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•3 


-    A     HISTORY 


OP 


MODERN    EUROPE 


A    HISTORY 


OF 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


O.    A.    FYPFE,    M.A., 

BARRISTER-AT-LAW  ;     FELLOW    OP    UNIVERSITY    COLLEGE,    OXFORD  ;     VICE-PRESIDEN'T 
OP  THE   ROYAL   HISTORICAL  SOCIETY. 


VOL.   III. 

FKOM  1843  TO  1878. 


CASSELL    &    COMPANY,    LIMITED: 

LONDON,  PARIS,  NEW  YORK  $  MELBOURNE. 


1889. 
[ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED.] 


ELECTRONIC  VERSION 
AVAILABLE 


NO. 


CONTENTS. 

>* 

s  • 

CHAPTER    I. 
THE    MARCH   REVOLUTION,   1848. 


Europe  in  1789  and  in  1848 — Agitation  in  Western  Germany  before  and 
after  the  Revolution  at  Paris — Austria  and  Hungary — The  March 
Revolution  at  Vienna — Flight'  of  Mettemich — The  Hungarian  Diet — 
Hungary  wins  its  independence — Bohemian  movement — Autonomy 
promised  to  Bohemia — Insurrection  of  Lombardy — Of  Venice; — Pied- 
mont makes  war  on  Austria — A  general  Italian  war  against  Austria 
imminent — The  March  Days  at  Berlin — Frederick  William  IV. — A 
National  Assembly  promised — Schleswig-Holstein — Insurrection  in 
Holstein — War  between  Germany  and  Denmark — The  German  Ante- 
Parliament — Republican  Rising  ia  Baden — Meeting  of  the  German 
National  Assembly  at  Frankfort — Europe  generally  in  March,  1848 — 
The  French  Provisional  Government — The  National  Workshops — The 
Government  and  the  Red  Republicans — French  National  Assembly — 
Riot  of  May  15 — Measures  against  the  National  Workshops — The  Four 
Days  of  June — Cavaignac — Louis  Napoleon — He  is  elected  to  the 
Assembly — Elected  President  •  .  - 


CHAPTER    II. 

THE   PERIOD   OF  CONFLICT,   DOWN    TO    THE    ESTABLISHMENT 
OF   THE   SECOND   FRENCH   EMPIRE. 

Austria  and  Italy — Vienna  from  March  to  May — Flight  of  the  Emperor — 
Bohemian  National  Movemenc — Windischgratz  subdues  Prague — Cam- 
paign, around  Verona — Papal  Allocution — Naples  in  May — Negotiations 
as  to  Lombardy — Reconquest  of  Venetia — Battle  of  Custozza — The 
Austrians  enter  Milan — Austrian  Court  and  Hungary — The  Serbs  in 
Southern  Hungary — Serb  Congress  at  Carlowitz — Jellacic — Affairs  of 
Croatia — Jellacic,  the  Court  and  the  Hungarian  Movement — Murder  of 
Lamberg — Manifesto  of  October  3— Vienna  on  October  6 — The  Emperor 
at  Olmiitz — Windischgratz  conquers  Vienna — The  Parliament  at 
Kremsier — Schwarzenberg  Minister — Ferdinand  abdicates — Dissolution 
of  the  Kremsier  Parliament— Unitary  Edict — Hungary — The  Rou- 
manians in  Transylvania — The  Austrian  Army  occupies  Pesth — Hun- 
garian Government  at  Debreczin — The  Austrians  driven  out  of  Hungary 
— Declaration  of  Hungarian  Independence — Russian  Intervention — 
The  Hungarian  Summer  Campaign — Capitulation  of  Vilagos — Italy 


vi  MODERN  EUROPE. 

PAGE 

— Murder  of  Rossi — Tuscany — The  March  Campaign  in  Lombard}* 
— Novara — Abdication  of  Charles  Albert— Victor  Emmanuel — Restora- 
tion in  Tuscany— French  Intervention  in  Rome — Defeat  of  Oudinot — 
Oudinot  and  Lesseps — The  French  enter  Rome — The  Restored  Pontifical 
Government — Brail  of  Venice — Ferdinand  reconquers  Sicily — Germany 
— The  National  Assembly  at  Frankfort — The  Armistice  of  Malmii — 
Berlin  from  April  to  September — The  Prussian  Army — Last  Days  of 
the  Prussian  Parliament — Prussian  Constitution  granted  by  Edict — The 
German  National  Assembly  and  Austria — Frederick  William  IV. 
elected  Emperor — He  refuses  the  Crown — End  of  the  National  Assembly 
— Prussia  attempts  to  form  a  separate  Union — The  Union  Parliament  at 
Erfurt — Action  of  Austria — Hesse-Cassel — The  Diet  of  Frankfort  re- 
stored— Olmutz — Schleswig-Holstein — Germany  after  1849 — Austria 
after  1851 — France  after  1848 — Louis  Napoleon — 'The  October  Message 
— Law  Limiting  the  Franchise — Louis  Napoleon  and  the  Army — Pro- 
posed Revision  of  the  Constitution — The  Coup  d'Etat — Napoleon  III. 
Emperor .  .  /48 

CHAPTER    III. 
THE      CRIMEAN      WAR. 

England  and  France  in  1851 — Russia  under  Nicholas — The  Hungarian 
Refugees — Dispute  between  France  and  Russia  on  the  Holy  Places — 
Nicholas  and  the  British  Ambassador— Lord  Stratford  de  Redcliffe — 
Menschikoff 's  Mission — Russian  troops  enter  the  Danubian  Principalities 
— Lord  Aberdeen's  Cabinet — Movements  of  the  Fleets— The  Vienna 
Note — The  Fleets  pass  the  Dardanelles — Turkish  Squadron  destroyed 
at  Sinope— Declaration  of  War — Policy  of  Austria — Policy  of  Prussia 
— The  Western  Powers  and  the  European  Concert — Siege  of  Silistria — 
The  Principalities  evacuated — Further  objects  of  the  Western  Powers 
— Invasion  of  the  Crimea — Battle  of  the  Alma — The  Flank  March — 
Balaclava — Inkermann — Winter  in  the  Crimea — Death  of  Nicholas — - 
Conference  of  Vienna — Austria — Progress  of'  the  Siege — Plans  of 
Napoleon  III.  — Canrobert  and  Pclissier — Unsuccessful  Assault — Battle 
of  the  Tchernaya— Capture  of  the  Malakoff— Fall  of  Sebastopol— Fall 
of  Kars — Negotiations  for  Peace — The  Conference  of  Paris — Treaty  of 
Paris — The  Danubian  Principalities — Continued  discord  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire— Revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  in  1871 178 


CHAPTER    IV. 

THE    CREATION   OF   THE    ITALIAN   KINGDOM. 

Piedmont  after  1849 — Ministry  of  Azeglio— Cavour  Prime  Minister — Designs 
of  Cavour— His  Crimean  Policy^Cavour  at  the  Conference  of  Paris — 
Cavour  and  Napoleon  III. — The  Meeting  at  Plombieres — Preparations 
in  Italy — Treaty  of  January,  1859— Attempts  at  Mediation— Austrian 
Ultimatum — Campaign  of  1859 — Magenta — Movement  in  Central  Italy 


CONTENTS.  vii 

PAGE 

— Solferino — Napoleon  and  Prussia — Interview  of  Villafranca — Cavour 
resigns — Peace  of  Ziirich — Central  Italy  after  Villafranca — The  Pro- 
posed Congress—"  The  Pope  and  the  Congress  " — Cavour  resumes  office 
— Cavour  and  Napoleon — Union  of  the  Duchies  and  the  Roinagna  with 
Piedmont — Savoy  and  Nice  added  to  France — Cavour  on  this  cession — 
European  opinion — Naples— Sicily — Garibaldi  lands  at  Marsala — Cap- 
ture of  Palermo — The  Neapolitans  evacuate  Sicily — Cavour  an.d  the 
Party  of  Action — Cavour's  Policy  as  to  Naples — Garibaldi  on  the  main- 
land— Persano  and  Villamarina  at  Naples — Garibaldi  'at  Naples — The 
Piedmontese  Army  enters  Umbria  and  the  Marches — Fall  of  Ancona — 
Garibaldi  and  Cavour — The  Armies  on  the  Volturno — Fall  of  Gaeta — 
Cavour's  Policy  with  regard  to  Rome  and  Venice— Death  of  Cavour — 
The  Free  Church  in  the  Free  State  241 


CHAPTER    V. 
GERMAN  ASCENDENCY   WON   BY   PRUSSIA. 

Germany  after  1858— The  Regency  in  Prussia— Army-reorganisation — King 
William  I.—  Conflict  between  the  Crown  and  the  Parliament — Bismarck 
— The  struggle  continued— Austria  from  1859 — The  October  Diploma 
— Resistance  of  Hungary — The  Reichsrath —Russia  under  Alexander 
II.— Liberation  of  the  Serfs— Poland— The  Insurrection  of  1863— 
Agrarian  measures  in  Poland — Schleswig-Holstein — Death  of  Frederick 
VII. — Plans  of  Bismarck— Campaign  in  Schleswig — Conference  of 
London — Treaty  of  Vienna — England  and  Napoleon  III. — Prussia  and 
Austria — Convention  of  Gastein— Italy — Alliance  of  Prussia  with  Italy 
— Proposals  for  a  Congress  fail — War  between  Austria  and  Prussia— 
Napoleonlll. — Koniggratz — Custozza — Mediation  of  Napoleon — Treaty 
'  of  Prague— South  Germany — Projects  for  compensation  to  France — 
Austria  and  Hungary—  Deak — Establishment  of  the  Dual  System  in 
Austria-Hungary  .........  ...  305 


CHAPTER    VI. 

it 
THE   WAR   BETWEEN   FRANCE   AND  GERMANY. 

Napoleon  III. — The  Mexican  Expedition — Withdrawal  of  the  French  and 
death  of  Maximilian — The  Luxemburg  Question — Exasperation  in 
France  against  Prussia — Austria — Italy — Montana — Germany  after 
18fi6 — The  Spanish  Candidature  of  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern — French 
declaration — Benedetti  and  King  William — Withdrawal  of  Leopold  and 
demand  for  guarantees — The  telegram  from  Ems — War — Expected 
Alliances  of  France — Austria — Italy — Prussian  plans — The  French 
army — Causes  of  French  inferiority — Weissenburg — Worth — Spicheren 
—  Borny  —  Mars-la-Tour  —  Gravelotte  —  Sedan  —  The  Republic  pro- 
claimed at  Paris — Favre  and  Bismarck — Siege  of  Paris  — Gambetta  at 
Tours — The  Army  of  the  Loire — Fall  of  Metz — Fighting  at  Orleans — 


viii  MODERN  EUROPE. 

PAGE 

Sortie  of  Champigny — The  Armies  of  the  North,  of  the  Loire,  of  the 
East — Bourbaki's  ruin — Capitulation  of  Paris  and  Armistice — Prelimi- 
naries of  Peace — Germany — Establishment  of  the  German  Empire — 
The  Commune  of  Paris— Second  Siege— Effects  of  the  war  as  to 
Russia  and  Italy — Rome 395 

CHAPTER    VII. 
EASTERN       AFFAIRS. 

France  after  1871— Alliance  of  the  Three  Emperors — Revolt  of  Herzegovina 
— The  Andrassy  Note— Murder  of  the  Consuls  at  Salonika— The  Berlin 
Memorandum — Rejected  by  England — Abdul  Aziz  deposed — Massacres 
in  Bulgaria — Servia  and  Montenegro  declare  War — Opinion  in  England 
— Disraeli — Meeting  of  Emperors  at  Reichstadt — Servian  Campaign — 
Declaration  of  the  Czar— Conference  at  Constantinople — Its  Failure — 
The  London  Protocol — Russia  declares  War — Advance  on  the  Balkans 
— Osman  at  Plevna — Second  Attack  on  Plevna — The  Shipka  Pass— 
Roumania — Third  Attack  on  Plevna — Todleben — Fall  of  Plevna — 
Passage  of  the  Balkans— Armistice — England — The  Fleet  passes  the 
Dardanelles — Treaty  of  San  Stefano — England  and  Russia— Secret 
Agreement — Convention  with  Turkey — Congress  of  Berlin — Treaty  of 
Berlin — Bulgaria .  .474 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


CHAPTER    I. 

Europe  in  1789  and  in  1848 — Agitation  in  Western  Germany  before  and  after 
the  Revolution  at  Paris — Austria  and  Hungary — The  March  Revolution  at 
Vienna — Flight  of  Metternich — The  Hungarian  Diet — Hungary  wins  its 
independence — Bohemian  movement — Autonomy  promised  to  Bohemia — 
Insurrection  of  Lombardy — Of  Venice — Piedmont  makes  war  on  Austria — 
A  general  Italian  war  against  Austria  imminent — The  March  Days  at  Berlin 
— Frederick  William  IV. — A  National  Assembly  promised — Schleswig-Hol- 
stein — Insurrection  in  Holstein — War  between  Germany  and  Denmark — 
The  German  Ante-Parliament — Republican  Rising  in  Baden — Meeting  of 
the  German  National  Assembly  at  Frankfort — Europe  generally  in  March, 
1848 — The  French  Provisional  Government — The  National  Workshops — 
The  Government  and  the  Red  Republicans — French  National  Assembly — 
Riot  of  May  15 — Measures  against  the  National  Workshops — The  Four  >* 
Days  of  June — Cavaignac — Louis  Napoleon — He  is  elected  to  the  Assembly 
— Elected  President. 
' 

THERE  were  few  statesmen  living  in  1848  who,  like 
Metternich  and  like  Louis  Philippe,  could  remember 
the  outbreak  of  the  French  Eevolution.  To  those  who 
could  so  look  back  across  the  space  of.  sixty  years,  a 
comparison  of  the  European  movements  that  followed 
the  successive  onslaughts  upon  authority  in  France 
afforded  some  measure  of  the  change  that  had  passed 
over  the  political  atmosphere  of  the  Continent  within  a 
single  lifetime.  The  Revolution  of  1789,  deeply  as  it  - 
stirred  men's  minds  in  neighbouring  coun-  Euro  e  in  1789 
tries,  had  occasioned  no  popular  outbreak 
on  a  large  scale  outside  France.  The  expulsion  of 
B 


2  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

Charles  X.  in  1830  had  been  followed  by  national 
uprisings  in  Italy,  Poland,  and  Belgium,  and  by  a 
struggle  for  constitutional  government  in  the  smaller 
States  of  Northern  Germany.  The  downfall  of  Louis 
Philippe  in  1848  at  once  convulsed  the  whole  of  central 
Europe.  From  the  Ehenish  Provinces  to  the  Ottoman 
frontier  there  was  no  government  but  the  Swiss  Bepub- 
lic  that  was  not  menaced ;  there  was  no  race  which  did 
not  assert  its  claim  to  a  more  or  less  complete  inde- 
pendence. Communities  whose  long  slumber  had  been 
undisturbed  by  the  shocks  of  the  Napoleonic  period 
now  vibrated  with  those  same  impulses  which,  since 
1815,  no  pressure  of  absolute  power  had  been  able 
wholly  to  extinguish  in  Italy  and  Germany.  The 
borders  of  the  region  of  political  discontent  had  been 
enlarged;  where  apathy,  or  immemorial  loyalty  to  some 
distant  crown,  had  long  closed  the  ear  to  the  voices  of 
the  new  age,  now  all  was  restlessness,  all  eager  expecta- 
tion of  the  dawning  epoch  of  national  life.  This  was 
especially  the  case  with  the  Slavic  races  included  in  the 
Austrian  Empire,  races  which  during  the  earlier  years 
of  this  century  had  been  wholly  mute.  These  in  their 
turn  now  felt  the  breath  of  patriotism,  and  claimed  the 
right  of  self-government.  Distinct  as  the  ideas  of 
national  independence  and  of  constitutional  liberty  are 
in  themselves,  they  were  not  distinct  in  their  operation 
over  a  great  part  of  Europe  in  1848 ;  and  this  epoch 
will  be  wrongly  conceived  if  it  is  viewed  as  no  more 
than  a  repetition  on  a  large  scale  of  the  democratic  out- 
break of  Paris  with  which  it  opened.  More  was  sought 


isia  EUROPE  IN  ISJfi.    '  '  3 

in  Europe  in  1848  than  the  substitution  of  popular  for 
monarchical  or  aristocratic  rule.  The  effort  to  make 
the  State  one  with  the  nation  excited  wider  interests 
than  the  effort  to  enlarge  and  equalise  citizen  rights ; 
and  it  is  in  the  action  of  this  principle  of  nationality 
that  we  find  the  explanation  of  tendencies  of  the  epoch 
which  appear  at  first  view  to  be  in  direct  conflict  with 
one  another.  In  Germany  a  single  race  was  divided 
under  many  governments  :  here  the  national  instinct 
impelled  to  unity.  In  Austria  a  variety  of  races  was 
held  together  by  one  crown  :  here  the  national  instinct 
impelled  to  separation.  In  both  these  States,  as  in 
Italy,  where  the  predominance  of  the  foreigner  and  the 
continuance  of  despotic  government  were  in  a  peculiar 
manner  connected  with  one  another,  the  efforts  of  1848 
failed ;  but  the  problems  which  then  agitated  Europe 
could  not  long  be  set  aside,  and  the  solution  of  them, 
complete  in  the  case  of  Germany  and  Italy,  partial  and 
tentative  in  the  case  of  Austria,  renders  the  succeeding 
twenty-five  years  a  memorable  period  in  European 
history. 

The  sudden  disappearance  of  the  Orleanist  monarchy 
and  the  proclamation  of  the  Eepublic  at  Paris  struck 
with  dismay  the  Governments  beyond  the 
Ehine.     Difficulties  were  already  gathering       westaemnGer- 

J  many. 

round  them,  opposition  among  their  own 
subjects  was  daily  becoming  more  formidable  and  more 
outspoken.  In  Western  Germany  a  meeting  of 
Liberal  deputies  had  been  held  in  the  autumn  of  1847, 
in  which  the  reform  of  the  Federal  Constitution  and  the 
B  2 


4  MODE  EN  EUROPE.  1848. 

establishment  of  a  German  Parliament  had  been  de- 
manded :  a  Republican  or  revolutionary  party,  small  but 
virulent,  had  also  its  own  avowed  policy  and  its  recog- 
nised organs  in  the  press.  No  sooner  had  the  news  of 
the  Revolution  at  Paris  passed  the  frontier  than  in  all 
the  minor  German  States  the  cry  for  reform  became 
irresistible.  Ministers  everywhere  resigned  ;  the  popular 
demands  were  granted ;  and  men  were  called  to  office 
whose  names  were  identified  with  the  struggle  for  the 
freedom  of  the  Press,  for  trial  by  jury,  and  for  the 
reform  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  The  Federal  Diet 
itself,  so  long  the  instrument  of  absolutism,  bowed 
beneath  the  stress  of  the  time,  abolished  the  laws  of 
censorship,  and  invited  the  Governments  to  send  Com- 
missioners to  Frankfort  to  discuss  the  reorganisation  of 
Germany.  It  was  not,  however,  at  Frankfort  or  at  the 
minor  capitals  that  the  conflict  between  authority  and 
its  antagonists  was  to  be  decided.  Vienna,  the  strong- 
hold of  absolutism,  the  sanctuary  from  which  so  many 
interdicts  had  gone  forth  against  freedom  in  every  part 
of  Europe,  was  itself  invaded  by .  the  revolutionary 
spirit.  The  clear  sky  darkened,  and  Metternich  found 
himself  powerless  before  the  storm. 

There  had  been  until   1848  so  complete  an  absence 

of  political  life  in  the  Austrian  capital,  that,  when  the 

conviction  suddenly  burst  upon  all  minds 

that  the  ancient  order  was  doomed,  there 

were  neither  party-leaders  to  confront  the  Government, 

nor  plans  of  reform  upon  which  any  considerable  body 

of  men  were    agreed.     The   first  utterances  of  public 


MIS.  AUSTRIA  5 

discontent  were  petitions  drawn  up  by  the  Chamber  of 
Commerce  and  by  literary  associations.  These  were 
vague  in  purport  and  far  from  aggressive  in  their  tone. 
A  sterner  note  sounded  when  intelligence  reached  the 
capital  of  the  resolutions  that  had  been  passed  by  the 
Hungarian  Lower  House  on  the  3rd  of  March,  and  of 
the  language  in  which  these  had  been  enforced  by 
Kossuth.  Casting  aside  all  reserve,  the  Magyar  leader 
had  declared  that  the  reigning  dynasty  could  only  be 
saved  by  granting  to  Hungary  a  responsible  Ministry 
drawn  from  the  Diet  itself,  and  by  establishing  consti- 
tutional government  throughout  the  Austrian  dominions. 
"  From  the  charnel-house  of  the  Viennese  system,"  he 
cried,  "  a  poison-laden  atmosphere  steals  over  us,  which 
paralyses  our  nerves  and  bows  us  when  we  would  soar. 
The  future  of  Hungary  can  never  be  secure  while  in  the 
other  provinces  there  exists  a  system  of  government  in 
direct  antagonism  to  every  constitutional  principle.  Chir 
task  it  is  to  found  a  happier  future  on  the  brotherhood 
of  all  the  Austrian  races,  and  to  substitute  for  the 
union  enforced  by  bayonets  and  police  the  enduring 
bond  of  a  free  constitution.;"  When  the  Hungarian 
Assembly  had  thus  taken  into  its  own  hands  the  cause 
of  the  rest  of  the  monarchy,  it  was  not  for  the  citizens 
of  Vienna  to  fall  short  in  the  extent  of  their  demands. 
The  idea  of  a  Constitution  for  the  Empire  at  large  was 
generally  accepted,  and  it  was  proposed  that  an  address 
embodying  this  demand  should  be  sent  in  to  the 
Emperor  by  the  Provincial  Estates  of  Lower  Austria, 
whose  meeting  happened  to  be  fixed  for  the  13th  of 


6  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

March.  In  the  meantime  the  students  made  themselves 
the  heroes  of  the  hour.  The  agitation  of  the  city  in- 
creased ;  rumours  of  State  hankruptcy  and  of  the  im- 
pending repudiation  of  the  paper  currency  filled  all 
classes  with  the  belief  that  some  catastrophe  was  near 
at  hand.* 

The  Provincial  Estates  of  Lower  Austria  had  long 

fallen  into  such  insignificance  that  in   ordinary  times 

their  proceedings  were  hardly   noticed   hy 

The  March  Re-  . 

wiution  at         the   capital.     The  accident  that  they  were 

Vienna.  » 

now  to  assemble  in  the  midst  of  a  great 
crisis  elevated  them  to  a  sudden  importance.  It  was 
believed  that  the  decisive  word  would  be  spoken  in  the 
course  of  their  debates ;  and  on  the  morning  of  the  13th 
of  March  masses  of  the  populace,  led  by  a  procession  of 
students,  assembled  round  the  Hall  of  the  Diet.  While 
the  debate  proceeded  within,  street- orators  inflamed  the 
passions  of  the  crowd  outside.  The  tumult  deepened ; 
and  when  at  length  a  note  was  let  down  from  one  of  the 
windows  of  the  Hall  stating  that  the  Diet  were  inclining 
to  half-measures,  the  mob  broke  into  uproar,  and  an 
attack  was  made  upon  the  Diet  Hall  itself.  The  lead- 
ing members  of  the  Estates  were  compelled  to  place 
themselves  at  the  head  of  a  deputation,  which  proceeded 
to  the  Emperor's  palace  in  order  to  enforce  the  demands 
of  the  people.  The  Emperor  himself,  who  at  no  time 


*  Metteruich,  vii.  538, 603 ;  Vitzthum,  Berlin  und  Wien,  1845-62,  p.  78  ; 
Kossuth,  Werke  (1850),  ii.  78;  Pillersdorff,  Riickblicke,  p.  22  j 
Reschauer,  Das  Jahr  1848,  i.  191 ;  Springer,  Geschichte  Oesterreichs,  ii. 
185 ;  Iranyi  et  Chassin,  Revolution  de  Hongrie,  i.  128. 


1849.  VIENNA.  7 

^s 
was  capable   of  paying  serious    attention   to  business, 

remained  invisible  during  this  and  the  two  following 
days ;  the  deputation  was  received  by  Metternich  and 
the  principal  officers  of  State,  who  were  assembled  in 
council.  Meanwhile  the  crowds  in  the  streets  became 
denser  and  more  excited ;  soldiers  approached,  to  protect 
the  Diet  Hall  and  to  guard  the  environs* of  the  palace; 
there  was  an  interval  of  confusion  ;  and  on  the  advance 
of  a  new  regiment,  which  was  mistaken  for  an  attack, 
the  mob  who  had  stormed  the  Diet  Hall  hurled  the 
shattered  furniture  from  the  windows  upon  the  soldiers' 
heads.  A  volley  was  now  fired,  which  cost  several  lives. 
At  the  sound  of  the  firing  still  deeper  agitation  seized 
the  city.  Barricades  were  erected,  and  the  people  and 
soldiers  fought  hand  to  hand.  As  evening  came 
on,  deputation  after  deputation  pressed  into  the  palace 
to  urge  concession  upon  the  Government.  Met- 
ternich, who,  almost  alone  in  the  Council,  had  made 
light  of  the  popular  uprising,  now  at  length  consented 
to  certain  definite  measures  of  reform.  He  retired  into 
an  adjoining  room  to  draft  an  order  abolishing  the  cen- 
sorship of  the  Press.  During  his  absence  the  cry  was 
raised  among  the  deputations  that  thronged  the  Council- 
chamber,  "  Down  with  Metternich  !  "  The  old  man 
returned,  and  found  himself  abandoned  by  his  col- 
leagues. There  were  some  among  them,  members  of 
the  Imperial  family,  who  had  long  been  his  opponents  ; 
others  who  had  in  vain  urged  him  to  make  concessions 
before  it  was  too  late.  Metternich  saw  that  the  end  of 
his  career  was  come ;  he  spoke  a  few  words,  marked  by 


8  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

all  the  dignity  arid  self-possession  of  his  greatest  days, 
and  withdrew,  to  place  his  resignation  in  the  Emperor's 
hands. 

For  thirty-nine  years  Metternich  had  been  so  com- 
pletely identified  with  the  Austrian  system  of  govern- 

riightof  uaent  that  in  his  fall  that  entire  system 
seemed  to  have  vanished  away.  The  tumult 
of  the  capital  subsided  on  the  mere  announcement  of 
his  resignation,  though  the  hatred  which  he  had  excited 
rendered  it  unsafe  for  him  to  remain  within  reach  of 
hostile  hands.  He  was  conveyed  from  Vienna  by  a 
faithful  secretary  on  the  night  of  the  14th  of  March, 
and,  after  remaining  for  a  few  days  in  concealment, 
crossed  the  Saxon  frontier.  His  exile  was  destined  to 
be  of  some  duration,  but  no  exile  was  ever  more  cheer- 
fully borne,  or  sweetened  by  a  profounder  satisfaction 
at  the  evils  which  a  mad  world  had  brought  upon 
itself  by  driving  from  it  its  one  thoroughly  wise  and 
just  statesman.  Betaking  himself  in  the  general  crash 
of  the  Continental  Courts  to  Great  Britain,  which  was 
still  as  safe  as  when  he  had  visited  it  fifty-five  years 
before,  Metternich  received  a  kindly  welcome  from  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  and  the  leaders  of  English  society; 
and  when  the  London  season  was  over  he  'sought  and 
found  at  Brighton  something  of  the  liveliness  and  the 
sunshine  of  his  own  southern  home.* 

*  Metternich,  viii.  181.  The  animation  of  his  remarks  on  all  sorts  of 
points  in  English  life  is  wonderful.  After  a  halt  at  Brussels  and  at  his 
Johannisburg  estate  Metternich  returned  to  Yieuna  in  1852,  and,  though 
nit  restored  to  office,  resumed  his  great  position  in  society.  He  lived 
through  the  Crimean  War,  on  which  he  wrote  numerous  memoranda,  for 


1848.  HUNGARY.  9 

The  action  of  the  Hungarian  Diet  under  Kossuth's 
leadership  had  powerfully  influenced  the  course  of  events 
at  Vienna.  The  Viennese  outbreak  in  its  The Hungarian 
turn  gave  irresistible  force  to  the  Hun- 
garian national  movement.  Up  to  the  13th  of  March 
the  Chamber  of  Magnates  had  withlield  their  assent 
from  the  resolution  passed  by  the  Lower  House  in 
favour  of  a  national  executive ;  they  now  accepted  it 
without  a  single  hostile  vote;  and  011  the  15th  a  depu- 
tation was  sent  to  Vienna  to  lay  before  the  Emperor  an 
address  demanding  not  only  the  establishment  of  a 
responsible  Ministry  but  the  freedom  of  the  Press,  trial 
by  jury,  equality  of  religion,  and  a  system  of  national 
education.  At  the  moment  when  this  deputation 
reached  Vienna  the  Government  was  formally  an- 
nouncing its  compliance  with  the  popular  demand  for  a 
Constitution  for  the  whole  of  the  Empire.  The  Hun- 
garians were  escorted  in  triumph  through  the  streets, 
and  were  received  on  the  following  day  by  the  Emperor 
himself,  who  expressed  a  general  concurrence  with  the 
terms  of  the  address.  The  deputation  returned  to  Pres- 
burg,  and  the  Palatine,  or  representative  of  the  sove- 
reign in  Hungary,  the  Archduke  Stephen,  forthwith 

whose  use  it  does  not  appear.  Even  on  the  outbreak  of  war  with  France 
in  1859  he  was  still  busy  with  his  pen.  He  survived  long  enough  to  hear 
of  the  battle  of  Magenta,  but  was  spared  the  sorrow  of  witnessing  the 
creation  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy.  He  died  on  the  llth  of  June,  1859,  in 
his  eighty-seventh  year.  Metternich  was  not  the  only  statesman  present 
at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  who  lived  to  see  the  second  Napoleonic  Empire. 
Nesselrode,  the  Russian  Chancellor,  lived  till  1862;  Czartoryski,  who  was 
Foreign  Minister  of  Russia  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Austerlitz,  till 
1861. 


10  MODERN  EUROPE.  isia 

charged  Count  Batthyany,  one  of  the  most  popular 
of  the  Magyar  nobles,  with  the  formation  of  a  national 
Ministry.  Thus  far  the  Diet  had  been  in  the  van  of 
the  Hungarian  movement ;  it  now  sank  almost  into 
insignificance  by  the  side  of  the  revolutionary  organisa- 
tion at  Pesth,  where  all  the  ardour  and  all  the  patriotism 
of  the  Magyar  race  glowed  in  their  native  force,  un- 
tempered  by  the  political  experience  of  the  statesmen 
who  were  collected  at  Presburg,  and  unchecked  by  any 
of  those  influences  which  belong  to  the  neighbourhood 
of  an  Imperial  Court.  At  Pesth  there  broke  out  an 
agitation  at  once  so  democratic  and  so  intensely  national 
that  all  considerations  of  policy  and  of  regard  for  the 
Austrian  Government  which  might  have  affected  the 
action  of  the  Diet  were  swept  away  before  it.  Kossuth, 
himself  the  genuine  representative  of  the  capital,  became 
supreme.  At  his  bidding  the  Diet  passed  a  law  abolish- 
ing the  departments  of  the  Central  Government  by 
which  the  control  of  the  Court  over  the  Hungarian 
body  politic  had  been  exercised.  A  list  of  Ministers 
was  submitted  and  approved,  including  not  only 
those  who  were  needed  for  the  transaction  of  domestic 
business,  but  Ministers  of  War,  Finance,  and  Foreign 
Affairs  ;  and  in  order  that  the  entire  nation  might  rally 
round  its  Government,  the  peasantry  were  at  one  stroke 
emancipated  from  all  services  attaching  to  the  land,  and 
converted  into  free  proprietors.  Of  the  compensation 
to  be  paid  to  the  lords  for  the  loss  of  these  services,  no 
more  was  said  than  that  it  was  a  debt  of  honour  to  be 
discharged  by  the  nation. 


1843.  HUNGARY.  11 

Within  the  next  few  days  the  measures  thus  carried 
through  the  Diet  by  Kossuth  were  presented  for  the 
Emperor's  ratification  at  Vienna.  The  fall 

A  .Hungary  wins 

of  Metternich,  important  as  it  was,  had  not 
in  reality  produced  that  effect  upon  the  Austrian 
Government  which  was  expected  from  it  by  popular 
opinion.  The  new  Cabinet  at  Vienna  was  drawn  from 
the  ranks  of  the  official  hierarchy  ;  and  although  some 
of  its  members  were  more  liberally  disposed  than  their 
late  chief,  they  had  all  alike  passed  their  lives  in  the 
traditions  of  the  ancient  system,  and  were  far  from 
intending  to  make  themselves  the  willing  agents  of 
revolution.  These  men  saw  clearly  enough  that  the 
action  of  the  Diet  at  Presburg  amounted  to  nothing  less 
than  the  separation  of  Hungary  from  the  Austrian 
Empire.  With  the  Ministries  of  War,  Finance,  and 
Foreign  Affairs  established  in  independence  of  the  cen- 
tral government,  there  would  remain  no  link  between 
Hungary  and  the  Hereditary  States  but  the  person  of  a 
titular,  and,  for  the  present  time,  an  imbecile  sovereign. 
Powerless  and  distracted,  Metternich's  successors  looked 
in  all  directions  for  counsel.  The  Palatine  argued  that 
three  courses  were  open  to  the  Austrian  Government. 
It  might  endeavour  to  crush  the  Hungarian  movement 
by  force  of  arms  ;  for  this  purpose,  however,  the  troops 
available  were  insufficient :  or  it  might  withdraw  from 
the  country  altogether,  leaving  the  peasants  to  attack 
the  nobles,  as  they  had  done  in  Galicia ;  this  was  a 
dishonourable  policy,  and  the  action  of  the  Diet  had, 
moreover,  secured  to  the  peasant  everything  that  he 


12  MODERN  EUROPE.  1843. 

could  gain  by  a  social  insurrection :  or  finally,  the 
Government  might  yield  for  the  moment  to  the  inevit- 
able, make  terms  with  Batthyany's  Ministry,  and 
quietly  prepare  for  vigorous  resistance  when  opportunity 
should  arrive.  The  last  method  was  that  which  the 
Palatine  recommended ;  the  Court  inclined  in  the  same 
direction,  but  it  was  unwilling  to  submit  without 
making  some  further  trial  of  the  temper  of  its  an- 
tagonists. A  rescript  was  accordingly  sent  to  Presburg, 
announcing  that  the  Ministry  formed  by  Count  Batthy- 
any  was  accepted  by  the  Emperor,  but  that  the  central 
offices  which  the  Diet  had  abolished  must  be  preserved, 
and  the  functions  of  the  Ministers  of  War  and  Finance 
be  reduced  to  those  of  chiefs  of  departments,  dependent 
on  the  orders  of  a  higher  authority  at  Vienna.  From 
the  delay  that  had  taken  place  in  the  despatch  of  this 
answer  the  nationalist  leaders  at  Pesth  and  at  Presburg 
had  augured  no  good  result.  Its  publication  brought 
the  country  to  the  verge  of  armed  revolt.  Batthyany 
refused  to  accept  office  under  the  conditions  named  ; 
the  Palatine  himself  declared  that  he 'could  remain  in 
Hungary  no  longer.  Terrified  at  the  result  of  its  own 
challenge,  the  Court  now  withdrew  from  the  position 
that  it  had  taken  up,  and  accepted  the  scheme  of  the 
Diet  in  its  integrity,  stipulating  only  that  the  disposal 
of  the  army  outside  Hungary  in  time  of  war,  and  the 
appointment  to  the  higher  commands,  should  remain 
with  the  Imperial  Government.* 

*  Acllerstein,  Archiv  des  Uugarischen  Ministeriums,  i.  27 ;  Iranyi  et 
Cliassin,  i.  184 ;  Springer,  ii.  219. 


1818.          6  BOHEMIA.  13 

Hungary  had  thus  made  good  its  position  as  an 
independent  State  connected  with  Austria  only  through 
the  person  of  its  monarch.  Vast  and  mo-  Bohemianmove. 
mentous  as  was  the  change,  fatal  as  it 
might  well  appear  to  those  who  could  conceive  of  no 
unity  hut  the  unity  of  a  central  government,  the  victory 
of  the  Magyars  appears  to  have  excited  no  feeling  among 
the  German  Liberals  at  Vienna  hut  one  of  satisfaction. 
So  odious,  so  detested,  was  the  fallen  system  of  despot- 
ism, that  every  victory  won  by  its  adversaries  was  hailed 
as  a  triumph  of  the  good  cause,  be  the  remoter  issues 
what  they  might.  Even  where  a  powerful  Grerman 
element,  such  as  did  not  exist  in  Hungary  itself,  was 
threatened  by  the  assertion  of  provincial  claims,  the 
Government  could  not  hope  for  the  support  of  the 
capital  if  it  should  offer  resistance.  The  example  of 
the  Magyars  was  speedily  followed  by  the  Czechs  in 
•Bohemia.  Forgotten  and  obliterated  among  the  nation- 
alities of  Europe,  the  Czechs  had  preserved  in  their 
language,  and  in  that  almost  alone,  the  emblem  of 
their  national  independence.  Within  the  borders  of 
Bohemia  there  was  so  large  a  German  population  that 
the  ultimate  absorption  of  the  Slavic  element  by  this 
wealthier  and  privileged  body  had  at  an  earlier  time 
seemed  not-  unlikely.  Since  1830,  however,  the  Czech 
national  movement  had  been  gradually  gaining  ground. 
In  the  first  days  of  the  agitation  of  1848  an  effort  had 
been  made  to  impress  a  purely  constitutional  form  upon 
the  demands  made  in  the  name  of  the  people  of  Prague, 
and  so  to  render  the  union  of  all  classes  possible.  This 


14  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848- 

policy,  however,  received  its  death-blow  from  the  Revo- 
lution in  Vienna  and  from  the  victory  of  the  Magyars. 
The  leadership  at  Prague  passed  from  men  of  position 
and  experience,  representing  rather  the  intelligence  of 
the  German  element  in  Bohemia  than  the  patriotism  of 
the  Czechs,  to  the  nationalist  orators  who  commanded 
the  streets.  An  attempt  made  by  the  Cabinet  at 
Vienna  to  evade  the  demands  drawn  up  under  the 
influence  of  the  more  moderate  politicians  resulted  only 
in  the  downfall  of  this  party,  and  in  the  tender  of  a  new 
series  of  demands  of  far  more  revolutionary  character. 
The  population  of  Prague  were  beginning  to  organise  a 
national  guard  ;  arms  were  being  distributed  ;  authority 
had  collapsed.  The  Grove  rnment  was  now  forced  to  con- 
Autonomy  sen^  ^°  everything  that  was  asked  of  it,  and  a 
legislative  Assembly  with  an  independent 


t  j 
is* 


local  administration  was  promised  to  Bohemia.  To  this 
Assembly,  as  soon  as  it  should  meet,  the  new  institu- 
tions of  the  kingdom  were  to  be  submitted. 

Thus  far,  if  the  authority  of  the  Court  of  Vienna 
had  been  virtually  shaken  off  by  a  great  part  of  its  sub- 
jects, the  Emperor  had  at  least  not  seen  these  subjects  in 
avowed  rebellion  against  the  House  of  Hapsburg,  nor 
supported  in  their  resistance  by  the  arms  of  a  foreign 
Power.  South  of  the  Alps  the  dynastic  connection  was 
openly  severed,  and  the  rule  of  Austria  declared  for  ever 
at  an  end.  Lombardy  had  since  the  beginning  of  the 
year  1848  been  held  in  check  only  by  the  display  of 
great  military  force.  The  Eevolution  at  Paris  had 
excited  both  hopes  and  fears  ;  the  Revolution  at  Vienna 


1843.  MILAN.  15 

was  instantly  followed  by  revolt  in  Milan.     Eacletzky, 
the   Austrian   commander,   a  veteran    who  had  served 
with  honour  in  every  campaign  since  that 
against  the  Turks  in  1788,  had  long  fore-     Lombwdy, 

March  18. 

seen    the    approach   of  an  armed  conflict ; 
yet  when  the  actual  crisis  arrived  his  dispositions  had 
not  been  made  for  meeting  it.     The  troops  in  Milan 
were  ill  placed ;  the  offices  of  Government  were  more- 
over separated  by  half  the  breadth  of  the  city  from  the 
military  head-quarters.     Thus   when   on   the    18th   of 
March  the  insurrection  broke  out,  it  carried  everything 
before  it.     The  Vice-Governor,  O'Donell,  was  captured, 
and  compelled  to  sign  his  name  to  decrees  handing  over 
the  government  of  the  city  to  the  Municipal  Council. 
Radetzky  now  threw  his  soldiers  upon  the  barricades, 
and  penetrated  to  the  centre  of  the  city ;  but  he  was 
unable  to   maintain  himself  there  under  the  ceaseless 
(fire  from  the  windows  and  the  housetops,  and  withdrew 
on  the  night  of  the  19th  to  the  line  of  fortifications. 
Fighting  continued  during  the  next  two  days  in  the 
outskirts  and  at  the  gates  of  the  city.     The  garrisons  of 
all  the   neighbouring   towns   were    summoned   to   the 
assistance  of  their  general,  but  the  Italians  broke  up 
the  bridges  and  roads,  and  one  detachment  alone  out  of 
all  the  troops  in  Lombardy  succeeded  in  reaching  Milan. 
A   report   now  arrived  at   Eadetzky's   camp   that  the 
King   of  Piedmont   was    on   the    march  against  him, 
Preferring  the  loss  of  Milan  to  the  possible  capture  of 
his  army,  he  determined  to  evacuate  the  city.     On  the 
night  of  the  22nd  of  March  the  retreat  was  begun,  and 


16  MODERN  EUROPE. 


1818. 


Kadetzky  fell  back  upon  the  Mincio  and  Verona,  which 

he  himself  had  made  the  centre  of  the  Austrian  system 

«/ 

of  defence  in  Upper  Italy.* 

Venice  had  already  followed  the  example  of  the 
Lombard  capital.  The  tidings  received  from  Vienna 
after  the  13th  of  March  appear  to  have  completely 
bewildered  both  the  military  and  the  civil  authorities 
insurrection  of  OI1  tne  Adriatic  coast.  They  released 
their  political  prisoners,  among  whom  was 
Daniel  Manin,  an  able  and  determined  foe  of  Austria; 
they  entered  into  constitutional  discussions  with  the 
popular  leaders ;  they  permitted  the  formation  of  a 
national  guard,  and  finally  handed  over  to  this 
guard  the  arsenals  and  the  dockyards  with  all  their 
stores.  From  this  time  all  was  over.  Manin  pro- 
claimed the  Eepublic  of  St.  Mark,  and  became  the  chief 
of  a  Provisional  Government.  The  Italian  regiments 
in  garrison  joined  the  national  cause ;  the  ships  of  war 
at  Pola,  manned  chiefly  by  Italian  sailors,  were  only 
prevented  from  sailing  to  the  assistance  of  the  rebels  by 
batteries  that  were  levelled  against  them  from  the 
shore.  Thus  without  a  blow  being  struck  Venice  was 
lost  to  Austria.  The  insurrection  spread  westwards 
and  northwards  through  city  and  village  in  the  in- 
terior, till  there  remained  to  Austria  nothing  but  the 
fortresses  on  the  Adige  and  the  Mincio,  where  Eadetzky, 
deaf  to  the  counsels  of  timidity,  held  his  ground 

*  Casati,  Nuove  Rivelazioni,  ii.  72.  Schonhals,  Campagnes  d'ltalie 
de  1848  et  1849,  p.  72.  Cattaneo,  Insurrezione  di  Milano,  p.  29.  Parl. 
Pap.  1849,  Ivii.  (2)  210,  333.  Schneidawind,  Feldzug  in  1848,  i.  30. 


I3t8.  PIEDMONT  MAKES   WAR.  17 

unshaken.  The  national  rising  carried  Piedmont  with  it. 
It  was  in  vain  that  the  British  envoy  at  Turin  urged 
the  Kincr  to  enter  into  no  conflict  with 

Piedmont  makes 


war. 


Austria.     On  the   24th  of  March   Charles 

Albert  published  a  proclamation  promising  his  help  to 

the    Lombards.      Two    days    later   his   troops    entered 

Milan.* 

Austria  had  for  thirty  years  consistently  laid  down 
the  principle  that  its  own  sovereignty  in  Upper  Italy 
vested  it  with  the  right  to  control  the  poli- 

General  war 

tical  system   of  every  other   State  in  the 


I  till  y 

peninsula.  It  had  twice  enforced  this  prin- 
ciple by  arms  :  first  in  its  intervention  in  Naples  in 
1820,  afterwards  in  its  occupation  of  the  Roman  States 
in  1831.  The  Government  of  Vienna  had,  as  it  were 
with  fixed  intention,  made  it  impossible  that  its  pre- 
sence in  any  part  of  Italy  should  be  regarded  as  the 
•  presence  of  an  ordinary  neighbour,  entitled  to  quiet 
possession  until  some  new  provocation  should  be  given. 
The  Italians  would  have  proved  themselves  the  simplest 
of  mankind  if,  having  any  reasonable  hope  of  military 
success,  they  had  listened  to  the  counsels  of  Palmerston 
and  other  statesmen  who  urged  them  not  to  take 
advantage  of  the  difficulties  in  which  Austria  was  now 
placed.  The  paralysis  of  the  Austrian  State  was 
indeed  the  one  unanswerable  argument  for  immediate 
war.  So  long  as  the  Emperor  retained  his  ascendency 

*  Manin,  Documents  laisses,  i.  106.  Perlbach,  Manin,  p.  14.  Con- 
tarini,  Memoriale  Yeneto,  p.  10.  Rovani,  Manin,  p.  25.  Parliamentary 
Papers,  1849,  Ivii.  (2)  267. 

C 


18  MODERN  EUROPE. 


1848. 


in  any  part  of  Italy,  his  interests  could  not  permanently 
suffer  the  independence  of  the  rest.  If  the  Italians 
should  chivalrously  wait  until  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna 
had  recovered  its  strength,  it  was  quite  certain  that 
their  next  efforts  in  the  cause  of  internal  liberty  would 
be  as  ruthlessly  crushed  as  their  last.  Every  clear- 
sighted patriot  understood  that  the  time  for  a  great 
national  effort  had  arrived.  In  some  respects  the  poli- 
tical condition  of  Italy  seemed  favourable  to  such  united 
action.  Since  the  insurrection  of  Palermo  in  January, 
1848,  absolutism  had  everywhere  fallen.  Ministries 
had  come  into  existence  containing  at  least  a  fair  pro- 
portion of  men  who  were  in  real  sympathy  with  the 
national  feeling.  Above  all,  the  Pope  seemed  disposed 
to  place  himself  at  the  head  of  a  patriotic  union  against 
the  foreigner.  Thus,  whatever  might  be  the  secret  x 
inclinations  of  the  reigning  Houses,  they  were  unable 
for  the  moment  to  resist  the  call  to  arms.  Without  an 
actual  declaration  of  war  troops  were  sent  northwards 
from  Naples,  from  Florence,  and  from  Rome,  to  take 
part,  as  it  was  supposed,  in  the  national  struggle  by  the 
side  of  the  King  of  Piedmont.  Volunteers  thronged  to 
the  standards.  The  Papal  benediction  seemed  for  once 
to  rest  on  the  cause  of  manhood  and  independence.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  very  impetus  which  had  brought 
Liberal  Ministries  into  power  threatened  to  pass  into  a 
phase  of  violence  and  disorder.  The  concessions  already  I 
made  were  mocked  by  men  who  expected  to  win  all  thef 
victories  of  democracy  in  an  hour.  It  remained  to  be 
seen  whether  there  existed  in  Italy  the  political  sagacity 


1848.  BERLIN.  19 

which,  triumphing  over  all  local  jealousies,  could  bend 
to  one  great  aim  the  passions  of  the  multitude  and  the 
fears  of  the  Courts,  or  whether  the  cause  of  the  whole 
nation  would  be  wrecked  in  an  ignoble  strife  between 
demagogues  and  reactionists,  between  the  rabble  of  the 
street  and  the  camarilla  round  the  throne.* 

Austria  had  with  one  hand  held  down  Italy,  with 
the  other  it  had  weighed  on  Germany.  Though  the 
Revolutionary  movement  was  in  full  course  on  the  east 
of  the  Ehine  before  Metternich's  fall,  it  received,  espe- 
cially at  Berlin,  a  great  impetus  from  this  ^  Marcl}  ^ 
event.  Since  the  beginning  of  March  the 
Prussian  capital  had  worn  an  unwonted  aspect  In  this 
city  of  military  discipline  public  meetings  had  been 
held  day  after  day,  and  the  streets  had  been  blocked  by 
excited  crowds.  Deputations  which  laid  before  the 
King  demands  similar  to  those  now  made  in  every 
German  town  received  halting  and  evasive  answers. 
Excitement  increased,  and  on  the  13th  of  March  en- 
counters began  between  the  citizens  and  the  troops, 
which,  though  insignificant,  served  to  exasperate  »the 
people  and  its  leaders.  The  King  appeared  to  be 
wavering  between  resistance  and  concession  until,  the 
Revolution  at  Vienna,  which  became  known  at  Berlin 
on  the  15th  of  March,  brought  affairs  to  their  crisis. 
On  the  17th  the  tumult  in  the  streets  suddenly  ceased; 
it  was  understood  that  the  following  day  would  see  the 
Government  either  reconciled  with  the  people  or  forced 

*  Bianchi,  Diplomazia  Europea,  v.  183.     Fariui,  Stato  Romano,  ii.  16. 
Parl.  Papers,  1849,  Ivii.  285,  297,  319.     Pasolini,  Memorie,  p.  91. 

C    2 


20  MODERN  EUROPE. 


1818. 


to  deal  with  an  insurrection  on  a  great  scale.  Accord- 
ingly on  the  morning  of  the  18th  crowds  made  their 
way  towards  the  palace,  which  was  surrounded  by 
troops.  About  midday  there  appeared  a  Royal  edict 
summoning  the  Prussian  United  Diet  for  the  2nd  of 
April,  and  announcing  that  the  King  had  determined 
to  promote  the  creation  of  a  Parliament  for  all  Ger- 
many and  the  establishment  of  Constitutional  Govern- 
ment in  every  German  State.  This  manifesto  drew 
fresh  masses  towards  the  palace,  desirous,  it  would  seem, 
to  express  their  satisfaction;  its  contents,  however,  were 
imperfectly  understood  by  the  assembly  already  in  front 
of  the  palace,  which  the  King  vainly  attempted  to 
address.  When  called  upon  to  disperse,  the  multitude 
refused  to  do  so,  and  answered  by  cries  for  the  with- 
drawal of  the  soldiery.  In  the  midst  of  the  confusion 
two  shots  were  fired  from  the  ranks  without  orders ;  a 
panic  followed,  in  which,  for  no  known  reason,  the 
cavalry  and  infantry  threw  themselves  upon  the  people. 
The  crowd  was  immediately  put  to  flight,  but  the 
combat  was  taken  up  b}-  the  population  of  Berlin. 
Barricades  appeared  in  the  streets ;  fighting  continued 
during  the  evening  and  night.  Meanwhile  the  King, 
who  was  shocked  and  distressed  at  the  course  that 
events  had  taken,  received  deputations  begging  that 
the  troops  might  be  withdrawn  from  the  city.  Frederick 
William  endeavoured  for  a  while  to  make  the  surrender 
of  the  barricades  the  condition  for  an  armistice ;  but  as 
night  went  on  the  troops  became  exhausted,  and 
although  they  had  gained  ground,  the  resistance  of  the 


1849.  BERLIN.  21 

people  was  not  overcome.  Whether  doubtful  of  the 
ultimate  issue  of  the  conflict  or  unwilling  to  permit 
further  bloodshed,  the  King  gave  way,  and  at  daybreak 
on  the  19th  ordered  the  troops  to  be  withdrawn.  His 
intention  was  that  they  should  continue  to  garrison  the 
palace,  but  the  order  was  misunderstood,  and  the  troops 
were  removed  to  the  outside  of  Berlin.  The  palace 
was  thus  left  unprotected,  and,  although  no  injury  was 
inflicted  upon  its  inmates,  the  King  was  made  to  feel 
that  the  people  could  now  command  his  homage.  The 
bodies  of  the  dead  were  brought  into  the  court  of  the 
palace ;  their  wounds  were  laid  bare,  and  the  King, 
who  appeared  in  a  balcony,  was  .compelled  to  descend 
into  the  court,  and  to  stand  before  them  with  uncovered 
head.  Definite  political  expression  was  given  to  the 
changed  state  of  affairs  by  the  appointment  of  a  new 
Ministry.* 

The  conflict  between  the  troops  and  the  people  at 
Berlin  was  described,  and  with  truth,  as  the  result  of  a 
misunderstanding.  Frederick  William  had  already  de- 
termined to  yield  to  the  principal  demands  of  his 
subjects ;  nor  on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  Berlin 
had  there  existed  any  general  hostility  towards  the 
sovereign,  although  a  small  group  of  agitators,  in  part 
foreign,  had  probably  sought  to  bring  about  an  armed 
attack  on  the  throne.  Accordingly,  when  once  the 


*  Die  Berliner  Marz-Revolution,  p.  55.  Ausfiihrliche  Beschreibung, 
p.  3.  Amtliche  Berichte,  p.  16.  Stahr,  Preussische  Revolution,  i.  91.  S. 
Stern,  Geschichte  des  Deutschen  Yolkes,  p.  58.  Stern  was  an  eye-witness 
at  Berlin,  though  not  generally  a  good  authoiity. 


22  '  MODERN  EUROPE.  is«. 

combat  was  broken  off,  there  seemed  to  be  no  important 
obstacle  to  a  reconciliation  between  the  King  and  the 
people.  Frederick  William  chose  a  course  which  spared 
and  even  gratified  his  own  self-love.  In  the  political 
faith  of  all  German  Liberals  the  establishment  of 
German  unity  was  now  an  even  more  important  article 
than  the  introduction  of  free  institutions  into  each 
particular  State.  The  Ee volution  at  Berlin  had  indeed 
been  occasioned  by  the  King's  delay  in  granting  internal 
reform;  but  these  domestic  disputes  might  well  be  for- 
gotten if  in  the  great  cause  of  German  unity  the 
Prussians  saw  their  King  rising  to  the  needs  of  the 
hour.  Accordingly  the  first  resolution  of  Frederick 
William,  after  quiet  had  returned  to  the  capital,  was  to 
appear  in  public  state  as  the  champion  of  the  Father- 
land. A  proclamation  announced  on  the  morning  of 
the  21st  of  March  that  the  King  had  placed  himself  at 
the  head  of  the  German  nation,  and  that  he  would  on 
that  day  appear  on  horseback  wearing  the  old  German 
colours.  In  due  time  Frederick  William  came  forth  at 
the  head  of  a  procession,  wearing  the  tricolor  of  gold, 
white,  and  black,  which  since  1815  had  been  so  dear 
to  the  patriots  and  so  odious  to  the  Governments  of 
Germany.  As  he  passed  through  the  streets  he  was 
saluted  as  Emperor,  but  he  repudiated  the  title,  assert- 
ing with  oaths  and  imprecations  that  he  intended  to 
rob  no  German  prince  of  his  sovereignty.  At  each 
stage  of  his  theatrical  progress  he  repeated  to  appro- 
priate auditors  his  sounding  but  ambiguous  allusions 
to  the  duties  imposed  upon  him  by  the  common  danger. 


1848.  FREDERICK  WILLIAM  IV.  23 

A  manifesto,  published  at  the  close  of  the  day,  summed 
up  the  utterances  of  the  monarch  in  a  somewhat  less 
rhetorical  form.  "  Germany  is  in  ferment  within,  and 
exposed  from  without  to  danger  from  more  than  one 
side.  Deliverance  from  this  danger  can  come  only  from 
the  most  intimate  union  of  the  Grerman  princes  and 
people  under  a  single  leadership.  I  take  this  leadership 
upon  me  for  the  hour  of  peril.  I  have  to-day  assumed 
the  old  German  colours,  and  placed  myself  and  my 
people  under  the  venerable  banner  of  the  German 
Empire.  Prussia  henceforth  is  merged  in  Germany." 

The  ride  of  the  King  through  Berlin,  and  his 
assumption  of  the  character  of  German  leader,  however 
little  it  pleased  the  minor  sovereigns,  or  gratified  the 
Liberals  of  the  smaller  States,  who  con-  National^8em. 
sidered  that  such  authority  ought  to  be 
conferred  by  the  nation,  not  assumed  by  a  prince,  was 
,  successful  for  the  moment  in  restoring  to  the  King 
some  popularity  among  his  own  subjects.  He  could 
now  without  humiliation  proceed  with  the  concessions 
which  had  been  interrupted  by  the  tragical  events  of 
the  18th  of  March.  In  answer  to  a  deputation  from 
Breslau,  which  urged  that  the  Chamber  formed  by  the 
union  of  the  Provincial  Diets  should  be  replaced  by  a 
Constituent  Assembly,  the  King  promised  that  a 
national  Eepresentative  Assembly  should  be  convoked 
as  soon  as  the  United  Diet  had  passed  the  necessary 

*  "  Preusseu  gelit  fortan  in  Dentschland  auf."  Reden  Friedrich 
Wilhelins,  p.  9.  In  conversation  with  Bassermann  Frederick  William  at 
a  later  time  described  his  ride  through  Berlin  as  "  a  comedy  which  he 
had  been  made  to  play."  The  bombast  at  any  rate  was  all  his  own. 


24  MODERN  EUROPE.  isw. 

electoral  law.  To  this  National  Assembly  the  Govern- 
ment would  submit  measures  securing  the  liberty  of  the 
individual,  the  right  of  public  meeting  and  of  associa- 
tions, trial  by  jury,  the  responsibility  of  Ministers,  and 
the  independence  of  the  judicature.  A  civic  militia  was" 
to  be  formed,  with  the  right  of  choosing  its  own 
officers,,  and  the  standing  army  was  to  take  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  Constitution.  Hereditary  jurisdictions 
and  manorial  rights  of  police  were  to  be  abolished  ; 
equality  before  the  law  was  to  be  universally  enforced  ; 
in  short  the  entire  scheme  of  reforms  demanded  by  the 
Constitutional  Liberals  of  Prussia  was  to  be  carried 
into  effect.  In  Berlin,  as  in  every  other  capital  in  Ger- 
many, the  victory  of  the  party  of  progress  now  seemed 
to  be  assured.  The  Government  no  longer  represented 
a  power  hostile  to  popular  rights  ;  and  when,  on  the 
22nd  of  March,  the  King  spontaneously  paid  the  last 
honours  to  those  who  had  fallen  in  combat  with  his 
troops,  as  the  long  funeral  procession  passed  his  palace, 
it  was  generally  believed  that  his  expression  of  feeling 
was  sincere^ 

In  the  passage  of  his  address  in  which  King  Fre- 
derick William  spoke  of  the  external  dangers  threaten- 
ing Germany,  he  referred  to  apprehensions  which  had 
for  a  while  been  current  that  the  second  French  Repub- 
lic would  revive  the  aggressive  energy  of  the  first.  This 
fear  proved  baseless ;  nevertheless,  for  a  sovereign  who 
really  intended  to  act  as  the  champion  of  the  German 
nation  at  large,  the  probability  of  war  with  a  neigh- 
bouring Power  was  far  from  remote.  The  cause  of  the 


SCHLESWIG-UOLSTEIN.  25 

.  Duchies  of  Schleswig-Holsteiu,  which  were  in  rebellion 
'against  the  Danish  Crown,  excited  the  utmost  interest 
and  sympathy  in  Germany.  The  popula-  gchles™g. 
tion  of  these  provinces,  with  the  exception 
of  certain  districts  in  Schleswig,  was  German ;  Holstein 
was  actually  a  member  of  the  German  Federation.  The 
legal  relation  of  the  Duchies  to  Denmark  was,  according 
to  the  popular  view,  very  nearly  that  of  Hanover  to 
England  before  1837.  The  King  of  Denmark  was  also 
Duke  of  Schleswig  and  of  Holstein,  but  these  were  no 
more  an  integral  portion  of  the  Danish  State  than 
Hanover  was  of  the  British  Empire ;  and  the  laws  of 
succession  were  moreover  different,  in  Schleswig- Holstein 
the  Crown  being  transmitted  by  males,  while  in  Denmark 
females  were  capable  of  succession.  On  the  part  of  the 
Danes  it  was  admitted  that  in  certain  districts  in 
Holstein  the  Salic  law  held  good ;  it  was,  however, 
.maintained  that  in  the  remainder  of  Holstein  and  in  all 
Schleswig  the  rules  of  succession  were  the  same  as  in 
Denmark.  The  Danish  Government  denied  that  Schles- 
wig-Holstein  formed  a  unity  in  itself,  as  alleged  by  the 
Germans,  and  that  it  possessed  separate  national  rights 
as  against  the  authority  of  the  King's  Government  at 
Copenhagen.  The  real  heart  of  the  difficulty  lay  in  the 
fact  that  the  population  of  the  Duchies  was  German. 
So  long  as  the  Germans  as  a  race  possessed  no  national 
feeling,  the  union  of  the  Duchies  with  the  Danish 
Monarchy  had  not  been  felt  as  a  grievance.  It  hap- 
pened, however,  that  the  great  revival  of  German 
patriotism  resulting  from  the  War  of  Liberation  in 


26  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

1813   was  almost  simultaneous  with  the  severance  of 
Norway  from  the  Danish  Crown,  which  compelled  the 
Government  of  Copenhagen  to  increase  very  heavily  the 
burdens  imposed  on  its  German  subjects  in  the  Duchies. 
From  this  time  discomtent  gained  ground,  especially  in 
Altona   and   Kiel,    where    society    was    as    thoroughly 
German    as    in    the    neighbouring    city    of    Hamburg. 
After  1830,  when  Provincial  Estates  were  established 
in    Schleswig   and    Holstein,    the    German    movement 
became    formidable.       The    reaction,    however,    which 
marked    the    succeeding   period   generally   in    Europe 
prevailed  in  Denmark  too,  and  it  was  not  until  1844, 
when  a  posthumous  work  of  Lornsen,  the  exiled  leader 
of   the  German  party,  vindicated  the  historical  rights 
of  the  Duchies,  that  the  claims  of  German  nationality 
in  these  provinces  were  again  vigorously  urged.      From 
this  time   the   separation   of    Schleswig- Hoi  stein    from 
Denmark  became  a  question  of  practical   politics.     The 
King  of  Denmark,  Christian  VIII.,  had  but  one  son, 
who,    though    long    married,    was    childless,    and  with 
whom    the    male   line    of   the    reigning   House    would 
expire.     In  answer  to  an  address  of  the  Danish  Pro- 
vincial Estates  calling  upon  the  King  to  declare  the 
unity  of  the  Monarchy  and  the  validity  of  the  Danish 
law  of  succession  for  all  its  parts,  the  Holstein  Estates 
passed  a  resolution  in  November,  1844,  that  the  Duchies 
were  an  independent  body,  governed  by  the  rule  of  male 
descent,  and  indivisible.     After  an  interval  of  two  years, 
during  which  a  Commission  examined  the  succession- 
laws,  King  Christian  published  a  declaration  that  the 


1848.  SCHLES WIG-HOLS TEIN.  27 

succession  was  the  same  in  Schleswig  as  in  Denmark 
proper,  and  that,  as  regarded  those  parts  of  Holstein 
where  a  different  rule  of  succession  existed,  he  would 
spare  no  effort  to  maintain  the  unity  of  the  Monarchy. 
On  this  the  Provincial  Estates  both  of  Schleswig  and  of 
Holstein  addressed  protests  to  the  King,  who  refused  to 
accept  them.  The  deputies  now  resigned  in  a  mass, 
whilst  on  behalf  of  Holstein  an  appeal  was  made  to  the 
German  Federal  Diet.  The  Diet  merely  replied  by  a 
declaration  of  rights;  but  in  Germany  at  large  the 
keenest  interest  was  aroused  on  behalf  of  these  severed 
members  of  the  race  who  were  so  resolutely  struggling 
against  incorporation  with  a  foreign  Power.  The 
deputies  themselves,  passing  from  village  to  village, 
excited  a  strenuous  spirit  of  resistance  throughout  the 
Duchies,  which  was  met  by  the  Danish  Government 
with  measures  of  repression  more  severe  than  any  which 
it  had  hitherto  employed.* 

Such  was  the  situation  of  affairs  when,  on  the  20th 
of  January,  1848,  King  Christian  VIII.  died,  leaving 
the  throne  to  Frederick  VII ,   the  last  of 
the  male   line   of  his    House.     Frederick's     Hoistem, 

March  24. 

first  act  was  to  publish  the  draft  of  a  Con- 
stitution, in   which  all  parts    of  the    Monarchy   were 
treated  as  on  the  same  footing.     Before  the  delegates 
could    assemble     to     whom    the    completion    of    this 
work  was  referred,  the  shock  of  the  Paris  Eevolution 

*  Droysen  und  Samwer,  Schleswig-Holstein,  p.  220.  Bunsen,  Memoir 
on  Schleswig-Holstein,  p.  25.  Schleswig-Holstein,  Uebersichtliche  Dar- 
etellung,  p.  51.  On  the  other  side,  N"oten  zur  Beleuchtung,  p.  12. 


23  MODERN  EUROPE.  MKS. 

reached  the  North  Sea  ports.  A  public  meeting  at 
Altona  demanded  the  establishment  of  a  separate  con- 
stitution for  Schleswig-Holstein,  and  the  admission  of 
Schleswig  into  the  German  Federation.  The  Pro- 
vincial Estates  accepted  this  resolution,  and  sent  a 
deputation  to  Copenhagen  to  present  this  and  other 
demands  to  the  King.  But  in  the  course  of  the  next 
few  days  a  popular  movement  at  Copenhagen  brought 
into  power  a  thoroughly  Danish  Ministry,  pledged  to  the 
incorporation  of  Schleswig  with  Denmark  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  Kingdom.  Without  waiting  to  learn  the 
answer  made  by  the  King  to  the  deputation,  the  Hol- 
steiners  now  took  affairs  into  their  own  hands.  A 
Provisional  Government  was  formed  at  Kiel  (March 
24),  the  troops  joined  the  people,  and  the  insurrection 
instantly  spread  over  the  whole  province.  As  the 
proposal  to  change  the  law  of  succession  to  the  throne 
had  originated  with  the  King  of  Denmark,  the  cause 
of  the  Holsteiners  was  from  one  point  of  view  that  of 
established  right.  The  King  of  Prussia,  accepting  the 
positions  laid  down  by  the  Holstein  Estates  in  1844, 
declared  that  he  would  defend  the  claims  of  the  legiti- 
mate heir  by  force  of  arms,  and  ordered  his  troops  to 
enter  Holstein.  The  Diet  of  Frankfort,  now  forced  to 
express  the  universal  will  of  Germany,  demanded  that 
Schleswig,  as  the  sister  State  of  Holstein, 
Germany  and  should  enter  the  Federation.  On  the  pass- 

Denmark. 

ing  of  this  resolution,  the  envoy  who  re- 
presented the  King  of  Denmark  at  the  Diet,  as  Duke 
of  Holstein,  quitted  Frankfort,  and  a  state  of  war 


IBIS.  THE  ANTE-PARLIAMENT.  29 

ensued  between  Denmark  on  the  one  side  and  Prussia 
with  the  German  Federation  on  the  other. 

The  passionate  impulse  of  the  German  people  to- 
wards unity  had  already  called  into  being  an  organ  for 
the  expression  of  national  sentiment,  which,  if  without 
any  Wai  or  constitutional  authority,  was 

J  J '  The  German 

yet  strong  enough  to  impose  its  will  upon  ment,PMarch 
the  old  and  discredited  Federal  Diet  and 
upon  most  of  the  surviving  Governments.  At  the 
invitation  of  a  Committee,  about  five  hundred  Liberals 
who  had  in  one  form  or  another  taken  part  in  public 
affairs  assembled  at  Frankfort  on  the  30th  of  March  to 
make  the  necessary  preparations  for  the  meeting  of  a 
German  national  Parliament.  This  Assembly,  which 
is  known  as  the  Ante-Parliament,  sat  but  for  five  da}rs. 
Its  resolutions,  so  far  as  regarded  the  method  of  electing 
the  new  Parliament,  and  the  inclusion  of  new  districts  in 
the  German  Federation,  were  accepted  by  the  Diet,  and 
in  the  main  carried  into  effect.  Its  denunciation  of 
persons  concerned  in  the  repressive  measures  of  1819 
and  subsequent  reactionary  epochs  was  followed  by  the 
immediate  retirement  of  all  members  of  the  .Diet  whose 
careers  dated  back  to  those  detested  days.  But  in  the 
most  important  work  that  was  expected  from  the  Ante- 
Parliament,  the  settlement  of  a  draft-Constitution  to  be 
laid  before  the  future  National  Assembly  as  a  basis  for 
its  deliberations,  nothing  whatever  was  accomplished. 
The  debates  that  took  place  from  the  31st  of  March  to 
the  4th  of  April  were  little  more  than  a  trial  of  strength 
between  the  Monarchical  and  Eepublican  parties.  The- 


30  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

Republicans,  far  outnumbered  when  they  submitted  a 
constitutional  scheme  of  their  own,  proposed,  after  this 
repulse,  that  the  existing  Assembly  should  continue  in 
session  until  the  National  Parliament  met ;  in  other 
words,  that  it  should  take  upon  itself  the  functions  and 
character  of  a  National  Convention.  Defeated  also  on 
this  proposal,  the. leaders  of  the  extreme  section  of  the 
Republican  party,  strangely  miscalculating  their  real 
strength,  determined  on  armed  insurrection.  Uniting 
with  a  body  of  German  refugees  beyond  the  Rhine,  who 
were  themselves  assisted  by  French  and  Polish  soldiers 
of  revolution,  they  raised  the  Republican 

.Republican  •/ 

standard    in    Baden,   and   for    a   few    days 
maintained  a  hopeless  and  inglorious  struggle  against 
the  troops  which  were  sent  to  suppress  them.     Even  in 
Baden,  which  had  long  been  in  advance  of   all  other 
German  States  in  democratic  sentiment,  and  which  was 
peculiarly  open  to  Republican   influences  from  France 
and  Switzerland,  the  movement  was  not  seriously  sup- 
ported  by   the    population,  and   in   the    remainder    of 
Germany  it  received  no  countenance  whatever.     The 
leaders    found  themselves  ruined   men.      The    best    of 
them    fled  to  the  United  States,  where,  in  the  great 
.struggle  against  slavery  thirteen  years  later,  they  ren- 
dered better  service  to  their  adopted  than  they  had  ever 
rendered  to  their  natural  Fatherland. 

On  breaking  up  on  the  4th  of  April,  the  Ante-Par- 
liament left  behind  it  a  Committee  of  Fifty,  whose  task 
it  was  to  continue  the  work  of  preparation  for  the 
National  Assembly  to  which  it  had  itself  contributed  so 


1848.  GERMAN  NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY.  31 

little.     One  thing  alone  had  been  clearly  established, 
that  the  future   Constitution   of  Germany 

Meeting  of  the 

was  not  to  be  Republican.  That  the  §3££iA«m. 
existing  Governments  could  not  be  safely 
ignored  by  the  National  Assembly  Jn  its  work  of 
founding  the  new  Federal  Constitution  for  Germany 
was  clear  to  those  who  were  not  blinded  by  the  enthu- 
siasm of  the  moment.  In  the  Committee  of  Fifty  and 
elsewhere  plans  were  suggested  for  giving  to  the 
Governments  a  representation  within  the  Constituent 
Assembly,  or  for  uniting  their  representatives  in  a 
Chamber  co-ordinate  with  this,  so  that  each  step  in  the 
construction  of  the  new  Federal  order  should  be  at  once 
the  work  of  the  nation  and  of  the  Governments.  Such 
plans  were  suggested  and  discussed ;  but  in  the  haste 
and  inexperience  of  the  time  they  were  brought  to  no 
conclusion.  The  opening  of  the  National  Assembly 
liad  been  fixed  for  the  18th  of  May,  and  this  brief 
interval  had  expired  before  the  few  sagacious  men  who 
understood  the  necessity  of  co-operation  between  the 
Governments  and  the  Parliament  had  decided  upon  any 
s  common  course  of  action.  To  the  mass  of  patriots  it- 
was  enough  that  Germany,  after  thirty  years  of  disap- 
pointment, had  at  last  won  its  national  representation. 
Before  this  imposing  image  of  the  united  race,  Kings, 
Courts,  and  armies,  it  was  fondly  thought,  must  bow. 
Thus,  in  the  midst  of  universal  hope,  the  elections  were 
held  throughout  Germany  in  its  utmost  federal  extent, 
from  the  Baltic  to  the  Italian  border ;  Bohemia  alone, 
where  the  Czech  majority  resisted  any  closer  union  with 


32  MODERN  EUROPE.-  iw. 

Germany,  declining  to  send  representatives  to  Frankfort. 
In  the  body  of  deputies  elected  there  were  to  be  found 
almost  all   the    foremost    Liberal    politicians    of   every 
German  community ;  a  few  still  vigorous  champions  of 
the  time  of  the  War  of  Liberation,  chief  among  them 
the  poet  Arndt;  patriots  who  in  the  evil    days    that 
followed   had    suffered    imprisonment   and    exile;    his- 
torians, professors,   critics,  who  in  the  sacred  cause  of 
liberty  have,  like  Gervinus,  inflicted  upon  their  readers 
worse  miseries  than  ever  they  themselves  endured  at  the 
hands  of  unregenerate  kings ;  theologians,  journalists ; 
in    short,    the    whole   group    of    leaders    under   whom 
Germany  expected  to  enter  into  the  promised  land  of 
national  unity  and  freedom.     No  Imperial  coronation 
ever  brought  to  Frankfort  so  many  honoured  guests,  or 
attracted   to    the    same    degree   the    sympathy    of   the 
German  race.     Greeted  with  the  cheers  of  the  citizens 
of  Frankfort,  whose  civic  militia  lined  the  streets,  the 
members  of  the  Assembly  marched  in  procession  on  the 
afternoon  of  the   18th  of  May  from  the  ancient  ban- 
queting-hall  of  the  Kaisers,  where  they  had  gathered, 
to  the  Church  of  St.  Paul,  which  had  been   chosen  as 
their  Senate  House.     Their  President  and  officers  were 
elected  on  the  following  day.    Arndt,  who  in  the  frantic 
confusion  of  the  first  meeting  had   been  unrecognised 
and  shouted  down,   was  called   into  the  Tribune,  but 
could  speak  only  a  few  words  for  tears.     The  Assembly 
voted  him   its  thanks  for  his  famous  song,  "What  is 
the    German's    Fatherland  ? "    and    requested   that  he 
would   add   to   it   another  stanza   commemorating  the 


1818.  PRUSSIAN  NATIONAL  PARLIAMENT.  33 

union  of  the  race  at  length  visibly  realised  in  that  great 
Parliament.  Four  days  after  the  opening  of  the  General 
Assembly  of  Frankfort,  the  Prussian  national  Parlia- 
ment began  its  sessions  at  Berlin.* 

At  this  point  the    first  act  in  the    Revolutionary 
drama  of   1848   in  Germany,   as  in  Europe  generally, 
may  be  considered  to  have  reached  its  close. 
A  certain  unity  marks  the  memorable  epoch       any  m March, 

J  1848. 

known  generally  as  the  March  Days  and 
the  events  immediately  succeeding.  E/e volution  i$ 
universal;  it  scarcely  meets  with  resistance;  its  views 
seem  on  the  point  of  being  achieved  ;  the  baffled  aspira- 
tions of  the  last  half- century  seem  on  the  point  of 
being  fulfilled.  There  exists  no  longer  in  Central 
Europe  such  a  thing  as  an  autocratic  Government;  and, 
while  the  French  Eepublic  maintains  an  unexpected 
attitude  of  peace,  Germany  and  Italy,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  old  dynasties  now  penetrated  with  a  new  spirit, 
appear  to  be  on  the  point  of  achieving  each  its  own 
work  of  Federal  union  and  of  the  expulsion  of  the 
foreigner  from  its  national  soil.  All  Italy  prepares 
to  move  under  Charles  Albert  to  force  the  Austrians 
from  their  last  strongholds  on  the  Mincio  and  the 
Adige ;  all  Germany  is  with  the  troops  of  Frederick 
William  of  Prussia  as  they  enter  Holstein  to  rescue 
this  and  the  neighbouring  German  province  from  the 
Dane.  In  Radetzky's  camp  alone,  and  at  the  Court  of 
St.  Petersburg,  the  old  monarchical  order  of  Europe 

*  Yerhandlungen    de^    National-versarnmlung,   i.   25.     Biederinann 
Dreissig  Jahre,  i.  278.     Radowitz,  Werke,  ii.  36. 

D 


.31  MODERN  EUROPE.  isis. 

still  survives.  How  powerful  were  these  two  isolated 
centres  of  anti-popular  energy  the  world  was  soon  to 
see.  Yet  they  would  not  have  turned  back  the  tide  of 
European  affairs  and  given  one  more  victory  to  reac- 
tion had  they  not  had  their  allies  in  the  hatred  of 
race  to  race,  in  the  incapacity  and  the  errors  of  peoples 
and  those  who  represented  them ;  above  all,  in  the 
enormous  difficulties  which,  even  had  the  generation 
been  one  of  sages  and  martyrs,  the  political  circum- 
stances of  the  time  would  in  themselves  have  opposed 
to  the  accomplishment  of  the  ends  desired. 
^  France  had  given  to  Central  Europe  the  signal  for 
the  Ee volution  of  1848,  and  it  was  in  France,  where 
the  conflict  was  not  one  for  national  independence  but 
for  political  and  social  interests,  that  the  Eevolution 
most  rapidly  ran  its  course  and  first  exhausted  its 
powers.  On  the  flight  of  Louis  Philippe  authority 
had  been  entrusted  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
to  a  Provisional  Government,  whose  most  prominent 
member  was  the  orator  and  •  poet  Lamartine.  Installed 
at  the  Hotel  de  Ville,  this  Government  had 

The  French 

Provisional       with    dimculty   prevented    the    mob    from 

Government.  •       * 

substituting  the  Eed  Flag  for  the  Tricolor, 
and  from  proceeding  at  once  to  realise  the  plans  of  its 
own  leaders.  The  majority  of  the  Provisional  Grovern- 
ment were  Eepublicans  of  a  moderate  type,  representing 
the  ideas  of  the  urban  middle  classes  rather  than 
of  the  workmen  ;  but  by  their  side  were  Ledru 
a  rhetorician  dominated  by  the  phrases  of  1793,  and 
Louis  Blanc,  who  considered  all  political  change 


/IwT  PARIS.  35 

as  but  an  instrument   for  advancing  the  organisation 

1  of  labour  and  for  the  emancipation  of  the  artisan  from 

[servitude,  by  the  establishment  of  State-directed  indus- 

/tries   affording  appropriate  employment   and  adequate 

(  remuneration  to  all.     Among  the  first  proclamations  of 

the- -Provisional    Government   was    one*  in    which,    in 

answer  to  a  petition  demanding  the  recognition  of  the 

to  guarantee  employ- 
This  engagement,  the  heaviest 

perhaps  that  was  ever  voluntarily  assumed  by  any 
Government,  was  followed  in  a  few  days  by  the  opening 
of  national  workshops  ~_  That  in  the  midst  of  a  Revolu- 
tion which  took  all  parties  by  surprise  plans  for  the 
conduct  of  a  series  of  industrial  enterprises  by  the  State 
should  have  been  seriously  examined  was  impossible. 
The  Government  had  paid  homage  to  an  abstract  idea ; 
they  were  without  a  conception  of  the  mode  in  which  it 
was  to  be  realised.  What  articles  were  to  be  made, 
what  works  were  to  be  executed,  no  one  knew.  The 
mere  direction  of  destitute  workmen  to  the  centres/ 
where  they  were  to  be  employed  was  a  task  for  which  a 
new  branch  of  the  administration  had  to  be  created. 
When  this  was  achieved,  the  men  collected  proved 
useless  for  all  purposes  of  industry.  Their  The  National 

i  .  T  I  •  •  •  •      xl  Workshops. 

numbers  increased  enormously,  rising  in  the 
course  of  four  weeks  from  fourteen  to  sixty-five  thousand. 
The  Revolution  had  itself  caused  a  financial  and  com- 
mercial panic,  interrupting  all  the  ordinary  occupations 
of  business,  and  depriving  masses  of  men  of  the  means 
of  earning  a  livelihood.  These,  with  others  who  had 
D  2 


30  MODERN  EUROPE.  1818. 

no  intention  of  working,  thronged  to  the  State  work- 
shops ;  while  the  certainty  of  obtaining  wages  from  the 
public  purse  occasioned  a  series  of  strikes  of  workmen 
against  their  employers  and  the  abandonment  of  private 
factories.  The  checks  which  had  been  intended  to 
confine  enrolment  at  the  public  works  to  persons  already 
domiciled  in  Paris  completely  failed;  from  all  the 
neighbouring  departments  the  idle  and  the  hungry 
streamed  into  the  capital.  Every  abuse  incidental  to  a 
system  of  public  relief  was  present  in  Paris  in  its  most 
exaggerated  form ;  every  element  of  experience,  of 
wisdom,  of  precaution,  was  absent.  If,  instead  of  a 
group  of  benevolent  theorists,  the  experiment  of  1848 
had  had  for  its  authors  a  company  of  millionaires  anxious 
to  dispel  all  hope  that  mankind  might  ever  rise  to  a 
higher  order  than  that  of  unrestricted  competition  of 
man  against  man,  it  could  not  have  been  conducted 
under  more  fatal  conditions.* 

The  leaders  of  the  democracy  in  Paris  had  from  the 

first    considered    that   the    decision    upon  the  form  of 

u  ^  . .     ,     Government  to  be    established   in    Trance 

The  Provisional 

|0eveiie"KneS-  in.  place  of  the  Orleanist  monarchy  be- 
longed rather  to  themselves  than  to  the 
nation  at  large.  They  distrusted,  and  with  good 
reason,  the  results  of  the  General  Election  which,  by 
a  decree  of  the  Provisional  Government,  was  to  be 
held  in  the  course  of  April.  A  circular  issued  by  Ledru 

*  Actes  du  Gouverneinent  Provisoire,  p.  12.  Louis  Blanc,  Revela- 
tions Historiques,  i.  135.  Gamier  Pages,  .Revolution  de  1848,  vi.  108, 
viii.  148.  Emile  Thomas,  Histoire  des  Ateliers  Nationaux,  p.  9J. 


1848.  LEDRU  ROLLIN.  37 

Eollin,  Minister  of  the  Interior,  without  the  knowledge 
of  his  colleagues,  to  the  Commissioners  by  whom  he 
had  replaced  the  Prefects  of  the  Monarchy  gave  the 
first  open  indication  of  this  alarm,  and  of  the  means  of 
violence  and  intimidation  by  which  the  party  which 
Ledru  Eollin  represented  hoped  to  impose  its  will  upon 
the  country.  The  Commissioners  were  informed  in 
plain  language  that,  as  agents  of  a  revolutionary 
authority,  their  powers  were  unlimited,  and  that  their 
task  was  to  exclude  from  election  all  persons  who  were 
not  -animated  by  revolutionary  spirit,  and  pure  from 
any  taint  of  association  with  the  past.  If  the  circular 
had  been  the  work  of  the  Government,  and  not  of  a 
single  member  of  it  who  was  at  variance  with  most  of 
his  colleagues  and  whose  words  were  far  more  formid- 
able than  his  actions,  it  would  have  clearly  foreshadowed 
a  return  to  the  system  of  1793.  But  the  isolation  of 

Ledru  Eoliin  was   well  understood.     The  attitude   of 

« 

the  Government  generally  was  so  little  in  accordance 
with  the  views  of  the  Eed  Eepublicans  that  on  the 
16th  of  April  a  demonstration  was  organised  with  the 
object  of  compelling  them  to  postpone  the  elections. 
The  prompt  appearance  in  arms  of  the  National  Guard, 
which  still  represented  the  middle  classes  of  Paris, 
baffled  the  design  of  the  leaders  of  the  mob,  and  gave 
to  Lamartine  and  the  majority  in  the  Government  a 
decisive  victory  over  their  revolutionary  Elections 
colleague.  The  elections  were  held  at  the 
time  appointed ;  and,  in  spite  of  the  institution  of 
universal  suffrage,  they  resulted  in  the  return  of  a  body 


33  MODERN  EUROPE.  184?. 

of  Deputies  not  widely  different  from  those  who  had 
hitherto  appeared  in  French  Parliaments.  The  great 
majority  were  indeed  Republicans  by  profession,  but  of 
a  moderate  type  ;  and  the  session  had  no  sooner  opened 
than  it  became  clear  that  the  relation  between  the 
Socialist  democracy  of  Paris  and  the  National  Repre- 
sentatives could  only  be  one  of  more  or  less  violent 
antagonism. 

The  first  act  of  the  Assembly,   which  met  on  the 
4th  of  May,  was  to  declare  that  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment had  deserved  well  of  the  country,  and 
Assembly,  to  reinstate  most  of  its  members  in  office 

Hay  4. 

under  the  title  of  an  Executive  Commis- 
sion. Ledru  Rollin's  offences  were  condoned,  as  those 
of  a  man  popular  with  the  democracy,  and  likely  on  the 
whole  to  yield  to  the  influence  of  his  colleagues.  Louis 
Blanc  and  his  confederate,  Albert,  as  really  dangerous 
persons,  were  excluded.  The  Jacobin  leaders  now 
proceeded  to  organise  an  attack  on  the  Assembly  by' 
main  force.  On  the  15th  of  May  the  attempt  was 
made.  Under  pretence  of  tendering  a  peti- 
tion on  behalf  of  Poland,  a  mob  invaded 
the  Legislative  Chamber,  declared  the  Assembly  dis- 
solved, and  put  the  Deputies  to  flight.  But  the 
triumph  was  of  short  duration.  The  National  Guard, 
whose  commander  alone  was  responsible  for  the  failure 
of  measures  of  defence,  soon  rallied  in  force ;  the  leaders 
of  the  insurgents,  some  of  whom  had  installed  them- 
selves as  a  Provisional  Government  at  the  Hotel  de 
Ville,  were  made  captive ;  and  after  an  interval  of  a 


1818.  THE  NATIONAL  WORKSHOPS.  39 

few  hours  the  Assembly  resumed  possession  of  the 
Palais  Bourbon.  The  dishonour  done  to  the  national 
representation  by  the  scandalous  scenes  of  the  15th  of 
May,  as  well  as  the  decisively  proved  superiority  of  the 
National  Guard  over  the  half-armed  mob,  encouraged 
the  Assembly  to  declare  open  war  against  the  so-called 
social  democracy,  and  to  decree  the  abolition 

»  Measures 

of  the  national  workshops.  ?  The  enormous 


growth  of  these  establishments,  which  now 
included  over  a  hundred  thousand  men,  threatened  to 
ruin  the  public  finances  ;  the  demoralisation  which  they 
engendered  seemed  likely  to  destroy  whatever  was  sound 
in  the  life  of  the  working  classes  of  Paris.  Of  honest 
industry  there  was  scarcely  a  trace  to  be  found  among 
the  masses  who  were  receiving  their  daily  wages 
from  the  State.  Whatever  the  sincerity  of  those  who 
had  founded  the  national  workshops,  whatever  the 
anxiety  for  employment  on  the  part  of  those  who  first 
'  resorted  to  them,  they  had  now  become  mere  hives  of 
disorder,  where  the  resources  of  the  State  were  lavished1 
in  Accumulating  a  force  for  its  own  overthrow.  It  was 
necessary,  at  whatever  risk,  to  extinguish  the  evil. 
Plans  for  the  gradual  dispersion  of  the  army  of  work- 
men were  drawn  up  by  Committees  and  discussed  by 
the  Assembly.  If  put  in  force  with  no  more  than  the 
necessary  delay,  these  plans  might  perhaps  have  rendered 
a  peaceful  solution  of  the  difficulty  possible.  But  the 
Government  hesitated,  and  finally,  when  a  decision 
could  no  longer  be  avoided,  determined  upon  measures 
more  violent  and  more  sudden  than  those  which  the 


40  MODERN  EUROPE.  isis. 

Committees  had  recommended.  On  the  21st  of  June 
an  order  was  published  that  all  occupants  of  the  public 
workshops  between  the  ages  of  seventeen  and  twenty- 
five  must  enlist  in  the  army  or  cease  to  receive  support 
from  the  State,  and  that  the  removal  of  the  workmen 
who  had  come  into  Paris  from  the  provinces,  for  which 
preparations  had  already  been  made,  must  be  at  once 
effected.* 

The  publication  of  this  order  was  the  signal  for  an 
appeal  to  arms.  The  legions  of  the  national  workshops 
were  in  themselves  a  half- organised  force  equal  in 
number  to  several  army-corps,  and  now  animated  by 
something  like  the  spirit  of  military  union.  The 
The  Four  Days  revolt,  which  began  on  the  morning  of  the 
23rd  of  June,  was  conducted  as  no  revolt  in 
Paris  had  ever  been  conducted  before.  The  eastern 
part  of  the  city  was  turned  into  a  maze  of  barricades. 
Though  the  insurgents  had  not  artillery,  they  were  in 
other  respects  fairly  armed.  The  terrible  nature  of  the 
conflict  impending  now  became  evident  to  the  Assembly. 
General  Cavaignac,  Minister  of  War,  -was  placed  in 
command,  and  subsequently  invested  with  supreme 
authority,  the  Executive  Commission  resigning  its 
powers.  All  the  troops  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Paris 
were  at  once  summoned  to  the  capital.  Cavaignac  well 
understood  that  any  attempt  to  hold  the  insurrection  in 
check  by  means  of  scattered  posts  would  only  end,  as  in 

*  Barrot,  Memoires,  ii.  103.  Caussidiere,  Memoires,  p.  117.  Gamier 
Pages,  x.  419.  Normanby,  Tear  of  Revolution,  i.  389.  Granier  de 
Cassagnac,  Chute  de  Louis  Philippe,  i.  359.  De  la  Gorce,  Seconde  Re- 
publique,  i.  273.  Falloux,  Memoires,  i.  328. 


184*.  THE  FOUR  DAYS  OF  JUNE.  41 

1830,  by  the  capture  or  the  demoralisation  of  the 
troops.  He  treated  Paris  as  one  great  battle-field  in 
which  the  enemy  must  be  attacked  in  mass  and  driven 
by  main  force  from  all  his  positions.  At  times  the 
effort  appeared  almost  beyond  the  power  of  the  forces 
engaged,  and  the  insurgents,  sheltered  by  huge  barri- 
cades and  firing  from  the  windows  of  houses,  seemed 
likely  to  remain  masters  of  the  field.  The  struggle 
continued  for  four  days,  but  Cavaignac's  artillery  and 
the  discipline  of  his  troops  at  last  crushed  resistance ; 
and  after  the  Archbishop  of  Paris  had  been  mortally 
wounded  in  a  heroic  effort  to  stop  further  bloodshed, 
the  last  bands  of  the  insurgents,  driven  back  into  the 
north-eastern  quarter  of  the  city,  and  there  attacked 
with  artillery  in  front  and  flank,  were  forced  to  lay 
down  their  arms. 

Such  was  the  conflict  of  the  Four  Days  of  June, 
-a  conflict  memorable  as  one  in  which  the  combatants 
fought  not  for  a  political  principle  or  form-  of  Govern-, 
ment,  but  for  the  preservatiojL-Jjr_.th.e  overthrow 
of_society  based  on  the  institution  of  private  pro- 
perty. The  National  Guard,  with  some  exceptions, 
fought  side  by  side  with  the  regiments  of  the  line, 
braved  the  same  perils,  and  sustained  an  equal  loss. 
The  workmen  threw  themselves  the  more  passionately 
into  the  struggle,  inasmuch  as  defeat  threatened  them 
with  deprivation  of  the  very  means  of  life.  On  both 
sides  acts  of  savagery  were  committed  which  the 
fury  of  the  conflict  could  not  excuse.  The  ven- 
geance of  the  conquerors  in  the  moment  of  success 


42  MODERN  EUROPE.  IMS. 

appears,  however,  to  have  been  less  unrelenting  than 
that  which  followed  the  overthrow  of  the  Commune  in 
1871,  though,  after  the  struggle  was  over,  the  Assembly 
had  no  scruple  -in  transporting  without  trial  the  whole 
mass  of  prisoners  taken  with  arms  in  their  hands. 
Cavaignac's  victory  left  the  classes  for  whom  he  had 
Fears  left  by  the  fought  terror- stricken  at  the  peril  from 
which  they  had  escaped,  and  almost  hope- 
less of  their  own  security  under  any  popular  form  of 
Government  in  the  future.  Against  the  rash  and  weak 
concessions  to  popular  demands  that  had  been  made  by 
the  administration  since  February,  especially  in  the 
matter  of  taxation  and  finance,  there  was  now  a  deep, 
if  not  loudly  proclaimed,  reaction.  The  national  work- 
shops disappeared  •  grants  were  made  by  the  Legislature 
for  the  assistance  of  the  masses  who  were  left  without 
resource,  but  the  money  was  bestowed  in  charitable 
relief  or  in  the  form  of  loans  to  associations,  not  as 
wages  from  the  State.  On  every  side  among  the  holders 
of  property  the  cry  was  for  a  return  to  sound  principles 
of  finance  in  the  economy  of  the  State,  and  for  the 
establishment  of  a  strong  central  power. 

General  Cavaignac  after  the  restoration  of  order  had 
laid  down  the  supreme  authority  which  had  been  con- 
ferred on  him,  but  at  the  desire  of  the  Assembly  he 
continued  to  exercise  it  until  the  new  Constitution 
Cavaignac  and  should  be  drawn  up  and  an  Executive  ap- 
ion'  pointed  in  accordance  with  its  provisions. 
Events  had  suddenly  raised  Cavaignac  from  obscurity 
to  eminence,  and  seemed  to  mark  him  out  as  the  future 


1818.  LOUIS  NAPOLEON.  43 

ruler  of    France.      But  he    displayed  during   the   six 
months  following  the  suppression  of  the  revolt  no  great 
capacity  for  government,  and  his  virtues  as  well  as  his 
defects  made  against  his  personal  success.     A  sincere 
Republican,  while  at  the  same  time  a  rigid  upholder  of 
law,    he  refused  to  lend  himself   to  those  who   were, 
except  in  name,  enemies  of  Republicanism  ;  and  in  his 
official  acts  and  utterances  he  spared  the  feelings  of  the 
reactionary  classes  as  little   as  he  would  have  spared 
those   of  rioters   and   Socialists.     As   the    influence   of 
Cavaignac  declined,  another  name  began  to  fill  men's 
thoughts.       Louis   Napoleon,    son    of    the    Emperor's 
brother  Louis,  King   of    Holland,    had  while    still   in 
exile  been  elected  to   the  National  Assembly  by  four 
Departments.     He  was  as  yet  almost  unknown  except 
by  name    to    his   fellow-countrymen.       Born    in    the 
Tuileries  in  1808,  he  had  been  involved  as  a  child  in 
the    ruin  of  the  Empire,  and  had  passed  into  banish- 
ment with  his  mother  Hortense,  under  the   law   that 
expelled    from    France    all    members    of    Napoleon's 
family.     He  had  been  brought  up  at  Augsburg  and  on 
the  shores  of  the  Lake  of  Constance,  and  as  a  volunteer 
in  a  Swiss  camp  of  artillery  he  had  gained  some  little 
acquaintance  with  military  life.     In  1831  he  had  joined 
the    insurgents   in  the   Romagna  who   were    in   arms 
against  the  Papal  Government.     The  death  of  his  own 
elder  brother,  followed  in  1832  by  that  of  Napoleon's 
son,   the  Duke  of  Reichstadt,   made  him  chief  of  the 
house  of  Bonaparte.      Though    far  more  of  a   recluse 
than  a  man  of  action,  though  so  little  of  his  own  nation 


44  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

that  he  could  not  pronounce  a  sentence  of  French  with- 
out a  marked  German  accent,  and  had  never  even  seen 
a  French  play  performed,  he  now  became  possessed  by  the 
fixed  idea  that  he  was  one  day  to  wear  the  French 
Crown.  A  few  obscure  adventurers  attached  themselves 
to  his  fortunes,  and  in  1836  he  appeared  at  Strasburg 
and  presented  himself  to  the  troops  as  Emperor.  The 
enterprise  ended  in  failure  and  ridicule.  Louis  Napo- 
leon was  shipped  to  America  by  the  Orleanist  Govern- 
ment, which  supplied  him  with  money,  and  thought  it 
unnecessary  even  to  bring  him  to  trial.  He  recrossed 
the  Atlantic,  made  his  home  in  England,  and  in  1840 
repeated  at  Boulogne  the  attempt  that  had  failed  at 
Strasburg.  The  result  was  again  disastrous.  He  was 
now  sentenced  to  perpetual  imprisonment,  and  passed 
the  next  six  years  in  captivity  at  Ham,  where  he 
produced  a  treatise  on  the  Napoleonip  Ideas,  and  certain 
fragments  on  political  and  social  questions.  The 
enthusiasm  for  Napoleon,"  of  which  there  had  been  little 
trace  in  France  since  1815,  was  now  reviving;  the 
sufferings  of  the  epoch  of  conquest  were,  forgotten  ;  the 
steady  maintenance  of  peace  by  Louis  Philippe  seemed 
humiliating  to  young  and  ardent  spirits  who  had  not 
known  the  actual  presence  of  the  foreigner.  In  literature 
two  men  of  eminence  worked  powerfully  upon  the 
national  imagination.  The  history  of  Thiers  gave  the 
nation  a  great  stage-picture  of  Napoleon's  exploits ; 
Beranger's  lyrics  invested  his  exile  at  St.  Helena  with 
an  irresistible,  though  spurious,  pathos.  Thus,  little  as 
the  world  concerned  itself  with  the  prisoner  at  Ham, 


18».  LOUIS  NAPOLEON.  45 

the  tendencies  of  the  time  were  working  in  his  favour ; 
and  his  confinement,  which  lasted  six  years  and  was 
terminated  by  his  escape  and  return  to  England,  appears 
to  have  deepened  his  brooding  nature,  and  to  have 
strengthened  rather  than  diminished  his  confidence  in 
himself.  On  the  overthrow  of  Louis  Philippe  he  visited 
Paris,  but  was  requested  by  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, on  the  ground  of  the  unrepealed  law  banishing 
the  Bonaparte  family,  to  quit  the  country.  He  obeyed, 
probably  foreseeing  that  the  difficulties  of  the  Republic 
would  create  better  opportunities  for  his  reappearance. 
Meanwhile  the  group  of  unknown  men  who  sought 
their  fortunes  in  a  Napoleonic  restoration  busily  can- 
vassed and  wrote  on  behalf  of  the  Prince,  and  with 
such  success  that,  in  the  supplementary  elections  that 
were  held  at  the  beginning  of  June,  he  obtained  a  four- 
fold triumph.  The  Assembly,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of 
the  Government,  pronounced  his  return 

Louis  Napoleon 

valid.  Yet  with  rare  self-command  the  but^s£uty' 
Prince  still  adhered  to  his  policy  of  reserve, 
resigning  his  seat  on  the  ground  that  his  election  had 
been  made  a  pretext  for  movements  of  which  he  dis- 
approved, while  at  the  same  time  he  declared  in  his 
letter  to  the  President  of  the  Assembly  that  if  duties 
should  be  imposed  upon  him  by  the  people  he  should 
know  how  to  fulfil  them.* 

From  this  time  Louis  Napoleon  was  a  recognised 
aspirant  to  power.     The  Constitution  of  the  Eepublic 

*  (Euvres  de  Napoleon  III.,  iii.  13,  24.     Granier  de  Cassaguac,  ii.  16. 
Jerrold,  Napoleon  III.,  ii.  393> 


46  MODERN  EUROPE. 


1848. 


was  now  being  drawn  up  by  the  Assembly.  The 
Executive  Commission  had  disappeared  in  the  convul- 
sion of  June ;  Cavaignac  was  holding  the  balance  be- 
tween parties  rather  than  governing  himself.  In  the 
midst  of  the  debates  on  the  Constitution 

Louis  Napoleon        _..___  .  -in 

again  elected,        _Louis  JNapoleon  was  again  returned  to  the 

Sept.  17. 

Assembly  by  the  votes  of  five  Departments. 
He    saw   that   he  ought  to  remain    no  longer  in  the 
background,  and,  accepting  the  call  of  the  electors,  he  took 
his  seat  in  the  Chamber.     It  was  clear  that  he  would 
become  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency  of  the  Eepublic, 
and  that  the  popularity  of  his  name  among  the  masses 
was   enormous.      He  had  twice   presented   himself  to 
France  as  the  heir  to  Napoleon's  throne ;  he  had  never 
directly  abandoned   his    dynastic   claim ;    he    had   but 
recently  declared,  in  almost  threatening  language,  that 
he  should  know  how  to  fulfil  the  duties  that  the  people 
might   impose    upon    him.     Yet  with   all   these   facts 
before  it  the  Assembly,  misled  by  the  puerile  rhetoric 
of  Lamartine,  decided  that  in  the  new  Constitution  the 
President  of  the  Republic,  in  whom  was  vested   the 
executive  power,  should  be  chosen  by  the  direct  vote  of 
all    Frenchmen,    and   rejected  the    amendment    of   M. 
Grevy,  who,  with  real  insight  into  the  future,  declared 
that  such  direct  election  by  the  people  could  only  give 
France  a  Dictator,  and  demanded  that  the   President 
should   be    appointed  not    by  the   masses  but  by  the 
Chamber.    Thus  was  the  way  paved  for  Louis  Napoleon's 
march  to  power.     The  events  of  June  had  dispelled  any 
attraction  that  he  had  hitherto  felt  towards  Socialistic 


ISM.  LOUIS  NAPOLEON,  PRESIDENT.  47 

theories.  He  saw  that  France  required  an  upholder  of 
order  and  of  property.  In  his  address  to  the  nation  an- 
nouncing his  candidature  for  the  Presidency  he  declared 
that  he  would  shrinkfrom  no  sacrifice  in  defending  society, 
so  audaciously  attacked ;  that  he  would  devote  himself 
without  reserve  to  the  maintenance  of  the  Republic,  and 
make  it  his  pride  to  leave  to  his  successor  at  the  end  of 
four  years1  authority  strengthened,  liberty  unimpaired, 
and  real  progress  accomplished.  Behind  these  gener- 
alities the  address  dexterously  touched  on  the  special 
wants  of  classes  and  parties,  and  promised  something  to 
each.  The  French  nation  in  the  election  which  followed 
showed  that  it  believed  in  Louis  Napoleon  even  more 
than  he  did  in  himself.  If  there  existed  in  the  opinion 
of  the  great  mass  any  element  beyond  the  mere  instinct 
of  self-defence  against  real  or  supposed  schemes  of  spolia- 
tion, it  was  reverence  for  Napoleon's  memory.  Out  of 
•seven millionsof  votes  given,  Louis  Napoleon 

,         ,  f,  .  ,  •.  Louis  Napoleon 

received  above  nve,  Cavaignac,  who  alone     elected  Presi- 
dent, Dec.  10. 

entered  into  serious  competition  with  him,  re- 
ceiving about  a  fourth  part  of  that  number.  Lamartine 
x,and  the  men  who  ten  months  before  had  represented  all 
the  hopes  of  the  nation  now  found  but  a  handful  of 
supporters.  Though  none  yet  openly  spoke  of  Monar- 
chy, on  all  sides  there  was  the  desire  for  the  restoration 
of  power.  The  day-dreams  of  the  second  Eepublic 
had  fled.  France  had  shown  that  its  choice  lay  only 
between  a  soldier  who  had  crushed  rebellion  and  a 
stranger  who  brought  no  title  to  its  confidence  but  an 
Imperial  name. 


CHAPTER    II. 

Austria  and  Italy— Vienna  from  March  to  May— Flight  of  the  Emperor- 
Bohemian  National  Movement — Windischgratz  subdues  Prague — Campaign 
around  Verona — Papal  Allocution — Naples  in  May — Negotiations  as  to  Lorn- 
hardy — Reconquest  of  Venetia  — Battle  of  Custozza — The  Austrians  enter 
Milan — Austrian  Court  and  Hungary — The  Serhs  in  Southern  Hungary — 
Serb  Congress  at  Carlowitz — Jellacic — Affairs  of  Croatia — Jellacic,  the 
Court  and  the  Hungarian  Movement — Murder  of  Lamberg — Manifesto  of 
October  3 — Vienna  on  October  6 — The  Emperor  at  Olmiitz— Windischgratz 
conquers  Vienna — The  Parliament  at  Kremsier — Schwarzenberg  Minister — - 
Ferdinand  abdicates — Dissolution  of  the  Kremsier  Parliament — Unitary 
Edict — Hungary — The  Roumanians  in  Transylvania — The  Austrian  Army 
occupies  Pesth  —  Hungarian  Government  at  Debreczin — The  Austrians 
driven  out  of  Hungary — Declaration  of  Hungarian  Independence — Russian 
Intervention — The  Hungarian  Summer  Campaign — Capitulation  of  Vilagos 
— Italy — Murder  of  Rossi — Tuscany — The  March  Campaign  in  Lombardy — 
Novara — Abdication  of  Charles  Albert — Victor  Emmanuel — Restoration  in 
Tuscany — French  Intervention  in  Rome — Defeat  of  Oudinot — Oudinot  and 
Lesseps — The  French  enter  Rome— The  Restored  Pontifical  Government — 
Fall  of  Venice — Ferdinand  reconquers  Sicily — Germany — The  National 
Assembly  at  Frankfort — The  Armistice  of  Malmo — Berlin  from  April  to 
September — The  Prussian  Army — Last  days  of  the  Prussian  Parliament — 
Prussian  Constitution  granted  by  Edict — The  German  National  Assembly 
and  Austria — Frederick  William  IV.  elected  Emperor — He  refuses  the 
Crown— End  of  the  National  Assembly — Prussia  attempts  to  form  a  separate 
Union — The  Union  Parliament  at  Erfurt — Action  of  Austria — Hesse -Cassel 
—The  Diet  of  Frankfort  restored — Olmiitz — Schleswig-Holstein — Germany 
after  1849 — Austria  after  1851— France  after  1848— Louis  Napoleon — The 
October  Message — Law  Limiting  the  Franchise — Louis  Napoleon  and  the 
Army  —  Proposed  Revision  of  the  Constitution  —  The  Coup  d'Etat  — 
Napoleon  III.  Emperor. 

THE  plain  of  Northern  Italy  has  ever  been  an  arena  on 
Austria  and  which  the  contest  between  interests  greater 
than  those  of  Italy  itself  has  been  brought 
to  an  issue  ;  and  it  may  perhaps  be  truly  said  that 
in  the  struggle  between  established  Governments 


1848.  AUSTRIA  AND  ITALY.  49 

and  Revolution  throughout  Central  Europe  in  1848 
the  real  turning-point,  if  it  can  anywhere  be  fixed,  lay 
rather  in  the  fortunes  of  a  campaign  in  Lomhardy  than 
in  any  single  combination  of  events  at  Vienna  or  Berlin. 
The  very  existence  of  the  Austrian  Monarchy  depended 
on  the  victory  of  Radetzky's  forces  over  the  national 
movement  at  the  head  of  which  Piedmont  had  now  placed 
itself.  If  Italian  independence  should  be  established 
upon  the  ruin  of  the  Austrian  arms,  and  the  influence 
and  example  of  the  victorious  Italian  people  be  thrown 
into  the  scale  against  the  Imperial  Government  in  its 
struggle  with  the  separatist  forces  that  convulsed  every 
part  of  the  Austrian  dominions,  it  was  scarcely  possible 
that  any  stroke  of  fortune  or  policy  could  save  the 
Empire  of  the  Hapsburgs  from  dissolution.  But  on 
the  prostration  or  recovery  of  Austria,  as  represented 
by  its  central  power  at  Vienna,  the  future  of  Germany 
in  great  part  depended.  Whatever  compromise  might 
be  effected  between  popular  and  monarchical  forces  in 
the  other  German  States  if  left  free  from  Austria's 
interference,  the  whole  influence  of  a  resurgent  Austrian 
power  could  not  but  be  directed  against  the  principles 
of  popular  sovereignty  and  national  union.  The  Par- 
laament  of  Frankfort  might  then  in  vain  affect  to  fulfil 
its  mandate  without  reckoning  with  the  Court  of 
Vienna.  All  this  was  indeed  obscured  in  the  tempests 
that  for  a  while  shut  out  the  political  horizon.  The 
Liberals  of  Northern  Germany  had  little  sympathy 
with  the  Italian  cause  in  the  decisive  days  of  1848. 
Their  inclinations  went  rather  with  the  combatant  who, 


50  MODERN  EUROPE.  ISM. 

though  bent  on  maintaining  an  oppressive  dominion, 
was  nevertheless  a  member  of  the  German  race  and  paid 
homage  for  the  moment  to  Constitutional  rights.  Yet, 
as  later  events  were  to  prove,  the  fetters  which  crushed 
liberty  beyond  the  Alps  could  fit  as  closely  on  to 
German  limbs  ;  and  in  the  warfare  of  Upper  Italy  for 
its  own  freedom  the  battle  of  German  Liberalism,  was 
in  no  small  measure  fought  and  lost. 

Metternich    once    banished   from  Vienna,  the  first 

\  popular  demand  was  for  a  Constitution.      His  successors 

in  office,  with  a  certain  characteristic  pedantry,  devoted 

Vienna  from         their  studies  to  the  Belgian  Constitution  of 

March  to  May.  jggj   .     ^   ^^  ^^   ^^   &    Constitution 

was  published  by  edict  for  the  non- Hungarian  part  of 
the  Empire,  including  a  Parliament  of  two  Chambers, 
the  Lower  to  be  chosen  by  indirect  election,  the  Upper 
consisting  of  nominees  of  the  Crown  and  representatives 
of  the  great  landowners.  The  provisions  of  this  Con- 
stitution in  favour  of  the  Crown  and  the  Aristocracy,  as 
well  as  the  arbitrary  mode  of  its  promulgation,  dis- 
pleased the  Viennese.  Agitation  recommenced  in  the 
city ;  unpopular  officials  were  roughly  handled ;  the 
Press  grew  ever  more  violent  and  more  scurrilous. 
.  One  strange  result  of  the  tutelage  in  which  Austrian 
society  had  been  held  was  that  the  students  of  the 
University  became,  and  for  some  time  continued  to  be, 
the  most  important  political  body  of  the  capital.  Their 
principal  rivals  in  influence  were  the  National  Guard 
drawn  from  citizens  of  the  middle  class,  the  workmen 
as  yet  remaining  in  the  background.  Neither  in  the 


1848.  VIENNA.  51 

Hall  of  the  University  nor  at  the  taverns  where  the 
civic  militia  discussed  the  events  of  the  hour  did  the 
office-drawn  Constitution  find  favour.  On  the  13th  of 
May  it  was  determined,  with  the  view  of  exercising 
stronger  pressure  upon  the  Government,  that  the  exist- 
ing committees  of  the  National  Guard  and  of  the 
students  should  be  superseded  by  one  central  committee 
representing  both  bodies.  The  elections  to  this  com- 
mittee had  been  held,  and  its  sittings  had  begun,  when 
the  commander  of  the  National  Guard  declared  such  pro- 
ceedings to  be  inconsistent  with  military  discipline,  and 
ordered  the  dissolution  of  the  committee.  Riots  followed, 
during  which  the  students  and  the  mob  made  their  way 
into  the  Emperor's  palace  and  demanded  from  his 
Ministers  not  only  the  re-establishment  of  the  central 
committee  but  the  abolition  o£4he  Upper  ChaTHlseF  in 
the  projected  -Constitution,  and  the  removal  of  the 
.checks  Imposed  on  popular  sov^eis^iy^Sy^a^  limited  ; 
franchise  and  the  sjste^m_jpj[^n^Lireci^£l£jctions.  On 
ponrTaffer  point  the  Ministry  gave  way ;  and,  in  spite 
_of  the  resistance  and  reproaches  of  the  Imperial  house- 
hold, they  obtained  the  Emperor's  signature  to  a 
document  promising  that  for  the  future  all  the  important 
military  posts  in  the  city  should  be  held  by  the  National 
Guard  jointly  with  the  regular  troops,  that  the  latter 
should  never.be  called  out  except  on  the  requisition  of 
the  National  Guard,  and  that  the  projected  Constitution 
should  remain  without  force  until  it  should  have  been 
submitted  for  confirmation  to  a  single  Constituent 
Assembly  elected  by  universal  suffrage. 


52  MODERN  EUROPE.  1843. 

The  weakness  of  the  Emperor's  intelligence  rendered 
him  a  mere  puppet  in  the  hands  of  those  who  for  the 
moment  exercised  control  over  his  actions.  During  the 
riot  of  the  15th  of  May  he  obeyed  his  Ministers  ;  a  few 
hours  afterwards  he  fell  under  the  sway  of  the  Court 
party,  and  consented  to  fly  from  Vienna. 


On  the   18th  the  Yiennese  learnt  to  their 

May  17. 

astonishment  that  Ferdinand  was  far  on  the 
road  to  the  Tyrol.  Soon  afterwards  a  manifesto  was 
published,  stating  that  the  violence  and  anarchy  of  the 
capital  had  compelled  the  Emperor  to  transfer  his 
residence  to  Innsbruck  ;  that  he  remained  true,  however, 
to  the  promises  made  in  March  and  to  their  legitimate 
consequences  ;  and  that  proof  must  be  given  of  the 
return  of  the  Viennese  to  their  old  sentiments  of  loyalty 
before  he  could  again,  appear  among  them.  A  certain 
revulsion  of  feeling  in  the  Emperor's  favour  now  became 
manifest  in  the  capital,  and  emboldened  the  Ministers 
to  take  the  first  step  necessary  towards  obtaining  his  ^ 
return,  namely  the  dissolution  of  the  Students'  Legion. 
They  could  count  with  some  confidence  on  the  support 
of  the  wealthier  part  of  the  middle  class,  who  were 
now  becoming  wearied  of  the  students'  extravagances 
and  alarmed  at  the  interruption  of  business  caused  by 
the  Revolution;  moreover,  the  ordinary  termination  of 
the  academic  year  was  near  at  hand.  The  order  was 
Tumult  of  accordingly  given  for  the  dissolution  of  the 

Legion  and  the  closing  of  the  University. 
But  the  students  met  the  order  with  the  stoutest  resist- 
ance. The  workmen  poured  in  from  the  suburbs  to' 


1S4S.  VIENNA.  53 

join  in  their  defence.  Barricades  were  erected,  and  the 
insurrection  of  March  seemed  on  the  point  of  being 
renewed.  Once  more  the  Government  gave  way,  and 
not  only  revoked  its  order,  but  declared  itself  incapable 
of  preserving  tranquillity  in  the  capital  unless  it  should 
receive  the  assistance  of  the  leaders  of  the  people. 
With  the  full  concurrence  of  the  Ministers,  a  Committee 
of  Public  Safety  was  formed,  representing  at  once  the 
students,  the  middle  class,  and  the  workmen  ;  and  it 
entered  upon  its  duties  with  an  authority  exceeding^ 
within  the  limits  of  the  capital,  that  of  the  shadow^ 
functionaries  of  State.* 

In  the  meantime  the  antagonism  between  the  Czechs 
and  the  Germans  in  Bohemia  was  daily  becoming  more 
bitter.     The  influence  of  the  party  of  com- 
promise, which  had  been  dominant  in  the     national 

A  Tnovprnoi 


movement. 


early  days  of  March,  had  disappeared  before 
•the  ill-timed  attempt  of  the  German  national  leaders 
at  Frankfort  to  include  Bohemia  within  the  territory 
sending  representatives  to  the  German  national  Parlia- 
ment. By  consenting  to  this  incorporation  the  Czech 
population  would  have  definitely  renounced  its  newly 
asserted  claim  to  nationality.  If  the  growth  of  demo- 
cratic spirit  at  Vienna  was  accompanied  by  a  more 
intense  German  national  feeling  in  the  capital,  the 
popular  movements  at  Vienna  and  at  Prague  must 
necessarily  pass  into  a  relation  of  conflict  with  one 

*  Yitzthum,  Wien,  p.  103.  Springer,  ii.  293.  Pillersdorff,  Riick- 
blicke,  p.  68;  Nachlass,  p.  118.  Reschauer,  ii.  376.  Dund«  r,  October 
Revolution,  p.  5.  Ficquelmout,  Aufkliirungen,  p.  65. 


54  MODERN  EUROPE.  IHS. 

another.  On  the  flight  of  the  Emperor  becoming 
known  at  Prague,  Count  Thun,  the  governor,  who  was 
also  the  chief  of  the  moderate  Bohemian  party,  incited 
Ferdinand  to  make  Prague  the  seat  of  his  Government. 
This  invitation,  which  would  have  directly  connected 
the  Crown  with  Czech  national  interests,  was  not  Ac- 
cepted. The  rasher  politicians,  chiefly  students  and 
workmen,  continued  to  hold  their  meetings  and  to  patrol 
the  streets ;  and  a  Congress  of  Slavs  'from  all  parts  of 
the  Empire,  which  was  opened  on  the  2nd  of  June, 
excited  national  passions  still  further.  So  threaten- 
ing grew  the  attitude  of  the  students  and  workmen 
that  Count  Windischgratz,  commander  of  the  troops  at 
Prague,  prepared  to  act  with  artillery.  On  the  12th  of 
June,  the  day  on  which  the  Congress  of 
subdues  Prague,  Slavs  broke  up,  fighting  began.  Windisch- 
gratz, whose  wife  was  killed  by  a  bullet, 
appears  to  have  acted  with  calmness,  and  to  have 
sought  to  arrive  at  some  peaceful  settlement.  He 
withdrew  his  troops,  and  desisted  from  a  bombardment 
that  he  had  begun,  on  the  understanding  that  the  barri- 
cades which  had  been  erected  should  be  removed.  This 
condition  was  not  fulfilled.  New  acts  of  violence  occurred 
in  the  city,  and  on  the  17th  Windischgratz  reopened 
fire.  On  the  following  day  Prague  surrendered,  and 
Windisehgiratz  re-entered  the  city  as  Dictator.  The 
autonomy  of  Bohemia  was  at  an  end.  The  army  had 
for  the  first  time  acted  with  effect  against  a  popular 
rising;  the  first  blow  had  been  struck  on  behalf  of 
the  central  power  against  the  revolution  which  till 


1848.  WAR  IN  NORTHERN  ITALY.  53 

now  had  seemed  about  to  dissolve  the  Austrian  State 
into  its  fragments. 

At  this  point  the  dominant  interest  in  Austrian 
affairs  passes  from  the  capital  and  the  northern  provinces 
to  Kadetzky's  army  and  the  Italians  with  whom  it 
stood  face  to.  face.  Once  convinced  of  the  necessity  of 
a  retreat 'from  Milan,  the  Austrian  com- 
mander had  mov/ed  with  sufficient  rapidity  aro™ndverona, 

J         April-May. 

to  save  Yerona  and  Mantua  from  passing 
into  the  hands  of  the  insurgents.  He  was  thus/enabled 
to  place  his  army  in  one  of  the  best  defensive  positions 
in  Europe,  the  Quadrilateral  flanked  by  the  rivers 
Mincio  and  Adige,  and  protected  by  the  fortresses  of 
Verona,  Mantua,  Peschiera,  and  Legnano.  With  his 
front  on  the  Mincio  he  awaited  at  once  the  attack  of 
the  Piedmontese  and  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  from 
the  north-east.  On  the  8th  of  April  the  first  attack  was 
<  made,  and  after  a  sharp  engagement  at  Goito  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Mincio  was  effected  by  the  Sardinian  army. 
Siege  was  now  laid  to  Peschiera ;  and  while  a  Tuscan 
contingent  watched  Mantua,  the  bulk  of  Charles  Albert's 
forces  operated  farther  northward  with  the  view  of  cutting 
off  Verona  from  the  roads  to  the  Tyrol.  This  result  was 
for  a  moment  achieved,  but  the  troops  at  the  King's 
disposal  were  far  too  weak  for  the  task  of  reducing  the 
fortresses ;  and  in  an  attempt  that  was  made  on  the  6th 
©f  May  to  drive  the  Austrians  out  of  their  positions  in 
front  of  Verona,  Charles  Albert  was  defeated  at  Santa 
Lucia  and  compelled  to  fall  back  towards  the  Mincio.* 
*  Schonhals,  p.  117.  Farini,  ii.  9.  Parl.  Pap.  1849,  Irii.  352. 


56    A^  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

A.  pause  in  the  war  ensued,  filled  by  political  events 
of  evil  omen  for  Italy.  Of  all  the  princes  who  had 
permitted  their  troops  to  march  northwards  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Lombards,  not  one  was  acting  in  full 
sincerity.  The  first  to  show  himself  in  his  true  colours 
was  the  Pope.  On  the  29th  of  April  an  Allocution 
was  addressed  to  the  Cardinals,  in  which  Pius  disavowed 
Pa  ai  Aiiocu-  a^  participation  in  the  war  against  Austria, 
tion,  Apni  29.  an<j  declared  that  his  own  troops  should  do 
no  more  than  defend  the  integrity  of  the  Boman  States. 
Though  at  the  moment  an  outburst  of  popular  indigna- 
tion in  Borne  forced  a  still  more  liberal  Ministry  into 
power,  and  Durando,  the  Papal  general,  continued  his 
advance  into  Venetia,  the  Pope's  renunciation  of  his 
supposed  national  leadership  produced  the  effect  which 
its  author  desired,  encouraging  every  open  and  every 
secret  enemy  of  the  Italian  cause,  and  perplexing  those 
who  had  believed  themselves  to  be  engaged  in  a  sacred 
as  well  as  a  patriotic  war.  In  Naples  things  hurried 
far  more  rapidly  to  a  catastrophe.  Elections  had  been 
held  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  which 
was  to  be  opened  on  the  15th  of  May,  and 
most  of  the  members  returned  were  men  who,  while 
devoted  to  the  Italian  national  cause,  were  neither  Re- 
publicans  nor  enemies  of  the  Bourbon  dynasty,  but 
anxious  to  co-operate  with  their  King  in  the  work  of 
Constitutional  reform.  Politicians  of  another  character, 
however,  commanded  the  streets  of  Naples.  Rumours 
were  spread  that  the  Court  was  on  the  point  of  restoring 
despotic  government  and  abandoning  the  Italian  cause. 


1848.  NAPLES.  57 

Disorder  and  agitation  increased  from  day  to  day; 
and  after  the  Deputies  had  arrived  in  the  city  and 
begun  a  series  of  informal  meetings  preparatory  to  the 
opening  of  the  Parliament,  an  ill-advised  act  of  Ferdi- 
nand gave  to  the  party  of  disorder,  who  were  weakly 
represented  in  the  Assembly,  occasion  for  an  insurrec- 
tion. After  promulgating  the  Constitution  on  February 
10th,  Ferdinand  had  agreed  that  it  should  be  submitted 
to  the  two  Chambers  for  revision.  He  notified,  how- 
ever, to  the  Eepresentatives  oia  the  eve  .of  the  opening 
of  Parliament  that  they  would  be  required  to  take 
an  oath  of  fidelity  to  the  Constitution.  They  urged 
that  such  an  oath  would  deprive  them  of  their 
right  of  revision.  The  King,  ;after  some  hours,  con- 
sented to  a  change  in  the  formula  of  the  oath  ;  but  his 
demand  had  already  thrown  the  city  into  tumult. 
Barricades  were  erected,  the  Deputies  in  vain  en- 
deavouring to  calm  the  rioters  and  to  prevent  a  conflict 
with  the  troops.  While  negotiations  were  still  in  pro- 
gress shots  were  fired.  The  troops  now  threw  them- 
selves upon  the  people  ;  there  was  a  struggle,  short  in 
duration,  but  sanguinary  and  merciless;  the  barricades 
were  captured,  some  hundreds  of  the  insurgents  slain, 
£nd  Ferdinand  was  once  more  absolute  master  of 
Naples.  The  Assembly  was  dissolved  on  the  day  after 
that  on  which  it  should  have  met.  Orders  were  at  once 
sent  by  the  King  to  General  Pepe,  commander  of  the 
troops  that  were  on  the  march  to  Lombardy,  to  return 
with  his  army  to  Naples.  Though  Pepe  continued 
true  to  the  national  cause,  and  endeavoured  to  lead  his 


58  MODERN   EUROPE.  1843, 

army  forward  from  Bologna  in  defiance  of  the  King's 
instructions,  his  troops  now  melted  away ;  and  when  he 
crossed  the  Po  and  placed  himself  under  the  standard 
of  Charles  Albert  in  Venetia  there  remained  with  him 
scarcely  fifteen  hundred  men.' 

It  thus  became  clear  before  the  end  of  May  that 
the  Lombards  would  receive  no  considerable  help  from 
the  Southern  States  in  their  struggle  for  freedom,  and 
that  the  promised  league  of  the  Governments  in  the 
national  cause  was  but  a  dream  from  which  there 
was  a  bitter  awakening.  Nor  in  Northern  Italy  itself 
was  there  the  unity  in  aim  and  action  without  which 
success  was  impossible.  The  Republican  party  ac- 
cused the  King  and  the  Provisional  Government  at 
Milan  of  an  unwillingness  to  arm  the 

Negotiations  as  & 

people ;  Charles  Albert  on  his  part  regarded 
every  Eepublican  as  an  enemy.  On  entering  Lombardy 
the  King  had  stated  that  no  question  as  to  the  political 
organisation  of  the  future  should  be  raised  until  the 
war  was  ended  ;  nevertheless,  before  a. fortress  had  been 
captured,  he  had  allowed  Modena  and  Parma  to  declare 
themselves  incorporated  with  the  Piedmontese  mon- 
archy; and,  in  spite  of  Mazzini's  protest,  their  example 
was  followed  by  Lombardy  and  some  Venetian  districts. 
In  the  recriminations  that  passed  between  the  Republi- 
cans and  the  Monarchists  it  was  even  suggested  that 
Austria  had  friends  of  its  own  in  certain  classes  of  the 
population.  This  was  not  the  view  taken  by  the 
Viennese  Government,  which  from  the  first  appears  to 
have  considered  its  cause  in  Lombardy  as  virtually  lost. 


1349.  AUSTRIA  AND  ITALY.  59 

The  mediation  of  Great  Britain  was  invoked  by  Metter- 
nich's  successors,  and  a  willingness  expressed  to  grant 
to  the  Italian  provinces  complete  autonomy  under  the 
Emperor's  sceptre.  Palmerston,  in  reply  to  the  suppli- 
cations of  a  Court  which  had  hitherto* cursed  his  influ- 
ence, urged  that  Lombardy  and  the  greater  part  of 
Venetia  should  be  ceded  to  the  King  of  Piedmont. 
The  Austrian  Government  would  have  given  up  Lom- 
bardy to  their  enemy  ;  they  hesitated  to  increase  his 
power  to  the  extent  demanded  by  Palmerston,  the  more 
so  as  the  French  Ministry  was  known  to  be  jealous  of 
the  aggrandisement  of  Sardinia,  and  to  desire  the 
establishment  of  weak  Eepublics  like  those  formed  in 
1796.  Withdrawing  from  its  negotiations  at  London, 
the  Emperor's  Cabinet  now  entered  into  direct  commu- 
nication with  the  Provisional  Government  at  Milan, 
and,  without  making  any  reference  to  Piedmont  or 
Venice,  offered  complete  independence  to  Lombardy. 
As  the  union  of  this  province  with  Piedmont  had 
already  been  voted  by  its  inhabitants,  the  offer  was  at 
once  rejected.  Moreover,  even  if  the  Italians  had  shown 
a  disposition  to  compromise  their  cause  and  abandon 
Venice,  Badetzky  would  not  have  broken  off  the  com- 
bat while  any  possibility  remained  of  winning  over 
the  Emperor  from  the  side  of  the  peace-party.  In 
reply  to  instructions  directing  him  to  offer  an  armistice 
to  the  enemy,  he  sent  Prince  Felix  Schwarzenberg  to 
Innsbruck  to  implore  the  Emperor  to  trust  to  the  valour 
of  his  soldiers  and  to  continue  the  combat.  Already 
there  were  signs  that  the  victory  would  ultimately  be 


GO  MODE  EN  EUROPE.  isis. 

with  Austria.  Reinforcements  had  cut  their  way 
through  the  insurgent  territory  and  reached  Verona; 
and  although  a  movement  by  which  R.adetzky  threatened  - 
to  sever  Charles  Albert's  communications  was  frustrated 
by  a  second  engagement  at  Groito,  and  Peschiera  passed 
into  the  besiegers'  hands,  this  was  the  last  success  won 
by  the  Italians.  Throwing  himself  suddenly  eastwards, 
Eadetzky  appeared  before  Vicenza,  and  compelled  this 
city,  with  the  entire  Papal  army,  commanded  by 
General  Durando,  to  capitulate.  The  fall 
venetia"june,  of  Vicenza  was  followed  by  that  of  the 

July.  J 

other  cities  on  the  Venetian  mainland  till 
Venice  alone  on  the  east  of  the  Adige  defied  the 
Austrian  arms.  As  the  invader  pressed  onward,  an 
Assembly  which  Manin  had  convoked  at  Venice  decided 
on  union  with  Piedmont.  Manin  himself  had  been  the 
most  zealous  opponent  of  what  he  considered  the 
sacrifice  of  Venetian  independence.  He  gave  way 
nevertheless  at  the  last,  ;and  made  no  attempt  to  fetter 
the  decision  of  the  Assembly;  but  when  this  decision 
had  been  given  he  handed  >over  the  conduct  of  affairs  to 
others,  and  retired  for  a  while  into  private  life,  declining 
to  serve  under  a  king.* 

Charles  Albert  now  renewed  his  attempt  to  wrest 
the  central  fortresses   from  the  Austrians. 

Battle  of  Cns- 

zza,juiy25.       Leaving    half  his    army  at   Peschiera   and 
farther   north,  he   proceeded   with   the   other   half   to 

*  Ficquelmonfc,  p.  6.  Pillersdorff,  KTachlass,  93.  Helfert,  iv.  142. 
Schonbals,  p.  177.  Parliamentary  Papers,  id.  332,  472,  597.  Contarini, 
p.  67.  Azeglio,  Operazioni  del  Durando,  p.  6.  Manin,  Documents,  i. 
289.  Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  v.  257.  Pasolini,  p.  100. 


1818.  RADETZKY  IN  MILAN.  61 

blockade  Mantua.  .Radetzky  took  advantage  of  the  un- 
skilful generalship  of  his  opponent,  and  threw  himself 
upon  the  weakly  guarded  centre  of  the  long  Sardinian  line. 
The  King  perceived  his  error,  and  sought  to  unite  with 
his  the  northern  detachments,  now  separated  from  him 
by  the  Mincio.  His  efforts  were  baffled,  and  on  the 
25th  of  July,  after  a  brave  resistance,  his  troops  were 
defeated  at  Custozza.  The  retieat  across  the  Mincio 
was  conducted  in  fair  order,  but  disasters  sustained  by 
the  northern  division,  which  should  have  held  the 
enemy  in  check,  destroyed  all  hope,  and  the  retreat  then 
became  a  flight.  Eadetzky  followed  in  close  pursuit. 
Charles  Albert  entered  Milan,  but  declared  himself 
unable  to  defend  the  city.  A  storm  of  indignation 
broke  out  against  the  unhappy  King  amongst  the 
Milanese,  whom  he  was  declared  to  have  betrayed. 
The  palace  where  he  had  taken  up  his  quarters  was 
besieged  by  the  mob ;  his  life  was  threatened  ;  and  he 
escaped  with  difficulty  on  the  night  of  August  5th 
under  the  protection  of  General  La  Marmora  and  a  few 
faithful  Guards.  A  capitulation  was  signed,  and  as  the 
Piedmontese  army  evacuated  the  city  Radetzky 's  troops 
entered  it  in  triumph.  Not  less  than  sixty 
thousand  of  the  inhabitants,  according  to  enter  Mu^aT 

*•  Aug.  6. 

Italian  statements,  abandoned  their  homes 
and  sought  refuge  in  Switzerland  or  Piedmont  rather 
than  submit  to  the  conqueror's  rule.  liadetzky  could 
now  have  followed  his  retreating  enemy  without  diffi- 
culty to  Turin,  and  have  crushed  Piedmont  itself  under 
foot ;  but  the  fear  of  France  and  Great  Britain  checked 


62  MODE  EN  EUROPE.  1848. 

his  career  of  victory,  and  hostilities  were  brought  to  a 
close  by  an  armistice  at  Yigevano  on  August  9th.*  >\> 

The  effects  of  Kadetzky's  triumph  were  felt  in  every 

province    of  the    Empire.     The    first   open    expression 

given   to  the   changed  state  of  affairs  was 

cou.t  "ndnai      the  return  of  the  Imperial  Court  from  its 

Hungary. 

refuge  at  Innsbruck  to  Vienna.  The  elec- 
tion promised  in  May  had  been  held,  and  an  Assembly 
representing  all  the  non-Hungarian  parts  of  the  Mon- 
archy, with  the  exception  of  the  Italian  provinces,  had 
been  opened  by  the  Archduke  John,  as  representative 
of  the  Emperor,  on  the  22nd  of  July.  Ministers  and 
Deputies  united  in  demanding  the  return  of  the  Emperor 
to  the  capital.  With  Radetzky  and  Windischgratz 
within  call,  the  Emperor  could  now  with  some  con- 
fidence face  his  students  and  his  Parliament.  But  of 
far  greater  importance  than  the  return  of  the  Court 
to  Vienna  was  the  attitude  which  it  now  assumed 
towards  the  Diet  and  the  national  Government  of 
Hungary.  The  concessions  made  in  April,  inevitable 
as  they  were,  had  in  fact  raised  Hungary  to  the 
position  of  an  independent  State.  When  such  matters 
as  the  employment  of  Hungarian  troops  against  Italy 
or  the  distribution  of  the  burden  of  taxation  came  into 
question,  the  Emperor  had  to  treat  with  the  Hungarian 
Ministry  almost  as  if  it  represented  a  foreign  and  a 
rival  Power..  For  some  months  this  humiliation  had  to 


*  Parliamentary  Papers,  1849,  Iviii.  p.  128.  Venice  refused  to  ac- 
knowledge the  armistice,  and  detached  itself  from  Sardinia,  restoring 
Manin  to  power. 


iwa  HUNGARY.  63 

be  borne,  and  the  appearance  of  fidelity  to  the  new 
Constitutional  law  maintained.  But  a  deep,  resentful 
hatred  against  the  Magyar  cause  penetrated  the  circles 
in  which  the  old  military  and  official  absolutism  of 
Austria  yet  survived ;  and  behind  the  men  and  the 
policy  still  representing  with  some  degree  of  sincerity 
the  new  order  of  things,  there  gathered  the  passions  and 
the  intrigues  of  a  reaction  that  waited  only  for  the 
outbreak  of  civil  war  within  Hungary  itself,  and  the 
restoration  of  confidence  to  the  Austrian  army,  to  draw 
the  sword  against  its  foe.  Already,  while  Italy  was 
still  unsubdued,  and  the  Emperor  was  scarcely  safe  in 
his  palace  at  Vienna,  the  popular  forces  that  might  be 
employed  against  the  Government  at  Pesth  came  into 
view. 

In  one  of  the  stormy  sessions  of  the  Hungarian 
Diet  at  the  time  when  the  attempt  was  first  made  to 
irr-pose  the  Magyar  language  upon  Croatia  the  Illyrian 
leader,  Gai,  had  thus  addressed  the  Assembly  :  "  You 
Magyars  are  an  island  in  the  ocean  of  Slavism.  Take 
heed  that  its  waves  do  not  rise  and  overwhelm  you." 
The  agitation  of  the  spring  of  1848  first  revealed  in  its 
full  extent  the  peril  thus  foreshadowed. 
Croatia  had  for  above  a  year  been  in  almost  southern  ' 

»  Hungary. 

open  mutiny,  but  the  spirit  of  revolt  now 

spread   through  the  whole   of  the  Serb  population  of 

Southern  Hungary,  from  the  eastern  limits  of  Slavonia,* 

*  Slavonia  itself  was  attached  to  Croatia  ;  Dalmatia  also  was  claimed 
as  a  member  of  this  triple  Kingdom  under  the  Hungarian  Crown  in  virtue 
of  ancient  rights,  though  since  its  annexation  in  1797  it  had  been  governed 


64  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

across  the  plain  known  as  the  Banat  beyond  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Theiss  and  the  Danube,  up  to  the  borders 
of  Transylvania.  The  Serbs  had  been  welcomed  into 
these  provinces  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  cen- 
turies by  the  sovereigns  of  Austria  as  a  bulwark  against 
the  Turks.  Charters  had  been  given  to  them,  which 
were  still  preserved,  promising  them  a  distinct  political 
administration  under  their  own  elected  Voivode,  and 
ecclesiastical  independence  under  their  own  Patriarch  of 
the  Greek  Church.*  These  provincial  rights  had  fared 
much  as  others  in  the  Austrian  Empire.  The  Patriarch 
and  the  Voivode  had  disappeared,  and  the  Banat  had 
been  completely  merged  in  Hungary.  Enough,  how- 
ever, of  Serb  nationality  remained  to  kindle  at  the  sum- 
mons of  1848,  and  to  resent  with  a  sudden  fierceness 
the  determination  of  the  Magyar  rulers  at  Pesth  that 
the  Magyar  language,  as  the  language  of  State,  should 
thenceforward  bind  together  all  the  races  of  Hungary 
in  the  enjoyment  of  a  common  national  life.  The  Serbs 
had  demanded  from  Kossuth  and  his  colleagues  the 
restoration  of  the  local  and  ecclesiastical  autonomy  of 
which  the  Hapsburgs  had  deprived  them,  and  the  recog- 
nition of  their  own  national  language  and  customs.  They 
found,  or  believed,  that  instead  of  a  German  they  were 
now  to  have  a  Magyar  lord,  and  one  more  near,  more 
energetic,  more  aggressive.  Their  reply  to  Kossuth's 

directly  from  Vienna,  and  in  1848  was  represented  in  the  Reichstag  of 
Vienna,  not  in  that  of  Pesth. 

*  The  real  meaning  of  the  Charters  is,  however,  contested.  Springer, 
ii.  281.  Adlerstein,  Archiv,  i.  166.  Helfert,  ii.  255.  Irduyi  et  Chasshi, 
i.  236.  Die  Serbische  Wojwodschaftsfrage,  p.  7. 


1848.  CROATIA.  65 

defence  of  Magyar  ascendency  was  the  summoning  of  a 
Congress  of  Serbs  at  Carlowitz  on  the  Lower 

TA  -i  i       i  i      it  it  Serb  Congress  at 

Danube.      Here   it    was  declared  that  the     cariowitz,  May 

13-15. 

Serbs  of  Austria  formed  a  free  and  inde- 
pendent nation  under  the  Austrian  sceptre  and  the  com- 
mon Hungarian  Crown.  A  Voivode  was  elected  and  the 
limits  of  his  province  were  defined,  A  National  Com- 
mittee was  charged  with  the  duty  of  organising  a  Govern- 
ment and  of  entering  into  intimate  connection  with  the 
neighbouring  Slavic  Kingdom  of  Croatia. 

At  Agram,  the  Croatian  capital^  all  established 
authority  had  sunk  in  the  catastrophe  of  March,  and  a 
National  Committee  had  assumed  power.  It  happened 
that  the  office  of  Governor,  or  Ban,  of  Croatia  was  then 
vacant.  The  Committee  sent  a  deputation  jellacicin 
to  Vienna  requesting  that  the  colonel  of 
the  first  Croatian  regiment,  Jellacic,  might  be  ap- 
pointed. Without  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  the  depu- 
tation, the  Court,  by  a  patent  dated  the  23rd  of  March, 
nominated  Jellacic  to  the  vacant  post.  The  date  of  this 
appointment,  and  the  assumption  of  office  hy  Jellacic 
on  the  14th  of  April,  the  very  day  before  the  Hungarian 
Ministry  entered  upon  its  powers,  have  been  considered 
proof  that  a  secret  understanding  existed  from  the  first 
between  Jellacic  and  the  Court.  No  further  evidence 
of  this  secret  relation  has,  however,  been  made  public, 
and  the  belief  long  current  among  all  friends  of 
the  Magyar  cause  that  Croatia  was  deliberately  insti- 
gated to  revolt  against  the  Hungarian  Government  by 
persons  around  the  Emperor  seems  to  rest  on  no  solid 
F 


66  MODERN  EUROPE.  1S48. 

foundation.  The  Croats  would  have  been  unlike  all 
other  communities  in  the  Austrian  Empire  if  they  had 
not  risen  under  the  national  impulse  of  1848.  They 
had  been  murmuring  against  Magyar  ascendency  for 
years  past,  and  the  fire  long  smouldering  now  probably 
burst  into  flame  here  as  elsewhere  without  the  touch  of 
an  incendiary  hand.  With  regard  to  Jellacic's  sudden 
appointment  it  is  possible  that  the  Court,  powerless  to 
check  the  Croatian  movement,  may  have  desired  to 
escape  the  appearance  of  compulsion  by  spontaneously 
conferring  office  on  the  popular  soldier,  who  was  at  least 
more  likely  to  regard  the  Emperor's  interests  than  the 
lawyers  and  demagogues  around  him.  Whether  Jellacic 
was  at  this  time  genuinely  concerned  for  Croatian 
autonomy,  or  whether  from  the  first,  while  he  appar- 
ently acted  with  the  Croatian  nationalists,  his  deepest 
sympathies  were  with  the  Austrian  army,  and  his  sole 
design  was  that  of  serving  the  Imperial  Crown  with  or 
without  its  own  avowed  concurrence,  it  is  impossible  to 
say.  That,  like  most  of  his  countrymen,  he  cordially 
hated  the  Magyars,  is  beyond  doubt.'  The  general  im- 
pression left  by  his  character  hardly  accords  with  the 
Magyar  conception  of  him  as  the  profound  and  far- 
sighted  conspirator;  he  would  seem,  on  the  contrary, 
to  have  been  a  man  easily  yielding  to  the  impulses  of 
the  moment,  and  capable  of  playing  contradictory  parts 
with  little  sense  of  his  own  inconsistency.* 

*  But  see  Kossuth,  Schriften  (1880)  ii.  215,  for  a  conversation  between 
Jellacic  and  Batthyany,  said  to  have  been  narrated  to  Kossuth  by  the 
latter.  If  authentic,  this  certainly  proves  Jellacic  to  have  used  the  Slavic 
agitation  from  the  first  solely  for  Austrian  ends.  See  alsoVitzthuin,  p.  207. 


1343.  JELLACIC.  67 

Installed  in  office,  Jellacic   cast   to  the  winds   all 
consideration  due  to   the    Emperor's  personal  engage- 
ments   towards    Hungary,    and    forthwith 
permitted  the  Magyar  officials  to  be  driven     Croatia,  April 
out  of  the  country.     On  the  $nd  of  May 
he  issued  an  order  forbidding  all  Croatian  authorities 

o 

to  correspond  with  the  Government  at  Pesth.  Batthy- 
any,  the  Hungarian  Premier,  at  once  hurried  to  Vienna, 
and  obtained  from  the  Emperor  a  letter  commanding 
Jellacic  to  submit  to  the  Hungarian  Ministry.  As 
the  Ban  paid  no  attention  to  this  mandate,  General 
Hrabowsky,  commander  of  the  troops  in  the  southern 
provinces,  received  orders  from  Pesth  to  annul  all  that 
Jellacic  had  done,  to  suspend  him  from  his  office,  and 
to  bring  him  to  trial  for  high  treason.  Nothing 
daunted,  Jellacic  on  his  own  authority  convoked  the 
Diet  of  Croatia  for  the  5th  of  June ;  the  populace  of 
Agram,  on  hearing  of  Hrabowsky's  mission,  burnt  the 
Palatine  in  effigy.  This  was  a  direct  outrage  on  the 
Imperial  family,  and  Batthyany  turned  it  to  account. 
The  Emperor  had  just  been  driven  from  Vienna  by  the 
riot  of  the  15th  of  May.  Batthyany  sought  him. at 
Innsbruck,  and  by  assuring  him  of  the  support  of  his 
loyal  Hungarians  against  both  the  Italians  and  the 
Viennese  obtained  his  signature  on  June  10th  to  a 
rescript  vehemently  condemning  the  Ban's  action  and 
suspending  him  from  office.  Jellacic  had  already  been 
summoned  to  appear  at  Innsbruck.  Ho  set  out,  taking 
with  him  a  deputation  of  Croats  and  Serbs,  and  leaving 
behind  him  a  popular  Assembly  sitting  at  Agram,  in 
f  2 


68  MODERN  EUROPE.  isis. 

which,  besides  the  representatives  of  Croatia,  there 
were  seventy  Deputies  from  the  Serb  provinces.  On 
the  very  day  on  which  the  Ban  reached  Innsbruck,  the 
Imperial  order  condemning  him  and  suspending  him 
from  his  functions  was  published  by  Batthyany  at 
Pesth.  Nor  was  the  situation  made  easier  by  the 
almost  simultaneous  announcement  that  civil  war  had 
broken  out  on  the  Lower  Danube,  and  that  General 
Hrabowsky,  on  attempting  to  occupy  Carlowitz,  had 
been  attacked  and  compelled  to  retreat  by  the  Serbs 
under  their  national  leader  Stratimirovic.* 

It   is    said   that   the    Emperor    Ferdinand,    during 

deliberations  in  council  on  which  the  fate  of  the  Austrian 

Empire  depended,  was  accustomed  to  occupy 

Jellacic,  the  ri/ 

himself     with    counting     the    number    of 


carriages  that  passed  from  right  and  left 
respectively  under  the  windows.  In  the  struggle  be- 
tween Croatia  and  Hungary  he  appears  to  have  avoided 
even  the  formal  exercise  of  authority,  preferring  to 
commit  the  decision  between  the  contending  parties  to 
the  Archduke  John,  as  mediator  or  judge.  John  was 
too  deeply  immersed  in  other  business  to  give  much 
attention  to  the  matter.  What  really  passed  between 
Jellacic  and  the  Imperial  family  at  Innsbruck  is  un- 
known. The  official  request  of  the  Ban  was  for  the 
withdrawal  or  suppression  of  the  rescript  signed  by  the 
Emperor  on  June  10th.  Prince  Esterhazy,  who  repre- 
sented the  Hungarian  Government  at  Innsbruck,  was 

*  Adlerstein,  Archiv,   i.    146,   156.      Klapka,   Ermnemngen,   p.   30. 
Jranyi  et  Chassin,  i.  344.     Serbische  Bewegung,  p.  106. 


1848.  JELLAGW.  69 

ready  to  make  this  concession  ;  but  before  the  document 
could  be  revoked,  it  had  been  made  public  by  Batthyany. 
With  the  object  of  proving  his  fidelity  to  the  Court, 
Jellacic  now  published  an  address  to  the  Croatian 
regiments  serving  in  Lombardy,  entreating  them  not 
to  be  diverted  from  their  duty  to  the  Emperor  in  the 
field  by  any  report  of  danger  to  their  rights  and  their 
nationality  nearer  home.  So  great  was  Jellacic's  influ- 
ence with  his  countrymen  that  an  appeal  from  him  of 
opposite  tenor  would  probably  have  caused  the  Croatian 
regiments  to  quit  Radetzky  in  a  mass,  and  so  have 
brought  the  war  in  Italy  to  an  ignominious  end.  His 
action  won  for  him  a  great  popularity  in  the  higher 
ranks  of  the  Austrian  army,  and  probably  gained  for  him, 
even  if  he  did  not  possess  it  before,  the  secret  confidence 
of  the  Court.  That  some  understanding  now  existed  is 
almost  certain,  for,  in  spite  of  the  unrepealed  declara- 
tion of  June  10th,  and  the  postponement  of  the  Arch- 
duke's judgment,  Jellacic  was  permitted  to  return  to 
Croatia  and  to  resume  his  government.  The  Diet  at 
Agram  occupied  itself  with  far-reaching  schemes  for  a 
confederation  of  the  southern  Slavs  ;  but  its  discussions 
were  of  no  practical  effect,  and  after  some  weeks  it  was 
extinguished  under  the  form  of  an  adjournment.  From 
this  time  Jellacic  held  dictatorial  power.  It  was  un- 
necessary for  him  in  his  relations  with  Hungary  any 
longer  to  keep  up  the  fiction  of  a  mere  defence  of 
Croatian  rights  ;  he  appeared  openly  as  the  champion 
of  Austrian  unity.  In  negotiations  which  he  held  with 
Batthyiiny  at  Vienna  during  the  last  days  of  July,  he 


70  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

demanded  the  restoration  of  single  Ministries  for  War, 
Finance,  and  Foreign  Affairs  for  the  whole  Austrian 
Empire.  The  demand  was  indignantly  refused,  and  the 
chieftains  of  the  two  rival  races  quitted  Vienna  to  pre- 
pare for  war. 

The  Hungarinn  ^National  Parliament,  elected  under 
the  new  Constitution,  had  been  opened  at  Pesth  on 
July  5th.  Great  efforts  had  been  made,  in  view  of  the 
difficulties  with  Croatia  and  of  the  suspected  intrigues 
between  the  Ban  and  the  Court  party,  to  induce  the 
Emperor  Ferdinand  to  appear  at  Pesth  in 

Imminent 

A^&bS5icen  person.  He  excused  himself  from  this  on 
the  ground  of  illness,  but  sent  a  letter  to 
the  Parliament  condemning  not  only  in  his  own  name 
but  in  that  of  every  member  of  the  Imperial  family 
the  resistance  offered  to  the  Hungarian  Government  in 
the  southern  provinces.  If  words  bore  any  meaning, 
the  Emperor  stood  pledged  to  a  loyal  co-operation  with 
the  Hungarian  Ministers  in  defence  of  the  unity  and 
the  constitution  of  the  Hungarian  Kingdom  as  estab- 
lished by  the  laws  of  April.  Yet  at  this  very  time  the 
Minister  of  War  at  Vienna  was  encouraging  Austrian 
officers  to  join  the  Serb  insurgents.  Kossuth,  who  con- 
ducted most  of  the  business  of  the  Hungarian  Govern- 
ment in  the  Lower  Chamber  at  Pesth,  made  no  secret 
of  his  hostility  to  the  central  powers.  While  his  col- 
leagues sought  to  avoid  a  breach  with  the  other  half 
of  the  Monarchy,  it  seemed  to  be  Kossuth's  object 
rather  to  provoke  it.  In  calling  for  a  levy  of  two 
hundred  thousand  men  to  crush  the  Slavic  rebellion, 


Mis.  AUSTRIA  AND  HUNGARY.  71 

he  openly  denounced  the  Viennese  Ministry  and  the 
Court  as  its  promoters.  In  leading  the  debate  upon 
the  Italian  War,  he  endeavoured  without  the  know- 
ledge of  his  colleagues  to  make  the  cession  of  the 
territory  west  of  the  Adige  a  condition  of  Hun- 
gary's participation  in  the  struggle.  As  Minister  of 
Imance,  he  spared  neither  word  nor  act  to  demon- 
strate his  contempt  for  the  financial  interests  of 
Austria.  Whether  a  gentler  policy  on  the  part  of 
the  most  powerful  statesman  in  Hungary  might  have 
averted  the  impending  conflict  it  is  vain  to  ask  ;  but  in 
the  uncompromising  enmity  of  Kossuth  the  Austrian 
Court  found  its  own  excuse  for  acts  in  which  shameless- 
ness  seemed  almost  to  rise  into  political  virtue.  No 
sooner  had  Kadetzky's  victories  and  the  fall  of  Milan 
brought  the  Emperor  back  to  Vienna  than  the  new 
policy  came  into  effect.  The  veto  of  the  sovereign  was 
'placed  upon  the  laws  passed  by  the  Diet  at  Pesth  for 
the  defence  of  the  kingdom.  The  Hungarian  Grovern- 
ment  was  required  to  reinstate  Jellacic  in  his  dignities, 
to  enter  into  negotiations  at  Vienna  with  him  and  the 
Austrian  Ministry,  and  finally  to  desist  from  all  mili- 
tary preparations  against  the  rebellious  provinces.  In 
answer  to  these  demands  the  Diet  sent  a  hundred  of  its 
members  to  Vienna  to  claim  from  the  Emperor  the 
fulfilment  of  his  plighted  word.  The  miserable  man 
received  them  on  the  9th  of  September  with  protesta- 
tions of  his  sincerity ;  but  even  before  the  deputation 
had  passed  the  palace-gates,  there  appeared  in  the 
official  gazette  a  letter  under  the  Emperor's  own 


72  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

hand   replacing  Jellacic  in    office  and  acquitting    him 

of  every  charge  that  had  been  brought  against  him.     It 

was  for  this  formal  recognition  alone  that 

Jellacic  restored 

He'marcSon3'     Jellacic  had  been  waiting.      On   the  llth 
of  September  he  crossed  the  Drave  with  his 
army,    and   began    his   march   against  the  Hungarian 
capital.* 

The  Ministry  now  in  office  at  Vienna  was  composed 

in  part  of  men  who  had  been  known  as  reformers  in  the 

early  days  of  1848  ;  but  the  old  order  was  represented 

in  it  by  Count  Wessenberg,  who  had  been 

Mission  of  Lam- 

Metternich's  assistant  at  the   Congress    ot 


Vienna,  and  by  Latour,  the  War  Minister, 
a  soldier  of  high  birth  whose  career  dated  back  to  the 
campaign  of  Austerlitz.  Whatever  contempt  might  be 
felt  by  one  section  of  the  Cabinet  for  the  other,  its 
members  were  able  to  unite  against  the  independence  of 
Hungary  as  they  had  united  against  the  independence 
of  Italy.  They  handed  in  to  the  Emperor  a  memorial 
in  which  the  very  concessions  to  which  they  owed  their 
own  existence  as  a  Constitutional  Ministry  were  made  a 
ground  for  declaring  the  laws  establishing  Hungarian 
autonomy  null  and  void.  In  a  tissue  of  transparent 
sophistries  they  argued  that  the  Emperor's  promise  of  a 
Constitution  to  all  his  dominions  on  the  15th  of  March 
disabled  him  from  assenting,  without  the  advice  of  his 
Viennese  Ministry,  to  the  resolutions  subsequently 
passed  by  the  Hungarian  Diet,  although  the  union 
between  Hungary  and  the  other  Hereditary  States  had 

*  Iranyi  et  Chassin,  ii.  56.     Codex  der  neuen  Gesetze  (Pesth),  i,  7. 


im.  AUSTRIA  AND  HUNGARY.  73 

from  the  first  rested  solely  on  the  person  of  the 
monarch,  and  no  German  official  had  ever  pretended  to 
exercise  authority  over  Hungarians  otherwise  than  by 
order  of  the  sovereign  as  Hungarian  King.  The  pub- 
lication of  this  Cabinet  memorial,  which  appeared  in 
the  journals  at  Pesth  on  the  17th  or  September,  gave 
plain  warning  to  the  Hungarians  that,  if  they  were  not 
to  be  attacked  by  Jellacic  and  the  Austrian  army  simul- 
taneously, they  must  make  some  compromise  with  the 
Government  at  Vienna.  Batthyany  was  inclined  to 
concession,  and  after  resigning  office  in  consequence  of 
the  Emperor's  desertion  he  had  already  re-assumed  his 
post  with  colleagues  disposed  to  accept  his  own  pacific 
policy.  Kossuth  spoke  openly  of  war  with  Austria  aud 
of  a  dictatorship.  As  Jellacic  advanced  towards  Pesth, 
the  Palatine  took  command  of  the  Hungarian  army  and 
marched  southwards.  On  reacliing  Lake  Baloton,  on 
whose  southern  shore  the  Croats  were  encamped,  he 
requested  a  personal  conference  with  Jellacic,  and  sailed 
to  the  appointed  place  of  meeting.  But  he  waited  in 
vain  for  the  Ban ;  and  rightly  interpreting  this  rejec- 
tion of  his  overtures,  he  fied  from  the  army  and  laid 
down  his  office.  The  Emperor  now  sent  General  Lam- 
berg  from  Vienna  with  orders  to  assume  the  supreme 
command  alike  over  the  Magyar  and  the  Croatian 
forces,  and  to  prevent  an  encounter.  On  the  success  of 
Lamberg's  mission  hung  the  last  chance  of  reconcilia- 
tion between  Hungary  and  Austria.  Batthyany,  still 
clinging  to  the  hope  of  peace,  set  out  for  the  camp  in 
order  to  meet  the  envoy  on  his  arrival.  Lamberg, 


74  MODERN  EUROPE.  isia 

desirous  of  obtaining  the  necessary  credentials  from  tlie 
Hungarian  Government,  made  his  way  to  Pesth.  There 
he  found  Kossuth  and  a  Committee  of  Six  installed  in 
power.  Under  their  influence  the  Diet  passed  a  resolu- 
tion forbidding  Lamberg  to  assume  command  of  the 
Hungarian  troops,  and  declaring  him  a  traitor  if  he 
should  attempt  to  do  so.  The  report  spread  through 
Pesth  that  Lamberg  had  come  to  seize  the  citadel  and 
bombard  the  town  ;  and  before  he  could  reach  a  place 
of  sa^fcty  he  was  attacked  and  murdered  by  a  raging 
mob.  It  was  in  vain  that  Batthyany,  who  now  laid 
down  his  office,  besought  the  Government  at  Vienna  to 
take  no  rash  step  of  vengeance.  The  pretext  for  anni- 
hilating Hungarian  independence  had  been  given,  and 
the  mask  was  cast  aside.  A  manifesto  published  by 
the  Emperor  on  the  3rd  of  October  declared  the  Hun- 
garian Parliament  dissolved,  and  its  acts  null  and  void. 
Manifesto  of  Martial  law  was  proclaimed,  and  Jellacic 

appointed  commander  of  all  the  forces  and 
representative  of  the  sovereign.  In  the  course  of  the 
next  few  days  it  was  expected  that  he  would  enter 
Pesth  as  conqueror. 

"  In  the  meantime,  however  confidently  the  Govern- 
ment might  reckon  on  Jellacic's  victory,  the  passions  of 
revolution  were  again  breaking  loose  in  Vienna  itself. 
Increasing  misery  among  the  poor,  financial  panics,  the 

reviviner  efforts  of  professional  agitators,  had 

Tumult  of  Oct.  6 

Latourmaur-         renewed  the  disturbances  of  the  spring  in 

forms    which   alarmed   the   middle    classes 

almost  as  much  as  the  holders  of  power.     The  conflict 


18»P.  VIENNA.  75 

of  the  Government  with  Hungary  brought  affairs  to  a 
crisis.  After  discovering  the  uselessness  of  negotiations 
with  the  Emperor,  the  Hungarian  Parliament  had  sent 
some  of  its  ablest  members  to  request  an  audience  from 
the  Assembly  sitting  at  Vienna,  in  order  that  the  re- 
presentatives of  the  western  half  of  the  Empire  might, 
even  at  the  last  moment,  have  the  opportunity  of  pro- 
nouncing a  judgment  upon  the  action  of  the  Court. 
The  most  numerous  group  in  the  Assembly  was  formed 
by  the  Czech  deputies  from  Bohemia.  As  Slavgpthe 
Bohemian  deputies  had  sympathised  with  the  Croats 
and  Serbs  in  their  struggle  against  Magyar  ascendency, 
and  in  their  eyes  Jellacic  was  still  the  champion  of  a 
national  cause.  Blinded  by  their  sympathies  of  race  to 
the  danger  involved  to  all  nationalities  alike  by  the 
restoration  of  absolutism,  the  Czech  majority,  in  spite 
of  a  singularly  impressive  warning  given  by  a  leader  of 
the  German  Liberals,  refused  a  hearing  to  the  Hun- 
garian representatives.  The  Magyars,  repelled  by  the 
Assembly,  sought  and  found  allies  in  the  democracy  of 
Vienna  itself.  The  popular  clubs  rang  with  acclama- 
tions for  the  cause  of  Hungarian  freedom  and  with 
invectives  against  the  Czech  instruments  of  tyranny. 
In  the  midst  of  this  deepening  agitation  tidings  arrived 
at  Vienna  that  Jellacic  had  been  repulsed  in  his  march 
on  Pesth  and  forced  to  retire  within  the  Austrian 
frontier.  It  became  necessary  for  the  Viennese  Govern- 
ment to  throw  its  own  forces  into  the  struggle,  and  an 
order  was  given  by  Latour  to  the  regiments  in  the 
capital  to  set  out  for  the  scene  of  warfare.  This  order 


76  MODERN  EUROPE.  IMS. 

had,  however,  been  anticipated  by  the  democratic, 
leaders,  and  a  portion  of  the  troops  had  been  won  over 
to  the  popular  side.  Latour's  commands  were  resisted  ; 
and  upon  an  attempt  being  made  to  enforce  the  depar- 
ture of  the  troops,  the  regiments  fired  on  one  another 
(October  6th).  The  battalions  of  the  National  Guard 
which  rallied  to  the  support  of  the  Government  were 
overpowered  by  those  belonging  to  the  working  men's 
districts.  The  insurrection  was  victorious ;  the  Minis- 
ters submitted  once  more  to  the  masters  of  the  streets, 
and  the  orders  given  to  the  troops  were  withdrawn. 
But  the  fiercer  part  of  the  mob  was  not  satisfied  with  a 
political  victory.  There  were  criminals  and  madmen 
among  its  leaders  who,  after  the  offices  of  Government 
had  been  stormed  and  Latour  had  been  captured, 
determined  upon  his  death.  It  was  in  vain  that  some 
of  the  keenest  political  opponents  of  the  Minister 
sought  at  the  peril  of  their  own  lives  to  protect  him 
from  his  murderers.  He  was  dragged  into  the  court  in 
front  of  the  War  Office,  and  there  slain  with  ferocious 
and  yet  deliberate  barbarity.* 

The  Emperor,  while  the  city  was  still   in  tumult', 

had    in  his  usual  fashion  promised  that  the    popular 

The  Emperor  at     demands  should  be  satisfied;  but  as  soon  as 

he  was  unobserved  he  fled  from  Vienna,  and 

in  his  flight  he  was  followed  by  the  Czech  deputies  and 


*  Adlerstein,  ii.  296.  Helferf,  Geschichte  Oesterreichs,  i.  79,  ii.  192. 
Dunder,  p.  77.  Springer,  ii.  520.  "Vitzthum,  p.  143.  Kossuth,  Scliriften 
(1881),  ii.  284.  Reschauer,  ii.  563.  Pillersdorff,  Nachlass,  p.  163.  Iraiiji 
et  Chassin,  ii.  98. 


iw.  WJNDISCHGPATZ.  77 

maoy  German  Conservatives,  who  declared  that  their 
lives  were  no  longer  safe  in  the  capital.  Most  of  the 
Ministers  gathered  round  the  Emperor  at  Olmiitz  in 
Moravia ;  the  Assembly,  however,  continued  to  hold  its 
sittings  in  Vienna,  and  the  Finance  Minister,  apparently 
under  instructions  from  the  Court,  remained  at  his  post, 
and  treated  the  Assembly  as  still  possessed  of  legal 
powers.  But  for  all  practical  purposes  the  western  half 
of  the  Austrian  Empire  had  now  ceased  to  have  any 
Government  whatever;  and  the  real  state  of  affairs  was 
bluntly  exposed  in  a  manifesto  published  by  Count 
Windischgratz  at  Prague  on  the  llth  of  October,  in 
which,  without  professing  to  have  received  any  commis- 
sion from  the  Emperor,  he  announced  his 

.      ,          .  .  p  ,   .  -,-...  .  ,  "Windischgratz 

intention  ot  marching  on  Vienna  in  order     marches  on 

Vienna. 

to  protect  the  sovereign  and  maintain  the 
unity  of  the  Empire.  In  due  course  the  Emperor 
ratified  the  action  of  his  energetic  soldier ;  Windischgratz 
was  appointed  to  the  supreme  command  over  all  the 
troops  of  the  Empire  with  the  exception  of  Kadetzky's 
army,  an.d  his  march  against  Vienna  was  begun. 

