platanar on the east side 
to defend the approach to the river. The revolu 
tionary leader, encouraged by his late success, not 
only felt confident of maintaining his position but 
anticipated victory, with the capital itself as the ob 
jective point. 

The bombardment began on the 10th of March, 
and for four days the iron shower fell upon the city. 
But the bursting shells and hurtling shot as they tore 
through parapet or house wall could not break the 
spirit of the defenders. Even the townspeople soon 
lost alarm as their children at play began collecting 
and making piles of the cannon-balls strewed about 
the streets. 61 Breaches in the defences made by day 
were repaired by night, and each morning the roy 
alist general must begin anew. As the water supply 
was cut off, wells were sunk. Every privation was 

60 He was compelled to abandon an 8-pounder, the gun-carriage having 
become unserviceable. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 531-4. 

61 Morelos, whose stock of ammunition was not very plentiful, paid them 
so much a dozen for them. Ward, Mex. in 1827, i. 194. 'Pagaba a peso cada 
bomba, granadas d cuatro reales, bala de fusil d medio la docena.' Buata- 
mante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 51. 


borne with such a cheerful fortitude that Calleja soon 
saw that there was here no thought of surrender. 
And he dreaded to risk another assault. The un 
yielding attitude of the besieged made him fear for 
the result; and again he urged the viceroy to send 
him quickly more and heavier cannon, for there was 
work here which would tax his utmost endeavor. 62 

But it was all of no use. The place was not to be 
captured by cannonade ; and recognizing this, or at least 
that to effect a breach with artillery of so light a cal 
ibre was not possible, Calleja reduced the siege to a 
mere blockade, and week after week passed by. The 
supply from the wells proved insufficient, and the be 
sieged made daily sallies and fought for water at the 
springs and conduits outside the city. To stop even 
the supply thus dearly obtained, the watercourse of 
the Juchitengo spring was turned into another chan 
nel, and sixty varas of the old ditch filled in. But 
Galeana in broad day took possession of it, threw up 
a strong square redoubt around the spring, and con 
nected it by intrenchments with the defences of the 
city. An attempt made the same night to take this 
fortification failed, and henceforth the besieged were 
in no want of water. 63 

Outside the line of circumvallation, too, the be 
siegers were continually harassed. Miguel Bravo and 
the cura Tapia hovered around with troops of cavalry ; 
fierce skirmishes were fought, and convoys of provi 
sions and ammunition intercepted or brought in with 
great difficulty. But hunger, a foe more terrible 
than musket or sword, began to press the beleaguered 
revolutionists. Morelos had not had time to provi 
sion the city for a lengthened siege, nor had he expected 
that Calleja would adopt so slow a method of warfare. 

62 He wanted the heavy artillery from Perote. In April the brigadier, 
Juan Jos6 de Olazabal, lately arrived from Spain, was ordered to bring it up. 
He was intercepted at Nopalucan by the revolutionists and compelled to re 
turn to Perote, losing a rich convoy, and with difficulty saving the artillery. 
Alaman, Hist. J\fej.,ii. 513. See Calleja's letter to Venegas of March 13th. 
Bmtamante, Cuad. Hist.,ii. 58. 

63 This occurred on the 3d of April. Id., ii. 61. 


There was no help for it, however, and so day by day 
the situation of his people became more distressing 
as the scarcity of food increased. But, as I have said, 
they bore their sufferings with heroic fortitude, and 
with every manifestation of unyielding purpose. The 
soldiers on their return from battle, whatever might 
be the result of their sally, were greeted with loud 
cheers; those who fell were buried to the sound of 
pealing church bells rung in celebration of their glori 
ous death; enthusiastic joy marked any success, how 
ever slight; and death was proclaimed against him 
who dared to speak of surrender. Even Calleja could 
not suppress his wonder and admiration at such high- 
souled fortitude. " These people are heroes," he writes 
the viceroy, "and they would merit a distinguished 
place in history if their cause were just"! Morelos 
he declared to be a second Mahomet. 64 

Nor was the situation of the royalists by any means 
an enviable one. The troops, reared in the temperate 
and cool regions of the table-land, suffered under the 
fervid sky of the tierra caliente. They broke down 
under their heavy fatigues by night and day; sick 
ness came upon them, and toward the end of April 
800 men were in hospital. The rainy season too was 
fast approaching ought already to have come; then 
fever would strike them down by files, and the enemy, 
inured to the deadly climate, would fall upon them 
and complete their ruin. It was a question between 
time and nature which would win. Nature was this 
time on the side of oppression, to her shame be it said. 
The rains were unusually late this year. Day after 
day the fiery sun rose and set, and still no cloud ap 
peared to the wistful eyes of the famished crowds in 
the beleaguered city. Their sufferings were awful. 65 
When all else was wellnigh consumed, old, time-worn, 

64 See his letter to the viceroy of April 24th. Id. , ii. 59. 

65 'A cat sold for six dollars, a lizard for two, and rats or other vermin for 
one. An ox which was seen one day feeding between the Spanish camp 
and the town nearly brought on a general engagement. ' Ward, Mex. in 1S27, 
i. 196-7. 


weather-beaten hides, stripped from doors to which 
they had been nailed for years, were macerated and 
eaten; foul grubs and crawling insects were devoured; 68 
and pest, the companion of famine, followed in her 
footsteps. The church of San Diego was converted 
into a hospital; from twenty to thirty died daily; 
gaunt, spectral forms moved wearily along the streets, 
and the children no longer, as heretofore, marshalled 
their bands in mimic warfare. 67 But still they yielded 
not, and still Calleja dared not risk a second assault. 63 
And all this time the junta at Sultepec remained 
inactive, the leaders in Michoacan with their numer 
ous forces came not to the aid of these brave, long- 
enduring patriots. Morelos vainly endeavored to 
break through the besiegers' lines and introduce pro 
visions. On the open plain the enemy was superior. 69 
On the 27th of April a desperate effort was made, 
but failed. 70 After this an unusual stillness and inac 
tivity was observed by the besiegers to prevail in the 
city. The last hostile sally had been made. No 
hope was left except to evacuate the town. Calleja's 
bloody intentions were too well known, and capitula- 

66 The house doors in Cuautla were protected with strong hides nailed to 
them, instead of sheets of tin. Alaman, Hist. Mcj., ii. 519. 'La espantosa 
escasez que la rednxo al te"rmino de comer insectos, cueros y quantas inmundi- 
cias se les presentaba,' are Calleja's own words. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 479. 

67 For an account of the children organizing themselves into companies, 
and of their capture on one occasion of a royalist dragoon outside the walls, 
see Bustamante, CuacL Hist., ii. 55-6. 

68 He says to the viceroy: 'No convenia asaltar a un enemigo que lo de- 
seaba.' Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 513-14. 

69 In one of these attempts directed by night against the redoubt on the 
Calvario, Gil Biafio, a son of the intendente who fell at the alhondiga of 
Guanajuato, was killed on the side of the royalists. Id., ii. 515. 

70 Matamoros and Colonel Perdiz sallied with 100 men on the night of the 
21st and forced the enemy's lines on the Santa Inesroad, Perdiz, however, and 
many others being killed. Matamoros succeeded in joining Miguel Bravo, who 
was stationed at Tlayacac near the Zacatepec range with a strong force and a 
large convoy of provisions. The design was to introduce it by the barranca He- 
dionda and the town of Amelcingo, and on the 27th, signals having been ex 
changed with Matamoros during the preceding night, Morelos attacked with 
the greater portion of his forces the royalists at several points. Calleja had, 
however, intercepted a letter which informed him of the plans of the besieged. 
He accordingly made his preparations. A sanguinary contest took place, the 
assailants being repulsed. Bravo and Matamoros were driven back with the 
loss of the convoy and their artillery. Id., ii. 516-18; Gaz. de Hex., 1812, iii. 

HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 24 


tion would be certain death. And still, reduced as 
they were to the direst extremity, Calleja dared not 
attack them; and had he not been made aware of 
their dreadful condition by the numerous fugitives 
who daily left the city, he would probably have 
raised the siege. But they were his; he would have 
their blood, as he thought, if only the rains would 
hold off a little longer. So with redoubled vigilance 

O O 

he waited for his prey. On the 1st of May he sent 
to Morelos copies of the general pardon lately pub 
lished by the viceroy. 71 As far as appearances went, 
this offer of mercy was received with joy by the be 
sieged troops, and hostilities ceased on both sides. 72 
It was but a ruse, however; Morelos had made his 
preparations to evacuate the town. His influence 
over his followers was unbounded, and whithersoever 
he went, or to whatever fate, they were ready to ac 
company him and die for him. That night the troops 
were silently marshalled in the plaza of San Diego, 
and at two o'clock on the morning of the 2d the 
march began, the lights being left burning on the ram 

Galeana led the van, consisting of over 1,000 infan 
try armed with muskets; then followed 250 cavalry, 
and a large number of troops whose weapons were 
slings and lances; after these followed a mixed crowd 
of both sexes and all ages. The rear was brought up 
by another body of infantry, with the baggage and 
two small pieces of artillery in its centre. 73 Morelos 
commanded in the centre with the Bravos, and Cap 
tain Anzures in the rear. 

Calleja lay stretched in sickness on his bed, and 

71 The Spanish c6rtes had decreed on the 9th of November, 1811, a sec 
ond general indulto. This was published by the viceroy on the 1st of April 
following, and appeared in the D'mrio de Mex. of April 3, 1812. 

72 Bustamante states that the indulto was brought by a royalist officer and 
was confined to Morelos, Galeana, and Bravo. The reply of Morelos was to 
the effect that he extended similar mercy to Calleja and his officers. Cuad. 
Hist., ii. 71. 

73 Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 522, supplies a copy of the original of Morelos' 
instructions as to the order of march, which differs somewhat from that given 
in the text and taken from Calleja's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 479-80. 


heartily wished himself away from the infernal place, 
as he called it. 74 He little imagined what the enemy 
were doing. With all his vigilance he was deceived; 
nor did he know till more than two hours afterward 
that he was being outwitted, so skilfully had Morelos 
made his arrangements. Directing its course to the 
river, so silently did the column move, that unper- 
ceived it approached the earth- works running north 
ward from the Calvario redoubt, drove back the 
guard, and demolishing a part of the intrenchments 
advanced to the river, which was crossed by means of 
hurdles provided for the purpose. 

But now the enemy was upon them. Llano's forces 
assailed them on the flank; their rear was attacked 
as the royalist troops rapidly came up. For a time 
the revolutionists sustained themselves under cover 
of the stone walls that surrounded the country 
haciendas, and for an hour a fierce contest raged. Out 
flanked at last, the order was given to disperse and 
fly, 75 but not before more than 800 had fallen. More 
los, after having two of his ribs crushed by falling 
with his horse into a ditch, 76 fled by way of Zacatepec 
to Ocuituco hotly pursued. Here, while changing 
horses, the enemy overtook him. To save their 
leader's life, those around him fought until they died, 
almost to a man, 77 and he escaped wellnigh alone. Pur 
suing his flight to Izucar he there met Victor Bravo, 

O O ' 

and thence proceeded to Chautla. Here, in safety at 
last, he remained for a month, and unbroken in spirit, 

74 He wrote a letter to the viceroy that same morning at half -past four, in 
which he says: 'Conviene mucho que el ejercito saiga de este infernal pais,' 
and adds that his own health is such that if he does not attend to it at once 
all aid will be too late. Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., iv. 438-9. 

73 Ward says that this was done with such promptitude that the Spanish 
troops which were advancing from opposite directions fired upon each other 
before they discovered their mistake. Mex. in 1827, i. 199. Bustamante 
makes the same statement. 

