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THE  LOEB  CLASSICAL  LIBRARY 

FOUNDED    BY   JAMES   LOEB,    LL.D. 
EDITED   BY 

tT.  E.  PAGE,  C.H.,  LiTT.D. 
E.  CAPPS,  PH.D.,  LL.D.  tW,  H.  D.  ROUSE,  litt.d. 

,.  A.  POST,  M.A.     E.  H.  WARMINGTON,  m.a.,  f.b.hist.soc. 


THUCYDIDES 
Π 


THUCYDIDES 

WITH  AN  ENGLISH  TRANSLATION  BY 

CHARLES   FORSTER  SMITH 

OF  THE    USIVKRSITY    OF   WISCONSIN 


IN  FOUR  VOLUiMES 
II 


HISTORY  OF  THE  PELOPONNESIAN  WAR 
BOOKS  III  AND  IV 


CAMBRIDGE,    MASSACHUSETTS 

HARVARD     UNIVERSITY     PRESS 

LONDON 

WILLIAM    HEINEMANN    LTD 

MCMLVrn 


First  printed  1920 

Reprinted  and  revised  1930 

Reprinted  1953,  195S 


Printed  in  Great  Britain 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

BOOK  III 1 

BOOK    IV 209 

MAPS : — 

Central  Greece  and  Peloponnesus    .    .        To  face  p.  171 

Pylos  and  its  Environs      „     „     „  219 


THUCYDIDES 
BOOK  III 


ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ    ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΙ 


Ι.  ΎοΟ  δ  eTTiytyvo μενού  θέρους  ΥΙεΧοττοννιίσιοι 
καΐ  οι  ζνμμαγ^οι  άμα  τω  σΰτω  άκμάζοντι  βστρά- 
τευσαν  69  την  Αττικην  {η^είτο  Be  αυτών  ^Αργί- 
Βαμος  6  ΖευξιΒάμου,  ΑακεΒαιμονίων  βασιΧεύς), 
καΐ  β'γκαθεζόμενοι  βΒήουν  την  <^ην•  καΐ  ττροσβοΧαί, 
ωσττβρ  βΐώθεσαν,  Ιη'ι^νοντο  των  'Αθηναίων  ίτητέων 
οτΓΎ}  τταρείκοι,  καΐ  τον  ττΧβΐστον  ομιΧον  των  ^pΊ\ώv 
elp'/ov  το  μη  ττροεξιοντας    των    οπΧων   τα  eyyij<; 

2  τη<ζ  ττόΧεως  κακουρ^εΐν.  εμμείναντες  Be  'χρόνον 
ού  ειχ^ον  τα  σιτια  άνεχ^ωρησαν  καΐ  ΒιεΧύθησαν 
κατά  τΓολεί?. 

ΤΙ.  Μβτά  Be  την  ΙσβοΧην  των  ΐΙεΧοττοννησίων 
ευθύς  Αεσβος  ττΧην  Μηθύμνης  άττέστη  άττό 
Άθηι  αίων,  βουΧηθεντες  μεν  καΐ  ττρο  του  ττοΧεμου 
(αλλ'  οι  Αακε^αιμόνωι  ου  ττροσεΒέξαντο),  avay- 
κασθεντες  Βε  καϊ  ταντην  την  άττόστασιν  ττρότερον 

2  17  Βιενοοΰντο  ιτοιησαηθαί.  των  τε  yap  Χι  μένων 
την    ^ώσιν    καϊ    τειχ^ών     οίκοόομησιν     και     νεών 


^  Mytilene  was  an  oligarchical  state,  with  dependent 
towns,  Aiitissa,  Pyrrha,  and  Eresus,  only  Methymna  on  the 
norllit'in  coast  retaining  its  democratic  coiistitution  and  its 
connection  with  Athens.     For   the  revolt,  cf.  Diod.  Pic.  xii. 


THUCYDIDES 
BOOK   III 

I.  During  the  following  summer,  when  the  grain  428  β  c 
was   ripening,   the    Peloponnesians    and    their   allies 
made  an  expedition  into  Attica  under  the  leadership 

of  Archidamus  son  of  Zeuxidamus,  king  of  the  Lace- 
daemonians, and  settling  in  camp  proceeded  to  ravage 
the  land.  And  sallies  were  made  as  usual  by  the 
Athenian  cavalry  wherever  opportunity  offered,  thus 
preventing  the  great  mass  of  the  enemv'!3  light- 
armed  troops  from  going  beyond  their  watch -posts 
and  laying  waste  the  districts  near  the  city.  The 
invaders  remained  as  long  as  their  provisions  lasted, 
then  withdrew  and  dispersed  to  their  several  cities. 

II.  Directly  after  the  invasion  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians, all  Lesbos,^  except  Methymna,  revolted 
from  Athens.  The  Lesbians  had  wished  to  do  this 
even  before  the  war,  but  the  Lacedaemonians  had 
not  taken  them  into  their  alliance,  and  even  in  this 
instance  they  were  forced  to  revolt  sooner  than  they 
had  intended.  For  they  vvere  waiting  until  the 
work  should  be  finished  of  blocking  their  harbours, 

45.  The  complaint  of  the  Mj'tilenaeans  was  founded  on  the 
Athenian  attempt  to  prevent  their  centralisation.  See  W. 
Herbiit,  Der  Abjall  Mytilenc.s,  18G1  ;  Leithauser,  De.r  Ah/all 
MylUtnes,  1874. 


THUCYDIDES 

ττοίησιν  eire^evov  τεΧβσθήραι,  καΐ  όσα  βκ  τον 
11  όντου  eSei  άφικβσθαι,  τοξότας  re  καΐ  σΐτον, 
3  καϊ  α  μβταττεμπόμβνοι  ήσαν.  TeveSioi  yap  οντ€<; 
αύτοΐς  Βιάφοροι  καϊ  ^ΙηθυμναΙοι  καΐ  αύτων  Μυ- 
τιΧηναίων  ΙΒία  avSpe<i  κατά,  στάσιν,  πρόξενοι 
^Αθηναίων,  μηνυταΐ  yiyvovTai  τοις  Άθηναίοις 
ΟΤΙ  ζυνοίκίζουσί  re  την  Αέσβον  ες  την  ^Ιυτι\7ίνην 
βία  καϊ  την  παρασκβυην  άττασαν  μετά  AaKeSat- 
μονίων  καϊ  Βοίωτωΐ'  ξυγγενών  όντων  εττϊ  αττο- 
στάσει  επείγονται•  καϊ  ei  μη  τι<;  προκαταΧη- 
Λ^τεταί  ηΒη,  στερήσεσθαι  αυτούς  Αεσβου. 

III.  Οι  δ'  Αθηναίοι  (ήσαν  yap  τεταΧαιπωρη- 
μένοι  νπο  τε  της  νόσου  και  του  ποΧεμου  άρτι 
καθιστάμενου  καϊ  ακμάζοντος)  μεya  μεν  εpyov 
rjyoDvTO  είναι  Αεσβυν  προσποΧεμωσασθαι  ναυ- 
τικον  ε\ουσαν  καϊ  Βύναμιν  άκεραιον,  καϊ  ουκ 
άπεΒε-χοντο  το  πρώτον  τας  κaτηyopLaς  μείζον 
ιιερος  νεμοντες  τω  μη  βουΚ,εσθαι  άΧηθή  είναι- 
επειΒη  μέντοι  καϊ  πεμψ^αντες  πρέσβεις  ουκ 
επειθον  τους  ^ΙυτιΧηναίους  την  τε  ξυνοίκίσιν 
καϊ  την  παρασκευην  ΒιαΧύειν,  Βείσαντες  προκατα- 

2  Χαβεΐν  εβούΧοντο.  καϊ  πεμ,πουσιν  εζαπιναίως 
τεσσαράκοντα  ναΰς,  at  ετυγ^ον  περί  ΤΙεΧοπόν- 
νησον    παρεσκευασμεναι   πΧεΙν.      ΚΧεϊππιδης    8ε 

3  ο  Αεινίου  τρίτος  αύτος  εστpaτήyει.  εσηyyεXθη 
yap  αύτοΐς  ώς   εϊη    ΑποΧΧωνος    ^ΙαΧοεντος  εξω 

'  The  word  means  liteially  '"public  guest,"  or  "friend." 
Under  the  condition  of  entertaining  and  assisting  ambassa- 
dors and  citizens  of  the  state  they  represented  they  enjoyed 


BOOK    III.  II.  2-1II.  3 

buildinor  Λναΐΐβ,  and  constnictinji  ships,  and  until 
the  arrival  of  what  they  needed  from  the  Pontus — 
archers  and  grain,  and  Λvhatever  else  they  were 
sending  for.  But  the  people  of  Tenedos,  who 
were  at  variance  with  them,  and  of  Methymna, 
and  some  of  the  Mytilenaeans  themselves,  men  in 
private  station  who  were  proxeni^  of  the  Athenians, 
were  moved  by  partisanship  to  turn  informers  and 
notify  the  Athenians  that  the  Mytilenaeans  were 
attempting  to  bring  all  Lesbos  into  a  political  union 
centred  in  Mytilene;  that  all  their  preparations  were 
being  hurried  forward,  in  concert  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians and  with  their  kinsmen  the  Boeotians,  with 
the  purpose  of  revolting ;  and  that  unless  someone 
should  forestall  them  forthwith,  Lesbos  would  be  lost 
to  Athens. 

in.  But  the  Athenians,  distressed  by  the  plague 
as  well  as  by  the  war,  which  had  recently  broken  out 
and  was  now  at  its  height,  thought  it  a  serious 
matter  to  make  a  new  enemy  of  Lesbos,  which  had 
a  fleet  and  power  unimpaired  ;  and  so  at  first  they 
would  not  listen  to  the  charges,  giving  greater  weight 
to  the  wish  that  they  might  not  be  true.  When, 
however,  the  envoys  whom  they  sent  could  not  per- 
suade the  Mytilenaeans  to  stop  their  measures  for 
political  union  and  their  pre])arations,  they  became 
alarmed  and  wished  to  forestall  them.  So  they  sud- 
denly despatched  forty  ships,  which  happened  to  be 
ready  for  a  cruise  around  the  Peloponnesus,  under 
the  command  of  Cleip|)ides  son  of  Deinias  and  two 
others;  for  word  had  come  to  them  that  there  was  a 

certain  privilefrcs  from  that  state,  and  answered  pretty  nearly 
to  our  Consul.•'  and  Resi'lenU,  thougli  the  proxeiuis  was  always 
a  member  of  the  state  where  he  served. 


THUCYDIDES 

τή<ί  ττόΧβως  €ορτή,  iv  y  τταν^ημύ  ^ΙυτιΧηναΐοί 
ίορτάζουσι,  καϊ  ελττιδα  elvai  €ττ€ΐχ^θ€ντας  eiri- 
ireaelv  άφνω•  καϊ  ην  μεν  ζυμβτ)  η  ireipa•  el  δε 
μ7'],  Μ.υτί\ηναίοις  είττβΐν  ναΰς  τ€  τταραΒοΰναι 
καϊ  τ€ίχη  KaOeXecv,  μη  ττβιθομβνων  he   ττοΧεμεΐν. 

4  καϊ  α'ί  μεν  νήες  ω^χ^οντο•  τά?  δε  των  ^ΙυηΧη- 
ναίων  Βεκα  rpLtipei^,  αΐ  βτνχ^ον  βοηθοί  τταρα 
σφά<?  κατά  το  ξυμμα'χ^ικον  τταροΰσαι,  κατεσ'χον 
οι     ^Αθηναίοι     καϊ     τού<;     άνΒρας     βζ     αυτών     βς 

5  φνΧακην  ίττοιησαντο.  τοΐ?  δε  ^ΙυτίΧηναίοί'ζ 
άνηρ  €Κ  των  ^Αθηνών  Βιαβά^  €<;  Έιΰβοιαν  καϊ 
πβζη  eVi.  Τβραιστον  βΧθων,  όΧκάΒος  άνα^ομενη^; 
βΤΓίτνχ^ών,  ττλω  'χρησάμενο'ί  και  τριταίος  €Κ  των 
*  Αθηνών  6?   ^ΙντιΧι'ινην   άφικόμ€νο<ζ  ayyeXXei  τον 

6  iiTLTrXovv.  οι  δβ  ούτε  ες  τον  ^ίαΧόεντα  εξήΧθον 
τά  τε  άΧΧα  τών  τειχών  καϊ  Χιμενων  ττερι  τα 
Ί)μιτεΧεστα  φαρζάμενοι  εφύλασσον. 

IV.  ΚαΙ  οΊ  ^Αθηναίοι  ου  ττοΧύ  ύστερον  κατα- 
ττΧεύσαντες  ώς  έώρων,  aTn'^yyeiXav  μεν  οι  στρα- 
τη^οϊ  τα  εττεσταΧμενα,   ουκ  εσακουόντων  Εε  τών 

2  \\υτιΧηναίων  e?  ττόΧεμον  καθισταντο.  ατταρά- 
σκενοι  δε  οι  \ϊυτιΧηναΙοι  καϊ  εζαιφνης  ανα~/κα- 
σθέντες  ττοΧεμεΐν  (ίκιτλουν  μεν  τινα  εττοιήσαντο 
τών  νεών  ώ?  εττϊ  ναυμαχιαν  oXiyov  προ  του 
Χιμενος,  εττειτα  καταοιωγθεντες  νττο  τών 
^Αττικών  νεών  Xόyoυς  ηύη  ττροσεφερον  τοις 
στpaτηyolς,  βουΧόμενοι  τά?  ναΰς  το  τταραυτίκα, 
el    Βύναιντο,   όμoXoyLa  τινϊ   εττιεικεΐ  αττοττεμψα- 

3  σθαι.      καϊ   οΐ   στpaτηyoϊ   τών  ^Αθηναίων  αττεΒε- 


^  i  e.  Apollo,  god  of  Malea,  the   place  north  of   the  city 
(r/.  ch.  iv.  5),  Avhere  Apollo  had  a  temple. 

6 


BOOK  ΠΙ.  in.  3-iv.  3 

festival  of  Apollo  Maloeis  ^  outside  Mytilene  at  which 
the  whole  populace  kept  holiday,  and  that  they 
mif;ht  hope  to  take  them  by  surprise  if  they  should 
make  haste.  And  if  the  attempt  succeeded,  well 
and  good  ;  but  if  not,  the  generals  were  to  order  the 
Mytilenaeans  to  deliver  up  their  ships  and  pull  doAvn 
their  walls,  and  if  they  disobeyed,  to  go  to  war.  So 
the  ships  set  off;  and  as  there  happened  to  be  at 
Athens  at  the  time  ten  Mytilenaean  triremes  serving 
as  auxiliaries  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  their 
alliance,  the  Athenians  detained  them,  placing  their 
crews  in  custody.  But  the  Mytilenaeans  got  word  of 
the  expedition  through  a  man  \vho  crossed  over  from 
Athens  to  Euboea,  Λvent  thence  by  land  to  Geraestus, 
and,  chancing  there  upon  a  merchantman  tiiat  was 
putting  to  sea,  took  ship  and  on  the  third  day  after 
leaving  Athens  reached  Mytilene.  The  Mytilenaeans, 
accordingly,  not  only  did  not  go  out  to  the  tem})le  of 
Apollo  Maloeis,  but  barricaded  the  half- finished 
portions  of  the  Λvalls  and  harbours  and  kept  guard. ^ 
IV.  When  not  long  afterwards  the  Athenians 
arrived  and  saw  the  state  of  affairs,  their  generals 
delivered  their  orders,  and  then,  as  the  Mytilenaeans 
did  not  hearken  to  them,  began  hostilities.  But  the 
Mytilenaeans,  being  unprepared  for  war  and  forced 
to  enter  upon  it  without  warning,  merely  sailed  out  a 
short  distance  beyond  their  harbour,  as  though 
offering  battle  ;  then,  Avhen  they  had  been  chased  to 
shore  by  the  Athenian  ships,  tliey  made  overtures  to 
the  generals,  wishing,  if  possible,  to  secure  some  sort 
of  reasonable  terms  and  thus  to  get  rid  of  the  fleet 
for  the  present.  The  Athenian  commanders  accepted 

'  Or,  with  Kriiger,  "  but  al^o  gnarderl  the  other  points 
after  throwing  h.urioarles  around  the  half-finished  poitions 
of  the  walls  and  harbours." 

7 


THUCYDIDES 

ζαντο,   και  αύτοΙ  φοβουμβνοι  μη  ού'χ^  ικανοί  ωσι 

4  Λεσ/3ω  ττάστ)  ττοΧβμεΐν.  καΐ  άνοκωχ^ην  ττοιησά- 
μβνοι  ΤΓβμτΓουσιν  e<;  τας  ^Κθηνα<ί  οι  \Ιντι\ηναΐοι 
των  Τ€  8ιαβαΧλοντων  eva,  ω  μετβμβΧβν  ηΒη,  και 
άΧΧους,   €Ϊ   ττω?    Treiaetav  τάς   ναΰς  άττέΧθεΙν   ώς 

5  σφων  ovSev  νεωτεριουντων.  ev  τούτω  δε  άττο- 
στβΧΧουσι  καΐ  ες  την  Αακβ^αίμονα  ττρεσββις 
TpLTjpei  Χαθόντβς  το  των  ^Αθηναίων  ναυτικόν,  οΊ 
ωρμονν  ev  τη  Μαλεα.  ττρος  βορέαν  της  πόλεως• 
ου  yap  βττίστενον  τοΙς  άπο  των  'Αθηναίων  ττρο- 

β  'χωρησειν.  καΐ  οι  μεν  ες  την  ΑακεΒαίμονα 
ταΧαιττώρως  δίο.  του  πελάγους  κομισθεντες  αύτοΐς 
εττρασσον  οττως  τις  βοήθεια  η  ζει. 

V.  Οι  δ'  εκ  των  'Αθηνών  ττρεσβεις  ως  ούΒέν 
ηΧθον  πράξαντες,  ες  ττόλεμον  καθίσταντο  οι 
ΜυτιΧηναΐοι  και  η  άΧΧη  Αεσβος  ττΧην  Μτ;- 
θύμνης'  ούτοι  δε  τοις  Άθηναίοις  εβεβοηθιίκεσαν 
και  "Ιμβριοι  και  Αημνιοι  καΐ  των  άΧΧων  oXiyoi 

2  τίνες  ξυμμάχ^ων.  και  εζο^ον  μεν  τίνα  ττανΒημεϊ 
εττοιησαντο  οΐ  ^ΙυτιΧηναΐοι  εττι  το  των  'Αθηναίων 
στρατόττεΕον,  καΐ  μάχη  iyereTo,  εν  η  ουκ  εΧασσον 
έχοντες  οι  ^ΙυτιΧηΐ'αΐοι  ούτε  εττηυΧισαντο  ούτε 
εττίστευσαν    σφίσιν    αύτοΐς,    άΧΧ     άνεχώρησαν 

3  έπειτα  οι  μεν  ησύχαζον,  εκ  ΐΙεΧοττοννήσον  καΐ 
μετ     άΧΧης    παρασκευής    βουΧόμενοί    el     προσ- 

4  yivoiTO  τι  κινΒυνεύειν  καΐ  yap  αύτοΐς  ΛΙελεας 
Αάκων  άφικνεΐται  και  ΈρμαιώνΒας  Θηβαίος, 
οΊ  ττροαπεστάΧησαν  μεν  της  αποστάσεως,  φθάσαι 
8ε  ου  Βυνάμενοι  τον  των  Αθηναίων  επιπΧουν 
κρύφα  μετά  την  μάχην  ύστερον  εσπΧεουσι 
τριηρει,  και  παρήνουν  πεμπειν  τριήρη  άΧΧην  και 


BOOK    III.  IV.  3-v.  4 

their  proposals,  being  themselves  afraid  that  they  were 
not  strong  enough  to  make  war  against  all  Lesbos 
So  the  Mytilenaeans,  having  concluded  an  armistice, 
sent  envoys  to  Athens,  among  Avhom  was  one  of  the 
informers  who  was  by  now  repentant,  in  the  hope 
that  they  might  persuade  them  to  recall  their  fleet, 
on  the  understanding  that  they  themselves  would 
not  start  a  revolution.  Meanwhile  they  also  sent 
envoys  to  Lacedaemon  in  a  trireme,  which  eluded 
the  Athenian  fleet  lying  at  anchor  at  Malea  north  of 
the  town  ;  for  they  had  no  confidence  in  the  success 
of  their  negotiations  with  the  Athenians.  These 
envoys,  arriving  at  Lacedaemon  after  a  hard  voyage 
through  the  open  sea,  began  negotiating  for  some  aid 
for  their  countrymen. 

V.  But  when  the  envoys  to  Athens  returned  with- 
out having  accomplished  anything,  the  people  oi 
Mytilene  and  tiie  rest  of  Lesbos,  except  Methymna, 
began  war ;  the  Methymnaeans,  ho\vever,  supported 
the  Athenians,  as  did  also  the  Imbrians,  Lemnians, 
and  a  ίελν  of  the  other  allies.  The  Mytilenaeans  made 
a  sortie  in  full  force  against  the  camp  of  the  Athe- 
nians, and  a  battle  occurred  in  which  the  Mytile- 
naeans had  the  advantage  ;  nevertheless  they  did  not 
have  enough  confidence  in  themselves  to  bivouack  on 
the  field,  but  withdrew.  From  this  time  on  they  kept 
quiet,  being  unwilling  to  risk  an  engagement  with- 
out reinforcements  from  Peloponnesus  and  elsewhere. 
Such  reinforcements  they  expected,  for  there  had 
come  to  them  Meleas  a  Laconian  and  Hermaeondas 
a  Theban,  Λvho  had  been  sent  out  before  the  revolt, 
but  being  unable  to  arrive  before  the  Athenian 
expedition,  had  sailed  in  secretly  after  the  battle  in 
a  trireme,  and  now  advised  them  to  send  a  second 


THUCYDIDES 

ττρεσββις  μβθ^  βαυτων  και  βκπεμττουσιν.  VI.  οι 
δε  ^Αθηναίοι  ττολι)  ζττιρρωσθίντβς  δίά  την  των 
^ίυτίΧηΐ'αίων  ήσνχ^ίαν  ξυμμάχον;  τ€  irpoae- 
κάΧονν,  οΐ  7Γθ\ύ  θασσον  ιταρησαν  ορωντε^  ovSev 
Ισγυρον  άττο  των  Αεσβίων,  καΐ  ττεριορμισάμβνοί 
καΐ  ^  το  77/309  νότον  τϊ}ί  ττόλβω?  ετείχ^ισαν  στρα- 
τόττεδα  δυο  εκατέρωθεν  της  ττοΧεως  και  τού<ζ 
εφόρμους  εττ  αμφότεροι•;  T0t9  Χιμεσιν  εττοίούντο. 
2  κα\  της  μεν  θαΧάσσης  εΙρΎον  μη  -χ^ρήσθαι  τους 
ΜυτίΧηναίους,  της  δε  Ύης  της  μεν  άλΧης  εκρά- 
τονν  οι  Μυτιληναίοι  και  οι  άΧΧοι  Αεσβιοι 
•προσ βεβοηθηκότες  ή8η,  το  δε  ττερί  τα  στρατό- 
πεδα ου  τΓοΧύ  κατεΐχον  οί  ^Αθηναίοι,  ναύσταθ- 
μον  δε  μάΧΧον  ήν  αντοΐς  ττΧοιων  και  αγοράς  η 
Μαλεα.  καϊ  τα  μεν  ττερΙ  ΜυτιΧ7]νην  οΰτως 
ετΓοΧεμεΐτο. 

VII.  Κ^τά  δε  τον  αυτόν  ■χρόνον  του  θέρους 
τούτου  'Αθηναίοι  καϊ  ττερΙ  ΐΙεΧοττοννησον  ναϋς 
άττεστειΧαν  τριάκοντα  καϊ  Άσώττιον  τον  Φορ- 
μίωνος στρατηΎον,  κεΧευσάντων  ' Ακαρνάνων  των 
Φορμίωνος  τίνα  σφίσι  ττεμψαι  η  υίον  ή  ξυγγενή 

2  άρχοντα,      καϊ  τταραττΧεουσαι  αϊ  νήες  της  Αακω- 

3  ν.κης  τα  επιθαΧάσσια  χωρία  εττορθησαν.  εττειτα 
τας  μεν  πΧείους  άττοττέμπει  των  νέων  ττάΧιν  εττ 
οίκου   6   ^ Ασώττιος,   αύτος    δ'  έχων  8ώ8εκα  άφικ- 

4  νείται  ες  Ναύττακτον,  καϊ  ύστερον  Ακαρνάνας. 
άιαστήσας  τταν^ημεί  στρατεύει  εττ  ΟΙνιάΖας  και 
ταις   τε  ναυσϊ  κατά,   τον   ΆχεΧωον  εττΧευσε  καϊ 

δ  ό  κατά  <yr)v  στρατός  εΒ[ίου  την  χώραν.  ώς  δ'  ου 
ττροσεχώρουν,   τον  μεν   ττεζον   άφίησιν,   αύτος   δε 

1  <  και  > ,  SO  Hude  with  Steup,  as  a  part  of  the  fleet  must 
have  continued  at  anchor  north  of  the  city. 


BOOK   III.  V.  4-vii.  5 

trireme  and  some  envoys  to  accompany  them.  And 
this  the  Mytilenaeans  did.  VI.  Meanwhile  the  Athe- 
nians, much  encouraged  by  the  inactivity  of  the  My- 
tilenaeans, summoned  their  allies,  Avho  put  in  an 
appearance  the  more  quickly  as  they  saΛV  that  no  ener- 
getic measures  were  being  taken  by  the  Lesbians. 
They  also  placed  their  ships  at  anchor  round  the 
southern  part  of  the  town,  and  established  a  block- 
ade against  both  harbours.  Thus  they  excluded  the 
Mytilenaeans  from  the  use  of  the  sea  ;  but  as  for  the 
land,  the  Mytilenaeans  and  the  other  Lesbians,  who 
had  now  come  to  their  aid,  dominated  all  the  island, 
except  the  small  strip  held  by  the  Athenians  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  their  camps,  and  it  was  Malea 
rather  than  their  camps  that  they  used  as  a  station 
for  boats  and  supplies.  Such  was  the  course  of  the 
war  at  Mytilene. 

VII.  About  the  same  time  during  this  summer 
the  Athenians  sent  also  on  a  cruise  round  the  Pelo- 
ponnesus thirty  ships  with  Asopius  son  of  Phormio 
as  commander  ;  for  the  Acarnanians  had  requested 
them  to  send  them  as  commander  either  a  son  or 
some  other  kinsman  of  Phormio's.  And  the  ships  as 
they  sailed  past  ravaged  the  coast  of  Laconia.  After- 
wards Asopius  sent  most  of  the  ships  back  home, 
but  had  twelve  with  him  when  he  reached  Naupnctus. 
Then  later,  having  called  out  all  the  forces  of  the 
Acarnanians,  he  made  an  expedition  against  Oenia- 
dae,  sailing  with  the  ships  up  the  Achelous,  while  his 
army  on  land  ravaged  the  country.  As,  however,  the 
inhabitants  would  not  come  over  to  him,  he  dismissed 


THUCYDIDES 

ττλεύσας  e<;  Αευκάύα  και  άττόβασίν  e?  ^ίηρικον 
ΤΓθΐησάμ€νο<;  άνα^χ^ωρών  Βιαφθβίρβταί  αύτος  re 
και  της  στρατίΰ<;  τι  μέρος  ΰττο  των  αύτοθβν  τα 
ξυμβοηθησάντων  και  φρουρών  τίνων  ολί,γωΐ'. 
6  καΧ  ύστερον  ύττοσττόνΒους  τους  νεκρούς  άττοττΧβύ 
σαντες  οί  ^Αθηναίοι  πάρα  των  Αευκα8ίων  εκομί- 
σαντο. 

VIII.  Οί  δβ  €7Γί  της  πρώτης  νβώς  ίκπεμ.φθ€ντ£ς 
^Ιυτίληναίων  πρέσβεις,  ώς  αύτοΐς  οί  ΑακεΒαι- 
μόνιοί  είπον  ΌΧυμπίαζε  παρεΐναι,  όπως  καΐ  οι 
άΧλοι  ξύμμαχ^οι  άκούσαντες  βουΧευσωνται,  άφικ- 
νοννται  ες  την  ^ΟΧυμπίαν  ην  8ε  ^ΟΧυμπιας  r] 
Αωριεύς  'Ρόδίο?  το  Ζεύτερον  ενικά,  καΐ  επει8η 
μετά,  την  εορτην  κατέστησαν  ες  Xoyovς,  είποι 
τοιάΒε. 

IX.  "Το  μεν  καθεστος  τοΐς  ΈΧΧησι  νόμιμον, 
ω  ΑακεΖαιμόνιοι  καΐ  ξύμμαχ^οι,  ϊσμεν  τους  jap 
άφισταμεΐ'ους  εν  τοΐς  ποΧέμοις  και  ξυμμα^ίαν 
την  πριν  άποΧείποντας  οι  Εεξάμενοι,  καθ^  όσον 
μεν  ώφεΧοΰνται,  εν  η8ονη  ε'χουσι,  νομιζοντες  8ε 
είναι     προΒότας     των    προ     του    φιΧων    -χείρους 

2  ηγούνται.  κα\  ουκ  ά8ικος  αύτη  ή  άξίωσίς  εστίν, 
ει  τύ)(θΐεν  προς  άΧΧήΧοις  οι  τε  αφισταμενοι  και 
αφ"  ών  8ιακρίνοιΐ'Τθ  'ίσοι  μεν  τη  ^νώμη  οντες  καΐ 
εύνοια,  άντίπαΧοι   8ε  τη   παρασκευή  και  8υνάμει, 


^  Foreigners  (φρουρών  as  opposed  to  τών  αντ6θ€ν  ξυμ-βο-ηθ-η- 
σάντων),  possibly  Corinthians. 

■^  Dorieiis  son  of  Diagoras  was  victor  three  times  in  suc- 
cession at  Olynipia  (Pans.  VI.  vii.  1),  as  well  as  in  numerous 


BOOK    III.  VII.  5-ix.  2 

liis  army,  but  himself  sailed  to  Leucas  and  made  a 
descent  upon  Nericus.  On  his  way  back  from 
Nericus  he  and  part  of  his  army  were  slain  by  the 
j)eople  of  that  place,  avIio  rallied  to  its  defence,  and 
by  a  few  «iuards.^  The  Athenians  first  stood  out  to 
sea  and  then  later  recovered  their  dead  from  the 
Leucadians  under  a  truce. 

VIII.  Meanwhile  the  Mytilenaean  envoys  who 
had  been  sent  on  the  first  ship,  having  been  told  by 
the  Lacedaemonians  to  present  themselves  at  Olym- 
pia,  in  order  that  the  other  members  of  the  alliance 
also  might  hear  them  and  take  counsel,  came  to 
Olympia.  It  was  the  Olymjiiad  in  which  Dorieus-  the 
Rhodian  won  his  second  victory.  After  the  festival 
the  Peloponnesians  met  in  council,  and  the  envoys 
spoke  as  follows  : 

IX.  "  We  are  not  unaware,  men  of  Lacedaemon 
and  members  of  the  alliance,  of  the  traditional  feeling 
of  the  Hellenes  towards  men  wlio  revolt  in  time  of 
war  and  abandon  their  former  alliance  :  those  Avho 
accejit  them  as  allies  are  indeed  pleased  with  them• 
in  so  far  as  they  derive  advantage,  but  they  regard 
them  as  traitors  to  their  former  friends  and  therefore 
think  the  worse  of  them.  And  this  estimate  is  not 
unjust,  provided  that  those  who  revolt  and  those 
from  whom  they  secede  held  the  same  political  views 
and  were  actuated  by  the  same  feeling  of  good  will 
toward  one  another,  and  were  evenly  matched  in 
preparation  for  \var  and  in  power,  and  provided  also 

other  contests  (Pans.  vi.  vii.  4).  He  fourrlit  ii)  tlie  Decelean 
war  on  the  Spartan  side  (viii.  xxxv.  ]  ;  Xen.  Hell.  i.  i.  2), 
and  was  captured  by  the  Athenians,  but  on  account  of  his 
fame  as  an  athlete  was  released  without  ransom  (Xcn.  Jlell. 
I.  V.  19  ;  Pans.  vi.  vii.  4,  5). 

13 


THUCYDIDES 

πρόψασίς  re  ^ττιβίκης  μηΒεμία  υττάρ^^^οί  της  άττο- 
στάσεως'  ο  καΐ  ημίν  καΐ  Άθηναίοίς  ουκ  ην,  μηΕε 
τω  'χει ρους  Βοξωμβν  elvai,  el  ev  ttj  ειρήνη  τιμώ- 
μενοι υπ   αυτών  εν  τοις  8εινοΐς  άφιστάμεθα. 

Χ.  "ΙΙερΙ  yap  του  Βικαίου  καϊ  αρετής  πρώτον, 
αλΧως  τε  καϊ  ζνμμα'χ^ίας  8εομενοί,  τους  Χόλους 
ποιησόμεθα,  ειΒότες  ούτε  φιΧίαν  Ιδιώταις  βέβαιον 
<^ι^νομενην  ούτε  κοινωνίαν  ποΧεσιν  ες  ovhev,  εΐ 
μη  μετ^  άρβτης  Βοκούσης  ες  αλΧηΧονς  'yLyvoiVTO 
καϊ  τάΧλα  ομοιότροποι  ειεν  εν  yap  τω  ΒιαΧλάσ- 
σοντι  της  yvωμης  καϊ  αι  όίαφοραΐ  τών  εpyωv 
καθίστανται. 

2  "Ήμΐν  δε  καϊ  Άθηναίοις  ξυμμαγία  εyevετo 
ττρώτον  άτΓοΧιπόντων  μεν  υμών  εκ  τον  ^Μτ/δίΛοΟ 
ποΧεμου,    παραμεινάντων     δε    εκείνων     προς     τα 

3  υπόλοιπα  τών  εpyωv.  ξύμμαχ^οι  μεντοι  εyεvό- 
μεθα  ουκ  επΙ  κατα8ου\ωσει  τών  'Έ,Χληνων 
Άθηναίοις,  αλλ   eV    ελευθερώσει  άπο  του   ^Ιηόου 

4  τοις•  "Έ^Χλησιν.  καϊ  μέχρι  μεν  άπο  του  Ίσου 
rjyovvTO,  προθύμως  είπόμεθα'  επειΒη  δε  εωρώμεν 
αυτούς  την  μεν  τον  Μτ^δου  εχθραν  άνιεντας,  την 
δε   τών   ξνμμάχων    8ου\ωσιν    επειyoμέvovς,^   ονκ 

5  άδεεΐ?  ετι  ημεν.  άΒννατοι  οε  οντες  καθ^  εν  '^ιενό- 
μενοι    Sia   πο\νψ7]φίαν    άμυνασθαι    οι    ξύμμαχοι 

6  εΒουΧώθησαν  π\ην  ημών  καϊ  1\ίων•  ημείς  δε 
αυτόνομοι  Ιη  οντες  καϊ  ελενθεροι  τω  ονόματι 
ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν.  καϊ  πιστούς  ούκετι  εϊχομεν 
7]yεμόvaς  ^Αθηναίονς,  πapal•είyμaσι  τοις  προ'/ενο- 

^    ^τΐ(ι•γομίνουί,  Russ'  conjecture  for  (ττα-γομίνουζ  of  the  MSS. 


BOOK   111.   IX.  2-x.  6 

that  there  were  no  reasonable  excuse  for  their  revolt. 
But  these  conditions  did  not  obtain  between  us  and 
the  Athenians ;  therefore,  let  no  one  think  the  worse 
of  us  on  the  ground  that  we  were  honoured  by  them 
in  time  of  peace  and  now  revolt  from  them  in  time 
of  danger. 

X.  "  We  Λνϋΐ  first  discuss  the  question  of  justice 
and  rectitude,  especially  as  we  are  seeking  an  alliance, 
for  we  know  that  neither  does  friendship  between 
men  prove  lasting,  nor  does  a  league  betAveen  states 
come  to  aught,  unless  they  comport  themselves  Avith 
transparent  honesty  of  purpose  towards  one  another 
and  in  general  are  of  like  character  and  way  of 
thinking;  for  differences  in  men's  actions  arise  from 
the  diversity  of  their  convictions. 

"  Now  between  us  and  the  Athenians  an  alliance 
was  first  made  when  you  withdrew  from  the  Persian 
war  but  they  remained  to  finish  the  work.  We  be- 
came allies,  however,  not  to  the  Athenians  for  the 
enslavement  of  the  Hellenes,  but  to  the  Hellenes 
for  their  emancipation  from  the  Persians.  And  as 
long  as  they  maintained  their  hegemony  on  terms 
of  equality  we  heartily  followed  their  lead  ;  but 
Avhen  we  saw  them  relaxing  their  hostility  to  the 
Persians  and  eager  for  the  enslavement  of  the  allies, 
we  were  no  longer  without  alarm.  And  the  allies, 
being  unable,  on  account  of  the  number  of  those 
who  had  votes,  to  unite  for  self-defence,  were  all 
enslaved  except  ourselves  and  the  Chians ;  Λvhile  we 
shared  their  campaigns  as  presumably  "independent " 
and  enjoying  at  least  the  name  of  freedom.  And 
we  could  no  longer  regard  the  Athenians  as  trust- 
worthy   leaders,    taking    as    warning    examples    the 


Ϊ5 


THUCYDIDES 

μένοις  γ^ρώμβνοί'  ου  'yap  εΙκος  ην  αυτούς  ους  pev 
μζθ^  ηρών  €νσ7ΓΟν8ους  ζττοίησαντο  καταστρέ- 
■^ασθαι,  τους  δβ  ύττοΧοίττους,  ei  ττοτβ  άρα  8υνη- 
deiev,^  μη  Βράσαι  τούτο. 

XI.  "  Και  el  pev  αυτόνομοι  βτι  ημβν  άπαντζς, 
βββαιοτεροι  αν  ημΐν  ήσαν  μηδβν  νεωτβριεΐν  νττο- 
'χβιρίους  δβ  'έ)(^υντες  τους  ττΧβίους,  ημΙν  δέ  άττό  του 
ϊσου  ομί\οΰντ€ς,  γ^αΧεττώτερον  βΐκότως  epeWor 
ο'ίσειν  καΐ  προς  το  irXeov  η8η  βίκον  του  ημετέρου 
έ'τί  μονού  άντισουμίνου,  άΧΧως  τε  καϊ  οσω 
δυνατώτεροί  αυτοί  αυτών  iyijvovTO  καϊ  ημείς 
ερημότεροι,  το  8ε  άντίτταΧον  δέος  μόνον  πιστόν 
ες  ξυμμαχ^ίαν   ό  yap  τταραβαίνειν  τι  βουΧό μένος 

2  τω  μη  ττρούχων  αν  εττεΧθεϊν  άττοτρεττεται.  αυτό- 
νομοι τε  εΧειφθημεν  ου  St  άλΧο  τί  ή  όσον  αύτοΐς 
ες  την  άρχ^ην  εύττρεττεία  τε  λόγου  καϊ  γνώμης 
μάΧΧον  εφοδω  η   Ισχ^ύος   τα   ττράγ/χατα   εφαίνετο 

3  καταΧητΓτά.  άμα  μεν  yap  μαρτυρίω  ε'χ^ρώντο 
μη  αν  τους  yε  Ισοψήφους  άκοντας,  ει  μη  τι 
ηδίκουν  οίς  ένησαν,  ξυστρατεύειν  εν  τω  αύτω 
δε  καϊ  τα  κράτιστα  επί  τε  τους  υποδεεστέρους 
πρώτους  ξυvεπ?]yov  και  τεΧευταΐα  ^  Χιπόντες  τον 
άΧΧου  περιηρημένου  ασθενέστερα  εμεΧΧον  εζειν. 
el  δε  αφ'  ημών  ηρξαντο,  εχόντων  ετι  τών   πάντων 

1  Svvrieflev,  Dobree's  conjecture  for  ΐΛυ^ηθησα^  of  the 
MSS 

-'  [τά]  τίλίΐ/τοΓα:  το  deleted  with  Kiiiger. 

i6 


BOOK    III.  X.  6x1.  3 

events  of  the  past ;  for  it  was  not  likely  that  they, 
after  subjugating  those  with  whom  they  had  entered 
into  treaty  relations  together  with  us,  would  not  do 
the  same  to  those  Avho  were  left,  if  ever  they  should 
possibly  have  the  power. 

XI.  "Again  if  we  had  all  remained  independent 
we  should  have  had  better  assurance  that  they  would 
make  no  violent  change  in  our  status ;  having, 
however,  the  majority  under  their  hands,  while 
still  associating  with  us  on  an  equal  footing,  they 
would  naturally  find  it  more  irksome  that  our  state 
alone  still  maintained  its  equality  as  com])ared  with 
the  majority  that  had  already  yielded,  especially 
since  they  w'ere  becoming  more  powerful  in  propor- 
tion as  we  became  more  isolated.  Indeed  it  is  only 
the  fear  that  arises  from  equality  of  power  that  con- 
stitutes a  firm  basis  for  an  alliance;  for  he  that  would 
transgress  is  deterred  by  the  feeling  that  he  has  no 
superiority  wherewith  to  make  an  attack.  And  we 
were  left  independent  for  no  other  reason  than  be- 
cause they  clearly  saw  that  with  a  view  to  empire 
they  must  get  control  of  affairs  by  fair-seeming  words 
and  by  attacks  of  policy  rather  than  of  force.  For,  on 
the  one  hand,  they  had  as  evidence  in  their  favour 
that  surely  those  Λνΐιο  have  an  equal  voice  with  them- 
selves would  never  have  taken  part  in  their  campaigns 
had  not  those  λνΐιοηι  they  attacked  been  guilty  of 
some  wrong  ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  they  also 
brought  the  united  strength  of  the  strongest  states 
against  the  less  powerful  first,  and  leaving  the 
former  to  the  last  they  counted  upon  finding  them 
weaker  when  all  the  rest  had  been  removed  from 
around  them.  But  if  they  had  begun  with  us,  while 
the  whole  body  of  allies  were  not  only  still  strong  in 

17 


THUCYDIDES 

αυτών   re  ίσχύν  καΐ  προς  6  tl  'χ^ρη  στήναι,  ουκ 

4  αν  ομοιω<ί  βχ^ειρωσαντο.  το  τε  ναυηκον  ημών 
παρείχε  τίνα  φόβον  μή  irore  καθ"  %ν  <^βνόμβνον 
η   ύμΐν  η  αλλω  τω    προσθβμβνον  κινΒυνον  σφίσι 

5  τταράσχτ].  τα  δε  καΐ  άττο  θεραπείας  του  Τ€ 
κοινού  αυτών  καΐ  τών  αΐεΐ  προεστώτων  περιεγι- 

6  ηνόμεθα.  ου  μεντοι  επΙ  πο\ύ  γ'  ^^  ε8οκοΰμεν 
Βυνηθήναι,  εΐ  μη  ο  ποΧεμος  68ε  κατέστη,  παρα- 
BeLyμaσι  'χρώμενοι  τοις  βς  τους  αΧλους. 

XII.  "  Ύίς  ουν  αΰτη  ή  φιΧία  ejiyveTo  η  εΧευ- 
θερια  πίστη,  εν  y  πάρα  '^/νώμην  άΧΧηΧους  ύπε- 
Βεχ^ομεθα  καΐ  οι  μεν  ημάς  εν  τω  ποΧεμω  ΒεΒιότες 
εθεράπευον,  ημείς  8ε  εκείνους  εν  τη  7]συχ^ία  το 
αύτο  εποιοΰμεν  6  τε  τοις  άΧΧοις  μάΧιστα  εύνοια 
πίστίν  βέβαιοι,  ήμΐν  τούτο  6  φόβος  εχυρον 
παρείχε,  8εει  τε  το  πΧίον  η  φιΧια  κατεχόμενοι 
ξύμμαχοι  ημεν  καΐ  όποτέροις  θάσσον  παράσχοι 
άσφάΧεια    θάρσος,   ούτοι   πρότεροι    τι   καΧ  παρα- 

2  βήσεσθαι  εμεΧΧον.  ώστε  εϊ  τω  Βοκούμεν  άΒικεΐν 
προαττοστάντες  8ια  την  εκείνων  μεΧΧησιν  τών  ες 
ημάς   Βεινών,   αύτοΙ   ουκ    άνταναμειναντες  σαφώς 

3  εΙΒέναι  εϊ  τι  αυτών  εσται,  ουκ  ορθώς  σκοπεί,  el 
•γαρ  ΒυνατοΙ  ημεν  εκ  του  Ίσου  και  άντεπιβου- 
Χεύσαι,  και  άντιμεΧΧησαί  τι  εύει  ημάς  εκ  τον 
όμοιου  eV  εκείνους  Ιέναί'  eV  εκείιοις  δε  οντος 
αΐεΐ  τού  επιχειρεΐν  και  εφ'  ήμΙν  είναι  Βεΐ  το 
προαμύνασθαί. 

ι8 


BOOK    III.  XI.  3-xii.  3 

their  own  strength,  but  also  had  a  leader  to  rally  to, 
they  would  not  have  got  the  mastery  so  easily.  Be- 
sides, our  navy  caused  them  some  fear,  lest  it  should 
some  day  be  augmented  by  being  united  either  witli 
yours  or  another's  and  thus  become  a  menace  to 
themselves.  To  some  extent  also  we  owe  our  sal- 
vation to  the  court  we  paid  to  the  Athenian  people 
and  to  the  political  leaders  of  the  day.  But  we 
could  not  have  expected  to  be  able  to  survive  for 
long,  if  we  may  judge  by  their  conduct  toward  the 
other  allies,  unless  this  war  had  broken  out. 

XII.  "Was  this  then  a  friendship  or  a  freedom  to 
put  faith  in,  \vhere  we  violated  our  real  feelings 
whenever  we  treated  each  other  as  friends?  They 
courted  us  in  time  of  war  only  because  they  were 
afraid  of  us,  while  we  acted  in  the  same  manner  toward 
them  in  time  of  peace  ;  and  good  faith,  Avhich  in 
most  cases  is  made  steadfast  by  good  Λνϋΐ,  Avas  in  our 
case  made  secure  by  fear,  and  it  was  fear  rather  than 
friendship  that  held  us  both  to  the  alliance ;  and 
whichever  of  us  should  soonest  gain  boldness  through 
a  feeling  of  security  was  bound  to  be  the  first  to 
commit  some  act  of  transgression  also.  If,  therefore, 
anyone  thinks  that,  just  because  they  postponed 
the  measures  we  dread,  we  do  wrong  in  revolting 
first,  without  having  Avaited  on  our  side  until  we 
were  quite  sure  that  any  of  our  suspicions  Λvould 
come  true,  he  is  in  error.  For  if  we  \vere  in  a 
position  to  meet  their  plotting  by  counter-measures 
on  equal  terms  with  them,  it  was  indeed  incumbent 
upon  us  on  our  part  to  postpone  likewise  our  offensive 
against  tliem ;  but  since  tlie  po\ver  of  attack  is 
always  in  their  hands,  the  right  of  acting  betimes  in 
our  own  defence  must  necessarily  be  in  ours. 

19 


THUCYDIDES 

XIII.  "  Τοιαύτα'}  βχ^οντβς  προφάσ€ΐ<;  καΐ  αΐ- 
τία<ί,  ώ  ΑακβΒαιμόνιΟί  καΐ  ζύμμα^οι,  άττβστημ^ν, 
σαφβΙ<ζ  μεν  τοις  ακονουσι  yvcovaL  ώ?  €ίκοτω<; 
€Βράσαμεΐ',  ίκανάς  oe  ημάς  €κφοβήσαι  καΐ  ττρος 
άσφάΧβιάν  rtva  τρβψαι,  βονΧομβί'ονς  μ^ν  και 
ττάΧαί,  6τ€  έ'τί  iv  ττ}  ΐίρηνη  έττεμψαμεν  ώς  υμάς 
irepX  άτΓοστάσεως,  υμών  δε  ου  ττροσδεξααένων 
κωΧυθύντας•  νυν  δε  iiretBr}  ΈοιωτοΙ  ττρονκαΧβ- 
σαντο,  βύθύς  ύπηκουσαμβν,  καΐ  ένομίζομεν  άπο- 
στησεσθαι  ΒίΤτΧην  άπόστασιν,  άττο  re  τώι>  Ελ- 
\ηνων  μη  ξυν  κακώς  νοιεΐν  αυτούς  μβτ^  ^Αθηναίων, 
αλλά  ξυνβΧβυθερούν,  αττό  re  ^Αθηναίων  μη  αύτοΙ 
Βιαφθαρήναι    ύττ'   εκείνων  iv  υστερώ,   αλλά   ττρο- 

2  ττοιήσαι.  η  μεντοι  άττοστασις  ημών  θάσσον 
'^^'^ενηται  καΐ  άτταράσκβυος'  τ)  καΐ  μάΧλον 
■χρη  ξυμμάχους  Βεξαμενους  ημάς  δίά  τα^χ^εων 
βοηθειαν  άττοστεΧΧειν,  ίνα  φαίνησθε  άμύνοντες 
τ€  οϊς  8εΐ  καΐ  εν  τω  αύτώ  τους  ττοΧεμίους  βΧάττ- 

3  τοντες.  καιρός  δε  ώς•  ονττω  ττροτερον.  νοσώ  τε 
yap  εφθάραται  ^Αθηναίοι  καΐ  'χ^ρημάτων  Βαπάνη, 
νΡ]ες    τε   αύτοΐς  αΐ  μεν   ττερί    την   ύμετεραν   είσιν 

4  αί  δ'  εφ'  ήμίν  τετάχαταΐ'  ώστε  ουκ  εΙκος  αυτούς 
ττερίουσίαν  νεών  εχ^ειν,  ψ•  υμεΐς  εν  τω  θερει  τώδβ 
ναυσί  τε  καΐ  ττεζώ  άμα  επεσβάΧητε  το  Βεύτερον, 
αλλ'   η   υμάς   ουκ  άμυνοΰνται   εττιπΧεοντας  ή  άττ 

5  αμφοτέρων    άττο^ζ^ωρήσονται.       νομιση    τε    μηΒεΙ<^ 

'  Tliis  has  not  been  definitely  stated  above,  but  it  is 
implied  in  ch.  ii.  3,  v.  4. 


BOOK    III.  XIII.  1-5 

XIII.  "  Such  were  the  motives  and  reasons,  Lace- 
daemonians and  aUies,  which  led  us  to  revolt,  and 
they  are  clear  enough  to  convince  all  Λvho  hear  them 
that  we  had  good  grounds  for  our  action,  and  cogent 
enough  to  alarm  us  and  impel  us  to  seek  some  means 
of  safety.  This  Λve  long  ago  wished  to  do  while  you 
were  still  at  peace,  when  we  sent  envoys  to  you 
suggesting  that  we  should  revolt,  but  were  pre- 
vented from  doing  so  because  you  would  not  re- 
ceive us.  But  now,  when  the  Boeotians  invited  ^ 
us  we  responded  promptly.  It  was  our  intention 
to  make  at  once  a  double  withdrawal — from  the 
Hellenes  2  and  thus  aid  in  liberating  them  instead 
of  joining  the  Athenians  to  do  them  wrong  ;  and 
from  the  Athenians,  and  thus  destroy  them  first  in- 
stead of  being  ourselves  destroyed  by  them  after- 
wards. Our  i-evolt,  however,  lias  been  made  pre- 
maturely and  without  preparation  ;  wherefore  it  is 
the  more  incumbent  upon  you  to  receive  us  as  allies 
and  quickly  send  us  aid,  in  order  that  all  men  may 
see  that  you  protect  those  whom  you  ought  to 
protect  and  at  the  same  time  harm  your  enemies. 
And  it  is  an  opportunity  such  as  never  has  been 
before.  For  the  Athenians  have  been  ruined  by 
j)estilence  as  well  as  by  heavy  expenses.  Part  of 
their  fleet  is  cruising  about  your  coasts,^  part  is 
arrayed  against  us ;  so  that  it  is  not  likely  that  they 
have  any  ships  to  spare  if  you  attack  them  this 
coming  summer  a  second  time,  by  sea  as  well  as  by 
land ;  but  they  will  either  not  resist  you  when  you 
sail  against  them,  or  else  they  will  have  to  withdraw 
their  fleets  both  from  our  waters  and  from  yours. 
And  let  no  one  think  that  he  will  be  incurring  a  risk 

*  i.e.  from  the  Delian  Confederacj'. 

•  c/.  ch.  vii.  2. 

ai 


THUCYDIDES 

άλλοτ/οια?  γτ}?  irepi  ^  οίκβΐον  κίνΒυνον  €^€tv.  ω 
<γάρ  8οκ€Ϊ  μακράν  airelvat  η  Αέσβος,  την  ωφβΧίαν 
αύτω  ijyv0€v  Trape^et.  ου  <yap  iv  ttj  ^Attiktj 
earat   6   ττόΧεμος,    ως    τις  οϊεται,    αλλά  Βι    ην  η 

6  ΆττίΚϊ]  ώφεΧβΐται.  έ'στί  δε  των  •χ^ρημάτων  άττό 
των  ξυμμάχ^ων  ί)  ττρόσοδος,  κα\  'άτι  μείζων  εσται, 
ei  ημάς  καταστ ρεψονταΐ'  οΰτβ  yap  άιτοστησεται 
άΧλος   τά    τ€   ημέτερα  ττροσ^ενησεται,  ττάθοιμεν 

7  τ'  άν  δεινότερα  η  οί  πριν  8ου\εύοντες.  βοηθη- 
σάντων  δε  υμών  ττροθύμως  ττόΧιν  τε  ττροσληψεσθε 
ναντικον  εγονσαν  μεηα,  ονττερ  υμίν  μάλιστα 
ττροσΒεΐ,  καΐ  ^ Α,θηναιους  ραον  καθαιρήσετε  νφαι- 
ροΰντες  αυτών  τους  ξυμμά^ους  {θ ρασύτερον  yap 
ττάς  τις  ττροσγωρήσεταϊ),  την  τε  αΐτίαν  άττο- 
φεύξεσθε  ην  εϊ-χετε  μη  βοηθεΐν  τοις  άφισταμενοις, 
ην  8ε  εΧευθεροΰντες  φαινησθε,  το  κράτος  του 
•ποΧεμου  βεβαιότερον  εξετε. 

XIV.  "  Αίσ)(^υνθέντες  ούν  τάς  τε  των  'ΚΧΧηνων 
ες  ημάς  εΧττιΒας  και  Δια  τον  ^ΟΧυμττιον,  εν  ου  τω 
Ιερω  ίσα  και  ίκεται  εσμεν,  ετταμύνατε  Μυτίλτ;- 
ναίοις  ξύμμαγοι  yεvόμεvoι,  καΐ  μη  ττρόησθε  ημάς, 
ϊΖιον  μεν  τον  κίνΒυνον  των  σωμάτων  τταραβαΧΧο- 
μενους,  κοινην  δε  την  εκ  του  κατορθώσαι  ωφεΧίαν 
άττασι  Βώσοντας,  ετι  δε  κοινοτέραν  την  βΧάβην, 
2  ει  μη  ττεισθεντων  υμών  σφαΧησομεθα.  γ^Ύ'^^''"^^ 
δε  άνΒρες  οϊουσττερ  υμάς  οι  τε  'Έλλί^ΐ'ες  άξιοϋσι 
Λ'αι  το  ημετερον  Βέος  βούΧεται." 

*  ονκ  is  inserted  by  Hude. 
22 


BOOK    III.   XIII.  5-xiv.  2 

of  his  own  for  the  country  of  another.  For  though 
Lesbos  seems  to  him  to  be  a  long  way  off,  tlie  help 
she  Λνίΐΐ  bring  him  will  be  close  at  hand.  For  the  war 
will  not  be  in  Attica,^  as  some  tiiink,  but  in  those 
countries  from  which  Athens  derives  its  support. 
The  revenues  of  Athens  come  from  her  allies,  and 
they  will  be  still  greater  if  they  shall  subdue  us ;  for 
not  only  will  no  one  else  revolt,  but  our  resources 
will  be  added  to  hers,  and  we  should  be  treated  with 
greater  rigour-  than  those  who  have  long  been  slaves. 
But  if  you  give  us  your  hearty  support,  you  will  add 
to  your  league  a  state  that  has  a  large  navy,  a  thing 
of  which  you  still  stand  most  in  need,  and  you  will 
find  it  easier  to  overthrow  the  Athenians  by  gradually 
drawing  their  allies  away  from  them — for  every  one 
will  be  emboldened  to  come  over  to  your  side — and 
you  will  free  yourselves  of  the  reproach  under  which 
you  have  heretofore  laboured,  of  refusing^  to  aid 
those  who  revolt  from  the  Athenians.  But  if  you 
openly  play  the  part  of  liberators,*  the  more  certain 
will  be  your  victory  in  the  war. 

XIV.  "Reverencing,  then,  not  only  the  hopes 
which  the  Hellenes  place  in  you,  but  also  that  Olym- 
pian Zeus  in  whose  temple  we  are  even  as  suppliants, 
succour  the  Mytilenaeans  by  entering  on  this  alliance; 
and  do  not  abandon  us  Avhen  we  are  hazarding  our 
lives  in  a  risk  all  our  own,  but  shall  bring  to  all  a 
general  benefit  if  we  succeed — and  a  still  more 
general  injury  if  through  your  refusal  we  shall  fail. 
Prove  yourselves,  therefore,  men  such  as  the  Hellenes 
account  you  and  our  fears  would  have  you  be." 

*  i.e.  the  war  will  not  be  decided  in  Attica. 

^  Especially  as  regards  the  tribute  which  would  be  exacted. 

'  c/.  I.  Ixix.  1,  5.  *  cf.  II.  viii.  4. 

23 


THUCYDIDES 

XV.  Ύοίαυτα  μβν  οι  Μ^ντίΧηναΐοι  βίττον.  οι 
he  ΑακβΒαιμονιοί  καΐ  οΙ  ξύμμαχ^οι  βττει^η  ηκονσαν, 
ττροσΒβ^άμενοι  τον<;  Xoyovi  ξνμμάχ^ου^  τε  τους 
Χεσ  βίους  βποιήσαντο  καΐ  την  e?  την  Αττική  ν 
€σβοΧην  τοις  Τ6  ζυμμάγ^οις  τταροΰσι  κατά  τάχος 
βφραζον  levai  ες  τον  Ισθμον  τοις  δύο  μερεσιν  ώς 
ΤΓΟίησομενοι,  καΐ  αύτοΙ  ττρωτοι  άφίκοντο,  καΙ 
όΧκους  τταρεσκεύαζον  των  νεών  ev  τω  Ισθμω  ώς 
ΰ7Γ€ροίσοΐ'Τ€ς  €κ  της  Κ,ορίνθου  e<?  την  ττρος 
^Αθήνας     θάΧασσαν    και     ναυσΐ    καΐ    ττβζω    άμα 

2  βπίόντες.  καΐ  οι  μβν  ττροθυμως  ταύτα  βττρασσον 
οΐ  he  άΧΧοι  ξύμμαχοι  βpaheως  Τ€  ^uveXeyovTO 
και  ev  καρτΓοϋ  ξu'γκoμιhτ}  ήσαν  και  αρρώστια 
του  στρατεύειν. 

XVI.  ΑΙσθόμ€νοι  he  αυτούς  οι  Αθηναίοι  hia 
κατά^νωσιν  ασθένειας  σφων  τταρασκευαζο μένους, 
hηXώσaι  βουΧόμενοι  'ότι  ουκ  ορθώς  ε^νώκασιν, 
αλλ'  οίοι  TS  είσι  μη  κινονντες  το  iirl  Αεσβω 
ναυτίκον  καΐ  το  άττο  ΐΙεΧοττοννήσου  eiriov 
pahίως  άμύνεσθαι,  επΧήρωσαν  ταΰς  εκατόν 
εσβάντες  αυτοί  τε  ττΧην  Ιτητεων  καΐ  ττεντακο- 
σιομεΒίμνων  και  οι  μέτοικοι,  καΐ  τταρα  τον  ισθμον 
άνα^α^όντες    εττίΐ>ειζιν     τε    εττοιουντο    και    άττο- 

2  βάσεις  της  ΐίεΧοττοννήσου  η  hoκoίη  αύτοΐς.  οι 
he  ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι  ορώντες  ποΧύν  τον  rrapaXcyov 
τά    τε    ύττο    τών   Αεσβιων  ρηθεντα   η^ούντο   ουκ 


1  cf.  II.  χ.  2. 

'  Of  citizens  usually  only  the  Θύ]Τ($,  who  were  light-armed 
troops  on  land,  served  in  the  fleet  (vi.  xliii)  ;  but  in  critical 

24 


BOOK    III.  XV.  i-xvi.  2 

XV,  Thus  spoke  the  Mytilenaeans.  The  Lacedae- 
monians and  their  allies,  after  they  had  heard  them, 
accepted  their  proposals,  and  received  the  Lesbians  as 
allies.  Those  allies  Avho  were  there  present  were 
directed  to  assemble  with  all  speed  at  the  Isthmus 
with  tΛvo-thirds  ^  of  their  forces  for  the  purpose  of 
making  the  proposed  invasion  of  Attica ;  and  the 
Lacedaemonians  themselves  arrived  first  and  pro- 
ceeded to  construct  on  the  Isthmus  hauling-machines 
with  which  to  transfer  the  ships  from  Corinth  to  the 
sea  on  the  Athenian  side,  in  order  to  attack  Athens 
both  by  sea  and  by  land.  They  set  to  work  zealously 
at  these  tilings,  but  the  rest  of  the  allies  collected 
slowly,  since  they  were  busy  gathering  in  their 
harvest  and  were  in  no  mood  for  campaigning. 