To  the  Hungarian  Parliament,  exasperated  by  the 
decree  ordering  its  own  dissolution  and  the  war  openly 
levied  against  the  country  by  the  Court  in 

»        »  Windischgratz 

alliance  with  Jellacic,  the  revolt  of  the  capi-     ^cnnZoct. 
tal  seemed  to  bring  a  sudden  deliverance 
from  all  danger.     The  Viennese  had  saved  Hungary, 
and  the  Diet  was  willing,  if  summoned  by  the  Assembly 
at  Vienna,  to  send  its  troops  to  the  defence  of  the  capital. 
But  the  urgency  of.the  need  was  iiot  understood  on  either 


78  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

side  till  too  late.  The  Viennese  Assembly,  treating  it- 
self as  a  legitimate  and  constitutional  power  threatened 
by  a  group  of  soldiers  who  had  usurped  the  monarch's 
authority,  hesitated  to  compromise  its  legal  character 
by  calling  in  a  Hungarian  army.  The  Magyar  generals 
on  the  other  hand  were  so  anxious  not  to  pass  beyond 
the  strict  defence  of  their  own  kingdom,  that,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  communication  from  a  Viennese  authority,  they 
twice  withdrew  from  Austrian  soil  after  following 
Jellacic  in  pursuit  beyond  the  frontier.  It  was  not 
until  Windischgratz  had  encamped  within  sight  of 
Vienna,  and  had  detained  as  a  rebel  the  envoy  sent  to 
him  by  the  Hungarian  Government,  that  Kossuth's 
will  prevailed  over  the  scruples  of  weaker  men,  and 
the  Hungarian  army  marched  against  the  besiegers. 
In  the  meantime  Windischgratz  had  begun  his  attack 
on  the  suburbs,  which  were  weakly  defended  by  the 
National  Guard  and  by  companies  of  students  and 
volunteers,  the  nominal  commander  being  one  Messen- 
hauser,  formerly  an  officer  in  the  regular  army,  who 
was  assisted  by  a  soldier  of  far  greater  merit  than 
himself,  the  Polish  general  Bern.  Among  those  who 
fought  were  two  members  of  the  German  Parliament  of 
Frankfort,  Kobert  Blum  and  Frobel,  who  had  been  sent  to 
mediate  between  the  Emperor  and  his  subjects,  but  had 
remained  at  Vienna  as  combatants.  The  besiegers  had 
captured  the  outskirts  of  the  city,  and  negotiations  for 
surrender  were  in  progress,  when,  on  the  30th  of 
October,  Messenhauser  from  the  top  of  the  cathedral 
tower  saw  beyond  the  line  of  the  besiegers  on  the 


1848.  WINDISCHGRATZ  ENTERS   VIENNA.  79 

south-east  the  smoke  of  battle,  and  announced  that  the 
Hungarian  army  was  approaching.  An  engagement 
had  in  fact  begun  on  the  plain  of  Schwechat  between 
the  Hungarians  and  Jellacic,  reinforced  by  divisions  of 
Windischgratz'  troops.  In  a  moment  of  wild  excite- 
ment the  defenders  of  the  capital  threw  themselves  once 
more  upon  their  foe,  disregarding  the  offer  of  surrender 
that  had  been  already  made.  But  the  tide  of  battle  at 
Schwechat  turned  against  the  Hungarians.  They  were 
compelled  to  retreat,  and  Windischgratz,  reopening  his 
cannonade  upon  the  rebels  who  were  also  violators  of 
their  truce,  became  in  a  few  hours  master  of  Vienna. 
He  made  his  entry  on  the  31st  of  October,  and  treated 
Vienna  as  a  conquered  city.  The  troops  had  behaved 
with  ferocity  during  the  combat  in  the  suburbs,  and 
slaughtered  scores  of  unarmed  persons.  No  Oriental 
tyrant  ever  addressed  his  fallen  foes  with  greater  insolence 
•  and  contempt  for  human  right  than  Windischgratz  in 
the  proclamations  which,  on  assuming  government,  he 
addressed  to  the  Viennese  ;  yet,  whatever  might  be  the 
number  of  persons  arrested  and  imprisoned,  the  number 
now  put  to  death  was  not  great.  The  victims  were  in- 
deed carefully  selected;  the  most  prominent  being  Robert 
Blum,  in  whom,  as  a  leader  of  the  German  Liberals  and 
a  Deputy  of  the  German  Parliament  inviolable  by  law, 
the  Austrian  Government  struck  ostentatiously  at  the 
Parliament  itself  and  at  German  democracy  at  large. 

In  the  subjugation  of  Vienna  the  army  had  again 
proved  itself  the  real  political  power  in  Austria ;  but 
the  time  had  not  yet  arrived  when  absolute  government 


80  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

could    be  openly  restored.      The    Bohemian   deputies, 

fatally  as  they  had  injured  the  cause  of  constitutional 

rule  by  their   secession  from  Vienna,  were 

The  Parliament  ,  •  1 1      •  •         n  r*  •        •    1 

atKremsier,         still  in   earnest  in  the  cause  or  provincial 

Nov.  22. 

autonomy,  and  would  vehemently  have  re- 
pelled the  charge  of  an  alliance  with  despotism.  Even 
the  mutilated  Parliament  of  Vienna  had  been  recog- 
nised by  the  Court  as  in  lawful  session  until  the  22nd 
of  October,  when  an  order  was  issued  proroguing  the 
Parliament  and  bidding  it  re-assemble  a  month  later  at 
Kremsier,  in  Moravia.  There  were  indications  in  the 
weeks  succeeding  the  fall  of  Vienna  of  a  conflict  between 
the  reactionary  and  the  more  liberal  influences  sur- 
rounding the  Emperor,  and  of  an  impending  coup  d'etat : 
but  counsels  of  prudence  prevailed  for  the  moment ; 
the  Assembly  was  permitted  to  meet  at  Kremsier, 
and  professions  of  constitutional  principle  were  still 
made  with  every  show  of  sincerity.  A  new  Ministry, 
schwarzenberg  however,  came  into  office,  with  Prince 

Felix  Schwarzenberg  at  its  head.  Schwarz- 
enberg  belonged  to  one  of  the  greatest  Austrian  families. 
He  had  been  ambassador  at  Naples  when  the  revolu- 
tion of  1848  broke  out,  and  had  quitted  the  city  with 
words  of  menace  when  insult  was  offered  to  the 
Austrian  flag.  Exchanging  diplomacy  for  war,  he 
served  under  Eadetzky,  and  was  soon  recognised  as 
the  statesman  in  whom  the  army,  as  a  political  power, 
found  its  own  peculiar  representative.  His  career  had 
hitherto  been  illustrated  chiefly  by  scandals  of  private 
life  so  flagrant  that  England  and  other  countries  where 


1818.  8CHWARZENSERG.  81 

he  had  held  diplomatic  posts  had  insisted  on  his  re- 
moval; hut  the  cynical  and  reckless  audacity  of  the 
man  rose  in  his  new  calling  as  Minister  of  Austria  to 
something  of  political  greatness.  Few  statesmen  have 
been  more  daring  than  Schwarzenberg ;  few  have  pushed 
to  more  excessive  lengths  the  advantages  to  be  derived 
from  the  moral  or  the  material  weakness  of  an  adver- 
sary. His  rule  was  the  debauch  of  forces  respited  in 
their  extremity  for  one  last  and  worst  exertion.  Like 
the  Bom  an  Sulla,  he  gave  to  a  condemned  and  perishing 
cause  the  passing  semblance  of  restored  vigour,  and 
died  before  the  next  great  wave  of  change  swept  his 
creations  away,  j 

Schwarzenberg's  first  act  was  the  deposition  of  his 
sovereign.  The  imbecility  of  the  Emperor  Ferdinand 
had  long  suggested  his  abdication  or  dethronement,  and 
the  time  for  decisive  action  had  now  arrived.  He 
gladly  withdrew  into  private  life  :  the  crown,  declined 
by  his  brother  and  heir,  was  passed  on  to 

J  Ferdinand  abli- 

his  nephew,  Francis  Joseph,  a  youth  of  R&fjkJjii 
eighteen.  This  prince  had  at  least  not 
made  in  person,  not  uttered  with  his  own  lips,  not 
signed  with  his  own  hand,  those  solemn  engagements 
with  the  Hungarian  nation  which  Austria  was  now 
about  to  annihilate  with  fire  and  sword.  He  had  not 
moved  in  friendly  intercourse  with  men  who  were  hence- 
forth doomed  to  the  scaffold.  He  came  to  the  throne 
as  little  implicated  in  the  acts  of  his  predecessor  as 
any  nominal  chief  of  a  State  could  be ;  as  fitting  an 
instrument  in  the  hands  of  Court  and  army  as  any 
c 


82  MODERN  EUROPE.  1849 

reactionary  faction  could  desire.  Helpless  and  well- 
meaning,  Francis  Joseph,  while  his  troops  poured  into 
Hungary,  played  for  a  while  in  Austria  the  part  of  a 
loyal  observer  of  his  Parliament;  then,  when  the  moment 
had  come  for  its  destruction,  he  obeyed  his 

Dissolution  of  " 

pSment,er        soldier-minister  as  Ferdinand  had  in  earlier 
days  obeyed  the  students,  and  signed  the 
decree  for  its  dissolution  (March  4,  1849).    The  Assem- 
bly, during  its  sittings  at  Vienna,  had  accomplished  one 
important  task :  it  had  freed  the  peasantry  from  the 
burdens  attaching  to  their  land  and  converted  them  into 
i independent  proprietors.      This  part  of  its  work  sur- 
vived it,  and  remained  almost  the  sole  gain  that  Austria 
derived  from  the  struggle  of  1848.     After  the  removal 
to  Kremsier,  a  Committee  of  the  Assembly  had  been 
engaged   with    the    formation    of    a    Constitution    for 
Austria,  and  the  draft  was  now  completed.    In  the  course 
of  debate    something  had  been  gained   by   the  repre- 
sentatives of  theGrerman  and  the  Slavic  races  in  the  way  of 
respect  for  one  another's  interests  and  prejudices ;  some 
political  knowledge  had  been  acquired ;  some  approach 
made  to  an  adjustment  between  the  claims  of  the  cen- 
tral power  and  of  provincial  autonomy.     If  the  Consti- 
tution sketched  at  Kremsier  had  come  into  being,  it 
would  at  least  have  given  to  Western  Austria  and  to 
Galicia,  which  belonged  to   this  half  of  the  Empire, .  a 
system    of    government  based    on  popular   desires  and 
worthy,  on  the  part  of  the  Crown,  of  a  fair  trial.     But, 
apart  from  its  own  defects  from  the  monarchical  point 
of  view,  this  Constitution  rested  on  the   division  of  the 


18*0.  THE  UNITARY  EDICT.  83 

Empire  into  two  independent  parts  ;  it  assumed  the 
separation  of  Hungary  from  the  other  Hereditary 
States;  and  of  a  separate  Hungarian  Kingdom  the 
Minister  now  in  power  would  hear  no  longer.  That 
Hungary  had  for  centuries  possessed  and  maintained  its 
rights  ;  that,  with  the  single  exception  of  the  English, 
no  nation  in  Europe  had  equalled  the  Magyars  in  the 
stubborn  and  unwearied  defence  of  Constitutional  law ; 
that,  in  an  age  when  national  spirit  was  far  less  hotly 
inflamed,  the  Emperor  Joseph  had  well-nigh  lost  his 
throne  and  wrecked  his  Empire  in  the  attempt  to 
subject  this  resolute  race  to  a  centralised  administration, 
was  nothing  to  Schwarzenberg  and  the  soldiers  who 
were  now  trampling  upon  revolution.  Hungary  was 
declared  to  have  forfeited  by  rebellion  alike  its  ancient 
rights  and  the  contracts  of  1848,  The  dissolution  of 
the  Parliament  of  Kremsier  was  followed  by 

J         The    Unitary 

the   publication   of   an    edict   affecting    to     SHJiiSS! 

1849 

bestow  a  uniform  and  centralised  Constitu- 
tion upon  the  entire  Austrian  Empire.  All  existing 
public  rights  were  thereby  extinguished ;  and,  inasmuch 
as  the  new  Constitution,  in  so  far  as  it  provided  .for  a 
representative  system,  never  came  into  existence,  but 
remained  in  abeyance  until  it  was  formally  abrogated  in 
1851,  the  real  effect  of  the  Unitary  Edict  of  March, 
1849,  which  professed  to  close  the  period  of  revolution 
by  granting  the  same  rights  to  all,  was  to  establish 
absolute  government  and  the  rule  of  the  sword  through- 
out the  Emperor's  dominions.  Provincial  institutions 
giving  to  some  of  the  German  and  Slavic  districts  a 


84  MODERN  EUROPE.  1849. 

shadowy  control  of  their  own  local  affairs  only  marked 
the  distinction  between  the  favoured  and  the  dreaded 
parts  of  the  Empire.  Ten  years  passed  before  freedom 
again  came  within  sight  of  the  Austrian  peoples.* 

The  Hungarian  Diet,  on  learning  of  the  transfer  of 
the  crown  from  Ferdinand  to  Francis  Joseph,  had  re- 
fused to  acknowledge  this  act  as  valid,  on  the  ground 
that  it  had  taken   place  without  the   consent   of   the 
Legislature,   and   that   Francis   Joseph   had   not   been 
crowned  King  of  Hungary.    Ferdinand  was 
treated  as  still  the  reigning  sovereign,  and 
the  war  now  became,  according  to  the  Hungarian  view, 

more  than  ever  a  war  in  defence  of  established  right, 

t 
inasmuch  as  the  assailants  of  Hungary  were  not  only 

violators  of  a  settled  constitution  but  agents  of  a 
usurping  prince.  The  whole  nation  was  summoned  to 
arms;  and  in  order  that  there  might  be  no  faltering 
at  headquarters,  the  command  over  the  forces  on  the 
Danube  was  given  by  Kossutlf  to  Gorgei,  a  young  officer 
of  whom  little  was  yet  known  to  the  world  but  that 
he  had  executed  Count  Eugene  Zichy,  'a  powerful  noble, 
for  holding  communications  with  Jellacic.  It  was  the 
design  of  the  Austrian  Government  to  attack  Hungary 
at  once  by  the  line  of  the  Danube  and  from  the  frontier 
of  Galicia  on  the  north-east.  The  Serbs  were  to  be 
led  forward  from  their  border-provinces  against  the 
capital ;  and  another  race,  which  centuries  of  oppres- 
sion had  filled  with  bitter  hatred  of  the  Magyars,  was 
to  be  thrown  into  the  struggle.  The  mass  of  the 

*•  Codex  der  neuen  Gesetze,  i.  37.     Helfert,  iv.  (3)  321. 


1849.  TRANSYLVANIA.  85 

population  of  Transylvania  belonged  to  the  Eoumanian 
stock.     The  Magyars,  here  known  by  the 

O*7  J  TheRoumamans 

name  of  Czeklers,  and  a  community  of 
Germans,  descended  from  immigrants  who  settled  in 
Transylvania  about  the  twelfth  century,  formed  a  small 
but  a  privileged  minority,  in  whose  presence  the  Rou- 
manian peasantry,  poor,  savage,  and  absolutely  without 
political  rights,  felt  themselves  before  1848  scarcely 
removed  from  serfdom.  In  the  Diet  of  Transylvania 
the  Magyars  held  command,  and  in  spite  of  the  resist^ 
ance  of  the  Germans,  they  had  succeeded  in  carrying  an 
Act,  in  May,  1848,  uniting  the  country  with  Hungary. 
This  Act  had  been  ratified  by  the  Emperor  Ferdinand, 
but  it  was  followed  by  a  widespread  insurrection  of  the 
Eoumanian  peasantry,  who  were  already  asserting  their 
claims  as  a  separate  nation  and  demanding  equality  with 
their  oppressors.  The  rising  of  the  Roumanians  had 
indeed  more  of  the  character  of  an  agrarian  revolt  than 
of  a  movement  for  national  independence.  It  was 
marked  by  atrocious  cruelty ;  and .  although  the  Haps- 
burg  standard  was  raised,  the  Austrian  commandant, 
General  Puchner,  hesitated  long  before  lending  the  in- 
surgents his  countenance.  At  length,  in  October,  he 
declared  against  the  Hungarian  Government.  The 
union  of  the  regular  troops  with  the  peasantry  over- 
powered for  a  time  all  resistance.  The  towns  fell 
under  Austrian  sway,  and  although  the  Czeklers  were 
not  yet  disarmed,  Transylvania  seemed  to  be  lost  to 
Hungary.  General  Puchner  received  orders  to  lead 
his  troops,  with  the  newly  formed  Roumanian  militia, 


86  MODERN  EUROPE.  1849. 

westward  into  the  Banat,  in  order  to  co-operate  in  the 
attack  which  was  to  overwhelm  the  Hungarians  from 
every  quarter  of  the  kingdom.* 

On  the  15th  of  December,  Windischgratz,  in  com- 
mand   of   the  main  Austrian  army,  crossed  the   river 
Leitha,  the  border  between  German  and  Magyar  terri- 
tory.    Gorgei,    who  was    opposed  to   him, 
occupy  Pesth®       had  from  the  first  declared  that  Pesth  must 

Jan.  5,  1849. 

be  abandoned  and  a  war  of  defence  carried 
on  in  Central  Hungary.  Kossuth,  however,  had  scorned 
this  counsel,  and  announced  that  he  would  defend  Pesth 
to  the  last.  The  backwardness  of  the  Hungarian  pre- 
parations and  the  disorder  of  the  new  levies  justified  the 
young  general,  who  from  this  time  assumed  the  attitude 
of  contempt  and  hostility  towards  the  Committee  of 
Defence.  Kossuth  had  in  fact  been  strangely  served  by 
fortune  in  his  choice  of  Gorgei.  He  had  raised  him  to 
command  on  account  of  one  irretrievable  act  of  severity 
against  an  Austrian  partisan,  and  without  any  proof  of 
his  military  capacity.  In  the  untried  soldier  he  had 
found  a  general  of  unusual  skill ;  -in  the '  supposed 
devotee  to  Magyar  patriotism  he  had  found  a  military 
politician  as  self-willed  and  as  insubordinate  as  any  who 
have  ever  distracted  the  councils  of  a  falling  State. 
Dissensions  and  misunderstandings  aggravated  the 
weakness  of  the  Hungarians  in  the  field.  Position 
after  position  was  lost,  and  it  soon  became  evident  that 
the  Parliament  and  Government  could  remain  no  longer 

*  Revolutiouskrieg  in   Siebenburgen,  i.  30.      Helfert,  11.  207.     Bra- 
tiano  et  Iranyi,  Lettres  Hongro-Roumaines,  Adlersteiu,  ii.  105. 


1849.  THE   WAR  IN  HUNGARY.  87 

at  Pesth.  They  withdrew  to  Debreczin  beyond  the 
Theiss,  and  on  the  5th  of  January,  1849,  Windischgratz 
made  his  entry  into  the  capital.* 

The  Austrians  now  supposed  the  war  to  be  at  an 
end.     It  was  in  fact  but  .beginning.     The  fortress  of 
Comorn,  on  the  Upper  Danube,  remained 
in  the  hands  of  the  Magyars  :  and  by  con-     Gowmmen*  «t 

Ot/  »  Debi-eczin. 

ducting  his  retreat  northwards  into  a  moun- 
tainous country  where  the  Austrians  could  not  follow 
him  Gorgei  gained  the  power  either  of  operating  against 
Windischgratz's  communications  or  of  combining  with 
the  army  of  General  Klapka,  who  was  charged  with  the 
defence  of  Hungary  against  an  enemy  advancing  from 
Galicia.  While  Windischgratz  remained  inactive  at 
Pesth,  Klapka  met  and  defeated  an  Austrian  division 
under  General  Schlick  which  had  crossed  the  Carpathians 
and  was  moving  southwards  towards  Debreczin.  Gorge) 
now  threw  himself  eastwards  upon  the  line  of  retreat  ot 
the  beaten  enemy,  and  Schlick's  army  only  escaped  cap- 
ture by  abandoning  its  communications  and  seeking 
refuge  with  Windischgratz  at  Pesth.  A  concentration  of 
the  Magyar  forces  was  effected  on  the  Theiss,  and  the 
command  over  the  entire  army  was  given  by  Kossuth  to 
Dembinski,  a  Pole  who  had  gained  distinction  in  the 
wars  of  Napoleon  and  in  the  campaign  of  Kossuth  and 
1831.  Gorgei,  acting  as  the  representative 
of  the  officers  who  had  been  in  the  service  before  the 
Revolution,  had  published  an  address  declaring  that  the 

*  Klapka,  Erinnerungen,  p.  56.     Helfert,  iv.  199 ;  Gorgei,  Leben  nnd 
Wirken,  i.  145.     Adlerstein,  iii.  576,  648. 


88  MODERN  EUROPE.  1849 

army  would  fight  for  no  cause  but  that  of  the  Constitu- 
tion as  established  by  Ferdinand,  the  legitimate  King, 
and  that  it  would  accept  no  commands  but  those  of  the 
Ministers  whom  Ferdinand  had  appointed.  Interpreting 
this  manifesto  as  a  direct  act  of  defiance,  and  as  a  warn- 
ing that  the  army  might  under  Gorgei's  command 
make  terms  on  its  own  authority  with  the  Austrian 
Government,  Kossuth  resorted  to  the  dangerous  experi- 
ment of  superseding  the  national  commanders  by  a  Pole 
who  was  connected  with  the  revolutionary  party  through- 
out Europe.  The  act  was  disastrous  in  its  moral  effects 
upon  the  army  ;  and,  as  a  general,  Dembinski  entirely 
failed  to  justify  his  reputation.  After  permitting 
Schlick's  corps  to  escape  him  he  moved  forwards  from 
the  Theiss  against  Pesth.  He  was  met  by  the  Austrian s 
and  defeated  at  Kapolna  (February  20).  Both  armies 
retired  to  their  earlier  positions,  and,  after  a  declara- 
tion from  the  Magyar  generals  that  they  would  no 
longer  obey  his  orders,  Dembinski  was  removed  from 
his  command,  though  he  remained  in  Hungary  to  in- 
terfere once  more  with  evil  effect  before  the  end  of 
the  war. 

The  struggle  between  Austria  and  Hungary  had 
reached  this  stage  when  the  Constitution  merging  all 
The  Austria^  provincial  rights  in  one  centralised  system 

driven     out    of 

Hungary,  April.  was  published  by  Schwarzenberg.  The 
Croats,  the  Serbs,  the  Roumanians,  who  had  so  credu- 
lously flocked  to  the  Emperor's  banner  under  the  belief 
that  they  were  fighting  for  their  own  independence,  at 
length  discovered  their  delusion.  Their  enthusiasm 


1849.  WAR  IN  HUNGARY.  89 

sank;  the  bolder  among  them  even  attempted  to 
detach  their  countrymen  from  the  Austrian  cause  ;  but 
it  was  too  late  to  undo  what  had  already  been 
done.  Jellacic,  now  un distinguishable  from  any  other 
Austrian  general,  mocked  the  politicians  of  A  gram 
who  still  babbled  of  Croatian  autonomy  :  Stratimirovic, 
the  national  leader  of  the  Serbs,  sank  before  his  rival 
the  Patriarch  of  Carlowitz,  a  Churchman  who  preferred 
ecclesiastical  immunities  granted  by  the  Emperor  of 
Austria  to  independence  won  on  the  field  of  battle  by 
his  countrymen.  Had  a  wiser  or  more  generous  states- 
manship controlled  the  Hungarian  Government  in  the 
first  months  of  its  activity,  a  union  between  the 
Magyars  and  the  subordinate  races  against  Viennese 
centralisation  might  perhaps  even  now  have  been 
effected.  But  distrust  and  animosity  had  risen  too 
high  for  the  mediators  between  Slav  and  Magyar  to 
attain  any  real  success,  nor  was  any  distinct  promise  of 
self-government  even  now  to  be  drawn  from  the  offers 
of  concession  which  were  held  out  at  Debreczin.  An 
interval  of  dazzling  triumph  seemed  indeed  to  justify 
the  Hungarian  Government  in  holding  fast  to  its 
sovereign  claims.  In  the  hands  of  able  leaders  no  task 
seemed  too  hard  for  Magyar  troops  to  accomplish, 
liem,  arriving  in  Transylvania  without  a  soldier,  created 
a  new  army,  and  by  a  series  of  extraordinary  marches 
and  surprises  not  only  overthrew  the  Austrian  and 
Roumanian  troops  opposed  to  him,  but  expelled  a 
corps  of  Russians  whom  General  Puchner  in  his  ex- 
tremity had  invited  to  garrison  Hermannstadt.  Gorgei, 


90  MODERN  EUROPE.  iw. 

resuming  in  the  first  week  of  April  the  movement  in 
which  Dembinski  had  failed,  inflicted  upon  the  Aus- 
trians  a  series  ,of  defeats  that  drove  them  back  to  the 
walls  of  Pesth  ;  while  Klapka,  advancing  on  Comorn, 
effected  the  relief  of  this  fortress,  and  planted  in  the 
rear  of  the  Austrians  a  force  which  threatened  to  cut 
them  off  from  Vienna.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  Austrian 
Government  removed  Windischgratz  from  his  command. 
His  successor  found  that  a  force  superior  to  his  own 
was  gathering  round  him  on  every  side.  He  saw  that 
Hungary  was  lost  ;  and  leaving  a  garrison  in  the 
fortress  of  Buda,  he  led  off  his  army  in  haste  from  the 
capital,  and  only  paused  in  his  retreat  when  he  had 
reached  the  Austrian  frontier. 

The  Magyars,  rallying  from  their  first  defeats,  had 

brilliantly  achieved  the  liberation  of  their  land.     The 

Court  of   Vienna,    attempting  in    right  of 

Declaration  of 

superior  force  to  overthrow  an  established 


constitution,  had  proved  itself  the  inferior 
power  ;  and  in  mingled  exaltation  and  resentment  it 
was  natural  that  the  party  and  the  •  leaders  who  had 
been  foremost  in  the  national  struggle  of  Hungary 
should  deem  a  renewed  union  with  Austria  impos- 
sible, and  submission  to  the  Hapsburg  crown  an 
indignity.  On  the  19th  of  April,  after  the  defeat 
of  Windischgratz  but  before  the  evacuatibn  of  Pesth, 
the  Diet  declared  that  the  House  of  Hapsburg 
had  forfeited  its  throne,  and  proclaimed  Hungary  an 
independent  State.  No  statement  was  made  as  to  the 
future  form  of  government,  but  everything  indicated 


1849.  DECLARATION  OF  INDEPENDENCE.  91 

that  Hungary,  if  successful  in  maintaining  its  inde- 
pendence, would  become  a  Eepublic,  with  Kossuth, 
who  was  now  appointed  Governor,  for  its  chief.  Even 
in  the  revolutionary  severance  of  ancient  ties  homage 
was  paid  to  the  legal  and  constitutional  bent  of  the 
Hungarian  mind.  Nothing  was  said  in  the  Declara- 
tion of  April  19th  of  the  rights  of  man;  there  was  no 
Parisian  commonplace  on  the  sovereignty  of  the  people. 
The  necessity  of  Hungarian  independence  was  deduced 
from  the  offences  which,  the  Austrian  House  had 
committed  against  the  written  and  unwritten  law 
of  the  land, .  offences  continued  through  centuries 
and  crowned  by  the  invasion  under  Windischgratz, 
by  the  destruction  of  the  Hungarian  Constitution  in 
the  edict  of  March  9th,  and  by  the  introduction  of  the 
Bussians  into  Transylvania.  Though  coloured  and 
exaggerated  by  Magyar  patriotism,  the  charges  made 
against  the  Hapsburg  dynasty  were  on  the  whole  in 
accordance  with  historical  fact;  and  if  the  affairs  of 
States  \vere  to  be  guided  by  no  other  considerations 
than  those  relating  to  the  performance  of  contracts, 
Hungary  had  certainly  established  its  right  to  be  quit 
of  partnership  with  Austria  and  of  its  Austrian  sovereign. 
But  the  judgment  of  history  has  condemned  Kossuth's 
declaration  of  Hungarian  independence  in  the  midst  of 
the  struggle  of  1849  as  a  great  political  error.  It 
served  no  useful  purpose ;  it  deepened  the  antagonism 
already  existing  between  the  Government  and  a  large 
part  of  the  army  ;  and  while  it  added  to  the  sources  of 
internal  discord,  it  gave  colour  to  the  intervention  of 


92  MODERN  EUROPE.  is*1. 

Russia  as  against  a  revolutionary  cause.  Apart  from 
its  disastrous  effect  upon  the  immediate  course  of  events, 
it  was  based  upon  a  narrow  and  inadequate  view  both 
of  the  needs  and  of  the  possibilities  of  the  future.  Even 
in  the  interests  of  the  Magyar  nation  itself  as  a  European 
power,  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  in  severance  from 
Austria  such  influence  and  such  weight  could  possibly 
have  been  won  by  a  race  numerically  weak  and  sur- 
rounded by  hostile  nationalities,  as  the  ability  and  the 
political  energy  of  the  Magyars  have  since  won  for 
them  in  the  direction  of  the  accumulated  forces  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire. 

It  has  generally  been  considered  a  fatal  error  on  the 

part  of  the  Hungarian  commanders  that,  after  expelling 

the   Austrian   army,  they  did  not  at  once 

Russian  inter-  ,  .-.-...  -,  ,       .         -, 

vention  against      march  upon   Vienna,   but  returned   to  lay 

Hungary. 

siege  to  the  fortress  of  Buda,  which  re- 
sisted long  enough  to  enable  the  Austrian  Government 
to  reorganise  and  to  multiply  its  forces.  But  the  inter- 
vention of  Russia  would  probably  have  been  fatal  to  Hun- 
garian independence,  even  if  Vienna  had  been  captured 
and  a  democratic  government  established  there  for  a 
while  in  opposition  to  the  Court  at  Olmiitz.  The  plan 
of  a  Eussian  intervention,  though  this  intervention  was 
now  explained  by  the  community  of  interest  between 
Polish  and  Hungarian  rebels,  was  no  new  thing. 
Soon  after  the  outbreak  of  the  March  Revolution  the 
Czar  had  desired  to  send  his  troops  both  into  Prussia 
and  into  Austria  as  the  restorers  of  monarchical  author- 
ity. His  help  was  declined  on  behalf  of  the  King 


1849.  SUSS  IAN  INTERVENTION.  93 

of  Prussia;  in  Austria  the  project  had  been  discussed 
at  successive  moments  of  danger,  and  after  the  over- 
throw of  the.  Imperial  troops  in  Transylvania  by  Bern 
the  proffered  aid  was  accepted.  The  Russians  who 
then  occupied  Hermannstadt  did  not,  however,  enter 
the  country  as  combatants  ;  their  task  was  to  garrison 
certain  positions  still  held  by  the  Austrians,  and  so  to 
set  free  the  Emperor's  troops  for  service  in  the  field. 
On  the  declaration  of  Hungarian  independence,  it  be- 
came necessary  for  Francis  Joseph  to  accept  his  pro- 
tector's help  without  qualification  or  disguise.  An 
army  of  eighty  thousand  Russians  marched  across 
Gralicia  to  assist  the  Austrians  in  grappling  with  an 
enemy  before  whom,  when  single-handed,  they  had 
succumbed.  Other  Russian  divisions,  while  Austria 
massed  its  troops  on  the  Upper  Danube,  entered  Tran- 
sylvania from  the  south  and  east,  and  the  Magyars  in 
the  summer  of  1849  found  themselves  compelled  to 
defend  their  country  against  forces  three  times  more 
numerous  than  their  own.* 

When  it  became  known  that  the  Czar  had  deter- 
mined to  throw  all  his  strength  into  the  scale,  Kossuth 
saw  that  no  ordinary  operations  of  war  could  possibly 
avert  defeat,  and  called  upon  his  country- 

••  The  summer 

men  to  destroy  their  homes  and  property  at 


the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  to  leave  to 

the  invader  a   naming  and  devastated  solitude.     But 

the  area  of  warfare  was  too  vast  for  the  execution  of 

*  Helfert,  iv.  (2)  326.     Klapka,  War  in  Hungary,  i  23.     Iranyi  et 
Chassin,  ii.  534.     Gorgei,  ii.  54. 


94  MODERN  EUROPE.  1849. 

this  design,  even  if  the  nation  had  been  prepared  for 
so  desperate  a  course.  The  defence  of  Hungary  was 
left  to  its  armies,  and  Gorgei  became  the  leading  figure 
in  the  calamitous  epoch  that  followed.  While  the 
Government  prepared  to  retire  to  Czegedin,  far  in  the 
south-east,  Gorgei  took  post  on  the  Upper  Danube,  to 
meet  the  powerful  force  which  the  Emperor  of  Austria 
had  placed  under  the  orders  of  General  Haynau,  a 
soldier  whose  mingled  energy  and  ferocity  in  Italy  had 
marked  him  out  as  a  fitting  scourge  for  the  Hungarians, 
and  had  won  for  him  supreme  civil  as  well  as  military 
powers.  Gorgei  naturally  believed  that  the  first  object 
of  the  Austrian  commander  would  be  to  effect  a  junction 
with  the  Russians,  who,  under  Paskiewitsch,  the  con- 
queror of  Kars  in.  1829,  were  now  crossing  the  Car- 
pathians ;  and  he  therefore  directed  all  his  efforts 
against  the  left  of  the  Austrian  line.  While  he  was 
unsuccessfully  attacking  the  enemy  on  the  river  Waag 
north  of  Comorn,  Haynau  with  the  mass  of  his  forces 
advanced  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  and 
captured  Raab  (June  28th).  Gorgei  threw  himself 
southwards,  but  his  efforts  to  stop  Haynau  were 
in  vain,  and  the  Austrians  occupied  Pesth  (July 
llth).  The  Russians  meanwhile  were  advancing 
southwards  by  an  independent  line  of  march.  Their 
vanguard  reached  the  Danube  and  the  Upper  Theiss, 
and  Gorgei  seemed  to  be  enveloped  by  the  enemy.  The 
Hungarian  Government  adjured  him  to  hasten  towards 
Czegedin  and  Arad,  where  Kossuth  was  concentrating 
all  the  other  divisions  for  a  final  struggle  ;  but  Gorgei 


1849.  CAPITULATION  OF  VILAGOS.  95 

held  on  to  his  position  about  Comorn  until  his  retreat 
could  only  be  effected  by  means  of  a  vast  detour  north- 
wards, and  before  he  could  reach  Arad  all  was  lost. 
Dembinski  was  again  in  command.  Charged  with  the 
defence  of  the  passage  of  the  Theiss  abeut  Czegedin,  he 
failed  to  prevent  the  Austrians  from  crossing  the  river, 
and  on  the  5th  of  August  was  defeated  at  Czoreg  with 
heavy  loss.  Kossuth  now  gave  the  command  to  Bern, 
who  had  hurried  from  Transylvania,  where  overpowering 
forces  had  at  length  wrested  victory  from  his  grasp. 
Bern  fought  the  last  battle  of  the  campaign  at  Temes- 
var.  He  was  overthrown  and  driven  eastwards,  but 
succeeded  in  leading  a  remnant  of  his  army  across  the 
Moldavian  frontier  and  so  escaped  capture.  Gorgei, 
who  was  now  close  to  Arad,  had  some 
strange  fancy  that  it  would  dishonour  his  Viiagos,  August 
army  to  seek  refuge  on  neutral  soil.  He 
turned  northwards  so  as  to  encounter  Eussian  and 
not  Austrian  regiments,  and  without  striking  a 
blow,  without  stipulating  even  for  the  lives  of  the 
civilians  in  his  camp,  he  led.  his  army  within  the  Rus- 
sian lines  at  Viiagos,  and  surrendered  unconditionally 
to  the  generals  of  the  Czar.  His  own  life  was  spared  ; 
no  mercy  was  shown  to  those  who  were  handed  over  as 
his  fellow-prisoners  by  the  Eussian  to  the  Austrian 
Government,  or  who  were  seized  by  Haynau  as  his 
troops  advanced.  Tribunals  more  resem-  Ven  r  e  of 
bling  those  of  the  French  Eeign  of  Terror 
than  the  Courts  of  a  civilised  Government  sent  the 
noblest  patriots  and  soldiers  of  Hungary  to  the  scaffold. 


93  MODERN  EUROPE.  1849. 

To  the  deep   disgrace   of  the  Austrian  Crown,  Count 
Batthyany,  the   Minister  of  Ferdinand,  was   included 
among   those    whose    lives   were    sacrificed.     The  ven- 
geance of  the  conqueror  seemed  the  more  frenzied  and 
the  more  insatiable  because  it  had  only  been  rendered 
possible  by  foreign  aid.     Crushed  under  an  iron  rule, 
exhausted  by  war,  the  prey  of  a  Government  which  knew 
only  how  to  employ  its  subject-races  as  gaolers  over  one 
another,  Hungary  passed  for  some  years    into  silence 
and  almost  into  despair.     Every  vestige  of  its  old  con- 
stitutional rights  was  extinguished.     Its  territory  was 
curtailed  by  the  separation  of  Transylvania  and  Croatia; 
its   administration  was   handed  over  to  Germans  from 
Vienna.     A  conscription,  enforced  not  for  the  ends  of 
military  service  but  as  the   surest  means  of  breaking 
the  national  spirit,  enrolled  its  youth  in  Austrian  regi- 
ments,  and  banished  them  to  the   extremities  of  the 
empire.     No  darker  period  was  known  in  the  history  of 
Hungary  since    the  wars    of   the    seventeenth  century 
than  that  which  followed  the  catastrophe  of  1849.* 

The   gloom  which  followed    Austrian   victory   was 
now  descending  not  on  Hungary  alone  but  on  Italy 
also.     The  armistice  made  between  Eadetzky  and  the 
King  of  Piedmont  at  Vigevano  in  August, 
1848,  lasted  for  seven  months,  during  which 


March,  1849. 

the  British  and  French  Governments  en- 
deavoured, but  in  vain,  to  arrange  terms  of  peace  be- 
tween the  combatants.  With  military  tyranny  in  its 

*  Klapka,  War,  ii.  106.   Erinnerungen,  58.    Gorgei,  ii.  373.    Kossuth, 
Scliriften  (1880),  ii.  291.    Codex  der  neuen  Gesetze,  i.  75,  105. 


isw.  HOME.  <)7 

most  brutal  form,  crushing  down  Lombarly,  it  was 
impossible  that  Charles  Albert  should  renounce  the 
work  of  deliverance  to  which  he  had  pledged  himself. 
Austria,  on  the  other  hand,  had  now  sufficiently  re- 
covered its  strength  to  repudiate  the  Concessions  which 
it  had  offered  at  an  earlier  time,  and  Schwarzenberg  on 
assuming  power  announced  that  the  Emperor  would 
maintain  Lombardy  at  every  cost.  The  prospects  of 
Sardinia  as  regards*  help  from  the  rest  of  the  Peninsula 
were  far  worse  than  when  it  took  up  arms  in  the  spring 
of  1848.  Projects  of  a  general  Italian  federation,  of  a 
military  union  between  the  central  States  and  Piedmont, 
of  an  Italian  Constituent  Assembly,  had  succeeded  one 
another  and  left  no  v result.  Naples  had  fallen  back 
into  absolutism ;  Borne  and  Tuscany,  from  which  aid 
might  still  have  been  expected,  were  distracted  by  in- 
ternal contentions,  and  hastening  as  it  seemed  towards 

-anarchy.  After  the  defeat  of  Charles  Albert  at  Cus- 
tozza,  Pius  IX.,  who  was  still  uneasily  playing  his  part 

-as  a  constitutional  sovereign,  had  called  to  office  Pelle- 
grino  Rossi,  an  Italian  patriot  of  an  earlier  time,  who 
had  since  been  ambassador  of  Louis  Philippe  at  Home, 
and  by  his  connection  with  the  Orleanist  Monarchy 
had  incurred  the  hatred  of  the  Republican 

i    T,     i  T-»          •  •  Murder  of  Rossi, 

party  throughout  Italy.  Rossi,  as  a  vigorous  NOV.  15.  Flight 
and  independent  reformer,  was  as  much  de- 
tested in  clerical  and  reactionary  circles  as  he  was  by 
the  demagogues  and  their  followers.  This,  however, 
profited  him  nothing ;  and  on  the  1 5th  of  November, 
as  he  was  proceeding  to  the  opening  of  the  Chambers, 


98  MODERN  EUROPE.  is». 

he  was  assassinated  by  an  unknown  Land.  Terrified 
by  this  crime,  and  by  an  attack  upon  his  own  palace  by 
which  it  was  followed,  Pius  fled  to  Gaeta  and  placed 
himself  under  the  protection  of  the  King  of  Naples.  A 
Constituent  Assembly  was  summoned,^  and 

Roman  Repub-  •/ 

uc,  Feb.  9, 1849.  &  Republic  proclaimed  at  Home,  between 
which  and  the  Sardinian  Government  there  was  so  little 
.community  of  feeling  that  Charles  Albert  would,  if  the 
Pope  had  accepted  his  protection,  have  sent  his  troops 
to  restore  him  to  a  position  of  security.  In  Tuscany 
affairs  were  in  a  similar  condition.  The  Grand  Duke 
had  for  some  months  been  regarded  as  a  sincere,  though 
reserved,  friend  of  the  Italian  cause,  and  he  had  even 
spoken  of  surrendering  his  crown  if  this  should  be  for 
the  good  of  the  Italian  nation.  When,  however,  the 
Pope  had  fled  to  Gaeta,  and  the  project  was  openly 
avowed  of  uniting  Tuscany  with  the  Roman 
States  in  a  Republic,  the  Grand  Duke, 
moved  more  by  the  fulminations  of  Pius  against  his 
despoilers  than  by  care  for  his  own  crown,  fled  in  his 
turn,  leaving  the  Republicans  masters  of  Florence.  A 
miserable  exhibition  of  vanity,  riot,  and  braggadocio 
was  given  to  the  world  by  the  politicians  of  the  Tuscan 
State.  Alike  in  Florence  and  in  Rome  all  sense  of  the 
true  needs  of  the  moment,  of  the  absolute  uselessuess 
of  internal  changes  of  Government  if  Austria  was  to 
maintain  its  dominion,  seemed  to  have  vanished  from 
men's  minds.  Republican  phantoms  distracted  the  heart 
and  the  understanding  ;  no  soldier,  no  military  adminis- 
trator arose  till  too  late  by  the  side  of  the  rhetoricians 


1S!9.  AUSTRIA  AND  PIEDMONT.  <  ft 

and  mob-leaders  who  filled  the  stage ;  and  when,  on 
the  19th  of  March,  the  armistice  was  brought  to  a 
close  in  Upper  Italy,  Piedmont  took  the  field  alone.* 

The  campaign  which  now  began  lasted  but  for 
five  days.  While  Charles  Albert  scattered  his  forces 
from  Lago  Maggiore  to  Stradella  on  the  south  of  the 
Po,  hoping  to  move  by  the  northern  road  upon  Milan, 
Radetzky  concentrated  his  troops  near  Pavia,  where  he 
intended  to  cross  the  Ticino.  In  an  evil 

The  March  cnm- 

moment  Charles  Albert  had  given  the  com- 
mand of  his  army  to  Chrzanowski,  a  Pole,  and  had 
entrusted  its  southern  division,  composed  chiefly  of 
Lombard  volunteers,  to  another  Pole,  Ramorino,  who 
had  been  engaged  in  Mazzini's  incursion  into  Savoy  in 
1833.  Kamorino  had  then,  rightly  or  wrongly,  incurred 
the  charge  of  treachery.  His  relations  with  Chrzanow- 
ski were  of  the  worst  character,  and  the  habit  of  mili- 
tary obedience  was  as  much  wanting  to  him  as  the 
sentiment  of  loyalty  to  the  sovereign  from  whom 
he  had  now  accepted  a  command.  The  wilfulness  of 
this  adventurer  made  the  Piedmontese  army  an  easy 
prey.  Eamorino  was  posted  on  the  south  of  the 
Po,  near  its  junction  with  the  Ticino,  but  received 
orders  on  the  commencement  of  hostilities  to  move 
rorthwards  and  defend  the  passage  of  the  Ticino  at 
Pavia,  breaking  up  the  bridges  behind  him.  Instead 
of  obeying  this  order  he  kept  his  division  lingering 
about  Stradella.  Eadetzky,  approaching  the  Ticino  at 

*  Farini,  ii.  404.     Parl.  Pap..  1849,  Ivii.  607  ;  Iviii.  (2)  117.     Bianchi, 
Diplomazia,  vi.  67.     Gennarelli,  Sventure,  p.  29.     Pasolini,  p.  139. 

H  2 


100  MODERN   EUROPE.  1819. 

Pavia,  found  the  passage  unguarded.  He  crossed  the 
river  with  the  mass  of  his  army,  and,  cutting  off  Ramo- 
rino's  division,  threw  himself  upon  the  flank  of  the 
scattered  Piedmontese.  Charles  Albert,  whose  head- 
quarters were  at  Novara,  hurried  southwards.  Before 
he  could  concentrate  his  troops,  he  was  attacked  at 
Mortara  by  the  Austrians  and  driven  back.  The  line 
of  retreat  upon  Turin  and  Alessandria  was  already 
lost ;  an  attempt  was  made  to  hold  Novara  against  the 
advancing-  Austrians.  The  battle  which 

Battle   of   No-  & 

23>  was  fought  in  front  of  this  town  on  the 
23rd  of  March  ended  with  the  utter  overthrow  of  the 
'  Sardinian  army.  So  complete  was  the  demoralisation  of 
the  troops  that  the  cavalry  were  compelled  to  attack 
bodies  of  half-maddened  infantry  in  the  streets  of 
Novara  in  order  to  save  the  town  from  pillage.* 

Charles  Albert  had  throughout  the  battle  of  the 
23rd  appeared  to  seek  death.  The  reproaches  levelled 
against  him  for  the  abandonment  of  Milan  in  the 
previous  year,  the  charges  of  treachery  which  awoke  to 
new  life  the  miserable  record  of  his  w'averings  in  1821, 
had  sunk  into  the  very  depths  of  his  being.  Weak 
and  irresolute  in  his  earlier  political  career,  harsh  and 
illiberal  towards  the  pioneers  of  Italian  freedom  during 
a  great  part  of  his  reign,  Charles  had  thrown  his  whole 
heart  and  soul  into  the  final  struggle  of  his  country 
against  Austria.  This  struggle  lost,  life  had  nothing 

^ 

*  Schonhals,  p.  332.  Parl.  Pap.,  1849,  Iviii.  (2)  216.  Bianchi,  Politica 
Austriaca,  p.  134.  Lamarmora,  Un  Episodic,  p.  175.  Portafogli  di 
R/amorino,  p.  41.  Ramorino  was  condemned  to  death,  and  executed. 


1849.  NO  VARA.  101 

more  for  him.  The  personal  hatred  borne  towards  him 
by  the  rulers  of  Austria  caused  him  to  believe  that 
easier  terms  of  peace  might  be  granted  to  A^^m  ot 
Piedmont  if  another  sovereign  were  on  its 
throne,  and  his  resolution,  in  case  of  defeat,  was  fixed 
and  settled.  When  night  fell  after  the  battle  of  Novara 
he  called  together  his  generals,  and  in  their  presence 
abdicated  his  crown.  Bidding  an  eternal  farewell  to  his 
son  Victor  Emmanuel,  who  knelt  weeping  before  him, 
he  quitted  the  army  accompanied  by  but  one  attendant; 
and  passed  unrecognised  through  the  enemy's  guards. 
He  left  his  queen,  his  capital,  unvisited  as  he  journeyed 
into  exile.  The  brief  residue  of  his  life  was  spent  in 
solitude  near  Oporto.  Six  months  after  the  battle  of 
Novara  he  was  carried  to  the  grave. 

-  It  may  be  truly  said  of  Charles  Albert  that  nothing 
in  his  reign  became  him  like  the  ending  of  it.  Hope- 
less as  the  conflict  of  1849  might  well  appear,  it  proved 
that  there  was  one  sovereign  in  Italy  who  was  willing 
to  stake  his  throne,  his  life,  the  whole  sum  of  his  per- 
sonal interests,  for  the  national  cause ;  one  dynasty 
whose  sons  knew  no  fear  save  that  others  should  en- 
counter death  before  them  on  Italy's  behalf. 
Had  the  profoundest  statesmanship,  the  victor  Emma- 

nuel's    reign. 

keenest  political  genius,  governed  the  coun- 
sels of  Piedmont  in  1849,  it  would,  with  full  prescience 
of  the  ruin  of  Novara,  have  bidden  the  sovereign  and 
the  army  strike  in  self-sacrifice  their  last  unaided  blow. 
From  this  time  there  was  but  one  possible  head  for 
Italy.  The  faults  of  the  Government  of  Turin  during 


102  MODERN  EUROPE.  w». 

Charles  Albert's  years  of  peace  had  ceased  to  have  any 
bearing  on  Italian  affairs ;  the  sharpest  tongues  no 
longer  repeated,  the  most  credulous  ear  no  longer 
harboured  the  slanders  of  1848;  the  man  who,  beaten 
and  outnumbered,  had  for  hours  sat  immovable  in 
front  of  the  Austrian  cannon  at  Novara  had,  in  the 
depth  of  his  misfortune,  given  to  his  son  not  the  crown 
of  Piedmont  only  but  the  crown  of  Italy.  Honour, 
patriotism,  had  made  the  young  Victor  Emmanuel  the 
hope  of  the  Sardinian  army;  the  same  honour  and 
patriotism  carried  him  safely  past  the  lures  which  Aus- 
tria set  for  the  inheritor  of  a  ruined  kingdom,  and  gave 
in  the  first  hours  of  his  reign  an  earnest  of  the  policy 
which  was  to  end  in  Italian  union.  It  was  necessary 
for  him  to  visit  Radetzky  in  his  camp  in  order  to 
arrange  the  preliminaries  of  peace.  There,  amid  flat- 
teries offered  to  him  at  his  father's  expense,  it  was 
notified  to  him  that  if  he  would  annul  the  Constitution 
that  his  father  had  made,  he  might  reckon  not  only  on 
an  easy  quittance  with  the  conqueror  but  on  the  friend- 
ship and  support  of  Austria.  This  demand,  though 
strenuously  pressed  in  later  negotiations,  Victor  Em- 
manuel unconditionally  refused.  He  had  to  endure  for 
a  while  the  presence  of  Austrian  troops  in  his  kingdom, 
and  to  furnish  an  indemnity  which  fell  heavily  on  so 
small  a  State  ;  but  the  liberties  of  his  people  remained 
intact,  and  the  pledge  given  by  his  father  inviolate. 
Amid  the  ruin  of  all  hopes  and  the  bankruptcy  of  all 
other  royal  reputations  throughout  Italy,  there  proved  to 
be  one  man,  one  government,  in  which  the  Italian  people 


1849.  ROME.  103 

could  trust.  This  compensation  at  least  was  given  in 
the  disasters  of  1849,  that  the  traitors  to  the  cause  of 
Italy  and  of  freedom  could  not  again  deceive,  nor  the 
dream  of  a  federation  of  princes  again  obscure  the 
necessity  of  a  single  national  government.  In  the 
fidelity  of  Victor  Emmanuel  to  the  Piedmontese  Con- 
stitution lay  the  pledge  that  when  Italy's  next  opportu- 
nity should  arrive,  the  chief  would  be  there  who  would 
meet  the  nation's  need. 

The  battle  of  Novara  had  not  long  been  fought 
when  the  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany  was  restored  to  his 
throne  under  an  Austrian  garrison,  and  his 

Restoration  in 

late  democratic  Minister,  Guerazzi,  who  had 
endeavoured  by  submission  to  the  Court-party  to  avert 
an  Austrian  occupation,  was  sent  into  imprisonment. 
At  Rome  a  far  bolder  spirit  was  shown.  Mazzini  had 
arrived  in  the  first  week  of  March,  arid,  though  his 
,  exhortation  to  the  Roman  Assembly  to  for- 

*  Rome  and 

get  the  offences  of  Charles  Albert  and  to 
unite  against  the  Austrians  in  Lombardy  came  too  late, 
he  was  able,  as  one  of  a  Triumvirate  with  dictatorial 
powers,  to  throw  much  of  his  own  ardour  into  the 
Roman  populace  in  defence  of  their  own  city  and  State. 
The  enemy  against  whom  Rome  had  to  be  defended 
proved  indeed  to  be  other  than  that  against  whom  pre- 
parations were  being  made.  The  victories  of  Austria 
had  aroused  the  apprehension  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment ;  and  though  the  fall  of  Piedmont  and  Lombardy 
could  not  now  be  undone,  it  was  determined  by  Louis 
Napoleon  and  his  Ministers  to  anticipate  Austria's 


104  MODERN   EUROPE.  1849. 

restoration    of    the    Papal   power  by  the   despatch   of 
French  troops  to  Rome.     All  the  traditions  of  French 
national  policy  pointed  indeed  to  such  an  intervention. 
Austria  had  already  invaded  the  Roman  States  from  the 
north,  and  the  political  conditions  which  in  1832  had 
led   so  pacific  a  minister  as  Casimir  Perier  to   occupy 
Ancona  were  now  present  in  much  greater  force.    Louis 
Napoleon  could  not,  without  abandoning  a  recognised 
interest  and  surrendering  something  of  the  due  influence 
of  France,  have  permitted  Austrian  generals  to  conduct 
the  Pope  back  to  his  capital  and  to  assume  the  govern- 
ment of  Central   Italy.      If  the   first  impulses   of  the 
Revolution  of  1848  had  still  been  active  in  France,  its 
intervention  would  probably  have  taken  the  form  of  a 
direct  alliance  with  the  T^oman  Republic ;  but  public 
opinion  had  travelled  far  in  the  opposite  direction  since 
the  Four  Days  of  June  ;  and  the  new  President,  if  he 
had  not  forgotten  his  own  youthful  relations  with  the 
Carbonari,  was  now  a  suitor   for  the  solid  favours  of 
French    conservative    and    religious    sentiment.       His 
Ministers    had   not    recognised    the    Roman  Republic. 
They  were  friends,  no  doubt,  to  liberty ;  but  when  it 
was  certain  that  the  Austrians,  the  Spaniards,  the  Nea- 
politans, were  determined  to  restore  the  Pope,  it  might 
be  assumed  that  the  continuance  of  the  Roman  Republic 
was  an  impossibility.     France,  as  a  Catholic  and  at  the 
same  time  a  Liberal   Power,  might  well,  under  these 
circumstances,  address  itself  to  the  task  of  reconciling 
Roman  liberty  with  the  inevitable  return  of  the  Holy 
Father  to  his  temporal  throne.     Events  were  moving 


1849.  FRENCH  INTERVENTION.  105 

too  fast  for  diplomacy;  troops  must  be  at  once  de- 
spatched, or  the  next  French  envoy,  would  find  Radetzky 
on  the  Tiber:  The  misgivings  of  the  Eepublican  part 
of  the  Assembly  at  Paris  were  stilled  by  assurances  of 
the  generous  intentions  of  the  Government 

towards  the  Roman  populations,  and  of  its     ven«on  deter- 
mined on. 

anxiety  to  shelter  them  from  Austrian  do- 
mination. President,  Ministers,  and  generals  resolutely 
shut  their  eyes  to  the  possibility  that  a  French  occupa- 
tion of  Rome  might  be  resisted  by  force  by  the  Romans 
themselves ;  and  on  the  2.2nd  of  April  an  armament  of 
about  ten  thousand  men  set  sail  for  Civita  Vecchia 
under  the  command  of  General  Oudinot,  a  son  of  the 
Marshal  of  that  name. 

Before   landing  on  the    Italian    coast,  the   French 
general  sent  envoys  to  the   authorities   at 
Civita  Vecchia,  stating-  that  his  troops  came     csvita  veccwa, 

April  25,  1849. 

%&  friends,  and  demanding  that  they  should 
be  admitted  into  the  town.  The  Municipal  Council 
determined  not  to  offer  resistance,  and  the  French  thus 
gained  a  footing  on  Italian  soil  and  a  basis  for  their 
operations.  Messages  came  from  French  diplomatists 
in  Rome  encouraging  the  general  to  advance  without 
delay.  The  mass  of  the  population,  it  was  said,  would 
welcome  his  appearance ;  the  democratic  faction,  if 
reckless,  was  too  small  to  offer  any  serious  resistance, 
and  would  disappear  as  soon  as  the  French  should  enter 
the  city.  On  this  point,  however,  Oudinot  was  speedily 
undeceived.  In  reply  to  a  military  envoy  who  was 
sent  to  assure  the  Triumvirs  of  the  benevolent  designs 


306  MODERN  EUROPE.  1849 

of  the  French,  Mazzini  bluntly  answered  that  no  re- 
conciliation with  the  Pope  was  possible ;  and'  on  the 
26th  of  April  the  Roman  Assembly  called  upon  the 
Executive  to  repel  force  by  force.  Oudinot  now 
proclaimed  a  state  of  siege  at  Civita  Vecchia,  seized 
the  citadel,  and  disarmed  the  garrison.  On  the  28th 
he  began  his  march  on  Rome.  As  he  approached, 
energetic  preparations  were  made  for  resistance.  Gari- 
baldi, who  had  fought  at  the  head  of  a 

Oudinot  attacks        p  .  ,  -,  .          ,     .  •       TT 

Rome  and  is  re-     tree  corps  against  the  Austnans  in  U  pper 

pelled,  April  30. 

Italy  in  1848,  had  now  brought  some  hun- 
dreds of  his  followers  to  Rome.  A  regiment  of  Lom- 
bard volunteers,  under  their  young  leader  Manara,  had 
escaped  after  the  catastrophe  of  Novara,  and  had  come 
to  fight  for  liberty  in  its  last  stronghold  on  Italian 
soil.  Heroes,  exiles,  desperadoes  from  all  parts  of  the 
Peninsula,  met  in  the  streets  of  Rome,  and  imparted  to 
its  people  a  vigour  and  resolution  of  which  the  world 
had  long  deemed  them  incapable.  Even  the  remnant 
of  the  Pontifical  Gruard  took  part  in  the  work  of  de- 
fence. Oudinot,  advancing  with  his  little  corps  of 
seven  thousand  men,  found  himself,  without  heavy 
artillery,  in  front  of  a  city  still  sheltered  by  its  ancient 
fortifications,  and  in  the  presence  of  a  body  of  com- 
batants more  resolute  than  his  own  troops  and  twice  as 
numerous.  He  attacked  on  the  30th,  was  checked  at 
every  point,  and  compelled  to  retreat  towards  Civita 
Vecchia,  leaving  two  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy.* 

*  Garibaldi,  Epistolario,  i.  33.     Del  Vecchio,  L'assedio  di  Roma,  p.  £0. 


1819.  LESSEPS.  107 

Insignificant  as  was  this  misfortune  of  the  French 
arms,  it  occasioned  no  small  stir  in  Paris  and  in  the 
Assembly.  The  Government,  which  had  declared  that 
the  armament  Was  intended  only  to  protect 

French  policy, 

Rome  against  Austria,  was  vehemently  re-  AP^-M"*- 
proached  for  its  duplicity,  and  a  vote  was  passed  de- 
manding that  the  expedition  should  not  be  permanently 
diverted  from  the  end  assigned  to  it.  Had  the  As- 
sembly not  been  on  the  verge  of  dissolution  it  would 
probably  have  forced  upon  the  Government  a  real 
change  of  policy.  A  general  election,  however,  was 
but  a  few  days  distant,  and  until  the  result  of  this 
election  should  be  known  the  Ministry  determined  to 
temporise.  M.  Lesseps,  since  famous  as  the  creator  of 
the  Suez  Canal,  was  sent  to  Rome  with  instructions  to 
negotiate  for  some  peaceable  settlement.  More  honest 
than  his  employers,  Lesseps  sought  with  heart  and 
soul  to  fulfil. his  task.  While  he  laboured  in  city  and 
camp,  the  French  elections  for  which  the  President  and 
Ministers  were  waiting  took  place,  resulting  in  the 
return  of  a  Conservative  and  reactionary  majority.  The 
new  Assembly  met  on  the  28th  of  May.  In  the  course 
of  the  next  few  days  Lesseps  accepted  terms  proposed 
by  the  Roman  Government,  which  would  have  pre- 
cluded the  French  from  entering  Rome.  Oudinot,  who 
had  been  in  open  conflict  with  the  envoy  throughout 
his  mission,  refused  his  sanction  to  the  treaty,  and  the 

Yaillant,  Siege  de  Rome,  p.  12.  Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  vi.  213.  Guerzoni, 
Garibaldi,  i.  266.  Grariier  de  Cassagiiac,  ii.  59.  Lesseps,  Memoire,  p.  61. 
Barrot,  iii.  191.  Discours  dc  Napoleou  III.,  p.  38. 


108  MODERN  EUROPE.  1819. 

altercations  between  the  general  and  the  diplomatist 
were  still  at  their  height  when  despatches  arrived 
from  Paris  announcing  that  the  powers  given  to 
Lesseps  were  at  an  end,  and  ordering  Oudinot  to  re- 
commence hostilities.  The  pretence  of  further  negotia- 
tion would  have  heen  out  of  place  with  the  new  Par- 
liament. On  the  4th  of  June  the  French  general,  now 
strongly  reinforced,  occupied  the  positions  necessary  for 
a  regular  siege  of  Rome. 

Against  the  forces  now  brought  into  action  it  was 
impossible  that  the  Roman  Republic  could  long  defend 
itself.       One  hope  remained,  and   that  was  in  a  revo- 
lution within    France    itself.      The    recent 
smrection  in        elections  had    united  on   the   one    side    all 

1  ranee,  June  13. 

Conservative  interests,  on  the  other  the 
Socialists  and  all  the  more  extreme  factions  of  the 
Republican  party.  It  was  determined  that  a  trial  of 
strength  should  first  be  made  within  the  Assembly 
itsel£-upon  the  Roman  question,  and  that,  if  the  majority 
there  should  stand  firm,  an  appeal  should  be  made  to 
insurrection.  Accordingly  on  the  llth  of  June,  after 
the  renewal  of  hostilities  had  been  announced  in  Paris, 
(.  /,  Ledru  Rollin  demanded  the  impeachment  of  the  Minis- 
1  try.  His  motion  was  rejected,  and  the  signal  was 
given  for  an  outbreak  not  only  in  the  capital  but  in 
Lyons  and  other  cities.  But  the  Government  were  on 
their  guard,  and  it  was  in  vain  that  the  resources  of 
revolution  were  once  more  brought  into  play.  General 
Changarnier  suppressed  without  bloodshed  a  tumult  in 
Paris  on  June  13th;  and  though  fighting  took  place 


1849.  THE  FRENCH  ENTER  ROMK.  109 

at  Lyons,  the  insurrection  proved  feeble  in  comparison 
with  the  movements  of  the  previous  year.  Louis  Napo- 
leon and  his  Ministry  remained  unshaken,  and  the  siege 
of  Eome  was  accordingly  pressed  to  its  conclusion. 
Oudinot,  who  at  the  beginning  of  the  month  had  carried 
the  positions  held  by  the  Roman  troops  outside  the 
walls,  opened  fire  with  heavy  artillery  on  the  14th. 
The  defence  was  gallantly  sustained  by  Garibaldi  and 
his  companions  until  the  end  of  the  month,  when  the 
breaches  made  in  the  walls  were  stormed  by  the  enemy, 
and  further  resistance  became  impossible.  The  French 
made  their  entry  into  Rome  on  the  3rd  of  July,  Gari- 
baldi  leading  his  troops  northwards  in  order 
to  prolong  the  struggle  with  the  Austrians  enter  Rome, 
who  were  now  in  possession  of  Bologna,  and, 
if  possible,  to  reach  Venice,  which  was  still  uncaptured. 
Driven  to  the  eastern  coast  and  surrounded  by  the 
f>nemy,  he  was  forced  to  put  to  sea.  He  landed  again, 
but  only  to  be  hunted  over  mountain  and  forest.  His, 
wife  died  by  his  side.  Rescued  by  the  devotion  of 
Italian  patriots,  he  made  his  escape  to  Piedmont  and 
thence  to  America,  to  reappear  in  all  the  fame  of  his 
heroic  deeds  and  sufferings  at  the  next  great  crisis  in 
the  history  of  his  country. 

It  had  been  an  easy  task  for  a  French  army  to  con- 
quer Rome;  it  was  not  so  easy  for  the  French 'Govern- 
ment   to  escape  from  the  embarrassments 
of  its  victory.  Liberalism  was  still  the  official     Pontifical 

<f  Government. 

creed  of  the  Republic,  and  the  protection  of 

the  Roman  population  from  a  reaction  under  Austrian 


110  MODERN   EUROPE.  isto. 

auspices  had  been   one   of  the   alleged   objects  of   the 
Italian  expedition.     No  stipulation  had,  however,  been 
made  with  the  Pope  during  the  siege  as  to  the  future 
institutions  of  Rome  ;  and  when,  on  the  14th  of  July, 
the  restoration  of  Papal   authority   was    formally  an- 
nouuced  by  Oudinot,  Pius  and  his  Minister  Antonelli 
still  remained  unfettered  by  any  binding  engagement. 
Nor  did  the  Pontiff  show  the  least  inclination  to  place 
himself  in  the  power  of  his  protectors.     He  remained 
at  Gaeta,  sending  a  Commission  of  three  Cardinals  to 
assume  the   government  of  Rome.      The   first  acts  of 
the   Cardinals  dispelled    any  illusion   that   the  French 
might  have  formed  as  to  the  docility  of  the  Holy  See. 
In   the    presence  of  a  French   Republican  army   they 
restored  the    Inquisition,    and    appointed   a   Board    to 
bring  to  trial  all  officials  compromised  in  the  events 
that   had    taken   place    since  the  murder  of   Rossi   in 
November,  1848.     So   great  was  the  impression  made 
on  public  opinion  by  the  action  of  the  Cardinals  that 
Louis  Napoleon  considered  it  well  to  enter  the  lists  in 
person  on  behalf  of  Roman  liberty  ;  and  in  a  letter  to 
Colonel  Ney,   a  son  of  the  Marshal,  he  denounced  in 
language  of  great  violence  the  efforts  that  were  being 
made  by  a  party  antagonistic  to  France   to   base  the 
Pope's  return  upon  proscription  and  tyranny.     Strong 
in  the  support  of  Austria  and  the  other  Catholic  Powers, 
the  Papal  Government  at  Gaeta  received  this  menace 
with  indifference,  and  even  made  the  discourtesy  of  the 
President  a  ground  for   withholding   concessions.     Of 
the   re-establishment    of  the   Constitution   granted   by 


1819.  ROME.  Ill 

Pius  in  1843  there  was  now  no  question;  all  that  the 
French  Ministry  could  hope  was  to  save  some  frag- 
ments in  the  general  shipwreck  of  representative  govern- 
ment, and  to  avert  the  vengeance  that  seemed  likely  to 
fall  upon  the  defeated  party.  A  Pontifical  edict,  known 
as  the  Motu  PropnV  ultimately  bestowed  upon  the 
municipalities  certain  local  powers,  and  gave  to  a  Coun- 
cil, nominated  by  the  Pope  from  among  the  persons 
chosen  by  the  municipalities,  the  right  of  consultation 
on  matters  of  finance.  More  than  this  Pius  refused  to 
grant,  and  when  he  returned  to  Rome  it  was  as  an 
absolute  sovereign.  In  its  efforts  on  behalf  of  the  large 
body  of  persons  threatened  with  prosecution  the  French 
Government  was  more  successful.  The  so-called  am- 
nesty which  was  published  by  Antonelli  with  the  Motu 
Proprio  seemed  indeed  to  have  for  its  object  the  classi- 
fication of  victims  rather  than  the  announcement  of 
pardon ;  but  under  pressure  from  the  French  the  ex- 
cepted  persons  were  gradually  diminished  in  number, 
and  all  were  finally  allowed  to  escape  other  penalties 
by  going  into  exile.  To  those  who  were  so  driven  from 
their  homes  Piedmont  offered  a  refuge. 

Thus  the  pall  of  priestly  absolutism  and  misrule 
fell  once  more  over  the  Roman  States,  and  the  deeper 
the  hostility  of  the  educated  classes  to  the  restored 
power  the  more  active  became  the  system  of  repression.- 
For  liberty  of  person  there  was  no  security  whatever, 
and,  though  the  offences  of  1848  were  now  professedly 
amnestied,  the  prisons  were  soon  thronged  with  persons 
arrested  on  indefinite  charges  and  detained  for  an 


112  MODERN   EUROPE. 


1849. 


unlimited  time  without  trial.  Nor  was  Rome  more  unfor- 
Faii  of  Venice  tunate  in  its  condition  than  Italy  generally. 

The  restoration  of  Austrian  authority  in 
the  north  was  completed  by  the  fall  of  Venice.  For 
months  after  the  subjugation  of  the  mainland,  Venice, 
where  the  E-epublic  had  again  been  proclaimed  and 
Manin  had  been  recalled  to  power,  had  withstood  all 
the  efforts  of  the  Emperor's  forces.  Its  hopes  had  been 
raised  by  the  victories  of  the  Hungarians,  which  for  a 
moment  seemed  almost  to  undo  the  catastrophe  of 
Novara.  But  with  the  extinction  of  all  possibility  of 
Hungarian  aid  the  inevitable  end  came  in  view. 
Cholera  and  famine  worked  with  the  enemy  ;  and  a 
fortnight  after  Gorgei  had  laid  down  his  arms  at 
Vilagos  the  long  and  honourable  resistance  of  Venice 
ended  with  the  entry  of  the  Austrians  (August  25th). 
In  the  south,  Ferdinand  of  Naples  was  again  ruling  as 

despot  throughout  the   full   extent  of   his 


by1    emand,     dominions.     Palermo,  which  had  struck  the 

April,  May. 

first  blow  for  freedom  in  1848,  had  soon 
afterwards  become  the  seat  of  a  Sicilian  Parliament, 
which  deposed  the  Bourbon  dynasty  and  offered  the 
throne  of  Sicily  to  the  younger  brother  of  Victor 
Emmanuel.  To  this  Ferdinand  replied  by  sending 
a  fleet  to  Messina,  which  bombarded  that  city  for  five 
days  and  laid  a  great  part  of  it  in  ashes.  His  violence 
caused  the  British  and  French  fleets  to  interpose,  and 
hostilities  were  suspended  until  the  spring  of  1849,  the 
Western  Powers  ineffectually  seeking  to  frame  some 
compromise  acceptable  at  once  to  the  Sicilians  and  to 


1819.  NAPLES   AND    SICILY.  113 

the  Bourbon  dynasty.     After  the  triumph  of  Radetzky 
at  Novara  and  the  rejection  by  the  Sicilian  Parliament 
of  the  offer  of  a  separate  constitution  and  administra- 
tion for  the  island,  Ferdinand  refused  to  remain  any 
longer  inactive.     His  fleet  and  army  rapved  southwards 
from  Messina,  and  a  victory  won  at  the  foot  of  Mount 
Etna  over  the  Sicilian  forces,  followed  by  the  capture  of 
Catania,  brought  the  struggle  to  a  close.  The  Assembly 
at  Palermo  dispersed,  and  the  Neapolitan  troops  made 
their  entry  into  the  capital  without  resistance  on  the 
15th  of  May.     It  was  in  vain  that  Great  Britain  now 
urged  Ferdinand  to  grant  to  Sicily  the  liberties  which 
he  had  hitherto  professed   himself  willing  to  bestow. 
Autocrat  he  was,  and  autocrat  he  intended  to  remain. 
Ou  the  mainland  the  iniquities  practised  by  his  agents 
seem  to  have  been  even  worse  than  in  Sicily,  where  at 
least  some  attempt  was  made  to  use  the  powers  of  the 
State  for  the  purposes  of  material  improvement.     For 
those    who   had    incurred   the    enmity    of   Ferdinand's 
Government   there  was    no    law  and   no    mercy.     Ten 
years    of    violence    and    oppression,    denounced  by  the 
voice  of  freer  lands,  had  still  to  be  borne  by  the  subjects 
of  this  obstinate  tyrant  ere  the  reckoning-day  arrived, 
and   the    deeply    rooted   jealousy   between   Sicily   and 
N;i pies,  which  had  wrought  so  much  ill  to  the  cause 
of  Italian  freedom,  was  appeased  by  the  fall    of   the 
Bourbon  throne.* -^L 

We    have   thus    far   traced   the    stages    of   conflict 

*  Manin,  Documents,  ii.  340.     Perlbach,  Manin,  p.  37.     Gennarelli, 
Governo  Poutificio,  i.  32.     Contariui,  p.  224. 


114  MODERN  EUROPE. 


1848. 


between  the  old  monarchical  order  and  the  forces  of 
Germany  from  revolution  in  the  Austrian  empire  and  in 

that  Mediterranean  land  whose  destiny  was 
so  closely  interwoven  with  that  of  Austria.  We  have 
now  to  pass  back  into  Germany,  and  to  resume  the 
history  of  the  German  revolution  at  tne  point  where 
the  national  movement  seemed  to  concentrate  itself  in 
visible  form,  the  opening  of  the  Parliament  of  Frank- 
fort on  the  18th  of  May,  1848.  That  an  Assembly 

representing    the    entire    German    people, 

The  National  . 

Assembly  at      elected  in  unbounded  enthusiasm  and  com- 

Frankfort. 

prising  within  it  nearly  every  man  of  poli- 
tical or  intellectual  eminence  who  sympathised  with  the 
national  cause,  should  be  able  tc||  impose  its  will  upon 
the  tottering  Governments  of  the  individual  German 
States,  was  not  an  unnatural  belief  in  the  circum- 
stances of  the  moment.  No  second  Chamber  represented 
the  interests  of  the  ruling  Houses,  nor  had  they  within 
the  Assembly  itself  the  organs  for  the  expression  of 
their  own  real  or  unreal  claims.  With  all  the  freedom 
of  a  debating  club  or  of  a  sovereign  authority  like  the 
French  Convention,  the  Parliament  of  Frankfort  entered 
upon  its  work  of  moulding  Germany  afresh,  limited 
only  by  its  own  discretion  as  to  what  it  should  make 
matter  of  consultation  with  any  other  power./  There 
were  thirty-six  Governments  in  Germany,  and  to 
negotiate  with  each  of  these  on  the  future  Constitu- 
tion might  well  seem  a  harder  task  than  to  enforce  a 
Constitution  on  all  alike.  In  the  creation  of  a  pro- 
visional executive  authority  there  was  something  of  the 


I8t8.  GERMAN'  NATIONAL    ASSEMBLY.  115 

same  difficulty.  Each  of  the  larger  States  might,  if 
consulted,  resist  the  selection  of  a  provisional  chief  from 
one  of  its  rivals ;  and  though  the  risk  of  bold  action 
was  not  denied,  the  Assembly,  on  the  instance  of  its 
President,  Von  Gagern,  a  former*  Minister  of  Hesse- 
Darmstadt,  resolved  to  appoint  an  Administrator  oj: 
the  Empire  by  a  direct  vote  of  its  own.  The 
Archduke  John  of  Austria,  long  known  as  an  enemy 
of  Metternich's  system  of  repression  and  as  a  patron 
of  the  idea  of  German  union,  was  chosen  Adminis- 
trator, and  he  accepted  the  office.  Prussia  and  the 
other  States  acquiesced  in  the  nomination,  though 
the  choice  of  a  Hapsburg  prince  was 

-.  •    i        j  i  -rt  •  •  ^        Archduke  John 

unpopular   with  the    Prussian  nation   and     chosen Admims- 

trator,  June  29. 

army,  and  did   not  improve   the  relations 
between   the    Frankfort   Assembly  and    the   Court    of 
Berlin.*     Schmerling,  an  Austrian,  was  placed  at  the 
head  of  the  Archduke's  Ministry. 

,/^In   the  preparation  of  a  Constitution  for  Germany 
the  Assembly  could  draw  little  help  from  the  work  of 
legislators  in  other  countries.     Belgium,  whose  institu- 
tions were  at   once  recent  and   successful, 
was  not  a  Federal  State  ;  the  founders  of  the     A^embiyT 

May— Sept. 

American  Union  had  not  had  to  reckon  with 
four  kings  and  to  include  in  their  federal  territory  part 
of  the  dominions  of  an  emperor.     Instead  of  grappling 
at   once    with   the    formidable    difficulties    of   political 

*  Verhandlungen  der  National  Versammlung,  i.  576.  Radowitz,  Werke, 

iii.  369.  Briefwechsel  Friedrick  Wilhelms,  p.  205.  Biedennann,  Dreissig 
Jahre,  i.  295. 

/  2 


116  MODERN  EUROPE.  isia 

organisation,  the  Committee  charged  with  the  drafting_ 
of  a  Constitution  determined  first  to  lay  dowrTtheprj 
ciples  of^civil  right  which  were  to  Be~The~^Dasis  of  the 
German^-eomtn^n^ealth^  There"  was  some^lnng^oTThe 
scientific"  "spirit  of  the  Germans  in  thus  working  out  the 
substructure  of  public  law  on  which  all  other  institu- 
tions were  to  rest  ;  moreover,  the  remembrance  of  the 
Decrees  of  Carlsbad  and  of  the  other  exceptional  legis- 
lation from  which  Germany  had  so  heavily  suffered  ex- 
cited a  strong  demand  for  the  most  solemn  guarantees 
against  arbitrary  departure  from  settled  law  in  the 
future.  Thus,  regardless  of  the  absence  of  any  material 
power  by  which  its  conclusions  were  to  be  enforced,  the 
Assembly,  m-the.  jnteryals  between  its  storrny_debates 
on  the  politics  of  the  hour,  traced  with  philosophic 
thoroughness  the  cohsegneiroes  —  of  the 


i  personal  "IrberEy  and  of  equality  before  the  law,  and 
fashioned  the  order  of  a  modern  society  in  which  pri- 
vileges of  class,  diversity  of  jurisdictions,  and  the  tram- 
mels of  feudalism  on  industrial  life  were  alike  swept 
away.  Four  months  had  passed,  and  the  discussion  of 
hlTsb-  called  Primary  Rights  was  still  unfinished,  when 
the  Assembly  was  warned  by  an  outbreak  of  popular 
violence  in  Frankfort  itself  of  the  necessity  of  hasten- 
ing towards  a  constitutional  settlement. 

The  progress  of  the  insurrection  in  Schleswig-Hol- 

stein  against  Danish  sovereignty  had  been 

oiMaimo,  watched  with  the  greatest  interest  through- 

out Germany  ;  and  in  the  struggle  of  these 

provinces   for   their   independence    the  rights   and  the 


isis.  SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.  117 

honour  of  the  German  nation  at  large  were  held  to 
be  deeply  involved.  As  the  representative  of  the 
Federal  authority,  King  Frederick  William  of  Prussia 
had  sent  his  troops  into  Holstein,  and  they  arrived 
there  in  time  to  prevent  the  Danish  army  from  follow 
ing  up  its  first  successes  and  crushing  the  insurgent 
forces.  Taking  up  the  offensive,  General  Wrangel  at 
the  head  of  th*e  Prussian  troops  succeeded  in  driving 
the  Danes  out  of  Schleswig,  and  at  the  beginning  of 
May  he  crossed  the  border  between  Schleswig  and 
Jutland  and  occupied  the  Danish  fortress  of  Fredericia. 
His  advance  into  purely  Danish  territory  occasioned  the 
diplomatic  intervention  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain ; 
and,  to  the  deep  disappointment  of  the  German  nation 
and  its  Parliament,  the  King  of  Prussia  ordered  his 
general  to  retire  into  Schleswig.  The  Danes  were  in 
the  meantime  blockading  the  harbours  and  capturing 
the  merchant-vessels  of  the  Germans,  as  neither  Prussia 
nor  the  Federal  Government  possessed  a  fleet  of  war. 
For  some  weeks  hostilities  were  irresolutely  continued 
in  Schleswig,  while  negotiations  were  pursued  in  foreign 
capitals  and  various  forms  of  compromise  urged  by 
foreign  Powers.  At  length,  on  the  26th  of  August,  an 
armistice  of  seven  months  was  agreed  upon  at  Malmo  in 
Sweden  by  the  representatives  of  Denmark  and  Prussia, 
the  Court  of  Copenhagen  refusing  to  recognise  the  Ger- 
man central  Government  at  Frankfort  or  to  admit  its 
envoy  to  the  conferences.  The  terms  of  this  armistice, 
when  announced  in  Germany,  excited  the  greatest  in- 
dignation, inasmuch  as  they  declared  all  the  acts  of  the 


118  MODERN   EUROPE.  1848. 

Provisional  Government  of  Schleswig-Holstein  null  and 
void,  removed  all  German  troops  from  the  Duchies,  and 
handed  over  their  government  during  the  duration  of 
the  armistice  to  a  Commission  of  which  half  the  mem- 
bers were  to  be  appointed  by  the  King  of  Denmark. 
Scornfully  as  Denmark  had  treated  the  Assembly  of 
Frankfort,  the  terms  of  the  armistice  nevertheless  re- 
quired its  sanction.  The  question  was  referred  to  a 
committee,  which,  under  the  influence  of  the  his- 
torian Dahlmann,  himself  formerly  an  official  in  Hoi- 
stein,  pronounced  for  the  rejection  of  the  treaty. 
The  Assembly,  in  a  scene  of  great  excitement,  re- 
solved that  the  execution  of  the  measures  at- 
tendant on  the  armistice  should  be  suspended. 
The  Ministry  in  consequence  resigned,  and  Dahl- 
mann was  called  upon  to  replace  it  by  one  under 
his  own  leadership.  He  proved  unable  to  do  so. 
Schmerling  resumed  office,  and  demanded  that  the 
Assembly  should  reverse  its  vote.  Though  in  sever- 
ance from  Prussia  the  Central  Government  had  no  real 
means  of  carrying  on  a  war  with  Denmark,  the  most 
passionate  opposition  was  made  to  this  demand.  The 
armistice  was,  however,  ultimately  ratified  by  a  small 
majority.  Defeated  in  the  Assembly,  the  leaders  of  the 
extreme  Democratic  faction  allied  themselves  with  the 
populace  of  Frankfort,  which  was  ready  for 
Frankfort,  acts  of  violence.  Tumultuous  meetings 

Sept.  18. 

were  held;  the  deputies  who  had  voted  for 
the  armistice  were  declared  traitors  to  Germany.  Barri- 
cades were  erected,  and  although  the  appearance  of 


1848.  BERLIN.  119 

Prussian  troops  prevented  an  assault  from  being 
made  on  the  Assembly;  its  members  were  attacked 
in  the  streets,  and  two  of  them  murdered  by  the  mob 
(Sept.  17th).  A  Republican  insurrection  was  once 
more  attempted  in  Baden,  but  it  was  quelled  without 
difficulty.  * 

The  intervention  of  foreign  Courts  on  behalf  of 
Denmark  had  given  ostensible  ground  to  the  Prus- 
sian Government  for  not  pursuing  the  war  with 
greater  resolution;  but  though  the  fear  of  Eussia  un- 
doubtedly checked  King  Frederick  William,  this  was 
not  the  sole,  nor  perhaps  the  most  powerful  influence 
that  worked  upon  him.  The  cause  of  Schleswig- Hoi- 
stein  was,  in  spite  of  its  legal  basis,  in  the  main  a 
popular  and  a  revolutionary  one,  and  between  the 
King  of  Prussia  and  the  revolution  there  was  an  in- 
tense and  a  constantly  deepening  antago-  Berlin  A  ril_ 
nism.  Since  the  meeting  of  the  National  Sept'' 1848' 
Assembty  at  Berlin  on  the  22nd  of  May  the  capital  had 
been  the  scene  of  an  almost  unbroken  course  of  disorder. 
The  Assembly,  which  was  far  inferior  in  ability  and 
character  to  that  of  Frankfort,  soon  showed  itself 
unable  to  resist  the  influence  of  the  populace.  On  the 
8th  of  June  a  resolution  was  moved  that  the  combat- 
ants in  the  insurrection  of  March  deserved  well  of  their 
country.  Had  this  motion  been  carried  the  King 
would  have  dissolved  the  Assembly :  it  was  outvoted, 

*  Verhandlungen  der  National  Versammlung,  ii.  1877,  2185.  Herzog 
Ernst  II.,  Aus  meinem  Lebeu,  i.  313.  Biedermaun,  i.  306.  Beseler, 
Erlebtes,  p.  68.  Waitz,  Friede  mit  Danemark.  Radowitz,  iii.  4(J6. 


120  MODERN  EUROPE.  IMS. 

but  the  mob  punished  this  concession  to  the  feelings  of 
the    monarch  by  outrages   upon   the    members  of  the 
majority.     A  Civic  Guard   was  enrolled  from  citizens 
of  the  middle  class,  but  it  proved  unable  to  maintain 
order,  and  wholly  failed  to  acquire  the  political  import- 
ance   which    was   gained    by    the   National   Guard    of 
Paris    after  the   revolution  of   1830.     Exasperated  by 
their  exclusion  from  service    in   the   Guard,   the  mob 
on  the  14  oh  of  June  stormed  an  arsenal  and  destroyed 
the  trophies  of  arms  which  they  found  there.     Though 
violence  reigned  in  the  streets  the  Assembly  rejected  a 
proposal  for  declaring  the  inviolability  of  its  members, 
and  placed  itself  under  the  protection  of  the  citizens  of 
Berlin.      King    Frederick  William  had  withdrawn  to 
Potsdam,  where  the  leaders  of  reaction  gathered  round 
him.     He  detested  his  Constitutional  Ministers,   who, 
between  a  petulant  king  and  a  suspicious  Parliament, 
were  unable  to  effect  any  useful  work  and  soon  found 
themselves    compelled   to    relinquish    their    office.      In 
Berlin  the  violence  of  the  working  classes,  the  inter- 
ruption of  business,  the  example  of  civil  war  in  Paris, 
inclined  men  of  quiet  disposition  to  a  return  to  settled 
government  at  any  price.     Measures  brought  forward 
by  the    new  Ministry  for  the  abolition   of  the  patri- 
monial jurisdictions,  the  hunting-rights  and  other  feudal 
privileges    of   the   greater   landowners,   occasioned   the 
organisation  of  a  league  for  the  defence  of  property,  which 
soon  became  the  focus  of  powerful  conservative  interests. 
Above  all,  the  claims  of  the  Archduke  John,  as  Ad- 
ministrator of  the  Empire,  to  the  homage  of  the  army, 


1848. 


BERLIN.  121 


and  the  hostile  attitude  assumed  towards  the  army 
by  the  Prussian  Parliament  itself,  exasperated  the 
military  class  and  encouraged  the  king  to  venture  on 
open  resistance.  A  tumult  having  taken  place  at 
Schweidnitz  in  Silesia,  in  which  several  persons  were 
shot  by  the  soldiery,  the  Assembly,  pending  an  in- 
vestigation into  the  circumstances,  demanded  that  the 
Minister  of  War  should  publish  an  order  requiring  the 
officers  of  the  army  to  work  with  the  citizens  for  the 
realisation  of  Constitutional  Government ;  and  it  called 
upon  all  officers  not  loyally  inclined  to  a  Constitutional 
system  to  resign  their  commissions  as  a  matter  of 
honour.  Denying  the  right  of  the  Chamber  to  act  as  a 
military  executive,  the  Minister  of  War  refused  to  pub- 
lish the  order  required.  The  vote  was  repeated,  and 
in  the  midst  of  threatening  demonstrations  in  the  streets 
the  Ministry  resigned  (Sept.  7th).* 

It  had  been  the  distinguishing  feature  of  the  Prus- 
sian revolution  that  the  army  had  never  for  a  moment 
wavered  in  its  fidelity  to  the  throne.  The  ThePrussian 
success  of  the  insurrection  of  March  18th 
had  been  due  to  the  paucity  of  troops  and  the  errors  of 
those  in  command,  not  to  any  military  disaffection 
such  as  had  paralysed  authority,  in  Paris  and  in  the 
Mediterranean  States.  Each  affront  offered  to  the 
army  by  the  democratic  majority  in  the  Assembly  sup- 
plied the  King  with  new  weapons ;  each  slight  passed 
upon  the  royal  authority  deepened  the  indignation  of 

*  Brief  wechsel  Friedrich  Wilhelins,  p.  184.    Wageuer,  Erlebfces,  p.  28. 
Stahr,  Preussische  Revolution,  i.  453. 


122  MODERN  EUROPE.  ism. 

the  officers.  The  armistice  of  Malmo  brought  back  to 
the  neighbourhood  of  the  capital  a  general  who  was 
longing  to  crush  the  party  of  disorder,  and  regiments 
on  whom  he  could  rely  ;  but  though  there  was  now  no 
military  reason  for  delay,  it  was  not  until  the  capture  of 
Vienna  by  Windischgratz  had  dealt  a  fatal  blow  at 
democracy  in  Germany  that  Frederick  William  deter- 
mined to  have  done  with  his  own  mutinous  Parliament 
and  the  mobs  by  which  it  was  controlled.  During 
September  and  October  the  riots  and  tumults  in  the 
streets  of  Berlin  continued.  The  Assembly,  w^hich  had 
rejected  the  draft  of  a  Constitution  submitted  to  it  by 
the  Cabinet,  debated  the  clauses  of  one  drawn  up  by 
a  Committee  of  its  own  members,  abolished  nobility, 
orders  and  titles,  and  struck  out  from  the  style  of  the 
sovereign  the  words  that  described  him  as  King  by  the 
Grace  of  God.  When  intelligence  arrived  in  Berlin 
that  the  attack  of  Windischgratz  upon  Vienna  had 
actually  begun,  popular  passion  redoubled.  The  As- 
sembly was  besieged  by  an  angry  crowd,  and  a  resolu- 
tion in  favour  of  the  intervention  of  Prussia  was  brought 
forward  within  the  House.  This  was  rejected,  and  it 
was  determined  instead  to  invoke  the  mediation  of  the 
Central  Government  at  Frankfort  between  the  Emperor 
and  his  subjects.  But  the  decision  of  the  Assembly  on 
this  and  every  other  point  was  now  matter 
burg  Minister,  of  indifference.  Events  outstripped  its  de- 

Nov.  2. 

liberations,  and  with  the  fall  of  Vienna 
its  own  course  was  run.  On  the  2nd  of  November  the 
King  dismissed  his  Ministers  and  called  to  office  the 

r- 


1843.  END    OF    THE   PRUSSIAN  PARLIAMENT.  123 

Count  of  Brandenburg,  a  natural  son  of  Frederick 
William  II.,  a  soldier  in  high  command,  and  one  of 
the  most  outspoken  representatives  of  the  monarchical 
spirit  of  the  army.  The  meaning  of  the  appointment 
was  at  once  understood.  A  deputation  from  the  As« 
sembly  conveyed  its  protest  to  the  King  at  Potsdam. 
The  King  turned  his  back  upon  them  with- 

,  n         mi          £       Prorogation  *  of 

out  giving  an  answer,  and  on  the  ytn  01     Ffus£j*"  ^   m~ 
November  an  order  was  issued  proroguing 
the  Assembly,  and  bidding  it  to  meet  on  the  27th  at 
Brandenburg,  not  at  Berlin. 

The  order  of  prorogation,  as  soon  as  signed  by  the 
King,  was  brought  into  the  Assembly  by  the  Ministers, 
who  demanded  that  it  should  be  obeyed  immediately 
and  without  discussion.  The  President 

.  _    -  i  -i         -»  T  •     •  Last  days  of 

allo winer  a  debate  to  commence,  the  Minis-     the  Prussian 

Assembly. 

ters  and  seventy-eight  Conservative  deputies 
le'ft  the  Hall.  The  remaining  deputies,  two  hundred 
and  eighty  in  number,  then  passed  a  resolution  declaring 
that  they  would  not  meet  at  Brandenburg ;  that  the 
King  had  no  power  to  remove,  to  prorogue,  or  to 
dissolve  the  Assembly  without  its  own  consent ;  and 
that  the  Ministers  were  unfit  to  hold  office.  This  chal- 
lenge was  answered  by  a  proclamation  of  the  Ministers 
declaring  the  further  meeting  of  the  deputies  il- 
legal, and  calling  upon  the  Civic  Guard  not  to  recog- 
nise them  as  a  Parliament.  On  the  following  day 
General  Wrangel  and  his  troops  entered  Berlin  and 
surrounded  the  Assembly  Hall.  In  reply  to  the  pro- 
tests of  the  President,  Wrangel  answered  that  the 


124  MODERN  EUROPE.  18*3. 

Parliament  had  been  prorogued  and  must  disappear. 
The  members  peaceably  left  the  Hall,  but  reassembled 
at  another  spot  that  they  had  selected  in  anticipation  of 
expulsion ;  and  for  some  days  they  were  pursued  by 
the  military  from  one  place  of  meeting  to  another.  On 
the  1 5th  of  November  they  passed  a  resolution  declaring 
the  expenditure  of  state-funds  and  the  raising  of  taxes 
by  the  Government  to  be  illegal  so  long  as  the  Assem- 
bly should  not  be  permitted  to  continue  its  delibera- 
tions. The  Ministry  on  its  part  showed  that  it  was 
determined  not  to  brook  resistance.  The  Civic  Guard 
was  dissolved  and  ordered  to  surrender  its  arms.  It 
did  so  without  striking  a  blow,  and  vanished  from  the 
scene,  a  memorable  illustration  of  the  political  nullity 
of  the  middle  class  in  Berlin  as  compared  with  that  of 
Paris.  The  state  of  siege  was  proclaimed,  the  freedom 
of  the  Press  and  the  right  of  public  "meeting  were  sus- 
pended. On  the  27th  of  November  a  portion  of  the 
Assembly  appeared,  according  to  the  King's  order, 
at  Brandenburg,  but  the  numbers,  present  were  not 
sufficient  for  the  transaction  of  business.  The 
presence  of  the  majority,  however,  was  not  required, 
for  the  King  had  determined  to  give  no  further 
legal  opportunities  to  the  men  who  had  defied  him. 
Treating  the  vote  of  November  1.5th  as  an  act  of  rebel- 
lion on  the  part  of  those  concerned  in  it, 
taw  Awembiy,  the  King  dissolved  the  Assembly  (Decem- 
ber 5th),  and  conferred  upon  Prussia  a  Con- 
stitution drawn  up  by  his  own  advisers,  with  the  pro- 
mise that  this  Constitution  should  be  subject  to  revision 


1848.  PRUSSIAN   CONSTITUTION.  125 

by  the  future  representative  body.  Though  the  dis- 
solution of  the  Assembly  occasioned  tumults  in  Breslau 
and  Cologne  it  was  not  actively  resented  by 

.  T  .  .  ,     i  m,  .     -,  en  Prussian  Consti- 

the  nation  at  large.     The  violence  or  the     tution   granted 

-,  by  edict. 

fallen  body  during  its  last  weeks  of  exist- 
ence had  exposed  it  to  general  discredit ;  its  vote  of 
the  15th  of  November  had  been  formally  condemned  by 
the  Parliament  of  Frankfort ;  and  the  liberal  character 
of  the  new  Constitution,  which  agreed  in  the  main  with 
thn  draft-Constitution  produced  by  the  Committee  of 
the  Assembly,  disposed  moderate  men  to  the  belief  that 
in  the  conflict  between  the  King  and  the  popular  repre- 
sentatives the  fault  had  not  been  on  the  side  of  the 
sovereign. 

In  the  meantime  the  Parliament  of  Frankfort, 
warned  against  longer  delay  by  the  disturbances  ot 
September  1  7th,  had  addressed  itself  in  earnest  to  the 
settlement  of  the  Federal  Constitution  of  Germany. 
Above  a  host  of  minor  difficulties  two  great  problems 
confronted  it  at  the  outset.  The  first  was 

The     Frankfort 

the  relation  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  with  IaurS,enoct.- 
its  partly  German  and  partly  foreign  terri- 
tory, to  the  German  national  State ;  the  other  was  the 
nature  of  the  headship  to  be  established.  As  it  was 
clear  that  the  A  ustrian  Government  could  not  apply  the 
public  law  of  Germany  to  its  Slavic  and  Hungarian  pro- 
vinces, it  was  enacted  in  the  second  article  of  the  Frank- 
fort Constitution  that  where  a  German  and  a  non-German 
territory  had  the  same  sovereign,  the  relation  between 
these  countries  must  be  one  of  purely  personal  union 


126  MODERN  EUROPE.  1848. 

under  the  sovereign,  no  part  of  Germany  being  incor- 
porated into  a  single  State  with  any  non- German  land. 
At  the  time  when  this  article  was  drafted  the  disintegra- 
tion of  Austria  seemed  more  probable  than  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  its  unity ;  no  sooner,  however,  had  Prince 
Schwarzenberg  been  brought  into  power  by  the  subju- 
gation of  Vienna,  than  he  made  it  plain  that  the 
government  of  Austria  was  to  be  centralised  as  it  had 
never  been  before.  In  the  lirst  public  declaration  of 
his  policy  he  announced  that  Austria  would  maintain 
its  unity  and  permit  no  exterior  influence  to  modify  its 
internal  organisation ;  that  the  settlement  of  the  rela- 
tions between  Austria  and  Germany  could  only  be 
effected  after  each  had  gained  some  new  and  abiding 
political  form  ;  and  that  in  the  meantime  Austria  would 
continue  to  fulfil  its  duties  as  a  confederate.*  The  in-, 
terpretation  put  upon  this  statement  at  Frankfort  was 
that  Austria,  in  the  interest  of  its  own  unity,  preferred 
not  to  enter  the  German  body,  but  looked  forward  to 
the  establishment  of  some  intimate  alliance  with  it  at 
a  future  time.  As  the  Court  of  Vienna  had  evidently 
determined  not  to  apply  to  itself  the  second  article  of 
the  Constitution,  and  an  antagonism  between  German 
and  Austrian  policy  came  within  view,  Schmerling*'as 
an  Austrian  subject,  was  induced  to  resign  his  office, 
and  was  succeeded  in  it  by  Gagern,  hitherto  President 
of  the  Assembly  (Dec.  16th).f 

*  Seine  Bundespflichten  :  an  ambiguous  expression  that  might  mean 
either  its  duties  as  an  ally  or  its  duties  as  a  member  of  the  German 
Federation.  The  obscurity  was  probably  intentional. 

f  Verhandlungen   der    National    Yersammluug,    vi.    4225.      Hayin, 


1849.  GERMAN  NATIONAL    ASSEMBLY.  127 

In    announcing   the   policy   of  the    new   Ministry, 
Gaffem  assumed  the  exclusion  of  Austria  from  the  Ger- 

o 

man    Federation.       Claiming    for   the   As- 

The     Frankfort 

sembly,  as  the  representative  of  the  Gerjman  IauS,entDeS 
nation,  sovereign  power  in  drawing  up  the 
Constitution,  he  denied  that  the  Constitution  could  be 
made  an  object  of  negotiation  with  Austria.  As 
Austria  refused  to  fulfil  the  conditions  of  the  second 
article,  it  must  remain  outside  the  Federation  j  the 
Ministry  desired,  however,  to  frame  some  close  and 
special  connection  between  Austria  and  Germany,  and 
asked  for  authority  to  negotiate  with  the  Court  of 
Vienna  for  this  purpose.  Gagern's  declaration  of  the 
exclusion  of  Austria  occasioned  a  vehement  and  natural 
outburst  of  feeling  among  the  Austrian  deputies,  and 
was  met  by  their  almost  unanimous  protest.  Some  days 
later  there  arrived  a  note  from  Schwarzenberg  which 
struck  at  the  root  of  all  that  had  been  done  and  all 
that  was  claimed  by  the  Assembly.  Repudiating  the 
interpretation  that  had  been  placed  upon  his  words, 
Schwarzenberg  declared  that  the  affairs  of  Germany 
could  only  be  settled  by  an  understanding  between  the 
Assembly  and  the  Courts,  and  by  an  arrangement  with 
Austria,  which  was  the  recognised  chief  of  the  Govern- 
ments and  intended  to  remain  so  in  the  new  Federation. 
The  question  of  the  inclusion  or  exclusion  of  Austria 
now  threw  into  the  shade  all  the  earlier  differences 

between  parties  in  the  Assembly.     A  new  dividing-line 

.• 

Deutsche  National  Versa  mini  ung,  ii.   112.     Radowitz,  iii.  459.     Helfert, 
iv.  62. 


128  MODERN  EUROPE.  1349. 

was  drawn.  On  the  one  side  appeared  a  group  com- 
posed of  the  Austrian  representatives,  of  Ultramontanes 
who  feared  a  Protestant  ascendency  if  Austria  should 
be  excluded,  and  of  deputies  from  some  of  the  smaller 
States  who  had  begun  to  dread  Prussian  domination. 
On  the  other  side  was  the  great  body  of  representatives 
who  set  before  all  the  cause  of  German  national  union, 
who  saw  that  this  union  would  never  be  effected  in  any 
real  form  if  it  was  made  to  depend  upon  negotiations 
with  the  Austrian  Court,  and  who  held,  with  the 
Minister,  that  to  create  a  true  Grerman  national  State 
without  the  Austrian  provinces  was  better  than  to 
accept  a  phantom  of  complete  union  in  which  the 
German  people  should  be  nothing  and  the  Cabinet  of 
Vienna  everything.  Though  coalitions  and  intrigues 
of  parties  obscured  the  political  prospect  from  day  to 
day,  the  principles  of  Gagern  were  affirmed  by  a 
majority  of  the  Assembly,  and  authority  to  negotiate 
some  new  form  of  connection  with  Austria,  as  a  power 
outside  the  Federation,  was  granted  to -the  Ministry. 

The  second  great  difficulty  of  the  Assembly  was  the 

settlement  of  the  Federal  headship.     Some  were  for  a 

The  Federal     hereditary  Emperor,  some  for  a  President 

ship'      or  Board;  some  for  a  monarchy  alternating 

between  the  Houses  of  Prussia  and  Austria,  some  for 

a  sovereign  elected  for  life  or  for  a  fixed  period.     The 

first  decision  arrived  at  was  that  the  head  should  be  one 

of  the  reigning  princes  of  Germany,  and  that  he  should 

bear   the    title    of  Emperor.     Against   the   hereditary 

principle  there  was  a  strong  and,  at  first,  a  successful 


1819.  GERMAN  CONSTITUTION,  129 

opposition.  Reserving  for  future  discussion  other 
questions  relating  to  the  imperial  office,  the  Assembly 
passed  the  Constitution  through  the  first  reading  on 
February  3rd,  ]  849.  It  was  now  communicated  to  all 
the  German  Governments,  with  the  request  that  they 
would  offer  their  opinions  upon  it.  The  four  minor 
kingdoms — Saxony,  Hanover,  Bavaria,  and  Wurtem- 
berg — with  one  consent  declared  against  any  Federation 
in  which  Austria  shguld  iiojb  be  included;  the  Cabinet 
of  Vienna  protested  against  the  subordination  of  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  to  a  central  po.wer  vested  in  any 
other  German  prince,  and  proposed  that  the  entire 
Austrian  -Empire,  with  its  foreign  as  well  as  its  German 
elements,  should  enter  the  Federation.  This  note  was 
enough  to  prove  that  Austria  was  in  direct  conflict 
with  the  scheme  of  national  union  which  the  Assembly 
had  accepted ;  but  the  full  peril  of  the  situation  was 
not  perceived  till  on  the  9th  of  March  Schwarzen- 
berg  published,  the  Constitution  of  Olmiitz,  which  ex- 
tinguished all  separate  rights  throughout  the  Austrian 
Empire,  and  confounded  in  one  mass,  as  subjects  of  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  Hungarians,  Germans,  Slavs 
and  Italians.  The  import  of  the  Austrian  demand  now 
scood  out  clear  and  undisguised.  Austria  claimed  to 
range  itself  with  a  foreign  population  of  thirty  million* 
within  the  German  Federation ;  in  other  words,  to 
reduce  the  German  national  union  to  a  partnership 
with  all  the  nationalities  of  Central  Europe,  to  throw 
the  weight  of  an  overwhelming  influence  against  any 
system  of  free  representative  government,  and  to 


130  MODERN   EUROPE.  1819. 

expose  Germany  to  war  where  no  interests  but  those 
of  the  Pole  or  the  Magyar  might  be  at  stake.  So 
deep  was  the  impression  made  at  Frankfort  by  the 
fall  of  the  Kremsier  Parliament  and  the  publication  of 
Schwarzenberg's  unitary  edict,  that  one  of  the  most 
eminent  of  the  politicians  who  had  hitherto  opposed 
the  exclusion  of  Austria  —  the  Baden  deputy  Welcker  — 
declared  that  further  persistence  in  this  course  would 
be  treason  to  Gfermany.  Ranging  himself  with  the 
Ministry,  he  proposed  that  the  entire  German  Constitu- 
tion, completed  by  a  hereditary  chieftainship,  should 
be  passed  at  a  single  vote  on  the  second  reading,  and 
that  the  dignity  of  Emperor  should  be  at  once  offered 
to  the  King  of  Prussia.  Though  the  Assembly  de- 
clined to  pass  the  Constitution  by  a  single  vote,  it 
agreed  to  vote  upon  clause  by  clause  without  discussion. 
The  hereditary  principle  was  affirmed  by  the  narrow 
majority  of  four  in  a  House  of  above  five  hundred. 
The  second  reading  of  the  Constitution  was  completed 
on  the  27th  of  March,  and-  on  the  following- 

King  Frederick 


the  election  of  the  sovereign  took  place. 
Two  hundred  and  ninety  votes  were  given 
for  the  King  of  Prussia.     Two  hundred  and  forty-eight 
members,  hostile  to  the  hereditary  principle  or  to  the 
prince  selected,  abstained  from  voting.*    </ 

Frederick  William  had  from  early  years  cherished 
the  hope  of  seeing  some  closer  union  of  Germany  estab- 
lished under  Prussian  influence.  But  he  dwelt  in  a 

*  Yerhandlungen,  viii.  6093.     Beseler,  p.  82.       Helfert,  iv.  (3)  390. 
Haym,  ii.  317.     Eadowitz,  v.  477. 


•1843.  FREDERICK    WILLIAM  IV.  131 

world  where  there  was  more  of  picturesque  mirage  than 
of  real  insight.  He  was  almost  superstitiously  loyal  to 
the  House  of  Austria  ;  and  he  failed  to  per-  Frederick 
ceive,  what  was  palpable  to  men  of  far  in- 
ferior endowments  to  his  own,  that  *by  setting  Prussia 
at  the  head  of  the  constitutional  movement  of  the  epoch 
he  might  at  any  time  from  the  commencement  of  his 
reign  have  rallied  all  Germany  round  it.  Thus  the 
revolution  of  1848  hurst  upon  him,  and  he  was  not  the 
man  to  act  or  to  lead  in  time  of  revolution.  Even  in 
1848,  had  he  given  promptly  and  with  dignity  what, 
after  blood  had  been  shed  in  his  streets,  he  had  to  give 
with  humiliation,  he  would  probably  have  been  ac- 
claimed Emperor  on  the  opening  of  the  Parliament  of 
Frankfort,  and  have  been  accepted  by  the  universal  voice 
of  Germany.  But  the  odium  cast  upon  him  by  the 
struggle  of  March  18th_was  scLgreat  that  in  the  election 
of  a  temporary  Administrator  of  the  Empire  in  June 
no  single  member  at  Frankfort  gave  him  a  vote.  Time 
was  needed  to  repair  his  credit,  and  while  time  passed 
Austria  rose  from  its  ruins.  In  the  spring  of  1849. 
Frederick  William  could  not  have  assumed  the  office  of  • 
Emperor  of  Germany  without  risk  of  a  war  with  Aus- 
tria, even  had  he  been  willing  to  accept  this  office  on 
the  nomination  of  the  Frankfort  Parliament.  But  to 
accept  the  Imperial  Crown  from  a  popular  Assembly 
was  repugnant  to  his  deepest  convictions.  Clear  as  the 
Frankfort  Parliament  had  been,  as  a  whole,  from  the 
taint  of  E-epublicanism  or  of  revolutionary  violence,  it 
had  nevertheless  had  its  birth  in  revolution :  the  crown 
*  2 


132  MODERN    EUROPE. 


1849. 


which  it  offered  would,  in  the  King's  expression,  have 
been  picked  up  from  blood  and  mire.  Had  the  princes 
of  Germany  by  any  arrangement  with  the  Assembly 
tendered  the  crown  to  Frederick  William  the  case 
would  have  been  different ;  a  new  Divine  right  would 
have  emanated  from  the  old,  and  conditions  fixed  by 
negotiation  between  the  princes  and  the  popular  As- 
sembly might  have  been  endured.  That  Frederick  Wil- 
liam still  aspired  to  German  leadership  in  one  form 
or  another  no  one  doubted ;  his  disposition  to  seek 
or  to  reject  an  accommodation  with  the  Frankfort 
Parliament  varied  with  the  influences  which  surrounded 
him.  The  Ministry  led  by  the  Count  of  Brandenburg, 
though  anti-popular  in  its  domestic  measures,  was  de- 
sirous of  arriving  at  some  understanding  with  Gagern 
and  the  friends  of  German  union.  Shortly  before  the 
first  reading  of  the  Constitution  at  Frankfort,  a  note 
had  been  drafted  in  the  Berlin  Cabinet  admitting  under 
certain  provisions  the  exclusion  of  Austria  from  the 
Federation,  and  proposing,  not  that  the  Assembly 
should  admit  the  right  of  each  Government  to  accept 
or  reject  the  Constitution,  but  that  it  should  meet  in  a 
fair  spirit  such  recommendations  as  all  the  Governments 
together  should  by  a  joint  act  submit  to  it.  This  note, 
which  would  have  rendered  an  agreement  between  the 
Prussian  Court  and  the  Assembly  possible,  Frederick 
William  at  first  refused  to  sign.  He  was  induced  tqL 
do  so  (Jan.  23rd)  by  his  confidant  Bunsen,  who  him- 
self was  authorised  to  proceed  to  Frankfort.  During 
Bunsen's  absence  despatches  arrived  at  Berlin  from 


18^9.       FREDERICK  WILLIAM  HE  FUSES    THE   CROWN.      133 

Schwarzenberg,  who,  in  his  usual  resolute  way,  proposed 
to  dissolve  the  Frankfort  Assembly,  and  to  divide  Ger- 
many between  Austria,  Prussia,  and  the  four  secondary 
kingdoms.  Bunsen  on  his  return  .found  his  work  un- 
done ;  the  King  recoiled  under  Austrian  pressure  from 
the  position  which  he  had  taken  up,  and  sent  a  note 
to  Frankfort  on  the  10th  of  February,  which  described 
Austria  as  a  necessary  part  of  Germany  and  claimed. 
for  each  separate  Government  the  right  to  accept  or 
reject  the  Constitution  as  it  might  think  fit.  Thus 
the  acceptance  of  the  headship  by  Frederick  William 
under  any  conditions  compatible  with  the  claims  of 
the  Assembly  was  known  to  be  doubtful  when,  on 
the  28th  of  March,  the  majority  resolved  to  offer  him 
the  Imperial  Crown.  The  disposition  of  the  Ministry 
at  Berlin  was  indeed  still  favourable  to  an  accom- 
modation; and  'when,  on  the  2nd  of  April,  the  members 
of  the  Assembly  who  were  charged  to  lay  its  offer 
before  Frederick  Willi-am  arrived  at  Berlin,  they  were 
received  with  such  cordiality  by  Brandenburg  that  it 
was  believed  the  King's  consent  had  been  won.  The 
reply  of  the  King  to  the  deputation  on  the 

r  J  Frederick 

following  day  rudely  dispelled  these  hopes. 


He  declared  that  before  he  could  accept  the 
Crown  not  only  must  he  be  summoned  to  it  by  the 
Princes  of  Germany,  but  the  consent  of  all  the  Govern- 
ments must  be  given  to  the  Constitution.  In  other 
words,  he  required  that  the  Assembly  should  sur- 
render its  claims  to  legislative  supremacy,  and  abandon 
all  those  parts  of  the  Federal  Constitution  of  which  any 


134  MODERN   EUROPE.  1849. 

of  the  existing  Governments  disapproved.  As  it  was 
certain  that  Austria  and  the  four  minor  kingdoms  would 
never  agree  to  any  Federal  union  worthy  of  the  name, 
and  that  the  Assembly  could  not  now,  without  re- 
nouncing its  past,  admit  that  the  right  of  framing 
the  Constitution  lay  outside  itself,  the  answer  of  the 
King  was  understood  to  amount  to  a  refusal.  The 
deputation  left  Berlin  in  the  sorrowful  conviction  that 
their  mission  had  failed  ;  and  a  note  which  was  soon 
afterwards  received  at  Frankfort  from  the  King  showed 
that  this  belief  was  correct.* 

.    The  answer  of  King  Frederick  William  proved  in- 
deed much  more  than  that  he  had  refused  the  Crown 
of    Germany ;    it    proved   that    he    would 

The  Frankfort  J 

r3ectetdbyIthe  n°t  accept  th e  Constitution  which  the 
Assembly  had  enacted.  The  full  import  of 
this  determination,  and  the  serious  nature  of  the  crisis 
now  impending  over  Germany,  were  at  once  under- 
stood. Though  twenty-eight  Governments  successively 
accepted  the  Constitution,  these  were  without  exception 
petty  States,  and  their  united  forces  would  scarcely 
have  been  a  match  for  one  of  its  more  powerful  enemies. 
On  the  5th  of  April  the  Austrian  Cabinet  declared 
the  Assembly  to  have  been  guilty  of  illegality  in  pub- 
lishing the  Constitution,  and  called  upon  all  Austrian 
deputies  to  quit  Frankfort.  The  Prussian  Lower 
Chamber,  elected  under  the  King's  recent  edict,  having 

*  Briefwechsel  Friedrich  Wilhelms,  pp.  233,  269.  Beseler,87.  Bieder- 
mami,  i.  389.  Wagener,  Politik  Friedrich  Wilhehn  TV.,  p.  56.  Ernst  II., 
i.  329. 


1819.         THE  ASSEMBLY  AND  THE  GOVERNMENTS.          135 

protested  against  the  state  of  siege  in  Berlin,  and  having 
passed  a  resolution  in  favour  of  the  Frankfort  Constitu- 
tion, was  forthwith  dissolved.  Within  the  Frankfort 
Parliament  the  resistance  of  Governments  excited  a 
patriotic  resentment  and  caused  for  the  moment  a  union 
of  parties.  Resolutions  were  passed  declaring  that  the 
Assembly  would  adhere  to  the  Constitution.  A  Com- 
mittee was  charged  with  the  ascertainment  of  measures 
to  be  adopted  for  enforcing  its  recognition  ;  and  a  note 
was  addressed  to  all  the  hostile  Governments  demand- 
ing that  they  should  abstain  from  proroguing  or  dis- 
solving the  representative  bodies  within  their  dominions 
with  the  view  of  suppressing  the  free  utterance  of 
opinions-  in  favour  of  the  Constitution. 

On  the  ground  of  this  last  demand  the  Prussian 
official  Press  now  began  to  denounce  the  Assembly  of 
Frankfort  as  a  revolutionary  body.  The  situation  of 
affairs  daily  became  worse.  It  was  in  vain 

»          •  End  of  the  Ger- 

that  the  Assembly  appealed  to  the  Govern- 
ments,  the  legislative  Chambers,  the  local 
bodies,  the  whole  German  people,  to  bring  the  Constitution 
into  effect.  The  moral  force  on  which  it  had  determined 
to  rely  proved  powerless,  and  in  despair  of  conquering  the 
Governments  by  public  opinion  the  more  violent  mem- 
bers of  the  democratic  party  determined  to  appeal  to 
insurrection.  On  the  4th  of  May  a  popular  rising 
began  at  Dresden,  where  the  King,  under  the  influence 
of  Prussia,  had  dismissed  those  of  his  Ministers  who 
urged  him  to  accept  the  Constitution,  and  had  dissolved 
his  Parliament.  The  outbreak  drove  the  King  from 


1849 


133  MODERN  EUROPE.  184S. 

his  capital ;  but  only  five  days  bad  passed  when  a 
Prussian  army-corps  entered  the  city  and  crushed  the 
rebellion.  In  this  interval,  short  as  it  was,  there  had 
been  indications  that  the  real  leaders  of  the  insurrection 
were  fighting  not  for  the  Frankfort  Constitution  but 
for  a  Republic,  and  that  in  the  event  of  their  victory  a 
revolutionary  Government,  connected  with  French  and 
Polish  schemes  of  subversion,  would  come  into  power. 
In  Baden  this  was  made  still  clearer.  There  the 
Government  of  the  Grand  Duke  had  actually  accepted 
the  Frankfort  Constitution,  and  had  ordered  elections 
to  be  held  for  the  Federal  legislative  body  by  which 
the  Assembly  was  to  be  succeeded.  Insurrection 
nevertheless  broke  out.  The  Republic  was  openly  pro- 
claimed ;  the  troops  joined  the  insurgents ;  and  a  Pro- 
visional Government  allied  itself  •  with  a  similar  body 
that  had  sprung  into  being  with  the  help  of  French  and 
Polish  refugees  in  the  neighbouring  Palatinate.  Con- 
scious that  these  insurrections  must  utterly  ruin  its  own 
cause,  the  Frankfort  Assembly  on  the  suggestion  of 
Gagern  called  upon  the  Archduke  John  to  suppress  them 
by  force  of  arms,  and  at  the  same  time  to  protect  the 
free  expression  of  opinion  on  behalf  of  the  Constitution 
where  threatened  by  Governments.  John,  who  had 
long  clung  to-  his  office  only  to  further  the  ends  of 
Austria,  refused  to  do  so,  and  Gagern  in  consequence 
resigned.  With  his  fall  ended  the  real  political  ex- 
istence of  the  Assembly.  Im  reply  to  a  resolution 
which  it  passed  on  the  10th  of  May,  calling  upon  John 
to  employ  all  the  forces  of  Germany  in  defence  of  the 


1849.       END  OF  THE  GERMAN  NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY.       137 

Constitution,  the  Archduke  placed  a  mock-Ministry  in 
office.  The  Prussian  Government,  declaring  the  vote  of 
the  10th  of  May  to  be  a  summons  to  civil  war,  ordered  all 
Prussian  deputies  to  withdraw  from  the  Assembly,  and 
a  few  days  later  its  example  was  imitated  by  Saxony 
and  Hanover.  On  the  20th  of  May  sixty-five  of  the 
best  known  of  the  members,  including  Arndt  and  Dahl- 
mann,  placed  on  record  their  belief  that  in  the  actual 
situation  the  relinquishment  of  the  task  of  the  Assembly 
was  the  least  of  evils,  and  declared  their  work  at  Frank- 
fort ended.  Other  groups  followed  them  till  there 
remained  only  the  party  of  the  extreme  Left,  which  had 
hitherto  been  a  weak  minority,  and  which  in  no  sense 
represented  the  real  opinions  of  Germany.  This  Rump- 
Parliament,  troubling  itself  little  with  John  and  his 
Ministers,  determined  to  withdraw  from  Frankfort, 
.where  it  dreaded  the  appearance  of  Prussian  troops, 
into  Wiirtemberg,  where  it  might  expect  some  support 
from  the  revolutionary  Governments  of  Baden  and  the 

Palatinate.     On   the  6th  of  June  a  hundred  and  five 

/ 

deputies  assembled  at  Scuttgart.  There  they  proceeded 
to  appoint  a  governing  Committee  for  all  Germany, 
calling  upon  the  King  of  Wiirtemberg  to  supply  them 
with  seven  thousand  soldiers,  and  sending  out  emissaries 
to  stir  up  the  neighbouring  population.  But  the  world 
disregarded  them.  The  Government  at  Stuttgart,  after 
an  interval  of  patience,  bade  them  begone ;  and  on  the 
18th  of  June  their  hall  was  closed  against  them  and 
they  were  dispersed  by  troops,  no  one  raising  a  hand  on 
their  behalf.  The  overthrow  of  the  insurgents  who 


138  MODERN  EUROPE.  mo. 

had  taken   up   arms  in  Baden  and  the  Palatinate  was 

not  so  easy  a  matter.     A  campaign  of  six  weeks  was 

necessary,   in  which  the  army  of  Prussia, 

The  Baden    in-  J  J 

i^ef"1  j'uiy;     led  by  the  Crown   Prince,  sustained  some 

1849 

reverses,  before  the  Republican  levies  were 
crushed,  and  with  the  fall  of  Rastadt  the  insurrection 
was  brought  to  a  close.* 

The  end  of  the  German  Parliament,  on  which  the 
nation  had  set  such  high  hopes  and  to  which  it  had 
sent  so  much  of  what  was  noblest  in  itself,  contrasted 
lamentably  with  the  splendour  of  its  opening.  Whether 
a  better  result  would  have  been  attained  if,  instead  of 
claiming  supreme  authority  in  the  construction  of 
Federal  union,  the  Assembly  had  from  the  first  sought 
the  co-operation  of  the  Governments,  must  remain  matter 
of  conjecture.  Austria  would  under  all  circumstances 
have  been  the  great  hindrance  in  the  way ;  and  after 
the  failure  of  the  efforts  made  at  Frankfort  to  establish 
the  general  union  of  Germany,  Austria  was  able  com- 
pletely to  frustrate  the  attempts  which  were  now  made 
at  Berlin  to  establish  partial  union  upon  a  different 
basis.  In  notifying  to  the  Assembly  his  refusal  of 
the  Imperial  Crown,  King  Frederick  "Wil- 
to  f<mn  a  sepa-  Ham  had  stated  that  he  was  resolved  to  place 

rate  union. 

himself  at  the  head  of  a  Federation  to  be 
formed  by  States  voluntarily  uniting  with  him  under 
terms  to  be  subsequently  arranged ;  and  in  a  circular 
note  addressed  to  the  German  Governments  he  invited 

*  Verhandlungen,  &c.,  ix.  6695,  6886.     Haym,  iii.  185.     Bamberger, 
Erlebnisse,  p.  6. 


18».          THE  LEAGUE  OF  THE  THREE  KINGDOMS.         139 

such  as  were  disposed  to  take  counsel  with  Prussia  to 
unite  in  Conference  ac  Berlin.  The  opening  of  the 
Conference  was  fixed  for  the  17th  of  May.  Two  days 
before  this  the  King  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  Prus- 
sian people  announcing  that  in  spite  of  the  failure  of 
the  Assembly  of  Frankfort  a  German  union  was  still  to 
be  formed.  When  the  Conference  opened  at  Berlin, 
no  envoys  appeared  but  those  of  Austria,  Saxon  \Y  •  f 
Hanover,  and  Bavaria.  The  Austrian  representative 
withdrew  at  the  end  of  the  first  sitting,  the  Bavarian 
rather  later,  leaving  Prussia  to  lay  such  foundations  as  it 
could  for  German  unity  with  the  temporising  support 
of  Saxony  and  Hanover.  A  confederation  was  formed, 
known  as  the  League  of  the  Three  Kingdoms.  An  /6  ./• 
undertaking  was  given  that  a  Federal  Parliament 
should  be  summoned,  and  that  a  Constitution  should  be 
•made  jointly  by  this  Parliament  and  the  Governments 
(May  26th).  On  the  llth  of  June  the  draft  of  a 
Federal  Constitution  was  published.  As  the  King  of 
Prussia  was  apparently  acting  in  good  faith,  and  the 
draft-Constitution  in  spite  of  some  defects  seemed  to 
afford  a  fair  basis  for  union,  the  question  now  arose  among 
the  leaders  of  the  German  national  movement  whether 
the  twenty-eight  States  which  had  accepted  the  ill-fated 
Constitution  of  Frankfort  ought  or  ought  not  to  enter 
the  new  Prussian  League.  A  meeting  of  a  hundred 
and  fifty  ex-members  of  the  Frankfort  Parliament  was 
held  at  Gotha ;  and  although  great  indignation  was  ex- 
pressed by  the  more  democratic  faction,  it  was  determined 
that  the  scheme  now  put  forward  by  Prussia  deserved 


140  MODERN  EUROPE.  im 

a  fair  trial.  The  whole  of  the  twenty-eight  minor  States 
consequently  entered  the  League,  which  thus  embraced 
all  Germany  with  the  exception  of  Austria,  Bavaria  and 
Wiirtemberg.  But  the  Courts  of  Saxony  and  Hanover 
had  from  the  first  been  acting  with  duplicity.  The 
military  influence  of  Prussia,  and  the  fear  which  they 
still  felt  of  their  own  subjects,  had  prevented  them  from 
offering  open  resistance  to  the  renewed  work  of  Federa- 
tion ;  but  they  had  throughout  been  in  communication 
with  Austria,  and  were  only  waiting  for  the  moment 
when  the  complete  restoration  of  Austria's  military 
strength  should  enable  them  to  display  their  true 
colours.  During  the  spring  of  1849,  wThile  the 
Conferences  at  Berlin  were  being  held,  Austria  was  still 
occupied  with  Hungary  and  Venice.  The  final  over- 
throw of  these  enemies  enabled  it  to  cast  its  entire 
weight  upon  Germany.  The  result  was  seen  in  the 
action  of  Hanover  and  Saxony,  which  now  formally 
seceded  from  the  Federation.  Prussia  thus  remained 
at  the  end  of  1849  with  no  support  but  that  of  the 
twenty-eight  minor  States.  Against  it,  in  open  or  in 
tacit  antagonism  to  the  establishment  of  German  unity 
in  any  effective  form,  the  four  secondary  Kingdoms 
stood  ranged  by  the  side  of  Austria. 

It  was  not  until  the  20th  of  March,  1850,  that  the 

Federal    Parliament,    which    had    been    promised   ten 

months  before  on  the  incorporation  of  the 

new  League,  assembled  at  Erfurt.     In  the 

meantime   reaction    had    gone  far  in  many  a  German 

State.     In  Prussia,  after  the  dissolution  of  the.  Lower 


1850.  PRUSSIA.  141 

Chamber  on  April  27th,  1849,  the  King  had  abrogated 
the  electoral  provisions  of  the  Constitution  so  recently 
granted  by  himself,  and  had  substituted  for  them  a 
system  based  on  the  re  presentation  of  classes.  Treating 
this  act  as  a  breach  of  faith,  the  Democratic  party 
had  abstained  from  voting  at  the  elections,  with  the 
result  that  in  the  Berliu  Parliament  of  1850  Con- 
servatives, Reactionists,  and  officials  formed  the  great 
majority.  The*  revision  of  the  Prussian  Constitution, 
promised  at  first  as  a  concession  to  Liberalism,  was 
conducted  in  the  opposite  sense.  The  King  demanded 
the  strengthening  of  monarchical  power;  the  Feudal- 
ists, going  far  beyond  him,  attacked  the  municipal  and 
social  reforms  of  the  last  two  years,  and  sought  to  lead 
Prussia  back  to  the  system  of  its  mediaeval  estates.  It 
was  in  the  midst  of  this  victory  of  reaction  in  Prussia 
that  the  Federal  Parliament  at  Erfurt  began  its  sittings. 
Though  the  moderate  Liberals,  led  by  Gagern  and 
other  tried  politicians  of  Frankfort,  held  the  majority 
in  both  Houses,  a  strong  Absolutist  party  from 
Prussia  confronted  them,  and  it  soon  became  clear 
that  the  Prussian  Government  was  ready  to  play 
into  the  hands  of  this  party.  The  draft  of 
the  Federal  Constitution,  which  had  been  iiamentIOat  Er" 

furt,  March,1850. 

made  at  Berlin,  was  presented,  according 
to  the  undertaking  of  May  26th,  1849,  to  the  Erfurt 
Assembly.  Aware  of  the  gathering  strength  of  the 
reaction  and  of  the  danger  of  delay,  the  Liberal  majority 
declared  itself  ready  to  pass  the  draft  into  law  with- 
out a  single  alteration.  The  reactionary  minority 


112  MODERN  EUROPE.  isso. 

demanded  that  a  revision  should  take  place  ;  and,  to 
the  scandal  of  all  who  understood  the  methods  or 
the  spirit  of  Parliamentary  rule,  the  Prussian  Minis- 
ters united  with  the  party  which  demanded  altera- 
tions in  the  project  which  they  themselves  had  brought 
forward.  A  compromise  was  ultimately  effected;  hut 
the  action  of  the  Court  of  Prussia  and  the  conduct 
of  its  Ministers  throughout  the  Erfurt  debates  struck 
with  deep  despondency  those  who  had  believed  that 
Frederick  William  might  still  effect  the  work  in  which 
the  Assembly  of  Frankfort  had  failed.  The  trust  in 
the  King's  sincerity  or  consistence  of  purpose  sank  low. 
The  sympathy  of  the  national. Liberal  party  throughout 
Germany  was  to  a  great  extent  alienated  from  Prussia  ; 
while,  if  any  expectation  existed  at  Berlin  that  the 
adoption  of  a  reactionary  policy  would  disarm  the  hos- 
tility of  the  Austrian  Government  to  the  new  League, 
this  hope  was  wholly  vain  and  baseless.* 
,  Austria  had  from  the  first  protested  against  the 
attempt  of  the  King  of  Prussia  to  establish  any  new 
form  of  union  in  Germany,  and  had  declared  that  it 
Action  of  would  recognise  none  of  the  conclusions  of 
Austria.  the  ^fa^  pariiament  of  Erfurt.  Accord- 

ing  to  the  theory  now  advanced  by  the  Cabinet  of 
Vienna  the  ancient  Federal  Constitution  of  Germany 
wTas  still  in  force.  All  that  had  happened  since  March, 
1848,  was  so  much  wanton  and  futile  mischief- making. 
The  disturbance  of  order  had  at  length  come  to  an  end, 

*  Verhandlungen  zu   Erfurt,    i.    114 ;  ii.  143.     Biederniann,    i.   469. 
Radowitz,  ii.  138. 


1850.  AUSTRIA.  H3 

and  with  the  exit  of  the  rioters  the  legitimate  powers 
re-entered  into  their  rights.  Accordingly,  there  could 
be  no  question  of  the  establishment  of  new  Leagues. 
The  old  relation  of  all  the  German  States  to  one 
another  under  the  ascendency  of  Austria  remained  inN 
full  strength  ;  the  Diet  of  Frankfort,  which  had  merely 
suspended  its  functions  and  by  no  means  suffered  ex- 
tinction, was  still  the  legitimate  central  authority. 
That  some  modifications  might  be  necessary  in  the 
ancient  Constitution  was  the  most  that  Austria  was 
willing  to  admit.  This,  however,  was  an  affair  not  for 
the  German  people  but  for  its  rulers,  and  Austria  ac- 
cordingly invited  all  the  Governments  to  a  Congress 
at  Frankfort,  where  the  changes  necessary  might  be 
discussed.  In  reply  to  this  summons,  Prussia  strenuously 
denied  that  the  old  Federal  Constitution  was  still  in 
existence.  The  princes  of  the  numerous  petty  States 
which  were  included  in  the  new  Union  assembled  at 
Berlin  round  Frederick  William,  and  resolved  that 
they  would  not  attend  the  Conference  at  Frankfort 
except  under  reservations  and  conditions  which  Austria 
would  not  admit.  Arguments  a'nd  counter-arguments 
were  exchanged  ;  but  the  controversy  between  an  old 
and  a  new  Germany  was  one  to  be  decided  by  force  of 
will  or  force  of  arms,  not  by  political  logic.  The 
struggle  was  to  be  one  between  Prussia  and  Austria, 
and  the  Austrian  Cabinet  had  well  gauged  the  temper 
mjt  its  opponent.  A  direct  summons  to  submission 
uld  have  roused  all  the  King's  pride,  and  have  been 
answered  by  war.  Before  demanding  from  Frederick 


144  MODERN   EUROPE.  1850. 

William  the  dissolution  of  the  Union  which  he  had 
founded,  Schwarzenherg  determined  to  fix  upon  a  quarrel 
in  which  the  King  should  be  perplexed  or  alarmed  at 
the  results  of  his  own  policy.  The  dominant  convic- 
tion in  the  mind  of  Frederick  William  was  that  of  the 
sanctity  of  monarchical  rule.  If  the  League  of  Berlin 
could  be  committed  to  some  enterprise  hostile  to  mon- 
archical power,  and  could  be  charged  with  an  alliance 
with  rebellion,  Frederick  William  would  probably  falter 
in  his  resolutions,  and  a  resort  to  arms,  for  which, 
however,  Austria  was  well  prepared,  would  become 
unnecessary.* 

Among  the   States   whose   Governments   had  been 
forced   by  public  opinion  to   join  the  new  Federation 

was  the  Electorate  of  Hesse-Cassel.     The  Elector  was, 

•  •"•      — ' 

like  his  predecessors,  a  thorough  despot  at 
heart,  and  chafed  under  the  restrictions 
which  a  constitutional  system  imposed  upon  his  rule. 
Acting  under  Austrian  instigation,  be  dismissed  his 
Ministers  in  the  spring  of  1850,  and  placed  in  office 
one  Hassenpfiug,  a  type  of  the  worst  and  most  violent 
class  of  petty  tyrants  produced  by  the  officialism  of 
the  minor  German  States.  Hassenpflug  immediately 
quarrelled  with  the  Estates  at  Cassel,  and  twice  dis- 
solved them,  after  which  he  proceeded  to  levy  taxes  by 
force.  The  law-courts  declared  his  acts  illegal ;  the 
officers  of  the  army,  when  called  on  for  assistance,  began 

*  Der  Fiirsten  Kongress,  p.  13.  Reden  Friedrich  Wilhelins,  iv.  p.  55, 
69.  Konfereuz  der  Verbiindeten,  1850,  pp  26,  53.  Beust,  Erinnerungen, 
i.  115.  Ernst  II.,  i.  525.  Duncker,  Tier  Monate,  p.  41. 


1850 


1850.     AUSTRIA  RESTORES  THE  DIET  OF  FRANKFORT.    145 

•  v 
to  resign.     The  conflict  between  the  Minister  and  the 

Hessian  population  was  in  full  progress  when,  at  the 
beginning  of  September,  Austria  with  its  vassal  Govern- 
ments proclaimed  the  re-establishment  of  the  Diet  of 
Frankfort.  Though  Prussia  and  most  of  the  twenty- 
eight  States  confederate  with  it  treated  this  announce- 
ment as  null  and  void,  the  Diet,  constituted  by  the 
envoys  of  Austria,  the  four  minor  Kingdoms,  and  a  few 
seceders  from  the  Prussian  Union,  com- 

The  Diet  of 

menced  its  sittings.  To  the  Diet.,  the 
Elector  of  Hesse  forthwith  appealed  for 
help  against  his  subjects,  and  the  decision  was  given 
that  the  refusal  of  the  Hessian  Estates  to  grant  the 
taxes  was  an  offence  justifying  the  intervention  of  the 
central  power.  Fortified  by  this  judgment,  Hassenpflug 
now  ordered  that  every  person  offering  resistance  to  the 
Government  should  be  tried  by  court-martial.  He  was 
baffled  by  the  resignation  of  the  entire  body  of  officers 
in  the  Hessian  army ;  and  as  this  completed  the  dis- 
comfiture of  the  Elector,  the  armed  intervention  of 
Austria,  as  identified  with  the  Diet  of  Frankfort,  now 
became  a  certainty.  But  to  the  protection  of  the 
people  of  Hesse  in  their  constitutional  rights  Prussia, 
as  chief  of  the  League  which  Hesse  had  joined,  stood 
morally  pledged.  It  remained  for  the  King  to  decide 
between  armed  resistance  to  Austria  or  the  humiliation 
of  a  total  abandonment  of  Prussia's  claim  « 

Prussia  and 

to  leadership  in  any  German  union.     Con- 
flicting influences  swayed  the  King  in  one  direction  and 
another.     The    friends  of   Austria   and   of   absolutism 


146  MODERN  EUROPE.  IBM- 

declared  that  the  employment  of  the  Prussian  army  on 
behalf  of  the  Hessians  would  make  the  King  an  accom- 
plice of  revolution  :  the  bolder  and  more  patriotic  spirits 
protested  against  the  abdication  of  Prussia's  just  claims 
and  the  evasion  of  its  responsibilities  towards  Germany. 
For  a  moment  the  party  of  action,  led  by  the  Crown 
Prince,  gained  the  ascendant.  General  Eadowitz, 
the  projector  of  the  Union,  was  called  to  the  Foreign 
Ministry,  and  Prussian  troops  entered  Hesse.  Austria 
now  ostentatiously  prepared  for  war.  Frederick  Wil- 
liam, terrified  by  the  danger  confronting  him,  yet  un- 
willing to  yield  all,  sought  the  mediation  of  the  Czar 
of  Russia.  Nicholas  came  to  Warsaw,  where  the  Em- 
peror of  Austria  and  Prince  Charles,  brother 
meeting,  oot  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  attended  by  the 

29, 1850-  J 

Ministers  of  their  States,  met  him.  The 
closest  family  ties  united  the  Courts  of  St.  Petersburg 
and  Berlin ;  but  the  Eussian  sovereign  was  still  the 
patron  of  Austria  as  he  had  been  in  the  Hungarian 
campaign.  He  resented  the  action  -of  Prussia  in 
Schleswig  -  Holstein,  and  was  offended  that  King 
Frederick  William  had  not  presented  himself  at  War- 
saw in  person.  He  declared  in  favour  of  all  Austria's 
demands,  and  treated  Count  Brandenburg  with  such 
indignity  that  the  Count,  a  high-spirited  patriot, 
never  recovered  from  its  effect.  He  returned  to  Berlin 
only  to  give  in  his  report  and  die.  Manteuffel,  Minister 
of  the  Interior,  assured  the  King  that  the  Prussian 
army  was  so  weak  in  numbers  and  so  defective  in 
organisation  that,  if  it  took  the  field  against  A,ustria 


1850.  OLMUTZ.  147 

and  its  allies,  it  would  meet  with  certain  ruin.  Bavarian 
troops,  representing  the  Diet  of  Frankfort,  now  entered 
Hesse  at  Austria's  bidding,  and  stood  face  to  face  with 
the  Prussians.  The  moment  had  come  when  the  de- 
cision must  be  made  between  peace  and  war.  At  a 
Council  held  at  Berlin  on  November  2nd  the  peace- 
party  carried  the  King  with  them.  Badowitz  gave 
up  office ;  Manteuffel,  the  Minister  of  repression 
within  and  of  submission  without,  was  set  at  the  head 
of  the  Government.  The  meaning  of  his  appointment 
was  well  understood,  and  with  each  new  proof  of  the 
weakness  of  the  King  the  tone  of  the  Court  of  Austria 
became  more  imperious.  On  the  9th  of  November 
Schwarzenberg  categorically  demanded  the  dissolution 
of  the  Prussian  Union,  the  recognition  of  the  Federal 
Diet,  and  the  evacuation  of  Hesse  by  the  Prussian 
troops.  The  first  point  was  at  once  conceded,  and  in 
hollow,  equivocating  language  Manteuffel  made  the  fact 
known  to  the  members  of  the  Confederacy.  The  other 
conditions  not  being  so  speedily  fulfilled,  Schwarzen- 
berg set  Austrian  regiments  in  motion,  and  demanded 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Prussian  troops  from  Hesse 
within  twenty-four  hours.  Manteuffel  begged  the 
Austrian  Minister  for  an  interview,  and,  without  wait*- 
ing  for  an  answer,  set  out  for  Olmiitz.  His  instructions 
bade  him  to  press  for  certain  concessions ;  none  of  these 
did  he  obtain,  and  he  made  the  necessary  Manteuffel  at 
submission  without  them.  On  the  29th  of  olmUtz'Noy-29- 
November  a  convention  was  signed  at  Olmiitz,  in  which 
Prussia  recognised  the  German  Federal  Constitution 
K  2 


148  MODERN  EUROPE.  isso. 

of  1815  as  still  existing,  undertook  to  withdraw  all 
its  troops  from  Hesse  with  the  exception  of  a  single 
battalion,  and  consented  to  the  settlement  of  affairs  both 
in  Hesse  and  in  Schleswig-Holstein  by  the  Federal 
Diet.  One  point  alone  in  the  scheme  of  the  Austrian 
statesman  was  wanting  among  the  fruits  of  his  victory 
at  Olmiitz  and  of  the  negotiations  at  Dresden  by  which 
this  was  followed.  Schwarzenberg  had  intended  that 
the  entire  Austrian  Empire  should  enter  the  German 
Federation  ;  and  if  he  had  had  to  reckon  with  no  oppo- 
nents but  the  beaten  and  humbled  Prussia,  he  would 
have  effected  his  design.  But  the  prospect  of  a  central 
European  Power,  with  a  population  of  seventy  millions, 
controlled  as  this  would  virtually  be  by  the  Cabinet  of 
Vienna,  alarmed  other  nations.  England  declared  that 
such  a  combination  would  undo  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe  and  menace  the  independence  of  Germany; 
France  protested  in  more  threatening  terms  ;  and  the 
project  fell  to  the  ground,  to  be  remembered  only  as 
the  boldest  imagination  of  a  statesman  for  whom 
fortune,  veiling  the  Nemesis  in  store,  seemed  to  set  no 
limit  to  its  favours. 

>^;The   cause    of    Schleswig-Holstein,    so    intimately 

bound   up    with    the  efforts   of  the   Germans   towards 

national    union,    sank  with  the   failure   of 

Bcnleswig- 

these  efforts  ;  and  in  the  final  humiliation  of 
Prussia  it  received  what  might  well  seem  its  death- 
blow. The  armistice  of  Malmo,  which  was  sanc- 
tioned by  the  Assembly  of  Frankfort  in  the  autumn  of 
1848,  lasted  until  March  26th,  1849.  War  was  then 


1850.  SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.  149 

recommenced  by  Prussia,  and  the  lines  of  Diippel 
were  stormed  by  its  troops,  while  the  volunteer  forces 
of  Schleswig-Holstein  unsuccessfully  laid  siege  to  Frede- 
ricia.  Hostilities  had  continued  for  three  months,  when 
a  second  armistice,  to  last  for  a  year,* and  Preliminaries 
of  Peace,  were  agreed  upon.  At  the  conclusion  of  this 
armistice,  in  July,  1850,  Prussia,  in  the  name  of  Ger- 
many, made  peace  with  Denmark..  The  inhabitants  of 
the  Duchies  in  consequence  continued  the  war  for 
themselves,  and  though  defeated  with  great  loss  at 
Idstedt  on  the  24th  of  July,  they  remained  uncon- 
quered  at  the  end  of  the  year.  This  was  the  situation 
of  affairs  when  Prussia,  by  the  Treaty  of  Olmutz,  agreed 
that  the  restored  Federal  Diet  should  take  upon  itself 
the  restoration  of  order  in  Schleswig-Holstein,  and  that 
the  troops  of  Prussia  should  unite  with  those  of  Austria 

to  enforce  its  decrees.     To  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna,  the 

' 
'  foe  in  equal  measure  of  German  national  union  and  of 

every  democratic  cause,  the  Schleswig-Holsteiners  were 
simply  rebels  in  insurrection  against  their  sovereign. 
They  were  required  by  the  Diet,  under  Austrian  dicta- 
tion, to  lay  down  their  arms ;  and  commissioners  from 
Austria  and  Prussia  entered  the  Duchies  to  compel 
them  to  do  so.  Against  Denmark,  Austria,  and  Prussia 
together,  it  was  impossible  for  Schleswig-Holstein  to 
prolong  its  resistance.  The  army  was  dissolved,  and 
the  Duchies  were  handed  over  to  the  King  of  Denmark, 
to  return  to  the  legal  status  which  was  defined  in  the 
Treaties  of  Peace.  This  was  the  nominal  condition  of 
the  transfer;  but  the  Danish  Government  treated 


150  MODERN  EUROPE.  1852. 

Schleswig  as  part  of  its  national  territory,  and  in 
the  northern  part  of  the  Duchy  the  process  of  sub- 
stituting Danish  for  German  nationality  was  actively 
pursued.  The  policy  of  foreign  Courts,  little  interested 
in  the  wish  of  the  inhabitants,  had  from  the  beginning 
of  the  struggle  of  the  Duchies  against  Denmark  favoured 
the  maintenance  and  consolidation  of  the  Danish  King- 
dom. The  claims  of  the  Duke  of  Augustenburg,  as 
next  heir  to  the  Duchies  in  the  male  line,  were  not 
considered  worth  the  risk  of  a  new  war;  and  by  a 
protocol  signed  at  London  on  the  2nd  of  August,  1850, 
the  Powers,  with  the  exception  of  Prussia,  declared 
themselves  in  favour  of  a  single  rule  of  succession  in  all 
parts  of  the  Danish  State.  By  a  Treaty  of  the  8th  of 
May,  1852,  to  which  Prussia  gave  its  assent,  the  pre- 
tensions of  all  other  claimants  to  the  disputed  succession 
were  set  aside,  and  Prince  Christian,  of  the  House  of 
Gliicksburg,  was  declared  heir .  to  the  throne,  the  rights 
of  the  German  Federation  as  established  by  the  Treaties 
of  1815  being  reserved.  In  spite  of  -this  reservation 
of  Federal  rights,  and  of  the  stipulations  in  favour  of 
Schleswig  and  Holstein  made  in  the  earlier  agreements, 
the  Duchies  appeared  to  be  now  practically  united  with 
the  Danish  State.  Prussia,  for  a  moment  their  cham- 
pion, had  joined  with  Austria  in  coercing  their  army, 
in  dissolving  their  Government,  in  annulling  the  legis- 
lation by  which  the  Parliament  of  Frankfort  had  made 
them  participators  in  public  rights  thenceforward  to  be 
the  inheritance  of  all  Germans.  A  page  in  the  national 
history  was  obliterated ;  Prussia  had  turned  its  back  on 


1852.  SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.  151 

its  own  professions ;  there  remained  but  one  relic  from 
the  time  when  the  whole  German  people  seemed  so  ardent 
for  the  emancipation  of  its  brethren  beyond  the  frontier. 
The  national  fleet,  created  by  the  Assembly  of  Frankfort 
for  the  prosecution  of  the  struggle  with  Denmark,  still 
lay  at  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe.  But  the  same  power 
which  had  determined  that  Germany  was  not  to  be  a 
nation  had  also  determined  that  it  could  have  no 
national  maritime  interests.  After  all  that 

The  German 

had  passed,  authority  had  little  call  to  be     S^Son, 

nice  about  appearances;   and  the  national 

fleet  was  sold  by  auction,  in  accordance  with  a  decree 

of  the  restored  Diet  of  Frankfort,  in  the  summer  of 

1852.* 

It  was  with  deep  disappointment  and  humiliation 
that  the  Liberals  of  Germany,  and  all  in  whom  the 
hatred  of  democratic  change  had  not  overpowered  the 
love  of  country,  witnessed  the  issue  of  the  Germanyafter 
movement  of  1848.  In  so  far  as  that  move- 
ment was  one  directed  towards  national  union  it  had 
totally  failed,  and  the  state  of  things  that  had  existed 
before  1848  was  restored  without  change.  As  a  move- 
ment of  constitutional  and  social  reform,  it  had  not 
been  so  entirely  vain ;  nor  in  this  respect  can  it  be  said 
that  Germany  after  the  year  1848  returned  altogether 
to  what  it  was  before  it.  Many  of  the  leading  figures 
of  the  earlier  time  re-appeared  indeed  with  more  or 
less  of  lustre  upon  the  stage.  Metternich  though 

»  Ernst  II.,  i.  377.    Hortslet,  Map  of  Europe,  ii.  1106,  1129,  1151. 
Parl.  Papers,  1864,  kiii.,  p.  29 :  1864,  Ixv.,  pp.  30,  187. 


152  MODERN   EUROPE.  1849-1859- 

excluded  from  office  by  younger  men,  beamed  upon 
Vienna  with  the  serenity  of  a  prophet  who  had  lived  to 
see  most  of  his  enemies  shot  and  of  a  martyr  who  had 
returned  to  one  of  the  most  enviable  Salons  in  Europe. 
No  dynasty  lost  its  throne,  no  class  of  the  population 
had  been  struck  down  with  proscription  as  were  the 
clergy  and  the  nobles  of  France  fifty  years  before.  Yet 
the  traveller  familiar  with  Germany  before  the  revolu- 
tion found  that  much  of  the  old  had  now  vanished, 
much  of  a  new  world  come  into  being.  It  was  not 
sought  by  the  re-established  Governments  to  undo  at 
one  stroke  the  whole  of  the  political,  the  social,  the 
agrarian  legislation  of  the  preceding  time,  as  in  some 
other  periods  of  reaction.  The  nearest  approach  that 
was  made  to  this  was  in  a  decree  of  the  Diet  annulling 
the  Declaration  of  Eights  drawn  up  by  the  Frankfort 
Assembly,  and  requiring  the  Governments  to  bring  into 
conformity  with  the  Federal  Constitution  all  laws  and 
institutions  made  since  the  beginning  of  1848.  Parlia- 
mentary government  was  thereby  enfeebled,  but  not 
necessarily  extinguished.  Governments  narrowed  the 
franchise,  curtailed  the  functions  of  representative 
assemblies,  filled  these  with  their  creatures,  coerced 
voters  at  elections ;  but,  except  in  Austria,  there  was 
no  open  abandonment  of  constitutional  forms.  In  some 
States,  as  in  Saxony  under  the  reactionary  rule  of  Count 
Beust,  the  system  of  national  representation  established 
in  1848  was  abolished  and  the  earlier  Estates  were  re- 
vived ;  in  Prussia  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament  con- 
tinued in  existence,  but  in  such  dependence  upon  the 


1849-1859.  PRUSSIA    UNDER   MANTEUFFEL.  153 

royal  authority,  and  under  such  strong  pressure  of  an 
aristocratic  and  official  reaction,  that,  after  struggling 
for  some  years  in  the  Lower  House,  the  Liberal  leaders 
at  length  withdrew  in  despair.  The  character  which 
Gfovernment  now  assumed  in  Prussia  was  indeed  far 
more  typical  of  the  condition  of  Germany  at  large  than 
was  the  bold  and  uncompromising  despotism  of  Prince 
Schwarzenberg  in  Austria.  Manteuffel,  in  whom  the 
Prussian  epoch  of  reaction  was  symbolised,  was  not  a 
cruel  or  a  violent  Minister;  but  his  rule  was  stamped 
with  a  peculiar  and  degrading  meanness,  more  irritating 
to  those  who  suffered  under  it  than  harsher  wrong.  In 
his  hands  government  was  a  thing  of  eavesdropping 
and  espionage,  a  system  of  petty  persecution,  a  school 
of  subservience  and  hypocrisy.  He  had  been  the  instru- 
ment at  Olmiitz  of  such  a  surrender  of  national  honour 
and  national  interests  as  few  nations  have  ever  endured 
with  the  chances  of  war  still  untried.  This  surrender 
may, 'in  the  actual  condition  of  the  Prussian  army,  have 
been  necessary,  but  the  abasement  of  it  seemed  to  cling 
to  Manteuffel  and  to  lower  all  his  conceptions  of  govern- 
ment. Even  where  the  conclusions  of  his  policy  were 
correct  they  seemed  to  have  been  reached  by  some 
unworthy  process.  Like  Germany  at  large,  Prussia 
breathed  uneasily  under  an  oppression  which  was  every- 
where felt  and  yet  was  hard  to  define.  Its  best  elements 
were  those  which  suffered  the  most :  its  highest  intel- 
lectual and  political  aims  were  those  which  most  ex- 
cited the  suspicion  of  the  Government.  Its  King 
had  lost  whatever  was  stimulating  or  elevated  in  his 


154  MODERN  EUROPE.  1849-1859. 

illusions.  From  him  no  second  alliance  with  Liberal- 
ism, no  further  effort  on  behalf  of  German  unity,  was  to 
be  expected  :  the  hope  for  Germany  and  for  Prussia, 
if  hope  there  was,  lay  in  a  future  reign. 

The  powerlessness  of  Prussia  was  the  measure  of 
Austrian  influence  and  prestige.  The  contrast  pre- 
sented by  Austria  in  1848  and  Austria  in  1851  was 
indeed  one  that  might  well  arrest  political  observers. 
Its  recovery  had  no  doubt  been  effected  partly  by 
foreign  aid,  and  in  the  struggle  with  the  Magyars  a 
Austria  after  dangerous  obligation  had  been  incurred  to- 
wards Russia  ;  but  scarred  and  riven  as  the 
fabric  was  within,  it  was  complete  and  imposing  without. 
Not  one  of  the  enemies  who  in  1848  had  risen  against 

o 

the  Court  of  Vienna  now  remained  standing.  In  Italy, 
Austria  had  won  back  what  had  appeared  to  be  hope- 
lessly lost ;  in  Germany  it  had  more  than  vindicated  its 
old  claims.  It  had  thrown  its  rival  to  the  ground,  and 
the  full  measure  of  its  ambition  was  perhaps  even  yet 
not  satisfied.  "  First  to  humiliate  Prussia,  then  to 
destroy  it,"  was  the  expression  in  which  Schwarzenberg 
summed  up  his  German  policy.  Whether,  with  his 
undoubted  firmness  and  daring,  the  Minister  possessed 
the  intellectual  qualities  and  the  experience  necessary 
for  the  successful  administration  of  an  Empire  built  up, 
as  Austria  now  was,  on  violence  and  on  the  suppression 
of  every  national  force,  was  doubted  even  by  his  ad- 
mirers. The  proof,  however,  was  not  granted  to  him, 
for  a  sudden  death  carried  him  off  in  his  fourth  year  of 
power  (April  5th,  1852).  Weaker  men  succeeded  to  his 


1819-1859.  AUSTRIA.  155 

task.  The  epoch  of  military  and  diplomatic  triumph 
was  now  ending-,  the  gloomier  side  of  the  reaction  stood 
out  unrelieved  by  any  new  succession  of  victories. 
Financial  disorder  grew  worse  and  worse.  Clericalism 
claimed  its  bond  from  the  monarchy  which  it  had 
hel-ped  to  restore.  In  the  struggle  of  the  nationalities 
of  Austria  against  the  central  authority  the  Bishops 
had  on  the  whole  thrown  their  influence  on  to  the  side 
of  the  Crown.  The  restored  despotism  owed  too  much 
to  their  help  and  depended  too  much  on  their  continued 
goodwill  to  be  able  to  refuse  their  demands.  Thus  the 
new  centralised  administration,  reproducing  in  general 
the  uniformity  of  government  attempted  by  the  Em- 
peror Joseph  II.,  contrasted  with  this  in  its  subservience 
to  clerical  power.  Ecclesiastical  laws  and  jurisdictions 
were  allowed  to  encroach  on  the  laws  and  jurisdiction 
of  the  -State ;  education  was  made  over  to  the  priest- 
'hood;  within  the  Church  itself  the  bishops  were  allowed 
to  rule  uncontrolled.  The  very  Minister  who  had  taken 
office  under  Schwarzenberg  as  the  representative  of  the 
modern  spirit,  to  which  the  Government 

..,,,,-,  ,  ,  ,  Austrian     Con- 

still  professed  to  render  homage,  became  cordat,  sept.  is, 
the  instrument  of  an  act  of  submission  to 
the  Papacy  which  marked  the  lowest  point  to  which 
Austrian  policy  fell.  Alexander  Bach,  a  prominent 
Liberal  inf  Vienna  at  the  beginning  of  1848,  had  ac- 
cepted office  at  the  price  of  his  independence,  and 
surrendered  himself  to  the  aristocratic  and  clerical 
influences  that  dominated  the  Court.  Consistent  only 
in  his  efforts  to  simplify  the  forms  of  government,  to 


156  MODERN  EUROPE.  wta-wso. 

promote  the  ascendency  of  German  over  all  other  ele- 
ments in  the  State,  to  maintain  the  improvement  in  the 
peasant's  condition  effected  by  the  Parliament  of  Krem- 
sier,  Bach,  as  Minister  of  the  Interior,  made  war  in  all 
other  respects  on  his  own  earlier  principles.  In  the 
former  representative  of  the  Liberalism  of  the  profes- 
sional classes  in  Vienna  absolutism  had  now  its  most  effi- 
cient instrument ;  and  the  Concordat  negotiated  by  Bach 
with  the  Papacy  in  1855  marked  the  definite  submis- 
sion of  Austria  to  the  ecclesiastical  pretensions  which 
in  £hese  years  of  political  languor  and  discouragement; 
gained  increasing  recognition  throughout  Central  Europe] 
Ultramontanism  had  sought  allies  in  many  political 
camps  since  the  revolution  of  1848.  It  had  dallied  in 
some  countries  with  Republicanism ;  but  its  truer  in- 
stincts divined  in  the  victory  of  absolutist  systems  its 
own  surest  gain.  Accommodations  between  the  Papacy 
and  several  of  the  German  Governments  were  made  in 
the  years  succeeding  1849;  and  from  the  centralised 
despotism  of  the  Emperor  Erancis  Joseph  the  Church 
won  concessions  which  since  the  time  of  Maria  Theresa 
it  had  in  vain  sought  from  any  ruler  of  the  Austrian 
State. 

The  European   drama  which   began   in    1848  had 

more  of  unity  and  more  of  concentration  in,  its  opening 

than    in    its    close.      In    Italy   it    ends    with   the   fall 

France  after       °^  Venice  ',  in  Germany  the  interest  lingers 

till  the   days  of  Olmlitz  ;   in  France  there 

is  no  decisive  break  in  the  action  until  the  Coup  d'Etat 

which,   at   the    end    of   the    year    1851,    made  o  Louis 


1849. 


FRANCE.  157 


Napoleon  in  all  but  name  Emperor  of  France.  The  six 
million  votes  which  had  raised  Louis  Napoleon  to  the  Pre- 
sidency of  the  Republic  might  well  have  filled  with  alarm 
all  who  hoped  for  a  future  of  constitutional  rule ;  yet  the 
warning  conveyed  by  the  election  sefems  to  have  been 
understood  by  but  few.  As  the  representative  of  order 
and  authority,  as  the  declared  enemy  of  Socialism,  Louis 

Napoleon  was  on  the  same  side  as  the  Par- 
Louis  Napoleon. 

liamentary   majority ;    he   had   even    been 

supported  in  his  candidature  by  Parliamentary  leaders 

such  as  M.  Thiers.     His  victory   was   welcomed  as  a 

victory  over  Socialism  and  the  Red  Republic ;  he  had 

received  some  patronage  from  the  official  party  of  order, 

and  it  was  expected  that,  as  nominal  chief  of  the  State, 

he  would  act  as  the  instrument  of  this  party.     He  was 

an  adventurer,  but  an  adventurer  with  so  little  that  was 

imposing  about  him,  that  it  scarcely  occurred  to  men  of 

'influence  in  Paris,  to  credit  him  with  the  capacity  for 

mischief.      His  mean  look  and  spiritless  address,  the 

absurdities  of  his  past,  the  insignificance  of  his  political 

friends,    caused   him   to   be   regarded  during   his  first 

months  of  public  life  with  derision  rather  than  with 

fear.     The   French,   said    M.   Thiers   long   afterwards, 

*y  made  two  mistakes  about    Louis  Napoleon :    the  first 

when  they  took  him  for  a  fool,  the  second  when  they 

took  him  for  a  man  of  genius.     It  was  not  until  the 

appearance  of  the  letter  to  Colonel  Ney,  in  which  the 

President    ostentatiously    separated   himself    from    his 

Ministers    and    emphasised   his   personal   will    in    the 

direction  of  the  foreign  policy  of  France,  that  suspicions 


158  MODERN  EUROPE.  iw». 

of  danger  to  the  Republic  from  Ins  ambition  arose. 
From  this  time,  in  the  narrow  circle  of  the  Ministers 
whom  official  duty  brought  into  direct  contact  with  the 
President,  a  constant  sense  of  insecurity  and  dread  of 
some  new  surprise  on  his  part  prevailed,  though  the 
accord  which  had  been  broken  by  the  letter  to  Colonel 
Ney  was  for  a  while  outwardly  re-established,  and  the 
forms  of  Parliamentary  government  remained  unim- 
paired. 

The  first  year  of  Louis  Napoleon's  term  of  office 
was  drawing  to  a  close  when  a  message  from  him  was 
delivered  to  the  Assembly  which  seemed  to  announce 
an  immediate  attack  upon  the  Constitution.  The 
Ministry  in  office  was  composed  of  men  of  high  Parlia- 
mentary position  ;  it  enjoyed  the  entire  confidence  of  a 
Messa-e  of  oct  great  majority  in  the  Assembly,  and  had 
31,  is49.  enforced  with  at  least  sufficient  energy  the 

<~J  •/ 

measures  of  public  security  which  the  President  and 
the  country  seemed  agreed  in  demanding.  Suddenly, 
on  the  31st  of  October,  the  President  announced  to  the 
Assembly  by  a  message  carried  by  one  of  his  aides-de- 
camp that  the  Ministry  were  dismissed.  The  reason 
assigned  for  their  dismissal  was  the  want  of  unity  within 
the  Cabinet  itself;  but  the  language  used  by  the  Presi- 
dent announced  much  more  than  a  ministerial  change. 
"  France,  in  the  midst  of  confusion,  seeks  for  the  hand, 
the  will  of  him  whom  it  elected  on  the  10th  of  Decem- 
ber. T^he  victory  won  on  that  day  was  the  victory  of  a 
sysiejiL^for  the  nanrfe  of  Napoleon  is  in  itself  a  pro- 
gramme. It  signifies  order,  authority,  religion,  national 


1849. 


LOUIS   NAPOLEON.  159 


prosperity  within  ;  national  dignity  without.  It  is^his 
.policy,  inaugurated  by  my  election,  that  I  desire  io 
carry  to  triumph  with  the  support  of  the  Assembly  and 

of  the  people." In  order  to  save  the  Republic  from 

anarchy,  to  maintain,  the  prestige  of  France  among 
other  nations,  the  President  declared  that  he  needed 
men  of  action  rather  than  of  words ;  yet  when  the  list 
of  the  new  Ministers  appeared,  it  contained  scarcely  a 
single  name  of  weight.  Louis  Napoleon  had  called  to 
office  persons  whose  very  obscurity  had  marked  them  as 
his  own  instruments,  and  guaranteed  to  him  the  as- 
cendency which  he  had  not  hitherto  possessed  within 
the  Cabinet.  Satisfied  with  having  given  this  proof  of 
his  power,  he  resumed  the  appearance  of  respect,  if  not 
of  cordiality,  towards  the  Assembly.  He  had  learnt  to 
beware  of  precipitate  action ;  above  two  years  of  office 
were  still  before  him  ;  and  he  had  now  done  enough  to 
make  it  clear  to  all  who  were  disposed  to  seek  their 
fortunes  in  a  new  political  cause  that  their  services  on 
his  behalf  would  be  welcomed,  and  any  excess  of  zeal 
more  than  pardoned.  From  this  time  there  grew  up  a 
party  which  had  for  its  watchword  the  exaltation  of 
vL^uis  Napoleon  and  the  derision  of  the  methods  of 
j/rarliamentary  government.  Journalists,  nnsi1ccessFul 
^politicians,  adventurers  of  every  description,  were  en- 
listed  in  the  ranks  of  this  obscure  but  active  band. 
For  their  acts  and  their  utterances  no  one  was  respon- 
sible but  themselves.  They  were  disavowed  without 
compunction  when  their  hardihood  went  too  far;  but 
their  ventures  brought  them  no  peril,  and  the  generosity 


160  MODERN  EUROPE.  isso. 

of  the  President  was  not  wanting   to  those  who    in- 
sisted on  serving  him  in  spite  of  himself. 