70 He was saved by Jose" Maria Franco, who assisted him out. Mex. Refni. 
Artie. Fondo, 13. 

77 ' Opusieron alguna resistencia d las nuestras con sacrificio de sus vidas 
que casi todos perdieron,' is Calleja's testimony to their self-sacrifice. Gaz. 
deMcx., 1812, iii. 480-1. 


hastened to repair his fortune, collecting his scattered 
troops and preparing for a new campaign. 78 

Meantime the slaughter of the unarmed crowd was 
horrible. Men, women, and children, old and young, 
were indiscriminately butchered by the royalists, 70 an J 
for seven leagues the bodies of the slain lay strewn 
upon the road. 80 This cowardly vengeance of Calle- 
ja's was among the most dastardly doings in the war. 
Villanous as it was, and vengeance-satisfying, it was 
but poor comfort after all to the leader so long sure of 
his prey. This priest had worsted him and baffled him, 
had finally eluded his grasp not a very happy reflec 
tion for so proud a soldier. Calleja's sickness was a 
serious bilious attack, and we may be sure that his 
temper was not improved thereby. Of the dreadful 
punishment which he inflicted upon the heroic inhab 
itants of that wretched city I shall give no further 
details. Let a veil be drawn over the frightful scenes 
of cruelty. " I have heard officers, who were present 
at the siege, speak of them," says Ward, " after a lapse 
of ten years, with horror." 81 

Having destroyed the fortifications of Cuautla 
the siege of which cost the government 564,426 pesos, 
exclusive of munitions of war and other expenses 
Calleja, with his military reputation by no means im 
proved, and his troops in miserable plight, returned 
to the capital, which he entered on the 16th of May, 
there to meet the ridicule of the inhabitants who well 
knew that he had been outwitted, despite his glowing 
accounts. 82 

78 He states that at Chautla 800 of the troops of Bravo and Galeana were 
reunited; that during the siege of 7*2 days he only lost about 50 men by the 
enemy's fire and 150 by the pest; that with regard to the number who fell on 
the evacuation of the town he could only say that Captain Yanez told him 
that he had counted 147 dead on one half of the road from Ocuituco to 
Cuautla. Morelos, Declar. , 25. 

7S) Est6van Montezuma, afterward a general of the republic, on his return 
from the pursuit, killed with his lance the wounded women whom he came 
across on his road! Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 524. 

80 Calleja's words are 'Las siete leguas estan tan sembradas de cadaveres 
enemigos que no se da un paso sin que se encuentren muchos. ' Gaz. de Mex. , 
1812, iii. 481. 

81 Mex. in 1827, i. 199. 

82 'A comedy was acted a few nights afterward, in which a soldier was 


introduced, who, on his return from battle, presents his general with a tur 
ban, and tells him in a very pompous manner, 'Here is the turban of the 
Moor, whom I took prisoner!' "And the Moor himself?' '0, he unfortu 
nately escaped!' The passage was received with bursts of laughter, and the 
application readily made by the audience.' Id. 199-200. 

The siege of Cuautla was a subject of public conversation in Cadiz. 
Wellington, at a banquet which was given to him in that city, asked the 
deputy for Mexico, Beye de Cisneros, what kind of a place Cuautla was. 
'It is a place,' replied Cisneros, 'open on all sides, situated in a plain or val 
ley.' 'That,' answered Wellington, 'is a proof both of the ignorance of the 
general attacking it, and of the wisdom and valor of the general who is de 
fending it.' Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. Ind. viii. 

The material for the history of the revolution is abundant, and the details of 
some parts of it have been fairly well presented by Mexican authors, though 
seldom without more or less bias, for and against persons and parties. Promi 
nent among writers on this episode is Anastasio Zerecero, Memorias para la 
Historia de las Revolutions de Mexico. Mexico, 1869, 1 vol. 608 pages. It is 
confined mostly to affairs during the time of Hidalgo, a brief sketch of the 
conquest being given as introductory. As the city of Mexico was occupied 
by the French at the time of his writing, the author pursued his labors at 
San Luis Potosf, and \diether so intended or not, the result was little more 
than a series of recollections, the author evidently intending to carry them 
through the war for independence. Only one volume, however, was pub 
lished. Zerecero was a strong revolutionary partisan. Thus while excusing 
the cruelties committed by the rebels, he denounces in strongest terms those 
indulged in by the royalists. He quotes freely from Alaman, and sparingly 
from Bustamante and Mendivil. The style is for the most part clear, yet 
without many distinctive characteristics. The last 150 pages are devoted to 
the biographies of Indians prominent since the conquest, and credited to An 
tonio Carrion. 

Bustamante, Martirolocjio de Alnunos de los Primeros Insurgentes por la 
libertad e independencia de la America Mexicana. Mexico, 1841, pp. 51. This 
short work gives a summary of the legal proceedings against those implicated 
in the plots of April and August 1811 to seize the viceroy. The particulars 
connected with the case of each ecclesiastic and layman are given, Bustamante 
having obtained them from the original documents of the junta de seguridad 
presided over by the oidor Miguel Bataller y Vasco. To these are added bio 
graphical notices of the subsequent fate of many of the conspirators. The 
names are given in alphabetical order, and among them appears that of Calleja. 
Bustamante deems it necessary to enter into an explanation of the reasons 
why he inserted the royalist general's name in a list of martyrs to the cause 
of independence and which he published to their honor. He, therefore, states 
that he did so in order that the indecent conduct of Calleja might be held up 
to view, who tried to pass over to the side of the insurgents when he found 
himself in disgrace with Venegas. Under such circumstances he ought to be 
regarded as one of the so-called insurgents. See also Bustamante, Cuad. Hi^t. , 
i. passim; Id., ii. 3-428; Id., iv. 309; Bustamante, Campailas de Galleja, 89- 
178, passim; Bustamante, Elogio, Mordos, passim. 

Diaz Calvillo, Sermon que en el aniversario solemne de gracias d Maria 
Santisima de los Remedios. . .Mexico, 1811; followed by Nol/idas para la His 
toria deNuestra Senora de los Rf.medios. . .Mexico, 1812. The sermon which 
precedes the historical matter in this volume, was preached in the cathedral 
of Mexico on the 10th of October, 1811, by Juan Bautista Diaz Calvillo, at 
the anniversary celebration of the royalist victory at the monte de las Graces! 
The author was prefect of the oratory of San Felipe Neri, and was apparently 
as credulous a believer in the marvellous and as unmitigated a denouncer of 
the revolution as can well be found among the ranks of the churchmen of 
that time. With regard to the sermon it is a fair specimen of the discourses 
delivered from the pulpit during the first years of the revolution. Abuso is 
plentifully heaped upon Hidalgo; the so-called victory of Las Cruces and 


Hidalgo's retreat are attributed to the miraculous intervention of the virgin, 
and, as a consequence, the events which led to his capture. In the Noticias 
para la Historia, which has been frequently quoted, an account of the image 
of the lady of los Remedies is given. Then follows a historical narration of 
events down to the escape of Morelos from Cuautla, supplemented with sub 
sequent occurrences during the same years. Castillo, resolutely blind to the 
true causes of the revolution, attributes its origin solely to French intrigues 
and Hidalgo's wicked readiness to listen to Napoleon's agents. In his per 
sistency to hold up Hidalgo as the author of the rebellion, he unblushingly 
states page 108 that his short interview with d'Alvimar was so satisfactory 
to the latter as to stimulate the activity of the French in their intrigues in 
other Spanish American countries. The historical portion of this volume of 
2C9 pages is but an emphasized rescript of the versions of events given in the 
Gazeta de Mexico. 

I add by way of general reference: Alaman, Mcj., ii. passim; Id., iii. 11- 
12, 58-60, 137-41, 170-86, 327, 335, app. 80-2, 85; Id., iv. 724, 727, app. 
47-8; Ilernany Dav..i. 492-3, 874; Id., ii. 227-8, 415-16, 424-30, 467-70, 
512-15; Id., iii. 223-315, 326, 328-95, 401-6, 424-530; Id., v. 245-7,865-7, 
876-903, 906-8, 919; Id., vi. 18-25; 35, 38-9, 77-81, 274-5, 280-2, 288, 981-8, 
1045-6; Gas. de Mex., 1784-5, i. 35; Id., 1810, i. 54, 802; Id., 1811, ii. passim; 
Id., 1812, iii. 6-490, passim; Id., 1790-1, iv. 361-2, 441-3; Id., 1792-3, v. 
349; Id., 1794, vi. 709; Id., 1802-3, xi. 166; Id., 1808, xv. 140; Id., 1809, xvi. 
793-4; Id., xxiii. 423-7; Id., xxiv. 1235-6; Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 
335-430, 448-91, 544-7; Cortes, Diar., 1811, iii. 354, 360; Id., iv. 192,397; 
Id., v. 175, 240-1, 269; Id., vii. 4, 17, 177, 199, 214; Id., 209, 220, 373; 
Id., 1812, xiv. 248; Id., 1820, xxiv. app. 40-53; Cortes, Col. Dec., i. 181-2; 
Id., ii. 26, 85-7; Cortes, Diar. Cong., ii. 405; Mora, Mej. y sus Rev., iii. 
358; Id., iv. passim; Mosaico Mex., ii. 197, 270, 341, 461-2; Ward, Mex. 
in 1827, i. 175, 225, 330, app. 483-9; Cancelada, Tel. Mex., 15-16, 23-8, 39- 
40, 48, 52-3, 58-60, 67-72, 177-81, 186-91, 216-21; Id., Ruina, N. Esp., 23, 
59, 62-3, 77; Cavo, Tre* Sig., iii. 382-3; Id., iv. 1-55; Cedulario, i. fol. 
236; Chevalier, Le Mex., 348-65; Collado, Juan, Inform., 4-8; Negrete, Mex. 
Sig., xix. iv. passim, v. 104-76, and Hist. Mil., i. 312-18; Liceaga, Adlc. y 
Rectific., 183-4, 188, 191, 199-200, 227-8. Other authorities consulted are: 
Conejares, Virtud Vengada; Cumplido Album Mex., ii. 97; Torrente, Rev. 
Hisp. Arner., i. 46-7, 73, 229-51, 310-37; Calderon, Life in Mex., ii. 179-89;, Espan. elnd. Amer. Esp., Cadiz, 1811, passim; Prov. Int.. 
Carta Minis. 24 de Jid. 1812, in Mayer M8S., no. 6; Prov. Int. Real Orden., 2J, 
Jul. 1812, in Mayer MSS., no. 7; Rivera, Gob. deMex., ii. 8, 33-46; Id., Hist. 
Jalapa, i. 305-8, 338-9, 394, 437; Revllla Gigedo, Bandas, no. 31, passim; 
Iturribarria, in Soc. Mex. Geog., vii. 291-2; Villasenor, in Id., iii. 71; Zamo- 
ra, iii. 188-9; Zamacois, Hist. Mex., v. 618, 657; Id., vii. passim; Id., viii. 
passim, ap. 737-8, 740-7, 749-50, 757-85; Id., 563, 820-1, 913-16; Zavala, 
Rev. Mex., 55-8, 61-4, 68-9; Id., Venerable Congreg. Neri, passim; Dipu- 
tac. Amer. Represent., passim; Juzgados de Hac., MS., passim, in Doc. Ecles. 
Mex., MS., ii. no. 5; Colcgio, etc., passim, in Id., v. no. 2; Chilpantzingo, in 
Id., ii. no. 3; Sumario Criminal contra Tres Relig., MS., 1811, in Disturbios 
de Frailes, ii. 341-48, no. 9; Disposic. Varias, vi. 61-71; Ximenez y Frias, 
El Fenix, passim; Mex., Cuad. de Formul., passim; Diez y Seis, passim; Vega, 
J. S. G., Exhortacion, passim; Acapulco, Provision, 6-31, in Virey de Mex. 
Instruc., MS., 2d ser. no. 2; Villasenor, Theat. Amer., i. 178-90, 233-4, 
237-40, 315-17; Id., ii. 30-4; Young, Hist. Mex., 89; Walton, Expose, 281, 
app. 26-30; Rebelion, Origen de la, passim; Rev. Span. Amer., 178-209, 318- 
21; Revue Amer., ii. 552; Romero in Soc. Mex., viii. 547; Robinson, Mex., 
44-56; Id., Mex. Rev., i. 47; Romero, in Soc. Mex. , viii. 621; Zdaa 6 Hidalgo, 
Queretaro Agrad., passim; Pap. Far., ii. 36-68; Exhort. Patriot, dinting. 
Fenian. Sept., passim; Payne, Hitt. Europ. Col., 305-6; Pcdraza, Biog. Can- 
dittos, 38-50; Perez, Dice. Geog. y Estad., i. 31-7, 114-15; Prov. Mich., 
111-25, 143-202; Puerto Convite, passim; Sastre, Constitut., pt ii. passim; 
Quart. Review, vii. 257; Id., xxx. 175-7; Reladon Christ., passim; J3ergosa 


y Jordan, Exhort., passim; Id., Carta Pastoral, passim; Obcr, Mex., 417; 
Cnmpillo, Edicto, passim; Id., Manifesto, passim; Olavarriay Ferrari, Junta, 
dc. Zitdcuaro, ix. passim; Orizava, Ocurr., 3; Tournon, Proceso, passim; 
Puebla, Mario Fiedo, passim; Inquisicion, Apol., passim; Mex. Bosq. Rev., 

