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O. A. FYPFE, M.A., 



FKOM 1843 TO 1878. 










Europe in 1789 and in 1848 Agitation in Western Germany before and 
after the Revolution at Paris Austria and Hungary The March 
Revolution at Vienna Flight' of Mettemich The Hungarian Diet 
Hungary wins its independence Bohemian movement Autonomy 
promised to Bohemia Insurrection of Lombardy Of Venice; Pied- 
mont makes war on Austria A general Italian war against Austria 
imminent The March Days at Berlin Frederick William IV. A 
National Assembly promised Schleswig-Holstein Insurrection in 
Holstein War between Germany and Denmark The German Ante- 
Parliament Republican Rising ia Baden Meeting of the German 
National Assembly at Frankfort Europe generally in March, 1848 
The French Provisional Government The National Workshops The 
Government and the Red Republicans French National Assembly 
Riot of May 15 Measures against the National Workshops The Four 
Days of June Cavaignac Louis Napoleon He is elected to the 
Assembly Elected President . - 



Austria and Italy Vienna from March to May Flight of the Emperor 
Bohemian National Movemenc Windischgratz subdues Prague Cam- 
paign, around Verona Papal Allocution Naples in May Negotiations 
as to Lombardy Reconquest of Venetia Battle of Custozza The 
Austrians enter Milan Austrian Court and Hungary The Serbs in 
Southern Hungary Serb Congress at Carlowitz Jellacic Affairs of 
Croatia Jellacic, the Court and the Hungarian Movement Murder of 
Lamberg Manifesto of October 3 Vienna on October 6 The Emperor 
at Olmiitz Windischgratz conquers Vienna The Parliament at 
Kremsier Schwarzenberg Minister Ferdinand abdicates Dissolution 
of the Kremsier Parliament Unitary Edict Hungary The Rou- 
manians in Transylvania The Austrian Army occupies Pesth Hun- 
garian Government at Debreczin The Austrians driven out of Hungary 
Declaration of Hungarian Independence Russian Intervention 
The Hungarian Summer Campaign Capitulation of Vilagos Italy 



Murder of Rossi Tuscany The March Campaign in Lombard}* 
Novara Abdication of Charles Albert Victor Emmanuel Restora- 
tion in Tuscany French Intervention in Rome Defeat of Oudinot 
Oudinot and Lesseps The French enter Rome The Restored Pontifical 
Government Brail of Venice Ferdinand reconquers Sicily Germany 
The National Assembly at Frankfort The Armistice of Malmii 
Berlin from April to September The Prussian Army Last Days of 
the Prussian Parliament Prussian Constitution granted by Edict The 
German National Assembly and Austria Frederick William IV. 
elected Emperor He refuses the Crown End of the National Assembly 
Prussia attempts to form a separate Union The Union Parliament at 
Erfurt Action of Austria Hesse-Cassel The Diet of Frankfort re- 
stored Olmutz Schleswig-Holstein Germany after 1849 Austria 
after 1851 France after 1848 Louis Napoleon 'The October Message 
Law Limiting the Franchise Louis Napoleon and the Army Pro- 
posed Revision of the Constitution The Coup d'Etat Napoleon III. 
Emperor . . /48 


England and France in 1851 Russia under Nicholas The Hungarian 
Refugees Dispute between France and Russia on the Holy Places 
Nicholas and the British Ambassador Lord Stratford de Redcliffe 
Menschikoff 's Mission Russian troops enter the Danubian Principalities 
Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet Movements of the Fleets The Vienna 
Note The Fleets pass the Dardanelles Turkish Squadron destroyed 
at Sinope Declaration of War Policy of Austria Policy of Prussia 
The Western Powers and the European Concert Siege of Silistria 
The Principalities evacuated Further objects of the Western Powers 
Invasion of the Crimea Battle of the Alma The Flank March 
Balaclava Inkermann Winter in the Crimea Death of Nicholas - 
Conference of Vienna Austria Progress of' the Siege Plans of 
Napoleon III. Canrobert and Pclissier Unsuccessful Assault Battle 
of the Tchernaya Capture of the Malakoff Fall of Sebastopol Fall 
of Kars Negotiations for Peace The Conference of Paris Treaty of 
Paris The Danubian Principalities Continued discord in the Ottoman 
Empire Revision of the Treaty of Paris in 1871 178 



Piedmont after 1849 Ministry of Azeglio Cavour Prime Minister Designs 
of Cavour His Crimean Policy^Cavour at the Conference of Paris 
Cavour and Napoleon III. The Meeting at Plombieres Preparations 
in Italy Treaty of January, 1859 Attempts at Mediation Austrian 
Ultimatum Campaign of 1859 Magenta Movement in Central Italy 



Solferino Napoleon and Prussia Interview of Villafranca Cavour 
resigns Peace of Ziirich Central Italy after Villafranca The Pro- 
posed Congress" The Pope and the Congress " Cavour resumes office 
Cavour and Napoleon Union of the Duchies and the Roinagna with 
Piedmont Savoy and Nice added to France Cavour on this cession 
European opinion Naples Sicily Garibaldi lands at Marsala Cap- 
ture of Palermo The Neapolitans evacuate Sicily Cavour an.d the 
Party of Action Cavour's Policy as to Naples Garibaldi on the main- 
land Persano and Villamarina at Naples Garibaldi 'at Naples The 
Piedmontese Army enters Umbria and the Marches Fall of Ancona 
Garibaldi and Cavour The Armies on the Volturno Fall of Gaeta 
Cavour's Policy with regard to Rome and Venice Death of Cavour 
The Free Church in the Free State 241 


Germany after 1858 The Regency in Prussia Army-reorganisation King 
William I. Conflict between the Crown and the Parliament Bismarck 
The struggle continued Austria from 1859 The October Diploma 
Resistance of Hungary The Reichsrath Russia under Alexander 
II. Liberation of the Serfs Poland The Insurrection of 1863 
Agrarian measures in Poland Schleswig-Holstein Death of Frederick 
VII. Plans of Bismarck Campaign in Schleswig Conference of 
London Treaty of Vienna England and Napoleon III. Prussia and 
Austria Convention of Gastein Italy Alliance of Prussia with Italy 
Proposals for a Congress fail War between Austria and Prussia 
Napoleonlll. Koniggratz Custozza Mediation of Napoleon Treaty 
' of Prague South Germany Projects for compensation to France 
Austria and Hungary Deak Establishment of the Dual System in 
Austria-Hungary ......... ... 305 



Napoleon III. The Mexican Expedition Withdrawal of the French and 
death of Maximilian The Luxemburg Question Exasperation in 
France against Prussia Austria Italy Montana Germany after 
18fi6 The Spanish Candidature of Leopold of Hohenzollern French 
declaration Benedetti and King William Withdrawal of Leopold and 
demand for guarantees The telegram from Ems War Expected 
Alliances of France Austria Italy Prussian plans The French 
army Causes of French inferiority Weissenburg Worth Spicheren 
Borny Mars-la-Tour Gravelotte Sedan The Republic pro- 
claimed at Paris Favre and Bismarck Siege of Paris Gambetta at 
Tours The Army of the Loire Fall of Metz Fighting at Orleans 



Sortie of Champigny The Armies of the North, of the Loire, of the 
East Bourbaki's ruin Capitulation of Paris and Armistice Prelimi- 
naries of Peace Germany Establishment of the German Empire 
The Commune of Paris Second Siege Effects of the war as to 
Russia and Italy Rome 395 


France after 1871 Alliance of the Three Emperors Revolt of Herzegovina 
The Andrassy Note Murder of the Consuls at Salonika The Berlin 
Memorandum Rejected by England Abdul Aziz deposed Massacres 
in Bulgaria Servia and Montenegro declare War Opinion in England 
Disraeli Meeting of Emperors at Reichstadt Servian Campaign 
Declaration of the Czar Conference at Constantinople Its Failure 
The London Protocol Russia declares War Advance on the Balkans 
Osman at Plevna Second Attack on Plevna The Shipka Pass 
Roumania Third Attack on Plevna Todleben Fall of Plevna 
Passage of the Balkans Armistice England The Fleet passes the 
Dardanelles Treaty of San Stefano England and Russia Secret 
Agreement Convention with Turkey Congress of Berlin Treaty of 
Berlin Bulgaria . .474 



Europe in 1789 and in 1848 Agitation in Western Germany before and after 
the Revolution at Paris Austria and Hungary The March Revolution at 
Vienna Flight of Metternich The Hungarian Diet Hungary wins its 
independence Bohemian movement Autonomy promised to Bohemia 
Insurrection of Lombardy Of Venice Piedmont makes war on Austria 
A general Italian war against Austria imminent The March Days at Berlin 
Frederick William IV. A National Assembly promised Schleswig-Hol- 
stein Insurrection in Holstein War between Germany and Denmark 
The German Ante-Parliament Republican Rising in Baden Meeting of 
the German National Assembly at Frankfort Europe generally in March, 
1848 The French Provisional Government The National Workshops 
The Government and the Red Republicans French National Assembly 
Riot of May 15 Measures against the National Workshops The Four >* 
Days of June Cavaignac Louis Napoleon He is elected to the Assembly 
Elected President. 

THERE were few statesmen living in 1848 who, like 
Metternich and like Louis Philippe, could remember 
the outbreak of the French Eevolution. To those who 
could so look back across the space of. sixty years, a 
comparison of the European movements that followed 
the successive onslaughts upon authority in France 
afforded some measure of the change that had passed 
over the political atmosphere of the Continent within a 
single lifetime. The Revolution of 1789, deeply as it - 
stirred men's minds in neighbouring coun- Euro e in 1789 
tries, had occasioned no popular outbreak 
on a large scale outside France. The expulsion of 


Charles X. in 1830 had been followed by national 
uprisings in Italy, Poland, and Belgium, and by a 
struggle for constitutional government in the smaller 
States of Northern Germany. The downfall of Louis 
Philippe in 1848 at once convulsed the whole of central 
Europe. From the Ehenish Provinces to the Ottoman 
frontier there was no government but the Swiss Bepub- 
lic that was not menaced ; there was no race which did 
not assert its claim to a more or less complete inde- 
pendence. Communities whose long slumber had been 
undisturbed by the shocks of the Napoleonic period 
now vibrated with those same impulses which, since 
1815, no pressure of absolute power had been able 
wholly to extinguish in Italy and Germany. The 
borders of the region of political discontent had been 
enlarged; where apathy, or immemorial loyalty to some 
distant crown, had long closed the ear to the voices of 
the new age, now all was restlessness, all eager expecta- 
tion of the dawning epoch of national life. This was 
especially the case with the Slavic races included in the 
Austrian Empire, races which during the earlier years 
of this century had been wholly mute. These in their 
turn now felt the breath of patriotism, and claimed the 
right of self-government. Distinct as the ideas of 
national independence and of constitutional liberty are 
in themselves, they were not distinct in their operation 
over a great part of Europe in 1848 ; and this epoch 
will be wrongly conceived if it is viewed as no more 
than a repetition on a large scale of the democratic out- 
break of Paris with which it opened. More was sought 

isia EUROPE IN ISJfi. ' ' 3 

in Europe in 1848 than the substitution of popular for 
monarchical or aristocratic rule. The effort to make 
the State one with the nation excited wider interests 
than the effort to enlarge and equalise citizen rights ; 
and it is in the action of this principle of nationality 
that we find the explanation of tendencies of the epoch 
which appear at first view to be in direct conflict with 
one another. In Germany a single race was divided 
under many governments : here the national instinct 
impelled to unity. In Austria a variety of races was 
held together by one crown : here the national instinct 
impelled to separation. In both these States, as in 
Italy, where the predominance of the foreigner and the 
continuance of despotic government were in a peculiar 
manner connected with one another, the efforts of 1848 
failed ; but the problems which then agitated Europe 
could not long be set aside, and the solution of them, 
complete in the case of Germany and Italy, partial and 
tentative in the case of Austria, renders the succeeding 
twenty-five years a memorable period in European 

The sudden disappearance of the Orleanist monarchy 
and the proclamation of the Eepublic at Paris struck 
with dismay the Governments beyond the 
Ehine. Difficulties were already gathering w es t a em n Ger- 

J many. 

round them, opposition among their own 
subjects was daily becoming more formidable and more 
outspoken. In Western Germany a meeting of 
Liberal deputies had been held in the autumn of 1847, 
in which the reform of the Federal Constitution and the 
B 2 

4 MODE EN EUROPE. 1848. 

establishment of a German Parliament had been de- 
manded : a Republican or revolutionary party, small but 
virulent, had also its own avowed policy and its recog- 
nised organs in the press. No sooner had the news of 
the Revolution at Paris passed the frontier than in all 
the minor German States the cry for reform became 
irresistible. Ministers everywhere resigned ; the popular 
demands were granted ; and men were called to office 
whose names were identified with the struggle for the 
freedom of the Press, for trial by jury, and for the 
reform of the Federal Constitution. The Federal Diet 
itself, so long the instrument of absolutism, bowed 
beneath the stress of the time, abolished the laws of 
censorship, and invited the Governments to send Com- 
missioners to Frankfort to discuss the reorganisation of 
Germany. It was not, however, at Frankfort or at the 
minor capitals that the conflict between authority and 
its antagonists was to be decided. Vienna, the strong- 
hold of absolutism, the sanctuary from which so many 
interdicts had gone forth against freedom in every part 
of Europe, was itself invaded by . the revolutionary 
spirit. The clear sky darkened, and Metternich found 
himself powerless before the storm. 

There had been until 1848 so complete an absence 

of political life in the Austrian capital, that, when the 

conviction suddenly burst upon all minds 

that the ancient order was doomed, there 

were neither party-leaders to confront the Government, 

nor plans of reform upon which any considerable body 

of men were agreed. The first utterances of public 


discontent were petitions drawn up by the Chamber of 
Commerce and by literary associations. These were 
vague in purport and far from aggressive in their tone. 
A sterner note sounded when intelligence reached the 
capital of the resolutions that had been passed by the 
Hungarian Lower House on the 3rd of March, and of 
the language in which these had been enforced by 
Kossuth. Casting aside all reserve, the Magyar leader 
had declared that the reigning dynasty could only be 
saved by granting to Hungary a responsible Ministry 
drawn from the Diet itself, and by establishing consti- 
tutional government throughout the Austrian dominions. 
" From the charnel-house of the Viennese system," he 
cried, " a poison-laden atmosphere steals over us, which 
paralyses our nerves and bows us when we would soar. 
The future of Hungary can never be secure while in the 
other provinces there exists a system of government in 
direct antagonism to every constitutional principle. Chir 
task it is to found a happier future on the brotherhood 
of all the Austrian races, and to substitute for the 
union enforced by bayonets and police the enduring 
bond of a free constitution.;" When the Hungarian 
Assembly had thus taken into its own hands the cause 
of the rest of the monarchy, it was not for the citizens 
of Vienna to fall short in the extent of their demands. 
The idea of a Constitution for the Empire at large was 
generally accepted, and it was proposed that an address 
embodying this demand should be sent in to the 
Emperor by the Provincial Estates of Lower Austria, 
whose meeting happened to be fixed for the 13th of 


March. In the meantime the students made themselves 
the heroes of the hour. The agitation of the city in- 
creased ; rumours of State hankruptcy and of the im- 
pending repudiation of the paper currency filled all 
classes with the belief that some catastrophe was near 
at hand.* 

The Provincial Estates of Lower Austria had long 

fallen into such insignificance that in ordinary times 

their proceedings were hardly noticed hy 

The March Re- . 

wiution at the capital. The accident that they were 


now to assemble in the midst of a great 
crisis elevated them to a sudden importance. It was 
believed that the decisive word would be spoken in the 
course of their debates ; and on the morning of the 13th 
of March masses of the populace, led by a procession of 
students, assembled round the Hall of the Diet. While 
the debate proceeded within, street- orators inflamed the 
passions of the crowd outside. The tumult deepened ; 
and when at length a note was let down from one of the 
windows of the Hall stating that the Diet were inclining 
to half-measures, the mob broke into uproar, and an 
attack was made upon the Diet Hall itself. The lead- 
ing members of the Estates were compelled to place 
themselves at the head of a deputation, which proceeded 
to the Emperor's palace in order to enforce the demands 
of the people. The Emperor himself, who at no time 

* Metteruich, vii. 538, 603 ; Vitzthum, Berlin und Wien, 1845-62, p. 78 ; 
Kossuth, Werke (1850), ii. 78; Pillersdorff, Riickblicke, p. 22 j 
Reschauer, Das Jahr 1848, i. 191 ; Springer, Geschichte Oesterreichs, ii. 
185 ; Iranyi et Chassin, Revolution de Hongrie, i. 128. 

1849. VIENNA. 7 

was capable of paying serious attention to business, 

remained invisible during this and the two following 
days ; the deputation was received by Metternich and 
the principal officers of State, who were assembled in 
council. Meanwhile the crowds in the streets became 
denser and more excited ; soldiers approached, to protect 
the Diet Hall and to guard the environs* of the palace; 
there was an interval of confusion ; and on the advance 
of a new regiment, which was mistaken for an attack, 
the mob who had stormed the Diet Hall hurled the 
shattered furniture from the windows upon the soldiers' 
heads. A volley was now fired, which cost several lives. 
At the sound of the firing still deeper agitation seized 
the city. Barricades were erected, and the people and 
soldiers fought hand to hand. As evening came 
on, deputation after deputation pressed into the palace 
to urge concession upon the Government. Met- 
ternich, who, almost alone in the Council, had made 
light of the popular uprising, now at length consented 
to certain definite measures of reform. He retired into 
an adjoining room to draft an order abolishing the cen- 
sorship of the Press. During his absence the cry was 
raised among the deputations that thronged the Council- 
chamber, " Down with Metternich ! " The old man 
returned, and found himself abandoned by his col- 
leagues. There were some among them, members of 
the Imperial family, who had long been his opponents ; 
others who had in vain urged him to make concessions 
before it was too late. Metternich saw that the end of 
his career was come ; he spoke a few words, marked by 


all the dignity arid self-possession of his greatest days, 
and withdrew, to place his resignation in the Emperor's 

For thirty-nine years Metternich had been so com- 
pletely identified with the Austrian system of govern- 

riightof uaent that in his fall that entire system 
seemed to have vanished away. The tumult 
of the capital subsided on the mere announcement of 
his resignation, though the hatred which he had excited 
rendered it unsafe for him to remain within reach of 
hostile hands. He was conveyed from Vienna by a 
faithful secretary on the night of the 14th of March, 
and, after remaining for a few days in concealment, 
crossed the Saxon frontier. His exile was destined to 
be of some duration, but no exile was ever more cheer- 
fully borne, or sweetened by a profounder satisfaction 
at the evils which a mad world had brought upon 
itself by driving from it its one thoroughly wise and 
just statesman. Betaking himself in the general crash 
of the Continental Courts to Great Britain, which was 
still as safe as when he had visited it fifty-five years 
before, Metternich received a kindly welcome from the 
Duke of Wellington and the leaders of English society; 
and when the London season was over he 'sought and 
found at Brighton something of the liveliness and the 
sunshine of his own southern home.* 

* Metternich, viii. 181. The animation of his remarks on all sorts of 
points in English life is wonderful. After a halt at Brussels and at his 
Johannisburg estate Metternich returned to Yieuna in 1852, and, though 
nit restored to office, resumed his great position in society. He lived 
through the Crimean War, on which he wrote numerous memoranda, for 

1848. HUNGARY. 9 

The action of the Hungarian Diet under Kossuth's 
leadership had powerfully influenced the course of events 
at Vienna. The Viennese outbreak in its The Hungarian 
turn gave irresistible force to the Hun- 
garian national movement. Up to the 13th of March 
the Chamber of Magnates had withlield their assent 
from the resolution passed by the Lower House in 
favour of a national executive ; they now accepted it 
without a single hostile vote; and 011 the 15th a depu- 
tation was sent to Vienna to lay before the Emperor an 
address demanding not only the establishment of a 
responsible Ministry but the freedom of the Press, trial 
by jury, equality of religion, and a system of national 
education. At the moment when this deputation 
reached Vienna the Government was formally an- 
nouncing its compliance with the popular demand for a 
Constitution for the whole of the Empire. The Hun- 
garians were escorted in triumph through the streets, 
and were received on the following day by the Emperor 
himself, who expressed a general concurrence with the 
terms of the address. The deputation returned to Pres- 
burg, and the Palatine, or representative of the sove- 
reign in Hungary, the Archduke Stephen, forthwith 

whose use it does not appear. Even on the outbreak of war with France 
in 1859 he was still busy with his pen. He survived long enough to hear 
of the battle of Magenta, but was spared the sorrow of witnessing the 
creation of the Kingdom of Italy. He died on the llth of June, 1859, in 
his eighty-seventh year. Metternich was not the only statesman present 
at the Congress of Vienna who lived to see the second Napoleonic Empire. 
Nesselrode, the Russian Chancellor, lived till 1862; Czartoryski, who was 
Foreign Minister of Russia at the time of the battle of Austerlitz, till 


charged Count Batthyany, one of the most popular 
of the Magyar nobles, with the formation of a national 
Ministry. Thus far the Diet had been in the van of 
the Hungarian movement ; it now sank almost into 
insignificance by the side of the revolutionary organisa- 
tion at Pesth, where all the ardour and all the patriotism 
of the Magyar race glowed in their native force, un- 
tempered by the political experience of the statesmen 
who were collected at Presburg, and unchecked by any 
of those influences which belong to the neighbourhood 
of an Imperial Court. At Pesth there broke out an 
agitation at once so democratic and so intensely national 
that all considerations of policy and of regard for the 
Austrian Government which might have affected the 
action of the Diet were swept away before it. Kossuth, 
himself the genuine representative of the capital, became 
supreme. At his bidding the Diet passed a law abolish- 
ing the departments of the Central Government by 
which the control of the Court over the Hungarian 
body politic had been exercised. A list of Ministers 
was submitted and approved, including not only 
those who were needed for the transaction of domestic 
business, but Ministers of War, Finance, and Foreign 
Affairs ; and in order that the entire nation might rally 
round its Government, the peasantry were at one stroke 
emancipated from all services attaching to the land, and 
converted into free proprietors. Of the compensation 
to be paid to the lords for the loss of these services, no 
more was said than that it was a debt of honour to be 
discharged by the nation. 

1843. HUNGARY. 11 

Within the next few days the measures thus carried 
through the Diet by Kossuth were presented for the 
Emperor's ratification at Vienna. The fall 

A .Hungary wins 

of Metternich, important as it was, had not 
in reality produced that effect upon the Austrian 
Government which was expected from it by popular 
opinion. The new Cabinet at Vienna was drawn from 
the ranks of the official hierarchy ; and although some 
of its members were more liberally disposed than their 
late chief, they had all alike passed their lives in the 
traditions of the ancient system, and were far from 
intending to make themselves the willing agents of 
revolution. These men saw clearly enough that the 
action of the Diet at Presburg amounted to nothing less 
than the separation of Hungary from the Austrian 
Empire. With the Ministries of War, Finance, and 
Foreign Affairs established in independence of the cen- 
tral government, there would remain no link between 
Hungary and the Hereditary States but the person of a 
titular, and, for the present time, an imbecile sovereign. 
Powerless and distracted, Metternich's successors looked 
in all directions for counsel. The Palatine argued that 
three courses were open to the Austrian Government. 
It might endeavour to crush the Hungarian movement 
by force of arms ; for this purpose, however, the troops 
available were insufficient : or it might withdraw from 
the country altogether, leaving the peasants to attack 
the nobles, as they had done in Galicia ; this was a 
dishonourable policy, and the action of the Diet had, 
moreover, secured to the peasant everything that he 

12 MODERN EUROPE. 1843. 

could gain by a social insurrection : or finally, the 
Government might yield for the moment to the inevit- 
able, make terms with Batthyany's Ministry, and 
quietly prepare for vigorous resistance when opportunity 
should arrive. The last method was that which the 
Palatine recommended ; the Court inclined in the same 
direction, but it was unwilling to submit without 
making some further trial of the temper of its an- 
tagonists. A rescript was accordingly sent to Presburg, 
announcing that the Ministry formed by Count Batthy- 
any was accepted by the Emperor, but that the central 
offices which the Diet had abolished must be preserved, 
and the functions of the Ministers of War and Finance 
be reduced to those of chiefs of departments, dependent 
on the orders of a higher authority at Vienna. From 
the delay that had taken place in the despatch of this 
answer the nationalist leaders at Pesth and at Presburg 
had augured no good result. Its publication brought 
the country to the verge of armed revolt. Batthyany 
refused to accept office under the conditions named ; 
the Palatine himself declared that he 'could remain in 
Hungary no longer. Terrified at the result of its own 
challenge, the Court now withdrew from the position 
that it had taken up, and accepted the scheme of the 
Diet in its integrity, stipulating only that the disposal 
of the army outside Hungary in time of war, and the 
appointment to the higher commands, should remain 
with the Imperial Government.* 

* Acllerstein, Archiv des Uugarischen Ministeriums, i. 27 ; Iranyi et 
Cliassin, i. 184 ; Springer, ii. 219. 

1818. 6 BOHEMIA. 13 

Hungary had thus made good its position as an 
independent State connected with Austria only through 
the person of its monarch. Vast and mo- Bohemianmove . 
mentous as was the change, fatal as it 
might well appear to those who could conceive of no 
unity hut the unity of a central government, the victory 
of the Magyars appears to have excited no feeling among 
the German Liberals at Vienna hut one of satisfaction. 
So odious, so detested, was the fallen system of despot- 
ism, that every victory won by its adversaries was hailed 
as a triumph of the good cause, be the remoter issues 
what they might. Even where a powerful Grerman 
element, such as did not exist in Hungary itself, was 
threatened by the assertion of provincial claims, the 
Government could not hope for the support of the 
capital if it should offer resistance. The example of 
the Magyars was speedily followed by the Czechs in 
Bohemia. Forgotten and obliterated among the nation- 
alities of Europe, the Czechs had preserved in their 
language, and in that almost alone, the emblem of 
their national independence. Within the borders of 
Bohemia there was so large a German population that 
the ultimate absorption of the Slavic element by this 
wealthier and privileged body had at an earlier time 
seemed not- unlikely. Since 1830, however, the Czech 
national movement had been gradually gaining ground. 
In the first days of the agitation of 1848 an effort had 
been made to impress a purely constitutional form upon 
the demands made in the name of the people of Prague, 
and so to render the union of all classes possible. This 

14 MODERN EUROPE. 1848- 

policy, however, received its death-blow from the Revo- 
lution in Vienna and from the victory of the Magyars. 
The leadership at Prague passed from men of position 
and experience, representing rather the intelligence of 
the German element in Bohemia than the patriotism of 
the Czechs, to the nationalist orators who commanded 
the streets. An attempt made by the Cabinet at 
Vienna to evade the demands drawn up under the 
influence of the more moderate politicians resulted only 
in the downfall of this party, and in the tender of a new 
series of demands of far more revolutionary character. 
The population of Prague were beginning to organise a 
national guard ; arms were being distributed ; authority 
had collapsed. The Grove rnment was now forced to con- 
Autonomy sen ^ ^ everything that was asked of it, and a 
legislative Assembly with an independent 

t j 

local administration was promised to Bohemia. To this 
Assembly, as soon as it should meet, the new institu- 
tions of the kingdom were to be submitted. 

Thus far, if the authority of the Court of Vienna 
had been virtually shaken off by a great part of its sub- 
jects, the Emperor had at least not seen these subjects in 
avowed rebellion against the House of Hapsburg, nor 
supported in their resistance by the arms of a foreign 
Power. South of the Alps the dynastic connection was 
openly severed, and the rule of Austria declared for ever 
at an end. Lombardy had since the beginning of the 
year 1848 been held in check only by the display of 
great military force. The Eevolution at Paris had 
excited both hopes and fears ; the Revolution at Vienna 

1843. MILAN. 15 

was instantly followed by revolt in Milan. Eacletzky, 
the Austrian commander, a veteran who had served 
with honour in every campaign since that 
against the Turks in 1788, had long fore- Lombwdy, 

March 18. 

seen the approach of an armed conflict ; 
yet when the actual crisis arrived his dispositions had 
not been made for meeting it. The troops in Milan 
were ill placed ; the offices of Government were more- 
over separated by half the breadth of the city from the 
military head-quarters. Thus when on the 18th of 
March the insurrection broke out, it carried everything 
before it. The Vice-Governor, O'Donell, was captured, 
and compelled to sign his name to decrees handing over 
the government of the city to the Municipal Council. 
Radetzky now threw his soldiers upon the barricades, 
and penetrated to the centre of the city ; but he was 
unable to maintain himself there under the ceaseless 
( fire from the windows and the housetops, and withdrew 
on the night of the 19th to the line of fortifications. 
Fighting continued during the next two days in the 
outskirts and at the gates of the city. The garrisons of 
all the neighbouring towns were summoned to the 
assistance of their general, but the Italians broke up 
the bridges and roads, and one detachment alone out of 
all the troops in Lombardy succeeded in reaching Milan. 
A report now arrived at Eadetzky's camp that the 
King of Piedmont was on the march against him, 
Preferring the loss of Milan to the possible capture of 
his army, he determined to evacuate the city. On the 
night of the 22nd of March the retreat was begun, and 



Kadetzky fell back upon the Mincio and Verona, which 

he himself had made the centre of the Austrian system 


of defence in Upper Italy.* 

Venice had already followed the example of the 
Lombard capital. The tidings received from Vienna 
after the 13th of March appear to have completely 
bewildered both the military and the civil authorities 
insurrection of OI1 tne Adriatic coast. They released 
their political prisoners, among whom was 
Daniel Manin, an able and determined foe of Austria; 
they entered into constitutional discussions with the 
popular leaders ; they permitted the formation of a 
national guard, and finally handed over to this 
guard the arsenals and the dockyards with all their 
stores. From this time all was over. Manin pro- 
claimed the Eepublic of St. Mark, and became the chief 
of a Provisional Government. The Italian regiments 
in garrison joined the national cause ; the ships of war 
at Pola, manned chiefly by Italian sailors, were only 
prevented from sailing to the assistance of the rebels by 
batteries that were levelled against them from the 
shore. Thus without a blow being struck Venice was 
lost to Austria. The insurrection spread westwards 
and northwards through city and village in the in- 
terior, till there remained to Austria nothing but the 
fortresses on the Adige and the Mincio, where Eadetzky, 
deaf to the counsels of timidity, held his ground 

* Casati, Nuove Rivelazioni, ii. 72. Schonhals, Campagnes d'ltalie 
de 1848 et 1849, p. 72. Cattaneo, Insurrezione di Milano, p. 29. Parl. 
Pap. 1849, Ivii. (2) 210, 333. Schneidawind, Feldzug in 1848, i. 30. 


unshaken. The national rising carried Piedmont with it. 
It was in vain that the British envoy at Turin urged 
the Kincr to enter into no conflict with 

Piedmont makes 


Austria. On the 24th of March Charles 

Albert published a proclamation promising his help to 

the Lombards. Two days later his troops entered 


Austria had for thirty years consistently laid down 
the principle that its own sovereignty in Upper Italy 
vested it with the right to control the poli- 

General war 

tical system of every other State in the 

I till y 

peninsula. It had twice enforced this prin- 
ciple by arms : first in its intervention in Naples in 
1820, afterwards in its occupation of the Roman States 
in 1831. The Government of Vienna had, as it were 
with fixed intention, made it impossible that its pre- 
sence in any part of Italy should be regarded as the 
presence of an ordinary neighbour, entitled to quiet 
possession until some new provocation should be given. 
The Italians would have proved themselves the simplest 
of mankind if, having any reasonable hope of military 
success, they had listened to the counsels of Palmerston 
and other statesmen who urged them not to take 
advantage of the difficulties in which Austria was now 
placed. The paralysis of the Austrian State was 
indeed the one unanswerable argument for immediate 
war. So long as the Emperor retained his ascendency 

* Manin, Documents laisses, i. 106. Perlbach, Manin, p. 14. Con- 
tarini, Memoriale Yeneto, p. 10. Rovani, Manin, p. 25. Parliamentary 
Papers, 1849, Ivii. (2) 267. 




in any part of Italy, his interests could not permanently 
suffer the independence of the rest. If the Italians 
should chivalrously wait until the Cabinet of Vienna 
had recovered its strength, it was quite certain that 
their next efforts in the cause of internal liberty would 
be as ruthlessly crushed as their last. Every clear- 
sighted patriot understood that the time for a great 
national effort had arrived. In some respects the poli- 
tical condition of Italy seemed favourable to such united 
action. Since the insurrection of Palermo in January, 
1848, absolutism had everywhere fallen. Ministries 
had come into existence containing at least a fair pro- 
portion of men who were in real sympathy with the 
national feeling. Above all, the Pope seemed disposed 
to place himself at the head of a patriotic union against 
the foreigner. Thus, whatever might be the secret x 
inclinations of the reigning Houses, they were unable 
for the moment to resist the call to arms. Without an 
actual declaration of war troops were sent northwards 
from Naples, from Florence, and from Rome, to take 
part, as it was supposed, in the national struggle by the 
side of the King of Piedmont. Volunteers thronged to 
the standards. The Papal benediction seemed for once 
to rest on the cause of manhood and independence. On 
the other hand, the very impetus which had brought 
Liberal Ministries into power threatened to pass into a 
phase of violence and disorder. The concessions already I 
made were mocked by men who expected to win all thef 
victories of democracy in an hour. It remained to be 
seen whether there existed in Italy the political sagacity 

1848. BERLIN. 19 

which, triumphing over all local jealousies, could bend 
to one great aim the passions of the multitude and the 
fears of the Courts, or whether the cause of the whole 
nation would be wrecked in an ignoble strife between 
demagogues and reactionists, between the rabble of the 
street and the camarilla round the throne.* 

Austria had with one hand held down Italy, with 
the other it had weighed on Germany. Though the 
Revolutionary movement was in full course on the east 
of the Ehine before Metternich's fall, it received, espe- 
cially at Berlin, a great impetus from this ^ Marcl} ^ 
event. Since the beginning of March the 
Prussian capital had worn an unwonted aspect In this 
city of military discipline public meetings had been 
held day after day, and the streets had been blocked by 
excited crowds. Deputations which laid before the 
King demands similar to those now made in every 
German town received halting and evasive answers. 
Excitement increased, and on the 13th of March en- 
counters began between the citizens and the troops, 
which, though insignificant, served to exasperate the 
people and its leaders. The King appeared to be 
wavering between resistance and concession until, the 
Revolution at Vienna, which became known at Berlin 
on the 15th of March, brought affairs to their crisis. 
On the 17th the tumult in the streets suddenly ceased; 
it was understood that the following day would see the 
Government either reconciled with the people or forced 

* Bianchi, Diplomazia Europea, v. 183. Fariui, Stato Romano, ii. 16. 
Parl. Papers, 1849, Ivii. 285, 297, 319. Pasolini, Memorie, p. 91. 

C 2 



to deal with an insurrection on a great scale. Accord- 
ingly on the morning of the 18th crowds made their 
way towards the palace, which was surrounded by 
troops. About midday there appeared a Royal edict 
summoning the Prussian United Diet for the 2nd of 
April, and announcing that the King had determined 
to promote the creation of a Parliament for all Ger- 
many and the establishment of Constitutional Govern- 
ment in every German State. This manifesto drew 
fresh masses towards the palace, desirous, it would seem, 
to express their satisfaction; its contents, however, were 
imperfectly understood by the assembly already in front 
of the palace, which the King vainly attempted to 
address. When called upon to disperse, the multitude 
refused to do so, and answered by cries for the with- 
drawal of the soldiery. In the midst of the confusion 
two shots were fired from the ranks without orders ; a 
panic followed, in which, for no known reason, the 
cavalry and infantry threw themselves upon the people. 
The crowd was immediately put to flight, but the 
combat was taken up b}- the population of Berlin. 
Barricades appeared in the streets ; fighting continued 
during the evening and night. Meanwhile the King, 
who was shocked and distressed at the course that 
events had taken, received deputations begging that 
the troops might be withdrawn from the city. Frederick 
William endeavoured for a while to make the surrender 
of the barricades the condition for an armistice ; but as 
night went on the troops became exhausted, and 
although they had gained ground, the resistance of the 

1849. BERLIN. 21 

people was not overcome. Whether doubtful of the 
ultimate issue of the conflict or unwilling to permit 
further bloodshed, the King gave way, and at daybreak 
on the 19th ordered the troops to be withdrawn. His 
intention was that they should continue to garrison the 
palace, but the order was misunderstood, and the troops 
were removed to the outside of Berlin. The palace 
was thus left unprotected, and, although no injury was 
inflicted upon its inmates, the King was made to feel 
that the people could now command his homage. The 
bodies of the dead were brought into the court of the 
palace ; their wounds were laid bare, and the King, 
who appeared in a balcony, was .compelled to descend 
into the court, and to stand before them with uncovered 
head. Definite political expression was given to the 
changed state of affairs by the appointment of a new 

The conflict between the troops and the people at 
Berlin was described, and with truth, as the result of a 
misunderstanding. Frederick William had already de- 
termined to yield to the principal demands of his 
subjects ; nor on the part of the inhabitants of Berlin 
had there existed any general hostility towards the 
sovereign, although a small group of agitators, in part 
foreign, had probably sought to bring about an armed 
attack on the throne. Accordingly, when once the 

* Die Berliner Marz-Revolution, p. 55. Ausfiihrliche Beschreibung, 
p. 3. Amtliche Berichte, p. 16. Stahr, Preussische Revolution, i. 91. S. 
Stern, Geschichte des Deutschen Yolkes, p. 58. Stern was an eye-witness 
at Berlin, though not generally a good authoiity. 

22 ' MODERN EUROPE. is. 

combat was broken off, there seemed to be no important 
obstacle to a reconciliation between the King and the 
people. Frederick William chose a course which spared 
and even gratified his own self-love. In the political 
faith of all German Liberals the establishment of 
German unity was now an even more important article 
than the introduction of free institutions into each 
particular State. The Ee volution at Berlin had indeed 
been occasioned by the King's delay in granting internal 
reform; but these domestic disputes might well be for- 
gotten if in the great cause of German unity the 
Prussians saw their King rising to the needs of the 
hour. Accordingly the first resolution of Frederick 
William, after quiet had returned to the capital, was to 
appear in public state as the champion of the Father- 
land. A proclamation announced on the morning of 
the 21st of March that the King had placed himself at 
the head of the German nation, and that he would on 
that day appear on horseback wearing the old German 
colours. In due time Frederick William came forth at 
the head of a procession, wearing the tricolor of gold, 
white, and black, which since 1815 had been so dear 
to the patriots and so odious to the Governments of 
Germany. As he passed through the streets he was 
saluted as Emperor, but he repudiated the title, assert- 
ing with oaths and imprecations that he intended to 
rob no German prince of his sovereignty. At each 
stage of his theatrical progress he repeated to appro- 
priate auditors his sounding but ambiguous allusions 
to the duties imposed upon him by the common danger. 


A manifesto, published at the close of the day, summed 
up the utterances of the monarch in a somewhat less 
rhetorical form. " Germany is in ferment within, and 
exposed from without to danger from more than one 
side. Deliverance from this danger can come only from 
the most intimate union of the Grerman princes and 
people under a single leadership. I take this leadership 
upon me for the hour of peril. I have to-day assumed 
the old German colours, and placed myself and my 
people under the venerable banner of the German 
Empire. Prussia henceforth is merged in Germany." 

The ride of the King through Berlin, and his 
assumption of the character of German leader, however 
little it pleased the minor sovereigns, or gratified the 
Liberals of the smaller States, who con- National ^ 8em . 
sidered that such authority ought to be 
conferred by the nation, not assumed by a prince, was 
, successful for the moment in restoring to the King 
some popularity among his own subjects. He could 
now without humiliation proceed with the concessions 
which had been interrupted by the tragical events of 
the 18th of March. In answer to a deputation from 
Breslau, which urged that the Chamber formed by the 
union of the Provincial Diets should be replaced by a 
Constituent Assembly, the King promised that a 
national Eepresentative Assembly should be convoked 
as soon as the United Diet had passed the necessary 

* " Preusseu gelit fortan in Dentschland auf." Reden Friedrich 
Wilhelins, p. 9. In conversation with Bassermann Frederick William at 
a later time described his ride through Berlin as " a comedy which he 
had been made to play." The bombast at any rate was all his own. 


electoral law. To this National Assembly the Govern- 
ment would submit measures securing the liberty of the 
individual, the right of public meeting and of associa- 
tions, trial by jury, the responsibility of Ministers, and 
the independence of the judicature. A civic militia was" 
to be formed, with the right of choosing its own 
officers,, and the standing army was to take the oath of 
allegiance to the Constitution. Hereditary jurisdictions 
and manorial rights of police were to be abolished ; 
equality before the law was to be universally enforced ; 
in short the entire scheme of reforms demanded by the 
Constitutional Liberals of Prussia was to be carried 
into effect. In Berlin, as in every other capital in Ger- 
many, the victory of the party of progress now seemed 
to be assured. The Government no longer represented 
a power hostile to popular rights ; and when, on the 
22nd of March, the King spontaneously paid the last 
honours to those who had fallen in combat with his 
troops, as the long funeral procession passed his palace, 
it was generally believed that his expression of feeling 
was sincere^ 

In the passage of his address in which King Fre- 
derick William spoke of the external dangers threaten- 
ing Germany, he referred to apprehensions which had 
for a while been current that the second French Repub- 
lic would revive the aggressive energy of the first. This 
fear proved baseless ; nevertheless, for a sovereign who 
really intended to act as the champion of the German 
nation at large, the probability of war with a neigh- 
bouring Power was far from remote. The cause of the 


. Duchies of Schleswig-Holsteiu, which were in rebellion 
'against the Danish Crown, excited the utmost interest 
and sympathy in Germany. The popula- gchl e s g. 
tion of these provinces, with the exception 
of certain districts in Schleswig, was German ; Holstein 
was actually a member of the German Federation. The 
legal relation of the Duchies to Denmark was, according 
to the popular view, very nearly that of Hanover to 
England before 1837. The King of Denmark was also 
Duke of Schleswig and of Holstein, but these were no 
more an integral portion of the Danish State than 
Hanover was of the British Empire ; and the laws of 
succession were moreover different, in Schleswig- Holstein 
the Crown being transmitted by males, while in Denmark 
females were capable of succession. On the part of the 
Danes it was admitted that in certain districts in 
Holstein the Salic law held good ; it was, however, 
.maintained that in the remainder of Holstein and in all 
Schleswig the rules of succession were the same as in 
Denmark. The Danish Government denied that Schles- 
wig-Holstein formed a unity in itself, as alleged by the 
Germans, and that it possessed separate national rights 
as against the authority of the King's Government at 
Copenhagen. The real heart of the difficulty lay in the 
fact that the population of the Duchies was German. 
So long as the Germans as a race possessed no national 
feeling, the union of the Duchies with the Danish 
Monarchy had not been felt as a grievance. It hap- 
pened, however, that the great revival of German 
patriotism resulting from the War of Liberation in 

26 MODERN EUROPE. 1848. 

1813 was almost simultaneous with the severance of 
Norway from the Danish Crown, which compelled the 
Government of Copenhagen to increase very heavily the 
burdens imposed on its German subjects in the Duchies. 
From this time discomtent gained ground, especially in 
Altona and Kiel, where society was as thoroughly 
German as in the neighbouring city of Hamburg. 
After 1830, when Provincial Estates were established 
in Schleswig and Holstein, the German movement 
became formidable. The reaction, however, which 
marked the succeeding period generally in Europe 
prevailed in Denmark too, and it was not until 1844, 
when a posthumous work of Lornsen, the exiled leader 
of the German party, vindicated the historical rights 
of the Duchies, that the claims of German nationality 
in these provinces were again vigorously urged. From 
this time the separation of Schleswig- Hoi stein from 
Denmark became a question of practical politics. The 
King of Denmark, Christian VIII., had but one son, 
who, though long married, was childless, and with 
whom the male line of the reigning House would 
expire. In answer to an address of the Danish Pro- 
vincial Estates calling upon the King to declare the 
unity of the Monarchy and the validity of the Danish 
law of succession for all its parts, the Holstein Estates 
passed a resolution in November, 1844, that the Duchies 
were an independent body, governed by the rule of male 
descent, and indivisible. After an interval of two years, 
during which a Commission examined the succession- 
laws, King Christian published a declaration that the 


succession was the same in Schleswig as in Denmark 
proper, and that, as regarded those parts of Holstein 
where a different rule of succession existed, he would 
spare no effort to maintain the unity of the Monarchy. 
On this the Provincial Estates both of Schleswig and of 
Holstein addressed protests to the King, who refused to 
accept them. The deputies now resigned in a mass, 
whilst on behalf of Holstein an appeal was made to the 
German Federal Diet. The Diet merely replied by a 
declaration of rights; but in Germany at large the 
keenest interest was aroused on behalf of these severed 
members of the race who were so resolutely struggling 
against incorporation with a foreign Power. The 
deputies themselves, passing from village to village, 
excited a strenuous spirit of resistance throughout the 
Duchies, which was met by the Danish Government 
with measures of repression more severe than any which 
it had hitherto employed.* 

Such was the situation of affairs when, on the 20th 
of January, 1848, King Christian VIII. died, leaving 
the throne to Frederick VII , the last of 
the male line of his House. Frederick's Hoistem, 

March 24. 

first act was to publish the draft of a Con- 
stitution, in which all parts of the Monarchy were 
treated as on the same footing. Before the delegates 
could assemble to whom the completion of this 
work was referred, the shock of the Paris Eevolution 

* Droysen und Samwer, Schleswig-Holstein, p. 220. Bunsen, Memoir 
on Schleswig-Holstein, p. 25. Schleswig-Holstein, Uebersichtliche Dar- 
etellung, p. 51. On the other side, N"oten zur Beleuchtung, p. 12. 


reached the North Sea ports. A public meeting at 
Altona demanded the establishment of a separate con- 
stitution for Schleswig-Holstein, and the admission of 
Schleswig into the German Federation. The Pro- 
vincial Estates accepted this resolution, and sent a 
deputation to Copenhagen to present this and other 
demands to the King. But in the course of the next 
few days a popular movement at Copenhagen brought 
into power a thoroughly Danish Ministry, pledged to the 
incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark as an integral 
part of the Kingdom. Without waiting to learn the 
answer made by the King to the deputation, the Hol- 
steiners now took affairs into their own hands. A 
Provisional Government was formed at Kiel (March 
24), the troops joined the people, and the insurrection 
instantly spread over the whole province. As the 
proposal to change the law of succession to the throne 
had originated with the King of Denmark, the cause 
of the Holsteiners was from one point of view that of 
established right. The King of Prussia, accepting the 
positions laid down by the Holstein Estates in 1844, 
declared that he would defend the claims of the legiti- 
mate heir by force of arms, and ordered his troops to 
enter Holstein. The Diet of Frankfort, now forced to 
express the universal will of Germany, demanded that 
Schleswig, as the sister State of Holstein, 
Germany and should enter the Federation. On the pass- 


ing of this resolution, the envoy who re- 
presented the King of Denmark at the Diet, as Duke 
of Holstein, quitted Frankfort, and a state of war 


ensued between Denmark on the one side and Prussia 
with the German Federation on the other. 

The passionate impulse of the German people to- 
wards unity had already called into being an organ for 
the expression of national sentiment, which, if without 
any Wai or constitutional authority, was 

J J ' The German 

yet strong enough to impose its will upon m ent, P March 
the old and discredited Federal Diet and 
upon most of the surviving Governments. At the 
invitation of a Committee, about five hundred Liberals 
who had in one form or another taken part in public 
affairs assembled at Frankfort on the 30th of March to 
make the necessary preparations for the meeting of a 
German national Parliament. This Assembly, which 
is known as the Ante-Parliament, sat but for five da} r s. 
Its resolutions, so far as regarded the method of electing 
the new Parliament, and the inclusion of new districts in 
the German Federation, were accepted by the Diet, and 
in the main carried into effect. Its denunciation of 
persons concerned in the repressive measures of 1819 
and subsequent reactionary epochs was followed by the 
immediate retirement of all members of the .Diet whose 
careers dated back to those detested days. But in the 
most important work that was expected from the Ante- 
Parliament, the settlement of a draft-Constitution to be 
laid before the future National Assembly as a basis for 
its deliberations, nothing whatever was accomplished. 
The debates that took place from the 31st of March to 
the 4th of April were little more than a trial of strength 
between the Monarchical and Eepublican parties. The- 

30 MODERN EUROPE. 1848. 

Republicans, far outnumbered when they submitted a 
constitutional scheme of their own, proposed, after this 
repulse, that the existing Assembly should continue in 
session until the National Parliament met ; in other 
words, that it should take upon itself the functions and 
character of a National Convention. Defeated also on 
this proposal, the. leaders of the extreme section of the 
Republican party, strangely miscalculating their real 
strength, determined on armed insurrection. Uniting 
with a body of German refugees beyond the Rhine, who 
were themselves assisted by French and Polish soldiers 
of revolution, they raised the Republican 

.Republican / 

standard in Baden, and for a few days 
maintained a hopeless and inglorious struggle against 
the troops which were sent to suppress them. Even in 
Baden, which had long been in advance of all other 
German States in democratic sentiment, and which was 
peculiarly open to Republican influences from France 
and Switzerland, the movement was not seriously sup- 
ported by the population, and in the remainder of 
Germany it received no countenance whatever. The 
leaders found themselves ruined men. The best of 
them fled to the United States, where, in the great 
.struggle against slavery thirteen years later, they ren- 
dered better service to their adopted than they had ever 
rendered to their natural Fatherland. 

On breaking up on the 4th of April, the Ante-Par- 
liament left behind it a Committee of Fifty, whose task 
it was to continue the work of preparation for the 
National Assembly to which it had itself contributed so 


little. One thing alone had been clearly established, 
that the future Constitution of Germany 

Meeting of the 

was not to be Republican. That the 3iAm. 
existing Governments could not be safely 
ignored by the National Assembly Jn its work of 
founding the new Federal Constitution for Germany 
was clear to those who were not blinded by the enthu- 
siasm of the moment. In the Committee of Fifty and 
elsewhere plans were suggested for giving to the 
Governments a representation within the Constituent 
Assembly, or for uniting their representatives in a 
Chamber co-ordinate with this, so that each step in the 
construction of the new Federal order should be at once 
the work of the nation and of the Governments. Such 
plans were suggested and discussed ; but in the haste 
and inexperience of the time they were brought to no 
conclusion. The opening of the National Assembly 
liad been fixed for the 18th of May, and this brief 
interval had expired before the few sagacious men who 
understood the necessity of co-operation between the 
Governments and the Parliament had decided upon any 
s common course of action. To the mass of patriots it- 
was enough that Germany, after thirty years of disap- 
pointment, had at last won its national representation. 
Before this imposing image of the united race, Kings, 
Courts, and armies, it was fondly thought, must bow. 
Thus, in the midst of universal hope, the elections were 
held throughout Germany in its utmost federal extent, 
from the Baltic to the Italian border ; Bohemia alone, 
where the Czech majority resisted any closer union with 


Germany, declining to send representatives to Frankfort. 
In the body of deputies elected there were to be found 
almost all the foremost Liberal politicians of every 
German community ; a few still vigorous champions of 
the time of the War of Liberation, chief among them 
the poet Arndt; patriots who in the evil days that 
followed had suffered imprisonment and exile; his- 
torians, professors, critics, who in the sacred cause of 
liberty have, like Gervinus, inflicted upon their readers 
worse miseries than ever they themselves endured at the 
hands of unregenerate kings ; theologians, journalists ; 
in short, the whole group of leaders under whom 
Germany expected to enter into the promised land of 
national unity and freedom. No Imperial coronation 
ever brought to Frankfort so many honoured guests, or 
attracted to the same degree the sympathy of the 
German race. Greeted with the cheers of the citizens 
of Frankfort, whose civic militia lined the streets, the 
members of the Assembly marched in procession on the 
afternoon of the 18th of May from the ancient ban- 
queting-hall of the Kaisers, where they had gathered, 
to the Church of St. Paul, which had been chosen as 
their Senate House. Their President and officers were 
elected on the following day. Arndt, who in the frantic 
confusion of the first meeting had been unrecognised 
and shouted down, was called into the Tribune, but 
could speak only a few words for tears. The Assembly 
voted him its thanks for his famous song, "What is 
the German's Fatherland ? " and requested that he 
would add to it another stanza commemorating the 


union of the race at length visibly realised in that great 
Parliament. Four days after the opening of the General 
Assembly of Frankfort, the Prussian national Parlia- 
ment began its sessions at Berlin.* 

At this point the first act in the Revolutionary 
drama of 1848 in Germany, as in Europe generally, 
may be considered to have reached its close. 
A certain unity marks the memorable epoch any m March, 

J 1848. 

known generally as the March Days and 
the events immediately succeeding. E/e volution i$ 
universal; it scarcely meets with resistance; its views 
seem on the point of being achieved ; the baffled aspira- 
tions of the last half- century seem on the point of 
being fulfilled. There exists no longer in Central 
Europe such a thing as an autocratic Government; and, 
while the French Eepublic maintains an unexpected 
attitude of peace, Germany and Italy, under the leader- 
ship of old dynasties now penetrated with a new spirit, 
appear to be on the point of achieving each its own 
work of Federal union and of the expulsion of the 
foreigner from its national soil. All Italy prepares 
to move under Charles Albert to force the Austrians 
from their last strongholds on the Mincio and the 
Adige ; all Germany is with the troops of Frederick 
William of Prussia as they enter Holstein to rescue 
this and the neighbouring German province from the 
Dane. In Radetzky's camp alone, and at the Court of 
St. Petersburg, the old monarchical order of Europe 

* Yerhandlungen de^ National-versarnmlung, i. 25. Biederinann 
Dreissig Jahre, i. 278. Radowitz, Werke, ii. 36. 


.31 MODERN EUROPE. isis. 

still survives. How powerful were these two isolated 
centres of anti-popular energy the world was soon to 
see. Yet they would not have turned back the tide of 
European affairs and given one more victory to reac- 
tion had they not had their allies in the hatred of 
race to race, in the incapacity and the errors of peoples 
and those who represented them ; above all, in the 
enormous difficulties which, even had the generation 
been one of sages and martyrs, the political circum- 
stances of the time would in themselves have opposed 
to the accomplishment of the ends desired. 
^ France had given to Central Europe the signal for 
the Ee volution of 1848, and it was in France, where 
the conflict was not one for national independence but 
for political and social interests, that the Eevolution 
most rapidly ran its course and first exhausted its 
powers. On the flight of Louis Philippe authority 
had been entrusted by the Chamber of Deputies 
to a Provisional Government, whose most prominent 
member was the orator and poet Lamartine. Installed 
at the Hotel de Ville, this Government had 

The French 

Provisional with dimculty prevented the mob from 

Government. * 

substituting the Eed Flag for the Tricolor, 
and from proceeding at once to realise the plans of its 
own leaders. The majority of the Provisional Grovern- 
ment were Eepublicans of a moderate type, representing 
the ideas of the urban middle classes rather than 
of the workmen ; but by their side were Ledru 
a rhetorician dominated by the phrases of 1793, and 
Louis Blanc, who considered all political change 

/IwT PARIS. 35 

as but an instrument for advancing the organisation 

1 of labour and for the emancipation of the artisan from 

[servitude, by the establishment of State-directed indus- 

/tries affording appropriate employment and adequate 

( remuneration to all. Among the first proclamations of 

the- -Provisional Government was one* in which, in 

answer to a petition demanding the recognition of the 

to guarantee employ- 
This engagement, the heaviest 

perhaps that was ever voluntarily assumed by any 
Government, was followed in a few days by the opening 
of national workshops ~_ That in the midst of a Revolu- 
tion which took all parties by surprise plans for the 
conduct of a series of industrial enterprises by the State 
should have been seriously examined was impossible. 
The Government had paid homage to an abstract idea ; 
they were without a conception of the mode in which it 
was to be realised. What articles were to be made, 
what works were to be executed, no one knew. The 
mere direction of destitute workmen to the centres/ 
where they were to be employed was a task for which a 
new branch of the administration had to be created. 
When this was achieved, the men collected proved 
useless for all purposes of industry. Their The National 

i . T I xl Workshops. 

numbers increased enormously, rising in the 
course of four weeks from fourteen to sixty-five thousand. 
The Revolution had itself caused a financial and com- 
mercial panic, interrupting all the ordinary occupations 
of business, and depriving masses of men of the means 
of earning a livelihood. These, with others who had 
D 2 

30 MODERN EUROPE. 1818. 

no intention of working, thronged to the State work- 
shops ; while the certainty of obtaining wages from the 
public purse occasioned a series of strikes of workmen 
against their employers and the abandonment of private 
factories. The checks which had been intended to 
confine enrolment at the public works to persons already 
domiciled in Paris completely failed; from all the 
neighbouring departments the idle and the hungry 
streamed into the capital. Every abuse incidental to a 
system of public relief was present in Paris in its most 
exaggerated form ; every element of experience, of 
wisdom, of precaution, was absent. If, instead of a 
group of benevolent theorists, the experiment of 1848 
had had for its authors a company of millionaires anxious 
to dispel all hope that mankind might ever rise to a 
higher order than that of unrestricted competition of 
man against man, it could not have been conducted 
under more fatal conditions.* 

The leaders of the democracy in Paris had from the 

first considered that the decision upon the form of 

u ^ . . , Government to be established in Trance 

The Provisional 

| e ve iie"K n eS- in. place of the Orleanist monarchy be- 
longed rather to themselves than to the 
nation at large. They distrusted, and with good 
reason, the results of the General Election which, by 
a decree of the Provisional Government, was to be 
held in the course of April. A circular issued by Ledru 

* Actes du Gouverneinent Provisoire, p. 12. Louis Blanc, Revela- 
tions Historiques, i. 135. Gamier Pages, .Revolution de 1848, vi. 108, 
viii. 148. Emile Thomas, Histoire des Ateliers Nationaux, p. 9J. 

1848. LEDRU ROLLIN. 37 

Eollin, Minister of the Interior, without the knowledge 
of his colleagues, to the Commissioners by whom he 
had replaced the Prefects of the Monarchy gave the 
first open indication of this alarm, and of the means of 
violence and intimidation by which the party which 
Ledru Eollin represented hoped to impose its will upon 
the country. The Commissioners were informed in 
plain language that, as agents of a revolutionary 
authority, their powers were unlimited, and that their 
task was to exclude from election all persons who were 
not -animated by revolutionary spirit, and pure from 
any taint of association with the past. If the circular 
had been the work of the Government, and not of a 
single member of it who was at variance with most of 
his colleagues and whose words were far more formid- 
able than his actions, it would have clearly foreshadowed 
a return to the system of 1793. But the isolation of 

Ledru Eoliin was well understood. The attitude of 

the Government generally was so little in accordance 
with the views of the Eed Eepublicans that on the 
16th of April a demonstration was organised with the 
object of compelling them to postpone the elections. 
The prompt appearance in arms of the National Guard, 
which still represented the middle classes of Paris, 
baffled the design of the leaders of the mob, and gave 
to Lamartine and the majority in the Government a 
decisive victory over their revolutionary Elec tions 
colleague. The elections were held at the 
time appointed ; and, in spite of the institution of 
universal suffrage, they resulted in the return of a body 

33 MODERN EUROPE. 184?. 

of Deputies not widely different from those who had 
hitherto appeared in French Parliaments. The great 
majority were indeed Republicans by profession, but of 
a moderate type ; and the session had no sooner opened 
than it became clear that the relation between the 
Socialist democracy of Paris and the National Repre- 
sentatives could only be one of more or less violent 

The first act of the Assembly, which met on the 
4th of May, was to declare that the Provisional Govern- 
ment had deserved well of the country, and 
Assembly, to reinstate most of its members in office 

Hay 4. 

under the title of an Executive Commis- 
sion. Ledru Rollin's offences were condoned, as those 
of a man popular with the democracy, and likely on the 
whole to yield to the influence of his colleagues. Louis 
Blanc and his confederate, Albert, as really dangerous 
persons, were excluded. The Jacobin leaders now 
proceeded to organise an attack on the Assembly by' 
main force. On the 15th of May the attempt was 
made. Under pretence of tendering a peti- 
tion on behalf of Poland, a mob invaded 
the Legislative Chamber, declared the Assembly dis- 
solved, and put the Deputies to flight. But the 
triumph was of short duration. The National Guard, 
whose commander alone was responsible for the failure 
of measures of defence, soon rallied in force ; the leaders 
of the insurgents, some of whom had installed them- 
selves as a Provisional Government at the Hotel de 
Ville, were made captive ; and after an interval of a 


few hours the Assembly resumed possession of the 
Palais Bourbon. The dishonour done to the national 
representation by the scandalous scenes of the 15th of 
May, as well as the decisively proved superiority of the 
National Guard over the half-armed mob, encouraged 
the Assembly to declare open war against the so-called 
social democracy, and to decree the abolition 


of the national workshops. ? The enormous 

growth of these establishments, which now 
included over a hundred thousand men, threatened to 
ruin the public finances ; the demoralisation which they 
engendered seemed likely to destroy whatever was sound 
in the life of the working classes of Paris. Of honest 
industry there was scarcely a trace to be found among 
the masses who were receiving their daily wages 
from the State. Whatever the sincerity of those who 
had founded the national workshops, whatever the 
anxiety for employment on the part of those who first 
' resorted to them, they had now become mere hives of 
disorder, where the resources of the State were lavished 1 
in Accumulating a force for its own overthrow. It was 
necessary, at whatever risk, to extinguish the evil. 
Plans for the gradual dispersion of the army of work- 
men were drawn up by Committees and discussed by 
the Assembly. If put in force with no more than the 
necessary delay, these plans might perhaps have rendered 
a peaceful solution of the difficulty possible. But the 
Government hesitated, and finally, when a decision 
could no longer be avoided, determined upon measures 
more violent and more sudden than those which the 

40 MODERN EUROPE. isis. 

Committees had recommended. On the 21st of June 
an order was published that all occupants of the public 
workshops between the ages of seventeen and twenty- 
five must enlist in the army or cease to receive support 
from the State, and that the removal of the workmen 
who had come into Paris from the provinces, for which 
preparations had already been made, must be at once 

The publication of this order was the signal for an 
appeal to arms. The legions of the national workshops 
were in themselves a half- organised force equal in 
number to several army-corps, and now animated by 
something like the spirit of military union. The 
The Four Days revolt, which began on the morning of the 
23rd of June, was conducted as no revolt in 
Paris had ever been conducted before. The eastern 
part of the city was turned into a maze of barricades. 
Though the insurgents had not artillery, they were in 
other respects fairly armed. The terrible nature of the 
conflict impending now became evident to the Assembly. 
General Cavaignac, Minister of War, -was placed in 
command, and subsequently invested with supreme 
authority, the Executive Commission resigning its 
powers. All the troops in the neighbourhood of Paris 
were at once summoned to the capital. Cavaignac well 
understood that any attempt to hold the insurrection in 
check by means of scattered posts would only end, as in 

* Barrot, Memoires, ii. 103. Caussidiere, Memoires, p. 117. Gamier 
Pages, x. 419. Normanby, Tear of Revolution, i. 389. Granier de 
Cassagnac, Chute de Louis Philippe, i. 359. De la Gorce, Seconde Re- 
publique, i. 273. Falloux, Memoires, i. 328. 


1830, by the capture or the demoralisation of the 
troops. He treated Paris as one great battle-field in 
which the enemy must be attacked in mass and driven 
by main force from all his positions. At times the 
effort appeared almost beyond the power of the forces 
engaged, and the insurgents, sheltered by huge barri- 
cades and firing from the windows of houses, seemed 
likely to remain masters of the field. The struggle 
continued for four days, but Cavaignac's artillery and 
the discipline of his troops at last crushed resistance ; 
and after the Archbishop of Paris had been mortally 
wounded in a heroic effort to stop further bloodshed, 
the last bands of the insurgents, driven back into the 
north-eastern quarter of the city, and there attacked 
with artillery in front and flank, were forced to lay 
down their arms. 

Such was the conflict of the Four Days of June, 
-a conflict memorable as one in which the combatants 
fought not for a political principle or form- of Govern-, 
ment, but for the overthrow 
of_society based on the institution of private pro- 
perty. The National Guard, with some exceptions, 
fought side by side with the regiments of the line, 
braved the same perils, and sustained an equal loss. 
The workmen threw themselves the more passionately 
into the struggle, inasmuch as defeat threatened them 
with deprivation of the very means of life. On both 
sides acts of savagery were committed which the 
fury of the conflict could not excuse. The ven- 
geance of the conquerors in the moment of success 


appears, however, to have been less unrelenting than 
that which followed the overthrow of the Commune in 
1871, though, after the struggle was over, the Assembly 
had no scruple -in transporting without trial the whole 
mass of prisoners taken with arms in their hands. 
Cavaignac's victory left the classes for whom he had 
Fears left by the fought terror- stricken at the peril from 
which they had escaped, and almost hope- 
less of their own security under any popular form of 
Government in the future. Against the rash and weak 
concessions to popular demands that had been made by 
the administration since February, especially in the 
matter of taxation and finance, there was now a deep, 
if not loudly proclaimed, reaction. The national work- 
shops disappeared grants were made by the Legislature 
for the assistance of the masses who were left without 
resource, but the money was bestowed in charitable 
relief or in the form of loans to associations, not as 
wages from the State. On every side among the holders 
of property the cry was for a return to sound principles 
of finance in the economy of the State, and for the 
establishment of a strong central power. 

General Cavaignac after the restoration of order had 
laid down the supreme authority which had been con- 
ferred on him, but at the desire of the Assembly he 
continued to exercise it until the new Constitution 
Cavaignac and should be drawn up and an Executive ap- 
ion ' pointed in accordance with its provisions. 
Events had suddenly raised Cavaignac from obscurity 
to eminence, and seemed to mark him out as the future 


ruler of France. But he displayed during the six 
months following the suppression of the revolt no great 
capacity for government, and his virtues as well as his 
defects made against his personal success. A sincere 
Republican, while at the same time a rigid upholder of 
law, he refused to lend himself to those who were, 
except in name, enemies of Republicanism ; and in his 
official acts and utterances he spared the feelings of the 
reactionary classes as little as he would have spared 
those of rioters and Socialists. As the influence of 
Cavaignac declined, another name began to fill men's 
thoughts. Louis Napoleon, son of the Emperor's 
brother Louis, King of Holland, had while still in 
exile been elected to the National Assembly by four 
Departments. He was as yet almost unknown except 
by name to his fellow-countrymen. Born in the 
Tuileries in 1808, he had been involved as a child in 
the ruin of the Empire, and had passed into banish- 
ment with his mother Hortense, under the law that 
expelled from France all members of Napoleon's 
family. He had been brought up at Augsburg and on 
the shores of the Lake of Constance, and as a volunteer 
in a Swiss camp of artillery he had gained some little 
acquaintance with military life. In 1831 he had joined 
the insurgents in the Romagna who were in arms 
against the Papal Government. The death of his own 
elder brother, followed in 1832 by that of Napoleon's 
son, the Duke of Reichstadt, made him chief of the 
house of Bonaparte. Though far more of a recluse 
than a man of action, though so little of his own nation 

44 MODERN EUROPE. 1848. 

that he could not pronounce a sentence of French with- 
out a marked German accent, and had never even seen 
a French play performed, he now became possessed by the 
fixed idea that he was one day to wear the French 
Crown. A few obscure adventurers attached themselves 
to his fortunes, and in 1836 he appeared at Strasburg 
and presented himself to the troops as Emperor. The 
enterprise ended in failure and ridicule. Louis Napo- 
leon was shipped to America by the Orleanist Govern- 
ment, which supplied him with money, and thought it 
unnecessary even to bring him to trial. He recrossed 
the Atlantic, made his home in England, and in 1840 
repeated at Boulogne the attempt that had failed at 
Strasburg. The result was again disastrous. He was 
now sentenced to perpetual imprisonment, and passed 
the next six years in captivity at Ham, where he 
produced a treatise on the Napoleonip Ideas, and certain 
fragments on political and social questions. The 
enthusiasm for Napoleon," of which there had been little 
trace in France since 1815, was now reviving; the 
sufferings of the epoch of conquest were, forgotten ; the 
steady maintenance of peace by Louis Philippe seemed 
humiliating to young and ardent spirits who had not 
known the actual presence of the foreigner. In literature 
two men of eminence worked powerfully upon the 
national imagination. The history of Thiers gave the 
nation a great stage-picture of Napoleon's exploits ; 
Beranger's lyrics invested his exile at St. Helena with 
an irresistible, though spurious, pathos. Thus, little as 
the world concerned itself with the prisoner at Ham, 


the tendencies of the time were working in his favour ; 
and his confinement, which lasted six years and was 
terminated by his escape and return to England, appears 
to have deepened his brooding nature, and to have 
strengthened rather than diminished his confidence in 
himself. On the overthrow of Louis Philippe he visited 
Paris, but was requested by the Provisional Govern- 
ment, on the ground of the unrepealed law banishing 
the Bonaparte family, to quit the country. He obeyed, 
probably foreseeing that the difficulties of the Republic 
would create better opportunities for his reappearance. 
Meanwhile the group of unknown men who sought 
their fortunes in a Napoleonic restoration busily can- 
vassed and wrote on behalf of the Prince, and with 
such success that, in the supplementary elections that 
were held at the beginning of June, he obtained a four- 
fold triumph. The Assembly, in spite of the efforts of 
the Government, pronounced his return 

Louis Napoleon 

valid. Yet with rare self-command the but^s uty ' 
Prince still adhered to his policy of reserve, 
resigning his seat on the ground that his election had 
been made a pretext for movements of which he dis- 
approved, while at the same time he declared in his 
letter to the President of the Assembly that if duties 
should be imposed upon him by the people he should 
know how to fulfil them.* 

From this time Louis Napoleon was a recognised 
aspirant to power. The Constitution of the Eepublic 

* (Euvres de Napoleon III., iii. 13, 24. Granier de Cassaguac, ii. 16. 
Jerrold, Napoleon III., ii. 393> 



was now being drawn up by the Assembly. The 
Executive Commission had disappeared in the convul- 
sion of June ; Cavaignac was holding the balance be- 
tween parties rather than governing himself. In the 
midst of the debates on the Constitution 

Louis Napoleon _..___ . -in 

again elected, _Louis JNapoleon was again returned to the 

Sept. 17. 

Assembly by the votes of five Departments. 
He saw that he ought to remain no longer in the 
background, and, accepting the call of the electors, he took 
his seat in the Chamber. It was clear that he would 
become a candidate for the Presidency of the Eepublic, 
and that the popularity of his name among the masses 
was enormous. He had twice presented himself to 
France as the heir to Napoleon's throne ; he had never 
directly abandoned his dynastic claim ; he had but 
recently declared, in almost threatening language, that 
he should know how to fulfil the duties that the people 
might impose upon him. Yet with all these facts 
before it the Assembly, misled by the puerile rhetoric 
of Lamartine, decided that in the new Constitution the 
President of the Republic, in whom was vested the 
executive power, should be chosen by the direct vote of 
all Frenchmen, and rejected the amendment of M. 
Grevy, who, with real insight into the future, declared 
that such direct election by the people could only give 
France a Dictator, and demanded that the President 
should be appointed not by the masses but by the 
Chamber. Thus was the way paved for Louis Napoleon's 
march to power. The events of June had dispelled any 
attraction that he had hitherto felt towards Socialistic 


theories. He saw that France required an upholder of 
order and of property. In his address to the nation an- 
nouncing his candidature for the Presidency he declared 
that he would shrinkfrom no sacrifice in defending society, 
so audaciously attacked ; that he would devote himself 
without reserve to the maintenance of the Republic, and 
make it his pride to leave to his successor at the end of 
four years 1 authority strengthened, liberty unimpaired, 
and real progress accomplished. Behind these gener- 
alities the address dexterously touched on the special 
wants of classes and parties, and promised something to 
each. The French nation in the election which followed 
showed that it believed in Louis Napoleon even more 
than he did in himself. If there existed in the opinion 
of the great mass any element beyond the mere instinct 
of self-defence against real or supposed schemes of spolia- 
tion, it was reverence for Napoleon's memory. Out of 
seven millionsof votes given, Louis Napoleon 

, , f, . , . Louis Napoleon 

received above nve, Cavaignac, who alone elected Presi- 
dent, Dec. 10. 

entered into serious competition with him, re- 
ceiving about a fourth part of that number. Lamartine 
x,and the men who ten months before had represented all 
the hopes of the nation now found but a handful of 
supporters. Though none yet openly spoke of Monar- 
chy, on all sides there was the desire for the restoration 
of power. The day-dreams of the second Eepublic 
had fled. France had shown that its choice lay only 
between a soldier who had crushed rebellion and a 
stranger who brought no title to its confidence but an 
Imperial name. 


Austria and Italy Vienna from March to May Flight of the Emperor- 
Bohemian National Movement Windischgratz subdues Prague Campaign 
around Verona Papal Allocution Naples in May Negotiations as to Lorn- 
hardy Reconquest of Venetia Battle of Custozza The Austrians enter 
Milan Austrian Court and Hungary The Serhs in Southern Hungary 
Serb Congress at Carlowitz Jellacic Affairs of Croatia Jellacic, the 
Court and the Hungarian Movement Murder of Lamberg Manifesto of 
October 3 Vienna on October 6 The Emperor at Olmiitz Windischgratz 
conquers Vienna The Parliament at Kremsier Schwarzenberg Minister - 
Ferdinand abdicates Dissolution of the Kremsier Parliament Unitary 
Edict Hungary The Roumanians in Transylvania The Austrian Army 
occupies Pesth Hungarian Government at Debreczin The Austrians 
driven out of Hungary Declaration of Hungarian Independence Russian 
Intervention The Hungarian Summer Campaign Capitulation of Vilagos 
Italy Murder of Rossi Tuscany The March Campaign in Lombardy 
Novara Abdication of Charles Albert Victor Emmanuel Restoration in 
Tuscany French Intervention in Rome Defeat of Oudinot Oudinot and 
Lesseps The French enter Rome The Restored Pontifical Government 
Fall of Venice Ferdinand reconquers Sicily Germany The National 
Assembly at Frankfort The Armistice of Malmo Berlin from April to 
September The Prussian Army Last days of the Prussian Parliament 
Prussian Constitution granted by Edict The German National Assembly 
and Austria Frederick William IV. elected Emperor He refuses the 
Crown End of the National Assembly Prussia attempts to form a separate 
Union The Union Parliament at Erfurt Action of Austria Hesse -Cassel 
The Diet of Frankfort restored Olmiitz Schleswig-Holstein Germany 
after 1849 Austria after 1851 France after 1848 Louis Napoleon The 
October Message Law Limiting the Franchise Louis Napoleon and the 
Army Proposed Revision of the Constitution The Coup d'Etat 
Napoleon III. Emperor. 

THE plain of Northern Italy has ever been an arena on 
Austria and which the contest between interests greater 
than those of Italy itself has been brought 
to an issue ; and it may perhaps be truly said that 
in the struggle between established Governments 


and Revolution throughout Central Europe in 1848 
the real turning-point, if it can anywhere be fixed, lay 
rather in the fortunes of a campaign in Lomhardy than 
in any single combination of events at Vienna or Berlin. 
The very existence of the Austrian Monarchy depended 
on the victory of Radetzky's forces over the national 
movement at the head of which Piedmont had now placed 
itself. If Italian independence should be established 
upon the ruin of the Austrian arms, and the influence 
and example of the victorious Italian people be thrown 
into the scale against the Imperial Government in its 
struggle with the separatist forces that convulsed every 
part of the Austrian dominions, it was scarcely possible 
that any stroke of fortune or policy could save the 
Empire of the Hapsburgs from dissolution. But on 
the prostration or recovery of Austria, as represented 
by its central power at Vienna, the future of Germany 
in great part depended. Whatever compromise might 
be effected between popular and monarchical forces in 
the other German States if left free from Austria's 
interference, the whole influence of a resurgent Austrian 
power could not but be directed against the principles 
of popular sovereignty and national union. The Par- 
laament of Frankfort might then in vain affect to fulfil 
its mandate without reckoning with the Court of 
Vienna. All this was indeed obscured in the tempests 
that for a while shut out the political horizon. The 
Liberals of Northern Germany had little sympathy 
with the Italian cause in the decisive days of 1848. 
Their inclinations went rather with the combatant who, 


though bent on maintaining an oppressive dominion, 
was nevertheless a member of the German race and paid 
homage for the moment to Constitutional rights. Yet, 
as later events were to prove, the fetters which crushed 
liberty beyond the Alps could fit as closely on to 
German limbs ; and in the warfare of Upper Italy for 
its own freedom the battle of German Liberalism, was 
in no small measure fought and lost. 

Metternich once banished from Vienna, the first 

\ popular demand was for a Constitution. His successors 

in office, with a certain characteristic pedantry, devoted 

Vienna from their studies to the Belgian Constitution of 

March to May. jggj . ^ ^^ ^^ ^^ & Constitution 

was published by edict for the non- Hungarian part of 
the Empire, including a Parliament of two Chambers, 
the Lower to be chosen by indirect election, the Upper 
consisting of nominees of the Crown and representatives 
of the great landowners. The provisions of this Con- 
stitution in favour of the Crown and the Aristocracy, as 
well as the arbitrary mode of its promulgation, dis- 
pleased the Viennese. Agitation recommenced in the 
city ; unpopular officials were roughly handled ; the 
Press grew ever more violent and more scurrilous. 
. One strange result of the tutelage in which Austrian 
society had been held was that the students of the 
University became, and for some time continued to be, 
the most important political body of the capital. Their 
principal rivals in influence were the National Guard 
drawn from citizens of the middle class, the workmen 
as yet remaining in the background. Neither in the 

1848. VIENNA. 51 

Hall of the University nor at the taverns where the 
civic militia discussed the events of the hour did the 
office-drawn Constitution find favour. On the 13th of 
May it was determined, with the view of exercising 
stronger pressure upon the Government, that the exist- 
ing committees of the National Guard and of the 
students should be superseded by one central committee 
representing both bodies. The elections to this com- 
mittee had been held, and its sittings had begun, when 
the commander of the National Guard declared such pro- 
ceedings to be inconsistent with military discipline, and 
ordered the dissolution of the committee. Riots followed, 
during which the students and the mob made their way 
into the Emperor's palace and demanded from his 
Ministers not only the re-establishment of the central 
committee but the abolition o4he Upper ChaTHlseF in 
the projected -Constitution, and the removal of the 
.checks Imposed on popular sov^eis^iy^Sy^a^ limited ; 
franchise and the sjste^m_jpj[^n^Lireci^ljctions. On 
ponrTaffer point the Ministry gave way ; and, in spite 
_of the resistance and reproaches of the Imperial house- 
hold, they obtained the Emperor's signature to a 
document promising that for the future all the important 
military posts in the city should be held by the National 
Guard jointly with the regular troops, that the latter 
should called out except on the requisition of 
the National Guard, and that the projected Constitution 
should remain without force until it should have been 
submitted for confirmation to a single Constituent 
Assembly elected by universal suffrage. 

52 MODERN EUROPE. 1843. 

The weakness of the Emperor's intelligence rendered 
him a mere puppet in the hands of those who for the 
moment exercised control over his actions. During the 
riot of the 15th of May he obeyed his Ministers ; a few 
hours afterwards he fell under the sway of the Court 
party, and consented to fly from Vienna. 

On the 18th the Yiennese learnt to their 

May 17. 

astonishment that Ferdinand was far on the 
road to the Tyrol. Soon afterwards a manifesto was 
published, stating that the violence and anarchy of the 
capital had compelled the Emperor to transfer his 
residence to Innsbruck ; that he remained true, however, 
to the promises made in March and to their legitimate 
consequences ; and that proof must be given of the 
return of the Viennese to their old sentiments of loyalty 
before he could again, appear among them. A certain 
revulsion of feeling in the Emperor's favour now became 
manifest in the capital, and emboldened the Ministers 
to take the first step necessary towards obtaining his ^ 
return, namely the dissolution of the Students' Legion. 
They could count with some confidence on the support 
of the wealthier part of the middle class, who were 
now becoming wearied of the students' extravagances 
and alarmed at the interruption of business caused by 
the Revolution; moreover, the ordinary termination of 
the academic year was near at hand. The order was 
Tumult of accordingly given for the dissolution of the 

Legion and the closing of the University. 
But the students met the order with the stoutest resist- 
ance. The workmen poured in from the suburbs to' 

1S4S. VIENNA. 53 

join in their defence. Barricades were erected, and the 
insurrection of March seemed on the point of being 
renewed. Once more the Government gave way, and 
not only revoked its order, but declared itself incapable 
of preserving tranquillity in the capital unless it should 
receive the assistance of the leaders of the people. 
With the full concurrence of the Ministers, a Committee 
of Public Safety was formed, representing at once the 
students, the middle class, and the workmen ; and it 
entered upon its duties with an authority exceeding^ 
within the limits of the capital, that of the shadow^ 
functionaries of State.* 

In the meantime the antagonism between the Czechs 
and the Germans in Bohemia was daily becoming more 
bitter. The influence of the party of com- 
promise, which had been dominant in the national 

A Tnovprnoi 


early days of March, had disappeared before 
the ill-timed attempt of the German national leaders 
at Frankfort to include Bohemia within the territory 
sending representatives to the German national Parlia- 
ment. By consenting to this incorporation the Czech 
population would have definitely renounced its newly 
asserted claim to nationality. If the growth of demo- 
cratic spirit at Vienna was accompanied by a more 
intense German national feeling in the capital, the 
popular movements at Vienna and at Prague must 
necessarily pass into a relation of conflict with one 

* Yitzthum, Wien, p. 103. Springer, ii. 293. Pillersdorff, Riick- 
blicke, p. 68; Nachlass, p. 118. Reschauer, ii. 376. Dund r, October 
Revolution, p. 5. Ficquelmout, Aufkliirungen, p. 65. 


another. On the flight of the Emperor becoming 
known at Prague, Count Thun, the governor, who was 
also the chief of the moderate Bohemian party, incited 
Ferdinand to make Prague the seat of his Government. 
This invitation, which would have directly connected 
the Crown with Czech national interests, was not Ac- 
cepted. The rasher politicians, chiefly students and 
workmen, continued to hold their meetings and to patrol 
the streets ; and a Congress of Slavs 'from all parts of 
the Empire, which was opened on the 2nd of June, 
excited national passions still further. So threaten- 
ing grew the attitude of the students and workmen 
that Count Windischgratz, commander of the troops at 
Prague, prepared to act with artillery. On the 12th of 
June, the day on which the Congress of 
subdues Prague, Slavs broke up, fighting began. Windisch- 
gratz, whose wife was killed by a bullet, 
appears to have acted with calmness, and to have 
sought to arrive at some peaceful settlement. He 
withdrew his troops, and desisted from a bombardment 
that he had begun, on the understanding that the barri- 
cades which had been erected should be removed. This 
condition was not fulfilled. New acts of violence occurred 
in the city, and on the 17th Windischgratz reopened 
fire. On the following day Prague surrendered, and 
Windisehgiratz re-entered the city as Dictator. The 
autonomy of Bohemia was at an end. The army had 
for the first time acted with effect against a popular 
rising; the first blow had been struck on behalf of 
the central power against the revolution which till 


now had seemed about to dissolve the Austrian State 
into its fragments. 

At this point the dominant interest in Austrian 
affairs passes from the capital and the northern provinces 
to Kadetzky's army and the Italians with whom it 
stood face to. face. Once convinced of the necessity of 
a retreat 'from Milan, the Austrian com- 
mander had mov/ed with sufficient rapidity arondverona, 

J April-May. 

to save Yerona and Mantua from passing 
into the hands of the insurgents. He was thus/enabled 
to place his army in one of the best defensive positions 
in Europe, the Quadrilateral flanked by the rivers 
Mincio and Adige, and protected by the fortresses of 
Verona, Mantua, Peschiera, and Legnano. With his 
front on the Mincio he awaited at once the attack of 
the Piedmontese and the arrival of reinforcements from 
the north-east. On the 8th of April the first attack was 
< made, and after a sharp engagement at Goito the pas- 
sage of the Mincio was effected by the Sardinian army. 
Siege was now laid to Peschiera ; and while a Tuscan 
contingent watched Mantua, the bulk of Charles Albert's 
forces operated farther northward with the view of cutting 
off Verona from the roads to the Tyrol. This result was 
for a moment achieved, but the troops at the King's 
disposal were far too weak for the task of reducing the 
fortresses ; and in an attempt that was made on the 6th 
f May to drive the Austrians out of their positions in 
front of Verona, Charles Albert was defeated at Santa 
Lucia and compelled to fall back towards the Mincio.* 
* Schonhals, p. 117. Farini, ii. 9. Parl. Pap. 1849, Irii. 352. 

56 A^ MODERN EUROPE. 1848. 

A. pause in the war ensued, filled by political events 
of evil omen for Italy. Of all the princes who had 
permitted their troops to march northwards to the 
assistance of the Lombards, not one was acting in full 
sincerity. The first to show himself in his true colours 
was the Pope. On the 29th of April an Allocution 
was addressed to the Cardinals, in which Pius disavowed 
Pa ai Aiiocu- a ^ participation in the war against Austria, 
tion, Apni 29. an< j declared that his own troops should do 
no more than defend the integrity of the Boman States. 
Though at the moment an outburst of popular indigna- 
tion in Borne forced a still more liberal Ministry into 
power, and Durando, the Papal general, continued his 
advance into Venetia, the Pope's renunciation of his 
supposed national leadership produced the effect which 
its author desired, encouraging every open and every 
secret enemy of the Italian cause, and perplexing those 
who had believed themselves to be engaged in a sacred 
as well as a patriotic war. In Naples things hurried 
far more rapidly to a catastrophe. Elections had been 
held to the Chamber of Deputies, which 
was to be opened on the 15th of May, and 
most of the members returned were men who, while 
devoted to the Italian national cause, were neither Re- 
publicans nor enemies of the Bourbon dynasty, but 
anxious to co-operate with their King in the work of 
Constitutional reform. Politicians of another character, 
however, commanded the streets of Naples. Rumours 
were spread that the Court was on the point of restoring 
despotic government and abandoning the Italian cause. 

1848. NAPLES. 57 

Disorder and agitation increased from day to day; 
and after the Deputies had arrived in the city and 
begun a series of informal meetings preparatory to the 
opening of the Parliament, an ill-advised act of Ferdi- 
nand gave to the party of disorder, who were weakly 
represented in the Assembly, occasion for an insurrec- 
tion. After promulgating the Constitution on February 
10th, Ferdinand had agreed that it should be submitted 
to the two Chambers for revision. He notified, how- 
ever, to the Eepresentatives oia the eve .of the opening 
of Parliament that they would be required to take 
an oath of fidelity to the Constitution. They urged 
that such an oath would deprive them of their 
right of revision. The King, ;after some hours, con- 
sented to a change in the formula of the oath ; but his 
demand had already thrown the city into tumult. 
Barricades were erected, the Deputies in vain en- 
deavouring to calm the rioters and to prevent a conflict 
with the troops. While negotiations were still in pro- 
gress shots were fired. The troops now threw them- 
selves upon the people ; there was a struggle, short in 
duration, but sanguinary and merciless; the barricades 
were captured, some hundreds of the insurgents slain, 
nd Ferdinand was once more absolute master of 
Naples. The Assembly was dissolved on the day after 
that on which it should have met. Orders were at once 
sent by the King to General Pepe, commander of the 
troops that were on the march to Lombardy, to return 
with his army to Naples. Though Pepe continued 
true to the national cause, and endeavoured to lead his 

58 MODERN EUROPE. 1843, 

army forward from Bologna in defiance of the King's 
instructions, his troops now melted away ; and when he 
crossed the Po and placed himself under the standard 
of Charles Albert in Venetia there remained with him 
scarcely fifteen hundred men.' 

It thus became clear before the end of May that 
the Lombards would receive no considerable help from 
the Southern States in their struggle for freedom, and 
that the promised league of the Governments in the 
national cause was but a dream from which there 
was a bitter awakening. Nor in Northern Italy itself 
was there the unity in aim and action without which 
success was impossible. The Republican party ac- 
cused the King and the Provisional Government at 
Milan of an unwillingness to arm the 

Negotiations as & 

people ; Charles Albert on his part regarded 
every Eepublican as an enemy. On entering Lombardy 
the King had stated that no question as to the political 
organisation of the future should be raised until the 
war was ended ; nevertheless, before a. fortress had been 
captured, he had allowed Modena and Parma to declare 
themselves incorporated with the Piedmontese mon- 
archy; and, in spite of Mazzini's protest, their example 
was followed by Lombardy and some Venetian districts. 
In the recriminations that passed between the Republi- 
cans and the Monarchists it was even suggested that 
Austria had friends of its own in certain classes of the 
population. This was not the view taken by the 
Viennese Government, which from the first appears to 
have considered its cause in Lombardy as virtually lost. 


The mediation of Great Britain was invoked by Metter- 
nich's successors, and a willingness expressed to grant 
to the Italian provinces complete autonomy under the 
Emperor's sceptre. Palmerston, in reply to the suppli- 
cations of a Court which had hitherto* cursed his influ- 
ence, urged that Lombardy and the greater part of 
Venetia should be ceded to the King of Piedmont. 
The Austrian Government would have given up Lom- 
bardy to their enemy ; they hesitated to increase his 
power to the extent demanded by Palmerston, the more 
so as the French Ministry was known to be jealous of 
the aggrandisement of Sardinia, and to desire the 
establishment of weak Eepublics like those formed in 
1796. Withdrawing from its negotiations at London, 
the Emperor's Cabinet now entered into direct commu- 
nication with the Provisional Government at Milan, 
and, without making any reference to Piedmont or 
Venice, offered complete independence to Lombardy. 
As the union of this province with Piedmont had 
already been voted by its inhabitants, the offer was at 
once rejected. Moreover, even if the Italians had shown 
a disposition to compromise their cause and abandon 
Venice, Badetzky would not have broken off the com- 
bat while any possibility remained of winning over 
the Emperor from the side of the peace-party. In 
reply to instructions directing him to offer an armistice 
to the enemy, he sent Prince Felix Schwarzenberg to 
Innsbruck to implore the Emperor to trust to the valour 
of his soldiers and to continue the combat. Already 
there were signs that the victory would ultimately be 


with Austria. Reinforcements had cut their way 
through the insurgent territory and reached Verona; 
and although a movement by which R.adetzky threatened - 
to sever Charles Albert's communications was frustrated 
by a second engagement at Groito, and Peschiera passed 
into the besiegers' hands, this was the last success won 
by the Italians. Throwing himself suddenly eastwards, 
Eadetzky appeared before Vicenza, and compelled this 
city, with the entire Papal army, commanded by 
General Durando, to capitulate. The fall 
venetia"june, of Vicenza was followed by that of the 

July. J 

other cities on the Venetian mainland till 
Venice alone on the east of the Adige defied the 
Austrian arms. As the invader pressed onward, an 
Assembly which Manin had convoked at Venice decided 
on union with Piedmont. Manin himself had been the 
most zealous opponent of what he considered the 
sacrifice of Venetian independence. He gave way 
nevertheless at the last, ;and made no attempt to fetter 
the decision of the Assembly; but when this decision 
had been given he handed >over the conduct of affairs to 
others, and retired for a while into private life, declining 
to serve under a king.* 

Charles Albert now renewed his attempt to wrest 
the central fortresses from the Austrians. 

Battle of Cns- 

zza,juiy25. Leaving half his army at Peschiera and 
farther north, he proceeded with the other half to 

* Ficquelmonfc, p. 6. Pillersdorff, KTachlass, 93. Helfert, iv. 142. 
Schonbals, p. 177. Parliamentary Papers, id. 332, 472, 597. Contarini, 
p. 67. Azeglio, Operazioni del Durando, p. 6. Manin, Documents, i. 
289. Bianchi, Diplomazia, v. 257. Pasolini, p. 100. 


blockade Mantua. .Radetzky took advantage of the un- 
skilful generalship of his opponent, and threw himself 
upon the weakly guarded centre of the long Sardinian line. 
The King perceived his error, and sought to unite with 
his the northern detachments, now separated from him 
by the Mincio. His efforts were baffled, and on the 
25th of July, after a brave resistance, his troops were 
defeated at Custozza. The retieat across the Mincio 
was conducted in fair order, but disasters sustained by 
the northern division, which should have held the 
enemy in check, destroyed all hope, and the retreat then 
became a flight. Eadetzky followed in close pursuit. 
Charles Albert entered Milan, but declared himself 
unable to defend the city. A storm of indignation 
broke out against the unhappy King amongst the 
Milanese, whom he was declared to have betrayed. 
The palace where he had taken up his quarters was 
besieged by the mob ; his life was threatened ; and he 
escaped with difficulty on the night of August 5th 
under the protection of General La Marmora and a few 
faithful Guards. A capitulation was signed, and as the 
Piedmontese army evacuated the city Radetzky 's troops 
entered it in triumph. Not less than sixty 
thousand of the inhabitants, according to enter Mu^aT 

* Aug. 6. 

Italian statements, abandoned their homes 
and sought refuge in Switzerland or Piedmont rather 
than submit to the conqueror's rule. liadetzky could 
now have followed his retreating enemy without diffi- 
culty to Turin, and have crushed Piedmont itself under 
foot ; but the fear of France and Great Britain checked 

62 MODE EN EUROPE. 1848. 

his career of victory, and hostilities were brought to a 
close by an armistice at Yigevano on August 9th.* >\> 

The effects of Kadetzky's triumph were felt in every 

province of the Empire. The first open expression 

given to the changed state of affairs was 

cou.t "nd nai the return of the Imperial Court from its 


refuge at Innsbruck to Vienna. The elec- 
tion promised in May had been held, and an Assembly 
representing all the non-Hungarian parts of the Mon- 
archy, with the exception of the Italian provinces, had 
been opened by the Archduke John, as representative 
of the Emperor, on the 22nd of July. Ministers and 
Deputies united in demanding the return of the Emperor 
to the capital. With Radetzky and Windischgratz 
within call, the Emperor could now with some con- 
fidence face his students and his Parliament. But of 
far greater importance than the return of the Court 
to Vienna was the attitude which it now assumed 
towards the Diet and the national Government of 
Hungary. The concessions made in April, inevitable 
as they were, had in fact raised Hungary to the 
position of an independent State. When such matters 
as the employment of Hungarian troops against Italy 
or the distribution of the burden of taxation came into 
question, the Emperor had to treat with the Hungarian 
Ministry almost as if it represented a foreign and a 
rival Power.. For some months this humiliation had to 

* Parliamentary Papers, 1849, Iviii. p. 128. Venice refused to ac- 
knowledge the armistice, and detached itself from Sardinia, restoring 
Manin to power. 

iwa HUNGARY. 63 

be borne, and the appearance of fidelity to the new 
Constitutional law maintained. But a deep, resentful 
hatred against the Magyar cause penetrated the circles 
in which the old military and official absolutism of 
Austria yet survived ; and behind the men and the 
policy still representing with some degree of sincerity 
the new order of things, there gathered the passions and 
the intrigues of a reaction that waited only for the 
outbreak of civil war within Hungary itself, and the 
restoration of confidence to the Austrian army, to draw 
the sword against its foe. Already, while Italy was 
still unsubdued, and the Emperor was scarcely safe in 
his palace at Vienna, the popular forces that might be 
employed against the Government at Pesth came into 

In one of the stormy sessions of the Hungarian 
Diet at the time when the attempt was first made to 
irr-pose the Magyar language upon Croatia the Illyrian 
leader, Gai, had thus addressed the Assembly : " You 
Magyars are an island in the ocean of Slavism. Take 
heed that its waves do not rise and overwhelm you." 
The agitation of the spring of 1848 first revealed in its 
full extent the peril thus foreshadowed. 
Croatia had for above a year been in almost southern ' 


open mutiny, but the spirit of revolt now 

spread through the whole of the Serb population of 

Southern Hungary, from the eastern limits of Slavonia,* 

* Slavonia itself was attached to Croatia ; Dalmatia also was claimed 
as a member of this triple Kingdom under the Hungarian Crown in virtue 
of ancient rights, though since its annexation in 1797 it had been governed 

64 MODERN EUROPE. 1848. 

across the plain known as the Banat beyond the junc- 
tion of the Theiss and the Danube, up to the borders 
of Transylvania. The Serbs had been welcomed into 
these provinces in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen- 
turies by the sovereigns of Austria as a bulwark against 
the Turks. Charters had been given to them, which 
were still preserved, promising them a distinct political 
administration under their own elected Voivode, and 
ecclesiastical independence under their own Patriarch of 
the Greek Church.* These provincial rights had fared 
much as others in the Austrian Empire. The Patriarch 
and the Voivode had disappeared, and the Banat had 
been completely merged in Hungary. Enough, how- 
ever, of Serb nationality remained to kindle at the sum- 
mons of 1848, and to resent with a sudden fierceness 
the determination of the Magyar rulers at Pesth that 
the Magyar language, as the language of State, should 
thenceforward bind together all the races of Hungary 
in the enjoyment of a common national life. The Serbs 
had demanded from Kossuth and his colleagues the 
restoration of the local and ecclesiastical autonomy of 
which the Hapsburgs had deprived them, and the recog- 
nition of their own national language and customs. They 
found, or believed, that instead of a German they were 
now to have a Magyar lord, and one more near, more 
energetic, more aggressive. Their reply to Kossuth's 

directly from Vienna, and in 1848 was represented in the Reichstag of 
Vienna, not in that of Pesth. 

* The real meaning of the Charters is, however, contested. Springer, 
ii. 281. Adlerstein, Archiv, i. 166. Helfert, ii. 255. Irduyi et Chasshi, 
i. 236. Die Serbische Wojwodschaftsfrage, p. 7. 

1848. CROATIA. 65 

defence of Magyar ascendency was the summoning of a 
Congress of Serbs at Carlowitz on the Lower 

TA -i i i i it it Serb Congress at 

Danube. Here it was declared that the cariowitz, May 


Serbs of Austria formed a free and inde- 
pendent nation under the Austrian sceptre and the com- 
mon Hungarian Crown. A Voivode was elected and the 
limits of his province were defined, A National Com- 
mittee was charged with the duty of organising a Govern- 
ment and of entering into intimate connection with the 
neighbouring Slavic Kingdom of Croatia. 

At Agram, the Croatian capital^ all established 
authority had sunk in the catastrophe of March, and a 
National Committee had assumed power. It happened 
that the office of Governor, or Ban, of Croatia was then 
vacant. The Committee sent a deputation j ellacicin 
to Vienna requesting that the colonel of 
the first Croatian regiment, Jellacic, might be ap- 
pointed. Without waiting for the arrival of the depu- 
tation, the Court, by a patent dated the 23rd of March, 
nominated Jellacic to the vacant post. The date of this 
appointment, and the assumption of office hy Jellacic 
on the 14th of April, the very day before the Hungarian 
Ministry entered upon its powers, have been considered 
proof that a secret understanding existed from the first 
between Jellacic and the Court. No further evidence 
of this secret relation has, however, been made public, 
and the belief long current among all friends of 
the Magyar cause that Croatia was deliberately insti- 
gated to revolt against the Hungarian Government by 
persons around the Emperor seems to rest on no solid 


foundation. The Croats would have been unlike all 
other communities in the Austrian Empire if they had 
not risen under the national impulse of 1848. They 
had been murmuring against Magyar ascendency for 
years past, and the fire long smouldering now probably 
burst into flame here as elsewhere without the touch of 
an incendiary hand. With regard to Jellacic's sudden 
appointment it is possible that the Court, powerless to 
check the Croatian movement, may have desired to 
escape the appearance of compulsion by spontaneously 
conferring office on the popular soldier, who was at least 
more likely to regard the Emperor's interests than the 
lawyers and demagogues around him. Whether Jellacic 
was at this time genuinely concerned for Croatian 
autonomy, or whether from the first, while he appar- 
ently acted with the Croatian nationalists, his deepest 
sympathies were with the Austrian army, and his sole 
design was that of serving the Imperial Crown with or 
without its own avowed concurrence, it is impossible to 
say. That, like most of his countrymen, he cordially 
hated the Magyars, is beyond doubt.' The general im- 
pression left by his character hardly accords with the 
Magyar conception of him as the profound and far- 
sighted conspirator; he would seem, on the contrary, 
to have been a man easily yielding to the impulses of 
the moment, and capable of playing contradictory parts 
with little sense of his own inconsistency.* 

* But see Kossuth, Schriften (1880) ii. 215, for a conversation between 
Jellacic and Batthyany, said to have been narrated to Kossuth by the 
latter. If authentic, this certainly proves Jellacic to have used the Slavic 
agitation from the first solely for Austrian ends. See alsoVitzthuin, p. 207. 

1343. JELLACIC. 67 

Installed in office, Jellacic cast to the winds all 
consideration due to the Emperor's personal engage- 
ments towards Hungary, and forthwith 
permitted the Magyar officials to be driven Croatia, April 
out of the country. On the $nd of May 
he issued an order forbidding all Croatian authorities 


to correspond with the Government at Pesth. Batthy- 
any, the Hungarian Premier, at once hurried to Vienna, 
and obtained from the Emperor a letter commanding 
Jellacic to submit to the Hungarian Ministry. As 
the Ban paid no attention to this mandate, General 
Hrabowsky, commander of the troops in the southern 
provinces, received orders from Pesth to annul all that 
Jellacic had done, to suspend him from his office, and 
to bring him to trial for high treason. Nothing 
daunted, Jellacic on his own authority convoked the 
Diet of Croatia for the 5th of June ; the populace of 
Agram, on hearing of Hrabowsky's mission, burnt the 
Palatine in effigy. This was a direct outrage on the 
Imperial family, and Batthyany turned it to account. 
The Emperor had just been driven from Vienna by the 
riot of the 15th of May. Batthyany sought him. at 
Innsbruck, and by assuring him of the support of his 
loyal Hungarians against both the Italians and the 
Viennese obtained his signature on June 10th to a 
rescript vehemently condemning the Ban's action and 
suspending him from office. Jellacic had already been 
summoned to appear at Innsbruck. Ho set out, taking 
with him a deputation of Croats and Serbs, and leaving 
behind him a popular Assembly sitting at Agram, in 
f 2 

68 MODERN EUROPE. isis. 

which, besides the representatives of Croatia, there 
were seventy Deputies from the Serb provinces. On 
the very day on which the Ban reached Innsbruck, the 
Imperial order condemning him and suspending him 
from his functions was published by Batthyany at 
Pesth. Nor was the situation made easier by the 
almost simultaneous announcement that civil war had 
broken out on the Lower Danube, and that General 
Hrabowsky, on attempting to occupy Carlowitz, had 
been attacked and compelled to retreat by the Serbs 
under their national leader Stratimirovic.* 

It is said that the Emperor Ferdinand, during 

deliberations in council on which the fate of the Austrian 

Empire depended, was accustomed to occupy 

Jellacic, the ri/ 

himself with counting the number of 

carriages that passed from right and left 
respectively under the windows. In the struggle be- 
tween Croatia and Hungary he appears to have avoided 
even the formal exercise of authority, preferring to 
commit the decision between the contending parties to 
the Archduke John, as mediator or judge. John was 
too deeply immersed in other business to give much 
attention to the matter. What really passed between 
Jellacic and the Imperial family at Innsbruck is un- 
known. The official request of the Ban was for the 
withdrawal or suppression of the rescript signed by the 
Emperor on June 10th. Prince Esterhazy, who repre- 
sented the Hungarian Government at Innsbruck, was 

* Adlerstein, Archiv, i. 146, 156. Klapka, Ermnemngen, p. 30. 
Jranyi et Chassin, i. 344. Serbische Bewegung, p. 106. 

1848. JELLAGW. 69 

ready to make this concession ; but before the document 
could be revoked, it had been made public by Batthyany. 
With the object of proving his fidelity to the Court, 
Jellacic now published an address to the Croatian 
regiments serving in Lombardy, entreating them not 
to be diverted from their duty to the Emperor in the 
field by any report of danger to their rights and their 
nationality nearer home. So great was Jellacic's influ- 
ence with his countrymen that an appeal from him of 
opposite tenor would probably have caused the Croatian 
regiments to quit Radetzky in a mass, and so have 
brought the war in Italy to an ignominious end. His 
action won for him a great popularity in the higher 
ranks of the Austrian army, and probably gained for him, 
even if he did not possess it before, the secret confidence 
of the Court. That some understanding now existed is 
almost certain, for, in spite of the unrepealed declara- 
tion of June 10th, and the postponement of the Arch- 
duke's judgment, Jellacic was permitted to return to 
Croatia and to resume his government. The Diet at 
Agram occupied itself with far-reaching schemes for a 
confederation of the southern Slavs ; but its discussions 
were of no practical effect, and after some weeks it was 
extinguished under the form of an adjournment. From 
this time Jellacic held dictatorial power. It was un- 
necessary for him in his relations with Hungary any 
longer to keep up the fiction of a mere defence of 
Croatian rights ; he appeared openly as the champion 
of Austrian unity. In negotiations which he held with 
Batthyiiny at Vienna during the last days of July, he 

70 MODERN EUROPE. 1848. 

demanded the restoration of single Ministries for War, 
Finance, and Foreign Affairs for the whole Austrian 
Empire. The demand was indignantly refused, and the 
chieftains of the two rival races quitted Vienna to pre- 
pare for war. 

The Hungarinn ^National Parliament, elected under 
the new Constitution, had been opened at Pesth on 
July 5th. Great efforts had been made, in view of the 
difficulties with Croatia and of the suspected intrigues 
between the Ban and the Court party, to induce the 
Emperor Ferdinand to appear at Pesth in 


A^& b S5i cen person. He excused himself from this on 
the ground of illness, but sent a letter to 
the Parliament condemning not only in his own name 
but in that of every member of the Imperial family 
the resistance offered to the Hungarian Government in 
the southern provinces. If words bore any meaning, 
the Emperor stood pledged to a loyal co-operation with 
the Hungarian Ministers in defence of the unity and 
the constitution of the Hungarian Kingdom as estab- 
lished by the laws of April. Yet at this very time the 
Minister of War at Vienna was encouraging Austrian 
officers to join the Serb insurgents. Kossuth, who con- 
ducted most of the business of the Hungarian Govern- 
ment in the Lower Chamber at Pesth, made no secret 
of his hostility to the central powers. While his col- 
leagues sought to avoid a breach with the other half 
of the Monarchy, it seemed to be Kossuth's object 
rather to provoke it. In calling for a levy of two 
hundred thousand men to crush the Slavic rebellion, 


he openly denounced the Viennese Ministry and the 
Court as its promoters. In leading the debate upon 
the Italian War, he endeavoured without the know- 
ledge of his colleagues to make the cession of the 
territory west of the Adige a condition of Hun- 
gary's participation in the struggle. As Minister of 
Imance, he spared neither word nor act to demon- 
strate his contempt for the financial interests of 
Austria. Whether a gentler policy on the part of 
the most powerful statesman in Hungary might have 
averted the impending conflict it is vain to ask ; but in 
the uncompromising enmity of Kossuth the Austrian 
Court found its own excuse for acts in which shameless- 
ness seemed almost to rise into political virtue. No 
sooner had Kadetzky's victories and the fall of Milan 
brought the Emperor back to Vienna than the new 
policy came into effect. The veto of the sovereign was 
'placed upon the laws passed by the Diet at Pesth for 
the defence of the kingdom. The Hungarian Grovern- 
ment was required to reinstate Jellacic in his dignities, 
to enter into negotiations at Vienna with him and the 
Austrian Ministry, and finally to desist from all mili- 
tary preparations against the rebellious provinces. In 
answer to these demands the Diet sent a hundred of its 
members to Vienna to claim from the Emperor the 
fulfilment of his plighted word. The miserable man 
received them on the 9th of September with protesta- 
tions of his sincerity ; but even before the deputation 
had passed the palace-gates, there appeared in the 
official gazette a letter under the Emperor's own 

72 MODERN EUROPE. 1848. 

hand replacing Jellacic in office and acquitting him 

of every charge that had been brought against him. It 

was for this formal recognition alone that 

Jellacic restored 

He'marcSon 3 ' Jellacic had been waiting. On the llth 
of September he crossed the Drave with his 
army, and began his march against the Hungarian 

The Ministry now in office at Vienna was composed 

in part of men who had been known as reformers in the 

early days of 1848 ; but the old order was represented 

in it by Count Wessenberg, who had been 

Mission of Lam- 

Metternich's assistant at the Congress ot 

Vienna, and by Latour, the War Minister, 
a soldier of high birth whose career dated back to the 
campaign of Austerlitz. Whatever contempt might be 
felt by one section of the Cabinet for the other, its 
members were able to unite against the independence of 
Hungary as they had united against the independence 
of Italy. They handed in to the Emperor a memorial 
in which the very concessions to which they owed their 
own existence as a Constitutional Ministry were made a 
ground for declaring the laws establishing Hungarian 
autonomy null and void. In a tissue of transparent 
sophistries they argued that the Emperor's promise of a 
Constitution to all his dominions on the 15th of March 
disabled him from assenting, without the advice of his 
Viennese Ministry, to the resolutions subsequently 
passed by the Hungarian Diet, although the union 
between Hungary and the other Hereditary States had 

* Iranyi et Chassin, ii. 56. Codex der neuen Gesetze (Pesth), i, 7. 


from the first rested solely on the person of the 
monarch, and no German official had ever pretended to 
exercise authority over Hungarians otherwise than by 
order of the sovereign as Hungarian King. The pub- 
lication of this Cabinet memorial, which appeared in 
the journals at Pesth on the 17th or September, gave 
plain warning to the Hungarians that, if they were not 
to be attacked by Jellacic and the Austrian army simul- 
taneously, they must make some compromise with the 
Government at Vienna. Batthyany was inclined to 
concession, and after resigning office in consequence of 
the Emperor's desertion he had already re-assumed his 
post with colleagues disposed to accept his own pacific 
policy. Kossuth spoke openly of war with Austria aud 
of a dictatorship. As Jellacic advanced towards Pesth, 
the Palatine took command of the Hungarian army and 
marched southwards. On reacliing Lake Baloton, on 
whose southern shore the Croats were encamped, he 
requested a personal conference with Jellacic, and sailed 
to the appointed place of meeting. But he waited in 
vain for the Ban ; and rightly interpreting this rejec- 
tion of his overtures, he fied from the army and laid 
down his office. The Emperor now sent General Lam- 
berg from Vienna with orders to assume the supreme 
command alike over the Magyar and the Croatian 
forces, and to prevent an encounter. On the success of 
Lamberg's mission hung the last chance of reconcilia- 
tion between Hungary and Austria. Batthyany, still 
clinging to the hope of peace, set out for the camp in 
order to meet the envoy on his arrival. Lamberg, 


desirous of obtaining the necessary credentials from tlie 
Hungarian Government, made his way to Pesth. There 
he found Kossuth and a Committee of Six installed in 
power. Under their influence the Diet passed a resolu- 
tion forbidding Lamberg to assume command of the 
Hungarian troops, and declaring him a traitor if he 
should attempt to do so. The report spread through 
Pesth that Lamberg had come to seize the citadel and 
bombard the town ; and before he could reach a place 
of sa^fcty he was attacked and murdered by a raging 
mob. It was in vain that Batthyany, who now laid 
down his office, besought the Government at Vienna to 
take no rash step of vengeance. The pretext for anni- 
hilating Hungarian independence had been given, and 
the mask was cast aside. A manifesto published by 
the Emperor on the 3rd of October declared the Hun- 
garian Parliament dissolved, and its acts null and void. 
Manifesto of Martial law was proclaimed, and Jellacic 

appointed commander of all the forces and 
representative of the sovereign. In the course of the 
next few days it was expected that he would enter 
Pesth as conqueror. 