France  was  still  trembling  with  the  shock  of  the 
Four    Days    of   June  ;    and    measures    of    repression 
formed  the  common  ground  upon  which  Louis  Napo- 
leon  and  the  Assembly  met  without  fear  of  conflict. 
Certain    elections    which   were    held  in  the   spring  of 
rL850,  and  which  gave  a  striking  victory  in  Paris  and 
elsewhere  to  Socialist  or  Ultra-Democratic  candidates, 
revived   the    alarms    of    the   owners    of  property,  and 
Inspired    the    fear    that    with    universal    suffrage    the 
itself    might     ultimately    fall     into    the 
of  the  Red  Republicans.     Trie  principle  of  uni- 
versal  suffrage  had   been  proclaimed   almost  by  acci- 
dent in  the  midst  of  the  revolution  of  1848.     It  had 
been  embodied  in  the  Constitution  of  that  year  because 
it   was    found    already   in    existence.      No    party    had 
"seriously  considered  the  conditions  under  which  it  was 
to  be  exercised,  or  had  weighed  the  political  qualifica- 
tions of  the  mass  to  whom  it  was  so  lightly  thrown. 
When  election  after  election  returned  to  the  Chamber 
(/men  whose  principles  were  held  to  menace  society  itself, 
the  cry  arose  that  France  must  be  saved  from  the  hands 
of  the  vile  multitude  ;  and  the  President  called  upon  a 
..Committee  of  the  Assembly   to  frame   the   necessary 
measures    r>f  ^Ip^tnvnl   reform.  -  Within   a 


Law  limiting  the  in  i        e    1  i         r^  -ii 

Franchise,  May     week  the  work  oi  the  Committee  was  com- 

31,  1850.  -  :  --  —  -  — 

pleted.  and  the  law  which  it  had  rWjgj 
was  brought  before  the  Assembly.  It  was  proposed 
that,  instead  of  a  residence  of  six  months,  a  continuous 


1850.  LIMITATION    OF    THE   FRANCHISE.  161 

residence  of  three  years  in  the  same  commune  should 
he  required  of  every  voter,  and  that  the  fulfilment  of  this 
condition  should  he  proved,  not  by  ordinary  evidence, 
hut  hy  one  of  certain  specified  acts,  such  as  the  pay- 
ment  of  personal  taxes.  With  modifications  of  little 
importance  the  Bill  was  passed  by  the  Assembly. 
Whether  its  real  effect  was  foreseen  even  by  those  who 
desired  the  greatest  possible  limitation  of  the  franchise 
is  doubtful ;  it  is  certain  that  many  who  supported  it 
believed,  in  their  ignorance  of  the  practical  working  of 
electoral  laws,  that  they  were  excluding  from  the  fran- 
chise only  the  vagabond  and  worthless  class  which 
has  no  real  place  within  the  body  politic.  When  the 
electoral  lists  drawn  up  in  pursuance  of  the  measure 
appeared,  they  astounded  all  parties  alike.  Three  out  of 
the  ten  millions  nf  voters  in  France  were  disfranchised. 
Not  only  the  inhabitant^  of  whole  qnn.rfprs  in  thp  grpn.f. 
cities  but  the  poorer  classes  among  the  peasantry 
throughout  Frn.nne,  had  rh'snpponrof]  from  tho  oWtornl 

Ivyty.        Thp     AqqomKly   linrl    nf     nnn     Klnw  r.nn  y<n»fnr|     Jntfl 

t  enemies  the  entire  mass  of  the  population  that  lived  by 

1  the  wages  of  bodily  labour.     It  had  committed  an  act 

(    of  political  suicide,  and  had  given  to  a  man  so  little 

(  troubled  with  scruples  of  honour  as  Louis  Napoleon 

the  fatal  opportunity  of   appealing   to    France  as  the 

champion  of  national  sovereignty  and   the    vindicator 

of  universal  suffrage  against  an  Assembly  which  had 

mutilated  it  in  the  interests  of  class.* 

*  Maupas,  Meinoires,  i.  176.  CEuvre.s  de  Napoleon  III.,  iii.  271.  Bar- 
rot,  iv.  21.  Granier  de  Cassagnac,  Chute  de  Louis  Philippe,  ii.  128  ;  Recifc 
complet,  p.  1.  Jerrold,  Napoleou  III.,  iii.  203.  Tocqueville,  Corresp.  ii  176. 

L 


162  MODERN  EUROPE.  isso 

The  duration  of  the  Presidency  was  fixed  by  the 
Constitution  of  1848  at  four  years,  and  it  was  enacted 
that  the  President  should  not  be  re-eligible  to  his 
Prospects  of  Dignity.  By  the  operation  of  certain  laws 

Louis  Napoleon.         •  /*      j  i  i  •        j      i       j  ii  JT 

imperfectly  adjusted  to  one  another,  the 
tenure  of  office  by  Louis  Napoleon  expired  on  the  8th 
of  May,  1852,  while  the  date  for  the  dissolution  of  the 
Assembly  fell  within  a  few  weeks  of  this  day.  France 
as  therefore  threatened  with  the  dangers  attending 
the  almost  simultaneous  extinction  of  all  authority. 
The  perils  of  1852  loomed  only  too  visibly  before  the 
country,  and  Louis  Napoleon  addressed  willing  hearers 
when,  in  the  summer  of  1850,  he  began  to  hint  at  the 
necessity  of  a  prolongation  of  his  tfwn  power.  The 
Parliamentary  recess  was  employed  by  the  Presi- 
dent  in  two  journeys  through  the  Departments  ;  the 
first  through  those  of  the  south-east,  where  Socialism 
was  most  active,  and  where  his  appearance  served  at 
once  to  prove  his  own  confidence  and  to  invigorate  the 
friends  of  authority ;  the  second  through  Normandy, 
where  the  prevailing  feeling  was  strongly  in  favour  of 
firm  government,  and  utterances  could  safely  be  made 
by  the  President  which  would  have  brought  him  into 
some  risk  at  Paris^  In  suggesting  that  France  required 
his  own  continued  presence  at  the  head  of  the  State 
Louis  Napoleon  was  not  necessarily  suggesting  a  viola- 
tion of  the  law.  It  was  provided  by  the  Statutes  of 
1848  that  the  Assembly  by  a  vote  of  three-fourths 
v  might  order  a  revision  of  the  Constitution ;  and  in 
favour  of  this  revision  petitions  were  already  being 


1850.  LOVIS   NAPOLEON.  163 

drawn  up  throughout  the  country.  Were  the  clause 
forbidding  the  re-election  of  the  President  removed 
from  the  Constitution,  Louis  Napo^on  might  fairly 
believe  that  an  immense  majority  of  the  French  people 
would  re-invest  him  with  power.  He  would  probably 
have  been  content  with  a  legal  re-election  had  this  been 
rendered  possible  ;  but  the  Assembly  showed  little  sign 
of  a  desire  to  smooth  his  way,  and  it  therefore  became 
necessary  for  him  to  seek  the  means  of  realising  his  aims 
in  violation  of  the  law,  jle  had  persuaded  himself  that 
his  mission,  his  destiny,  was  to  rule  France  ;  in  other 
words,  he  had  made  up  his  mind  to  run  such  risks  and 
to  sanction  such  crimes  as  might  be  necessary  to  win 
him  sovereign  power.  With  the  loftier  impulses  of 
ambition,  motives  of  a  meaner  kind  stimulated  him 
to  acts  of  energy.  Never  wealthy,  the  father  of  a 
family  though  unmarried  (  hp.  had  exhausted  his  means. 
and  would  have  returned  to  private  life  a  destitute 


if  not  laden  with  debt.  When  his  own  resolution 
flagged,  there  were  those  about  him  too  deeply  in- 
terested in  his  fortunes  to  allow  him  to  draw  back. 

It  was  by  means  of  the  army  that  Louis  Napoleon 
intended  in  the  last  resort  to  make  himself  master  of 
France,  and  the  army  had  therefore  to  be     ^^  Napoleon 
won  over  to  his  personal  cause.    The  generals 
who  had  gained  distinction  either  in  the  Algerian  wars 
or  in  the   suppression  of  insurrection  in  France  were 
without  exception  Orleanists   or  Republicans.      Not  a 
single  officer  of  eminence  was  as  yet  included  in  the 
Bonapartist  band,    The  President  himself  had  never  seen 
L  2 


164  MODERN  EUROPE.  1851. 

service  except  in  a  Swiss  camp  of  exercise  ;  beyond  his 
name  he  possessed  nothing  that  could  possibly  touch 
the  imagination  of  a  soldier.  The  heroic  element  not 
being  discoverable  in  his  person  or  his  career,  it  re- 
mained to  work  by  more  material  methods.  Louis 
Napoleon  had  learnt  many  things  in  England,  and  had 
perhaps  observed  in  the  English  elections  of  that  period 
how  much  may  be  effected  by  the  simple  means  of 
money-bribes  and  strong  drink.  The  saviour  of  society 
was  not  ashamed  to  order  the  garrison  of  Paris  double 
rations  of  brandy  and  to  distribute  innumerable  doles  of 
half  a  franc  or  less.  Military  banquets  were  given,  in 
which  the  sergeant  and  the  corporal  sat  side  by  side 
with  the  higher  officers.  Promotion  was  skilfully 

I/offered  or  withheld.  As  the  generals  of  the  highest 
position  were  hostile  to  Bonaparte,  it  was  the  easier  to 

_jtempt  their  subordinates  with  the  prospect  of  their 
Tr>  the  acclamations  which  greeted  the  Presi- 


dent at  the  reviews  held  at  Paris  1T1  the  mitiimn  nf  1 
in  the  behaviour  both  of  officers  and  men  in  certain 
regiments,  it  was  seen  how  successful  had  been  the 
emissaries  of  Bonapartism.  The  Committee  which  re- 
presented the  absent  Chamber  in  vain  called  the  Minis- 
ter of  War  to  account  for  these  irregularities.  It  was 
in  vain  that  Changarnier,  who,  as  commander  both  of 
the  National  Guard  of  Paris  and  of  the 

Dismissal  of  „  .,.  i  •     •    •  T     j         i      i  -i     ,  i 

Changarnier,         hrst  military  division,  seemed  to  hold  the 

Jan.,  1851.  <* 

arbitrament  between  President  and  Assembly 
in  his  hands,  openly  declared  at  the  beginning  of  1851 
.in  favour  of  the  Constitution.  He  was  dismissed  from 


1851.       PROPOSED  REVISION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.       165 

his  post ;  and  although  a  vote  of  censure  which  fol- 
lowed this  dismissal  led  to  the  resignation  of  the 
Ministry,  the  Assembly  was  unable  to  reinstate  Chan- 
gamier  in  his  command,  and  helplessly  witnessed  the 
authority  which  he  had  held  pass  into  hostile  or 
untrustworthy  hands. 

There  now  remained  only  one  possible  means    of 
averting  the  attack  upon  the  Constitution  which  was  so 
clearly  threatened,  and  that  was  by  subject- 
ing the  Constitution  itself   to  revision    in     sion  of  the 

Constitution. 

order  that  Louis  Napoleon  might  legally 
seek  re-election  at  the  end  of  his  Presidency.  An  over- 
whelming current  of  public  opinion  pressed  indeed  in 
the  direction  of  such  a  change.  However  gross  and 
undisguised  the  initiative  of  the  local  functionaries  in 
preparing  the  petitions  which  showered  upon  the  As- 
sembly, the  national  character  of  the  demand  could 
not  be  doubted.  There  was  no  other  candidate  whose 
name  carried  with  it  any  genuine  popularity  or  prestige, 
or  around  whom  even  the  Parliamentary  sections  at 
enmity  with  the  President  could  rally.  The  Assembly 
was  divided  not  very  unevenly  between  Legitimists, 
Qrleanists.  and  Republicans.  Had  indeed  the  two  mon- 
archical groups  been  able  to  act  in  accord,  they  might 
have  had  some  hope  of  re-establishing  the  throne ; 
and  an  attempt  had  already  been  made  to  effect  a 
union,  on  the  understanding  that  the  childless  Comte 
de  Chambord_sliQuM  recognise  the  grandson  of  Louis 
Philippe  as  his,  heir,  the  House  of  Orleans  renouncing 
its  claims  during  the  lifetime  of  the  chief  of  the 


166  MODERN  EUROPE.  MSI. 

elder  line.  These  plans  had  been  frustrated  by  the 
refusal  of  the  Comte  de  Chambord  to  sanction  any 
appeal  to  the  popular  vote,  and  the  restoration  of 
the  monarchy  was  therefore  hopeless  for  the  present. 
It  remained  for  the  Assembly  to  decide  whether 
V/it  would  facilitate  Louis  Napoleon's  re-election  as 
President  by  a  revision  of  the  Constitution  or  brave  the 
risk  of  his  violent  usurpation  of  power.  The  position 
was  a  sad  and  even  humiliating  one  for  those  who, 
while  they  could  not  disguise  their  real  feeling  towards 
the  Prince,  yet  knew  themselves  unable  to  count  on  the 
support  of  the  nation  if  they  should  resist  him.  The 
Legitimists,  more  sanguine  in  temper,  kept  in  view  an 
ultimate  restoration  of  the  monarchy,  and  lent  them- 
selves gladly  to  any  policy  which  might  weaken  the 
constitutional  safeguards  of  the  Eepublic.  The  Repub- 
lican minority  alone  determined  to  resist  any  proposal 
for  revision,  and  to  stake  everything  upon  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  Constitution  in  its  existing 

Revision  of  the          „  ^TT      ,  . ,          ^-^          ,  , . 

constitution         form.      Weak  as  the   Kepubhcans  were  as 

rejected,  July  19. 

compared  with  the  other  groups  in  the 
Assembly  when  united  against  them,  they  were  yet 
strong  enough  to  prevent  the  Ministry  from  securing 
ttiat  majority  of  three-fourths  without  which  the  re- 
Vvision  of  the  Constitution  could  not  be  undertaken. 
Four  hundred  and  fifty  votes  were  given  in  favour  of 
revision,  two  hundred  and  seventy  against  it  (July 
19th).  The  proposal  therefore  fell  to  the  ground,  and 
Louis  Napoleon,  who  could  already  charge  the  Assem- 
bly with  having  by  its  majority  destroyed  universal 


PEEPAEATIONS   FOR    THE    COUP   D'ETAT.  167 


suffrage,    could    now    charge    it    with    having    by    its 
linority  forbidden  the  nation  to  choose  its  own  head. 

He  had    only 


to  decide  upon  the  time  and  the  cirejim  stances  of  the 
coup  d'etat  which  was  to  rid  him  of  his  adversaries  and 
to  make  him  master  of  France. 

Louis  Napoleon  had  few  intimate  confidants  ;  the 
chief  among  these  were  his  half-brother  Morny.  one  of 
the  illegitimate  offspring  of  Queen  Hortense,  a  man  of 
fashion  and  speculator  in  the  stocks  ;  Fial  i  n  p^p^y^  f  or 
or  Persigny,  a  person  of  humble  origin  who 
had  proved  himself  a  devoted  follower  of  the  Prince 
through  good  and  evil  ;  and  Fleury,  an  officer  at  this 
time  on  a  mission  in  Algiers.  These  were  not  men 
out  of  whom  Louis  Napoleon  conld  form  an  ad- 
ministration, but  they  were  useful  to  him  in  dis- 
.  covering  and  winning  over  soldiers  and  officials  of 
sufficient  standing  to  give  to  the  execution  of  the  con- 
spiracy something  of  the  appearance  of  an  act  of 
Government.  A  general  was  needed  at  the  War  Office 
who  would  go  all  lengths  in  illegality.  Such  a  man 
had  already  been  found  in  St.  Arnaud.  commander  of  a 
Jjriiiade  in  Algiers,  a  brilliant  soldier  who  had  redeemed 


a  disreputable  past  by  years  of  hard  service,  and  who 
was  known  to  be  ready  to  treat  his  French  fellow- 
citizens  exactly  as  he  would  treat  the  Arabs,  As  St. 
Arnaud's  name  was  not  yet  familiar  in  Paris,  a  cam- 
paign was  arranged  in  the  summer  of  1851  for  the 
purpose  of  winning  him  distinction.  At  the  cost  of 
some  hundreds  of  lives  St.  Arnaud  was  pushed  into 


/la 


163  MODERN  EUROPE.  mi. 

sufficient  fame ;  and  after  receiving  congratulations 
proportioned  to  his  exploits  from  the  President's 
own  hand,  he  was  summoned  to  Paris,  in  order  at 
the  right  moment  to  be  made  Minister  of  War.  A 
roop  of  younger  officers,  many  of  whom  gained  a 
lamentable  celebrity  as  the  generals  of  18-70,  were 
gradually  brought  over  from  Algiers  and  placed  round 
the  Minister  in  the  capital.  The  command  of  the  army 
of  Paris  was  given  to  General  Magnan,  who,  though 
he  preferred  not  to  share  in  the  deliberations  on  the 
coup  d'Maf,  had  promised  his  co-operation  when  the 
moment  should  arrive.  The  support,  or  at  least  the 
acquiescence,  of  the  army  seemed  thus  to  be  assured. 
The  National  Guard,  which,  under  Changarnier,  would 
probably  have  rallied  in  defence  of  the  Assembly,  had 
been  placed  under  an  officer  pledged  to  keep  it  in 
inaction.  For  the  management  of  the  police  Louis 
Napoleon  had  fixed  upon  M.  Maupas,  Prefet  of  the 
Haute  Garonne.  This  person,  to  whose  shamelessness 
we  owe  the  most  authentic  information  that  exists  on 
the  coup  d'elat,  had,  while  in  an  inferior  station,  made 
it  his  business  to  ingratiate  himself  with  the  President 
by  sending  to  him  personally  police  reports  which  ought 
to  have  been  sent  to  the  Ministers.  The  objects  and 
the  character  of  M.  Maupas  were  soon  enough  under- 
stood by  Louis  Napoleon.  He  promoted  him  to  high 
office  ;  sheltered  him  from  the  censure  of  his  superiors ; 
and,  when  the  coup  d'etat  was  drawing  nigh,  called  him 
to  Paris,  in  the  full  and  well-grounded  confidence  that, 
whatever  the  most  perfidious  ingenuity  could  contrive 


1851.  ST.    AENAUD.  169 

in  turning  the  guardians  of  the  law  against  the  law 
itself,  that  M.  Maupas,  as  Prefet  of  Police,  might  be 
relied  upon  to  accomplish. 

Preparations  for  the  coup  d'etat. ^had  been  so  far 
advanced  in  September  that  a  majority  of  the  conspirators 
had  then  urged  Louis  Napoleon  to  strike  the  blow  with- 
out delay,  while  the  members  of  the  Assembly  were  still 
dispersed  over  France  in  the  vacation.  St. 

f  .   .  The  coup  (I'itnt 

Arnaud,    however,    reiused    his  assent,  de-       fixed  for  De- 
cember. 

claring  that  the  deputies,  if  left  free,  would 
assemble  at  a  distance  from  Paris,  summon  to  them  the 
generals  loyal  to  the  Constitution,  and  commence  a 
civil  war.  He  urged  that,  in  order  ,to  avoid  greater 
subsequent-risks,  it  would  be  npfipssnry^f.n  spize  all  the 
leading  representatives  and  generals  from  whom  re- 
sistance  might  be  expected,  and  to  hold  theia~rmde^ 
durance  until  the  crisis  should  be  over.  This  simul- 
taneous arrest  of  all  the  foremost  public  men  in  France 
could  only  be  effected  at  a  time  when  the  Assembly 
was  sitting.  St.  Arnaud  therefore  demanded  that  the 
coup  d'etat  should  be  postponed  till  the  winter.  Another 
reason  made  for  delay.  Little  as  the  populace  of  Paris 
loved  the  reactionary  Assembly,  Louis  Napoleon  was 
not  altogether  assured  that  it  would  quietly  witness  his 
own  usurpation  of  power.  In  waiting  until  the  Cham- 
ber should  again  be  in  session,  he  saw  the  opportunity 
of  exhibiting  his  cause  as  that  of  the  masses  themselves, 
and  of  justifying  his  action  as  the  sole  means  of  en- 
forcing popular  rights  against  a  legislature  obstinately 
bent  on  denying  them.  Louis  Napoleon's  own  Ministers 


170  MODERN  EUROPE.  issi. 

had  overthrown  universal  suffrage.  This  might  indeed 
be  matter  for  comment  on  the  part  of  the  censorious, 
but  it  was  not  a  circumstance  to  stand  in  the  way  of 
the  execution  of  a  great  design.  Accordingly  Louis 
Napoleon  determined  to  demand  from  the  Assembly  at 
the  opening  of  the  winter  session  the  repeal  of  the 
electoral  law  of  May  31st,  and  to  make  its  refusal,  on 
which  he  could  confidently  reckon^  the,  occasioiv  of  its 
destruction.  ^Z^^^^^f^^^^ 

The  consprators  were  up  to  this  time  conspirators 
and  nothing  more.  A  Ministry  still  subsisted  which 
was  not  initiated  in  the  President's  designs  nor  alto- 
gether at  his  command.  On  his  requiring  that  the 
repeal  of  .the  law  of  May  31st  should  be  proposed  to 
the  Assembly,  the  Cabinet  resigned.  The  way  to  the 
highest  functions  of  State  was  thus  finally  opened  for 
the  agents  of  the  coup  d'etat.  St.  Arnaud  was  placed 
v^at  the  War  Office,  Maupas  at  the  Prefecture  of  Police. 
The  colleagues  assigned  to  them  were  too  insignificant 
to  exercise  any  control  over  their  actions.  At  the  re- 
opening of  the  Assembly  on  the  4th  of  November  an 
energetic  message  from  the  President  was  read.  On 
the  one  hand  he  denounced  avast  and  perilous •  com- 
bination of  all  the  most  dangerous  elements  of  society 
which  threatened  to  overwhelm  France  in  the  following 
year;  on  the  other  hand  he  demanded,  with 

Louis  Napoleon        J 

Jfi^arSS     certain  undefined  safeguards,  the  re-establish- 
ment of   universal   suffrage.       The  middle 
classes  were  scared  with  the  prospect  of  a  Socialist  revo- 
1  ution ;  the  Assembly  was  divided  against  itself,  ai;d  the 


1851.  THE   ASSEMBLY  AT  PARIS.  171 

democracy  of  Paris  flattered  by  the  homage  paid  to  the 
popular  vote.  With  very  little  delay  a  measure  repeal- 
ing the  Law  of  May  3.1st  was  introduced  into  the 
Assembly.  It  was  supported  by  the  Republicans  and 
by  many  members  of  the  other  groups;  but  the  majority 
of  the  Assembly,  while  anxious  to  devise  some  com- 
promise, refused  to  condemn  its  own  work  in  the 
nqualified  form  on  which  the  President  insisted.  The 
Bill  was  thrown  out  by  seven  votes.  Forth-  The  Awembiy 
with  the  rumour  of  an  impending  coup 
d'etat  spread  through  Paris.  The  Questors,  or  members 
charged  with  the  safeguarding  of  the  Assembly,  moved 
the  resolutions  necessary  to  enable  them  to  secure 
sufficient  military  aid.  Even  now  prompt  action 
might  perhaps  have  saved  the  Chamber.  But  the 
Republican  deputies,  incensed  by  their  defeat  on  the 
(question  of  universal  suffrage,  plunged  headlong  into 
the  snare  set  for  them  by  the  President,  and  combined 
with  his  open  or  secret  partisans  to  reject  the  proposi- 
tion of  the  Questors.  Changarnier  had  blindly  vouched 
for  the  fidelity  of  the  army  ;  one  Republican  deputy, 
more  imaginative  than  his  colleagues,  bade  the  Assembly 
confide  in  their  invisible  sentinel,  the  people.  Thus 
the  majority  of  the  Chamber,  with  the  clearest  warning 
of  danger,  insisted  on  giving  the  aggressor  every  pos- 
sible advantage.  If  the  imbecility  of  opponents  is  the 
best  augury  of  success  in  a  bold  enterprise,  the  Presi- 
dent had  indeed  little  reason  to  anticipate  failure. 

The  execution  of  the  coup  d'etat  was  fixed  for  the 
early   morning   of  December    2nd.     On    the   previous 


172  MODERN  EUROPE.  1851. 

evening  Louis  Napoleon  held  a  public  reception  at  the 
Elysee,  his  quiet  self-possessed  manner  indicating 
The  coup  cntat,  nothing  of  the  struggle  at  hand.  Before 
the  guests  dispersed  the  President  with- 
drew to  his  study.  There  the  last  council  of  the  con- 
spirators was  held,  and  they  parted,  each  to  the  execu- 
tion of  the  work  assigned  to  him.  The  central  element 
^in  the  plan  was  the  arrest  of  Cavaignac,  of  Changarnier 
and  three  other  generals  who  were  members  of  the 
Assembly,  of  eleven  civilian  dpprrh'ea  inp.lnfUnp^JVT. 
Thiers,  and  of  sixty-two  other  politicians  of  influence. 
Maupas  summoned  to  the  Prefecture  of  Police  in  the 
dead  of  night  a  sufficient  number  of  his  trusted  agents, 
received  each  of  them  on  hi?  arrival  in  a  sppnrnitp  rr^Tn, 
and  charged  each  with  the  arrest  of  one  of  the  victims. 
The  arrests  were  accomplished  before  dawn,  and  the 
leading  soldiers  and  citizens  of  France  met  one  another 
in  the  prison  of  Mazas.^  The  Palais  Bourbon,  the 
meeting-place  of  the  Assembly,  was  occupied  by  troops. 
The  national  printing  establishment,  was  seized  by 
y^endarmes,  and  the  proclamations  of  Louis  Napoleon, 
distributed  sentence  by  sentence  to  different  composi- 
tors, were  set  in  type  before  the  workmen  knew  upon 
'what  they  were  engaged.  When  day  broke  the  Paris- 
ians found  the  soldiers  in  the  streets,  and  the  walls 
placarded  with  manifestoes  of  Louis  Napoleon.  The 
lirst  of  these  was  a  decree  which  announced  in  the  name 
of  the  French  people  that  the  National  Assembly  and 
the  Council  of  State  were  dissolved,  that  universal  suf- 
frage  was  restored,  and  that  the  nation  was  convoked 


ipsi.  THE   COUP   D'ETAT.  173 

in  its  electoral  colleges  from  the  14th  to  the  2 1  st 
of  December.  The  second  was  a  proclamation  to  the 
people,  in  which  Louis  Napoleon  denounced  at  once  the 
monarchical  conspirators  within  the  Assembly  and  the 
anarchists  who  sought  to  overthrow  all'government.  His 
duty  called  upon  him  to  save  the  Republic  by  an  appeal 
to  the  nation.  He  proposed  the  establishment  of  a 
decennial  executive  authority,  with  a  Senate,  a  Council 
of  State,  a  Legislative  Body,  and  other  institutions 
borrowed  from  the  Consulate  of  1799.  If  the  nation 

^refused  him  a  majority  of  its  votes  he  would  summon 
a  new  Assembly  and  resign  his  powers ;  if  the  nation 
believed  in  the  cause  of  which  his  name  was  the  symbol, 
in  France  regenerated  by  the  Revolution  and  organised 
by  the  Emperor,  it  would  prove  this  by  ratifying  his 
V/authority.  A  third  proclamation  was  addressed  to  the 
army.  In  1830  and  in  1848  the  army  had  been  treated 

'as  the  conquered,  but  its  voice  was  now  to  be  heard. 
Common  glories  and  sorrows  united  the  soldiers  of 
France  with  Napoleon's  heir,  and  the  future  would 
unite  them  in  common  devotion  to  the  repose  and 
greatness  of  their  country. 
^  The  full  meaning  of  these  manifestoes  was  not  at 

'  first  understood  by  the  groups  who  read  them.  The 
Assembly  was  so  unpopular  that  the  announcement  of 
its  dissolution,  with  the  restoration  of  uni- 

Paris  on  Dec.  2. 

versa!  suffrage,  pleased  rather  than  alarmed 
the   democratic  quarters  of   Paris.      It  was    not   until 
some  hours  had  passed  that  the  arrests  became  gener- 
ally known,  and  that  the  first  symptoms  of  resistance 


•  at 


174  MODERN  EUROPE.  issi. 

appeared.  Groups  of  deputies  assembled  at  the  houses  of 
the  Parliamentary  leaders  ;  a  body  of  fifty  even  succeeded 
in  entering  the  Palais  Bourbon  and  in  commencing  a 
debate :  they  were,  however,  soon  dispersed  by  soldiers, 
ater  in  the  day  above  two  hundred  members  assembled 
at  the  Mairie  of  the  Tenth  Arrondissement.  There 
they  passed  resolutions  declaring  the  President  removed 
from  his  office,  and  appointing  a  commander  of  the 
troops  at  Paris.  The  first  officers  who  were  sent  to 
clear  the  Mairie  flinched  in  the  execution  of  their  work, 
and  withdrew  for  further  orders.  The  M agistrales  j^f 
the  High  Court,  whose  duty  it  was  to  order  the  im- 
peachment of  the  President  in  case  of  the  violation  of 
his  oath  to  the  Constitution,  assembled,  and  commenced 
the  necessary  proceedings ;  but  before  they  could  sign  a 
warrant,  soldiers  forced  their  way  into  the  hall  and  drove 


the  judges  from  tl 
appeared  with  a 


e  Bench.   In  due  course  General  Forey 
strong  body  of  troops  at  the  Mairie, 


where  the  two  hundred  deputies  were  assembled.  Ee- 
fusing  to  disperse\  they  were  one  and  all  arrested,  and 
conducted  as  prisoners  between  files  of  troops  to  the 
y' Barracks  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  The  National  Guard, 
whose  drums  had  been  removed  by  their  commander  in 
view  of  any  spontaneous  movement  to  arms,  remained 
invisible.  Louis  Napoleon  rode  out  amidst  the  accla- 
mations of  the  soldiery;  and  when  the  day  closed  it 
seemed  as  if  Paris  had  resolved  to  accept  the  change  of 
Government  and  the  overthrow  of  the  Constitution 
without  a  struggle. 

There  were,  however,  a  few  resolute  men  at  work  in 


1851.  THE    COUP   D'ETAT.  175 

the  workmen's  quarters ;  and  in  the  wealthier  part  of 
the  city  the  outrage  upon  the  National  Representation 
gradually  roused  a  spirit  of  resistance.  On  the  morning 
of  December  3rd  the  Deputy  Baudin  met 
with  his  death  in  attempting  to  defend^  a 
barricade  which  had  been  erected  in  the  Faubourg  St. 
Antoiiie.  The  artisans  of  eastern  Paris  showed, 
however,  little  inclination  to  take  up  arms  on 
behalf  of  those  who  had  crushed  them  in  the  Four 
Days  of  .Tune  •  the  agitation  was  strongest  within  the 
Boulevards,  and  spread  westwards  towards  the  stateliest 
district  of  Paris.  The  barricades  erected  on  the  south 
of  the  Boulevards  were  so  numerous,  the  crowds  so  for- 
midable, that  towards  the  close  of  the  day  the  troops 
were  withdrawn,  and  it  was  determined  that  after  a  night 
of  quiet  they  should  make  a  general  attack  and  end 
the  struggle  at  one  blow.  At  midday  on 
December  4th  divisions  of  the  army  con- 
verged from  all  directions  upon  the  insurgent  quarter. 
The  barricades  were  captured  or  levelled  by  artillery, 
and  with  a  loss  on  the  part  of  the  troops  of  twenty-eight 
killed  and  a  hundred  and  eighty  wounded  resistance 
was  overcome.  But  the  soldiers  had  been  taught  to 
regard  the  inhabitants  of  Paris  as  their  enemies,  and 
they  bettered  the  instructions  given  them.  Maddened 
by  drink  or  panic,  they  commenced  indiscriminate 
firing  in  the  Boulevards  after  the  conflict  was  over, 
and  slaughtered  all  who  either  in  the  street  or  at  the 
windows  of  the  houses  came  within  range  of  their 
bullets.  According  to  official  admissions,  the  lives  of 


173.  MODERN  EUROPE.  msi. 

sixteen  civilians  paid  for  every  soldier  slain ;  inde- 
pendent estimates  place  far  higher  the  number  of  the 
victims  of  this  massacre.  Two  thousand  arrests  followed, 
and  every  Frenchman  who  appeared  dangerous  to  Louis 
Napoleon's  myrmidons,  from  Thiers  and  Victor  Hugo 
down  to  the  anarchist  orators  of  the  wineshops,  was 
"either  transported,  exiled,  or  lodged  in  prison.  Thus 
was^the  Republic  preserved  and  society  saved. 

France  in  general  received  the  news  of  the  coup 
d'etat  with  indifference :  where  it  excited  popular  move- 
ments these  movements  were  of  such  a  character  that 
Louis  Napoleon  drew  from  them  the  utmost  profit.  A 
The  plebiscite  certain  fierce,  blind  Socialism  had  spread 
among  the  poorest  of  the  rural  classes  in  the 
centre  and  south  of  France.  In  these  departments  there 
were  isolated  risings,  accompanied  by  acts  of  such  mur- 
derous outrage  and  folly  that  a  general  terror  seized  the 
surrounding  districts.  In  the  course  of  a  few  days  the 
predatory  bands  were  dispersed,  and  an  unsparing 
chastisement  was  inflicted  on  all  who  were  concerned  in 
their  misdeeds ;  but  the  reports  sent  to  Paris  were  too 
serviceable  to  Louis  Napoleon  to  be  left  in  obscurity ; 
and  these  brutish  village-outbreaks,  which  collapsed  at 
the  first  appearance  of  a  handful  of  soldiers,  were  re- 
presented  as  the  prelude  to  a  vast  Socialist  revolution 
ni  which  the  coup  d'etat,  and  that  alone,  had  saved 
France.  Terrified  by  the  re-appearance  of  the  Red 
Spectre^,  the  French  nation  proceeded  on  the  20th  of 
December  to  pass  its  judgment  on  the  accomplished 
usurpation.  The  question  submitted  for  the  plebiscite 


1852^  NAPOLEON  III.  177 

was,  whether  the  people  desiredthe  maintenance  of 
.Louis  .Napoleon's  authority  and  committed  to  him  the 
necessary  powers  for  ftsj^hlishiTig  a  Constitution  on  the 


basis  laid  down  in  his  proclamation  of  December  2nd. 
Seven  million  Yntpfl  anflw?™^  fV^cgnoc^n  {n  fV^  a,ffitm- 
ative,  less  than  one-tenth  of  that  number  in  the  nega- 
tive. The  result  was  made  known  on  the  last  day  of 
the  year  1851.  On  the  first  day  of  the  new  year  Louis 
Napoleon  attended  a  service  of  thanksgiving  at  Notre 
Dame,  took  possession  of  the  Tuileries,  and  restored  the 
eagle  as  the  military  emblem  of  France.  He_was  now 
in  all  but  name  a.n  absolute  sovereign  The  Church, 
the  army,  the  ever-servile  body  of  the  civil  administra- 
tion, waited  impatiently  for  the  revival  of  the  Imperial 
itle.  Nor  was  the  saviour  of  society  the  man  to  shrink 
from  further  responsibilities.  Before  the  year  closed 
the  people  was  once  more  called  upon  to 
express  its  will.  Seven  millions  of  votes  Emperor"  Dec! 

2,  1852. 

pronounced  for  hereditary  power  ;  and  on 

the  anniversary  of  the  coup  d'etat  Napoleon  III.  was 

proclaimed  Emperor  of  the  French.   Q 


M 


CHAPTER   III. 

England  and  France  in  1851— Russia  under  Nicholas— The  Hungarian  Refugees 
— Dispute  between  France  and  Russia  on  the  Holy  Places — Nicholas  and 
the  British  Ambassador  —  Lord  Stratford  de  Redcliffe  —  Menschikoff's 
Missions—Russian  Troops  enter  the  Danubian  Principalities — Lord  Aber- 
deen's Cabinet — Movements  of  the  Fleets — The  Vienna  Note — The  Fleets 
pass  the  Dardanelles — Turkish  Squadron  destroyed  at  Sinope — Declaration 
of  "War — Policy  of  Austria — Policy  of  Prussia — The  Western  Powers  and 
the  European  Concert — Siege  of  Silistria — The  Principalities  evacuated — 
Further  objects  of  the  "Western  Powers — Invasion  of  the  Crimea — Battle 
of  the  Alma — The  Flank  March — Balaclava — Inkermann — Winter  in  the 
Crimea — Death  of  Nicholas — Conference  of  Vienna — Austria — Progress  of 
the  Siege — Plans  of  Napoleon  III. — Canrobert  and  Pelissier — Unsuccessful 
Assault— Battle  of  the  Tchernaya— Capture  of  the  Malakoff — Fall  of  Sebas- 
topol — Fall  of  Kars — Negotiations  for  Peace — The  Conference  of  Paris — 
Treaty  of  Paris— The  Danubian  Principalities — Continued  discord  in  the 
Ottoman  Empire — Revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  in  1871. 

THE  year  1851  was  memorable  in  England  as  that 
of  the  Great  Exhibition.  Thirty- six  years  of  peace, 
marked  by  an  enormous  development  of  manufacturing 
industry,  by  the  introduction  of  railroads,  and  by  the 
victory  of  the  principle  of  Tree  Trade,  had  culminated 
in  a  spectacle  so  impressive  and  so  novel  that  to  many  it 
seemed  the  emblem  and  harbinger  of  a  new  epoch  in 
the  history  of  mankind,  in  which  war  should 
cease,  and  the  rivalry  of  nations  should  at 
length  find  its  true  scope  in  the  advancement  of  the 
arts  of  peace.  The  apostles  of  Free  Trade  had  idealised 
the  cause  for  which  they  contended.  The  unhappiness 
and  the  crimes  of  nations  had,  as  they  held,  been  due 


ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE.  179 

principally  to  the  action  of  governments,  which  plunged 
harmless  millions  into  war  for  dynastic  ends,  and 
paralysed  human  energy  by  their  own  blind  and  sense- 
less interference  with  the  natural  course  of  exchange. 
Compassion  for  the  poor  and  the  suffering,  a  just  resent- 
ment  against  laws  which  in  the  interest  of  one  dominant 
class  condemned  the  mass  of  the  nation  to  a  life  of 
want,  gave  moral  fervour  and  elevation  to  the  teaching 
of  Cobden  and  those  who  shared  his  spirit.  Like  others 
who  have  been  constrained  by  a  noble  enthusiasm,  they 
had  their  visions;  and  in  their  sense  of  the  greatness  of 
that  new  force  which  was  ready  to  operate  upon  human 
life,  they  both  forgot  the  incompleteness  of  their  own 
doctrine,  and  under-estimated  the  influences  which 
worked,  and  long  must  work,  upon  mankind  in  an 
opposite  direction.  In  perfect  sincerity  the  leader  of 
English  economical  reform  at  the  middle  of  this  century 
looked  forward  to  a  reign  of  peace  and  of  unfettered 
intercourse  among  the  members  of  the  European  family. 
What  the  man  of  genius  and  conviction  had  pro- 
claimed the  charlatan  repeated  in  his  turn.  Louis 
Napoleon  appreciated  the  charm  which  schemes  of  com- 
mercial development  .exercised  upon  the  trading  classes 
in  France.  He  was  ready  to  salute  the  Imperial  eagles 
as  objects  of  worship,  and  to  invoke  the  memories  of 
Napoleon's  glory  when  addressing  soldiers ;  when  it 
concerned  him  to  satisfy  the  commercial  world,  he  was 
the  very  embodiment  of  peace  and  of  peaceful  industry. 
"  Certain  persons,"  he  said,  in  an  address  at  Bordeaux, 
shortly  before  assuming  the  title  of  Emperor,  "  say 
M  2 


180  MODERN  EUROPE. 

that  the  Empire  is  war.  I  say  that  the  Empire 
is  peace  ;  for  France  desires  peace,  and  when  France 
is  satisfied  the  world  is  tranquil.  We  have  waste 
territories  to  cultivate,  roads  to  open,  harbours  to  dig,  a 
system  of  railroads  to  complete ;  we  have  to  bring  all 
our  great  western  ports  into  connection  with  the  Ameri- 
can continent  by  a  rapidity  of  communication  which  we, 
still  want.  We  have  ruins  to  restore,  false  gods  to 
overthrow,  truths  to  make  triumphant.  This  is  the 
sense  that  I  attach  to  the  Empire ;  these  are  the  con- 
quests which  I  contemplate."  Never  had  the  ideal  of 
industrious  peace  been  more  impressively  set  before 
mankind  than  in  the  years  which  succeeded  the  con- 
vulsion of  1848.  Yet  the  epoch  on  which  Europe  was 
then  about  to  enter  proved  to  be  pre-eminently  an  epoch 
of  war.  In  the  next  quarter  of  a  century  there  w,as  not 
one  of  the  Great  Powers  which  was  not  engaged  in  an 
armed  struggle  with  its  rivals.  Nor  were  the  wars  of 
this  period  in  any  sense  the  result  of  accident,  or  dis- 
connected with  the  stream  of  political  tendencies  which 
makes  the  history  of  the  age.  With  one  exception 
they  left  in  their  train  great  changes  for  which  the 
time  was  ripe,  changes  which  for  more  than  a  genera- 
tion had  been  the  recognised  objects  of  national  desire, 
but  which  persuasion  and  revolution  had  equally  failed 
to  bring  into  effect.  The  Crimean  War  alone  was 
barren  in  positive  results  of  a  lasting  nature,  and  may 
seem  only  to  have  postponed,  at  enormous  cost  of  life, 
the  fall  of  a  doomed  and  outworn  Power.  But  the 
time  has  not  yet  arrived  when  the  real  bearing  of  the 


NICHOLAS.  181 

overthrow  of  Eussia  in  1854  on  the  destiny  of  the' 
Christian  races  of  Turkey  can  be  confidently  expressed. 
The  victory  of  the  Sultan's  protectors  delayed  the 
emancipation  of  these  races  for  twenty  years ;  the 
victory,  or  the  unchecked  aggression,  6f  Eussia  in  1854 
might  possibly  have  closed  to  them  for  ever  the  ways  to 
national  independence. 

The  plans  formed  by  the  Empress  Catherine  in  the 
last  century  for  the  restoration  of  the  Greek  Empire 
under  a  prince  of  the  Eussian  House  had  long  been 
abandoned  at  St.  Petersburg.  The  later 

Russian     policy 

aim  of  Eussian  policy  found  its  clearest  ex-  under  Nicholas- 
pression  in  the  Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi,  extorted  from 
Sultan  Mahmud  in  1833  in  the  course  of  the  first  war 
against  Mehemet  Ali.  This  Treaty,  if  it  had  not  been 
set  aside  by  the  Western  Powers,  would  have  made  the 
Ottoman  Empire  a  vassal  State  under  the  Czar's  pro- 
tection. In  the  concert  of  Europe  which  was  called 
into  being  by  the  second  war  of  Mehemet  Ali  against 
the  Sultan  in  1840,  Nicholas  had  considered  it  his 
interest  to  act  with  England  and  the  German  Powers  in 
pefence  of  the  Porte  against  its  Egyptian  rival  and 
pis  French  ally.  A  policy  of  moderation  had  been 
imposed  upon  Eussia  by  the  increased  watchfulness 
and  activity  now  displayed  by  the  other  European  States 
in  all  that  related  to  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Isolated 
aggression  had  become  impracticable ;  it  was  necessary 
for  Eussia  to  seek  the  countenance  or  support  of  some 
ally  before  venturing  on  the  next  step  in  the  extension 
of  its  power  southwards.  In  1844  Nicholas  visited^ 


182  MODERN  EUROPE.  1844-54. 

England.     The  object  of  his  journey  was  to  sound  the 
Court  and  the  Government,  and  to  lay  the 

Nicholas  in 

,  England,  1844.  foundation  for  concerted  action  between 
Eussia  and  England,  to  the  exclusion  of  France, 
when  circumstances  should  bring  about  the  dis-^, 
|  solution  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  an  event  which  the 
\  Czar  believed  to  be  not  far  off.  Peel  was  then  Prime 
Minister;  Lord  Aberdeen  was  Foreign  Secretary.  Aber- 
deen had  begun  his  political  career  in  a  diplomatic 
mission  to  the  Allied  Armies  in  1814.  His  feelings 
towards  Russia  were  those  of  a  loyal  friend  towards  an 
old  ally  ;  and  the  remembrance  of  the  epoch  of  1814, 
when  the  young  Nicholas  had  made  acquaintance  with 
Lord  Aberdeen  in  France,  appears  to  have  given  to  the 
Czar  a  peculiar  sense  of  confidence  in  the  goodwill  of 
the  English  Minister  towards  himself.  Nicholas  spoke 
freely  with  Aberdeen,  as  well  as  with  Peel  and  Wel- 
lington, on  the  impending  fall  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
"  We  have,"  he  said,  "  a  sick,  a  dying  man  on  our 
hands.  We  must  keep  him  alive  so  long  as  it  is  pos- 
sible to  do  so,  but  we  must  frankly  take  into  view  all 
contingencies.  I  wish  for  no  inch  of  Turkish  soil 
myself,  but  neither  will  I  permit  any  other  Power  to 
seize  an  inch  of  it.  France,  which  has  designs  upon 
Africa,  upon  the  Mediterranean,  and  upon  the  East,  is 
the  only  Power  to  be  feared.  An  understanding  between 
England  and  Russia  will  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe." 
If  the  Czar  pursued  his  speculations  further  into  detail, 
of  which  there  is  no  evidence,  he  elicited  no  response. 
He  was  heard  with  caution,  and  his  visit  appears  to 


ISM-SI.  NICHOLAS.  183 

have  produced  nothing  more  than  the  formal  expression 
of  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government  that 
the  existing  treaty-rights  of  Russia  should  be  respected 
by  the  Porte,  together  with  an  unmeaning  promise  that, 
if  unexpected  events  should  occur  in  Turkey,  Russia  and 
England  should  enter  into  counsel  as  to  the  best  course 
of  action  to  be  pursued  in  common.* 

Nicholas,  whether  from  policy  or  from  a  sense  of 
kingly  honour  which  at  most  times  powerfully  in- 
fluenced him,  did  not  avail  himself  of  the  prostration 
of  the  Continental  Powers  in  1848  to  attack  Turkey. 
He  detested  revolution,  as  a  crime  against  the  divinely 
ordered  subjection  of  nations  to  their  rulers, 
and  would  probably  have  felt  himself  de- 
graded had  he,  in  the  spirit  of  his  predecessor  Catherine, 
turned  the  calamities  of  his  brother-monarchs  to  his 
own  separate  advantage.  It  accorded  better  with 
'  his  proud  nature,  possibly  also  with  the  schemes  of  a 
far-reaching  policy,  for  Russia  to  enter  the  field  as  the 
protector  of  the  Hapsburgs  against  the  rebel  Hungarians 
than  for  its  armies  to  snatch  from  the  Porte  what  the 
lapse  of  time  and  the  goodwill  of  European  allies  would 
probably  give  to  Russia  at  no  distant  date  without  a 
struggle.  Disturbances  at  Bucharest  and  at  Jassy 
led  indeed  to  a  Russian  intervention  in  the  Danu- 
bian  Principalities  in  the  interests  of  a  despotic 

*  Stockmar,  396.  Eastern  Papers  (i.e.,  Parliamentary  Papers,  1854, 
vol.  71),  part  6.  Malmesbury,  Memoirs  of  an  ex-Minister,  i.  402 ;  the 
last  probably  inaccurate.  Diplomatic  Study  of  the  Crimean  War,  i.  11. 
This  work  is  a  Russian  official  publication,  and,  though  loose  and  untrust- 
worthy, is  valuable  as  showing  the  Russian  official  view. 


184  MODERN  EUROPE,  1848-53. 

system  of  government ;  but  Eussia  possessed  by  treaty 
protecfcoral  rights  over  these  Provinces.  The  mili- 
tary occupation  which  followed  the  revolt  against  the 
Hospodars  was  the  subject  of  a  convention  between 
Turkey  and  Russia ;  it  was  effected  by  the  armies  of 
the  two  Powers  jointly ;  and  at  the  expiration  of  two 
years  the  Russian  forces  were  peacefully  withdrawn. 
More  serious  were  the  difficulties  which  arose  from  the 
flight  of  Kossuth  and  other  Hungarian  leaders  into 
j Turkey  after  the  subjugation  of  Hungary  ^^^ 
Iby  the  allied  Austrian  and  Russian  armies. 
The  Courts  of  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  united  in 
demanding  from  the  Porte  the  surrender  of  these 
refugees ;  the  Sultan  refused  to  deliver  them  up,  and 
he  was  energetically  supported  by  Great  Britain, 
Kossuth's  children  on  their  arrival  at  Constantinople 
being  received  and  cared  for  at  the  British  Embassy. 
The  tyrannous  demand  of  the  two  Emperors,  the 
courageous  resistance  of  the  Sultan,  excited  the  utmost 
interest  in  Western  Europe.  By  a  strange  turn  of 
fortune,  the  Power  which  at  the  end  of  the  last  century 
had  demanded  from  the  Court  of  Vienna  the  Greek 
leader  Rhegas,  and  had  put  him  to  death  as  soon  as  he 
was  handed  over  by  the  Austrian  police,  was  now  gain- 
ing the  admiration  of  all  free  nations  as  the  last  barrier 
that  sheltered  the  champions  of  European  liberty  from 
the  vengeance  of  despotic  might.  The  Czar  and  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  had  not  reckoned  with  the  forces  of 
public  indignation  aroused  against  them  in  the  West 
by  their  attempt  to  wrest  their  enemies  from  the 


1848-53.  NICHOLAS.  185 

Sultan's  hand.  They  withdrew  their  ambassadors  from 
Constantinople  and  threatened  to  resort  to  force.  But 
the  appearance  of  the  British  and  French  fleets  at  the 
Dardanelles  gave  a  new  aspect  to  the  dispute.  The  Em- 
perors learnt  that  if  they  made  war  upbn  Turkey  for  the 
question  at  issue  they  would  have  to  fight  also  against 
the  Western  Powers.  The  demand  for  the  surrender 
of  the  refugees  was  withdrawn  ;  and  in  undertaking  to 
keep  the  principal  of  them  under  surveillance  for  a 
reasonable  period,  the  Sultan  gave  to  the  two  Imperial 
Courts  such  satisfaction  as  they  could,  without  loss  of 
dignity,  accept.* 

The  coup  d'etat  of  Louis  Napoleon  at  the  end  of  the 
year  1851  was  witnessed  by  the  Czar  with  sympathy 
and  admiration  as  a  service  to  the  cause  of  order  ;  but 
the  assumption  of  the  Imperial  title  by  the  Dispute  between 
Prince  displeased  him  exceedingly.  While  Russia  on  the 

°  J  Holy  Places, 

'not  refusing  to   recognise    Napoleon   III.,     1850"2< 
he  declined  to  address  him  by  the  term  (mon  frere] 
usually   employed    by   monarchs    in    writing    to    one 
another.     In  addition  to  the  question  relating  to  the 
Hungarian  refugees,    a  dispute   concerning   the 


Places  in  Palestine  threatened  to  cause  strife  between  / 
France  and  Eussia.  The  same  wave  of  religious  and 
theological  interest  which  in  England  produced  the 
Tractarian  movement  brought  into  the  arena  of  politi- 
cal life  in  France  an  enthusiasm  for  the  Church  long 
strange  to  the  Legislature  and  the  governing  circles  of 
Paris.  In  the  Assembly  of  1849  Montalembert,  the 

«  Ashley's  Palinerston,  ii.  142.   Lane  Poole,  Stratford  de  Redcliffe,ii.  191. 


18.1  MODERN  EUROPE.  1849-53. 

spokesman  of  this  militant  Catholicism,  was  one  of  the 
foremost  figures.  Louis  Napoleon,  as  President,  sought 
the  favour  of  those  whom  Montalembert  led ;  and  the 
same  Government  which  restored  the  Pope  to  Rome 
demanded  from  the  Porte  a  stricter  enforcement  of  the 

^rights  of  the  Latin  Church  in  the  East.  The  earliest 
Christian  legends  had  been  localised  in  various  spots 
around  Jerusalem.  These  had  been  in  the  ages  of  faith 
the  goal  of  countless  pilgrimages,  and  in  more  recent 
centuries  they  had  formed  the  object  of  treaties  between 

v/  the  Porte  and  France.  Greek  monks,  however,  disputed 
with  Latin  monks  for  the  guardianship  of  the  Holy 
Places;  and  as  the  power  of  Kussia  grew,  the  privileges 

**"  of  the  Greek  monks  had  increased.  The  claims  of  the 
rival  brotherhoods,  which  related  to  doors,  keys,  stars 
and  lamps,  might  probably  have  been  settled  to  the 
satisfaction  of  all  parties  within  a  few  hours  by  an  ex- 
perienced stage- manager ;  in  the  hands  of  diplomatists 
bent  on  obtaining  triumphs  over  one  another  they  as- 
sumed dimensions  that  overshadowedthe.peace  of  Europe. 
The  French  and  the  Russian  Ministers  at  Constantinople 
alternately  tormented  the  Sultan  in  the  character  of 
aggrieved  sacristans,  until,  at  the  beginning  of  1852, 
the  Porte  compromised  itself  with  both  parties  by  ad- 
judging to  each  rights  which  it  professed  also  to  secure 
to  the  other.  A  year  more,  spent  in  prevarications,  in 
excuses,  and  in  menaces,  ended  with  the  triumph  of  the 
French,  with  the  evasion  of  the  promises  made  by  the 
Sultan  to  Russia,  and  with  the  discomfiture  of  the 
Greek  Church  in  the  person  of  the  monks  who 


1853. 


NICHOLAS.  187 


officiated  at  the  Holy  Sepulchre  and  the  Shrine  of  the 
Nativity.* 

Nicholas  treated  the  conduct  of  the  Porte  as  an 
outrage  upon  himself.  A  conflict  which  had  hroken 
out  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Montenegrins,  and 
which  now  threatened  to  take  a  deadly  form,  confirmed 
the  Czar  in  his  belief  that  the  time  for  resolute  action 
had  arrived.  At  the  beginning  of  the  year 
C  1853  he  addressed  himself  to  Sir  Hamil-  sir H.  Seymour, 

Jan.,  Feb.,  1853. 

ton  Seymour,  British  ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg,  in  terms  much  stronger  and  clearer  than 
those  which  he  had  used  towards  Lord  Aberdeen  nine 
years  before.  "  The  Sick  Man,"  he  said,  "  was  in  extre- 
mities ;  the  time  had  come  for  a  clear  understanding 
between  England  and  Russia.  The  occupation  of  Con- 
stantinople by  Eussian  troops  might  be  necessary,  but 
the  Czar  would  not  hold  it  permanently.  He  would 
not  permit  any  other  Power  to  establish  itself  at  the 
Bosphorus,  neither  would  he  permit  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire to  be  broken  up  into  Republics  to  afford  a  refuge 
to  the  Mazzinis  and  the  Kossuths  of  Europe.  The 
Danubian  Principalities  were  already  independent  States 
"Bunder  Russian  protection.  The  other  possessions  of  the 
Sultan  north  of  the  Balkans  might  be  placed  on  the 
same  footing.  England  might  annex  Egypt  and  Crete." 
After  making  this  communication  to  the  British  am- 
bassador, and  receiving  the  reply  that  England  declined 
to  enter  into  any  schemes  based  on  the  fall  of  the 
Turkish  Empire  and  disclaimed  all  desire  for  the 

*  Eastern  Papers,  i.  55.     Diplomatic  Study,  i.  121. 


188  MODERN  EUROPE.  1863. 

annexation  of  any  part  of  the  Sultan's  dominions, 
Nicholas  despatched  Prince  Menschikoff  to  Constantin- 
ople, to  demand  from  the  Porte  not  only  an  immediate 
settlement  of  the  questions  relating  to  the  Holy  Places, 
but  a  Treaty  guaranteeing  to  the  Greek  Church  the 
undisturbed  enjoyment  of  all  its  ancient  rights  and  the 
benefit  of  all  privileges  that  might  be  accorded  by  the 
Porte  to  any  other  Christian  communities.* 

The  Treaty  which  Menschikoff  was  instructed  to 
demand  would  have  placed  the  Sultan  and  the  Czar  in 
the  position  of  contracting  parties  with  regard  to  the 
The  oiaim*  of  entire  body  of  rights  and  privileges  enjoyed 
by  the  Sultan's  subjects  of  the  Greek  con- 
fession, and  would  so  have  made  the  violation  of  these 
rights  in  the  case  of  any  individual  Christian  a  matter 
entitling  Russia  to  interfere,  or  to  claim  satisfaction  as 
for  the  breach  of  a  Treaty  engagement.  By  the  Treaty 
of  Kainardjie  (1774)  the  Sultan  had  indeed  bound  him- 
self "  to  protect  the  Christian  religion  and  its  Churches ; " 
but  this  phrase  was  too  indistinct  to  create  specific  matter 
of  Treaty- obligation ;  and  if  it  had  given  to  Russia  any 
general  right  of  interference  on  behalf  of  members  of 
the  Greek  Church,  it  would  have  given  it  the  same 
right  in  behalf  of  all  the  Roman  Catholics  and  all  the 
Protestants  in  the  Sultan's  dominions,  a  right  which 
the  Czars  had  never  professed  to  enjoy.  Moreover  the 
Treaty  of  Kainardjie  itself  forbade  by  implication  any 
such  construction,  for  it  mentioned  by  name  one  eccle- 
siastical building  for  whose  priests  the  Porte  did 

*  Eastern  Papers,  ,v.,  2,  19. 


1853.  MENSCHIKOFF  AT  CONSTANTINOPLE.  189 

concede  to  Russia  the  right  of  addressing  representations 
to  the  Sultan.  Over  the  Danubian  Principalities  Russia 
possessed  by  the  Treaty  of  Adrianople  undoubted  pro- 
tectoral  rights ;  but  these  Provinces  stood  on  a  footing 
quite  different  from  that  of  the  remainder  of  the 
Empire.  That  the  Greek  Church  possessed  by  custom 
and  by  enactment  privileges  which  it  was  the  duty  of 
the  Sultan  to  respect,  no  one  contested  :  the  novelty  of 
Menschikoff's  claim  was  that  the  observation  of  these 
rights  should  be  made  matter  of  Treaty  with  Russia. 
The  importance  of  the  demand  was  proved  by  the  fact 
that  Menschikoff  strictly  forbade  the  Turkish  Ministers 
to  reveal  it  to  the  other  Powers,  and  that  Nicholas 
caused  the  English  Government  to  be  informed  that 
the  mission  of  his  envoy  had  no  other  object  than  the 
final  adjustment  of  the  difficulties  respecting  the  Holy 
Places.* 

When    Menschikoff    reached    Constantinople     the 
British   Embassy  was  in  the  hands  of  a  subordinate 
officer.     The  Ambassador,   Sir  Stratford  Canning,  had 
recently  returned   to    England.     Stratford  Canning,  a 
cousin  of  the  Premier,  had  been  employed  in  the  East 
at  intervals  since  1810.     There  had  been  a  period  in 
his  career  when  he  had  desired  to  see  the      Lord  8tratford 
Turk  expelled  from  Europe  as  an  incurable 
barbarian ;  but  the  reforms  of  Sultan  Mahmud  had  atj' 
a  later  time  excited  his  warm  interest  and  sympathy,  \ 
and  as  Ambassador  at   Constantinople    from    1842  to  ) 
1852  he  had  laboured  strenuously  for  the  regeneration'' 

*  Eastern  Papers,  i.  102.     Admitted  in  Diplomatic  Study,  i.  163. 


190  MODERN   EUROPE.  1853. 

of  the  Turkish  Empire,  and  for  the  improvement  of  the 
condition  of  the  Christian  races  under  the  Sultan's 
rule.  His  dauntless,  sustained  energy,  his  noble  pre- 
sence, the  sincerity  of  his  friendship  towards  the  Porte, 
gave  him  an  influence  at  Constantinople  seldom,  if 
ever,  exercised  by  a  foreign  statesman.  There  were 
moments  when  he  seemed  to  be  achieving  results  of 
some  value ;  but  the  task  which  he  had  attempted  was 
one  that  surpassed  human  power ;  and  after  ten  years 
so  spent  as  to  win  for  him  the  fame  of  the  greatest 
ambassador  by  whom  England  has  been  represented  in 
modern  times,  he  declared  that  the  prospects  of  Turkish 
reform  were  hopeless,  and  left  Constantinople,  not  in- 
tending to  return.*  Before  his  successor  had  been^ 
appointed,  the  mission  of  Prince  Menschikoff,  the 
violence  of  his  behaviour  at  Constantinople,  and  a 
rumour  that  he  sought  far  more  than  his  ostensible 
object,  alarmed  the  British  Government.  Canning  was 
asked  to  resume  his  post.  Returning  to  Constantinople 
as  Lord  Stratford  de  Redcliffe,  he  communicated  on  his 
journey  with  the  Courts  of  Paris  and  Vienna,  and 
carried  with  him  authority  to  order  the  Admiral  of 

*  He  writes  thus,  April  5,  1851 : — "  The  great  game  of  improvement 
is  altogether  up  for  the  present.  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  conceal  that 
the  main  object  of  my  stay  here  is  almost  hopeless."  Even  Palmerstou, 
in  the  rare  moments  when  he  allowed  his  judgment  to  master  his  prepos- 
sessions on  this  subject,  expressed  the  same  view.  He  wrote  on  Novem- 
ber 24,  1850,  warning  Rescind  Pasha  "  the  Turkish  Empire  is  doomed  to 
fall  by  the  timidity  and  irresolution  of  its  Sovereign  and  of  its  Ministers  ; 
and  it  is  evident  we  shall  ere  long  have  to  consider  what  other 
arrangements  may  be  set  up  in  its  place."  Stratford  left  Constantinople 
on  leave  in  June,  1852,  but  resigned  his  Embassy  altogether  in  January, 
1853.  (Lane  Poole,  Stratford  de  Redcliffe,  ii.  212,  215.) 


1853.  STRATFORD   DE  RED  CLIFFS  191 

the  fleet  at  Malta  to  hold  his  ships  in  readiness  to  sail 
for  the  East,  He  arrived  at  the  Bosphorus  on 
April  5th,  learnt  at  once  the  real  situation  of  affairs, 
and  entered  into  negotiation  with  Menschikoff.  The 
Russian,  a  mere  child  in  diplomacy  in>  comparison  with 
his  rival,  suffered  himself  to  be  persuaded  to  separate 
the  question  of  the  Holy  Places  from  that  of  the  gua- 
rantee of  the  rights  of  the  Greek  Church.  In  the  first 
matter  Eussia  had  a  good  cause ;  in  the  second  it  was 
advancing  a  new  claim.  The  two  being  dissociated, 
Stratford  had  no  difficulty  in  negotiating  a  com- 
promise on  the  Holy  Places  satisfactory  to  the 
Czar's  representative ;  and  the  demand  for  the  Pro- 
tectorate over  the  Greek  Christians  now  stood  out  un- 
obscured  by  those  grievances  of  detail  with  which  it 
had  been  at  first  interwoven.  Stratford  encouraged  the 
Turkish  Government  to  reject  the  Russian  proposal. 
Knowing,  nevertheless,  that  Menschikoff  would  in  the 
last  resort  endeavour  to  intimidate  the  Sultan  personally, 
he  withheld  from  the  Ministers,  in  view  of  this  last 
peril,  the  strongest  of  all  his  arguments  ;  and  seeking 
a  private  audience  with  the  Sultan  on  the  9th  of 
May,  he  made  known  to  him  with  great  solemnity 
the  authority  which  he  had  received  to  order  the  fleet 
at  Malta  to  be  in  readiness  to  sail.  The  Sultan 
placed  the  natural  interpretation  on  this 
statement,  and  ordered  the  final  rejection  of  I«V<N  co°nstan- 

tinople,  May  21. 

Menschikoff's  demand,  though  the  Eussian 

had    consented     to    a   modification    of    its   form,  and 

would  now  have   accepted  a   note    declaratory  of  the 


192  MODERN  EUROPE.  1853. 

intentions  of  the  Sultan  towards  the  Greek  Church 
instead  of  a  regular  Treaty.  On  the  21st  of  May 
Menschikoff  quitted  Constantinople ;  and  the  Czar, 
declaring-  that  some  guarantee  must  be  held  by  Russia 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  rights  of  the  Greek  Chris- 
tians, announced  that  he  should  order  his  army  to 
occupy  the  Danubian  Provinces.  After  an 

Russian   troops         .  ,       „  ,  .          „ 

enter  the  Princi-     interval  or  some  weeks  the  Russian  troops 

palities. 

crossed  the  Pruth,  and    spread  themselves 
over  Moldavia  and  Wallachia.      (June  22nd.)  * 

In  the  ordinary  course  of  affairs  the  invasion  of 
the  territory  of  one  Empire  by  the  troops  of  another 
is,  and  can  be  nothing  else  than,  an  act  of  war,  necessi- 
tating hostilities  as  a  measure  of  defence  on  the  part 
of  the  Power  invaded.  But  the  Czar  protested  that 
in  taking  the  Danubian  Principalities  in  pledge  he  had 
no  intention  of  violating  the  peace ;  and  as  yet  the  com- 
mon sense  of  the  Turks,  as  well  as  the  counsels  that  they 
received  from  without,  bade  them  hesitate  before  issuing 
a  declaration  of  war.  Since  December,  1852,  Lord 
Aberdeen  had  been  Prime  Minister  of  Eng- 
land, at  the  head  of  a  Cabinet  formed  by  a 
coalition  between  followers  of  Sir  Robert  Peel  and 
the  Whig  leaders  Palmerston  and  Russell,  f  There  was 
no  man  in  England  more  pacific  in  disposition,  or  more 
anxious  to  remain  on  terms  of  honourable  friendship 
with  Russia,  than  Lord  Aberdeen.  The  Czar  had 

*  Eastern  Papers,  i.  253,  339.     Lane  Poole,  Stratford,  ii.  248. 

f  Palmerston  had  accepted  the  office  of  Home  Secretary,  but  naturally 
exercised  great  influence  in  foreign  affairs.  The  Foreign  Secretary  was 
Lord  Clarendon. 


1853.  STRATFORD  DE  REDCLIFFE.  19.3 

justly  reckoned  on  the  Premier's  own  forbearance;  but 
he  had  failed  to  recognise  the  strength  of  those  forces 
which,  both  within  and  without  the  Cabinet,  set  in 
the  direction  of  armed  resistance  to  Russia.  Palmer  - 
ston  was  keen  for  action.  Lord  Stratford  appears 
to  have  taken  it  for  granted  from  the  first  that,  if  a 
war  should  arise  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Czar 
in  consequence  of  the  rejection  of  Menschikoff's 
demand,  Great  Britain  would  fight  in  defence  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  He  had  not  stated  this  in  express 
terms,  but  the  communication  which  he  made  to  the 
Sultan  regarding  his  own  instructions  could  only  have 
been  intended  to  convey  this  impression.  If  the  fleet 
was  not  to  defend  the  Sultan,  it  was  a  mere  piece  of 
deceit  to  inform  him  that  the  Ambassador  had  powers 
to  place  it  in  readiness  to  sail ;  and  such  deceit  was  as 
alien  to  the  character  of  Lord  Stratford  as  the  assump- 
tion of  a  virtual  engagement  towards  the  Sultan  was  in 
keeping  with  his  imperious  will  and  his  passionate 
conviction  of  the  duty  of  England.  From  the  date  of 
Lord  Stratford's  visit  to  the  Palace,  although  no  Treaty 
or  agreement  was  in  existence,  England  stood  bound  in 
honour,  so  long  as  the  Turks  should  pursue  the  policy 
laid  down  by  her  envoy,  to  fulfil  the  expectations  which 
this  envoy  had  held  out. 

Had  Lord  Stratforj^l  been  at  the  head  of  the 
Government,  the  policy  and  intentions  of  Great  Britain 
would  no  doubt  have  been  announced  with  such 
distinctness  that  the  Czar  could  have  fostered  no 
misapprehension  as  to  the  results  of  his  own  acts. 

N 


194  MODERN  EUROPE.  1853. 

Palmerston,  as  Premier,  would  probably  have  adopted 
the  same  clear  course,  and  war  would  either  have  been 
avoided  by  this  nation  or  have  been  made  with  a  dis- 
tinct purpose  and  on  a  definite  issue.  But  the  Cabinet  of 
Lord  Aberdeen  was  at  variance  with  itself.  Aberdeen 
was  ready  to  go  to  all  lengths  in  negotiation,  but  he 
was  not  sufficiently  master  of  his  colleagues  and  of  the 
representatives  of  England  abroad  to  prevent  acts  and 
declarations  which  in  themselves  brought  war  near ; 
above  all,  he  failed  to  require  from  Turkey  that  abstention 
from  hostilities  on  which,  so.  long  as  negotiations  lasted, 
England  and  the  other  Powers  which  proposed  to  make 
the  cause  of  the  Porte  their  own  ought  unquestion- 
ably to  have  insisted.  On  the  announcement  by  the 
Czar  that  his  army  was  about  to  enter  the  Prin- 
cipalities, the  British  Government  de- 

Bntish  and 

spatched  the  fleet  to  Besika  Bay  near  the 


entrance  to  the  Dardanelles,  and  authorised 
Stratford  to  call  it  to  the  Bosphorus,  in  case  Constan- 
tinople should  be  attacked.*  The  French  fleet,  which 
had  corne  into  Greek  waters  on  Menschikoff's  appear- 
ance at  Constantinople,  took  up  the  same  position. 
Meanwhile  European  diplomacy  was  busily  engaged 
in  framing  schemes  of  compromise  between  the  Porte 
and  Russia.  The  representatives  of  the  four  Powers 
met  at  Vienna,  and  agreed  upon  a  note  which,  as  they 
considered,  would  satisfy  any  legitimate  claims  of 
Russia  on  behalf  of  the  Greek  Church,  and  at  the  same 
time  impose  upon  the  Sultan  no  further  obligations 

*  Eastern  Papers,  i.  210,  ii.  116.     Ashley's  Palmerston,  ii.  23. 


1853.  THE   VIENNA  NOTE.  195 

towards  Russia  than  those  which  already  existed.* 
This  note,  however,  was  ill  drawn,  and  would  have 
opened  the  door  to  new  claims  on  the  part  of  Russia 
to  a  general  Protectorate  not  sanctioned  by  its  authors. 
The  draft  was  sent  to  St.  Petersburg,  'and  _ 

The  Vienna 

was    accepted   by  the  Czar.     At  Constan- 
tinople  its  ambiguities  were  at  once  recognised ;    and 
though  Lord  Stratford    in   his   official  capacity  urged 
its    acceptance    under    a   European    guarantee    against 
misconstruction,  the  Divan,  now  under  the  pressure  of 
strong  patriotic  forces,  refused  to  accept  the  note  un- 
less   certain    changes    were    made    in    its    expressions. 
France,   England,   and  Austria  united  in  recommend- 
ing to   the  Court  of  St.   Petersburg  the  adoption   of 
these    amendments.     The   Czar,    however,    declined   to 
admit  them,  and  a  Russian  document,  which  obtained  a 
publicity  for  which  it  was  not  intended,  proved  that 
thi)   construction  of  the   note   which  the   amendments 
were  expressly  designed  to  exclude  was  precisely  that 
which    Russia  meant  to  place  upon  it.      The  British 
Ministry   now   refused   to    recommend   the    note    any 
longer  to  the  Porte. f     Austria,   while  it  approved  of 
the  amendments,  did  not  consider  that  their  rejection 
by  the  Czar  justified  England  in  abandoning  the  note 
as  the  common  award  of  the  European  Powers ;  and 
thus  the  concert  of  Euron^  was  interrupted,  England  and 
France  combining  in  a  policy  which  Austria  and  Prussia 
were    not    willing   to   follow.       In    proportion    as    the 
chances  of  joint  European  action  diminished,  the  ardour 

*  Eastern  Papers,  ii.  23.          t  Eastern  Papers,  ii.  86,  91, 103. 
N  2 


196  MODERN  EUROPE.  IKB. 

of  the  Turks  themselves,  and  of  those  who  were  to  be 

Constantinople  iliQ'lY  allies>  rose  higher.  Tumults,  organised 
by  the  heads  of  the  war-party,  broke  out  at 
Constantinople  ;  and  although  Stratford  scorned  the 
alarms  of  his  French  colleagues,  who  reported  that  a 
massacre  of  the  Europeans  in  the  capital  was  imminent, 
he  thought  it  necessary  to  call  up  two  vessels  of  war  in 
order  to  provide  for  the  security  of  the  English  residents 
and  of  the  Sultan  himself.  In  England  Palmerston 
and  the  men  of  action  in  the  Cabinet  dragged  Lord 
Aberdeen  with  them.  The  French  Government  pressed 
for  vigorous  measures,  and  in  conformity  with  its  desire 
instructions  were  sent  from  London  to  Lord  Stratford 
to  call  the  fleet  to  the  Bosphorus,  and  to  employ  it  in 
defending1  the  territory  of  the  Sultan 

British  and  « 

against  aggression.    On  the  22nd  of  October 


the  British  and  French  fleets  passed  the 
Dardanelles. 

The  Turk,  sure  of  the  protection  of  the  Western 
Powers,  had  for  some  weeks  resolved  upon  war  ;  and  yet 
the  possibilities  of  a  diplomatic  settlement  were  not  yet 
exhausted.  Stratford  himself  had  forwarded  to  Vienna 
the  draft  of  an  independent  note  which  the  Sultan  was 

prepared  to  accept.     This  had  not  yet  been 

The    ultimatum  o,        -,-,    .          ,  ~    , 

of  omar  Pasha     seen    at    fet.    Petersburg.       Other    proiects 

rejected,  Oct.  10. 

of  conciliation  filled  the  desks  of  all  the 
leading  politicians  of  Europe.  Yet,  though  the  belief 
generally  existed  that  some  scheme  could  be  framed 
by  which  the  Sultan,  without  sacrifice  of  his  dignity 
and  interest,  might  induce  the  Czar  to  evacuate  the 


1853.  SINOPE.  197 

Principalities,  no  serious  attempt  was  made  to  prevent 
the  Turks  from  coming  into  collision  with  their  enemies 
both  by  land  and  sea.  The  commander  of  the  Russian 
troops  in  the  Principalities  having,  on  the  10th  of 
October,  rejected  an  ultimatum  requiring  him  to  with- 
draw within  fifteen  days,  this  answer  was  taken  as  the 
signal  for  the  commencement  of  hostilities.  The 
Czar  met  the  declaration  of  war  with  a  statement 
that  he  would  abstain  from  taking  the  offensive,  and 
would  continue  merely  to  hold  the  Principalities  as 
a  material  guarantee.  Omar  Pasha,  the  Ottoman 
commander  in  Bulgaria,  was  not  permitted  to  observe 
the  same  passive  attitude.  Crossing  the  Danube,  he 
attacked  and  defeated  the  Russians  at  Oltenitza.  Thus 
assailed,  the  Czar  considered  that  his  engagement  not  to 
act  on  the  offensive  was  at  an  end,  and  the 

....,,  ,          Turkish    squad- 

Kussian    fleet,    issuing1    trom     bebastopol,     ron  destroyed  at 

Sinope,  Nov.  30. 

attacked  and  destroyed  a  Turkish  squadron 
in  the  harbour  of  Sinope  on  the  southern  coast  of  the 
Black  Sea  (November  30).  The  action  was  a  piece  of 
gross  folly  on  the  part  of  the  Russian  authorities  if  they 
still  cherished  the  hopes  of  pacification  which  the  Czar 
professed  ;  but  others  also  were  at  fault.  Lord  Stratford 
and  the  British  Admiral,  if  they  could  not  prevent  the 
Turkish  ships  from  remaining  in  the  Euxine,  where  they 
were  useless  against  the  superior  force  of  Russia,  might  at 
least  in  exercise  of  the  powers  given  to  them  have  sent 
a  sufficient  escort  to  prevent  an  encounter.  But  the 
same  ill-fortune  and  incompleteness  that  had  marked 
all  the  diplomacy  of  the  previous  months  attended  the 


193  MODERN   EUROPE.  1853. 

counsels  of  the  Admirals  at  the  Bosphorus;  and  the 
disaster  of  Sinope  rendered  war  between  the  Western 
Powers  and  Russia  almost  inevitable.* 

The  Turks  themselves  had  certainly  not  understood 
the  declaration  of  the  Emperor  Nicholas  as  assuring 
Effect  of  the  their  squadron  at  Sinope  against  attack;  and 
so  far  was  the  Ottoman  Admiral  from  being 
the  victim  of  a  surprise  that  he  had  warned  his  Govern- 
ment some  days  before  of  the  probability  of  his  own 
destruction.  But  to  the  English  people,  indignant 
with  Russia  since  its  destruction  of  Hungarian  liberty 
and  its  tyrannous  demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  Hun- 
garian refugees,  all  that  now  passed  heaped  up  the  intoler- 
able sum  of  autocratic  violence  and  deceit.  The  cannon- 
ade which  was  continued  against  the  Turkish  crews  at 
Sinope  long  after  they  had  become  defenceless  gave  to  the 
battle  the  aspect  of  a  massacre  ;  the  supposed  promise 
of  the  Czar  to  act  only  on  the  defensive  caused  it  to  be 
denounced  .as  an  act  of  flagrant  treachery ;  the  circum- 
stance that  the  Turkish  fleet  was  lying  within  one  of 
the  Sultan's  harbours,  touching  as  it  were  the  terri- 
tory which  the  navy  of  England  had  undertaken  to  pro- 
tect, imparted  to  the  attack  the  character  of  a  direct 
challenge  and  defiance  to  England.  The  cry  rose 
loud  for  war.  Napoleon,  eager  for  the  alliance  with 
England,  eager  in  conjunction  with  England  to  play 
a  great  part  before  Europe,  even  at  the  cost  of  a  war 
from  which  France  had  nothing  to  gain,  proposed  that  the 
combined  fleets  should  pass  the  Bosphorus  and  require 

*  Eastern  Papers,  ii.  203,  227,  299. 


1854.  FRANCE  AND  ENGLAND  DECLARE  WAR.          (  199 

\_> 

every  Russian  vessel  sailing  on  the  Black  Sea  to  re- 
enter  port.     His  proposal  was  adopted  by 
the   British  Government.     Nicholas  learnt     quired  to  enter 

port,  December. 

that  the  Russian  flag  was  swept  from  the 
Euxine.  It  was  in  vaia  that  a  note  upon  which  the 
representatives  of  the  Powers  at  Vienna  had  once  more 
agreed  was  accepted  by  the  Porte  and  forwarded  to  St. 
Petersburg  (December  31).  The  pride  of  the  Czar  was 
wounded  beyond  endurance,  and  at  the  beginning  of 
February  he  recalled  his  ambassadors  from  London  and/ 
Paris.  A  letter  written  to  him  by  Napoleon  III.,  de- 
manding, in  the  name  of  himself  and  the  Queen  of  Eng- 
land the  evacuation  of  the  Principalities,  was  answered 
by  a  reference  to  the  campaign  of  Moscow.  Austria  now 
informed  the  Western  Powers  that  if  they  would  fix  a 
delay  for  the  evacuation  of  the  Principalities,  the  ex- 
piration of  which  should  be  the  signal  for  hostilities, 
it  would  support  the  summons ;  and  without  waiting 
to  learn  whether  Austria  would  also  unite  with  them 
in  hostilities  in  the  event  of  the  summons  being  re- 
jected, the  British  and  French  Governments  despatched 
their  ultimatum  to  St.  Petersburg.  Austria  and 
Prussia  sought,  but  in  vain,  to  reconcile  the  Court  of 
St.  Petersburg  to  the  only  measure  by 
which  peace  could  now  be  preserved.  The 

1854. 

ultimatum    remained    without   an    answer, 

and  on  the  27th  of  March  England  and  France  declared 

war. 

The   Czar  had  at   one   time   believed  that  in   his 
Ku>tern  schemes  he  was  sure  of  the  support  of  Austria ; 


200  MODERN  EUROPE.  1854. 

and  he  had  strong  reasons  for  supposing  himself  en- 
titled to  its  aid.  But  his  mode  of  thought  was  simpler 
than  that  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.  Schvvarzenberg, 
when  it  was  remarked  that  the  intervention  of  Russia 
poiic  of  in  Hungary  would  bind  the  House  of 
Hapsburg  too  closely  to  its  protector,  had 
made  the  memorable  answer,  "  We  will  astonish  the 
world  by  our  ingratitude."  It  is  possible  that  an 
instance  of  Austrian  gratitude  would  have  astonished 
the  world  most  of  all ;  but  Schwarzenberg's  successors 
were  not  the  men  to  sacrifice  a  sound  principle  to  romance. 
Two  courses  of  Eastern  policy  have,  under  various 
modifications,  had  their  advocates  in  rival  schools  of 
statesmen  at  Vienna.  The  one  is  that  of  expansion 
southward  in  concert  with  Russia  ;  the  other  is  that 
of  resistance  to  the  extension  of  Russian  power,  and 
the  consequent  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  During  Metternich's  long  rule,  in- 
spired as  this  was  by  a  faith  in  the  Treaties  and  the 
institutions  of  1815,  and  by  the  dread-of  every  living,  dis- 
turbing force,  the  second  of  these  systems  had  been  con- 
sistently followed.  In  1854  the  determining  motive 
of  the  Court  of  Vienna  was  not  a  decided  political  con- 
viction, but  the  certainty  that  if  it  united  with  Russia 
it  would  be  brought  into  war  with  the  Western  Powers. 
Had  Russia  and  Turkey  been  likely  to  remain  alone  in 
the  arena,  an  arrangement  for  territorial  compensation 
would  possibly,  as  on  some  other  occasions,  have  won 
for  the  Czar  an  Austrian  alliance.  Combination  against 
Turkey  was,  however,  at  the  present  time,  too  perilous 


v 


1851.  AUSTRIA.  201 

an  enterprise  for  the  Austrian  monarchy ;  and,  as 
nothing  was  to  be  gained  through  the  war,  it  remained' 
for  the  Viennese  diplomatists  to  see  that  nothing  was 
lost  and  as  little  as  possible  wasted-  The  presence 
of  Russian  troops  in  the  Principalities,  where  they 
controlled  the  Danube  in  its  course  between  the 
Hungarian  frontier  and  the  Black  Sea,  was,  in 
default  of  some  definite  understanding,  a  danger  to 
Austria;  and  Count_JBijol,  the  Minister  at  Vienna, 
had  therefore  every  reason  to  thank  the  Western 
Powers  for  insisting  on  the  evacuation  of  this  district-f 
When  France  and  England  were  burning  to  take 
up  arms,  it  would  have  been  a  piece  of  superfluous 
brutality  towards  the  Czar  for  Austria  to  attach  to  its 
own  demand  for  the  evacuation  of  the  Principalities  the 
threat  of  war.  But  this  evacuation  Austria  was  de-  , 

•4. 

termined  to  enforce.  It  refused,  as  did  Prussia,  to  give  to 
the  Czar  the  assurance  of  its  neutrality  ;  and,  inasmuch 
as  the  free  navigation  of  the  Danube  as  far  as  the  Black 
Sea  had  now  become  recognised  as  one  of  the  commercial 
interests  of  Germany  at  large,  Prussia  and  the  Grerman 
Federation  undertook  to  protect  the  territory  of  Aus- 
tria, if,  in  taking  the  measures  necessary  to  free  the 
Principalities,  it  should  itself  be  attacked  by  Russia.*  "*- 
The  King  of  Prussia,  clouded  as  his  mind  was 


*  Treaty  of  April  20,  1854,  and  Additional  Article,  Eastern  Papers, 
ix.  61.  The  Treaty  between  Austria  and  Prussia  was  one  of  general 
defensive  alliance,  covering  also  the  case  of  Austria  incurring  attack 
through  an  advance  into  the  Principalities.  In  the  event  of  Russia 
annexing  the  Principalities  or  sending  its  troops  beyond  the  Balkans  the 
alliance  was  to  be  offensive. 


4 
202  MODERN   EUROPE.  issi. 

by     political    and     religious     phantasms,     had    never- 
theless   at   times    a   larger  range    of   view 

Prussia.  .  ... 

than  his  neighbours ;  and  his  opinion 
as  to  the  true  solution  of  the  difficulties  between 
Nicholas  and  the  Porte,  at  the  time  of  Menschikoff's 
mission,  deserved  more  attention  than  it  received. 
Frederick  William  proposed  that  the  rights  of  the 
Christian  subjects  of  the  Sultan  should  be  placed  by 
Treaty  under  the  guarantee  of  all  the  Great  Powers. 
This  project  was  opposed  by  Lord  Stratford  and  the 
Turkish  Ministers  as  an  encroachment  on  the  Sultan's 
sovereignty,  and  its  rejection  led  the  King  to  write 
with  some  asperity  to ,  his  ambassador  in  London  that 
he  should  seek  the  welfare  of  Prussia  in  absolute 
neutrality.*  At  a  later  period  the  King  demanded  from 
England,  as  the  condition  of  any  assistance  from  him- 
self, a  guarantee  for  the  maintenance  of  the  frontiers  of 
Germany  and  Prussia.  He  regarded  Napoleon  III.  as 
the  representative  of  a  revolutionary  system,  and  be- 
lieved that  under  him  French  armies  would  soon  en- 
deavour to  overthrow  the  order  of  Europe  established 

in    1815.      That    England   should  enter   into    a    close 

W 

*  Briefwechsel  F.  Wilhelins  mit  Buiisen,  p.  310.  Martin's  Prince 
Consort,  iii.  39.  On  November  20,  after  the  Turks  had  begun  war, 
the  King1  of  Prussia  wrote  thus  to  Bunsen  (the  italics,  capitals,  and 
exclamations  are  his  own) :  "  All  direct  help  which  England  in  unchris- 
tian folly  !  I !  I ! !  gives  TO  ISLAM  AGAINST  CHRISTIANS  !  will 
have  (besides  God's  avenging  judgment  [hear !  hear !]),  no  other  effect 
than  to  bring  what  is  now  Turkish  territory  at  a  somewhat  later  period 
under  Russian  dominion"  (Brief wechsel,  p.  317).  The  reader  may 
think  that  the  insanity  to  which  Frederick  William  succumbed  was 
already  mastering  him  ;  but  the  above  is  no  rare  specimen  of  his  epistolary 
style. 


185t. 


FREDERICK  WILLIAM  IV.  203 


alliance  with  this  man  excited  the  King's  astonishment 
and  disgust ;  and  unless  the  Cabinet  of  London  were 
prepared  to  give  a  guarantee  against  any  future  attack 
on  Germany  by  the  French  Emperor,  who  was  believed 
to  be  ready  for  every  political  adventure,  it  was  vain  for 
England  to  seek  Prussia's  aid.  Lord  Aberdeen  could 
give  no  such  guarantee ;  still  less  could  he  gratify  the 
King's  strangely  passionate  demand  for  (the  restoration 
of  his  authority  in  the  Swiss  canton  of  Neuchatel, 
which  before  1848  had  belonged  in  name  to  the  Hohen- 
zollerns.  Many  influences  were  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  King  from  the  side  both  of  England  and  of  Russia. 
The  English  Court  and  Ministers,  strenuously  sup- 
ported by  Bunsen,  the  Prussian  ambassador,  strove  to 
enlist  the  King  in  an  active  concert  of  Europe  against 
Russia  by  dwelling  on  the  duties  of  Prussia  as  a  Great 
Power  and  the  dangers  arising  to  it  from  isolation. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  admiration  felt  by  Frederick 
William  for  the  Emperor  Nicholas,  and  the  old 
habitual  friendship  between  Prussia  and  Russia,  gave 
strength  to  the  Czar's  advocates  at  Berlin.  Schemes 
for  a  reconstruction  of  Europe,  which  were  devised  by 
Napoleon,  and  supposed  to  receive  some  countenance 
from  Palmerston,  reached  the  King's  ear.*  He  heard 
that  Austria  was  to  be  offered  the  Danubian  Provinces 
upon  condition  of  giving  up  northern  Italy ;  that 
Piedmont  was  to  receive  Lombardy,  and  in  return  to 

*  The  Treaty  of  alliance  between  France  and  England,  to  which 
Prussia  was  asked  to  accede,  contained,  however,  a  clause  pledging  the 
contracting  parties  "  under  no  circumstance  to  seek  to  obtain  from  the 
war  any  advantage  to  themselves.." 


204  MODERN  EUROPE.  1854 

surrender  Savoy  to  France  ;  that,  if  Austria  should 
decline  to  unite  actively  with  the  Western  Powers, 
revolutionary  movements  were  to  be  stirred  up  in  Italy 
and  in  Hungary.  Such  reports  kindled  the  King's  rage. 
"  Be  under  no  illusion,"  he  wrote  to  his  ambassador  ; 
"  tell  the  British  Ministers  in  their  private  ear  and 
on  the  housetops  that  I  will  not  suffer  Austria  to  be 
attacked  by  the  revolution  without  drawing  the  sword 
in  its  defence.  If  England  and  France  let  loose  revolu- 
tion as  their  ally,  be  it  where  it  may,  1  unite  with 
Russia  for  life  and  death."  Bunsen  advocated  the 
participation  of  Prussia  in  the  European  concert  with 
more  earnestness  than  success.  While  the  King  was 
declaiming  against  the  lawlessness  which  was  supposed 
to  have  spread  from  the  Tuileries  to  Downing  Street, 
Bunsen,  on  his  own  authority,  sent  to  Berlin  a  project 
for  the  annexation  of  Russian  territory  by  Prussia  as  a 
reward  for  its  alliance  with  the  Western  Courts.  This 
document  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Russian  party 
at  Berlin,  and  it  roused  the  King's  own  indignation. 
Bitter  reproaches  were  launched  against  the  Authors  of 
so  felonious  a  scheme.  Bunsen  could  no  longer  retain 
his  office.  Obher  advocates  of  the  Western  alliance 
were  dismissed  from  their  places,  and  the  policy  of 
neutrality  carried  the  day  at  Berlin. 

The  situation  of  the    European    Powers   in   April, 
1854,  was  thus  a  very   strange    one.     All 

Relation  of   the  * 

totherEuro^eean     the  Four  Powers  were  agreed  in  demand- 
ing   the    evacuation    of     the   Principalities 
by   Russia,  and   in  the    resolution   to   enforce    this,    if 


1854.  AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA.  205 

necessary,  by  arms.  Protocols  witnessing  this  agreement 
were  signed  on  the  9th  of  April  and  the  23rd  of 
May,*  and  it  was  moreover  declared  that  the  Four 
Powers  recognised  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the 
independence  and  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
But  France  and  England,  while  they  made  the  presence 
of  the  Eussians  in  the  Principalities  the  avowed  cause 
of  war,  had  in  reality  other  intentions  than  the  mere 
expulsion  of  the  intruder  and  the  restoration  of  the 
state  of  things  previously  existing.  It  was  their  desire 


so  to  cripple  Eussia  that  it  should  not  again  be  in 
condition  to  menace  the  Ottoman  Empire.  This  i 
tention  made  it  impossible  for  the  British  Cabinet  to 
name,  as  the  basis  of  a  European  league,  that  single 
definite  object  for  which,  and  for  which  alone,  all  the 
Powers  were  in  May,  1854,  ready  to  unite  in  arms. 
England,  the  nation  and  the  Government  alike,  chose 
nil  her  to  devote  itself,  in  company  with  France,  to  the 
task  of  indefinitely  weakening  Eussia  than,  in  company 
with  all  Europe,  to  force  Eussia  to  one  humiliating  but 
inevitable  act  of  submission.  Whether  in  the  prosecu- 
tion of  their  ulterior  objects  the  Western  Courts  might 
or  might  not  receive  some  armed  assistance  from  Austria 
and  Prussia  no  man  could  yet  predict  with  confidence. 
That  Austria  would  to  some  extent  make  common 
cause  with  the  Allies  seemed  not  unlikely  ;  that  Prussia 
would  do  so  there  was  no  real  ground  to  believe  ;  on 
the  contrary,  fair  warning  had  been  given  that  there 
were  contingencies  in  which  Prussia  might  ultimately 

*  Eastern  Papers,  viii.  1. 


;/ 


206  MODERN   EUROPE.  1854. 

be  found  on  the  side  of  the  Czar.  Striving  to  the 
utmost  to  discover  some  principle,  some  object,  or 
even  some  formula  which  might  expand  the  purely 
defensive  basis  accepted  by  Austria  and  Prussia  into  a 
common  policy  of  reconstructive  action,  the  Western 
Powers  could  obtain  nothing  more  definite  from  the 
Conference  at  Vienna  than  the  following  shadowy  en- 
gagement : — "  The  Four  Governments  engage  to  en- 
deavour in  common  to  discover  the  guarantees  most 
likely  to  attach  the  existence  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
to  the  general  equilibrium  of  Europe.  They  are  ready 
to  deliberate  as  to  the  employment  of  means  calculated 
to  accomplish  the  obje6t  of  their  agreement."  This 
readiness  to  deliberate,  so  cautiously  professed,  was  a 
quality  in  which  during  the  two  succeeding  years  the 
Courts  of  Vienna  and  Berlin  were  not  found  wanting  ; 
but  the  war  in  which  England  and  France  were  now 
engaged  was  one  which  they  had  undertaken  at  their 
own  risk,  and  they  discovered  little  anxiety  on  any  side 
to  share  their  labour. 

During  the  winter  of  1853  and  the  first  weeks  of 
the  following  year  hostilities  of  an  indecisive  character 
continued  between  the  Turks  and  the  Russians  on  the 
Danube.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Nicholas  had 
sieo-eofsiiistria  consulted  the  veteran  Paskiewitsch  as  to 
the  best  road  by  which  to  march  on 
Constantinople.  Paskiewitsch,  as  a  strategist,  knew  the 
danger  to  which  a  Russian  force  crossing  the  Danube 
would  be  exposed  from  the  presence  of  Austrian  armies 
on  it^  flank  ;  as  commander  in  the  invasion  of  Hungary 


185K  SIEGE  OF  SILTSTRIA.  207 

in  1849  he  had  encountered,  as  he  believed,  ill  faith 
and  base  dealing  on  the  part  of  his  ally,  and  had  repaid 
it  with  insult  and  scorn  :  he  had  learnt  better  than  any 
other  man  the  military  and  the  moral  weakness  of  the 
Austrian  Empire  in  its  eastern  part.  -His  answer  to 
the  Czar's  inquiries  was,  "  The  road  to  Constantinople 
lies  through  Vienna."  But  whatever  bitterness  the 
Czar  might  have  felt  at  the  ingratitude  of  Francis 
Joseph,  he  was  not  ready  for  a  war  with  Austria,  in 
which  he  could  hardly  have  avoided  the  assistance  of 
revolutionary  allies  ;  moreover,  if  the  road  to  Constan- 
tinople lay  through  Vienna,  it  might  be  urged  that 
the  road  to  Vienna  lay  through  Berlin.  The  simpler 
plan  was  adopted  of  a  march  on  the  Balkans  by  way  of 
Shumla,  to  which  the  capture  of  Silistria  was  to  be  the 
prelude.  At  the  end  of  March  the  Russian  vanguard 
passed  the  Danube  at  the  lowest  point  where  a  crossing 
could  be  made,  and  advanced  into  the  Dobrudscha.  In 
May  the  siege  of  Silistria  was  undertaken  by  Paskie- 
witsch  himself.  But  the  enterprise  began  too  late,  and 
the  strength  employed  both  in  the  siege  and  in  the  * 
field-operations  farther  east  was  insufficient.  The 
Turkish  garrison,  schooled  by  a  German  engineer 
and  animated  by  two  young  English  officers,  main- 
tained a  stubborn  and  effective  resistance.  French  and 
English  troops  had  already  landed  at  Gallipoli  for 
the  defence  of  Constantinople,  and  finding  no  enemy 
within  range  had  taken  ship  for  Varna  on  the  north  of 
the  Balkans.  Austria,  on  the  3rd  of  June,  delivered  its 
summons  requiring  the  evacuation  of  the  Principalities. 


208  MODERN  EUROPE. 


185 1. 


Almost  at  the  same  time  Paskiewitsch  received  a  wound 
that  disabled  him,  and  was  forced  to  sur- 

The  Principal!-  ,  ,   .  ,       .  . 

ties  evacuated,       render    his    command    into    other    hands. 

June. 

During  the  succeeding  fortnight  the  be- 
siegers of  Silistria  were  repeatedly  beaten  back,  and  on 
the  22nd  they  were  compelled  to  raise  the  siege.  The 
Russians,  now  hard  pressed  by  an  enemy  whom  they  had 
despised,  withdrew  to  the  north  of  the  Danube.  The 
retreating  movement  was  continued  during  the  succeed- 
ing weeks,  until  the  evacuation  of  the  Principalities 
was  complete,  and  the  last  Russian  soldier  had  re- 
crossed  the  Pruth.  As  the  invader  retired,  Austria 
sent  its  troops  into  these  border-provinces,  pledging 
itself  by  a  convention  with  the  Porte  to  protect  them 
until  peace  should  be  concluded,  and  then  to  restore 
them  to  the  Sultan. 

With  the  liberation  of  the  Principalities  the  avowed 
V ground  of  war  passed  away;  but  the  Western  Powers 
had  no  intention  of  making  peace  without  further  con- 
cessions on  the  part  of  Bussia.     As  soon  as 

Further  objects  ,  .  ,,     o.,.         .  ,      . 

of  the  western      the    siege    oi    feilistria   was  raised  instruc- 

Powers. 

tions  were  sent  to  the  commanders  of  the 
allied  armies  at  Varna,  pressing,  if  not  absolutely 
commanding,  them  to  attack  Sebastopol,  the  head- 
quarters of  Russian  maritime  power  in  the  Euxine. 
The  capture  of  Sebastopol  had  been  indicated  some 
months  before  by  Napoleon  III.  as  the  most  effective 
blow  that  could  be  dealt  to  Russia.  It  was  from  Sebas- 
topol that  the  fleet  had  issued  which  destroyed  the  Turks 
at  Sinope  :  until  this  arsenal  had  fallen,  the  growing 


i85i.  THE   FOUR   POINTS.  209 

naval  might  which  pressed  even  more  directly  upon 
Constantinople  than  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Czar's 
armies  by  land  could  not  be  permanently  laid  low. 
The  objects  sought  by  England  and  France  were  now 
gradually  brought  into  sufficient  clearness  to  be  com- 
municated to  the  other  Powers,  though  the  more  precise 
interpretation  of  the  conditions  laid  down  remained 
open  for  future  discussion.  It  was  announced  that  the  1 

^Protectorate  of  Russia  over  the  Danubian  Principalities  \ 
and  Servia  must  be  abolished;   that  the  navigation  of  ' 
the  Danube    at    its    mouths    must    be    freed   from    all 
obstacles;  that  the  Treaty  of  July,  1841,  relating  to 
the  Black  Sea  and  the  Dardanelles,  must  be  revised  in 
the  interest  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe ;  and 
that  the  claim  to  any  official  Protectorate  over  Chris- 
tian subjects  of  the   Porte,  of  whatever  rite,  must  be 

•*  abandoned  by  the  Czar.  Though  these  conditions, 
known  as  the  Four  Points,  were  not  approved  by 
Prussia,  they  were  accepted  by  Austria  in  August, 
1854,.  and  were  laid  before  Russia  as  the  basis  of 
any  negotiation  for  peace.  The  Czar  declared  in  answer 
that  liussia  would  only  negotiate  on  such  a  basis 
when  at  the  last  extremity.  The  Allied  Governments, 
measuring  their  enemy's  weakness  by  his  failure  before 
Silistria,  were  determined  to  accept  nothing  less  ;  and  the 
attack  upon  Sebastopol,  ordered  before  the  evacuation 
of  the  Principalities,  was  consequently  allowed  to  take 
its  course.* 

*  Eastern  Papers,  xi.  3.     Ashley's  Palmerston,  ii.  60.     For  the  navi- 
gation of  the  mouths  of  the  Danube,  see  Diplomatic  Study,  ii.  39.    Russia, 

0 


210  MODERN   EUROPE.  18.54. 

The    Koadstead,  or  Great    Harbour,  of   Sebastopol 

runs   due  eastwards  inland  from  a  point  not  far  from 

the  south-western  extremity  of  the  Crimea.     One  mile 

from    the   open  sea  its  waters    divide,  the 

Sebastopol.  .  i-n'i. 

larger  arm  still  running  eastwards  till  it 
meets  the  River  Tchernaya,  the  smaller  arm,  known 
as  the  Man- of- War  Harbour,  bending  sharply  to  the 
south.  On  both  sides  of  this  smaller  harbour  Sebastopol 
is  built.  To  the  seaward,  that  is  from  the  smaller  har- 
bour westwards,  Sebastopol  and  its  approaches  were 
thoroughly  fortified.  On  its  landward,  southern,  side  the 
town  had  been  open  till  1853,  and  it  was  still  but 
imperfectly  protected,  most  weakly  on  the  south-eastern 
side.  On  the  north  of  the  Great  Harbour  Fort  Constan- 
tine  at  the  head  of  a  line  of  strong  defences  guarded  the 
entrance  from  the  sea ;  while  on  the  high  ground  imme- 
diately opposite  Sebastopol  and  commanding  the  town 
there  stood  the  Star  Fort  with  other  military  construc- 
tions. The  general  features  of  Sebastopol  were  known 
to  the  Allied  commanders ;  they  had,  however,  no 
precise  information  as  to  the  force  by  which  it  was 
held,  nor  as  to  the  armament  of  its  fortifications.  It 
was  determined  that  the  landing  should  be  made  in 
the  Bay  of  Eupatoria,  thirty  miles  north  of  the  fortress. 
Here,  on  the  14th  of  September,  the  Allied  forces, 
numbering  about  thirty  thousand  French,  twenty-seven 
thousand  English,  and  seven  thousand  Turks,  effected 

which  had  been  in  possession  of  the  mouths  of  the  Danube  since  the 
Treaty  of  Adrianople,  and  had  undertaken  to  keep  the  mou  hs  clear,  had 
allowed  the  passage  to  become  blocked  and  had  otherwise  prevented 
traffic  descending,  in  order  to  keep  the  Black  Sea  trade  in  its  own  hands. 


1854.  INVASION  OF   THE    CRIMEA.  211 

their  disembarkation   without  meeting  any  resistance. 
The     Russians,    commanded    by    Prince    Menschikoff 
lately  envoy  at  Constantinople,  had  taken  post  ten  miles 
farther  south  on  high  ground  behind  the 
River  Alma.      On  the   20th  of  September     in  the  Crimea, 

Sept.  14. 

they  were  attacked  in  front  by  the  English, 
while  the  French  attempted  a  turning  movement  from 
the  sea.  The  battle  was  a  scene  of  confusion,  and  for  a 
moment  the  assault  of  the  English  seemed  to  be  rolled 
back.  But  it  was  renewed  with  ever  in-  Battle  of  the 
creasing  vigour,  and  before  the  French  had 
made  any  impression  on  the  Eussian  left  Lord  Rag- 
lan's troops  had  driven  the  enemy  from  their  positions. 
Struck  on  the  flank  when  their  front  was  already 
broken,  outnumbered  and  badly  led,  the  Russians  gave 
up  all  for  lost.  The  form  of  an  orderly  retreat  was 
maintained  only  long  enough  to  disguise  from  the 
conquerors  the  completeness  of  their  victory.  When 
night  fell  the  Russian  army  abandoned  itself  to  total 
disorder,  and  had  the  pursuit  been  made  at  once  it 
could  scarcely  have  escaped  destruction.  But  St. 
Arnaud,  who  was  in  the  last  stage  of  mortal  illness, 
refused,  in  spite  of  the  appeal  of  Lord  Raglan,  to 
press  on  his  wearied  troops.  Menschikoff,  abandon- 
ing the  hope  of  checking  the  advance  of  the 
Allies  in  a  second  battle,  and  anxious  only  to  prevent 
the  capture  of  Sebastopol  by  an  enemy  supposed  to 
be  following  at  his  heels,  retired  into  the  fortress,  and 
there  sank  seven  of  his  war-ships  as  a  barrier  across 
the  mouth  of  the  Great  Harbour,  mooring  the  rest 
o  2 


212  MODERN  EUROPE.  1854- 

within.  The  crews  were  brought  on  shore  to  serve  in 
the  defence  by  land  ;  the  guns  were  dragged  from  the 
ships  to  the  bastions  and  redoubts.  Then,  when  it 
appeared  that  the  Allies  lingered,  the  Russian  com- 
mander altered  his  plan.  Leaving  Korniloff,  the  Vice- 
Admiral,  and  Todleben,  an  officer  of  engineers,  to  man 
the  existing  works  and  to  throw  up  new  ones  where 
the  town  was  undefended,  Menschikoff  determined  to 
lead  off  the  bulk  of  his  army  into  the  interior  of  the 
Crimea,  in  order  to  keep  open  his  communications  with 
Russia,  to  await  in  freedom  the  arrival  of  reinforce- 
ments, and,  if  Sebastopol  should  not  at  once  fall,  to 
attack  the  Allies  at  his  own  time  and  opportunity. 
(September  24th.) 

The    English  had  lost  in   the  battle  of  the  Alma 

o 

about  two  thousand  men,  the  French  probably  less  than 
half  that  number.  On  the  morning  after  the  engage- 
ment Lord  Raglan  proposed  that  the  two  armies  should 
march  straight  against  the  fortifications  lying  on  the 
north  of  the  Great  Harbour,  and  carry  these 

Flank  march  to        ,  .  .    .  ,  . , 

south  of  sebasto-  by  storm,  so  winning  a  position  where  their 
guns  would  command  Sebastopol  itself. 
The  French,  supported  by  Eurgoyne,  the  chief  of  the 
English  engineers,  shrank  from  the  risk  of  a  front 
attack  on  works  supposed  to  be  more  formidable 
than  ihey  really  were,  and  induced  Lord  Raglan  to 
consent  to  a  long  circuitous  march  which  would  bring 
the  armies  right  round  Sebastopol  to  its  more  open 
southern  side,  from  which,  it  was  thought,  an  assault 
might  be  successfully  made.  This  flank-march,  which 


1854. 


SEBASTOPOL.  2:3 


was  one  of  extreme  risk,  was  carried  out  safely, 
Menschikoff  himself  having  left  Sebastopol,  and  having 
passed  along  the  same  road  in  his  retreat  into  the 
interior  a  little  hefore  the  appearance  of  the  Allies. 
Pushing  southward,  the  English  reached  the  sea  at 
Balaclava,  and  took  possession  of  the  harbour  there, 
accepting  the  exposed  eastward  line  between  the  fortress 
and  the  Russians  outside ;  the  French,  now  commanded 
by  Canrobert,  continued  their  march  westwards  round 
the  back  of  Sebastopol,  and  touched  the  sea  at  Kasatch 
Bay.  The  two  armies  were  thus  masters  of  the  broken 
plateau  which,  rising  westwards  from  the  plain  of  Bala- 
clava and  the  valley  of  the  Tchernaya,  overlooks  Sebas- 
topol on  its  southern  side.  That  the  garrison,  which 
now  consisted  chiefly  of  sailors,  could  at  this  moment 
have  resisted  the  onslaught  of  the  fifty  thousand  troops 
who  had  won  the  battle  of  the  Alma,  the  Russians  them- 
selves did  not  believe  ;*  but  once  more  the  French  staff, 
with  Burgoyne,  urged  caution,  and  it  was  determined 
to  wait  for  the  siege-guns,  which  were  still  at  sea. 
The  decision  was  a  fatal  one.  While  the  Allies  chose 
positions  for  their  heavy  artillery  and  slowly  landed  and 
placed  their  guns,  Korniloff  and  Todleben  made  the  for- 
tifications on  the  southern  side  of  Sebastopol  an  effective 
barrier  before  an  enemy.  The  sacrifice  of  the  Russian 
fleet  had  not  been  in  vain.  The  sailors  were  learning 
all  the  duties  of  a  garrison  :  the  cannon  from  the  ships 
proved  far  more  valuable  on  land.  Three  weeks  of 

*  See,  however,  Burgoyne's  Letter  to  the  Times,  August  4,  1868,  in 
Kinglake,  iv.  465.     Rousset,  Guerre  de  Crimee,  i.  280. 


214  MODERN  EUROPE.  1854. 

priceless  time  were  given  to  leaders  who  knew  how  to 
turn  every  moment  to  account.  When,  on  the  17th  of 

-^  October,  the  bombardment  which  'was  to  precede  the 
assault  on  Sebastopol  began,  the  Trench  artillery, 

i    operating  on  the  south-west,  was   overpowered  by  that 

Lof  the  defenders.  The  fleets  in  vain  thun- 
Ineffectual  ..  -.  .  -  ,._  .,  r  ji 

bombardment,  dered  against  the  solid  sea-rront  or  the 
Sept.  17—25. 

fortress.  At  the  end  of  eight  days'  can- 
nonade, during  which  the  besiegers'  batteries  poured 
such  a  storm  of  shot  and  shell  upon  Sebastopol  as  no 
fortress  had  yet  withstood,  the  defences  were  still  un- 
broken. 

Menschikoff  in  the  meantime  had  received  the 
reinforcements  wrhich  he  expected,  and  was  now  ready 
to  fall  upon  the  besiegers  from  the  east.  His  point 
of  attack  was  the  English  port  of  Balaclava  and 
Battle  of  Baia-  ^ue  fortified  road  lying  somewhat  east  of 
this,  which  formed  the  outer  line  held  by 
the  English  and  their  Turkish  supports.  The  plain  of 
Balaclava  is  divided  by  a  low  ridge  into  a  northern  and 
a  southern  valley.  Along  this  ridge  runs  the  cause- 
way, which  had  been  protected  by  redoubts  committed 
to  a  weak  Turkish  guard.  On  the  morning  of  the 
25th  the  Russians  appeared  in  the  northern  valley. 
They  occupied  the  heights  rising  from  it  on  the  north 
and  east,  attacked  the  causeway,  captured  three  of  the 
redoubts,  and  drove  off  the  Turks,  left  to  meet  their 
onset  alone.  Lord  Raglan,  who  watched  these  opera- 
tions from  the  edge  of  the  western  plateau,  ordered  up 
infantry  from  a  distance,  but  the  only  Englisji  troops 


185k  BALACLAVA.  215 

on  the  spot  were  a  light  and  a  heavy  brigade  of  cavalry, 
each  numbering  about  six  hundred  men.  The  Heavy 
Brigade,  under  General  Scarlett,  was  directed  to  move  to- 
wards Balaclava  itself,  which  was  now  threatened.  While 
they  were  on  the  march,  a  dense  column  of  Eussian 
cavalry,  about  three  thousand  strong,  appeared  above  the 
crest  of  the  low  ridge,  ready,  as  it  seemed,  to  overwhelm 
the  weak  troops  before  them.  But  in  their  descent  from 
the  ridge  the  Russians  halted,  and  Scarlett  with  admirable 
courage  and  judgment  formed  his  men  for  attack,  and 
charged  full  into  the  enemy  with  the  handful  who  were 
nearest  to  him.  .  They  cut  their  way  into  the  very  heart 
of  the  column;  and  before  the  Russians  could  crush 
them  with  mere  weight  the  other  regiments  of  the  same 
brigade  hurled  themselves  on  the  right  and  on  the  left 
against  the  huge  inert  mass.  The  Russians  broke  and 
retreated  in  disorder  before  a  quarter  of  their  number, 
'leaving  to  Scarlett  and  his  men  the  glory  of  an  action 
which  ranks  with  the  Prussian  attack  at  Mars-la-Tour  in 
1870  as  the  most  brilliant  cavalry-operation  in  modern 
warfare.  The  squadrons  of  the  Light  Brigade,  during 
the  peril  and  the  victory  of  their  comrades,  stood  motion- 
less, paralysed  by  the  same  defect  of  temper  or  intelli- 
gence in  command  which  was  soon  to  devote  them 
to  a  fruitless  but '  ever-memorable  act  of  self-sacrifice. 
Russian  infantry  were  carrying  off  the  cannon  from  the 
conquered  redoubts  in  the  causeway,  when  an  aide-de- 
camp from  the  general-in-chief  brought  to  the  Earl  of 
Lucan,  commander  of  the  cavalry,  an  order  to  advance 
rapidly  to  the  front,  and  save  these  guns.  Lucan,  who 


216  MODERN   EUROPE.  1854. 

from  his  position  could  see  neither  the  enemy  nor  the 
guns,  believed  himself  ordered  to  attack  the  Russian 
artillery  at  the  extremity  of  the  northern  valley,  and  he 
directed  the  Light  Brigade  to  charge  in  this  direction. 
It  was  in  vain  that  the  leader  of  the  Light  Brigade, 
Lord  Cardigan,  warned  his  chief,  in  words  which  were 
indeed  but  too  weak,  that  there  was  a  battery  in  front,  a 
battery  on  each  flank,  and  that  the  ground  was  covered 
with  Russian  riflemen.  The  order  was  repeated  as 
that  of  the  head  of  the  army,  and  it  was  obeyed.  Thus 

"Into  the  valley  of  Death 
Rode  the  Six  Hundred." 

How  they,  died  there,  the  remnant  not  turning  till 
they  had  hewn  their  way  past  the  guns  and  routed 
the  enemy's  cavalry  behind  them,  the  English  people 
will  never  forget.* 

The  day  of  Balaclava  brought  to  each  side  some- 
thing of  victory  and  something  of  failure.  The 
Russians  remained  masters  of  the  road  that  they  had 
captured,  and  carried  off  seven  English  guns ;  the 
English,,  where  they  had  met  the  enemy,  proved 
that  they  could  defeat  overwhelming  numbers.  Not 
many  days  passed  before  our  infantry  were  put  to  the 
Battle  of  inker-  test  wni°n  the  cavalry  had  so  victoriously 
undergone.  The  siege-approaches  of  the 
French  had  been  rapidly  advanced,  and  it  was  deter- 
mined that  on  the  5th  of  November  the  long-deferred 
assault  on  Sebastopol  should  be  made.  On  that  very 
morning,  under  cover  of  a  thick  mist,  the  English 

*' Statements  of  Raglau,   Lucan,  Cardigan;  Kinglake,  v.  108,  402. 


1854.  INKERMANN.  217 

right  was  assailed  by  massive  columns  of  the  enemy. 
Menschikoff' s  army  had  now  risen  to  a  hundred  thou- 
sand men;  he  had  thrown  troops  into  Sebastopol,  and 
had  planned  the  capture  of  the  English  positions  by  a 
combined  attack  from  Sebastopol  itself,  and  by  troops 
advancing  from  the  lower  valley  of  the  Tchernaya  across 
the  bridge  of  Inkermaun.  The  battle  of  the  5th  of 
November,  on  the  part  of  the  English,  was  a  soldiers' 
battle,  without  generalship,  without  order,  without 
design.  The  men,  standing  to  their  ground  whatever 
their  own  number  and  whatever  that  of  the  foe,  fought, 
after  their  ammunition  was  exhausted,  with  bayonets, 
with  the  butt  ends  of  their  muskets,  with  their  fists  and 
with  stones.  For  hours  the  ever-surging  Russian  mass 
rolled  in  upon  them  ;  but  they  maintained  the  unequal 
struggle  until  the  arrival  of  French  regiments  saved 
them  from  their  deadly  peril  and  the  enemy  were  driven 
in  confusion  from  the  field.  The  Russian  columns, 
marching  right  up  to  the  guns,  had  been  torn  in  pieces 
by  artillery-fire.  Their  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was 
enormous,  their  defeat  one  which  no  ingenuity  could 
disguise.  Yet  the  battle  of  Inkernrann  had  made  the 
capture  of  Sebastopol,  as  it  had  been  planned  by  the 
Allies,  impossible.  Their  own  loss  was  too  great,  the 
force  which  the  enemy  had  displayed  was  too  vast,  to 
leave  any  hope  that  the  fortress  could  be  mastered  by  a 
sudden  assault.  The  terrible  truth  soon  became  plain 
that  the  enterprise  on  which  the  armies  had  been  sent 
had  in  fact  failed,  and  that  another  enterprise  of  a 
quite  different  character,  a  winter  siege  in  the  presence 


218  MODERN  EUROPE. 

of  a  superior  enemy,  a  campaign  for  which  no  prepara- 
tions had  been  made,  and  for  which  all  that  was  most 
necessary  was  wanting,  formed  the  only  alternative  to 
an  evacuation  of  the  Crimea. 

On  the  14th  of  November  the  Euxine  winter  began 
with  a  storm  which  swept  away  the  tents  on  the  ex- 
posed plateau,  .and  wrecked  twenty-one  vessels  bearing 
stores  of  ammunition  and  clothing.  From  this  time 
rain  and  snow  turned  the  tract  between  the  camp  and 
storm  of  Balaclava  into  a  morass.  The  loss  of  the 
causeway  which  had  been  captured  by  the 
Russians  three  weeks  before  now  told  with  fatal  effect 
on  the  British  army.  The  only  communication  with 
the  port  of  Balaclava  was  by  a  hillside  track,  which 
soon  became  impassable  by  carts.  It  was  necessary  to 
bring  up  supplies  on  the  backs  of  horses ;  but  the 
horses  perished  from  famine  and  from  excessive  labour. 
The  men  were  too  few,  too  weak,  too  destitute  of  the 
winter  in  the  helpful  ways  of  English  sailors,  to  assist  in 
providing  for  themselves.  Thus  penned  up 
on  the  bleak  promontory,  cholera-stricken,  mocked  rather 
than  sustained  during  their  benumbing  toil  with  rations 
of  uncooked  meat  and  green  coffee-berries,  the  British 
soldiery  wasted  away.  Their  effective  force  sank  at 
mid-winter  to  eleven  thousand  men.  In  the  hospitals, 
which  even  at  Scutari  were  more  deadly  to  those  who 
passed  within  them  than  the  fiercest  fire  of  the  enemy, 
nine  thousand  men  perished  before  the  end  of  February. 
The  time  indeed  came  when  the  very  Spirit  of  Mercy 
seemed  to  enter  these  abodes  of  woe,  and  in  the  presence 


1854-55.  THE    CRIMEAN    WINTER.  219 

of  Florence  Nightingale  nature  at  last  regained  its 
healing  power,  pestilence  no  longer  hung  in  the  at- 
mosphere which  the  sufferers  breathed,  and  death  itself 
grew  mild.  But  before  this  new  influence  had  van- 
quished routine  the  grave  had  closed  over  whole  regi- 
ments of  men  whom  it  had  no  right  to  claim.  The 
sufferings  of  other  armies  have  been  .on  a  greater  scale, 
but  seldom  has  any  body  of  troops  furnished  a  heavier 
tale  of  loss  and  death  in  proportion  to  its  numbers  than 
the  British  army  during  the  winter  of  the  Crimean 
War.  The  unsparing  exposure  in  the  Press  of  the  mis- 
management under  which  our  soldiers  were  perishing 
excited  an  outburst  of  indignation  which  overthrew 
Lord  Aberdeen's  Ministry  and  placed  Palmerston  in 
power.  It  also  gave  to  Europe  at  large  an  impres- 
sion that  Great  Britain  no  longer  knew  how  to  conduct 
a  war,  and  unduly  raised  the  reputation  of  the  French 
I'nilitary  administration,  whose  shortcomings,  great  as 
they  were,  no  French  journalist  dared  to  describe.  In 
spite  of  Alma  and  Inkermann,  the  military  prestige 
of  England  was  injured,  not  raised,  by  the  Crimean 
campaign  ;  nor  was  it  until  the  suppression  of  the 
Indian.  Mutiny  that  the  true  capacity  of  the  nation  in 
war  was  again  vindicated  before  the  world. 

"  I  have  two  generals  who  will  not  fail  me,"  the 
Czar  is  reported  to  have  said  when  he  heard  of  Menschi- 
koff's  last  defeat,  "  Generals  January  and 
Februar}-."     General  February  fulfilled  his     i^.  M-**  *, 
task,  but  he  smote  the  Czar  too.     In  the 
first  days  of  March  a  new  monarch  inherited  the  Russian 


220  MODERN  EUROPE.  1855. 

crown.*  Alexander  II.  ascended  the  throne,  announcing 
that  he  would  adhere  to  the  policy  of  Peter  the  Great, 
of  Catherine,  and  of  Nicholas.  But  the  proud  tone 
was  meant  rather  for  the  ear  of  Russia  than  of  Europe, 
since  Nicholas  had  already  expressed  his  willingness  to 
treat  for  peace  on  the  basis  laid  down  by  the  Western 
Powers  in  August,  1854.  This  change  was  not  pro- 
duced wholly  by  the  battles  of  Alma  and  Inkermann. 
Prussia,  finding  itself  isolated  in  Germany,  had  after 
some  months  of  hesitation  given  a  diplomatic  sanction 
to  the  Pour  Points  approved  by  Austria  as  indispens- 
able conditions  of  peace.  Kussia  thus  stood  forsaken, 
as  it  seemed,  by  its  only  friend,  and  Nicholas  could  no 
longer  hope  to  escape  with  the  mere  abandonment  of 
those  claims  which  had  been  the  occasion  of  the  war. 
He  consented  to  treat  with  his  enemies  on  their  own 
terms.  Austria  now  approached  still  more  closely  to 
the  Western  Powers,  and  bound  itself  by  treaty,  in  the 

*  On  the  death  of  Nicholas,  the  King1  of  Prussia  addressed  the  follow- 
ing lecture  to  the  unfortunate  Bunsen  : — "  You  little  thought  that,  at  the 
very  moment  when  you  were  writing  to  me,  one  of  the  noblest  of  men,  one  of 
the  grandest  forms  in  history,  one  of  the  truest  hearts,  and  at  the  same 
time  one  of  the  greatest  rulers  of  this  narrow  world,  was  called  from 
faith  to  sight.  1  thank  God  on  my  knees  that  He  deemed  me  worthy  to 
be,  in  the  best  sense  of  the  word,  his  [Nicholas']  friend,  and  to  remain 
true  to  him.  You,  dear  Bunsen,  thought  differently  of  him,  and  you  will 
now  painfully  confess  this  before  your  conscience,  most  painfully  of  all 
the  truth  (which  all  your  letters  in  these  late  bad  times  have  unfortunately 
shown  me  but  too  plainly),  that  you  hated  him.  You  hated  him,  not  as  a 
man,  but  as  the  representative  of  a  principle,  that  of  violence.  If  ever, 
redeemed  like  him  through  simple  faith  in  Christ's  blood,  you  see  him  in 
eternal  peace,  then  remember  what  I  now  write  to  you :  '  You  will  beg  his 
pardon.'  Even  here,  my  dear  friend,  may  the  blessing  of  repentance  be 
granted  to  you." — Briefwechsel,  p.  325.  Frederick  William  seems  to  have 
forgotten  to  send  the  same  pious  wishes  to  the  Poles  in  Siberia. 


18&".  CONFERENCE   OF    VIENNA.  -2-2} 

event  of  peace  not  being  concluded  by  the  end  of  the 
year  on  the  stated  basis,  to  deliberate  with  France  and 
England  upon  effectual  means  for  obtaining  the  object 
of  the  Alliance.*  Preparations  were  made  for  a  Con- 
ference at  Vienna,  from  which  Prussia, 'still 
declining1  to  pledge  itself  to  warlike  action  Vienna.  March 

—May,  1S55. 

in  case  of  the  failure  of  the  negotiations, 
was  excluded.  The  sittings  of  the  Conference  began  a 
few  days  after  the  accession  of  Alexander  II.  Russia 
was  represented  by  its  ambassador,  Prince  Alexander 
Gortschakoff,  who,  as  Minister  of  later  years,  was  to 
play  so  conspicuous  a  part  in  undoing  the  work  of  the 
Crimean  epoch.  On  the  first  two  Articles  forming  the 
subject  of  negotiation,  namely  the  abolition  of  the 
Eussian  Protectorate  over  Servia  and  the  Principalities,) 
and  the  removal  of  all  impediments  to  the  free  uavi-  \ 
gation  of  the  Danube,  agreement  was  reached.  On 
the  third  Article,  the  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  July, 
1841,  relating  to  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Dardanelles, 
the  Russian  envoy  and  the  representatives  of  the 
Western  Powers  found  themselves  completely  at 
variance.  Gortschakoff  had  admitted  that  the  Treaty 
of  1841  must  be  so  revised  as  to  put  an  end  to  the 
preponderance  of  Russia  in  the  Black  Sea;f  but  while 
the  Western  Governments  insisted  upon  the  exclusion 
of  Russian  war-vessels  from  these  waters,  Gortscha- 
koff would  consent  only  to  the  abolition  of  Russia's 

*  Parliamentary  Papers,  1854-5,  vol.  55,  p.  1,  Dec.  2,  1854.     Ashley's 
Palm  erst  on,  ii.  84. 

•f  Eastern  Papers,  Part  13,  1. 


222  MODERN  EUROPE.  1855. 

preponderance  by  the  free  admission  of  the  war- vessels  of 
all  nations,  or  by  some  similar  method  of  counterpoise. 
The  negotiations  accordingly  came  to  an  end,  but  not 
before  Austria,  disputing  the  contention  of  the  Allies  that 
the  object  of  the  third  Article  could  be  attained  only 
by  the  specific  means  proposed  by  them,  had  brought 
forward  a  third  scheme  based  partly  upon 
the  limitation  of  the  Russian  navy  in  the 
Euxine,  partly  upon  the  admission  of  wardships  of  other 
nations.  This  scheme  was  rejected  by  the  Western 
Powers,  whereupon  Austria  declared  that  its  obligations 
under  the  Treaty  of  December  2nd,  1854,  had  now  been 
fulfilled,  and  that  it  returned  in  consequence  to  the 
position  of  a  neutral. 

Great  indignation  was  felt  and  was  expressed  at 
London  and  Paris  at  this  so-called  act  of  desertion, 
and  at  the  subsequent  withdrawal  of  Austrian  regi- 
ments from  the  positions  which  they  had  occupied  in 
anticipation  of  war.  It  was  alleged  that  in  the  first 
two  conditions  of  peace  Austria  had  seen  its  own 
special  interests  effectually  secured ;  and  that  as  soon 
as  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  had  given  the  neces- 
sary assurances  on  these  heads  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna 
was  willing  to  sacrifice  the  other  objects  of  the 
Alliance  and  to  abandon  the  cause  of  the  Maritime 
Powers,  in  order  to  regain,  with  whatever  loss  of  honour, 
the  friendship  of  the  Czar.  Though  it  was  answered 
with  perfect  truth  that  Austria  had  never  accepted  the 
principle  of  the  exclusion  of  Russia  from  the  Black 
Sea,  and  was  still  ready  to  take  up  arms  in  defence  of 


1855.  AUSTRIA.  223 

that  system  by  which  it  considered  that  Russia's  pre- 
ponderance in  the  Black  Sea  might  be  most  suitably 
prevented,  this  argument  sounded  hollow  to  com- 
batants convinced  of  the  futility  of  all  methods  for 
holding  Russia  in  check  except  their  *own.  Austria 
had  grievously  injured  its  own  position  and  credit  with 
the  Western  Powers.  On  the  other  hand  it  had 
wounded  Russia  too  deeply  to  win  from  the  Czar  the 
forgiveness  which  it  expected.  Its  policy  of  balance, 
whether  best  described  as  too  subtle  or  as  too  impartial, 
had  miscarried.  It  had  forfeited  its  old,  without  ac- 
quiring new,  friendships.  It  remained  isolated  in  Europe, 
and  destined  to  meet  without  support  and  without  an 
ally  the  blows  which  were  soon  to  fall  upon  it. 
<  The  prospects  of  the  besieging  armies  before  Sebas- 
top(  1  were  in  some  respects  better  towards  the  close  of 
January,  1855,  than  they  were  when  the 
Conference  of  Vienna  commenced  its  sit-  siege,  January 

— jWay,  1855. 

tings  six  weeks  later.  Sardinia,  under  the 
guidance  of  Cavour,  had  joined  the  Western  Alliance, 
and  was  about  to  send  fifteen  thousand  soldiers  to  the 
Crimea.  A  new  plan  of  operations,  which  promised 
excellent  results,  had  been  adopted  at  headquarters. 
Up  to  the  end  of  1854  the  French  had  directed  their 
main  .attack  against  the  Flagstaff  bastion,  a  little  to 
the  west  of  the  head  of  the  Man-of-War  Harbour. 
They  were  now,  however,  convinced  by  Lord  Raglan 
that  the  true  keystone  to  the  defences  of  Sebastopol  was 
the  Malakoff,  on  the  eastern  side,  and  they  under- 
took the  reduction  of  this  formidable  work,  while 


•J-M  .1/0 /WO"  EUROPE. 

the  British  directed  their  efforts  against  tlio  neigh- 
bouring Redan.*  The  heaviest  fire  of  the  besiegers 
being  thus  concentrated  on  a  narrow  line,  it  seemed 
as  if  Sebastopol  must  soon  fall.  But  at  the  be- 
ginning of  February  a  sinister  change  came  over  the 
French  camp.  General  Niel  arrived  from  Paris  vested 
with  powers  which  really  placed  him  in  control  of 
the  general-in-chief ;  and  though  Canrobert  was  but 
partially  made  acquainted  with  the  Emperor's  designs, 
he  was  forced  to  sacrifice  to  them  much  of  his  own 
honour  and  that  of  the  army.  Napoleon  had  deter- 
mined to  come  to  the  Crimea  himself,  and  at  the  fitting 
moment  to  end  by  one  grand  stroke  the  war  which 
had  dragged  so  heavily  in  the-  hands  of  others.  He 
believed  that  Sebastopol  could  only  be  taken  by  a  com- 
plete investment;  and  it  was  his  design  to  land  with 
a  fresh  army  on  the  south-eastern  coast  of  the  Crime, i, 
to  march  across  the  interior  of  the  peninsula,  to  sweep 
Menschikoff's  forces  from  their  position  above  the 
Tchernaya,  and  to  complete  the  investment  of  Sebasto- 
pol from  the  north.  With  this  scheme  of  operations  in 
view,  all  labour  expended  in  the  attack  on  Sebastopol 
from  the  south  was  effort  thrown  away.  Canrobert, 
who  had  promised  his  most  vigorous  co-operation  to 
Lord  Raglan,  was  fettered  and  paralysed  by  the.  Em- 
peror's emissary  at  headquarters.  For  three  successive 
months  the  Russians  not  only  held  their  own,  but  by 
means  of  counter-approaches  won  back  from  the  French 
some  of  the  ground  that  they  had  taken.  The  very 
*  Kingkke,  vii.  21.  Rousset,  ii.  35,  148. 


existence  of  the  Alliance  was  threatened  when,  after 
Cafirobert  and  Lord  Raglan  had  despatched  a  force  to 
sei/e  the  Russian  posts  on  the  Sea  of  Azof,  the  French 
portion  of  this  force  was  peremptorily  recalled  by  the 
Kmpcror,  in  order  that  it  might  be  employed  in  the 
march  northwards  across  the  Crimea.  At  length,  un- 
able to  endure  the  miseries  of  the  position, 
Canrobert  asked  to  be  relieved  of  his  com-  nu^dedhy 

IVlissier,  May. 

m and.  He  was  succeeded  by  General 
Pelissier.  Pelissier,  a  resolute,  energetic  soldier,  one 
moreover  who  did  not  owe  his  promotion  to  complicity 
in  the  con/i  c/V/V//,  Jlatly  refused  to  obey  the  Emperor's 
orders.  Sweeping  aside  the  ilimsy  schemes  evolved  at 
tin-  Tnileries,  he  returned  with  all  his  heart  to  the  plan 
agreed  upon  by  the  Allied  commanders  at  the  beginning 
of  the  year;  and  from  this  time,  though  disasters  were 
still  in  store,  they  were  not  the  result  of  faltering 
01-  disloyalty  at  the  headquarters  of  the  French  army. 
The  general  assault  on  the  Malakoff  and  the  Redan 
\\as  lixcd  for  the  18th  of  June.  It  was  '  Un(tuooeMfu, 
bravely  met  by  the  Russians;  the  Allies  "•"* 
were  driven  back  with  heavy  loss,  and  three  months 
more  were  added  to  the  duration  of  the  siege.  Lord 
Raglan  did  not  live  to  witness  the  last  stage  of  the 
war.  Exhausted  by  his  labours,  heartsick  at  the  failure 
of  the  great  attack,  he  died  on  the  :J^th  of  June,  leaving 
the  command  to  General  Simpson,  an  officer  far  his 
inferior.  As  the  lines  of  the  besiegers  approached 
nearer  and  nearer  to  the  Russian  fortifications,  the  army 
which  had  Keen  defeated  at  Inkermaim  advanced  for 
p 


Battle  of  the 

Tchernaya, 


226  MODERN  EUROPE.  1855. 

one  last  effort.  Crossing  the  Tchernaya,  it  gave  battle 
on  the  16th  of  August.  The  French  and  the  Sar- 
dinians, without  assistance  from  the  British 

-.       .    .  •     •  o    T_        L  1 

army,  won  a  decisive  victory,     bebastopol 
could     hope     no     longer      for     assistance 
from    without,    and    on    the    8th    of    September    the 
blow  which  had  failed  in  June  was   dealt 

Capture   of  the 

:off,sePt.8.  once  more>  The  rrenchj  throwing  them- 
selves in  great  strength  upon  the  Malakoff,  carried  this 
fortress  by  storm,  and  frustrated  every  effort  made  for 
its  recovery  ;  the  British,  attacking  the  Eedan  with  a 
miserably  weak  force,  were  beaten  and  overpowered. 
But  the  fall  of  the  Malakoff  was  in  itself  equivalent  to 
the  capture  of  Sebastopol.  A  few  more  hours  passed, 
and  a  series  of  tremendous  explosions  made  known  to 
the  Allies  that  the  Russian  commander  was  blowing  up 
his  magazines  and  withdrawing  to  the  north  of  the 
ran  of  sebas-  Great  Harbour.  The  prize  was  at  length 
won,  and  at  the  end  of  a  siege  of  three 
hundred  and  fifty  days  what  remained  of  the  Czar's 
great  fortress  passed  into  the  hands  of  his  enemies. 

The    Allies    had   lost    since   their   landing    in   the 

Crimea  not  less  than   a  hundred  thousand  men.     An 

enterprise  undertaken  in  the  belief  that  it  would    be 

accomplished  in  the  course  of  a  few  weeks,  and  with 

„  .     ,.          no  greater  sacrifice  of  life  than  attends  every 

Exhaustion  J 

attack  upon  a  fortified  place,  had  proved 
arduous  and  terrible  almost  beyond  example.  Yet  if 
the  Crimean  campaign  was  the  result  of  error  and 
blindness  on  the  part  of  the  invaders,  it  was  perhaps 


1855. 


FALL    OF  SEBASTOPOL.  227 


even  more  disastrous  to  Russia  than  any  warfare  in 
which  an  enemy  would  have  been  likely  to  engage  with 
fuller  knowledge  of  the  conditions  to  be  met.  The  vast 
distances  that  separated  Sebastopol  from  the  military 
depots  in  the  interior  of  Russia  made  its  defence  a  drain 
of  the  most  fearful  character  on  the  levies  and  the  re- 
sources of  the  country.  What  tens  of  thousands  sank 
in  the  endless,  unsheltered  march  without  ever  nearing 
the  sea,  what  provinces  were  swept  of  their  beasts  of 
burden,  when  every  larger  shell  fired  against  the  enemy 
had  to  be  borne  hundreds  of  miles  by  oxen,  the  records 
of  the  war  but  vaguely  make  known.  The  total  loss 
of  the  Russians  should  perhaps  be  reckoned  at  three 
times  that  of  the  Allies.  Yet  the  fall  of  Sebastopol  was 
not  immediately  followed  by  peace.  The  hesitation  of 
the  Allies  in  cutting  off  the  retreat  of  the  Russian 
army  had  enabled  its  commander  to  retain  his  hold  upon 
'the  Crimea;  in  Asia,  the  delays  of  a  Turkish  relieving 
army  gave  to  the  Czar  one  last  gleam  of  success  in  the 
capture  of  Kars,  which,  after  a  strenuous  FallofKar8) 
resistance,  succumbed  to  famine  on  the  28th 
of  November.  But  before  Kars  had  fallen  negotiations' 
for  peace  had  commenced.  France  was  weary  of  the 
war.  Napoleon,  himself  unwilling  to  continue  it  except 
at  the  price  of  French  aggrandisement  on  the  Continent, 
was  surrounded  by  a  band  of  palace  stock-jobbers  who 
had  staked  everything  on  the  rise  of  the  funds  that 
would  result  from  peace.  It  was  known  at  every  Court 
of  Europe  that  the  Allies  were  completely  at  variance 
with  one  another ;  that  while  the  English  nation,  stung 
p  '2 


228  MODERN  EUROPE.  1855. 

by  the  failure  of  its  military  administration  during  the 
winter,  by  the  nullity  of  its  naval  operations  in  the 
Baltic,  and  by  the  final  disaster  at  the  Redan,  was 
eager  to  prove  its  real  power  in  a  new  campaign,  the 
ruler  of  France,  satisfied  with  the  crowning  glory  of 
the  Malakoff,  was  anxious  to  conclude  peace  on  any 
tolerable  .  terms.  Secret  communications  from  St. 
Petersburg  were  made  at  Paris  by  Baron  Seebach, 
.,  ,  ,.  envoy  of  Saxony,  a  son-in-law  of  the  Rus- 

Neg-otiations  J  J  ' 

sian  Chancellor :  the  Austrian  Cabinet,  still 
bent  on  acting  the  part  of  arbiter,  but  hopeless  of  the 
results  of  a  new  Conference,  addressed  itself  to  the 
Emperor  Napoleon  singly,  and  persuaded  him  to  enter 
into  a  negotiation  which  was  concealed  for  a  while  from 
Great  Britain.  The  two  intrigues  were  simultaneously 
pursued  by  our  ally,  but  Seebach 's  proposals  were  such 
that  even,  the  warmest  friends  of  Russia^at  the  Tuileries 
could  scarcely  support  them,  and  the  Viennese  diplo- 
matists won  the  day.  It  was  agreed  that  a  note  con- 
taining Preliminaries  of  Peace  should  be  presented  by 
Austria  at  St.  Petersburg  as  its  own  ultimatum,  after 
the  Emperor  Napoleon  should  have  won  from  the  British 
Government  its  assent  to  these  terms  without  any 
alteration.  The  Austrian  project  embodied  indeed  the 
Four  Points  which  Britain  had  in  previous  months 
fixed  as  the  conditions  of  peace,  and  in  substance  it 
differed  little  from  what,  even  after  the  fall  of  Sebastopol, 
British  statesmen  were  still  prepared  to  accept ;  but  it 
was  impossible  that  a  scheme  completed  without  the 
participation  of  Britain  and  laid  down  for  its  passive 


ray  PEACE   NEGOTIATIONS.  229 

acceptance  should  be  thus  uncomplainingly  adopted  by 
its  Government.  Lord  Palmerston  required  that  the 
Four  Articles  enumerated  should  be  understood  to  cover 
points  not  immediately  apparent  on  their  surface,  and 
that  a  fifth  Article  should  be  added,  reserving  to  the 
Powers  the  right  of  demanding  certain  further  special 
conditions,  it  being  understood  that  Great  Britain  would 
require  under  this  clause  only  that  Russia  should  bind 
itself  to  leave  the  Aland  Islands  in  the  Baltic  Sea 
unfortified.  Modified  in  accordance  with  the  demand 
of  the  British  Government,  the  Austrian  draft  was 
presented  to  the  Czar  at  the  end  of  December,  with 
the  notification  that  if  it  was  not  accepted  by  the  10th 
of  January  the  Austrian  ambassador  would  quit  St. 
Petersburg.  On  the  15th  a  Council  was  held  in  the 
presence  of  the  Czar.  Nesselrode,  who  first  gave  his 
opinion,  urged  that  the  continuance  of  the  war  would 
plunge  Russia  into  hostilities  with  all  Europe,  and 
advised  submission  to  a  compact  which  would  last  only 
until  Russia  had  recovered  its  strength  or  new  relations 
had  arisen  among  the  Powers.  One  Minister  after 
another  declared  that  Poland,  Finland,  the  Crimea,  and 
the  Caucasus  would  be  endangered  if  peace  were  not 
now  made;  tire  Chief  of  the  Finances  stated  that  Russia 
could  not  go  through  another  campaign  without  bank- 
ruptcy.* At  the  end  of  the  discussion  the  Council 
declared  unanimously  in  favour  of  accepting  the  Aus- 
trian propositions ;  and  although  the  national  feeling 
was  still  in  favour  of  resistance,  there  appears  to  have 

*  Diplomatic  Study,  ii.  361.     Martin,  Prince  Consort,  iii.  394. 


P 


230  MODERN  EUROPE.  1856. 

been  one  Russian  statesman  alone,  Prince  GortschakofF, 
ambassador  at  Vienna,  who  sought  to  dissuade  the 
Czar  from  making  peace.  His  advice  was  not  taken. 
The  vote  of  the  Council  was  followed  by  the  despatch 
of  plenipotentiaries  to  Paris,  and  here,  on  the  25th  of 
February,  1856,  the  envoys  of  all  the  Powers,  with 
the  exception  of  Prussia,  assembled  in  Conference,  in 
order  to  frame  the  definitive  Treaty  of  Peace.* 

In  the  debates  which  now  followed,  and  which 
occupied  more  than  a  month,  Lord  Clarendon,  who 
conference  of  represented  Great  Britain,  discovered  that  in 

Paris,  Feb.  25, 

each  contested  point  he  had  to  fight  against 

the  Russian  and  the  French  envoys  combined,  so  com- 

pletely was  the  Court  of  the  Tuileries  now  identified  with 

]  a  policy  of  conciliation  and  friendliness  towards  Russia,  f 

Great  firmness,  great  plainness  of  speech  was  needed 

on  the  part  of  the   British   Government,  in  order  to 

prevent  the  recognised  objects  of  the  war  from  being 

surrendered  by  its  ally,  not  from  a  conviction  that  they 

(were  visionary  or  unattainable,  but  from  unsteadiness  of 

(purpose  and  from  the  desire  to  convert  a  defeated  enemy 

Treaty  of  pans,     into  a  t™nd.     The  end,  however,  was   at 

length  reached,  and  on  the  30th  of  March 

the  Treaty  of  Paris  was  signed.     The  Black  Sea  was 

*  Prussia  was  admitted  when  the  first  Articles  had  been  settled,  and  it 
became  necessary  to  revise  the  Treaty  of  July,  1841,  of  which  Prussia  had 
been  one  of  the  signatories. 

f  "  In  the  course  of  th^  deliberation,  whenever  our  [Russian]  plenipo- 
tentiaries found  themselves  in  the  presence  of  insurmountable  difficulties, 
they  appealed  to  the  personal  intervention  of  this  sovereign  [Napoleon]  , 
and  had  only  to  congratulate  themselves  on  the  result."  —  Diplomatic 
Study,  ii.  377. 


1856.  TREATY   OF  PARIS.  231 

neutralised;  its  waters  and  ports,  thrown  open  to  the, 
mercantile  marine  of  every  nation,  were  formally  and 
in  perpetuity  interdicted  to  the  war-ships  both  of  the 
Powers  possessing  its  coasts  and  of  all  other  Powers. 
The  Czar  and  the  Sultan  undertook  not  to  establish  or 
maintain  upon  its  coasts  any  military  or  maritime 
arsenal.  Russia  ceded  a  portion  of  Bessarabia,  accept- 
ing a  frontier  which  excluded  it  from  the  Danube.  The 
free  navigation  of  this  river,  henceforth  to  be  effectively 
maintained  by  an  international  Commission,  was  de- 
clared part  of  the  public  law  of  Europe.  The  Powers 
declared  the  Sublime  Porte  admitted  to  participate  in 
the  advantages  of  the  public  law  and  concert  of  Europe, 
each  engaging  to  respect  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  all  guaranteeing  in  common 
the  strict  observance  of  this  engagement,  and  promising 
to  consider  any  act  tending  to  its  violation  as  a  question 
'  of  general  interest.  The  Sultan  "  having,  in  his  con- 
stant solicitude  for  the  welfare  of  his  subjects,  issued  a 
firman  recording  his  generous  intentions  towards  the 
Christian  population  of  his  empire,*  and  having  com- 
municated it  to  the  Powers,"  the  Powers  "  recognised 

*  Three  pages  of  promises.  Eastern  Papers,  xvii.  One  was  kept 
faithfully.  "  To  accomplish  these  objects,  means  shall  be  sought  to  profit 
by  the  science,  the  art,  and  the  funds  of  Europe."  One  of  the  drollest 
of  the  prophecies  of  that  time  is  the  congratulatory  address  of  the  Mis- 
sionaries to  Lord  Stratford  de  Redcliffe,  id.  1882 : — "  The  Imperial 
Hatti-sherif  has  convinced  us  that  our  fond  expectations  are  likely  to  be 
realised.  The  light  will  shine  upon  those  who  have  long  sat  in  darkness 
and  blest  by  social  prosperity  and  religions  freedom,  the  millions  of 
Turkey  will,  we  trust,  be  seen  ere  long  sitting  peacefully  under  their  own 
vine  and  fig-tree."  So  they  were,  and  with  poor  Lord  Stratford's  fortune, 
among  others,  in  their  pockets. 


232  MODERN  EUROPE.  1866. 

the  high  value  of  this  communication,"  declaring  at 
the  same  time  "  that  it  could  not,  in  any  case,  give  to 
them  the  right  to  interfere,  either  collectively  or  separ- 
ately, in  the  relations  of  the  Sultan  to  his  subjects,  or 
in  the  internal  administration  of  his  empire."  The 
Danubian  Principalities,  augmented  by  the  strip  of 
Bessarabia  taken  from  Russia,  were  to  continue  to 
enjoy,  under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Porte  and  under  the 
guarantee  of  the  Powers,  all  the  privileges  and  immu- 
nities of  which  they  were  in  possession,  no  exclusive 
protection  being  exercised  by  any  of  the  guaranteeing 
Powers.* 

Passing  beyond  the  immediate  subjects  of  nego- 
tiation, the  Conference  availed  itself  of  its  international 
character  to  gain  the  consent  of  Great  Britain  to  a 
change  in  the  laws  of  maritime  war.  England  had 
always  claimed,  and  had  always  exercised,  the  right  to 
seize  an  enemy's  goods  on  the  high  sea 

Agreement   of  » 

One  cr?ghtsenol  though  conveyed  in  a  neutral  vessel,  and  to 
stop  and  search  the  merchant-ships  of  neu- 
trals for  this  purpose.  The  exercise  of  this  right  had 
stirred  up  against  England  the  Maritime  League  of 
1800,  and  was  condemned  by  nearly  the  whole  civilised 
world.  Nothing  short  of  an  absolute  command  of  the 
seas  made  it  safe  or  possible  for  a  single  Power  to  main- 
tain a  practice  which  threatened  at  moments  of  danger 
to  turn  the  whole  body  of  neutral  States  into  its 
enemies.  Moreover,  if  the  seizure  of  belligerents'  goods 
in  neutral  ships  profited  England  when  it  was  itself  at 

*  All  verbatim  from  the  Treaty.     Parl.  Papers,  1856,  vol.  Ixi.  p.  1. 


1856.  TREATY   OF   PARIS.  233 

war,  it  injured  England  at  all  times  when  it  remained 
at  peace  during  the  struggles  of  other  States.  Similarly 
by  the  issue  of  privateers  England  inflicted  great  injury 
on  its  enemies  ;  but  its  own  commerce,  exceeding  that 
of  every  other  State,  offered  to  the  prrvateers  of  its  foes 
a  still  richer  booty.  The  advantages  of  the  existing 
laws  of  maritime  war  were  not  altogether  on  the  side  of 
England,  though  mistress  of  the  seas  ;  and  in  return 
for  the  abolition  of  privateering,  the  British  Govern- 
ment consented  to  surrender  its  sharpest,  but  most 
dangerous,  weapon  of  offence,  and  to  permit  the  pro- 
ducts of  a  hostile  State  to  find  a  market  in  time  of  war. 
The  rule  was  laid  down  that  the  goods  of  an  enemy 
other 'than  contraband  of  war  should  henceforth  be  safe 
under  a  neutral  flag.  Neutrals'  goods  discovered  on 
an  enemy's  ship  were  similarly  made  exempt  from 
capture. 

The  enactments  of  the  Conference  of  Paris  relating 

to  commerce  in  time  of  hostilities  have  not  yet  been 

subjected  to  the  strain  of  a  war  between  England  and 

lany  European  State ;  its  conclusions  on  all  other  sub- 

nects  were  but  too  soon  put  to  the  test,  and 

Fictions  of 

pave  one  after  another   been  found  want-       0fepLri?!2 
ing1.     If  the   Power  which  calls   man  into 

o 

his  moment  of  life  could  smile  at  the  efforts  and  the 
assumptions  of  its  creature,  such  smile  might  have  been 
moved  by  the  assembly  of  statesmen  who,  at  the  close 
of  the  Crimean  War,  affected  to  shape  the  future  of 
Eastern  Europe.  They  persuaded  themselves  that  by 
dint  of  the  iteration  of  certain  phrases  they  could 


234  MODERN  EUROPE.  1856. 

convert   the  Sultan   and  his  hungry  troop    of  Pashas 
into  the   chiefs  of  a  European  State.     They  imagined 
that  the  House  of  Osman,  which  in  the  stages  of  a 
continuous  decline  had  successively  lost  its  sway  over 
Hungary,  over  Servia,   over  Southern  Greece  and  the 
Danubian  Provinces,  and  which  would  twice  within  the 
last  twenty-five  years  have  seen  its  Empire  dashed  to 
pieces  by  an  Egyptian  vassal  but  for  the  intervention  of 
Europe,  might  be  arrested  in  its  decadence  by  an  incan- 
tation,   and  be  made   strong  enough    and  enlightened 
enough  to  govern   to  all   time    the  Slavic  and   Greek 
populations  which  had  still  the  misfortune  to  be  in- 
cluded within  its  dominions.     Eecognising — so  ran  the 
words  which   read  like    bitter   irony,   but  which  were 
meant  for  nothing  of  the  kind — the  value  of  the  Sul- 
tan's promises  of  reform,  the  authors  of  the  Treaty  of 
Paris  proceeded,  as  if  of  set  purpose,  to  extinguish  any 
vestige  of  responsibility  which  might  have  been  felt  at 
Constantinople,  and  any  spark  of  confidence  that  might 
.still    linger    among   the  Christian  populations,  by  de- 
Lblaring  that,  whether  the  Sultan  observed  or  broke  his 
i  {promises,  in  no  case  could  any  right  of  intervention  by 
[Europe   arise.     The  helmsman  was  given  his  course ; 
the  hatches  were  battened  down.     If  words  bore  any 
meaning,  if  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was  not  an  elaborate 
piece  of  imposture,  the  Christian  subjects  of  the  Sultan 
had  for  the  future,  whatever  might  be  their  wrongs, 
hno  redress  to  look  for  but  in  the  exertion  of  their  own 
1  power.     The  terms  of  the  Treaty  were  in  fact  such  as 
might  have  been  imposed  if  the  Western  Powers  had 


1856.  TREATY   OF   PARIS.  235 

gone  to  war  with  Russia  for  some  object  of  their  own, 
and  had  been  rescued,  when  defeated  and  overthrown, 
I'by  the  victorious  interposition  of  the  Porte.  All  was 
hollow,  all  based  on  fiction  and  convention.  The 
illusions  of  nations  in  time  of  revolutionary  excitement, 
the  shallow,  sentimental  commonplaces  of  liberty  and 
fraternity  have  afforded  just  matter  for  satire ;  but  no 
democratic  platitudes  were  ever  more  palpably  devoid 
of  connection  with  fact,  more  flagrantly  in  contradiction 
to  the  experience  of  the  past,  or  more  ignominiously  to 
be  refuted  by  each  succeeding  act  of  history,  than  the 
deliberate  consecration  of  the  idol  of  an  Ottoman  Em- 
pire as  the  crowning  act  of  European  wisdom  in  1856. 

Among  the  devotees  of  the  Turk  the  English  Minis- 
ters were  the  most  impassioned,  having  indeed  in  the 
possession  of  India  some  excuse  for  their  fervour  on 
behalf  of  any  imaginable  obstacle  that  would  keep  the 
Russians  out  of  Constantinople.  The  Emperor  of  the 
French  had  during  the  Conferences  at  TheDanubian 
Paris  revived  his  project  of  incorporating 
the  Danubian  Principalities  with  Austria  in  return  for 
the  cession  of  Lombardy,  but  the  Viennese  Government 
had  declined  to  enter  into  any  such  arrangement.  Na- 
poleon  consequently  entered  upon  a  new  Eastern  policy. 
Appreciating  the  growing  force  of  nationality  in  Euro- 
pean affairs,  and  imagining  that  in  the  championship  of 
the  principle  of  nationality  against  the  Treaties  of  1815 
he  would  sooner  or  later  find  means  for  the  aggrandise- 
ment of  himself  and  France,  he  proposed  that  the  Pro- 
vinces of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  while  remaining  in 


235  MODE  UN  EUROPE.  1857. 

dependence  upon  the  Sultan,  should  be  united  into  a 
single  State  under  a  prince  chosen  by  themselves.     The 
English  Ministry   would  not  hear  of  this  union.     In 
their  view  the   creation  of  a  Koumanian   Principality 
under  a  chief  not  appointed  by  the  Porte  was  simply 
the  abstraction  from  the  Sultan  of  six  million  persons 
who  at  present  acknowledged  his  suzerainty,  and  whose 
tribute    to    Constantinople    ought,    according   to   Lord 
Clarendon,  to  be  increased.*     Austria,  fearing  the  effect 
of    a   Roumanian   national   movement   upon   its    own 
Roumanian  subjects  in  Transylvania,  joined  in  resist- 
ance to  Napoleon's  scheme,  and  the  political  organisation 
of  the  Principalities  was  in  consequence  reserved  by  the 
Conference   of  Paris    for  future  settlement.     Elections" 
were  held  in  the  spring  of  1857  under  a  decree  from 
the  Porte,  with  the  result  that  Moldavia,  as  it  seemed, 
pronounced    against    union    with   the    sister   province. 
But  the  complaint  at  once  arose  that  the  Porte  had 
falsified  the  popular  vote.     France  and  Russia  had  now 
established  relations  of  such  amity  that- their  ambassa- 
dors jointly  threatened  to  quit  Constantinople  if   the 
elections    were    not   annulled.      A    visit    paid    by   the 
French  Emperor  to  Queen  Victoria,  with  the  object  of 
smoothing   over   the   difficulties  which  had   begun   to 
threaten   the  Western  alliance,  resulted  rather  in  in- 
creased  misunderstandings    between  the    two    Govern- 
ments as  to  the  future  of  the  Principalities  than  in  any 
real   agreement.     The    elections    were  annulled.     New 
representative  bodies  met  at  Bucharest  and  Jassy,  and 

*  Martin,  Prince  Consort,  iii.  452.     Poole,  Stratford,  ii.  356, 


IBS:--*.  ^J^^  RQJJMA^-IA^)  -{  237 


pronounced  almost  unanimously  for  union  (October, 
•  1857).  In  the  spring  of  1858  the  Conference  of  Paris 
reassembled  in  order  to  frame  a  final  settlement  of  the 
affairs  of  the  Principalities.  It  determined  that  iu  each 
Province  there  should  be  a  Hospodar'  elected  for  life,  a 
separate  judicature,  and  a  separate  legislative  Assembly, 
while  a  central  Commission,  formed  by  representatives 
of  both  Provinces,  should  lay  before  the  Assemblies 
projects  of  law  on  matters  of  joint  interest.  In  ac- 
cordance with  these  provisions,  Assemblies  were  elected 
in  each  Principality  at  the  beginning  of  1859.  Their 
first  duty  was  to  choose  the  two  Hospodars,  but  in 
both  Provinces  a  unanimous  vote  fell  upon 

-  -.,.    .  .  ,  -  ~  Alexander  Cuza, 

the  same  person,  Prince   Alexander    buza.     Hospodarof 

both  Provinces. 

The  efforts  of  England  and  Austria  to  pre- 
vent union  were  thus  baffled  by  the  Eoumanian  people 
^itself,  and  after  three  years  the  elaborate  arrangements 
'made  by  the  Conference  were  similarly 
swept  away,  and  a  single  Ministry  and 
Assembly  took  the  place  of  the  dual  Government.  It 
now  remained  only  to  substitute  a  hereditary  Prince  for 
a  Hospodar  elected  for  life;  and  in  1866,  on  the  ex- 
pulsion of  Alexander  Cuza  by  his  subjects,  Prince 
Charles  of  Hohenzollern  -  Sigmaringen,  a 

Charles  of 

distant  kinsman  of  the   reigning   Prussian     iSSuS?™ 

•       J      -i,  11      TTi  Prince,  1866. 

sovereign,  was    recognised    by    all    Europe 
as  Hereditary  Prince  of  Koumania.     The  suzerainty  of 
^the  Porte,  now  reduced  to  the  bare  right  to  receive  a 
fixed  tribute,   was  fated  to  last    but  for   a   few  years 
longer, 


238  MODERN  EUROPE.  1853-70. 

V  Europe  had  not  to  wait  for  the  establishment  of 
Roumanian  independence  in  order  to  judge  of  the  fore- 
sight and  the  statesmanship  of  the  authors  of  the 
Treaty  of  Paris.  Scarcely  a  year  passed  without  the 
occurrence  of  some  event  that  cast  ridicule  upon  the 
fiction  of  a  self-regenerated  Turkey,  and  upon  the  pro- 
fession of  the  Powers  that  the  epoch  of  external  inter- 
ference in  its  affairs  was  at  an  end.  The  active 
misgovernment  of  the  Turkish  authorities  themselves, 
,their  powerlessness  or  want  of  will  to 

Continued    dis-  .    n  _ 

cord m Turkish      prevent  flagrant  outrage  and  wrong  among 

Empire. 

those  whom  they  professed  to  rule,  con- 
tinued after  the  Treaty  of  Paris  to  he  exactly  what 
they  had  been  before  it.  In  1860  massacres  and 
civil  war  in  Mount  Lebanon  led  to  the  occupation 
of  Syria  by  French  troops.  In  1861  Bosnia  and  v 
Herzegovina  took  up  arms.  In  1863  Servia  expelled* 
its  Turkish  garrisons.  Crete,  rising  in  the  follow- 
ing year,  fought  long  for  its  independence,  and 
seemed  for  a  moment  likely  to  be  united  with  Greece 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Powers,  but  it  was  finally 
abandoned  to  its  Ottoman  masters.  At  the  end  of 
fourteen  years  from  the  signature  of  the  Peace  of  Paris, 

the  downfall  of  the  French  Empire  enabled 
Treaty  of  Paris,      Russia  to  declare  that  it  would  no  longer 

1871. 

recognise    the    provisions    of    the    Treaty 
which   excluded   its    war-ships    and   its   arsenals    from* 
the  Black  Sea.     It  was  for  this,  and  for  this  almost 
alone,  that   England  had   gone  through  the   Crimean* 
War.     But  for  the  determination  of  Lord  Palmerston  to 


1856-70.  TREATY   OF   PARIS.  239 

exclude  Russia  from  the  Black  Sea,  peace  might  have 
been  made  while  the  Allied  armies  were  still  at  Varna. 
This  exclusion  was  alleged  to  be  necessary  in  the  in- 
terests of  Europe  at  large ;  that  it  was  really  enforced 
not  in  the  interest  of  Europe  but  ifi  the  interest  of 
England  was  made  sufficiently  clear  by  the  action  of 
Austria  and  Prussia,  whose  statesmen,  in  spite  of  the 
discourses  so  freely  addressed  to  them  from  London, 
were  at  least  as  much  alive  to  the  interests  of  their 
respective  countries  as   Lord   Palmerston  could  be  on 
their  behalf.     Nor  had  Prance  in  1854  any  interest  in 
crippling  the  power  of    Russia,  or  in  Eastern  affairs 
generally,  which  could  be  remotely  compared  with  those 
of   the    possessors    of    India.     The   personal    needs    of 
Napoleon  III.  made  him,  while  he  seemed  to  lead,  the 
instrument   of  the    British  Government  for  enforcing 
British  aims,  and  so  gave  to  Palmerston  the  momentary 
Shaping  of  a  new  and  superficial  concert  of  the  Powers. 
Masters  of  Sebastopol,  the  Allies  had  experienced  little 
difficulty  in  investing  their  own  conclusions  with  the 
seeming  authority  of  Europe  at  large ;    but  to  bring 
the  representatives  of  Austria  and  Prussia  to  a  Council- 
table,  to  hand  them  the  pen  to  sign  a  Treaty  dictated 
by  France  and  England,  was  not  to  bind  them  to  a 
policy  which  was    not   their   own,  or  to    make   those 
things  interests  of  Austria  and  Prussia  which  were  not 
their  interests  before.     Thus  when  in  1870  the  French 
Empire  fell,  England   stood  alone  as  tli£  Power  con-    / 
cerned  in  maintaining,  the  exclusion  of  llussia  from  the 
Euxine,  and  this  exclusion  it  could  enforce  no  longer.   It 


240    .  MODERN  EUROPE.  1856-70. 

was  well  that  Palmerston  had  made  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
the  act  of  Europe,  but  not  for  the  reasons  which  Pal- 
merston had  imagined.  The  fiction  had  engendered  no 
new  relation  in  fact ;  it  did  not  prolong  for  one  hour 
flife  'submission  of  Russia  after  it,  had  ceased  to  he  con- 
fronted in  the  West  by  a  superior  force ;  but  it  enabled 
Great  Britain  to  retire  without  official  humiliation  from 
a  position  which  it  had  conquered  only  through  the 
help  of  an  accidental  Alliance,  and  which  it  was  unable 
to  maintain  alone.  The  ghost  of  the  Conference  of 
1856  was,  as  it  were,  conjured  up  in  the  changed  world 
of  1871.  The  same  forms  which  had  once  stamped  with 
the  seal  of  Europe  the  instrument  of  restraint  upon 
Russia  now  as  decorously  executed  its  release.  Britain 
accepted  what  Europe  would, not  resist;  and  below  the 
slopes  where  lay  the,  countless  dead  of  three  nations 
Seba^topol  rose  from  its  ruins,  and  the  ensign  or  Russia 
floated  once  more  over  its  ships  of  war. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

Piedmont  after  1849 — Ministry  of  Azeglio — Cavour  Prime  Minister — Designs  of 
Cavour — His  Crimean  Policy — Cavour  at  the  Conference  of  Paris — Cavour 
and  Napoleon  III. — The  Meeting  at  Plombieres — Preparations  in  Italy — 
Treaty  of  January,  1859— Attempts  at  Mediation — Austrian  Ultimatum — 
Campaign  of  1859 — Magonta — Movement  in  Central  Italy — Solferino — 
Napoleon  and  Prussia — Interview  of  Villafranca — Cavour  resigns — Peace 
of  Zurich — Central  Italy  after  Villafranca — The  Proposed  Congress — "The 
Pope  and  the  Congress  " — Cavour  resumes  office — Cavour  and  Napoleon — 
Union  of  the  Duchies  and  the  Romagna  with  Piedmont — Savoy  and  Nice 
added  to  France — Cavour  on  this  cession — European  opinion — Naples — 
Sicily — Garibaldi  lands  at  Marsala — Capture  of  Palermo — The  Neapoli- 
tans evacuate  Sicily — Cavour  and  the  Party  of  Action — Cavour's  Policy  as 
to  Naples — Garibaldi  on  the  Mainland — Persano  and  Yillamarina  at  Naples 
— Garibaldi  at  Naples — The  Piedmontese  Army  enters  Umbria  and  the, 
Marches — Fall  of  Ancona — Garibaldi  and  Cavour — The  Armies  on  the 
Volturno — Fall  of  Gaeta — Cavour's  Policy  with  regard  to  Rome  and 
Venice — Death  of  Cavour — The  Free  Church  in  the  Free  State. 