10, 29, 34; Mex. Cabildo Metrop., 1-14, in Doc. Ecles. Mex., MS., ii. no. 4; 
Museo, Mex., i. 133; Id., ii. 163-76; Modern Travel. Mex. Guat., i. 109-15; 
La Ilustr. Mex., iv. 229, 273-5; Las Closes Product., Set re . 15, 1878, in 
Pi ii art Coll.; Lezama, Exhort de Paz, passim; Mayer, Mex. Aztec, 256-7, 
287-90; Martinez, Sinop. Hist. Rev., i. 58-66; Id., Parabien, passim; Mani 
festo contra las Instrucc., passim; Maillard, Hist. Tex., 17-19; Linati, 

Costumes, passim; Diar. Imper., June 8, 1866, 559; Gonzales, Col. N. Leon, 
213-28, 238-48; Pasatiempo Militar, passim; Borricon, Exhort., passim; 
Alvarez, Estud., iii. 459-61; Aim. Calend. Man. y Guia, 1811, 45-102, 173- 
206; Apunt. Hist., passim, in Pan. Bol. Ofic., June 4, 1868; Pinart Col; Gaz. 
Mex., Arevalo Compend., 7-104, passim; Arrangoiz, Mej., i. 129-55, 161-70; 
Arroniz, Hist, y Cron., 184-7, 387-9; Azanza, Instrucc., MS., 92-4, 171; 
Gallo, Hombres Ilustres, iv. 7-171, 221-6; Robles, Diar., in Doc. Hist. Mex., 
Istser. ii. 70; Domenech, Hist. Mex., ii. 16-21; Dill, Hist. Mex., 292-329; 
Descripcion de Amer., 119 et seq. ; Foote, Tex., i. 94-9; Conder, Mex. Guat., 
109-10; Chynoweth,Max., 6-9; Mendibil, Res. Hist., 51-5, 61-72, 79-98, 103- 
19, 141-60, ap. vii. 391-4; ix. 396-7; Narte, Clamores, passim; Niks' Register, 

11. 238, 365; Niles, S. Amer. Mex., i. 142-54; Notidoso Gen., Aug. 28, 1815, 
1-2; Mex. Refut. Art. Fondo, 3-15; Dice. Univ. Hist. Geog., i. 102; Id., ii. 
666-8; Id., viii. 27; Id., ix. 44-5, 68, 602-3; Id., x. 77-80, 141, 474-5, 482-4, 
522, 616, 636-7, 911-12, 1102, 1120-8, ap. i. 57, 300-1; Fronterizo, Dec. 5, 
1880, 1. 




DURING the siege of Cuautla the viceregal govern 
ment had to resort to extraordinary measures to carry 
on the war. Public loans, voluntary and forced, were 
long since an old story; yet one more attempt was made 
to borrow two million dollars from the church and the 
wealthy men and merchants of Mexico, Puebla, and 
Yera Cruz, but without success. Then it was ordered 
that all persons should surrender their plate and jew 
elry, a promise in return being given that their value 
should be paid in one year with interest. As it was 
customary at that time to invest largely in valuables 
of the kind, many were stripped of their all, and a 
considerable sum was raised, but the people never 
received any pay. Another infliction was a tax of 
ten per cent on rents of urban property. In order to 
provide the army with horses, and prevent their fall 
ing into the hands of the insurgents, this quixotic 
viceroy ordered bought all in the country, except 
those of the troops, guards, dependents of the acor- 



dada, and mail carriers, and such as might be found 
useless for military service. 1 This brilliant scheme 
failed, for when Venegas came to pay for the beasts, 
like Simple Simon, he had not the money. All this 
tended to the further disgust of the people, and to the 
advancement of the revolutionary cause. Nor were 
the continued offers of pardon emanating from the 
Spanish c6rtes sufficient to hold forever the good 
will of the Spanish Americans. 2 

There were several secret clubs in the capital at 
this time, one claiming special attention, called Los 
Guadalupes, 3 whose members, like others before men 
tioned, labored to spread discontent in regard to the 
viceregal government. 

One of the richest towns of that period, now within 
the state of Tlascala, was Huamantla, situated on the 
line of trade between Vera Cruz and Mexico. The 
place was garrisoned by forty infantry of the line, 200 
royalist auxiliaries, also infantry, most of them armed 
with lances, there being but few muskets among them, 
and sixty cavalrymen. Of artillery there were only 
three small guns. The commandant, Antonio Garcia 
del Casal, having been apprised that a large force of 
insurgents meditated an attack upon the town, opened 
ditches and erected barricades. The insurgents, 2,000 
strong, assailed the place on the 18th of March, 1812, 
and though repulsed at first, carried it next day, after 
nearly all the regulars and a number of officers had 

1 The owners of the last class were required to have a written license. 
And any one found riding a horse, unprovided with the license, fifteen days 
after the publication of the edict at the head town of his district was to be 
shot. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 174-7. 

2 This became evident in the reception given to the amnesty law of Nov. 8, 
1811, published in Mexico in the Diario of April 3, 1812. In fact, decrees 
purporting to be for the general good were looked on, not as springing from 
a desire to benefit the colony, but as so many rights forced from the Spanish 
rulers. Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 136-41. 

3 Established for securing independence, when and by whom has not been 
ascertained; but it existed prior to 1808; it was said that Viceroy Iturrigaray 
had relations with them; and that in the differences between Venegas and 
Calleja they made proposals to the latter which were not looked upon with 
displeasure. The labors of these clubs were very important. They were in 
constant correspondence with the independent chiefs. Negrete, Mex. Siy. 
XIX., v. 14. 


been slain. Captain Casal and the rest of the garri 
son were made prisoners. The victors abandoned the 
town on the 20th, after having sacked it. 4 Death 
without quarter frequently awaited the prisoners in 
this war, as we have seen ; but thanks to the influence 
of some priests, their lives in this instance were spared, 
and they were set at liberty a few days later. The 
same force of insurgents afterward made several as 
saults against Nopalucan, but were repulsed by the 
garrison under Captain Antonio Conti, finally losing 
three guns, a number of mules, and a quantity of sup 

Shortly afterward, at Nopalucan, a train of imported 
merchandise valued at two million dollars fell into the 
hands of the independents, 5 under Osorno, Arroyo, 
Bocardo, Ramirez, and others. It was a rich prize, 
from which, however, the captors derived but little 
benefit, as it was quickly dissipated. 6 

When the revolutionary junta suprema, after its 
flight from Zitdcuaro, had gathered its dispersed 

4 ' Han clestrozado el pueblo. . .llevandose una cuerda de prisoneros.' Gaz. 
de Mex., 1812, iii. 206, 337-42. Mendibil, Resumen Hist., 95, states that 
Casal escaped; the insurgent chief celebrated the victory, never thinking of 
affording aid to Morelos at Cuautla. Huamantla became a very important 
place for the Americans, a mart for the free sale of tobacco being established 
there. The profits that might have been obtained, sufficient to meet the war 
expenses, were, however, squandered by the chiefs of guerrilla parties. 

5 It happened thus: The brigadier Juan Jose" de Olazabal, a recent arrival, 
started for Perote on the 18th of April with 325 men, of whom 25 were cav 
alry, escorting a large train of merchandise belonging to the merchants, two 
pieces of siege artillery, and ammunition to be used against Cuautla. When 
near Nopalucan he sent forward for assistance, the place being beset by in 
surgents, who after a fight retired, and Olazabal entered the town. The 
mules of the merchandise teams, being then taken out of the town to water, 
were cut off by the enemey. All his despatches to Puebla had been inter 
cepted; and the brigadier, leaving the merchandise in the town, returned to 
Perote with the artillery and ammunition, arriving there on the 30th of 
April. Meantime the independents captured Nopalucan and made a prize of 
the merchandise. Gaz. de Mcx., 1812, iii. 505-7; Alaman, Hist. AJej., ii. 
570-3; Negrete^ Mex. Sly. XIX., v. 183-5. Bustamante says that Olazabal 
spent his time in Nopalucan reflecting on the audacity of the 'citoyones de 
gcunuza y rueda de cuerda,' as he called the men that wore buckskin and used 
the lasso. That author gives him the worst of characters, accusing him of 
ingratitude and scandalous theft. Cuad. Hist., i. 415-7. 

6 No account was ever rendered of it. Among the spoils were some beau 
tiful diamond rings, a pectoral for the bishop of Puebla, and a necklace of 
fine stones which was sent as a present to Morelos. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., 
i. 417-8. 


forces and established itself at Sultepec, matters on 
the whole for a time looked well for the indepen 
dent cause. Calleja had suffered a signal repulse 
at Cuautla; near Izucar were the forces which had 
placed Llano in so compromised a position; Atlixco 
was threatened, the provinces were overrun by revolu 
tionary troops, and Calleja was at a standstill. Abouti 
this time an idea became prevalent that the struggle 
would soon be terminated by a compromise favorable 
to independence, and it was even hinted at by an arti 
cle in the government organ, which announced with 
satisfaction an arrangement entered into by Francisco 
Xavier Elio, viceroy of the provinces of Rio de la 
Plata, with the revolutionary junta in Buenos Aires. 7 
This was the first time that the possibility of a com 
promise was broached; for hitherto, to speak of affairs 
in the other Spanish American possessions, was but to 
tell of royalist victories. 8 Some thought the viceroy 
leaned that way, but that was not so. No one knew 
better than he that in the present war there was no 
possibility of compromise. There must be either 
freedom or bondage. But the junta at Sultepec, un 
der the impression that the time had come for making 
some such proposal, approved two plans or projects 
devised by Doctor Cos, which he respectively named 
Plan of peace and Plan of war. These, accompanied 
with a manifesto entitled "de la nacion americana a 
los europeos habitantes de este continente," were sent 
in the name of the junta to the viceroy, together with 
a letter dated March 16th. At the same time copies 
of the documents were distributed to the corporations 
and chief authorities in the country. 9 

7 The arrangement was signed October 20, 1811, at Montevideo, with the 
view of establishing peace iu those provinces. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 223-4; 
Negrete, Mex. Sir,. XIX., v. 43. 

8 The fiscal of the tribunal de mineria, at the meeting of that body in 
March, endeavored to prove that the only efficacious means to revive the min 
ing industry was peace, such as had been made in Buenos Aires. Arechcder- 
r<ta, Apuni. Hist., in Alaman, Hist. Mcj., ii. 555-6. 

9 Doctor Cos' ideas produced so strong an impression on Venegas that it 
was said he would allow no one to see the letter. It may be found entire in 
Reyrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 88-90. Both plans were based on the principle 


The corporations and authorities placed Cos' pro 
ductions, unread by many of them, in the hands of 
the viceroy. The latter, though pretending to look 

entertained by the ayuntamiento of Mexico in 1808, adopted by Hidalgo and 
followed by Rayon and the junta, of using the name of Fernando VII. only 
to aid in achieving independence. On that ground Cos founded his plan of 
peace; in the preamble he maintained that the sovereignty resided in the body 
of the nation; that Spain and America were integral parts of the monarchy, 
subject to the king, which parts possessed equal rights and were independent 
of one another; that in the absence of the monarch, America, having kept her 
self loyal to him, had a better right to convoke c6rtes, and to call thereto the 
few Spanish patriots who had not stained themselves with treason, than 
Spain to summon deputies from America; that the inhabitants of Spain had 
no right to assume the supreme power in the colonies, and authorities sent by 
them were illegally constituted, and that Americans, as a natural consequence, 
had the right to conspire against them; such action, instead of being treason 
able, was on the contrary meritorious; and the king, if present, would certainly 
commend them. To reduce his principles to practice, Cos proposed in the plan 
of peace the creation of a national congress, independent of Spain, representing 
Fernando VII. and affirming his right. The European officials and the armed 
force were to resign their offices and powers into the hands of the congress, and 
remain as private citizens, with their lives and estates guaranteed; the employes 
retaining their honors and fueros, and a portion of their pay if they continued 
residing in the country. Past grievances should be forgotten, and the Mexi 
can congress would then, as a token of fraternity, afford some pecuniary 
assistance to the Spaniards fighting in Spain against the foreign usuper and 
his allies. If that plan were not accepted, then the alternative of war 
should be recognized, and under it hostilities carried on according to the laws 
of nations, prisoners being treated as belligerents, and not as traitors, for 
both would be fighting for their national rights under the common banner of 
Fernando VII. 