" In the meantime, however confidently the Govern- 
ment might reckon on Jellacic's victory, the passions of 
revolution were again breaking loose in Vienna itself. 
Increasing misery among the poor, financial panics, the 

reviviner efforts of professional agitators, had 

Tumult of Oct. 6 

Latourm a ur- renewed the disturbances of the spring in 

forms which alarmed the middle classes 

almost as much as the holders of power. The conflict 

18P. VIENNA. 75 

of the Government with Hungary brought affairs to a 
crisis. After discovering the uselessness of negotiations 
with the Emperor, the Hungarian Parliament had sent 
some of its ablest members to request an audience from 
the Assembly sitting at Vienna, in order that the re- 
presentatives of the western half of the Empire might, 
even at the last moment, have the opportunity of pro- 
nouncing a judgment upon the action of the Court. 
The most numerous group in the Assembly was formed 
by the Czech deputies from Bohemia. As Slavgpthe 
Bohemian deputies had sympathised with the Croats 
and Serbs in their struggle against Magyar ascendency, 
and in their eyes Jellacic was still the champion of a 
national cause. Blinded by their sympathies of race to 
the danger involved to all nationalities alike by the 
restoration of absolutism, the Czech majority, in spite 
of a singularly impressive warning given by a leader of 
the German Liberals, refused a hearing to the Hun- 
garian representatives. The Magyars, repelled by the 
Assembly, sought and found allies in the democracy of 
Vienna itself. The popular clubs rang with acclama- 
tions for the cause of Hungarian freedom and with 
invectives against the Czech instruments of tyranny. 
In the midst of this deepening agitation tidings arrived 
at Vienna that Jellacic had been repulsed in his march 
on Pesth and forced to retire within the Austrian 
frontier. It became necessary for the Viennese Govern- 
ment to throw its own forces into the struggle, and an 
order was given by Latour to the regiments in the 
capital to set out for the scene of warfare. This order 


had, however, been anticipated by the democratic, 
leaders, and a portion of the troops had been won over 
to the popular side. Latour's commands were resisted ; 
and upon an attempt being made to enforce the depar- 
ture of the troops, the regiments fired on one another 
(October 6th). The battalions of the National Guard 
which rallied to the support of the Government were 
overpowered by those belonging to the working men's 
districts. The insurrection was victorious ; the Minis- 
ters submitted once more to the masters of the streets, 
and the orders given to the troops were withdrawn. 
But the fiercer part of the mob was not satisfied with a 
political victory. There were criminals and madmen 
among its leaders who, after the offices of Government 
had been stormed and Latour had been captured, 
determined upon his death. It was in vain that some 
of the keenest political opponents of the Minister 
sought at the peril of their own lives to protect him 
from his murderers. He was dragged into the court in 
front of the War Office, and there slain with ferocious 
and yet deliberate barbarity.* 

The Emperor, while the city was still in tumult', 

had in his usual fashion promised that the popular 

The Emperor at demands should be satisfied; but as soon as 

he was unobserved he fled from Vienna, and 

in his flight he was followed by the Czech deputies and 

* Adlerstein, ii. 296. Helferf, Geschichte Oesterreichs, i. 79, ii. 192. 
Dunder, p. 77. Springer, ii. 520. "Vitzthum, p. 143. Kossuth, Scliriften 
(1881), ii. 284. Reschauer, ii. 563. Pillersdorff, Nachlass, p. 163. Iraiiji 
et Chassin, ii. 98. 


maoy German Conservatives, who declared that their 
lives were no longer safe in the capital. Most of the 
Ministers gathered round the Emperor at Olmiitz in 
Moravia ; the Assembly, however, continued to hold its 
sittings in Vienna, and the Finance Minister, apparently 
under instructions from the Court, remained at his post, 
and treated the Assembly as still possessed of legal 
powers. But for all practical purposes the western half 
of the Austrian Empire had now ceased to have any 
Government whatever; and the real state of affairs was 
bluntly exposed in a manifesto published by Count 
Windischgratz at Prague on the llth of October, in 
which, without professing to have received any commis- 
sion from the Emperor, he announced his 

. , . . p , . -,-... . , "Windischgratz 

intention ot marching on Vienna in order marches on 


to protect the sovereign and maintain the 
unity of the Empire. In due course the Emperor 
ratified the action of his energetic soldier ; Windischgratz 
was appointed to the supreme command over all the 
troops of the Empire with the exception of Kadetzky's 
army, an.d his march against Vienna was begun. 

To the Hungarian Parliament, exasperated by the 
decree ordering its own dissolution and the war openly 
levied against the country by the Court in 


alliance with Jellacic, the revolt of the capi- ^cnnZoct. 
tal seemed to bring a sudden deliverance 
from all danger. The Viennese had saved Hungary, 
and the Diet was willing, if summoned by the Assembly 
at Vienna, to send its troops to the defence of the capital. 
But the urgency of.the need was iiot understood on either 

78 MODERN EUROPE. 1848. 

side till too late. The Viennese Assembly, treating it- 
self as a legitimate and constitutional power threatened 
by a group of soldiers who had usurped the monarch's 
authority, hesitated to compromise its legal character 
by calling in a Hungarian army. The Magyar generals 
on the other hand were so anxious not to pass beyond 
the strict defence of their own kingdom, that, in the ab- 
sence of communication from a Viennese authority, they 
twice withdrew from Austrian soil after following 
Jellacic in pursuit beyond the frontier. It was not 
until Windischgratz had encamped within sight of 
Vienna, and had detained as a rebel the envoy sent to 
him by the Hungarian Government, that Kossuth's 
will prevailed over the scruples of weaker men, and 
the Hungarian army marched against the besiegers. 
In the meantime Windischgratz had begun his attack 
on the suburbs, which were weakly defended by the 
National Guard and by companies of students and 
volunteers, the nominal commander being one Messen- 
hauser, formerly an officer in the regular army, who 
was assisted by a soldier of far greater merit than 
himself, the Polish general Bern. Among those who 
fought were two members of the German Parliament of 
Frankfort, Kobert Blum and Frobel, who had been sent to 
mediate between the Emperor and his subjects, but had 
remained at Vienna as combatants. The besiegers had 
captured the outskirts of the city, and negotiations for 
surrender were in progress, when, on the 30th of 
October, Messenhauser from the top of the cathedral 
tower saw beyond the line of the besiegers on the 


south-east the smoke of battle, and announced that the 
Hungarian army was approaching. An engagement 
had in fact begun on the plain of Schwechat between 
the Hungarians and Jellacic, reinforced by divisions of 
Windischgratz' troops. In a moment of wild excite- 
ment the defenders of the capital threw themselves once 
more upon their foe, disregarding the offer of surrender 
that had been already made. But the tide of battle at 
Schwechat turned against the Hungarians. They were 
compelled to retreat, and Windischgratz, reopening his 
cannonade upon the rebels who were also violators of 
their truce, became in a few hours master of Vienna. 
He made his entry on the 31st of October, and treated 
Vienna as a conquered city. The troops had behaved 
with ferocity during the combat in the suburbs, and 
slaughtered scores of unarmed persons. No Oriental 
tyrant ever addressed his fallen foes with greater insolence 
and contempt for human right than Windischgratz in 
the proclamations which, on assuming government, he 
addressed to the Viennese ; yet, whatever might be the 
number of persons arrested and imprisoned, the number 
now put to death was not great. The victims were in- 
deed carefully selected; the most prominent being Robert 
Blum, in whom, as a leader of the German Liberals and 
a Deputy of the German Parliament inviolable by law, 
the Austrian Government struck ostentatiously at the 
Parliament itself and at German democracy at large. 

In the subjugation of Vienna the army had again 
proved itself the real political power in Austria ; but 
the time had not yet arrived when absolute government 

80 MODERN EUROPE. 1848. 

could be openly restored. The Bohemian deputies, 

fatally as they had injured the cause of constitutional 

rule by their secession from Vienna, were 

The Parliament , 1 1 n r* 1 

atKremsier, still in earnest in the cause or provincial 

Nov. 22. 

autonomy, and would vehemently have re- 
pelled the charge of an alliance with despotism. Even 
the mutilated Parliament of Vienna had been recog- 
nised by the Court as in lawful session until the 22nd 
of October, when an order was issued proroguing the 
Parliament and bidding it re-assemble a month later at 
Kremsier, in Moravia. There were indications in the 
weeks succeeding the fall of Vienna of a conflict between 
the reactionary and the more liberal influences sur- 
rounding the Emperor, and of an impending coup d'etat : 
but counsels of prudence prevailed for the moment ; 
the Assembly was permitted to meet at Kremsier, 
and professions of constitutional principle were still 
made with every show of sincerity. A new Ministry, 
schwarzenberg however, came into office, with Prince 

Felix Schwarzenberg at its head. Schwarz- 
enberg belonged to one of the greatest Austrian families. 
He had been ambassador at Naples when the revolu- 
tion of 1848 broke out, and had quitted the city with 
words of menace when insult was offered to the 
Austrian flag. Exchanging diplomacy for war, he 
served under Eadetzky, and was soon recognised as 
the statesman in whom the army, as a political power, 
found its own peculiar representative. His career had 
hitherto been illustrated chiefly by scandals of private 
life so flagrant that England and other countries where 

1818. 8CHWARZENSERG. 81 

he had held diplomatic posts had insisted on his re- 
moval; hut the cynical and reckless audacity of the 
man rose in his new calling as Minister of Austria to 
something of political greatness. Few statesmen have 
been more daring than Schwarzenberg ; few have pushed 
to more excessive lengths the advantages to be derived 
from the moral or the material weakness of an adver- 
sary. His rule was the debauch of forces respited in 
their extremity for one last and worst exertion. Like 
the Bom an Sulla, he gave to a condemned and perishing 
cause the passing semblance of restored vigour, and 
died before the next great wave of change swept his 
creations away, j 

Schwarzenberg's first act was the deposition of his 
sovereign. The imbecility of the Emperor Ferdinand 
had long suggested his abdication or dethronement, and 
the time for decisive action had now arrived. He 
gladly withdrew into private life : the crown, declined 
by his brother and heir, was passed on to 

J Ferdinand abli- 

his nephew, Francis Joseph, a youth of R&fjkJjii 
eighteen. This prince had at least not 
made in person, not uttered with his own lips, not 
signed with his own hand, those solemn engagements 
with the Hungarian nation which Austria was now 
about to annihilate with fire and sword. He had not 
moved in friendly intercourse with men who were hence- 
forth doomed to the scaffold. He came to the throne 
as little implicated in the acts of his predecessor as 
any nominal chief of a State could be ; as fitting an 
instrument in the hands of Court and army as any 


reactionary faction could desire. Helpless and well- 
meaning, Francis Joseph, while his troops poured into 
Hungary, played for a while in Austria the part of a 
loyal observer of his Parliament; then, when the moment 
had come for its destruction, he obeyed his 

Dissolution of " 

pSment, er soldier-minister as Ferdinand had in earlier 
days obeyed the students, and signed the 
decree for its dissolution (March 4, 1849). The Assem- 
bly, during its sittings at Vienna, had accomplished one 
important task : it had freed the peasantry from the 
burdens attaching to their land and converted them into 
i independent proprietors. This part of its work sur- 
vived it, and remained almost the sole gain that Austria 
derived from the struggle of 1848. After the removal 
to Kremsier, a Committee of the Assembly had been 
engaged with the formation of a Constitution for 
Austria, and the draft was now completed. In the course 
of debate something had been gained by the repre- 
sentatives of theGrerman and the Slavic races in the way of 
respect for one another's interests and prejudices ; some 
political knowledge had been acquired ; some approach 
made to an adjustment between the claims of the cen- 
tral power and of provincial autonomy. If the Consti- 
tution sketched at Kremsier had come into being, it 
would at least have given to Western Austria and to 
Galicia, which belonged to this half of the Empire, . a 
system of government based on popular desires and 
worthy, on the part of the Crown, of a fair trial. But, 
apart from its own defects from the monarchical point 
of view, this Constitution rested on the division of the 


Empire into two independent parts ; it assumed the 
separation of Hungary from the other Hereditary 
States; and of a separate Hungarian Kingdom the 
Minister now in power would hear no longer. That 
Hungary had for centuries possessed and maintained its 
rights ; that, with the single exception of the English, 
no nation in Europe had equalled the Magyars in the 
stubborn and unwearied defence of Constitutional law ; 
that, in an age when national spirit was far less hotly 
inflamed, the Emperor Joseph had well-nigh lost his 
throne and wrecked his Empire in the attempt to 
subject this resolute race to a centralised administration, 
was nothing to Schwarzenberg and the soldiers who 
were now trampling upon revolution. Hungary was 
declared to have forfeited by rebellion alike its ancient 
rights and the contracts of 1848, The dissolution of 
the Parliament of Kremsier was followed by 

J The Unitary 

the publication of an edict affecting to SHJiiSS! 


bestow a uniform and centralised Constitu- 
tion upon the entire Austrian Empire. All existing 
public rights were thereby extinguished ; and, inasmuch 
as the new Constitution, in so far as it provided .for a 
representative system, never came into existence, but 
remained in abeyance until it was formally abrogated in 
1851, the real effect of the Unitary Edict of March, 
1849, which professed to close the period of revolution 
by granting the same rights to all, was to establish 
absolute government and the rule of the sword through- 
out the Emperor's dominions. Provincial institutions 
giving to some of the German and Slavic districts a 

84 MODERN EUROPE. 1849. 

shadowy control of their own local affairs only marked 
the distinction between the favoured and the dreaded 
parts of the Empire. Ten years passed before freedom 
again came within sight of the Austrian peoples.* 

The Hungarian Diet, on learning of the transfer of 
the crown from Ferdinand to Francis Joseph, had re- 
fused to acknowledge this act as valid, on the ground 
that it had taken place without the consent of the 
Legislature, and that Francis Joseph had not been 
crowned King of Hungary. Ferdinand was 
treated as still the reigning sovereign, and 
the war now became, according to the Hungarian view, 

more than ever a war in defence of established right, 

inasmuch as the assailants of Hungary were not only 

violators of a settled constitution but agents of a 
usurping prince. The whole nation was summoned to 
arms; and in order that there might be no faltering 
at headquarters, the command over the forces on the 
Danube was given by Kossutlf to Gorgei, a young officer 
of whom little was yet known to the world but that 
he had executed Count Eugene Zichy, 'a powerful noble, 
for holding communications with Jellacic. It was the 
design of the Austrian Government to attack Hungary 
at once by the line of the Danube and from the frontier 
of Galicia on the north-east. The Serbs were to be 
led forward from their border-provinces against the 
capital ; and another race, which centuries of oppres- 
sion had filled with bitter hatred of the Magyars, was 
to be thrown into the struggle. The mass of the 

* Codex der neuen Gesetze, i. 37. Helfert, iv. (3) 321. 


population of Transylvania belonged to the Eoumanian 
stock. The Magyars, here known by the 

O* 7 J TheRoumamans 

name of Czeklers, and a community of 
Germans, descended from immigrants who settled in 
Transylvania about the twelfth century, formed a small 
but a privileged minority, in whose presence the Rou- 
manian peasantry, poor, savage, and absolutely without 
political rights, felt themselves before 1848 scarcely 
removed from serfdom. In the Diet of Transylvania 
the Magyars held command, and in spite of the resist^ 
ance of the Germans, they had succeeded in carrying an 
Act, in May, 1848, uniting the country with Hungary. 
This Act had been ratified by the Emperor Ferdinand, 
but it was followed by a widespread insurrection of the 
Eoumanian peasantry, who were already asserting their 
claims as a separate nation and demanding equality with 
their oppressors. The rising of the Roumanians had 
indeed more of the character of an agrarian revolt than 
of a movement for national independence. It was 
marked by atrocious cruelty ; and . although the Haps- 
burg standard was raised, the Austrian commandant, 
General Puchner, hesitated long before lending the in- 
surgents his countenance. At length, in October, he 
declared against the Hungarian Government. The 
union of the regular troops with the peasantry over- 
powered for a time all resistance. The towns fell 
under Austrian sway, and although the Czeklers were 
not yet disarmed, Transylvania seemed to be lost to 
Hungary. General Puchner received orders to lead 
his troops, with the newly formed Roumanian militia, 

86 MODERN EUROPE. 1849. 

westward into the Banat, in order to co-operate in the 
attack which was to overwhelm the Hungarians from 
every quarter of the kingdom.* 

On the 15th of December, Windischgratz, in com- 
mand of the main Austrian army, crossed the river 
Leitha, the border between German and Magyar terri- 
tory. Gorgei, who was opposed to him, 
occupy Pesth had from the first declared that Pesth must 

Jan. 5, 1849. 

be abandoned and a war of defence carried 
on in Central Hungary. Kossuth, however, had scorned 
this counsel, and announced that he would defend Pesth 
to the last. The backwardness of the Hungarian pre- 
parations and the disorder of the new levies justified the 
young general, who from this time assumed the attitude 
of contempt and hostility towards the Committee of 
Defence. Kossuth had in fact been strangely served by 
fortune in his choice of Gorgei. He had raised him to 
command on account of one irretrievable act of severity 
against an Austrian partisan, and without any proof of 
his military capacity. In the untried soldier he had 
found a general of unusual skill ; -in the ' supposed 
devotee to Magyar patriotism he had found a military 
politician as self-willed and as insubordinate as any who 
have ever distracted the councils of a falling State. 
Dissensions and misunderstandings aggravated the 
weakness of the Hungarians in the field. Position 
after position was lost, and it soon became evident that 
the Parliament and Government could remain no longer 

* Revolutiouskrieg in Siebenburgen, i. 30. Helfert, 11. 207. Bra- 
tiano et Iranyi, Lettres Hongro-Roumaines, Adlersteiu, ii. 105. 


at Pesth. They withdrew to Debreczin beyond the 
Theiss, and on the 5th of January, 1849, Windischgratz 
made his entry into the capital.* 

The Austrians now supposed the war to be at an 
end. It was in fact but .beginning. The fortress of 
Comorn, on the Upper Danube, remained 
in the hands of the Magyars : and by con- Gowmmen* t 

Ot/ Debi-eczin. 

ducting his retreat northwards into a moun- 
tainous country where the Austrians could not follow 
him Gorgei gained the power either of operating against 
Windischgratz's communications or of combining with 
the army of General Klapka, who was charged with the 
defence of Hungary against an enemy advancing from 
Galicia. While Windischgratz remained inactive at 
Pesth, Klapka met and defeated an Austrian division 
under General Schlick which had crossed the Carpathians 
and was moving southwards towards Debreczin. Gorge) 
now threw himself eastwards upon the line of retreat ot 
the beaten enemy, and Schlick's army only escaped cap- 
ture by abandoning its communications and seeking 
refuge with Windischgratz at Pesth. A concentration of 
the Magyar forces was effected on the Theiss, and the 
command over the entire army was given by Kossuth to 
Dembinski, a Pole who had gained distinction in the 
wars of Napoleon and in the campaign of Kossuth and 
1831. Gorgei, acting as the representative 
of the officers who had been in the service before the 
Revolution, had published an address declaring that the 

* Klapka, Erinnerungen, p. 56. Helfert, iv. 199 ; Gorgei, Leben nnd 
Wirken, i. 145. Adlerstein, iii. 576, 648. 


army would fight for no cause but that of the Constitu- 
tion as established by Ferdinand, the legitimate King, 
and that it would accept no commands but those of the 
Ministers whom Ferdinand had appointed. Interpreting 
this manifesto as a direct act of defiance, and as a warn- 
ing that the army might under Gorgei's command 
make terms on its own authority with the Austrian 
Government, Kossuth resorted to the dangerous experi- 
ment of superseding the national commanders by a Pole 
who was connected with the revolutionary party through- 
out Europe. The act was disastrous in its moral effects 
upon the army ; and, as a general, Dembinski entirely 
failed to justify his reputation. After permitting 
Schlick's corps to escape him he moved forwards from 
the Theiss against Pesth. He was met by the Austrian s 
and defeated at Kapolna (February 20). Both armies 
retired to their earlier positions, and, after a declara- 
tion from the Magyar generals that they would no 
longer obey his orders, Dembinski was removed from 
his command, though he remained in Hungary to in- 
terfere once more with evil effect before the end of 
the war. 

The struggle between Austria and Hungary had 
reached this stage when the Constitution merging all 
The Austria^ provincial rights in one centralised system 

driven out of 

Hungary, April. was published by Schwarzenberg. The 
Croats, the Serbs, the Roumanians, who had so credu- 
lously flocked to the Emperor's banner under the belief 
that they were fighting for their own independence, at 
length discovered their delusion. Their enthusiasm 

1849. WAR IN HUNGARY. 89 

sank; the bolder among them even attempted to 
detach their countrymen from the Austrian cause ; but 
it was too late to undo what had already been 
done. Jellacic, now un distinguishable from any other 
Austrian general, mocked the politicians of A gram 
who still babbled of Croatian autonomy : Stratimirovic, 
the national leader of the Serbs, sank before his rival 
the Patriarch of Carlowitz, a Churchman who preferred 
ecclesiastical immunities granted by the Emperor of 
Austria to independence won on the field of battle by 
his countrymen. Had a wiser or more generous states- 
manship controlled the Hungarian Government in the 
first months of its activity, a union between the 
Magyars and the subordinate races against Viennese 
centralisation might perhaps even now have been 
effected. But distrust and animosity had risen too 
high for the mediators between Slav and Magyar to 
attain any real success, nor was any distinct promise of 
self-government even now to be drawn from the offers 
of concession which were held out at Debreczin. An 
interval of dazzling triumph seemed indeed to justify 
the Hungarian Government in holding fast to its 
sovereign claims. In the hands of able leaders no task 
seemed too hard for Magyar troops to accomplish, 
liem, arriving in Transylvania without a soldier, created 
a new army, and by a series of extraordinary marches 
and surprises not only overthrew the Austrian and 
Roumanian troops opposed to him, but expelled a 
corps of Russians whom General Puchner in his ex- 
tremity had invited to garrison Hermannstadt. Gorgei, 


resuming in the first week of April the movement in 
which Dembinski had failed, inflicted upon the Aus- 
trians a series ,of defeats that drove them back to the 
walls of Pesth ; while Klapka, advancing on Comorn, 
effected the relief of this fortress, and planted in the 
rear of the Austrians a force which threatened to cut 
them off from Vienna. It was in vain that the Austrian 
Government removed Windischgratz from his command. 
His successor found that a force superior to his own 
was gathering round him on every side. He saw that 
Hungary was lost ; and leaving a garrison in the 
fortress of Buda, he led off his army in haste from the 
capital, and only paused in his retreat when he had 
reached the Austrian frontier. 

The Magyars, rallying from their first defeats, had 

brilliantly achieved the liberation of their land. The 

Court of Vienna, attempting in right of 

Declaration of 

superior force to overthrow an established 

constitution, had proved itself the inferior 
power ; and in mingled exaltation and resentment it 
was natural that the party and the leaders who had 
been foremost in the national struggle of Hungary 
should deem a renewed union with Austria impos- 
sible, and submission to the Hapsburg crown an 
indignity. On the 19th of April, after the defeat 
of Windischgratz but before the evacuatibn of Pesth, 
the Diet declared that the House of Hapsburg 
had forfeited its throne, and proclaimed Hungary an 
independent State. No statement was made as to the 
future form of government, but everything indicated 


that Hungary, if successful in maintaining its inde- 
pendence, would become a Eepublic, with Kossuth, 
who was now appointed Governor, for its chief. Even 
in the revolutionary severance of ancient ties homage 
was paid to the legal and constitutional bent of the 
Hungarian mind. Nothing was said in the Declara- 
tion of April 19th of the rights of man; there was no 
Parisian commonplace on the sovereignty of the people. 
The necessity of Hungarian independence was deduced 
from the offences which, the Austrian House had 
committed against the written and unwritten law 
of the land, . offences continued through centuries 
and crowned by the invasion under Windischgratz, 
by the destruction of the Hungarian Constitution in 
the edict of March 9th, and by the introduction of the 
Bussians into Transylvania. Though coloured and 
exaggerated by Magyar patriotism, the charges made 
against the Hapsburg dynasty were on the whole in 
accordance with historical fact; and if the affairs of 
States \vere to be guided by no other considerations 
than those relating to the performance of contracts, 
Hungary had certainly established its right to be quit 
of partnership with Austria and of its Austrian sovereign. 
But the judgment of history has condemned Kossuth's 
declaration of Hungarian independence in the midst of 
the struggle of 1849 as a great political error. It 
served no useful purpose ; it deepened the antagonism 
already existing between the Government and a large 
part of the army ; and while it added to the sources of 
internal discord, it gave colour to the intervention of 

92 MODERN EUROPE. is* 1 . 

Russia as against a revolutionary cause. Apart from 
its disastrous effect upon the immediate course of events, 
it was based upon a narrow and inadequate view both 
of the needs and of the possibilities of the future. Even 
in the interests of the Magyar nation itself as a European 
power, it may well be doubted whether in severance from 
Austria such influence and such weight could possibly 
have been won by a race numerically weak and sur- 
rounded by hostile nationalities, as the ability and the 
political energy of the Magyars have since won for 
them in the direction of the accumulated forces of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. 

It has generally been considered a fatal error on the 

part of the Hungarian commanders that, after expelling 

the Austrian army, they did not at once 

Russian inter- , .-.-... -, , . -, 

vention against march upon Vienna, but returned to lay 


siege to the fortress of Buda, which re- 
sisted long enough to enable the Austrian Government 
to reorganise and to multiply its forces. But the inter- 
vention of Russia would probably have been fatal to Hun- 
garian independence, even if Vienna had been captured 
and a democratic government established there for a 
while in opposition to the Court at Olmiitz. The plan 
of a Eussian intervention, though this intervention was 
now explained by the community of interest between 
Polish and Hungarian rebels, was no new thing. 
Soon after the outbreak of the March Revolution the 
Czar had desired to send his troops both into Prussia 
and into Austria as the restorers of monarchical author- 
ity. His help was declined on behalf of the King 


of Prussia; in Austria the project had been discussed 
at successive moments of danger, and after the over- 
throw of the. Imperial troops in Transylvania by Bern 
the proffered aid was accepted. The Russians who 
then occupied Hermannstadt did not, however, enter 
the country as combatants ; their task was to garrison 
certain positions still held by the Austrians, and so to 
set free the Emperor's troops for service in the field. 
On the declaration of Hungarian independence, it be- 
came necessary for Francis Joseph to accept his pro- 
tector's help without qualification or disguise. An 
army of eighty thousand Russians marched across 
Gralicia to assist the Austrians in grappling with an 
enemy before whom, when single-handed, they had 
succumbed. Other Russian divisions, while Austria 
massed its troops on the Upper Danube, entered Tran- 
sylvania from the south and east, and the Magyars in 
the summer of 1849 found themselves compelled to 
defend their country against forces three times more 
numerous than their own.* 

When it became known that the Czar had deter- 
mined to throw all his strength into the scale, Kossuth 
saw that no ordinary operations of war could possibly 
avert defeat, and called upon his country- 

The summer 

men to destroy their homes and property at 

the approach of the enemy, and to leave to 

the invader a naming and devastated solitude. But 

the area of warfare was too vast for the execution of 

* Helfert, iv. (2) 326. Klapka, War in Hungary, i 23. Iranyi et 
Chassin, ii. 534. Gorgei, ii. 54. 

94 MODERN EUROPE. 1849. 

this design, even if the nation had been prepared for 
so desperate a course. The defence of Hungary was 
left to its armies, and Gorgei became the leading figure 
in the calamitous epoch that followed. While the 
Government prepared to retire to Czegedin, far in the 
south-east, Gorgei took post on the Upper Danube, to 
meet the powerful force which the Emperor of Austria 
had placed under the orders of General Haynau, a 
soldier whose mingled energy and ferocity in Italy had 
marked him out as a fitting scourge for the Hungarians, 
and had won for him supreme civil as well as military 
powers. Gorgei naturally believed that the first object 
of the Austrian commander would be to effect a junction 
with the Russians, who, under Paskiewitsch, the con- 
queror of Kars in. 1829, were now crossing the Car- 
pathians ; and he therefore directed all his efforts 
against the left of the Austrian line. While he was 
unsuccessfully attacking the enemy on the river Waag 
north of Comorn, Haynau with the mass of his forces 
advanced on the right bank of the Danube, and 
captured Raab (June 28th). Gorgei threw himself 
southwards, but his efforts to stop Haynau were 
in vain, and the Austrians occupied Pesth (July 
llth). The Russians meanwhile were advancing 
southwards by an independent line of march. Their 
vanguard reached the Danube and the Upper Theiss, 
and Gorgei seemed to be enveloped by the enemy. The 
Hungarian Government adjured him to hasten towards 
Czegedin and Arad, where Kossuth was concentrating 
all the other divisions for a final struggle ; but Gorgei 


held on to his position about Comorn until his retreat 
could only be effected by means of a vast detour north- 
wards, and before he could reach Arad all was lost. 
Dembinski was again in command. Charged with the 
defence of the passage of the Theiss abeut Czegedin, he 
failed to prevent the Austrians from crossing the river, 
and on the 5th of August was defeated at Czoreg with 
heavy loss. Kossuth now gave the command to Bern, 
who had hurried from Transylvania, where overpowering 
forces had at length wrested victory from his grasp. 
Bern fought the last battle of the campaign at Temes- 
var. He was overthrown and driven eastwards, but 
succeeded in leading a remnant of his army across the 
Moldavian frontier and so escaped capture. Gorgei, 
who was now close to Arad, had some 
strange fancy that it would dishonour his Viiagos, August 
army to seek refuge on neutral soil. He 
turned northwards so as to encounter Eussian and 
not Austrian regiments, and without striking a 
blow, without stipulating even for the lives of the 
civilians in his camp, he led. his army within the Rus- 
sian lines at Viiagos, and surrendered unconditionally 
to the generals of the Czar. His own life was spared ; 
no mercy was shown to those who were handed over as 
his fellow-prisoners by the Eussian to the Austrian 
Government, or who were seized by Haynau as his 
troops advanced. Tribunals more resem- Ven r e of 
bling those of the French Eeign of Terror 
than the Courts of a civilised Government sent the 
noblest patriots and soldiers of Hungary to the scaffold. 

93 MODERN EUROPE. 1849. 

To the deep disgrace of the Austrian Crown, Count 
Batthyany, the Minister of Ferdinand, was included 
among those whose lives were sacrificed. The ven- 
geance of the conqueror seemed the more frenzied and 
the more insatiable because it had only been rendered 
possible by foreign aid. Crushed under an iron rule, 
exhausted by war, the prey of a Government which knew 
only how to employ its subject-races as gaolers over one 
another, Hungary passed for some years into silence 
and almost into despair. Every vestige of its old con- 
stitutional rights was extinguished. Its territory was 
curtailed by the separation of Transylvania and Croatia; 
its administration was handed over to Germans from 
Vienna. A conscription, enforced not for the ends of 
military service but as the surest means of breaking 
the national spirit, enrolled its youth in Austrian regi- 
ments, and banished them to the extremities of the 
empire. No darker period was known in the history of 
Hungary since the wars of the seventeenth century 
than that which followed the catastrophe of 1849.* 

The gloom which followed Austrian victory was 
now descending not on Hungary alone but on Italy 
also. The armistice made between Eadetzky and the 
King of Piedmont at Vigevano in August, 
1848, lasted for seven months, during which 

March, 1849. 

the British and French Governments en- 
deavoured, but in vain, to arrange terms of peace be- 
tween the combatants. With military tyranny in its 

* Klapka, War, ii. 106. Erinnerungen, 58. Gorgei, ii. 373. Kossuth, 
Scliriften (1880), ii. 291. Codex der neuen Gesetze, i. 75, 105. 

isw. HOME. <)7 

most brutal form, crushing down Lombarly, it was 
impossible that Charles Albert should renounce the 
work of deliverance to which he had pledged himself. 
Austria, on the other hand, had now sufficiently re- 
covered its strength to repudiate the Concessions which 
it had offered at an earlier time, and Schwarzenberg on 
assuming power announced that the Emperor would 
maintain Lombardy at every cost. The prospects of 
Sardinia as regards* help from the rest of the Peninsula 
were far worse than when it took up arms in the spring 
of 1848. Projects of a general Italian federation, of a 
military union between the central States and Piedmont, 
of an Italian Constituent Assembly, had succeeded one 
another and left no v result. Naples had fallen back 
into absolutism ; Borne and Tuscany, from which aid 
might still have been expected, were distracted by in- 
ternal contentions, and hastening as it seemed towards 

-anarchy. After the defeat of Charles Albert at Cus- 
tozza, Pius IX., who was still uneasily playing his part 

-as a constitutional sovereign, had called to office Pelle- 
grino Rossi, an Italian patriot of an earlier time, who 
had since been ambassador of Louis Philippe at Home, 
and by his connection with the Orleanist Monarchy 
had incurred the hatred of the Republican 

i T, i T- Murder of Rossi, 

party throughout Italy. Rossi, as a vigorous NOV. 15. Flight 
and independent reformer, was as much de- 
tested in clerical and reactionary circles as he was by 
the demagogues and their followers. This, however, 
profited him nothing ; and on the 1 5th of November, 
as he was proceeding to the opening of the Chambers, 


he was assassinated by an unknown Land. Terrified 
by this crime, and by an attack upon his own palace by 
which it was followed, Pius fled to Gaeta and placed 
himself under the protection of the King of Naples. A 
Constituent Assembly was summoned,^ and 

Roman Repub- / 

uc, Feb. 9, 1849. & Republic proclaimed at Home, between 
which and the Sardinian Government there was so little 
.community of feeling that Charles Albert would, if the 
Pope had accepted his protection, have sent his troops 
to restore him to a position of security. In Tuscany 
affairs were in a similar condition. The Grand Duke 
had for some months been regarded as a sincere, though 
reserved, friend of the Italian cause, and he had even 
spoken of surrendering his crown if this should be for 
the good of the Italian nation. When, however, the 
Pope had fled to Gaeta, and the project was openly 
avowed of uniting Tuscany with the Roman 
States in a Republic, the Grand Duke, 
moved more by the fulminations of Pius against his 
despoilers than by care for his own crown, fled in his 
turn, leaving the Republicans masters of Florence. A 
miserable exhibition of vanity, riot, and braggadocio 
was given to the world by the politicians of the Tuscan 
State. Alike in Florence and in Rome all sense of the 
true needs of the moment, of the absolute uselessuess 
of internal changes of Government if Austria was to 
maintain its dominion, seemed to have vanished from 
men's minds. Republican phantoms distracted the heart 
and the understanding ; no soldier, no military adminis- 
trator arose till too late by the side of the rhetoricians 


and mob-leaders who filled the stage ; and when, on 
the 19th of March, the armistice was brought to a 
close in Upper Italy, Piedmont took the field alone.* 

The campaign which now began lasted but for 
five days. While Charles Albert scattered his forces 
from Lago Maggiore to Stradella on the south of the 
Po, hoping to move by the northern road upon Milan, 
Radetzky concentrated his troops near Pavia, where he 
intended to cross the Ticino. In an evil 

The March cnm- 

moment Charles Albert had given the com- 
mand of his army to Chrzanowski, a Pole, and had 
entrusted its southern division, composed chiefly of 
Lombard volunteers, to another Pole, Ramorino, who 
had been engaged in Mazzini's incursion into Savoy in 
1833. Kamorino had then, rightly or wrongly, incurred 
the charge of treachery. His relations with Chrzanow- 
ski were of the worst character, and the habit of mili- 
tary obedience was as much wanting to him as the 
sentiment of loyalty to the sovereign from whom 
he had now accepted a command. The wilfulness of 
this adventurer made the Piedmontese army an easy 
prey. Eamorino was posted on the south of the 
Po, near its junction with the Ticino, but received 
orders on the commencement of hostilities to move 
rorthwards and defend the passage of the Ticino at 
Pavia, breaking up the bridges behind him. Instead 
of obeying this order he kept his division lingering 
about Stradella. Eadetzky, approaching the Ticino at 

* Farini, ii. 404. Parl. Pap.. 1849, Ivii. 607 ; Iviii. (2) 117. Bianchi, 
Diplomazia, vi. 67. Gennarelli, Sventure, p. 29. Pasolini, p. 139. 

H 2 

100 MODERN EUROPE. 1819. 

Pavia, found the passage unguarded. He crossed the 
river with the mass of his army, and, cutting off Ramo- 
rino's division, threw himself upon the flank of the 
scattered Piedmontese. Charles Albert, whose head- 
quarters were at Novara, hurried southwards. Before 
he could concentrate his troops, he was attacked at 
Mortara by the Austrians and driven back. The line 
of retreat upon Turin and Alessandria was already 
lost ; an attempt was made to hold Novara against the 
advancing- Austrians. The battle which 

Battle of No- & 

23> was fought in front of this town on the 
23rd of March ended with the utter overthrow of the 
' Sardinian army. So complete was the demoralisation of 
the troops that the cavalry were compelled to attack 
bodies of half-maddened infantry in the streets of 
Novara in order to save the town from pillage.* 

Charles Albert had throughout the battle of the 
23rd appeared to seek death. The reproaches levelled 
against him for the abandonment of Milan in the 
previous year, the charges of treachery which awoke to 
new life the miserable record of his w'averings in 1821, 
had sunk into the very depths of his being. Weak 
and irresolute in his earlier political career, harsh and 
illiberal towards the pioneers of Italian freedom during 
a great part of his reign, Charles had thrown his whole 
heart and soul into the final struggle of his country 
against Austria. This struggle lost, life had nothing 


* Schonhals, p. 332. Parl. Pap., 1849, Iviii. (2) 216. Bianchi, Politica 
Austriaca, p. 134. Lamarmora, Un Episodic, p. 175. Portafogli di 
R/amorino, p. 41. Ramorino was condemned to death, and executed. 

1849. NO VARA. 101 

more for him. The personal hatred borne towards him 
by the rulers of Austria caused him to believe that 
easier terms of peace might be granted to A ^^ m ot 
Piedmont if another sovereign were on its 
throne, and his resolution, in case of defeat, was fixed 
and settled. When night fell after the battle of Novara 
he called together his generals, and in their presence 
abdicated his crown. Bidding an eternal farewell to his 
son Victor Emmanuel, who knelt weeping before him, 
he quitted the army accompanied by but one attendant; 
and passed unrecognised through the enemy's guards. 
He left his queen, his capital, unvisited as he journeyed 
into exile. The brief residue of his life was spent in 
solitude near Oporto. Six months after the battle of 
Novara he was carried to the grave. 

- It may be truly said of Charles Albert that nothing 
in his reign became him like the ending of it. Hope- 
less as the conflict of 1849 might well appear, it proved 
that there was one sovereign in Italy who was willing 
to stake his throne, his life, the whole sum of his per- 
sonal interests, for the national cause ; one dynasty 
whose sons knew no fear save that others should en- 
counter death before them on Italy's behalf. 
Had the profoundest statesmanship, the victor Emma- 

nuel's reign. 

keenest political genius, governed the coun- 
sels of Piedmont in 1849, it would, with full prescience 
of the ruin of Novara, have bidden the sovereign and 
the army strike in self-sacrifice their last unaided blow. 
From this time there was but one possible head for 
Italy. The faults of the Government of Turin during 


Charles Albert's years of peace had ceased to have any 
bearing on Italian affairs ; the sharpest tongues no 
longer repeated, the most credulous ear no longer 
harboured the slanders of 1848; the man who, beaten 
and outnumbered, had for hours sat immovable in 
front of the Austrian cannon at Novara had, in the 
depth of his misfortune, given to his son not the crown 
of Piedmont only but the crown of Italy. Honour, 
patriotism, had made the young Victor Emmanuel the 
hope of the Sardinian army; the same honour and 
patriotism carried him safely past the lures which Aus- 
tria set for the inheritor of a ruined kingdom, and gave 
in the first hours of his reign an earnest of the policy 
which was to end in Italian union. It was necessary 
for him to visit Radetzky in his camp in order to 
arrange the preliminaries of peace. There, amid flat- 
teries offered to him at his father's expense, it was 
notified to him that if he would annul the Constitution 
that his father had made, he might reckon not only on 
an easy quittance with the conqueror but on the friend- 
ship and support of Austria. This demand, though 
strenuously pressed in later negotiations, Victor Em- 
manuel unconditionally refused. He had to endure for 
a while the presence of Austrian troops in his kingdom, 
and to furnish an indemnity which fell heavily on so 
small a State ; but the liberties of his people remained 
intact, and the pledge given by his father inviolate. 
Amid the ruin of all hopes and the bankruptcy of all 
other royal reputations throughout Italy, there proved to 
be one man, one government, in which the Italian people 

1849. ROME. 103 

could trust. This compensation at least was given in 
the disasters of 1849, that the traitors to the cause of 
Italy and of freedom could not again deceive, nor the 
dream of a federation of princes again obscure the 
necessity of a single national government. In the 
fidelity of Victor Emmanuel to the Piedmontese Con- 
stitution lay the pledge that when Italy's next opportu- 
nity should arrive, the chief would be there who would 
meet the nation's need. 

The battle of Novara had not long been fought 
when the Grand Duke of Tuscany was restored to his 
throne under an Austrian garrison, and his 

Restoration in 

late democratic Minister, Guerazzi, who had 
endeavoured by submission to the Court-party to avert 
an Austrian occupation, was sent into imprisonment. 
At Rome a far bolder spirit was shown. Mazzini had 
arrived in the first week of March, arid, though his 
, exhortation to the Roman Assembly to for- 

* Rome and 

get the offences of Charles Albert and to 
unite against the Austrians in Lombardy came too late, 
he was able, as one of a Triumvirate with dictatorial 
powers, to throw much of his own ardour into the 
Roman populace in defence of their own city and State. 
The enemy against whom Rome had to be defended 
proved indeed to be other than that against whom pre- 
parations were being made. The victories of Austria 
had aroused the apprehension of the French Govern- 
ment ; and though the fall of Piedmont and Lombardy 
could not now be undone, it was determined by Louis 
Napoleon and his Ministers to anticipate Austria's 

104 MODERN EUROPE. 1849. 

restoration of the Papal power by the despatch of 
French troops to Rome. All the traditions of French 
national policy pointed indeed to such an intervention. 
Austria had already invaded the Roman States from the 
north, and the political conditions which in 1832 had 
led so pacific a minister as Casimir Perier to occupy 
Ancona were now present in much greater force. Louis 
Napoleon could not, without abandoning a recognised 
interest and surrendering something of the due influence 
of France, have permitted Austrian generals to conduct 
the Pope back to his capital and to assume the govern- 
ment of Central Italy. If the first impulses of the 
Revolution of 1848 had still been active in France, its 
intervention would probably have taken the form of a 
direct alliance with the T^oman Republic ; but public 
opinion had travelled far in the opposite direction since 
the Four Days of June ; and the new President, if he 
had not forgotten his own youthful relations with the 
Carbonari, was now a suitor for the solid favours of 
French conservative and religious sentiment. His 
Ministers had not recognised the Roman Republic. 
They were friends, no doubt, to liberty ; but when it 
was certain that the Austrians, the Spaniards, the Nea- 
politans, were determined to restore the Pope, it might 
be assumed that the continuance of the Roman Republic 
was an impossibility. France, as a Catholic and at the 
same time a Liberal Power, might well, under these 
circumstances, address itself to the task of reconciling 
Roman liberty with the inevitable return of the Holy 
Father to his temporal throne. Events were moving 


too fast for diplomacy; troops must be at once de- 
spatched, or the next French envoy, would find Radetzky 
on the Tiber: The misgivings of the Eepublican part 
of the Assembly at Paris were stilled by assurances of 
the generous intentions of the Government 

towards the Roman populations, and of its venon deter- 
mined on. 

anxiety to shelter them from Austrian do- 
mination. President, Ministers, and generals resolutely 
shut their eyes to the possibility that a French occupa- 
tion of Rome might be resisted by force by the Romans 
themselves ; and on the 2.2nd of April an armament of 
about ten thousand men set sail for Civita Vecchia 
under the command of General Oudinot, a son of the 
Marshal of that name. 

Before landing on the Italian coast, the French 
general sent envoys to the authorities at 
Civita Vecchia, stating- that his troops came csvita veccwa, 

April 25, 1849. 

%& friends, and demanding that they should 
be admitted into the town. The Municipal Council 
determined not to offer resistance, and the French thus 
gained a footing on Italian soil and a basis for their 
operations. Messages came from French diplomatists 
in Rome encouraging the general to advance without 
delay. The mass of the population, it was said, would 
welcome his appearance ; the democratic faction, if 
reckless, was too small to offer any serious resistance, 
and would disappear as soon as the French should enter 
the city. On this point, however, Oudinot was speedily 
undeceived. In reply to a military envoy who was 
sent to assure the Triumvirs of the benevolent designs 

306 MODERN EUROPE. 1849 

of the French, Mazzini bluntly answered that no re- 
conciliation with the Pope was possible ; and' on the 
26th of April the Roman Assembly called upon the 
Executive to repel force by force. Oudinot now 
proclaimed a state of siege at Civita Vecchia, seized 
the citadel, and disarmed the garrison. On the 28th 
he began his march on Rome. As he approached, 
energetic preparations were made for resistance. Gari- 
baldi, who had fought at the head of a 

Oudinot attacks p . , -, . , . TT 

Rome and is re- tree corps against the Austnans in U pper 

pelled, April 30. 

Italy in 1848, had now brought some hun- 
dreds of his followers to Rome. A regiment of Lom- 
bard volunteers, under their young leader Manara, had 
escaped after the catastrophe of Novara, and had come 
to fight for liberty in its last stronghold on Italian 
soil. Heroes, exiles, desperadoes from all parts of the 
Peninsula, met in the streets of Rome, and imparted to 
its people a vigour and resolution of which the world 
had long deemed them incapable. Even the remnant 
of the Pontifical Gruard took part in the work of de- 
fence. Oudinot, advancing with his little corps of 
seven thousand men, found himself, without heavy 
artillery, in front of a city still sheltered by its ancient 
fortifications, and in the presence of a body of com- 
batants more resolute than his own troops and twice as 
numerous. He attacked on the 30th, was checked at 
every point, and compelled to retreat towards Civita 
Vecchia, leaving two hundred and fifty prisoners in 
the hands of the enemy.* 

* Garibaldi, Epistolario, i. 33. Del Vecchio, L'assedio di Roma, p. 0. 

1819. LESSEPS. 107 

Insignificant as was this misfortune of the French 
arms, it occasioned no small stir in Paris and in the 
Assembly. The Government, which had declared that 
the armament Was intended only to protect 

French policy, 

Rome against Austria, was vehemently re- AP^-M"*- 
proached for its duplicity, and a vote was passed de- 
manding that the expedition should not be permanently 
diverted from the end assigned to it. Had the As- 
sembly not been on the verge of dissolution it would 
probably have forced upon the Government a real 
change of policy. A general election, however, was 
but a few days distant, and until the result of this 
election should be known the Ministry determined to 
temporise. M. Lesseps, since famous as the creator of 
the Suez Canal, was sent to Rome with instructions to 
negotiate for some peaceable settlement. More honest 
than his employers, Lesseps sought with heart and 
soul to fulfil. his task. While he laboured in city and 
camp, the French elections for which the President and 
Ministers were waiting took place, resulting in the 
return of a Conservative and reactionary majority. The 
new Assembly met on the 28th of May. In the course 
of the next few days Lesseps accepted terms proposed 
by the Roman Government, which would have pre- 
cluded the French from entering Rome. Oudinot, who 
had been in open conflict with the envoy throughout 
his mission, refused his sanction to the treaty, and the 

Yaillant, Siege de Rome, p. 12. Bianchi, Diplomazia, vi. 213. Guerzoni, 
Garibaldi, i. 266. Grariier de Cassagiiac, ii. 59. Lesseps, Memoire, p. 61. 
Barrot, iii. 191. Discours dc Napoleou III., p. 38. 

108 MODERN EUROPE. 1819. 

altercations between the general and the diplomatist 
were still at their height when despatches arrived 
from Paris announcing that the powers given to 
Lesseps were at an end, and ordering Oudinot to re- 
commence hostilities. The pretence of further negotia- 
tion would have heen out of place with the new Par- 
liament. On the 4th of June the French general, now 
strongly reinforced, occupied the positions necessary for 
a regular siege of Rome. 

Against the forces now brought into action it was 
impossible that the Roman Republic could long defend 
itself. One hope remained, and that was in a revo- 
lution within France itself. The recent 
smrection in elections had united on the one side all 

1 ranee, June 13. 

Conservative interests, on the other the 
Socialists and all the more extreme factions of the 
Republican party. It was determined that a trial of 
strength should first be made within the Assembly 
itsel-upon the Roman question, and that, if the majority 
there should stand firm, an appeal should be made to 
insurrection. Accordingly on the llth of June, after 
the renewal of hostilities had been announced in Paris, 
(. /, Ledru Rollin demanded the impeachment of the Minis- 
1 try. His motion was rejected, and the signal was 
given for an outbreak not only in the capital but in 
Lyons and other cities. But the Government were on 
their guard, and it was in vain that the resources of 
revolution were once more brought into play. General 
Changarnier suppressed without bloodshed a tumult in 
Paris on June 13th; and though fighting took place 


at Lyons, the insurrection proved feeble in comparison 
with the movements of the previous year. Louis Napo- 
leon and his Ministry remained unshaken, and the siege 
of Eome was accordingly pressed to its conclusion. 
Oudinot, who at the beginning of the month had carried 
the positions held by the Roman troops outside the 
walls, opened fire with heavy artillery on the 14th. 
The defence was gallantly sustained by Garibaldi and 
his companions until the end of the month, when the 
breaches made in the walls were stormed by the enemy, 
and further resistance became impossible. The French 
made their entry into Rome on the 3rd of July, Gari- 
baldi leading his troops northwards in order 
to prolong the struggle with the Austrians enter Rome, 
who were now in possession of Bologna, and, 
if possible, to reach Venice, which was still uncaptured. 
Driven to the eastern coast and surrounded by the 
f>nemy, he was forced to put to sea. He landed again, 
but only to be hunted over mountain and forest. His, 
wife died by his side. Rescued by the devotion of 
Italian patriots, he made his escape to Piedmont and 
thence to America, to reappear in all the fame of his 
heroic deeds and sufferings at the next great crisis in 
the history of his country. 

It had been an easy task for a French army to con- 
quer Rome; it was not so easy for the French 'Govern- 
ment to escape from the embarrassments 
of its victory. Liberalism was still the official Pontifical 

<f Government. 

creed of the Republic, and the protection of 

the Roman population from a reaction under Austrian 

110 MODERN EUROPE. isto. 

auspices had been one of the alleged objects of the 
Italian expedition. No stipulation had, however, been 
made with the Pope during the siege as to the future 
institutions of Rome ; and when, on the 14th of July, 
the restoration of Papal authority was formally an- 
nouuced by Oudinot, Pius and his Minister Antonelli 
still remained unfettered by any binding engagement. 
Nor did the Pontiff show the least inclination to place 
himself in the power of his protectors. He remained 
at Gaeta, sending a Commission of three Cardinals to 
assume the government of Rome. The first acts of 
the Cardinals dispelled any illusion that the French 
might have formed as to the docility of the Holy See. 
In the presence of a French Republican army they 
restored the Inquisition, and appointed a Board to 
bring to trial all officials compromised in the events 
that had taken place since the murder of Rossi in 
November, 1848. So great was the impression made 
on public opinion by the action of the Cardinals that 
Louis Napoleon considered it well to enter the lists in 
person on behalf of Roman liberty ; and in a letter to 
Colonel Ney, a son of the Marshal, he denounced in 
language of great violence the efforts that were being 
made by a party antagonistic to France to base the 
Pope's return upon proscription and tyranny. Strong 
in the support of Austria and the other Catholic Powers, 
the Papal Government at Gaeta received this menace 
with indifference, and even made the discourtesy of the 
President a ground for withholding concessions. Of 
the re-establishment of the Constitution granted by 

1819. ROME. Ill 

Pius in 1843 there was now no question; all that the 
French Ministry could hope was to save some frag- 
ments in the general shipwreck of representative govern- 
ment, and to avert the vengeance that seemed likely to 
fall upon the defeated party. A Pontifical edict, known 
as the Motu PropnV ultimately bestowed upon the 
municipalities certain local powers, and gave to a Coun- 
cil, nominated by the Pope from among the persons 
chosen by the municipalities, the right of consultation 
on matters of finance. More than this Pius refused to 
grant, and when he returned to Rome it was as an 
absolute sovereign. In its efforts on behalf of the large 
body of persons threatened with prosecution the French 
Government was more successful. The so-called am- 
nesty which was published by Antonelli with the Motu 
Proprio seemed indeed to have for its object the classi- 
fication of victims rather than the announcement of 
pardon ; but under pressure from the French the ex- 
cepted persons were gradually diminished in number, 
and all were finally allowed to escape other penalties 
by going into exile. To those who were so driven from 
their homes Piedmont offered a refuge. 

Thus the pall of priestly absolutism and misrule 
fell once more over the Roman States, and the deeper 
the hostility of the educated classes to the restored 
power the more active became the system of repression.- 
For liberty of person there was no security whatever, 
and, though the offences of 1848 were now professedly 
amnestied, the prisons were soon thronged with persons 
arrested on indefinite charges and detained for an 



unlimited time without trial. Nor was Rome more unfor- 
Faii of Venice tunate in its condition than Italy generally. 

The restoration of Austrian authority in 
the north was completed by the fall of Venice. For 
months after the subjugation of the mainland, Venice, 
where the E-epublic had again been proclaimed and 
Manin had been recalled to power, had withstood all 
the efforts of the Emperor's forces. Its hopes had been 
raised by the victories of the Hungarians, which for a 
moment seemed almost to undo the catastrophe of 
Novara. But with the extinction of all possibility of 
Hungarian aid the inevitable end came in view. 
Cholera and famine worked with the enemy ; and a 
fortnight after Gorgei had laid down his arms at 
Vilagos the long and honourable resistance of Venice 
ended with the entry of the Austrians (August 25th). 
In the south, Ferdinand of Naples was again ruling as 

despot throughout the full extent of his 

by 1 emand, dominions. Palermo, which had struck the 

April, May. 

first blow for freedom in 1848, had soon 
afterwards become the seat of a Sicilian Parliament, 
which deposed the Bourbon dynasty and offered the 
throne of Sicily to the younger brother of Victor 
Emmanuel. To this Ferdinand replied by sending 
a fleet to Messina, which bombarded that city for five 
days and laid a great part of it in ashes. His violence 
caused the British and French fleets to interpose, and 
hostilities were suspended until the spring of 1849, the 
Western Powers ineffectually seeking to frame some 
compromise acceptable at once to the Sicilians and to 


the Bourbon dynasty. After the triumph of Radetzky 
at Novara and the rejection by the Sicilian Parliament 
of the offer of a separate constitution and administra- 
tion for the island, Ferdinand refused to remain any 
longer inactive. His fleet and army rapved southwards 
from Messina, and a victory won at the foot of Mount 
Etna over the Sicilian forces, followed by the capture of 
Catania, brought the struggle to a close. The Assembly 
at Palermo dispersed, and the Neapolitan troops made 
their entry into the capital without resistance on the 
15th of May. It was in vain that Great Britain now 
urged Ferdinand to grant to Sicily the liberties which 
he had hitherto professed himself willing to bestow. 
Autocrat he was, and autocrat he intended to remain. 
Ou the mainland the iniquities practised by his agents 
seem to have been even worse than in Sicily, where at 
least some attempt was made to use the powers of the 
State for the purposes of material improvement. For 
those who had incurred the enmity of Ferdinand's 
Government there was no law and no mercy. Ten 
years of violence and oppression, denounced by the 
voice of freer lands, had still to be borne by the subjects 
of this obstinate tyrant ere the reckoning-day arrived, 
and the deeply rooted jealousy between Sicily and 
N;i pies, which had wrought so much ill to the cause 
of Italian freedom, was appeased by the fall of the 
Bourbon throne.* -^L 

We have thus far traced the stages of conflict 

* Manin, Documents, ii. 340. Perlbach, Manin, p. 37. Gennarelli, 
Governo Poutificio, i. 32. Contariui, p. 224. 



between the old monarchical order and the forces of 
Germany from revolution in the Austrian empire and in 

that Mediterranean land whose destiny was 
so closely interwoven with that of Austria. We have 
now to pass back into Germany, and to resume the 
history of the German revolution at tne point where 
the national movement seemed to concentrate itself in 
visible form, the opening of the Parliament of Frank- 
fort on the 18th of May, 1848. That an Assembly 

representing the entire German people, 

The National . 

Assembly at elected in unbounded enthusiasm and com- 


prising within it nearly every man of poli- 
tical or intellectual eminence who sympathised with the 
national cause, should be able tc|| impose its will upon 
the tottering Governments of the individual German 
States, was not an unnatural belief in the circum- 
stances of the moment. No second Chamber represented 
the interests of the ruling Houses, nor had they within 
the Assembly itself the organs for the expression of 
their own real or unreal claims. With all the freedom 
of a debating club or of a sovereign authority like the 
French Convention, the Parliament of Frankfort entered 
upon its work of moulding Germany afresh, limited 
only by its own discretion as to what it should make 
matter of consultation with any other power./ There 
were thirty-six Governments in Germany, and to 
negotiate with each of these on the future Constitu- 
tion might well seem a harder task than to enforce a 
Constitution on all alike. In the creation of a pro- 
visional executive authority there was something of the 


same difficulty. Each of the larger States might, if 
consulted, resist the selection of a provisional chief from 
one of its rivals ; and though the risk of bold action 
was not denied, the Assembly, on the instance of its 
President, Von Gagern, a former* Minister of Hesse- 
Darmstadt, resolved to appoint an Administrator oj: 
the Empire by a direct vote of its own. The 
Archduke John of Austria, long known as an enemy 
of Metternich's system of repression and as a patron 
of the idea of German union, was chosen Adminis- 
trator, and he accepted the office. Prussia and the 
other States acquiesced in the nomination, though 
the choice of a Hapsburg prince was 

-. i j i -rt ^ Archduke John 

unpopular with the Prussian nation and chosen Admims- 

trator, June 29. 

army, and did not improve the relations 
between the Frankfort Assembly and the Court of 
Berlin.* Schmerling, an Austrian, was placed at the 
head of the Archduke's Ministry. 

,/^In the preparation of a Constitution for Germany 
the Assembly could draw little help from the work of 
legislators in other countries. Belgium, whose institu- 
tions were at once recent and successful, 
was not a Federal State ; the founders of the A^embiyT 

May Sept. 

American Union had not had to reckon with 
four kings and to include in their federal territory part 
of the dominions of an emperor. Instead of grappling 
at once with the formidable difficulties of political 

* Verhandlungen der National Versammlung, i. 576. Radowitz, Werke, 

iii. 369. Briefwechsel Friedrick Wilhelms, p. 205. Biedennann, Dreissig 
Jahre, i. 295. 

/ 2 

116 MODERN EUROPE. isia 

organisation, the Committee charged with the drafting_ 
of a Constitution determined first to lay dowrTtheprj 
ciples of^civil right which were to Be~The~^Dasis of the 
German^-eomtn^n^ealth^ There" was some^lnng^oTThe 
scientific" "spirit of the Germans in thus working out the 
substructure of public law on which all other institu- 
tions were to rest ; moreover, the remembrance of the 
Decrees of Carlsbad and of the other exceptional legis- 
lation from which Germany had so heavily suffered ex- 
cited a strong demand for the most solemn guarantees 
against arbitrary departure from settled law in the 
future. Thus, regardless of the absence of any material 
power by which its conclusions were to be enforced, the 
Assembly, m-the. jnteryals between its storrny_debates 
on the politics of the hour, traced with philosophic 
thoroughness the cohsegneiroes of the 

i personal "IrberEy and of equality before the law, and 
fashioned the order of a modern society in which pri- 
vileges of class, diversity of jurisdictions, and the tram- 
mels of feudalism on industrial life were alike swept 
away. Four months had passed, and the discussion of 
hlTsb- called Primary Rights was still unfinished, when 
the Assembly was warned by an outbreak of popular 
violence in Frankfort itself of the necessity of hasten- 
ing towards a constitutional settlement. 

The progress of the insurrection in Schleswig-Hol- 

stein against Danish sovereignty had been 

oiMaimo, watched with the greatest interest through- 

out Germany ; and in the struggle of these 

provinces for their independence the rights and the 


honour of the German nation at large were held to 
be deeply involved. As the representative of the 
Federal authority, King Frederick William of Prussia 
had sent his troops into Holstein, and they arrived 
there in time to prevent the Danish army from follow 
ing up its first successes and crushing the insurgent 
forces. Taking up the offensive, General Wrangel at 
the head of th*e Prussian troops succeeded in driving 
the Danes out of Schleswig, and at the beginning of 
May he crossed the border between Schleswig and 
Jutland and occupied the Danish fortress of Fredericia. 
His advance into purely Danish territory occasioned the 
diplomatic intervention of Russia and Great Britain ; 
and, to the deep disappointment of the German nation 
and its Parliament, the King of Prussia ordered his 
general to retire into Schleswig. The Danes were in 
the meantime blockading the harbours and capturing 
the merchant-vessels of the Germans, as neither Prussia 
nor the Federal Government possessed a fleet of war. 
For some weeks hostilities were irresolutely continued 
in Schleswig, while negotiations were pursued in foreign 
capitals and various forms of compromise urged by 
foreign Powers. At length, on the 26th of August, an 
armistice of seven months was agreed upon at Malmo in 
Sweden by the representatives of Denmark and Prussia, 
the Court of Copenhagen refusing to recognise the Ger- 
man central Government at Frankfort or to admit its 
envoy to the conferences. The terms of this armistice, 
when announced in Germany, excited the greatest in- 
dignation, inasmuch as they declared all the acts of the 

118 MODERN EUROPE. 1848. 

Provisional Government of Schleswig-Holstein null and 
void, removed all German troops from the Duchies, and 
handed over their government during the duration of 
the armistice to a Commission of which half the mem- 
bers were to be appointed by the King of Denmark. 
Scornfully as Denmark had treated the Assembly of 
Frankfort, the terms of the armistice nevertheless re- 
quired its sanction. The question was referred to a 
committee, which, under the influence of the his- 
torian Dahlmann, himself formerly an official in Hoi- 
stein, pronounced for the rejection of the treaty. 
The Assembly, in a scene of great excitement, re- 
solved that the execution of the measures at- 
tendant on the armistice should be suspended. 
The Ministry in consequence resigned, and Dahl- 
mann was called upon to replace it by one under 
his own leadership. He proved unable to do so. 
Schmerling resumed office, and demanded that the 
Assembly should reverse its vote. Though in sever- 
ance from Prussia the Central Government had no real 
means of carrying on a war with Denmark, the most 
passionate opposition was made to this demand. The 
armistice was, however, ultimately ratified by a small 
majority. Defeated in the Assembly, the leaders of the 
extreme Democratic faction allied themselves with the 
populace of Frankfort, which was ready for 
Frankfort, acts of violence. Tumultuous meetings 

Sept. 18. 

were held; the deputies who had voted for 
the armistice were declared traitors to Germany. Barri- 
cades were erected, and although the appearance of 

1848. BERLIN. 119 

Prussian troops prevented an assault from being 
made on the Assembly; its members were attacked 
in the streets, and two of them murdered by the mob 
(Sept. 17th). A Republican insurrection was once 
more attempted in Baden, but it was quelled without 
difficulty. * 

The intervention of foreign Courts on behalf of 
Denmark had given ostensible ground to the Prus- 
sian Government for not pursuing the war with 
greater resolution; but though the fear of Eussia un- 
doubtedly checked King Frederick William, this was 
not the sole, nor perhaps the most powerful influence 
that worked upon him. The cause of Schleswig- Hoi- 
stein was, in spite of its legal basis, in the main a 
popular and a revolutionary one, and between the 
King of Prussia and the revolution there was an in- 
tense and a constantly deepening antago- Berlin A ril _ 
nism. Since the meeting of the National Sept '' 1848 ' 
Assembty at Berlin on the 22nd of May the capital had 
been the scene of an almost unbroken course of disorder. 
The Assembly, which was far inferior in ability and 
character to that of Frankfort, soon showed itself 
unable to resist the influence of the populace. On the 
8th of June a resolution was moved that the combat- 
ants in the insurrection of March deserved well of their 
country. Had this motion been carried the King 
would have dissolved the Assembly : it was outvoted, 

* Verhandlungen der National Versammlung, ii. 1877, 2185. Herzog 
Ernst II., Aus meinem Lebeu, i. 313. Biedermaun, i. 306. Beseler, 
Erlebtes, p. 68. Waitz, Friede mit Danemark. Radowitz, iii. 4(J6. 


but the mob punished this concession to the feelings of 
the monarch by outrages upon the members of the 
majority. A Civic Guard was enrolled from citizens 
of the middle class, but it proved unable to maintain 
order, and wholly failed to acquire the political import- 
ance which was gained by the National Guard of 
Paris after the revolution of 1830. Exasperated by 
their exclusion from service in the Guard, the mob 
on the 14 oh of June stormed an arsenal and destroyed 
the trophies of arms which they found there. Though 
violence reigned in the streets the Assembly rejected a 
proposal for declaring the inviolability of its members, 
and placed itself under the protection of the citizens of 
Berlin. King Frederick William had withdrawn to 
Potsdam, where the leaders of reaction gathered round 
him. He detested his Constitutional Ministers, who, 
between a petulant king and a suspicious Parliament, 
were unable to effect any useful work and soon found 
themselves compelled to relinquish their office. In 
Berlin the violence of the working classes, the inter- 
ruption of business, the example of civil war in Paris, 
inclined men of quiet disposition to a return to settled 
government at any price. Measures brought forward 
by the new Ministry for the abolition of the patri- 
monial jurisdictions, the hunting-rights and other feudal 
privileges of the greater landowners, occasioned the 
organisation of a league for the defence of property, which 
soon became the focus of powerful conservative interests. 
Above all, the claims of the Archduke John, as Ad- 
ministrator of the Empire, to the homage of the army, 


BERLIN. 121 

and the hostile attitude assumed towards the army 
by the Prussian Parliament itself, exasperated the 
military class and encouraged the king to venture on 
open resistance. A tumult having taken place at 
Schweidnitz in Silesia, in which several persons were 
shot by the soldiery, the Assembly, pending an in- 
vestigation into the circumstances, demanded that the 
Minister of War should publish an order requiring the 
officers of the army to work with the citizens for the 
realisation of Constitutional Government ; and it called 
upon all officers not loyally inclined to a Constitutional 
system to resign their commissions as a matter of 
honour. Denying the right of the Chamber to act as a 
military executive, the Minister of War refused to pub- 
lish the order required. The vote was repeated, and 
in the midst of threatening demonstrations in the streets 
the Ministry resigned (Sept. 7th).* 

It had been the distinguishing feature of the Prus- 
sian revolution that the army had never for a moment 
wavered in its fidelity to the throne. The ThePrussian 
success of the insurrection of March 18th 
had been due to the paucity of troops and the errors of 
those in command, not to any military disaffection 
such as had paralysed authority, in Paris and in the 
Mediterranean States. Each affront offered to the 
army by the democratic majority in the Assembly sup- 
plied the King with new weapons ; each slight passed 
upon the royal authority deepened the indignation of 

* Brief wechsel Friedrich Wilhelins, p. 184. Wageuer, Erlebfces, p. 28. 
Stahr, Preussische Revolution, i. 453. 

122 MODERN EUROPE. ism. 

the officers. The armistice of Malmo brought back to 
the neighbourhood of the capital a general who was 
longing to crush the party of disorder, and regiments 
on whom he could rely ; but though there was now no 
military reason for delay, it was not until the capture of 
Vienna by Windischgratz had dealt a fatal blow at 
democracy in Germany that Frederick William deter- 
mined to have done with his own mutinous Parliament 
and the mobs by which it was controlled. During 
September and October the riots and tumults in the 
streets of Berlin continued. The Assembly, w^hich had 
rejected the draft of a Constitution submitted to it by 
the Cabinet, debated the clauses of one drawn up by 
a Committee of its own members, abolished nobility, 
orders and titles, and struck out from the style of the 
sovereign the words that described him as King by the 
Grace of God. When intelligence arrived in Berlin 
that the attack of Windischgratz upon Vienna had 
actually begun, popular passion redoubled. The As- 
sembly was besieged by an angry crowd, and a resolu- 
tion in favour of the intervention of Prussia was brought 
forward within the House. This was rejected, and it 
was determined instead to invoke the mediation of the 
Central Government at Frankfort between the Emperor 
and his subjects. But the decision of the Assembly on 
this and every other point was now matter 
burg Minister, of indifference. Events outstripped its de- 

Nov. 2. 

liberations, and with the fall of Vienna 
its own course was run. On the 2nd of November the 
King dismissed his Ministers and called to office the 



Count of Brandenburg, a natural son of Frederick 
William II., a soldier in high command, and one of 
the most outspoken representatives of the monarchical 
spirit of the army. The meaning of the appointment 
was at once understood. A deputation from the As 
sembly conveyed its protest to the King at Potsdam. 
The King turned his back upon them with- 

, n mi Prorogation * of 

out giving an answer, and on the ytn 01 Ff us j*" ^ m ~ 
November an order was issued proroguing 
the Assembly, and bidding it to meet on the 27th at 
Brandenburg, not at Berlin. 

The order of prorogation, as soon as signed by the 
King, was brought into the Assembly by the Ministers, 
who demanded that it should be obeyed immediately 
and without discussion. The President 

. _ - i -i - T Last days of 

allo winer a debate to commence, the Minis- the Prussian 


ters and seventy-eight Conservative deputies 
le'ft the Hall. The remaining deputies, two hundred 
and eighty in number, then passed a resolution declaring 
that they would not meet at Brandenburg ; that the 
King had no power to remove, to prorogue, or to 
dissolve the Assembly without its own consent ; and 
that the Ministers were unfit to hold office. This chal- 
lenge was answered by a proclamation of the Ministers 
declaring the further meeting of the deputies il- 
legal, and calling upon the Civic Guard not to recog- 
nise them as a Parliament. On the following day 
General Wrangel and his troops entered Berlin and 
surrounded the Assembly Hall. In reply to the pro- 
tests of the President, Wrangel answered that the 

124 MODERN EUROPE. 18*3. 

Parliament had been prorogued and must disappear. 
The members peaceably left the Hall, but reassembled 
at another spot that they had selected in anticipation of 
expulsion ; and for some days they were pursued by 
the military from one place of meeting to another. On 
the 1 5th of November they passed a resolution declaring 
the expenditure of state-funds and the raising of taxes 
by the Government to be illegal so long as the Assem- 
bly should not be permitted to continue its delibera- 
tions. The Ministry on its part showed that it was 
determined not to brook resistance. The Civic Guard 
was dissolved and ordered to surrender its arms. It 
did so without striking a blow, and vanished from the 
scene, a memorable illustration of the political nullity 
of the middle class in Berlin as compared with that of 
Paris. The state of siege was proclaimed, the freedom 
of the Press and the right of public "meeting were sus- 
pended. On the 27th of November a portion of the 
Assembly appeared, according to the King's order, 
at Brandenburg, but the numbers, present were not 
sufficient for the transaction of business. The 
presence of the majority, however, was not required, 
for the King had determined to give no further 
legal opportunities to the men who had defied him. 
Treating the vote of November 1.5th as an act of rebel- 
lion on the part of those concerned in it, 
taw Awembiy, the King dissolved the Assembly (Decem- 
ber 5th), and conferred upon Prussia a Con- 
stitution drawn up by his own advisers, with the pro- 
mise that this Constitution should be subject to revision 


by the future representative body. Though the dis- 
solution of the Assembly occasioned tumults in Breslau 
and Cologne it was not actively resented by 

. T . . , i m, . -, en Prussian Consti- 

the nation at large. The violence or the tution granted 

-, by edict. 

fallen body during its last weeks of exist- 
ence had exposed it to general discredit ; its vote of 
the 15th of November had been formally condemned by 
the Parliament of Frankfort ; and the liberal character 
of the new Constitution, which agreed in the main with 
thn draft-Constitution produced by the Committee of 
the Assembly, disposed moderate men to the belief that 
in the conflict between the King and the popular repre- 
sentatives the fault had not been on the side of the 

In the meantime the Parliament of Frankfort, 
warned against longer delay by the disturbances ot 
September 1 7th, had addressed itself in earnest to the 
settlement of the Federal Constitution of Germany. 
Above a host of minor difficulties two great problems 
confronted it at the outset. The first was 

The Frankfort 

the relation of the Austrian Empire, with I a u r S, en oct.- 
its partly German and partly foreign terri- 
tory, to the German national State ; the other was the 
nature of the headship to be established. As it was 
clear that the A ustrian Government could not apply the 
public law of Germany to its Slavic and Hungarian pro- 
vinces, it was enacted in the second article of the Frank- 
fort Constitution that where a German and a non-German 
territory had the same sovereign, the relation between 
these countries must be one of purely personal union 

126 MODERN EUROPE. 1848. 

under the sovereign, no part of Germany being incor- 
porated into a single State with any non- German land. 
At the time when this article was drafted the disintegra- 
tion of Austria seemed more probable than the re-estab- 
lishment of its unity ; no sooner, however, had Prince 
Schwarzenberg been brought into power by the subju- 
gation of Vienna, than he made it plain that the 
government of Austria was to be centralised as it had 
never been before. In the lirst public declaration of 
his policy he announced that Austria would maintain 
its unity and permit no exterior influence to modify its 
internal organisation ; that the settlement of the rela- 
tions between Austria and Germany could only be 
effected after each had gained some new and abiding 
political form ; and that in the meantime Austria would 
continue to fulfil its duties as a confederate.* The in-, 
terpretation put upon this statement at Frankfort was 
that Austria, in the interest of its own unity, preferred 
not to enter the German body, but looked forward to 
the establishment of some intimate alliance with it at 
a future time. As the Court of Vienna had evidently 
determined not to apply to itself the second article of 
the Constitution, and an antagonism between German 
and Austrian policy came within view, Schmerling*'as 
an Austrian subject, was induced to resign his office, 
and was succeeded in it by Gagern, hitherto President 
of the Assembly (Dec. 16th).f 

* Seine Bundespflichten : an ambiguous expression that might mean 
either its duties as an ally or its duties as a member of the German 
Federation. The obscurity was probably intentional. 

f Verhandlungen der National Yersammluug, vi. 4225. Hayin, 


In announcing the policy of the new Ministry, 
Gaffem assumed the exclusion of Austria from the Ger- 


man Federation. Claiming for the As- 

The Frankfort 

sembly, as the representative of the Gerjman I a uS, ent DeS 
nation, sovereign power in drawing up the 
Constitution, he denied that the Constitution could be 
made an object of negotiation with Austria. As 
Austria refused to fulfil the conditions of the second 
article, it must remain outside the Federation j the 
Ministry desired, however, to frame some close and 
special connection between Austria and Germany, and 
asked for authority to negotiate with the Court of 
Vienna for this purpose. Gagern's declaration of the 
exclusion of Austria occasioned a vehement and natural 
outburst of feeling among the Austrian deputies, and 
was met by their almost unanimous protest. Some days 
later there arrived a note from Schwarzenberg which 
struck at the root of all that had been done and all 
that was claimed by the Assembly. Repudiating the 
interpretation that had been placed upon his words, 
Schwarzenberg declared that the affairs of Germany 
could only be settled by an understanding between the 
Assembly and the Courts, and by an arrangement with 
Austria, which was the recognised chief of the Govern- 
ments and intended to remain so in the new Federation. 
The question of the inclusion or exclusion of Austria 
now threw into the shade all the earlier differences 

between parties in the Assembly. A new dividing-line 


Deutsche National Versa mini ung, ii. 112. Radowitz, iii. 459. Helfert, 
iv. 62. 

128 MODERN EUROPE. 1349. 

was drawn. On the one side appeared a group com- 
posed of the Austrian representatives, of Ultramontanes 
who feared a Protestant ascendency if Austria should 
be excluded, and of deputies from some of the smaller 
States who had begun to dread Prussian domination. 
On the other side was the great body of representatives 
who set before all the cause of German national union, 
who saw that this union would never be effected in any 
real form if it was made to depend upon negotiations 
with the Austrian Court, and who held, with the 
Minister, that to create a true Grerman national State 
without the Austrian provinces was better than to 
accept a phantom of complete union in which the 
German people should be nothing and the Cabinet of 
Vienna everything. Though coalitions and intrigues 
of parties obscured the political prospect from day to 
day, the principles of Gagern were affirmed by a 
majority of the Assembly, and authority to negotiate 
some new form of connection with Austria, as a power 
outside the Federation, was granted to -the Ministry. 

The second great difficulty of the Assembly was the 

settlement of the Federal headship. Some were for a 

The Federal hereditary Emperor, some for a President 

ship ' or Board; some for a monarchy alternating 

between the Houses of Prussia and Austria, some for 

a sovereign elected for life or for a fixed period. The 

first decision arrived at was that the head should be one 

of the reigning princes of Germany, and that he should 

bear the title of Emperor. Against the hereditary 

principle there was a strong and, at first, a successful 


opposition. Reserving for future discussion other 
questions relating to the imperial office, the Assembly 
passed the Constitution through the first reading on 
February 3rd, ] 849. It was now communicated to all 
the German Governments, with the request that they 
would offer their opinions upon it. The four minor 
kingdoms Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, and Wurtem- 
berg with one consent declared against any Federation 
in which Austria shguld iiojb be included; the Cabinet 
of Vienna protested against the subordination of the 
Emperor of Austria to a central po.wer vested in any 
other German prince, and proposed that the entire 
Austrian -Empire, with its foreign as well as its German 
elements, should enter the Federation. This note was 
enough to prove that Austria was in direct conflict 
with the scheme of national union which the Assembly 
had accepted ; but the full peril of the situation was 
not perceived till on the 9th of March Schwarzen- 
berg published, the Constitution of Olmiitz, which ex- 
tinguished all separate rights throughout the Austrian 
Empire, and confounded in one mass, as subjects of the 
Emperor Francis Joseph, Hungarians, Germans, Slavs 
and Italians. The import of the Austrian demand now 
scood out clear and undisguised. Austria claimed to 
range itself with a foreign population of thirty million* 
within the German Federation ; in other words, to 
reduce the German national union to a partnership 
with all the nationalities of Central Europe, to throw 
the weight of an overwhelming influence against any 
system of free representative government, and to 

130 MODERN EUROPE. 1819. 

expose Germany to war where no interests but those 
of the Pole or the Magyar might be at stake. So 
deep was the impression made at Frankfort by the 
fall of the Kremsier Parliament and the publication of 
Schwarzenberg's unitary edict, that one of the most 
eminent of the politicians who had hitherto opposed 
the exclusion of Austria the Baden deputy Welcker 
declared that further persistence in this course would 
be treason to Gfermany. Ranging himself with the 
Ministry, he proposed that the entire German Constitu- 
tion, completed by a hereditary chieftainship, should 
be passed at a single vote on the second reading, and 
that the dignity of Emperor should be at once offered 
to the King of Prussia. Though the Assembly de- 
clined to pass the Constitution by a single vote, it 
agreed to vote upon clause by clause without discussion. 
The hereditary principle was affirmed by the narrow 
majority of four in a House of above five hundred. 
The second reading of the Constitution was completed 
on the 27th of March, and- on the following- 

King Frederick 

the election of the sovereign took place. 
Two hundred and ninety votes were given 
for the King of Prussia. Two hundred and forty-eight 
members, hostile to the hereditary principle or to the 
prince selected, abstained from voting.* </ 

Frederick William had from early years cherished 
the hope of seeing some closer union of Germany estab- 
lished under Prussian influence. But he dwelt in a 

* Yerhandlungen, viii. 6093. Beseler, p. 82. Helfert, iv. (3) 390. 
Haym, ii. 317. Eadowitz, v. 477. 


world where there was more of picturesque mirage than 
of real insight. He was almost superstitiously loyal to 
the House of Austria ; and he failed to per- Frede rick 
ceive, what was palpable to men of far in- 
ferior endowments to his own, that *by setting Prussia 
at the head of the constitutional movement of the epoch 
he might at any time from the commencement of his 
reign have rallied all Germany round it. Thus the 
revolution of 1848 hurst upon him, and he was not the 
man to act or to lead in time of revolution. Even in 
1848, had he given promptly and with dignity what, 
after blood had been shed in his streets, he had to give 
with humiliation, he would probably have been ac- 
claimed Emperor on the opening of the Parliament of 
Frankfort, and have been accepted by the universal voice 
of Germany. But the odium cast upon him by the 
struggle of March 18th_was scLgreat that in the election 
of a temporary Administrator of the Empire in June 
no single member at Frankfort gave him a vote. Time 
was needed to repair his credit, and while time passed 
Austria rose from its ruins. In the spring of 1849. 
Frederick William could not have assumed the office of 
Emperor of Germany without risk of a war with Aus- 
tria, even had he been willing to accept this office on 
the nomination of the Frankfort Parliament. But to 
accept the Imperial Crown from a popular Assembly 
was repugnant to his deepest convictions. Clear as the 
Frankfort Parliament had been, as a whole, from the 
taint of E-epublicanism or of revolutionary violence, it 
had nevertheless had its birth in revolution : the crown 
* 2 



which it offered would, in the King's expression, have 
been picked up from blood and mire. Had the princes 
of Germany by any arrangement with the Assembly 
tendered the crown to Frederick William the case 
would have been different ; a new Divine right would 
have emanated from the old, and conditions fixed by 
negotiation between the princes and the popular As- 
sembly might have been endured. That Frederick Wil- 
liam still aspired to German leadership in one form 
or another no one doubted ; his disposition to seek 
or to reject an accommodation with the Frankfort 
Parliament varied with the influences which surrounded 
him. The Ministry led by the Count of Brandenburg, 
though anti-popular in its domestic measures, was de- 
sirous of arriving at some understanding with Gagern 
and the friends of German union. Shortly before the 
first reading of the Constitution at Frankfort, a note 
had been drafted in the Berlin Cabinet admitting under 
certain provisions the exclusion of Austria from the 
Federation, and proposing, not that the Assembly 
should admit the right of each Government to accept 
or reject the Constitution, but that it should meet in a 
fair spirit such recommendations as all the Governments 
together should by a joint act submit to it. This note, 
which would have rendered an agreement between the 
Prussian Court and the Assembly possible, Frederick 
William at first refused to sign. He was induced tqL 
do so (Jan. 23rd) by his confidant Bunsen, who him- 
self was authorised to proceed to Frankfort. During 
Bunsen's absence despatches arrived at Berlin from 


Schwarzenberg, who, in his usual resolute way, proposed 
to dissolve the Frankfort Assembly, and to divide Ger- 
many between Austria, Prussia, and the four secondary 
kingdoms. Bunsen on his return .found his work un- 
done ; the King recoiled under Austrian pressure from 
the position which he had taken up, and sent a note 
to Frankfort on the 10th of February, which described 
Austria as a necessary part of Germany and claimed. 
for each separate Government the right to accept or 
reject the Constitution as it might think fit. Thus 
the acceptance of the headship by Frederick William 
under any conditions compatible with the claims of 
the Assembly was known to be doubtful when, on 
the 28th of March, the majority resolved to offer him 
the Imperial Crown. The disposition of the Ministry 
at Berlin was indeed still favourable to an accom- 
modation; and 'when, on the 2nd of April, the members 
of the Assembly who were charged to lay its offer 
before Frederick Willi-am arrived at Berlin, they were 
received with such cordiality by Brandenburg that it 
was believed the King's consent had been won. The 
reply of the King to the deputation on the 

r J Frederick 

following day rudely dispelled these hopes. 

He declared that before he could accept the 
Crown not only must he be summoned to it by the 
Princes of Germany, but the consent of all the Govern- 
ments must be given to the Constitution. In other 
words, he required that the Assembly should sur- 
render its claims to legislative supremacy, and abandon 
all those parts of the Federal Constitution of which any 

134 MODERN EUROPE. 1849. 

of the existing Governments disapproved. As it was 
certain that Austria and the four minor kingdoms would 
never agree to any Federal union worthy of the name, 
and that the Assembly could not now, without re- 
nouncing its past, admit that the right of framing 
the Constitution lay outside itself, the answer of the 
King was understood to amount to a refusal. The 
deputation left Berlin in the sorrowful conviction that 
their mission had failed ; and a note which was soon 
afterwards received at Frankfort from the King showed 
that this belief was correct.* 

. The answer of King Frederick William proved in- 
deed much more than that he had refused the Crown 
of Germany ; it proved that he would 

The Frankfort J 

r3ecte t dby I the n t accept th e Constitution which the 
Assembly had enacted. The full import of 
this determination, and the serious nature of the crisis 
now impending over Germany, were at once under- 
stood. Though twenty-eight Governments successively 
accepted the Constitution, these were without exception 
petty States, and their united forces would scarcely 
have been a match for one of its more powerful enemies. 
On the 5th of April the Austrian Cabinet declared 
the Assembly to have been guilty of illegality in pub- 
lishing the Constitution, and called upon all Austrian 
deputies to quit Frankfort. The Prussian Lower 
Chamber, elected under the King's recent edict, having 

* Briefwechsel Friedrich Wilhelms, pp. 233, 269. Beseler,87. Bieder- 
mami, i. 389. Wagener, Politik Friedrich Wilhehn TV., p. 56. Ernst II., 
i. 329. 


protested against the state of siege in Berlin, and having 
passed a resolution in favour of the Frankfort Constitu- 
tion, was forthwith dissolved. Within the Frankfort 
Parliament the resistance of Governments excited a 
patriotic resentment and caused for the moment a union 
of parties. Resolutions were passed declaring that the 
Assembly would adhere to the Constitution. A Com- 
mittee was charged with the ascertainment of measures 
to be adopted for enforcing its recognition ; and a note 
was addressed to all the hostile Governments demand- 
ing that they should abstain from proroguing or dis- 
solving the representative bodies within their dominions 
with the view of suppressing the free utterance of 
opinions- in favour of the Constitution. 

On the ground of this last demand the Prussian 
official Press now began to denounce the Assembly of 
Frankfort as a revolutionary body. The situation of 
affairs daily became worse. It was in vain 

End of the Ger- 

that the Assembly appealed to the Govern- 
ments, the legislative Chambers, the local 
bodies, the whole German people, to bring the Constitution 
into effect. The moral force on which it had determined 
to rely proved powerless, and in despair of conquering the 
Governments by public opinion the more violent mem- 
bers of the democratic party determined to appeal to 
insurrection. On the 4th of May a popular rising 
began at Dresden, where the King, under the influence 
of Prussia, had dismissed those of his Ministers who 
urged him to accept the Constitution, and had dissolved 
his Parliament. The outbreak drove the King from 



his capital ; but only five days bad passed when a 
Prussian army-corps entered the city and crushed the 
rebellion. In this interval, short as it was, there had 
been indications that the real leaders of the insurrection 
were fighting not for the Frankfort Constitution but 
for a Republic, and that in the event of their victory a 
revolutionary Government, connected with French and 
Polish schemes of subversion, would come into power. 
In Baden this was made still clearer. There the 
Government of the Grand Duke had actually accepted 
the Frankfort Constitution, and had ordered elections 
to be held for the Federal legislative body by which 
the Assembly was to be succeeded. Insurrection 
nevertheless broke out. The Republic was openly pro- 
claimed ; the troops joined the insurgents ; and a Pro- 
visional Government allied itself with a similar body 
that had sprung into being with the help of French and 
Polish refugees in the neighbouring Palatinate. Con- 
scious that these insurrections must utterly ruin its own 
cause, the Frankfort Assembly on the suggestion of 
Gagern called upon the Archduke John to suppress them 
by force of arms, and at the same time to protect the 
free expression of opinion on behalf of the Constitution 
where threatened by Governments. John, who had 
long clung to- his office only to further the ends of 
Austria, refused to do so, and Gagern in consequence 
resigned. With his fall ended the real political ex- 
istence of the Assembly. Im reply to a resolution 
which it passed on the 10th of May, calling upon John 
to employ all the forces of Germany in defence of the 


Constitution, the Archduke placed a mock-Ministry in 
office. The Prussian Government, declaring the vote of 
the 10th of May to be a summons to civil war, ordered all 
Prussian deputies to withdraw from the Assembly, and 
a few days later its example was imitated by Saxony 
and Hanover. On the 20th of May sixty-five of the 
best known of the members, including Arndt and Dahl- 
mann, placed on record their belief that in the actual 
situation the relinquishment of the task of the Assembly 
was the least of evils, and declared their work at Frank- 
fort ended. Other groups followed them till there 
remained only the party of the extreme Left, which had 
hitherto been a weak minority, and which in no sense 
represented the real opinions of Germany. This Rump- 
Parliament, troubling itself little with John and his 
Ministers, determined to withdraw from Frankfort, 
.where it dreaded the appearance of Prussian troops, 
into Wiirtemberg, where it might expect some support 
from the revolutionary Governments of Baden and the 

Palatinate. On the 6th of June a hundred and five 


deputies assembled at Scuttgart. There they proceeded 
to appoint a governing Committee for all Germany, 
calling upon the King of Wiirtemberg to supply them 
with seven thousand soldiers, and sending out emissaries 
to stir up the neighbouring population. But the world 
disregarded them. The Government at Stuttgart, after 
an interval of patience, bade them begone ; and on the 
18th of June their hall was closed against them and 
they were dispersed by troops, no one raising a hand on 
their behalf. The overthrow of the insurgents who 


had taken up arms in Baden and the Palatinate was 

not so easy a matter. A campaign of six weeks was 

necessary, in which the army of Prussia, 

The Baden in- J J 

i^ef" 1 j'uiy; led by the Crown Prince, sustained some 


reverses, before the Republican levies were 
crushed, and with the fall of Rastadt the insurrection 
was brought to a close.* 

The end of the German Parliament, on which the 
nation had set such high hopes and to which it had 
sent so much of what was noblest in itself, contrasted 
lamentably with the splendour of its opening. Whether 
a better result would have been attained if, instead of 
claiming supreme authority in the construction of 
Federal union, the Assembly had from the first sought 
the co-operation of the Governments, must remain matter 
of conjecture. Austria would under all circumstances 
have been the great hindrance in the way ; and after 
the failure of the efforts made at Frankfort to establish 
the general union of Germany, Austria was able com- 
pletely to frustrate the attempts which were now made 
at Berlin to establish partial union upon a different 
basis. In notifying to the Assembly his refusal of 
the Imperial Crown, King Frederick "Wil- 
to f<mn a sepa- Ham had stated that he was resolved to place 

rate union. 

himself at the head of a Federation to be 
formed by States voluntarily uniting with him under 
terms to be subsequently arranged ; and in a circular 
note addressed to the German Governments he invited 

* Verhandlungen, &c., ix. 6695, 6886. Haym, iii. 185. Bamberger, 
Erlebnisse, p. 6. 


such as were disposed to take counsel with Prussia to 
unite in Conference ac Berlin. The opening of the 
Conference was fixed for the 17th of May. Two days 
before this the King issued a proclamation to the Prus- 
sian people announcing that in spite of the failure of 
the Assembly of Frankfort a German union was still to 
be formed. When the Conference opened at Berlin, 
no envoys appeared but those of Austria, Saxon \Y f 
Hanover, and Bavaria. The Austrian representative 
withdrew at the end of the first sitting, the Bavarian 
rather later, leaving Prussia to lay such foundations as it 
could for German unity with the temporising support 
of Saxony and Hanover. A confederation was formed, 
known as the League of the Three Kingdoms. An /6 ./ 
undertaking was given that a Federal Parliament 
should be summoned, and that a Constitution should be 
made jointly by this Parliament and the Governments 
(May 26th). On the llth of June the draft of a 
Federal Constitution was published. As the King of 
Prussia was apparently acting in good faith, and the 
draft-Constitution in spite of some defects seemed to 
afford a fair basis for union, the question now arose among 
the leaders of the German national movement whether 
the twenty-eight States which had accepted the ill-fated 
Constitution of Frankfort ought or ought not to enter 
the new Prussian League. A meeting of a hundred 
and fifty ex-members of the Frankfort Parliament was 
held at Gotha ; and although great indignation was ex- 
pressed by the more democratic faction, it was determined 
that the scheme now put forward by Prussia deserved 


a fair trial. The whole of the twenty-eight minor States 
consequently entered the League, which thus embraced 
all Germany with the exception of Austria, Bavaria and 
Wiirtemberg. But the Courts of Saxony and Hanover 
had from the first been acting with duplicity. The 
military influence of Prussia, and the fear which they 
still felt of their own subjects, had prevented them from 
offering open resistance to the renewed work of Federa- 
tion ; but they had throughout been in communication 
with Austria, and were only waiting for the moment 
when the complete restoration of Austria's military 
strength should enable them to display their true 
colours. During the spring of 1849, w T hile the 
Conferences at Berlin were being held, Austria was still 
occupied with Hungary and Venice. The final over- 
throw of these enemies enabled it to cast its entire 
weight upon Germany. The result was seen in the 
action of Hanover and Saxony, which now formally 
seceded from the Federation. Prussia thus remained 
at the end of 1849 with no support but that of the 
twenty-eight minor States. Against it, in open or in 
tacit antagonism to the establishment of German unity 
in any effective form, the four secondary Kingdoms 
stood ranged by the side of Austria. 

It was not until the 20th of March, 1850, that the 

Federal Parliament, which had been promised ten 

months before on the incorporation of the 

new League, assembled at Erfurt. In the 

meantime reaction had gone far in many a German 

State. In Prussia, after the dissolution of the. Lower 

1850. PRUSSIA. 141 

Chamber on April 27th, 1849, the King had abrogated 
the electoral provisions of the Constitution so recently 
granted by himself, and had substituted for them a 
system based on the re presentation of classes. Treating 
this act as a breach of faith, the Democratic party 
had abstained from voting at the elections, with the 
result that in the Berliu Parliament of 1850 Con- 
servatives, Reactionists, and officials formed the great 
majority. The* revision of the Prussian Constitution, 
promised at first as a concession to Liberalism, was 
conducted in the opposite sense. The King demanded 
the strengthening of monarchical power; the Feudal- 
ists, going far beyond him, attacked the municipal and 
social reforms of the last two years, and sought to lead 
Prussia back to the system of its mediaeval estates. It 
was in the midst of this victory of reaction in Prussia 
that the Federal Parliament at Erfurt began its sittings. 
Though the moderate Liberals, led by Gagern and 
other tried politicians of Frankfort, held the majority 
in both Houses, a strong Absolutist party from 
Prussia confronted them, and it soon became clear 
that the Prussian Government was ready to play 
into the hands of this party. The draft of 
the Federal Constitution, which had been iiament IO at Er" 

furt, March,1850. 

made at Berlin, was presented, according 
to the undertaking of May 26th, 1849, to the Erfurt 
Assembly. Aware of the gathering strength of the 
reaction and of the danger of delay, the Liberal majority 
declared itself ready to pass the draft into law with- 
out a single alteration. The reactionary minority 

112 MODERN EUROPE. isso. 

demanded that a revision should take place ; and, to 
the scandal of all who understood the methods or 
the spirit of Parliamentary rule, the Prussian Minis- 
ters united with the party which demanded altera- 
tions in the project which they themselves had brought 
forward. A compromise was ultimately effected; hut 
the action of the Court of Prussia and the conduct 
of its Ministers throughout the Erfurt debates struck 
with deep despondency those who had believed that 
Frederick William might still effect the work in which 
the Assembly of Frankfort had failed. The trust in 
the King's sincerity or consistence of purpose sank low. 
The sympathy of the national. Liberal party throughout 
Germany was to a great extent alienated from Prussia ; 
while, if any expectation existed at Berlin that the 
adoption of a reactionary policy would disarm the hos- 
tility of the Austrian Government to the new League, 
this hope was wholly vain and baseless.* 
, Austria had from the first protested against the 
attempt of the King of Prussia to establish any new 
form of union in Germany, and had declared that it 
Action of would recognise none of the conclusions of 
Austria. the ^fa^ p ar ii ament o f Erfurt. Accord- 

ing to the theory now advanced by the Cabinet of 
Vienna the ancient Federal Constitution of Germany 
w T as still in force. All that had happened since March, 
1848, was so much wanton and futile mischief- making. 
The disturbance of order had at length come to an end, 

* Verhandlungen zu Erfurt, i. 114 ; ii. 143. Biederniann, i. 469. 
Radowitz, ii. 138. 

1850. AUSTRIA. H3 

and with the exit of the rioters the legitimate powers 
re-entered into their rights. Accordingly, there could 
be no question of the establishment of new Leagues. 
The old relation of all the German States to one 
another under the ascendency of Austria remained in N 
full strength ; the Diet of Frankfort, which had merely 
suspended its functions and by no means suffered ex- 
tinction, was still the legitimate central authority. 
That some modifications might be necessary in the 
ancient Constitution was the most that Austria was 
willing to admit. This, however, was an affair not for 
the German people but for its rulers, and Austria ac- 
cordingly invited all the Governments to a Congress 
at Frankfort, where the changes necessary might be 
discussed. In reply to this summons, Prussia strenuously 
denied that the old Federal Constitution was still in 
existence. The princes of the numerous petty States 
which were included in the new Union assembled at 
Berlin round Frederick William, and resolved that 
they would not attend the Conference at Frankfort 
except under reservations and conditions which Austria 
would not admit. Arguments a'nd counter-arguments 
were exchanged ; but the controversy between an old 
and a new Germany was one to be decided by force of 
will or force of arms, not by political logic. The 
struggle was to be one between Prussia and Austria, 
and the Austrian Cabinet had well gauged the temper 
mjt its opponent. A direct summons to submission 
uld have roused all the King's pride, and have been 
answered by war. Before demanding from Frederick 

144 MODERN EUROPE. 1850. 

William the dissolution of the Union which he had 
founded, Schwarzenherg determined to fix upon a quarrel 
in which the King should be perplexed or alarmed at 
the results of his own policy. The dominant convic- 
tion in the mind of Frederick William was that of the 
sanctity of monarchical rule. If the League of Berlin 
could be committed to some enterprise hostile to mon- 
archical power, and could be charged with an alliance 
with rebellion, Frederick William would probably falter 
in his resolutions, and a resort to arms, for which, 
however, Austria was well prepared, would become 

Among the States whose Governments had been 
forced by public opinion to join the new Federation 

was the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel. The Elector was, 

" ' 

like his predecessors, a thorough despot at 
heart, and chafed under the restrictions 
which a constitutional system imposed upon his rule. 
Acting under Austrian instigation, be dismissed his 
Ministers in the spring of 1850, and placed in office 
one Hassenpfiug, a type of the worst and most violent 
class of petty tyrants produced by the officialism of 
the minor German States. Hassenpflug immediately 
quarrelled with the Estates at Cassel, and twice dis- 
solved them, after which he proceeded to levy taxes by 
force. The law-courts declared his acts illegal ; the 
officers of the army, when called on for assistance, began 

* Der Fiirsten Kongress, p. 13. Reden Friedrich Wilhelins, iv. p. 55, 
69. Konfereuz der Verbiindeten, 1850, pp 26, 53. Beust, Erinnerungen, 
i. 115. Ernst II., i. 525. Duncker, Tier Monate, p. 41. 



to resign. The conflict between the Minister and the 

Hessian population was in full progress when, at the 
beginning of September, Austria with its vassal Govern- 
ments proclaimed the re-establishment of the Diet of 
Frankfort. Though Prussia and most of the twenty- 
eight States confederate with it treated this announce- 
ment as null and void, the Diet, constituted by the 
envoys of Austria, the four minor Kingdoms, and a few 
seceders from the Prussian Union, com- 

The Diet of 

menced its sittings. To the Diet., the 
Elector of Hesse forthwith appealed for 
help against his subjects, and the decision was given 
that the refusal of the Hessian Estates to grant the 
taxes was an offence justifying the intervention of the 
central power. Fortified by this judgment, Hassenpflug 
now ordered that every person offering resistance to the 
Government should be tried by court-martial. He was 
baffled by the resignation of the entire body of officers 
in the Hessian army ; and as this completed the dis- 
comfiture of the Elector, the armed intervention of 
Austria, as identified with the Diet of Frankfort, now 
became a certainty. But to the protection of the 
people of Hesse in their constitutional rights Prussia, 
as chief of the League which Hesse had joined, stood 
morally pledged. It remained for the King to decide 
between armed resistance to Austria or the humiliation 
of a total abandonment of Prussia's claim 

Prussia and 

to leadership in any German union. Con- 
flicting influences swayed the King in one direction and 
another. The friends of Austria and of absolutism 


declared that the employment of the Prussian army on 
behalf of the Hessians would make the King an accom- 
plice of revolution : the bolder and more patriotic spirits 
protested against the abdication of Prussia's just claims 
and the evasion of its responsibilities towards Germany. 
For a moment the party of action, led by the Crown 
Prince, gained the ascendant. General Eadowitz, 
the projector of the Union, was called to the Foreign 
Ministry, and Prussian troops entered Hesse. Austria 
now ostentatiously prepared for war. Frederick Wil- 
liam, terrified by the danger confronting him, yet un- 
willing to yield all, sought the mediation of the Czar 
of Russia. Nicholas came to Warsaw, where the Em- 
peror of Austria and Prince Charles, brother 
meeting, oot of the King of Prussia, attended by the 

29, 1850- J 

Ministers of their States, met him. The 
closest family ties united the Courts of St. Petersburg 
and Berlin ; but the Eussian sovereign was still the 
patron of Austria as he had been in the Hungarian 
campaign. He resented the action -of Prussia in 
Schleswig - Holstein, and was offended that King 
Frederick William had not presented himself at War- 
saw in person. He declared in favour of all Austria's 
demands, and treated Count Brandenburg with such 
indignity that the Count, a high-spirited patriot, 
never recovered from its effect. He returned to Berlin 
only to give in his report and die. Manteuffel, Minister 
of the Interior, assured the King that the Prussian 
army was so weak in numbers and so defective in 
organisation that, if it took the field against A,ustria 

1850. OLMUTZ. 147 

and its allies, it would meet with certain ruin. Bavarian 
troops, representing the Diet of Frankfort, now entered 
Hesse at Austria's bidding, and stood face to face with 
the Prussians. The moment had come when the de- 
cision must be made between peace and war. At a 
Council held at Berlin on November 2nd the peace- 
party carried the King with them. Badowitz gave 
up office ; Manteuffel, the Minister of repression 
within and of submission without, was set at the head 
of the Government. The meaning of his appointment 
was well understood, and with each new proof of the 
weakness of the King the tone of the Court of Austria 
became more imperious. On the 9th of November 
Schwarzenberg categorically demanded the dissolution 
of the Prussian Union, the recognition of the Federal 
Diet, and the evacuation of Hesse by the Prussian 
troops. The first point was at once conceded, and in 
hollow, equivocating language Manteuffel made the fact 
known to the members of the Confederacy. The other 
conditions not being so speedily fulfilled, Schwarzen- 
berg set Austrian regiments in motion, and demanded 
the withdrawal of the Prussian troops from Hesse 
within twenty-four hours. Manteuffel begged the 
Austrian Minister for an interview, and, without wait*- 
ing for an answer, set out for Olmiitz. His instructions 
bade him to press for certain concessions ; none of these 
did he obtain, and he made the necessary Manteuffel at 
submission without them. On the 29th of olmUtz ' Noy - 29 - 
November a convention was signed at Olmiitz, in which 
Prussia recognised the German Federal Constitution 
K 2 

148 MODERN EUROPE. isso. 

of 1815 as still existing, undertook to withdraw all 
its troops from Hesse with the exception of a single 
battalion, and consented to the settlement of affairs both 
in Hesse and in Schleswig-Holstein by the Federal 
Diet. One point alone in the scheme of the Austrian 
statesman was wanting among the fruits of his victory 
at Olmiitz and of the negotiations at Dresden by which 
this was followed. Schwarzenberg had intended that 
the entire Austrian Empire should enter the German 
Federation ; and if he had had to reckon with no oppo- 
nents but the beaten and humbled Prussia, he would 
have effected his design. But the prospect of a central 
European Power, with a population of seventy millions, 
controlled as this would virtually be by the Cabinet of 
Vienna, alarmed other nations. England declared that 
such a combination would undo the balance of power in 
Europe and menace the independence of Germany; 
France protested in more threatening terms ; and the 
project fell to the ground, to be remembered only as 
the boldest imagination of a statesman for whom 
fortune, veiling the Nemesis in store, seemed to set no 
limit to its favours. 

>^;The cause of Schleswig-Holstein, so intimately 

bound up with the efforts of the Germans towards 

national union, sank with the failure of 


these efforts ; and in the final humiliation of 
Prussia it received what might well seem its death- 
blow. The armistice of Malmo, which was sanc- 
tioned by the Assembly of Frankfort in the autumn of 
1848, lasted until March 26th, 1849. War was then 


recommenced by Prussia, and the lines of Diippel 
were stormed by its troops, while the volunteer forces 
of Schleswig-Holstein unsuccessfully laid siege to Frede- 
ricia. Hostilities had continued for three months, when 
a second armistice, to last for a year,* and Preliminaries 
of Peace, were agreed upon. At the conclusion of this 
armistice, in July, 1850, Prussia, in the name of Ger- 
many, made peace with Denmark.. The inhabitants of 
the Duchies in consequence continued the war for 
themselves, and though defeated with great loss at 
Idstedt on the 24th of July, they remained uncon- 
quered at the end of the year. This was the situation 
of affairs when Prussia, by the Treaty of Olmutz, agreed 
that the restored Federal Diet should take upon itself 
the restoration of order in Schleswig-Holstein, and that 
the troops of Prussia should unite with those of Austria 

to enforce its decrees. To the Cabinet of Vienna, the 

' foe in equal measure of German national union and of 

every democratic cause, the Schleswig-Holsteiners were 
simply rebels in insurrection against their sovereign. 
They were required by the Diet, under Austrian dicta- 
tion, to lay down their arms ; and commissioners from 
Austria and Prussia entered the Duchies to compel 
them to do so. Against Denmark, Austria, and Prussia 
together, it was impossible for Schleswig-Holstein to 
prolong its resistance. The army was dissolved, and 
the Duchies were handed over to the King of Denmark, 
to return to the legal status which was defined in the 
Treaties of Peace. This was the nominal condition of 
the transfer; but the Danish Government treated 

150 MODERN EUROPE. 1852. 

Schleswig as part of its national territory, and in 
the northern part of the Duchy the process of sub- 
stituting Danish for German nationality was actively 
pursued. The policy of foreign Courts, little interested 
in the wish of the inhabitants, had from the beginning 
of the struggle of the Duchies against Denmark favoured 
the maintenance and consolidation of the Danish King- 
dom. The claims of the Duke of Augustenburg, as 
next heir to the Duchies in the male line, were not 
considered worth the risk of a new war; and by a 
protocol signed at London on the 2nd of August, 1850, 
the Powers, with the exception of Prussia, declared 
themselves in favour of a single rule of succession in all 
parts of the Danish State. By a Treaty of the 8th of 
May, 1852, to which Prussia gave its assent, the pre- 
tensions of all other claimants to the disputed succession 
were set aside, and Prince Christian, of the House of 
Gliicksburg, was declared heir . to the throne, the rights 
of the German Federation as established by the Treaties 
of 1815 being reserved. In spite of -this reservation 
of Federal rights, and of the stipulations in favour of 
Schleswig and Holstein made in the earlier agreements, 
the Duchies appeared to be now practically united with 
the Danish State. Prussia, for a moment their cham- 
pion, had joined with Austria in coercing their army, 
in dissolving their Government, in annulling the legis- 
lation by which the Parliament of Frankfort had made 
them participators in public rights thenceforward to be 
the inheritance of all Germans. A page in the national 
history was obliterated ; Prussia had turned its back on 


its own professions ; there remained but one relic from 
the time when the whole German people seemed so ardent 
for the emancipation of its brethren beyond the frontier. 
The national fleet, created by the Assembly of Frankfort 
for the prosecution of the struggle with Denmark, still 
lay at the mouth of the Elbe. But the same power 
which had determined that Germany was not to be a 
nation had also determined that it could have no 
national maritime interests. After all that 

The German 

had passed, authority had little call to be S^Son, 

nice about appearances; and the national 

fleet was sold by auction, in accordance with a decree 

of the restored Diet of Frankfort, in the summer of 


It was with deep disappointment and humiliation 
that the Liberals of Germany, and all in whom the 
hatred of democratic change had not overpowered the 
love of country, witnessed the issue of the Germanyafter 
movement of 1848. In so far as that move- 
ment was one directed towards national union it had 
totally failed, and the state of things that had existed 
before 1848 was restored without change. As a move- 
ment of constitutional and social reform, it had not 
been so entirely vain ; nor in this respect can it be said 
that Germany after the year 1848 returned altogether 
to what it was before it. Many of the leading figures 
of the earlier time re-appeared indeed with more or 
less of lustre upon the stage. Metternich though 

Ernst II., i. 377. Hortslet, Map of Europe, ii. 1106, 1129, 1151. 
Parl. Papers, 1864, kiii., p. 29 : 1864, Ixv., pp. 30, 187. 

152 MODERN EUROPE. 1849-1859- 

excluded from office by younger men, beamed upon 
Vienna with the serenity of a prophet who had lived to 
see most of his enemies shot and of a martyr who had 
returned to one of the most enviable Salons in Europe. 
No dynasty lost its throne, no class of the population 
had been struck down with proscription as were the 
clergy and the nobles of France fifty years before. Yet 
the traveller familiar with Germany before the revolu- 
tion found that much of the old had now vanished, 
much of a new world come into being. It was not 
sought by the re-established Governments to undo at 
one stroke the whole of the political, the social, the 
agrarian legislation of the preceding time, as in some 
other periods of reaction. The nearest approach that 
was made to this was in a decree of the Diet annulling 
the Declaration of Eights drawn up by the Frankfort 
Assembly, and requiring the Governments to bring into 
conformity with the Federal Constitution all laws and 
institutions made since the beginning of 1848. Parlia- 
mentary government was thereby enfeebled, but not 
necessarily extinguished. Governments narrowed the 
franchise, curtailed the functions of representative 
assemblies, filled these with their creatures, coerced 
voters at elections ; but, except in Austria, there was 
no open abandonment of constitutional forms. In some 
States, as in Saxony under the reactionary rule of Count 
Beust, the system of national representation established 
in 1848 was abolished and the earlier Estates were re- 
vived ; in Prussia the two Houses of Parliament con- 
tinued in existence, but in such dependence upon the 


royal authority, and under such strong pressure of an 
aristocratic and official reaction, that, after struggling 
for some years in the Lower House, the Liberal leaders 
at length withdrew in despair. The character which 
Gfovernment now assumed in Prussia was indeed far 
more typical of the condition of Germany at large than 
was the bold and uncompromising despotism of Prince 
Schwarzenberg in Austria. Manteuffel, in whom the 
Prussian epoch of reaction was symbolised, was not a 
cruel or a violent Minister; but his rule was stamped 
with a peculiar and degrading meanness, more irritating 
to those who suffered under it than harsher wrong. In 
his hands government was a thing of eavesdropping 
and espionage, a system of petty persecution, a school 
of subservience and hypocrisy. He had been the instru- 
ment at Olmiitz of such a surrender of national honour 
and national interests as few nations have ever endured 
with the chances of war still untried. This surrender 
may, 'in the actual condition of the Prussian army, have 
been necessary, but the abasement of it seemed to cling 
to Manteuffel and to lower all his conceptions of govern- 
ment. Even where the conclusions of his policy were 
correct they seemed to have been reached by some 
unworthy process. Like Germany at large, Prussia 
breathed uneasily under an oppression which was every- 
where felt and yet was hard to define. Its best elements 
were those which suffered the most : its highest intel- 
lectual and political aims were those which most ex- 
cited the suspicion of the Government. Its King 
had lost whatever was stimulating or elevated in his 

154 MODERN EUROPE. 1849-1859. 

illusions. From him no second alliance with Liberal- 
ism, no further effort on behalf of German unity, was to 
be expected : the hope for Germany and for Prussia, 
if hope there was, lay in a future reign. 