XVI.  Meanwhile  the  Athenians,  perceiving  that 
the  enemy,  in  making  their  preparations,  were  acting 
upon  a  conviction  of  their  own  weakness,  and  wishing 
to  show  that  they  were  mistaken  in  their  judgment, 
and  that  without  moving  the  fleet  at  Lesbos  they  could 
easily  ward  off  the  new  force  coming  from  the  Pelo- 
ponnesus, manned  one  hundred  ships,  the  citizens,^ 
— except  the  kniglits  and  the  highest  class — em- 
barking as  well  as  the  resident  aliens.  Then  putting 
out  to  sea  they  displayed  their  strength  along  the 
coast  of  the  Isthmus  and  made  descents  upon  the 
Peloponnesus  wherever  they  pleased.  As  for  the 
Lacedaemonians,  Avhen  they  saw  how  greatly  they 
liad  miscalculated,  they  concluded  that  the  reports 
of   the  Lebbians  ^    were    untrue,  and  regarding  the 

times  members  of  the   three  upper  classes,   whose  regular 
duty  was  hoplite  service,  might  be  pressed  into  service  in  the 
fleet  (viii.  xxiv.  2). 
'  c/.  ch.  xiii.  3,  4. 

VOL.  II.  Β        *5 


THUCYDIDES 

άΧηθή  και  άττορα  νομίζοντβς,  ώς  αύτοΐζ  καΐ  οί 
ξύμμα)(οι  άμα  ου  τταρήσαν  καΐ  ■η'^/^/eXkovro  καΐ 
αϊ  776/51  την  ΏεΧοττόΐΊ^ησορ  τριάκοντα  νή€ς  των 
Αθηναίων  την  rrepioiKLCa  αυτών  ττορθούσαι,  ave- 

3  χώρησαν  err  οικον.  ΰστβρον  he  ναντικον  irape- 
σκεύαζον  ο  τι  ττέβψονσιν  ες  την  Αεσβον  και 
κατά  7Γολει<{  eTryjyyeXov  τεσσαράκοντα  νβών 
ττΧηθο'ζ  και   ναύαρ'χον  ττροσεταζαν  \\Χκί8αν,  ος 

4  εμεΧΧεν  βττίττΧβύσεσθαι.  άνεγ^ώρησαν  δε  κα\  οΐ 
Αθηναίοι  ταΐς  εκατόν  ναυσίν,  εττειΕη  και  εκείνους 

elSov. 

ΧΛ^ΙΙ.  ΚαΙ  ^  κατά,  τον  γ^ρόνον  τούτον  ον  α'ι 
νήες  εττΧεον  εν  τοις  ττΧεΐσται  Βη  νήες  άμ 
αύτοΐς   ενεργοί    κάΧΧει  ^   iyevovTO,    τταραττΧησιαι 

2  δε  καΐ  ετι  ττΧείους  άρχ^ομενον  του  ττοΧεμου.  την 
τε  yap  Άττικην  καΐ  Κύ,3οιαν  και  Έ,αΧαμΐνα 
εκατόν  εφύΧασσον  και  ττερί  ΤΙεΧοττόννησον  ετεραι 
εκατόν  ήσαν,  χωρίς  δε  αί  ττερΙ  ΤΙοτιΒαιαν  και 
ev  τοις  άΧΧοις  χωρίοις,  ώστε  αΐ  ττάσαι  άμα 
iyiyvovTo  εν  εν\  θερει  Βιακόσιαι  και  πεντήκοντα. 

3  καΐ  τα  χρίσματα  τούτο  μάΧιστα  ύττανάΧωσε  μετά 
Ποτίδα/ας.  Ty'jv  τε  yap  ΐίοτιοαιαν  ΒίΒραχμοι 
όττΧΐται  εφρονρουν  (αύτω  yap  και  ύττηρετη 
Βραχμ.ην  εΧάμβανε  της  ημέρας),  τρισχίλιοι  μεν 
οι  ττρώτοι,  ων  ουκ  εΧάσσους  διεττοΧιόρκησαν, 
εξακόσιοι  δε  καΐ  χίΧιοι  μετά  Φορμίωνος,  όΙ 
προαττήΧθον   νήές  τε  αί  ττάσαι  τον  αύτον  μισθον 

^  This  whole  chapter  is  condemned  as  spurious  by  Steup, 
followed  by  Hude. 

2  Untranslatable  in  this  context :  Stahl  writes  καΧ  άΚλρ, 
van  Herwerden  άλλαι  άλλτρ,  CuUinan  «αλλαι,  L.  Herbst  tr' 
καΐ  λ'. 

26 


BOOK    III.  XVI.  2-xvii.  3 

expedition  as  impracticable,  since  their  allies  had  not 
yet  arrived,  and,  besides,  word  had  come  to  them  that 
the  thirty  ^  ships  which  were  cruising  around  the 
Peloponnese  were  ravaging  their  own  country  dis- 
tricts, they  went  back  home.  Later,^  however,  they 
prepared  a  fleet  which  was  to  be  dispatched  to 
Lesbos  and  sent  orders  to  the  allied  states  for  forty 
ships,  appointing  Alcidas  who  was  to  sail  as  admiral 
of  this  fleet.  And  Avhen  the  Athenians  saw  that 
the  enemy  had  Avithdrawn,  they  also  returned  home 
Λvith  their  hundred  ships. 

XVII.  At  the  time  when  these  ships  were  at  sea 
about  the  largest  number  the  Athenians  ever  had 
at  once  were  on  active  service,  though  there  Λvere  as 
many  or  even  more  at  the  beginning  of  the  Λν3Γ. 
For  one  hundred  ships  were  guarding  Attica,  Euboea 
and  Salamis,  and  another  hundred  were  cruising  off 
the  Peloponnesus,  besides  those  at  Potidaea  and  in 
other  places,  so  that  the  number  in  service  at  the 
same  time  in  a  single  summer  was  all  told  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty.  It  Λvas  this  effort,  together  with 
Potidaea,  that  chiefly  exhausted  their  resources  of 
money.  For  in  the  siege  of  Potidaea  the  hoplite 
received  a  Avage  of  two  drachmas  a  day,  one  for  him- 
self and  one  for  his  attendant;  and  there  were  at 
first  three  thousand  of  these,  and  the  number  was 
not  less  than  this  throughout  the  siege,  besides  six- 
teen hundred  who  came  with  Phormio,  but  went 
away  before  the  siege  was  over;  and  the  sailors 
on  the  ships  all  drew  the  same  pay  as  the  soldiers. 
'  cf.  ch.  vii.  1.  "^  cf.  ch.  xxv.  1  ;  xxvi.  1. 

27 


THUCYDIDES 

4  €φ€ρον.  ra  μεν  ουν  -χ^ρηματα  οΰτω<ζ  υττανα/^ώθη 
το  ττρόίτον,  και  νή€<;  τοσαΰται  8η  ττΧβΐσται 
εττΧηρώθησαν. 

XVIII.  ^Ιυτίληναΐοί  δε  κατά  τον  αυτόν  χρο- 
νον  ον  οι  ΑακβΒαιμόνιοί  rrepl  τον  ίσθμυν  ήσαν 
67γΙ  Ι^Ιήθυμναν  ώ?  ττροΒιΒομβνην  εστράτευσαν 
κατά  <γήν  αυτοί  τε  καΐ  οι  ετηκουροι•  καΐ  ττροσ- 
βαλόντε<;  τί)  ττόΧει,  εττειΒη  ου  ττρου-χωρει  γ 
ττροσεοεχοντο,  αττηΚθον  ετΓ  Αντισσης  καΙΐΙύρρα<; 
καΐ  ^Ερέσον,  καΐ  καταστησάμενοί  τα  εν  ταΐς 
ττόΧεσί    ταύταί<ί    βεβαιότερα    καΐ    τείχη     κρατυ- 

2  ναντε^  Βια  τάχου<;  άττήΧθον  βττ'  οϊκου.  εστρά- 
τευσαν  δε  και  οι  Μηθυμναΐοι  άναχωρησάντων 
αυτών  eV  "Αντισσαν"  και  εκβοηθεία^  τίνος  'γενο- 
μένης ττΧη'γεντες  ύπο  τε  των  Αντισσαίων  και 
των  επικούρων  άττεθανόν  τε  ττοΧΧοϊ  και  άνεχώ- 

3  ρησαν  οι  ΧοιττοΙ  κατα  τάχος,  οι  δε  ^Αθηναίοι 
ττννθανόμενοι  ταντα,  τους  τε  \ΙυτιΧηναίους  της 
γ?}?  κρατοΰντας  και  τους  σφετερους  στρατιώτας 
ούχ  ίκανοϋς  οντάς  εϊρ^ειν,  ττίμττουσι  ττερΧ  το 
φθινόττωρον  η8η  άρχόμενον  ΤΙάχητα  τον  Έττί- 
κούρου  στρατη'^/ον  καϊ  χιΧιους   οττΧίτας  εαυτών, 

4  οΐ  δε  αύτερεται  πΧεύσαντες  τών  νεών  άφικνοΰΐ'ται 
καϊ  ττεριτειχίζουσι  ΛΙ^τίλ^/ι^ί^ζ^  εν  κύκΧω  άττΧώ 
τείχεί'  φρούρια    δ'  ^στιν    οΐ    εττΧ    τών    καρτερών 

5  εγκατοικοοομεΐται.  καϊ  η  μεν  ^ΙυτιΧήνη  κατά 
κράτος  ηΒη  άμφοτερωθεν  καϊ  εκ  'γης  και  εκ 
θαΧάσσης  είρ^/ετο,  καϊ  ο  χειμών  ηρχετο  'γί- 
<γνεσθαι. 

XIX.  ΥΙροσΒεόμενοι  δε  οι  Αθηναίοι  χρημάτων 
ες   την    ττυΧιορκίαν,  καϊ  αύτοϊ   έσενε^κόντες  τότε 


28 


BOOK    III.  XVII.  3-xix.  i 

It  was  in  this  way,  then,  that  their  money  was  ex- 
hausted at  first,  and  this  was  the  largest  number  of 
ships  manned  by  them. 

XVIII.  Wliile  the  Lacedaemonians  were  at  the 
Isthmus,  the  Mytilenaeans  and  their  auxiliaries  ^ 
marched  Avitli  their  army  against  Methymna,  which 
they  supposed  was  being  betrayed  into  their  hands ; 
and  they  assaulted  the  city,  but  when  their  attempt 
did  not  succeed  as  they  had  expected,  they  went  off 
to  Antissa,  Pyrrha  and  Eresus,  and  after  establishing 
their  interests  in  these  cities  on  a  firmer  basis  and 
strengthening  the  walls,  went  home  in  haste.  As 
soon,  however,  as  they  had  ΛvithdraΛvn,  the  Methvm- 
naeans  in  their  turn  made  an  exj)edition  against 
Antissa ;  but  a  sortie  Avas  made  by  the  inhabitants  of 
Antissa  and  the  auxiliary  troops  in  which  the  Methym- 
naeans  were  defeated  and  many  of  them  slain, 
ΛvIlereupon  the  rest  withdrew  in  haste.  Now  when 
the  Athenians  learned  that  the  Mytilenaeans  were 
masters  of  the  country  and  that  their  own  soldiers 
were  not  numerous  enough  to  keep  them  within 
their  walls,  about  the  beginning  of  autumn  they 
sent  Paches  son  of  Epicurus  in  command  of  a  thou- 
sand Athenian  hoplites,  who  also  served  as  rowers.^ 
When  they  arrived  at  Mytilene,  they  encircled  it 
with  a  single  wall,  in  which  forts  were  built  at  a 
number  of  strong  positions.  Mytilene  was  thus  at 
last  completely  cut  off  both  by  sea  and  land  just  as 
the  winter  set  in. 

XIX.  Now  the  Athenians,  finding  themselves  in 
need  of  additional  funds  for  the  siege,  having  then 

'  Foreign  mercenaries ;  cf.  ch.  ii.  2. 

'•^  The  fact  of  hoplites  serving  at  the  oars — evidently  for 
economical  reasons  [cf.  ch.  xix.  1) — is  especially  emphasised. 
cf.  I.  X.  4  ;  VI.  xci,  4. 

2Q 


THUCYDIDES 

•πρώτον  βσφοραν  Βιακόσια  τάλαντα,  εξύπβμψαν 
και  €7γΙ  τους  ξυμμάχ^ους  apyvpoXoyov^:  ναΰ<ϊ 
ΒώΕβκα  καΐ  ΑυσικΧεα  ττβμτττον  αύτον  CTpaTi^yov. 
2  ό  δβ  αΚΧα  τ€  ypyupoXoyeL  καΐ  TrepieTrXet,  καΐ 
της  ίίαρίας  €κ  Μι/οΟί^το?  άναβάς  Βια  του 
}^Ιαιάνδρον  ττβΗου  μεχ^ρι  του  Έ,ανΒίου  Χόφου, 
επιθεμένων  των  Κ,αρών  καΐ  \\ναΐίτών,  αυτός  τ€ 
Βιαφθειρβταί  και  της  άΧΧης  στρατιάς  ποΧΧοί. 

XX.  Ύοΰ  δ'  αυτού  ■χ^€ΐμωνος  οι  ΐΙΧαταιής  {βτι 
yap  έποΧιορκοϋντο  υττο  των  ΤΙεΧοποννησίων  καΐ 
ϋοίωτών)  βττειΖη  τω  τε  σιτω  εττιΧείττοντι  εττιβζοντο 
και  άπο  των  Α.θηνο)ν  ουδεμία  εΧττΙς  ην  τιμωρίας 
ονΒε  άΧΧη  σωτηρία  εφαίνετο,  επιβουΧεύουσιν 
αυτοί  Τ€  και  \\θηναίων  ο'ι  ξυμποΧιορκούμενοι 
■πρώτον  μεν  πάντες  εξεΧθεΐν  και  υπερβψαι  τα 
τεί'χτι  των  ττοΧεμίων,  ην  Βύνωνται  βιάσασθαι, 
εσηyησaμivωv  την  ττεΐραν  αύτοΐς  @εαινετου  τε 
του  ΎοΧμίδου,   ανδρός  μάντεως,   και   Έ,ύτΓομττίδου 

2  του  Ααϊμά'χ^ου,  ος  καΙ  εστpaτήyει^  έπειτα  οι  μεν 
ημίσεις  άπώκνησάν  πως  τον  κίνδυνον  μεyav 
ηyησάμεvoL,  ες  δε  άνδρας  διακόσιους  καΐ  είκοσι 
μάΧιστα    ενεμειναν    τη    εξόδ(ύ    εθεΧονταΙ    τρόπω 

3  τοίώδε.  κΧίμακας  εποιήσαντο  ϊσας  τω  τεί-χει 
των  ποΧεμιων  ζυνεμετρησαντο  δε  ταΐς  επιβοΧαΐς 
των  πΧινθων,  η  ετνχε.  προς  σφάς  ουκ  εξαΧη- 
Χιμμένον  το  τείχος  αυτών,  ηριθμοΰντο  δε  ποΧΧοϊ 
άμα    τας    επιβοΧας    και    εμεΧΧον     οι    μεν     τίνες 


3θ 


BOOK    III.  XIX.  i-xx.  3 

for  the  first  time  resorted  to  a  property  tax  ^  upon 
themselves  to  the  amount  of  two  hundred  talents, 
also  sent  to  the  allies  tAvelve  ships  under  the  com- 
mand of  Lysicles  and  four  others,  to  collect  money 
from  them.  He  cruised  about  and  collected  money 
at  various  places  ;  but  on  his  way  inland  from  Myus 
in  Caria  through  the  plain  of  the  Meander,  after  he 
had  reached  the  hill  of  Sandius,  he  was  attacked  by 
the  Carians  and  the  Anaeitans  and  slain,  together 
with  many  of  his  army. 

XX.  During  the  same  winter  the  Plataeans,  who 
were  still ^  being  besieged  by  the  Peloponnesians  and 
the  Boeotians,  began  to  be  distressed  by  failure  of 
their  supply  of  food,  and  since  there  was  no  hope  of 
aid  from  Athens  nor  any  other  means  of  safety  in 
sight,  they  and  the  Athenians  who  were  besieged 
with  them  planned  to  leave  the  city  and  climb  over 
the  enemy's  walls,  in  the  hope  that  they  might  be 
able  to  force  a  passage.  The  attempt  Avas  suggested 
to  them  by  Theaenetus  son  of  Tolmides,  a  soothsayer, 
and  Eupompidas  son  of  Daimachus,  who  was  one  of 
the  generals.  At  first  all  were  to  take  part,  but 
afterwards  half  of  them  somehow  lost  heart,  thinking 
the  risk  too  great,  and  only  about  two  hundred  and 
twenty  voluntarily  persisted  in  making  the  sortie, 
which  was  carried  out  in  the  following  way.  They 
made  ladders  equal  in  height  to  the  enemy's  wall, 
getting  the  measure  by  counting  the  layers  of  bricks 
at  a  point  where  the  enemy's  wall  on  the  side  facing 
Plataea  happened  not  to  have  been  plastered  over. 
Many  counted  the  layers  at  the  same  time,  and  while 

^  The  (σφορά  was  an  extraordinary  tax  levied  only  in  war 
time.     See  Boeckh,  Public  Economy,  p.  612. 
^  For  previous  discussion  of  this  siege,  see  il.  Lxxi.-lxxviii. 

31 


THUCYDIDES 

άμαρτησεσθαι,  οι  Be  ττΧβίους  τ€νξ€σθαί  Ύοΰ 
άΧηθονς  \ο^ισμοΰ,  οίλλω?  τε  καΧ  ττοΧλάκις 
άριθμούντ€<;  καϊ  άμα  ου  ττοΧυ  άττεχ^οντε'ί,  άΧΧα 
ραζίως  καθορωμενου  €9  δ  ββούΧοντο  τοΰ  τβίχονζ. 
4  την  μβν  ουν  ξνμμετρησιν  των  κΧιμάκων  οντω<ί 
βΧαβον  €Κ  τοΰ  πάχ^ου^  της  πΧίνθου  εΐκάσαντβς 
το  μέτρον. 

XXI.  Το  δε  ret^o?  ην  των  ΐΙεΧοττοννησίων 
TOLovSe  TTj  οΙκοΒομήσα.  eZ;^e  μεν  Βύο  τους  irept- 
βόΧονς,  ττρός  τ€  ΥΙΧαταιών  καϊ  €Ϊ  τις  έξωθεν  άττ 
'Αθηνών  εττίοί,  ζίεΐχ^ον  8ε  οι  ττερίβοΧοι  εκκαίΒεκα 

2  ττόΒας  μάΧιστα  απ  άΧΧήΧων.  το  ουν  μεταξύ 
τούτο  οι  εκκα'ώεκα  ττόδε?  ^  τοις  φύΧαξιν  οΙκήματα 
Βιανβνεμημένα  ωκοΒύμητο,  καϊ  ην  ζυνε'χτ}  -  ώστε 
6V  φαίνεσθαι  τεΐχ^ος  τταχύ   εττάΧξεις  έχον  άμφο- 

3  τερωθεν.  Βία  δέκα  δε  έττάΧξεων  ττΰρηοί  ήσαν 
με'^/άΧοί  καϊ  ΙσοττΧατεΐς  τω  τείχ^ει,  ζιηκοντες  ες 
τε  το  έσω  μετωττον  αυτού  οί  αύτοΙ  καϊ  το  εζω, 
ώστε  πάροΒον  μη   είναι,  τταρα    ττύρ^/ον,^  άΧΧα   δί 

4  αυτών  μέσων  Βιησαν.  τας  ουν  νύκτας,  όττότε 
-χειμών  εϊη  νοτερος,  τας  μεν  επάΧξεις  άττεΧειττον, 
εκ  δε  των  τΓΰρ<ηων  όντων  δί'  οΧί^ου  καϊ  άνωθεν 
στεγανών  την  φυΧακην  εττοιοΰντο.  το  μεν  ουν 
τείχος  ω  ττεριεφρουροΰντο  οί  Ώ,Χαταίής  τοιού- 
τον ην. 

XXII.  Οι  δ',  επεώη  τταρεσκεύαστο  αύτοΐς, 
τηρήσαντες  νύκτα  ■χ^ειμεριον  ΰΒατί  καϊ  άνεμω  και 
άμϋ  ασεΧηνον  εξησαν   ΐ]'γούντο   δε  οϊπερ   και  της 

^  οί  (κκαίζ(κα  iroSfs  deleted  by  van  Herwerden,  followed 
bj•  Hude. 

■■^  ξυνΐχη  \vith  all  MSS.  except  C,  which  Hude  follows. 
^  τταρα  xvpyov  deleted  by  Naber,  followed  by  Hude. 

32 


BOOK    III.  XX.  3-xxii.  i 

some  were  sure  to  make  a  mistake,  the  majority  were 
likely  to  hit  the  true  count,  especially  since  they 
counted  time  and  again,  and,  besides,  were  at  no  great 
distance,  and  the  part  of  the  wall  they  wished  to  see 
Λvas  easily  visible.  The  measurement  of  the  ladders, 
then,  they  got  at  in  this  way,  reckoning  the  measure 
from  the  thickness  of  the  bricks. 

XXI.  The  wall  of  the  Peloponnesians  was  built  in 
the  following  fashion.  It  had  two  encircling  lines, 
the  inner  looking  towards  Plataea,  the  outer  to  guard 
against  attack  from  the  direction  of  Athens,  and  the 
two  circuits  were  distant  about  sixteen  feet  from  one 
another.  This  interval  of  sixteen  feet  had  in  building 
been  divided  up  into  rooms  assigned  to  the  guards ; 
and  the  whole  structure  Avas  continuous,^  so  as  to 
appear  to  be  a  single  thick  wall  furnished  with  battle- 
ments on  both  sides.  And  at  every  tenth  battlement 
there  were  high  towers  of  the  same  width  as  the  wall, 
extending  both  to  the  inner  and  outer  faces  of  it,  so 
that  there  was  no  passage  left  at  the  sides  of  the 
towers,  but  the  guards  had  to  go  through  the  middle 
of  them.  Now  at  night  when  the  weather  was  rainy 
the  guards  left  the  battlements  and  kept  watch  from 
the  towers,  which  were  not  far  apart  and  were 
roofed  overhead.  Such,  then,  was  the  wall  by  which 
the  Plataeans  were  beleaguered. 

XXII.  After  the  Plataeans  had  finished  their 
preparations,  they  waited  for  a  night  that  was  stormy 
with  rain  and  wind  and  at  the  same  time  moonless, 
and  then  went  forth.     They  were  led  by  the  men 

'  i.e.  the  two  nepieoKot  were  joined  together  by  a  roof. 

33 


THUCYDIDES 

ττείρας  αίτιοι  ήσαν.  καΐ  πρώτϋν  μεν  την  ταφρον 
Βίέβησαν  η  ττβριβΐχεν  αυτούς,  έ'ττβίτα  ττροσβμβιξαν 
τω  τείχβι  των  ττοΧβμίων  Χαθόντες  τους  φυΧακας, 
άνα  το  σκοτβινον  μεν  ου  ττρο'ώόντων  αυτών,  ψοφώ 
δε  τω  €κ  του  ττροσιεναι  αυτούς  άντητατα~/ούντος 

2  του  άνεμου  ου  κατακουσάντων  αμα  Βε  καΐ  8ιε- 
'χοντες  ττοΧύ  fjaav,  ό'ττω?  τα  οττΧα  μη  κρουομενα 
προς  άΧληΧα  αϊσθησιν  τταρεχοι.  ήσαν  8ε  εύστα- 
Χεΐς  τε  τη  όπΧίσει  καΐ  τον  άριστερον  μόνον  ττόδα 
ύτΓοΒεΒεμενοι    άσφαΧείας     ένεκα     της     -προς     τον 

3  ττηΧόν.  κατά  ούν  μεταττύρ'^/ιον  ττροσέμισ'^ον  προς 
τάς  επάλξεις  ε18ότες  οτι  ερήαοί  είσι,  πρώτον  μεν 
οι  τάς  κ\ίμακας  φέροντες,  και  προσέθεσαν  έπειτα 
•yjnXol  8ώ8εκα  ζύν  ξιφιΒίω  και  θώρακι  ανεβαινον, 
ων  η'^είτο  ^Αμμέας  ό  Κοροίΐ3ου  καΐ  πρώτος  άνέβη, 
μετά  8ε  αύτον  οι  επόμενοι  εξ  εφ  εκάτερον  τών 
πύρ^οίν  ανεβαινον  έπειτα  ψιΧοι  άλλοι  μετά 
τούτους  ξύν  8ορατίοις  εγ^ώρουν,  οις  έτεροι  κατόπιν 
τας  άσπίύας  εφερον,  όπως  εκείνοι  ραον  προσβαι- 
νοιεί',  και  εμελΧον  8ώσειν  οπότε  προς  τοις  ποΧε- 

4  μίοις  είεν.  ώς  8ε  ανω  πΧειους  εΎενοντο,  ησθοντο 
οΐ  εκ  τών  πύργων  φύλακες'  κατέβαΧε  yap  τις  τών 
ΐΐλαταιών  αντιλαμβανόμενος   άπο   τών  επάλξεων 

5  κεραμίΒα,  η  πεσούσα  8οΰπον  εποίησεν.  και 
αντίκα  βοη  ην,  το  8ε  στρατόπεΒον  επΙ  το  τεΐχ^ος 
ώρμησεν  ου  yap  η8ει  ο  τι  ην  το  Βεινον  σκοτεινής 
νυκτός  καΐ  ■χειμώνος  οντος,  καΐ  άμα  οι  εν  τη  πόΧβι 
τών  ΐΙΧαταιών  υπ οΧεΧει μμενοι  εξελθόντες  προσε- 
βάλΧον  τω  τείχει  τών  Ώ.εΧοπονν7]σίων  εκ  τούμ- 

34 


BOOK    III.  XXII.  1-5 

who  were  the  authors  of  the  enterprise.  First  they 
crossed  the  ditch  which  surrounded  the  town,  then 
reached  the  foot  of  the  enemy's  wall  unobserved  by 
the  guards,  who  in  the  all-pervading  darkness  could 
not  see  ahead  and  could  not  hear  because  the  clatter 
of  the  Λvind  drowned  the  noise  of  their  approach  ; 
and,  besides,  they  kept  a  good  distance  apart  as  they 
advanced,  in  order  that  their  arms  might  not  rattle 
against  each  other  and  cause  detection.  And  they 
were  not  only  lightly  armed  but  also  had  only  the 
left  foot  sandalled,  for  security  against  slipping  in  the 
mud.  So  they  came  up  to  the  battlements  at  a  space 
between  two  towers,  knowing  that  the  battlements 
were  deserted.  First  came  the  men  with  the  ladders, 
who  set  them  against  the  wall ;  next  came  twelve 
light  armed  men,  Avith  dagger  and  corslet  only,  who 
mounted  the  ladders.  These  Λvere  led  by  Ammeas  son 
of  Coroebus,  who  was  the  first  to  ascend,  and  after 
him  his  followers  ascended,  six  men  going  against 
each  of  the  adjoining  towers.  Next  after  these  came 
other  light  troops  armed  with  short  spears,  their 
shields  being  borne  by  another  group  which  followed, 
that  the  former  might  advance  more  easily  ;  and 
their  shields  were  to  be  handed  them  when  they  were 
close  to  the  enemy.  Now  when  several  had  got  up, 
the  sentinels  on  the  towers  became  aware  of  their 
presence ;  for  one  of  the  Plataeans  in  laying  hold  of 
the  battlements  threw  down  a  tile,  which  fell  with  a 
thud.  And  immediately  there  was  an  outcry,  and 
the  garrison  rushed  to  the  wall ;  for  they  did  not 
knoΛv  what  the  danger  was,  as  the  night  Λvas  dark 
and  stormy,  and  at  the  same  time  the  Plataeans  who 
had  been  left  behind  in  the  toAvn  Λvent  out  and 
attacked  the  wall  of  the  Peloponnesians  on  the  side 

35 


THUCYDIDES 

τταΧιν    η    οΐ    ανΒρες    αυτών    υ'πζρββαινον,    οττως 

6  ηκιστα  προς  αυτούς  τον  νουν  βχοίβν.  βθορυβοΰντο 
μίν  ουν  κατά  -χ^ώραν  μένοντες,  βοηθείν  he  oxjhei^ 
€τό\μα  €κ   τη-;   εαυτών  φυΧακής,   αλλ'  iv  άπόρω 

7  ήσαν  είκάσαι  το  'γΐ'γνόμενον.  καϊ  οι  τριακόσιοι 
αυτών,  οίς  ετετακτο  τταραβοηθείν  el'  Tt  heoi, 
εχ^ώρουν    έξωθεν    του     τείγ^ους    προς     την    βοήν, 

8  φρυκτοί  τε  jjpovTo  ες  τ  ας  Θήβας  ποΧεμιοί'  παραν- 
ΐσ-χον  δέ  κα\  οΐ  εκ  της  ποΧεως  ΤΙΧαταιης  άπο 
του  τεί'χ^ους  φρυκτούς  ποΧΧούς  πρότερου  παρε- 
σκευασμενους  ες  αντο  τούτο,  όπως  ασαφή  τα 
σημεία  της  φυκτωρίας  τοις  ποΧεμιοις  rj  καϊ  μη 
βοηθοΐεν,  άΧΧο  τί  νομίσαντες  το  "^ιηνόμενον  ε^.ναι 
η  το  6ν,  πρ\ν  σφών  οι  άνδρες  οι  εζιόντες  Βια- 
φύ•γοιεν  καϊ  του  άσφαΧοΰς  άντιΧάβοιντο. 

XXIII.  Οί  δ'  υπερβαίνοντες  τών  ΐΙΧαταιών  εν 
τούτω,  ώς  ol  πρώτοι  αυτών  άνεβεβήκεσαν  καϊ 
του  πύργου  εκατερου  τους  φύΧακας  Βιαφθείραντες 
εκεκρατηκεσαν,  τάς  τε  ΒιόΒους  τών  πύρΎων 
ενστάντες  αύτοΙ  εφύΧασσον  μηΒενα  Sl"  αυτών 
επιβοηθείν,  καϊ  κλίμακας  προσθεντες  άττο  του 
τείχους  τοις  πύρ'^/οις  καϊ  επαναβιβάσαντες  ανΒρας 
πΧείους,  οί  μεν  άπο  τών  πύργων  τους  επιβοηθούν- 
τας  καϊ  κάτωθεν  καϊ  άνωθεν  είρ'^/ον  βάΧΧοντες, 
οί  δ'  εν  τούτω  οί  πΧείους  ποΧΧάς  προσθεντες 
κΧίμακας  άμα  καϊ  τάς  επάΧξεις  άπώσαντες  Βιά 
2  του  μεταπυρ'^/ίου  ύπερεβαινον.  ό  Βε  Βιακομιζό- 
μενος  αΐεϊ  ϊστατο  επϊ  του  'χείΧους  της  τάφρου 
36 


BOOK    III.  XXII.  5-xxiii.  2 

opposite  that  over  which  their  men  were  climbing, 
to  distract  attention  from  them  as  far  as  possible.  Now 
the  sentinels  remained  at  their  posts,  though  in  a 
state  of  excitement,  no  one  daring  to  leave  his  station 
and  lend  aid,  but  all  being  at  a  loss  to  conjecture 
what  was  going  on.  Furthermore,  the  three  hundred, 
who  had  been  appointed  to  bring  aid  wherever  it  was 
needed,  proceeded  outside  of  the  wall  in  the  direction 
of  the  outcry,  and  beacon  fires  indicating  danger 
from  the  enemy  were  flashed  towards  Thebes.  But  the 
Plataeans  in  the  town  at  the  same  time  raised  from 
their  wall  many  beacons,  which  had  been  prepared 
beforehand  for  this  very  purpose,  that  the  enemy's 
beacon  signals  might  be  rendered  unintelligible  and 
that  the  Thebans,  thinking  that  the  situation  was 
different  from  what  it  really  was,  might  defer  bring- 
ing aid  until  the  Plataeans  who  were  leaving  should 
have  made  good  their  escape  and  reached  safety. 

XXIII.  Meanwhile,  when  the  foremost  of  the 
Plataeans  who  were  scaling  the  walls  had  mounted, 
slain  the  guards,  and  got  possession  of  the  two  towers, 
they  themselves  took  position  inside  the  towers  and 
guarded  the  passageways,  that  no  one  might  come 
through  these  against  them.  Then  from  the  top  of 
the  wall  they  placed  ladders  against  the  towers, 
got  up  a  number  of  men,  and  kept  all  assailants 
away  from  the  towers,  shooting  at  them  from  below 
and  above.^  Meanwhile  the  others,  the  main  body, 
had  put  up  a  large  number  of  ladders  and  thrown 
down  the  battlements,  and  were  climbing  over 
through  the  space  between  the  towers.  And  as  each 
one  got  over  he  halted  on  the  edge  of  the  ditch  ;  and 

*  i.e.  from  the  tops  of  the  towers  and  from  the  wall  at 
their  base. 

37 


THUCYDIDES 

καϊ  ivTevOtv    βτόξ^νόν  re    και    ήκόντοζον,   e"    τί? 
Ίταραβοηθών   τταρά   το   τβΐχος   κωΧυτη^   yiyvoiro 

3  της  8ιαβάσ€ως.  evret  δε  ττάντβς  Βίζττεττβραίωντο, 
οι  άτΓο  των  irvpywv  χαλεττώ?  οι  TeKevraioL  κατα- 
βαίνοντας εγ^ωρουν  εττϊ  την  τάφρον,  καϊ  iv  τού- 
τω  οι   τριακόσιοι    αύτοΐς   έπεφβροντο    ΧαμΎτάΒας 

4  εχοΐ'τε?.  οι  μβν  ονν  ΙΙΧαταιής  εκείνους  εώρων 
μάΧλον  εκ  του  σκότους  εστώτε?  eVi.  του  ■χείΧους 
της  τάφρου,  και  ετόζευόν  τε  και  εσηκόντιζον  ες 
τα  ηυμνά,  αύτοΙ  Be  εν  τω  άφανεΐ  οντες  ησσον  8ιά 
τάς  ΧαμπάΒας  καθεωρωντο,  ώστε  φθάνουσι  των 
ΥίΧαταιων  και  οι  ύστατοι  Βιαβάντες  την  τάφρον, 

5  χαλεττως  δε  καϊ  βιαίως'  κρύσταΧΧός  τε  'yap 
εττεττηηει  ου  βέβαιος  εν  αύτη  ώστ  εττεΧθεΐν,  αλλ' 
οίο?  άττηΧιώτου  ?)  βορίου  ^  ύΒατώΒης  μάΧΧον,  καϊ 
η  νύξ  τοίούτω  άνεμω  υττονειφομενη  ττοΧυ  το  ΰ8ωρ 
εν  αύτη  εττεττοιηκει,  ο  μόΧις  ύττερέχ^οντες  εττεραιώ- 
θησαν.  iy ενετό  δε  κα\  η  Βιάφενξις  αύτοΐς  μάΧΧον 
δίά  του  χειμώνος  το  μέγεθος. 

XXIV.  Όρμησαντες  δε  αττο  Τϊ)ς  τάφρου  ο'ι 
ΤΙΧαταιης  εχώρουν  αθρόοι  την  ες  ('')ηβας  φερον- 
σαν  ahov  εν  8εξια  εχ^οντες  το  του  ΑνΒροκράτους 
ήργον,  νομίζοντες  ήκιστ  αν  σφάς  ταύτην  αυτούς 
ύτΓοτοττήσαί  τραττεσθαι  την  ες  τους  ττοΧεμίους• 
και  άμα  εώρων  τους  ΥΙεΧοττοννησίους  την  ττρος 
}ίιθαιρόη>α  καϊ  Αρυος  κεφαΧάς  την  ε'ττ  'Αθηνών 
2  φερουσαν  μετά  ΧαατταΒων  ζιωκοΐ'τας.  καϊ  ε'ττΐ 
μεν  εξ  η  επτά  σταΒιους  οι  ΤΙΧαταιής  την  εττι  τών 
@ηβών  εχ^ώρησαν,  εττειθ'  ύττοστρεψαντες  ήσαν 
την  ττρος  το  όρος  φερουσαν  όΒόν  ες  Ερυθράς  και 

^  fi  Bopeov,  deleted  by  Dobree,  followed  by  Hude.     Poppo 
■would  transpose  δΒατώδη!  μάχκοί',  or  bracket  ύδοτώδη». 

38 


BOOK    III.  ΧΧΙΠ.  2-xxiv.  2 

from  there  they  shot  arrows  and  hurled  javelins  at 
any  enemy  who  tried  to  approach  along  the  wall  and 
interfere  with  their  crossing.  And  when  all  these  had 
reached  the  other  side,  the  men  Λνΐιο  had  held  the 
towers,  the  last  of  whom  descended  with  difficulty, 
advanced  toΛvard  the  ditch  ;  and  at  the  same  time  the 
three  hundred  bore  down  upon  them,  carrying 
torches.  Now  the  Plataeans,  as  they  stood  on  the 
edge  of  the  ditch,  saw  them  better  out  of  the  dark- 
ness, and  kept  launching  arrows  and  javelins  at  their 
uncovered  sides,  \vhile  they  themselves,  being  in  the 
shadow,  Λvere  rendered  less  visible  by  the  enemy's 
torches.  Consequently  even  the  last  of  the  Plataeans 
got  safely  across  tlie  ditch,  though  only  with  difficulty 
and  after  a  hard  struggle ;  for  in  the  ditch  ice  had 
formed  that  was  not  firm  enough  to  walk  on  but 
mushy,  such  as  is  formed  when  the  wind  is  east 
instead  of  north  ;  and  since  the  night,  the  wind  being 
from  that  quarter,  Avas  somewhat  snowy,  the  water  in 
the  ditch  had  become  so  deep  that  they  could 
scarcely  keep  their  heads  above  it  as  they  crossed. 
It  was,  however,  chiefly  the  violence  of  the  storm 
that  enabled  them  to  escape  at  all. 

XXIV'.  Starting  from  the  ditch,  the  Plataeans 
advanced  in  a  body  along  the  road  toward  Thebes, 
having  on  their  right  the  shrine  of  the  hero  Andro- 
crates;  for  they  thought  that  no  one  would  ever  suspect 
them  of  having  taken  this  road,  which  led  towards 
their  enemies;  besides,  they  saw  the  Peloponnesians, 
torches  in  hand,  taking  in  pursuit  the  road  toward 
Cithaeron  and  Dryoscephalae,  Λvhich  is  the  road  to 
Athens.  And  for  six  or  seven  stadia  the  Plataeans 
proceeded  on  the  road  towai-d  Thebes,  then  turned 
and   followed    that   leading   towards    Erythrae    and 

39 


THUCYDIDES 

'Τσ/άς,  και  Χαβόμβνοι  των  ορών  Βιαφβύ'γουσιν  e<> 
τα?  ^Αθήνας,  auSpe<;  ΒώΒβκα  καΐ  Βιακοσιοι  άττο 
ττΧβιόνων  είσϊ  yap  rives  αύτων  οι  άττβτράτΓοντο 
is  την  ττόΧιν  ττρίν  υττΐρβαίνειν,  et?  δ'  eVt  rfj  βξω 

3  τάφρω  τοξότης  βΧηφθη.  οί  μ€ν  ουν  ΓΙελο- 
ττοννήσωι  κατά  'χώραν  iyevovTO  της  βοηθείας 
ττανσάμβνοί'  οί  δ'  €κ  της  ττόΧεως  ΤΙΧαταιής  των 
μεν  'γβ'^/ενημβνων  ειΒοτες  ούοέν,  των  Be  άποτραττο- 
μένο)ν  σφίσιν  άτταγ^ειΧάντων  ώς  ούΒεΙς  ττεριεστι, 
κήρυκα  έκ7Γ€μψαντ€ς,  eirel  ημέρα  eyevero,  εσττέν- 
hovTO  avaipeaiv  τοις  νεκροΐς,  μαθόντες  he  το 
άΧηθΙς  eiravaavTO.  οί  μεν  Βη  των  ΐίΧαταιών 
άνΒρες  οΰτω  ύττερβάντες  εσώθησαν. 

XXV.  Έλ:  δε  της  ΑακεΒαίμονος  τον  αυτοί)  χεί- 
αώνος  τεΧευτώντος  εκπέμπεται  Έ,άΧαιθος  ό  Αακε- 
Βαιμόνίος  ες  ^ΙυτιΧήνην  τριηρει.  καΐ  πΧεύσας  ες 
ΙΙύρραν  και  εξ  αύτης  ττεζη  κατά  'χαράΒραν  τινά, 
η  ύττερβατόν^  ην  το  ττεριτείχ^ισμα,  ΒιαΧαθων 
εσεργεται  ες  την  ΜυτιΧηνην,  καΐ  εX€yε  τοις 
ττροεΒροις  οτι  εσβοΧη  τε  άμα  ες  την  ^Αττικην 
εσται  και  αϊ  τεσσαρύκοντα  νήες  τταρεσονται 
ας  εΒει  βοηθήσαι  αύτοΐς,  ττροαττοπεμφθηναι  τ€ 
αύτος  τούτων  ένεκα  καΐ  άμα  των  άλΧων  επιμεΧη- 

2  σ 6 μένος,  και  οί  μεν  ^ΙυτιΧηναΐοι  εθάρσουν  τε 
καϊ  προς  τους  ^Αθηναίους  ησσον  είχον  την 
yvωμηv  ώστε  ξυμβαίιειν.  ο  τε  χειμων  ετεΧεύτα 
ούτος,  καϊ  τέταρτον  έτος  τω  ποΧεμω  ετεΧεύτα 
τάδε  ον  ^ουκυΒίΒης  ξυvεypa^p■εv. 

ΧΧΛ-^Ι.  ΤοΟ  δ'  επιyιyvoμevoυ  θέρους  οί  Πελο- 
ποννησιοι    επειδή    τάς    ες  την  Μ.υτίΧ7ίνην^   τεσ- 

*  Van  Herwerden  suggests  ΰποβατόν,  followed  by  Hude. 

*  δύο  κάΙ  of  the  MSS.  before  τίσσσ.ρι'.κοντα  suspected  by 
Kriiger  and  deleted  by  van  Herwerden. 

40 


BOOK    III.  XXIV,  2-xxvi.  i 

Hysiae,  and  reaching  the  mountains  escaped  to 
Athens.  They  Λvere  only  two  hundred  and  twelve 
men  out  of  a  larger  number ;  for  some  had  turned 
back  to  the  town  without  trying  to  climb  the  wall, 
and  one  man,  an  archer,  had  been  taken  at  the  outer 
ditch.  The  Peloponnesians,  then,  desisted  from  the 
pursuit  and  returned  to  their  post.  But  the  Plataeans 
in  the  town,  knowing  nothing  of  what  had  really 
happened,  but  informed  by  those  who  had  turned 
back  that  no  one  survived,  sent  a  herald  at  daybreak 
and  asked  for  a  truce  that  they  might  take  up  their 
dead  ;  on  learning  the  truth  however,  they  desisted. 
So  these  Plataeans  got  over  the  wall  in  the  manner 
described  and  reached  safety.^ 

XXV,  Toward  the  close  of  the  same  winter,  Salae- 
thus  the  Lacedaemonian  was  sent  in  a  trireme  from 
Lacedaemon  to  Mytilene.  Landing  at  Pyrrha  and 
proceeding  thence  on  foot,  he  followed  the  bed  of  a 
ravine,  where  the  circuit-Avall  could  be  crossed,  and 
came  undetected  into  Mytilene.  He  told  the  magis- 
trates that  there  would  be  an  invasion  of  Attica 
and  that  simultaneously  the  forty  ships  ^  which  were 
to  come  to  their  aid  would  arrive,  adding  that  he 
himself  had  been  sent  ahead  to  make  these  announce- 
ments and  also  to  take  charge  of  matters  in  general. 
Accordingly  the  Mvtilenaeans  were  encouraged  and 
were  less  inclined  than  ever  to  make  terms  with  the 
Athenians.  So  this  winter  ended,  and  with  it  the 
fourth  year  of  this  war  of  which  Thucydides  Avrote 
the  history. 

XXVL  During  the  following  summer  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  first  despatched  the  forty  ships  which  they 

1  For  the  fate  of  the  city  and  of  the  Plataeans  who  re- 
mained in  it,  see  chs.  lii.-lxviii. 
"^  cf.  oh.  xvi,  3. 

4Ϊ 


THUCYDIDES 

σαράκοντα  ι/αΟ?  άττβστβίΧαν  άρχοντα  ^ΑΧκίΒαν, 
δς  ην  αύτοΐς  ναύαρ)(^ος,  ττροστάξαντε'ί,  αυτοί  €9 
την  ^ Κττικην  και  οι  ξύμμαχοί  βσββαΧον,  6τΓω<; 
οί  ^Αθηναία  άμφοτέρωθβν  θορυβούμβνοί  ησσον 
τα?9    ναυσίν  69    την    Μυτιλτ^μϊ^ΐ'    καταττΧβουσαις 

2  Ιττιβοηθησωσιν.  ψ/€Ϊτο  Be  της  βσβοΧής  ταύτης 
ΚΧ€ομ€ΐ>ης  ύπβρ  ΤΙαυσανίου  του  ΐΙΧείστοανακτος 
υίζος  βασιΧ^ως   οντάς  καΐ    νεωτβρου  €τι,   πατρός 

3  Βη  ά8€Χφος  ων.  βΒιρωσαν  δε  τλ}9  Άττί/ίΓ;9  τά 
τ€  πρότερον  τετμημενα,^  ei  τι  εβββΧαστήκβι, 
και  όσα  ev  ταΐς  ττρίν  βσβοΧαΐς  παρεΧύΧεηττο• 
και    ή    βσβοΧη    αύτη    γ^αΧβττωτάτη    ey ενετό    τοις 

4  ^ Αθηναίοις  μετά  την  Βευτεραν.  επιμένοντες  yap 
αιει  άπο  της  Αεσβου  τι  πεύσεσθαι  των  νεών 
ερ'γον  ώς  ήΒη  πεπεραιωμενων  έπεζηΧθον  τα  ποΧΧα 
τέμνοντες.  ως  δ'  ουΒεν  άπεβαινεν  αύτοΐς  ων 
προσεΒέχ^οντο  καΐ  επεΧεΧοιπει  ο  σίτος,  άνε'χω- 
ρησαν  και  ΒιεΧνθησαν  κατά  ποΧεις. 

XXVII.  Οί  Βε  ^ΙυτιΧηναιοι  εν  τούτω,  ως  α'ί  τε 
νηες  αύτοΐς  ού)^  ήκον  άπο  της  Π.εΧοποννΐ]σ-ου,  άΧΧα 
ενε'χρόΐ'ΐζον,  και  ο  σίτος  επεΧεΧοιπει,  άνα^γκά- 
2  ζονται  ξυμβαίνειν  προς  τους  Αθηναίους  Βια  τάδε. 
ό  Έ,άΧαιθος  και  αύτος  ου  προσΒεχόμενος  ετι  τάς 
ναύς  όπΧ'ιζει  τον  Βημον  προτερον  -ψιΧον  οντά  ώς 
1  και  of  the  MSS.  before  ft  τι  deleted  by  Dindorf. 

*  cf.  II.  Ivii.  2. 

^  It   is   implied  that   the   Lacedaemonians    planned    this 
summer,  as  on  previous  invasions,  to  ravage  certain  districts 

42 


BOOK    III.   XXVI.  i-xxvii.  2 

had  promised  to  Mytilene,  appointing  in  command  of 
them  Alcidas,  who  was  the  Lacedaemonian  admiral, 
and  then  invaded  Attica,  themselves  and  their  allies, 
in  order  that  the  Athenians,  threatened  on  both  sea 
and  land,  might  be  deterred  from  sending  a  force  to 
attack  the  fleet  that  was  on  its  way  to  Mytilene. 
The  leader  of  this  invasion  was  Cleomenes,  regent  for 
his  nephcAv  Pausanias  son  of  Pleistoanax,  who  was 
king  but  still  a  minor.  And  they  ravaged  the  parts 
of  Attica  that  had  been  laid  waste  before,  wherever 
any  new  growth  had  sprung  up,  as  well  as  those  that 
had  been  left  untouched  in  the  former  invasions. 
And  this  invasion  proved  more  grievous  to  the 
Athenians  than  any  except  the  second  ;  ^  for  the 
enemy,  who  were  momentarily  expecting  to  hear 
from  Lesbos  of  some  achievement  of  their  fleet, 
which  they  supposed  had  already  got  across,  went 
on  and  on,  ravaging  most  of  the  country.  But  when 
they  found  that  nothing  turned  out  as  they  ex- 
pected and  their  food  was  exhausted,  they  withdrew 
and  dispersed  to  their  several  cities.^ 

XXV'IL  Meanwhile  the  Mytilenaeans,  seeing  that 
the  fleet  had  not  arrived  from  the  Peloponnesus  but 
was  loitering  on  the  way,  and  that  their  food  was 
exhausted,  were  compelled  to  make  terms  with  the 
Athenians  by  the  following  circumstances.  Salaethus, 
who  himself  no  longer  expected  the  fleet  to  come, 
equipped  the  commons  with  heavy  armour,^  instead 
of  their  former  light  arms,  intending  to  attack  the 

and  then,  after  hearing  of  the  success  of  the  fleet  at  Lesbos, 
to  withdraw.  But  they  were  kept  in  Attica  longer  than  they 
had  intended  by  the  delay  on  the  part  of  the  fleet. 

^  With  .shield  and  spears  and  breast-plate.  The  light- 
armed  troops  wore  no  defensive  armour  and  carried  spear 
or  bow. 

43 


THUCYDIDES 

3  €ΤΓ€ξίων  τοις  *Αθηραίοις'  οι  δε  βττβιΒη  €\αβον 
οπΧα,  ούτε  ηκροώντο  βτι  των  αρχόντων,  κατά 
Ι-υλλόγοι^ς  re  'γΐ'γνόμβνοι  ή  τον  σΐτον  eKeXevov 
τους  Βυνατού<ϊ  φέρβιν  e?  το  φανερον  καϊ  Ζιανίμειν 
αττασιν,  ή  αυτοί  ξυ'γχωρήσαντες  ττρος  Αθήναιον; 
βφασαν  τταραΒώσβιν  την  ττόΧιν.  XXVIII.  <yvovT€<i 
he  οΐ  iv  τοις  7Γpάyμaσιv  ούτ  άττοκωΧύειν  Βυνατοι 
δντ€ς,  €Ϊ  τ  άττομονωθήσονται  της  ξυμβάσεως,  κιν- 
Βυνβύσοντες,  ττοιοΰνται  κοινή  ομοΧο'γίαν  προς  re 
ΤΙάχητα  καϊ  το  στρατόττεδον,  ώστ€  ^Αθηναυοις 
μβν  e^eivat  βου^βΰσαι  irepX  ^ϊντίΚηναυων  οττοΐον 
αν  τί  βούΧωνται  καϊ  την  στρατιαν  ες  την  ττοΧίν 
Βεχεσθαι  αυτούς,  ττρεσβείαν  δε  άττοστίΧλειν  ες 
τας  ^Αθήνας  Μυτιληναίους  ττερί  εαυτών  εν  οσω 
δ'  αν  ττάΧιν  εΧθωσι,  Ώάχητα  μήτε  δησαι 
ΜυτιΧηναίων    μηδενα    μη8ε     άνδραττοΒίσαι    μήτε 

2  άτΓοκτεΐναι.  ή  μεν  ξύμβασις  αύτη  ε'γένετο.  οι 
δε  Ίτράξαντες  προς  τους  ΑακεΒαιμονιους  μαΧιστα 
των  ΜυτιΧηναίων  ττεριδεεΐς  όντες,  ώς  ή  στρατιά 
εσήΧθεν,  ουκ  ήνεσχοντο,  άΧΧ  εττΐ  τους  βωμούς 
όμως  καθίζονσιν  ΤΙάχης  δ'  άναστήσας  αυτούς 
ώστε  μή  άΒικήσαι,  κατατίθεται  ες  ΎενεΒον  μέχρι 

3  ου  τοις  ^ Αθηναίο ις  τι  Βόξη.  πεμψας  δε  καϊ  ες 
την  Άντισσαν  τριήρεις  ττροσεκτήσατο  καϊ  τάΧΧα 
τα  ττερί  το  στρατόπεΒον  καθίστατο  η  αυτω  εΒοκει. 

XXIX.  Οι  δ'  εν  ταΐς  τεσσαράκοντα  ναυσΐ 
ΐΙεΧοτΓοννήσιοι,  ους  εδεί  εν  τύχει  τΓαρα-γενεσθαι, 
ττΧεοντες  ττερί  τε  αυτήν  τήι>  ΐΙεΧοπόννησον  ενΒιε- 

44 


BOOK    III.  xxvii.  2-xxix.  i 

Athenians ;  but  the  commons,  as  soon  as  they 
had  got  arms,  would  no  longer  obey  their  com- 
manders, but  gathered  in  groups  and  ordered  the 
aristocrats  to  bring  out  whatever  food  there  was  and 
distribute  it  to  all ;  otherwise,  they  said,  they  would 
come  to  terms  with  the  Atlienians  independently  and 
deliver  up  the  city.  XXVIII.  Thereupon  the  men  in 
authority,  realizing  that  they  could  not  prevent  this 
and  that  they  would  be  in  peril  if  excluded  from  the 
capitulation,  joined  the  commons  in  making  an  agree- 
ment with  Paches  and  his  army.  The  conditions 
Avere  that  the  Athenian  state  should  have  the  power 
to  decide  as  they  pleased  about  the  fate  of  the  My- 
tileneans  and  that  the  besieging  army  should  be 
admitted  into  the  city  ;  but  it  was  conceded  that 
the  Mytilenaeans  might  send  an  embassy  to  Athens 
to  treat  for  terms,  Paches,  meanwhile,  until  the  return 
of  the  embassy,  agreeing  not  to  imprison  or  enslave 
or  ])ut  to  death  any  Mytilenaean.  Such  was  the  agree- 
ment. But  those  of  the  Mytilenaeans  who  had  been 
most  involved  in  the  intrigue  with  the  Lacedae- 
monians were  in  great  terror  when  the  army  entered 
the  town,  and  could  not  keep  quiet,  but  notwith- 
standing the  agreement  took  refuge  at  the  altars. 
Paches,  however,  induced  them  to  leave  the  altars, 
promising  to  do  them  no  injury,  and  placed  them  for 
safe  keeping  in  Tenedos  until  the  Athenians  should 
reach  a  decision.  He  also  sent  triremes  to  Antissa 
and  took  possession  of  it,  and  made  such  other  dis- 
jiositions  with  reference  to  the  army  as  seemed  best 
to  him. 

XXIX.  Meanwhile  the  Peloponnesians  in  the 
forty  ships,  who  ought  to  have  arrived  sjieedily  at 
Mytilene,  wasted  time  on  their   voyage  round  the 

45 


THUCYDIDES 

τρίψαν  καϊ  κατά  τον  αΧλον  ττΧοΰν  σ'χ^οΧαιοι  κο- 
μισθέντα  τους  μεν  €κ  της  ττόλεω?  ^Αθηναίους 
Χανθάνονσι,  ττρϊν  Βη  ττ)  Δ?;λω  βσχον,  ττροσμευ- 
ξαντες  Se  αττ  αυτής  ττ}  ^Ικάρω  καϊ  Μυκονω  ττνν- 
2  θάνονται  ττρωτον  οτι  ή  ^'ίυτιΚηνη  εάΧωκεν.  βου- 
Χόμενοι  he  το  σαφές  elhevai  κατεττΧενσαν  ες 
"Εμβατον  της  ^Ερυθραίας'  ημεραί  he  μάΧιστα 
ήσαν  ττ)  Μ.υτίΧηνί}  εαΧωκυια  ετττα  ore  ες  το 
"Εμβατον  κατεττΧευσαν.  ττυθόμενοι  he  το  σαφές 
εβουΧενοντο  εκ  των  τταρόντων  καϊ  εΧεζεν  αυτοΐς 
ΎευτίαττΧος  άνηρ  ^ΗΧεΐος  τάhε. 

XXX.  "  WXKiha  καϊ  ΐΙεΧοττοννησ ίων  όσοι  ττάρ- 
εσμεν  άρχοντες  της  στρατιάς,  εμοϊ  hoκεΐ  ττΧεΐν 
ημάς  εττϊ    \ΙντιΧηνην   ττρϊν  εκττνστους   γενέσθαι, 

2  ώσπερ  εχ^ομεν.  κατά,  yap  το  είκος  avhpcov  rewart 
ΊτόΧιν  ε'χ^όντων  ποΧύ  το  άφύΧακτον  ευρησομεν, 
κατά  μεν  θάΧασσαν  καϊ  ττάνυ,  η  εκείνοι,  τε  ανεΧ- 
•πιστοί  εττί'γενεσθαι  αν  τίνα  σφίσι  ττοΧεμιον  καϊ 
ημών  η  άΧκη  τνγχ^άνεί  μάΧιστα  ούσα'  είκος  he  και 
το  ττεζον  αυτών  κατ  οΙκίας  άμεΧεστερον  ώς  κεκρα- 

3  τηκότων  hιeσ'πάpθaι.  el  ουν  ττροσττεσοιμεν  άφνω 
τε  καϊ  νυκτός,  ελπίζω  μετά  των  'ivhov,  εϊ  τις  άρα 
ημΐν   εστίν   υττόΧοιττος   εννους,  καταΧηφθήναι   αν 

4  τά  7Γ pay ματα.  καΐ  μη  άττοκνησωμεν  τον  κίνΒννον, 
νομίσαντες  ουκ  ά\Χο  τι  είναι  το  καινον  του 
ττοΧεμου  η  το   τοιοϋτον   ο  εϊ  τις  στρατηγός  εν  τε 


40 


BOOK    III.  xxix.  i-xxx.  4 

Peloponnesus  and  on  the  rest  of  the  way  proceeded 
leisurely.  They  were  unobserved  by  the  Athenian 
home  fleet  until  they  reached  Delos ;  but  when  after 
leaving  Delos  they  touched  at  Icaros  and  Myconos 
they  received  the  first  tidings  that  Mytilene  had  been 
taken.  Wishing  however  to  ΙνηοΛν  the  exact  situation 
they  sailed  to  Embatum  in  Erythraea ;  and  it  was 
about  seven  days  after  the  capture  of  Mytilene  that 
they  came  to  Embatum.  Now  that  they  had  learned 
the  truth,  they  took  counsel  in  view  of  the  present 
emergency,  and  Teutiaplus,  an  Elean,  spoke  to  them 
as  follows : 

XXX.  "  Alcidas,  and  you  who,  like  myself,  are 
present  here  as  commanders  of  the  Peloponnesian 
forces,  it  seems  to  me  that  we  should  sail  to  Mytilene 
before  our  approach  becomes  known,  without  a 
moment's  delay.  For  in  all  probability  we  shall  find 
that  men  who  have  but  lately  come  into  possession 
of  a  city  are  very  much  off"  their  guard.  At  sea, 
indeed,  they  will  be  altogether  so,  where  they  have 
no  expectation  of  any  possible  hostile  attack  and 
our  role  is  chiefly  to  act  on  the  defensive  ;  ^  and  on 
land  also  their  forces  are  probably  scattered  among 
the  houses  all  the  more  carelessly  because  they  be- 
lieve that  they  are  victors.  If,  then,  we  should  fall 
upon  them  suddenly  and  at  night,  I  believe  that, 
in  concert  with  our  supporters  inside,  if  any  are  left, 
we  should  find  ourselves  masters  of  the  situation. 
And  let  us  not  shrink  from  the  danger,  remembering 
that  the  element  of  surprise  in  warfare  is  precisely 
of  this  nature.'  And  if  a  general  guards  against 
such   surprises   in   his  own   case,   and,  whenever  he 

^  Or,  "  while  on  our  side  it  is  just  here  that  our  strength 
lies."  ^  i.e.  dangerous. 

47 


THUCYDIDES 

αύτω    φνΧάσσοιτο     και    roc<i    7Γθ\€μίοι<;     ivopa>v 
ΐττίχβιροίη,  ττΧζίστ  αν  ορθοΐτο." 

XXXI.  Ό  μβν  τοσαΰτα  βίττων  ουκ  βττβιθβ  τον 
Α\κί8αν.  aWoL  Be  τίνες  των  άττ  Ίωΐ'ΐα?  φν^άΒων 

και  οι  Αέσβιοι  οί^  ξνμτΓΧύοντες  τταρ^νουν,  €7Τ€ί8η 
τούτον  τον  κίνΒυνον  φοβ€Ϊται,  των  ev  ^Ιωνία  ττόλ- 
εων  καταΧαβεΐν  τίνα  η  Κ.νμην  την  ΑΙοΧίΒα,  οττως 
€κ  ΤΓολεω?  ορμώμενοι  την  ^Ιωνίαν  άττοστήσωσιν 
(ελττ/δα  δ'  είναί'  ovSevl  yap  άκονσίω<;  άφΐχ^θαι), 
και  την  ττρόσοΒον  ταύτην  με'γίστην  ονσαν 
Αθηναίων  'ίν  υφεΚωσι  και  άμα,  ην  εφορμωσι 
σφίσιν,  αύτοΐς  Βαττάνη  yί'γvητat^^  ττείσειν  τ  ε 
2  οϊεσθαι  καΐ  Τίισσούθνην  ώστε  ξνμποΧεμεΐν.  ό 
δέ  ού8ε  ταύτα  ενεΒεχ^ετο,  αλλά  το  ττλεΐστον  της 
ηνώμης  εΙχ€ν,  εττεώη  της  ΜντιΧηνης  νστερηκει, 
ΟΤΙ  τάχιστα  τη  ΤΙεΧθ7Γονν)ίσω  ττάΧιν  -προσμεΐξαι. 