The doctor made a re'sume' of charges for violence, atrocities, and griev 
ances, real or supposed, said to have been committed by the royalists, and 
concluded by trying to prove that it was in the interests of the Europeans, 
whom he called 'brethren, friends, and fellow-citizens,' to accept the plan 
of peace, and thus contribute to the general welfare. His plans acquired 
great celebrity. The difficulty with them was that the principles supposed to 
be therein established were the very gist of the trouble, about which there 
could be no compromise; for one party wanted an independent government, 
though under the name of Fernando, which the other party well understood 
the meaning of. As to the war plan, the insurgent junta was pledging 
more than it could fulfil, its authority not being recognized by all the chiefs 
at war with the viceregal government. El Ilustrador Am., nos 2-6, in Her 
nandez y Ddvalos, Col. Doc., iv. 189-90, 193-5, 207-8, 222-4, 230; Ne- 
grete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 15-32; Guerra, Rev. N. Esp., ii. 548-63; Zerecero, 
Rev. Mex., 133; Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 389-406; Mendibil, Res. Hist., 
app. ii. 375-83; iii. 384-5; iv. 385; Ward, Mex., i. 183-5; Mora, Revol. 
Mex., iv. 202-14. The pretended allegiance to Fernando was a deception, a 
mere matter of policy, and so considered by Cos and the junta. Alaman, Hint. 
Mej., ii. 556-61. This was an undeniable fact, recognized by Bustamante as 
such, and fully confirmed in a confidential letter of the junta to Morelos, 
dated Sept. 4, 1811, which contains these words: ' Habrd sin duda reflexado 
V. E. que hemos apellidado en nuestra junta el nombre de Fernando VII. 
que hasta ahora no se habia tornado para iiada. . .nos surte el mejor efecto. . . 
Nuestros planes en efecto, son de independencia, . . .no nos ha de dauar el 
nombre de Fernando.' Bustamante, Cuad. Hit., i. 405-6; Oaz. de Mex., 1812. 
iii. 489-90; Mendibil, Resumen Hist., app. 5, 385-G. 


on the manifesto with contempt, in reality gave it the 
greatest importance by decreeing on the 8th of April 
that the document should be burned in the public plaza 
by the common executioner, thus awakening in the 
people a desire to know its contents. 10 Another edict 
required that all copies should be gathered in; and the 
reading of the documents, except by special govern 
ment sanction, was strictly forbidden. 11 

The sovereign junta continued the policy of giving 
publicity to its views by means of the printing-press. 12 
The viceroy did what he could to counteract this in 
fluence by edicts and ecclesiastical injunctions. The 
circulation and reading of such productions were for 
bidden, and every copy called in. Priests at the con 
fessional and from the pulpit were directed to enjoin 
upon the faithful obedience to these commands. 13 

During the siege of Cuautla a number of persons 
occupying good social standing hastened to join the 
revolution. Among them was a distinguished law 
yer, Juan Nepornuceno Rosains, who had been de 
terred for a year past from such action by the bad 
character of some of the insurgent leaders. 14 

10 He said that he could find no better means of showing the horror and 
abomination inspired by those proposals. Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 90-2; 
Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 373-4. 

H Beristain, archdeacon of Mexico and influential with the viceroy, and 
Friar Diego Miguel Bringas y Eucinas, guardian of Santa Cruz de Quere"taro, 
undertook to defend the despotic order, and to impugn Cos' plan. Busta- 
mante believed it beneficent. Of Bringas' character he speaks in high terms 
of praise, giving him credit for honesty of purpose in his effort, though based 
on wrong impressions. Cu adro Hist. , i. 401. Be ristaiii gave his arguments in 
the journal El Filopatro. and in a pamphlet of Go numbers, ending 15th Octo 
ber, 1812, dedicated to the tribunal of the inquisition. Bringas confutes the 
charges made against the royalists, and specifies the acts of atrocity by the 
insurgents which he saw or heard of. If he did not vindicate the royalists, 
he made it appear that the insurgents had excelled them in cruelty. Bringas, 
Impugn, del pap. sedic., 176 and 143 pp. issued from the press of Maria Fer 
nandez de Jaurequi, in Mex., 1812. 

12 Owing to the acquisition of the type as already narrated at this time, the 
Ilustrador Americano and the Semanario Patriotico had freer course, and exer 
cised no small influence. Rivera, Gob. Mex. , ii. 39. 

13 The edicts were dated June 1st and 3d respectively. The ecclesiastical 
chapter said that the newspapers of the independents were 'una maquina in 
fernal inventada por el padre de la discordia para desterrar del pais la paz. ' 
Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 509-001. 

11 Such men had justly won the name of 'devorantes' given them by 
Morelos. Maximo Machorro, Arroyo, and Antonio Bocardo were of the 


On the 3d of April Rosains raised the revolution 
ary standard, but with the resolve that all his acts 
should bear the stamp of order and true patriotism. 
He soon placed himself in contact with others hold 
ing like views, and within a fortnight there was thus 
gathered a force 800 strong, enlisted about San Andres 
and Nopalucan, and between Quichula and Tepeya- 

Insurrection becoming thus rank throughout Pue- 
bla, the viceroy gave command of the province to Brig 
adier Santiago Irisarri, already mentioned, and sent 
him the first battalion of the Americano infantry regi 
ment/ 5 Major Gomendio, which with a small body of 
cavalry and the royalist auxiliaries, were all the 
troops at his command to defend that section. Every 
loyal town hereabout was in turn assailed, 16 including 
Atlixco, which was attacked on the 23d of April by 
a strong force from Iziicar, and saved from capture only 
by the arrival of troops under Colonel Ordonez. At 
the end of April the viceregal authority, whose forces 
were all engaged in front of Cuautla, was recognized 
only in the city of Puebla, and a few towns, includ- 

number. Machorro was like a wild beast, having plenty of physical courage, 
and indulging it in the way of murder and robbery without limit. Morelos 
tried to bring him under discipline, but failed. Bocardo was a little less 
brutal, a little more amenable to reason. Bustamante., Cuad. Hist., ii. 132. 
This author uses similar language respecting other leaders whom he person 
ally knew, and with whom he had to associate even at the peril of his life, 
men who were no better than bandits. His lamantations are touching. 
But on the other hand, he was inclined to judge more favorably of other 
leaders that he was not acquainted with, such as Albino Garcia, the Villa- 
grans, Osorno, and others, whom Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 5G3-6, stamps with 
the same stripe. Such men gave Morelos and other respectable chiefs much 
trouble, and were the bane of the revolution. 

15 Arrived at Vera Cruz, from Spain, January 29, 1812. The second bat- 
> lion remained at Habana. A little later the Castilla regiment came out. 

fourth expedition arrived August 25, 1812, consisting of the Zamora 
in i an try regiment, Colonel Rafael Bracho, a company of flying artillery, 
and the rest of the men to complete the Castilla and Lovera regiments. Ala- 
-i <n, Hist. Mej., ii. 469-70; iii. 237; Guerra, Rev. Mej., ii. 447; Mendibil, 
jJtes. Hist., 94; Bustamante, Camp, de Calleja, 158-9; Niles' Reg., ii. 71; Zama- 
cois, Hist. Mex., viii. 86-8, 236; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 349-50. 

16 At the foot of Popocatapetl was posted an insurgent party led by a mon 
ster called Vicente Gomez, nicknamed El Capador, recognizing no authority. 
As late as 1850, there was in Mexico, begging his daily food, an old soldier 
of the Asturias battalion, whom Gomez had mutilated. Alaman, Hist. Mej., 
ii. 568. 


ing the ever faithful Tlascala, and even this city was 
seriously threatened. Communication was so much in 
terrupted that for several months Mexico knew not 
what occurred in Jalapa and Vera Cruz. Neverthe 
less, Rosains and his party had no faith in their ability 
to withstand an attack from the royalists at Puebla; 
and upon news of danger reaching them, the priest 
Jose Rafael Tarelo, who had prevailed on Rosains to 
join the revolution, wrote to Bishop Campillo that he 
and his companions would accept the royal amnesty if 
they were not required to perform humiliating acts. 
The bishop returned a letter of acceptance, and Tarelo 
with another priest, Amador, began their prepara 
tions, when, the affair reaching Rosains, he had the 
latter arrested and summoned a meeting, before which 
he laid the bishop's letter and signified his intention, 
now more confirmed than ever, of fighting for the 
national independence. On the same day came Ra 
fael Argiielles, a lawyer from Orizaba, commissioned 
by a meeting called a few days before by the curate 
Montezuma, at Zongolica, to arrange cooperation 
with Rosains and Osorno. Tarelo's negotiations with 
Bishop Campillo caused much trouble, and almost 
brought about the destruction of himself, Rosains, 
Argiielles, and others. 17 

During the same period revolution raged in the 
provinces of its birth, left scantily garrisoned when 
Calleja abandoned Guanajuato. The chief towns were 
fortified, but had no available troops for distant ex- 

17 The report got out that Rosains and his friends intended to apply for 
amnesty. A rough, unbridled rabble, led by Machorro and the Francis- 
friar Ibargiien, fell upon Rosains and Argiielles, severely maletreated them 1 
confined Tarelo, who, however, escaped. Ibargiien was of Arroyo's stamp, a,nd 
even worse if possible. No arguments availed with such men, and Rosains and 
Argiielles were on the point of being sacrificed, but after much trouble f c- 
ceeded in escaping and fled toward San Andre's Chalchicomula. Tarelo, who 
had joined the revolution for the sake of plunder and had taken a large share 
of the two million conducta captured at Nopalucan, sent men in pursuit. 
Rosains was taken and in shackles conveyed to Tepeaca, where he was saved 
only by the prayers of the people. But he was confined in a dungeon, and 
was in peril of his life till he escaped. Rosains, JReL, in Alaman, Hist. Mci. t 
ii. 575-6; Negrete, Hex. Sig. XIX., v. 186-7. 


peditions. Calleja, after taking Zitdcuaro, sent a di 
vision of the central army against the parties over 
running the Bajio or plains of Guanajuato. 18 Colonel 
Diego Garcia Conde, the chief commander, displayed 
great activity. He fortified his headquarters at 
Maravatio, a central point between Valladolid, Guana 
juato, and Queretaro, and organized royalist compa 
nies. 19 His chief aims were to destroy Albino Garcia, 
and to secure communication with Mexico and the 
safe passage of trains. Yillalba went against Cafias 
and Ramon Rayon, and destroyed the artillery and 
foundry at Santa Maria Tismade. Oroz and Iturbide 
were sent with a force as far as Indaparapeo to relieve 
Valladolid, and Garcia Conde, after visiting Celaya, 
hastened to Acambaro to be at convenient distance 
from Valladolid. Albino Garcia kept the garrisons of 
small towns constantly alarmed, and forced other in 
surgent leaders to obey him. 20 At this time he formed ' 
a combination with Muniz and Father Navarrete to 
assail Valladolid, on the 3d of February, which had a 
most disastrous result. 21 Trujillo defeated them in de 
tail, captured their artillery, and destroyed their foun 
dry at Tacambaro. This, however, did not improve 

18 It consisted of one battalion of the Corona, lieut-col. Villalba, another 
made up from several regiments under Captain Agustin de Iturbide, the 
Puebla cavalry regiment, and two squadrons of frontier troops, with some 
pieces of artillery. 

19 His report of Feb. 17th, from Salamanca. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 218- 
22, 225-8. 

20 As he acted with entire freedom from control, the junta, when at Zitd- 
cuaro, sent a certain Cajigas with troops and artillery to bring him under 
subjection; but he, caring no more for the junta than for the government at 
Mexico, fell upon Cajigas, taking his cannon and other arms, and sent him 
back to the junta. Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 430. The junta on the 18th of 
March, 1812, declared Albino Garcia an outlaw, ' por su crueldad, y embria- 
guez, lascivia, latrocinios, escandalos y despotismo coiiciliandose el odio y de- 
testacion general.' Ner/rete, Mex. Sig. XIX., v. 198-200. 

21 The plan was for Garcia to attack on the north; Navarrete on the west; 
Muniz on the south; and Piedra with 400 men from his hacienda El Canario 
was to render aid. Trujillo and his subordinate, Captain Antonio Linares, 
made short work of the matter. The latter, with 100 foot, 200 cavalry, and 3 
pieces, charged upon Garcia, who had about 4,000 or 5,000 men, mostly 
mounted, and six pieces, on the heights of Tarimbaro, and after some fighting 
dispersed them and captured their artillery. Linares returned to Valladolid 
with the cannon and upward of 600 horses and mules, most of them saddled, 
and other spoils. Muniz, not knowing what had befallen Garcia, appeared be 
fore the city, and occupied the heights of Santa Maria with 10 pieces. Trujillo 



matters for the royal cause in Michoacan. Muuiz 
soon managed to make more cannon; and though the 
insurgent guerrilla parties were not formidable, they so 
multiplied that Valladolid was for eight months with 
out news from Mexico. 22 Albino Garcia seemed to 
derive greater resolution and power of resource from 
every reverse. He soon gathered his dispersed forces, 
and returned to his headquarters in the valley of 
Santiago. He was joined there by the parties under 

i* a CasasA'iejas 

' 5 o ./> Tollman 
jn GaravatilWT 
.Miguel H Grande 


and Linares together made a dash against him and signally defeated him, cap- 
taring all his artillery. Linares went in pursuit as far as Tacambaro, burned 
the town after removing nine cannon, and thereby destroyed the factory of 
arms that Muuiz had there. Navarrete, receiving timely advice, kept away 
and returned to his old position. Thus Trujillo in three days broke up, with 
out losing a man, a combination of 8,000 or 10,000, taking besides about 25 
pieces of artillery, and large quantities of supplies. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 
589-95; Mora, Revol Mex., iv. 426-8. 