The powerlessness of Prussia was the measure of 
Austrian influence and prestige. The contrast pre- 
sented by Austria in 1848 and Austria in 1851 was 
indeed one that might well arrest political observers. 
Its recovery had no doubt been effected partly by 
foreign aid, and in the struggle with the Magyars a 
Austria after dangerous obligation had been incurred to- 
wards Russia ; but scarred and riven as the 
fabric was within, it was complete and imposing without. 
Not one of the enemies who in 1848 had risen against 


the Court of Vienna now remained standing. In Italy, 
Austria had won back what had appeared to be hope- 
lessly lost ; in Germany it had more than vindicated its 
old claims. It had thrown its rival to the ground, and 
the full measure of its ambition was perhaps even yet 
not satisfied. " First to humiliate Prussia, then to 
destroy it," was the expression in which Schwarzenberg 
summed up his German policy. Whether, with his 
undoubted firmness and daring, the Minister possessed 
the intellectual qualities and the experience necessary 
for the successful administration of an Empire built up, 
as Austria now was, on violence and on the suppression 
of every national force, was doubted even by his ad- 
mirers. The proof, however, was not granted to him, 
for a sudden death carried him off in his fourth year of 
power (April 5th, 1852). Weaker men succeeded to his 

1819-1859. AUSTRIA. 155 

task. The epoch of military and diplomatic triumph 
was now ending-, the gloomier side of the reaction stood 
out unrelieved by any new succession of victories. 
Financial disorder grew worse and worse. Clericalism 
claimed its bond from the monarchy which it had 
hel-ped to restore. In the struggle of the nationalities 
of Austria against the central authority the Bishops 
had on the whole thrown their influence on to the side 
of the Crown. The restored despotism owed too much 
to their help and depended too much on their continued 
goodwill to be able to refuse their demands. Thus the 
new centralised administration, reproducing in general 
the uniformity of government attempted by the Em- 
peror Joseph II., contrasted with this in its subservience 
to clerical power. Ecclesiastical laws and jurisdictions 
were allowed to encroach on the laws and jurisdiction 
of the -State ; education was made over to the priest- 
'hood; within the Church itself the bishops were allowed 
to rule uncontrolled. The very Minister who had taken 
office under Schwarzenberg as the representative of the 
modern spirit, to which the Government 

..,,,,-, , , , Austrian Con- 

still professed to render homage, became cordat, s ep t. is, 
the instrument of an act of submission to 
the Papacy which marked the lowest point to which 
Austrian policy fell. Alexander Bach, a prominent 
Liberal inf Vienna at the beginning of 1848, had ac- 
cepted office at the price of his independence, and 
surrendered himself to the aristocratic and clerical 
influences that dominated the Court. Consistent only 
in his efforts to simplify the forms of government, to 

156 MODERN EUROPE. wta-wso. 

promote the ascendency of German over all other ele- 
ments in the State, to maintain the improvement in the 
peasant's condition effected by the Parliament of Krem- 
sier, Bach, as Minister of the Interior, made war in all 
other respects on his own earlier principles. In the 
former representative of the Liberalism of the profes- 
sional classes in Vienna absolutism had now its most effi- 
cient instrument ; and the Concordat negotiated by Bach 
with the Papacy in 1855 marked the definite submis- 
sion of Austria to the ecclesiastical pretensions which 
in hese years of political languor and discouragement; 
gained increasing recognition throughout Central Europe] 
Ultramontanism had sought allies in many political 
camps since the revolution of 1848. It had dallied in 
some countries with Republicanism ; but its truer in- 
stincts divined in the victory of absolutist systems its 
own surest gain. Accommodations between the Papacy 
and several of the German Governments were made in 
the years succeeding 1849; and from the centralised 
despotism of the Emperor Erancis Joseph the Church 
won concessions which since the time of Maria Theresa 
it had in vain sought from any ruler of the Austrian 

The European drama which began in 1848 had 

more of unity and more of concentration in, its opening 

than in its close. In Italy it ends with the fall 

France after ^ Venice ', in Germany the interest lingers 

till the days of Olmlitz ; in France there 

is no decisive break in the action until the Coup d'Etat 

which, at the end of the year 1851, made o Louis 


FRANCE. 157 

Napoleon in all but name Emperor of France. The six 
million votes which had raised Louis Napoleon to the Pre- 
sidency of the Republic might well have filled with alarm 
all who hoped for a future of constitutional rule ; yet the 
warning conveyed by the election sefems to have been 
understood by but few. As the representative of order 
and authority, as the declared enemy of Socialism, Louis 

Napoleon was on the same side as the Par- 
Louis Napoleon. 

liamentary majority ; he had even been 

supported in his candidature by Parliamentary leaders 

such as M. Thiers. His victory was welcomed as a 

victory over Socialism and the Red Republic ; he had 

received some patronage from the official party of order, 

and it was expected that, as nominal chief of the State, 

he would act as the instrument of this party. He was 

an adventurer, but an adventurer with so little that was 

imposing about him, that it scarcely occurred to men of 

'influence in Paris, to credit him with the capacity for 

mischief. His mean look and spiritless address, the 

absurdities of his past, the insignificance of his political 

friends, caused him to be regarded during his first 

months of public life with derision rather than with 

fear. The French, said M. Thiers long afterwards, 

*y made two mistakes about Louis Napoleon : the first 

when they took him for a fool, the second when they 

took him for a man of genius. It was not until the 

appearance of the letter to Colonel Ney, in which the 

President ostentatiously separated himself from his 

Ministers and emphasised his personal will in the 

direction of the foreign policy of France, that suspicions 


of danger to the Republic from Ins ambition arose. 
From this time, in the narrow circle of the Ministers 
whom official duty brought into direct contact with the 
President, a constant sense of insecurity and dread of 
some new surprise on his part prevailed, though the 
accord which had been broken by the letter to Colonel 
Ney was for a while outwardly re-established, and the 
forms of Parliamentary government remained unim- 

The first year of Louis Napoleon's term of office 
was drawing to a close when a message from him was 
delivered to the Assembly which seemed to announce 
an immediate attack upon the Constitution. The 
Ministry in office was composed of men of high Parlia- 
mentary position ; it enjoyed the entire confidence of a 
Messa-e of oct great majority in the Assembly, and had 
31, is49. enforced with at least sufficient energy the 

<~J / 

measures of public security which the President and 
the country seemed agreed in demanding. Suddenly, 
on the 31st of October, the President announced to the 
Assembly by a message carried by one of his aides-de- 
camp that the Ministry were dismissed. The reason 
assigned for their dismissal was the want of unity within 
the Cabinet itself; but the language used by the Presi- 
dent announced much more than a ministerial change. 
" France, in the midst of confusion, seeks for the hand, 
the will of him whom it elected on the 10th of Decem- 
ber. T^he victory won on that day was the victory of a 
sysiejiL^for the nanrfe of Napoleon is in itself a pro- 
gramme. It signifies order, authority, religion, national 



prosperity within ; national dignity without. It is^his 
.policy, inaugurated by my election, that I desire io 
carry to triumph with the support of the Assembly and 

of the people." In order to save the Republic from 

anarchy, to maintain, the prestige of France among 
other nations, the President declared that he needed 
men of action rather than of words ; yet when the list 
of the new Ministers appeared, it contained scarcely a 
single name of weight. Louis Napoleon had called to 
office persons whose very obscurity had marked them as 
his own instruments, and guaranteed to him the as- 
cendency which he had not hitherto possessed within 
the Cabinet. Satisfied with having given this proof of 
his power, he resumed the appearance of respect, if not 
of cordiality, towards the Assembly. He had learnt to 
beware of precipitate action ; above two years of office 
were still before him ; and he had now done enough to 
make it clear to all who were disposed to seek their 
fortunes in a new political cause that their services on 
his behalf would be welcomed, and any excess of zeal 
more than pardoned. From this time there grew up a 
party which had for its watchword the exaltation of 
vL^uis Napoleon and the derision of the methods of 
j/rarliamentary government. Journalists, nn si1 ccessFul 
^politicians, adventurers of every description, were en- 
listed in the ranks of this obscure but active band. 
For their acts and their utterances no one was respon- 
sible but themselves. They were disavowed without 
compunction when their hardihood went too far; but 
their ventures brought them no peril, and the generosity 

160 MODERN EUROPE. isso. 

of the President was not wanting to those who in- 
sisted on serving him in spite of himself. 

France was still trembling with the shock of the 
Four Days of June ; and measures of repression 
formed the common ground upon which Louis Napo- 
leon and the Assembly met without fear of conflict. 
Certain elections which were held in the spring of 
rL850, and which gave a striking victory in Paris and 
elsewhere to Socialist or Ultra-Democratic candidates, 
revived the alarms of the owners of property, and 
Inspired the fear that with universal suffrage the 
itself might ultimately fall into the 
o f the Red Republicans. Trie principle of uni- 
versal suffrage had been proclaimed almost by acci- 
dent in the midst of the revolution of 1848. It had 
been embodied in the Constitution of that year because 
it was found already in existence. No party had 
"seriously considered the conditions under which it was 
to be exercised, or had weighed the political qualifica- 
tions of the mass to whom it was so lightly thrown. 
When election after election returned to the Chamber 
(/men whose principles were held to menace society itself, 
the cry arose that France must be saved from the hands 
of the vile multitude ; and the President called upon a 
..Committee of the Assembly to frame the necessary 
measures r>f ^Ip^tnvnl reform. - Within a 

Law limiting the in i e 1 i r^ -ii 

Franchise, May week the work oi the Committee was com- 

31, 1850. - : -- - 

pleted. and the law which it had rWjgj 
was brought before the Assembly. It was proposed 
that, instead of a residence of six months, a continuous 


residence of three years in the same commune should 
he required of every voter, and that the fulfilment of this 
condition should he proved, not by ordinary evidence, 
hut hy one of certain specified acts, such as the pay- 
ment of personal taxes. With modifications of little 
importance the Bill was passed by the Assembly. 
Whether its real effect was foreseen even by those who 
desired the greatest possible limitation of the franchise 
is doubtful ; it is certain that many who supported it 
believed, in their ignorance of the practical working of 
electoral laws, that they were excluding from the fran- 
chise only the vagabond and worthless class which 
has no real place within the body politic. When the 
electoral lists drawn up in pursuance of the measure 
appeared, they astounded all parties alike. Three out of 
the ten millions nf voters in France were disfranchised. 
Not only the inhabitant^ of whole qnn.rfprs in thp grpn.f. 
cities but the poorer classes among the peasantry 
throughout Frn.nne, had rh'snpponrof] from tho oWtornl 

Ivyty. Thp AqqomKly linrl nf nnn Klnw r.nn y<nfnr| Jntfl 

t enemies the entire mass of the population that lived by 

1 the wages of bodily labour. It had committed an act 

( of political suicide, and had given to a man so little 

( troubled with scruples of honour as Louis Napoleon 

the fatal opportunity of appealing to France as the 

champion of national sovereignty and the vindicator 

of universal suffrage against an Assembly which had 

mutilated it in the interests of class.* 

* Maupas, Meinoires, i. 176. CEuvre.s de Napoleon III., iii. 271. Bar- 
rot, iv. 21. Granier de Cassagnac, Chute de Louis Philippe, ii. 128 ; Recifc 
complet, p. 1. Jerrold, Napoleou III., iii. 203. Tocqueville, Corresp. ii 176. 


162 MODERN EUROPE. isso 

The duration of the Presidency was fixed by the 
Constitution of 1848 at four years, and it was enacted 
that the President should not be re-eligible to his 
Prospects of Dignity. By the operation of certain laws 

Louis Napoleon. /* j i i j i j ii JT 

imperfectly adjusted to one another, the 
tenure of office by Louis Napoleon expired on the 8th 
of May, 1852, while the date for the dissolution of the 
Assembly fell within a few weeks of this day. France 
as therefore threatened with the dangers attending 
the almost simultaneous extinction of all authority. 
The perils of 1852 loomed only too visibly before the 
country, and Louis Napoleon addressed willing hearers 
when, in the summer of 1850, he began to hint at the 
necessity of a prolongation of his tfwn power. The 
Parliamentary recess was employed by the Presi- 
dent in two journeys through the Departments ; the 
first through those of the south-east, where Socialism 
was most active, and where his appearance served at 
once to prove his own confidence and to invigorate the 
friends of authority ; the second through Normandy, 
where the prevailing feeling was strongly in favour of 
firm government, and utterances could safely be made 
by the President which would have brought him into 
some risk at Paris^ In suggesting that France required 
his own continued presence at the head of the State 
Louis Napoleon was not necessarily suggesting a viola- 
tion of the law. It was provided by the Statutes of 
1848 that the Assembly by a vote of three-fourths 
v might order a revision of the Constitution ; and in 
favour of this revision petitions were already being 

1850. LOVIS NAPOLEON. 163 

drawn up throughout the country. Were the clause 
forbidding the re-election of the President removed 
from the Constitution, Louis Napo^on might fairly 
believe that an immense majority of the French people 
would re-invest him with power. He would probably 
have been content with a legal re-election had this been 
rendered possible ; but the Assembly showed little sign 
of a desire to smooth his way, and it therefore became 
necessary for him to seek the means of realising his aims 
in violation of the law, jle had persuaded himself that 
his mission, his destiny, was to rule France ; in other 
words, he had made up his mind to run such risks and 
to sanction such crimes as might be necessary to win 
him sovereign power. With the loftier impulses of 
ambition, motives of a meaner kind stimulated him 
to acts of energy. Never wealthy, the father of a 
family though unmarried ( hp. had exhausted his means. 
and would have returned to private life a destitute 

if not laden with debt. When his own resolution 
flagged, there were those about him too deeply in- 
terested in his fortunes to allow him to draw back. 

It was by means of the army that Louis Napoleon 
intended in the last resort to make himself master of 
France, and the army had therefore to be ^^ Napoleon 
won over to his personal cause. The generals 
who had gained distinction either in the Algerian wars 
or in the suppression of insurrection in France were 
without exception Orleanists or Republicans. Not a 
single officer of eminence was as yet included in the 
Bonapartist band, The President himself had never seen 
L 2 

164 MODERN EUROPE. 1851. 

service except in a Swiss camp of exercise ; beyond his 
name he possessed nothing that could possibly touch 
the imagination of a soldier. The heroic element not 
being discoverable in his person or his career, it re- 
mained to work by more material methods. Louis 
Napoleon had learnt many things in England, and had 
perhaps observed in the English elections of that period 
how much may be effected by the simple means of 
money-bribes and strong drink. The saviour of society 
was not ashamed to order the garrison of Paris double 
rations of brandy and to distribute innumerable doles of 
half a franc or less. Military banquets were given, in 
which the sergeant and the corporal sat side by side 
with the higher officers. Promotion was skilfully 

I/offered or withheld. As the generals of the highest 
position were hostile to Bonaparte, it was the easier to 

_jtempt their subordinates with the prospect of their 
Tr> the acclamations which greeted the Presi- 

dent at the reviews held at Paris 1T 1 the mitiimn nf 1 
in the behaviour both of officers and men in certain 
regiments, it was seen how successful had been the 
emissaries of Bonapartism. The Committee which re- 
presented the absent Chamber in vain called the Minis- 
ter of War to account for these irregularities. It was 
in vain that Changarnier, who, as commander both of 
the National Guard of Paris and of the 

Dismissal of .,. i T j i i -i , i 

Changarnier, hrst military division, seemed to hold the 

Jan., 1851. <* 

arbitrament between President and Assembly 
in his hands, openly declared at the beginning of 1851 
.in favour of the Constitution. He was dismissed from 


his post ; and although a vote of censure which fol- 
lowed this dismissal led to the resignation of the 
Ministry, the Assembly was unable to reinstate Chan- 
gamier in his command, and helplessly witnessed the 
authority which he had held pass into hostile or 
untrustworthy hands. 

There now remained only one possible means of 
averting the attack upon the Constitution which was so 
clearly threatened, and that was by subject- 
ing the Constitution itself to revision in sion of the 


order that Louis Napoleon might legally 
seek re-election at the end of his Presidency. An over- 
whelming current of public opinion pressed indeed in 
the direction of such a change. However gross and 
undisguised the initiative of the local functionaries in 
preparing the petitions which showered upon the As- 
sembly, the national character of the demand could 
not be doubted. There was no other candidate whose 
name carried with it any genuine popularity or prestige, 
or around whom even the Parliamentary sections at 
enmity with the President could rally. The Assembly 
was divided not very unevenly between Legitimists, 
Qrleanists. and Republicans. Had indeed the two mon- 
archical groups been able to act in accord, they might 
have had some hope of re-establishing the throne ; 
and an attempt had already been made to effect a 
union, on the understanding that the childless Comte 
de Chambord_sliQuM recognise the grandson of Louis 
Philippe as his, heir, the House of Orleans renouncing 
its claims during the lifetime of the chief of the 


elder line. These plans had been frustrated by the 
refusal of the Comte de Chambord to sanction any 
appeal to the popular vote, and the restoration of 
the monarchy was therefore hopeless for the present. 
It remained for the Assembly to decide whether 
V/it would facilitate Louis Napoleon's re-election as 
President by a revision of the Constitution or brave the 
risk of his violent usurpation of power. The position 
was a sad and even humiliating one for those who, 
while they could not disguise their real feeling towards 
the Prince, yet knew themselves unable to count on the 
support of the nation if they should resist him. The 
Legitimists, more sanguine in temper, kept in view an 
ultimate restoration of the monarchy, and lent them- 
selves gladly to any policy which might weaken the 
constitutional safeguards of the Eepublic. The Repub- 
lican minority alone determined to resist any proposal 
for revision, and to stake everything upon the mainten- 
ance of the Constitution in its existing 

Revision of the ^ TT , . , ^-^ , , . 

constitution form. Weak as the Kepubhcans were as 

rejected, July 19. 

compared with the other groups in the 
Assembly when united against them, they were yet 
strong enough to prevent the Ministry from securing 
ttiat majority of three-fourths without which the re- 
Vvision of the Constitution could not be undertaken. 
Four hundred and fifty votes were given in favour of 
revision, two hundred and seventy against it (July 
19th). The proposal therefore fell to the ground, and 
Louis Napoleon, who could already charge the Assem- 
bly with having by its majority destroyed universal 


suffrage, could now charge it with having by its 
linority forbidden the nation to choose its own head. 

He had only 

to decide upon the time and the cirejim stances of the 
coup d'etat which was to rid him of his adversaries and 
to make him master of France. 

Louis Napoleon had few intimate confidants ; the 
chief among these were his half-brother Morny. one of 
the illegitimate offspring of Queen Hortense, a man of 
fashion and speculator in the stocks ; Fial i n p^p^y^ f or 
or Persigny, a person of humble origin who 
had proved himself a devoted follower of the Prince 
through good and evil ; and Fleury, an officer at this 
time on a mission in Algiers. These were not men 
out of whom Louis Napoleon conld form an ad- 
ministration, but they were useful to him in dis- 
. covering and winning over soldiers and officials of 
sufficient standing to give to the execution of the con- 
spiracy something of the appearance of an act of 
Government. A general was needed at the War Office 
who would go all lengths in illegality. Such a man 
had already been found in St. Arnaud. commander of a 
Jjriiiade in Algiers, a brilliant soldier who had redeemed 

a disreputable past by years of hard service, and who 
was known to be ready to treat his French fellow- 
citizens exactly as he would treat the Arabs, As St. 
Arnaud's name was not yet familiar in Paris, a cam- 
paign was arranged in the summer of 1851 for the 
purpose of winning him distinction. At the cost of 
some hundreds of lives St. Arnaud was pushed into 



sufficient fame ; and after receiving congratulations 
proportioned to his exploits from the President's 
own hand, he was summoned to Paris, in order at 
the right moment to be made Minister of War. A 
roop of younger officers, many of whom gained a 
lamentable celebrity as the generals of 18-70, were 
gradually brought over from Algiers and placed round 
the Minister in the capital. The command of the army 
of Paris was given to General Magnan, who, though 
he preferred not to share in the deliberations on the 
coup d'Maf, had promised his co-operation when the 
moment should arrive. The support, or at least the 
acquiescence, of the army seemed thus to be assured. 
The National Guard, which, under Changarnier, would 
probably have rallied in defence of the Assembly, had 
been placed under an officer pledged to keep it in 
inaction. For the management of the police Louis 
Napoleon had fixed upon M. Maupas, Prefet of the 
Haute Garonne. This person, to whose shamelessness 
we owe the most authentic information that exists on 
the coup d'elat, had, while in an inferior station, made 
it his business to ingratiate himself with the President 
by sending to him personally police reports which ought 
to have been sent to the Ministers. The objects and 
the character of M. Maupas were soon enough under- 
stood by Louis Napoleon. He promoted him to high 
office ; sheltered him from the censure of his superiors ; 
and, when the coup d'etat was drawing nigh, called him 
to Paris, in the full and well-grounded confidence that, 
whatever the most perfidious ingenuity could contrive 

1851. ST. AENAUD. 169 

in turning the guardians of the law against the law 
itself, that M. Maupas, as Prefet of Police, might be 
relied upon to accomplish. 

Preparations for the coup d'etat. ^had been so far 
advanced in September that a majority of the conspirators 
had then urged Louis Napoleon to strike the blow with- 
out delay, while the members of the Assembly were still 
dispersed over France in the vacation. St. 

f . . The coup (I'itnt 

Arnaud, however, reiused his assent, de- fixed for De- 

claring that the deputies, if left free, would 
assemble at a distance from Paris, summon to them the 
generals loyal to the Constitution, and commence a 
civil war. He urged that, in order ,to avoid greater 
subsequent-risks, it would be npfipssnry^f.n spize all the 
leading representatives and generals from whom re- 
sistance might be expected, and to hold theia~rmde^ 
durance until the crisis should be over. This simul- 
taneous arrest of all the foremost public men in France 
could only be effected at a time when the Assembly 
was sitting. St. Arnaud therefore demanded that the 
coup d'etat should be postponed till the winter. Another 
reason made for delay. Little as the populace of Paris 
loved the reactionary Assembly, Louis Napoleon was 
not altogether assured that it would quietly witness his 
own usurpation of power. In waiting until the Cham- 
ber should again be in session, he saw the opportunity 
of exhibiting his cause as that of the masses themselves, 
and of justifying his action as the sole means of en- 
forcing popular rights against a legislature obstinately 
bent on denying them. Louis Napoleon's own Ministers 

170 MODERN EUROPE. issi. 

had overthrown universal suffrage. This might indeed 
be matter for comment on the part of the censorious, 
but it was not a circumstance to stand in the way of 
the execution of a great design. Accordingly Louis 
Napoleon determined to demand from the Assembly at 
the opening of the winter session the repeal of the 
electoral law of May 31st, and to make its refusal, on 
which he could confidently reckon^ the, occasioiv of its 
destruction. ^Z^^^^^f^^^^ 

The consprators were up to this time conspirators 
and nothing more. A Ministry still subsisted which 
was not initiated in the President's designs nor alto- 
gether at his command. On his requiring that the 
repeal of .the law of May 31st should be proposed to 
the Assembly, the Cabinet resigned. The way to the 
highest functions of State was thus finally opened for 
the agents of the coup d'etat. St. Arnaud was placed 
v^at the War Office, Maupas at the Prefecture of Police. 
The colleagues assigned to them were too insignificant 
to exercise any control over their actions. At the re- 
opening of the Assembly on the 4th of November an 
energetic message from the President was read. On 
the one hand he denounced avast and perilous com- 
bination of all the most dangerous elements of society 
which threatened to overwhelm France in the following 
year; on the other hand he demanded, with 

Louis Napoleon J 

Jfi^arSS certain undefined safeguards, the re-establish- 
ment of universal suffrage. The middle 
classes were scared with the prospect of a Socialist revo- 
1 ution ; the Assembly was divided against itself, ai;d the 


democracy of Paris flattered by the homage paid to the 
popular vote. With very little delay a measure repeal- 
ing the Law of May 3.1st was introduced into the 
Assembly. It was supported by the Republicans and 
by many members of the other groups; but the majority 
of the Assembly, while anxious to devise some com- 
promise, refused to condemn its own work in the 
nqualified form on which the President insisted. The 
Bill was thrown out by seven votes. Forth- The Awembiy 
with the rumour of an impending coup 
d'etat spread through Paris. The Questors, or members 
charged with the safeguarding of the Assembly, moved 
the resolutions necessary to enable them to secure 
sufficient military aid. Even now prompt action 
might perhaps have saved the Chamber. But the 
Republican deputies, incensed by their defeat on the 
(question of universal suffrage, plunged headlong into 
the snare set for them by the President, and combined 
with his open or secret partisans to reject the proposi- 
tion of the Questors. Changarnier had blindly vouched 
for the fidelity of the army ; one Republican deputy, 
more imaginative than his colleagues, bade the Assembly 
confide in their invisible sentinel, the people. Thus 
the majority of the Chamber, with the clearest warning 
of danger, insisted on giving the aggressor every pos- 
sible advantage. If the imbecility of opponents is the 
best augury of success in a bold enterprise, the Presi- 
dent had indeed little reason to anticipate failure. 

The execution of the coup d'etat was fixed for the 
early morning of December 2nd. On the previous 

172 MODERN EUROPE. 1851. 

evening Louis Napoleon held a public reception at the 
Elysee, his quiet self-possessed manner indicating 
The coup c ntat, nothing of the struggle at hand. Before 
the guests dispersed the President with- 
drew to his study. There the last council of the con- 
spirators was held, and they parted, each to the execu- 
tion of the work assigned to him. The central element 
^in the plan was the arrest of Cavaignac, of Changarnier 
and three other generals who were members of the 
Assembly, of eleven civilian dpprrh'ea inp.lnfUnp^JVT. 
Thiers, and of sixty-two other politicians of influence. 
Maupas summoned to the Prefecture of Police in the 
dead of night a sufficient number of his trusted agents, 
received each of them on hi? arrival in a sppnrnitp rr^Tn, 
and charged each with the arrest of one of the victims. 
The arrests were accomplished before dawn, and the 
leading soldiers and citizens of France met one another 
in the prison of Mazas.^ The Palais Bourbon, the 
meeting-place of the Assembly, was occupied by troops. 
The national printing establishment, was seized by 
y^endarmes, and the proclamations of Louis Napoleon, 
distributed sentence by sentence to different composi- 
tors, were set in type before the workmen knew upon 
'what they were engaged. When day broke the Paris- 
ians found the soldiers in the streets, and the walls 
placarded with manifestoes of Louis Napoleon. The 
lirst of these was a decree which announced in the name 
of the French people that the National Assembly and 
the Council of State were dissolved, that universal suf- 
frage was restored, and that the nation was convoked 

ipsi. THE COUP D'ETAT. 173 

in its electoral colleges from the 14th to the 2 1 st 
of December. The second was a proclamation to the 
people, in which Louis Napoleon denounced at once the 
monarchical conspirators within the Assembly and the 
anarchists who sought to overthrow all'government. His 
duty called upon him to save the Republic by an appeal 
to the nation. He proposed the establishment of a 
decennial executive authority, with a Senate, a Council 
of State, a Legislative Body, and other institutions 
borrowed from the Consulate of 1799. If the nation 

^refused him a majority of its votes he would summon 
a new Assembly and resign his powers ; if the nation 
believed in the cause of which his name was the symbol, 
in France regenerated by the Revolution and organised 
by the Emperor, it would prove this by ratifying his 
V/authority. A third proclamation was addressed to the 
army. In 1830 and in 1848 the army had been treated 

'as the conquered, but its voice was now to be heard. 
Common glories and sorrows united the soldiers of 
France with Napoleon's heir, and the future would 
unite them in common devotion to the repose and 
greatness of their country. 
^ The full meaning of these manifestoes was not at 

' first understood by the groups who read them. The 
Assembly was so unpopular that the announcement of 
its dissolution, with the restoration of uni- 

Paris on Dec. 2. 

versa! suffrage, pleased rather than alarmed 
the democratic quarters of Paris. It was not until 
some hours had passed that the arrests became gener- 
ally known, and that the first symptoms of resistance 


174 MODERN EUROPE. issi. 

appeared. Groups of deputies assembled at the houses of 
the Parliamentary leaders ; a body of fifty even succeeded 
in entering the Palais Bourbon and in commencing a 
debate : they were, however, soon dispersed by soldiers, 
ater in the day above two hundred members assembled 
at the Mairie of the Tenth Arrondissement. There 
they passed resolutions declaring the President removed 
from his office, and appointing a commander of the 
troops at Paris. The first officers who were sent to 
clear the Mairie flinched in the execution of their work, 
and withdrew for further orders. The M agistrales j^f 
the High Court, whose duty it was to order the im- 
peachment of the President in case of the violation of 
his oath to the Constitution, assembled, and commenced 
the necessary proceedings ; but before they could sign a 
warrant, soldiers forced their way into the hall and drove 

the judges from tl 
appeared with a 

e Bench. In due course General Forey 
strong body of troops at the Mairie, 

where the two hundred deputies were assembled. Ee- 
fusing to disperse\ they were one and all arrested, and 
conducted as prisoners between files of troops to the 
y' Barracks of the Quai d'Orsay. The National Guard, 
whose drums had been removed by their commander in 
view of any spontaneous movement to arms, remained 
invisible. Louis Napoleon rode out amidst the accla- 
mations of the soldiery; and when the day closed it 
seemed as if Paris had resolved to accept the change of 
Government and the overthrow of the Constitution 
without a struggle. 

There were, however, a few resolute men at work in 

1851. THE COUP D'ETAT. 175 

the workmen's quarters ; and in the wealthier part of 
the city the outrage upon the National Representation 
gradually roused a spirit of resistance. On the morning 
of December 3rd the Deputy Baudin met 
with his death in attempting to defend^ a 
barricade which had been erected in the Faubourg St. 
Antoiiie. The artisans of eastern Paris showed, 
however, little inclination to take up arms on 
behalf of those who had crushed them in the Four 
Days of .Tune the agitation was strongest within the 
Boulevards, and spread westwards towards the stateliest 
district of Paris. The barricades erected on the south 
of the Boulevards were so numerous, the crowds so for- 
midable, that towards the close of the day the troops 
were withdrawn, and it was determined that after a night 
of quiet they should make a general attack and end 
the struggle at one blow. At midday on 
December 4th divisions of the army con- 
verged from all directions upon the insurgent quarter. 
The barricades were captured or levelled by artillery, 
and with a loss on the part of the troops of twenty-eight 
killed and a hundred and eighty wounded resistance 
was overcome. But the soldiers had been taught to 
regard the inhabitants of Paris as their enemies, and 
they bettered the instructions given them. Maddened 
by drink or panic, they commenced indiscriminate 
firing in the Boulevards after the conflict was over, 
and slaughtered all who either in the street or at the 
windows of the houses came within range of their 
bullets. According to official admissions, the lives of 

173. MODERN EUROPE. msi. 

sixteen civilians paid for every soldier slain ; inde- 
pendent estimates place far higher the number of the 
victims of this massacre. Two thousand arrests followed, 
and every Frenchman who appeared dangerous to Louis 
Napoleon's myrmidons, from Thiers and Victor Hugo 
down to the anarchist orators of the wineshops, was 
"either transported, exiled, or lodged in prison. Thus 
was^the Republic preserved and society saved. 

France in general received the news of the coup 
d'etat with indifference : where it excited popular move- 
ments these movements were of such a character that 
Louis Napoleon drew from them the utmost profit. A 
The plebiscite certain fierce, blind Socialism had spread 
among the poorest of the rural classes in the 
centre and south of France. In these departments there 
were isolated risings, accompanied by acts of such mur- 
derous outrage and folly that a general terror seized the 
surrounding districts. In the course of a few days the 
predatory bands were dispersed, and an unsparing 
chastisement was inflicted on all who were concerned in 
their misdeeds ; but the reports sent to Paris were too 
serviceable to Louis Napoleon to be left in obscurity ; 
and these brutish village-outbreaks, which collapsed at 
the first appearance of a handful of soldiers, were re- 
presented as the prelude to a vast Socialist revolution 
ni which the coup d'etat, and that alone, had saved 
France. Terrified by the re-appearance of the Red 
Spectre^, the French nation proceeded on the 20th of 
December to pass its judgment on the accomplished 
usurpation. The question submitted for the plebiscite 

1852^ NAPOLEON III. 177 

was, whether the people desiredthe maintenance of 
.Louis .Napoleon's authority and committed to him the 
necessary powers for ftsj^hlishiTig a Constitution on the 

basis laid down in his proclamation of December 2nd. 
Seven million Y n tpfl anflw?^ fV^cgnoc^n { n fV^ a,ffitm- 
ative, less than one-tenth of that number in the nega- 
tive. The result was made known on the last day of 
the year 1851. On the first day of the new year Louis 
Napoleon attended a service of thanksgiving at Notre 
Dame, took possession of the Tuileries, and restored the 
eagle as the military emblem of France. He_was now 
in all but name a.n absolute sovereign The Church, 
the army, the ever-servile body of the civil administra- 
tion, waited impatiently for the revival of the Imperial 
itle. Nor was the saviour of society the man to shrink 
from further responsibilities. Before the year closed 
the people was once more called upon to 
express its will. Seven millions of votes Emperor" Dec! 

2, 1852. 

pronounced for hereditary power ; and on 

the anniversary of the coup d'etat Napoleon III. was 

proclaimed Emperor of the French. Q 



England and France in 1851 Russia under Nicholas The Hungarian Refugees 
Dispute between France and Russia on the Holy Places Nicholas and 
the British Ambassador Lord Stratford de Redcliffe Menschikoff's 
MissionsRussian Troops enter the Danubian Principalities Lord Aber- 
deen's Cabinet Movements of the Fleets The Vienna Note The Fleets 
pass the Dardanelles Turkish Squadron destroyed at Sinope Declaration 
of "War Policy of Austria Policy of Prussia The Western Powers and 
the European Concert Siege of Silistria The Principalities evacuated 
Further objects of the "Western Powers Invasion of the Crimea Battle 
of the Alma The Flank March Balaclava Inkermann Winter in the 
Crimea Death of Nicholas Conference of Vienna Austria Progress of 
the Siege Plans of Napoleon III. Canrobert and Pelissier Unsuccessful 
Assault Battle of the Tchernaya Capture of the Malakoff Fall of Sebas- 
topol Fall of Kars Negotiations for Peace The Conference of Paris 
Treaty of Paris The Danubian Principalities Continued discord in the 
Ottoman Empire Revision of the Treaty of Paris in 1871. 

THE year 1851 was memorable in England as that 
of the Great Exhibition. Thirty- six years of peace, 
marked by an enormous development of manufacturing 
industry, by the introduction of railroads, and by the 
victory of the principle of Tree Trade, had culminated 
in a spectacle so impressive and so novel that to many it 
seemed the emblem and harbinger of a new epoch in 
the history of mankind, in which war should 
cease, and the rivalry of nations should at 
length find its true scope in the advancement of the 
arts of peace. The apostles of Free Trade had idealised 
the cause for which they contended. The unhappiness 
and the crimes of nations had, as they held, been due 


principally to the action of governments, which plunged 
harmless millions into war for dynastic ends, and 
paralysed human energy by their own blind and sense- 
less interference with the natural course of exchange. 
Compassion for the poor and the suffering, a just resent- 
ment against laws which in the interest of one dominant 
class condemned the mass of the nation to a life of 
want, gave moral fervour and elevation to the teaching 
of Cobden and those who shared his spirit. Like others 
who have been constrained by a noble enthusiasm, they 
had their visions; and in their sense of the greatness of 
that new force which was ready to operate upon human 
life, they both forgot the incompleteness of their own 
doctrine, and under-estimated the influences which 
worked, and long must work, upon mankind in an 
opposite direction. In perfect sincerity the leader of 
English economical reform at the middle of this century 
looked forward to a reign of peace and of unfettered 
intercourse among the members of the European family. 
What the man of genius and conviction had pro- 
claimed the charlatan repeated in his turn. Louis 
Napoleon appreciated the charm which schemes of com- 
mercial development .exercised upon the trading classes 
in France. He was ready to salute the Imperial eagles 
as objects of worship, and to invoke the memories of 
Napoleon's glory when addressing soldiers ; when it 
concerned him to satisfy the commercial world, he was 
the very embodiment of peace and of peaceful industry. 
" Certain persons," he said, in an address at Bordeaux, 
shortly before assuming the title of Emperor, " say 
M 2 


that the Empire is war. I say that the Empire 
is peace ; for France desires peace, and when France 
is satisfied the world is tranquil. We have waste 
territories to cultivate, roads to open, harbours to dig, a 
system of railroads to complete ; we have to bring all 
our great western ports into connection with the Ameri- 
can continent by a rapidity of communication which we, 
still want. We have ruins to restore, false gods to 
overthrow, truths to make triumphant. This is the 
sense that I attach to the Empire ; these are the con- 
quests which I contemplate." Never had the ideal of 
industrious peace been more impressively set before 
mankind than in the years which succeeded the con- 
vulsion of 1848. Yet the epoch on which Europe was 
then about to enter proved to be pre-eminently an epoch 
of war. In the next quarter of a century there w,as not 
one of the Great Powers which was not engaged in an 
armed struggle with its rivals. Nor were the wars of 
this period in any sense the result of accident, or dis- 
connected with the stream of political tendencies which 
makes the history of the age. With one exception 
they left in their train great changes for which the 
time was ripe, changes which for more than a genera- 
tion had been the recognised objects of national desire, 
but which persuasion and revolution had equally failed 
to bring into effect. The Crimean War alone was 
barren in positive results of a lasting nature, and may 
seem only to have postponed, at enormous cost of life, 
the fall of a doomed and outworn Power. But the 
time has not yet arrived when the real bearing of the 


overthrow of Eussia in 1854 on the destiny of the' 
Christian races of Turkey can be confidently expressed. 
The victory of the Sultan's protectors delayed the 
emancipation of these races for twenty years ; the 
victory, or the unchecked aggression, 6f Eussia in 1854 
might possibly have closed to them for ever the ways to 
national independence. 

The plans formed by the Empress Catherine in the 
last century for the restoration of the Greek Empire 
under a prince of the Eussian House had long been 
abandoned at St. Petersburg. The later 

Russian policy 

aim of Eussian policy found its clearest ex- under Nicholas - 
pression in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, extorted from 
Sultan Mahmud in 1833 in the course of the first war 
against Mehemet Ali. This Treaty, if it had not been 
set aside by the Western Powers, would have made the 
Ottoman Empire a vassal State under the Czar's pro- 
tection. In the concert of Europe which was called 
into being by the second war of Mehemet Ali against 
the Sultan in 1840, Nicholas had considered it his 
interest to act with England and the German Powers in 
pefence of the Porte against its Egyptian rival and 
pis French ally. A policy of moderation had been 
imposed upon Eussia by the increased watchfulness 
and activity now displayed by the other European States 
in all that related to the Ottoman Empire. Isolated 
aggression had become impracticable ; it was necessary 
for Eussia to seek the countenance or support of some 
ally before venturing on the next step in the extension 
of its power southwards. In 1844 Nicholas visited^ 

182 MODERN EUROPE. 1844-54. 

England. The object of his journey was to sound the 
Court and the Government, and to lay the 

Nicholas in 

, England, 1844. foundation for concerted action between 
Eussia and England, to the exclusion of France, 
when circumstances should bring about the dis-^, 
| solution of the Ottoman Empire, an event which the 
\ Czar believed to be not far off. Peel was then Prime 
Minister; Lord Aberdeen was Foreign Secretary. Aber- 
deen had begun his political career in a diplomatic 
mission to the Allied Armies in 1814. His feelings 
towards Russia were those of a loyal friend towards an 
old ally ; and the remembrance of the epoch of 1814, 
when the young Nicholas had made acquaintance with 
Lord Aberdeen in France, appears to have given to the 
Czar a peculiar sense of confidence in the goodwill of 
the English Minister towards himself. Nicholas spoke 
freely with Aberdeen, as well as with Peel and Wel- 
lington, on the impending fall of the Ottoman Empire. 
" We have," he said, " a sick, a dying man on our 
hands. We must keep him alive so long as it is pos- 
sible to do so, but we must frankly take into view all 
contingencies. I wish for no inch of Turkish soil 
myself, but neither will I permit any other Power to 
seize an inch of it. France, which has designs upon 
Africa, upon the Mediterranean, and upon the East, is 
the only Power to be feared. An understanding between 
England and Russia will preserve the peace of Europe." 
If the Czar pursued his speculations further into detail, 
of which there is no evidence, he elicited no response. 
He was heard with caution, and his visit appears to 


have produced nothing more than the formal expression 
of a desire on the part of the British Government that 
the existing treaty-rights of Russia should be respected 
by the Porte, together with an unmeaning promise that, 
if unexpected events should occur in Turkey, Russia and 
England should enter into counsel as to the best course 
of action to be pursued in common.* 

Nicholas, whether from policy or from a sense of 
kingly honour which at most times powerfully in- 
fluenced him, did not avail himself of the prostration 
of the Continental Powers in 1848 to attack Turkey. 
He detested revolution, as a crime against the divinely 
ordered subjection of nations to their rulers, 
and would probably have felt himself de- 
graded had he, in the spirit of his predecessor Catherine, 
turned the calamities of his brother-monarchs to his 
own separate advantage. It accorded better with 
' his proud nature, possibly also with the schemes of a 
far-reaching policy, for Russia to enter the field as the 
protector of the Hapsburgs against the rebel Hungarians 
than for its armies to snatch from the Porte what the 
lapse of time and the goodwill of European allies would 
probably give to Russia at no distant date without a 
struggle. Disturbances at Bucharest and at Jassy 
led indeed to a Russian intervention in the Danu- 
bian Principalities in the interests of a despotic 

* Stockmar, 396. Eastern Papers (i.e., Parliamentary Papers, 1854, 
vol. 71), part 6. Malmesbury, Memoirs of an ex-Minister, i. 402 ; the 
last probably inaccurate. Diplomatic Study of the Crimean War, i. 11. 
This work is a Russian official publication, and, though loose and untrust- 
worthy, is valuable as showing the Russian official view. 

184 MODERN EUROPE, 1848-53. 

system of government ; but Eussia possessed by treaty 
protecfcoral rights over these Provinces. The mili- 
tary occupation which followed the revolt against the 
Hospodars was the subject of a convention between 
Turkey and Russia ; it was effected by the armies of 
the two Powers jointly ; and at the expiration of two 
years the Russian forces were peacefully withdrawn. 
More serious were the difficulties which arose from the 
flight of Kossuth and other Hungarian leaders into 
j Turkey after the subjugation of Hungary ^^^ 
Iby the allied Austrian and Russian armies. 
The Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg united in 
demanding from the Porte the surrender of these 
refugees ; the Sultan refused to deliver them up, and 
he was energetically supported by Great Britain, 
Kossuth's children on their arrival at Constantinople 
being received and cared for at the British Embassy. 
The tyrannous demand of the two Emperors, the 
courageous resistance of the Sultan, excited the utmost 
interest in Western Europe. By a strange turn of 
fortune, the Power which at the end of the last century 
had demanded from the Court of Vienna the Greek 
leader Rhegas, and had put him to death as soon as he 
was handed over by the Austrian police, was now gain- 
ing the admiration of all free nations as the last barrier 
that sheltered the champions of European liberty from 
the vengeance of despotic might. The Czar and the 
Emperor of Austria had not reckoned with the forces of 
public indignation aroused against them in the West 
by their attempt to wrest their enemies from the 

1848-53. NICHOLAS. 185 

Sultan's hand. They withdrew their ambassadors from 
Constantinople and threatened to resort to force. But 
the appearance of the British and French fleets at the 
Dardanelles gave a new aspect to the dispute. The Em- 
perors learnt that if they made war upbn Turkey for the 
question at issue they would have to fight also against 
the Western Powers. The demand for the surrender 
of the refugees was withdrawn ; and in undertaking to 
keep the principal of them under surveillance for a 
reasonable period, the Sultan gave to the two Imperial 
Courts such satisfaction as they could, without loss of 
dignity, accept.* 

The coup d'etat of Louis Napoleon at the end of the 
year 1851 was witnessed by the Czar with sympathy 
and admiration as a service to the cause of order ; but 
the assumption of the Imperial title by the Dispute between 
Prince displeased him exceedingly. While Russia on the 

J Holy Places, 

'not refusing to recognise Napoleon III., 1850 " 2< 
he declined to address him by the term (mon frere] 
usually employed by monarchs in writing to one 
another. In addition to the question relating to the 
Hungarian refugees, a dispute concerning the 

Places in Palestine threatened to cause strife between / 
France and Eussia. The same wave of religious and 
theological interest which in England produced the 
Tractarian movement brought into the arena of politi- 
cal life in France an enthusiasm for the Church long 
strange to the Legislature and the governing circles of 
Paris. In the Assembly of 1849 Montalembert, the 

Ashley's Palinerston, ii. 142. Lane Poole, Stratford de Redcliffe,ii. 191. 

18.1 MODERN EUROPE. 1849-53. 

spokesman of this militant Catholicism, was one of the 
foremost figures. Louis Napoleon, as President, sought 
the favour of those whom Montalembert led ; and the 
same Government which restored the Pope to Rome 
demanded from the Porte a stricter enforcement of the 

^rights of the Latin Church in the East. The earliest 
Christian legends had been localised in various spots 
around Jerusalem. These had been in the ages of faith 
the goal of countless pilgrimages, and in more recent 
centuries they had formed the object of treaties between 

v/ the Porte and France. Greek monks, however, disputed 
with Latin monks for the guardianship of the Holy 
Places; and as the power of Kussia grew, the privileges 

**" of the Greek monks had increased. The claims of the 
rival brotherhoods, which related to doors, keys, stars 
and lamps, might probably have been settled to the 
satisfaction of all parties within a few hours by an ex- 
perienced stage- manager ; in the hands of diplomatists 
bent on obtaining triumphs over one another they as- 
sumed dimensions that overshadowedthe.peace of Europe. 
The French and the Russian Ministers at Constantinople 
alternately tormented the Sultan in the character of 
aggrieved sacristans, until, at the beginning of 1852, 
the Porte compromised itself with both parties by ad- 
judging to each rights which it professed also to secure 
to the other. A year more, spent in prevarications, in 
excuses, and in menaces, ended with the triumph of the 
French, with the evasion of the promises made by the 
Sultan to Russia, and with the discomfiture of the 
Greek Church in the person of the monks who 



officiated at the Holy Sepulchre and the Shrine of the 

Nicholas treated the conduct of the Porte as an 
outrage upon himself. A conflict which had hroken 
out between the Sultan and the Montenegrins, and 
which now threatened to take a deadly form, confirmed 
the Czar in his belief that the time for resolute action 
had arrived. At the beginning of the year 
C 1853 he addressed himself to Sir Hamil- sir H. Seymour, 

Jan., Feb., 1853. 

ton Seymour, British ambassador at St. 
Petersburg, in terms much stronger and clearer than 
those which he had used towards Lord Aberdeen nine 
years before. " The Sick Man," he said, " was in extre- 
mities ; the time had come for a clear understanding 
between England and Russia. The occupation of Con- 
stantinople by Eussian troops might be necessary, but 
the Czar would not hold it permanently. He would 
not permit any other Power to establish itself at the 
Bosphorus, neither would he permit the Ottoman Em- 
pire to be broken up into Republics to afford a refuge 
to the Mazzinis and the Kossuths of Europe. The 
Danubian Principalities were already independent States 
"Bunder Russian protection. The other possessions of the 
Sultan north of the Balkans might be placed on the 
same footing. England might annex Egypt and Crete." 
After making this communication to the British am- 
bassador, and receiving the reply that England declined 
to enter into any schemes based on the fall of the 
Turkish Empire and disclaimed all desire for the 

* Eastern Papers, i. 55. Diplomatic Study, i. 121. 

188 MODERN EUROPE. 1863. 

annexation of any part of the Sultan's dominions, 
Nicholas despatched Prince Menschikoff to Constantin- 
ople, to demand from the Porte not only an immediate 
settlement of the questions relating to the Holy Places, 
but a Treaty guaranteeing to the Greek Church the 
undisturbed enjoyment of all its ancient rights and the 
benefit of all privileges that might be accorded by the 
Porte to any other Christian communities.* 

The Treaty which Menschikoff was instructed to 
demand would have placed the Sultan and the Czar in 
the position of contracting parties with regard to the 
The oiaim* of entire body of rights and privileges enjoyed 
by the Sultan's subjects of the Greek con- 
fession, and would so have made the violation of these 
rights in the case of any individual Christian a matter 
entitling Russia to interfere, or to claim satisfaction as 
for the breach of a Treaty engagement. By the Treaty 
of Kainardjie (1774) the Sultan had indeed bound him- 
self " to protect the Christian religion and its Churches ; " 
but this phrase was too indistinct to create specific matter 
of Treaty- obligation ; and if it had given to Russia any 
general right of interference on behalf of members of 
the Greek Church, it would have given it the same 
right in behalf of all the Roman Catholics and all the 
Protestants in the Sultan's dominions, a right which 
the Czars had never professed to enjoy. Moreover the 
Treaty of Kainardjie itself forbade by implication any 
such construction, for it mentioned by name one eccle- 
siastical building for whose priests the Porte did 

* Eastern Papers, ,v., 2, 19. 


concede to Russia the right of addressing representations 
to the Sultan. Over the Danubian Principalities Russia 
possessed by the Treaty of Adrianople undoubted pro- 
tectoral rights ; but these Provinces stood on a footing 
quite different from that of the remainder of the 
Empire. That the Greek Church possessed by custom 
and by enactment privileges which it was the duty of 
the Sultan to respect, no one contested : the novelty of 
Menschikoff's claim was that the observation of these 
rights should be made matter of Treaty with Russia. 
The importance of the demand was proved by the fact 
that Menschikoff strictly forbade the Turkish Ministers 
to reveal it to the other Powers, and that Nicholas 
caused the English Government to be informed that 
the mission of his envoy had no other object than the 
final adjustment of the difficulties respecting the Holy 

When Menschikoff reached Constantinople the 
British Embassy was in the hands of a subordinate 
officer. The Ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, had 
recently returned to England. Stratford Canning, a 
cousin of the Premier, had been employed in the East 
at intervals since 1810. There had been a period in 
his career when he had desired to see the Lord 8tratford 
Turk expelled from Europe as an incurable 
barbarian ; but the reforms of Sultan Mahmud had atj' 
a later time excited his warm interest and sympathy, \ 
and as Ambassador at Constantinople from 1842 to ) 
1852 he had laboured strenuously for the regeneration'' 

* Eastern Papers, i. 102. Admitted in Diplomatic Study, i. 163. 

190 MODERN EUROPE. 1853. 

of the Turkish Empire, and for the improvement of the 
condition of the Christian races under the Sultan's 
rule. His dauntless, sustained energy, his noble pre- 
sence, the sincerity of his friendship towards the Porte, 
gave him an influence at Constantinople seldom, if 
ever, exercised by a foreign statesman. There were 
moments when he seemed to be achieving results of 
some value ; but the task which he had attempted was 
one that surpassed human power ; and after ten years 
so spent as to win for him the fame of the greatest 
ambassador by whom England has been represented in 
modern times, he declared that the prospects of Turkish 
reform were hopeless, and left Constantinople, not in- 
tending to return.* Before his successor had been^ 
appointed, the mission of Prince Menschikoff, the 
violence of his behaviour at Constantinople, and a 
rumour that he sought far more than his ostensible 
object, alarmed the British Government. Canning was 
asked to resume his post. Returning to Constantinople 
as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, he communicated on his 
journey with the Courts of Paris and Vienna, and 
carried with him authority to order the Admiral of 

* He writes thus, April 5, 1851 : " The great game of improvement 
is altogether up for the present. It is impossible for me to conceal that 
the main object of my stay here is almost hopeless." Even Palmerstou, 
in the rare moments when he allowed his judgment to master his prepos- 
sessions on this subject, expressed the same view. He wrote on Novem- 
ber 24, 1850, warning Rescind Pasha " the Turkish Empire is doomed to 
fall by the timidity and irresolution of its Sovereign and of its Ministers ; 
and it is evident we shall ere long have to consider what other 
arrangements may be set up in its place." Stratford left Constantinople 
on leave in June, 1852, but resigned his Embassy altogether in January, 
1853. (Lane Poole, Stratford de Redcliffe, ii. 212, 215.) 


the fleet at Malta to hold his ships in readiness to sail 
for the East, He arrived at the Bosphorus on 
April 5th, learnt at once the real situation of affairs, 
and entered into negotiation with Menschikoff. The 
Russian, a mere child in diplomacy in> comparison with 
his rival, suffered himself to be persuaded to separate 
the question of the Holy Places from that of the gua- 
rantee of the rights of the Greek Church. In the first 
matter Eussia had a good cause ; in the second it was 
advancing a new claim. The two being dissociated, 
Stratford had no difficulty in negotiating a com- 
promise on the Holy Places satisfactory to the 
Czar's representative ; and the demand for the Pro- 
tectorate over the Greek Christians now stood out un- 
obscured by those grievances of detail with which it 
had been at first interwoven. Stratford encouraged the 
Turkish Government to reject the Russian proposal. 
Knowing, nevertheless, that Menschikoff would in the 
last resort endeavour to intimidate the Sultan personally, 
he withheld from the Ministers, in view of this last 
peril, the strongest of all his arguments ; and seeking 
a private audience with the Sultan on the 9th of 
May, he made known to him with great solemnity 
the authority which he had received to order the fleet 
at Malta to be in readiness to sail. The Sultan 
placed the natural interpretation on this 
statement, and ordered the final rejection of IV<N constan- 

tinople, May 21. 

Menschikoff's demand, though the Eussian 

had consented to a modification of its form, and 

would now have accepted a note declaratory of the 

192 MODERN EUROPE. 1853. 

intentions of the Sultan towards the Greek Church 
instead of a regular Treaty. On the 21st of May 
Menschikoff quitted Constantinople ; and the Czar, 
declaring- that some guarantee must be held by Russia 
for the maintenance of the rights of the Greek Chris- 
tians, announced that he should order his army to 
occupy the Danubian Provinces. After an 

Russian troops . , , . 

enter the Princi- interval or some weeks the Russian troops 


crossed the Pruth, and spread themselves 
over Moldavia and Wallachia. (June 22nd.) * 

In the ordinary course of affairs the invasion of 
the territory of one Empire by the troops of another 
is, and can be nothing else than, an act of war, necessi- 
tating hostilities as a measure of defence on the part 
of the Power invaded. But the Czar protested that 
in taking the Danubian Principalities in pledge he had 
no intention of violating the peace ; and as yet the com- 
mon sense of the Turks, as well as the counsels that they 
received from without, bade them hesitate before issuing 
a declaration of war. Since December, 1852, Lord 
Aberdeen had been Prime Minister of Eng- 
land, at the head of a Cabinet formed by a 
coalition between followers of Sir Robert Peel and 
the Whig leaders Palmerston and Russell, f There was 
no man in England more pacific in disposition, or more 
anxious to remain on terms of honourable friendship 
with Russia, than Lord Aberdeen. The Czar had 

* Eastern Papers, i. 253, 339. Lane Poole, Stratford, ii. 248. 

f Palmerston had accepted the office of Home Secretary, but naturally 
exercised great influence in foreign affairs. The Foreign Secretary was 
Lord Clarendon. 


justly reckoned on the Premier's own forbearance; but 
he had failed to recognise the strength of those forces 
which, both within and without the Cabinet, set in 
the direction of armed resistance to Russia. Palmer - 
ston was keen for action. Lord Stratford appears 
to have taken it for granted from the first that, if a 
war should arise between the Sultan and the Czar 
in consequence of the rejection of Menschikoff's 
demand, Great Britain would fight in defence of the 
Ottoman Empire. He had not stated this in express 
terms, but the communication which he made to the 
Sultan regarding his own instructions could only have 
been intended to convey this impression. If the fleet 
was not to defend the Sultan, it was a mere piece of 
deceit to inform him that the Ambassador had powers 
to place it in readiness to sail ; and such deceit was as 
alien to the character of Lord Stratford as the assump- 
tion of a virtual engagement towards the Sultan was in 
keeping with his imperious will and his passionate 
conviction of the duty of England. From the date of 
Lord Stratford's visit to the Palace, although no Treaty 
or agreement was in existence, England stood bound in 
honour, so long as the Turks should pursue the policy 
laid down by her envoy, to fulfil the expectations which 
this envoy had held out. 

Had Lord Stratforj^l been at the head of the 
Government, the policy and intentions of Great Britain 
would no doubt have been announced with such 
distinctness that the Czar could have fostered no 
misapprehension as to the results of his own acts. 


194 MODERN EUROPE. 1853. 

Palmerston, as Premier, would probably have adopted 
the same clear course, and war would either have been 
avoided by this nation or have been made with a dis- 
tinct purpose and on a definite issue. But the Cabinet of 
Lord Aberdeen was at variance with itself. Aberdeen 
was ready to go to all lengths in negotiation, but he 
was not sufficiently master of his colleagues and of the 
representatives of England abroad to prevent acts and 
declarations which in themselves brought war near ; 
above all, he failed to require from Turkey that abstention 
from hostilities on which, so. long as negotiations lasted, 
England and the other Powers which proposed to make 
the cause of the Porte their own ought unquestion- 
ably to have insisted. On the announcement by the 
Czar that his army was about to enter the Prin- 
cipalities, the British Government de- 

Bntish and 

spatched the fleet to Besika Bay near the 

entrance to the Dardanelles, and authorised 
Stratford to call it to the Bosphorus, in case Constan- 
tinople should be attacked.* The French fleet, which 
had corne into Greek waters on Menschikoff's appear- 
ance at Constantinople, took up the same position. 
Meanwhile European diplomacy was busily engaged 
in framing schemes of compromise between the Porte 
and Russia. The representatives of the four Powers 
met at Vienna, and agreed upon a note which, as they 
considered, would satisfy any legitimate claims of 
Russia on behalf of the Greek Church, and at the same 
time impose upon the Sultan no further obligations 

* Eastern Papers, i. 210, ii. 116. Ashley's Palmerston, ii. 23. 

1853. THE VIENNA NOTE. 195 

towards Russia than those which already existed.* 
This note, however, was ill drawn, and would have 
opened the door to new claims on the part of Russia 
to a general Protectorate not sanctioned by its authors. 
The draft was sent to St. Petersburg, 'and _ 

The Vienna 

was accepted by the Czar. At Constan- 
tinople its ambiguities were at once recognised ; and 
though Lord Stratford in his official capacity urged 
its acceptance under a European guarantee against 
misconstruction, the Divan, now under the pressure of 
strong patriotic forces, refused to accept the note un- 
less certain changes were made in its expressions. 
France, England, and Austria united in recommend- 
ing to the Court of St. Petersburg the adoption of 
these amendments. The Czar, however, declined to 
admit them, and a Russian document, which obtained a 
publicity for which it was not intended, proved that 
thi) construction of the note which the amendments 
were expressly designed to exclude was precisely that 
which Russia meant to place upon it. The British 
Ministry now refused to recommend the note any 
longer to the Porte. f Austria, while it approved of 
the amendments, did not consider that their rejection 
by the Czar justified England in abandoning the note 
as the common award of the European Powers ; and 
thus the concert of Euron^ was interrupted, England and 
France combining in a policy which Austria and Prussia 
were not willing to follow. In proportion as the 
chances of joint European action diminished, the ardour 

* Eastern Papers, ii. 23. t Eastern Papers, ii. 86, 91, 103. 
N 2 


of the Turks themselves, and of those who were to be 

Constantinople iliQ ' lY allies > rose higher. Tumults, organised 
by the heads of the war-party, broke out at 
Constantinople ; and although Stratford scorned the 
alarms of his French colleagues, who reported that a 
massacre of the Europeans in the capital was imminent, 
he thought it necessary to call up two vessels of war in 
order to provide for the security of the English residents 
and of the Sultan himself. In England Palmerston 
and the men of action in the Cabinet dragged Lord 
Aberdeen with them. The French Government pressed 
for vigorous measures, and in conformity with its desire 
instructions were sent from London to Lord Stratford 
to call the fleet to the Bosphorus, and to employ it in 
defending 1 the territory of the Sultan 

British and 

against aggression. On the 22nd of October 

the British and French fleets passed the 

The Turk, sure of the protection of the Western 
Powers, had for some weeks resolved upon war ; and yet 
the possibilities of a diplomatic settlement were not yet 
exhausted. Stratford himself had forwarded to Vienna 
the draft of an independent note which the Sultan was 

prepared to accept. This had not yet been 

The ultimatum o , -,-, . , ~ , 

of omar Pasha seen at fet. Petersburg. Other proiects 

rejected, Oct. 10. 

of conciliation filled the desks of all the 
leading politicians of Europe. Yet, though the belief 
generally existed that some scheme could be framed 
by which the Sultan, without sacrifice of his dignity 
and interest, might induce the Czar to evacuate the 

1853. SINOPE. 197 

Principalities, no serious attempt was made to prevent 
the Turks from coming into collision with their enemies 
both by land and sea. The commander of the Russian 
troops in the Principalities having, on the 10th of 
October, rejected an ultimatum requiring him to with- 
draw within fifteen days, this answer was taken as the 
signal for the commencement of hostilities. The 
Czar met the declaration of war with a statement 
that he would abstain from taking the offensive, and 
would continue merely to hold the Principalities as 
a material guarantee. Omar Pasha, the Ottoman 
commander in Bulgaria, was not permitted to observe 
the same passive attitude. Crossing the Danube, he 
attacked and defeated the Russians at Oltenitza. Thus 
assailed, the Czar considered that his engagement not to 
act on the offensive was at an end, and the 

....,, , Turkish squad- 

Kussian fleet, issuing 1 trom bebastopol, ron destroyed at 

Sinope, Nov. 30. 

attacked and destroyed a Turkish squadron 
in the harbour of Sinope on the southern coast of the 
Black Sea (November 30). The action was a piece of 
gross folly on the part of the Russian authorities if they 
still cherished the hopes of pacification which the Czar 
professed ; but others also were at fault. Lord Stratford 
and the British Admiral, if they could not prevent the 
Turkish ships from remaining in the Euxine, where they 
were useless against the superior force of Russia, might at 
least in exercise of the powers given to them have sent 
a sufficient escort to prevent an encounter. But the 
same ill-fortune and incompleteness that had marked 
all the diplomacy of the previous months attended the 

193 MODERN EUROPE. 1853. 

counsels of the Admirals at the Bosphorus; and the 
disaster of Sinope rendered war between the Western 
Powers and Russia almost inevitable.* 

The Turks themselves had certainly not understood 
the declaration of the Emperor Nicholas as assuring 
Effect of the their squadron at Sinope against attack; and 
so far was the Ottoman Admiral from being 
the victim of a surprise that he had warned his Govern- 
ment some days before of the probability of his own 
destruction. But to the English people, indignant 
with Russia since its destruction of Hungarian liberty 
and its tyrannous demand for the surrender of the Hun- 
garian refugees, all that now passed heaped up the intoler- 
able sum of autocratic violence and deceit. The cannon- 
ade which was continued against the Turkish crews at 
Sinope long after they had become defenceless gave to the 
battle the aspect of a massacre ; the supposed promise 
of the Czar to act only on the defensive caused it to be 
denounced .as an act of flagrant treachery ; the circum- 
stance that the Turkish fleet was lying within one of 
the Sultan's harbours, touching as it were the terri- 
tory which the navy of England had undertaken to pro- 
tect, imparted to the attack the character of a direct 
challenge and defiance to England. The cry rose 
loud for war. Napoleon, eager for the alliance with 
England, eager in conjunction with England to play 
a great part before Europe, even at the cost of a war 
from which France had nothing to gain, proposed that the 
combined fleets should pass the Bosphorus and require 

* Eastern Papers, ii. 203, 227, 299. 



every Russian vessel sailing on the Black Sea to re- 
enter port. His proposal was adopted by 
the British Government. Nicholas learnt quired to enter 

port, December. 

that the Russian flag was swept from the 
Euxine. It was in vaia that a note upon which the 
representatives of the Powers at Vienna had once more 
agreed was accepted by the Porte and forwarded to St. 
Petersburg (December 31). The pride of the Czar was 
wounded beyond endurance, and at the beginning of 
February he recalled his ambassadors from London and/ 
Paris. A letter written to him by Napoleon III., de- 
manding, in the name of himself and the Queen of Eng- 
land the evacuation of the Principalities, was answered 
by a reference to the campaign of Moscow. Austria now 
informed the Western Powers that if they would fix a 
delay for the evacuation of the Principalities, the ex- 
piration of which should be the signal for hostilities, 
it would support the summons ; and without waiting 
to learn whether Austria would also unite with them 
in hostilities in the event of the summons being re- 
jected, the British and French Governments despatched 
their ultimatum to St. Petersburg. Austria and 
Prussia sought, but in vain, to reconcile the Court of 
St. Petersburg to the only measure by 
which peace could now be preserved. The 


ultimatum remained without an answer, 

and on the 27th of March England and France declared 


The Czar had at one time believed that in his 
Ku>tern schemes he was sure of the support of Austria ; 

200 MODERN EUROPE. 1854. 

and he had strong reasons for supposing himself en- 
titled to its aid. But his mode of thought was simpler 
than that of the Court of Vienna. Schvvarzenberg, 
when it was remarked that the intervention of Russia 
poiic of i n Hungary would bind the House of 
Hapsburg too closely to its protector, had 
made the memorable answer, " We will astonish the 
world by our ingratitude." It is possible that an 
instance of Austrian gratitude would have astonished 
the world most of all ; but Schwarzenberg's successors 
were not the men to sacrifice a sound principle to romance. 
Two courses of Eastern policy have, under various 
modifications, had their advocates in rival schools of 
statesmen at Vienna. The one is that of expansion 
southward in concert with Russia ; the other is that 
of resistance to the extension of Russian power, and 
the consequent maintenance of the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire. During Metternich's long rule, in- 
spired as this was by a faith in the Treaties and the 
institutions of 1815, and by the dread-of every living, dis- 
turbing force, the second of these systems had been con- 
sistently followed. In 1854 the determining motive 
of the Court of Vienna was not a decided political con- 
viction, but the certainty that if it united with Russia 
it would be brought into war with the Western Powers. 
Had Russia and Turkey been likely to remain alone in 
the arena, an arrangement for territorial compensation 
would possibly, as on some other occasions, have won 
for the Czar an Austrian alliance. Combination against 
Turkey was, however, at the present time, too perilous 


1851. AUSTRIA. 201 

an enterprise for the Austrian monarchy ; and, as 
nothing was to be gained through the war, it remained' 
for the Viennese diplomatists to see that nothing was 
lost and as little as possible wasted- The presence 
of Russian troops in the Principalities, where they 
controlled the Danube in its course between the 
Hungarian frontier and the Black Sea, was, in 
default of some definite understanding, a danger to 
Austria; and Count_JBijol, the Minister at Vienna, 
had therefore every reason to thank the Western 
Powers for insisting on the evacuation of this district-f 
When France and England were burning to take 
up arms, it would have been a piece of superfluous 
brutality towards the Czar for Austria to attach to its 
own demand for the evacuation of the Principalities the 
threat of war. But this evacuation Austria was de- , 


termined to enforce. It refused, as did Prussia, to give to 
the Czar the assurance of its neutrality ; and, inasmuch 
as the free navigation of the Danube as far as the Black 
Sea had now become recognised as one of the commercial 
interests of Germany at large, Prussia and the Grerman 
Federation undertook to protect the territory of Aus- 
tria, if, in taking the measures necessary to free the 
Principalities, it should itself be attacked by Russia.* "*- 
The King of Prussia, clouded as his mind was 

* Treaty of April 20, 1854, and Additional Article, Eastern Papers, 
ix. 61. The Treaty between Austria and Prussia was one of general 
defensive alliance, covering also the case of Austria incurring attack 
through an advance into the Principalities. In the event of Russia 
annexing the Principalities or sending its troops beyond the Balkans the 
alliance was to be offensive. 

202 MODERN EUROPE. issi. 

by political and religious phantasms, had never- 
theless at times a larger range of view 

Prussia. . ... 

than his neighbours ; and his opinion 
as to the true solution of the difficulties between 
Nicholas and the Porte, at the time of Menschikoff's 
mission, deserved more attention than it received. 
Frederick William proposed that the rights of the 
Christian subjects of the Sultan should be placed by 
Treaty under the guarantee of all the Great Powers. 
This project was opposed by Lord Stratford and the 
Turkish Ministers as an encroachment on the Sultan's 
sovereignty, and its rejection led the King to write 
with some asperity to , his ambassador in London that 
he should seek the welfare of Prussia in absolute 
neutrality.* At a later period the King demanded from 
England, as the condition of any assistance from him- 
self, a guarantee for the maintenance of the frontiers of 
Germany and Prussia. He regarded Napoleon III. as 
the representative of a revolutionary system, and be- 
lieved that under him French armies would soon en- 
deavour to overthrow the order of Europe established 

in 1815. That England should enter into a close 


* Briefwechsel F. Wilhelins mit Buiisen, p. 310. Martin's Prince 
Consort, iii. 39. On November 20, after the Turks had begun war, 
the King 1 of Prussia wrote thus to Bunsen (the italics, capitals, and 
exclamations are his own) : " All direct help which England in unchris- 
tian folly ! I ! I ! ! gives TO ISLAM AGAINST CHRISTIANS ! will 
have (besides God's avenging judgment [hear ! hear !]), no other effect 
than to bring what is now Turkish territory at a somewhat later period 
under Russian dominion" (Brief wechsel, p. 317). The reader may 
think that the insanity to which Frederick William succumbed was 
already mastering him ; but the above is no rare specimen of his epistolary 



alliance with this man excited the King's astonishment 
and disgust ; and unless the Cabinet of London were 
prepared to give a guarantee against any future attack 
on Germany by the French Emperor, who was believed 
to be ready for every political adventure, it was vain for 
England to seek Prussia's aid. Lord Aberdeen could 
give no such guarantee ; still less could he gratify the 
King's strangely passionate demand for (the restoration 
of his authority in the Swiss canton of Neuchatel, 
which before 1848 had belonged in name to the Hohen- 
zollerns. Many influences were brought to bear upon 
the King from the side both of England and of Russia. 
The English Court and Ministers, strenuously sup- 
ported by Bunsen, the Prussian ambassador, strove to 
enlist the King in an active concert of Europe against 
Russia by dwelling on the duties of Prussia as a Great 
Power and the dangers arising to it from isolation. 
On the other hand, the admiration felt by Frederick 
William for the Emperor Nicholas, and the old 
habitual friendship between Prussia and Russia, gave 
strength to the Czar's advocates at Berlin. Schemes 
for a reconstruction of Europe, which were devised by 
Napoleon, and supposed to receive some countenance 
from Palmerston, reached the King's ear.* He heard 
that Austria was to be offered the Danubian Provinces 
upon condition of giving up northern Italy ; that 
Piedmont was to receive Lombardy, and in return to 

* The Treaty of alliance between France and England, to which 
Prussia was asked to accede, contained, however, a clause pledging the 
contracting parties " under no circumstance to seek to obtain from the 
war any advantage to themselves.." 

204 MODERN EUROPE. 1854 

surrender Savoy to France ; that, if Austria should 
decline to unite actively with the Western Powers, 
revolutionary movements were to be stirred up in Italy 
and in Hungary. Such reports kindled the King's rage. 
" Be under no illusion," he wrote to his ambassador ; 
" tell the British Ministers in their private ear and 
on the housetops that I will not suffer Austria to be 
attacked by the revolution without drawing the sword 
in its defence. If England and France let loose revolu- 
tion as their ally, be it where it may, 1 unite with 
Russia for life and death." Bunsen advocated the 
participation of Prussia in the European concert with 
more earnestness than success. While the King was 
declaiming against the lawlessness which was supposed 
to have spread from the Tuileries to Downing Street, 
Bunsen, on his own authority, sent to Berlin a project 
for the annexation of Russian territory by Prussia as a 
reward for its alliance with the Western Courts. This 
document fell into the hands of the Russian party 
at Berlin, and it roused the King's own indignation. 
Bitter reproaches were launched against the Authors of 
so felonious a scheme. Bunsen could no longer retain 
his office. Obher advocates of the Western alliance 
were dismissed from their places, and the policy of 
neutrality carried the day at Berlin. 

The situation of the European Powers in April, 
1854, was thus a very strange one. All 

Relation of the * 

tothe r Euro^e e an the Four Powers were agreed in demand- 
ing the evacuation of the Principalities 
by Russia, and in the resolution to enforce this, if 


necessary, by arms. Protocols witnessing this agreement 
were signed on the 9th of April and the 23rd of 
May,* and it was moreover declared that the Four 
Powers recognised the necessity of maintaining the 
independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
But France and England, while they made the presence 
of the Eussians in the Principalities the avowed cause 
of war, had in reality other intentions than the mere 
expulsion of the intruder and the restoration of the 
state of things previously existing. It was their desire 

so to cripple Eussia that it should not again be in 
condition to menace the Ottoman Empire. This i 
tention made it impossible for the British Cabinet to 
name, as the basis of a European league, that single 
definite object for which, and for which alone, all the 
Powers were in May, 1854, ready to unite in arms. 
England, the nation and the Government alike, chose 
nil her to devote itself, in company with France, to the 
task of indefinitely weakening Eussia than, in company 
with all Europe, to force Eussia to one humiliating but 
inevitable act of submission. Whether in the prosecu- 
tion of their ulterior objects the Western Courts might 
or might not receive some armed assistance from Austria 
and Prussia no man could yet predict with confidence. 
That Austria would to some extent make common 
cause with the Allies seemed not unlikely ; that Prussia 
would do so there was no real ground to believe ; on 
the contrary, fair warning had been given that there 
were contingencies in which Prussia might ultimately 

* Eastern Papers, viii. 1. 


206 MODERN EUROPE. 1854. 

be found on the side of the Czar. Striving to the 
utmost to discover some principle, some object, or 
even some formula which might expand the purely 
defensive basis accepted by Austria and Prussia into a 
common policy of reconstructive action, the Western 
Powers could obtain nothing more definite from the 
Conference at Vienna than the following shadowy en- 
gagement : " The Four Governments engage to en- 
deavour in common to discover the guarantees most 
likely to attach the existence of the Ottoman Empire 
to the general equilibrium of Europe. They are ready 
to deliberate as to the employment of means calculated 
to accomplish the obje6t of their agreement." This 
readiness to deliberate, so cautiously professed, was a 
quality in which during the two succeeding years the 
Courts of Vienna and Berlin were not found wanting ; 
but the war in which England and France were now 
engaged was one which they had undertaken at their 
own risk, and they discovered little anxiety on any side 
to share their labour. 

During the winter of 1853 and the first weeks of 
the following year hostilities of an indecisive character 
continued between the Turks and the Russians on the 
Danube. At the outbreak of the war Nicholas had 
sieo-eofsiiistria consulted the veteran Paskiewitsch as to 
the best road by which to march on 
Constantinople. Paskiewitsch, as a strategist, knew the 
danger to which a Russian force crossing the Danube 
would be exposed from the presence of Austrian armies 
on it^ flank ; as commander in the invasion of Hungary 


in 1849 he had encountered, as he believed, ill faith 
and base dealing on the part of his ally, and had repaid 
it with insult and scorn : he had learnt better than any 
other man the military and the moral weakness of the 
Austrian Empire in its eastern part. -His answer to 
the Czar's inquiries was, " The road to Constantinople 
lies through Vienna." But whatever bitterness the 
Czar might have felt at the ingratitude of Francis 
Joseph, he was not ready for a war with Austria, in 
which he could hardly have avoided the assistance of 
revolutionary allies ; moreover, if the road to Constan- 
tinople lay through Vienna, it might be urged that 
the road to Vienna lay through Berlin. The simpler 
plan was adopted of a march on the Balkans by way of 
Shumla, to which the capture of Silistria was to be the 
prelude. At the end of March the Russian vanguard 
passed the Danube at the lowest point where a crossing 
could be made, and advanced into the Dobrudscha. In 
May the siege of Silistria was undertaken by Paskie- 
witsch himself. But the enterprise began too late, and 
the strength employed both in the siege and in the * 
field-operations farther east was insufficient. The 
Turkish garrison, schooled by a German engineer 
and animated by two young English officers, main- 
tained a stubborn and effective resistance. French and 
English troops had already landed at Gallipoli for 
the defence of Constantinople, and finding no enemy 
within range had taken ship for Varna on the north of 
the Balkans. Austria, on the 3rd of June, delivered its 
summons requiring the evacuation of the Principalities. 


185 1. 

Almost at the same time Paskiewitsch received a wound 
that disabled him, and was forced to sur- 

The Principal!- , , . , . . 

ties evacuated, render his command into other hands. 


During the succeeding fortnight the be- 
siegers of Silistria were repeatedly beaten back, and on 
the 22nd they were compelled to raise the siege. The 
Russians, now hard pressed by an enemy whom they had 
despised, withdrew to the north of the Danube. The 
retreating movement was continued during the succeed- 
ing weeks, until the evacuation of the Principalities 
was complete, and the last Russian soldier had re- 
crossed the Pruth. As the invader retired, Austria 
sent its troops into these border-provinces, pledging 
itself by a convention with the Porte to protect them 
until peace should be concluded, and then to restore 
them to the Sultan. 

With the liberation of the Principalities the avowed 
V ground of war passed away; but the Western Powers 
had no intention of making peace without further con- 
cessions on the part of Bussia. As soon as 

Further objects , . ,, o .,. . , . 

of the western the siege oi feilistria was raised instruc- 


tions were sent to the commanders of the 
allied armies at Varna, pressing, if not absolutely 
commanding, them to attack Sebastopol, the head- 
quarters of Russian maritime power in the Euxine. 
The capture of Sebastopol had been indicated some 
months before by Napoleon III. as the most effective 
blow that could be dealt to Russia. It was from Sebas- 
topol that the fleet had issued which destroyed the Turks 
at Sinope : until this arsenal had fallen, the growing 

i85i. THE FOUR POINTS. 209 

naval might which pressed even more directly upon 
Constantinople than the neighbourhood of the Czar's 
armies by land could not be permanently laid low. 
The objects sought by England and France were now 
gradually brought into sufficient clearness to be com- 
municated to the other Powers, though the more precise 
interpretation of the conditions laid down remained 
open for future discussion. It was announced that the 1 

^Protectorate of Russia over the Danubian Principalities \ 
and Servia must be abolished; that the navigation of ' 
the Danube at its mouths must be freed from all 
obstacles; that the Treaty of July, 1841, relating to 
the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, must be revised in 
the interest of the balance of power in Europe ; and 
that the claim to any official Protectorate over Chris- 
tian subjects of the Porte, of whatever rite, must be 

* abandoned by the Czar. Though these conditions, 
known as the Four Points, were not approved by 
Prussia, they were accepted by Austria in August, 
1854,. and were laid before Russia as the basis of 
any negotiation for peace. The Czar declared in answer 
that liussia would only negotiate on such a basis 
when at the last extremity. The Allied Governments, 
measuring their enemy's weakness by his failure before 
Silistria, were determined to accept nothing less ; and the 
attack upon Sebastopol, ordered before the evacuation 
of the Principalities, was consequently allowed to take 
its course.* 

* Eastern Papers, xi. 3. Ashley's Palmerston, ii. 60. For the navi- 
gation of the mouths of the Danube, see Diplomatic Study, ii. 39. Russia, 

210 MODERN EUROPE. 18.54. 

The Koadstead, or Great Harbour, of Sebastopol 

runs due eastwards inland from a point not far from 

the south-western extremity of the Crimea. One mile 

from the open sea its waters divide, the 

Sebastopol. . i-n'i. 

larger arm still running eastwards till it 
meets the River Tchernaya, the smaller arm, known 
as the Man- of- War Harbour, bending sharply to the 
south. On both sides of this smaller harbour Sebastopol 
is built. To the seaward, that is from the smaller har- 
bour westwards, Sebastopol and its approaches were 
thoroughly fortified. On its landward, southern, side the 
town had been open till 1853, and it was still but 
imperfectly protected, most weakly on the south-eastern 
side. On the north of the Great Harbour Fort Constan- 
tine at the head of a line of strong defences guarded the 
entrance from the sea ; while on the high ground imme- 
diately opposite Sebastopol and commanding the town 
there stood the Star Fort with other military construc- 
tions. The general features of Sebastopol were known 
to the Allied commanders ; they had, however, no 
precise information as to the force by which it was 
held, nor as to the armament of its fortifications. It 
was determined that the landing should be made in 
the Bay of Eupatoria, thirty miles north of the fortress. 
Here, on the 14th of September, the Allied forces, 
numbering about thirty thousand French, twenty-seven 
thousand English, and seven thousand Turks, effected 

which had been in possession of the mouths of the Danube since the 
Treaty of Adrianople, and had undertaken to keep the mou hs clear, had 
allowed the passage to become blocked and had otherwise prevented 
traffic descending, in order to keep the Black Sea trade in its own hands. 


their disembarkation without meeting any resistance. 
The Russians, commanded by Prince Menschikoff 
lately envoy at Constantinople, had taken post ten miles 
farther south on high ground behind the 
River Alma. On the 20th of September in the Crimea, 

Sept. 14. 

they were attacked in front by the English, 
while the French attempted a turning movement from 
the sea. The battle was a scene of confusion, and for a 
moment the assault of the English seemed to be rolled 
back. But it was renewed with ever in- Battle of the 
creasing vigour, and before the French had 
made any impression on the Eussian left Lord Rag- 
lan's troops had driven the enemy from their positions. 
Struck on the flank when their front was already 
broken, outnumbered and badly led, the Russians gave 
up all for lost. The form of an orderly retreat was 
maintained only long enough to disguise from the 
conquerors the completeness of their victory. When 
night fell the Russian army abandoned itself to total 
disorder, and had the pursuit been made at once it 
could scarcely have escaped destruction. But St. 
Arnaud, who was in the last stage of mortal illness, 
refused, in spite of the appeal of Lord Raglan, to 
press on his wearied troops. Menschikoff, abandon- 
ing the hope of checking the advance of the 
Allies in a second battle, and anxious only to prevent 
the capture of Sebastopol by an enemy supposed to 
be following at his heels, retired into the fortress, and 
there sank seven of his war-ships as a barrier across 
the mouth of the Great Harbour, mooring the rest 
o 2 

212 MODERN EUROPE. 1854- 

within. The crews were brought on shore to serve in 
the defence by land ; the guns were dragged from the 
ships to the bastions and redoubts. Then, when it 
appeared that the Allies lingered, the Russian com- 
mander altered his plan. Leaving Korniloff, the Vice- 
Admiral, and Todleben, an officer of engineers, to man 
the existing works and to throw up new ones where 
the town was undefended, Menschikoff determined to 
lead off the bulk of his army into the interior of the 
Crimea, in order to keep open his communications with 
Russia, to await in freedom the arrival of reinforce- 
ments, and, if Sebastopol should not at once fall, to 
attack the Allies at his own time and opportunity. 
(September 24th.) 

The English had lost in the battle of the Alma 


about two thousand men, the French probably less than 
half that number. On the morning after the engage- 
ment Lord Raglan proposed that the two armies should 
march straight against the fortifications lying on the 
north of the Great Harbour, and carry these 

Flank march to , . . . , . , 

south of sebasto- by storm, so winning a position where their 
guns would command Sebastopol itself. 
The French, supported by Eurgoyne, the chief of the 
English engineers, shrank from the risk of a front 
attack on works supposed to be more formidable 
than ihey really were, and induced Lord Raglan to 
consent to a long circuitous march which would bring 
the armies right round Sebastopol to its more open 
southern side, from which, it was thought, an assault 
might be successfully made. This flank-march, which 



was one of extreme risk, was carried out safely, 
Menschikoff himself having left Sebastopol, and having 
passed along the same road in his retreat into the 
interior a little hefore the appearance of the Allies. 
Pushing southward, the English reached the sea at 
Balaclava, and took possession of the harbour there, 
accepting the exposed eastward line between the fortress 
and the Russians outside ; the French, now commanded 
by Canrobert, continued their march westwards round 
the back of Sebastopol, and touched the sea at Kasatch 
Bay. The two armies were thus masters of the broken 
plateau which, rising westwards from the plain of Bala- 
clava and the valley of the Tchernaya, overlooks Sebas- 
topol on its southern side. That the garrison, which 
now consisted chiefly of sailors, could at this moment 
have resisted the onslaught of the fifty thousand troops 
who had won the battle of the Alma, the Russians them- 
selves did not believe ;* but once more the French staff, 
with Burgoyne, urged caution, and it was determined 
to wait for the siege-guns, which were still at sea. 
The decision was a fatal one. While the Allies chose 
positions for their heavy artillery and slowly landed and 
placed their guns, Korniloff and Todleben made the for- 
tifications on the southern side of Sebastopol an effective 
barrier before an enemy. The sacrifice of the Russian 
fleet had not been in vain. The sailors were learning 
all the duties of a garrison : the cannon from the ships 
proved far more valuable on land. Three weeks of 

* See, however, Burgoyne's Letter to the Times, August 4, 1868, in 
Kinglake, iv. 465. Rousset, Guerre de Crimee, i. 280. 

214 MODERN EUROPE. 1854. 

priceless time were given to leaders who knew how to 
turn every moment to account. When, on the 17th of 

-^ October, the bombardment which 'was to precede the 
assault on Sebastopol began, the Trench artillery, 

i operating on the south-west, was overpowered by that 

Lof the defenders. The fleets in vain thun- 
Ineffectual .. -. . - ,._ ., r ji 

bombardment, dered against the solid sea-rront or the 
Sept. 1725. 

fortress. At the end of eight days' can- 
nonade, during which the besiegers' batteries poured 
such a storm of shot and shell upon Sebastopol as no 
fortress had yet withstood, the defences were still un- 

Menschikoff in the meantime had received the 
reinforcements w r hich he expected, and was now ready 
to fall upon the besiegers from the east. His point 
of attack was the English port of Balaclava and 
Battle of Baia- ^ ue fortified road lying somewhat east of 
this, which formed the outer line held by 
the English and their Turkish supports. The plain of 
Balaclava is divided by a low ridge into a northern and 
a southern valley. Along this ridge runs the cause- 
way, which had been protected by redoubts committed 
to a weak Turkish guard. On the morning of the 
25th the Russians appeared in the northern valley. 
They occupied the heights rising from it on the north 
and east, attacked the causeway, captured three of the 
redoubts, and drove off the Turks, left to meet their 
onset alone. Lord Raglan, who watched these opera- 
tions from the edge of the western plateau, ordered up 
infantry from a distance, but the only Englisji troops 

185k BALACLAVA. 215 

on the spot were a light and a heavy brigade of cavalry, 
each numbering about six hundred men. The Heavy 
Brigade, under General Scarlett, was directed to move to- 
wards Balaclava itself, which was now threatened. While 
they were on the march, a dense column of Eussian 
cavalry, about three thousand strong, appeared above the 
crest of the low ridge, ready, as it seemed, to overwhelm 
the weak troops before them. But in their descent from 
the ridge the Russians halted, and Scarlett with admirable 
courage and judgment formed his men for attack, and 
charged full into the enemy with the handful who were 
nearest to him. . They cut their way into the very heart 
of the column; and before the Russians could crush 
them with mere weight the other regiments of the same 
brigade hurled themselves on the right and on the left 
against the huge inert mass. The Russians broke and 
retreated in disorder before a quarter of their number, 
'leaving to Scarlett and his men the glory of an action 
which ranks with the Prussian attack at Mars-la-Tour in 
1870 as the most brilliant cavalry-operation in modern 
warfare. The squadrons of the Light Brigade, during 
the peril and the victory of their comrades, stood motion- 
less, paralysed by the same defect of temper or intelli- 
gence in command which was soon to devote them 
to a fruitless but ' ever-memorable act of self-sacrifice. 
Russian infantry were carrying off the cannon from the 
conquered redoubts in the causeway, when an aide-de- 
camp from the general-in-chief brought to the Earl of 
Lucan, commander of the cavalry, an order to advance 
rapidly to the front, and save these guns. Lucan, who 

216 MODERN EUROPE. 1854. 

from his position could see neither the enemy nor the 
guns, believed himself ordered to attack the Russian 
artillery at the extremity of the northern valley, and he 
directed the Light Brigade to charge in this direction. 
It was in vain that the leader of the Light Brigade, 
Lord Cardigan, warned his chief, in words which were 
indeed but too weak, that there was a battery in front, a 
battery on each flank, and that the ground was covered 
with Russian riflemen. The order was repeated as 
that of the head of the army, and it was obeyed. Thus 

"Into the valley of Death 
Rode the Six Hundred." 

How they, died there, the remnant not turning till 
they had hewn their way past the guns and routed 
the enemy's cavalry behind them, the English people 
will never forget.* 

The day of Balaclava brought to each side some- 
thing of victory and something of failure. The 
Russians remained masters of the road that they had 
captured, and carried off seven English guns ; the 
English,, where they had met the enemy, proved 
that they could defeat overwhelming numbers. Not 
many days passed before our infantry were put to the 
Battle of inker- test wn i n the cavalry had so victoriously 
undergone. The siege-approaches of the 
French had been rapidly advanced, and it was deter- 
mined that on the 5th of November the long-deferred 
assault on Sebastopol should be made. On that very 
morning, under cover of a thick mist, the English 

*' Statements of Raglau, Lucan, Cardigan; Kinglake, v. 108, 402. 

1854. INKERMANN. 217 

right was assailed by massive columns of the enemy. 
Menschikoff' s army had now risen to a hundred thou- 
sand men; he had thrown troops into Sebastopol, and 
had planned the capture of the English positions by a 
combined attack from Sebastopol itself, and by troops 
advancing from the lower valley of the Tchernaya across 
the bridge of Inkermaun. The battle of the 5th of 
November, on the part of the English, was a soldiers' 
battle, without generalship, without order, without 
design. The men, standing to their ground whatever 
their own number and whatever that of the foe, fought, 
after their ammunition was exhausted, with bayonets, 
with the butt ends of their muskets, with their fists and 
with stones. For hours the ever-surging Russian mass 
rolled in upon them ; but they maintained the unequal 
struggle until the arrival of French regiments saved 
them from their deadly peril and the enemy were driven 
in confusion from the field. The Russian columns, 
marching right up to the guns, had been torn in pieces 
by artillery-fire. Their loss in killed and wounded was 
enormous, their defeat one which no ingenuity could 
disguise. Yet the battle of Inkernrann had made the 
capture of Sebastopol, as it had been planned by the 
Allies, impossible. Their own loss was too great, the 
force which the enemy had displayed was too vast, to 
leave any hope that the fortress could be mastered by a 
sudden assault. The terrible truth soon became plain 
that the enterprise on which the armies had been sent 
had in fact failed, and that another enterprise of a 
quite different character, a winter siege in the presence 


of a superior enemy, a campaign for which no prepara- 
tions had been made, and for which all that was most 
necessary was wanting, formed the only alternative to 
an evacuation of the Crimea. 

On the 14th of November the Euxine winter began 
with a storm which swept away the tents on the ex- 
posed plateau, .and wrecked twenty-one vessels bearing 
stores of ammunition and clothing. From this time 
rain and snow turned the tract between the camp and 
storm of Balaclava into a morass. The loss of the 
causeway which had been captured by the 
Russians three weeks before now told with fatal effect 
on the British army. The only communication with 
the port of Balaclava was by a hillside track, which 
soon became impassable by carts. It was necessary to 
bring up supplies on the backs of horses ; but the 
horses perished from famine and from excessive labour. 
The men were too few, too weak, too destitute of the 
winter in the helpful ways of English sailors, to assist in 
providing for themselves. Thus penned up 
on the bleak promontory, cholera-stricken, mocked rather 
than sustained during their benumbing toil with rations 
of uncooked meat and green coffee-berries, the British 
soldiery wasted away. Their effective force sank at 
mid-winter to eleven thousand men. In the hospitals, 
which even at Scutari were more deadly to those who 
passed within them than the fiercest fire of the enemy, 
nine thousand men perished before the end of February. 
The time indeed came when the very Spirit of Mercy 
seemed to enter these abodes of woe, and in the presence 

1854-55. THE CRIMEAN WINTER. 219 

of Florence Nightingale nature at last regained its 
healing power, pestilence no longer hung in the at- 
mosphere which the sufferers breathed, and death itself 
grew mild. But before this new influence had van- 
quished routine the grave had closed over whole regi- 
ments of men whom it had no right to claim. The 
sufferings of other armies have been .on a greater scale, 
but seldom has any body of troops furnished a heavier 
tale of loss and death in proportion to its numbers than 
the British army during the winter of the Crimean 
War. The unsparing exposure in the Press of the mis- 
management under which our soldiers were perishing 
excited an outburst of indignation which overthrew 
Lord Aberdeen's Ministry and placed Palmerston in 
power. It also gave to Europe at large an impres- 
sion that Great Britain no longer knew how to conduct 
a war, and unduly raised the reputation of the French 
I'nilitary administration, whose shortcomings, great as 
they were, no French journalist dared to describe. In 
spite of Alma and Inkermann, the military prestige 
of England was injured, not raised, by the Crimean 
campaign ; nor was it until the suppression of the 
Indian. Mutiny that the true capacity of the nation in 
war was again vindicated before the world. 

" I have two generals who will not fail me," the 
Czar is reported to have said when he heard of Menschi- 
koff's last defeat, " Generals January and 
Februar}-." General February fulfilled his i^. M-** *, 
task, but he smote the Czar too. In the 
first days of March a new monarch inherited the Russian 

220 MODERN EUROPE. 1855. 

crown.* Alexander II. ascended the throne, announcing 
that he would adhere to the policy of Peter the Great, 
of Catherine, and of Nicholas. But the proud tone 
was meant rather for the ear of Russia than of Europe, 
since Nicholas had already expressed his willingness to 
treat for peace on the basis laid down by the Western 
Powers in August, 1854. This change was not pro- 
duced wholly by the battles of Alma and Inkermann. 
Prussia, finding itself isolated in Germany, had after 
some months of hesitation given a diplomatic sanction 
to the Pour Points approved by Austria as indispens- 
able conditions of peace. Kussia thus stood forsaken, 
as it seemed, by its only friend, and Nicholas could no 
longer hope to escape with the mere abandonment of 
those claims which had been the occasion of the war. 
He consented to treat with his enemies on their own 
terms. Austria now approached still more closely to 
the Western Powers, and bound itself by treaty, in the 

* On the death of Nicholas, the King 1 of Prussia addressed the follow- 
ing lecture to the unfortunate Bunsen : " You little thought that, at the 
very moment when you were writing to me, one of the noblest of men, one of 
the grandest forms in history, one of the truest hearts, and at the same 
time one of the greatest rulers of this narrow world, was called from 
faith to sight. 1 thank God on my knees that He deemed me worthy to 
be, in the best sense of the word, his [Nicholas'] friend, and to remain 
true to him. You, dear Bunsen, thought differently of him, and you will 
now painfully confess this before your conscience, most painfully of all 
the truth (which all your letters in these late bad times have unfortunately 
shown me but too plainly), that you hated him. You hated him, not as a 
man, but as the representative of a principle, that of violence. If ever, 
redeemed like him through simple faith in Christ's blood, you see him in 
eternal peace, then remember what I now write to you : ' You will beg his 
pardon.' Even here, my dear friend, may the blessing of repentance be 
granted to you." Briefwechsel, p. 325. Frederick William seems to have 
forgotten to send the same pious wishes to the Poles in Siberia. 


event of peace not being concluded by the end of the 
year on the stated basis, to deliberate with France and 
England upon effectual means for obtaining the object 
of the Alliance.* Preparations were made for a Con- 
ference at Vienna, from which Prussia, 'still 
declining 1 to pledge itself to warlike action Vienna. March 

May, 1S55. 

in case of the failure of the negotiations, 
was excluded. The sittings of the Conference began a 
few days after the accession of Alexander II. Russia 
was represented by its ambassador, Prince Alexander 
Gortschakoff, who, as Minister of later years, was to 
play so conspicuous a part in undoing the work of the 
Crimean epoch. On the first two Articles forming the 
subject of negotiation, namely the abolition of the 
Eussian Protectorate over Servia and the Principalities,) 
and the removal of all impediments to the free uavi- \ 
gation of the Danube, agreement was reached. On 
the third Article, the revision of the Treaty of July, 
1841, relating to the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, 
the Russian envoy and the representatives of the 
Western Powers found themselves completely at 
variance. Gortschakoff had admitted that the Treaty 
of 1841 must be so revised as to put an end to the 
preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea;f but while 
the Western Governments insisted upon the exclusion 
of Russian war-vessels from these waters, Gortscha- 
koff would consent only to the abolition of Russia's 

* Parliamentary Papers, 1854-5, vol. 55, p. 1, Dec. 2, 1854. Ashley's 
Palm erst on, ii. 84. 

f Eastern Papers, Part 13, 1. 

222 MODERN EUROPE. 1855. 

preponderance by the free admission of the war- vessels of 
all nations, or by some similar method of counterpoise. 
The negotiations accordingly came to an end, but not 
before Austria, disputing the contention of the Allies that 
the object of the third Article could be attained only 
by the specific means proposed by them, had brought 
forward a third scheme based partly upon 
the limitation of the Russian navy in the 
Euxine, partly upon the admission of wardships of other 
nations. This scheme was rejected by the Western 
Powers, whereupon Austria declared that its obligations 
under the Treaty of December 2nd, 1854, had now been 
fulfilled, and that it returned in consequence to the 
position of a neutral. 

Great indignation was felt and was expressed at 
London and Paris at this so-called act of desertion, 
and at the subsequent withdrawal of Austrian regi- 
ments from the positions which they had occupied in 
anticipation of war. It was alleged that in the first 
two conditions of peace Austria had seen its own 
special interests effectually secured ; and that as soon 
as the Court of St. Petersburg had given the neces- 
sary assurances on these heads the Cabinet of Vienna 
was willing to sacrifice the other objects of the 
Alliance and to abandon the cause of the Maritime 
Powers, in order to regain, with whatever loss of honour, 
the friendship of the Czar. Though it was answered 
with perfect truth that Austria had never accepted the 
principle of the exclusion of Russia from the Black 
Sea, and was still ready to take up arms in defence of 

1855. AUSTRIA. 223 

that system by which it considered that Russia's pre- 
ponderance in the Black Sea might be most suitably 
prevented, this argument sounded hollow to com- 
batants convinced of the futility of all methods for 
holding Russia in check except their *own. Austria 
had grievously injured its own position and credit with 
the Western Powers. On the other hand it had 
wounded Russia too deeply to win from the Czar the 
forgiveness which it expected. Its policy of balance, 
whether best described as too subtle or as too impartial, 
had miscarried. It had forfeited its old, without ac- 
quiring new, friendships. It remained isolated in Europe, 
and destined to meet without support and without an 
ally the blows which were soon to fall upon it. 
< The prospects of the besieging armies before Sebas- 
top( 1 were in some respects better towards the close of 
January, 1855, than they were when the 
Conference of Vienna commenced its sit- siege, January 

jWay, 1855. 

tings six weeks later. Sardinia, under the 
guidance of Cavour, had joined the Western Alliance, 
and was about to send fifteen thousand soldiers to the 
Crimea. A new plan of operations, which promised 
excellent results, had been adopted at headquarters. 
Up to the end of 1854 the French had directed their 
main .attack against the Flagstaff bastion, a little to 
the west of the head of the Man-of-War Harbour. 
They were now, however, convinced by Lord Raglan 
that the true keystone to the defences of Sebastopol was 
the Malakoff, on the eastern side, and they under- 
took the reduction of this formidable work, while 

J-M .1/0 /WO" EUROPE. 

the British directed their efforts against tlio neigh- 
bouring Redan.* The heaviest fire of the besiegers 
being thus concentrated on a narrow line, it seemed 
as if Sebastopol must soon fall. But at the be- 
ginning of February a sinister change came over the 
French camp. General Niel arrived from Paris vested 
with powers which really placed him in control of 
the general-in-chief ; and though Canrobert was but 
partially made acquainted with the Emperor's designs, 
he was forced to sacrifice to them much of his own 
honour and that of the army. Napoleon had deter- 
mined to come to the Crimea himself, and at the fitting 
moment to end by one grand stroke the war which 
had dragged so heavily in the- hands of others. He 
believed that Sebastopol could only be taken by a com- 
plete investment; and it was his design to land with 
a fresh army on the south-eastern coast of the Crime, i, 
to march across the interior of the peninsula, to sweep 
Menschikoff's forces from their position above the 
Tchernaya, and to complete the investment of Sebasto- 
pol from the north. With this scheme of operations in 
view, all labour expended in the attack on Sebastopol 
from the south was effort thrown away. Canrobert, 
who had promised his most vigorous co-operation to 
Lord Raglan, was fettered and paralysed by the. Em- 
peror's emissary at headquarters. For three successive 
months the Russians not only held their own, but by 
means of counter-approaches won back from the French 
some of the ground that they had taken. The very 
* Kingkke, vii. 21. Rousset, ii. 35, 148. 

existence of the Alliance was threatened when, after 
Cafirobert and Lord Raglan had despatched a force to 
sei/e the Russian posts on the Sea of Azof, the French 
portion of this force was peremptorily recalled by the 
Kmpcror, in order that it might be employed in the 
march northwards across the Crimea. At length, un- 
able to endure the miseries of the position, 
Canrobert asked to be relieved of his com- nu^dedhy 

IVlissier, May. 

m and. He was succeeded by General 
Pelissier. Pelissier, a resolute, energetic soldier, one 
moreover who did not owe his promotion to complicity 
in the con/i c/V/V//, Jlatly refused to obey the Emperor's 
orders. Sweeping aside the ilimsy schemes evolved at 
tin- Tnileries, he returned with all his heart to the plan 
agreed upon by the Allied commanders at the beginning 
of the year; and from this time, though disasters were 
still in store, they were not the result of faltering 
01- disloyalty at the headquarters of the French army. 
The general assault on the Malakoff and the Redan 
\\as lixcd for the 18th of June. It was ' Un(tuooeMfu , 
bravely met by the Russians; the Allies ""* 
were driven back with heavy loss, and three months 
more were added to the duration of the siege. Lord 
Raglan did not live to witness the last stage of the 
war. Exhausted by his labours, heartsick at the failure 
of the great attack, he died on the :J^th of June, leaving 
the command to General Simpson, an officer far his 
inferior. As the lines of the besiegers approached 
nearer and nearer to the Russian fortifications, the army 
which had Keen defeated at Inkermaim advanced for 

Battle of the 


226 MODERN EUROPE. 1855. 

one last effort. Crossing the Tchernaya, it gave battle 
on the 16th of August. The French and the Sar- 
dinians, without assistance from the British 

-. . . o T_ L 1 

army, won a decisive victory, bebastopol 
could hope no longer for assistance 
from without, and on the 8th of September the 
blow which had failed in June was dealt 

Capture of the 

:off,se P t.8. once more> The rrenchj throwing them- 
selves in great strength upon the Malakoff, carried this 
fortress by storm, and frustrated every effort made for 
its recovery ; the British, attacking the Eedan with a 
miserably weak force, were beaten and overpowered. 
But the fall of the Malakoff was in itself equivalent to 
the capture of Sebastopol. A few more hours passed, 
and a series of tremendous explosions made known to 
the Allies that the Russian commander was blowing up 
his magazines and withdrawing to the north of the 
ran of sebas- Great Harbour. The prize was at length 
won, and at the end of a siege of three 
hundred and fifty days what remained of the Czar's 
great fortress passed into the hands of his enemies. 

The Allies had lost since their landing in the 

Crimea not less than a hundred thousand men. An 

enterprise undertaken in the belief that it would be 

accomplished in the course of a few weeks, and with 

. ,. no greater sacrifice of life than attends every 

Exhaustion J 

attack upon a fortified place, had proved 
arduous and terrible almost beyond example. Yet if 
the Crimean campaign was the result of error and 
blindness on the part of the invaders, it was perhaps 



even more disastrous to Russia than any warfare in 
which an enemy would have been likely to engage with 
fuller knowledge of the conditions to be met. The vast 
distances that separated Sebastopol from the military 
depots in the interior of Russia made its defence a drain 
of the most fearful character on the levies and the re- 
sources of the country. What tens of thousands sank 
in the endless, unsheltered march without ever nearing 
the sea, what provinces were swept of their beasts of 
burden, when every larger shell fired against the enemy 
had to be borne hundreds of miles by oxen, the records 
of the war but vaguely make known. The total loss 
of the Russians should perhaps be reckoned at three 
times that of the Allies. Yet the fall of Sebastopol was 
not immediately followed by peace. The hesitation of 
the Allies in cutting off the retreat of the Russian 
army had enabled its commander to retain his hold upon 
'the Crimea; in Asia, the delays of a Turkish relieving 
army gave to the Czar one last gleam of success in the 
capture of Kars, which, after a strenuous FallofKar8) 
resistance, succumbed to famine on the 28th 
of November. But before Kars had fallen negotiations' 
for peace had commenced. France was weary of the 
war. Napoleon, himself unwilling to continue it except 
at the price of French aggrandisement on the Continent, 
was surrounded by a band of palace stock-jobbers who 
had staked everything on the rise of the funds that 
would result from peace. It was known at every Court 
of Europe that the Allies were completely at variance 
with one another ; that while the English nation, stung 
p '2 

228 MODERN EUROPE. 1855. 

by the failure of its military administration during the 
winter, by the nullity of its naval operations in the 
Baltic, and by the final disaster at the Redan, was 
eager to prove its real power in a new campaign, the 
ruler of France, satisfied with the crowning glory of 
the Malakoff, was anxious to conclude peace on any 
tolerable . terms. Secret communications from St. 
Petersburg were made at Paris by Baron Seebach, 
., , ,. envoy of Saxony, a son-in-law of the Rus- 

Neg-otiations J J ' 

sian Chancellor : the Austrian Cabinet, still 
bent on acting the part of arbiter, but hopeless of the 
results of a new Conference, addressed itself to the 
Emperor Napoleon singly, and persuaded him to enter 
into a negotiation which was concealed for a while from 
Great Britain. The two intrigues were simultaneously 
pursued by our ally, but Seebach 's proposals were such 
that even, the warmest friends of Russia^at the Tuileries 
could scarcely support them, and the Viennese diplo- 
matists won the day. It was agreed that a note con- 
taining Preliminaries of Peace should be presented by 
Austria at St. Petersburg as its own ultimatum, after 
the Emperor Napoleon should have won from the British 
Government its assent to these terms without any 
alteration. The Austrian project embodied indeed the 
Four Points which Britain had in previous months 
fixed as the conditions of peace, and in substance it 
differed little from what, even after the fall of Sebastopol, 
British statesmen were still prepared to accept ; but it 
was impossible that a scheme completed without the 
participation of Britain and laid down for its passive 


acceptance should be thus uncomplainingly adopted by 
its Government. Lord Palmerston required that the 
Four Articles enumerated should be understood to cover 
points not immediately apparent on their surface, and 
that a fifth Article should be added, reserving to the 
Powers the right of demanding certain further special 
conditions, it being understood that Great Britain would 
require under this clause only that Russia should bind 
itself to leave the Aland Islands in the Baltic Sea 
unfortified. Modified in accordance with the demand 
of the British Government, the Austrian draft was 
presented to the Czar at the end of December, with 
the notification that if it was not accepted by the 10th 
of January the Austrian ambassador would quit St. 
Petersburg. On the 15th a Council was held in the 
presence of the Czar. Nesselrode, who first gave his 
opinion, urged that the continuance of the war would 
plunge Russia into hostilities with all Europe, and 
advised submission to a compact which would last only 
until Russia had recovered its strength or new relations 
had arisen among the Powers. One Minister after 
another declared that Poland, Finland, the Crimea, and 
the Caucasus would be endangered if peace were not 
now made; tire Chief of the Finances stated that Russia 
could not go through another campaign without bank- 
ruptcy.* At the end of the discussion the Council 
declared unanimously in favour of accepting the Aus- 
trian propositions ; and although the national feeling 
was still in favour of resistance, there appears to have 

* Diplomatic Study, ii. 361. Martin, Prince Consort, iii. 394. 


230 MODERN EUROPE. 1856. 

been one Russian statesman alone, Prince GortschakofF, 
ambassador at Vienna, who sought to dissuade the 
Czar from making peace. His advice was not taken. 
The vote of the Council was followed by the despatch 
of plenipotentiaries to Paris, and here, on the 25th of 
February, 1856, the envoys of all the Powers, with 
the exception of Prussia, assembled in Conference, in 
order to frame the definitive Treaty of Peace.* 

In the debates which now followed, and which 
occupied more than a month, Lord Clarendon, who 
conference of represented Great Britain, discovered that in 

Paris, Feb. 25, 

each contested point he had to fight against 

the Russian and the French envoys combined, so com- 

pletely was the Court of the Tuileries now identified with 

] a policy of conciliation and friendliness towards Russia, f 

Great firmness, great plainness of speech was needed 

on the part of the British Government, in order to 

prevent the recognised objects of the war from being 

surrendered by its ally, not from a conviction that they 

(were visionary or unattainable, but from unsteadiness of 

(purpose and from the desire to convert a defeated enemy 

Treaty of pans, into a tnd. The end, however, was at 

length reached, and on the 30th of March 

the Treaty of Paris was signed. The Black Sea was 

* Prussia was admitted when the first Articles had been settled, and it 
became necessary to revise the Treaty of July, 1841, of which Prussia had 
been one of the signatories. 

f " In the course of th^ deliberation, whenever our [Russian] plenipo- 
tentiaries found themselves in the presence of insurmountable difficulties, 
they appealed to the personal intervention of this sovereign [Napoleon] , 
and had only to congratulate themselves on the result." Diplomatic 
Study, ii. 377. 

1856. TREATY OF PARIS. 231 

neutralised; its waters and ports, thrown open to the, 
mercantile marine of every nation, were formally and 
in perpetuity interdicted to the war-ships both of the 
Powers possessing its coasts and of all other Powers. 
The Czar and the Sultan undertook not to establish or 
maintain upon its coasts any military or maritime 
arsenal. Russia ceded a portion of Bessarabia, accept- 
ing a frontier which excluded it from the Danube. The 
free navigation of this river, henceforth to be effectively 
maintained by an international Commission, was de- 
clared part of the public law of Europe. The Powers 
declared the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in 
the advantages of the public law and concert of Europe, 
each engaging to respect the independence and integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire, and all guaranteeing in common 
the strict observance of this engagement, and promising 
to consider any act tending to its violation as a question 
' of general interest. The Sultan " having, in his con- 
stant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a 
firman recording his generous intentions towards the 
Christian population of his empire,* and having com- 
municated it to the Powers," the Powers " recognised 

* Three pages of promises. Eastern Papers, xvii. One was kept 
faithfully. " To accomplish these objects, means shall be sought to profit 
by the science, the art, and the funds of Europe." One of the drollest 
of the prophecies of that time is the congratulatory address of the Mis- 
sionaries to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, id. 1882 : " The Imperial 
Hatti-sherif has convinced us that our fond expectations are likely to be 
realised. The light will shine upon those who have long sat in darkness 
and blest by social prosperity and religions freedom, the millions of 
Turkey will, we trust, be seen ere long sitting peacefully under their own 
vine and fig-tree." So they were, and with poor Lord Stratford's fortune, 
among others, in their pockets. 