IN  the  gloomy  years  that  followed  1849  the  kingdom  of 
Sardinia  had  stood  out  in  bright  relief  as  a  State  which, 
though  crushed  on  the  battle-field,  had  re-  piedmont  after 
mained  true  to  the  cause  of  liberty  while 
all  around  it  the  forces  of  reaction  gained  triumph  after 
triumph.  Its  King  had  not  the  intellectual  gifts  of  the 
maker  of  a  great  State,  but  he  was  one  with  whom  those 
possessed  of  such  gifts  could  work,  and  on  whom  they 
could  depend.  With  certain  grave  private  faults  Victor 
Emmanuel  had  the  public  virtues  of  intense  patriotism, 
of  loyalty  to  his  engagements  and  to  his  Ministers, 
of  devotion  to  a  single  great  aim.  Little  given  to 
Q 


242  MODEliN  EUROPE.  1849-59. 

speculative  thought,  he  saw  what  it  most  concerned  him 
to  see,  that  Piedmont  hy  making  itself  the  home  of 
liherty  could  become  the  Master-State  of  Italy.  His 
courage  on  the  battle-field,  splendid  and  animating  as 
it  was,  distinguished  him  less  than  another  kind  of 
courage  peculiarly  his  own.  Ignorant  and  supersti- 
tious, he  had  that  rare  and  masculine  quality  of  soul 
which  in  the  anguish  of  bereavement  and  on  the  verge 
of  the  unseen  world  remains  proof  against  the  appeal 
and  against  the  terrors  of  a  voice  speaking  with  more 
than  human  authority.  Rome,  not  less  than  Austria, 
stood  across  the  path  that  led  to  Italian  freedom,  and 
employed  all  its  art,  all  its  spiritual  force,  to  turn 
Victor  Emmanuel  from  the  work  that  lay  before 
him.  There  were  moments  in  bis  life  when  a  man 
of  not  more  than  common  weakness  might  well  have 
flinched  from  the  line  of  conduct  on  which  he  had 
resolved  in  hours  of  strength  and  of  insight ;  there 
were  times  when  a  less  constant  mind  might  well 
have  wavered  and  cast  a  balance  between  opposing 
systems  of  policy.  It  was  not  through  heroic  great- 
ness that  Victor  Emmanuel  rendered  his  priceless 
services  to  Italy.  He  was  a  man  not  conspicuously 
cast  in  a  different  mould  from  many  another  plain, 
strong  nature,  but  the  qualities  which  he  possessed  were 
precisely  those  which  Italy  required.  Fortune,  circum- 
stance, position  favoured  him  and  made  his  glorious 
work  possible ;  but  what  other  Italian  prince  of  this 
century,  though  placed  on  the  throne  of  Piedmont,  and 
numbering  Cavour  among  his  subjects,  would  have 


1849-52.  .  PIEDMONT.  243 

played  the  part,  the  simple  yet  all  momentous  part, 
which  Victor  Emmanuel  played  so  well  ?  The  love  and 
the  gratitude  of  Italy  have  been  lavished  without  stint 
on  the  memory  of  its  first  sovereign,  who  served  his 
nation  with  qualities  of  so  homely  a  type,  and  in  whose 
life  there  was  so  much  that  needed  pardon.  The  colder 
judgment  of  a  later  time  will  hardly  contest  the  title  of 
Victor  Emmanuel  to  be  ranked  among  those  few  men 
without  whom  Italian  union  would  not  have  been 
achieved  for  another  generation. 

On  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  Austria  after  the 
campaign  of  Novara,  the  Government  and  the  Parlia- 
ment of  Turin  addressed  themselves  to  the  work  of 
emancipating  the  State  from  the  system  of  ecclesiastical 
privilege  and  clerical  ascendency  which  had  continued 
in  full  vigour  down  to  the  last  year  of  Charles  Albert's 
.reign.  Since  1814  the  Church  had  maintained,  or  had 
recovered,  both  in  Piedmont  and  in  the  island  of  Sar- 
dinia, rights  which  had  been  long  wrested  from  it  in 
other  European  societies,  and  which  were  out  of  har- 
mony with  the  Constitution  now  taking  root  under 
Victor  Emmanuel.  The  clergy  had  still  their  own 
tribunals,  and  even  irt  the  case  of  criminal  MinistiyofAzeg. 
offences  were  not  subject  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  State.  The  Bishops  possessed  excessive  powers 
and  too  large  a  share  of  the  Church  revenues ;  the 
parochial  clergy  lived  in  want ;  monasteries  and  con- 
vents abounded.  It  was  not  in  any  spirit  of  hostility 
towards  the  Church  that  Massimo  d'Azeglio,  whom  the 
King  called  to  office  after  Novara,  commenced  the  work  of 
Q  2 


244  MODERN  EUROPE.  1849-52. 

reform  by  measures  subjecting  tbe  clergy  to  the  law-courts 
of  the  State,  abolishing  the  right  of  sanctuary  in  monas- 
teries, and  limiting  the  power -of  corporations  to  acquire 
landed  property.  If  the  Papacy  would  have  met  Victor 
Emmanuel  in  a  fair  spirit  his  Government  would  gladly 
have  avoided  a  dangerous  and  exasperating  struggle ; 
but  all  the  forces  and  the  passions  of  Ultramontanism 
were  brought  to  bear  against  the  proposed  reforms.  The 
result  was  that  the  Minister,  abandoned  by  a  section  of 
the  Conservative  party  on  whom  he  had  relied,  sought 
the  alliance  of  men  ready  for  a  larger  and  bolder  policy, 
and  called  to  office  the  foremost  of  those  from  whom  he 
had  received  an  independent  support  in  the  Chamber, 
Count  Cavour.  Entering  the  Cabinet  in  1850  as 
Minister  of  Commerce,  Cavour  rapidly  became  the 
master  of  all  his  colleagues.  On  his  own  responsibility 
he  sought  and  won  the  support  of  the  more  moderate 
section  of  the  Opposition,  headed  by  Eattazzi ;  and  after 
cavour  Prime  a  brief  withdrawal  from  office,  caused  by 
divisions  within  the  Cabinet,  he  returned  to 
power  in  October,  1852,  as  Prime  Minister. 

Cavour,  though  few  men  have  gained  greater  fame 
as  diplomatists,  had  not   been  trained  in   official  life. 
The  younger  son  of  a  noble  family,  he  had 
entered  the  army  in  1826,  and  served  in  the 
Engineers ;   but  his  sympathies  with  the  liberal  move- 
ment of  1830  brought  him  into  extreme  disfavour  with 
his  chiefs.     He  was  described  by  Charles  Albert,  then 
Prince  of  Carignano,  as  the  most  dangerous  man  in  the 
kingdom,  and  was  transferred  at  the  instance  of  his  own 


1849-so.  CAVOUR.  245 

father  to  the  solitary  Alpine  fortress  of  Bard.  Too 
vigorous  a  nature  to  submit  to  inaction,  too  buoyant 
and  too  sagacious  to  resort  to  conspiracy,  he  quitted  the 
army,  and  soon  afterwards  undertook  the  management 
of  one  of  the  family  estates,  devoting  iiimself  to  scien- 
tific agriculture  on  a  large  scale.  He  was  a  keen  and 
successful  man  of  business,  but  throughout  the  next 
twelve  years,  which  he  passed  in  fruitful  private  industry, 
his  mind  dwelt  ardently  on  public  affairs.  He  was 
filled  with  a  deep  discontent  at  the  state  of  society 
which  he  saw  around  him  in  Piedmont,  and  at  the  con- 
dition of  Italy  at  large  under  foreign  and  clerical  rule. 
Repeated  visits  to  France  and  England  made  him 
familiar  with  the  institutions  of  freer  lands,  and  gave 
definiteness  to  his  political  and  social  aims.*  In 
1847,  when  changes  were  following  fast,  he  founded 
with  some  other  Liberal  nobles  the  journal  Risor- 
'pimento,  devoted  to  the  cause  of  national  revival ; 
and  he  was  one  of  the  first  who  called  upon 
King  Charles  Albert  to  grant  a  Constitution.  During 
the  stormy  days  of  1848  lie  was  at  once  the  vigorous 
advocate  of  war  with  Austria  and  the  adversary  of 
Republicans  and  Extremists  who  for  their  own  theories 
seemed  willing  to  plunge  Italy  into  anarchy.  Though 
unpopular  with  the  mob,  he  was  elected  to  the  Chamber 
by  Turin,  and  continued  to  represent  the  capital  after 
the  peace.  Up  to  this  time  there  had  been  little 
opportunity  for  the  proof  of  his  extraordinary  powers, 

*  Berti,  Cavonr  avanti  1848,  p.  110.     La  Rive,  Cavour,  p.  58.    Cavour, 
Lettere  (ed.  Chiala),  introd.  p.  73. 


246  MODERN  EUROPE.  1852-59. 

but  the  inborn  sagacity  of  Victor  Emmanuel  had  already 
discerned  in  him  a  man  who  could  not  remain  in  a 
subordinate  position.  "  You  will  see  him  turn  you  all 
out  of  your  places,"  the  King  remarked  to  his  Ministers, 
as  he  gave  his  assent  to  Cavour's  first  appointment  to  a 
seat  in  the  Cabinet. 

The  Ministry  of  Azeglio  had  served  Piedmont  with 
honour  from  1849  to  1852,  but  its  leader  scarcely  pos- 
sessed the  daring  and  fertility  of  mind  which  the  time 
required.  Cavour  threw  into  the  work  of  Government 
a  passion  and  intelligence  which  soon  produced  results 
visible  to  all  Europe.  His  devotion  to  Italy  was  as 
deep,  as  all-absorbing,  as  that  of  Mazzini 
himself,  though  the  methods  and  schemes 
of  the  two  men  were  in  such  complete  antagonism. 
Cavour's  fixed  purpose  was  to  drive  Austria  out  of 
Italy  by  defeat  in  the  battle-field,  and  to  establish,  as 
the  first  step  towards  national  union,  a  powerful  king- 
dom of  Northern  Italy  under  Victor  Emmanuel.  In 
order  that  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  Piedmont 
might  be  raised  to  the  highest  possible  strength  and 
efficiency,  he  saw  that  the  resources  of  the  country 
must  be  largely  developed;  and  with  this  object  he 
negotiated  commercial  treaties  with  Foreign  Powers, 
laid  down  railways,  and  suppressed  the  greater  part  of 
the  monasteries,  selling  their  lands  to  cultivators,  and 
devoting  the  proceeds  of  sale  not  to  State-purposes  but 
to  the  payment  of  the  working  clergy.  Industry  ad- 
vanced ;  the  heavy  pressure  of  taxation  was  patiently 
borne;  the  army  and  the  fleet  grew  apace.  But  the 


185^-59.  CAVOUR.  247 

cause  of  Piedmont  was  one  with  that  of  the  Italian 
nation,  and  it  became  its  Government  to  demonstrate 
this  day  by  day  with  no  faltering  voice  or  hand.     Pro- 
tection and  support  were  given  to  fugitives  from  Aus- 
trian and  Papal  tyranny ;  the  Press  Was  laid  open  to 
every  tale  of  wrong ;  and  when,  after  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  at  insurrection  in  Milan  in   1853,  for  which 
Mazzini  and  the  Eepublican  exiles  were  alone  respon- 
sible,   the     Austrian     Government    sequestrated     the 
property  of  its  subjects  who   would   not   return   from 
Piedmont,  Cavour  bade    his  ambassador  quit  Vienna, 
and  appealed  to  every  Court  in  Europe.     Nevertheless, 
Cavour  did  not  believe  that  Italy,  even  by  a  simulta- 
neous   rising,    could   permanently    expel  the    Austrian 
armies  or  conquer  the  Austrian  fortresses.     The  expe- 
rience of  forty  years  pointed  to  the  opposite  conclusion ; 
and  while  Mazzini  in  his  exile  still  imagined  that  a 
people  needed  only  to  determine  to  be  free  in  order  to 
be  free,  Cavour  schemed  for  an  alliance  which  should 
range  "against  the  Austrian  Emperor  armed  forces  as 
numerous  and  as  disciplined  as  his  own.    It  was  mainly 
with  this  object  that  Cavour  plunged  Sar-         Cavour'8 
dinia  into  the  Crimean  War.     He  was  not 
without  just  causes  of  complaint  against  the  Czar;  but 
the  motive  with  which  he  sent  the  Sardinian  troops  to 
Sebastopol  was  not  that  they  might  take  vengeance  on 
Eussia,  but  that  they  might  fight  side  by  side  with  the 
soldiers  of  England  and  France.     That  the  war  might 
lead  to  complications   still  unforeseen  was  no  doubt  a 
possibility  present  to  Cavour's  mind,  and  in  that  case  it 


A^ 


248  MODERN   EUROPE.    •  185-2-59. 

was  no  small  thing  that  Sardinia  stood  allied  to  the  two 
Western  Powers ;  but  apart  from  these  chances  of  the 
future,  Sardinia  would  have  done  ill  to  stand  idle  when 
at  any  moment,  as  it  seemed,  Austria  might  pass  from 
armed  neutrality  into  active  concert  with  England  and 
France.  Had  Austria  so  drawn  the  sword  against 
Eussia  whilst  Piedmont  stood  inactive,  the  influence  of 
the  Western  Powers  must  for  some  years  to  come  have 
been  ranged  on  the  side  of  Austria  in  the  maintenance 
of  its  Italian  possessions,  and  Piedmont  could  at  the 
best  have  looked  only  to  St.  Petersburg  for  sympathy 
or  support.  Cavour  was  not  scrupulous  in  his  choice  of 
means  when  the  liberation  of  Italy  was  the  end  in  view, 
and  the  charge  was  made  against  him  that  in  joining 
the  coalition  against  Eussia  he  lightly  entered  into  a 
war  in  which  Piedmont  had  no  direct  concern.  But 
reason  and  history  absolve,  and  far  more  than  absolve, 
tbe  Italian  statesman.  If  the  cause  of  European 
equilibrium,  for  which  England  and  France  took  up 
arms,  was  a  legitimate  ground  of  war  in  the  case 
of  these  two  Powers,  it  was  not  less  so  in  the  case 
of  their  ally ;  while  if  the  ulterior  results  rather  than 
the  motive  of  a  war  are  held  to  constitute  its  justifica- 
tion, Cavour  stands  out  as  the  one  politician  in  Europe 
whose  aims  in  entering  upon  the  Crimean  War  have 
been  fulfilled,  not  mocked,  by  events.  He  joined  in 
the  struggle  against  Eussia  not  in  order  to  maintain 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  but  to  gain  an  ally  in  liberating 
7  Italy.  The  Ottoman  Empire  has  n«tt  been  maintained ; 
independence  of  Italy  has  been  established,  and 


1852-59.  CAVOUR.  249 

established  by  means  of  the  alliance  which  Cavour  gained. 
His  Crimean  policy  is  one  of  those  excessively  rare  in- 
stances of  statesmanship  where  action  has  been  deter- 
mined not  by  the  driving  and  half-understood  necessi- 
ties of  the  moment,  but  by  a  distinct  and  true  perception 
of  the  future.  He  looked  only  in  one  direction,  but  in 
that  direction  he  saw  clearly.  Other  statesmen  struck 
blindfold,  or  in  their  vision  of  a  regenerated  Turkey 
fought  for  an  empire  of  mirage.  It  may  with  some 
reason  be  asked  whether  the  order  of  Eastern  Europe 
would  now  be  different  if  our  own  English  soldiers  who 

O 

fell  at  Balaclava  had  been  allowed  to  die  in  their  beds : 
every  Italian  whom  Cavour  sent  to  perish  on  the  Tcher- 
naya  or  in  the  cholera-stricken  camp  died  as  directly  for 
the  cause  of  Italian  independence  as  if  he  had  fallen  on 
the  slopes  of  Custozza  or  under  the  walls  of  Rome.  ^  n*~ 

At  the  Conference  of  Paris  in   18 50  the  Sardinian 

. 

Premier  took  his  place  in  right  of  alliance  by  the  side  of 
the  representatives  of  the  great  Powers ;  and  when  the 
main  business  of  the  Conference  was  concluded,  Count 
Buol,  the  Austrian  Minister,  was  forced  to 

, .  .  ,  .     . .  i         j-*  Cavour  at  the 

listen  to  a  vigorous  denunciation  by  (Javour     conference  of 
of  the  misgovernment  that  reigned  in  Cen- 
tral and  Southern  Italy,  and  of  the  Austrian  occupation 
which  rendered  this  possible.     Though  the  French  were 
still  in   Borne,  their   presence   might   by   courtesy   be 
described  as  a  measure  of  precaution  rendered  necessary 
by  the  intrusion  of  the  Austrians  farther  north ;  and 
both  the  French  and  English  plenipotentiaries  at  the 
Conference  supported  Cavour  in  his  invective.     Cavour 


250  MODERN  EUEOPE.  1832-59. 

returned  to  Italy  without  any  territorial  reward  for  the 
services  that  Piedmont  had  rendered  to  the  Allies  ;  but 
his  object  was  attained.  He  had  exhibited  Austria 
isolated  and  discredited  before  Europe ;  he  had  given 
to  his  country  a  voice  that  it  had  never  before  had  in 
the  Councils  of  the  Powers ;  he  had  produced  a  deep 
conviction  throughout  Italy  that  Piedmont  not  only 
could  and  would  act  with  vigour  against  the  national 
enemy,  but  that  in  its  action  it  would  have  the  help  of 
allies.  From  this  time  the  Republican  and  Mazzinian 
societies  lost  ground  before  the  growing  confidence  in 
the  House  of  Savoy,  in  its  Minister  and  its  army.*  The 
strongest  evidence  of  the  effect  of  Cavour's  Crimean 
policy  and  of  his  presence  at  the  Conference  of  Paris 
was  seen  in  the  action  of  the  Austrian 
Austrian  policy,  Government  itself.  From  1849  to  1856 

'1856. 

its  rule  in  Northern  Italy  had  been  one  not 
so  much  of  severity  as  of  brutal  violence.  Now  all  was 
changed.  The  Emperor  came  to  Milan  to  proclaim  a 
general  amnesty  and  to  win  the  affection  of  his  subjects. 
The  sequestrated  estates  were  restored  to  their  owners. 
Eadetzky,  in  his  ninety-second  year,  was  at  length 
allowed  to  pass  into  retirement ;  the  government  of  the 
sword  was  declared  at  an  end  ;  Maximilian,  the  gentlest 
and  most  winning  of  the  Hapsburgs,  was  sent  with  his 
young  bride  to  charm  away  the  sad  memories  of  the 
evil  time.  But  it  was  too  late.  The  recognition  shown 

*  Cavour,  Lettere  (Chiala),  ii.  introd.  p.  187.  Guerzoui,  Garibaldi,  i. 
412.  Manin,  the  Ex-President  of  Venice,  now  in  exile,  declared  from  this 
time  for  the  House  of  Savoy.  Garibaldi  did  the  same. 


1852^9.  CAVOUR.  251 

by  the  Lombards  of  the  Emperor's  own  personal  friend- 
liness indicated  no  reconciliation  with  Austria :  and 
while  Francis  Joseph  was  still  in  Milan,  King  Victor 
Emmanuel,  in  the  presence  of  a  Lombard  deputation, 
laid  the  first  stone  of  the  monument  erected  by  subscrip- 
tions from  all  Italy  in  memory  of  those  who  had  fallen 
in  the  campaigns  of  1848  and  1849,  the  statue  of  a 
foot-soldier  waving  his  sword  towards  the  Austrian 
frontier.  The  Sardinian  Press  redoubled  its  attacks  on 
Austria  and  its  Italian  vassals.  The  Government  of 
Vienna  sought  satisfaction  ;  Cavour  sharplj'-  refused  it ; 
and  diplomatic  relations  between  the  two  Courts,  which 
had  been  resumed  since  the  Conference  of  Paris,  were 
again  broken  off.  v 

Of  the  two  Western  Powers,  Cavour  would  have 
preferred  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  which  had  no 
objects  of  its  own  to  seek  in  Italy ;  but  when  he  found 
'  that  the  Government  of  London  would  not  Cavour  and 
assist  him  by  arms  against  Austria,  he  drew 
closer  to  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  and  supported  him 
throughout  his  controversy  with  England  and  Austria 
on  the  settlement  of  the  Danubian  Principalities. 
Napoleon,  there  is  no  doubt,  felt  a  real  interest  in  Italy. 
His  own  early  political  theories  formed  on  a  study 
of  the  Napoleonic  Empire,  his  youthful  alliance  with 
the  Carbonari,  point  to  a  sympathy  with  the  Italian 
national  cause  which  was  genuine  if  not  profound,  and 
which  was  not  altogether  lost  in  1849,  though  France 
then  acted  as  the  enemy  of  Roman  independence.  If 
Napoleon  intended  to  remould  the  Continental  order 


252  MODERN  EUROPE.  1852-59. 

and  the  Treaties  of  1815  in  the  interests  of  France 
and  of  the  principle  of  nationality,  he  could  make 
no  better  beginning  than  by  driving  Austria  from 
Northern  Italy.  It  was  not  even  necessary  for  him  to 
devise  an  original  policy.  Early  in  1848,  when  it 
seemed  probable  that  Piedmont  would  be  increased  by 
Lombardy  and  part  of  Venetia,  Lamartine  had  laid  it 
down  that  France  ought  in  that  case  to  be  compensated  by 
Savoy,  in  order  to  secure  its  frontiers  against  so  power- 
ful a  neighbour  as  the  new  Italian  State.  To  this  idea 
Napoleon  returned.  Savoy  had  been  incorporated  with 
France  from  1792  to  1814;  its  people  were  more 
French  than  Italian  ;  its  annexation  would  not  directly 
injure  the  interests  of  any  great  Power.  Of  the  three 
directions  in  which  France  might  stretch  towards  its 
old  limits  of  the  Alps  and  the  Rhine,  the  direction  of 
Savoy  was  by  far  the  least  dangerous.  Belgium  could 
not  be  touched  without  certain  loss  of  the  English 
alliance,  with  which  Napoleon  could  not  yet  dispense ; 
an  attack  upon  the  Rhenish  Provinces  .would  probably 
be  met  by  all  the  German  Powers  together ;  in  Savoy 
alone  was  there  the  chance  of  gaining  territory  without 
raising  a  European  coalition  against  France.  No  sooner 
had  the  organisation  of  the  Danubian  Principalities 
been  completed  by  the  Conference  which  met  in  the  spring 
of  1858  than  Napoleon  began  to  develop  his  Italian 
plans.  An  attempt  of  a  very  terrible  character  which 
was  made  upon  his  life  by  Orsini,  a  Roman  exile, 
though  at  the  moment  it  threatened  to  embroil  Sar- 
dinia with  France,  probably  stimulated  him  to  action. 


1858.         CAVOUR  AND  NAPOLEON  AT  PLOMBIERES.         253 

In  the  summer  of  1858  he  invited  Cavour  to  meet  him 
at  Plombieres.     The    negotiations  which  there  passed 
were  not  made  known  by  the  Emperor  to 
his    Ministers :    they    were    communicated     piombieres, 

•f  July,  1858. 

by  Cavour  to  two  persons  only  besides 
Victor  Emmanuel.  It  seems  that  no  written  engage- 
ment was  drawn  up ;  it  was  verbally  agreed  that  if 
Piedmont  could,  without  making  a  revolutionary  war, 
and  without  exposing  Napoleon  to  the  charge  of  aggres- 
sion, incite  Austria  to  hostilities,  France  would  act  as 
its  ally.  Austria  was  then  to  be  expelled  from  Venetia 
as  well  as  from  Lombardy.  Victor  Emmanuel  was 
to  become  sovereign  of  North-Italy,  with  the  Roman 
Legations  and  Marches  ;  the  remainder  of  the  Papal 
territory,  except  Rome  itself  and  the  adjacent  dis- 
trict, was  to  be  added  to  Tuscany,  so  constituting  a 
new  kingdom  of  Central  Italy.  The  two  kingdoms, 
together  with  Naples  and  Rome,  were  to  form  an 
Italian  Confederation  under  the  presidency  of  the  Pope. 
France  was  to  receive  Savoy  and  possibly  Nice.  A 
marriage  between  the  King's  young  daughter  Clotilde 
and  the  Emperor's  cousin  Prince  Jerome  Napoleon  was 
discussed,  if  not  actually  settled.*  r 

From  this  moment  Cavour  laboured  night  and  day 
for  war.     His  position  was  an  exceedingly 

TIT!  i  Cavour  in  view 

difficult  one.     Not  only  had   he  to  reckon     of  the  French 

<*  Alliance. 

with  the  irresolution  of  Napoleon,  and  his 

avowed    unwillingness   to    take  up   arms  unless  with 

*  Cavour,  Lettere  (Chiala),  ii.  intr.  289,  324;   iii.  intr.  1.    Bianchi, 
Diplomazia,  vii.  1.    Mazade,  Cavour,  p.  187.    Massari,  La  Marmora,  p.  204. 


254  MODERN  EUROPE.  1858-59. 

the  appearance  of  some  good  cause  ;  but  even  supposing 
the  goal  of  war  reached,  and  Austria  defeated,  how  little 
was  there  in  common  between  Cavour's  aims  for  Italy 
and  the  traditional  policy  of  France  !  The  first  Napo- 
leon had  given  Venice  to  Austria  at  Campo  Formio ; 
even  if  the  new  Napoleon  should  fulfil  his  promise  and 
liberate  all  Northern  Italy,  his  policy  in  regard  to  the 
centre  and  south  of  the  Peninsula  would  probably  be 
antagonistic  to  any  effective  union  or  to  any  further 
extension  of  the  influence  of  the  House  of  Savoy. 
Cavour  had  therefore  to  set  in  readiness  for  action 
national  forces  of  such  strength  that  Napoleon,  even  if 
he  desired  to  draw  back,  should  find  it  difficult  to  do 
so,  and  that  the  shaping  of  the  future  of  the  Italian 
people  should  be  governed  not  by  the  schemes  which 
the  Emperor  might  devise  at  Paris,  but  by  the  claims 
and  the  aspirations  of  Italy  itself.  It  was  necessary 
for  him  not  only  to  encourage  and  subsidise  the 
National  Society — a  secret  association  whose  branches  in 
the  other  Italian  States  were  preparing  to  assist  Pied- 
mont in  the  coming  war,  and  to  unite  Italy  under 
the  House  of  Savoy — but  to  enter  into  communica- 
tion with  some  of  the  Republican  or  revolutionary 
party  who  had  hitherto  been  at  enmity  with  all 
Crowns  alike.  He  summoned  Graribaldi  in  secrecy 
to  Turin,  and  there  convinced  him  that  the  war  about 
to  be  waged  by  Victor  Emmanuel  was  one  in  which 
he  ought  to  take  a  prominent  part.  As  the  fore- 
most defender  of  the  Roman  Republic  and  a  revolu- 
tionary hero,  Graribaldi  was  obnoxious  to  the  French 


1858-59.  CAVOUB.  255 

Emperor.  Cavour  had  to  conceal  from  Napoleon  the 
fact  that  Garibaldi  would  take  the  field  at  the  head  of  a 
free-corps  by  the  side  of  the  Allied  armies ;  he  had 
similarly  to  conceal  from  Garibaldi  that  one  result  of 
the  war  would  be  the  cession  of  Nice,  his  own  birth- 
place, to  France.  Thus  plunged  in  intrigue,  driving 
his  Savoyards  to  the  camp  and  raising  from  them  the 
last  farthing  in  taxation,  in  order  that  after  victory 
they  might  be  surrendered  to  a  Foreign  Power;  goading 
Austria  to  some  act  of  passion ;  inciting,  yet  checking 
and  controlling,  the  Italian  revolutionary  elements  ;  bar- 
gaining away  the  daughter  of  his  sovereign  to  one  of 
the  most  odious  of  mankind,  Cavour  staked  all  on  the 
one  great  end  of  his  being,  the  establishment  of  Italian 
independence.  Words  like  those  which  burst  from 
Danton  in  the  storms  of  the  Convention — "  Perish  my 
name,  my  reputation,  so  that  France  be  free  "  —were 
'•the  calm  and  habitual  expression  of  Cavour's  thought 
when  none  but  an  intimate  friend  was  by  to  hear.* 
Such  tasks  as  Cavour's  are  not  to  be  achieved  with- 
out means  which,  to  a  man  noble  in  view  as  Cavour 
really  was,  it  would  have  been  more  agreeable  to  leave 
unemployed.  Those  alone  are  entitled  to  pronounce 
judgment  upon  him  who  have  made  a  nation,  and 
made  it  with  purer  hands.  It  was  well  for  English 
statesmen  and  philanthropists,  inheritors  of  a  world- 
wide empire,  to  enforce  the  ethics  of  peace  and  to 

*  "  In  mezzo  alle  piu  angosciose  crisi  politiche,  osclamava  nolle  soli- 
tudine  delle  sue  stauze ;  '  Perisca  il  mio  nome,  perisca  la  inia  fa  ma,  piirehe 
ritalia  sia.'  "  Artom  (Cavour's  secretary),  Cavour  iu  Parlameiito :  introd. 
p.  46. 


258  MODERN   EUROPE.  1859. 

plead  for  a  gentlemanlike  frankness  and  self-restraint 
in  the  conduct  of  international  relations.  English, 
women  had  not  been  flogged  by  Austrian  soldiers  in 
the  market-place;  the  treaties  of  1815  had  not  conse- 
crated a  foreign  rule  over  half  our  race.  To  Cavour  the 
greatest  crime  would  have  been  to  leave  anything 
,  undone  which  might  minister  to  Italy's  liberation.* 

Napoleon  seems  to  have  considered  that  he  would 
be  ready  to  begin  war  in  the  spring  of  1859.  At  the 
Treaty  of  reception  at  the  Tuileries  on  the  1st  of 
January  he  addressed  the  Austrian  ambas- 
sador in  words  that  pointed  to  an  approaching  conflict ; 
a  few  weeks  later  a  marriage-contract  was  signed  between 
Prince  Napoleon  and  Clotilde  daughter  of  Victor 
Emmanuel,  and  part  of  the  agreement  made  at  Plom- 
bieres  was  embodied  in  a  formal  Treaty.  Napoleon 
undertook  to  support  Sardinia  in  a  war  that  might 
arise  from  any  aggressive  act  on  the  part  of  Austria, 
and,  if  victorious,  to  add  both  Lombardy  and  Venetia 
to  Victor  Emmanuel's  dominions.  France  was  in 
return  to  receive  Savoy,  the  disposal  of  Nice  being 
reserved  till  the  restoration  of  peace. f  Even  before  the 
Treaty  was  signed  Victor  Emmanuel  had  thrown  down 
the  challenge  to  Austria,  declaring  at  the  opening  of 
the  Parliament  of  Turin  that  he  could  not  be  insen- 
sible to  the  cry  of  suffering  that  rose  from  Italy.  In 

*  La  Farina  Epistolario,  ii.  56,  81,  137,  426.  The  interview  with 
Garibaldi ;  Cavour,  Lettere,  id.  introd.  297.  Garibaldi,  Epistolario,  i.  55. 

f  Cavour,  Lettere  (Chiala),  iii.  introd.  32.  Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  viii. 
11.  The  statement  of  Napoleon  III.  to  Lord  Cowley,  in  Martin,  Prince 
Consort,  v.  31,  that  there  was  no  Treaty,  is  untrue. 


law.  ATTEMPTS    AT   MEDIATION.  257 

all  but  technical  form  the  imminence  of  war  had  been 
announced,  when,  under  the  influence  of  diplomatists 
and  Ministers  about  him,  and  of  a  financial  panic 
that  followed  his  address  to  the  Austrian  ambas- 
sador, the  irresolute  mind  of  Napoleon*  shrank  from  its 
purpose,  and  months  more  of  suspense  were  imposed 
upon  Italy  and  Europe,  to  be  terminated  at  last  not  by 
any  effort  of  Napoleon's  will  but  by  the  rash  and  im- 
politic action  of  Austria  itself.  At  the  in- 

Attempts  at 

stance  of  the  Court  of  Vienna  the  British  medi 
Government  had  consented  to  take  steps  towards  media- 
tion. Lord  Cowley,  Ambassador  at  Paris,  was  sent  to 
Vienna  with  proposals  which,  it  was  believed,  might 
form  the  basis  for  an  amicable  settlement  of  Italian 
affairs.  He  asked  that  the  Papal  States  should  be 
evacuated  by  both  Austrian  and  French  troops ;  that 
Austria  should  abandon  the  Treaties  which  gave  it  a 
virtual  Protectorate  over  Modena  and  Parma;  and 
that  it  should  consent  to  the  introduction  of  reforms  in 
all  the  Italian  Governments.  Negotiations  towards 
this  end  had  made  some  progress  when  they  were  inter- 
rupted by  a  proposal  sent  from  St.  Petersburg,  at  the 
instance  of  Napoleon,  that  Italian  affairs  should  be  sub- 
mitted to  a  European  Congress.  Austria  was  willing 
under  certain"  conditions  to  take  part  in  a  Congress, 
but  it  required,  as  a  preliminary  measure,  that  Sardinia 
should  disarm.  Napoleon  had  now  learnt  that  Garibaldi 
was  to  fight  at  the  head  of  the  volunteers  for  Victor  Em- 
manuel. His  doubts  as  to  the  wisdom  of  his  own  policy 
seem  to  have  increased  hour  by  hour;  from  Britain,  whose 
A 


258  MODERN  EUROPE.  isse. 

friendship  he  still  considered  indispensable  to  him,  he 
received  the  most  urgent  appeals  against  war ;  it  was  ne- 
cessary that  Cavour  himself  should  visit  Paris  in  order 
to  prevent  the  Emperor  from  acquiescing  in  Austria's 
demand.  In  Cavour's  presence  Napoleon  seems  to  have 
lost  some  of  his  fears,  or  to  have  been  made  to  feel  that 
it  was  not  safe  to  provoke  his  confidant  of  Plombieres ;  * 
but  Cavour  had  not  long  left  Paris  when  a  proposal 
was  made  from  London,  that  in  lieu  of  the  separate 
disarmament  of  Sardinia  the  Powers  should  agree  to  a 
general  disarmament,  the  details  to  be  settled  by  a 
European  Commission.  This  proposal  received  Napo- 
leon's assent.  He  telegraphed  to  Cavour  desiring  him  to 
join  in  the  agreement.  Cavour  could  scarcely  disobey,  yet 
at  one  stroke  it  seemed  that  all  his  hopes  when  on  the 
very  verge  of  fulfilment  were  dashed  to  the  ground,  all 
his  boundless  efforts  for  the-  liberation  of  Italy  through 
war  with  Austria  lost  and  thrown  away.  For  some 
hours  he  appeared  shattered  by  the  blow.  Strung  to 
the  extreme  point  of  human  endurance  by  labour 
scarcely  remitted  by  day  or  night  for'  weeks  together, 
his  strong  but  sanguine  nature  gave  way,  and  for  a 
while  the  few  friends  who  saw  him  feared  that  he  would 
take  his  own  life.  But  the  crisis  passed :  Cavour  ac- 
cepted, as  inevitable,  the  condition  of  general  disarma- 
ment; and  his  vigorous  mind  had  already  begun  to' 
work  upon  new  plans  for  the  future,  when  the  report  of 

*  Bianchi,  Politique  de  Cavour,  p.  328,  where  is  Cavour's  indignant 
letter  to  Napoleon.  The  last  paragraph  of  this  seems  to  convey  a  veiled 
threat  to  publish  the  secret  negotiations. 


H»  WAR    BETWEEN   FRAXCE    AXD    AUSTRIA.  259 

a  decision  made  at  Vienna,  which  was  soon  confirmed 
by  the    arrival  of  an  Austrian   ultimatum, 

Austrian  ulti- 

threw  him  into  joy  as  intense  as  his  previous  matum-  APril 23- 
despair.  Ignoring  the  British  proposal  for  a  general  dis- 
armament, already  accepted  at  Turin,  the  Austrian  Cabi- j 
net  demanded,  without  qualifications  and  under  threat  of  \ 
war  within  three  days,  that  Sardinia  should  separately  \ 
disarm.  It  was  believed  at  Vienna  that  Napoleon  was 
merely  seeking  to  gain  time ;  that  a  conflict  was  in- 
evitable ;  and  that  Austria  now  stood  better  prepared 
for  immediate  action  than  its  enemies.  Right  or  wrong 
in  its  judgment  of  Napoleon's  real  intentions,  the  Aus- 
trian Government  had  undeniably  taken  upon  itself  the 
part  of  the  aggressor.  Cavour  had  only  to  point  to  his 
own  acceptance  of  the  plan  of  a  general  disarmament, 
and  to  throw  upon  his  enemy  the  responsibility  for  a 
disturbance  of  European  peace.  His  reply  was  taken 
as  the  signal  for  hostilities,  and  on  the  29th  of  April 
Austrian  troops  crossed  the  Ticino.  A  declaration  of 
war  from  Paris  followed  without  delay.*  l^ 

For  months  past  Austria  had  been  pouring  its 
troops  into  Northern  Italy.  It  had  chosen  its  own 
time  for  the  commencement  of  war;  a  feeble 

Campaign  of 

enemy  stood  before  it ;  its  more  powerful 
adversary  could  not  reach  the  field  without  crossing  the 
Alps  or  the  mountain-range  above  Genoa.     Everything 
.pointed   to   a  vigorous    offensive   on   the   part  of   the 

*  Cavour,  Lettere,  iii.  introd.  p.  115 ;  iii.  29.  Bianchi,  Politique  de 
Cavour,  p.  333.  Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  vii.  61.  Massari,  Cavour,  p.  314. 
Parliamentary  Papers,  1859,  xxxii.  204,  262.  Merimee,  Lettres  k  Panizzi, 
i  21.  Martin,  Prince  Consort,  iv.  427. 

X    2 


260  MODERN   EUROPE.  1859. 

Austrian  generals,  and  in  Piedmont  itself  it  was  believed 
that  Turin  must  fall  before  French  troops  could  assist 
in  its  defence.  From  Turin  as  a  centre  the  Austrians 
could  then  strike  with  ease,  and  with  superior  numbers, 
against  the  detachments  of  the  French  army  as  they 
descended  the  mountains  at  any  points  in  the  semi- 
circle from  Genoa  to  Mont  Cenis.  There  has  seldom 
been  a  case  where  the  necessity  and  the  advantages  of  a 
particular  line  of  strategy  have  been  so  obvious ;  yet 
after  crossing  the  Ticino  the  Austrians,  above  a  hundred 
thousand  strong,  stood  as  if  spell-bound  under  their 
incompetent  chief,  Giulay.  Meanwhile  French  detach- 
ments crossed  Mont  Cenis ;  others,  more  numerous, 
landed  with  the  Emperor  at  Genoa,  and  established 
communications  with  the  Piedmontese,  whose  head- 
quarters were  at  Alessandria.  Giulay  now  believed 
that  the  Allies  would  strike  upon  his  communications 
in  the  direction  of  Parma.  The  march  of  Bonaparte 
upon , Piacenza  in  1796,  as  well  as  the  campaign  of 
Marengo,  might  well  inspire  this  fear ;  but  the  real  in- 
tention of  Napoleon  III.  was  to  outflank  the  Austrians 
from  the  north  and  so  to  gain  Milan.  Garibaldi  was 
already  operating  at  the  extreme  left  of  the  Sardinian 
line  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Como.  While  the  Pied- 
montese maintained  their  positions  in  the  front,  the 
French  from  Genoa  marched  northwards  behind  them, 
crossed  the  Po,  and  reached  Vercelli  before  the  Aus- 
trians discovered  their  manoeuvre.  Giulay,  still  linger- 
ing between  the  Sesia  and  the  Ticino,  now  called  up  part 
of  his  forces  northwards,  but  not  in  time  to  prevent  the 


18».  MAGENTA.  281 

Piedmontese  from  crossing  the  Sesia  and  defeating  the 
troops  opposed  to  them  at  Palestro  (May  30).  While 
the  Austrians  were  occupied  at  this  point,  the  French 
crossed  the  river  farther  north,  and  moved  eastwards  on 
the  Ticino.  Giulay  was  thus  outflanked  and  compelled 
to  fall  back.  The  Allies  followed  him,  and  on  the  4th 
of  June  attacked  the  Austrian  army  in  its  positions 
about  Magenta  on  the  road  to  Milan.  The  assault  of 
Macmahon  from  the  north  gave  the  Allies 

Battle  of 

victory  after  a  hard-fought  day.  It  was 
impossible  for  the  Austrians  to  defend  Milan  ;  they 
retired  upon  the  Adda  and  subsequently  upon  the 
Mincio,  abandoning  all  Lombardy  to  the  invaders,  and 
calling  up  their  troops  from  Bologna  and  the  other 
occupied  towns  in  the  Papal  States,  in  order  that  they 
might  take  part  in  the  defence  of  the  Venetian  frontier 
and  the  fortresses  that  guarded  it. 

The  victory  of  the  Allies  was  at  once  felt  through- 
out Central  Italy.  The  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany  had 
already  fled  from  his  dominions,  and  the  Dictatorship 
for  the  period  of  the  war  had  been  offered  by  a  Pro- 
visional Government  to  Victor  Emmanuel,  who,  while 
refusing  this,  had  allowed  his  envoy,  Boncampagni,  to 
assume  temporary  powers  at  Florence  as  his  representa- 
tive. The  Duke  of  Modena  and  the  Duchess  of  Parma 
now  quitted  their  territories.  In  the  Romagna  the 
disappearance  of  the  Austrians  resulted  in 

Movement  in 

the  immediate  overthrow  of  Papal  authority. 
Everywhere  the  demand  was  for  union  with  Piedmont. 
The  calamities  of  the  last  ten  years  had  taught  their 


262  MODERN  EUROPE.  1859. 

lesson  to  the  Italian  people.  There  was  now  nothing 
of  the  disorder,  the  extravagance,  the  childishness  of 
1848.  The  populations  who  had  then  been  so  divided, 
so  suspicious,  so  easy  a  prey  to  demagogues,  were  now 
watchful,  self-controlled,  and  anxious  for  the  guidance 
of  the  only  real  national  Government.  As  at  Florence, 
so  in  the  Duchies  and  in  the  Romagna,  it  was  desired 
that  Victor  Emmanuel  should  assume  the  Dictatorship. 
The  King  adhered  to  the  policy  which  he  had  adopted 
towards  Tuscany,  avoiding  any  engagement  that  might 
compromise  him  with  Europe  or  his  ally,  but  appointing 
Commissioners  to  enrol  troops  for  the  common  war 
against  Austria  and  to  conduct  the  necessary  work  of 
administration  in  these  districts.  Farini,  the  historian  of 
the  Koman  States,  was  sent  to  Modena ;  Azeglio,  the 
ex-Minister,  to  Bologna.  Each  of  these  officers  entered 
on  his  task  in  a  spirit  worthy  of  the  time ;  each  under- 
stood how  much  might  be  won  for  Italy  by  boldness, 
how  much  endangered  or  lost  by  untimely  scruples.* 

In  his  proclamations  at  the  opening  of  the  war 
Napoleon  had  declared  that  Italy  must  be  freed  up  to 
the  shore  of  the  Adriatic.  His  address  to  the  Italian 
people  on  entering  Milan  with  Victor  Emmanuel  after 
the  victory  of  Magenta  breathed  the  same  spirit.  As 
yet,  however,  Lombardy  alone  had  been  won.  The 
advance  of  the  allied  armies  was  accordingly  resumed 
after  an  interval  of  some  days,  and  on  the  23rd  of  June 
they  approached  the  positions  held  by  the  Austrians  a 

•  La  Farina,  Epistolario,  ii.  172.     Parliamentary  Papers,  1859,  xxxii. 
391,  470. 


1859  80LFERINO.  263 

little  to  the  west  of  the  Mincio.  Francis  Joseph  had 
come  from  Vienna  to  take  command  of  the  army.  His 
presence  assisted  the  enemy,  inasmuch  as  he  had  no  plan 
of  his  own,  and  wavered  from  day  to  day  between  the 
antagonistic  plans  of  the  generals  at  headquarters. 
Some  wished  to  make  the  Mincio  the  line 

Battle  of  Sol- 

of  defence,  others  to  hold  the  Chiese  some 
miles  farther  west.  The  consequence  was  that  the 
army  marched  backwards  and  forwards  across  the  space 
between  the  two  rivers  according  as  one  or  another 
general  gained  for  the  moment  the  Emperor's  confi- 
dence. It  was  while  the  Austrians  were  thus  engaged 
that  the  allied  armies  came  into  contact  with  them 
about  Solferino.  On  neither  side  was  it  known  that  the 
whole  force  of  the  enemy  was  close  at  hand.  The  battle 
of  Solferino,  one  of  the  bloodiest  of  recent  times,  was 
fought  almost  by  accident.  About  a  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  men  were  present  under  Napoleon  and  Victor 
Emmanuel ;  the  Austrians  had  a  slight  superiority  in 
force.  On  the  north,  where  Benedek  with  the  Austrian 
right  was  attacked  by  the  Piedmontese  at  San  Martino, 
it  seemed  as  if  the  task  imposed  on  the  Italian  troops 
was  beyond  their  power.  Victor  Emmanuel,  fighting 
with  the  same  courage  as  at  Novara,  saw  the  positions 
in  front  of  his  troops  alternately  won  and  lost.  But 
the  success  of  the  French  at  Solferino  in  the  centre 
decided  the  day,  and  the  Austrians  withdrew  at  last 
from  their  whole  line  with  a  loss  in  killed  and  wounded 
of  fourteen  thousand  men.  On  the  part  of  the  Allies 
the  slaughter  was  scarcely  less. 


264  MODERN  EUROPE.  1859. 

Napoleon   stood   a   conqueror,  but   a   conqueror  at 

terrible  cost;  and  in  front  of  him  he  saw  the  fortresses 

of  the  Quadrilateral,  while  new  divisions  were  hastening 

from  the  north  and  east  to  the  support  of  the    still 

unbroken  Austrian  army.     He  might  well 

Napoleon  and 

doubt  whether,  even  against  his  present 
antagonist  alone,  further  success  was  possible.  The 
fearful  spectacle  of  Solferino,  heightened  by  the  effects 
of  overpowering  summer  heat,  probably  affected  a  mind 
humane  and  sensitive  and  untried  in  the  experience  of 
war.  The  condition  of  the  French  army,  there  is 
reason  to  believe,  was  far  different  from  that  represented 
in  official  reports,  and  likely  to  make  the  continuance  of 
the  campaign  perilous  in  the  extreme.  But  beyond  all 
this,  the  Emperor  knew  that  if  he  advanced  farther 
Prussia  and  all  Germany  might  at  any  moment  take 
up  arms  against  him.  There  had  been  a  strong  out- 
burst of  sympathy  for  Austria  in  the  south-western 
German  States.  National  patriotism  was  excited  by 
the  attack  of  Napoleon  on  the  chief  of  the  German 
sovereigns,  and  the  belief  was  widely  spread  that  French 
conquest  in  Italy  would  soon  be  followed  by  French 
conquest  on  the  Rhine.  Prussia  had  hitherto  shown 
reserve.  It  would  have  joined  its  arms  with  those  of 
Austria  if  its  own  claims  to  an  improved  position  in 
Germany  had  been  granted  by  the  Court  of  Vienna ; 
but  Francis  Joseph  had  up  to  this  time  refused  the 
concessions  demanded.  In  the  stress  of  his  peril  he 
might  at  any  moment  close  with  the  offers  which  he 
had  before  rejected ;  even  without  a  distinct  agree- 


1859.  VILLAFRANCA.  265 

ment  between  the  two  Courts,  and  in  mere  deference  to 
German  public  opinion,  Prussia  might  launch  against 
France  the  armies  which  it  had  already  brought  into 
readiness  for  the  field.  A  war  upon  the  Ehine  would 
then  be  added  to  the  war  before  the  Quadrilateral,  and' 
from  the  risks  of  this  double  effort  Nap'oleon  might  well 
shrink  in  the  interest  of  Prance  not  less  than  of  his, 
own  dynasty.  He  determined  to  seek  an  interview 
with  Francis  Joseph,  and  to  ascertain  on  what  terms 
peace  might  now  be  made.  The  interview  took  place 
at  Villafranca,  east  of  the  Mincio,  on  the 
llth  of  July.  Francis  Joseph  refused  to  vniafranca, 

J  July  11. 

cede  any  part  of  Venetia  without  a  further 
struggle.  He  was  willing  to  give  up  Lombardy,  and 
to  consent  to  the  establishment  of  an  Italian  Federation 
under  the  presidency  of  the  Pope,  of  which  Federation 
Venetia,  still  under  Austria's  rule,  should  be  a  member  ; 
but  he  required  that  Mantua  should  be  left  within  his  own. 
frontier,  and  that  the  sovereigns  of  Tuscany  and  Modena 
should  resume  possession  of  their  dominions.  To  these 
terms  Napoleon  assented,  on  obtaining  a  verbal  agree- 
ment that  the  dispossessed  princes  should  not  be  restored 
by  foreign  arms.  Kegarding  Parma  and  the  restoration 
of  the  Papal  authority  in  the  Romagna  no  stipulations 
were  made.  With  the  signature  of  the 

Peace  of  Villa- 

Preliminaries  of  Villafranca,  which  were  to 
form  the  base  of  a  regular  Treaty  to  be  negotiated  at 
Zurich,    and   to    which    Victor   Emmanuel   added    his 
name  with  words  of  reservation,  hostilities  came  to  a  close. 
The    negotiations    at  Zurich,    though    they   lasted  for 


266  MODERN   EUROPE.  1859. 

several  months,  added  nothing  of  importance  to  the 
matter  of  the  Preliminaries,  and  decided 

Treaty  of 

nothing  that  had  been  left  in  uncertainty.  zarich>  *v- 10> 
The  Italian  Federation  remained  a  scheme  which  the 
two  Emperors,  and  they  alone,  undertook  to  promote. 
Piedmont  entered  into  no  engagement  either  with 
regard  to  the  Duchies  or  with  regard  to  Federation. 
Victor  Emmanuel  had  in  fact  announced  from  the  first 
that  he  would  enter  no  League  of  which  a  province 
governed  by  Austria  formed  a  part,  and  from  this 
resolution  he  never  swerved.* 

Though  Lombardy  was  gained,  the  impression  made 

upon  the  Italians  by  the  Peace  of  Villafranca  was  one 

of  the  utmost  dismay.     Napoleon  had  so  confidently  and 

so  recently  promised  the  liberation   of   all 

Resignation  of  •>      A 

Northern  Italy  that  public  opinion  ascribed 
to  treachery  or  weakness  what  was  in  truth  an  act  of 
political  necessity.  On  the  first  rumour  of  the  nego- 
tiations Cavour  had  hurried  from  Turin,  but  the  agree- 
ment was  signed  before  his  arrival.  The  anger  and 
the  grief  of  Cavour  are  described  by 'those  who  then 
saw  him  as  terrible  to  witness. t  Napoleon  had  not 
the  courage  to  face  him ;  Victor  Emmanuel  bore  for 
two  hours  the  reproaches  of  his  Minister,  who 
had  now  completely  lost  his  self-control.  Cavour  re- 
turned to  Turin,  and  shortly  afterwards  withdrew  from 

*  Cavour,  Lettere  iii.  introd.  212,  iii.  107.  Bianchi,  Politique  de  Cavour, 
p.  349.  Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  viii.  145, 198.  Massari,  Vittorio  Emanuele 
ii.  32.  Kossuth,  Memories,  p.  394.  Parl.  Pap.  1859,  xxxii.  63,  1860,  Ixviii. 
7.  La  Farina  Epist,ii.  190.  Ollivier,  L'figlise  et  1'titet,  ii.  452. 

f  Arrivabene,  Italy  under  Victor  Emmanuel,  i.  268. 


18W. "  CENTRAL  ITALY.  267 

office,  his  last  act  being  the  despatch  of  ten  thousand 
muskets  to  Farini  at  Modena.  In  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  peace,  instructions,  which  were  probably  not 
meant  to  be  obeyed,  were  sent  by  Cavour's  successor, 
Rattazzi,  to  the  Piedmontese  Commissioners  in  Central 
Italy,  bidding  them  to  return  to  Turin  and  to 
disband  any  forces  that  they  had  collected. 
Farini,  on  receipt  of  this  order,  adroitly  divested  him- 
self of  his  Piedmontese  citizenship,  and,  as  an  honorary 
burgher  of  Modena,  accepted  the  Dictatorship  from  his 
fellow-townsmen.  Azeglio  returned  to  Turin,  but  took 
care  before  quitting  the  Romagna  to  place  four  thou- 
sand soldiers  under  competent  leaders  in  a  position  to 
resist  attack.  It  was  not  the  least  of  Cavour's  merits 
that  he  had  gathered  about  him  a  body  of  men  whtf, 
when  his  own  hand  was  for  a  while  withdrawn,  could 
pursue  his  policy  with  so  much  energy  and  sagacity  as 
$kras  now  shown  by  the  leaders  of  the  national  movement 
in  Central  Italy.  Venetia  was  lost  for  the  present ; 
but  if  Napoleon's  promise  was  broken,  districts  which 
he  had  failed  or  had  not  intended  to  liberate  might  be 
united  with  the  Italian  Kingdom.  The  Duke  of  Mo- 
dena, with  six  thousand  men  who  had  remained  true  to 
him,  lay  on  the  Austrian  frontier,  and  threatened  to 
inarch  upon  his  capital.  Farini  mined  the  city  gates, 
and  armed  so  considerable  a  force  that  it  became  clear 
that  the  Duke  would  not  recover  his  dominions  without 
a  serious  battle.  Parma  placed  itself  under  the  same 
Dictatorship  with  Modena;  in  the  Romagna  a  Pro- 
visional Government  which  Azeglio  had  left  behind 


Cavour's  Plans 


franca. 


268  MODERN  EUROPE.  1859. 

him  continued  his  work.  Tuscany,  where  Napoleon 
had  hoped  to  find  a  throne  for  his  cousin,  pronounced 
for  national  union,  and  organised  a  common  military 
force  with  its  neighbours.  During  the  weeks  that 
followed  the  Peace  of  Villafranca,  declarations  signed  by 
tens  of  thousands,  the  votes  of  representative  bodies, 
and  popular  demonstrations  throughout  Central  Italy, 
showed  in  an  orderly  and  peaceful  form  how  universal 
was  the  desire  for  union  under  the  House  of  Savoy. 

Cavour,  in  the  plans  which  he  had  made  before 
1859,  had  not  looked  for  a  direct  and  immediate  result 
beyond  the  creation  of  an  Italian  Kingdom 
including  the  whole  of  the  territory  north 
of  the  Po.  The  other  steps  in  the  con- 
solidation of  Italy  would,  he  believed,  follow  in 
their  order.  They  might  be  close  at  hand,  or  they 
might  be  delayed  for  a  while ;  but  in  the  expulsion  of 
Austria,  in  'the  interposition  of  a  purely  Italian  State 
numbering  above  ten  millions  of  inhabitants,  mistress 
of  the  fortresses  and  of  a  powerful  fleet,  between  Aus- 
tria and  those  who  had  been  its  vassals,  the  essential 
conditions  of  Italian  national  independence  would 
have  been  won.  For  the  rest,  Italy  might  be  content 
to  wait  upon  time  and  opportunity.  But  the  Peace  of 
Villafranca,  leaving  Venetia  in  the  enemy's  hands, 
completely  changed  this  prospect.  The  fiction  of  an 
Italian  Federation  in  which  the  Hapsburg  Emperor,  as 
lord  of  Venice,  should  forget  his  Austrian  interests  and 
play  the  part  of  Italian  patriot,  was  too  gross  to 
deceive  any  one.  Italy,  on  these  terms,  would  either 


1859.  CENTRAL   ITALY.  2C9 

continue  to  be  governed  from\Vienna,  or  be  made  a 
pawn  in  the  hands  of  its  French\protector.  What 
therefore  Cavour  had  hitherto  been  willing  to  leave  to 
future  years  now  became  the  need  of  the  present. 
"  Before  Villafranca,"  in  his  own  words,  "  the  union  pf 
Italy  was  a  possibility;  since  Villafranca  it  is  a  neces- 
sity." Victor  Emmanuel  understood  this 

*  Central  Italy 

too,  and  saw  the  need  for  action  more  SSiJjS^- 
clearly  than  Rattazzi  and  the  Ministers  who, 
on  Cavour's  withdrawal  in  July,  stepped  for  a  few 
mouths  into  his  place.  The  situation  was  one  that 
called  indeed  for  no  mean  exercise  of  statesmanship.  If 
Italy  was  not  to  be  left  dependent  upon  the  foreigner 
and  the  reputation  of  the  House  of  Savoy  ruined,  it 
was  necessary  not  only  that  the  Duchies  of  Modena  and 
Parma,  but  that  Central  Italy,  including  Tuscany  and 
at  least  the  Romagna,  should  be  united  with  the  Kingdom 
cf  Piedmont ;  yet  the  accomplishment  of  this  work 
was  attended  with  the  utmost  danger.  Napoleon  him- 
self was  hoping  to  form  Tuscany,  with  an  augmented 
territory,  into  a  rival  Kingdom  of  Etruria  or  Central 
Italy,  and  to  place  his  cousin  on  its  throne.  The 
Ultramontane  party  in  France  was  alarmed  and  indig- 
nant at  the  overthrow  of  the  Pope's  authority  in  the 
Romagna,  and  already  called  upon  the  Emperor  to 
fulfil  his  duties  towards  the  Holy  See.  If  the  national 
movement  should  extend  to  Rome  itself,  the  hostile 
intervention  of  France  was  almost  inevitable.  While 
the  negotiations  with  Austria  at  Zurich  were  still  pro- 
ceeding, Victor  Emmanuel  could  not  safely  accept  the 


270  MODERN  EUROPE.  1859. 

sovereignty  that  was  offered  him  by  Tuscany  and  the 
neighbouring  provinces,  nor  permit  his  cousin,  the 
Prince  of  Carignano,  to  assume  the  regency  which, 
during  the  period  of  suspense,  it  was  proposed  to 
confer  upon  him.  Above  all  it  was  necessary  that  the 
Government  should  not  allow  the  popular  forces  with 
which  it  was  co-operating  to  pass  beyond  its  own  con- 
trol. In  the  critical  period  that  followed  the  armistice 
of  Villafranca,  Mazzini  approached  Yictor  Emmanuel, 
as  thirty  years  before  he  had  approached 

Mazzini  and 

-'       his  fathw—  and  offered  his  own  assistance 


in  the  establishmeirtHSi|Italian  union  under 
the  House  of  Savoy.  He  proposed,  as  the  first  step, 
to  overthrow  the  Neapolitan  Government  by  means  of 
an  expedition  headed  by  Garibaldi,  atid  to  unite  Sicily 
and  Naples  to  the  King's  dominions  ;  but  he  demanded 
in  return  that  Piedmont  should  oppose  armed  resistance 
to  any  foreign  intervention  occasioned  by  this  enter- 
prise ;  and  he  seems  also  to  have  required  that  an 
attack  should  be  made  immediately  afterwards  upon 
Rome  and  upon  Venetia.  To  these  conditions  the 
King  could  not  accede  ;  and  Mazzini,  confirmed  in  his 
attitude  of  distrust  towards  the  Court  of  Turin,  turned 
to  Garibaldi,  who  was  now  at  Modena.  At  his  instiga- 
tion Garibaldi  resolved  to  lead  an  expedition  at  once 
against  Borne  itself.  Napoleon  was  at  this  very 
moment  promising  reforms  on  behalf  of  the  Pope, 
and  warning  Victor  Emmanuel  against  the  annexa- 
tion even  of  the  Eomagna  (Oct.  20th).  At  the  risk 
of  incurring  the  hostility  of  Garibaldi's  followers 


1859.  THE   PROPOSED    CONGRESS.  271 

and  throwing  their  leader  into  opposition  to  the 
dynasty,  it  was  necessary  for  the  Sardinian  Government 
to  check  him  in  his  course.  The  moment  was  a  critical 
one  in  the  history  of  the  House  of  Savoy.  But  the 
soldier  of  Republican  Italy  proved  more  tractable  than 
its  prophet.  Garibaldi  was  persuaded  to  abandon  or  post- 
pone an  enterprise  which  could  only  have  resulted  in 
disaster  for  Italy;  and  with  expressions  of  cordiality 
towards  the  King  himself,  and  of  bitter  contempt  for  the 
fox-like  politicians  who  advised  him,  he  resigned  his  com- 
mand and  bade  farewell  to  his  comrades,  recommending 
them,  however,  to  remain  under  arms,  in  full  confidence 
that  they  would  ere  long  find  a  better  opportunity,  for 
carrying  the  national  flag  southwards.* 

Soon  after  the  Agreement  of  Villafranca,  Napoleon 
had  proposed  to  the  British  Government  that  a  Con- 
gress of  all  the  Powers  should  assemble  at  Paris  in 
ovder  to  decide  upon  the  many  Italian  questions  which 
still  remained  unsettled.  '  In  taking  upon  himself  the 
emancipation  of  Northern  Italy  Napoleon  had,  as  it 
proved,  attempted  a  task  far  beyond  his  own  powers. 
The  work  had  been  abruptly  broken  off;  the  promised 
services  had  not  been  rendered,  the  stipulated  reward 
had  not  been  won.  On  the  other  hand, 

The  proposed 

forces  had  been  set  in  motion  which  he  who 
raised  them  could  not  allay  ;  populations  stpod  in  arms 
against   the   Governments   which    the    Agreement    of 
Villafrauca  purported  to  restore;  the  Pope's  authority 

*  Cavour,  Lettere,  iii.   introd.  301.     Bianchi,  viii.   180.     Garibaldi, 
Epist.,  i.  79.     Guerzoni,  i.  491.     Reuchlin,  iv.  410. 


272  MODERN  EUROPE.  1859. 

in  the  northern  part  of  his  dominions  was  at  an  end ; 
the  Italian  League  over  which  France  and  Austria  were 
to  join  hands  of  benediction  remained  the  laughing- 
stock of  Europe.  Napoleon's  victories  had  added  Lorn- 
hardy  to  Piedmont ;  for  the  rest,  except  from  the 
Italian  point  of  view,  they  had  only  thrown  affairs 
into  confusion.  Hesitating  at  the  first  between 
his  obligations  towards  Austria  and  the  maintenance 
of  his  prestige  in  Italy,  perplexed  between  the  con- 
tradictory claims  of  nationality  and  of  Ultramon- 
tanism,  Napoleon  would  gladly  have  cast  upon  Great 
Britain,  or  upon  Europe  at  large,  the  task  of  extricating 
him  from  his  embarrassment.  But  the  Cabinet  of 
London,  while  favourable  to  Italy,  showed  little  inclina- 
tion to  entangle  itself  in  engagements  which  might  lead 
to  war  with  Austria  and  Germany  in  the  interest  of 
the  French  Sovereign.  Italian  affairs,  it  was  urged  by 
Lord  John  Russell,  might  well  be  governed  by  the 
course  of  events  within  Italy  itself;  and,  as  Austria 
remained  inactive,  the  principle  of  non-intervention 
really  gained  the  day.  The  firm  attitude  of  the  popu- 
lation both  in  the  Duchies  and  in  the  Romagna, 
their  unanimity  and  self-control,  the  absence  of  those 
disorders  which  had  so  often  been  made  a  pretext  for 
foreign  intervention,  told  'upon  the  mind  of  Napoleon 
and  on  the  opinion  of  Europe  at  large.  Each  month 
that  passed  rendered  the  restoration  of  the  fallen 
Governments  a  work  of  greater  difficulty,  and  increased 
the  confidence  of  the  Italians  in  themselves.  Napoleon 
watched  and  wavered.  When  the  Treaty  of  Zurich  was 


1859.  THE  POPE  AND   THE  CONGRESS.  273 

signed  his  policy  was  still  undetermined.  By  the 
prompt  and  liberal  concession  of  reforms  the  Papal 
Government  might  perhaps  even  now  have  turned  the 
balance  in  its  favour.  But  the  obstinate  mind  of 
Pius  IX.  was  proof  against  every  politic  And  every  gene- 
rous influence.  The  stubbornness  shown  by  Rome,  the 
remembrance  of  Antonelli's  conduct  towards  the  French 
Republic  in  1849^  possibly  also  the  discovery  of  a 
Treaty  of  Alliandf  between  the  Papal  Government  and 
Austria,  at  length  overcame  Napoleon's  hesitation  in 
meeting  the  national  demand  of  Italy,  and  gave  him 
courage  to  defy  both  the  Papal  Court  and  the  French 
priesthood.  He  resolved  to  consent  to  the  formation 
of  an  Italian  Kingdom  under  Victor  Emmanuel  in- 
cluding the  northern  part  of  the  Papal  territories  as 
well  as  Tuscany  and  the  other  Duchies,  and  to  silence 
the  outcry  which  this  act  of  spoliation  would  excite 
aViong  the  clerical  party  in  France  by  the  annexation  ^ 
of  Nice  and  Savoy. 

The    decision    of   the    Emperor    was   foreshadowed 
by    the    publication    on    the    24th    of    December    of 
a    pamphlet     entitled     "  The     Pope     and 
the    Congress."      The    doctrine    advanced     the  congr**,- 

Dec.  fe». 

in  this  essay  was  that,  although  a  cer- 
tain temporal  authority  was  necessary  to  the  Pope's 
spiritual  independence,  the  peace  and  unity  which 
should  surround  the  Vicar  of  Christ  would  be  best 
attained  when  his  temporal  sovereignty  was  reduced 
within  the  narrowest  possible  limits.  Rome  and  the 
territory  immediately  around  it,  if  guaranteed  to  the  Pope 


274  MODERN  EUROPE.  i860. 

by  the  Great  Powers,  would  be  sufficient  for  the  temporal 
needs  of  the  Holy  See.  The  revenue  lost  by  the  separa- 
tion of  the  remainder  of  the  Papal  territories  might  be 
replaced  by  a  yearly  tribute  of  reverence  paid  by  the 
Catholic  Powers  to  the  Head  of  the  Church.  That  the 
pamphlet  advocating  this  policy  was  written  at  the  dic- 
tation of  Napoleon  was  not  made  a  secret.  Its  appear- 
ance occasioned  an  indignant  protest  at  Rome.  The 
Pope  announced  that  he  would  take  no  part  in  the 
proposed  Congress  unless  the  doctrines  advanced  in 
the  pamphlet  were  disavowed  by  the  French  Govern- 
ment. Napoleon  in  reply  submitted  to  the  Pope  that 
he  would  do  well  to  purchase  the  guarantee  of  the 
Powers  for  the  remainder  of  his  territories  by  giving  up 
all  claim  to  the  Romagna,  which  he  had  already  lost. 
Pius  retorted  that  he  could  not  cede  what  Heaven  had 
granted,  not  to  himself,  but  to  the  Church;  and  that 
if  the  Powers  would  but  clear  the  Romagna  of  Pied- 
montese  intruders  he  would  soon  reconquer  the  rebellious 
province  without  the  assistance  either  of  France  or  of 
Austria.  The  attitude  assumed  by  the  Papal  Court 
gave  Napoleon  a  good  pretext  for  abandoning  the  plan 
of  a  European  Congress,  from  which  he  could  hardly 
expect  to  obtain  a  grant  of  Nice  and  Savoy. 
try  at  Pans,  '  It  was  announced  at  Paris  that  the  Con- 

Jan.  5,  1860. 

gress  would  be  postponed ;  and  on  the  5th 
of  January,  1860,  the  change  in  Napoleon's  policy  was 
cavour  res™  publicly  marked  by  the  dismissal  of  his 

Foreign  Minister,  Walewski,  and  the  ap- 
pointment in  his  place  of  Thouvenel,  a  friend  to  Italian 


jsso.  CAVOUR  AND  NAPOLEON.  275 

union.     Ten  days  later  Rattazzi  gave  up  office  at  Turin, 
and  Cavour  returned  to  power. 

Rattazzi,  during  the  six  months  that  he  had  con- 
ducted affairs,  had  steered  safely  past  some  dangerous 
rocks;  but  he  held  the  helm  with  am  unsteady  and 
untrusted  hand,  and  he  appears  to  have  displayed  an 
unworthy  jealousy  towards  Cavour,  who,  while  out  of 
office,  had  not  ceased  to  render  what  services  he  could  to 
his  country.  Cavour  resumed  his  post,  with  the  resolve 
to  defer  no  longer  the  annexation  of  Central  Italy,  but 
with  the  heavy  consciousness  that  Napoleon  would 
demand  in  return  for  his  consent  to  this 
union  the  cession  of  Nice  and  Savoy.  No  Na^>iL^n 

"  Jan. — March. 

Treaty  entitled  France  to  claim  this  reward, 
for  the  Austrians  still  held  Venetia;  but  Napoleon's 
troops  lay  at  Milan,  and  by  a  march  southwards  they 
could  easily  throw  Italian  affairs  again  into  confusion, 
and  undo  all  that  the  last  six  months  had  effected. 
Cavour  would  perhaps  have  lent  himself  to  any 
European  combination  which,  while  directed  against 
the  extension  of  France,  would  have  secured  the  ex- 
istence of  the  Italian  Kingdom ;  but  no  such  alterna- 
tive to  the  French  alliance  proved  possible ;  and  the 
subsequent  negotiations  between  Paris  and  Turin  were 
intended  only  to  vest  with  a  certain  diplomatic  pro- 
priety the  now  inevitable  transfer  of  territory  from 
the  weaker  to  the  stronger  State.  A  series  of  propo- 
sitions made  from  London  with  the  view  of  with- 
drawing from  Italy  both  French  and  Austrian  influence 
led  the  Austrian  Court  to  acknowledge  that  its  army 
*  2 


276  MODEEN  EUROPE.  IMP. 

would  not  be  employed  for  the  restoration  of  the 
^overeigns  of  Tuscany  and  Modena.  Construing  this 
statement  as  an  admission  that  the  stipulations  of 
Villafranca  and  Zurich  as  to  the  return  of  the  fugi- 
tive princes  had  become  impracticable,  Napoleon 
now  suggested  that  Victor  Emmanuel  should  annex 
Parma  and  Modena,  and  assume  secular  power  in  the 
Komagna  as  Vicar  of  the  Pope,  leaving  Tuscany  to 
form  a  separate  Government.  The  establishment  of  so 
powerful  a  kingdom  on  the  confines  of  France  was.  he 
added,  not  in  accordance  with  the  traditions  of  French 
foreign  policy,  and  in  self-defence  France  must  rectify 
its  military  frontier  by  the  acquisition  of  Nice  and 
Savoy  (Feb.  24th).  Cavour  well  understood  that  the 
mention  of  Tuscan  independence,  and  the  qualified 
recognition  of  the  Pope's  rights  in  the  Bomagna,  were 
no  more  than  suggestions  of  the  means  of  pressure  by 
which  France  might  enforce  the  cessions  it  required. 
He  answered  that,  although  Victor  Emmanuel  could 
not  alienate  any  part  of  his  dominions,  his  Govern- 
ment recognised  the  same  popular  fights  in  Savoy  and 
Nice  as  in  Central  Italy  ;  and  accordingly  that  if  the 
population  of  these  districts  declared  in  a  legal  form 
their  desire  to  be  incorporated  with  France,  the  King 
would  not  resist  their  will.  Having  thus  consented  to 
the  necessary  sacrifice,  #nd  ignoring  Napoleon's  reserva- 
tions with  regard  to  Tuscany  and  the  Pope,  Cavour  gave 
orders  that  a  popular  vote  should  at  once  be  taken  in 
Tuscany,  as  well  as  in  Parma,  Modena,  and  the  Romagna, 
on  the  question  of  union  with  Piedmont.  The  voting 


1860.        UNION  OF  CENTRAL  ITALY  WITH  PIEDMONT.       277 

took  place  early  in  March,  and  gave  an  overwhelming 
majority   in   favour  of  union.     The    Pope     union  of  the 

•  j      ,  i  .  .        .  .  .  Duchies  and  th 

issued  the  maior  excommunication  against     Romans  with 

Piedmont. 

the  authors,  abettors,  and   agents   in  this     March- 
work  of  sacrilege,  and  heaped  curses  on  9 curses ;( but,  no 
one  seemed   the   worse  for  them!)    Victor   Emmanuel 
accepted  the  sovereignty  that  was  offered  to  him,  and 
•n    the    2nd  of  April  the    Parliament   of   the  united 
kingdom    assembled   at  Turin.      It  had  already  been 
announced  to  the  inhabitants  of  Nice  and  Savoy  that 
the    King  had  consented  to  their  union  with  France. 
The  formality  of  a  plebiscite  was  enacted  a  few  days 
later,  and  under  the  combined  pressure  of    gavo  andNice 
the    French    and    Sardinian   Governments 
the  desired  results  were  obtained.      Not  more  than  a 
few  hundred   persons   protested  by  their  vote  against 
a  transaction  to  which  it  was  understood  that  the  King 
had  no  choice  but  to  submit.* 

That  Victor  Emmanuel  had  at  one  time  been  dis- 
posed  to   resist  Cavour's    surrender   of    the    home    of 
his  race  is  well  known.     Above  a  year,  however,  had 
passed  since  the  project  had  been  accepted 
as  the  basis  of  the  French  alliance  :  and  if,     cession  of  Nice 

and  Savoy. 

during  the  interval  of  suspense  after  Villa- 
franca,  the  King  had  cherished  a  hope  that  the  sacrifice 
might  be  avoided  without  prejudice  either  to  the  cause 
of  Italy  or  to  his  own  relations  with  Napoleon,  Cavour 

*  Cavour,  Lettore,  iv.  introd.  20.  Bianchi,  Politique,  p.  354. 
Bianchi,  Diplomazia,  viii.  256.  Parliamentary  Papers,  1860,  Ixvii.  203 ; 
Ixviii.  53. 


278  MODERN  EUROPE.  i860. 

had  entertained  no  such  illusions.     He  knew  that  the 
cession  was  an  indispensable  link  in  the  chain  of  his 
own  policy,  that  policy  which  had  made  it  possible  to 
defeat  Austria,  and  which,  he  believed,  would  lead  to 
the  further  consolidation  of  Italy.     Looking  to  Eome, 
to  Palermo,  where  the  smouldering  fire  might  at  any 
moment  blaze  out,  he  could  not  yet  dispense  with  the 
friendship  of  Napoleon,  he  could  not  provoke  the  one 
man  powerful  enough  to  shape  the  action  of  France  in 
defiance  of  Clerical  and  of  Legitimist  aims.     Eattazzi 
might  claim  credit  for  having  brought  Piedmont  past 
the  Treaty  of  Zurich  without  loss  of  territory  ;  Cavour, 
in  a  far  finer  spirit,  took  upon  himself  the  responsibility 
for  the  sacrifice  made  to  France,  and  bade  the  Parlia- 
ment  of    Italy   pass    judgment   upon   his    act.      The 
cession  of  the  border-provinces  overshadowed  what  would 
otherwise   have   been   the   brightest   scene   in    Italian 
history  for  many  generations,  the  meeting  of  the  first 
North- Italian  Parliament  at  Turin.     Garibaldi,  coming 
as  deputy  from  his  birthplace,  Nice,  uttered  words  of 
scorn  and  injustice  against  the  man  who  had  made  him 
an  alien  in  Italy,  and  quitted  the  Chamber.     Bitterly 
as  Cavour  felt,  both  now  and  down  to  the  end  of  his 
life,  the  reproaches  that  were  levelled  against  him,  he 
allowed  no  trace  of  wounded  feeling,  of  impatience,  of 
the  sense  of  wrong,  to  escape  him  in  the  masterly  speech 
in  which  he  justified  his  policy  and  won  for  it  the  rati- 
fication of  the  Parliament.   It  was  not  until  a  year  later, 
when  the  hand  of  death  was  almost  upon  him,  that 
fierce  words  addressed  to  him  face  to  face  by  Garibaldi 


i960.  CAVOUll  AND  GARIBALDI.  279 

wrung  from  him  the  impressive  answer,  "  The  act  that 
has  made  this  gulf  between  us  was  the  most  painful  duty 
of  my  life.  By  what  I  have  felt  myself  I  know  what 
Garibaldi  must  have  felt.  If  he  refuses  me  his  forgive- 
ness I  cannot  reproach  him  for  it."  * 

The  annexation  of  Nice  and  Savoy  by  Napoleon 
was  seen  with  extreme  displeasure  in  Europe  generally, 
and  most  of  all  in  England.  It  directly 

*         The  cession  in 

affected  the  history  of  Britain  by  the  ££££* 
stimulus  which  it  gave  to  the  development 
of  the  Volunteer  Forces.  Owing  their  origin  to  certain 
demonstrations  of  hostility  towards  England  made  by 
the  French  army  after  Orsini's  conspiracy  and  the 
acquittal  of  one  of  his  confederates  in  London,  the  Volun- 
teer Forces  rose  in  the  three  months  that  followed  the 
annexation  of  Nice  and  Savoy  from  seventy  to  a  hundred 
and  eighty  thousand  men.  If  viewed  as  an  indication 
that  the  ruler  of  France  would  not  b3  content  with  the 
frontiers  of  1815,  the  acquisition  of  the  Sub-Alpine 
provinces  might  with  some  reason  excite  alarm  ;  on  no 
other  ground  could  their  transfer  be  justly  condemned. 
Geographical  position,  language,  commercial  interests, 
separated  Savoy  from  Piedmont  and  connected  it  with 
France ;  and  though  in  certain  parts  of  the  County  of 
Nice  the  Italian  character  predominated,  this  district  as 
a  whole  bore  the  stamp  not  of  Piedmont  or  Liguria 
but  of  Provence.  Since  the  separation  from  France  in 
1815  there  had  always  been,  both  in  Nice  and  Savoy,  a 
considerable  party  which  desired  reunion  with  that 

*  Cavour  iii  Parlainento,  p.  556. 


280  MODERN  EUROPE.     r~  i860. 

country.  The  political  and  social  order  of  the  Sardinian 
Kingdom  had  from  1815  to  1848  been  so  backward,  so  re- 
actionary, that  the  middle  classes  in  the  border-provinces 
looked  wistfully  to  France  as  a  land  where  their  own 
grievances  had  been  removed  and  their  own  ideals  at- 
tained. The  constitutional  system  of  Victor  Emmanuel, 
and  the  despotic  system  of  Louis  Napoleon  had  both  been 
too  recently  introduced  to  reverse  in  the  minds  of  the 
greater  number  the  political  tradition  of  the  preceding 
thirty  years.  Thus  if  there  were  a  few  who,  like  Gari- 
baldi, himself  of  Genoese  descent  though  born  at  Nice, 
passionately  resented  separation  from  Italy,  they  found 
no  considerable  party  either  in  Nice  or  in  Savoy  animated 
by  the  same  feeling.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ecclesias-> 
tical  sentiment  of  Savoy  rendered  its  transfer  to  France^ 
an  actual  advantage  to  the  Italian  State.  The  Papacy 
had  here  a  deeply-rooted  influence.  The  reforms  be- 
gun by  Azeglio's  Ministry  had  been  steadily  resisted 
by  a  Savoyard  group  of  deputies  in  the  interests 
of  Rome.  Cavour  himself,  in  the  prosecution  of  his 
larger  plans,  had  always  been  exposed  to  the  danger  of 
a  coalition  between  this  ultra-Conservative  party  and 
his  opponents  of  the  other  extreme.  It  was  well  that 
in  the  conflict  with  the  Papacy,  without  which  there 
could  be  no  such  thing  as  a  Kingdom  of  United  Italy, 
these  influences  of  the  Savoyard  Church  and  Noblesse 
should  be  removed  from  the  Parliament  and  the  Throne. 
Honourable  as  the  Savoyard  party  of  resistance  had 
proved  themselves  in  Parliamentary  life,  loyal  and 
faithful  as  they  were  to  their  sovereign,  they  were  yet 


i860.  NAPLES.  281 

not  a  part  of  the  Italian  nation.  Their  interests  were 
not  bound  up  with  the  cause  of  Italian  union ;  their 
leaders  were  not  inspired  with  the  ideal  of  Italian 
national  life.  The  forces  that  threatened  the  future  of 
the  new  State  from  within  were  too  .powerful  for  the 
surrender  of  a  priest-governed  and  half -foreign  element 
to  be  considered  as  a  real  loss. 

Nice  and  Savoy  had  hardly  been  handed  over  to 
Napoleon  when  Garibaldi  set  out  from  Genoa  to  effect 
the  liberation  of  Sicily  and  Naples.  King 
Ferdinand  II.,  known  to  his  subjects  and 
to  Western  Europe  as  King  Bomba,  had  died  a  few 
days  before  the  battle  of  Magenta,  leaving  the 
throne  to  his  son  Francis  II.  In  consequen.ce  of  the 
friendship  shown  by  Ferdinand  to  Russia  during  the 
Crimean  War,  and  of  his  refusal  to  amend  his  tyran- 
nical system  of  government,  the  Western  Powers 
.had  in  1856  withdrawn  their  representatives  from 
Naples.  On  the  accession  of  Francis  II.  diplo- 
matic intercourse  was  renewed,  and  Cavour,  who  had 
been  at  bitter  enmity  with  Ferdinand,  sought  to  es- 
tablish relations  of  friendship  with  his  son.  In  the 
war  against  Austria  an  alliance  with  Naples  would 
have  been  of  value  to  Sardinia  as  a  counterpoise  to 
Napoleon's  influence,  and  this  alliance  Cavour  attempted 
to  obtain.  He  was,  however,  unsuccessful ;  and  after 
the  Peace  of  Villafranca  the  Neapolitan  Court  threw 
itself  with  ardour  into  schemes  for  the  restoration  of 
the  fallen  Governments  and  the  overthrow  of  Pied- 
montese  authority  in  the  Romagna  by  means  of  a 


282  MODERN  EUROPE.  i960. 

coalition  with  Austria  and  Spain  and  a  counter-re- 
volutionary movement  in  Italy  itself.  A  rising  on 
behalf  of  the  fugitive  Grand  Duke  of  Tuscany  was  to  give 
the  signal  for  the  march  of  the  Neapolitan  army  north- 
wards. This  rising,  however,  was  expected  in  vain, 
and  the  great  Catholic  design  resulted  in  nothing. 
Baffled  in  its  larger  aims,  the  Bourbon  Government 
proposed  in  the  spring  of  18 GO  to  occupy  Umbria  and 
the  Marches,  in  order  to  prevent  the  revolutionary 
movement  from  spreading  farther  into  the  Papal  States. 
Against  this  Cavour  protested,  and  King  Francis 
yielded  to  his  threat  to  withdraw  the  Sardinian  am- 
bassador from  Naples.  Knowing  that  a  conspiracy 
existed  for  the  restoration  of  the  House  of  Murat  to 
the  Neapolitan  throne,  which  would  have  given  France 
the  ascendency  in  Southern  Italy,  Cavour  now  renewed 
his  demand  that  Francis  II.  should  enter  into  alliance 
with  Piedmont,  accepting  a  constitutional  system  of 
government  and  the  national  Italian  policy  of  Victor 
Emmanuel.  But  neither  the  summons  from  Turin,  nor 
the  agitation  of  the  Muratists,  nor  the  warnings  of 
Great  Britain  that  the  Bourbon  dynasty  could  only 
avert  its  fall  by  reform,  produced  any  real  change  in 
the  spirit  of  the  Neapolitan  Court.  Ministers  were 
removed,  but  the  absolutist  and  anti-national  system 
remained  the  same.  Meanwhile  Garibaldi  was  gather- 
ing his  followers  round  him  in  Genoa.  On  the  15th  of 
April  Victor  Emmanuel  wrote  to  King  Francis  that  un- 
less his  fatal  system  of  policy  was  immediately  abandoned 
the  Piedmontese  Government  itself  might  shortly  be 


1860.  SICILY.  283 

•  • 

forced  to  become  the  agent  of  his  destruction.  Even 
this  menace  proved  fruitless ;  and  after  thus  fairly 
exposing  to  the  Court  of  Naples  the  consequence  of  its 
own  stubbornness,  Victor  Emmanuel  let  loose  against  it 
the  revolutionary  forces  of  Garibaldi,  f"  *- 

Since   the  campaign  of  1859  msurrectid^^y  com- 
mittees had  been  active  in  the  principal  Sicilian  towns. 
The  old  desire  of  the  Sicilian  Liberals  for  the 
independence  of  the  island  had  given  place, 
under  the  influence  of  the  events  of  the  past  year,  to  the 
desire  for  Italian  union.     On  the  abandonment  of  Gari- 
baldi's plan  for  the  march  on  Borne  in  November,  1859, 
the  liberation  of  Sicily  had  been  suggested  to  him  as  a 
more  feasible  enterprise,  and  the  general  himself  wavered 
in  the  spring  of  1860  between  the  resumption  of  hi& 
Roman  project   and  an  attack  upon  the  Bourbons  of 
Naples  from  the  south.     The  rumour  spread  through 
Sicily  that  Garibaldi  would  soon  appear  there  at  the  head 
of  his  followers.     On  the  3rd  of  April  an  attempt  at  in- 
surrection was  made  at  Palermo.  It  was  repressed  without 
difficulty ;  and  although  disturbances  broke  out  in  other 
parts  of  the  island,  the  reports  which  reached  Garibaldi 
at  Genoa  as  to  the  spirit  and  prospects  of  the  Sicilians 
were  so  disheartening  that  for  a  while  he  seemed  dis- 
posed to  abandon  the  project  of  invasion  as  hopeless  for 
the  present.     It  was  only  when  some  of  the  Sicilian 
exiles    declared    that   they  would  risk  the     Garibaldi  8tarts 
enterprise  without  him  that  he  resolved  upon 
immediate  action.    On  the  night  of  the  5th  of  May  two 
steamships  lying  in  the  harbour  of  Genoa  were  seized, 


284  MODERN  EUROPE.  mo. 

and  on  these  Garibaldi  with  his  Thousand  put  to  sea. 
Cavour,  though  he  would  have  preferred  that  Sicily 
should  remain  unmolested  until  some  progress  had  been 
made  in  the  consolidation  of  the  North  Italian  King- 
dom, did  not  venture  to  restrain  Garibaldi's  movements, 
with  which  he  was  well  acquainted.  He  required, 
however,  that  the  expedition  should  not  touch  at  the 
island  of  Sardinia,  and  gave  ostensible  orders  to  his 
admiral,  Persano,  to  seize  the  ships  of  Garibaldi  if 
they  should  put  into  any  Sardinian  port.  Garibaldi, 
who  had  sheltered  the  Sardinian  Government  from 
responsibility  at  the  outset  by  the  fiction  of  a  sudden 
capture  of  the  two  merchant-ships,  continued  to  spare 
Victor  Emmanuel  unnecessary  difficulties  by  avoiding 
the  fleet  which  was  supposed  to  be  en  the  watch  for 
him  off  Cagliari  in  Sardinia,  and  only  interrupted  his 
voyage  by  a  landing  at  a  desolate  spot  on  the  Tuscan 
coast  in  order  to  take  up  artillery  and  ammunition 
which  were  waiting  for  him  there.  On  the  llth  of 
May,  having  heard  from  some  English  merchantmen 
that  there  were  no  Neapolitan  vessels  of  war  at  Marsala, 
he  made  for  this  harbour.  The  first  of  his  two  ships 
Ganbaidi  at  entered  it  in  safety  and  disembarked  her 
crew;  the  second,  running  on  a  rock,  lay 
for  some  time  within  range  of  the  guns  of  a  Neapolitan 
war-steamer  which  was  bearing  up  towards  the  port. 
But  for  some  unknown  reason  the  Neapolitan  commander 
delayed  opening  fire,  and  the  landing  of  Garibaldi's  fol- 
lowers was  during  this  interval  completed  without  loss.* 

*  Garibaldi,  Ep'st.  i.  97.     Persauo,  Diario,  i.  14.     Le  Farina,  Epist., 


I8co.  GARIBALDI  IX  SICILY.  235 

On  the  following  day  the  little  army,  attired  in  the 
red  shirts  which  are  worn  by  cattle-ranchers  in  South 
America,  marched  eastwards  from  Marsala.  Bands  of 
villagers  joined  them  as  they  moved  through  the 
country,  and  many  unexpected  adherents  were  gained 
among  the  priests.  On  the  third  day's  march  Neapoli- 
tan troops  were  seen  in  position  at  Calatafimi.  They 
were  attacked  by  Garibaldi,  and,  though  far  superior  in 
number,  were  put  to  the  rout.  The  moral  effects  of 
this  first  victory  were  very  great.  The  Neapolitan 
commander  retired  into  Palermo,  leaving  Garibaldi 
master  of  the  western  portion  of  the  island.  Insur- 
rection spread  towards  the  interior;  the  revolutionary 
party  at  Palermo  itself  regained  its  courage  and  pre- 
pared to  co-operate  with  Garibaldi  on  his  approach. 
On  nearing  the  city  Garibaldi  determined  that  he  could 
not  risk  a  direct  assault  upon  the  forces 
•which  occupied  it.  He  resolved,  if  possible,  tun»  Palermo, 
to  lure  part  of  the  defenders  into  the  moun- 
tains, and  during  their  absence  to  throw  himself  into 
the  city  and  to  trust  to  the  energy  of  its  inhabitants 
to  maintain  himself  there.  This  strategy  succeeded. 
While  the  officer  in  command  of  some  of  the  Neapoli- 
tan battalions,  tempted  by  an  easy  victory  over  the 
ill-disciplined  Sicilian  bands  opposed  to  him,  pursued 
his  beaten  enemy  into  the  mountains,  Garibaldi  with 
the  best  of  his  troops  fought  his  way  into  Palermo  on 
the  night  of  May  2Gth.  Fighting  continued  in  the 

ii.  324.     Guerzoni,  ii.  23.     Parliamentary  Papers,  I860,  Ixviii.  2.     Mundy, 
H.M.S.  Hannibal  at  Palermo,  p.  133. 


286  MODERN  EUROPE.  i860. 

streets  during  the  next  two  days,  and  the  cannon  of 
the  forts  and  of  the  Neapolitan  vessels  in  harbour 
ineffectually  bombarded  the  city.  On  the  30th,  at  the 
moment  when  the  absent  battalions  were  coming  again 
into  sight,  an  armistice  was  signed  on  board  the  British 
man-of-war  Hannibal.  The  Neapolitan  commander 
gave  up  to  Garibaldi  the  bank  and  public  buildings,  and 
withdrew  into  the  forts  outside  the  town.  But  the 
Government  at  Naples  was  now  becoming  thoroughly 
alarmed ;  and  considering  Palermo  as  lost,  it  directed 
the  troops  to  be  shipped  to  Messina  and  to  Naples 
itself.  Garibaldi  was  thus  left  in  undisputed  possession 
of  the  Sicilian  capital.  He  remained  there  for  nearly 
two  months,  assuming  the  government  of  Sicily  as 
Dictator  in  the  name  of  Victor  Emmanuel,  appointing 
Ministers,  and  levying  taxes.  Heavy  reinforcements 
reached  him  from  Italy.  The  Neapolitans,  driven  from 
the  interior  as  well  as  from  the  towns  occupied  by  the 
invader,  now  held  only  the  north-eastern  extremity  of 
the  island.  On  the  20th  of  July  Garibaldi,  operating 
both  by  land  and  sea,  attacked  and  defeated  them  at 
Milazzo  on  the  northern  coast.  The  result  of  this 
victory  was  that  Messina  itself,  with  the  exception  of 
the  citadel,  was  evacuated  by  the  Neapolitans  with- 
out resistance.  Garibaldi,  whose  troops  now  numbered 
eighteen  thousand,  was  master  of  the  island  from  sea  to 
sea,  and  could  with  confidence  look  forward  to  the  over- 
throw of  Bourbon  authority  on  the  Italian  mainland. 

During  Garibaldi's  stay  at  Palermo  the  antagonism 
between   the  two  political  creeds  which  severed  those 


1860.  GARIRALDI,  MAZZINI,   CAVOUR.  287 

whose  devotion  to  Italy  was  the  strongest  came  clearly 
into  view.  This  antagonism  stood  embodied  in  its  ex- 
treme form  in  the  contrast  between  Maz-  Thepwtyof 
zini  and  Cavour.  Mazzini,  handling  moral 
and  political  conceptions  with  something  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  a  mathematician,  laid  it  down  as  the  first 
duty  of  the  Italian  nation  to  possess  itself  of  Rome 
and  Venice,  regardless  of  difficulties  that  might  be 
raised  from  without.  By  conviction  he  desired  that 
Italy  should  be  a  Republic,  though  under  certain  con- 
ditions he  might  be  willing  to  tolerate  the  monarchy  of 
Victor  Emmanuel.  Cavour,  accurately  observing  the 
play  of  political  forces  in  Europe,  conscious  above  all  of 
the  strength  of  those  ties  which  still  bound  Napoleon 
to  the  clerical  cause,  knew  that  there  were  limits  which 
Italy  could  not  at  present  pass  without  ruin.  The 
centre  of  Mazzini's  hopes,  an  advance  upon  Rome 
itself,  he  knew  to  be  an  act  of  self-destruction  for  Italy, 
and  this  advance  he  was  resolved  at  all  costs  to  prevent. 
Cavour  had  not  hindered  the  expedition  to  Sicily;  he 
had  not  considered  it  likely  to  embroil  Italy  with  its 
ally  ;  but  neither  had  he  been  the  author  of  this  enter- 
prise. The  liberation  of  Sicily  might  be  deemed  the 
work  rather  of  the  school  of  Mazzini  than  of  Cavour. 
Garibaldi  indeed  was  personally  loyal  to  Victor  Em- 
manuel ;  but  around  him  there  were  men  who,  if  not 
Republicans,  were  at  least  disposed  to  make  the  grant 
of  Sicily  to  Victor  Emmanuel  conditional  upon  the 
king's  fulfilling  the  will  of  the  so-called  Party  of  Action, 
and  consenting  to  an  attack  upon  Rome.  Under  the 


288  MODERN  EUROPE.  i860. 

influence  of  these  politicians  Garibaldi,  in  reply  to  a  depu- 
tation expressing  to  him  the  desire  of  the  Sicilians  for 
union  with  the  Kingdom  of  Victor  Emmanuel,  declared 
that  he  had  come  to  fight  not  for  Sicily  alone  but  for  all 
Italy,  and  that  if  the  annexation  of  Sicily  was  to  take 
place  before  the  union  of  Italy  was  assured,  he  must 
withdraw  his  hand  from  the  work  and  retire.  The  effect 
produced  by  these  words  of  Garibaldi  was  so  serious 
that  the  Ministers  whom  he  had  placed  in  office  resigned. 
Garibaldi  endeavoured  to  substitute  for  them  men  more 
agreeable  to  the  Party  of  Action,  but  a  demonstration  in 
Palermo  itself  forced  him  to  nominate  Sicilians  in  favour 
of  immediate  annexation.  The  public  opinion  of  the 
island  was  hostile  to  Republicanism  and  to  the  friends 
of  Mazzini ;  nor  could  the  prevailing  anarchy  long 
continue  without  danger  of  a  reactionary  movement. 
Garibaldi  himself  possessed  no  glimmer  of  administra- 
tive faculty.  After  weeks  of  confusion  and  misgovern- 
ment  he  saw  the  necessity  of  accepting  direction  from 
Turin,  and  consented  to  recognise  as  Pro-Dictator  of 
the  island  a  nominee  of  Cavour,  the  Piedmontese 
Depretis.  Under  the  influence  of  Depretis  a  commence- 
ment was  made  in  the  work  of  political  and  social 
reorganisation.*  4 

Cavour,  during  Garibaldi's  preparation  for  his  descent 
upon  Sicily  and  until  the  capture  of  Palermo,  had 
affected  to  disavow  and  condemn  the  enterprise  as  one 
undertaken  by  individuals  in  spite  of  the  Government, 

*  Cavour,  Lettere,  iii.  iutrod.  269.     La  Farina,  Epist,  ii.  336.     Bianchi, 
folitique,  p.  366.     fersano,  Diario,  i.  50,  72,  96. 


1860.  NAPLES.  289 

and  at  their  own  risk.  The  Piedmontese  ambassador 
was  still  at  Naples  as  the  representative  of  a  friendly 
Court ;  and  in  reply  to  the  reproaches  of 
Germany  and  Russia,  Cavour  alleged  that  with  regard  to 
the  title  of  Dictator  of  Sicily  in  the  name 
of  Victor  Emmanuel  had  been  assumed  by  Garibaldi 
without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  his  sovereign. 
But  whatever  might  be  said  to  Foreign  Powers,  Cavour, 
from  the  time  of  the  capture  of  Palermo,  recognised 
that  the  hour  had  come  for  further  steps  towards  Italian 
union ;  and,  without  committing  himself  to  any  definite 
line  of  action,  he  began  already  to  contemplate  the 
overthrow  of  the  Bourbon  dynasty  at  Naples.  It  was 
in  vain  that  King  Francis  now  released  his  political 
prisoners,  declared  the  Constitution  of  1848  in  force, 
and  tendered  to  Piedmont  the  alliance  which  he  had 
before  refused.  Cavour,  in  reply  to  his  overtures, 
stated  that  he  could  not  on  his  own  authority  pledge 
Piedmont  to  the  support  of  a  dynasty  now  almost  in 
the  agonies  of  dissolution,  and  that  the  matter  must 
await  the  meeting  of  Parliament  at  Turin.  Thus 
far  the  way  had  not  been  absolutely  closed  to  a  recon- 
ciliation between  the  two  Courts ;  but  after  the 
victory  of  Garibaldi  at  Milazzo  and  the  evacuation 
of  Messina  at  the  end  of  July  Cavour  cast  aside  all 
hesitation  and  reserve.  He  appears  to  have  thought 
a  renewal  of  the  war  with  Austria  probable,  and 
now  strained  every  nerve  to  become  master  of  Naples 
and  its  fleet  before  Austria  could  take  the  field.  He 
ordered  Admiral  Persano  to  leave  two  ships  of  war  to 
T 


290  MODERN  EUROPE.  i860. 

cover  Garibaldi's  passage  to  the  mainland,  and  with 
one  ship  to  proceed  to  Naples  himself,  and  there  excite 
insurrection  and  win  over  the  Neapolitan  fleet  to  the 
flag  of  Victor  Emmanuel.  Persano  reached  Naples  on 
the  3rd  of  August,  and  on  the  next  day  the 

Garibaldi  crosses  .  .       .  ,  . ,  .  ~ 

to  the  mainland,     negotiations   between  the  two  Courts  were 

Aug.  19. 

broken  off.  On  the  19th  Garibaldi  crossed 
from  Sicily  to  the  mainland.  His  march  upon  the 
capital  was  one  unbroken  triumph. 

It  was  the  hope  of  Cavour  that  before  Garibaldi 
could  reach  Naples  a  popular  movement  in  the  city 
itself  would  force  the  King  to  take  flight,  so  that 
Garibaldi  on  his  arrival  would  find  the  machinery  of 
government,  as  well  as  the  command  of  the  fleet  and 

the  army,  already  in  the  hands  of  Victor 
viiiamanna  at  Emmanuel's  representatives.  If  war  with 

Naples. 

Austria  was  really  impending,  incalculable 
mischief  might  be  caused  by  the  existence  of  a  semi- 
independent  Government  at  Naples,  reckless,  in  its  en- 
thusiasm for  the  march  on  Home,  of  the  effect  which  its 
acts  might  produce  on  the  French  alliance.  In  any  case 
the  control  of  Italian  affairs  could  but  half  belong  to  the 
King  and  his  Minister  if  Garibaldi,  in  the  full  glory  of 
his  unparalleled  exploits,  should  add  the  Dictatorship 
of  Naples  to  the  Dictatorship  of  Sicily.  Accordingly 
Cavour  plied  every  art  to  accelerate  the  inevitable  revo- 
lution. Persano  and  the  Sardinian  ambassador,  Villa- 
marina,  had  their  confederates  in  the  Bourbon  Ministry 
and  in  the  Royal  Family  itself.  But  their  efforts  to 
drive  King  Francis  from  Naples,  and  to  establish  the 


1860.  NAPLES.  291 

authority  of  Victor  Emmanuel  before  Garibaldi's  arrival, 
were  baffled  partly  by  the  tenacity  of  the  King  and 
Queen,  partly  by  the  opposition  of  the  committees  of 
the  Party  of  Action,  who  were  determined  that  power 
should  fall  into  no  hands  but  those  of  Garibaldi  himself. 
It  was  not  till  Garibaldi  had  reached  Salerno,  and  the 
Bourbon  generals  had  one  after  another  declined  to 
undertake  the  responsibility  of  command  in  a  battle 
against  him,  that  Francis  resolved  on  flight.  It  was 
now  feared  that  he  might  induce  the  fleet  to  sail  with 
him,  and  even  that  he  might  hand  it  over  to  the 
Austrians.  The  crews,  it  was  believed,  were  willing  to 
follow  the  King ;  the  officers,  though  inclined  to  the 
Italian  cause,  would  be  powerless  to  prevent  them. 
There  was  not  an  hour  to  lose.  On  the  night  of 
September  5th,  after  the  King's  intention  to  quit  the 
capital  had  become  known,  Persano  and  Villamarina 
disguised  themselves,  and  in  company  with  their  parti- 
sans mingled  with  the  crews  of  the  fleet,  whom  they 
induced  by  bribes  and  persuasion  to  empty  the  boilers 
and  to  cripple  the  engines  of  their  ships.  When, 
on  the  Gth,  King  Francis,  having  announced  his 
intention  to  spare  the  capital  bloodshed,  went  on 
board  a  mail  steamer  and  quitted  the  harbour,  ac- 
companied by  the  ambassadors  of  Austria,  Prussia, 
and  Spain,  only  one  vessel  of  the  fleet 

_    ,.  -1      -I    •  Departure  of 

followed    him.     An    urgent  summons    was     Kin?  Francis, 

Sept.  6. 

sent   to    Garibaldi,    whose    presence   was 
now    desired   by    all   parties    alike    in    order    to   pre- 
vent the  outbreak    of   disorders.     Leaving  his   troops 
T  2 


292  MODERN   EUROPE.  i860. 

at    Salerno,    Garibaldi    came    by   railroad    to   Naples 
on     the     morning    of    the     7th,     escorted     only     by 

S0me     °f      nis     staff"        Tn6     f°lts     W61>e 


Garibaldi  enters 

garrisoned  by  eight  thousand  of  the  Bour- 
bon troops,  but  all  idea  of  resistance  had  been  aban- 
doned, and  Garibaldi  drove  fearlessly  through  the  city 
in  the  midst  of  joyous  crowds.  His  first  act  as  Dicta- 
tor was  to  declare  the  ships  of  war  belonging  to  the 
State  of  the  Two  Sicilies  united  to  those  of  King  Victor 
Emmanuel  under  Admiral  Persano's  command.  Before 
sunset  the  flag  of  Italy  was  hoisted  by  the  Neapolitan 
fleet.  The  army  was  not  to  be  so  easily  incorporated 
with  the  national  forces.  King  Francis,  after  abandon- 
ing the  idea  of  a  battle  between  Naples  and  Salerno, 
had  ordered  the  mass  of  his  troops  to  retire  upon  Capua 
in  order  to  make  a  final  struggle  on  the  line  of  the 
Volturno,  and  this  order  had  been  obeyed.* 

As  soon  as  it  had  become  evident  that  the  entry  of 
Garibaldi  into  Naples  could  not  be  anticipated  by  the 
establishment  of  Victor  Emmanuel's  own  authority, 
Cavour  recognised  that  bold  and  aggressive  action  on 
the  part  of  the  National  Government  was  now  a  neces- 

sity.    Garibaldi  made  no  secret  of  his  inten- 


umbriaandthe      tion  to  carry  the  Italian  arms  to  Rome.  The 

Marches,  Sept. 

time  was  past  when  the  national  movement 


*  Bianchi,  Politique,  p.  377.  Persano,  ii.  p.  1  —  102.  Persano  sent  his 
Diary  in  MS.  to  Azeglio,  and  asked  his  advice  on  publishing  it.  Azeglio 
referred  to  Cavour's  saying,  ''  If  we  did  for  ourselves  what  we  are  doing 
for  Italy,  we  should  be  sad  blackguards,"  and  begged  Persano  to  let  his 
secrets  be  secrets,  saying  that  since  the  partition  of  Poland  no  confession  of 
such  "  colossal  blackguardism  "  had  been  published  by  any  public  man. 


1860.  CAVOUR   AND    THE   PAPAL    STATES.  293 

could  be  checked  at  the  frontiers  of  Naples  and  Tus- 
cany. It  remained  only  for  Cavour  to  throw  the  King's 
own  troops  into  the  Papal  States  before  Garibaldi  could 
move  from  Naples,  and,  while  winning  for  Italy  the 
last  foot  of  ground  that  could  be  won  without  an 
actual  conflict  with  France,  to  stop  short  at  those  limits 
where  the  soldiers  of  Napoleon  would  certainly  meet  an 
invader  with  their  fire.  The  Pope  was  still  in  posses- 
sion of  the  Marches,  of  Umbria,  and  of  the  territory 
between  the  Apennines  and  the  coast  from  Orvieto  to- 
Terracina.  Cavour  had  good  reason  to  believe  that 
Napoleon  would  not  strike  on  behalf  of  the  Temporal 
Power  until  this  last  narrow  district  was  menaced.  He 
resolved  to  seize  upon  the  Marches  and  Umbria,  and  to 
brave  the  consequences.  On  the  day  of  Garibaldi's 
entry  into  Naples  a  despatch  was  sent  by  Cavour  to  the 
Papal  Government  requiring,  in  the  name  of  Victor 
Emmanuel,  the  disbandment  of  the  foreign  mercenaries 
who  in  the  previous  spring  had  plundered  Perugia,  and 
whose  presence  was  a  continued  menace  to  the  peace  of 
Italy.  The  announcement  now  made  by  Napoleon  that 
he  must  break  off  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Sar- 
dinian Government  in  case  of  the  invasion  of  the  Papal 
States  produced  no  effect.  Cavour  replied  that  by  no 
other  means  could  he  prevent  revolution  from  master- 
ing all  Italy,  and  on  the  10th  of  September  the 
French  ambassador  quitted  Turin.  Without  waiting  for 
Antonelli's  answer  to  his  ultimatum,  Cavour  ordered 
the  King's  troops  to  cross  the  frontier.  The  Papal 
army  was  commanded  by  Lamoriciere,  a  French  general 


294  MODERN  EUROPE.  i860. 

who  had  gained  some  reputation  in  Algiers  ;  but  the 
resistance  offered  to  the  Piedmontese  was  unexpectedly 
feeble.  The  column  which  entered  Umbria  reached  the 
southern  limit  without  encountering  any  serious  oppo- 
sition except  from  the  Irish  garrison  of  Spoleto.  In 
the  Marches,  where  Lamoriciere  had  a  considerable 
force  at  his  disposal,  the  dispersion  of  the  Papal  troops 
and  the  incapacity  shown  in  their  command  brought 
the  campaign  to  a  rapid  and  inglorious  end.  The  main 
body  of  the  defenders  was  routed  on  the  Musone,  near 
Loreto,  on  the  19th  of  September.  Other  divisions 
surrendered,  and  Ancona  alone  remained  to  Lamoriciere. 
Fail  of  Ancona  Vigorously  attacked  in  this  fortress  both  by 

land  and  sea,  Lamoriciere  surrendered  after 
a  siege  of  eight  days.  Within  three  weeks  from  Gari- 
baldi's entrj'  into  Naples  the  Piedmontese  army  had  com- 
pleted the  task  imposed  upon  it,  and  Victor  Emmanuel 
was  master  of  Italy  as  far  as  the  Abruzzi. 

Cavour's  successes  had  not  come  a  day  too  soon,  for 
Garibaldi,  since  his  entry  into  Naples,  was  falling  more 
and  more  into  the  hands  of  the  Party  of  Action,  and, 

while  protesting  his  loyalty  to  Victor  Em- 
bfticB,  andthfl  manuel,  was  openly  announcing  that  he 

Party  of  Action.  J 

would  march  on  Rome  whether  the  King's 
Government  permitted  it  or  no.  In  Sicily  the  officials 
appointed,  by  this  Party  were  proceeding  with  such 
violence  that  Depretis,  unable  to  obtain  troops  from 
Cavour,  resigned  his  post.  Garibaldi  suddenly  appeared 
at  Palermo  on  the  llth  of  September,  appointed  a  new 
Pro-Dictator,  and  repeated  to  the  Sicilians  that  their 


1860.  GARIBALDI.  295 

union  with  the  Kingdom  of  Victor  Emmanuel  must  be 
postponed  until  all  members  of  the  Italian  family  were 
free.  But  even  the  personal  presence  and  the  angry 
words  of  Garibaldi  were  powerless  to  check  the  strong 
expression  of  Sicilian  opinion  in  favour  of  immediate 
and  unconditional  annexation.  His  visit  to  Palermo 
was  answered  by  the  appearance  of  a  Sicilian  deputation 
at  Turin  demanding  immediate  union,  and  complaining 
that  the  island  was  treated  by  Garibaldi's  officers  like  a 
conquered  province.  At  Naples  the  rash  and  violent 
utterances  of  the  Dictator  were  equally  condemned. 
The  Ministers  whom  he  had  himself  appointed  resigned. 
Garibaldi  replaced'  them  by  others  who  were  almost 
Republicans,  and  sent  a  letter  to  Victor  Emmanuel 
requesting  him  to  consent  to  the  march  upon  Rome 
and  to  dismiss  Cavour.  It  was  known  in  Turin  that 
at  this  very  moment  Napoleon  was  taking  steps  to 
jncrease  the  French  force  in  Rome,  and  to  garrison  the 
whole  of  the  territory  that  still  remained  to  the  Pope. 
Victor  Emmanuel  understood  how  to  reply  to  Garibaldi's 
letter.  He  remained  true  to  his  Minister,  and  sent 
orders  to  Villamarina  at  Naples  in  case  Garibaldi  should 
proclaim  the  Republic  to  break  off  all  relations  with 
him  and  to  secure  the  fleet.  The  fall  of  Ancona  on 
September  28th  brought  a  timely  accession  of  popularity 
and  credit  to  Cavour.  He  made  the  Parliament  which 
assembled  at  Turin  four  days  later  arbiter  in  the  struggle 
between  Garibaldi  and  himself,  and  received  from  it  an 
almost  unanimous  vote  of  confidence.  Garibaldi  would 
perhaps  have  treated  lightly  any  resolution  of  Parliament 


296  MODERN  EUROPE.  i860. 

which  conflicted  with  his  own  opinion :  he  shrank 
from  a  breach  with  the  soldier  of  Novara  and  Solferino. 
Now,  as  at  other  moments  of  danger,  the  character  and 
reputation  of  Victor  Emmanuel  stood  Italy  in  good 
stead.  In  the  enthusiasm  which  Garibaldi's  services 
to  Italy  excited  in  every  patriotic  heart,  there  was 
room  for  thankfulness  that  Italy  possessed  a  sovereign 
and  a  statesman  strong  enough  even  to  withstand  its 
hero  when  his  heroism  endangered  the  national  cause.* 
The  King  of  Naples  had  not  yet  abandoned  the 
hope  that  one  or  more  of  the  European  Powers  would 
intervene  in  his  behalf.  The  trustworthy  part  of  his 
Thearmieson  army  had  gathered  round  the  fortress  of 
Capua  on  the  Volturno,  and  there  were 
indications  that  Garibaldi  would  here  meet  with  far 
more  serious  resistance  than  he  had  yet  encountered. 
While  he  was  still  in  Naples,  his  troops,  which 
had  pushed  northwards,  sustained  a  repulse  at 
Cajazzo.  Emboldened  by  this  success,  the  Neapolitan 
army  at  the  beginning  of  October  assumed  the  offen- 
sive. It  was  with  difficulty  that  Garibaldi,  placing 
himself  again  at  the  head  of  his  forces,  drove  the 
enemy  back  to  Capua,  But  the  arms  of  Victor 
Emmanuel  were  now  thrown  into  the  scale.  Crossing 
the  Apennines,  and  driving  before  him  the  weak  force 
that  was  intended  to  bar  his  way  at  Isernia,  the  King 
descended  in  the  rear  of  the  Neapolitan  army.  The 
Bourbon  commander,  warned  of  his  approach,  moved 

*  Bianchi,  Politique,  p.  383.     Persano,  iii.  61.      Bianchi,  Diplomazia, 
viii/337.     Garibaldi,  Epist,  i.  127. 


1860.  VICTOR   EMMANUEL   AND    GARIBALDI.  297 

northwards  on  the  line  of  the  Garigliano,  leaving  a 
garrison  to  defend  Capua.  Garibaldi  followed  on  his 
track,  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Teano  met  King 
Victor  Emmanuel  (October  26th).  The 

Meeting  of  Vic- 

meeting  is  said  to  have  been  cordial  on  the  ^,rd^SS^! 
part  of  the  King,  reserved  on  the  part  of 
Garibaldi,  who  saw  in  the  King's  suite  the  men  by 
whom  he  had  been  prevented  from  invading  the  Papal 
States  in  the  previous  year.  In  spite  of  their  common 
patriotism  the  volunteers  of  Garibaldi  and  the  army  of 
Victor  Emmanuel  were  rival  bodies,  and  the  relations 
between  the  chiefs  of  each  camp  were  strained  and 
difficult.  Garibaldi  himself  returned  to  the  siege  of 
Capua,  while  the  King  marched  northwards  against  the 
retreating  Neapolitans.  All  that  was  great  in  Garibaldi's 
career  was  now  in  fact  accomplished.  The  politicians 
about  him  had  attempted  at  Naples,  as  in  Sicily,  to 
postpone  the  union  with  Victor  Emmanuel's  monarchy, 
and  to  convoke  a  Southern  Parliament  which  should  fix 
the  conditions  on  which  annexation  would  be  permitted; 
but,  after  discrediting  the  General,  they  had  been  crushed 
by  public  opinion,  and  a  popular  vote  which  was 
taken  at  the  end  of  October  on  the  question  of  immediate 
union  showed  the  majority  in  favour  of  this  course  to 
be  overwhelming.  After  the  surrender  of  Capua  on  the 
2nd  of  November,  Victor  Emmanuel  made  his  entry  into 
Naples.  Garibaldi,  whose  request  for  the  Lieutenancy  of 
Southern  Italy  for  the  space  of  a  year  with  full  powers 
was  refused  by  the  King,*  declined  all  minor  honours 

*  "  Le  Roi  n-pondit  tout  court :  '  C'est  impossible.' "     Cavour  to  his 


298  MODERN  EUROPE.  isei. 

and  rewards,  and  departed  to  his  home,  still  filled  with 
resentment  against  Cavour,  and  promising  his  soldiers 
that  he  would  return  in  the  spring  and  lead  them  to 
Rome  and  Venice.  The  reduction  of  Gaeta,  where 
King  Francis  II.  had  taken  refuge,  and  of  the  citadel 
of  Messina,  formed  the  last  act  of  the  war.  The  French 
fleet  for  some  time  prevented  the  Sardinians  from 
operating  against  Gaeta  from  the  sea,  and  the  siege  in 
consequence  made  slow  progress.  It  was  not  until  the 
middle  of  January,  1861,  that  Napoleon  permitted  the 
French  admiral  to  quit  his  station.  The  bombardment 
was  now  opened  both  by  land  and  sea,  and  after  a  brave 
Fail  of  Gaeta  resistance  Gaeta  surrendered  on  the  14th  of 

February.  King  Francis  and  his  young 
Queen,  a  sister  of  the  Empress  of  Austria,  were  con- 
veyed in  a  French  steamer  to  the  Papal  States,  and 
there  began  their  life-long  exile.  The  citadel  of  Mes- 
sina, commanded  by  one  of  the  few  Neapolitan  officers 
who  showed  any  soldierly  spirit,  maintained  its  obstinate 
defence  for  a  month  after  the  Bourbon  flag  had  dis- 
appeared from  the  mainland. 

Thus  in  the  spring  of  1861,  within  two  years  from 
the  outbreak  of  war  with  Austria,  Italy  with  the 
exception  of  Rome  and  Venice  was  united  under 
Victor  Emmanuel.  Of  all  the  European  Powers,  Great 

Britain  alone  watched  the  creation  of  the 

Cavour  s  policy 

Sim^S?*0       new  Italian  Kingdom  with  complete  sym- 
pathy and  approval.      Austria,   though  it 

ambassador  at  London,  Nov.  16,  in  Bianchi,  Politique,  p.  386.  La  Farina, 
Epist.,  ii.  438.  Persano,  iv.  44.  Guerzoni,  ii.  212. 


1881.  ANTICIPATIONS    OF   CAVOUR.  299 

had  made  peace  at  Zurich,  declined  to  renew  diplomatic 
intercourse  with  Sardinia,  and  protested  against  the 
assumption  by  Victor  Emmanuel  of  the  title  of  King 
of  Italy.  Eussia,  the  ancient  patron  of  the  Neapolitan 
Bourbons,  declared  that  geographical  conditions  alone 

•» 

prevented  -its  intervention  against  their  despoilers. 
Prussia,  though  under  a  new  sovereign,  had  not  yet 
completely  severed  the  ties  which  bound  it  to  Austria. 
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  wide  political  ill-will,  and  of 
the  passionate  hostility  of  the  clerical  party  throughout 
Europe,  there  was  little  probability  that  the  work  of 
the  Italian  people  would  be  overthrown  by  external 
force.  The  problem  which  faced  Victor  Emmanuel's 
Government  was  not  so  much  the  frustration  of  re- 
actionary designs  from  without  as  the  determination  of 
the  true  line  of  policy  to  be  followed  in  regard  to  Eome 
and  Venice.  There  were  few  who,  like  Azeglio,  held 
that  Eome  might  be  permanently  left  outside  the 
Italian  Kingdom ;  there  were  none  who  held  this  of 
Venice.  Garibaldi  might  be  mad  enough  to  hope  for 
victory  in  a  campaign  against  Austria  and  against 
France  at  the  head  of  such  a  troop  as  he  himself  could 
muster  ;  Cavour  would  have  deserved  ill  of  his  country 
if  he  had  for  one  moment  countenanced  the  belief  that 
the  force  which  had  overthrown  the  Neapolitan  Bourbons 
could  with  success,  or  with  impunity  to  Italy,  measure 
itself  against  the  defenders  of  Venetia  or  of  Eome. 
Yet  the  mind  of  Cavour  was  not  one  which  could  rest 
in  mere  passive  expectancy  as  to  the  future,  or  in  mere 
condemnation  of  the  unwise  schemes  of  others.  His 


300  MODERN  EUROPE.  iwi. 

intelligence,  so  luminous,  so  penetrating,  that  in  its 
utterances  we  seem  at  times  to  be  listening  to  the  very 
spirit  of  the  age,  ranged  over  wide  fields  of  moral  and 
of  spiritual  interests  in  its  forecast  of  the  future  of 
Italy,  and  spent  its  last  force  in  one  of  those  prophetic 
delineations  whose  breadth  and  power  the  world  can  feel, 
though  a  later  time  alone  can  judge  of  their  correspond- 
ence with  the  destined  course  of  history.  Venice  was 
less  to  Europe  than  Eome  ;  its  transfer  to  Italy  would, 
Cavour  believed,  be  effected  either  by  arms  or  negotia- 
tion so  soon  as  the  German  race  should  find  a  really 
national  Government,  and  refuse  the  service  which  had 
hitherto  been  exacted  from  it  for  the  maintenance  of 
Austrian  interests.  It  was  to  Prussia,  as  the  represen- 
tative of  nationality  in  Germany,  that  Cavour  looked 
as  the  natural  ally  of  Italy  in  the  vindication  of  that 
part  of  the  national  inheritance  which  still  lay  under 
the  dominion  of  the  Hapsburg.  Home,  unlike  Venice, 
was  not  only  defended  by  foreign  arms,  it  was  the  seat 
of  a  Power  whose  empire  over  the  mind  of  man  was  not 
the  sport  of  military  or  political  vicissitudes.  Circum- 
stances might  cause  France  to  relax  its  grasp  on 
Rome,  but  it  was  not  to  such  an  accident  that  Cavour 
looked  for  the  incorporation  of  Rome  with  Italy.  He 
conceived  that  the  time  would  arrive  when  the  Catholic 
world  would  recognise  that  the  Church  would  best  fulfil 
its  task  in  complete  separation  from  temporal  power. 
Rome  would  then  assume  its  natural  position  as  the 
centre  of  the  Italian  State  ;  the  Church  would  be  the 
noblest  friend,  not  the  misjudging  enemy,  of  the  Italian 
national  monarchy.  Cavour 's  own  religious  beh'efs  were 


isei  OAVOUR.  301 

perhaps  less  simple  than  he  chose  to  represent  them. 
Occupying  himself,  however,  with  institutions,  not  with 
dogmas,  he  regarded  the  Church  in  profound  earnest- 
ness as  a  humanising  and  elevating  power.  He  valued 
its  independence  so  highly  that  even  on  the  suppression 
of  the  Piedmontese  monasteries  he  had  refused  to  give 
to  the  State  the  administration  of  the  revenue  arising 
from  the  sale  of  their  lands,  and  had  formed  this  into  a 
fund  belonging  to  the  Church  itself,  in  order  that  the 
clergy  might  not  become  salaried  officers  of  the  State. 
Human  freedom  was  the  principle  in  which  he  trusted ; 
and  looking  upon  the  Church  as  the  greatest  association 
formed  by  men,  he  believed  that  here  too  the  rule  of  . 
freedom,  of  the  absence  of  State-regulation,  would  in 
the  end  best  serve  man's  highest  interests.  With  the 
passing  away  of  the  Dope's  temporal  power,  Cavour 
imagined  that  the  constitution  of  the 

,  TheFreeChurch 

Church   itselt    would   become    more    demo-     mtheiw* 

State. 

cratic,   more  responsive   to   the    movement 
of  the  modern  world.     His  own  effort  in  ecclesiastical  I 
reform   had  been    to    improve   the   condition   and   to/ 
promote  the   independence  of   the  lower   clergy.     He 
had  hoped  that  each  step  in  their  moral  and  material 
progress  would  make  them  more  national  at  heart ;  and 
though    this    hope    had   been   but   partially   fulfilled, 
Cavour   had   never   ceased   to    cherish   the   ideal  of  a 
national  Church  which,  while  recognising  its  Head  in 
Home,  should  cordially  and  without  reserve  accept  the 
friendship  of  the  Italian  State.* 

*  Cavour  in  Parlamento,  p.  630.     Azeglio,  Correspond.-mce  Politique, 
p.  180.    La  Eire,  p.  313.    Berti,  Cavour  avanti  1848,  p.  302. 


302  MODERN   EUROPE.  isei. 

It  was  in  the  exposition  of  these  principles,  in  the 
enforcement  of  the  common  moral  interest  of  Italian 
nationality  and  the  Catholic  Church,  that  Cavour  gave 
his  last  counsels  to  the  Italian  Parliament.  He  was 
not  himself  to  lead  the  nation  farther  towards  the 
promised  land.  The  immense  exertions  which  he  had 
maintained  during  the  last  three  years,  the  indignation 
and  anxiety  caused  to  him  by  Graribaldi's  attacks,  pro- 
duced an  illness  which  Cavour's  own  careless  habits  of 

the   unskilfulness    of  his   doctors 


Death  of  carom- 

rendered   fatal.      With    dying   lips   he  re- 

peated to  those  about  him  the  words  in  which  he  had 
summed  up  his  policy  in  the  Italian  Parliament  :  "  A 
free  Church  in  a  free  State."  *  Other  Catholic  lands  had 
adjusted  by  Concordats  with  the  Papacy  the  conflicting 
Free  church  in  c^aims  of  temporal  and  spiritual  authority 
in  such  matters  as  the  appointment  of 
bishops,  the  regulation  of  schools,  the  family-rights  of 
persons  married  without  ecclesiastical  form.  Cavour 
appears  to  have  thought  that  in  Italy,  where  the  whole 
nation  was  in  a  sense  Catholic,  -the  Church  might 
as  safely  and  as  easily  be  left  to  manage  its  own 
affairs  as  in  the  United  States,  where  the  Catholic  com- 
munity is  only  one  among  many  religious  societies. 
His  optimism,  his  sanguine  and  large-hearted  tolerance, 
was  never  more  strikingly  shown  than  in  this  fidelity  to 
the  principle  of  liberty,  even  in  the  case  of  those  who 

*  "  Le  comte  le  reconim,  ltd  serra  la  main  et  dit  :  '  Frate,  frate,  libera 
chiesa  in  libero  stato.'  Ce  furent  ses  dernieres  paroles."  Account  of  the 
death  of  Cavour  by  his  niece,  Countess  Alfieri,  in  La  Rive,  Cavour,  p.  319. 


1861.  DEATH   OF   GAVOUR.  303 

for  the  time  declined  all  reconciliation  with  the  Italian  4 
State.  Whether  Cavour's  ideal  was  an  impracticable 
fancy  a  later  age  will  decide.  The  ascendency  within 
the  Church  of  Eome  would  seem  as  yet  to  have 
rested  with  the  elements  most  opposed  to  the  spirit  of 
the  time,  most  obstinately  bent  on  setting  faith  and 
reason  in  irreconcilable  enmity.  In  place  of  that 
democratic  movement  within  the  hierarchy  and  the 
priesthood  which  Cavour  anticipated,  absolutism  has 
won  a  new  crown  in  the  doctrine  of  Papal  Infallibility. 
Catholic  dogma  has  remained  impervious  to  the  solvents 
which  during  the  last  thirty  years  have  operated  with 
perceptible  success  on  the  theology  of  Protestant  lands. 
Each  conquest  made  in  the  world  of  thought  and 
knowledge  is  still  noted  as  the  next  appropriate  object 
of  denunciation  by  the  Vatican.  Nevertheless  the 
cautious  spirit  will  be  slow  to  conclude  that  hopes  like 
those  of  Cavour  were  wholly  vain.  A  single  generation 
may  see  but  little  of  the  seed-time,  nothing  of  the 
harvests  that  are  yet  to  enrich  mankind.  And  even  if 
all  wider  interests  be  left  out  of  view,  enough  remains 
to  justify  Cavour's  policy  of  respect  for  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  Church  in  the  fact  that  Italy  during  the  I 
thirty  years  succeeding  the  establishment  of  its  union 
has  remained  free  from  civil  war,  Cavour  was  wont  to 
refer  to  the  Constitution  which  the  French  National 
Assembly  imposed  upon  the  clergy  in  1790  as  the  type 
of  erroneous  legislation.  Had  his  own  policy  and  that 
of  his  successors  not  been  animated  by  a  wiser  spirit ; 
had  the  Government  of  Italy,  after  overthrowing  the 


304  MODERN  EUROPE. 

Pope's  temporal  sovereignty,  sought  enemies  among  the 
rural  priesthood  and  their  congregations,  the  provinces 
added  to  the  Italian  Kingdom  by  Garibaldi  would 
hardly  have  been  maintained  by  the  House  of  Savoy 
without  a  second  and  severer  struggle.  Between  the 
ideal  Italy  which  filled  the  thoughts  not  only  of  Mazzini 
but  of  some  of  the  best  English  minds  of  that  time— 
the  land  of  immemorial  greatness,  touched  once  more  by 
the  divine  hand  and  advancing  from  strength  to  strength 
as  the  intellectual  and  moral  pioneer  among  nations- 
bet  ween  this  ideal  and  the  somewhat  hard  and  common- 
place realities  of  the  Italy  of  to-day  there  is  indeed  little 
enough  resemblance.  Poverty,  the  pressure  of  inordinate 
taxation,  the  physical  and  moral  habits  inherited  from 
centuries  of  evil  government, — all  these  have  darkened 
in  no  common  measure  the  conditions  from  which 
Italian  national  life  has  to  be  built  up.  If  in  spite 
of  overwhelming  difficulties  each  crisis  has  hitherto  been 
surmounted ;  if,  with  all  that  is  faulty  arid  infirm,  the 
omens  for  the  future  of  Italy  are  still  favourable,  one 
source  of  its  good  fortune  has  been  the  impress  given  to 
its  ecclesiastical  policy  by  the  great  statesman  to  whom 
above  all  other  men  it  owes  the  accomplishment  of  its 
union,  and  who,  while  claiming  for  Italy  the  whole  of  its  ' 
national  inheritance,  yet  determined  to  inflict  no  need- 
less wound  upon  the  conscience  of  Rome.  '){/ 

0 


CHAPTEK    V. 

Germany  after  1858 — The  Regency  in  Prussia — Army-reorganisation — King 
AVilliam  I. — Conflict  between  the  Crown  and  the  Parliament — Bismarck — 
The  struggle  continued— Austria  from  1859 — The  October  Diploma- 
Resistance  of  Hungary — The  Reichsrath — Russia  under  Alexander  II. — 
Liberation  of  the  Serfs — Poland — The  Insurrection  of  1863— Agrarian 
measures  in  Poland—  Schleswig-Holstein — Death  of  Frederick  VII. — Plans 
of  Bismarck — Campaign  in  Schleswig— Conference  of  London — Treaty  of 
Vienna — England  and  Napoleon  III. — Prussia  and  Austria— Convention  of 
Gastein — Italy— Alliance  of  Prussia  with  Italy — Proposals  for  a  Congress 
fail — War  between  Austria  and  Prussia — Napoleon  III. — -Koniggratz — 
Custozza — Mediation  of  Napoleon — Treaty  of  Prague — South  Germany — 
Projects  for  compensation  to  France — Austria  and  Hungary — Deak — 
Establishment  of  the  Dual  System  in  Austria-Hungary. 

SHORTLY  before  the  events  which  broke  the  power  of 
Austria  in  Italy,    the  German   people   believed   them- 
>rlves  to  have  entered   on  a  new  political     Germanyfrom 
era.     King  Frederick   William   IV.,   who, 
since  1848,  had  disappointed  every  hope  that  had  been 
fixed   on   Prussia   and   on   himself,   was  compelled  by 
mental  disorder  to  withdraw  from  public  affairs  in  the 
autumn    of    1858.       His   brother,    the   Crown   Prince 
William,  who  had  for  a  year  acted  as  the 

T7--        ,  ,.  i       ,-,  The  Regency  in 

Ivmg  s    representative,    now    assumed    the     Prussia,  Oct. 
Regency.    In  the  days  when  King  Frederick 
William  still  retained  some  vestiges  of  his  reputation 
the  Crown  Prince  had  been  unpopular,  as  the  supposed 
head  of  the  reactionary  party ;  but  the  events  of  the 
last  few  years  had  exhibited  him  in  a  better  aspect. 

s 

u 


306  MODERN  EUROPE.  to* 

V 

Though  strong  in  his  belief  both  in  the  Divine  right  of 
kings  in  general,  and  in  the  necessity  of  a  powerful 
monarchical  rule  in  Prussia,  he  was  disposed  to  tolerate, 
and  even  to  treat  with  a  certain  respect,  the  humble 
elements  of  constitutional  government  which  he  found 
in  existence.  There  was  more  manliness  in  his  nature 
than  in  that  of  his  brother,  more  belief  in  the  worth  of 
his  own  people.  The  espionage,  the  servility,  the 
overdone  professions  of  sanctity  in  Manteuffel's  regime 
displeased  him,  but  most  of  all  he  despised  its  pusil- 
lanimity in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  His  heart 
indeed  was  Prussian,  not  German,  and  the  destiny 
which  created  him  the  first  Emperor  of  united  Germany 
was  not  of  his  own  making  nor  of  his  own  seeking ;  but 
he  felt  that  Prussia  ought  to  hold  a  far  greater  station 
both  in  Germany  and  in  Europe  than  it  had  held 
during  his  brother's  reign,  and  that  the  elevation  of  the 
State  to  the  position  which  it  ought  to  occupy  was  the 
task  that  lay  before  himself.  During  the  twelve  months 
preceding  the  Regency  the  retirement  of  the  King  had 
not  been  treated  as  more  than  temporary,  and  the 
Crown  Prince,  though  constantly  at  variance  with  Man- 
teuffel's  Cabinet,  had  therefore  not  considered  himself 
at  liberty  to  remove  his  brother's  advisers.  His  first 
act  on  the  assumption  of  the  constitutional  office  of 
Regent  was  to  dismiss  the  hated  Ministry.  Prince 
Antony  of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen  was  called  to 
office,  and  posts  in  the  Government  were  given  to  men 
well  known  as  moderate  Liberals.  Though  the  Eegent 
stated  in  clear  terms  that  he  had  no  intention  of  form- 


1858-61.  GERMANY.  307 

ing  a  Liberal  party-administration,  his  action  satisfied 
public  opinion.  The  troubles  and  the  failures  of  1849 
had  inclined  men  to  be  content  with  far  less  than  had 
been  asked  years  before.  The  leaders  of  the  more 
advanced  sections  among  the  Liberals  preferred  for  the 
most  part  to  remain  outside  Parliamentery  life  rather 
than  to  cause  embarrassment  to  the  new  Government ; 
and  the  elections  of  1859  sent  to  Berlin  a  body  of 
representatives  fully  disp.osed  to  work  with  the  Regent 
and  his  Ministers  in  the  policy  of .  guarded  progress 
which  they  had  laid  down. 

This  change  of  spirit  in  the  Prussian  Government, 
followed  by  the  events  that  established  Italian  in- 
dependence, told  powerfully  upon  public 
opinion  throughout  Germany.  Hopes  that  ot  German 
had  been  crushed  in  1849  now  revived. 
With  the  collapse  of  military  despotism  in  the  Austrian 
Empire  the  clouds  of  reaction  seemed  everywhere  to  be 
parsing  away ;  it  was  possible  once  more  to  think  of 
German  national  union  and  of  common  liberties  in 
which  all  Germans  should  share.  As  in  1808  the 
rising  of  the  Spaniards  against  Napoleon  had  inspired 
Eliicher  and  his  countrymen  with  the  design  of  a  truly 
national  effort  against  their  foreign  oppressor,  so  in 
1859  the  work  of  Cavour  challenged  the  Germans  to 
prove  that  their  national  patriotism  and  their  political 
aptitude  were  not  inferior  to  those  of  the  Italian  people. 
Men  who  had  been  prominent  in  the  National  Assembly 
at  Frankfort  again  met  one  another  and  spoke  to  the 
nation.  In  the  Parliaments  of  several  of  the  minor 
u  2 


308  MODERN  EUROPE.  1858-61. 

States  resolutions  were  brought  forward  in  favour  of 
the  creation  of  a  central  German  authority.  Protests 
were  made  against  the  infringement  of  constitutional 
rights  that  had  been  common  during  the  last  ten  years ; 
patriotic  meetings  and  demonstrations  were  held ;  and  a 
National  Society,  in  imitation  of  that  which  had  pre- 
pared the  way  for  union  with  Piedmont  in  Central  and 
Southern  Italy,  was  formally  established.  There  was 
indeed  no  such  preponderating  opinion  in  favour  of 
Prussian  leadership  as  had  existed  in  1848.  The 
southern  States  had  displayed  a  strong  sympathy  with 
Austria  in  its  war  with  Napoleon  III.,  and  had  re- 
garded the  neutrality  of  Prussia  during  the  Italian - 
campaign  as  a  desertion  of  the  German  cause.  Here 
there  were  few  who  looked  with  friendly  eye  upon 
Berlin.  It  was  in  the  minor  states  of  the  north,  and 
especially  in  Hesse-Cassel,  where  the  struggle  between 
the  Elector  and  his  subjects  was  once  more  breaking 
out,  that  the  strongest  hopes  were  directed  towards  the 
new  Prussian  ruler,  and  the  measures  of  his  govern- 
ment were  the  most  anxiously  watched.  , 

The  Prince  Regent  was  a  soldier  by  profession  and 
habit.  He  was  born  in  1797,  and  had  been  present  at 
the  battle  of  Arcis-sur-Aube,  the  last  fought  by  Napo- 
leon against  the  Allies  in  1814.  During  forty  years  he 
had  served  on  every  commission  that  had  been  occupied 
with  Prussian  military  affairs ;  no  man 
Prussia  and  the  better  understood  the  military  organisation 

army. 

of  his  country,  no  man  more  clearly  recog- 
nised its  capacities  and  its  faults.     The  defective  con- 


i858-€i.  PRUSSIA.  309 

dition  of  the  Prussian  army  had  been  the  principal, 
though  not  the  sole,  cause  of  the  miserable  submission 
to  Austria  at  Olmiitz  in  1850,  and  of  the  abandonment 
of  all  claims  to  German  leadership  on  the  part  of  the 
Court  of  Berlin.  The  Crown  Prince  would  himself  have 
risked  all  chances  of  disaster  rather  than  inflict  upon 
Prussia  the  humiliation  with  which  King  Frederick 
William  then  purchased  peace;  but  Manteuffel  had 
convinced  his  sovereign  that  the  army  could  not  engage 
in  a  campaign  against  Austria  without  ruin.  Military 
impotence  was  the  only  possible  justification  for  tn~e 
policy  then  adopted,  and  the  Crown  Prince  determined 
that  Prussia  should  not  under  his  own  rule  have  the 
same  excuse  for  any  political  shortcomings.  The  work 
of  reorganisation  was  indeed  begun  during  the  reign  of 
Frederick  William  IV.,  through  the  enforcement  of 
the  three-years'  service  to  which  the  conscript  was 
liable  by  law,  but  which  had  fallen  during  the  long 
period  of  peace  to  two-years'  service.  The  number  of 
troops  with  the  colours  was  thus  largely  increased,  but 
no  addition  had  been  made  to  the  yearly  levy,  and  no 
improvement  attempted  in  the  organisation  of  the  Land- 
wehr.  When  in  1859  the  order  for  mobilisation  was 
given  in  consequence  of  the  Italian  war,  it  was  dis- 
covered that  the  Landwehr  battalions  were  almost 
useless.  The  members  of  this  force  were  mostly 
married  men  approaching  middle  life,  who  had  been  too 
long  engaged  in  other  pursuits  to  resume  their  military 
duties  with  readiness,  and  whose  call  to  the  field  left  their 
families  without  means  of  support  and  chargeable  upon 


310  MODERN  EUROPE.  1862. 

the  public  purse.  Too  much,  in  the  judgment  of  the 
reformers  of  the  Prussian  army,  was  required  from  men 
past  youth,  not  enough  from  youth  itself.  The  plan  of 
the  Prince  Regent  was  therefore  to  enforce  in  the  first 
instance  with  far  more  stringency  the  law  imposing 
scheme  of  re-  ^e  universal  obligation  to  military  service  ; 
and,  while  thus  raising  the  annual  levy  from 
40,000  to  60,000  men,  to  extend  the  period  of  service 
in  the  Reserve,  into  which  the  young  soldier  passed  on 
the  completion  of  his  three  years  with  the  colours,  from 
two  to  four  years.  Asserting  with  greater  rigour  its 
claim  to  seven  years  in  the  early  life  of  the  citizen,  the 
State  would  gain,  without  including  the  Landwehr,  an 
effective  army  of  four  hundred  thousand  men,  and  would 
practically  be  able  to  dispense  with  the  service  of  those 
who  were  approaching  middle  life,  except  in  cases  of 
great  urgency.  In  the  execution  of  this  reform  the 
Government  could  on  its  own  authority  enforce  the 
increased  levy  and  the  full  three  years'  service  in  the 
standing  army ;  for  the  prolongation  of  service  in  the 
Reserve,  and  for  the  greater  expenditure  entailed  by  the 
new  system,  the  consent  of  Parliament  was  necessary. 

The  general  principles  on  which  the  proposed  re- 
organisation was  based  were  accepted  by  public  opinion 
and  by  both  Chambers  of  Parliament ;  it  was,  however, 
held  by  the  Liberal  leaders  that  the  increase 

The  Prussian  " 

SSSSTiSS      of  expenditure  might,  without  impairing  the 

1861 

efficiency  of  the  army,  be  avoided  by  re- 
turning to  the  system  of  two-years'  service  with  the 
colours,  which  during  so  long  a  period  had  been 


1860-ei.  PRUSSIAN  ARMY  BILL.  311 

thought  sufficient  for  the  training  of  the  soldier.  The 
Eegent,  however,  was  convinced  that  the  discipline  and 
the  instruction  of  three  years  were  indispensable  to  the 
Prussian  conscript,  and  he  refused  to  accept  the  com- 
promise suggested.  The  mobilisation  of,  1859  had  given 
him  an  opportunity  for  forming  additional  battalions  ; 
and  although  the  Landwehr  were  soon  dismissed  to  their 
homes  the  new  formation  was  retained,  and  the  place 
of  the  retirirg  militiamen  was  filled  by  conscripts  of 
the  year.  The  Lower  Chamber,  in  voting  the  sum 
required  in  1860  for  the  increased  numbers  of  the 
army,  treated  this  arrangement  as  temporary,  and 
limited  the  grant  to  one  year;  in  spite  of  this  the 
Regent,  who  on  the  death  of  his  brother  in  January, 
1861,  became  King  of  Prussia,  formed  the  additional 
battalions  into  new  regiments,  and  gave 

,  ••  .  ii»  i         Accession  of 

to  these   new  regiments  their  names  and     KI^ wuiiam, 

Jan.,  1801. 

colours.  The  year  1861  passed  without 
bringing  the  questions  at  issue  between  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  to  a  settlement. 
Public  feeling,  disappointed  in  the  reserved  and  hesi- 
tating policy  which  was  still  followed  by  the  Court  in 
German  affairs,  stimulated  too  by  the  rapid  consolida- 
tion of  the  Italian  monarchy,  which  the  Prussian  Govern- 
ment on  its  part  had  as  yet  declined  to  recognise,  was 
becoming  impatient  and  resentful.  It  seemed  as  if  the 
Court  of  Berlin  still  shrank  from  committing  itself  to 
the  national  cause.  The  general  confidence  reposed  in  the 
new  ruler  at  his  accession  was  passing  away  ;  and  when 
in  the  summer  of  1861  the  dissolution  of  Parliament 


312  MODERN  EUROPE.  1862. 

took  place,  the  elections  resulted  in  the  return  not 
only  of  a  Progressist  majority,  but  of  a  majority  little 
inclined  to  submit  to  measures  of  compromise,  or  to 
shrink  from  the  assertion  of  its  full  constitutional 
rights. 

The  new  Parliament  assembled  at  the  beginning  of 
1862.  Under  the  impulse  of  public  opinion,  the  Go- 
vernment was  now  beginning  to  adopt  a  more  vigorous 
First  Pariia-  policy  in  German  affairs,  and  to  re-assert 
Prussia's  claims  to  an  independent  leader- 
ship in  defiance  of  the  restored  Diet  of  Frankfort. 
But  the  conflict  with  the  Lower  Chamber  was  not  to 
be  averted  by  revived  energy  abroad.  The  Army  Bill," 
which  was  passed  at  once  by  the  Upper  House,  was 
referred  t6  a  hostile  Committee  on  reaching  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  a  resolution  was  carried 
insisting  on  the  right  of  the  representatives  of  the 
people  to  a  far  more  effective  control  over  the  Budget 
thanvthey  had  hitherto  exercised.  The  result  of  this 
Dissolution  vo^e  was  ^ne  dissolution  of  Parliament  by 
the  King,  and  the  resignation  of  the 
Ministry,  with  the  exception  of  General  Roon,  Minister 
of  War,  and  two  of  the  most  conservative  among 
his  colleagues.  Prince  Hohenlohe,  President  of  the 
Upper  House,  became  chief  of  the  Government.  There 
was  now  an  open  and  undisguised  conflict  between 
the  Crown  and  the  upholders  of  Parliamentary  rights. 
"  King  or.  Parliament "  was  the  expression  in  which 
the  newly- appointed  Ministers  themselves  summed 
up  the  struggle.  The  utmost  pressure  was  exerted 


1882.  BISMARCK.  313 

by  the  Government  in  the  course  of  the  elections 
which  followed,-  but  in  vain.  The  Progressist  party 
returned  in  overwhelming  strength  to  the  gecond  Parlia_ 
new  Parliament;  the  voice  of  the  country 
seemed  unmistakably  to  condemn  the  policy  to  which 
the  King  and  his  advisers  were  committed.  After 
a  long  and  sterile  discussion  in  the  Budget  Committee, 
the  debate  on  the  Army  Bill  began  in  the  Lower  House 
on  the  11  th  of  September.  Its  principal  clauses  were 
rejected  by  an  almost  unanimous  vote.  An  attempt 
made  by  General  Eoon  to  satisfy  his  opponents  by  a 
partial  and  conditional  admission  of  the  principle  of 
two-years'  service  resulted  only  in  increased  exaspera- 
tion on  both  sides.  Hohenlohe  resigned,  and  the  King 
now  placed  in  power,  at  the  head  of  a  Minis- 
try of  conflict,  the  most  resolute  and  un-  ,  comes  Minister, 

.       J*  Sept.,  1862. 

flinching  of  all  his  friends,  the  most  con- 
temptuous scorner  of   Parliamentary  majorities,    Herr 
von  Bismarck.* 

The   new    Minister   was,    like    Cavour,    a   country 
gentleman,   and,  like   Cavour,  he  otoed  his  real  entry 
into  public  life  to  the  revolutionary  movement  of  1848. 
He%had  indeed  held  some  obscure  official  posts  before 
that  epoch,  but  it  was  as  a  member  of  the 
United  Diet  which  assembled  at  Berlin  in 
April,   1848,  that  he  first  attracted   the  attention  of 
King  or  people.     He   was  one  of  two  Deputies  who 
refused  to  join    in   the    vote   of   thanks  to  Frederick 

*  Bericlite  uber  der  Militair-etat,  p.  669.     Schulthess.-Europaischer 
Geschichts  Kaleiider,  1862,  p.  1'2± 


314  MODERN  EUROPE.  1882. 

William  IV.  for  the  Constitution  which  he  had  pro- 
mised to  Prussia.  Bismarck,  then  thirty-three  years 
old,  was  a  Royalist  of  Royalists,  the  type,  as  it  seemed, 
of  the  rough  and  masterful  Junker,  or  Squire,  of  the 
older  parts  of  Prussia,  to  whom  all  reforms  from  those 
of  Stein  downwards  were  hateful,  all  ideas  but  those  of 
the  barrack  and  the  kennel  alien.  Others  in  the  spring 
of  1848  lamented  the  concessions  made  by  the  Crown 
to  the  people ;  Bismarck  had  the  courage  to  say  so. 
When  reaction  came  there  were  naturally  many,  and 
among  them  King  Frederick  William,  who  were  in- 
terested in  the  man  who  in  the  heyday  of  constitutional 
enthusiasm  had  treated  the  whole  movement  as  so  much 
midsummer  madness,  and  had  remained  faithful  to 
monarchical  authority  as  the  one  thing  needful  for  the 
Prussian  State.  Bismarck  continued  to  take  a  pro- 
minent part  in  the  Parliaments  of  Berlin  and  Erfurt ; 
it  was  not,  however,  till  1851  that  he  passed  into  the 
inner  official  circle.  He  was  then  sent  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  Prussia  to  the  restored  Diet  of  Frankfort. 
As  an  absolutist  and  a  conservative,  brought  up  in  the 
traditions  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  Bismarck  had  in  earlier 
days  looked  up  to  Austria  as  the  mainstay  of 
monarchical  order  and  the  historic  barrier  against 
the  flood  of  democratic  and  wind-driven  sentiment 
which  threatened  to  deluge  Germany.  He  had  even 
approved  the  surrender  made  at  Olmiitz  in  1850,  as  a 
matter  of  necessity;  but  the  belief  now  grew  strong 
in  his  mind,  and  was  confirmed  by  all  he  saw  at  Frank- 
fort, that  Austria  under  Schwarzenberg's  rule  was  no 


1862.  BISMARCK.  315 

longer  the  Power  which  had  been  content  to  share  the 
German  leadership  with  Prussia  in  the  period  before 
1848,  but  a  Power  which  meant  to  rule  in  Germany 
uncontrolled.  In  contact  with  the  representatives  of 
that  outworn  system  which  Austria  had  resuscitated  at 
Frankfort,  and  with  the  instruments  of  the  dominant 
-State  itself,  Bismarck  soon  learnt  to  detest  the  paltri- 
ness of  the  one  and  the  insolence  of  the  other.  He 
declared  the  so-called  Federal  system  to  be  a  mere 
device  for  employing  the  secondary  German  States 
for  the  aggrandisement  of  Austria  and  the  humilia- 
tion of  Prussia.  The  Court  of  Vienna,  and  with  it 
the  Diet  of  Frankfort,  became  in  his  eyes  the  enemy 
of  Prussian  greatness  and  independence.  During  the 
Crimean  war  he  was  the  vigorous  opponent  of  an 
alliance  with  the  Western  Powers,  not  only  from  dis- 
trust of  France,  and  from  regard  towards  Russia  as  on 
•the  whole  the  most  constant  and  the  most  natural  ally 
of  his  own  country,  but  from  the  conviction  that  Prussia 
ought  to  assert  a  national  policy  wholly  independent  of 
that  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.  That  the  Emperor  of 
Austria  was  approaching  more  or  less  nearly  to  union 
with  France  and  England  was,  in  Bismarck's  view,  a 
good  reason  why  Prussia  should  stand  fast  in  its  rela- 
tions of  friendship  with  St.  Petersburg.*  The  policy 
of  neutrality,  which  King  Frederick  William  and 
Manteuffel  adopted  more  out  of  disinclination  to 
strenuous  action  than  from  any  clear  political  view,  was 

*  Poschinger,  Preussen  iin  Bundestag  ii.   69,  97 ;  iv.   178.       Halm, 
Bismarck,  i.  608. 


316  MODERN  EUROPE.  1862. 

advocated  by  Bismarck  for  reasons  which,  if  they  made 
Europe  nothing  and  Prussia  everything,  were  at  least 
inspired  by  a  keen  and  accurate  perception  of  Prus- 
sia's own  interests  in  its  present  and  future  relations 
with  its  neighbours.  When  the  reign  of  Frederick 
William  ended,  Bismarck,  who  stood  high  in  the  confi- 
dence of  the  new  Eegent,  was  sent  as  ambassador  to  St. 
Petersburg.  He  subsequently  represented  Prussia  for 
a  short  time  at  the  Court  of  Napoleon  III.,  and  was 
recalled  by  the  King  from  Paris  in  the  autumn  of  1862 
in  order  to  be  placed  at  the  head  of  the  Government. 
Far  better  versed  in  diplomacy  than  in  ordinary  ad- 
ministration, he  assumed,  together  with  the  Presidency 
of  the  Cabinet,  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

There  were  now  at  the  head  of  the  Prussian  State 

three  men  eminently  suited  to  work  with  one  another, 

and  to  carry  out,  in  their  own  rough  and 

Bismarck  and  ...  „          .  i  •    i 

the  Lower  military  lasmon,  the  policy  which  was  to 

Chamber,  1862.  *  * 

unite  Germany  under  the  House  of  Hohen- 
zollern.  The  King,  Bismarck,  and  Eoon  were  tho- 
roughly at  one  in  their  aim,  the.  enforcement  of 
Prussia's  ascendency  by  means  of  the  army.  The 
designs  of  the  Minister,  which  expanded  with  success 
and  which  involved  a  certain  daring  in  the  choice  of 
"means,  were  at  each  new  development  so  ably  veiled  or 
disclosed,  so  dexterously  presented  to  the  sovereign,  as 
to  overcome  his  hesitation  on  striking  into  many  an  un- 
accustomed path.  Eoon  and  his  workmen,  who,  in  the 
face  of  a  hostile  Parliament  and  a  hostile  Press,  had  to 
supply  to  Bismarck  what  a  foreign  alliance  and  enthu- 


1862.  BISMARCK.  317 

siastic  national  sentiment  had  supplied  to  Cavour,  forged 
for  Prussia  a  weapon  of  such  temper  that,  against  the 
enemies  on  whom  it  was  employed,  no  extraordinary 
genius  was  necessary  to  render  its  thrust  fatal.  It 
was  no  doubt  difficult  for  the  Prime  Minister,  without 
alarming  his  sovereign  and  without  risk  of  an  immediate 
breach  with  Austria,  to  make  his  ulterior  aims  so  clear 
as  to  carry  the  Parliament  with  him  in  the  policy  of. 
military  reorganisation.  Words  frank  even  to  brutality 
were  uttered  by  him,  but  they  sounded  more  like 
menace  and  bluster  than  the  explanation  of  a  well-con- 
sidered plan.  "  Prussia  must  keep  its  forces  together," 
he  said  in  one  of  his  first  Parliamentary  appearances, 
"  its  boundaries  are  not  those  of  a  sound  State.  The 
great  questions  of  the  time  are  to  be  decided  not  by 
speeches  and  votes  of  majorities  but  by  blood  and 
iron."  After  the  experience  of  1848  and  1850,  a  not 
too  despdndent  political  observer  might  well  have 
frrmed  the  conclusion  that  nothing  less  than  the  mili- 
tary overthrow  of  Austria  could  give  to  Germany  any 
tolerable  system  of  national  government,  or  even  secure 
to  Prussia  its  legitimate  field  of  action.  This  was  the 
keystone  of  Bismarck's  belief,  but  he  failed  to  make  his 
purpose  and  his  motives  intelligible  to  the  representa- 
tives of  the  Prussian  people.  He  was  taken  for  a  mere 
bully  and  absolutist  of  the  old  type.  His  personal 
characteristics,  his  arrogance,  his  sarcasm,  his  habit  of 
banter,  exasperated  and  inflamed,  lloon  was  no  better 
suited  to  the  atmosphere  of  a  popular  assembly.  Each 
encounter  of  the  Ministers  with  the  Chamber  embittered 


318  MODERN  EUROPE.  1862. 

the  struggle  and  made  reconciliation  more  difficult. 
The  Parliamentary  system  of  Prussia  seemed  threatened 
in  its  very  existence  when,  after  the  rejection  by  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  of  the  clause  in  the  Budget  pro- 
viding for  the  cost  of  the  army-reorganisation,  this 
clause  was  restored  by  the  Upper  House,  and  the 
Budget  of  the  Government  passed  in  its  original  form. 
By  the  terms  of  the  Constitution  the  right  of  the  Upper 
House  in  matters  of  taxation  was  limited  to  the  approval 
or  rejection  of  the  Budget  sent  up  to  it  from  the  Cham- 
ber of  Representatives.  It  possessed  no  power  of 
amendment.  Bismarck,  however,  had  formed  the  theory 
that  in  the  event  of  a  disagreement  between  the  two 
Houses  a  situation  arose  for  which  the  Constitution 
had  not  provided,  and  in  which  therefore  the  Crown 
was  still  possessed  of  its  old  absolute  authority.  No 
compromise,  no  negotiation  between  the  two  Houses, 
was,  in  his  view,  to  be  desired.  He  was  resolved  to 
govern  and  to  levy  taxes  without  a  Budget,  and  had 
obtained  the  King's  permission  to  close  the  session 
immediately  the  Upper  House  had  given  its  vote.  But 
before  the  order  for  prorogation  could  be  brought  down 
the  President  of  the  Lower  Chamber  had  assembled  his 
colleagues,  and  the  unanimous  vote  of  those  present 
declared  the  action  of  the  Upper  House  null  and  void. 
In  the  agitation  attending  this  trial  of  strength  between 
the  Crown,  the  Ministry  and  the  Upper  House  on  one 
side  and  the  Representative  Chamber  on  the  other  the 
session  of  1862  closed.* 

*  Hahn,  Fiirst  Bismarck,  i.  66.    This  work  is  a  collection  of  documents, 


18C2-3.  THE  CONFLICT  TIME  IN  PRUSSIA.  319 

The  Deputies,  returning  to  their  constituencies, 
carried  with  them  the  spirit  of  combat,  and  received 
the  most  demonstrative  proofs  of  popular 
sympathy  and  support.  Representations  of 
great  earnestness  were  made  to  the  King,  but  they 
failed  to  shake  in  the  slightest  degree  his  confidence  in 
his  Minister,  or  to  bend  his  fixed  resolution  to  carry  out 
his  military  reforms  to  the  end.  The  claim  of  Parlia- 
ment to  interfere  with  matters  of  military  organisation 
in  Prussia  touched  him  in  his  most  sensitive  point. 
He  declared  that  the  aim  of  his  adversaries  was  nothing 
less  than  the  establishment  of  a  Parliamentary  instead 
of  a  royal  army.  In  perfect  sincerity  he  believed  that 
the  convulsions  of  1848  were  on  the  point  of  breaking 
out  afresh.  "You  mourn  the  conflict  between  the 
Crown  and  the  national  representatives,"  he  said  to  the 
spokesman  of  an  important  society ;  "  do  I  not  mourn 
it  ?  I  sleep  no  single  night."  The  anxiety,  the  de- 
spondency of  the  sovereign  were  shared  by  the  friends 
of  Prussia  throughout  Germany ;  its  enemies  saw  with 
wonder  that  Bismarck  in  his  struggle  with  the  educated 
Liberalism  of  the  middle  classes  did  not  shrink  from 
dalliance  with  the  Socialist  leaders  and  their  organs. 
When  Parliament  reassembled  at  the  beginning  of 
1863  the  conflict  was  resumed  with  even  greater  heat. 
The  Lower  Chamber  carried  an  address  to  The  eortmct coam 
the  King,  which,  while  dwelling  on  the 

speeches,  and  letters  not  only  by  Bismarck  himself  but  on  all  the  principal 
matters  in  which  Bismarck  was  concerned.  It  is -perhaps,  from  the 
German  point  of  view,  the  most  important  repertory  of  authorities  for  the 
period  1862—1885. 


320  MODERN  EUROPE.  1862-3. 

loyalty  of  the  Prussian  people  to  their  chief,  charged 
the  Ministers  with  violating  the  Constitution,  and  de- 
manded their  dismissal.  The  King  refused  to  receive 
the  deputation  which  was  to  present  the  address,  and 
in  the  written  communication  in  which  he  replied  to  it 
he  sharply  reproved  the  Assembly  for  their  errors  and 
presumption.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  Army  Bill  was 
again  introduced.  The  House,  while  allowing  the 
ordinary  military  expenditure  for  the  year,  struck  out 
the  costs  of  the  reorganisation,  and  declared  Ministers 
personally  answerable  for  the  sums  expended.  Each 
appearance  of  the  leading  members  of  the  Cabinet  now 
became  the  signal  for  contumely  and  altercation.  The 
decencies  of  debate  ceased  to  be  observed  on  either  side. 
When  the  President  attempted  to  set  some  limit  to  the 
violence  of  Bismarck  and  Boon,  and,  on  resistance  to  his . 
authority,  terminated  the  sitting,  the  Ministers  de- 
clared that  they  would  no  longer  appear  in  a  Chamber 
where  freedom  of  speech  was  denied  to  them.  Affairs 
came  to  a  deadlock.  The  Chamber  again  appealed  to 
the  King,  and  insisted  that  reconciliation  between  the 
Crown  and  the  nation  was  impossible  so  long  as  the 
present  Ministers  remained  in  office.  The  King,  now 
thoroughly  indignant,  charged  the  Assembly  with  at- 
tempting to  win  for  itself  supreme  power,  expressed  his 
gratitude  to  his  Ministers  for  their  resistance  to  this 
usurpation,  and  declared  himself  too  confident  in  the 
loyalty  of  the  Prussian  people  to  be  intimidated  by 
threats.  His  reply  was  followed  by  the  prorogation  of 
the  Assembly  (May  26th).  A  dissolution  would  have 


1862-63.  THE    CONFLICT   TIME   IN  PRUSSIA.  321 

been  worse  than  useless,  for  in  the  actual  state  of  public 
opinion  the  Opposition  would  probably  have  triumphed 
throughout  the  country.  It  only  remained  for  Bis- 
marck to  hold  his  ground,  and,  having  silenced  the 
Parliament  for  a  while,  to  silence  the  Press 
also  by  the  exercise  of  autocratic  power,  against  the 
The  Constitution  authorised  the  King,  in 
the  absence  of  the  Chambers,  to  publish  enactments  on 
matters  of  urgency  having  the  force  of  laws.  No  sooner 
had  the  session  been  closed  than  an  edict  was  issued 
empowering  the  Government,  without  resort  to  courts 
of  law,  to  suppress  any  newspaper  after  two  warnings. 
An  outburst  of  public  indignation  branded  this  return 
to  the  principles  of  pure  despotism  in  Prussia;  but 
neither  King  nor  Minister  was  to  be  diverted  by  threats 
or  by  expostulations  from  his  course.  The  Press  was 
effectively  silenced.  So  profound,  however,  was  the 
Distrust  now  everywhere  felt  as  to  the  future  of  Prussia, 
and  so  deep  the  resentment  against  the  Minister  in  all 
circles  where  Liberal  influences  penetrated,  that  the 
Crown  Prince  himself,  after  in  vain  protesting  against  a 
policy  of  violence  which  endangered  his  own  prospective 
interests  in  the  Crown,  publicly  expressed  his  disap- 
proval of  the  action  of  Government.  For  this  offence 
he  was  never  forgiven.  «- 

The   course  which    affairs    were    taking    at   Berlin 
excited   the    more    bitter    regret    and    disappointment 
among  all  friends  of  Prussia  as  at  this  very     Augtriafrom 
time  it  seemed  that  constitutional  govern- 
ment was  being  successfully  established  in  the  western 
v 


322  MODERN  EUROPE.  1859-eo. 

part  of  the  Austrian  Empire.  The  centralised  military 
despotism  with  which  Austria  emerged  from  the  con- 
vulsions of  1848  had  heen  allowed  ten  years  of  undis- 
puted sway ;  at  the  end  of  this  time  it  had  brought 
things  to  such  a  pass  that,  after  a  campaign  in  which 
there  had  been  but  one  great  battle,  and  while  still  in 
possession  of  a  vast  army  and  an  unbroken  chain  of 
fortresses,  Austria  stood  powerless  to  move  hand  or  foot. 
It  was  not  the  defeat  of  Solferino  or  the  cession  of  Lom- 
bardy  that  exhibited  the  prostration  of  Austria's  power, 
but  the  fact  that  while  the  conditions  of  the  Peace  of 
Zurich  were  swept  away,  and  Italy  was  united  under 
Victor  Emmanuel  in  defiance  of  the  engagements  made 
by  Napoleon  III.  at  Villafranca,  the  Austrian  Emperor 
was  compelled  to  look  on  with  folded  arms.  To  have 
drawn  the  sword  again,  to  have  fired  a  shot  in  defence 
of  the  Pope's  temporal  power  or  on  behalf  of  the  vassal 
princes  of  Tuscany  and  Modena,  would  have  been  to 
risk  the  existence  of  the  Austrian  monarchy.  The 
State  was  all  but  bankrupt ;  rebellion  might  at  any 
moment  break  out  in  Hungary,  which  had  already  sent 
thousands  of  soldiers  to  the  Italian  camp.  Peace  at 
whatever  price  was  necessary  abroad,  and  at  home  the 
system  of  centralised  despotism  could  no  longer  exist, 
come  what  might  in  its  place.  It  was  natural  that  the 
Emperor  should  but  imperfectly  understand  at  the  first 
the  extent  of  the  concessions  which  it  was  necessary  for 
him  to  make.  He  determined  that  the  Provincial  Councils 
which  Schwarzenberg  had  promised  in  1850  should  be 
called  into  existence,  and  that  a  Council  of  the  Empire 


1859-eo.  AUSTRIA.  323 

(Eeichsrath),  drawn  in  part  from  these,  should  assemble 
at  Vienna,  to  advise,  though  not  to  control,  the  Govern- 
ment in  matters  of  finance.  So  urgent,  however,  were 
the  needs  of  the  exchequer,  that  the  Emperor  proceeded 
at  once  to  the  creation  of  the  Central  Council,  and 
nominated  its  first  members  himself.  (March,  1860.) 