22 Arechederreta saw a letter from the bishop elect, Abad y Queipo, to a 
friend of his in Mexico, which so stated. The official reports of Trujillo and 
Linares, dated Feb. 8th, of the actions opposite Valladolid, did not reach 
Mexico till the latter part of May or beginning of June, and they were the 

HIST. MEX., VOL. IV. 25 


Escandon, the Gonzales, Tomas Baltierra Salmeron, 
Cleto Camacho, the negro Valero, and others. Gar 
cia Conde resolved to attack them in the valley, and 
succeeded in penetrating as far as the plaza of Santi 
ago on the 13th of February, but was compelled to 
retreat in haste. He made a second attempt with 
all his forces on the 15th, with no better result, and 
then withdrew to Celaya. 23 It would be useless at 
tempting to follow the repeated movements and coun 
ter-movements of the belligerents, as they reached no 
result other than to keep the country in a state of 
disturbance and suffering. 

In March and April Guanajuato was reduced to 
the last extremity for the want of specie. 24 By re 
quest of the civil authority Garcia Conde, now a 
brigadier, escorted the bullion on hand to Queretaro. 
On the 8th of April he started on his return with 
specie and merchandise, about 1,000 mule loads, for 
Guanajuato and interior towns; but encountering in 
surgents, he lost one load of specie and a large quan 
tity of merchandise. He succeeded in taking to 
Guanajuato on the 17th only the specie of the royal 
treasury. The specie of private individuals and the 
merchandise that escaped capture he was forced to 
leave in Irapuato. However, Colonel Jose Castro 
started from this place soon after with the effects, and 
leaving in Silao those for Guadalajara and Zacatecas, 
inarched on with the rest to Guanajuato, which he 
reached safely on the 21st. 25 Garcia Conde now re 
ceived orders from the viceroy to convey to Mexico 

23 He had to abandon the place on hearing that Pedro Garcia had taken 
and sacked the villa de Leon, and slain its comandante, Manuel Gutierrez de 
la Concha. Mora, Kevol. Mex., iv. 428. 

24 Silver bullion was selling at very low prices, and work in the mines 
suffered accordingly. A deputation of the ayuntamiento went with a letter 
from the intendente to Garcia Conde, then at Silao, requesting him to escort 
to Quere'taro the bullion belonging to private persons the royal treasury 
officials would not send the silver of the crown without orders from the 
viceroy and bring back the coin and goods detained there. Alaman, Hist. 
Mej., iii. 176-81. 

25 Garcia Conde's official report to the viceroy from Silao, April 24th. 
Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 741-4; Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 181-2; Bustamante, 
Cuad Hist., ii. 299-301. 


all the silver bullion in Guanajuato, together with 
that left at Queretaro, and a large flock of sheep; 
mutton being very scarce in the capital. To the 
people dwelling in the towns of the Bajio this news was 
anything but pleasing, and petitions poured upon him 
not to leave them at the mercy of the insurgent ma 
rauders. On the other hand, Cruz, deeming his own 
province in danger, also requested Garcia Conde not 
to start with the trains till Albino Garcia was put out 
of the way. The latter having overcome the insur 
gent chiefs, Escandon, Rubi, Gonzalez, and others 
who had been acting too independently of him, had 
increased his own force and become more dangerous. 
Under the circumstances, Garcia Conde delayed his 
departure and decided to combine a plan of operations 
with the comandante general of Nueva Galicia. 26 The 
troops of this province since the opening of the year 
had been engaged in keeping at bay insurgent parties 
on the confines of Michoacan and Guanajuato; and if 
any of them set foot in Nueva Galicia territory they 
were forthwith destroyed. In these repeated encoun 
ters a number of notable guerrilla chiefs had perished, 
some of them killed in action, and some captured and 
shot. 27 

Among the most noted royalist commanders, both 
for activity and severity, was Pedro Celestino Negrete. 
Haughty and inflexible, he never spoke of the insur 
gents without applying to them some blackening 
epithet, 28 and not one that was captured by him 
escaped death. On the other hand, he did not spare 
his officers and men from hard work, though he looked 

afi He despatched Captain Iturbide with 60 Silao royalists to confer with 
Cruz and Negrete. With this small escort Iturbide traversed the region in 
fested by insurgent parties, fulfilled his commission in a satisfactory manner, 
and in six days was back again at Garcia Conde's headquarters. The time 
occupied by him was hardly more than the postman employed in time of 
peace. These facts and future operations appear in his report of May 18th. 
Gaz. tie Mcx., 1812, iii. 733-9. 

27 Such was the fate of Colonel Vargas, Francisco Pifia, El Seguidillo, 
Maldonado, Tomas Rodriguez, and others. 

28 Monsters, infamous rebels, wretches, cowardly assassins, vile canaille, 
and such like, were words constantly occurring in his official reports; and 
yet that man lived to serve the republic, and so did Garcia Conde. 


after their interests with the utmost care, and they 
had accustomed themselves to look up to him as a 
father as well as an invincible commander. His tena 
cious persecution of rebels had put an end to many 
obscure leaders, till at last there remained in the 
province only one insurgent chief who had acquired 
any considerable distinction. This was Jose Anto 
nio Torres, generally called El viejo Torres, who 
had rendered good service to the cause in Nueva 
Galicia. His fate was a sad one. With his later 
operations against Valladolid the reader is already 
acquainted. From his stronghold in Michoacan he 
was wont to invade the region of Rio Grande, and in 
February 1812 he attacked Negrete near Tlasasalca. 
Torres was repulsed and, assailed in turn, was utterly 
routed. From the time of this reverse he was ac 
tively pursued from place to place, and on the 4th of 
April was surprised and captured at Palo Alto, near 
Tupataro, by Lopez Merino, one of Negrete's subor 
dinates. It was no small matter this capture of so 
noble a patriot, and the royalists made the most of it 
after their fashion. He was taken to Guadalajara 
and his arrival made a public spectacle. Wishing to 
heap every indignity upon him, his foes were about to 
fasten him by the neck to a wooden prop that his face 
might be well seen, but the old man told them to 
have no fear, he would carry his head high enough. 
He was tried by the oidor Yelasco, and sentenced on 
the 12th of May to be hanged and quartered. The 
execution was carried into effect on the 23d. In the 
presence of the assembled crowd the head was severed 
from the body and raised upon a pole. One quarter 
of the body was sent to Zacoalco, the scene of his vic 
tory over Villasenor; another was placed at the Mexi- 
calcingo gate, by which he had made his triumphal 
entry into Guadalajara, and the remaining two at the 
gates of El Carmen and San Pedro. 29 

29 At each place were posted these words: 'Jose" Antonio Torres, traidor al 
rey y a la Patria, cabecilla rebelde e" invasor de esta Capital.' The remains 


Negrete's division could now be employed in the 
pursuit of Albino Garcia. Orders were brought him 
from Cruz by Iturbide to march at once. It was 
arranged that on the 15th of May at ten o'clock in 
the morning he should attack Albino Garcia, cover 
ing the roads leading from Parangues and Yurira to 
the valley of Santiago; and that Garcia Conde should 
at the same hour come upon the enemy's camp from 
the Celaya side, thus cutting off escape. In order 
not to awaken suspicion, Garcia Conde tarried in 
Silao, 33 where on the 1st of May he received infor 
mation from Captain Esquivel, commanding at Ira 
puato, that he was surrounded by numerous parties of 
Albino Garcia's. Conde at once despatched Villalba 
with one battalion, 100 dragoons, and two cannon. 
The rebel chief, who had been all day assailing the 
town with 4,000 cavalry and seven pieces of artillery, 
on learning of their approach retired to the hacienda 
de las Animas, a league distant, whence two of his 
lieutenants kept up a skirmish with Villalba's force. 31 
Meantime Albino Garcia marched against Celaya, and 
was repulsed. 32 

were incinerated forty days after. His house in San Pedro Piedra Gorda was 
razed to the ground and sown with salt. Thus we see what it was to be a 
patriot in those days. It must be confessed that in the city of Mexico more 
decency was shown. The execution took place the 23d of May, all the garri 
son being out under arms to see it. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 639-40; Castillo, 
Negrcte, Mex., v. 57-63, 78; Bustamante, Guadro Hist., i. 145; Zerecero, Rev. 
Mex., 185-90; Alaman, Hi*t. Mej., iii. 185-6; Mora, M^x. y xus Rev., iv. 439- 
43. At the time of his capture Torres had 400 men with him, all of whom 
perished, many of them being burned alive, Merino having ordered some 
barns in which they had sought refuge to be set on fire. Hernandez y Ddvalos, 
Col. Doc., iv. 147-8. 

30 Official reports of May llth and 16th. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 733-9, 

31 Villalba, being told by Esquivel that the people of the San Jacinto rancho 
were friendly to the insurrection, ordered Lieut. Gutierrez to put them all 
to the sword, an order which he afterward modified by sparing the women 
and children; but as all the men but one had fled, on him alone must fall the 
vengeance of the realm. Alaman, Hist. Mex., iii. 188. 

32 The vccinos of Celaya, Irapuato, and other towns, instead of making 
so strenuous a resistance, would have joined the 1'evolution if the junta 
soberana had been able to keep in check the guerrilla chiefs. The coman- 
dante at Irapuato, Jose" M a Esquivel, was decidedly in favor of independence. 
In after years he was several times a member of the legislature, and once 
vice-governor of Guanajuato, and died as one of the justices of her supreme 
court. Id., iii. 189-90. 


Garcia Conde departed with the conducta of silver 
bullion from Guanajuato to escort it to Mexico, 
and conveyed it as far as Irapuato. From this place, 
where he incorporated into his force Villalba's com 
mand, without divulging his destination, he started 
at two o'clock in the morning of May 15th, so as to 
reach the valley of Santiago by ten, and occupy the 
points agreed upon with Negrete. But Albino Gar 
cia, if unlettered, was a shrewd military man. He 
well understood the royalists' movements, and easily 
disconcerted them. Not finding Negrete where he 
expected to meet him, and hearing a brisk firing from 
the direction of Parangues, Garcia Conde inferred 
that Albino Garcia had attacked Negrete, which was 
true. On Garcia Conde's approach, t"ie enemy re 
tired, and, pursued by the cavalry, lost some men. 33 

33 Among the slain was one of the most efficient officers of the guerrilla 
band. Conde and Negrete marched into the valley in three sections, one of 
which was under Iturbide, with the view of pursuing Albino if he returned. 
They failed to find him, however, only priests, women, and children being 
left in the town. Conde wanted to form other combinations with Negrete, 
but the latter had to return to his former positions to protect the Nueva 
Galicia frontier from possible invasion by Albino Garcia. It was, however, 
agreed that Negrete should march by the Pe"njamo road, Conde taking 
that of Yuriria, so as to place the enemy between two fires; but the latter 
eluded the hot pursuit of Conde and Iturbide, though owing to the fact of his 
being afflicted with gout, Albino had to journey in a carriage or on a bed. 
When the pursuers came near he would quickly mount a horse and escape 
by some side road, after hiding his artillery. Once his artillery carriages 
were captured and destroyed. At the end of this unsuccessful pursuit the 
royalists were completely exhausted. Conde gave up the chase, and re 
turning to the valley of Santiago, took the sacred vessels and paraments and 
the priests of that town and of Yuriria to Irapuato. Conde, in his report 
of May 31st, speaks of Albino's force being all dispersed, arid states that the 
chief had only 100 men with him; but, of course, that is a part of guerrilla war 
fare. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 749-55; Alaman, Hist. Mcj., iii. 191-3; Mora, 
liC-vol. Mex., iv. 431-2. Albino Garcia's bands consisted of large masses of 
mounted men, mostly mestizos and mulattoes, some armed with spears, 
others with muskets and swords, ready for attack and still readier for run 
ning away. Their chief was the most active and dreaded guerrilla that the 
war produced. When he intended to assault a town or hacienda, a large num 
ber of Indian slingers assembled in the neighboring villages and fields, and with 
a few badly made and worse served pieces of artillery, rendered aid. The 
attack was made by surrounding the town with cavalry, which was, of course, 
useless against a fortified place. The most abusive epithets were hurled at 
the besieged, and a brisk fire of artillery and musketry sustained for hours, 
discharging perhaps GOO or 700 cannon-shots, which did little or no harm, the 
royalists returning the fire from behind their intrenchments. Finally, after 
having some men killed and wounded, the foiled assailants would retire either 
because their ammunition had given out, or some royalist force was approach 
ing to relieve the town. In the retreat the guerrillas would sack every hacienda 