232 MODERN EUROPE. 1866. 

the high value of this communication," declaring at 
the same time " that it could not, in any case, give to 
them the right to interfere, either collectively or separ- 
ately, in the relations of the Sultan to his subjects, or 
in the internal administration of his empire." The 
Danubian Principalities, augmented by the strip of 
Bessarabia taken from Russia, were to continue to 
enjoy, under the suzerainty of the Porte and under the 
guarantee of the Powers, all the privileges and immu- 
nities of which they were in possession, no exclusive 
protection being exercised by any of the guaranteeing 

Passing beyond the immediate subjects of nego- 
tiation, the Conference availed itself of its international 
character to gain the consent of Great Britain to a 
change in the laws of maritime war. England had 
always claimed, and had always exercised, the right to 
seize an enemy's goods on the high sea 

Agreement of 

O n e c r ?ghts en ol though conveyed in a neutral vessel, and to 
stop and search the merchant-ships of neu- 
trals for this purpose. The exercise of this right had 
stirred up against England the Maritime League of 
1800, and was condemned by nearly the whole civilised 
world. Nothing short of an absolute command of the 
seas made it safe or possible for a single Power to main- 
tain a practice which threatened at moments of danger 
to turn the whole body of neutral States into its 
enemies. Moreover, if the seizure of belligerents' goods 
in neutral ships profited England when it was itself at 

* All verbatim from the Treaty. Parl. Papers, 1856, vol. Ixi. p. 1. 

1856. TREATY OF PARIS. 233 

war, it injured England at all times when it remained 
at peace during the struggles of other States. Similarly 
by the issue of privateers England inflicted great injury 
on its enemies ; but its own commerce, exceeding that 
of every other State, offered to the prrvateers of its foes 
a still richer booty. The advantages of the existing 
laws of maritime war were not altogether on the side of 
England, though mistress of the seas ; and in return 
for the abolition of privateering, the British Govern- 
ment consented to surrender its sharpest, but most 
dangerous, weapon of offence, and to permit the pro- 
ducts of a hostile State to find a market in time of war. 
The rule was laid down that the goods of an enemy 
other 'than contraband of war should henceforth be safe 
under a neutral flag. Neutrals' goods discovered on 
an enemy's ship were similarly made exempt from 

The enactments of the Conference of Paris relating 

to commerce in time of hostilities have not yet been 

subjected to the strain of a war between England and 

lany European State ; its conclusions on all other sub- 

nects were but too soon put to the test, and 

Fictions of 

pave one after another been found want- f e pL r i?!2 
ing 1 . If the Power which calls man into 


his moment of life could smile at the efforts and the 
assumptions of its creature, such smile might have been 
moved by the assembly of statesmen who, at the close 
of the Crimean War, affected to shape the future of 
Eastern Europe. They persuaded themselves that by 
dint of the iteration of certain phrases they could 

234 MODERN EUROPE. 1856. 

convert the Sultan and his hungry troop of Pashas 
into the chiefs of a European State. They imagined 
that the House of Osman, which in the stages of a 
continuous decline had successively lost its sway over 
Hungary, over Servia, over Southern Greece and the 
Danubian Provinces, and which would twice within the 
last twenty-five years have seen its Empire dashed to 
pieces by an Egyptian vassal but for the intervention of 
Europe, might be arrested in its decadence by an incan- 
tation, and be made strong enough and enlightened 
enough to govern to all time the Slavic and Greek 
populations which had still the misfortune to be in- 
cluded within its dominions. Eecognising so ran the 
words which read like bitter irony, but which were 
meant for nothing of the kind the value of the Sul- 
tan's promises of reform, the authors of the Treaty of 
Paris proceeded, as if of set purpose, to extinguish any 
vestige of responsibility which might have been felt at 
Constantinople, and any spark of confidence that might 
.still linger among the Christian populations, by de- 
Lblaring that, whether the Sultan observed or broke his 
i {promises, in no case could any right of intervention by 
[Europe arise. The helmsman was given his course ; 
the hatches were battened down. If words bore any 
meaning, if the Treaty of Paris was not an elaborate 
piece of imposture, the Christian subjects of the Sultan 
had for the future, whatever might be their wrongs, 
hno redress to look for but in the exertion of their own 
1 power. The terms of the Treaty were in fact such as 
might have been imposed if the Western Powers had 

1856. TREATY OF PARIS. 235 

gone to war with Russia for some object of their own, 
and had been rescued, when defeated and overthrown, 
I'by the victorious interposition of the Porte. All was 
hollow, all based on fiction and convention. The 
illusions of nations in time of revolutionary excitement, 
the shallow, sentimental commonplaces of liberty and 
fraternity have afforded just matter for satire ; but no 
democratic platitudes were ever more palpably devoid 
of connection with fact, more flagrantly in contradiction 
to the experience of the past, or more ignominiously to 
be refuted by each succeeding act of history, than the 
deliberate consecration of the idol of an Ottoman Em- 
pire as the crowning act of European wisdom in 1856. 

Among the devotees of the Turk the English Minis- 
ters were the most impassioned, having indeed in the 
possession of India some excuse for their fervour on 
behalf of any imaginable obstacle that would keep the 
Russians out of Constantinople. The Emperor of the 
French had during the Conferences at TheDanubian 
Paris revived his project of incorporating 
the Danubian Principalities with Austria in return for 
the cession of Lombardy, but the Viennese Government 
had declined to enter into any such arrangement. Na- 
poleon consequently entered upon a new Eastern policy. 
Appreciating the growing force of nationality in Euro- 
pean affairs, and imagining that in the championship of 
the principle of nationality against the Treaties of 1815 
he would sooner or later find means for the aggrandise- 
ment of himself and France, he proposed that the Pro- 
vinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, while remaining in 

235 MODE UN EUROPE. 1857. 

dependence upon the Sultan, should be united into a 
single State under a prince chosen by themselves. The 
English Ministry would not hear of this union. In 
their view the creation of a Koumanian Principality 
under a chief not appointed by the Porte was simply 
the abstraction from the Sultan of six million persons 
who at present acknowledged his suzerainty, and whose 
tribute to Constantinople ought, according to Lord 
Clarendon, to be increased.* Austria, fearing the effect 
of a Roumanian national movement upon its own 
Roumanian subjects in Transylvania, joined in resist- 
ance to Napoleon's scheme, and the political organisation 
of the Principalities was in consequence reserved by the 
Conference of Paris for future settlement. Elections" 
were held in the spring of 1857 under a decree from 
the Porte, with the result that Moldavia, as it seemed, 
pronounced against union with the sister province. 
But the complaint at once arose that the Porte had 
falsified the popular vote. France and Russia had now 
established relations of such amity that- their ambassa- 
dors jointly threatened to quit Constantinople if the 
elections were not annulled. A visit paid by the 
French Emperor to Queen Victoria, with the object of 
smoothing over the difficulties which had begun to 
threaten the Western alliance, resulted rather in in- 
creased misunderstandings between the two Govern- 
ments as to the future of the Principalities than in any 
real agreement. The elections were annulled. New 
representative bodies met at Bucharest and Jassy, and 

* Martin, Prince Consort, iii. 452. Poole, Stratford, ii. 356, 

IBS:--*. ^J^^ RQJJMA^-IA^) - { 237 

pronounced almost unanimously for union (October, 
1857). In the spring of 1858 the Conference of Paris 
reassembled in order to frame a final settlement of the 
affairs of the Principalities. It determined that iu each 
Province there should be a Hospodar' elected for life, a 
separate judicature, and a separate legislative Assembly, 
while a central Commission, formed by representatives 
of both Provinces, should lay before the Assemblies 
projects of law on matters of joint interest. In ac- 
cordance with these provisions, Assemblies were elected 
in each Principality at the beginning of 1859. Their 
first duty was to choose the two Hospodars, but in 
both Provinces a unanimous vote fell upon 

- -.,. . . , - ~ Alexander Cuza, 

the same person, Prince Alexander buza. Hospodarof 

both Provinces. 

The efforts of England and Austria to pre- 
vent union were thus baffled by the Eoumanian people 
^itself, and after three years the elaborate arrangements 
'made by the Conference were similarly 
swept away, and a single Ministry and 
Assembly took the place of the dual Government. It 
now remained only to substitute a hereditary Prince for 
a Hospodar elected for life; and in 1866, on the ex- 
pulsion of Alexander Cuza by his subjects, Prince 
Charles of Hohenzollern - Sigmaringen, a 

Charles of 

distant kinsman of the reigning Prussian iSSuS? 

J -i, 11 TTi Prince, 1866. 

sovereign, was recognised by all Europe 
as Hereditary Prince of Koumania. The suzerainty of 
^the Porte, now reduced to the bare right to receive a 
fixed tribute, was fated to last but for a few years 

238 MODERN EUROPE. 1853-70. 

V Europe had not to wait for the establishment of 
Roumanian independence in order to judge of the fore- 
sight and the statesmanship of the authors of the 
Treaty of Paris. Scarcely a year passed without the 
occurrence of some event that cast ridicule upon the 
fiction of a self-regenerated Turkey, and upon the pro- 
fession of the Powers that the epoch of external inter- 
ference in its affairs was at an end. The active 
misgovernment of the Turkish authorities themselves, 
,their powerlessness or want of will to 

Continued dis- . n _ 

cord m Turkish prevent flagrant outrage and wrong among 


those whom they professed to rule, con- 
tinued after the Treaty of Paris to he exactly what 
they had been before it. In 1860 massacres and 
civil war in Mount Lebanon led to the occupation 
of Syria by French troops. In 1861 Bosnia and v 
Herzegovina took up arms. In 1863 Servia expelled* 
its Turkish garrisons. Crete, rising in the follow- 
ing year, fought long for its independence, and 
seemed for a moment likely to be united with Greece 
under the auspices of the Powers, but it was finally 
abandoned to its Ottoman masters. At the end of 
fourteen years from the signature of the Peace of Paris, 

the downfall of the French Empire enabled 
Treaty of Paris, Russia to declare that it would no longer 


recognise the provisions of the Treaty 
which excluded its war-ships and its arsenals from* 
the Black Sea. It was for this, and for this almost 
alone, that England had gone through the Crimean* 
War. But for the determination of Lord Palmerston to 

1856-70. TREATY OF PARIS. 239 

exclude Russia from the Black Sea, peace might have 
been made while the Allied armies were still at Varna. 
This exclusion was alleged to be necessary in the in- 
terests of Europe at large ; that it was really enforced 
not in the interest of Europe but ifi the interest of 
England was made sufficiently clear by the action of 
Austria and Prussia, whose statesmen, in spite of the 
discourses so freely addressed to them from London, 
were at least as much alive to the interests of their 
respective countries as Lord Palmerston could be on 
their behalf. Nor had Prance in 1854 any interest in 
crippling the power of Russia, or in Eastern affairs 
generally, which could be remotely compared with those 
of the possessors of India. The personal needs of 
Napoleon III. made him, while he seemed to lead, the 
instrument of the British Government for enforcing 
British aims, and so gave to Palmerston the momentary 
Shaping of a new and superficial concert of the Powers. 
Masters of Sebastopol, the Allies had experienced little 
difficulty in investing their own conclusions with the 
seeming authority of Europe at large ; but to bring 
the representatives of Austria and Prussia to a Council- 
table, to hand them the pen to sign a Treaty dictated 
by France and England, was not to bind them to a 
policy which was not their own, or to make those 
things interests of Austria and Prussia which were not 
their interests before. Thus when in 1870 the French 
Empire fell, England stood alone as tli Power con- / 
cerned in maintaining, the exclusion of llussia from the 
Euxine, and this exclusion it could enforce no longer. It 

240 . MODERN EUROPE. 1856-70. 

was well that Palmerston had made the Treaty of Paris 
the act of Europe, but not for the reasons which Pal- 
merston had imagined. The fiction had engendered no 
new relation in fact ; it did not prolong for one hour 
flife 'submission of Russia after it, had ceased to he con- 
fronted in the West by a superior force ; but it enabled 
Great Britain to retire without official humiliation from 
a position which it had conquered only through the 
help of an accidental Alliance, and which it was unable 
to maintain alone. The ghost of the Conference of 
1856 was, as it were, conjured up in the changed world 
of 1871. The same forms which had once stamped with 
the seal of Europe the instrument of restraint upon 
Russia now as decorously executed its release. Britain 
accepted what Europe would, not resist; and below the 
slopes where lay the, countless dead of three nations 
Seba^topol rose from its ruins, and the ensign or Russia 
floated once more over its ships of war. 


Piedmont after 1849 Ministry of Azeglio Cavour Prime Minister Designs of 
Cavour His Crimean Policy Cavour at the Conference of Paris Cavour 
and Napoleon III. The Meeting at Plombieres Preparations in Italy 
Treaty of January, 1859 Attempts at Mediation Austrian Ultimatum 
Campaign of 1859 Magonta Movement in Central Italy Solferino 
Napoleon and Prussia Interview of Villafranca Cavour resigns Peace 
of Zurich Central Italy after Villafranca The Proposed Congress "The 
Pope and the Congress " Cavour resumes office Cavour and Napoleon 
Union of the Duchies and the Romagna with Piedmont Savoy and Nice 
added to France Cavour on this cession European opinion Naples 
Sicily Garibaldi lands at Marsala Capture of Palermo The Neapoli- 
tans evacuate Sicily Cavour and the Party of Action Cavour's Policy as 
to Naples Garibaldi on the Mainland Persano and Yillamarina at Naples 
Garibaldi at Naples The Piedmontese Army enters Umbria and the, 
Marches Fall of Ancona Garibaldi and Cavour The Armies on the 
Volturno Fall of Gaeta Cavour's Policy with regard to Rome and 
Venice Death of Cavour The Free Church in the Free State. 

IN the gloomy years that followed 1849 the kingdom of 
Sardinia had stood out in bright relief as a State which, 
though crushed on the battle-field, had re- piedmont after 
mained true to the cause of liberty while 
all around it the forces of reaction gained triumph after 
triumph. Its King had not the intellectual gifts of the 
maker of a great State, but he was one with whom those 
possessed of such gifts could work, and on whom they 
could depend. With certain grave private faults Victor 
Emmanuel had the public virtues of intense patriotism, 
of loyalty to his engagements and to his Ministers, 
of devotion to a single great aim. Little given to 

242 MODEliN EUROPE. 1849-59. 

speculative thought, he saw what it most concerned him 
to see, that Piedmont hy making itself the home of 
liherty could become the Master-State of Italy. His 
courage on the battle-field, splendid and animating as 
it was, distinguished him less than another kind of 
courage peculiarly his own. Ignorant and supersti- 
tious, he had that rare and masculine quality of soul 
which in the anguish of bereavement and on the verge 
of the unseen world remains proof against the appeal 
and against the terrors of a voice speaking with more 
than human authority. Rome, not less than Austria, 
stood across the path that led to Italian freedom, and 
employed all its art, all its spiritual force, to turn 
Victor Emmanuel from the work that lay before 
him. There were moments in bis life when a man 
of not more than common weakness might well have 
flinched from the line of conduct on which he had 
resolved in hours of strength and of insight ; there 
were times when a less constant mind might well 
have wavered and cast a balance between opposing 
systems of policy. It was not through heroic great- 
ness that Victor Emmanuel rendered his priceless 
services to Italy. He was a man not conspicuously 
cast in a different mould from many another plain, 
strong nature, but the qualities which he possessed were 
precisely those which Italy required. Fortune, circum- 
stance, position favoured him and made his glorious 
work possible ; but what other Italian prince of this 
century, though placed on the throne of Piedmont, and 
numbering Cavour among his subjects, would have 

1849-52. . PIEDMONT. 243 

played the part, the simple yet all momentous part, 
which Victor Emmanuel played so well ? The love and 
the gratitude of Italy have been lavished without stint 
on the memory of its first sovereign, who served his 
nation with qualities of so homely a type, and in whose 
life there was so much that needed pardon. The colder 
judgment of a later time will hardly contest the title of 
Victor Emmanuel to be ranked among those few men 
without whom Italian union would not have been 
achieved for another generation. 

On the conclusion of peace with Austria after the 
campaign of Novara, the Government and the Parlia- 
ment of Turin addressed themselves to the work of 
emancipating the State from the system of ecclesiastical 
privilege and clerical ascendency which had continued 
in full vigour down to the last year of Charles Albert's 
.reign. Since 1814 the Church had maintained, or had 
recovered, both in Piedmont and in the island of Sar- 
dinia, rights which had been long wrested from it in 
other European societies, and which were out of har- 
mony with the Constitution now taking root under 
Victor Emmanuel. The clergy had still their own 
tribunals, and even irt the case of criminal MinistiyofAzeg . 
offences were not subject to the jurisdiction 
of the State. The Bishops possessed excessive powers 
and too large a share of the Church revenues ; the 
parochial clergy lived in want ; monasteries and con- 
vents abounded. It was not in any spirit of hostility 
towards the Church that Massimo d'Azeglio, whom the 
King called to office after Novara, commenced the work of 
Q 2 

244 MODERN EUROPE. 1849-52. 

reform by measures subjecting tbe clergy to the law-courts 
of the State, abolishing the right of sanctuary in monas- 
teries, and limiting the power -of corporations to acquire 
landed property. If the Papacy would have met Victor 
Emmanuel in a fair spirit his Government would gladly 
have avoided a dangerous and exasperating struggle ; 
but all the forces and the passions of Ultramontanism 
were brought to bear against the proposed reforms. The 
result was that the Minister, abandoned by a section of 
the Conservative party on whom he had relied, sought 
the alliance of men ready for a larger and bolder policy, 
and called to office the foremost of those from whom he 
had received an independent support in the Chamber, 
Count Cavour. Entering the Cabinet in 1850 as 
Minister of Commerce, Cavour rapidly became the 
master of all his colleagues. On his own responsibility 
he sought and won the support of the more moderate 
section of the Opposition, headed by Eattazzi ; and after 
cavour Prime a brief withdrawal from office, caused by 
divisions within the Cabinet, he returned to 
power in October, 1852, as Prime Minister. 

Cavour, though few men have gained greater fame 
as diplomatists, had not been trained in official life. 
The younger son of a noble family, he had 
entered the army in 1826, and served in the 
Engineers ; but his sympathies with the liberal move- 
ment of 1830 brought him into extreme disfavour with 
his chiefs. He was described by Charles Albert, then 
Prince of Carignano, as the most dangerous man in the 
kingdom, and was transferred at the instance of his own 

1849-so. CAVOUR. 245 

father to the solitary Alpine fortress of Bard. Too 
vigorous a nature to submit to inaction, too buoyant 
and too sagacious to resort to conspiracy, he quitted the 
army, and soon afterwards undertook the management 
of one of the family estates, devoting iiimself to scien- 
tific agriculture on a large scale. He was a keen and 
successful man of business, but throughout the next 
twelve years, which he passed in fruitful private industry, 
his mind dwelt ardently on public affairs. He was 
filled with a deep discontent at the state of society 
which he saw around him in Piedmont, and at the con- 
dition of Italy at large under foreign and clerical rule. 
Repeated visits to France and England made him 
familiar with the institutions of freer lands, and gave 
definiteness to his political and social aims.* In 
1847, when changes were following fast, he founded 
with some other Liberal nobles the journal Risor- 
'pimento, devoted to the cause of national revival ; 
and he was one of the first who called upon 
King Charles Albert to grant a Constitution. During 
the stormy days of 1848 lie was at once the vigorous 
advocate of war with Austria and the adversary of 
Republicans and Extremists who for their own theories 
seemed willing to plunge Italy into anarchy. Though 
unpopular with the mob, he was elected to the Chamber 
by Turin, and continued to represent the capital after 
the peace. Up to this time there had been little 
opportunity for the proof of his extraordinary powers, 

* Berti, Cavonr avanti 1848, p. 110. La Rive, Cavour, p. 58. Cavour, 
Lettere (ed. Chiala), introd. p. 73. 

246 MODERN EUROPE. 1852-59. 

but the inborn sagacity of Victor Emmanuel had already 
discerned in him a man who could not remain in a 
subordinate position. " You will see him turn you all 
out of your places," the King remarked to his Ministers, 
as he gave his assent to Cavour's first appointment to a 
seat in the Cabinet. 

The Ministry of Azeglio had served Piedmont with 
honour from 1849 to 1852, but its leader scarcely pos- 
sessed the daring and fertility of mind which the time 
required. Cavour threw into the work of Government 
a passion and intelligence which soon produced results 
visible to all Europe. His devotion to Italy was as 
deep, as all-absorbing, as that of Mazzini 
himself, though the methods and schemes 
of the two men were in such complete antagonism. 
Cavour's fixed purpose was to drive Austria out of 
Italy by defeat in the battle-field, and to establish, as 
the first step towards national union, a powerful king- 
dom of Northern Italy under Victor Emmanuel. In 
order that the military and naval forces of Piedmont 
might be raised to the highest possible strength and 
efficiency, he saw that the resources of the country 
must be largely developed; and with this object he 
negotiated commercial treaties with Foreign Powers, 
laid down railways, and suppressed the greater part of 
the monasteries, selling their lands to cultivators, and 
devoting the proceeds of sale not to State-purposes but 
to the payment of the working clergy. Industry ad- 
vanced ; the heavy pressure of taxation was patiently 
borne; the army and the fleet grew apace. But the 

185^-59. CAVOUR. 247 

cause of Piedmont was one with that of the Italian 
nation, and it became its Government to demonstrate 
this day by day with no faltering voice or hand. Pro- 
tection and support were given to fugitives from Aus- 
trian and Papal tyranny ; the Press Was laid open to 
every tale of wrong ; and when, after an unsuccessful 
attempt at insurrection in Milan in 1853, for which 
Mazzini and the Eepublican exiles were alone respon- 
sible, the Austrian Government sequestrated the 
property of its subjects who would not return from 
Piedmont, Cavour bade his ambassador quit Vienna, 
and appealed to every Court in Europe. Nevertheless, 
Cavour did not believe that Italy, even by a simulta- 
neous rising, could permanently expel the Austrian 
armies or conquer the Austrian fortresses. The expe- 
rience of forty years pointed to the opposite conclusion ; 
and while Mazzini in his exile still imagined that a 
people needed only to determine to be free in order to 
be free, Cavour schemed for an alliance which should 
range "against the Austrian Emperor armed forces as 
numerous and as disciplined as his own. It was mainly 
with this object that Cavour plunged Sar- C avour' 8 
dinia into the Crimean War. He was not 
without just causes of complaint against the Czar; but 
the motive with which he sent the Sardinian troops to 
Sebastopol was not that they might take vengeance on 
Eussia, but that they might fight side by side with the 
soldiers of England and France. That the war might 
lead to complications still unforeseen was no doubt a 
possibility present to Cavour's mind, and in that case it 


248 MODERN EUROPE. 185-2-59. 

was no small thing that Sardinia stood allied to the two 
Western Powers ; but apart from these chances of the 
future, Sardinia would have done ill to stand idle when 
at any moment, as it seemed, Austria might pass from 
armed neutrality into active concert with England and 
France. Had Austria so drawn the sword against 
Eussia whilst Piedmont stood inactive, the influence of 
the Western Powers must for some years to come have 
been ranged on the side of Austria in the maintenance 
of its Italian possessions, and Piedmont could at the 
best have looked only to St. Petersburg for sympathy 
or support. Cavour was not scrupulous in his choice of 
means when the liberation of Italy was the end in view, 
and the charge was made against him that in joining 
the coalition against Eussia he lightly entered into a 
war in which Piedmont had no direct concern. But 
reason and history absolve, and far more than absolve, 
tbe Italian statesman. If the cause of European 
equilibrium, for which England and France took up 
arms, was a legitimate ground of war in the case 
of these two Powers, it was not less so in the case 
of their ally ; while if the ulterior results rather than 
the motive of a war are held to constitute its justifica- 
tion, Cavour stands out as the one politician in Europe 
whose aims in entering upon the Crimean War have 
been fulfilled, not mocked, by events. He joined in 
the struggle against Eussia not in order to maintain 
the Ottoman Empire, but to gain an ally in liberating 
7 Italy. The Ottoman Empire has ntt been maintained ; 
independence of Italy has been established, and 

1852-59. CAVOUR. 249 

established by means of the alliance which Cavour gained. 
His Crimean policy is one of those excessively rare in- 
stances of statesmanship where action has been deter- 
mined not by the driving and half-understood necessi- 
ties of the moment, but by a distinct and true perception 
of the future. He looked only in one direction, but in 
that direction he saw clearly. Other statesmen struck 
blindfold, or in their vision of a regenerated Turkey 
fought for an empire of mirage. It may with some 
reason be asked whether the order of Eastern Europe 
would now be different if our own English soldiers who 


fell at Balaclava had been allowed to die in their beds : 
every Italian whom Cavour sent to perish on the Tcher- 
naya or in the cholera-stricken camp died as directly for 
the cause of Italian independence as if he had fallen on 
the slopes of Custozza or under the walls of Rome. ^ n*~ 

At the Conference of Paris in 18 50 the Sardinian 


Premier took his place in right of alliance by the side of 
the representatives of the great Powers ; and when the 
main business of the Conference was concluded, Count 
Buol, the Austrian Minister, was forced to 

, . . , . . . i j-* Cavour at the 

listen to a vigorous denunciation by (Javour conference of 
of the misgovernment that reigned in Cen- 
tral and Southern Italy, and of the Austrian occupation 
which rendered this possible. Though the French were 
still in Borne, their presence might by courtesy be 
described as a measure of precaution rendered necessary 
by the intrusion of the Austrians farther north ; and 
both the French and English plenipotentiaries at the 
Conference supported Cavour in his invective. Cavour 

250 MODERN EUEOPE. 1832-59. 

returned to Italy without any territorial reward for the 
services that Piedmont had rendered to the Allies ; but 
his object was attained. He had exhibited Austria 
isolated and discredited before Europe ; he had given 
to his country a voice that it had never before had in 
the Councils of the Powers ; he had produced a deep 
conviction throughout Italy that Piedmont not only 
could and would act with vigour against the national 
enemy, but that in its action it would have the help of 
allies. From this time the Republican and Mazzinian 
societies lost ground before the growing confidence in 
the House of Savoy, in its Minister and its army.* The 
strongest evidence of the effect of Cavour's Crimean 
policy and of his presence at the Conference of Paris 
was seen in the action of the Austrian 
Austrian policy, Government itself. From 1849 to 1856 


its rule in Northern Italy had been one not 
so much of severity as of brutal violence. Now all was 
changed. The Emperor came to Milan to proclaim a 
general amnesty and to win the affection of his subjects. 
The sequestrated estates were restored to their owners. 
Eadetzky, in his ninety-second year, was at length 
allowed to pass into retirement ; the government of the 
sword was declared at an end ; Maximilian, the gentlest 
and most winning of the Hapsburgs, was sent with his 
young bride to charm away the sad memories of the 
evil time. But it was too late. The recognition shown 

* Cavour, Lettere (Chiala), ii. introd. p. 187. Guerzoui, Garibaldi, i. 
412. Manin, the Ex-President of Venice, now in exile, declared from this 
time for the House of Savoy. Garibaldi did the same. 

1852^9. CAVOUR. 251 

by the Lombards of the Emperor's own personal friend- 
liness indicated no reconciliation with Austria : and 
while Francis Joseph was still in Milan, King Victor 
Emmanuel, in the presence of a Lombard deputation, 
laid the first stone of the monument erected by subscrip- 
tions from all Italy in memory of those who had fallen 
in the campaigns of 1848 and 1849, the statue of a 
foot-soldier waving his sword towards the Austrian 
frontier. The Sardinian Press redoubled its attacks on 
Austria and its Italian vassals. The Government of 
Vienna sought satisfaction ; Cavour sharplj'- refused it ; 
and diplomatic relations between the two Courts, which 
had been resumed since the Conference of Paris, were 
again broken off. v 

Of the two Western Powers, Cavour would have 
preferred an alliance with Great Britain, which had no 
objects of its own to seek in Italy ; but when he found 
' that the Government of London would not Cavour and 
assist him by arms against Austria, he drew 
closer to the Emperor Napoleon, and supported him 
throughout his controversy with England and Austria 
on the settlement of the Danubian Principalities. 
Napoleon, there is no doubt, felt a real interest in Italy. 
His own early political theories formed on a study 
of the Napoleonic Empire, his youthful alliance with 
the Carbonari, point to a sympathy with the Italian 
national cause which was genuine if not profound, and 
which was not altogether lost in 1849, though France 
then acted as the enemy of Roman independence. If 
Napoleon intended to remould the Continental order 

252 MODERN EUROPE. 1852-59. 

and the Treaties of 1815 in the interests of France 
and of the principle of nationality, he could make 
no better beginning than by driving Austria from 
Northern Italy. It was not even necessary for him to 
devise an original policy. Early in 1848, when it 
seemed probable that Piedmont would be increased by 
Lombardy and part of Venetia, Lamartine had laid it 
down that France ought in that case to be compensated by 
Savoy, in order to secure its frontiers against so power- 
ful a neighbour as the new Italian State. To this idea 
Napoleon returned. Savoy had been incorporated with 
France from 1792 to 1814; its people were more 
French than Italian ; its annexation would not directly 
injure the interests of any great Power. Of the three 
directions in which France might stretch towards its 
old limits of the Alps and the Rhine, the direction of 
Savoy was by far the least dangerous. Belgium could 
not be touched without certain loss of the English 
alliance, with which Napoleon could not yet dispense ; 
an attack upon the Rhenish Provinces .would probably 
be met by all the German Powers together ; in Savoy 
alone was there the chance of gaining territory without 
raising a European coalition against France. No sooner 
had the organisation of the Danubian Principalities 
been completed by the Conference which met in the spring 
of 1858 than Napoleon began to develop his Italian 
plans. An attempt of a very terrible character which 
was made upon his life by Orsini, a Roman exile, 
though at the moment it threatened to embroil Sar- 
dinia with France, probably stimulated him to action. 


In the summer of 1858 he invited Cavour to meet him 
at Plombieres. The negotiations which there passed 
were not made known by the Emperor to 
his Ministers : they were communicated piombieres, 

f July, 1858. 

by Cavour to two persons only besides 
Victor Emmanuel. It seems that no written engage- 
ment was drawn up ; it was verbally agreed that if 
Piedmont could, without making a revolutionary war, 
and without exposing Napoleon to the charge of aggres- 
sion, incite Austria to hostilities, France would act as 
its ally. Austria was then to be expelled from Venetia 
as well as from Lombardy. Victor Emmanuel was 
to become sovereign of North-Italy, with the Roman 
Legations and Marches ; the remainder of the Papal 
territory, except Rome itself and the adjacent dis- 
trict, was to be added to Tuscany, so constituting a 
new kingdom of Central Italy. The two kingdoms, 
together with Naples and Rome, were to form an 
Italian Confederation under the presidency of the Pope. 
France was to receive Savoy and possibly Nice. A 
marriage between the King's young daughter Clotilde 
and the Emperor's cousin Prince Jerome Napoleon was 
discussed, if not actually settled.* r 

From this moment Cavour laboured night and day 
for war. His position was an exceedingly 

TIT! i Cavour in view 

difficult one. Not only had he to reckon of the French 

<* Alliance. 

with the irresolution of Napoleon, and his 

avowed unwillingness to take up arms unless with 

* Cavour, Lettere (Chiala), ii. intr. 289, 324; iii. intr. 1. Bianchi, 
Diplomazia, vii. 1. Mazade, Cavour, p. 187. Massari, La Marmora, p. 204. 

254 MODERN EUROPE. 1858-59. 

the appearance of some good cause ; but even supposing 
the goal of war reached, and Austria defeated, how little 
was there in common between Cavour's aims for Italy 
and the traditional policy of France ! The first Napo- 
leon had given Venice to Austria at Campo Formio ; 
even if the new Napoleon should fulfil his promise and 
liberate all Northern Italy, his policy in regard to the 
centre and south of the Peninsula would probably be 
antagonistic to any effective union or to any further 
extension of the influence of the House of Savoy. 
Cavour had therefore to set in readiness for action 
national forces of such strength that Napoleon, even if 
he desired to draw back, should find it difficult to do 
so, and that the shaping of the future of the Italian 
people should be governed not by the schemes which 
the Emperor might devise at Paris, but by the claims 
and the aspirations of Italy itself. It was necessary 
for him not only to encourage and subsidise the 
National Society a secret association whose branches in 
the other Italian States were preparing to assist Pied- 
mont in the coming war, and to unite Italy under 
the House of Savoy but to enter into communica- 
tion with some of the Republican or revolutionary 
party who had hitherto been at enmity with all 
Crowns alike. He summoned Graribaldi in secrecy 
to Turin, and there convinced him that the war about 
to be waged by Victor Emmanuel was one in which 
he ought to take a prominent part. As the fore- 
most defender of the Roman Republic and a revolu- 
tionary hero, Graribaldi was obnoxious to the French 

1858-59. CAVOUB. 255 

Emperor. Cavour had to conceal from Napoleon the 
fact that Garibaldi would take the field at the head of a 
free-corps by the side of the Allied armies ; he had 
similarly to conceal from Garibaldi that one result of 
the war would be the cession of Nice, his own birth- 
place, to France. Thus plunged in intrigue, driving 
his Savoyards to the camp and raising from them the 
last farthing in taxation, in order that after victory 
they might be surrendered to a Foreign Power; goading 
Austria to some act of passion ; inciting, yet checking 
and controlling, the Italian revolutionary elements ; bar- 
gaining away the daughter of his sovereign to one of 
the most odious of mankind, Cavour staked all on the 
one great end of his being, the establishment of Italian 
independence. Words like those which burst from 
Danton in the storms of the Convention " Perish my 
name, my reputation, so that France be free " were 
'the calm and habitual expression of Cavour's thought 
when none but an intimate friend was by to hear.* 
Such tasks as Cavour's are not to be achieved with- 
out means which, to a man noble in view as Cavour 
really was, it would have been more agreeable to leave 
unemployed. Those alone are entitled to pronounce 
judgment upon him who have made a nation, and 
made it with purer hands. It was well for English 
statesmen and philanthropists, inheritors of a world- 
wide empire, to enforce the ethics of peace and to 

* " In mezzo alle piu angosciose crisi politiche, osclamava nolle soli- 
tudine delle sue stauze ; ' Perisca il mio nome, perisca la inia fa ma, piirehe 
ritalia sia.' " Artom (Cavour's secretary), Cavour iu Parlameiito : introd. 
p. 46. 

258 MODERN EUROPE. 1859. 

plead for a gentlemanlike frankness and self-restraint 
in the conduct of international relations. English, 
women had not been flogged by Austrian soldiers in 
the market-place; the treaties of 1815 had not conse- 
crated a foreign rule over half our race. To Cavour the 
greatest crime would have been to leave anything 
, undone which might minister to Italy's liberation.* 

Napoleon seems to have considered that he would 
be ready to begin war in the spring of 1859. At the 
Treaty of reception at the Tuileries on the 1st of 
January he addressed the Austrian ambas- 
sador in words that pointed to an approaching conflict ; 
a few weeks later a marriage-contract was signed between 
Prince Napoleon and Clotilde daughter of Victor 
Emmanuel, and part of the agreement made at Plom- 
bieres was embodied in a formal Treaty. Napoleon 
undertook to support Sardinia in a war that might 
arise from any aggressive act on the part of Austria, 
and, if victorious, to add both Lombardy and Venetia 
to Victor Emmanuel's dominions. France was in 
return to receive Savoy, the disposal of Nice being 
reserved till the restoration of peace. f Even before the 
Treaty was signed Victor Emmanuel had thrown down 
the challenge to Austria, declaring at the opening of 
the Parliament of Turin that he could not be insen- 
sible to the cry of suffering that rose from Italy. In 

* La Farina Epistolario, ii. 56, 81, 137, 426. The interview with 
Garibaldi ; Cavour, Lettere, id. introd. 297. Garibaldi, Epistolario, i. 55. 

f Cavour, Lettere (Chiala), iii. introd. 32. Bianchi, Diplomazia, viii. 
11. The statement of Napoleon III. to Lord Cowley, in Martin, Prince 
Consort, v. 31, that there was no Treaty, is untrue. 


all but technical form the imminence of war had been 
announced, when, under the influence of diplomatists 
and Ministers about him, and of a financial panic 
that followed his address to the Austrian ambas- 
sador, the irresolute mind of Napoleon* shrank from its 
purpose, and months more of suspense were imposed 
upon Italy and Europe, to be terminated at last not by 
any effort of Napoleon's will but by the rash and im- 
politic action of Austria itself. At the in- 

Attempts at 

stance of the Court of Vienna the British medi 
Government had consented to take steps towards media- 
tion. Lord Cowley, Ambassador at Paris, was sent to 
Vienna with proposals which, it was believed, might 
form the basis for an amicable settlement of Italian 
affairs. He asked that the Papal States should be 
evacuated by both Austrian and French troops ; that 
Austria should abandon the Treaties which gave it a 
virtual Protectorate over Modena and Parma; and 
that it should consent to the introduction of reforms in 
all the Italian Governments. Negotiations towards 
this end had made some progress when they were inter- 
rupted by a proposal sent from St. Petersburg, at the 
instance of Napoleon, that Italian affairs should be sub- 
mitted to a European Congress. Austria was willing 
under certain" conditions to take part in a Congress, 
but it required, as a preliminary measure, that Sardinia 
should disarm. Napoleon had now learnt that Garibaldi 
was to fight at the head of the volunteers for Victor Em- 
manuel. His doubts as to the wisdom of his own policy 
seem to have increased hour by hour; from Britain, whose 

258 MODERN EUROPE. isse. 

friendship he still considered indispensable to him, he 
received the most urgent appeals against war ; it was ne- 
cessary that Cavour himself should visit Paris in order 
to prevent the Emperor from acquiescing in Austria's 
demand. In Cavour's presence Napoleon seems to have 
lost some of his fears, or to have been made to feel that 
it was not safe to provoke his confidant of Plombieres ; * 
but Cavour had not long left Paris when a proposal 
was made from London, that in lieu of the separate 
disarmament of Sardinia the Powers should agree to a 
general disarmament, the details to be settled by a 
European Commission. This proposal received Napo- 
leon's assent. He telegraphed to Cavour desiring him to 
join in the agreement. Cavour could scarcely disobey, yet 
at one stroke it seemed that all his hopes when on the 
very verge of fulfilment were dashed to the ground, all 
his boundless efforts for the- liberation of Italy through 
war with Austria lost and thrown away. For some 
hours he appeared shattered by the blow. Strung to 
the extreme point of human endurance by labour 
scarcely remitted by day or night for' weeks together, 
his strong but sanguine nature gave way, and for a 
while the few friends who saw him feared that he would 
take his own life. But the crisis passed : Cavour ac- 
cepted, as inevitable, the condition of general disarma- 
ment; and his vigorous mind had already begun to' 
work upon new plans for the future, when the report of 

* Bianchi, Politique de Cavour, p. 328, where is Cavour's indignant 
letter to Napoleon. The last paragraph of this seems to convey a veiled 
threat to publish the secret negotiations. 


a decision made at Vienna, which was soon confirmed 
by the arrival of an Austrian ultimatum, 

Austrian ulti- 

threw him into joy as intense as his previous matum - A P ril 23 - 
despair. Ignoring the British proposal for a general dis- 
armament, already accepted at Turin, the Austrian Cabi- j 
net demanded, without qualifications and under threat of \ 
war within three days, that Sardinia should separately \ 
disarm. It was believed at Vienna that Napoleon was 
merely seeking to gain time ; that a conflict was in- 
evitable ; and that Austria now stood better prepared 
for immediate action than its enemies. Right or wrong 
in its judgment of Napoleon's real intentions, the Aus- 
trian Government had undeniably taken upon itself the 
part of the aggressor. Cavour had only to point to his 
own acceptance of the plan of a general disarmament, 
and to throw upon his enemy the responsibility for a 
disturbance of European peace. His reply was taken 
as the signal for hostilities, and on the 29th of April 
Austrian troops crossed the Ticino. A declaration of 
war from Paris followed without delay.* l^ 

For months past Austria had been pouring its 
troops into Northern Italy. It had chosen its own 
time for the commencement of war; a feeble 

Campaign of 

enemy stood before it ; its more powerful 
adversary could not reach the field without crossing the 
Alps or the mountain-range above Genoa. Everything 
.pointed to a vigorous offensive on the part of the 

* Cavour, Lettere, iii. introd. p. 115 ; iii. 29. Bianchi, Politique de 
Cavour, p. 333. Bianchi, Diplomazia, vii. 61. Massari, Cavour, p. 314. 
Parliamentary Papers, 1859, xxxii. 204, 262. Merimee, Lettres k Panizzi, 
i 21. Martin, Prince Consort, iv. 427. 

X 2 

260 MODERN EUROPE. 1859. 

Austrian generals, and in Piedmont itself it was believed 
that Turin must fall before French troops could assist 
in its defence. From Turin as a centre the Austrians 
could then strike with ease, and with superior numbers, 
against the detachments of the French army as they 
descended the mountains at any points in the semi- 
circle from Genoa to Mont Cenis. There has seldom 
been a case where the necessity and the advantages of a 
particular line of strategy have been so obvious ; yet 
after crossing the Ticino the Austrians, above a hundred 
thousand strong, stood as if spell-bound under their 
incompetent chief, Giulay. Meanwhile French detach- 
ments crossed Mont Cenis ; others, more numerous, 
landed with the Emperor at Genoa, and established 
communications with the Piedmontese, whose head- 
quarters were at Alessandria. Giulay now believed 
that the Allies would strike upon his communications 
in the direction of Parma. The march of Bonaparte 
upon , Piacenza in 1796, as well as the campaign of 
Marengo, might well inspire this fear ; but the real in- 
tention of Napoleon III. was to outflank the Austrians 
from the north and so to gain Milan. Garibaldi was 
already operating at the extreme left of the Sardinian 
line in the neighbourhood of Como. While the Pied- 
montese maintained their positions in the front, the 
French from Genoa marched northwards behind them, 
crossed the Po, and reached Vercelli before the Aus- 
trians discovered their manoeuvre. Giulay, still linger- 
ing between the Sesia and the Ticino, now called up part 
of his forces northwards, but not in time to prevent the 

18. MAGENTA. 281 

Piedmontese from crossing the Sesia and defeating the 
troops opposed to them at Palestro (May 30). While 
the Austrians were occupied at this point, the French 
crossed the river farther north, and moved eastwards on 
the Ticino. Giulay was thus outflanked and compelled 
to fall back. The Allies followed him, and on the 4th 
of June attacked the Austrian army in its positions 
about Magenta on the road to Milan. The assault of 
Macmahon from the north gave the Allies 

Battle of 

victory after a hard-fought day. It was 
impossible for the Austrians to defend Milan ; they 
retired upon the Adda and subsequently upon the 
Mincio, abandoning all Lombardy to the invaders, and 
calling up their troops from Bologna and the other 
occupied towns in the Papal States, in order that they 
might take part in the defence of the Venetian frontier 
and the fortresses that guarded it. 

The victory of the Allies was at once felt through- 
out Central Italy. The Grand Duke of Tuscany had 
already fled from his dominions, and the Dictatorship 
for the period of the war had been offered by a Pro- 
visional Government to Victor Emmanuel, who, while 
refusing this, had allowed his envoy, Boncampagni, to 
assume temporary powers at Florence as his representa- 
tive. The Duke of Modena and the Duchess of Parma 
now quitted their territories. In the Romagna the 
disappearance of the Austrians resulted in 

Movement in 

the immediate overthrow of Papal authority. 
Everywhere the demand was for union with Piedmont. 
The calamities of the last ten years had taught their 

262 MODERN EUROPE. 1859. 

lesson to the Italian people. There was now nothing 
of the disorder, the extravagance, the childishness of 
1848. The populations who had then been so divided, 
so suspicious, so easy a prey to demagogues, were now 
watchful, self-controlled, and anxious for the guidance 
of the only real national Government. As at Florence, 
so in the Duchies and in the Romagna, it was desired 
that Victor Emmanuel should assume the Dictatorship. 
The King adhered to the policy which he had adopted 
towards Tuscany, avoiding any engagement that might 
compromise him with Europe or his ally, but appointing 
Commissioners to enrol troops for the common war 
against Austria and to conduct the necessary work of 
administration in these districts. Farini, the historian of 
the Koman States, was sent to Modena ; Azeglio, the 
ex-Minister, to Bologna. Each of these officers entered 
on his task in a spirit worthy of the time ; each under- 
stood how much might be won for Italy by boldness, 
how much endangered or lost by untimely scruples.* 

In his proclamations at the opening of the war 
Napoleon had declared that Italy must be freed up to 
the shore of the Adriatic. His address to the Italian 
people on entering Milan with Victor Emmanuel after 
the victory of Magenta breathed the same spirit. As 
yet, however, Lombardy alone had been won. The 
advance of the allied armies was accordingly resumed 
after an interval of some days, and on the 23rd of June 
they approached the positions held by the Austrians a 

La Farina, Epistolario, ii. 172. Parliamentary Papers, 1859, xxxii. 
391, 470. 

1859 80LFERINO. 263 

little to the west of the Mincio. Francis Joseph had 
come from Vienna to take command of the army. His 
presence assisted the enemy, inasmuch as he had no plan 
of his own, and wavered from day to day between the 
antagonistic plans of the generals at headquarters. 
Some wished to make the Mincio the line 

Battle of Sol- 

of defence, others to hold the Chiese some 
miles farther west. The consequence was that the 
army marched backwards and forwards across the space 
between the two rivers according as one or another 
general gained for the moment the Emperor's confi- 
dence. It was while the Austrians were thus engaged 
that the allied armies came into contact with them 
about Solferino. On neither side was it known that the 
whole force of the enemy was close at hand. The battle 
of Solferino, one of the bloodiest of recent times, was 
fought almost by accident. About a hundred and fifty 
thousand men were present under Napoleon and Victor 
Emmanuel ; the Austrians had a slight superiority in 
force. On the north, where Benedek with the Austrian 
right was attacked by the Piedmontese at San Martino, 
it seemed as if the task imposed on the Italian troops 
was beyond their power. Victor Emmanuel, fighting 
with the same courage as at Novara, saw the positions 
in front of his troops alternately won and lost. But 
the success of the French at Solferino in the centre 
decided the day, and the Austrians withdrew at last 
from their whole line with a loss in killed and wounded 
of fourteen thousand men. On the part of the Allies 
the slaughter was scarcely less. 

264 MODERN EUROPE. 1859. 

Napoleon stood a conqueror, but a conqueror at 

terrible cost; and in front of him he saw the fortresses 

of the Quadrilateral, while new divisions were hastening 

from the north and east to the support of the still 

unbroken Austrian army. He might well 

Napoleon and 

doubt whether, even against his present 
antagonist alone, further success was possible. The 
fearful spectacle of Solferino, heightened by the effects 
of overpowering summer heat, probably affected a mind 
humane and sensitive and untried in the experience of 
war. The condition of the French army, there is 
reason to believe, was far different from that represented 
in official reports, and likely to make the continuance of 
the campaign perilous in the extreme. But beyond all 
this, the Emperor knew that if he advanced farther 
Prussia and all Germany might at any moment take 
up arms against him. There had been a strong out- 
burst of sympathy for Austria in the south-western 
German States. National patriotism was excited by 
the attack of Napoleon on the chief of the German 
sovereigns, and the belief was widely spread that French 
conquest in Italy would soon be followed by French 
conquest on the Rhine. Prussia had hitherto shown 
reserve. It would have joined its arms with those of 
Austria if its own claims to an improved position in 
Germany had been granted by the Court of Vienna ; 
but Francis Joseph had up to this time refused the 
concessions demanded. In the stress of his peril he 
might at any moment close with the offers which he 
had before rejected ; even without a distinct agree- 

1859. VILLAFRANCA. 265 

ment between the two Courts, and in mere deference to 
German public opinion, Prussia might launch against 
France the armies which it had already brought into 
readiness for the field. A war upon the Ehine would 
then be added to the war before the Quadrilateral, and' 
from the risks of this double effort Nap'oleon might well 
shrink in the interest of Prance not less than of his, 
own dynasty. He determined to seek an interview 
with Francis Joseph, and to ascertain on what terms 
peace might now be made. The interview took place 
at Villafranca, east of the Mincio, on the 
llth of July. Francis Joseph refused to vniafranca, 

J July 11. 

cede any part of Venetia without a further 
struggle. He was willing to give up Lombardy, and 
to consent to the establishment of an Italian Federation 
under the presidency of the Pope, of which Federation 
Venetia, still under Austria's rule, should be a member ; 
but he required that Mantua should be left within his own. 
frontier, and that the sovereigns of Tuscany and Modena 
should resume possession of their dominions. To these 
terms Napoleon assented, on obtaining a verbal agree- 
ment that the dispossessed princes should not be restored 
by foreign arms. Kegarding Parma and the restoration 
of the Papal authority in the Romagna no stipulations 
were made. With the signature of the 

Peace of Villa- 

Preliminaries of Villafranca, which were to 
form the base of a regular Treaty to be negotiated at 
Zurich, and to which Victor Emmanuel added his 
name with words of reservation, hostilities came to a close. 
The negotiations at Zurich, though they lasted for 

266 MODERN EUROPE. 1859. 

several months, added nothing of importance to the 
matter of the Preliminaries, and decided 

Treaty of 

nothing that had been left in uncertainty. zarich> * v - 10> 
The Italian Federation remained a scheme which the 
two Emperors, and they alone, undertook to promote. 
Piedmont entered into no engagement either with 
regard to the Duchies or with regard to Federation. 
Victor Emmanuel had in fact announced from the first 
that he would enter no League of which a province 
governed by Austria formed a part, and from this 
resolution he never swerved.* 

Though Lombardy was gained, the impression made 

upon the Italians by the Peace of Villafranca was one 

of the utmost dismay. Napoleon had so confidently and 

so recently promised the liberation of all 

Resignation of > A 

Northern Italy that public opinion ascribed 
to treachery or weakness what was in truth an act of 
political necessity. On the first rumour of the nego- 
tiations Cavour had hurried from Turin, but the agree- 
ment was signed before his arrival. The anger and 
the grief of Cavour are described by 'those who then 
saw him as terrible to witness. t Napoleon had not 
the courage to face him ; Victor Emmanuel bore for 
two hours the reproaches of his Minister, who 
had now completely lost his self-control. Cavour re- 
turned to Turin, and shortly afterwards withdrew from 

* Cavour, Lettere iii. introd. 212, iii. 107. Bianchi, Politique de Cavour, 
p. 349. Bianchi, Diplomazia, viii. 145, 198. Massari, Vittorio Emanuele 
ii. 32. Kossuth, Memories, p. 394. Parl. Pap. 1859, xxxii. 63, 1860, Ixviii. 
7. La Farina Epist,ii. 190. Ollivier, L'figlise et 1'titet, ii. 452. 

f Arrivabene, Italy under Victor Emmanuel, i. 268. 

18W. " CENTRAL ITALY. 267 

office, his last act being the despatch of ten thousand 
muskets to Farini at Modena. In accordance with the 
terms of peace, instructions, which were probably not 
meant to be obeyed, were sent by Cavour's successor, 
Rattazzi, to the Piedmontese Commissioners in Central 
Italy, bidding them to return to Turin and to 
disband any forces that they had collected. 
Farini, on receipt of this order, adroitly divested him- 
self of his Piedmontese citizenship, and, as an honorary 
burgher of Modena, accepted the Dictatorship from his 
fellow-townsmen. Azeglio returned to Turin, but took 
care before quitting the Romagna to place four thou- 
sand soldiers under competent leaders in a position to 
resist attack. It was not the least of Cavour's merits 
that he had gathered about him a body of men whtf, 
when his own hand was for a while withdrawn, could 
pursue his policy with so much energy and sagacity as 
$k r as now shown by the leaders of the national movement 
in Central Italy. Venetia was lost for the present ; 
but if Napoleon's promise was broken, districts which 
he had failed or had not intended to liberate might be 
united with the Italian Kingdom. The Duke of Mo- 
dena, with six thousand men who had remained true to 
him, lay on the Austrian frontier, and threatened to 
inarch upon his capital. Farini mined the city gates, 
and armed so considerable a force that it became clear 
that the Duke would not recover his dominions without 
a serious battle. Parma placed itself under the same 
Dictatorship with Modena; in the Romagna a Pro- 
visional Government which Azeglio had left behind 

Cavour's Plans 


268 MODERN EUROPE. 1859. 

him continued his work. Tuscany, where Napoleon 
had hoped to find a throne for his cousin, pronounced 
for national union, and organised a common military 
force with its neighbours. During the weeks that 
followed the Peace of Villafranca, declarations signed by 
tens of thousands, the votes of representative bodies, 
and popular demonstrations throughout Central Italy, 
showed in an orderly and peaceful form how universal 
was the desire for union under the House of Savoy. 

Cavour, in the plans which he had made before 
1859, had not looked for a direct and immediate result 
beyond the creation of an Italian Kingdom 
including the whole of the territory north 
of the Po. The other steps in the con- 
solidation of Italy would, he believed, follow in 
their order. They might be close at hand, or they 
might be delayed for a while ; but in the expulsion of 
Austria, in 'the interposition of a purely Italian State 
numbering above ten millions of inhabitants, mistress 
of the fortresses and of a powerful fleet, between Aus- 
tria and those who had been its vassals, the essential 
conditions of Italian national independence would 
have been won. For the rest, Italy might be content 
to wait upon time and opportunity. But the Peace of 
Villafranca, leaving Venetia in the enemy's hands, 
completely changed this prospect. The fiction of an 
Italian Federation in which the Hapsburg Emperor, as 
lord of Venice, should forget his Austrian interests and 
play the part of Italian patriot, was too gross to 
deceive any one. Italy, on these terms, would either 


continue to be governed from\Vienna, or be made a 
pawn in the hands of its French\protector. What 
therefore Cavour had hitherto been willing to leave to 
future years now became the need of the present. 
" Before Villafranca," in his own words, " the union pf 
Italy was a possibility; since Villafranca it is a neces- 
sity." Victor Emmanuel understood this 

* Central Italy 

too, and saw the need for action more SSiJjS^- 
clearly than Rattazzi and the Ministers who, 
on Cavour's withdrawal in July, stepped for a few 
mouths into his place. The situation was one that 
called indeed for no mean exercise of statesmanship. If 
Italy was not to be left dependent upon the foreigner 
and the reputation of the House of Savoy ruined, it 
was necessary not only that the Duchies of Modena and 
Parma, but that Central Italy, including Tuscany and 
at least the Romagna, should be united with the Kingdom 
cf Piedmont ; yet the accomplishment of this work 
was attended with the utmost danger. Napoleon him- 
self was hoping to form Tuscany, with an augmented 
territory, into a rival Kingdom of Etruria or Central 
Italy, and to place his cousin on its throne. The 
Ultramontane party in France was alarmed and indig- 
nant at the overthrow of the Pope's authority in the 
Romagna, and already called upon the Emperor to 
fulfil his duties towards the Holy See. If the national 
movement should extend to Rome itself, the hostile 
intervention of France was almost inevitable. While 
the negotiations with Austria at Zurich were still pro- 
ceeding, Victor Emmanuel could not safely accept the 

270 MODERN EUROPE. 1859. 

sovereignty that was offered him by Tuscany and the 
neighbouring provinces, nor permit his cousin, the 
Prince of Carignano, to assume the regency which, 
during the period of suspense, it was proposed to 
confer upon him. Above all it was necessary that the 
Government should not allow the popular forces with 
which it was co-operating to pass beyond its own con- 
trol. In the critical period that followed the armistice 
of Villafranca, Mazzini approached Yictor Emmanuel, 
as thirty years before he had approached 

Mazzini and 

-' his fathw and offered his own assistance 

in the establishmeirtHSi|Italian union under 
the House of Savoy. He proposed, as the first step, 
to overthrow the Neapolitan Government by means of 
an expedition headed by Garibaldi, atid to unite Sicily 
and Naples to the King's dominions ; but he demanded 
in return that Piedmont should oppose armed resistance 
to any foreign intervention occasioned by this enter- 
prise ; and he seems also to have required that an 
attack should be made immediately afterwards upon 
Rome and upon Venetia. To these conditions the 
King could not accede ; and Mazzini, confirmed in his 
attitude of distrust towards the Court of Turin, turned 
to Garibaldi, who was now at Modena. At his instiga- 
tion Garibaldi resolved to lead an expedition at once 
against Borne itself. Napoleon was at this very 
moment promising reforms on behalf of the Pope, 
and warning Victor Emmanuel against the annexa- 
tion even of the Eomagna (Oct. 20th). At the risk 
of incurring the hostility of Garibaldi's followers 


and throwing their leader into opposition to the 
dynasty, it was necessary for the Sardinian Government 
to check him in his course. The moment was a critical 
one in the history of the House of Savoy. But the 
soldier of Republican Italy proved more tractable than 
its prophet. Garibaldi was persuaded to abandon or post- 
pone an enterprise which could only have resulted in 
disaster for Italy; and with expressions of cordiality 
towards the King himself, and of bitter contempt for the 
fox-like politicians who advised him, he resigned his com- 
mand and bade farewell to his comrades, recommending 
them, however, to remain under arms, in full confidence 
that they would ere long find a better opportunity, for 
carrying the national flag southwards.* 

Soon after the Agreement of Villafranca, Napoleon 
had proposed to the British Government that a Con- 
gress of all the Powers should assemble at Paris in 
ovder to decide upon the many Italian questions which 
still remained unsettled. ' In taking upon himself the 
emancipation of Northern Italy Napoleon had, as it 
proved, attempted a task far beyond his own powers. 
The work had been abruptly broken off; the promised 
services had not been rendered, the stipulated reward 
had not been won. On the other hand, 

The proposed 

forces had been set in motion which he who 
raised them could not allay ; populations stpod in arms 
against the Governments which the Agreement of 
Villafrauca purported to restore; the Pope's authority 

* Cavour, Lettere, iii. introd. 301. Bianchi, viii. 180. Garibaldi, 
Epist., i. 79. Guerzoni, i. 491. Reuchlin, iv. 410. 

272 MODERN EUROPE. 1859. 

in the northern part of his dominions was at an end ; 
the Italian League over which France and Austria were 
to join hands of benediction remained the laughing- 
stock of Europe. Napoleon's victories had added Lorn- 
hardy to Piedmont ; for the rest, except from the 
Italian point of view, they had only thrown affairs 
into confusion. Hesitating at the first between 
his obligations towards Austria and the maintenance 
of his prestige in Italy, perplexed between the con- 
tradictory claims of nationality and of Ultramon- 
tanism, Napoleon would gladly have cast upon Great 
Britain, or upon Europe at large, the task of extricating 
him from his embarrassment. But the Cabinet of 
London, while favourable to Italy, showed little inclina- 
tion to entangle itself in engagements which might lead 
to war with Austria and Germany in the interest of 
the French Sovereign. Italian affairs, it was urged by 
Lord John Russell, might well be governed by the 
course of events within Italy itself; and, as Austria 
remained inactive, the principle of non-intervention 
really gained the day. The firm attitude of the popu- 
lation both in the Duchies and in the Romagna, 
their unanimity and self-control, the absence of those 
disorders which had so often been made a pretext for 
foreign intervention, told 'upon the mind of Napoleon 
and on the opinion of Europe at large. Each month 
that passed rendered the restoration of the fallen 
Governments a work of greater difficulty, and increased 
the confidence of the Italians in themselves. Napoleon 
watched and wavered. When the Treaty of Zurich was 


signed his policy was still undetermined. By the 
prompt and liberal concession of reforms the Papal 
Government might perhaps even now have turned the 
balance in its favour. But the obstinate mind of 
Pius IX. was proof against every politic And every gene- 
rous influence. The stubbornness shown by Rome, the 
remembrance of Antonelli's conduct towards the French 
Republic in 1849^ possibly also the discovery of a 
Treaty of Alliandf between the Papal Government and 
Austria, at length overcame Napoleon's hesitation in 
meeting the national demand of Italy, and gave him 
courage to defy both the Papal Court and the French 
priesthood. He resolved to consent to the formation 
of an Italian Kingdom under Victor Emmanuel in- 
cluding the northern part of the Papal territories as 
well as Tuscany and the other Duchies, and to silence 
the outcry which this act of spoliation would excite 
aViong the clerical party in France by the annexation ^ 
of Nice and Savoy. 

The decision of the Emperor was foreshadowed 
by the publication on the 24th of December of 
a pamphlet entitled " The Pope and 
the Congress." The doctrine advanced the congr**,- 

Dec. fe. 

in this essay was that, although a cer- 
tain temporal authority was necessary to the Pope's 
spiritual independence, the peace and unity which 
should surround the Vicar of Christ would be best 
attained when his temporal sovereignty was reduced 
within the narrowest possible limits. Rome and the 
territory immediately around it, if guaranteed to the Pope 

274 MODERN EUROPE. i860. 

by the Great Powers, would be sufficient for the temporal 
needs of the Holy See. The revenue lost by the separa- 
tion of the remainder of the Papal territories might be 
replaced by a yearly tribute of reverence paid by the 
Catholic Powers to the Head of the Church. That the 
pamphlet advocating this policy was written at the dic- 
tation of Napoleon was not made a secret. Its appear- 
ance occasioned an indignant protest at Rome. The 
Pope announced that he would take no part in the 
proposed Congress unless the doctrines advanced in 
the pamphlet were disavowed by the French Govern- 
ment. Napoleon in reply submitted to the Pope that 
he would do well to purchase the guarantee of the 
Powers for the remainder of his territories by giving up 
all claim to the Romagna, which he had already lost. 
Pius retorted that he could not cede what Heaven had 
granted, not to himself, but to the Church; and that 
if the Powers would but clear the Romagna of Pied- 
montese intruders he would soon reconquer the rebellious 
province without the assistance either of France or of 
Austria. The attitude assumed by the Papal Court 
gave Napoleon a good pretext for abandoning the plan 
of a European Congress, from which he could hardly 
expect to obtain a grant of Nice and Savoy. 
try at Pans, ' It was announced at Paris that the Con- 

Jan. 5, 1860. 

gress would be postponed ; and on the 5th 
of January, 1860, the change in Napoleon's policy was 
cavour res publicly marked by the dismissal of his 

Foreign Minister, Walewski, and the ap- 
pointment in his place of Thouvenel, a friend to Italian 


union. Ten days later Rattazzi gave up office at Turin, 
and Cavour returned to power. 

Rattazzi, during the six months that he had con- 
ducted affairs, had steered safely past some dangerous 
rocks; but he held the helm with am unsteady and 
untrusted hand, and he appears to have displayed an 
unworthy jealousy towards Cavour, who, while out of 
office, had not ceased to render what services he could to 
his country. Cavour resumed his post, with the resolve 
to defer no longer the annexation of Central Italy, but 
with the heavy consciousness that Napoleon would 
demand in return for his consent to this 
union the cession of Nice and Savoy. No Na^>iL^ n 

" Jan. March. 

Treaty entitled France to claim this reward, 
for the Austrians still held Venetia; but Napoleon's 
troops lay at Milan, and by a march southwards they 
could easily throw Italian affairs again into confusion, 
and undo all that the last six months had effected. 
Cavour would perhaps have lent himself to any 
European combination which, while directed against 
the extension of France, would have secured the ex- 
istence of the Italian Kingdom ; but no such alterna- 
tive to the French alliance proved possible ; and the 
subsequent negotiations between Paris and Turin were 
intended only to vest with a certain diplomatic pro- 
priety the now inevitable transfer of territory from 
the weaker to the stronger State. A series of propo- 
sitions made from London with the view of with- 
drawing from Italy both French and Austrian influence 
led the Austrian Court to acknowledge that its army 
* 2 


would not be employed for the restoration of the 
^overeigns of Tuscany and Modena. Construing this 
statement as an admission that the stipulations of 
Villafranca and Zurich as to the return of the fugi- 
tive princes had become impracticable, Napoleon 
now suggested that Victor Emmanuel should annex 
Parma and Modena, and assume secular power in the 
Komagna as Vicar of the Pope, leaving Tuscany to 
form a separate Government. The establishment of so 
powerful a kingdom on the confines of France was. he 
added, not in accordance with the traditions of French 
foreign policy, and in self-defence France must rectify 
its military frontier by the acquisition of Nice and 
Savoy (Feb. 24th). Cavour well understood that the 
mention of Tuscan independence, and the qualified 
recognition of the Pope's rights in the Bomagna, were 
no more than suggestions of the means of pressure by 
which France might enforce the cessions it required. 
He answered that, although Victor Emmanuel could 
not alienate any part of his dominions, his Govern- 
ment recognised the same popular fights in Savoy and 
Nice as in Central Italy ; and accordingly that if the 
population of these districts declared in a legal form 
their desire to be incorporated with France, the King 
would not resist their will. Having thus consented to 
the necessary sacrifice, #nd ignoring Napoleon's reserva- 
tions with regard to Tuscany and the Pope, Cavour gave 
orders that a popular vote should at once be taken in 
Tuscany, as well as in Parma, Modena, and the Romagna, 
on the question of union with Piedmont. The voting 


took place early in March, and gave an overwhelming 
majority in favour of union. The Pope union of the 

j , i . . . . . Duchies and th 

issued the maior excommunication against Romans with 


the authors, abettors, and agents in this March - 
work of sacrilege, and heaped curses on 9 curses ;( but, no 
one seemed the worse for them!) Victor Emmanuel 
accepted the sovereignty that was offered to him, and 
n the 2nd of April the Parliament of the united 
kingdom assembled at Turin. It had already been 
announced to the inhabitants of Nice and Savoy that 
the King had consented to their union with France. 
The formality of a plebiscite was enacted a few days 
later, and under the combined pressure of gavo andNice 
the French and Sardinian Governments 
the desired results were obtained. Not more than a 
few hundred persons protested by their vote against 
a transaction to which it was understood that the King 
had no choice but to submit.* 

That Victor Emmanuel had at one time been dis- 
posed to resist Cavour's surrender of the home of 
his race is well known. Above a year, however, had 
passed since the project had been accepted 
as the basis of the French alliance : and if, cession of Nice 

and Savoy. 

during the interval of suspense after Villa- 
franca, the King had cherished a hope that the sacrifice 
might be avoided without prejudice either to the cause 
of Italy or to his own relations with Napoleon, Cavour 

* Cavour, Lettore, iv. introd. 20. Bianchi, Politique, p. 354. 
Bianchi, Diplomazia, viii. 256. Parliamentary Papers, 1860, Ixvii. 203 ; 
Ixviii. 53. 

278 MODERN EUROPE. i860. 

had entertained no such illusions. He knew that the 
cession was an indispensable link in the chain of his 
own policy, that policy which had made it possible to 
defeat Austria, and which, he believed, would lead to 
the further consolidation of Italy. Looking to Eome, 
to Palermo, where the smouldering fire might at any 
moment blaze out, he could not yet dispense with the 
friendship of Napoleon, he could not provoke the one 
man powerful enough to shape the action of France in 
defiance of Clerical and of Legitimist aims. Eattazzi 
might claim credit for having brought Piedmont past 
the Treaty of Zurich without loss of territory ; Cavour, 
in a far finer spirit, took upon himself the responsibility 
for the sacrifice made to France, and bade the Parlia- 
ment of Italy pass judgment upon his act. The 
cession of the border-provinces overshadowed what would 
otherwise have been the brightest scene in Italian 
history for many generations, the meeting of the first 
North- Italian Parliament at Turin. Garibaldi, coming 
as deputy from his birthplace, Nice, uttered words of 
scorn and injustice against the man who had made him 
an alien in Italy, and quitted the Chamber. Bitterly 
as Cavour felt, both now and down to the end of his 
life, the reproaches that were levelled against him, he 
allowed no trace of wounded feeling, of impatience, of 
the sense of wrong, to escape him in the masterly speech 
in which he justified his policy and won for it the rati- 
fication of the Parliament. It was not until a year later, 
when the hand of death was almost upon him, that 
fierce words addressed to him face to face by Garibaldi 


wrung from him the impressive answer, " The act that 
has made this gulf between us was the most painful duty 
of my life. By what I have felt myself I know what 
Garibaldi must have felt. If he refuses me his forgive- 
ness I cannot reproach him for it." * 

The annexation of Nice and Savoy by Napoleon 
was seen with extreme displeasure in Europe generally, 
and most of all in England. It directly 

* The cession in 

affected the history of Britain by the * 
stimulus which it gave to the development 
of the Volunteer Forces. Owing their origin to certain 
demonstrations of hostility towards England made by 
the French army after Orsini's conspiracy and the 
acquittal of one of his confederates in London, the Volun- 
teer Forces rose in the three months that followed the 
annexation of Nice and Savoy from seventy to a hundred 
and eighty thousand men. If viewed as an indication 
that the ruler of France would not b3 content with the 
frontiers of 1815, the acquisition of the Sub-Alpine 
provinces might with some reason excite alarm ; on no 
other ground could their transfer be justly condemned. 
Geographical position, language, commercial interests, 
separated Savoy from Piedmont and connected it with 
France ; and though in certain parts of the County of 
Nice the Italian character predominated, this district as 
a whole bore the stamp not of Piedmont or Liguria 
but of Provence. Since the separation from France in 
1815 there had always been, both in Nice and Savoy, a 
considerable party which desired reunion with that 

* Cavour iii Parlainento, p. 556. 

280 MODERN EUROPE. r~ i860. 

country. The political and social order of the Sardinian 
Kingdom had from 1815 to 1848 been so backward, so re- 
actionary, that the middle classes in the border-provinces 
looked wistfully to France as a land where their own 
grievances had been removed and their own ideals at- 
tained. The constitutional system of Victor Emmanuel, 
and the despotic system of Louis Napoleon had both been 
too recently introduced to reverse in the minds of the 
greater number the political tradition of the preceding 
thirty years. Thus if there were a few who, like Gari- 
baldi, himself of Genoese descent though born at Nice, 
passionately resented separation from Italy, they found 
no considerable party either in Nice or in Savoy animated 
by the same feeling. On the other hand, the ecclesias-> 
tical sentiment of Savoy rendered its transfer to France^ 
an actual advantage to the Italian State. The Papacy 
had here a deeply-rooted influence. The reforms be- 
gun by Azeglio's Ministry had been steadily resisted 
by a Savoyard group of deputies in the interests 
of Rome. Cavour himself, in the prosecution of his 
larger plans, had always been exposed to the danger of 
a coalition between this ultra-Conservative party and 
his opponents of the other extreme. It was well that 
in the conflict with the Papacy, without which there 
could be no such thing as a Kingdom of United Italy, 
these influences of the Savoyard Church and Noblesse 
should be removed from the Parliament and the Throne. 
Honourable as the Savoyard party of resistance had 
proved themselves in Parliamentary life, loyal and 
faithful as they were to their sovereign, they were yet 

i860. NAPLES. 281 

not a part of the Italian nation. Their interests were 
not bound up with the cause of Italian union ; their 
leaders were not inspired with the ideal of Italian 
national life. The forces that threatened the future of 
the new State from within were too .powerful for the 
surrender of a priest-governed and half -foreign element 
to be considered as a real loss. 

Nice and Savoy had hardly been handed over to 
Napoleon when Garibaldi set out from Genoa to effect 
the liberation of Sicily and Naples. King 
Ferdinand II., known to his subjects and 
to Western Europe as King Bomba, had died a few 
days before the battle of Magenta, leaving the 
throne to his son Francis II. In consequen.ce of the 
friendship shown by Ferdinand to Russia during the 
Crimean War, and of his refusal to amend his tyran- 
nical system of government, the Western Powers 
.had in 1856 withdrawn their representatives from 
Naples. On the accession of Francis II. diplo- 
matic intercourse was renewed, and Cavour, who had 
been at bitter enmity with Ferdinand, sought to es- 
tablish relations of friendship with his son. In the 
war against Austria an alliance with Naples would 
have been of value to Sardinia as a counterpoise to 
Napoleon's influence, and this alliance Cavour attempted 
to obtain. He was, however, unsuccessful ; and after 
the Peace of Villafranca the Neapolitan Court threw 
itself with ardour into schemes for the restoration of 
the fallen Governments and the overthrow of Pied- 
montese authority in the Romagna by means of a 

282 MODERN EUROPE. i960. 

coalition with Austria and Spain and a counter-re- 
volutionary movement in Italy itself. A rising on 
behalf of the fugitive Grand Duke of Tuscany was to give 
the signal for the march of the Neapolitan army north- 
wards. This rising, however, was expected in vain, 
and the great Catholic design resulted in nothing. 
Baffled in its larger aims, the Bourbon Government 
proposed in the spring of 18 GO to occupy Umbria and 
the Marches, in order to prevent the revolutionary 
movement from spreading farther into the Papal States. 
Against this Cavour protested, and King Francis 
yielded to his threat to withdraw the Sardinian am- 
bassador from Naples. Knowing that a conspiracy 
existed for the restoration of the House of Murat to 
the Neapolitan throne, which would have given France 
the ascendency in Southern Italy, Cavour now renewed 
his demand that Francis II. should enter into alliance 
with Piedmont, accepting a constitutional system of 
government and the national Italian policy of Victor 
Emmanuel. But neither the summons from Turin, nor 
the agitation of the Muratists, nor the warnings of 
Great Britain that the Bourbon dynasty could only 
avert its fall by reform, produced any real change in 
the spirit of the Neapolitan Court. Ministers were 
removed, but the absolutist and anti-national system 
remained the same. Meanwhile Garibaldi was gather- 
ing his followers round him in Genoa. On the 15th of 
April Victor Emmanuel wrote to King Francis that un- 
less his fatal system of policy was immediately abandoned 
the Piedmontese Government itself might shortly be 

1860. SICILY. 283 

forced to become the agent of his destruction. Even 
this menace proved fruitless ; and after thus fairly 
exposing to the Court of Naples the consequence of its 
own stubbornness, Victor Emmanuel let loose against it 
the revolutionary forces of Garibaldi, f" *- 

Since the campaign of 1859 msurrectid^^y com- 
mittees had been active in the principal Sicilian towns. 
The old desire of the Sicilian Liberals for the 
independence of the island had given place, 
under the influence of the events of the past year, to the 
desire for Italian union. On the abandonment of Gari- 
baldi's plan for the march on Borne in November, 1859, 
the liberation of Sicily had been suggested to him as a 
more feasible enterprise, and the general himself wavered 
in the spring of 1860 between the resumption of hi& 
Roman project and an attack upon the Bourbons of 
Naples from the south. The rumour spread through 
Sicily that Garibaldi would soon appear there at the head 
of his followers. On the 3rd of April an attempt at in- 
surrection was made at Palermo. It was repressed without 
difficulty ; and although disturbances broke out in other 
parts of the island, the reports which reached Garibaldi 
at Genoa as to the spirit and prospects of the Sicilians 
were so disheartening that for a while he seemed dis- 
posed to abandon the project of invasion as hopeless for 
the present. It was only when some of the Sicilian 
exiles declared that they would risk the Garibaldi 8tarts 
enterprise without him that he resolved upon 
immediate action. On the night of the 5th of May two 
steamships lying in the harbour of Genoa were seized, 


and on these Garibaldi with his Thousand put to sea. 
Cavour, though he would have preferred that Sicily 
should remain unmolested until some progress had been 
made in the consolidation of the North Italian King- 
dom, did not venture to restrain Garibaldi's movements, 
with which he was well acquainted. He required, 
however, that the expedition should not touch at the 
island of Sardinia, and gave ostensible orders to his 
admiral, Persano, to seize the ships of Garibaldi if 
they should put into any Sardinian port. Garibaldi, 
who had sheltered the Sardinian Government from 
responsibility at the outset by the fiction of a sudden 
capture of the two merchant-ships, continued to spare 
Victor Emmanuel unnecessary difficulties by avoiding 
the fleet which was supposed to be en the watch for 
him off Cagliari in Sardinia, and only interrupted his 
voyage by a landing at a desolate spot on the Tuscan 
coast in order to take up artillery and ammunition 
which were waiting for him there. On the llth of 
May, having heard from some English merchantmen 
that there were no Neapolitan vessels of war at Marsala, 
he made for this harbour. The first of his two ships 
Ganbaidi at entered it in safety and disembarked her 
crew; the second, running on a rock, lay 
for some time within range of the guns of a Neapolitan 
war-steamer which was bearing up towards the port. 
But for some unknown reason the Neapolitan commander 
delayed opening fire, and the landing of Garibaldi's fol- 
lowers was during this interval completed without loss.* 

* Garibaldi, Ep'st. i. 97. Persauo, Diario, i. 14. Le Farina, Epist., 


On the following day the little army, attired in the 
red shirts which are worn by cattle-ranchers in South 
America, marched eastwards from Marsala. Bands of 
villagers joined them as they moved through the 
country, and many unexpected adherents were gained 
among the priests. On the third day's march Neapoli- 
tan troops were seen in position at Calatafimi. They 
were attacked by Garibaldi, and, though far superior in 
number, were put to the rout. The moral effects of 
this first victory were very great. The Neapolitan 
commander retired into Palermo, leaving Garibaldi 
master of the western portion of the island. Insur- 
rection spread towards the interior; the revolutionary 
party at Palermo itself regained its courage and pre- 
pared to co-operate with Garibaldi on his approach. 
On nearing the city Garibaldi determined that he could 
not risk a direct assault upon the forces 
which occupied it. He resolved, if possible, tun Palermo, 
to lure part of the defenders into the moun- 
tains, and during their absence to throw himself into 
the city and to trust to the energy of its inhabitants 
to maintain himself there. This strategy succeeded. 
While the officer in command of some of the Neapoli- 
tan battalions, tempted by an easy victory over the 
ill-disciplined Sicilian bands opposed to him, pursued 
his beaten enemy into the mountains, Garibaldi with 
the best of his troops fought his way into Palermo on 
the night of May 2Gth. Fighting continued in the 

ii. 324. Guerzoni, ii. 23. Parliamentary Papers, I860, Ixviii. 2. Mundy, 
H.M.S. Hannibal at Palermo, p. 133. 

286 MODERN EUROPE. i860. 

streets during the next two days, and the cannon of 
the forts and of the Neapolitan vessels in harbour 
ineffectually bombarded the city. On the 30th, at the 
moment when the absent battalions were coming again 
into sight, an armistice was signed on board the British 
man-of-war Hannibal. The Neapolitan commander 
gave up to Garibaldi the bank and public buildings, and 
withdrew into the forts outside the town. But the 
Government at Naples was now becoming thoroughly 
alarmed ; and considering Palermo as lost, it directed 
the troops to be shipped to Messina and to Naples 
itself. Garibaldi was thus left in undisputed possession 
of the Sicilian capital. He remained there for nearly 
two months, assuming the government of Sicily as 
Dictator in the name of Victor Emmanuel, appointing 
Ministers, and levying taxes. Heavy reinforcements 
reached him from Italy. The Neapolitans, driven from 
the interior as well as from the towns occupied by the 
invader, now held only the north-eastern extremity of 
the island. On the 20th of July Garibaldi, operating 
both by land and sea, attacked and defeated them at 
Milazzo on the northern coast. The result of this 
victory was that Messina itself, with the exception of 
the citadel, was evacuated by the Neapolitans with- 
out resistance. Garibaldi, whose troops now numbered 
eighteen thousand, was master of the island from sea to 
sea, and could with confidence look forward to the over- 
throw of Bourbon authority on the Italian mainland. 

During Garibaldi's stay at Palermo the antagonism 
between the two political creeds which severed those 


whose devotion to Italy was the strongest came clearly 
into view. This antagonism stood embodied in its ex- 
treme form in the contrast between Maz- Thepwtyof 
zini and Cavour. Mazzini, handling moral 
and political conceptions with something of the inde- 
pendence of a mathematician, laid it down as the first 
duty of the Italian nation to possess itself of Rome 
and Venice, regardless of difficulties that might be 
raised from without. By conviction he desired that 
Italy should be a Republic, though under certain con- 
ditions he might be willing to tolerate the monarchy of 
Victor Emmanuel. Cavour, accurately observing the 
play of political forces in Europe, conscious above all of 
the strength of those ties which still bound Napoleon 
to the clerical cause, knew that there were limits which 
Italy could not at present pass without ruin. The 
centre of Mazzini's hopes, an advance upon Rome 
itself, he knew to be an act of self-destruction for Italy, 
and this advance he was resolved at all costs to prevent. 
Cavour had not hindered the expedition to Sicily; he 
had not considered it likely to embroil Italy with its 
ally ; but neither had he been the author of this enter- 
prise. The liberation of Sicily might be deemed the 
work rather of the school of Mazzini than of Cavour. 
Garibaldi indeed was personally loyal to Victor Em- 
manuel ; but around him there were men who, if not 
Republicans, were at least disposed to make the grant 
of Sicily to Victor Emmanuel conditional upon the 
king's fulfilling the will of the so-called Party of Action, 
and consenting to an attack upon Rome. Under the 

288 MODERN EUROPE. i860. 

influence of these politicians Garibaldi, in reply to a depu- 
tation expressing to him the desire of the Sicilians for 
union with the Kingdom of Victor Emmanuel, declared 
that he had come to fight not for Sicily alone but for all 
Italy, and that if the annexation of Sicily was to take 
place before the union of Italy was assured, he must 
withdraw his hand from the work and retire. The effect 
produced by these words of Garibaldi was so serious 
that the Ministers whom he had placed in office resigned. 
Garibaldi endeavoured to substitute for them men more 
agreeable to the Party of Action, but a demonstration in 
Palermo itself forced him to nominate Sicilians in favour 
of immediate annexation. The public opinion of the 
island was hostile to Republicanism and to the friends 
of Mazzini ; nor could the prevailing anarchy long 
continue without danger of a reactionary movement. 
Garibaldi himself possessed no glimmer of administra- 
tive faculty. After weeks of confusion and misgovern- 
ment he saw the necessity of accepting direction from 
Turin, and consented to recognise as Pro-Dictator of 
the island a nominee of Cavour, the Piedmontese 
Depretis. Under the influence of Depretis a commence- 
ment was made in the work of political and social 
reorganisation.* 4 

Cavour, during Garibaldi's preparation for his descent 
upon Sicily and until the capture of Palermo, had 
affected to disavow and condemn the enterprise as one 
undertaken by individuals in spite of the Government, 

* Cavour, Lettere, iii. iutrod. 269. La Farina, Epist, ii. 336. Bianchi, 
folitique, p. 366. fersano, Diario, i. 50, 72, 96. 

1860. NAPLES. 289 

and at their own risk. The Piedmontese ambassador 
was still at Naples as the representative of a friendly 
Court ; and in reply to the reproaches of 
Germany and Russia, Cavour alleged that with regard to 
the title of Dictator of Sicily in the name 
of Victor Emmanuel had been assumed by Garibaldi 
without the knowledge or consent of his sovereign. 
But whatever might be said to Foreign Powers, Cavour, 
from the time of the capture of Palermo, recognised 
that the hour had come for further steps towards Italian 
union ; and, without committing himself to any definite 
line of action, he began already to contemplate the 
overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty at Naples. It was 
in vain that King Francis now released his political 
prisoners, declared the Constitution of 1848 in force, 
and tendered to Piedmont the alliance which he had 
before refused. Cavour, in reply to his overtures, 
stated that he could not on his own authority pledge 
Piedmont to the support of a dynasty now almost in 
the agonies of dissolution, and that the matter must 
await the meeting of Parliament at Turin. Thus 
far the way had not been absolutely closed to a recon- 
ciliation between the two Courts ; but after the 
victory of Garibaldi at Milazzo and the evacuation 
of Messina at the end of July Cavour cast aside all 
hesitation and reserve. He appears to have thought 
a renewal of the war with Austria probable, and 
now strained every nerve to become master of Naples 
and its fleet before Austria could take the field. He 
ordered Admiral Persano to leave two ships of war to 

290 MODERN EUROPE. i860. 

cover Garibaldi's passage to the mainland, and with 
one ship to proceed to Naples himself, and there excite 
insurrection and win over the Neapolitan fleet to the 
flag of Victor Emmanuel. Persano reached Naples on 
the 3rd of August, and on the next day the 

Garibaldi crosses . . . , . , . ~ 

to the mainland, negotiations between the two Courts were 

Aug. 19. 

broken off. On the 19th Garibaldi crossed 
from Sicily to the mainland. His march upon the 
capital was one unbroken triumph. 

It was the hope of Cavour that before Garibaldi 
could reach Naples a popular movement in the city 
itself would force the King to take flight, so that 
Garibaldi on his arrival would find the machinery of 
government, as well as the command of the fleet and 

the army, already in the hands of Victor 
viiiamanna at Emmanuel's representatives. If war with 


Austria was really impending, incalculable 
mischief might be caused by the existence of a semi- 
independent Government at Naples, reckless, in its en- 
thusiasm for the march on Home, of the effect which its 
acts might produce on the French alliance. In any case 
the control of Italian affairs could but half belong to the 
King and his Minister if Garibaldi, in the full glory of 
his unparalleled exploits, should add the Dictatorship 
of Naples to the Dictatorship of Sicily. Accordingly 
Cavour plied every art to accelerate the inevitable revo- 
lution. Persano and the Sardinian ambassador, Villa- 
marina, had their confederates in the Bourbon Ministry 
and in the Royal Family itself. But their efforts to 
drive King Francis from Naples, and to establish the 

1860. NAPLES. 291 

authority of Victor Emmanuel before Garibaldi's arrival, 
were baffled partly by the tenacity of the King and 
Queen, partly by the opposition of the committees of 
the Party of Action, who were determined that power 
should fall into no hands but those of Garibaldi himself. 
It was not till Garibaldi had reached Salerno, and the 
Bourbon generals had one after another declined to 
undertake the responsibility of command in a battle 
against him, that Francis resolved on flight. It was 
now feared that he might induce the fleet to sail with 
him, and even that he might hand it over to the 
Austrians. The crews, it was believed, were willing to 
follow the King ; the officers, though inclined to the 
Italian cause, would be powerless to prevent them. 
There was not an hour to lose. On the night of 
September 5th, after the King's intention to quit the 
capital had become known, Persano and Villamarina 
disguised themselves, and in company with their parti- 
sans mingled with the crews of the fleet, whom they 
induced by bribes and persuasion to empty the boilers 
and to cripple the engines of their ships. When, 
on the Gth, King Francis, having announced his 
intention to spare the capital bloodshed, went on 
board a mail steamer and quitted the harbour, ac- 
companied by the ambassadors of Austria, Prussia, 
and Spain, only one vessel of the fleet 

_ ,. -1 -I Departure of 

followed him. An urgent summons was Kin? Francis, 

Sept. 6. 

sent to Garibaldi, whose presence was 
now desired by all parties alike in order to pre- 
vent the outbreak of disorders. Leaving his troops 
T 2 

292 MODERN EUROPE. i860. 

at Salerno, Garibaldi came by railroad to Naples 
on the morning of the 7th, escorted only by 

S0me f nis staff " Tn6 f lts W61>e 

Garibaldi enters 

garrisoned by eight thousand of the Bour- 
bon troops, but all idea of resistance had been aban- 
doned, and Garibaldi drove fearlessly through the city 
in the midst of joyous crowds. His first act as Dicta- 
tor was to declare the ships of war belonging to the 
State of the Two Sicilies united to those of King Victor 
Emmanuel under Admiral Persano's command. Before 
sunset the flag of Italy was hoisted by the Neapolitan 
fleet. The army was not to be so easily incorporated 
with the national forces. King Francis, after abandon- 
ing the idea of a battle between Naples and Salerno, 
had ordered the mass of his troops to retire upon Capua 
in order to make a final struggle on the line of the 
Volturno, and this order had been obeyed.* 

As soon as it had become evident that the entry of 
Garibaldi into Naples could not be anticipated by the 
establishment of Victor Emmanuel's own authority, 
Cavour recognised that bold and aggressive action on 
the part of the National Government was now a neces- 

sity. Garibaldi made no secret of his inten- 

umbriaandthe tion to carry the Italian arms to Rome. The 

Marches, Sept. 

time was past when the national movement 

* Bianchi, Politique, p. 377. Persano, ii. p. 1 102. Persano sent his 
Diary in MS. to Azeglio, and asked his advice on publishing it. Azeglio 
referred to Cavour's saying, '' If we did for ourselves what we are doing 
for Italy, we should be sad blackguards," and begged Persano to let his 
secrets be secrets, saying that since the partition of Poland no confession of 
such " colossal blackguardism " had been published by any public man. 


could be checked at the frontiers of Naples and Tus- 
cany. It remained only for Cavour to throw the King's 
own troops into the Papal States before Garibaldi could 
move from Naples, and, while winning for Italy the 
last foot of ground that could be won without an 
actual conflict with France, to stop short at those limits 
where the soldiers of Napoleon would certainly meet an 
invader with their fire. The Pope was still in posses- 
sion of the Marches, of Umbria, and of the territory 
between the Apennines and the coast from Orvieto to- 
Terracina. Cavour had good reason to believe that 
Napoleon would not strike on behalf of the Temporal 
Power until this last narrow district was menaced. He 
resolved to seize upon the Marches and Umbria, and to 
brave the consequences. On the day of Garibaldi's 
entry into Naples a despatch was sent by Cavour to the 
Papal Government requiring, in the name of Victor 
Emmanuel, the disbandment of the foreign mercenaries 
who in the previous spring had plundered Perugia, and 
whose presence was a continued menace to the peace of 
Italy. The announcement now made by Napoleon that 
he must break off diplomatic relations with the Sar- 
dinian Government in case of the invasion of the Papal 
States produced no effect. Cavour replied that by no 
other means could he prevent revolution from master- 
ing all Italy, and on the 10th of September the 
French ambassador quitted Turin. Without waiting for 
Antonelli's answer to his ultimatum, Cavour ordered 
the King's troops to cross the frontier. The Papal 
army was commanded by Lamoriciere, a French general 

294 MODERN EUROPE. i860. 

who had gained some reputation in Algiers ; but the 
resistance offered to the Piedmontese was unexpectedly 
feeble. The column which entered Umbria reached the 
southern limit without encountering any serious oppo- 
sition except from the Irish garrison of Spoleto. In 
the Marches, where Lamoriciere had a considerable 
force at his disposal, the dispersion of the Papal troops 
and the incapacity shown in their command brought 
the campaign to a rapid and inglorious end. The main 
body of the defenders was routed on the Musone, near 
Loreto, on the 19th of September. Other divisions 
surrendered, and Ancona alone remained to Lamoriciere. 
Fail of Ancona Vigorously attacked in this fortress both by 

land and sea, Lamoriciere surrendered after 
a siege of eight days. Within three weeks from Gari- 
baldi's entrj' into Naples the Piedmontese army had com- 
pleted the task imposed upon it, and Victor Emmanuel 
was master of Italy as far as the Abruzzi. 

Cavour's successes had not come a day too soon, for 
Garibaldi, since his entry into Naples, was falling more 
and more into the hands of the Party of Action, and, 

while protesting his loyalty to Victor Em- 
bfticB, andthfl manuel, was openly announcing that he 

Party of Action. J 

would march on Rome whether the King's 
Government permitted it or no. In Sicily the officials 
appointed, by this Party were proceeding with such 
violence that Depretis, unable to obtain troops from 
Cavour, resigned his post. Garibaldi suddenly appeared 
at Palermo on the llth of September, appointed a new 
Pro-Dictator, and repeated to the Sicilians that their 

1860. GARIBALDI. 295 

union with the Kingdom of Victor Emmanuel must be 
postponed until all members of the Italian family were 
free. But even the personal presence and the angry 
words of Garibaldi were powerless to check the strong 
expression of Sicilian opinion in favour of immediate 
and unconditional annexation. His visit to Palermo 
was answered by the appearance of a Sicilian deputation 
at Turin demanding immediate union, and complaining 
that the island was treated by Garibaldi's officers like a 
conquered province. At Naples the rash and violent 
utterances of the Dictator were equally condemned. 
The Ministers whom he had himself appointed resigned. 
Garibaldi replaced' them by others who were almost 
Republicans, and sent a letter to Victor Emmanuel 
requesting him to consent to the march upon Rome 
and to dismiss Cavour. It was known in Turin that 
at this very moment Napoleon was taking steps to 
jncrease the French force in Rome, and to garrison the 
whole of the territory that still remained to the Pope. 
Victor Emmanuel understood how to reply to Garibaldi's 
letter. He remained true to his Minister, and sent 
orders to Villamarina at Naples in case Garibaldi should 
proclaim the Republic to break off all relations with 
him and to secure the fleet. The fall of Ancona on 
September 28th brought a timely accession of popularity 
and credit to Cavour. He made the Parliament which 
assembled at Turin four days later arbiter in the struggle 
between Garibaldi and himself, and received from it an 
almost unanimous vote of confidence. Garibaldi would 
perhaps have treated lightly any resolution of Parliament 

296 MODERN EUROPE. i860. 

which conflicted with his own opinion : he shrank 
from a breach with the soldier of Novara and Solferino. 
Now, as at other moments of danger, the character and 
reputation of Victor Emmanuel stood Italy in good 
stead. In the enthusiasm which Garibaldi's services 
to Italy excited in every patriotic heart, there was 
room for thankfulness that Italy possessed a sovereign 
and a statesman strong enough even to withstand its 
hero when his heroism endangered the national cause.* 
The King of Naples had not yet abandoned the 
hope that one or more of the European Powers would 
intervene in his behalf. The trustworthy part of his 
Thearmieson army had gathered round the fortress of 
Capua on the Volturno, and there were 
indications that Garibaldi would here meet with far 
more serious resistance than he had yet encountered. 
While he was still in Naples, his troops, which 
had pushed northwards, sustained a repulse at 
Cajazzo. Emboldened by this success, the Neapolitan 
army at the beginning of October assumed the offen- 
sive. It was with difficulty that Garibaldi, placing 
himself again at the head of his forces, drove the 
enemy back to Capua, But the arms of Victor 
Emmanuel were now thrown into the scale. Crossing 
the Apennines, and driving before him the weak force 
that was intended to bar his way at Isernia, the King 
descended in the rear of the Neapolitan army. The 
Bourbon commander, warned of his approach, moved 

* Bianchi, Politique, p. 383. Persano, iii. 61. Bianchi, Diplomazia, 
viii/337. Garibaldi, Epist, i. 127. 


northwards on the line of the Garigliano, leaving a 
garrison to defend Capua. Garibaldi followed on his 
track, and in the neighbourhood of Teano met King 
Victor Emmanuel (October 26th). The 

Meeting of Vic- 

meeting is said to have been cordial on the ^, r d^SS^! 
part of the King, reserved on the part of 
Garibaldi, who saw in the King's suite the men by 
whom he had been prevented from invading the Papal 
States in the previous year. In spite of their common 
patriotism the volunteers of Garibaldi and the army of 
Victor Emmanuel were rival bodies, and the relations 
between the chiefs of each camp were strained and 
difficult. Garibaldi himself returned to the siege of 
Capua, while the King marched northwards against the 
retreating Neapolitans. All that was great in Garibaldi's 
career was now in fact accomplished. The politicians 
about him had attempted at Naples, as in Sicily, to 
postpone the union with Victor Emmanuel's monarchy, 
and to convoke a Southern Parliament which should fix 
the conditions on which annexation would be permitted; 
but, after discrediting the General, they had been crushed 
by public opinion, and a popular vote which was 
taken at the end of October on the question of immediate 
union showed the majority in favour of this course to 
be overwhelming. After the surrender of Capua on the 
2nd of November, Victor Emmanuel made his entry into 
Naples. Garibaldi, whose request for the Lieutenancy of 
Southern Italy for the space of a year with full powers 
was refused by the King,* declined all minor honours 

* " Le Roi n-pondit tout court : ' C'est impossible.' " Cavour to his 

298 MODERN EUROPE. isei. 

and rewards, and departed to his home, still filled with 
resentment against Cavour, and promising his soldiers 
that he would return in the spring and lead them to 
Rome and Venice. The reduction of Gaeta, where 
King Francis II. had taken refuge, and of the citadel 
of Messina, formed the last act of the war. The French 
fleet for some time prevented the Sardinians from 
operating against Gaeta from the sea, and the siege in 
consequence made slow progress. It was not until the 
middle of January, 1861, that Napoleon permitted the 
French admiral to quit his station. The bombardment 
was now opened both by land and sea, and after a brave 
Fail of Gaeta resistance Gaeta surrendered on the 14th of 

February. King Francis and his young 
Queen, a sister of the Empress of Austria, were con- 
veyed in a French steamer to the Papal States, and 
there began their life-long exile. The citadel of Mes- 
sina, commanded by one of the few Neapolitan officers 
who showed any soldierly spirit, maintained its obstinate 
defence for a month after the Bourbon flag had dis- 
appeared from the mainland. 

Thus in the spring of 1861, within two years from 
the outbreak of war with Austria, Italy with the 
exception of Rome and Venice was united under 
Victor Emmanuel. Of all the European Powers, Great 

Britain alone watched the creation of the 

Cavour s policy 

Sim^S?* new Italian Kingdom with complete sym- 
pathy and approval. Austria, though it 

ambassador at London, Nov. 16, in Bianchi, Politique, p. 386. La Farina, 
Epist., ii. 438. Persano, iv. 44. Guerzoni, ii. 212. 


had made peace at Zurich, declined to renew diplomatic 
intercourse with Sardinia, and protested against the 
assumption by Victor Emmanuel of the title of King 
of Italy. Eussia, the ancient patron of the Neapolitan 
Bourbons, declared that geographical conditions alone 

prevented -its intervention against their despoilers. 
Prussia, though under a new sovereign, had not yet 
completely severed the ties which bound it to Austria. 
Nevertheless, in spite of wide political ill-will, and of 
the passionate hostility of the clerical party throughout 
Europe, there was little probability that the work of 
the Italian people would be overthrown by external 
force. The problem which faced Victor Emmanuel's 
Government was not so much the frustration of re- 
actionary designs from without as the determination of 
the true line of policy to be followed in regard to Eome 
and Venice. There were few who, like Azeglio, held 
that Eome might be permanently left outside the 
Italian Kingdom ; there were none who held this of 
Venice. Garibaldi might be mad enough to hope for 
victory in a campaign against Austria and against 
France at the head of such a troop as he himself could 
muster ; Cavour would have deserved ill of his country 
if he had for one moment countenanced the belief that 
the force which had overthrown the Neapolitan Bourbons 
could with success, or with impunity to Italy, measure 
itself against the defenders of Venetia or of Eome. 
Yet the mind of Cavour was not one which could rest 
in mere passive expectancy as to the future, or in mere 
condemnation of the unwise schemes of others. His 

300 MODERN EUROPE. iwi. 

intelligence, so luminous, so penetrating, that in its 
utterances we seem at times to be listening to the very 
spirit of the age, ranged over wide fields of moral and 
of spiritual interests in its forecast of the future of 
Italy, and spent its last force in one of those prophetic 
delineations whose breadth and power the world can feel, 
though a later time alone can judge of their correspond- 
ence with the destined course of history. Venice was 
less to Europe than Eome ; its transfer to Italy would, 
Cavour believed, be effected either by arms or negotia- 
tion so soon as the German race should find a really 
national Government, and refuse the service which had 
hitherto been exacted from it for the maintenance of 
Austrian interests. It was to Prussia, as the represen- 
tative of nationality in Germany, that Cavour looked 
as the natural ally of Italy in the vindication of that 
part of the national inheritance which still lay under 
the dominion of the Hapsburg. Home, unlike Venice, 
was not only defended by foreign arms, it was the seat 
of a Power whose empire over the mind of man was not 
the sport of military or political vicissitudes. Circum- 
stances might cause France to relax its grasp on 
Rome, but it was not to such an accident that Cavour 
looked for the incorporation of Rome with Italy. He 
conceived that the time would arrive when the Catholic 
world would recognise that the Church would best fulfil 
its task in complete separation from temporal power. 
Rome would then assume its natural position as the 
centre of the Italian State ; the Church would be the 
noblest friend, not the misjudging enemy, of the Italian 
national monarchy. Cavour 's own religious beh'efs were 

isei OAVOUR. 301 

perhaps less simple than he chose to represent them. 
Occupying himself, however, with institutions, not with 
dogmas, he regarded the Church in profound earnest- 
ness as a humanising and elevating power. He valued 
its independence so highly that even on the suppression 
of the Piedmontese monasteries he had refused to give 
to the State the administration of the revenue arising 
from the sale of their lands, and had formed this into a 
fund belonging to the Church itself, in order that the 
clergy might not become salaried officers of the State. 
Human freedom was the principle in which he trusted ; 
and looking upon the Church as the greatest association 
formed by men, he believed that here too the rule of . 
freedom, of the absence of State-regulation, would in 
the end best serve man's highest interests. With the 
passing away of the Dope's temporal power, Cavour 
imagined that the constitution of the 

, TheFreeChurch 

Church itselt would become more demo- mtheiw* 


cratic, more responsive to the movement 
of the modern world. His own effort in ecclesiastical I 
reform had been to improve the condition and to/ 
promote the independence of the lower clergy. He 
had hoped that each step in their moral and material 
progress would make them more national at heart ; and 
though this hope had been but partially fulfilled, 
Cavour had never ceased to cherish the ideal of a 
national Church which, while recognising its Head in 
Home, should cordially and without reserve accept the 
friendship of the Italian State.* 

* Cavour in Parlamento, p. 630. Azeglio, Correspond.-mce Politique, 
p. 180. La Eire, p. 313. Berti, Cavour avanti 1848, p. 302. 

302 MODERN EUROPE. isei. 

It was in the exposition of these principles, in the 
enforcement of the common moral interest of Italian 
nationality and the Catholic Church, that Cavour gave 
his last counsels to the Italian Parliament. He was 
not himself to lead the nation farther towards the 
promised land. The immense exertions which he had 
maintained during the last three years, the indignation 
and anxiety caused to him by Graribaldi's attacks, pro- 
duced an illness which Cavour's own careless habits of 

the unskilfulness of his doctors 

Death of carom- 

rendered fatal. With dying lips he re- 

peated to those about him the words in which he had 
summed up his policy in the Italian Parliament : " A 
free Church in a free State." * Other Catholic lands had 
adjusted by Concordats with the Papacy the conflicting 
Free church in c ^ a i ms of temporal and spiritual authority 
in such matters as the appointment of 
bishops, the regulation of schools, the family-rights of 
persons married without ecclesiastical form. Cavour 
appears to have thought that in Italy, where the whole 
nation was in a sense Catholic, -the Church might 
as safely and as easily be left to manage its own 
affairs as in the United States, where the Catholic com- 
munity is only one among many religious societies. 
His optimism, his sanguine and large-hearted tolerance, 
was never more strikingly shown than in this fidelity to 
the principle of liberty, even in the case of those who 

* " Le comte le reconim, ltd serra la main et dit : ' Frate, frate, libera 
chiesa in libero stato.' Ce furent ses dernieres paroles." Account of the 
death of Cavour by his niece, Countess Alfieri, in La Rive, Cavour, p. 319. 

1861. DEATH OF GAVOUR. 303 

for the time declined all reconciliation with the Italian 4 
State. Whether Cavour's ideal was an impracticable 
fancy a later age will decide. The ascendency within 
the Church of Eome would seem as yet to have 
rested with the elements most opposed to the spirit of 
the time, most obstinately bent on setting faith and 
reason in irreconcilable enmity. In place of that 
democratic movement within the hierarchy and the 
priesthood which Cavour anticipated, absolutism has 
won a new crown in the doctrine of Papal Infallibility. 
Catholic dogma has remained impervious to the solvents 
which during the last thirty years have operated with 
perceptible success on the theology of Protestant lands. 
Each conquest made in the world of thought and 
knowledge is still noted as the next appropriate object 
of denunciation by the Vatican. Nevertheless the 
cautious spirit will be slow to conclude that hopes like 
those of Cavour were wholly vain. A single generation 
may see but little of the seed-time, nothing of the 
harvests that are yet to enrich mankind. And even if 
all wider interests be left out of view, enough remains 
to justify Cavour's policy of respect for the indepen- 
dence of the Church in the fact that Italy during the I 
thirty years succeeding the establishment of its union 
has remained free from civil war, Cavour was wont to 
refer to the Constitution which the French National 
Assembly imposed upon the clergy in 1790 as the type 
of erroneous legislation. Had his own policy and that 
of his successors not been animated by a wiser spirit ; 
had the Government of Italy, after overthrowing the 


Pope's temporal sovereignty, sought enemies among the 
rural priesthood and their congregations, the provinces 
added to the Italian Kingdom by Garibaldi would 
hardly have been maintained by the House of Savoy 
without a second and severer struggle. Between the 
ideal Italy which filled the thoughts not only of Mazzini 
but of some of the best English minds of that time 
the land of immemorial greatness, touched once more by 
the divine hand and advancing from strength to strength 
as the intellectual and moral pioneer among nations- 
bet ween this ideal and the somewhat hard and common- 
place realities of the Italy of to-day there is indeed little 
enough resemblance. Poverty, the pressure of inordinate 
taxation, the physical and moral habits inherited from 
centuries of evil government, all these have darkened 
in no common measure the conditions from which 
Italian national life has to be built up. If in spite 
of overwhelming difficulties each crisis has hitherto been 
surmounted ; if, with all that is faulty arid infirm, the 
omens for the future of Italy are still favourable, one 
source of its good fortune has been the impress given to 
its ecclesiastical policy by the great statesman to whom 
above all other men it owes the accomplishment of its 
union, and who, while claiming for Italy the whole of its ' 
national inheritance, yet determined to inflict no need- 
less wound upon the conscience of Rome. '){/ 


Germany after 1858 The Regency in Prussia Army-reorganisation King 
AVilliam I. Conflict between the Crown and the Parliament Bismarck 
The struggle continued Austria from 1859 The October Diploma- 
Resistance of Hungary The Reichsrath Russia under Alexander II. 
Liberation of the Serfs Poland The Insurrection of 1863 Agrarian 
measures in Poland Schleswig-Holstein Death of Frederick VII. Plans 
of Bismarck Campaign in Schleswig Conference of London Treaty of 
Vienna England and Napoleon III. Prussia and Austria Convention of 
Gastein Italy Alliance of Prussia with Italy Proposals for a Congress 
fail War between Austria and Prussia Napoleon III. -Koniggratz 
Custozza Mediation of Napoleon Treaty of Prague South Germany 
Projects for compensation to France Austria and Hungary Deak 
Establishment of the Dual System in Austria-Hungary. 

SHORTLY before the events which broke the power of 
Austria in Italy, the German people believed them- 
>rlves to have entered on a new political Germanyfrom 
era. King Frederick William IV., who, 
since 1848, had disappointed every hope that had been 
fixed on Prussia and on himself, was compelled by 
mental disorder to withdraw from public affairs in the 
autumn of 1858. His brother, the Crown Prince 
William, who had for a year acted as the 

T7-- , ,. i ,-, The Regency in 

Ivmg s representative, now assumed the Prussia, Oct. 
Regency. In the days when King Frederick 
William still retained some vestiges of his reputation 
the Crown Prince had been unpopular, as the supposed 
head of the reactionary party ; but the events of the 
last few years had exhibited him in a better aspect. 





Though strong in his belief both in the Divine right of 
kings in general, and in the necessity of a powerful 
monarchical rule in Prussia, he was disposed to tolerate, 
and even to treat with a certain respect, the humble 
elements of constitutional government which he found 
in existence. There was more manliness in his nature 
than in that of his brother, more belief in the worth of 
his own people. The espionage, the servility, the 
overdone professions of sanctity in Manteuffel's regime 
displeased him, but most of all he despised its pusil- 
lanimity in the conduct of foreign affairs. His heart 
indeed was Prussian, not German, and the destiny 
which created him the first Emperor of united Germany 
was not of his own making nor of his own seeking ; but 
he felt that Prussia ought to hold a far greater station 
both in Germany and in Europe than it had held 
during his brother's reign, and that the elevation of the 
State to the position which it ought to occupy was the 
task that lay before himself. During the twelve months 
preceding the Regency the retirement of the King had 
not been treated as more than temporary, and the 
Crown Prince, though constantly at variance with Man- 
teuffel's Cabinet, had therefore not considered himself 
at liberty to remove his brother's advisers. His first 
act on the assumption of the constitutional office of 
Regent was to dismiss the hated Ministry. Prince 
Antony of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was called to 
office, and posts in the Government were given to men 
well known as moderate Liberals. Though the Eegent 
stated in clear terms that he had no intention of form- 

1858-61. GERMANY. 307 

ing a Liberal party-administration, his action satisfied 
public opinion. The troubles and the failures of 1849 
had inclined men to be content with far less than had 
been asked years before. The leaders of the more 
advanced sections among the Liberals preferred for the 
most part to remain outside Parliamentery life rather 
than to cause embarrassment to the new Government ; 
and the elections of 1859 sent to Berlin a body of 
representatives fully disp.osed to work with the Regent 
and his Ministers in the policy of . guarded progress 
which they had laid down. 