That  the  Hungarian  members  nominated  by  the 
Emperor  would  decline  to  appear  at  Vienna  unless 
some  further  guarantee  was  given  for  the 
restoration  of  Hungarian  liberty  was  well 
known.  The  Emperor  accordingly  promised  to  restore 
the  ancient  county-organisation,  which  had  filled  so  great 
a  space  in  Hungarian  history  before  1848,  and  to  take 
steps  for  assembling  the  Hungarian  Diet.  This,  with 
the  repeal  of  an  edict  injurious  to  the  Protestants,  opened 
the  way  for  reconciliation,  and  the  nominated  Hungarians 
took  their  place  in  the  Council,  though  under  protest 
.that  the  existing  arrangement  could  only  be  accepted  as 
preparatory  to  the  full  restitution  of  the  rights  of  their 
country.  The  Council  continued  in  session  during  the 
summer  of  1860.  Its  duties  were  financial;  but  the 
establishment  of  financial  equilibrium  in  Austria  was 
inseparable  from  the  establishment  of  political  stability 
and  public  confidence ;  and  the  Council,  in  its  last 
sittings,  entered  on  the  widest  constitutional  problems. 
The  non-German  members  were  in  the  majority ;  and 
while  all  parties  alike  condemned  the  fallen  absolutism, 
the  rival  declarations  of  policy  submitted  to  the  Council 
marked  the  opposition  which  was  henceforward  to  exist 
between  the  German  Liberals  of  Austria  and  the  various 


324  MODERN  EUROPE.  i860. 

Nationalist  or  Federalist  groups.  The  Magyars,  uniting 
with  those  who  had  been  their  bitterest  enemies,  de- 
clared that  the  ancient  independence  in  legislation  and 
administration  of  the  several  countries  subject  to  the 
House  of  Hapsburg  must  be  restored,  each  country 
retaining  its  own  historical  character.  The  German 
minority  contended  that  the  Emperor  should  bestow 
upon  his  subjects  such  institutions  as,  while 

Centralists  and         -  1  .     .  „  .  „ 

Federalists  in        based    on    the    right    ot    sell-government. 

the  Council 

should  secure  the  unity  of  the  Empire  and 
the  force  of  its  central  authority.  All  parties  were  for 
a  constitutional  system  and  for  local  liberties  in  one 
form  or  another;  but  while  the  Magyars  and  their 
supporters  sought  for  nothing  less  than  national  inde- 
pendence, the  Germans  would  at  the  most  have  granted 
a  uniform  system  of* provincial  self-government  in  strict 
subordination  to  a  central  representative  body  drawn 
from  the  whole  Empire  and  legislating  for  the  whole 
Empire.  The  decision  of  the  Emperor  was  necessarily  a 
The  Diploma  of  compromise.  By  a  Diploma  published  on 

the  20th  of  October  he  promised  to  restore 
to  Hungary  its  old  Constitution,  and  to  grant  wide, 
legislative  rights  to  the  other  States  of  the  Monarchy, 
establishing  for  the  transaction  of  affairs  common  to  the 
whole  Empire  an  Imperial  Council,  and  reserving  for 
the  non-Hungarian  members  of  this  Council  a  qualified 
right  of  legislation  for  all  the  Empire  except  Hungary.* 
The  Magyars  had  conquered  their  King ;  and  all 

*  Sammlung  der  Staatsacten  Oesterreichs  (1 861),  pp.  2,  33.    Drei  Jahre 
Verfassuiigstreit,  p.  107. 


HUNGARY. 


the  impetuous  patriotism  that  had  been  crushed  down 
since  the  ruin  of  1849  now  again  burst  into  flame. 
The  County  Assemblies  met,  and  elected  as 


.  _,  nunpu-y  -™ 

their  officers  men  who  had  been  condemned  JlJSfSSifc. 
to  death  in  1849  and  who  were  living  in 
exile;  they  swept  away  the  existing  Taw-courts,  refused 
the  taxes,  and  proclaimed  the  legislation  of  1848  again 
in  force.  Francis  Joseph  seemed  anxious  to  avert  a 
conflict,  and  to  prove  both  in  Hungary  and  in  the 
other  parts  of  the  Empire  the  sincerity  of  his  promises 
of  reform,  on  which  the-  nature  of  the  provincial  Con- 
stitutions which  were  published  immediately  after  the 
Diploma  of  October  had  thrown  some  doubt.  At  the 
instance  of  his  Hungarian  advisers  he  dismissed  the 
chief  of  his  Cabinet,  and  called  to  office  Schmerling, 
who,  in  1848,  had  been  Prime  Minister  of  the 
German  National  Government  at  Frankfort.  Schmer- 
ling at  once  promised  important  changes  in  the  pro- 
'vincial  systems  drawn  up  by  his  predecessor,  but  in 
his  dealings  with  Hungary  he  proved  far  less  tract- 
able than  the  Magyars  had  expected.  If  the  Hun- 
garians had  recovered  their  own  constitutional  forms, 
they  still  stood  threatened  with  the  supremacy  of  a 
Central  Council  in  all  that  related  to  themselves  in  com- 
mon with  the  rest  of  the  Empire,  and  against  this  they 
rebelled.  But  from  the  establishment  of  this  Council 
of  the  Empire  neither  the  Emperor  nor  Schmerling 
would  recede.  An  edict  of  February  26th,  1861,  while 
it  made  good  the  changes  promised  by  Schmerling  in 
the  several  provincial  systems,  confirmed  the  general 


326  MODERN  EUROPE.  isei. 

provisions  of  the  Diploma  of  October,  and  declared  that 
the  Emperor  would  maintain  the  Constitution  of  his 
dominions  as  now  established  against  all  attack. 

In   the  following  April   the    Provincial    Diets  met 

throughout  the  Austrian  Empire,  and  the  Diet  of  the 

Hungarian  Kingdom  assembled  at   Pesth. 

*aV*ithth™      The  first  duty  of  each  of  these  bodies  was 

Crown,  1861.  » 

to  elect  representatives  to  the  Council  of 
the  Empire  which  was  to  meet  at  Vienna.  Neither 
Hungary  nor  Croatia,  however,  would  elect  such  repre- 
sentatives, each  claiming  complete  legislative  independ- 
ence, and  declining  to  recognise  any  such  external 
authority  as  it  was  now  proposed  to  create.  The 
Emperor  warned  the  Hungarian  Diet  against  the  con- 
sequences of  its  action ;  but  the  national  spirit  of  the 
Magyars  was  thoroughly  roused,  and  the  County  Assem- 
blies vied  with  one  another  in  the  violence  of  their 
addresses  to  the  Sovereign.  The  Diet,  reviving  the 
constitutional  difficulties  connected  with  the  abdication 
of  Ferdinand,  declared  that  it  would  only  negotiate 
for  the  coronation  of  Francis  Joseph  after  the  esta- 
blishment of  a  Hungarian  Ministry  and  the  restora- 
tion of  Croatia  and  Transylvania  to  the  Hungarian 
Kingdom.  Accepting  Schmerling's  contention  that  the 
ancient  constitutional  rights  of  Hungary  had  been 
extinguished  by  rebellion,  the  Emperor  insisted  on  the 
establishment  of  a  Council  for  the  whole  Empire,  and 
refused  to  recede  from  the  declarations  which  he  had 
made  in  the  edict  of  February.  The  Diet  hereupon 
protested,  in  a  long  and  vigorous  address  to  the  King, 


1861.  THE   REICHSRATH  AT    VIENNA.  327 

against  the  validity  of  all  laws  made  without  its  own 
concurrence,  and  declared  that  Francis  Joseph  had  ren- 
dered an  agreement  between  the  King  and  the  nation 
impossible.  A  dissolution  followed.  The  County  As- 
semblies took  up  the  national  struggle.  They  in  their 
turn  were  suppressed ;  their  officers  were  dismissed, 
and  military  rule  was  established  throughout  the  land, 
though  with  explicit  declarations  on  the  part  of  the 
King  that  it  was  to  last  only  till  the  legally  existing 
Constitution  could  be  brought  into  peaceful  working.* 

Meanwhile  the  Central  Representative  Body,  now 
by  enlargement  of  its  functions  and  increase  in  the 
number  of  its  members  made  into  a  Parlia- 

n     ,  i         T-.  .  -,  ,      ,         .     ~ff.  The  Reichsrath    ,' 

ment  or  the  Empire,  assembled  at  Vienna,     at  Vienna,  May,  \ 

186l-Dec.,iN;.'. 

Its  real  character  was  necessarily  altered  by 
the  absence  of  representatives  from  Hungary  ;  and  for  " 
some  time  the  Government  seemed  disposed  to  limit  its 
Competence  to  the  affairs  of  the  Cis-Leithan  province^; 
but  after  satisfying  himself  that  no  accord  with  Hun- 
gary was  possible,  the  Emperor  announced  this  fact  to 
the  Assembly,  and  bade  it  perform  its  part  as  the 
organ  of  the  Empire  at  large,  without  regard  to  the 
abstention  of  those  who  did  not  choose  to  exercise  their 
rights.  The  Budget  for  the  entire  Empire  was  accord- 
ingly submitted  to  the  Assembly,  and  for  the  first  time 
the  expenditure  of  the  Austrian  State  was  laid  open  to 
public  examination  and  criticism.  The  first  session  of 
this  Parliament  lasted,  with  adjournments,  from  May, 

*  Sammlung  der  Staatsacten,  p.  89.     Der  Ungarische  Reichstag  1861, 
pp.  3,  192,  238.     Arnold  Forster,  Life  of  Deak,  p.  141., 


828  MODERN  EUROPE. 

1861,  to  December,  1862.  In  legislation  it  effected 
little,  but  its  relations  as  a  whole  with  the  Government 
remained  excellent,  and  its  long-continued  activity, 
unbroken  by  popular  disturbances,  did  much  to  raise 
the  fallen  credit  of  the  Austrian  State  and  to  win  for  it 
the  regard  of  Germany.  On  the  close  .of  the  session 
the  Provincial  Diets  assembled,  and  throughout  the 
spring  of  1863  the  rivalry  of  the  Austrian  nationalities 
gave  abundant  animation  to  many  a  local 


Second  session 


second  session  . .     -,          -r         ,1  i  n         T»    •    r. 

of  the  Reichs-       capital.      In  the  next  summer  the  Keichs- 

rath,  1863. 

rath  reassembled  at  Vienna.  Though  Hun- 
gary remained  in  a  condition  not  far  removed  from 
rebellion,  the  Parliamentary  system  of  Austria  was 
gaining  in  strength,  and  indeed,  as  it  seemed,  at  the 
expense  of  Hungary  itself;  for  the  Eoumanian  and 
German  population  of  Transylvania,  rejoicing  in  the 
opportunity  of  detaching  themselves  from  the  Magyars, 
now  sent  deputies  to  Vienna.  While  at  Berlin  each 
week  that  passed  sharpened  the  antagonism  between 
|  the  nation  and  its  Government,  and  made  the 'Minister's 
name  more  odious,  Austria  seemed  to.  have  successfully 
broken  with  the  traditions  of  its  past,  and  to  be  fast 
earning  for  itself  an  honourable  place  among  States  of 
the  constitutional  type. 

One  of  the  reproaches  brought  against  Bismarck  by 
the  Progressist  majority  in  the  Parliament  of  Berlin  was 
that  he  had  isolated  Prussia  both  in  Germany  and  in 
Europe.  That  he  had  roused  against  the  Goverment  of 
his  country  the  public  opinion  of  Germany  was  true :  that 
he  had  alienated  Prussia  from  all  Europe  was  not  the 


i-    i  RUSSIA    AFTER    THE    CRIMEAN   WAR.  329 

case;  on  the  contrary,  he  had  established  a  closer  rela- 
tion  between  the  Courts  of  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg 
than  had  existed  at  any  time  since  the  commencement 
of  the  Regency,  and  had  secured  for  Prussia  a  degree  of 
confidence  and  goodwill  on  the  part  of  the  C/.ar  which, 
in  the  memorable  years  that  were  to  follow,  served  it 
scarcely  less  effectively  than  an  armed  alliance.  Russia, 
since  the  Crimean  War,  had  seemed  to  be  Ruw,iaunder 
entering  upon  an  epoch  of  boundless  change.  Ale 
The  calamities  with  which  the  reign  of  Nicholas  had 
closed  had  excited  in  that  narrow  circle  of  Russian 
society  where  thought  had  any  existence  a  vehement 
revulsion  against  the  sterile  and  unchanging  system  of 
repression,  the  grinding  servitude  of  the  last  thirty 
years.  From  the  Ernperor  downwards  all  educated 
men  believed  not  only  that  the  system  of  government, 
but  that  the  whole  order  of  Russian  social  life,  must  be 
recast.  The  ferment  of  ideas  which  marks  an  age  of 
revolution  was  in  full  course;  but  in  what  forms  the 
new  order  was  to  be  moulded,  through  what  processes 
Russia  was  to  be  'brought  into  its  new  life,  no  one 
knew.  Russia  was  wanting  in  capable  statesmen ;  it  was 
even  more  conspicuously  wanting  in  the  class  of  ser- 
viceable and  intelligent  agents  of  Government  of  the 
second  rank.  Its  monarch,  Alexander  II.,  humane  and 
well-meaning,  was  irresolute  and  vacillating  beyond  the 
measure  of  ordinary  men.  He  was  not  only  devoid  of 
all  administrative  and  organising  faculty  himself,  but  so 
infirm  of  purpose  that  Ministers  whose  policy  he  had 
accepted  feared  to  let  him  pass  out  of  their  sight,  lest  in 


330  MODERN  EUEOPE.  1856-61. 

the  course  of  a  single  journey  or  a  single  interview  he 
should  succumb  to  the  persuasions  of  some  rival  poli- 
tician. In  no  country  in  Europe  was  there  such  inco- 
herence, such  self-contradiction,  such  absence  of  unity 
of  plan  and  purpose  in  government  as  in  Russia,  where 
all  nominally  depended  upon  a  single  will.  Pressed 
and  tormented  by  all  the  rival  influences  that  beat  upon 
the  centre  of  a  great  empire,  Alexander  seems  at  times 
to  have  played  off  against  one  another  as  colleagues  in 
the  same  branch  of  Government  the  representatives  of 
the  most  opposite  schools  of  action,  and,  after  assenting 
to  the  plans  of  one  group  of  advisers,  to  have  committed 
the  execution  of  these  plans,  by  way  of  counterpoise,  to 
those  who  had  most  opposed  them.  But,  like  other 
weak  men,  he  dreaded  nothing  so  much  as  the  reproach 
of  weakness  or  inconstancy  ;  and  in  the  cloud  of  half- 
formed  or  abandoned  purposes  there  were  some  few  to 
which  he  resolutely  adhered.  The  chief  of  these,  the 
great  achievement  of  his  reign,  was  the  liberation  of  the 
serfs.  • 

It  was  probably  owing  to  the  outbreak  of  the  revo- 
lution of  1848  that  the  serfs  had  not  been  freed  by 
Nicholas.     That  sovereign  had  long  under- 

Liberationofthe  ..       . 

serfs,  March,  stood  the  necessity  lor  the  change,  and  in 
1847  he  had  actually  appointed  a  Commis- 
sion to  report  on  the  best  means  of  effecting  it.  The 
convulsions  of  1848,  followed  by  the  Hungarian  and  the 
Crimean  Wars,  threw  the  project  into  the  background 
during  the  remainder  of  Nicholas's  reign;  but  if  the 
belief  of  the  Eussian  people  is  well  founded,  the  last 


1861.  LIBERATION   OF    THE   SERFS.  331 

injunction  of  the  dying  Czar  to  his  successor  was  to 
emancipate  the  serfs  throughout  his  empire.  Alexander 
was  little  capable  of  grappling  with  so  tremendous  a 
problem  himself;  in  the  year  1859,  however,  he  di- 
rected a  Commission  to  make  a  complete  inquiry  into 
the  subject,  and  to  present  a  scheme  of  emancipation. 
The  labours  of  the  Commission  extended  over  two  years; 
its  discussions  were  agitated,  at  times  violent.  That 
serfage  must  sooner  or  later  be  abolished  all  knew ;  the 
points  on  which  the  Commission  was  divided  were  the"! 
bestowal  of  land  on  the  peasants  and  the  regulation] 
of  the  village-community.  European  history  afforded 
abundant  precedents  in  emancipation,  and  under  an 
infinite  variety  of  detail  three  types  of  the  process  of 
enfranchisement  were  clearly  distinguishable  from  one 
another.  Maria  Theresa,  in  liberating  the  serf,  had 
required  him  to  continue  to  render  a  fixed  amount  of 
labour  to  his  lord,  and  had  given  him  on  this  condition 
fixity  of  tenure  in  the  land  he  occupied ;  the  Prussian 
reformers  had  made  a  division  of  the  land  between  the 
peasant  and  the  lord,  and  extinguished  all  labour-dues  ; 
Napoleon,  in  enfranchising  the  serfs  in  the  Duchy  of 
Warsaw,  had  simply  turned  them  into  free  men,  leaving 
the  terms  of  their  occupation  of  land  to  be  settled  by 
arrangement  0£  free  contract  with  their  former  lords. 
This  example  had  been  followed  in  the  Baltic  Provinces 
of  Russia  itself  by  Alexander  I.  Of  the  three  modes 
of  emancipation,  that  based  on  free  contract  had 
produced  the  worst  results  for  the  peasant  ;  and 
though  many  of  the  Russian  landowners  and  their 


332  MODERN  EUHOPE.  ISBI. 

representatives  in  the  Commission  protested  against  a 
division  of  the  land  between  themselves  and  their  serfs 
as  an  act  of  agrarian  revolution  and  spoliation,  there  were 
men  in  high  office,  and  some  few  among  the  proprietors, 
who  resolutely  and  successfully  fought  for  the  principle 
of  independent  ownership  by  the  peasants.  The  lead- 
ing spirit  in  this  great  work  appears  to  have  been 
Nicholas  Milutine,  Adjunct  of  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  Lanskoi.  Milutine,  who  had  drawn  up  the 
Municipal  Charta  of  St.  Petersburg,  was  distrusted  by 
the  Czar  as  a  restless  and  uncompromising  reformer. 
It  was  uncertain  from  day  to  day  whether  the  views  of 
the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  or  those  of  the  territorial 
aristocracy  would  prevail ;  ultimately,  however,  under 
instructions  from  the  Palace,  the  Commission  accepted 
not  only  the  principle  of  the  division  of  the  land,  but 
the  Astern  of  communal  self-government  by  the  peasants 
themselves.  The  determination  of  the  amount  of  land 
to  be  held  by  the  peasants  of  a  commune  and  of  the  fixed 
rent  to  be  paid  to  the  lord  was  left  in  the  first  instance 
to  private  agreement ;  but  where  such  agreement  was 
not  reached,  the  State,  through  arbiters  elected  at  local 
assemblies  of  the  nobles,  decided  the  matter  itself. 
The  rent  once  fixed,  the  State  enabled  the  commune  to 
redeem  it  by  advancing  a  capital  sum  to  be  recouped 
by  a  quit-rent  to  the  State  extending  over  forty-nine 
years.  The  Ukase  of  the  Czar  converting  twenty- five 
millions  of  serfs  into  free  proprietors,  the  greatest  act 
of  legislation  of  modern  times,  was  signed  on  the  3rd 
of  March,  1861,  and  within  the  next  few  weeks  was 


1861.  LIBERATION   OF    THE    SEltFS. 

read  in  every  clmrcli  of  the  Russian  Empire.  It  was  a 
strange  comment  on  the  system  of  government  in 
Russia  that  in  the  very  month  in  which  the  edict  was 
published  both  Lanskoi  and  Milutine,  who  had  been  its 
principal  authors,  were  removed  from  their  posts.  The 
Czar  feared  to  leave  them  in  power  to  superintend  the 
actual  execution  of  the  law  which  they  had  inspired. 
In  supporting  them  up  to  the  final  stage  of  its  enact- 
ment Alexander  had  struggled  against  misgivings  of 
his  own,  and  against  influences  of  vast  strength  alike 
at  the  Court,  within  the  Government,  and  in  the  Pro- 
vinces. With  the  completion  of  the  Edict  of  Emanci- 
pation his  power  of  resistance  was  exhausted,  and  its 
execution  was  committed  by  him  to  those  who  had  been 
its  opponents.  That  some  of  the  evils  which  have 
mingled  with  the  good  in  Russian  enfranchisement 
might  have  been  less  had  the  Czar  resolutely  stood  by 
the,  authors  of  reform  and  allowed  them  to  complete 
their  work  in  accordance  with  their  own  designs  and 
convictions,  is  scarcely  open  to  doubt.* 

It  had  been  the  belief  of  educated  men  in  Russia 
that  the  emancipation  of  the  serf  would  be  but  the  first 
of  a  series  of  great  organic  changes,  bringing     Poland>  136I> 
their  country  more  nearly  to  the  political  and 
social  level  of  its  European  neighbours.    This  belief  was 
not  fulfilled.     Work  of  importance  was  done  in  the  re- 
construction of  the  judicial  system  of  Russia,  but  in  the 
other  reforms    expected   little   was  accomplished.     An 

*  Celestin,   Russland,   p.  3.     Leroy-Beaulieu,    I/Empire    des   Tsars, 
i.  400.     Hoinine  d'Etat  Russe,  p.  73.     Wallace,  Russia,  p.  485. 


334  MODERN  EUROPE. 

insurrection  which  broke  out  in  Poland  at  the  beginning 
of  1863  diverted  the  energies  of  the  Government  from  all 
other  objects  ;  and  in  the  overpowering  outburst  of  Rus- 
sian patriotism  and  national  feeling  which  it  excited, 
domestic  reforms,  no  less  than  the  ideals  of  Yvrestern 
civilisation,  lost  their  interest.  The  establishment  of 
Italian  independence,  coinciding  in  time  with  the  general 
unsettlenient  and  expectation  of  change  which  marked 
the  first  years  of  Alexander's  reign,  had  stirred  once 
more  the  ill-fated  hopes  of  the  Polish  national  leaders. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  year  1861  Warsaw  was  the 
scene  of  repeated  tumults.  The  Czar  was  inclined, 
within  certain  limits,  to  a  policy  of  conciliation.  ^  The 
separate  Legislature  and  separate  army  which  Poland 
had  possessed  from  1815  to  1830  he  was  determined 
not  to  restore ;  but  he  was  willing  to  give  Poland 
a  large  degree  of  administrative  autonomy,  to  confide 
the  principal  offices  in  its  Grovernment  to  natives,  and 
generally  to  relax  something  of  that  close  union  with 
Russia  which  had  been  enforced  by  Nicholas  since  the 
rebellion  of  1831.  But  the  concessions  of  the  Czar, 
accompanied  as  they  were  by  acts  of  repression  and 
severity,  were  far  from  satisfying  the  demands  of  Polish 
patriotism.  It  was  in  vain  that  Alexander  in  the. 
summer  of  1862  sent  his  brother  Constantine  as  Viceroy 
to  Warsaw,  established  a  Polish  Council  of  State,  placed 
a  Pole,  Wielopolski,  at  the  head  of  the  Administration, 
superseded  all  the  Russian  governors  of  Polish  provinces 
by  natives,  and  gave  to  the  municipalities  and  the 


i    .    ;  POLAND.  335 

districts  the  right  of  electing  local  councils ;  these  con- 
cessions seemed  nothing,  and  were  in  fact  nothing,  in 
comparison  with  the  national  independence  which  the 
Polish  leaders  claimed.  The  situation  grew  worse  and 
worse.  An  attempt  made  upon  the  life,  of  the  Grand 
Duke  Constantine  during  his  entry  into  Warsaw  was 
but  one  among  a  series  of  similar  acts  which  discredited 
the  Polish  cause  and  strengthened  those  who  at  St. 
Petersburg  had  from  the  first  condemned  the  Czar's 
attempts  at  conciliation.  At  length  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment took  the  step  which  precipitated  revolt.  A 
levy  of  one  in  every  two  hundred  of  the  population 
throughout  the  Empire  had  been  ordered  in  the  autumn 
of  1862.  Instructions  were  sent  from  St.  Petersburg 
to  the  effect  that  in  raising  this  levy  in  Poland 
the  country -population  were  to  be  spared,  and  that  all 
persons  who  were  known  to  be  connected  with  the 
disorders  in  the  towns  were  to  be  seized  as  soldiers. \ 
This  terrible  sentence  against  an  entire 

i  •  i  •      m        i  -i  t>  Levy  and  insur- 

pohtical   class  was   carried  out,    so   tar   as     rectioni/jan.i4 
it  lay  within  the  power  of  the  authorities, 
on  the    night   of   January    14th,    1863.      But  before 
the    imperial   press-gang    surrounded    the     houses    of 
its  victims  a  rumour  of  the  intended  blow  had  gone 
abroad.     In  the  preceding  hours,  and  during  the  night 
of  the  14th,  thousands  fled  from  Warsaw  and  the  other 
Polish   towns   into  the   forests.      There    they   formed 
themselves  into  armed  bands,  and  in  the  course  of  the 
next  few  days  a  guerilla  warfare   broke  out  wherever 


336  MODERN  EUROPE.  ises. 

Russian  troops  were  found  in  insufficient  strength  or  off 
their  guard.* 

The  classes  in  which  the  national  spirit  of  Poland 

lived  were  the  so-called  noblesse,  numbering  hundreds 

of  thousands,  the  town-populations,  and  the  priesthood. 

The  peasants,  crushed  and  degraded,  though  not  nomi- 

.      nally  in  servitude,  were  indifferent  to  the 

Poland  and  J 

national  cause.  On  the  neutrality,  if  not 
on  the  support,  of  the  peasants  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment could  fairly  reckon  ;  within  the  towns  it  found 
itself  at  once  confronted  by  an  invisible  national  Gov- 
ernment whose  decrees  were  printed  and  promulgated 
by  unknown  hands,  and  whose  sentences  of  death  were 
mercilessly  executed  against  those  whom  it  condemned 
as  enemies  or  traitors  to  the  national  cause.  So  extra- 
ordinary was  the  secrecy  which  covered  the  action  of 
this  National  Executive,  that  Milutine,  who  was  subse- 
quently sent  by  the  Czar  to  examine  into  the  affairs  of 
Poland,  formed  the  conclusion  that  it  had  possessed 
accomplices  within  the  Imperial  Government  at  St. 
Petersburg  itself.  The  Polish  cause  retained  indeed 
some  friends  in  Russia  even  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
insurrection ;  it  was  not  until  the  insurrection  passed 
the  frontier  of  the  kingdom  and  was  carried  by  the 
nobles  into  Lithuania  and  Podolia  that  the  entire 
Russian  nation  took  up  the  struggle  with  passionate 
and  vindictive  ardour  as  one  for  life  or  death.  It  was 
the  fatal  bane  of  Polish  nationality  that  the  days  of  its 

*  Raczynski,  Memoires  sur  la  Pologne,  p.  14.    B.  and  F.  State  Papers, 
1862-63,  p.  769. 


1863.  POLAND.  337 

greatness  had  left  it  a  claim  upon  vast  territories 
where  it  had  planted  nothing  but  a  territorial  aristo- 
cracy, and  where  the  mass  of  population,  if  not  actually 
Russian,  was  almost  indistinguishable  from  the  Rus- 
sians in  race  and  language,  and  belonged  like  them  to 
the  Greek  Church,  which  Catholic  Poland  had  always 
persecuted.  For  ninety  years  Lithuania  and  the  border- 
provinces  had  been  incorporated  with  the  Czar's  do- 
minions, and  with  the  exception  of  their  Polish  land- 
owners they  were  now  in  fact  thoroughly  Russian. 
When  therefore  the  nobles  of  these  provinces  de'clared 
that  Poland  must  be  reconstituted  with  the  limits  of 
1772,  and  subsequently  took  up  arms  in  concert  with 
the  insurrectionary  Government  at  Warsaw,  the  Rus- 
sian people,  from  the  Czar  to  the  peasant,  felt  the 
struggle  to  be  nothing  less  than  one  for  the  dismember- 
ment or  the  preservation  of  their  own  country,  and  the 
doom  of  Polish  nationality,  at  least  for  some  genera- 
tions, was  sealed.  The  diplomatic  intervention  of 
the  Western  Powers  on  behalf  of  the  constitutional 
rights  of  Poland  under  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  which 
was  to  some  extent  supported  by  Austria,  only 
prolonged  a  hopeless  struggle,  and  gave  unbounded 
popularity  to  Prince  Gortschakoff,  by  whom,  after  a 
show  of  courteous  attention  during  the  earlier  and 
still  perilous  stage  of  the  insurrection,  the  inter- 
ference of  the  Powers  was  resolutely  and  uncondition- 
ally repelled.  By  the  spring  of  1864  the  insurgents 
were  crushed  or  exterminated.  General  Muravieff,  the 
Governor  of  Lithuania,  fulfilled  his  task  against  the 
w 


338  MODERN  EUROPE.  1863-64. 

mutinous  nobles  of  this  province  with  unshrinking 
severity,  sparing  neither  life  nor  fortune  so  long  as  an 
enemy  of  Eussia  remained  to  be  overthrown.  It  was 
at  Wilna,  the  Lithuanian  capital,  not  at  Warsaw,  that 
the  terrors  of  Russian  repression  were  the  greatest. 
Muravieff's  executions  may  have  been  less  numerous 
than  is  commonly  supposed ;  but  in  the  form  of 
pecuniary  requisitions  and  fines  he  undoubtedly  aimed 
at  nothing  less  than  the  utter  ruin  of  a  great  part  of 
the  class  most  implicated  in  the  rebellion.  - 

In  Poland  itself  the  Czar,   after   some  hesitation, 

determined  once  and   for  all  to   establish   a  friend  to 

Eussia  in  every  homestead  of  the  kingdom 

measmes  in     by  making  the  peasant  owner  of  the  land 

Poland.  J 

on  which  he  laboured.  The  insurrectionary 
Government  at  the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion  had  at- 
tempted to  win  over  the  peasantry  by  promising  enact- 
ments to  this  effect,  but  no  one  had  responded  to  their 
appeal.  In  the  autumn  of  1863  the  Czar  recalled 
Milutine  from  his  enforced  travels  and  directed  him  to 
proceed  to  Warsaw,  in  order  to  study  the  affairs  of 
Poland  on  the  spot,  and  to  report  on  the  measures 
necessary  to  be  taken  for  its  future  government  and 
organisation.  Milutine  obtained  the  assistance  of  some 
of  the  men  who  had  laboured  most  earnestly  with  him 
in  the  enfranchisement  of  the  Eussian  serfs ;  and  in  the 
course  of  a  few  weeks  he  returned  to  St.  Petersburg, 
carrying  with  him  the  draft  of  measures  which  were  to 
change  the  face  of  Poland.  He  recommended  on  the 
one  hand  that  every  political  institution  separating 


1864  AGRARIAN  MEASURES   IN  POLAND.  339 

Poland  from  the  rest  of  the  Empire  should  be  swept 
away,  and  the  last  traces  of  Polish  independence  utterly 
obliterated ;  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  peasants,  as 
the  only  class  on  which  Russia  could  hope  to  count  in 
the  future,  should  be  made  absolute  and  independent 
owners  of  the  land  they  occupied.  Prince 
Gortschakoff,  who  had  still  some  regard  for  measures  in 

Poland,  1864. 

the  opinion  of  Western  Europe,  and  possibly 
some  sympathy  for  the  Polish  aristocracy,  resisted  this 
daring  policy  ;  but  the  Czar  accepted  Milutine's  counsel, 
and  gave  him  a  free  hand  in  the  execution  of  his 
agrarian  scheme.  The  division  of  the  land  between  the 
nobles  and  the  peasants  was  accordingly  carried  out  by 
Milutine's  own"  officers  under  conditions  very  different 
from  those  adopted  in  Russia.  The  whole  strength  of  the 
Government  was  thrown  on  to  the  side  of  the  peasant  and 
against  the  noble.  Though  the  population  was  denser  in 
Poland  than  in  Russia,  the  peasant  received  on  an  average 
four  times  as  much  land ;  the  compensation  made  to  the 
lords  (which  was  paid  in  bonds  which  immediately  fell 
to  half  their  nominal  value)  was  raised  not  by  quit-rents 
on  the  peasants'  lands  alone,  as  in  Russia,  but  by  a 
general  land-tax  falling  equally  on  the  land  left  to  the 
lords,  who  had  thus  to  pay  a  great  part  of  their  own 
compensation  :  above  all,  the  questions  in  dispute  were 
settled,  not  as  in  Russia  by  arbiters  elected  at  local 
assemblies  of  the  nobles,  but  by  officers  of  the  Crown. 
Moreover,  the  division  of  landed  property  was  not  made 
once  and  for  all,  as  in  Russia,  but  the  woods  and 
pastures  remaining  to  the  lords  continued  subject  to 
w  2 


340  MODERN  EUROPE.  1864. 

undefined  common-rights  of  the  peasants.  These  com- 
mon-rights were  deliberately  left  unsettled  in  order 
that  a  source  of  contention  might  always  be  present 
between  the  greater  and  the  lesser  proprietors,  and  that 
the  latter  might  continue  to  look  to  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment as  the  protector  or  extender  of  their  interests. 
"  We  hold  Poland,"  said  a  Russian  statesman,  "  by  its 
rights  of  common."* 

Milutine,  who,  with  all  the  fiery  ardour  of  his 
national  and  levelling  policy,  seems  to  have  been  a 
gentle  and  somewhat  querulous  invalid,  and  who  was 
shortly  afterwards  struck  down  by  paralysis,  to  remain 
a  helpless  spectator  of  the  European  changes  of  the 
next  six  years,  had  no  share  in  that  warfare  against 
the  language,  the  religion,  and  the  national 
and  polish  culture  of  Poland  with  which  Russia  has 

nationality. 

pursued  its  victory  since  1863.  The  public 
life  of  Poland  he  was  determined  to  Russianise ;  its 
private  and  social  life  he  would  probably  have  left 
unmolested,  relying  on  the  goodwill  of  the  great  mass 
of  peasants  who  owed  their  proprietorship  to  the  action 
of  the  Czar.  There  were,  however,  politicians  at  Moscow 
and  St.  Petersburg  who  believed  that  the  deep-lying 
instinct  of  nationality  would  for  the  first  time  be  called 
into  real  life  among  these  peasants  by  their  very  eleva- 
tion from  misery  to  independence,  and  that  where 
Russia  had  hitherto  had  three  hundred  thousand 
enemies  Milutine  was  preparing  for  it  six  millions.  It 
was  the  dread  of  this  possibility  in  the  future,  the 

*  Lcroy-Beaulieu,  Homme  d'etat  Russe,  p.  259. 


MM  POLAND.  :H1 

apprehension  that  material  interests  might  not  perma- 
nently vanquish  the  subtler  forces  which  pass  from 
generation  to  generation,  latent,  if  still  unconscious, 
where  nationality  itself  is  not  lost,  that  made  the 
Russian  Government  follow  up  the  political  destruc- 
tion of  the  Polish  noblesse  by  measures  directed  against 
Polish  nationality  itself,  even  at  the  risk  of  alienating ; 
the  class  who  for  the  present  were  effectively  won  over  L 
to  the  Czar's  cause.  By  the  side  of  its  life-giving 
and  beneficent  agrarian  policy  Russia  has  pursued  the 
odious  system  of  debarring  Poland  from  all  means  of 
culture  and  improvement  associated  with  the  use  of  its 
own  language,  and  has  aimed  at  eventually  turning  the 
Poles  into  Russians  by  the  systematic  impoverishment 
and  extinction  of  all  that  is  essentially  Polish  in  thought, 
in  sentiment,  and  in  expression.  The  work  may  .prove 
to  be  one  not  beyond  its  power ;  and  no  common  per- 
versity on  the  part  of  its  Government  would  be  neces- 
sary to  turn  against  Russia  the  millions  who  in  Poland 
owe  all  they  have  of  prosperity  and  independence  to  the 
Czar :  but  should  the  excess  of  Russian  propagandism, 
or  the  hostility  of  Church  to  Church,  at  some  distant 
date  engender  a  new  struggle  for  Polish  independence, 
this  struggle  will  be  one  governed  by  other  conditions 
than  those  of  1831  or  18G3,  and  Russia  will,  for  the 
first  time,  have  to  conquer  on  the  Vistula  not  a  class 
nor  a  city,  but  a  nation. 

It  was  a  matter  of  no  small  importance  to  Bismarck 
and  to  Prussia  that  in  the  years  1863  and  1864  the 
Court  of  St.  Petersburg  found  itself  confronted  with 


342  MODERN  EUROPE.  1864. 

affairs  of  such  seriousness  in  Poland.     From  the  oppor- 
tunity which  was  then  presented  to  him  of  obliging 
an   important  neighbour,  arid   of  profiting 

Berlin  and  St.  -  '  •     i  i  >  •     •         -\  T_ 

Petersburg,  by  that  neighbour  s  conjoined  embarrass- 
ment and  goodwill,  Bismarck  drew  full  ad- 
vantage. He  had  always  regarded  the  Poles  as  a  mere 
nuisance  in  Europe,  and  heartily  despised  the  Germans 
for  the  sympathy  which  they  had  shown  towards  Poland 
in  1848.  When  the  insurrection  of  1863  broke  out, 
Bismarck  set  the  policy  of  his  own  country  in  emphatic 
contrast  with  that  of  Austria  and  the  Western  Powers, 
and  even  entered  into  an  arrangement  with  Russia  for 
an  eventual  military  combination  in  case  the  insurgents 
should  pass  from  one  side  to  the  other  of  the  frontier.* 
Throughout  the  struggle  with  the  Poles,  and  through- 
out the  diplomatic  conflict  with  the  Western  Powers, 
the  Czar  had  felt  secure  in  the  loyalty  of  the  stub- 
born Minister  at  Berlin;  and  when,  at  the  close  of 
the  Polish  revolt,  the  events  occurred  which  opened  to 
Prussia  the  road  to  political  fortune,  Bismarck  received 
his  reward  in  the  liberty  jof  action  given  him  by  the 
Eussian  Government.  The  difficulties  connected  with 
Schleswig-Holstein,  which,  after  a  short  interval  of  tran- 
quillity following  the  settlement  of  1852,  had  again 
begun  to  trouble  Europe,  were  forced  to  the  very  front 
of  Continental  affairs  by  the  death  of  Frederick  VII., 
King  of  Denmark,  in  November,  1863.  Prussia  had 
now  at  its  head  a  statesman  resolved  rto  pursue  to  their 
extreme  limit  the  chances  which  this  complication 

*  Halm,  i.  112.     Verhandl.  des  Preuss.  Abgeord.  iiber  Polen,  p.  45. 


1832-st.  SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.  343 

offered  to  his  own  country ;  and,  more  fortunate  than 
his  predecessors  of  1848,  Bismarck  had  not  to  dread  the 
interference  of  the  Czar  of  Russia  as  the  patron  and 
protector  of  the  interests  of  the  Danish  court. 

By  the  Treaty  of  London,  signed  on  May  8th,  1852, 
all  the  great  Powers,  including  Prussia*  had  recognised 
the  principle  of  the  integrity  of  the  Danish  gc}?leswi(?.Hoi- 
Monarchy,  and  had  pronounced  Prince 
Christian  of  Gliicksburg  to  be  heir-presumptive  to  the 
whole  dominions  of  the  reigning  King.  The  rights  of 
the  German  Federation  in  Holstein  were  nevertheless 
declared  to  remain  unprejudiced;  and  in  a  Convention 
made  with  Austria  and  Prussia  before  they  joined  in  this 
Treaty,  King  Frederick  VII.  had  undertaken  to  conform 
to  certain  rules  in  his  treatment  of  Schleswig  as  well  as 
of  Holstein.  The  Duke  of  Augustenburg,  claimant  to 
the  succession  in  Schleswig-Holstein  through  the  male 
line,  had  renounced  his  pretensions  in  consideration  of 
an  indemnity  paid  to  him  by  the  King  of  Denmark. 
This  surrender,  however,  had  not  received  the  consent 
of  his  son  and  of  the  other  members  of  the  House  of 
Augustenburg,  nor  had  the  German  Federation,  as  such, 
been  a  party  to  the  Treaty  of  London.  Belying  on  the 
declaration  of  the  Great  Powers  in  favour  of  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Danish  Kingdom,  Frederick  VII.  had 
resumed  his  attempts  to  assimilate  Schleswig,  and  in 
some  degree  Holstein,  to  the  rest  of  the  Monarchy ;  and 
although  the  Provincial  Estates  were  allowed  to  remain 
in  existence,  .a  national  Constitution'  was  established 
in  October,  1855,  for  the  entire  Danish  State. 


344  MODERN  EUROPE.  1852-64. 

Bitter  complaints  were  made  of  the  system  of  repres- 
sion and  encroachment  with  which  the  Government  of 
Copenhagen  was  attempting  to  extinguish  German  nation- 
ality in  the  border-provinces ;  at  length,  in  November, 
1858,  under  threat  of  armed  intervention  by  the  German 
Federation,  Frederick  consented  to  exclude  Holstein 
from  the  operation  of  the  new  Constitution.  But 
this  did  not  produce  peace,  for  j  the  inhabitants  of 
Schleswig,  severed  from  the  sister- province  and  now 
excited  by  the  Italian  war,  raised  all  the  more  vigor- 
ous a  protest  against  their  own  incorporation  with 
Denmark ;  while  in  Holstein  itself  the  Government 
incurred  the  charge  of  unconstitutional  action  in  fixing 
the  Budget  without  the  consent  of  the  Estates.  The 
German  Federal  Diet  again  threatened  to  resort  to 
force,  and  Denmark  prepared  for  war.  Prussia  took  up 
the  cause  of  Schleswig  in  1861;  and  even  the  British 
Government,  which  had  hitherto  shown  far  more  in- 
terest in  the  integrity  of  Denmark  than  in  the  rights 
of  the  German  provinces,  now  recommended  that 
the  Constitution  of  1855  should  .be  abolished,  and 
that  a  separate  legislation  and  administration  should 
be  granted  to  Schleswig  as  well  as  to  Holstein.  The 
Danes,  however,  were  bent  on  preserving  Schleswig 
as  an  integral  part  of  the  State,  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  King  Frederick,  while  willing  to  recognise 
Holstein  as  outside  Danish  territory  proper,  insisted 
that  Schleswig  should  be  included  within  the  unitary 
Constitution,  and  that  Holstein  should  contribute  a 
fixed  share  to  the  national  expenditure.  A  manifesto 


1863.  SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.  345 

to  this  effect,  published  by  King  Frederick  on  the 
30th  of  March,  18C3,  was  the  immediate  The Patent of 
ground  of  the  conflict  now  about  to  break 
out  between  Germany  and  Denmark.  The  Diet  of 
Frankfort  announced  that  if  this  proclamation  were 
not  revoked  it  should  proceed  to  Federal  execution, 
that  is,  armed  intervention,  against  the  King  of  Den- 
mark as  Duke  of  Holstein.  Still  counting  upon  foreign 
aid  or  upon  the  impotence  of  the  Diet,  the  Danish 
Government  refused  to  change  its  policy,  and  on  the 
29th  of  September  laid  before  the  Parliament  at  Copen- 
hagen the  law  incorporating  Schleswig  with  the  rest  of 
the  Monarchy  under  the  new  Constitution.  Negotia- 
tions were  thus  brought  to  a  close,  and  on  the  1st  of 
October  the  Diet  decreed  the  long-threatened  Federal 
execution.* 

Affairs  had  reached  this   stage,  and  the  execution 
had  not  yet  been  put  in  force,  when,  on  the  15th  of 
November,  King  Frederick  VII.  died.    For 
a  moment    it    appeared    possible   that    his     Frederick vn., 

November,  18G3. 

successor,  Prince  Christian  of  Gliicksburg, 
might  avert  the  conflict  with  Germany  by  withdrawing 
from  the  position  which  his  predecessor  had  taken  up. 
But  the  Danish  people  and  Ministry  were  little  inclined 
to  give  way  ;  the  Constitution  had  passed  through  Par- 
liament two  days  before  King  Frederick's  death,  and 
on  the  18th  of  November  it  received  the  assent  of  the 
new  monarch.  German  national  feeling  was  now  as 

*  Parliamentary  Papers,  1864,  vol.  Ixiv.  pp.  28,  263.    Hakn,  Bismarck, 
i.  165. 


346  MODERN  EUROPE.  1863. 

strongly  excited  on  the  question  of  Schleswig-Holstein 
as  it  had  been  in  1848.  The  general  cry  was  that  the 
union  of  these  provinces  with  Denmark  must  be  treated 
as  at  an  end,  and  their  legitimate  ruler,  Frederick  of 
Augustenburg,  son  of  the  Duke  who  had  renounced 
his  rights,  be  placed  on  the  throne.  The  Diet  of  Frank- 
fort, however,  decided  to  recognise  neither  of  the  two 
rival  sovereigns  in  Holstein  until  its  own  intervention 
should  have  taken  place.  Orders  were  given  that 
a  Saxon  and  a  Hanoverian  corps  should  enter  the 
country ;  and  although  Prussia  and  Austria  had 
made  a  secret  agreement  that  the  settlement  of  the 
Schleswig-Holstein  question  was  to  be  conducted  by 
themselves  independently  of  the  Diet,  the  tide  of 
popular  enthusiasm  ran  so  high  that  for  the  moment 
the  two  leading  Powers  considered  it  safer  not  to 
obstruct  the  Federal  authority,  and  the  Saxon  and 
Hanoverian  troops  accordingly  entered  Hol- 
tion  in Hoistein.  stein  as  mandatories  of  the  Diet  at  the  end 

December,  1863. 

of  1863.  The  Danish  Government,  offer- 
ing no  resistance,  withdrew  its  troops  .across  the  river 
Eider  into  Schleswig. 

From  this   time   the   history    of   Germany   is   the 

history  of  the  profound  and  audacious  statecraft  and  of 

the  overmastering  will  of  Bismarck  ;  the  nation,  except 

through  its  valour  on  the  battle-field,  ceases  to  influence 

the    shaping   of  its  own  fortunes.       What 

Plans  ot  -^        ~ 

the  German  people  desired  in  1864  was 
that  Schleswig-Holstein  should  be  attached,  under  a 
ruler  of  its  own,  to  the  German  Federation  as  it  then 


1861.  POLICY.   OF  BISMARCK.  347 

existed ;  what  Bismarck  intended  was  that  Schleswig- 
Holstein,  itself  incorporated  more  or  less  directly  with 
Prussia,  should  be  made  the  means  of  the  -destruction 
of  the  existing  Federal  system  and  of  the  expulsion  of 
Austria  from  Germany.  That  another  petty  State, 
bound  to  Prussia  by  no  closer  tie  than  its  other 
neighbours,  should  be  added  to  the  troop  among  whom 
Austria  found  its  vassals  and  its  instruments,  would 
have  been  in  Bismarck's  eyes  no  gain  but  actual  detri- 
ment to  Germany.  The  German  people  desired  one 
course  of  action ;  Bismarck  had  determined  on  some- 
thing totally  different ;  and  with  matchless  resolution 
and  skill  he  bore  down  all  opposition  of  people  and  of 
Courts,  and  forced  .a  reluctant  nation  to  the  goal  which 
he  had  himself  .chosen  for  it.  The  first  point  of  con- 
flict was  the  apparent  recognition  by  Bismarck  of  the 
rights  of  King  Christian  IX.  as  lawful  sovereign  in 
•"the  Duchies  as  well  as  in  the  rest  of  the  Danish  State. 
By  the  Treaty  of  London  Prussia  had  indeed  pledged 
itself  to  this  recognition  ;  but  the  German  Federation 
had  been  no  party  to  the  Treaty,  and  under  the  pressure 
of  a  vehement  national  agitation  Bavaria  and  the  minor 
States  one  after  another  recognised  Frederick  of  Augus- 
tenburg  as  Duke  of  Schleswig-Holstein.  Bismarck  was 
accused  alike  by  the  Prussian  Parliament  and  by  the 
popular  voice  of  Germany  at  large  of  betraying  German 
interests  to  Denmark,  of  abusing  Prussia's  position  as  a 
Great  Power,  of  inciting  the  nation  to  civil  war.  In 
vain  he  declared  that,  while  surrendering  no  iota  of 
German  rights,  the  Government  of  Berlin  must  recognise 


348  MODERN  EUROPE.  1864. 

those  treaty-obligations  with  which  its  own  legal  title  to 
a  voice  in  the  affairs  of  Schleswig  was  intimately  bound 
up,  and  that  the  King  of  Prussia,  not  a  multitude  of 
irresponsible  and  ill-informed  citizens,  must  be  the 
judge  of  the  measures  by  which  German  interests  were 
to  be  effectually  protected.  His  words  made  no  single 
convert  either  in  the  Prussian  Parliament  or  in  the 
Federal  Diet.  At  Frankfort  the  proposal  made  by  the 
two  leading  Powers  that  King  Christian  should  be  re- 
quired to  annul  the  November  Constitution,  and  that 
in  case  of  his  refusal  Schleswig  also  should  be  occupied, 
was  rejected,  as  involving  an  acknowledgment  of  the 
title  of  Christian  as  reigning  sovereign.  At  Berlin  the 
Lower  Chamber  refused  the  supplies  which  Bismarck 
demanded  for  operations  in  the  Duchies,  and  formally 
resolved  to  resist  his  policy  by  every  means  at  its  com- 
mand. But  the  resistance  of  Parliament  and  of  Diet  were 
alike  in  vain.  By  a  masterpiece  of  diplomacy  Bismarck 
had  secured  the  support  and  co-operation  of  Austria  in 
his  own  immediate  Danish  policy,  though 
Austria0 and  but  a  few  months  before  he  had  incurred 

Prussia. 

the  bitter  hatred  of  the  Court  of  Vienna 
by  frustrating  its  plans  for  a  reorganisation  of  Germany 
by  a  Congress  of  princes  at  Frankfort,  and  had  frankly 
declared  to  the  Austrian  ambassador  at  Berlin  that  if 
Austria  did  not  transfer  its  political  centre  to  Pesth 
and  leave  to  Prussia  free  scope  in  Germany,  it  would 
find  Prussia  on  the  side  of  its  enemies  in  the  next 
war  in  which  it  might  be  engaged.*  But  the 

*  From  Rechberg'd  despatch  of  Feb.  28, 1863  (in  Hahn,  i.  84),  apparently 


Bti  PRUSSIA   AND   AUSTRIA.  349 

democratic  and  impassioned  character  of  the  agitation 
in  the  minor  States  in  favour  of  the  Schleswig-Hol- 
steiners  and  their  Augustenburg  pretender  had  enabled 
Bismarck  to  represent  this  movement  to  the  Austrian 
Government  as  a  revolutionary  one,  an^  by  a  dexterous 
appeal  to  the  memories  of  1848  to  awe  the  Em- 
peror's advisers  into  direct  concert  with  the  Court  of 
Berlin,  as  the  representative  of  monarchical  order,  in 
dealing  with  a  problem  otherwise  too  likely  to  be  solved 
by  revolutionary  methods  and  revolutionary  forces. 
Count  liechberg,  the  Foreign  Minister  at  Vienna, 
was  lured  into  a  policy  which,  after  drawing  upon 
Austria  a  full  share  of  the  odium  of  Bismarck's  Danish 
plans,  after  forfeiting  for  it  the  goodwill  of  the  minor 
States  with  which  it  might  have  kept  Prussia  in  check, 
and  exposing  it  to  the  risk  of  a  European  war,  was  to 
confer  upon  its  rival  the  whole  profit  of  the  joint  enter- 
Jfise,  and  to  furnish  a  pretext  for  the  struggle  by  which 
Austria  was  to  be  expelled  alike  from  Germany  and 
from  what  remained  to  it  of  Italy.  But  of  the  nature 
of  the  toils  into  which  he  was  now  taking  the  first  fatal 
and  irrevocable  step  Count  Rechberg  appears  to  have 
had  no  suspicion.  A  seeming  cordiality  united  the 
Austrian  and  Prussian  Governments  in  the  policy  of 
defiance  to  the  will  of  all  the  rest  of  Germany  and  to  the 
demand)  of  their  own  subjects.  It  was  to  no  purpose 
that  the  Federal  Diet  vetoed  the  proposed  summons  to 

quoting  actual  words  uttered  by  Bismarck.  Bismarck's  account  of  the 
conversation  (id.  80)  tones  it  down  to  a  demand  that  Austr  a  should 
not  encroach  on  Prussia's  recognised  joint-leadership  in  Germany. 


350  MODERN  EUROPE.  1864. 

King  Christian  and  the  proposed  occupation  of  Schles- 

wig.      Austria   and    Prussia    delivered    an   ultimatum 

at  Copenhagen  demanding  the  repeal  of  the 

Austrian  and 

LrterSlsdiSg.  November  Constitution  ;  and  on  its  rejection 
their  troops  entered  Schleswig,  not  as  the 
mandatories  of  the  German  Federation,  but  as  the 
instruments  of  two  independent  and  allied  Powers. 
(Feb.  1,  1864.). 

Against  the  overwhelming  forces  by  which  they 
were  thus  attacked  the  Danes  could  only  make  a  brave1 
but  ineffectual  resistance.  Their  first  line  of  defence 
was  the  Danewerke,  a  fortification  extending  east  and 
west  towards  the  sea  from  the  town  of 
schiesawig.  JFeb.  Sclileswigr.  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  who 

— April,  1864. 

commanded  the  Prussian  right,  was  re- 
pulsed in  an  attack  upon  the  easternmost  part  of  this 
work  at  Missunde ;  the  Austrians,  however,  carried 
some  positions  in  the  centre  which  commanded  the 
defenders'  lines,  and  the  Danes  fell  back  upon  the  forti- 
fied post  of  Diippel,  covering  the  narrow  channel  which 
separates  the  island  of  Alsen  from  the  mainland.  Here 
for  some  weeks  they  held  the  Prussians  in  check,  while 
the  Austrians,  continuing  the  march  northwards,  en- 
tered Jutland.  At  length,  on  the  18th  of  April,  after 
several  hours  of  heavy  bombardment,  the  lines  of 
Diippel  were  taken  by  storm  and  the  defenders  driven 
across  the  channel  into  Alsen.  Unable  to  pursue  the 
enemy  across  this  narrow  strip  of  sea,  the  Prussians 
joined  their  allies  in  Jutland,  and  occupied  the  whole 
of  the  Danish  mainland  as  far  as  the  Lum  Fiord.  The 


186*.  THE   DANISH    WAR.  351 

war,  however,  was  not  to  be  terminated  without  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  neutral  Powers  to  arrive  at 
a  settlement  by  diplomacy.  A  Conference  was  opened 
at  London  on  the  20th  of  April,  and  after  three  weeks 
of  negotiation  the  belligerents  were  induced  to  accept 
an  armistice.  As  the  troops  of  the  German  Federation, 
though  unconcerned  in  the  military  operations  of  the 
two  Great  Powers,  were  in  possession  of  Holstein,  the 
Federal  Government  was  invited  to  take  part  in  the 
Conference.  It  was  represented  by  Count  Beust,  Prime 
Minister  of  Saxony,  a  politician  who  was  soon  to  rise 
to  much  greater  eminence ;  but  in  consequence  of 
the  diplomatic  union  of  Prussia  and  Austria  the 
views  entertained  by  the  Governments  of  the  secondary 
German  States  had  now  no  real  bearing  on  the  course 
of  events,  and  Count  Beust's  earliest  appearance  on 
the  great  European  stage  was  without  result,  except 
in  its  influence  on  his  own  career.* 

The  first  proposition  laid  before  the  Conference  was 
that  submitted  by  Bernstorff,  the  Prussian  envoy,  to 
the  effect  that  Schleswig-Holstein  should 

i     ,       .      i  . ,  .  .  Conference  of 

receive  complete  independence,  the  question  London.  April 
whether  King  Christian  or  some  other 
prince  should  be  sovereign  of  the  new  State  being 
reserved  for  future  settlement.  To  this  the  Danish 
envoys  replied  that  even  on  the  condition  of  personal 
union  with  Denmark  through  the  Crown  they  could 
not  assent  to  the  grant  of  complete  independence  to 
the  Duchies.  Eaising  their  demand  in  consequence  of 

*  B.  and  F.  State  Papers,  1863-4,  p.  173.     Beust,  Erinnerungen,  i.  336. 


352  MODERN  EUROPE.  1864. 

this  refusal,  and  declaring  that  the  war  had  made  an 
end  of  the  obligations   subsisting  under    the   London 
Treaty   of   1852,    the   two   German    Powers    then    de- 
manded that  Schleswig-Holstein  should  be  completely 
separated   from   Denmark    and   formed    into    a   single 
State   under   Frederick  of  Augustenburg,   who  in  the 
eyes  of  Germany  possessed  the  best  claim  to  the  suc- 
cession.    Lord    Russell,    while    denying  that  the  acts 
or   defaults    of   Denmark    could   liberate    Austria   and 
Prussia    from    their    engagements    made    with    other 
Powers  in  the   Treaty  of   London,   admitted  that  no 
satisfactory  result  was  likely  to  arise  from  the  continued 
union  of  the  Duchies  with    Denmark,  and   suggested 
that  King  Christian  should  make  an  absolute  cession  of 
Holstein  and  of  the  southern  part  of  Schleswig,  retain- 
ing the  remainder  in  full  sovereignty.     The  frontier- 
line  he  proposed  to  draw  at  the  River  Schlei.     To  this 
principle  of  partition  both  Denmark  and  the  German 
Powers  assented,  but  it  proved  impossible  to  reach  an 
agreement  on  the  frontier-line.     Bernstorff,   who   had 
at  first  required  , nearly  all  Schleswig,  abated  his  de- 
mands, and  would  have  accepted  a  line  drawn  westward 
from  Flensburg,  so  leaving  to  Denmark  at  least  half 
the  province,  including  the  important  position  of  Diip- 
pel.     The   terms   thus    offered    to   Denmark   were  not 
unfavourable.     Holstein  it   did  not  expect,  and  could 
scarcely   desire,    to   retain ;    and    the   territory   which 
would  have  been  taken  from  it  in  Schleswig  under  this 
arrangement  included  few  districts  that  were  not  really 
German.     But  the  Government  of  Copenhagen,  misled 


1864.  TREATY  OF  VIENNA.  353 

by  the  support  given  to  it  at  the  Conference  by  England 
and  Russia — a  support  which  was  one  of  words  only — 
refused  to  cede  anything  north  of  the  town  of  Schleswig. 
Even  when  in  the  last  resort  Lord  Russell  proposed 
that  the  frontier-line  should  be  settled,  by  arbitration 
the  Danish  Government  held  fast  to  its  refusal,  and  for 
the  sake  of  a  few  miles  of  territory  plunged  once  more 
into  a  struggle  which,  if  it  was  not  to  kindle  a  Euro- 
pean war  of  vast  dimensions,  could  end  only  in  the 
ruin  of  the  Danes.  The  expected  help  Continuation  of 
failed  them.  Attacked  and  overthrown  in 
the  island  of  Alsen,  the  German  flag  carried  to  the 
northern  extremity  of  their  mainland,  they  were  com- 
pelled to  make  peace  on  their  enemies'  terms.  Hostilities 
were  brought  to  a  close  by  the  signature  of  Preliminaries 
on  the  1st  of  August ;  and  by  the  Treaty  of  Vienna, 
concluded  on  the  30th  of  October,  1864,  _ 

Treaty  of  Vienna, 

King   Christian   ceded   his    rights   in   the 
whole  of  Schleswig-Holstein  to  the  sovereigns  of  Austria 
and  Prussia  jointly,  and  undertook  to  recognise  whatever 
dispositions  they  might  make  of  those  provinces. 

The  British  Government  throughout  this  conflict  had 
played  a  sorry  part,  at  one  moment  threatening  the  Ger- 
mans, at  another  using  language  towards  the  Danes  which 
might  well  be  taken  to  indicate  an  intention 
of  lending  them  armed  support.     To  some     andNapoieon 
extent  the  errors  of  the  Cabinet  were  due  to 
the  relation  which  existed  between  Great  Britain  and 
Napoleon  III.     It  had  up  to  this  time  been  considered 
both  at  London  and  at  Paris    that  the  Allies  of  the 
x 


354  MODERN  EUROPE.  1863-64. 

Crimea  had  still  certain  common  interests  in  Europe ; 
and  in  the  unsuccessful  intervention  at  St.  Petersburg 
on  behalf  of  Poland  in  1863  the  British  and  French 
Governments  had  at  first  gone  hand  in  hand.  But 
behind  every  step  openly  taken  by  Napoleon  III. 
there  was  some  half-formed  design  for  promoting  the 
interests  of  his  dynasty  or  extending  the  frontiers  of 
France ;  and  if  England  had  consented  to  support  the 
diplomatic  concert  at  St.  Petersburg  by  measures  of  force, 
it  would  have  found  itself  engaged  in  a  war  in  which 
other  ends  than  those  relating  to  Poland  would  have 
been  the  foremost.  Towards  the  close  of  the  year  1863 
Napoleon  had  proposed  that  a  European  Congress 
should  assemble,  in  order  to  regulate  not  only  the 
affairs  of  Poland  but  all  those  European  questions 
which  remained  unsettled.  This  proposal  had  been 
abruptly  declined  by  the  English  Government ;  and 
when  in  the  course  of  the  Danish  war  Lord  Palmerston 
showed  an  inclination  to  take  up  arms  if  France  would 
do  the  same,  Napoleon  was  probably  not  sorry  to  have 
the  opportunity  of  repaying  England  for  its  rejection 
of  his  own  overtures  in  the  previous  year.  He  had 
moreover  hopes  of  obtaining  from'  Prussia  an  extension 
of  the  French  frontier  either  in  Belgium  or  towards  the 
Ehine.*  In  reply  to  overtures  from  London,  Napoleon 

*  Bismarck's  note  of  July  29th,  1870,  in  Hahn,  i.  506,  describing 
Napoleon's  Belgian  project,  which  dated  from  the  time  when  he  was  him- 
self ambassador  at  Paris  in  1862,  gives  this  as  the  explanation  of  Napo- 
leon's policy  in  1864.  The  Commercial  Treaty  with  Prussia  and  friendly 
personal  relations  with  Bismarck  also  influenced  Napoleon's  views.  See 
Bismarck's  speech  of  Feb.  21st,  1879,  on  this  subject,  in  Hahn,  iii.  599. 


ISM.  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE.  355 

stated  that  the  cause  of  Schleswig-Holstein  to  some 
extent  represented  the  principle  of  nationality,  to  which 
France  was  friendly,  and  that  of  all  wars  in  which 
France  could  engage  a  war  with  Germany  would  be  the 
least  desirable.  England  accordingly,  if  it  took  up  arms 
for  the  Danes,  would  have  been  compelled  to  enter  the  war 
alone  ;  and  although  at  a  later  time,  when  the  war  was 
over  and  the  victors  were  about  to  divide  the  spoil,  the 
British  and  French  fleets  ostentatiously  combined  in  man- 
oauvres  at  Cherbourg,  this  show  of  union  deceived  no 
one,  least  of  all  the  resolute  and  well-informed  director 
of  affairs  at  Berlin.  To  force,  and  force  alone,  would 
Bismarck  have  yielded.  Palmerston,  now  sinking  into 
old  age,  permitted  Lord  Russell  to  parody  his  own 
fierce  language  of  twenty  years  back;  but  all  the  world, 
except  the  Danes,  knew  that  the  fangs  and  the  claws 
were  drawn,  and  that  British  foreign  policy  had  become 
-for  the  time  a  thing  of  snarls  and  grimaces.  / 

Bismarck  had  not  at  first  determined  actually  to 
annex  Schleswig-Holstein  to  Prussia.  He  would  have 
been  content  to  leave  it  under  the  nominal 

Intentions  of 

sovereignty  of  Frederick  of  Augustenburg     iSSS^"* 
if  that  prince  would  have  placed  the  entire 
military   and   naval    resources    of    Schleswig-Holstein 
under  the  control  of  the  Government  of  Berlin,  and 
have  accepted  on  behalf  of  his  Duchies  conditions  which 
Bismarck   considered   indispensable   to   German   union 
under  Prussian  leadership.     In  the  harbour  of  Kiel  it 
was  not  difficult  to  recognise  the  natural  headquarters 
of   a  future   German  fleet ;   the    narrow   strip  of  land 
x  2  ' 


356"  MODERN  EUROPE.  1864 

projecting  between  the  two  seas  naturally  suggested 
the  formation  of  a  canal  connecting  the  Baltic  with  the 
German  Ocean,  and  such  a  work  could  only  belong  to 
Germany  at  large  or  to  its  leading  Power.  Moreover, 
as  a  frontier  district,  Schleswig-Holstein  was  peculiarly 
exposed  to  foreign  attack  ;  certain  strategical  positions 
necessary  for  its  defence  must  therefore  be  handed  over 
to  its  protector.  That  Prussia  should  have  united  its 
forces  with  Austria  in  order  to  win  for  the  Schleswig- 
Holsteiners  the  power  of  governing  themselves  as  they 
pleased,  must  have  seemed  to  Bismarck  a  supposition  in 
the  highest  degree  preposterous.  He  had  taken  up  the 
cause  of  the  Duchies  not  in  the  interest  of  the  inhabi- 
tants but  in  the  interest  of  Germany ;  and  by  Germany 
he  understood  Germany  centred  at  Berlin  and  ruled  by 
the  House  of  Hohenzollern.  If  therefore  the  Augus- 
tenburg  prince  was  not  prepared  to  accept  his  throne 
on  these  terms,  there  was  no  room  for  him,  and  the 
provinces  must  be  incorporated  with  Prussia  itself. 
That  Austria  would  not  without  compensation  permit 
the  Duchies  thus  to  fall  directly  or  indirectly  under 
Prussian  sway  was  of  course  well  known  to  Bismarck ; 
but  so  far  was  this  from  causing  him  any  hesitation  in 
his  policy,  that  from  the  first  he  had  discerned  in  the 
Schleswig-Holstein  question  a  favourable  pretext  for 
the  war  which  was  to  drive  Austria  out  of  Germany. 

Peace  with  Denmark  was  scarcely  concluded  when, 
at  the  bidding  of  Prussia,  reluctantly  supported  by 
Austria,  the  Saxon  and  Hanoverian  troops  which  had 
entered  Holstein  as  the  mandatories  of  the  Federal  Diet 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA.  357 

were  compelled  to  leave  the  country.  A  Provisional 
Government  was  established  under  the  direction  of  an 
Austrian  and  a  Prussian  Commissioner.  Bismarck  had 
met  the  Prince  of  Augustenburg  at  Berlin  some  months 
before,  and  had  formed  an  unfavourable  opinion  of 
the  policy  likely  to  be  adopted  by  hira  towards  Prussia. 
All  Germany,  however,  was  in  favour  of  the  Prince's 
claims,  and  at  the  Conference  of  London  these  claims 
had  been  supported  by  the  Prussian  envoy  himself.  In 
order  to  give  some  appearance  of  formal  legality  to  his 
own  action,  Bismarck  had  to  obtain  from  the  Crown- 
jurists  of  Prussia  a  decision  that  King  Christian  IX.  had, 
contrary  to  the  general  opinion  of  Germany,  been  the 
lawful  inheritor  of  Schleswig-Holstein,  and 

Relations  of 

that  the  Prince  of  Augustenburg  had  there-  SSSS^Dlc., 
fore  no  rights  whatever  in  the  Duchies. 
As  the  claims  of  Christian  hud  been  transferred  by  the 
Treaty  of  Vienna  to  the  sovereigns  of  Austria  and 
'  Prussia  jointly,  it  rested  with  them  to  decide  who 
should  be  Duke  of  Schleswig-Holstein,  and  under  what 
conditions.  Bismarck  announced  at  Vienna  on  the 
22nd  of  February,  1865,  the  terms  on  which  he  was 
willing  that  Schleswig-Holstein  should  be  conferred  by 
the  two  sovereigns  upon  Frederick  of  Augustenburg. 
He  required,  in  addition  to  community  of  finance, 
postal  system,  and  railways,  that  Prussian  law,  including 
the  obligation  to  military  service,  should  be  introduced 
into  the  Duchies ;  that  their  regiments  should  take  the 
oath  of  fidelity  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  that  tluir 
principal  military  positions  should  be  held  by  Prussian 


358  MODEEN  EUIiOPE.  IMS. 

troops.  These  conditions  would  have  made  Schleswig- 
Holstein  in  all  but  name  a  part  of  the  Prussian  State  : 
they  were  rejected  both  by  the  Court  of  Vienna  and  by 
Prince  Frederick  himself,  and  the  population  of  Schles- 
wig-Holstein  almost  unanimously  declared  against  them. 
Both  Austria  and  the  Federal  Diet  now  supported  the 
Schleswig-Holsteiners  in  what  appeared  to  be  a  struggle 
on  behalf  of  their  independence  against  Prussian 
domination;  and  when  the  Prussian  Commissioner  in 
Schleswig-Holstein  expelled  the  most  prominent  of  the 
adherents  of  Augustenburg,  his  Austrian  colleague 
published  a  protest  declaring  the  act  to  be  one  of  law- 
less violence.  It  seemed  that  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  the  two  rival  Powers  could  not  long  be  de- 
layed ;  but  Bismarck  had  on  this  occasion  moved  too 
rapidly  for  his  master,  and  considerations  relating  to 
the  other  European  Powers  made  it  advisable  to  post- 
convention  of  pone  the  rupture  for  some  months.  An 
1865.  agreement  was  patched  up  at  Grastein  by 

which,  pending  an  ultimate  settlement,  the  government 
of  the  two  provinces  was  divided  between  their  masters, 
Austria  taking  the  administration  of  Holstein,  Prussia 
that  of  Schleswig,  while  the  little  district  of  Lauenburg 
on  the  south  was  made  over  to  King  William  in  full 
sovereignty.  An  actual  conflict  between  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  two  rival  governments  at  their  joint  head- 
quarters in  Schleswig-Holstein  was  thus  averted ;  peace, 
was  made  possible  at  least  for  some  months  longer; 
and  the  interval  wras  granted  to  Bismarck  which  was 
still  required  for  the  education  of  his  Sovereign  in  the 


1865.  BISMARCK  AT  BIARRITZ.  359 

policy  of  blood  and  iron,  and  for  the  completion  of  his 
own  arrangements  with  the  enemies  of  Austria  outside 
Germany.* 

The  natural  ally  of  Prussia  was  Italy  ;  but  without 
the  sanction  of  Napoleon  III.  it  woujd  have  been  diffi- 
cult to  engage  Italy  in  a  new  war.  Bismarck  had 
therefore  to  gain  at  least  the  passive  con-  Bismarck  at 

.  .  Biarritz,   Sept., 

currence  of  the  French  Emperor  in  the  union  1865- 
of  Italy  and  Prussia  against  Austria.  He  visited 
Napoleon  at  Biarritz  in  September,  1865,  and  returned 
with  the  object  of  his  journey  achieved.  The  negotia- 
tion of  Biarritz,  if  truthfully  recorded,  would  probably 
give  the  key  to  much  of  the  European  history  of  the 
next  five  years.  As  at  Plombieres,  the  French  Em- 
peror acted  without  his  Ministers,  and  what  he  asked 
he  asked  without  a  witness.  That  Bismarck  actually 
promised  to  Napoleon  III.  either  Belgium  or  any  part 
of  the  Rhenish  Provinces  in  case  of  the  aggrandise- 
ment of  Prussia  has  been  denied  by  him,  and  is  not 
in  itself  probable.  But  there  are  understandings  which 
prove  to  be  understandings  on  one  side  only ;  politeness 
may  be  misinterpreted ;  and  the  world  would  have 
found  Count  Bismarck  unendurable  if  at  every  friendly 
meeting  he  had  been  guilty  of  the  frankness  with 
which  be  informed  the  Austrian  Government  that  its 
centre  of  action  must  be  transferred. from  Vienna  to  Pesth. 
That  Napoleon  was  now  scheming  for  an  extension 
of  France  on  the  north-east  is  certain ;  that  Bismarck 
treated  such  rectification  of  the  frontier  as  a  matter  for 

*  Halm,  Bismarck,  i.  271,  318.     Oesterreichs  Krimpfe  in  1866,  i.  8. 


360  MODE  UN  EUROPE.  1865. 

arrangement  is  hardly  to  be  doubted ;  and  if  without 
a  distinct  and  written  agreement  Napoleon  was  con- 
tent to  base  his  action  on  the  belief  that  Bismarck 
would  not  withhold  from  him  his  reward,  this  only 
proved  how  great  was  the  disparity  between  the  aims 
which  the  French  ruler  allowed  himself  to  cherish  and 
his  mastery  of  the  arts  by  which  alone  such  aims  were 
to  be  realised.  Napoleon  desired  to  see  Italy  placed  in 
possession  of  Venice ;  he  probably  believed  at  this  time 
that  Austria  would  be  no  unequal  match  for  Prussia 
and  Italy  together,  and  that  the  natural  result  of  a 
well-balanced  struggle  would  be  not  only  the  completion 
of  Italian  union  but  the  purchase  of  French  neutrality 
or  mediation  by  the  cession  of  German  territory  west 
of  the  Rhine.  It  was  no  part  of  the  duty  of  Count 
Bismarck  to  chill  Napoleon's  fancies  or  to  teach  him 
political  wisdom.  The  Prussian  statesman  may  have 
left  Biarritz  with  the  conviction  that  an  attack  on 
Germany  would  sooner  er  later  follow  the  disappoint- 
ment of  those  hopes  which  he  had  nattered  and  intended 
to  mock;  but  for  the  present  he  had  removed  one 
dangerous  obstacle  from  his  path,  and  the  way  lay  free 
before  him  to  an  Italian  alliance  if  Italy  itself  should 
choose  to  combine  with  him  in  war. 

Since  the  death  of  Cavour  the  Italian  Government 

had  made  no  real  progress  towards  the  attainment  of 

the  national  aims,  the  acquisition  of  Rome  and  Venice. 

Garibaldi,  impatient  of  delay,  had  in  1862 

Italy,  1862-66.  r . 

landed  again  in   Sicily  and  summoned  his 
followers  to  march  with   him   upon   Rome.      But  the 


1862^5.  ITALY.  361 

enterprise  was  resolutely  condemned  by  Victor  Em- 
manuel, and  when  Garibaldi  crossed  to  the  mainland 
he  found  the  King's  troops  in  front  of  him  at  Aspro- 
monte.  There  was  an  exchange  of  shots,  and  Gari- 
baldi fell  wounded.  He  was  treated'  with  something 
of  the  distinction  shown  to  a  royal  prisoner,  and 
when  his  wound  was  healed  he  was  released  from 
captivity.  His  enterprise,  however,  and  the  indiscreet 
comments  on  it  made  by  Rattazzi,  who  was  now 
in  power,  strengthened  the  friends  of  the  Papacy 
at  the  Tuileries,  and  resulted  in  the  fall  of  the 
Italian  Minister.  His  successor,  Minghetti,  deemed  it 
necessary  to  arrive  at  some  temporary  understanding 
with  Napoleon  on  the  Eoman  question.  The  presence 
of  French  troops  at  Rome  offended  national  feeling, 
and  made  any  attempt  at  conciliation  between  the 
Papal  Court  and  the  Italian  Government  hopeless.  In 
order  to  procure  the  removal  of  this  foreign  garrison 
Minghetti  was  willing  to  enter  into  engagements 
which  seemed  almost  to  imply  the  renunciation  of  the 
claim  on  Rome.  By  a  Convention  made  in  Septem- 
ber, 1864,  the  Italian  Government  undertook  not  to 
attack  the  territory  of  the  Pope,  and  to  oppose  by 
force  every  attack  made  upon  it  from  without.  Napo- 
leon on  his  part  engaged  to  withdraw  his  troops 
gradually  from  Rome  as  the  Pope  should  organise  his 
own  army,  and  to  complete  the  evacuation  within  two 
years.  It  was,  however,  stipulated  in  an  Article  which 
was  intended  to  be  kept  secret,  that  the  capital  of 
Italy  should  be  changed,  the  meaning  of  this  stipula- 


362  MODERN  EUROPE.  1865-66. 

tion  being  that  Florence  should  receive  the  dignity 
which  by  the  common  consent  of  Italy  ought  to  have 
been  transferred  from  Turin  to  Eome  and  to  Borne 
alone.  The  publication  of  this  Article,  which  was 
followed  by  riots  in  Turin,  caused  the  immediate  fall 
of  Minghetti's  Cabinet.  He  was  succeeded  in  office 
by  General  La  Marmora,  under  whom  the  negotiations 
with  Prussia  were  begun  which,  after  long  uncertainty, 
resulted  in  the  alliance  of  1866  and  in  the  final 
expulsion  of  Austria  from  Italy.* 

Bismarck    from    the    beginning    of    his     Ministry 
appears  to  have  looked  forward  to  the  com- 

La  Marmora.  .  . 

bmation  of  Italy  and  Prussia  against  the 
common  enemy ;  but  his  plans  ripened  slowly.  In  the 
spring  of  1865,  when  affairs  seemed  to  be  reaching  a 
crisis  in  Schleswig-Holstein,  the  first  serious  overtures 
were  made  by  the  Prussian  ambassador  at  Florence.  La 
Marmora  answered  that  any  definite  proposition  would 
receive  the  careful  attention  of  the  Italian  Government, 
but  that  Italy  would  not  permit  itself  to  be  made  a  mere 
instrument  in  Prussia's  hands  for  the  intimidation  of 
Austria.  Such  caution  was  both  natural  and  necessary 
on  the  part  of  the  Italian  Minister ;  and  his  reserve 
seemed  to  be  more  than  justified  when,  a  few  months  later, 
the  Treaty  of  Gastein  restored  Austria  and  Prussia  to 
relations  of  friendship..  La  Marmora  might  now  well 
consider  himself  released  from  all  obligations  towards 
the  Court  of  Berlin  :  and,  entering  on  a  new  line  of 
policy,  he  sent  an  envoy  to  Vienna  to  ascertain  if  the 

*  B.  and  F.  State  Papers,  1864-65,  p.  460. 


1866.  OOVONE  AT  BERLIN.  363 

Emperor  would  amicably  cede  Venetia  to  Italy  in 
return  for  the  payment  of  a  very  large  sum  of  money 
and  the  assumption  by  Italy  of  part  of  the  Austrian 
national  debt.  Had  this  transaction  been  effected,  it 
would  probably  have  changed  the  course  of  European 

•V 

history ;  the  Emperor,  however,  declined  to  bargain 
away  any  part  of  his  dominions,  and  so  threw  Italy 
once  more  into  the  camp  of  his  great  enemy.  In  the 
meantime  the  disputes  about  Schleswig-Holstein  broke 
out  afresh.  Bismarck  renewed  his  efforts  at  Florence 
in  the  spring  of  1866,  with  the  result  that 
General  Govone  was  sent  to  Berlin  in  order  Berlin, March,. 

1866. 

to  discuss  with  the  Prussian  Minister  the 
political  and  military  conditions  of  an  alliance.  But 
instead  of  proposing  immediate  action,  Bismarck  stated 
to  Govone  that  the  question  of  Schleswig-Holstein  was 
insufficient  to  justify  a  great  war  in  the  eyes  of  Europe, 
and  that  a  better  cause  must  be  put  forward,  namely, 
the  reform  of  the  Federal  system  of  Germany.  Once 
more  the  subtle  Italians  believed  that  Bismarck's 
anxiety  for  a  war  with  Austria  was  feigned,  and  that 
he  sought  their  friendship  only  as  a  means  of  extort- 
ing from  the  Court  of  Vienna  its  consent  to  Prussia's 
annexation  of  the  Danish  Duchies.  There  was  an 
apparent  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Prussian  statesman 
to  avoid  entering  into  any  engagement  which  involved 
immediate  action ;  the  truth  being  that  Bismarck  was 
still  in  conflict  with  the  pacific  influences  which  sur- 
rounded the  King,  and  uncertain  from  day  to  day 
whether  his  master  would  really  follow  him  in  the 


364  MODERN  EUROPE.  1866 

policy  of  war.  He  sought  therefore  to  make  the  joint 
resort  to  arms  dependent  on  some  future  act,  such  as 
the  summoning  of  a  German  Parliament,  from  which 
the  King  of  Prussia  could  not  recede  if  once  he  should 
go  so  far.  But  the  Italians,  apparently  not  pene- 
trating the  real  secret  of  Bismarck's  hesitation,  would 
be  satisfied  with  no  such  indeterminate  engagement ; 
they  pressed  for  action  within  a  limited  time ;  and  in 
the  end,  after  Austria  had  taken  steps  which  went  far 
to  overcome  the  last  scruples  of  King  William,  Bis- 
marck consented  to  fix  three  months  as  the  limit 
beyond  which  the  obligation  of  Italy  to  accompany 
Prussia  into  war  should  not  extend.  On  the  8th  of 
Treaty.  of  April  a  Treaty  of  offensive  and  defensive 
alliance  was  signed.  It  was  agreed  that 
if  the  King  of  Prussia  should  within  three  months 
take  up  arms  for  the  reform  of  the  Federal  system 
of  Germany,  Italy  would  immediately  after  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  declare  war  upon  Austria.  Both 
Powers  were  to  engage  in  the  war  with  their  whole 
force,  and  peace  was  not  to  be  made  but  by  common 
consent,  such  consent  not  to  be  withheld  after  Austria 
should  have  agreed  to  cede  Venetia  to  Italy  and  territory 
with  an  equal  population  to  Prussia.* 

Eight  months  had  now  passed  since  the  signature 
of  the  Convention  of  Gastein.     The  experiment  of  an 

*  La  Marmora,  Un  po  piu  di  luce,  pp.  109, 146.  Jacini,  Due  Anni,  p.  154. 
Hahn,  i.  377.  In  the  first  draft  of  the  Treaty  Italy  was  required  to 
declare  war  not  only  on  Austria  but  on  all  German  Governments  wliich 
should  join  it.  King  William,  who  had  still  some  compunction  in 
calling  in  Italian  arms  against  the  Eatherland,  struck  out  these  words. 


1866. 


BISMARCK  AND  AUSTRIA.  365 


understanding  with  Austria,  which  King  William  had 
deemed  necessary,  had  been  made,  and  it  had  failed ; 
or  rather,  as  Bismarck  expressed  himself  in 

Bismarck  and 

a  candid  moment,  it  had  succeeded,  inas-     lUjftttt- 
much  as    it  had    cured   the   King    of  his 
scruples  and   raised   him   to   the   proper  point   of  in- 
dignation  against    the   Austrian   Court.      The   agents 
in  effecting  this  happy  result  had  been  the  Prince  of 
Augustenburg,   the   population   of   Holstein,    and   the 
Liberal    party    throughout    Germany    at    large.      In 
Schleswig,  which  the  Convention  of  Gastein  had  handed 
over   to    Prussia,    General    Manteuffel,    a   son   of    the 
Minister  of   1850,  had  summarily  put  a  stop  to  every 
expression  of  public  opinion,   and   had   threatened   to 
imprison  the  Prince  if  he  came  within  his  reach  ;  in  Hol- 
stein the  AustrianJGovernment  had  permitted,  if  it  had  not 
encouraged,  the  inhabitants  to  agitate^in  favour  of  the 
Pretender,  and  had  allowed  a  mass-meeting  to  be  held 
at  Altona  on  the  23rd  of  January,  where  cheers  were 
raised  for  Augustenburg,  and   the   summoning  of  the 
Estates  of  Schleswig-Holstein   was    demanded.      This 
was  enough  to  enable  Bismarck  to  denounce  the  con- 
duct  of    Austria  as  an  alliance  with  revolution.      He 
demanded  explanations  from  the  Government  of  Vienna, 
and  the  Emperor  declined  to  render  an  account  of  his 
actions.     Warlike  preparations  now  began,  and  on  the 
16th  of   March  the  Austrian  Government   announced 
that  it  should  refer  the  affairs  of    Schleswig-Holstein  v 
to  the  Federal  Diet.     This  was  a  clear  departure  from 
the  terms  of  the  Convention  of  Gastein,  and  from  the 


366  MODERN  EUROPE.  1866. 

agreement  made  between  Austria  and  Prussia  before 
entering  into  the  Danish  war  in  1864  that  the  Schles- 
wig-Holstein  question  should  be  settled  by  the  two 
Powers  independently  of  the  German  Federation.  King 
William  was  deeply  moved  by  such  a  breach  of  good 
faith ;  tears  filled  his  eyes  when  he  spoke  of  the  con- 
duct of  the  Austrian  Emperor ;  and  though  pacific 
influences  were  still  active  around  him  he  now  began 
to  fall  in  more  cordially  with  the  warlike  policy 
of  his  Minister.  The  question  at  issue  between 
Prussia  and  Austria  expanded  from  the  mere  disposal 
of  the  Duchies  to  the  reconstitution  of  the  Federal 
system  of  Germany.  In  a  note  laid  before  the 
.  Governments  of  all  the  Minor  States  Bismarck  de- 
clared that  the  time  had  come  when  Germany  must 
receive  a  new  and  more  effective  organisation,  and 
inquired  how  far  Prussia  could  count  on  the  support 
of  allies  if  it  should  be  attacked  by  Austria  or  forced 
into  war.  It  was  immediately  after  this  re-opening  of 
the  whole  problem  of  Federal  reform  in  Germany  that 
the  draft  of  the  Treaty  with  Italy  was  brought  to  its 
final  shape  by  Bismarck  and  the  Italian  envoy,  and  sent 
to  the  Ministry  at  Florence  for  its  approval. 

Bismarck  had  now  to  make  the  best  use  of  the  three 
months'  delay  that  was  granted  to  him.  On  the  day 
after  the  acceptance  of  the  Treaty  by  the  Italian 
Austria  offers  Government,  the  Prussian  representative  at 
the  Diet  of  Frankfort  handed  in  a  proposal 
for  the  summoning  of  a  German  Parliament,  to  be 
elected  by  universal  suffrage.  Coming  from  the  Minister 


1866. 


AUSTRIA  OFFERS  VENICE.  367 


who  had  made  Parliamentary  government  a  mockery 
in  Prussia,  this  proposal  was  scarcely  considered  as 
serious.  Bavaria,  as  the  chief  of  the  secondary  States, 
had  already  expressed  its  willingness  to  enter  upon  the 

discussion  of  Federal   reform,    but   it .  asked   that   the 

» 

two  leading  Powers  should  in  the  meantime  undertake 
not  to  attack  one  another.  Austria  at  once  acceded  to  this 
request,  and  so  forced  Bismarck  into  giving  a  similar  as- 
surance. Promises  of  disarmament  were  then  exchanged; 
but  as  Austria  declined  to  stay  the  collection  of  its 
forces  in  Venetia  against  Italy,  Bismarck  was  able  to 
charge  his  adversary  with  insincerity  in  the  negotiation, 
and  preparations  for  war  were  resumed  on  both  sides. 
Other  difficulties,  however,  now  came  into  view.  The 
Treaty  between  Prussia  and  Italy  had  been  made 
known  to  the  Court  of '  Vienna  by  Napoleon,  whose 
advice  La  Marmora  had  sought  before  its  conclusion. 

O  y 

3,nd  the  Austrian  Emperor  had  thus  become  aware  of 
his  danger.  He  now  determined  to  sacrifice  Venetia  if 
Italy's  neutrality  could  be  so  secured.  On  the  5th  of 
May  the  Italian  ambassador  at  Paris,  Count  Nigra, 
was  informed  by  Napoleon  that  Austria  had  offered 
to  cede  Venetia  to  him  on  behalf  of  Victor  Emmanuel 
if  France  and  Italy  would  not  prevent  Austria  from 
indemnifying  itself  at  Prussia's  expense  in  Silesia. 
Without  a  war,  at  the  price  of  mere  inaction,  Italy  was 
offered  all  that  it  could  gain  by  a  struggle  which  was 
likely  to  be  a  desperate  one,  and  which  might  end 
in  disaster.  La  Marmora  was  in  sore  perplexity. 
Though  he  had  formed  a  juster  estimate  of  the  capacity 


368  MODERN  EUROPE.  law. 

of  the  Prussian  army  than  any  other  statesman  or 
soldier  in  Europe,  he  was  thoroughly  suspicious  of  the 
intentions  of  the  Prussian  Government ;  and  in  sanction- 
ing the  alliance  of  the  previous  month  he  had  done  so 
half  expecting  that  Bismarck  would  through  the  prestige 
of  this  alliance  gain  for  Prussia  its  own  objects  without 
entering  into  war,  and  then  leave  Italy  to  reckon  with 
Austria  as  best  it  might.  He  would  gladly  have 
abandoned  the  alliance  and  have  accepted  Austria's  offer 
if  Italy  could  have  done  this  without  disgrace.  But  the 
sense  of  honour  was  sufficiently  strong  to  carry  him 
past  this  temptation.  He  declined  the  offer  made 
through  Paris,  and  continued  the  armaments  of  Italy, 
though  still  with  a  secret  hope  that  European  diplomacy 
might  find  the  means  of  realising  the  purpose  of  his 
country  without  war.* 

The  neutral  Powers  were  now,  with  various  objects, 
bestirring  themselves  in  favour  of  a  Euro- 

Proposals  for  a 

pean  Congress.  Napoleon  believed  the  time 
to  be  come  when  the  Treaties  of  1815  might  be  finally 
obliterated  by  the  joint  act  of  Europe.-  He  was  himself 
ready  to  join  Prussia  with  three  hundred  thousand  men  if 
the  King  would  transfer  the  Rhenish  Provinces  to  France. 
Demands,  direct  and  indirect,  were  made  on  Count  Bis- 
marck on  behalf  of  the  Tuileries  for  cessions  of  territory 
of  greater  or  less  extent.  These  demands  were  neither 
granted  nor  refused.  Bismarck  procrastinated ;  he  spoke 
of  the  obstinacy  of  the  King  his  master;  he  inquired 
whether  parts  of  Belgium  or  Switzerland  would  not  better 

*  La  Marmora,  Un  po  piu  di  luce,  p.  204.   Halm,  i.  402. 


1866.        AUSTRIA   AND    THE   PROPOSED    CONGRESS.        369 

assimilate  with  France  than  a  German  province ;  he  put 
off  the  Emperor's  representatives  by  the  assurance  that 
he  could  more  conveniently  arrange  these  matters  with 
the  Emperor  when  he  should  himself  visit  Paris.  On  the 
28th  of  May  invitations  to  a  Congress  were  issued  by 
France,  England,  and  Russia  jointly,  the  objects  of  the 
Congress  being  defined  as  the  settlement  of  the  affairs 
of  Schleswig-Holstein,  of  the  differences  between  Austria 
and  Italy,  and  of  the  reform  of  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution of  Germany,  in  so  far  as  these  affected  Europe 
at  large.  The  invitation  was  accepted  by  Prussia  and 
by  Italy;  it  was  accepted  by  Austria  only  under  the 
condition  that  no  arrangement  should  be  discussed 
which  should  give  an  increase  of  territory  or  power  to 
(one)of  the  States  invited  to  the  Congress.  This  subtly- 
worded  condition  would  not  indeed/  have  excluded  the 

r  \^*JU*A*lLi 
equal  aggrandisement  of  ^lp    It  would  not  have  rendered 

the  cession  of  Venetia  to  Italy  or  the  annexation  of 
Schleswig-Holstein  to  Prussia  impossible ;  but  it  would 
either  have  Involved  the  surrender  of  Trie  former  Papal 
territory  by  Italy  in  order  that  Victor  Emmanuel's 
dominions  should  receive  no  increase,  or,  in  the  alter- 
native, it  would  have  entitled  Austria  to  claim  Silesia 
as  its  own  equivalent  for  the  augmentation  of  the 
Italian  Kingdom.  Such  reservations  would  have  ren- 
dered any  efforts  of  the  Powers  to  preserve  peace 
useless,  and  they  were  accepted  as  tantamount  to  a 
refusal  on  the  part  of  Austria  to  attend  the  Congress. 
Simultaneously  with  its  answer  to  the  neutral  Powers, 
Austria  called  upon  the  Federal  Diet  to  take  the  affairs 
Y 


370  MODEEN  EUROPE.  1866. 

of  Schleswig-Holstein  into  its  own  hands,  and  convoked 
the  Holstein  Estates.  Bismarck  thereupon  declared 
the  Convention  of  Gastein  to  be  at  an  end,  and  ordered 
General  Manteuffel  to  lead  his  troops  into  Holstein.  The 
Austrian  commander,  protesting  that  he  yielded  only  to 
superior  force,  withdrew  through  Altona  into  Hanover. 
Austria  at  once  demanded  and  obtained  from  the  Diet  8f 
Frankfort  the  mobilisation  of  the  whole  of  the  Federal 
armies.  The  representative  of  Prussia,  declaring  that 
this  act  of  the  Diet  had  made  an  end  of  the  ex- 
isting Federal  union,  handed  in  the  plan  of  his 
Government  for  the  reorganisation  of  Germany,  and 
quitted  Frankfort.  Diplomatic  relations  between  Aus- 
tria and  Prussia  were  broken  off  on  the  12th  of  June, 
and  on  the  15th  Count  Bismarck  demanded  of  the 
sovereigns  of  Hanover,  Saxony,  and  Hesse-Cassel,  that 
they  should  on  that  very  day  put  a  stop  to  their 
military  preparations  and  accept  the  Prussian  scheme 
of  Federal  reform.  Negative  answers  being  given, 

•B 

Prussian  troops  immediately  marched  into  these  terri- 
tories, and  war  began.  Weimar,  Mecklenburg,  and 
other  petty  States  in  the  north  took  part  with  Prussia : 
all  the  rest  of  Germany  joined  Austria.*  '. 

The  goal  of  Bismarck's  desire,  the  end  which  he 
'had  steadily  set  before  himself  since  entering  upon  his 
German         Ministry,  was  attained ;  and,  if  his  calcula- 
tions as  to  the  strength  of  the  Prussian  army 
were  not  at  fault,  Austria  was  at  length  to  be  expelled 

*  Halm,  Bismarck,  i.  425.     Halm,  Zwei  Jahre,  p.  60.     Oesterreiehs 
Krimpfc,  i.  30. 


1866.  GERMAN   OPINION.  371 

from  the  German  Federation  by  force  of  arms.     But  the 
process  by  which  Bismarck  had  worked  up  to  this  result 
had  ranged  against  him  the  almost  unanimous  opinion  of 
Germany  outside  the  military  circles  of  Prussia  itself. 
His  final    demand    for    the   summoning  of    a  German  - 
Parliament  was  taken  as  mere  comedy.      The  guiding 
star  of  his  policy  had  hitherto  been  the  dynastic  in- 
terest of  the  House  of  Hohenzollern  ;  and  now,  when 
the  Germans  were  to  be  plunged  into   war  with  one 
another,  it  seemed  as  if  the  real  object  of  the  struggle 
was    no   more    than    the    annexation    of    the    Danish 
Duchies  and  some  other  coveted  territory  to  the  Prussian  - 
Kingdom.     The  voice  of  protest  and  condemnation  rose  - 
loud   from  every  organ  of  public  opinion.      Even   in 
Prussia  itself  the  instances  were  few  where  any  spon- 
taneous support  was  tendered  to  the  Government.    The 
Parliament  of  Berlin,  struggling  up  to  the  end  against 
'the  all-powerful  Minister,  had  seen  its  members  prose- 
cuted for  speeches  made  within  its  own  walls,  and  had 
at  last  been  prorogued  in  order  that  its  insubordination 
might  not  hamper  the  Crown  in  the  moment  of  danger. 
But  the  mere   disappearance  of  Parliament  could  not 
conceal  the  intensity  of  ill  will  which  the  Minister  and 
his  policy  had  excited.     The  author  of  a  fratricidal  war  ^ 
of  Germans  against  Germans  was  in  the  eyes  of  many 
the  greatest  of  all  criminals ;  and  on  the  7th  of  May  an 
attempt  was  made  by  a  young  fanatic  to  take  Bismarck's 
life  in  the  streets  of  Berlin.     The  Minister  owed  the 
preservation  of  his  life  to  the  feebleness  of  his  assailant's 
weapon  and  to  his  own  vigorous  arm.    But  the  imminence 


372  MODERN  EUROPE.  1866. 

of  the  danger  affected  King  William  far  more  than  Bis- 
marck himself.  It  spoke  to  his  simple  mind  of  super- 
natural protection  and  aid;  it  stilled  his  doubts;  and 
confirmed  him  in  the  belief  that  Prussia  was  in  this  crisis 
the  instrument  for  working  out  the  Almighty's  will. 

A  few  days  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  the 

Emperor  Napoleon  gave  publicity  to  his  own  view  of 

the  European  situation.     He  attributed  the 

Napoleon  UL 

coming  war  to  three  causes:  to  the  faulty- 
geographical  limits  of  the  Prussian  State,  to  the  desire  for*- 
a  better  Federal  system  in  Germany,  and  to  the  neces- 

^x 

sity  felt  by  the  Italian  nation  for  securing  its  inde- 
pendence. These  needs  would,  he  conceived,  be  met  by 
a  territorial  rearrangement  in  the  north  of  Germany 
consolidating  and  augmenting  the  Prussian  Kingdom ; 
by  the  creation  of  a  more  effective  Federal  union  between 
the  secondary  German  States ;  and  finally,  by  the  in- 
corporation of.  Venetia  with  Italy,  Austria's  position  in 
Germany  remaining  unimpaired.  Only  in  the  event  of 
the  map  of  Europe  being  altered  to  the  exclusive  advan- 
tage of  one  Great  Power  would  France 'require  an  exten- 
sion of  frontier.  Its  interests  lay  in  the  preservation  of 
the  equilibrium  of  Europe,  and  in  the  maintenance  of 
the  Italian  Kingdom.  These  had  already  been  secured 
by  arrangements  which  would  not  require  France  to 
draw  the  sword  ;  a  watchful  but  unselfish  neutrality 
was  the  policy  which  its  Government  had  determined 
to  pursue.  Napoleon  had  in  fact  lost  all  control  over 
events,  and  all  chance  of  gaining  the  Rhenish  Provinces, 
from  the  time  when  he  permitted  Italy  to  enter  into 


1866. 


NAPOLEON  III.  373 


the  Prussian  alliance  without  any  stipulation  that  France 
should  at  its  option  be  admitted  as  a  third  member  of 
the  coalition.  He  could  not  ally  himself  with  Austria 
against  his  own  creation,  the  Italian  Kingdom;  on 
the  other  hand,  he  had  no  means  of  extorting  cessions 
from  Prussia  when  once  Prussia  was  sure  of  an  ally 
who  could  bring  two  hundred  thousand  men  into  the 
field.  His  diplomacy  had  been  successful  in  so  far  as 
it  had  assured  Venetia  to  Italy  whether  Prussia  should 
be  victorious  or  overthrown,  but  as  regarded  France  it 
had  landed  him  in  absolute  powerlessness.  He  was 
unable  to  act  on  one  side ;  he  was  not  wanted  on 
the  other.  Neutrality  had  become  a  matter  not  of 
choice  but  of  necessity ;  and  until  the  course  of  military 
events  should  have  produced  some  new  situation  in 
Europe,  France  might  well  be  watchful,  but  it  could 
scarcely  gain  much  credit  for  its  disinterested  part.* 

Assured   against  an  attack   from   the  side    of   the 
Ehine,  Bismarck  was  able  to  throw  the  mass  of  the 
Prussian  forces  southwards  against  Austria, 
leaving  in  the  north  only  the  modest  con-     Hesse  cassei 

•  conquered. 

tingent  which   was  necessary  to  overcome 

the  resistance  of  Hanover  and  Hesse-Cassel.    Through 

*  Discours  de  Napoleon  III.,  p.  456.  On  May  llth,  Nigra,  Italian  am- 
bassador at  Paris,  reported  that  Napoleon's  ideas  on  the  objects  to  be  attained 
by  a  Congress  were  as  follows : — Venetia  to  Italy";  Silesia  to  Austria ; 
the  Danish  Duchies  and  other  territory  in  North  Germany  to  Prussia ; 
the  establishment  of  several  small  States  on  the  Rhine  under  French  pro- 
tection ;  the  dispossessed  German  princes  to  be  compensated  in  Roumauia. 
La  Marmora,  p.  228.  Napoleon  III.  was  pursuing  in  a  somewhat  altered 
form  the  old  German  policy  of  the  Republic  and  the  Empire— namely, 
the  balancing  of  Austria  and  Prussia  against  one  another,  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  French  protectorate  over  the  group  of  secondary  States. 


374  MODERN  EUROPE.  isse. 

the  precipitancy  of  a  Prussian  general,  who  struck 
without  waiting  for  his  colleagues,  the  Hanoverians 
gained  a  victory  at  Langensalza  on  the  27th  of 
June ;  but  other  Prussian  regiments  arrived  on  the 
field  a  few  hours  later,  and  the  Hanoverian  army 
was  forced  to  capitulate  on  the  next  day.  The  King 
made  his  escape  to  Austria ;  the  Elector  of  Hesse- 
Cassel,  less  fortunate,  was  made  a  prisoner  of  war. 
Northern  Germany  was  thus  speedily  reduced  to  sub-1 
mission,  and  any  danger  of  a  diversion  in  favour  of 
Austria  in  this  quarter  disappeared.  In  Saxony  no 
attempt  was  made  to  bar  the  way  to  the  advancing 
Prussians.  Dresden  was  occupied  without  resistance, 
but  the  Saxon  army  marched  southwards  in  good  time, 
and  joined  the  Austrians  in  Bohemia.  The  Prussian 
forces,  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  strong, 
now  gathered  on  the  Saxon  and  Silesian  frontier,  covering 
the  line  from  Pirna  to  Landshut.  They  were  composed 
of  three  armies :  the  first,  or  central,  army  under 
Prince  Frederick  Charles,  a  nephew  of  the  King;  the 
second,  or  Silesian,  army  under  the  'Crown  Prince ; 
the  westernmost,  known  as  the  army  of  the  Elbe, 
under  General  Herwarth  von  Bittenfeld.  Against  these 
were  ranged  about  an  equal  number  of  Austrians,  led 
by  Benedek,  a  general  who  had  gained  great  dis- 
tinction in  the  Hungarian  and  the  Italian  can> 
paigns.  It  had  at  first  been  thought 

TheBohemian  .      ..  - 

jS&iiys      Probable    that   Benedek,    whose   forces  lay 

about    Olmutz,     would    invade     Southern 

Silesia,    and    the    Prussian    line    had    therefore    been 


I  *•  •  '  <. 


KONIGGEATZ.  375 


extended  far  to  the  east.  Soon,  however,  it  appeared 
that  the  Austrians  were  unable  to  take  up  the  offensive, 
and  Benedek  moved  westwards  into  Bohemia.  The 
Prussian  line  was  now  shortened,  and  orders  were 
given  to  the  three  armies  to  cross  the.Bohemian  frontier 
and  converge  in  the  direction  of  the  town  of  Gitschin. 
General  Moltke,the  chief  of  the  staff,  directed  their  opera- 
tions from  Berlin  by  telegraph.  The  combined  advance 
of  the  three  armies  was  executed  with  extraordinary  pre- 
cision ;  and  in  a  series  of  hard-fought  combats  extending 
from  the  2Gth  to  the  29th  of  June  the  Austrians  were 
driven  back  upon  their  centre,  and  effective  communica- 
tion was  established  between  the  three  invading 
bodies.  On  the  30th  the  King  of  Prussia,  with 
General  Moltke  and  Counjjr  Bismarck,  left  Berlin ;  on 
the  2nd  of  July  they  were  at  headquarters  at  Gits- 
chin.  It  had  been  Benedek's  design  to  leave  a  small 
force  to  hold  the  Silesian  army  in  check,  and  to 
throw  the  mass  of  his  army  westwards  upon  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  and  overwhelm  him  before  he  could 
receive  help  from  his  colleagues.  This  design  had  been 
baffled  by  the  energy  of  the  Crown  Prince's  attack,  and 
by  the  superiority  of  the  Prussians  in  generalship,  in 
the  discipline  of  their  troops,  and  in  the  weapon  they 
carried  ;  for  though  the  Austrians  had  witnessed  in  the 
Danish  campaign  the  effects  of  the  Prussian  breech- 
loading  rifle,  they  had  not  thought  it  necessary  to  adopt 
a  similar  arm.  Benedek,  though  no  great  battle  had 
yet  been  fought,  saw  that  the  campaign  was  lost,  and 
wTrote  to  the  Emperor  on  the  1st  of  July  recommending 


376  MODERN  EUROPE.  isee. 

him  to  make  peace,  for  otherwise  a  catastrophe  was 

inevitable.     He   then  concentrated  his   army  on  high 

ground   a  few   miles  west  of  Ko'niggratz, 

K6ni|^atz,     and  prepared  for  a  defensive  battle  on  the 

July  3. 

grandest  scale.  In  spite  of  the  losses  of 
the  past  week  he  could  still  bring  about  two  hundred 
thousand  men  into  action.  The  three  Prussian 
armies  were  now  near  enough  to  one  another  to 
combine  in  their  attack,  and  on  the  night  of  July  2nd 
the  King  sent  orders  to  the  three  commanders  to  move 
against  Benedek  before  daybreak.  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  advancing  through  the  village  of  Sadowa,  was 
the  first  in  the  field.  For  hours  his  divisions  sustained 
an  unequal  struggle  against  the  assembled  strength  of 
the  Austrians.  Midday  passed ;  the  defenders  now 
pressed  down  upon  their  assailants ;  and  preparations 
for  a  retreat  had  been  begun,  when  the  long-expected 
message  arrived  that  the  Crown  Prince  was  close  at  hand. 
The  onslaught  of  the  army  of  Silesia  on  Benedek's  right, 
which  was  accompanied  by  the  arrival  of  Herwarth  at  the 
other  end  of  the  field  of  battle,  at  once  'decided  the  day. 
It  was  with  difficulty  that  the  Austrian  commander  pre- 
vented the  enemy  from  seizing  the  positions  which  would 
have  cut  off  his  retreat.  He  retired  eastwards  across 
the  Elbe  with  a  loss  of  eighteen  thousand  killed  and 
wounded  and  twenty  -  four  thousand  prisoners.  His 
army  was  ruined ;  and  ten  days  after  the  Prussians  had 
crossed  the  frontier  the  war  was  practically  at  an  end.* 

*  Oesterreichs  Kampfe,  ii.  341.     Prussian  Staff,  Campaign  of  1866, 
(Hozier),  p.  167. 


1866.  ACTION  OF   NAPOLEON  III.  377 

The  disaster  of  Koniggratz  was  too  great  to  1 
neutralised  by  the  success  of  the  Austrian  forces  in 
Italy.  La  Marmora,  who  had  given  up  his  place  at  the 
head  of  the  Government  in  order  to  take  command  of 
the  army,  crossed  the  Mincio  at  the  head  of  a  hundred 
und  twenty  thousand  men,  but  was  defeated  Battieofcus. 

•!•/••  i  1 1          n    ,     i  T         r>       to/.za.  June  24. 

by  inferior  numbers  on  the  fatal  ground  or 
Custozza,    and   compelled   to  fall   back   on  the  Oglio. 
This  gleam  of  success,  which  was  followed  by  a  naval 
victory  at  Lissa  off'  the  Istrian  coast,  made  it  easier  for 
the  Austrian  Emperor  to  face  the  sacrifices  that  were 
now    inevitable.       Immediately    after    the    battle    of 
Koniggratz  he  invoked  the  mediation  of  Napoleon  III., 
and  ceded  Venetia  to  him  on  behalf  of  Italy.    Napoleon 
at   once   tendered  his  good   offices   to  the 
belligerents,    and    proposed    an    armistice,     mediation, 

July  6. 

His  mediation  was  accepted  in  principle  by 
4;he  King  of  Prussia,  who  expressed  his  willingness  also 
to  grant  an  armistice  as  soon  as  preliminaries  of  peace 
were  recognised  by  the  Austrian  Court.  In  the  mean- 
time, while  negotiations  passed  between  all  four  Go\- 
ernments,  the  Prussians  pushed  forward  until  their 
outposts  came  within  sight  of  Vienna.  If  in  pursuance 
of  General  Moltke's  plan  the  Italian  generals  had 
thrown  a  corps  north-eastwards  from  the  head  of  the 
Adriatic,  and  so  struck  at  the  very  heart  of  the  Austrian 
monarchy,  it  is  possible  that  the  victors  of  Koniggratz 
might  have  imposed  their  own  terms  without  regard  to 
Napoleon's  mediation,  and,  while  adding  the  Italian 
Tyrol  to  Victor  Emmanuel's  dominions,  have  completed 


378  MODERN  EUROPE.  i£66. 

the  union  of  Germany  under  the  House  of  Hohenzollern 
at  one  stroke.  But  with  Hungary  still  intact,  and  the 
Italian  army  paralysed  by  the  dissensions  of  its  com- 
manders, prudence  bade  the  great  statesman  of  Berlin 
content  himself  with  the  advantages  which  he  could 
reap  without  prolongation  of  the  war,  and  without  the 
risk  of  throwing  Napoleon  into  the  enemy's  camp. 
He  had  at  first  required,  as  conditions  of  peace,  that 
Prussia  should  be  left  free  to  annex  Saxony,  Hanover, 
Hesse-Cassel,  and  other  North  German  territory  ;  that 
Austria  should  wholly  withdraw  from  German  affairs ; 
and  that  all  Germany,  less  the  Austrian  Provinces, 
should  be  united  in  a  Federation  under  Prussian  leader- 
ship. To  gain  the  assent  of  Napoleon  to  these  terms, 
Bismarck  hinted  that  Trance  might  by  accord  with 
Prussia  annex  Belgium.  Napoleon,  however,  refused 
to  agree  to  the  extension  of  Prussia's  ascendency  over 
all  Germany,  and  presented  a  counter-project  which 
was  in  its  turn  rejected  by  Bismarck.  It  was  finally 
settled  that  Prussia  should  not  be  prevented  from 
Annexing  Hanover,  Nassau,  and  Hesse-Cassel,  as  con- 
quered territory  that  lay  between  its  own  Rhenish* 
Provinces  and  the  rest  of  the  kingdom;  that  Austria 
should  completely  withdraw  from  German  affairs ;  that 
Germany  north  of  the  Main,  together  with  Saxony, 
should  be  included  in  a  Federation  under  Prussian 
leadership ;  and  that  for  the  States  south  of  the 
Main  there  should  be  reserved  the  right  of  entering 
into  some  kind  of  national  bond  with  the  Northern 
League.  Austria  escaped  without  loss  of  any  of  its 


;-.,:  TREATY   OF  PRAGUE.  379 

IK »n- Italian  territory;  it  also  succeeded  in  preserving 
the  existence  of  Saxony,  which,  as  in  1815,  the  Prussian 
Government  had  been  most  anxious  to  annex.  Na- 
poleon, in  confining  the  Prussian  Federation  to  the 
north  of  the  Main,  and  in  securing  by  a  formal  stipu- 
lation in  the  Treaty  the  independence  of  the  Southern 
States,  imagined  himself  to  have  broken  Germany  into 
halves,  and  to  have  laid  the  foundation  of  a  South 
German  League  which  should  look  to  France  as  its 
protector.  On  the  other  hand,  Bismarck  by  his  an- 
nexation of  Hanover  and  neighbouring  districts  had 
added  a  population  of  four  millions  to  the  Prussian 
Kingdom,  and  given  it  a  continuous  territory ;  he  had 
forced  Austria  out  of  the  German  system  ;  he  had 
gained  its  sanction  to  the  Federal  union  of  all  Germany 
north  of  the  Main,  and  had  at  least  kept  the  way  open 
for  the  later  extension  of  this  union  to  the  Southern 
States.  Preliminaries  of  peace  embodying 

, .    .  ,  .    .  -.-I  .    ,          Preliminaries  of 

these  conditions  and  recognising  Prussia  s     Mcoisburg, 
sovereignty    in     Schlesvvig-Holstein     were 
signed  at  Nicolsburg  on  the  26th  of  July,  and  formed 
the  basis  of  the  definitive  Treaty  of  Peace  which  was 
concluded   at   Prague    on   the    23rd    of    August.     An 
illusory   clause,    added  at   the    instance    of        Treaty  of 
Napoleon,  provided  that  if  the  population     ^ue'    e-^3'  * 
of  the  northern  districts  of  Schleswig  should  by  a  free 
vote  express  the  wish  to  be  united  with  Denmark,  these 
districts  should  be  ceded  to  the  Danish  Kingdom.* 

*  Halm,  i.  476.     Benedetti,  Ma  Mission  en  Prusse,  p.  186.    Reuckliu, 
v.  457.     Massari,  La  Marmora,  p.  350. 


380  MODERN  EUROPE.  1866. 

Bavaria  and    the   south-western   allies   of  Austria, 
though  their  military  action  was  of  an  ineffective  cha- 
racter, continued  in  arms   for  some  weeks 

The  South  Ger- 

after  the  battle  of  Koniggratz,  and  the 
suspension  of  hostilities  arranged  at  Nicolsburg  did  not 
come  into  operation  on  their  behalf  till  the  2nd  of 
August.  Before  that  date  their  forces  were  dispersed 
and  their  power  of  resistance  broken  by  the  Prussian 
generals  Falckenstein  and  Manteuffel  in  a  series  of 
unimportant  engagements  and  intricate  manoeuvres. 
The  City  of  Frankfort,  against  which  Bismarck  seems 
to  have  borne  some  personal  hatred,  was  treated  for  a 
while  by  the  conquerors  with  extraordinary  and  most 
impolitic  harshness  ;  in  other  respects  the  action  of  the 
Prussian  Government  towards  these  conquered  States 
was  not  such  as  to  render  future  union  and  friendship 
difficult.  All  the  South  German  Governments,  with 
the  single  exception  of  Baderi,  appealed  to  the  Emperor 
Napoleon  for  assistance  in  the  negotiations  which  they 
had  opened  at  Berlin.  But  at  the  very  moment  when 
this  request  was  made  and  granted  Napoleon  was 
himself  demanding  from  Bismarck  the  cession  of  the 
Bavarian  Palatinate  and  of  the  Hessian  districts  west 
of  the  Ehine.  Bismarck  had  only  to  acquaint  the 
King  of  Bavaria  and  the  South  German  Ministers 
with  the  designs  of  their  French  protector  in  order  to  re- 
concile them  to  his  own  chastening,  but  not  unfriendly, 
hand.  The  grandeur  of  a  united  Fatherland  flashed 
upon  minds  hitherto  impenetrable  by  any  national 
ideal  when  it  became  known  that  Napoleon  was 


1868.        TREATIES    WITH   THE    SOUTHERN   STATES.        381 

bargaining  for  Oppenheim  and  Kaiserslautern.  Not  only 
were  the  insignificant  questions  as  to  the,,  war-indem- 
nities to  be  paid  to  Prussia  and  the  frontier  villages 
to  be  exchanged  promptly  settled,  but  by  a  series  of 
secret  Treaties  all  the  South  German  States 

Secret  Treaties 

entered  into  an  offensive  and  defensive  alii-  $£2S£** 
ance  with  the  Prussian  King,  and  engaged 
in  case  of  war  to  place  their  entire  forces  at  his  dis- 
posal and  under  his  command.  The  diplomacy  of  Napo- 
leon III.  had  in  the  end  effected  for  .Bismarck  almost 
more  than  his  earlier  intervention  had  frustrated,  for 
it  had  made  the  South  German  Courts  the  allies  of 
Prussia  not  through  conquest  or  mere  compulsion  but 
out  of  regard  for  their  own  interests.*  It  was  said  by 
the  opponents  of  the  Imperial  Government  in  France, 
and  scarcely  with  exaggeration,  that  every  error  which 
it  was  possible  to  commit  had,  in  the  course  of  the 
yoar  1800,  been  committed  by  Napoleon  III.  One 
crime,  one  act  of  madness,  remained  open  to  the 
Emperor's  critics,  to  lash  him  and  France  into  a 
conflict  \rith  the  Power  whose  union  he  had  not  been 
able  to  prevent. 

Prior  to  the  battle  of  Koniggriitz,  it  would  seem 
that  all  the    suggestions  of    the  French    Emperor  re- 
lating to  the  acquisition  of  Belgium  were 
made  to  the  Prussian  Government  through     petition  form" 

France. 

secret   agents,    and    that    they    were     ac- 
tually unknown,  or  known  by  mere  hearsay,  to  Bene- 
detti,    the   French   Ambassador  at  Berlin.     According 
*  Habn,  L  501,  505. 


'382  MODERN  EUROPE.  me.' 

to  Prince  Bismarck,  these  overtures  had  begun  as  early 
as  1862,  when  he  was  himself  Ambassador  at  Paris,  and 
were  then  made  verbally  and  in  private  notes  to 
himself;  they  were  the  secret  of  Napoleon's  neutrality- 
during  the  Danish  war ;  and  were  renewed  through 
relatives  and  confidential  agents  of  the  Emperor  when 
the  struggle  with  Austria  was  seen  to  be  approaching. 
The  ignorance  in  which  Count  Benedetti  was  'kept  of 
his  master's  private  diplomacy  may  to  some  extent 
explain  the  extraordinary  contradictions  between  the 
accounts  given  by  this  Minister  and  by  Prince  Bismarck 
of  the  negotiations  that  passed  between  them  in  the 
period  following  the  campaign  of  1866,  after  Benedetti 
had  himself  been  charged  to  present  the  demands  of  the 
French  Government.  In  June,  while  the  Ambassador 
was  still,  as  it  would  seem,  in  ignorance  of  what  was 
passing  behind  his  back,  he  had  informed  the  French 
Ministry  that  Bismarck,  anxious  for  the  preservation 
of  French  neutrality,  had  hinted  at  the  compensations 
that  might  be  made  to  France  if  Prussia  should  meet 
with  great  success  in  the  coming  war.  According  to 
the  report  of  the  Ambassador,  made  at  the  time,  Count 
Bismarck  stated  that  he  would  rather  withdraw  from 
public  life  than  cede  the  Ehenish  Provinces  with 
Cologne  and  Bonn,  but  that  he  believed  it  would 
be  possible  to  gain  the  King's  ultimate  consent  to 
the  cession  of  the  Prussian  district  of  Treves  on  the 
Upper  Moselle,  which  district,  together  with  Luxem- 
burg or  parts  of  Belgium  and  Switzerland,  would  give 
France  an  adequate  improvement  of  its  frontier.  The 


IBM 


BISMARCK  AND   BENEDETTI.  383 


Ambassador  added  in  his  report,  by  way  of  comment,  that 
Count  Bismarck  was  the  only  man  in  the  kingdom  who 
was  disposed  to  make  any  cession  of  Prussian  territory 
whatever,  and  that  a  unanimous  and  violent  revulsion 
against  France  would  be  excited  by  "the  slightest  in- 
dication of  any  intention  on  the  part  of  the  French 
Government  to  extend  its  frontiers  towards  the  Ehine. 
He  concluded  his  report  with  the  statement  that,  after 
hearing  Count  Bismarck's  suggestions,  he  had  brought 
the  discussion  to  a  summary  close,  not  wishing  to  leavr 
the  Prussian  Minister  under  the  impression  that  any 
scheme  involving  the  seizure  of  Belgian  or  Swiss 
territory  had  the  slightest  chance  of  being  seriously 
considered  at  Paris.  (June  4 — 8.) 

Benedetti  probably  wrote  these  last  words  in  full 
sincerity.  Seven  weeks  later,  after  the  settlement  of  the 
Preliminaries  of  Nicolsburg,  he  was  ordered  to  demand 
{he  cession  of  the  Bavarian  Palatinate,  of 

Demand  for 

the  portion  of  Hesse-Darmstadt  west  of  ££"£££.' 
the  llhine,  including  Mainz,  and  of  the 
strip  of  Prussian  territory  on  the  Saar  which  had  been 
left  to  France  in  1814  but  taken  from  it  in  1815. 
According  to  the  statement  of  Prince  Bismarck,  which 
would  seem  to  be  exaggerated,  this  demand  was  made 
by  Benedetti  as  an  ultimatum  and  with  direct  threats 
of  war,  which  were  answered  by  Bismarck  in  language 
of  equal  violence.  In  any  case  the  demand  was  un- 
conditionally refused,  and  Benedetti  travelled  to  Paris 
in  order  to  describe  what  had  passed  at  the  Prussian 
headquarters.  His  report  made  such  an  impression 


384  MODERN  EUROPE.  isee. 

on  the  Emperor  that  the  demand  for  cessions  on  the 
Ehine  was  at  once  abandoned,  and  the  Foreign 
Minister,  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  who  had  been  disposed 
to  enforce  this  by  arms,  was  compelled  to  quit  office. 
Benedetti  returned  to  Berlin,  and  now  there  took  place 
that  negotiation  relating  to  Belgium  on  which  not 
only  the  narratives  of  the  persons  immediately  con- 
cerned, but  the  documents  written  at  the  time,  leave 
so  much  that  is  strange  and  unexplained. 
project,  Aug.  According  to  Benedetti,  Count  Bismarck 

16—30.  v 

was  keenly  anxious  to  extend  the  German 
Federation  to  the  South  of  the  Main,  and  desired  with 
this  object  an  intimate  union  with  at  least  one  Great 
Power.  He  sought  in  the  first  instance  the  support 
of  France,  and  offered  in  return  to  facilitate  the  seizures 
1  of  Belgium.  The  negotiation,  according  to  Benedetti, 
failed  because  the  Emperor  Napoleon  required  that 
the  fortresses  in  Southern  Germany  should  be  held 
by  the  troops  of  the  respective  States  to  which  they 
belonged,  while  at  the  same  time  General  Manteuffel, 
who  had  been  sent  from  Berlin  on  a  special  mission 
to  St.  Petersburg,  succeeded  in  effecting  so  intimate  a 
union  with  Russia  that  alliance  with  France  became 
unnecessary.  According  to  the  counter- statement  of 
Prince  Bismarck,  the  plan  now  proposed  originated 
entirely  with  the  French  Ambassador,  and  was  merely 
a  repetition  of  proposals  which  had  been  made  by 
Napoleon  during  the  preceding  four  years,  and  which 
were  subsequently  renewed  at  intervals  by  secret 
agents  almost  down  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war  of 


is«j.  PRUSSIA.  385 

1870.  Prince  Bismarck  has  stated  that  he  dallied 
with  these  proposals  only  because  a  direct  refusal  might 
at  any  moment  have  caused  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  France  and  Prussia,  a  catastrophe  which  up 
to  the  end  he  sought  to  avert.  -Jn  any  case  the 
negotiation  with  Benedetti  led  to  no  conclusion,  and 
was  broken  off  by  the  departure  of  both  statesmen  from 
Berlin  in  the  beginning  of  autumn.* 

The  war  of  1866  had  been  brought  to  an  end  with 
extraordinary    rapidity ;    its    results    were    solid    and 
imposing.     Venice,  perplexed  no  longer  by 
its  Republican   traditions  or  by  doubts  of     No,thaGtermany 

»  after  the  war. 

the  patriotism  of  the  House  of  Savoy,  pre- 
pared to  welcome  King  Victor  Emmanuel;  Bismarck, 
returning  from  the  battle-field  of  Koniggratz,  found 
his  earlier  unpopularity  forgotten  in  the  flood  of 
national  enthusiasm  which  his  achievements  and  those 
of  the  army  had  evoked.  A  new  epoch  had  begun ; 
the  antagonisms  of  the  past  were  out  of  date  ;  nobler 

*  Benedetti,  p.  191.  Hahn,i.  508 ;  ii.  328,  635.  See  also  La  Marmora's 
Un  po  pice  di  luce,  p.  242,  and  his  Segreti  di  Stato,  p.  274.  Govone's 
despatches  strongly  confirm  the  view  that  Bismarck  w«s  more  than  a 
mere  passive  listener  to  French  schemes  for  the  acquisition  of  Belgium. 
That  he  originated  the  plan  is  not  probable ;  that  he  encouraged  it  seems 
to  me  quite  certain,  unless  various  French  and  Italian  documents 
unconnected  with  one  another  are  forgeries  from  beginning  to  end. 
On  the  outbreak  of  the  war  of  1870  Bismarck  published  the  text  of 
tlu-  draft-treaty  discussed  in  1866  providing  fur  an  offensive  and 
defensive  alliance  between  France  and  Prussia,  and  the  seizure  of 
Belgium  by  France.  The  draft  was  in  Benedetti's  handwriting,  and 
written  on  paper  of  the  French  Embassy.  Benedetti  stated  in  answer 
that  he  had  made  the  draft  at  Bismarck's  dictation.  This  might  seem 
very  unlikely  were  it  not  known  that  the  draft  of  the  Treaty  between 
Prussia  and  Italy  in  1866  was  actually  so  written  down  by  Barrel,  the 
Italian  Ambassador,  at  Bismarck's  dictation. 


386  MODERN  EUROPE.  isee. 

work  now  stood  before  the  Prussian  people  and  its 
rulers  than  the  perpetuation  of  a  barren  struggle 
between  Crown  and  Parliament.  By  none  was  the 
severance  from  the  past  more  openly  expressed  than  by 
Bismarck  himself;  by  none  was  it  more  bitterly  felt 
than  by  the  old  Conservative  party  in  Prussia,  who  had 
hitherto  regarded  the  Minister  as  their  own  representa- 
tive. In  drawing  up  the  Constitution  of  the  North 
German  Federation,  Bismarck  remained  true  to  the 
principle  which  he  had  laid  down  at  Frankfort  before 
the  war,  that  the  German  people  must  be  represented 
by  a  Parliament  elected  directly  by  the  people  them- 
selves. In  the  incorporation  of  Hanover,  Hesse-Cassel 
and  the  Danish  Duchies  with  Prussia,  he  saw  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  win  the  new  populations  to  a 
loyal  union  with  Prussia  if  the  King's  Government 
continued  to  recognise  no  friends  but  the  landed  aris- 
tocracy and  the  army.  He  frankly  declared  that  the 
action  of  the  Cabinet  in  raising  taxes  without  the 
consent  of  Parliament  had  been  illegal,  and  asked  for 
an  Act  of  Indemnity.  The  Parliament  of  Berlin 
understood  and  welcomed  the  message  of  reconciliation. 
It  heartity  forgave  the  past,  and  on  its  own  initiative 
added  the  name  of  Bismarck  to  those  for  whose  services 
to  the  State  the  King  asked  a  recompense.  The  Pro- 
gressist party,  which  had  constituted  the  majority  in 
the  last  Parliament,  gave  place  to  a  new  combina- 
tion known  as  the  National  Liberal  party,  which,  while 
adhering  to  the  Progressist  creed  in  domestic  affairs, 
gave  its  allegiance  to  the  Foreign  and  the  German 


1868-67.       THE   NATIONAL   LIBERALS   IN  PRUSSIA.  387 

policy  of  the  Minister.  Within  this  party  many  able 
•men  who  in  Hanover  and  the  other  annexed  territories 
had  been  the  leaders  of  opposition  to  their  own  Govern- 
ments now  found  a  larger  scope  and  a  greater  political 
career.  More  than  one  of  the  colleaguesof  Bismarck  who 
had  been  appointed  to  their  offices  in  the  years  of 
conflict  were  allowed  to  pass  into  retirement,  and  their 
places  were  filled  by  men  in  sympathy  with  the  Na- 
tional Liberals.  With  the  expansion  of  Prussia  and 
the  establishment  of  its  leadership  in  a  German  Federal 
union,  the  ruler  of  Prussia  seemed  himself  to  expand 
from  the  instrument  of  a  military  monarchy  to  the 
representative  of  a  great  nation. 

To  Austria  the  battle  of  Koniggratz  brought  a 
settlement  of  the  conflict  between  the  Crown  and  Hun- 
gary. The  Constitution  of  February,  1861,  Hung?ryand 
hopefully  as  it  had  worked  during  its  first  Au8tria-lw 
jears,  bad  in  the  end  fallen  before  the  steady  refusal  of 
the  Magyars  to  recognise  the  authority  of  a  single 
Parliament  for  the  whole  Monarchy.  Within  the 
Reichsrath  itself  the  example  of  Hungary  told  as  a 
disintegrating  force ;  the  Poles,  the  Czechs  seceded 
from  the  Assembly ;  the  Minister,  Schmerling,  lost  his 
authority,  and  was  forced  to  resign  in  the  summer  of 
1MI5.  Soon  afterwards  an  edict  of  the  Emperor  sus- 
pended the  Constitution.  Count  Belcredi,  who  took 
office  in  Schmerling's  place,  attempted  to  arrive  at  an 
understanding  with  the  Magyar  leaders.  The  Hunga- 
rian Diet  was  convoked,  and  was  opened  by  the  King 
in  person  before  the  end  of  the  year.  Francis  Joseph 
z  2 


388  MODERN  EUROPE.  wes. 

announced  his  abandonment  of  the  principle  that 
Hungary  had  forfeited  its  ancient  rights  by  rebellion, 
and  asked  in  return  that  the  Diet  should  not  insist 
upon  regarding  the  laws  of  1848  as  still  in  force. 
Whatever  might  be  the  formal  validity  of  those  laws, 
it  was,  he  urged,  impossible  that  they  should  be  brought 
into  operation  unaltered.  For  the  common  affairs  of 
the  two  halves  of  the  Monarchy  there  must  be  some 
common  authority.  It  rested  with  the  Diet  to  arrive 
at  the  necessary  understanding  with  the  Sovereign  on 
this  point,  and  to  place  on  a  satisfactory  footing  the 
relations  of  Hungary  to  Transylvania  and  Croatia.  As 
soon  as  an  accord  should  have  been  reached  on  these 
subjects,  Francis  Joseph  stated  that  he  would  complete 
his  reconciliation  with  the  Magyars  by  being  crowned 
King  of  Hungary. 

In  the  Assembly  to  which  these  words  were  ad- 
dressed the  majority  was  composed  of  men  of  moderate 
opinions,  under  the  leadership  of  Francis 
Deak.  Deak  had  drawn  up  the  programme 
of  the  Hungarian  Liberals  in  the  election  of  1847.  He 
had  at  that  time  appeared  to  be  marked  out  by  his  rare 
political  capacity  and  the  simple  manliness  of  his 
character  for  a  great,  if  not  the  greatest,  part  in  the 
work  that  then  lay  before  his  country.  But  the  vio- 
lence of  revolutionary  methods  was  alien  to  his  tempera- 
ment. After  serving  in  Batthyany's  Ministry,  he  with- 
drew from  public  life  on  the  outbreak  of  war  with 
Austria,  and  remained  in  retirement  during  the  dic- 
tatorship of  Kossuth  and  the  struggle  of  1849.  As 


1866.  VEAK.  389 

a  loyal  friend  to  the  Hapsburg  dynasty,  and  a  clear- 
sighted judge  of  the  possibilities  of  the  time,  he  stood 
apart  while  Kossuth  dethroned  the  Sovereign  and 
proclaimed  Hungarian  independence.  Of  the  patriotism 
and  the  disinterestedness  of  Deak  there  was  never 
the  shadow  of  a  doubt ;  a  distinct  political  faith 
severed  him  from  the  leaders  whose  enterprise  ended 
in  the  catastrophe  which  he  had  foreseen,  and  pre- 
served for  Hungary  one  statesman  who  could,  with- 
out renouncing  his  own  past  and  without  inflicting 
humiliation  on  the  Sovereign,  stand  as  the  mediator 
between  Hungary  and  Austria  when  the  time  for 
reconciliation  should  arrive.  Deak  was  little  disposed 
to  abate  anything  of  what  he  considered  the  just 
demands  of  his  country.  It  was  under  his  leadership 
that  the  Diet  had  in  18C1  refused  to  accept  the  Consti- 
tution which  established  a  single  Parliament  for  the 
vrhole  Monarchy.  The  legislative  independence  of 
Hungary  he  was  determined  at  all  costs  to  preserve 
intact ;  rather  than  surrender  this  he  hud  been  willing 
in  1861  to  see  negotiations  broken  off  and  military  rule 
restored.  But  when  Francis  Joseph,  wearied  of  the 
sixteen  years'  struggle,  appealed  once  more  to  Hun- 
gary for  union  and  friendship,  there  was  no  man 
more  earnestly  desirous  to  reconcile  the  Sovereign  with 
the  nation,  and  to  smooth  down  the  opposition  to  the 
King's  proposals  which  arose  within  the 

Scheme  of  Hun- 

Diet  itself,    than  Deitk.     Under  his  influ-     t^iSSS^ 

lAflfl 

ence  a  Committee  was  appointed  to  frame 

the  necessary  basis  of   negotiation.      On   the  25th  of 


390  MODERN  EUROPE.  1866. 

June,  1866,  the  Committee  gave  in  its  report.  It  de- 
clared against  any  Parliamentary  union  with  the  Cis- 
Leithan  half  of  the  Monarchy,  but  consented  to  the 
establishment  of  common  Ministries  for  War,  Finance, 
and  Foreign  Affairs,  and  recommended  that  the  Budget 
necessary  for  these  joint  Ministries  should  be  settled  by 
Delegations  from  the  Hungarian  Diet  and  from  the 
western  Keichsrath.*  The  Delegations,  it  was  proposed, 
should  meet  separately,  and  communicate  their  views  to 
one  another  by  writing.  Only  when  agreement  should 
not  have  been  thus  attained  were  the  Delegations  to 
unite  in  a  single  body,  in  which  case  the  decision  was 
to  rest  with  an  absolute  majority  of  votes. 

The  debates  of  the  Diet  on  the  proposals  of  King 
Francis  Joseph  had  been  long  and  anxious  ;  it  was  not 
until  the  moment  when  the  war  with  Prussia  was 
breaking  out  that  the  Committee  presented  its  report. 
The  Diet  was  now  prorogued,  but  immediately  after 
the  battle  of  Koniggratz  the  Hungarian  leaders  were 
called  to  Vienna,  and  negotiations  were  pushed  forward 
on  the  lines  laid  down  by  the  Committee.  It  was  a 
matter  of  no  small  moment  to  the  Court  of 

Negotiations 

Sto-1^7  Vienna  that  while  bodies  of  Hungarian 
exiles  had  been  preparing  to  attack  the 
Empire  both  from  the  side  of  Silesia  and  of 
Venice,  Deak  and  his  friends  had  loyally  abstained 
from  any  communication  with  the  foreign  enemies  of 
the  House  of  Hapsburg.  That  Hungary  would  now 
gain  almost  complete  independence  was  certain ;  the 

*  Regelung  der  Yerhaltnisse,  p.  4.     Ausgleich  mit  Ungarn,  p.  9. 


ises-w.  FEDERALISM   OR   DUALISM.  391 

question  was  not  so  much  whether  there  should  be 
an  independent  Parliament  and  Ministry  at  Pesth  as 
whether  there  should  not  be  a  similarly  independent 
Parliament  and  Ministry  in  each  of  the  territories  of 
the  Crown,  the  Austrian  Sovereign  becoming  the  head 
of  a  Federation  instead  of  the  chief  of  a  single  or  a 
dual  State.  Count  Belcredi,  the  Minister  at  Vienna,  was 
disposed  towards  such  a  Federal  system ;  he  Federali8m  or 
was,  however,  now  confronted  within  the 
Cabinet  by  a  rival  who  represented  a  different  policy. 
After  making  peace  with  Prussia,  the  Emperor  called 
to  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  Count  Beust,  who 
had  hitherto  been  at  the  head  of  the  Saxon  Government, 
and  who  had  been  the  representative  of  the  German 
Federation  at  the  London  Conference  of  1864.  Beust, 
while  ready  to  grant  the  Hungarians  their  independence, 
advocated  the  retention  of  the  existing  Eeichsrath  and 
'.  of  a  single  Ministry  for  all  the  Cis-Leithan  parts  of 
the  Monarchy.  His  plan,  which  pointed  to  the  main- 
tenance of  German  ascendency  in  the  western  provinces, 
and  which  deeply  offended  the  Czechs  and  the  Slavic 
populations,  was  accepted  by  the  Emperor:  Belcredi 
withdrew  from  office,  and  Beust  was  charged,  as  Presi- 
dent of  the  Cabinet,  with  the  completion  of  the  settle- 
ment with  Hungary  (Feb.  7,  1867).  Deak  had  hitherto 
left  the  chief  ostensible  part  in  the  negotiations  to  Count 
Andrassy,  one  of  the  younger  patriots  of  1848,  who  had 
been  condemned  to  be  hanged,  and  had  8etti0mentb 
lived  a  refugee  during  the  next  ten  years. 

now  came   to  Vienna  himself,  and   in  the  course 


392  MODERN   EUROPE.  1867. 

of  a  few  days  removed  the  last  remaining  difficulties. 
The  King  gratefully  charged  him  with  the  formation  of 
the  Hungarian  Ministry  under  the  restored  Constitution, 
but  Deak  declined  alike  all  office,  honours,  and  rewards, 
and  Andrassy,  who  had  actually  been  hanged  in  effigy, 
was  plnced  at  the  head  of  the  Government.     The  Diet, 
which  had  reassembled  shortly  before  the  end  of  1866, 
greeted  the  national  Ministry  with  enthusiasm.     Altera- 
tions in  the  laws  of  1 848  proposed  in  accordance  with  the 
agreement  made  at  Vienna,  and  establishing  the  three 
common  Ministries  with  the  system  of  Delegations  for 
common  affairs,  were  carried  by  large  majorities.*     The 
abdication     of     Ferdinand,     which      throughout     the 
struggle  of  1849   Hungary  had  declined  to  recognise, 
was  now  acknowledged   as  valid,  and   on  the    8th   of 
June,  1867,  Francis  Joseph  was  crowned  King  of  Hun- 
gary amid  the  acclamations  ofPesth.  The  gift  of  money 
which  is  made  to  each  Hungarian  monarch  on  his  corona- 
tion   Francis    Joseph  by  a  happy  impulse 
Browned.  Sjune     distributed  among  the  families  of  those  who 

B     1 BR7  O 


had  fallen  in  fighting  against  him  in  1849. 
A  universal  amnesty  was  proclaimed,  no  condition  being 
imposed  on  the  return  of  the  exiles  but  that  they 
should  acknowledge  the  existing  Constitution.  Kossuth 
alone  refused  to  return  to  his  country  so  long  as  a 
Hapsburg  should  be  its  King,  and  proudly  clung  to 
ideas  which  were  already  those  of  the  past. 

*  Hungary  retained  a  Ministry  of  National  Defence  for  its  Reserve 
Forces,  and  a  Finance  Ministry  for  its  own  separate  finance.  Thus  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  the  only  one  of  the  three  common 
Ministries  which  covered  the  entire  range  of  a  department. 


HUNGARY.  393 

The  victory  of  the  Magyars  was  indeed  but  too 
complete.  Not  only  were  Beust  and  the  representatives 
of  the  western  half  of  the  Monarchy  so  over- 

•/  Hungary  since 

matched  by  the  Hungarian  negotiators  that 
in   the   distribution    of   the    financial  ^burdens   of   the 
Empire   Hungary  escaped  with  far  too  small  a  share, 
but  in  the  more  important  problem  of  the  relation  of 
'  the  Slavic  and  Roumanian  populations  of  the  Hungarian 
Kingdom  to  the  dominant  race  no  adequate  steps  were 
taken  for  the  protection  of  these  subject  nationalities. 
That  Croatia  and  Transylvania  should  be  re-united  with 
Hungary  if  the  Emperor  and  the  Magyars  were  ever 
to  be  reconciled  was  inevitable ;    and  in   the   case  of 
Croatia  certain  conditions  were  no  doubt  imposed,  and 
certain  local  rights  guaranteed.     But  on  the  whole  the 
non-Magyar  peoples  in  Hungary  were  handed  over  to 
the  discretion   of  the    ruling    race.       The    demand  of 
]«isrnarck  that  the  centre  of  gravity  of  the    Austrian 
States    should  be   transferred   from    Vienna   to    Pesth 
had  indeed  been  brought  to  pass.     While  in  the  western 
half  of  the  Monarchy  the  central  authority,  still  repre- 
sented by  a  single  Parliament,  seemed  in  the  succeeding 
years  to  be  altogether  losing  its  cohesive  power,  and  the 
political  life  of  Austria  became  a  series  of  distracting 
complications,    in    Hungary  the    Magyar   Government 
resolutely  set  itself  to  the  task  of  moulding  into  one 
the   nationalities    over    which  it  ruled.      Uniting  the 
characteristic  faults  with  the   great  qualities  of  a  race 
marked  out  by  Nature  and  ancient  habit  for  domination 
over  more   numerous  but  less  aggressive    neighbours, 


394,  MODERN  EUROPE. 

the  Magyars  have  steadily  sought  to  the  best  of  their 
power  to  obliterate  the  distinctions  which  make  Hun- 
gary in  reality  not  one  but  several  nations.  They  have 
held  the  Slavic  and  the  Roumanian  population  within 
their  borders  with  an  iron  grasp,  but  they  have  not 
gained  their  affection.  The  memory  of  the  Russian 
intervention  in  1849  and  of  the  part  then  played  by 
Serbs,  by  Croats  and  Roumanians  in  crushing  Magyar 
independence  has  blinded  the  victors  to  the  just  claims 
of  these  races  both  within  and  without  the  Hungarian 
kingdom,  and  attached  their  sympathy  to  the  hateful  and 
outworn  empire  of  the  Turk.  But  the  individuality  of 
peoples  is  not  to  be  blotted  out  in  a  day ;  nor,  with  all 
its  striking  advance  in  wealth,  in  civilisation,  and  in 
military  power,  has  the  Magyar  State  been  able  to 
free  itself  from  the  insecurity  arising  from  the  presence 
of  independent  communities  on  its  immediate  frontiers 
belonging  to  the  same  race  as  those  whose  language 
and  nationality  it  seeks  to  repress. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

Napoleon  III. — The  Mexican  Expedition — Withdrawal  of  the  French  and  death 
of  Maximilian — The  Luxemburg  Question— Exasperation  in  France  against 
Prussia — Austria— Italy — Mentana— Germany  after  1866 — The  Spanish 
candidature  of  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern — French  declaration — Benedetti 
and  King  William — Withdrawal  of  Leopold  and  demand  for  guarantees — 
The  telegram  from  Ems — War — Expected  Alliances  of  France — Austria — 
Italy — Prussian  plans — The  French  army — Causes  of  French  inferiority — 
Weissenburg  —  Worth — S^jieheren — Borny — Mars- la-Tour — Gravelotte — 
Sedan— The  Republic  proclaimed  at  Paris — Favre  and  Bismarck — Siege  of 
Paris— Gambetta  at  Tours— The  Army  of  the  Loire — Fall  of  Metz— Fight- 
ing at  Orleans — Sortie  of  Champigny — The  Armies  of  the  North,  of  the 
Loire,  of  the  East — Bourbaki's  ruin — Capitulation  of  Paris  and  Armistice — 
Preliminaries  of  Peace — Germany — Establishment  of  the  German  Empire — 
The  Commune  of  Paris — Second  siege— Effects  of  the  war  as  to  Russia  and 
Italy — Rome. 

THE  reputation  of  Napoleon  III.  was  perhaps  at  its 
height  at  the  end  of  the  first  ten  years  of  his  reign. 
His  victories  over  Russia  and  Austria  had  flattered 
the  military  pride  of  France  ;  the  flowing  tide  of  com- 
mercial prosperity  bore  witness,  as  it 

r         r          J  <  Napoleon  m. 

seemed,  to  the  blessings  of  a  government  at 
once  firm  and  enlightened ;  the  reconstruction  of  Paris 
dazzled  a  generation  accustomed  to  the  mean  and  dingy 
aspect  of  London  and  other  capitals  before  1850,  and 
scarcely  conscious  of  the  presence  or  absence  of  real 
Ix-uuty  and  dignity  where  it  saw  spaciousness  and 
brilliance.  The  political  faults  of  Napoleon,  the 
shiftiness  and  incoherence  of  his  designs,  his  want  of 
grasp  on  reality,  his  absolute  personal  nullity  as  an 


396  MODERN  EUEOPE. 

administrator,  were  known  to  some  few,  but  they  had 
not  been  displayed  to  the  world  at  large.  He  had 
done  some  great  things,  he  had  conspicuously  failed 
in  nothing.  Had  his  reign  ended  before  1363,  he 
would  probably  have  left  behind  him  in  popular 
memory  the  name  of  a  great  ruler.  But  from  this 
time  his  fortune  paled.  The  repulse  of  his  intervention 
on  behalf  of  Poland  in  1863  by  the  Eussian  Court, 
his  petulant  or  miscalculating  inaction  during  the 
Danish  War  of  the  following  year,  showed  those  to  be 
mistaken  who  had  imagined  that  the  Emperor  must 
always  exercise  a  controlling  power  in  Europe.  During 
the  events  which  formed  the  first  stage  in  the  con- 
solidation of  Germany  his  policy  was  a  succession  of 
errors.  Simultaneously  with  the  miscarriage  of  his 
European  schemes,  an  enterprise  which  he  had  under- 
taken beyond  the  Atlantic,  and  which  seriously 
weakened  his  resources  at  a  time  when  concentrated 
strength  alone  could  tell  on  European  affairs,  ended  in 
tragedy  and  disgrace. 

There  were  in  Napoleon  III.,  as  a  man  of  State, 
two  personalities,  two  mental  existences,  which  blended 
but  ill  with  one  another.  There  was  the  contemplator 
of  great  human  forces,  the  intelligent,  if  not  deeply 
penetrative,  reader  of  the  signs  of  the  times,  the 
brooder  through  long,  years  of  imprisonment  and 
The  Mexican  exile,  the  child  of  Europe,  to  whom 
Germany,  Italy,  and  England  had  all  in 
turn  been  nearer  than  his  own  country ;  and  there  was 
the  crowned  adventurer,  bound  by  his  name  and 


NAPOLEON  1IL  397 

position  to  gain  for  France  something  that  it  did 
not  possess,  and  to  regard  the  greatness  of  every  other 
nation  as  an  impediment  to  the  ascendency  of  his 
own.  Napoleon  correctly  judged  the  principle  of 
nationality  to  be  the  dominant  force  in  the  immediate 
future  of  Europe.  He  saw  in  Italy  and  in  Germany 
races  whose  internal  divisions  alone  had  prevented 
them  from  being  the  formidable  rivals  of  France,  and 
yet  he  assisted  the  one  nation  to  effect  its  union, 
and  was  not  indisposed,  within  certain  limits,  to 
promote  the  consolidation  of  the  other.  That  the 
acquisition  of  Nice  and  Savoy,  and  even  of  the 
Ehenish  Provinces,  could  not  in  itself  make  up  to 
France  for  the  establishment  of  two  great  nations  on 
its  immediate  frontiers  Napoleon  must  have  well 
understood  :  he  sought  to  carry  the  principle  of  ag- 
glomeration a  stage  farther  in  the  interests  of  France 
•itself,  and  to  form  some  moral,  if  not  political,  union 
of  the  Latin  nations,  which  should  embrace  under  his 
own  ascendency  communities  beyond  the  Atlantic  as 
well  as  those  of  the  Old  World.  It  was  with  this 
design  that  in  the  year  1862  he  made  the  financial 
misdemeanours  of  Mexico  the  pretext  for  an  expedition 
to  that  country,  the  object  of  which  was  to  subvert 
the  native  Republican  Government,  and  to  place  the 
Hapsburg  Maximilian,  as  a  "vassal  prince,  on  its 
throne.  England  and  Spain  had  at  first  agreed  to 
unite  with  France  in  enforcing  the  claims  of  the 
European  creditors  of  Mexico ;  but  as  soon  as  Napoleon 
had  made  public  his  real  intentions  these  Powers 


398  MODERN  EUROPE.  1865-67. 

withdrew  their  forces,  and  the  Emperor  was  left  free 
to  carry  out  his  plans  alone. 

The  design  of  Napoleon  to  establish  French  in- 
fluence in  Mexico  was  connected  with  his  attempt  to 
break  up  the  United  States  by  establishing  the  in- 
dependence of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  then  in 
rebellion,  through  the  mediation  of  the  Great  Powers 
of  Europe.  So  long  as  the  Civil  War  in  the  United 
States  lasted,  it  seemed  likely  that  Napoleon's  enterprise 
in  Mexico  would  be  successful.  Maximilian  was  placed 
upon  the  throne,  and  the  Eepublican  leader, 

The  Mexican  Ex-        -,-  -•    •  .      ,         .  ••  .  •• 

pedition.  1862-     J  uarez.  was  driven  into  the  extreme  north 

1865. 

of  the  country.  But  with  the  overthrow 
of  the  Southern  Confederacy  and  the  restoration  of 
peace  in  the  United  States  in  1865  the  prospect 
totally  changed.  The  Government  of  "Washington 
refused  to  acknowledge  any  authority  in  Mexico  but 
that  of  Juarez,  and  informed  Napoleon  in  courteous 
terms  that  his  troops  must  be  withdrawn.  Napoleon 
had  bound  himself  by  Treaty  to  keep  twenty-five 
thousand  men  in  Mexico  for  the  protection  of  Maxi- 
milian. He  was,  however,  unable  to  defy  the  order 
of  the  United  States.  Early  in  1866  he  acquainted 
Maximilian  with  the  necessities  of  the  situation,  and 
with  the  approaching  removal  of  the  force  which 
alone  had  placed  him  and  could  sustain  him  on  the 
throne.  The  unfortunate  prince  sent  his  consort, 
the  daughter  of  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  to  Europe 
to  plead  against  this  act  of  desertion ;  but  her 
efforts  were  vain,  and  her  reason  sank  under  the  just 


1887.  END    OF   THE   MEXICAN  EXPEDITION.  399 

presentiment  of  her  husband's  ruin.     The    utmost  on 
which  Napoleon  could  venture  was  the  postponement 
of  the  recall  of  his  troops  till  the  spring 
of  1867.    He  urged  Maximilian  to  abdicate     pciied  to  with- 

draw.    1866—7. 

before  it  was  too  late ;  but  the  prince  re- 
fused to  dissociate  himself  from  his  counsellors  who 
still  implored  him  to  remain.  Meanwhile  the  Juarists 
pressed  back  towards  the  capital  from  north  and 
south.  As  the  French  detachments  were  withdrawn 
towards  the  coast  the  entire  country  fell  into  their 
hands.  The  last  French  soldiers  quitted  Mexico  at 
the  beginning  of  March,  1867,  and  on  the  Fall  ^  Death 
15th  of  May,  Maximilian,  still  lingering  ofMaximili*a- 
at  Queretaro,  was  made  prisoner  by  the  Republicans. 
He  had  himself  while  in  power  ordered  that  the 
partisans  of  Juarez  should  be  treated  not  as  soldiers 
but  as  brigands,  and  that  when  captured  they  should 
lv  tried  by  court-martial  and  executed  within  twenty- 
four  hours.  The  same  severity  was  applied  to  himself. 
He  was  sentenced  to  death  and  shot  at  Queretaro  on 
the  19th  of  June. 

Thus  ended  the  attempt  of  Napoleon  III.  to 
establish  the  influence  of  France  and  of  his  dynasty 
beyond  the  seas.  The  doom  of  Maximilian  excited 
the  compassion  of  Europe  ;  a  deep,  irreparable  wound 
was  inflicted  on  the  reputation  of  the  man 
who  had  tempted  him  to  his  treacherous  le^'Treputa*1*0 

tion. 

throne,  who  had  guaranteed  him  protection, 

and  at  the  bidding  of  a  superior  power  had  abandoned 

him  to  his  ruin.     From  this  time,  though  the  outward 


400  MODERN  EUROPE.  1837 

splendour  of  the  Empire  was  undiminished,  there  re- 
mained scarcely  anything  of  the  personal  prestige  which 
Napoleon  had  once  enjoyed  in  so  rich  a  measure.     He 
was  no  longer  in  the  eyes   of  Europe  or  of   his  own 
country  the  profound,  self-contained  statesman  in  whose 
brain  lay  the  secret  of  coming  events ;    he  was  rather 
the  gambler  whom  fortune  was  preparing  to  desert,  the 
usurper  trembling  for    the  future  of  his  dynasty  and 
his  crown.     Premature  old  age  and  a  harassing  bodily 
ailment  began  to  incapacitate  him  for  personal  exertion. 
He    sought   to  loosen   the   reins  in  which  his  despot- 
ism  held   France,    and   to   make    a    compromise   with 
public  opinion  which   was  now  declaring  against  him. 
And    although    his    own    cooler   judgment    set    little 
store    by    any    addition    of     frontier-strips    of     alien 
territory  to  France,  and  he  would  probably  have  been 
best  pleased   to    pass   the   remainder  of   his   reign    in 
undisturbed    inaction,    he    deemed  it    necessary,    after 
failure  in  Mexico  had  become  inevitable,  to  seek  some 
satisfaction   in  Europe    for    the    injured  pride   of    his 
country.    He  entered  into  negotiations  with 

The  Luxemburg          -  _. 

question.  Feb.-     the  .King   or   Holland   tor   the  cession   of 

May,  1867. 

Luxemburg,  and  had  gained  his  assent, 
when  rumours  of  the  transaction  reached  the  North 
German  Press,  and  the  project  passed  from  out  the 
control  of  diplomatists  and  became  an  affair  of  rival 
nations. 

Luxemburg,  which  was  an  independent  Duchy  ruled 
by  the  King  of  Holland,  had  until  1866  formed  a  part 
of  the  German  Federation ;  and  although  Bismarck 


mr. 


LUXEMBURG.  401 


had  not  attempted  to  include  it  in  his  own  North 
German  Union,  Prussia  retained  by  the  Treaties  of 
1815  a  right  to  garrison  the  fortress  of  Luxemburg, 
and  its  troops  were  actually  there  in  possession.  The 
proposed  transfer  of  the  Duchy  to  France  excited  an 
outburst  of  patriotic  resentment  in  the  Federal  Par- 
liament at  Berlin.  The  population  of  Luxemburg 
was  indeed  not  wholly  German,  and  it  had  shown 
the  strongest  disinclination  to  enter  the  North  German 
league  ;  but  the  connection  of  the  Duchy  with  Germany 
in  the  past  was  close  enough  to  explain  the  indignation 
roused  by  Napoleon's  project  among  politicians  who 
little  suspected  that  during  the  previous  year  Bismarck 
himself  had  cordially  recommended  this  annexation, 
and  that  up  to  the  last  moment  he  had  been  privy  to 
the  Emperor's  plan.  The  Prussian  Minister,  though  he 
did  not  affect  to  share  the  emotion  of  his  countrymen, 
stated  that  his  policy  in  regard  to  Luxemburg  must 
be  influenced  by  the  opinion  of  the  Federal  Parliament, 
and  he  shortly  afterwards  caused  it  to  be  understood 
at  Paris  that  the  annexation  of  the  Duchy  to  France 
was  impossible.  As  a  warning  to  France  he  had  already 
published  the  Treaties  of  alliance  between  Prussia  and 
the  South  German  States,  which  had  been  made  at  the 
close  of  the  war  of  1866,  but  had  hitherto  been  kept 
secret.*  Other  powers  now  began  to  tender  their  good 
offices.  Count  Beust,  on  behalf  of  Austria,  suggested 
that  Luxemburg  should  be  united  to  Belgium,  which 

*  They  had  indeed  been  discovered  by  French  agents  in  Germany. 
Rothan,  L" Affaire  du  Luxembourg,  p.  74. 

A    A 


40:2  MODERN  EUROPE.  1867. 

in  its  turn  should  cede  a  small  district  to  France. 
This  arrangement,  which  would  have  been  accepted 
at  Berlin,  and  which,  by  soothing  the  irritation  pro- 
duced in  France  by  Prussia's  successes,  would  possibly 
have  averted  the  war  of  1870,  was  frustrated  by  the 
refusal  of  the  King  of  Belgium  to  part  with  any  of 
his  territory.  Napoleon,  disclaiming  all  desire  for 
territorial  extension,  now  asked  only  for  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Prussian  garrison  from  Luxemburg; 
but  it  was  known  that  he  was  determined  to  enforce 
this  demand  by  arms.  The  Russian  Government 
proposed  that  the  question  should  be  settled  by  a 
Conference  of  the  Powers  at  London.  This  proposal 
was  accepted  under  certain  conditions  by  France  and 
Prussia,  and  the  Conference  assembled  on  the  7th  of 
May.  Its  deliberations  were  completed  in  four  days, 
and  the  results  were  summed  up  in  the  Treaty  of 
London  signed  on  the  llth.  By  this  Treaty  the 
Duchy  of  Luxemburg  was  declared  neutral  territory 
under  the  collective  guarantee  of  the  Powers.  Prussia 
withdrew  its  garrison,  and  the  King  of  Holland,  who 
continued  to  be  sovereign  of  the  Duchy,  undertook  to 
demolish  the  fortifications  of  Luxemburg,  and  to 
maintain  it  in  the  future  as  an  open  town.* 

Of  the  politicians  of  France,  those  who  even 
affected  to  regard  the  aggrandisement  of  Prussia  and 
the  union  of  Northern  Germany  with  indifference  or 
satisfaction  were  a  small  minority.  Among  these 

*  Hahn,  i.  658.     B/othan,  Luxembourg,  p.  246.     Correspondenzen  des 
K  K.  Minist.  des  Aiisseru,  1868,  p.  24.    Parl.  Pap.,  1867,  vol.  kxiv.,  p.  427. 


18«7.  FRENCH   OPINION.  403 

were  the  Emperor,  who,  after  his  attempts  to  gain  a 
Ehenish  Province  had  been  baffled,  sought  to  prove  in 
an  elaborate  State -paper  that  France  had 

.  .  .  Exasperation  in 

won  more  than  it  had  lost  by  the  extmc-     France  against 

*  Prussia. 

tion  of  the  German  Federation  as  es- 
tablished in  1815,  and  by  the  dissolution  of  the 
tie  that  had  bound  Austria  and  Prussia  together  as 
members  of  this  body.  The  events  of  1866  had,  he 
contended,  broken  up  a  system  devised  in  evil  days 
for  the  purpose  of  uniting  Central  Europe  against 
France,  and  had  restored  to  the  Continent  the  freedom 
of  alliances ;  in  other  words,  they  had  made  it 

possible  for  the  South  German  States  to  connect  them-  ^ 

selves  with  France.  If  this  illusion  was  really 
entertained  by  the  Emperor,  it  was  rudely  dispelled 
by  the  discovery  of  the  Treaties  between  Prussia 
and  the  Southern  States  and  by  their  publication 
in  the  spring  of  1867.  But  this  revelation  was 
not  necessary  to  determine  the  attitude  of  the  great 
majority  of  those  who  passed  for  the  representa- 
tives of  independent  political  opinion  in  France. 
The  Ministers  indeed  were  still  compelled  to 
imitate  the  Emperor's  optimism,  and  a  few  enlightened 
men  among  the  Opposition  understood  that  France 
must  be  content  to  see  the  Germans  effect  their 
national  unity ;  but  the  great  body  of  unofficial  [^_ 
politicians,  to  whatever  party  they  belonged,  joined 
in  the  bitter  outcry  raised  at  once  against  the 
aggressive  Government  of  Prussia  and  the  feeble 
administration  at  Paris,  which  had  not  found  the 

A    A    2 


404  MODERN  EUROPE.  1867. 

means  to  prevent,  or  had  actually  facilitated,  Prussia's 
successes.  Thiers,  who  more  than  any  one  man  had 
by  his  writings  popularised  the  Napoleonic  legend 
and  accustomed  the  French  to  consider  themselves 
entitled  to  a  monopoly  of  national  greatness  on  the 
Ehine,  was  the  severest  critic  of  the  Emperor,  the 
most  zealous  denouncer  of  the  work  which  Bismarck 
had  effected.  It  was  only  with  too  much  reason  that 
the  Prussian  Government  looked  forward  to  an  attack 
by  France  at  some  earlier  or  later  time  as  almost 
certain,  and  pressed  forward  the  military  organisation 
which  was  to  give  to  Germany  an  army  of  unheard-of 
efficiency  and  strength. 

There  appears  to  be  no  evidence  that  Napoleon  III. 

himself  desired  to  attack  Prussia  so  long  as  that  Power 

should  strictly  observe  the  stipulations   of 

Prussia  after      the  Treaty  of  Prague  which   provided  for 

1867.  J 

the  independence  of  the  South  German 
States.^  But  the  current  of  events  irresistibly  im- 
(/  pelled  Germany  to  unity.  The  very  Treaty  which 
made  the  river  Main  the  limit  of  the  North  German 
Confederacy  reserved  for  the  Southern  States  the  right 
of  attaching. themselves  to  those  of  the  North  by  some 
kind  of  national  tie.  Unless  the  French  Emperor  was 
resolved  to  acquiesce  in  the  gradual  development  of  this 
federal  unity  until,  as  regarded  the  foreigner,  the  North 
and  the  South  of  Germany  should  be  a  single  body,  he 
could  have  no  cdnfident  hope  of  lasting  peace.  To  have 
thus  anticipated  and  accepted  the  future,  to  have  re- 
moved once  and  for  all  the  sleepless  fears  of  Prussia  by 


1868-9.  FRANCE   AND   AUSTRIA.  406 

the  frank  recognition  of  its  right  to  give  all  Germany 
effective  union,  would  have  been  an  act  too  great  and 
too  wise   in   reality,  too  weak  and  self-renouncing  in 
appearance,  for  any  chief  of  a  rival  nation.     Napoleon 
did  not  take  this  course  ;  on  the  other  hand,  not  desir- 
ing  to    attack  Prussia  while    it   remained   within  the 
limits  of  the  Treaty  of  Prague,  he  refrained  from  seek- 
ing alliances  with  the  object  of  immediate  and  aggres- 
sive action.     The  diplomacy  of  the  Emperor  during  the 
period  from  18G6  to  1870  is  indeed  still  but  im  perfectly^ 
known  ;  but  it  would  appear  that  his  efforts  were  directed  I 
only  to   the  formation  of  alliances  with  the  view   of  i 
eventual  action  when  Prussia  should  have  passed  the/ 
limits  which  the  Emperor  himself  or  public  opinion  in  \ 
Paris  should,  as  interpreter  of  the  Treaty  of  Prague,  j 
impose  upon  this  Power  in  its  dealings  with  the  South 
German  States. 

The  Governments  to  which  Napoleon  could  look  for 
some  degree  of  support  were  those  of  Austria  and  Italy. 
Count   Beust,   now  Chancellor   of   the  Austrian  Mon- 
archy, was  a  bitter  enemy  to  Prussia,  and  a 
rash  and  adventurous  politician,  to  whom     with  Austria. 

1868-60. 

the  very  circumstance  of  his  sudden  eleva- 
tion from  the  petty  sphere  of  Saxon  politics  gave  a 
certain  levity  and  unconstraint  in  the  handling  of  great 
affairs.  He  cherished  the  idea  of  recovering  Austria's 
ascendency  in  Germany,  and  was  disposed  to  repel  the 
extension  of  Kussian  influence  westwards  by  boldly 
encouraging  the  Poles  to  seek  for  the  satisfaction  of 
their  national  hopes  in  Galicia  under  the  Hapsburg 


406  MODERN  EUROPE.  1868-9. 

Crown.  To  Count  Beust  France  was  the  most  natural 
of  all  allies.  On  the  other  hand,  the  very  system  which 
Beust  had  helped  to  establish  in  Hungary  raised  serious 
obstacles  against  the  adoption  of  his  own  policy.  An- 
drassy,  the  Hungarian  Minister,  while  sharing  Beust's 
hostility  to  Eussia,  declared  that  his  countrymen  had 
no  interest  in  restoring  Austria's  German  connection, 
and  were  in  fact  better  without  it.  In  these  circum- 
stances the  negotiations  of  the  French  and>  the  Austrian 
Emperor  were  conducted  by  a  private  correspondence. 
The  interchange  of  letters  continued  during  the  years 
1868  and  1869,  and  resulted  in  a  promise  made  by 
Napoleon  to  support  Austria  if  it  should  be  attacked  by 
Prussia,  while  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  promised  to 
assist  France  if  it  should  be  attacked  by  Prussia  and 
Eussia  together.  No  Treaty  was  made,  but  a  general 
assurance  was  exchanged  between  the  two  Emperors 
that  they  would  pursue  a  common  policy  and  treat  one 
another's  interests  as  their  own.  With  the  view  of 
forming  a  closer  understanding  the  Archduke  Albrecht 
visited  Paris  in  February,  1870,  and  a  French  general 
was  sent  to  Vienna  to  arrange  the  plan  of  campaign  in 
case  of  war  with  Prussia.  In  such  a  war,  if  undertaken 
by  the  two  Powers,  it  was  hoped  that  Italy  would  join.  * 
The  alliance  of  1866  between  Prussia  and  Italy  had 
left  behind  it  in  each  of  these  States  more 

Italy  after  1866. 

of  rancour  than  of  good  will.     La  Marmora 
had  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  been  unfortunate 

*  Sorel,   Histoire  Diplomatique,   i.   38.      But    see   the  controversy 
between  Beust  and  Gramont  in  Le  Temps,  Jan.  11 — 16,  18T3. 