The brigadier again started on the 4th of June 
with the conducta for Mexico; but hearing at Sala 
manca that the guerrilla chiefs were reorganizing in 
the valley of Santiago, he thought that as they be 
lieved him occupied with the conducta, it would be a 
good opportunity to take them unawares and even 
capture Albino Garcia. The same evening he de 
spatched his most efficient officer, Agustin Iturbidc, 
with about 160 mounted men with orders to reach 
Santiago at moonrise. Iturbide was there at two in 
the morning of the 5th, surprised the guard at the 
entrance of the town, and pretending to be Pedro 
Garcia, who had been called by Albino to join him, 
obtained the pass and countersign, and took pos 
session of the place without arousing the sleeping 
revolutionists. At length they were purposely awak 
ened by orders loudly issued for the grenadiers of 
la Corona to occupy a certain position, the battalion 
of Mixto another, and so on, several organizations 
being named, to each of which a few of Iturbide's men 
belonged. The insurgents believed the whole division 
of Garcia Conde was upon them; they attempted, 
however, to defend the barracks which were taken 
by force. Some soldiers took possession of the 
roof of the house occupied by Albino Garcia. This 
chief, his brother Francisco, known as El brigadier 
Don Pachito, his secretary, Jose Maria Rubio who 
on presenting himself said he had been held in the 
insurgent quarters by force, which plea saved his life- 
en their way, and then disperse, to meet again at some other place agreed upon. 
The good fortune of towns that thus escaped being plundered and destroyed 
was attributed to a miracle, and the te deum was chanted. If any prisoners 
had been taken on either side they were forthwith shot. In a field of battle 
the insurgents generally placed their artillery on some height, the infantry 
behind it, and the large masses of cavalry at the wings. The cavalry would 
charge upon the royalists, who easily drove them away with a few discharges 
of grape; they would then flee in all directions, throw their ill-disciplined and 
poorly armed infantry into confusion, and the artillery would fall into the 
royalists' hands after the first discharge. Albino Garcia complained that his 
men were always more disposed to plunder than to fight. But this kind of 
warfare was excessively fatiguing for the royalist troops, constantly deprived 
of rest and food, marching and countermarching without being able to catch 
or strike the foe. 


and a man named Pineda, a deserter from the royal 
service, were taken alive, together with some 100 or 
150 more. About 150 guerrillas were killed; while 
Iturbide's only casualty, by his report, was the death 
of one grenadier. As Iturbide had to traverse on 
his return a region teeming with insurgents, and 
his force was too small to guard so many prisoners, 
he ordered them to be shot, excepting only the two 
Garcias, Rubio, and Pineda, whom he conveyed to 
Celaya. Three days later, after certain empty judi 
cial proceedings, the Garcias and Pineda were pub 
licly executed. 34 

The capture of Albino Garcia was a great triumph 
for the royalists, none of whom had ever gained much 
advantage over him. It must be confessed that like 
the other side he was something of a scourge, the Bajio 
region having suffered greatly at his hands. Garcia 
Conde could now proceed with his conducta. One of 
the Villagrans, however, attacked him in the sierra of 
Capulalpan, but was routed by Iturbide with heavy 
loss. 35 The same division on its return escorted from 
Mexico a large train of European and other merchan 
dise and passengers to Queretaro. 36 

Meantime Liceaga had been sent by the stiprema 
junta to assume the government of the northern 

34 Garcia Conde's conduct toward his prisoner, according to his own re 
port was dastardly, even for that day and place. He pretended to pay him 
honors as captain-general by bringing his troops out on parade, ringing bells, 
and firing salvoes of artillery. Albino and his brother being placed in the 
plaza opposite the brigadier's residence, the latter used insulting words to the 
chief prisoner, and then made a ribald speech to the crowd who had come to 
see the fallen hero. Notified of his death-sentence, Albino Garcia wrote his 
parents, who were royalists and had formerly rendered service to Garcia 
Conde himself on his expeditions, asking their pardon and blessing, and or 
dering the restoration of all property he had seized to the owners. His head 
was elevated in Celaya at the crossing of San Juan de Dios street, where he 
made his greatest effort to capture the city. The crippled hand, which made 
him known as El Manco, was taken to Guanajuato, and the other to Irapuato. 
Years after, when the country became independent, the skull was buried. 
Gaz. deMex., 1812, iii. 640-4; Liceaya, Adic. y Rect., 237-8; Alarnan, Hist. 
Mej., iii. 196-203; Mora, Revol. Mex., iv. 435-6; Mej. Bosquejo Ligeris, 14, 
257-8; MendiUl, Res. Hist., 132. 

35 Conde's report of June 16th. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 645-6. 
. 36 7,706 bales, 79 coaches with passengers, 632 mules, and 130 asses laden. 
Numbers of persons, including troops, passengers, and muleteers, 5,920. 
Negrete, Mex. Siy. XIX., v. 85-6. 


provinces, and, accompanied by Doctor Cos, had en 
tered the Bajio of Guanajuato. On the 24th of July 
the insurgents, who had again collected in the valley 
of Santiago, were defeated by Iturbide, sent in advance 
from Queretaro. Liceaga and Cos saved themselves by 
flight, and Garcia Conde now proceeded with the con 
voy, but was attacked near Salamanca on the 7th of 
August, and lost 400 mule loads. Iturbide actively pur 
sued the insurgents, and in September defeated them on 
several occasions, Liceaga and Cos narrowly escaping 
capture. 87 Cos, having been appointed his second in 
command by Liceaga, retired to Dolores, which place 
he made the centre of his future operations, while the 
latter remained in the vicinity of Yuriria. The lake, 
on the southern side of which this town is situated, 
has two islets or cays, the larger being about 1,000 va- 
ras in circumference, and the other somewhat smaller. 
They were 180 varas apart, and Liceaga joined them 
by a causeway three varas wide, protecting the 
cays as well as the bridge with a stone wall six feet 
in height, a moat, and a stockade made of prickly 
plants. In the larger cay there were 71 merlons, 
and 64 in the other. 38 To this fortress, which Liceaga 
deemed impregnable, he gave his own name, and it is 
called in the official reports Isla Liceaga. He estab 
lished factories there for making cannon and ammu 
nition, and a mint. Garcia Conde deemed it unnec 
essary, and even imprudent, to undertake the capture 
of the place by main force, inasmuch as, holding 
possession of the shores of the lake, it must sooner or 
later surrender. But Iturbide resolved to attack it; 
and to this end he first cleared the surrounding coun 
try of insurgents. He allowed the enemy no rest 
from the 9th of September till he pitched his camp 
in Santiaguillo opposite the fortress. 39 His position 

s 'Gaz. deMex., 1812, iii. 1014-17, 1095-1110. 

38 Iturbide's detailed report in Gaz. de Max., 1813, iv. 25-39. The town 
and lake have different names assigned to them by different writers; namely, 
Yurira, Yuriria, Yurirapandaro, Yuririapundaro, and Yurirapundaro. 

39 In ID actions during 40 days he killed many, some of whom were chiefs 


was within cannon-shot, but was protected by a small 
rise of ground. Liceaga, who never bore the palm 
for bravery, on seeing the approach of danger, left the 
island, the command of which, together with 200 men, 
was intrusted to Father Jose Mariano Hamirez. 40 
Iturbide, having made eight rafts and brought two 
canoes from a long distance, attacked during the 
night of October 31st at four different points, placing 
Captain Vicente Enderica in command. A powder- 
magazine that caught fire disheartened the garrison, 
and the place was taken without resistance. Father 
Kamirez, Jose Maria Santa Cruz, the town major, 
Tomas Moreno, commandant of the artillery, Nelson, 
an English engineer under whose direction the forti 
fications were built, and Felipe Amador, who had 
received one of the minor orders of priesthood, were 
captured, conveyed to Irapuato with others, and shot. 
The royalist loss was small. Of the defenders none 
escaped; such as did not fall into the victors' hands 
perished in the lake. 41 The small number of arms 
found indicates clearly that the fortress, when assailed, 
was almost abandoned, and the garrison had been 
mostly removed. 42 

of renown, and took prisoners Colonel Francisco Ruiz, and lieutenant-colonel 
of artillery, Francisco Valle, known as the 'negro habanero,' both of whom 
it is hardly necessary to say were executed at once. Liceaga, A die. y Recti- 
fic., 241. 

40 Bustamante, calling him a sub-deacon, says: 'En quien siempre admire* 
buenas disposiciones para puntear una guitarra y divertio un estrado de da- 
mas, y no tenia otras.' Cuad. Hist., ii. 240. 

41 Iturbide, whose pedantry in his reports equalled his bravery and cru 
elty, broke out on this occasion into one of his peculiar bursts: 'Miserables, 
ellos habran conocido su error en aquel lugar terrible en que no podnln reme- 
diarlo. j Quizd su catastrofe triste servird de escarmieuto a los que estaii aun 
en tiempo de salvarse!' Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 27. 

42 Bustamante has it that Liceaga had taken out the troops, leaving his 
prisoners, who found ways to plot with Iturbide to secure their freedom. 
The latter says: 'Fu6 preciso valerse de nrachos ardides, cuyorelacion no con - 
templo interesante para este lugar, y el resultado lo hard infcrir a los cnten- 
dimientos claros, imparciales y sin preocupacion.' For all that, Iturbidc or 
dered many military executions there, and sent hundreds hence of whom he 
made no mention. It was his chief delight in this world to consign to hell 
the excommunicated. Ramon Rayon occupied the island several months 
later, and exhumed the bones of about 600 persons, whom he caused to be in 
terred with funeral honors in the parish church, which Iturbide looked upon 
as a crime, prosecuting the priest that officiated, and holding much corre 
spondence with Rayon on the subject. Iturbide put himself up for a sage, and 


Doctor Cos at Dolores engaged himself in organiz 
ing and bringing together the armed parties of that 
region. With him was Rafael Rayon, one of the 
president's brothers, and Matias Ortiz, who from this 
time began with his brothers to acquire distinction, 
and were generally known as Los Pachones. With 
the force he had organized, Cos marched on the 27th 
of November against Guanajuato; but his movement 
was attended with no result, and he had to return to 
Dolores. He did not remain there permanently, how 
ever, as that town was on the line of transit for pro 
duce and other merchandise to and from the inland 
provinces; and when trains approached he usually 
abandoned the place for the purpose of attacking 
them. It often happened that reinforcements had 
to be sent from Queretaro to save the trains from 
capture. 43 

On the opposite side of the sierra of Guanajuato, 
separating on the north the bajio from the plains of 
Dolores and the province of San Luis Potosi, the 
operation of escorting live-stock from the latter place 
to Queretaro, and transporting merchandise from 
Mexico, furnished opportunities for repeated hostile 
encounters. One of the hottest of these took place 
on the 3d of February, at the Santuario de Atoto- 
nilco near San Miguel el Grande, on which occasion 
Ildefonso de la Torre, the royalist commander, who 
had advanced to that place to receive 500 silver bars 
from Zacatecas, saw a refulgent palm in the sky. 44 
Another train was convoyed by the royalist priest 

a loyal vassal of Fernando VII. Cuadro Hist., ii. 246-7. Thus far in this 
history we find him both fanatical and murderous. 

43 Bustamante, Guad. Hist., ii. 295-8, cannot reconcile Cos' statement on 
his attack against Guanajuato, appearing in Diariode Operac., in Hernandez y 
Ddvtdos, Col. Doc., v. 626, with the report of Intendente Maranon inserted in 
Gaz. de Hex., 1813, iv. 207-9; Mendibil, Resumen Hist., 167-8. The same 
difficulty occurs in comparing the false accounts of insurgent and royalist 
commanders. Liceaga, Adic. y Rectijic., 23S-9, says that the invading force 
was repulsed. 

44 Torre's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 257-9. The palm phenomenon 
had become fashionable since Calleja pretended to have seen one at Zitacuaro. 
Alaman, Hist. Alej., iii. 205. 