XXXII.  "Αράς  δβ  εκ  τού  'Κμβάτου  τταρεττΧει, 
καϊ  ττροσσχ^ων  ^Ιυοννησω  τη  Ύηιων  τους  αιγ^μα- 
Χώτους  ους  κατά  ττΧούν  ζΐΧηφει  άττεσφαξε   τους 

*  οΐ  before  ξυμπΚ(οντ($  added  by  Madvig,  followed  by 
Hude. 

^  Kol  τί)ί'  Ίτρόσο^ον  .  .  .  yiyvriTai.  The  first  part  of  this 
vexed  passage  is  in  accord  with  the  essentially  unanimous 
tradition  of  tiie  MSS.,  except  that  Dobree's  conjecture,  ΐν' 
ΰφ€Κωσι,  is  substituted  for  ijv  ΰφίλωσι.  The  second  part 
(«αϊ  αμα  .  .  .  ylyvητai)  is  in  agreement  with  van  Herwerden 
and  Muller-Striibing,  Thuk.  Forsch.,  p.  97,  after  Codex  Μ 
and  a  Schol.  (rb  σφίσιν  ainots  ουχ  αμα,  avayyceffreoi',  άλλα 
SiaipfTfof,  κα\  κατά  rh  σφίσιν  ΰτιοστικτίον).  Most  MSS.  have 
(φορμίΐισι  αυτοϊί  (or  aliTohs)  δαπάνη  σφ'ισι  ylyv7)Tai  (Β  yiyvtrai)  ; 
G  ^φορμίσιν  avTols  σφίσι  Sa-πάνη  yiyvqTai.  Dobree's  conjec- 
ture {"ίνα)  not  only  gives  a  good  construction  for  ΰφ4λωσι — 

48 


BOOK    III.  XXX.  4-XXX11.  I 

sees  an  opportunity  to  employ  them  in  the  case  of 
the  enemy,  makes  the  attempt,  he  will  win  the 
greatest  success." 

XXXI.  Thus  he  spoke,  but  could  not  win  Alcidas 
to  his  plan.  Then  some  others,  exiles  from  Ionia, 
and  the  Lesbians  ^  who  were  with  the  fleet,  advised 
him,  since  he  feared  the  risk  of  this  enterprise,  to 
seize  one  of  the  cities  in  Ionia,  or  Cyme  in  Aeolia,  in 
order  that  they  mij^ht  have  a  city  as  their  base  and 
bring  Ionia  to  revolt  (and  that  there  was  a  prospect 
of  success,  seeing  that  everyone  welcomed  his  coming) 
and  might  thus  steal  from  the  Athenians  this  the 
greatest  source  of  their  revenue,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  Athenians  might  be  put  to  expense,  in  case 
they  should  attempt  to  blockade  their  base.  They 
thought,  moreover,  that  they  could  persuade  Pis- 
suthnes  to  join  them  in  the  war.  Alcidas,  however, 
would  not  accept  these  proposals,  either,  but  his 
chief  concern,  now  that  he  was  too  late  for  Mytilene, 
was  to  get  back  to  Peloponnesus  as  quickly  as 
possible. 

XXXII.  So  he  set  sail  from  Embatum  and  skirted 
the  coast ;  and  putting  in  at  Myonnesus  in  the 
country  of  the  Tcians  he  butchered  most  of  the 
captives  Λvhom  he  had  taken  on  the  voyage.     Then 

^  The  vpfff&fis  of  chs.  iv.,  v. 

without  altering  the  essential  meaning  of  the  sentence — but 
obviates  the  necessity  of  making  -γίγνηται  dependent  on  Hirois, 
which  is  loo  far  off  and  separated  from  it  by  too  many 
subordinate  clauses.  If  ίιν  ΰφίΚωσι  be  retained,  with  most 
editors,  the  sense  would  be:  "and  if  they  could  steal 
from  the  Athenians  this  the  greatest  source  of  their 
revenue,  these  might  also  at  the  same  time,  in  case  they 
should  blockade  them  [the  Peloponnesians],  be  put  to 
expense." 

49 


THUCYDIDES 

2  ΤΓολλου?.  καΙ  e?  την  "Έφβσον  καθορμισαμβνου 
αυτοί)  %αμίων  των  βξ  ^Αναυων  αφικόμ€ΐΌί  ττρεσ- 
βεΐ'ζ  eXejov  ου  καΧως  την  Ελλάδα.  ίΧβυθβροΰν 
αυτόν,  el  avBpa<i  ΒιβφΟβιρεν  ούτε  'χί.Ιρα^;  άνταιρο- 
μά'ους  ούτε  ■πο\εμίου<ί,  ^ λθηναίων  he  ύττο  άνά'γκη'ζ 
ξυμμάχ^ους•  εΐ  re  μη  τταύσεται,  οΧίΎους  μεν  αυτόν 
των    εχ^θρών    €9    φι\ίαν    ττροσάξεσθαι,    ιτοΧύ    δε 

3  ττΧείους  των  φίΧων  ποΧεμίους  εξειν.  καϊ  ο  μεν 
εττείσθη  τ€  καϊ  Ύ^ίων  άνδρας  όσους  et^ei/  έτί 
άφήκε  καΐ  των  αΧΧων  τινάς•  ορωντες  yap  τας 
ναΰς  οι  άνθρωττοι  ουκ  εφευ'^/ον,  άΧΧα  ττροσεγ^ωρουν 
μάΧΧον  ώ?  ΆττίΛτα??  καϊ  εΧπίΒα  ούΒε  την 
εΧαχίστην  είχον  μη  ττοτε  ^Αθηναίων  της 
θαΧάσσης  κρατούντων  ναύς  ΤΙεΧοττοννησίων  ες 
^ϊωνίαν  ιταραβαΧεΙν, 

XXXIII.  ΆτΓο  he  ττ/ς'Εφβσου  ό  ^ΑΧκίΒας  εττΧει 
κατά  τάχος  και  φυ^ην  εποιεΐτο•  ώφθη  yap  ύττο  της 
ΧαΧαμινίας  καϊ  ΐΙαράΧου  έ'τί  ττερϊ  ΐίΧάρον  ορμών 
(αϊ  δ'  αττ'  ^Αθηνών  ετυχον  ττΧεουσαι),  καϊ  δβδίώ? 
την  Βίωξιν  εττΧεί  8ια  του  ττεΧά^ους  ως  yfj  εκούσιος 
2  ου  σχήσων  αΧΧη  η  Πeλo7ΓO^τ^y'σω.  τω  δε  Ήάχητι 
καϊ  τοις  ^Αθηναίοις  ήΧθε  μεν  καϊ  άττο  της 
^Έιρυθραίας  α^^εΧία,  άφικνείτο  δε  καϊ  ττανταχόθεν 
ατείχιστου  yap   ούσης   της  ^Ιωνίας  μεya  το  δεο9 


'  These  were  probably  the  Samians  who  settled  at  Anaea, 
on  the  coast  opposite  the  island,  after  the  overthrow  of 
Samos  in  439  B.C.  (c/.  i.  cxvii.  3).  They  are  referred  to  in 
ch.  xix.  2  as  "  Anaeitans." 

50 


BOOK    III.  xxxii.  i-xxxiii.  2 

he  anchored  at  Ephesus,  where  he  was  visited  by 
envoys  of  the  Samians  who  were  settled  at  Anaea,i 
who  said  that  it  was  an  ill  way  he  had  of  freeing 
Hellas,  to  destroy  men  who  were  not  lifting  their 
hands  against  him  and  Avere  not  enemies,  but  were 
merely  allies  of  the  Athenians  under  compulsion  ; 
and  unless  he  abandoned  this  course  he  would  win 
few  enemies  over  into  friendship  and  would  turn 
far  more  friends  into  enemies.  Alcidas  \vas  per- 
suaded, and  set  free  all  the  Chians  whom  he  still 
held  and  some  of  the  others.  It  should  be  ex- 
plained that  the  people  of  the  coast,'^  when  they 
saw  the  Peloponnesian  ships,  made  no  attempt  to  flee, 
but  came  near,  supposing  that  they  were  Athenian 
ships  ;  and  they  had  not  the  slightest  expectation 
that  while  the  Athenians  dominated  the  sea  the 
Peloponnesian  fleet  Avould  ever  venture  over  to  Ionia. 
XXXI II.  From  Ephesus  Alcidas  sailed  in  haste 
and  took  to  flight ;  for  Λνΐιϋβ  still  at  anchor  near 
Clarus^  he  had  been  sighted  by  the  Salaminia  and 
Paralus,•*  which  happened  to  be  on  a  voyage  from 
Athens,  and  in  fear  of  pursuit  he  sailed  through  the 
open  sea,  determined  that  he  would  not,  unless 
obliged  to  do  so,  i)ut  into  land  anywhere  except  in 
the  Peloponnesus.  Reports  of  him  had  been  brought 
from  Erythraea  to  Paches  and  the  Athenians,  and 
ηοΛν  kept  coming  from  all  quarters.  For  since  Ionia 
was  unfortified,  a  great  alarm  arose  everywhere  lest 

'  i.e.  the  Greeks  of  whom  Alcidas  had  taken  so  many 
prisoners. 

'  i.e.  while  on  his  way  from  Embatum  to  Ephesus. 

*  The  two  swift  Athenian  state  triremes  kept  always 
manned  ready  for  extraordinary  service.  Alcidas  knew  that 
these  two  boats  would  notify  the  main  Athenian  fleet  under 
Paches  of  his  whereabouts,  and  that  Paches  would  make 
pursuit. 

51 


THUCYDIDES 

eyevcTO  μη  7rapa7r\eovTe<;  ol  ΐΙεΧοττοννησιοι,  el 
KOL  ως  μη  Βιβνοονντο  μενβιν,  ττορθώσιν  άμα 
ττροσττίτΓτοί'Τβ?  τά?  ττόλεί?.  avrayyeXoi  δ'  αυτόν 
ΙΒοΰσαί     ev    τη     Κ.Χάρω    η    τε     ΥΙάραΧος    καΐ    η 

3  Έ,αΧαμινία  βφρασαν.  6  δε  ύττο  σττονΒής  iiroLelro 
την  Βιωξίν  καΐ  μ^χρί  μβν  ΐΐάτμου  της  νήσου 
eirehiw^ev,  ώ?  δ'  ούκέτι  ev  καταΧήψβι  βφαίνετο, 
έπανβ-χ^ώρςι.  κερΒος  δε  €νόμισ€ν,  ίττειΒη  ου 
μετεώροις  ττεριετυχεν,  οτί  ούΒαμοϋ  εγ/ίαταλ?;- 
φθβΐσαι  ηνα'^/κάσθησαν  στρατοττεΒον  τ€  ττοιεΐσθαι 
καΐ  φυΧακην  σφίσί  και,  εφορμησιν  τταρασχ^ειν. 

XXXIV.  ΐΙαραττΧεων  δε  ττάλιν  €σχ^€  και  ε'?  Νό- 
τιον  το  Κ.οΧοφωνίωΐ',  ου  κατωκηντο  Κ.οΧοφώριοί 
της  άνω  ττόΧβως  εαΧωκυιας  ύττο  ^Ιταμάνους  και  των 
βαρβάρων  κατά  στάσυν  Ihia  ετταχθεντων  εαλω 
δε   μάλιστα   αύτη  ό'τε  /}   δειτε'ρα  ΐΙεΧοποννησίων 

2  εσβοΧη  ες  την  Άττικην  iyiyveTO.  εν  ουν  τω 
Νοτίω  οι  κaτaφυyovτeς  καΐ  κατοικήσαντες  αυτόθι 
αύθις  στασιάσαντες,  οι  μεν  τταρά  ΐΐισσούθνου 
εττικούρους  ^ΧρκάΒων  τε  καΙ  των  βαρβάρων 
ε^τayayόμεvoL  εν  Βιατειγισματι  ^^ιχον  {καΐ  των 
εκ  της  άνω  ττόΧεως  }ίοΧοφωνίων  οι  μηΒίσαντες 
ξυνεσεΧθόντες  εττοΧίτευον),  οι  δε  ύττεξεΧθόντες 
τούτους  και  οντες  φυyά8eς  τον  ΥΙάχητα  eTrayovTai. 


^  i.e.  since  they  were  only  cruising. 

*  Such  a  blockade  Λνοιιΐοΐ  not  only  have  been  costly,  but 
would  also  have  kept  the  fleet  from  carrying  on  its  work  at 
Lesbos. 

52 


BOOK    III.  XXXIII.  z-xxxiv.   2 

the  Peloponnesians,  ΛνΗϊΙε  following  the  coast — even 
if,  under  the  circumstances,^  they  had  no  intention  of 
remaining — might  in  passing  fall  upon  their  cities 
and  plunder  them.  And  finally  the  Paralus  and  the 
Salaminia  brought  the  ne-ws  tliat  they  had  them- 
selves seen  him  at  Clarus.  So  Paches  eagerly  under- 
took the  pursuit ;  and  he  followed  him  as  far  as  the 
island  of  Patmos,  but  when  it  was  clear  that  Alcidas 
could  no  longer  be  overtaken  he  turned  back  again. 
And  since  he  had  not  come  up  with  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  fleet  in  the  open  sea,  he  considered  it  a  piece 
of  good  fortune  that  they  had  not  been  overtaken  in 
some  port  and  compelled  to  set  up  a  camp  there, 
thus  giving  the  Athenian  fleet  the  trouble  of  watch- 
ing and  blockading  them.^ 

XXXIV.  On  the  way  back  as  he  sailed  along  the 
coast  he  put  in  at  Notium,  the  port  of  the  Colopho- 
nians,  where  the  Colophonians  had  settled  when  the 
upper  town  had  been  taken  by  Itamenes  and  the 
barbarians,^  who  had  been  called  in  on  account  of 
party  discord  by  one  of  the  factions.  And  this  place 
had  been  taken  about  the  time  when  the  second 
Peloponnesian  invasion  of  Attica  Avas  made.*  Now 
those  Avho  had  fled  for  refuge  to  Notium  and 
settled  there  again  fell  into  sedition.  One  party 
called  in  mercenaries,  both  Arcadian  and  barbarian, 
whom  they  had  obtained  from  Pissuthnes,  and  kept 
them  in  a  space  walled  off  from  the  rest  of  the  city, 
and  the  Colophonians  from  the  upper  town  who 
were  in  sympathy  with  the  Persians  joined  them 
there  and  were  admitted  to  citizenship ;  the  other 
party   had   secretly   made   their  escape,   and,    being 


i.e.  the  Persians.     Itamenes  is  otherwise  unknown. 
In  the  spring  of  430  B.C. 


53 


THUCYDIDES 

3  ό  Se  ΤΓ ροκα\€σάμενο<ί  €9  λόγου?  Ίτητίαν  των  ev  τω 
Βιατειχίσματι  ^ΑρκάΒων  άρχοντα,  ωστ€,  ην  μη^Ιν 
αρίσκον  \e^/r],  ττάΧιν  αυτόν  καταστήσειν  e?  το 
τ6Ϊχ^ο<ζ  σων  καΐ  uyta,  6  μεν  βξηΧθβ  τταρ  αυτόν, 
ο  δ'  eKelvov  μεν  ev  φυΧακη  άΒίσμω  είχεν,  αύτο<;  oe 
ττροσβαΧων  τω  τειχίσματί  €ξα7Γΐναίω<;  και  ου 
■π poahe^o μίΐ'ων  αίρει,  τού?  τε  \\ρκάοα<;  και  των 
βαρβάρων  'όσοι,  ένησαν  διαφθείρει,'  και  τον 
ΊτΓττίαν  ύστερον  εσα'^αηων  ωσττερ  εσττεισατο' 
εττειΒη  ενΒον  ην,   ξυΧΧαμβάνει   καΐ   κατατοξευει. 

4  Κ,οΧοφωνίοις  δε  ^ότιον  τταραΒίΕωσι  ττΧην  των 
μΐ/Βισάντων.  καΐ  ύστερον  Αθηναίοι  οικιστας 
7Γεμψαντ€<;  κατά  τους  εαυτών  νόμους  κατωκισαν 
το  ^ότιον,  ξυνα'γα'^/όντες  ττάντας  εκ  των  ττόΧεων, 
€1  ΤΓού  τις  ην  ΚοΧο^>ωνίθ)ν. 

ΧΧΧΛ^.  Ό  δε  ΐΐάχης  άφικόμενος  ες  την  MuTt- 
Χηνην  την  τε  ΤΙύρραν  καΐ  "Ερεσον  τταρεστησατο, 
και  ΈάΧαίθον  Χαβων  εν  τη  πόΧει  τον  ΑακεΒαι- 
μόνιον  κεκρυμμενον  αττοττεμττει  ες  τας  Αθήνας 
καϊ  τους  εκ  της  ΎενέΒου  ^ίυτιΧηναιων  άνδρας  άμα 
ους  κατέθετα  καϊ  εϊ  τις  άΧΧος  αυτω  αίτιος  εΒόκει 
2  είναι  της  αποστάσεως'  αττοττεμττει  Βε  καϊ  της 
στρατιάς  το  ττΧέον.  τοις  δε  Χοιττοΐς  υπομένων 
καθίστατο  τα  περί  την  ^ΙυτιΧιίνην  καϊ  την  άΧΧην 
Αέσβον  fi  αυτω  εΒόκει. 

XXXVI.  ^ Αφικομενων  δε  τών  άνΒρών  καϊ  του 
'^.αΧαίθου  οι  \\θηναΐοι  τον  μεν  ^άΧαιθον  ευθύς 
άπεκτειναν,  εστίν  α  παρεχόμενον  τά  τ  άΧΧα  καϊ 
άπο   ΐΙΧαταιών  (ετί  yap  εττοΧιορκουντο)  άπάξειν 

54 


BOOK   III.  XXXIV.  3-xxxvi.  i 

ηοΛν  in  exile,  called  in  Paches.  And  he  summoned 
Hippias,  the  commander  of  the  Arcadians  in  the 
fortified  quarter,  to  a  conference,  on  condition  that  if 
his  proposals  were  unsatisfactory  he  would  restore 
him  safe  and  sound  to  the  fortress.  Bat  Λvhen 
Hippias  came  out  to  him,  he  kept  him  under  guard 
but  unfettered  while  he  himself  made  a  sudden  and 
unexpected  attack  upon  the  fortress,  captured  it,  and 
put  to  death  all  the  Arcadians  and  barbarians  that 
were  in  it.  As  for  Hippias,  he  afterward  took  him 
into  the  fortress  just  as  he  had  agreed  to  do,  and  as 
soon  as  he  was  inside  seized  him  and  shot  him  down. 
He  then  delivered  Notium  to  the  Colophonians, 
excepting,  however,  the  Persian  sympathizers.  The 
Athenians  afterwards  sent  a  commission  and  re- 
colonized  Notium,  giving  it  their  own  institutions, 
after  they  had  first  brought  together  all  the  Colo- 
phonians from  cities  where  any  of  them  were  to  be 
found. 

XXXV.  After  returning  to  Mytilene  Paches  re- 
duced Pyrrha  and  Eresus,  and  having  caught  Salae- 
thus  the  Lacedaemonian  in  hiding  in  the  town  sent 
him  off  to  Athens,  as  also  the  Mytilenaean  men  whom 
he  had  placed  for  safe -keeping  in  Tenedos,  and  any 
others  who  seemed  to  him  to  blame  for  the  revolt. 
He  also  sent  back  most  of  his  army;  Λvith  the  rest 
he  remained,  and  proceeded  to  settle  the  affairs  of 
Mytilene  and  of  Lesbos  in  general  as  seemed  best 
to   him. 

XXXVL  When  Salaethus  and  the  others  arrived 
at  Athens,  the  Athenians  at  once  put  Salaethus  to 
death,  although  he  offered  among  other  things  to 
induce  the  Peloponnesians  to  abandon  Plataea,  which 


55 


THUCYDIDES 

2  ΠβΧοτΓοννησίονς'  7Γ€ρΙ  Be  των  άνΒρων  Ύνώμας 
€7Γοιοϋντο,  καϊ  νττο  ορ'γής  eho^ev  αντοΐς  ου  το  ι)? 
τταροντας  μόνον  άττοκτεΐναι,  αλλά  καΐ  τους 
ατταντα'ί  ^υτιΚ,ηναίου<ί  'όσοι  ηβωσι,  τταΐΒας  Be 
καϊ  yvvaiKa^  άνΒραττοΒίσαί,  €7ΓΐκαΧονντ€<;  την  τ€ 
άΧΧην  άτΓοστασίν  οτί  ουκ  άρχ^όμενοι  ώσττερ  οι 
αΧΧοί  €7Γθίήσαι>το,  καϊ  ττροσξυνβΧάβοντο  ουκ 
Ιλάγ^ιστον  τή<ί  ορμής  αϊ  YleXoTTov νησιών  vr}e<;  e? 
^Ιωνίαν  eKewoi<;  βοηθοί  τοΧμησασαι  τταρακιν- 
ΒυνβΟσαΐ'  ου  yap  άττο  βραχ^ειας  Βιανοίας  eSoKovv 

3  την  άπόστασιν  ττοιησασθαι.  ττβμττουσιν  ουν 
τριήρη  ώ?  Ώά^ητα  ayyeXov  των  SeSoy μένων,  κατά 
τάχ^ο<;    κεΧεύοντα    Βιαχ^ρϊίσασθαι    Μ.υτιΧηναίου';• 

4  καϊ  τη  ΰστβραία  μβτάνοιά  τις  €νθύς  ήν  αύτοΐς 
καϊ  άvaXoyισμoς  ωμον  το  βούΧευμα  καϊ  μeya 
eyvώσθaι,   ττοΧιν   οΧην   Βιαφθβΐραι  μάΧΧον  ή    ου 

5  τους  αιτίους,  ώς  δ  ησθοντο  τούτο  των  Μυτίλτ;- 
ναίων  οι  "παρόντες  πρέσβεις  καϊ  οι  αύτοΐς  των 
^Αθηναίων  ζυμττρασσοντες,  τταρεσκεύασαν  τους 
εν  τεΧει  ώστε  αύθις  yvώμaς  ττροθεΐναι•  καϊ 
εττεισαν  ραον,  Βιότι  καϊ  εκείνοις  ενΒηΧον  ην  βουΧό- 
μενον  το  ττΧεον  των  ττοΧιτών  αυθίς  τινας  σφίσιν 

6  άποΒοϋναι  βουΧεύσασθαι.  κατάστασης  δ'  ευθύς 
εκκΧησιας  αΧΧαι  τε  yvωμaι  άφ  εκάστων  εΧέ- 
yovTo  καϊ  Κ,Χεων  ο  Κ,Χεαινετου,  οσττερ  καϊ  την 
ττροτεραν  ενενικηκει  ώστε  άττοκτεΐναι,  ων  καϊ  ες 
τά  άΧΧα  βιαιότατος  των  ττοΧιτών  τω  τε  δ //'/χω 
56 


BOOK    III.  XXXVI.  1-6 

was  still  under  siege  ;  as  to  the  others  they  held  a 
debate,  and  under  the  impulse  of  anger  finally  deter- 
mined to  put  to  death,  not  only  the  Mytilenaeans  who 
Λvere  there  in  Athens,  but  also  all  whoAvere  of  adult 
age,  and  to  enslave  their  Avomen  and  children.  The 
general  charge  which  they  brought  against  them  was 
that  they  had  made  this  revolt  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
they  were  not  held  in  subjection  like  the  other  allies; 
and  what  contributed  not  least  to  their  fury  was  that 
the  Peloponnesian  fleet  had  dared  to  venture  over  to 
Ionia  to  their  support  ;  for  from  this  they  thought 
the  revolt  had  been  made  after  long  deliberation. 
Accordingly  they  sent  a  trireme  to  Paches  to  an- 
nounce Avhat  had  been  determined  upon,  and  bidding 
him  to  despatch  the  Mytilenaeans  with  all  haste ;  but 
on  the  very  next  day  a  feeling  of  repentance  came 
over  them  and  they  began  to  reflect  that  the  design 
Avhich  they  had  formed  was  cruel  and  monstrous,  to 
destroy  a  whole  city  instead  of  merely  those  who 
were  guilty.  And  when  this  became  known  to  the 
Mytilenaean  ^  envoys  who  were  present  and  their 
Athenian  supporters,  they  induced  those  in  authority 
to  bring  the  question  before  the  people  again  ;  and 
they  found  less  difliculty  in  persuading  them  because 
it  was  evident  to  them  also  that  the  greater  part  of 
the  citizens  Avished  that  another  ojiportunity  should 
be  given  thein  to  consider  the  matter.  A  meeting 
of  the  assembly  was  held  immediately,  at  which 
various  opinions  were  expressed  by  the  several 
speakers.  One  of  these  was  Cleon  son  of  Cleaenetus, 
who  had  been  successful  in  carrying  the  earlier 
motion  to  put  the  Mytilenaeans  to  death.  He  was 
not  only  the  most  violent  of  the  citizens,  but  at  that 

^  cf.  ch.  xxviii.  1. 
VOL.  II.  r      57 


THUCYDIDES 

πάρα  ττοΧύ   iv    τω   τοτβ   ττιθανωτατος,  τταρβλθων 
ανθίς  eXeye  roiahe. 

XXXVII.  "  ΠολλαΛΤΐ?  μ^ν  η8η  έ'γωγε  και  άΧ- 
Χοτβ  β^νων  Βημοκρατίαν  otl  άΒυνατόν  βστιν 
€Τ€ρων   αρχ^ειν,   μάΧιστα    δ'    iv    rrj    νυν    υμετέρα 

2  Tvepl  MuTiXr;;  α/ωΐ'  μεταμέλεια.  Βια  yap  το  καθ 
ήμεραν  aSees  καΐ  ανετηβούΧευτον  ττρος  αλλί^λου? 
καΐ  69  τους  ξυμμάχ^ους  το  αύτο  'έ'χετε,  καΐ  6  τί 
αν  ή  λόγω  ττεισθέντε^;  υττ  αυτών  άμάρτητε  η 
οϊκτω  ενΒώτε,  ουκ  εττικινΒύνω•;  ηyεΐσθε  e?  υμάς 
καΐ  ουκ  ες  την  των  ξυμμάχ^ων  χάριν  μαΧακίζεσθαι, 
ου  σκοπούντες  οτι  τυραννίδα  έχετε  την  άρχην 
καΐ  ττρος  εττιβουΧεύοντας  αυτούς  καΐ  ακοντας 
αρχόμενους,  οΊ  ^  ουκ  εξ  ων  αν  χαρίζησθε  βΧαττ- 
τόμενοι  αύτοΙ  άκροώνται  υμών,  αλλ,'  εξ  ων  αν 
ισχύί  μαΧΧον   η  ττ]  εκείνων  εύνοια  ττερι^ένησθε. 

3  ττάντων  δε  Βεινότατον  εΐ  βέβαιον  ημίν  μηζεν 
καθεστηξει  ών  αν  ^όζη  ττέρι,  μηΒε  yvωσόμεθa  οτι 
χείροσι  νόμοις  άκινητοις  χρω  μένη  ττόΧις  κρε'ισσων 
εστίν  η  καΧώς  εχουσιν  άκύροις,  αμαθία  τε  μετά 
σωφροσύνης  ωφεΧίμώτερον  η  Βεξιότης  μετά  άκο- 
Χασίας,  οΓ  τε  φαυΧοτεροι  των  άνθρώττων  προς 
τους     ξυνετωτέρονς     ώς    έπι     το     πΧέον    άμεινον 

4  οίκούσι  τας  πόΧεις.  οΐ  μεν  yap  των  τε  νόμων 
σοφωτεροι  βούΧονται  φαινεσθαι  των  τε  αίει 
Χε^ο μένων  ες  το  κοινον  πεpιyίyvεσθaι,  ώς  εν 
άΧΧοις  μείζοσιν  ούκ  αν  δηΧώσαντες  την  yvώμηv, 

^  οί  wanting  in  all  better  MSS.,  but  adopted  by  Bekker, 
Kriiger,  and  Hude. 

58 


BOOK    III.  XXXVI.  6-x.\-xvii.  4 

time  had  by  far  the  greatest  influence  with  the 
people.  He  now  came  forward  a  second  time  and 
spoke  as  follows  : 

XXXVII.  "On  many  other  occasions  in  the  past 
I  have  realized  that  a  democracy  is  incompetent  to 
govern  others,  but  more  than  ever  to-day,  when  I 
observe  your  change  of  heart  concerning  the  My- 
tilenaeans.  The  fact  is  that,  because  your  daily  life 
is  unaffected  by  fear  and  intrigue  in  your  relations  to 
each  other,^  you  have  the  same  attitude  towards 
your  allies  also,  and  you  forget  that  whenever  you 
are  led  into  error  by  their  representations  or  yield 
out  of  pity,  your  weakness  involves  you  in  danger 
and  does  not  win  the  gratitude  of  your  allies,  f'or 
you  do  not  reflect  that  the  empire  you  hold  is  a 
despotism'^  imposed  upon  subjects  who,  for  their 
part,  do  intrigue  against  you  and  submit  to  your  rule 
against  their  will,  who  render  obedience,  not  because 
of  any  kindnesses  you  may  do  them  to  your  own 
hurt,  but  because  of  such  superiority  as  you  may  have 
established  by  reason  of  your  strength  rather  than  of 
their  goodwill.  But  quite  the  most  alarming  thing 
is,  if  nothing  we  have  resolved  upon  shall  be  settled 
once  for  all,  and  if  we  shall  refuse  to  recognize  that 
a  state  which  has  inferior  laws  that  are  inviolable 
is  stronger  than  one  whose  laws  are  good  but  with- 
out authority ;  that  ignorance  combined  with  self- 
restraint  is  more  serviceable  than  cleverness  combined 
with  recklessness ;  and  that  simpler  people  for  the 
most  part  make  better  citizens  than  the  more 
shrewd.  The  latter  always  want  to  show  that  they 
are  wiser  than  the  laws,  and  to  dominate  all  public 
discussions,  as    if  there    could    never   be  weightier 

^  c/.  II.  xxxvii.  2.  *  cf.  11.  Ixiii.  2. 

59 


THUCYDIDES 

και  €Κ  του  τοιούτου  τα  ποΧλα  σφάΧλουσι  τας 
ττόλβί?•  οι  δ  ά7Γΐστοΰντε<;  ττ}  εξ  εαυτών  ξυνεσει 
αμαθέστεροι  μεν  των  νόμων  άξιοΰσιν  είναι,  ά8υ- 
νατώτεροι  Be  τον^  του  κα\ό)<;  ειττοντος  μεμψασθαι 
\oyov,  κριταΐ  δε  οΐ'Τ€<ζ  άττο  του  ίσου  μάΧΧον  η 
5  άyωvιστal  ορθοΰνται  τα  ττλεί,ω.  0)<ί  ούν  ■χ^ρη  καΐ 
ημάς  ττοιοΰντας  μη  Βεινοτητι  και  ζυρεσεως  ayojvi 
επαιρομένους  τταρα  Βόξαν  τω  ύμετερω  ττΧηθει 
τταραινεΐν. 

XXXVIII.  "'Εγώ  μεν  ούν  6  «ύτός•  εΙμι  rfj 
^νώμτ)  και  θαυμάζω  μεν  των  ττροθεντων  αύθις 
ττερί  ^Ιντι\ηναίων  Xiyeiv  και  ■χρόνου  8ιατρίβην 
εμτΓοιησάντων,  6  εστί  προς  των  ήΖίκηκότων 
μά\\ον  (ό  yap  τταθων  τω  Βράσαντι  άμβΧυτερα 
ττ)  opyrj  εττ εξέρχεται,  άμύνεσθαι  Βε  τω  τταθεΐν 
ΟΤΙ  εyyυτάτω  κειμενον  άντιτταΧον  ον  ^  μάΧιστα 
την  τιμωρίαν  Χαμβάνει^),  θαυμάζω  Be  και  όστις 
εσται  ό  άντερων  και  άξιώσων  άττοφαίνειν  τας  μεν 
^ΙυτίΧηναίων  άΒίκιας  ημΐν  ώφεΧιμους  οΰσας,  τας 
δ'    ημετέρας   ξυμφοράς    τοις    ξυμμάχ^οις    βΧάβας 

2  καθισταμένας.  και  ΒήΧον  Οτι  η  τω  Xiyeiv 
ΤΓίστεύσας  το  πάνυ  Βοκοΰν  άνταποφηναι  ώς  ουκ 
eyvωστaι  άyωvίσaιτ  αν,  ή  κερΒει  επαιρόμενος  το 
ευπρεπές  του  Xόyoυ  εκπονησας  πapάyειv  πειρά- 

3  σεται.  η  Βε  πόΧις  εκ  των  τοιώνΒε  άyώvωv  τα 
μεν  αθΧα  ετεροις  Βίόωσιν,  αύτη  Βε  τους  κινΒΰνους 

4  αναφέρει,     αϊτιοι  δ'  νμεΐς  κακ6)ς  άyωvoθeτoύvτeς , 

^  rhv,  added  from  Stobaeus  by  Xaber,  followed  by  Hude. 

2  ov  is  deleted  by  Haase,  followed  by  Hade,  and 
generally. 

^  \au-ha.vii,  for  oi'a\au/3a!'€i  of  the  MSS.,  Reiske,  followed 
by  Hude. 

6o 


BOOK    III.  XXXVII.  4-xxxviii.  4 

questions  on  which  to  declare  their  opinions,  and  as 
a  consequence  of  such  conduct  they  generally  bring 
their  states  to  ruin  ;  the  former,  on  the  contrary, 
mistrusting  their  ΟΛνη  insight,  are  content  to  be 
less  enlightened  than  the  laws  and  less  competent 
than  others  to  criticise  the  words  of  an  able  speaker, 
but  being  impartial  judges  rather  than  interested 
contestants  they  generally  prosper.  Thus,  then,  we 
ought  to  act  and  not  be  so  excited  by  eloquence  and 
combat  of  Avits  as  to  advise  the  Athenian  people 
contrary  to  our  own  judgment. 

XXXVIIl.  "As  for  me,  I  have  not  changed  my 
opinion,  and  I  wonder  at  those  who  propose  to 
debate  again  the  question  of  the  Mytilenaeans  and 
thus  interpose  delay,  which  is  in  the  interest  of 
those  who  have  done  the  wrong ;  for  thus  the  edge 
of  the  victim's  wrath  is  duller  when  he  proceeds 
against  the  offender,  whereas  the  vengeance  that 
follo\vs  uj)on  the  very  heels  of  the  outrage  exacts  a 
punishment  that  most  nearh'  matches  the  offence. 
And  1  Avonder,  too,  Λνΐιο  Λνίΐΐ  answer  me  and  under- 
take to  prove  that  the  Avrong-doings  of  the  Myti- 
lenaeans are  beneficial  to  us  but  that  our  misfortunes 
prove  injurious  to  our  allies.  Manifestly  he  must  either 
have  such  confidence  in  his  powers  of  speech  as  to 
undertake  to  show  that  Λν1ΐ3ί  is  universally  accepted 
as  true  has  not  been  established,^  or  else,  incited 
by  gain,  will  by  an  elaborate  display  of  specious 
oratory  attempt  to  mislead  you.  But  in  contests  of 
that  kind  the  city  bestows  the  prizes  upon  others, 
while  she  herself  undergoes  all  the  risks.  And  you 
are  yourselves    to   blame,  for  your  management    or 

1  Or,  "your  absolute  resolve  has  really  not  been  adopted." 

61 


THUCYDIDES 

o'lTivet  βΐώθατβ  Oearal  μβν  των  λόγων  yiyveaOai, 
άκροαταΐ  Be  των  ερ^ων,  τα  μβν  μίΧΚοντα  €pya 
άτΓΟ  των  ev  είττοντων  σκοττονντβ<;  ώς•  Βυνατα 
yiyveadai,  τα  he  τγ61τ  pay  μίνα  ή^η,  ου  το  Βρασθεν 
ΊΤίστοτβρον   οψβί   Χαβοντα   η   το   άκουσθέν,   άττο 

5  των  λόγω  κα\ω<;  έττιτιμησάντων  καϊ  μβτα  καινό- 
τητο<;  μ€ν  λόγου  άττατάσθαι  άριστοι,  μετά  SeSoKC- 
μασμβνου  Be  μη  ξυνέττεσθαί  eOeXecv,  BovXoi  6ντ€ς 
των    alel  άτόττων,   ύττερόττταί   Be   των   βίωθότων, 

6  καΐ  μάλιστα  μεν  αύτο<;  elirelv  €καστο<;  βουΧόμενο^ 
Βννασθαι,  ει  Βε  μη,  άvτayωvtζόμεvoί  τοΐ<;  τοιαύτα 
Xέyoυσι  μη  ύστεροι  άκοΧονθήσαι  ΒοκεΙν  τη  yvώμη, 
6ξεω<ί  Βε  τι  λεγοι/το?  -προετταινεσαι,  καϊ  ττρο- 
αισθεσθαι  τε  πρόθυμοι  ^  τα  Xey6μeva  καϊ  ττρο- 
νοήσαι     βραΒεΐ'ζ     τύ,     εζ    αυτών     άττοβησόμενα, 

7  ζητούντές  τε  άΧΧο  τι  ώς  είττεΐν  ή  εν  οίς  ζώμεν, 
φρονούντε'ζ  Βε  ούΒε  ττερί  τών  τταρόντων  Ικανώς' 
άττΧώς  τε  ακοής  ήΒονη  ησσώμενοι  καϊ  σοφιστών 
θεαταΐς  εοικότες  καθημενοις  μάΧΧον  η  ττερί  ττόΧεως 
βουΧευομενοις. 

XXXIX.  "  ^flv  εyώ  ττειρώμενος  άττοτρεττειν 
υμάς  άτΓοφαίνω  Μ,υτιΧηναίους  μάΧιστα  Βη  μίαν 
2  ττόΧιν  ηΒικηκοτας  υμάς.  εγώ  yap,  ο'ίτινες  μεν 
μη  ΒννατοΙ  φερειν  την  υμετεραν  (ϊρ-χΐ]ν  η  ο'ίτινες 
ύπο  τών  ττοΧεμιων  άvayκaσθεvτες  άττέστησαν, 
ξυyyvώμηv  εχω•  νήσον  Βε  ο'ίτινες  ε'χ^οντες  μετά 
τειγ^ών  καϊ  κατά  θάΧασσαν  μόνον  φοβούμενοι 
τους  ημέτερους  ττοΧεμιους,  εν  ω  καϊ  αύτοΙ  τριηρών 
•παρασκευή    ουκ    άφαρκτοι     ήσαν     ττρος     αυτούς. 


1  ίΖΐΌΐ    after    -πρόθυμοι,    deleted    by   Poppo,   followed   by 
Hudc. 

62 


BOOK    III.  xxxviii.  4-xxxix.  2 

these  contests  is  Avrong.  It  is  your  wont  to  be 
spectators  of  ΛVΌrds  and  hearers  of  deeds,  forming 
your  judgment  of  future  enterprises  according  as 
able  speakers  represent  them  to  be  feasible,  but  as 
regards  accomplished  facts,  not  counting  wliat  has 
been  done  more  credible,  because  you  have  seen 
it,  than  \vhat  you  have  heard,  you  are  swayed  in 
judgment  by  those  who  have  made  an  elocjucnt 
invective.  You  are  adepts  not  only  at  being  de- 
ceived by  novel  proposals  but  also  at  refusing  to 
follow  approved  advice,  slaves  as  you  are  of  each 
new  paradox  and  scorners  of  Avhat  is  familiar.  Each 
of  you  wishes  above  all  to  be  an  orator  himself,  or, 
failing  that,  to  vie  Avith  those  dealers  in  paradox  by 
seeming  not  to  lag  behind  them  in  wit  but  to 
applaud  a  smart  saying  before  it  is  out  of  the  speaker's 
mouth  ;  you  are  as  quick  to  forestall  Avliat  is  said 
as  you  are  slow  to  foresee  what  will  come  of  it.  You 
seek,  one  mig'it  say,  a  Λvorld  quite  unlike  that  in 
which  we  live,  but  give  too  little  heed  to  that  which 
is  at  hand.  In  a  word,  you  are  in  thrall  to  the 
pleasures  of  the  ear  and  are  more  like  men  λυΙιο  sit 
as  spectators  at  exhibitions  of  so))hists  than  men  who 
take  counsel  for  the  welfare  of  the  state. 

XXXIX.  "And  it  is  from  these  ways  that  I  seek 
to  turn  you  when  I  attempt  to  prove  that  Mytilene 
has  done  you  more  injury  than  any  single  state.  I 
can  make  allowance  for  men  who  resorted  to  revolt 
because  they  "s^ere  unable  to  bear  your  rule  or 
because  they  were  compelled  by  your  enemies  to  do 
so ;  but  men  who  inhabited  a  fortified  island  and  had 
no  fear  of  our  enemies  except  by  sea,  and  even  there 
were  not  without  the  protection  of  a  force  of  their 
own  triremes,  who  moreover  were  independent  and 

63 


THUCYDIDES 

αυτόνομοι  τ€  οΙκοΰντ€<;  και  τιμωμβνοί  €9  τα  ττρωτα 
υτΓΟ  ημών  τοιαύτα  elpydaavTo,  τι  άλ\ο  ούτοι  η 
€7Γ€βού\€υσάν  re  κα\  ζττανβστησαν  μαΧΧον  η 
άτΓβστησαν  (άττόστασις  μέν  ye  των  βίαιόν  τι 
■πασχόντων  εστίν),  βζητησάν  τβ  μετά  των  rroXe- 
μιωτάτων  ημά<;  στάντ€ς  Βιαφθεΐραι;  καίτοι  Seivo- 
τβρόν  εστίν   η  el  καθ'  αυτούς   ^ύναμιν  κτώμενοι 

3  άντ€7Γθ\εμησαν.  τταρά^ει^μα  he  αύτοΐς  ούτε  αϊ 
των  ττελας  ξυμφοραΐ  ε^ενοντο,  όσοι  άττοστάντες 
ηΕη  ημών  εχειρώθησαν,  ούτε  η  παρούσα  εύ8αι- 
μονία  τταρίσχεν  οκνον  μη  εΧθεΙν  69  τα  Βεινά' 
γενόμενοι  δε  ττρο'ί  το  μεΧλον  Θρασε1<ζ  κα\  έ\τη- 
σαντε<ί  μακρότερα  μεν  τή<;  δυνάμεως,  εΚ,άσσω  δέ 
της  βουΧησεως,  ττόΧεμον  ήραντο,  Ισχύν  αξιώ- 
σαντες  τού  δικαίου  ιτροθεΐναι•  εν  ω  yap  ωήθη- 
σαν  ττεριέσεσθαι,  εττεθεντο  ημΐν  ουκ  αδικούμενοι. 

4  εϊωθε  δε  τών  -πόΧ^ων  αίς  αν  μάΧιστα  αττροσδοκη- 
Τ09  και  δι  εΧαχίστου  εύττραξία  εΧθη,  ες  ύβριν 
τρέττειν  τα  δε  ττοΧΧα  κατά  Xoyov  τοις  ανθρώττοις 
εύτυχούντα  άσφαΧέστερα  η  τταρα  δόξαν,  και 
κa^co■πpayίav  ως  είττεΐν  ραον  απωθούνται  ή  εύδαι- 

5  μονίαν  διασώζονται,  χρήν  δε  ^ΙυτιΧηναίους  καΐ 
ττάΧαι  μηδέν  διαφερόντως  τών  άΧΧων  ύφ'  ημών 
τετιμησθαι,  καΐ  ουκ  αν  ες  τόδε  εξύβρισαν  ττεφυκε 
yap  καΐ  άΧΧως  ανθρωττος  το  μεν  θεραττεύον 
ύπερφρονεΐν,  το  δε  μη  ύπ-εΐκον  θαυμάζειν. 

6  "  Ι^οΧασθεντων  δε  καΐ  νύν  άξίως  της  αδικίας 
και  μη  τοις  μεν  όXίyoις  ή  αίτια  ττροστεθ^,  τον  δε 
64 


BOOK    III.  xxxix.  2-6 

were  treated  by  us  with  the  highest  consideration, 
when  these  men  have  acted  thus,  what  else  is  it  but 
conspiracy  and  rebellion  rather  than  revolt — for  revolt 
is  the  work  of  those  λυΙιο  suffer  oppression — and  a 
deliberate  attempt  by  taking  their  stand  on  the  side  of 
our  bitterest  enemies  to  bring  about  our  destruction? 
And  yet  this  is  assuredly  a  more  heinous  thing  than 
if  they  had  gone  to  war  against  us  by  themselves  for 
the  acquisition  of  power.  The  calamities  of  their 
neighbours  who  had  already  revolted  from  us  and 
been  subdued  proved  no  warning  to  them  ;  nor  did 
the  good  fortune  Avhich  they  enjoyed  make  them 
hesitate  to  take  the  perilous  step  ;  on  the  contrary, 
becoming  over-confident  as  to  the  future,  and  con- 
ceiving hopes  which,  though  greater  than  their 
powers,  were  less  than  their  ambition,  they  took  up 
arms,  presuming  to  put  might  before  right ;  for  the 
moment  they  thought  they  should  prove  superior 
they  attacked  us  unprovoked.  And  indeed  it  is  the 
rule,  that  such  states  as  come  to  unexpected  pros- 
perity most  fully  and  most  suddenly,  do  turn  to 
insolence,  Avhereas  men  generally  find  success 
less  precarious  Λvhen  it  comes  in  accordance  with 
reasonable  calculations  than  when  it  surpasses  ex- 
pectation, and  more  easily,  as  it  seems,  they  repel 
adversity  than  maintain  prosperity.  But  the  Myti- 
lenaeans  from  the  first  ought  never  to  have  been 
treated  by  us  with  any  more  consideration  than  our 
other  allies,  and  then  they  would  not  have  broken 
out  into  such  insolence ;  for  it  is  human  nature  in 
any  case  to  be  contemptuous  of  those  who  pay  court 
but  to  admire  those  who  Avill  not  yield. 

"  Let  them  be  punished,  therefore,  even  now,  in  a 
manner  befitting  their  crime,  and  do  not  put  the 

65 


THUCYDIDES 

δήμον  άττοΧύσητβ.  ττάντες  yap  υμ,ΐν  ye  ομοίως 
ίττέθβντο,  οΓ?  7'  ^ζ^'^  ώς  ημάς  τραττομίνοις  νυν 
ttoKlv  iv  rfi  ττολβί  eivai'  aWa  τον  μετά  των 
ο\ί'/ων  κίνΒυνον   η-^/ησάμενοι  βββαιότβρον  ξνναττ- 

7  έστησαν,  των  τε  ξυμμάγ^ων  σκέψασθε  et  τοις 
Τ€  άvayκaσθelσLv  νττο  των  ττοΧβμίων  κα\  τοις 
€κοΰσιν  άτΓοστάσι  τας  αύτάς  ζημίας  ττροσθήσετε, 
τίνα  οϊεσθβ  όντινα  ου  βραχ^ει,α  ττροφάσει  άποστη- 
σεσθαι,    όταν   η   κατορθώσαντί    εΧευθβρωσις   rj  η 

8  σφαΧβντι  μη8εν  παθεΐν  άνηκβστον;  ημΐν  δε  ττρος 
εκάστην  ττόΧιν  ατΓΟΚβκιν^υνεύσεται  τά  τε  γ^ρήματα 
καΐ  αϊ  ψυχ^αί•  και  τνχόντες  μεν  ττόΧιν  εφθαρ- 
μενην  τταραΧαβόντες  της  εττειτα  ^  ττροσόδου,  δί 
ην  Ισχύομεν,  το  Χοιττον  στερησεσθε,  σφαΧεντες 
δε  τΓοΧεμίους  ττρος  τοις  ύττάρ'χ^ουσίν  εζομεν,  καϊ 
ον  -χρόνον  τοις  νυν  καθεστηκοσι  δει  εχ^θροΐς  άν- 
θίστασθαι,  τοις  οίκειοις  ξυμμάχοις  ττοΧεμησομεν. 

XL.  "  Οΰκουν  δει  ττροθεΐναί"  εΧττίόα  ούτε  λόγω 
ΤΓίστην  οΰτε  'χ^ρήμασιν  ώνητήν,  ώς  ξυyyvώμηv 
άμαρτεΐν  ανθρωπίνως  Χιίψονται.  άκοντες  μεν 
yap  ουκ  εβΧαψαν,  είδότες  δε  εττεβούΧευσαν  f  yy- 
2  yvωμov  δ'  εστί  το  άκούσιον.  εγώ  μεν  ουν  καϊ 
τότε  ττρώτον  καϊ  νυν  δίαμά•χομαί  μη  μετayvώvai 
υμάς  τα  ^Γpoδεδoyμεva,  μy]δ€  τρισΐ  τοις  άξυμ- 
φορωτάτοις  τι)  άρχη,  οϊκτω  καϊ  ηδοντ}  λόγων  καϊ 

'  (ττατα,  Hiide  adopts  inereias,  van  Herwerden   and    H. 
Weil  eTSTeiou. 

*  προθίΓί'αι,  Hude  retains  ττροσθΐϊναι,  with  BC. 

66 


BOOK    III.  XXXIX.  6-XL.  2 

blame  upon  the  aristocrats  and  exonerate  the  common 
people.  For  they  all  alike  attacked  you,  even 
the  commons,  who,  if  they  had  taken  our  side, 
might  now  have  been  reinstated  in  their  city ;  but 
they  thought  there  was  less  risk  in  sharing  the 
dangers  of  the  oligarchs,  and  so  joined  them  in  the 
revolt.  Consider,  moreover,  your  allies :  if  you  in- 
flict upon  those  who  wilfully  revolt  no  greater 
punishment  than  upon  those  who  revolt  under  com- 
pulsion from  our  foes,  which  of  them,  think  you,  will 
not  revolt  on  a  slight  pretext,  when  the  alternatives 
are  liberty  if  he  succeeds  or  a  fate  not  irreparable  if 
he  fails?  We,  on  the  other  hand,  shall  have  to  risk 
our  money  and  our  lives  against  each  separate  state, 
and  when  we  succeed  we  shall  recover  a  ruined  state 
and  be  deprived  for  the  future  of  its  revenue,  the 
source  of  our  strength,  whereas  if  we  fail  we  shall 
be  adding  fresh  enemies  to  those  we  have  already, 
and  when  we  should  be  resisting  our  present  foes  we 
shall  be  fighting  our  own  allies. 

XL.  "  We  must  not,  therefore,  hold  out  to  them 
any  hope,  either  to  be  secured  by  eloquence  or 
purchased  by  money,  that  they  will  be  excused 
on  the  plea  that  their  error  was  human.  For 
their  act  was  no  unintentional  injury  but  a  de- 
liberate plot  ;  and  it  is  that  which  is  unintentional 
which  is  excusable.  Therefore,  I  still  protest,  as 
I  have  from  the  first,^  that  you  should  not  re- 
verse your  former  decision  or  be  led  into  error  by 
pity,  delight  in  eloquence,  or  clemency,  the  three 

^  Referring  to  what  happened  in  the  assembly  of  the  day 
before,  in  which,  however,  be  liad  urged  the  action  that  was 
taken  ;  its  reconsideration  was  not  urged  till  tiie  present 
meeting. 

67 


THUCYDIDES 

3  ε•πΐ€ΐκ€ία,  άμαρτάνβιν.  eXeo'i  re  yap  ττρος  του? 
ομοίους  8ίκαίθ<;  άντώίζοσθαί  καΐ  μη  ττρος  του? 
ούτ  άντοικτίούντας  έξ  ανάγκης  Τ€  καθβστώτας 
alel  ΤΓοΧβμίους'  ο'ί  τε  τβρττοντβς  Xoyro  ρηΎορβ<;  ^ 
βξουσν  και  ev  αΚΧοί<ί  βΧάσσοσιν  ά^ώνα,  καΐ  μη 
iv  ω  η  μβν  ττόλί?  βραχ^βα  ησθβΐσα  μβ^άΧα  ζημιώ- 
σεται,  αυτοί  he  Ικ  του  ευ  elrreiv  το  παθεΐν  ευ 
άντιΧηψ-ονταΐ'  καΐ  η  iineiKeLa  irpo•?  του?  μβΧ- 
Χοντα<;  ετητηΒείονς  καϊ  το  Χοιττον  βσβσθαι  μάΧΧον 
δίΒοταί  ή  ττρο?  του?  ομοίως  τε  καϊ  ούΒεν  ησσον 
ΤΓοΧεμίους  ΰττοΧειττομίνους. 

4  ""Εν  τ€  ξυνεΧων  λέγω•  ττιθόμενοι  μεν  εμοϊ 
τά  τε  Βίκαια  ες  Ί^ΙυτιΧηναίους  καϊ  τα  ξύμφορα 
άμα  ττοίησετε,  άΧΧως  he  ηνόντες  τοις  μεν  ου 
'χ^αριείσθε,  υμάς  he  αυτούς  μάΧΧον  hLKaiwaeaOe. 
ει  yap  ούτοι  ορθώς  άπεστησαν,  ύμεΐς  αν  ου 
■χρεούν  άργοίτε.  ει  hε  hrj  καϊ  ου  ττροσηκον  όμως 
άξιοΰτε  τούτο  hpav,  παρά  το  εικός  τοι  καϊ  τoύσhε 
ξυμφόρως  het  κοΧάζεσθαι,  η  τταΰεσθαι  της  αρχής 

5  και  εκ  του  άκινΒύνου  άvhpayaθιζεσθaι.  ττ)  τε 
αύττ)  ζημία  άζιώσατε  άμυνασθαι  καϊ  μη  avaXyη- 
τότεροι  οι  hιaφυy6vτeς  των  επιβουΧευσάντων 
φανήναι,  ενθυμηθεντες  ά  εΙκος  ην  αυτούς  ποιησαι 
κρατησαντας  υμών,  άΧΧως  τε  καϊ  ττροϋττάρζαντας 

^  ^riTopes,  deleted  by  Naber,  followed  by  Hude 
68 


BOOK    ΠΙ.  XL.  2-5 

influences  most  prejudicial  to  a  ruling  state.  For 
compassion  may  rightly  be  bestowed  upon  those  who 
are  likewise  compassionate  and  not  upon  those  who 
will  show  no  pity  in  return  but  of  necessity  are 
always  enemies.  As  to  the  orators  who  charm  by 
their  eloquence,  they  will  have  other  opportunities 
of  display  in  matters  of  less  importance,  and  not 
where  the  city  for  a  brief  pleasure  will  pay  a  heavy 
penalty  >vhile  they  themselves  get  a  fine  fee  for 
their  fine  speaking.  And  clemency  would  better  be 
reserved  for  those  who  will  afterwards  be  faithful 
allies  than  be  shown  to  those  who  remain  just  what 
they  were  before  and  no  whit  the  less  our  enemies. 

"I  can  sum  up  what  I  have  to  say  in  a  word.  If 
you  take  my  advice,  you  will  do  not  only  what  is  just 
to  the  Mytilenaeans  but  also  at  the  same  time  what 
is  expedient  for  us  ;  but  if  you  decide  otherwise,  you 
will  not  win  their  gratitude  but  will  rather  bring  a 
just  condemnation  upon  yourselves ;  for  if  these 
people  had  a  right  to  secede,  it  would  follow  that 
you  are  wrong  in  exercising  dominion.  But  if,  right 
or  wrong,  you  are  still  resolved  to  maintain  it,  then 
you  must  punish  these  people  in  defiance  of  equity  as 
your  interests  require  ;  or  else  you  must  give  up  your 
empire  and  in  discreet  safety  practise  the  fine  virtues 
you  preach.^  Resolve  also  to  punish  them  with  the 
same  penalty  that  has  already  been  voted,^  and  that 
those  who  have  escaped  the  plot  shall  not  appear  to 
have  less  feeling  than  those  who  framed  it,  bearing  in 
mind  what  they  Avould  probably  have  done  to  you 
had   they   won   the    victory,    especially   since    they 

'  For  tlie  thought,  cf.  ii.  Ixiii.  2. 

^  So  Steup  explains.  Most  editors  explain,  "  with  the 
same  penalty  they  would  have  inflicted,"  following  the  schol. 
^  h-v  {τιμωρ-Ιισαντο  καΐ  αυτοί  νμαί,  irtpiyd'ontvoi  ΰμων, 

69 


THUCYDIDES 

6  άΒικίας.  μάΧιστα  8e  οΐ  μη  ξυν  ττροφάσει  τινά, 
κακώς  7Γθίοΰντ€<;  Ιττβξερχηΐ'ταί  και  hLoWvuai}  τον 
KLi'huvov  ύφορώμενοί  του  ίιποΧβιττομενον  €)(θροΰ' 
ο  ηαρ  μη  ξυν  avayKj}  τι  τταθών  'χ^αΧβττώτβρος 
Ζιαφν^ών  του  άττο  της  ϊσης  έγθρού. 

7  "  Μ?7  ουν  ττροίοται  '^ί.νησθε  υμών  αυτών,  γενό- 
μενοι Β  ΟΤΙ  εγγύτατα  ττ)  ^νώμτ)  του  ττάσχ^ειν  καΐ 
ως  ττρο  τταντος  αν  ετιμησασθε  αυτούς  γ^ειρώ- 
σασθαι,  νυν  άνταπόΒοτε  μη  μαΧακισθεντες  ττρος 
το  τταρον  αύτικα  μηΒε  του  ετηκρεμασθ εντός  ττοτε 

8  Βεινοΰ  άμνημονοΰντες.  κοΧάσατε  Βε  άξίως  τού- 
τους τε  και  τοις  άΧλοις  ξυμμάχ^οις  τταράΒεΐ'γμα 
σαφές  καταστήσατε,  ας  αν  άφίστηται,  θανάτω 
ζημιωσόμενον.  τόΒε  <yap  ην  γνώσιν,  ησσον  τών 
ποΧεμίων  άμέΧήσαντες  τοις  υμετεροις  αυτών 
μα)(εΐσθε   ξυμμάχ^οις.^ 

XLI.  Τοιαύτα  μεν  6  ΚΧεων  είττεν.  μετά  δ' 
αύτον  ΑιοΒοτος  ο  Κύκράτους,  οσττερ  καΐ  εν  τη 
ττροτέρα  εκκΧησία  άντεΧε^ε  μάΧιστα  μη  άττο- 
κτεΐναι  ^ϊυτ ιΧηναίους ,  τταρεΧθών  και  τότβ  Ιλεγε 
τοιάΒε. 

XLTI.  "Οϊ5τ6  τους  ττροθεντας  την  Βια^γνώμην 
αύθις  ΊτερΙ  ΜυτιΧηναίων  αΐτιώμαι  ούτε  τους  μεμ- 
φομενους  μη  ττοΧΧάκις  ττερί  τών  μεγίστων  βου- 
Χεύεσθαι  επαινώ,  νομίζω  Βε  Βύο  τα  εναντιώτατα 
εύβουΧ'ια  είναι,  τάχ^ος  τε  και  opyijv,  ων  το  μεν 
μετά  άνοιας  φιΧεΐ  'γίγνεσθαι,  το  Βε  μετά  άτται- 
2  Βευσίας  καΐ  βραχ^ύτητος  γνώμης,  τους  τε  Χόγους 
όστις  Βιαμάχεται  μη  ΒιΒασκάΧους  τών  πραγμά- 


^  διολλΰΐΌί,    Stahl's    conjecture,    followed    by    Hucle   and 
others,  for  ζιόλλυνται  of  the  MSS. 

70 


BOOK    III.  XL.  5-xLii.  2 

were  the  aggressors.  Indeed  it  is  generally  those 
who  ΛvιΌng  another  without  cause  that  follow  him  up 
to  destroy  him  utterly,  ])erceiving  the  danger  that 
threatens  from  an  enemy  who  is  left  alive;  for  one 
who  has  been  needlessly  injured  is  more  dangerous 
if  he  escape  than  an  avowed  enemy  who  expects  to 
give  and  take. 

"  Do  not,  then,  be  traitors  to  your  own  cause,  but 
recalling  as  nearly  as  possible  how  you  felt  when 
they  made  you  suffer  and  how  you  would  then  have 
given  anything  to  crush  them,  now  pay  them  back. 
Do  not  become  tender-hearted  at  the  sight  of  their 
present  distress,  nor  unmindful  of  the  danger  that  so 
lately  hung  over  you,  but  chastise  them  as  they 
deserve,  and  give  to  your  other  allies  plain  warning 
that  Λvhoever  revolts  shall  be  punished  with  death. 
For  if  they  realise  this,  the  less  will  you  have  to  neg- 
lect your  enemies  and  fight  against  your  own  allies." 

XLI.  Such  Λvas  Cleon's  speech.  After  him  Dio- 
dotus  son  of  Eucrates,  who  in  the  earlier  meeting 
had  been  the  principal  speaker  against  putting  the 
Mytilenaeans  to  death,  came  forward  now  also  and 
spoke  as  follows : 

XLI  I.  "I  have  no  fault  to  find  with  those  who 
have  proposed  a  reconsideration  of  the  question  of 
the  Mytilenaeans,  nor  do  I  commend  those  who 
object  to  repeated  deliberation  on  matters  of  the 
greatest  moment ;  on  the  contrary,  I  believe  the  two 
things  most  opposed  to  good  counsel  are  haste  and 
passion,  of  which  the  one  is  wont  to  keep  company 
with  folly,  the  other  with  an  undisciplined  and 
shallow  mind.  As  for  words,  whoever  contends^  that 
they  are  not  to  be  guides  of  our  actions  is  either  dull 

^  Directed  at  Cleon's  remarks,  ch.  xxxviii.  4  fF. 