1866-7.  ITALY.  407 

in  his  relations  with  Berlin.  He  had  entered  into  the 
alliance  with  suspicion ;  he  would  gladly  have  seen 
Venetia  given  to  Italy  by  a  European  Congress  with- 
out war;  and  when  hostilities  broke  out,  he  had  dis- 
regarded and  resented  what  he  considered  an  attempt 
of  the  Prussian  Government  to  dictate  to  him  the 
military  measures  to  be  pursued.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Prussians  charged  the  Italian  Government  with 
having  deliberately  held  back  its  troops  after  the  battle 
of  Custozza  in  pursuance  of  arrangements  made  be- 
tween Napoleon  and  the  Austrian  Emperor  on  the 
voluntary  cession  of  Venice,  and  with  having  en- 
dangered or  minimised  Prussia's  success  by  enabling 
the  Austrians  to  throw  a  great  part  of  their  Italian 
forces  northwards.  There  was  nothing  of  that  com- 
radeship between  the  Italian  and  the  Prussian  armies 
which  is  acquired  on  the  field  of  battle.  The  personal 
sympathies  of  Victor  Emmanuel  were  strongly  on  the 
side  of  the  French  Emperor ;  and  when,  at  the  close 
of  the  year  1866,  the  French  garrison  was  withdrawn 
from  Rome  in  pursuance  of  the  convention  made  in 
September,  1864,  it  seemed  probable  that  France  and 
Italy  might  soon  unite  in  a  close  alliance.  But  in 
the  following  year  the  attempts  of  the  Garibaldians 
to  overthrow  the  Papal  Government,  now  left  without 
its  foreign  defenders,  embroiled  Napoleon  and  the 
Italian  people.  Napoleon  was  unable  to  defy  the 
clerical  party  in  France;  he  adopted  the  language  of 
menace  in  his  communications  with  the  Italian  Cabinet ; 
and  when,  in  the  autumn  of  1867,  the  Garibaldians 


408  MODERN  EUROPE.  1867. 

actually  invaded  the  Eoman  States,  he  despatched  a 
body  of  French  troops  under  General  Failly  to  act  in 
Mentana,  support  of  those  of  the  Pope.  An  encounter 

took  place  at  Mentana  on  November  3rd, 
in  which  the  Garibaldians,  after  defeating  the  Papal 
forces,  were  put  to  the  rout'  by  General  Failly.  The 
occupation  of  Civita  Yecchia  was  renewed,  and  in  the 
course  of  the  debates  raised  at  Paris  on  the  Italian 
policy  of  the  Government,  the  Prime  Minister,  M. 
Eouher,  stated,  with  the  most  passionate  emphasis  that, 
come  what  might,  Italy  should  never  possess  itself  of 
Eome.  "  Never,"  he  cried,  "  will  France  tolerate  such 
an  outrage  on  its  honour  and  its  dignity."' 

The  affair  of  Mentana,  the  insolent  and  heartless 
language  in  which  General  Failly  announced  his  success, 
the  reoccupation  of  Eoman  territory  by  French  troops, 
and  the  declaration  made  by  M.  Eouher  in  the  French 

Assembly,    created   wide    and   deep   anger 

Napoleon  and  .        -,- .     •.  -.  -,  i     r>         n         i  '  p 

Italy  after  m  Italy,  and  made  an  end  tor  the  time  or 

Mentana.  » 

all.  possibility  of  a  French  alliance.  Napo- 
leon was  indeed,  as  regarded  Italy,  in  an  evil  case. 
By  abandoning  Eome  he  would  have  turned  against 
himself  and  his  dynasty  the  whole  clerical  interest 
in  France,  whose  confidence  he  had  already  to  some 
extent  forfeited  by  his  policy  in  1860  ;  on  the  other 
hand,  it  was  vain  for  him  to  hope  for  the  friendship 
of  Italy  whilst  he  continued  to  bar  the  way  to  the 

*  Rothan,  La  France  en  1867,  ii.  316.  Renchlin,  v.  547.  Two  his- 
torical expressions  belong  to  Mentana :  the  "  Never,"  of  M.  Rouher,  and 
"  The  Chassepots  have  done  wonders,"  of  General  Failly. 


FRANCE   AND   ITALY.  409 

fulfilment  of  the  universal  national  desire.  With  the  view 
of  arriving  at  some  compromise  he  proposed  a  European 
Conference  on  the  Roman  question  ;  but  this  was  re- 
sisted above  all  by  Count  Bismarck,  whose  interest  it 
was  to  keep  the  sore  open  ;  and  neither  England  nor 
Russia  showed  any  anxiety  to  help  the  Pope's  pro- 
tector out  of  his  difficulties.  Napoleon  sought  by  a 
correspondence  with  Victor  Emmanuel  during  1868  and 
1869  to  pave  the  way  for  a  defensive  alliance  ;  but 
Victor  Emmanuel  was  in  reality  as  well  as  in  name 
a  constitutional  king,  and  probably  could  not,  even  if 
he  had  desired,  have  committed  Italy  to  engagements 
disapproved  by  the  Ministry  and  Parliament.  It  was 
made  clear  to  Napoleon  that  the  evacuation  of  the  Papal 
States  must  precede  any  treaty  of  alliance  between 
France  and  Italy.  Whether  the  Italian  Government 
would  have  been  content  with  a  return  to  the  condi- 
tions of  the  September  Convention,  or  whether  it  made 
the  actual  possession  of  Rome  the  price  of  a  treaty- 
engagement,  is  uncertain  ;  but  inasmuch  as  Napoleon 
was  not  at  present  prepared  to  evacuate  Civita  Vecchia,  he 
could  aim  at  nothing  more  than  some  eventual  concert 
when  the  existing  difficulties  should  have  been  removed. 
The  Court  of  Vienna  now  became  the  intermediary 
between  the  two  Powers  who  had  united  against  it  in 
1859.  Count  Beust  was  free  from  the  asso- 


ciations  which  had  made  any  approach  to 
friendship  with  the  kingdom  of  Victor  Emmanuel  im- 
possible for  his  predecessors.     He  entered  into  nego- 
tiations at  Florence,  which  resulted  in  the  conclusion 


-   410  MODERN    EUROPE.  1868-9. 

of  an  agreement  between  the  Austrian  and  the  Italian 
Governments  that  they  would  act  together  and  guar- 
antee one  another's  territories  in  the  event  of  a  war 
between  France  and  Prussia.  -This  agreement  was 
made  with  the  assent  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  and 
was  understood  to  be  preparatory  to  an  accord  with 
France  itself;  but  it  was  limited  to  a  defensive  cha- 
racter, and  it  implied  that  any  eventual  concert  with 
France  must  be  arranged  by  the  two  Powers  in  com- 
bination with  one  another.* 

•^  At  the  beginning  of  1870  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
was  therefore  without  any  more  definite  assurance  of 
support  in  a  war  with  Prussia  than  the  promise  of  the 
Austrian  Sovereign  that  he  would  assist  France  if  at- 
isoiation  of  tacked  by  Prussia  and  Russia  together,  and 
that  he  would  treat  the  interests  of  France 
as  his  own.  By  withdrawing  his  protection  from  Rome 
Napoleon  had  undoubtedly  a  fair  chance  of  building  up 
this  shadowy  and  remote  engagement  into  a  defensive 
alliance  with  both  Austria  and  Italy.  But  perfect 
clearness  and  resolution  of  purpose,  as  well  as  the  steady 
avoidance  of  all  quarrels  on  mere  incidents,  were  abso- 
lutely indispensable  to  the  creation  and  the  employment 
of  such  a  league  against  the  Power  which  alone  it  could 

*  Sorel,  i.  40.  Hahn,  i.  720.  Immediately  after  Mentana,  on  Nov.  17, 
1867,  Mazzini  wrote  to  Bismarck  and  to  the  Prussian  ambassados  at  Flor- 
ence, Count  Usedom,  stating  that  Napoleon  had  resolved  to  make  war 
on  Prussia  and  had  proposed  an  alliance  to  Yictor  Emmanuel,  who  had 
accepted  it  for  the  price  of  Rome.  Mazzini  offered  to  employ  revolu- 
tionary means  to  frustrate  this  plan,"and  asked  for  money  and  arms.  Bis- 
marck showed  caution,  but  did  not  altogether  disregard  the  communication. 
Politica  Segreta  Italiaua,  p.  339. 


1867-70.  GERMANY.  411 

have  in  view  ;  and  Prussia  had  now  little  reason  to  fear 
any  such  exercise  of  statesmanship  on  the  part  of 
Napoleon.  The  solution  of  the  Eoman  question,  in 
other  words  the  withdrawal  of  the  French  garrison 
from  Roman  territory,  could  proceed  only  from  some 
stronger  stimulus  than  the  declining  force  of  Napo- 
leon's own  intelligence  and  will  could  now  supply. 
This  fatal  problem  baffled  his  attempts  to  gain  alliances ; 
and  yet  the  isolation  of  France  was  but  half  acknow- 
ledged, but  half  understood ;  rand  a  host  of  rash,  vain- 
glorious spirits  impatiently  awaited  the  hour  that  should 
call  them  to  their  revenge  on  Prussia  for  the  triumphs 
in  which  it  had  not  permitted  France  to  share. 

Meanwhile    on    the    other    side    Count    Bismarck, 
advanced  with  what  was  most  essential  in  his  relations 
with  the  States  of  Southern  Germany — the      Germany 
completion  of  the  Treaties  of  Alliance  by 
conventions  assimilating  the  military  systems  of  these 
States  to  that  of  Prussia.     A  Customs-Parliament  was 
established   for  the  whole  of  Germany,  which,  it  was 
hoped,  would  be  the  precursor  of  a  National  Assembly 
uniting  the  North  and  the  South  of  the  Main.     But  in 
spite  of    this  military  and    commercial  approximation,] 
the  progress  towards  union  was  neither  so  rapid  nor 
so  smooth  as  the  patriots   of  the  North  could  desire. 
There  was  much  in  the  harshness  and  self-assertion  of 
the  Prussian  character  that  repelled  the  less  disciplined 
communities  of  the  South.     Ultramontanism  was  strong 
in  Bavaria  ;  and  throughout  the  minor  States  the  most 
advanced  of  the  Liberals  were  opposed  to  a  closer  union 


412  MODERN  EUEOPE.  1867-70. 

,with  Berlin,  from  dislike  of  its  absolutist  traditions  and 
the  heavy  hand  of  its  Government.  Thus  the  tendency- 
known  as  Particularism  was  supported  in  Bavaria  and 
Wiirtemberg  by  classes  of  the  population  who  in  most 
respects  were  in  antagonism  to  one  another ;  nor  could 
the  memories  of  the  campaign  of  1866  and  the  old  regard 
for  Austria  be  obliterated  in  a  day.  Bismarck  did  not 
unduly  press  on  the  work  of  consolidation.  He  marked 
and  estimated  the  force  of  the  obstacles  which  too  rapid 
a  development  of  his  national  policy  would  encounter. 
It  is  possible  that  he  may  even  have  seen  indications 
that  religious  and  other  influences  might  imperil  the 
military  union  which  he  already  established,  and  that 
he  may  not  have  been  unwilling  to  call  to  his  aid,  as  the 
surest  of  all  preparatives  for  national  union,  the  event 
which  he  had  long  believed  to  be  inevitable  at  some 
time  or  other  in  the  future,  a  war  with  France. 

Since  the  autumn  of  1868  the  throne  of  Spain  had 

been  vacant  in  consequence  of  a  revolution  in   which 

General  Prim  had   been  the  leading  actor. 

The  Spanish 

iSSffif0  It  was  not  easy  to  discover  a  successor  for 
the  Bourbon  Isabella ;  and  after  other  can- 
didatures had  been  vainly  projected  it  occurred  to  Prim 
and  his  friends  early  in  1869  that  a  suitable  candidate 
might  be  found  in  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern- 
Sigmaringen,  whose  elder  brother  had  been  made  Prince 
of  Eou  mania,  and  whose  father,  Prince  Antony,  had 
been  Prime  Minister  of  Prussia  in  1859.  The  House  of 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen  was  so  distantly  related  to 
the  reigning  family  of  Prussia  that  the  name  alone 


1969-70.  THE   SPANISH   CANDIDATURE.  413 

preserved  the  memory  of  the  connection ;  and  in  actual 
blood-relationship  Prince  Leopold  was  much  more 
nearly  allied  to  the  French  Houses  of  Murat  and 
Beauharnais.  But  the  Sigmaringen  family  was  dis- 
tinctly Prussian  by  interest  and  association,  and  its 
chief,  Antony,  had  not  only  been  at  the  head  of  the 
Prussian  Administration  himself,  but  had,  it  is  said, 
been  the  first  to  suggest  the  appointment  of  Bismarck 
to  the  same  office.  The  candidature  of  a  Hohenzollern 
might  reasonably  be  viewed  in  France  as  an  attempt  to 
connect  Prussia  politically  with  Spain  ;  and  with  so 
much  reserve  was  this  candidature  at  the  first  handled 
at  Berlin  that,  in  answer  to  inquiries  made  by  Benedetti 
in  the  spring  of  1869,  the  Secretary  of  State  who 
represented  Count  Bismarck  stated  on  his  word  of 
honour  that  the  candidature  had  never  been  suggested. 
The  affair  was  from  first  to  last  ostensibly  treated 
at  Berlin  as  one  with  which  the  Prussian  Government 
was  wholly  unconcerned,  and  in  which  King  William 
was  interested  only  as  head  of  the  family  to  which 
Prince  Leopold  belonged.  For  twelve  months  after 
Benedetti's  inquiries  it  appeared  as  if  the  project  had 
been  entirely  abandoned ;  it  was,  however,  revived  in 
the  sprint  of  1870,  and  on  the  3rd  of 

Leopold  accepts 

July  the  announcement  was  made  at  Paris     creownanish 
that  Prince  Leopold  had  consented  to  ac- 
cept the  Crown  of  Spain  if  the  Cortes  should  confirm 
his  election. 

At  once  there  broke  out  in  the  French  Press  a  storm 
of   indignation  against   Prussia.      The  organs   of    the 


414  MODERN  EUROPE.  1870. 

Government  took  the  lead  in  exciting  public  opinion. 

On   the  6th  of  July   the  Duke  of  Gramont,  Foreign 

Minister,  declared   to  the  Legislative  Body   that   the 

attempt  of  a  Foreign  Power  to  place  one  of  its  Princes 

on  the  throne  of  Charles  V.  imperilled  the  interests  and 

the  honour  of  France,  and  that,  if  such  a  contingency 

were  realised,  the  Government  would  fulfil 

Dedbnttn.     its   duty    without   hesitation   and   without 

July  6.  J 

weakness.  The  violent  and  unsparing  lan- 
guage of  this  declaration,  which  had  been  drawn  up  at 
a  Council  of  Ministers  under  the  Emperor's  presidency, 
proved  that  the  Cabinet  had  determined  either  to  humi- 
liate Prussia  or  to  take  vengeance  by  arms.  It  was  at 
once  seen  by  foreign  diplomatists,  who  during  the  pre- 
ceding days  had  been  disposed  to  assist  in  removing  a 
reasonable  subject  of  complaint,  how  little  was  the 
chance  of  any  peaceable  settlement  after  such  a  public 
challenge  had  been  issued  to  Prussia  in  the  Emperor's 
name.  One  means  of  averting  war  alone  seemed 
possible,  the  voluntary  renunciation  by  Prince  Leopold 
of  the  offered  Crown.  To  obtain'  this  renunciation 
became  the  task  of  those  who,  unlike  the  French 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  were  anxious  to  preserve 
peace. 

The  parts  that  were  played  at  this  crisis  by  the 
individuals  who  most  influenced  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
are  still  but  imperfectly  known ;  but  there  is  no  doubt 
omvier's  Minis-  *na^  ^rom  ^ne  beginning  to  the  end  the 
Duke  of  Gramont,  with  short  intermissions, 
pressed  with  insane  ardour  for  war.  The  Ministry  now 


1870.  THE   SPANISH   CANDIDATURE.  415 

in  office  had  been  called  to  their  places  in  January, 
1870,  after  the  Emperor  had  made  certain  changes  in 
the  constitution  in  a  Liberal  direction,  and  had  pro- 
fessed to  transfer  the  responsibility  of  power  from 
himself  to  a  body  of  advisers  possessing  the  confidence 
of  the  Chamber.  Ollivier,  formerly  one  of  the  leaders 
of  the  Opposition,  had  accepted  the  Presidency  of  the 
Cabinet.  His  colleagues  were  for  the  most  part  men 
new  to  official  life,  and  little  able  to  hold  their  own 
against  such  representatives  of  unreformed  Imperialism 
as  the  Duke  of  Gramont  and  the  War-Minister  Lebceuf 
who  sat  beside  them.  Ollivier  himself  was  one  of  the  few 
politicians  in  France  who  understood  that  his  countrymen 
must  be  content  to  see  German  unity  established 
whether  they  liked  it  or  not.  He  was  entirely  averse 
from  war  with  Prussia  on  the  question  which  had  now 
arisen ;  but  the  fear  that  public  opinion  would  sweep 
away  a  Liberal  Ministry  which  hesitated  to  go  all 
lengths  in  patriotic  extravagance  led  him  to  sacrifice  his 
own  better  judgment,  and  to  accept  the  responsibility 
for  a  policy  which  in  his  heart  he  disapproved. 
Gramont's  rash  hand  was  given  free  play/  Instructions 
were  sent  to  Benedetti  to  seek  the  King  of  Prussia  at 
Ems,  where  he  was  taking  the  waters,  and  to  demand 
from  him,  as  the  only  means  of  averting  war,  that  he ' 
should  order  the  Hohenzollern  Prince  to  revoke  his 
acceptance  of  the  Crown.  "We  are  in  great  haste," 
Gramont  added,  "  for  we  must  gain  the  start  in  case 
of  an  unsatisfactory  reply,  and  commence  the  move- 
ment of  troops  by  Saturday  in  order  to  enter  upon  the 


416       ,  MODERN  EUROPE.  ISTO. 

campaign  in  a  fortnight.  Be  on  your  guard  against 
an  answer  merely  leaving  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern 
to  his  fate,  and  disclaiming  on  the  part  of  the  King 
any  interest  in  his  future."* 

Benedetti's  first  interview  with  the  King  was  on  the 
9th  of  July.     He  informed  the  King  of  the  emotion  ' 

that  had  been  caused  in  France  by  the 
K^ wiliiam at  candidature  of  the  Hohenzollern  Prince; 

Ems,  July  9— 14. 

he  dwelt  on  the  value  to  both  countries  of 
the  friendly  relation  between  France  and  Prussia ;  and, 
while  studiously  avoiding  language  that  might  wound 
or  irritate  the  King,  he  explained  to  him  the  require- 
ments of  the  Government  at  Paris.  The  King  had 
learnt  beforehand  what  would  be  the  substance  of 
Benedetti's  communication.  He  had  probably  been 
surprised  and  grieved  at  the  serious  consequences 
which  Prince  Leopold's  action  had  produced  in 
France ;  and  although  he  had  determined  not  to  sub- 
mit to  dictation  from  Paris  or  to  order  Leopold  to 
abandon  his  candidature,  he  had  already,  as  it  seems, 
taken  steps  likely  to  render  the  preservation  of  peace 
more  probable.  At  the  end  of  a  conversation  with  the 
Ambassador,  in  which  he  asserted  his  complete  inde- 
pendence as  head  of  the  family  of  Hohenzollern,  he 
informed  Benedetti  that  he  had  entered  into  com- 
munication with  Leopold  and  his  father,  and  that 
he  expected  shortly  to  receive  a  despatch  from  Sig- 
maringen.  Benedetti  rightly  judged  that  the  King, 

*  Benedetti,  Ma  Mission,  p.  319,  July  7.     Gramont,  La  France  et  la 
Prusse,  p.  61. 


1870.  LEOPOLD   WITHDRAWS.  417 

wliile  positively  refusing  to  meet  Gramont's  demands, 
was  yet  desirous  of  finding  some  peaceable  way  out  of 
the  difficulty ;  and  the  report  of  this  interview  which 
he  sent  to  Paris  was  really  a  plea  in  favour  of  good  sense 
and  moderation.  But  Gramont  was  little  disposed  to 
accept  such  counsels.  "  I  tell  you  plainly,"  he  wrote 
to  Benedetti  on  the  next  day,  "  public  opinion  is  on 
fire,  and  will  leave  us  behind  it.  We  must  begin ;  we 
wait  only  for  your  despatch  to  call  up  the  three 
hundred  thousand  men  who  are  waiting  the  summons. 
Write,  telegraph,  something  definite.  If  the  King  will 
not  counsel  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  to  resign,  well, 
it  is  immediate  war,  and  in  a  few  days  we  are  on  the 
lihine.'^ 

Nevertheless  Benedetti's  advice  was  not  without  its 
influence  on  the  Emperor  and  his  Ministers.  Napo- 
leon, himself  wavering  from  hour  to  hour,  now 
ruclined  to  the  peace-party,  and  during  the  llth  there 

was  a  pause  in  the  military  preparations   that  had  been 

craytf 

begun.  On  the  12th  the  oflj^pts  of  disinterested  Govern- 
ments, probably  also  the  suggestions  of  the  King  of 
Prussia  himself,  produced  their  effect.  A 

Ix-opold  with- 

telegram  was  received  at  Madrid  from  Prince 
Antony  stating  that  his  son's  candidature  was  with- 
drawn. A  few  hours  later  Ollivier  announced  the  news 
in  the  Legislative  Chamber  at  Paris,  and  exchanged 
congratulations  with  the  friends  of  peace,  who  con- 
» it  Wed  that  the  matter  was  now  at  an  end.  But  this 
pacific  conclusion  little  suited  either  the  war- party  or 
the  Bonapartists  of  the  old  type,  who  grudged  to  a 
B  B 


418  MODERN  EUROPE.  isro. 

Constitutional   Ministry  so    substantial    a    diplomatic 

success.     They  at  once  declared  that  the  retirement  of 

Prince  Leopold  was  a  secondary  matter,  and  that  the 

real  question  was  what  guarantees  had  been 

Guarantee  ,    „  -r»  •  j.  1       £ 

against  renewal      received  irom  Prussia  against  a  renewal  ot 

^  demanded. 

the  candidature.  Gramont  himself,  in  an 
interview  with  the  Prussian  Ambassador,  Baron  Werther, 
sketched  a  letter  which  he  proposed  that  King  William 
should  send  to  the  Emperor,  stating  that  in  sanction- 
ing the  candidature  of  Prince  Leopold  he  had  not 
intended  to  offend  the  French,  and  that  in  associating 
himself  with  the  Prince's  withdrawal  he  desired  that 
all  misunderstandings  should  be  at  an  end  between 
the  two  Governments.  The  despatch  of  Baron 
Werther  conveying  this  proposition  appears  to  have 
deeply  offended  King  William,  whom  it  reached  about 
midday  on  the  1 3th.  Benedetti  had  that  morning  met 
the  King  on  the  promenade  at  Ems,  and  had  received 

from  him  the  promise  that  as  soon  as  the 

Benedetti  and  ,     .  1-1  ,  -n  "i  c 

the  King,  letter   which   was    still    on    its  way   irom 

July  13.  J 

Sigmaringen  should  arrive  he  would  send 
for  the  Ambassador  in  order  that  he  might  communicate 
its  contents  at  Paris.  The  letter  arrived ;  but  Baron 
Werther's  despatch  from  Paris  had  arrived  before  it ;  and 
instead  of  summoning  Benedetti  as  he  had  promised, 
the  King  sent  one  of  his  aides-de-camp  to  him  with  a 
message  that  a  written  communication  had  been  received 
from  Prince  Leopold  confirming  his  withdrawal,  and  that 
the  matter  was  now  at  an  end.  Benedetti  desired  the 
aide-de-camp  to  inform  the  King  that  he  was  compelled 


1870.  A7AY;    \V1LL1A\T  AND  BKM'IVKTTI.  419 

by  his  instructions  to  ask  for  a  guarantee  against  a 
renewal  of  the  candidature.  The  aide-de-camp  did  as 
he  was  requested,  and  brought  back  a  message  that  the 
King  gave  his  entire  approbation  to  the  withdrawal  of 
the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  but  that  he  could  do  no 
more.  Benedetti  begged  for  an  audience  with  His 
Majesty.  The  King  replied  that  he  was  compelled  to 
decline  entering  into  further  negotiation,  and  that  he 
had  said  his  last  word.  Though  the  King  thus  refused 
any  further  discussion,  perfect  courtesy  was  observed  on 
both  sides  ;  and  on  the  following  morning  the  King 
and  the  Ambassador,  who  were  both  leaving  Ems,  took 
leave  of  one  another  at  the  railway  station  with  the 
usual  marks  of  respect. 

That  the  guarantee  which  the  French  Government 

o 

had  resolved  to  demand  would  not  be  given  was  now 
perfectly  certain ;  yet,  with  the  candidature  of  Prince 
.Leopold  fairly  extinguished,  it  was  still  possible  that 
the  cooler  heads  at  Paris  might  carry  the  day,  and  that 
the  Government  would  stop  short  of  declaring  war  on  a 
point  on  which  the  unanimous  judgment  of  the  other 
Powers  declared  it  to  be  in  the  wrong.  But  Count 
Hismarck  was  determined  not  to  let  the  French  escape 
lightly  from  the  quarrel.  He  had  to  do  with  an  enemy 
who  by  his  own  folly  had  come  to  the  brink  of  an 
aggressive  war,  and,  far  from  facilitating  his  retreat,  it 
was  Bismarck's  policy  to  lure  him  over  the 

•  Publication  of 

precipice.    Not  many  hours   after  the  last     8lSS2S«h 

13 

message  had  passed  between  King  William 
and    Benedetti,  a   telegram  was  officially  published  at 
B  B  '2 


420  MODERN  EUROPE.  1870. 

Berlin,  stating,    in    terms  so   brief  as   to   convey    the 
impression  of  an  actual  insult,  that  the  King  had  refused 
to  see  the  French  Ambassador,  and  had  informed  him 
by  an  aide-de-camp  that  he  had  nothing  more  to  com- 
municate to  him.     This  telegram  was  sent  to  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Prussia  at  most  of  the  European  Courts,  and 
to  its  agents  in  every  German  capital.      Narratives  in- 
stantly gained  currency,  and  were  not  contradicted  by 
the  Prussian  Government,  that  Benedetti   had   forced 
himself  upon  the  King  on  the  promenade   at  Ems,  and 
that  in  the  presence  of  a  large  company   the  King  had 
turned  his  back  upon  the  Ambassador.     The  publication 
of  the  alleged  telegram   from  Ems  became  known  in 
Paris    on   the    14th.       On   that    day   the    Council   of 
Ministers  met  three  times.     At  the  first  meeting  the 
advocates  of  peace  were  still  in  the  majority ;  in  the 
afternoon,  as  the  news  from  Berlin  and  the  fictions  de- 
scribing the  insult  offered  to  the  French  Ambassador 
spread  abroad,  the  agitation  in  Paris  deepened,  and  the 
Council  decided  upon  calling  up  the  Reserves ;  yet  the 
Emperor  himself  seemed  still  disposed  for  peace.     It 
was  in  the  interval  between  the  second  and  the  third 
meeting   of    the    Council,   between    the    hours    of    six 
and   ten    in  the    evening,   that  Napoleon    finally  gave 
war  decided  at     way   before    the  threats  and  importunities 
of  the    war-party.      The   Empress,    fanati- 
cally anxious  for  the  overthrow  of  a  great   Protestant 
Power,  passionately  eager  for  the  military  glory  which 
alone   could   insure    the    Crown   to    her   son,  won  the 
triumph  which  she  was  so  bitterly  to  rue.     At  the  third 


1870.  FRANCE  DECLARES   WAR.  421 

meeting  of  the  Council,  held  shortly  before  midnight, 
the  vote  was  given  for  war. 

In  Germany  this  decision  had  been  expected  ;  yet  it 
made  a  deep  impression  not  only  on  the  German  people 
but  on  Europe  at  large  that,  when  the  declaration  of  war 
was  submitted  to  the  French  Legislative  Body  in  the 
form  of  a  demand  for  supplies,  no  single  voice  was 
raised  to  condemn  the  war  for  its  criminality  and 
injustice :  the  arguments  which  were  urged  against 
it  by  M.  Thiers  and  others  were  that  the  Government 
had  fixed  upon  a  bad  cause,  and  that  the  occasion  was 
inopportune.  Whether  the  majority  of  the  Assembly 
really  desired  war  is  even  now  matter  of  doubt.  But 
the  clamour  of  a  hundred  madmen  within  its  walls, 
the  ravings  of  journalists  and  incendiaries,  who  at  such 
a  time  are  to  the  true  expression  of  public  opinion(what 
the  Spanish  Inquisition  was  to  the  Christian  religion^ 
paralysed  the  will  and  the  understanding  of  less  in- 
fatuated men.  Ten  votes  alone  were  given  in  the 
Assembly  against  the  grant  demanded  for  war;  to 
Europe  at  large  it  went  out  that  the  crime  and  the  \ 
madness  was  that  of  France  as  a  nation.  Yet  1 
Ollivier  and  many  of  his  colleagues  up  to  the  last 
moment  disapproved  of  the  war,  and  consented  to 
it  only  because  they  believed  that  the  nation  would 
otherwise  rush  into  hostilities  under  a  reactionary 
Ministry  who  would  serve  France  worse  than  them- 
selves. They  discovered  when  it  was  too  late  that  the 
supposed  national  impulse  which  they  had  thought 
irresistible  was  but  the  outcry  of  a  noisy  minority.  The 


422  MODERN   EUROPE.  WTO. 

reports  of  their  own  officers  informed  them  that  in  six- 
teen alone  out  of  the  eighty-seven  Departments  of 
France  was  the  war  popular.  In  the  other  seventy -one 
it  was  accepted  either  with  hesitation  or  regret.* 

How  vast  were  the  forces  which  the  North  German 
Confederation  could  hring  into  the  field  was  well 
known  to  Napoleon's  Government.  Benedetti  had 
initiaiforcesof  kePt  his  employers  thoroughly  informed 
of  the  progress  of  the  North  German  mili- 
tary organisation  ;  he  had  warned  them  that  the  South 
German  States  would  most  certainly  act  with  the 
North  against  a  foreign  assailant ;  he  had  described 
with  great  accuracy  and  great  penetration  the  nature 
of  the  tie  that  existed  between  Berlin  and  St.  Peters- 
burg, a  tie  which  was  close  enough  to  secure  for  Prussia 
the  goodwill,  and  in  certain  contingencies  the  armed 
support,  of  Russia,  while  it  was  loose  enough  not  to 
involve  Prussia  in  any  Muscovite  enterprise  that  would 
bring  upon  it  the  hostility  of  England  and  Austria. 
The  utmost  force  which  the  French  military  ad- 
ministration reckoned  on  placing  in  the  field  at  the 
beginning  of  the  campaign  was  two  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  men,  to  be  raised  at  the  end  of  three  weeks  by 
about  fifty  thousand  more.  The  Prussians,  even  without 
reckoning  on  any  assistance  from  Southern  Germany, 
and  after  allowing  for  three  army-corps  that  might  b'e 
needed  to  watch  Austria  and  Denmark,  could  begin  the 
campaign  with  three  hundred  and  thirty  thousand. 
Army  to  army,  the  French  thus  stood  according  to  the 

*  Sorel,  Histoire  Diplomatique,  i.  197. 


1870.  AUSTRIA.  423 

reckoning  of  their  own  War  Office  outnumbered  at  the 
outset ;  but  Lebceuf,  tbe  War-Minister,  imagined  that 
the  Foreign  Office  had  made  sure  of  alii-  Expected  A]li. 
ances,  and  that  a  great  part  of  the  Prussian 
Army  would  not  be  free  to  act  on  the  "western  frontier. 
Napoleon  had  in  fact  pushed  forward  his  negotiations 
with  Austria  and  Italy  from  the  time  that  war  became 
imminent.  Count  Beust,  while  clearly  laying  it  down 
that  Austria  was  not  bound  to  follow  France  into  a 
war  made  at  its  own  pleasure,  nevertheless  felt  some 
anxiety  lest  France  and  Prussia  should  settle  their 
differences  at  Austria's  expense ;  moreover  from  the 
victory  of  Napoleon,  assisted  in  any  degree  by  himself, 
he  could  fairly  hope  for  the  restoration  of  Austria's 
ascendency  in  Germany  and  the  undoing  Augtriapre_ 
of  the  work  of  1866.  It  was  determined 
at  a  Council  held  at  Vienna  on  the  18th  of  July  that 
Austria  should  for  the  present  be  neutral  if  Russia 
should  not  enter  the  war  on  the  side  of  Prussia;  but 
this  neutrality  was  nothing  more  than  a  stage  towards 
alliance  with  France  if  at  the  end  of  a  certain  brief 

*» 

period  the  army  of  Napoleon  should  have  penetrated 
into  Southern  Germany.  In  a  private  despatch  to 
the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Paris  Count  Beust 
pointed  out  that  the  immediate  participation  of 
Austria  in  the  war  would  bring  Russia  into  the 
field  on  King  William's  side.  "  To  keep  Russia 
neutral,"  he  wrote,  "  till  the  season  is  sufficiently  ad- 
vanced to  prevent  the  concentration  of  its  troops  must 
be  at  present  our  object;  but  this  neutrality  is  nothing 


424  MODERN   EUROPE.  1870. 

raore  than  a  means  for  arriving  at  the  real  end  of  our 
policy,  the  only  means  for  completing  our  preparations 
without  exposing  ourselves  to  premature  attack  by 
Prussia  or  Russia."  He  added  that  Austria  had 
already  entered  into  a  negotiation  with  Italy  with  a 
view  to  the  armed  mediation  of  the  two  Powers,  and 
strongly  recommended  the  Emperor  to  place  the  Italians 
in  possession  of  Rome.* 

Negotiations  were  now  pressed  forward  between  Paris, 
Florence,  and  Vienna,  for  the  conclusion  of  a  triple 
alliance.  Of  the  course  taken  by  these  negotiations  con- 
rrance,  Austria,  tradictory  accounts  are  given  by  the  persons 
concerned  in  them.  According  to  Prince 
Napoleon,  Victor  Emmanuel  demanded  possession  of 
Rome  and  this  was  refused  to  him  by  the  French 
Emperor,  in  consequence  of  which  the  project  of  alliance 
failed.  According  to  the  Duke  of  Grramont,  no  more 
was  demanded  by  Italy  than  the  return  to  the  condi- 
tions of  the  September  Convention  ;  this  was  agreed  to 
by  the  Emperor,  and  it  was  in  pursuance  of  this  agree- 
ment that  the  Papal  States  were  evacuated  by  their 
French  garrison  on  the  2nd  of  August.  Throughout 
the  last  fortnight  of  July,  after  war  had  actually  been 
declared,  there  was,  if  the  statement  of  Grramont  is  to 
be  trusted,  a  continuous  interchange  of  notes,  projects, 
and  telegrams  between  the  three  Governments.  The 
difficulties  raised  by  Italy  and  Austria  were  speedily 
removed,  and  though  some  weeks  were  needed  by  these 
Powers  for  their  military  preparations,  Napoleon  was 

*  Hahn,  ii.  69.     Sorel,  i.  236. 


1870.  AUSTRIA  AND  ITALY.  425 

definitely  assured  of  their  armed  support  in  case  of  his 
preliminary  success.  It  was  agreed  that  Austria  and 
Italy,  assuming  at  the  first  the  position  of  armed 
neutrality,  should  jointly  present  an  ultimatum  to 
Prussia  in  September  demanding  the,  exact  perform- 
ance of  the  Treaty  of  Prague,  and,  failing  its  com- 
pliance with  this  summons  in  the  sense  understood  by 
its  enemies,  that  the  two  Powers  would  immediately 
declare  war,  their  armies  taking  the  field  at  latest  on 
the  15th  of  September.  That  Russia  would  in  that 
case  assist  Prussia  was  well  known ;  but  it  would  seem 
that  Count  Beust  feared  little  from  his  northern  enemy 
in  an  autumn  campaign.  The  draft  of  the  Treaty 
between  Italy  and  Austria  had  actually,  according  to 
Gramont's  statement,  been  accepted  by  the  two  latter 
Powers,  and  received  its  last  amendments  in  a  nego- 
tiation between  the  Emperor  Napoleon  and  an  Italian 
J^voy,  Count  Vimercati,  at  Metz.  Vimercati  reached 
Florence  with  the  amended  draft  on  the  4th  of  August, 
and  it  was  expected  that  the  Treaty  would  be  signed 
on  the  following  day.  When  that  day  came  it  saw  the 
forces  of  the  French  Empire  dashed  to  pieces.* 

Preparations  for  a  war  with  France  had  long 
occupied  the  general  staff  at  Berlin.  Before  the  winter 
of  1868  a  memoir  had  been  drawn  up  by 

Prussian  plans. 

General  Moltke,   containing   plans  for  the 
concentration  of  the  whole  of  the  German  forces,   for 


*  Prince  Napoleon,  in  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  April  1,  1878; 
Gramout,  in  Revue  do  France,  April  17, 1878.  (Signed  Andreas  Memor.) 
Ollivicr,  L'fcglise  et  1'fitat,  ii.  473.  Sorel,  i.  245. 


426  MODERN   EUROPE.  1870. 

the  formation  of  each  of  the  armies  to  he  employed, 
and  the  positions  to  be  occupied  at  the  outset  "by  each 
corps.     On  the  basis  of  this  memoir  the  arrangements 
for  the  transport  of  each  corps  from  its  depot  to  the 
frontier   had   subsequently  been    worked   out   in   such 
minute  detail  that  when,   on  the  16th  of  July,  King 
William  gave  the  order   for  mobilisation,  nothing  re- 
mained but  to  insert   in   the  railway  time-tables  and 
marching-orders  the  day  on  which  the  movement  was 
to    commence.      This   minuteness    of   detail   extended, 
however,   only  to   that   part   of    Moltke's  plan   which 
related   to   the    assembling    and    first    placing    of    the 
troops.     The  events  of  the  campaign  could  not  thus  be 
arranged  and  tabulated   beforehand;  only  the  general 
object  and  design  could  be  laid  down.     That  the  French 
would    throw    themselves    with    great    rapidity   upon 
Southern    Germany    was    considered    probable.       The 
armies  of  Baden,  Wurtemberg,  and  Bavaria  were  too 
weak,  the  military  centres  of  the  North  were  too  far 
distant,  for  effective  resistance  to  be  made  in  this  quarter 
to  the  first  blows   of  the  invader.      Moltke  therefore 
recommended  that  the  Southern  troops   should  with- 
draw from  their  own  States  and  move  northwards  to 
join   those    of    Prussia   in   the    Palatinate    or   on   the 
Middle   Rhine,   so  that  the  entire  forces   of  Germany 
should  be  thrown  upon  the  flank  or  rear  of  the  invader ; 
while,  in  the  event  of  the  French  not  thus  taking  the 
offensive,  France  itself  was  to  be  invaded  by  the  col- 
lective strength  of  Germany  along  the  line  from  Saar- 
briicken  to  Landau,  and  its  armies  were  to  be,  cut  off 


1870.  GERMAN  MOBILISATION.  427 

from   their    communications    with   Paris    by   vigorous 
movements  of  the  invader  in  a  northerly  direction.* 

The  military  organisation  of  Germany  is  based  on 
the  division  of  the  country  into  districts,  each  of  which 
furnishes  at  its  own  depot  a  small  but  complete  army. 
The  nucleus  of  each  such  corps  exists  in  time  of  peace, 
with  its  own  independent  artillery,  stores,  German 
and  material  of  war.  On  the  order  for 
mobilisation  being  given,  every  man  liable  to  military 
service,  but  not  actually  serving,  joins  the  regiment 
to  which  he  locally  belongs,  and  in  a  given  number  of 
days  each  corps  is  ready  to  take  the  field  in  full  strength. 
The  completion  of  each  corps  at  its  own  depot  is  the 
first  stage  in  the  preparation  for  a  campaign.  Not  till 
this  is  effected  does  the  movement  of  troops  towards  the 
frontier  begin.  The  time  necessary  for  the  first  act  of 
preparation  was,  like  that  to  be  occupied  in  transport, 
accurately  determined  by  the  Prussian  War  Office.  It 
resulted  from  General  Moltke's  calculations  that,  the 
order  of  mobilisation  having  been  given  on  the  16th  of 
July,  the  entire  army  with  which  it  was  intended  to 
begin  the  campaign  would  be  collected  and  in  position 
ready  to  cross  the  frontier  on  the  4th  of  August,  if  the 
French  should  not  have  taken  up  the  offensive  before 
that  day.  But  as  it  was  apprehended  that  part  at  least 
of  the  French  army  would  be  thrown  into  Germany 
before  that  date,  the  westward  movement  of  the  German 
troops  stopped  short  at  a  considerable  distance  from  the 

*  Der  Deutsch  Franzosische  Krieg,  1870-71  (Prussian  General  Staff), 
i.  72. 


428  MODERN  EUROPE.  1870. 

border,  in  order  that  the  troops  first  arriving  might  not 
be  exposed  to  the  attack  of  a  superior  force  before  their 
supports  should  be  at  hand.  On  the  actual  frontier 
there  was  placed  only  the  handful  of  men  required  for 
reconnoitring,  and  for  checking  the  enemy  during  the 
few  hours  that  would  be  necessary  to  guard  against  the 
effect  of  a  surprise. 

The  Trench  Emperor  was  aware  of  the  numerical 

inferiority  of  his  army  to  that  of  Prussia;  he  hoped, 

The  French      however,  by  extreme  rapidity  of  movement 

to  penetrate  Southern  Germany  before  the 

Prussian  army  could    assemble,  and    so,  while  forcing 

the  Southern  Governments  to  neutrality,  to  meet  on  the 

Upper  Danube  the  assisting  forces  of  Italy  and  Austria. 

It  was  his  design  to  concentrate  a  hundred  and  fifty 

thousand  men  at  Metz,  a  hundred  thousand  at  Stras- 

burg.  and  with  these  armies  united  to  cross  the  Rhine 

o ' 

into  Baden ;  while  a  third  army,  which  was  to  assemble 
at  Chalons,  protected  the  north-eastern  frontier  against 
an  advance  of  the  Prussians.  A  few  days  after  the 
declaration  of  war,  while  the  German  corps  were  still  at 
their  depots  in  the  interior,  considerable  forces  were 
massed  round  Metz  and  Strasburg.  All  Europe  listened 
for  the  rush  of  the  invader  and  the  first  swift  notes  of 
triumph  from  a  French  army  beyond  the  Rhine ;  but 
week  after  week  passed,  and  the  silence  was  still  un- 
broken. Stories,  incredible  to  those  who  first  heard 
them,  yet  perfectly  true,  reached  the  German  frontier- 
stations  of  actual  famine  at  the  advanced  posts  of  the 
enemy,  and  of  French  soldiers  made  prisoners  while 


1870.  STATE  OF  THE  FRENCH  ARMIES.  429 

digging  in  potato-fields  to  keep  themselves  alive.     That 
Napoleon  was  less   ready   than   had    been    anticipated 
became  clear  to  all  the  world ;  but  none  yet  imagined 
the  revelations  which  each  successive  day  was  bringing 
at  the  headquarters    of  the  French  armies.     Absence  x 
of  whole  regiments  that  figured  in  the  official  order  of 
battle,  defective  transport,  stores  missing  or  congested, 
made  it  impossible   even  to   attempt  the    inroad   into 
Southern  Germany   within  the    date    up    to   which  it 
had  any  prospect  of  success.     The  design  was  aban- 
doned, yet  not  in  time  to  prevent  the  troops  that  were 
hurrying  from  the  interior  from  being  sent  backwards 
and  forwards  according  as  the  authorities  had,  or  had 
not,  heard  of  the  change  of  plan.     Napoleon  saw  that 
a  Prussian  force  was  gathering  on  the  Middle  Ehine 
which  it  would  be  madness  to  leave  on  his  flank ;  he 
ordered  his  own  commanders  to  operate  on  the  corre- 
sponding line  of  the  Lauter  and  the  Saar,  and  despatched 
isolated  divisions  to  the   very  frontier,   still  uncertain 
whether  even  in  this  direction  he  would  be  able  to  act 
on  the  offensive,  or  whether  nothing  now  remained  to 
him  but  to  resist  the  invasion  of  France  by  a  superior 
enemy.     Ollivier  had  stated  in  the  Assembly  that  he 
and  his  colleagues  entered  upon  the  war  with  a  light 
heart ;  he  might  have  added  that  they  entered  upon  it 
with  bandaged  eyes.     The  Ministers  seem  actually  not 
to  have  taken  the  trouble  to  exchange  explanations  with 
one   another.      Leboeuf,  the  War-Minister,    had   taken 
it  for  granted  that  Grramont  had  made  arrangements 
with  Austria  which  would  compel  the  Prussians  to  keep 


430  MODERN  EUROPE.  wo. 

a  large  part  of  their  forces  in  the  interior.  Gramont,  in 
forcing  on  the  quarrel  with  Prussia,  and  in  his  nego- 
tiations with  Austria,  had  taken  it  for  granted  that 
Lebreuf  could  win  a  series  of  victories  at  the  outset 
in  Southern  Germany.  The  Emperor,  to  whom  alone 
the  entire  data  of  the  military  and  the  diplomatic 
services  of  France  were  open,  was  incapable  of  exer- 
tion or  scrutiny,  purposeless,  distracted  with  pain,  half- 
imbecile,  tfc 

That    the    Imperial    military    administration    was 

rotten  to  the  core  the  terrible  events  of  the  next  few 

weeks  sufficiently  showed.      Men  were    in   high  place 

whose  antecedents  would  have  shamed  the 

mutely  better  kind  of  brigand.     The  deficiencies  of 

inferiority. 

the  army  were  made  worse  by  the  diversion 
of  public  funds  to  private  necessities  ;  the  looseness, 
the  vulgar  splendour,  the  base  standards  of  judgment 
of  the  Imperial  Court  infected  each  branch  of  the  public 
services  of  France,  and  worked  perhaps  not  least  on  those 
who  were  in  military  command.  But  the  catastrophe 
of  1870  seemed  to  those  who  witnessed  it  to  tell  of 
more  than  the  vileness  of  an  administration ;  in  England, 
not  less  than  in  Germany,  voices  of  influence  spoke 
of  the  doom  that  had  overtaken  the  depravity  of  a 
sunken  nation ;  of  the  triumph  of  simple  manliness,  of 
God-fearing  virtue  itself,  in  the  victories  of  the  German 
army.  There  may  have  been  truth  in  this;  yet  it 
would  require  a  nice  moral  discernment  to  appraise  the 
exact  degeneracy  of  the  French  of  1870  from  the  French 
of  1854  who  humbled  Eussia,  or  from  the  French  of 


1870.  CAUSES  OF  GERMAN  SUCCESS.  431 

1859  who  triumphed  at  Solferino ;  and  it  would  need 
a  very  comprehensive  acquaintance  with  the  lower  forms 
of  human  pleasure  to  judge  in  what  degree  the  sinful- 
ness  of  Paris  exceeds  the  sinfulness  of  Berlin.  Had  the 
French  been  as  strict  a  race  as  the  Spartans  who  fell  at 
Thermopylae,  as  devout  as  the  Tyrolese  who  perished 
at  Koniggriitz,  it  is  quite  certain  that,  with  the  num- 
bers which  took  the  field  against  Germany  in  1870, 
with  Napoleon  III.  at  the  head  of  affairs,  and  the  actual 
generals  of  1870  in  command,  the  armies  of  France 
could  not  have  escaped  destruction. 

The  main  cause  of  the  disparity  of  France  and  Ger- 
many in  1870  was  in  truth  that  Prussia  had  had  from 
1862  to  1866  a  Government  so  strong  as  to 
be  able  to  force  upon  its  subjects  its  own 
gigantic  scheme  of  military  organisation  in  defiance  of  the 
votes  of  Parliament  and  of  the  national  will.  In  I860 
Brussia,  with  a  population  of  nineteen  millions,  brought 
actually  into  the  field  three  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men,  or  one  in  fifty- four  of  its  inhabitants.  There  was 
no  other  government  in  Europe,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  Russia,  which  could  have  imposed  upon  its 
subjects,  without  risking  its  own  existence,  so  vast  a 
burden  of  military  service  as  that  implied  in  this  strength 
of  the  fighting  army.  Napoleon  III.  at  the  height  of 
his  power  could  not  have  done  so ;  and  when  after 
JConiggratz  he  endeavoured  to  raise  the  forces  of  France 
to  an  equality  with  those  of  the  rival  Power  by  a 
system  which  would  have  brought  about  one  in 
seventy  of  the  population  into  the  field,  his  own 


Cause  of  German 

success. 


432  MODERN  EUROPE.  1870. 

nominees  in  the  Legislative  Body,  under  pressure  of 
public  opinion,  so  weakened  the  scheme  that  the  effective 
numbers  of  the  army  remained  little  more  than  they 
were  before.  The  true  parallel  to  the  German  victories 
of  1870  is  to  be  found  in  the  victories  of  the  French 
Committee  of  Public  Safety  in  1794  and  in  those  of  the 
first  Napoleon.  A  government  so  powerful  as  to  bend 
the  entire  resources  of  the  State  to  military  ends  will, 
whether  it  is  one  of  democracy  run  mad,  or  of  a  crowned 
soldier  of  fortune,  or  of  an  ancient  monarchy  throwing 
new  vigour  into  its  traditional  system  and  policy,  crush 
in  the  moment  of  impact  communities  of  equal  or  greater 
resources  in  which  a  variety  of  rival  influences  limit 
and  control  the  central  power  and  subordinate  military 
to  other  interests.  It  was  so  in  the  triumphs  of  the 
Reign  of  Terror  over  the  First  Coalition  ;  it  was  so  in 
the  triumphs  of  King  William  over  Austria  and  France. 
But  the  parallel  between  the  founders  of  German 
unity  and  the  organisers  of  victory  after  1793  extends 
no  farther  than  to  the  sources  of  their  success.  Ag- 
gression and  adventure  have  not  been  the  sequels  of 
the  war  of  1870.  The  vast  armaments  of  Prussia  were 
created  in  order  to  establish  German  union  under  the 
House  of  Hohenzollern,  and  they  have  been  employed 
for  no  other  object.  It  is  the  triumph  of  statesmanship, 
and  it  has  been  the  glory  of  Prince  Bismarck,  after  thus 
reaping  the  fruit  of  a  well-timed  homage  to  the  God  of 
Battles,  to  know  how  to  quit  his  shrine.  ^ 

At  the  end  of  July,  twelve  days  after  the  formal 
declaration  of  war,  the  gathering  forces  of  the  Germans, 


1870.  ON  THE  FRONTIER.  433 

over  three  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  strong,  were 
still  at  some  distance  behind  the  Lauter  and  the  Saar. 
Napoleon,    apparently   without  any    clear    design,  had 
placed    certain    bodies    of    troops    actually     Thefrontier 
on  the  frontier  at  Forbach,   Weissenburg, 
and  elsewhere,  while  other  troops,   raising  the    whole 
number  to  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand,  lay 
round  Metz  and  Strasburg,  and  at  points  between  these 
and  the  most  advanced  positions.      The  reconnoitring 
of  the  small  German  detachments  on  the  frontier  was 
conducted  with  extreme   energy  :  the  French  appear  to 
have   made  no  reconnaissances  at   all,  for   when  they 
determined  at  last  to  discover  what  was  facing  them 
at  Saarbriicken,  they  advanced  with  twenty-five  thou- 
sand men  against  one-tenth  of  that  number.     On  the 
2nd  of  August  Frossard's  corps  from  Forbach  moved 
upon  Saarbriicken  with  the  Emperor  in  person.     The 
garrison  was  driven  out,  and  the  town  bombarded,  but 
even  now  the  reconnaissance  was  not  continued  beyond 
the  bridge  across  the  Saar  which  divides  the     g^rf.^^ 
two  parts  of  the  town.      Forty-eight  hours 
later  the  alignment  of  the  German  forces  in  their  in- 
vading order  was  completed,  and  all  was  ready  for  an 
offensive  campaign.     The  central  army,  commanded  by 
Prince    Frederick    Charles,    spreading    east   and    west 
behind  Saarbriicken,  touched  on  its  right  the  northern 
army  commanded  by  General  Steinmetz,  on  its  left  the 
southern  army  commanded  by  the  Crown  Prince,  which 
covered  the  frontier  of  the  Palatinate,  and  included  the 
troops   of    Bavaria    and    Wiirtemberg.      The    general 
c  c 


434  MODERN  EUROPE.  1870. 

direction  of  the  three  armies  was  thus  from  north- 
west to  south-east.  As  the  line  of  invasion  was  to 
be  nearly  due  west,  it  was  necessary  that  the  first  step 
forwards  should  be  made  by  the  army  of  the  Crown 
Prince  in  order  to  bring  it  more  nearly  to  a  level  with 
the  northern  corps  in  the  march  into  France.  On  the 
4th  of  August  the  Crown  Prince  crossed  the  Al- 
satian frontier  and  moved  against  Weissenburg.  The 
French  General  Douay,  who  was  posted  here  with 
about  twelve  thousand  men,  was  neither  reinforced  nor 
bidden  to  retire.  His  troops  met  the  attack  of  an 
enemy  many  times  more  numerous  with  great  courage ; 
but  the  struggle  was  a  hopeless  one,  and  after  several 
Weissenburg  hours  of  severe  fighting  the  Germans  were 
masters  of  the  field.  Douay  fell  in  the 
battle ;  his  troops  frustrated  an  attempt  made  to  cut 
off  their  retreat,  and  fell  back  southwards  towards  the 
corps  of  McMahon,  which  lay  about  ten  miles  behind 
them. 

The  Crown  Prince  marched  on-  in  search  of  his 
enemy.  McMahon,  who  could  collect  only  forty- 
five  thousand  men,  desired  to  retreat  until  he  could 
gain  some  support ;  but  the  Emperor,  tormented  by 
fears  of  the  political  consequences  of  the  invasion,  in- 

Battie  of  worth.  sisted  uPon  his  giving  battle.  He  drew  up 
on  the  hills  about  Worth,  almost  on  the 
spot  where  in  1793  Hoche  had  overthrown  the  armies 
of  the  First  Coalition.  On  the  6th  of  August  the 
leading  divisions  of  the  Crown  Prince,  about  a  hundred 
thousand  strong,  were  within  striking  distance.  The 


1870. 


WORTH.  435 


superiority  of  the  Germans  in  numbers   was  so  great 
that   McMahon's   army   might    apparently  have    been 
captured  or  destroyed  with  far  less  loss  than  actually 
took  place  if  time  had  been  given  for  the  movements 
which  the  Crown  Prince's  staff  had  in  view,  and  for 
the  employment   of  his  full    strength.      But   the  im- 
petuosity of  divisional  leaders  on  the  morning  of  the 
6th  brought  on  a  general  engagement.     The  resistance 
of  the  French  was  of  the  most  determined  character. 
With  one  more  army-corps — and  the  corps  of  General 
Failly  was  expected  to  arrive  on  the  field — it  seemed  as 
if  the  Germans  might  yet  be  beaten  back.     But  each 
hour  brought  additional  forces  into  action  in  the  attack, 
while  the  French  commander  looked  in  vain  for  the 
reinforcements    that  could  save  him  from   ruin.      At 
length,    when    the     last     desperate    charges    of    the 
Cuirassiers   had   shattered    against   the  fire  of  cannon 
and  needle-guns,  and  the  village  of  Froschwiller,   the 
centre  of  the  French  position,  had  been  stormed  house 
by  house,  the  entire  army  broke  and  fled  in  disorder. 
Nine  thousand  prisoners,  thirty-three  cannon,  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  conquerors.     The  Germans  had  lost 
ten   thousand    men,    but   they   had   utterly  destro}red 
McMahon's  army  as  an  organised  force.     Its  remnant 
disappeared  from  the  scene  of  warfare,  escaping  by  the 
western  roads  in  the  direction  of  Chalons,  where  first 
it  was  restored  to  some  degree  of  order.     The  Crown 
Prince,  leaving  troops  behind    him  to    beleaguer   the 
smaller    Alsatian   fortresses,   marched    on    untroubled 
through  the  northern  Vosges,  and  descended  into  the 
c  c  2 


436  MODERN  EUROPE.  ISTO. 

open  country  about  Luneville  and  Nancy,  unfortified 
towns  which  could  offer  no  resistance  to  the  passage  of 
an  enemy. 

On  the  same  day  that  the  battle  of  Worth  was 
fought,  the  leading  columns  of  the  armies  of  Steinmetz 
and  Prince  Frederick  Charles  crossed  the  frontier  at 
Saarbriicken.  Frossard's  corps,  on  the  news  of  the 
spicheren.  defeat  at  Weissenburg,  had  withdrawn  to 
its  earlier  positions  between  Forbach  and 
the  frontier  :  it  held  the  steep  hills  of  Spicheren  that 
look  down  upon  Saarbriicken,  and  the  woods  that  flank 
the  high  road  where  this  passes  from  Germany  into 
France.  As  at  Worth,  it  was  not  intended  that  any 
general  attack  should  be  made  on  the  6th  ;  a  delay  of 
twenty-four  hours  would  have  enabled  the  Germans  to 
envelop  or  crush  Frossard's  corps  with  an  overwhelming 
force.  But  the  leaders  of  the  foremost  regiments  threw 
themselves  impatiently  upon  the  French  whom  they 
found  before  them :  other  brigades  hurried  up  to  the 
sound  of  the  cannon,  until  the  struggle  took  the  pro- 
portion of  a  battle,  and  after  hours  of  fluctuating 
success  the  heights  of  Spicheren  were  carried  by 
successive  rushes  of  the  infantry  full  in  the  enemy's 
fire.  Why  Frossard  was  not  reinforced  has  never  been 
explained,  for  several  French  divisions  lay  at  no  great 
distance  westward,  and  the  position  was  so  strong 
that,  if  a  pitched  battle  was  to  be  fought  anywhere 
east  of  Metz,  few  better  points  could  have  been  chosen. 
But,  like  Douay  at  Weissenburg,  Frossard  was  left  to 
struggle  alone  against  whatever  forces  the  frermans 


1870.  NAPOLEON  AT  METZ.  437 

might  throw  upon  him.  Napoleon,  .who  directed  the 
operations  of  the  French  armies  from  Metz,  appears  to 
have  been  now  incapable  of  appreciating  the  simplest 
military  necessities,  of  guarding  against  the  most 
obvious  dangers.  Helplessness,  infatuation  ruled  the 
miserable  hours. 

The  impression  made  upon  Europe  by  the  battles 
of  the  Gth  of  August  corresponded  to  the  greatness  of 
their  actual  military  effects.  There  was  an  end  to 
all  thoughts  of  the  alliance  of  Austria  and  Italy  with 
France.  Germany,  though  unaware  of  the  full  mag- 
nitude of  the  perils  from  which  it  had  escaped,  breathed 
freely  after  weeks  of  painful  suspense ;  the 
very  circumstance  that  the  disproportion  of  Plug.a6ter 
numbers  on  the  battle-field  of  Worth  was 
still  unknown  heightened  the  joy  and  confidence  pro- 
el  uced  by  the  Crown  Prince's  victory,  a  victory  in 
which  the  South  German  troops,  fighting  by  the  side 
of  those  who  had  been  their  foes  in  1866,  had  borne 
their  full  part.  In  Paris  the  consternation  with  which 
the  news  of  McMahon's  overthrow  was  received  was 
all  the  greater  that  on  the  previous  day  reports  had 
been  circulated  of  a  victory  won  at  Landau  and  of  the 
capture  of  the  Crown  Prince  with  his  army.  The 
bulletin  of  the  Emperor,  briefly  narrating  McMahon's 
defeat  and  the  repulse  of  Frossard,  showed  in  its  con- 
cluding words — "  All  may  yet  be  retrieved  " — how  pro- 
found was  the  change  made  in  the  prospects  of  the  war 
by  that  fatal  day.  The  truth  was  at  once  apprehended- 
A  storm  of  indignation  broke  out  against  the  Imperial 


438  MODERN  EUROPE.  1870. 

Government  at  Paris.  The  Chambers  were  summoned. 
Ollivier,  attacked  alike  by  the  extreme  Bonapartists  and 
by  the  Opposition,  laid  down  his  office.  A  reactionary 
Ministry,  headed  by  the  Count  of  Palikao,  was  placed 
in  power  by  the  Empress,  a  Ministry  of  the  last  hour 
as  it  was  justly  styled  by  all  outside  it.  Levies  were 
ordered,  arms  and  stores  accumulated  for  the  reserve- 
forces,  preparations  made  for  a  siege  of  Paris  itself.  On 
the  12th  the  Emperor  gave  up  the  command  which  he 
had  exercised  with  such  miserable  results,  and  appointed. 
Marshal  Bazaine,  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  Mexican  Ex- 
pedition, General-in-Chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine. 
After  the  overthrow  of  McMahon  and  the  victory  of 
the  Germans  at  Spicheren,  there  seems  to 

Napoleon  at 

have  been  a  period  of  utter  paralysis  in  the 
French  headquarters  at  Metz.  The  divisions  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  and  Steinmetz  did  not  immediately 
press  forward ;  it  was  necessary  to  allow  some  days  for 
the  advance  of  the  Crown  Prince  through  the  Vosges ; 
and  during  these  days  the  French  army  about  Metz, 
which,  when  concentrated,  numbered  nearly  two  hun- 
dred thousand  men,  might  well  have  taken  the  positions 
necessary  for  the  defence  of  Moselle,  or  in  the  alterna- 
tive might  have  gained  several  marches  in  the  retreat 
towards  Verdun  and  Chalons.  Only  a  small  part  of  this 
body  had  as  yet  been  exposed  to  defeat.  It  included  in 
it  the  very  flower  of  the  French  forces,  tens  of  thousands 
of  troops  probably  equal  to  any  in  Europe,  and  capable 
of  forming  a  most  formidable  army  if  united  to  the 
reserves  which  would  shortly  be  collected  at  'Chalons 


1870.  BORNY.  433 

or  nearer  Paris.  But  from  the  7th  to  the  12th  of 
August  Napoleon,  too  cowed  to  take  the  necessary  steps 
for  battle  in  defence  of  the  line  of  Moselle,  lingered  pur- 
poseless and  irresolute  at  Metz,  unwilling  to  fall  back 
from  this  fortress.  It  was  not  till  the  14th  that  the 
retreat  was  begun.  By  this  time  the  Germans  were 
close  at  hand,  and  their  leaders  were  little  disposed  to 
let  the  hesitating  enemy  escape  them.  While  the  lead- 
ing divisions  of  the  French  were  crossing 
the  Moselle,  Steinmetz  hurried  forward  his 
troops  and  fell  upon  the  French  detachments  still  lying 
on  the  south-east  of  Metz  about  Borny  and  Courcelles. 
Bazaine  suspended  his  movement  of  retreat  in  order  to 
beat  back  an  assailant  who  for  once  seemed  to  be 
inferior  in  strength.  At  the  close  of  the  day  the  French 
commander  believed  that  he  had  gained  a  victory  and 
driven  the  Germans  off  their  line  of  advance;  in  reality 
he  had  allowed  himself  to  be  diverted  from  the  passage 
of  the  Moselle  at  the  last  hour,  while  the  Germans  left 
under  Prince  Frederick  Charles  gained  the  river  farther 
south,  and  actually  began  to  cross  it  in  order  to  bar  his 
retreat. 

From  Metz  westwards  there  is  as  far  as  the  village  of 
Gravelotte,  which  is  seven  miles  distant,  but  one  direct 
road ;  at  Gravelotte  the  road  forks,  the  southern  arm 
leading  towards  Verdun  by  Vionville  and     Maw.laFTtonr 
Mars-la-Tour,    the    northern   by   Conflans. 
During    the    15th    of    August   the   first   of   Bazaine's 
divisions  moved  as  far  as  Vionville  along  the  southern 
road ;    others  came  into  the  neighbourhood  of  Grave- 


440  MODERN  EUROPE.  1870. 

lotte,  but  two  ccur*?  which  should  have  advanced  past 

r 

Gravelotte  on  to  the  northern  road  still  lay  close  to  Metz. 
The  Prussian  vanguard  was  meanwhile  crossing  the 
'Moselle  southwards  from  Noveant  to  Pont-a-Mousson, 
and  hurrying  forwards  by  lines  converging  on  the  road 
taken  by  Bazaine.  Down  to  the  evening  of  the  15th 
it  was  not  supposed  at  the  Prussian  headquarters  that 
Bazaine  could  be  overtaken  and  brought  to  battle 
nearer  than  the  line  of  the  Mease ;  but  on  the  morning 
of  the  16th  the  cavalry-detachments  which  had  pushed 
farthest  to  the  north-west  discovered  that  the  heads  of 
the  French  columns  had  still  not  passed  Mars-la-Tour. 
An  effort  was  instantly  made  to  seize  the  road  and 
block  the  way  before  the  enemy.  The  struggle,  begun 
by  a  handful  of  combatants  on  each  side,  drew  to  it 
regiment  after  regiment  as  the  French  battalions  close 
at  hand  came  into  action,  and  the  Prussians  hurried  up 
in  wild  haste  to  support  their  comrades  who  were 
exposed  to  the  attack  of  an  entire  army.  The  rapidity 
with  which  the  Prussian  generals  grasped  the  situation 
before  them,  the  vigour  with  which  they  brought  up 
their  cavalry  over  a  distance  which  no  infantry  could 
traverse  in  the  necessary  time,  and  without  a  moment's 
hesitation  hurled  this  cavalry  in  charge  after  charge 
against  a  superior  foe,  mark  the  battle  of  Mars-la-Tour 
as  that  in  which  the  military  superiority  of  the  Germans 
was  most  truly  shown.  Numbers  in  this  battle  had 
little  to  do  with  the  result,  for  by  better  generalship 
Bazaine  could  certainly  at  any  one  point  have  over- 
powered his  enemy.  But  while  the  Germans  rushed 


1870.  MARS-LA-TOUR— GRAVELOTTE.  4U 

like  a  torrent  upon  the  true  point  of  attack — that  is 
the  westernmost — Bazaine  by  some  delusion  considered 
'it  his  primary  object  to  prevent  the  Germans  from 
thrusting  themselves  between  the  retreating  army  and 
Metz,  and  so  kept  a  great  part  of  his  troops  inactive 
about  the*fortress.  The  result  was  that  the  Germans, 
with  a  loss  of  sixteen  thousand  men,  remained  at  the 
close  of  the  day  masters  of  the  road  at  Vionville,  and 
that  the  French  army  could  no£,  without  winning  a 
victory  and  breaking  through  the  enemy's  line,  resume 
its  retreat  along  this  line. 

It  was  expected  during  the  1 7th  that  Bazaine  would 
make  some  attempt  to  escape  by  the  northern  road,  but 
instead  of  doing  so  he  fell  back  on  Gravelotte  and  the 
heights  between  this  and  Metz,  in  order  to  fight  a 
pitched  battle.  The  position  was  a  well-chosen  one ; 
but  by  midday  on  the  18th  the  armies  of  Steinmetz  and 
Prince  Frederick  Charles  were  ranged  in  Gravelotte 
front  of  Bazaine  with  a  strength  of  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  and  in  the  judgment 
of  the  King  these  forces  were  equal  to  the  attack. 
Again,  as  at  Worth,  the  precipitancy  of  divisional 
commanders  caused  the  sacrifice  of  whole  brigades 
before  the  battle  was  won.  While  the  Saxon  corps 
with  which  Moltke  intended  to  deliver  his  slow  but 
fatal  blow  upon  the  enemy's  right  flank  was  engaged  in 
its  long  northward  de'tour,  Steinmetz  pushed  his  Ehine- 
landers  past  the  ravine  of  Gravelotte  into  a  fire  where 
no  human  being  could  survive,  and  the  Guards,  pressing 
forward  in  column  over  the  smooth  unsheltered  slope 


442  MODERN   EUROPE.  1370. 

from  St.  Marie  to  St.  Privat,  sank  by  thousands  without 
reaching  midway  in  their  course.  Until  the  final  blow 
was  dealt  by  the  Saxon  corps  from  the  north  flank,  the 
ground  which  was  won  by  the  Prussians  was  won 
principally  by  their  destructive  artillery  fire :  their 
infantry  attacks  had  on  the  whole  been  repelled,  and  at 
Gravelotte  itself  it  had  seemed  for  a  moment  as  if  the 
French  were  about  to  break  the  assailant's  line.  But 
Bazaine,  as  on  the  16th,  steadily  kept  his  reserves  at  a 
distance  from  the  points  where  their  presence  was  most 
required,  and,  according  to  his  own  account,  succeeded 
in  bringing  into  action  no  more  than  a  hundred 
thousand  men,  or  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  forces 
under  his  command.*  At  the  close  of  the  awful  day, 
when  the  capture  of  St.  Privat  by  the  Saxons  turned 
the  defender's  line,  the  French  abandoned  all  their 
positions  and  drew  back  within  the  defences  of  Metz. 

The  Germans  at  once  proceeded  to  block   all  the 

roads  round  the  fortress,  and  Bazaine  made  no  effort  to 

prevent  them.     At  the  end  of  a  few  days  the  line  was 

drawn    around  him   in    sufficient   strength 

McMahon 

SSJj?41  to  resist  any  sudden  attack.  Steinmetz, 
who  was  responsible  for  a  great  part  of  the 
loss  sustained  at  Gravelotte,  was  now  removed  from  his 
command ;  his  army  was  united  with  that  under  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  as  the  besieging  force,  while  sixty  thou- 
sand men,  detached  from  this  great  mass,  were  formed  into 
a  separate  army  under  Prince  Albert  of  Saxony,  and  sent 
by  way  of  Verdun  to  co-operate  with  the  Crown  Prince 

*  Bazaine,  L'Armee  du  Hhin,  p.  74. 


1870.  MCMAHON  MOVES  NORTHWARDS.  443 

against  McMahon.  The  Government  at  Paris  knew 
but  imperfectly  what  was  passing  around  Metz  from  day 
to  day ;  it  knew,  however,  that  if  Metz  should  be  given 
up  for  lost  the  hour  of  its  own  fall  could  not  be  averted. 
One  forlorn  hope  remained,  to  throw' the  army  which 
McMahon  was  gathering  at  Chalons  north-eastward  to 
Bazaine's  relief,  though  the  Crown  Prince  stood  between 
Chalons  and  Metz,  and  could  reach  every  point  in  the 
line  of  march  more  rapidly  than  McMahon  himself. 
Napoleon  had  quitted  Metz  on  the  evening  of  the  15th; 
on  the  17th  a  council  of  war  was  held  at  Chalons,  at 
which  it  was  determined  to  fall  back  upon  Paris  and  to 
await  the  attack  of  the  Crown  Prince  under  the  forts  of 
the  capital.  No  sooner  was  this  decision  announced 
to  the  Government  at  Paris  than  the  Empress  tele- 
graphed to  her  husband  warning  him  to  consider  what 
would  be  the  effects  of  his  return,  and  insisting  that  an 
attempt  should  be  made  to  relieve  Bazaine.*  McMahon, 
against  his  own  better  judgment,  consented  to  the 
northern  march.  He  moved  in  the  first  instance  to 
Rheims  in  order  to  conceal  his  intention  from  the 
enemy,  but  by  doing  this  he  lost  some  days.  On  the 
23rd,  in  pursuance  of  arrangements  made  with  Bazaine, 
whose  messengers  were  still  able  to  escape  the  Prussian 
watch,  he  set  out  north-eastwards  in  the  direction  of 
Montme*dy.  The  movement  was  discovered 

German 

by  the   Prussian   cavalry   and   reported  at     Swa^s. 

the  headquarters  at  Bar-le-Duc  on  the  25th. 

Instantly  the  westward  march  of  the  Crown  Prince  \vus 

*  Papiers  Se'crets  du  Second  Empire  (1875),  pp.  33, 240. 


444  MODERN  EUROPE.  1370. 

arrested,  and  his  array,  with  that  of  the  Prince  of 
Saxony,  was  thrown  northwards  in  forced  marches 
towards  Sedan.  On  reaching  Le  Chesne,  west  of  the 
Meuse,  on  the  27th,  McMahon  became  aware  of  the 
enemy's  presence.  He  saw  that  his  plan  was  discovered, 
and  resolved  to  retreat  westwards  before  it  was  too 
late.  The  Emperor,  who  had  attached  himself  to  the 
army,  consented,  but  again  the  Government  at  Paris 
interfered  with  fatal  effect.  More  anxious  for  the 
safety  of  the  dynasty  than  for  the  existence  of  the  army, 
the  Empress  and  her  advisers  insisted  that  McMahon 
should  continue  his  advance.  Napoleon  seems  now  to 
have  abdicated  all  authority  and  thrown  to  the  winds  all 
responsibility.  He  allowed  the  march  to  be  resumed  in 
the  direction  of  Mouzon  and  Stenay.  Failly's  corps, 
which  formed  the  right  wing,  was  attacked  on  the  29th 
before  it  could  reach  the  passage  of  the  Meuse  at  the 
latter  place,  and  was  driven  northwards  to  Beaumont. 
Here  the  commander  strangely  imagined  himself  to  be 
in  security.  He  was  surprised  in  his- camp  on  the  fol- 
lowing day,  defeated,  and  driven  northwards  towards 
Mouzon.  Meanwhile  the  left  of  McMahon's  army  had 
crossed  the  Meuse  and  moved  eastwards  to  Carignan, 
so  that  his  troops  were  severed  by  the  river  and  at  some 
distance  from  one  another.  Part  of  Failly's  men  were 
made  prisoners  in  the  struggle  on  the  30th  or  dispersed 
on  the  west  of  the  Meuse  ;  tbe  remainder,  with  their 
commander,  made  a  hurried  and  disorderly  escape  beyond 
the  river,  and  neglected  to  break  down  the  bridges  by 
which  they  had  passed.  McMahon  saw  thatj  if  the 


1870.  SEDAN.  44.", 

advance  was  continued  his  divisions  would  one  after 
another  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands.  He  recalled  the 
troops  which  had  reached  Carignan,  and  concentrated 
his  army  about  Sedan  to  fight  a  pitched  battle.  The 
passages  of  the  Me  use  above  and  below  Sedan  were 
seized  by  the  Germans.  Two  hundred  and  forty  thou- 
sand men  were  at  Moltke's  disposal ;  McMahon  had 
about  half  that  number.  The  task  of  the  Germans  was 
not  so  much  to  defeat  the  enemy  as  to  prevent  them 
from  escaping  to  the  Belgian  frontier.  On  Battle  of  gedan 
the  morning  of  September  1st,  while  on 
the  east  of  Sedan  the  Bavarians  after  a  desperate 
resistance  stormed  the  village  of  Bazeilles,  Hessian  and 
Prussian  regiments  crossed  the  Meuse  at  Don  chery  several 
miles  to  the  west.  From  either  end  of  this  line  corps 
after  corps  now  pushed  northwards  round  the  French 
positions,  driving  in  the  enemy  wherever  they  found  them, 
and  converging,  under  the  eyes  of  the  Prussian  King, 
his  general,  and  his  Minister,  each  into  its  place  in  the 
arc  of  fire  before  which  the  French  Empire  was  to  perish. 
The  movement  was  as  admirably  executed  as  designed. 
The  French  fought  furiously  but  in  vain :  the  mere  mass 
of  the  enemy,  the  mere  narrowing  of  the  once  completed 
circle,  crushed  down  resistance  without  the  clumsy  havoc 
of  Gravelotte.  From  point  after  point  the  defenders 
were  forced  back  within  Sedan  itself.  The  streets  were 
choked  with  hordes  of  beaten  infantry  and  cavalry  ;  the 
Germans  had  but  to  take  one  more  step  forward  and 
the  whole  of  their  batteries  would  command  the  town. 
Towards  evening  there  was  a  pause  in  the  firing,  in 


446  MODERN  EUROPE.  isro. 

order  that  the  French  might  offer  negotiations  for 
surrender ;  but  no  sign  of  surrender  was  made,  and  the 
Bavarian  cannon  resumed  their  fire,  throwing  shells 
into  the  town  itself.  Napoleon  now  caused  a  white 
flag  to  he  displayed  on  the  fortress,  and  sent  a  letter  to 
the  King  of  Prussia,  stating  that  as  he  had  not  been 
able  to  die  in  the  midst  of  his  troops,  nothing  remained 
for  him  but  to  surrender  his  sword  into  the  hands  of  his 
Majesty.  The  surrender  was  accepted  by  King  William, 
who  added  that  General  Moltke  would  act  on  his  behalf 
in  arranging  terms  of  capitulation.  G-eneral  Wimpffen, 
who  had  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  French  army 
on  the  disablement  of  McMahon  by  a  wound,  acted  on 
capitulation  of  behalf  of  Napoleon.  The  negotiations  con- 
ledan'  Sept-2'  tinned  till  late  in  the  night,  the  French 
general  pressing  for  permission  for  his  troops  to  be  dis- 
armed in  Belgium,  while  Moltke  insisted  on  the  sur- 
render of  the  entire  army  as  prisoners  of  war.  Fearing 
the  effect  of  an  appeal  by  Napoleon  himself  to  the 
King's  kindly  nature,  Bismarck  had  taken  steps  to 
remove  his  sovereign  to  a  distance  until  the  terms  of 
surrender  should  be  signed.  At  daybreak  on  September 
2nd  Napoleon  sought  the  Prussian  headquarters.  He 
was  met  on  the  road  by  Bismarck,  who  remained  in 
conversation  with  him  till  the  capitulation  was  com- 
pleted on  the  terms  required  by  the  Germans.  He 
then  conducted  Napoleon  to  the  neighbouring  chateau 
of  Bellevue,  where  King  William,  the  Crown  Prince, 
and  the  Prince  of  Saxony  visited  him.  One  pang 
had  still  to  be  borne  by  the  unhappy  man,.  Down 


1870.  SEDAN.  447 

to  his  interview  with  the  King,  Napoleon  had 
imagined  that  all  the  German  armies  together  had 
operated  against  him  at  Sedan,  and  he  must  con- 
sequently have  still  had  some  hope  that  his  own  ruin 
might  have  purchased  the  deliverance  of  Bazaine. 
He  learnt  accidentally  from  the  King  that  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  had  never  stirred  from  before  Metz. 
A  convulsion  of  anguish  passed  over  his  face  :  his  eyes 
filled  with  tears.  There  was  no  motive  for  a  prolonged 
interview  between  the  conqueror  and  the  conquered,  for, 
as  a  prisoner,  Napoleon  could  not  discuss  conditions  of 
peace.  After  some  minutes  of  conversation  the  King 
departed  for  the  Prussian  headquarters.  Napoleon 
remained  in  the  chateau  until  the  morning  of  the  next 
day,  and  then  began  his  journey  towards  the  place 
chosen  for  his  captivity,  the  palace  of  Wilhelmshohe  at 
Cassel.* 

Rumours  of  disaster  had  reached  Paris  in  the  last 
days  of  August,  but  to  each  successive  report  of  evil 
the  Government  replied  with  lying  boasts  of  success, 
until  on  the  3rd  of  September  ifc  was  forced 

•.         f  .  The  Republic 

to   announce   a   catastrophe  tar  surpassing     Proclaimed. 

Sept  4. 

the  worst  anticipations  of  the  previous  days. 
With  the  Emperor  and  his  entire  army  in  the  enemy's 
hands,  no  one  supposed  that  the  dynasty  could  any 
longer  remain  on  the  throne  :  the  only  question  was  by 
what  form  of  government  the  Empire  should  be  suc- 
ceeded. The  Legislative  Chamber  assembled  in  the 
dead  of  night;  Jules  Favre  proposed  the  deposition 

*  Diary  of  the  Emperor  Frederick,  Sept.  2. 


448  MODERN  EUROPE,  1370. 

of  the  Emperor,  and  was  heard  in  silence.  The 
Assembly  adjourned  for  some  hours.  On  the  morning 
of  the  4th,  Thiers,  who  sought  to  keep  the  way  open 
for  an  Orleanist  restoration,  moved  that  a  Committee 
of  Government  should  be  appointed  by  the  Chamber 
itself,  and  that  elections  to  a  new  Assembly  should  be 
held  as  soon  as  circumstances  should  permit.  Before 
this  and  other  propositions  of  the  same  nature  could  be 
put  to  the  vote,  the  Chamber  was  invaded  by  the  mob. 
Gambetta,  with  most  of  the  Deputies  for  Paris,  pro- 
ceeded to  the  Hotel  de  Yille,  and  there  proclaimed  the 
Republic.  The  Empress  fled;  a  Government  of 
National  Defence  came  into  existence,  with  General 
Trochu  at  its  head,  Jules  Favre  assuming  the  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Gambetfca  that  of  the  Interior. 
No  hand  was  raised  in  defence  of  the  Napoleonic 
dynasty  or  of  the  institutions  of  the  Empire.  The 
Legislative  Chamber  and  the  Senate  disappeared  without 
even  making  an  attempt  to  prolong  their  own  existence. 
Thiers,  without  approving  of  the  Republic  or  the  mode  in 
which  it  had  come  into  being,  recommended  his  friends 
to  accept  the  new  Government,  and  gave  it  his  own 
support.  On  the  6th  of  September  a  circular  of  Jules 
Favre,  addressed  to  the  representatives  of  France  at 
all  the  European  Courts,  justified  the  overthrow  of  the 
circular  of  juies  Napoleonic  Empire,  and  claimed  for  the 
Government  by  which  it  was  succeeded 
the  goodwill  of  the  neutral  Powers.  Napoleon  III. 
was  charged  with  the  responsibility  for  the  war:  with 
the  fall  of  his  dynasty,  it  was  urged,  the  reasons  for  a 


1870.  THE    GERMANS   REACH  PARIS.  449 

continuance  of  the  struggle  had  ceased  to  exist.  France 
only  asked  for  a  lasting  peace.  Such  peace,  however, 
must  leave  the  territory  of  France  inviolate,  for  peace 
with  dishonour  would  be  but  the  prelude  to  a  new 
war  of  extermination.  "Not  an  inch 'of  our  soil  will 
we  cede  " — so  ran  the  formula — "  not  a  stone  of  our 
fortresses. "* 

The  German  Chancellor  had  nothing  ready  in  the 
way  of  rhetoric  e^ual  to  his  antagonist's  phrases ;  but 
as  soon  as  the  battle  of  Sedan  was  won  it  was  settled 
at  the  Prussian  headquarters  that  peace  would  not  be 
made  without  the  annexation  of  Alsace  and  Favre  and  Bis 
Lorraine.  Prince  Bismarck  has  stated 
that  his  own  policy  would  have  stopped  at  the  ac- 
quisition of  Strasburg  :  Moltke,  however,  and  the  chiefs 
of  the  army  pronounced  that  Germany  could  not  be 
secure  against  invasion  while  Metz  remained  in  the 
hands  of  France,  and  this  opinion  was  accepted  by  the 
King.  For  a  moment  it  was  imagined  that  the  victory 
of  Sedan  had  given  the  conqueror  peace  on  his  own 
terms.  This  hope,  however,  speedily  disappeared,  and 
the  march 'upon  Paris  was  resumed  by  the  army  of  the 
Crown  Prince  without  waste  of  time.  In  the  third 
week  of  September  the  invaders  approached  the  capital. 
Favre,  in  spite  of  his  declaration  of  the  Gth,  was  not 

*  Favre's  circular  alleged  that  the  .King  of  Prussia  had  declared  that 
he  made  war  not  on  France  but  on  the  Imperial  Dynasty.  King  William 
had  never  stated  anything  of  the  kind.  His  proclamation  on  entering 
France,  to  which  Favre  appears  to  have  referred,  merely  said  that  the 
war  was  to  be  waged  against  the  French  army,  and  not  against  the  in- 
habitants, who,  so  long  as  they  kept  quiet,  would  not  be  molested. 

D  D 


450  MODERN  EUROPE.  iwo. 

indisposed  to  enter  upon  negotiations  ;  and,  trusting  to 
his  own  arts  of  persuasion,  he  sought  an  interview 
with  the  German  Chancellor,  which  was  granted  to 
him  at  Ferrieres  on  the  19th,  and  continued  on  the  fol- 
lowing day.  Bismarck  hesitated  to  treat  the  holders 
of  office  in  Paris  as  an  established  Government;  he  was 
willing  to  grant  an  armistice  in  order  that  elections 
might  be  held  for  a  National  Assembly  with  which 
Germany  could  treat  for  peace  ;  but  he  required,  as  a 
condition  of  the  armistice,  that  Strasburg  and  Toul 
should  be  surrendered.  Toul  was  already  at  the  last 
extremity;  Strasburg  was  not  capable  of  holding  out 
ten  days  longer  ;  but  of  this  the  Government  at  Paris 
was  not  aware.  The  conditions  demanded  by  Bismarck 
were  rejected  as  insulting  to  France,  and  the  war  was 
left  to  take  its  course.  Already,  while  Favre  was  nego- 
tiating at  Ferrieres,  the  German  vanguard  was  pressing 
round  to  tl^e  west  of  Paris.  A  body  of  French  troops 
which  attacked  them  on  the  19th  at  Chatillon  was  put 
to  the  rout  and  fled  in  panic.  Versailles  was  occupied 
on  the  same  day,  and  the  line  of  investment  was  shortly 
afterwards  completed  around  the  capital. 

The  second  act  in  the  war  now  began.  Paris  had 
been  fortified  by  Thiers  about  1840,  at  the  time 
when  it  seemed  likely  that  France  might  be  engaged 


siege  of  Paris  *n  war  w^h  a  coalition  on  the  affairs  of 
Mehemet  Ali.  The  forts  were  not  distant 
enough  from  the  city  to  protect  it  altogether  from 
artillery  with  the  lengthened  range  of  1870  ;  they  were 
sufficient,  however,  to  render  an  assault  out  of  the 


1870.  SIEGE \  OF  PARIS.  4.">1 

question,  and  to  compel  the  besieger  to  rely  mainly  on 
the  slow  operation  of  famine.  It  had  been  reckoned 
by  the  engineers  of  1840  that  food  enough  might  be 
collected  to  enable  the  city  to  stand,  a  two-months' 
siege ;  so  vast,  however,  were  the  supplies  collected  in 
1870  that,  with  double  the  population,  Paris  had  pro- 
visions for  above  four  months.  In  spite  therefore  of 
the  capture  and  destruction  of  its  armies  the  cause  of 
France  was  not  hopeless,  if,  while  Paris  and  Metz 
occupied  four  hundred  thousand  of  the  invaders,  the 
population  of  the  provinces  should  take  up  the  struggle 
with  enthusiasm,  and  furnish  after  some  months  .of 
military  exercise  troops  more  numerous  than  those 
which  France  had  lost,  to  attack  the  besiegers  from  all 
points  at  once  and  to  fall  upon  their  communications. 
To  organise  such  a  national  resistance  was,  however, 
impossible  for  any  Government  within  the  besieged 
capital  itself.  It  was  therefore  determined  to  establish 
a  second  seat  of  Government  on  the  Loire ; 

Toura. 

and  before  the  lines  were  drawn  round 
Paris  three  members  of  the  Ministry,  with  M.  Cre*mieux 
at  their  head,  set  out  for  Tours.  Cre*mieux,  however, 
who  was  an  aged  lawyer,  proved  quite  unequal  to  his 
t;-sk.  His  authority  was  disputed  in  the  west  and  the 
south.  Eevolutionary  movements  threatened  to  break 
up  the  unity  of  the  national  defence.  A  stronger 
hand,  a  more  commanding  will,  was  needed.  Such  a 
hand,  such  a  will  belonged  to  Gambetta,  who  on  the 
7th  of  October  left  Paris  in  order  to  undertake  the 
government  of  the  provinces  and  the  organisation  of 
D  D  2 


452  MODERN    EUROPE.  WTO. 

the  national  armies.  The  circle  of  the  besiegers  was 
now  too  closely  drawn  for  the  ordinary  means  of  travel 
to  be  possible.  Gambetta  passed  over  the  German  lines 
Gambetteat  in  a  Balloon,  and  reached  Tours  in  safety, 
where  he  immediately  threw  his  feeble 
colleagues  into  the  background  and  concentrated  all 
power  in  his  own  vigorous  grasp.  The  effect  of  his  pre- 
sence was  at  once  felt  throughout  France.  There  was 
an  end  of  the  disorders  in  the  great  cities,  and  of  all 
attempts  at  rivalry  with  the  central  power.  Gambetta 
had  the  faults  of  rashness,  of  excessive  self-confidence, 
of  defective  regard  for  scientific  authority  in  matters 
where  he  himself  was  ignorant :  but  he  possessed  in 
an  extraordinary  degree  the  qualities  necessary  for  a 
Dictator  at  such  a  national  crisis :  boundless,  in- 
domitable courage ;  a  simple,  elemental  passion  of  love 
for  his  country  that  left  absolutely  no  place  for  hesita- 
tions or  reserve  in  the  prosecution  of  the  one  object  for 
which  France  then  existed,  the  war.  He  carried  the 
nation  with  him  like  a  whirlwind. .  Whatever  share 
the  military  errors  of  Gambetta  and  his  rash  personal 
interference  with  commanders  may  have  had  in  the 
ultimate  defeat  of  France,  without  him  it  would  never 
have  been  known  of  what  efforts  France  was  capable. 
The  proof  of  his  capacity  was  seen  in  the  hatred  and  the 
fear  with  which  down  to  the  time  of  his  death  he  inspired 
the  German  people.  Had  there  been  at  the  head  of 
the  army  of  Metz  a  man  of  one-tenth  of  Gambetta's 
effective  force,  it  is  possible  that  France  might  have 
closed  the  war,  if  not  with  success,  at  least  with  un- 
diminished  territory. 


1870.  GAMBETTA.  453 

Before    Gambetta  left  Paris  the    fall  of  Strasburs: 

o 

set  free  the  army  under  General  Werder  by  which 
it  had  been  besieged,  and  enabled  the  Germans  to 
establish  a  civil  Government  in  Alsace, 

Fall  of  Stras- 

the  western  frontier  of  the  new  province 
having  been  already  so  accurately  studied  that,  when 
peace  was  made  in  1871,  the  frontier-line  was  drawn 
not  upon  one  of  the  earlier  French  maps  but  on  the  map 
now  published  by  the  German  staff.  It  was  Gambetta's 
first  task  to  divide  France  into  districts,  each  with  its 
own  military  centre,  its  own  army,  and  its  own  com- 
11  umder.  Four  such  districts  were  made :  the  centres 
were  Lille,  Le  Mans,  Bourges,and  Besancon.  At  Bourges 
and  in  the  neighbourhood  considerable  progress  had 
already  been  made  in  organisation.  Early  in  October 
German  cavalry  -  detachments,  exploring  The  ofthe 
southwards,  found  that  French  troops 
were  gathering  on  the  Loire.  The  Bavarian  General 
Tann  was  detached  by  Moltke  from  the  besieging 
army  at  Paris,  and  ordered  to  make  himself  master 
of  Orleans.  Tann  hastened  southwards,  defeated  the 
French  outside  Orleans  on  the  llth  of  October,  and 
occupied  this  city,  the  French  retiring  Tanntake8 
'  towards  Bourges.  Gambetta  removed  the  o*"*0*1* 
Defeated  commander,  and  set  in  his  place  General 
Aurelle  de  Paladines.  Tann  was  directed  to  cross  the 
Loire  and  destroy  the  arsenals  at  Bourges ;  he  reported, 
however,  that  this  task  was  beyond  his  power,  in  con- 
sequence of  which  Moltke  ordered  General  Werder 
with  the  army  of  Strasburg  to  move  westwards  against 


454  MODERN  EUROPE.  1870. 

Bourges,  after  dispersing  the  weak  forces  that  were 
gathering  about  Besangon.  Werder  set  out  on  his 
dangerous  march,  but  he  had  not  proceeded  far  when 
an  army  of  very  different  power  was  thrown  into  the 
scale  against  the  French  levies  on  the  Loire. 

In  the  battle  of  Gravelotte,  fought  on  the  18th  of 
August,  the  French  troops  had  been  so  handled  by 
Bazaine  as  to  render  it  doubtful  whether  he  really 
intended  to  break  through  the  enemy's 
line  and  escape  from  Metz.  At  what 
period  political  designs  inconsistent  with  his  military 
duty  first  took  possession  of  Bazaine's  thoughts  is 
uncertain.  He  had  played  a  political  part  in  Mexico  ; 
it  is  probable  that  as  soon  as  he  found  himself  at  the 
head  of  the  one  effective  army  of  France,  and  saw 
Napoleon  hopelessly  discredited,  he  began  to  aim  at  per- 
sonal power.  Before  the  downfall  of  the  Empire  he  had 
evidently  adopted  a  scheme  of  inaction  with  the  object 
of  preserving  his  army  entire :  even  the  sortie  by  which 
it  had  been  arranged  that  he  should,  assist  McMahon 
on  the  day  before  Sedan  was  feebly  and  irresolutely 
conducted.  After  the  proclamation  of  the  Republic 
Bazaine's  inaction  became  still  more  marked.  The 
intrigues  of  an  adventurer  named  Eegnier,  who  en- 
deavoured to  open  a  negotiation  between  the  Prussians 
and  the  exiled  Empress  Eugenie,  encouraged  him  in 
his  determination  to  keep  his  soldiers  from  fulfilling 
their  duty  to  France.  Week  after  week  passed  by ;  a 
fifth  of  the  besieging  army  was  struck  down  with 
sickness ;  yet  Bazaine  made  no  effort  to  break  through, 


1870.  SURRENDER    OF  METZ.  455 

or  even  to  diminish  the  number  of  men  who  were  con- 
suming the  supplies  of  Metz  by  giving  to  separate 
detachments  the  opportunity  of  escape.  On  the 
12th  of  October,  after  the  pretence  of  a  sortie  on  the 
north,  he  entered  into  communication  with  the  German 
headquarters  at  Versailles.  Bismarck  offered  to  grant 
a  free  departure  to  the  army  of  Metz  on  condition 
that  the  fortress  should  be  placed  in  his  hands,  that 
the  army  should  undertake  to  act  on  behalf  of  the 
Empress,  and  that  the  Empress  should  pledge  her- 
self to  accept  the  Prussian  conditions  of  peace,  what- 
ever these  might  be.  General  Boyer  was  sent  to 
England  to  acquaint  the  Empress  with  these  pro- 
positions. They  were  declined  by  her,  and  after  a 
fortnight  had  been  spent  in  manoeuvres  for  a  Bona- 
partist  restoration  Bazaine  found  himself  at  the  end 
of  his  resources.  On  the  27th  the  capitula-  „ 

I  Capitulation  of 

tion  of   Metz   was   signed.      The  •  fortress 
itself,   with  incalculable   cannon  and  material  of  war, 
and  an  army  of  a  hundred  and  seventy  thousand  men, 
including  twenty-six  thousand  sick  and  wounded  in  the 
hospitals,  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans.* 

Bazaine  was  at  a  later  time  tried  by  a  court- 
martial,  found  guilty  of  the  neglect  of  duty,  and 
sentenced  to  death.  That  sentence  was  not  executed ; 
but  if  there  is  an  infamy  that  is  worse  than 

Bazaine. 

death,  such  infamy  will  to  all  time  cling 

to  his  name.     In  the  circumstances  in  which  France 

*  Deutsch-Franzosiche  Krieg,  vol.  iii.,  p.  104.    Bazaine,  p.  166.    Proces 
de  Bazaine,  vol.  ii.,  p.  219.     Regnier,  p.  20.     Hahii,  ii.  171. 


456  MODERN  EUROPE.  1870. 

was  placed  no  effort,  no  sacrifice  of  life  could  have 
been  too  great  for  the  commander  of  the  army  at 
Metz.  To  retain  the  besiegers  in  full  strength  before 
the  fortress  would  not  have  required  the  half  of 
Bazaine's  actual  force.  If  half  his  army  had  fallen 
on  the  field  of  battle  in  successive  attempts  to  cut 
their  way  through  the  enemy,  brave  men  would  no 
doubt  have  perished ;  but  even  had  their  efforts  failed 
their  deaths  would  have  purchased  for  Metz  the  power 
to  hold  out  for  weeks  or  for  months  longer.  The 
civil  population  of  Metz  was  but  sixty  thousand,  its 
army  was  three  times  as  numerous ;  unlike  Paris,  it 
saw  its  stores  consumed  not  by  helpless  millions  of 
women  and  children,  but  by  soldiers  whose  duty  it 
was  to  aid  the  defence  of  their  country  at  whatever 
cost.  Their  duty,  if  they  could  not  cut  their  way 
through,  was  to  die  fighting ;  and  had  they  shown 
hesitation,  which  was  not  the  case,  Bazaine  should 
have  died  at  their  head.  That  Bazaine  would  have 
fulfilled  his  duty  even  if  Napoleon  III.  had  remained 
on  the  throne  is  more  than  doubtful,  for  his  inaction 
had  begun  before  the  catastrophe  of  Sedan.  His 
pretext  after  that  time  was  that  the  government  of 
France  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  men  of  disorder, 
and  that  it  was  more  important  for  his  army  to  save 
France  from  the  Government  than  from  the  invader. 
He  was  the  only  man  in  France  who  thought  so.  The 
Government  of  September  4th,  whatever  its  faults,  was 
good  enough  for  tens  of  thousands  of  brave  men, 
Legitimists,  Orleanists,  Bonapartists,  who  nocked 


1870.  RECAPTURE    OF  ORLEANS.  457 

without  distinction  of  party  to  its  banners :  it  might 
have  been  good  enough  for  Marshal  Bazaine.  But 
France  had  to  pay  the  penalty  for  the  political,  the 
moral  indifference  which  could  acquiesce  in  the  Coup 
d'fitat  of  1851,  in  the  servility  of  t*he  Empire,  in 
many  a  vile  and  boasted  deed  in  Mexico,  in  China,  in 
Algiers.  Such  indifference  found  its  Nemesis  in  a 
Bazaine. 

The  surrender  of  Metz  and  the  release  of  the  great 
army  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles  by  which  it  was 
besieged  fatally  changed  the  conditions  of  the  French 
war  of  national  defence.  Two  hundred  thousand  of 
the  victorious  troops  of  Germany  under  some  of  their 
ablest  generals  were  set  free  to  attack  the  still  untrained 
levies  on  the  Loire  and  in  the  north  of  France,  which, 
with  more  time  for  organisation,  might  well  have 
forced  the  Germans  to  raise  the  siege  of  Paris.  The 
army  once  commanded  by  Steinmetz  was  now  recon- 
stituted, and  despatched  under  General  Manteuffel 
towards  Amiens ;  Prince  Frederick  Charles  moved 
with  the  remainder  of  his  troops  towards  the  Loire. 
Aware  that  his  approach  could  not  long  be  delayed, 
Gambetta  insisted  that  Aurelle  de  Paladines  should 
begin  the  march  on  Paris.  The  general  attacked  Tann 
at  Coulmiers  on  the  9th  of  November, 
defeated  him,  and  re-occupied  Orleans,  the  from  oceans, 

Nov.  9. 

first    real    success    that    the    French    had 
gained   in   the  war.      There    was  great    alarm  at  the 
German  headquarters  at  Versailles ;  the  possibility  of 
a  failure  of  the  siege  was  discussed;  and  forty  thou- 


458  MODERN  EUROPE.  MTO. 

sand  troops  were  sent  southwards  in  haste  to  the 
support  of  the  Bavarian  general.  Aurelle,  however, 
did  not  move  upon  the  capital :  his  troops  were  still 
unfit  for  the  enterprise;  and  he  remained  stationary 
on  the  north  of  Orleans,  in  order  to  improve  his 
organisation,  to  await  reinforcements,  and  to  meet  the 
attack  of  Frederick  Charles  in  a  strong  position.  In 
the  third  week  of  November  the  leading  divisions  of 
the  army  of  Metz  approached,  and  took  post  between 
Orleans  and  Paris.  Gambetta  now  insisted  that  the 
effort  should  be  made  to  relieve  the  capital.  Aurelle 
resisted,  but  was  forced  to  obey.  The  garrison  of 
Paris  had  already  made  several  unsuccessful  attacks 
upon  the  lines  of  their  besiegers,  the  most  vigorous 
being  that  of  Le  Bourget  on  the  30th  of  October, 
in  which  bayonets  were  crossed.  It  was  arranged  that 
in  the  last  days  of  November  General  Trochu  should 
endeavour  to  break  out  on  the  southern  side,  and  that 
simultaneously  the  army  of  the  Loire  should  fall  upon 
the  enemy  in  front  of  it  and  endeavour  to  force  its 
way  to  the  capital.  On  the  28th  the  attack  upon  the 
Germans  on  the  north  of  Orleans  began.  For  several 
days  the  struggle  was  renewed  by  one 

Battles  of  Or-  ..     .    .  .  _ 

leans,  NOV.  28-      division   after    another   or    the    armies    ot 

Dec.  2. 

Aurelle  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles. 
Victory  remained  at  last  with  the  Germans;  the 
centre  of  the  French  position  was  carried ;  the  right 
and  left  wings  of  the  army  were  severed  from  one 
another  and  forced  to  retreat,  the  one  up  the  Loire, 
the  other  towards  the  west.  Orleans  on  'the  5th 


MTO.  FAILURE    OF   THE    BELIEVING   ARMIES.  459 

of  December  passed  back  into  the  hands  of  the  Ger- 
mans. The  sortie  from  Paris,  which  began  with  a 
successful  attack  by  General  Ducrot  upon 

.  .  -i     -i        rvi  Sortie  of  Cham- 

Champigny  beyond  the  Marne,  ended  alter     pjg-ny.  NOV.  *>- 
some  days    of  combat  in  the  recovery  by 
the  Germans    of  the    positions   which   they  had  lost, 
and   in   the   retreat   of    Ducrot    into   Paris.      In    the 
same    week    Manteuffel,    moving    against 
the  relieving   army  of  the  north,  encoun- 
tered   it   near   Amiens,    defeated    it    after 
a    hard    struggle,    and    gained    possession    of   Amiens 
itself. 

After  the  fall  of  Amiens,  Manteufiel  moved  upon 
Rouen.  This  city  fell  into  his  hands  without  resist- 
ance ;  the  conquerors  pressed  on  westwards,  and  at 
Dieppe  troops  which  had  come  from  the 

Rouen  occupied, 

confines  of  Eussia  gazed  for  the  first  time 
upon  the  sea.  But  the  Republican  armies,  unlike  those 
which  the  Germans  had  first  encountered,  were  not  to 
be  crushed  at  a  single  blow.  Under  the  energetic  com- 
mand of  Faidherbe  the  army  of  the  North  advanced 
again  upon  Amiens.  Goeben,  who  was  left  to  defend 
the  line  of  the  Somme,  went  out  to  meet  him,  defeated 
him  on  the  23rd  of  December,  and  drove  him  back  to 
Arras.  But  again,  after  a  week's  interval,  Faidherbe 
pushed  forward.  On  the  3rd  of  January  he  fell  upon 
Goeben's  weak  division  at  Bapaume,  and  handled  it 
so  severely  that  the  Germans  would  on  the 

Bapaume,  Jan.  3. 

following  day  have  abandoned  their  position, 

if    the   French   had  not    themselves  been   the    first  to 


460  MODERN   EUROPE.  1871. 

retire.  Faidherbe,  however,  had  only  fallen  back  to 
receive  reinforcements.  After  some  days'  rest  he  once 
more  sought  to  gain  the  road  to  Paris,  advancing  this 
time  by  the  eastward  line  through  St.  Quentin.  In 
front  of  this  town  Goeben  attacked  him.  The  last 
st.  Quentin,  battle  of  the  army  of  the  North  was  fought 

on  the  19th  of  January.  The  French 
general  endeavoured  to  disguise  his  defeat,  but  the 
German  commander  had  won  all  that  he  desired. 
Faidherbe's  army  was  compelled  to  retreat  northwards 
in  disorder ;  its  part  in  the  war  was  at  an  end. 

During  the  last  three  weeks  of  December  there  was 
a  pause  in  the  operations  of  the  Germans  on  the  Loire. 

It  was  expected  that  Bourbaki  and  the  east 

The  Armies    of  ,,         ,          „  ,  ,  , 

the  Loire  and  of     wing1    or    the    £  rencn    armv    would    soon 

the  East.  J 

re-appear  at  Orleans  and  endeavour  to 
combine  with  Chanzy's  troops.  Gambetta,  however, 
had  formed  another  plan.  He  considered  that 
Chanzy,  with  the  assistance  of  divisions  'formed 
in  Brittany,  would  be  strong  enough  to  encounter 
Prince  Frederick  Charles,  and  he  determined  to  throw 
the  army  of  Bourbaki,  strengthened  by  reinforcements 
from  the  south,  upon  Germany  itself.  The  design  was 
a  daring  one,  and  had  the  two  French  armies  been 
capable  of  performing  the  work  which  Gambetta  required 
of  them,  an  inroad  into  Baden,  or  even  the  re-conquest 
of  Alsace,  would  most  seriously  have  affected  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Germans  before  Paris.  But  Gambetta 
miscalculated  the  power  of  young,  untrained  troops, 
imperfectly  armed,  badly  fed,  against  a  veteran"  enemy. 


1871. 


BOURBAKI.  461 


In  a  series  of  hard-fought  struggles  the  army  of  the 
Loire  under  General  Chanzy  was  driven  back  at  the 
beginning  of  January  from  Vendome  to  Le  Mans.  On 
the  12th,  Chanzy  took  post  before  this  city  and  fought  his 
last  battle.  While  he  was  making  a  vigorous  resistance 
in  the  centre  of  the  line,  the  Breton  regiments  stationed 
on  his  right  gave  way;  the  Germans  pressed  round 
him,  and  gained  possession  of  the  town.  Chanzy 
retreated  towards  Laval,  leaving  thousands 

Le  Mans,  Jan.  12. 

of  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and 
saving  only  the  debris  of  an  army.  Bourbaki  in  the 
meantime,  with  a  numerous  but  miserably  equipped 
force,  had  almost  reached  Belfort.  The  report  of  his 
eastward  movement  was  not  at  first  believed  Bourbaki. 
at  the  German  headquarters  before  Paris,  and  the  troops 
of  General  Werder,  which  had  been  engaged  about  Dijon 
faith  a  body  of  auxiliaries  commanded  by  Garibaldi,  were 
left  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  attack  without  support. 
When  the  real  state  of  affairs  became  known  Manteuffel 
was  sent  eastwards  in  hot  haste  towards  the  threatened 
point.  Werder  had  evacuated  Dijon  and  fallen  back 
upon  Vesoul  ;  part  of  his  army  was  still  occupied  in  the 
siege  of  Belfort.  As  Bourbaki  approached  he  fell  back 
with  the  greater  part  of  his  troops  in  order  to  cover  the 
besieging  force,  leaving  one  of  his  lieutenants  to  make 
a  flank  attack  upon  Bourbaki  at  Villersexel.  This 
attack,  one  of  the  fiercest  in  the  war,  delayed  the 
French  for  two  days,  and  gave  Werder  time 


to  occupy  the  strong  positions  that  he  had 

chosen   about    Montbeliard.      Here,    on    the    15th    of 


462  MODERN  EUROPE.  isn. 

January,  began  a  struggle  which  lasted  for  three  days. 
The  French,  starving  and  perishing  with  cold,  though  far 
superior  in  number  to  their  enemy,  were  led  with  little 
effect  against  the  German  entrenchments.  On  the  18th 
Bourbaki  began  his  retreat.  Werder  was  unable  to 
follow  him ;  Manteuffel  with  a  weak  force  was  still  at 
some  distance,  and  for  a  moment  it  seemed  possible 
that  Bourbaki,  by  a  rapid  movement  westwards,  might 
crush  this  isolated  foe.  Gambetta  ordered  Bourbaki  to 
make  the  attempt :  the  commander  refused  to  court 
further  disaster  with  troops  who  were  not  fit  to  face 
an  enemy,  and  retreated  towards  Pontarlier  in  the 
hope  of  making  his  way  to  Lyons.  But  Manteuffel 
now  descended  in  front  of  him ;  divisions  of  Werder's 
army  pressed  down  from  the  north  ;  the  retreat  was  cut 
off;  and  the  unfortunate  Trench  general,  whom  a 
telegram  from  Gambetta  removed  from  his  command, 
attempted  to  take  his  own  life.  On  the  1st 

The  Eastern 

ESfer!16     of  February,  the  wreck  of   his  army,  still 
numbering  eighty-five  thousand  men,   but 
reduced   to    the    extremity   of    weakness   and   misery, 
sought  refuge  beyond  the  Swiss  frontier. 

The  war  was  now  over.  Two  days  after  Bourbaki's 
repulse  at  Montbeliard  the  last  unsuccessful  sortie  was 
made  from  Paris.  There  now  remained  provisions  only 
for  another  fortnight ;  above  forty  thousand  of  the  in- 
habitants had  succumbed  to  the  privations  of  the  siege; 
all  hope  of  assistance  from  the  relieving  armies  before 
actual  famine  should  begin  disappeared.  On  the  23rd 
of  January  Favre  sought  the  German  Chancellor  at 


1871.  CAPITULATION   OF  PARIS.  463 

Versailles  in  order  to  discuss  the  conditions  of  a  general 
armistice  and  of  the  capitulation  of  Paris. 

_.  .       .  ,  ..    _  ,    .  Capitulation  of 

I  he  negotiations  lasted  ior  several  days;  on     Pa™  and  AT- 

»  nustace,  Jan.  28. 

the  28th  an  armistice  was  signed  with  ^  the 
declared  object  that  elections  might  at  once  be  freely 
held  for  a  National  Assembly,  which  should  decide 
whether  the  war  should  be  continued,  or  on  what  con- 
ditions peace  should  be  made.  The  conditions  of  the 
armistice  were  that  the  forts  of  Paris  and  all  their 
material  of  war  should  be  handed  over  to  the  German 
army ;  that  the  artillery  of  the  enceinte  should  be 
dismounted  ;  and  that  the  regular  troops  in  Paris  should,  . 
as  prisoners  of  war,  surrender  their  arms.  The  National 
Guard  were  permitted  to  retain  their  weapons  and  their 
artillery.  Immediately  upon  the  fulfilment  of  the  first 
two  conditions  all  facilities  were  to  be  given  for  the 
e-ntry  of  supplies  of  food  into  Paris.* 

The  articles  of  the  armistice  were  duly  executed,  and 
on  the  30th  of  January  the  Prussian  flag  waved 
over  the  forts  of  the  French  capital.  Orders  were  sent 
into  the  provinces  by  the  Government  that  elections 
should  at  once  be  held.  It  had  at  one  time  been  feared 
by  Count  Bismarck  that  Gambetta  would  acknowledge 
no  armistice  that  might  be  made  by  his  colleagues  at 
Paris.  But  this  apprehension  was  not  realised,  for, 
while  protesting  against  a  measure  adopted 
without  consultation  with  himself  and  his  biy  at  Bordeaux^ 

Feb.  12. 

companions  at  Bordeaux,  Gambetta  did  not 

*  Hahn,  ii.  216.     Valfrey,  Diplomatic  clu  Gouvernement  de  k  Defense 
Nationale,  ii.  51.     Hertslet,  Map  of  Europe,  iii.  1912,  1954. 


464  MODERN  EUROPE.  isn. 

actually  reject  the  armistice.  He  called  upon  the 
nation,  however,  to  use  the  interval  for  the  collection  of 
new  forces;  and  in  the  hope  of  gaining  from  the 
election  an  Assembly  in  favour  -of  a  continuation  of  the 
war,  he  published  a  decree  incapacitating  for  election  all 
persons  who  had  been  connected  with  the  Government 
of  Napoleon  III.  Against  this  decree  Bismarck  at  once 
protested,  and  at  his  instance  it  was  cancelled  by  the 
Government  of  Paris.  Gambetta  thereupon  resigned. 
The  elections  were  held  on  the  8th  of  February,  and  on 
the  12th  the  National  Assembly  was  opened  at  Bord- 
eaux. The  Government  of  Defence  now  laid  down  its 
powers.  Thiers — who  had  been  the  author  of  those 
fortifications  which  had  kept  the  Germans  at  bay  for 
four  months  after  the  overthrow  of  the  Imperial  armies ; 
who,  in  the  midst  of  the  delirium  of  July,  1870,  had  done 
all  that  man  could  do  to  dissuade  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment and  its  Parliament  from  war ;  who,  in  spite  of 
his  seventy  years,  had,  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon t 
hurried  to  London,  to  St.  Petersburg,  to  Florence,  to 
Vienna,  in  the  hope  of  winning  some  support  for  France, 
—was  the  man  called  by  common  assent  to  the  helm 
of  State.  He  appointed  a  Ministry,  called'  upon  the 
Assembly  to  postpone  all  discussions  as  to  the  future 
Government  of  France,  and  himself  proceeded  to 
Versailles  in  order  to  negotiate  conditions  of  peace. 
For  several  days  the  old  man  struggled  with  Count 
Bismarck  on  point  after  point  in  the  Prussian  demands. 
(Bismarck  required  the  cession  of  Alsace  and  Eastern 
Lorraine,  the  payment  of  six  milliards  of  francs,  and  the 


1871.  CONDITIONS    OF   PEACE.  455 

occupation  of  part  of  Paris  by  the  German  army  until 
the  conditions  of  peace  should  be  ratified  by  the 
Assembly.  Thiers  strove  hard  to  save  Metz,  but  on 
this  point  the  German  staff  was  inexorable ;  he  suc- 
ceeded at  last  in  reducing  the  indemnity  to  five  milliards, 
and  was  given  the  option  between  retaining  Belfort  and 
sparing  Paris  the  entry  of  the  German  troops.  On  the 
last  point  his  patriotism  decided  without  a  moment's 
hesitation.  He  bade  the  Germans  enter  Paris,  and  saved 
Belfort  for  France.  On  the  26th  of  February  preliminaries 
of  peace  were  signed.  Thirty  thousand  Preliminaries  of 
German  soldiers  marched  into  the  Champs 
Elysees  on  the  1st  of  March;  but  on  that  same  day  the 
treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Assembly  at  Bordeaux,  and 
after  forty-eight  hours  Paris  was  freed  from  the  sight  of 
its  conquerors.  The  Articles  of  Peace  provided  for  the 
gradual  evacuation  of  France  by  the  German  army  as 
the  instalments  of  the  indemnity,  which  were  allowed 
to  extend  over  a  period  of  three  years,  should  be  paid. 
There  remained  for  settlement  only  certain  matters  of 
detail,  chiefly  connected  with  finance ;  these,  however, 
proved  the  object  of  long  and  bitter  controversy,  and 
it  was  not  until  the  10th  of  May  that  the  definitive 
Treaty  of  Peace  was  signed  at  Frankfort. 

France  had  made  war  in  order  to  undo  the  work  of 
partial  union  effected  by  Prussia  in  18G6  :  it  achieved 
the  opposite  result,  and  Germany  emerged 

*  German  Unity. 

from  the  war  with  the  Empire  established. 
Immediately   after    the   victory  of   Worth  the    Crown 
Prince  had  seen  that  the  time  had  come  for  abolishing 

o 
E    E 


466  MODERN   EUROPE.  1870. 

the  line  of  division  which  severed  Southern  Germany 
from  the  Federation  of  the  North.  His  own  concep- 
tion of  the  best  form  of  national  union  was  a  German 
Empire  with  its  chief  at  Berlin.  That  Count  Bismarck 
was  without  plans  for  uniting  North  and  South  Ger- 
many it  is  impossible  to  believe ;  but  the  Minister 
and  the  Crown  Prince  had  always  been  at  enmity ;  and 
when,  after  the  battle  of  Sedan,  they  spoke  together  of 
the  future,  it  seemed  to  the  Prince  as  if  Bismarck  had 
scarcely  thought  of  the  federation  of  the  Empire  or  of 
the  re-establishment  of  the  Imperial  dignity,  and  as 
if  he  was  inclined  to  it  only  under  certain  reserves.  It 
was,  however,  part  of  Bismarck's  system  to  exclude 
the  Crown  Prince  as  far  as  possible  from  political  affairs, 
under  the  strange  pretext  that  his  relationship  to 
Queen  Victoria  would  be  abused  by  the  French  pro- 
clivities of  the  English  Court ;  and  it  is  possible  that 
had  the  Chancellor  after  the  battle  of  Sedan  chosen  to 
admit  the  Prince  to  his  confidence  instead  of  resenting 
his  interference,  the  difference  between  their  views  as  to 
the  future  of  Germany  would  have  been  seen  to  be  one 
rather  of  forms  and  means  than  of  intention.  But 
whatever  the  share  of  these  two  dissimilar  spirits  in  the 
initiation  of  the  last  steps  towards  German  union,  the 
work,  as  ultimately  achieved,  was  both  in  form  and 
in  substance  that  which  the  Crown  Prince  had  con- 
ceived. In  the  course  of  September  negotiations  were 
opened  with  each  of  the  Southern  States  for  its  entry 
into  the  Northern  Confederation.  Bavaria  alone  raised 
serious  difficulties,  and  demanded  terms  to  which  the 


1870.          FOUNDATION'   OF   THE    GERMAN  EMPIRE.          437 

Prussian  Government  could  not  consent.  Bismarck 
refrained  from  exercising  pressure  at  Munich,  but  invited 
the  several  Governments  to  send  representatives  to 
Versailles  for  the  purpose  of  arriving  at  a  settlement. 
For  a  moment  the  Court  of  Miinich  drew  the  sovereign 
of  Wiirtemberg  to  its  side,  and  orders  were  sent  to  the 
envoys  of  Wiirtemberg  at  Versailles  to  act  with  the 
Bavarians  in  refusing  to  sign  the  treaty  projected  by 
Bismarck.  The  Wiirtemberg  Ministers  hereupon  ten- 
dered their  resignation ;  Baden  and  Hesse-Darmstadt 
signed  the  treaty,  and  the  two  dissentient  kings  saw 
themselves  on  the  point  of  being  excluded  from 
United  Germany.  They  withdrew  their  opposition, 
and  at  the  end  of  November  the  treaties  uniting  all1 
the  Southern  States  with  the  existing  Confederation 
were  executed,  Bavaria  retaining  larger  separate  rights 
than  were  accorded  to  any  other  member  of  the  Union. 

In  the  acts  which  thus  gave  to  Germany  political 
cohesion  there  was  nothing  that  altered  the  title 
of  its  chief.  Bismarck,  however,  had  in  the  mean- 
time informed  the  recalcitrant  sovereigns  that  if 
they  did  not  themselves  offer  the  Imperial  dignity 
to  King  William,  the  North  German  Parliament 
would  do  so.  At  the  end  of  November  a  letter 
was  accordingly  sent  by  the  King  of  Bavaria  to 
all  his  fellow-sovereigns,  proposing  that  the  King  of 
Prussia,  as  President  of  the  newly-formed  Federation, 
should  assume  the  title  of  German  Emperor.  Shortly 
afterwards  the  same  request  was  made  by  the  same 
sovereign  to  King  William  himself,  in  a  letter  dictated 
E  E  2 


468  MODERN  EUROPE.  Wi. 

by  Bismarck.  A  deputation  from  the  North  German 
Keichstag,  headed  by  its  President,  Dr.  Simson,  who, 
as  President  of  the  Frankfort  National  Assembly,  had 
'  in  1849  offered  the  Imperial  Crown  to  King  Frederick 
William,  expressed  the  concurrence  of  the  nation  in  the 
act  of  the  Princes.  It  was  expected  that  before  the  end 
of  the  year  the  new  political  arrangements  would  have 
been  sanctioned  by  the  Parliaments  of  all  the  States 
concerned,  and  the  1st  of  January  had  been  fixed  for  the 
assumption  of  the  Imperial  title.  So  vigorous,  however, 
was  the  opposition  made  in  the  Bavarian  Chamber,  that 
the  ceremony  was  postponed  till  the  1  8th.  Even  then 
the  final  approving  vote  had  not  been  taken  at  Munich ; 
but  a  second  adjournment  would  have  been  fatal  to  the 
dignity  of  the  occasion ;  and  on  the  18th  of  January, 
in  the  midst  of  the  Princes  of  Germany  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  its  army  assembled  in  the  Hall 

Proclamation  of  .,    -_.-.  ,     \r  -n  IT"  -nr'ii- 

the  Empire,  Jan  •  or  Mirrors  at  Versailles,  Hmg   William  as- 
sumed the  title  of  German  Emperor.     The  i 
first  Parliament  of  the  Empire  was  opened  at  Berlin  two 
months  later.4- 

The  misfortunes  of  France  did  not  end  with  the 
fall  of  its  capital  and  the  loss  of  its  border-provinces ; 
the  terrible  drama  of  1870  closed  with  civil  war.  It 
is  part  of  the  normal  order  of  French  history  that  when 
an  established  Government  is  overthrown,  and  another 
is  set  in  its  place,  this  second  Government  is  in  its  turn 
The  commune  attacked  by  insurrection  in  Paris,  and  an 

of  Palis. 

effort  is  made  to  establish  the  rule  of  the 
democracy  of  the  capital  itself,  or  of  those   who9  for  the 


1871.  THE    COMMUNE    OF  PAP  IS.  469 

moment  pass  for  its  leaders.  It  was  so  in  1793,  in  1831, 
in  1848,  and  it  was  so  again  in  1870.  Favre,  Trochu, 
and  the  other  members  of  the  Government  of  Defence 
had  assumed  power  on  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  II F., 
because  they  considered  themselves  the  individuals  best 
able  to  serve  the  State.  There  were  hundreds  of  other 
persons  in  Paris  who  had  exactly  the  same  opinion 
of  themselves;  and  when,  with  the  progress  of  the 
siege,  the  Government  of  Defence  lost  its  popularity  and 
credit,  it  was  natural  that  ambitious  and  impatient  men 
of  a  lower  political  rank  should  consider  it  time  to  try 
whether  Paris  could  not  make  a  better  defence  under 
their  own  auspices.  Attempts  were  made  before  the  end 
of  October  to  overthrow  the  Government.  They  were 
repeated  at  intervals,  but  without  success.  The  agita- 
tion, however,  continued  within  the  ranks  of  the 
•  National  Guard,  which,  unlike  the  National  Guard  in 
the  time  of  Louis  Philippe,  now  included  the  mass  of 
the  working  class,  and  was  the  most  dangerous  enemy, 
instead  of  the  support,  of  Government.  The  capitula- 
tion brought  things  to  a  crisis.  Favre  had  declared 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  disarm  the  National 
Guard  without  a  battle  in  the  streets  ;  at  his  instance 
Hismarck  allowed  the  National  Guard  to  retain  their 
weapons,  and  the  fears  of  the  Government  itself  thus 
prepared  the  way  for  successful  insurrection.  When 
the  Germans  were  about  to  occupy  western  Paris,  the 
National  Guard  drew  off  its  artillery  to  Montmartre  and 
there  erected  entrenchments.  During  the  next  fort- 
night, while  the  Germans  were  withdrawing  from  the 


i70  MODERN  EUROPE.  1871. 

western  forts  in  accordance  with  the  conditions  of  peace, 
the  Government  and  the  National  Guard  stood  facing 
one  another  in  inaction ;  on  the  18th  of  March  General 
Lecomte  was  ordered  to  seize  the  artillery  parked  at 
Montmartre.  His  troops,  surrounded  and  solicited  by 
the  National  Guard,  abandoned  their  com- 
dr™n8nTver-  mander.  Lecomte  was  seized,  and,  with 

8'i  i'.lts,  March  18. 

General  Clement  Thomas,  was  put  to  death. 
A  revolutionary  Central  Committee  took  possession  of 
the  Hotel  de  Ville ;  the  troops  still  remaining1  faithful 
to  the  Government  were  withdrawn  to  Versailles,  where 
Thiers  had  assembled  the. Chamber.  Not  only  Paris 
itself,  but  the  western  forts  with  the  exception  of 
Mont  Valerien,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  insurgents.  On 
the  26th  of  March  elections  were  held  for  the  Commune. 
The  majority  of  peaceful  citizens  abstained  from  voting. 

A  council  was  elected,   which  by  the  side 

The  Commune.  • 

of  certain  harmless  and  well-meaning  men 
contained  a  troop  of  revolutionists  by  profession ;  and 
after  the  failure  of  all  attempts  at  conciliation,  hostilities 
began  between  Paris  and  Versailles. 

There  were  in  the  ranks  of  those  who  fought  for  the 
second  siege-      Commune  some  who  fought  in  the  sincere 

April  2,  May  21.       ,      ,.     „       .  -      . 

beliel  that  their  cause  was  that  of  munici- 
pal freedom ;  there  were  others  who  believed,  and  with 
good  reason,  that  the  existence  of  the  Eepublic  was 
threatened  by  a  reactionary  Assembly  at  Versailles;  but 
the  movement  was  on  the  whole  the  work  of  fanatics  who 
sought  to  subvert  every  authority  but  their  own ;  and 
the  unfortunate  mob  who  followed  them,  in  so  far  as  they 


1971.  THE    COMMUNE.  471 

fought  for  anything  beyond  the  daily  pay  which  had 
been  their  only  means  of  sustenance  since  the  siege 
began,  fought  for  they  knew  not  what.  As  the  conflict 
was  prolonged,  it  took  on  both  sides^  a  character  of 
atrocious  violence  and  cruelty.  The  murder  of  Generals 
Lecomte  and  Thomas  at  the  outset  was  avenged  by  the 
execution  of  some  of  the  first  prisoners  taken  by  the 
troops  of  Versailles.  Then  hostages  were  seized  by  the 
Commune.  The  slaughter  in  cold  blood  of  three  hundred 
National  Guards  surprised  at  Clamart  by  the  besiegers 
gave  to  the  Parisians  the  example  of  massacre.  When, 
after  a  siege  of  six  weeks,  in  which  Paris  suffered  far  more 
severely  than  it  had  suffered  from  the  cannonade  of  the 
Germans,  the  troops  of  Versailles  at  length  made  their 
way  into  the  capital,  huinanity,  civilisation,  seemed  to 
have  vanished  in  the  orgies  of  devils.  The  defenders, 
•$s  they  fell  back,  murdered  their  hostages,  and  left 
behind  them  palaces,  museums,  the  entire  public  inheri- 
tance of  the  nation  in  its  capital,  in  flames.  The 
conquerors  during  several  days  shot  down  all  whom 
they  took  fighting,  and  in  many  cases  put  to  death 
whole  bands  of  prisoners  without  distinction.  The 
temper  of  the  army  was  such  that  the  Government, 
even  if  it  had  desired,  could  probably  not  have 
mitigated  the  terrors  of  this  vengeance.  But  there 
was  little  sign  anywhere  of  an  inclination^  mercy, 
Courts-martial  and  executions  continuecL^ong  after  the 
heat  of  combat  was  overT^^Ar  year  passed,  and  the 


tribunals   were  still    busy   with    their    work.      Above 
ten   thousand    persons    were    sentenced    to    transpor- 


472  MODERN  EUROPE.  1870. 

tation    or    imprisonment    before    public    justice     was 
satisfied. 

The  material  losses  which  France  sustained  at  the 
hands  of  the  invader  and  in  civil  war  were  soon 
repaired;  but  from  the  battle  of  Worth  down  to  the 
overthrow  of  the  Commune  France  had  been  effaced  as 
a  European  Power,  and  its  effacement  was  turned  to 
good  account  by  two  nations  who  were  not  its  enemies. 
Russia,  with  the  sanction  of  Europe,  threw  off  the 
trammels  which  had  been  imposed  upon  it  in  the  Black 
Sea  by  the  Treaty  of  1856.  Italy  gained  possession  of 
Rome.  Soon  after  the  declaration  of  war  the  troops  of 
France,  after  an  occupation  of  twenty-one  years  broken 
only  by  an  interval  of  some  months  in  1867,  were  with- 
drawn from  the  Papal  territory.  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  understanding  with  Victor  Emmanuel  on  which 
Napoleon  recalled  his  troops  from  Civita  Vecchia,  the 
Entry  Of  battle  of  Sedan  set  Italy  free  ;  and  on  the 

.     20th    of   September    the    National   Army, 


after  overcoming  a  brief  show  of  resistance, 
entered  Rome.  The  unity  of  Italy  was  at  last  com- 
pleted ;  Florence  ceased  to  be  the  national  capital.  A 
body  of  laws  passed  by  the  Italian  Parliament,  and 
known  as  the  Guarantees,  assured  to  the  Pope  the 
honours  and  immunities  of  a  sovereign,  the  possession  of 
the  Vatican  and  the  Lateran  palaces,  and  a  princely 
ihePapac  income  ;  in  the  appointment  of  Bishops  and 

generally  in  the  government  of  the  Church 
a  fulness  of  authority  was  freely  left  to  him  such  as 
he  possessed  in  no  other  European  land.  But  Pius 


1870.  ROME.  473 

would  accept  no  compromise  for  the  loss  of  his  temporal 
power.  He  spurned  the  reconciliation  with  the  Italian 
people,  which  had  now  for  the  first  time  since  1849 
become  possible.  He  declared  Borne  to  be  in  the 
possession  of  brigands  ;  and,  with  a  fine  affectation  of 
disdain  for  Victor  Emmanuel  and  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment, he  invented,  and  sustained  down  to  the  end  of  his 
life,  before  a  world  too  busy  to  pay  much  heed  to  his 
performance,  the  reproachful  part  of  the  Prisoner  of  the 
Vatican.  > 


CHAPTER  VII. 

France  after  1871— Alliance  of  the  Three  Emperors— Revolt  of  Herzegovina— 
The  Andrassy  Note— Murder  of  the  Consuls  at  Salonika — The  Berlin 
Memorandum — Rejected  by  England — Abdul  Aziz  deposed — Massacres  in 
Bulgaria — Servia  and  Montenegro  declare  War— Opinion  in  England — 
Disraeli — Meeting  of  Emperors  at  Reichstadt — Servian  Campaign — Declara- 
tion of  the  Czar — Conference  at  Constantinople — Its  Failure — The  London 
Protocol — Russia  declares  War — Advance  on  the  Balkans— Osman  at  Plevna 
—Second  Attack  on  Plevna— The  Shipka  Pass— Roumania— Third  Attack 
on  Plevna — Todleben— Fall  of  Plevna — Passage  of  the  Balkans— Armistice 
— England— The  Fleet  passes  the  Dardanelles — Treaty  of  San  Stefano — 
England  and  Russia — Secret  Agreement — Convention  with  Turkey — Con- 
gress of  Berlin — Treaty  of  Berlin — Bulgaria. 

THE  storm  of  1870  was  followed  by  some  years  of 
France  after  European  calm.  France,  recovering  with 
wonderful  rapidity  from  the  wounds  in- 
flicted by  the  war,  paid  with  ease  the  instalments  of 
its  debt  to  Germany,  and  saw  its  soil  liberated  from 
the  foreigner  before  the  period  fixed  by  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort.  The  efforts  of  a  reactionary  Assembly 
were  kept  in  check  by  M.  Thiers ;  the  Eepublic,  as 
the  form  of  government  which  divided  Frenchmen  the 
least,  was  preferred  by  him  to  the  monarchical  re- 
storation which  might  have  won  France  allies  at  some 
of  the  European  Courts.  For  two  years  Thiers  baffled 
or  controlled  the  royalist  majority  at  Versailles 
which  sought  to  place  the  Comte  de  Chambord  or 
the  chief  of  the  House  of  Orleans  on  the  throne, 
and  thus  saved  his  country  from  the  greatest  of  all 


1871-77.  FRANCE   AFTER    THE    WAR.  475 

perils,  the  renewal  of  civil  war.  In  1873  he  fell 
before  a  combination  of  his  opponents,  and  McMahon 
succeeded  to  the  Presidency,  only  to  find  that  the 
royalist  cause  was  made  hopeless  by  the  refusal  of  the 
Comte  de  Chambord  to  adopt  the  Tricolour  nag,  and 
that  France,  after  several  years  of  trial,  definitely  preferred 
the  Republic.  Meanwhile,  Prince  Bismarck  had  known 
how  to  frustrate  all  plans  for  raising  a  coalition  against 
victorious  Germany  among  the  Powers  which  had  been 
injured  by  its  successes,  or  whose  interests  were  threat- 
ened by  its  greatness.  He  saw  that  a  Bourbon  or  a 
Napoleon  on  the  throne  of  France  would  find  far  more 
sympathy  and  confidence  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg 
than  the  shifting  chief  of  a  Republic,  and  ordered  Count 
Arnim,  the  German  Ambassador  at  Paris,  who  wished 
to  promote  a  Napoleonic  restoration,  to  desist  from  all 
attempts  to  weaken  the  Republican  Government.  At 
St.  Petersburg,  where  after  the  misfortunes  of  1815 
France  had  found  its  best  friends,  the  German  states- 
man had  as  yet  little  to  fear.  Bismarck  had  sup- 
ported Russia  in  undoing  the  Treaty  of  Paris;  in 
announcing  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  France,  the 
German  Emperor  had  assured  the  Czar  in  the  most 
solemn  language  that  his  services  in  preventing  the 
war  of  1870  from  becoming  general  should  never  be  for- 
gotten ;  and,  whatever  might  be  the  feeling  of  his  sub- 
jects, Alexander  II.  continued  to  believe  that  Russia  could 
find  no  steadier  friend  than  the  Government  of  Berlin. 

With  Austria  Prince  Bismarck  had  a  more  difficult 
part  to  play.     He  could  hope  for  no  real  understanding 


476  MODERN   EUROPE.  1872, 

so  long  as  Beust  remained  at  the  head  of  affairs.  But 
the  events  of  1870,  utterly  frustrating  Beust's  plans 
Alliance  of  the  f°r  a  coalition  against  Prussia,  and  definitely 
closing  for  Austria  all  hope  of  recovering 
its  position  within  Germany,  had  shaken  the  Minister's 
position.  Bismarck  was  able  to  offer  to  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  the  sincere  and  cordial  friendship  of  the 
powerful  German  Empire,  on  the  condition  that  Austria 
should  frankly  accept  the  work  of  1866  and  1870.  He 
had  dissuaded  his  master  after  the  victory  of  Konig- 
gratz  from  annexing  any  Austrian  territory ;  he  had 
imposed  no  condition  of  peace  that  left  behind  it  a 
lasting  exasperation  ;  and  he  now  reaped  the  reward  of 
his  foresight.  Francis  Joseph  accepted  the  friendship 
offered  him  from  Berlin,  and  dismissed  Count  Beust 
from  office,  calling  to  his  place  the  Hungarian  Minister 
Andrassy,  who,  by  conviction  as  well  as  profession, 
welcomed  the  establishment  of  a  German  Empire,  and 
the  definite  abandonment  by  Austria  of  its  interference 
in  German  affairs.  In  the  summer  of  1872  the  three 
Emperors,  accompanied  by  their  Ministers,  met  in 
Berlin.  No  formal  alliance  was  made,  but  a  relation 
was  established  of  sufficient  intimacy  to  insure  Prince 
Bismarck  against  any  efforts  that  might  be  made  by 
France  to  gain  an  ally.  For  five  years  this  so-called 
League  of  the  three  Emperors  continued  in  more  or  less 
effective  existence,  and  condemned  France  to  isolation. 
In  the  apprehension  of  the  French  people,  Germany, 
gorged  with  the  five  milliards  but  still  lean  and 
ravenous,  sought  only  for  some  new  occasion  *for  war. 


1872.  THE    THREE   EMPERORS.  477 

Tiiis  was  not  the  case.  The  German  nation  had  entered 
unwillingly  into  the  war  of  1870  ;  that  its  ruler,  when 
once  his  great  aim  had  been  achieved,  sought  peace  not 
only  in  word  but  in  deed  the  history;  of  subsequent 
years  has  proved.  The  alarms  which  at  intervals  were 
raised  at  Paris  and  elsewhere  had  little  real  foundation  ; 
and  when  next  the  peace  of  Europe  was  broken,  it  was 
not  by  a  renewal  of  the  struggle  on  the  Vosges,  but  by 
a  conflict  in  the  East,  which,  terrible  as  it  was  in  the 
sufferings  and  the  destruction  of  life  which  it  involved, 
was  yet  no  senseless  duel  between  two  jealous  nations, 
but  one  of  the  most  fruitful  in  results  of  all  modern 
wars,  rescuing  whole  provinces  from  Ottoman  dominion, 
and  leaving  behind  it  in  place  of  a  chaos  of  outworn 

'  barbarism  at  least  the  elements  for  a  future  of  national 
independence  among  the  Balkan  population. 

<?•  ;  in  the  summer  of  1875  Herzegovina  rose  against 
its  Turkish  masters,  and  in  Bosnia  conflicts  broke  out 
between  Christians  and  Mohammedans.  The 

.  .  .  ,  Revolt  of  Her- 

msurreetion    was    vigorously,    though    pn-     z^vinu,  Aug. 


vately,  supported  by  Servia  and  Montenegro, 
and  for  some  months  baffled  all  the  efforts  made  by  the 
Porte  for  its  suppression.  Many  thousands  of  the 
Christians,  flying  from  a  devastated  land  and  a  merci- 
less enemy,  sought  refuge  beyond  the  Austrian  frontier, 
and  became  a  burden  upon  the  Austrian  Government. 
The  agitation  among  the  Slavic  neighbours  and  kins- 
men of  the  insurgents  threatened  the  peace  of  Austria 
itself,  where  Slav  and  Magyar  were  almost  as  ready  to 
fall  upon  one  another  us  Christian  and  Turk.  Andrassy 


478  MODERN  EUROPE.  1S7& 

entered  into  communications  with  the  Governments  of 
St.  Petersburg  and  Berlin  as  to  the  adoption  of  a  com- 
mon line  of  policy  by  the  three  Empires  towards  the 
Porte  ;  and  a  scheme  of  reforms,  intended  to  effect  the 
pacification  of  the  insurgent  provinces,  was  drawn  up  by 
the  three  Ministers  in  concert  with  one  another.  This 
project,  which  was  known  as  the  Andrassy  Note,  and 
which  received  the  approval  of  England  and  France, 
demanded  from  the  Porte  the  establishment  of  full  and 
entire  religious  liberty,  the  abolition  of  the  farming  of 
taxes,  the  application  of  the  revenue  produced  by  direct 
taxation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  to  the  needs  of 
those  provinces  themselves,  the  institution  of  a  Com- 
mission composed  equally  of  Christians  and  Moham- 
medans to  control  the  execution  of  these  reforms  and 
of  those  promised  by  the  Porte,  and  finally  the  im- 
provement of  the  agrarian  condition  of  the  popula- 
tion by  the  sale  to  them  of  waste  lands  belonging 
to  the  State.  The  Note  demanding  these  reforms 
Note,  was  presented  in  Constantinople  on  the 


31st  of  January,  1876.  The  Porte,  which 
had  already  been  lavish  of  promises  to  the  insurgents, 
raised  certain  objections  in  detail,  but  ultimately  de- 
clared itself  willing  to  grant  in  substance  the  conces- 
sions which  were  specified  by  the  Powers.* 

Armed  with  this  assurance,  the  representatives  of 
Austria  now  endeavoured  to  persuade  the  insurgents  to 
lay  down  their  arms  and  the  refugees  to  return  to  their 
homes.  But  the  answer  was  made  that  promises  enough 

*  Par!  Pap.  1876,  vol.  Ixxxiv.,  pp.  74,  96 


1876.  MUItDER    OF   THE    CONSULS.  47s) 

had  already  been  given  by  the  Sultan,  and  that  the 
question  was,  not  what  more  was  to  be  written  on  a 
piece  of  paper,  but  how  the  execution  of  these  promises 
was  to  be  enforced.  Without  some  guarantee  from  the 
Great  Powers  of  Europe  the  refugees  refused  to  place 
themselves  again  at  the  mercy  of  the  Turk  and  the 
leaders  in  Herzegovina  refused  to  disband  their  troops. 
The  conflict  broke  out  afresh  with  greater  energy ;  the 
intervention  of  the  Powers,  far  from  having 

i  i  ,    , ,        P          .  .       ,  .  Murder  of  the 

produced  peace,  roused  the  ranatical  passions     consuls  at  saio- 

nika,  May  6. 

of  the  Mohammedans  both  against  the 
Christian  rayahs  and  against  the  foreigner  to  whom  they 
had  appealed.  A  wave  of  religious,  of  patriotic  agita- 
tion, of  political  disquiet,  of  barbaric  fury,  passed  over 
the  Turkish  Empire.  On  the  6th  of  May  the  Prussian 
and  the  French  Consuls  at  Salonika  were  attacked  and 
murdered  by  the  mob.  In  Smyrna  and  Constantinople 
there  were  threatening  movements  against  the  European 
inhabitants  ;  in  Bulgaria,  the  Circassian  settlers  and  the 
hordes  of  irregular  troops  whom  the  Government  hnd 
recently  sent  into  that  province  waited  only  for  the 
first  sign  of  an  expected  insurrection  to  fall  upon  their 
prey  and  deluge  the  land  with  blood. 

As  soon  as  it  became  evident  that  peace  was  not  to 
be  produced  by  Count  Andrassy's  Note,  the  Ministers 
of  the  three  Empires  determined  to  meet  one  another 
with  the  view  of  arranging  further  diplo- 
matic steps  to  be  taken  in  common.     Berlin,     Memorandum, 

1  May  13. 

which   the   Czar   was   about    to   visit,  was 

chosen  as  the  meeting-place ;  the  date  of  the  meeting 


480  MODERN  EUROPE.  1,76. 

was  fixed  for  the  second  week  in  May.  It  was  in  the 
interval  between  the  despatch  of  Prince  Bismarck's 
invitation  and  the  arrival  of  the  Czar,  with  Prince 
Gortschakoff  and  Count  Andrassy,  that  intelligence 
came  of  the  murder  of  the  Prussian  and  French  Con- 
suls at  Salonika.  This  event  gave  a  deeper  serious- 
ness to  the  deliberations  now  held.  The  Ministers 
declared  that  if  the  representatives  of  two  foreign 
Powers  could  be  thus  murdered  in  broad  daylight  in  a 
peaceful  town  under  the  eyes  of  the  powerless  authori- 
ties, the  Christians  of  the  insurgent  provinces  might 
well  decline  to  entrust  themselves  to  an  exasperated 
enemy.  An  effective  guarantee  for  the  execution  of  the 
promises  made  by  the  Porte  had  become  absolutely 
necessary.  The  conclusions  of  the  Ministers  were 
embodied  in  a  Memorandum,  which  declared  that  an 
armistice  of  two  months  must  be  imposed  on  the  com- 
batants ;  that  the  mixed  Commission  mentioned  in  the 
Andrassy  Note  must  be  at  once  called  into  being,  with 
a  Christian  native  of  Herzegovina  at  its  head  ;  and  that 
the  reforms  promised  by  the  Porte  must  be  carried  out 
under  the  superintendence  of  the  representatives  of  the 
European  Powers.  If  before  the  end  of  the  armistice 
the  Porte  should  not  have  given  its  assent  to  these 
terms,  the  Imperial  Courts  declared  that  they  must 
support  these  diplomatic  efforts  by  measures  of  a  more 
effective  character.* 

On   the    same    day   that   this    Memorandum     was 
signed,  Prince  Bismarck  invited  the  British,  the  French, 

*  Parl.  Pap.  187t>,  vol.  Ixxxiv.,  p.  183. 


1876.  THE  BERLIN  MEMORANDUM.  481 

and  Italian  Ambassadors  to  meet  the  Russian  and  the 
Austrian  Chancellors  at  his  residence.  They  did  so.  The 
Memorandum  was  read,  and  an  urgent  request  was 
made  that  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy  would  com- 
bine with  the  Imperial  Courts  in  support  of  the  Berlin 
Memorandum  as  they  had  in  support  of  the  Andrassy 
Note.  As  Prince  Gortschakoff  and  Andrassy  were 
staying:  in  Berlin  only  for  two  days  longer, 

»  J  J  England    alone 

it  was  hoped  that  answers  might  be  received  SS^SoSS". 
by  telegraph  within  forty-eight  hours. 
Within  that  time  answers  arrived  from  the  French  and 
Italian  Governments  accepting  the  Berlin  Memorandum  ; 
the  reply  from  London  did  not  arrive  till  five  days  later  ;  it 
announced  the  refusal  of  the  Government  to  join  in  the 
course  proposed.  Pending  further  negotiations  on  this 
subject,  French,  German,  Austrian,  Italian,  and  Russian 
ships  of  war  were  sent  to  Salonika  to  enforce  satisfaction 
for  the  murder  of  the  Consuls.  The  Cabinet  of  London, 
declining  to  associate  itself  with  the  concert  of  the 

O 

Powers,  and  stating  that  Great  Britain,  while  intending 
nothing  in  the  nature  of  a  menace,  could  not  permit 
territorial  changes  to  be  made  in  the  East  without  it;s 
own  consent,  despatched  the  fleet  to  Besika  Bay. 

Up  to  this  time  little  attention  had  been  paid  in 
England  to  the  revolt  of  the  Christian  subjects  of  the 
Porte  or  its  effect  on  European  politics.  Now,  how- 
ever, a  series  of  events  began  which  excited  the  interest 
and  even  the  passion  of  the  English  people  Abdul  A,^  de_ 
in  an  extraordinary  degree.  The  ferment  P06*1-^  29- 

in  Constantinople  was  deepening.     On  the  29th  of  May 
F  F 


482  MODERN   EUROPE.  1876. 

the  Sultan  Abdul  Aziz  was  deposed  by  Midhat  Pasha 
and  Hussein  Avni,  the  former  the  chief  of  the  party 
of  reform,  the  latter  the  representative  of  the  older 
Turkish  military  and  patriotic  spirit  which  Abdul 
Aziz  had  incensed  by  his  subserviency  to  Russia.  A 
few  days  later  the  deposed  Sultan  was  murdered.  Hus- 
sein Avni  and  another  rival  of  Midhat  were  assas- 
sinated by  a  desperado  as  they  sat  at  the  council ; 
Murad  V.,  who  had  been  raised  to  the  throne,  proved 
imbecile ;  and  Midhat,  the  destined  regenerator  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  as  many  outside  Turkey  believed, 
grasped  all  but  the  highest  power  in  the  State.  To- 
wards the  end  of  June  reports  reached  western  Europe 
Massacres  in  °^  ^ie  repression  of  an  insurrection  in  Bul- 
garia with  measures  of  atrocious  violence. 
Servia  and  Montenegro,  long  active  in  support  of  their 
kinsmen  who  were  in  arms,  declared  war. 

Servia  and  Mon-        „.  ., 

tenegro  declare     l  he  reports  trom  .Bulgaria,  at  nrst  vagnie, 

war,  July  2. 

took  more  definite  form ;  and  at  length  the 
correspondents  of  German  as  well  as  English  news- 
papers, making  their  way  to  the  district  south  of  the 
Balkans,  found  in  villages  still  strewed  with  skeletons 
and  human  remains  the  terrible  evidence  of  what  had 
passed.  The  British  Ministry,  relying  upon  the  state- 
ments of  Sir  H.  Elliot,  Ambassador  at  Constantinople, 
at  first  denied  the  seriousness  of  the  massacres  :  they 
directed,  however,  that  investigations  should  be  made 
on  the  spot  by  a  member  of  the  Embassy;  and  Mr. 
Baring,  Secretary  of  Legation,  was  sent  to  Bulgaria 
with  this  duty.  Baring's  report  confirmed  the  accounts 


1878.  THE  BULGARIAN  MASSACRES.  483 

which  his  chief  had  refused  to  believe,  and  placed 
the  number  of  the  victims,  rightly  or  wrongly,  at  not 
less  than  twelve  thousand.* 

The  Bulgarian   massacres  acted  on  Europe  in  1876 
as  the  massacre  of  Chios  had  acted  oh  Europe  in  1822. 
In  England  especially  they  excited  the  deepest  horror, 
and  completely  changed  the  tone  of  public       opinion  in 
opinion  towards  the  Turk.      Hitherto  the 
public  mind  had  scarcely  been  conscious  of  the  questions 
that  were  at  issue  in  the  East.     Herzegovina,  Bosnia, 
Bulgaria,   were   not    familiar  names    like  Greece ;    the 
English   people    hardly   knew    where    these    countries 
were,  or  that  they  were  not  inhabited  by  Turks.     The 
Crimean  War  had  left  behind  it  the  tradition  of  friend- 
ship with  the  Sultan  ;   it  needed  some  lightning-flash, 
some  shock  penetrating  all  ranks  of  society,  to  dispel 
once  and  for  all  the  conventional  idea  of  Turkey  as  a 
community  resembling  a  European  State,  and  to  bring 
home  to  the  English  people  the  true  condition  of  the 
Christian    races   of  the    Balkan  under    their   Ottoman 
masters.     But  this  the  Bulgarian  massacres  effectively 
did ;  and  from  this  time  the  great  mass  of  the  English 
people,    who  had    sympathised    so    strongly    with    the 
Italians   and   the    Hungarians    in    their    struggle    for 
national  independence,  were  not  disposed  to  allow  the 
influence  of  Great  Britain  to  be  used  for  the  perpetua- 
tion  of    Turkish    ascendency    over    the    Slavic   races. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  if  in  the  autumn  of  1876  the 
nation  had  had  the  opportunity  of  expressing  its  views 

*  Parl.  Pap.  1877,  voL  xc.,  p.  143. 
F   F   2 


f 

484  MODERN  EUROPE.  1876. 

by  a  Parliamentary  election,  it  would  have  insisted  on 
the  adoption  of  active  measures  in  concert  with  the 
Powers  which  were  prepared  to  force  reform  upon  the 
Porte.  But  the  Parliament  of  1876  was  but  two  years 
old ;  the  majority  which  supported  the  Government 
was  still  unbroken;  and  at  the  head  of  the  Cabinet  there 
was  a  man  gifted  with  extraordinary  tenacity  of  purpose, 
with  great  powers  of  command  over  others,  and  with 
a  clear,  cold,  untroubled  apprehension  of  the  line  of 
conduct  which  he  intended  to  pursue.  It  was  one  of 
the  strangest  features  of  this  epoch  that  a  Minister  who 
in  a  long  career  had  never  yet  exercised  the  slightest 
influence  upon  foreign  affairs,  and  who  was  not  him- 
self English  by  birth,  should  have  impressed  in  such 
an  extreme  degree  the  stamp  of  his  own  individuality 
upon  the  conduct  of  our  foreign  policy ;  that  he  should 
have  forced  England  to  the  very  front  in  the  crisis 
through  which  Europe  was  passing;  and  that,  for 
good  or  for  evil,  he  should  have  reversed  the  tendency 
which  since  the  Italian  war  of  1859  had  seemed  ever 
to  be  drawing  England  further  and  further  away  from 
Continental  affairs. 

Disraeli's  conception  of  Parliamentary  politics  was 

an  ironical  one.      It  had   pleased   the    British   nation 

that  the  leadership  of  one  of  its  great  political  parties 

should  be   won   by  a  man  of  genius  only 

Disraeli.  J  J 

on  the  condition  of  accommodating  himself 
to  certain  singular  fancies  of  his  contemporaries ;  and 
for  twenty  years,  from  the  time  of  his  attacks  upon 
£ir  Robert  Peel  for  the  abolition  of  the  corn-la\ys  down 


1876.  DISRAELI.  485 

to  the  time  when  he  educated  his  party  into  thp, 
democratic  Eeform  Bill  of  1867,  Disraeli  with  an  ex- 
cellent grace  suited  himself  to  the  somewhat  strange 
parts  which  he  was  required  to  play.  -,  But  after  1874, 
when  he  was  placed  in  office  at  the  head  of  a  powerful 
majority  in  both  Houses  of  Parliament  and  of  a  sub- 
missive Cabinet,  the  antics  ended ;  the  epoch  of  states- 
manship, and  of  statesmanship  based  on  the  leader's 
own  individual  thought  not  on  the  commonplace  of 
public  creeds,  began.  At  a  time  when  Cavour  was 
rice-growing  and  Bismarck  unknown  outside  his  own 
county,  Disraeli  had  given  to  the  world  in  Tancred  his 
visions  of  Eastern  Empire.  Mysterious  chieftains 
planned  the  regeneration  of  Asia  by  a  new  crusade  of 
Arab  and  Syrian  votaries  of  the  one  living  faith,  and 
lightly  touched  on  the  transfer  of  Queen  Victoria's  Court 
.from  London  to  Delhi.  Nothing  indeed  is  perfect; 
and  Disraeli's  eye  was  favoured  with  such  extra- 
ordinary perceptions  of  the  remote  that  it  proved 
a  little  uncertain  in  its  view  of  matters  not  quite 
without  importance  nearer  home.  He  thought  the 
attempt  to  establish  Italian  independence  a  misde- 
meanour ;  he  listened  to  Bismarck's  ideas  on  the  future 
of  Germany,  and  described  them  as  the  vapourings  of 
a  German  baron.  Fora  quarter  of  a  century  Disraeli 
had  dazzled  and  amused  the  House  of  Commons  with- 
out, as  it  seemed,  drawing  inspiration  from  any  one 
great  cause  or  discerning  any  one  of  the  political  goals 
towards  which  the  nations  of  Europe  were  tending. 
At  length,  however,  the  time  came  for  the  realisation 


486  MODERN  EUROPE.  isrft, 

of  his  own  imperial  policy ;  and  before  the  Eastern 
question  had  risen  conspicuously  above  the  horizon 
in  Europe,  Disraeli,  as  Prime  Minister  of  England, 
had  begun  to  act  in  Asia  and  Africa.  He  sent  the 
Prince  of  Wales  to  hold  Durbars  and  to  hunt  tigers 
amongst  the  Hindoos ;  he  proclaimed  the  Queen 
Empress  of  India ;  he  purchased  the  Khedive's  shares 
in  the  Suez  Canal.  Thus  far  it  had  been  uncertain 
whether  there  was  much  in  the  Minister'  policy  beyond 
what  was  theatrical  and  picturesque;  but  when  a 
great  part  of  the  nation  began  to  ask  for  intervention 
on  behalf  of  the  Eastern  Christians  against  the  Turks, 
they  found  out  that  Disraeli's  purpose  was  solid 
enough.  Animated  by  a  deep  distrust  and  fear  of 
Russia,  he  returned  to  what  had  been  the  policy  of 
Tory  Governments  in  the  days  before  Canning,  the 
identification  of  British  interests  with  the  maintenance 
of  Ottoman  power.  If  a  generation  of  sentimentalists 
were  willing  to  sacrifice  the  grandeur  of  an  Empire  to 
their  sympathies  with  an  oppressed  people,  it  was  not 
Disraeli  who  would  be  their  instrument.  When  the 
massacre  of  Batak  was  mentioned  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  he  dwelt  on  the  honourable  qualities  of  the 
Circassians ;  when  instances  of  torture  were  alleged, 
he  remarked  that  an  oriental  people  generally  ter- 
minated its  connection  with  culprits  in  a  more  expedi- 
tious manner.*  There  were  indeed  Englishmen  enough 
who  loved  their  country  as  well  as  Disraeli,  and  who  had 
proved  their  love  by  sacrifices  which  Disraeli  had  not  had 

*  Parl.  Deb.  July  10,  1876,  verbatim. 


. 

187«.  DISRAELI.  187 

occasion  to  make,  who  thought  it  humiliating  that  the 
^n-atness  of  England  should  be  purchased  by  the  servi- 
tude and  oppression  of  other  races,  and  that  the  security 
of  their  Empire  should  be  deemed  to  r^st  on  so  miserable 
a  thing  as  Turkish  rule.  These  were  considerations  to 
which  Disraeli  did  not  attach  much  importance.  He 
believed  the  one  thing  needful  to  be  the  curbing  of 
iiussia;  and,  unlike  Canning,  who  held  that  Russia 
would  best  be  kept  in  check  by  England's  own  armed 
co-operation  with  it  in  establishing  the  independence 
of  Greece,  he  declined  from  the  first  to  entertain  any 
project  of  imposing  reform  on  the  Sultan  by  force,  »-~ 
doubting  only  to  what  extent  it  would  be  possible  for 
him  to  support  the  Sultan  in  resistance  to  other 
Powers.  According  to  his  own  later  statement  he 
would  himself,  had  he  been  left  unfettered,  have  de- 
vfinitely  informed  the  Czar  that  if  he  should  make  war 
upon  the  Porte  England  would  act  as  its  ally.  Public 
opinion  in  England,  however,  rendered  this  course  im- 
possible. The  knife  of  Circassian  and  Bashi-Bazouk 
had  severed  the  bond  with  Great  Britain  which  had 
saved  Turkey  in  1854.  Disraeli — henceforward  Earl  of 
Beaconsfield — could  only  utter  grim  anathemas  against 
Servia  for  presuming  to  draw  the  sword  upon  its 
rightful  lord  and  master,  and  chide  those  impatient 
English  who,  like  the  greater  man  whose  name  is 
associated  with  Beaconsfield,  considered  that  the  world 
need  not  be  too  critical  as  to  the  means  of  getting  rid 
of  such  an  evil  as  Ottoman  rule.* 

•  See  Burke's  speech  on  the  Russian  armament,  March  29,  1791,  arid 


488  MODERN   EUROPE.  1876. 

The  rejection  by  England  of  the  Berlin  Memo- 
randum and  the  proclamation  of  war  by  Servia  and 
Montenegro  were  followed  by  the  closer  union  of  the  three 
Imperial  Courts.  The  Czar  and  the  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph,  with  their  Ministers,  met  at  Eeichstadt  in 
Bohemia  on  the  8th  of  July.  According  to  official 
statements  the  result  of  the  meeting  was 
that  the  two  sovereigns  determined  upon 

&  r 


stadt,  JulyS.  . 

non-intervention  for  the  present,  and  pro- 
posed only  to  renew  the  attempt  to  unite  all  the 
Christian  Powers  in  a  common  policy  when  some 
definite  occasion  should  arise.  Rumours,  however, 
which  proved  to  be  correct,  went  abroad  that  something 
of  the  nature  of  an  eventual  partition  of  European 
Turkey  had  been  the  object  of  negotiation.  A  Treaty 
had  in  fact  been  signed  providing  that  if  Russia 
should  liberate  Bulgaria  by  arms,  Austria  should  enter 
into  possession  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The 
neutrality  of  Austria  had  virtually  been  purchased  at 
this  price,  and  Russia  had  thus  secured  freedom  of 
action  in  the  event  of  the  necessary  reforms  not  being 
forced  upon  Turkey  by  the  concert  of  Europe.  Sooner 
perhaps  than  Prince  GortschakofT  had  expected,  the 
religious  enthusiasm  of  the  Russian  people  and  their 
sympathy  for  their  kinsmen  and  fellow-believers  beyond 
the  Danube  forced  the  Czar  into  vigorous  action.  In 

the  passage  on  "  the  barbarous  anarchic  despotism  "  of  Turkey  in  his  Re- 
flections on  the  French  Revolution,  p.  150,  Clar.  Edit.  Burke  lived  and  died 
at  Beaconsfield,  and  his  grave  is  there.  There  seems,  however,  to  be  no 
evidence  for  the  story  that  he  was  about  to  receive  a  peerago  with  the 
title  of  Beaconsfield,  when  the  death  of  his  son  Ircko  all  his  hopes. 


1-7.:. 


SERVIAN  WAR.  489 


spite  of  the  assistance  of  several  thousands  of  Eussian 
volunteers  and  of  the  leadership  of  the  Russian  General 
Tchernaieff,  the  Servians  were  defeated  in 

-i  •  1 1     1 1       «n      l  mi  J  •  '^ie  Servian 

their  struggle  with  the  lurks.     Ine  media-     £«•?•&• 

July— Oct. 

tion  of  England  was  in  vain  tendered  to 
the  Porte  on  the  only  terras  on  which  even  at 
London  peace  was  seen  to  he  possible,  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  existing  rights  of  Servia  and  the  establish- 
ment of  provincial  autonomy  in  Bosnia,  Herzegovina, 
and  Bulgaria.  After  a  brief  suspension  of  hostilities 
in  September  war  was  renewed.  The  Servians  were 
driven  from  their  positions :  Alexinatz  was  captured, 
the  road  to  Belgrade  lay  open,  and  the  doom  of  Bul- 
garia seemed  likely  to  descend  upon  the  conquered 
Principality.  The  Turks  offered  indeed  a  five  months' 
armistice,  which  would  have  saved  them  the  risks  of 
a  winter  campaign  and  enabled  them  to  crush  their 
enemy  with  accumulated  forces  in  the  following  spring. 
This,  by  the  advice  of  Russia,  the  Servians  refused  to 
accept.  On  the  30th  of  October  a  Russian 
ultimatum  was  handed  in  at  Constantinople  an^8tke,c 

Oct.  30. 

by  the  Ambassador  Ignatieff,  requiring 
within  forty-eight  hours  the  grant  to  Servia  of  an 
armistice  for  two  months  and  the  cessation  of  hostilities. 
The  Porte  submitted ;  and  wherever  Slav  and  Ottoman 
stood  facing  one  another  in  arms,  in  Herzegovina  and 
Bosnia  as  well  as  Servia  and  Montenegro,  there  was  a 
pause  in  the  struggle. 

The  imminence  of  a  war  between  Russia  and  Turkey  in 
the  last  days  of  October  and  the  close  connection  between 


490  MODERN  EUROPE.  1876. 

Kussia  and  the  Servian  cause  justified  the  anxiety  of 

the  British  Government.     This  anxiety  the  Czar  sought 

to  dispel  by  a  frank  declaration  of  his  own 

thTc*rar,lon          views.    On  the  2nd  of  November  he  entered 

Nov.  2. 

into  conversation  with  the  British  Ambassa- 
dor, Lord  A.  Loftus,  and  assured  him  on  his  word  of 
honour  that  he  had  no  intention  of  acquiring  Constanti- 
nople ;  that  if  it  should  be  necessary  for  him  to  occupy 
part  of  Bulgaria  his  army  would  remain  there  only 
until  peace  was  restored  and  the  security  of  the  Christian 
population  established;  and  generally,  that  he  desired 
nothing  more  earnestly  than  a  complete  accord  between 
England  and  Russia  in  the  maintenance  of  European 
peace  and  the  improvement  of  the  condition  of  the 
Christian  population  in  Turkey.  He  stated,  however, 
with  perfect  clearness  that  if  the  Porte  should  continue 
to  refuse  the  reforms  demanded  by  Europe,  and  the 
Powers  should  put  up  with  its  continued  refusal,  Russia 
would  act  alone.  Disclaiming  in  words  of  great 
earnestness  all  desire  for  territorial  aggrandisement, 
he  protested  against  the  suspicion  with  which  his  policy 
was  regarded  in  England,  and  desired  that  his  words 
might  be  made  public  in  England  as  a  message  of  peace.* 
Lord  Derby,  then  Foreign  Secretary,  immediately  ex- 
pressed the  satisfaction  with  which  the  Government 

had  received  these  assurances ;  and  on  the 

England  pro-  „  ... 

p^eaa  confer-       tollowmg  day  an  invitation  was  sent  from 
London  to  all  the  European  Powers  pro- 
posing a  Conference  at  Constantinople,  on  the  basis  of 
*  Parl.  Pap.  1877,  vol.  xc.,  p.  642 ;  1878,  vol.  Ixxxi.,  p.*679. 