This change of spirit in the Prussian Government, 
followed by the events that established Italian in- 
dependence, told powerfully upon public 
opinion throughout Germany. Hopes that ot German 
had been crushed in 1849 now revived. 
With the collapse of military despotism in the Austrian 
Empire the clouds of reaction seemed everywhere to be 
parsing away ; it was possible once more to think of 
German national union and of common liberties in 
which all Germans should share. As in 1808 the 
rising of the Spaniards against Napoleon had inspired 
Eliicher and his countrymen with the design of a truly 
national effort against their foreign oppressor, so in 
1859 the work of Cavour challenged the Germans to 
prove that their national patriotism and their political 
aptitude were not inferior to those of the Italian people. 
Men who had been prominent in the National Assembly 
at Frankfort again met one another and spoke to the 
nation. In the Parliaments of several of the minor 
u 2 

308 MODERN EUROPE. 1858-61. 

States resolutions were brought forward in favour of 
the creation of a central German authority. Protests 
were made against the infringement of constitutional 
rights that had been common during the last ten years ; 
patriotic meetings and demonstrations were held ; and a 
National Society, in imitation of that which had pre- 
pared the way for union with Piedmont in Central and 
Southern Italy, was formally established. There was 
indeed no such preponderating opinion in favour of 
Prussian leadership as had existed in 1848. The 
southern States had displayed a strong sympathy with 
Austria in its war with Napoleon III., and had re- 
garded the neutrality of Prussia during the Italian - 
campaign as a desertion of the German cause. Here 
there were few who looked with friendly eye upon 
Berlin. It was in the minor states of the north, and 
especially in Hesse-Cassel, where the struggle between 
the Elector and his subjects was once more breaking 
out, that the strongest hopes were directed towards the 
new Prussian ruler, and the measures of his govern- 
ment were the most anxiously watched. , 

The Prince Regent was a soldier by profession and 
habit. He was born in 1797, and had been present at 
the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, the last fought by Napo- 
leon against the Allies in 1814. During forty years he 
had served on every commission that had been occupied 
with Prussian military affairs ; no man 
Prussia and the better understood the military organisation 


of his country, no man more clearly recog- 
nised its capacities and its faults. The defective con- 

i858-i. PRUSSIA. 309 

dition of the Prussian army had been the principal, 
though not the sole, cause of the miserable submission 
to Austria at Olmiitz in 1850, and of the abandonment 
of all claims to German leadership on the part of the 
Court of Berlin. The Crown Prince would himself have 
risked all chances of disaster rather than inflict upon 
Prussia the humiliation with which King Frederick 
William then purchased peace; but Manteuffel had 
convinced his sovereign that the army could not engage 
in a campaign against Austria without ruin. Military 
impotence was the only possible justification for tn~e 
policy then adopted, and the Crown Prince determined 
that Prussia should not under his own rule have the 
same excuse for any political shortcomings. The work 
of reorganisation was indeed begun during the reign of 
Frederick William IV., through the enforcement of 
the three-years' service to which the conscript was 
liable by law, but which had fallen during the long 
period of peace to two-years' service. The number of 
troops with the colours was thus largely increased, but 
no addition had been made to the yearly levy, and no 
improvement attempted in the organisation of the Land- 
wehr. When in 1859 the order for mobilisation was 
given in consequence of the Italian war, it was dis- 
covered that the Landwehr battalions were almost 
useless. The members of this force were mostly 
married men approaching middle life, who had been too 
long engaged in other pursuits to resume their military 
duties with readiness, and whose call to the field left their 
families without means of support and chargeable upon 

310 MODERN EUROPE. 1862. 

the public purse. Too much, in the judgment of the 
reformers of the Prussian army, was required from men 
past youth, not enough from youth itself. The plan of 
the Prince Regent was therefore to enforce in the first 
instance with far more stringency the law imposing 
scheme of re- ^e universal obligation to military service ; 
and, while thus raising the annual levy from 
40,000 to 60,000 men, to extend the period of service 
in the Reserve, into which the young soldier passed on 
the completion of his three years with the colours, from 
two to four years. Asserting with greater rigour its 
claim to seven years in the early life of the citizen, the 
State would gain, without including the Landwehr, an 
effective army of four hundred thousand men, and would 
practically be able to dispense with the service of those 
who were approaching middle life, except in cases of 
great urgency. In the execution of this reform the 
Government could on its own authority enforce the 
increased levy and the full three years' service in the 
standing army ; for the prolongation of service in the 
Reserve, and for the greater expenditure entailed by the 
new system, the consent of Parliament was necessary. 

The general principles on which the proposed re- 
organisation was based were accepted by public opinion 
and by both Chambers of Parliament ; it was, however, 
held by the Liberal leaders that the increase 

The Prussian " 

SSSSTiSS of expenditure might, without impairing the 


efficiency of the army, be avoided by re- 
turning to the system of two-years' service with the 
colours, which during so long a period had been 

1860-ei. PRUSSIAN ARMY BILL. 311 

thought sufficient for the training of the soldier. The 
Eegent, however, was convinced that the discipline and 
the instruction of three years were indispensable to the 
Prussian conscript, and he refused to accept the com- 
promise suggested. The mobilisation of, 1859 had given 
him an opportunity for forming additional battalions ; 
and although the Landwehr were soon dismissed to their 
homes the new formation was retained, and the place 
of the retirirg militiamen was filled by conscripts of 
the year. The Lower Chamber, in voting the sum 
required in 1860 for the increased numbers of the 
army, treated this arrangement as temporary, and 
limited the grant to one year; in spite of this the 
Regent, who on the death of his brother in January, 
1861, became King of Prussia, formed the additional 
battalions into new regiments, and gave 

, . ii i Accession of 

to these new regiments their names and KI^ wuiiam, 

Jan., 1801. 

colours. The year 1861 passed without 
bringing the questions at issue between the Govern- 
ment and the Chamber of Deputies to a settlement. 
Public feeling, disappointed in the reserved and hesi- 
tating policy which was still followed by the Court in 
German affairs, stimulated too by the rapid consolida- 
tion of the Italian monarchy, which the Prussian Govern- 
ment on its part had as yet declined to recognise, was 
becoming impatient and resentful. It seemed as if the 
Court of Berlin still shrank from committing itself to 
the national cause. The general confidence reposed in the 
new ruler at his accession was passing away ; and when 
in the summer of 1861 the dissolution of Parliament 

312 MODERN EUROPE. 1862. 

took place, the elections resulted in the return not 
only of a Progressist majority, but of a majority little 
inclined to submit to measures of compromise, or to 
shrink from the assertion of its full constitutional 

The new Parliament assembled at the beginning of 
1862. Under the impulse of public opinion, the Go- 
vernment was now beginning to adopt a more vigorous 
First Pariia- policy in German affairs, and to re-assert 
Prussia's claims to an independent leader- 
ship in defiance of the restored Diet of Frankfort. 
But the conflict with the Lower Chamber was not to 
be averted by revived energy abroad. The Army Bill," 
which was passed at once by the Upper House, was 
referred t6 a hostile Committee on reaching the 
Chamber of Deputies, and a resolution was carried 
insisting on the right of the representatives of the 
people to a far more effective control over the Budget 
than v they had hitherto exercised. The result of this 
Dissolution vo ^ e was ^ ne dissolution of Parliament by 
the King, and the resignation of the 
Ministry, with the exception of General Roon, Minister 
of War, and two of the most conservative among 
his colleagues. Prince Hohenlohe, President of the 
Upper House, became chief of the Government. There 
was now an open and undisguised conflict between 
the Crown and the upholders of Parliamentary rights. 
" King or. Parliament " was the expression in which 
the newly- appointed Ministers themselves summed 
up the struggle. The utmost pressure was exerted 

1882. BISMARCK. 313 

by the Government in the course of the elections 
which followed,- but in vain. The Progressist party 
returned in overwhelming strength to the gecond Parlia _ 
new Parliament; the voice of the country 
seemed unmistakably to condemn the policy to which 
the King and his advisers were committed. After 
a long and sterile discussion in the Budget Committee, 
the debate on the Army Bill began in the Lower House 
on the 11 th of September. Its principal clauses were 
rejected by an almost unanimous vote. An attempt 
made by General Eoon to satisfy his opponents by a 
partial and conditional admission of the principle of 
two-years' service resulted only in increased exaspera- 
tion on both sides. Hohenlohe resigned, and the King 
now placed in power, at the head of a Minis- 
try of conflict, the most resolute and un- , comes Minister, 

. J* Sept., 1862. 

flinching of all his friends, the most con- 
temptuous scorner of Parliamentary majorities, Herr 
von Bismarck.* 

The new Minister was, like Cavour, a country 
gentleman, and, like Cavour, he otoed his real entry 
into public life to the revolutionary movement of 1848. 
He % had indeed held some obscure official posts before 
that epoch, but it was as a member of the 
United Diet which assembled at Berlin in 
April, 1848, that he first attracted the attention of 
King or people. He was one of two Deputies who 
refused to join in the vote of thanks to Frederick 

* Bericlite uber der Militair-etat, p. 669. Schulthess.-Europaischer 
Geschichts Kaleiider, 1862, p. 1'2 

314 MODERN EUROPE. 1882. 

William IV. for the Constitution which he had pro- 
mised to Prussia. Bismarck, then thirty-three years 
old, was a Royalist of Royalists, the type, as it seemed, 
of the rough and masterful Junker, or Squire, of the 
older parts of Prussia, to whom all reforms from those 
of Stein downwards were hateful, all ideas but those of 
the barrack and the kennel alien. Others in the spring 
of 1848 lamented the concessions made by the Crown 
to the people ; Bismarck had the courage to say so. 
When reaction came there were naturally many, and 
among them King Frederick William, who were in- 
terested in the man who in the heyday of constitutional 
enthusiasm had treated the whole movement as so much 
midsummer madness, and had remained faithful to 
monarchical authority as the one thing needful for the 
Prussian State. Bismarck continued to take a pro- 
minent part in the Parliaments of Berlin and Erfurt ; 
it was not, however, till 1851 that he passed into the 
inner official circle. He was then sent as the repre- 
sentative of Prussia to the restored Diet of Frankfort. 
As an absolutist and a conservative, brought up in the 
traditions of the Holy Alliance, Bismarck had in earlier 
days looked up to Austria as the mainstay of 
monarchical order and the historic barrier against 
the flood of democratic and wind-driven sentiment 
which threatened to deluge Germany. He had even 
approved the surrender made at Olmiitz in 1850, as a 
matter of necessity; but the belief now grew strong 
in his mind, and was confirmed by all he saw at Frank- 
fort, that Austria under Schwarzenberg's rule was no 

1862. BISMARCK. 315 

longer the Power which had been content to share the 
German leadership with Prussia in the period before 
1848, but a Power which meant to rule in Germany 
uncontrolled. In contact with the representatives of 
that outworn system which Austria had resuscitated at 
Frankfort, and with the instruments of the dominant 
-State itself, Bismarck soon learnt to detest the paltri- 
ness of the one and the insolence of the other. He 
declared the so-called Federal system to be a mere 
device for employing the secondary German States 
for the aggrandisement of Austria and the humilia- 
tion of Prussia. The Court of Vienna, and with it 
the Diet of Frankfort, became in his eyes the enemy 
of Prussian greatness and independence. During the 
Crimean war he was the vigorous opponent of an 
alliance with the Western Powers, not only from dis- 
trust of France, and from regard towards Russia as on 
the whole the most constant and the most natural ally 
of his own country, but from the conviction that Prussia 
ought to assert a national policy wholly independent of 
that of the Court of Vienna. That the Emperor of 
Austria was approaching more or less nearly to union 
with France and England was, in Bismarck's view, a 
good reason why Prussia should stand fast in its rela- 
tions of friendship with St. Petersburg.* The policy 
of neutrality, which King Frederick William and 
Manteuffel adopted more out of disinclination to 
strenuous action than from any clear political view, was 

* Poschinger, Preussen iin Bundestag ii. 69, 97 ; iv. 178. Halm, 
Bismarck, i. 608. 

316 MODERN EUROPE. 1862. 

advocated by Bismarck for reasons which, if they made 
Europe nothing and Prussia everything, were at least 
inspired by a keen and accurate perception of Prus- 
sia's own interests in its present and future relations 
with its neighbours. When the reign of Frederick 
William ended, Bismarck, who stood high in the confi- 
dence of the new Eegent, was sent as ambassador to St. 
Petersburg. He subsequently represented Prussia for 
a short time at the Court of Napoleon III., and was 
recalled by the King from Paris in the autumn of 1862 
in order to be placed at the head of the Government. 
Far better versed in diplomacy than in ordinary ad- 
ministration, he assumed, together with the Presidency 
of the Cabinet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

There were now at the head of the Prussian State 

three men eminently suited to work with one another, 

and to carry out, in their own rough and 

Bismarck and ... . i i 

the Lower military lasmon, the policy which was to 

Chamber, 1862. * * 

unite Germany under the House of Hohen- 
zollern. The King, Bismarck, and Eoon were tho- 
roughly at one in their aim, the. enforcement of 
Prussia's ascendency by means of the army. The 
designs of the Minister, which expanded with success 
and which involved a certain daring in the choice of 
"means, were at each new development so ably veiled or 
disclosed, so dexterously presented to the sovereign, as 
to overcome his hesitation on striking into many an un- 
accustomed path. Eoon and his workmen, who, in the 
face of a hostile Parliament and a hostile Press, had to 
supply to Bismarck what a foreign alliance and enthu- 

1862. BISMARCK. 317 

siastic national sentiment had supplied to Cavour, forged 
for Prussia a weapon of such temper that, against the 
enemies on whom it was employed, no extraordinary 
genius was necessary to render its thrust fatal. It 
was no doubt difficult for the Prime Minister, without 
alarming his sovereign and without risk of an immediate 
breach with Austria, to make his ulterior aims so clear 
as to carry the Parliament with him in the policy of. 
military reorganisation. Words frank even to brutality 
were uttered by him, but they sounded more like 
menace and bluster than the explanation of a well-con- 
sidered plan. " Prussia must keep its forces together," 
he said in one of his first Parliamentary appearances, 
" its boundaries are not those of a sound State. The 
great questions of the time are to be decided not by 
speeches and votes of majorities but by blood and 
iron." After the experience of 1848 and 1850, a not 
too despdndent political observer might well have 
frrmed the conclusion that nothing less than the mili- 
tary overthrow of Austria could give to Germany any 
tolerable system of national government, or even secure 
to Prussia its legitimate field of action. This was the 
keystone of Bismarck's belief, but he failed to make his 
purpose and his motives intelligible to the representa- 
tives of the Prussian people. He was taken for a mere 
bully and absolutist of the old type. His personal 
characteristics, his arrogance, his sarcasm, his habit of 
banter, exasperated and inflamed, lloon was no better 
suited to the atmosphere of a popular assembly. Each 
encounter of the Ministers with the Chamber embittered 

318 MODERN EUROPE. 1862. 

the struggle and made reconciliation more difficult. 
The Parliamentary system of Prussia seemed threatened 
in its very existence when, after the rejection by the 
Chamber of Deputies of the clause in the Budget pro- 
viding for the cost of the army-reorganisation, this 
clause was restored by the Upper House, and the 
Budget of the Government passed in its original form. 
By the terms of the Constitution the right of the Upper 
House in matters of taxation was limited to the approval 
or rejection of the Budget sent up to it from the Cham- 
ber of Representatives. It possessed no power of 
amendment. Bismarck, however, had formed the theory 
that in the event of a disagreement between the two 
Houses a situation arose for which the Constitution 
had not provided, and in which therefore the Crown 
was still possessed of its old absolute authority. No 
compromise, no negotiation between the two Houses, 
was, in his view, to be desired. He was resolved to 
govern and to levy taxes without a Budget, and had 
obtained the King's permission to close the session 
immediately the Upper House had given its vote. But 
before the order for prorogation could be brought down 
the President of the Lower Chamber had assembled his 
colleagues, and the unanimous vote of those present 
declared the action of the Upper House null and void. 
In the agitation attending this trial of strength between 
the Crown, the Ministry and the Upper House on one 
side and the Representative Chamber on the other the 
session of 1862 closed.* 

* Hahn, Fiirst Bismarck, i. 66. This work is a collection of documents, 


The Deputies, returning to their constituencies, 
carried with them the spirit of combat, and received 
the most demonstrative proofs of popular 
sympathy and support. Representations of 
great earnestness were made to the King, but they 
failed to shake in the slightest degree his confidence in 
his Minister, or to bend his fixed resolution to carry out 
his military reforms to the end. The claim of Parlia- 
ment to interfere with matters of military organisation 
in Prussia touched him in his most sensitive point. 
He declared that the aim of his adversaries was nothing 
less than the establishment of a Parliamentary instead 
of a royal army. In perfect sincerity he believed that 
the convulsions of 1848 were on the point of breaking 
out afresh. "You mourn the conflict between the 
Crown and the national representatives," he said to the 
spokesman of an important society ; " do I not mourn 
it ? I sleep no single night." The anxiety, the de- 
spondency of the sovereign were shared by the friends 
of Prussia throughout Germany ; its enemies saw with 
wonder that Bismarck in his struggle with the educated 
Liberalism of the middle classes did not shrink from 
dalliance with the Socialist leaders and their organs. 
When Parliament reassembled at the beginning of 
1863 the conflict was resumed with even greater heat. 
The Lower Chamber carried an address to The eortmct coam 
the King, which, while dwelling on the 

speeches, and letters not only by Bismarck himself but on all the principal 
matters in which Bismarck was concerned. It is -perhaps, from the 
German point of view, the most important repertory of authorities for the 
period 18621885. 

320 MODERN EUROPE. 1862-3. 

loyalty of the Prussian people to their chief, charged 
the Ministers with violating the Constitution, and de- 
manded their dismissal. The King refused to receive 
the deputation which was to present the address, and 
in the written communication in which he replied to it 
he sharply reproved the Assembly for their errors and 
presumption. It was in vain that the Army Bill was 
again introduced. The House, while allowing the 
ordinary military expenditure for the year, struck out 
the costs of the reorganisation, and declared Ministers 
personally answerable for the sums expended. Each 
appearance of the leading members of the Cabinet now 
became the signal for contumely and altercation. The 
decencies of debate ceased to be observed on either side. 
When the President attempted to set some limit to the 
violence of Bismarck and Boon, and, on resistance to his . 
authority, terminated the sitting, the Ministers de- 
clared that they would no longer appear in a Chamber 
where freedom of speech was denied to them. Affairs 
came to a deadlock. The Chamber again appealed to 
the King, and insisted that reconciliation between the 
Crown and the nation was impossible so long as the 
present Ministers remained in office. The King, now 
thoroughly indignant, charged the Assembly with at- 
tempting to win for itself supreme power, expressed his 
gratitude to his Ministers for their resistance to this 
usurpation, and declared himself too confident in the 
loyalty of the Prussian people to be intimidated by 
threats. His reply was followed by the prorogation of 
the Assembly (May 26th). A dissolution would have 


been worse than useless, for in the actual state of public 
opinion the Opposition would probably have triumphed 
throughout the country. It only remained for Bis- 
marck to hold his ground, and, having silenced the 
Parliament for a while, to silence the Press 
also by the exercise of autocratic power, against the 
The Constitution authorised the King, in 
the absence of the Chambers, to publish enactments on 
matters of urgency having the force of laws. No sooner 
had the session been closed than an edict was issued 
empowering the Government, without resort to courts 
of law, to suppress any newspaper after two warnings. 
An outburst of public indignation branded this return 
to the principles of pure despotism in Prussia; but 
neither King nor Minister was to be diverted by threats 
or by expostulations from his course. The Press was 
effectively silenced. So profound, however, was the 
Distrust now everywhere felt as to the future of Prussia, 
and so deep the resentment against the Minister in all 
circles where Liberal influences penetrated, that the 
Crown Prince himself, after in vain protesting against a 
policy of violence which endangered his own prospective 
interests in the Crown, publicly expressed his disap- 
proval of the action of Government. For this offence 
he was never forgiven. - 

The course which affairs were taking at Berlin 
excited the more bitter regret and disappointment 
among all friends of Prussia as at this very Augtriafrom 
time it seemed that constitutional govern- 
ment was being successfully established in the western 

322 MODERN EUROPE. 1859-eo. 

part of the Austrian Empire. The centralised military 
despotism with which Austria emerged from the con- 
vulsions of 1848 had heen allowed ten years of undis- 
puted sway ; at the end of this time it had brought 
things to such a pass that, after a campaign in which 
there had been but one great battle, and while still in 
possession of a vast army and an unbroken chain of 
fortresses, Austria stood powerless to move hand or foot. 
It was not the defeat of Solferino or the cession of Lom- 
bardy that exhibited the prostration of Austria's power, 
but the fact that while the conditions of the Peace of 
Zurich were swept away, and Italy was united under 
Victor Emmanuel in defiance of the engagements made 
by Napoleon III. at Villafranca, the Austrian Emperor 
was compelled to look on with folded arms. To have 
drawn the sword again, to have fired a shot in defence 
of the Pope's temporal power or on behalf of the vassal 
princes of Tuscany and Modena, would have been to 
risk the existence of the Austrian monarchy. The 
State was all but bankrupt ; rebellion might at any 
moment break out in Hungary, which had already sent 
thousands of soldiers to the Italian camp. Peace at 
whatever price was necessary abroad, and at home the 
system of centralised despotism could no longer exist, 
come what might in its place. It was natural that the 
Emperor should but imperfectly understand at the first 
the extent of the concessions which it was necessary for 
him to make. He determined that the Provincial Councils 
which Schwarzenberg had promised in 1850 should be 
called into existence, and that a Council of the Empire 

1859-eo. AUSTRIA. 323 

(Eeichsrath), drawn in part from these, should assemble 
at Vienna, to advise, though not to control, the Govern- 
ment in matters of finance. So urgent, however, were 
the needs of the exchequer, that the Emperor proceeded 
at once to the creation of the Central Council, and 
nominated its first members himself. (March, 1860.) 

That the Hungarian members nominated by the 
Emperor would decline to appear at Vienna unless 
some further guarantee was given for the 
restoration of Hungarian liberty was well 
known. The Emperor accordingly promised to restore 
the ancient county-organisation, which had filled so great 
a space in Hungarian history before 1848, and to take 
steps for assembling the Hungarian Diet. This, with 
the repeal of an edict injurious to the Protestants, opened 
the way for reconciliation, and the nominated Hungarians 
took their place in the Council, though under protest 
.that the existing arrangement could only be accepted as 
preparatory to the full restitution of the rights of their 
country. The Council continued in session during the 
summer of 1860. Its duties were financial; but the 
establishment of financial equilibrium in Austria was 
inseparable from the establishment of political stability 
and public confidence ; and the Council, in its last 
sittings, entered on the widest constitutional problems. 
The non-German members were in the majority ; and 
while all parties alike condemned the fallen absolutism, 
the rival declarations of policy submitted to the Council 
marked the opposition which was henceforward to exist 
between the German Liberals of Austria and the various 

324 MODERN EUROPE. i860. 

Nationalist or Federalist groups. The Magyars, uniting 
with those who had been their bitterest enemies, de- 
clared that the ancient independence in legislation and 
administration of the several countries subject to the 
House of Hapsburg must be restored, each country 
retaining its own historical character. The German 
minority contended that the Emperor should bestow 
upon his subjects such institutions as, while 

Centralists and - 1 . . . 

Federalists in based on the right ot sell-government. 

the Council 

should secure the unity of the Empire and 
the force of its central authority. All parties were for 
a constitutional system and for local liberties in one 
form or another; but while the Magyars and their 
supporters sought for nothing less than national inde- 
pendence, the Germans would at the most have granted 
a uniform system of* provincial self-government in strict 
subordination to a central representative body drawn 
from the whole Empire and legislating for the whole 
Empire. The decision of the Emperor was necessarily a 
The Diploma of compromise. By a Diploma published on 

the 20th of October he promised to restore 
to Hungary its old Constitution, and to grant wide, 
legislative rights to the other States of the Monarchy, 
establishing for the transaction of affairs common to the 
whole Empire an Imperial Council, and reserving for 
the non-Hungarian members of this Council a qualified 
right of legislation for all the Empire except Hungary.* 
The Magyars had conquered their King ; and all 

* Sammlung der Staatsacten Oesterreichs (1 861), pp. 2, 33. Drei Jahre 
Verfassuiigstreit, p. 107. 


the impetuous patriotism that had been crushed down 
since the ruin of 1849 now again burst into flame. 
The County Assemblies met, and elected as 

. _, nunpu-y - 

their officers men who had been condemned JlJSfSSifc. 
to death in 1849 and who were living in 
exile; they swept away the existing Taw-courts, refused 
the taxes, and proclaimed the legislation of 1848 again 
in force. Francis Joseph seemed anxious to avert a 
conflict, and to prove both in Hungary and in the 
other parts of the Empire the sincerity of his promises 
of reform, on which the- nature of the provincial Con- 
stitutions which were published immediately after the 
Diploma of October had thrown some doubt. At the 
instance of his Hungarian advisers he dismissed the 
chief of his Cabinet, and called to office Schmerling, 
who, in 1848, had been Prime Minister of the 
German National Government at Frankfort. Schmer- 
ling at once promised important changes in the pro- 
'vincial systems drawn up by his predecessor, but in 
his dealings with Hungary he proved far less tract- 
able than the Magyars had expected. If the Hun- 
garians had recovered their own constitutional forms, 
they still stood threatened with the supremacy of a 
Central Council in all that related to themselves in com- 
mon with the rest of the Empire, and against this they 
rebelled. But from the establishment of this Council 
of the Empire neither the Emperor nor Schmerling 
would recede. An edict of February 26th, 1861, while 
it made good the changes promised by Schmerling in 
the several provincial systems, confirmed the general 

326 MODERN EUROPE. isei. 

provisions of the Diploma of October, and declared that 
the Emperor would maintain the Constitution of his 
dominions as now established against all attack. 

In the following April the Provincial Diets met 

throughout the Austrian Empire, and the Diet of the 

Hungarian Kingdom assembled at Pesth. 

*aV*ithth The first duty of each of these bodies was 

Crown, 1861. 

to elect representatives to the Council of 
the Empire which was to meet at Vienna. Neither 
Hungary nor Croatia, however, would elect such repre- 
sentatives, each claiming complete legislative independ- 
ence, and declining to recognise any such external 
authority as it was now proposed to create. The 
Emperor warned the Hungarian Diet against the con- 
sequences of its action ; but the national spirit of the 
Magyars was thoroughly roused, and the County Assem- 
blies vied with one another in the violence of their 
addresses to the Sovereign. The Diet, reviving the 
constitutional difficulties connected with the abdication 
of Ferdinand, declared that it would only negotiate 
for the coronation of Francis Joseph after the esta- 
blishment of a Hungarian Ministry and the restora- 
tion of Croatia and Transylvania to the Hungarian 
Kingdom. Accepting Schmerling's contention that the 
ancient constitutional rights of Hungary had been 
extinguished by rebellion, the Emperor insisted on the 
establishment of a Council for the whole Empire, and 
refused to recede from the declarations which he had 
made in the edict of February. The Diet hereupon 
protested, in a long and vigorous address to the King, 


against the validity of all laws made without its own 
concurrence, and declared that Francis Joseph had ren- 
dered an agreement between the King and the nation 
impossible. A dissolution followed. The County As- 
semblies took up the national struggle. They in their 
turn were suppressed ; their officers were dismissed, 
and military rule was established throughout the land, 
though with explicit declarations on the part of the 
King that it was to last only till the legally existing 
Constitution could be brought into peaceful working.* 

Meanwhile the Central Representative Body, now 
by enlargement of its functions and increase in the 
number of its members made into a Parlia- 

n , i T-. . -, , , . ~ff. The Reichsrath ,' 

ment or the Empire, assembled at Vienna, at Vienna, May, \ 


Its real character was necessarily altered by 
the absence of representatives from Hungary ; and for " 
some time the Government seemed disposed to limit its 
Competence to the affairs of the Cis-Leithan province^; 
but after satisfying himself that no accord with Hun- 
gary was possible, the Emperor announced this fact to 
the Assembly, and bade it perform its part as the 
organ of the Empire at large, without regard to the 
abstention of those who did not choose to exercise their 
rights. The Budget for the entire Empire was accord- 
ingly submitted to the Assembly, and for the first time 
the expenditure of the Austrian State was laid open to 
public examination and criticism. The first session of 
this Parliament lasted, with adjournments, from May, 

* Sammlung der Staatsacten, p. 89. Der Ungarische Reichstag 1861, 
pp. 3, 192, 238. Arnold Forster, Life of Deak, p. 141., 


1861, to December, 1862. In legislation it effected 
little, but its relations as a whole with the Government 
remained excellent, and its long-continued activity, 
unbroken by popular disturbances, did much to raise 
the fallen credit of the Austrian State and to win for it 
the regard of Germany. On the close .of the session 
the Provincial Diets assembled, and throughout the 
spring of 1863 the rivalry of the Austrian nationalities 
gave abundant animation to many a local 

Second session 

second session . . -, -r ,1 i n T r. 

of the Reichs- capital. In the next summer the Keichs- 

rath, 1863. 

rath reassembled at Vienna. Though Hun- 
gary remained in a condition not far removed from 
rebellion, the Parliamentary system of Austria was 
gaining in strength, and indeed, as it seemed, at the 
expense of Hungary itself; for the Eoumanian and 
German population of Transylvania, rejoicing in the 
opportunity of detaching themselves from the Magyars, 
now sent deputies to Vienna. While at Berlin each 
week that passed sharpened the antagonism between 
| the nation and its Government, and made the 'Minister's 
name more odious, Austria seemed to. have successfully 
broken with the traditions of its past, and to be fast 
earning for itself an honourable place among States of 
the constitutional type. 

One of the reproaches brought against Bismarck by 
the Progressist majority in the Parliament of Berlin was 
that he had isolated Prussia both in Germany and in 
Europe. That he had roused against the Goverment of 
his country the public opinion of Germany was true : that 
he had alienated Prussia from all Europe was not the 


case; on the contrary, he had established a closer rela- 
tion between the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg 
than had existed at any time since the commencement 
of the Regency, and had secured for Prussia a degree of 
confidence and goodwill on the part of the C/.ar which, 
in the memorable years that were to follow, served it 
scarcely less effectively than an armed alliance. Russia, 
since the Crimean War, had seemed to be Ruw , iaunder 
entering upon an epoch of boundless change. Ale 
The calamities with which the reign of Nicholas had 
closed had excited in that narrow circle of Russian 
society where thought had any existence a vehement 
revulsion against the sterile and unchanging system of 
repression, the grinding servitude of the last thirty 
years. From the Ernperor downwards all educated 
men believed not only that the system of government, 
but that the whole order of Russian social life, must be 
recast. The ferment of ideas which marks an age of 
revolution was in full course; but in what forms the 
new order was to be moulded, through what processes 
Russia was to be 'brought into its new life, no one 
knew. Russia was wanting in capable statesmen ; it was 
even more conspicuously wanting in the class of ser- 
viceable and intelligent agents of Government of the 
second rank. Its monarch, Alexander II., humane and 
well-meaning, was irresolute and vacillating beyond the 
measure of ordinary men. He was not only devoid of 
all administrative and organising faculty himself, but so 
infirm of purpose that Ministers whose policy he had 
accepted feared to let him pass out of their sight, lest in 

330 MODERN EUEOPE. 1856-61. 

the course of a single journey or a single interview he 
should succumb to the persuasions of some rival poli- 
tician. In no country in Europe was there such inco- 
herence, such self-contradiction, such absence of unity 
of plan and purpose in government as in Russia, where 
all nominally depended upon a single will. Pressed 
and tormented by all the rival influences that beat upon 
the centre of a great empire, Alexander seems at times 
to have played off against one another as colleagues in 
the same branch of Government the representatives of 
the most opposite schools of action, and, after assenting 
to the plans of one group of advisers, to have committed 
the execution of these plans, by way of counterpoise, to 
those who had most opposed them. But, like other 
weak men, he dreaded nothing so much as the reproach 
of weakness or inconstancy ; and in the cloud of half- 
formed or abandoned purposes there were some few to 
which he resolutely adhered. The chief of these, the 
great achievement of his reign, was the liberation of the 

It was probably owing to the outbreak of the revo- 
lution of 1848 that the serfs had not been freed by 
Nicholas. That sovereign had long under- 

Liberationofthe .. . 

serfs, March, stood the necessity lor the change, and in 
1847 he had actually appointed a Commis- 
sion to report on the best means of effecting it. The 
convulsions of 1848, followed by the Hungarian and the 
Crimean Wars, threw the project into the background 
during the remainder of Nicholas's reign; but if the 
belief of the Eussian people is well founded, the last 


injunction of the dying Czar to his successor was to 
emancipate the serfs throughout his empire. Alexander 
was little capable of grappling with so tremendous a 
problem himself; in the year 1859, however, he di- 
rected a Commission to make a complete inquiry into 
the subject, and to present a scheme of emancipation. 
The labours of the Commission extended over two years; 
its discussions were agitated, at times violent. That 
serfage must sooner or later be abolished all knew ; the 
points on which the Commission was divided were the"! 
bestowal of land on the peasants and the regulation] 
of the village-community. European history afforded 
abundant precedents in emancipation, and under an 
infinite variety of detail three types of the process of 
enfranchisement were clearly distinguishable from one 
another. Maria Theresa, in liberating the serf, had 
required him to continue to render a fixed amount of 
labour to his lord, and had given him on this condition 
fixity of tenure in the land he occupied ; the Prussian 
reformers had made a division of the land between the 
peasant and the lord, and extinguished all labour-dues ; 
Napoleon, in enfranchising the serfs in the Duchy of 
Warsaw, had simply turned them into free men, leaving 
the terms of their occupation of land to be settled by 
arrangement free contract with their former lords. 
This example had been followed in the Baltic Provinces 
of Russia itself by Alexander I. Of the three modes 
of emancipation, that based on free contract had 
produced the worst results for the peasant ; and 
though many of the Russian landowners and their 


representatives in the Commission protested against a 
division of the land between themselves and their serfs 
as an act of agrarian revolution and spoliation, there were 
men in high office, and some few among the proprietors, 
who resolutely and successfully fought for the principle 
of independent ownership by the peasants. The lead- 
ing spirit in this great work appears to have been 
Nicholas Milutine, Adjunct of the Minister of the 
Interior, Lanskoi. Milutine, who had drawn up the 
Municipal Charta of St. Petersburg, was distrusted by 
the Czar as a restless and uncompromising reformer. 
It was uncertain from day to day whether the views of 
the Ministry of the Interior or those of the territorial 
aristocracy would prevail ; ultimately, however, under 
instructions from the Palace, the Commission accepted 
not only the principle of the division of the land, but 
the Astern of communal self-government by the peasants 
themselves. The determination of the amount of land 
to be held by the peasants of a commune and of the fixed 
rent to be paid to the lord was left in the first instance 
to private agreement ; but where such agreement was 
not reached, the State, through arbiters elected at local 
assemblies of the nobles, decided the matter itself. 
The rent once fixed, the State enabled the commune to 
redeem it by advancing a capital sum to be recouped 
by a quit-rent to the State extending over forty-nine 
years. The Ukase of the Czar converting twenty- five 
millions of serfs into free proprietors, the greatest act 
of legislation of modern times, was signed on the 3rd 
of March, 1861, and within the next few weeks was 


read in every clmrcli of the Russian Empire. It was a 
strange comment on the system of government in 
Russia that in the very month in which the edict was 
published both Lanskoi and Milutine, who had been its 
principal authors, were removed from their posts. The 
Czar feared to leave them in power to superintend the 
actual execution of the law which they had inspired. 
In supporting them up to the final stage of its enact- 
ment Alexander had struggled against misgivings of 
his own, and against influences of vast strength alike 
at the Court, within the Government, and in the Pro- 
vinces. With the completion of the Edict of Emanci- 
pation his power of resistance was exhausted, and its 
execution was committed by him to those who had been 
its opponents. That some of the evils which have 
mingled with the good in Russian enfranchisement 
might have been less had the Czar resolutely stood by 
the, authors of reform and allowed them to complete 
their work in accordance with their own designs and 
convictions, is scarcely open to doubt.* 

It had been the belief of educated men in Russia 
that the emancipation of the serf would be but the first 
of a series of great organic changes, bringing Poland> 136I> 
their country more nearly to the political and 
social level of its European neighbours. This belief was 
not fulfilled. Work of importance was done in the re- 
construction of the judicial system of Russia, but in the 
other reforms expected little was accomplished. An 

* Celestin, Russland, p. 3. Leroy-Beaulieu, I/Empire des Tsars, 
i. 400. Hoinine d'Etat Russe, p. 73. Wallace, Russia, p. 485. 


insurrection which broke out in Poland at the beginning 
of 1863 diverted the energies of the Government from all 
other objects ; and in the overpowering outburst of Rus- 
sian patriotism and national feeling which it excited, 
domestic reforms, no less than the ideals of Yv r estern 
civilisation, lost their interest. The establishment of 
Italian independence, coinciding in time with the general 
unsettlenient and expectation of change which marked 
the first years of Alexander's reign, had stirred once 
more the ill-fated hopes of the Polish national leaders. 
From the beginning of the year 1861 Warsaw was the 
scene of repeated tumults. The Czar was inclined, 
within certain limits, to a policy of conciliation. ^ The 
separate Legislature and separate army which Poland 
had possessed from 1815 to 1830 he was determined 
not to restore ; but he was willing to give Poland 
a large degree of administrative autonomy, to confide 
the principal offices in its Grovernment to natives, and 
generally to relax something of that close union with 
Russia which had been enforced by Nicholas since the 
rebellion of 1831. But the concessions of the Czar, 
accompanied as they were by acts of repression and 
severity, were far from satisfying the demands of Polish 
patriotism. It was in vain that Alexander in the. 
summer of 1862 sent his brother Constantine as Viceroy 
to Warsaw, established a Polish Council of State, placed 
a Pole, Wielopolski, at the head of the Administration, 
superseded all the Russian governors of Polish provinces 
by natives, and gave to the municipalities and the 

i . ; POLAND. 335 

districts the right of electing local councils ; these con- 
cessions seemed nothing, and were in fact nothing, in 
comparison with the national independence which the 
Polish leaders claimed. The situation grew worse and 
worse. An attempt made upon the life, of the Grand 
Duke Constantine during his entry into Warsaw was 
but one among a series of similar acts which discredited 
the Polish cause and strengthened those who at St. 
Petersburg had from the first condemned the Czar's 
attempts at conciliation. At length the Russian Gov- 
ernment took the step which precipitated revolt. A 
levy of one in every two hundred of the population 
throughout the Empire had been ordered in the autumn 
of 1862. Instructions were sent from St. Petersburg 
to the effect that in raising this levy in Poland 
the country -population were to be spared, and that all 
persons who were known to be connected with the 
disorders in the towns were to be seized as soldiers. \ 
This terrible sentence against an entire 

i i m i -i t> Levy and insur- 

pohtical class was carried out, so tar as rectio ni/ jan.i4 
it lay within the power of the authorities, 
on the night of January 14th, 1863. But before 
the imperial press-gang surrounded the houses of 
its victims a rumour of the intended blow had gone 
abroad. In the preceding hours, and during the night 
of the 14th, thousands fled from Warsaw and the other 
Polish towns into the forests. There they formed 
themselves into armed bands, and in the course of the 
next few days a guerilla warfare broke out wherever 

336 MODERN EUROPE. ises. 

Russian troops were found in insufficient strength or off 
their guard.* 

The classes in which the national spirit of Poland 

lived were the so-called noblesse, numbering hundreds 

of thousands, the town-populations, and the priesthood. 

The peasants, crushed and degraded, though not nomi- 

. nally in servitude, were indifferent to the 

Poland and J 

national cause. On the neutrality, if not 
on the support, of the peasants the Russian Govern- 
ment could fairly reckon ; within the towns it found 
itself at once confronted by an invisible national Gov- 
ernment whose decrees were printed and promulgated 
by unknown hands, and whose sentences of death were 
mercilessly executed against those whom it condemned 
as enemies or traitors to the national cause. So extra- 
ordinary was the secrecy which covered the action of 
this National Executive, that Milutine, who was subse- 
quently sent by the Czar to examine into the affairs of 
Poland, formed the conclusion that it had possessed 
accomplices within the Imperial Government at St. 
Petersburg itself. The Polish cause retained indeed 
some friends in Russia even after the outbreak of the 
insurrection ; it was not until the insurrection passed 
the frontier of the kingdom and was carried by the 
nobles into Lithuania and Podolia that the entire 
Russian nation took up the struggle with passionate 
and vindictive ardour as one for life or death. It was 
the fatal bane of Polish nationality that the days of its 

* Raczynski, Memoires sur la Pologne, p. 14. B. and F. State Papers, 
1862-63, p. 769. 

1863. POLAND. 337 

greatness had left it a claim upon vast territories 
where it had planted nothing but a territorial aristo- 
cracy, and where the mass of population, if not actually 
Russian, was almost indistinguishable from the Rus- 
sians in race and language, and belonged like them to 
the Greek Church, which Catholic Poland had always 
persecuted. For ninety years Lithuania and the border- 
provinces had been incorporated with the Czar's do- 
minions, and with the exception of their Polish land- 
owners they were now in fact thoroughly Russian. 
When therefore the nobles of these provinces de'clared 
that Poland must be reconstituted with the limits of 
1772, and subsequently took up arms in concert with 
the insurrectionary Government at Warsaw, the Rus- 
sian people, from the Czar to the peasant, felt the 
struggle to be nothing less than one for the dismember- 
ment or the preservation of their own country, and the 
doom of Polish nationality, at least for some genera- 
tions, was sealed. The diplomatic intervention of 
the Western Powers on behalf of the constitutional 
rights of Poland under the Treaty of Vienna, which 
was to some extent supported by Austria, only 
prolonged a hopeless struggle, and gave unbounded 
popularity to Prince Gortschakoff, by whom, after a 
show of courteous attention during the earlier and 
still perilous stage of the insurrection, the inter- 
ference of the Powers was resolutely and uncondition- 
ally repelled. By the spring of 1864 the insurgents 
were crushed or exterminated. General Muravieff, the 
Governor of Lithuania, fulfilled his task against the 

338 MODERN EUROPE. 1863-64. 

mutinous nobles of this province with unshrinking 
severity, sparing neither life nor fortune so long as an 
enemy of Eussia remained to be overthrown. It was 
at Wilna, the Lithuanian capital, not at Warsaw, that 
the terrors of Russian repression were the greatest. 
Muravieff's executions may have been less numerous 
than is commonly supposed ; but in the form of 
pecuniary requisitions and fines he undoubtedly aimed 
at nothing less than the utter ruin of a great part of 
the class most implicated in the rebellion. - 

In Poland itself the Czar, after some hesitation, 

determined once and for all to establish a friend to 

Eussia in every homestead of the kingdom 

measmes in by making the peasant owner of the land 

Poland. J 

on which he laboured. The insurrectionary 
Government at the outbreak of the rebellion had at- 
tempted to win over the peasantry by promising enact- 
ments to this effect, but no one had responded to their 
appeal. In the autumn of 1863 the Czar recalled 
Milutine from his enforced travels and directed him to 
proceed to Warsaw, in order to study the affairs of 
Poland on the spot, and to report on the measures 
necessary to be taken for its future government and 
organisation. Milutine obtained the assistance of some 
of the men who had laboured most earnestly with him 
in the enfranchisement of the Eussian serfs ; and in the 
course of a few weeks he returned to St. Petersburg, 
carrying with him the draft of measures which were to 
change the face of Poland. He recommended on the 
one hand that every political institution separating 


Poland from the rest of the Empire should be swept 
away, and the last traces of Polish independence utterly 
obliterated ; on the other hand, that the peasants, as 
the only class on which Russia could hope to count in 
the future, should be made absolute and independent 
owners of the land they occupied. Prince 
Gortschakoff, who had still some regard for measures in 

Poland, 1864. 

the opinion of Western Europe, and possibly 
some sympathy for the Polish aristocracy, resisted this 
daring policy ; but the Czar accepted Milutine's counsel, 
and gave him a free hand in the execution of his 
agrarian scheme. The division of the land between the 
nobles and the peasants was accordingly carried out by 
Milutine's own" officers under conditions very different 
from those adopted in Russia. The whole strength of the 
Government was thrown on to the side of the peasant and 
against the noble. Though the population was denser in 
Poland than in Russia, the peasant received on an average 
four times as much land ; the compensation made to the 
lords (which was paid in bonds which immediately fell 
to half their nominal value) was raised not by quit-rents 
on the peasants' lands alone, as in Russia, but by a 
general land-tax falling equally on the land left to the 
lords, who had thus to pay a great part of their own 
compensation : above all, the questions in dispute were 
settled, not as in Russia by arbiters elected at local 
assemblies of the nobles, but by officers of the Crown. 
Moreover, the division of landed property was not made 
once and for all, as in Russia, but the woods and 
pastures remaining to the lords continued subject to 
w 2 

340 MODERN EUROPE. 1864. 

undefined common-rights of the peasants. These com- 
mon-rights were deliberately left unsettled in order 
that a source of contention might always be present 
between the greater and the lesser proprietors, and that 
the latter might continue to look to the Russian Gov- 
ernment as the protector or extender of their interests. 
" We hold Poland," said a Russian statesman, " by its 
rights of common."* 

Milutine, who, with all the fiery ardour of his 
national and levelling policy, seems to have been a 
gentle and somewhat querulous invalid, and who was 
shortly afterwards struck down by paralysis, to remain 
a helpless spectator of the European changes of the 
next six years, had no share in that warfare against 
the language, the religion, and the national 
and polish culture of Poland with which Russia has 


pursued its victory since 1863. The public 
life of Poland he was determined to Russianise ; its 
private and social life he would probably have left 
unmolested, relying on the goodwill of the great mass 
of peasants who owed their proprietorship to the action 
of the Czar. There were, however, politicians at Moscow 
and St. Petersburg who believed that the deep-lying 
instinct of nationality would for the first time be called 
into real life among these peasants by their very eleva- 
tion from misery to independence, and that where 
Russia had hitherto had three hundred thousand 
enemies Milutine was preparing for it six millions. It 
was the dread of this possibility in the future, the 

* Lcroy-Beaulieu, Homme d'etat Russe, p. 259. 


apprehension that material interests might not perma- 
nently vanquish the subtler forces which pass from 
generation to generation, latent, if still unconscious, 
where nationality itself is not lost, that made the 
Russian Government follow up the political destruc- 
tion of the Polish noblesse by measures directed against 
Polish nationality itself, even at the risk of alienating ; 
the class who for the present were effectively won over L 
to the Czar's cause. By the side of its life-giving 
and beneficent agrarian policy Russia has pursued the 
odious system of debarring Poland from all means of 
culture and improvement associated with the use of its 
own language, and has aimed at eventually turning the 
Poles into Russians by the systematic impoverishment 
and extinction of all that is essentially Polish in thought, 
in sentiment, and in expression. The work may .prove 
to be one not beyond its power ; and no common per- 
versity on the part of its Government would be neces- 
sary to turn against Russia the millions who in Poland 
owe all they have of prosperity and independence to the 
Czar : but should the excess of Russian propagandism, 
or the hostility of Church to Church, at some distant 
date engender a new struggle for Polish independence, 
this struggle will be one governed by other conditions 
than those of 1831 or 18G3, and Russia will, for the 
first time, have to conquer on the Vistula not a class 
nor a city, but a nation. 

It was a matter of no small importance to Bismarck 
and to Prussia that in the years 1863 and 1864 the 
Court of St. Petersburg found itself confronted with 

342 MODERN EUROPE. 1864. 

affairs of such seriousness in Poland. From the oppor- 
tunity which was then presented to him of obliging 
an important neighbour, arid of profiting 

Berlin and St. - ' i i > -\ T_ 

Petersburg, by that neighbour s conjoined embarrass- 
ment and goodwill, Bismarck drew full ad- 
vantage. He had always regarded the Poles as a mere 
nuisance in Europe, and heartily despised the Germans 
for the sympathy which they had shown towards Poland 
in 1848. When the insurrection of 1863 broke out, 
Bismarck set the policy of his own country in emphatic 
contrast with that of Austria and the Western Powers, 
and even entered into an arrangement with Russia for 
an eventual military combination in case the insurgents 
should pass from one side to the other of the frontier.* 
Throughout the struggle with the Poles, and through- 
out the diplomatic conflict with the Western Powers, 
the Czar had felt secure in the loyalty of the stub- 
born Minister at Berlin; and when, at the close of 
the Polish revolt, the events occurred which opened to 
Prussia the road to political fortune, Bismarck received 
his reward in the liberty jof action given him by the 
Eussian Government. The difficulties connected with 
Schleswig-Holstein, which, after a short interval of tran- 
quillity following the settlement of 1852, had again 
begun to trouble Europe, were forced to the very front 
of Continental affairs by the death of Frederick VII., 
King of Denmark, in November, 1863. Prussia had 
now at its head a statesman resolved r to pursue to their 
extreme limit the chances which this complication 

* Halm, i. 112. Verhandl. des Preuss. Abgeord. iiber Polen, p. 45. 


offered to his own country ; and, more fortunate than 
his predecessors of 1848, Bismarck had not to dread the 
interference of the Czar of Russia as the patron and 
protector of the interests of the Danish court. 

By the Treaty of London, signed on May 8th, 1852, 
all the great Powers, including Prussia* had recognised 
the principle of the integrity of the Danish gc}?leswi(? .Hoi- 
Monarchy, and had pronounced Prince 
Christian of Gliicksburg to be heir-presumptive to the 
whole dominions of the reigning King. The rights of 
the German Federation in Holstein were nevertheless 
declared to remain unprejudiced; and in a Convention 
made with Austria and Prussia before they joined in this 
Treaty, King Frederick VII. had undertaken to conform 
to certain rules in his treatment of Schleswig as well as 
of Holstein. The Duke of Augustenburg, claimant to 
the succession in Schleswig-Holstein through the male 
line, had renounced his pretensions in consideration of 
an indemnity paid to him by the King of Denmark. 
This surrender, however, had not received the consent 
of his son and of the other members of the House of 
Augustenburg, nor had the German Federation, as such, 
been a party to the Treaty of London. Belying on the 
declaration of the Great Powers in favour of the in- 
tegrity of the Danish Kingdom, Frederick VII. had 
resumed his attempts to assimilate Schleswig, and in 
some degree Holstein, to the rest of the Monarchy ; and 
although the Provincial Estates were allowed to remain 
in existence, .a national Constitution' was established 
in October, 1855, for the entire Danish State. 

344 MODERN EUROPE. 1852-64. 

Bitter complaints were made of the system of repres- 
sion and encroachment with which the Government of 
Copenhagen was attempting to extinguish German nation- 
ality in the border-provinces ; at length, in November, 
1858, under threat of armed intervention by the German 
Federation, Frederick consented to exclude Holstein 
from the operation of the new Constitution. But 
this did not produce peace, for j the inhabitants of 
Schleswig, severed from the sister- province and now 
excited by the Italian war, raised all the more vigor- 
ous a protest against their own incorporation with 
Denmark ; while in Holstein itself the Government 
incurred the charge of unconstitutional action in fixing 
the Budget without the consent of the Estates. The 
German Federal Diet again threatened to resort to 
force, and Denmark prepared for war. Prussia took up 
the cause of Schleswig in 1861; and even the British 
Government, which had hitherto shown far more in- 
terest in the integrity of Denmark than in the rights 
of the German provinces, now recommended that 
the Constitution of 1855 should .be abolished, and 
that a separate legislation and administration should 
be granted to Schleswig as well as to Holstein. The 
Danes, however, were bent on preserving Schleswig 
as an integral part of the State, and the Govern- 
ment of King Frederick, while willing to recognise 
Holstein as outside Danish territory proper, insisted 
that Schleswig should be included within the unitary 
Constitution, and that Holstein should contribute a 
fixed share to the national expenditure. A manifesto 


to this effect, published by King Frederick on the 
30th of March, 18C3, was the immediate The Patent of 
ground of the conflict now about to break 
out between Germany and Denmark. The Diet of 
Frankfort announced that if this proclamation were 
not revoked it should proceed to Federal execution, 
that is, armed intervention, against the King of Den- 
mark as Duke of Holstein. Still counting upon foreign 
aid or upon the impotence of the Diet, the Danish 
Government refused to change its policy, and on the 
29th of September laid before the Parliament at Copen- 
hagen the law incorporating Schleswig with the rest of 
the Monarchy under the new Constitution. Negotia- 
tions were thus brought to a close, and on the 1st of 
October the Diet decreed the long-threatened Federal 

Affairs had reached this stage, and the execution 
had not yet been put in force, when, on the 15th of 
November, King Frederick VII. died. For 
a moment it appeared possible that his Frederick vn., 

November, 18G3. 

successor, Prince Christian of Gliicksburg, 
might avert the conflict with Germany by withdrawing 
from the position which his predecessor had taken up. 
But the Danish people and Ministry were little inclined 
to give way ; the Constitution had passed through Par- 
liament two days before King Frederick's death, and 
on the 18th of November it received the assent of the 
new monarch. German national feeling was now as 

* Parliamentary Papers, 1864, vol. Ixiv. pp. 28, 263. Hakn, Bismarck, 
i. 165. 

346 MODERN EUROPE. 1863. 

strongly excited on the question of Schleswig-Holstein 
as it had been in 1848. The general cry was that the 
union of these provinces with Denmark must be treated 
as at an end, and their legitimate ruler, Frederick of 
Augustenburg, son of the Duke who had renounced 
his rights, be placed on the throne. The Diet of Frank- 
fort, however, decided to recognise neither of the two 
rival sovereigns in Holstein until its own intervention 
should have taken place. Orders were given that 
a Saxon and a Hanoverian corps should enter the 
country ; and although Prussia and Austria had 
made a secret agreement that the settlement of the 
Schleswig-Holstein question was to be conducted by 
themselves independently of the Diet, the tide of 
popular enthusiasm ran so high that for the moment 
the two leading Powers considered it safer not to 
obstruct the Federal authority, and the Saxon and 
Hanoverian troops accordingly entered Hol- 
tion in Hoistein. stein as mandatories of the Diet at the end 

December, 1863. 

of 1863. The Danish Government, offer- 
ing no resistance, withdrew its troops .across the river 
Eider into Schleswig. 

From this time the history of Germany is the 

history of the profound and audacious statecraft and of 

the overmastering will of Bismarck ; the nation, except 

through its valour on the battle-field, ceases to influence 

the shaping of its own fortunes. What 

Plans ot -^ ~ 

the German people desired in 1864 was 
that Schleswig-Holstein should be attached, under a 
ruler of its own, to the German Federation as it then 


existed ; what Bismarck intended was that Schleswig- 
Holstein, itself incorporated more or less directly with 
Prussia, should be made the means of the -destruction 
of the existing Federal system and of the expulsion of 
Austria from Germany. That another petty State, 
bound to Prussia by no closer tie than its other 
neighbours, should be added to the troop among whom 
Austria found its vassals and its instruments, would 
have been in Bismarck's eyes no gain but actual detri- 
ment to Germany. The German people desired one 
course of action ; Bismarck had determined on some- 
thing totally different ; and with matchless resolution 
and skill he bore down all opposition of people and of 
Courts, and forced .a reluctant nation to the goal which 
he had himself .chosen for it. The first point of con- 
flict was the apparent recognition by Bismarck of the 
rights of King Christian IX. as lawful sovereign in 
"the Duchies as well as in the rest of the Danish State. 
By the Treaty of London Prussia had indeed pledged 
itself to this recognition ; but the German Federation 
had been no party to the Treaty, and under the pressure 
of a vehement national agitation Bavaria and the minor 
States one after another recognised Frederick of Augus- 
tenburg as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein. Bismarck was 
accused alike by the Prussian Parliament and by the 
popular voice of Germany at large of betraying German 
interests to Denmark, of abusing Prussia's position as a 
Great Power, of inciting the nation to civil war. In 
vain he declared that, while surrendering no iota of 
German rights, the Government of Berlin must recognise 

348 MODERN EUROPE. 1864. 

those treaty-obligations with which its own legal title to 
a voice in the affairs of Schleswig was intimately bound 
up, and that the King of Prussia, not a multitude of 
irresponsible and ill-informed citizens, must be the 
judge of the measures by which German interests were 
to be effectually protected. His words made no single 
convert either in the Prussian Parliament or in the 
Federal Diet. At Frankfort the proposal made by the 
two leading Powers that King Christian should be re- 
quired to annul the November Constitution, and that 
in case of his refusal Schleswig also should be occupied, 
was rejected, as involving an acknowledgment of the 
title of Christian as reigning sovereign. At Berlin the 
Lower Chamber refused the supplies which Bismarck 
demanded for operations in the Duchies, and formally 
resolved to resist his policy by every means at its com- 
mand. But the resistance of Parliament and of Diet were 
alike in vain. By a masterpiece of diplomacy Bismarck 
had secured the support and co-operation of Austria in 
his own immediate Danish policy, though 
Austria and but a few months before he had incurred 


the bitter hatred of the Court of Vienna 
by frustrating its plans for a reorganisation of Germany 
by a Congress of princes at Frankfort, and had frankly 
declared to the Austrian ambassador at Berlin that if 
Austria did not transfer its political centre to Pesth 
and leave to Prussia free scope in Germany, it would 
find Prussia on the side of its enemies in the next 
war in which it might be engaged.* But the 

* From Rechberg'd despatch of Feb. 28, 1863 (in Hahn, i. 84), apparently 


democratic and impassioned character of the agitation 
in the minor States in favour of the Schleswig-Hol- 
steiners and their Augustenburg pretender had enabled 
Bismarck to represent this movement to the Austrian 
Government as a revolutionary one, an^ by a dexterous 
appeal to the memories of 1848 to awe the Em- 
peror's advisers into direct concert with the Court of 
Berlin, as the representative of monarchical order, in 
dealing with a problem otherwise too likely to be solved 
by revolutionary methods and revolutionary forces. 
Count liechberg, the Foreign Minister at Vienna, 
was lured into a policy which, after drawing upon 
Austria a full share of the odium of Bismarck's Danish 
plans, after forfeiting for it the goodwill of the minor 
States with which it might have kept Prussia in check, 
and exposing it to the risk of a European war, was to 
confer upon its rival the whole profit of the joint enter- 
Jfise, and to furnish a pretext for the struggle by which 
Austria was to be expelled alike from Germany and 
from what remained to it of Italy. But of the nature 
of the toils into which he was now taking the first fatal 
and irrevocable step Count Rechberg appears to have 
had no suspicion. A seeming cordiality united the 
Austrian and Prussian Governments in the policy of 
defiance to the will of all the rest of Germany and to the 
demand) of their own subjects. It was to no purpose 
that the Federal Diet vetoed the proposed summons to 

quoting actual words uttered by Bismarck. Bismarck's account of the 
conversation (id. 80) tones it down to a demand that Austr a should 
not encroach on Prussia's recognised joint-leadership in Germany. 

350 MODERN EUROPE. 1864. 

King Christian and the proposed occupation of Schles- 

wig. Austria and Prussia delivered an ultimatum 

at Copenhagen demanding the repeal of the 

Austrian and 

L r ter Sl sdiSg. November Constitution ; and on its rejection 
their troops entered Schleswig, not as the 
mandatories of the German Federation, but as the 
instruments of two independent and allied Powers. 
(Feb. 1, 1864.). 

Against the overwhelming forces by which they 
were thus attacked the Danes could only make a brave 1 
but ineffectual resistance. Their first line of defence 
was the Danewerke, a fortification extending east and 
west towards the sea from the town of 
schi es a wig. J Feb. Sclileswigr. Prince Frederick Charles, who 

April, 1864. 

commanded the Prussian right, was re- 
pulsed in an attack upon the easternmost part of this 
work at Missunde ; the Austrians, however, carried 
some positions in the centre which commanded the 
defenders' lines, and the Danes fell back upon the forti- 
fied post of Diippel, covering the narrow channel which 
separates the island of Alsen from the mainland. Here 
for some weeks they held the Prussians in check, while 
the Austrians, continuing the march northwards, en- 
tered Jutland. At length, on the 18th of April, after 
several hours of heavy bombardment, the lines of 
Diippel were taken by storm and the defenders driven 
across the channel into Alsen. Unable to pursue the 
enemy across this narrow strip of sea, the Prussians 
joined their allies in Jutland, and occupied the whole 
of the Danish mainland as far as the Lum Fiord. The 

186*. THE DANISH WAR. 351 

war, however, was not to be terminated without an 
attempt on the part of the neutral Powers to arrive at 
a settlement by diplomacy. A Conference was opened 
at London on the 20th of April, and after three weeks 
of negotiation the belligerents were induced to accept 
an armistice. As the troops of the German Federation, 
though unconcerned in the military operations of the 
two Great Powers, were in possession of Holstein, the 
Federal Government was invited to take part in the 
Conference. It was represented by Count Beust, Prime 
Minister of Saxony, a politician who was soon to rise 
to much greater eminence ; but in consequence of 
the diplomatic union of Prussia and Austria the 
views entertained by the Governments of the secondary 
German States had now no real bearing on the course 
of events, and Count Beust's earliest appearance on 
the great European stage was without result, except 
in its influence on his own career.* 

The first proposition laid before the Conference was 
that submitted by Bernstorff, the Prussian envoy, to 
the effect that Schleswig-Holstein should 

i , . i . , . . Conference of 

receive complete independence, the question London. April 
whether King Christian or some other 
prince should be sovereign of the new State being 
reserved for future settlement. To this the Danish 
envoys replied that even on the condition of personal 
union with Denmark through the Crown they could 
not assent to the grant of complete independence to 
the Duchies. Eaising their demand in consequence of 

* B. and F. State Papers, 1863-4, p. 173. Beust, Erinnerungen, i. 336. 

352 MODERN EUROPE. 1864. 

this refusal, and declaring that the war had made an 
end of the obligations subsisting under the London 
Treaty of 1852, the two German Powers then de- 
manded that Schleswig-Holstein should be completely 
separated from Denmark and formed into a single 
State under Frederick of Augustenburg, who in the 
eyes of Germany possessed the best claim to the suc- 
cession. Lord Russell, while denying that the acts 
or defaults of Denmark could liberate Austria and 
Prussia from their engagements made with other 
Powers in the Treaty of London, admitted that no 
satisfactory result was likely to arise from the continued 
union of the Duchies with Denmark, and suggested 
that King Christian should make an absolute cession of 
Holstein and of the southern part of Schleswig, retain- 
ing the remainder in full sovereignty. The frontier- 
line he proposed to draw at the River Schlei. To this 
principle of partition both Denmark and the German 
Powers assented, but it proved impossible to reach an 
agreement on the frontier-line. Bernstorff, who had 
at first required , nearly all Schleswig, abated his de- 
mands, and would have accepted a line drawn westward 
from Flensburg, so leaving to Denmark at least half 
the province, including the important position of Diip- 
pel. The terms thus offered to Denmark were not 
unfavourable. Holstein it did not expect, and could 
scarcely desire, to retain ; and the territory which 
would have been taken from it in Schleswig under this 
arrangement included few districts that were not really 
German. But the Government of Copenhagen, misled 

1864. TREATY OF VIENNA. 353 

by the support given to it at the Conference by England 
and Russia a support which was one of words only 
refused to cede anything north of the town of Schleswig. 
Even when in the last resort Lord Russell proposed 
that the frontier-line should be settled, by arbitration 
the Danish Government held fast to its refusal, and for 
the sake of a few miles of territory plunged once more 
into a struggle which, if it was not to kindle a Euro- 
pean war of vast dimensions, could end only in the 
ruin of the Danes. The expected help Continuation of 
failed them. Attacked and overthrown in 
the island of Alsen, the German flag carried to the 
northern extremity of their mainland, they were com- 
pelled to make peace on their enemies' terms. Hostilities 
were brought to a close by the signature of Preliminaries 
on the 1st of August ; and by the Treaty of Vienna, 
concluded on the 30th of October, 1864, _ 

Treaty of Vienna, 

King Christian ceded his rights in the 
whole of Schleswig-Holstein to the sovereigns of Austria 
and Prussia jointly, and undertook to recognise whatever 
dispositions they might make of those provinces. 

The British Government throughout this conflict had 
played a sorry part, at one moment threatening the Ger- 
mans, at another using language towards the Danes which 
might well be taken to indicate an intention 
of lending them armed support. To some andNapoieon 
extent the errors of the Cabinet were due to 
the relation which existed between Great Britain and 
Napoleon III. It had up to this time been considered 
both at London and at Paris that the Allies of the 

354 MODERN EUROPE. 1863-64. 

Crimea had still certain common interests in Europe ; 
and in the unsuccessful intervention at St. Petersburg 
on behalf of Poland in 1863 the British and French 
Governments had at first gone hand in hand. But 
behind every step openly taken by Napoleon III. 
there was some half-formed design for promoting the 
interests of his dynasty or extending the frontiers of 
France ; and if England had consented to support the 
diplomatic concert at St. Petersburg by measures of force, 
it would have found itself engaged in a war in which 
other ends than those relating to Poland would have 
been the foremost. Towards the close of the year 1863 
Napoleon had proposed that a European Congress 
should assemble, in order to regulate not only the 
affairs of Poland but all those European questions 
which remained unsettled. This proposal had been 
abruptly declined by the English Government ; and 
when in the course of the Danish war Lord Palmerston 
showed an inclination to take up arms if France would 
do the same, Napoleon was probably not sorry to have 
the opportunity of repaying England for its rejection 
of his own overtures in the previous year. He had 
moreover hopes of obtaining from' Prussia an extension 
of the French frontier either in Belgium or towards the 
Ehine.* In reply to overtures from London, Napoleon 

* Bismarck's note of July 29th, 1870, in Hahn, i. 506, describing 
Napoleon's Belgian project, which dated from the time when he was him- 
self ambassador at Paris in 1862, gives this as the explanation of Napo- 
leon's policy in 1864. The Commercial Treaty with Prussia and friendly 
personal relations with Bismarck also influenced Napoleon's views. See 
Bismarck's speech of Feb. 21st, 1879, on this subject, in Hahn, iii. 599. 


stated that the cause of Schleswig-Holstein to some 
extent represented the principle of nationality, to which 
France was friendly, and that of all wars in which 
France could engage a war with Germany would be the 
least desirable. England accordingly, if it took up arms 
for the Danes, would have been compelled to enter the war 
alone ; and although at a later time, when the war was 
over and the victors were about to divide the spoil, the 
British and French fleets ostentatiously combined in man- 
oauvres at Cherbourg, this show of union deceived no 
one, least of all the resolute and well-informed director 
of affairs at Berlin. To force, and force alone, would 
Bismarck have yielded. Palmerston, now sinking into 
old age, permitted Lord Russell to parody his own 
fierce language of twenty years back; but all the world, 
except the Danes, knew that the fangs and the claws 
were drawn, and that British foreign policy had become 
-for the time a thing of snarls and grimaces. / 

Bismarck had not at first determined actually to 
annex Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia. He would have 
been content to leave it under the nominal 

Intentions of 

sovereignty of Frederick of Augustenburg iSSS^"* 
if that prince would have placed the entire 
military and naval resources of Schleswig-Holstein 
under the control of the Government of Berlin, and 
have accepted on behalf of his Duchies conditions which 
Bismarck considered indispensable to German union 
under Prussian leadership. In the harbour of Kiel it 
was not difficult to recognise the natural headquarters 
of a future German fleet ; the narrow strip of land 
x 2 ' 

356" MODERN EUROPE. 1864 

projecting between the two seas naturally suggested 
the formation of a canal connecting the Baltic with the 
German Ocean, and such a work could only belong to 
Germany at large or to its leading Power. Moreover, 
as a frontier district, Schleswig-Holstein was peculiarly 
exposed to foreign attack ; certain strategical positions 
necessary for its defence must therefore be handed over 
to its protector. That Prussia should have united its 
forces with Austria in order to win for the Schleswig- 
Holsteiners the power of governing themselves as they 
pleased, must have seemed to Bismarck a supposition in 
the highest degree preposterous. He had taken up the 
cause of the Duchies not in the interest of the inhabi- 
tants but in the interest of Germany ; and by Germany 
he understood Germany centred at Berlin and ruled by 
the House of Hohenzollern. If therefore the Augus- 
tenburg prince was not prepared to accept his throne 
on these terms, there was no room for him, and the 
provinces must be incorporated with Prussia itself. 
That Austria would not without compensation permit 
the Duchies thus to fall directly or indirectly under 
Prussian sway was of course well known to Bismarck ; 
but so far was this from causing him any hesitation in 
his policy, that from the first he had discerned in the 
Schleswig-Holstein question a favourable pretext for 
the war which was to drive Austria out of Germany. 

Peace with Denmark was scarcely concluded when, 
at the bidding of Prussia, reluctantly supported by 
Austria, the Saxon and Hanoverian troops which had 
entered Holstein as the mandatories of the Federal Diet 


were compelled to leave the country. A Provisional 
Government was established under the direction of an 
Austrian and a Prussian Commissioner. Bismarck had 
met the Prince of Augustenburg at Berlin some months 
before, and had formed an unfavourable opinion of 
the policy likely to be adopted by hira towards Prussia. 
All Germany, however, was in favour of the Prince's 
claims, and at the Conference of London these claims 
had been supported by the Prussian envoy himself. In 
order to give some appearance of formal legality to his 
own action, Bismarck had to obtain from the Crown- 
jurists of Prussia a decision that King Christian IX. had, 
contrary to the general opinion of Germany, been the 
lawful inheritor of Schleswig-Holstein, and 

Relations of 

that the Prince of Augustenburg had there- SSSS^Dlc., 
fore no rights whatever in the Duchies. 
As the claims of Christian hud been transferred by the 
Treaty of Vienna to the sovereigns of Austria and 
' Prussia jointly, it rested with them to decide who 
should be Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, and under what 
conditions. Bismarck announced at Vienna on the 
22nd of February, 1865, the terms on which he was 
willing that Schleswig-Holstein should be conferred by 
the two sovereigns upon Frederick of Augustenburg. 
He required, in addition to community of finance, 
postal system, and railways, that Prussian law, including 
the obligation to military service, should be introduced 
into the Duchies ; that their regiments should take the 
oath of fidelity to the King of Prussia, and that tluir 
principal military positions should be held by Prussian 


troops. These conditions would have made Schleswig- 
Holstein in all but name a part of the Prussian State : 
they were rejected both by the Court of Vienna and by 
Prince Frederick himself, and the population of Schles- 
wig-Holstein almost unanimously declared against them. 
Both Austria and the Federal Diet now supported the 
Schleswig-Holsteiners in what appeared to be a struggle 
on behalf of their independence against Prussian 
domination; and when the Prussian Commissioner in 
Schleswig-Holstein expelled the most prominent of the 
adherents of Augustenburg, his Austrian colleague 
published a protest declaring the act to be one of law- 
less violence. It seemed that the outbreak of war 
between the two rival Powers could not long be de- 
layed ; but Bismarck had on this occasion moved too 
rapidly for his master, and considerations relating to 
the other European Powers made it advisable to post- 
convention of pone the rupture for some months. An 
1865. agreement was patched up at Grastein by 

which, pending an ultimate settlement, the government 
of the two provinces was divided between their masters, 
Austria taking the administration of Holstein, Prussia 
that of Schleswig, while the little district of Lauenburg 
on the south was made over to King William in full 
sovereignty. An actual conflict between the represen- 
tatives of the two rival governments at their joint head- 
quarters in Schleswig-Holstein was thus averted ; peace, 
was made possible at least for some months longer; 
and the interval w r as granted to Bismarck which was 
still required for the education of his Sovereign in the 


policy of blood and iron, and for the completion of his 
own arrangements with the enemies of Austria outside 

The natural ally of Prussia was Italy ; but without 
the sanction of Napoleon III. it woujd have been diffi- 
cult to engage Italy in a new war. Bismarck had 
therefore to gain a t least the passive con- Bismarck at 

. . Biarritz, Sept., 

currence of the French Emperor in the union 1865 - 
of Italy and Prussia against Austria. He visited 
Napoleon at Biarritz in September, 1865, and returned 
with the object of his journey achieved. The negotia- 
tion of Biarritz, if truthfully recorded, would probably 
give the key to much of the European history of the 
next five years. As at Plombieres, the French Em- 
peror acted without his Ministers, and what he asked 
he asked without a witness. That Bismarck actually 
promised to Napoleon III. either Belgium or any part 
of the Rhenish Provinces in case of the aggrandise- 
ment of Prussia has been denied by him, and is not 
in itself probable. But there are understandings which 
prove to be understandings on one side only ; politeness 
may be misinterpreted ; and the world would have 
found Count Bismarck unendurable if at every friendly 
meeting he had been guilty of the frankness with 
which be informed the Austrian Government that its 
centre of action must be transferred. from Vienna to Pesth. 
That Napoleon was now scheming for an extension 
of France on the north-east is certain ; that Bismarck 
treated such rectification of the frontier as a matter for 

* Halm, Bismarck, i. 271, 318. Oesterreichs Krimpfe in 1866, i. 8. 

360 MODE UN EUROPE. 1865. 

arrangement is hardly to be doubted ; and if without 
a distinct and written agreement Napoleon was con- 
tent to base his action on the belief that Bismarck 
would not withhold from him his reward, this only 
proved how great was the disparity between the aims 
which the French ruler allowed himself to cherish and 
his mastery of the arts by which alone such aims were 
to be realised. Napoleon desired to see Italy placed in 
possession of Venice ; he probably believed at this time 
that Austria would be no unequal match for Prussia 
and Italy together, and that the natural result of a 
well-balanced struggle would be not only the completion 
of Italian union but the purchase of French neutrality 
or mediation by the cession of German territory west 
of the Rhine. It was no part of the duty of Count 
Bismarck to chill Napoleon's fancies or to teach him 
political wisdom. The Prussian statesman may have 
left Biarritz with the conviction that an attack on 
Germany would sooner er later follow the disappoint- 
ment of those hopes which he had nattered and intended 
to mock; but for the present he had removed one 
dangerous obstacle from his path, and the way lay free 
before him to an Italian alliance if Italy itself should 
choose to combine with him in war. 

Since the death of Cavour the Italian Government 

had made no real progress towards the attainment of 

the national aims, the acquisition of Rome and Venice. 

Garibaldi, impatient of delay, had in 1862 

Italy, 1862-66. r . 

landed again in Sicily and summoned his 
followers to march with him upon Rome. But the 

1862^5. ITALY. 361 

enterprise was resolutely condemned by Victor Em- 
manuel, and when Garibaldi crossed to the mainland 
he found the King's troops in front of him at Aspro- 
monte. There was an exchange of shots, and Gari- 
baldi fell wounded. He was treated' with something 
of the distinction shown to a royal prisoner, and 
when his wound was healed he was released from 
captivity. His enterprise, however, and the indiscreet 
comments on it made by Rattazzi, who was now 
in power, strengthened the friends of the Papacy 
at the Tuileries, and resulted in the fall of the 
Italian Minister. His successor, Minghetti, deemed it 
necessary to arrive at some temporary understanding 
with Napoleon on the Eoman question. The presence 
of French troops at Rome offended national feeling, 
and made any attempt at conciliation between the 
Papal Court and the Italian Government hopeless. In 
order to procure the removal of this foreign garrison 
Minghetti was willing to enter into engagements 
which seemed almost to imply the renunciation of the 
claim on Rome. By a Convention made in Septem- 
ber, 1864, the Italian Government undertook not to 
attack the territory of the Pope, and to oppose by 
force every attack made upon it from without. Napo- 
leon on his part engaged to withdraw his troops 
gradually from Rome as the Pope should organise his 
own army, and to complete the evacuation within two 
years. It was, however, stipulated in an Article which 
was intended to be kept secret, that the capital of 
Italy should be changed, the meaning of this stipula- 

362 MODERN EUROPE. 1865-66. 

tion being that Florence should receive the dignity 
which by the common consent of Italy ought to have 
been transferred from Turin to Eome and to Borne 
alone. The publication of this Article, which was 
followed by riots in Turin, caused the immediate fall 
of Minghetti's Cabinet. He was succeeded in office 
by General La Marmora, under whom the negotiations 
with Prussia were begun which, after long uncertainty, 
resulted in the alliance of 1866 and in the final 
expulsion of Austria from Italy.* 

Bismarck from the beginning of his Ministry 
appears to have looked forward to the com- 

La Marmora. . . 

bmation of Italy and Prussia against the 
common enemy ; but his plans ripened slowly. In the 
spring of 1865, when affairs seemed to be reaching a 
crisis in Schleswig-Holstein, the first serious overtures 
were made by the Prussian ambassador at Florence. La 
Marmora answered that any definite proposition would 
receive the careful attention of the Italian Government, 
but that Italy would not permit itself to be made a mere 
instrument in Prussia's hands for the intimidation of 
Austria. Such caution was both natural and necessary 
on the part of the Italian Minister ; and his reserve 
seemed to be more than justified when, a few months later, 
the Treaty of Gastein restored Austria and Prussia to 
relations of friendship.. La Marmora might now well 
consider himself released from all obligations towards 
the Court of Berlin : and, entering on a new line of 
policy, he sent an envoy to Vienna to ascertain if the 

* B. and F. State Papers, 1864-65, p. 460. 

1866. OOVONE AT BERLIN. 363 

Emperor would amicably cede Venetia to Italy in 
return for the payment of a very large sum of money 
and the assumption by Italy of part of the Austrian 
national debt. Had this transaction been effected, it 
would probably have changed the course of European 


history ; the Emperor, however, declined to bargain 
away any part of his dominions, and so threw Italy 
once more into the camp of his great enemy. In the 
meantime the disputes about Schleswig-Holstein broke 
out afresh. Bismarck renewed his efforts at Florence 
in the spring of 1866, with the result that 
General Govone was sent to Berlin in order Berlin, March,. 


to discuss with the Prussian Minister the 
political and military conditions of an alliance. But 
instead of proposing immediate action, Bismarck stated 
to Govone that the question of Schleswig-Holstein was 
insufficient to justify a great war in the eyes of Europe, 
and that a better cause must be put forward, namely, 
the reform of the Federal system of Germany. Once 
more the subtle Italians believed that Bismarck's 
anxiety for a war with Austria was feigned, and that 
he sought their friendship only as a means of extort- 
ing from the Court of Vienna its consent to Prussia's 
annexation of the Danish Duchies. There was an 
apparent effort on the part of the Prussian statesman 
to avoid entering into any engagement which involved 
immediate action ; the truth being that Bismarck was 
still in conflict with the pacific influences which sur- 
rounded the King, and uncertain from day to day 
whether his master would really follow him in the 

364 MODERN EUROPE. 1866 

policy of war. He sought therefore to make the joint 
resort to arms dependent on some future act, such as 
the summoning of a German Parliament, from which 
the King of Prussia could not recede if once he should 
go so far. But the Italians, apparently not pene- 
trating the real secret of Bismarck's hesitation, would 
be satisfied with no such indeterminate engagement ; 
they pressed for action within a limited time ; and in 
the end, after Austria had taken steps which went far 
to overcome the last scruples of King William, Bis- 
marck consented to fix three months as the limit 
beyond which the obligation of Italy to accompany 
Prussia into war should not extend. On the 8th of 
Treaty. of April a Treaty of offensive and defensive 
alliance was signed. It was agreed that 
if the King of Prussia should within three months 
take up arms for the reform of the Federal system 
of Germany, Italy would immediately after the out- 
break of hostilities declare war upon Austria. Both 
Powers were to engage in the war with their whole 
force, and peace was not to be made but by common 
consent, such consent not to be withheld after Austria 
should have agreed to cede Venetia to Italy and territory 
with an equal population to Prussia.* 

Eight months had now passed since the signature 
of the Convention of Gastein. The experiment of an 

* La Marmora, Un po piu di luce, pp. 109, 146. Jacini, Due Anni, p. 154. 
Hahn, i. 377. In the first draft of the Treaty Italy was required to 
declare war not only on Austria but on all German Governments wliich 
should join it. King William, who had still some compunction in 
calling in Italian arms against the Eatherland, struck out these words. 



understanding with Austria, which King William had 
deemed necessary, had been made, and it had failed ; 
or rather, as Bismarck expressed himself in 

Bismarck and 

a candid moment, it had succeeded, inas- lUjftttt- 
much as it had cured the King of his 
scruples and raised him to the proper point of in- 
dignation against the Austrian Court. The agents 
in effecting this happy result had been the Prince of 
Augustenburg, the population of Holstein, and the 
Liberal party throughout Germany at large. In 
Schleswig, which the Convention of Gastein had handed 
over to Prussia, General Manteuffel, a son of the 
Minister of 1850, had summarily put a stop to every 
expression of public opinion, and had threatened to 
imprison the Prince if he came within his reach ; in Hol- 
stein the AustrianJGovernment had permitted, if it had not 
encouraged, the inhabitants to agitate^in favour of the 
Pretender, and had allowed a mass-meeting to be held 
at Altona on the 23rd of January, where cheers were 
raised for Augustenburg, and the summoning of the 
Estates of Schleswig-Holstein was demanded. This 
was enough to enable Bismarck to denounce the con- 
duct of Austria as an alliance with revolution. He 
demanded explanations from the Government of Vienna, 
and the Emperor declined to render an account of his 
actions. Warlike preparations now began, and on the 
16th of March the Austrian Government announced 
that it should refer the affairs of Schleswig-Holstein v 
to the Federal Diet. This was a clear departure from 
the terms of the Convention of Gastein, and from the 

366 MODERN EUROPE. 1866. 

agreement made between Austria and Prussia before 
entering into the Danish war in 1864 that the Schles- 
wig-Holstein question should be settled by the two 
Powers independently of the German Federation. King 
William was deeply moved by such a breach of good 
faith ; tears filled his eyes when he spoke of the con- 
duct of the Austrian Emperor ; and though pacific 
influences were still active around him he now began 
to fall in more cordially with the warlike policy 
of his Minister. The question at issue between 
Prussia and Austria expanded from the mere disposal 
of the Duchies to the reconstitution of the Federal 
system of Germany. In a note laid before the 
. Governments of all the Minor States Bismarck de- 
clared that the time had come when Germany must 
receive a new and more effective organisation, and 
inquired how far Prussia could count on the support 
of allies if it should be attacked by Austria or forced 
into war. It was immediately after this re-opening of 
the whole problem of Federal reform in Germany that 
the draft of the Treaty with Italy was brought to its 
final shape by Bismarck and the Italian envoy, and sent 
to the Ministry at Florence for its approval. 

Bismarck had now to make the best use of the three 
months' delay that was granted to him. On the day 
after the acceptance of the Treaty by the Italian 
Austria offers Government, the Prussian representative at 
the Diet of Frankfort handed in a proposal 
for the summoning of a German Parliament, to be 
elected by universal suffrage. Coming from the Minister 



who had made Parliamentary government a mockery 
in Prussia, this proposal was scarcely considered as 
serious. Bavaria, as the chief of the secondary States, 
had already expressed its willingness to enter upon the 

discussion of Federal reform, but it . asked that the 

two leading Powers should in the meantime undertake 
not to attack one another. Austria at once acceded to this 
request, and so forced Bismarck into giving a similar as- 
surance. Promises of disarmament were then exchanged; 
but as Austria declined to stay the collection of its 
forces in Venetia against Italy, Bismarck was able to 
charge his adversary with insincerity in the negotiation, 
and preparations for war were resumed on both sides. 
Other difficulties, however, now came into view. The 
Treaty between Prussia and Italy had been made 
known to the Court of ' Vienna by Napoleon, whose 
advice La Marmora had sought before its conclusion. 

O y 

3,nd the Austrian Emperor had thus become aware of 
his danger. He now determined to sacrifice Venetia if 
Italy's neutrality could be so secured. On the 5th of 
May the Italian ambassador at Paris, Count Nigra, 
was informed by Napoleon that Austria had offered 
to cede Venetia to him on behalf of Victor Emmanuel 
if France and Italy would not prevent Austria from 
indemnifying itself at Prussia's expense in Silesia. 
Without a war, at the price of mere inaction, Italy was 
offered all that it could gain by a struggle which was 
likely to be a desperate one, and which might end 
in disaster. La Marmora was in sore perplexity. 
Though he had formed a juster estimate of the capacity 

368 MODERN EUROPE. law. 

of the Prussian army than any other statesman or 
soldier in Europe, he was thoroughly suspicious of the 
intentions of the Prussian Government ; and in sanction- 
ing the alliance of the previous month he had done so 
half expecting that Bismarck would through the prestige 
of this alliance gain for Prussia its own objects without 
entering into war, and then leave Italy to reckon with 
Austria as best it might. He would gladly have 
abandoned the alliance and have accepted Austria's offer 
if Italy could have done this without disgrace. But the 
sense of honour was sufficiently strong to carry him 
past this temptation. He declined the offer made 
through Paris, and continued the armaments of Italy, 
though still with a secret hope that European diplomacy 
might find the means of realising the purpose of his 
country without war.* 

The neutral Powers were now, with various objects, 
bestirring themselves in favour of a Euro- 

Proposals for a 

pean Congress. Napoleon believed the time 
to be come when the Treaties of 1815 might be finally 
obliterated by the joint act of Europe.- He was himself 
ready to join Prussia with three hundred thousand men if 
the King would transfer the Rhenish Provinces to France. 
Demands, direct and indirect, were made on Count Bis- 
marck on behalf of the Tuileries for cessions of territory 
of greater or less extent. These demands were neither 
granted nor refused. Bismarck procrastinated ; he spoke 
of the obstinacy of the King his master; he inquired 
whether parts of Belgium or Switzerland would not better 

* La Marmora, Un po piu di luce, p. 204. Halm, i. 402. 


assimilate with France than a German province ; he put 
off the Emperor's representatives by the assurance that 
he could more conveniently arrange these matters with 
the Emperor when he should himself visit Paris. On the 
28th of May invitations to a Congress were issued by 
France, England, and Russia jointly, the objects of the 
Congress being defined as the settlement of the affairs 
of Schleswig-Holstein, of the differences between Austria 
and Italy, and of the reform of the Federal Consti- 
tution of Germany, in so far as these affected Europe 
at large. The invitation was accepted by Prussia and 
by Italy; it was accepted by Austria only under the 
condition that no arrangement should be discussed 
which should give an increase of territory or power to 
(one)of the States invited to the Congress. This subtly- 
worded condition would not indeed/ have excluded the 

r \^* JU * A * l Li 
equal aggrandisement of ^lp It would not have rendered 

the cession of Venetia to Italy or the annexation of 
Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia impossible ; but it would 
either have Involved the surrender of Trie former Papal 
territory by Italy in order that Victor Emmanuel's 
dominions should receive no increase, or, in the alter- 
native, it would have entitled Austria to claim Silesia 
as its own equivalent for the augmentation of the 
Italian Kingdom. Such reservations would have ren- 
dered any efforts of the Powers to preserve peace 
useless, and they were accepted as tantamount to a 
refusal on the part of Austria to attend the Congress. 
Simultaneously with its answer to the neutral Powers, 
Austria called upon the Federal Diet to take the affairs 

370 MODEEN EUROPE. 1866. 

of Schleswig-Holstein into its own hands, and convoked 
the Holstein Estates. Bismarck thereupon declared 
the Convention of Gastein to be at an end, and ordered 
General Manteuffel to lead his troops into Holstein. The 
Austrian commander, protesting that he yielded only to 
superior force, withdrew through Altona into Hanover. 
Austria at once demanded and obtained from the Diet 8f 
Frankfort the mobilisation of the whole of the Federal 
armies. The representative of Prussia, declaring that 
this act of the Diet had made an end of the ex- 
isting Federal union, handed in the plan of his 
Government for the reorganisation of Germany, and 
quitted Frankfort. Diplomatic relations between Aus- 
tria and Prussia were broken off on the 12th of June, 
and on the 15th Count Bismarck demanded of the 
sovereigns of Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Cassel, that 
they should on that very day put a stop to their 
military preparations and accept the Prussian scheme 
of Federal reform. Negative answers being given, 


Prussian troops immediately marched into these terri- 
tories, and war began. Weimar, Mecklenburg, and 
other petty States in the north took part with Prussia : 
all the rest of Germany joined Austria.* '. 

The goal of Bismarck's desire, the end which he 
'had steadily set before himself since entering upon his 
German Ministry, was attained ; and, if his calcula- 
tions as to the strength of the Prussian army 
were not at fault, Austria was at length to be expelled 

* Halm, Bismarck, i. 425. Halm, Zwei Jahre, p. 60. Oesterreiehs 
Krimpfc, i. 30. 

1866. GERMAN OPINION. 371 

from the German Federation by force of arms. But the 
process by which Bismarck had worked up to this result 
had ranged against him the almost unanimous opinion of 
Germany outside the military circles of Prussia itself. 
His final demand for the summoning of a German - 
Parliament was taken as mere comedy. The guiding 
star of his policy had hitherto been the dynastic in- 
terest of the House of Hohenzollern ; and now, when 
the Germans were to be plunged into war with one 
another, it seemed as if the real object of the struggle 
was no more than the annexation of the Danish 
Duchies and some other coveted territory to the Prussian - 
Kingdom. The voice of protest and condemnation rose - 
loud from every organ of public opinion. Even in 
Prussia itself the instances were few where any spon- 
taneous support was tendered to the Government. The 
Parliament of Berlin, struggling up to the end against 
'the all-powerful Minister, had seen its members prose- 
cuted for speeches made within its own walls, and had 
at last been prorogued in order that its insubordination 
might not hamper the Crown in the moment of danger. 
But the mere disappearance of Parliament could not 
conceal the intensity of ill will which the Minister and 
his policy had excited. The author of a fratricidal war ^ 
of Germans against Germans was in the eyes of many 
the greatest of all criminals ; and on the 7th of May an 
attempt was made by a young fanatic to take Bismarck's 
life in the streets of Berlin. The Minister owed the 
preservation of his life to the feebleness of his assailant's 
weapon and to his own vigorous arm. But the imminence 

372 MODERN EUROPE. 1866. 

of the danger affected King William far more than Bis- 
marck himself. It spoke to his simple mind of super- 
natural protection and aid; it stilled his doubts; and 
confirmed him in the belief that Prussia was in this crisis 
the instrument for working out the Almighty's will. 

A few days before the outbreak of hostilities the 

Emperor Napoleon gave publicity to his own view of 

the European situation. He attributed the 

Napoleon UL 

coming war to three causes: to the faulty- 
geographical limits of the Prussian State, to the desire for*- 
a better Federal system in Germany, and to the neces- 


sity felt by the Italian nation for securing its inde- 
pendence. These needs would, he conceived, be met by 
a territorial rearrangement in the north of Germany 
consolidating and augmenting the Prussian Kingdom ; 
by the creation of a more effective Federal union between 
the secondary German States ; and finally, by the in- 
corporation of. Venetia with Italy, Austria's position in 
Germany remaining unimpaired. Only in the event of 
the map of Europe being altered to the exclusive advan- 
tage of one Great Power would France 'require an exten- 
sion of frontier. Its interests lay in the preservation of 
the equilibrium of Europe, and in the maintenance of 
the Italian Kingdom. These had already been secured 
by arrangements which would not require France to 
draw the sword ; a watchful but unselfish neutrality 
was the policy which its Government had determined 
to pursue. Napoleon had in fact lost all control over 
events, and all chance of gaining the Rhenish Provinces, 
from the time when he permitted Italy to enter into 



the Prussian alliance without any stipulation that France 
should at its option be admitted as a third member of 
the coalition. He could not ally himself with Austria 
against his own creation, the Italian Kingdom; on 
the other hand, he had no means of extorting cessions 
from Prussia when once Prussia was sure of an ally 
who could bring two hundred thousand men into the 
field. His diplomacy had been successful in so far as 
it had assured Venetia to Italy whether Prussia should 
be victorious or overthrown, but as regarded France it 
had landed him in absolute powerlessness. He was 
unable to act on one side ; he was not wanted on 
the other. Neutrality had become a matter not of 
choice but of necessity ; and until the course of military 
events should have produced some new situation in 
Europe, France might well be watchful, but it could 
scarcely gain much credit for its disinterested part.* 

Assured against an attack from the side of the 
Ehine, Bismarck was able to throw the mass of the 
Prussian forces southwards against Austria, 
leaving in the north only the modest con- Hesse cassei 


tingent which was necessary to overcome 

the resistance of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel. Through 

* Discours de Napoleon III., p. 456. On May llth, Nigra, Italian am- 
bassador at Paris, reported that Napoleon's ideas on the objects to be attained 
by a Congress were as follows : Venetia to Italy"; Silesia to Austria ; 
the Danish Duchies and other territory in North Germany to Prussia ; 
the establishment of several small States on the Rhine under French pro- 
tection ; the dispossessed German princes to be compensated in Roumauia. 
La Marmora, p. 228. Napoleon III. was pursuing in a somewhat altered 
form the old German policy of the Republic and the Empire namely, 
the balancing of Austria and Prussia against one another, and the estab- 
lishment of a French protectorate over the group of secondary States. 

374 MODERN EUROPE. isse. 

the precipitancy of a Prussian general, who struck 
without waiting for his colleagues, the Hanoverians 
gained a victory at Langensalza on the 27th of 
June ; but other Prussian regiments arrived on the 
field a few hours later, and the Hanoverian army 
was forced to capitulate on the next day. The King 
made his escape to Austria ; the Elector of Hesse- 
Cassel, less fortunate, was made a prisoner of war. 
Northern Germany was thus speedily reduced to sub- 1 
mission, and any danger of a diversion in favour of 
Austria in this quarter disappeared. In Saxony no 
attempt was made to bar the way to the advancing 
Prussians. Dresden was occupied without resistance, 
but the Saxon army marched southwards in good time, 
and joined the Austrians in Bohemia. The Prussian 
forces, about two hundred and fifty thousand strong, 
now gathered on the Saxon and Silesian frontier, covering 
the line from Pirna to Landshut. They were composed 
of three armies : the first, or central, army under 
Prince Frederick Charles, a nephew of the King; the 
second, or Silesian, army under the 'Crown Prince ; 
the westernmost, known as the army of the Elbe, 
under General Herwarth von Bittenfeld. Against these 
were ranged about an equal number of Austrians, led 
by Benedek, a general who had gained great dis- 
tinction in the Hungarian and the Italian can> 
paigns. It had at first been thought 

TheBohemian . .. - 

jS&iiys P roba ble that Benedek, whose forces lay 

about Olmutz, would invade Southern 

Silesia, and the Prussian line had therefore been 

I * ' <. 


extended far to the east. Soon, however, it appeared 
that the Austrians were unable to take up the offensive, 
and Benedek moved westwards into Bohemia. The 
Prussian line was now shortened, and orders were 
given to the three armies to cross the.Bohemian frontier 
and converge in the direction of the town of Gitschin. 
General Moltke,the chief of the staff, directed their opera- 
tions from Berlin by telegraph. The combined advance 
of the three armies was executed with extraordinary pre- 
cision ; and in a series of hard-fought combats extending 
from the 2Gth to the 29th of June the Austrians were 
driven back upon their centre, and effective communica- 
tion was established between the three invading 
bodies. On the 30th the King of Prussia, with 
General Moltke and Counjjr Bismarck, left Berlin ; on 
the 2nd of July they were at headquarters at Gits- 
chin. It had been Benedek's design to leave a small 
force to hold the Silesian army in check, and to 
throw the mass of his army westwards upon Prince 
Frederick Charles and overwhelm him before he could 
receive help from his colleagues. This design had been 
baffled by the energy of the Crown Prince's attack, and 
by the superiority of the Prussians in generalship, in 
the discipline of their troops, and in the weapon they 
carried ; for though the Austrians had witnessed in the 
Danish campaign the effects of the Prussian breech- 
loading rifle, they had not thought it necessary to adopt 
a similar arm. Benedek, though no great battle had 
yet been fought, saw that the campaign was lost, and 
w T rote to the Emperor on the 1st of July recommending 

376 MODERN EUROPE. isee. 

him to make peace, for otherwise a catastrophe was 

inevitable. He then concentrated his army on high 

ground a few miles west of Ko'niggratz, 

K6ni|^atz, and prepared for a defensive battle on the 

July 3. 

grandest scale. In spite of the losses of 
the past week he could still bring about two hundred 
thousand men into action. The three Prussian 
armies were now near enough to one another to 
combine in their attack, and on the night of July 2nd 
the King sent orders to the three commanders to move 
against Benedek before daybreak. Prince Frederick 
Charles, advancing through the village of Sadowa, was 
the first in the field. For hours his divisions sustained 
an unequal struggle against the assembled strength of 
the Austrians. Midday passed ; the defenders now 
pressed down upon their assailants ; and preparations 
for a retreat had been begun, when the long-expected 
message arrived that the Crown Prince was close at hand. 
The onslaught of the army of Silesia on Benedek's right, 
which was accompanied by the arrival of Herwarth at the 
other end of the field of battle, at once 'decided the day. 
It was with difficulty that the Austrian commander pre- 
vented the enemy from seizing the positions which would 
have cut off his retreat. He retired eastwards across 
the Elbe with a loss of eighteen thousand killed and 
wounded and twenty - four thousand prisoners. His 
army was ruined ; and ten days after the Prussians had 
crossed the frontier the war was practically at an end.* 

* Oesterreichs Kampfe, ii. 341. Prussian Staff, Campaign of 1866, 
(Hozier), p. 167. 


The disaster of Koniggratz was too great to 1 
neutralised by the success of the Austrian forces in 
Italy. La Marmora, who had given up his place at the 
head of the Government in order to take command of 
the army, crossed the Mincio at the head of a hundred 
und twenty thousand men, but was defeated Batt i eof c us . 

!/ i 1 1 n , i T r> to/.za. June 24. 

by inferior numbers on the fatal ground or 
Custozza, and compelled to fall back on the Oglio. 
This gleam of success, which was followed by a naval 
victory at Lissa off' the Istrian coast, made it easier for 
the Austrian Emperor to face the sacrifices that were 
now inevitable. Immediately after the battle of 
Koniggratz he invoked the mediation of Napoleon III., 
and ceded Venetia to him on behalf of Italy. Napoleon 
at once tendered his good offices to the 
belligerents, and proposed an armistice, mediation, 

July 6. 

His mediation was accepted in principle by 
4;he King of Prussia, who expressed his willingness also 
to grant an armistice as soon as preliminaries of peace 
were recognised by the Austrian Court. In the mean- 
time, while negotiations passed between all four Go\- 
ernments, the Prussians pushed forward until their 
outposts came within sight of Vienna. If in pursuance 
of General Moltke's plan the Italian generals had 
thrown a corps north-eastwards from the head of the 
Adriatic, and so struck at the very heart of the Austrian 
monarchy, it is possible that the victors of Koniggratz 
might have imposed their own terms without regard to 
Napoleon's mediation, and, while adding the Italian 
Tyrol to Victor Emmanuel's dominions, have completed 

378 MODERN EUROPE. i66. 

the union of Germany under the House of Hohenzollern 
at one stroke. But with Hungary still intact, and the 
Italian army paralysed by the dissensions of its com- 
manders, prudence bade the great statesman of Berlin 
content himself with the advantages which he could 
reap without prolongation of the war, and without the 
risk of throwing Napoleon into the enemy's camp. 
He had at first required, as conditions of peace, that 
Prussia should be left free to annex Saxony, Hanover, 
Hesse-Cassel, and other North German territory ; that 
Austria should wholly withdraw from German affairs ; 
and that all Germany, less the Austrian Provinces, 
should be united in a Federation under Prussian leader- 
ship. To gain the assent of Napoleon to these terms, 
Bismarck hinted that Trance might by accord with 
Prussia annex Belgium. Napoleon, however, refused 
to agree to the extension of Prussia's ascendency over 
all Germany, and presented a counter-project which 
was in its turn rejected by Bismarck. It was finally 
settled that Prussia should not be prevented from 
Annexing Hanover, Nassau, and Hesse-Cassel, as con- 
quered territory that lay between its own Rhenish* 
Provinces and the rest of the kingdom; that Austria 
should completely withdraw from German affairs ; that 
Germany north of the Main, together with Saxony, 
should be included in a Federation under Prussian 
leadership ; and that for the States south of the 
Main there should be reserved the right of entering 
into some kind of national bond with the Northern 
League. Austria escaped without loss of any of its 

;-.,: TREATY OF PRAGUE. 379 

IK n- Italian territory; it also succeeded in preserving 
the existence of Saxony, which, as in 1815, the Prussian 
Government had been most anxious to annex. Na- 
poleon, in confining the Prussian Federation to the 
north of the Main, and in securing by a formal stipu- 
lation in the Treaty the independence of the Southern 
States, imagined himself to have broken Germany into 
halves, and to have laid the foundation of a South 
German League which should look to France as its 
protector. On the other hand, Bismarck by his an- 
nexation of Hanover and neighbouring districts had 
added a population of four millions to the Prussian 
Kingdom, and given it a continuous territory ; he had 
forced Austria out of the German system ; he had 
gained its sanction to the Federal union of all Germany 
north of the Main, and had at least kept the way open 
for the later extension of this union to the Southern 
States. Preliminaries of peace embodying 

, . . , . . -.-I . , Preliminaries of 

these conditions and recognising Prussia s Mcoisburg, 
sovereignty in Schlesvvig-Holstein were 
signed at Nicolsburg on the 26th of July, and formed 
the basis of the definitive Treaty of Peace which was 
concluded at Prague on the 23rd of August. An 
illusory clause, added at the instance of Treaty of 
Napoleon, provided that if the population ^ ue ' e -^ 3 ' * 
of the northern districts of Schleswig should by a free 
vote express the wish to be united with Denmark, these 
districts should be ceded to the Danish Kingdom.* 

* Halm, i. 476. Benedetti, Ma Mission en Prusse, p. 186. Reuckliu, 
v. 457. Massari, La Marmora, p. 350. 

380 MODERN EUROPE. 1866. 

Bavaria and the south-western allies of Austria, 
though their military action was of an ineffective cha- 
racter, continued in arms for some weeks 

The South Ger- 

after the battle of Koniggratz, and the 
suspension of hostilities arranged at Nicolsburg did not 
come into operation on their behalf till the 2nd of 
August. Before that date their forces were dispersed 
and their power of resistance broken by the Prussian 
generals Falckenstein and Manteuffel in a series of 
unimportant engagements and intricate manoeuvres. 
The City of Frankfort, against which Bismarck seems 
to have borne some personal hatred, was treated for a 
while by the conquerors with extraordinary and most 
impolitic harshness ; in other respects the action of the 
Prussian Government towards these conquered States 
was not such as to render future union and friendship 
difficult. All the South German Governments, with 
the single exception of Baderi, appealed to the Emperor 
Napoleon for assistance in the negotiations which they 
had opened at Berlin. But at the very moment when 
this request was made and granted Napoleon was 
himself demanding from Bismarck the cession of the 
Bavarian Palatinate and of the Hessian districts west 
of the Ehine. Bismarck had only to acquaint the 
King of Bavaria and the South German Ministers 
with the designs of their French protector in order to re- 
concile them to his own chastening, but not unfriendly, 
hand. The grandeur of a united Fatherland flashed 
upon minds hitherto impenetrable by any national 
ideal when it became known that Napoleon was 


bargaining for Oppenheim and Kaiserslautern. Not only 
were the insignificant questions as to the,, war-indem- 
nities to be paid to Prussia and the frontier villages 
to be exchanged promptly settled, but by a series of 
secret Treaties all the South German States 

Secret Treaties 

entered into an offensive and defensive alii- $2S** 
ance with the Prussian King, and engaged 
in case of war to place their entire forces at his dis- 
posal and under his command. The diplomacy of Napo- 
leon III. had in the end effected for .Bismarck almost 
more than his earlier intervention had frustrated, for 
it had made the South German Courts the allies of 
Prussia not through conquest or mere compulsion but 
out of regard for their own interests.* It was said by 
the opponents of the Imperial Government in France, 
and scarcely with exaggeration, that every error which 
it was possible to commit had, in the course of the 
yoar 1800, been committed by Napoleon III. One 
crime, one act of madness, remained open to the 
Emperor's critics, to lash him and France into a 
conflict \rith the Power whose union he had not been 
able to prevent. 

Prior to the battle of Koniggriitz, it would seem 
that all the suggestions of the French Emperor re- 
lating to the acquisition of Belgium were 
made to the Prussian Government through petition for m " 


secret agents, and that they were ac- 
tually unknown, or known by mere hearsay, to Bene- 
detti, the French Ambassador at Berlin. According 
* Habn, L 501, 505. 

'382 MODERN EUROPE. me.' 

to Prince Bismarck, these overtures had begun as early 
as 1862, when he was himself Ambassador at Paris, and 
were then made verbally and in private notes to 
himself; they were the secret of Napoleon's neutrality- 
during the Danish war ; and were renewed through 
relatives and confidential agents of the Emperor when 
the struggle with Austria was seen to be approaching. 
The ignorance in which Count Benedetti was 'kept of 
his master's private diplomacy may to some extent 
explain the extraordinary contradictions between the 
accounts given by this Minister and by Prince Bismarck 
of the negotiations that passed between them in the 
period following the campaign of 1866, after Benedetti 
had himself been charged to present the demands of the 
French Government. In June, while the Ambassador 
was still, as it would seem, in ignorance of what was 
passing behind his back, he had informed the French 
Ministry that Bismarck, anxious for the preservation 
of French neutrality, had hinted at the compensations 
that might be made to France if Prussia should meet 
with great success in the coming war. According to 
the report of the Ambassador, made at the time, Count 
Bismarck stated that he would rather withdraw from 
public life than cede the Ehenish Provinces with 
Cologne and Bonn, but that he believed it would 
be possible to gain the King's ultimate consent to 
the cession of the Prussian district of Treves on the 
Upper Moselle, which district, together with Luxem- 
burg or parts of Belgium and Switzerland, would give 
France an adequate improvement of its frontier. The 



Ambassador added in his report, by way of comment, that 
Count Bismarck was the only man in the kingdom who 
was disposed to make any cession of Prussian territory 
whatever, and that a unanimous and violent revulsion 
against France would be excited by "the slightest in- 
dication of any intention on the part of the French 
Government to extend its frontiers towards the Ehine. 
He concluded his report with the statement that, after 
hearing Count Bismarck's suggestions, he had brought 
the discussion to a summary close, not wishing to leavr 
the Prussian Minister under the impression that any 
scheme involving the seizure of Belgian or Swiss 
territory had the slightest chance of being seriously 
considered at Paris. (June 4 8.) 

Benedetti probably wrote these last words in full 
sincerity. Seven weeks later, after the settlement of the 
Preliminaries of Nicolsburg, he was ordered to demand 
{he cession of the Bavarian Palatinate, of 

Demand for 

the portion of Hesse-Darmstadt west of ".' 
the llhine, including Mainz, and of the 
strip of Prussian territory on the Saar which had been 
left to France in 1814 but taken from it in 1815. 
According to the statement of Prince Bismarck, which 
would seem to be exaggerated, this demand was made 
by Benedetti as an ultimatum and with direct threats 
of war, which were answered by Bismarck in language 
of equal violence. In any case the demand was un- 
conditionally refused, and Benedetti travelled to Paris 
in order to describe what had passed at the Prussian 
headquarters. His report made such an impression 

384 MODERN EUROPE. isee. 

on the Emperor that the demand for cessions on the 
Ehine was at once abandoned, and the Foreign 
Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, who had been disposed 
to enforce this by arms, was compelled to quit office. 
Benedetti returned to Berlin, and now there took place 
that negotiation relating to Belgium on which not 
only the narratives of the persons immediately con- 
cerned, but the documents written at the time, leave 
so much that is strange and unexplained. 
project, Aug. According to Benedetti, Count Bismarck 

1630. v 

was keenly anxious to extend the German 
Federation to the South of the Main, and desired with 
this object an intimate union with at least one Great 
Power. He sought in the first instance the support 
of France, and offered in return to facilitate the seizure s 
1 of Belgium. The negotiation, according to Benedetti, 
failed because the Emperor Napoleon required that 
the fortresses in Southern Germany should be held 
by the troops of the respective States to which they 
belonged, while at the same time General Manteuffel, 
who had been sent from Berlin on a special mission 
to St. Petersburg, succeeded in effecting so intimate a 
union with Russia that alliance with France became 
unnecessary. According to the counter- statement of 
Prince Bismarck, the plan now proposed originated 
entirely with the French Ambassador, and was merely 
a repetition of proposals which had been made by 
Napoleon during the preceding four years, and which 
were subsequently renewed at intervals by secret 
agents almost down to the outbreak of the war of 

isj. PRUSSIA. 385 

1870. Prince Bismarck has stated that he dallied 
with these proposals only because a direct refusal might 
at any moment have caused the outbreak of war 
between France and Prussia, a catastrophe which up 
to the end he sought to avert. -Jn any case the 
negotiation with Benedetti led to no conclusion, and 
was broken off by the departure of both statesmen from 
Berlin in the beginning of autumn.* 

The war of 1866 had been brought to an end with 
extraordinary rapidity ; its results were solid and 
imposing. Venice, perplexed no longer by 
its Republican traditions or by doubts of No,th a Gterman y 

after the war. 

the patriotism of the House of Savoy, pre- 
pared to welcome King Victor Emmanuel; Bismarck, 
returning from the battle-field of Koniggratz, found 
his earlier unpopularity forgotten in the flood of 
national enthusiasm which his achievements and those 
of the army had evoked. A new epoch had begun ; 
the antagonisms of the past were out of date ; nobler 

* Benedetti, p. 191. Hahn,i. 508 ; ii. 328, 635. See also La Marmora's 
Un po pice di luce, p. 242, and his Segreti di Stato, p. 274. Govone's 
despatches strongly confirm the view that Bismarck ws more than a 
mere passive listener to French schemes for the acquisition of Belgium. 
That he originated the plan is not probable ; that he encouraged it seems 
to me quite certain, unless various French and Italian documents 
unconnected with one another are forgeries from beginning to end. 
On the outbreak of the war of 1870 Bismarck published the text of 
tlu- draft-treaty discussed in 1866 providing fur an offensive and 
defensive alliance between France and Prussia, and the seizure of 
Belgium by France. The draft was in Benedetti's handwriting, and 
written on paper of the French Embassy. Benedetti stated in answer 
that he had made the draft at Bismarck's dictation. This might seem 
very unlikely were it not known that the draft of the Treaty between 
Prussia and Italy in 1866 was actually so written down by Barrel, the 
Italian Ambassador, at Bismarck's dictation. 

386 MODERN EUROPE. isee. 

work now stood before the Prussian people and its 
rulers than the perpetuation of a barren struggle 
between Crown and Parliament. By none was the 
severance from the past more openly expressed than by 
Bismarck himself; by none was it more bitterly felt 
than by the old Conservative party in Prussia, who had 
hitherto regarded the Minister as their own representa- 
tive. In drawing up the Constitution of the North 
German Federation, Bismarck remained true to the 
principle which he had laid down at Frankfort before 
the war, that the German people must be represented 
by a Parliament elected directly by the people them- 
selves. In the incorporation of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel 
and the Danish Duchies with Prussia, he saw that it 
would be impossible to win the new populations to a 
loyal union with Prussia if the King's Government 
continued to recognise no friends but the landed aris- 
tocracy and the army. He frankly declared that the 
action of the Cabinet in raising taxes without the 
consent of Parliament had been illegal, and asked for 
an Act of Indemnity. The Parliament of Berlin 
understood and welcomed the message of reconciliation. 
It heartity forgave the past, and on its own initiative 
added the name of Bismarck to those for whose services 
to the State the King asked a recompense. The Pro- 
gressist party, which had constituted the majority in 
the last Parliament, gave place to a new combina- 
tion known as the National Liberal party, which, while 
adhering to the Progressist creed in domestic affairs, 
gave its allegiance to the Foreign and the German 


policy of the Minister. Within this party many able 
men who in Hanover and the other annexed territories 
had been the leaders of opposition to their own Govern- 
ments now found a larger scope and a greater political 
career. More than one of the colleaguesof Bismarck who 
had been appointed to their offices in the years of 
conflict were allowed to pass into retirement, and their 
places were filled by men in sympathy with the Na- 
tional Liberals. With the expansion of Prussia and 
the establishment of its leadership in a German Federal 
union, the ruler of Prussia seemed himself to expand 
from the instrument of a military monarchy to the 
representative of a great nation. 

To Austria the battle of Koniggratz brought a 
settlement of the conflict between the Crown and Hun- 
gary. The Constitution of February, 1861, Hung?ryand 
hopefully as it had worked during its first Au8tria - lw 
jears, bad in the end fallen before the steady refusal of 
the Magyars to recognise the authority of a single 
Parliament for the whole Monarchy. Within the 
Reichsrath itself the example of Hungary told as a 
disintegrating force ; the Poles, the Czechs seceded 
from the Assembly ; the Minister, Schmerling, lost his 
authority, and was forced to resign in the summer of 
1MI5. Soon afterwards an edict of the Emperor sus- 
pended the Constitution. Count Belcredi, who took 
office in Schmerling's place, attempted to arrive at an 
understanding with the Magyar leaders. The Hunga- 
rian Diet was convoked, and was opened by the King 
in person before the end of the year. Francis Joseph 
z 2 

388 MODERN EUROPE. wes. 

announced his abandonment of the principle that 
Hungary had forfeited its ancient rights by rebellion, 
and asked in return that the Diet should not insist 
upon regarding the laws of 1848 as still in force. 
Whatever might be the formal validity of those laws, 
it was, he urged, impossible that they should be brought 
into operation unaltered. For the common affairs of 
the two halves of the Monarchy there must be some 
common authority. It rested with the Diet to arrive 
at the necessary understanding with the Sovereign on 
this point, and to place on a satisfactory footing the 
relations of Hungary to Transylvania and Croatia. As 
soon as an accord should have been reached on these 
subjects, Francis Joseph stated that he would complete 
his reconciliation with the Magyars by being crowned 
King of Hungary. 