71 


THUCYDIDES 

των  yiyveaOaL,  η  άξύν€τό<;  ίστιν  ή  Ihict  τί  αύτω 
hta^eper  άξύνβτος  μ€ν,  el  αλΧω  τινί  ηγείται 
τΓβρΙ  του  /αελλοι^τος  hvvarov  elvai  καΧ  μη  εμ- 
φανούς φράσαί,  Βιαφέρει  δ'  αύτω,  el  βουΧομενος 
Τί  αίσ'χ^ρ'ορ  ττεΐσαι  ευ  μεν  είττείν  ουκ  αν  ηγείται, 
ττερΧ  του  μη  κα\οΰ  Βύνασθαι,  ευ  8ε  οιαβαΧων 
εκττΧηζαι  αν  τους  τε  αντερουντας  και  τους  ακου- 

3  σομενους.  χαλεττώτατοί  δέ  καΐ  οι  εττΐ  γ^ρημασι 
■προκατη^οροΰντες  εττίΒειξίν  τίνα.  εΐ  μεν  yap 
αμαθίαν  κατητιωντο,  ό  μη  ττείσας  άζυνετωτερος 
αν  Βόξας  είναι  η  άΒίκώτερος  άττεχώρεί'  άΒικίας 
δ'  ετηφερομενης  ττείσας  τε  ύποπτος  yίyvετaL  καί 

4  μη  τυχ^ων  μετά  άξυνεσίας  καΐ  άόικος.  η  τε 
ττόΧι,ς  ουκ  ωφεΧεΙταί  εν  τω  τοιωΒε'  φόβω  yap 
αποστερείται  των  ξυμβούΧων.  καΐ  πΧεΐστ  αν 
ορθοίτο  αδυνάτους  Xeyείv  έχουσα  τους  τοιούτους 
των   ποΧίτών    εΧά'χ^ιστα   yap    αν     πεισθείησαν^ 

5  άμαρτάνειν.  χρη  δέ  τον  μεν  ayaOov  ποΧιτην  μη 
εκφοβούντα  τους  άντεροΰντας,  αΧΧ  άπο  του  ίσου 
φαίνεσθαι  άμεινον  XiyovTa,  την  8ε  σώφρονα  ττόΧιν 
τω  τε  πΧεΙστα  ευ  βουΧεύοντι  μη  προστιθέναι 
τιμήν,  άΧΧα  μηΒ^  εΧασσοΰν  της  ύπαρχούσης,  καΐ 
τον  μη  τυχόντα  yvώμης  ούχ  όπως   ζημιουν,  άΧΧα 

6  μηΒ^  άτιμάζειν.  ούτω  yap  6  τε  κατορθών  ηκιστα 
αν  επΙ   τω  ετι  μειζόνων  άξιουσθαι  πάρα  yvώμηv 

^  ΐΓΐίσθΐίησαν,   Hude  adopts   Madvig's  conjecture  πΐΐσθ(1η 
ζυΐ'αμαρτάΐ'ΐΐν. 

72 


BOOK    III.  xLii.  2-6 

of  wit  or  has  some  private  interest  at  stake — dull, 
if  he  thinks  it  possible  by  any  other  means  to  throw 
light  on  that  which  still  belongs  to  the  dim  and 
distant  future  ;  self-interested,  if,  wishing  to  put 
through  a  discreditable  measure,  he  realizes  that 
while  he  cannot  speak  well  in  a  bad  cause,  he 
can  at  least  slander  well  and  thus  intimidate  both 
liis  opponents  and  his  hearers.  Most  dangerous  oi 
all,  however,  are  precisely  those  who  ^  charge  a 
speaker  beforehand  with  being  bribed  to  make  a 
display  of  rhetoric.  For  if  they  merely  imputed 
ignorance,  the  speaker  Λνΐιο  failed  to  carry  his 
audience  might  go  his  way  with  the  repute  of  being 
dull  but  not  dishonest ;  when,  however,  the  charge 
is  dishonesty,  the  speaker  who  succeeds  becomes  an 
object  of  suspicion,  Λvhereas  if  he  fails  he  is  regarded 
as  not  only  dull  but  dishonest  as  well.  And  all 
this  is  a  detriment  to  the  state,  \vhich  is  thus  robbed 
of  its  counsellors  through  fear.  Indeed  it  would 
prosper  most  if  its  citizens  of  this  stamp  had  no 
eloquence  at  all,  for  then  the  people  would  be  least 
likely  to  blunder  through  their  influence.  But  the 
good  citizen  ought  to  show  himself  a  better  speaker, 
not  by  trying  to  browbeat  those  who  will  oppose 
him,  but  by  fair  argument ;  and  while  the  wise  city 
should  not  indeed  confer  fresh  honours  upon  the 
man  whose  advice  is  most  often  salutary,  it  certainly 
should  not  detract  from  those  Avhich  he  already  has, 
and  as  for  him  whose  suggestion  does  not  meet  with 
approval,  so  far  from  punishing  him,  it  should  not 
even  treat  him  Avith  disrespect.  For  then  it  would 
be  least  likely  that  a  successful  speaker,  with  a  view 
to  being  counted  worthy  of  still   greater  honours, 

^  Like  Cleon,  ch.  xxxviii.  2  ;  xl.  1,3. 

73 


THUCYDIDES 

τί  καΐ  ττρος  χύ-piv  Xeyoi,  ο  re  μη  ζτητυχων  ope- 
γοίτο  τω  αύτω,  'χ^αριζόμενος  τί  και  αυτο'ζ,  ττροσα- 
yeaOai   το  π\ήθο<;. 

XLIII.  Ώι^  ημείς  τάναντία  Βρώμεν,  καΐ  ττροσ- 
€τι,  ην  τις  και  ύττοπτεύηται  κέρΒονς  μίν  eveKU, 
τα  βέΧτίστα  δε  όμως  \eyeiv,  φθονήσαντες  της 
ου   βββαίου   Βοκησβως   των   κ€ρΒών  την  φανβραν 

2  ωφεΚίαν  της  πόΧεως  άφαιρονμεθα.  καθέστηκ€ 
Be  τ  ay  αθ  α  άττο  τον  βύθεος  Χε^όμβνα  μηΒεν  άνυ- 
τΓοτΓτότερα  elvai  των  κακών,  ωστ€  Beiv  ομοίως 
τον  τ€  τα  Ββίνότατα  βουΧόμενον  ττβΐσαί  άττάττ] 
ττροσά^εσθαι  το    ττΧηθος  καϊ   τον  τα   άμεινω  Xe- 

3  jovTa  ψευσάμενον  ττιστον  γενέσθαι,  μονην  τε 
ττόΧίν  Βια  τας  ττερινοίας  ευ  ττοιήσαί  εκ  του  προ- 
φανούς μη  εξαττατήσαντα  άΒύνατον  6  <yap  Βώούς 
φανερώς   τι   ά^αθον  άνθ υποπτεύεται   άφανώς  πτ] 

Α  πΧεον  εζειν.  γ^ρη  Βε  προς  τα  μεηιστα  καΧ  εν  τω 
τοιωΒε  άξιοΰν  τι  ^  ημάς  περαιτέρω  προνοούντας 
Χε'γειν  υμών  των  Βι*  οΧί^ου  σκοπούντων,  άΧΧως 
τ€   καϊ   υπεΰθννον  την  παραίνεσιν  εχ^οντας  προς 

5  άνεύθυνον  την  ύμετεραν  άκρόασιν.  εΐ  yap  ο  τε 
πείσας  και  ο  επισπόμενος  ομοίως  εβΧάπτοντο, 
σωφρονεστερον   αν   εκρίνετε•    νυν   Be  προς    opyrjv 

'  Conjecture  of  Kriiger  and  Haase,  confirmed  by  ABFM, 
for  the  Vulgate  άζιονντι,  with  CEG. 

74 


BOOK    III.  XLH.  6-xLiii.  5 

would  speak  insincerely  and  for  the  purpose  of 
winning  favour  and  that  the  unsuccessful  speaker 
would  employ  the  same  means,  by  courting  favour 
in  his  turn  in  an  effort  to  win  the  multitude  to 
himself. 

XLIII.  But  we  pursue  the  opposite  course,  and, 
moreover,  if  a  man  be  even  suspected  of  corrup- 
tion, albeit  he  give  the  best  counsel,  we  conceive 
a  grudge  against  him  because  of  the  dubious  sur- 
mise that  he  is  corrupt  and  thus  deprive  the  state 
of  an  indubitable  advantage.  And  it  has  come  to 
such  a  pass  that  good  advice  frankly  given  is  re- 
garded with  just  as  much  suspicion  as  the  bad, 
and  that,  in  consequence,  a  speaker  who  wants  to 
carry  the  most  dangerous  measures  must  resort  to 
deceit  in  order  to  win  the  people  to  his  views,  pre- 
cisely as  the  man  whose  proposals  are  good  must  lie  in 
order  to  be  believed.  And  because  of  this  excessive 
cleverness  Athens  is  the  only  state  where  a  man 
cannot  do  a  good  service  to  his  country  openly  and 
without  deceiving  it ;  for  Λvhenever  he  openly  offers 
you  something  good  you  requite  him  by  suspecting 
that  in  some  way  he  will  secretly  profit  by  it.  Yet  even 
so,  in  view  of  the  very  great  interests  at  stake,  and 
in  so  grave  a  matter,  we  who  advise  must  regard  it 
as  our  duty  to  look  somewhat  further  ahead  than 
you  who  give  matters  only  a  brief  consideration, 
especially  smce  we  are  responsible  advisers,^  while  you 
are  irresponsible  listeners.  Indeed,  if  not  only  those 
who  gave  advice  but  also  those  who  followed  it  had  to 
suffer  alike,  you  would  show  greater  prudence  in 
your  decisions  ;  but  as  it  is,  whenever  you  meet  with 

*  It  was  open  to  any  Athenian  citizen  to  impeach  any  law 
or  decree,  as  contrary  to  some  existing  law  or  as  unjust  or 
inexpedient,  by  a  pioceeding  called  ypa<p^  ηαμαΐ'όμωΐ'. 

75 


THUCYDIDES 

YjVTLv'  αν  τύγ?;τ€  βστιν  ore  σφαΚβντΐ^  την  του 
7Γβίσαρτο<ί  μίαν  ^νώμην  ζημιοΰτβ  και  ου  τας 
ύμβτερας  αύτόη•,  αΐ  ττοΧλαΙ  ουσαι  ξυνβξήμαρτον. 

XLIV.  "  'E7<w  δε  τταρήΧθον  ούτε  άντερων  ττερί 
"ΜνηΧηναίων  ούτε  κατηΎορήσων.  ου  yap  ττερΙ 
τ/)?  εκείνων  αΒικίας  ημΐν  ο  ά'^/ων,  ei  σωφρονοΰμεν, 

2  άλλα  ττερΙ  τί)?  ημετέρας  εύβουΧίας.  ην  τε  yap 
άτΓοφΐίνω  ττάνυ  άΒίκοΰντα<ί  αυτούς,  ου  Sia  τούτο 
καΐ  άτΓ οκτεΐναι  κεΧεύσω,  ει  μη  ξυμφέρον,  ην  τε 
και  εγοντάς  τι  ξν^^νώμης,  εάν}  εΐ  rfj  ττόΧει  μη 

3  ayaOov  φαίνοιτο.  νομίζω  δέ  ττερΙ  του  με\\οντο<! 
ημάς  μάΧΧον  βουΧεύεσθαί  η  του  τταρόντος.  καΧ 
τούτο  ο  μάΧίστα  Κ,Χεων  Ισ γυρίζεται,,  ες  το  \onrbv 
ξυμφέρον  εσεσθαι  προς  το  ησσον  άφίστασθαι 
θάνατον  ζημίαν  ττροθεΐσί,  καΐ  αύτος  ττερΙ  τού  ες 
το  μεΧΧον   καΧως   εγοντος  άντισγυ  ριζά  μένος  τά- 

4  ναντία  yιyvωσκω.  και  ουκ  αζίω  υμάς  τω  εύ- 
ττρεττεΐ  τού  εκείνου  λόγοι»  το  γρήσιμον  τού  εμού 
άττωσασθαι.  Βικαιότερος  yap  ων  αυτού  ό  Xόyoς 
Ίτρος  την  νύν  ύμετεραν  opyrjv  ες  ^ίυτιΧηναίους 
τάχ'  αν  ετΓίσττάσαιτο'  ημείς  δέ  ου  Βικαζόμεθα  ττρος 
αυτούς,  ώστε  των  δίκαιων  ^είν,  άΧΧα  βουΧευό- 
μεθα  ττερϊ  αυτών,  οττως  γρησίμως  εζουσιν. 

XLV.  "  Έι^  ούν  ταΐς  ττόΧεσί  ττοΧΧών  θάνατον 
ζημίαι  ττρόκεινται  και  ουκ  'ίσων  τω8ε,  αλλ' 
εΧασσόνων     αμαρτημάτων     όμως    δε    ττ}     εΧνίδι 

*  4αν,  Lindau's  conjecture  for  eUy  of  the  MSS. 
76 


BOOK   HI.  xLiii.  5-xLv.  i 

a  reverse  you  give  way  to  your  first  impulse  and 
punish  your  adviser  for  his  single  error  of  judgment 
instead  of  yourselves^  the  multitude  who  shared  in 
the  error. 

XLIV.  "  But  I  have  come  forward  neither  as  an 
advocate  of  the  Mytilenaeans  in  opposition  to  Cleon 
nor  as  their  accuser.  For  the  question  for  us  to 
consider,  if  we  are  sensible,  is  not  what  wrong  they 
have  done,  but  what  is  the  wise  course  for  us.  For 
no  matter  how  guilty  I  βΙιοΛν  them  to  be,  I  shall  not 
on  that  account  bid  you  to  put  them  to  death, 
unless  it  is  to  our  advantage;  and  if  I  show  that  they 
have  some  claim  for  forgiveness,  I  shall  not  on  that 
account  advise  you  to  spare  their  lives,  if  this  should 
prove  clearly  not  to  be  for  the  good  of  the  state.  In 
my  opinion  we  are  deliberating  about  the  future 
rather  than  the  present.  And  as  for  the  point 
which  Cleon  especially  maintains,  that  it  will  be  to 
our  future  advantage  to  inflict  the  penalty  of  death, 
to  the  end  that  revolts  may  be  less  frequent,  I  also 
in  the  interest  of  our  future  prosperity  emphatically 
maintain  the  contrary.  And  I  beg  you  not  to  be  led 
by  the  speciousness  of  his  argument  to  reject  the 
practical  advantages  in  mine.  For  embittered  as  you 
are  toward  the  Mytilenaeans,  you  may  perhaps  be 
attracted  by  his  argument,  based  as  it  is  on  the  more 
legal  aspects  of  the  case  ;  we  are,  however,  not 
engaged  in  a  law-suit  vvith  them,  so  as  to  be  con- 
cerned about  the  question  of  right  and  wrong ;  but 
we  are  deliberating  about  them,  to  determine  what 
policy  will  make  them  useful  to  us. 

XLV.  "  Now  the  death-penalty  has  been  pre- 
scribed in  various  states  for  many  offences  Avhich  are 
not  so  serious  as   this  is,  nay,  for  minor  ones ;  but 

77 


THUCYDIDES 

€7ταιρόμ€νοι    Kivhvvevovai,  και    ούδεις  ττω   κατα- 
fyvom  εαυτού  μη  TrepieaeaOat  τω  επιβουΧεύματι 

2  ηΚ,θεν  €9  το  heivov.  ττόΧις  re  άφισταμένΐ]  τί?  ττω 
ήσσω  rfj  8οκήσ€ΐ  β'χ^ουσα  την  τταρασκβυην,  η 
οίκβίαν    ή    αΧλων   ξυμμα-χία,    τούτω    εττβ'χείρησβ; 

3  ΤΓβφύκασί  τε  ατταντε^  και  ΙΒία  και  δημοσία 
άμαρτάνβιν,  καΐ  ουκ  βστι  νομός  όστις  άττείρζει 
τούτον,  έττεί  διβξεΧηΧύθασι  ye  Βιά  ττασών  των 
ζημιών  οΐ  άνθρωττοι  ττροστιθβντες,^  ei  πως  ησσον 
άΒικοίΡΤο  ντΓΟ  των  κακούργων.  και  βίκος  το 
τταΚαι  των  με'^ιστων  αδικημάτων  μαΧακωτερας 
κεΐσθαι  αύτάς,  τταραβαινομενων  δε  τω  γ^ρόνω  ες 
τον    θάνατον  αΐ   ττολλαΐ  άνήκουσιν   και  ταντα^ 

4  όμως  τταραβαίνεται.  η  το'ινυν  δεινότερόν  η 
τούτου  δέος  ευρετίον  εστίν  ή  τόδε  >γε  ούδεν 
εττίσ'χει,  αλλ,  η  μεν  πενία  avajKr]  την  τοΧμαν 
παρέχουσα,  η  δ'  εξουσία  ΰβρει  την  ττΧεονεζίαν 
και  φρονήματι,  αί  δ'  άΧΧαι  ξυντνχίαι  opyij  ^  των 
ανθρώπων,  ώς  εκάστη  τις  κατέχεται  υπ''  ανή- 
κεστου    τίνος     κρεισσονος,     εζάγουσιν    ες    τους 

6  κινδύνους,  η  τε  εΧπΙς  καΐ  6  έρως  επι  παντί,  6 
μεν  ηγούμενος,  ή  δ'  εφεπομέιη,  και  ο  μεν  την 
επιβουΧην  εκφροντίζων,  η  δε  την  εύπορίαν  της 
τύχης  νποτιθεΐσα  πΧεΐστα  βΧάπτουσι,  και  οντά 

6  αφανή  κρείσσω  εστί  τών  ορωμένων  δεινών,  και 
η  τύχη  έπ"  αύτοΐς  ουδέν  εΧασσον  ζυμβάΧΧεται 
ες  το  έπαίρειν  άδοκήτως  yap  εστίν  οτε  παρι- 
στάμενη και  εκ  τών  υποδεεστέρων  κινδυνεύειν  τινά 

^  ττροστίθίντΐί  MSS.,  Kriiger  ιτροτιθίντα,  followed  by  Hude. 
^  Hude's  correclion.    Or,  reading  καΐ  roiro  with  the  MiSS., 
"and  still  even  this  is  disregarded." 

■^  ορΎγ  MSS.,  Stahl  opyi)v,  followed  by  Hude. 

78 


BOOK    ΠΙ.  xLv.  1-6 

nevertheless  men  are  so  inspired  by  hope  as  to  take 
the  risk ;  indeed,  no  one  ever  yet  has  entered  upon  a 
perilous  enterprise  with  the  conviction  that  his  plot 
was  condemned  to  failure.  And  as  to  states,  what 
one  that  was  meditating  revolt  ever  took  the  de- 
cisive step  in  the  belief  that  the  resources  at  hand, 
whether  its  own  or  contributed  by  its  allies,  Λvere 
inadequate  for  success  ?  All  men  are  by  nature 
prone  to  err,  both  in  private  and  in  public  life,  and 
there  is  no  law  which  will  prevent  them  ;  in  fact, 
mankind  has  run  the  whole  gamut  of  penalties, 
making  them  more  and  more  severe,  in  the  hope 
that  the  transgressions  of  evil-doers  might  be  abated. 
It  is  probable  that  in  ancient  times  the  penalties 
prescribed  for  the  greatest  offences  were  relatively 
mild,  but  as  transgressions  still  occurred,  in  course  of 
time  the  penalty  was  seldom  less  than  death.  But 
even  so  there  is  still  transgression.  Either,  then, 
some  terror  more  dreadful  than  death  must  be 
discovered,  or  we  must  own  that  death  at  least  is  no 
prevention.  Nay,  men  are  lured  into  hazardous 
enterprises  by  the  constraint  of  poverty,  which 
makes  them  bold,  by  the  insolence  and  pride  of 
affluence,  \vhich  makes  them  greedy,  and  by  the 
various  passions  engendered  in  the  other  conditions 
of  human  life  as  these  are  severally  mastered  by 
some  mighty  and  irresistible  impulse.  Then,  too, 
Hope  and  Desire  are  everyAvhere;  Desire  leads,  Hope 
attends  ;  Desire  contrives  the  plan,  Hope  suggests 
the  facility  of  fortune ;  the  two  passions  are  most 
baneful,  and  being  unseen  phantoms  prevail  over 
seen  dangers.  Besides  these,  fortune  contributes  in 
no  less  degree  to  urge  men  on  ;  for  she  sometimes 
presents  herself  unexpectedly  and  thus  tempts  men 

79 


THUCYDIDES 

trpoa^ei  και  ovy^  ησσον  τά?  ττόλείς•,  οσω  ττβρί  των 
μζ'^ίστων  re,  iX€v0€pLa<;  ή  άΧλων  άρχ^ής,  καϊ  μετά 
ττάντων  βκαστος  ά\ο^/ιστω^  έττΐ  ττΧίον  τι  aurou 
7  iBo^aaev.  άπλώ?  τε  αδύνατον  καϊ  7ΓθΧλη<;  €υη- 
θβία•;,  6στί<;  o'Urai,  της  άνθρωττείας  φύσεω? 
ορμώμενης  ττροθύμως  τι  ττράζαι,  άττοτροττην  τίνα 
εχβιν  ή  νόμων  Ισχνι  ή  αλλω  τω  Ββιιω. 

XLVI.  "  Οΰκουν  'χ^ρη  ούτε  του  θανάτου  rfj 
ζημία  ώ?  εχεγγύω  ττιστβύσαντας  -χείρον  βονΧεν• 
σασθαι,  οΰτε  άνεΧττιστον  καταστήσαί  τοις  άττο- 
στάσιν    ώ?     ουκ   earac     μετα^νώναι    καϊ    ότι    iv 

2  βραχυτάτω  την  άμαρτιαν  καταΧυσαι.  σκεψασθβ 
yap  ΟΤΙ  νυν  μεν,  ην  τίς  καϊ  άττοστάσα  ττόΧος  ιγνω 
μη  7Γ€ρί€σομ€νη,  βΧθοί  αν  e?  ξύμβασιν  Βυνατη 
ουσα  βτι  την  Ζαττάνην  άττοΒονναι  καϊ  το  Xolttov 
ίητοτεΚεΙν  εκβίνως  δε  τίνα  οϊεσθε  ηντινα  ουκ 
αμεινον  μεν  -η  νυν  τταρασκευάσεσθαι,  ττοΧιορκία 
Be  τταρατενεΐσθοί  ες  τοΰσχατον,  ει  το  αυτό  Βύνα- 

3  Tat  σχολ^  καϊ  ταχύ  ξυμβήναι;  ημΐν  τε  ττως  ου 
βΧάβη  Βαπανάν  καθημενοις  Bta  το  άξύμβατον,  καϊ 
ην  εΧωμεν,  ττοΧιν  εφθαρμενην  τταραΧαβεΐν  καϊ  της 
προσοΒου  το  Xolttov  άττ  αυτής  στερεσθαι  ;   1(τχύ- 

4  ομεν  Βε  ττρος  τους  ττοΧεμίους  τωΒε.  ώστε  ου  Βικα- 
στας  οντάς  Βεΐ  ημάς  μάΧΧον  των  εζαμαρτανόντων 
ακριβείς  βΧάτττεσθαί  ή  όράν  οττως  ες  τον  εττειτα 
8ο 


BOOK    III.  xLv.  6-XLvi.  4 

to  take  risks  even  when  their  resources  are  inade- 
quate, and  states  even  more  than  men,  inasmuch  as 
the  stake  is  the  greatest  of  all — their  own  freedom 
or  empire  over  others — and  the  individual,  when 
supported  by  the  Λvhole  people,  unreasonably  over- 
estimates his  own  strength.  In  a  Λvord,  it  is  im- 
possible, and  a  mark  of  extreme  simplicity,  for  any- 
one to  imagine  that  Λvhen  human  nature  is  whole- 
heartedly bent  on  any  undertaking  it  can  be  diverted 
from  it  by  rigorous  laws  or  by  any  other  terror. 

XLVI.  "We  must  not,  therefore,  so  pin  our  faith 
to  the  penalty  of  death  as  a  guarantee  against  re- 
volt as  to  make  the  wrong  decision,  or  lead  our 
rebellious  subjects  to  believe  that  there  will  be  no 
chance  for  them  to  repent  and  in  the  briefest  time 
possible  put  an  end  to  their  error.  Consider  ηολν : 
according  to  your  present  policy  ^  if  a  city  has  re- 
volted and  then  realizes  that  it  Λνϊΐΐ  fail,  it  may  come 
to  terms  Avhile  still  able  to  pay  the  indemnity  and  to 
keep  up  its  tribute  in  the  future  ;  but,  in  the  other 
case,  what  city,  think  you,  will  not  prepare  itself 
more  thoroughly  than  now,  and  hold  out  in  siege  to 
the  last  extremity,  if  it  makes  no  difference  whether 
it  capitulates  quickly  or  at  its  leisure  ?  And  as 
for  us,  how  can  we  fail  to  suflTer  loss,  incurring  the 
expense  of  besieging  a  city  because  it  will  not 
surrender,  and,  if  Λve  capture  it,  recovering  one  that 
is  ruined,  and  losing  thereafter  the  revenue  from  it — 
the  source  of  our  strength  against  our  enemies  .''  We 
must  not,  therefore,  be  such  rigorous  judges  of  the 
delinquents  as  to  suffer  harm  ourselves,  but  we  must 
rather  see  ho\v  for  the  time  to  come,  by  punishing 

^  Athens  had  not  been  accustomed  to  treat  secession  from 
the  alliance  as  treason  piinisliable  with  death  for  the  men 
and  slavery  for  the  women  and  children. 

8i 


THUCYDIDES 

'χ^ρόνον  μβτρίως  κοΧάζοντες  ταΐς  ττοΧβσιν  βξομβν 
6?  γ^ρημάτων  Xoyov  Ισ-χυουσαΐ'ί  -χ^ρήσθαι,  και  την 
φνΧακην  μη  άττο  των  νόμων  της  Ββινότητος  άξιουν 
7Γ0ί€Ϊσθαί,  αλλ'  άττό  των  ερ^ων  της   β-πιμβΧειας. 

5  ου  νυν  τουναντίον  Βρωντες,  ην  τίνα  eXeuOepov  και 
βία  άρ'χ^ομενον  είκοτως  ττρος  αυτονομιαν  αττο- 
στάντα   ■χ^ειρωσώμεθα,   χαλεττώς   οΐόμεθα   'χρήναι 

6  τιμωρβΐσθαι.  χρη  δε  τους  βΧβυθερους  ουκ  άφί- 
σταμβνους  σφόΒρα  κοΧάζειν,  άλλα  ιτριν  αττοστήναί 
σφό8ρα  φυΧάσσβιν  καΐ  ττροκαταΧαμβανείν  Όττως 
μη^"  €ς  έττίνοιαν  τούτου  ϊωσι,  κρατησαντας  τβ  δτί 
eV'  iXa-χ^ιστον  την  αΐτίαν  ΐττιφ^ρβιν. 

XLVII.   "  'Ύμ€Ϊς  δέ  σκέψασθε  όσον  αν  καϊ  τούτο 

2  άμαρτάνοίτε  ΚΧέωνι  ττειθόμενοί,  νυν  μεν  yap 
υμΐν  6  Βήμος  εν  πάσαις  ταΐς  ττοΧεσιν  εΰνους 
εστί  καϊ  η  ου  ξυναφίσταται  τοις  6XLyoις  η,  εαν 
βιασθτ],  ύττάρχ^εί  τοις  άττοστήσασί  ττοΧεμιος 
ευθύς,  καϊ  της  άντικαθ  ιστάμενης  ττόΧεως  το 
ττΧήθος  ξύμμαχον  έχοντες  ες  ττόΧεμον  επερχεσθε. 

3  ει  δε  8ιαφθερεΐτ€  τον  Βήμον  τον  ΜυτιΧηναίων, 
ος  ούτε  μετεσχε  της  αποστάσεως,  εττειΒη  τ€ 
οττΧων  εκράτησεν,  εκών  τταρεΒωκε  την  ττοΧιν, 
•πρώτον  μεν  άΒικησετε  τους  εύεpyετaς  κτεινοντες, 
εττειτα  καταστήσετε  τοις  Βυνατοΐς  των  ανθρώπων 
ο  βούΧονται  μάΧιστα•  άφιστάντες  yap  τας  ττόΧεις 
τον  δήμον  ευθύς  ξύμμαχον  εξουσι  ττροΒειξάντων 
υμών  την  αύτην  ζημίαν  τοις  τε  άΒικονσιν  ομοίως 

82 


BOOK    III.  XLVi.  4-XLVii.  3 

moderately,  we  may  have  at  our  service  dependent 
cities  that  are  strong  in  material  resources  ;  and  we 
must  deem  it  proper  to  protect  ourselves  against 
revolts,  not  by  the  terror  of  our  laws,  but  rather  by 
the  vigilance  of  our  administration.  At  present  we 
do  just  the  opposite  :  whenever  a  free  people  that 
is  forced  into  subjection  revolts,  as  it  naturally  will, 
in  order  to  recover  its  independence,  we  think  that, 
as  soon  as  Λve  have  subdued  it,  we  must  punish  it 
severely.  We  ought,  on  the  contrary,  instead  of 
rigorously  chastising  free  peoples  when  they  revolt, 
to  watch  them  rigorously  before  they  revolt,  and 
thus  forestall  their  even  thinking  of  such  a  thing  ; 
and  when  we  have  subdued  a  revolt,  we  ought  to 
put  the  blame  on  as  {ew  as  possible.^ 

XLVII.  "And  do  you  consider,  too,  how  great  a 
mistake  you  would  make  in  another  point  also  by 
following  Cleon's  advice.  At  the  present  time  the 
populace  of  all  the  cities  is  well  disposed  to  you,  and 
either  does  not  join  with  the  aristocrats  in  revolting, 
or,  if  forced  to  do  so,  is  hostile  from  the  beginning 
to  those  who  stirred  up  the  revolt ;  and  so,  when 
you  go  to  war,  you  have  the  populace  of  the  rebellious 
city  as  your  allies.  If,  however,  you  destroy  the 
poj)ulace  in  Mytilene,  which  took  no  part  in  the 
revolt,  and  which  voluntarily  put  the  city  into  your 
hands  as  soon  as  it  got  hold  of  arms,  in  the  first 
place  you  will  be  guilty  of  killing  your  benefactors, 
and,  in  the  second  place,  you  Λνϋΐ  bring  about  what 
the  influential  men  most  wish  :  the  next  time  they 
instigate  a  revolt  among  our  allies  they  will  at  once 
have  the  populace  on  their  side,  because  you  will 
have  published  it  abroad  that  the  same  punishment 

^  In  answer  to  Cleon's  demand,  ch.  xxxix.  6. 

83 


THUCYDIDES 

4  κεΐσθαι  και  τοΐ^  μι'].  Set  Be,  καΐ  el  ηΒίκησαν,  μη 
προστΓΟίεΐσθαι,  οττως   ο  μόνον  ημΐν  en  ξύμμαχόν 

δ  εστί  μη  ττολε/ϋοι^  'γένηται.  καΐ  τούτο  ττολλω 
ξυμφορώτ€ρον  ηηονμαι  e?  την  κάθεξιν  της  άρ'χ^Ρ]ς, 
€κόντα<;  ημα<;  άΒικηβήναι  η  δικαίως  οϋ<;  μη  Bel 
Βιαφθ€Ϊραί•  καΐ  το  ΚΧβωνος  το  αύτο  Βίκαιον  καί 
ξύμφορον  τή'ζ  τιμωρίας  ούχ^  eipiaKeTat  iv  αύτω 
Βυνατον  ον  αμα  '^ιην^σθαι. 

XLVIII.  *'  'TyLtetf  δε  <yvovTe<i  άμάνω  τάδε  elvai 
καϊ  μητβ  οίκτω  ττΧέον  v€Lμavτeς  μητ  ewieiKeia, 
οί?  ουδέ  εγώ  εω  TrpoaayeaOai,  άττ'  αυτών  Be  των 
τταραιί'ουμένων  ττειί^εσ^ε  μοι  ^ΙυτίΧηναίων  ους 
μ€ν  Ώά'χ^ης  άττέττεμψεν  ώς  άΒικοΰντας  κρΐναι  καθ^ 

2  ησυγίαν,  τους  δ'  αΧλους  eav  οίκεΐν.  τάδε  yap 
ε?  τε  το  μέΧΧον  ayada  καϊ  τοις  ττολε/χίοί?  ηΒη 
φοβερά'  όστις  yap  el•  βουΧεύ€ται  προς  τους 
εναντίους  κρείσσων  εστίν  η  μετ  €pyωv  Ισγύος 
άνοια  ετΓΐών.^ 

XLIX.  Τοιαύτα  δε  6  ΑιόΒοτος  είττεν.  ρη- 
θεισών  Be  των  yvωμώv  τούτων  μάΧιστα  άντι- 
ττάΧων  ττρος  άΧΧήΧας  οι  Αθηναίοι  ηΧθον  μεν 
ες  aycbva  όμως  ^  της  Βόξης  και  eyevovTO  εν  τη 
■χειροτονία  άyχώμaXoι,   εκ:ράτησε   Βε  η   του  Αιο- 

2  δότου.  και  τριήρη  ευθύς  άΧΧην  άττεστεΧΧον 
κατά  στΓουΒήν,  οττως  μη  φθασάσης  της  ττροτερας- 
εύρωσι     Βιεφθαρμενην     την    ττοΧιν      ττροεΐχε     Βε 

3  ημέρα  και  νυκτΐ  μάΧιστα.  τταρασκευασάντων  Βε 
των    ^ΙυτιΧηναίων    πρέσβεων    τη    νηΐ    οίνον    κα\ 

^  ομ.ω$,  with  MSS.  Bredow  emends  to  δμοίω$,  followed 
by  Hilda. 

2  Trporepas,  generally  adopted,  Valla  and  a  few  MSS., 
against  Seurepas  or  kripas  of  other  MSS. 

84 


BOOK    III.  xLvii.  3-xLix.  3 

is  ordained  for  the  innocent  and  for  the  guilty. 
Why,  even  if  they  were  guilty,  you  should  pretend 
not  to  know  it,  to  the  end  that  the  only  class  that  is 
still  friendly  to  us  may  not  become  hostile.  And  it  is,  1 
think,  far  more  conducive  to  the  maintenance  of  our 
dominion,  that  we  should  Avillingly  submit  to  be 
wronged,  than  that  we  should  destroy,  however 
justly,  those  whom  Ave  ought  not  to  destroy.  And 
Avhereas  Cleon  claims  ^  that  this  punisliment  com- 
bines justice  and  expediency,  it  appears  that  in  such 
a  policy  the  two  cannot  be  combined. 

XLVllI.  "Do  you,  then,  recognize  that  mine  is  the 
better  course,  and  Avithout  being  unduly  swayed  by 
either  pity  or  clemency — for  neither  would  I  have 
you  influenced  by  such  motives — but  simply  Aveigh- 
ing  the  considerations  1  have  urged,  accede  to  my 
proposal  :  pass  sentence  at  your  leisure  upon  the 
Mytilenaeans  whom  Paches  sent  here  as  guilty,^ 
but  let  the  rest  dwell  in  peace.  Such  a  course  will 
be  best  for  the  future,  and  will  cause  alarm  among 
our  enemies  at  once  ;  for  he  who  is  wise  in  counsel  is 
stronger  against  the  foe  than  he  who  recklessly 
ruslies  on  with  brute  force." 

XLIX.  Such  was  the  speech  of  Diodotus.  And 
after  these  opinions  had  been  maintained  with  nearly 
equal  force,  the  one  against  the  other,  the  Athenians, 
in  spite  of  the  reaction,  experienced  such  a 
conflict  ot  opinion  that  in  the  show  of  hands  they 
were  about  equally  divided  ;  but  the  view  of  Diodotus 
prevailed.  They  then  immediately  despatched  a 
second  trireme  Avith  all  haste,  hoping  that  the  first 
trireme,  which  had  the  start  by  about  a  day  and  a 
night,  might  not  arrive  first  and  the  city  be  found 
destroyed.     The  Mytilenaean  envoys  provided  wine 

*  cf.  ch.  xl.  4.  "  cf,  ch.  XXXV.  1. 

^5 


THUCYDIDES 

άΧφίτα  καΐ  /χεγάλα  ΰττοσγ^ομενων,  el  φθασβιαν, 
eyevero  σττουΒη  του  ττλοΟ  τοιαύτη  ώστε  ησθιόν  re 
άμα  iXauvoi>T€<;  οΐνω  καΐ  βΧαίω  άΧφιτα  ττΐφνρ- 
μένα,    καΐ    οι   μβν   ϋττνον  rjpovi'ro   κατά  μβρο<;,   οι 

4  8e  ηΧαυνον.  κατά  τύχ^ην  Be  7Γν€ύματο<ί  ovBevo^ 
εναντιωθβντος  και  της  μίν  ττροτέρας  νβώς  ου 
στΓονΒ-ρ  ττΧεούσης  errX  ιτραημα  άΧΧόκοτον,  ταύτη<; 
Be  τοιούτω  τρόττω  €π€ΐ'•/ομ€ρΐ]ς,  η  μεν  έφθασε 
τοσούτον  όσον  ΐΐαχ^ητα  ανε^νωκίναι  το  -ψήφισμα 
καΧ  μεΧΧειν  Βράσειν  τα  ΒεΒο^μενα,  η  δ'  υστέρα 
αύτή<;  ετηκατά^εται  καΐ  ΒιεκώΧνσε  μη  Βιαφθεΐραι. 
■πάρα  τοσούτον  μεν  η  ΜυτιΧήνη  ηΧθε  κινΒύνου. 

L.  Τού?  δ'  άΧΧου<;  avBpa<i  ους  6  Ι1ά-χ^η<;  άττέ- 
ττεμψεν  ώ?  αίτιωτάτους  οντάς  της  αποστάσεως 
Κ,Χεωνος  ^νώμτ]  Βιεφθειραν  οι  ^Αθηναίοι  {ήσαν  Βε 
οΧί^ω   ττΧείους  'χ^ίΧίων),  καΐ  ^ίυτιΧηναΙων  τεί'χτι 

2  καθεΐΧον  καΐ  ναύς  τταρεΧαβον.  ύστερον  Βε  φόρον 
μεν  ουκ  έταζαν  Χεσβίοις,  κΧήρους  Βε  ττοιήσαντες 
της  γης  ΊίΧην  της  \1ηθνμναίων  τρισχ^ιΧίους,  τρια- 
κόσιους μεν  τοις  θεοϊς  Ιερούς  εξεΐΧον,  εττΧ  Βε  τους 
άΧΧους  σφων  αύτων  κΧηρουχ^ους  τους  Χα-χ^οντας 
άττέττεμψαν  οϊς  αρηΰριον  Αεσβιοι  ταζάμενοι  τού 
κΧηρου    έκαστου    τού    εΐ'ίαυτού  Βυο  μνάς   φέρειν 


1  Usually  the  barley-meal  was  mixed  with  water  and 
oil. 

^  Λ  crew  ordinarily  stopped  for  meals  and  rested  at  anchor 
at  night. 

^  Paohes  was  accused  of  shameful  deeds  of  violence  toward 
Lesbian  men  and  women  (Agath.   Epigr.   Ivii.),   and   when 

86 


BOOK    III.  xLix.  3-L.  2 

and  barley  for  the  crew  and  promised  a  large  re>vard 
if  they  should  arrive  in  time ;  and  such  was  their 
haste  on  the  voyage  that  they  kept  on  rowing  as 
thev  ate  their  barley-cakes,  kneaded  with  wine  and 
oil/  and  took  turns  at  sleeping  and  roAving.-  And 
since  by  good  fortune  no  contrary  wind  arose,  and 
the  earlier  ship  was  sailing  in  no  hurry  on  so  horrible 
a  business,  while  the  second  pressed  on  in  the 
manner  described,  although  the  former  did  in  fact 
arrive  first,  so  that  Paches  had  just  time  enough  to 
read  the  decree  and  was  about  to  execute  the  orders, 
the  second  put  in  close  after  it  and  prevented  the 
destruction  of  the  city.  By  just  so  much  did 
Mytilene  escape  its  peril. 

L.  The  rest  of  the  men,  however,  whom  Paches  ^ 
had  sent  to  Athens  as  chief  authors  of  the  revolt, 
numbering  somewhat  more  than  a  thousand,^  were 
put  to  death  by  the  Athenians  on  the  motion  of 
Cleon.  They  also  pulled  down  the  walls  of  Mytilene 
and  took  possession  of  the  Mytilenaean  fleet.  After- 
awards,  instead  of  imposing  a  tribute  upon  the 
Lesbians,  they  divided  all  the  land  except  that  of  the 
Methymnaeans  into  three  thousand  allotments,  and 
reserving  three  hundred  of  these  as  sacred  to  the 
gods  they  sent  out  Athenian  colonists,  chosen  by 
lot,  to  occupy  the  rest.  With  these  the  Lesbians 
made  an  arrangement  to  pay  a  rental  of  two  minas  a 
year^  for  each  lot,  they  themselves  to  cultivate  the 

brought  to  trial  committed  suicide  in  the  presence  of  his 
judges. 

*  On  the  ground  that  so  large  a  number  is  incompatible 
with  ch.  xxviii.  1,2;  xxxv.  1,  8teup  conjectures  τριάκοντα 
(Λ'  for  ,Λ). 

'  The  whole  rental  amounting  to  90  talents;  £18,000; 
$87,300. 

87 


THUCYDIDES 

3  αντοί  εΙρΎαζοντο  την  yrjv.  τταρέΧαβον  δε  και  τα 
iv  TTJ  ηπείρφ  ττολίσματα  οΐ  ^Αθηναίοι  όσων 
^ΙντιΧηναΐοί  βκράτονν,  και  ύττήκουον  νστβρον 
^Αθηναίων,  τα  μβν  κατά  Αβσβον  οΰτως  iyeveTO. 
LT.  Έι/  δε  τω  αύτω  θβρει  μβτά  την  Αέσβου 
αΚωσιν  ^Αθηναίοι  Νικίον  του  Νικηράτου  στρατη- 
yovvTO^  έστράτευσαν  βττϊ  Μινώαν  την  νησον,  η 
κ€Ϊταί   ττρο   Μεγά/ίωΐ'•   βχρώντο   δε    αύτη    rrvpyov 

2  €νοίκο8ομ}']σαντ€ς  οι  ^ieyaprj^  φρουρίω.  ζβού- 
λετο  δε  ^ικία<ί  την  φυΧακην  avToOev  Βί  ε'λάσ- 
σονοζ  τοις  ^Αθηναίοις  καΐ  μη  άττο  του  ΉουΒόρου 
καΐ  της  ^αΧαμΐνος  elvai,  τους  τε  ΐΙβΧοττοννη- 
σίους  οττως  μη  ττοιώνταί  βκττΧους  αύτόθβν  Χαν- 
θάνοντβς  τριηρών  τε,  οΐον  καΐ  τον  πρΙν  ^ενόμενον, 
κα\    Χηστών     έκττομτταΐς,    τοις    τε     ^Ιεγαρεύσιν 

3  αμα  μηΒεν  έσττΧεΐν.  ίΧων  οΰν  άττο  της  Νί- 
σαίας  ττρωτον  δύο  ττύργω  ττρούχ^οντε  μηχ^αναΐς 
€κ  θαλάσσης  και  τον  εσττΧουν  ε'?  το  μεταξύ  της 
νησον  εΧευθερωσας  άττετείχ^ιζε  καΐ  το  εκ  της  ηπεί- 
ρου,  η   κατά,    ιγεφυραν   8ιά  τενάγους   εττιβοήθεια 

4  ην  τη  νήσω  ού  τΓοΧύ  Βίε)(θύση  της  ηττειρου.  ώς  δε 
τούτο  εξειρ^άσαντο  εν  ήμεραις  6XL•yaις,  ύστερον 
8η  καΐ  εν  τη  νήσω  τείχος  ^  ε'γΛταταλίττών  καΐ 
φρουραν  άνεχώρησε  τω  στρατω. 

*  τβΓχοϊ — the   text  is   probabl}'  corrupt,   the  verb    being 
omitted. 

^  cf.  IV.  lii.  3,  where  tliey  are  called  άκταΐαι  πόλευ. 

"^  Referring  to  BrasiJas'  attempt,  described  ii.  xciii.,  xciv. 

88 


BOOK    III.  L.  2-Li.  4 

land.  The  Athenians  also  took  possession  of  all  the 
towns  on  the  mainland  which  the  Mytilenaeans 
controlled,^  and  these  were  thereafter  subject  to  the 
Athenians.  Such  was  the  course  of  events  at  Lesbos. 
LI.  In  the  same  summer,  after  the  capture  of 
Lesbos,  the  Athenians,  under  the  command  of  Nicias 
son  of  Niceratus,  made  an  expedition  against  the 
island  of  Minoa,  which  lies  in  front  of  Megara 
and  was  used  as  a  garrison-station  by  the  Me- 
garians,  who  had  built  a  tower  upon  it.  But 
Nicias  was  desirous  that  the  watch  which  the  Athe- 
nians kept  should  be  maintained  at  that  point, 
which  would  be  at  closer  range  for  them,  instead  of 
at  Budonim  in  Salamis,  the  purpose  of  the  watch 
being  to  prevent  the  Peloponnesians  from  using  the 
harbour  of  Megara  as  a  base  from  which  to  send 
out  unobserved  either  triremes,  as  they  had  done 
once  before,-  or  expeditions  of  privateers,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  see  to  it  that  nothing  Avas  brought  in 
by  sea  for  the  Megarians.  Accordingly,  by  an 
attack  from  the  sea  he  took  by  means  of  engines  of 
\var  two  projecting  towers — first  that  on  the  island 
opposite  Nisaea — and  when  he  had  thus  cleared  the 
way  into  the  channel  between  the  island  and  the 
mainland  he  walled  off  also  the  point  on  the  side 
toward  the  mainland,  where  by  a  bridge  across  a 
morass  aid  could  be  brought  to  the  island,  which  is 
not  far  distant  from  the  mainland.•*  And  when,  after 
a  few  days,  this  work  Avas  completed,  Nicias  built  a 
fort  on  the  island  also,  left  a  garrison  in  it,  and  then 
withdrew  his  army  to  Athens. 

*  This  seems  to  be  the  sense  intended.  The  passage  is 
very  much  condensed  or  corrupt.  Tlie  two  towers  seem  to 
have  stood  on  tlie  strait  between  Minoa  and  tlie  mainland, 
one  on  each  side,  at  the  end  of  dams  built  out  to  narrow  the 
strait. 

vol..  II,  η     °9 


THUCYDIDES 

LIT.  'ΤτΓο  δε  τού^  αυτούς  'χ^ρόνονς  του  θέρους 
τούτου  και  οι  ΤίΧαταιής  ούκετί  βχ^οντες  σΐτον 
ονΒε    Βυνάμενοί     ττοΧιορκεΐσθαι     ξυνεβησαν    τοις 

2  ΐΙεΧοτΓοννησίοις  τοιω8ε  τρόττω.  ττροσεβαΧον 
αύτό)ν  τω  τείχει,  οΐ  8ε  ουκ  έόύναντο  αμΰνεσθαι. 
ηνους  δε  ο  Κακε^αιμόνιος  άρχ^ων  την  ασθενειαν 
αυτών  βία  μεν  ουκ  εβούΧετο  εΚεΙν  (είρημενον  yap 
ην  ^  αύτω  εκ  ΑακεΒαίμονος,  οττως,  ει  σττονΒαΙ  yi- 
yvoivTO  τΓΟτε  προς  'Αθηναίους  καΐ  ^vyy^wpolev 
όσα  τΓοΧεμω  γ^ωρία  εχουσιν  εκάτεροι  άττούι,οοσθαι, 
μη  άνάΒοτος  εΐη  η  Πλάταια  ώς  αύτό)ν  εκοντων 
ττροσχ^ωρησάντων),  ττροσπεμττεί  δε  αύτοΐς  κήρυκα 
\kyovTa,  ει  βούΧονται  τταραΖονναι  την  ττόΧιν  εκόν- 
τες  τοις  ΑακεΕαιμονίοις  καΐ  Βικασταΐς  εκείνοις 
•χ^ρησασθαι,  τους  τε  άΒίκους  κοΧάσειν,  τταρά  Βίκην 

3  δε  ούΒενα.  τοσαΰτα  μεν  ο  κήρυξ  είττεν  οι  δε 
{ήσαν  yap  ηόη  εν  τω  άσθενεστ(ΐτω)  τταρεδοσαν 
την  ττοΧίν.  καϊ  τους  ΐίΧαταιάς  έτρεφαν  οι 
ΙΙεΧοττοννησιοι  ημέρας  τινάς,  εν  οσω  οι  εκ  της 
Αακεδαίμονος   Βικασταί,  πέντε  άνΒρες,  άφίκοντο. 

4  εΧθόντων  δε  αυτών  κaτηyopLa  μεν  ούΒεμία  πρου- 
τεθη,  ηρώτων  δε  αυτούς  επικαΧεσάμενοί  τοσούτον 
μόνον,  εϊ  τί  ΑακεΒαι μονίους  καϊ  τους  ζυμμά'χ^ους 
εν  τω  ποΧέμω   τω   καθεστώτι   (^/αθον  τί   είpyaσ- 

5  μενοί  είσίν.  οι  δ'  €Xεyov  αΐτησάμενοο  μακρότερα 
εΙπεΙν  καϊ  προτάζαντες  σφών  αυτών  Αστύμα)(όν 
τε  τον'ΑσωποΧάου  καϊ  Αακωνα  τον  Αίειμνι/στου, 

'  ήν,  brackeied  by  Hude,  as  not  read  by  the  Scholiast. 
90 


BOOK    III.  Lii.  1-5 

— '  LII.  During  this  summer  and  about  the  same 
time,  the  Plataeans,^  who  were  now  Λvitllout  food  and 
could  endure  the  siege  no  longer,  surrendered  to  the 
Peloponnesians.  It  happened  in  the  following  manner. 
An  assault  was  in  progress  upon  their  wall  and  they 
were  unable  to  repel  it.  The  Lacedaemonian  com- 
mander recognised  their  weakness  ;  but  he  did  not 
wish  to  take  Plataea  by  storm,  for  he  had  received 
orders  to  this  effect  from  Sparta,  to  the  end  that^ 
if  ever  a  treaty  of  peace  should  be  made  with  the 
Athenians  and  the  Lacedaemonians  should  consent 
that  all  the  places  each  had  taken  in  war  should  be 
given  back,  Plataea  might  not  have  to  be  given  up, 
on  the  ground  that  its  inhabitants  had  gone  over  to 
Sparta  voluntarily.  So  he  sent  a  herald  to  them  to 
say  that  if  they  ΛνουΜ  of  their  own  accord  deliver 
their  city  into  the  hands  of  the  Lacedaemonians  and 
sul)mit  to  their  decisions  they  would  punish  the 
guilty,  but  none  contrary  to  justice.  The  herald 
made  this  proposal,  and  they,  since  they  were  now  in 
the  last  stage  of  Aveakness,  surrendered  the  city. 
And  the  Peloponnesians  fed  the  Plataeans  for  some 
days,  until  the  judges,  five  in  number,  arrived  from 
Lacedaemon.  When  they  came  no  accusation  was 
brought  against  the  Plataeans,  but  they  were  sum- 
moned by  the  judges  and  asked  this  single  question  : 
"  Have  you  rendered  any  good  service  to  the  Lace- 
daemonians and  their  allies  in  the  present  war.''" 
The  Plataeans,  however,  begged  to  be  allowed  to 
speak  at  greater  length,  and  appointed  as  their 
spokesmen  Astymachus  son  of  Asopolaus  and  Lacon 
son    of  Aeimnestus,    who    Avas    a    proxenus    of   the 

*  Resuming  the  narrative  from  the  end  of  ch.  xxiv. 

91 


THUCYDIDES 

Ίτρόζενον   οντά    Αακεδαιμονίων    και    €7Γ€Χθ6ντ€<; 
eXeyov  roulBe. 

LIII.  "Την  μ€ν  τταράζοσιν  τή^  ττόλβω?,  ω 
Αακεδαιμόιηοι,  ττιστενσαντες  νμΐν  ^ιτοιησάμεθα, 
ου  TOLuvte  Βίκην  οίομενοι  υφεζβιν,  νομιμωτβραν 
8e  τίνα  eaeaOai,  καΐ  iv  Βικασταΐς  ουκ  αν  άΧΧοις 
Ββξάμενοι,   ωσπερ    καΐ    βσμβν,  yevkcOai   η   υμΐν,^ 

2  η'^/ούμ€νοι  το  Ισον  μαΧιστ  αν  φβρεσθαι.  νυν  δε 
φοβούμεθα  μη  αμφοτέρων  άμα  ημαρτήκαμεν 
τον  τ€  'yap  αηωνα  trepi  των  Ββινοτάτων  elvai  eiKo- 
τως  υτΓΟτττεύομζν  καΐ  υμάς  μη  ου  κοινοί  άττοβητε, 
τεκμαιρόμενοι  ττροκατη'^/οριας  τ€  ημών  ου  jrpoye- 
ηβνημενης  η  χρη  άντειττεΐν  (αλλ'  αύτοΙ  \oyov 
τιτησάμεθα)  τό  τ€  εττερώτημα  βραχύ  6ν,  ω  τα 
μεν  άΧηθή  άτΓοκρίνασθαι  εναντία  ηίηνεται,  τα  δε 

3  ψενΒή  εΧεγχ^ον  έχει.  ττανταχόθεν  δε  άποροι 
καθεστώτες  άνα^καζόμεθα  και  άσφαΧεστερον 
Ζοκεϊ  είναι  είττόντας  τι  κιν^υνεύειν  και  yap  ό  μη 
ρ7]θεΙς  λόγο?   τοις  ώδ'  εχουσιν  αΐτίαν  αν  τταρά- 

4  σχοι  ως,  el  εΧέχθη,  σωτήριος  αν  ην.     χαΧεττώς 

δε    έχει    ημΐν    ττρος    τοις    άΧΧοις    και    ή    πειθώ. 

άyvώ^ες  μεν  yap  οντες  άΧΧιίΧων  επεσεvεyκάμεvoι 

μαρτυρία  ων  άπειροι   ήτε  ώφεΧουμεθ    άν  νυν  δε 

προς  εΙΒότας  πάντα  ΧεΧε^εται,^  καΐ  ΒέΒιμεν  ούχΙ 

1  ij  νμΐν,  bracketed  by  Hnde,  as  seemingly  not  read  by  the 
Scholiast.  -  AeXf'|eToi,  Hude  reads  λίξ^ται  with  C. 

*  Public  host  or  consul.  He  had  commanded  the  Plataean 
lontingent  at  Marathon. 

92 


BOOK    III.  Lii.  5-uii.  4 

Lacedaemonians.^     These    men    came    fnrward    and 
spoke  as  follows : 

LIII.  "  VV'hen  we  surrendered  our  city,  Lacedae- 
monians, trusting  in  your  good  faith,  we  liad  no 
thought  that  we  should  have  to  undergo  a  trial  like 
this,  but  supposed  it  would  be  a  more  regular  pro- 
cedure ;  and  when  we  consented  to  be  on  trial  before 
you  and  you  alone  as  judges,  as  Λve  now  are,  we 
believed  that  we  should  be  most  likely  to  obtain  fair 
treatment.  But  now  we  fear  that  we  have  been 
disappointed  in  both  expectations ;  for  we  have 
good  reason  to  suspect,  not  only  that  the  issues 
involved  in  the  trial  are  of  the  gravest  nature  ^  but 
also  that  you  will  not  prove  to  be  impartial  judges. 
These  inferences  we  draw  from  the  fact  that  no 
accusation  was  first  brought  against  us  requiring  a 
plea  in  defence,  but  we  have  had  to  ask  leave  to 
speak,  and  that  the  question  Λvhich  is  put  to  us  is  so 
curt  that  a  truthful  answer  to  it  is  against  our 
interests,  while  a  false  one  can  be  exposed  at  once. 
But  beset  as  we  are  with  perplexities  on  every  hand, 
we  are  forced,  as  indeed  seems  to  be  the  safer  course, 
to  say  something  and  take  the  risk;  for  to  men  in  our 
condition  not  to  have  spoken  would  cause  us  after- 
wards to  reproach  ourselves  Avith  the  thought  that, 
had  the  word  been  spoken,  it  would  have  saved  us. 
A  further  difficulty  in  our  position  is  the  task  of 
convincing  you.  For  if  we  were  strangers  to  each 
other,  we  might  find  it  to  our  advantage  to  introduce 
evidence  on  matters  with  which  you  were  un- 
acquainted ;  but  as  it  is,  anything  that  we  shall  say  is 
already  knoΛvn  to  you,  and  what  λ\e  fear  is,  not  that 

'  i.e.  that  their  very  lives  were  at  stake,  whereas  they 
had  expected,  after  capitulation,  that  in  the  formal  trial 
there  could  be  no  question  of  capital  punishment. 

93 


THUCYDIDES 

μη  τιροκατα^νόντες  ημών  τα<;  άρβτας  ησσον<;  eivat, 
των  ύμετβρων  e<yκ\ημa  αύτο  ττοίήτε,  άλλα  μη 
άλλοίς•  χάριν  φβροντβς  eVl  ^ί£'^νωσμίν^)ν  κρίσιν 
καθιστώ  μέθα. 

LIV.  "  Παρεχόμβνοι  δε  όμως  α  €χομ€ν  δίκαια 
7Γ/ο09  Τ€  τα  %ηβαίων  διάφορα  καΐ  €<;  υμάς  καΐ 
τους  άΧλους  "ΚλΧηνας,  τών  el•  ΒεΒραμβί'ων  ύττό- 
μνησιν     ττοιησόμβθα     καΐ     ττβίθειν    ττβιρασομβθα. 

2  φαμβν  yap  προς  το  ερώτημα  το  βραχύ,  el  τι 
Αακε^αιμονίους  καΧ  τους  Συμμάχους  ev  τω  ττολβ- 
μω  Ttohe  ά^αθον  ττεττοΐΊ^καμβν,  et,  μεν  ώς  ττοΧεμι- 
ους  ερωτάτε,  ουκ  άΒικεΐσθαι  υμάς  μη  ευ  τταθόν- 
τας,    φίΧους     Be    νομίζοντας    αυτούς    άμαρτάνειν 

3  μάΧλον  τους  ημίν  εττιστρατεύσαντας.  τα  δ  εν 
τη  elprjvr)  καΐ  ττρος  τον  Μ/}δον  αγαθοί  ηεηενημεθα, 
την  μεν  ου  Χύσαντες  νυν  πρότεροι,  τω  8ε  ξυνεπι- 
θεμεΐΌΐ   τότε  ες   εΧευθερίαν   της   Έλλάδο?   μονοί 

4  Βοιωτών,  καϊ  yap  ηπειρώταί  τε  οντες  εναυμαχή- 
σαμεν  εττ  *Αρτεμισίω,  μάχτ]  τε  ttj  εν  τη  ημέτερα 
yrj  yεvoμεvr)  ^Γapεyevόμεθa  ύμΐν  τε  καϊ  ΥΙαυσανια' 
εϊ  τε  τι  άΧΧο  κατ  εκείνον  τον  χρόνον  εγενετο 
ετΓΐκίνΒυνον  τοις  "ΕιΧΧησι,  πάντων  παρά  Βυναμιν 

5  μετεσχομεν.  και  ύμΐν,  ώ  Αακεοαιμονιοι,  ιοια, 
οτεπερ  8η  μeyιστoς  φόβος  περιέστη  την  Χπάρτην 
μετά  τον  σεισμον  τών  ες    Ιθώμην   ΚιΧωτων  άπο- 

'  Referring  to  the  achievements  of  the  Plataeans  in  the 
Persian  wars. 

-  i.e.  the  Thebans.  With  bitter  irony  the  Plataeans 
ascribe      to      themselves      the     evident     purpose     of     the 


94 


BOOK    HI.  Liii.  4-uv.  5 

you  have  already  judged  our  virtues^  to  be  inferior  to 
your  own  and  now  make  that  a  charge  against  us, 
but  that  in  order  to  gratify  others  ^  we  are  to  appear 
before  a  court  that  has  already  decided  against  us. 

LIV.  "  Nevertheless,  we  shall  present  whatever 
just  claims  we  have,  both  as  regards  our  quarrel  with 
theThebans  and  as  touching  you  and  the  rest  of  the 
Hellenes,  and  thus,  by  reminding  you  of  our  public 
services,  shall  try  to  persuade  you.  In  reply  to  the 
curt  inquiry  of  yours,  whether  we  have  rendered  any 
good  service  to  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies 
in  this  Avar,  if  you  ask  us  as  enemies,  we  say  that 
you  are  not  wronged  if  you  did  not  receive  benefit  at 
our  hands ;  but  if  in  asking  it  you  regard  us  as 
friends,  we  reply  that  you  yourselves  rather  than  we 
are  at  fault,  in  that  you  made  war  upon  us.  But  in 
the  war  against  the  Persians  and  during  the  peace 
which  followed  we  have  proved  ourselves  good  and 
true  men  ;  we  have  not  now  been  the  first  to  break 
the  peace,  and  then  we  were  the  only  Boeotians^  who 
rallied  to  defend  the  freedom  of  Hellas.  For  though 
we  are  an  inland  people,  we  took  pai-t  in  the  sea-fight 
at  Artemisium  ;  in  the  battle  that  Avas  fought  here  in 
our  own  land  *  we  stood  side  by  side  with  you  and 
Pausanias  ;  and  Avhatever  perils  arose  to  threaten 
the  Hellenes  in  those  days,  we  bore  our  part  in 
them  all  beyond  our  strength.  And  to  you  in  par- 
ticular, Lacedaemonians,  at  that  critical  moment 
when  after  the  earthquake  Sparta  was  encompassed 
by  a  mighty  terror  owing  to  the  revolt  of  the  Helots 

Lacedaemonians — by  standing  trial  before  a  prejudiced  court 
they  will  "  do  a  favour  to  the  Thebans." 