1876.  A  CONFERENCE  PROPOSED.  491 

a  common  recognition  of  the  integrity  of  the  Otto- 
-man  Empire,  accompanied  by  a  disavowal  on  the  part 
of  each  of  the  Powers  of  all  aims  at  aggrandisement  or 
separate  advantage.  In  proposing  this- -Conference  the 
Government  acted  in  conformity  with  the  expressed 
desire  of  the  Czar.  But  there  were  two  voices  within 
the  Cabinet.  Lord  Beaconsfield,  had  it  been  in  his 
power,  would  have  informed  Russia  categorically 
that  England  would  support  the  Sultan  if  attacked. 
This  the  country  and  the  Cabinet  forbade :  but  the 
Premier  had  his  own  opportunities  of  utterance,  and 
at  the  Guildhall  Banquet  on  the  9th  of  November,  six 
days  after  the  Foreign  Secretary  hud  acknowledged  the 
Czar's  message  of  friendship,  and  before  this  message 
had  been  made  known  to  the  English  people,  Lord 
Beaconsfield  uttered  words  which,  if  they  were  not  idle 
blaster,  could  have  been  intended  only  as  a  menace  to 
the  Czar  or  as  an  appeal  to  the  war-party  at  home : — 
"  Though  the  policy  of  England  is  peace,  there  is  no 
country  so  well  prepared  for  war  as  our  own.  If 
England  enters  into  conflict  in  a  righteous  cause,  her 
resources  are  inexhaustible.  She  is  not  a  country  that 
when  she  enters  into  a  campaign  has  to  ask  herself 
whether  she  can  support  a  second  or  a  third  campaign. 
She  enters  into  a  campaign  which  she  will  not  ter- 
minate till  right  is  done."  */ 

The  proposal  made  by  the  Earl  of  Derby  for  a 
Conference  at  Constantinople  was  accepted  by  all 
the  Powers,  and  accepted  on  the  bases  specified. 
Lord  Salisbury,  then  Secretary  of  State  for  India,  was 


492  MODERN  EUROPE.  1876. 

appointed  to  represent  Great  Britain  in  conjunction 
with  Sir  H.  Elliot,  its  Ambassador.  The  Minister 
made  his  journey  to  Constantinople  by  way  of  the 
European  capitals,  and  learnt  at  Berlin  that  the  good 
understanding  between  the  German  Emperor  and  the 
Czar  extended  to  Eastern  affairs.  Whether  the  British 
Government  had  as  yet  gained  any  trustworthy  in- 
formation on  the  Treaty  of  Eeichstadt  is  doubtful; 
but  so  far  as  the  public  eye  could  judge,  there  was  now, 
in  spite  of  the  tone  assumed  by  Lord  Beaconsfield,  a 
fairer  prospect  of  the  solution  of  the  Eastern  question 
by  the  establishment  of  some  form  of  autonomy  in  the 
Christian  provinces  than  there  had  been  at  any  previous 
time.  The  Porte  itself  recognised  the  serious  intention 
of  the  Powers,  and,  in  order  to  forestall  the  work  of 
the  Conference,  prepared  a  scheme  of  constitutional 
reform  that  far  surpassed  the  wildest  claims 

Project  of  Otto-          />   TT  .     .  r    o<      i  -vr    ii   •          1 

j?an  constitu-  or  Herzegoviman  or  or  Serb.  JNothing  less 
than  a  complete  system  of  Parliamentary 
Government,  with  the  very  latest  ingenuities  from 
France  and  Belgium,  was  to  be  granted  to  the  entire 
Ottoman  Empire.  That  Midhat  Pasha,  who  was  the 
author  of  this  scheme,  may  have  had  some  serious  end 
in  view  is  not  impossible ;  but  with  the  mass  of  Palace- 
functionaries  at  Constantinople  it  was  simply  a  device 
for  embarrassing  the  West  with  its  own  inventions ; 
and  the  action  of  men  in  power,  both  great  and 
small,  continued  after  the  constitution  had  come  into 
nominal  existence  to  be  exactly  what  it  had  been 
before.  The  very  terms  of  the  constitution  must  have 


18?«.  THE  PRELIMINARY  CONFERENCE.  493 

been  unintelligible  to  all  but  those  who  had  been 
employed  at  foreign  courts.  The  Government  might 
as  well  have  announced  its  intention  of  clothing  the 
Balkans  with  the  flora  of  the  deep  sea.  > 

In  the  second  week  of  December  the  representatives 
of  the  six  Great  Powers  assembled  at  Constantinople. 
In  order  that  the  demands  of  Europe  should  be  pre- 
sented to  the  Porte  with  unanimity,  they  determined 
to  hold  a  series  of  preliminary  meetings  with  one 
another  before  the  formal  opening  of  the  Conference 
and  before  communicating  with  the  Turks.  At  these 
meetings,  after  Ignatieff  had  withdrawn  his  *  Demand8 
proposal  for  a  Russian  occupation  of  Bui-  Preliminary 

Conference, 

garia,  complete  accord  was  attained.  It  Dec-11-21- 
was  resolved  to  demand  the  cession  of  certain  small 
districts  by  the  Porte  to  Servia  and  Montenegro ;  the 
grant  of  administrative  autonomy  to  Bosnia,  Herze- 
govina, and  Bulgaria;  the  appointment  in  each  of 
these  provinces  of  Christian  governors,  whose  terms  of 
office  should  be  for  five  years,  and  whose  nomination 
should  be  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Powers ;  the 
confinement  of  Turkish  troops  to  the  fortresses;  the 
removal  of  the  bands  of  Circassians  to  Asia  ;  and  finally 
the  execution  of  these  reforms  under  the  superintendence 
of  an  International  Commission,  which  should  have  at 
its  disposal  a  corps  of  six  thousand  gendarmes  to  be 
enlisted  in  Switzerland  or  Belgium.  By  these  arrange- 
ments, while  the  Sultan  retained  his  sovereignty  and 
the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  remained  un- 
impaired, it  was  conceived  that  the  Christian  population 


494  MODERN  EUROPE.  isre. 

would   be  effectively  secured  against  Turkish  violence 
and  caprice. 

All  differences  between  the  representatives  of  the 
European  Powers  having  been  removed,  the  formal 
Conference  was  opened  on  the  23rd  of  December  under 
the  presidency  of  the  Turkish  Foreign  Minister,  Savfet 
Pasha.  The  proceedings  had  not  gone  far  when  they 
were  interrupted  by  the  roar  of  cannon.  Savfet  ex- 
plained that  the  new  Ottoman  constitution  was  being 
promulgated,  and  that  the  salvo  which  the  members  of 
the  Conference  heard  announced  the  birth  of  an  era 
of  universal  happiness  and  prosperity  in  the  Sultan's 
dominions.  It  soon  appeared  that  in  the  presence  of 
this  great  panacea  there  was  no  place  for  the  reforming 
efforts  of  the  Christian  Powers.  Savfet 


The  Turks  re- 


fuse the  dem^ds     declared  from  the  first  that,  whatever  con- 

of  the  Con- 
ference, Jan.  20,      cessions   might    be   made    on    other  .points, 

the  Sultan's  Government  would  never  con- 
sent to  the  establishment  of  a  Foreign  Commission 
to  superintend  the  execution  of  its  reforms,  nor  to  the 
joint  action  of  the  Powers  in  the  appointment  of  the 
governors  of  its  provinces.  It  was  in  vain  argued 
that  without  such  foreign  control  Europe  possessed  no 
guarantee  that  the  promises  and  the  good  intentions 
of  the  Porte,  however  gratifying  these  might  be,  would 
be  carried  into  effect.  Savfet  replied  that  by  the 
Treaty  of  1856  the  Powers  had  declared  the  Ottoman 
Empire  to  stand  on  exactly  the  same  footing  as  any 
other  great  State  in  Europe,  and  had  expressly  debarred 
themselves  from  interfering,  under  whatever  circum- 


1877.  FAILURE  OF  THE  CONFERENCE.  495 

stances,  with  its  internal  administration.  The  position 
of  the  Turkish  representative  at  the  Conference  was 
in  fact  the  only  logical  one.  In  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
the  Powers  had  elaborately  pledged  themselves  to  an 
absurdity ;  and  this  Treaty  the  Turk  was  never  weary 
of  throwing  in  their  faces.  But  the  situation  was  not 
one  for  lawyers  and  for  the  interpretation  of  documents. 
The  Conference,  after  hearing  the  arguments  and  the 
counter-projects  of  the  Turkish  Ministers,  after  re- 
considering its  own  demands  and  modifying  these  in 
many  important  points  in  deference  to  Ottoman  wishes, 
adhered  to  the  demand  for  a  Foreign  Commission  and 
for  a  European  control  over  the  appointment  of 
governors.  Midhat,  who  was  now  Grand  Vizier,  sum- 
moned the  Great  Council  of  the  Empire,  and  presented 
to  it  the  demands  of  the  Conference.  These  demands 
the  Great  Council  unanimously  rejected.  Lord  Salisbury 
had  already  warned  the  Sultan  what  would  be  the 
results  of  continued  obstinacy;  and  after  receiving 
Midhat's  flnal  reply  the  ambassadors  of  all  the  Powers, 
together  with  the  envoys  who  had  been  specially  ap- 
pointed for  the  Conference,  quitted  Constantinople. 

Russia,  since  the  beginning  of  November,  had  been 
actively  preparing  for  war.  The  Czar  had  left  the  world  in 
no  doubt  as  to  his  own  intentions  in  case  of  the  failure 
of  the  European  concert ;  it  only  remained  for  him  to 
ascertain  whether,  after  the  settlement  of  a 
definite  scheme  of  reform  by  the  Conference  Proto^ii,  ° 

J  Mar.  31. 

and  the    rejection  of    this  scheme    by  the 

Porte,  the  Powers  would  or  would  not  take  steps  to 


496  MODERN  EUROPE.  1877. 

enforce  their  conclusion.  England  suggested  that  the 
Sultan  should  be  allowed  a  year  to  carry  out  his  good 
intentions :  Gortschakoff  inquired  whether  England 
would  pledge  itself  to  action  if,  at  the  end  of  the 
year,  reform  was  not  effected ;  but  no  such  pledge  was 
forthcoming.  With  the  object  either  of  discovering 
some  arrangement  in  which  the  Powers  would  combine, 
or  of  delaying  the  outbreak  of  war  until  the  Russian 
preparations  were  more  advanced  and  the  season  more 
favourable,  Ignatieif  was  sent  round  to  all  the  European 
Courts.  He  visited  England,  and  subsequently  drew 
up,  with  the  assistance  of  Count  Schouvaloff,  Russian 
Ambassador  at  London,  a  document  which  gained  the 
approval  of  the  British  as  well  as  the  Continental 
Governments.  This  document,  known  as  the  London 
Protocol,  was  signed  on  the  31st  of  March.  After  a 
reference  to  the  promises  of  reform  made  by  the  Porte, 
it  stated  that  the  Powers  intended  to  watch  carefully 
by  their  representatives  over  the  manner  in  which  these 
promises  were  carried  into  effect;  that  if  their  hopes 
should  be  once  more  disappointed  they  should  regard 
the  condition  of  affairs  as  incompatible  with  the 
interests  of  Europe ;  and  that  in  such  case  they  would 
decide  in  common  upon  the  means  best  fitted  to 
secure  the  well-being  of  the  Christian  population  and 
the  interests  of  general  peace.  Declarations  relative 
to  the  disarmament  of  Russia,  which  it  was  now  the 
principal  object  of  the  British  Government  to  effect, 
were  added.  There  was  indeed  so  little  of  a  sub- 
stantial engagement  in  this  Protocol  that  it  would  have 


1W7.  DECLARATION  OF  WAR.  497 

been  surprising  had  Russia  disarmed  without  obtaining 
some  further  guarantee  for  the  execution  of  reform. 
But  weak  as  the  Protocol  was,  it  was  rejected  by  the 
Porte.  Once  more  the  appeal  was  made 

_      _,.  . .  The  Porte  re- 

to    the    Treaty  of    Pans,    once   more   the     jectathepro- 

»  tocoL 

Sultan  protested  against  the  encroachment 
of   the    Powers   on  his  own  inviolable   rights.      Lord 
Beaconsfi eld's  Cabinet   even  now  denied  that  the  last 
word  had  been  spoken,  and  professed  to  entertain  some 
hope   in   the    effect   of   subsequent   diplomatic    steps ; 
but  the  rest  of  Europe  asked  and  expected  no  further 
forbearance   on    the    part   of    Russia.      The   army   of 
operations  already  lay  on  the  Pruth :  the  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas,  brother  of  the    Czar,   was   appointed  to   its 
command ;   and  on  the  24th  of  April  the 
Russian  Government  issued  its  declaration     ^^AP^L* 
o'f  war.  S- 

Between  the  Russian  frontier  and  the  Danube  lay 
the  Principality  of  Roumania.  A  convention  signed 
before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  gave  to  the  Russian 
army  a  free  passage  through  this  territory,  and  Rou- 
mania subsequently  entered  the  war  as  Russia's  ally. 
It  was  not,  however,  until  the  fourth  week  of  June 
that  the  invaders  were  able  to  cross  the  Danube.  Seven 
army-corps  were  assembled  in  Roumania ;  of  these  one 
crossed  the  Lower  Danube  into  the  Dobrudscha,  two 
were  retained  in  Roumania  as  a  reserve, 

t     f  j     ,v  ,  i  •     i  Passage  of  the 

and   four  crossed  the  river  in   the  neigh-     Danube, 

June  27. 

bourhood  of  Sistowa,  in  order  to  enter  upon 
the  Bulgarian  campaign.       It  was  the    desire   of  the 
c  c 


498  MODERN  EUROPE.  1877. 

Eussians  to  throw  forward  the  central  part  of  their 
army  by  the  line  of  the  river  Jantra  upon  the  Balkans  ; 
with  their  left  to  move  against  Eustchuk  and  the 
Turkish  armies  in  the  eastern  fortresses  of  Bulgaria; 
with  their  right  to  capture  Nicopolis,  and  guard  the 
central  column  against  any  flank  attack  from  the 
west.  But  both  in  Europe  and  in  Asia  the  Eussians 
had  underrated  the  power  of  their  adversary,  and 
entered  upon  the  war  with  insufficient  forces.  Ad- 
vantages won  by  their  generals  on  the  Armenian 
frontier  while  the  European  army  was  still  marching 
through  Eoumania  were  lost  in  the  course  of  the  next 
few  weeks.  Bayazid  and  other  places  that  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Eussians  at  the  first  onset  were  recovered 
by  the  Turks  under  Mukhtar  Pasha ;  and  within  a  few 
days  after  the  opening  of  the  European  campaign  the 
Eussian  divisions  in  Asia  were  everywhere  retreating 
upon  their  own  frontier.  The  Bulgarian  campaign  was 
marked  by  the  same  rapid  successes  of  the  invader  at 
the  outset,  to  be  followed,  owing  to  the  same  insuffi- 
ciency of  force,  by  similar  disasters.  Encountering 
no  effective  opposition  on  the  Danube,  the  Eussians 
Advance  on  the  pushed  forward  rapidly  towards  the  Balkans 
by  the  line  of  the  Jantra.  The  Turkish 
army  lay  scattered  in  the  Bulgarian  fortresses,  from 
Widdin  in  the  extreme  west  to  Shumla  at  the  foot 
of  the  Eastern  Balkans.  It  was  considered  by  the 
Eussian  commanders  that  two  army-corps  would  be 
required  to  operate  against  the  Turks  in  Eastern  Bul- 
garia, while  one  corps  would  be  enough  to  'cover  the 


1877.  FIRST  PASSAGE  OF  THE  BALKANS.  499 

central  line  of  invasion  from  the  west.  There  remained, 
excluding  the  two  corps  in  reserve  in  Roumania  and 
the  corps  holding  the  Dobrudscha,  but  one  corps  for 
the  march  on  the  Balkans  and  Adrianople.  The  com- 
mand of  the  vanguard  of  this  body  was  given  to 
General  Gourko,  who  pressed  on  into  the  Balkans, 
seized  the  Shipka  Pass,  and  descended  into  Southern 
Bulgaria  (July  15).  The  Turks  were 
driven  from  Kesanlik  and  Eski  Sagra,  and  the  Baikana, 

July  16. 

Gourko's  cavalry,  a  few  hundreds  in  num- 
ber, advanced  to  within  two  days'  march  of  Adrianople. 
The  headquarters  of  the  whole  Russian  army  were 
now  at  Tirnova,  the  ancient  Bulgarian  capital,  about  half- 
way between  the  Danube  and  the  Balkans.  Two  army- 
corps,  commanded  by  the  Czarewitch,  moved  eastwards 
against  Rustchuk  and  the  so-called  Turkish  army  of  the 
"Danube,  which  was  gathering  behind  the  lines  of  the 
Kara  Lorn  ;  another  division,  under  General  Krudener, 
turned  westward  and  captured  Nicopolis  with  its  gar- 
rison. Lovatz  and  other  points  lying  westward  of 
the  Jantra  were  occupied  by  weak  detachments;  but 
so  badly  were  the  reconnaissances  of  the  Russians  per- 
formed in  this  direction  that  they  were 

J  ( >Mimn  occupies 

unaware   of    the    approach    of    a    Turkish 
army  from   Widdin,  thirty-five    thousand    strong,    till 
this  was  close  on  their  flank.    Before  the  Russians  could 
prevent  him,  Osman  Pasha,  with  the  van- 
guard of  this  army,  had  occupied  the  town     me^tlt p£tna, 
and   heights   of  Plevna,  between  Nicopolis 
and  Lovatz.     On  the  20th  of  July,  still  unaware  of  tlu-ir 
G  c  -2 


500  MODERN   EUROPE.  1877 

enemy's  strength,  the  Eussians  attacked  him  at  Plevna : 
they  were  defeated  with  considerable  loss,  and  after  a  few 
days  one  of  Osman's  divisions,  pushing  forward  upon 
the  invader's  central  line,  drove  them  out  of  Lovatz. 
The  Grand  Duke  now  sent  reinforcements  to  Krudener, 
and  ordered  him  to  take  Plevna  at  all  costs.  Krude- 
ner's  strength  was  raised  to  thirty-five  thousand ;  but 
in  the  meantime  new  Turkish  regiments  had  joined 
Osman,  and  his  troops,  now  numbering  about  fifty 
thousand,  had  been  working  day  and  night  entrenching 
themselves  in  the  heights  round  Plevna  which  the 
Russians  had  to  attack.  The  assault  was 

Second  battle  at 

made  on  the  30th  of  July;  it  was  beaten 
back  with  terrible  slaughter,  the  Eussians  leaving 
a  fifth  of  their  number  on  the  field.  Had  Osman 
taken  up  the  offensive  and  the  Turkish  commander 
on  the  Lorn  pressed  vigorously  upon  the  invader's  line, 
it  would  probably  have  gone  ill  with  the  Eussian  army 
in  Bulgaria.  Gourko  was  at  once  compelled  to 
abandon  the  country  south  of  the  Balkans.  His  troops, 
falling  back  upon  the  Shipka  Pass,  were  there  attacked 
from  the  south  by  far  superior  forces  under  Suleiman 
Pasha.  The  Ottoman  commander,  prodigal  of  the 
The shipka  Pa*.,  ^ves  °^  n^s  men  an(^  trusting  to  mere  blind- 
fold violence,  hurled  his  army  day  after  day 
against  the  Eussian  positions  (Aug.  20 — 23).  There 
was  a  moment  when  all  seemed  lost,  and  the  Eussian 
soldiers  sent  to  their  Czar  the  last  message  of  devotion 
from  men  who  were  about  to  die  at  their  post.  But  in 
the  extremity  of  peril  there  arrived  a  reinforcement, 


1877. 


PLEVNA.  501 


weak,  but  sufficient  to  turn  the  scale  against  the 
ill-commanded  Turks.  Suleiman's  army  withdrew  to 
the  village  of  Shipka  at  the  southern  end  of  the  pass. 
The  pass  itself,  with  the  entrance,  from  northern 
Bulgaria,  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Russians. 

After  the  second  battle  of  Plevna  it  became  clear 
that  the  Russians  could  not  carry  on  the  campaign 
with  their  existing  forces.  Two  army-corps  were 
called  up  which  were  guarding  the  coast  of 

Boumania. 

the  Black  Sea ;  several  others  were  mobil- 
ised in  the  interior  of  Russia,  and  began  their  journey 
towards  the  Danube.  So  urgent,  however,  was  the 
immediate  need,  that  the  Czar  was  compelled  to  ask 
help  from  Rou mania.  This  help  was  given.  Roumanian 
troops,  excellent  in  quality,  filled  up  the  gap  caused  by 
Krudener's  defeats,  and  the  whole  army  before  Plevna 
.was  placed  under  the  command  of  the  Roumanian 
Prince  Charles.  At  the  beginning  of  September  the 
Russians  were  again  ready  for  action.  Lovatz  was 
wrested  from  the  Turks,  and  the  division  which  had 
captured  it  moved  on  to  Plevna  to  take  part  in  a 
great  combined  attack.  This  attack  was  made  on  the 
llth  of  September  under  the  eyes  of  the  Czar.  On 
the  north  the  Russians  and  Roumanians 
together,  after  a  desperate  struggle,  stormed  pie Vna,  sept°  n 
the  Grivitza  redoubt.  On  the  south  Skobe- 
leff  carried  the  first  Turkish  position,  but  could  make 
no  impression  on  their  second  line  of  defence.  Twelve 
thousand  men  fell  on  the  Russian  side  before  the  day 
was  over,  and  the  main  defences  of  the  Turks  were 


502  MODERN  EUROPE.  1877. 

still  unbroken.  On  the  morrow  the  Turks  took  up 
the  offensive.  Skobeleff,  exposed  to  the  attack  of  a 
far  superior  foe,  prayed  in  vain  for  reinforcements. 
His  men,  standing  in  the  positions  that  they  had  won 
from  the  Turks,  repelled  one  onslaught  after  another, 
but  were  ultimately  overwhelmed  and  driven  from  the 
field.  At  the  close  of  the  second  day's  battle  the 
Russians  were  everywhere  beaten  back  within  their 
own  lines,  except  at  the  Grivitza  redoubt,  which  was 
itself  but  an  outwork  of  the  Turkish  defences,  and 
faced  by  more  formidable  works  within.  The  assailants 
had  sustained  a  loss  approaching  that  of  the  Germans 
at  Gravelotte  with  an  army  one-third  of  the  Germans' 
strength.  Osman  was  stronger  than  at  the  beginning 
of  the  campaign ;  with  what  sacrifices  Russia  would 
have  to  purchase  its  ultimate  victory  no  man  could 
calculate. 

The  three  defeats  at  Plevna  cast  a  sinister  light 
upon  the  Russian  military  administration  and  the 
quality  of  its  chiefs.  The  soldiers  had  fought  heroic- 
ally; divisional  generals  like  Skobeleff  had  done  all 
Todiebenbe-  ^at  man  could  do  in  such  positions;  the 
faults  were  those  of  the  headquarters  and 
the  officers  by  whom  the  Imperial  Family  were  sur- 
rounded. After  the  third  catastrophe,  public  opinion 
called  for  the  removal  of  the  authors  of  these  disasters 
and  the  employment  of  abler  men.  Todleben,  the 
defender  of  Sebastopol,  who  for  some  unknown  reason 
had  been  left  without  a  command,  was  now  summoned 
to  Bulgaria,  and  virtually  placed  at  the  heajl  of  the 


1877. 


FALL  OF  PLEVNA.  503 


army  before  Plevna.  He  saw  that  the  stronghold  of 
Osman  could  only  be  reduced  by  a  regular  siege, 
and  prepared  to  draw  his  lines  right  round  it.  For  a 
time  Osman  kept  open  his  communications  with  the 
south-west,  and  heavy  trains  of  'ammunition  and 
supplies  made  their  way  into  Plevna  from  this  direc- 
tion ;  but  the  investment  was  at  length  completed,  and 
the  army  of  Plevna  cut  off  from  the  world.  In  the 
meantime  new  regiments  were  steadily  pouring  into 
Bulgaria  from  the  interior  of  Russia.  East  of  the 
Jantra,  after  many  alternations  of  fortune,  the  Turks 
were  finally  driven  back  behind  the  river  Lorn. 
The  last  efforts  of  Suleiman  failed  to  wrest  the 
Shipka  Pass  from  its  defenders.  From  the  narrow 
line  which  the  invaders  had  with  such  difficulty  held 

• 

during  three  anxious  months  their  forces,  accumu- 
lating day  by  day,  spread  out  south  and  west  up  to  the 
slopes  of  the  Balkans,  ready  to  burst  over  the  moun- 
tain-barrier and  sweep  the  enemy  back  to  the  walls 
of  Constantinople  when  once  Plevna  should  have  fallen 
and  the  army  which  besieged  it  should  be  added  to  the 
invader's  strength.  At  length,  in  the  second  week  of 
December,  Osman's  supply  of  food  was  exhausted. 
Victor  in  three  battles,  he  refused  to  surrender  without 
one  more  struggle.  On  the  10th  of  December,  after 
distributing  among  his  men  what  there  remained  of 
provisions,  he  made  a  desperate  effort  to  FaUofPlevna 
break  out  towards  the  west.  His  columns 
dashed  in  vain  against  the  besieger's  lines ;  behind  him 
his  enemies  pressed  forward  into  the  positions  which 


504  MODERN  EUROPE. 

he  had  abandoned ;  a  ring  of  fire  like  that  of  Sedan 
surrounded  the  Turkish  army ;  and  after  thousands 
had  fallen  in  a  hopeless  conflict,  the  general  and  the 
troops  who  for  five  months  had  held  in  check  the 
collected  forces  of  the  .Russian  Empire  surrendered  to 
their  conqueror. 

If  in  the  first  stages  of  the  war  there  was  little  that 
did  credit  to  Russia's  military  capacity,  the  energy  that 
marked  its  close  made  amends  for  what  had  gone  be- 
fore. Winter  was  descending  in  extreme  severity :  the 
Balkans  were  a  mass  of  snow  and  ice  ;  but  no  obstacle 
could  now  bar  the  invader's  march.  Gourko,  in  com- 
mand of  an  army  that  had  gathered  to  the  south-west 
of  Plevna,  made  his  way  through  the  mountains  above 
Etropol  in  the  last  days  of  December,  and,  driving  the 
Turks  from  Sophia,  pressed  on  towards  Philippopolis 
and  Adrianople.  Farther  east  two  columns  crossed  the 
Balkans  by  bye-paths  right  and  left  of  the  Shipka 
Pass,  and  then,  converging  on  Shipka  it- 

Crossing  of  the  if       p    11  ,t  c       n  m       i   •    i 

Balkans,  Dec.  25     sell,    ie]i   upon    the    rear  or    the    Turkish 

—  Jan.  8. 

army  which  still  blocked  the  southern 
outlet.  Simultaneously  a  third  corps  marched  down 
the  pass  from  the  north  and  assailed  the  Turks  in 
front.  After  a  fierce  struggle  the  entire  Turkish  army, 
thirty-five  thousand  strong,  laid  down  its  arms.  There 
capitulation  of  now  r^mamed  only  one  considerable  force 

between  the  invaders  and  Constantinople. 
This  body,  which  was  commanded  by  Suleiman,  held 
the  road  which  runs  along  the  valley  of  the  Maritza,  at 
a  point  somewhat  to  the  east  of  Philippopolis.  Against 


1878.  THE  RUSSIANS  IN  ADRIANOPLE.  505 

it  Gourko  advanced  from  the  west,  while  the  victors  of 
Shipka,  descending  due  south  through  Kesanlik,  barred 
the  line  of  retreat  towards  Adrianople.  The  last  en- 
counter of  the  war  took  place  on  the  17th  of  January. 
Suleiman's  army,  routed  and  demoralised,  succeeded  in 
making  its  escape  to  the  ^JEgean  coast.  Pursuit  was  un- 
necessary, for  the  war  was  now  practically  over.  On  the 
20th  of  January  the  Russians  made  their 

.    ,    .  i'ii  >_  e          j  Russians  enter 

entry  into  Adrianople;  in  the  next  tew  days     Adrianople, 

J  t  J  Jan.  20, 1878. 

their  advanced   guard  touched  the  Sea  of 
Marmora  at  Rodosto. 

Immediately  after  the  fall  of  Plevna  the  Porte  had 
applied  to  the  European  Powers  for  their  mediation. 
Disasters  in  Asia  had  already  warned  it  not  to  delay 
submission  too  long ;  for  in  the  middle  of  October 
Mukhtar  Pasha  had  been  driven  from  his  positions,  and 
a  month  later  Kars  had  been  taken  by  storm.  The 
Russians  had  subsequently  penetrated  into  Armenia  and 
had  captured  the  outworks  of  Erzeroum.  Each  day  that 
now  passed  brought  the  Ottoman  Empire  nearer  to 
destruction.  Servia  agaiu  declared  war;  the  Montene- 
grins made  themselves  masters  of  the  coast-towns  and 
of  border-territory  north  and  south ;  Greece  seemed 
likely  to  enter  into  the  struggle.  Baffled  in  his 
attempt  to  gain  the  common  mediation  of  the  Powers, 
the  Sultan  appealed  to  the  Queen  of  England  per- 
sonally for  her  good  offices  in  bringing  the  conflict 
to  a  close.  In  reply  to  a  telegram  from  Armigtice 
London,  the  Czar  declared  himself  willing 
to  treat  for  peace  as  soon  as  direct  communications  should 


506  MODERN  EUROPE.  1878. 

be  addressed  to  his  representatives  by  the  Porte. 
On  the  14th  of  January  commissioners  were  sent  to 
the  headquarters  of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  at 
Kesanlik  to  treat  for  an  armistice  and  for  prelimin- 
aries of  peace.  The  Kussians,  now  in  the  full  tide  of 
victory,  were  in  no  hurry  to  agree  with  their  adversary . 
Nicholas  bade  the  Turkish  envoys  accompany  him  to 
Adrianople,  and  it  was  not  until  the  31st  of  January 
that  the  armistice  was  granted  and  the  preliminaries 
of  peace  signed. 

While  the  Turkish  envoys  were  on  their  journey  to 
the  Eussian  headquarters,  the  session  of  Parliament 
opened  at  London.  The  Ministry  had  declared  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  that  Great  Britain 
would  remain  neutral  unless  its  own  in- 
terests should  be  imperilled,  and  it  had  defined  these 
interests  with  due  clearness  both  in  its  communications 
with  the  Russian  Ambassador  and  in  its  statements  in 
Parliament.  It  was  laid  down  that  Her  Majesty's 
Government  could  not  permit  the  blockade  of  the  Suez 
Canal,  or  the  extension  of  military  operations  to  Egypt ; 
that  it  could  not  witness  with  indifference  the  passing  of 
Constantinople  into  other  hands  than  those  of  its  present 
possessors ;  and  that  it  would  entertain  serious  ob- 
jections to  any  material  alterations  in  the  rules  made 
under  European  sanction  for  the  navigation  of  the 
Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles.*  In  reply  to  Lord  Derby's 
note  which  formulated  these  conditions  of  neutrality 
Prince  Gortschakoff  had  repeated  the  Czar's  assurance 

*  Parl.  Pap.  1877,  vol.  Ixxxix.,  p.  135. 


1878. 


ACTION  OF  ENGLAND.  507 


that  the  acquisition  of  Constantinople  was  excluded 
from  his  views,  and  had  promised  to  undertake  no 
military  operation  in  Egypt ;  he  had,  however,  let  it 
be  understood  that,  as  an  incident  of  warfare,  the 
reduction  of  Constantinople  might  be  necessary  like 
that  of  any  other  capital.  In  the  Queen's  speech  at 
the  opening  of  Parliament,  Ministers  stated  that  the 
conditions  on  which  the  neutrality  of  England  was 
founded  had  not  hitherto  been  infringed  by  either 
belligerent,  but  that,  should  hostilities  be  prolonged, 
some  unexpected  occurrence  might  render  it  necessary 
to  adopt  measures  of  precaution,  measures  which  could 
not  be  adequately  prepared  without  an  appeal  to  the 
liberality  of  Parliament.  From  language  subsequently 
used  by  Lord  Beaconsfield's  colleagues,  it  would  appear 
that  the  Cabinet  had  some  apprehension  that  the 
Russian  army,  escaping  from  the  Czar's  control,  might 
seize  and  attempt  permanently  to  hold  Constantinople. 
On  the  23rd  of  January  orders  were  sent  to  Admiral 
Hornby,  commander  of  the  fleet  at  Besika  Bay,  to 
pass  the  Dardanelles,  and  proceed  to  Constantinople. 
Lord  Derby,  who  saw  no  necessity  for  measures  of  a 
warlike  character  until  the  result  of  the  negotiations 
at  Adrianople  should  become  known,  now  resigned  office ; 
but  on  the  reversal  of  the  order  to  Admiral  Hornby  he 
rejoined  the  Cabinet.  On  the  28th  of  January,  after 
the  bases  of  peace  had  been  communicated  by  Count 
Schouvaloff  to  the  British  Government  but  before  they 
had  been  actually  signed,  the  Chancellor  of  the  Ex- 
chequer moved  for  a  vote  of  £6,000,000  for  increasing 


508  MODERN  EUROPE.  1878. 

the  armaments  of  the  country.    This  vote  was  at  first 

vigorously   opposed   on   the  ground  that  none  of   the 

. -.-       stated  conditions  of  England's  neutrality  had 

Vote  of  Credit, 

?eb' 8<  been  infringed,  and  that  in  the  conditions  of 
peace  between  Eussia  and  Turkey  there  was  nothing  that 
justified  a  departure  from  the  policy  which  England 
had  hitherto  pursued.  In  the  course  of  the  debates, 
however,  a  telegram  arrived  from  Mr.  Layard,  Elliot's 
successor  at  Constantinople,  stating  that  notwith- 
standing the  armistice  the  Eussians  were  pushing  on 
towards  the  capital ;  that  the  Turks  had  been  com- 
pelled to  evacuate  Silivria  on  the  Sea  of  Marmora ; 
that  the  Eussian  general  was  about  to  occupy 
Tchataldja,  an  outpost  of  the  last  line  of  defence 
not  thirty  miles  from  Constantinople ;  and  that  the 
Porte  was  in  great  alarm,  and  unable  to  understand 
the  Eussian  proceedings.  The -utmost  excitement  was 
caused  at  Westminster  by  this  telegram.  The  fleet 
was  at  once  ordered  to  Constantinople. 

es,  e      Mr.  Forster,  who  had  led  the  opposition  to 


the  vote  of  credit,  sought  to  withdraw  his 
amendment ;  and  although  on  the  following  day,  with 
the  arrival  of  the  articles  of  the  armistice,  it  appeared 
that  the  Eussians  were  simply  moving  up  to  the 
accepted  line  of  demarcation,  and  that  the  Porte '  could 
hardly  have  been  ignorant  of  this  when  Layard's  tele- 
gram was  despatched,  the  alarm  raised  in  London  did 
not  subside,  and  the  vote  of  credit  was  carried  by  a 
majority  of  above  two  hundred.* 

*  Par!.  Pap.,  1878,  vol.  Ixxxi.,  pp.  661,  725.     ParL  Deb.,  v,ol.  ccxxxvii. 


1878.  RUSSIA  AND  GREAT  BRITAIN.  509 

When  a  victorious  army  is,  without  the  intervention 
of  some  external  Power,  checked  in  its  work  of  con- 
quest by  the  negotiation  of  an  armistice,  it  is  invariably^ 
made  a  condition  that  positions  shall  be  Jianded  over  to 
it  which  it  does  not  at  the  moment  occupy,  but  which 
it  might  reasonably  expect  to  have  conquered  within  a 
certain  date,  had  hostilities  not  been  suspended.  The 
armistice  granted  to  Austria  by  Napoleon  after  the 
battle  of  Marengo  involved  the  evacuation  of  the 
whole  of  Upper  Italy;  the  armistice  which  Bismarck 
offered  to  the  French  Government  of  Defence  at  the 
beginning  of  the  siege  of  Paris  would  have  involved  the 
surrender  of  Strasburg  and  of  Toul.  In  demanding  that 
the  line  of  demarcation  should  be  carried  almost  up  to 
the  walls  of  Constantinople  the  Russians  were  asking  for 
"  no  more  than  would  certainly  have  been  within  their 
hands  had  hostilities  been  prolonged  for  a  few  weeks, 
or  even  days.  Deeply  as  the  conditions  of  the  armistice 
agitated  the  English  people,  it  was  not  in  these  con- 
ditions, but  in  the  conditions  of  the  peace  which  was 
to  follow,  that  the  true  cause  of  contention  between 
England  and  Russia,  if  cause  there  was,  had  to  be 
found.  Nevertheless,  the  approach  of  the  Russians  to 
Gallipoli  and  the  lines  of  Tchataldja,  fol- 
lowed, as  it  was,  by  the  despatch  of  the  war  with  Eng- 
British  fleet  to  Constantinople,  brought 
Russia  and  Great  Britain  within  a  hair's  breadth  of 
war.  It  was  in  vain  that  Lord  Derby  described  the 
fleet  as  sent  only  for  the  protection  of  the  lives  and 
property  of  British  subjects.  Gortschakoff,  who  was 


510  MODERN  EUROPE.  1878. 

superior  in  amenities  of  this  kind,  replied  that  the 
Russian  Government  had  exactly  the  same  end  in  view, 
with  the  distinction  that  its  protection  would  be  ex- 
tended to  all  Christians.  Should  the  British  fleet 
appear  at  the  Bosphorus,  Russian  troops  would,  in  the 
fulfilment  of  a  common  duty  of  humanity,  enter  Con- 
stantinople. Yielding  to  this  threat,  Lord  Beaconsfield 
bade  the  fleet  halt  at  a  convenient  point  in  the  Sea 
of  Marmora.  On  both  sides  preparations  were  made 
for  immediate  action.  The  guns  on  our  ships  stood 
charged  for  battle ;  the  Russians  strewed  the  shallows 
with  torpedoes.  Had  a  Russian  soldier  appeared  on 
the  heights  of  Gallipoli,  had  an  Englishman  landed  on 
the  Asiatic  shore  of  the  Bosphorus,  war  would  at  once 
have  broken  out.  But  after  some  weeks  of  extreme 
ganger  the  perils  of  mere  contiguity  passed  away,  and 
the  decision  between  peace  and  war  was  transferred 
from  the  accidents  of  tent  and  quarter-deck  to  the 
deliberations  of  statesmen  assembled  in  Congress. 

The  bases  of  Peace  which  were  made  the  condition 
of  the  armistice  granted  at  Adrianople  formed  with 
little  alteration  the  substance  of  the  Treaty  signed  by 
Treaty  of  san  Russia  and  Turkey  at  San  Stefano,  a  vil- 
/lage  on  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  on  the  3rd  of 
March.  By  this  Treaty  the  Porte  recognised  the  in- 
dependence of  Servia,  Montenegro,  and  Roumania,  and 
made  considerable  cessions  of  territory  to  the  two  former 
States.  Bulgaria  was  constituted  an  autonomous 
tributary  Principality,  with  a  Christian  Government 
\and  a  national  militia.  Its  frontier,  which"  was  made 


1U78.  TREATY  OF  SAN  8TEFANO.  511 

so  extensive  as  to  include  the  greater  part  of  European 
Turkey,  was  defined  as  beginning  near  Midia  on  the 
Black  Sea,  not  sixty  miles  from  the  Bosphorus;  passing 
thence  westwards  just  to  the  north  of  Adrianople ;  de- 
scending to  the  ^gean  Sea,  and  following  the  coast  as 
far  as  the  Thracian  Chersonese ;  then  passing  inland 
westwards,  so  as  barely  to  exclude  Salonika  ;  running 
on  to  the  border  of  Albania  within  fifty  miles  of  the 
Adriatic,  and  from  this  point  following  the  Albanian 
border  up  to  the  new  Servian  frontier.  The  Prince  of 
Bulgaria  was  to  be  freely  elected  by  the  population, 
and  confirmed  by  the  Porte  with  the  assent  of  the 
Powers ;  a  system  of  administration  was  to  be  drawn 
up  by  an  Assembly  of  Bulgarian  notables  ;  and  the  in- 
troduction of  the  new  system  into  Bulgaria  with  the 
superintendence  of  its  working  was  to  be  entrusted  for 
tw(o  years  to  a  Russian  Commissioner.  Until  the  native 
militia  was  organised,  Russian  troops,  not  exceeding 
fifty  thousand  in  number,  were  to  occupy  the  country ; 
this  occupation,  however,  was  to  be  limited  to  a  term  ap- 
proximating to  two  years.  In  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
the  proposals  laid  before  the  Porte  at  the  first  sitting 
of  the  Conference  of  1876  were  to  be  immediately  intro- 
duced, subject  to  such  modifications  as  might  be  agreed 
upon  between  Turkey,  Russia,  and  Austria.  The  Porte 
undertook  to  apply  scrupulously  in  Crete  the  Organic 
Law  which  had  been  drawn  up  in  1868,  taking  into 
account  the  previously  expressed  wishes  of  the  native 
population.  An  analogous  law,  adapted  to  local  re- 
quirements, was,  after  being  communicated  to  the  Czar, 


512  MODERN  EUROPE.  1878. 

to  be  introduced  into  Epirus,  Thessaly,  and  the  other 
parts  of  Turkey  in  Europe  for  which  a  special  con- 
stitution was  not  provided  by  the  Treaty.  Com- 
missions, in  which  the  native  population  was  to  he 
largely  represented,  were  in  each  province  to  he  en- 
trusted with  the  task  of  elaborating  the  details  of  the 
new  organisation.  In  Armenia  the  Sultan  undertook 
to  carry  into  effect  without  further  delay  the  improve- 
ments and  reforms  demanded  by  local  requirements, 
and  to  guarantee  the  security  of  the  Armenians  from 
Kurds  and  Circassians.  As  an  indemnity  for  the  losses 
and  expenses  of  the  war  the  Porte  admitted  itself  to  be 
indebted  to  Russia  in  the  sum  of  fourteen  hundred 
million  roubles ;  but  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of 
the  Sultan,  and  in  consideration  of  the  financial  em- 
barrassments of  Turkey,  the  Czar  consented  to  accept  in 
substitution  for  the  greater  part  of  this  sum  the  cession 
of  the  Dobrudscha  in  Europe,  and  of  the  districts  of 
Ardahan,  Kars,  Batoum,  and  Bayazid  in  Asia.  As  to 
the  balance  of  three  hundred  million  roubles  left  due 
to  Eussia,  the  mode  of  payment  or  guarantee  was  to  be 
settled  by  an  understanding  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments. The  Dobrudscha  was  to  be  given  by  the  Czar 
to  Eoumania  in  exchange  for  Bessarabia,  which  this 
State  was  to  transfer  to  Eussia.  The  complete  evacua- 
tion of  Turkey  in  Europe  was  to  take  place  within  three 
months,  that  of  Turkey  in  Asia  within  six  months, 
from  the  conclusion  of  peace.* 

It  had  from  the  first  been  admitted  by  the  Eussian 

*  The  Treaty,  with  Maps,  is  in  Parl.  Pap.  1878,  vol.  Ixxxiii.,  p.  239. 


1878.  CONGRESS  PROPOSED.  513 

Government  that  questions  affecting  the  interests  of 
Europe  at  large  could  not  be  settled  by  a  Treaty 
between  Russia  and  Turkey  alone,  but  con^^p^,. 
must  form  the  subject  of  European  agree- 
ment. Early  in  February  the  Emperor  of  Austria  had 
proposed  that  a  European  Conference  should  assemble 
at  his  own  capital.  It  was  subsequently  agreed  that 
Berlin,  instead  of  Vienna,  should  be  the  place  of 
meeting,  and  that  instead  of  a  Conference  a  Congress 
should  be  held,  that  is,  an  international  assembly  of  the 
most  solemn  form,  in  which  each  of  the  Powers  is  repre- 
sented not  merely  by  an  ambassador  or  an  envoy  but  by 
its  leading  Ministers.  But  the  question  at  once  arose 
whether  there  existed  in  the  mind  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment a  distinction  between  parts  of  the  Treaty  of  San 
ano  bearing  on  the  interests  of  Europe  generally  and 
parts  which  affected  no  States  but  Russia  and  Turkey  ; 
and  whether,  in  this  case,  Russia  was  willing  that 
Europe  should  be  the  judge  of  the  distinction,  or,  on 
the  contrary,  claimed  for  itself  the  right  of  withholding 
portions  of  the  Treaty  from  the  cognisance  of  the 
European  Court.  In  accepting  the  prin- 
ciple of  a  Congress,  Lord  Derby  on  behalf 

°  J 


and  England. 

of  Great  Britain  made  it  a  condition  that 
every  article  of  the  Treaty  without  exception  should  be 
laid  before  the  Congress,  not  necessarily  as  requiring 
the  concurrence  of  the  Powers,  but  in  order  that  the 
Powers  themselves  might  in  each  case  decide  whetlin- 
their  concurrence  was  necessary  or  not.  To  this  de- 
mand Prince  Gortschakoff  offered  the  most  strenuous 


514  MODERN  EUROPE.  1878. 

resistance,  claiming  for  Russia  the  liberty  of  accepting, 
or  not  accepting,  the  discussion  of  any  question  that 
might  be  raised.  It  would  clearly  have  been  in  the 
power  of  the  Russian  Government,  had  this  condition 
been  granted,  to  exclude  from  the  consideration  of 
Europe  precisely  those  matters  which  in  the  opinion 
of  other  States  were  most  essentially  of  European 
import.  Phrases  of  conciliation  were  suggested ;  but 
no  ingenuity  of  language  could  shade  over  the  dif- 
ference of  purpose  which  separated  the  rival  Powers. 
Every  day  the  chances  of  the  meeting  of  the  Congress 
seemed  to  be  diminishing,  the  approach  of  war  between 
Russia  and  Great  Britain  more  unmistakable.  Lord 
Beaconsfield  called  out  the  Reserves  and  summoned 
troops  from  India ;  even  the  project  of  seizing  a  port 
in  Asia  Minor  in  case  the  Sultan  should  fall  under 
Russian  influence  was  discussed  in  the  Cabinet.  Un- 
able to  reconcile  himself  to  these  vigorous  measures, 
Lord  Derby,  who  had  long  been  at  variance  with  the 
Premier,  now  finally  withdrew  from  the  Cabinet 
(March  28).  He  was  succeeded  in  his  office  by  the 
Marquis  of  Salisbury,  whose  comparison  of  his  relative 
and  predecessor  to  Titus  Gates  revived  the  interest 
of  the  diplomatic  world  in  a  now  forgotten  period  of 
English  history. 

The    new   Foreign   Secretary  had  not  been    many 
days  in  office  when   a  Circular,   despatched  to  all  the 
Foreign    Courts,  summed  up  the  objections  of   Great 
Britain  to  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano.     It  .  arcularof 
was  pointed  out  that  a  strong  Slavic  State 


1878.  LORD  SALISBURY'S  CIRCULAR.  515 

would  be  created  under  the  control  of  Russia,  possessing 
important  harbours  upon  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea 
and  the  Archipelago,  and  giving  to  Russia  a  prepon- 
derating influence  over  political  and  commercial  re- 
lations on  both  those  seas ;  that  a  large  Greek  popula- 
tion would  be  merged  in  a  dominant  Slavic  majority  ; 
that  by  the  extension  of  Bulgaria  to  the  Archipelago 
the  Albanian  and  Greek  provinces  left  to  the  Sultan 
would  be  severed  from  Constantinople ;  that  the  an- 
nexation of  Bessarabia  and  of  Batoum  would  make 
the  will  of  the  Russian  Government  dominant  over  all 
the  vicinity  of  the  Black  Sea ;  that  the  acquisition  of 
the  strongholds  of  Armenia  would  place  the  population 
of  that  province  under  the  immediate  influence  of  the 
Power  that  held  these  strongholds,  while  through  the 
cession  of  Bayazid  the  European  trade  from  Trebizond 
to  Persia  would  become  liable  to  be  arrested  by  the 
prohibitory  barriers  of  the  Russian  commercial  system. 
Finally,  by  the  stipulation  for  an  indemnity  which  it 
was  beyond  the  power  of  Turkey  to  discharge,  and  by 
the  reference  of  the  mode  of  payment  or  guarantee 
to  a  later  settlement,  Russia  had  placed  it  in  its  power 
either  to  extort  yet  larger  cessions  of  territory,  or  to 
force  Turkey  into  engagements  subordinating  its  policy 
in  all  things  to  that  of  St.  Petersburg. 

It  was  the  object  of  Lord  Salisbury  to  show  that 
the  effects  of  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  taken  in  a 
mass,  threatened  the  peace  and  the  interests  of  Europe, 
and  therefore,  whatever  might  be  advanced  for  or 
against  individual  stipulations  of  the  Treaty,  that  the 
a  n  '2 


516  MODERN  EUROPE.  1878. 

Treaty  as  a  whole,  and  not  clauses  selected  by  one 
Power,  must  be  submitted  to  the  Congress  if  the 
examination  was  not  to  prove  illusory.  This  was  a 
just  line  of  argument.  Nevertheless  it  was  natural  to 
suppose  that  some  parts  of  the  Treaty  must  be  more 
distasteful  than  others  to  Great  Britain ;  and  Count 
Schouvaloff ,  who  was  sincerely  desirous  of 

Count  Schouva-  •? 

peace,  applied  himself  to  the  task  of  dis- 
covering with  what  concessions  Lord  Beaconsfield's 
Cabinet  would  be  satisfied.  He  found  that  if  Russia 
would  consent  to  modifications  of  the  Treaty  in  Congress 
excluding  Bulgaria  from  the  .ZEgean  Sea,  reducing  its 
area  on  the  south  and  west,  dividing  it  into  two 
provinces,  and  restoring  the  Balkans  to  the  Sultan  as 
a  military  frontier,  giving  back  Bayazid  to  the  Turks, 
and  granting  to  other  Powers  besides  Russia  a  voice 
in  the  organisation  of  Epirus,  Thessaly,  and  the  other 
Christian  provinces  of  the  Porte,  England  might  be 
induced  to  accept  without  essential  change  the  other 
provisions  of  San  Stefano.  On  the  7th  of  May  Count 
Schouvaloff  quitted  London  for  St.  Petersburg,  in  order 
to  lay  before  the  Czar  the  results  of  his  communi- 
cations with  the  Cabinet,  and  to  acquaint  him  with 
the  state  of  public  opinion  in  England.  On  his 
journey  hung  the  issues  of  peace  or  war.  Backed  by 
the  counsels  of  the  German  Emperor,  Schouvaloff 
succeeded  in  his  mission.  The  Czar  determined  not 
to  risk  the  great  results  already  secured  by  insisting 
on  the  points  contested,  and  Schouvaloff  returned 
to  London  authorised  to  conclude  a  pact  with  the 


».  THE  SECRET  AGREEMENT.  517 

British  Government  on  the  general  basis  which  had 
been  laid  down.  On  the  30th  of  May  a  secret  agree- 
ment, in  which  the  above  were  the  princi-  aemtllgne. 
pal  points,  was  signed,  and  the  meeting  of 
the  Congress  for  the  examination  of  the  entire  Treaty 
of  San  Stefano  was  now  assured.  But  it  was  not 
without  the  deepest  anxiety  and  regret  that  Lord 
Beaconsfield  consented  to  the  annexation  of  Batoum 
and  the  Armenian  fortresses.  He  obtained  indeed  an 
assurance  in  the  secret  agreement  with  Schouvaloff 
that  the  Kussian  frontier  should  be  no  more  extended 
on  the  side  of  Turkey  in  Asia ;  but  his  policy  did  not 
stop  short  here.  By  a  Convention  made  with  the  Sultan 
on  the  4th  of  June,  Great  Britain  engaged,  Convention  ^ 
in  the  event  of  any  further  aggression  by  :key»J«ne4- 

Russia  upon  the  Asiatic   territories  of  the  Sultan,  to 
.  *•  . 

defend  these  territories  by  force  of  arms.  The  Sultan 
in  return  promised  to  introduce  the  necessary  reforms, 
to  be  agreed  upon  by  the  two  Powers,  for  the  protection 
of  the  Christian  and  other  subjects  of  the  Porte  in  these 
territories,  and  further  assigned  the  Island  of  Cyprus 
to  be  occupied  and  administered  by  Eng- 

Cvprus, 

land.       It   was  stipulated  by  a  humorous 
after-clause  that  if  Eussia  should  restore  to  Turkey  its 
Armenian    conquests,  Cyprus  would   be   evacuated   by 
England,    and  the  Convention  itself  should  be  at  an 
end.* 

The   Congress   of   Berlin,    at    which   the    Premier 
himself  and  Lord  Salisbury  represented  Great  Britain, 
*  Parl.  Pap.  1878,  vl.  Ixxxii.,  p.  3.     Globe,  May  31, 1878.    Halm,  iii.  116. 


518  MODERN  EUROPE.  im. 

opened  on  the  13th  of  June.  Though  the  compromise 
between  England  and  Russia  had  been  settled  in 
general  terms,  the  arrangement  of  details  opened  such 
a  series  of  difficulties  that  the  Congress  seemed  more 
than  once  on  the  point  of  breaking  up.  It 

Congress  of  •     i          i  j  i  i 

Berlin,  June  13      was    mainly  due   to    the  perseverance  and 

—July  13.  J  r 

wisdom  of  Prince  Bismarck,  who  transferred 
the  discussion  of  the  most  crucial  points  from  the 
Congress  to  private  meetings  of  his  guests,  and  who 
himself  acted  as  conciliator  when  Gortschakoff  folded 
up  his  maps  or  Lord  Beaconsfield  ordered  a  special 
train,  that  the  work  was  at  length  achieved.  The 
Treaty  of  Berlin,  signed  on  the  13th  of  July,  confined 
Bulgaria,  as  an  autonomous  Principality,  to  the  country 
Treaty  of  Berlin  north  of  the  Balkans,  and  diminished  the  au- 
thority which,  pending  the  establishment 
of  its  definitive  system  of  government,  would  by 
the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  have  belonged  to  a  Russian 
commissioner.  The  portion  of  Bulgaria  south  of  the 
Balkans,  but  extending  no  farther  west  than  the 
valley  of  the  Maritza,  and  no  farther  south  than 
Mount  Rhodope,  was  formed  into  a  Province  of  East 
Roumelia,  to  remain  subject  to  the  direct  political 
and  military  authority  of  the  Sultan,  under  con- 
ditions of  administrative  autonomy.  The  Sultan  was 
declared  to  possess  the  right  of  erecting  fortifications 
both  on  the  coast  and  on  the  land-frontier  of  this 
province,  and  of  maintaining  troops  there.  Alike  in 
Bulgaria  and  in  Eastern  Roumelia  the  period  of  occu- 
pation by  Russian  troops  was  limited  to  nine  months. 


1878.  TREATY  OF  BE  KLIN.  519 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  were  handed  over  to  Austria, 
to  be  occupied  and  administered  by  that  Power.  The 
cessions  of  territory  made  to  Servia  and  Montenegro  in 
the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  were  modified  with  the 
object  of  interposing  a  broader  strip  between  these  two 
States  ;  Bayazid  was  omitted  from  the  ceded  districts 
in  Asia,  and  the  Czar  declared  it  his  intention  to  erect 
Batoum  into  a  free  port,  essentially  commercial.  At 
the  instance  of  France  the  provisions  relating  to  the 
Greek  Provinces  of  Turkey  were  superseded  by  a  vote 
in  favour  of  the  cession  of  part  of  these  Provinces  to 
the  Hellenic  Kingdom.  The  Sultan  was  recommended 
to  cede  Thessaly  and  part  of  Epirus  to  Greece,  the 
Powers  reserving  to  themselves  the  right  of  offering 
their  mediation  to  facilitate  the  negotiations.  In 
other  respects  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  San 
Stefano  were  confirmed  without  substantial  change. 


Lord  Beaconsfield  returned  to  London, bringing,  as  he 
said,  peace  with  honour.  It  was  claimed,  in  the  despatch 
to  our  Ambassadors  which  accompanied  the  publication 
of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  that  in  this  Treaty  the  cardinal 
objections  raised  by  the  British  Government  to  the 
Treaty  of  San  Stefano  had  found  an  entire  remedy. 
"Bulgaria,"  wrote  Lord  Salisbury,  "is  now  confined 
to  the  river-barrier  of  the  Danube,  and 

Comparison  of 

consequently  has  not  only  ceased  to  possess 

any  harbour    on  the  Archipelago,  but  is  removed  by 

more  than  a  hundred  miles   from   the  neighbourhood 


520  MODERN   EUROPE.  1878. 

of  that  sea.  On  the  Euxine  the  important  port  of 
Bourgas  has  been  restored  to  the  Government  of 
Turkey ;  and  Bulgaria  retains  less  than  half  the  sea- 
board originally  assigned  to  it,  and  possesses  no  other 
port  except  the  roadstead  of  Varna,  which  can  hardly 
be  used  for  any  but  commercial  purposes.  The  re- 
placement under  Turkish  rule  of  Bourgas  and  the 
southern  half  of  the  sea-board  on  the  Euxine,  and  the 
strictly  commercial  character  assigned  to  Batoum,  have 
largely  obviated  the  menace  to  the  liberty  of  the  Black 
Sea.  The  political  outposts  of  Eussian  power  have 
been  pushed  back  to  the  region  beyond  the  Balkans ; 
the  Sultan's  dominions  have  been  provided  with  a  de- 
fensible frontier."  It  was  in  short  the  contention 
of  the  English  Government  that  while  Russia,  in  the 
pretended  emancipation  of  a  great  part  of  European 
Turkey  by  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  had  but  ac- 
quired a  new  dependency,  England,  by  insisting  on  the 
division  of  Bulgaria,  had  baffled  this  plan  and  restored 
to  Turkey  an  effective  military  dominion  over  all  the 
country  south  of  the  Balkans.  That  Lord  Beaconsfield 
did  well  in  severing  Macedonia  from  the  Slavic  State  of 
Bulgaria  there  is  little  reason  to  doubt ;  that,  having  so 
severed  it,  he  did  ill  in  leaving  it  without  a  European 
guarantee  for  good  government,  every  successive  year 
made  more  plain ;  the  wisdom  of  his  treatment  of  Bul- 
garia itself  must,  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events, 
remain  matter  for  controversy.  It  may  fairly  be  said 
that  in  dealing  with  Bulgaria  English  statesmen  were, 
on  the  whole,  dealing  with  the  unknown.  Nevertheless, 


isra 


THE  DIVISION  OF  BULGARIA.  521 


had  guidance  been  accepted  from  the  history  of  the  other 
Balkan  States,  analogies  were  not  altogether  wanting 
or  altogether  remote.  During  the  present  century 
three  Christian  States  had  been  formed  out  of  what 
had  been  Ottoman  territory :  Servia,  Greece,  and 
Eoumania.  Not  one  of  these  had  become  a  Russian 
Province,  or  had  failed  to  develop  and  maintain  a 
distinct  national  existence.  In  Servia  an  attempt  had 
been  made  to  retain  for  the  Porte  the  right  of  keeping 
troops  in  garrison.  This  attempt  had  proved  a  mis- 
take.  So  long  as  the  right  was  exercised  it  had  simply 
been  a  source  of  danger  and  disquiet,  and  it  had  finally 
been  abandoned  by  the  Porte  itself.  In  the  case  of 
Greece,  Russia,  with  a  view  to  its  own  interests,  had 
originally  proposed  that  the  country  should  be  divided 
into  four  autonomous  provinces  tributary  to  the  Sultan  : 
against  this  the  Greeks  had  protested,  and  Canning 
had  successfully  supported  their  protest.  Even  the 
appointment  of  an  ex-Minister  of  St.  Petersburg,  Capo- 
distrias,  as  first  President  of  Greece  in  1827  had  failed  to 
bring  the  liberated  country  under  Russian  influence;  and 
in  the  course  of  the  half-century  which  had  since 'elapsed 
it  had  become  one  of  the  commonplaces  of  politics, 
accepted  by  every  school  in  every  country  of  Western 
Europe,  that  the  Powers  had  committed  a  great  error 
in  1833  in  not  extending  to  far  larger  dimensions  the 
Greek  Kingdom  which  they  then  established.  In  the 
case  of  Roumania,  the  British  Government  had,  out  of 
fear  of  Russia,  insisted  in  1856  that  the  provinces  of 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia  should  remain  separate :  the 


522. -"X  MODERN  EUROPE.  1878. 


result  was  that  the  inhabitants  in  defiance  of  England 
effected  their  union,  and  that  after  a  few  years  had 
passed  there  was  not  a  single  politician  in  England 
who  regarded  their  union  otherwise  than  with  satis- 
faction. If  history  taught  anything  in  the  solution 
of  the  Eastern  question,  it  taught  that  the  effort  to 
reserve  for  the  Sultan  a  military  existence  in  countries 
which  had  passed  from  under  his  general  control  was 
futile,  and  that  the  best  barrier  against  Russian  in- 
fluence was  to  be  found  not  in  the  division  but  in 
the  strengthening  and  consolidation  of  the  States 
rescued  from  Ottoman  dominions. 

It  was  of  course  open  to  English  statesmen  in  1878 
to  believe  that  all  that  had  hitherto  passed  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  had  no  bearing  upon  the  problems  of 
the  hour,  and  that,  whatever  might  have  been  the  case 
with  Greece,  Servia,  and  Roumania,  Bulgaria  stood  on 
a  completely  different  footing,  and  called  for  the  appli- 
cation of  principles  not  based  on  the  .experience  of  the 
past  but  on  the  divinations  of  superior  minds.  Should 
the  history  of  succeeding  years  bear  out  this  view, 
should  the  Balkans  become  a  true  military  frontier  for 
Turkey,  should  Northern  Bulgaria  sink  to  the  condition 
of  a  Russian  dependency,  and  Eastern  Roumelia,  in 
severance  from  its  enslaved  kin,  abandon  itself  to  a 
thriving  ease  behind  the  garrisons  of  the  reforming 
Ottoman,  Lord  Beacon sfield  will  have  deserved  the 
fame  of  a  statesman  whose  intuitions,  undimmed  by 
the  mists  of  experience,  penetrated  the  secret  of  the 
future,  and  shaped,  because  they  discerned,  the  destiny 


1878.  UNION  OF  BULGARIA.  523 

of  nations.     It  will  be  the  task  of  later  historians  to 
measure  the  exact  period  after  the  Congress  of  Berlin' 
at   which  the  process  indicated  by  Lord   Beaconsfield 
came  into   visible  operation ;    it  is    the  misfortune  of 
those  whose  view  is  limited  by  a  single  decade  to  have 
to  record  that  in  every  particular,  with  the  single  ex- 
ception   of    the    severance    of    Macedonia    from    the* 
Slavonic   Principality,  Lord  Beaconsfield's   ideas,    pur- 
poses, and  anticipations,  in  so  far  as    they  related  to 
Eastern   Europe,    have   hitherto  been   contradicted  by 
events.     What  happened  in  Greece,  Servia,  and  Rou- 
mania  has  happened  in  Bulgaria.     Experience,  thrown 
to  the  winds  by  English  Ministers  in  1878,  has  justified 
those  who  listened  to  its  voice.     There  exists  no  such 
thing  as  a  Turkish  fortress  on  the  Balkans ;  Bourgas 
no  more  belongs  to  the    Sultan  than   Athens  or  Bel- 
grade ;    no  Turkish  soldier  has  been  able  to  set  foot 
within  the  territory  whose  very  name,  Eastern  Rou- 
melia,  was  to  stamp  it  as  Turkish  dominion.     National 
independence,   a   living   force  in  Greece,  in  Servia,  in 
Roumania,  has  proved  its  power  in  Bulgaria  too.     The 
efforts  of  Russia  to  establish  its  influence  over  a  people 
liberated  by  its  arms   have  been  repelled  with  unex- 
pected firmness.     Like  the  divided  members  of  Rou- 
mania, the  divided  members  of  Bulgaria  have  effected 
their  union.      In  this  union,  in  the  growing  material 
and  moral  force  of  the  Bulgarian  State;  Western  Europe 
^    sees  a  power  wholly  favourable  to  its  own  hopes  for  the 
future  of  the  East,  wholly  adverse  to  the  extension  of 
Russian    rule :    and   it   has    been    reserved    for    Lord 


MODERN  EUROPE.  1878. 

Beacons  field's  colleague  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin, 
regardless  of  the  fact  that  Bulgaria  north  of  the 
Balkans,  not  the  southern  Province,  created  that 
vigorous  military  and  political  organisation  which 
was  the  precursor  of  national  union,  to  explain  that 
in  dividing  Bulgaria  into  two  portions  the  English 
Ministers  of  1878  intended  to  promote  its  ultimaj£__ 
unity,  and  that  in  subjecting  the  southern  half  to 
the  Sultan's  rule  they  laid  the  foundation  for  its 
ultimate  independence. 


THE    END. 


INDEX. 


Abdallah,  Pasha  of  Acre ;  quarrel  with 
Viceroy  of  Egypt,  ii.  442 

Abdul  Medjid,  succeeds  Mahmud  II. 
as  Sultan  of  Turkey,  ii.  454 

Abercromby,  Sir  Ralph,  British  ad- 
miral, i.  195,  235 

Aberdeen,  Lord ;  despatches  on  the 
b«ttle  of  Leipzig,  i.  519  (note) ; 
(Foreign  Secretary,  1846),  declines 
to  assent  to  the  proposed  Spanish 
marriages,  ii.  504  ;  friendship  to- 
wards the  Emperor  Nicholas,  iii. 
182;  policy  towards  Russia  and 
Turkey  (1853),  193;  refuses  King 
Frederick  William's  request  for  a 
guarantee  against  an  attack  from 
France,  203 ;  resignation  of  pre- 
miership, 219 

Abisbal;  his  conspiracy  in  the  army 
of  Cadiz,  ii.  173 

Aboukir,  Bonaparte's  victory  over 
Turks  at,  i.  200;  landing  of 
English  troops  at,  235 

Aero,  Siege  of,  ii.  443  :  captured  by 
Sir  Charles  Napier,  460 

Acte  Additionnel  ( France),  ii.  43 

A ilana,  given  to  Viceroy  of  Egypt  by 
Turkey,  ii.  446 

Addington,  Mr.,  Speaker  of  the  House 
of  Commons,  i.  240 ;  his  govern- 
ment's hostility  to  Bonaparte,  266  ; 
leads  a  section  of  the  Tory  party, 
311 

Adrianoplo,  Peace  of,  ii.  343 ;  entry 
of  Russians  into,  iii.  505 

^gean  Islands,  ii.  247,  287 

Aggrandisement,  Schemes  of,  advanced 
by  European  allies  (1793),  i.  77,  78 

Agram,  iii.  66,  67,  69 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  Conference  of.  ii.  131 

Albert,  French  Republican ;  excluded 
from  National  Assembly,  iii.  38 

Albrecht,  Archduk.-,  iii.  400 

Albuera,  Battle  of,  i.  447 

Alessandria,!.  182,  221 


Alexander  I.,  Emperor  of  Russia,  i. 
232 ;  pacific  proposals  to  England, 
233 ;  secret  treaty  with  France 
(1801),  251 ;  distrust  of  Bonaparte, 
274 ;  rupture  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Bonaparte,  278 ;  treaty 
with  King  of  Prussia  at  Potsdam, 
292 ;  seeks  the  help  of  England 
against  France,  343 ;  cordial  rela- 
tions with  the  King  of  Prussia, 
344 ;  interview  with  Napoleon  on 
the  Niemen,  346  ;  conspiracy  with 
Napoleon,  348 ;  meets  Napoleon  at 
Erfurt,  390 ;  breaks  off  friendly  re- 
lations with  Napoleon,  442 ;  de- 
clines to  assist  Prussia  against 
France,  458 ;  summons  Stein  to 
St.  Petersburg,  480;  enters  the 
War  of  Liberation  against  Napo- 
leon, 501 ;  arrival  at  Frankfort, 
617 ;  insists  on  Napoleon's  de- 
thronement, 523 ;  arrives  in  Paris 
and  secures  the  restoration  of  Louis 
XVIII.,  531,  532;  at  the  Congress 
of  Vienna,  ii.  22 ;  arrives  in  Paris 
after  Battle  of  Waterloo,  60;  Treaty 
of  Holy  Alliance,  63 ;  addresses 
Polish  Diet  on  his  design  to  extend 
popular  representation,  129  ;  raises 
alarm  in  Germany  by  distributing 
Stourdza's  pamphlet  on  revolution- 
ary movements,  138  ;  sale  of  rotten 
ships  to  Spain,  171 ;  proposes  joint 
action  with  regard  to  Spain  (1820), 
189 ;  his  views  with  regard  to 
Austrian  intervention  in  Italy,  194  ; 
proposes  to  send  troops  to  Spain  to 
overthrow  the  Constitution,  213; 
intervention  in  Turkey  on  behalf 
of  the  Christians,  277,  278  ;  his  re- 
fusal to  aid  the  Greeks  rouses  dis- 
content in  Russia,  315 ;  death 
(1825),  and  character,  317,  318 

Alexander  II.,  Emperor  of  Russia,  suc- 
ceeds the  Emperor  Nicholas,  iii. 


526 


MODERN   EUROPE. 


220;  liberates  the  Serfs,  330; 
meeting  at  Eeichstadt  with  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  on  the 
Eastern  Question,  488 ;  assurances 
to  Britain  respecting  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Constantinople,  490 

Alexandria :  capitulation  by  the  French 
to  the  English,  i.  236 

Alexinatz,  Capture  of,  by  the  Turks, 
iii.  489 

Alfieri,  Vittorio,  i.  114,  117 

Algiers  ;  captured  by  France,  ii.  367 

Ali  Pasha,  ii.  242,  264,  286,  295 

Alkmaar,  Battle  of,  i.  196 

Allvintzy,  Austrian  general,  defeated 
by  Bonaparte  at  Eivoli,  i.  135 

Alma,  Battle  of  the,  iii.  211 

Alsace,  German  rights  in,  i.  12  ;  France, 
fatherland  of,  50 ;  declared  to  be 
French  territory  by  Congress  of 
Vienna,  ii.  70 ;  probable  conse- 
quences had  it  been  annexed  to 
Prussia,  72 ;  civil  government 
established  by  Germans  during 
the  Franco-Prussian  war,  iii.  453  ; 
ceded  to  Germany  by  the  Treaties 
of  Versailles  and  Frankfort,  464 

Altona ;  discontent  with  Danish  rule, 
iii.  28,  30 

Amiens,  Treaty  of,  i.  238  ;  capitulates 
to  the  Prussians,  iii.  459 

Ancona,  Surrender  of,  to  troops  of 
Victor  Emmanuel,  iii.  294 

Andrassy,  Count,  negotiates  reconcilia- 
tion between  Austria  and  Hungary 
(1867),  iii.  391,  392;  opinion  on 
projected  restoration  of  German 
leadership  to  Austria,  406 ;  com- 
municates with  St.  Petersburg  and 
Berlin  on  a  line  of  policy  towards 
the  Porte,  478 

"  Andrassy  Note,  The,"  iii.  478 

Angouleme,  Duchess  of,  i.  534,  ii.  59, 
98,  114 

Angouleme,  Duke  of,  leads  the  French 
troops  in  the  invasion  of  Spain 
(1823),  ii.  219 

Antonelli,  Cardinal,  minister  of  Pius 
IX.,  iii.  110,  273 

Antony,  Prince,  appointed  Prussian 
prime  minister,  iii.  306 

Antwerp,  taken  by  the  French,  i.  93 ; 
failure  of  English  expedition 
against,  428 ;  bombardment  by 
French  and  English,  389 

Apostolicals  (See  Carlists) 

Arcola,  Battle  of,  i.  134 

Ardcihiin,  iii.  512 

Armatoli,  The,  ii.  247 

Armenia,  iii.  512 


Armistice,  between  France  and  Sar- 
dinia (1796),  i.  119;  Bonaparte 
and  King  of  Naples  (1796),  123; 
Bonaparte  and  the  Pope  (1796),  123 ; 
Duke  of  Wiirtemberg  and  the 
French  (1796),  127;  Naples  and 
France  (1798),  175  ;  Austria  and 
France  (1800),  222;  (secret)  Em- 
peror of  Austria  and  France  (1800), 
223  ;  Austria  and  France  at  Steyer 
(1800),  225;  England  and  Den- 
mark (1801),  232;  Austria  and 
France  after  the  Battle  of 
Austerlitz  (1805),  297  ;  Russia 
and  France  after  the  Battle  of 
Friedland  (1807),  345;  Znaim 
(1809),  Austria  and  France,  425; 
France,  Russia,  and  Prussia  (1813), 
495 ;  Austria  and  Sardinia  at 
Vigevano  (1848),  iii.  62;  Malmo, 
Denmark  and  Prussia  (1848),  117; 
Garibaldi  and  the  Neapolitans 
(1860),  286;  Denmark,  Austria, 
and  Prussia  (1864),  351 ;  France 
and  Prussia  (1871),  463;  Servia 
and  Turkey  (1876),  489 

Arnaud,  St.,  French  officer,  conspires 
with  Louis  Napoleon  against  the 
government,  iii.  167 — 169  ;  French 
commander  in  the  Crimea,  211. 

Arndt,  the  German  poet,  i.  407  ;  pro- 
secution of,  ii.  148 ;  member  of 
German  National  Assembly,  iii.  32 ; 
Song  of  the  "Fatherland,"  ib. ;  re- 
tires from  National  Assembly,  137 

Artois,  Count  of  (afterwards  Charles 
X.),  i.  274,  531,  ii.  13 ;  heads  the 
party  of  reaction  in  1815  in  France, 
91  ;  growth  of  his  party,  94 ;  am- 
bitious projects,  160  (See  also 
Charles  X.) 

Asia  Minor,  conquered  by  Egyptians 
under  Ibrahim,  ii.  443 

Aspern,  Battle  of,  i.  421 

Asturias ;  popular  rising  against  the 
French,  i.  380. 

Athos,  Monks  of  Mount,  ii.  286 

Auerstadt,  Battle  of,  i.  329 

Augereau,  French  general,  attacks 
the  Directory,  i.  146 

Augustenburg,  Duke  of  (elder),  re- 
nounces his  claims  in  Schleswig- 
Holstein,  iii.  343. 

Augustenburg,  Duke  of  (younger) ; 
Bismarck  proposes  that  the  crown 
of  Schleswig-Holstein  should  be 
conferred  upon  the,  357 

Aurelle  de  Pakdines,  French  general, 
advances  to  the  relief  <SE  Paris,  iii. 
457 


INDEX. 


527 


Austerlitx,  Battle  of,  i.  296 

Aii-tm,  Dci-lanition  of  war  by  France 
against  (1792),  i.  2  ;  ultimatum  to 
nice,  12;  state  of,  before  the 
war  of  1792,  18  —  30;  reforms 
of  Maria  Theresa,  21 ;  reforms  of 
Joseph  II.  in,  22  ;  under  Leopold 
II.,  25;  under  Francis  II.,  27; 
greed  for  territory  in,  29;  open- 
ing of  war  against  France,  41 ; 
allied  to  Prussia,  42  ;  defeats 
French  at  Neerwinden,  68  ;  schemes 
of  aggrandisement,  76 ;  invests 
Cambray  and  Le  Quesnoy,  78 ; 
defeated  at  Wattignies,  81;  in- 
difference to  English  plans  for 
Bourbon  restoration,  86  ;  breach 
with  Prussia  after  the  partition  of 
Poland,  86 ;  defeated  by  French  at 
Worth  and  Weissenburg,  87 ;  de- 
feated by  Bonaparte  on  the  Mincio, 
122 ;  retires  before  the  French  in 
Italy,  126;  invaded  by  the  French, 
126  ;  treaty  with  France  at  Leoben, 
138 ;  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio  with 
Franco,  147  ;  renewal  of  war  with 
France,  177 ;  defeats  France  at 
Stockach  and  Magnano,  179,  181  ; 
designs  in  Italy,  185  ;  jealousy  to- 
wards Russia,  192  (note) ;  end  of 
alliance  with  Russia,  195;  reply 
to  Bonaparte's  proposal  for  peace, 
216 ;  resumption  of  hostilities  with 

«  France,  217;  defeated  at  Hohen- 
linden,  225 ;  interests  in  Germany, 
249;  state  in  1805,  282—283; 
occupies  Bavaria,  287 ;  surrender 
of  army  to  the  French  at  Ulm, 
289 ;  the .  French  occupy  Vienna, 
293  ;  defeated  at  Austerlitz,  296  ; 
loss  of  territory,  300 ;  prepares 
for  war  against  France,  402 ;  in- 
vasion of  Bavaria,  410:  defeated 
by  Napoleon  at  Landshut  and 
tggmuhl,  415;  Napoleon  enters 
Vienna,  416 ;  conquests  in  Poland 
and  Italy,  417  ;  defeats  the  French 
at  Aspern,  421 ;  defeated  by  Napo- 
leon at  Wagram.  425 ;  peace  with 
Franco,  430 ;  losses  by  the  Peace 
of  Vienna,  430 ;  alliance  with 
Napoleon,  460 ;  attitude  towards 
Napoleon  in  1813,  496  ;  Treaty  of 
Reichenbach,  499;  enters  the  war 
against  France,  501 ;  defeated  at 
Dresden,  505 ;  results  of  Napoleon's 
wars,  545  ;  its  gains  by  the  Settle- 
ment of  1814,  ii.  4;  Congress  of 
Vienna,  20—31,  38;  MetU-rnich's 
statesmanship,  82 — 86  ;  the  Em- 


peror's resistance  to  progress,  82 ; 
Conference  of  Aix-l.i-t'h.qi.'llc,  131 
— 133;  Conservative  principles  of 
Metternich,  135;  proposed  inter- 
vention in  Italy,  192 ;  invades 
Italy,  201 ;  policy  towards  Tur- 
key in  1821,  279;  intervention 
in  Papal  States  for  suppression  of 
revolt  (183-1),  402;  second  inter- 
vention in  Papal  States,  404  ;  with- 
draws from  Papal  States  (1838), 
405 ;  rule  in  Italy,  467 ;  occupies 
Ferrara,  473;  rule  in  Hungary, 
476  —  482;  death  of  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph,  and  accession  of 
Ferdinand,  482 ;  rural  system  in 
Hungary,  491 ;  insurrection  of 
Poles  in  Galicia,  493  ;  Rural  Edict 
(1846),  494;  revolution  at  Vienna, 
1848,  iii.  6  ;  fall  of  Mettornich,  8  ; 
Hungarian  deputation  received  by 
the  Emperor,  9 ;  accepts  Hun- 
garian scheme  of  independence, 
1 1 ;  autonomy  promised  to  Bohemia, 
14 ;  insurrection  in  Lombardy  and 
Venice,  15,  16 ;  general  war  in 
Italy  against  Austrian  rule,  17,  18 ; 
Constitution  published,  50  ;  agita- 
tation  in  Vienna,  ib. ;  night  of  the 
Emperor,  52 ;  further  riots  of 
students  and  workmen,  52,  53 ; 
riots  at  Prague,  54 ;  campaign 
around  Verona,  55 ;  re-conquest  of 
Venetia,  60 ;  Emperor  returns  to 
Vienna  from  Innsbruck,  62; 
revolt  in  Croatia,  63 — 69 ;  Emperor 
dissolves  Hungarian  Parliament, 
and  declares  its  acts  null  and  void, 
74 ;  tumult  at  Vienna,  76 ;  flight 
of  the  Emperor  to  Olmiitz,  77 ; 
General  Windischgratz  subdues  the. 
revolt  at  Vienna,  79  ;  abdication  of 
the  Emperor,  and  accession  of  his 
nephew  Francis  Joseph  I.,  81 ; 
the  Unitary  Constitutional  Edict 
(March,  1849),  83;  occupation  of 
Pesth,  86 ;  Constitution  published 
by  Schwarzenberg,  88  ;  driven  from 
Hungary,  88 ;  subdues  Hungary, 
95 ;  overthrows  Sardinian  army  at 
Novara,  100 ;  surrender  of  Venice  to, 
112 ;  proposed  connection  with  Ger- 
many at  the  Frankfort  Parliament, 
127  ;  refuses  to  recognise  the  Ger- 
man Federal  Union,  142 ;  proposes 
a  conference  at  Frankfort  to  discuss 
question  of  union,  143 ;  restores  the 
Diet  of  Frankfort,  145;  conflict 
with  Prussia  respecting  affairs  in 
Hesse-Cassel,  145—148;  demands 


528 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


,are  granted  by  Prussia  respecting 
Hesse,  147;  condition  after  1851, 
154 — 156;  concessions  to  the  Pa- 
pacy, 155 ;  policy  towards  Russia  on 
outbreak  of  Crimean  War,  200; 
Conference  of  Vienna,  May,  1855, 
221  ;  mediates  between  Eussia  and 
European  allies  after  fall  of 
Sebastopol,  228  ;  its  government  of 
Central  and  Southern  Italy  de- 
nounced by  Count  Cavour  at  the 
Paris  Conference,  249 ;  rupture 
with  Sardinia,  251;  declaration 
of  war  by  France  and  Sardinia, 
259;  defeated  at  the  Battles  of 
Magenta  and  Solferino,  261,  263; 
peace  concluded  with  France 
and  Sardinia  at  "Villafranca,  265  ; 
opposition  to  the  union  of  Italy 
under  Victor  Emmanuel,  298  ; 
state  of  affairs  after  1859,  and  crea- 
tion of  Central  Council,  322,  323  ; 
diploma  published  for  restoring  to 
Hungary  its  old  Constitution,  324  ; 
Hungary  resists  the  establishment 
of  a  Central  Council,  325 ;  the 
Reichsrath  assembles  at  Vienna 
(1861),  327;  progress  of  Parlia- 
mentary system,  328  ;  troops  enter 
Schleswig  conjointly  with  the 
Prussians,  350 ;  secures  Schleswig- 
Holstein  in  conjunction  with  Prus- 
sia by  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  353  ; 
refuses  to  attend  proposed  Euro- 
pean Congress,  and  bids  the 
Federal  Diet  take  over  the  con- 
trol of  Schleswig-Holstein,  369, 
370 ;  commencement  of  war  with 
Prussia,  373 ;  defeated  by  Prussia 
at  Koniggriitz,  376 ;  victories  of 
Custozza  and  Lissa,  377  ;  terms  of 
peace  with  Prussia  (1866),  376-379  ; 
settlement  of  conflict  with  Hungary 
after  the  Battle  of  Koniggriitz, 
387-392 ;  defensive  alliance  with 
Italy,  410;  "  League  of  the  Three 
Emperors,"  476;  treaty  with 
Russia  at  Reichstadt  on  the  Eastern 
Question,  488  ;  acquires  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  at  the  Congress  of 
Berlin,  519 

Avignon,  Claims  of  the  Pope  in,  i. 
13 

Azeglio,  Sardinian  minister,  iii.  243 ; 
envoy  to  Bologna,  262  ;  provides 
for  the  defence  of  Romagna  against 
Austria,  267;  Admiral  Persano 
refers  his  diary  to,  292  (note)  ; 
views  regarding  exclusion  of  Rome 
from  Italian  Kingdom,  299 


Bach,  Alexander  (Austrian  minister), 
negotiates  the  Concordat  with  the 
Papacy,  iii.  155 

Badajoz,  Capture  of,  by  the  Duke 
of  Wellington,  i.  448 

Baden,  entered  by  French  troops,  i. 
127 ;  formation  of  a  Constitution, 
ii.  144  ;  Liberal  sentiments  of  the 
sovereign,  411 ;  Republican  rising 
(1848),  iii.  30  ;  insurrection  (Sept- 
ember, 1848),  119  ;  the  government 
of  the  Grand  Duke  accepts  the 
Frankfort  Constitution,  136 ;  Re- 
publican insurrection,  ib.,  138; 
insurrection  quelled  by  Prussian 
troops  after  fall  of  Rastadt,  138 

Bagration,  Prince,  Russian  comman- 
der, i.  462,  464 

Baird,  General,  i.  236,  396 

Bayazid,  iii.  498 

Balaclava,  iii.  213;  Battle  of,  215; 
Charge  of  the  Light  Brigade  at, 
216 

Balance  of  Power  in  Germany,  i.  40  ; 
in  Europe  after  the  Treaty  of 
Basle,  97 ;  after  the  English  vic- 
tories in  Egypt,  237;  Austrian 
defence  of,  404 

Balearic  Islands,  offered  by  Napoleon 
to  Great  Britain,  i.  368 

Balkans,  Russian  advance  on  the,  iii. 
498 

Bapaume,  iii.  459 

Barclay  de  Tolly,  Russian  commander, 
i.  462,  464,  466,  467 

Baring,  Mr.,  Secretary  of  English 
Legation  at  Constantinople  ;  report 
on  Bulgarian  massacres,  iii.  482 

Barras,  M.,  French  Director,  i.  199, 
202 

Barthelemy,  M.,  member  of  French 
Directory,  i.  144 :  seized  by  Auge- 
reau's  troops,  146;  ambassador  at 
Berne,  160 

Basle,  Treaty  of,  i.  96 

Basque  Provinces,  centre  of  Carlist 
rebellion  (1834),  ii.  431 ;  immunity 
from  customs-dues,  432 

Bastille,  The,  i.  44 

Batoum,  iii.  512 

Batthyany,  Count,  instructed  to  form 
a  National  Ministry  in  Hungary, 
iii.  10 ;  publishes  Emperor  of 
Austria's  order  suspending  Jellacic 
from  office,  68 ;  resigns  office,  73  ; 
sentenced  to  death,  96 

"Battle  of  the  Nations"  (Leipzig),  i. 
5lo 

Bautzen,  Battle  of,  i.  494 

Bavaria,  Weakness  of  (1792),  i.  16; 


INDEX. 


529 


designs  of  Francis  II.  on,  28 ;  entered 
by  French  troops,  127  ;  treaty  with 
Bonaparte,  250 ;  reforms  under 
Montgelas,  255 ;  occupied  by  the 
Austrians,  287 ;  invaded  by  Aus- 
t  riai is,  410  ;  surrenders  Innsbruck 
to  the  Tyrolese,  413  ;  obtains  Salz- 
burg, 430  ;  joins  the  Allies  in  War 
of  Liberation,  511  ;  formation  of 
a  Constitution,  ii.  144  ;  disturb- 
ance in  the  Palatinate,  408 
r.ityuzid,  iii.  512,  519 
B.iylen,  Capitulation  of,  i.  384 
Bayonne,  meeting  of  Napoleon  and 
Prince  Ferdinand  of  Spain,  i.  376 ; 
Napoleon's  Spanish  Assembly,  380 
Bazaine,  Marshal,  French  commander 
of  the  army  of  the  Rhine,  iii.  438, 
439  ;  defeated  by  the  Prussians  at 
Mars-la-Tour,  440 ;  defeated  at 
Gravelotte,  441 ;  retires  with 
army  to  Metz,  442 ;  inaction  at 
Metz,  and  probable  intrigues  for 

ersonal  power,  454 ;  surrenders 
etz  to  the  Prussians,  455 ;  tried 
by  court-martial  and  sentenced  to 
death,  ib. ;  the  Nemesis  of  the 
moral  indifference  and  servility  of 
the  French  Empire,  457 

Beaconsfield,  Lord,  Eastern  Policy 
and  distrust  of  Russia,  iii.  484 — 
487  ;  war-speech  at  Guildhall  ban- 
quet, 491 ;  represents  England, 
•',  with  Lord  Salisbury,  at  the  Con- 
gress of  Berlin,  517 ;  policy  in 
severing  Macedonia  from  Bulgaria, 
520  ;  his  anticipations  relative  to 
Eastern  Europe  so  far  contradicted, 
523 

Beauharnais,  Eugene,  i.  303,  485 

Beaulieu,  Austrian  general,  i.  118,  119, 
122 

Beccaria  on  "  Crimes  and  Punish- 
ments," i.  113 

Beethoven  entertains  members  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  ii.  21 

Belcredi,  Count,  Austrian  minister,  iii. 
387 

Belgium,  under  Austria,  i.  50 ;  French 
victories,  92  ;  united  to  Holland  at 
Congress  of  Vienna,  ii.  70 ;  revolu- 
tion of  August,  1830,  383 ;  separated 
from  Holland,  384 ;  influence  of 
France  and  Talleyrand,  384,  385 ; 
independence  recognised  by  the 
Conference  of  London,  386;  Due 
de  Nemours  elected  king,  and 
shortly  retires  at  the  instigation  of 
Louis  Philippe,  387 ;  Prince  Leopold 
of  Saxe-Coburg  elected  king,  i*. ; 

/   7 


settlement  of  the  frontier,  388 ; 
project  of  France  for  its  acquisi- 
tion, iii.  384 ;  proposal  to  cede 
Belgic  territory  to  France  in  return 
for  Luxemburg,  402 

Bolliard,  French  general,  i.  236 

Bern,  Hungarian  general,  defeats  the 
Austrians,  iii.  89  ;  defeated  by 
Austrians  at  Temesvar,  95 

Benedek,  Austrian  general,  iii.  263, 
374 ;  destruction  of  his  army  at 
Koniggriitz,  376 

Benedetti,  Count,  French  ambassador 
at  Berlin,  report  on  the  French 
project  for  the  acquisition  of  Bel- 
gium, iii.  384,  385,  note  ;  inter- 
view with  the  King  of  Prussia  at 
Ems  respecting  the  candidature  of 
of  Prince  Leopold  for  the  Spanish 
throne,  416 

Bennigsen,  Russian  general,  i.  341 ; 
defeated  by  the  French  at  Fried- 
land,  345 ;  leads  the  Russian  re- 
serves during  the  War  of  Libera- 
tion, 512 

Bentinck,  Lord  W.,  on  Murat's  du- 
plicity, i.  537,  note ;  English 
representative  in  Sicily;  forces 
King  Ferdinand  to  establish  a 
Parliament,  ii.  87 

Benvenuti,  Cardinal,  ii.  400,  404 

Beranger  on  Bonaparte's  return  to 
France,  i.  201 ;  Napoleonic  lyrics, 
iii.  44 

Beresford,  English  commander  in 
Portugal,  ii.  186 

Beresina,  Passage  of  the,  by  Napoleon, 
i.  476 

Berlin,  entry  of  Napoleon,  i.  332 ;  fight 
between  the  French  and  Cossacks, 
485 ;  evacuation  by  the  French, 
486 ;  revolutionary  movement  of 
March,  1848,  iii.  19;  conflict  be- 
tween the  people  and  troops,  21 ; 
the  King  rides  through  the  streets 
in  the  character  of  German  leader, 
23 ;  opening  of  Prussian  National 
Parliament,  33 ;  riots  against  the 
Assembly  (Sept.  1848),  119,  120; 
Conference  of  1849,  139;  opening 
of  the  first  Parliament  of  the 
German  Empire,  March,  1871,  468 ; 
Congress  of  (1878),  518 

Berlin  Memorandum,  The,  rejected  by 
England,  iii.  481 

Bernadotte,  Crown  Prince  of  Sweden  ; 
alliance  with  Russia,  i.  463  ;  enters 
the  War  of  Liberation,  612 

Bernadotte,  French  general,  com- 
mands the  army  in  Hanover,  L 


530 


CODERS'  EUROPE. 


286;  HuihtHi  Prussian  territory, 
291 ;  commands  troops  against 
Russia,  341 

Bernard,  Pass  of  the  Great  SL,  L  219 

Berne,  L  161 

Bernstorff,  Count,  PiaMiin  envoy  at 
the  Conference  of  London  (1864), 
iiL  351 

Berry,  Murder  of  Duke  of,  iL  15S 

Berthier.  General,  leads  French  troops 
into  Rome,  L  164 

Besika  Bay,  iiL  194;  despatch  of 
English'fleet  to,  4S1,  507 

Bessarabia;  gained  bv  Russia  in  1814, 
fi.4 

Bessiem,  Marshal  (French),  defeats 
the  Spanish  at  Rio  Seoo,  L  3S3 

BflBBeres.  Spanish  insurgent,  iL  219 

Beust,  Count,  iiL  152 :  Saxon  minis- 
ter at  the  Conference  of  London 
(1864),  351 ;  Austrian  Minister,  391 : 
his  •«  «!"•"••  A  with  Hungarv,  i  J. : 
suggests  the  union  of  Luxemburg- 
with  Belgium.  401 ;  arranges  de- 
fensive  ^T^fir  with  Italv,  410 : 
disuiiiapd  from  office  at  the  insti- 
gation of  Bismarck.  476 

Tfiaiiiti,  meeting  at  Napoleon  JLLL.  and 
Bismarck.  iiL  3S9 

Bflbao,  iL  433 ;  besieged  by  the  Car- 


.          . 

Bismarck.    Prince,     succeeds    Prince 
Hinhfalnte  a*  Prime  Minister,  iiL 
-  -          -_-•-'-     :~      -.;•  .'.-.--  -----      -  i 

monarchical  tendencies.  31-3  —  315; 
policy  of  "Blood  and  Iron,"  317  ; 
reaches  to  levy  taxes  without  a 
~~  •  .-  :.  -  ~  :..  -.:---.'-:  :lr 
Press,  321  ;  nrtahlishan  friendly  re- 
lations with  Russia,  329;  hostility 
towaids  Poland,  342  ;  -**it™fat 
'  "  :  --  I  .  :.:  .  .:£  r.  tlr  :•  ::  - 
Redaiek  TIF^  343;  statecraft 
respectmg  Schleswig-Holstein,  346, 
349,  355  —  358  ;  names  conditions  on 
' 


_  >  -  ••-.--"    -•:-    -.        . 

be  giren  to  the  Prince  of 
Aofnstenbnrg.  357;  •nets  Xapo- 
teon  ILL  at  «—^t-,  359:  seeks 
co-opentiaB  of  Italy  in  war  against 
Ansbia,  364;  proposes  to  summon  a 
German  Parliament,  966;  reply  to 
Ttapofeon  IIL  on  his  demand  tor 
Ae  cession  of  the  UWainli  Pro- 
TmceE,  368;  orders  troops  to  enter 
Holstein  on  ilaaliia's  infa^iiig  to 
attend  the  proposed  European  (W 
:  -  :  -  '.'••- 
:_>  I;:-.  .:'- 
:::  ft* 


370:  his 

States,   it.; 
tempted,  371;  his 


acquisition  of  toiiiliiij  after  the 
war  with  Austria,  378,  379  ;  views 
on  the  project  of  Napoleon  HI.  for 
the  acquisition  of  Belgium,  3S4; 
popularity  after  the  Battle  of 
KSniggratz,  3S6;  treatment  of 
cess;on 


of  Luxemburg  to  France,  401  ; 
triumph  of  his  statesmanship  in  the 
strensth  and  success  01  vuo  Cjeiman 
army,  432  ;  meets  Napoleon  ILL  at 
Sedan,  446;  meets  IL  Jules  Favre 


for  peace,  450;  requires  the  surren- 
der of  Strasburg  and  Tool,  t*.  ; 
meets  Thiers  at  Versailles  to  arrange 
terms  of  peace,  464  ;  requires  the 
cession  of  Alsace  and  Eastern  Lor- 
raine, and  payment  of  six  milliards 
francs  as  the  basis  of  peace,  it.; 
hostility  towards  the  Crown  Prince, 
466  :  policy  in  favouring  a  Repub- 
lic for  France,  475  :  assurances  to 
Russia  and  Austria,  475,  476;  policy 
at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  518 

F.lake,  Spanish  general,  L  394 

liLinc,  Louis,  iL  510;  member  of 
French  Provincial  Government 
(1848),  iiL  31  ;  excluded  from  Na- 
tional Assembly,  38 

BMcher,  General;  capitulates  at 
Labeck,  L  331  ;  leads  Prussian 
army  against  Napoleon,  491  ;  heads 
division  of  Russians  and  Prus- 
sians, 502,  506,  512,  514  ;  attacks 
Xapoleon  in  France,  522  ;  head  of 
Prussian  Imp*  (1815),  iL  49  ;  de- 
feated at  Lagny  by  Napoleon,  50  ; 
his  action  at  Waterloo,  52. 

Blum,  Robert,  German  Liberal;  exe- 
cuted after  revolt  of  Vienna  (1S48), 


iiL  79 


fasal 


(18H— 

1843),  iL  486,  487;  the  Czechs' 
movement  for  independence,  Hi_  13; 
dnrfiaaa  to  send  representatives  to 
^uliisMl  IsaisiUj  •iFlaiii  fn  (,  31  ; 
rebellion  at  Prague,  53,  54;  Pros- 
Bum.-Anstziflji  cftxnpBaign.  375 

Bologna;  portion  of  Cispadane  Re- 
public, i.  133;  insurrection  of  1831, 
iL  399 

Rnnapaito,  Jerome;  i  i  ig  liff  •  1  to 
marry  the  daughter  of  the  King  of 
Wurtemberg,  by  his  trother  Xapo- 
leon,  L  303;  Kingdom  of  Weat- 
phalia  given  to  hun,  347;  flight 
mam  Woatol 


, 

Bonaparte,  Joseph;  Frend  ambassa- 
dor at  Borne,  L  163;    represent* 


ISDEX. 


m 


France  at  the  peace  conference*  at 
Amiens,  242  :  Naples  given  to  him, 
301;  made  King  of  Spain,  381; 
flight  from  Madrid,  384;  second 
flight,  449  ;  defeated  at  Yittoria  by 
Wellington,  520 

Bonaparte,    Louis;     made    King    of 
Holland,    L   302;    abdication  and 


. 

Bonaparte,  Lucien,  L  202,  203 
Bonaparte,  Napoleon  (See  Napoleon) 
Boncampagni,     Sardinian    envoy,   iii-  • 

261 
Bordeaux  ;  takes  arm*  against  Paris,  i 

71:    French    National     Assembly 

opened  at  (1871),  iii.  463 
Borodino,  Battle  of,  i.  468 
Bosnia,   takes  arms    against  Turkey, 

iii.  238  ;  handed  over  to  Austria  at 

the  Congress  of  Berlin  (1877)  519 
Bosphoros,  The  ;  rule  for  passage  of 

war-ships    agreed    upon    by    the 

Powers,  iL  462 
Bxlogne,  Army  of,  i.  284 
Bourbaki,  General,  commands  French 

army  of  the  East,  and  is  defeated  by 

the   Germans  at  Montbeliard,  iii. 

461,  462 
Bourdonnaye,  La  :  member  of  French 

House  of  Representatives,  iL  101, 

102  ;   miniatAT  under  Charles  X., 

361 
Bourmont,  General;  French  minister, 

iL   361  ;    campaign  against  fa^^i 

365;  captures  Algiers,  367 
Braganza,  House  of,  L  356 
Brandenburg,    meeting    of    Prussian 

Parliament  at,  iii.  124 
Brandenburg,  Count  ;  Prussian  minis- 

ter (1848),  iiL  123:  death,  146 
Brazil  ;  seat  of  Portuguese  government, 

ii.  186 
Brionis,  Omer;    Turkish  commander, 

ii.  295.  297,  339 
Brisson,   French  general;    surrenders 

to  the  Tyrolese,  L  413 
Brissot,  M.,  journalist  and  Girondin 

•ember  of  Legislative  Assembly,  L 

9  ;  urges  war  against  Austria,  10 
Brune,  Marshal  ;  murdered  by  French 

Royalists  at  Mam-iHt*,  iL  93 
Brunn,  L  295 
Brunswick,   Duke  of;  his  hatred  to- 

wards  Emigrants,    L   33  ;  invades 

France,  42  ;    his    proclamation  to 

the  French,  43  ;  retreat  at  Valmy, 

43  ;    retire*  before  the  French  at 
rth,  87:  on  Prussian  policy,  299  ; 

prepares   for  a  campaign  against 

France  (1806).  317;  his  opinion  of 

ii  -2 


the  Prussian  army,  325 ;  mortally 
wounded  at  the  Battle  of  Anentadt, 
329 

Brunswick  (Younger)  Duke  of,  invades 
Saxony, L  422 

Brunswick,  Insurrection  in,  iL  407 

Buenos  Ayres;  falls  into  the  hand*  of 
tka  English,  L  369 

Bulgaria,  iL  250 ;  Turkish  massacres, 
iiL  483;  autonomy  constituted  by 
the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  510; 
provisions  of  Treaty  of  Berlin 
Misting  to,  518 

Bulow,  Prussian  general,  L  508 

Bunsen,  Count,  iiL  132;  letter  from 
King  of  Prussia  on  England's 
assistance  to  Turkey,  202,  note; 
Prussian  ambassador  at  London, 
203  ;  conflict  with  King  Frederick 
WijiyftTti^  nrwi  resignation  of  office, 
204;  hllm  fts^lfriitoiii'Wgsisa 
on  the  Emperor  Nicholas,  220,  note 

Bool,  Count;  Austrian  minister,  iiL 
201,  249 

Bnrdett,  Sir  Francis,  iL  165 

Burgoyne,  English  engineer  in  the 
Crimea,  iiL  212;  letter  to  the 
Ttmtt,  213,  note 

Burke,  Edmund,  L  63 ;  bis  description 
of  the  state  of  France,  75  ;  associa- 
tion with  Beaconsfield,  iiL  487,  note 

XltrlirV  I        COKDZDsUK&B 

British  troops  in  Portugal,  L  385 
Byron,    Lord,    iL     212,     286,    313; 
writings   excluded   from   Austria, 
495 

Cadiz,  inrestment  by  the  French,  L 

453;  conspiracy  in  Spanish  army; 

iL    172 ;  meeting  of  Cortes,   221 ; 

besieged  by  the  French,  231 
Cfrrt  ii  asHO  •>•&•%  his  plot  to  asMsc- 

inate  Bonaparte,  L  274 
Cagliari,iiL  284 
Cajaxzo,  iii.  296 
CAtaa,  Duke  of,  Yiceroy  of  Naples, 

iL  184, 200 ;  rising  against  Austrian 

Ufa,  474 


Calder,  Sir  Robert,  "K»g*Hi  admiral, 

L286 
Calderari,   Neapolitan  Society  of,  iL 

181 
|  Cambaceres,  Second  Coosnl  of  France, 

L  210 

Gunbray,  invested  by  Austrian*,  L  78 
Cambridge,  Duke  of,  his  flight  from 

Hanover,  L  271 
Camperdown,  Battle  of,  L  151 
Campo  Furmio,  Treaty  of,  L  147 


53-2 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


Canning,  George,  Mr.,  i.  343 ;  deter- 
mines to  seize  Danish  navy,  350 ; 
on  the  proposals  of  the  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  Conference,  ii.  131;  op- 
posed to  joint  intervention  with 
Allies,  190  ;  withdraws  from  office, 
191 ;  succeeds  Castlereagh  as 
Foreign  Secretary,  212;  determines 
to  uphold  the  independence  of  the 
Spanish  colonies,  227  ;  sends  troops 
to  Portugal,  231 ;  statesmanship, 
233  ;  attitude  towards  Greece,  312  ; 
Metternich's  hostility  towards  him 
for  arranging  the  Anglo-Russian 
protocol  for  intervention  in  Greece, 
323  ;  death  and  policy,  326—328 
Canning,  Sir  Stratford  (See  Lord  Strat- 
ford de  Redcliffe) 

Canrobert,  French  commander  in  the 
Crimea,  iii.  213,  224;  succeeded 
hy  Pelissier,  225 
Cape"  of  Good  Hope,  i.  237 
Capodistrias,  Foreign  Minister  of 
Russia,  ii.  195;  his  rule  in  Corfu, 
264  ;  love  for  the  Greek  cause,  267  ; 
retires  from  office,  285;  elected 
President  of  Greece,  345 ;  policy 
and  administration,  350—351  ; 
assassination,  354 

Capua,    i.    174;    surrendered    to    the 
French,  175,  iii.  292  :  surrendered 
to  Sardinian  troops,  297 
Carhonari,   Neapolitan  secret  society, 

ii.  180,  199 

Cardigan,  Lord,  iii.  216 
Carignano,  Prince  of,  ii.  204,  iii.  270  ; 

and  see  Charley  Albert 
Carinthia,  annexed  to  Napoleon's  em- 
pire, i.  430 

Carlists,  or  Apostolicals,  ii.  230,  232  ; 
rebellions,    427 ;     victories    under 
leadership  of  Zumalacarregui,  434 
Carlos,  Don,  brother  of  King  Ferdinand 
of  Spain,  head  of  clerical  party,  ii. 
176,  177  ;  claims  the  crown  of  Spain 
on  the  death  of  Ferdinand,   429 ; 
unites  with  Don  Miguel,  ib. ;   de- 
feated and  conducted  to   London, 
430 ;    reappears  in  Spain  at  head 
of  insurgents,  431 ;  victories,  435  ; 
surrender    of    troops    to    General 
Espartero,  and  end  of  war,  441 
Carlowitz,  Congress  of  Serbs   (1848), 

iii.  65 ;  patriarch  of,  89 
Carlsbad,  conference  of  ministers  (1819) 

ii.  142,  145 

Carnot,  M.,  administrator  of  French 
army,  i.  76  ;  his  policy,  80  ;  member 
of  Directory,  103;  opposes  the  rule 
of  the  Directory,  144 ;  flies  for  Jiis 


life,  146  ;  his  work  of  organisation, 
178;  protests  against  Bonaparte's 
assumption  of  the  title  of  Emperor, 
276  ;  urges  assembly  to  provide  for 
defence  of  Paris  after  battle  of 
Waterloo,  ii.  56 ;  exile  and  death, 
103 

Carrascosa,  Neapolitan  general,  ii.  183 
Carthagena,  rising  against  the  French, 

i.  380 

Casos,  taken  by  Egyptians,  ii.  303 
Cassel,  Insurrection  in,  ii.  407  ;  con- 
quered by  Prussia,  iii.  374 
Castlereagh,  Lord,  i.  343, 523 ;  represents 
England  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna, 
ii.  20,  24,  28 ;  declines  to  sign  the 
Treaty  of  Holy  Alliance,  65  ;  pro- 
poses council  of  ambassadors  for 
the  abolition  of  the  slave-trade,  76 ; 
foreign  policy  in  Sicily,  Spain,  and 
France,  87 — 90 ;  on  the  proposals 
of  the  Aix-la-Chapelle  Conference, 
132;  Conservative  policy,  164;  op- 
poses the  Czar's  proposal  for  joint 
intervention,  190 ;  death  and  cha- 
racter, 212 

Catherine  of  Russia,  her  hatred  to  the 
French  Revolution,  i.  13  ;  design 
on  Poland,  33,  57  ;  gives  Westei-n 
Poland  to  Prussia,  83  ;  death,  168 
Catholic  Emancipation  Act,  i.  240 
Caulaincourt,  French  envoy  at  the 
Congress  of  Prague,  i.  500  ;  at  the 
Congress  of  Chatillon,  523 
Cavaignac,  General,  leads  troops 
against  insurgents  in  Paris  (June, 
1848)  iii.  40  ;  rise  and  decline  of  his 
power,  43  ;  candidate  for  the  Presi- 
dency of  the  Republic,  47  ;  arrested 
by  Louis  Napoleon,  172 
Cavour,  Count,  iii.  223  ;  Prime  Minister 
of  Piedmontese  Government,  244  ; 
character  and  plans,  245,  246 ; 
Crimean  policy,  247  ;  meets  Napo- 
leon III.  at  Ploinbieres  to  negotiate 
respecting  war  with  Austria,  253  ; 
Bummons  Garibaldi  to  support  him 
in  a  war  with  Austria,  254  ;  various 
intrigues  on  behalf  of  Italian  in- 
dependence, 255 ;  accepts  British 
proposal  for  disarmament,  258  ;  dis- 
pleasure at  the  terms  of  the  Peace 
of  Villafranca,  and  resignation, 
266 ;  his  plans  for  the  union  of 
Italy,  268,  269 ;  returns  to  power, 
275  ;  agrees  to  the  cession  of  Nice 
and  Savoy  to  France,  277 ;  policy 
•with  regard  to  Naplesr,289  ;  orders 
Admiral  Persano  to  excite  insurrec- 
tion at  Naples,  290 ;  struggle  with 


INDEX. 


533 


Garibaldi,  295  ;  views  regarding  the 
transfer  of  Venice  to  Italian  King- 
dom, 300 ;  attitude  towards  the 
Catholic  Church,  301 ;  last  words 
and  death,  302  ;  character  and  great 
work  on  behalf  of  Italy,  302-304 

Ceylon,  retained  by  England  by  the 
Treaty  of  Amiens,  i.  238 

Chaloidice,  district  in  Greece,  ii.  286 

Chambord,  Comte  de  (Due  de  Bor- 
deaux), grandson  of  Charles  X.,  ii. 
376,  iii.  165,  474,  475 

Champ  de  Mai,  ii.  46 

Championnet,  French  general,  i.  172, 
173,  176 

Changarnier,  commander  of  the 
National  Guard  in  Paris,  iii.  164, 
arrested  by  Louis  Napoleon,  172 

Chansenets,  Marquis  de,  governor  of 
the  Tuileries,  ii.  17 

Chanzy,  General,  leads  the  French 
army  of  the  Loire  against  the 
Prussians  atVenddmeand  LeMans, 
iii.  461 

Charles  Albert,  King  of  Sardinia, 
defeats  Austrians  at  Goito,  iii.  55  ; 
defeated  at  Santa  Lucia,  ib.  ;  enters 
Milan,  but  retreats  on  the  advance 
of  Austrians,  61 ;  defeated  at 
Novara  and  abdicates,  100 

Charles,  Archduke,  entrusted  with  the 
defence  of  Austria  against  the 
French,!.  127;  defeats  French  at 
Amberg,  128 ;  defeats  the  French 
at  Stockach,  179;  withdraws  from 
Russian  allied  troops,  192  ;  head  of 
Austrian  military  administration, 
282 ;  replaced  by  General  Mack, 
ib. ;  proclamation  to  the  German 
nation,  409 ;  Bavarian  campaign, 
415  ;  army  defeated  by  Napoleon  at 
Abensberg,  415;  defeated  by  the 
French  at  Wagram,  425 

Charles  III.,  his  rule  in  Naples  and 
Sicily,  i.  115 

Charles  IV.  (Spain),  i.  367;  seeks 
Napoleon's  intervention,  371 ;  abdi- 
cates, 374 

Charles  X.,  king  of  France,  ii.  324; 
his  government  (1824-1827),  358- 
360  ;  dissolves  the  Chambers,  360  ; 
makes  Vicomte  de  Martignac  chief 
minister,  ib.  ;  conflict  with  ministers, 
364 ;  Ordinances  of  July,  368 ; 
abdicates  and  retires  to  England, 
376,  377  ;  death  at  Goritz,  377 

Charles,  Prince,  of  Hohenzollcrn- 
Sigmaringen,  elected  Hereditary 
Prince  of  Roumania,  iii.  237  ;  com- 
mands at  Plevna,  iii.  501 


Charlottenburg,  Convention  of,  i.  334 
Chateaubriand,  M.,  member  of  French 

Chamber     of    Deputies     ii.     96 ; 

appointed  Foreign  Minister,  217 
Chatham,     Earl     of,     commander    of 

expedition  against  Antwerp,  i.  428 
Chatillon,  Congress  of,  i.  523,  526 
Chauvelin,  French  ambassador,  expelled 

from  England,  i.  58 
Chios,   ii.   248 ;    massacre    by  Turks, 

291 
Christian  VIII.,  King  of  Denmark,  iii. 

27 
Christian  IX.,  succeeds  Frederick  VII. 

as  King  of  Denmark,  ii.  345 ;  cedes 

his  claims  in  Schleswig-Holatein  to 

Austria  and  Prussia,  353 
Christian,    Prince     (of     Gliicksburg), 

declared   heir    to    the    throne    of 

Schleswig-Holstein,    iii.    150    (Sea 

Christian  IX.) 
Chrzanowski,  commander  of  Sardinian 

army  against  Austria,  iii.  99 
Cintra,  Convention  of,  i.  385 
Circles  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  i. 

.   17 

Cisalpine  Republic,  i.  148  ;  its  dissolu- 
tion, 181 

Cispadane  Republic  in  Italy,  Creation 
of  the,  i.  133 

Ciudad,  capture  of,  by  the  Duke  of 
Wellington,  i.  448 

Civil  Code  of  Bonaparte,  i.  258,  543 ; 
abolished  in  Westphalia,  ii.  8 

Civita  Vecchia,  The  French  at,  iii.  105  ; 
occupation  by  the  French  renewed, 
408 

Clarendon,  Lord,  represents  Great 
Britain  at  the  Conference  of  Paris 
(1856),  iii  230 

Clarke,  M.,  French  Minister  of  War, 
ii.  103.  104 

Clerfayt,  Austrian  commander,  i.  94, 
97 

Clergy  (Greek),  ii.  243 

Clergy  (Romish)  ;  opposed  to  decrees 
of  National  Assembly,  i.  7 ;  their 
power  in  Austria,  20 ;  position  in 
Ecclesiastical  States,  37 ;  incite  to 
insurrection  in  Naples,  177 ;  re- 
conciliation with  Bonaparte,  260 ; 
popularity  in  the  Tyrol,  411;  im- 
prisonment of,  by  Napoleon,  in 
Papal  States,  437 ;  fanaticism  in 
Spain,  and  opposition  to  the  Cortes, 
454  ;  restored  to  power  in  Spain,  ii. 
11  ;  encroachments  in  France,  18; 
benefited  in  France  under  Richelieu's 
ministry,  107  ;  intrigues  in  Spain 
against  the  Constitution,  207 ; 


534 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


appointed  to  State  offices  in  Spain, 
223 ;  rise  of  power  in  France  under 
Charles  X.,  359 ;  decline  of  in- 
fluence in  France  under  Louis 
Philippe,  381 ;  reformation  pro- 
posed in  Italy,  471.  ^Growth  of 
power  in  Austria,  iii.  156 

Clotilde,  Princess,  iii.  253  ;  betrothed 
to  Prince  Jerome  Napoleon,  256 

Clubs,  French,  in  1791,  i.  8;  Repub- 
lican club  at  Maincz,  52 

Coalition  (1798)  between  England, 
Russia,  Turkey,  and  Naples  against 
the  French  Republic,!.  169  ;  between 
England  and  Russia  against  France, 
278 

Cobden,  Richard,  Mr.,  iii.  179 

Cobenzl,  Ludwig,  Austrian  plenipo- 
tentiary in  Italy,  i.  147;  at  the 
Congress  of  Rastadt,  156;  Prime 
Minister,  282 

Coblentz,  head-quarters  of  Emigrants, 
i.  7 

Coburg,  Prince ;  invests  Cambray  and 
Le  Quesnoy,  i.  78;  defeated  by 
French  at  Fleurus,  92 ;  replaced  by 
Clerfayt,  94 

Coclrington,  Admiral ;  attacks  Ibra- 
him's forces,  ii.  330 

Colberg,  Gallant  defence  of,  against 
the  French,  i.  342 

Collin,  Austrian  general,  occupies  free 
city  of  Cracow,  ii  492 

Cologne;  condition  in  1792,  i.  37; 
captured  by  French,  94 ;  wealth 
of  the  Elector,  254 

Commissioners  '  of  the  Convention 
(France),  i.  73 

Committee  of  Public  Safety  (France),  i. 
71 

Commune  of  Paris,  The  (1793)  ;  op- 
position  to  the  Girondins,  i.  66 ; 
crushes  Girondins,  71  ;  (1871) 
attempts  made  to  overthrow  the 
Government  of  National  Defence, 
and  to  secure  the  co-operation  of 
the  National  Guard,  iii.  469 ; 
Generals  Lecomte  and  Clement 
Thomas  seized  and  put  to  death ; 
a  revolutionary  committee  formed 
at  the  Hotel  de  Ville;  elections 
held  for  the  council ;  hostilities 
•with  the  trooj  s  of  Versailles,  470; 
slaughter  of  prisoners  and  hostages, 
and  destruction  of  public  buildings 
on  the  entry  of  the  Government 
troops  into  Paris,  471 

Concordat  of  Bonaparte,  i.  260 — 265 

Coiide,  Siege  of,  i.  70;  surrenders  to 
Austrians,  75 


Condorcet,  philosopher,  and  Girondin 
member  of  Legislative  Assembly,  i. 
9  ;  his  manifesto,  14 

Congress  of  Vienna,  ii.  20 — 31,  38; 
resumption  and  completion  after 
second  Treaty  of  Paris,  67 — 77. 

Conscription ;  in  France,  i.  76 ;  in 
Prussia,  483  ;  in  Hungary,  iii.  96 

Constant,  Benjamin,  draws  up 
Napoleon's  Acte  Additionnel,  ii.  43 

Constantine,  Grand  Duke,  ii.  318,  319  ; 
withdraws  Russian  troops  from 
Poland,  393 

Constantine,  Grand  Duke  (younger), 
appointed  Viceroy  at  Warsaw,  iii. 
334  ;  attempt  on  his  life  at  War- 
saw, 335 

Constantinople ;  execution  of  Patriarch 
and  massacre  of  archbishops  and 
Christians,  ii.  275,  276 ;  expulsion 
of  Christians  by  Mahmud  IL,  335  ; 
Conference  (1876),  iii.  493  _ 

Convention,  French,  proclaims  the 
Republic,  i.  49  ;  receives  addresses 
from  English  Radical  societies,  59  ; 
invaded  by  mob,  71 ;  change  of 
constitution,  101 ;  attacked  by 
Royalists,  and  defended  by  Bona- 
parte, 102 

Copenhagen,  Battle  of,  i.  231;  bom- 
bardment by  the  English,  351 

Corfu,  ii.  264 

Corinth,  Isthmus  of,  ii.  298 

Corsica,  i.  50 

Cortes,  Spanish,  i.  450 ;  declares  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people,  and  the 
freedom  of  the  Press,  453 ;  opposi- 
tion of  the  clergy,  454 ;  declines  to 
restore  the.  Inquisition,  ib. ;  leaders 
arrested  by  the  king,  ii.  168 ; 
summoned  (1820),  176;  retires  to 
Cadiz  on  the  invasion  of  the 
French,  221 ;  banishment  of  mem- 
bers, 223  ;  frequent  succession  of 
new,  439 ;  agrees  to  modification 
of  Constitution  of  1812,  440 

Corunna,  Battle  of,  i.  398  ;  declares 
for  a  Constitution,  ii.  175 

Council  of  Ancients  (France),  i.  202 

Council  of  Five  Hundred  (France),  i. 
203 

Council  of  State  (France),  i.  204 

Cowley,  Lord,  British  ambassador  at 
Paris,  attempts  to  mediate  between 
Austria,  France,  and  Sardinia,  iii. 
257 

Cracow,  ii.  30  ;  occupied  by  Austrians, 
492 

Crete,  ii.  288  ;  conquered  by  Egyptians, 
303  ;  rises  against  Turkey,  iii.  238 


INDEX. 


535 


Crimoan  "War,  barren  in  positive  re- 
sults, iii.  181 ;  Parliamentary  papers 
&c.,  respecting,  note,  1 83 ;  com- 
mencement of,  199;  Battle  of  the 
Alma,  211 ;  bombardment  of  Sebas- 
topol,  and  Battle  of  Balaclava,  214  ; 
Battle  of  Inkermann,  216;  loss  of 
English  troops  from  severe  winter, 
218;  Battle  of  the  Tchernaya,  226; 
capture  of  the  Malakoff  by  the 
French,  ib.  ;  fall  of  Sebastopol,  ib. 

Croatia,  Movement  in  (1848),  iii.  63—69 

Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  opposes  Bis- 
marck's measures  against  the  Press, 
321 ;  takes  part  in  the  campriiu;n 
against  Austria  (1866),  374—376  ; 
commands  southern  army  against 
the  French  (1870),  433;  defeats 
the  French  at  .Weissenburg,  434 ; 
defeats  McMahon  at  Worth,  434 ; 
at  the  Battle  of  Sedan,  446 ;  at  the 
eiege  of  Paris,  450 ;  unfriendly  re- 
lations with  Bismarck,  466 

Custine,  General,  enters  Mainz,  i.  51  ; 
defeated  in  the  Palatinate,  69 ; 
commands  army  of  the  North,  75  ; 
executed  by  RevolutionaryTribunal, 
79 

Custozza,  Battle  of,  between  Austrians 
and  Sardinians,  iii.  61 ;  second 
battle  of,  between  Austrians  and 
Italians,  377 

Cuxhaven ;  blockade  by  the  French,  i. 

,     271 

Cuza,  Prince  Alexander,  elected  Hos- 
podar  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia, 
iii.  237 ;  expelled  by  his  subjects, 
t*. 

Cyprus,  assigned  to  England  by  Tur- 
ke)',  iii.,  517 

Czartoryski,  Polish  noble,  President  of 
Provisional  Government  in  Poland, 
ii.  393 

Czechs,  The,  of  Bohemia,  iii.  1 3  ;  their 
rising  at  Prague,  53 ;  hostility  to 
Hungary,  75,  387,  391 

Czeklers,  The,  of  Transylvania,  iii.  85 

Dahlmann,  reports  on  the  armistice  of 
Malmo,  iii.  118  ;  retires  from 
National  Assembly,  137 

Dalmatia,  taken  by  France,  i.  148 ; 
won  by  Austria,  ii.  4 

Danton,  sends  the  mob  against  the 
Tuileries,  i.  44  ;  permits  the  Sept- 
ember massacre,  45,  46  ;  leader  of 
the  Mountain  party,  67  ;  attacks 
Girondins,  67 

Duntzig,  Surrender  of,  to  the  French, 
i.  342 


Danube,  Napoleon's  passage  of  the,  i. 
420  ;  second  passage,  424  ;  Russian 
passage  of  the  (1876),  iii.  497 

Danubian  Provinces  entered  by  Russian 
troops,  iii.  194 ;  evacuation  by 
Russia,  208  ;  Austrian  protection, 
ib.;  rights  and  privileges  guaran- 
teed by  the  Powers  at  the  Confer- 
ence of  Psyis  (1856),  232;  incor- 
poration with  Austria  proposed  by 
Napoleon  III.,  235 ;  Prince  Alex- 
ander Cuza  elected  Hospodar  of 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  and  after- 
wards expelled,  237 ;  Charles  of 
Hohenzollern  elected  Hereditary 
Prince  of  Roumania,  ib. 

Dardanelles,  The,  ii.  448;  entry  of 
French  and  English  fleets  (1839), 
454  ;  rule  for  passage  of  war-ships 
agreed  upon  by  the  Powers,  462  ; 
entry  of  British  and  French  fleets, 
iii.  196 

Davidovich,  Austrian  general,  i.  134 

Davoust,  General  (French),  defeats 
Prussians  at  Auerstadt,  i.  329 ; 
enters  Berlin,  332  ;  heads  the  army 
in  Bavaria,  408 

Dcak,  Hungarian  statesman,  ii.  490  ; 
leader  of  Hungarian  Assembly, 
promotes  reconciliation  with  Aus- 
tria, iii.  388,  389 

Debreczin,  Hungarian  Parliament 
meets  there,  iii.  87 

Decazes,  M.,  French  minister,  1815, 
ii.  96,  97 ;  sanguinary  measures 
respecting  the  rising  at  Grenoble, 
115;  influence  over  Louis  XVIII., 
116;  his  measures,  154;  victory 
over  ultra-Royalists,  156;  com- 
promise with  Royalists,  158 ;  dis- 
missal, 159 

Declaration,  of  Leopold  II.  and  Frede- 
rick William  II.  respecting  the 
safety  of  Louis  XVI.,  i.  4,  5;  of 
Duke  of  Brunswick  to  France,  43  ; 
of  French  Convention  to  all  na- 
tions, 54 

De  Gallo,  Austrian  envoy  to  Bonaparte, 
i.  141 

Delessart,  M.,  Foreign  Minister  of 
Louis  XVI.,  i.  12. 

Dembinski,  appointed  by  Kossuth  to 
the  command  of  Hungarian  army 
in  the  war  against  Austria,  iii.  87, 
90,  95 

Denmark;  joins  the  Northern  Mari- 
time League,  i.  228 ;  Battle  of 
Copenhagen,  231  ;  landing  of 
English  troops,  351 ;  declares  war 
against  England,  353;  loses 


536 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


Norway,  ii.  5  ;  rebellion  of 
Schleswig-Holstein,  iii.  25  ;  death 
of  King  Christian  VI II.,  and  ac- 
cession of  Frederick  VII.,  27  ;  war 
with  Prussia  respecting  Sehleswig- 
Holstein,  28 ;  armistice  of  Malmo 
with  Prussia,  117;  peace  with 
Prussia,  149 ;  death  of  Frederick 
VII.,  342  ;  accession  of  Chris- 
tian VII.,  347  ;  conflict  with 
Prussia  and  Austria  respecting 
Sehleswig-Holstein,  343-353;  hy 
Treaty  of  Vienna  King  Christian 
cedes  his  rights  in  Sehleswig-Hol- 
stein to  Prussia  and  Austria,  353. 

Dennewitz,  Battle  of,  i.  508. 

Depretis  ;  Pro-Dictator  at  Palermo, 
iii.  288  ;  resigns  office,  294. 

Derby,  Lord,  English  Foreign  Secre- 
tary (1876),  proposes  a  conference 
at  Constantinople,  iii.  490  ;  resigna- 
tion and  resumption  of  office,  .507  ; 
differences  with  Lord  Beaconsfield 
on  the  Eastern  Question,  and  re- 
signation of  office,  514. 

Diavolo,  Fra,  i.  177. 

Diebitsch,  commander  of  Russian 
forces,  ii.  340 ;  defeats  Turks  at 
Kalewtscha,  341 ;  crosses  the  Bal- 
kans, 342;  invades  Poland,  395. 

Diet  of  the  Empire,  i.  17,  154,  248- 
254 

Diet  of  Frankfort,  ii.  68  ;  passes  re- 
pressive measures,  145-150  ;  fur- 
ther repression,  410 ;  enters  upon 
reform,  iii.  4,  29 ;  extinct  from 
1848  to  1850,  143;  restored  by 
Austria,  145  ;  decrees  federal  exe- 
cution in  Holstein,  345  ;  Prussian 
demands  (1866),  366;  calls  out  the 
Federal  forces ;  Prussian  envoy 
withdraws,  370. 

Dijon,  iii.  461. 

Directory,  The  French,  i.  101,  103  : 
instructions  to  Bonaparte  regarding 
campaign  in  Italy,  121  ;  negotiates 
with  Prussia  and  Austria,  '  129  ; 
declines  proposals  of  peace  with 
England,  131  ;  party  of  opposition 
in  the,  144  ;  intimidated  by  Bona- 
parte. 144 ;  members  seized  by 
Augereau's  troops,  146 ;  reorgan- 
isation, ib. ;  consents  to  Bonaparte's 
attack  on  Egypt,  153 ;  unpopularity 
in  1799,  198  ;  its  overthrow  (1799), 
203 

Disraeli,  Mr.  B.  (See  Lord  Beacons- 
field) 

Divorce,  abolition  of,  in  France,  ii. 
107 


Dobrudscha,  The  ;  advance  of  the  Rus- 
sians into,  iii.  207;  advance  of 
1876,  499;  ceded  to  Russia  and 
given  by  Russia  to  Roumania  in 
exchange  for  Bessarabia,  512 

Domingo,  St.,  ceded  by  Spain  to  French 
Republic,  i.  96 

Donnadieu,  French  general  at  Gren- 
oble, ii.  115 

DSrnberg,  General,  revolts  against 
King  Jerome  of  Westphalia,  i.  417 

Douay,  General,  leads  French  troops 
at  Weissenburg,  and  is  defeated  and 
killed,  iii.  434 

D'Oubril;  Russian  envoy  to  Paris,  i. 
315 

Dramali ;  Turkish  commander,  ii.  295, 
297,  298,  299 

Dresden;  entry  of  Napoleon,  i.  494  ; 
battle  of,  505 ;  democratic  rising, 
iii.  135 ;  occupied  by  Prussians, 
374 

Ducos,  M.,  French  Director,  i.  201 

Dumouriez,  General,  French  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  i.  2 ;  checks 
Prussians  at  Valmy,  47  ;  proposes 
peace  to  King  of  Prussia,  47;  in- 
vades the  Netherlands,  52 ;  defeated 
by  Austrians  at  Neerwinden,  68 ; 
his  treason,  69 

Dundas,  Mr.,  retires  from  office  with 
Pitt,  i.  240 

Dunkirk  ;  besieged  by  English,  i.  78  ; 
Duke  of  York  defeated,  79 

Dupont,  French  general,  enters  Spain, 
i.  372:  defeated  at  Baylen,  384; 
Minister  of  War  (1814),  ii.  16 

Durando,  Papal  general,  iii.  56,  60 

Ecclesiastical  States  (German),  i.  37 ; 
secularisation  of,  129;  suppression 
of,  157,  252 

Ecclesiastical  System  (France),  re- 
organised by  National  Assembly,  i. 
7 

Edelsberg,  Battle  of,  i.  416 

Egypt ;  Bonaparte's  design  of  attack 
on,  i.  152 ;  failure  of  French  ex- 
pedition under  Bonaparte,  167 ; 
Bonaparte's  victory  at  Aboukir, 
200  ;  French  and  Turkish  engage- 
ments, 234  ;  capitulation  of  Cairo 
to  English,  236 ;  capitulation  of 
Alexandria  to  English,  ib. ;  con- 
quest of  Crete,  ii.  303 ;  navy  de- 
feated at  Navarino,  330 — 332  ;  war 
with  Turkey  (1832),  443—446; 
second  war  with  Turkey  (1839), 
453 

Elba,  i.  535 


INDEX. 


537 


Elgin,  Lord ;  his  report  concerning 
French  emigrants,  i.  45,  note  ;  on 
the  Battle  of  Jemappes,  64,  note ; 
on  Prussia's  designs,  77,  note ;  on 
the  French  army  in  the  Nether- 
lands, 90,  note ;  report  on  the  re- 
volutionary feeling  in  France,  131, 
note 

Elliot,  Sir  H.,  British  ambassador  at 
Constantinople,  iii.  482,  492 

Emigrant  Nobles  (France) ;  take  arms 
against  France,  i.  7  ;  head-quarters 
at  Coblentz,  7  ;  protected  by  Elector 
of  Treves,  10 ;  their  dispersal  de- 
manded by  the  Gironde,  10 ;  allied 
•with  Austria  and  Prussia  against 
France,  42;  their  cruelties,  45, 
note ;  landed  by  English  fleet  in 
Brittany,  100 ;  their  defeat  by 
General  Hoche,  100;  return  to 
France,  103,  ii.  13;  restored  to 
official  rank,  16;  granted  com- 
pensation of  £40,000,000,  359 

Ems,  iii.  416 ;  telegram  respecting 
pretended  insult  to  the  French 
Ambassador,  by  King  William 
of  Prussia,  420 

Enghien,  Murder  of  the  Duke  of,  i.  575 

England ;  alarmed  by  Decree  of  French 
Convention,  i.  55  ;  feeling  towards 
French  Revolution,  56 ;  French 
ambassador  expelled,  58  ;  war  with 
France,  59;  condition  in  1793,  59  ; 

<  sympathy  of  Fox  with  French  Revo- 
lution, 61 ;  struggle  of  George  III. 
•with  Whigs,  61  ;  attitude  of  Pitt  to- 
wards French  Re  volution,  62 ;  Burke 
denounces  the  Revolutionary  move- 
ment, 63 ;  victories  on  French 
frontier,  76  ;  driven  from  Dunkirk, 
79  ;  commands  Mediterranean  after 
the  siege  of  Toulon,  82  ;  contrast  of 
English  and  Austrian  policy,  note, 
86 ;  furnishes  a  subsidy  to  Prussia, 
88  ;  retires  from  Holland,  95 ;  at- 
tempts to  negotiate  peace  with 
France,  130;  Battles  of  St.  Vin- 
cent and  Camperdown,  151  ; 
Battle  of  the  Nile,  168  ;  coali- 
tion with  Russia,  Turkey  and 
Naples  against  France,  169  ;  com- 
bined expedition  with  Russia  against 
Holland,  195 — 197  ;  replyto  Bona- 
parte's proposal  for  peace,  216  ;  new 
proposals  rejected,  223  ;  differences 
with  Russia,  228  ;  war  with  North- 
ern Maritine  Powers,  230  ;  Battle 
of  Copenhagen,  231  ;  peace  with 
Northern  Powers,  233 ;  attacks  the 
French  in  Egypt,  235 ;  Battle  of 


Alexandria,  235 ;  takes  Cairo 
and  Alexandria,  236 ;  Treaty  of 
Amiens  with  France,  238 ;  Act  of 
Union  with  Ireland  passed,  240 ; 
National  Debt  in  1801,  241  ;  war 
with  France  (1803),  266  ;  occupa- 
tion of  Hanover  by  the  French, 
270 ;  joins  Russia  in  coalition 
'  against  France,  278 ;  Battle  of 
Trafalgar,  290  ;  attacks  the  French 
in  Italy,  302  ;  death  of  Pitt,  309 ; 
coalition  ministry  of  Fox  and 
Grenville,  310;  ships  excluded 
from  Prussian  ports,  314;  seizure 
of  Prussian  vessels,  ib.  ;  Napoleon's 
Berlin  decree  against  English  com- 
merce, 336;  fall  of  the  Grenville 
ministry  and  appointment  of  the 
Duke  of  Portland  Prime  Minister, 
343;  Treaty  of  Bartenstein,  344; 
troops  land  in  Denmark,  351  ; 
bombardment  of  Copenhagen,  tJ.  ; 
Denmark  declares  war,  353;  troops 
enter  Portugal,  385  ;  victory  over 
the  French  at  Vimieiro,  38o ;  Spanish 
campaign  (1809),  395—398  ;  defeats 
the  French  at  Talavera,  426 ;  failure 
of  expedition  against  Antwerp, 
428  ;  Spanish  Campaigns  (1810-12), 
443—449;  (1813),  519;  Duke  of 
Wellington  enters  France,  520. 
At  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  ii.  28  ; 
at  Battle  of  Quatre  Bras,  51  ; 
Battle  of  Waterloo,  53  —  56  ; 
part  taken  in  drawing  up  second 
Treaty  of  Paris,  59  —  62  ;  de- 
clines the  Czar's  Treaty  of 
Holy  Alliance,  64 ;  seeks  at  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  to  secure  aboli- 
tion of  the  Slave  Trade,  74-76; 
foreign  policy  under  Wellington 
and  Castlereagh,  86-90  ;  discontent 
from  1815  to  1819,  121 ;  Canning's 
opinion  on  the  proposals  of  the  Aix- 
la-Chapelle  Conference,  131;  refuses 
to  enter  into  a  general  league  with 
the  Allies  and  France,  133  ;  Con- 
ser vati  ve  poli  cy  of  Lord  Castlereagh , 
164;  protection  of  Portugal,  186; 
prevents  joint  diplomatic  action 
with  regard  to  Spain,  190 ;  with- 
drawal of  Canning,  191 ;  protests 
against  the  Troppau  circular, 
197;  neutral  attitude  towards 
Spanish  revolution  of  1822,  210  ; 
death  of  Castlereagh,  and  appoint- 
ment of  Canning  as  Foreign  Secre- 
tary, 212;  Congress  of  Veronn, 
215-217  ;  prohibits  the  conquest  of 
Spanish  colonies,  225;  sends  troops 


538 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


to  Portugal,  231 ;  Canning's  states- 
manship, 233;  protocol  with  Russia, 
321 ;  defeats  Turks  at  Navarino, 
330-332  ;  inaction  in  Eastern  policy 
after  the  Battle  of  Navarino,  333  ; 
Protocol  of  London  respecting  Greek 
frontier,  348 ;  Talleyrand, as  French 
ambassador  to  London,  persuades 
William  IV.  and  Wellington  to 
abstain  from  intervention  in  Belgian 
affairs,  385  ;  Conference  of  London 
recognises  the  independence  of 
Belgium,  386 ;  passing  of  the 
Reform  Bill  (1832),  419,  420;  grow- 
ing friendliness  towards  France, 
422 ;  squadron  sent  to  Portugal  to 
demand  indemnity  for  attack  on 
British  subjects,  426 ;  assists  Spain 
with  arms  and  stores  in  quelling 
Carlist  rebellion,  435  ;  fleet  sent  to 
the  Dardanelles,  454  ;  settlement  of 
Eastern  Question,  1841,  461 ;  fleet 
sent  to  Naples  on  the  occupation  of 
Ferrara  by  Austria,  473.  State  of, 
in  1851,  iii.  179  ;  repudiates  schemes 
suggested  by  Emperor  Nicholas 
respecting  disintegration  of  the 
Sultan's  dominions,  187;  policy  of 
Lord  Aberdeen  and  coalition  minis- 
try (1853),  192—194 ;  despatch  of 
fleet  to  Besika  Bay  on  the  entry  of 
Russian  troops  into  Danubian  Pro- 
vinces, 194 ;  declaration  of  war  in 
conjunction  with  France  Against 
Russia,  199  ;  demands  on  Russia  as 
the  basis  of  peace,  209 ;  troops  land 
in  the  Crimea,  210;  Battle  of  the 
Alma,  211;  Battle  of  Balaclava  and 
Charge  of  the  Light  Brigade,  215, 
216  ;  Battle  of  Inkermann,  217  ; 
loss  of  troops  in  the  Crimea  during 
the  winter  of  1854,  218 ;  mis- 
management of  the  campaign,  219; 
Lord  Aberdeen's  ministry  resigns, 
and  Lord  Palmerston  is  made  Prime 
Minister,  219;  Conference  of  Vienna 
(May,  1855),  fails  to  arrange  treaty 
of  peace  between  England  and 
Russia,  222 ;  resumption  of  the 
siege  of  Sebastopol,  223 ;  fall  of 
Sevastopol,  226 ;  treaty  of  peace 
•with  Russia  signed  at  Paris 
(1856),  230;  agreement  made  at 
Conference  of  Paris  with  re- 
gard to  the  rights  of  neutrals, 
232  ;  insists  on  division  of 
Danubian  Principalities,  326 ;  at- 
tempts to  mediate  between  A  ustria, 
France,  and  Sardinia,  256;  volun- 
teer forces,  279 ;  sympathy  with 


Italian  revolution,  298  ;  Conference 
of  London  respecting  Denmark  and 
Schleswig-Holstein,  351 ;:  vacilla- 
tion on  the  Schleswig-Holstein  ques- 
tion, 353  ;  rejects  the  Berlin  Mem- 
orandum, and  dispatches  the  fleet 
to  Besika  Bay,  481 ;  opinion  on 
Bulgarian  massacres,  483 ;  Disraeli's 
Foreign  Policy,  484-487 ;'  the  Con- 
stantinople Conference,  493-495  ; 
the  "  London  Protocol,"  496  ;  fleet 
ordered  to  Constantinople,  and  re- 
versal of  order,  507  ;  Lord  Derby's 
resignation  and  resumption  of  office, 
507 ;  Vote  of  Credit  of  £6,000,000 
for  army  purposes,  ib. ;  fleet  ordered 
to  Constantinople,  508  ;  imminence 
of  war  with  Russia,  509  ;  objections 
to  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  sum- 
med up  in  a  circular  to  the  Powers, 
514  ;  secret  agreement  with  Russia, 
517;  acquisition  of  Cyprus,  ib.; 
Congress  of  Berlin,  518 

English  Commonwealth,  i.  60 

Epirus,  ii.  354 

Erfurt;  head-quarters  of  Prussian 
army  (1806),  i.  326;  meeting  of 
Napoleon  and  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander, 390 ;  meeting- place  of  Federal 
Parliament  (1849),  iii.  141 

Erzeroum,  iii.  505 

Eski  Sagra,  iii.  499 

Espartero,  General,  totally  defeats  the 
Carlists  (1839)  ii.  441  ;  appointed 
Regent  of  Spain,  ib. ;  exiled,  442 

Etienne,  St.,  Revolt  of  working-classes 
at,  ii.  416 

Etropol,  iii.  504 

Etruria ;  ceded  to  France  by  Spain,  i. 
355 

Eugenie,  Empress,  eagerness  for  war 
with  Prussia,  iii.  420 ;  insists  on 
McMahon  marching  to  the  relief  of 
Metz,  443 ;  flight  from  Paris  after 
the  surrender  of  Napoleon  at 
Sedan,  448;  declines  the  Prussian 
conditions  of  peace,  455 

Eupatoria,  Bay  of,  iii.  210 

Evans,  Colonel  De  Lacy  ;  leads  English 
and  French  volunteers  against  the 
Carlists,  ii.  438 

Exhibition,  Great,  of  1851,  iii.  178 

Eylau,  Battle  of,  i.  341 

Faidherbe,  General,  leads  the  French 

army   of    the   North    against    the 

Prussians,  iii.  459 
Failly,    General,  defeats  Garibaldians 

at  Mentana,  iii.  408 ;  surprised  at 

Beaumont,  iii.  444 


INDEX. 


639 


Famars,  i.  70 

Farini,  Sardinian  commissioner  in 
Modena,  iii.  262;  accepts  dictator- 
ship of  Modena,  267 

Favre,  Jules,  proposes  the  deposition 
of  Napoleon  III.,  iii.  447  ;  addresses 
a  circular  to  the  European  Courts 
on  the  overthrow  of  the  Napoleonic 
Empire,  448 ;  meets  Bismarck  at 
Ferrieres  to  negotiate  for  peace, 
450 ;  meets  Bismarck  at  Versailles 
to  discuss  terms  of  an  armistice,  463 

Ferdinand,  Archduke,  i.  288 

Feidinand,  Crown  Prince  of  Spain,  i. 
368 ;  placed  under  arrest  for 
a  supposed  intrigue  with  Napoleon, 
371  ;  restored  to  the  king's  favour, 
371 ;  proclaimed  king,  374  ;  lured  to 
Bayonne,  375  ;  renounces  the  crown 
of  Spain,  376  ;  restoration  in  1814, 
ii.  9 ;  arrests  the  leaders  of  the 
Cortes,  168;  partiality  to  the 
clergy,  ib. ;  establishes  the  Constitu- 
tion, 177;  conspires  against  the 
Constitution,  207  ;  retires  to  Seville 
on  the  invasion  of  the  French,  219  ; 
annuls  the  Constitution,  222  ;  death 
(1833),  427 

Ferdinand  I.,  Emperor  of  Austria, 
succeeds  Francis  (1835),  ii.  483; 
yields  to  demands  of  students 
and  mob  respecting  the  National 
Guard,  iii.  51 ;  night  from  Vienna, 
,  62 ;  dissolves  Hungarian  Parlia- 
ment, and  declares  its  acts  null  and 
void,  74;  flight  to  Oluiiitz,  77; 
abdication,  81 

Ferdinand,  King  of  Naples,  armistice 
•with  Bonaparte,  i.  123  ;  proclama- 
tion against  the  French,  171  ; 
enters  Home,  172;  despatch  to  the 
exiled  Pope,  172  ;  flees  from  Rome, 
173;  escapes  to  Palermo  in  the 
Vanguard,  174  and  (note)  175  ; 
returns  to  Naples,  184  ;  treaty  with 
Austria,  ii.  85  ;  rule  in  Sicily,  ii.  ; 
declares  a  Constitution,  184  ;  hypo- 
crisy, 185,  note  ;  goes  to  conference 
at  Laibach,  199 

Ferdinand  II.,  King  of  Naples,  pro- 
claims a  Constitution,  ii.  474  ;  con- 
quers Sicily,  iii.  112;  his  violence 
and  oppression,  113;  death,  281 

Ferrara,  portion  of  Cispadane  Republic, 
i.  133 

Fichte,  i.  407,  441 ;  ii.  127,  149 

Fieschi,  attempt  on  the  life  of  Louis 
Philippe,  ii.  417 

Finland,  gained  by  Russia  in  1814, 
ii.  1 


Flanders,  battles  between  French  and 
allied  armies  of  England  and 
Austria,  i.  91 

Fleet,  German,  sold  by  auction,  iii.  151 

Fleury,  French  officer,  confidant  of 
Louis  Napoleon,  iii.  167 

Florence  (See  Tuscany) 

Fontainebleau,  Treaty  of,  i.  355 

Forbach,  iii.  483 

Forey,  French  general,  under  Louis 
Napoleon,  iii.  174 

Forster,  Mr.  W.  E.,  M.P.,  opposes  the 
Vote  of  Credit  for  £6,000,000  for 
army  purposes,  iii.  508 

Fouche,  M.,  appointed  to  the  head  of 
French  Provisional  Government  by 
Louis  XVIII.,  ii.  69;  f all  of  his 
ministry  in  1815,  95 

Fourier,  M.,  his  Socialistic  work,  ii. 
509 

Fox,  Mr.  C.  J.,  M.P.,  sympathy  with 
French  Revolution,  i.  61 ;  takes 
office  with  Lord  Grenville,  310; 
pacific  attitude  towards  France, 
311;  death,  343 

France ;  war  declared  against  Austria 
(1792),  i.  2;  Louis  XVI.  accepts 
Constitution  of  National  Assembly 
(1791),  5;  National  Assembly  dis- 
solved (1791),  6;  Emigrants  take 
arms  against,  7  ;  war-policy  of  the 
Gironde,  9  ;  opening  of  war  against 
Austria,  41 ;  invaded  by  Prussian 
troops,  4  '2 ;  war  against  Allies  now  a 
just  one,46;  patriotism, 46;  evacuated 
by  Prussia,  48;  declared  a  Republic 
by  Convention,  49;  the  war  be- 
comes a  crusade  of  democracy,  49  ; 
successes  of  army  in  Germany,  52  ; 
annexes  Savoy  and  Nice,  54;  execu- 
tion of  Louis  XVI.,  58 ;  war  with 
England,  59 ;  opposition  between 
Girondmsand Mountain  Party,  66— 

68  ;  treason  of  General  Dumouricz, 

69  ;  loses  former  conquests,  69  ;  out- 
break of  civil  war,  70,  71 ;  victory 
of  the  Mountain  over  Girondins,71 ; 
Committee    of   Public   Safety  ap- 
pointed, 71  ;  Reign  of  Terror,  72 — 
75 ;  conscription,  76;  Social  Equali- 
ty, 80 ;  defeats  Austrians  at  Wat- 
tignies,  81  :  victories  at  Worth  and 
Weissenbuig,  87 ;   takes  Antwerp, 
93 ;  conquers  Holland,  95 ;   treaty 
of  peace  with  Prussia  at  Basle,  96  ; 
condition  in  1795,  99  ;  Constitution 
of  1795,  101 ;  the  Directory,  Cham- 
ber, and  Council  of  Ancients,  101 ; 
opening  of  campaign  in  Italy,  118  ; 
victories  of  Bonaparte  in  Italy,  119, 


540 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


120;  invades  Germany,  126;  de- 
feats Austria  at  Arcola  and  Rivoli, 
134,  135  ;  negotiations  with  Aus- 
tria at  Leoben,  138;  elections  of 
1797,  143 ;  seizure  of  Directors,  and 
reorganisation  of  Directory,  146; 
treaty  with  Austria  at  Campo  For- 
mic, 147 ;  intervention  in  Switzer- 
land, 159;  intrigues  in  Home, 
163 ;  occupies  Rome,  164  ;  expedi- 
tion to  Egypt,  166;  defeated 
by  England  at  the  Battle  of  the 
Nile,  168;  coalition  of  1798  against, 
169;  evacuates  Rome,  172;  re- 
enters  Rome,  173;  takes  Naples, 
176;  defeated  by  Austria  at  Stoc- 
kach  and  Magnano,  179,  181 ;  de- 
feated by  Russia  on  the  Trebbia, 
182;  defeated  at  Novi,  191;  vic- 
tories over  English  and  Russians  in 
Holland,  195,  196 ;  condition  in 
1799, 198 — 200;  Bonaparte's  return 
from  Egypt,  201 ;  new  Constitution 
of  1799,"  203— 208;  the  Consulate 
of  Bonaparte,  211 — 214;  resump- 
tion of  war  against  Austria,  217; 
Peace  of  Luneville,  226;  friendly 
with  Russia,  227  ;  defeats  Turks 
at  Heliopolis,  234 ;  defeated  by 
English  in  Egypt,  235;  Treaty 
of  Amiens  with  England,  238; 
French  rule  in  Italy  and  Switzer- 
land, 244—246;  Civil  Code  and 
Concordat,  258 — 265  ;  growth  of 
Papal  power,  263  ;  war  with  Eng- 
land (1803),  '266;  Bonaparte  as- 
sumes the  title  of  Emperor,  276  ; 
coalition  of  Russia,  England,  and 
Austria,  278 ;  defeats  Austrians 
at  Ulm,  288  ;  occupation  of  Vienna, 
293 ;  Austerlitz,  296 ;  Peace  of 
Presburg,  299  ;  influence  in  Ger- 
many and  Italy,  307 ;  war  against 
Prussia,  1806,  326 — 336;  acquisition 
of  Prussian  territory,  347 ,  war 
against  Portugal,  355 ;  troops  enter 
Spain,  372 ;  war  reopened  by 
Austria,  402 ;  surrender  of  General 
Brisson's  column  to  the  Tyrolese, 
413;  Napoleon  enters  Vienna,  416; 
defeated  by  Austrians  at  Aspern, 
421;  defeats  Austrians  at  Wagram, 
425 ;  French  defeated  at  Talavera 
by  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley,  426: 
peace  with  Austria,  430 ;  Napo- 
leon's annexations  of  the  Papal 
States,  Holland,  &c.,  436 —  438  ; 
troops  enter  Portugal,  445  ;  in- 
vasion of  Russia,  462 — 477  ;  Prussia 
declares  war,  486 ;  opening  of 


the  War  of  Liberation  against 
Napoleon,  502 ;  Battles  of  Dres- 
den, Grossbeeren,  Kulm,  Leipzig, 
505  —  513  ;  invasion  -by  Prussia 
and  Allies,  519  ;  dethronement  of 
Napoleon,  531  ;  Peace  of  Paris,  536 ; 
results  of  Napoleon's  wars,  540 — 
544 ;  restoration  of  Louis  XVIII., 
531 — 533.  Character  of  Louis 
XVIII.,  ii.  12,  13;  new  Constitu- 
tion, 14  ;  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna, 
22 — 31  ;  Napoleon  leaves  Elba,  31  ; 
Napoleon  enters  Paris,  38  ;  flight 
of  King  Louis,  ib. ;  the  Acte  Ad- 
ditionnel  (1815),  42;  the  Chambers 
summoned,  44  ;  election,  45 ;  new 
Constitution,  46  ;  Battles  of  Ligny, 
Quatre  Bras,  and  Waterloo,  50 — 
55  ;  Napoleon's  flight  to  Paris,  56  ; 
Napoleon's  abdication,  55 ;  Allies 
enter  Paris,  57 ;  restoration  of 
Louis  XVIII.,  57 ;  removal  of 
Napoleon  to  St.  Helena,  58 ; 
cessions  and  indemnity  by  the 
second  Treaty  of  Paris,  62,  63; 
International  Council  of  Ambas- 
sadors meets  in  Paris  for  the 
regulation  of  French  affairs,  79 ; 
Royalist  outrages  at  Marseilles, 
Nismes,  and  Avignon,  91 — 93 ; 
Elections  of  1815,93,94  ;  reactionary 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  96 ;  execution 
of  Marshal  Ney,  98 ;  Richelieu's 
Amnesty  Bill,  101 ;  persecution  of 
suspected  Bonapartists,  103,  104, 
and  note  ;  the  ultra-Royalist  party 
adopts  Parliamentary  theory  in 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  105  ;  ecclesi- 
astical sehemes,  106;  abolition  of 
divorce,  107;  Electoral  Bill,  108; 
Villele's  counter-project  of  popular 
franchise,  110,  111  ;  contest  in  the 
Chambers  on  the  Budget,  113;  the 
Chambers  prorogued,  114;  rii-ing  at 
Grenoble,  115;  dissolution  of  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  117;  passing 
of  Electoral  Law,  117;  partial 
evacuation  by  Allied  troops,  119; 
general  improvement  from  1816  to 
1818,  119,  120;  evacuation  by 
Allied  troops,  131 ;  Conference  of 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  131 — 133;  condi- 
tion after  1818,  154;  measures  of 
Decazes,  155  ;  resignation  of  Riche- 
lieu, 155  ;  reaction  against  Liberal- 
ism after  the  murder  of  the  Duke 
of  Berry,  160 ;  second  retirement 
of  Richelieu,  ib. ;  projects  of  Count 
of  Artois,  160  ;  Villele's  Ministry, 
161 ;  the  Congregation,  161 ;  re- 


INDEX. 


541 


presentation  at  the  Congress  of 
Verona,  215 — 217;  invasion  of 
Spain  (1823),  219;  sympathy  with 
Greece,  324  ;  joins  in  a  treaty  with 
England  and  Russia  for  suppressing 
the  conflict  in  the  East,  ib.  ;  defeats 
Turks  at  Navarino,  330—332  ;  Go- 
vernment of  Charles  X.  (1824— 
1827),  358—360;  Ministries  of 
Martignac  and  Polignac,  360,  361  ; 
prorogation  of  Chambers,  and 
General  Election,  365 — 368  ;  cam- 
paign against  the  Arabs,  365 ; 
capture  of  Algiers  by  General 
Bourmont,  367  ;  publication  of 
Ordinances  in  the  Moniteur,  368 ; 
Revolution  of  July,  1830,  371—376; 
abdication  of  Charles  X.,  Louis 
Philippe  made  King,  378  ;  nature 
of  the  Revolution  of  1830,  379; 
attitude  towards  insurrection  in 
Papal  States,  401  ;  insurrections  in 
Paris,  Lyons,  Grenoble,  and  other 
places,  against  the  Government, 
415,  416;  attempt  on  the  life  of 
Louis  Philippe  by  Fieschi,  417; 
laws  of  1835  to  repress  sedition, 
417 ;  growth  of  friendliness  to- 
wards England,  422 ;  declines  to 
send  troops  to  Spain  to  quell  Carlist 
rebellion,  437 ;  suppoit  given  to 
Viceroy  of  Egypt,  450,  456 ;  fleet 
sent  to  Naples  on  the  occupation  of 
Ferrara  by  Austria,  473  ;  marriage 
of  the  Duke  of  Montpensier  to  the 
Infanta  of  Spain,  506  ;  demand  for 
Parliamentary  reform,  507  ;  oppo- 
sition in  the  Chambers  to  Louis 
Philippe,  608 ;  spread  of  Socialism, 
509  ;  Revolution  of  February,  1848, 
512;  abdication  and  flight  of  Louis 
Philippe,  513  ;  Republic  proclaimed, 
ib.  ;  effect  of  the  Revolution  on 
Europe,  iii.  3 ;  meeting  of  Pro- 
visional Government,  34  ;  national 
workshops,  35  ;  first  acts  of  National 
Assembly,  38  ;  riot  of  May  15th, 
1848,  ib.  ;  the  Assembly  seeks  to 
abolish  national  workshops,  38 ; 
order  for  enlistment  of  workmen, 
40  ;  insurrection  of  June,  ib.  ;  rise 
of  Louis  Napoleon,  43 — 46 ;  Louis 
Napoleon  elected  President,  47; 
troops  dispatched  to  occupy  Rome 
and  restore  the  Papal  power,  105  ; 
attempted  insurrections  (1849),  108 ; 
siege  and  capture  of  Rome,  108, 
109 ;  restores  Pontifical  Govern- 
ment, 109 ;  aims  of  Louis  Napo- 
leon, 157 ;  law  carried  for  limit- 


ing the  franchise,  160 ;  Louis 
Napoleon  seeks  for  prolongation 
of  his  Presidency,  162 ;  revision 
of  Constitution  for  prolonging 
Napoleon's  Presidency  rejected 
by  Assembly,  166 ;  Louis  Napo- 
leon's preparations  for  the  Coup 
d'etat,  167  -r  Assembly  refuses  Louis 
Napoleon's  'demands  for  re-estab- 
lishing universal  suffrage,  170; 
Coup  d'etat  of  Dec.  2,  1851,  172— 
174;  massacre  in  Paris,  176;  the 
plebiscite  entrusts  Louis  Napoleon 
with  forming  a  constitution,  and 
maintains  him  in  office,  177; 
Louis  Napoleon  proclaimed  Napo- 
leon III.,  Emperor  (Dec.  2,  1852), 
177  ;  dispute  with  Russia  respecting 
Holy  Places  in  Palestine,  185  ;  fleet 
dispatched  to  Besika  Bay  on  the 
entry  of  Russian  troops  into  Dan- 
ubian  provinces,  194 ;  declaration 
of  war  against  Russia,  199  ;  troops 
land  in  the  Crimea,  210;  Battle  of 
the  Alma,  211;  Battle  of  Inker- 
mann,  217  ;  attack  on  the  Malakoff, 
223  ;  Emperor  Napoleon  proposes 
to  direct  operations  at  the  siege  of 
Sebastopol,  224  ;  defeats  Russia  at 
the  Battle  of  the  Tchernaya,  226  ; 
Treaty  of  Peace  with  Russia 
signed  at  Paris  (1856),  230  ;  troops 
occupy  Syria  (1860),  238  ;  declares 
war,  in  conjunction  with  Sardinia, 
against  Austria  259 ;  defeats 
Austriansat  Magenta,  261  ;  victory 
of  Solferino,  263 ;  peace  with 
Austria  concluded  at  Villafranca, 
265 ;  Napoleon  plans  the  establish- 
ment of  an  Italian  kingdom,  273 ; 
dismissal  of  Walewski,  foreign 
minister,  and  appointment  of 
Thouvenel,  274 ;  annexation  of 
Savoy  and  Nice,  277;  ambassador 
withdraws  from  Turin  on  the  Sar- 
dinian invasion  of  the  Papal  States, 
293 ;  September  Convention  with 
Italy,  361  ;  obtains  Venetia  for 
Italy,  377  ;  Napoleon  III.  mediates 
between  Prussia  and  Austria,  ib.  ; 
Napoleon  seeks  for  the  cession  of 
Luxemburg,  401 ;  outcry  against 
Prussian  aggression,  403;  re- 
occupation  of  Civita  Vecchia,  408; 
isolation  in  1870,  410  ;  indignation 
against  Prussia  at  the  candidature 
of  Prince  Leopold  for  the  Spanish 
throne,  413  ;  war  decided  against 
Prussia  (1870),  420:  only  sixteen 
out  of  eighty-seven  departments  in 


542 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


favour  of  war  with  Prussia,  422 ; 
condition  of  the  army,  428  ;  incom- 
petence and  lethargy  of  ministers 
in  war  preparations,  429  ;  deficien- 
cies of  the  army  aggravated  by  the 
misappropriation  of  public  funds, 
430 ;  defeated  by  Prussians  at 
Weissenburg,  434  ;  defeated  at  the 
Battle  of  Worth,  435  ;  defeated  at 
Spicheren,  Mars-la-Tour,  and 
Gravelotte,  436—441  ;  Battle  of 
Sedan  and  surrender  of  Napoleon, 
446 ;  deposition  of  the  Emperor 
and  proclamation  of  the  Eepublic, 
447,  448 ;  formation  of  a  govern- 
ment of  national  defence,  448 ; 
Gambetta  undertakes  the  formation 
of  national  armies,  450  ;  siege  of 
Paris,  450  ;  fall  of  Strasburg,  453  ; 
army  of  the  Loire,  453 ;  Orleans 
taken  by  Germana,  ib.  ;  capitula- 
tion of  Metz,  455  ;  capitulation  of 
Paris  and  armistice,  463  ;  elections 
ordered  to  be  held,  463  ;  National 
Assembly  meets  at  Bordeaux,  464  ; 
Thiers  arranges  terms  of  peace 
with  Bismarck,  ib. ;  entry  of 
Germans  into  Paris  1st  March, 
1871,  465;  Treaties  of  Versailles 
and  Frankfort  with  Germany,  ib.  ; 
insurrection  of  the  Commune  and 
national  guard  in  Paris,  468 — 471  ; 
the  Republic  under  M.  Thiers,  474  ; 
McMahon's  presidency,  475 ;  Comte 
de  Chambord,  ib. ;  at  the  Congress 
of  Berlin,  519 

Francis  II.,  Austria  under,  i.  27  ;  his 
address  to  the  Germanic  body,  154  ; 
assumes  the  title  of  Emperor  of  all 
his  dominions,  277 ;  incapacity,  405. 
On  the  Holy  Alliance,  ii.  64  ; 
his  intolerance  and  resistance  to 
progress,  82  ;  death  (1835),  482. 

Francis  II.,  King  of  Naples  ;  succeeds 
his  father,  Ferdinand  II.,  iii.  281  ; 
attempts  to  negotiate  an  alliance 
with  Piedmont,  289;  flight  from 
Naples  on  the  advance  of  Garibaldi, 
291  ;  conducted  by  the  French,  on 
the  fall  of  Gaeta,  to  Papal  States, 
288 

Francis  Joseph  I. ,  Emperor  of  Austria 
(1848),  iii.  81 ;  dissolves  Parliament, 
82;  demands  from  Turkey  the  sur- 
render of  Kossuth,  184  ;  commands 
his  army  in  Italy  against  France 
and  Sardinia,  263 :  interview  with 
Napoleon  III.  at  Villafranca,  265  j 
promises  to  restore  the  old  Con- 
stitution to  Hungary,  324  ;  conflict 


with  Hungarian  Assemblies,  325; 
excluded  from  Germany,  376 — 379 ; 
reconciliation  with  Hungary,  389 ; 
crowned  King  of  Hungary,  392; 
private  arrangements  with  Na- 
poleon III.  for  defence  against 
Prussia,  406 

Frankfort,  rising  at,  ii.  411 

Frankfort,  German  National  Assembly 
of,  iii.  31  ;  debates  on  Primary 
Eights,  114 — 116;  outrages  on  the 
ratification  of  the  armistice  of 
Malmo,  118;  discusses  German 
relations  with  Austria,  125  ;  passes 
the  Constitution,  130  ;  elects 
Frederick  William  IV.,  Emperor, 
130 ;  German  governments  reject 
the  Constitution,  134;  end  of  the 
Parliament,  135 

Frederick  Charles,  Prince,  commands 
Prussian  troops  in  Schleswig  against 
Denmark,  iii.  350  ;  takes  part  in  the 
campaign  against  Austria,  374 — 
376;  commands  the  central  Prussian 
army  against  the  French,  433  ;  be- 
sieges Metz,  441,  447 

Frederick  the  Great,  work  in  Prussia 
of,  i.  30,  37 

Frederick  VII.,  King  of  Denmark ; 
accession  to  the  throne,  iii.  27  ;  pub- 
lishes draft  of  a  Constitution,  ib.  ; 
war  with  Prussia  respecting  Schles- 
wig-Holstein,  28;  death  in  1863, 
342,  345 

Frederick  William  II.  (Prussia),  meets 
Emperor  Leopold  at  Pillnitz,  and 
issues  joint  declaration  relating  to 
safety  of  Louis  XVI.,  i.  4  ;  charac- 
ter of  his  rule,  32  ;  his  alliance  with 
Austria  against  the  French,  33 ; 
treaty  with  Catherine  of  Russia, 
83  ;  breach  with  Austria,  86  ;  leads 
army  upon  Warsaw,  89 

Frederick  William  III.  (Prussia) ;  his 
proposals  regarding  Hanover,  i. 
270 ;  his  remonstrance  with  Bona- 
parte, 272  ;  temporising  policy  with 
Bonaparte,  280 ;  treaty  with  the 
Emperor  of  Russia  at  Potsdam,  292  ; 
evades  engagements  with  Russia,  29  7; 
attempts  to  disguise  the  cession  of 
Hanover,  312;  at  the  Battle  of 
Auerstadt,  329  ;  flight  to  Weimar, 
330  ;  dismisses  Stein,  335 ;  cordial 
relations  with  Emperor  of  Russia, 
344  ;  cedes  large  portions  of  terri- 
tory to  Napoleon,  347  ,  reluctance 
to  enter  into  war  with  Austria,  407; 
proclamation  to  the  German  nation, 
409 ;  proposal  of  alliance  with  Russia 


INDEX. 