In the Assembly to which these words were ad- 
dressed the majority was composed of men of moderate 
opinions, under the leadership of Francis 
Deak. Deak had drawn up the programme 
of the Hungarian Liberals in the election of 1847. He 
had at that time appeared to be marked out by his rare 
political capacity and the simple manliness of his 
character for a great, if not the greatest, part in the 
work that then lay before his country. But the vio- 
lence of revolutionary methods was alien to his tempera- 
ment. After serving in Batthyany's Ministry, he with- 
drew from public life on the outbreak of war with 
Austria, and remained in retirement during the dic- 
tatorship of Kossuth and the struggle of 1849. As 

1866. VEAK. 389 

a loyal friend to the Hapsburg dynasty, and a clear- 
sighted judge of the possibilities of the time, he stood 
apart while Kossuth dethroned the Sovereign and 
proclaimed Hungarian independence. Of the patriotism 
and the disinterestedness of Deak there was never 
the shadow of a doubt ; a distinct political faith 
severed him from the leaders whose enterprise ended 
in the catastrophe which he had foreseen, and pre- 
served for Hungary one statesman who could, with- 
out renouncing his own past and without inflicting 
humiliation on the Sovereign, stand as the mediator 
between Hungary and Austria when the time for 
reconciliation should arrive. Deak was little disposed 
to abate anything of what he considered the just 
demands of his country. It was under his leadership 
that the Diet had in 18C1 refused to accept the Consti- 
tution which established a single Parliament for the 
vrhole Monarchy. The legislative independence of 
Hungary he was determined at all costs to preserve 
intact ; rather than surrender this he hud been willing 
in 1861 to see negotiations broken off and military rule 
restored. But when Francis Joseph, wearied of the 
sixteen years' struggle, appealed once more to Hun- 
gary for union and friendship, there was no man 
more earnestly desirous to reconcile the Sovereign with 
the nation, and to smooth down the opposition to the 
King's proposals which arose within the 

Scheme of Hun- 

Diet itself, than Deitk. Under his influ- t^iSSS^ 


ence a Committee was appointed to frame 

the necessary basis of negotiation. On the 25th of 

390 MODERN EUROPE. 1866. 

June, 1866, the Committee gave in its report. It de- 
clared against any Parliamentary union with the Cis- 
Leithan half of the Monarchy, but consented to the 
establishment of common Ministries for War, Finance, 
and Foreign Affairs, and recommended that the Budget 
necessary for these joint Ministries should be settled by 
Delegations from the Hungarian Diet and from the 
western Keichsrath.* The Delegations, it was proposed, 
should meet separately, and communicate their views to 
one another by writing. Only when agreement should 
not have been thus attained were the Delegations to 
unite in a single body, in which case the decision was 
to rest with an absolute majority of votes. 

The debates of the Diet on the proposals of King 
Francis Joseph had been long and anxious ; it was not 
until the moment when the war with Prussia was 
breaking out that the Committee presented its report. 
The Diet was now prorogued, but immediately after 
the battle of Koniggratz the Hungarian leaders were 
called to Vienna, and negotiations were pushed forward 
on the lines laid down by the Committee. It was a 
matter of no small moment to the Court of 


Sto-1^ 7 Vienna that while bodies of Hungarian 
exiles had been preparing to attack the 
Empire both from the side of Silesia and of 
Venice, Deak and his friends had loyally abstained 
from any communication with the foreign enemies of 
the House of Hapsburg. That Hungary would now 
gain almost complete independence was certain ; the 

* Regelung der Yerhaltnisse, p. 4. Ausgleich mit Ungarn, p. 9. 


question was not so much whether there should be 
an independent Parliament and Ministry at Pesth as 
whether there should not be a similarly independent 
Parliament and Ministry in each of the territories of 
the Crown, the Austrian Sovereign becoming the head 
of a Federation instead of the chief of a single or a 
dual State. Count Belcredi, the Minister at Vienna, was 
disposed towards such a Federal system ; he Federali8m or 
was, however, now confronted within the 
Cabinet by a rival who represented a different policy. 
After making peace with Prussia, the Emperor called 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Count Beust, who 
had hitherto been at the head of the Saxon Government, 
and who had been the representative of the German 
Federation at the London Conference of 1864. Beust, 
while ready to grant the Hungarians their independence, 
advocated the retention of the existing Eeichsrath and 
'. of a single Ministry for all the Cis-Leithan parts of 
the Monarchy. His plan, which pointed to the main- 
tenance of German ascendency in the western provinces, 
and which deeply offended the Czechs and the Slavic 
populations, was accepted by the Emperor: Belcredi 
withdrew from office, and Beust was charged, as Presi- 
dent of the Cabinet, with the completion of the settle- 
ment with Hungary (Feb. 7, 1867). Deak had hitherto 
left the chief ostensible part in the negotiations to Count 
Andrassy, one of the younger patriots of 1848, who had 
been condemned to be hanged, and had 8et ti mentb 
lived a refugee during the next ten years. 

now came to Vienna himself, and in the course 

392 MODERN EUROPE. 1867. 

of a few days removed the last remaining difficulties. 
The King gratefully charged him with the formation of 
the Hungarian Ministry under the restored Constitution, 
but Deak declined alike all office, honours, and rewards, 
and Andrassy, who had actually been hanged in effigy, 
was plnced at the head of the Government. The Diet, 
which had reassembled shortly before the end of 1866, 
greeted the national Ministry with enthusiasm. Altera- 
tions in the laws of 1 848 proposed in accordance with the 
agreement made at Vienna, and establishing the three 
common Ministries with the system of Delegations for 
common affairs, were carried by large majorities.* The 
abdication of Ferdinand, which throughout the 
struggle of 1849 Hungary had declined to recognise, 
was now acknowledged as valid, and on the 8th of 
June, 1867, Francis Joseph was crowned King of Hun- 
gary amid the acclamations ofPesth. The gift of money 
which is made to each Hungarian monarch on his corona- 
tion Francis Joseph by a happy impulse 
Browned. S june distributed among the families of those who 

B 1 BR7 O 

had fallen in fighting against him in 1849. 
A universal amnesty was proclaimed, no condition being 
imposed on the return of the exiles but that they 
should acknowledge the existing Constitution. Kossuth 
alone refused to return to his country so long as a 
Hapsburg should be its King, and proudly clung to 
ideas which were already those of the past. 

* Hungary retained a Ministry of National Defence for its Reserve 
Forces, and a Finance Ministry for its own separate finance. Thus the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the only one of the three common 
Ministries which covered the entire range of a department. 


The victory of the Magyars was indeed but too 
complete. Not only were Beust and the representatives 
of the western half of the Monarchy so over- 

/ Hungary since 

matched by the Hungarian negotiators that 
in the distribution of the financial ^burdens of the 
Empire Hungary escaped with far too small a share, 
but in the more important problem of the relation of 
' the Slavic and Roumanian populations of the Hungarian 
Kingdom to the dominant race no adequate steps were 
taken for the protection of these subject nationalities. 
That Croatia and Transylvania should be re-united with 
Hungary if the Emperor and the Magyars were ever 
to be reconciled was inevitable ; and in the case of 
Croatia certain conditions were no doubt imposed, and 
certain local rights guaranteed. But on the whole the 
non-Magyar peoples in Hungary were handed over to 
the discretion of the ruling race. The demand of 
]isrnarck that the centre of gravity of the Austrian 
States should be transferred from Vienna to Pesth 
had indeed been brought to pass. While in the western 
half of the Monarchy the central authority, still repre- 
sented by a single Parliament, seemed in the succeeding 
years to be altogether losing its cohesive power, and the 
political life of Austria became a series of distracting 
complications, in Hungary the Magyar Government 
resolutely set itself to the task of moulding into one 
the nationalities over which it ruled. Uniting the 
characteristic faults with the great qualities of a race 
marked out by Nature and ancient habit for domination 
over more numerous but less aggressive neighbours, 


the Magyars have steadily sought to the best of their 
power to obliterate the distinctions which make Hun- 
gary in reality not one but several nations. They have 
held the Slavic and the Roumanian population within 
their borders with an iron grasp, but they have not 
gained their affection. The memory of the Russian 
intervention in 1849 and of the part then played by 
Serbs, by Croats and Roumanians in crushing Magyar 
independence has blinded the victors to the just claims 
of these races both within and without the Hungarian 
kingdom, and attached their sympathy to the hateful and 
outworn empire of the Turk. But the individuality of 
peoples is not to be blotted out in a day ; nor, with all 
its striking advance in wealth, in civilisation, and in 
military power, has the Magyar State been able to 
free itself from the insecurity arising from the presence 
of independent communities on its immediate frontiers 
belonging to the same race as those whose language 
and nationality it seeks to repress. 


Napoleon III. The Mexican Expedition Withdrawal of the French and death 
of Maximilian The Luxemburg Question Exasperation in France against 
Prussia Austria Italy Mentana Germany after 1866 The Spanish 
candidature of Leopold of Hohenzollern French declaration Benedetti 
and King William Withdrawal of Leopold and demand for guarantees 
The telegram from Ems War Expected Alliances of France Austria 
Italy Prussian plans The French army Causes of French inferiority 
Weissenburg Worth S^jieheren Borny Mars- la-Tour Gravelotte 
Sedan The Republic proclaimed at Paris Favre and Bismarck Siege of 
Paris Gambetta at Tours The Army of the Loire Fall of Metz Fight- 
ing at Orleans Sortie of Champigny The Armies of the North, of the 
Loire, of the East Bourbaki's ruin Capitulation of Paris and Armistice 
Preliminaries of Peace Germany Establishment of the German Empire 
The Commune of Paris Second siege Effects of the war as to Russia and 
Italy Rome. 

THE reputation of Napoleon III. was perhaps at its 
height at the end of the first ten years of his reign. 
His victories over Russia and Austria had flattered 
the military pride of France ; the flowing tide of com- 
mercial prosperity bore witness, as it 

r r J < Napoleon m. 

seemed, to the blessings of a government at 
once firm and enlightened ; the reconstruction of Paris 
dazzled a generation accustomed to the mean and dingy 
aspect of London and other capitals before 1850, and 
scarcely conscious of the presence or absence of real 
Ix-uuty and dignity where it saw spaciousness and 
brilliance. The political faults of Napoleon, the 
shiftiness and incoherence of his designs, his want of 
grasp on reality, his absolute personal nullity as an 


administrator, were known to some few, but they had 
not been displayed to the world at large. He had 
done some great things, he had conspicuously failed 
in nothing. Had his reign ended before 1363, he 
would probably have left behind him in popular 
memory the name of a great ruler. But from this 
time his fortune paled. The repulse of his intervention 
on behalf of Poland in 1863 by the Eussian Court, 
his petulant or miscalculating inaction during the 
Danish War of the following year, showed those to be 
mistaken who had imagined that the Emperor must 
always exercise a controlling power in Europe. During 
the events which formed the first stage in the con- 
solidation of Germany his policy was a succession of 
errors. Simultaneously with the miscarriage of his 
European schemes, an enterprise which he had under- 
taken beyond the Atlantic, and which seriously 
weakened his resources at a time when concentrated 
strength alone could tell on European affairs, ended in 
tragedy and disgrace. 

There were in Napoleon III., as a man of State, 
two personalities, two mental existences, which blended 
but ill with one another. There was the contemplator 
of great human forces, the intelligent, if not deeply 
penetrative, reader of the signs of the times, the 
brooder through long, years of imprisonment and 
The Mexican exile, the child of Europe, to whom 
Germany, Italy, and England had all in 
turn been nearer than his own country ; and there was 
the crowned adventurer, bound by his name and 


position to gain for France something that it did 
not possess, and to regard the greatness of every other 
nation as an impediment to the ascendency of his 
own. Napoleon correctly judged the principle of 
nationality to be the dominant force in the immediate 
future of Europe. He saw in Italy and in Germany 
races whose internal divisions alone had prevented 
them from being the formidable rivals of France, and 
yet he assisted the one nation to effect its union, 
and was not indisposed, within certain limits, to 
promote the consolidation of the other. That the 
acquisition of Nice and Savoy, and even of the 
Ehenish Provinces, could not in itself make up to 
France for the establishment of two great nations on 
its immediate frontiers Napoleon must have well 
understood : he sought to carry the principle of ag- 
glomeration a stage farther in the interests of France 
itself, and to form some moral, if not political, union 
of the Latin nations, which should embrace under his 
own ascendency communities beyond the Atlantic as 
well as those of the Old World. It was with this 
design that in the year 1862 he made the financial 
misdemeanours of Mexico the pretext for an expedition 
to that country, the object of which was to subvert 
the native Republican Government, and to place the 
Hapsburg Maximilian, as a "vassal prince, on its 
throne. England and Spain had at first agreed to 
unite with France in enforcing the claims of the 
European creditors of Mexico ; but as soon as Napoleon 
had made public his real intentions these Powers 

398 MODERN EUROPE. 1865-67. 

withdrew their forces, and the Emperor was left free 
to carry out his plans alone. 

The design of Napoleon to establish French in- 
fluence in Mexico was connected with his attempt to 
break up the United States by establishing the in- 
dependence of the Southern Confederacy, then in 
rebellion, through the mediation of the Great Powers 
of Europe. So long as the Civil War in the United 
States lasted, it seemed likely that Napoleon's enterprise 
in Mexico would be successful. Maximilian was placed 
upon the throne, and the Eepublican leader, 

The Mexican Ex- -,- - . , . . 

pedition. 1862- J uarez. was driven into the extreme north 


of the country. But with the overthrow 
of the Southern Confederacy and the restoration of 
peace in the United States in 1865 the prospect 
totally changed. The Government of "Washington 
refused to acknowledge any authority in Mexico but 
that of Juarez, and informed Napoleon in courteous 
terms that his troops must be withdrawn. Napoleon 
had bound himself by Treaty to keep twenty-five 
thousand men in Mexico for the protection of Maxi- 
milian. He was, however, unable to defy the order 
of the United States. Early in 1866 he acquainted 
Maximilian with the necessities of the situation, and 
with the approaching removal of the force which 
alone had placed him and could sustain him on the 
throne. The unfortunate prince sent his consort, 
the daughter of the King of the Belgians, to Europe 
to plead against this act of desertion ; but her 
efforts were vain, and her reason sank under the just 


presentiment of her husband's ruin. The utmost on 
which Napoleon could venture was the postponement 
of the recall of his troops till the spring 
of 1867. He urged Maximilian to abdicate pciied to with- 

draw. 18667. 

before it was too late ; but the prince re- 
fused to dissociate himself from his counsellors who 
still implored him to remain. Meanwhile the Juarists 
pressed back towards the capital from north and 
south. As the French detachments were withdrawn 
towards the coast the entire country fell into their 
hands. The last French soldiers quitted Mexico at 
the beginning of March, 1867, and on the Fall ^ Death 
15th of May, Maximilian, still lingering ofMaximili * a - 
at Queretaro, was made prisoner by the Republicans. 
He had himself while in power ordered that the 
partisans of Juarez should be treated not as soldiers 
but as brigands, and that when captured they should 
lv tried by court-martial and executed within twenty- 
four hours. The same severity was applied to himself. 
He was sentenced to death and shot at Queretaro on 
the 19th of June. 

Thus ended the attempt of Napoleon III. to 
establish the influence of France and of his dynasty 
beyond the seas. The doom of Maximilian excited 
the compassion of Europe ; a deep, irreparable wound 
was inflicted on the reputation of the man 
who had tempted him to his treacherous le^'Treputa* 1 * 


throne, who had guaranteed him protection, 

and at the bidding of a superior power had abandoned 

him to his ruin. From this time, though the outward 

400 MODERN EUROPE. 1837 

splendour of the Empire was undiminished, there re- 
mained scarcely anything of the personal prestige which 
Napoleon had once enjoyed in so rich a measure. He 
was no longer in the eyes of Europe or of his own 
country the profound, self-contained statesman in whose 
brain lay the secret of coming events ; he was rather 
the gambler whom fortune was preparing to desert, the 
usurper trembling for the future of his dynasty and 
his crown. Premature old age and a harassing bodily 
ailment began to incapacitate him for personal exertion. 
He sought to loosen the reins in which his despot- 
ism held France, and to make a compromise with 
public opinion which was now declaring against him. 
And although his own cooler judgment set little 
store by any addition of frontier-strips of alien 
territory to France, and he would probably have been 
best pleased to pass the remainder of his reign in 
undisturbed inaction, he deemed it necessary, after 
failure in Mexico had become inevitable, to seek some 
satisfaction in Europe for the injured pride of his 
country. He entered into negotiations with 

The Luxemburg - _. 

question. Feb.- the .King or Holland tor the cession of 

May, 1867. 

Luxemburg, and had gained his assent, 
when rumours of the transaction reached the North 
German Press, and the project passed from out the 
control of diplomatists and became an affair of rival 

Luxemburg, which was an independent Duchy ruled 
by the King of Holland, had until 1866 formed a part 
of the German Federation ; and although Bismarck 



had not attempted to include it in his own North 
German Union, Prussia retained by the Treaties of 
1815 a right to garrison the fortress of Luxemburg, 
and its troops were actually there in possession. The 
proposed transfer of the Duchy to France excited an 
outburst of patriotic resentment in the Federal Par- 
liament at Berlin. The population of Luxemburg 
was indeed not wholly German, and it had shown 
the strongest disinclination to enter the North German 
league ; but the connection of the Duchy with Germany 
in the past was close enough to explain the indignation 
roused by Napoleon's project among politicians who 
little suspected that during the previous year Bismarck 
himself had cordially recommended this annexation, 
and that up to the last moment he had been privy to 
the Emperor's plan. The Prussian Minister, though he 
did not affect to share the emotion of his countrymen, 
stated that his policy in regard to Luxemburg must 
be influenced by the opinion of the Federal Parliament, 
and he shortly afterwards caused it to be understood 
at Paris that the annexation of the Duchy to France 
was impossible. As a warning to France he had already 
published the Treaties of alliance between Prussia and 
the South German States, which had been made at the 
close of the war of 1866, but had hitherto been kept 
secret.* Other powers now began to tender their good 
offices. Count Beust, on behalf of Austria, suggested 
that Luxemburg should be united to Belgium, which 

* They had indeed been discovered by French agents in Germany. 
Rothan, L" Affaire du Luxembourg, p. 74. 

A A 

40:2 MODERN EUROPE. 1867. 

in its turn should cede a small district to France. 
This arrangement, which would have been accepted 
at Berlin, and which, by soothing the irritation pro- 
duced in France by Prussia's successes, would possibly 
have averted the war of 1870, was frustrated by the 
refusal of the King of Belgium to part with any of 
his territory. Napoleon, disclaiming all desire for 
territorial extension, now asked only for the with- 
drawal of the Prussian garrison from Luxemburg; 
but it was known that he was determined to enforce 
this demand by arms. The Russian Government 
proposed that the question should be settled by a 
Conference of the Powers at London. This proposal 
was accepted under certain conditions by France and 
Prussia, and the Conference assembled on the 7th of 
May. Its deliberations were completed in four days, 
and the results were summed up in the Treaty of 
London signed on the llth. By this Treaty the 
Duchy of Luxemburg was declared neutral territory 
under the collective guarantee of the Powers. Prussia 
withdrew its garrison, and the King of Holland, who 
continued to be sovereign of the Duchy, undertook to 
demolish the fortifications of Luxemburg, and to 
maintain it in the future as an open town.* 

Of the politicians of France, those who even 
affected to regard the aggrandisement of Prussia and 
the union of Northern Germany with indifference or 
satisfaction were a small minority. Among these 

* Hahn, i. 658. B/othan, Luxembourg, p. 246. Correspondenzen des 
K K. Minist. des Aiisseru, 1868, p. 24. Parl. Pap., 1867, vol. kxiv., p. 427. 


were the Emperor, who, after his attempts to gain a 
Ehenish Province had been baffled, sought to prove in 
an elaborate State -paper that France had 

. . . Exasperation in 

won more than it had lost by the extmc- France against 

* Prussia. 

tion of the German Federation as es- 
tablished in 1815, and by the dissolution of the 
tie that had bound Austria and Prussia together as 
members of this body. The events of 1866 had, he 
contended, broken up a system devised in evil days 
for the purpose of uniting Central Europe against 
France, and had restored to the Continent the freedom 
of alliances ; in other words, they had made it 

possible for the South German States to connect them- ^ 

selves with France. If this illusion was really 
entertained by the Emperor, it was rudely dispelled 
by the discovery of the Treaties between Prussia 
and the Southern States and by their publication 
in the spring of 1867. But this revelation was 
not necessary to determine the attitude of the great 
majority of those who passed for the representa- 
tives of independent political opinion in France. 
The Ministers indeed were still compelled to 
imitate the Emperor's optimism, and a few enlightened 
men among the Opposition understood that France 
must be content to see the Germans effect their 
national unity ; but the great body of unofficial [^_ 
politicians, to whatever party they belonged, joined 
in the bitter outcry raised at once against the 
aggressive Government of Prussia and the feeble 
administration at Paris, which had not found the 

A A 2 

404 MODERN EUROPE. 1867. 

means to prevent, or had actually facilitated, Prussia's 
successes. Thiers, who more than any one man had 
by his writings popularised the Napoleonic legend 
and accustomed the French to consider themselves 
entitled to a monopoly of national greatness on the 
Ehine, was the severest critic of the Emperor, the 
most zealous denouncer of the work which Bismarck 
had effected. It was only with too much reason that 
the Prussian Government looked forward to an attack 
by France at some earlier or later time as almost 
certain, and pressed forward the military organisation 
which was to give to Germany an army of unheard-of 
efficiency and strength. 

There appears to be no evidence that Napoleon III. 

himself desired to attack Prussia so long as that Power 

should strictly observe the stipulations of 

Prussia after the Treaty of Prague which provided for 

1867. J 

the independence of the South German 
States.^ But the current of events irresistibly im- 
(/ pelled Germany to unity. The very Treaty which 
made the river Main the limit of the North German 
Confederacy reserved for the Southern States the right 
of attaching. themselves to those of the North by some 
kind of national tie. Unless the French Emperor was 
resolved to acquiesce in the gradual development of this 
federal unity until, as regarded the foreigner, the North 
and the South of Germany should be a single body, he 
could have no cdnfident hope of lasting peace. To have 
thus anticipated and accepted the future, to have re- 
moved once and for all the sleepless fears of Prussia by 

1868-9. FRANCE AND AUSTRIA. 406 

the frank recognition of its right to give all Germany 
effective union, would have been an act too great and 
too wise in reality, too weak and self-renouncing in 
appearance, for any chief of a rival nation. Napoleon 
did not take this course ; on the other hand, not desir- 
ing to attack Prussia while it remained within the 
limits of the Treaty of Prague, he refrained from seek- 
ing alliances with the object of immediate and aggres- 
sive action. The diplomacy of the Emperor during the 
period from 18G6 to 1870 is indeed still but im perfectly^ 
known ; but it would appear that his efforts were directed I 
only to the formation of alliances with the view of i 
eventual action when Prussia should have passed the/ 
limits which the Emperor himself or public opinion in \ 
Paris should, as interpreter of the Treaty of Prague, j 
impose upon this Power in its dealings with the South 
German States. 

The Governments to which Napoleon could look for 
some degree of support were those of Austria and Italy. 
Count Beust, now Chancellor of the Austrian Mon- 
archy, was a bitter enemy to Prussia, and a 
rash and adventurous politician, to whom with Austria. 


the very circumstance of his sudden eleva- 
tion from the petty sphere of Saxon politics gave a 
certain levity and unconstraint in the handling of great 
affairs. He cherished the idea of recovering Austria's 
ascendency in Germany, and was disposed to repel the 
extension of Kussian influence westwards by boldly 
encouraging the Poles to seek for the satisfaction of 
their national hopes in Galicia under the Hapsburg 

406 MODERN EUROPE. 1868-9. 

Crown. To Count Beust France was the most natural 
of all allies. On the other hand, the very system which 
Beust had helped to establish in Hungary raised serious 
obstacles against the adoption of his own policy. An- 
drassy, the Hungarian Minister, while sharing Beust's 
hostility to Eussia, declared that his countrymen had 
no interest in restoring Austria's German connection, 
and were in fact better without it. In these circum- 
stances the negotiations of the French and> the Austrian 
Emperor were conducted by a private correspondence. 
The interchange of letters continued during the years 
1868 and 1869, and resulted in a promise made by 
Napoleon to support Austria if it should be attacked by 
Prussia, while the Emperor Francis Joseph promised to 
assist France if it should be attacked by Prussia and 
Eussia together. No Treaty was made, but a general 
assurance was exchanged between the two Emperors 
that they would pursue a common policy and treat one 
another's interests as their own. With the view of 
forming a closer understanding the Archduke Albrecht 
visited Paris in February, 1870, and a French general 
was sent to Vienna to arrange the plan of campaign in 
case of war with Prussia. In such a war, if undertaken 
by the two Powers, it was hoped that Italy would join. * 
The alliance of 1866 between Prussia and Italy had 
left behind it in each of these States more 

Italy after 1866. 

of rancour than of good will. La Marmora 
had from the beginning to the end been unfortunate 

* Sorel, Histoire Diplomatique, i. 38. But see the controversy 
between Beust and Gramont in Le Temps, Jan. 11 16, 18T3. 

1866-7. ITALY. 407 

in his relations with Berlin. He had entered into the 
alliance with suspicion ; he would gladly have seen 
Venetia given to Italy by a European Congress with- 
out war; and when hostilities broke out, he had dis- 
regarded and resented what he considered an attempt 
of the Prussian Government to dictate to him the 
military measures to be pursued. On the other hand, 
the Prussians charged the Italian Government with 
having deliberately held back its troops after the battle 
of Custozza in pursuance of arrangements made be- 
tween Napoleon and the Austrian Emperor on the 
voluntary cession of Venice, and with having en- 
dangered or minimised Prussia's success by enabling 
the Austrians to throw a great part of their Italian 
forces northwards. There was nothing of that com- 
radeship between the Italian and the Prussian armies 
which is acquired on the field of battle. The personal 
sympathies of Victor Emmanuel were strongly on the 
side of the French Emperor ; and when, at the close 
of the year 1866, the French garrison was withdrawn 
from Rome in pursuance of the convention made in 
September, 1864, it seemed probable that France and 
Italy might soon unite in a close alliance. But in 
the following year the attempts of the Garibaldians 
to overthrow the Papal Government, now left without 
its foreign defenders, embroiled Napoleon and the 
Italian people. Napoleon was unable to defy the 
clerical party in France; he adopted the language of 
menace in his communications with the Italian Cabinet ; 
and when, in the autumn of 1867, the Garibaldians 

408 MODERN EUROPE. 1867. 

actually invaded the Eoman States, he despatched a 
body of French troops under General Failly to act in 
Mentana, support of those of the Pope. An encounter 

took place at Mentana on November 3rd, 
in which the Garibaldians, after defeating the Papal 
forces, were put to the rout' by General Failly. The 
occupation of Civita Yecchia was renewed, and in the 
course of the debates raised at Paris on the Italian 
policy of the Government, the Prime Minister, M. 
Eouher, stated, with the most passionate emphasis that, 
come what might, Italy should never possess itself of 
Eome. " Never," he cried, " will France tolerate such 
an outrage on its honour and its dignity."' 

The affair of Mentana, the insolent and heartless 
language in which General Failly announced his success, 
the reoccupation of Eoman territory by French troops, 
and the declaration made by M. Eouher in the French 

Assembly, created wide and deep anger 

Napoleon and . -,- . . -. -, i r> n i ' p 

Italy after m Italy, and made an end tor the time or 


all. possibility of a French alliance. Napo- 
leon was indeed, as regarded Italy, in an evil case. 
By abandoning Eome he would have turned against 
himself and his dynasty the whole clerical interest 
in France, whose confidence he had already to some 
extent forfeited by his policy in 1860 ; on the other 
hand, it was vain for him to hope for the friendship 
of Italy whilst he continued to bar the way to the 

* Rothan, La France en 1867, ii. 316. Renchlin, v. 547. Two his- 
torical expressions belong to Mentana : the " Never," of M. Rouher, and 
" The Chassepots have done wonders," of General Failly. 


fulfilment of the universal national desire. With the view 
of arriving at some compromise he proposed a European 
Conference on the Roman question ; but this was re- 
sisted above all by Count Bismarck, whose interest it 
was to keep the sore open ; and neither England nor 
Russia showed any anxiety to help the Pope's pro- 
tector out of his difficulties. Napoleon sought by a 
correspondence with Victor Emmanuel during 1868 and 
1869 to pave the way for a defensive alliance ; but 
Victor Emmanuel was in reality as well as in name 
a constitutional king, and probably could not, even if 
he had desired, have committed Italy to engagements 
disapproved by the Ministry and Parliament. It was 
made clear to Napoleon that the evacuation of the Papal 
States must precede any treaty of alliance between 
France and Italy. Whether the Italian Government 
would have been content with a return to the condi- 
tions of the September Convention, or whether it made 
the actual possession of Rome the price of a treaty- 
engagement, is uncertain ; but inasmuch as Napoleon 
was not at present prepared to evacuate Civita Vecchia, he 
could aim at nothing more than some eventual concert 
when the existing difficulties should have been removed. 
The Court of Vienna now became the intermediary 
between the two Powers who had united against it in 
1859. Count Beust was free from the asso- 

ciations which had made any approach to 
friendship with the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel im- 
possible for his predecessors. He entered into nego- 
tiations at Florence, which resulted in the conclusion 

- 410 MODERN EUROPE. 1868-9. 

of an agreement between the Austrian and the Italian 
Governments that they would act together and guar- 
antee one another's territories in the event of a war 
between France and Prussia. -This agreement was 
made with the assent of the Emperor Napoleon, and 
was understood to be preparatory to an accord with 
France itself; but it was limited to a defensive cha- 
racter, and it implied that any eventual concert with 
France must be arranged by the two Powers in com- 
bination with one another.* 

^ At the beginning of 1870 the Emperor Napoleon 
was therefore without any more definite assurance of 
support in a war with Prussia than the promise of the 
Austrian Sovereign that he would assist France if at- 
isoiation of tacked by Prussia and Russia together, and 
that he would treat the interests of France 
as his own. By withdrawing his protection from Rome 
Napoleon had undoubtedly a fair chance of building up 
this shadowy and remote engagement into a defensive 
alliance with both Austria and Italy. But perfect 
clearness and resolution of purpose, as well as the steady 
avoidance of all quarrels on mere incidents, were abso- 
lutely indispensable to the creation and the employment 
of such a league against the Power which alone it could 

* Sorel, i. 40. Hahn, i. 720. Immediately after Mentana, on Nov. 17, 
1867, Mazzini wrote to Bismarck and to the Prussian ambassados at Flor- 
ence, Count Usedom, stating that Napoleon had resolved to make war 
on Prussia and had proposed an alliance to Yictor Emmanuel, who had 
accepted it for the price of Rome. Mazzini offered to employ revolu- 
tionary means to frustrate this plan,"and asked for money and arms. Bis- 
marck showed caution, but did not altogether disregard the communication. 
Politica Segreta Italiaua, p. 339. 

1867-70. GERMANY. 411 

have in view ; and Prussia had now little reason to fear 
any such exercise of statesmanship on the part of 
Napoleon. The solution of the Eoman question, in 
other words the withdrawal of the French garrison 
from Roman territory, could proceed only from some 
stronger stimulus than the declining force of Napo- 
leon's own intelligence and will could now supply. 
This fatal problem baffled his attempts to gain alliances ; 
and yet the isolation of France was but half acknow- 
ledged, but half understood ; r and a host of rash, vain- 
glorious spirits impatiently awaited the hour that should 
call them to their revenge on Prussia for the triumphs 
in which it had not permitted France to share. 

Meanwhile on the other side Count Bismarck, 
advanced with what was most essential in his relations 
with the States of Southern Germany the Germany 
completion of the Treaties of Alliance by 
conventions assimilating the military systems of these 
States to that of Prussia. A Customs-Parliament was 
established for the whole of Germany, which, it was 
hoped, would be the precursor of a National Assembly 
uniting the North and the South of the Main. But in 
spite of this military and commercial approximation,] 
the progress towards union was neither so rapid nor 
so smooth as the patriots of the North could desire. 
There was much in the harshness and self-assertion of 
the Prussian character that repelled the less disciplined 
communities of the South. Ultramontanism was strong 
in Bavaria ; and throughout the minor States the most 
advanced of the Liberals were opposed to a closer union 

412 MODERN EUEOPE. 1867-70. 

,with Berlin, from dislike of its absolutist traditions and 
the heavy hand of its Government. Thus the tendency- 
known as Particularism was supported in Bavaria and 
Wiirtemberg by classes of the population who in most 
respects were in antagonism to one another ; nor could 
the memories of the campaign of 1866 and the old regard 
for Austria be obliterated in a day. Bismarck did not 
unduly press on the work of consolidation. He marked 
and estimated the force of the obstacles which too rapid 
a development of his national policy would encounter. 
It is possible that he may even have seen indications 
that religious and other influences might imperil the 
military union which he already established, and that 
he may not have been unwilling to call to his aid, as the 
surest of all preparatives for national union, the event 
which he had long believed to be inevitable at some 
time or other in the future, a war with France. 

Since the autumn of 1868 the throne of Spain had 

been vacant in consequence of a revolution in which 

General Prim had been the leading actor. 

The Spanish 

iSSffif It was not easy to discover a successor for 
the Bourbon Isabella ; and after other can- 
didatures had been vainly projected it occurred to Prim 
and his friends early in 1869 that a suitable candidate 
might be found in Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern- 
Sigmaringen, whose elder brother had been made Prince 
of Eou mania, and whose father, Prince Antony, had 
been Prime Minister of Prussia in 1859. The House of 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was so distantly related to 
the reigning family of Prussia that the name alone 


preserved the memory of the connection ; and in actual 
blood-relationship Prince Leopold was much more 
nearly allied to the French Houses of Murat and 
Beauharnais. But the Sigmaringen family was dis- 
tinctly Prussian by interest and association, and its 
chief, Antony, had not only been at the head of the 
Prussian Administration himself, but had, it is said, 
been the first to suggest the appointment of Bismarck 
to the same office. The candidature of a Hohenzollern 
might reasonably be viewed in France as an attempt to 
connect Prussia politically with Spain ; and with so 
much reserve was this candidature at the first handled 
at Berlin that, in answer to inquiries made by Benedetti 
in the spring of 1869, the Secretary of State who 
represented Count Bismarck stated on his word of 
honour that the candidature had never been suggested. 
The affair was from first to last ostensibly treated 
at Berlin as one with which the Prussian Government 
was wholly unconcerned, and in which King William 
was interested only as head of the family to which 
Prince Leopold belonged. For twelve months after 
Benedetti's inquiries it appeared as if the project had 
been entirely abandoned ; it was, however, revived in 
the sprint of 1870, and on the 3rd of 

Leopold accepts 

July the announcement was made at Paris cr e own anish 
that Prince Leopold had consented to ac- 
cept the Crown of Spain if the Cortes should confirm 
his election. 

At once there broke out in the French Press a storm 
of indignation against Prussia. The organs of the 

414 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

Government took the lead in exciting public opinion. 

On the 6th of July the Duke of Gramont, Foreign 

Minister, declared to the Legislative Body that the 

attempt of a Foreign Power to place one of its Princes 

on the throne of Charles V. imperilled the interests and 

the honour of France, and that, if such a contingency 

were realised, the Government would fulfil 

Dedbnttn. its duty without hesitation and without 

July 6. J 

weakness. The violent and unsparing lan- 
guage of this declaration, which had been drawn up at 
a Council of Ministers under the Emperor's presidency, 
proved that the Cabinet had determined either to humi- 
liate Prussia or to take vengeance by arms. It was at 
once seen by foreign diplomatists, who during the pre- 
ceding days had been disposed to assist in removing a 
reasonable subject of complaint, how little was the 
chance of any peaceable settlement after such a public 
challenge had been issued to Prussia in the Emperor's 
name. One means of averting war alone seemed 
possible, the voluntary renunciation by Prince Leopold 
of the offered Crown. To obtain' this renunciation 
became the task of those who, unlike the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, were anxious to preserve 

The parts that were played at this crisis by the 
individuals who most influenced the Emperor Napoleon 
are still but imperfectly known ; but there is no doubt 
omvier's Minis- * na ^ ^ rom ^ ne beginning to the end the 
Duke of Gramont, with short intermissions, 
pressed with insane ardour for war. The Ministry now 


in office had been called to their places in January, 
1870, after the Emperor had made certain changes in 
the constitution in a Liberal direction, and had pro- 
fessed to transfer the responsibility of power from 
himself to a body of advisers possessing the confidence 
of the Chamber. Ollivier, formerly one of the leaders 
of the Opposition, had accepted the Presidency of the 
Cabinet. His colleagues were for the most part men 
new to official life, and little able to hold their own 
against such representatives of unreformed Imperialism 
as the Duke of Gramont and the War-Minister Lebceuf 
who sat beside them. Ollivier himself was one of the few 
politicians in France who understood that his countrymen 
must be content to see German unity established 
whether they liked it or not. He was entirely averse 
from war with Prussia on the question which had now 
arisen ; but the fear that public opinion would sweep 
away a Liberal Ministry which hesitated to go all 
lengths in patriotic extravagance led him to sacrifice his 
own better judgment, and to accept the responsibility 
for a policy which in his heart he disapproved. 
Gramont's rash hand was given free play/ Instructions 
were sent to Benedetti to seek the King of Prussia at 
Ems, where he was taking the waters, and to demand 
from him, as the only means of averting war, that he ' 
should order the Hohenzollern Prince to revoke his 
acceptance of the Crown. "We are in great haste," 
Gramont added, " for we must gain the start in case 
of an unsatisfactory reply, and commence the move- 
ment of troops by Saturday in order to enter upon the 


campaign in a fortnight. Be on your guard against 
an answer merely leaving the Prince of Hohenzollern 
to his fate, and disclaiming on the part of the King 
any interest in his future."* 

Benedetti's first interview with the King was on the 
9th of July. He informed the King of the emotion ' 

that had been caused in France by the 
K^ wiliiam at candidature of the Hohenzollern Prince; 

Ems, July 9 14. 

he dwelt on the value to both countries of 
the friendly relation between France and Prussia ; and, 
while studiously avoiding language that might wound 
or irritate the King, he explained to him the require- 
ments of the Government at Paris. The King had 
learnt beforehand what would be the substance of 
Benedetti's communication. He had probably been 
surprised and grieved at the serious consequences 
which Prince Leopold's action had produced in 
France ; and although he had determined not to sub- 
mit to dictation from Paris or to order Leopold to 
abandon his candidature, he had already, as it seems, 
taken steps likely to render the preservation of peace 
more probable. At the end of a conversation with the 
Ambassador, in which he asserted his complete inde- 
pendence as head of the family of Hohenzollern, he 
informed Benedetti that he had entered into com- 
munication with Leopold and his father, and that 
he expected shortly to receive a despatch from Sig- 
maringen. Benedetti rightly judged that the King, 

* Benedetti, Ma Mission, p. 319, July 7. Gramont, La France et la 
Prusse, p. 61. 


wliile positively refusing to meet Gramont's demands, 
was yet desirous of finding some peaceable way out of 
the difficulty ; and the report of this interview which 
he sent to Paris was really a plea in favour of good sense 
and moderation. But Gramont was little disposed to 
accept such counsels. " I tell you plainly," he wrote 
to Benedetti on the next day, " public opinion is on 
fire, and will leave us behind it. We must begin ; we 
wait only for your despatch to call up the three 
hundred thousand men who are waiting the summons. 
Write, telegraph, something definite. If the King will 
not counsel the Prince of Hohenzollern to resign, well, 
it is immediate war, and in a few days we are on the 

Nevertheless Benedetti's advice was not without its 
influence on the Emperor and his Ministers. Napo- 
leon, himself wavering from hour to hour, now 
ruclined to the peace-party, and during the llth there 

was a pause in the military preparations that had been 


begun. On the 12th the oflj^pts of disinterested Govern- 
ments, probably also the suggestions of the King of 
Prussia himself, produced their effect. A 

Ix-opold with- 

telegram was received at Madrid from Prince 
Antony stating that his son's candidature was with- 
drawn. A few hours later Ollivier announced the news 
in the Legislative Chamber at Paris, and exchanged 
congratulations with the friends of peace, who con- 
it Wed that the matter was now at an end. But this 
pacific conclusion little suited either the war- party or 
the Bonapartists of the old type, who grudged to a 
B B 

418 MODERN EUROPE. isro. 

Constitutional Ministry so substantial a diplomatic 

success. They at once declared that the retirement of 

Prince Leopold was a secondary matter, and that the 

real question was what guarantees had been 

Guarantee , -r j. 1 

against renewal received irom Prussia against a renewal ot 

^ demanded. 

the candidature. Gramont himself, in an 
interview with the Prussian Ambassador, Baron Werther, 
sketched a letter which he proposed that King William 
should send to the Emperor, stating that in sanction- 
ing the candidature of Prince Leopold he had not 
intended to offend the French, and that in associating 
himself with the Prince's withdrawal he desired that 
all misunderstandings should be at an end between 
the two Governments. The despatch of Baron 
Werther conveying this proposition appears to have 
deeply offended King William, whom it reached about 
midday on the 1 3th. Benedetti had that morning met 
the King on the promenade at Ems, and had received 

from him the promise that as soon as the 

Benedetti and , . 1-1 , -n "i c 

the King, letter which was still on its way irom 

July 13. J 

Sigmaringen should arrive he would send 
for the Ambassador in order that he might communicate 
its contents at Paris. The letter arrived ; but Baron 
Werther's despatch from Paris had arrived before it ; and 
instead of summoning Benedetti as he had promised, 
the King sent one of his aides-de-camp to him with a 
message that a written communication had been received 
from Prince Leopold confirming his withdrawal, and that 
the matter was now at an end. Benedetti desired the 
aide-de-camp to inform the King that he was compelled 

1870. A7AY; \V1LL1A\T AND BKM'IVKTTI. 419 

by his instructions to ask for a guarantee against a 
renewal of the candidature. The aide-de-camp did as 
he was requested, and brought back a message that the 
King gave his entire approbation to the withdrawal of 
the Prince of Hohenzollern, but that he could do no 
more. Benedetti begged for an audience with His 
Majesty. The King replied that he was compelled to 
decline entering into further negotiation, and that he 
had said his last word. Though the King thus refused 
any further discussion, perfect courtesy was observed on 
both sides ; and on the following morning the King 
and the Ambassador, who were both leaving Ems, took 
leave of one another at the railway station with the 
usual marks of respect. 

That the guarantee which the French Government 


had resolved to demand would not be given was now 
perfectly certain ; yet, with the candidature of Prince 
.Leopold fairly extinguished, it was still possible that 
the cooler heads at Paris might carry the day, and that 
the Government would stop short of declaring war on a 
point on which the unanimous judgment of the other 
Powers declared it to be in the wrong. But Count 
Hismarck was determined not to let the French escape 
lightly from the quarrel. He had to do with an enemy 
who by his own folly had come to the brink of an 
aggressive war, and, far from facilitating his retreat, it 
was Bismarck's policy to lure him over the 

Publication of 

precipice. Not many hours after the last 8lSS2Sh 


message had passed between King William 
and Benedetti, a telegram was officially published at 
B B '2 

420 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

Berlin, stating, in terms so brief as to convey the 
impression of an actual insult, that the King had refused 
to see the French Ambassador, and had informed him 
by an aide-de-camp that he had nothing more to com- 
municate to him. This telegram was sent to the repre- 
sentatives of Prussia at most of the European Courts, and 
to its agents in every German capital. Narratives in- 
stantly gained currency, and were not contradicted by 
the Prussian Government, that Benedetti had forced 
himself upon the King on the promenade at Ems, and 
that in the presence of a large company the King had 
turned his back upon the Ambassador. The publication 
of the alleged telegram from Ems became known in 
Paris on the 14th. On that day the Council of 
Ministers met three times. At the first meeting the 
advocates of peace were still in the majority ; in the 
afternoon, as the news from Berlin and the fictions de- 
scribing the insult offered to the French Ambassador 
spread abroad, the agitation in Paris deepened, and the 
Council decided upon calling up the Reserves ; yet the 
Emperor himself seemed still disposed for peace. It 
was in the interval between the second and the third 
meeting of the Council, between the hours of six 
and ten in the evening, that Napoleon finally gave 
war decided at wa y before the threats and importunities 
of the war-party. The Empress, fanati- 
cally anxious for the overthrow of a great Protestant 
Power, passionately eager for the military glory which 
alone could insure the Crown to her son, won the 
triumph which she was so bitterly to rue. At the third 


meeting of the Council, held shortly before midnight, 
the vote was given for war. 

In Germany this decision had been expected ; yet it 
made a deep impression not only on the German people 
but on Europe at large that, when the declaration of war 
was submitted to the French Legislative Body in the 
form of a demand for supplies, no single voice was 
raised to condemn the war for its criminality and 
injustice : the arguments which were urged against 
it by M. Thiers and others were that the Government 
had fixed upon a bad cause, and that the occasion was 
inopportune. Whether the majority of the Assembly 
really desired war is even now matter of doubt. But 
the clamour of a hundred madmen within its walls, 
the ravings of journalists and incendiaries, who at such 
a time are to the true expression of public opinion(what 
the Spanish Inquisition was to the Christian religion^ 
paralysed the will and the understanding of less in- 
fatuated men. Ten votes alone were given in the 
Assembly against the grant demanded for war; to 
Europe at large it went out that the crime and the \ 
madness was that of France as a nation. Yet 1 
Ollivier and many of his colleagues up to the last 
moment disapproved of the war, and consented to 
it only because they believed that the nation would 
otherwise rush into hostilities under a reactionary 
Ministry who would serve France worse than them- 
selves. They discovered when it was too late that the 
supposed national impulse which they had thought 
irresistible was but the outcry of a noisy minority. The 


reports of their own officers informed them that in six- 
teen alone out of the eighty-seven Departments of 
France was the war popular. In the other seventy -one 
it was accepted either with hesitation or regret.* 

How vast were the forces which the North German 
Confederation could hring into the field was well 
known to Napoleon's Government. Benedetti had 
initiaiforcesof ke P t his employers thoroughly informed 
of the progress of the North German mili- 
tary organisation ; he had warned them that the South 
German States would most certainly act with the 
North against a foreign assailant ; he had described 
with great accuracy and great penetration the nature 
of the tie that existed between Berlin and St. Peters- 
burg, a tie which was close enough to secure for Prussia 
the goodwill, and in certain contingencies the armed 
support, of Russia, while it was loose enough not to 
involve Prussia in any Muscovite enterprise that would 
bring upon it the hostility of England and Austria. 
The utmost force which the French military ad- 
ministration reckoned on placing in the field at the 
beginning of the campaign was two hundred and fifty 
thousand men, to be raised at the end of three weeks by 
about fifty thousand more. The Prussians, even without 
reckoning on any assistance from Southern Germany, 
and after allowing for three army-corps that might b'e 
needed to watch Austria and Denmark, could begin the 
campaign with three hundred and thirty thousand. 
Army to army, the French thus stood according to the 

* Sorel, Histoire Diplomatique, i. 197. 

1870. AUSTRIA. 423 

reckoning of their own War Office outnumbered at the 
outset ; but Lebceuf, tbe War-Minister, imagined that 
the Foreign Office had made sure of alii- Expected A]li . 
ances, and that a great part of the Prussian 
Army would not be free to act on the "western frontier. 
Napoleon had in fact pushed forward his negotiations 
with Austria and Italy from the time that war became 
imminent. Count Beust, while clearly laying it down 
that Austria was not bound to follow France into a 
war made at its own pleasure, nevertheless felt some 
anxiety lest France and Prussia should settle their 
differences at Austria's expense ; moreover from the 
victory of Napoleon, assisted in any degree by himself, 
he could fairly hope for the restoration of Austria's 
ascendency in Germany and the undoing Augtriapre _ 
of the work of 1866. It was determined 
at a Council held at Vienna on the 18th of July that 
Austria should for the present be neutral if Russia 
should not enter the war on the side of Prussia; but 
this neutrality was nothing more than a stage towards 
alliance with France if at the end of a certain brief 


period the army of Napoleon should have penetrated 
into Southern Germany. In a private despatch to 
the Austrian Ambassador at Paris Count Beust 
pointed out that the immediate participation of 
Austria in the war would bring Russia into the 
field on King William's side. " To keep Russia 
neutral," he wrote, " till the season is sufficiently ad- 
vanced to prevent the concentration of its troops must 
be at present our object; but this neutrality is nothing 

424 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

raore than a means for arriving at the real end of our 
policy, the only means for completing our preparations 
without exposing ourselves to premature attack by 
Prussia or Russia." He added that Austria had 
already entered into a negotiation with Italy with a 
view to the armed mediation of the two Powers, and 
strongly recommended the Emperor to place the Italians 
in possession of Rome.* 

Negotiations were now pressed forward between Paris, 
Florence, and Vienna, for the conclusion of a triple 
alliance. Of the course taken by these negotiations con- 
rrance, Austria, tradictory accounts are given by the persons 
concerned in them. According to Prince 
Napoleon, Victor Emmanuel demanded possession of 
Rome and this was refused to him by the French 
Emperor, in consequence of which the project of alliance 
failed. According to the Duke of Grramont, no more 
was demanded by Italy than the return to the condi- 
tions of the September Convention ; this was agreed to 
by the Emperor, and it was in pursuance of this agree- 
ment that the Papal States were evacuated by their 
French garrison on the 2nd of August. Throughout 
the last fortnight of July, after war had actually been 
declared, there was, if the statement of Grramont is to 
be trusted, a continuous interchange of notes, projects, 
and telegrams between the three Governments. The 
difficulties raised by Italy and Austria were speedily 
removed, and though some weeks were needed by these 
Powers for their military preparations, Napoleon was 

* Hahn, ii. 69. Sorel, i. 236. 


definitely assured of their armed support in case of his 
preliminary success. It was agreed that Austria and 
Italy, assuming at the first the position of armed 
neutrality, should jointly present an ultimatum to 
Prussia in September demanding the, exact perform- 
ance of the Treaty of Prague, and, failing its com- 
pliance with this summons in the sense understood by 
its enemies, that the two Powers would immediately 
declare war, their armies taking the field at latest on 
the 15th of September. That Russia would in that 
case assist Prussia was well known ; but it would seem 
that Count Beust feared little from his northern enemy 
in an autumn campaign. The draft of the Treaty 
between Italy and Austria had actually, according to 
Gramont's statement, been accepted by the two latter 
Powers, and received its last amendments in a nego- 
tiation between the Emperor Napoleon and an Italian 
J^voy, Count Vimercati, at Metz. Vimercati reached 
Florence with the amended draft on the 4th of August, 
and it was expected that the Treaty would be signed 
on the following day. When that day came it saw the 
forces of the French Empire dashed to pieces.* 

Preparations for a war with France had long 
occupied the general staff at Berlin. Before the winter 
of 1868 a memoir had been drawn up by 

Prussian plans. 

General Moltke, containing plans for the 
concentration of the whole of the German forces, for 

* Prince Napoleon, in Revue des Deux Mondes, April 1, 1878; 
Gramout, in Revue do France, April 17, 1878. (Signed Andreas Memor.) 
Ollivicr, L'fcglise et 1'fitat, ii. 473. Sorel, i. 245. 

426 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

the formation of each of the armies to he employed, 
and the positions to be occupied at the outset "by each 
corps. On the basis of this memoir the arrangements 
for the transport of each corps from its depot to the 
frontier had subsequently been worked out in such 
minute detail that when, on the 16th of July, King 
William gave the order for mobilisation, nothing re- 
mained but to insert in the railway time-tables and 
marching-orders the day on which the movement was 
to commence. This minuteness of detail extended, 
however, only to that part of Moltke's plan which 
related to the assembling and first placing of the 
troops. The events of the campaign could not thus be 
arranged and tabulated beforehand; only the general 
object and design could be laid down. That the French 
would throw themselves with great rapidity upon 
Southern Germany was considered probable. The 
armies of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria were too 
weak, the military centres of the North were too far 
distant, for effective resistance to be made in this quarter 
to the first blows of the invader. Moltke therefore 
recommended that the Southern troops should with- 
draw from their own States and move northwards to 
join those of Prussia in the Palatinate or on the 
Middle Rhine, so that the entire forces of Germany 
should be thrown upon the flank or rear of the invader ; 
while, in the event of the French not thus taking the 
offensive, France itself was to be invaded by the col- 
lective strength of Germany along the line from Saar- 
briicken to Landau, and its armies were to be, cut off 


from their communications with Paris by vigorous 
movements of the invader in a northerly direction.* 

The military organisation of Germany is based on 
the division of the country into districts, each of which 
furnishes at its own depot a small but complete army. 
The nucleus of each such corps exists in time of peace, 
with its own independent artillery, stores, German 
and material of war. On the order for 
mobilisation being given, every man liable to military 
service, but not actually serving, joins the regiment 
to which he locally belongs, and in a given number of 
days each corps is ready to take the field in full strength. 
The completion of each corps at its own depot is the 
first stage in the preparation for a campaign. Not till 
this is effected does the movement of troops towards the 
frontier begin. The time necessary for the first act of 
preparation was, like that to be occupied in transport, 
accurately determined by the Prussian War Office. It 
resulted from General Moltke's calculations that, the 
order of mobilisation having been given on the 16th of 
July, the entire army with which it was intended to 
begin the campaign would be collected and in position 
ready to cross the frontier on the 4th of August, if the 
French should not have taken up the offensive before 
that day. But as it was apprehended that part at least 
of the French army would be thrown into Germany 
before that date, the westward movement of the German 
troops stopped short at a considerable distance from the 

* Der Deutsch Franzosische Krieg, 1870-71 (Prussian General Staff), 
i. 72. 

428 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

border, in order that the troops first arriving might not 
be exposed to the attack of a superior force before their 
supports should be at hand. On the actual frontier 
there was placed only the handful of men required for 
reconnoitring, and for checking the enemy during the 
few hours that would be necessary to guard against the 
effect of a surprise. 

The Trench Emperor was aware of the numerical 

inferiority of his army to that of Prussia; he hoped, 

The French however, by extreme rapidity of movement 

to penetrate Southern Germany before the 

Prussian army could assemble, and so, while forcing 

the Southern Governments to neutrality, to meet on the 

Upper Danube the assisting forces of Italy and Austria. 

It was his design to concentrate a hundred and fifty 

thousand men at Metz, a hundred thousand at Stras- 

burg. and with these armies united to cross the Rhine 

o ' 

into Baden ; while a third army, which was to assemble 
at Chalons, protected the north-eastern frontier against 
an advance of the Prussians. A few days after the 
declaration of war, while the German corps were still at 
their depots in the interior, considerable forces were 
massed round Metz and Strasburg. All Europe listened 
for the rush of the invader and the first swift notes of 
triumph from a French army beyond the Rhine ; but 
week after week passed, and the silence was still un- 
broken. Stories, incredible to those who first heard 
them, yet perfectly true, reached the German frontier- 
stations of actual famine at the advanced posts of the 
enemy, and of French soldiers made prisoners while 


digging in potato-fields to keep themselves alive. That 
Napoleon was less ready than had been anticipated 
became clear to all the world ; but none yet imagined 
the revelations which each successive day was bringing 
at the headquarters of the French armies. Absence x 
of whole regiments that figured in the official order of 
battle, defective transport, stores missing or congested, 
made it impossible even to attempt the inroad into 
Southern Germany within the date up to which it 
had any prospect of success. The design was aban- 
doned, yet not in time to prevent the troops that were 
hurrying from the interior from being sent backwards 
and forwards according as the authorities had, or had 
not, heard of the change of plan. Napoleon saw that 
a Prussian force was gathering on the Middle Ehine 
which it would be madness to leave on his flank ; he 
ordered his own commanders to operate on the corre- 
sponding line of the Lauter and the Saar, and despatched 
isolated divisions to the very frontier, still uncertain 
whether even in this direction he would be able to act 
on the offensive, or whether nothing now remained to 
him but to resist the invasion of France by a superior 
enemy. Ollivier had stated in the Assembly that he 
and his colleagues entered upon the war with a light 
heart ; he might have added that they entered upon it 
with bandaged eyes. The Ministers seem actually not 
to have taken the trouble to exchange explanations with 
one another. Leboeuf, the War-Minister, had taken 
it for granted that Grramont had made arrangements 
with Austria which would compel the Prussians to keep 


a large part of their forces in the interior. Gramont, in 
forcing on the quarrel with Prussia, and in his nego- 
tiations with Austria, had taken it for granted that 
Lebreuf could win a series of victories at the outset 
in Southern Germany. The Emperor, to whom alone 
the entire data of the military and the diplomatic 
services of France were open, was incapable of exer- 
tion or scrutiny, purposeless, distracted with pain, half- 
imbecile, tfc 

That the Imperial military administration was 

rotten to the core the terrible events of the next few 

weeks sufficiently showed. Men were in high place 

whose antecedents would have shamed the 

mutely better kind of brigand. The deficiencies of 


the army were made worse by the diversion 
of public funds to private necessities ; the looseness, 
the vulgar splendour, the base standards of judgment 
of the Imperial Court infected each branch of the public 
services of France, and worked perhaps not least on those 
who were in military command. But the catastrophe 
of 1870 seemed to those who witnessed it to tell of 
more than the vileness of an administration ; in England, 
not less than in Germany, voices of influence spoke 
of the doom that had overtaken the depravity of a 
sunken nation ; of the triumph of simple manliness, of 
God-fearing virtue itself, in the victories of the German 
army. There may have been truth in this; yet it 
would require a nice moral discernment to appraise the 
exact degeneracy of the French of 1870 from the French 
of 1854 who humbled Eussia, or from the French of 


1859 who triumphed at Solferino ; and it would need 
a very comprehensive acquaintance with the lower forms 
of human pleasure to judge in what degree the sinful- 
ness of Paris exceeds the sinfulness of Berlin. Had the 
French been as strict a race as the Spartans who fell at 
Thermopylae, as devout as the Tyrolese who perished 
at Koniggriitz, it is quite certain that, with the num- 
bers which took the field against Germany in 1870, 
with Napoleon III. at the head of affairs, and the actual 
generals of 1870 in command, the armies of France 
could not have escaped destruction. 

The main cause of the disparity of France and Ger- 
many in 1870 was in truth that Prussia had had from 
1862 to 1866 a Government so strong as to 
be able to force upon its subjects its own 
gigantic scheme of military organisation in defiance of the 
votes of Parliament and of the national will. In I860 
Brussia, with a population of nineteen millions, brought 
actually into the field three hundred and fifty thousand 
men, or one in fifty- four of its inhabitants. There was 
no other government in Europe, with the possible 
exception of Russia, which could have imposed upon its 
subjects, without risking its own existence, so vast a 
burden of military service as that implied in this strength 
of the fighting army. Napoleon III. at the height of 
his power could not have done so ; and when after 
JConiggratz he endeavoured to raise the forces of France 
to an equality with those of the rival Power by a 
system which would have brought about one in 
seventy of the population into the field, his own 

Cause of German 


432 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

nominees in the Legislative Body, under pressure of 
public opinion, so weakened the scheme that the effective 
numbers of the army remained little more than they 
were before. The true parallel to the German victories 
of 1870 is to be found in the victories of the French 
Committee of Public Safety in 1794 and in those of the 
first Napoleon. A government so powerful as to bend 
the entire resources of the State to military ends will, 
whether it is one of democracy run mad, or of a crowned 
soldier of fortune, or of an ancient monarchy throwing 
new vigour into its traditional system and policy, crush 
in the moment of impact communities of equal or greater 
resources in which a variety of rival influences limit 
and control the central power and subordinate military 
to other interests. It was so in the triumphs of the 
Reign of Terror over the First Coalition ; it was so in 
the triumphs of King William over Austria and France. 
But the parallel between the founders of German 
unity and the organisers of victory after 1793 extends 
no farther than to the sources of their success. Ag- 
gression and adventure have not been the sequels of 
the war of 1870. The vast armaments of Prussia were 
created in order to establish German union under the 
House of Hohenzollern, and they have been employed 
for no other object. It is the triumph of statesmanship, 
and it has been the glory of Prince Bismarck, after thus 
reaping the fruit of a well-timed homage to the God of 
Battles, to know how to quit his shrine. ^ 

At the end of July, twelve days after the formal 
declaration of war, the gathering forces of the Germans, 

1870. ON THE FRONTIER. 433 

over three hundred and eighty thousand strong, were 
still at some distance behind the Lauter and the Saar. 
Napoleon, apparently without any clear design, had 
placed certain bodies of troops actually Thefrontier 
on the frontier at Forbach, Weissenburg, 
and elsewhere, while other troops, raising the whole 
number to about two hundred and fifty thousand, lay 
round Metz and Strasburg, and at points between these 
and the most advanced positions. The reconnoitring 
of the small German detachments on the frontier was 
conducted with extreme energy : the French appear to 
have made no reconnaissances at all, for when they 
determined at last to discover what was facing them 
at Saarbriicken, they advanced with twenty-five thou- 
sand men against one-tenth of that number. On the 
2nd of August Frossard's corps from Forbach moved 
upon Saarbriicken with the Emperor in person. The 
garrison was driven out, and the town bombarded, but 
even now the reconnaissance was not continued beyond 
the bridge across the Saar which divides the g^rf.^^ 
two parts of the town. Forty-eight hours 
later the alignment of the German forces in their in- 
vading order was completed, and all was ready for an 
offensive campaign. The central army, commanded by 
Prince Frederick Charles, spreading east and west 
behind Saarbriicken, touched on its right the northern 
army commanded by General Steinmetz, on its left the 
southern army commanded by the Crown Prince, which 
covered the frontier of the Palatinate, and included the 
troops of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg. The general 
c c 

434 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

direction of the three armies was thus from north- 
west to south-east. As the line of invasion was to 
be nearly due west, it was necessary that the first step 
forwards should be made by the army of the Crown 
Prince in order to bring it more nearly to a level with 
the northern corps in the march into France. On the 
4th of August the Crown Prince crossed the Al- 
satian frontier and moved against Weissenburg. The 
French General Douay, who was posted here with 
about twelve thousand men, was neither reinforced nor 
bidden to retire. His troops met the attack of an 
enemy many times more numerous with great courage ; 
but the struggle was a hopeless one, and after several 
Weissenburg hours of severe fighting the Germans were 
masters of the field. Douay fell in the 
battle ; his troops frustrated an attempt made to cut 
off their retreat, and fell back southwards towards the 
corps of McMahon, which lay about ten miles behind 

The Crown Prince marched on- in search of his 
enemy. McMahon, who could collect only forty- 
five thousand men, desired to retreat until he could 
gain some support ; but the Emperor, tormented by 
fears of the political consequences of the invasion, in- 

Battie of worth. sisted u P on his g ivin g battle. He drew up 
on the hills about Worth, almost on the 
spot where in 1793 Hoche had overthrown the armies 
of the First Coalition. On the 6th of August the 
leading divisions of the Crown Prince, about a hundred 
thousand strong, were within striking distance. The 


WORTH. 435 

superiority of the Germans in numbers was so great 
that McMahon's army might apparently have been 
captured or destroyed with far less loss than actually 
took place if time had been given for the movements 
which the Crown Prince's staff had in view, and for 
the employment of his full strength. But the im- 
petuosity of divisional leaders on the morning of the 
6th brought on a general engagement. The resistance 
of the French was of the most determined character. 
With one more army-corps and the corps of General 
Failly was expected to arrive on the field it seemed as 
if the Germans might yet be beaten back. But each 
hour brought additional forces into action in the attack, 
while the French commander looked in vain for the 
reinforcements that could save him from ruin. At 
length, when the last desperate charges of the 
Cuirassiers had shattered against the fire of cannon 
and needle-guns, and the village of Froschwiller, the 
centre of the French position, had been stormed house 
by house, the entire army broke and fled in disorder. 
Nine thousand prisoners, thirty-three cannon, fell into 
the hands of the conquerors. The Germans had lost 
ten thousand men, but they had utterly destro} r ed 
McMahon's army as an organised force. Its remnant 
disappeared from the scene of warfare, escaping by the 
western roads in the direction of Chalons, where first 
it was restored to some degree of order. The Crown 
Prince, leaving troops behind him to beleaguer the 
smaller Alsatian fortresses, marched on untroubled 
through the northern Vosges, and descended into the 
c c 2 


open country about Luneville and Nancy, unfortified 
towns which could offer no resistance to the passage of 
an enemy. 

On the same day that the battle of Worth was 
fought, the leading columns of the armies of Steinmetz 
and Prince Frederick Charles crossed the frontier at 
Saarbriicken. Frossard's corps, on the news of the 
spicheren. defeat at Weissenburg, had withdrawn to 
its earlier positions between Forbach and 
the frontier : it held the steep hills of Spicheren that 
look down upon Saarbriicken, and the woods that flank 
the high road where this passes from Germany into 
France. As at Worth, it was not intended that any 
general attack should be made on the 6th ; a delay of 
twenty-four hours would have enabled the Germans to 
envelop or crush Frossard's corps with an overwhelming 
force. But the leaders of the foremost regiments threw 
themselves impatiently upon the French whom they 
found before them : other brigades hurried up to the 
sound of the cannon, until the struggle took the pro- 
portion of a battle, and after hours of fluctuating 
success the heights of Spicheren were carried by 
successive rushes of the infantry full in the enemy's 
fire. Why Frossard was not reinforced has never been 
explained, for several French divisions lay at no great 
distance westward, and the position was so strong 
that, if a pitched battle was to be fought anywhere 
east of Metz, few better points could have been chosen. 
But, like Douay at Weissenburg, Frossard was left to 
struggle alone against whatever forces the frermans 

1870. NAPOLEON AT METZ. 437 

might throw upon him. Napoleon, .who directed the 
operations of the French armies from Metz, appears to 
have been now incapable of appreciating the simplest 
military necessities, of guarding against the most 
obvious dangers. Helplessness, infatuation ruled the 
miserable hours. 

The impression made upon Europe by the battles 
of the Gth of August corresponded to the greatness of 
their actual military effects. There was an end to 
all thoughts of the alliance of Austria and Italy with 
France. Germany, though unaware of the full mag- 
nitude of the perils from which it had escaped, breathed 
freely after weeks of painful suspense ; the 
very circumstance that the disproportion of P lug. a 6 ter 
numbers on the battle-field of Worth was 
still unknown heightened the joy and confidence pro- 
el uced by the Crown Prince's victory, a victory in 
which the South German troops, fighting by the side 
of those who had been their foes in 1866, had borne 
their full part. In Paris the consternation with which 
the news of McMahon's overthrow was received was 
all the greater that on the previous day reports had 
been circulated of a victory won at Landau and of the 
capture of the Crown Prince with his army. The 
bulletin of the Emperor, briefly narrating McMahon's 
defeat and the repulse of Frossard, showed in its con- 
cluding words " All may yet be retrieved " how pro- 
found was the change made in the prospects of the war 
by that fatal day. The truth was at once apprehended- 
A storm of indignation broke out against the Imperial 

438 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

Government at Paris. The Chambers were summoned. 
Ollivier, attacked alike by the extreme Bonapartists and 
by the Opposition, laid down his office. A reactionary 
Ministry, headed by the Count of Palikao, was placed 
in power by the Empress, a Ministry of the last hour 
as it was justly styled by all outside it. Levies were 
ordered, arms and stores accumulated for the reserve- 
forces, preparations made for a siege of Paris itself. On 
the 12th the Emperor gave up the command which he 
had exercised with such miserable results, and appointed. 
Marshal Bazaine, one of the heroes of the Mexican Ex- 
pedition, General-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine. 
After the overthrow of McMahon and the victory of 
the Germans at Spicheren, there seems to 

Napoleon at 

have been a period of utter paralysis in the 
French headquarters at Metz. The divisions of Prince 
Frederick Charles and Steinmetz did not immediately 
press forward ; it was necessary to allow some days for 
the advance of the Crown Prince through the Vosges ; 
and during these days the French army about Metz, 
which, when concentrated, numbered nearly two hun- 
dred thousand men, might well have taken the positions 
necessary for the defence of Moselle, or in the alterna- 
tive might have gained several marches in the retreat 
towards Verdun and Chalons. Only a small part of this 
body had as yet been exposed to defeat. It included in 
it the very flower of the French forces, tens of thousands 
of troops probably equal to any in Europe, and capable 
of forming a most formidable army if united to the 
reserves which would shortly be collected at 'Chalons 

1870. BORNY. 433 

or nearer Paris. But from the 7th to the 12th of 
August Napoleon, too cowed to take the necessary steps 
for battle in defence of the line of Moselle, lingered pur- 
poseless and irresolute at Metz, unwilling to fall back 
from this fortress. It was not till the 14th that the 
retreat was begun. By this time the Germans were 
close at hand, and their leaders were little disposed to 
let the hesitating enemy escape them. While the lead- 
ing divisions of the French were crossing 
the Moselle, Steinmetz hurried forward his 
troops and fell upon the French detachments still lying 
on the south-east of Metz about Borny and Courcelles. 
Bazaine suspended his movement of retreat in order to 
beat back an assailant who for once seemed to be 
inferior in strength. At the close of the day the French 
commander believed that he had gained a victory and 
driven the Germans off their line of advance; in reality 
he had allowed himself to be diverted from the passage 
of the Moselle at the last hour, while the Germans left 
under Prince Frederick Charles gained the river farther 
south, and actually began to cross it in order to bar his 

From Metz westwards there is as far as the village of 
Gravelotte, which is seven miles distant, but one direct 
road ; at Gravelotte the road forks, the southern arm 
leading towards Verdun by Vionville and Maw . laFTtonr 
Mars-la-Tour, the northern by Conflans. 
During the 15th of August the first of Bazaine's 
divisions moved as far as Vionville along the southern 
road ; others came into the neighbourhood of Grave- 

440 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

lotte, but two ccur*? which should have advanced past 


Gravelotte on to the northern road still lay close to Metz. 
The Prussian vanguard was meanwhile crossing the 
'Moselle southwards from Noveant to Pont-a-Mousson, 
and hurrying forwards by lines converging on the road 
taken by Bazaine. Down to the evening of the 15th 
it was not supposed at the Prussian headquarters that 
Bazaine could be overtaken and brought to battle 
nearer than the line of the Mease ; but on the morning 
of the 16th the cavalry-detachments which had pushed 
farthest to the north-west discovered that the heads of 
the French columns had still not passed Mars-la-Tour. 
An effort was instantly made to seize the road and 
block the way before the enemy. The struggle, begun 
by a handful of combatants on each side, drew to it 
regiment after regiment as the French battalions close 
at hand came into action, and the Prussians hurried up 
in wild haste to support their comrades who were 
exposed to the attack of an entire army. The rapidity 
with which the Prussian generals grasped the situation 
before them, the vigour with which they brought up 
their cavalry over a distance which no infantry could 
traverse in the necessary time, and without a moment's 
hesitation hurled this cavalry in charge after charge 
against a superior foe, mark the battle of Mars-la-Tour 
as that in which the military superiority of the Germans 
was most truly shown. Numbers in this battle had 
little to do with the result, for by better generalship 
Bazaine could certainly at any one point have over- 
powered his enemy. But while the Germans rushed 


like a torrent upon the true point of attack that is 
the westernmost Bazaine by some delusion considered 
'it his primary object to prevent the Germans from 
thrusting themselves between the retreating army and 
Metz, and so kept a great part of his troops inactive 
about the*fortress. The result was that the Germans, 
with a loss of sixteen thousand men, remained at the 
close of the day masters of the road at Vionville, and 
that the French army could no, without winning a 
victory and breaking through the enemy's line, resume 
its retreat along this line. 

It was expected during the 1 7th that Bazaine would 
make some attempt to escape by the northern road, but 
instead of doing so he fell back on Gravelotte and the 
heights between this and Metz, in order to fight a 
pitched battle. The position was a well-chosen one ; 
but by midday on the 18th the armies of Steinmetz and 
Prince Frederick Charles were ranged in Gravelotte 
front of Bazaine with a strength of two 
hundred and fifty thousand men, and in the judgment 
of the King these forces were equal to the attack. 
Again, as at Worth, the precipitancy of divisional 
commanders caused the sacrifice of whole brigades 
before the battle was won. While the Saxon corps 
with which Moltke intended to deliver his slow but 
fatal blow upon the enemy's right flank was engaged in 
its long northward de'tour, Steinmetz pushed his Ehine- 
landers past the ravine of Gravelotte into a fire where 
no human being could survive, and the Guards, pressing 
forward in column over the smooth unsheltered slope 

442 MODERN EUROPE. 1370. 

from St. Marie to St. Privat, sank by thousands without 
reaching midway in their course. Until the final blow 
was dealt by the Saxon corps from the north flank, the 
ground which was won by the Prussians was won 
principally by their destructive artillery fire : their 
infantry attacks had on the whole been repelled, and at 
Gravelotte itself it had seemed for a moment as if the 
French were about to break the assailant's line. But 
Bazaine, as on the 16th, steadily kept his reserves at a 
distance from the points where their presence was most 
required, and, according to his own account, succeeded 
in bringing into action no more than a hundred 
thousand men, or less than two-thirds of the forces 
under his command.* At the close of the awful day, 
when the capture of St. Privat by the Saxons turned 
the defender's line, the French abandoned all their 
positions and drew back within the defences of Metz. 

The Germans at once proceeded to block all the 

roads round the fortress, and Bazaine made no effort to 

prevent them. At the end of a few days the line was 

drawn around him in sufficient strength 


SSJj? 41 to resist any sudden attack. Steinmetz, 
who was responsible for a great part of the 
loss sustained at Gravelotte, was now removed from his 
command ; his army was united with that under Prince 
Frederick Charles as the besieging force, while sixty thou- 
sand men, detached from this great mass, were formed into 
a separate army under Prince Albert of Saxony, and sent 
by way of Verdun to co-operate with the Crown Prince 

* Bazaine, L'Armee du Hhin, p. 74. 


against McMahon. The Government at Paris knew 
but imperfectly what was passing around Metz from day 
to day ; it knew, however, that if Metz should be given 
up for lost the hour of its own fall could not be averted. 
One forlorn hope remained, to throw' the army which 
McMahon was gathering at Chalons north-eastward to 
Bazaine's relief, though the Crown Prince stood between 
Chalons and Metz, and could reach every point in the 
line of march more rapidly than McMahon himself. 
Napoleon had quitted Metz on the evening of the 15th; 
on the 17th a council of war was held at Chalons, at 
which it was determined to fall back upon Paris and to 
await the attack of the Crown Prince under the forts of 
the capital. No sooner was this decision announced 
to the Government at Paris than the Empress tele- 
graphed to her husband warning him to consider what 
would be the effects of his return, and insisting that an 
attempt should be made to relieve Bazaine.* McMahon, 
against his own better judgment, consented to the 
northern march. He moved in the first instance to 
Rheims in order to conceal his intention from the 
enemy, but by doing this he lost some days. On the 
23rd, in pursuance of arrangements made with Bazaine, 
whose messengers were still able to escape the Prussian 
watch, he set out north-eastwards in the direction of 
Montme*dy. The movement was discovered 


by the Prussian cavalry and reported at Swa^s. 

the headquarters at Bar-le-Duc on the 25th. 

Instantly the westward march of the Crown Prince \vus 

* Papiers Se'crets du Second Empire (1875), pp. 33, 240. 

444 MODERN EUROPE. 1370. 

arrested, and his array, with that of the Prince of 
Saxony, was thrown northwards in forced marches 
towards Sedan. On reaching Le Chesne, west of the 
Meuse, on the 27th, McMahon became aware of the 
enemy's presence. He saw that his plan was discovered, 
and resolved to retreat westwards before it was too 
late. The Emperor, who had attached himself to the 
army, consented, but again the Government at Paris 
interfered with fatal effect. More anxious for the 
safety of the dynasty than for the existence of the army, 
the Empress and her advisers insisted that McMahon 
should continue his advance. Napoleon seems now to 
have abdicated all authority and thrown to the winds all 
responsibility. He allowed the march to be resumed in 
the direction of Mouzon and Stenay. Failly's corps, 
which formed the right wing, was attacked on the 29th 
before it could reach the passage of the Meuse at the 
latter place, and was driven northwards to Beaumont. 
Here the commander strangely imagined himself to be 
in security. He was surprised in his- camp on the fol- 
lowing day, defeated, and driven northwards towards 
Mouzon. Meanwhile the left of McMahon's army had 
crossed the Meuse and moved eastwards to Carignan, 
so that his troops were severed by the river and at some 
distance from one another. Part of Failly's men were 
made prisoners in the struggle on the 30th or dispersed 
on the west of the Meuse ; tbe remainder, with their 
commander, made a hurried and disorderly escape beyond 
the river, and neglected to break down the bridges by 
which they had passed. McMahon saw thatj if the 

1870. SEDAN. 44.", 

advance was continued his divisions would one after 
another fall into the enemy's hands. He recalled the 
troops which had reached Carignan, and concentrated 
his army about Sedan to fight a pitched battle. The 
passages of the Me use above and below Sedan were 
seized by the Germans. Two hundred and forty thou- 
sand men were at Moltke's disposal ; McMahon had 
about half that number. The task of the Germans was 
not so much to defeat the enemy as to prevent them 
from escaping to the Belgian frontier. On Battle of gedan 
the morning of September 1st, while on 
the east of Sedan the Bavarians after a desperate 
resistance stormed the village of Bazeilles, Hessian and 
Prussian regiments crossed the Meuse at Don chery several 
miles to the west. From either end of this line corps 
after corps now pushed northwards round the French 
positions, driving in the enemy wherever they found them, 
and converging, under the eyes of the Prussian King, 
his general, and his Minister, each into its place in the 
arc of fire before which the French Empire was to perish. 
The movement was as admirably executed as designed. 
The French fought furiously but in vain : the mere mass 
of the enemy, the mere narrowing of the once completed 
circle, crushed down resistance without the clumsy havoc 
of Gravelotte. From point after point the defenders 
were forced back within Sedan itself. The streets were 
choked with hordes of beaten infantry and cavalry ; the 
Germans had but to take one more step forward and 
the whole of their batteries would command the town. 
Towards evening there was a pause in the firing, in 

446 MODERN EUROPE. isro. 

order that the French might offer negotiations for 
surrender ; but no sign of surrender was made, and the 
Bavarian cannon resumed their fire, throwing shells 
into the town itself. Napoleon now caused a white 
flag to he displayed on the fortress, and sent a letter to 
the King of Prussia, stating that as he had not been 
able to die in the midst of his troops, nothing remained 
for him but to surrender his sword into the hands of his 
Majesty. The surrender was accepted by King William, 
who added that General Moltke would act on his behalf 
in arranging terms of capitulation. G-eneral Wimpffen, 
who had succeeded to the command of the French army 
on the disablement of McMahon by a wound, acted on 
capitulation of behalf of Napoleon. The negotiations con- 
ledan ' Sept - 2 ' tinned till late in the night, the French 
general pressing for permission for his troops to be dis- 
armed in Belgium, while Moltke insisted on the sur- 
render of the entire army as prisoners of war. Fearing 
the effect of an appeal by Napoleon himself to the 
King's kindly nature, Bismarck had taken steps to 
remove his sovereign to a distance until the terms of 
surrender should be signed. At daybreak on September 
2nd Napoleon sought the Prussian headquarters. He 
was met on the road by Bismarck, who remained in 
conversation with him till the capitulation was com- 
pleted on the terms required by the Germans. He 
then conducted Napoleon to the neighbouring chateau 
of Bellevue, where King William, the Crown Prince, 
and the Prince of Saxony visited him. One pang 
had still to be borne by the unhappy man,. Down 

1870. SEDAN. 447 

to his interview with the King, Napoleon had 
imagined that all the German armies together had 
operated against him at Sedan, and he must con- 
sequently have still had some hope that his own ruin 
might have purchased the deliverance of Bazaine. 
He learnt accidentally from the King that Prince 
Frederick Charles had never stirred from before Metz. 
A convulsion of anguish passed over his face : his eyes 
filled with tears. There was no motive for a prolonged 
interview between the conqueror and the conquered, for, 
as a prisoner, Napoleon could not discuss conditions of 
peace. After some minutes of conversation the King 
departed for the Prussian headquarters. Napoleon 
remained in the chateau until the morning of the next 
day, and then began his journey towards the place 
chosen for his captivity, the palace of Wilhelmshohe at 

Rumours of disaster had reached Paris in the last 
days of August, but to each successive report of evil 
the Government replied with lying boasts of success, 
until on the 3rd of September ifc was forced 

. f . The Republic 

to announce a catastrophe tar surpassing Proclaimed. 

Sept 4. 

the worst anticipations of the previous days. 
With the Emperor and his entire army in the enemy's 
hands, no one supposed that the dynasty could any 
longer remain on the throne : the only question was by 
what form of government the Empire should be suc- 
ceeded. The Legislative Chamber assembled in the 
dead of night; Jules Favre proposed the deposition 

* Diary of the Emperor Frederick, Sept. 2. 

448 MODERN EUROPE, 1370. 

of the Emperor, and was heard in silence. The 
Assembly adjourned for some hours. On the morning 
of the 4th, Thiers, who sought to keep the way open 
for an Orleanist restoration, moved that a Committee 
of Government should be appointed by the Chamber 
itself, and that elections to a new Assembly should be 
held as soon as circumstances should permit. Before 
this and other propositions of the same nature could be 
put to the vote, the Chamber was invaded by the mob. 
Gambetta, with most of the Deputies for Paris, pro- 
ceeded to the Hotel de Yille, and there proclaimed the 
Republic. The Empress fled; a Government of 
National Defence came into existence, with General 
Trochu at its head, Jules Favre assuming the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Gambetfca that of the Interior. 
No hand was raised in defence of the Napoleonic 
dynasty or of the institutions of the Empire. The 
Legislative Chamber and the Senate disappeared without 
even making an attempt to prolong their own existence. 
Thiers, without approving of the Republic or the mode in 
which it had come into being, recommended his friends 
to accept the new Government, and gave it his own 
support. On the 6th of September a circular of Jules 
Favre, addressed to the representatives of France at 
all the European Courts, justified the overthrow of the 
circular of juies Napoleonic Empire, and claimed for the 
Government by which it was succeeded 
the goodwill of the neutral Powers. Napoleon III. 
was charged with the responsibility for the war: with 
the fall of his dynasty, it was urged, the reasons for a 


continuance of the struggle had ceased to exist. France 
only asked for a lasting peace. Such peace, however, 
must leave the territory of France inviolate, for peace 
with dishonour would be but the prelude to a new 
war of extermination. "Not an inch 'of our soil will 
we cede " so ran the formula " not a stone of our 
fortresses. "* 

The German Chancellor had nothing ready in the 
way of rhetoric e^ual to his antagonist's phrases ; but 
as soon as the battle of Sedan was won it was settled 
at the Prussian headquarters that peace would not be 
made without the annexation of Alsace and Favre and Bis 
Lorraine. Prince Bismarck has stated 
that his own policy would have stopped at the ac- 
quisition of Strasburg : Moltke, however, and the chiefs 
of the army pronounced that Germany could not be 
secure against invasion while Metz remained in the 
hands of France, and this opinion was accepted by the 
King. For a moment it was imagined that the victory 
of Sedan had given the conqueror peace on his own 
terms. This hope, however, speedily disappeared, and 
the march 'upon Paris was resumed by the army of the 
Crown Prince without waste of time. In the third 
week of September the invaders approached the capital. 
Favre, in spite of his declaration of the Gth, was not 

* Favre's circular alleged that the .King of Prussia had declared that 
he made war not on France but on the Imperial Dynasty. King William 
had never stated anything of the kind. His proclamation on entering 
France, to which Favre appears to have referred, merely said that the 
war was to be waged against the French army, and not against the in- 
habitants, who, so long as they kept quiet, would not be molested. 

D D 

450 MODERN EUROPE. iwo. 

indisposed to enter upon negotiations ; and, trusting to 
his own arts of persuasion, he sought an interview 
with the German Chancellor, which was granted to 
him at Ferrieres on the 19th, and continued on the fol- 
lowing day. Bismarck hesitated to treat the holders 
of office in Paris as an established Government; he was 
willing to grant an armistice in order that elections 
might be held for a National Assembly with which 
Germany could treat for peace ; but he required, as a 
condition of the armistice, that Strasburg and Toul 
should be surrendered. Toul was already at the last 
extremity; Strasburg was not capable of holding out 
ten days longer ; but of this the Government at Paris 
was not aware. The conditions demanded by Bismarck 
were rejected as insulting to France, and the war was 
left to take its course. Already, while Favre was nego- 
tiating at Ferrieres, the German vanguard was pressing 
round to tl^e west of Paris. A body of French troops 
which attacked them on the 19th at Chatillon was put 
to the rout and fled in panic. Versailles was occupied 
on the same day, and the line of investment was shortly 
afterwards completed around the capital. 

The second act in the war now began. Paris had 
been fortified by Thiers about 1840, at the time 
when it seemed likely that France might be engaged 

siege of Paris * n war w ^h a coalition on the affairs of 
Mehemet Ali. The forts were not distant 
enough from the city to protect it altogether from 
artillery with the lengthened range of 1870 ; they were 
sufficient, however, to render an assault out of the 

1870. SIEGE \ OF PARIS. 4.">1 

question, and to compel the besieger to rely mainly on 
the slow operation of famine. It had been reckoned 
by the engineers of 1840 that food enough might be 
collected to enable the city to stand, a two-months' 
siege ; so vast, however, were the supplies collected in 
1870 that, with double the population, Paris had pro- 
visions for above four months. In spite therefore of 
the capture and destruction of its armies the cause of 
France was not hopeless, if, while Paris and Metz 
occupied four hundred thousand of the invaders, the 
population of the provinces should take up the struggle 
with enthusiasm, and furnish after some months .of 
military exercise troops more numerous than those 
which France had lost, to attack the besiegers from all 
points at once and to fall upon their communications. 
To organise such a national resistance was, however, 
impossible for any Government within the besieged 
capital itself. It was therefore determined to establish 
a second seat of Government on the Loire ; 


and before the lines were drawn round 
Paris three members of the Ministry, with M. Cre*mieux 
at their head, set out for Tours. Cre*mieux, however, 
who was an aged lawyer, proved quite unequal to his 
t;-sk. His authority was disputed in the west and the 
south. Eevolutionary movements threatened to break 
up the unity of the national defence. A stronger 
hand, a more commanding will, was needed. Such a 
hand, such a will belonged to Gambetta, who on the 
7th of October left Paris in order to undertake the 
government of the provinces and the organisation of 
D D 2 


the national armies. The circle of the besiegers was 
now too closely drawn for the ordinary means of travel 
to be possible. Gambetta passed over the German lines 
Gambetteat i n a Balloon, and reached Tours in safety, 
where he immediately threw his feeble 
colleagues into the background and concentrated all 
power in his own vigorous grasp. The effect of his pre- 
sence was at once felt throughout France. There was 
an end of the disorders in the great cities, and of all 
attempts at rivalry with the central power. Gambetta 
had the faults of rashness, of excessive self-confidence, 
of defective regard for scientific authority in matters 
where he himself was ignorant : but he possessed in 
an extraordinary degree the qualities necessary for a 
Dictator at such a national crisis : boundless, in- 
domitable courage ; a simple, elemental passion of love 
for his country that left absolutely no place for hesita- 
tions or reserve in the prosecution of the one object for 
which France then existed, the war. He carried the 
nation with him like a whirlwind. . Whatever share 
the military errors of Gambetta and his rash personal 
interference with commanders may have had in the 
ultimate defeat of France, without him it would never 
have been known of what efforts France was capable. 
The proof of his capacity was seen in the hatred and the 
fear with which down to the time of his death he inspired 
the German people. Had there been at the head of 
the army of Metz a man of one-tenth of Gambetta's 
effective force, it is possible that France might have 
closed the war, if not with success, at least with un- 
diminished territory. 

1870. GAMBETTA. 453 

Before Gambetta left Paris the fall of Strasburs: 


set free the army under General Werder by which 
it had been besieged, and enabled the Germans to 
establish a civil Government in Alsace, 

Fall of Stras- 

the western frontier of the new province 
having been already so accurately studied that, when 
peace was made in 1871, the frontier-line was drawn 
not upon one of the earlier French maps but on the map 
now published by the German staff. It was Gambetta's 
first task to divide France into districts, each with its 
own military centre, its own army, and its own com- 
11 umder. Four such districts were made : the centres 
were Lille, Le Mans, Bourges,and Besancon. At Bourges 
and in the neighbourhood considerable progress had 
already been made in organisation. Early in October 
German cavalry - detachments, exploring The ofthe 
southwards, found that French troops 
were gathering on the Loire. The Bavarian General 
Tann was detached by Moltke from the besieging 
army at Paris, and ordered to make himself master 
of Orleans. Tann hastened southwards, defeated the 
French outside Orleans on the llth of October, and 
occupied this city, the French retiring Tanntake8 
' towards Bourges. Gambetta removed the o*"* * 1 * 
Defeated commander, and set in his place General 
Aurelle de Paladines. Tann was directed to cross the 
Loire and destroy the arsenals at Bourges ; he reported, 
however, that this task was beyond his power, in con- 
sequence of which Moltke ordered General Werder 
with the army of Strasburg to move westwards against 

454 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

Bourges, after dispersing the weak forces that were 
gathering about Besangon. Werder set out on his 
dangerous march, but he had not proceeded far when 
an army of very different power was thrown into the 
scale against the French levies on the Loire. 

In the battle of Gravelotte, fought on the 18th of 
August, the French troops had been so handled by 
Bazaine as to render it doubtful whether he really 
intended to break through the enemy's 
line and escape from Metz. At what 
period political designs inconsistent with his military 
duty first took possession of Bazaine's thoughts is 
uncertain. He had played a political part in Mexico ; 
it is probable that as soon as he found himself at the 
head of the one effective army of France, and saw 
Napoleon hopelessly discredited, he began to aim at per- 
sonal power. Before the downfall of the Empire he had 
evidently adopted a scheme of inaction with the object 
of preserving his army entire : even the sortie by which 
it had been arranged that he should, assist McMahon 
on the day before Sedan was feebly and irresolutely 
conducted. After the proclamation of the Republic 
Bazaine's inaction became still more marked. The 
intrigues of an adventurer named Eegnier, who en- 
deavoured to open a negotiation between the Prussians 
and the exiled Empress Eugenie, encouraged him in 
his determination to keep his soldiers from fulfilling 
their duty to France. Week after week passed by ; a 
fifth of the besieging army was struck down with 
sickness ; yet Bazaine made no effort to break through, 


or even to diminish the number of men who were con- 
suming the supplies of Metz by giving to separate 
detachments the opportunity of escape. On the 
12th of October, after the pretence of a sortie on the 
north, he entered into communication with the German 
headquarters at Versailles. Bismarck offered to grant 
a free departure to the army of Metz on condition 
that the fortress should be placed in his hands, that 
the army should undertake to act on behalf of the 
Empress, and that the Empress should pledge her- 
self to accept the Prussian conditions of peace, what- 
ever these might be. General Boyer was sent to 
England to acquaint the Empress with these pro- 
positions. They were declined by her, and after a 
fortnight had been spent in manoeuvres for a Bona- 
partist restoration Bazaine found himself at the end 
of his resources. On the 27th the capitula- 

I Capitulation of 

tion of Metz was signed. The fortress 
itself, with incalculable cannon and material of war, 
and an army of a hundred and seventy thousand men, 
including twenty-six thousand sick and wounded in the 
hospitals, passed into the hands of the Germans.* 

Bazaine was at a later time tried by a court- 
martial, found guilty of the neglect of duty, and 
sentenced to death. That sentence was not executed ; 
but if there is an infamy that is worse than 


death, such infamy will to all time cling 

to his name. In the circumstances in which France 

* Deutsch-Franzosiche Krieg, vol. iii., p. 104. Bazaine, p. 166. Proces 
de Bazaine, vol. ii., p. 219. Regnier, p. 20. Hahii, ii. 171. 

456 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

was placed no effort, no sacrifice of life could have 
been too great for the commander of the army at 
Metz. To retain the besiegers in full strength before 
the fortress would not have required the half of 
Bazaine's actual force. If half his army had fallen 
on the field of battle in successive attempts to cut 
their way through the enemy, brave men would no 
doubt have perished ; but even had their efforts failed 
their deaths would have purchased for Metz the power 
to hold out for weeks or for months longer. The 
civil population of Metz was but sixty thousand, its 
army was three times as numerous ; unlike Paris, it 
saw its stores consumed not by helpless millions of 
women and children, but by soldiers whose duty it 
was to aid the defence of their country at whatever 
cost. Their duty, if they could not cut their way 
through, was to die fighting ; and had they shown 
hesitation, which was not the case, Bazaine should 
have died at their head. That Bazaine would have 
fulfilled his duty even if Napoleon III. had remained 
on the throne is more than doubtful, for his inaction 
had begun before the catastrophe of Sedan. His 
pretext after that time was that the government of 
France had fallen into the hands of men of disorder, 
and that it was more important for his army to save 
France from the Government than from the invader. 
He was the only man in France who thought so. The 
Government of September 4th, whatever its faults, was 
good enough for tens of thousands of brave men, 
Legitimists, Orleanists, Bonapartists, who nocked 


without distinction of party to its banners : it might 
have been good enough for Marshal Bazaine. But 
France had to pay the penalty for the political, the 
moral indifference which could acquiesce in the Coup 
d'fitat of 1851, in the servility of t*he Empire, in 
many a vile and boasted deed in Mexico, in China, in 
Algiers. Such indifference found its Nemesis in a 

The surrender of Metz and the release of the great 
army of Prince Frederick Charles by which it was 
besieged fatally changed the conditions of the French 
war of national defence. Two hundred thousand of 
the victorious troops of Germany under some of their 
ablest generals were set free to attack the still untrained 
levies on the Loire and in the north of France, which, 
with more time for organisation, might well have 
forced the Germans to raise the siege of Paris. The 
army once commanded by Steinmetz was now recon- 
stituted, and despatched under General Manteuffel 
towards Amiens ; Prince Frederick Charles moved 
with the remainder of his troops towards the Loire. 
Aware that his approach could not long be delayed, 
Gambetta insisted that Aurelle de Paladines should 
begin the march on Paris. The general attacked Tann 
at Coulmiers on the 9th of November, 
defeated him, and re-occupied Orleans, the from oceans, 

Nov. 9. 

first real success that the French had 
gained in the war. There was great alarm at the 
German headquarters at Versailles ; the possibility of 
a failure of the siege was discussed; and forty thou- 


sand troops were sent southwards in haste to the 
support of the Bavarian general. Aurelle, however, 
did not move upon the capital : his troops were still 
unfit for the enterprise; and he remained stationary 
on the north of Orleans, in order to improve his 
organisation, to await reinforcements, and to meet the 
attack of Frederick Charles in a strong position. In 
the third week of November the leading divisions of 
the army of Metz approached, and took post between 
Orleans and Paris. Gambetta now insisted that the 
effort should be made to relieve the capital. Aurelle 
resisted, but was forced to obey. The garrison of 
Paris had already made several unsuccessful attacks 
upon the lines of their besiegers, the most vigorous 
being that of Le Bourget on the 30th of October, 
in which bayonets were crossed. It was arranged that 
in the last days of November General Trochu should 
endeavour to break out on the southern side, and that 
simultaneously the army of the Loire should fall upon 
the enemy in front of it and endeavour to force its 
way to the capital. On the 28th the attack upon the 
Germans on the north of Orleans began. For several 
days the struggle was renewed by one 

Battles of Or- .. . . . _ 

leans, NOV. 28- division after another or the armies ot 

Dec. 2. 

Aurelle and Prince Frederick Charles. 
Victory remained at last with the Germans; the 
centre of the French position was carried ; the right 
and left wings of the army were severed from one 
another and forced to retreat, the one up the Loire, 
the other towards the west. Orleans on 'the 5th 


of December passed back into the hands of the Ger- 
mans. The sortie from Paris, which began with a 
successful attack by General Ducrot upon 

. . -i -i rvi Sortie of Cham- 

Champigny beyond the Marne, ended alter pjg-ny. NOV. *>- 
some days of combat in the recovery by 
the Germans of the positions which they had lost, 
and in the retreat of Ducrot into Paris. In the 
same week Manteuffel, moving against 
the relieving army of the north, encoun- 
tered it near Amiens, defeated it after 
a hard struggle, and gained possession of Amiens 

After the fall of Amiens, Manteufiel moved upon 
Rouen. This city fell into his hands without resist- 
ance ; the conquerors pressed on westwards, and at 
Dieppe troops which had come from the 

Rouen occupied, 

confines of Eussia gazed for the first time 
upon the sea. But the Republican armies, unlike those 
which the Germans had first encountered, were not to 
be crushed at a single blow. Under the energetic com- 
mand of Faidherbe the army of the North advanced 
again upon Amiens. Goeben, who was left to defend 
the line of the Somme, went out to meet him, defeated 
him on the 23rd of December, and drove him back to 
Arras. But again, after a week's interval, Faidherbe 
pushed forward. On the 3rd of January he fell upon 
Goeben's weak division at Bapaume, and handled it 
so severely that the Germans would on the 

Bapaume, Jan. 3. 

following day have abandoned their position, 

if the French had not themselves been the first to 

460 MODERN EUROPE. 1871. 

retire. Faidherbe, however, had only fallen back to 
receive reinforcements. After some days' rest he once 
more sought to gain the road to Paris, advancing this 
time by the eastward line through St. Quentin. In 
front of this town Goeben attacked him. The last 
st. Quentin, battle of the army of the North was fought 

on the 19th of January. The French 
general endeavoured to disguise his defeat, but the 
German commander had won all that he desired. 
Faidherbe's army was compelled to retreat northwards 
in disorder ; its part in the war was at an end. 

During the last three weeks of December there was 
a pause in the operations of the Germans on the Loire. 

It was expected that Bourbaki and the east 

The Armies of ,, , , , , 

the Loire and of wing 1 or the rencn armv would soon 

the East. J 

re-appear at Orleans and endeavour to 
combine with Chanzy's troops. Gambetta, however, 
had formed another plan. He considered that 
Chanzy, with the assistance of divisions 'formed 
in Brittany, would be strong enough to encounter 
Prince Frederick Charles, and he determined to throw 
the army of Bourbaki, strengthened by reinforcements 
from the south, upon Germany itself. The design was 
a daring one, and had the two French armies been 
capable of performing the work which Gambetta required 
of them, an inroad into Baden, or even the re-conquest 
of Alsace, would most seriously have affected the posi- 
tion of the Germans before Paris. But Gambetta 
miscalculated the power of young, untrained troops, 
imperfectly armed, badly fed, against a veteran" enemy. 



In a series of hard-fought struggles the army of the 
Loire under General Chanzy was driven back at the 
beginning of January from Vendome to Le Mans. On 
the 12th, Chanzy took post before this city and fought his 
last battle. While he was making a vigorous resistance 
in the centre of the line, the Breton regiments stationed 
on his right gave way; the Germans pressed round 
him, and gained possession of the town. Chanzy 
retreated towards Laval, leaving thousands 

Le Mans, Jan. 12. 

of prisoners in the hands of the enemy, and 
saving only the debris of an army. Bourbaki in the 
meantime, with a numerous but miserably equipped 
force, had almost reached Belfort. The report of his 
eastward movement was not at first believed Bourbaki. 
at the German headquarters before Paris, and the troops 
of General Werder, which had been engaged about Dijon 
faith a body of auxiliaries commanded by Garibaldi, were 
left to bear the brunt of the attack without support. 
When the real state of affairs became known Manteuffel 
was sent eastwards in hot haste towards the threatened 
point. Werder had evacuated Dijon and fallen back 
upon Vesoul ; part of his army was still occupied in the 
siege of Belfort. As Bourbaki approached he fell back 
with the greater part of his troops in order to cover the 
besieging force, leaving one of his lieutenants to make 
a flank attack upon Bourbaki at Villersexel. This 
attack, one of the fiercest in the war, delayed the 
French for two days, and gave Werder time 

to occupy the strong positions that he had 

chosen about Montbeliard. Here, on the 15th of 

462 MODERN EUROPE. isn. 

January, began a struggle which lasted for three days. 
The French, starving and perishing with cold, though far 
superior in number to their enemy, were led with little 
effect against the German entrenchments. On the 18th 
Bourbaki began his retreat. Werder was unable to 
follow him ; Manteuffel with a weak force was still at 
some distance, and for a moment it seemed possible 
that Bourbaki, by a rapid movement westwards, might 
crush this isolated foe. Gambetta ordered Bourbaki to 
make the attempt : the commander refused to court 
further disaster with troops who were not fit to face 
an enemy, and retreated towards Pontarlier in the 
hope of making his way to Lyons. But Manteuffel 
now descended in front of him ; divisions of Werder's 
army pressed down from the north ; the retreat was cut 
off; and the unfortunate Trench general, whom a 
telegram from Gambetta removed from his command, 
attempted to take his own life. On the 1st 

The Eastern 

ESfer! 16 of February, the wreck of his army, still 
numbering eighty-five thousand men, but 
reduced to the extremity of weakness and misery, 
sought refuge beyond the Swiss frontier. 

The war was now over. Two days after Bourbaki's 
repulse at Montbeliard the last unsuccessful sortie was 
made from Paris. There now remained provisions only 
for another fortnight ; above forty thousand of the in- 
habitants had succumbed to the privations of the siege; 
all hope of assistance from the relieving armies before 
actual famine should begin disappeared. On the 23rd 
of January Favre sought the German Chancellor at 


Versailles in order to discuss the conditions of a general 
armistice and of the capitulation of Paris. 

_. . . , .. _ , . Capitulation of 

I he negotiations lasted ior several days; on Pa and AT- 

nustace, Jan. 28. 

the 28th an armistice was signed with ^ the 
declared object that elections might at once be freely 
held for a National Assembly, which should decide 
whether the war should be continued, or on what con- 
ditions peace should be made. The conditions of the 
armistice were that the forts of Paris and all their 
material of war should be handed over to the German 
army ; that the artillery of the enceinte should be 
dismounted ; and that the regular troops in Paris should, . 
as prisoners of war, surrender their arms. The National 
Guard were permitted to retain their weapons and their 
artillery. Immediately upon the fulfilment of the first 
two conditions all facilities were to be given for the 
e-ntry of supplies of food into Paris.* 

The articles of the armistice were duly executed, and 
on the 30th of January the Prussian flag waved 
over the forts of the French capital. Orders were sent 
into the provinces by the Government that elections 
should at once be held. It had at one time been feared 
by Count Bismarck that Gambetta would acknowledge 
no armistice that might be made by his colleagues at 
Paris. But this apprehension was not realised, for, 
while protesting against a measure adopted 
without consultation with himself and his bi y at Bordeaux^ 

Feb. 12. 

companions at Bordeaux, Gambetta did not 

* Hahn, ii. 216. Valfrey, Diplomatic clu Gouvernement de k Defense 
Nationale, ii. 51. Hertslet, Map of Europe, iii. 1912, 1954. 

464 MODERN EUROPE. isn. 

actually reject the armistice. He called upon the 
nation, however, to use the interval for the collection of 
new forces; and in the hope of gaining from the 
election an Assembly in favour -of a continuation of the 
war, he published a decree incapacitating for election all 
persons who had been connected with the Government 
of Napoleon III. Against this decree Bismarck at once 
protested, and at his instance it was cancelled by the 
Government of Paris. Gambetta thereupon resigned. 
The elections were held on the 8th of February, and on 
the 12th the National Assembly was opened at Bord- 
eaux. The Government of Defence now laid down its 
powers. Thiers who had been the author of those 
fortifications which had kept the Germans at bay for 
four months after the overthrow of the Imperial armies ; 
who, in the midst of the delirium of July, 1870, had done 
all that man could do to dissuade the Imperial Govern- 
ment and its Parliament from war ; who, in spite of 
his seventy years, had, after the fall of Napoleon t 
hurried to London, to St. Petersburg, to Florence, to 
Vienna, in the hope of winning some support for France, 
was the man called by common assent to the helm 
of State. He appointed a Ministry, called' upon the 
Assembly to postpone all discussions as to the future 
Government of France, and himself proceeded to 
Versailles in order to negotiate conditions of peace. 
For several days the old man struggled with Count 
Bismarck on point after point in the Prussian demands. 
(Bismarck required the cession of Alsace and Eastern 
Lorraine, the payment of six milliards of francs, and the 


occupation of part of Paris by the German army until 
the conditions of peace should be ratified by the 
Assembly. Thiers strove hard to save Metz, but on 
this point the German staff was inexorable ; he suc- 
ceeded at last in reducing the indemnity to five milliards, 
and was given the option between retaining Belfort and 
sparing Paris the entry of the German troops. On the 
last point his patriotism decided without a moment's 
hesitation. He bade the Germans enter Paris, and saved 
Belfort for France. On the 26th of February preliminaries 
of peace were signed. Thirty thousand Preliminaries of 
German soldiers marched into the Champs 
Elysees on the 1st of March; but on that same day the 
treaty was ratified by the Assembly at Bordeaux, and 
after forty-eight hours Paris was freed from the sight of 
its conquerors. The Articles of Peace provided for the 
gradual evacuation of France by the German army as 
the instalments of the indemnity, which were allowed 
to extend over a period of three years, should be paid. 
There remained for settlement only certain matters of 
detail, chiefly connected with finance ; these, however, 
proved the object of long and bitter controversy, and 
it was not until the 10th of May that the definitive 
Treaty of Peace was signed at Frankfort. 

France had made war in order to undo the work of 
partial union effected by Prussia in 18G6 : it achieved 
the opposite result, and Germany emerged 

* German Unity. 

from the war with the Empire established. 
Immediately after the victory of Worth the Crown 
Prince had seen that the time had come for abolishing 

E E 

466 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

the line of division which severed Southern Germany 
from the Federation of the North. His own concep- 
tion of the best form of national union was a German 
Empire with its chief at Berlin. That Count Bismarck 
was without plans for uniting North and South Ger- 
many it is impossible to believe ; but the Minister 
and the Crown Prince had always been at enmity ; and 
when, after the battle of Sedan, they spoke together of 
the future, it seemed to the Prince as if Bismarck had 
scarcely thought of the federation of the Empire or of 
the re-establishment of the Imperial dignity, and as 
if he was inclined to it only under certain reserves. It 
was, however, part of Bismarck's system to exclude 
the Crown Prince as far as possible from political affairs, 
under the strange pretext that his relationship to 
Queen Victoria would be abused by the French pro- 
clivities of the English Court ; and it is possible that 
had the Chancellor after the battle of Sedan chosen to 
admit the Prince to his confidence instead of resenting 
his interference, the difference between their views as to 
the future of Germany would have been seen to be one 
rather of forms and means than of intention. But 
whatever the share of these two dissimilar spirits in the 
initiation of the last steps towards German union, the 
work, as ultimately achieved, was both in form and 
in substance that which the Crown Prince had con- 
ceived. In the course of September negotiations were 
opened with each of the Southern States for its entry 
into the Northern Confederation. Bavaria alone raised 
serious difficulties, and demanded terms to which the 


Prussian Government could not consent. Bismarck 
refrained from exercising pressure at Munich, but invited 
the several Governments to send representatives to 
Versailles for the purpose of arriving at a settlement. 
For a moment the Court of Miinich drew the sovereign 
of Wiirtemberg to its side, and orders were sent to the 
envoys of Wiirtemberg at Versailles to act with the 
Bavarians in refusing to sign the treaty projected by 
Bismarck. The Wiirtemberg Ministers hereupon ten- 
dered their resignation ; Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt 
signed the treaty, and the two dissentient kings saw 
themselves on the point of being excluded from 
United Germany. They withdrew their opposition, 
and at the end of November the treaties uniting all 1 
the Southern States with the existing Confederation 
were executed, Bavaria retaining larger separate rights 
than were accorded to any other member of the Union. 

In the acts which thus gave to Germany political 
cohesion there was nothing that altered the title 
of its chief. Bismarck, however, had in the mean- 
time informed the recalcitrant sovereigns that if 
they did not themselves offer the Imperial dignity 
to King William, the North German Parliament 
would do so. At the end of November a letter 
was accordingly sent by the King of Bavaria to 
all his fellow-sovereigns, proposing that the King of 
Prussia, as President of the newly-formed Federation, 
should assume the title of German Emperor. Shortly 
afterwards the same request was made by the same 
sovereign to King William himself, in a letter dictated 
E E 2 


by Bismarck. A deputation from the North German 
Keichstag, headed by its President, Dr. Simson, who, 
as President of the Frankfort National Assembly, had 
' in 1849 offered the Imperial Crown to King Frederick 
William, expressed the concurrence of the nation in the 
act of the Princes. It was expected that before the end 
of the year the new political arrangements would have 
been sanctioned by the Parliaments of all the States 
concerned, and the 1st of January had been fixed for the 
assumption of the Imperial title. So vigorous, however, 
was the opposition made in the Bavarian Chamber, that 
the ceremony was postponed till the 1 8th. Even then 
the final approving vote had not been taken at Munich ; 
but a second adjournment would have been fatal to the 
dignity of the occasion ; and on the 18th of January, 
in the midst of the Princes of Germany and the repre- 
sentatives of its army assembled in the Hall 

Proclamation of ., -_.-. , \r -n IT" -nr'ii- 

the Empire, Jan or Mirrors at Versailles, Hmg William as- 
sumed the title of German Emperor. The i 
first Parliament of the Empire was opened at Berlin two 
months later.4- 

The misfortunes of France did not end with the 
fall of its capital and the loss of its border-provinces ; 
the terrible drama of 1870 closed with civil war. It 
is part of the normal order of French history that when 
an established Government is overthrown, and another 
is set in its place, this second Government is in its turn 
The commune attacked by insurrection in Paris, and an 

of Palis. 

effort is made to establish the rule of the 
democracy of the capital itself, or of those who 9 for the 


moment pass for its leaders. It was so in 1793, in 1831, 
in 1848, and it was so again in 1870. Favre, Trochu, 
and the other members of the Government of Defence 
had assumed power on the downfall of Napoleon II F., 
because they considered themselves the individuals best 
able to serve the State. There were hundreds of other 
persons in Paris who had exactly the same opinion 
of themselves; and when, with the progress of the 
siege, the Government of Defence lost its popularity and 
credit, it was natural that ambitious and impatient men 
of a lower political rank should consider it time to try 
whether Paris could not make a better defence under 
their own auspices. Attempts were made before the end 
of October to overthrow the Government. They were 
repeated at intervals, but without success. The agita- 
tion, however, continued within the ranks of the 
National Guard, which, unlike the National Guard in 
the time of Louis Philippe, now included the mass of 
the working class, and was the most dangerous enemy, 
instead of the support, of Government. The capitula- 
tion brought things to a crisis. Favre had declared 
that it would be impossible to disarm the National 
Guard without a battle in the streets ; at his instance 
Hismarck allowed the National Guard to retain their 
weapons, and the fears of the Government itself thus 
prepared the way for successful insurrection. When 
the Germans were about to occupy western Paris, the 
National Guard drew off its artillery to Montmartre and 
there erected entrenchments. During the next fort- 
night, while the Germans were withdrawing from the 

i70 MODERN EUROPE. 1871. 

western forts in accordance with the conditions of peace, 
the Government and the National Guard stood facing 
one another in inaction ; on the 18th of March General 
Lecomte was ordered to seize the artillery parked at 
Montmartre. His troops, surrounded and solicited by 
the National Guard, abandoned their com- 
drn 8 nTver- mander. Lecomte was seized, and, with 

8'i i'.lts, March 18. 