^  Rhetorical  inaccuracy,  for  the  Thespians  did  the  same 
(Hdt.  VII.  cxxxii.;  viii.  1.). 

*  The  battle  of  Plataea,  479  B.C.     See  Hdt.  ix.  Ixii.  flF. 

95 


THUCYDIDES 

στάντων,  το  τρίτον  μβρος  ημών  αυτών  βξεττεμψα- 
μβν  €9  €ΤΓίκονρίαν'   ων  ουκ  βίκο'ί  άμνημονβίν. 

LV.  "  ΚαΙ  τα  μ€ν  ΊταΚαια  καΐ  μβ'γιστα  τοιούτοι 
ηξιώσαμβν  elvat,  ττοΧέμιοι  δε  ^'γβνόμεθα  ΰστβρον. 
ίιμβΐς  Βέ  αίτιοι'  Βεομένων  yap  ξυμμαχ^ία•;  δτε 
Θηβαίοι  ημάς  ίβιάσαντο,  ύμεΐς  άπεωσασθε  καΐ 
7Γ/30?  ^Αθηναίους    e/ceXeueTe  τραττεσθαι  ώς  iyyv^ 

2  6ντα<ί,  υμών  oe  μακράν  αττοικούντων.  iv  μβντοι 
τω  τΓοΧβμω  ovSev  €Κ7τρ€7Γβστ€ρον  ύττο   ημών  ούτε 

3  βττάθετε  οΰτβ  €/Αβλλ?;σατ6.  et  δ'  άποστήΐ'αι 
*  Αθηναίων  ουκ  ηθβΚησαμεν  υμών  κεΚευσάντων, 
ουκ  ηύίκούμεν  και  yap  €Κ€Ϊνοι  εβοηθουν  ημϊν 
εναντία  ^)ηβαίοι<;  οτε  ύμβΐς  άττωκνεΐτε,  και  ττρο- 
Βοΰναι  αυτούς  ούκβτι  ην  καΧόν,  αλλω?  τε  και  ους 
ευ  παθών  τις  καΐ  αύτος  Βεόμενος  7Γpoσηyάy€τo 
ξυμμάχ^ους  καΐ  ττοΧιτείας  μετβΧαβεν,  levai  Be  ες 

4  τα  'πapayyeXX6μεva  εικός  ην  ττροθύμως.  α  Be 
εκάτεροι  iξηyεΐσθε  τοις  ξυμμάχ^οις,  ούχ  οι  eiro- 
μενοι  αίτιοι  ει  τι  μη  καΧώς  εορατο,  άΧΧ  οΐ  άyovτες 
εττϊ  τα  μη  ορθώς  έχοντα. 

LVI.  "@ηβαΐοι  Βε  ττοΧΧα  μεν  καΐ  άΧΧα  ημάς 
ηΗκησαν,  το  Βε  τεΧευτάΐον  αύτοΙ  ξύνιστε,  δ^'  οττερ 
2  καΐ  τάδε  ττάσχομεν.  ττόΧιν  yap  αυτούς  την  ημετε- 
ραν  καταΧαμβάνοντας  εν  σττονΒαΐς  και  προσέτι 
Ιερομηνία  ορθώς  τε  ετιμωρησάμεθα  κατά  τον  ττάσι 
νόμον    καθεστώτα,   τον    εττιοντα   ττοΧεμιον    όσιον 


96 


BOOK   III.  Liv.  5-Lvi.  2 

and  their  occupation  of  Ithonie,  we  sent  a  third  part 
of  our  citizens  to  bring  aid.  Tliese  are  things  you 
ought  not  to  forget. 

LV.  "  Such  was  the  part  we  were  proud  to  phiy  in 
the  great  actions  of  the  past.  It  was  not  until  later 
that  we  became  your  enemies,  and  for  this  you 
yourselves  were  to  blame  ;  for  when  the  Thebans 
oppressed  us  and  we  sought  alliance  with  you,  you 
rebuffed  us  and  bade  us  apply  to  the  Athenians, 
because  they  were  near,  whereas  you  lived  far  away. 
In  the  course  of  this  war,  however,  you  have  neither 
suffered,  nor  were  ever  in  danger  of  suffering,  any 
extraordinary  harm  at  our  hands.  And  if  we  refused 
to  revolt  from  the  Athenians  at  your  bidding,  we 
were  not  in  the  Λvrong  ;  for  they  helped  us  against 
the  Thebans  when  you  held  back.  After  that  it 
would  not  have  been  honourable  for  us  to  desert  them, 
above  all  when  we  were  their  debtors  and  when  at  our 
own  request  we  had  been  admitted  to  their  alliance 
and  had  shared  the  rights  of  citizenship  with  them. 
On  the  contrary,  there  was  every  reason  why  we 
should  heartily  obey  their  commands.  And  what- 
ever measures  eitlier  you  or  they  have  initiated  for 
your  allies,  it  is  not  the  followers  who  are  to  blame 
for  any  wrong  that  has  been  done,  but  those  who 
have  led  them  into  evil  courses. 

LVI.  "As  for  the  Thebans,  they  have  done  us 
many  wrongs  in  the  past,  and  you  yourselves  are  well 
aware  of  this  crowning  outrage,  which  has  brought  us 
into  our  present  plight.  They  attempted  to  seize 
our  city  in  time  of  peace,  and  furthermore  on  a  day 
of  festival  ;  therefore  we  were  justified  in  punishing 
them  in  accordance  with  the  law  which  has  universal 
sanction,  that  it  is  right  to  repel   him   who  comes 

97 


THUCYDIDES 

elvai  αμννεσθαι,  καΐ  νυν  ουκ  αν  €ΐκότως  St  αυτούς 

3  βΧατΓΤοίμεθα.  el  <γαρ  τω  αύτίκα  -χ^ρησίμω  υμών 
Τ€  καΐ  €Keiv(i)v  ττοΧεμίψ  ^  το  Βυκαιον  Χή-^εσθε,  του 
μεν  ορθού  φανεΐσθζ  ουκ  άΧηθβΐς  κρίταΐ   οντες,  το 

4  Se  ζυμφίρον  μάΧλον  θεραττεύοντες.  καίτοι  el  νυν 
ύμΐν  ώφέΧιμοι  Βοκοΰσιν  είναι,  ττοΧύ  καΐ  ημείς  και 
οι  αΧΧοι  "ΚΧΧΐ]νες  μάΧΧον  τότε  οτε  εν  μείζονι 
κινΖύνω  ητε.  νυν  μεν  yap  ετεροις  υμείς  εττεργεσθε 
δεινοί,  εν  εκείνω  δε  τω  καιρώ,  οτε   ττάσί   ΒουΧείαν 

5  εττεφερεν  ο  βάρβαρος,  ο'ίΖε  μετ  αυτού  ήσαν.  καΐ 
δίκαιον  ημών  της  νύν  αμαρτίας,  εΐ  άρα  ημάρτηταί 
τι,  άντιθεΐναι  την  τότε  προθυμιαν,  καΐ  μείζω  τε 
■νρος  εΧάσσω  εύρησετε  καΐ  ev  καιροίς  οίς  σττάνιον 
ην  τών  ΕΧΧιίνων  τίνα  άρετην  τη  "Β,ερζου  δυνάμει 
άντιτάζασθαι,  εττηνούντο  τε  μάΧΧον  οι  μη  τα 
ξύμφορα  ττρος  την  εφυδον  αύτοΐς  ^  άσφαΧεία 
ττράσσοντες,  εθεΧοντες  δε  τοΧμάν  μετά   κινδύνων 

6  τά  βεΧτιστα.  ών  ημείς  γενόμενοι  και  τιμηθεντες 
ες  τα  ττρώτα  νύν  εττΐ  τοις  αύτοΐς  δέδιμεν  μη  δια- 
φθαρώμεν,  \\θηναίους  εΧόμενοι  δικαίως  μάΧΧον  ή 

7  υμάς  κερδαΧέως.  καίτοι  χρη  ταύτα  ττερϊ  τών 
αυτών  ομοίως  φαινεσθαι  ηιηνωσκοντας  καΐ  το 
ξυμφερον  μη  άΧΧο  τι  νομίσαι,  η  τών  ξυμμάχ^ων 
τοις    ά^αθοίς    όταν    αΐεϊ    βέβαιον  την  χάριν  της 

*  τοΚ^μιψ,  bracketed  by   Hude,  as  derived  from  a  gloss 
(πολίμία'^). 

-  αύτοΰ,  Beliker  and  most  editors  with  M,  Hude  αΐ/τοΓϊ. 

98 


BOOK    ΠΙ.  Lvi.  2-7 

against  you  as  an  enemy;  and  now  Λνε  cannot  reason- 
ably be  made  to  suffer  on  their  account.  For  if  you 
shall  decide  the  question  of  justice  by  such  considera- 
tions as  your  immediate  advantage  and  their  hostility, 
you  will  show  yourselves  to  be,  not  true  judges  of 
what  is  right,  but  rather  to  be  mere  slaves  of  ex- 
pediency. And  yet  if  the  Thebans  seem  serviceable 
to  you  now,  we  and  the  rest  of  the  Hellenes  Avere  of 
far  greater  service  to  you  when  you  were  in  greater 
danger.  For  now  you  are  attacking  others  and  are  a 
menace  to  them,  but  in  that  crisis,  when  the  barbarian 
was  threatening  us  all  with  slavery,  these  men  were 
on  his  side.  And  it  is  only  fair  that  you  should  set 
our  present  error,  if  error  there  has  been,  over  against 
the  zeal  vre  showed  then  ;  if  you  do,  you  will  find, 
not  only  that  the  zeal  outweighs  the  offence,  but 
also  that  it  was  shown  at  a  time  Avhen  it  was  a  rare 
thing  for  Hellenes  to  oppose  their  courage  to  the 
power  of  Xerxes.  At  that  time  the  greater  praise 
was  given  to  those  who,  instead  of  intriguing  in 
security  for  their  own  advantage  with  reference  to 
the  invasion,^  were  ready  to  hazard  the  noblest  course 
though  fraught  with  danger.  With  these  we  took 
our  stand  and  were  honoured  among  the  foremost ; 
but  ηοΛν,  for  the  same  conduct,  we  fear  lest  we 
are  to  be  destroyed,  in  that  we  have  chosen  the 
Athenians  from  regard  to  right  rather  than  you  for 
profit.  And  yet  you  ought  to  show  yourselves  con- 
sistent, giving  the  same  judgment  concerning  the 
same  things,  and  to  consider  your  true  advantage  to 
be  only  this— to  cherish  an  ever-enduring  gratitude 

'  As  the  Thebans  did.  If  ούτοΓι  be  read,  with  nearly  all 
MSS.,  it  must  be  construed  with  ίφο5ον,  "  working  to  further 
the  invasion  of  the  enemy," 

99 


THUCYDIDES 

άρ€τής    β'χουσί  ^    καΐ    το    παραυτίκα    που    νμΐν  ^ 
ώφέΧιμον  καθίστηται. 

LVII.  "  ΐϊροσσκέψασθε  ^  Τ€  οτι  νυν  μεν  τταρά- 
δβί'γμα  τοις  ττοΧλοΐς  των  ΈΧλ,ιίνων  avhpayaeia<i 
νομίζβσθβ'  elBeirepl  ημών  yvcoaeaOe  μη  τα  εικότα 
{ου  yap  αφανή  κρινεΐτβ  την  Βίκην  τήνΒβ,  ετταινού- 
μβνοί  he  rrepl  ουδ'  ημών  μβμτττών),  άρατε  οττως  μη 
ουκ  άττοΒβξωνται  άνΒρών  ayaOajv  ττερι  αύτού<; 
άμείνους  οντάς  άττρεττες  τι  ε7nyvώvaι,  ού8ε  προς 
ιεροΐς  τοις  κοινοΐς  σκΐίΚα  απο  ημών  τών  εύεpyeτώv 

2  της  Ελλάδος  άνατεθήναι.  Seivnv  δέ  δό^βί  εΙναί 
ΐΙΧύταιαν  ΑακεΒαίμονίους  πορθήσαι,  καΐ  τους  μεν 
πατέρας  avaypa^jrai  ες  τον  τρίποδα  τον  εν  ΑεΧφοΐς 
8ί  άρετηΐ'  την  πόΧιν,  υμάς  8ε  κα\  εκ  παντός  του 
'ΕιλΧηνικοΰ  πανοικησία  δίά  Θηβαίους  εξαΧεΐψαι. 

3  ες  τοΰτο  yap  8η  ζνμφ  τράς  προκε}^ωρηκαμεν, 
οίτινες  ΛΙ/^δωζ^  τε  κρατησάντων  άπωΧλύμβθα  καϊ 
νυν  εν  ύμΐν  τοις  πρΙν  φιΧτάτοις  (Θηβαίων  ήσ- 
σώμεθα  καΐ  Βυο  (^/ώνας  τους  μεyίστoυς  ύπεστημεν, 
τότε  μεν,  την  ποΧιν  ει  μη  παρεδομεν,   Χιμώ   Sia- 

4  φθαρήναι,  νυν  8ε  θανάτου  8ίκη  κρίνεσθαι.  καϊ 
περιεώσμεθα  εκ  πάντων  ΤίΧαταιής,  οι  παρά 
8ύναμιν  πρόθυμοι  ες  τους  "ΚΧΧηνας,  έρημοι  και 
ατιμώρητοι•  καϊ  ούτε  το)ντότε  ^υμμάχ^ων  ώφεΧεΐ 
ούΒείς,  ημείς  τε,  ώ  Λακεδαιμόνιοι,  ή  μόνη  εΧπίς, 
8ε8ιμεν  μη  ου  βέβαιοι  ϊ)τε. 

^  Heilmaim'a  correction  for  ΐχωσι  of  the  MSS. 

^  Jowett  prefers  ήμΊν,  with  M,  in  which  case  the  sense 
would  be  ger.eral :  "  while  (as  a  matter  of  course)  our  own 
iinmediate  interests  are  sufficiently  secured."  With  ΰμΊν 
there  is  a  return  to  the  particular,  i.e.  the  case  of  the 
Lacedaeinon  i  ans . 

^  ιτροσσκ(>\ια.σθ(,  Meineke's  conjecture  for   ■προσκί'^ασθ^  of 
the  MSS. 
lOO 


BOOK    III.  Lvi.  7-Lvii.  4 

toward  the  best  of  3-our  allies  for  their  valour,  Λvhile 
also  securing  what  may  be  to  your  advantage  at  the 
present  moment. 

LVII.  "Consider,  too,  that  you  are  now  regarded 
by  most  of  the  Hellenes  as  an  example  of  upright- 
ness ;  but  if  the  verdict  you  give  concerning  us 
shall  be  inequitable,  beware  (since  the  case  you  are 
deciding  here  is  not  obscure,  but  you  the  judges 
are  the  object  of  men's  praise  and  we  the  defend- 
ants are  of  no  mean  repute),  beware,  I  say,  lest  men 
repudiate  an  unseemly  sentence  passed  upon  good 
men  by  men  still  better  and  resent  the  dedication  in 
the  common  temples  of  spoils  taken  from  us,  the 
benefactors  of  Hellas.  Monstrous  Λνϋΐ  it  seem  that 
the  Lacedaemonians  should  sack  Plataea,  and  that 
you,  whose  fathers  inscribed  the  name  of  our  city  on 
the  tripod  at  Delphi  in  commemoration  of  her  valour, 
should  blot  her  out,  house  and  home,  from  the  map 
of  Hellas — to  please  the  Thebans!  For  to  this  depth 
of  misfortune  have  we  come,  we  who,  when  the 
Persians  prevailed,  vrere  on  the  verge  of  ruin,^  and 
now  when  ^^•e  plead  before  you,  formerly  our  closest 
fr.ends,  we  are  beaten  by  Thebans  ;  and  we  have 
had  to  face  two  supreme  dangers,  at  that  time  of 
perishing  by  starvation  if  we  had  not  surrendered  our 
city,  and  now  of  standing  trial  for  our  lives.  And 
we  have  been  thrust  aside  by  all,  we  men  of  Plataea, 
who  were  zealous  toward  the  Hellenes  beyond  our 
strength,  and  are  now  desolate  and  undefended.  No 
one  of  our  former  allies  now  aids  us,  and  as  for  you, 
Lacedaemonians,  our  only  hope,  we  fear  that  you  are 
not  steadfast. 

*  The  reference  is  to  the  burning  of  their  city  by  Xerxes ; 
see  Hdt.  viii.  1. 

lOI 


THUCYDIDES 

LVIII.  "  Και'τοί  άξιονμεν  ye  καί  θέων  βνβκα 
των  ξυμμαχ^ικών  ττοτβ  γενομένων  καϊ  τή<;  άρ€τΡ]ς 
της  e?  τους  ΈΧληνας  καμφθήναι  υμάς  καΧ  μβτα- 
yvowuL  et  τι  ύτΓΟ  Θηβαίων  βττβίσθητβ,  την  τβ  όω- 
peiav  άντατταίτήσαι  αυτούς  μη  KTeiveiv  ους  μη  ύμϊν 
TTperrei,  σώφρονα  re  άντΙ  αίσχράς  κομίσασθαι 
y^apiv,  καϊ  μη   ηΒον'ην  ζάντας   αΧΧοις   κακίαν  αύ- 

2  τους  άντιΧαβεΐν.  βρα-χυ  yap  το  τα  ημέτερα 
σώματα  Βιαφθβΐραι,  ζτηττονον  he  την  ΒύσκΧειαν 
αύτοΰ  άφανίσαί'  ουκ  εχθρούς  yap  ημάς^  είκότως 
τιμωρήσβσθε,   άΧλ   εύρους,  κατ   άvάyκηv  ττοΧεμη- 

3  σαντας.  ώστε  και  των  σωμάτων  aSeiav  ττοιουντες 
όσια  αν  Βικάζοιτε  καϊ  ττρονοούντες  οτι  εκόντας  τε 
εΧάβετε  καϊ  χείρας  Ύτροϊσχο μένους  (ό  δε  νόμος 
τοις  'ΈΧΧησί    μη    KTeiveiv    τούτους),  ετι    δε    καΧ 

4  eύepyeτaς  yeyεvημevoυς  δίά  παντός.  άττοβΧεψατε 
yap  €ς  ττατερων  των  υμετέρων  θήκας,  ους  άττο- 
θανόντας  ύπο  ^ΙήΒων  καϊ  ταφεντας  iv  ττ}  ημετέρα 
ετίμώμεν  κατά  έτος  εκαστον  Βημοσί,α  εσθήμασί  τε 
καϊ  τοις  άΧΧοίς  νομυμοις,  όσα  τε  ή  yrj  7]μων 
άνε8ι8ου  ωραία,  ττάντων  άτταρχάς  εττίφέροντες, 
ευνοι  μεν  εκ  φίΧίας  χωράς,  ξύμμαχοί  δε  όμαίχ- 
μοις    ΤΓΟτέ    yevoμevoις.      ών   ύμεΐς    τουναντίον   αν 

5  Βράσαίτε  μη  ορθώς  γΐ'όΐ'τε?.     σκεψασθε  δε'"  Παυ- 

'  ήμαί,  bracketed  by  Hude,  because  omitted  in  M. 
'  5e',  Hude  reads  re,  ΛλϊιΗ  C. 

*  The  Thebans  had  demanded  that  the  Plataeans  be  put 
to  death. 

I02 


BOOK    III.  Lviii.  1-5 

LVIII.  "And  yet  we  adjure  you,  for  the  sake  of 
the  gods  who  of  old  sanctioned  our  alliance  and  for 
our  good  service  in  the  cause  of  the  Hellenes,  to 
relent  and  change  your  minds,  if  you  have  been  in 
any  way  Λνοη  over  by  the  Thebans,^  and  in  your  turn 
to  ask  of  them  the  boon  not  to  put  to  death  those 
whom  it  ill  becomes  you  to  slay,  that  you  may  thus 
receive  an  honest  instead  of  a  shameful  gratitude, 
and  may  not  in  giving  pleasure  to  others  get  in  re- 
turn ignominy  for  yourselves.  It  is  a  simple  matter  to 
take  our  lives,  but  a  grievous  task  to  blot  out  the 
infamy  of  it ;  for  we  are  not  enemies  whom  you 
Avould  have  a  right  to  punish,  but  good  friends  who 
were  forced  into  \var  with  you.  You  Avould,  therefore, 
render  a  righteous  judgment  if  you  guaranteed  us 
security  of  life  and  if  you  bore  in  mind,  before  it  is 
too  late,  that  it  was  in  voluntary  surrender  and  with 
outstretched  hands  that  you  received  us  (and  the 
usage  of  the  Hellenes  forbids  the  slaying  of  sup- 
pliants) ;  and,  moreover,  that  we  have  always  been 
your  benefactors.  Turn  your  eyes  upon  the  sepul- 
chres of  your  fathers,  slain  by  the  Persians  and 
buried  in  our  land,  whom  Λve  have  honoured  year 
bv  year  with  a  public  offering  of  raiment  ^  and 
other  customary  gifts  ;  the  first  fruits,  too,  of  all  that 
the  earth  each  year  has  produced  have  been  brought 
them,  the  tribute  of  kindly  hands  from  a  friendly 
land  and  of  allies  to  those  who  were  once  their 
companions  in  arms.  All  this  you  Avould  reverse  by 
an  unjust  verdict.      Reflect :    Avhen  Pausanias  buried 

^  For  garments  as  offerings  to  the  dead,  cf.  Soph.  El.  4-52  ; 
Eur.  Or.  l'?3,  14H6  ;  Tac.  A.  iii.  2.  But  some  understand 
(σθνμα(τι  to  refer  to  mourning  garments.  See  also  Plot. 
Arislides,  xxi. 

103 


THUCYDIDES 

σανία<ί  μβν  jap  eOairrev  αυτούς  ΐ'ομίζων  ev  yfj  re 
φιΧία  τιθέΐ'αί  και  ιταρ^  άνΒρασί  τοιουτοίς•  ύμεΐ<; 
δε  el  Krevelre  ημά<;  καΐ  -χώραν  την  YlXaradha 
%ηβαίΖα  ττοιησβτε,  τί  άΧΧο  ή  ev  ττοΧβμία  re  και 
τταρα  TOLS  ανθβνταις  irarepa^  τονς  υμβτίρου^;  και 
^uyyevei'i  άτιμους  yepoyv  ων  νυν  ϊσχ^ουσι  κατα- 
Xei-ylreTe  ;  ττρος  8e  καΐ  jrjv  ev  y  ηΧβυθβρώθηταν 
οι  Έλλί^νες  ΒονΧώσβτε,  Ίβρά  re  θε^•)ν  οίς  εύξά- 
μ6νοι  Μί;δωι^  €κράτησαν  €ρημοΰτε^  και  θυσίας 
τάς  ττατρίους  των  ίσσαμβί'ων  καΐ  κτισάντων 
tK^aipy^aeaOe. 

LIX.  "Ου  Ίτρος  της  ύμβτερας  Βόξης,  ω  Αακ€- 
Βαιμόνιοι,  τάδε,  ούτε  e?  τα  κοινά  των  ΚΧΧιίνων 
νόμιμα  καΐ  e?  τους  ττρο^ονους  άμαρτανβιν  οΰτ€ 
ημάς  τους  €ύ€ρ'γέτας  άΧΧοτριας  βνβκα  €)(θρας  μη 
αυτούς  άΒικηθύντας  Βιαφθβΐραι,  φίΐσασθαι  8e  και 
(ΤΓίκΧασθήναι  ττ)  <γνώμη  οϊκτω  σώφρον  ι  Χα  β  όντας 
μη  ων  ττβισόμεθα  μόνον  Βεινότητα  κατανοοΰντας, 
αλ\'  οΙοί  τ€  αν  οντες  ττάθοιμεν  καΐ  ώς  άστάθ- 
μητον  το  της  ξυμφοράς  ώτινί  ττοτ  αν  και  άναξίω 
2  ξυμττεσοι.  ημβΐς  τ€,  ώς  ιτρίττον  ημΐν  και  ώς  η 
Xpeia  TTpoayei,  αΐτουμεθα  υμάς,  θεούς  τους 
όμοβωμιους  και  κοινούς  των  ΕΧΧί']νων  εττιβοώ- 
μεΐΌΐ,  ττεΐσαι  τά8ε,  προφερομενοΐ'-  θ^  όρκους  ους 
οι   ττατβρες   υμών   ώμοσαν   μη    άμνημονεΐν   ίκεται 

^  4ρ•ημοντ(,  Hucle  adopts  Stahl's  conjecture  4ρ-ημονντΐ5, 
because  of  the  strikinfr  present  between  two  futures. 

^  Θ'  after  ττροφΐρόμΒνοι  is  Stahl's  conjecture,  adopted  by 
Hude. 

104 


BOOK    III.  Lviii.  5-Lix  2 

them  he  thought  he  was  laying  them  in  a  friendly 
land  and  among  friends;  but  you,  if  you  put  us  to  death 
and  make  the  territory  of  Plataea  a  Theban  province, 
will  you  not  be  leaving  them  in  a  hostile  land  and 
among  their  murderers  ^ — these  your  fathers  and 
kinsmen — and  dispossessed  of  the  honours  they  now 
enjoy  ?  Nay  more,  you  will  be  enslaving  the  very 
land  in  which  the  Hellenes  gained  their  liberty  ;  you 
Avill  be  bringing  desolation  upon  the  temples  of  the 
gods  to  whom  they  prayed  when  they  conquered  the 
Persians  ;  and  you  will  be  robbing  of  their  hereditary 
sacrifices  the  people  who  founded  and  established 
them. 

LIX.  "  These  things  are  not  consistent  with  your 
honour,  Lacedaemonians,  nor  can  it  be  so  to  offend 
against  the  common  usage  of  the  Hellenes  and  against 
)Our  ancestors,  or  to  put  us,  your  benefactors,  to  death 
because  of  the  enmity  of  others,  when  you  have  not 
been  wronged  yourselves.  Nay,  your  good  name 
demands  that  you  should  spare  us  and  be  softened  in 
heart,  regarding  us  with  a  dispassionate  pity  and  bear- 
ing in  mind,  not  only  how  terrible  Avill  be  our  fate, 
but  Λνΐιο  we  are  that  must  suffer,  and  how  uncertain 
is  fortune,  whose  strokes  sometimes  fall  even  upon 
the  innocent.  And  we,  as  befits  our  condition 
and  as  our  sore  need  demands,  entreat  you  in  the 
name  of  the  common  gods  of  tlie  Hellenic  race  whom 
we  invoke,  gods  worshipped  by  us  all  at  the  same 
altars,  to  listen  to  our  prayers ;  and  at  the  same  time, 
appealing  to  the  oaths  wherein  your  fathers  swore 
that  they  would  never  forget  us,  we  become  suppliants 

^  The  Thebans  are  called  their  murderers  because  they 
had  sided  with  the  Persians  against  the  Hellenic  allies. 

105 


THUCYDIDES 

ηιηνόμ^θα  νμων  των  -πατρώων  τάφων  κσΧ  im- 
καΚούμ,ζθα  τους  Κ€κμηκότα<;  μη  yeveaOai  υττο 
^ηβαίοίς  μηΒβ  τοις  €χ^θίστοις  φίΧτατοι  οντβς 
τταραΒοθήναί,  ημέρας  Τ€  αναμιμνησκομεν  εκείνης 
η  τα  Χαμττρότατα  μετ    αύτων  ττράξαντες   νυν  εν 

3  τη^ε  τα  δεινότατα  κίν8υνεύομεν  παθεΐν.  δττερ 
8ε  avajKaiov  re  καΐ  γ^αΧεττώτατον  τοις  ώδε 
ε^ονσί,  Xoyou  τέλευτάν,  Βιότι  καΐ  του  βίου  6 
κίνδυνος  εγγύς  μετ  αύτου,  τταυόμενοι  Χε-γομεν  η8η 
οτί  ου  &ηβαίοις  τταρεδομεν  την  ττοΧιν  (εΙΧόμεθα 
yap  αν  ττρο  γε  τούτου  τω  αισ'χ^ίστω  οΧεβρω  Χιμώ 
τεΧευτήσαι),  υμίν  δε  ττιστεύσαντες  ΊτροσηΧθομεν 
(καΐ  δίκαιον,  βί  μη  ττείθομεν,  ες  τα  αυτά  καταστή- 
σαντας    τον    ^υντυχ^όντα    κινδυνον    εάσαι     ημάς 

4  αυτούς  ελεσθαι),  εττισκητττομεν  τ€  αμα  μη  Πλα- 
ταιης  οντες,  οι  "προθυμότατοι  ττερί  τους  ΕΧΧηνας 
^γενόμενοι,  ^ηβαίοις  τοις  ϊ]μΐν  εχθίστοις  εκ  των 
υμετέρων  χειρών  καΐ  τ»)?  υμετέρας  πίστεως  ίκεται 
οντες,  ω  Λακεδαιμόνιοι,  τταραδοθήναι,  γενέσθαι 
δε  σωτΡ]ρας  ημών  καϊ  μη  τους  άΧΧους  '  ΚΧΧηνας 
εΧευθερουντας  ημάς  διοΧέσαι." 

LX.  Ύοιαΰτα  μεν  οΐ  Πλαταί?}?  είττον.  οι  δε 
Θηβαίοι  δείσαντες  ττρος  τον  Xoyov  αυτών  μη  οι 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι  τι  ένδώσι,  τταρεΧθοντες '  εφασαν 
και  αύτοΙ  βούΧεσθαι  είττεΐν,  εττειδη  καϊ  εκείνοις 
τταρά  yvώμηv  την  αυτών  μακρότερος  Xόyoς  εδόθη 
της  προς  το  ερώτημα  άποκρίσεως.  ώς  δ'  εκε- 
Χευσαν,   εXεyov   τοιάδε. 

LXI.   "  Ύούς    μεν    Xόyoυς    ουκ    αν    ητησάμεθα 

^  ταρΐλβόίτα,    Hude  adopts    Ullrich's   conjecture   προαελ- 

θηΐ'Τ(5. 

ιο6 


BOOK     III.    LIX.   2-LXI.    I 

before  your  ancestral  tombs  and  call  upon  the  de- 
parted not  to  suffer  us  to  come  into  the  power  of 
Thebans  or  permit  us,  who  were  their  dearest  friends, 
to  be  delivered  into  the  hands  of  their  bitterest 
foes.  We  also  remind  you  of  that  day  on  which  we 
shared  with  them  in  the  most  brilliant  deeds,  we 
who  now  on  this  day  are  on  the  brink  of  the  most 
aAvfiil  fate.  And  now,  bringing  our  plea  to  an  end — 
and  this  must  be,  howbeit  for  men  in  our  condition  it  is 
the  hardest  thing  of  all,  seeing  that  Avith  its  ending 
our  mortal  peril  also  draws  near — we  say  that  \ve  did 
not  surrender  our  city  to  the  Tliebans— in  preference 
to  that  our  choice  would  have  been  to  die  of  starva- 
tion, the  most  horrible  of  deaths — but  capitulated 
to  you  because  Λve  trusted  you.  And  it  is  but  right, 
if  we  fail  in  our  plea,  that  you  should  restore  us  to 
our  former  position  and  let  us  choose  for  ourselves  the 
danger  that  sh.ill  confront  us.  And  Λve  likewise  adjure 
you,  Plataeans  that  we  are,  people  who  were  most 
zealous  for  the  cause  of  Hellas,  and  are  now  your 
suppliants,  Ο  Lacedaemonians,  not  to  deliver  us  out 
of  your  hands  and  your  good  faith  to  the  Thebans, 
our  bitterest  foes,  but  to  become  our  saviours,  and 
not,  Avhile  liberating  the  rest  of  the  Hellenes,  to 
bring  utter  destruction  upon  us." 

LX.  Tims  the  Plataeans  spoke.  And  the  Thebans, 
fearing  lest  the  Lacedaemonians  might  be  so  moved 
by  their  plea  as  to  yield  somewhat,  came  forward  and 
said  that  they,  too,  wished  to  speak,  since,  against 
their  own  judgment,  the  Plataeans  had  been  granted 
leave  to  speak  at  greater  length  than  the  answer 
to  the  question  required.  And  when  the  judges 
assented,  they  spoke  as  follows  : 

LXL   "  We  should  not  have  asked  permission  to 

107 


THUCYDIDES 

elirelv,  el  και  αύτοΙ  βραγ^ζω'ί  το  ζρωτηθεν  άττβκρι,- 
ναντο  καΐ  μη  βττΐ  ημα'ί  τραττόμενοί  κατψ/ορίαν 
βΤΓΟίήσαντο  καΐ  irepl  αυτών  βξω  των  ττροκειμύνων 
καϊ  άμα  ovBe  7}τιαμβνων  ττοΧΧην  την  αττοΚοηίαν 
καΐ  eiraivov  ων  ούδβΐ?  βμεμψατο.  νυν  δε  ττρός 
μίν  τα  avTecrretv  δει,  των  δε  eXey^^ov  ττοη^σασθαι, 
ίνα  μήτε  η  ήμβτβρα  αύτου<ί  κακία  ωφβΧη  μήτβ  ή 
τούτων  8όζα,  το  δ  άλ.ηθε<;  ττερϊ  άμφοτίρων 
άκούσαντβ'ζ  κρινητβ. 
2  "Ίΐμ€Ϊ<;  δε  αύτοΐς  Βιάφορα  έ^βνόμβθα  το 
Ίτρώτον  ΟΤΙ  ημών  κτισάντων  ΙΙΧάταιαν  ΰστβρον 
τή<;  άΧΧης  Έοιωτίας  καϊ  άΧλα  γ^ωρια  μβτ  αντή'ζ, 
α  Συμμείκτους  άνθρώττους  εξέλάσαντβς  εσχ^ομεν, 
ουκ  ήζίουν  ούτοι,  ώσττερ  βτάχ^θη  το  πρώτον, 
ή'γβμονεύεσθαί  υφ'  ημών,  βξω  δε  τών  άΧΧων 
Έθίθ)τών  παραβαίνοντες  τα  πάτρια,  βπειΒη  προσ- 
ηνα'γκάζοντο,  προσεχ^ώρησαν  προς  Αθηναίους 
καϊ  μετ  αυτών  ττολλά  ημάς  εβΧαπτον,  άνθ'  ών 
καΧ  άντεπασγον.  LXII.  επειΒη  δε  και  ό  βάρ- 
βαρος ηΧθεν  επΙ  την  Ελλάδα,  φασϊ  μόνοι 
Βοιωτών   ου  μηΒίσαι,   καϊ  τούτω  μάΧιστα    αύτοι 

2  τ€  ayaXXovTai  καϊ  ημάς  Χοιδορούσιν.  ημείς  δε 
μηΖίσαι  μεν  αυτούς  ου  φαμεν  όιότι  ούδ'  Αθη- 
ναίους, τη  μεντοι  αύτη  ιδέα  ύστερον  ιόντων 
'Αθηναίων  επΙ  ιούς  "ΚΧΧηνας  μόνους  αύ  ΰοιωτών 

3  άττικίσαι.     καίτοι  σκεψασθε  εν  ο'ίω  εΓδεί  εκατεροι 

'  Strabo  mentions  Pelasgiana,  Thracians,  Hjantians. 
io8 


BOOK    III.  I.XI.  i-Lxii.  3 

make  this  speech,  if  the  Phitaeans  had  briefly 
answered  the  question,  and  had  not  turned  upon  us 
and  accused  us,  at  the  same  time  setting  up  a  long 
defence  of  tliemselves  on  matters  foreign  to  the  issue 
and  on  which  no  charge  whatever  had  been  made 
against  them,  and  praising  themselves  where  nobody 
had  blamed  them.  But  as  it  is,  we  must  answer 
their  charges  and  expose  their  self-praise,  in  order 
that  neither  our  baseness  nor  their  good  repute  may 
help  them,  but  that  you  may  hear  the  truth  about  us 
both  before  you  decide. 

"The  quarrel  we  had  with  them  began  in  this 
way  ;  after  we  had  settled  the  rest  of  Boeotia  and 
had  occupied  Plataea  and  other  places  of  λυΙηοΙι  we 
got  possession  bv  driving  out  a  mixed  population,^ 
these  Plataeans  disdained  to  submit  to  our  leadership, 
as  had  been  agreed  upon  at  first,  and  separating 
themselves  from  the  rest  of  the  Boeotians  and 
breaking  away  from  the  traditions  of  our  fathers 
went  over  to  the  Athenians  as  soon  as  an  attempt  was 
made  to  force  them  into  obedience,  and  in  conjunction 
with  the  Athenians  did  us  much  harm,  for  which 
they  also  suffered  in  return.  LXII.  Again,  they  say 
that  when  the  barbarians  came  against  Hellas  they 
were  the  only  Boeotians  who  did  not  medize,  and  for 
this  especially  they  j)lume  themselves  and  abuse  us. 
We  say,  however,  that  the  only  reason  they  did  not 
medize  was  because  the  Athenians  also  did  not,  and 
that,  moreover,  on  the  same  principle,  when  the 
Athenians  afterwards  assailed  all  Hellas,  they  Λvere 
the  only  Boeotians  who  atticized.^     And  yet  consider 

^  Ever  since  the  Persian  war  medize  and  meclism  had  been 
terms  of  bitter  reproach  in  Hellas  ;  in  the  mouths  of  the 
Thebans  atlicize  and  atticism  have  a  like  invidious  meaning. 

109 


THUCYDIDES 

ημών  τούτο  βπραζαν.  ημΐν  μ€ν  yap  η  ττόΧις  τότε 
Ιτΰγχ^αν^ν  οΰτ€  κατ  oXiyapy^iav  Ισόνομον  ποΧί- 
τεύουσα  οϋτβ  κατά  Βημοκρατίαν  οπβρ  Se  eaTt 
νομοΐ'ζ  μ€ν  και  τω  σωφρονβστάτω  €ναντιώτατον, 
εγγι^τάτω  δε  τυράννου,  δυναστεία  ολίγων  άνΒρών 

4  βΐχ^ε  τα  πράγματα.  καΐ  ούτοι  ί8ίας  8υνάμ€ΐς 
ελτησαζ'τε?  eVt  μάΧλον  σγ^ήσβιν,  el  τα  του  AI//Sou 
κρατήσβίβ,  κατβγοντ€<ί  Ισχύι  το  7τΧήθο<;  εττη^ά- 
yovTo  αυτόν  και  ι)  ζυμττασα  ττοΧις  ουκ  αυτο- 
κράτωρ ούσα  €αυτΡ]ς  τοΰτ  βττραζεν,  ούδ'  άξιον 
αύτρ     oveiSiaai     ων     μη     μετά     νόμων     ημαρτεν. 

5  €7Γ€ΐ8η  yodv  6  τε  Μ/}δο?  άττΡιΧθε  και  τού<;  νομου<ί 
'έΧαβε,  σκέψασθαι  χρη,  ^Αθηναίων  ύστερον  βττι- 
οντων  την  τ€  άΧΧην  Ελλάδα  καΐ  την  ήμετεραν 
•χ^ώραν  πειρωμενων  ύφ'  αύτοΖ?  ττοιεΐσθαι  καΐ  κατά 
στάσιν  ή^ΐ]  βχοιηων  αύτΓ;?  τά  ποΧΧά,  ei  μα-χ^ό- 
μενοι  iv  Κ^ορωνεια  καΐ  νικήσαντες  αυτούς  7]Χ€υ- 
θβρωσαμεν  την  Έοιωτιαν  και  τους  άΧΧους  νυν 
ττροθύμως  ξυνεΧευθεροΰμεν,  ϊττττους  τε  τταρεχοντες 
και  τταρασκευήν  οσην  ουκ   άΧΧοι   των  ξυμμάχ^ων. 

6  καΐ  τά  μέν  ες  τον  μηΒισμον  τοσαΰτα  άττοΧο- 
yoύμeθa- 

LXIII.   "  Ώς    δε    υμεις    μάΧΧόν    τε  ηΒικήκατε 

τους  '  ΈΐΚΧηνας  κα\  άζιωτβραΐ  ε'στε  ττάσης  ζημίας, 

2  τΓβιρασομεθα  άττοφαίνειν.     iyeveσθe  iiri  τη  ήμε- 

1  t.e.    \vhere,    as   at    Sparta,    the   oKiyoi,   or  ruling  class, 
possessed  equal  riglits. 

no 


BOOK    III.  Lxn.  3-Lxiii.  2 

the  circumstances  under  which  we  each  acted  as  we 
did.  For  the  constitution  of  our  city  at  that  time 
was,  as  it  happened,  neither  an  oHgarchy  under  equal 
laws^  nor  yet  a  democracv;  but  its  affairs  were  in  the 
hands  of  a  small  group  of  powerful  men — the  form 
which  is  most  opposed  to  law  and  the  best  regulated 
polity,  and  most  allied  to  a  tyranny.  These  men, 
hoping  to  win  still  greater  power  for  themselves  if 
the  fortunes  of  the  Persian  should  prevail,  forcibly 
kept  the  people  down  and  brought  him  in.  The 
city  as  a  \vhole  Λvas  not  in  control  of  its  own  actions 
when  Thebes  took  the  course  it  did,  nor  is  it  fair  to 
reproach  it  for  the  mistakes  it  made  when  not  under 
the  rule  of  law.  At  any  rate,  after  the  Persian  de- 
parted and  Thebes  obtained  its  lawful  government, 
and  \vhen  subsequently  the  Athenians  became  ag- 
gressive and  Λvere  trying  to  bring  not  only  the  rest 
of  Hellas  but  also  our  country  under  their  own  sway 
and,  owing  to  factions  amongst  us,  were  already  in 
possession  of  most  of  it,^  pray  observe  whether  we 
fought  and  defeated  them  at  Coronea^  and  thus 
liberated  Boeotia,  and  whether  we  are  now  zealously 
helping*  to  liberate  the  other  peoples,  furnishing 
more  cavalry  and  munitions  of  war  than  any  of  the 
other  allies.  Such  is  our  defence  against  the  charge 
of  medism. 

LXIII.  "We  will  ηοΛν  try  to  show  that  you 
Plataeans  have  wronged  the  Hellenes  more  than  we 
and  are  more  deserving  of  any  punishment,  however 
severe.     You  became  allies  and  citizens   of  Athens 

'  After  tlie  battle  at  Oenophyta,  458  B.O.     cj.  I.  cviii.  2,  3. 
3  446  B.C.     cf.  I.  cxiii.  2. 

*  This  is  mentioned  with  a  view  to  influencing  Spartan 
judges. 


THUCYDIDES 

Tepa  τιμωρία,  ώ?  φατβ,  ^Αθηναίων  ξύμμαχοί  και 
ΤΓολΙταί.  ούκοΰν  χρήν  τα  ττρος  ημα'ί  μόνον  ύμά<ζ 
iTrayeaOai  αντους  και  μη  ζυνξττύναι  μβτ  αυτών 
αλλοί9,  νττάρχ^ον  γε  ύμΐν,  €Ϊ  τι  και  άκοντες  προσ- 
'ηηεσθζ  υττ  ^Αθηναίων,  της  των  ΑακβΒαιμονίων 
τώνΒβ  ηΒη  €7Γΐ  τω  Μ))δω  ξυμμαχ^ίας  '^β'^/βνημενης, 
ην  αύτοϊ  μάΧιστα  ττροβάΧλεσθε'  ίκανί]  je  ^ 
ην  ημά<;  τ€  υμών  άττοτρβττειν  και,  το  μέ'γιστον, 
αδεώς  τταρίγ^ειν  βουΧβΰβσθαι.  αλλ'  €κόντ€ς  καΐ 
ου  βιαζόμβνοί  €τι   elXeaOe  μαΚΧον  τα  ^Αθηναίων. 

3  και  λέγετε  ώ?  αίσγ^ρον  ην  ττροΒούναι  Toij<i  εύε/3- 
γε'τα?-  ττοΧύ  δε  ye  αϊσχ^ιον  και  άΖικωτερον  τους 
7Γάντα<ί"Κ\\ηνας  καταττ ροοουναι,  οίς  ξυνωμόσατε, 
η   'Αθηναίους  μόνους,  τους  μβν  καταΒουΧουμβνους 

4  την  Ελλάδα,  τους  δε  βΧευθβρουντας.  καΐ  ουκ 
ίσην  αυτοις  την  χάριν  ανταπεοοτε  ουοβ  αισχύνης 
ά7ΓηΧλ.α•/μένην•  ύμβΐς  μ€ν  yap  αδικούμενοι  αυτούς, 
ως  φάτε,  ε^τηyάyεσθε,  τοις  δε  αΒικοΰσιν  αΧλους 
ξυvεpyo\  κατεστητε.  καίτοι  τας  όμοίας  χάριτας 
μη  avTihihovai  αίσχρον  μαΧλον  η  τας  μετά 
δικαιοσύνης  μεν  οφειΧηθείσας,  ες  άΖικίαν  δε 
άτΓοδίδο/Αε'ί'α?. 

^  Ικαν-Ι)  ye,  Hude  reads  ίκαν^  yap,  with  Cod.  Graev. 

1  ef.  ch.  Iv.  1. 

^  The  alliance  of  the  Lacedaemonians  that  is  in  mind  here 
•would  seem  to  be  the  general  leagixe  of  the  Hellenes  in  the 
Persian  War,  in  which  the  Lacedaemonians  were  leaders  ; 
but  in  ch.  Iviii.  1  the  Plataeans  use  the  words  θ(ων  των 
ξυμμαχικά.ν  vore  yevoμΐvιύv  especially  with  reference  to  the 
compact  mentioned  in  ii.  Ixxi,,  where  it  is  said  that  the 
allies,    at   the   instance   of    Pausanias,    after   the   battle   of 


BOOK    III.  Ι-ΧΠΙ.  2-4 

that  you  might,  as  you  claim,'  obtain  protection 
against  us.  In  that  case  you  ought  only  to  have 
invoked  their  aid  against  us,  instead  of  assisting 
them  in  their  aggressions  against  others;  such  a 
course  Λvas  certainly  open  to  you,  in  case  you  were 
ever  being  led  on  by  the  Athenians  against  your  will, 
since  the  alliance  of  the  Lacedaemonians  here  had 
already  been  organized  against  the  Persians— -the 
alliance  of  which  you  are  always  reminding  us.^ 
That  Avould  have  been  enough  to  keep  us  from 
interfering  with  you,  and,  what  is  more  important, 
to  enable  you  to  take  your  own  counsel  without  fear. 
Nay,  it  was  ΛvilIingly  and  not  now  under  compulsion 
that  you  embraced  tlie  Athenian  cause.  You  say, 
however,  that  it  would  have  been  dishonourable  to 
betray  your  benefactors ;  but  it  was  far  more  dis- 
honourable and  wicked  to  betray  to  their  destruction 
all  the  Hellenes,  with  whom  you  had  sworn  alliance, 
than  merely  the  Athenians,  when  they  were  en- 
deavouring to  enslave  Hellas,  the  others  to  liberate 
her.  And  the  recompense  you  made  them  is  not 
equal,  nor  indeed  free  from  dishonour.  For  you 
were  being  Λvrϋnged,  as  you  claim,  when  you  in- 
voked their  aid,  but  they  Avere  wronging  others 
when  you  became  their  helpers.  And  vet,  surely,  not 
to  repay  favours  \vith  like  favours  is  dishonourable  ; 
but  it  is  not  so  when,  tiiough  the  debt  was  incurred  in 
a  just  matter,  it  can  only  be  repaid  by  Avrong-doing.^ 

Plataea,  mutually  guaranteed  the  independence  of  all  the 
Hellenic  states,  and  of  the  Plataeans  in  partif-ular. 

'  cf.  Cicero,  tie  Olf.  1.  In.  48,  lom.  reddereviro  I)07iono7i  licet, 
moilo  idfarere  posait  sine  injuria.  The  whole  sentence  serves 
to  substantiate  the  words  uvhi  αίσχϋνιηί  anri\\ay,ufvr)y,  the 
cliarL'e  ras  δμοία^  χάριτατ  μη  άι  TiSiSoVai  being,  according  to 
the  Thcban  speakers,  applicable  to  the  Plataeans. 

113 


THUCYDIDES 

LXIV.  "  ΑήΧόν  re  βποιησατβ  ουδέ  τότ6  των 
ΈιΧληνων  eveKa  μονοί  ου  μ,η^ίσαντΐς,  αλλ  οτί 
ούδ'  'Αθηναίοι  7;/xei?  ^  8e,  τοΐς  μεν  ταύτα  βουΚό- 

2  μενοί  ττοιεΐν,  τοις  Be  τάναντία.  καΐ  νυν  άξιούτβ, 
αφ'  ων  St  ίτβρονς  ijeveaOe  ayaOoi,  άττο  τούτων 
ωφβΧξΙσθαί.  ίΐλλ'  ουκ  εΙκός'  ώσττβρ  δε  'Αθηναί- 
ους βίΧβσθε,  τούτοις  ξυνα'^ωνίζβσθε,  καί  μη  ττρο- 
φ€ρ€Τ€    την    τότε   Ύβνομενην    ζυνωμοσίαν  ώς  -χρη 

3  ίΐττ'  αύτΡ]ς  νυν  σωζβσθαι.  αττελ/ττετε  yap  αύτην 
καΐ  παραβάντβς  ^ν^κατεΖουΧοΰσθε  μαλΧον  ΑΙ- 
^ίνητας  καΐ  αΧλους  τινας  των  ξυνομοσάντων  ή 
Βΐ€κω\ύ€Τ€,  και  ταύτα  ούτβ  άκοντες  έχοντες  τβ 
τους  νόμους  ούσττβρ  μέχρι  του  Βεύρο  και  ούΒενος 
υμάς  βιασαμενου,  ωσττερ  ημάς.  την  τέλευταίαν 
τβ  ττρίν  ττεριτειχίζεσθαι  ττρόκΧησιν  ες  ήσυχίαν 
ημών,    ώστε    μηΒετεροις    άμύνειν,    ουκ    εΒεχεσθε. 

4  τίνες  αν  ονν  υμών  Βικαιοτερον  πάσι  τοις  '  ΈΧ\ησι 
μισοίντο,  οϊτινες  έττΧ  τω  εκείνων  κακω  avBpaya- 
θίαν  ττρούθεσθε;  και  α  μεν  ττοτε  χρηστοί  iyk- 
νεσθε,  ώς  φάτε,  ου  "προσήκοντα  νυν  εττεΒείζατε,  α 
Be  η  φύσις  αιεί  εβούΧετο,  €ξι|\εyχθη  ες  το  άΧη- 
θές'    μετά    yap     'Αθηναίων    άΒικον    όΒον    ιόντων 

5  εχωρήσατε.  τα  μεν  οΰν  ες  τον  ήμετερόν  τ€  άκον- 
σιον  μηΒισμον  καΐ  τον  ΰμβτερον  εκούσιον  άττικι- 
σμον  τοιαύτα  αττοφαινομεν. 

LXV.  "'^Α  8e  τελει^ταΓά  φάτε  άΒικηθηναι 
{τταρανόμως    yap    εΧθεΐν    ημάς  εν   σπονΒαΐς    καΐ 

1  T/.uety,  with  the  majority  of  the  best  MSS. ;  Hude  reads 
vμeΐs  with  CG. 

114 


BOOK    III.  Lxiv.   i-Lxv.  i 

LXIV.  "  You  have,  therefore,  made  it  clear  that 
even  then  it  Avas  not  for  the  sake  of  the  Hellenes 
that  you  alone  of  the  Boeotians  refused  to  medize, 
but  merely  because  the  Athenians  also  refused  while 
we  did  not,  and  you  preferred  to  act  with  the  one 
party  and  against  the  other.  And  now  you  expect  to 
be  rewarded  for  the  virtuous  conduct  that  was  due  to 
the  inspiration  of  others!  But  that  is  unreasonable; 
as  you  chose  the  Athenians,  continue  to  fight  on  their 
side.  And  do  not  keep  reminding  us  of  the  alliance 
you  made  then,  and  claim  that  it  ought  to  save  you 
now.  For  you  have  abandoned  it  and  in  violation  of  its 
principles  have  constantly  aided,  instead  of  trying  to 
prevent,  the  enslavement  of  the  Aeginetans^  and  other 
members  of  the  alliance  ;  and  that,  too,  not  against 
your  will,  since  you  then  enjoyed  the  laws  under 
which  you  have  lived  till  now  and  were  not,  like  us, 
under  compulsion  by  another.  Moreover,  you 
refused  to  accept  the  last  proposal  w^e  made  you  be- 
fore Plataea  was  invested  - — to  leave  you  unmolested 
if  you  would  aid  neither  side.  Who,  then,  would  more 
justly  be  hated  by  all  the  Hellenes  than  you,  who  dis- 
played your  virtue  in  order  to  compass  their  injury? 
Furthermore,  those  noble  qualities  which,  as  you 
claim,  you  once  displayed  you  have  now  made  plain 
were  not  properly  yours,  but  your  natural  longings 
have  been  put  to  the  proof  and  shown  in  their 
reality;  for  you  have  followed  the  Athenians  when 
they  walked  in  the  way  of  iniquity.  Such,  then, 
is  our  affirmation  regarding  our  unwilling  medism 
and  your  willing  atticism. 

LXV.  "As  to  your  last  charge  of  wrong-doing  on 
our  part — that  we  unlawfully  attacked  your  city  in 

*  cf.  I.  cv.,  cviii.;  ii.  xxvii.  *  (/.  ii.  Ixxii.  1. 

IIS 


THUCYDIDES 

ιβρομηνια  eVt  την  νμετεραν  ττόΧιν),  ου  νομίζομβν 

2  ούΒ  ev  τούτοίς  υμών  μάΧλον  ύμαρτεΐν.  el  μ(ν 
yap  7)μ€Ϊς  αύτοΙ  ττρός  τβ  την  ττόΧιν  €\θόντ€ς  €μα- 
^υμβθα  καΐ  την  yr/v  βόηοΰμβν  ώς  ττολβμιοι,  αδί- 
κοΰμεν  el  Be  άνόρες  υμών  οΐ  ττρώτοί  και  γ^ρημασί 
κα\  yevei,  βουΧόμενοι  της  μβν  βζω  ξνμμαχ^ίας 
υμάς  τταύσαι,  ες  δε  τα  κοινά  των  ττάντων  lι^oίωτώv 
πάτρια  καταστησαι,  eireKciXeaavTo  βκόντες,  τι 
άΒικουμβν;   οΐ  yap  άyovτeς   τταρανομοΰσι   μάΧΧον 

3  των  βτΓομά'ων.  αλλ'  οΰτ  €κεΐνοί,  ώς  ημείς  κρι- 
νομεν,  ούτε  ημείς-  ττοΧΐται  Βε  οντες  ωσττερ  ύμεΐς 
καΐ  ττΧείω  τταραβαΧΧόμενοί,  το  εαυτών  τεΐ'χος 
άνοίζαντες  και  ες  την  αυτών  ττόΧιν  φιΧίους,  ου 
ΤΓοΧεμίους  ^  κομίσαντες  εβούΧοντο  τους  τε  υμών 
-χ^είρους  μηκετι  μάΧΧον  yεvεσθaι,  τους  τε  αμείνους 
τα  άξια  εχ^ειν,  σωφρονισταΐ  οντες  της  yvώμης  και 
τών  σωμάτων  την  ττοΧιν  ουκ  άΧΧοτριοΰντες,  άΧ\ 
€ς  την  ξυyyεveιav  οίκειοΰντες,  εχ^θρούς  ούΒενΙ 
καθιστάντες,  άττασι  δ'  ομοίως  ενσττόνΒους. 

LXVI.  "  Ύεκμηριον  δε  ώς  ου  ττοΧεμιως  εττράσ- 
σομεν  οΰτε  yap  ηΒικησαμεν  ούΒενα,  τΓροείττομεν 
τε  τον  βουΧόμενον  κατά  τά  τών  ττάντων  Βοιωτών 
2  πάτρια  ττοΧιτεΰειν  Ιεναι  ττρος  ημάς.  και  ύμεΐς 
άσμενοι  γ^ωρήσαντβς  και  ζύμβασιν  ττοιησάμενοι 
το  μεν  ττρώτον  ησυ)(_άζετε,   ύστερον   Be  κατανοή- 

^  φιλίοι/s    ου    τΓολίαι'ουϊ,    Steup's    correction   for   φιλίω5  ου 
ΐΓολίμία,-ί  of  the  MSS. 

'  cf.  II.  ii.  2.  *  Parody  on  ch.  Iv.  4. 

ii6 


BOOK     in.    LXV.    I-LXVI.   2 

time  of  peace  and  on  a  day  of  festival — Λve  do 
not  think  that  in  this  matter,  either,  we  are  more  at 
fault  than  you.  If  it  was  of  our  own  motion  that  we 
Avent  to  your  city,  fought  you,  and  ravaged  your  land 
as  enemies,  we  are  in  the  Avrong ;  but  if  some  of  your 
countrymen,  the  leading  men  in  both  wealth  and 
family,!  wishing  to  put  an  end  to  your  alliance  with 
an  outsider  and  to  restore  you  to  the  traditions  of  our 
fathers  which  are  common  to  all  the  Boeotians,  of 
their  own  free  will  invoked  our  aid,  of  Mhat  Λvrong 
are  \ve  guilty  ?  For  it  is  those  who  lead  that  break 
the  laws  rather  than  those  who  follow.^  But  in  my 
judgment  neither  they  nor  we  did  wrong.  They, 
who  are  just  as  much  citizens  as  you  and  had  more 
at  stake,  opened  their  gales  and  conducted  into  their 
own  city  friends,  not  enemies,  because  they  wished 
that  the  baser  sort  among  you  should  not  become 
still  worse,  and  that  the  better  sort  should  have  their 
deserts,  being  the  censors  of  your  political  principles^ 
and  not  seeking  to  deprive  the  state  of  your  persons, 
but  rather  bringing  you  back  into  a  natural  union 
with  your  kindred,  and  that  without  making  you  an 
enemy  of  anyone  but  restoring  you  to  peace  with 
all  alike. 

LXVI.  "The  proof  that  Λve  acted  in  no  hostile 
spirit  is  that  we  wronged  nobody,  and  made  a  pro- 
clamation that  anyone  who  wislud  to  be  a  citizen 
according  to  the  hereditary  ways  of  all  the  Boeotians 
should  come  over  to  us.  And  you  came  gladly,  and 
entering  into  an  agreement  Avith  us  you  kept  quiet 
at  first;  but  afterwards,  when  you  became  aware  that 

'  σαιφροΐΊσταί,  regulators  or  censors,  those  who  bring  others 
to  a  right  mind  and  are  a  clieck  on  vice  and  lawlesbness  It 
was  a  technical  term  applied  to  magistrates,  ten  in  number, 
at  Athens,  who  superinlendeJ  the  murals  of  the  youth. 

117 


THUCYDIDES 

σαντ€<;  ημάς  6\Lyovς  οντάς,  el  a  pa  καϊ  εΒοκονμεν 
τι  (iveTTLeiKeaTepov  ιτράξαί  ου  μετά  του  ττΧηθους 
υμών  βσβ\θόντ€ς,  τα  μβν  ομοΐα  ουκ  άνταττβ^οτβ 
ημΐν,  μήτε  νεωτερίσαι  €ργω  λόγολ?  re  ττβίθειν 
ώστε  εξεΧθεΐν,  εττιθεμενοι  δβ  τταρα  την  ζύμ- 
βασιν,  ους  μεν  εν  'χερσίν  άττεκτείνατε,  ούχ^ 
ομοίως  αΧ^ουμεν  (κατά  νομον  '^/αρ  Βη  τίνα  εττα- 
σχ^ον),  ους  Βε  ■χ^εΐρας  προϊσχ^ομενους  καΐ  ζω'^/ρή- 
σαντες  ύττοσχ^ομενοί  τε  ημΐν  ύστερον  ^  μη  κτενείν 
τταρανόμως  Βιεφθείρατε,  πώς  ου  Βεινα  εφ^ασθε; 

3  κα\  ταύτα  τρεΙς  άΒικίας  εν  ολίγω  πράζαντες,  την 
τε  Χνθεΐσαν  όμοΧο'^ίαν  καϊ  τών  άνΒρών  τον  ύστε- 
ρον θάνατον  και  την  ττερϊ  αυτών  ημΐν  μη  κτενείν 
ψευσθεΐσαν  ύττόσ-χ^εσιν,  ην  τα  εν  τοΐς  ά^ροΐς 
ύμΐν  μη  άΒικώμεν,  όμως  φάτε  ημάς  τταρανομήσαι 

4  καϊ  αύτοΙ  άξίούτε  μη  άντιΒούναί  Βίκην.  ουκ,  ην 
γβ  ούτοί  τα  ορθά  ^ΐ'^νώσκωσιν  ττάντων  Βε  αυτών 
ένεκα  κοΧασθ ήσεσθε. 