543 


against  France  declined,  458 ;  de- 
ciiirea  war  against  France,  486;  Con- 
gress of  Vienna,ii.  24,  26  ;  weakness 
and  timidity,  83  ;  promises  a  popu- 
lar Constitution,  121;  interferes  in 
the  diacussion  caused  by  Schmalz's 
pamphlet,  125 ;  recommendations 
given  to  him  by  Metternich,  137  ; 
establishes  the  Provincial  Estates, 
151 ;  attitude  towards  Greece,  323  ; 
death  in  1840,  496 

Frederick  William  IV.,  of  Prussia, 
succeeds  his  father  in  1840,  ii.  497  ; 
his  character,  498 ;  convokes  united 
Diet  at  Berlin,  ib. ;  violent  language 
to  the  deputies,  500  ;  manifesto  to 
the  German  people  during  the  dis- 
turbances of  March,  1848,  iii.  33  ; 
withdraws  to  Potsdam  during  riots 
at  Berlin,  120:  prorogues  and 
afterwards  dissolves  the  Prussian 
Assembly,  123,  124;  elected  Em- 
peror of  Germany  by  the  Frankfort 
Parliament,  1 30 ;  refuses  the 
Imperial  crown,  133  ;  attempts  to 
form  a  union  of  German  states, 
139 ;  total  failure  of  attempt  to 
form  a  German  Federal  Union, 
154 ;  proposes  that  the  rights  of 
the  Christian  subjects  of  the  Sultan 
should  be  guaranteed  by  the  Great 
Powers,  202  ;  letter  to  Bunsen  on 
England's  assistance  to  Turkey,  ib., 
note ;  letter  to  Bunsen  on  the 
'  Emperor  Nicholas,  220,  note  ;  with- 
draws from  public  affairs,  305 

Friedland,  Battle  of,  i.  345 

FrOschwiller,  iii.  435 

Frossard,  General,  leads  French  corps 
against  Saarbnicken,  iii.  433 

Fuentes  d'Onoro,  Battle  of,  i.  447 

Gaeta ;  flight  of  Pius  IX.  to,  iii.  98  ; 
bombardment  and  surrender  to  Sar- 
dinian troops,  298 

Gagern,  Von;  President  of  the  Ger- 
man National  Assembly  (1848),  iii. 
115;  succeeds  Schmerling  as  chief 
minister  in  Frankfort  Parliament, 
126 ;  proposes  a  conditional  union 
with  Austria,  127 ;  leads  the 
Liberals  in  the  Federal  Parliament 
at  Erfurt,  141 

Gai,  Illyri an  leader,  iii.  63 

Galicia;  insurrection  of  Poles  (1846), 
ii.  493 

GaUipoli;.iii.207,  509 

Gambetta,  M.,  proclaims  the  French 
Republic  after  the  surrender  of 
Nacolcon  at  Sedan,  iii.  448  ;  leaves 


Paris  during  the  siege  to  undertake 
the  government  of  the  provinces 
and  the  organisation  of  national 
armies,  451 ;  resigns  on  the  rejec- 
tion of  his  proposal  for  excluding 
from  election  all  persons  connected 
with  the  Government  of  Napoleon 
HI.,  464 

Garibaldi,  Gengral;  heads  a  corps  in 
defence  of  Rome  against  the  French, 
iii.  106 ;  leaves  Rome  and  escapes 
from  Austrians  to  America,  109 ; 
leads  volunteers  against  Austria 
(1859),  257,  260;  proposes  to  lead 
an  expedition  against  Rome.  270  ; 
hostility  to  the  cession  of  Nice  to 
France,  278 ;  breach  with  Count 
Cavour,  279 ;  expedition  to  Sicily, 
283 ;  captures  Palermo,  and  as- 
sumes the  dictatorship,  285,  286  ; 
defeats  the  Neapolitans  at  Mi- 
lazzo,  286  ;  lack  of  administrative 
faculty,  288 ;  triumphant  entry 
into  Naples,  292;  requests  Victor 
Emmanuel  to  consent  to  his  march 
on  Rome,  and  to  dismiss  Cavour, 
295  ;  defeats  Neapolitan  troops 
at  Cajazzo,  296  ;  meeting  with  Vic- 
tor Emmanuel,  297 ;  reduces 
Capua,  ib. ;  his  request  for  the 
lieutenancy  of  Southern  Italy  de- 
clined by  Victor  Emmanuel,  ib.  ; 
returns  home,  298 ;  wounded  and 
made  prisoner  by  the  troops  of 
Victor  Emmanuel  at  Aspromonte, 
361 ;  his  troops  invade  Papal  States 
(1867),  408;  commands  a  body  of 
auxiliaries  during  the  Franco- 
Prussian  war,  461 

Gastein,  Convention  of.  iii.  358,  370 

Gegenbach,  Abbot  of,  i.  18 

Genoa;  overthrow  of  oligarchic  govern- 
ment, and  establishment  of  demo- 
cratic constitution  favourable  to 
France,  i.  142  ;  blockaded  by  Aus- 
trians, 217 ;  surrendered  to  Aus- 
trians, 220 ;  given  to  the  King  of 
Sardinia,  537,  ii.  70 

Georgakis ;  Greek  insurgent,  ii.  272 

George  III.,  Elector  of  Hanover,  i.  36  ; 
abuses  in  England  under  his  rule, 
69 ;  struggle  with  political  parties, 
61 ;  hostility  to  the  Catholic  Eman- 
cipation Act,  240 ;  announces  the 
coalition  with  Russia  against 
France,  278 ;  quarrels  with  his 
ministers  on  the  Catholic  Disabili- 
ties question,  343 

Germany,  state  of,  in  1792,  i.  15-40; 
whole  of  west  of  the  Rhine  in  the 


544 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


hands  of  the  French  (1794),  95; 
abandoned  by  Austria,  150;  its 
representatives  at  the  Congress  of 
Rastadt,  155  ;  after  the  Peace  of 
Luneville,  226 ;  settlement  of,  by 
Bonaparte  248  ;  absence  of  national 
sentiment,  250;  Bonaparte's  organi- 
sation of  Western,  303  ;  no  national 
unity  (1806),  304  ;  condition  under 
Napoleon's  rule,  307  ;  Austrian  war 
of  1809  against  France  on  behalf 
of  Germany,  403 ;  Southern  Ger- 
many sides  with  Napoleon,  406 ; 
patriotism  in  Northern  Germany, 
ib. ;  idea  of  unity  at  the  outbreak  of 
war  with  France  in  1813,  487; 
Napoleon's  campaign  of  1813,  490  ; 
Stein's  policy  during  the  War  of 
Liberation,  508  ;  beneficial  effect  of 
Napoleon's  wars,  542.  Act  of 
Federation  at  Congress  of  Vienna, 
ii.  67  ;  delay  in  promised  Consti- 
tution, 125 ;  alarm  raised  by 
Stourdza's  pamphlet,  138  ;  murder 
of  Kotzebue,  141  ;  relation  of  Minor 
States  to  Prussia,  143  ;  measures  of 
the  Conference  of  Carlsbad,  145  ; 
commission  of  Mainz,  149 ;  re- 
actionary despotism,  152;  rise  of 
secret  societies,  153 ;  sympathy 
with  France,  153  ;  condition  after 
French  Revolution  of  1830,  405— 
411;  the  Zollverein,  406;  insur- 
rections in  Brunswick  and  Cassel, 
407 ;  Constitutions  granted  in 
Hanover  and  Saxony,  408  ;  despotic 
reaction  (1832),  410—412  ;  rising  at 
Frankfort,  411 ;  repressive  measures 
of  Metternich,  411,  412.  Agitation 
in  Western  Germany,  1847,  iii.  3  ; 
sympathy  with  Schleswig-Holstein 
in  its  rebellion  against  Denmark, 
25 ;  desire  for  unity  amongst  the 
people,  29  ;  formation  of  the  Ante- 
Parliament,  29 ;  meeting  of  the 
National  Assembly  at  Frankfort, 
31;  work  of  the  Assembly,  114, 
outrages  at  Frankfort  on  the  ratifi- 
cation of  the  armistice  of  Malm  5, 
118;  the  Frankfort  Assembly  dis- 
cusses the  relation  of  Austrian 
Empire  to  German y,  125  ;  Frederick 
William  IV.  refuses  to  accept  the 
Imperial  Crown,  133 ;  Frankfort 
Assembly  denounced  as  a  revolu- 
tionary body,  135 ;  end  of  the 
Parliament,  137;  formation  of 
Federal  Constitution  and  Federal 
Parliament  at  Erfurt,  140,  141 ; 
conflict  in  Hesse-Cassel  between 


the  ministry  and  the  people,  145; 
national  fleet  sold  by  auction,  151 ; 
'  epoch  of  reaction,  151  ;  revival  of 
idea  of  German  union  under  the  Re- 
gency of  Crown  Prince  William,  307; 
formation  of  National  Society,  308  ; 
Schleswig-Holstein  and  German 
interests,  348,  349 ;  the  Danish  war, 
350  ;  disagreement  between  Austria 
and  Prussia,  356 ;  agreement  of 
Gastein,  358  ;  war  between  Austria 
and  Prussia,  370-376  ;  Treaty  of 
Prague,  378 ;  Southern  States  enter 
into  alliance  with  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia, 381 ;  military  organisation,  404  ; 
establishment  of  a  Customs-Parlia- 
ment, 411 ;  progress  of  the  work  of 
consolidation  by  Bismarck,  412 ; 
mobilisation  of  troops,  427 ;  Franco- 
German  War,  433-465 ;  union  of 
Northern  and  Southern  States, 
and  assumption  of  the  title  of 
Emperor  by  King  William,  466 — 
468  ;  first  Parliament  of  the  German 
Empire  opened  at  Berlin,  468 ; 
"  League  of  the  Three  Emperors," 
476 

Gervinus,  member  of  German  National 
Assembly,  iii.  32 

Gioberti,  aims  in  his  writings  at  a 
reformation  of  Italy  through  the 
Papacy,  ii.  471 

Girondins,  i.  9 ;  their  war-policy,  9 ; 
demand  dispersal  of  Emigrants,  10 ; 
influence  in  the  Convention,  48 ; 
at  variance  with  the  Commune,  65 ; 
accusations  against  the  Commune 
and  Robespierre,  66  ;  hated  by  the 
people,.  66  ;  influence  declines,  67  ; 
crushed  by  Commune  and  members 
arrested,  71 

Gitschin,  headquarters  of  King  of 
Prussia  in  campaign  against  Aus- 
tria, iii.  375 

Giulay,  General,  commands  the  Aus- 
trians  in  1859,  iii.  260 

Gneisenau,  Prussian  general,  gallant 
defence  of  Colberg,  i.  342 ;  advocates 
an  invasion  of  France,  517  ;  serves 
with  Bliicher  in  Napoleon's  last 
campaign,  ii.  52,  53 

Godoy,  Spanish  minister,  injurious  in- 
fluence, i.  367  ;  seized  by  the  mob, 
374 

Goethe,  i.  38,  305 

Gorgei,  Hungarian  commander,  iii.  84, 
86,  88  ;  surrenders  to  Austrians  at 
Vilagos,  95 

Gortchakoff,  Prince  Alexander,  re- 
presents Russia  at  the  Conference 


INDEX. 


545 


of  Vienna,  May,  1855,  iii.  221  ; 
seeks  to  dissuade  the  Czar  from 
making  peace  with  England  and 
Allies,  230  ;  rejects  the  interference 
of  the  Powers  with  regard  to  Polish 
affairs,  337  ;  resists  Milutine's 
measures  in  Poland,  339 ;  Berlin 
Memorandum,  481  ;  Servian  cam- 
paign, 489,  496,  509 

Gourko,  General,  leads  Russian  corps 
in  Bulgaria,  iii.  499,  500,  504,  505 

Graham,  General,  commands  English 
troops  at  Cadiz,  i.  446 

Gramont,  Duke  of,  French  Foreign 
Minister  (1870),  iii.  414  ;  favours  a 
war  with  Prussia,  415 

Gravelotte,  Battle  of,  iii.  441 

Greece,  Revolt  in,  ii.  167  ;  races  and 
institutions,  237—242 ;  Greek 
Church,  243 ;  the  Armatoli  and 
Klephts,  247  ;  Islands  of,  243  ;  the 
Phanariots,  251 ;  the  Hospodars, 
ib.;  intellectual  revival  in  eighteenth 
century,  253  ;  Koraes,  254 — 257  ; 
growth  of  commerce,  260  ;  founda- 
tion of  Odessa,  ib. ;  influence  of 
French  Revolution,  262  ;  the  songs 
of  Rhegas,  263;  the  Hetaeria 
Philike,  265,  268;  revolt  of  the 
Morea,  273 ;  extension  of  the 
revolt,  285;  massacre  at  Chios,  291 ; 
double  invasion  by  Turks,  295 ; 
defeat  of  the  Turks,  299;  civil 
war,  300 ;  defeats  in  the  Morea, 
'  306—310;  fall  of  the  Acropolis  of 
Athens,  311 ;  intervention  of  Great 
Britain  and  Russia,  322  ;  Turks  to 
be  removed  from  the  country,  322  ; 
sympathy  amongst  the  Liberals  and 
Ultramontanes  of  France,  324 ; 
the  Sultan  to  retain  paramount 
sovereignty,  325 ;  condition  after 
Battle  of  Navarino,  332  ;  Capodis- 
trias  elected  President,  345  ;  limits 
of,  settled  by  the  Powers,  349 ; 
Prince  Leopold  of  Saxe-Coburg 
accepts  the  crown,  349 ;  Prince 
Leopold  renounces  the  crown,  352  ; 
assassination  of  Capodistrias,  354  ; 
Prince  Otto  of  Bavaria  made  King, 
354  :  transfer  of  Ionian  Islands 
(1864)  by  Great  Britain,  ^355; 
gains  Thessaly  at  the  Congress  of 
Berlin,  iii.  519 

Gregoire  (ex-bishop),  election  to 
French  Chamber  of  Deputies,  ii. 
156  ;  election  invalidated,  158 

Gregory  XVI.  ( Pope),  ii.  399;  appeals  to 
Austria  for  assistance  against  insur- 
gents of  Bologna,  400 ;  refuses  to 

J    J 


accept  the  proposals  of  reform 
recommended  by  the  Conference  of 
Rome,  404  ;  death  (1846),  472 

Grenoble,  Napoleon's  arrival  at,  after 
escaping  from  Elba,  ii.  34  ;  popular 
rising,  115;  represented  by  Gregoire 
in  Chamber  of  Deputies,  1 56 ; 
revolt  of  working-classes  (1834), 
416 

Greiiville,  Lord*,  and  the  designs  of 
Austria  and  Prussia,  i.  57  (note),  77 
(note) ;  on  the  royalist  movement  in 
France,  98  (note)  ;  retires  from 
office,  240;  Prime  Minister,  311; 
fall  of  his  Ministry,  343 

Grey,  Lord,  and  the  English  Reform 
Bill,  ii.  420 

Grossbeeren,  Battle  of,  i.  506 

Guizot,  M. ,  succeeds  Thiers  as  French 
Premier,  ii.  460  ;  approves  of  the 
marriage  of  the  Duke  of  Montpen- 
sier  to  the  Infanta  of  Spain,  505  ; 
resignation  (1848),  512 

Gustavus  III.  (Sweden),  his  hatred  to 
French  Revolution,  i.  13 

Gymnastic  establishments,  supposed 
by  Metternich  to  be  dangerous  to 
European  peace,  ii.  137 


Habeas  Corpus  Act,  Suspension  of,  in 
England,  ii.  165 

Ham,  place  of  Louis  Napoleon's  im- 
prisonment, iii  44 

Hambach,  Castle  of,  demonstration 
against  German  despotism  held  at, 
ii.  410 

Hamburg,  effect  of  the  blockade  of 
English  commerce  by  Napoleon,  i. 
441 

Hamilton,  Lady,  i.  169  (note);  185 
(note) 

Hamilton,  Sir  "W.,  despatch  respecting 
General  Mack,  i.  171  (note);  on  the 
escape  of  the  Royal  Family  from 
Naples,  175  (note) 

Hanover,  Nobles  of,  i.  36 ;  occupation 
by  the  French,  269;  offered  to 
Prussia  by  Bonaparte,  281;  King 
of  Prussia's  dissimulation  respect- 
ing its  cession,  312;  offered  to 
England  by  Napoleon,  315 ;  in- 
surrection, ii.408.  Attempt  to  form  <\ 
union  with  Prussia,  iii.  139  ;  secedes 
from  league  -with  Prussia,  140 : 
conquered  by  Prussia,  374;  annexed 
by  Prussia,  378 

Hapsburgs,  The,  i.  17—33 

Hirdenberg,  Baron  (Prussian  minis- 
ter), i.  280 ;  on  Prussia's  acquisi- 


546 


MODERN  EUROPE, 


tion  of  Hanover,  313  (note)  ;  dis- 
missal from  office,  357  ;  recalled  in 
1810,  457 ;  policy,  458 ;  meets 
Stein  at  Breslau  to  arrange  Treaty 
of  Kalisch,  484.  At  the  Congress 
of  Vienna,  ii.  23;  his  demands 
respecting  second  Treaty  of  Paris, 
60,  61  ;  his  constitutional  system, 
123;  decline  of  his  influence,  135 — 
148;  death,  151 

Harrowby,  Lord,  his  despatch  from 
Berlin  on  the  evasion  of  Prussian 
engagements  with  Russia,  298 
(note) 

Hassenpflug,  Chief  Minister  in  Hesse- 
Cassel,  iii.  144 

Hastings,  Captain,  commands  a  Greek 
detachment,  ii.  329 

Haugwitz,  Prussian  Minister,  i.  88 — 
89 ;  recommends  the  occupation  of 
Hanover,  269  ;  his  withdrawal,  280  ; 
interview  with  Bonaparte  at 
Briinn,  295  ;  arranges  treaty  with 
Bonaparte  at  Schonbrunn,  298 ; 
signs  a  treaty  forcing  Prussia  into 
war  with  England,  313 ;  resigns 
office,  335 

Haydn,  the  musician,  i.  21,  404 

Helena,  St.,  ii.  58 

Helvetic  Republic,  i.  162 

Herzegovina  revolts  against  Turkey, 
iii.  477 ;  handed  over  to  Austria  at 
the  Congress  of  Berlin,  519 

Hesse,  restoration  of  the  Elector,  ii.  8  ; 
the  Elector's  extortions,  126. 
Hassenpflug  appointed  Chief  Minis- 
ter, iii.  144 ;  conflict  between  the 
Ministry  and  the  people,  and 
appeal  to  Diet  of  Frankfort,  145  ; 
settlement  of  affairs  referred  to  the 
Diet  of  Frankfort,  148 ;  renewed 
struggle  between  the  Elector  and 
the  people,  308  ;  conquered  by 
Prussia,  374;  annexed  to  Prussia, 
378 

Hetaeria  Philike,  The,  ii.  265,  268 

Hoche,  French  general,  i.  87 

Hofer,  Tyrolese  leader,  i.  435 

Hohenlinden,  Battle  of,  i.  225 

Hohenlohe,  Prince,  Prussian  general, 
i.  325 ;  advice  on  the  movements  of 
the  army  against  France,  326; 
destruction  of  his  army  at  Jena, 
328 ;  surrenders  to  Napoleon  at 
Prenzlau,  331. 

Hohenlohe,  Prince,  Prime  Minister  of 
Prussia  (1862),  iii.  312;  resigna- 
tion, 313 

Holland :  war  against  France,  i.  59  ; 
conquered  by  French,  95 ;  expedi- 


tion of  Engknd  and  Russia  against, 
195  ;  the  Batavian  Republic, 
237  ;  its  constitution  in  1801, 
243 ;  the  Crown  given  to  Louis 
Bonaparte,  302  ;  abdication  of 
the  King,  438 ;  annexed  to  the 
French  Empire,  438 ;  restored  to 
the  House  of  Orange,  536.  United 
to  Belgium  at  Congress  of  Vienna, 
ii.  70  ;  prohibits  the  slave-trade,  75 ; 
conflict  with  Belgium,  388  ;  refuses 
to  accept  decision  of  Conference  of 
London  with  regard  to  Belgian 
frontier,  388 ;  bombardment  of 
Antwerp,  389 

Holstein  (see  Schleswig-Holstein) 

Holy  Alliance,  Treaty  of,  ii.  63—66 

Holy  Roman  Empire,  i.  16,  156  ;  ita 
end,  300 

Hood,  Admiral,  at  the  siege  of  Toulon, 
i.  82 

Hornby,  Admiral,  ordered  with  English 
fleet  to  Besika  Bay,  iii.  507 

Hortense,  mother  of  Louis  Napoleon, 
iii  43 

Hospodars,  Greek,  ii.  251 ;  iii.  184 ; 
Alexander  Cuza  elected  Hospodar 
of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  237 

Hotel  de  Ville,  ii.  370;  meeting  of 
Lafayette's  Municipal  Committee 
(July,  1830),  375;  Louis  Philippe 
addresses  the  mob  from,  376. 
Meeting-place  of  Provisional  Go- 
vernment (1848),  iii.  34 

Houchard,  General,  attacks  Germans 
at  Dunkirk,  i.  79 ;  executed  by 
Revolutionary  Tribunal,  79 

Howe,  Lord,  victory  over  French  off 
Ushant,  i.  96 

Hrabowsky,  Austrian  general,  attempt 
to  occupy  Carlowitz,  iii.  68 

Hugo,  Victor,  arrested  by  Louis 
Napoleon,  iii.  176 

Humboldt,  Prussian  Minister,  resigna- 
tion, ii.  147 

Hungary,  Autocracy  of  Joseph  II.  in, 
i.  24 ;  policy  of  Leopold  II.  in,  25. 
Affairs  in  1825,  ii.  477 ;  the  Mag- 
yars and  Slavs,  478  ;  Kossuth  is 
imprisoned  for  publishing  reports 
of  debates,  479;  general  progress 
after  1830,  480;  peasantry  laws, 
481 ;  schemes  of  Count  Szechenyi, 
481 ;  Kossuth's  journal,  484  ;  re- 
forms of  the  Diet  of  1843,  ib. ; 
power  of  the  Magyars,  485  ;  Slavic 
national  movements,  486,  487 ; 
Count  Apponyi  appointed  Chief 
Minister,  489.  Kossuih's  address  to 
the  Chambers  on  Austrian  despot- 


INDEX. 


547 


ism,  iii.  5 ;  wins  independence,  1 1 ; 
revolt  of  the  Serbs,  63 — 69;  war 
with  Austria,  84 — 89  ;  Austrians 
enter  Pesth,  86  ;  Parliament  with- 
draws to  Debreczin,  87  ;  drives  the 
Austrians  out  of  the  country,  89, 
90 ;  declaration  of  independence, 
90 ;  Russian  intervention  on  the 
side  of  Austria,  93 ;  campaign 
of  1849,  94  ;  capitulation  of 
Vilagos,  94,  95 ;  constitutional 
rights  extinguished,  96  ;  Austria's 
vengeance,  95,  96 ;  diploma  for 
restoring  the  old  Constitution  pub- 
lished by  Austria,  324  ;  resists  the 
establishment  of  a  Central  Council, 
325 ;  meeting  of  Diet  at  Pesth, 
326 ;  the  Diet  refuses  to  elect 
representatives  to  the  Austrian 
Central  Council,  326 ;  dissolution 
of  the  Diet,  and  establishment  of 
military  rule,  327 ;  settlement  of 
conflict  with  Austria,  and  corona- 
tion of  Francis  Joseph,  387—392 

Hussein  Pasha  leads  Turkish  troops 
into  Syria,  ii.  443 ;  defeated  by 
Egyptians  at  Beilan,  444 

Hydra,  one  of  the  2Egean  Islands,  ii. 
2S7 

Hypsilanti,  Demetrius,  leader  of  Greek 
revolt  in  the  Morea,  ii.  289,  298, 
307 

Uypsilanti,  Prince  Alexander,  ii.  268 

' «  — 272 ;  dismissed  from  the  Russian 
service,  271 ;  flight  to  Austria, 
272 

Ibrahim,  commander-in- chief  of  Otto- 
man forces,  ii.  302,  303 ;  invades 
the  Morea,  306—308;  at  the  siege 
of  Missolonghi,  309  ;  devastates  the 
Morea  in  opposition  to  proposal  for 
armistice  by  the  allies,  328 ;  be- 
sieges Acre,  442  ;  declared  a  rebel 
by  the  Sultan,  443 ;  conquers 
Syria  and  Asia  Minor,  443;  charac- 
ter of  his  rule  after  the  peace  of 
Kutaya,  451 ;  expelled  from  Syria 
by  European  allies,  460 

Ibraila,  capitulates  to  Russian  army, 
ii.  339 

Ignatieff,  General,  Russian  ambassa- 
dor at  Constantinople,  iii.  489,  493  ; 
draws  up  the  London  Protocol,  496 

Tllyria,  i.  25 

Inkermann,  Battle  of,  iii.  217 

Innsbruck,  surrender  to  the  Tyrolese 
by  the  Bavarians,  i.  413.  Place  of 
r>  treat  of  Ferdinand  I.,  Emperor 
of  Austria,  iii.  52 

J    J    '2 


Inquisition,  The,  in  Spain,  i.  393  ;  the 
Cortes  declines  to  restore  it,  462. 
Restored  by  King  Ferdinand  (1814), 
ii.  9  ;  attacked  in  Spain,  177 

Ionian  Islands  taken  by  France,  i.  48. 
Made  a  Republic,  ii.  264  ;  trans- 
ferred by  Great  Britain  to  Greece, 
355 

Ireland,  Union  of  Great  Britain  with, 
i.  239 

Isabella,  Queen  of  Spain,  placed  on  the 
throne  (1843),  ii.  442.  Dethroned, 
iii.  412 

Istria,  taken  by  France,  i.  148 

Italy  :  condition  in  1796,  i.  111—116  ; 
opening  of  French  campaign,  118; 
pillage  by  Bonaparte  after  his 
entry  into  Milan,  121  ;  the  Cispa- 
dane  Republic  created  by  Bona- 
parte, 132 ;  birth  of  the  idea  of 
Italian  independence,  133  ;  Venice 
given  to  Austria  by  Bonaparte, 
141 ;  Genoa  receives  a  democratic 
constitution  favourable  to  France, 
142 ;  the  French  at  Rome  nnd 
Naples  (1798),  163—177;  reaction 
at  Naples,  183  ;  campaign  of  1799, 
191 ;  campaign  of  1800,  Marengo, 
218—222;  Bonaparte  made  Pre- 
sident of  the  Italian  Republic, 
244  ;  Bonaparte  accepts  the  title  of 
King  of  Italy,  279  ;  condition  under 
Napoleon's  rule,  307.  Austrian 
policy  (1816),  ii.  83—85;  Austrian 
rule,  1815—1819,  121  ;  revolu- 
tion in  Naples,  182  ;  Austrians 
invade  Naples,  202 ;  insurrection  in 
Piedmont,  203 ;  insurrection  and 
Austrian  intervention  in  Papal 
States,  1831,401—405;  occupation  of 
Ancona  by  the  French,  404 ;  Ancona 
handed  over  to  the  Pope  by  the 
French  (1838),  405;  Austrian  rule 
hostile  to  reforms,  467 ;  Mazzini, 
468  ;  Gioberti's  writings,  471  ; 
reformation  of  the  Papacy  pro- 
posed, ib. ;  election  of  Pius  IX., 
472  ;  political  amnesty,  ib. ;  enthu- 
siasm in  Rome,  ib. ;  Austria  occu- 
pies Ferrara,  473 ;  conflict  with 
Austrians  in  Milan,  476.  Insurrec- 
tion in  Lombardy  and  Venice,  iii. 
15,  16,  17  ;  general  war  against 
Austria,  17,  18 ;  Custozza,  re- 
capture of  Milan,  61 ;  revolutionary 
period  (August  1848— March  1849), 
96—113;  Novara,  100;  French 
intervention  at  Rome,  105  ;  fall 
of  Venice,  112 ;  Neapolitan  des- 
potism, 113;  Victor  Emmanuel, 


548 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


I 


242;  campaign  of  1859,  259; 
battle  of  Magenta,  261  ;  _  over- 
throw of  Papal  authority  in  the 
Romagna,  261 ;  Battle  of  Solferino, 
263 ;  peace  of  Villafranca,  265 ; 
treaties  of  Zurich,  266 ;  Garibaldi 
proposes  to  attack  Rome,  270 ; 
Napoleon  III.  proposes  a  Congress 
at  Paris  to  discuss  Italian  questions, 
271 ;  Napoleon  III.  consents  to  the 
formation  of  an  Italian  Kingdom 
under  Victor  Emmanuel,  273 ;  pub- 
lication of  the  pamphlet  "  The 
Pope  and  the  Congress,"  273 ; 
union  of  Tuscany,  Parma,  Modena, 
and  the  Romagna  with  Piedmont 
under  the  rule  of  Victor  Emmanuel, 
276 ;  cession  of  Nice  and  Savoy  to 
France,  279  ;  Sicily  and  Naples  con- 
quered by  Garibaldi  in  the  name  of 
Victor  Emmanuel,  285,  290  ;  Pied- 
montese  troops  enter  TJmbria  and 
the  Marches,  and  capture  Ancona, 
293—294;  all  Italy,  excepting 
Rome  and  Venice,  united  under 
Victor  Emmanuel  (1861),  298;  the 
great  work  of  Cavour  on  behalf  of 
Italian  liberty,  and  his  hopes  for 
the  future,  302—304 ;  Garibaldi 
at  Aspromonte,  361 ;  September 
Convention,  ib. ;  relations  with 
Prussia  and  Austria,  367 ;  war  of 
1866 ;  Custozza,  Venice  ceded, 
377  ;  Battle  of  Mentana,  between 
Garibaldians  and  Papal  forces,  408  ; 
re-occupation  of  Civita  Vecchia  by 
France,  408 ;  projected  alliance 
with  Austria,  410  ;  takes  possession 
of  Rome,  472 ;  guarantees  to  the 
Pope,  ib. 

Jacobins  (see  Girondins) 

Janina,  Siege  of,  ii.  286 

Janissaries  (Turkish),  ii.  336 

Jarvis,  English  admiral,  defeats  the 
Spanish  fleet  at  St.  Vinc(ent,  i.  151 

Jellacic,  Governor  of  Croatia,  iii.  65  ; 
summoned  to  the  Emperor  of 
Austria  at  Innsbruck,  68 ;  allowed 
to  resume  his  government,  and 
becomes  the  champion  of  Austrian 
unity,  69 ;  appointed  by  the  Em- 
peror commander  of  all  the  forces 
in  Hungary,  74 

Jemappes,  Battle  of,  i.  53 

Jena,  Defeat  of  Prussians  by  Napoleon 
at,  i.  328 ;  freedom  of  printing, 
ii.  127  ;  students  of,  ib. 

Jesuits,  their  influence  declines  in 
Germany,  i.  22 


Jews,  prohibition  affecting  them  in 
Austria,  i.  283 

John,  Archduke,  i.  224 ;  plans  the 
Tyrolese  insurrection,  412 ;  mediates 
with  Croatia,  iii.  68  ;  appointed  ad- 
ministrator of  theAustrian  Empire, 
115  ;  refuses  to  suppress  the  Baden 
insurrection,  136 

John  VI.,  King  of  Portugal,  ii.  228; 
death  229 

Joseph  II.,  Reforms  of,  i.  22 

Joubert,  French  general,  i.  191,  199 

Jourdan,  French  general,  i.  81;  defeats 
Austrians  at  Wattignies,  81  ;  in- 
vades Germany,  126  ;  defeated  by 
Archduke  Charles  at  Amberg,  128  ; 
on  the  Rhine,  179;  presides  at 
court-martial  on  Marshal  Ney,  ii. 
98 

Jovellanos,  member  of  Spanish  Junta, 
i.  450  ;  policy  in  1810,  452 

Juarez,  President  of  Mexican  Republic, 
driven  from  power,  iii.  398 

Junot,  French  general,  i.  354  ;  invades 
Portugal,  355  ;  defeated  by  British 
troops  at  Vimieiro,  385 

Junta,  Spanish,  i.  392;  policy  in  1809, 
450;  resignation  in  1810,  452.  Pro- 
visional in  1820,  ii.  177;  appointed 
at  Oporto,  188 

Just,  St.,  commissioner  of  the  French 
Convention,  i.  87 

Kainardji,  Treaty  of;  ii.  259;  iii.  188 

Kamenski,  Russian  general,  i.  340 

Kanaris  (Greek  captain),  heroic  ex- 
ploit against  the  Turks,  ii.  293 

Kars,  Capture  of,  by  the  Russians,  iii. 
227,  505 

Kasatch  Bay,  iii.  213 

Katzbach,  Battle  of,  i.  506 

Kaunitz,  Austrian  Minister,  i.  10; 
retirement  of,  28  ;  his  work,  28 

Kehl,  Fortress  of,  i.  158 

Kesanlik,  iii.  499,  506 

Khosrew,  Turkish  admiral,  takes 
Psara,  ii.  304 

Khurshid,  Ottoman  commander,  ii. 
286,  295 

Kiel,  formation  of  Provisional  Govern- 
ment during  insurrection  against 
Denmark,  iii.  28,  355 

Klapka,  Hungarian  general,  iii.  87 

Kleber,  General,  i.  83,  234  ;  assassina- 
tion, 234 

Klephts,  The,  ii.  247 

Knights  of  the  Empire,  i.  39,  255 

Knobelsdorff,  General,  Prussian  am- 
bassador at  Paris,  i.*324 

Kolettis,  Greek  Minister,  ii.  300 


INDEX. 


549 


Kolokotronee,  Greek  commander,  ii. 
264,  289,  298,  300  ;  imprisonment, 
301  ;  reinstated,  306. 

Konduriottes,  President  of  Greek 
Chambers,  ii.  300,  303. 

Konieh,  Battle  of,  between  Egyptians 
and  Turks,  ii.  444. 

Koniggratz,  Battle  of,  between  Prussia 
and  Austria  (1866),  iii.  376. 

Konigsberg,  Flight  of  King  Frederick 
William  to,  i.  338;  entry  of  the 
French,  345  ;  Russians  admitted  to, 
479 ;  Stein  publishes  the  Czar's 
order  for  the  arming  of  East 
Prussia,  481. 

Koraes,  Greek  scholar,  ii.  254 — 257  ; 
statement  respecting  Greek  navy, 
261 

Korniloff,  Russian  general  in  the 
Crimea,  iii.  212,  213 

Korsakoff,  Russian  general,  i.  189, 
192,  193 

Kosciusko,  leads  Polish  revolt,  i.  89  ; 
distrusts  Napoleon's  professions,339 

Kossuth,  Hungarian  deputy,  circu- 
lates reports  of  debates  in  defiance 
of  Austrian  Emperor,  ii.  479  ;  edits 
a  Liberal  journal  at  Pesth,  483 ; 
his  patriotic  oratory,  489.  His  ad- 
dress to  the  Hungarian  Chambers 
on  Austrian  despotism,  iii.  5  ;  heads 
democratic  movement  at  Pesth, 
10  ;  hostility  to  Austria,  71  ;  orders 
'«  march  against  Austrians  during 
revolt  of  Vienna,  78  ;  appointed 
governor  of  Hungary,  91  ;  flight 
into  Turkey,  1 84 ;  protected  by 
the  Sultan  against  the  demands  of 
Austria  and  Russia  for  his  surren- 
der, ib. ;  refuses  to  acknowledge  the 
sovereignty  of  Francis  Joseph  in 
Hungary,  392 

Kotzebue,  Murder  of,  ii.  140 

Krasnoi,  Brattle  of,  i.  474 

Kray, -Austrian  general,  i.  191,  218  ; 

Kremsier,  Parliament  of  Vienna  meets 
at,  iii.  80,  82 

Krudener,  Russian  general  in  Bulgaria, 
iii.  500,  501 

Knlm,  Battle  of,  i,  506 

Kiistrin,  Prussian  fortress,  surrendered 
to  the  French,  i.  333 

Kutnya,  Peace  of,  between  Turkey  and 
Egypt,  ii.  446 

Kutusoff,  Russian  general,  i.  292,  467, 
472, 492 

Labedoyere,  Colonel,  declares  for 
Napoleon  at  Grenoble,  ii.  34  ;  exe- 
cution in  1815,  98 


Lafayette,  ii.  38,  45;  elected  to 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  1 55 ;  takes 
part  in  the  Revolution  of  July, 
1830,  373;  head  of  Provisional 
Government,  375 

Lafitte,  French  deputy,  ii.  372 ;  ad- 
vances the  cause  of  the  Duke  of 
Orleans,  373 ;  head  of  Louis 
Philippe's-Government,400 ;  resigns 
office,  402 

Laibach,  Conference  at,  ii.  198,  205 

Lamartine,  M.,  member  of  French 
Provisional  Government  (1848),  iii. 
34  ;  loss  of  power  on  the  election  of 
Louis  Napoleon  to  the  Presidency 
of  the  Republic,  47 

Lamberg,  Murder  of  General,  at 
Pesth,  iii.  74 

Lamoriciere,  General,  leads  Papal 
troops  against  the  Piedmontese,  iii. 
294 

Landrecies,  Siege  of,  i.  90 

Landsturm,  The  Prussian,  i.,  363,  489 

Landwehr,  The  Prussian,  i.  363,  482, 
489,  501 

Languages  in  Austria,  i.  19 

Lannes,  Marshal,  at  the  Siege  of 
Saragossa,  i.  399 

Lanskoi,  Russian  Minister,  prepares, 
with  Milutine,  the  charta  for  the 
liberation  of  serfs,  iii.  332 

Laon,  Battle  of,  i.  526 

Latour,  Austrian  Minister,  iii.  72 

La  Vendee,  Revolt  of,  i.  70,  76 

Layard,  Mr.,  succeeds  Sir  H.  Elliot  as 
English  Ambassador  at  Constantin- 
ople, iii.  508 

"League  of  the  Three  Emperors" 
(1872),  iii.  476 

League  of  the  Three  Ki  ngdoms  (Prussia, 
Saxony,  and  Hanover,  &c.)  iii.  139, 
140 

Lebreuf,  French  War  Minister  (1870), 
iii.  415,  429 

Lebrun,  M.,  colleague  of  Bonaparte  in 
the  Consulship,  i.  210 

Lecomto,  General,  murdered  by  the 
Commune  of  Paris,  iii.  470 

Legislative  Assembly,  French ,  ma j  ority 
for  war  against  Austria  (1792),  i.  3  ; 
its  composition,  8  ;  Girondin  De- 
puties, 9  ;  reception  of  the  Emperor 
Leopold's  despatch,  11  ;  mani- 
festo renouncing  intention  of  con- 
quest, 14 ;  determines  to  banish 
priests,  41  ;  dissolved,  48 

Legislative  Chambers,  opening  by 
Napoleon  (1815),  ii.  47 

Lehrbach,  Austrian  Envoy  to  Prussia, 
i.  86 ;  Austrian  Minister,  224 


550 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


Leipzig,  Battle  of,i.  516.  Celebration 
of  anniversary  at  Eisenach,  ii.  127 

Le  Mans,  iii.  461. 

Leoben,  Preliminary  Treaty  of,  i.  138 

Leopold  II.  (Emperor)  addresses 
European  Courts  on  situation  of 
French  Koyal  Family,  i.  4;  his 
despatch  to  Paris,  abusing  the  war 
party,  11  ;  his  death  (1792),  11,  27  ; 
his  policy  and  work,  24 — 27 

Leopold,  Prince,  of  Hohenzollem- 
Sigmaringen,  candidate  for  the 
throne  of  Spain  (1868),  iii.  412; 
withdraws  his  candidature,  417 

Leopold,  Prince,  of  Saxe-Coburg, 
accepts  Crown  of  Greece,  ii.  349  ; 
renounces  the  Greek  Crown,  352 ; 
elected  King  of  Belgium.  387 

Le  Quesnoy,  investment  by  Austrians, 
i.  78 

Lesseps,  M.,  French  envoy  to  Rome  to 
negotiate  terms  of  peace,  iii.  107 

Lestocq,  Prussian  general,  i.  340 

Levant,  Commerce  of  the,  under 
Mehemet  Ali's  rule,  ii.  452 

Ligny,  Battle  of,  ii.  50 

Lisbon,  entry  of  French  troops,  i. 
356 

Literature  in  North  Germany,  i.  21  ; 
suppression  of,  in  Austria,  283 

Lithuania,  ii.  395.  The  nobles  rebel 
against  Russia,  iii.  337 

Liverpool,  Lord,  English  Prime 
Minister,  ii.  6  ;  on  the  terms  of  the 
second  Treaty  of  Paris,  60  ;  re- 
sponsible for  death  of  Marshal  Ney, 
99  ;  on  the  proposals  of  the  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  Conference,  132  ;  unpopu- 
larity, 190 

Lodi,  Bridge  of,  i.  120 

Lombard,  Prussian  minister,  i.  272 

Lombardy,  under  Maria  Theresa  and 
the  Emperor  Joseph,  i.  113;  con- 
quered by  Bonaparte,  135 ;  made 
a  Republic  by  the  treaty  of  Campo 
Formio,  148  ;  arrival  of  Russian 
army,  181  ;  evacuated  by  Austrians 
after  Marengo,  222;  part  of  the 
kingdom  of  Italy,  279 ;  restored 
to  Austria  by  Treaty  of  Paris,  537  ; 
insurrection  of  1848,  iii.  15  ;  war 
with  Austria,  55 ;  united  with 
Piedmont,  265 

London,  Treaty  of  (1827),  ii.  325 ; 
(1852),  iii.  150;  (1867),  iii.  402; 
protocol  of,  496 

Lornsen,  work  on  the  independence  of 
the  German  Duchies,  iii.  26. 

Lorraine,  i.  50  ;  left  to  France  by  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  ii.  70;  probable 


consequences  had  it  been  annexed 
to  Prussia,  72.  Ceded  to  Germany 
by  the  Treaties  of  Versailles  and 
Frankfort,  iii.  464 

Louis  Ferdinand,  Prince,  Prussian 
general,  i.  327 

Louis  XVI.,  letter  to  the  Legislative 
Assembly,  i.  1 ;  declares  war  against 
Austria  (1792),  2  ;  flight  from 
Paris  and  return  (1791),  4;  con- 
finement in  Tuileries,  4 ;  accepts 
constitution  of  National  Assembly, 
5  ;  manifesto  to  Electors  of  Treves 
and  Mainz,  10  ;  vetoes  the  banish- 
ment of  priests,  42 ;  quits  the 
Tuileries,  44  ;  execution,  58  ;  his 
execution  celebrated  by  a  national 
fete,  143 

Louis  XVIII.,  restored  to  the  throne 
of  France,  i.  531—533.  Character, 
ii.  12,  13  ;  his  Constitution,  14 ;  sum- 
mons the  Legislative  Chambers  on 
Napoleon's  return  to  France,  37 ; 
flight  from  Tuileries,  38  ;  restora- 
tion to  the  throne,  57  ;  partiality 
for  Decazes,  116:  dissolves  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  117  ;  displeasure  on  the 
election  of  Gregoire,  157 ;  war 
declaration  against  Spain,  217; 
death  (1824),  324 

Louis  Napoleon,  election  to  National 
Assembly,  iii.  43  ;  presents  himself 
to  troops  at  Strasburg  as  Emperor, 
44 ;  sent  to  America,  but  returns 
and  repeats  his  attempt  at  Boulogne, 
ib ;  imprisonment  at  Ham,  ib. ; 
escapes,  visits  Paris,  is  elected 
Deputy,  but  resigns,  45  ;  re-elected, 
46 ;  eleeted  President  of  the 
Republic,  47  ;  determines  to  restore 
the  Pope,  103;  effects  the  Pope's 
restoration,  110;  protests  against 
the  Pope's  tyrannous  policy,  ib; 
supported  by  Thiers,  157  ;  letter  to 
Colonel  Ney,  157 ;  message  to  the 
Assembly  dismissing  the  ministry, 
158  ;  demands  measures  from  new 
ministry  limiting  the  franchise 
(1850),  160;  aims  at  a  prolonga- 
tion of  his  presidency,  162  ;  seeks  to 
win  the  support  of  the  army,  163  ; 
vote  of  Assembly  against  a  revision 
of  the  Constitution  for  prolonging 
his  presidency,  166  ;  prepares  for  a 
coup  d  etat,  167 ;  demands  from 
Assembly  the  re-establishment  of 
universal  suffrage,  170;  coup  d 'etat 
of  December  2nd,  1851,  172;  his 
proclamations,  173  ;  hi»  reception  in 
Paris,  174 ;  proclaimed  Emperor 


INDEX. 


551 


(1852)  177;  declares  in  address  at 
Bordeaux  the  peaceful  policy  of 
France,  180 ;  proposes  the  incorpora- 
tion of  Danubian  Principalities  with 
Austria,  235 ;  negotiates  with 
Count  Cavour  at  Plombieres,  re- 
specting war  with  Austria,  253  ; 
commands  his  army  in  Italian 
campaign,  263  ;  interview  with  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  at  Villa- 
franca,  265  ;  proposes  a  Congress  at 
Paris  for  the  consideration  of 
Italian  questions,  271  ;  annexes 
Nice  and  Savoy,  277 ;  announces 
his  opposition  to  a  Sardinian  invasion 
of  the  Papal  States,  293 ,  secret 
design  for  extending  the  French 
frontier,  354  ;  proposes  a  European 
Congress,  ib. ;  meets  Bismarck  at 
Biarritz,  359 ;  his  views  on  the 
interests  of  France  as  affected  by 
the  war  between  Prussia  and 
Austria,  372 ;  mediates  between 
Prussia  and  Austria,  377  ;  demands 
from  Bismarck  the  cession  of 
Bavarian  Palatinate  and  western 
Hesse,  380-383 ;  design  to  acquire 
Belgium,  384 ;  decline  of  fortune 
after  1863,  396  ;  failure  of  Mexican 
Expedition,  396-399 ;  negotiates 
with  King  of  Holland  for  the 
cession  of  Luxemburg,  400 ;  attitude 
towards  Prussia  after  1867,  404  ; 
.  private  arrangements  with  Austrian 
Emperor  for  defence  against  Prussia, 
406  ;  seeks  defensive  alliance  with 
Italy  against  Prussia,  409  ;  failure 
to  secure  alliances  with  the  Powers, 
411 ;  incapacity  in  command  of  his 
army  against  Prussia,  437 ;  sur- 
renders to  King  William  at  Sedan, 
446  •,  placed  in  captivity  at  Wil- 
helmshohe,  447 

Louis  Philippe,  Duke  of  Orleans,  ii. 
363  ;  marries  daughter  of  Ferdin- 
and of  Sicily,  ib. ;  made  Lieuten- 
ant-General of  France,  374  ;  made 
King  of  France,  378  ;  policy  and  in- 
fluence as  citizen-king,  379 ;  ap- 
proves of  election  of  Leopold  of 
Saxe-Coburg  as  King  of  Belgium, 
387  ;  critical  relations  with  Austria 
and  Russia,  402  ;  growing  unpopu- 
larity, 415;  his  life  attempted  by 
Fieschi,  417;  declines  to  assist 
i  in  in  quelling  Carlist  rebellion, 
437  ;  intrigues  for  the  marriage  of 
his  son,  the  Duke  of  Montpensier, 
with  the  Infanta  Fernanda,  sister 
of  the  Queen  of  Spain,  504 ;  mar- 


riage of  Montpensier  to  the  In- 
fanta, 506  ;  struggle  with  the  Re- 
form party  in  the  Chambers,  511  ; 
abdicates  in  favour  of  grandson, 
the  Count  of  Paris,  and  flies  from 
Paris,  513 

Louvain,  University  of,  i.  24,  255 

Louvre,  The,  seized  by  mob,  ii.  372 

Lovatz,  iii.  499,  501 

Liibeck,  scene  of  Bliicher's  capitula- 
tion,!. 331 

Lubecki,  member  of  Polish  council,  ii. 
393,  394 

Lucan,  Earl  of,  English  commander 
of  cavalry  at  Balaclava,  iii.  215 

Lucchesini,  Prussian  Minister,  i.  77 ; 
ambassador  at  Paris,  317  ;  sent  to 
Berlin  to  negotiate  with  Napoleon 
for  peace,  334 

Luneville,  Peace  of,  i.  226,  243 

Lutzen,  Battle  of,  i.  493 

Luxemburg,  ii.  389 ;  Napoleon  III. 
negotiates  with  King  of  Holland 
for  its  cession  to  France,  iii.  400 ; 
declared  neutral  territory  by  the 
Treaty  of  London  (1867),  402 

Lyons,  takes  arms  against  Paris,  i.  71; 
surrenders  to  Republic,  81.  Entry 
of  Napoleon  after  escaping  from 
Elba,  ii.  37 ;  revolt  of  working- 
classes  (1834),  416 

Macdonald,  French  General,  i.  182, 
478,  508,  ii.  36 

Mack,  Austrian  general,  leads  Neapoli- 
tan army  against  the  French,  i. 
171  ;  defeated  by  the  French,  173  ; 
disorder  in  his  army,  174  ;  enters 
Bavaria,  287  ;  capitulates  at  Ulm, 
289 

Macmahon,  General,  commands  French 
troops  against  Austrians,  iii.  261; 
army  defeated  by  Prussians  at 
Worth,  435  ;  marches  to  the  relief 
of  Bazaine  at  Metz,  443;  wounded 
at  Sedan,  446 ;  succeeds  Thiers  as 
President  of  the  French  Republic, 
475 

Madrid,  entry  of  French  troops,  i.  374; 
revolt  against  the  French,  377; 
entry  of  Napoleon  395 ;  popular 
demand  for  a  constitution,  ii.  177 

Maestricht,  Battle  of,  i.  68 

Magdeburg,  Fortress  of,  surrendered 
to  the  French,  i.  333 

Magenta,  Battle  of,  iii  261 

Magnan,  General,  assists  Louis  Napo- 
leon in  his  cintp  d'etat  of  Dec.  2, 
1851,  iii.  168 

Magnano,  Battle  of ,  L  181 


552 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


Magyars,  i.  19,  24,  25;  ii.,  466,  477, 
478,  485 ;  iii.  66,  75,  325,  387— 
394 

Mahinud  II.,  Sultan  of  Turkey,  ii.  291, 
295,  301 ;  manifesto  after  battle  of 
Navarino,  335;  declares  Mehemet 
AH  and  his  son  Ibrahim  rebels, 
443  ;  army  defeated  by  Egyptians 
at  Beilan  and  Konieh,  444 ;  peace 
of  Kutaya,  446;  campaign  of 
Nissib,  453  ;  death,  454 

Maida,  Battle  of,  i.  302 

Mainz,  French  emigrants  expelled,  i. 
10;  condition  in  1792,  37;  capitu- 
lates to  the  French,  52  ;  taken  by 
the  Germans,  76;  cruel  measures 
of  the  Archbishop,  108 ;  entry  of 
the  French,  157;  Commission  of 
Ministers,  ii.  149 

Malakotf,  Assault  on  the,  iii.  225  ;  cap- 
ture of  the,  226 

Malmesbury,  Lord,  treats  with  Prussia, 
i.  88 ;  his  opinion  of  Prussia,  94  ; 
despatched  to  Paris  to  negotiate 
with  the  French  Directory,  130, 
146 

Malmo,  Armistice  of,  between  Den- 
mark and  Prussia,  iii.  117 

Malta,  obtained  by  Bonaparte,  i.  167  ; 
offered  to  Russia,  227 ;  demanded 
by  France  for  the  Knights  of  St. 
John,  237  ;  claimed  by  England, 
267 

Manifesto  (see  Declaration) 

Manin,  Daniel,  political  prisoner,  re- 
leased during  insurrection  of 
Venice  (1848),  and  becomes  chief 
of  Provisional  Government,  iii.  16  ; 
retirement  on  union  with  Piedmont, 
60  ;  resumes  office,  112 

Manteuffel,  Prussian  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  iii.  146 ;  appointed  chief 
Minister,  147 ;  unpatriotic  policy, 
153 ;  dismissed  by  the  Crown  Prince 
Regent,  306 ;  on  the  weakness  of 
the  Prussian  army,  309 

Manteuffel,  General,  son  of  above,  iii. 
365 ;  leads  troops  into  Holstein, 
370  ;  defeats  Bavarians,  380 ;  mis- 
sion to  St.  Petersburg,  384 ;  con- 
quers Amiens  and  Rouen,  459 

Mantua,  Investment  of,  by  Bonaparte, 
i.  124;  the  siege  raised,  125;  sur- 
renders to  Bonaparte,  135 ;  takuii 
by  Austrians,  191 

Marches,  The,  iii.  282  ;  entry  of  Pied- 
montese  troops,  293 

Marengo,  Battle  of,  i.  221 

Maret,  M. ,  French  Foreign  Minister, 
i.  499 


Maria  Christina  of  Naples  marries 
King  Ferdinand  of  Spain,  ii.  428  ; 
declared  Regent  on  the  death  of 
Ferdinand,  429 ;  compelled  to  re- 
store Constitution  of  1812,  439; 
resigns  the  Regency  and  quits 
Spain,  441 ;  returns  to  Spain,  442  ; 
carries  out  intrigue  for  the  "  Spanish 
Marriages,"  506 

Maria,  Donna,  daughter  of  Emperor  of 
Brazil,  ii.  424,  425 

Maria  Theresa,  Reforms  of,  i.  21 

Marie  Antoinette,  her  life  threatened, 
i.  4 

Marie  Louise  of  Austria,  second  wife 
of  Bonaparte,  i.  435 

Marmont,  French  general,  i.  514,  522, 
524 ;  capitulates  to  the  allies  at 
Paris,  529.  Attacks  insurgents  in 
Paris,  ii.  370 

Marmora,  La,  Italian  Prime  Minister, 
iii.  362  ;  declines  to  accept  Venetia 
from  Austria,  368  ;  commands  army 
against  Austria  at  Custozza,  377 ; 
attitude  towards  Prussia  and  France, 
407 

Marsala,  Landing  of  Garibaldi's  troops 
at,  iii.  284 

"  Marseillaise,"  The,  i.  11,  14 

Marseilles,  takes  arms  against  Paris,  i. 
71.  Royalist  riots  in  1815,  ii.  91 

Mars-la-Tour,  Prussian  attack  at,  iii. 
215,  440 

Martignac,  Vicomte  de,  chief  French 
Minister,  ii.  360;  dismissed,  361 

Massena,  French  general,  i.  80,  179, 
181,  192,  193,  217;  surrenders 
Genoa  tp  the  Austrians,  220  ;  com- 
mands in  Spain,  444 ;  retreats 
before  the  English,  446 

Maubeuge  invested  by  Austrians,  i. 
81 

Maupas,  M.,  appointed  to  management 
of  French  police  by  Louis  Napo- 
leon, iii.  168 

Maurokordatos,  Alexander,  founder  of 
a  line  of  Hospodars,  ii.  251 

Maurokordatos,  Greek  leader  (1821), 
ii.  289,  293,  296,  297 

Maximilian,  Emperor  of  Mexico,  fall 
and  death,  iii.  399 

Mazas,  Prison  of,  iii.  172 

Mazzini  leads  incursion  into  Savoy 
(1834),  ii.  413,  414  ;  exalted 
patriotism,  468.  At  Rome,  in 
1849,  iii.  103 ;  offers  to  assist 
Victor  Emmanuel  in  the  establish- 
ment of  Italian  union,  270  ;  pro- 
ject for  the  capture  of  Rome  and 
Venice,  287  ;  letter  to  Bismarck  on 


INDEX. 


553 


Napoleon's  resolve  to  make  war  on 
Prussia,  410  (note) 

Medici,  The,  i.  115 

Mehemet  Ali,  Pasha  and  Viceroy  of 
Egypt,  ii.  301,  302  ;  conflict  with 
Turkey,  442,  443  ;  sends  army  into 
Palestine,  442  ;  victories  over 
Turks,  444  ;  Peace  of  Kutaya  gives 
Syria  and  Adana  to  him,  446  ;  cha- 
racter of  his  rule,  451 ;  second  war, 
453 ;  relinquishes  conquered  pro- 
vinces, 461 ;  Egypt  conferred  upon 
him,  ib. 

M.'lus,  Austrian  general,  i.  217,  220 

Mecklenburg,  i.  36 

Mendizabal,  succeeds Toreno  as  Spanish 
War  Minister  (1836),  ii.  438 

Menotti  leads  insurrection  at  Modena 
(1831),  ii.  399 

Monou,  French  general,  i.  234,  236 

Menschikoff,  Prince,  Russian  Envoy  to 
Constantinople,  iii.  188  ;  commands 
Russians  in  the  Crimea,  211 

Montana,  Battle  of,  between  Gari- 
baldians  and  Papal  troops,  iii.  408 

Messenhauser,  commander  of  volun- 
tcrrs  during  the  revolt  of  Vienna 
(1848),  iii.  78 

Messina,  rising  against  Neapolitan  rule, 
ii.  474.  Bombarded  by  Ferdinand 
of  Naples,  iii.  112  ;  surrendered  to 
Sardinian  troops,  298 
''«  Mettornich,  Austrian  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  i.  281 ;  Ambassador  at 
Paris,  403;  Austrian  Minister,  433  ; 
foreign  policy  of  1813,  496;  policy 
during  the  War  of  Liberation, 
610.  President  of  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  ii.  20;  his  demands  re- 
specting the  second  Treaty  of 
Paris,  60 ;  Austria  under  his  states- 
manship, 82 ;  Conservative  prin- 
ciples, 135;  influence  in  Europe, 
1 36 ;  advice  to  King  Frederick 
William  on  the  universities,  gym- 
nastic establishments,  and  the 
Press,  137  ;  takes  measures  to  pre- 
vent a  German  revolution,  142 ; 
opposes  Bavarian  and  Baden  Con- 
stitutions, 144 ;  requisitions  at  the 
Conf.-rence  of  Carlsbad,  145;  in- 
fluence at  the  Conference  of 
Troppau,  194  ;  Eastern  policy,  279  ; 
condemnation  of  the  Greek  revolt, 
283 ;  views  with  disgust  the  Anglo- 
Russian  protocol  for  intervention 
in  Greece,  322  ;  efforts  to  form  a 
coalition  against  Russia,  340;  in- 
tervention in  Papal  States,  402 ; 
rigorous  measures  to  repress  Liberal 


movements  in  Germany,  411,  412  ; 
policy  in  Austrian  Italy,  475 ; 
statement  respecting  insurrection 
in  Galicia,  493.  Resignation  during 
Revolution  of  1848,  iii.  8  ;  flight  to 
England,  8  ;  return  to  Vienna,  152 

Metz,  iii.  425,  428 ;  capitulates  to  the 
Prussians,  455 

Mexico,  Expedition  of  France  to,  iii. 
396—398 ;  recall  of  French  troops, 
and  fall  and  death  of  Maximilian, 
399 

Midhat  Pasha,  deposes  Sultan  Abdul 
Aziz,  iii.  482  ;  proposes  a  Constitu- 
tion, 492  ;  rejects  the  proposals  of 
the  Powers  for  an  international 
Commission,  495 

Miguel,  Don,  son  of  King  John  of 
Portugal,  leads  conspiracy  against 
the  Cortes,  ii.  228  ;  causes  himself 
to  be  proclaimed  King  of  Portugal 
(1828),  425;  his  violence,  ib. ;  his 
fleet  destroyed  off  St.  Vincent  by 
volunteer  force  under  Captain 
Charles  Napier,  426 ;  unites  with 
Don  Carlos,  429 ;  defeated  and  re- 
moved from  Portugal,  430 

Milan,  portion  of  Austrian  dominions, 
i.  19;  Bonaparte's  triumphal  entry, 
120;  surrenders  to  Russians  and 
Austrians,  181.  Insurrection  of 
1848,  iii.  15;  entry  of  Austrians, 
61  ;  evacuation  by  Austrians,  261 

Milazzo,  Battle  of,  iii.  286 

Milutim-,  Nicholas,  prepares  the  charter 
for  the  liberation  of  Russian  serfs, 
iii.  332 ;  carries  out  in  Poland  the 
Russian  measures  for  division  of 
land  amongst  the  peasantry,  338 

Mina,  Spanish  general,  ii.  169,  209  ; 
leads  troops  against  Carlists,  434 

Mincio,  Battle  on  the,  i.  122 

Minghetti,  Italian  Prime  Minster,  iii. 
361 

Minto,  Lord,  on  the  designs  of  Austria 
in  Italy,  i.  186,  187  (note) 

Miranda,  General,  i.  68 

Missolonghi,  Siege  of,  ii.  297 ;  second 
siege,  308 ;  re-taken  by  Greeks, 
347 

Modena,  portion  of  Cispadane  Repub- 
lic, i.  132  ;  Congress  of,  134.  In- 
corporated  with  Piedmontese  m  n- 
archy,  iii.  58,  276 

Modena,  Duke  of;  his  tyranny,  ii. 
467.  Flight  from  his  dominions,  iii. 
261 

Mohammedans,  in  Greece,  ii.  243, 
245  ;  massacre  of,  in  the  Morea, 
274 ;  attacked  in  Central  Greece,  285 


554 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


Moldavia,  proposed  annexation  to 
Russia,  i.  348  ;  rising  of  the  Greeks, 
ii.  269.  Entry  of  Russian  troops 
(1853),  iii.  192;  proposed  union 
with  Wallachia,  235  ;  actual  union, 
236 

Mcillendorf,  General  (Prussian),  takes 
possession  of  Western  Poland,  i. 
83;  defeats  Pitt's  object  in  granting 
a  subsidy  to  Prussia,  90 

Moltke,  General,  organises  Turkish 
army,  ii.  451 ;  in  the  campaign  of 
1839,  453.  Directs  the  movements 
of  Prussian  troops  against  Austria 
(1866),  iii.  375  ;  plans  for  war  with 
France,  426 ;  arranges  terms  of 
capitulation  of  Sedan,  446 

Monasteries,  dissolved,  in  Austria,  i. 
23 ;  in  Germany,  253 ;  in  Papal 
States  by  Napoleon,  437  ;  in  Spain, 
454.  Restored  in  Spain,  ii.  12;  re- 
stored in  Naples,  179 

Montalembert,  M.,  spokesman  in 
French  National  Assembly  on  be- 
half of  Catholicism,  iii.  185. 

Montbeliard,  iii.  461 

Montenegro,  takes  arms  against  Tur- 
key, iii.  238  ;  supports  the  revolt  of 
Herzegovina,  477 ;  declares  war 
against  Turkey,  482  ;  independence 
recognised  by  the  Treaty  of  San 
Stefano,  510 

Montereau,  Battle  of,  i.  525 

Montesquieu,  ii.  108 

Montgelas,  Bavarian  Minister,  i.  255 ; 
treatment  of  Tyrolese  bishops,  411 

Monthieu,  French  general,  i.  374. 

Montmorency,  French  Minister,  ii. 
206 ;  represents  France  at  Congress 
of  Verona,  216  ;  retires  from  office, 
217 

Moore,  Sir  John,  campaign  in  Spain, 
i.  395  ;  death  at  Corunna,  398 

Moravia,  Junction  of  Russian  and 
Austrian  troops  in,  i.  293. 

Morea,  The,  ii.  258 ;  Greek  rising, 
273  ;  second  revolt,  289 

Moreau,  French  general,  i.  80  ;  invades 
Germany,  126 ;  advances  against 
the  Russians  in  Lombardy,  182  ; 
advances  against  the  Austrians, 
218 ;  charged  with  conspiring 
against  Bonaparte,  275 ;  at  the 
Battle  of  Dresden,  505 

Morelli,  Neapolitan  insurgent,  ii.  182, 
203 

1'orny,  half-brother  of  Louis  Napo- 
leon, iii.  167 

ilorpeth,  Lord,  English  Envoy  to 
Prussia,  i.  330 


Mortemart,  Due  de,  French  Ambassa- 
dor at  St.  Petersburg,  ii.  371,  373, 
374 

Moscow,  entry  of  the  French,  i.  469 ; 
burning  of,  ib. ;  departure  of  Napo- 
leon, 471 

Mountain,  Political  party  of  the,  i.  49  ; 
becomes  powerful  in  the  Conven- 
tion, 66  ;  victory  over  Girondins, 
71  ;  attacked  by  Girondins  and 
Royalists,  71 ;  its  power  increases, 
72 

Mozart,  i.  108 

Mukhtar  Pasha,  iii.  498,  505 

Mulgrave,  Lord,  on  the  Russian  cam- 
paign in  Lombardy,  i.  186  (note) 

Miinchengratz,  meeting  place  of  em- 
perors of  Russia  and  Austria  in 
1833  to  consort  for  the  suppression 
of  revolutionary  movements,  ii. 
413. 

Munster,  Bishopric  of,  i.  129,  149,  157 

Murat,  French  general,  i.  80,  293; 
marries  Napoleon's  sister,  303 ; 
seizes  Prussian  territory,  316 ; 
despatched  to  Spain,  373 ;  enters 
Madrid,  374 ;  crafty  tactics,  ib. ; 
allied  with  Austria,  537.  Treachery 
towards  allies  in  1814,  ii.  6  ;  flight 
from  Naples,  42 

Muravieff,  General,  Russian  Envoy  to 
Constantinople,  ii.  445.  Crushes 
the  Polish  rebellion  (1864),  iii.  337 

Napier,  Sir  Charles,  destroys  navy  of 
Don  Miguel  off  St.  Vincent,  ii. 
426  ;  captures  Acre,  460 

Naples,  allied  with  England  against 
France,  i.  .59  ;  strengthened  by  de- 
struction of  French  fleet  at  Toulon, 
82;  condition  in  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, 115;  joins  coalition  between 
England,  Russia,  and  Turkey 
against  France,  169 ;  flight  of  the 
royal  family,  174  ;  riots,  175  ;  entry 
of  the  French,  176  ;  converted  into 
the  Parthenopean  Republic,  ib. ;  at- 
tacked by  fanatics,  led  by  Cardinal 
Ruffo,  182;  Ruffo' s  negotiations  for 
peace,  183  ;  arrival  of  Nelson's  fleet, 
ib. ;  a  reign  of  terror,  184  ;  Admiral 
Caracciolo  executed  with  Nelson's 
sanction,  183;  peace  with  France 
(1801)  227;  flight  of  King  Fer- 
dinand, 301 ;  the  throne  given  to 
Joseph  Bonaparte,  301 ;  after- 
wards to  Murat,  439.  Fall  of 
Murat,  ii.  41  ;  restoration  of  King 
Ferdinand  I.,  42 ;  condition  from 
1815 — 1820,  178  ;  the  Carbonari  and 


INDEX. 


555 


the  Caldernri,  181 ;  Morelli's  revolt, 
182;  constitution  declared,  184; 
conference  at  Troppau  between  the 
Sovereigns  of  Austria,  Russia,  and 
Prussia,  respecting  Neapolitan 
affaire,  193 ;  summoned  by  con- 
ference of  Troppau  to  abandon  its 
constitution,  196  ;  invaded  by 
Austria  and  returns  to  despotism, 
202,  203  ;  Ferdinand  II.,  474  ;  con- 
stitution granted,  475.  Insurrection 
of  May,  1848,  iii.  57;  death  of  Ferdi- 
nand II.,  and  accession  of  Francis 
II.,  281 ;  rejects  the  constitutional 
system  proposed  by  Cavour,  282 ; 
Cavour's  double  policy  with  regard 
to,  289 ;  advance  of  Garibaldi's 
troops  and  Sardinian  fleet  upon, 
290 ;  flight  of  King  Francis,  291  ; 
triumphant  entry  of  Garibaldi,  292 

Napoleon  I.,  Bonaparte,  serves  at  the 
siege  of  Toulon,  i  81,  82  (note)  ; 
defends  the  Convention  against  the 
Royalists,  102 ;  appointed  to  the 
command  of  the  army  in  Italy, 
110;  his  cajolery,  118;  triumphal 
entry  into  Milan,  120 ;  defeats 
Austrians  on  the  Mincio,  122 ; 
seizes  Leghorn,  124 ;  invests 
Mantua,  125  ;  takes  Roveredo  and 
Trent,  126  ;  creates  the  Cispadane 
Republic  in  Italy,  132 ;  defeats 
Austrians  at  Arcola  and  Rivoli, 

,  134,  135  ;  npgotiations  with  the 
Pope,  1 36  ;  enters  Venice,  and  offers 
it  to  Austria,  139 — 141;  treatment  of 
Genoa,  142 ;  sends  Augereau  to 
intimidate  the  Directory,  145 ; 
Treaty  with  Austria  at  Campo 
Formio,  147  (and  note) ;  his  policy  in 
1797,  150;  designs  to  attack  Egypt, 
152;  intervenes  in  Switzerland, 
160;  Egyptian  Campaign,  166—168; 
obtains  Malta,  167 ;  victory  over 
Turks  at  Aboukir,  200 ;  returns  to 
France  (1799),  201 ;  coup  d'etat  of 
Brumaire,  202  ;  appointed  First 
Consul,  206  ;  his  policy  and  rule, 
211 — 213  ;  makes  proposals  of  peace 
to  Austria  and  England,  215; 
campaign  against  the  Austrians  in 
Italy,  218—222 ;  peace  of  Luneville, 
226  ;  peace  of  Amiens,  238 ;  his  ag- 
gressions after  the  peace  of  Amiens, 
242;  made  President  of  Italian 
Republic,  244  ;  his  intervention  in 
Switzerland,  246 ;  his  settlement 
of  Germany,  247—254;  his  Civil 
Code  and  Concordat,  258 — 265; 
renews  the  war  with  England, 


268  ;  occupation  of  Hanover,  269 ; 
determines  to  become  Emperor, 
274 ;  assumes  the  title  of  Emperor, 
276  ;  accepts  the  title  of  King  of 
Italy,  279  ;  failure  of  naval  designs 
against  England,  284 ;  victory  over 
Austrians  at  Ulm,  289 ;  victory  of 
Austerlitz,  296 ;  appoints  Joseph 
Bonaparte  ,King  of  Naples,  301  ; 
styles  himself  the  "  new  Charle- 
magne, "  302 ;  gives  the  crown  of 
Holland  to  Louis  Bonaparte,  302  ; 
compels  Jerome  Bonaparte  to  marry 
the  daughter  of  the  King  of  Wiir- 
temberg,  303  ;  his  organisation  of 
Western  Germany,  303  ;  negotiates 
for  the  cession  of  Sicily  to  his 
brother  Joseph,  315 ;  war  against 
Prussia,  1806,  326—337 ;  enters 
Berlin,  332;  robs  Frederick  the 
Great's  tomb,  ib. ;  determines  to 
extinguish  the  commerce  of  Great 
Britain,  336;  enters  Poland,  338; 
Polish  campaign,  340  ;  Eylau,  341  ; 
Friedland,  345 ;  interview  with 
the  Emperor  of  Russia  on  the 
Niemen,  346  ;  acquisition  of 
Prussian  territory,  347 ;  Treaties 
of  Tilsit,  ib. ;  conspiracy  with 
the  Emperor  of  Russia,  348 ; 
attitude  towards  England  after 
the  bombardment  of  Copenhagen, 
352 ;  his  demands  upon  Portugal, 
354 ;  orders  the  banishment  of 
Stein,  Prussian  Minister,  366  ;  de- 
signs in  Spain,  368,  371;  receives 
the  crown  of  Spain,  377 ;  treats 
with  Prussia  for  the  French 
evacuation,  389;  at  Erfurt,  390; 
Spanish  campaign,  394 ;  plans 
for  campaign  against  Austria 
(1809),  victories  over  Austrians,  415; 
enters  Vienna,  416  ;  passage  of  the 
Danube,  420 ;  defeated  at  Aspern 
by  the  Austrians,  421 ;  second 
passage  of  the  Danube,  424  ;  defeats 
Austrians  at  Wagrara,  425  ;  peace 
with  Austria,  430 ;  divorces 
Josephine,  and  marries  Marie 
Louise  of  Austria,  435 ;  annexes 
Papal  States  and  is  excommunicated, 
436  ;  annexes  Holland,  Le  Valais, 
and  North  German  coast,  438 ; 
benefits  and  wrongs  of  his  rule  in 
the  French  Empire,  440 ;  blockade 
of  British  commerce,  44 1 ;  alliance 
with  Prussia,  1812,  459;  alliance 
with  Austria,  460 ;  invasion  of 
Russia  and  retreat,  462 — 477  ;  cam- 
paign in  Germany  against  Prussia 


556 


MODERN   EUROPE. 


and  Russia,  490  —  495 ;  enters 
Dresden,  494 ;  attitude  towards 
Austria  in  1813,  496  ;  Austria  joins 
his  enemies,  501 ;  battles  of  Dresden, 
505  ;  Grosbeeren,  Dennewitz,  508  ; 
defeated  by  the  allies  at  Leipzig, 
616 ;  retreat  across  the  Rhine, 
517  ;  campaign  of  1814,  524—526  ; 
dethronement  by  proclamation  of 
the  Senate,  531 ;  abdicates  in 
favour  of  infant  son,  535 ;  sent 
to  Elba,  ib. ;  results  of  his  wars  on 
Europe,  542.  Motives  for  modera- 
tion in  1807  respecting  Poland,  ii., 
3 ;  leaves  Elba,  31  ;  lands  in  France, 
32 ;  enters  Grenoble,  34  ;  declara- 
tion of  his  purpose,  35 ;  enters 
Lyons,  37 ;  enters  Paris,  38 ; 
outlawed  by  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  ib. ;  abolishes  the  slave- 
trade  after  return  from  Elba,  76 ; 
prepares  for  war,  40 ;  plan  of 
campaign,  48 ;  Waterloo,  53 — 55  ; 
'  flight  to  Paris,  and  abdication, 
56 ;  conveyed  to  St.  Helena,  58 

Napoleon  III.  (see  Louis  Napoleon). 

Napoleon,  Prince  Jerome,  iii.  253 ; 
betrothed  to  Princess  Clotilde,  256 

Narvaez,  head  of  Spanish  Government 
(1843),  ii.  442 

Nassau,  annexed  to  Prussia,  iii.  378 

Nassau.  Duke  of,  i.  256 

National  Assembly  (France),  de- 
stroys power  of  the  Crown  and 
nobility,  i.  3  ;  its  interpretation  of 
the  manifesto  of  Pillnitz,  5 ;  its 
Constitution  accepted  by  Louis 
XVI.,  5;  dissolved  (1791),  6;  its 
beneficial  work,  6,  7 

National  Debt  (in  England),  i.  241 

Nauplia,  Siege  of,  ii.  307 

Navarino,  Surrender  of,  to  Greek  in- 
surgents, ii.  290 ;  capitulates  to  the 
Egyptians,  306;  battle  of  (1827), 
330—332 

Navarre,  head-quarters  of  Carlist  in- 
surgents (1834),  ii.  431 

Nelson,  Admiral  (Lord),  destroys 
French  fleet  at  the  battle  of  the 
Nile,  i.  168 ;  his  reception  at  Naples, 
169;  takes  the  Neapolitan  royal 
family  to  Palermo,  174  ;  returns  to 
Naples,  183  ;  execution  of  Admiral 
Caracciolo,  1 84;  his  dislike  of  Thugut 
190  (note) ;  superiority  of  his  sea- 
men, 197  ;  at  the  battle  of  Copen- 
hagen, 231  ;  statement  in  the  House 
of  Lords,  respecting  Malta  and  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  242 ;  pursues 
the  French  in  the  West  Indies, 


285 ;  victory  of  Trafalgar,  and 
death,  290 

Nemours,  Due  de,  elected  King  of  the 
Belgians,  ii.  387  ;  election  annulled 
by  Louis  Philippe,  ib. 

Netherlands  (see  Holland,  Belgium, 
and  Flanders) 

Neutrality,  Armed,  of  1800,  i.  228 

Ney,  French  general,  i.  341,  395,  475, 
476,  494,  508,  ii.  37 ;  at  the  battle 
of  Quatre  Bras,  51 ;  at  Waterloo, 
54 ;  execution,  98  ;  character,  100 
(note) 

Ney,  Colonel  (son  of  Marshal  Ney),  iii. 
110;  letter  to,  from  Louis  Napo- 
leon, 157 

Nice,  annexed  to  France,  i.  54 ;  re- 
stored to  Sardinia  (1814),  537. 
Annexed  to  France,  iii.  277 ;  effect 
of  the  annexation  on  Europe,  279 

Nicholas  (Emperor  of  Russia),  ii.  319 ; 
principle  of  autocratic  rule,  320 ; 
lack  of  sympathy  with  the  Greeks, 
321 ;  policy  towards  Poland  during 
insurrection  of  1830,  3"95  ;  invasion 
of  Poland,  396.  Attempts  to  mediate 
between  Prussia  and  Austria  re- 
specting affairs  in  Hesse-Cassel,  iii. 
146 ;  visits  England  in  1844,  and 
seeks  to  negotiate  with  respect  to 
Turkey,  the  "  sick,  or  dying  man," 
182  ;  policy  in  1848,  183  ;  demands 
the  surrender  of  Hungarians  from 
Turkey,  184  ;  affronted  at  Turkey's 
concessions  to  France  respecting 
Holy  Places  in  Palestine,  187;  oc- 
cupies the  Principalities,  192  ;  war 
with  Turkey,  197  ;  with  England 
and  France,  199 ;  rejects  the 
"  Four  Points,"  209  ;  death  (1855), 
219 

Nicholas,  Grand  Duke,  iii.  506 

Nicolsburg,  iii.  379 

Nicopolis,  iii.  498,  499 

Niebuhr,  the  historian,  i.  357.  Replies 
to  Schmalz's  pamphlet,  ii.  124 

Niel,  French  general  in  the  Crimea, 
iii.  224 

Nightingale,  Florence,  iii.  219 

Nigra,  Italian  Ambassador  at  Paris, 
report  on  the  ideas  of  Napoleon  III. 
respecting  a  Congress,  iii.  373 
(note) 

Nile,  Battle  of  the,  i.  168 

Nismes,  royalist  outrages  in  1815,  ii. 
92 

Nissib,  Battle  of,  between  Turks  and 
Egyptians,  ii.  454 

Normandy,  takes  arms  against  Paris,  i. 
71 


INDEX. 


557 


North,  Lord,  i.  62 

Northern  Maritime  League  (1800),  i. 

228 
Norway,  given  to  Bernudotte,  Crown 

Prince  of  Sweden,  ii.  5 
Novara,  Battle  of,  between  Austrians 

and  Sardinians,  iii.  100 
Novi,  Battle  of,  i.  191 

Odessa,  ii.  260 

Ollivier,  M.,  President  of  French 
Cabinet  (1870),  iii.  415;  averse  to 
war  with  Prussia,  ib.,  421 ;  ignor- 
ance of  the  condition  of  the  army, 
429 ;  resignation,  438 

Olmiitz,  iii.  77 ;  convention  of,  re- 
specting the  dissolution  of  the 
Prussian  Union,  and  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  diet  of  Frankfort  by 
Prussia,  147 

Oltc-nitza,  iii.  197 

Omar  Pasha,  defeats  Russians  at 
Oltenitza,  iii.  197 

Oporto,  Fall  of,  i.  401.  Revolution  at, 
ii.  187  ;  taken  by  Don  Pedro  (1832), 
426  ;  besieged  by  Dou  Miguel,  ib. 

Orleans,  taken  by  the  Prussians,  iii. 
453 ;  re-taken  by  the  French,  and 
again  occupied  by  the  Prussians, 
457,  458 

Orsini's  conspiracy,  iii.  279 

Osman  Pasha,  iii.  499,  500 ;  surrender 
f  to  the  Russians  at  Plevna,  504 

'Otho,  King  of  Greece,  ii.  354 

Ott,  Austrian  general,  i.  220 

Oudinot  (1)  French  general,  i.  503, 
504,  506 

Oudinot  (2),  French  general,  sent  to 
Itome,  Ui.  105,  106  ;  enters  Rome, 
109 

Palatinate,  Bavarian,  ii.  408 ;  re- 
actionary measures  against  Liberal- 
ism, 4 10 

Palatine,  Elector,  i.  247 

Palermo :  revolution  of  1848,  ii.  474. 
Surrendered  toFerdinand  of  Naples, 
iii.  113;  captured  by  Garibaldi, 
who  assumes  the  dictatorship  of 
Sicily,  285,  286;  Depretis  appointed 
Pro-Dictator,  288 

Palestine,  dispute  between  France  and 
Russia  respecting  Holy  Places  in, 
iii.  185—189 

Palestro,  Battle  of,  between 'Austrians 
and  Piedmontese,  iii.  261 

Palikao,  Count  of,  succeeds  Ollivier  as 
the  head  of  the  French  Ministry, 
iii.  438 


Palm,    German    bookseller,    executed 

by  Napoleon's  orders,  i.  322 
Palmerston,  Lord,  ii.  389;  as  Foreign 
Secretary  secures  indemnity  from 
Portuguese  Government  for  attack 
on  British  subjects,  426 ;  declines 
to  share  with  France  the  conse- 
quences of  intervention  in  Spain 
for  quelling  the  Carlist  rebellion, 
437  ;  view  of  the  growth  of  Russian 
power,  455 ;  obstinacy  on  the 
Eastern  question  (1840),  457,  460  ; 
accepts  arrangements  settling 
Egypt  upon  Mehomet  Ali,  461  ; 
proposes  a  marriage  between  a 
Prince  of  Saxe-Coburg  and  the 
Queen  of  Spain,  505.  Advice  to 
Austria  respecting  Lombardy,  iii. 
59 ;  on  the  dissolution  of  the 
Turkish  Empire,  190  (note);  favours 
war  with  Russia,  196 ;  succeeds 
Lord  Aberdeen  as  Prime  Minister, 
219  ;  policy  during  Crimean  War, 
238 ;  attitude  during  Danish  war, 
354 

Papal  Infallibility,  i.  263 
Papal  States,  allied  with  England 
against  France,  i.  59  ;  cession  of  part 
by  Treaty  of  Tolentino,  136;  annex- 
ation by  Napoleon,  436.  Insurrection 
of  1831,  ii.  399;  intervention  of 
Austria,  and  suppression  of  revolt, 
402 ;  second  insurrection,  and 
second  Austrian  intervention,  404. 
Events  of  1848-9,  iii.  97  ;  103-110; 
Sardinian  troops  occupy  Umbria 
and  the  Marches,  and  capture 
Ancona,  293,  294  (and  see  Rome) 
Paris,  Exasperation  in,  against  Louis 
XVI.,  i.  4;  Austria  demands  an 
anti-democratic  government  in,  12 ; 
insurrection  of  August  10,  1792, 
44  ;  September  Massacres,  45  ;. 
overthrow  of  the  Gironde,  71  ; 
insurrection  against  the  conven- 
tion, 102 ;  coup  d'etat  of  Fructidor, 
return  of  Bonaparte,  201  ;  coup 
d'etat,  18  Brumaire,  1799,202;  sur- 
rendered to  the  allies,  529 ;  arrival 
of  Louis  XVIII.,  533  ;  treaty  of, 
636.  Napoleon's  entry  after  leaving 
Elba  and  flight  of  King  Louis,  ii. 
38 ;  Napoleon's  arrival  after  the 
defeat  of  Waterloo,  56  ;  entry  of 
allies,  57  ;  Fouche  appointed  head 
of  the  Provisional  Government,  58  ; 
restoration  of  King  Louis,  57 ; 
second  treaty  of,  62 ;  meeting  of 
council  of  ambassadors,  79  ;  insur- 
rection of  July,  1830,  370 ;  Hotel 


558 


MODERN   EUROPE. 


de  Ville  seized  by  insurgents,  ib. ; 
insurgents  seize  Tuileries  and  the 
Louvre,  372  ;  insurrections,  1832 — 
1834,  415—417  ;  Fieschi's  attempt 
on  the  life  of  Louis  Philippe,  417  ; 
revolution  of  February,  1848,  and 
abdication  and  flight  of  Louis  j 
Philippe,  513;  Republic  proclaimed,  j 
ib.  Riot  of  May,  iii.  38;  insurrection  j 
of  workmen,  June,  40;  Archbishop  of 
Paris  killed,  41 ;  Louis  Napoleon's 
coup  d'etat  of  Dec.  2,  1851,  175 ; 
Treaty  of  (1856),  between  Russia, 
Great  Britain,  and  allies,  230  ;  re- 
construction of,  in  the  reign  of 
Napoleon  III.,  395  ;  consternation 
after  Battle  of  Worth,  437  ;  invest- 
ment by  the  Germans,  450;  sor- 
ties, 458,  459  ;  forty  thousand 
of  the  inhabitants  perish  during 
the  siege,  462  ;  capitulation,  463  ; 
entry  of  the  Germans,  March  1, 
1871,  465 ;  insurrection  of  the 
Commune  and  National  Guard, 
withdrawal  of  Government  troops 
to  Versailles,  and  second  siege, 
468 — 470  ;  destruction  wrought  by 
the  Commune,  and  re-entry  of  Go- 
vernment troops,  471 

Paris,  Archbishop  of , mortally  wounded 
in  insurrection  of  June,  1848,  iii. 
41 

Paris,  Count  of,  ii.  513 

Parker,  English  admiral,  i.  231 

Parma,  incorporated  with  Piedmontese 
Monarchy,  iii.  58 ;  unites  with 
Modena  under  the  dictatorship  of 
Farini,  267 

Parma,  Duchess  of,  iii.  261 

Parma,  Prince  of,  i.  245 

Parthenopean  Republic,  i.  176 

Paskiewitsch  (Russian  commander),  ii. 
338  ;  iii.  206,  208 

Patriarch  of  Constantinople,  ii.  243 ; 
execution,  275 

Paul,  Emperor  of  Russia,  i.  168  ;  joins 
the  second  coalition,  169;  suspicions 
of  Austria,  189  ;  proposes  European 
Congress,  190  ;  hatred  to  England, 
227  ;  his  assassination,  232 

Pavia,  Pillage  of,  by  the  French,  i. 
122 

Peasantry,  position  improved  in  Austria 
by  Leopold  II.,  i.  25,  26  ;  Serfdom 
in  Prussia,  35 ;  of  France,  36  ;  con- 
dition in  minor  States  of  Germany, 
36  ;  patriotism  in  France,  46 ;  revolt 
in  La  Vendee,  70 ;  in  France,  1795, 
99;  in  Italy,  112;  revolt  in  Lom- 
bardy  against  the  French,  121  ; 


improved  position  in  France  owing 
to  the  Revolution,  131 ;  of  Switzer- 
land, 162;  Neapolitan,  174;  re- 
lieved in  Germany,  255  ;  improve- 
ment in  Prussia  after  Stein's  edict, 
359 ;  English  in  1807,  361 ;  in 
Spain,  381 ;  Tyrolese  rising  of  1809, 
411,  413.  In  Greece,  ii.  238;  in 
Poland,  391  ;  in  Hungary  (1832), 
481,  491.  Emancipation  in  Hun- 
gary, iii.  10  ;  converted  into  inde- 
pendent proprietors  in  Austria,  82 ; 
rising  in  Roumania,  85 ;  emancipa- 
tion in  Russia,  331 ;  made  land- 
owners in  Poland  by  Russia,  339 

Pedro,  Don,  Emperor  of  Brazil,  re- 
nounces Crown  of  Portugal,  ii.  229 ; 
invades  Portugal,  and  enters  Lisbon 
on  the  destruction  of  the  Constitu- 
tion by  Miguel,  426,  427 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  English  Prime 
Minister,  iii.  188 

Pelissier,  General,  French  commander 
in  the  Crimea,  iii.  225 

Pepe,  Neapolitan  general,  ii.  183,  184, 
202 ;  iii.  57 

Perier,  Casimir,  succeeds  Lafitte  as 
French  Premier,  ii.  402 ;  sends 
troops  to  occupy  Ancona,  404 ; 
death,  405 ;  pacific  policy  mis- 
understood, 415 

Persano,  Sardinian  admiral,  iii.  285  ; 
excites  insurrection  at  Naples  by 
Count  Cavour's  orders,  290  ;  refers 
his  diary  to  Azeglio,  292  (note) 

Persigny,  confidant  of  Louis  Napoleon, 
iii.  167 

Pesth,  bridge  uniting  the  double 
capital  of  Hungary,  ii.  482.  Derno- 
craticinovement  headed  by  Kossuth, 
iii.  10 ;  meeting  of  Parliament  at, 
70  ;  Jellacic  marches  against,  72 ; 
martial  law  proclaimed,  74  ;  occu- 
pied by  Austrians,  86  ;  evacuated 
by  them,  90  ;  but  re-occupied,  94. 

Petrobei,  leader  of  Greek  revolt  in  the 
Morea,  ii.  289 

Phanariots,  The  Greek,  ii.  251 

Philhellenes,  Corps  of,  ii.  296 

Philippopolis,  iii.  504 

Pichegru,  French  general,  i.  87 ; 
enters  Antwerp,  93 ;  conquers  Hol- 
land, 95  ;  charged  with  complicity 
in  plot  against  Bonaparte,  275 

Piedmont,  social  condition  in  eighteenth 
century,  i.  117;  Bonaparte's  suc- 
cesses, 119;  annexed  to  France. 
245.  Insurrection  in,  ii.  203.  Events 
of  1848-9,  iii.  17,  55—62,  96—103; 
ecclesiastical  reform  'under  Victor 


INDEX. 


559 


Emmanuel  and  Massimo  d'Azeglio, 
243  ;  Cavour,  Minister,  244  ; 
allied  with  France  in  war  against 
Austria,  256 ;  movement  in  Central 
Italy  for  union  with,  261 ;  union 
with  Tuscany,  Parma,  Modena,  and 
the  Romagna,  276  :  union  of  Naples 
and  Sicily  with,  281 — 297  ;  troops 
enter  Umbria  and  the  Marches,  and 
seize  Ancona,  293,  294 

Pillnitz,  Emperor  Leopold  II.  and 
Frederick  William  II.  meet  at,  i. 
4 

Pitt,  "William,  view  of  French  Revolu- 
tion, i.  57 ;  attempts  to  unite 
Europe  against  France,  59  ;  Liberal 
policy,  62 ;  grants  subsidy  to 
Prussia,  88  ;  attempts  to  suppress 
Jacobinism,  107  ;  enters  into  nego- 
tiations for  peace  with  French 
Directory,  130 ;  his  scheme  of  a 
coalition  against  France  favoured 
by  the  Emperor  Paul,  169 ;  his 
object  in  the  war  against  France, 
237  ;  retirement,  238  ;  his  Act  for 
the  Union  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland,  239 ;  again  Prime  Minister, 
278;  death,  309;  his  "Austerlitz 
look,"  ib.  (note) 

Pius  VI.,  Pope,  Austria  claims  indem- 
nification for  him  from  France  for 
the  loss  of  Avignon  and  the 
Venaissin,  i.  12 ;  his  armistice  with 
Bonaparte,  124 ;  submits  to  Bona- 
parte, and  cedes  Bologna,  Ferrara, 
and  Romagna,  136;  his  authority 
renounced  by  the  Roman  people, 
165  ;  removed  by  the  French  to 
Tuscany,  and  afterwards  to  Valence, 
•where  he  dies,  ib. ;  King  Ferdi- 
nand's letter  to  him,  172 

Pius  VII.,  Pope,  excommunicates 
Bonaparte,  and  is  imprisoned  at 
Savona,  i.  436.  Resents  attempt  of 
Austria  to  gain  Bologna  and  Ra- 
venna, ii.  86 

Pius  VIII.  (Pope),  ii.  399 

Pius  IX.,  elected  Pope  (1846),  ii.  472; 
publishes  amnesty  for  political  of- 
fences, ib.  Disavows  sympathy  with 
the  war  of  the  Lombards  against 
Austria,  iii.  56  ;  flight  from  Rome 
after  murder  of  Rossi,  97  ;  restora- 
tion by  the  French,  110;  seeks  to 
restore  the  Inquisition,  110;  re- 
fuses to  consider  any  proposals  for 
Italian  reform,  273  ;  indignation  at 
the 'doctrines  in  the  pamphlet,  "The 
Pope  and  the  Congress,"  274  ;  loses 
temporal  power  by  the  Italian  oc- 


cupation of  Rome,  but  is  guaranteed 
various  rights  by  the  Italian  Par- 
liament, 472 

Plevna,  Battles  of,  iii.  499—501  ;  faU 
of,  504 

Poland,  Designs  of  Austria  and  Prussia 
against,  i.  33,  83 ;  Cobden's  views 
on  the  partition  of,  34  (note)  ; 
second  partition  of,  83  ;  revolt,  89  ; 
third  partition,  9^  Napoleon  enters. 
338 ;  establishment  of  Duchy  of 
Warsaw,  347.  Probable  re- 
sults in  the  Polish  kingdom  had 
Napoleon's  Russian  campaign  suc- 
ceeded, ii.  2  ;  discussion  of  affairs 
at  Congress  of  Vienna,  23,  24 ; 
Duchy  of  Warsaw  made  Kingdom 
of  Poland  under  Alexander  L, 
Emperor  of  Russia,  80 ;  Alexan- 
der addresses  Polish  Diet,  on  his 
design  to  extend  popular  represen- 
tation, 121 ;  insurrection  at  War- 
saw (1830),  392;  invaded  by  Russia, 
396 ;  Russians  capture  Warsaw,  397 ; 
becomes  a  province  of  Russia,  ib. ;  re- 
volt in  Prussia  and  Austrian  Poland 
(1846),492.  Condition  in  1861,iii.333; 
tumults  at  Warsaw,  334 ;  Grand 
Duke  Constantino  appointed  Vice- 
roy at  Warsaw,  334  ;  levy,  and  in- 
surrection (1863),  335  ;  a  secret  Na- 
tional Government,  336  ;  General 
Muravieff  crushes  the  rebellion 
in  Lithuania,  337  ;  ownership  of 
land  given  to  the  peasantry,  338 ; 
the  Czar's  endeavours  to  Russianise 
social  and  national  life,  340 

Polignac,  Jules,  chief  French  Minister, 
ii.  361  ;  project  to  suspend  the  Con- 
stitution, 365 

Portland,  Duke  of,  Prime  Minister,  i. 
343 

Portugal,  allied  with  England  against 
France,  i.  59  ;  Napoleon's  demands 
upon,  354;  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau 
for  the  partition  of,  355 ;  flight  of 
the  Regent  to  Brazil,  356;  the 
French  enter  Lisbon,  356  ;  entry  of 
British  troops  under  Sir  Arthur 
WeUesley,  385  ;  Battle  of  Vimieiro, 
385 ;  evacuated  by  the  French,  ib. ; 
invaded  by  Marshal  Soult,  401 ; 
Wellesley  drives  Soult  from  Oporto, 
426  ;  holds  Torres  Vedras  and 
drives  Massena  back,  445.  Refuses 
to  abolish  slave-trade,  ii.  75 ;  affairs 
from  1807—1820,  186—189  ;  revo- 
lution at  Oporto,  187  ;  Don  Pedro 
grants  a  Constitution,  229 ;  de- 
sertion of  soldiery,  230 ;  demands 


SCO 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


assistance  from  England  against  at- 
attack,  ib. ;  Don  Miguel  causes 
himself  to  be  proclaimed  King,  425 ; 

*  Constitution  destroyed,  ib. ;  Reign 
of  Terror,  ib. ;  attacks  by  Miguel 
on  English  and  French  subjects,  ib. ; 
invasion  by  the  Emperor  Pedro, 
426 ;  English  and  French  squad- 
rons appear  in  the  Tagus  and  pro- 
cure indemnity,  ib. ;  Don  Pedro 
enters  Lisbon,  427  ;  Miguel  defeated 
and  expelled  from  the  Peninsula, 
430 

Potsdam,  Treaty  of,  i.  292.  King 
Frederick  William  IV.  withdraws 
to,  iii.  120 

Prague,  Congress  of,  i.  500.  Riots 
(1848),  iii.  54;  Treaty  of,  379 

Prenzlau,  i.  331 

Presburg,  iii.  9,  11, 12 

Presburg,  Treaty  of,  i.  299 

Press,  Censorship  of,  restored  in  Spain, 
ii.  10 ;  in  France,  160 

Press,  Freedom  of  the,  established  in 
Franceby  Louis  XVIII.,  ii.  15;  at 
Jena,  127 ;  Metternich  proposes 
restrictions  in  Germany,  137;  re- 
strictions ordered  by  Conference  of 
Carlsbad,  145 ;  restrictions  in  France 
under  Charles  X.,  369  ;  freedom  ex- 
tended in  Germany,  408 ;  suppres- 
sion of  journals  in  Germany  during 
the  reaction  of  1832,  410;  Bis- 
marck's suppressive  measures  in 
Prussia,  421 

Prim,  General,  chief  mover  in  Spanish 
Revolution  (1868),  iii.  412 

Protestantism,  of  Northern  Germany,  i. 
18  ;  Emperor  Ferdinand's  hatred  of, 
20 ;  Bohemian  Protestants  lose 
their  estates,  20 ;  its  survival  in 
Hungary,  ib. ;  its  extension  in  Ger- 
many, 253 

Prussia,  State  of,  before  the  war  of 
1792,  i.  30 ;  rule  of  Frederick  the 
Great  in,  30 ;  poverty  of,  30 ;  ab- 
sence of  political  opinion  in,  31  ; 
social  system,  34 ;  allied  with 
Austria  against  France,  42 ;  invades 
France,  42  ;  evacuates  France,  48 ; 
besieges  Mainz,  76 ;  seeks  to  pre- 
vent Austria  from  gaining  Bavaria, 
77  (and  note)  ;  takes  possession  of 
Western  Poland,  83 ;  breach  with 
Austria,  86  ;  subsidised  by  England, 
88  ;  treaty  of  peace  with  France  at 
Basle,  96 ;  at  the  Congress  of 
Rastadt,  156 ;  joins  the  Northern 
Maritime  League,  228 ;  interests 
in  Germany,  249 ;  inaction  with  re- 


gard to  Hanover,  269 ;  the  King's 
dissimulation  on  the  acquisition  of 
Hanover,  312 ;  excludes  English 
ships  from  the  ports,  314 ;  vessels 
seized  by  British  navy,  314  ;  Stein 
exposes  the  character  of  Prussian 
Ministers,  318 ;  demoralised  state 
of  the  army  (1806),  319—321;  de- 
feated by  the  French  at  Jena 
and  Auerstadt,  328,  329  ;  entry  of 
Napoleon  into  Berlin,  332  ;  capitu- 
lation of  fortresses  to  the  French, 
ib. ;  large  cessions  of  territory  to 
France,  347  ;  condition  after  the 
peace  of  Tilsit,  356  ;  Stein's  edictfor 
the  abolition  of  serfage,  358 ;  re- 
form of  army,  362 ;  plans  for  war 
against  Napoleon,  389  ;  terms  with 
Napoleon  for  the  French  evacua- 
tion, 391  ;  seeks  the  aid  of  Russia 
against  France,  458 ;  accepts 
alliance  with  Napoleon,  459  ;  arm- 
ing of  East  Prussia  by  order  of  the 
Czar,  482 ;  Treaty  of  Kalisch  with 
Russia,  484  ;  the  French  evacuate 
Berlin,  486 ;  war  declared  against 
France,  486  ;  national  spirit,  487  ; 
defeated  Liitzen  and  Bautzen, 
493  ;  victories  of  Grossbeeren  and 
Dennewitz,  506 ;  results  of  the 
wars  of  Napoleon,  540,  542.  Cam- 
paign of  1815  against  Napoleon,  ii. 
48—56  ;  Treaty  of  Paris,  60—62 ; 
national  disappointment  after  1815, 
121  ;  King  Frederick  William  pro- 
mises a  popular  Constitution,  121  ; 
Hardenberg's  system,  123  ;  Wart- 
burg  festival,  127;  policy  of  inaction 
(1818),  135  ;  Metternich's  influence, 
136  ;  relation  to  the  minor  States 
of  Germany,  143 ;  resignation  of 
Humboldt  owing  to  Metternich's 
influence,  148  ;  Provincial  Estates 
established  (1823),  151  ;  nature  of 
its  government,  152 ;  view  of 
Anglo-Russian  Protocol  for  inter- 
vention in  Greece,  323  ;  condition 
after  the  French  Revolution 
of  1830,  405;  King  Frederick 
William  still  withholds  a  Constitu- 
tion, 405;  progress  of  commerce, 
406  ;  the  Zollverein,  ib.;  understand- 
ing with  allies  in  Turkish  affairs, 
460  ;  death  of  Frederick  William 
III.,  and  accession  of  Frederick 
William  IV.  (1840),  497;  United 
Diet  convoked  at  Berlin,  498. 
Events  in  Berlin,  March,  1848,  iii. 
19,  20,  21 ;  the  king  promises  a 
National  Assembly,  23;  war  with 


INDEX. 


561 


Denmark  respecting 
Holstein,  28  ;  armistice  of  Malmo 
•with  Denmark,  117;  riots  at  Berlin 
against  the  National  Assembly,  119, 
120;  fidelity  of  the  army  to  the 
throne,  121  ;  the  king  appoints 
Count  Brandenburg  Minister,  123  ; 
prorogation  of  the  Assembly,  123 ; 
the  Assembly  refusing  to  disperse, 
are  driven  from  their  hall  by 
General  Wrangel  and  his  troops, 
124 ;  the  king  dissolves  the 
Assembly  and  publishes  a  Consti- 
tution, ib. ;  attempt  to  form  a 
Federation  of  German  States,  139  ; 
formation  of  Federal  Constitution 
and  Federal  Parliament  at  Erfurt, 
140,  141 ;  conflict  with  Austria 
respecting  affairs  in  Hesse- Cassel, 
145 — 148;  seeks  the  Czar's  mediation 
respecting  affairs  in  Hesse,  146 ; 
submits  to  Austria's  demands  for 
dissolution  of  Prussian  union  and 
•withdrawal  of  troops  from  Hesse, 
147 ;  peace  with  Denmark,  149 ; 
policy  at  the  opening  of  the  Crimean 
War,  201 — 204  ;  approves  the  Four 
Points,  220 ;  sends  plenipoten- 
tiaries to  the  Conference  at  Paris 
(1856),  230;  King  Frederick 
William  IV.  withdraws  from  public 
affairs,  and  his  brother,  the  Crown 
Prince  William,  is  appointed 
Regent,  306 ;  reorganisation  of 
army  by  Crown  Prince  Regent, 
310  ;  accession  of  the  Prince  Regent 
to  the  throne,  311;  Parliamentary 
measures  of  1862,  312  ;  dissolution 
of  Parliament  and  appointment  o? 
Prince  Hohenlohe  as  Prime  Ministei , 
312  ;  conflict  between  the  king  and 
Parliament  on  the  Army  Bill,  313  ; 
resignation  of  Hohenlohe,  and 
appointment  of  Bismarck,  313 ; 
rejection  of  army-clause  in  the 
Budget,  318  ;  struggle  betwei  n 
the  Upper  House  and  Lower 
House  on  the  Budget,  318 ;  con- 
tinuation of  the  struggle  between 
Bismarck  and  Liberals  on  the  re- 
assembling of  Parliament  in  1863, 
319,  320  ;  Bismarck's  measures 
against  the  Press,  321 ;  Bismarck's 
plans  regarding  Schleswig-Hol- 
stein,  346 ;  Danish  '  War,  350  ; 
secures  Schleswig-Holstein  jointly 
with  Austria  by  the  Treaty 
of  Vienna,  353 ;  Convention 
of  Gastein,  358  ;  Italian  al- 
liance, 364 ;  commencement  of 

K  K 


war  with  Austria,  Hanover, 
Saxony,  and  Hesse-Cassel,  370 ; 
defeats  Austria  at  Koniggratz,  376  ; 
terms  of  peace  with  Austria,  378» 
379 ;  secret  treaties  with  the 
South  German  States,  381 ;  with- 
drawal from  Luxemburg,  402 ; 
the  question  of  Prince  Leo- 
pold's election  to  the  Spanish 
throne,  iii.  416 — 422  ;  prepara- 
tions for  war,  425-^-427 ;  Moltke's 
plans  for  war,  426 ;  causes  of  suc- 
cess in  the  war  against  France, 
431  ;  victories  over  the  French  at 
Weissenburg  and  Worth,  434 ; 
victories  of  Spicheren,  Mars-la-Tour, 
and  Gravelotte,  436 — 441  ;  sur- 
render of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  at 
Sedan,  446,  447 ;  troops  invest 
Paris,  450 ;  capitulation  of  Hetz, 
455 ;  overthrow  of  the  relieving 
armies,  457 — 462  ;  capitulation  of 
Paris  and  armistice,  463 ;  troops 
enter  Paris,  465 ;  treaties  of  Ver- 
sailles and  Frankfort  with  France, 
t b.;  Union  of  Northern  and  Southern 
States  of  Germany,  and  the  title  of 
Emperor  assumed  by  King  William, 
466—468;  opening  of  the  first 
Parliament  of  the  Empire  at  Berlin, 
468 

Psara,  one  of  the  ^Egean  Islands,  ii. 
287  ;  destroyed  by  Egyptians,  304 

Puchner,  Austrian  commander,  leads 
troops  against  Hungary,  iii.  85 

Quatre  Bras,  Battle  of,  ii.  51 
Quentin,  St.,  iii.  460 
Quiroga,  Spanish  conspirator,  ii.  173 
Quosdanovich,    Austrian    general,    i. 
124 

Raab,  surrendered  to  Austrians  (1849), 
iii.  94 

Radetzky,  Austrian  commander- in- 
chief,  carries  out  fortifications  in 
Italy,  ii.  475.  Fails  to  suppress 
insurrection  at  Milan,  iii.  15 ; 
campaign  in  Northern  Italy,  55  ; 
re-conquers  Venetia,  60  ;  at 
Novara,  100 

Radicalism,  Lord  Castlereagh  on,  165 
(note) 

Radowitz,  General,  projector  of  German 
Federal  Union,  iii.  146 ;  resigns 
office  of  chief  Prussian  Minister, 
147 

Raglan,  Lord,  British  commander  in 
the  Crimea,  defeats  Russians  at  the 
Aimu,  iii.  211 ;  besieges  the  Redan, 


562 


MODERN   EUROPE. 


223 ;  thwarted  by  the  French,  224  ; 
death,  225 

Ramorino,  leads  part  of  Sardinian 
army  against  Austria,  iii.  99 

Rastadt,  Congress  of,  i.  154;  murder 
of  French  envoys  at,  180.  Fall  of, 
at  insurrection  of  July,  1849,  iii. 
138 

Ratisbon,  Diet  of  (see  Diet  of  the  Empire) 

Rattazzi,  Piedmontese  Minister,  iii. 
244 ;  succeeds  Cavour  as  Prime 
Minister,  267  ;  resigns  office,  275  ; 
comments  on  Garibaldi's  attempted 
march  on  Rome,  361 

Rechberg,  Count,  Foreign  Minister  at 
Vienna  (1864),  iii.  349 

Redan,  Assault  on  the,  iii.  225 

Redcliffe,  Lord  Stratford  de,  British 
Ambassador  at  Constantinople,  iii. 
190 ;  negotiates  with  Prince 
Menschikoff  respecting  Russian 
rights  in  the  Holy  Places,  and 
Turkish  protectorate  over  Greek 
Christians,  191  ;  opposes  King  of 
Prussia's  proposition  respecting  the 
rights  of  the  Sultan's  Christian 
subjects,  202 

"  Reflections  on  French  Revolution," 
Burke's,  i.  63 ;  iii.  488  (note) 

Reformation,  The,  in  Germany,  i.  17 

Reform  Bill,  English,  Passing  of  (1832) 
ii.  419,  420 

Reggio,  portion  of  Cispadane  Republic 
i.  132  ;  general  assembly  of,  134 

Regnier,  his  secret  negotiations 
between  the  Prussians  and  the 
Empress  Eugenie,  iii.  454 

Reichsrath,  The  Austrian,  assembles  at 
Vienna  (1861),  iii.  327 

Reichstadt,  Duke  of,  son  of  Napoleon 
Bonaparte,  ii.  401 ;  iii.  43 

Reichstadt,  Treaty  of  (1876),  Russia 
and  Austria,  iii.  488 

Reign  of  Terror,  i.  72 — 75  ;  its  level- 
ling principle,  79;  its  end,  98 

Reschid,  Turkish  commander  at 
Missolonghi,  ii.  308,  309  ;  takes  the 
Acropolis  of  Athens,  311  ;  defeated 
by  Russians  at  Kulewtscha,  341  ; 
defeated  by  Egyptians  at  Konieh, 
444 

Reschid  Pasha,  Turkish  Minister ; 
his  reforms  in  Turkey,  463 ;  his 
fall,  464 

Revolution,  The  French ;  its  influence 
on  Europe,  i.  105 — 109 

Revolutionary  epoch  of  1848,  charac- 
teristics of,  iii.  33 

Pihegas,  Greek  poet,  ii.  262 

Rhenish  confederacy,  i.  303,  511 


Eicci,  Bishop  of  Pistoia,  i.  164 

Richelieu,  Due  de,  Ministry  under 
Louis  XVIII.,  ii.  95 ;  recom- 
mended by  the  Czar  to  Louis,  ib. ; 
Amnesty  Bill,  101 ;  opposition  to 
his  Budget  for  providing  funds 
from  sale  of  Church  forests,  113; 
consents  to  an  annual  grant  to  the 
Church,  119;  at  the  conference  of 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  131 ;  views  of  the 
measures  of  Decazes,  154 ;  resigna- 
tion, 155;  returns  to  office,  159; 
second  retirement,  160 

Riego,  Spanish  conspirator,  ii.  173 — 
175;  head  of  Liberals  at  Madrid, 
207  ;  President  of  the  Cortes  (1822), 
208;  execution,  224 

Rights,  The,  of  man,  i.  58 

Rigny,  Admiral  de,  ii.  329 

Rio  Seco,  Battle  of,  i.  383 

Rivoli,  Battle  of,  i.  135 

Robespierre,  club  orator,  i.  8  ;  against 
war,  9 ;  accused  of  aiming  at  the 
Dictatorship,  66  ;  prominent  in  the 
Reign  of  Terror,  72 ;  death,  98 

Rodil,  Spanish  general,  defeats  the 
forces  of  the  usurper  Miguel,  ii. 
430 

Rollin,  Ledru,  member  of  French 
Provisional  Government  (1848), 
iii.  34 ;  Republican  circular,  37 ; 
National  Assembly  condones  his 
offences,  38  ;  demands  the  impeach- 
ment of  the  Ministry,  108 

Romagna,  united  to  Piedmont  under 
Victor  Emmanuel,  iii.  276 

Romanzoff,  Chief  Russian  Minister,  i. 
480 

Rome,  French  intrigues  in,  i.  163 ; 
entry  of  French  troops,  164;  con- 
stituted a  Republic,  165  ;  spoliation 
by  the  French,  165  ;  evacuation  by 
French,  and  entry  of  King  Ferdin- 
and, 172;  flight  of  King  Ferdin- 
and, and  re-entry  of  French, 
173  ;  annexed  by  Napoleon,  436  ; 
Conference  after  the  insurrection  in 
Papal  States,  ii.  403 ;  enthusiasm 
on  the  publication  of  amnesty  for 
political  oifences  by  Pius  IX.,  472. 
Murder  of  Rossi,  and  flight  of  the 
Pope,  iii.  97,  98 ;  republic  pro- 
claimed by  Constituent  Assembly, 
93 ;  besieged  and  captured  by  the 
French  and  Pius  IX.  restored,  103 
—109;  the  Motu  Proprio,  111; 
Mazzini's  project  for  the  capture 
of,  287  ;  excluded  from  the  new 
Italian  kingdom  (1§61),  298  ;  failure 
of  Garibaldi's  attempted  march  on, 


INDEX. 


563 


361 ;  French  garrison  withdrawn, 
407  ;  entry  of  Italian  troops,  472  ; 
becomes  the  national  capital,  ib. ; 
"The  Prisoner  of  the  Vatican," 
473  (and  see  Papal  States) 

Roon,  General,  Prussian  Minister  of 
War,  iii.  312;  supports  the  "blood 
and  iron"  policy  of  Bismarck,  316, 
317 

Rosa,  Martinez  de  la,  Spanish  Minis- 
ter, pives  a  Constitution  to  Spain, 
ii.  429 

Rousseau's  writings,  i.  67 

Rossi,  Pellegrino,  Murder  of,  iii.  97 

Rostopchin,  Count,  fires  Moscow,  i. 
469 

Rotenmunster,  Abbess  of,  i.  18 

Rothiere,  La,  Battle  of,  i.  522 

Rouen,  occupied  by  the  Prussians,  iii. 
459 

Rouher,  M.,  French  Minister,  iii.  408 

Roumania,  ii.  250  ;  Charles  of  Hohen- 

tt    zollern,  elected  Hereditary  Prince, 

\\\    237  ;  allied  with  Russia  in  the  war 

against  Turkey,  497  ;  independence 

recognised  by  the  Treaties  of  San 

Stefano  and  Berlin,  510 — 516 

Roussin,  Admiral,  French  Ambassador 
at  Constantinople,  ii.  446 

Ruffo,  Cardinal,  i.  182 

Riigen,  Landing  of  British  troops  at, 
i.  350 

Russell,  Earl,  iii.  192  ;  views  on  Italian 
atl'airs,  272 ;  proposal  respecting 
'  Schleswig-Holstein  at  the  Confer- 
ence of  London  (1864),  352 ;  atti- 
tude during  the  Danish  War,  355 

Russia,  partitions  Poland,  i.  83,  97 ; 
death  of  Catherine  and  accession  of 
Paul,  168  ;  ooalition  with  England, 
Turkey,  and  Naples,  against  France, 
169  ;  advance  of  troops  against  the 
French,  177  ;  army  arrives  in 
Lombardy,  181  ;  victories  over  the 
French,  181,  182,  191  ;  jealousy 
towards  Austria,  192  (note);  end  of 
alliance  with  Austria,  195  ;  Anglo- 
Russian  expedition  against  Holland, 
195—197  ;  peace  with  France,  227  ; 
joins  the  Northern  Maritime 
League,  228 ;  secret  treaty  with 
France  (1801),  250;  joins  England 
in  a  coalition  against  France,  278  ; 
troops  enter  Bavaria,  292  ;  defeated 
by  the  French  at  Austerlitz,  296 ; 
D'Oubril's  negotiations  for  the 
cession  of  Sicily  to  Joseph  Bona- 
parte, 315;  entry  of  Napoleon  into 
Poland,  340 ;  continuation  of  war 
with  France,  340—342;  treaty  of 

K  K  2 


Bartenstein,  344 ;  defeated  by  the 
French  at  Friedland,  345  ;  trea- 
ties of  Tilsit,  347  ;  rupture  of 
friendly  relations  with  France,  442 ; 
declines  to  send  troops  into  Prussia 
against  France,  458 ;  invasion  by 
Napoleon,  462 — 477 ;  treaty  of 
Kalisch  with  Prussia,  484 ;  Cossacks 
enter  Berlin,  485  ;  campaigns  of 
1813  and  1814,  492—529.  Its 
gains  by  the  settlement  of  1814,  ii. 
4 ;  second  Treaty  of  Paris,  60 — 62  ; 
the  Czar's  Treaty  of  Holy  Alliance, 
63 ;  the  Czar  restores  the  King- 
dom of  Poland,  80 ;  intervention 
in  Turkey,  277  ;  project  of  joint 
intervention  in  Greece,  313;  dis- 
content and  conspiracies,  315 ;  death 
of  Alexander  I.,  317 ;  military 
insurrection  at  St.  Petersburg,  319  ; 
the  Grand  Dukes  Constantino  and 
Nicholas,  ib. ;  Nicholas  Emperor, 
ib.;  protocol withEngland,321;  takes 
part  at  Navarino,  330 — 332  ;  war 
with  Turkey,  335 — 343;  peace  of 
Adrianople,  343  ;  invasion  of  Poland, 
396 ;  capture  of  Warsaw,  397  ; 
intervention  in  Turkey  during  war 
with  Egyptians,  446 ;  Treaty  of 
Unkiar  Skelessi  with  Turkey,  447  ; 
joins  in  Quadruple  Treaty  and  de- 
claration as  toDardanelles,4  5  6 — 462; 
intervention  against  Hungary 
(1849),  iii.  93 ;  dispute  with  France 
respecting  Holy  Places  in  Palestine, 
185  ;  claims  in  Turkey,  188;  troops 
enter  Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  192  ; 
rejects  amended  Vienna  note,  195  ; 
outbreak  of  hostilities  with  Turkey, 
197 ;  recall  of  ambassadors  from 
London  and  Paris,  199  ;  war 
declared  by  England  and  France, 
ib.  ;  evacuation  of  Danubian 
Provinces,  208  ;  defeat  at  the 
battle  of  the  Alma,  211  ; 
Battle  of  Balaclava,  215:  defeat 
at  Iiikermann,  217;  fall  of  Sebas- 
topol,  226  ;  losses  in  the  Crimea, 
227 ;  capture  of  Kara,  ib. ;  treaty 
of  peace  with  Great  Britain  and 
Allies  signed  at  Paris  (1856),  230 ; 
regains  right  of  having  war-ships 
and  arsenals  in  Black  Sea  (1871), 
240  ;  proposes  a  Congress  to  discuss 
Italian  affairs,  256  ;  opposition  to 
Victor  Emmanuel's  assumption  of 
the  title  of  King  of  Italy,  299  ;  con- 
dition under  Alexander  II.,  329 ; 
liberation  of  the  serfs,  330 ;  conces- 
sions of  the  Czar  in  Poland  insuffi- 


564 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


cient  to  prevent  national  insurrec- 
tion, 334;  the  Czarmakesthepeasants 
in  Poland  land- proprietors,  339;  pro- 
poses Conference  of  London  on  Lux- 
emburg question,  4  04 ;  freed  from  the 
obligations  of  the  treaty  (Black  Sea) 
of  1856  at  the  close  of  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War,  472  :  "  League  of 
the  three  Emperors,"  476  ;  treaty 
with  Austria  at  Eeichstadt  on 
Eastern  Question,  488 ;  enforces 
Servian  armistice,  489 ;  conference 
of  Constantinople,  493 ;  the  "  London 
Protocol,"  496  ;  declares  war  against 
Turkey,  497 ;  advances  on  the 
Balkans,  and  three  battles  of 
Plevna,  498—501  ;  fall  of  Plevna, 
50L- ;  capitulation  of  Shipka,  and 
entry  of  ti-oops  into  Adrianople, 
504,  505 ;  armistice,  505 ;  Immi- 
nence of  war  with  England,  509  ; 
treaty  of  San  Stefano,  510;  secret 
agreement  with  England,  517; 
Congress  of  Berlin,  518 
Rustchuk,  iii.  498,  499 

Sualfeld,  Defeat  of  the  Prussians  by 
Napoleon  at,  i.  327 

Saarbriicken,  iii.  433,  436 

Salamanca,  Battle  of,  i.  449 

Salerno,  iii.  292 

Salisbury,  Lord,  represents  England  at 
the  Constantinople  Conference,  iii. 
491 ;  succeeds  Lord  Derby  as 
Foreign  Minister,  514  ;  circular  to 
the  Powers  on  the  Treaty  of  San 
Stefano,  515;  represents  England, 
with  Lord  Beaconsfield,  at  the 
Congress  of  Berlin,  517;  on  the 
relations  of  Eussia  and  Turkey,  519 

Salonika,  Murder  of  Prussian  and 
French  consuls  at,  iii.  480 

Salzburg,  Bishopric  of,  i.  149 ;  ceded 
to  Bavaria,  430.  Won  by  Austria, 
ii.  4 

Sambre,  River,  battles  between  French 
and  allied  forces  of  England  and 
Austria,  i.  91 

Samos,  ii.  288 

San  Stefano,  Treaty  of,  iii.  510 

Sand,  Carl,  assassin  of  Kotzebue,  ii. 
141 

Snragossa,  i.  395 ;  siege  of,  399 

Sardinia,  war  against  France,  i.  54 ; 
army  joins  Austrians  in  Italy 
against  France,  118  ;  armistice  and 
peace  with  French,  119.  Declines 
alliance  with  Austria,  ii.  86.  War 
with  Austria,  iii.  55 ;  total  defeat 
at  Novara,  100 ;  the  King  abdi- 


cates and  retires  to  Oporto,  where 
he  dies,  101  ;  accession  of  Victor 
Emmanuel,  102  ;  troops  sent  to  the 
Crimea,  223 ;  defeats  Russians  at 
the  Tchernaya,  226  ;  Count  Cavour, 
Prime  Minister,  244  ;  rupture 
with  Austria,  251 ;  declares  war,  in 
conjunction  with  France,  against 
Austria,  259  ;  victories  of  Magenta 
and  Solferino,  261,  263  ;  peace  with 
Austria  concluded  at  Villafranca, 
265  ;  union  with  Central  Italy,  277; 
Garibaldi  conquers  Sicily  and 
Naples  in  the  name  of  Victor 
Emmanuel,  285,  292  (and  see 
Italy,  Piedmont) 

Savary,  French  general,  brings  the 
King  of  Spain  to  Bayonne,  i.  375 

Savf  et  Pasha,  Turkish  Foreign 
Minister,  presides  at  the  Constan- 
tinople Conference  (1876),  iii.  494 

"  Saviour  of  Society "  (Louis  Napo- 
leon), iii.  164,  177 

Savoy,  i.  50 ;  annexed  to  France,  54 , 
part  of,  left  to  France  (1814),  536  ; 
but  taken  away  (1815),  ii.  62. 
Revolutionary  movement  of  1834, 
headed  by  Mazzini,  ii.  413 ;  Charles 
Albert  of  Carignano  ascends  the 
throne,  470.  Annexed  to  France, 
iii.  277 ;  effect  of  annexation  on 
Europe,  279  ;  power  of  the  Papacy 
in,  230 

Saxony,  Weakness  of  (1792),  i.  16; 
King  of,  acquires  from  Napoleon 
the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  347. 
The  Czar  proposes  its  annexation 
to  Prussia  at  Congress  of  Vienna, 
ii.  24,  25  ;  the  King  restored  to  the 
throne,  30  ;  Constitution,  408.  In- 
surrection, iii.  135  ;  attempt  to 
form  a  union  with  Prussia,  139; 
secedes  from  League  with  Prussia, 
140 ;  Dresden  occupied  by  Prussians, 
374  ;  included  in  a  federation  under 
Prussian  leadership,  378 

Scarlett,  General,  commands  the  Heavy 
Brigade  at  Balaclava,  iii.  215 

Scharnhorst,  president  of  Prussian 
military  commission,  363 ;  his 
reforms,  406  ;  resigns  office,  459 

Schelde,  River,  i.  56. 

Si  herer,  French  general,  i.  1 79. 

Schill,  Prussian  officer,  gallant  defence 
of  Colberg  against  the  French,  i. 
342 ;  leads  the  rising  against  the 
French  in  Northern  Germany,  417  ; 
heroic  death,  419 

Schiller,  his  conn ection^vith  the  Grand 
Duke  of  Weiinar,  ii.  126 


INDEX. 


565 


Schl<-iermacher,  German  theologian,  i. 
407 

Schleswig-Holstcin,  rebels  against  Den- 
mark, iii.  25, 117  ;  end  of  rebellion 
Hnd  union  with  Denmark,  150  ; 
Prince  Christian  declared  heir  to 
the  throne,  ib.  ;  Duke  of  Au<?usten- 
burg  renounces  his  pretensions  to 
the  throne,  343 ;  King  Frederick 
excludes  Holstcin  from  the  now 
Constitution,  344  ;  Prussia  sup- 
ports Schleswig  against  Den- 
mark, 344 ;  England  recommends 
separate  legislature,  ib.  ;  King 
Frederick's  manifesto  declares 
Schleswig  incorporated  with  Den- 
mark, 345  ;  Christian  IX.  supports 
bis  predecessor's  policy,  345  ;  Saxon 
and  Hanoverian  troops  enter  Hoi- 
stein,  346  ;  Bismarck's  plans,  347 ; 
Austrian  and  Prussian  troops  enter 
Schleswig,  350  ;  armistice  and 
Conference  of  London,  351 ;  con- 
tinuation of  the  war,  and  failure  of 
Denmark  to  enforce  its  .demands, 
353 ;  surrender  of  the  Duchies  to 
Austria  and  Prussia  by  the  Treaty 
of  Vienna,  ib. ;  Bismarck  pro- 
poses conditionally  that  the  crown 
should  be  conferred  upon  the  Prince 
of  Augustenburg,  357  ;  annexed  to 
Prussia,  379 

ochlick,  Austrian  general,  defeated  by 
.",  Hungarians,  iii.  87 

Schrmdz,  his  pamphlet  against  Prus- 
sian Liberals,  ii.  124 

Schmerling,  leader  of  German  Assem- 
bly, iii.  118;  resigns  office,  126; 
called  to  office  by  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  L,  325  ;  resignation, 
387 

Schonbrunn,  Treaty  of,  i.  298 

Schouvaloff,  Count,  Russian  Ambasca- 
dor  at  London,  iii.  496,  507,  516 

Schwarzenberg,  Austrian  commander 
in  Russia,  i.  462  ;  commands  army 
of  Bohemia  against  Napoleon,  502, 
505,  513,  521 

Schwarzenberg,  Felix,  chief  Austrian 
Minister  (1848),  iii.  80 ;  deposes  the 
Emperor  j  81 ;  publishes  a  Constitu- 
tion, 88  ;  design  regarding  Loin- 
bardy,  97 ;  plan  for  centralisation 
of  Government  in  Austria,  126; 
seeks  to  provoke  a  quarrel  with 
Prussia,  144 ;  Prussia  submits  to 
his  demands  for  dissolution  of 
Prussian  Union,  and  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  Diet  of  Frankfort,  147  ; 
despotic  policy,  153  ;  death,  154 
KK* 


Schweidnitz,  Tumult  at,  iii.  120 

Sebaitopol,  ii.  447 ;  iii.  197 ;  fortifica- 
cations  of,  210 ;  bombardment  of, 
214  ;  progress  of  the  siege  of,  223; 
fall  of,  226  ;  restoration  of  Russian 
power  by  the  revision  of  the  Treaty 
of  Paris  (1871),  240 

Sebastiani,  his  report  upon  Egypt,  i. 
267-  French  Foreign  Minister 
(1831),  ii.  402 

Sedan,  Battle  and  capitulation  of,  iii. 
446 

Senate  of  France  (1799),  i.  205 

Serbs,  The,  of  Southern  Hungary, 
revolt  in  1848,  iii.  63,  64,  65 ;  de- 
feat Hungarians  at  Carlowitz,  68 

Serfage,  Abolition  of,  in  Austria,  i. 
22;  in  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  358; 
in  Prussia,  ib.  In  Russia,  iii.  330 

Servia  expels  Turkish  garrisons,  iii. 
238  ;  supports  the  revolt  of  Herze- 
govina, 477 ;  declares  war  against 
Turkey,  482;  defeated  by  Turks, 
489 ;  independence  recognised  by 
the  Treaties  of  San  Stefano  and 
Berlin,  510 

Seville  taken  by  the  French,  i.  446 ; 
ii.  219 

Seymour,  Sir  Hamilton,  British  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg,  iii.  187 

Shipka  Pass,  Battle  of,  iii.  500; 
capitulation  of,  504 

Sicily,  condition  of  in  eighteenth 
century,  i.  115 ;  Bonaparte  demands 
its  cession  to  his  brother  Joseph, 
315.  Under  Ferdinand  of  Naples, 
ii.  85  ;  British  influence,  88  ;  state 
of,  in  1821,  201  ;  revolution  at 
Palermo,  474;  conquered  by  Ferdi- 
nand of  Naples,  112;  Garibaldi 
captures  Palermo,  and  assumes  the 
dictatorship  of  the  island,  285,  286 ; 
Garibaldi's  difficulties  in  carrying 
on  the  government,  288 ;  desires 
annexation  to  the  kingdom  of 
Victor  Emmanuel,  295 

Siey&,  Abbe,  i.  199,  201,  204 

Silesia,  Loss  of,  by  Austria,  i.  21 

Silistria,  Siege  of,  iii.  207 

Simon,  St.,  Socialistic  writings,  ii.  509 

Simpson,  General,  succeeds  Lord  Rag- 
lan as  English  commander  in  the 
Crimea,  iii.  225 

Simson,  Dr.,  President  of  the  Frank- 
fort National  Assembly,  offers  the 
Imperial  Crown  to  King  Frederick 
William,  iii.  133  ;  spokesman  at 
Versailles,  468 

Sinope,  Turkish  squadron  destroyed  by 
Russia  at,  iii.  197 


566 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


Skobeleff,  General,  at  the  battles  of 
Plevna,  Hi.  501 

Slavery,  abolished  by  England  (1833), 
ii.  77 

Slave-trade,  prohibited  by  England 
(1807),  ii.  74 ;  France  unites  with 
England  by  the  treaty  of  Paris  for 
its  suppression,  i.  537.  England 
proposes  its  universal  abolition  at 
the  Congress  of  Vienna,  ii.  74; 
Sweden  and  Holland  prohibit  it, 
ib. ;  Spain  refuses  any  restriction, 
76  ;  abolished  by  Napoleon,  ib. 

Slavs  of  Hungary,  ii.  478 ;  national 
movements  (1830—1843),  486,  487; 
iii.  75,  394 

Smith,  Sir  Sidney,  English  admiral,234 

Smolensko,  surrendered  to  Napoleon  by 
the  Kussians,  i.  467  ;  entry  of  the 
French  on  the  retreat  from  Moscow, 
473 

Socialism  in  France  under  Louis  Phi- 
lippe, ii.  509 

Solferino,  Battle  of,  iii.  263 

Sophia,  iii.  504 

Soult,  French  general,  i.  394,  397  ;  in- 
vades Portugal,  401  ;  captures 
Seville,  and  lays  siege  to  Cadiz, 
446  ;  in  the  Pyrenees,  520.  Serves 
under  Louis  XVIII. ,  ii.  18 

Spain,  allied  with  England  against 
France,  i.  59 ;  cedes  to  France  a 
portion  of  St.  Domingo,  96 ;  fleet 
beaten  by  English  off  St.  Vincent, 
151  ;  treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  355  ; 
under  Charles  IV.,  367;  disastrous 
influence  of  Godoy,  367 ;  designs  of 
Napoleon,  368 ;  loss  of  Buenos 
Ayres,  369  ;  friendly'  entry  of  the 
French,  372  ;  hatred  towards  Godoy 
and  the  Queen,  372;  entry  of 
General  Murat,  373  ;  abdication  of 
Charles  IV.,  and  accession  of 
Ferdinand,  '374;  Charles  and 
Ferdinand  surrender  their  rights 
to  Napoleon  at  Bayonne,  377 ; 
national  spirit,  377 ;  rising  of 
the  people  against  the  French, 
379  ;  Joseph  Bonaparte  made  King, 
381;  Spaniards  defeated  at  Eio 
Seco,  383  ;  victory  of  Baylen,  384  ; 
Napoleon's  campaign,  394 :  Battle 
of  Corunna,  398 ;  siege  of  Saragossa, 
400 ;  invaded  by  Wellington ; 
Talavera,  444 ;  victoiies  of 
Marshal  Soult,  446 ;  campaigns  of 
1810,  1811,  447—449;  Wellington 
enters  Madrid,  but  retreats,  449  ; 
attack  of  the  Liberals  on  despotism, 
451 ;  the  Junta  resigns  its  powers 


into  the  hands  of  a  Eegency,  452  ; 
Constitution  made  by  the  Cortes, 
453 ;  antagonism  of  the  clergy  to 
the  Cortes,  454  ;  campaign  of  1813, 
Vittoria,  520.  Restoration  of 
Ferdinand,  ii.  9 ;  power  of  the 
clergy,  11 ;  decline  of  commerce 
and  agriculture,  12 ;  refuses  to 
accept  any  restriction  regarding 
the  slave-trade,  75,  76  ;  action  of 
England  in  1815  under  Lord 
Castlereagh  regarding  the  Con- 
stitution, 89  ;  condition  between 
1814—1820,  168—177 ;  affairs 
between  1820—1822,  207—209 ; 
King  Ferdinand  conspires  against 
the  Constitution,  ib. ;  the  Exaltados 
and  Serviles,  207,  208  ;  civil  war, 
209 ;  Congress  of  Verona,  215 — 
217;  invasion  of  the  French,  219; 
appointment  of  a  Regency,  220  ; 
Siege  of  Cadiz,  222  ;  the  Constitu- 
tion abrogated,  ib. ;  clergy  placed 
in  office,  223 ;  reign  of  terror,  224  ; 
England  prohibits  the  conquest  of 
Spanish  colonies  by  France  or 
Allies,  225—227;  death  of  King 
Ferdinand,  427,  429  ;  repeals  Salic 
law,  and  appoints  his  daughter 
Isabella  to  succeed  him  under  the 
Regency  of  the  Queen,  429  ;  Don 
Carlos  claims  the  crown,  and  heads 
a  rebellion,  ib.  •  Martinez  de  la 
Rosa  gives  a  Constitution,  ib. ;  Don 
Carlos  defeated  and  removed  to 
London,  430  ;  Don  Carlos  re- 
appears in,  at  head  of  insurgents 
(1834),  431  ;  victories  of  Carlists, 
434 ;  defeat  of  General  Valdes, 
435  ;  appeal  to  France  for  assistance 
which  is  refused,  435 — 437  ;  volun- 
teers in  England  and  France  en- 
rolled, commanded  by  Colonel  De 
Lacy  Evans,  to  quell  Carlist  rebellion 
438 ;  total  defeat  of  Carlists  by 
General  Espartero,  and  end  of 
Carlist  war  (1839),  441 ;  Queen 
Christina  resigns  the  Regency,  and 
is  succeeded  by  General  Espartero, 
ib. ;  exile!  of  Espartero,  442 ; 
Princess  Isabella  made  Queen, 
ib.  ;  Marriages  of  the  Queen  to 
Don  Francisco  and  of  the  In- 
fanta to  the  Duke  of  Montpensier, 
506.  Revolution  of  1868,  iii.  412  ; 
candidature  of  Prince  Leopold  for 
the  throne  opposed  by  France,  412 
—416 

Spandau,    Prussian    fortress,   surren- 
dered to  the  French,  i.  333 


INDEX. 


567 


Spanish  Marriages,  The,  ii.  504—506 

Spetza,  one  of  the  ./Egean  Islands,  ii. 
287 

Sphakteria,  Island  of,  ii.  306 

Spicheren,  Battle  of,  between  French 
and  Prussians,  iii.  436 

Spires,  captured  by  French,  i.  52 

Stadion,  Count,  Austrian  Minister,  i. 
403  ;  retires  from  public  affairs,  429 

Stael,  Mme.  de,  i.  211 

Stein,  Hitter  vom,  i.  256 ;  his  ex- 
posure of  the  character  of  King 
Frederick  William's  advisers,  318  ; 
appeals  to  Prussian  patriotism,  335 
(and  note)  ;  chief  Minister,  357 ; 
edict  for  the  abolition  of  serfage, 
358  ;  reorganisation  of  army,  362  ; 
political  reforms,  365 ;  attempts 
to  negotiate  with  Napoleon  for 
the  French  evacuation  of  Prussia, 
388 ;  encourages  a  popular  in- 
surrection, 389 ;  resigns  office, 
391;  outlawed  by  Napoleon,  392; 
adviser  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia, 
480;  his  commission  from  the 
Czar  to  East  Prussia,  481 ;  ar- 
ranges treaty  of  Kalisch,  484 ; 
policy  during  War  of  Liberation, 
508.  Present  at  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  ii.  20,  26 ;  on  the  terms  of 
second  Treaty  of  Paris,  61  ;  with- 
drawal from  Congress  of  Vienna, 
(is 

Styinmetz,  General,  commands  northern 
•  Prussian  army  against  the  French, 
iii.  433 

Stettin,  Prussian  fortress,  surrendered 
to  the  French,  i.  333 

Stewart,  Sir  Charles,  i.  535 

Stockach,  Battle  of,  i.  179 

Stourdzn,  his  pamphlet  on  German  re- 
volutionary movements,  ii.  138 

Stralsund,  Capitulation  of,  to  the 
French,  i.  350;  taken  by  Schill, 
and  afterwards  by  Napoleon,  419 

Strangford,  Lord,  English  Ambassador 
at  Constantinople,  ii.  276,  278 

Strasburg,  expected  Royalist  move- 
ment at,  i.  87.  Concentration  of 
troops  at  (1870),  iii.  428 ;  capitulates 
to  the  Prussians,  453 

Stratimirovic,  leader  of  the  Serbs,  iii. 
89 

Stro^onoff,  Russian  Ambassador  at 
Constantinople,  ii.  276 

Stuttgart,  Remnant  of  German  Na- 
tional Assembly  meets  at,  but  ex- 
pelled in  a  few  days  by  the  Govern- 
ment, iii.  137 

Subsidy  of  England  to  Prussia,  i.  88 ; 


fails  to  accomplish  intended  result, 
93;  to  Austria,  97,  223;  system 
of,  343 

Suleiman  Pasha,  iii.  501,  503,  605 

Suliotes,  The,  ii.  264,  296 

Suvaroff,  Russian  general,  i.  177 ;  cam- 
paign in  Lombardy,  181;  dissensions 
with  Austrian  Government,  188 ; 
victories  over,the  French,  191  ;  re- 
treats across  the  Alps,  194 

Sweden,  joins  the  Northern  Maritime 
League,  i.  228 ;  unites  with  Eng- 
.  land  against  France,  278  ;  joins  in 
the  treaty  of  Bartenstein,  344.  Pro- 
hibits the  slave-trade,  ii.  75 

Switzerland,  French  intervention,  i. 
159  ;  war  with  France,  161  ;  the 
Helvetic  Republic,  162;  movements 
of  French  troops,  178;  Russian 
campaign,  191 ;  civil  war,  and 
Bonaparte's  intervention,  246 ; 
declared  independent  by  the  treaty 
of  Paris,  536.  Dispersion  of 
revolutionary  leaders  by  order  of 
European  Powers,  ii.  414 

Syria,  conquered  by  Egyptians  under 
Ibrahim,  ii.  443  ;  given  to  Viceroy 
of  Egypt,  446  ;  expulsion  of  Ibra- 
him by  European  allies,  460.  Occu- 
pied by  the  French,  iii.  238 

Szechenyi,  Count,  his  reforms  in  Hun- 
gary, ii.  481  ;  alarmed  at  Kossuth's 
liberalism.  484 


Talavera,  Battle  of,  i.  426 

Talleyrand,  Bonaparte's  letter  to  him  on 
the  support  of  Italy,  i.  150  ;  reply  to 
England  on  the  rejection  of  Bona- 
parte's peace  proposal,  217  ;  draws 
up  Italian  Constitution,  244 ;  his 
work  in  the  settlement  of  Germany, 
248  ;  at  Erfurt,  391  ;  acts  with 
Alexander  on  dethronement  of 
Napoleon,  531.  Represents  France 
at  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  ii.  20 — 30; 
united  to  Fouche  in  office  under 
Louis  XyilL,  61;  fall  of  his 
Ministry  in  1815,  95  ;  intrigues  on 
behalf  of  Louis  Philippe,  363; 
Ambassador  to  London,  385  ;  per- 
suades William  IV.  and  Wellington 
to  abstain  from  intervention  in 
Belgian  affairs,  386 

Tann,  Prussian  General,  takes  Orleans, 
iii.  453 ;  driven  from  Orleans,  457 

Tatistcheff,  General,  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  Madrid,  ii.  81 

Tchemaieff,  General,  leads  Russian 
troops  in  Servia,  iii.  489 


568 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


Tchernaya,  Valley  of  the,  iii.  213,  217 ; 
battle  of  the,  226 

Tchitchagoff,  Russian  commander,  i. 
475 

Thessaly,  ii.  354,  355,  iii.  519 

Thiers,  M.,  editor  of  the  National, 
publishes  a  protest  against  the 
edicts  of  Charles  X.,  ii.  369  ;  opposes 
insurrection  in  Paris,  370  ;  advances 
the  cause  of  the  Duke  of  Orleans, 
373  ;  premier,  warlike  policy  on  the 
Eastern  Question,  458 ;  resignation, 
460.  His  history  of  Napoleon,  iii. 
44 ;  arrested  by  Louis  Napoleon, 
172 ;  denounces  Bismarck's  aggres- 
sions, 404 ;  arguments  against  war 
with  Prussia,  421 ;  moves  the 
formation  of  a  Committee  of 
Government  on  the  surrender  of 
Napoleon  at  Sedan,  448 ;  elected 
President  by  the  National  Assembly 
at  Bordeaux,  and  arranges  terms 
of  peace  at  Versailles  with  Bismarck, 
464 ;  efforts  to  save  Metz,  465  ;  the 
French  Republic  under  his  Presi- 
dency, 474 

Thirty  Years'  War,  i.  17,  19,  21 

Thomas,  General  Clement,  murdered  by 
National  Guards  of  Paris,  iii.  470 

Thouvenel,  M.,  French  Foreign 
Minister,  iii  274 

Thugut  (Austrian  Minister) ;  character, 
and  European  opinion  of  him,  i.  84 
(and  note) ;  projects  of  annexation, 
85  ;  on  the  disorder  in  the  Austrian 
army,  91;  his  war  policy  opposed, 
129  (and  note),  138 ;  determines  to 
renew  the  war  with  France,  159  ; 
disagrees  with  Russian  commander, 
Suvaroif,  188 ;  design  to  annex 
Piedmont  to  Austria,  190  (and 
note) ;  on  the  Emperor's  secret 
armistice  with  France,  223  (and 
note)  ;  resigns  office,  and  re- 
appointed,  224 ;  dismissed  from 
power,  225  ;  his  advice  sought  by 
the  Emperor  after  Wagram,  430 

Tirnova,  iii.  499 

Todleben,  Russian  general  in  the 
Crimea,  iii.  212,  213 ;  placed  at  the 
head  of  the  army  before  Plevna,  502 

Toreno  succeeds  Valdes  as  Spanish 
War  Minister,  ii.  438 

Torres  Vedras,  Lines  of,  i.  444 

Tory  Party,  i.  62 

Toulon  in  revolt,  i.  76 ;  surrender  to 
Republic,  82 

Tours,  second  seat  of  French  Govern- 
ment at  the  commencement  of  the 
f'ege  of  Paris,  iii.  451 


Trafalgar,  Battle  of,  i.  290 

Transylvania,  i.  25.  Agitation  for 
Constitutional  rights,  ii.  482.  The 
Roumanian  movement  in,  iii.  85 ; 
Russians  enter,  89 

Treaty,  Westphalia  (1648),  i.  17 ;  for 
the  partition  of  Poland,  between 
Empress  Catherine  and  King 
Frederick  William  (1793),  83; 
Basle  (1795),  France  and  Prussia, 
France  and  Spain,  96  ;  Secret, 
France  and  Prussia  (1796),  128  ; 
Tolentino,  Fiance  and  Pope,  136; 
Leoben  (1797),  France  and  Austria, 
138  ;  CampoFormio  (1797),  France 
and  Austria,  147 ;  Luneville  (1801), 
France  and  Austria,  226  ;  Amiens 
(1802),  France  and  Great  Britain, 
238  ;  Potsdam  (1805),  Prussia  and 
Russia,  292;  Schonbrunn  (1805), 
Prussia  and  France,  298 ;  Pres- 
burg  (1805),  France  and  Austria, 
299;  Bartenstein  (1807),  Russia, 
Prussia,  England,  and  Sweden, 
344  ;  Tilsit  (1807),  France,  Russia, 
and  Prussia,  347 ;  Fontainebleau 
(1807),  France  and  Spain,  355; 
Vienna  (1809),  France  and 
Austria,  430  ;  Kalisch  (1813), 
Prussia  and  Russia,  484  ;  Reichen- 
bach  (1813),  Austria,  Russia, 
and  Prussia,  499;  Teplitz  (1813), 
Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria,  511  ; 
Ried  (1813),  Bavaria  and  the 
Allies  during  the  War  of  Libera- 
tion, 511 ;  Paris  (1814),  France 
and  the  Allies,  536,  537.  (Secret) 
at  Congress  of  Vienna  (1815), 
France,  England,  and  Austria 
against'  Russia  and  Prussia,  ii. 
28 ;  Paris  (second)  (1815),  62  ;  Holy 
Alliance  (1815) ;  Russia  and  the 
Powers,  63;  London  (1827),  Eng- 
land, Russia,  and  France,  324 ; 
Russia  and  Turkey  at  Akerman 
(1826),  335;  Adrianople  (1829), 
Russia  and  Turkey,  343 ;  London 
(1834),  Spain,  Portugal,  Eng- 
land, and  France,  for  the  expulsion 
of  Don  Carlos  and  Don  Miguel  from 
Spain  and  Portugal,  430  ;  Unkiar 
Skelessi  (1833);  Russia  and  Turkey, 
447 ;  Commercial,  England  and 
Turkey  (1838),  453;  England, 
Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia  on 
the  Eastern  Question  (1840),  456. 
Paris  (1856),  Russia,  Great  Britain, 
and  Allies,  iii.  230 ;  (Secret)  France 
and  Sardinia  (1859),  256  ;  Zurich 
(1859),  Austria,  France,  and  Sar- 


INDEX. 


509 


dinia,  266;  Vienna  (1864),  Denmark, 
Austria,  and  Prussia,  3o3  ;  Prague 
(1866),  Prussia  and  Austria,  379; 
London  (1867)  on  tbo  Luxemburg 
( Question,  402 ;  Versailles  and 
Frankfort  (1871),  Prussia  and 
France,  465;  Reichstadt  (1876), 
Russia  and  Austria,  488 ;  San 
Stefano  (1878),  Russia  and  Turkey, 
510  ;  Berlin  (1878),  general,  218 

Trebbia,  Battle  of  the,  i.  182,  185 

Treves,  Elector  of,  protects  French 
emigrants,  i.  10 ;  emigrants  ex- 
pelled from,  10;  condition  in  1792, 
37 

Tribunal,  Revolutionary,  i.  74 

Tribunate  (France),  i.  205,  259 

Trinidad,  i.  238 

Tripolitaft,  centre  of  Turkish  Govern- 
ment in  the  Morea,  ii.  288  ;  capture 
of,  by  Greek  insurgents,  and  mas- 
sacre of  inhabitants,  291;  burned 
by  Ibrahim,  347 

Trochu,  General,  head  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  National  Defence  in  Paris, 
Hi.  448 

Troppau,  Conference  of,  ii.  193 

Tugendbund,  German  Society,  i.  407. 
Attacked  by  Schmalz,  ii.  124 ; 
discussed  at  commission  of  Mainz, 
149 

Tuileries,  Louis  XVI.  confined  at 
(1791),  i.  4  ;  attacked  by  mob,  42  ; 
Attacked  by  Royalists,  102  ;  sur- 
•  rounded  by  Augereau's  troops  for 
the  seizure  of  the  opposition  section 
in  the  Directory,  146.  Flight  of 
Louis  XVIII.,  ii.  38;  devastated 
by  the  mob  (1848),  513.  Louis 
Napoleon  takes  possession  of,  iii. 
177 

Turin,  entry  of  Russian  troops,  i.  187. 
Government  commences  eccle- 
siastical reform,  iii.  243  ;  with- 
drawal of  French  Ambassador  on 
the  invasion  of  the  Papal  States  by 
the  Piedmontese,  293 

Turkey,  declaration  of  war  against 
French  Republic,  i.  169  ;  joins  the 
coalition  against  France,  ib. ;  de- 
bated by  France  at  Hcliopolis,  234. 
Designs  of  Austria  and  Russia,  ii. 
235  ;  supremacy  in  certain  districts 
of  Greece,  248  ;  reverses  in  Greece, 
261,  270  ;  driven  out  of  the  Morea, 
274 ;  massacre  of  Christians  at 
Constantinople,  275,  276  ;  Austrian 
policy,  279 ;  attitude  of  England, 
281  ;  fall  of  Tripolitza,  290 ; 
massacre  of  Chios,  291 ;  double 


invasion  of  Greece,  295 — 298 ; 
defeated  by  Greeks,  299 ;  siege  of 
Missolonghi,  309—311;  refuses 
armistice  proposed  by  Allies,  329  ; 
defeated  by  Allies  at  Navarino, 
330—332  ;  Sultan's  manifesto,  335  ; 
war  with  llussia,  335 — 343  ;  peace 
of  Adrianople,  343;  war  with 
Mehemet  Ali,  442 — 446;  peace 'of 
Kutaya,  446'  Treaty  of  Unkiar 
Skelessi  with  Russia,  449  ;  second 
war  with  Mehemet  Ali,  453  ;  death 
of  Mahmud  II.,  454  ;  accession  of 
Abdul  Medjid,  454 ;  Admiral 
Achmet  Fewzi  hands  over  Turkish 
fleet  to  Mehemet  Ali,  ib. ;  joint 
action  with  Allies  against  Mehemet 
Ali,  and  Ibrahim,  459,  460 ;  here- 
.ditary  government  of  Egypt  con- 
ferred on  Mehemet  Ali  and  family, 
461 ;  reforms  of  Reschid  Pasha, 
463;  fall  of  Reschid,  464.  The 
Czar  visits  England  respecting 
Turkish  affairs,  and  speaks  of 
Turkey  "  as  a  sick,  a  dying 
man,"  iii.  182  ;  protects  Kossuth 
and  other  Hungarian  leaders,  184  ; 
dispute  with  Russia  respecting 
Holy  Places  in  Palestine,  and  pro- 
tection of  Greek  Christians,  185 — 
189 ;  rejects  the  Vienna  Note,  195  ; 
outbreak  of  hostilities  with  Russia, 
197  ;  defeats  Russians  at  Oltenitza, 
197  ;  squadron  destroyed  by  Russia 
atSinope,  ib. ;  Crimean  War,  210 — 
226;  fall  of  Kars,  227  ;  Treaty  of 
Paris,  230 ;  engagements  made  with 
regard  to  the  protection  of  Chris- 
tians, 231  (and  note) ;  hollow  and 
fictitious  character  of  Treaty  of 
Paris,  234  ;  discord  through- 
out the  Empire,  238 ;  revolt  of 
Herzegovina,  477  ;  presentation 
of  the  Andrassy  Note  at  Con- 
stantinople demanding  certain 
reforms,  478 ;  murder  of  Prussian 
and  French  Consuls  at  Salonika, 
479  ;  the  Berlin  Memorandum,  480 ; 
deposition  and  murder  of  Sultan 
Abdul  Aziz,  482  ;  assassination  of 
Hussein  Avni,  ib. ;  accession  of 
Murad  V.,  ib. ;  war  declared  by 
Servia  and  Montenegro,  ib. ;  Ser- 
vian defeats  and  armistice,  489; 
Constitution,  492 ;  Constantinople 
Conference,  493 ;  rejects  the  pro- 
posals of  the  Powers  for  an  Inter- 
national Commission,  495  ;  rejects 
'the  London  Protocol,  497';  Russia 
declares  war,  497  ;  campaign  in 


570 


MODERN'  EUROPE. 


Bulgaria,  497—502  :  fall  of  Plevna, 
capitulation  of  Shipka,  and  entry  of 
Russian  troops  into  Adrianople, 
•503 — 505 ;  the  Sultan  appeals  to 
Queen  Victoria,  505  ;  Treaty  of  San 
Stefano,  510 ;  cedes  Cyprus  to 
England,  and  undertakes  to  protect 
Christian  subjects  in  Asia,  517 ; 
modifications  of  the  Treaty  of  San 
Stefano  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin, 
218,  219 

Tuscany,  Rule  of  Leopold  II.  in,  i. 
26 ;  allied  with  England  against 
France,  59  ;  state  of,  in  eighteenth 
century,  115;  given  to  Prince  of 
Parma  by  Bonaparte,  245.  Events 
in  1848,  iii.  18,  97;  flight  and  re- 
storation of  the  Grand  Duke,  98, 
103 ;  final  flight  of  the  Grand  Duke, 
261 ;  dictatorship  offered  to  Victor 
Emmanuel,  ib. ;  united  to  Pied- 
mont under  Victor  Emmanuel,  276 

Tyrol,  The,  ceded  to  Bavaria  by 
Austria,  i.  300 ;  rising  against  the 
French  (1809),  410  ;  treatment  by 
the  Emperor  of  Austria,  433  ;  exe- 
cution of  Hofer  by  Napoleon,  435 

TJlm,  i.  288 

Ultramontanism,  i.  263 ;  spreads  in 
Austria,  iii.  156 ;  opposition  of,  to 
Victor  Emmanuel's  reforms,  244  ; 
power  in  Bavaria,  411 

Umbria,  iii.  282 ;  entry  of  Piedmontese 
troops,  293 

Universities,  considered  by  Metternich 
to  be  dangerous  to  European  peace, 
ii.  137  ;  placed  under  police  super- 
vision in  Germany  (1832),  411. 
Influence  and  agitation  of  the 
students  of  Vienna  (1848),  iii.  50, 
51 

Valdes,  Spanish  "War  Minister,  takes 
the  field  against  Carlists  and  suffers 
ruinous  defeat,  ii.  435  ;  retirement, 
438 

Valencia,  Ferdinand  of  Spain's  mani- 
festo at,  ii.  10 

Valenciennes,  Siege  of,  i.  70 ;  capitu- 
lates to  Duke  of  York,  75 

Valladolid,  i.  396 

Valmy,  Battle  of,  i.  47 

Vandamme,  French  General,  i.  505, 
506 

Varna,  surrendered  to  Russians,  ii,  340 

Vaublanc,  M.,  French  Minister,  intro- 
duces the  Electoral  Bill  (1815),  ii. 
108 


Venaissin,  Claims  of  the  Pope  in  the, 
i.  13 

Venetia,  offered  to  Italy  by  Austria, 
iii.  367  ;  ceded  to  France  for  Italy 
377 

Venice,  Bonaparte's  designs  on,  i.  122  ; 
refuses  French  alliance,  137  ;  popu- 
lar outbreak,  139  ;  entered  by 
French  troops,  ib.  ;  offered  by 
Bonaparte  to  Austria,  141  ;  be- 
comes the  property  of  Austria 
by  the  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio, 
147;  ceded  to  France,  300. 
Won  by  Austria  (1814),  ii.  4 ;  under 
Austrian  rule,  83.  Insurrection 
(1848),  iii.  16  ;  excluded  from  the 
new  Italian  kingdom  (1861),  298; 
united  with  Italy  (1866),  385 

Vergniaud,  Girondin  member  of  Legis- 
lative Assembly,  i.  9 

Verona,  Congress  of,  ii.  215 — 217 

Versailles,  iii.  450,  463,  464 ;  Treaty  of, 
465 ;  King  William  takes  the 
title  of  German  Emperor  at,  468  ; 
headquarters  of  French  Govern- 
ment troops  during  the  insurrection 
of  the  Paris  Commune,  470 

Vicenza,  capitulates  to  Austria,  iii.  60 

Victor,  French  general,  i.  426,  474 

Victor  Emmanuel,  succeeds  his  father 
Charles  Albert,  as  King  of  Sardinia, 
iii.  101,  102  ;  character,  and  work 
on  behalf  of  Italian  freedom,  241, 
242 ;  offered  the  Dictatorship  of 
Tuscany,  261 ;  appoints  com- 
missioners to  enrol  troops  in  Italy 
against  Austria,  262 ;  courage  at 
battle  of  Solferino,  263 ;  accepts 
the  sovereignty  of  Tuscany,  Parma, 
Modeiia,  and  the  Romagna,  277 ; 
threatened  breach  with  Garibaldi 
with  regard  to  the  proposed  invasion 
of  Rome,  295 ;  all  Italy  excepting 
Rome  and  Veuetia  united  under  his 
sovereignty  (1861),  298  ;  allied  with 
Prussia  in  war  against  Austria 
(1866),  377;  gains  Venetia,  385;  Na- 
poleon's proposed  defensive  alliance 
against  Prussia,  409  ;  gains  Rome, 
472 

Vienna,  occupied  by  the  French,  i. 
293 ;  second  occupation  by  the 
French,  416 ;  peace  of,  430 ;  con- 
ference of  Ministers,  146 ;  popu- 
lar discontent  in  1846,  495.  Riots 
of  1848,  iii.  51 ;  flight  of  the  Em- 
peror Ferdinand,  i.  52 ;  tumult 
(October)  and  murder  of  Latour, 
76  ;  General  Windischgratz  con- 
quers it,  79 ;  conference  of  May, 


INDEX. 


571 


1855,  221;  assembly  of  the  Reichs- 

rath  (1861),  327  ;  treaty  of  (1864) 

353 
tVienna,  Congress  of,  ii.  20—31,  38, 69— 

71 

Vigtevano,  Armistice  of,  iii.  62 
Vilagos,  Capitulation  of,  to  Austrians, 

iii.  95 

Villafranca,  iii.  265 
Villamarina,  Sardinian  ambassador  at 

Naples,  iii.  291 
Villele,     De,     Royalist     member     of 

Chamber  of  Deputies;  scheme  for 

a  Franchise  Bill,  ii.  110 ;  enters  the 

Cabinet,  160  ;  Spanish  policy,  206  ; 

opposition  to  Montmorency,   217 ; 

under  Charles  X.,  358 
Villeneuve,  Admiral,  i.  285 ;  defeated 

by  Nelson  at  Trafalgar,  290 
Vimieiro,  Battle  of,  i.  385 
Vincent,    St.,    Battle   of,    151;    Don 

Miguel's  fleet  destroyed  by  Captain 

Charles  Napier,  ii.  426 
Vittoria,  i.  372,  394 
Volunteer  Forces  in  England,  iii.  279 

Wagram,  Battle  of,  i.  424 

Walewski,  French  Foreign  Minister, 
iii.  274 

Wallachia,  proposed  annexation  to 
Russia,  i.  348.  Entry  of  Russian 
troops  (1853),  iii.  192 ;  uniou 
with  Moldavia,  235 

\V;ir  of  Liberation,  i.  490 

Warsaw,  Advance  of  Prussians  on,  i. 
89  ;  Grand  Duchy  of,  347.  Yielded 
to  Russia  by  Prussia,  ii.  26  ;  Grand 
Duchy  restored  to  independence 
under  the  title  of  Kingdom  of 
Poland  by  Alexander,  i.  80  ;  insur- 
rection (1830),  392  ;  captured,  397. 
Tumults  and  appointment  of  Grand 
Duke  Constantino  as  Viceroy,  iii. 
334;  levy  and  insurrection  (1863), 
335 

Wartburg  Festival,  ii.  127,  128  (note) 

"Waterloo,  Battle  of,  ii.  53—56 

Wattignies,  Battle  of,  i.  81 

Weimar,  Grand  Duke  of,  ii.  126—129 

Weimar,  home  of  Goethe,  i.  38 

Weissenburg,  i.  69 ;  stormed  by 
Austrians,  87  ;  taken  by  French,  87  ; 
battle  of,  iii.  433 

Wellesley,  Sir  Arthur  (see  Wellington, 
Duke  of) 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  lands  in  Portugal, 
i.  385 ;  battle  of  Vimieiro,  ib. ; 
.defeats  the  French  at  Talavera, 
426  ;  retreats  into  Portugal,  427  ; 
at  Torres  Vodras,  444 ;  campaign 


of  1811,  447;  campaign  of  1812, 
battle  of  Salamanca,  449 ;  enters 
Madrid,  ib. ;  campaign  of  1813,  vic- 
tory of  Vittoria,  520 ;  enters  France, 
ib.  Ambassador  at  Paris,  ii.  19  and 
note ;  succeeds  Lord  Castlereagh  at 
the  Congress  of  Vienna,  31,  39  ;  at 
head  of  English  army  at  Brussels, 
48  ;  at  Quatre  Bras,  50 ;  Battle  of 
Waterloo,  58  —  56  ;  arrives  in 
Paris,  and  proposes  Fouche  as 
Minister  to  Louis  XVIII.,  59 ; 
against  taking  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine from  France,  61  ;  foreign 
policy  in  Sicily,  France,  and 
Spain,  87-90  ;  abstains  from  plead- 
ing for  the  life  of  Marshal  Ney, 
99 ;  protests  to  Louis  XVIII. 
against  the  machinations  of  Count 
of  Artois  in  the  French  Chambers, 
114  ;  attempt  on  his  life,  134  ;  asked 
to  preside  at  a  Conference  at 
Madrid ;  called  "  the  Man  of  Europe," 
172 ;  represents  England  at  the 
Congress  of  Verona,  215;  mission 
to  St.  Petersburg,  321 ;  Prime 
Minister,  328  ;  insists  on  limitation 
of  Greece,  345  ;  policy  with  regard 
to  Belgium,  385.  The  Emperor 
Nicholas  consults  with  him  re- 
specting impending  fall  of  Ottoman 
Empire,  iii.  182 

Werder,  Prussian  general,  takes  Stras- 
burg,   iii.   453 ;    defeats  Bourbaki, 
461 
Werther,  Baron,  Prussian  Ambassador 

at  Paris  (1870),  iii.  418 
Wesselenyi,      Count,      Transylvanian 
deputy,  exiled  for  Liberal  princi- 
ples, ii.  483 
"\Vrsst'nbcrg,  Count,  Austrian  Minister, 

iii.  72 

Westphalia,    Kingdom    of,   given  by 
Napoleon  to  his  brother  Jerome,  i. 
347  ;  prepares  to  revolt  against  the 
French,     407  ;      requisitions     for 
French  troops,   462.      Dissolution 
after  Battle  of  Leipzig,  ii.  8 
Westphalia,  Treaty  of  1648,  i.  17 
Whig  party,    i.   61  ;  portion  of,  sup- 
port Pitt  against  France,  64 
Widdiu,  iii  499 

Wilberforce,  William,  efforts  for  ex- 
tinction of  English  slave-trade,  ii. 
74 

Wilhelmshohe,  Palace  of,  place  of  cap- 
tivity of  Napoleon  III.,  iii.  447 
William   I.     (of  Prussia),    suppresses 
Baden     insurrection     as      Crown 
Prince,    iii.    138  ;     his    Regency 


572 


MODERN  EUROPE. 


during  his  brother  Frederick 
William  IV.'s  withdrawal  from 
public  affairs,  305 ;  dismisses 
the  Ministry,  and  appoints  Prince 
Antony  to  office,  306 ;  reorganises 
the  army,  309,  310;  succeeds  to 
the  throne  (1861),  312;  supports 
the  autocratic  policy  of  Bismarck, 
319,  320 ;  approves  of  Bismarck's 
measures  against  the  Press,  321; 
Danish  war,.  350  ;  his  differences 
with  Bismarck,  358,  363 ;  alliance 
with  Italy  against  Austria,  364  ; 
at  Koniggratz,  375  ;  chief  of  North 
German  Federation,  and  his  secret 
treaties  with  the  South  German 
States,  381  ;  interview  with  C.ount 
Benedetti  at  Ems  on  the  election 
of  Prince  Leopold  to  the  Spanish 
throne,  416,  418;  at  Gravelotte, 
441  ;  accepts  the  surrender  of 
Napoleon  III.  at  Sedan,  447 ;  as- 
sumes the  title  of  Emperor  of 
Germany,  468 

William  IV.,  policy  of  non-intervention 
with  regard  to  Belgium,  ii.  385 

Wilna,  headquarters  of  Russian  army 
in  1812,  i.  463  ;  entry  of  Napoleon, 
465 ;  abandoned  by  the  French, 
476.  Under  Muravieff,  iii.  338 

Winckelmann,  i.  21 

Windischgratz,  Count,  subdues  the 
rebellion  at  Prague,  and  acts  as 
Dictator,  iii.  54  ;  marches  on  Vienna 
and  conquers  it,  77 — 79 ;  occupies 
Pesth,  86  ;  removed  from  his 
command,  90 

Witgenstein,  Russian  commander,  i. 
474,  486  ;  ii.  338,  339,  340 

Wladimiresco,  Theodor,  Roumanian 
insurgent,  ii.  269,  270  ;  death,  272 

Wordsworth,  i.  46 

Workshops,  National,  in  France,  iii. 
37  ;  abolition  aimed  at  by  National 
Assembly,  39 ;  entirely  abolished, 
42 


Worms,  captured  by  French,  i.  51 

Worship,  Public,  in  France,  i.  261 
and  note 

Worth,  taken  by  French,  i.  87.  Battle 
of,  iii.  434 

Wrangel,  Prussian  general,  drives 
the  Assembly  from  their  hall,  iii. 
123 

Wurmser,  Austrian  general,  i.  86 ; 
advances  against  the  French  in 
Italy,  124  ;  defeated  at  Castiglione, 
125  ;  takes  refuge  with  remnant  of 
army  in  Mantua,  126 

Wiirtemberg,  i.  36,  formation  of  a 
Constitution,  ii.  147 

Wiirtemberg,  Duke  of,  his  armistice 
with  the  French,  i.  127 

Wiirtemberg,  Prince  Eugene  of,  at- 
tacks the  Turks,  ii.  339 


Yarmouth,  Lord,  letter  from  Prussian 
camp,  i.  77  (note) 

York,  Von,  Prussian  commander,  i. 
478  ;  his  convention  with  the  Rus- 
sians, 479  ;  president  of  Prussian 
Assembly,  481  ;  defeats  the  French 
at  Mockern,  514 

York,  Duke  of,  takes  Valenciennes,  i. 
75 ;  driven  from  Dunkirk,  79 ; 
defeated  at  Turcoing,  91  ;  succeeds 
Sir  Ralph  Abercromby  in  the  com- 
mand of  army  in  Holland,  196  ;  his 
incompetency,  197 


Zichy,  Count  Eugene,  iii.  84 

Znaim,  Armistice  of,  i.  425 

Zollverein,  The,  ii.  406  ;  beneficial 
results  on  German  commerce,  407 

Zumalacarregui,  Carlist  leader,  vic- 
torious over  Royalists,  ii.  434; 
death,  438 

Ziirich,  evacuated  by  the  French,  i. 
181  ;  battle  between  French  and 
Russians,  193.  Treaty  of,  iii.  266. 


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