General Clement Thomas, was put to death. 
A revolutionary Central Committee took possession of 
the Hotel de Ville ; the troops still remaining 1 faithful 
to the Government were withdrawn to Versailles, where 
Thiers had assembled the. Chamber. Not only Paris 
itself, but the western forts with the exception of 
Mont Valerien, fell into the hands of the insurgents. On 
the 26th of March elections were held for the Commune. 
The majority of peaceful citizens abstained from voting. 

A council was elected, which by the side 

The Commune. 

of certain harmless and well-meaning men 
contained a troop of revolutionists by profession ; and 
after the failure of all attempts at conciliation, hostilities 
began between Paris and Versailles. 

There were in the ranks of those who fought for the 
second siege- Commune some who fought in the sincere 

April 2, May 21. , ,. . - . 

beliel that their cause was that of munici- 
pal freedom ; there were others who believed, and with 
good reason, that the existence of the Eepublic was 
threatened by a reactionary Assembly at Versailles; but 
the movement was on the whole the work of fanatics who 
sought to subvert every authority but their own ; and 
the unfortunate mob who followed them, in so far as they 

1971. THE COMMUNE. 471 

fought for anything beyond the daily pay which had 
been their only means of sustenance since the siege 
began, fought for they knew not what. As the conflict 
was prolonged, it took on both sides^ a character of 
atrocious violence and cruelty. The murder of Generals 
Lecomte and Thomas at the outset was avenged by the 
execution of some of the first prisoners taken by the 
troops of Versailles. Then hostages were seized by the 
Commune. The slaughter in cold blood of three hundred 
National Guards surprised at Clamart by the besiegers 
gave to the Parisians the example of massacre. When, 
after a siege of six weeks, in which Paris suffered far more 
severely than it had suffered from the cannonade of the 
Germans, the troops of Versailles at length made their 
way into the capital, huinanity, civilisation, seemed to 
have vanished in the orgies of devils. The defenders, 
$s they fell back, murdered their hostages, and left 
behind them palaces, museums, the entire public inheri- 
tance of the nation in its capital, in flames. The 
conquerors during several days shot down all whom 
they took fighting, and in many cases put to death 
whole bands of prisoners without distinction. The 
temper of the army was such that the Government, 
even if it had desired, could probably not have 
mitigated the terrors of this vengeance. But there 
was little sign anywhere of an inclination^ mercy, 
Courts-martial and executions continuecL^ong after the 
heat of combat was overT^^Ar year passed, and the 

tribunals were still busy with their work. Above 
ten thousand persons were sentenced to transpor- 

472 MODERN EUROPE. 1870. 

tation or imprisonment before public justice was 

The material losses which France sustained at the 
hands of the invader and in civil war were soon 
repaired; but from the battle of Worth down to the 
overthrow of the Commune France had been effaced as 
a European Power, and its effacement was turned to 
good account by two nations who were not its enemies. 
Russia, with the sanction of Europe, threw off the 
trammels which had been imposed upon it in the Black 
Sea by the Treaty of 1856. Italy gained possession of 
Rome. Soon after the declaration of war the troops of 
France, after an occupation of twenty-one years broken 
only by an interval of some months in 1867, were with- 
drawn from the Papal territory. Whatever may have 
been the understanding with Victor Emmanuel on which 
Napoleon recalled his troops from Civita Vecchia, the 
Entry O f battle of Sedan set Italy free ; and on the 

. 20th of September the National Army, 

after overcoming a brief show of resistance, 
entered Rome. The unity of Italy was at last com- 
pleted ; Florence ceased to be the national capital. A 
body of laws passed by the Italian Parliament, and 
known as the Guarantees, assured to the Pope the 
honours and immunities of a sovereign, the possession of 
the Vatican and the Lateran palaces, and a princely 
ihePapac income ; in the appointment of Bishops and 

generally in the government of the Church 
a fulness of authority was freely left to him such as 
he possessed in no other European land. But Pius 

1870. ROME. 473 

would accept no compromise for the loss of his temporal 
power. He spurned the reconciliation with the Italian 
people, which had now for the first time since 1849 
become possible. He declared Borne to be in the 
possession of brigands ; and, with a fine affectation of 
disdain for Victor Emmanuel and the Italian Govern- 
ment, he invented, and sustained down to the end of his 
life, before a world too busy to pay much heed to his 
performance, the reproachful part of the Prisoner of the 
Vatican. > 


France after 1871 Alliance of the Three Emperors Revolt of Herzegovina 
The Andrassy Note Murder of the Consuls at Salonika The Berlin 
Memorandum Rejected by England Abdul Aziz deposed Massacres in 
Bulgaria Servia and Montenegro declare War Opinion in England 
Disraeli Meeting of Emperors at Reichstadt Servian Campaign Declara- 
tion of the Czar Conference at Constantinople Its Failure The London 
Protocol Russia declares War Advance on the Balkans Osman at Plevna 
Second Attack on Plevna The Shipka Pass Roumania Third Attack 
on Plevna Todleben Fall of Plevna Passage of the Balkans Armistice 
England The Fleet passes the Dardanelles Treaty of San Stefano 
England and Russia Secret Agreement Convention with Turkey Con- 
gress of Berlin Treaty of Berlin Bulgaria. 

THE storm of 1870 was followed by some years of 
France after European calm. France, recovering with 
wonderful rapidity from the wounds in- 
flicted by the war, paid with ease the instalments of 
its debt to Germany, and saw its soil liberated from 
the foreigner before the period fixed by the Treaty 
of Frankfort. The efforts of a reactionary Assembly 
were kept in check by M. Thiers ; the Eepublic, as 
the form of government which divided Frenchmen the 
least, was preferred by him to the monarchical re- 
storation which might have won France allies at some 
of the European Courts. For two years Thiers baffled 
or controlled the royalist majority at Versailles 
which sought to place the Comte de Chambord or 
the chief of the House of Orleans on the throne, 
and thus saved his country from the greatest of all 

1871-77. FRANCE AFTER THE WAR. 475 

perils, the renewal of civil war. In 1873 he fell 
before a combination of his opponents, and McMahon 
succeeded to the Presidency, only to find that the 
royalist cause was made hopeless by the refusal of the 
Comte de Chambord to adopt the Tricolour nag, and 
that France, after several years of trial, definitely preferred 
the Republic. Meanwhile, Prince Bismarck had known 
how to frustrate all plans for raising a coalition against 
victorious Germany among the Powers which had been 
injured by its successes, or whose interests were threat- 
ened by its greatness. He saw that a Bourbon or a 
Napoleon on the throne of France would find far more 
sympathy and confidence at Vienna and St. Petersburg 
than the shifting chief of a Republic, and ordered Count 
Arnim, the German Ambassador at Paris, who wished 
to promote a Napoleonic restoration, to desist from all 
attempts to weaken the Republican Government. At 
St. Petersburg, where after the misfortunes of 1815 
France had found its best friends, the German states- 
man had as yet little to fear. Bismarck had sup- 
ported Russia in undoing the Treaty of Paris; in 
announcing the conclusion of peace with France, the 
German Emperor had assured the Czar in the most 
solemn language that his services in preventing the 
war of 1870 from becoming general should never be for- 
gotten ; and, whatever might be the feeling of his sub- 
jects, Alexander II. continued to believe that Russia could 
find no steadier friend than the Government of Berlin. 

With Austria Prince Bismarck had a more difficult 
part to play. He could hope for no real understanding 

476 MODERN EUROPE. 1872, 

so long as Beust remained at the head of affairs. But 
the events of 1870, utterly frustrating Beust's plans 
Alliance of the f r a coalition against Prussia, and definitely 
closing for Austria all hope of recovering 
its position within Germany, had shaken the Minister's 
position. Bismarck was able to offer to the Emperor 
Francis Joseph the sincere and cordial friendship of the 
powerful German Empire, on the condition that Austria 
should frankly accept the work of 1866 and 1870. He 
had dissuaded his master after the victory of Konig- 
gratz from annexing any Austrian territory ; he had 
imposed no condition of peace that left behind it a 
lasting exasperation ; and he now reaped the reward of 
his foresight. Francis Joseph accepted the friendship 
offered him from Berlin, and dismissed Count Beust 
from office, calling to his place the Hungarian Minister 
Andrassy, who, by conviction as well as profession, 
welcomed the establishment of a German Empire, and 
the definite abandonment by Austria of its interference 
in German affairs. In the summer of 1872 the three 
Emperors, accompanied by their Ministers, met in 
Berlin. No formal alliance was made, but a relation 
was established of sufficient intimacy to insure Prince 
Bismarck against any efforts that might be made by 
France to gain an ally. For five years this so-called 
League of the three Emperors continued in more or less 
effective existence, and condemned France to isolation. 
In the apprehension of the French people, Germany, 
gorged with the five milliards but still lean and 
ravenous, sought only for some new occasion *for war. 


Tiiis was not the case. The German nation had entered 
unwillingly into the war of 1870 ; that its ruler, when 
once his great aim had been achieved, sought peace not 
only in word but in deed the history; of subsequent 
years has proved. The alarms which at intervals were 
raised at Paris and elsewhere had little real foundation ; 
and when next the peace of Europe was broken, it was 
not by a renewal of the struggle on the Vosges, but by 
a conflict in the East, which, terrible as it was in the 
sufferings and the destruction of life which it involved, 
was yet no senseless duel between two jealous nations, 
but one of the most fruitful in results of all modern 
wars, rescuing whole provinces from Ottoman dominion, 
and leaving behind it in place of a chaos of outworn 

' barbarism at least the elements for a future of national 
independence among the Balkan population. 

<? ; in the summer of 1875 Herzegovina rose against 
its Turkish masters, and in Bosnia conflicts broke out 
between Christians and Mohammedans. The 

. . . , Revolt of Her- 

msurreetion was vigorously, though pn- z^vinu, Aug. 

vately, supported by Servia and Montenegro, 
and for some months baffled all the efforts made by the 
Porte for its suppression. Many thousands of the 
Christians, flying from a devastated land and a merci- 
less enemy, sought refuge beyond the Austrian frontier, 
and became a burden upon the Austrian Government. 
The agitation among the Slavic neighbours and kins- 
men of the insurgents threatened the peace of Austria 
itself, where Slav and Magyar were almost as ready to 
fall upon one another us Christian and Turk. Andrassy 


entered into communications with the Governments of 
St. Petersburg and Berlin as to the adoption of a com- 
mon line of policy by the three Empires towards the 
Porte ; and a scheme of reforms, intended to effect the 
pacification of the insurgent provinces, was drawn up by 
the three Ministers in concert with one another. This 
project, which was known as the Andrassy Note, and 
which received the approval of England and France, 
demanded from the Porte the establishment of full and 
entire religious liberty, the abolition of the farming of 
taxes, the application of the revenue produced by direct 
taxation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the needs of 
those provinces themselves, the institution of a Com- 
mission composed equally of Christians and Moham- 
medans to control the execution of these reforms and 
of those promised by the Porte, and finally the im- 
provement of the agrarian condition of the popula- 
tion by the sale to them of waste lands belonging 
to the State. The Note demanding these reforms 
Note, was presented in Constantinople on the 

31st of January, 1876. The Porte, which 
had already been lavish of promises to the insurgents, 
raised certain objections in detail, but ultimately de- 
clared itself willing to grant in substance the conces- 
sions which were specified by the Powers.* 

Armed with this assurance, the representatives of 
Austria now endeavoured to persuade the insurgents to 
lay down their arms and the refugees to return to their 
homes. But the answer was made that promises enough 

* Par! Pap. 1876, vol. Ixxxiv., pp. 74, 96 


had already been given by the Sultan, and that the 
question was, not what more was to be written on a 
piece of paper, but how the execution of these promises 
was to be enforced. Without some guarantee from the 
Great Powers of Europe the refugees refused to place 
themselves again at the mercy of the Turk and the 
leaders in Herzegovina refused to disband their troops. 
The conflict broke out afresh with greater energy ; the 
intervention of the Powers, far from having 

i i , , , P . . , . Murder of the 

produced peace, roused the ranatical passions consuls at saio- 

nika, May 6. 

of the Mohammedans both against the 
Christian rayahs and against the foreigner to whom they 
had appealed. A wave of religious, of patriotic agita- 
tion, of political disquiet, of barbaric fury, passed over 
the Turkish Empire. On the 6th of May the Prussian 
and the French Consuls at Salonika were attacked and 
murdered by the mob. In Smyrna and Constantinople 
there were threatening movements against the European 
inhabitants ; in Bulgaria, the Circassian settlers and the 
hordes of irregular troops whom the Government hnd 
recently sent into that province waited only for the 
first sign of an expected insurrection to fall upon their 
prey and deluge the land with blood. 

As soon as it became evident that peace was not to 
be produced by Count Andrassy's Note, the Ministers 
of the three Empires determined to meet one another 
with the view of arranging further diplo- 
matic steps to be taken in common. Berlin, Memorandum, 

1 May 13. 

which the Czar was about to visit, was 

chosen as the meeting-place ; the date of the meeting 

480 MODERN EUROPE. 1,76. 

was fixed for the second week in May. It was in the 
interval between the despatch of Prince Bismarck's 
invitation and the arrival of the Czar, with Prince 
Gortschakoff and Count Andrassy, that intelligence 
came of the murder of the Prussian and French Con- 
suls at Salonika. This event gave a deeper serious- 
ness to the deliberations now held. The Ministers 
declared that if the representatives of two foreign 
Powers could be thus murdered in broad daylight in a 
peaceful town under the eyes of the powerless authori- 
ties, the Christians of the insurgent provinces might 
well decline to entrust themselves to an exasperated 
enemy. An effective guarantee for the execution of the 
promises made by the Porte had become absolutely 
necessary. The conclusions of the Ministers were 
embodied in a Memorandum, which declared that an 
armistice of two months must be imposed on the com- 
batants ; that the mixed Commission mentioned in the 
Andrassy Note must be at once called into being, with 
a Christian native of Herzegovina at its head ; and that 
the reforms promised by the Porte must be carried out 
under the superintendence of the representatives of the 
European Powers. If before the end of the armistice 
the Porte should not have given its assent to these 
terms, the Imperial Courts declared that they must 
support these diplomatic efforts by measures of a more 
effective character.* 

On the same day that this Memorandum was 
signed, Prince Bismarck invited the British, the French, 

* Parl. Pap. 187t>, vol. Ixxxiv., p. 183. 


and Italian Ambassadors to meet the Russian and the 
Austrian Chancellors at his residence. They did so. The 
Memorandum was read, and an urgent request was 
made that Great Britain, France, and Italy would com- 
bine with the Imperial Courts in support of the Berlin 
Memorandum as they had in support of the Andrassy 
Note. As Prince Gortschakoff and Andrassy were 
staying: in Berlin only for two days longer, 

J J England alone 

it was hoped that answers might be received SS^SoSS". 
by telegraph within forty-eight hours. 
Within that time answers arrived from the French and 
Italian Governments accepting the Berlin Memorandum ; 
the reply from London did not arrive till five days later ; it 
announced the refusal of the Government to join in the 
course proposed. Pending further negotiations on this 
subject, French, German, Austrian, Italian, and Russian 
ships of war were sent to Salonika to enforce satisfaction 
for the murder of the Consuls. The Cabinet of London, 
declining to associate itself with the concert of the 


Powers, and stating that Great Britain, while intending 
nothing in the nature of a menace, could not permit 
territorial changes to be made in the East without it;s 
own consent, despatched the fleet to Besika Bay. 

Up to this time little attention had been paid in 
England to the revolt of the Christian subjects of the 
Porte or its effect on European politics. Now, how- 
ever, a series of events began which excited the interest 
and even the passion of the English people Abdul A,^ de _ 
in an extraordinary degree. The ferment P 06 * 1 -^ 29 - 

in Constantinople was deepening. On the 29th of May 
F F 

482 MODERN EUROPE. 1876. 

the Sultan Abdul Aziz was deposed by Midhat Pasha 
and Hussein Avni, the former the chief of the party 
of reform, the latter the representative of the older 
Turkish military and patriotic spirit which Abdul 
Aziz had incensed by his subserviency to Russia. A 
few days later the deposed Sultan was murdered. Hus- 
sein Avni and another rival of Midhat were assas- 
sinated by a desperado as they sat at the council ; 
Murad V., who had been raised to the throne, proved 
imbecile ; and Midhat, the destined regenerator of the 
Ottoman Empire as many outside Turkey believed, 
grasped all but the highest power in the State. To- 
wards the end of June reports reached western Europe 
Massacres in ^ ^ ie repression of an insurrection in Bul- 
garia with measures of atrocious violence. 
Servia and Montenegro, long active in support of their 
kinsmen who were in arms, declared war. 

Servia and Mon- . ., 

tenegro declare l he reports trom .Bulgaria, at nrst vagnie, 

war, July 2. 

took more definite form ; and at length the 
correspondents of German as well as English news- 
papers, making their way to the district south of the 
Balkans, found in villages still strewed with skeletons 
and human remains the terrible evidence of what had 
passed. The British Ministry, relying upon the state- 
ments of Sir H. Elliot, Ambassador at Constantinople, 
at first denied the seriousness of the massacres : they 
directed, however, that investigations should be made 
on the spot by a member of the Embassy; and Mr. 
Baring, Secretary of Legation, was sent to Bulgaria 
with this duty. Baring's report confirmed the accounts 


which his chief had refused to believe, and placed 
the number of the victims, rightly or wrongly, at not 
less than twelve thousand.* 

The Bulgarian massacres acted on Europe in 1876 
as the massacre of Chios had acted oh Europe in 1822. 
In England especially they excited the deepest horror, 
and completely changed the tone of public opinion in 
opinion towards the Turk. Hitherto the 
public mind had scarcely been conscious of the questions 
that were at issue in the East. Herzegovina, Bosnia, 
Bulgaria, were not familiar names like Greece ; the 
English people hardly knew where these countries 
were, or that they were not inhabited by Turks. The 
Crimean War had left behind it the tradition of friend- 
ship with the Sultan ; it needed some lightning-flash, 
some shock penetrating all ranks of society, to dispel 
once and for all the conventional idea of Turkey as a 
community resembling a European State, and to bring 
home to the English people the true condition of the 
Christian races of the Balkan under their Ottoman 
masters. But this the Bulgarian massacres effectively 
did ; and from this time the great mass of the English 
people, who had sympathised so strongly with the 
Italians and the Hungarians in their struggle for 
national independence, were not disposed to allow the 
influence of Great Britain to be used for the perpetua- 
tion of Turkish ascendency over the Slavic races. 
There is little doubt that if in the autumn of 1876 the 
nation had had the opportunity of expressing its views 

* Parl. Pap. 1877, voL xc., p. 143. 
F F 2 


484 MODERN EUROPE. 1876. 

by a Parliamentary election, it would have insisted on 
the adoption of active measures in concert with the 
Powers which were prepared to force reform upon the 
Porte. But the Parliament of 1876 was but two years 
old ; the majority which supported the Government 
was still unbroken; and at the head of the Cabinet there 
was a man gifted with extraordinary tenacity of purpose, 
with great powers of command over others, and with 
a clear, cold, untroubled apprehension of the line of 
conduct which he intended to pursue. It was one of 
the strangest features of this epoch that a Minister who 
in a long career had never yet exercised the slightest 
influence upon foreign affairs, and who was not him- 
self English by birth, should have impressed in such 
an extreme degree the stamp of his own individuality 
upon the conduct of our foreign policy ; that he should 
have forced England to the very front in the crisis 
through which Europe was passing; and that, for 
good or for evil, he should have reversed the tendency 
which since the Italian war of 1859 had seemed ever 
to be drawing England further and further away from 
Continental affairs. 

Disraeli's conception of Parliamentary politics was 

an ironical one. It had pleased the British nation 

that the leadership of one of its great political parties 

should be won by a man of genius only 

Disraeli. J J 

on the condition of accommodating himself 
to certain singular fancies of his contemporaries ; and 
for twenty years, from the time of his attacks upon 
ir Robert Peel for the abolition of the corn-la\ys down 

1876. DISRAELI. 485 

to the time when he educated his party into thp, 
democratic Eeform Bill of 1867, Disraeli with an ex- 
cellent grace suited himself to the somewhat strange 
parts which he was required to play. -, But after 1874, 
when he was placed in office at the head of a powerful 
majority in both Houses of Parliament and of a sub- 
missive Cabinet, the antics ended ; the epoch of states- 
manship, and of statesmanship based on the leader's 
own individual thought not on the commonplace of 
public creeds, began. At a time when Cavour was 
rice-growing and Bismarck unknown outside his own 
county, Disraeli had given to the world in Tancred his 
visions of Eastern Empire. Mysterious chieftains 
planned the regeneration of Asia by a new crusade of 
Arab and Syrian votaries of the one living faith, and 
lightly touched on the transfer of Queen Victoria's Court 
.from London to Delhi. Nothing indeed is perfect; 
and Disraeli's eye was favoured with such extra- 
ordinary perceptions of the remote that it proved 
a little uncertain in its view of matters not quite 
without importance nearer home. He thought the 
attempt to establish Italian independence a misde- 
meanour ; he listened to Bismarck's ideas on the future 
of Germany, and described them as the vapourings of 
a German baron. Fora quarter of a century Disraeli 
had dazzled and amused the House of Commons with- 
out, as it seemed, drawing inspiration from any one 
great cause or discerning any one of the political goals 
towards which the nations of Europe were tending. 
At length, however, the time came for the realisation 

486 MODERN EUROPE. isrft, 

of his own imperial policy ; and before the Eastern 
question had risen conspicuously above the horizon 
in Europe, Disraeli, as Prime Minister of England, 
had begun to act in Asia and Africa. He sent the 
Prince of Wales to hold Durbars and to hunt tigers 
amongst the Hindoos ; he proclaimed the Queen 
Empress of India ; he purchased the Khedive's shares 
in the Suez Canal. Thus far it had been uncertain 
whether there was much in the Minister' policy beyond 
what was theatrical and picturesque; but when a 
great part of the nation began to ask for intervention 
on behalf of the Eastern Christians against the Turks, 
they found out that Disraeli's purpose was solid 
enough. Animated by a deep distrust and fear of 
Russia, he returned to what had been the policy of 
Tory Governments in the days before Canning, the 
identification of British interests with the maintenance 
of Ottoman power. If a generation of sentimentalists 
were willing to sacrifice the grandeur of an Empire to 
their sympathies with an oppressed people, it was not 
Disraeli who would be their instrument. When the 
massacre of Batak was mentioned in the House of 
Commons, he dwelt on the honourable qualities of the 
Circassians ; when instances of torture were alleged, 
he remarked that an oriental people generally ter- 
minated its connection with culprits in a more expedi- 
tious manner.* There were indeed Englishmen enough 
who loved their country as well as Disraeli, and who had 
proved their love by sacrifices which Disraeli had not had 

* Parl. Deb. July 10, 1876, verbatim. 


187. DISRAELI. 187 

occasion to make, who thought it humiliating that the 
^n-atness of England should be purchased by the servi- 
tude and oppression of other races, and that the security 
of their Empire should be deemed to r^st on so miserable 
a thing as Turkish rule. These were considerations to 
which Disraeli did not attach much importance. He 
believed the one thing needful to be the curbing of 
iiussia; and, unlike Canning, who held that Russia 
would best be kept in check by England's own armed 
co-operation with it in establishing the independence 
of Greece, he declined from the first to entertain any 
project of imposing reform on the Sultan by force, -~ 
doubting only to what extent it would be possible for 
him to support the Sultan in resistance to other 
Powers. According to his own later statement he 
would himself, had he been left unfettered, have de- 
vfinitely informed the Czar that if he should make war 
upon the Porte England would act as its ally. Public 
opinion in England, however, rendered this course im- 
possible. The knife of Circassian and Bashi-Bazouk 
had severed the bond with Great Britain which had 
saved Turkey in 1854. Disraeli henceforward Earl of 
Beaconsfield could only utter grim anathemas against 
Servia for presuming to draw the sword upon its 
rightful lord and master, and chide those impatient 
English who, like the greater man whose name is 
associated with Beaconsfield, considered that the world 
need not be too critical as to the means of getting rid 
of such an evil as Ottoman rule.* 

See Burke's speech on the Russian armament, March 29, 1791, arid 

488 MODERN EUROPE. 1876. 

The rejection by England of the Berlin Memo- 
randum and the proclamation of war by Servia and 
Montenegro were followed by the closer union of the three 
Imperial Courts. The Czar and the Emperor Francis 
Joseph, with their Ministers, met at Eeichstadt in 
Bohemia on the 8th of July. According to official 
statements the result of the meeting was 
that the two sovereigns determined upon 

& r 

stadt, JulyS. . 

non-intervention for the present, and pro- 
posed only to renew the attempt to unite all the 
Christian Powers in a common policy when some 
definite occasion should arise. Rumours, however, 
which proved to be correct, went abroad that something 
of the nature of an eventual partition of European 
Turkey had been the object of negotiation. A Treaty 
had in fact been signed providing that if Russia 
should liberate Bulgaria by arms, Austria should enter 
into possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
neutrality of Austria had virtually been purchased at 
this price, and Russia had thus secured freedom of 
action in the event of the necessary reforms not being 
forced upon Turkey by the concert of Europe. Sooner 
perhaps than Prince GortschakofT had expected, the 
religious enthusiasm of the Russian people and their 
sympathy for their kinsmen and fellow-believers beyond 
the Danube forced the Czar into vigorous action. In 

the passage on " the barbarous anarchic despotism " of Turkey in his Re- 
flections on the French Revolution, p. 150, Clar. Edit. Burke lived and died 
at Beaconsfield, and his grave is there. There seems, however, to be no 
evidence for the story that he was about to receive a peerago with the 
title of Beaconsfield, when the death of his son Ircko all his hopes. 



spite of the assistance of several thousands of Eussian 
volunteers and of the leadership of the Russian General 
Tchernaieff, the Servians were defeated in 

-i 1 1 1 1 n l mi J '^ ie Servian 

their struggle with the lurks. Ine media- ?& 

July Oct. 

tion of England was in vain tendered to 
the Porte on the only terras on which even at 
London peace was seen to he possible, the mainten- 
ance of the existing rights of Servia and the establish- 
ment of provincial autonomy in Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
and Bulgaria. After a brief suspension of hostilities 
in September war was renewed. The Servians were 
driven from their positions : Alexinatz was captured, 
the road to Belgrade lay open, and the doom of Bul- 
garia seemed likely to descend upon the conquered 
Principality. The Turks offered indeed a five months' 
armistice, which would have saved them the risks of 
a winter campaign and enabled them to crush their 
enemy with accumulated forces in the following spring. 
This, by the advice of Russia, the Servians refused to 
accept. On the 30th of October a Russian 
ultimatum was handed in at Constantinople an^ 8 tke, c 

Oct. 30. 

by the Ambassador Ignatieff, requiring 
within forty-eight hours the grant to Servia of an 
armistice for two months and the cessation of hostilities. 
The Porte submitted ; and wherever Slav and Ottoman 
stood facing one another in arms, in Herzegovina and 
Bosnia as well as Servia and Montenegro, there was a 
pause in the struggle. 

The imminence of a war between Russia and Turkey in 
the last days of October and the close connection between 

490 MODERN EUROPE. 1876. 

Kussia and the Servian cause justified the anxiety of 

the British Government. This anxiety the Czar sought 

to dispel by a frank declaration of his own 

thTc* r ar, lon views. On the 2nd of November he entered 

Nov. 2. 

into conversation with the British Ambassa- 
dor, Lord A. Loftus, and assured him on his word of 
honour that he had no intention of acquiring Constanti- 
nople ; that if it should be necessary for him to occupy 
part of Bulgaria his army would remain there only 
until peace was restored and the security of the Christian 
population established; and generally, that he desired 
nothing more earnestly than a complete accord between 
England and Russia in the maintenance of European 
peace and the improvement of the condition of the 
Christian population in Turkey. He stated, however, 
with perfect clearness that if the Porte should continue 
to refuse the reforms demanded by Europe, and the 
Powers should put up with its continued refusal, Russia 
would act alone. Disclaiming in words of great 
earnestness all desire for territorial aggrandisement, 
he protested against the suspicion with which his policy 
was regarded in England, and desired that his words 
might be made public in England as a message of peace.* 
Lord Derby, then Foreign Secretary, immediately ex- 
pressed the satisfaction with which the Government 

had received these assurances ; and on the 

England pro- ... 

p^eaa confer- tollowmg day an invitation was sent from 
London to all the European Powers pro- 
posing a Conference at Constantinople, on the basis of 
* Parl. Pap. 1877, vol. xc., p. 642 ; 1878, vol. Ixxxi., p.*679. 


a common recognition of the integrity of the Otto- 
- man Empire, accompanied by a disavowal on the part 
of each of the Powers of all aims at aggrandisement or 
separate advantage. In proposing this- -Conference the 
Government acted in conformity with the expressed 
desire of the Czar. But there were two voices within 
the Cabinet. Lord Beaconsfield, had it been in his 
power, would have informed Russia categorically 
that England would support the Sultan if attacked. 
This the country and the Cabinet forbade : but the 
Premier had his own opportunities of utterance, and 
at the Guildhall Banquet on the 9th of November, six 
days after the Foreign Secretary hud acknowledged the 
Czar's message of friendship, and before this message 
had been made known to the English people, Lord 
Beaconsfield uttered words which, if they were not idle 
blaster, could have been intended only as a menace to 
the Czar or as an appeal to the war-party at home : 
" Though the policy of England is peace, there is no 
country so well prepared for war as our own. If 
England enters into conflict in a righteous cause, her 
resources are inexhaustible. She is not a country that 
when she enters into a campaign has to ask herself 
whether she can support a second or a third campaign. 
She enters into a campaign which she will not ter- 
minate till right is done." */ 

The proposal made by the Earl of Derby for a 
Conference at Constantinople was accepted by all 
the Powers, and accepted on the bases specified. 
Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India, was 

492 MODERN EUROPE. 1876. 

appointed to represent Great Britain in conjunction 
with Sir H. Elliot, its Ambassador. The Minister 
made his journey to Constantinople by way of the 
European capitals, and learnt at Berlin that the good 
understanding between the German Emperor and the 
Czar extended to Eastern affairs. Whether the British 
Government had as yet gained any trustworthy in- 
formation on the Treaty of Eeichstadt is doubtful; 
but so far as the public eye could judge, there was now, 
in spite of the tone assumed by Lord Beaconsfield, a 
fairer prospect of the solution of the Eastern question 
by the establishment of some form of autonomy in the 
Christian provinces than there had been at any previous 
time. The Porte itself recognised the serious intention 
of the Powers, and, in order to forestall the work of 
the Conference, prepared a scheme of constitutional 
reform that far surpassed the wildest claims 

Project of Otto- /> TT . . r o< i -vr ii 1 

j?an constitu- or Herzegoviman or or Serb. JNothing less 
than a complete system of Parliamentary 
Government, with the very latest ingenuities from 
France and Belgium, was to be granted to the entire 
Ottoman Empire. That Midhat Pasha, who was the 
author of this scheme, may have had some serious end 
in view is not impossible ; but with the mass of Palace- 
functionaries at Constantinople it was simply a device 
for embarrassing the West with its own inventions ; 
and the action of men in power, both great and 
small, continued after the constitution had come into 
nominal existence to be exactly what it had been 
before. The very terms of the constitution must have 


been unintelligible to all but those who had been 
employed at foreign courts. The Government might 
as well have announced its intention of clothing the 
Balkans with the flora of the deep sea. > 

In the second week of December the representatives 
of the six Great Powers assembled at Constantinople. 
In order that the demands of Europe should be pre- 
sented to the Porte with unanimity, they determined 
to hold a series of preliminary meetings with one 
another before the formal opening of the Conference 
and before communicating with the Turks. At these 
meetings, after Ignatieff had withdrawn his * Dema nd 8 
proposal for a Russian occupation of Bui- Preliminary 


garia, complete accord was attained. It Dec - 11 - 21 - 
was resolved to demand the cession of certain small 
districts by the Porte to Servia and Montenegro ; the 
grant of administrative autonomy to Bosnia, Herze- 
govina, and Bulgaria; the appointment in each of 
these provinces of Christian governors, whose terms of 
office should be for five years, and whose nomination 
should be subject to the approval of the Powers ; the 
confinement of Turkish troops to the fortresses; the 
removal of the bands of Circassians to Asia ; and finally 
the execution of these reforms under the superintendence 
of an International Commission, which should have at 
its disposal a corps of six thousand gendarmes to be 
enlisted in Switzerland or Belgium. By these arrange- 
ments, while the Sultan retained his sovereignty and 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire remained un- 
impaired, it was conceived that the Christian population 

494 MODERN EUROPE. isre. 

would be effectively secured against Turkish violence 
and caprice. 

All differences between the representatives of the 
European Powers having been removed, the formal 
Conference was opened on the 23rd of December under 
the presidency of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Savfet 
Pasha. The proceedings had not gone far when they 
were interrupted by the roar of cannon. Savfet ex- 
plained that the new Ottoman constitution was being 
promulgated, and that the salvo which the members of 
the Conference heard announced the birth of an era 
of universal happiness and prosperity in the Sultan's 
dominions. It soon appeared that in the presence of 
this great panacea there was no place for the reforming 
efforts of the Christian Powers. Savfet 

The Turks re- 

fuse the dem^ds declared from the first that, whatever con- 

of the Con- 
ference, Jan. 20, cessions might be made on other .points, 

the Sultan's Government would never con- 
sent to the establishment of a Foreign Commission 
to superintend the execution of its reforms, nor to the 
joint action of the Powers in the appointment of the 
governors of its provinces. It was in vain argued 
that without such foreign control Europe possessed no 
guarantee that the promises and the good intentions 
of the Porte, however gratifying these might be, would 
be carried into effect. Savfet replied that by the 
Treaty of 1856 the Powers had declared the Ottoman 
Empire to stand on exactly the same footing as any 
other great State in Europe, and had expressly debarred 
themselves from interfering, under whatever circum- 


stances, with its internal administration. The position 
of the Turkish representative at the Conference was 
in fact the only logical one. In the Treaty of Paris 
the Powers had elaborately pledged themselves to an 
absurdity ; and this Treaty the Turk was never weary 
of throwing in their faces. But the situation was not 
one for lawyers and for the interpretation of documents. 
The Conference, after hearing the arguments and the 
counter-projects of the Turkish Ministers, after re- 
considering its own demands and modifying these in 
many important points in deference to Ottoman wishes, 
adhered to the demand for a Foreign Commission and 
for a European control over the appointment of 
governors. Midhat, who was now Grand Vizier, sum- 
moned the Great Council of the Empire, and presented 
to it the demands of the Conference. These demands 
the Great Council unanimously rejected. Lord Salisbury 
had already warned the Sultan what would be the 
results of continued obstinacy; and after receiving 
Midhat's flnal reply the ambassadors of all the Powers, 
together with the envoys who had been specially ap- 
pointed for the Conference, quitted Constantinople. 

Russia, since the beginning of November, had been 
actively preparing for war. The Czar had left the world in 
no doubt as to his own intentions in case of the failure 
of the European concert ; it only remained for him to 
ascertain whether, after the settlement of a 
definite scheme of reform by the Conference Proto^ii, 

J Mar. 31. 

and the rejection of this scheme by the 

Porte, the Powers would or would not take steps to 

496 MODERN EUROPE. 1877. 

enforce their conclusion. England suggested that the 
Sultan should be allowed a year to carry out his good 
intentions : Gortschakoff inquired whether England 
would pledge itself to action if, at the end of the 
year, reform was not effected ; but no such pledge was 
forthcoming. With the object either of discovering 
some arrangement in which the Powers would combine, 
or of delaying the outbreak of war until the Russian 
preparations were more advanced and the season more 
favourable, Ignatieif was sent round to all the European 
Courts. He visited England, and subsequently drew 
up, with the assistance of Count Schouvaloff, Russian 
Ambassador at London, a document which gained the 
approval of the British as well as the Continental 
Governments. This document, known as the London 
Protocol, was signed on the 31st of March. After a 
reference to the promises of reform made by the Porte, 
it stated that the Powers intended to watch carefully 
by their representatives over the manner in which these 
promises were carried into effect; that if their hopes 
should be once more disappointed they should regard 
the condition of affairs as incompatible with the 
interests of Europe ; and that in such case they would 
decide in common upon the means best fitted to 
secure the well-being of the Christian population and 
the interests of general peace. Declarations relative 
to the disarmament of Russia, which it was now the 
principal object of the British Government to effect, 
were added. There was indeed so little of a sub- 
stantial engagement in this Protocol that it would have 


been surprising had Russia disarmed without obtaining 
some further guarantee for the execution of reform. 
But weak as the Protocol was, it was rejected by the 
Porte. Once more the appeal was made 

_ _,. . . The Porte re- 

to the Treaty of Pans, once more the jectathepro- 


Sultan protested against the encroachment 
of the Powers on his own inviolable rights. Lord 
Beaconsfi eld's Cabinet even now denied that the last 
word had been spoken, and professed to entertain some 
hope in the effect of subsequent diplomatic steps ; 
but the rest of Europe asked and expected no further 
forbearance on the part of Russia. The army of 
operations already lay on the Pruth : the Grand Duke 
Nicholas, brother of the Czar, was appointed to its 
command ; and on the 24th of April the 
Russian Government issued its declaration ^^AP^L* 
o'f war. S- 

Between the Russian frontier and the Danube lay 
the Principality of Roumania. A convention signed 
before the outbreak of hostilities gave to the Russian 
army a free passage through this territory, and Rou- 
mania subsequently entered the war as Russia's ally. 
It was not, however, until the fourth week of June 
that the invaders were able to cross the Danube. Seven 
army-corps were assembled in Roumania ; of these one 
crossed the Lower Danube into the Dobrudscha, two 
were retained in Roumania as a reserve, 

t f j ,v , i i Passage of the 

and four crossed the river in the neigh- Danube, 

June 27. 

bourhood of Sistowa, in order to enter upon 
the Bulgarian campaign. It was the desire of the 
c c 

498 MODERN EUROPE. 1877. 

Eussians to throw forward the central part of their 
army by the line of the river Jantra upon the Balkans ; 
with their left to move against Eustchuk and the 
Turkish armies in the eastern fortresses of Bulgaria; 
with their right to capture Nicopolis, and guard the 
central column against any flank attack from the 
west. But both in Europe and in Asia the Eussians 
had underrated the power of their adversary, and 
entered upon the war with insufficient forces. Ad- 
vantages won by their generals on the Armenian 
frontier while the European army was still marching 
through Eoumania were lost in the course of the next 
few weeks. Bayazid and other places that fell into the 
hands of the Eussians at the first onset were recovered 
by the Turks under Mukhtar Pasha ; and within a few 
days after the opening of the European campaign the 
Eussian divisions in Asia were everywhere retreating 
upon their own frontier. The Bulgarian campaign was 
marked by the same rapid successes of the invader at 
the outset, to be followed, owing to the same insuffi- 
ciency of force, by similar disasters. Encountering 
no effective opposition on the Danube, the Eussians 
Advance on the pushed forward rapidly towards the Balkans 
by the line of the Jantra. The Turkish 
army lay scattered in the Bulgarian fortresses, from 
Widdin in the extreme west to Shumla at the foot 
of the Eastern Balkans. It was considered by the 
Eussian commanders that two army-corps would be 
required to operate against the Turks in Eastern Bul- 
garia, while one corps would be enough to 'cover the 


central line of invasion from the west. There remained, 
excluding the two corps in reserve in Roumania and 
the corps holding the Dobrudscha, but one corps for 
the march on the Balkans and Adrianople. The com- 
mand of the vanguard of this body was given to 
General Gourko, who pressed on into the Balkans, 
seized the Shipka Pass, and descended into Southern 
Bulgaria (July 15). The Turks were 
driven from Kesanlik and Eski Sagra, and the Baikana, 

July 16. 

Gourko's cavalry, a few hundreds in num- 
ber, advanced to within two days' march of Adrianople. 
The headquarters of the whole Russian army were 
now at Tirnova, the ancient Bulgarian capital, about half- 
way between the Danube and the Balkans. Two army- 
corps, commanded by the Czarewitch, moved eastwards 
against Rustchuk and the so-called Turkish army of the 
"Danube, which was gathering behind the lines of the 
Kara Lorn ; another division, under General Krudener, 
turned westward and captured Nicopolis with its gar- 
rison. Lovatz and other points lying westward of 
the Jantra were occupied by weak detachments; but 
so badly were the reconnaissances of the Russians per- 
formed in this direction that they were 

J ( >Mimn occupies 

unaware of the approach of a Turkish 
army from Widdin, thirty-five thousand strong, till 
this was close on their flank. Before the Russians could 
prevent him, Osman Pasha, with the van- 
guard of this army, had occupied the town me^tlt ptna, 
and heights of Plevna, between Nicopolis 
and Lovatz. On the 20th of July, still unaware of tlu-ir 
G c -2 

500 MODERN EUROPE. 1877 

enemy's strength, the Eussians attacked him at Plevna : 
they were defeated with considerable loss, and after a few 
days one of Osman's divisions, pushing forward upon 
the invader's central line, drove them out of Lovatz. 
The Grand Duke now sent reinforcements to Krudener, 
and ordered him to take Plevna at all costs. Krude- 
ner's strength was raised to thirty-five thousand ; but 
in the meantime new Turkish regiments had joined 
Osman, and his troops, now numbering about fifty 
thousand, had been working day and night entrenching 
themselves in the heights round Plevna which the 
Russians had to attack. The assault was 

Second battle at 

made on the 30th of July; it was beaten 
back with terrible slaughter, the Eussians leaving 
a fifth of their number on the field. Had Osman 
taken up the offensive and the Turkish commander 
on the Lorn pressed vigorously upon the invader's line, 
it would probably have gone ill with the Eussian army 
in Bulgaria. Gourko was at once compelled to 
abandon the country south of the Balkans. His troops, 
falling back upon the Shipka Pass, were there attacked 
from the south by far superior forces under Suleiman 
Pasha. The Ottoman commander, prodigal of the 
The shipka Pa*., ^ ves ^ n ^ s men an( ^ trusting to mere blind- 
fold violence, hurled his army day after day 
against the Eussian positions (Aug. 20 23). There 
was a moment when all seemed lost, and the Eussian 
soldiers sent to their Czar the last message of devotion 
from men who were about to die at their post. But in 
the extremity of peril there arrived a reinforcement, 


PLEVNA. 501 

weak, but sufficient to turn the scale against the 
ill-commanded Turks. Suleiman's army withdrew to 
the village of Shipka at the southern end of the pass. 
The pass itself, with the entrance, from northern 
Bulgaria, remained in the hands of the Russians. 

After the second battle of Plevna it became clear 
that the Russians could not carry on the campaign 
with their existing forces. Two army-corps were 
called up which were guarding the coast of 


the Black Sea ; several others were mobil- 
ised in the interior of Russia, and began their journey 
towards the Danube. So urgent, however, was the 
immediate need, that the Czar was compelled to ask 
help from Rou mania. This help was given. Roumanian 
troops, excellent in quality, filled up the gap caused by 
Krudener's defeats, and the whole army before Plevna 
.was placed under the command of the Roumanian 
Prince Charles. At the beginning of September the 
Russians were again ready for action. Lovatz was 
wrested from the Turks, and the division which had 
captured it moved on to Plevna to take part in a 
great combined attack. This attack was made on the 
llth of September under the eyes of the Czar. On 
the north the Russians and Roumanians 
together, after a desperate struggle, stormed pie Vna, sept n 
the Grivitza redoubt. On the south Skobe- 
leff carried the first Turkish position, but could make 
no impression on their second line of defence. Twelve 
thousand men fell on the Russian side before the day 
was over, and the main defences of the Turks were 

502 MODERN EUROPE. 1877. 

still unbroken. On the morrow the Turks took up 
the offensive. Skobeleff, exposed to the attack of a 
far superior foe, prayed in vain for reinforcements. 
His men, standing in the positions that they had won 
from the Turks, repelled one onslaught after another, 
but were ultimately overwhelmed and driven from the 
field. At the close of the second day's battle the 
Russians were everywhere beaten back within their 
own lines, except at the Grivitza redoubt, which was 
itself but an outwork of the Turkish defences, and 
faced by more formidable works within. The assailants 
had sustained a loss approaching that of the Germans 
at Gravelotte with an army one-third of the Germans' 
strength. Osman was stronger than at the beginning 
of the campaign ; with what sacrifices Russia would 
have to purchase its ultimate victory no man could 

The three defeats at Plevna cast a sinister light 
upon the Russian military administration and the 
quality of its chiefs. The soldiers had fought heroic- 
ally; divisional generals like Skobeleff had done all 
Todiebenbe- ^at man could do in such positions; the 
faults were those of the headquarters and 
the officers by whom the Imperial Family were sur- 
rounded. After the third catastrophe, public opinion 
called for the removal of the authors of these disasters 
and the employment of abler men. Todleben, the 
defender of Sebastopol, who for some unknown reason 
had been left without a command, was now summoned 
to Bulgaria, and virtually placed at the heajl of the 



army before Plevna. He saw that the stronghold of 
Osman could only be reduced by a regular siege, 
and prepared to draw his lines right round it. For a 
time Osman kept open his communications with the 
south-west, and heavy trains of 'ammunition and 
supplies made their way into Plevna from this direc- 
tion ; but the investment was at length completed, and 
the army of Plevna cut off from the world. In the 
meantime new regiments were steadily pouring into 
Bulgaria from the interior of Russia. East of the 
Jantra, after many alternations of fortune, the Turks 
were finally driven back behind the river Lorn. 
The last efforts of Suleiman failed to wrest the 
Shipka Pass from its defenders. From the narrow 
line which the invaders had with such difficulty held 

during three anxious months their forces, accumu- 
lating day by day, spread out south and west up to the 
slopes of the Balkans, ready to burst over the moun- 
tain-barrier and sweep the enemy back to the walls 
of Constantinople when once Plevna should have fallen 
and the army which besieged it should be added to the 
invader's strength. At length, in the second week of 
December, Osman's supply of food was exhausted. 
Victor in three battles, he refused to surrender without 
one more struggle. On the 10th of December, after 
distributing among his men what there remained of 
provisions, he made a desperate effort to FaUofPlevna 
break out towards the west. His columns 
dashed in vain against the besieger's lines ; behind him 
his enemies pressed forward into the positions which 


he had abandoned ; a ring of fire like that of Sedan 
surrounded the Turkish army ; and after thousands 
had fallen in a hopeless conflict, the general and the 
troops who for five months had held in check the 
collected forces of the .Russian Empire surrendered to 
their conqueror. 

If in the first stages of the war there was little that 
did credit to Russia's military capacity, the energy that 
marked its close made amends for what had gone be- 
fore. Winter was descending in extreme severity : the 
Balkans were a mass of snow and ice ; but no obstacle 
could now bar the invader's march. Gourko, in com- 
mand of an army that had gathered to the south-west 
of Plevna, made his way through the mountains above 
Etropol in the last days of December, and, driving the 
Turks from Sophia, pressed on towards Philippopolis 
and Adrianople. Farther east two columns crossed the 
Balkans by bye-paths right and left of the Shipka 
Pass, and then, converging on Shipka it- 

Crossing of the if p 11 ,t c n m i i 

Balkans, Dec. 25 sell, ie]i upon the rear or the Turkish 

Jan. 8. 

army which still blocked the southern 
outlet. Simultaneously a third corps marched down 
the pass from the north and assailed the Turks in 
front. After a fierce struggle the entire Turkish army, 
thirty-five thousand strong, laid down its arms. There 
capitulation of now r ^ m amed only one considerable force 

between the invaders and Constantinople. 
This body, which was commanded by Suleiman, held 
the road which runs along the valley of the Maritza, at 
a point somewhat to the east of Philippopolis. Against 


it Gourko advanced from the west, while the victors of 
Shipka, descending due south through Kesanlik, barred 
the line of retreat towards Adrianople. The last en- 
counter of the war took place on the 17th of January. 
Suleiman's army, routed and demoralised, succeeded in 
making its escape to the ^JEgean coast. Pursuit was un- 
necessary, for the war was now practically over. On the 
20th of January the Russians made their 

. , . i'ii >_ e j Russians enter 

entry into Adrianople; in the next tew days Adrianople, 

J t J Jan. 20, 1878. 

their advanced guard touched the Sea of 
Marmora at Rodosto. 

Immediately after the fall of Plevna the Porte had 
applied to the European Powers for their mediation. 
Disasters in Asia had already warned it not to delay 
submission too long ; for in the middle of October 
Mukhtar Pasha had been driven from his positions, and 
a month later Kars had been taken by storm. The 
Russians had subsequently penetrated into Armenia and 
had captured the outworks of Erzeroum. Each day that 
now passed brought the Ottoman Empire nearer to 
destruction. Servia agaiu declared war; the Montene- 
grins made themselves masters of the coast-towns and 
of border-territory north and south ; Greece seemed 
likely to enter into the struggle. Baffled in his 
attempt to gain the common mediation of the Powers, 
the Sultan appealed to the Queen of England per- 
sonally for her good offices in bringing the conflict 
to a close. In reply to a telegram from Armigtice 
London, the Czar declared himself willing 
to treat for peace as soon as direct communications should 

506 MODERN EUROPE. 1878. 

be addressed to his representatives by the Porte. 
On the 14th of January commissioners were sent to 
the headquarters of the Grand Duke Nicholas at 
Kesanlik to treat for an armistice and for prelimin- 
aries of peace. The Kussians, now in the full tide of 
victory, were in no hurry to agree with their adversary . 
Nicholas bade the Turkish envoys accompany him to 
Adrianople, and it was not until the 31st of January 
that the armistice was granted and the preliminaries 
of peace signed. 

While the Turkish envoys were on their journey to 
the Eussian headquarters, the session of Parliament 
opened at London. The Ministry had declared at 
the outbreak of the war that Great Britain 
would remain neutral unless its own in- 
terests should be imperilled, and it had defined these 
interests with due clearness both in its communications 
with the Russian Ambassador and in its statements in 
Parliament. It was laid down that Her Majesty's 
Government could not permit the blockade of the Suez 
Canal, or the extension of military operations to Egypt ; 
that it could not witness with indifference the passing of 
Constantinople into other hands than those of its present 
possessors ; and that it would entertain serious ob- 
jections to any material alterations in the rules made 
under European sanction for the navigation of the 
Bosphorus and Dardanelles.* In reply to Lord Derby's 
note which formulated these conditions of neutrality 
Prince Gortschakoff had repeated the Czar's assurance 

* Parl. Pap. 1877, vol. Ixxxix., p. 135. 



that the acquisition of Constantinople was excluded 
from his views, and had promised to undertake no 
military operation in Egypt ; he had, however, let it 
be understood that, as an incident of warfare, the 
reduction of Constantinople might be necessary like 
that of any other capital. In the Queen's speech at 
the opening of Parliament, Ministers stated that the 
conditions on which the neutrality of England was 
founded had not hitherto been infringed by either 
belligerent, but that, should hostilities be prolonged, 
some unexpected occurrence might render it necessary 
to adopt measures of precaution, measures which could 
not be adequately prepared without an appeal to the 
liberality of Parliament. From language subsequently 
used by Lord Beaconsfield's colleagues, it would appear 
that the Cabinet had some apprehension that the 
Russian army, escaping from the Czar's control, might 
seize and attempt permanently to hold Constantinople. 
On the 23rd of January orders were sent to Admiral 
Hornby, commander of the fleet at Besika Bay, to 
pass the Dardanelles, and proceed to Constantinople. 
Lord Derby, who saw no necessity for measures of a 
warlike character until the result of the negotiations 
at Adrianople should become known, now resigned office ; 
but on the reversal of the order to Admiral Hornby he 
rejoined the Cabinet. On the 28th of January, after 
the bases of peace had been communicated by Count 
Schouvaloff to the British Government but before they 
had been actually signed, the Chancellor of the Ex- 
chequer moved for a vote of 6,000,000 for increasing 

508 MODERN EUROPE. 1878. 

the armaments of the country. This vote was at first 

vigorously opposed on the ground that none of the 

. -.- stated conditions of England's neutrality had 

Vote of Credit, 

?eb ' 8< been infringed, and that in the conditions of 
peace between Eussia and Turkey there was nothing that 
justified a departure from the policy which England 
had hitherto pursued. In the course of the debates, 
however, a telegram arrived from Mr. Layard, Elliot's 
successor at Constantinople, stating that notwith- 
standing the armistice the Eussians were pushing on 
towards the capital ; that the Turks had been com- 
pelled to evacuate Silivria on the Sea of Marmora ; 
that the Eussian general was about to occupy 
Tchataldja, an outpost of the last line of defence 
not thirty miles from Constantinople ; and that the 
Porte was in great alarm, and unable to understand 
the Eussian proceedings. The -utmost excitement was 
caused at Westminster by this telegram. The fleet 
was at once ordered to Constantinople. 

es, e Mr. Forster, who had led the opposition to 

the vote of credit, sought to withdraw his 
amendment ; and although on the following day, with 
the arrival of the articles of the armistice, it appeared 
that the Eussians were simply moving up to the 
accepted line of demarcation, and that the Porte ' could 
hardly have been ignorant of this when Layard's tele- 
gram was despatched, the alarm raised in London did 
not subside, and the vote of credit was carried by a 
majority of above two hundred.* 

* Par!. Pap., 1878, vol. Ixxxi., pp. 661, 725. ParL Deb., v,ol. ccxxxvii. 


When a victorious army is, without the intervention 
of some external Power, checked in its work of con- 
quest by the negotiation of an armistice, it is invariably^ 
made a condition that positions shall be Jianded over to 
it which it does not at the moment occupy, but which 
it might reasonably expect to have conquered within a 
certain date, had hostilities not been suspended. The 
armistice granted to Austria by Napoleon after the 
battle of Marengo involved the evacuation of the 
whole of Upper Italy; the armistice which Bismarck 
offered to the French Government of Defence at the 
beginning of the siege of Paris would have involved the 
surrender of Strasburg and of Toul. In demanding that 
the line of demarcation should be carried almost up to 
the walls of Constantinople the Russians were asking for 
" no more than would certainly have been within their 
hands had hostilities been prolonged for a few weeks, 
or even days. Deeply as the conditions of the armistice 
agitated the English people, it was not in these con- 
ditions, but in the conditions of the peace which was 
to follow, that the true cause of contention between 
England and Russia, if cause there was, had to be 
found. Nevertheless, the approach of the Russians to 
Gallipoli and the lines of Tchataldja, fol- 
lowed, as it was, by the despatch of the war with Eng- 
British fleet to Constantinople, brought 
Russia and Great Britain within a hair's breadth of 
war. It was in vain that Lord Derby described the 
fleet as sent only for the protection of the lives and 
property of British subjects. Gortschakoff, who was 

510 MODERN EUROPE. 1878. 

superior in amenities of this kind, replied that the 
Russian Government had exactly the same end in view, 
with the distinction that its protection would be ex- 
tended to all Christians. Should the British fleet 
appear at the Bosphorus, Russian troops would, in the 
fulfilment of a common duty of humanity, enter Con- 
stantinople. Yielding to this threat, Lord Beaconsfield 
bade the fleet halt at a convenient point in the Sea 
of Marmora. On both sides preparations were made 
for immediate action. The guns on our ships stood 
charged for battle ; the Russians strewed the shallows 
with torpedoes. Had a Russian soldier appeared on 
the heights of Gallipoli, had an Englishman landed on 
the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, war would at once 
have broken out. But after some weeks of extreme 
ganger the perils of mere contiguity passed away, and 
the decision between peace and war was transferred 
from the accidents of tent and quarter-deck to the 
deliberations of statesmen assembled in Congress. 

The bases of Peace which were made the condition 
of the armistice granted at Adrianople formed with 
little alteration the substance of the Treaty signed by 
Treaty of san Russia and Turkey at San Stefano, a vil- 
/lage on the Sea of Marmora, on the 3rd of 
March. By this Treaty the Porte recognised the in- 
dependence of Servia, Montenegro, and Roumania, and 
made considerable cessions of territory to the two former 
States. Bulgaria was constituted an autonomous 
tributary Principality, with a Christian Government 
\and a national militia. Its frontier, which" was made 


so extensive as to include the greater part of European 
Turkey, was defined as beginning near Midia on the 
Black Sea, not sixty miles from the Bosphorus; passing 
thence westwards just to the north of Adrianople ; de- 
scending to the ^gean Sea, and following the coast as 
far as the Thracian Chersonese ; then passing inland 
westwards, so as barely to exclude Salonika ; running 
on to the border of Albania within fifty miles of the 
Adriatic, and from this point following the Albanian 
border up to the new Servian frontier. The Prince of 
Bulgaria was to be freely elected by the population, 
and confirmed by the Porte with the assent of the 
Powers ; a system of administration was to be drawn 
up by an Assembly of Bulgarian notables ; and the in- 
troduction of the new system into Bulgaria with the 
superintendence of its working was to be entrusted for 
tw ( o years to a Russian Commissioner. Until the native 
militia was organised, Russian troops, not exceeding 
fifty thousand in number, were to occupy the country ; 
this occupation, however, was to be limited to a term ap- 
proximating to two years. In Bosnia and Herzegovina 
the proposals laid before the Porte at the first sitting 
of the Conference of 1876 were to be immediately intro- 
duced, subject to such modifications as might be agreed 
upon between Turkey, Russia, and Austria. The Porte 
undertook to apply scrupulously in Crete the Organic 
Law which had been drawn up in 1868, taking into 
account the previously expressed wishes of the native 
population. An analogous law, adapted to local re- 
quirements, was, after being communicated to the Czar, 

512 MODERN EUROPE. 1878. 

to be introduced into Epirus, Thessaly, and the other 
parts of Turkey in Europe for which a special con- 
stitution was not provided by the Treaty. Com- 
missions, in which the native population was to he 
largely represented, were in each province to he en- 
trusted with the task of elaborating the details of the 
new organisation. In Armenia the Sultan undertook 
to carry into effect without further delay the improve- 
ments and reforms demanded by local requirements, 
and to guarantee the security of the Armenians from 
Kurds and Circassians. As an indemnity for the losses 
and expenses of the war the Porte admitted itself to be 
indebted to Russia in the sum of fourteen hundred 
million roubles ; but in accordance with the wishes of 
the Sultan, and in consideration of the financial em- 
barrassments of Turkey, the Czar consented to accept in 
substitution for the greater part of this sum the cession 
of the Dobrudscha in Europe, and of the districts of 
Ardahan, Kars, Batoum, and Bayazid in Asia. As to 
the balance of three hundred million roubles left due 
to Eussia, the mode of payment or guarantee was to be 
settled by an understanding between the two Govern- 
ments. The Dobrudscha was to be given by the Czar 
to Eoumania in exchange for Bessarabia, which this 
State was to transfer to Eussia. The complete evacua- 
tion of Turkey in Europe was to take place within three 
months, that of Turkey in Asia within six months, 
from the conclusion of peace.* 

It had from the first been admitted by the Eussian 

* The Treaty, with Maps, is in Parl. Pap. 1878, vol. Ixxxiii., p. 239. 


Government that questions affecting the interests of 
Europe at large could not be settled by a Treaty 
between Russia and Turkey alone, but con^^p^,. 
must form the subject of European agree- 
ment. Early in February the Emperor of Austria had 
proposed that a European Conference should assemble 
at his own capital. It was subsequently agreed that 
Berlin, instead of Vienna, should be the place of 
meeting, and that instead of a Conference a Congress 
should be held, that is, an international assembly of the 
most solemn form, in which each of the Powers is repre- 
sented not merely by an ambassador or an envoy but by 
its leading Ministers. But the question at once arose 
whether there existed in the mind of the Russian Govern- 
ment a distinction between parts of the Treaty of San 
ano bearing on the interests of Europe generally and 
parts which affected no States but Russia and Turkey ; 
and whether, in this case, Russia was willing that 
Europe should be the judge of the distinction, or, on 
the contrary, claimed for itself the right of withholding 
portions of the Treaty from the cognisance of the 
European Court. In accepting the prin- 
ciple of a Congress, Lord Derby on behalf 


and England. 

of Great Britain made it a condition that 
every article of the Treaty without exception should be 
laid before the Congress, not necessarily as requiring 
the concurrence of the Powers, but in order that the 
Powers themselves might in each case decide whetlin- 
their concurrence was necessary or not. To this de- 
mand Prince Gortschakoff offered the most strenuous 

514 MODERN EUROPE. 1 878 . 

resistance, claiming for Russia the liberty of accepting, 
or not accepting, the discussion of any question that 
might be raised. It would clearly have been in the 
power of the Russian Government, had this condition 
been granted, to exclude from the consideration of 
Europe precisely those matters which in the opinion 
of other States were most essentially of European 
import. Phrases of conciliation were suggested ; but 
no ingenuity of language could shade over the dif- 
ference of purpose which separated the rival Powers. 
Every day the chances of the meeting of the Congress 
seemed to be diminishing, the approach of war between 
Russia and Great Britain more unmistakable. Lord 
Beaconsfield called out the Reserves and summoned 
troops from India ; even the project of seizing a port 
in Asia Minor in case the Sultan should fall under 
Russian influence was discussed in the Cabinet. Un- 
able to reconcile himself to these vigorous measures, 
Lord Derby, who had long been at variance with the 
Premier, now finally withdrew from the Cabinet 
(March 28). He was succeeded in his office by the 
Marquis of Salisbury, whose comparison of his relative 
and predecessor to Titus Gates revived the interest 
of the diplomatic world in a now forgotten period of 
English history. 

The new Foreign Secretary had not been many 
days in office when a Circular, despatched to all the 
Foreign Courts, summed up the objections of Great 
Britain to the Treaty of San Stefano. It . arcularof 
was pointed out that a strong Slavic State 


would be created under the control of Russia, possessing 
important harbours upon the shores of the Black Sea 
and the Archipelago, and giving to Russia a prepon- 
derating influence over political and commercial re- 
lations on both those seas ; that a large Greek popula- 
tion would be merged in a dominant Slavic majority ; 
that by the extension of Bulgaria to the Archipelago 
the Albanian and Greek provinces left to the Sultan 
would be severed from Constantinople ; that the an- 
nexation of Bessarabia and of Batoum would make 
the will of the Russian Government dominant over all 
the vicinity of the Black Sea ; that the acquisition of 
the strongholds of Armenia would place the population 
of that province under the immediate influence of the 
Power that held these strongholds, while through the 
cession of Bayazid the European trade from Trebizond 
to Persia would become liable to be arrested by the 
prohibitory barriers of the Russian commercial system. 
Finally, by the stipulation for an indemnity which it 
was beyond the power of Turkey to discharge, and by 
the reference of the mode of payment or guarantee 
to a later settlement, Russia had placed it in its power 
either to extort yet larger cessions of territory, or to 
force Turkey into engagements subordinating its policy 
in all things to that of St. Petersburg. 

It was the object of Lord Salisbury to show that 
the effects of the Treaty of San Stefano, taken in a 
mass, threatened the peace and the interests of Europe, 
and therefore, whatever might be advanced for or 
against individual stipulations of the Treaty, that the 
a n '2 

516 MODERN EUROPE. 1878. 

Treaty as a whole, and not clauses selected by one 
Power, must be submitted to the Congress if the 
examination was not to prove illusory. This was a 
just line of argument. Nevertheless it was natural to 
suppose that some parts of the Treaty must be more 
distasteful than others to Great Britain ; and Count 
Schouvaloff , who was sincerely desirous of 

Count Schouva- ? 

peace, applied himself to the task of dis- 
covering with what concessions Lord Beaconsfield's 
Cabinet would be satisfied. He found that if Russia 
would consent to modifications of the Treaty in Congress 
excluding Bulgaria from the .ZEgean Sea, reducing its 
area on the south and west, dividing it into two 
provinces, and restoring the Balkans to the Sultan as 
a military frontier, giving back Bayazid to the Turks, 
and granting to other Powers besides Russia a voice 
in the organisation of Epirus, Thessaly, and the other 
Christian provinces of the Porte, England might be 
induced to accept without essential change the other 
provisions of San Stefano. On the 7th of May Count 
Schouvaloff quitted London for St. Petersburg, in order 
to lay before the Czar the results of his communi- 
cations with the Cabinet, and to acquaint him with 
the state of public opinion in England. On his 
journey hung the issues of peace or war. Backed by 
the counsels of the German Emperor, Schouvaloff 
succeeded in his mission. The Czar determined not 
to risk the great results already secured by insisting 
on the points contested, and Schouvaloff returned 
to London authorised to conclude a pact with the 


British Government on the general basis which had 
been laid down. On the 30th of May a secret agree- 
ment, in which the above were the princi- aemtllgne . 
pal points, was signed, and the meeting of 
the Congress for the examination of the entire Treaty 
of San Stefano was now assured. But it was not 
without the deepest anxiety and regret that Lord 
Beaconsfield consented to the annexation of Batoum 
and the Armenian fortresses. He obtained indeed an 
assurance in the secret agreement with Schouvaloff 
that the Kussian frontier should be no more extended 
on the side of Turkey in Asia ; but his policy did not 
stop short here. By a Convention made with the Sultan 
on the 4th of June, Great Britain engaged, Convention ^ 
in the event of any further aggression by :ke yJne 4 - 

Russia upon the Asiatic territories of the Sultan, to 
. * . 

defend these territories by force of arms. The Sultan 
in return promised to introduce the necessary reforms, 
to be agreed upon by the two Powers, for the protection 
of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these 
territories, and further assigned the Island of Cyprus 
to be occupied and administered by Eng- 


land. It was stipulated by a humorous 
after-clause that if Eussia should restore to Turkey its 
Armenian conquests, Cyprus would be evacuated by 
England, and the Convention itself should be at an 

The Congress of Berlin, at which the Premier 
himself and Lord Salisbury represented Great Britain, 
* Parl. Pap. 1878, vl. Ixxxii., p. 3. Globe, May 31, 1878. Halm, iii. 116. 


opened on the 13th of June. Though the compromise 
between England and Russia had been settled in 
general terms, the arrangement of details opened such 
a series of difficulties that the Congress seemed more 
than once on the point of breaking up. It 

Congress of i i j i i 

Berlin, June 13 was mainly due to the perseverance and 

July 13. J r 

wisdom of Prince Bismarck, who transferred 
the discussion of the most crucial points from the 
Congress to private meetings of his guests, and who 
himself acted as conciliator when Gortschakoff folded 
up his maps or Lord Beaconsfield ordered a special 
train, that the work was at length achieved. The 
Treaty of Berlin, signed on the 13th of July, confined 
Bulgaria, as an autonomous Principality, to the country 
Treaty of Berlin north of the Balkans, and diminished the au- 
thority which, pending the establishment 
of its definitive system of government, would by 
the Treaty of San Stefano have belonged to a Russian 
commissioner. The portion of Bulgaria south of the 
Balkans, but extending no farther west than the 
valley of the Maritza, and no farther south than 
Mount Rhodope, was formed into a Province of East 
Roumelia, to remain subject to the direct political 
and military authority of the Sultan, under con- 
ditions of administrative autonomy. The Sultan was 
declared to possess the right of erecting fortifications 
both on the coast and on the land-frontier of this 
province, and of maintaining troops there. Alike in 
Bulgaria and in Eastern Roumelia the period of occu- 
pation by Russian troops was limited to nine months. 

1878. TREATY OF BE KLIN. 519 

Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed over to Austria, 
to be occupied and administered by that Power. The 
cessions of territory made to Servia and Montenegro in 
the Treaty of San Stefano were modified with the 
object of interposing a broader strip between these two 
States ; Bayazid was omitted from the ceded districts 
in Asia, and the Czar declared it his intention to erect 
Batoum into a free port, essentially commercial. At 
the instance of France the provisions relating to the 
Greek Provinces of Turkey were superseded by a vote 
in favour of the cession of part of these Provinces to 
the Hellenic Kingdom. The Sultan was recommended 
to cede Thessaly and part of Epirus to Greece, the 
Powers reserving to themselves the right of offering 
their mediation to facilitate the negotiations. In 
other respects the provisions of the Treaty of San 
Stefano were confirmed without substantial change. 

Lord Beaconsfield returned to London, bringing, as he 
said, peace with honour. It was claimed, in the despatch 
to our Ambassadors which accompanied the publication 
of the Treaty of Berlin, that in this Treaty the cardinal 
objections raised by the British Government to the 
Treaty of San Stefano had found an entire remedy. 
"Bulgaria," wrote Lord Salisbury, "is now confined 
to the river-barrier of the Danube, and 

Comparison of 

consequently has not only ceased to possess 

any harbour on the Archipelago, but is removed by 

more than a hundred miles from the neighbourhood 

520 MODERN EUROPE. 1878. 

of that sea. On the Euxine the important port of 
Bourgas has been restored to the Government of 
Turkey ; and Bulgaria retains less than half the sea- 
board originally assigned to it, and possesses no other 
port except the roadstead of Varna, which can hardly 
be used for any but commercial purposes. The re- 
placement under Turkish rule of Bourgas and the 
southern half of the sea-board on the Euxine, and the 
strictly commercial character assigned to Batoum, have 
largely obviated the menace to the liberty of the Black 
Sea. The political outposts of Eussian power have 
been pushed back to the region beyond the Balkans ; 
the Sultan's dominions have been provided with a de- 
fensible frontier." It was in short the contention 
of the English Government that while Russia, in the 
pretended emancipation of a great part of European 
Turkey by the Treaty of San Stefano, had but ac- 
quired a new dependency, England, by insisting on the 
division of Bulgaria, had baffled this plan and restored 
to Turkey an effective military dominion over all the 
country south of the Balkans. That Lord Beaconsfield 
did well in severing Macedonia from the Slavic State of 
Bulgaria there is little reason to doubt ; that, having so 
severed it, he did ill in leaving it without a European 
guarantee for good government, every successive year 
made more plain ; the wisdom of his treatment of Bul- 
garia itself must, in the light of subsequent events, 
remain matter for controversy. It may fairly be said 
that in dealing with Bulgaria English statesmen were, 
on the whole, dealing with the unknown. Nevertheless, 



had guidance been accepted from the history of the other 
Balkan States, analogies were not altogether wanting 
or altogether remote. During the present century 
three Christian States had been formed out of what 
had been Ottoman territory : Servia, Greece, and 
Eoumania. Not one of these had become a Russian 
Province, or had failed to develop and maintain a 
distinct national existence. In Servia an attempt had 
been made to retain for the Porte the right of keeping 
troops in garrison. This attempt had proved a mis- 
take. So long as the right was exercised it had simply 
been a source of danger and disquiet, and it had finally 
been abandoned by the Porte itself. In the case of 
Greece, Russia, with a view to its own interests, had 
originally proposed that the country should be divided 
into four autonomous provinces tributary to the Sultan : 
against this the Greeks had protested, and Canning 
had successfully supported their protest. Even the 
appointment of an ex-Minister of St. Petersburg, Capo- 
distrias, as first President of Greece in 1827 had failed to 
bring the liberated country under Russian influence; and 
in the course of the half-century which had since 'elapsed 
it had become one of the commonplaces of politics, 
accepted by every school in every country of Western 
Europe, that the Powers had committed a great error 
in 1833 in not extending to far larger dimensions the 
Greek Kingdom which they then established. In the 
case of Roumania, the British Government had, out of 
fear of Russia, insisted in 1856 that the provinces of 
Moldavia and Wallachia should remain separate : the 

522. -"X MODERN EUROPE. 1878. 

result was that the inhabitants in defiance of England 
effected their union, and that after a few years had 
passed there was not a single politician in England 
who regarded their union otherwise than with satis- 
faction. If history taught anything in the solution 
of the Eastern question, it taught that the effort to 
reserve for the Sultan a military existence in countries 
which had passed from under his general control was 
futile, and that the best barrier against Russian in- 
fluence was to be found not in the division but in 
the strengthening and consolidation of the States 
rescued from Ottoman dominions. 

It was of course open to English statesmen in 1878 
to believe that all that had hitherto passed in the 
Balkan Peninsula had no bearing upon the problems of 
the hour, and that, whatever might have been the case 
with Greece, Servia, and Roumania, Bulgaria stood on 
a completely different footing, and called for the appli- 
cation of principles not based on the .experience of the 
past but on the divinations of superior minds. Should 
the history of succeeding years bear out this view, 
should the Balkans become a true military frontier for 
Turkey, should Northern Bulgaria sink to the condition 
of a Russian dependency, and Eastern Roumelia, in 
severance from its enslaved kin, abandon itself to a 
thriving ease behind the garrisons of the reforming 
Ottoman, Lord Beacon sfield will have deserved the 
fame of a statesman whose intuitions, undimmed by 
the mists of experience, penetrated the secret of the 
future, and shaped, because they discerned, the destiny 


of nations. It will be the task of later historians to 
measure the exact period after the Congress of Berlin' 
at which the process indicated by Lord Beaconsfield 
came into visible operation ; it is the misfortune of 
those whose view is limited by a single decade to have 
to record that in every particular, with the single ex- 
ception of the severance of Macedonia from the* 
Slavonic Principality, Lord Beaconsfield's ideas, pur- 
poses, and anticipations, in so far as they related to 
Eastern Europe, have hitherto been contradicted by 
events. What happened in Greece, Servia, and Rou- 
mania has happened in Bulgaria. Experience, thrown 
to the winds by English Ministers in 1878, has justified 
those who listened to its voice. There exists no such 
thing as a Turkish fortress on the Balkans ; Bourgas 
no more belongs to the Sultan than Athens or Bel- 
grade ; no Turkish soldier has been able to set foot 
within the territory whose very name, Eastern Rou- 
melia, was to stamp it as Turkish dominion. National 
independence, a living force in Greece, in Servia, in 
Roumania, has proved its power in Bulgaria too. The 
efforts of Russia to establish its influence over a people 
liberated by its arms have been repelled with unex- 
pected firmness. Like the divided members of Rou- 
mania, the divided members of Bulgaria have effected 
their union. In this union, in the growing material 
and moral force of the Bulgarian State; Western Europe 
^ sees a power wholly favourable to its own hopes for the 
future of the East, wholly adverse to the extension of 
Russian rule : and it has been reserved for Lord 


Beacons field's colleague at the Congress of Berlin, 
regardless of the fact that Bulgaria north of the 
Balkans, not the southern Province, created that 
vigorous military and political organisation which 
was the precursor of national union, to explain that 
in dividing Bulgaria into two portions the English 
Ministers of 1878 intended to promote its ultimaj__ 
unity, and that in subjecting the southern half to 
the Sultan's rule they laid the foundation for its 
ultimate independence. 



Abdallah, Pasha of Acre ; quarrel with 
Viceroy of Egypt, ii. 442 

Abdul Medjid, succeeds Mahmud II. 
as Sultan of Turkey, ii. 454 

Abercromby, Sir Ralph, British ad- 
miral, i. 195, 235 

Aberdeen, Lord ; despatches on the 
bttle of Leipzig, i. 519 (note) ; 
(Foreign Secretary, 1846), declines 
to assent to the proposed Spanish 
marriages, ii. 504 ; friendship to- 
wards the Emperor Nicholas, iii. 
182; policy towards Russia and 
Turkey (1853), 193; refuses King 
Frederick William's request for a 
guarantee against an attack from 
France, 203 ; resignation of pre- 
miership, 219 

Abisbal; his conspiracy in the army 
of Cadiz, ii. 173 

Aboukir, Bonaparte's victory over 
Turks at, i. 200; landing of 
English troops at, 235 

Aero, Siege of, ii. 443 : captured by 
Sir Charles Napier, 460 

Acte Additionnel ( France), ii. 43 

A ilana, given to Viceroy of Egypt by 
Turkey, ii. 446 

Addington, Mr., Speaker of the House 
of Commons, i. 240 ; his govern- 
ment's hostility to Bonaparte, 266 ; 
leads a section of the Tory party, 

Adrianoplo, Peace of, ii. 343 ; entry 
of Russians into, iii. 505 

^gean Islands, ii. 247, 287 

Aggrandisement, Schemes of, advanced 
by European allies (1793), i. 77, 78 

Agram, iii. 66, 67, 69 

Aix-la-Chapelle, Conference of. ii. 131 

Albert, French Republican ; excluded 
from National Assembly, iii. 38 

Albrecht, Archduk.-, iii. 400 

Albuera, Battle of, i. 447 

Alessandria,!. 182, 221 

Alexander I., Emperor of Russia, i. 
232 ; pacific proposals to England, 
233 ; secret treaty with France 
(1801), 251 ; distrust of Bonaparte, 
274 ; rupture of diplomatic rela- 
tions with Bonaparte, 278 ; treaty 
with King of Prussia at Potsdam, 
292 ; seeks the help of England 
against France, 343 ; cordial rela- 
tions with the King of Prussia, 
344 ; interview with Napoleon on 
the Niemen, 346 ; conspiracy with 
Napoleon, 348 ; meets Napoleon at 
Erfurt, 390 ; breaks off friendly re- 
lations with Napoleon, 442 ; de- 
clines to assist Prussia against 
France, 458 ; summons Stein to 
St. Petersburg, 480; enters the 
War of Liberation against Napo- 
leon, 501 ; arrival at Frankfort, 
617 ; insists on Napoleon's de- 
thronement, 523 ; arrives in Paris 
and secures the restoration of Louis 
XVIII., 531, 532; at the Congress 
of Vienna, ii. 22 ; arrives in Paris 
after Battle of Waterloo, 60; Treaty 
of Holy Alliance, 63 ; addresses 
Polish Diet on his design to extend 
popular representation, 129 ; raises 
alarm in Germany by distributing 
Stourdza's pamphlet on revolution- 
ary movements, 138 ; sale of rotten 
ships to Spain, 171 ; proposes joint 
action with regard to Spain (1820), 
189 ; his views with regard to 
Austrian intervention in Italy, 194 ; 
proposes to send troops to Spain to 
overthrow the Constitution, 213; 
intervention in Turkey on behalf 
of the Christians, 277, 278 ; his re- 
fusal to aid the Greeks rouses dis- 
content in Russia, 315 ; death 
(1825), and character, 317, 318 

Alexander II., Emperor of Russia, suc- 
ceeds the Emperor Nicholas, iii. 



220; liberates the Serfs, 330; 
meeting at Eeichstadt with the 
Emperor Francis Joseph on the 
Eastern Question, 488 ; assurances 
to Britain respecting the acquisi- 
tion of Constantinople, 490 

Alexandria : capitulation by the French 
to the English, i. 236 

Alexinatz, Capture of, by the Turks, 
iii. 489 

Alfieri, Vittorio, i. 114, 117 

Algiers ; captured by France, ii. 367 

Ali Pasha, ii. 242, 264, 286, 295 

Alkmaar, Battle of, i. 196 

Allvintzy, Austrian general, defeated 
by Bonaparte at Eivoli, i. 135 

Alma, Battle of the, iii. 211 

Alsace, German rights in, i. 12 ; France, 
fatherland of, 50 ; declared to be 
French territory by Congress of 
Vienna, ii. 70 ; probable conse- 
quences had it been annexed to 
Prussia, 72 ; civil government 
established by Germans during 
the Franco-Prussian war, iii. 453 ; 
ceded to Germany by the Treaties 
of Versailles and Frankfort, 464 

Altona ; discontent with Danish rule, 
iii. 28, 30 

Amiens, Treaty of, i. 238 ; capitulates 
to the Prussians, iii. 459 

Ancona, Surrender of, to troops of 
Victor Emmanuel, iii. 294 

Andrassy, Count, negotiates reconcilia- 
tion between Austria and Hungary 
(1867), iii. 391, 392; opinion on 
projected restoration of German 
leadership to Austria, 406 ; com- 
municates with St. Petersburg and 
Berlin on a line of policy towards 
the Porte, 478 

" Andrassy Note, The," iii. 478 

Angouleme, Duchess of, i. 534, ii. 59, 
98, 114 

Angouleme, Duke of, leads the French 
troops in the invasion of Spain 
(1823), ii. 219 

Antonelli, Cardinal, minister of Pius 
IX., iii. 110, 273 

Antony, Prince, appointed Prussian 
prime minister, iii. 306 

Antwerp, taken by the French, i. 93 ; 
failure of English expedition 
against, 428 ; bombardment by 
French and English, 389 

Apostolicals (See Carlists) 

Arcola, Battle of, i. 134 

Ardcihiin, iii. 512 

Armatoli, The, ii. 247 

Armenia, iii. 512 

Armistice, between France and Sar- 
dinia (1796), i. 119; Bonaparte 
and King of Naples (1796), 123; 
Bonaparte and the Pope (1796), 123 ; 
Duke of Wiirtemberg and the 
French (1796), 127; Naples and 
France (1798), 175 ; Austria and 
France (1800), 222; (secret) Em- 
peror of Austria and France (1800), 
223 ; Austria and France at Steyer 
(1800), 225; England and Den- 
mark (1801), 232; Austria and 
France after the Battle of 
Austerlitz (1805), 297 ; Russia 
and France after the Battle of 
Friedland (1807), 345; Znaim 
(1809), Austria and France, 425; 
France, Russia, and Prussia (1813), 
495 ; Austria and Sardinia at 
Vigevano (1848), iii. 62; Malmo, 
Denmark and Prussia (1848), 117; 
Garibaldi and the Neapolitans 
(1860), 286; Denmark, Austria, 
and Prussia (1864), 351 ; France 
and Prussia (1871), 463; Servia 
and Turkey (1876), 489 

Arnaud, St., French officer, conspires 
with Louis Napoleon against the 
government, iii. 167 169 ; French 
commander in the Crimea, 211. 

Arndt, the German poet, i. 407 ; pro- 
secution of, ii. 148 ; member of 
German National Assembly, iii. 32 ; 
Song of the "Fatherland," ib. ; re- 
tires from National Assembly, 137 

Artois, Count of (afterwards Charles 
X.), i. 274, 531, ii. 13 ; heads the 
party of reaction in 1815 in France, 
91 ; growth of his party, 94 ; am- 
bitious projects, 160 (See also 
Charles X.) 

Asia Minor, conquered by Egyptians 
under Ibrahim, ii. 443 

Aspern, Battle of, i. 421 

Asturias ; popular rising against the 
French, i. 380. 

Athos, Monks of Mount, ii. 286 

Auerstadt, Battle of, i. 329 

Augereau, French general, attacks 
the Directory, i. 146 

Augustenburg, Duke of (elder), re- 
nounces his claims in Schleswig- 
Holstein, iii. 343. 

Augustenburg, Duke of (younger) ; 
Bismarck proposes that the crown 
of Schleswig-Holstein should be 
conferred upon the, 357 

Aurelle de Pakdines, French general, 
advances to the relief <SE Paris, iii. 



Austerlitx, Battle of, i. 296 

Aii-tm, Dci-lanition of war by France 
against (1792), i. 2 ; ultimatum to 
nice, 12; state of, before the 
war of 1792, 18 30; reforms 
of Maria Theresa, 21 ; reforms of 
Joseph II. in, 22 ; under Leopold 
II., 25; under Francis II., 27; 
greed for territory in, 29; open- 
ing of war against France, 41 ; 
allied to Prussia, 42 ; defeats 
French at Neerwinden, 68 ; schemes 
of aggrandisement, 76 ; invests 
Cambray and Le Quesnoy, 78 ; 
defeated at Wattignies, 81; in- 
difference to English plans for 
Bourbon restoration, 86 ; breach 
with Prussia after the partition of 
Poland, 86 ; defeated by French at 
Worth and Weissenburg, 87 ; de- 
feated by Bonaparte on the Mincio, 
122 ; retires before the French in 
Italy, 126; invaded by the French, 
126 ; treaty with France at Leoben, 
138 ; Treaty of Campo Formio with 
Franco, 147 ; renewal of war with 
France, 177 ; defeats France at 
Stockach and Magnano, 179, 181 ; 
designs in Italy, 185 ; jealousy to- 
wards Russia, 192 (note) ; end of 
alliance with Russia, 195; reply 
to Bonaparte's proposal for peace, 
216 ; resumption of hostilities with 

France, 217; defeated at Hohen- 
linden, 225 ; interests in Germany, 
249; state in 1805, 282283; 
occupies Bavaria, 287 ; surrender 
of army to the French at Ulm, 
289 ; the . French occupy Vienna, 
293 ; defeated at Austerlitz, 296 ; 
loss of territory, 300 ; prepares 
for war against France, 402 ; in- 
vasion of Bavaria, 410: defeated 
by Napoleon at Landshut and 
tggmuhl, 415; Napoleon enters 
Vienna, 416 ; conquests in Poland 
and Italy, 417 ; defeats the French 
at Aspern, 421 ; defeated by Napo- 
leon at Wagram. 425 ; peace with 
Franco, 430 ; losses by the Peace 
of Vienna, 430 ; alliance with 
Napoleon, 460 ; attitude towards 
Napoleon in 1813, 496 ; Treaty of 
Reichenbach, 499; enters the war 
against France, 501 ; defeated at 
Dresden, 505 ; results of Napoleon's 
wars, 545 ; its gains by the Settle- 
ment of 1814, ii. 4; Congress of 
Vienna, 2031, 38; MetU-rnich's 
statesmanship, 82 86 ; the Em- 

peror's resistance to progress, 82 ; 
Conference of Aix-l.i-t'h.qi.'llc, 131 
133; Conservative principles of 
Metternich, 135; proposed inter- 
vention in Italy, 192 ; invades 
Italy, 201 ; policy towards Tur- 
key in 1821, 279; intervention 
in Papal States for suppression of 
revolt (183-1), 402; second inter- 
vention in Papal States, 404 ; with- 
draws from Papal States (1838), 
405 ; rule in Italy, 467 ; occupies 
Ferrara, 473; rule in Hungary, 
476 482; death of the Emperor 
Francis Joseph, and accession of 
Ferdinand, 482 ; rural system in 
Hungary, 491 ; insurrection of 
Poles in Galicia, 493 ; Rural Edict 
(1846), 494; revolution at Vienna, 
1848, iii. 6 ; fall of Mettornich, 8 ; 
Hungarian deputation received by 
the Emperor, 9 ; accepts Hun- 
garian scheme of independence, 
1 1 ; autonomy promised to Bohemia, 
14 ; insurrection in Lombardy and 
Venice, 15, 16 ; general war in 
Italy against Austrian rule, 17, 18 ; 
Constitution published, 50 ; agita- 
tation in Vienna, ib. ; night of the 
Emperor, 52 ; further riots of 
students and workmen, 52, 53 ; 
riots at Prague, 54 ; campaign 
around Verona, 55 ; re-conquest of 
Venetia, 60 ; Emperor returns to 
Vienna from Innsbruck, 62; 
revolt in Croatia, 63 69 ; Emperor 
dissolves Hungarian Parliament, 
and declares its acts null and void, 
74 ; tumult at Vienna, 76 ; flight 
of the Emperor to Olmiitz, 77 ; 
General Windischgratz subdues the. 
revolt at Vienna, 79 ; abdication of 
the Emperor, and accession of his 
nephew Francis Joseph I., 81 ; 
the Unitary Constitutional Edict 
(March, 1849), 83; occupation of 
Pesth, 86 ; Constitution published 
by Schwarzenberg, 88 ; driven from 
Hungary, 88 ; subdues Hungary, 
95 ; overthrows Sardinian army at 
Novara, 100 ; surrender of Venice to, 
112 ; proposed connection with Ger- 
many at the Frankfort Parliament, 
127 ; refuses to recognise the Ger- 
man Federal Union, 142 ; proposes 
a conference at Frankfort to discuss 
question of union, 143 ; restores the 
Diet of Frankfort, 145; conflict 
with Prussia respecting affairs in 
Hesse-Cassel, 145148; demands 



,are granted by Prussia respecting 
Hesse, 147; condition after 1851, 
154 156; concessions to the Pa- 
pacy, 155 ; policy towards Russia on 
outbreak of Crimean War, 200; 
Conference of Vienna, May, 1855, 
221 ; mediates between Eussia and 
European allies after fall of 
Sebastopol, 228 ; its government of 
Central and Southern Italy de- 
nounced by Count Cavour at the 
Paris Conference, 249 ; rupture 
with Sardinia, 251; declaration 
of war by France and Sardinia, 
259; defeated at the Battles of 
Magenta and Solferino, 261, 263; 
peace concluded with France 
and Sardinia at "Villafranca, 265 ; 
opposition to the union of Italy 
under Victor Emmanuel, 298 ; 
state of affairs after 1859, and crea- 
tion of Central Council, 322, 323 ; 
diploma published for restoring to 
Hungary its old Constitution, 324 ; 
Hungary resists the establishment 
of a Central Council, 325 ; the 
Reichsrath assembles at Vienna 
(1861), 327; progress of Parlia- 
mentary system, 328 ; troops enter 
Schleswig conjointly with the 
Prussians, 350 ; secures Schleswig- 
Holstein in conjunction with Prus- 
sia by the Treaty of Vienna, 353 ; 
refuses to attend proposed Euro- 
pean Congress, and bids the 
Federal Diet take over the con- 
trol of Schleswig-Holstein, 369, 
370 ; commencement of war with 
Prussia, 373 ; defeated by Prussia 
at Koniggriitz, 376 ; victories of 
Custozza and Lissa, 377 ; terms of 
peace with Prussia (1866), 376-379 ; 
settlement of conflict with Hungary 
after the Battle of Koniggriitz, 
387-392 ; defensive alliance with 
Italy, 410; " League of the Three 
Emperors," 476; treaty with 
Russia at Reichstadt on the Eastern 
Question, 488 ; acquires Bosnia 
and Herzegovina at the Congress of 
Berlin, 519 

Avignon, Claims of the Pope in, i. 

Azeglio, Sardinian minister, iii. 243 ; 
envoy to Bologna, 262 ; provides 
for the defence of Romagna against 
Austria, 267; Admiral Persano 
refers his diary to, 292 (note) ; 
views regarding exclusion of Rome 
from Italian Kingdom, 299 

Bach, Alexander (Austrian minister), 
negotiates the Concordat with the 
Papacy, iii. 155 

Badajoz, Capture of, by the Duke 
of Wellington, i. 448 

Baden, entered by French troops, i. 
127 ; formation of a Constitution, 
ii. 144 ; Liberal sentiments of the 
sovereign, 411 ; Republican rising 
(1848), iii. 30 ; insurrection (Sept- 
ember, 1848), 119 ; the government 
of the Grand Duke accepts the 
Frankfort Constitution, 136 ; Re- 
publican insurrection, ib., 138; 
insurrection quelled by Prussian 
troops after fall of Rastadt, 138 

Bagration, Prince, Russian comman- 
der, i. 462, 464 

Baird, General, i. 236, 396 

Bayazid, iii. 498 

Balaclava, iii. 213; Battle of, 215; 
Charge of the Light Brigade at, 

Balance of Power in Germany, i. 40 ; 
in Europe after the Treaty of 
Basle, 97 ; after the English vic- 
tories in Egypt, 237; Austrian 
defence of, 404 

Balearic Islands, offered by Napoleon 
to Great Britain, i. 368 

Balkans, Russian advance on the, iii. 

Bapaume, iii. 459 

Barclay de Tolly, Russian commander, 
i. 462, 464, 466, 467 

Baring, Mr., Secretary of English 
Legation at Constantinople ; report 
on Bulgarian massacres, iii. 482 

Barras, M., French Director, i. 199, 

Barthelemy, M., member of French 
Directory, i. 144 : seized by Auge- 
reau's troops, 146; ambassador at 
Berne, 160 

Basle, Treaty of, i. 96 

Basque Provinces, centre of Carlist 
rebellion (1834), ii. 431 ; immunity 
from customs-dues, 432 

Bastille, The, i. 44 

Batoum, iii. 512 

Batthyany, Count, instructed to form 
a National Ministry in Hungary, 
iii. 10 ; publishes Emperor of 
Austria's order suspending Jellacic 
from office, 68 ; resigns office, 73 ; 
sentenced to death, 96 

"Battle of the Nations" (Leipzig), i. 

Bautzen, Battle of, i. 494 

Bavaria, Weakness of (1792), i. 16; 



designs of Francis II. on, 28 ; entered 
by French troops, 127 ; treaty with 
Bonaparte, 250 ; reforms under 
Montgelas, 255 ; occupied by the 
Austrians, 287 ; invaded by Aus- 
t riai is, 410 ; surrenders Innsbruck 
to the Tyrolese, 413 ; obtains Salz- 
burg, 430 ; joins the Allies in War 
of Liberation, 511 ; formation of 
a Constitution, ii. 144 ; disturb- 
ance in the Palatinate, 408 
r.ityuzid, iii. 512, 519 
B.iylen, Capitulation of, i. 384 
Bayonne, meeting of Napoleon and 
Prince Ferdinand of Spain, i. 376 ; 
Napoleon's Spanish Assembly, 380 
Bazaine, Marshal, French commander 
of the army of the Rhine, iii. 438, 
439 ; defeated by the Prussians at 
Mars-la-Tour, 440 ; defeated at 
Gravelotte, 441 ; retires with 
army to Metz, 442 ; inaction at 
Metz, and probable intrigues for 

ersonal power, 454 ; surrenders 
etz to the Prussians, 455 ; tried 
by court-martial and sentenced to 
death, ib. ; the Nemesis of the 
moral indifference and servility of 
the French Empire, 457 

Beaconsfield, Lord, Eastern Policy 
and distrust of Russia, iii. 484 
487 ; war-speech at Guildhall ban- 
quet, 491 ; represents England, 
', with Lord Salisbury, at the Con- 
gress of Berlin, 517 ; policy in 
severing Macedonia from Bulgaria, 
520 ; his anticipations relative to 
Eastern Europe so far contradicted, 

Beauharnais, Eugene, i. 303, 485 

Beaulieu, Austrian general, i. 118, 119, 

Beccaria on " Crimes and Punish- 
ments," i. 113 

Beethoven entertains members of the 
Congress of Vienna, ii. 21 

Belcredi, Count, Austrian minister, iii. 

Belgium, under Austria, i. 50 ; French 
victories, 92 ; united to Holland at 
Congress of Vienna, ii. 70 ; revolu- 
tion of August, 1830, 383 ; separated 
from Holland, 384 ; influence of 
France and Talleyrand, 384, 385 ; 
independence recognised by the 
Conference of London, 386; Due 
de Nemours elected king, and 
shortly retires at the instigation of 
Louis Philippe, 387 ; Prince Leopold 
of Saxe-Coburg elected king, i*. ; 

/ 7 

settlement of the frontier, 388 ; 
project of France for its acquisi- 
tion, iii. 384 ; proposal to cede 
Belgic territory to France in return 
for Luxemburg, 402 

Bolliard, French general, i. 236 

Bern, Hungarian general, defeats the 
Austrians, iii. 89 ; defeated by 
Austrians at Temesvar, 95 

Benedek, Austrian general, iii. 263, 
374 ; destruction of his army at 
Koniggriitz, 376 

Benedetti, Count, French ambassador 
at Berlin, report on the French 
project for the acquisition of Bel- 
gium, iii. 384, 385, note ; inter- 
view with the King of Prussia at 
Ems respecting the candidature of 
of Prince Leopold for the Spanish 
throne, 416 

Bennigsen, Russian general, i. 341 ; 
defeated by the French at Fried- 
land, 345 ; leads the Russian re- 
serves during the War of Libera- 
tion, 512 

Bentinck, Lord W., on Murat's du- 
plicity, i. 537, note ; English 
representative in Sicily; forces 
King Ferdinand to establish a 
Parliament, ii. 87 

Benvenuti, Cardinal, ii. 400, 404 

Beranger on Bonaparte's return to 
France, i. 201 ; Napoleonic lyrics, 
iii. 44 

Beresford, English commander in 
Portugal, ii. 186 

Beresina, Passage of the, by Napoleon, 
i. 476 

Berlin, entry of Napoleon, i. 332 ; fight 
between the French and Cossacks, 
485 ; evacuation by the French, 
486 ; revolutionary movement of 
March, 1848, iii. 19; conflict be- 
tween the people and troops, 21 ; 
the King rides through the streets 
in the character of German leader, 
23 ; opening of Prussian National 
Parliament, 33 ; riots against the 
Assembly (Sept. 1848), 119, 120; 
Conference of 1849, 139; opening 
of the first Parliament of the 
German Empire, March, 1871, 468 ; 
Congress of (1878), 518 

Berlin Memorandum, The, rejected by 
England, iii. 481 

Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden ; 
alliance with Russia, i. 463 ; enters 
the War of Liberation, 612 

Bernadotte, French general, com- 
mands the army in Hanover, L 



286; HuihtHi Prussian territory, 
291 ; commands troops against 
Russia, 341 

Bernard, Pass of the Great SL, L 219 

Berne, L 161 

Bernstorff, Count, PiaMiin envoy at 
the Conference of London (1864), 
iiL 351 

Berry, Murder of Duke of, iL 15S 

Berthier. General, leads French troops 
into Rome, L 164 

Besika Bay, iiL 194; despatch of 
English'fleet to, 4S1, 507 

Bessarabia; gained bv Russia in 1814, 

Bessiem, Marshal (French), defeats 
the Spanish at Rio Seoo, L 3S3 

BflBBeres. Spanish insurgent, iL 219 

Beust, Count, iiL 152 : Saxon minis- 
ter at the Conference of London 
(1864), 351 ; Austrian Minister, 391 : 
his !"" A with Hungarv, i J. : 
suggests the union of Luxemburg- 
with Belgium. 401 ; arranges de- 
fensive ^T^fir with Italv, 410 : 
disuiiiapd from office at the insti- 
gation of Bismarck. 476 

Tfiaiiiti, meeting at Napoleon JLLL. and 
Bismarck. iiL 3S9 

Bflbao, iL 433 ; besieged by the Car- 

. . 

Bismarck. Prince, succeeds Prince 
Hinhfalnte a* Prime Minister, iiL 
- - -_--'- :~ -.; .'.-.-- ----- - i 

monarchical tendencies. 31-3 315; 
policy of "Blood and Iron," 317 ; 
reaches to levy taxes without a 
~~ .- :. - ~ :.. -.:---.'-: :lr 
Press, 321 ; nrtahlishan friendly re- 
lations with Russia, 329; hostility 
towaids Poland, 342 ; -** i tfat 
' " : -- I . :.: . .: r. tlr : :: - 
Redaiek TIF^ 343; statecraft 
respectmg Schleswig-Holstein, 346, 
349, 355 358 ; names conditions on 

_ > - -.--" -:- -. . 

be giren to the Prince of 
Aofnstenbnrg. 357; nets Xapo- 
teon ILL at ^t-, 359: seeks 
co-opentiaB of Italy in war against 
Ansbia, 364; proposes to summon a 
German Parliament, 966; reply to 
Ttapofeon IIL on his demand tor 
Ae cession of the UWainli Pro- 
TmceE, 368; orders troops to enter 
Holstein on ilaaliia's infa^iiig to 
attend the proposed European (W 
: - : - '.'- 
:_> I;:-. .:'- 
::: ft* 

370: his 

States, it.; 
tempted, 371; his 

acquisition of toiiiliiij after the 
war with Austria, 378, 379 ; views 
on the project of Napoleon HI. for 
the acquisition of Belgium, 3S4; 
popularity after the Battle of 
KSniggratz, 3S6; treatment of 
cess ; on 

of Luxemburg to France, 401 ; 
triumph of his statesmanship in the 
strensth and success 01 vuo Cjeiman 
army, 432 ; meets Napoleon ILL at 
Sedan, 446; meets IL Jules Favre 

for peace, 450; requires the surren- 
der of Strasburg and Tool, t*. ; 
meets Thiers at Versailles to arrange 
terms of peace, 464 ; requires the 
cession of Alsace and Eastern Lor- 
raine, and payment of six milliards 
francs as the basis of peace, it.; 
hostility towards the Crown Prince, 
466 : policy in favouring a Repub- 
lic for France, 475 : assurances to 
Russia and Austria, 475, 476; policy 
at the Congress of Berlin, 518 

F.lake, Spanish general, L 394 

liLinc, Louis, iL 510; member of 
French Provincial Government 
(1848), iiL 31 ; excluded from Na- 
tional Assembly, 38 

BMcher, General; capitulates at 
Labeck, L 331 ; leads Prussian 
army against Napoleon, 491 ; heads 
division of Russians and Prus- 
sians, 502, 506, 512, 514 ; attacks 
Xapoleon in France, 522 ; head of 
Prussian Imp* (1815), iL 49 ; de- 
feated at Lagny by Napoleon, 50 ; 
his action at Waterloo, 52. 

Blum, Robert, German Liberal; exe- 
cuted after revolt of Vienna (1S48), 

iiL 79 



1843), iL 486, 487; the Czechs' 
movement for independence, Hi_ 13; 
dnrfiaaa to send representatives to 
^uliisMl IsaisiUj iFlaiii fn (, 31 ; 
rebellion at Prague, 53, 54; Pros- 
Bum.-Anstziflji cftxnpBaign. 375 

Bologna; portion of Cispadane Re- 
public, i. 133; insurrection of 1831, 
iL 399 

Rnnapaito, Jerome; i i ig liff 1 to 
marry the daughter of the King of 
Wurtemberg, by his trother Xapo- 
leon, L 303; Kingdom of Weat- 
phalia given to hun, 347; flight 
mam Woatol 


Bonaparte, Joseph; Frend ambassa- 
dor at Borne, L 163; represent* 



France at the peace conference* at 
Amiens, 242 : Naples given to him, 
301; made King of Spain, 381; 
flight from Madrid, 384; second 
flight, 449 ; defeated at Yittoria by 
Wellington, 520 

Bonaparte, Louis; made King of 
Holland, L 302; abdication and 


Bonaparte, Lucien, L 202, 203 
Bonaparte, Napoleon (See Napoleon) 
Boncampagni, Sardinian envoy, iii- 

Bordeaux ; takes arm* against Paris, i 

71: French National Assembly 

opened at (1871), iii. 463 
Borodino, Battle of, i. 468 
Bosnia, takes arms against Turkey, 

iii. 238 ; handed over to Austria at 

the Congress of Berlin (1877) 519 
Bosphoros, The ; rule for passage of 

war-ships agreed upon by the 

Powers, iL 462 
Bxlogne, Army of, i. 284 
Bourbaki, General, commands French 

army of the East, and is defeated by 

the Germans at Montbeliard, iii. 

461, 462 
Bourdonnaye, La : member of French 

House of Representatives, iL 101, 

102 ; miniatAT under Charles X., 

Bourmont, General; French minister, 

iL 361 ; campaign against fa^^i 

365; captures Algiers, 367 
Braganza, House of, L 356 
Brandenburg, meeting of Prussian 

Parliament at, iii. 124 
Brandenburg, Count ; Prussian minis- 

ter (1848), iiL 123: death, 146 
Brazil ; seat of Portuguese government, 

ii. 186 
Brionis, Omer; Turkish commander, 

ii. 295. 297, 339 
Brisson, French general; surrenders 

to the Tyrolese, L 413 
Brissot, M., journalist and Girondin 

ember of Legislative Assembly, L 

9 ; urges war against Austria, 10 
Brune, Marshal ; murdered by French 

Royalists at Mam-iHt*, iL 93 
Brunn, L 295 
Brunswick, Duke of; his hatred to- 

wards Emigrants, L 33 ; invades 

France, 42 ; his proclamation to 

the French, 43 ; retreat at Valmy, 

43 ; retire* before the French at 
rth, 87: on Prussian policy, 299 ; 

prepares for a campaign against 

France (1806). 317; his opinion of 

ii -2 

the Prussian army, 325 ; mortally 
wounded at the Battle of Anentadt, 

Brunswick (Younger) Duke of, invades 
Saxony, L 422 

Brunswick, Insurrection in, iL 407 

Buenos Ayres; falls into the hand* of 
tka English, L 369 

Bulgaria, iL 250 ; Turkish massacres, 
iiL 483; autonomy constituted by 
the Treaty of San Stefano, 510; 
provisions of Treaty of Berlin 
Misting to, 518 

Bulow, Prussian general, L 508 

Bunsen, Count, iiL 132; letter from 
King of Prussia on England's 
assistance to Turkey, 202, note; 
Prussian ambassador at London, 
203 ; conflict with King Frederick 
WijiyftTti^ nrwi resignation of office, 
204; hllm fts^lfriitoiii'Wgsisa 
on the Emperor Nicholas, 220, note 

Bool, Count; Austrian minister, iiL 
201, 249 

Bnrdett, Sir Francis, iL 165 

Burgoyne, English engineer in the 
Crimea, iiL 212; letter to the 
Ttmtt, 213, note 

Burke, Edmund, L 63 ; bis description 
of the state of France, 75 ; associa- 
tion with Beaconsfield, iiL 487, note 


British troops in Portugal, L 385 
Byron, Lord, iL 212, 286, 313; 
writings excluded from Austria, 

Cadiz, inrestment by the French, L 

453; conspiracy in Spanish army; 

iL 172 ; meeting of Cortes, 221 ; 

besieged by the French, 231 
Cfrrt ii asHO >&% his plot to asMsc- 

inate Bonaparte, L 274 
Cagliari,iiL 284 
Cajaxzo, iii. 296 
CAtaa, Duke of, Yiceroy of Naples, 

iL 184, 200 ; rising against Austrian 

Ufa, 474 

Calder, Sir Robert, "Kg*Hi admiral, 

Calderari, Neapolitan Society of, iL 

| Cambaceres, Second Coosnl of France, 

L 210 

Gunbray, invested by Austrian*, L 78 
Cambridge, Duke of, his flight from 

Hanover, L 271 
Camperdown, Battle of, L 151 
Campo Furmio, Treaty of, L 147 



Canning, George, Mr., i. 343 ; deter- 
mines to seize Danish navy, 350 ; 
on the proposals of the Aix-la- 
Chapelle Conference, ii. 131; op- 
posed to joint intervention with 
Allies, 190 ; withdraws from office, 
191 ; succeeds Castlereagh as 
Foreign Secretary, 212; determines 
to uphold the independence of the 
Spanish colonies, 227 ; sends troops 
to Portugal, 231 ; statesmanship, 
233 ; attitude towards Greece, 312 ; 
Metternich's hostility towards him 
for arranging the Anglo-Russian 
protocol for intervention in Greece, 
323 ; death and policy, 326328 
Canning, Sir Stratford (See Lord Strat- 
ford de Redcliffe) 

Canrobert, French commander in the 
Crimea, iii. 213, 224; succeeded 
hy Pelissier, 225 
Cape" of Good Hope, i. 237 
Capodistrias, Foreign Minister of 
Russia, ii. 195; his rule in Corfu, 
264 ; love for the Greek cause, 267 ; 
retires from office, 285; elected 
President of Greece, 345 ; policy 
and administration, 350351 ; 
assassination, 354 

Capua, i. 174; surrendered to the 
French, 175, iii. 292 : surrendered 
to Sardinian troops, 297 
Carhonari, Neapolitan secret society, 

ii. 180, 199 

Cardigan, Lord, iii. 216 
Carignano, Prince of, ii. 204, iii. 270 ; 

and see Charley Albert 
Carinthia, annexed to Napoleon's em- 
pire, i. 430 

Carlists, or Apostolicals, ii. 230, 232 ; 
rebellions, 427 ; victories under 
leadership of Zumalacarregui, 434 
Carlos, Don, brother of King Ferdinand 
of Spain, head of clerical party, ii. 
176, 177 ; claims the crown of Spain 
on the death of Ferdinand, 429 ; 
unites with Don Miguel, ib. ; de- 
feated and conducted to London, 
430 ; reappears in Spain at head 
of insurgents, 431 ; victories, 435 ; 
surrender of troops to General 
Espartero, and end of war, 441 
Carlowitz, Congress of Serbs (1848), 

iii. 65 ; patriarch of, 89 
Carlsbad, conference of ministers (1819) 

ii. 142, 145 

Carnot, M., administrator of French 
army, i. 76 ; his policy, 80 ; member 
of Directory, 103; opposes the rule 
of the Directory, 144 ; flies for Jiis 

life, 146 ; his work of organisation, 
178; protests against Bonaparte's 
assumption of the title of Emperor, 
276 ; urges assembly to provide for 
defence of Paris after battle of 
Waterloo, ii. 56 ; exile and death, 

Carrascosa, Neapolitan general, ii. 183 
Carthagena, rising against the French, 

i. 380 

Casos, taken by Egyptians, ii. 303 
Cassel, Insurrection in, ii. 407 ; con- 
quered by Prussia, iii. 374 
Castlereagh, Lord, i. 343, 523 ; represents 
England at the Congress of Vienna, 
ii. 20, 24, 28 ; declines to sign the 
Treaty of Holy Alliance, 65 ; pro- 
poses council of ambassadors for 
the abolition of the slave-trade, 76 ; 
foreign policy in Sicily, Spain, and 
France, 87 90 ; on the proposals 
of the Aix-la-Chapelle Conference, 
132; Conservative policy, 164; op- 
poses the Czar's proposal for joint 
intervention, 190 ; death and cha- 
racter, 212 

Catherine of Russia, her hatred to the 
French Revolution, i. 13 ; design 
on Poland, 33, 57 ; gives Westei-n 
Poland to Prussia, 83 ; death, 168 
Catholic Emancipation Act, i. 240 
Caulaincourt, French envoy at the 
Congress of Prague, i. 500 ; at the 
Congress of Chatillon, 523 
Cavaignac, General, leads troops 
against insurgents in Paris (June, 
1848) iii. 40 ; rise and decline of his 
power, 43 ; candidate for the Presi- 
dency of the Republic, 47 ; arrested 
by Louis Napoleon, 172 
Cavour, Count, iii. 223 ; Prime Minister 
of Piedmontese Government, 244 ; 
character and plans, 245, 246 ; 
Crimean policy, 247 ; meets Napo- 
leon III. at Ploinbieres to negotiate 
respecting war with Austria, 253 ; 
Bummons Garibaldi to support him 
in a war with Austria, 254 ; various 
intrigues on behalf of Italian in- 
dependence, 255 ; accepts British 
proposal for disarmament, 258 ; dis- 
pleasure at the terms of the Peace 
of Villafranca, and resignation, 
266 ; his plans for the union of 
Italy, 268, 269 ; returns to power, 
275 ; agrees to the cession of Nice 
and Savoy to France, 277 ; policy 
with regard to Naples r ,289 ; orders 
Admiral Persano to excite insurrec- 
tion at Naples, 290 ; struggle with 



Garibaldi, 295 ; views regarding the 
transfer of Venice to Italian King- 
dom, 300 ; attitude towards the 
Catholic Church, 301 ; last words 
and death, 302 ; character and great 
work on behalf of Italy, 302-304 

Ceylon, retained by England by the 
Treaty of Amiens, i. 238 

Chaloidice, district in Greece, ii. 286 

Chambord, Comte de (Due de Bor- 
deaux), grandson of Charles X., ii. 
376, iii. 165, 474, 475 

Champ de Mai, ii. 46 

Championnet, French general, i. 172, 
173, 176 

Changarnier, commander of the 
National Guard in Paris, iii. 164, 
arrested by Louis Napoleon, 172 

Chansenets, Marquis de, governor of 
the Tuileries, ii. 17 

Chanzy, General, leads the French 
army of the Loire against the 
Prussians atVenddmeand LeMans, 
iii. 461 

Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, 
defeats Austrians at Goito, iii. 55 ; 
defeated at Santa Lucia, ib. ; enters 
Milan, but retreats on the advance 
of Austrians, 61 ; defeated at 
Novara and abdicates, 100 

Charles, Archduke, entrusted with the 
defence of Austria against the 
French,!. 127; defeats French at 
Amberg, 128 ; defeats the French 
at Stockach, 179; withdraws from 
Russian allied troops, 192 ; head of 
Austrian military administration, 
282 ; replaced by General Mack, 
ib. ; proclamation to the German 
nation, 409 ; Bavarian campaign, 
415 ; army defeated by Napoleon at 
Abensberg, 415; defeated by the 
French at Wagram, 425 

Charles III., his rule in Naples and 
Sicily, i. 115 

Charles IV. (Spain), i. 367; seeks 
Napoleon's intervention, 371 ; abdi- 
cates, 374 

Charles X., king of France, ii. 324; 
his government (1824-1827), 358- 
360 ; dissolves the Chambers, 360 ; 
makes Vicomte de Martignac chief 
minister, ib. ; conflict with ministers, 
364 ; Ordinances of July, 368 ; 
abdicates and retires to England, 
376, 377 ; death at Goritz, 377 

Charles, Prince, of Hohenzollcrn- 
Sigmaringen, elected Hereditary 
Prince of Roumania, iii. 237 ; com- 
mands at Plevna, iii. 501 

Charlottenburg, Convention of, i. 334 
Chateaubriand, M., member of French 

Chamber of Deputies ii. 96 ; 

appointed Foreign Minister, 217 
Chatham, Earl of, commander of 

expedition against Antwerp, i. 428 
Chatillon, Congress of, i. 523, 526 
Chauvelin, French ambassador, expelled 

from England, i. 58 
Chios, ii. 248 ; massacre by Turks, 

Christian VIII., King of Denmark, iii. 