Diego Bear with 250 men, who corning upon a small 
party of insurgents near Dolores on the 22d of March, 
killed a number and dispersed the rest. On that 
same side of the sierra the independents with three 
guns assaulted the hacienda of Villela on the 7th of 
April, but were repulsed with the loss of the guns. 
Colonel Nunez and Major Molleda perished in the 
action, and Colonel Gutierrez was taken prisoner and 
subsequently shot by order of Colonel Tovar, coman- 
dante at San Luis Potosi. Father Zimarripa was 
also captured ; he had once before been taken in Aculco 
and pardoned; now he was retained in irons pending 
orders from the viceroy. 45 About this time, owing to 
the defeat of the royalist Bengoa on the 16th of Feb 
ruary, three leagues from Rio Verde, this place was 
at the mercy of the insurgents, who, according to the 
official reports, plundered it, and also the rancho 
Jabali. Tovar despatched Captain Sanz with a force 
on the 23d of February, who recovered the town and 
the artillery the insurgents had possessed themselves 
of, but could not overtake the assailants. The latter 
were, however, defeated and dispersed by Arredondo, 
who pursued the governor of Sierra Gorda as Colo 
nel Felipe Landaverde was called, being represented 
to have been an honorable man so hotly that to es 
cape he threw himself down a precipice, abandoning 
his arms and horse. 46 

45 Tovar's report in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 626-7, 669-75. 
46 Tovar's report and annexes, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 615-18, 625-7; 
Arredondo's report in Id., 1812, 1111-15; Mora, Mex. Rev., iv. 445-8. 





MILITARY operations had resulted more favorably 
for the royalist arms in the interior than in the east 
ern and southern provinces, owing, it would seem, to 
the fact that in the former locality the insurrectionary 
forces were in independent parties, more or less nu 
merous, but nearly always acting without combina 
tion, which, though obstructing the public highways, 
interrupting traffic, and living by plunder, rarely at 
tempted to assail fortified towns, or to confront their 
royalist foe in an open field. To the east and south 
of Mexico military affairs had been more skilfully 
conducted by the insurgent chiefs, who acted more in 
concert, and whose troops had been kept well in to 
gether and were better disciplined. Hence the rapid 
progress made by the revolution in these regions, and 
its strong and menacing attitude at the end of Septem 
ber 1812 toward the viceregal government. Prior to 



his departure from Chilapa for Ouautla and Izticar in 
thu latter end of 1811, Morelos diroctod bin active liou- 
I- luuit, Trujano, to spread tlio insurrection through- 
<il, tlio Mi/toe country, and partion wore accordingly 
despatched in all direction**, appropriating to tbojr 
own uses tho grain, live-stock, and every other avail 
able tiling belonging to tbe Spaniards or to those of 
i yalist proolivitiei, Ono of those parties, commanded 
by Colonel Figuoroa, paid a visit to Tohuacan, a rich 
nty and the commercial centre of the provinces of Pue- 
U;i , ( )ajaca, and Vera ( Jrux, Tho place bad been aban 
doned by tho Spaniards and authorities, and Figueroa 
r.ntorod it unopposed; but having no force to bold it, 
he went harvesting in tho hacienaas and farms of the 
lurroundinff country; upon which the Spaniards re 
turned with seventy-five soldiers and two pieces of 
artillery, erected intrenohments, and organized volun 
teer companion. Tho insurgents, however, again made 
their nppoaranco, and in February surrounded the city. 
Tho number of the besieger** increased rapidly, and the 
beleaguered in the latter part of April and beginning 
of May found themselves reduced to the last extrem 
ity. Their water supply had been cut off, and most of 
the garrison had perished. Despairing of any relief, 
the city capitulated under a guarantee that the lives of 
tho Spaniards and other royalists would be spared; to 
Which stipulation, according to custom, not the Blight- 
tit attention wan subsequently paid. 1 

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\Vhilo Mio iihlrpnuli'Mts \\-iT. dMim;;- M 

Mn. M .11 i.m. !r IMS l-'urut.-. \ l.uv<>:i. mnito of 

Maltrata,* raised a force and declared for independence, 
having east a cannon with the metal of the largo 

rhmvh U'll. I'r-hK > IMV|MU;'; M \\;\trh on Ori/^lha, 
lh> rMpdnvJ c\rr\ j li. un \\-.\\ ;:i-, nuMvliMlhliso 

for the royalists, lie put men under Miguel Moreno, 


\\P S,M nn-KN Vru v i'ui . 

who with groat activity began to plunder and desolate 
the neighboring haciendas, daily augmenting his force. 
Lieutenant-colonel Miguel FOB, comandanto at Ori- 

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zaba, on being apprised of these doings, despatched a 
force to bring away from Aculcingo the church para- 
ments and the frightened priest. His force was at 
tacked by the insurgents, who dispersed the cavalry 
and compelled the infantry to retreat to Orizaba. 3 

Before long the villa of Orizaba found itself seri 
ously menaced by the united forces of the curate of 
ZoDgolica, Juan Montezuma y Cortes, 4 and Alarcon. 
The place had a garrison of 400 or 500 men under 
Lieutenant-colonel Jose Manuel Panes. Its only 
defence was a stockade on the Santa Catalina bridge, 
half a league from the villa, manned by 100 infantry, 
thirty cavalry, and a few artillerymen to manage one 
gun. The independents attacked on the 22d of May, 
and again on the 28th. They had no difficulty in en 
tering the villa by the Angostura gate. Panes at 
first concentrated in the Carmen convent, but having 
neither provisions nor water he evacuated the place 
and went to Cordoba, after destroying the ammuni 
tion he could not carry away, the Carmelites, who 
were mostly Spaniards, and the rest of the Europeans 
accompanying him. 5 The curate of Zongolica, now 
having the rank of colonel, tried to intercept the 
royalists on the Escamela bridge; but being attacked 
by the major of the Tlascala regiment, he fled to 
the Tuxpango sugar-mill, leaving with the custom 
house guards his baggage. Marching by night, Panes 
reached Cordoba early next morning. 

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th Alarcon 
and Moreno entered Orizaba. Their men were poorly 
armed and had but little ammunition, which they 
consumed that night in salutes to the virgin of Gua- 

3 Paz's report to General Carlos Urrutia, commander at Vera Cruz, on the 
24th of March, Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 417-20. 

4 He held as a descendant of Montezuma a cacicazgo in Tepeji de las Sedas. 
Bustamante, who knew him well, says he was a perfect image of the emperor, 
but would make a better preacher than soldier. Guadro Hist., ii. 135-6. 
Alaman did not know how the descent came. Hist. Mcj., iii. 226. It was he 
who sent the lawyer Argiielles to confer with Rosains and Osorno. 

5 Panes' reports, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 781-8, 794-6; Orizava, Ocur- 
rencias, 4-15; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 386. 


clalupe. They were soon joined by Montezuma, Fran 
cisco Leiva, Padre Sanchez, and Arroyo, the total 
force being now 1,500 men. Hoping to capture C6r- 
doba, a demand for its surrender was sent to Panes, 
and refused. Presently, however, the independents 
learned that a large force of royalist regular troops 
was coming upon them. A general retreat then set 
in, the curate of Zongolica, who was the first to 
move, returning to his town. The viceroy had ordered 
Llano, 6 on his return from Cuautla, to march from 
Puebla with 2,265 men, and attack the insurgents 
intrenched at Tecamachalco and Tepeaca, being spe 
cially desirous of securing 52,000 bales of tobacco 
which were at Orizaba and Cordoba. 7 In the morn 
ing of May 30th the independents tried to check 
Llano's advance at the town of Amozoque but were 
repulsed. 8 They made a second attempt on the Aca- 
tlan and Santiago hills, and a third on the parapets 
of Tepeaca, but were defeated with the loss of six 
guns. From Tepeaca, Llano advanced rapidly upon 
Orizaba, and took it on the llth of June. 9 At first 
he resolved to put the population to the sword, but 
was prevented through the intercession of the friars 
of San Jose de Gracia. Without loss of time he 
advanced on Cordoba, and Paries returned to Ori 
zaba, but being suspected of insurgent proclivities was 
superseded by Colonel Andrade. 

On the 25th Llano started on his return to Puebla, 
having in charge 4,098 bales of tobacco. Several 

6 In order that Llano might attend to the campaign, the viceroy appointed 
the mariscal de campo, conde de Castro Terreno, a grandee who had come to 
Mexico for other purposes, military and civil governor of Puebla, a position 
that he accepted out of consideration for the viceroy. Arechederreta, Apunt. 
Hist., May 25, 1812; Alaman, Hist. Mej., iii. 164. 

7 This was about all the viceroy had to raise revenue from at this time. 
The number of the royalist force as given in the text was found in the office 
of the viceroy's secretary. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 136. 

8 Llano's report to the viceroy is dated June 3d. Gaz. de Mex., 1812. iii. 

9 June 10th he assaulted the batteries placed by the curate Alarcon on the 
hills of Huilapa, and dislodged the insurgents. The next day he met with 
the same success at the entrance of La Angostura. Bustamante, Cuad. Jlist., 
ii. 137; Mcndibil, Res. Hist., 131-2; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 387. 

HIST. HEX., VOL. IV. 2o 


parties of independents, commanded by Father San 
chez, Osorio, El Beridito, Manchorro, and others, took 
up positions on the heights of Aculcingo to interrupt 
his passage and to capture the tobacco. Llano, how 
ever, dislodged them from every place, and arrived 
at Puebla without loss on the 28th. The tobacco 
reached Mexico on the 5th of July under a strong 

There were many thrilling adventures, many sad 
episodes, during the war for independence. In March 
of this year there was lodged in the castle of San Juan 
de Ulua Jose Mariano de Michelena, who, though 
holding only the rank of captain, had much politi 
cal influence, and in later years became a promi 
nent statesman. At first he was immured in a dark 
cell dug out of the rock, arid was given only a board 
for his bed; but his health becoming thereby greatly 
impaired, the comandante of the fort asked General 
Urrutia to allow him to be removed to the adjutant's 
quarters, the petitioner being responsible for his safety. 
The request was granted; and thus the prisoner came 
to be placed in relations with the officers of the garri 
son and with his friends. Among his visitors was a 
popular young treasury clerk, Cayetano Perez, an 
enthusiast on behalf of his country's freedom. Put 
ting their heads together, Michelena and Perez soon 
hit upon a plan to get possession of the castle, and 
of the men-of-war. They would take a day when a 
heavy norther was blowing, so that the other ships 
could not get at them, but they could get at the 
other ships. 10 The plan appeared well conceived, and 
promised success; but alas! in the execution all was 

10 Michelena detailed on the 2d of Oct. 1830, the plan to Alaman, who also 
obtained a narrative from Manuel Perez, a brother of Cayetano. The scheme 
was to win over the most reliable officers of the Vera Cruz regiment, being 
sure of the artillery detachment, who would do what they were asked to by 
their commander, Pedro Nolasco Valde"s, he being interested in the success 
of the plan. Perez's part was to seize the bastions and gate of the pier, for 
which he had made arrangements beforehand. The undertaking at this part 
was deemed practicable. Ataman, Hint. Jlej., iv. 88-90, ap., 3-5. 


lost. Being detected, Perez and several others were 
arrested on the 18th of March, and hurriedly tried. 
Perez and five others were sentenced to death, and 
executed on the 29th of July. 11 One Molina, to save 
his own life, accused Michelena, but was unable to 
prove his words, as Perez, the only one having knowl 
edge of the details, had refused to divulge them. 
Michelena, Merino, and others, however, being sus 
pected, were sent to Spain, where the first named 
continued his military career, and rose to be a lieu 

While the royalists were recovering Tepeaca, Tecam- 
achalco, and Orizaba, the independents had been in 
tent on some important places garrisoned by viceregal 
forces. A conspiracy was planned by a sergeant in 
Perote where Olazabal had remained after his loss 
of the train at Nopalucan to surrender the fortress. 
All the leading officers, with Castro Terreno and 
Olazdbal at their head, were to be killed. The plot 
was detected on the 8th of June, and the conspir 
ators being arrested and tried by court-martial, all 
were sentenced to death and eight days afterward 
shot in the castle moat. 12 

It was now midsummer, and at the capital no news 
had come from Vera Cruz for three months. Even 
the ingenuity of the merchants could not invent 
means to get a letter through. 13 Further than this, 
smokers were suffering. Paper was getting scarce at 
the cigar factory; and the viceroy finally ordered 
Llano to march with his division to Jalapa, escorting 

11 The five others were Jos6 Evaristo Molina, Josd Ignacio Murillo, Barto- 
lome" Flores, Josd Nicasio Arizmendi, and Jos6 Prudencio Silva. Six years 
after the independence was secured, the state congress had a tablet placed in 
the town hall, commemorative of the event, and containing the names of tho 
six victims. 