LXVII.  "  Και  ταύτα,  ώ  ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι,  τούτου 
ένεκα  εττεζήΧθομεν  καϊ  ύττερ  υμών  καϊ  ημών,  'ίνα 
ύμεΐς  μεν  εΙΒ?]τε  και  Βικαιως  αυτών  κατα'γνωσό- 
2  μενοι,  7]μεΐς  Be  ετί  όσιώτερον  τετιμωρημενοι.  καϊ 
μη  τταΧαίάς  άρετάς,  ει  τις  άρα  καϊ  ε^ενετο,  άκού- 
οντες  ετΓίκΧασθήτε,  άς  χρη  τοΐς  μεν  άΒικουμένοις 
επικούρους  είναι,  τοΐς  Βε  αίσχρόν  τι  Βρώσι  Bt- 
πΧασίας  ζημίας,  οτι  ουκ  εκ  προσηκόντων  άμ.αρ- 
τάνουσι,  μηΟε  οΧοφνρμώ   καϊ   οϊκτω   ώφεΧείσθων, 

'   ύστερον  μτ}   Kreve'ty,    Hude   transposes  μη  KTfVf'ti'   υστίρον, 
against  the  MSS. 

ii8 


BOOK     III.    LXVI.   2-LXVII.   2 

we  were  few  in  number — even  supposing  we  might 
seem  to  have  acted  somewhat  inconsiderately  in 
entering  your  town  Avithout  the  consent  of  the  pop- 
ular party — you  did  not  repay  us  in  kind,  resorting 
to  no  act  of  violence  but  endeavouring  by  arguments 
to  induce  us  to  withdraw,  but  you  assailed  us  in 
violation  of  your  agreement.  Now  as  to  those  whom 
you  killed  in  hand-to-hand  conflict  we  are  not  so 
much  grieved — for  they  suffered,  we  grant  you,  by  a 
kind  of  law — but  as  regards  those  whom  you  spared 
when  they  stretched  out  their  hands  to  you,  and  then, 
though  you  afterwards  promised  us  that  you  Avould 
not  kill  them,  lawlessly  butchered — was  not  that  an 
abominable  deed.'*  And  after  committing  these  three 
wrongs  within  a  short  space  of  time — the  violation 
of  your  agreement,  the  subsequent  murder  of  our 
men,  and  the  breaking  of  your  promise  to  us  not  to 
kill  them  if  we  sj)ared  your  property  in  the  fields — 
you  nevertheless  assert  that  we  were  the  trans- 
gressors, and  claim  exemption  from  punishment  for 
yourselves !  No,  not  if  these  judges  decide  aright ; 
but  for  all  these  crimes  you  must  be  chastised. 

LXV^II.  "We  have  discussed  these  matters  at 
length,  Lacedaemonians,  both  for  your  sakes  and 
our  own,  in  order  that  you,  for  your  part,  may  knoAv 
that  you  Avill  justly  condemn  them,  and  we  that  we 
have  still  more  righteously  exacted  vengeance.  And 
let  not  your  hearts  be  softened  \vhen  you  hear 
them  speak  of  their  ancient  virtues,  if  indeed  they 
ever  had  any  ;  for  virtues  might  well  be  a  succour 
to  the  victims  of  wrong,  but  should  bring  a  two-fold 
penalty  upon  the  authors  of  a  shameful  deed,  because 
their  offence  is  out  of  keeping  with  their  character. 
And   let   not  their  lamentation  and  pitiful  wailing 

119 


THUCYDIDES 

•πατέρων    τβ    τάφους    των  ύμβτβρων  €7Γΐβοώμ€νοι 

3  καΐ  την  σφετίραν  ερημίαν.  καΐ  yap  ημεΐς  άνταττο- 
φαίνομεν  ΤΓολλω  heivoTepa  τταθοΰσαν  την  ύττο 
τούτων  ηΧικιαν  ημών  Βιεφθαρμενην,  ων  ττατερες 
ο'ί  μεν  ττρος  υμάς  την  Βοιωτίαν  άγοντες  άπεθανον 
ev  Ιίορωνεία,  οί  Βε  ττρεσβΰταί  ΧεΧειμμενοι  κατ  ^ 
οικίας  έρημοι   ττολλω   δίκαιοτεραν  υμών  Ικβτείαν 

4  τΓοιοΰνται  τούσδε  τιμωρησασθαί.  οϊκτου  τε 
άζίώτεροι  τνγχ^άνείν  οι  άττρεττες  τι  ττάσ'χ^οντες 
των    ανθρώπων,    οί   δέ   Βικαίως,    όισττερ   ο'ίΒε,    τα 

5  εναντία  εττίχαρτοί  είναι,  καΐ  την  νυν  ερημιαν 
hi  εαυτούς  εχ^αυσιν  τους  yap  άμεινους  ζυμμά- 
χους  εκόντες  άττεώσαντο.  τταρενόμησάν  τε  ου 
•προτταθΰντες  ΰή)  ημών,  μίσει  οε  ττΧεον  ή  8ίκτ} 
κρίναντες,  καϊ  ουκ '  αν  άνταττοΒόντες  νυν  την 
Ίσην  τιμωρίαν  έννομα  yap  ττείσονται  καΐ  ούχΙ  εκ 
μάχ^ης  -χείρας  ττροισχόμενοί,  ώσττερ  φασίν,  luOC 
άττο  ζυμβάσεως  ες  δι,κην  σφάς  αυτούς  τταραΒοντες. 

6  άμύι•ατ€  ουν,  ω  ΧηκεΒαιμόνιοι,  καϊ  τω  τών'ΚΧΧή- 
νων  νόμω  ύττο  τώνδε  παραβαθέντι  και  ημίν  άνομα 
τταθούσιν  άνταττόδοτε^  χάριν  Βικαίαν  ojv  "πρό- 
θυμοι yεyεvήμε9a^  καϊ  μη  τοις  τώνδε  Χόγοις 
ττεριωσθώμεν  εν  νμΐν,  ποιήσατε  δε  τοις  "Ε,ΧΧησι 
παράδειγμα  ού  Χόγων  τους  αγώνας  προθήσοντες. 
αλλ'    έργων,   ων    αγαθών    μεν    όντων    βραχεία    ή 

'  κατ'  oiKias,  Stahl's  emendation  for  /ca!  οΐκίαι  of  the  MSS. 

'  &[/  άΐ'ταπο?όντ«5,  Dobiee  aiMed  &v. 

^  avTairoSuTf,  Hude  άνταπο'δοτί  τί,  after  Gerlz. 

120 


BOOK    III.  Lxvii.  2-6 

avail  them,  nor  tlieir  appeals  to  the  sepulchres  of 
your  fathers  and  their  own  desolate  state.  For 
in  answer  we  too  Avould  point  out  that  a  far  more 
dreadful  fate  befell  our  young  men  who  were 
butchered  by  them,  of  whose  fathers  some  died  at 
Coronea^  trying  to  win  Boeotia  to  your  cause,  Λνΐιϋβ 
others,  left  desolate  at  home  in  their  old  age,  with 
far  greater  justice  make  supplication  to  you  to  take 
vengeance  upon  these  men.  Pity  is  more  worthily 
bestowed  upon  those  Λνΐιο  suffer  an  unseemly  fate, 
but  those  who,  like  these  Plataeans,  deserve  their 
fate  afford  on  the  contrary  a  subject  for  rejoicing. 
As  for  their  present  desolation,  that  also  is  their 
own  fault;  for  of  their  own  free  will  they  rejected 
the  better  alliance.  They  acted  unlawfully  without 
having  received  provocation  at  our  hands,  but 
through  hatred  rather  than  according  to  a  just 
judgment,  and  they  could  not  possibly  pay  now  a 
penalty  equal  to  their  guilt,  for  they  Avill  suffer  a 
lawful  sentence;  and  they  are  not,  as  they  claim, ^ 
stretching  out  suppliant  hands  on  the  field  of  battle, 
but  have  delivered  themselves  up  to  justice  under 
formal  agreement.  Vindicate,  therefore,  Lacedae- 
monians, the  law  of  the  Hellenes  which  has  been 
transgressed  by  these  men,  and  render  to  us  who 
have  suffered  by  their  lawlessness  a  just  recompense 
for  the  services  we  have  zealously  given,  and  let  us 
not  because  of  their  words  be  thrust  aside  when  we 
plead  before  you,•'  but  make  it  plain  to  the  Hellenes 
by  an  example  that  the  trials  you  institute  will  be  of 
deeds,  not  words,  and  that,  if  the  deeds  are  good,  a 

'  As  at  ch,  Ixii.  5,  a  reminder  flattering  to  the  Lacedae- 
monians. ^  cf.  ch.  Iviii.  .3. 

*  Note  the  mocking  quotation  of  phrases  in  the  speech  of 
the  Plataeans,  ch.  Ivii.  3,  4, 

VOL,   II.  Ε         '^' 


THUCYDIDES 

anayyeXia  αρκεί,  άμαρτανομβνων  8e  Xoyoi  eireai 
7  κοσμηθβντα  ττροκαΧνμματα  yiyvovTai.  αλλ'  ην 
οι  ^]yeμόveς,  ωσττβρ  νυν  ύμεΐς,  κ€φα\αιώσαντ€<; 
ττρος  T0U9  ξύμτταντας  Sιayvώμa^  ττοιήσησθε, 
ησσόν  τί?  eV  άΒίκοις  epyoi^  λόγους  καΧού'ί 
ζητήσει^ 

ΕΧΛ^ΙΙΙ.  Ύοιαΰτα  he  οι  Θηβαίοι  elirov.  οι  Be 
ΑακεΒαιμόνιοί  Βικασταϊ  νομίζοντ€ς  το  εττβρώτημα 
σφίσιν  ορθώς  e^eiv,  el  η  ev  τω  ττοΧίμω  υπ  αυτών 
ayaOov  ΤΓ€7Γονθασι,  Βιότί  τον  re  αΧΧον  ■χρόνον 
ηζιουν  hrjOev  αυτούς  κατά  τας  παΧαιας  Τίαυ- 
σανίου  μβτα  τον  ^ΙήΒον  σττονΒάς  ησυχάζειν  καΐ 
6τ€  ύστερον  α  ττρο  του  περιτειχίζεσθαι  ττροεί- 
γοντο  αυτόΐς,  κοινούς  elvai  κατ  εκβίνας,^  ουκ  ihe- 
ξαντο,    ■ηyoύμevoL     ττ}     εαυτών    Βικαία    βουΧήσει 

2  εκστΓονΒοι  ηδη  υττ  αυτών  κακώς  ττεττονθεναί, 
αύθις  το  αυτό  eva  εκαστον  ^τapayayόvτeς  καΐ 
ερωτώντες,  εϊ  τι  ΑακεΒαιμονίους  καΐ  τους  Συμμά- 
χους άyaθov  ev  τω  ττόΧεμω  ΒεΒρακότες  εισίν, 
όττότε  μη  φαΐεν,  ά'πάyovτeς  ά-πεκτεινον  και  εξαί- 

3  ρετον  εττοιήσαντο  ουΒενα.  Βιεφθειραν  Βε  Πλα- 
ταιών  μεν  αυτών  ουκ  εΧάσσους  Βιακοσίων,  αθη- 
ναίων Be  πέντε  και  είκοσι,  οι  ξυνεποΧιορκούντο• 
yυvaΐκaς  Βε  ηνΒραττοΒισαν.     την  Be  πόΧιν  ενιαυ- 

^  κατ  4κΐΙναί,  Badham's  conjecture  for  κατ'  4κ(ΐνα  ws  of 
the  MSS. 

'  Referring  to  the  4ττ(ρωτ-ημ&  βραχύ  of  ch.  lii.  4;  liii.  2. 
Possibly  Trphs  toIs  ζνμττανταί  goes  with  5ια•γνίίμα$  ποιτ]σησθ(, 
"  and  then  as  a  warning  to  all  pass  sentence," 

122 


BOOK    III.  Lxvii.  6-Lxviii.  3 

brief  recital  of  them  suffices,  but  if  they  are  wrong, 
speeches  decked  out  with  phrases  are  but  veils  to 
hide  the  truth.  Nay,  if  all  leaders,  like  you  in  the 
present  instance,  should  first  state  the  facts  briefly 
for  all  concerned,^  and  then  pass  sentence,  there 
will  be  less  seeking  of  fair  words  after  foul  deeds." 

LXVII  I.  Such  was  the  speech  of  the  Thebans. 
And  the  Lacedaemonian  judges  decided  that  their 
question,  whether  they  had  received  any  benefit  from 
the  Plataeans  in  the  war,  would  be  a  fair  one  for 
them  to  put ;  for  they  had  at  all  other  times  urged 
them,  they  claimed,  to  maintain  neutrality  in  accord- 
ance with  the  old  covenant  which  they  had  made 
with  Pausanius  after  the  Persian  defeat ;  and  when 
afterwards,  before  the  investment  of  Plataea  was 
undertaken,  their  proposal  to  the  Plataeans  that 
they  remain  neutral  in  accordance  with  the  earlier 
agreement  had  not  been  accepted,'^  they  thought 
themselves  thenceforth  released  from  all  obligations 
of  the  treaty  because  their  ΟΛνη  intentions  had  been 
honourable,  and  considered  that  they  had  been 
wronged  by  the  Plataeans.  So  they  caused  them  to 
come  forward  again,  one  at  a  time,  and  asked  them  the 
same  question,  whether  they  had  rendered  any  good 
service  to  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  in  the 
war,  and  when  they  said  "  no  "  they  led  them  off  and 
slew  them,  exempting  no  one.  The  number  of  the 
Plataeans  that  perished  was  not  less  than  two  hun- 
dred, and  of  the  Athenians  who  had  taken  part  in 
the  siege  twenty-five ;  and  the  women  were  sold  as 
slaves.    As  for  the  city  itself,  they  gave  occupation  of 

^  The  text  is  certainly  corrupt.  Badham's  slight  change, 
adopted  by  Hude,  seems  to  be  the  simplest  solution  cf  the 
difficulty. 

123 


THUCYDIDES 

τον  μεν  τινα^  ^Λεγαρβων  άνΒράσι  κατά  στάσιν 
έκτΓβτΓτωκοσι  kul  όσοι  τα  σφετερα  φροι>οΰντ€ς 
ΥΙΧαταιών  ττεριησαν  ehoaav  βνοικβΐν  ύστερον  δέ 
καθεΧόντες  αύτην  e<i  βΒαφο'^  ττάσαν  εκ  των  θεμε- 
Χίων  ωκοΒομησαν  ττρος  τω  Ήραιω  KaTa'ycii^iov 
διακοσίων  ττο^ων  τταρταχ^τ)  κυκΧω  οΙκηματα  έχον 
κάτωθεν  καΐ  άνωθεν,  και  οροφαΐς  καΐ  θυρώμασι 
τοί9  των  ΤΙΧατηιών  εχρησαντο,  καΐ  τοΐ?  cixXois  α 
ην  εν  τω  τείχ^ει  εττιπΧα,  χαΧκος  καϊ  σίδηρος, 
κΧίνας  κατασκευάσαντες  ανέθεσαν  ττ}'Ήρα,  καΐ 
νέων  εκατόμττεΒον  Χίθινον  ωκοΒόμησαν  αύττ}.  την 
8ε    yi]v    8ημοσιώσαντες    άπεμίσθωσαν    έττΐ    8εκα 

4  ετη,  καϊ  ενεμοντο  %ηβαΙοι.  σχεδόν  Βέ  τι  καϊ  το 
ξύμτταν  περί  ΐΙΧαταιών  οι  Αακε8αιμόνιοι  οντω^ 
άττοτετ ραμμένοι  ε<γένοντο  @ηβαίων  ένεκα,  νομί- 
ζοντε<ί  ev  τον  ττόΧεμον  αυτούς  άρτι  τότε  καθιστά- 

5  μενον  ώφεΧίμονς  είναι,  καϊ  τα  μεν  κατά  ΥΙΧα- 
ταιαν  ετει  τρίτω  και  ενενηκοστω  εττειΒη  ^Αθη- 
ναίων ξύμμαχ^οι  iyivovTo  οΰτως  ετεΧ€ύτΐ]σεν. 

LXIX.  Αϊ  δε  τεσσαράκοντα  νήες  των  ΐΙεΧο- 
ΤΓοννησίων  αί  Αεσβίοις  βοηθοί  έΧθοΰσαι,  ώς  τότε 
φεύ-'/ουσαι  Βιά  του  πελάγου?  εκ  τ€  των  ^ Αθ ηναιων 
εττιΒιω-χθεΙσαι  και  ττρος  ττ]  Κ,ρϊίτη  'χ^ειμασθ είσαι 
καϊ"  απ'  αύτη^;  σπορά8ε<;  προς  την  ΥίεΧοπόννησον 
κατηνεγθησαν,  καταΧαμβάνουσιν  εν  ttj  ΚυΧΧήν^ι 
τρεις  καϊ  8έκα  τριήρεις  ΑευκαΒίων  καϊ  Άμπρα- 
κιωτών  και  ΒρασίΒαν  τον  Τελλίδο?  ξύμβουΧον 
2  \\Χκί8α  επεΧ7]Χυθότα.  εβούΧοντο  yap  οι  Αακε- 
Βαιμόνιοι,  ώς  της  Αέσβου  ήμαρτηκεσαν,  πΧεον  το 

1  Θί73σΓοι  before  Mfyapfwv,  deleted  by  Clasi!en. 

2  κα\,  omitted  by  Classen,  followed  by  Hude. 

124 


BOOK    III.  Lxviii.  3-LXIX.  2 

it  for  about  a  year  to  some  men  of  Megara  who  had 
been  driven  out  in  consequence  of  a  sedition,  and 
also  to  such  of  the  surviving  Plataeans  as  favoured 
the  Lacedaemonian  cause.  Afterwards,  however, 
they  razed  it  entirely^  to  the  ground,  and  built,  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  sanctuary  of  Hera,  an  inn  two 
hundred  feet  square,  with  rooms  all  around,  above 
and  below,  using  for  this  purpose  the  roofs  and  doors 
of  the  Plataeans ;  and  with  the  rest  of  the  material 
inside  the  walls,  articles  of  copper  and  iron,  they 
fashioned  couches,  which  they  dedicated  to  Hera; 
and  they  also  built  for  her  a  stone  temple  one  hun- 
dred feet  long.  But  the  land  they  confiscated  and 
leased  for  ten  years,  and  the  Thebans  occupied 
it.  Indeed  it  was  almost  wholly  for  the  sake  of 
the  Thebans  that  the  Lacedaemonians  in  all  their 
dealings  with  the  Plataeans  showed  themselves  so 
thoroughly  hostile  to  them,  thinking  that  the 
Thebans  would  be  serviceable  in  the  war  then  just 
beginning.  Such  was  the  fate  of  Plataea,  in  the 
ninetv-third  year  after  they  became  allies  of  Athens.   519  b.c 

LXIX.  Meanwhile  2  the  forty  Peloponnesian  ships, 
which  had  gone  to  the  relief  of  the  Lesbians  and 
were  at  that  time  traversing  the  open  sea  in  flight, 
after  they  had  first  been  pursued  by  the  Athenians 
and  had  been  caught  in  a  storm  off  Crete,  had  come 
straggling  back  to  the  Peloponnesus,  where  they 
found,  at  Cyllene,  thirteen  Leucadian  and  Ambraciot 
triremes  and  Brasidas  son  of  Tellis,  who  had  come  as 
adviser  to  Alcidas.  For  after  they  had  failed  to  cap- 
ture Lesbos  the  Lacedaemonians  wished  to  strengthen 

'  Or,  taking  i'c  tS>v  θΐμΐλίων  with  ψκο5όμ•ησαν,  as  Steup  and 
others  do,  "  they  built  on  the  ohl  foundations." 

*  Resuming  the  narrative  interrupted  at  cli.  xxxiii.  1. 


THUCYDIDES 

ναυηκον  ττοιήσαντβς  e?  την  Κ,έρκνραν  ττΧβΰσαι 
στασιάζονσαν,  όώΒεκα  μβν  ΐ'αυσΐ  μόναι<ϊ  τταρόντων 
Αθηναίων  Trepi  ^αύττακτον,  ττρίν  Be  ττΧβον  τι 
eTTi^orjerjaaL  e'/c  των  Αθηνο)ν  ναυτικόν,  οττως 
προφθάσωσι,  καΐ  τταρεσκευάζοντο  ο  re  Βρασίδα? 
και  6  Άλ/ίτιδα?  ττρος  ταύτα. 

LXX.  0/  yap  Κ.€ρκυραΐοί  βστασίαζον,  €7Γ€ΐΒη 
οι  αΙ^μαΚωτοι  ifkOov  αύτοΐς  οι  €κ  των  irepX 
Ε7Γΐ6αμνον  νανμα'χ^ιών  ύττο  Κ.ορίνθίων  άφ€θ€ντ€<;, 
τω  μεν  λόγω  οκτακοσίων  ταΧάντων  τοις  7Tpo^€voi<; 
Βιη^^υημένοι,  epyo)  Si  ττεττεισμβνοι  Κορινθίοις 
Κ-έρκυραν  ττροστΓΟίησαι.  και  βττρασσον  ούτοι 
€καστον   των   ττοΧιτών  μετιόντβς,  οττω?   άττοστη- 

2  σωσιν  ^Αθηναίων  την  ττόΧιν.  καΐ  άφικομάνης 
'ΑττίΛ^9  τε  ν€ως  καΐ  Κ.ορινθία'ί  τΓρέσβει•;  ayov- 
σών  και  e?  Xoyovς  καταστάντων  εψηφίσαντο 
}ζ.€ρκνραΐοι  ^Αθηναίοις  μβν  ξύμμαχ^οι  elvai  κατά 
τα    ζυyκ€Lμ€va,   ΤΙεΧοττοννησίοις  Be  φιΧοι    ώσττερ 

3  καϊ  ττρότβρον.  και  {ην  yap  ΐΐβιθίας  εθβΧοττρόξβνό'ζ 
τ€  των  'Αθηναίων  καϊ  τον  Βημου  ττροειστηκει) 
vTrayouaiv  αύτον  ούτοι  οι  avop€<i  e?  Βίκην,  XeyovTe^ 

4  ^Αθηναίοις  την  I\epKvpav  καταΒουΧούν.  ο  Be 
άπoφυyώv  av0u7rayei  αυτών  τους  τΐΧουσιωτάτου^ 
TrevTS  άνΒρας,  φάσκων  τβμνειν  •χάρακας  εκ  του  τβ 
Αιος   του   τεμένους   και   του  ΆΧκίνου'      ζημία  Be 

5  καθ'  εκάστην  χάρακα  εττεκειτο  στατηρ.   οφΧόντων 

1  cf.  Ι.  χ1νϋ.-1ν.  =  £160.000,  8770,000. 

^  The  igreeraent  was  for  a  defensive  allianoe  ((πίμαχία) ; 
cf.  I.  xliv.  1. 

120 


BOOK    III.  i.xix.  2-Lxx.  5 

their  fleet  and  to  sail  to  Corcyra,  which  was  in  the 
throes  of  a  revolution.  The  Athenians  had  a  fleet  of 
only  twelve  ships  at  Naupactus,  and  the  Lacedae- 
monians desired  to  reach  Corcyra  before  a  larger  fleet 
could  come  from  Athens  to  re-enforce  them.  It 
was  with  this  end  in  view  that  Brasidas  and  Alcidas 
set  about  making  their  preparations. 

LXX.  The  Corcvraeans  had  been  in  a  state  of 
revolution  ever  since  the  home-coming  of  the  captives 
Λνΐιο  had  been  taken  in  the  two  sea-fights  off 
Epidamnus^  and  had  been  released  by  the  Corinthians. 
They  had  nominally  been  set  free  on  bail  in  the  sum 
of  eight  hundred  talents  ^  pledged  by  their  proxeni, 
but  in  fact  they  had  been  bribed  to  bring  Corcyra 
over  to  the  Corinthian  side.  And  these  men  had 
been  going  from  citizen  to  citizen  and  intriguing  with 
them,  with  a  view  to  inducing  the  city  to  revolt 
from  Athens.  And  on  the  arrival  of  an  Attic  and 
Corinthian  ship  bringing  envoys,  and  after  the  envoys 
had  held  conferences  with  them,  the  Corcyraeans 
voted  to  continue  to  be  allies  to  the  Athenians 
according  to  their  agreement,^  but  on  the  other 
hand  to  renew  their  former  friendship  with  the 
Peloponnesians.  Thereupon  the  returned  prisoners 
brought  Peithias,  a  volunteer  proxenus  of  the  Athen- 
ians and  leader  of  the  popular  party,  to  trial,  charg- 
ing him  with  trying  to  bring  Corcyra  into  servitude 
to  Athens.  But  he,  being  acquitted,  brought  suits  in 
turn  against  the  five  wealthiest  men  of  their  number, 
alleging  that  they  were  cutting  vine-poles  from  the 
sacred  pi'ecincts  of  Zeus  and  Alcinous,  an  offence  for 
which  a  fine  of  a  stater•*  for  each  stake  was  fixed  by 

*  If  of  gold,  about  16s. ;  if  the  silver  Athenian  stater,  about 
2s.  Sd. ;  if  the  silver  Corinthian  stater,  about  Is.  4d. 

127 


THUCYDJDES 

Be  ούτων  κα\  προς  τα  lepa  Ικετών  καθεζο μίνων 
δια  ττΧήθος  τη<;  ζημίας,  οττως  ταξάμβί'οι  άττοΖώσιν, 
6  ΥΙειθίας  (eruy^ai^e  yap  καΐ  βουΧής  ων)  ττείθει 

6  ώστε  τω  νόμω  γ^ρήσασθαι.  οΊ  δ'  έττειΒη  τω  τ€ 
νόμω  e^eipyovTO  και  άμα  εττυνθάνοντο  τον  ΧΛβιθίαν, 
έω?  έ'τί  βου\ης  εστί,  μεΧΧειν  το  ττΧήθος  ανα- 
•κεισειν  τους  αυτούς  ^ Αθηναίο ίς  φίΧονς  τε  καΐ 
εχθρούς  νομίζειν,  ξυνίσταντό  τε  κα\  Χαβόντες 
iyX^ipiSia  εξαττιναίως  ες  την  βουΧην  εσελθοντες 
τον  τε  ΐίειθίαν  κτείνουσι  και  άΧλους  των  τε 
βουΧευτών  και  ιδιωτών  ες  εζήκοντα'  οι  8ε  τίνες 
της  αυτής  yvώμης  τω  ΐίειθία  6Xίyoι  ες  την  Άττί- 
κην  τριήρη  κaτeφυyov  ετι  τταρονσαν. 

LXXI.  Αρύσαντες  δε  τούτο  καΐ  ξvyκaXέσavτες 
Κερκυραίους  είττον  οτι  ταύτα  και  βεΧτιστα  εϊη 
καΐ  ήκιστ^  αν  δουΧωθεΐεν  ύττ  ^Αθηναίων,  τό  τε 
ΧοιτΓον  μηδετερους  δεχεσθαι  αλλ'  τ)  μια  νηι  ησυ'χά- 
ζοντας,  το  δε  ττΧεον  ττοΧεμιον  ήyεΐσθaί.  ώς  δε 
είττον,   καΐ    εττικυρώσαι   rjvayKaaav  την  yvώμηv. 

2  ττεμτΓουσι  δε  και  ες  τάς  ^ Αθι^νας  ευθύς  πρέσβεις 
περί  τε  τών  πεπpay μένων  διδάζοντας  ώς  ξυνεφερε 
καΐ  τους  εκεί  κaτaπεφευyότaς  πείσοντας  μηδέν 
άνεπιτήδειον  πράσσειν,  όπως  μη  τις  επιστροφή 
Ύενηται.     LXXII.   εΧθόντων  δε  οΐ  *  Αθηναίοι  τους 

^  Or,  perhaps,  (ττιστροψ-η  =  animadverdo,  "  tliat  no  atten- 
tion sliould  be  paid" — by  way  of  punishment  for  the  change 
in  Corey raean  policy. 

128 


BOOK    III.  Lxx.  5-Lxxir.  i 

law.  Wlicn  they  Had  been  convicted  and  because  of 
the  excessive  amount  of  the  fine  took  refuge  at  the 
temples  as  suppliants,  that  they  might  arrange  for 
the  payment  of  the  fine  by  instalments,  Peithias  per- 
suaded the  senate,  of  which  he  Λvas  also  a  member,  to 
let  the  law  take  its  course.  The  condemned  men, 
seeing  that  they  were  debarred  bj-  the  law  from  carry- 
ing out  their  proposal  and  at  the  same  time  learning 
that  Peithias,  so  long  as  he  continued  to  be  a  member 
of  the  senate,  would  persist  in  his  attempt  to  per- 
suade the  populace  to  conclude  an  offensive  and  de- 
fensive alliance  with  the  Athenians,  banded  together 
and  suddenly  rushing  into  the  senate  with  daggers 
in  their  hands  killed  Peithias  and  others,  both  sena- 
tors and  private  persons,  to  the  number  of  sixty.  A 
few,  however,  who  held  the  same  political  views  as 
Peithias,  took  refuge  in  the  Attic  trireme  that  was 
still  in  the  harbour. 

LXXI.  After  they  had  taken  these  measures  the 
conspirators  called  the  Corey raeans  together  and 
told  them  that  it  \vas  all  for  the  best,  and  that 
now  they  ΛνουΜ  be  least  likely  to  be  enslaved  by  the 
Athenians ;  and  in  future  they  should  remain  neutral 
and  receive  neither  party  if  they  came  Avith  more 
than  one  ship,  regarding  any  larger  number  as 
hostile.  Having  thus  spoken  they  compelled  the 
people  to  ratify  their  proposal.  1  hey  also  sent  at 
once  to  Athens  envoys  to  explain  recent  events  at 
Corcyra,  showing  how  these  Avere  for  the  interests 
of  Athens,  and  to  persuade  those  who  had  taken 
refuge  there  to  do  nothing  prejudicial  to  them,  in 
order  that  there  might  not  be  a  reaction  against 
Corcyra.^  LXXII.  But  wlien  the  envoys  arrived, 
the  Athenians  arrested  them  as  revolutionists,  and 

129 


THUCYDIDES 

re  ττρέσβεις  ώ<;   νεωτερίζοντας  ξυ\\αβόντ€<;   και 
oaovs  €7Τ€ΐσαν  κατεθβντο  e?  Al'yivav. 

2  Έι»  δε  τοιίτω  των  Κερκυραίων  οι  έχοντες  τα. 
ττρά<γματα  εΧθούσης  τριήρους  Κορινθίας  καΐ  Αακε- 
Βαιμονίων    πρέσβεων    εττιτίθεντα     τω    8ήμω    και 

3  μαχόμενοι  ενίκησαν.  άφικομενης  8ε  νυκτός  ό 
μεν  8Γ]μος  ες  την  άκρόττοΧιν  καΐ  τα  μετέωρα  της 
ττόΧεως  καταφεύγει  και  αυτού  ξυΧΧεγεΙς  ίΒρύθη, 
και  τον  ΎΧΧαϊκον  Χιμενα  είχον  οι  8ε  την  τε 
ayopav  κατέΧαβον,  ονττερ  οι  ττοΧΧοϊ  ωκουν  αυτών, 
καΐ  τον  Χιμενα  τον  ττρος  αύτη  καΐ  προς  την 
ηπειρον.  LXXIII.  τη  δ'  ύστεραία  ήκροβοΧίσαντό 
τε  οΧίΎα  και  ες  τους  αγρούς  περιεπεμπον  αμφό- 
τεροι, τους  Βούλους  παρακαΧοΰντές  τε  και  εΧευ- 
θερίαν  ύπισ~χνούμενοΐ'  καϊ  τω  μεν  Βήμω  των 
οίκετών  το  πΧήθος  παρεγενετο  ζυμμαχον,  τοις  δ' 
ετέροις  εκ  της  ηπείρου  επίκουροι  οκτακόσιοι. 
LXXIV.  ΒιαΧιπούσης  δ'  ημέρας  μάχη  αύθις 
γίηνεται,  και  νίκα  ο  Βήμος  χωρίων  τβ  ίσχύι  και 
ΊτΧηθει  π  ρούχων  αί  τε  γυναίκες  αύτοΐς  τοΧμηρώς 
ξυνεπβΧάβοντο  βάΧΧουσαι  άπο  των  οικιών  τω 
κεράμω   καϊ  πάρα  φύσιν   ύπομενουσαι  τον   θορυ- 

2  βον.  γενομένης  Βε  της  τροπής  περί  ΒειΧην  οψίαν 
Βείσαντες  οι  όΧίγοι  μη  αύτοβοεί  ο  Βήμος  του  τε 
νεωρίου  κρατήσειεν  επεΧθών  καϊ  σφάς  Βιαφθεί- 
ρειεν,  εμπιπράσι  τας  οικίας  τάς  εν  κύκΧω  της 
αγοράς  καϊ  τάς  ξννοικίας,  όπως  μη  η  εφοΒος, 
φειΒόμενοι  ούτε  οικείας  ούτε  άΧΧοτριας,  ώστε  και 
130 


BOOK    III.  Lxxii.  i-Lxxiv.  2 

deposited  them  in  Aegina,  together  with  such  of  the 
fugitives  as  they  had  won  over. 

Meanwhile  the  dominant  party  at  Corcyra,  on  the 
arrival  of  a  Corinthian  trireme  Avith  Lacedaemonian 
envoys,  attacked  the  people  and  were  victorious  in 
the  fight.  But  when  night  came  on  the  people  fled 
for  refuge  to  the  acropolis  and  the  high  places  of  the 
city,  and  getting  together  in  a  body  established 
themselves  there.  They  held  also  the  Hyllaic  har- 
bour,^  while  the  other  party  seized  the  quarter  of  the 
market-place  where  most  of  them  lived,  and  the 
harbour"^  adjacent  to  it  which  faces  the  mainland. 
LXXII  I.  On  the  next  day  they  skirmished  a  little, 
and  both  jjarties  sent  messengers  round  into  the 
fields,  calling  upon  the  slaves  and  offering  them 
freedom  ;  and  a  majority  of  the  slaves  made  common 
cause  with  the  people,  while  the  other  party  gained 
the  support  of  eight  hundred  mercenaries  from  the 
mainland.  LXXIV.  After  a  day's  interval  another 
battle  occurred,  and  the  people  won,  as  they  had 
the  advantage  in  the  strength  of  their  position  as 
well  as  in  numbers.  The  women  also  boldly  took 
part  with  them  in  the  fight,  hurling  tiles  from  the 
houses  and  enduring  the  uproar  with  a  courage  be- 
yond their  sex.  But  about  twilight,  when  their  forces 
had  been  routed,  the  oligarchs,  fearing  lest  the 
people,  if  they  came  on,  might  at  the  first  onset  get 
possession  of  the  arsenal  and  put  them  to  the  SAvord, 
set  fire  to  the  dwelling-houses  around  the  market- 
place and  to  the  tenements,^  in  order  to  prevent  an 
assault,  sparing  neither  their  own  houses  nor  those 
of  others.  The  result  was  that  much  merchandise 
1  Probably  the  present  bay  Chalikiopulon.  *  Now  bay  of 
Kastradu.  *  Large  buildings  rented  to  several  poor  families 
( =  insulae  at  Rome), 


THUCYDIDES 

■χ^ρηματα  πολλά  εμττύρων  κατβκαύθη  καΐ  η  ττόΧις 
eKivBuvevae  ττάσα  Ειαφθαρήναι,  el  άνεμο<;  eVe- 
3  yevero  ττ)  φ\oyϊ  επίφορο^  e?  αυτιών,  και  οι  μεν 
πανσάμβνοι  τ/}?  μάχη<;  ώ?  €κάτ€ροι  ησνχ^άσανΎ€<; 
την  νύκτα  ev  φυΧακτ}  ήσαν  και  ή  Κ^ορινθία  νανς 
του  Βιίμου  κβκρατηκότο^  ύττεξανψ/βτο,  καΐ  των 
επικούρων  οι  ττοΧλοΙ  eV  τ?)^  ήττειρον  Χαθόντε'ί 
Βιεκομίσθησαν. 

LXX  V.  Τ^  Se  εττι^Γ/νομεντ]  ήμερα  Κικόστρατος 
6  Αιειτρεφους,  Αθηναίων  στρατη^ό<ί,  ιταρα- 
^Ιηνεται  βοηθών  εκ  ^^ανττάκτου  8ώ8εκα  ναυσι 
καΐ  \ίεσσ7]νίωΐ'  ττεντακοσίοα  όττλίταί?•  ξύμβασίν 
re  εττρασσε  καΐ  πείθει  ώστε  ξνγχ^ωρήσαι  άλλ?;'- 
λοί?  Βεκα  μεν  άνδρας  τους  αιτιωτάτους  κρίναι,  οι 
ούκέτι  έμειναν,  τους  δ'  άΧλ,ονς  οικεΐν  σπόντας 
προς  άΧληΧους  ποιησαμενους  και  προς  'Αθηναίους 
ώστε   τους  αυτούς   εχθρούς   καΐ  φίΧους  νομίζειν. 

2  και  6  μεν  ταύτα  πράζας  εμεΧΧεν  άποπΧεύσεσθαι• 
οι  5e  του  δήμου  προστάται  πείθουσιν  αύτον  πέντε 
αεν  ναΟς  των  αυτού  σφίσι  καταλιπεΐν,  όπως 
ησσον  τι  εν  κινήσει  ώσιν  οι  ενάντιοι,  ϊσας  δε 
αύτοΙ  πΧηρώσαντες  εκ  σφών  αυτών  ξυμπεμψειν. 

3  και  ό  μεν  ξυνεχώρησεν,  οί  δε  τους  εχθρούς  κατε- 
Χε^ον  ες  τας  νανς.  δείσαντες  δε  εκείνοι  μη  ες  τας 
^Αθήνας    άποπεμφθώσι    καθίζουσιν    ες    το     των 

4  Αιοσκόρων  ιερόν.  Νικοστρατος  δε  αυτούς  άνίστη 
τε  και  παρεμυθείτο.  ώς  δ'  ουκ  επειθεν,  ό  δήμος 
όπΧισθεΙς     επΙ    τ^     ττροφάσει    ταύττ],    ώς    ούδεν 

132 


BOOK    III.  Lxxiv.  2-L\xv.  4 

was  burned  up  and  that  the  wliole  city  was  in  im- 
minent danger  of  being  entirely  destroyed  if  a  wind 
blowing  toward  the  city  had  sprung  up  to  reinforce 
the  Hames.  And  during  the  night,  after  tliey  had 
desisted  from  battle,  both  parties  rested  but  re- 
mained on  the  alert ;  and  now  that  the  people  had 
got  the  upper  hand  the  Corinthian  ship  slipped  out 
to  sea,  and  most  of  the  mercenaries  were  secretly 
conveyed  over  to  the  mainland. 

LXXV.  On  the  following  day  Nicostratus  son  of 
Diitrephes,  general  of  the  Athenians,  came  to  their 
assistance  from  Naupactus  with  twelve  ships  and  five 
hundred  Messenian  hoplites.  He  tried  to  negotiate  a 
settlement  between  the  factions,  and  succeeded  in 
persuading  them  to  come  to  a  mutual  agreement : 
that  the  twelve  men  who  were  chiefly  to  blame 
should  be  brought  to  trial  (whereupon  they  fled  at 
once)  and  that  the  rest  should  make  peace  with 
each  other  and  dwell  together,  and  enter  into  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  the  Athenians. 
When  he  had  accomplished  this,  he  was  about  to 
sail  away ;  but  the  leaders  of  the  people  persuaded 
him  to  leave  them  five  of  his  ships,  that  their 
opponents  might  be  somewhat  less  inclined  to  dis- 
turbance, agreeing  on  their  part  to  man  and  send 
with  him  an  equal  number  of  their  own  ships.  He 
agreed,  and  they  began  to  tell  off  their  ])ersonal 
enemies  as  crews  for  the  ships.  But  these,  fearing 
that  they  might  be  sent  oft'  to  Athens,  sat  down 
as  suppliants  in  the  temple  of  the  Dioscuri.  Nico- 
stratus, however,  urged  them  to  rise  and  tried  to 
reassure  them.  But  when  he  could  not  induce  them 
to  rise,  the  people  took  this  pretext  to  arm  them- 
selves, interpreting  their  distrust  and  refusal  to  sail 

133 


THUCYDIDES 

αυτών  ύγίβς  διανοουμένων  rrj  του  μη  ξυμττΧεΐν 
άτΓίστία,  τά  τ€  οπΧα  αυτών  βκ  των  οικιών  εΧαβε 
καΐ  αυτών  τίνας  οΐς  εττετυχ^ον,  ec  μη  ^ικόστρατο<; 

5  εκώΧυσε,  Βιέφθειραν  αν.  όρώντε^  δε  οΐ  άΧΧοι 
τά  Ύί^νόμενα  καθίζουσιν  ες  το  "Ηραιον  Ικέται 
και  'yL'yvovTai  ουκ  εΧάσσου<;  τετρακοσίων.  6  δε 
Βήμο<;  8είσα<;  μη  τι  νεωτερισωσιν  άνίστησί  τε 
αυτούς  ττείσας  καϊ  διακομίζει  β?  την  τιρο  του 
'Υϋραίου  νήσον  καϊ  τα  ετητήδεια  εκεΐσβ  αυτοίς 
ΒιεττέμτΓετο. 

LXXVI.  Τ?}?  8ε  στάσεως  εν  τούτω  οΰσης  τ€- 
τάρττ)  η  πεμττττ]  ημέρα  μετά  την  τών  ανδρών  ες 
την  νήσον  διακομιδην  αϊ  εκ  της  Κ,υΧΧηνης  ΤΙεΧο- 
τΓοννησίων  νήες,  μετά  τον  εκ  της  ^Ιωνίας  πΧοΰν 
εφορμοι  ούσαι,  TrapayiyvovTai  τρεις  καϊ  "πεντή- 
κοντα' ηρχε  δε  αυτών  ^ΑΧκίδας,  οσπερ  καϊ  ττρό- 
τερον,  και  Έρασίδας  αύτω  ζύμβουΧος  επέπΧει. 
ορμισάμενοι  δε  ες  Χυβοτα  Χιμένα  της  ήττείρου 
άμα  εφ  εττεττΧεον  τγ  Κέρκυρα.  LXXVII.  οι  δε 
ΤΓοΧΧώ  θορύβω  και  ττεφοβημενοι  τά  τ  εν  τη 
τΓοΧει  και  τον  εττίττΧουν  τταρεσκευάζοντο  τε  άμα 
εξήκοντα  ναύς  καϊ  τάς  αΐεΐ  ττΧηρουμίνας  εξέ- 
ττεμτΓον  προς  τους  εναντίους,  π-αραινούντων  'Αθη- 
ναίων    σφάς     τ€    εάσαι    πρώτον    εκπΧεύσαι    και 

2  ύστερον  πάσαις  άμα  εκείνους  επι^ενέσθαι.  ώς  δε 
αύτοΐς  ττρος  τοις  ττοΧεμίοις  ήσαν  σποράδες  αι 
νήες,  δύο  μεν  ευθύς  ηύτομόΧησαν,  εν  ετέραις  δε 
άΧΧηΧοις  οι  εμπΧεοντες  εμάχ^οντο'    ην  δε  ουδείς 

134 


BOOK    III.  Lxxv.  4-LXXVI1.  2 

with  Nicostratus  as  proof  that  their  intentions  were 
anything  but  good.  Accordingly  they  took  arms 
from  their  houses,  and  would  have  slain  some  of  the 
oligarchs  whom  they  chanced  to  meet,  if  Nicostratus 
had  not  prevented  them.  The  rest,  seeing  what  was 
going  on,  sat  doAvn  as  suppliants  in  the  temple  of 
Hera,  and  they  were  not  less  than  four  hundred  in 
number.  But  the  people,  fearing  that  they  might 
start  a  revolution,  persuaded  them  to  rise  and  con- 
veyed them  over  to  the  island  which  lies  in  front  of 
the  temple  of  Hera ;  and  provisions  were  regularly 
sent  to  them  there. 

LXXVI.  At  this  stage  of  the  revolution,  on  the 
fourth  or  fifth  day  after  the  transfer  of  the  men  to 
the  island,  the  Peloponnesian  ships  arrived  ^  from 
Cyllene,  where  they  had  been  lying  at  anchor  since 
their  voyage  from  Ionia,  being  fifty-three  in  number; 
and  Alcidas  was  in  command  of  them  as  before, 
Λvith  Brasidas  on  board  as  his  adviser.  They  came  to 
anchor  first  at  Sybota,  a  harbour  of  the  mainland,  and 
then  at  daybreak  sailed  for  Corcyra.  LXXVI  I.  But 
the  Corcyraeans,'^  being  in  great  confusion  and  thrown 
into  a  panic  by  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  city  as  well 
as  by  the  approaching  fleet,  proceeded  to  equip  sixty 
ships  and  at  the  same  time  to  send  them  out  against 
the  enemy  as  fast  as  they  were  manned,  although 
the  Athenians  urged  that  they  themselves  be  per- 
mitted to  sail  out  first,  and  that  the  Corcyraeans 
should  come  out  afterwai'ds  with  all  their  ships  in  a 
body.  But  when  their  ships  Λvere  near  the  enemy, 
scattered  here  and  there,  two  of  them  deserted 
immediately,  while  in  others  the  crews  were  fighting 
one  another ;  and  there  was  no  order  in  anything 

'  c/.  ch.  Ixix.  1. 

■  i.e.  tlie  democratic  party,  now  la  control. 


THUCYDIDES 

3  κόσμος  των  ττοιουμένων.  ιΒόντα  oe  οι  ΙΙεΧοττον- 
νησίΟί  την  ταραχ^ην  είκοσι  μβν  ναυσι  ττρος  τοίις 
Κερκυραίους  ετάξαντο,  ταΐς  Se  Χοιπαΐς  ττρος  τας 
ΒώΒεκα  ναΰς  των  Αθηναίων,  ων  ήσαν  αΐ  δύο  η  ^ 
^αΧαμινία   και  Πάραλος. 

LXXVIII.  ΚαΙ  οι  μ'βν  Κερκυραίοι  κακώς  re 
και  κατ  οΧί^ας  προσττηττοντες  βταΧαιττώρουν  το 
καθ'  αυτούς'  οΐ  δ  Αθηναίοι  φοβούμενοι  το 
ττΧήθος  και  την  ττερικυκΧωσιν  άθρόαις  μεν  ου 
ΤΓροσετΓίπτον  ούΒε  κατά  μέσον  ταις  εφ^  εαυτούς 
τετα'/μεναις,  ττροσβαΧόντες  he  κατά  κέρας  κατα- 
Βύουσι  μίαν  ναύν.  και  μετά  ταύτα  κύκΧον  ταξα- 
μένων  αυτών  ττεριεττΧεον  και  επειρώντο  θορυβεΐν. 

2  'γνόντες  Be  οί  ττρος  τοις  Κερκυραιοις  και  Βείσαντες 
μη  οττερ  εν  ^αυπάκτω  ηενοιτο,  εττιβ  ,ηθούσι, 
καΐ  Ύενομεναι  άθροαι  αι  νήες  άμα  τον  εττίττΧουν 

3  τοις  Άθηναίοις  εττοιοΰντο.  οί  δ'  ύπεχώρουν  ηΒη 
ττρύμναν  κρουσμένοι  καϊ  άμα  τάς  των  Κερκυραίων 
έβούΧοντο  προκαταφυγεΐν  οτι  μάΧιστα,  εαυτών 
σχ^οΧτ)   τε  ύττοχ^ωρούντων  καϊ  ττρος   σφάς  τεταγ- 

4  μένων  των  εναντίων.  ή  μεν  ούν  ναυμαχ^ία 
τοιαύτη  "γενομένη  ετεΧεύτα  ες  ηΧίου  Βύσιν. 

LXXIX.  Καϊ  οί  Κερκυραίοι  Βείσαντες  μη 
σφίσιν  ετΓΐπΧεύσαντες  εττι  την  ττόΧιν  ώς  κρα- 
τούντες οί  ποΧεμιοι  ή  τους  εκ  της  νήσου  άναΧά- 
βωσιν  η  και  άΧΧο  τι  νεωτερισωσι,  τους  τε  εκ  της 
νήσου  ττάΧιν  ες  το   '  \λραίον  Βιεκομισαν  καϊ   την 

^  ή  added  by  Kriiger. 
136 


BOOK     ΙΙί.    LXXVII.   2-LXXIX.    1 

thev  did.  And  when  the  Peloponnesians  saw  their 
confusion  they  arrayed  only  twenty  ships  against 
the  Corcyraeans,  and  all  the  rest  against  the  twelve 
Athenian  ships,  among  which  were  the  two  sacred 
ships,  the  Salaminia  and  the  Paralos. 

LXXVII  I.  Now  the  Corcyi-aeans,  since  they  were 
attacking  in  disorder  and  with  few  ships  at  a  time, 
were  having  trouble  in  their  part  of  the  battle  ;  and 
the  Athenians,  fearing  the  enemy's  superior  numbers 
and  seeing  the  danger  of  being  surrounded,  did  not 
attack  the  Avhole  body  together  nor  the  centre  of 
the  ships  that  were  arrayed  against  them,  but  charged 
upon  one  of  the  wings  and  sank  a  single  ship.  And 
then,  when  the  Peloponnesians  after  this  move 
formed  their  ships  in  a  circle,  they  kept  sailing  round 
the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  trying  to  throw  it  into 
confusion.  But  those  who  were  facing  the  Corcy- 
raeans, perceiving  this  manoeuvre  and  fearing  a 
repetition  of  what  happened  at  Naupactus,^  came  to 
the  rescue,  and  the  whole  fleet,  ηολν  united,  advanced 
simultaneously  upon  the  Athenians.  Thereupon  the 
Athenians  began  to  retire,  backing  water, '-^  hoping  at 
the  same  time  that  the  Corcyraean  shii)S  might  as 
far  as  possible  escape  into  harbour,^  as  they  them- 
selves retired  slowly  and  the  enemy's  attacks  were 
directed  only  against  them.  Such  then  was  the 
course  of  the  battle,  which  lasted  till  sunset. 

LXXIX.  The  Corcyraeans,  fearing  that  the 
enemy,  confident  of  victory,  might  sail  against  the 
city  and  either  take  on  board  the  prisoners  on  the 
island  or  commit  some  other  act  of  violence,  trans- 
ferred these  prisoners  once  more  to  the  temple  of 

^  cf.  II.  Ixxxiv.         ^  i.e.  keeping  their  faces  to  the  enemy. 
'  i.e.  with  as  many  ships  as  possible  ;  as  it  was  they  lost 
thirteen  ships. 


THUCYDIDES 

2  ΤΓοΧιν  βφυΧασσον.  οι  δ'  eVl  μεν  την  ττοΧιν  ουκ 
έτόΧμησαν  ττΧβϋσαί  κρατονντε'ί  rfj  νανμαχ^ία, 
τρεις  δέ  καϊ  8εκα  ναΰς  €χοντ€<ί  των  Κερκυραίων 
άττέπΧευσαν  €<;  την  ήτταρον  οθβνττβρ  άνηΎάΎοντο. 

3  τί)  δ'  ύστ€ραία  βττΐ  μεν  την  ττόΧιν  ου^εν  μάΧΧον 
βττεττΧεον,  καίττερ  iv  ποΧΧτ)  ταραχ^τ)  και  φοβ(ύ 
οντάς  καϊ  Βρασίδον  τταραινουντος,  ώς  XeyeTUi, 
Άλκιδα,  ίσοψήφου  8e  ουκ  οντος'  έττϊ  δέ  την 
Αευκίμνην  το  άκρωτήριον  άτΓθβάντβ<;  έπόρθουν 
του?  aypov<;. 

LXXX.  Ο  δε  Βήμος  των  Κερκυραίων  iv  τούτω 
περιΒεης  'γενόμενο';  μη  εττίττΧεύσωσιν  αΐ  νΡ]ε<;,  τοΐ<; 
τε  ίκέταις  rjaav  ε'?  λόγου?  και  rot?  άΧΧοίς  οττω? 
σωθησεταί  η  ττολί?.  /cat  τινας  αυτών  εττεισαν 
ες  τα?  ναΰς  εσβηναι-  εττΧηρωσαν  yap  όμως  τριά- 
2  κοντά}  οί  δε  HeXoTrovvi'jaLOL  με'χ^ρι  μέσου  ημέρας 
δηώσαντες  την  y'qv  άττεττΧευσαν,  καϊ  ύττο  νύκτα 
αύτοΐς  εφρυκτωρήθ ήσαν  εξήκοντα  νήες  'Αθηναίων 
προσττΧεουσαι  άπο  ΑενκάΒος•  ας  οί  'Αθηναίοι 
ττυνθανόμενοι  την  στάσιν  καϊ  τας  μετ  AXklBov 
ναυς  εττΐ  Κερκυραν  μεΧΧουσας  ττΧεΐν  άττεστειΧαν 
καϊ  ΚνρυμεΒοντα  τον  &ουκΧεους  στpaτηyόv. 

LXXXI.  Οί  μεν  οΰν  ΐΙεΧοττο^ηηίσιοι  της 
νυκτός  ευθύς  κατά  τάγ^ος  εκομίζοντο  ε'ττ  οίκον 
τταρα  την  yr)v'  καϊ  ^J^τεpεvεyκόvτες  τον  Αευ καΒίων 
Ισθμον  τας  ναυς,  δττως  μη  ττεριπΧεοντβς  οφθώσιν, 

'  Some  MSS.  give  ττροσΒΐχόμίΐΌί  roy  (ττίπλουν  after  τοιά• 
κοντά,  most  editors  omit. 

138 


BOOK    III.  Lxxix.  i-Lxxxi.  i 

Hera  and  then  took  measures  to  protect  the  city. 
The  Peloponnesians,  however,  although  they  were 
the  victors  in  the  naval  battle,  did  not  venture  to 
attack  the  city,  but  Avith  thirteen  Corcyraean  ships 
which  they  had  taken  sailed  back  to  tlie  harbour  on 
the  mainland  from  which  they  had  set  out.  On  the 
next  day  they  Avere  no  more  inclined  to  attack  the 
city,  though  the  inhabitants  were  in  a  state  of  great 
confusion  and  fear,  and  though  Brasidas,  it  is  said, 
urged  Alcidas  to  do  so,  but  did  not  have  equal 
authority  with  him.  Instead,  they  merely  landed  on 
the  promontory  of  Leucimne  and  ravaged  the  fields. 

LXXX.  Meanwhile  the  ))eople  of  Corcyra,  becom- 
ing alarmed  lest  the  shi|)s  should  attack  them, 
conferred  Avith  the  suppliants  and  also  with  the  other 
members  of  the  opposite  faction  on  the  best  means  of 
saving  the  city.  And  some  of  them  they  persuaded 
to  go  on  board  the  ships ;  for  in  sjiite  of  all  the 
Corcyraeans  had  manned  thirty  ships.  But  the 
Peloponnesians,  after  ravaging  the  land  till  midday, 
sailed  away,  and  toward  night  a  signal  was  flashed  to 
them  that  sixty  Athenian  ships  were  approaching 
from  Leucas.  These  ships  had  been  sent  by  the 
Athenians,  under  the  command  of  Eurymedon  son 
of  Thucles,  when  they  learned  of  the  revolution  at 
Corcyra  and  that  the  fleet  under  Alcidas  was  about 
to  sail  thither. 

LXXXI.  The  Peloponnesians  accordingly  set  sail 
that  very  night  for  home,  going  with  all  speed  and 
keeping  close  to  the  shore  ;  and  hauling  their  ships 
across  the  Leucadian  isthmus,^  in  order  to  avoid  being 
seen,  as  they  would  be  if  they  sailed  around,  they  got 

^  This  isthmus  Avas  the  άκτί/  rinelpou  of  Homer  {ω  378), 
now  Santa  Maura,  tlie  neck  of  land,  about  three  stadia  in 
width,  joining  Leucas  with  the  mainland. 


THUCYDIDES 

2  άττ OKo μίζοντ αι.  Kep/cvpaLoi  8e  αίσθόμβνοι  τάς  re 
^Αττίκας  ναΰς  ττροσπΧεούσας  τάς  re  των  ττολε- 
μιωΐ'  οΐχ^ομύνας,  Χαθόντες  ^  τους  τ€  Λΐ€σσηνίους  e? 
την  ττόΧιν  riyayov  ττρότβρον  'έξω  ορτας,  και  τα<; 
vad<i  ττβρητΧεΰσαι  κεΧβνσαντες  ας  βττΧι^ρωσαν  69 
Ύον  ΎΧΧαϊκον  Χιμά'α,  iv  οσω  ire  pie  κ  ο  μίζοντ  ο,  των 
ζ-χθρων  ei  τίνα  Χάβοίβν,  άττεκτεινον  καΐ  e«  των 
νέων  οσονς  eireiaav  βσβήναι  €κβιβάζοντ€ς  άπ€- 
γ^ρώντο,  €9  το  "Ηραιόν  τ€  έΧθόντες  των  Ικετών 
ώς   πβντήκοντα   άνΒρας  8ίκην   υττοσγβΐν   έπεισαν 

3  καΐ  κaτeyvωσav  ττάντων  θάνατον,  οι  Be  ττοΧΧοΙ 
των  ικετών,  οσοί  ουκ  εττείσθησαν,  ώς  εώρων  τα 
yιyvόμεva,  Ειεφθειρον  αυτού  εν  τω  ίερω  άΧΧιίΧους 
και   εκ   τών   8εν8ρων   τίνες  aTT^yy(0VT0,    οι    δ'  ώ9 

4  έκαστοι  εΒύναντο  ανηΧοΰντο.  ημέρας  τε  ετττά,  ας 
άφικομενος  ο  ΚύρυμεΒων  ταΐς  εξηκοντα  ναυσΐ 
τταρεμεινε,  Κερκυραίοι  σφών  αυτών  τους  έ-χθρους 
Βοκοΰντας  είναι  εφόνενον,  την  μεν  αίτίαν  εττι- 
φεροντες  τοις  τον  8ήμον  καταΧύονσιν,  άττεθανον 
Ζε  τίνες  καΐ  ί8ίας  έχθρας  ένεκα,  καΐ  άΧΧοι  χρη- 
μάτων  σφίσιν    οφειΧομενων   ύττο    τών  Χαβοντων 

5  πασά  τε  Ihea  κατέστη  θανάτου,  καΐ  οίον  φιΧεΐ  εν 
τω  τοιοντω  yiyvεσθaι,  ού8εν  6  τι  ου  ζννεβη  καΐ 
ετι    περαιτέρω.         καΐ    yap    πατήρ    παίΒα    άπέ- 

^  XaBovTfs,  Hade'8  conjecture  for  \αβ6ντ(5  of  the  MSS. 


^  The   500   whom    Nicostratus    liad    brought,    the   object 
being  doubtless  merely  the  intimidation  of  the  oligarchs. 

140 


BOOK    III.   Lxxxi.  1-5 

away.  Now  the  Corcyraeans  had  no  sooner  perceived 
that  the  Athenian  fleet  was  approacliing  and  that 
the  enemy's  fleet  had  gone  than  they  secretly 
brought  the  Messenians,^  who  had  till  then  been  out- 
side the  walls,  into  the  city^  and  ordered  the  ships 
which  they  had  manned  to  sail  round  into  the 
Hyllaic  harbour-;  then  while  these  were  on  their 
way  thither  they  slew  any  of  their  personal  enemies 
whom  they  could  lay  hands  upon.  They  also  put 
ashore  and  despatched  all  those  on  board  the  ships 
Λνΐιοπι  they  had  persuaded  to  go  aboard,  then  went 
into  the  temple  of  Hera,  persuaded  about  fifty  of 
the  suppliants  there  to  submit  to  trial,  and  con- 
demned them  all  to  death.  But  most  of  the  sup- 
pliants, not  having  consented  to  be  tried,  Λvhen 
they  saw  what  \vas  happening  set  about  destroying 
one  another  in  the  sacred  precinct  itself,  while  a 
few  hanged  themselves  on  trees,  and  still  others 
made  away  \vith  themselves  as  best  they  could.  And 
during  the  seven  days  tiiat  Eurymedon,  after  his 
arrival,  stayed  there  Avith  his  sixty  ships,  the  Cor- 
cyraeans continued  slaughtering  such  of  their  fellow- 
citizens  as  they  considered  to  be  their  personal 
enemies.  The  charge  they  brought  was  of  conspiring 
to  overthrow  the  democracy,  but  some  were  in  fact 
put  to  death  merely  to  satisfy  private  enmity,  and 
others,  because  money  was  owing  to  them,  were  slain 
by  those  Λvho  had  borrowed  it.  Death  in  every  form 
ensued,  and  whatever  horrors  are  wont  to  be  per- 
petrated at  such  times  all  happened  then — aye,  and 
even  woi'se.     For  father  slew  son,  men  were  dragged 

^  The  object  was  that  the  oligarchs  on  them  might  be  cut 
off  from  their  friends  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  agora  and 
in  the  temple  of  Hera. 

141 


THUCYDIDES 

Kreive  και  άττο  των  lepoiv  αττβσττωιτο  και  ττρος 
αύτοΐς  βκτβίνοντο,  οΐ  he  riv€<;  και  πβριοικοΒομη- 
θίντε';  eV  του  Αιονύσου  τω  ίερω  άττβθανον. 