Christian IX., succeeds Frederick VII. 

as King of Denmark, ii. 345 ; cedes 

his claims in Schleswig-Holatein to 

Austria and Prussia, 353 
Christian, Prince (of Gliicksburg), 

declared heir to the throne of 

Schleswig-Holstein, iii. 150 (Sea 

Christian IX.) 
Chrzanowski, commander of Sardinian 

army against Austria, iii. 99 
Cintra, Convention of, i. 385 
Circles of the Holy Roman Empire, i. 

. 17 

Cisalpine Republic, i. 148 ; its dissolu- 
tion, 181 

Cispadane Republic in Italy, Creation 
of the, i. 133 

Ciudad, capture of, by the Duke of 
Wellington, i. 448 

Civil Code of Bonaparte, i. 258, 543 ; 
abolished in Westphalia, ii. 8 

Civita Vecchia, The French at, iii. 105 ; 
occupation by the French renewed, 

Clarendon, Lord, represents Great 
Britain at the Conference of Paris 
(1856), iii 230 

Clarke, M., French Minister of War, 
ii. 103. 104 

Clerfayt, Austrian commander, i. 94, 

Clergy (Greek), ii. 243 

Clergy (Romish) ; opposed to decrees 
of National Assembly, i. 7 ; their 
power in Austria, 20 ; position in 
Ecclesiastical States, 37 ; incite to 
insurrection in Naples, 177 ; re- 
conciliation with Bonaparte, 260 ; 
popularity in the Tyrol, 411; im- 
prisonment of, by Napoleon, in 
Papal States, 437 ; fanaticism in 
Spain, and opposition to the Cortes, 
454 ; restored to power in Spain, ii. 
11 ; encroachments in France, 18; 
benefited in France under Richelieu's 
ministry, 107 ; intrigues in Spain 
against the Constitution, 207 ; 



appointed to State offices in Spain, 
223 ; rise of power in France under 
Charles X., 359 ; decline of in- 
fluence in France under Louis 
Philippe, 381 ; reformation pro- 
posed in Italy, 471. ^Growth of 
power in Austria, iii. 156 

Clotilde, Princess, iii. 253 ; betrothed 
to Prince Jerome Napoleon, 256 

Clubs, French, in 1791, i. 8; Repub- 
lican club at Maincz, 52 

Coalition (1798) between England, 
Russia, Turkey, and Naples against 
the French Republic,!. 169 ; between 
England and Russia against France, 

Cobden, Richard, Mr., iii. 179 

Cobenzl, Ludwig, Austrian plenipo- 
tentiary in Italy, i. 147; at the 
Congress of Rastadt, 156; Prime 
Minister, 282 

Coblentz, head-quarters of Emigrants, 
i. 7 

Coburg, Prince ; invests Cambray and 
Le Quesnoy, i. 78; defeated by 
French at Fleurus, 92 ; replaced by 
Clerfayt, 94 

Coclrington, Admiral ; attacks Ibra- 
him's forces, ii. 330 

Colberg, Gallant defence of, against 
the French, i. 342 

Collin, Austrian general, occupies free 
city of Cracow, ii 492 

Cologne; condition in 1792, i. 37; 
captured by French, 94 ; wealth 
of the Elector, 254 

Commissioners ' of the Convention 
(France), i. 73 

Committee of Public Safety (France), i. 

Commune of Paris, The (1793) ; op- 
position to the Girondins, i. 66 ; 
crushes Girondins, 71 ; (1871) 
attempts made to overthrow the 
Government of National Defence, 
and to secure the co-operation of 
the National Guard, iii. 469 ; 
Generals Lecomte and Clement 
Thomas seized and put to death ; 
a revolutionary committee formed 
at the Hotel de Ville; elections 
held for the council ; hostilities 
with the trooj s of Versailles, 470; 
slaughter of prisoners and hostages, 
and destruction of public buildings 
on the entry of the Government 
troops into Paris, 471 

Concordat of Bonaparte, i. 260 265 

Coiide, Siege of, i. 70; surrenders to 
Austrians, 75 

Condorcet, philosopher, and Girondin 
member of Legislative Assembly, i. 
9 ; his manifesto, 14 

Congress of Vienna, ii. 20 31, 38; 
resumption and completion after 
second Treaty of Paris, 67 77. 

Conscription ; in France, i. 76 ; in 
Prussia, 483 ; in Hungary, iii. 96 

Constant, Benjamin, draws up 
Napoleon's Acte Additionnel, ii. 43 

Constantine, Grand Duke, ii. 318, 319 ; 
withdraws Russian troops from 
Poland, 393 

Constantine, Grand Duke (younger), 
appointed Viceroy at Warsaw, iii. 
334 ; attempt on his life at War- 
saw, 335 

Constantinople ; execution of Patriarch 
and massacre of archbishops and 
Christians, ii. 275, 276 ; expulsion 
of Christians by Mahmud IL, 335 ; 
Conference (1876), iii. 493 _ 

Convention, French, proclaims the 
Republic, i. 49 ; receives addresses 
from English Radical societies, 59 ; 
invaded by mob, 71 ; change of 
constitution, 101 ; attacked by 
Royalists, and defended by Bona- 
parte, 102 

Copenhagen, Battle of, i. 231; bom- 
bardment by the English, 351 

Corfu, ii. 264 

Corinth, Isthmus of, ii. 298 

Corsica, i. 50 

Cortes, Spanish, i. 450 ; declares the 
sovereignty of the people, and the 
freedom of the Press, 453 ; opposi- 
tion of the clergy, 454 ; declines to 
restore the. Inquisition, ib. ; leaders 
arrested by the king, ii. 168 ; 
summoned (1820), 176; retires to 
Cadiz on the invasion of the 
French, 221 ; banishment of mem- 
bers, 223 ; frequent succession of 
new, 439 ; agrees to modification 
of Constitution of 1812, 440 

Corunna, Battle of, i. 398 ; declares 
for a Constitution, ii. 175 

Council of Ancients (France), i. 202 

Council of Five Hundred (France), i. 

Council of State (France), i. 204 

Cowley, Lord, British ambassador at 
Paris, attempts to mediate between 
Austria, France, and Sardinia, iii. 

Cracow, ii. 30 ; occupied by Austrians, 

Crete, ii. 288 ; conquered by Egyptians, 
303 ; rises against Turkey, iii. 238 



Crimoan "War, barren in positive re- 
sults, iii. 181 ; Parliamentary papers 
&c., respecting, note, 1 83 ; com- 
mencement of, 199; Battle of the 
Alma, 211 ; bombardment of Sebas- 
topol, and Battle of Balaclava, 214 ; 
Battle of Inkermann, 216; loss of 
English troops from severe winter, 
218; Battle of the Tchernaya, 226; 
capture of the Malakoff by the 
French, ib. ; fall of Sebastopol, ib. 

Croatia, Movement in (1848), iii. 6369 

Crown Prince of Prussia opposes Bis- 
marck's measures against the Press, 
321 ; takes part in the campriiu;n 
against Austria (1866), 374376 ; 
commands southern army against 
the French (1870), 433; defeats 
the French at .Weissenburg, 434 ; 
defeats McMahon at Worth, 434 ; 
at the Battle of Sedan, 446 ; at the 
eiege of Paris, 450 ; unfriendly re- 
lations with Bismarck, 466 

Custine, General, enters Mainz, i. 51 ; 
defeated in the Palatinate, 69 ; 
commands army of the North, 75 ; 
executed by RevolutionaryTribunal, 

Custozza, Battle of, between Austrians 
and Sardinians, iii. 61 ; second 
battle of, between Austrians and 
Italians, 377 

Cuxhaven ; blockade by the French, i. 

, 271 

Cuza, Prince Alexander, elected Hos- 
podar of Moldavia and Wallachia, 
iii. 237 ; expelled by his subjects, 

Cyprus, assigned to England by Tur- 
ke)', iii., 517 

Czartoryski, Polish noble, President of 
Provisional Government in Poland, 
ii. 393 

Czechs, The, of Bohemia, iii. 1 3 ; their 
rising at Prague, 53 ; hostility to 
Hungary, 75, 387, 391 

Czeklers, The, of Transylvania, iii. 85 

Dahlmann, reports on the armistice of 
Malmo, iii. 118 ; retires from 
National Assembly, 137 

Dalmatia, taken by France, i. 148 ; 
won by Austria, ii. 4 

Danton, sends the mob against the 
Tuileries, i. 44 ; permits the Sept- 
ember massacre, 45, 46 ; leader of 
the Mountain party, 67 ; attacks 
Girondins, 67 

Duntzig, Surrender of, to the French, 
i. 342 

Danube, Napoleon's passage of the, i. 
420 ; second passage, 424 ; Russian 
passage of the (1876), iii. 497 

Danubian Provinces entered by Russian 
troops, iii. 194 ; evacuation by 
Russia, 208 ; Austrian protection, 
ib.; rights and privileges guaran- 
teed by the Powers at the Confer- 
ence of Psyis (1856), 232; incor- 
poration with Austria proposed by 
Napoleon III., 235 ; Prince Alex- 
ander Cuza elected Hospodar of 
Moldavia and Wallachia, and after- 
wards expelled, 237 ; Charles of 
Hohenzollern elected Hereditary 
Prince of Roumania, ib. 

Dardanelles, The, ii. 448; entry of 
French and English fleets (1839), 
454 ; rule for passage of war-ships 
agreed upon by the Powers, 462 ; 
entry of British and French fleets, 
iii. 196 

Davidovich, Austrian general, i. 134 

Davoust, General (French), defeats 
Prussians at Auerstadt, i. 329 ; 
enters Berlin, 332 ; heads the army 
in Bavaria, 408 

Dcak, Hungarian statesman, ii. 490 ; 
leader of Hungarian Assembly, 
promotes reconciliation with Aus- 
tria, iii. 388, 389 

Debreczin, Hungarian Parliament 
meets there, iii. 87 

Decazes, M., French minister, 1815, 
ii. 96, 97 ; sanguinary measures 
respecting the rising at Grenoble, 
115; influence over Louis XVIII., 
116; his measures, 154; victory 
over ultra-Royalists, 156; com- 
promise with Royalists, 158 ; dis- 
missal, 159 

Declaration, of Leopold II. and Frede- 
rick William II. respecting the 
safety of Louis XVI., i. 4, 5; of 
Duke of Brunswick to France, 43 ; 
of French Convention to all na- 
tions, 54 

De Gallo, Austrian envoy to Bonaparte, 
i. 141 

Delessart, M., Foreign Minister of 
Louis XVI., i. 12. 

Dembinski, appointed by Kossuth to 
the command of Hungarian army 
in the war against Austria, iii. 87, 
90, 95 

Denmark; joins the Northern Mari- 
time League, i. 228 ; Battle of 
Copenhagen, 231 ; landing of 
English troops, 351 ; declares war 
against England, 353; loses 



Norway, ii. 5 ; rebellion of 
Schleswig-Holstein, iii. 25 ; death 
of King Christian VI II., and ac- 
cession of Frederick VII., 27 ; war 
with Prussia respecting Sehleswig- 
Holstein, 28 ; armistice of Malmo 
with Prussia, 117; peace with 
Prussia, 149 ; death of Frederick 
VII., 342 ; accession of Chris- 
tian VII., 347 ; conflict with 
Prussia and Austria respecting 
Sehleswig-Holstein, 343-353; hy 
Treaty of Vienna King Christian 
cedes his rights in Sehleswig-Hol- 
stein to Prussia and Austria, 353. 

Dennewitz, Battle of, i. 508. 

Depretis ; Pro-Dictator at Palermo, 
iii. 288 ; resigns office, 294. 

Derby, Lord, English Foreign Secre- 
tary (1876), proposes a conference 
at Constantinople, iii. 490 ; resigna- 
tion and resumption of office, .507 ; 
differences with Lord Beaconsfield 
on the Eastern Question, and re- 
signation of office, 514. 

Diavolo, Fra, i. 177. 

Diebitsch, commander of Russian 
forces, ii. 340 ; defeats Turks at 
Kalewtscha, 341 ; crosses the Bal- 
kans, 342; invades Poland, 395. 

Diet of the Empire, i. 17, 154, 248- 

Diet of Frankfort, ii. 68 ; passes re- 
pressive measures, 145-150 ; fur- 
ther repression, 410 ; enters upon 
reform, iii. 4, 29 ; extinct from 
1848 to 1850, 143; restored by 
Austria, 145 ; decrees federal exe- 
cution in Holstein, 345 ; Prussian 
demands (1866), 366; calls out the 
Federal forces ; Prussian envoy 
withdraws, 370. 

Dijon, iii. 461. 

Directory, The French, i. 101, 103 : 
instructions to Bonaparte regarding 
campaign in Italy, 121 ; negotiates 
with Prussia and Austria, ' 129 ; 
declines proposals of peace with 
England, 131 ; party of opposition 
in the, 144 ; intimidated by Bona- 
parte. 144 ; members seized by 
Augereau's troops, 146 ; reorgan- 
isation, ib. ; consents to Bonaparte's 
attack on Egypt, 153 ; unpopularity 
in 1799, 198 ; its overthrow (1799), 

Disraeli, Mr. B. (See Lord Beacons- 

Divorce, abolition of, in France, ii. 

Dobrudscha, The ; advance of the Rus- 
sians into, iii. 207; advance of 
1876, 499; ceded to Russia and 
given by Russia to Roumania in 
exchange for Bessarabia, 512 

Domingo, St., ceded by Spain to French 
Republic, i. 96 

Donnadieu, French general at Gren- 
oble, ii. 115 

DSrnberg, General, revolts against 
King Jerome of Westphalia, i. 417 

Douay, General, leads French troops 
at Weissenburg, and is defeated and 
killed, iii. 434 

D'Oubril; Russian envoy to Paris, i. 

Dramali ; Turkish commander, ii. 295, 
297, 298, 299 

Dresden; entry of Napoleon, i. 494 ; 
battle of, 505 ; democratic rising, 
iii. 135 ; occupied by Prussians, 

Ducos, M., French Director, i. 201 

Dumouriez, General, French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, i. 2 ; checks 
Prussians at Valmy, 47 ; proposes 
peace to King of Prussia, 47; in- 
vades the Netherlands, 52 ; defeated 
by Austrians at Neerwinden, 68 ; 
his treason, 69 

Dundas, Mr., retires from office with 
Pitt, i. 240 

Dunkirk ; besieged by English, i. 78 ; 
Duke of York defeated, 79 

Dupont, French general, enters Spain, 
i. 372: defeated at Baylen, 384; 
Minister of War (1814), ii. 16 

Durando, Papal general, iii. 56, 60 

Ecclesiastical States (German), i. 37 ; 
secularisation of, 129; suppression 
of, 157, 252 

Ecclesiastical System (France), re- 
organised by National Assembly, i. 

Edelsberg, Battle of, i. 416 

Egypt ; Bonaparte's design of attack 
on, i. 152 ; failure of French ex- 
pedition under Bonaparte, 167 ; 
Bonaparte's victory at Aboukir, 
200 ; French and Turkish engage- 
ments, 234 ; capitulation of Cairo 
to English, 236 ; capitulation of 
Alexandria to English, ib. ; con- 
quest of Crete, ii. 303 ; navy de- 
feated at Navarino, 330 332 ; war 
with Turkey (1832), 443446; 
second war with Turkey (1839), 

Elba, i. 535 



Elgin, Lord ; his report concerning 
French emigrants, i. 45, note ; on 
the Battle of Jemappes, 64, note ; 
on Prussia's designs, 77, note ; on 
the French army in the Nether- 
lands, 90, note ; report on the re- 
volutionary feeling in France, 131, 

Elliot, Sir H., British ambassador at 
Constantinople, iii. 482, 492 

Emigrant Nobles (France) ; take arms 
against France, i. 7 ; head-quarters 
at Coblentz, 7 ; protected by Elector 
of Treves, 10 ; their dispersal de- 
manded by the Gironde, 10 ; allied 
with Austria and Prussia against 
France, 42; their cruelties, 45, 
note ; landed by English fleet in 
Brittany, 100 ; their defeat by 
General Hoche, 100; return to 
France, 103, ii. 13; restored to 
official rank, 16; granted com- 
pensation of 40,000,000, 359 

Ems, iii. 416 ; telegram respecting 
pretended insult to the French 
Ambassador, by King William 
of Prussia, 420 

Enghien, Murder of the Duke of, i. 575 

England ; alarmed by Decree of French 
Convention, i. 55 ; feeling towards 
French Revolution, 56 ; French 
ambassador expelled, 58 ; war with 
France, 59; condition in 1793, 59 ; 

< sympathy of Fox with French Revo- 
lution, 61 ; struggle of George III. 
with Whigs, 61 ; attitude of Pitt to- 
wards French Re volution, 62 ; Burke 
denounces the Revolutionary move- 
ment, 63 ; victories on French 
frontier, 76 ; driven from Dunkirk, 
79 ; commands Mediterranean after 
the siege of Toulon, 82 ; contrast of 
English and Austrian policy, note, 
86 ; furnishes a subsidy to Prussia, 
88 ; retires from Holland, 95 ; at- 
tempts to negotiate peace with 
France, 130; Battles of St. Vin- 
cent and Camperdown, 151 ; 
Battle of the Nile, 168 ; coali- 
tion with Russia, Turkey and 
Naples against France, 169 ; com- 
bined expedition with Russia against 
Holland, 195 197 ; replyto Bona- 
parte's proposal for peace, 216 ; new 
proposals rejected, 223 ; differences 
with Russia, 228 ; war with North- 
ern Maritine Powers, 230 ; Battle 
of Copenhagen, 231 ; peace with 
Northern Powers, 233 ; attacks the 
French in Egypt, 235 ; Battle of 

Alexandria, 235 ; takes Cairo 
and Alexandria, 236 ; Treaty of 
Amiens with France, 238 ; Act of 
Union with Ireland passed, 240 ; 
National Debt in 1801, 241 ; war 
with France (1803), 266 ; occupa- 
tion of Hanover by the French, 
270 ; joins Russia in coalition 
' against France, 278 ; Battle of 
Trafalgar, 290 ; attacks the French 
in Italy, 302 ; death of Pitt, 309 ; 
coalition ministry of Fox and 
Grenville, 310; ships excluded 
from Prussian ports, 314; seizure 
of Prussian vessels, ib. ; Napoleon's 
Berlin decree against English com- 
merce, 336; fall of the Grenville 
ministry and appointment of the 
Duke of Portland Prime Minister, 
343; Treaty of Bartenstein, 344; 
troops land in Denmark, 351 ; 
bombardment of Copenhagen, tJ. ; 
Denmark declares war, 353; troops 
enter Portugal, 385 ; victory over 
the French at Vimieiro, 38o ; Spanish 
campaign (1809), 395398 ; defeats 
the French at Talavera, 426 ; failure 
of expedition against Antwerp, 
428 ; Spanish Campaigns (1810-12), 
443449; (1813), 519; Duke of 
Wellington enters France, 520. 
At the Congress of Vienna, ii. 28 ; 
at Battle of Quatre Bras, 51 ; 
Battle of Waterloo, 53 56 ; 
part taken in drawing up second 
Treaty of Paris, 59 62 ; de- 
clines the Czar's Treaty of 
Holy Alliance, 64 ; seeks at the 
Congress of Vienna to secure aboli- 
tion of the Slave Trade, 74-76; 
foreign policy under Wellington 
and Castlereagh, 86-90 ; discontent 
from 1815 to 1819, 121 ; Canning's 
opinion on the proposals of the Aix- 
la-Chapelle Conference, 131; refuses 
to enter into a general league with 
the Allies and France, 133 ; Con- 
ser vati ve poli cy of Lord Castlereagh , 
164; protection of Portugal, 186; 
prevents joint diplomatic action 
with regard to Spain, 190 ; with- 
drawal of Canning, 191 ; protests 
against the Troppau circular, 
197; neutral attitude towards 
Spanish revolution of 1822, 210 ; 
death of Castlereagh, and appoint- 
ment of Canning as Foreign Secre- 
tary, 212; Congress of Veronn, 
215-217 ; prohibits the conquest of 
Spanish colonies, 225; sends troops 



to Portugal, 231 ; Canning's states- 
manship, 233; protocol with Russia, 
321 ; defeats Turks at Navarino, 
330-332 ; inaction in Eastern policy 
after the Battle of Navarino, 333 ; 
Protocol of London respecting Greek 
frontier, 348 ; Talleyrand, as French 
ambassador to London, persuades 
William IV. and Wellington to 
abstain from intervention in Belgian 
affairs, 385 ; Conference of London 
recognises the independence of 
Belgium, 386 ; passing of the 
Reform Bill (1832), 419, 420; grow- 
ing friendliness towards France, 
422 ; squadron sent to Portugal to 
demand indemnity for attack on 
British subjects, 426 ; assists Spain 
with arms and stores in quelling 
Carlist rebellion, 435 ; fleet sent to 
the Dardanelles, 454 ; settlement of 
Eastern Question, 1841, 461 ; fleet 
sent to Naples on the occupation of 
Ferrara by Austria, 473. State of, 
in 1851, iii. 179 ; repudiates schemes 
suggested by Emperor Nicholas 
respecting disintegration of the 
Sultan's dominions, 187; policy of 
Lord Aberdeen and coalition minis- 
try (1853), 192194 ; despatch of 
fleet to Besika Bay on the entry of 
Russian troops into Danubian Pro- 
vinces, 194 ; declaration of war in 
conjunction with France Against 
Russia, 199 ; demands on Russia as 
the basis of peace, 209 ; troops land 
in the Crimea, 210; Battle of the 
Alma, 211; Battle of Balaclava and 
Charge of the Light Brigade, 215, 
216 ; Battle of Inkermann, 217 ; 
loss of troops in the Crimea during 
the winter of 1854, 218 ; mis- 
management of the campaign, 219; 
Lord Aberdeen's ministry resigns, 
and Lord Palmerston is made Prime 
Minister, 219; Conference of Vienna 
(May, 1855), fails to arrange treaty 
of peace between England and 
Russia, 222 ; resumption of the 
siege of Sebastopol, 223 ; fall of 
Sevastopol, 226 ; treaty of peace 
with Russia signed at Paris 
(1856), 230; agreement made at 
Conference of Paris with re- 
gard to the rights of neutrals, 
232 ; insists on division of 
Danubian Principalities, 326 ; at- 
tempts to mediate between A ustria, 
France, and Sardinia, 256; volun- 
teer forces, 279 ; sympathy with 

Italian revolution, 298 ; Conference 
of London respecting Denmark and 
Schleswig-Holstein, 351 ;: vacilla- 
tion on the Schleswig-Holstein ques- 
tion, 353 ; rejects the Berlin Mem- 
orandum, and dispatches the fleet 
to Besika Bay, 481 ; opinion on 
Bulgarian massacres, 483 ; Disraeli's 
Foreign Policy, 484-487 ;' the Con- 
stantinople Conference, 493-495 ; 
the " London Protocol," 496 ; fleet 
ordered to Constantinople, and re- 
versal of order, 507 ; Lord Derby's 
resignation and resumption of office, 
507 ; Vote of Credit of 6,000,000 
for army purposes, ib. ; fleet ordered 
to Constantinople, 508 ; imminence 
of war with Russia, 509 ; objections 
to the Treaty of San Stefano sum- 
med up in a circular to the Powers, 
514 ; secret agreement with Russia, 
517; acquisition of Cyprus, ib.; 
Congress of Berlin, 518 

English Commonwealth, i. 60 

Epirus, ii. 354 

Erfurt; head-quarters of Prussian 
army (1806), i. 326; meeting of 
Napoleon and the Emperor Alex- 
ander, 390 ; meeting- place of Federal 
Parliament (1849), iii. 141 

Erzeroum, iii. 505 

Eski Sagra, iii. 499 

Espartero, General, totally defeats the 
Carlists (1839) ii. 441 ; appointed 
Regent of Spain, ib. ; exiled, 442 

Etienne, St., Revolt of working-classes 
at, ii. 416 

Etropol, iii. 504 

Etruria ; ceded to France by Spain, i. 

Eugenie, Empress, eagerness for war 
with Prussia, iii. 420 ; insists on 
McMahon marching to the relief of 
Metz, 443 ; flight from Paris after 
the surrender of Napoleon at 
Sedan, 448; declines the Prussian 
conditions of peace, 455 

Eupatoria, Bay of, iii. 210 

Evans, Colonel De Lacy ; leads English 
and French volunteers against the 
Carlists, ii. 438 

Exhibition, Great, of 1851, iii. 178 

Eylau, Battle of, i. 341 

Faidherbe, General, leads the French 

army of the North against the 

Prussians, iii. 459 
Failly, General, defeats Garibaldians 

at Mentana, iii. 408 ; surprised at 

Beaumont, iii. 444 



Famars, i. 70 

Farini, Sardinian commissioner in 
Modena, iii. 262; accepts dictator- 
ship of Modena, 267 

Favre, Jules, proposes the deposition 
of Napoleon III., iii. 447 ; addresses 
a circular to the European Courts 
on the overthrow of the Napoleonic 
Empire, 448 ; meets Bismarck at 
Ferrieres to negotiate for peace, 
450 ; meets Bismarck at Versailles 
to discuss terms of an armistice, 463 

Ferdinand, Archduke, i. 288 

Feidinand, Crown Prince of Spain, i. 
368 ; placed under arrest for 
a supposed intrigue with Napoleon, 
371 ; restored to the king's favour, 
371 ; proclaimed king, 374 ; lured to 
Bayonne, 375 ; renounces the crown 
of Spain, 376 ; restoration in 1814, 
ii. 9 ; arrests the leaders of the 
Cortes, 168; partiality to the 
clergy, ib. ; establishes the Constitu- 
tion, 177; conspires against the 
Constitution, 207 ; retires to Seville 
on the invasion of the French, 219 ; 
annuls the Constitution, 222 ; death 
(1833), 427 

Ferdinand I., Emperor of Austria, 
succeeds Francis (1835), ii. 483; 
yields to demands of students 
and mob respecting the National 
Guard, iii. 51 ; night from Vienna, 
, 62 ; dissolves Hungarian Parlia- 
ment, and declares its acts null and 
void, 74; flight to Oluiiitz, 77; 
abdication, 81 

Ferdinand, King of Naples, armistice 
with Bonaparte, i. 123 ; proclama- 
tion against the French, 171 ; 
enters Home, 172; despatch to the 
exiled Pope, 172 ; flees from Rome, 
173; escapes to Palermo in the 
Vanguard, 174 and (note) 175 ; 
returns to Naples, 184 ; treaty with 
Austria, ii. 85 ; rule in Sicily, ii. ; 
declares a Constitution, 184 ; hypo- 
crisy, 185, note ; goes to conference 
at Laibach, 199 

Ferdinand II., King of Naples, pro- 
claims a Constitution, ii. 474 ; con- 
quers Sicily, iii. 112; his violence 
and oppression, 113; death, 281 

Ferrara, portion of Cispadane Republic, 
i. 133 

Fichte, i. 407, 441 ; ii. 127, 149 

Fieschi, attempt on the life of Louis 
Philippe, ii. 417 

Finland, gained by Russia in 1814, 
ii. 1 

Flanders, battles between French and 
allied armies of England and 
Austria, i. 91 

Fleet, German, sold by auction, iii. 151 

Fleury, French officer, confidant of 
Louis Napoleon, iii. 167 

Florence (See Tuscany) 

Fontainebleau, Treaty of, i. 355 

Forbach, iii. 483 

Forey, French general, under Louis 
Napoleon, iii. 174 

Forster, Mr. W. E., M.P., opposes the 
Vote of Credit for 6,000,000 for 
army purposes, iii. 508 

Fouche, M., appointed to the head of 
French Provisional Government by 
Louis XVIII., ii. 69; f all of his 
ministry in 1815, 95 

Fourier, M., his Socialistic work, ii. 

Fox, Mr. C. J., M.P., sympathy with 
French Revolution, i. 61 ; takes 
office with Lord Grenville, 310; 
pacific attitude towards France, 
311; death, 343 

France ; war declared against Austria 
(1792), i. 2; Louis XVI. accepts 
Constitution of National Assembly 
(1791), 5; National Assembly dis- 
solved (1791), 6; Emigrants take 
arms against, 7 ; war-policy of the 
Gironde, 9 ; opening of war against 
Austria, 41 ; invaded by Prussian 
troops, 4 '2 ; war against Allies now a 
just one,46; patriotism, 46; evacuated 
by Prussia, 48; declared a Republic 
by Convention, 49; the war be- 
comes a crusade of democracy, 49 ; 
successes of army in Germany, 52 ; 
annexes Savoy and Nice, 54; execu- 
tion of Louis XVI., 58 ; war with 
England, 59 ; opposition between 
Girondmsand Mountain Party, 66 

68 ; treason of General Dumouricz, 

69 ; loses former conquests, 69 ; out- 
break of civil war, 70, 71 ; victory 
of the Mountain over Girondins,71 ; 
Committee of Public Safety ap- 
pointed, 71 ; Reign of Terror, 72 
75 ; conscription, 76; Social Equali- 
ty, 80 ; defeats Austrians at Wat- 
tignies, 81 : victories at Worth and 
Weissenbuig, 87 ; takes Antwerp, 
93 ; conquers Holland, 95 ; treaty 
of peace with Prussia at Basle, 96 ; 
condition in 1795, 99 ; Constitution 
of 1795, 101 ; the Directory, Cham- 
ber, and Council of Ancients, 101 ; 
opening of campaign in Italy, 118 ; 
victories of Bonaparte in Italy, 119, 



120; invades Germany, 126; de- 
feats Austria at Arcola and Rivoli, 
134, 135 ; negotiations with Aus- 
tria at Leoben, 138; elections of 
1797, 143 ; seizure of Directors, and 
reorganisation of Directory, 146; 
treaty with Austria at Campo For- 
mic, 147 ; intervention in Switzer- 
land, 159; intrigues in Home, 
163 ; occupies Rome, 164 ; expedi- 
tion to Egypt, 166; defeated 
by England at the Battle of the 
Nile, 168; coalition of 1798 against, 
169; evacuates Rome, 172; re- 
enters Rome, 173; takes Naples, 
176; defeated by Austria at Stoc- 
kach and Magnano, 179, 181 ; de- 
feated by Russia on the Trebbia, 
182; defeated at Novi, 191; vic- 
tories over English and Russians in 
Holland, 195, 196 ; condition in 
1799, 198 200; Bonaparte's return 
from Egypt, 201 ; new Constitution 
of 1799," 203 208; the Consulate 
of Bonaparte, 211 214; resump- 
tion of war against Austria, 217; 
Peace of Luneville, 226; friendly 
with Russia, 227 ; defeats Turks 
at Heliopolis, 234 ; defeated by 
English in Egypt, 235; Treaty 
of Amiens with England, 238; 
French rule in Italy and Switzer- 
land, 244246; Civil Code and 
Concordat, 258 265 ; growth of 
Papal power, 263 ; war with Eng- 
land (1803), '266; Bonaparte as- 
sumes the title of Emperor, 276 ; 
coalition of Russia, England, and 
Austria, 278 ; defeats Austrians 
at Ulm, 288 ; occupation of Vienna, 
293 ; Austerlitz, 296 ; Peace of 
Presburg, 299 ; influence in Ger- 
many and Italy, 307 ; war against 
Prussia, 1806, 326 336; acquisition 
of Prussian territory, 347 , war 
against Portugal, 355 ; troops enter 
Spain, 372 ; war reopened by 
Austria, 402 ; surrender of General 
Brisson's column to the Tyrolese, 
413; Napoleon enters Vienna, 416; 
defeated by Austrians at Aspern, 
421; defeats Austrians at Wagram, 
425 ; French defeated at Talavera 
by Sir Arthur Wellesley, 426: 
peace with Austria, 430 ; Napo- 
leon's annexations of the Papal 
States, Holland, &c., 436 438 ; 
troops enter Portugal, 445 ; in- 
vasion of Russia, 462 477 ; Prussia 
declares war, 486 ; opening of 

the War of Liberation against 
Napoleon, 502 ; Battles of Dres- 
den, Grossbeeren, Kulm, Leipzig, 
505 513 ; invasion -by Prussia 
and Allies, 519 ; dethronement of 
Napoleon, 531 ; Peace of Paris, 536 ; 
results of Napoleon's wars, 540 
544 ; restoration of Louis XVIII., 
531 533. Character of Louis 
XVIII., ii. 12, 13; new Constitu- 
tion, 14 ; at the Congress of Vienna, 
22 31 ; Napoleon leaves Elba, 31 ; 
Napoleon enters Paris, 38 ; flight 
of King Louis, ib. ; the Acte Ad- 
ditionnel (1815), 42; the Chambers 
summoned, 44 ; election, 45 ; new 
Constitution, 46 ; Battles of Ligny, 
Quatre Bras, and Waterloo, 50 
55 ; Napoleon's flight to Paris, 56 ; 
Napoleon's abdication, 55 ; Allies 
enter Paris, 57 ; restoration of 
Louis XVIII., 57 ; removal of 
Napoleon to St. Helena, 58 ; 
cessions and indemnity by the 
second Treaty of Paris, 62, 63; 
International Council of Ambas- 
sadors meets in Paris for the 
regulation of French affairs, 79 ; 
Royalist outrages at Marseilles, 
Nismes, and Avignon, 91 93 ; 
Elections of 1815,93,94 ; reactionary 
Chamber of Deputies, 96 ; execution 
of Marshal Ney, 98 ; Richelieu's 
Amnesty Bill, 101 ; persecution of 
suspected Bonapartists, 103, 104, 
and note ; the ultra-Royalist party 
adopts Parliamentary theory in 
Chamber of Deputies, 105 ; ecclesi- 
astical sehemes, 106; abolition of 
divorce, 107; Electoral Bill, 108; 
Villele's counter-project of popular 
franchise, 110, 111 ; contest in the 
Chambers on the Budget, 113; the 
Chambers prorogued, 114; rii-ing at 
Grenoble, 115; dissolution of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 117; passing 
of Electoral Law, 117; partial 
evacuation by Allied troops, 119; 
general improvement from 1816 to 
1818, 119, 120; evacuation by 
Allied troops, 131 ; Conference of 
Aix-la-Chapelle, 131 133; condi- 
tion after 1818, 154; measures of 
Decazes, 155 ; resignation of Riche- 
lieu, 155 ; reaction against Liberal- 
ism after the murder of the Duke 
of Berry, 160 ; second retirement 
of Richelieu, ib. ; projects of Count 
of Artois, 160 ; Villele's Ministry, 
161 ; the Congregation, 161 ; re- 



presentation at the Congress of 
Verona, 215 217; invasion of 
Spain (1823), 219; sympathy with 
Greece, 324 ; joins in a treaty with 
England and Russia for suppressing 
the conflict in the East, ib. ; defeats 
Turks at Navarino, 330332 ; Go- 
vernment of Charles X. (1824 
1827), 358360; Ministries of 
Martignac and Polignac, 360, 361 ; 
prorogation of Chambers, and 
General Election, 365 368 ; cam- 
paign against the Arabs, 365 ; 
capture of Algiers by General 
Bourmont, 367 ; publication of 
Ordinances in the Moniteur, 368 ; 
Revolution of July, 1830, 371376; 
abdication of Charles X., Louis 
Philippe made King, 378 ; nature 
of the Revolution of 1830, 379; 
attitude towards insurrection in 
Papal States, 401 ; insurrections in 
Paris, Lyons, Grenoble, and other 
places, against the Government, 
415, 416; attempt on the life of 
Louis Philippe by Fieschi, 417; 
laws of 1835 to repress sedition, 
417 ; growth of friendliness to- 
wards England, 422 ; declines to 
send troops to Spain to quell Carlist 
rebellion, 437 ; suppoit given to 
Viceroy of Egypt, 450, 456 ; fleet 
sent to Naples on the occupation of 
Ferrara by Austria, 473 ; marriage 
of the Duke of Montpensier to the 
Infanta of Spain, 506 ; demand for 
Parliamentary reform, 507 ; oppo- 
sition in the Chambers to Louis 
Philippe, 608 ; spread of Socialism, 
509 ; Revolution of February, 1848, 
512; abdication and flight of Louis 
Philippe, 513 ; Republic proclaimed, 
ib. ; effect of the Revolution on 
Europe, iii. 3 ; meeting of Pro- 
visional Government, 34 ; national 
workshops, 35 ; first acts of National 
Assembly, 38 ; riot of May 15th, 
1848, ib. ; the Assembly seeks to 
abolish national workshops, 38 ; 
order for enlistment of workmen, 
40 ; insurrection of June, ib. ; rise 
of Louis Napoleon, 43 46 ; Louis 
Napoleon elected President, 47; 
troops dispatched to occupy Rome 
and restore the Papal power, 105 ; 
attempted insurrections (1849), 108 ; 
siege and capture of Rome, 108, 
109 ; restores Pontifical Govern- 
ment, 109 ; aims of Louis Napo- 
leon, 157 ; law carried for limit- 

ing the franchise, 160 ; Louis 
Napoleon seeks for prolongation 
of his Presidency, 162 ; revision 
of Constitution for prolonging 
Napoleon's Presidency rejected 
by Assembly, 166 ; Louis Napo- 
leon's preparations for the Coup 
d'etat, 167 - r Assembly refuses Louis 
Napoleon's 'demands for re-estab- 
lishing universal suffrage, 170; 
Coup d'etat of Dec. 2, 1851, 172 
174; massacre in Paris, 176; the 
plebiscite entrusts Louis Napoleon 
with forming a constitution, and 
maintains him in office, 177; 
Louis Napoleon proclaimed Napo- 
leon III., Emperor (Dec. 2, 1852), 
177 ; dispute with Russia respecting 
Holy Places in Palestine, 185 ; fleet 
dispatched to Besika Bay on the 
entry of Russian troops into Dan- 
ubian provinces, 194 ; declaration 
of war against Russia, 199 ; troops 
land in the Crimea, 210; Battle of 
the Alma, 211; Battle of Inker- 
mann, 217 ; attack on the Malakoff, 
223 ; Emperor Napoleon proposes 
to direct operations at the siege of 
Sebastopol, 224 ; defeats Russia at 
the Battle of the Tchernaya, 226 ; 
Treaty of Peace with Russia 
signed at Paris (1856), 230 ; troops 
occupy Syria (1860), 238 ; declares 
war, in conjunction with Sardinia, 
against Austria 259 ; defeats 
Austriansat Magenta, 261 ; victory 
of Solferino, 263 ; peace with 
Austria concluded at Villafranca, 
265 ; Napoleon plans the establish- 
ment of an Italian kingdom, 273 ; 
dismissal of Walewski, foreign 
minister, and appointment of 
Thouvenel, 274 ; annexation of 
Savoy and Nice, 277; ambassador 
withdraws from Turin on the Sar- 
dinian invasion of the Papal States, 
293 ; September Convention with 
Italy, 361 ; obtains Venetia for 
Italy, 377 ; Napoleon III. mediates 
between Prussia and Austria, ib. ; 
Napoleon seeks for the cession of 
Luxemburg, 401 ; outcry against 
Prussian aggression, 403; re- 
occupation of Civita Vecchia, 408; 
isolation in 1870, 410 ; indignation 
against Prussia at the candidature 
of Prince Leopold for the Spanish 
throne, 413 ; war decided against 
Prussia (1870), 420: only sixteen 
out of eighty-seven departments in 



favour of war with Prussia, 422 ; 
condition of the army, 428 ; incom- 
petence and lethargy of ministers 
in war preparations, 429 ; deficien- 
cies of the army aggravated by the 
misappropriation of public funds, 
430 ; defeated by Prussians at 
Weissenburg, 434 ; defeated at the 
Battle of Worth, 435 ; defeated at 
Spicheren, Mars-la-Tour, and 
Gravelotte, 436441 ; Battle of 
Sedan and surrender of Napoleon, 
446 ; deposition of the Emperor 
and proclamation of the Eepublic, 
447, 448 ; formation of a govern- 
ment of national defence, 448 ; 
Gambetta undertakes the formation 
of national armies, 450 ; siege of 
Paris, 450 ; fall of Strasburg, 453 ; 
army of the Loire, 453 ; Orleans 
taken by Germana, ib. ; capitula- 
tion of Metz, 455 ; capitulation of 
Paris and armistice, 463 ; elections 
ordered to be held, 463 ; National 
Assembly meets at Bordeaux, 464 ; 
Thiers arranges terms of peace 
with Bismarck, ib. ; entry of 
Germans into Paris 1st March, 
1871, 465; Treaties of Versailles 
and Frankfort with Germany, ib. ; 
insurrection of the Commune and 
national guard in Paris, 468 471 ; 
the Republic under M. Thiers, 474 ; 
McMahon's presidency, 475 ; Comte 
de Chambord, ib. ; at the Congress 
of Berlin, 519 

Francis II., Austria under, i. 27 ; his 
address to the Germanic body, 154 ; 
assumes the title of Emperor of all 
his dominions, 277 ; incapacity, 405. 
On the Holy Alliance, ii. 64 ; 
his intolerance and resistance to 
progress, 82 ; death (1835), 482. 

Francis II., King of Naples ; succeeds 
his father, Ferdinand II., iii. 281 ; 
attempts to negotiate an alliance 
with Piedmont, 289; flight from 
Naples on the advance of Garibaldi, 
291 ; conducted by the French, on 
the fall of Gaeta, to Papal States, 

Francis Joseph I. , Emperor of Austria 
(1848), iii. 81 ; dissolves Parliament, 
82; demands from Turkey the sur- 
render of Kossuth, 184 ; commands 
his army in Italy against France 
and Sardinia, 263 : interview with 
Napoleon III. at Villafranca, 265 j 
promises to restore the old Con- 
stitution to Hungary, 324 ; conflict 

with Hungarian Assemblies, 325; 
excluded from Germany, 376 379 ; 
reconciliation with Hungary, 389 ; 
crowned King of Hungary, 392; 
private arrangements with Na- 
poleon III. for defence against 
Prussia, 406 

Frankfort, rising at, ii. 411 

Frankfort, German National Assembly 
of, iii. 31 ; debates on Primary 
Eights, 114 116; outrages on the 
ratification of the armistice of 
Malmo, 118; discusses German 
relations with Austria, 125 ; passes 
the Constitution, 130 ; elects 
Frederick William IV., Emperor, 
130 ; German governments reject 
the Constitution, 134; end of the 
Parliament, 135 

Frederick Charles, Prince, commands 
Prussian troops in Schleswig against 
Denmark, iii. 350 ; takes part in the 
campaign against Austria, 374 
376; commands the central Prussian 
army against the French, 433 ; be- 
sieges Metz, 441, 447 

Frederick the Great, work in Prussia 
of, i. 30, 37 

Frederick VII., King of Denmark ; 
accession to the throne, iii. 27 ; pub- 
lishes draft of a Constitution, ib. ; 
war with Prussia respecting Schles- 
wig-Holstein, 28; death in 1863, 
342, 345 

Frederick William II. (Prussia), meets 
Emperor Leopold at Pillnitz, and 
issues joint declaration relating to 
safety of Louis XVI., i. 4 ; charac- 
ter of his rule, 32 ; his alliance with 
Austria against the French, 33 ; 
treaty with Catherine of Russia, 
83 ; breach with Austria, 86 ; leads 
army upon Warsaw, 89 

Frederick William III. (Prussia) ; his 
proposals regarding Hanover, i. 
270 ; his remonstrance with Bona- 
parte, 272 ; temporising policy with 
Bonaparte, 280 ; treaty with the 
Emperor of Russia at Potsdam, 292 ; 
evades engagements with Russia, 29 7; 
attempts to disguise the cession of 
Hanover, 312; at the Battle of 
Auerstadt, 329 ; flight to Weimar, 
330 ; dismisses Stein, 335 ; cordial 
relations with Emperor of Russia, 
344 ; cedes large portions of terri- 
tory to Napoleon, 347 , reluctance 
to enter into war with Austria, 407; 
proclamation to the German nation, 
409 ; proposal of alliance with Russia 



against France declined, 458 ; de- 
ciiirea war against France, 486; Con- 
gress of Vienna,ii. 24, 26 ; weakness 
and timidity, 83 ; promises a popu- 
lar Constitution, 121; interferes in 
the diacussion caused by Schmalz's 
pamphlet, 125 ; recommendations 
given to him by Metternich, 137 ; 
establishes the Provincial Estates, 
151 ; attitude towards Greece, 323 ; 
death in 1840, 496 

Frederick William IV., of Prussia, 
succeeds his father in 1840, ii. 497 ; 
his character, 498 ; convokes united 
Diet at Berlin, ib. ; violent language 
to the deputies, 500 ; manifesto to 
the German people during the dis- 
turbances of March, 1848, iii. 33 ; 
withdraws to Potsdam during riots 
at Berlin, 120: prorogues and 
afterwards dissolves the Prussian 
Assembly, 123, 124; elected Em- 
peror of Germany by the Frankfort 
Parliament, 1 30 ; refuses the 
Imperial crown, 133 ; attempts to 
form a union of German states, 
139 ; total failure of attempt to 
form a German Federal Union, 
154 ; proposes that the rights of 
the Christian subjects of the Sultan 
should be guaranteed by the Great 
Powers, 202 ; letter to Bunsen on 
England's assistance to Turkey, ib., 
note ; letter to Bunsen on the 
' Emperor Nicholas, 220, note ; with- 
draws from public affairs, 305 

Friedland, Battle of, i. 345 

FrOschwiller, iii. 435 

Frossard, General, leads French corps 
against Saarbnicken, iii. 433 

Fuentes d'Onoro, Battle of, i. 447 

Gaeta ; flight of Pius IX. to, iii. 98 ; 
bombardment and surrender to Sar- 
dinian troops, 298 

Gagern, Von; President of the Ger- 
man National Assembly (1848), iii. 
115; succeeds Schmerling as chief 
minister in Frankfort Parliament, 
126 ; proposes a conditional union 
with Austria, 127 ; leads the 
Liberals in the Federal Parliament 
at Erfurt, 141 

Gai, Illyri an leader, iii. 63 

Galicia; insurrection of Poles (1846), 
ii. 493 

GaUipoli;.iii.207, 509 

Gambetta, M., proclaims the French 
Republic after the surrender of 
Nacolcon at Sedan, iii. 448 ; leaves 

Paris during the siege to undertake 
the government of the provinces 
and the organisation of national 
armies, 451 ; resigns on the rejec- 
tion of his proposal for excluding 
from election all persons connected 
with the Government of Napoleon 
HI., 464 

Garibaldi, Gengral; heads a corps in 
defence of Rome against the French, 
iii. 106 ; leaves Rome and escapes 
from Austrians to America, 109 ; 
leads volunteers against Austria 
(1859), 257, 260; proposes to lead 
an expedition against Rome. 270 ; 
hostility to the cession of Nice to 
France, 278 ; breach with Count 
Cavour, 279 ; expedition to Sicily, 
283 ; captures Palermo, and as- 
sumes the dictatorship, 285, 286 ; 
defeats the Neapolitans at Mi- 
lazzo, 286 ; lack of administrative 
faculty, 288 ; triumphant entry 
into Naples, 292; requests Victor 
Emmanuel to consent to his march 
on Rome, and to dismiss Cavour, 
295 ; defeats Neapolitan troops 
at Cajazzo, 296 ; meeting with Vic- 
tor Emmanuel, 297 ; reduces 
Capua, ib. ; his request for the 
lieutenancy of Southern Italy de- 
clined by Victor Emmanuel, ib. ; 
returns home, 298 ; wounded and 
made prisoner by the troops of 
Victor Emmanuel at Aspromonte, 
361 ; his troops invade Papal States 
(1867), 408; commands a body of 
auxiliaries during the Franco- 
Prussian war, 461 

Gastein, Convention of. iii. 358, 370 

Gegenbach, Abbot of, i. 18 

Genoa; overthrow of oligarchic govern- 
ment, and establishment of demo- 
cratic constitution favourable to 
France, i. 142 ; blockaded by Aus- 
trians, 217 ; surrendered to Aus- 
trians, 220 ; given to the King of 
Sardinia, 537, ii. 70 

Georgakis ; Greek insurgent, ii. 272 

George III., Elector of Hanover, i. 36 ; 
abuses in England under his rule, 
69 ; struggle with political parties, 
61 ; hostility to the Catholic Eman- 
cipation Act, 240 ; announces the 
coalition with Russia against 
France, 278 ; quarrels with his 
ministers on the Catholic Disabili- 
ties question, 343 

Germany, state of, in 1792, i. 15-40; 
whole of west of the Rhine in the 



hands of the French (1794), 95; 
abandoned by Austria, 150; its 
representatives at the Congress of 
Rastadt, 155 ; after the Peace of 
Luneville, 226 ; settlement of, by 
Bonaparte 248 ; absence of national 
sentiment, 250; Bonaparte's organi- 
sation of Western, 303 ; no national 
unity (1806), 304 ; condition under 
Napoleon's rule, 307 ; Austrian war 
of 1809 against France on behalf 
of Germany, 403 ; Southern Ger- 
many sides with Napoleon, 406 ; 
patriotism in Northern Germany, 
ib. ; idea of unity at the outbreak of 
war with France in 1813, 487; 
Napoleon's campaign of 1813, 490 ; 
Stein's policy during the War of 
Liberation, 508 ; beneficial effect of 
Napoleon's wars, 542. Act of 
Federation at Congress of Vienna, 
ii. 67 ; delay in promised Consti- 
tution, 125 ; alarm raised by 
Stourdza's pamphlet, 138 ; murder 
of Kotzebue, 141 ; relation of Minor 
States to Prussia, 143 ; measures of 
the Conference of Carlsbad, 145 ; 
commission of Mainz, 149 ; re- 
actionary despotism, 152; rise of 
secret societies, 153 ; sympathy 
with France, 153 ; condition after 
French Revolution of 1830, 405 
411; the Zollverein, 406; insur- 
rections in Brunswick and Cassel, 
407 ; Constitutions granted in 
Hanover and Saxony, 408 ; despotic 
reaction (1832), 410412 ; rising at 
Frankfort, 411 ; repressive measures 
of Metternich, 411, 412. Agitation 
in Western Germany, 1847, iii. 3 ; 
sympathy with Schleswig-Holstein 
in its rebellion against Denmark, 
25 ; desire for unity amongst the 
people, 29 ; formation of the Ante- 
Parliament, 29 ; meeting of the 
National Assembly at Frankfort, 
31; work of the Assembly, 114, 
outrages at Frankfort on the ratifi- 
cation of the armistice of Malm 5, 
118; the Frankfort Assembly dis- 
cusses the relation of Austrian 
Empire to German y, 125 ; Frederick 
William IV. refuses to accept the 
Imperial Crown, 133 ; Frankfort 
Assembly denounced as a revolu- 
tionary body, 135 ; end of the 
Parliament, 137; formation of 
Federal Constitution and Federal 
Parliament at Erfurt, 140, 141 ; 
conflict in Hesse-Cassel between 

the ministry and the people, 145; 
national fleet sold by auction, 151 ; 
' epoch of reaction, 151 ; revival of 
idea of German union under the Re- 
gency of Crown Prince William, 307; 
formation of National Society, 308 ; 
Schleswig-Holstein and German 
interests, 348, 349 ; the Danish war, 
350 ; disagreement between Austria 
and Prussia, 356 ; agreement of 
Gastein, 358 ; war between Austria 
and Prussia, 370-376 ; Treaty of 
Prague, 378 ; Southern States enter 
into alliance with the King of Prus- 
sia, 381 ; military organisation, 404 ; 
establishment of a Customs-Parlia- 
ment, 411 ; progress of the work of 
consolidation by Bismarck, 412 ; 
mobilisation of troops, 427 ; Franco- 
German War, 433-465 ; union of 
Northern and Southern States, 
and assumption of the title of 
Emperor by King William, 466 
468 ; first Parliament of the German 
Empire opened at Berlin, 468 ; 
" League of the Three Emperors," 

Gervinus, member of German National 
Assembly, iii. 32 

Gioberti, aims in his writings at a 
reformation of Italy through the 
Papacy, ii. 471 

Girondins, i. 9 ; their war-policy, 9 ; 
demand dispersal of Emigrants, 10 ; 
influence in the Convention, 48 ; 
at variance with the Commune, 65 ; 
accusations against the Commune 
and Robespierre, 66 ; hated by the 
people,. 66 ; influence declines, 67 ; 
crushed by Commune and members 
arrested, 71 

Gitschin, headquarters of King of 
Prussia in campaign against Aus- 
tria, iii. 375 

Giulay, General, commands the Aus- 
trians in 1859, iii. 260 

Gneisenau, Prussian general, gallant 
defence of Colberg, i. 342 ; advocates 
an invasion of France, 517 ; serves 
with Bliicher in Napoleon's last 
campaign, ii. 52, 53 

Godoy, Spanish minister, injurious in- 
fluence, i. 367 ; seized by the mob, 

Goethe, i. 38, 305 

Gorgei, Hungarian commander, iii. 84, 
86, 88 ; surrenders to Austrians at 
Vilagos, 95 

Gortchakoff, Prince Alexander, re- 
presents Russia at the Conference 



of Vienna, May, 1855, iii. 221 ; 
seeks to dissuade the Czar from 
making peace with England and 
Allies, 230 ; rejects the interference 
of the Powers with regard to Polish 
affairs, 337 ; resists Milutine's 
measures in Poland, 339 ; Berlin 
Memorandum, 481 ; Servian cam- 
paign, 489, 496, 509 

Gourko, General, leads Russian corps 
in Bulgaria, iii. 499, 500, 504, 505 

Graham, General, commands English 
troops at Cadiz, i. 446 

Gramont, Duke of, French Foreign 
Minister (1870), iii. 414 ; favours a 
war with Prussia, 415 

Gravelotte, Battle of, iii. 441 

Greece, Revolt in, ii. 167 ; races and 
institutions, 237242 ; Greek 
Church, 243 ; the Armatoli and 
Klephts, 247 ; Islands of, 243 ; the 
Phanariots, 251 ; the Hospodars, 
ib.; intellectual revival in eighteenth 
century, 253 ; Koraes, 254 257 ; 
growth of commerce, 260 ; founda- 
tion of Odessa, ib. ; influence of 
French Revolution, 262 ; the songs 
of Rhegas, 263; the Hetaeria 
Philike, 265, 268; revolt of the 
Morea, 273 ; extension of the 
revolt, 285; massacre at Chios, 291 ; 
double invasion by Turks, 295 ; 
defeat of the Turks, 299; civil 
war, 300 ; defeats in the Morea, 
' 306310; fall of the Acropolis of 
Athens, 311 ; intervention of Great 
Britain and Russia, 322 ; Turks to 
be removed from the country, 322 ; 
sympathy amongst the Liberals and 
Ultramontanes of France, 324 ; 
the Sultan to retain paramount 
sovereignty, 325 ; condition after 
Battle of Navarino, 332 ; Capodis- 
trias elected President, 345 ; limits 
of, settled by the Powers, 349 ; 
Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg 
accepts the crown, 349 ; Prince 
Leopold renounces the crown, 352 ; 
assassination of Capodistrias, 354 ; 
Prince Otto of Bavaria made King, 
354 : transfer of Ionian Islands 
(1864) by Great Britain, ^355; 
gains Thessaly at the Congress of 
Berlin, iii. 519 

Gregoire (ex-bishop), election to 
French Chamber of Deputies, ii. 
156 ; election invalidated, 158 

Gregory XVI. ( Pope), ii. 399; appeals to 
Austria for assistance against insur- 
gents of Bologna, 400 ; refuses to 

J J 

accept the proposals of reform 
recommended by the Conference of 
Rome, 404 ; death (1846), 472 

Grenoble, Napoleon's arrival at, after 
escaping from Elba, ii. 34 ; popular 
rising, 115; represented by Gregoire 
in Chamber of Deputies, 1 56 ; 
revolt of working-classes (1834), 

Greiiville, Lord*, and the designs of 
Austria and Prussia, i. 57 (note), 77 
(note) ; on the royalist movement in 
France, 98 (note) ; retires from 
office, 240; Prime Minister, 311; 
fall of his Ministry, 343 

Grey, Lord, and the English Reform 
Bill, ii. 420 

Grossbeeren, Battle of, i. 506 

Guizot, M. , succeeds Thiers as French 
Premier, ii. 460 ; approves of the 
marriage of the Duke of Montpen- 
sier to the Infanta of Spain, 505 ; 
resignation (1848), 512 

Gustavus III. (Sweden), his hatred to 
French Revolution, i. 13 

Gymnastic establishments, supposed 
by Metternich to be dangerous to 
European peace, ii. 137 

Habeas Corpus Act, Suspension of, in 
England, ii. 165 

Ham, place of Louis Napoleon's im- 
prisonment, iii 44 

Hambach, Castle of, demonstration 
against German despotism held at, 
ii. 410 

Hamburg, effect of the blockade of 
English commerce by Napoleon, i. 

Hamilton, Lady, i. 169 (note); 185 

Hamilton, Sir "W., despatch respecting 
General Mack, i. 171 (note); on the 
escape of the Royal Family from 
Naples, 175 (note) 

Hanover, Nobles of, i. 36 ; occupation 
by the French, 269; offered to 
Prussia by Bonaparte, 281; King 
of Prussia's dissimulation respect- 
ing its cession, 312; offered to 
England by Napoleon, 315 ; in- 
surrection, ii.408. Attempt to form <\ 
union with Prussia, iii. 139 ; secedes 
from league -with Prussia, 140 : 
conquered by Prussia, 374; annexed 
by Prussia, 378 

Hapsburgs, The, i. 1733 

Hirdenberg, Baron (Prussian minis- 
ter), i. 280 ; on Prussia's acquisi- 



tion of Hanover, 313 (note) ; dis- 
missal from office, 357 ; recalled in 
1810, 457 ; policy, 458 ; meets 
Stein at Breslau to arrange Treaty 
of Kalisch, 484. At the Congress 
of Vienna, ii. 23; his demands 
respecting second Treaty of Paris, 
60, 61 ; his constitutional system, 
123; decline of his influence, 135 
148; death, 151 

Harrowby, Lord, his despatch from 
Berlin on the evasion of Prussian 
engagements with Russia, 298 

Hassenpflug, Chief Minister in Hesse- 
Cassel, iii. 144 

Hastings, Captain, commands a Greek 
detachment, ii. 329 

Haugwitz, Prussian Minister, i. 88 
89 ; recommends the occupation of 
Hanover, 269 ; his withdrawal, 280 ; 
interview with Bonaparte at 
Briinn, 295 ; arranges treaty with 
Bonaparte at Schonbrunn, 298 ; 
signs a treaty forcing Prussia into 
war with England, 313 ; resigns 
office, 335 

Haydn, the musician, i. 21, 404 

Helena, St., ii. 58 

Helvetic Republic, i. 162 

Herzegovina revolts against Turkey, 
iii. 477 ; handed over to Austria at 
the Congress of Berlin, 519 

Hesse, restoration of the Elector, ii. 8 ; 
the Elector's extortions, 126. 
Hassenpflug appointed Chief Minis- 
ter, iii. 144 ; conflict between the 
Ministry and the people, and 
appeal to Diet of Frankfort, 145 ; 
settlement of affairs referred to the 
Diet of Frankfort, 148 ; renewed 
struggle between the Elector and 
the people, 308 ; conquered by 
Prussia, 374; annexed to Prussia, 

Hetaeria Philike, The, ii. 265, 268 

Hoche, French general, i. 87 

Hofer, Tyrolese leader, i. 435 

Hohenlinden, Battle of, i. 225 

Hohenlohe, Prince, Prussian general, 
i. 325 ; advice on the movements of 
the army against France, 326; 
destruction of his army at Jena, 
328 ; surrenders to Napoleon at 
Prenzlau, 331. 

Hohenlohe, Prince, Prime Minister of 
Prussia (1862), iii. 312; resigna- 
tion, 313 

Holland : war against France, i. 59 ; 
conquered by French, 95 ; expedi- 

tion of Engknd and Russia against, 
195 ; the Batavian Republic, 
237 ; its constitution in 1801, 
243 ; the Crown given to Louis 
Bonaparte, 302 ; abdication of 
the King, 438 ; annexed to the 
French Empire, 438 ; restored to 
the House of Orange, 536. United 
to Belgium at Congress of Vienna, 
ii. 70 ; prohibits the slave-trade, 75 ; 
conflict with Belgium, 388 ; refuses 
to accept decision of Conference of 
London with regard to Belgian 
frontier, 388 ; bombardment of 
Antwerp, 389 

Holstein (see Schleswig-Holstein) 

Holy Alliance, Treaty of, ii. 6366 

Holy Roman Empire, i. 16, 156 ; ita 
end, 300 

Hood, Admiral, at the siege of Toulon, 
i. 82 

Hornby, Admiral, ordered with English 
fleet to Besika Bay, iii. 507 

Hortense, mother of Louis Napoleon, 
iii 43 

Hospodars, Greek, ii. 251 ; iii. 184 ; 
Alexander Cuza elected Hospodar 
of Moldavia and Wallachia, 237 

Hotel de Ville, ii. 370; meeting of 
Lafayette's Municipal Committee 
(July, 1830), 375; Louis Philippe 
addresses the mob from, 376. 
Meeting-place of Provisional Go- 
vernment (1848), iii. 34 

Houchard, General, attacks Germans 
at Dunkirk, i. 79 ; executed by 
Revolutionary Tribunal, 79 

Howe, Lord, victory over French off 
Ushant, i. 96 

Hrabowsky, Austrian general, attempt 
to occupy Carlowitz, iii. 68 

Hugo, Victor, arrested by Louis 
Napoleon, iii. 176 

Humboldt, Prussian Minister, resigna- 
tion, ii. 147 

Hungary, Autocracy of Joseph II. in, 
i. 24 ; policy of Leopold II. in, 25. 
Affairs in 1825, ii. 477 ; the Mag- 
yars and Slavs, 478 ; Kossuth is 
imprisoned for publishing reports 
of debates, 479; general progress 
after 1830, 480; peasantry laws, 
481 ; schemes of Count Szechenyi, 
481 ; Kossuth's journal, 484 ; re- 
forms of the Diet of 1843, ib. ; 
power of the Magyars, 485 ; Slavic 
national movements, 486, 487 ; 
Count Apponyi appointed Chief 
Minister, 489. Kossuih's address to 
the Chambers on Austrian despot- 



ism, iii. 5 ; wins independence, 1 1 ; 
revolt of the Serbs, 63 69; war 
with Austria, 84 89 ; Austrians 
enter Pesth, 86 ; Parliament with- 
draws to Debreczin, 87 ; drives the 
Austrians out of the country, 89, 
90 ; declaration of independence, 
90 ; Russian intervention on the 
side of Austria, 93 ; campaign 
of 1849, 94 ; capitulation of 
Vilagos, 94, 95 ; constitutional 
rights extinguished, 96 ; Austria's 
vengeance, 95, 96 ; diploma for 
restoring the old Constitution pub- 
lished by Austria, 324 ; resists the 
establishment of a Central Council, 
325 ; meeting of Diet at Pesth, 
326 ; the Diet refuses to elect 
representatives to the Austrian 
Central Council, 326 ; dissolution 
of the Diet, and establishment of 
military rule, 327 ; settlement of 
conflict with Austria, and corona- 
tion of Francis Joseph, 387392 

Hussein Pasha leads Turkish troops 
into Syria, ii. 443 ; defeated by 
Egyptians at Beilan, 444 

Hydra, one of the 2Egean Islands, ii. 

Hypsilanti, Demetrius, leader of Greek 
revolt in the Morea, ii. 289, 298, 

Uypsilanti, Prince Alexander, ii. 268 

' 272 ; dismissed from the Russian 
service, 271 ; flight to Austria, 

Ibrahim, commander-in- chief of Otto- 
man forces, ii. 302, 303 ; invades 
the Morea, 306308; at the siege 
of Missolonghi, 309 ; devastates the 
Morea in opposition to proposal for 
armistice by the allies, 328 ; be- 
sieges Acre, 442 ; declared a rebel 
by the Sultan, 443 ; conquers 
Syria and Asia Minor, 443; charac- 
ter of his rule after the peace of 
Kutaya, 451 ; expelled from Syria 
by European allies, 460 

Ibraila, capitulates to Russian army, 
ii. 339 

Ignatieff, General, Russian ambassa- 
dor at Constantinople, iii. 489, 493 ; 
draws up the London Protocol, 496 

Tllyria, i. 25 

Inkermann, Battle of, iii. 217 

Innsbruck, surrender to the Tyrolese 
by the Bavarians, i. 413. Place of 
r> treat of Ferdinand I., Emperor 
of Austria, iii. 52 

J J '2 

Inquisition, The, in Spain, i. 393 ; the 
Cortes declines to restore it, 462. 
Restored by King Ferdinand (1814), 
ii. 9 ; attacked in Spain, 177 

Ionian Islands taken by France, i. 48. 
Made a Republic, ii. 264 ; trans- 
ferred by Great Britain to Greece, 

Ireland, Union of Great Britain with, 
i. 239 

Isabella, Queen of Spain, placed on the 
throne (1843), ii. 442. Dethroned, 
iii. 412 

Istria, taken by France, i. 148 

Italy : condition in 1796, i. 111116 ; 
opening of French campaign, 118; 
pillage by Bonaparte after his 
entry into Milan, 121 ; the Cispa- 
dane Republic created by Bona- 
parte, 132 ; birth of the idea of 
Italian independence, 133 ; Venice 
given to Austria by Bonaparte, 
141 ; Genoa receives a democratic 
constitution favourable to France, 
142 ; the French at Rome nnd 
Naples (1798), 163177; reaction 
at Naples, 183 ; campaign of 1799, 
191 ; campaign of 1800, Marengo, 
218222; Bonaparte made Pre- 
sident of the Italian Republic, 
244 ; Bonaparte accepts the title of 
King of Italy, 279 ; condition under 
Napoleon's rule, 307. Austrian 
policy (1816), ii. 8385; Austrian 
rule, 18151819, 121 ; revolu- 
tion in Naples, 182 ; Austrians 
invade Naples, 202 ; insurrection in 
Piedmont, 203 ; insurrection and 
Austrian intervention in Papal 
States, 1831,401405; occupation of 
Ancona by the French, 404 ; Ancona 
handed over to the Pope by the 
French (1838), 405; Austrian rule 
hostile to reforms, 467 ; Mazzini, 
468 ; Gioberti's writings, 471 ; 
reformation of the Papacy pro- 
posed, ib. ; election of Pius IX., 
472 ; political amnesty, ib. ; enthu- 
siasm in Rome, ib. ; Austria occu- 
pies Ferrara, 473 ; conflict with 
Austrians in Milan, 476. Insurrec- 
tion in Lombardy and Venice, iii. 
15, 16, 17 ; general war against 
Austria, 17, 18 ; Custozza, re- 
capture of Milan, 61 ; revolutionary 
period (August 1848 March 1849), 
96113; Novara, 100; French 
intervention at Rome, 105 ; fall 
of Venice, 112 ; Neapolitan des- 
potism, 113; Victor Emmanuel, 




242; campaign of 1859, 259; 
battle of Magenta, 261 ; _ over- 
throw of Papal authority in the 
Romagna, 261 ; Battle of Solferino, 
263 ; peace of Villafranca, 265 ; 
treaties of Zurich, 266 ; Garibaldi 
proposes to attack Rome, 270 ; 
Napoleon III. proposes a Congress 
at Paris to discuss Italian questions, 
271 ; Napoleon III. consents to the 
formation of an Italian Kingdom 
under Victor Emmanuel, 273 ; pub- 
lication of the pamphlet " The 
Pope and the Congress," 273 ; 
union of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, 
and the Romagna with Piedmont 
under the rule of Victor Emmanuel, 
276 ; cession of Nice and Savoy to 
France, 279 ; Sicily and Naples con- 
quered by Garibaldi in the name of 
Victor Emmanuel, 285, 290 ; Pied- 
montese troops enter TJmbria and 
the Marches, and capture Ancona, 
293294; all Italy, excepting 
Rome and Venice, united under 
Victor Emmanuel (1861), 298; the 
great work of Cavour on behalf of 
Italian liberty, and his hopes for 
the future, 302304 ; Garibaldi 
at Aspromonte, 361 ; September 
Convention, ib. ; relations with 
Prussia and Austria, 367 ; war of 
1866 ; Custozza, Venice ceded, 
377 ; Battle of Mentana, between 
Garibaldians and Papal forces, 408 ; 
re-occupation of Civita Vecchia by 
France, 408 ; projected alliance 
with Austria, 410 ; takes possession 
of Rome, 472 ; guarantees to the 
Pope, ib. 

Jacobins (see Girondins) 

Janina, Siege of, ii. 286 

Janissaries (Turkish), ii. 336 

Jarvis, English admiral, defeats the 
Spanish fleet at St. Vinc ( ent, i. 151 

Jellacic, Governor of Croatia, iii. 65 ; 
summoned to the Emperor of 
Austria at Innsbruck, 68 ; allowed 
to resume his government, and 
becomes the champion of Austrian 
unity, 69 ; appointed by the Em- 
peror commander of all the forces 
in Hungary, 74 

Jemappes, Battle of, i. 53 

Jena, Defeat of Prussians by Napoleon 
at, i. 328 ; freedom of printing, 
ii. 127 ; students of, ib. 

Jesuits, their influence declines in 
Germany, i. 22 

Jews, prohibition affecting them in 
Austria, i. 283 

John, Archduke, i. 224 ; plans the 
Tyrolese insurrection, 412 ; mediates 
with Croatia, iii. 68 ; appointed ad- 
ministrator of theAustrian Empire, 
115 ; refuses to suppress the Baden 
insurrection, 136 

John VI., King of Portugal, ii. 228; 
death 229 

Joseph II., Reforms of, i. 22 

Joubert, French general, i. 191, 199 

Jourdan, French general, i. 81; defeats 
Austrians at Wattignies, 81 ; in- 
vades Germany, 126 ; defeated by 
Archduke Charles at Amberg, 128 ; 
on the Rhine, 179; presides at 
court-martial on Marshal Ney, ii. 

Jovellanos, member of Spanish Junta, 
i. 450 ; policy in 1810, 452 

Juarez, President of Mexican Republic, 
driven from power, iii. 398 

Junot, French general, i. 354 ; invades 
Portugal, 355 ; defeated by British 
troops at Vimieiro, 385 

Junta, Spanish, i. 392; policy in 1809, 
450; resignation in 1810, 452. Pro- 
visional in 1820, ii. 177; appointed 
at Oporto, 188 

Just, St., commissioner of the French 
Convention, i. 87 

Kainardji, Treaty of; ii. 259; iii. 188 

Kamenski, Russian general, i. 340 

Kanaris (Greek captain), heroic ex- 
ploit against the Turks, ii. 293 

Kars, Capture of, by the Russians, iii. 
227, 505 

Kasatch Bay, iii. 213 

Katzbach, Battle of, i. 506 

Kaunitz, Austrian Minister, i. 10; 
retirement of, 28 ; his work, 28 

Kehl, Fortress of, i. 158 

Kesanlik, iii. 499, 506 

Khosrew, Turkish admiral, takes 
Psara, ii. 304 

Khurshid, Ottoman commander, ii. 
286, 295 

Kiel, formation of Provisional Govern- 
ment during insurrection against 
Denmark, iii. 28, 355 

Klapka, Hungarian general, iii. 87 

Kleber, General, i. 83, 234 ; assassina- 
tion, 234 

Klephts, The, ii. 247 

Knights of the Empire, i. 39, 255 

Knobelsdorff, General, Prussian am- 
bassador at Paris, i.*324 

Kolettis, Greek Minister, ii. 300 



Kolokotronee, Greek commander, ii. 
264, 289, 298, 300 ; imprisonment, 
301 ; reinstated, 306. 

Konduriottes, President of Greek 
Chambers, ii. 300, 303. 

Konieh, Battle of, between Egyptians 
and Turks, ii. 444. 

Koniggratz, Battle of, between Prussia 
and Austria (1866), iii. 376. 

Konigsberg, Flight of King Frederick 
William to, i. 338; entry of the 
French, 345 ; Russians admitted to, 
479 ; Stein publishes the Czar's 
order for the arming of East 
Prussia, 481. 

Koraes, Greek scholar, ii. 254 257 ; 
statement respecting Greek navy, 

Korniloff, Russian general in the 
Crimea, iii. 212, 213 

Korsakoff, Russian general, i. 189, 
192, 193 

Kosciusko, leads Polish revolt, i. 89 ; 
distrusts Napoleon's professions,339 

Kossuth, Hungarian deputy, circu- 
lates reports of debates in defiance 
of Austrian Emperor, ii. 479 ; edits 
a Liberal journal at Pesth, 483 ; 
his patriotic oratory, 489. His ad- 
dress to the Hungarian Chambers 
on Austrian despotism, iii. 5 ; heads 
democratic movement at Pesth, 
10 ; hostility to Austria, 71 ; orders 
' march against Austrians during 
revolt of Vienna, 78 ; appointed 
governor of Hungary, 91 ; flight 
into Turkey, 1 84 ; protected by 
the Sultan against the demands of 
Austria and Russia for his surren- 
der, ib. ; refuses to acknowledge the 
sovereignty of Francis Joseph in 
Hungary, 392 

Kotzebue, Murder of, ii. 140 

Krasnoi, Brattle of, i. 474 

Kray, -Austrian general, i. 191, 218 ; 

Kremsier, Parliament of Vienna meets 
at, iii. 80, 82 

Krudener, Russian general in Bulgaria, 
iii. 500, 501 

Knlm, Battle of, i, 506 

Kiistrin, Prussian fortress, surrendered 
to the French, i. 333 

Kutnya, Peace of, between Turkey and 
Egypt, ii. 446 

Kutusoff, Russian general, i. 292, 467, 
472, 492 

Labedoyere, Colonel, declares for 
Napoleon at Grenoble, ii. 34 ; exe- 
cution in 1815, 98 

Lafayette, ii. 38, 45; elected to 
Chamber of Deputies, 1 55 ; takes 
part in the Revolution of July, 
1830, 373; head of Provisional 
Government, 375 

Lafitte, French deputy, ii. 372 ; ad- 
vances the cause of the Duke of 
Orleans, 373 ; head of Louis 
Philippe's-Government,400 ; resigns 
office, 402 

Laibach, Conference at, ii. 198, 205 

Lamartine, M., member of French 
Provisional Government (1848), iii. 
34 ; loss of power on the election of 
Louis Napoleon to the Presidency 
of the Republic, 47 

Lamberg, Murder of General, at 
Pesth, iii. 74 

Lamoriciere, General, leads Papal 
troops against the Piedmontese, iii. 

Landrecies, Siege of, i. 90 

Landsturm, The Prussian, i., 363, 489 

Landwehr, The Prussian, i. 363, 482, 
489, 501 

Languages in Austria, i. 19 

Lannes, Marshal, at the Siege of 
Saragossa, i. 399 

Lanskoi, Russian Minister, prepares, 
with Milutine, the charta for the 
liberation of serfs, iii. 332 

Laon, Battle of, i. 526 

Latour, Austrian Minister, iii. 72 

La Vendee, Revolt of, i. 70, 76 

Layard, Mr., succeeds Sir H. Elliot as 
English Ambassador at Constantin- 
ople, iii. 508 

"League of the Three Emperors" 
(1872), iii. 476 

League of the Three Ki ngdoms (Prussia, 
Saxony, and Hanover, &c.) iii. 139, 

Lebreuf, French War Minister (1870), 
iii. 415, 429 

Lebrun, M., colleague of Bonaparte in 
the Consulship, i. 210 

Lecomto, General, murdered by the 
Commune of Paris, iii. 470 

Legislative Assembly, French , ma j ority 
for war against Austria (1792), i. 3 ; 
its composition, 8 ; Girondin De- 
puties, 9 ; reception of the Emperor 
Leopold's despatch, 11 ; mani- 
festo renouncing intention of con- 
quest, 14 ; determines to banish 
priests, 41 ; dissolved, 48 

Legislative Chambers, opening by 
Napoleon (1815), ii. 47 

Lehrbach, Austrian Envoy to Prussia, 
i. 86 ; Austrian Minister, 224 



Leipzig, Battle of,i. 516. Celebration 
of anniversary at Eisenach, ii. 127 

Le Mans, iii. 461. 

Leoben, Preliminary Treaty of, i. 138 

Leopold II. (Emperor) addresses 
European Courts on situation of 
French Koyal Family, i. 4; his 
despatch to Paris, abusing the war 
party, 11 ; his death (1792), 11, 27 ; 
his policy and work, 24 27 

Leopold, Prince, of Hohenzollem- 
Sigmaringen, candidate for the 
throne of Spain (1868), iii. 412; 
withdraws his candidature, 417 

Leopold, Prince, of Saxe-Coburg, 
accepts Crown of Greece, ii. 349 ; 
renounces the Greek Crown, 352 ; 
elected King of Belgium. 387 

Le Quesnoy, investment by Austrians, 
i. 78 

Lesseps, M., French envoy to Rome to 
negotiate terms of peace, iii. 107 

Lestocq, Prussian general, i. 340 

Levant, Commerce of the, under 
Mehemet Ali's rule, ii. 452 

Ligny, Battle of, ii. 50 

Lisbon, entry of French troops, i. 

Literature in North Germany, i. 21 ; 
suppression of, in Austria, 283 

Lithuania, ii. 395. The nobles rebel 
against Russia, iii. 337 

Liverpool, Lord, English Prime 
Minister, ii. 6 ; on the terms of the 
second Treaty of Paris, 60 ; re- 
sponsible for death of Marshal Ney, 
99 ; on the proposals of the Aix-la- 
Chapelle Conference, 132 ; unpopu- 
larity, 190 

Lodi, Bridge of, i. 120 

Lombard, Prussian minister, i. 272 

Lombardy, under Maria Theresa and 
the Emperor Joseph, i. 113; con- 
quered by Bonaparte, 135 ; made 
a Republic by the treaty of Campo 
Formio, 148 ; arrival of Russian 
army, 181 ; evacuated by Austrians 
after Marengo, 222; part of the 
kingdom of Italy, 279 ; restored 
to Austria by Treaty of Paris, 537 ; 
insurrection of 1848, iii. 15 ; war 
with Austria, 55 ; united with 
Piedmont, 265 

London, Treaty of (1827), ii. 325 ; 
(1852), iii. 150; (1867), iii. 402; 
protocol of, 496 

Lornsen, work on the independence of 
the German Duchies, iii. 26. 

Lorraine, i. 50 ; left to France by the 
Congress of Vienna, ii. 70; probable 

consequences had it been annexed 
to Prussia, 72. Ceded to Germany 
by the Treaties of Versailles and 
Frankfort, iii. 464 

Louis Ferdinand, Prince, Prussian 
general, i. 327 

Louis XVI., letter to the Legislative 
Assembly, i. 1 ; declares war against 
Austria (1792), 2 ; flight from 
Paris and return (1791), 4; con- 
finement in Tuileries, 4 ; accepts 
constitution of National Assembly, 
5 ; manifesto to Electors of Treves 
and Mainz, 10 ; vetoes the banish- 
ment of priests, 42 ; quits the 
Tuileries, 44 ; execution, 58 ; his 
execution celebrated by a national 
fete, 143 

Louis XVIII., restored to the throne 
of France, i. 531533. Character, 
ii. 12, 13 ; his Constitution, 14 ; sum- 
mons the Legislative Chambers on 
Napoleon's return to France, 37 ; 
flight from Tuileries, 38 ; restora- 
tion to the throne, 57 ; partiality 
for Decazes, 116: dissolves Chamber 
of Deputies, 117 ; displeasure on the 
election of Gregoire, 157 ; war 
declaration against Spain, 217; 
death (1824), 324 

Louis Napoleon, election to National 
Assembly, iii. 43 ; presents himself 
to troops at Strasburg as Emperor, 
44 ; sent to America, but returns 
and repeats his attempt at Boulogne, 
ib ; imprisonment at Ham, ib. ; 
escapes, visits Paris, is elected 
Deputy, but resigns, 45 ; re-elected, 
46 ; eleeted President of the 
Republic, 47 ; determines to restore 
the Pope, 103; effects the Pope's 
restoration, 110; protests against 
the Pope's tyrannous policy, ib; 
supported by Thiers, 157 ; letter to 
Colonel Ney, 157 ; message to the 
Assembly dismissing the ministry, 
158 ; demands measures from new 
ministry limiting the franchise 
(1850), 160; aims at a prolonga- 
tion of his presidency, 162 ; seeks to 
win the support of the army, 163 ; 
vote of Assembly against a revision 
of the Constitution for prolonging 
his presidency, 166 ; prepares for a 
coup d etat, 167 ; demands from 
Assembly the re-establishment of 
universal suffrage, 170; coup d 'etat 
of December 2nd, 1851, 172; his 
proclamations, 173 ; hi reception in 
Paris, 174 ; proclaimed Emperor 



(1852) 177; declares in address at 
Bordeaux the peaceful policy of 
France, 180 ; proposes the incorpora- 
tion of Danubian Principalities with 
Austria, 235 ; negotiates with 
Count Cavour at Plombieres, re- 
specting war with Austria, 253 ; 
commands his army in Italian 
campaign, 263 ; interview with the 
Emperor Francis Joseph at Villa- 
franca, 265 ; proposes a Congress at 
Paris for the consideration of 
Italian questions, 271 ; annexes 
Nice and Savoy, 277 ; announces 
his opposition to a Sardinian invasion 
of the Papal States, 293 , secret 
design for extending the French 
frontier, 354 ; proposes a European 
Congress, ib. ; meets Bismarck at 
Biarritz, 359 ; his views on the 
interests of France as affected by 
the war between Prussia and 
Austria, 372 ; mediates between 
Prussia and Austria, 377 ; demands 
from Bismarck the cession of 
Bavarian Palatinate and western 
Hesse, 380-383 ; design to acquire 
Belgium, 384 ; decline of fortune 
after 1863, 396 ; failure of Mexican 
Expedition, 396-399 ; negotiates 
with King of Holland for the 
cession of Luxemburg, 400 ; attitude 
towards Prussia after 1867, 404 ; 
. private arrangements with Austrian 
Emperor for defence against Prussia, 
406 ; seeks defensive alliance with 
Italy against Prussia, 409 ; failure 
to secure alliances with the Powers, 
411 ; incapacity in command of his 
army against Prussia, 437 ; sur- 
renders to King William at Sedan, 
446 , placed in captivity at Wil- 
helmshohe, 447 

Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, ii. 
363 ; marries daughter of Ferdin- 
and of Sicily, ib. ; made Lieuten- 
ant-General of France, 374 ; made 
King of France, 378 ; policy and in- 
fluence as citizen-king, 379 ; ap- 
proves of election of Leopold of 
Saxe-Coburg as King of Belgium, 
387 ; critical relations with Austria 
and Russia, 402 ; growing unpopu- 
larity, 415; his life attempted by 
Fieschi, 417; declines to assist 
i in in quelling Carlist rebellion, 
437 ; intrigues for the marriage of 
his son, the Duke of Montpensier, 
with the Infanta Fernanda, sister 
of the Queen of Spain, 504 ; mar- 

riage of Montpensier to the In- 
fanta, 506 ; struggle with the Re- 
form party in the Chambers, 511 ; 
abdicates in favour of grandson, 
the Count of Paris, and flies from 
Paris, 513 

Louvain, University of, i. 24, 255 

Louvre, The, seized by mob, ii. 372 

Lovatz, iii. 499, 501 

Liibeck, scene of Bliicher's capitula- 
tion,!. 331 

Lubecki, member of Polish council, ii. 
393, 394 

Lucan, Earl of, English commander 
of cavalry at Balaclava, iii. 215 

Lucchesini, Prussian Minister, i. 77 ; 
ambassador at Paris, 317 ; sent to 
Berlin to negotiate with Napoleon 
for peace, 334 

Luneville, Peace of, i. 226, 243 

Lutzen, Battle of, i. 493 

Luxemburg, ii. 389 ; Napoleon III. 
negotiates with King of Holland 
for its cession to France, iii. 400 ; 
declared neutral territory by the 
Treaty of London (1867), 402 

Lyons, takes arms against Paris, i. 71; 
surrenders to Republic, 81. Entry 
of Napoleon after escaping from 
Elba, ii. 37 ; revolt of working- 
classes (1834), 416 

Macdonald, French General, i. 182, 
478, 508, ii. 36 

Mack, Austrian general, leads Neapoli- 
tan army against the French, i. 
171 ; defeated by the French, 173 ; 
disorder in his army, 174 ; enters 
Bavaria, 287 ; capitulates at Ulm, 

Macmahon, General, commands French 
troops against Austrians, iii. 261; 
army defeated by Prussians at 
Worth, 435 ; marches to the relief 
of Bazaine at Metz, 443; wounded 
at Sedan, 446 ; succeeds Thiers as 
President of the French Republic, 

Madrid, entry of French troops, i. 374; 
revolt against the French, 377; 
entry of Napoleon 395 ; popular 
demand for a constitution, ii. 177 

Maestricht, Battle of, i. 68 

Magdeburg, Fortress of, surrendered 
to the French, i. 333 

Magenta, Battle of, iii 261 

Magnan, General, assists Louis Napo- 
leon in his cintp d'etat of Dec. 2, 
1851, iii. 168 

Magnano, Battle of , L 181 



Magyars, i. 19, 24, 25; ii., 466, 477, 
478, 485 ; iii. 66, 75, 325, 387 

Mahinud II., Sultan of Turkey, ii. 291, 
295, 301 ; manifesto after battle of 
Navarino, 335; declares Mehemet 
AH and his son Ibrahim rebels, 
443 ; army defeated by Egyptians 
at Beilan and Konieh, 444 ; peace 
of Kutaya, 446; campaign of 
Nissib, 453 ; death, 454 

Maida, Battle of, i. 302 

Mainz, French emigrants expelled, i. 
10; condition in 1792, 37; capitu- 
lates to the French, 52 ; taken by 
the Germans, 76; cruel measures 
of the Archbishop, 108 ; entry of 
the French, 157; Commission of 
Ministers, ii. 149 

Malakotf, Assault on the, iii. 225 ; cap- 
ture of the, 226 

Malmesbury, Lord, treats with Prussia, 
i. 88 ; his opinion of Prussia, 94 ; 
despatched to Paris to negotiate 
with the French Directory, 130, 

Malmo, Armistice of, between Den- 
mark and Prussia, iii. 117 

Malta, obtained by Bonaparte, i. 167 ; 
offered to Russia, 227 ; demanded 
by France for the Knights of St. 
John, 237 ; claimed by England, 

Manifesto (see Declaration) 

Manin, Daniel, political prisoner, re- 
leased during insurrection of 
Venice (1848), and becomes chief 
of Provisional Government, iii. 16 ; 
retirement on union with Piedmont, 
60 ; resumes office, 112 

Manteuffel, Prussian Minister of the 
Interior, iii. 146 ; appointed chief 
Minister, 147 ; unpatriotic policy, 
153 ; dismissed by the Crown Prince 
Regent, 306 ; on the weakness of 
the Prussian army, 309 

Manteuffel, General, son of above, iii. 
365 ; leads troops into Holstein, 
370 ; defeats Bavarians, 380 ; mis- 
sion to St. Petersburg, 384 ; con- 
quers Amiens and Rouen, 459 

Mantua, Investment of, by Bonaparte, 
i. 124; the siege raised, 125; sur- 
renders to Bonaparte, 135 ; takuii 
by Austrians, 191 

Marches, The, iii. 282 ; entry of Pied- 
montese troops, 293 

Marengo, Battle of, i. 221 

Maret, M. , French Foreign Minister, 
i. 499 

Maria Christina of Naples marries 
King Ferdinand of Spain, ii. 428 ; 
declared Regent on the death of 
Ferdinand, 429 ; compelled to re- 
store Constitution of 1812, 439; 
resigns the Regency and quits 
Spain, 441 ; returns to Spain, 442 ; 
carries out intrigue for the " Spanish 
Marriages," 506 

Maria, Donna, daughter of Emperor of 
Brazil, ii. 424, 425 

Maria Theresa, Reforms of, i. 21 

Marie Antoinette, her life threatened, 
i. 4 

Marie Louise of Austria, second wife 
of Bonaparte, i. 435 

Marmont, French general, i. 514, 522, 
524 ; capitulates to the allies at 
Paris, 529. Attacks insurgents in 
Paris, ii. 370 

Marmora, La, Italian Prime Minister, 
iii. 362 ; declines to accept Venetia 
from Austria, 368 ; commands army 
against Austria at Custozza, 377 ; 
attitude towards Prussia and France, 

Marsala, Landing of Garibaldi's troops 
at, iii. 284 

" Marseillaise," The, i. 11, 14 

Marseilles, takes arms against Paris, i. 
71. Royalist riots in 1815, ii. 91 

Mars-la-Tour, Prussian attack at, iii. 
215, 440 

Martignac, Vicomte de, chief French 
Minister, ii. 360; dismissed, 361 

Massena, French general, i. 80, 179, 
181, 192, 193, 217; surrenders 
Genoa tp the Austrians, 220 ; com- 
mands in Spain, 444 ; retreats 
before the English, 446 

Maubeuge invested by Austrians, i. 

Maupas, M., appointed to management 
of French police by Louis Napo- 
leon, iii. 168 

Maurokordatos, Alexander, founder of 
a line of Hospodars, ii. 251 

Maurokordatos, Greek leader (1821), 
ii. 289, 293, 296, 297 

Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, fall 
and death, iii. 399 

Mazas, Prison of, iii. 172 

Mazzini leads incursion into Savoy 
(1834), ii. 413, 414 ; exalted 
patriotism, 468. At Rome, in 
1849, iii. 103 ; offers to assist 
Victor Emmanuel in the establish- 
ment of Italian union, 270 ; pro- 
ject for the capture of Rome and 
Venice, 287 ; letter to Bismarck on 



Napoleon's resolve to make war on 
Prussia, 410 (note) 

Medici, The, i. 115 

Mehemet Ali, Pasha and Viceroy of 
Egypt, ii. 301, 302 ; conflict with 
Turkey, 442, 443 ; sends army into 
Palestine, 442 ; victories over 
Turks, 444 ; Peace of Kutaya gives 
Syria and Adana to him, 446 ; cha- 
racter of his rule, 451 ; second war, 
453 ; relinquishes conquered pro- 
vinces, 461 ; Egypt conferred upon 
him, ib. 

M.'lus, Austrian general, i. 217, 220 

Mecklenburg, i. 36 

Mendizabal, succeeds Toreno as Spanish 
War Minister (1836), ii. 438 

Menotti leads insurrection at Modena 
(1831), ii. 399 

Monou, French general, i. 234, 236 

Menschikoff, Prince, Russian Envoy to 
Constantinople, iii. 188 ; commands 
Russians in the Crimea, 211 

Montana, Battle of, between Gari- 
baldians and Papal troops, iii. 408 

Messenhauser, commander of volun- 
tcrrs during the revolt of Vienna 
(1848), iii. 78 

Messina, rising against Neapolitan rule, 
ii. 474. Bombarded by Ferdinand 
of Naples, iii. 112 ; surrendered to 
Sardinian troops, 298 
'' Mettornich, Austrian Ambassador at 
Berlin, i. 281 ; Ambassador at 
Paris, 403; Austrian Minister, 433 ; 
foreign policy of 1813, 496; policy 
during the War of Liberation, 
610. President of the Congress of 
Vienna, ii. 20; his demands re- 
specting the second Treaty of 
Paris, 60 ; Austria under his states- 
manship, 82 ; Conservative prin- 
ciples, 135; influence in Europe, 
1 36 ; advice to King Frederick 
William on the universities, gym- 
nastic establishments, and the 
Press, 137 ; takes measures to pre- 
vent a German revolution, 142 ; 
opposes Bavarian and Baden Con- 
stitutions, 144 ; requisitions at the 
Conf.-rence of Carlsbad, 145; in- 
fluence at the Conference of 
Troppau, 194 ; Eastern policy, 279 ; 
condemnation of the Greek revolt, 
283 ; views with disgust the Anglo- 
Russian protocol for intervention 
in Greece, 322 ; efforts to form a 
coalition against Russia, 340; in- 
tervention in Papal States, 402 ; 
rigorous measures to repress Liberal 

movements in Germany, 411, 412 ; 
policy in Austrian Italy, 475 ; 
statement respecting insurrection 
in Galicia, 493. Resignation during 
Revolution of 1848, iii. 8 ; flight to 
England, 8 ; return to Vienna, 152 

Metz, iii. 425, 428 ; capitulates to the 
Prussians, 455 

Mexico, Expedition of France to, iii. 
396398 ; recall of French troops, 
and fall and death of Maximilian, 

Midhat Pasha, deposes Sultan Abdul 
Aziz, iii. 482 ; proposes a Constitu- 
tion, 492 ; rejects the proposals of 
the Powers for an international 
Commission, 495 

Miguel, Don, son of King John of 
Portugal, leads conspiracy against 
the Cortes, ii. 228 ; causes himself 
to be proclaimed King of Portugal 
(1828), 425; his violence, ib. ; his 
fleet destroyed off St. Vincent by 
volunteer force under Captain 
Charles Napier, 426 ; unites with 
Don Carlos, 429 ; defeated and re- 
moved from Portugal, 430 

Milan, portion of Austrian dominions, 
i. 19; Bonaparte's triumphal entry, 
120; surrenders to Russians and 
Austrians, 181. Insurrection of 
1848, iii. 15; entry of Austrians, 
61 ; evacuation by Austrians, 261 

Milazzo, Battle of, iii. 286 

Milutim-, Nicholas, prepares the charter 
for the liberation of Russian serfs, 
iii. 332 ; carries out in Poland the 
Russian measures for division of 
land amongst the peasantry, 338 

Mina, Spanish general, ii. 169, 209 ; 
leads troops against Carlists, 434 

Mincio, Battle on the, i. 122 

Minghetti, Italian Prime Minster, iii. 

Minto, Lord, on the designs of Austria 
in Italy, i. 186, 187 (note) 

Miranda, General, i. 68 

Missolonghi, Siege of, ii. 297 ; second 
siege, 308 ; re-taken by Greeks, 

Modena, portion of Cispadane Repub- 
lic, i. 132 ; Congress of, 134. In- 
corporated with Piedmontese m n- 
archy, iii. 58, 276 

Modena, Duke of; his tyranny, ii. 
467. Flight from his dominions, iii. 

Mohammedans, in Greece, ii. 243, 
245 ; massacre of, in the Morea, 
274 ; attacked in Central Greece, 285 



Moldavia, proposed annexation to 
Russia, i. 348 ; rising of the Greeks, 
ii. 269. Entry of Russian troops 
(1853), iii. 192; proposed union 
with Wallachia, 235 ; actual union, 

Mcillendorf, General (Prussian), takes 
possession of Western Poland, i. 
83; defeats Pitt's object in granting 
a subsidy to Prussia, 90 

Moltke, General, organises Turkish 
army, ii. 451 ; in the campaign of 
1839, 453. Directs the movements 
of Prussian troops against Austria 
(1866), iii. 375 ; plans for war with 
France, 426 ; arranges terms of 
capitulation of Sedan, 446 

Monasteries, dissolved, in Austria, i. 
23 ; in Germany, 253 ; in Papal 
States by Napoleon, 437 ; in Spain, 
454. Restored in Spain, ii. 12; re- 
stored in Naples, 179 

Montalembert, M., spokesman in 
French National Assembly on be- 
half of Catholicism, iii. 185. 

Montbeliard, iii. 461 

Montenegro, takes arms against Tur- 
key, iii. 238 ; supports the revolt of 
Herzegovina, 477 ; declares war 
against Turkey, 482 ; independence 
recognised by the Treaty of San 
Stefano, 510 

Montereau, Battle of, i. 525 

Montesquieu, ii. 108 

Montgelas, Bavarian Minister, i. 255 ; 
treatment of Tyrolese bishops, 411 

Monthieu, French general, i. 374. 

Montmorency, French Minister, ii. 
206 ; represents France at Congress 
of Verona, 216 ; retires from office, 

Moore, Sir John, campaign in Spain, 
i. 395 ; death at Corunna, 398 

Moravia, Junction of Russian and 
Austrian troops in, i. 293. 

Morea, The, ii. 258 ; Greek rising, 
273 ; second revolt, 289 

Moreau, French general, i. 80 ; invades 
Germany, 126 ; advances against 
the Russians in Lombardy, 182 ; 
advances against the Austrians, 
218 ; charged with conspiring 
against Bonaparte, 275 ; at the 
Battle of Dresden, 505 

Morelli, Neapolitan insurgent, ii. 182, 

1'orny, half-brother of Louis Napo- 
leon, iii. 167 

ilorpeth, Lord, English Envoy to 
Prussia, i. 330 

Mortemart, Due de, French Ambassa- 
dor at St. Petersburg, ii. 371, 373, 

Moscow, entry of the French, i. 469 ; 
burning of, ib. ; departure of Napo- 
leon, 471 

Mountain, Political party of the, i. 49 ; 
becomes powerful in the Conven- 
tion, 66 ; victory over Girondins, 
71 ; attacked by Girondins and 
Royalists, 71 ; its power increases, 

Mozart, i. 108 

Mukhtar Pasha, iii. 498, 505 

Mulgrave, Lord, on the Russian cam- 
paign in Lombardy, i. 186 (note) 

Miinchengratz, meeting place of em- 
perors of Russia and Austria in 
1833 to consort for the suppression 
of revolutionary movements, ii. 

Munster, Bishopric of, i. 129, 149, 157 

Murat, French general, i. 80, 293; 
marries Napoleon's sister, 303 ; 
seizes Prussian territory, 316 ; 
despatched to Spain, 373 ; enters 
Madrid, 374 ; crafty tactics, ib. ; 
allied with Austria, 537. Treachery 
towards allies in 1814, ii. 6 ; flight 
from Naples, 42 

Muravieff, General, Russian Envoy to 
Constantinople, ii. 445. Crushes 
the Polish rebellion (1864), iii. 337 

Napier, Sir Charles, destroys navy of 
Don Miguel off St. Vincent, ii. 
426 ; captures Acre, 460 

Naples, allied with England against 
France, i. .59 ; strengthened by de- 
struction of French fleet at Toulon, 
82; condition in eighteenth cen- 
tury, 115; joins coalition between 
England, Russia, and Turkey 
against France, 169 ; flight of the 
royal family, 174 ; riots, 175 ; entry 
of the French, 176 ; converted into 
the Parthenopean Republic, ib. ; at- 
tacked by fanatics, led by Cardinal 
Ruffo, 182; Ruffo' s negotiations for 
peace, 183 ; arrival of Nelson's fleet, 
ib. ; a reign of terror, 184 ; Admiral 
Caracciolo executed with Nelson's 
sanction, 183; peace with France 
(1801) 227; flight of King Fer- 
dinand, 301 ; the throne given to 
Joseph Bonaparte, 301 ; after- 
wards to Murat, 439. Fall of 
Murat, ii. 41 ; restoration of King 
Ferdinand I., 42 ; condition from 
1815 1820, 178 ; the Carbonari and 



the Caldernri, 181 ; Morelli's revolt, 
182; constitution declared, 184; 
conference at Troppau between the 
Sovereigns of Austria, Russia, and 
Prussia, respecting Neapolitan 
affaire, 193 ; summoned by con- 
ference of Troppau to abandon its 
constitution, 196 ; invaded by 
Austria and returns to despotism, 
202, 203 ; Ferdinand II., 474 ; con- 
stitution granted, 475. Insurrection 
of May, 1848, iii. 57; death of Ferdi- 
nand II., and accession of Francis 
II., 281 ; rejects the constitutional 
system proposed by Cavour, 282 ; 
Cavour's double policy with regard 
to, 289 ; advance of Garibaldi's 
troops and Sardinian fleet upon, 
290 ; flight of King Francis, 291 ; 
triumphant entry of Garibaldi, 292 

Napoleon I., Bonaparte, serves at the 
siege of Toulon, i 81, 82 (note) ; 
defends the Convention against the 
Royalists, 102 ; appointed to the 
command of the army in Italy, 
110; his cajolery, 118; triumphal 
entry into Milan, 120 ; defeats 
Austrians on the Mincio, 122 ; 
seizes Leghorn, 124 ; invests 
Mantua, 125 ; takes Roveredo and 
Trent, 126 ; creates the Cispadane 
Republic in Italy, 132 ; defeats 
Austrians at Arcola and Rivoli, 

, 134, 135 ; npgotiations with the 
Pope, 1 36 ; enters Venice, and offers 
it to Austria, 139 141; treatment of 
Genoa, 142 ; sends Augereau to 
intimidate the Directory, 145 ; 
Treaty with Austria at Campo 
Formio, 147 (and note) ; his policy in 
1797, 150; designs to attack Egypt, 
152; intervenes in Switzerland, 
160; Egyptian Campaign, 166168; 
obtains Malta, 167 ; victory over 
Turks at Aboukir, 200 ; returns to 
France (1799), 201 ; coup d'etat of 
Brumaire, 202 ; appointed First 
Consul, 206 ; his policy and rule, 
211 213 ; makes proposals of peace 
to Austria and England, 215; 
campaign against the Austrians in 
Italy, 218222 ; peace of Luneville, 
226 ; peace of Amiens, 238 ; his ag- 
gressions after the peace of Amiens, 
242; made President of Italian 
Republic, 244 ; his intervention in 
Switzerland, 246 ; his settlement 
of Germany, 247254; his Civil 
Code and Concordat, 258 265; 
renews the war with England, 

268 ; occupation of Hanover, 269 ; 
determines to become Emperor, 
274 ; assumes the title of Emperor, 
276 ; accepts the title of King of 
Italy, 279 ; failure of naval designs 
against England, 284 ; victory over 
Austrians at Ulm, 289 ; victory of 
Austerlitz, 296 ; appoints Joseph 
Bonaparte ,King of Naples, 301 ; 
styles himself the " new Charle- 
magne, " 302 ; gives the crown of 
Holland to Louis Bonaparte, 302 ; 
compels Jerome Bonaparte to marry 
the daughter of the King of Wiir- 
temberg, 303 ; his organisation of 
Western Germany, 303 ; negotiates 
for the cession of Sicily to his 
brother Joseph, 315 ; war against 
Prussia, 1806, 326337 ; enters 
Berlin, 332; robs Frederick the 
Great's tomb, ib. ; determines to 
extinguish the commerce of Great 
Britain, 336; enters Poland, 338; 
Polish campaign, 340 ; Eylau, 341 ; 
Friedland, 345 ; interview with 
the Emperor of Russia on the 
Niemen, 346 ; acquisition of 
Prussian territory, 347 ; Treaties 
of Tilsit, ib. ; conspiracy with 
the Emperor of Russia, 348 ; 
attitude towards England after 
the bombardment of Copenhagen, 
352 ; his demands upon Portugal, 
354 ; orders the banishment of 
Stein, Prussian Minister, 366 ; de- 
signs in Spain, 368, 371; receives 
the crown of Spain, 377 ; treats 
with Prussia for the French 
evacuation, 389; at Erfurt, 390; 
Spanish campaign, 394 ; plans 
for campaign against Austria 
(1809), victories over Austrians, 415; 
enters Vienna, 416 ; passage of the 
Danube, 420 ; defeated at Aspern 
by the Austrians, 421 ; second 
passage of the Danube, 424 ; defeats 
Austrians at Wagrara, 425 ; peace 
with Austria, 430 ; divorces 
Josephine, and marries Marie 
Louise of Austria, 435 ; annexes 
Papal States and is excommunicated, 
436 ; annexes Holland, Le Valais, 
and North German coast, 438 ; 
benefits and wrongs of his rule in 
the French Empire, 440 ; blockade 
of British commerce, 44 1 ; alliance 
with Prussia, 1812, 459; alliance 
with Austria, 460 ; invasion of 
Russia and retreat, 462 477 ; cam- 
paign in Germany against Prussia 



and Russia, 490 495 ; enters 
Dresden, 494 ; attitude towards 
Austria in 1813, 496 ; Austria joins 
his enemies, 501 ; battles of Dresden, 
505 ; Grosbeeren, Dennewitz, 508 ; 
defeated by the allies at Leipzig, 
616 ; retreat across the Rhine, 
517 ; campaign of 1814, 524526 ; 
dethronement by proclamation of 
the Senate, 531 ; abdicates in 
favour of infant son, 535 ; sent 
to Elba, ib. ; results of his wars on 
Europe, 542. Motives for modera- 
tion in 1807 respecting Poland, ii., 
3 ; leaves Elba, 31 ; lands in France, 
32 ; enters Grenoble, 34 ; declara- 
tion of his purpose, 35 ; enters 
Lyons, 37 ; enters Paris, 38 ; 
outlawed by the Congress of 
Vienna, ib. ; abolishes the slave- 
trade after return from Elba, 76 ; 
prepares for war, 40 ; plan of 
campaign, 48 ; Waterloo, 53 55 ; 
' flight to Paris, and abdication, 
56 ; conveyed to St. Helena, 58 

Napoleon III. (see Louis Napoleon). 

Napoleon, Prince Jerome, iii. 253 ; 
betrothed to Princess Clotilde, 256 

Narvaez, head of Spanish Government 
(1843), ii. 442 

Nassau, annexed to Prussia, iii. 378 

Nassau. Duke of, i. 256 

National Assembly (France), de- 
stroys power of the Crown and 
nobility, i. 3 ; its interpretation of 
the manifesto of Pillnitz, 5 ; its 
Constitution accepted by Louis 
XVI., 5; dissolved (1791), 6; its 
beneficial work, 6, 7 

National Debt (in England), i. 241 

Nauplia, Siege of, ii. 307 

Navarino, Surrender of, to Greek in- 
surgents, ii. 290 ; capitulates to the 
Egyptians, 306; battle of (1827), 

Navarre, head-quarters of Carlist in- 
surgents (1834), ii. 431 

Nelson, Admiral (Lord), destroys 
French fleet at the battle of the 
Nile, i. 168 ; his reception at Naples, 
169; takes the Neapolitan royal 
family to Palermo, 174 ; returns to 
Naples, 183 ; execution of Admiral 
Caracciolo, 1 84; his dislike of Thugut 
190 (note) ; superiority of his sea- 
men, 197 ; at the battle of Copen- 
hagen, 231 ; statement in the House 
of Lords, respecting Malta and the 
Cape of Good Hope, 242 ; pursues 
the French in the West Indies, 

285 ; victory of Trafalgar, and 
death, 290 

Nemours, Due de, elected King of the 
Belgians, ii. 387 ; election annulled 
by Louis Philippe, ib. 

Netherlands (see Holland, Belgium, 
and Flanders) 

Neutrality, Armed, of 1800, i. 228 

Ney, French general, i. 341, 395, 475, 
476, 494, 508, ii. 37 ; at the battle 
of Quatre Bras, 51 ; at Waterloo, 
54 ; execution, 98 ; character, 100 

Ney, Colonel (son of Marshal Ney), iii. 
110; letter to, from Louis Napo- 
leon, 157 

Nice, annexed to France, i. 54 ; re- 
stored to Sardinia (1814), 537. 
Annexed to France, iii. 277 ; effect 
of the annexation on Europe, 279 

Nicholas (Emperor of Russia), ii. 319 ; 
principle of autocratic rule, 320 ; 
lack of sympathy with the Greeks, 
321 ; policy towards Poland during 
insurrection of 1830, 3"95 ; invasion 
of Poland, 396. Attempts to mediate 
between Prussia and Austria re- 
specting affairs in Hesse-Cassel, iii. 
146 ; visits England in 1844, and 
seeks to negotiate with respect to 
Turkey, the " sick, or dying man," 
182 ; policy in 1848, 183 ; demands 
the surrender of Hungarians from 
Turkey, 184 ; affronted at Turkey's 
concessions to France respecting 
Holy Places in Palestine, 187; oc- 
cupies the Principalities, 192 ; war 
with Turkey, 197 ; with England 
and France, 199 ; rejects the 
" Four Points," 209 ; death (1855), 

Nicholas, Grand Duke, iii. 506 

Nicolsburg, iii. 379 

Nicopolis, iii. 498, 499 

Niebuhr, the historian, i. 357. Replies 
to Schmalz's pamphlet, ii. 124 

Niel, French general in the Crimea, 
iii. 224 

Nightingale, Florence, iii. 219 

Nigra, Italian Ambassador at Paris, 
report on the ideas of Napoleon III. 
respecting a Congress, iii. 373 

Nile, Battle of the, i. 168 

Nismes, royalist outrages in 1815, ii. 

Nissib, Battle of, between Turks and 
Egyptians, ii. 454 

Normandy, takes arms against Paris, i. 



North, Lord, i. 62 

Northern Maritime League (1800), i. 

Norway, given to Bernudotte, Crown 

Prince of Sweden, ii. 5 
Novara, Battle of, between Austrians 

and Sardinians, iii. 100 
Novi, Battle of, i. 191 

Odessa, ii. 260 

Ollivier, M., President of French 
Cabinet (1870), iii. 415; averse to 
war with Prussia, ib., 421 ; ignor- 
ance of the condition of the army, 
429 ; resignation, 438 

Olmiitz, iii. 77 ; convention of, re- 
specting the dissolution of the 
Prussian Union, and the recogni- 
tion of the diet of Frankfort by 
Prussia, 147 

Oltc-nitza, iii. 197 

Omar Pasha, defeats Russians at 
Oltenitza, iii. 197 

Oporto, Fall of, i. 401. Revolution at, 
ii. 187 ; taken by Don Pedro (1832), 
426 ; besieged by Dou Miguel, ib. 

Orleans, taken by the Prussians, iii. 
453 ; re-taken by the French, and 
again occupied by the Prussians, 
457, 458 

Orsini's conspiracy, iii. 279 

Osman Pasha, iii. 499, 500 ; surrender 
f to the Russians at Plevna, 504 

'Otho, King of Greece, ii. 354 

Ott, Austrian general, i. 220 

Oudinot (1) French general, i. 503, 
504, 506 

Oudinot (2), French general, sent to 
Itome, Ui. 105, 106 ; enters