12 Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 144-5, gives the text of a letter found in 
the correspondence of the conde de Castro Terreno with Venegas, supposed 
to have been written in Jalapa to Gen. .Davila in Vera Cruz. Among those 
executed was Vicente Acuiia, who had been banished by the junta de 
seguridad, and had returned under the general amnesty. Alaman, Hist. Mcj. , 
ii. 233. 

13 Arechederreta, Apunt. Hist., said early in July that the last advices 
were of April 10th. 


a consignment of flour to Vera Cruz, and bringing 
back some paper. Llano deemed a small detachment 
sufficient for the merchandise service; and he would 
occupy himself meanwhile in bringing under viceregal 
subjection the towns in the vicinity of Jalapa. 14 Leav 
ing Puebla on the 3d of July, on the way to Perote 
Llano was attacked at Tepeyahualco by insurgents, 
who were defeated and put to flight with the loss of five 
guns, by Lieutenant-colonel Jose Moran of the cavalry. 
Llano found Jalapa beset by the enemy, and provisions 
scanty. The whole province was in a state of insur 
rection, and communications so interrupted that in 
Jalapa, as in Mexico and Puebla, nothing was known 
of affairs in Vera Cruz. From some insurgent pris 
oners he learned that Vera Cruz was surrounded by 
foes, who swarmed up to its very suburbs; that a regi 
ment of the Castilla infantry from Spain and another 
from Campeche had been unable to cut their way 
through to the interior, though they had made several 
sallies; and that a permanent court-martial had been 
established under Colonel Daoiz, recently arrived from 
Spain. Llano saw at once that he had to abandon his 
original plans, and in spite of the deadly season he must 
go on to the much infected seaport. Taking troops 
native to that region that he found in Jalapa, 15 he 
set out with the flour on the 24th of July, and after 
some fighting reached Vera Cruz the 30th. He 
found the once famous Castilla regiment reduced to 
a few dying men. 16 On his return to Jalapa, Llano 
escorted 2,000 mules laden with merchandise, a large 
number of passengers in vehicles, and forty boxes of 
mail matter from Spain. At Perote he was joined 
by Olazabal with a few detachments. From Ojo de 

14 Llano's reports of his expedition to Vera Cruz are in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, 
iii. 831-2, 921, 925-9; Bustamante, Cuadro Hist., ii. 142-6. 

15 Before setting out he marched against a rebel junta at Naulingo, which 
hurried away at his approach, on the 18th of July, leaving live guns and 
some other arms. 

10 It originally had 1,300 men, 500 of whom perished of the black -vomit; 
the other 800 reached Jalapa. From Campeche came also 1,300, of whom 
500 reenforced the garrison of Orizaba, and the rest remained at Vera Cruz. 


Agua, near Puebla, he sent to Castro Terreno on the 
27th of August triplicates of his reports to the vice 
roy, nothing having been hitherto known of his move 
ments owing to his despatches having been inter 
cepted. 17 The expedition arrived in Mexico on the 
5th of September. 

The plains of Apam, common to the provinces of 
Mexico and Puebla, had been but scantily garrisoned 
since Soto's division marched to Izucar in December 
1811. Owing to this, Tulancingo was assailed, about 
the middle of February, by 3,000 cavalry and 300 
infantry under generals Anaya, Canas, and Serrano, 
and colonels Osorno, Olvera, and Guarneros; but the 
assailants were beaten off by Captain Las Piedras with 
his small force of a little over 100 men of regular 
troops, and the royalist auxiliaries. 18 The hostile par 
ties extended their raids to the city of Tezcuco, whose 
small garrison made several sallies and prevented their 
capturing the place. Of all other places, however, 
most desired was Pachuca, a mining centre, having 
Spaniards to kill and silver bars to capture. On the 
23d of April Serrano undertook the attack with 500 
men, and two pieces of artillery managed by Vicente 
Beristain, a brother of the archdeacon of Mexico. 10 
They soon had possession of all the houses but three, 
which were held by Madera, and the conde de Casa 
Alta, who commanded the royalist forces. During the 
whole of that day the three houses were under fire, 
particularly the one owned by Villaldea, a rich miner. 
Night came on, when some of the houses caught 
fire, and altogether the people were badly frightened. 
The religious of the apostolic college finally mediated 
to obtain terms of capitulation, which the insurgents 

17 His despatches were intercepted at El Cdrmen, and out of revenge he 
now burned the town. Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 921. 

15 Olvera was shot dead by the chaplain. It is noticed that several priests 
joined hotly in the fighting. Gaz. de Max., 1812, iii. 207-11. 

19 The place was in charge of Lieutenant-colonel Madera, who had brought 
a few men from Tulancingo. From the capital had been sent 25 dragoons 
under Sub-lieutenant Juan Jose" Andrade, but he went over to the enemy. 
fliojrio, MS., in Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 577. 


granted. 20 Next day news came that Vicente Fer 
nandez with a force from Tlahuelilpan was approach 
ing to relieve Pachuca. With some difficulty Madera 
satisfied the insurgents that there had been no treach 
ery on his part; and to convince them, he went with a 
priest of the apostolic college to request Fernandez 
to retire. But during the conference the latter chief 
noticed that insurgents were occupying positions in 
his rear; indeed, they had opened fire on his men. 
He therefore beat a retreat, and the insurgents used 
this as a pretext to arrest all the Spaniards and convey 
them to Sultepec. 21 The viceroy, in ignorance of the 
occurrences at Pachuca, on the 25th of April de 
spatched 300 men with two howitzers to bring away 
the silver bars, and provide the place with coin and 
tobacco ; but the force only reached San Cristobal and 
returned on the 27th. 

The repeated losses thus sustained by the royalists in 
the last two months greatly troubled Venegas, who 
in his correspondence with Calleja clearly intimated 
that the capture of Cuautla was a question of life 
or death. Had the insurgents acted together un 
der one or more leaders, and on some uniform plan, 

20 The terms of capitulation were: All arms and valuables of the royal 
treasury, including upwards of 200 bars of silver, were to be surrendered, 
and in consideration thereof the lives of the soldiers and Spaniards were 
guaranteed, and passports were to be given the latter to go where they pleased. 
The troops were left free to join the revolution if they desired; many of the 
men and one Spaniard, named Videgaray, did so. J3ustamante, Cuadro Hist., 
i. 369-73. 

21 Madera was left free and joined Las Piedras at Tulancingo. He was 
never again trusted with a command. The conde de Casa Alta, though car 
ried to Sultepec, was suspected of having gone there not unwillingly because 
lie was of the family of the late viceroy Iturrigaray, and had been his master 
of the horse. His subsequent conduct strengthened the suspicion. The 
count certainly remained with the independents till his death, which occurred 
shortly after from disease in a small town of Michoacan. The insurgents 
divided the booty; a portion of the bars were sent to Rayon, and a portion 
reserved for Morelos; some were coined by Osorno under Beristain's direction, 
at Zacatlan. It was stated that Serrano paid one silver bar for a pair of fancy 
shoes of the kind used by the country people at their feasts. The infringe 
ment of the capitulation at Pachuca, sustained by the junta at Sultepec, was 
an evidence that Doctor Cos' plan de guerra really had no weight with the 
existing powers. The Spaniards, with the exception of three who escaped, 
were shot. It was alleged that they had attempted to escape. Alaman, Hist. 
Mej., ii. 577-81; iii. 152-3; Zamacois, Hist. Mcj., viii. 348-52; Gaz. de Mex., 
1812, iii. 717-20. 


while the government troops were kept so fully 
occupied by Morelos, the triumph of the cause 
would have been at once assured. But the men 
were not at hand for the emergency; that is, men 
capable of bringing that too watery mass into a 
state of concretion, such as to make it serviceable; 
and the result was that Calleja w r as allowed to take 
the place, dispersing the forces engaged in its de 
fence, and leaving the royalist army free to operate 
in various directions, and to recover the lost towns. 
All this time that Morelos was nobly struggling for 
high principles, for liberty, humanity, freedom of 
thought, and independence of country, large numbers 
of so-called revolutionists were occupying themselves 
in labors little better than those of banditti, robbing, 
murdering, drinking, and gambling. The govern 
ment was thus enabled to extricate itself from the 
painful situation late events had placed it in, and 
again to resume the offensive. 

A few days after the siege of Cuautla had begun, 
there was a movement against the independent cause 
in the region known as tierra caliente del Sur, in the 
provinces of Mexico and Puebla. That part of the 
country had been occupied by Morelos after he de 
feated a number of royalist commanders, but his 
control of it was not continuous or assured. There 
were many towns still recognizing the viceregal au 
thority; and as soon as Morelos found himself pent 
up in Cuautla, unable to detach any portion of his 
forces, his agents were soon expelled from the places 
where he had appointed them. 22 

The commander of the fifth division of southern 
militia, Francisco Paris, when on his way to reoccupy 

22 Most of the sugar estates in that country were owned by Spaniards, 
who, besides affording to a large number of inhabitants the means of earning a 
livelihood, had attached them by continued acts of kindness. Morelos had 
caused the seizure of estates, and placed in them overseers to receive the prod 
uce, whose value was applied to the support of the independent forces. Bub 
the employe's and servants, when they saw that Morelos could send no support 
to the overseers, forthwith expelled them, and the control of the estates re 
verted to their owners. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 534-5. 


the district of Tlapa toward the end of March 1812, 
was requested by Brigadier Bonavia, commanding at 
Oajaca, to keep within call, as the city was in danger, 
a large force of insurgents having entered the Miz- 
teca country. That trouble being over, he again be 
gan his march, when a second detention occurred, 
caused by the insurgents having besieged Regales at 
Yanhuitlan. Caldelas was despatched to Regules' aid, 
but as the insurgents raised the siege and went to 
Huajuapan, those officers invested that town. March 
and April having passed, it was too late for the ex 
pedition to Tiapa, and Paris, aware that Regules and 
Caldelas had met at Huajuapan, concluded to take 
up a position at Ayutla, to watch the departure 
or flight of Morelos, who on being pursued must 
go by way of Tlapa if he retreated to the coast of 
Tecpan. He must pass, too, through Ayutla, and 
there Paris hoped to place him in check. 23 While 
there, the inhabitants of Chilapa, said to have been 
intensely loyal to the crown, on hearing of the ap 
proach of a royalist party from Ayutla, with the 
giant Martin Salmeron leading, struck a blow for the 
royal cause, seizing Francisco Montezuma, the sub- 
delegado, and others of insurgent antecedents, and 
sent them as prisoners to Paris at Ayutla. Their 
example was followed at Tixtla, Mochitlan, Peta- 
quillas, Quechultenango, and other neighboring towns ; 
in consequence of which the independent chief Mdxi- 
ino Bravo, finding his position at Chilparicingo unten 
able, after the artillery and a few muskets had been 
taken to El Veladero, took refuge at the hacienda of 
Chichihualco, belonging to his family. 24 Paris placed 
Captain Manuel del Cerro in command at Chilapa, 
and Captain Anorve was also ordered there with a 
force to support him. Both officers at once organized 

123 See his report from Ometepec, April llth, in Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 

24 See Calleja's letter to the viceroy enclosing one of Maximo Bravo to his 
brother, the brigadier Miguel Bravo, of April 29, 1812, from Zumpango. Gaz. 
de Mtx., 1812, iii. 491-4. 


volunteer companies armed with the muskets that 
had been hidden when Morelos came. The same 
measures were adopted at Chilpancingo; indeed, im 
mediately after Morelos escaped from Cuautla and 
his army became dispersed, there was a general move 
ment throughout all that country in favor of the royal 

Among the officers thus dispersed were Leonardo 
Bravo, Jose Mariano de la Piedra, and Colonel Man 
uel Sosa with twenty men, whose whole armament con 
sisted of seven muskets, three fowling-pieces, two pairs 
of pistols, and five sabres. Journeying south through 
the valley of Cuernavaca, they arrived, worn out 
with fatigue, on the 5th of May, three days from 
Cuautla, at the hacienda of San Gabriel, the property 
of the archroyalist Gabriel de Yermo, the greater 
portion of whose laboring men had been serving as 
teamsters and otherwise to Calleja's army. But the 
few left to take care of the hacienda were neither 
less loyal to the crown nor less attached to their 
employer. They had kept concealed, to meet an 
emergency, a four-pounder, s