LXXXII.  Ούτως  ώμη  η  στάσις  ^  'προνχωρησε, 
καΧ  eSo^e  μίιΧλον,  Βιότι  iv  τοις  ττρώτη  ijevcTo, 
eVel  ύστερον  ye  καϊ  ττάν  ώς  enreiv  το  ΕΑΧηνικον 
€κιν7]Θη  διαφορών  ονσών  βκασταγοΰ  τοις  τβ  των 
ζήμων  ττροστάταις  τους  ^Αθηναίους  εττύ^εσθαί 
και  τοις  οΧί'γοις  τους  ΑακβΒαιμονίους.  καϊ  iv  μεν 
είρηντ)  ουκ  αν  εχόντων  ττρόφασιν  ούδ'  ετοίμων 
τταρακαΧεΙν  αυτούς,  •πο\ε  μου  μένων  he  καϊ  ζυμ- 
μαχ^ίας  αμα  εκατεροις  τι)  των  ενάντιων  κακώσει 
καϊ  σφίσιν  αύτοΐς  εκ  του  αυτού  ττροσττοιήσει 
ρα^ίως   αι    εττα^ω^αΐ   τοις  νεωτερίζειν  τί  βουΧο- 

2  μενοις  εττορίζοντο,  και  εττεττεσε  ττολλά  κα\ 
χαλετΓΟ.  κατά  στάσιν  ταΐς  ττόΧεσι,  •γΐ'γνόμενα  μεν 
και  αιεί  εσόμενα,  εως  αν  ή  αύτη  φύσις  άνθρώττων 
rj,  μάΧλον  δέ  και  ησυχ^αιτεηα  καϊ  τοις  εϊΒεσι 
^ιηΧλα^μένα,  ως  αν  εκασται  "^  αϊ  μεταβοΧαΙ  των 
ξυντυχ^ίών  εφιστώνται.  iv  μεν  yap  είρηνττ]  και 
ά^αθοΐς  ττρά^μασιν  αι  τε  ττοΧεις  και  οι  ιΒιώταί 
άμείνους  τας  <^νώμας  εχουσι  δια  το  μη  ες  ακου- 
σίους άνά^κας  ττίπτειν  6  8ε  ττόΧεμος  ύφεΧων  την 
εύττορίαν  του  καθ"  ημεραν  βίαιος  διδάσκαλος  κα\ 
•προς  τα  τταρόντα  τάς  ορ^ας  των  ττόΧΧών  όμοιοι. 

3  Έστασ/αζ'ε  τε  ουν  τα  των  ττόΧεων  και  τα 
εφυστερίζοντά   ττου     ττυστει    των    ττρο^ενομενων 


'  ή  στά(τΐϊ,  for  στάσΐ!  of  the  MSS. ,  Kriiger  with  Schol. 
^  ΐκασται,  Hude  alters  to  έκάσταυ. 


142 


BOOK    III.  Lxxxi.  5-LXXX11.  3 

from  the  temples  and  slain  near  them,  and  some 
were  even  walled  up  in  the  temple  of  Dionysus  and 
perished  there. 

LXXXII.  To  such  excesses  of  sav-agery  did  the 
revolution  go  ;  and  it  seemed  the  more  savage,  because 
it  was  among  the  first  that  occurred  ;  for  afterwards 
practically  the  whole  Hellenic  world  was  convulsed, 
since  in  each  state  the  leaders  of  the  democratic 
factions  were  at  variance  with  the  oligarchs,  the 
former  seeking  to  bring  in  the  Athenians,  the  latter 
the  Lacedaemonians.  And  while  in  time  of  peace 
they  would  have  had  no  pretext  for  asking  their 
intervention,  nor  any  inclination  to  do  so,  yet  now 
that  these  two  states  were  at  war,  either  faction  in 
the  various  cities,  if  it  desired  a  revolution,  found 
it  easy  to  bring  in  allies  also,  for  the  discomfiture  at 
one  stroke  of  its  opponents  and  the  strengthening 
of  its  own  cause.  And  so  there  fell  upon  the  cities 
on  account  of  revolutions  many  grievous  calamities, 
such  as  happen  and  always  will  happen  while  human 
nature  is  the  same,  but  which  are  severer  or  milder, 
and  different  in  their  manifestations,  according  as 
the  variations  in  circumstances  present  themselves 
in  each  case.  For  in  peace  and  prosperity  both 
states  and  individuals  have  gentler  feelings,  because 
men  are  not  then  forced  to  face  conditions  of  dire 
necessity ;  but  war,  Λvhich  robs  men  of  the  easy 
supply  of  their  daily  Λvants,  is  a  rough  schoolmaster 
and  creates  in  most  people  a  temper  that  matches 
their  condition. 

And  so  the  cities  began  to  be  disturbed  by  revolu- 
tions, and  those  that  fell  into  this  state  later,  on 
hearing  of  what  had  been   done    before,  carried  to 


143 


THUCYDIDES 

ΤΓοΧύ  €ΤΓ€φ€ρ€  την  νττερβοΧην  του  καιουσθαι  τάς 
Βίανοίας    των    τ    βτηγ^βιρησβων    ττζριΤΒχνησβί  και 

4  των  τιμωριών  άτοττία.  καΐ  την  εΐωθυϊαν  άζίωσιν 
των  ονομάτων  e?  τά  epya  άντήΧλαξαν  τη  Βι- 
καιώσεί.  τοΧμα  μβν  yap  άλογίστο?  avSpeia 
φιΧβταιρος  ενομίσθη,  μέΧΧησις  δε  ττρομηθη<; 
BeiXia  ev7rpe7r7]<;,  το  Be  σώφρον  τον  άνάνΒρου 
ττρόσ-χτιμα,  και  το  7Γρ6<;  ατταν  ξνν€τ6ν  iwl  ττάν 
apyov  το  δ'  €μπΧηκτως  οΡύ  άνΒρος  μοίρα  ττροσ- 
€τεθη,   άσφαΧεία    Be  το  ^  βιτίβουΧεύσασθαι  αττο- 

5  τροττής  ττρόφασί'ί  ei>Xoyo<;.  και  6  μβν  χαλε- 
τταίνων  ττιστος  alei,  ο  δ'  άvτtXeyωv  αύτω  ϋττοτΓτος. 
έττίβονΧεύσα'ζ  Be  τί?  τνχ^ων  ζυνετο^  και  υττονοή- 
aa<i  €Τί  Βεινότερος'  ττροβουΧενσας  Be  όττως  μηΒεν 
αυτών  Βεησει,  τη<;  τ€  βταιρία^  ΒιαΧυτης  και  τους 
εναντιου<ί  €K7Γe7ΓXηyμevo<;.  άττλως  re  ό  φθάσας 
τον  μέΧΧοντα  κακόν  τι  Βράν  εττηνεΐτο  και  6  εττι- 

6  κεΧεύσας  τον  μη  Βιανοούμβνον.  καΐ  μην  και  το 
^vyyeve's  του  εταιρικού  άΧΧοτ ριώτερον  ε^ενετο  Βια 
το  ετοιμοτερον  είναι  άττροφασιστοι^  τοΧμάν  ου 
yap  μετά  των  κειμένων  νόμων  ωφεΧία  ^  αΐ  τοιαν- 
ται  ξύνοΒοι,  άΧΧα  τταρά  τους  καθεστώτας  ττΧεο- 
νεξία.  καΐ  τά?  ες  σφάς  αυτούς  ττίστεις  ου  τω 
θείω    νόμω   μάΧΧον    εκρατύνοντο   ή    τω   κοινή   τι 

7  τταρανομήσαι.  τά  τε  άττο  των  εναντίων  καΧώς 
X€yόμεva  ενεΒεχοντο  ερ^ων  φυΧακη,  el  προύχ^οιεν, 
καΐ  ου  yεvvaιότητL.     αντιτιμωρησασθαί  τε  τίνα 

^  α(Τφά\ΐΐα  δί  τον  (ΐΓΐβΊυλΐύσασθαί  Hude. 
*  ώψίλίχ,  Ρορρο  for  ώφΐΛία!  of  the  MSS. 

^  i.e.  either  of  plotting  or  of  detecting  plots. 

*  Or,  "Fair  words  proffered  bv  their  opponents  they  re- 

144 


BOOK    III.  Lxxxn.  3-7 

still  more  extravagant  lengths  the  invention  of  new 
devices,  both  by  the  extreme  ingenuity  of  their 
attacks  and  the  monstrousness  of  their  revenges. 
The  ordinary  acceptation  of  words  in  their  relation  to 
things  was  changed  as  men  thought  fit.  Reckless 
audacity  came  to  be  regarded  as  courageous  loyalty 
to  party,  prudent  hesitation  as  sjiecious  cowardice, 
moderation  as  a  cloak  for  unmanly  weakness,  and 
to  be  clever  in  everything  was  to  do  naught  in  any- 
thing. Frantic  impulsiveness  was  accounted  a  true 
man's  part,  but  caution  in  deliberation  a  specious 
pretext  for  shirking.  The  hot-headed  man  was 
always  trusted,  his  opponent  suspected.  He  Λνΐιο 
succeeded  in  a  plot  was  clever,  and  he  who  had 
detected  one  was  still  shrewder ;  on  the  other  hand, 
he  who  made  it  his  aim  to  have  no  need  of  such 
thii  gs  ^  w^as  a  disrupter  of  party  and  scared  of  his 
opponents.  In  a  word,  both  he  that  got  ahead  of 
another  who  intended  to  do  something  evil  and  he 
that  prompted  to  evil  one  who  had  never  thought  of 
of  it  were  alike  commended.  Furtliermore,  the  tie 
of  blood  was  weaker  than  the  tie  of  party,  because 
the  partisan  was  more  ready  to  dare  without  demur ; 
for  such  associations  are  not  entered  into  for  the 
public  good  in  conformity  Avith  the  prescribed  laws, 
but  for  selfish  aggrandisement  contrary  to  the  estab- 
lished laws.  Their  pledges  to  one  another  were 
confirmed  not  so  much  by  divine  law  as  by  common 
transgression  of  the  law.  Fair  words  proffered  by 
opponents,  if  these  had  the  upper  hand,  were  re- 
ceived with  caution  as  to  their  actions  and  not  in  a 
generous  spirit. ^     To  get  revenge  on  some  one  was 

ceived,  if  they  had  the  upper  hand,  by  vigilant  action  rather 
than  with  frank  generosity." 

145 


THUCYDIDES 

Trepi  'ir\eLovo<;  ην  ή  αύτον  μη  ΤΓροτταθβΐν.  καΐ 
όρκοι  βΐ  τΓον  άρα  yevoLvro  ^vva\Xayf]<;,  iv  τώ 
αντίκα  7rpo<;  το  άττορον  βκατίρω  ΒιΒόμενοί  ΐσχ^υον, 
ουκ  εχ^οντων  αΧλοθβν  Βύναμιν  ev  δέ  τω  τταρα- 
τνχ^όντι  6  φθάσα^  θαρσήσαι,  el  ϊδοι  αφαρκτον, 
ηΖίον  Βίά  την  ττίστιν  έτιμωρεΐτο  η  αττο  του  ττρο- 
φανοϋς,  καΐ  τό  τε  άσφαΧ'βς  βΧο'/ίζετο  καϊ  'ότι 
άττάττ]  ττερι^ενόμ^νο'^  ξυνέσεως  ά'^/ώνισμα  ττρυσε- 
Χάμβανβν.  ραον  δ'  οι  ττολλοι  KaKovpyoi  οντες 
ΒεξιοΙ  κβκΧηνται,  η  αμαθείς  αγαθοί,  καϊ  τώ  μεν 
αίσχ^ύνονται,  ε'/τΐ  he  τω  άyάXXovτaι. 
8  ΤΙάντων  δ'  αυτών  αϊτών  ^  αρχή  η  ^  hia  ττΧεο- 
νεζιατ  καϊ  φιΧοτιμιαν,  εκ  δ  αυτών  καϊ  ες  το 
φιΧονικβΐν  καθισταμένων  το  ττρόθυμον.  οΐ  yap 
εν  ταΐς  ττοΧεσι  ττροστάντες  μετ  ονόματος  εκά- 
τεροι  εύιτρζΤΓους,  ττΧηθους  τε  Ισονομίας  ττοΧιτικής 
και  αριστοκρατίας  σώφρονος  ττροτιμι'^σει,  τα  μεν 
κοινά  λόγω  θεραττευοντες  αθΧα  εττοιοΰντο,  τταντϊ 
δε  τρόττω  άyωvLζόμεvoL  άΧΧηΧων  πεpιyL•yvεσθaι 
ετοΧμησαν  τε  τα  δεινότατα,  εττεξτϊσάν  τε  τάς 
τιμωρίας  ετι  μειζους,  ου  μέχρι  του  δικαίου  καϊ 
ττ)  τΓοΧει  ξυμφορου  ττροστιθεντες,^  ες  δε  το  εκα- 
τεροις  ττου  αΐεϊ  ήδονην  έχον  ορίζοντες,  καϊ  η  μετά 

*  αίτιον,  Hude  deletes,  with  Madvig. 

'  f],  Hilda  deletes. 

'  προστιθίντίτ,  Dion.  Hal.  for  npoTidh'Tis  of  the  MSS. 

^  Or,    omitting    ovres,    "And   in    general    men    are    more 
■willing  to  be  called  clever  rogues  than  good  simpletons." 

14O 


BOOK    III.  Lxxxii.  7-8 

more  valued  than  never  to  have  sufFered  injury 
oneself.  And  if  in  any  case  oaths  of  reconcilement 
were  exchanged,  for  the  moment  only  were  they  bind- 
ing, since  each  side  had  given  them  merely  to  meet 
the  emergency,  having  at  the  time  no  other  resource; 
but  he  Λνΐιο,  Avhen  the  opportunity  offered  and  he 
saw  his  enemy  off  his  guard,  was  the  first  to  pluck  up 
courage,  found  his  revenge  sweeter  because  of  the 
violated  pledge  than  if  he  had  openly  attacked,  and 
took  into  account  not  only  the  greater  safety  of  such 
a  course,  but  also  that,  by  winning  through  deceit, 
he  was  gaining  besides  the  prize  of  astuteness.  And 
in  general  it  is  easier  for  rogues  to  get  themselves 
called  clever  than  for  the  stupid  to  be  reputed 
good,^  and  they  are  ashamed  of  the  one  but  glory  in 
the  other. 

The  cause  of  all  these  evils  was  the  desire  to  rule 
which  greed  and  ambition  inspire,  and  also,  springing 
from  them,  that  ardour-  which  belongs  to  men  who 
once  have  become  engaged  in  factious  rivalry.  For 
those  who  emerged  as  party  leaders  in  the  several 
cities,  by  assuming  on  either  side  a  fair-sounding 
name,  the  one  using  as  its  catch-Λvord  "  political 
equality  for  the  masses  under  the  laAV,"  the  other 
"  temperate  aristocracy,"  ^  Avhile  they  pretended  to  be 
devoted  to  the  common  Aveal,  in  reality  made  it  their 
prize  ;  striving  in  every  way  to  get  the  better  of  each 
other  they  dared  the  most  awful  deeds,  and  sought 
revenges  still  more  aAvful,  not  pursuing  these  within 
the  bounds  of  justice  and  the  public  weal,  but  limit- 
ing them,  both  parties  alike,  only  by  the  moment's 

*  Or,  rh  ττρόθυμον,  "  ])arty-spirit." 

^  For  tlie  objectionable  terms  "democracy"  (ζημοκρατία) 
and  "oligarchy"  (ολιγαρχία). 

147 


THUCYDIDES 

ψήφου  ahiKov  κaτayvώσ€ω<i  ^  ή  χ^ιρί  κτώμενοι  το 
κρατείν  έτοιμοι  ήσαν  την  αντίκα  φιΧονικίαν 
εκτΓΐμττΧαναι.  ώστε  εύσβββία  μεν  ούΒετεροι  ivo- 
μιζον,  εύπρβττεία  Be  λόγου  οί?  ξνμβαίη  €7τιψθόνω<; 
τι  Βιαττράξασθαι,  άμεινον  ηκουον.  τα  Be  μέσα 
των  ΤΓοΧιτων  ύττ  αμφοτέρων  η  οτι  ου  ζυνη^ωνί- 
ζοντο  η  φθονώ  του  ττεριεΐναι  Βιεφθίίροντο. 

LXXXIII.  Ούτω  ττάσα  IBea  κατέστη  κακο- 
τροττίας  δια  τάς  στάσεις  τω  ΚΧληνικω,  και  το 
€νηθε<;,  ου  το  <γενναΐον  ττΧεΊστον  μετεγ^ει,  κατα- 
^εΧασθεν  ήφανίσθη,  το  Βε  άντιτετάχ^θαι  άΧΧι']Χοίς 

2  ττ)  'γνώμτ/  άττιστως  εττΐ  ττοΧύ  Βΐ7Ίνε'γκεν•  ου  yap 
ην  ο  ΒιαΧυσων  ούτε  λόγο?  εχυρος  ούτε  όρκος  φο- 
βερός, κρείσσους  Βε  οντες  άτταντες  Χο^ισμω  ες  το 
ανεΧτΓίστον  του  βέβαιου  μη  τταθέΐν  μάΧΧον  ττρου- 

3  σκοπούν  ?/  πιστεΰσαί  εΒύναντο.  και  οί  φανΧό- 
τεροι  Ύνώμην  ώς  τα  ττΧείω  περιε^ί^νοντο•  τω  yap 
BeBiivai  τό  τβ  αυτών  ενΒεες  και  το  των  εναντίων 
ξυνετόν,  μη  Xόyoις  τε  ησσους  ώσι  καΐ  εκ  του 
ΤΓοΧυτροτΓου  αυτών  της  yvώμης  φθάσωσι  προεττι- 
βουΧευόμβνοι,  τοΧμηρώς  ττρος  τα  έργα  εχώρονν. 

4  Οί  δε  καταφρονοϋντες  καν  ττροαισθεσθαι  και  εpyω 
ούΒεν  σφάς  Βεΐν  Χαμβάνειν  α  yvώμ>|  εξεστιν, 
άφαρκτοι  μάΧΧον  Βιεφθείροντο. 

^  κατα-γνώσΐωί,  Hude  deletes,  with  van  Herwerden. 

^  Or,  as  Shilleto,  "leaning  in  calculation  to  considering 
that  seciiritj'  was  hopeless,  they  rather  took  precautions  .  .  ." 
cj.  Schol.,  pfTTovTes  δί  οί  ίνθρωποι  Tois  λοΎΐσμοΪ5  vphs  τ6  μ)} 
ίλτΓΐ^ίιι/  τι;/ά  ττίστιν  καΐ  βΐβαίοτητα. 

148 


BOOK    III.  i-xxxii.  8-Lxxxin.  4 

caprice ;  and  they  were  ready,  either  by  passing  an 
unjust  sentence  of  condemnation  or  by  winning  the 
upper  hand  through  acts  of  violence,  to  glut  the 
animosity  of  the  moment.  The  result  was  that 
though  neither  had  any  regard  for  true  piety,  yet 
those  who  could  carry  through  an  odious  deed  under 
the  cloak  of  a  specious  phrase  received  the  higher 
praise.  And  citizens  who  belonged  to  neither  party 
were  continually  destroyed  by  both,  either  because 
they  would  not  make  common  cause  with  them,  or 
through  mere  jealousy  that  they  should  survive. 

LXXXIII.  So  it  was  that  every  form  of  depravity 
showed  itself  in  Hellas  in  consequence  of  its  revolu- 
tions, and  that  simplicity,  Avhich  is  the  chief  element 
of  a  noble  nature,  was  laughed  to  scorn  and  dis- 
appeared, while  mutual  antagonism  of  feeling,  com- 
bined with  mistrust,  prevailed  far  and  wide.  For 
there  was  no  assurance  binding  enough,  no  oath 
terrible  enough,  to  reconcile  men  ;  but  always,  if  they 
were  stronger,^  since  they  accounted  all  security 
hopeless,  they  were  rather  disposed  to  take  pre- 
cautions against  being  wronged  than  able  to  trust 
others.  And  it  was  generally  those  of  meaner  intel- 
lect who  won  the  day ;  for  being  afraid  of  their  own 
defects  and  of  their  opponents'  sagacity,  in  order 
that  they  might  not  be  worsted  in  words,  and,  by 
reason  of  their  opponents*  intellectual  versatility 
find  themselves  unawares  victims  of  their  plots,  they 
boldly  resorted  to  deeds.  Their  opponents,  on  the 
other  hand,  contemptuously  assuming  that  they 
would  be  aware  in  time  and  that  there  was  no  need 
to  secure  by  deeds  what  they  might  have  by  wit, 
were  taken  off  their  guard  and  perished  in  greater 
numbers. 

149 


THUCYDIDES 

LXXXIV.  Ey  δ  ovv  Trj  KepKvpa  ra  ττολλά 
αυτών  ττροβτοΧμηθη,  καΐ  όττοσ  αν^  ύβρβι  μ€ν 
αρχ^ομβνοί  το  ττΧβον  η  σωψροσύντ)  υττο  των  την 
τιμωριαν  τταρασχ^ύντων  οι  άνταμυΐ'όμβνοί  Βρά- 
σ€ίαν,  TrevLWi  δε  τ?}?  εΐωθυία•:;  άτταΧΧαξβίοντί'ί 
τίνα,  μάΧιστα  δ'  άν  Βία  ττάθους  βττιθυμοΰντε^; 
τα  των  πέΧας  €χ€ΐν,  τταρα  8ίκην  'γι•/νώσκοί,€ν,  α 
τ€  μη  €7γΪ  πΧβονβξία,  άττο  ϊσου  he  μάΧιστα  iin- 
0VT€<i    άτταώευσία    ορ'^η^;    ιτΧβΐστον    έκφβρόμβνοί 

2  ώμώ^  καϊ  απαραιτήτως  έττβΧθοίβν.  ξυνταραχ^- 
θβντος  τε  του  βίου  e?  τον  καιρόν  τούτον  TJj  jroXei 
καϊ  των  νόμων  κρατήσασα  η  άνθρωττβία  φύσις, 
βίωθυΐα  καϊ  τταρα  τους  νόμους  άΒικεΐν,  άσμίνη 
βΒήΧωσεν  άκρατης  μβν  6pyής  ούσα,  κρείσσων  δε 
του  Βικαίου,  ττοΧβμία  he  του  7Γρού•)^οντος.  ου  yap 
άν  του  τ€  όσιου  το  τιμωρεΐσθαι  ττρουτίθεσαν  του 
τ€  μη  ahiKeiv  το  Kephaiveiv,  ev  ω  μη  βΧάτντουσαν 

3  Ισ'χυν  el-^e  το  φθον€Ϊν.  άζιουσι  re  τους  κοινούς 
ττερϊ  των  τοιούτων  οι  άνθρωττοι  νομούς,  άφ^  ων 
άττασιν  εΧττΙς  ύττόκβιται  σφαΧ€Ϊσι  καν  αυτούς 
Βιασφζεσθαι,  ev  άΧΧων  τιμωρίαις  ττροκαταΧύειν 
καϊ  μη  ύττοΧείττεσθαι,  ei  ττοτε  άρα  τις  κιvhυveύσaς 
τίνος  Βεησεται  αυτών. 

^  ο-πόσ'  h.v,  Hude's  correction  for  '6-ποσα  of  the  MSS. 

'  This   chapter   is    bracketed   as  spurious   by   Ilude   and 
nearly  all  recent  commentators,  because  it  is  condemned  by 

150 


BOOK   III.  Lxxxiv.  1-3 

LXXXIV.^  It  was  in  Corcyra,  tlieii,  that  most  of 
these  atrocities  were  first  committed — all  the  acts  of 
retaliation  \vhich  men  Λνΐιο  are  governed  with  high- 
handed insolence  rather  than  with  moderation  are 
likely  to  commit  upon  their  rulers  when  these  at  last 
afford  them  opportunity  for  revenge;  or  such  as  men 
resolve  upon  contrary  to  justice  when  they  seek 
release  from  their  accustomed  poverty,  and  in  con- 
sequence of  their  sufferings  are  likely  to  be  most 
eager  for  their  neighbours'  goods;-  and  assaults 
of  pitiless  cruelty,  such  as  men  make,  not  with  a 
view  to  gain,  but  when,  being  on  terms  of  com- 
plete equality  with  their  foe,  they  are  utterly  carried 
away  by  uncontrollable  passion.  At  this  crisis,  when 
the  life  of  the  city  had  been  thrown  into  utter 
confusion,  human  nature,  now  triumphant  over  the 
laws,  and  accustomed  even  in  spite  of  the  laws  to 
do  wrong,  took  delight  in  sho\ving  that  its  passions 
were  ungovernable,  that  it  was  stronger  than  justice 
and  an  enemy  to  all  superiority.  For  surely  no  man 
would  have  put  revenge  before  religion,  and  gain 
before  innocence  of  wrong,  had  not  envy  swayed  him 
with  her  blighting  power.  Indeed,  men  do  not 
hesitate,  \vhen  they  seek  to  avenge  themselves  upon 
others,  to  abrogate  in  advance  the  common  principles 
observed  in  such  cases — those  principles  upon  which 
depends  every  man's  own  hope  of  salvation  should 
he  himself  be  overtaken  by  misfortune — thus  failing 
to  leave  them  in  force  against  the  time  when  per- 
chance a  man  in  peril  shall  have  need  of  some  one 
of  them. 

the  ancient  grammarians,  is  not  mentioned  by  Dionyaius  ot 
Halicarnassus,  and  is  obelised  in  Codex  F. 

■^  Or,  μάλιστα  δ'  tif  δια  iradovs  fniUi'uovyTfSf  "  would  be 
above  all  men  passionately  eager  for  ..." 


THUCYDIDES 

LXXXV.  Ot  μίν  ουν  κατά  την  ττόΧιν  \\ep- 
κυραΐοι  τοιανταίς  ορ^αΐς  ταΐς  ττρώταις  €?  άΧλη- 
\ους  έχριίσαντο,  και  ό  ΈJί<pυμihωv  καΐ  οί^ Αθηναίοι 
άτΓβττΧβυσαν  ταΐς  ναυσίν  ύστερον  he  οι  φβύ^οντε^ 

2  των  Κερκυραίων  {διεσώθησαν  yap  αυτών  e?  πεν- 
τακοσίον<;)  τεί'χΊ]  τε  Χαβόντες,  α  ην  εν  ττ)  ητταίρω, 
εκράτουν  τή^  ττεραν  οικείας  γης  καΐ  εξ  αύτης 
ορμώμενοι  εΧήζοντο  τους  ει>  τη  νήσω  και  ττοΧΧά 
εβλατττον,  και  Χιμος  Ισχυρός  ε^ενβτο  εν  τη  ττόΧει. 

3  εττρεσβεύοντο  Βε  καΐ  ες  την  ΑακεΒαίμοΐ'α  καΐ 
Κόρινθον  ττερί  καθόΒου•  και  ως  ούΒεν  αύτοΐς 
εττράσσετο,  ύστερον  χρόνω  ττΧοΐα  και  επικούρους 
τταρασκενασάμενοι  Βιεβησαν  ες  την  νήσον  εζακό- 

4  σιοι  μάΧιστα  οι  ττάντες,  καΐ  τα  ττΧοΐα  εμττρή- 
σαντες,  οττως  άττό^νοια  rj  του  άΧλο  τι  η  κρατείν 
της  γης,  άναβάντες  ες  το  ορός  την  Ίστώνην. 
τείχος  ενοικοΒομησάμενοι  εφθειρον  τους  εν  τ^ 
ττόΧει  καΐ  της  ^γής  εκράτουν. 

LXXXVI.  Ύοΰ  δ'  αυτού  θέρους  τεΧευτώντος 
^Αθηναίοι  είκοσι  ναύς  εστειΧαν  ες  ΙικεΧίαν  και 
Αάχητα  τον    ^ΙεΧανώττου  στρατη^Όν   αυτών   και 

2  Χ.αροιά8ην  τον  ΚύφίΧ7)του.  οι  yap  Έ,υρακόσιοι 
και  Αεοντΐνοι  ες  ττόΧεμον  άΧΧηΧοις  καθεστασαν. 
ξύμμαχοι  Βε  τοις  μεν  Έ,υρακοσίοις  ήσαν  ττΧην 
Καμαριναίων  αϊ  άΧΧαι  ΑωριΒες  ττόΧεις,  αϊττερ  και 
ττρος  την  τών  ΑακεΒαιμονίων  το  ττρώτον  αρχομέ- 
νου του  τΓοΧεμου  ξυμμαχίαν  ετάχθησαν,  ου  μέν- 
τοι  ξυνετΓοΧεμησάν  yε^  τοις  δε  Αεοντίνοις  αι 
^αΧκιΒικαϊ  ττοΧεις  και  Κ,αμάρινα'  της  Βε  Ιταλία? 
Αοκροϊ  μεν   Έ,υρακοσίων  ήσαν,  'Fηyΐvoι   Βε   κατά 

3  το     ^νγγεί'ί?     Αεοντίνων,     ες    ούν    τάς    ^Αθήνας 


152 


BOOK    III.  Lxxxv.  i-LxxxvT.  3 

LXXXV.  Such  then  -were  the  first  outbi-eaks  of 
passion  Avhich  the  Coi  cyraeans  who  remained  at  home 
indulged  in  toward  each  other;  and  Eurymedon 
sailed  away  Λvitll  the  Athenian  fleet.  Later,  how- 
ever, the  Corcyraean  fugitives,  of  whom  about  five 
hundred^  had  got  safely  across  to  the  mainland,  seized 
some  forts  there,  and  thus  dominating  the  territory 
belonging  to  Corcyra  on  the  opposite  coast  made  it  a 
base  from  Avhich  they  plundered  the  people  of  the 
island  and  did  them  much  harm,  so  that  a  severe 
famine  arose  in  the  city.  They  also  sent  envoys  to 
Lacedaemon  and  Corinth  to  negotiate  for  their  restor- 
ation ;  but  since  nothing  was  accomplished  by  these 
they  afterwards  procured  boats  and  mercenaries  and 
crossed  over  to  the  island,  about  six  hundred  in  all. 
They  then  burned  their  boats,  in  order  that  they 
might  despair  of  success  unless  they  dominated  the 
country,  and  Λvent  up  to  Mt.  Istone,  and  after 
building  a  fort  there  began  to  destroy  the  people  in 
the  city,  exercising  dominion  over  the  country. 

LXXXVI.  Toward  the  close  of  the  same  summer 
the  Athenians  sent  twenty  ships  to  Sicily  under  the 
command  of  Laches  son  of  Melanopus  and  Charoeades 
son  of  Euphiletus.  For  the  Syracusans  and  the 
Leontines  were  now  at  war  Avith  each  other.  In 
alliance  with  the  Syracusans  were  all  the  Dorian 
cities  except  Camarina — the  cities  which  at  the  out- 
break of  the  Avar  had  joined  the  Lacedaemonian 
alliance,  although  they  had  taken  no  active  part  in 
the  war — while  the  Chalcidian  cities  and  Camarina 
Avere  allies  of  the  Leontines.  In  Italy  the  Locrians 
allied  themselves  with  the  Syracusans,  and  the  Rhe- 
gians  with  the  Leontines,  because  they  were  kins- 
men.2  The  Leontines  and  their  allies  sent  an 
»  c/.  cli.  XX.  2.  2  cf  yi_  x]iy_  3_ 

153 

Vol.  II.  F 


THUCYDIDES 

ττεμψαντβ'ζ  οι  των  Κ^ονηνων  ^ύμμα-χοι  κατά  re 
τταΧαιαν  ξνμμαχ^ίαν  καΐ  ότι  "Ιω^ε?  ήσαν,  ττβί- 
θονσι  τους  Αθηναίους  ττεμψαι  σφίσί  ναΰς•  υττο 
yap  των  Έ,νρακοσίων  της  τ€  γΊ?  e'lpyovTo  και  της 

4  θαΧάσσης.  και  βττβμψαν  οι  \\.θηναΐοι  της  μεν 
οίκειοτητος  ττροφάσει,  βουΧομβνοι  Be  μήτε  σΐτον 
ές  την  ΙΙε\ο7Γοννΐ]σον  ayeaOai  αύτόθβν  ττρόττβιράν 
τε    ποιούμενοι    ει    σφίσι    Βυνατα     εϊη    τα    εν    τ?} 

5  ΣικεΧια  ττράγματα  ύττοχ^ειρια  γενέσθαι,  κατα- 
στάντες  ουν  ες  Vi]yiov  της  ΙταΧιας  τον  ττοΧεμον 
βτΓΟίοΰντο  μετά  των  ζυμμά-χ^ων.  καΐ  το  θέρος 
έτεΧεύτα. 

LXXXVII.  Ύοΰ  δ  imyiyvo μενού  ■χ^ειμωνος  η 
νόσος  το  δεύτερον  εττεπεσε  τοις  Άθηναίοις,  εκΧι- 
ττοΰσα  μεν  ούΒενα  -χ^ρόνον  το  τταντάττασιν,  iyeveTO 

2  δε  Τί9  όμως  Βιοκωχ^ι'].  τταρεμεινε  δε  το  μεν  ύστε- 
ρον ουκ  εΧασσον  ενιαυτοΰ,  το  δε  ττρότερον  και 
8ύο  ετη,  ώστε  'Αθηναίους  yε  μη  είναι  6  τι  μάΧ- 
Χον   τούτου   εττιεσε   καΐ     εκάκωσε    την    Βύναμιν. 

3  τετρακοσίων  yap  όττΧηών  και  τετ ρακισχ^ιΧίων 
ουκ  εΧάσσους  άττεθανον  εκ  των  τάξεων  και  τρια- 
κοσίων Ιπττεων,  του  δε  αΧΧου  οχΧον  άνεζεύρετος 

4  αριθμός.  iyevovTo  δε  και  οι  ττοΧΧοΙ  σεισμοί  τότε 
της  yής  εν  τε  ^Αθήναις  καΐ  εν  Έ,ύβο'ια  κα\  εν 
Βοίωτοί?  κα\  μάΧιστα  εν  Όρχ^ομενω  τω  Βοίωτιω. 

LXXXVIII.  Καί  οί  μεν  εν  'Σ,ικεΧία  \\θηναίθΐ 
και  'PηyίVoι  τον  αύτον  -χειμώνας  τριάκοντα  ναυσι 

1  At  the  head  of  this  embassy  was  the  celebrated  rhetori- 
cian Gorgias. 

'^  cf.  C.I. A.  i.  33  for  some  fragments  of  treaties  of  alliance 
renewed  under  the  archon  Apseudes  (433-432  B.C.). 

'  rf.  II.  xlvii.  ίΐ. 

ί54 


BOOK    III.  Lxxxvi.  3-LXXXV111.  I 

embassy  ^  to  Athens  and  urged  them,  both  on  the 
ground  of  an  earher  alHance  -  and  because  they 
were  lonians,  to  send  them  ships  ;  for  they  were 
being  exckided  from  botli  the  land  and  the  sea  by 
the  Syracusans.  And  the  Athenians  sent  the  ships, 
professedly  on  the  ground  of  their  relationship,  but 
really  because  they  wished  to  prevent  the  importation 
of  grain  from  Sicily  into  the  Peloponnesus,  and  also 
to  make  a  preliminary  test  whether  the  affairs  of  Sicih' 
could  be  brought  under  their  own  control.  So  they 
established  themselves  at  Rhegium  in  Italy  and  pro- 
ceeded to  carry  on  the  war  in  concert  with  their 
allies.     And  the  summer  ended. 

LXXXVII.  In  the  course  of  the  following  winter  427  b.o. 
the  plague  again ^  fell  upon  the  Athenians;  and  in- 
deed it  had  not  died  out  at  any  time  entirely,  though 
there  had  been  a  period  of  respite.  And  it  continued 
the  second  time  not  less  than  a  year,  having  run  for 
tAvo  full  years  on  the  previous  occasion,  so  that  the 
Athenians  were  more  distressed  by  it  than  by  any 
other  misfortune  and  their  power  more  crippled. ■*  For 
no  fewer  than  four  thousand  four  hundred  of  those 
enrolled  as  hoplites  died  and  also  three  hundred 
cavalry,  and  of  the  populace  a  number  tliat  could  not 
be  ascertained.  It  Avas  at  this  time  also  that  the 
great  number  of  earthquakes  occurred  at  Athens,  in 
Euboea,  andin  Boeotia,  and  especially  at  Orchomenus 
in  Boeotia. 

LXXXV'III.  The  same  winter  the  Athenians  in 
Sicily  and  the  Rhegians  made  an  expedition  with  thirty 

*  This  statement  may  have  been  written  without  a  know- 
ledge of  tlie  later  events  of  the  war,  especially  the  unhappy 
issue  of  the  Sicilian  expedition  (see  Introd.  p.  xiii.) — unless 
δύκαμίϊ  be  taken  to  mean  "fighting  strength,"  or  something 
narrower  than  "power." 


THUCYDIDES 

στρατεύουσίν  eirl  τας  Α^όΧον  νήσους  καΧουμβνας• 
θβρους  yap  δί'  ανυΖρίαν  αδύνατα  ην  ζττίστρατενειν. 

2  νέμονται  Be  Αιτταραΐοι  αύτά<;,  ]^νιΒίων  άποικοι 
οντες.  οίκοΰσι  δ'  ev  μία  των  νήσων  ου  μβηαΚτ], 
κάΚβΙται  he  Αιττύρα•  τάς  oe  a\.Xa<i  €Κ  ταύτης 
ορμώμενοι  ^εωρηουσι,    ΑιΒύμην   και    Έ.τρο^^ύ\ην 

3  και  '\epav.  νομίζουσι  Be  οί  eKeivrj  άνθρωποι  ev 
TTJ  lepa  ώς  ό  Ήφαιστος  γ^αΧκβύει,  ότι  την  νύκτα 
φαίνεται  πυρ  αναΒιΒούσα  ποΧύ  και  την  ημεραν 
καπνόν.  κείνται  Be  αΐ  νήσοι  αύται  κατά  την 
"^(κεΧων  καΐ   ^Ιεσσηί'ίων  ^ην,  ζύμμαχ^οι   δ'   ήσαν 

4  Ένρακοσίων  reyU-oi^Te?  δ'  οί  ^Αθηναίοι  την  yrjv, 
ώς  ου  προσε'χ^ώρουν,  άττεττΧενσαν  ές  το  Ρψ/ιον. 
και  ό  "χειμων  ετεΧεύτα,  και  πέμπτον  έτος  τω 
ποΧεμω  ετεΧεύτατωΒε  ον  (^ουκυΒίΒης  ξυveypaψev. 

LXXXIX.  Ύοΰ  δ'  επιycyvoμεvoυ  θέρους  ΤΙεΧο- 
ποννήσιοι  καΐ  οί  ξύμμαχ^οι  μεχ^οι  μεν  του  ισθμού 
ηΧθον  ως  ες  την  Άττικην  εσβαΧονντες  '  Ayι8oς 
τοΰ  Άρχ^ίΒάμου  ήyovμεvoυ,  ΑακεΒαιμονίων  βασι- 
Χεως,  σεισμών  Be  yεvoμevωv  ποΧΧων  άπετράποντο 
2  πάΧιν  καΐ  ουκ  eyeveTO  εσβοΧή.  και  περί  τούτους 
τους  -χ^ρονους,  των  σεισμών  κατεχ^όντων,  της 
Έιύβοίας  εν  Οροβιαις  ή  θάΧασσα  επανεΧθοΰσα 
άπο  της  τότε  ούσης  yής  και  κυματωθείσα  επηΧθε 
της  πόΧεως  μέρος  τι,  και  το  μεν  κατεκΧυσε,  το  δ" 
νπενόστησε,  καΐ  θάΧασσα  νυν  εστί  πρότερον  ονσα 

1  Rtrabo  mines  three  more,  modern  gco^raphei-s  eleven  or 

twelve.     Stroiigyle,  the  modern  Stromboli,  seat  of  an  active 


BOOK    III.   Lxxxvni.  i-lxxxix.  2 

ships  against  the  islands  of  Aeohis,  as  they  are  called  ; 
for  it  was  impossible  to  invade  them  in  the  summer 
time  on  account  of  the  lack  of  water  there.  These 
islands  are  occupied  by  the  Liparaeans,  Λνΐιο  are 
colonists  of  the  Cnidians.  They  have  their  homes 
on  one  of  the  islands,  which  is  not  large,  called 
Lipara,  and  from  this  go  out  and  cultivate  the  rest, 
namely  Didyme,  Strongyle  and  Hiera.^  The 
people  of  this  region  believe  that  Hephaestus  has 
his  forge  in  Hiera,  because  this  island  is  seen 
to  send  up  a  great  flame  of  iire  at  night  and 
smoke  by  day.  The  islands  lie  over  against  the 
territory  of  the  Sicels  and  the  Messenians,  and 
were  in  alliance  Avith  the  Syracusans  ;  the  Athen- 
ians, therefore,  laid  Avaste  their  land,  but  since  the 
inhabitants  Λvould  not  come  over  to  their  side  they 
sailed  back  to  Rhegium.  And  the  Λvinter  ended,  and 
with  it  the  fifth  year  of  this  war  of  which  Thucydides 
Avrote  the  history. 

LXXXIX.  In  the  following  summer  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  and  their  allies,  led  by  Agis  son  of  Archida- 
mus,  king  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  advanced  as  far  as 
the  Isthmus  with  the  intention  of  invading  Attica  ; 
but  a  great  many  earthquakes  occurred,  causing 
them  to  turn  back  again,  and  no  invasion  took  place. 
At  about  the  same  time,  while  the  earthquakes 
prevailed,  the  sea  at  Orobiae  in  Euboea  receded 
from  Avhat  was  then  the  shore-line,  and  then  coming 
on  in  a  great  Avave  overran  a  portion  of  the  city. 
One  part  of  the  flood  subsided,  but  another  en- 
gulfed  the   shore,  so   that   Avhat  Avas  land  before   is 

volcano,  has  recentl}'  become  especially  notable  on  account 
of  its  nearness  to  Messina  and  Reggio,  wiiere  the  great  earth- 
quake occurred,  Dec.  28,  1908. 

157 


THUCYDIDES 

γ^•   και  ανθρώτΓους  ^ιβφθβιρεν  όσοι  μη  ehuvavro 

3  φθηναι  ττρο^  τα  μ€Τ€ωρα  άνα8ραμόντ€<ί.  καϊ 
irepi  ΑταΧαντην  την  irrl  Αοκροΐς  τοις  ^Οττουντίοις 
νησον  τταραττΧησία  yiyi'eTai  βττίκΧυσις,  καΐ  του 
τ€  φρουρίου  τό)ν  ^Αθηναίων  τταρβΐλε  καϊ  ούο  νέων 

4  ανβιλκυσ μένων  την  ετεραν  κατεαζεν.  ε'γένετο  8e 
καϊ  εν  ΥΥετταρηθω  κύματο<ί  εττανα'χ^ωρησί'ί  τί9,  ου 
μεντοι  εττεκλ,υσε  ye'  καϊ  σεισμοί  του  τεί^^^ους  τι 
κατεβάΧβ  καϊ   το    ττρντανεΐον    καϊ   άλ\α<;    οΙκίας 

δ  oXiya^.  αίτιον  δ'  έ'γωγβ  νομίζω  του  τοιούτου, 
f]  ισχ^υροτατος  ο  σεισμός  εyεvετo,  κατά  τούτο 
ατΓοστεΧΧειν  τε  την  θάλασσαν  και  εζαττίνης  ττάΧιν 
ετΓίσττωμένην  ^  βιαιότερον  την  ετνίκΧυσιν  ττοιείν 
άνευ  he  σεισμού  ουκ  αν  μοι  8οκεΐ  το  τοιούτο 
ξυμβήναι  yεveσθaι. 

XC.  Ύού  δ  αυτού  θέρους  εττοΧεμουν  μεν  και 
αΧΧοι,  ώ?  εκάστοί^  ζυνεβαινεν,  εν  τ-η  ΈικεΧία  και 
αυτοί  οι  ^ικεΧιωται  eV  άΧΧιίΧους  στρατεύοντες 
και  οι  Αθηναίοι  ξύν  τοις  σφετεροις  ξυμμάχ^οις' 
α  Be  Xoyov  μάΧιστα  άξια  η  μετά  των  'Αθηναίων 
οι    ζυμμα'χ^οι    έπραξαν    η    προς   τους    ^Αθηναίους 

2  οί  αντιποΧεμοι,  τούτων  μνησθήσομαι.  ^apoiahov 
yap  η8η  του  ^Αθηναίων  στpaτηyoύ  τεθνηκυτος 
ύπο  Έυρακοσίων  ποΧεμω,  Αάχ^ης  άπασαν  εχ^ων 
των  νέων  την  άρχ^ην  εστράτευσε  μετά  των  ξνμ- 
μάγ^ων  επΙ   ^ΙύΧας   τας    }\1εσσηνίων.     ετυχ^ον  8ε 

^  Madvig  reads  ΐτησπώμ^νον,  after  Schol.,  followed  by 
Hude. 

'  (•/.  II.  xxxii. 

^  "  Thucydides  is  pointing  out  the  connection  between  the 
earthquake  and  the  inundation.  Where  the  earthquake  was 
most  violent,  there  the  inundation  Avas  greatest.     But  the 


BOOK    III.  Lxxxix.  2-xc.  i 

now  sea;  and  it  destroyed  of  the  people  as  many 
as  could  not  run  up  to  the  high  ground  in  time. 
In  the  neighbourhood  also  of  the  island  of  Atalante, 
which  lies  off  the  co;ist  of  Opuntian  Locris,  there 
was  a  similar  inundation,  which  carried  away  a  part 
of  the  Athenian  fort  there,^  and  wrecked  one  of 
two  ships  which  had  been  drawn  up  on  the  shore. 
At  Peparethos  likewise  there  was  a  recession  of  the 
waters,  but  no  inundation  ;  and  there  was  an  earth- 
quake, which  threw  down  a  part  of  the  wall  as  Λν^Ι 
as  the  prytaneum  and  a  few  other  houses.  And  the 
cause  of  such  a  phenomenon,  in  my  own  opinion,  was 
this  :  at  that  point  where  the  shock  of  the  earthquake 
was  greatest  the  sea  was  driven  back,  then,  suddenly 
returning  2  \vith  increased  violence,  made  the  inunda- 
tion ;  but  without  an  earthquake,  it  seems  to  me,  such  a 
thing  would  not  have  haj)pened, 

XC.  During  the  same  summer  Λvar  was  being  waged 
in  Sicily,  not  only  by  other  peoples  as  they  each  had 
occasion  to  do  so,  but  also  by  the  Siceliots  them- 
selves, who  were  campaigning  against  one  another, 
and  likewise  by  the  Athenians  in  conceit  with  their 
allies  ;  but  I  shall  mention  only  the  most  memorable 
things  done  by  the  Athenians  in  concert  with  their 
allies,  or  against  the  Athenians  by  their  opponents. 
After  Charoeades,  the  Athenian  general,  had  been 
slain  in  battle  by  the  Syracusans,  Laches,  being  now 
in  sole  command  of  the  fleet,  made  an  expedition 
with  the  allies  against  Mylae,  a  town  belonging  to 
the  Messenians.     It  so  happened  that  two  divisions 

effect  was  indirect,  being  immediately  caused  by  the  recoil 
of  the  sea  after  the  earthquake  was  over  ;  hence  tt]u  θάΚασ- 
σαν,  and  not,  as  we  might  expect,  Thv  σΐΐσμόν,  is  tlie  subject 
of  τΓοίίΓ;'.     αποστέλλει»' either  active  or  neuter."     (Jowett. ) 

159 


THUCYDIDES 

Βύο  φνΧαΙ  ev  ταΐς  Μύλαί?  των  ^Ιβσσηνίων  φρου- 
ρούσα ι  και  τίνα  καΐ  eveSpav  ττβττοίημβναί  τοΐ<ί  άττο 

3  των  νεών.  οι  Se  ^Αθηναία  και  οι  ζύμμα-χ^οί  τους 
τ€  €κ  της  βνέΒρας  τρέττουσι  καΐ  Βιαφθβίρουσί 
ΤΓοΧλούς,  καϊ  τω  βρνματι  ττροσβαΧόντβς  rjvay- 
κασαν  ομόΧο^ια  την  Τ€  άκροττοΧιν  τταραΒοΰναι  καΐ 

4  €7γΙ  Μεσσ7ίνην  ξνστρατβνσαι.  και  μετά,  τοντο 
έττεΧθόντων  οι  ^leaaijviot  των  re  ^Αθηναίων  καΐ 
των  ξνμμάχ^ων  ττροσεχ^ώρησαν  καϊ  αυτοί,  όμηρους 
Τ€  Ζόντζς  καϊ  τά  άΧλα  τηστα  τταρασχ^όμενοι. 

XCI.  Του  δ'  αυτού  θβρους  οι  'Αθηναίοι  τριά- 
κοντα μεν  ναύς  €στ€ΐ\αν  ττβρί  ΐΙξΧοττόννησον,  ων 
έστρατη^ει  Αημοσθβνης  re  6  ΆΧκισθβνους  καϊ 
ΥίροκΧής  ο  Θεοδώρου,  ίζηκοντα  δέ  69  ^Ιήλ,ον  καϊ 
8ισ-χιΧίους  όπΧίτας,  βστρατ//γ€ί  δε  αυτών  Ί^^ικίας 

2  ο  Ί^ικηράτου.  τους  yap  ^Ϊ7]Χίονς  οντάς  νησιώτας 
και    ουκ    έθβΧοντας    ύπακούειν   ούΒβ   ές  το   αυτών 

3  ξυμμα'χ^ικον  ievai  εβούΧοντο  Ίτροσαηαηίσθαι.  ώς 
δε  αύτοίς  Βγιουμενης  ΤΎ\ς  ^ης  ου  προσε-χ^ώρουν, 
άραντες  εκ  της  Μ7']Χου  αύτοΙ  μεν  εττΧευσαν  ες 
Ώ.ρωτΓον  της  Γραΐκής,  ύπο  νύκτα  δε  σχόντες  ευθύς 
ετΓορεύοντο    οι    όττΧΐται    άττο    τών    νεών   ττεζη   ες 

4  Tavaypav  της  Ί^oιωτLaς.  οι  δε  εΆ;  της  ττοΧεως 
ττανΖημεϊ  Αθηναίοι,  ΊτΓΤΓονίκου  τ€  τού  Κ.αΧΧίον 
στρατη^ούντος  καϊ   ΈJύpυμehovτoς  τού  ©ουκΧεους, 

5  άττο  σημείου  ες  το  αυτό  κατά  yijv  άττήντων.  καϊ 
στ ρατοττεΖευσάμενοι  ταύτην  την  ημέραν  εν  τη 
Tavdjpa  εΒηουν  καϊ  ενηυΧίσαντο.  καϊ  τη  ύστε- 
ι6ο 


BOOK    III.  xc.  2-xci.  5 

of  the  Messenians  ΛνβΓβ  in  garrison  at  Mylae,  and 
that  these  had  laid  an  ambush  against  the  men  who 
had  landed  from  the  ships.  The  Athenians  and  their 
allies,  however,  put  to  rout  the  ambushing  troops, 
slaying  many  of  them  ;  then,  assaulting  the  fortifi- 
cation, they  compelled  its  defenders  to  surrender 
the  acropolis  by  agreement  and  march  with  them 
against  Messene.  After  this,  on  the  appiOach  of  the 
Athenians  and  their  allies,  the  Messenians  also  sub- 
mitted, giving  hostages  and  offering  the  other 
customary  pledges  of  good  fxith. 

XCI.  That  same  summer  the  Athenians  sent  thirty 
ships  round  the  Peloponnesus  under  the  command 
of  Demosthenes  son  of  Alcisthenes  and  Procles  son 
of  Theodorus,  and  sixty  ships  and  two  thousand 
hoplites  under  the  command  of  Nicias  son  of  Nicera- 
tus,  to  Melos.  For  the  Melians,  although  they  were 
islanders,^  were  unAvilling  to  be  subject  to  Athens 
or  even  to  join  their  alliance,  and  the  Athenians 
wished  to  bring  them  over.  But  when  they  would 
not  submit,  even  after  their  land  had  been  ravaged, 
the  Athenians  left  Melos  and  sailed  to  Oropus  in  the 
territory  of  Graia,  and  the  hoplites,  landing  there  at 
nightfall,  proceeded  at  once  by  land  to  Tanagra  in 
Boeotia.  There  thev  were  met  by  the  Athenians 
from  the  city  in  full  force,  Λνΐιο,  under  the  command 
of  Hipponicus  son  of  Callias  and  Eurj'medon  son  of 
Thucles,  came  overland  upon  a  concerted  signal  and 
joined  them.  And  after  they  had  made  camp  they 
spent  that  day  in  ravaging  the  territory  of  Tanagra, 
and  also  passed  the  night  there.     On  the  next  day 

^  The  Melians  and  Theraeans,  as  Laconian  colonists  (v. 
Ixxxiv.  2),  aloue  in  the  Cyclades  held  aloof  from  the  Athe- 
nian alliance. 

i6i 


THUCYDIDES 

paia  μ^αχΐ!  κρατήσαντα  τους  βπεζελθοντας  των 
Ύανα'γραίων  καΐ  Θηβαίων  riva<i  ττροσβζβοηθη- 
κότας  και  οπΧα  \αβοντ€ς  καΐ  τροτταΐον  στησαντβς 
άνεχωρησαν,  οι  μβν  e?  την  ττόΧιν,  οι  he  €7γΙ  τάς 
6  ναΰ<;.  καΐ  τταραττΧβυσας  ο  Ni/cta?  ταΐ?  βζηκοντα 
ναυσϊ  της  ΑοκρίΒος  τα  εττιθαΧάσσια  eVe/ie  και 
άνβχ^ώρησεν  eV    οικον. 

XCIT.    ΤτΓΟ  Be  τον  'χρονον  τούτον  ΑακζΒαιμόνιοι 
'UpafcXeiav  την  ev  Ύραχ^ινία  άττοικίαν  καθίσταντο 

2  αττό  TOiciahe  'γνώμης.  ΜηΧιής  οί  ξύμτταντες  elal 
μεν  τρία  μέρη,  ΐίαράΧιοι,  Ιερής,  Ύραχίνιοί•  τού- 
των 8e  οί  Ύραχ^ινιοι  ττοΧεμφ  (.φθαρμένοι  υττο 
ΟΙταιων  ομόρων  όντων,  το  πρώτον  μεΧΧήσαντες 
* Αθηναίοίς  ττροσθεΐναι  σφάς  αυτούς,  Βείσαντες  Be 
μη    ου    σφισι    ττιστοί    ωσι,    ττεμπουσιν   ες   ^Χακε- 

3  Βαίμονα  εΧόμενοι  ττρεσβευτην  Ύεισαμενόν.  ξυνε- 
πρεσβεύοντο  Βέ  αύτοΐς  και  Αωριής,  η  μητρόττοΧις 
των  ΑακεΒαι μονιων ,  των  αυτών  Βεομενοι•   υττο  yap 

4  τών  ΟΙταίων  καΐ  αύτοΙ  εφθείροντο.  άκούσαντες 
Be  οί  ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι  ^νώμην  είχ^ον  την  άττοικίαν 
εκττέμττειν,  τοις  τε  Ύραχ^ινίοις  βουΧόμενοι  και  τοις 
Αωριεύσί  τιμωρεΐν.  και  άμα  του  ττρος  ^Αθηναίους 
ποΧεμου  καΧώς  αύτοΐς  εΒόκει  η  ττόΧις  καθίστα- 
σθαΐ'  εττί  τε  yap  τ?}  Έ^ύβοία  ναυτικού  τταρα- 
σκευασθήναι  αν,  ώστ  εκ  βραχεος  την  Βιάβασιν 
yiyveadai,  της  τε  επΙ  Θράκης  τταρόΒου  'χρησίμως 
εζειν.     το  τε  ζυμτταν  ώρμηντο  το  χ^ωρίον  κτίζειν. 

5  ττρώτον  μεν  ουν  εν  ΑεΧφοΐς  τον  θεον  ζττηροντο, 
κεΧεύοντος  Βε   εξέπεμψαν  τους  οίκήτορας  αυτών 

102 


BOOK    III.  xci.  5-xcii.  5 

they  defeated  in  battle  the  men  of  Taiiagra  who  came 
out  against  them,  as  well  as  some  Thebans  who  had 
come  to  their  aid,  then  taking  possession  of  the  arms 
of  the  fallen  and  setting  up  a  trophy  they  returned, 
the  one  party  to  the  city,  the  other  to  the  ships.  And 
Nicias  sailed  along  the  coast  with  his  sixty  ships, 
ravaged  the  seaboard  of  Locris,  and  then  returned 
home. 

XCI  I.  It  Λvas  about  this  time  that  the  Lacedaemoni- 
ans established  Heracleia,  their  colony  in  Trachinia, 
with  the  following  object  in  view.  The  people  of 
Malia,  considered  as  a  Avhole,  consist  of  three  divisions, 
Paralians,  Hiereans,  and  Trachinians.  Of  these  the 
Trachinians,  after  they  had  been  ruined  in  war  by 
their  neighbours  the  Oetaeans,  at  first  intended  to 
attach  themselves  to  the  Athenians,  but,  fearing  that 
these  might  not  be  loyal,  sent  to  Lacedaemon, 
choosing  Teisamenus  as  their  envoy.  And  envoys 
from  Doris,  the  mother  city  of  the  Lacedaemonians, 
also  took  part  in  the  embassy,  making  the  same 
request,  for  they  too  Avere  being  ruined  by  the 
Oetaeans.  After  hearing  their  appeal,  the  Lacedae- 
monians were  of  the  opinion  that  they  should  send 
out  the  colony,  wishing  to  aid  both  the  Trachinians 
and  the  Dorians.  At  the  same  time,  the  site  of  the 
proposed  city  seemed  to  them  well  adajited  for  carry- 
ing on  the  war  against  Athens;  for  a  fleet  could  be 
equipped  there  for  an  attack  upon  Euboea  and  the 
crossing  thus  made  from  a  short  distance  away,  and 
the  place  would  also  be  useful  for  expeditions  along 
the  coast  towards  Thrace.  In  short,  they  were  eager 
to  found  the  settlement.  They  therefore  first  con- 
sulted the  god  at  Delphi,  and  at  his  bidding  sent 
out  the  colonistSj  consisting  of   both  Spartans  and 

163 


THUCYDIDES 

re  καΧ  των  περιοίκων,  καΧ  των  αΧΚων  'Έ^ΧΚ-ήνων 
τον  βονΧόμενορ  eKeXevov  εττεσθαί  ifkTjV  Ιώνων 
καΐ  Άγαί-ωΐ'  καΐ  εστίν  ων  αΧλων  εθνών.  οΙκισταΧ 
Βε     τρεΐ<;    Λακεδαιμονίων     η'^/ησαντο,     Λέων     καΐ 

ϋ  ^ΑΧκί^ας  καΐ  ^αμύ^ων.  καταστάντες  Βε  ετείχ^ισαν 
την  ττόΧιν'εκ  καινής,  η  νυν  ΉράκΧεια  καΧεΙται, 
άττε'χουσα  ©ερμοττυΧών  στα8ίου<;  μάΧιστα  τεσσα- 
ράκοντα,  τή<;  δε  θαΧάσσης  εϊκοσι.  νεώρια  τε 
ιταρεσκευάζοντο  καΐ  είρξαν  το  κατά.  @ερμο7τύ\α<; 
κατ  αντο  το  στενόν,  οττως  εύφύΧακτα  αύτοΐς 
εϊη. 

XCIII.  0(  δέ  ^ΑΘΐ]ναΐοι  τής  ττόΧεως  ταύτη<; 
ξννοικιζομένης  το  ττρώτον  ε^εισάν  τε  καΐ  ενόμισαν 
€7γΙ  Trj  Ε,νβοία  μάΧιστα  καθίστασθαι,  'ότι  βράχους 
εστίν  6  ΒιάττΧονς  προς  το  Κηναιον  της  Έ^ύβοίας. 
εττειτα  μεντοι  τταρα  Βοζαν  αύτοΐς  άπεβη'   ου  'yap 

2  ε^ενετο  αττ  αυτής  Βεινον  ούΒέν.  αϊτιον  δέ  ήν  ο'ί 
τ€  @εσσα\οΙ  εν  Ζυνάμει  οντες  των  ταύτη  -χλωρίων 
καΐ  ων  ετΓΐ  τη  <γη  εκτίζετο,  φοβούμενοι  μη  σφίσι 
με'γαΧη  ΐ'Ο'χνι  τταροικώσιν,  εφθειρον  καΐ  δίά 
τταντος  εττοΧεμουν  άνθρώττοις  νεοκαταστάτοις, 
εως  εξετρύχωσαν  'γενομένους  το  "πρώτον  και  ττάνν 
ΤΓοΧΧούς  (πάς  'yap  τις  Λακεδαιμονίων  οίκιζόντων 

S  θαρσαΧεως  ηει,  βέβαιον  νομίζων  την  πόΧιν)'  ου 
μεντοι  ήκιστα  οι  άρχοντες  αυτών  τών  Λακεδαι- 
μονίων οι  άφικνουμενοι  τα  πρά'γματά  τε  έφθειραν 
καΐ  ες  οΧι^ανθρωπίαν  κατέστησαν,  εκφοβήσαντες 
164 


BOOK    III.  xcii.  5-xcni.  3 

Perioeci,^  and  tLey  invited  any  otlier  Hellenes  who 
so  desired  to  accompany  them,  except  lonians  and 
Achaeans  and  certain  other  races.  Tlie  founders  of 
the  colony  in  charge  of  the  expedition  were  three 
Lacedaemonians,  Leon,  Alcidas,  and  Damai^on. 
When  they  had  established  themselves  they  built  a 
new  wall  about  the  city,  which  is  now  called  Heracleia, 
and  is  about  forty  stadia  distant  from  Thermopylae 
and  twenty  from  the  sea.  They  then  proceeded  to 
build  dockyards,  and  in  order  that  the  place  might 
be  easy  to  guard  fenced  off  the  approach  on  the  side 
toward  Thermopylae  by  a  wall  across  the  pass  itself. 
XCII  I.  As  for  the  Athenians,  while  the  colonists 
were  being  gathered  for  this  city,  they  at  first  became 
alarmed,  thinking  it  was  being  established  chiefly  as 
a  metiace  to  Euboea,  because  it  is  only  a  short  distance 
across  from  hei'e  to  Cenaeum  in  Euboea.  Afterwards, 
however,  the  matter  turned  out  contrary  to  their  ex- 
pectations ;  for  no  harm  came  from  the  city.  And  the 
reasons  Avere  as  follows:  theThessalians,  who  were  the 
paramount  })ower  in  those  regions  and  \vhose  territory 
was  being  menaced  by  the  settlement,  fearing  that 
their  new  neighbours  might  become  very  powerful, 
began  to  harry  and  make  war  continually  upon  the 
ncAv  settlers,  until  they  finally  wore  them  out,  although 
they  had  at  first  been  very  numerous  ;  for,  since  the 
Lacedaemonians  were  founding  the  colony,  everybody 
came  boldly,  thinking  the  city  secure.  One  of  the 
principal  causes,  however,  was  that  the  governors 
sent  out  by  the  Lacedaemonians  themselves  ruined 
the  undertaking  and  reduced  the  ])opulation  to  a 
handful,  frightening  most  of    the  settlers    away  by 

1  The  old  inhabitants,  chiefly  of  Achaean  stock,  who  had 
been  reduced  to  a  condition  of  dependence  (not  slavery)  by 
the  Dorians, 

165 


THUCYDIDES 

τους  τΓοΧλούς  χαλβττώς•  re  και  εστίν  α  ου  καΧώς 
^ζτ/ούμ€νοί,  ωστβ  ραον  ηόη  αυτώρ  οι  ττμοσοικοι, 
έττζκράτουν. 

XCIV.  Ύού  δ'  αυτού  θέρους,  καΐ  ττερί  τον  αύτον 
'χρόνον  ον  iv  ττ)  λίτ^λω  οΐ  ^Αθηναΐοί  κατείχ^οντο, 
καΐ  οΐ  άτΓΟ  των  τριάκοντα  νέων  Αθηναίοι  ττερι 
ΤΙεΧοτΓοννησον  οντες  ττρώτον  εν  ^ΕΧλομενω  τΡ]ς 
Αευκα^ίας  φρουρούς  τινας  Χοχ^ήσαντες  ζιεφθει- 
ραν,  εττειτα  ύστερον  εττι  Αευκάόα  μείζονι  στόΧω 
ηΧθον,  Άκαρνάσί  τε  ττασιν,  οι  ττανΒηαεΙ  ττΧην 
ΟΙνιαζών  ξυνεστΓοντο,  καΐ  Ζακυνθίοις  καΐ  ΐίεφαΧ- 
Χήτι    καΐ    Ιίερκυραίων    ττέντε    και    Βεκα    ναυσιν. 

2  κα\  οΐ  μεν  Αευκάδιοι,  της  τε  εζω  Ύης  ^τ]ουμενης 
καΐ  της  εντός  του  Ισθμού,  εν  fj  καΐ  η  Αευκάς  εστί 
και  το  Ίερον  τού  ΑττόΧΧωνος,  ττΧηθει  βιαζόμενοί 
ησύχ^αζον  οι  δε  \\καηνανες  ηζιουν  Δημοσθένη 
τον  στρατη^/ον  τών  ^Αθηναίων  άττοτεί-χ^ιζειν  αυ- 
τούς, νομίζοντες  ραΒίως  7'   ^^  εκποΧιορκήσαι  καϊ 

3  ττόΧεως  αΐεΐ  σφίσι  ττοΧεμιας  airaXXayijvai .  Δη- 
μοσθένης δ'  άναττείθεται  κατά  τον  γ^ρΰνον  τούτον 
ύτΓΟ  ^Ιεσσηνίων  ό^ς  καΧον  αύτω  στρατιάς  τοσαύ- 
της  ξυιειΧε'^/μενης  ΑΐτωΧοΐς  εττιθέσθαι,  Χαυ- 
Ίτάκτω  τε  ττοΧεμίοις  ουσι,  κα\  -ην  κράτηση  αυτών, 
ρα8ίως  καϊ  το  άΧΧο   7)7τειρωτικ6ν   το   ταύτη   \\θη- 

4  ναίοις    ττροστΓΟίήσειν.      το    ηαρ    έθνος    μέγα    μβν 

^  This  isthmus,  which  at  this  time  connected  the  island 
with  the  mainland,  had  Vjeen  previously  cut  through  by  the 
Corinthians  (Strabo,  p.  452  cj  ;  but  it  had  been  filled  with 

166 


BOOK    III.  xnii.  3-xciv.  4 

their  harsh  and  sometimes  unjust  administration,  so 
that  at  length  their  neighbours  more  easily  prevailed 
over  them. 

XCIV.  During  the  same  summer,  and  at  about  the 
time  when  the  Athenians  were  detained  at  Melos, 
the  troops  of  the  thirty  Athenian  ships  that  were 
cruising  round  the  Peloponnesus  first  set  an  ambush 
at  Ellomenus  in  Leucadia  and  killed  some  of  the 
garrison,  and  then,  later  on,  went  against  Leucas 
with  a  greater  armament,  which  consisted  of  all  the 
Acarnanians,  who  joined  the  expedition  with  their 
entire  forces  (with  the  exception  of  the  people  of 
Oeniadae),  some  Zacynthians  and  Cephallenians, 
and  fifteen  ships  from  Corcyra.  The  Leucadians,  find- 
ing themselves  outnumbered,  were  obliged  to  remain 
quiet,  although  their  lands  Λvere  being  ravaged  both 
without  and  within  the  isthmus,^  where  stands  Leucas 
and  the  temple  of  Apollo  ;  but  the  Acarnanians  tried 
to  induce  Demosthenes,  the  Athenian  general,  to 
shut  them  in  by  a  wall,  thinking  they  could  easily 
reduce  them  by  siege  and  thus  rid  themselves  of  a 
city  that  was  always  hostile  to  them.  But  just  at 
this  time  Demosthenes  was  persuaded  by  the  Mes- 
senians  that  it  was  a  fine  opportunity  for  him,  seeing 
that  so  large  an  army  was  collected,  to  attack  the 
Aetolians,  because  they  were  hostile  to  Naupactus, 
and  also  because,  if  he  defeated  them,  he  would  find 
it  easy  to  bring  the  rest  of  the  mainland  in  that  region 
into  subjection  to  the  Athenians.  The  Aetolians, 
they  explained,  were,  it  Λvas  true,  a  great  and  warlike 

sand  before  the  Peloponnesian  war,  as  is  evident  from  con- 
stant allusions  to  hauling  ships  across.  It  is  clear  from  the 
context  that  the  territory  of  the  Leucadians  included  a  part 
of  the  mainland  of  Acaruania. 

167 


THUCYDIDES 

€Lvai  το  των  ΑΐτωΧών  καϊ  μά'χ^ιμον,  οίκοΰν  he 
κατά  κίομα^  άτείχ;  στους•,  κα\  ταύτας  8ια  ττοΧλοΰ, 
και  aKevrj  yjriXfj  ■χ^ρωμίρον  ου  -χαΧβττον  αττεφαινον, 

5  ττρίν  ξυμβοηθϊ}σαι,  καταστραφήναί.  eTri^^eipeiv 
δ'  eKeXevov  πρώτον  μ(ν  Άποδωτοΐς,  έ'ττβίτα  δε 
Οφιονβνσί,  καΐ  μβτα  τούτου?  Έ,ύρυτασιν,  Όττβρ 
μί^ιστον  μερο<;  εστί,  των  ΑΐτωΧών,  ά'γνωστοτατοι 
Be  η\ώσσαν  και  ωμοφά^/οί  ασίν,  ως  XeyovTai. 
τούτων  yap  Χηφθεντων  ραοίο)ς  καΙ  ταΧλα  ττροσ- 
'χωρησ€ΐν. 

XCV.  Ό  δε  των  ^Ιεσσηνίων  γ^άριτι  TreiaOel^ 
καϊ  μάλιστα  νομίσας  avev  της  των  ^Αθηναίων 
δυνάμβως  τοις  ητταρωταις  ζυμμάχ^οις  μετά  των 
ΑΐτωΧών  Βύνασθαι  αν  κατά  yrjv  eXOelv  eVt  Βοίω- 
τούς  Βία  Αοκρών  των  ^Οζο\ών  €ς  Κ^υτίνιον  το 
Αωρικον,  iv  Be^ca  €χων  τον  Ιϊαρνασσόν,  €ως 
καταβαιη  eς  Φωκέας,  οΊ  ττροθύμως  eBoKovv  κατά 
την  Αθηναίων  alei  ττοτε  φιΧίαν  ξvστpaτeύσeιv  ή 
καν  βία  7Γροσα-χ^θΡ]ναί  (καϊ  Φωκβύσιν  ηΒη  όμορος 
η  ^οίωτία  εστίν),  αράς  ουν  ^ύμτταντι  τω  στρατ€ύ- 
ματι  αττο  της  ΑευκάΒος  ακόντων  των  \\καρνάνων 

2  ^Γape■π\eυσev  ε'?  ΈόΧΧίον.  κοινώσας  Be  την  eVt- 
νοιαν  τοις  Άκαρνάσιν,  ώς  ου  7ΓpoσeBeξavτo  Βιά 
τ?}ς•  ΑευκάΒος  την  ου  ττερίτείχισιν,  αύτος  τη  Χοιττή 
στρατιά,  ΚεφαΧΧ{]σι  καϊ  'Μβσσηνίοις  καϊ  Ζακυν- 
θίοίς  καΐ  ^Αθηναίων  τριακοσίοις  τοις  εττιβάταις 
των  σφετ€ρων  νεών  (αί  yap  ττέντε  καϊ  Βίκα  των 
ι68 


BOOK    III.  xciv.  4-.\cv.  2 

people,  but  as  they  lived  in  unwalled  villages,  which, 
moreover,  were  widely  separated,  and  as  they  used 
only  light  armour,  they  could  be  subdued  Avithout 
difficulty  before  they  could  unite  for  mutual  defence. 
And  they  advised  him  to  attack  the  Apodotians  first, 
then  the  Ophioneans,  and  after  them  the  Eurytanians. 
These  last  constitute  the  largest  division  of  the 
Aetolians,  their  speech  is  more  unintelligible  than 
that  of  the  other  Aetolians,  and,  according  to  report, 
they  are  eaters  of  raw  flesh.  If  these  tribes  were 
subdued,  they  said,  the  rest  would  readily  yield. 

XCV.  Demostlienes  was  induced  to  make  this 
decision,  not  only  by  his  desire  to  please  the  Mes- 
senians,  but  chiefly  because  he  thought  that,  without 
help  from  Athens,  he  would  be  able  Avilh  his  allies 
from  the  mainland,  once  the  Aetolians  had  joined 
him,  to  make  an  overland  expedition  against  the 
Boeotians  by  passing  through  the  country  of  the 
Ozolian  Locrians  to  Cytinium  in  Doris,  keeping 
Parnassus  on  the  right,  until  he  should  descend  into 
Phocian  territory.  The  Phocians  would  presumably 
be  eager  to  join  the  expedition  in  view  of  their 
traditional  friendship  Avith  Athens,  or  else  could  be 
forced  to  do  so ;  and  Phocis  is  on  tb.e  very  borders  of 
Boeotia.  So  he  set  sail  from  Leucas  with  his  Avhole 
armament  in  spite  of  the  unwillingness  of  the 
Acarnanians  and  went  along  the  coast  to  Sollium. 
There  he  made  his  plan  known  to  the  Acarnanians, 
but  they  would  not  agree  to  it  because  of  his  refusal 
to  invest  Leucas ;  he  therefore  set  out  upon  his 
expedition  against  the  Aetolians  without  them, 
taking  the  rest  of  his  army,  which  consisted  of 
Cephallcnians,  Messenians,  Zacynthians,  and  three 
hundred  Athenian  marines  from  his  own  ships — for 

169 


THUCYDIDES 

Κ.€ρκνραίων  άττηΧθον  νήες),  iarpciTcvaev  evr' 
3  Αιτωλούς•,  ώρματο  oe  βζ  Olveowo^  της  Αοκρίόος. 
οΐ  δε  ^ΟζόΧαί  οΰτοι,  ΑοκροΙ  ξύμμα'χ^οι  ήσαν,  καΐ 
eSei  αυτούς  ττατστρατία  άτταντησαι  τοις  \\θη- 
ναίοις  €ς  την  μβσό^/βιαν  οντβς  '^/αρ  όμοροι  τοις 
ΑΐτωΧοΐς  καΐ  ομοσκευοί  μβ'^/αΚ.η  ώφβΧία  iSoKovv 
elvat  ζυστρατεύοντβς  μάχ^ης  τβ  ίμττβίρία  της  εκεί- 
νων καΐ  -χλωρίων. 

XCVI.  ΑνΧισαμβνος  δε  τω  στρατω  ev  του 
Αίος  του  Νε/^ειου  τω  ίερω,  ev  ω  Ήσίοζος  ό  ττοιη- 
της  XeyeTac  ύττο  των  ταύτη  άττοθανβΐν,  γ^ρησθίν 
αύτω   iv   Κεμεα    τούτο   τταθεΐν,   άμα   τη   ecp   άρας 

2  έτΓορεύετο  ε?  την  ΑΙτωΧίαν.  καΐ  alpei  τη  ττρώτη 
ήμερα  TloTiSaviai'  καΐ  τη  hevTepa  }^ροκύΧβιον  καΐ 
τη  τρίτη  Ύεί-χ^ιον,  βμενβ  τ€  αυτού  καΐ  την  Χείαν  ες 
ΈίύπύΧιον  της  ΑοκρίΒος  άττεττεμψεν  την  yap  yvco- 
μην  είχ^ε  τα  άΧΧα  καταστρεψάμενος  ούτως  εττΐ 
"Όφίονεας,  ει  μη  βούΧοιντο    ξυ^-χωρείν,  ες  Ναύ- 

3  ττακτον  εττανα•χωρησας  στρατεύσαι  ύστερον,  τους 
δε  Αιτωλού?  ουκ  εΧάνθανεν  αύτη  η  παρασκευή 
ούτε  οτε  το  ττρώτον  επεβουΧεύετο,  επειδή  τε  ό 
στρατός  έσεβεβΧήκει,  ττοΧΧη  χ€ΐρΙ  εττεβοήθουν 
πάντες,  ώστε  και  οι  εσχ^ατοί  ^Οφιονεωΐ'  οι  προς 
τον  ^ΐ7]Χιακον  κοΧπον  καθήκοντες,  ^ωμιης  και 
Ιζ,αΧΧίής,  εβοήθησαν. 

XCVII.  Τω  δε  Αημοσθενει  τοιονΕε  τι  οΐ  Μεσ- 
σήνιοι  παρηνουν,  οττερ  και  το  πρώτον  avahiha- 
σκοντες  αύτον  των  ΑΙτωΧών  ώς  εΐη  paSia  η 
170 


BOOK    III.  xcv.  2-xcvii.  i 

the  fifteen  Corcyraean  ships  had  gone  back  home. 
The  base  from  which  lie  started  was  Oeneon  in 
Locris.  The  people  of  this  country,  Ozolian  Locris, 
were  aUies,  and  they  Avith  their  whole  force  were  to 
meet  the  Athenians  in  the  interior ;  for  since  they 
were  neighbours  of  the  Aetolians  and  used  the  same 
sort  of  arms,  it  was  believed  that  their  help  would 
be  of  great  service  on  the  expedition  on  account 
of  their  knowledge  both  of  the  Aetolian  manner  of 
fighting  and  of  tiie  country. 

XC\T.  He  bivouacked  \vith  his  army  in  the  pre- 
cinct of  Nemean  Zeus,  where  the  j)oet  Hesiod  '  is 
said  to  have  been  killed  by  the  men  of  that  region, 
an  oracle  having  foretold  to  him  that  he  should  suffer 
this  fate  at  Xemea  ;  then  he  set  out  at  daybreak  for 
Aetolia.  On  the  first  day  he  took  Potidania,  on 
the  second  Crocyleum,  on  the  third  Teichium.  There 
he  remained,  sending  his  bootΛ'  back  to  Eupalium  in 
Locris ;  for  his  intention  was  to  subdue  the  other 
places  first,  and  then,  in  case  the  Ophioneans  would 
not  submit,  to  return  to  Naupactus  and  make  a 
second  expedition  against  them.  But  all  these  pre- 
parations did  not  escape  the  notice  of  the  Aetolians, 
either  when  the  design  was  first  being  formed  or 
afterwards ;  indeed  his  army  had  no  sooner  invaded 
their  country  than  they  all  began  to  rally  in  great 
force,  so  that  help  came  even  from  the  remotest 
tribes  of  the  Ophioneans,  who  stretch  as  far  as  the 
Maliac  Gulf,  and  from  the  Bomians  and  Callians. 

XCVII.  Tlie  Messenians,  however,  gave  Demos- 
thenes about  the  same  advice  as  at  first  :  informing 
him    that  the   conquest  of  the    Aetohans  Λvas  easy, 

^  For  the  particulars  of  the  tradition,  cf.  Plut.  8epi.  Sap. 
Conv.  xix. 

171 


THUCYDIDES 

αιρβσις,  levat  CKeXevov  οτι  τάχ^ιστα  iirl  τάς  κω- 
μα'ί  καΐ  μη  μ€Ρ€ΐΐ'  έως  αν  ξνμτΓαντες  άθροισθβντες 
άντιτάξωνται,    την    δ'    iv    ττοσίν   alel    7Τ€ΐρασθαι 

2  αίρεΐν.  ο  8e  τούτοα  re  ττβισθζΧ^  καΐ  rfj  TV)(^r} 
ελτΓίσα?,  δτί  ovSev  αύτω  ηναντιούτο,  τους  Λο- 
κρούς  ουκ  άναμβίνα<ί  ους  αύτω  eSei  ττροσβοηθήσαί 
(•ψ-ίλων  yap  ακοντιστών  βνΒβης  ην  μάΧιστα)  βχώ- 
pei  €7τΙ  Αί,γίτί,οι;,  καΐ  κατά  κράτος  αίρει  εττιών. 
ύπβφβυ'γον  yap  οι  άιθρωττοι  και  βκύθηντο  eVl  των 
Χόφων  των  ΰττερ  της  ττόλεω?•  ην  yap  εφ  ύψι^Χών 
'χωρίων    ίΠΓεχουσα     της     θαΧάσσης     oyhorjKOVTa 

3  σταΒίους  μάλιστα,  οι  δε  ΑίτωΧοί  (βεβοηθηκότες 
yap  ήΒη  ήσαν  εττΐ  το  Alyiriov)  ττροσεβαΧΧον  τοις 
^Αθηναίοις  καϊ  τοις  ξυμμάγοις  καταθεοντες  άττο 
των  Χοφων  αΧΧοι  άΧΧοθεν  κα\  εσηκοντιζον,  καϊ 
οτε  μεν  εττίοι  το  των  'Αθηναίων  στρατόττεΒον, 
ΰτΓε~χωρουν,  άνα'χ^ωροΰσι  8ε  εττεκειντο'  καϊ  ην  εττΐ 
ττοΧύ  τοιαύτη  ή  μάχη,  διώξεις  τε  και  ύτταγωγαί, 
iv  οίς  αμφοτέροις  ήσσους  ήσαν  οι  'Αθηναίοι. 

XCVIII.  ^Ιεχρι  μεν  ουν  οι  τοξόται  είχόν  τε  τα 
βεΧη  αύτοΐς  καϊ  οίοι  τε  ήσαν  χρήσθαι,  οΐ  δε 
άντεΐχον  (τοξευόμενοι  yap  οι  ΑιτωΧοι,  άνθρωττοι 
■ψιλοί,  άνεστελΧοντο)'  εττειδη  δε  του  τε  τοζάρχου 
άτΓοθανόντος  ούτοι  διεσκεόάσθησαν  καϊ  αυτοί, 
εκεκμήκεσαν  καϊ  εττϊ  ττοΧύ  τω  αύτω  ττόνω  ξυνε- 
χόμενοι,  ο'ί  τε  ΑίτωΧοϊ  ενεκειντο  καϊ  εσηκοντιζον, 
ούτω  St]  τραττόμενοι  εφευyov,  και  εσττιπτοντες  ες 
Τ€  χαράδρας  άνεκβάτους  καϊ  χωρία  ων  ούκ  ήσαν 

172 


BOOK    III.  xcvii.  i-xcvMi.  i 

they  urged  him  to  proceed  as  quickly  as  possible 
against  tlie  villages,  not  waiting  until  they  should  all 
unite  and  array  themselves  against  him,  but  trying 
to  take  the  first  village  in  his  way.  Yielding  to  their 
advice  and  being  hopeful  because  of  his  good  fortune, 
since  he  was  meeting  with  no  o])position,  he  did  not 
wait  for  the  Locrians,  who  were  to  have  brought  him 
reinforcements — for  he  was  greatly  in  need  of  light- 
armed  men  that  were  javelin-throwers — but  advanced 
against  Aegitium  and  took  it  by  storm  at  the  first 
onset.  For  the  inhabitants  secretly  fled  and  took 
post  on  the  hills  above  the  city,  which  stood  on  high 
ground  about  eighty  stadia  from  the  sea.  But  the 
Aetolians,  who  by  this  time  had  come  to  the  rescue 
of  x\egitium,  attacked  the  Athenians  and  their  allies, 
running  down  from  the  hills  on  every  side  and 
showering  javelins  upon  them,  then  retreating  Avhen- 
ever  the  Athenian  army  advanced  and  advancing 
whenever  they  retreated.  Indeed,  the  battle  con- 
tinued for  a  long  time  in  this  fashion,  alternate 
pursuits  and  retreats,  and  in  both  the  Athenians  had 
the  worst  of  it. 

XCVllI.  Now  so  long  as  their  bowmen  had  arrows 
and  were  able  to  use  them  the  Athenians  held  out, 
for  the  Aetolian  troops  were  light-armed  and  so,  while 
thev  Λvere  exposed  to  the  arrows,  they  were  con- 
stantly driven  back.  But  when  the  captain  of  the 
archers  had  been  killed  and  his  men  scattered,  and  the 
lioplites  were  worn  out,  since  they  had  been  engaged 
for  a  long  time  in  the  unremitting  struggle  and  the 
Aetolians  Avere  pressing  them  hard  and  hurling 
javelins  upon  them,  they  at  last  turned  and  fled,  and 
falling  into  ravines  from  Avliich  there  was  no  way  out 
and  into  places  with  which  they  were  unacquainted, 

173 


THUCYDIDES 

βμ-πειροι  ΖιβφΘζίροντο'    καΙ  yap  6  ψ/εμων  avroU 
των  όΒό)ν  Χρόμων  6  Μεσσί^^ίος  ετύ^γ^ανε  τεθνη- 

2  K0j<i.  οι  he  ΑΙτω\οΙ  εσακοντίζοντε^  ττολλοί/ς  μεν 
αυτού  iv  ττ]  τροττΊΐ  κατά  7Γο8α<ί  αΙρούντε<ί,  άνθρω- 
1T0L  7Γθ8ώκ€ΐς  καΐ  yjriXoL,  Βιεφθειροί',  τους  Se 
ττΧείονς  των  οΒών  άμαρτάναντας  καΐ  ες  την  ΰΧην 
εσ φερομένους,  όθεν  hie^ohot  ουκ  ήσαν,   ττύρ  κομι- 

3  σύμενοι  ττεριετημτνρασαν  ττασά  τε  18έα  κατέστη 
της  φυΎης  καΐ  του  οΧεθρου  τω  στρατοττέ^ω  των 
^Αθηναίων,  μόΧίς  τε  εττΐ  την  θάΧασσαν  καΐ  τον 
ΟΙνεωνα  της  Αοκρί^,ος,   οθενπερ  καΐ   ώρμήθησαν, 

4  οί'  ιτερί^ενομενοί  κατέφυ'γον.  άττέθανον  8ε  των  τε 
ξυμμύγ^ων  ττοΧΧοΙ  καΐ  αυτών  Αθηναίων  όττΧΐται 
ττερι  είκοσι  μαΧιστα  και  εκατόν,  τοσούτοι  μεν 
το  ττΧήθος  καΐ  ήΧικια  ή  αύτη^  ούτοι  βεΧτιστοι  6η 
άνΒρες  εν  τω  ττοΧέμω  τωζε  εκ  της  ^ Αθηναίοι 
ττόλεω?   ^ιεφθαρησαν    άττεθανε   8ε   καΐ    ο    έτερος 

5  στρατηγός  ΏροκΧης.  τους  Be  νεκρούς  ύττοσττόν- 
δου?  άνεΧομενοι  τταρα  των  ΑΐτωΧών  και  άνα- 
'χ^ωρήσαντες  ες  Ναύπακτον  ύστερον  ες  τας  \\θηνας 
ταΐς  ναυσίν  εκομισθησαν.  Αημοσθένης  ^ε  περί 
'ί^αύττακτον  και  τα  'χωρία  ταύτα  ύττεΧείφθη  τοις 
ττειτρα^μενοίς  φοβούμενος  τους  ^Αθηναίους. 

XCIX.  Κατά  δέ  τους  αυτούς  "χ^ρόνους  και  οί 
ΊτερΙ  ^ικεΧιαν  Αθηναίοι  ττΧεύσαντες  ες  την  Αοκ- 
ρί^α  εν  άττοβάσει  τε  τινι  τους  προσβοηθησαντας 
Αοκρών  εκράιησαν  και  περιττόΧιον  αιρούσιν  ο  ην 
iiTi  τω  '  ΑΧηκι  ττοταμω. 

C.  Ύοΰ  δ'  αυτού  θέρους  ΑίτωΧοΙ  ττροττεμψαντες 
ττρότερον  ες  τε  Κ.όρινθον  και  ες  ΑακεΒαίμονα 
ττρέσβεις,  ΎοΧοφόν  τε  τον  ^Οφιονέα  και  ΏοριάΒην 

^  7;  αυτή,  Hude  τ)     ρ^τη, 

174 


BOOK    III.  xcviii.  i-c.  i 

they  perished  ;  for  Chromon^  the  Messenian,  Λvho  had 
been  their  guide  on  the  way,  had  unfortunately 
been  killed.  The  Aetolians  kept  plying  their  javelins, 
and  being  swift  of  foot  and  lightly  equipped,  follow- 
ing at  their  heels  they  caught  many  there  in  the 
rout  and  slew  them  ;  but  the  greater  number  missed 
the  roads  and  got  into  the  forest,  from  which  there 
were  no  paths  out,  and  the  Aetolians  brought  fire 
and  set  the  woods  ablaze  around  them.  Then  every 
manner  of  flight  was  essayed  and  every  manner  ot" 
destruction  befell  the  army  of  the  Athenians,  and 
it  was  only  with  difficulty  that  the  survivors  escaped 
to  the  sea  at  Oeneon  in  Locris,  whence  they  had  set 
out.  Many  of  the  allies  were  slain,  and  of  the 
Athenians  themselves  about  one  hundred  and  twenty 
hoplites.  So  great  a  number  of  men,  and  all  of  the 
same  age,  perished  here,  the  best  men  in  truth 
whom  the  city  of  Athens  lost  in  this  war ;  and 
Procles,  one  of  the  two  generals,  perished  also. 
When  they  had  received  back  their  dead  from  the 
Aetolians  under  a  truce  and  had  retreated  to  Nau- 
pactus,  they  were  afterwards  taken  back  by  the  fleet 
to  Athens.  Demosthenes,  however,  remained  behind 
in  Naupactus  and  the  region  round  about,  for  he  was 
afraid  of  the  Athenians  because  of  what  had  happened. 

XCIX.  About  the  same  time  the  Athenian  forces 
over  in  Sicily  sailed  to  Locris  ^  and  disembarking 
there  defeated  the  Locrians  Λνΐιο  came  against  them 
and  took  a  guard-house  which  was  situated  on  the 
river  Halex. 

C.  During  the  same  summer  the  Aetolians,  who  had 
previously  sent  three  envoys  to  Corinth  and  Lace- 
daemon,  namely  Tolophus  the  Ophionean,  Boriades 

^  i.e.  the  territory  of  the  Epizephyrian  Locri,  north  of 
Rhegium  in  Italy. 


THUCYDIDES 

τον    Κυρντάνα    και    ΎβίσανΒρον    τον    Άττοδωτόϊ', 
ιτείθουσιν  ώστε  σφισί  ττβμ-ψαί  στρατιάν  έττϊ  Ναύ- 

2  πακτον  Bta  την  των  ^ Α,θηναίων  βττα^ω^/ήν.  και 
€ξ67Γ€μψαν  ΑακβΒαιμόνιοί  ττβρϊ  το  φθινόττωρον 
τρισχ^ίΧίονς  οπλιτα?  των  ζυμμάγων.  τούτων 
ήσαν  ττβντακοσιοί  βξ  ΗρακΧβίας,  τή<;  iv  Ύραχΐνι 
ΤΓολβως  Τ0Τ6  νεόκτιστου  οΰση^'  Σπαρτιάτης  δ' 
ηρχεν  Έ,ύρύΧοχος  τή<;  στρατιάς,  καΐ  ξννηκοΧού- 
θουν  αύτω  Μακάριος  και  ΛΙε^εδάίο?  οι  Έ,τταρ- 
τιάται.  CI.  ξυWeyevτoς  8e  του  στρατεύματος 
βς  ΑεΧφους  επβκηρυκευετο  ΈύρύΧηχ^ος  Αοκροΐς 
τοις  ^ΟζόΧαις'  8ιά  τούτων  yap  η  όΒ6ς  ην  ες  Ναι;- 
ττακτον,  και  άμα   των    Αθηναίων  εβούΧετο  αττο- 

2  στήσαι  αυτούς,  ξυνεττρασσον  he  μάΧιστα  αύτω 
των  Αοκρών  Αμφισσής  8ια  το  των  Φωκεων 
εγΟος  8ε8ιοτες•  και  αύτοΙ  ττρωτοί  Βόντες  όμηρους 
και  τους  άΧΧους  εττεισαν  Βοΰναι  φοβονμειους  τον 
ετΓίοντα  στρατοί',  πρώτον  μεν  ούν  τους  όμορους 
αύτοίς  Μνονεας  {ταύτη  yap  ΒυσεσβοΧώτατος  η 
Αοκρίς),  εττειτα  Ίττνέας  καΐ  λΐεσσαττίους  καΐ 
Ύριταιεας  καΐ  Χ,αΧαίους  καΐ  ΎοΧοφωνίους  και 
Ησσιους  και  ΟΙανθεας.  ούτοι  καΐ  ζυνεστράτευον 
πάντες.  ΟΧπαΐοι  6ε  ομήρους  μεν  εΒοσαν,  ήκοΧού- 
θουν  Ζε  ού'  και  'Ύαΐοι  ουκ  εΒοσαν  όμηρους  πριν 
αυτών  ei^ov  κώμην  ΥΙοΧιν  όνομα  εχ^ουσαν. 

CII.  ^ΚπειΒή  Βε  παρεσκεναστο  πάντα  καΐ  τους 
ομήρους  κατεθετο  ες  Κ.υτινιον  το  Αωρικόν,  εγ^ώρει 
τω  στρατω  επι  την  ^αύπακτον  Βιά  των  Αοκρών, 
και   πορευομενος   Οίνεώνα   αίρει   αυτών   και    Κύ- 

2  παΧιον  ού  yap  προσεγ^ωρησαν.  yεvόμεvoι  δ'  εν 
τη  Ναυπακτία  και  οι  ΑίτωΧοι  άμα  i'jBi]  προσββ- 

176 


BOOK    III.  c.  i-(ii.  2 

the  Eurytanian,  and  Teisander  the  Apodotian,  urged 
them  to  send  an  army  against  Naupactus  because 
this  city  had  brought  the  Athenians  against  them. 
So  towards  autumn  the  Lacedaemonians  sent  three 
thousand  hoj^htes  of  their  alHes,  among  whom  Λvere 
six  hundred  from  Heracleia,  the  city  which  had  re- 
cently been  founded  in  Trachis.  The  commander  of 
the  expedition  was  Eurylochus  a  Spartan,  who  was  ac- 
companied by  tlie  Spartans  Macarius  and  Menedaius, 
CI.  And  Λvhen  the  army  was  collected  at  Delphi, 
Eurylochus  sent  a  herald  to  the  Ozolian  Locrians  ; 
for  the  road  to  Naupactus  lay  through  their  territory, 
and  he  also  wished  to  induce  them  to  revolt  from 
Athens.  Of  the  Locrians  the  peoj)le  of  Am))hissa 
co-operated  \vith  him  chieHy,  these  being  afraid  on 
account  of  their  enmity  to  the  Phocians ;  and  after 
these  had  taken  the  lead  in  giving  him  hostages 
they  persuaded  the  rest,  who  were  afraid  of  the 
invading  army,  to  do  likewise— first  their  neighbours 
the  Myoneans,  -who  held  the  country  from  Avhich 
Locris  was  most  difficult  of  access,  then  the  I{)neans, 
Messapians,  Tritaeeans,Chalaeans,Tolophonians,  Hes- 
sians and  Oeantheans.  All  these  tribes  also  took  part 
in  the  expedition.  The  Olpaeans  gave  hostages,  but 
did  not  take  the  field  Λvith  the  others ;  and  the 
Hyaeans  refused  to  give  hostages  until  a  village  of 
theirs,  Polis  by  name,  Avas  taken. 

CII.  When  all  preparations  had  been  made,  and 
the  hostages  had  been  deposited  at  Cytiniuni  in 
Doris,  Eurylochus  advanced  with  his  army  against 
Naupactus  through  the  Locrian  territory,  taking  on 
his  march  two  of  their  towns,  Oeneon  and  Eupalium, 
which  refused  to  yield.  And  when  they  reached  the 
territory    of    Naupactus,    the    Aetolians    meanwhile 

177 


THUCYDIDES 

βοηΘηκότ€<;,  iSrjovv  την  jrjv  και  το  Ίτροάστειον 
άτείχ^ιστον  ον  eVkov  βττί  re  \1ο\ύκρ€ΐον  €\θόντ€<;, 
την   Κ.οριι>θίων  μ(ν  άποίκίαν,  \\.θηναίων  he  ύττη- 

3  κοον,  αιροΰσιν.  ίλημοσθβί'ης  δέ  ό  Αθηναίος  (έ'τί 
<γαρ  irv'^/'x^avev  ων  μετά  τα  έκ  της  Αίτωλια?  ττερί 
'Ναύττακτον)  ττροαισθόμβνος  του  στρατού  κα\ 
heiaa<i  ττερί  αυτής,  εΧθων  πείθει  Ακαρνΰνας, 
χαλβττώς  δίά   την  εκ   της  Αευκύ8ος  άναχ^ώρησιν, 

4  βοηθήσαι  Καυττάκτω.  και  ττεμττονσι  μετ  αύτου 
εττΐ  των  νέων  ■χ^ιΧιους  οττΧιτας,  ο'ι  εσεΧθόντες 
ττεριεποίησαν  το  "χ^ωρίον  heivov  yap  ήν  μη,  με^ά- 
\ου  oVto?  του  τείχους,  oXiywv  Βε  των  αμυνομένων, 

5  ουκ  άντίσχ^ωσιν.  ΚύρύΧο'χος  8ε  και  οι  μετ  αυτού 
ώς  ησθοντο  την  στρατιαν  εσεΧηΧυθυΐαν  και  αδύ- 
νατον ον  την  ττόΧιν  βια  εΧεΐν,  άνεχ^ώρησαν  ουκ 
εττΐ  ΤΙεΧοττοννι'ισου,  αλλ'  69  την  AloXiSa  την  νύν 
καΧουμενην,  Καλυδώζ^α  καΐ  ΥΙΧευρωνα  και  ες  τα 
ταύτη    -χ^ωρία,    καΐ    ες    ΐΐροσχ^ιον   της    ΑίτωΧίας, 

6  οι  yap  \\μττρακίθ)ται  εΧθοντες  ττρος  αυτούς  ττεί- 
θονσιν  ώστε  μετά  σφών  ''Apyει  τε  τω  ΆμφιΧο- 
χικφ  καΐ  ΑμφιΧοχια  τη  άΧΧη  επίχειρΡ]σαι  καΐ 
^Ακαρνανία  ίιμα,  \eyovτες  οτι,  ήν  τούτων  κρα- 
τήσωσι,  ττίιν  το  ήττειρωτικύν  ΑακεΒαιμονίοις  ζύμ- 

7  μαχον  καθεστήζει.  και  ο  μεν  ΆύρυΧοχος  ττεισθείς 
και  τούς  ΑίτωΧούς  άφείς  ησύχαζε  τω  στρατω 
ττερΧ  τούς  χώρους  τούτους,  εως  τοις  Αμττρακιώ- 
ταις  εκστρατευσαιχενοις  ττερϊ  το  "Apyoς  δέοι  βοη- 
θεΐν.     και  το  θέρος  ετεΧεύτα. 


*  i.e.  the  fleet  of  the  Acarnanians  tlieinselves  ;  the  thirty 
Athenian  ships,  which   Demostlienea  had  commanded,   had 

178 


BOOK   III.  cii.  2-7 

having  come  to  their  support,  tliey  ravaged  the  land 
and  took  the  outer  town,  which  was  not  fortified  ; 
and  advancing  against  Molycreium,  a  colony  founded 
by  the  Corinthians  but  subject  to  Athens,  they  took 
it.  But  Demosthenes  the  Athenian,  Avho  liajijiened 
to  have  remained  in  tlie  neighbourhood  of  Naupactus 
after  his  retreat  from  Aetolia,  got  information  of  the 
expedition,  and  fearing  for  the  town  went  and 
persuaded  the  Acarnanians,  though  with  difficulty 
on  account  of  his  Avithdrawal  from  Leucas,  to  come  to 
the  aid  of  Naupactus.  And  they  sent  with  him  on 
board  the  fleet  ^  one  thousand  hoplites,  \vho  entered 
the  place  and  saved  it ;  for  there  was  d.uiger  that 
they  might  not  be  able  to  hold  out,  since  the  walls 
were  extensive  aud  the  defenders  few  in  number. 
Eurylochus  and  his  men,  perceiving  tliat  the  army 
had  entered  and  that  it  was  impossible  to  take  the 
town  by  storm,  ηοΛν  withdrew,  not  to  the  Pelopon- 
nesus, but  to  the  district  of  Aeolis,  as  it  is  now  called, 
to  Calydon,  namely,  and  Pleuron,  and  the  other 
towns  of  that  region,  and  to  Proschium  in  Aetolia. 
For  the  Ambraciots  came  and  urged  him  to  join 
them  in  an  attack  upon  Atnphilocliian  Argos  and  the 
rest  of  Amphilochia,  and  at  the  same  time  upon 
Acarnania,  saying  tliat  if  they  got  control  of  these 
places  all  the  mainland  would  be  brought  into 
alliance  with  the  Lacedaemonians.  Eurylochus  was 
persuaded,  and  dismissing  the  Aetolians  remained 
inactive,  keeping  his  army  in  these  regions  until 
the  Ambraciots  should  take  the  field  and  the  time 
should  come  for  him  to  join  them  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Argos.      And  the  summer  ended. 

returneil  to  Athens  (ch.  xcviii.  5),  while  those  mentioned 
ch.  cv.  3  dul  not  come  till  laler. 

179 


THUCYDIDES 

CUT.  01 B^  €V  ττ}ΈίΚ€\ία^ Αθηναίοι  του  imyiyro- 
μΑνου  γβίμωνο'ζ  βιτελθοντες  μβτα  τών'ΕΧλ,ηνωΐ'ξυμ- 
μά-χ^ων  και  όσοι  Σί/ίβλων  κατά  κράτος  άργ^όμενοι 
υττο  —υρακοσιων  και  ξυμμαχ^οι  οντες  άττοστάντες 
αύτοίς^  ζυνεττοΧεμουν,  err  "Ινησσαν  το  ^lk€\lkoi> 
τίοΚισμα,  ου  την  άκροττοΧιν  "^νρακόσιοι  είχ^ον, 
ττροσέβαΧΚον,  και  ώς  ουκ  εούναντο  eXelv,  άπησαν. 

2  iv  Se  TTJ  άνα)(ωρήσ€ΐ  ύστέροις  ^Αθηναίων  τοις 
ζυμμάγοις  άναχ^ωρούσιν  επιτίθενται  οι  εκ  του 
τειχίσματος  Χυρακοσιοι,  καΐ  ττροσττεσοντες  τρε- 
ΊΓουσί  τε  μέρος   τι  του   στρατού  και  άττεκτειναν 

3  ουκ  οΧί^ους.  καΐ  μετά  τούτο  άττο  των  νεό)ν  ο 
Αά^ης  και  οι  Αθηναίοι  ες  την  Αοκρίόα  αποβάσεις 
τινάς  ποιησάμενοι  κατά  τον  Καϊκΐνον  ποταμον 
τους  ττροσβοηθούντας  Αοκρων  μετά  ΥΙροξενου  του 
}ζ.ατΓάτωνος  ώς  τριακόσιους  μά-χτ]  εκράτησαν  και 
οπΧα  Χαβόντες  άπεχ^ώρησαν. 

CIV.  ιού  δ'  αυτού  -χ^ειμώνος  καΐ  ΑήΧον  εκά- 
θηραν  Αθηναίοι  κατά  γ^ρησμον  8ή  Twa.  εκάθηρε 
μεν  yap  καΐ  ΥΙεισιστρατος  ο  τύραννος  πρότερον 
αυτήν,  ούχ^  άπασαν,  αλλ  όσον  άπο  τού  ιερού 
εφεο)ράτο  της  νήσου•  τότε  8ε  πάσα  εκαθάρθη 
2  τοιωΒε  τρόπω,  θήκαι  οσαι  ήσαν  των  τεθνεώτων 
εν  Δ?;λω,  πάσας  άνεΐΧον,  και  το  Χοιπον  προεΐπον 
μήτε  εναποθνήσκειν  εν  τη  νήσω  μι'/τε  εντίκτειν, 
«λλ'  ες  την  Ρήνειαν  Βιακομίζεσθαι.  απέχει  8ε 
ή  'Ρηνεια  της  Α7']Χου  ούτως  oXiyov  ώστε  Πολν- 
κράτης,  ό  Ταμιών  τύραννος,  Ισγύσας  τινά  χρόνον 
ναυτικω  και  των  τε  άΧΧων  νήσων  άρζας  και  την 
νήνειαν  εΧων  άνίθηκε  τω  ΆπόΧΧωνι  τω  Δί;λίω 

''άπο  Χυρακοσίων  attur  ούτοΓϊ,  deleted  by  van  Herwerden. 

i8o 


BOOK    III.  cm.  i-civ.  2 

cm.  The  folloΛvίng  winter  the  Athenians  in 
Sicily,  Λvith  their  Hellenic  allies  and  such  of  the 
Sicels  as  had  been  unwilling  subjects  and  allies  of 
the  Syracusans  but  had  now  revolted  from  them  and 
Avere  taking  sides  with  the  Athenians,  attacked  the 
Sicel  town  Inessa,  the  acropolis  of  \vhich  was  held 
by  the  Syracusans,  but  being  unable  to  take  it  they 
departed.  On  their  retreat,  however,  the  allies,  who 
were  in  the  rear  of  the  Athenians,  were  attacked  by 
the  Syracusan  garrison  of  the  fort,  who  fell  upon  them 
and  put  to  flight  part  of  the  army,  killing  not  a  few 
of  them.  After  this  Laches  and  the  Athenians  took 
the  fleet  and  made  several  descents  upon  Locris;  and 
at  the  river  Caicinus  they  defeated  in  battle  about 
three  hundred  Locrians  who  came  out  against  them, 
under  the  command  of  Proxenus  son  of  Capato,  took 
the  arms  of  the  fallen,  and  returned  to  Rhegium. 

CIV.  During  the  same  winter  the  Athenians  puri- 
fied Delos  in  compli;incc  with  a  certain  oracle.  It 
had  been  purified  before  by  Peisistratus  the  tyrant,^ 
not  indeed  the  whole  of  the  island  but  that  portion  of 
it  which  Avas  visible  from  the  temple  ;  but  at  this 
time  the  whole  of  it  was  purified,  and  in  the  folloAving 
manner.  All  the  sepulchres  of  the  dead  that  Avere 
in  Delos  thev  removed,  and  proclaimed  that  there- 
after no  one  should  either  die  or  give  birth  to  a  child 
on  the  island,  but  should  first  be  carried  over  to 
Rheneia.  For  Rheneia  is  so  short  a  distance  from 
Delos  that  Polycrates  the  tvrant  of  Samos,  Avho  for 
some  time  was  powerful  on  the  sea  and  not  only 
gained  control  of  the  other  islands'-  but  also  seized 
Rheneia,  dedicated  this  island  to  the  Delian  Apollo, 

^  First  tyranny  560  B.C.;  death  527  e.c. 
^  The  Cyclades. 

iSt 


THUCYDIDES 

αλυσβι  hy]aa<;  ττρος  την  ΔίήΧον.      καΐ   την   ττεντβ- 
τηρί8α  τότε  πρώτον  μετά  την  κάθαρσιν  eTToiijaav 

3  0L  \\θηναΐοι^  ην  δί  ττοτβ  καΐ  το  ττάΧαί  μβ'γάΧη 
ξύνο8ος  e?  την  ΑήΧον  των  ^Ιώνων  re  καΐ  ττβρίκτιό- 
νών  νησιωτών  ζυν  Τ6  yap  ^υναι'ζί  καΐ  τταισϊν 
βθβώρουν,  ωστΓβρ  νυν  69  τα  ^Εφίσια  "Ιωνες,  κα\ 
ά^ών  βποιβΐτο  αυτόθι  καΐ  yvμl•ικoς  καΐ  μουσικούς, 

4  ■χ^ηρούς  Τ6  άνη^ον  αϊ  ττόΧεις.  δ?/λοΐ  Se  μάΧιστα 
"Ομηρος  οτι  τοιαύτα  ην  ev  Toh  βττεσι  Tolahe,  a 
εστίν  €Κ  ττροοιμίου  Άττόλλωζ/ο?• 

αΧΧοτ€"  Α)]Χω,  Φοίβε,  μαΧιστά  ye   θυμον  ετερ- 

φθης, 
ένθα  τοι  εΧκεχ^ίτωνες  ^Ιάονες  ηyεpeθovτaί 
συν  σφοΐσιν  τεκέεσσι  yuvat^L  τε  σην  ες  ayviav 
ένθα  σε  ττυγμαχίτ)  καΐ  ορχ^ηστυΐ  και  doiSf] 
μνησάμενοι  τβρπουσιν,  όταν  καθεσωσιν  άyώva. 

5  ότι  8ε  καΐ  μουσικής  άγω;'  ην  καΐ  άyωvιoύμεvoι 
εφοίτων  εν  τοΐσ8ε  αυ  8η\οΐ,  α  εστίν  εκ  του  αύτοΰ 
•προοιμίου,      τον  yap  ί^η\ιακον  -χορον  tojv  yuvai- 

^  τά  Δτ/λια,  after  οί  'Αθηναίοι,  deleted  by  van  Hemverden, 
followed  by  Hude. 

*  a\\oT€,  Camerarius'  conjecture,  now  generally  adopted, 
for  the  Vulgate  άλλ'  ore,  which  Hude  retains. 

^  "  As  a  symbolical  expression  of  indissoluble  union " 
(Curtius). 

"  i.e.  celebrated  every  fifth  year. 

^  Homer  is  clearly  regarded  by  Thucydides  as  the  author 
of  the  hymn  here  cited.     How  definite  a  personality  he  was 

182 


BOOK    III.  CIV.  2-5 

and  bound  it  with  a  chain  to  Delos.^  It  was  at  this 
time,  after  the  purification,  that  the  Athenians  first 
celebrated  their  penteteric-  festival  in  Delos.  There 
had  indeed  in  ancient  times  been  a  great  gathering 
at  Delos  of  the  lonians  and  the  inhabitants  of  the 
neighbouring  islands  ;  and  they  used  to  resort  to  the 
festival  with  their  Avives  and  children,  as  the  lonians 
ποΛν  do  to  the  Ephesian  games ;  and  a  contest  was 
formerly  held  there,  both  gymnastic  and  musical,  and 
choruses  were  sent  thither  by  the  cities.  The  best 
evidence  that  the  festival  was  of  this  character  is 
given  by  Homer  ^  in  the  following  verses,  which  are 
from  the  hymn  to  Apollo  :  * 

"  At  other  times,  Phoebus,  Delos  is  dearest  to 
thy  heart,  where  the  lonians  in  trailing  robes 
are  gathered  together  with  their  Avives  and 
children  in  thy  street;  there  they  delight  thee 
with  boxing  and  dancing  and  song,  making 
mention  of  thy  name,  whenever  they  ordain  the 
contest." 

And  that  tliere  was  a  musical  contest  also  to  which 
men  resorted  as  competitors  Homer  once  more 
makes  clear  in  the  following  verses  from  the  same 
hjmn.     After  connnemorating  the  Delian  chorus  of 

to  Thucydides  is  shown  by  the  words  "  in  whicli  he  also 
mentions  himself." 

■*  -προοΊμιον,  jiroem  or  introduction.  In  connection  with 
epic  poems  the  h\'mns  were  called  ηροοίμια,  because  they 
were  sung  liefore  other  poems,  i.e.  by  the  rliapsodists  as 
preludes  to  their  rhapsodies.  Schol  i^  ύμνου•  rohs  -γαμ  'ύμνου! 
■προοίμια  ίκάλουν.  The  question  has  been  raised  whether  the 
hymn  was  a  prelude  to  the  rhapsodies  or  was,  as  e.g.  here, 
in  itself  a  rhapsody.  The  citations  here  made  by  Thucydides 
are  from  the  Hymn  to  the  Delian  Ajio/lo,  146  if.  and  165  ff. 

183 


THUCYDIDES 

κων  νμΐ'ήσας  ereXevra   του   βτταίνου   e?    τάδε   τα 
βπη,  iv  ol<i  καϊ  eavrov  βττεμί'ήσθη' 

αλλ'  ayee\  ΙΧήκοί  μίν  \\.7ΓΟΧλων^Αρτ€μι8ί  ξνν, 
χαίρβτε  δ'  νμβΐ^  ττάσαι.      βμεΐο  66  και  μξτυττισθε 
μνήσασθ\  όττπότε  κβ,ν  Τί9  βττιχθοιήων  ανθρώπων 
ivOaS'  άνείρηται  Ta\aiTeipio<^  άλλος  βττελθων 
"^Ω  κονραι,  τί<ί  δ'  νμΐν  άνηρ  ηΒίστος  άθί8ών 
evOuEe  ττωλβίταί  καΐ  tgco  rep-neaOe  μαΧιστα; 
ΰμείς  δ'  ev  μά\α  ττασαι  υττοκρίνασθαι  ευφημω'^•'^ 
"ΎυφΧος  άνηρ,  οίκϊΐ  Be  Χ,ίγ  evi  τταίτταΧοεσστ]. 

6  Ύοσαΰτα  μεν  "Ομηρο<;  βτβκμηρίωσ£ν  οτι  ην  καϊ 
το  ττάλαι  μβ'^αΚ,η  ξύνοΒος  καϊ  εορτή  εν  ττ)  Δ7;λω• 
ύστερον  8ε  τους  μεν  'χορούς  οι  νησιώται  καϊ  at 
\\θηναΐοι  μεθ'  Ιερών  εττεμπον,  τα  δε  Trepl  τους 
αγώνας  καϊ  τα  ττΧεΐστα  κατε\υθη  υττο  ζυμφορών, 
ώς  εΙκός,  ττρίν  Βη  οι  ^Αθηναίοι  τότε  τον  ά^ώνα 
έτΓοίησαν  καϊ  ΊτητοΒρομίας,  ο  προτερον  ουκ  ην. 

CV.  Ύοΰ  δ'  αυτού  χειμώνος  ^Αμττρακιώται, 
ώσττερ  υποσχόμενοι  ΚύρυΧυχω  την  στρατιαν 
κατεσχον,  εκστρατεύονται  επΙ  "Αργός  το  \\μφί- 
Χοχικον  τρισχιΧίοις  όπΧίταις,  καϊ  εσβαΧοντες  ες 
την  'Αρ-γείαν  καταΧαμβάνουσυν  '  Ολπας,  τείχος 
επΙ  Χόφου  Ισχυρον  προς  ττ)  θαΧάσση,  Ό  ποτέ 
^Ακαρνανες  τβιχισάμενοο  κοινώ  Βικαστηρίω 
εχρώντο'    απέχει    δέ   άπο   τΡ]ς    Αργειων    ποΧεως 

^   ΐυφημω$,  Hude  α.φ-ημω5. 

^  i.e.  either  a  federal  court  of  the  Acarnanians,  as  Steup 
maintains  (see  Schoemann,  Gr.  Alttrthiiintr,  ii•*.  ρ  76),  or  a 
court  of  justice  commoa  to  the  Acarnanians  and  Amphilo- 

184 


BOOK    III.  CIV.  s-cv.  I 

women  he  ends  his  praise  of  them  with  the  following 
verses,  in  which  he  also  mentions  himself: 

"  Come  now,  let  Apollo  be  gracious  and  Ar- 
temis likewise,  and  farewell,  all  ye  maidens. 
Yet  remember  me  even  in  after  times,  whenever 
some  other  toil-enduring  man,  a  dweller  upon  the 
earth,  shall  visit  this  isle  and  ask  :  *  Ο  maidens, 
Avhat  man  is  the  sweetest  of  minstrels  to  you  of 
all  who  Avander  hither,  and  in  Avhom  do  you 
take  most  delight.^'  Do  you  make  answer,  all 
Avith  one  accord,  in  gentle  words,  *  The  blind 
man  who  dwells  in  rugged  Chios.'  " 

Such  is  Homer's  testimony,  showing  that  in  an- 
cient times  also  there  was  a  great  concourse  and 
festival  in  Delos.  And  in  later  times  the  people  of 
the  islands  and  the  Athenians  continued  to  send 
their  choruses  with  sacrifices,  but  the  contests,  and 
indeed  most  of  the  ceremonies,  fell  into  disuse  in 
consequence,  probably,  of  calamities,  until  the  Athen- 
ians, at  the  time  of  which  we  now  speak,  restored 
the  contests  and  added  horse-races,  of  which  there 
had  been  none  before. 

CV.  During  the  same  winter  the  Ambraciots, 
fulfilling  the  promise  by  which  they  had  induced 
Eurylochus  to  keep  his  army  there,  made  an  ex- 
pedition against  Amphilochian  Argos  Avith  three 
thousand  hoplites,  and  invading  its  territory  took 
Olpae,  a  stronghold  on  the  hill  near  the  sea,  which 
the  Acarnanians  had  fortified  and  had  at  one  time 
used  as  a  common  tribunal  ^    of  justice ;   and  it  is 

chians  (see  Kruse,  Hcllan,  ii.  p.  333),  as  Classen  explains. 
Tlie  latter  view  has  the  sujipoit  of  Steph.  Byz. :  "Όλπαι-  <ρροϋ- 
piov,  KOtvhv  Άκαονάνων  καΐ   ΆμψιΚόχων  hiKaari]pt.ov,  Θουκυδίδη! 

Τ/η'τ7). 

VOL.   Π.  G         ^^5 


THUCYDIDES 

έπιθάλασσίας    οΰσης  irevre  καΐ  eiKoai   σταΒίους 

2  μύΧιστα.  οι  Be  ^Ακαρνάνβς  οΐ  μεν  €<;  "Apyo^ 
ξυνεβοιΊθουν,  οι  Be  της  ^ Α μφ ίΧογίας  €V  τούτω  τω 
•χ^ωρίω  ο  Κ.ρήναι  KoKelrai,  φυΧάσσοντες  τους 
μετά  ΚύρνΧόχου  ΥΙβΧοττοννησίους  μη  Χάθωσι  ττρος 
τους    ^Αμττρακιώτας     ΒίεΧθόντες,     εστρατοττεΒεύ- 

3  σαντο.  ττεμπουσι  Be  κα\  eirl  Αημοσθενη  τον  ες 
την  ΑΐτωΧίαν  Αθηναίων  στρατη^ησαντα,  οττως 
σφίσιν  ήρεμων  ΎίΎνηται,  καϊ  εττϊ  τας  είκοσι  ναΰς 
^Αθηναίων  αΐ  ετυχ^ον  ττερϊ  ΐΙεΧοττόννησον  ουσαι, 
ων    ηρχεν    \\ριστοτεΧης    re    ό    Ύιμοκράτους    καϊ 

4  'λεροφων  ο  Αντιμνήστου.  άττεστειΧαν  Be  καϊ 
άγγελοι^  οί  ττερϊ  τας  ΌΧττας  ^Αμττρακιώταί  ες 
την  πόΧιν  κεΧεύοντες  σφίσι  βοηθείν  ττανΒημεί, 
ΒεΒώτες  μη  οί  μετ  ΚύρυΧο•χ^ου  ου  Βύνωνταί  BieX- 
θεΐν  τους  Άκαρνάνας  καϊ  σφίσιν  η  μονωθεΐσιν 
η  μάχη  '^/βνηται  η  άναχωρεΐν  βουΧομενοις  ουκ  τ) 
ασφαΧες. 

CVI.  Οί  μεν  ουν  μετ  ΈύρυΧόχου  ΤΙεΧοττον- 
νήσιοί  ώς  τίσθοντο  τους  εν'ΌΧτταις' Αμττρακίώτας 
ηκοντας,  άραντες  εκ  του  Υίροσχίου  εβοηθουν  κατά 
τάχος,  καϊ  Βιαβάντες  τον  ^ ΑχεΧωον  εχώρουν  Bl 
*  Ακαρνανίας  ούσης  ερήμου  Βια  την  ες  "Αριγος 
βοήθειαν,  εν  Βε^ια  μεν  έχοντες  την  Χτρατίων 
ττόΧιν  καϊ  την  φρουράν  αύτων,  εν  αριστερά  Βε  την 
2  άΧΧην  ^ Ακαρνανίαν.     καϊ  ΒιεΧθόντες  την    Έτρα- 

1  After  the  return  of  the  thirty  ships  (eh.  xcviii.  5),  these 
twenty  had  been  sent  out  again  round   the    Peloponnesus. 

1 86 


BOOK   III.  cv.  i-cvi.  2 

about  twenty-five  stadia  from  the  city  of  Argos, 
λνίποΐι  is  by  the  sea.  Meanwhile  some  of  the  Acar- 
nanian  troops  came  to  the  relief  of  Argos,  while  the 
rest  encamped  at  a  place  in  Am{)hilochia  which  is 
called  Crenae,  keeping  guard  to  prevent  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  with  Eurylochus  from  passing  through  un- 
observed to  join  the  Ambraciots.  They  also  sent  for 
Demosthenes,  who  had  led  the  army  of  the  Athenians 
into  Aetolia,  to  come  and  be  their  leader,  as  well  as 
for  the  twenty  Athenian  ships  ^  which  happened  to 
be  off  the  coast  of  Peloponnesus  under  the  command 
of  Aristotle  son  of  Timocrates  and  Hierophon  son  of 
Antimnestus.  A  messenger  was  also  sent  by  the 
Ambraciots  at  Olpae  to  the  city  of  Ambracia  with  a 
request  that  all  the  forces  of  the  town  should  be 
dispatched  to  their  aid,  for  they  feared  that  Eury- 
lochus and  his  troops  might  not  be  able  to  make 
their  way  through  the  Acarnanians,  and,  in  that  c;ise, 
that  they  themselves  would  either  have  to  fight 
single-handed,  or,  if  they  wished  to  retreat,  would 
find  that  unsafe. 

CVI.  Now  the  Peloponnesian  forces  under  Eury- 
lochus, Avhen  they  learned  that  the  Ambraciots  had 
arrived  at  Olpae,  set  out  from  Proschium  with  all  speed 
to  reinforce  them,  and  crossing  the  Acheloiis  advanced 
through  Acarnania,  Avhich  was  Λvithout  defenders  be- 
cause of  the  reinforcements  which  had  been  sent  to 
Argos,  and  as  they  advanced  they  had  the  city  of 
Stratus  Λvith  its  garrison  on  their  right,  and  the  rest 
of  Acarnania  on  their  left.  Then  traversing  the 
territory    of    the   Stratians    they    advanced    through 

Their  real  goal  was  Naupactug  (ch.  cxiv.  2),  but  answering 
the  appeal  of  the  Acarnanians  they  turned  aside  for  the 
momeut  to  the  Ambracian  Gulf  (ch.  evil.  1). 

187 


THUCYDIDES 

τίων  ηην  i-χ^ώρουν  Sia  τή^  Φυτιας  κα]  ανθις 
^Ιεόεώνος  τταρ  βσχ^ατα,  εττβιτα  Bca  Λιμναίας' 
καΐ  €ΤΓί/3ησατ  Τ7}ς  ' Α'/ραίων,  ονκέτι  \\καρνανίας, 
3  φιλίας  Be  σφίσιν.  Χαβόμειοι  Be  τού  θνάμον 
ηρους,  6  έστιν  ^ Χ^/ραϊκόν}  εχώρουν  Βι"  αυτού  καΐ 
Kare^ro-av  ei  την  Wpyeiav  νυκτός  ηΒη,  καΐ 
^ιβξβΧθόντες  μεταξύ  της  re  \\.ρ~/είων  ττόλεως  καΐ 
τΡ]^  tVl  Κρι',ναις  Άκαρνάνων  φυΧακή^  eXaOov 
κα\  Ύτροσέμειξαν  τοϊς  iv  " ΟΧιταις  \\μ77 ρακιώταις. 
CVII.  Γενόμενοι  ce  αθρόοι  άμα  ttj  ήμερα 
καθίζουσιν  εττΐ  την  ^ΙητρόττοΧιν  καΧουμενην  καΐ 
στρατόττεΒον  εττοιησαντο.  'Αθηναίοι  Βε  ταΐς 
εϊκοσι  ναυσίν  ου  ττοΧΧω  ύστερον  τταρα^ιηνονται 
ες  τον  \\μ77ρακίκον  κόΧττον  3οηθονντες  τοΙς  Αρ- 
^είοις,  κα\  Αημοσβένης  ^Ιεσσηνίων  μεν  έχων 
ίιακοσίονς  ότ\ίτας,    εξηκοντα   Be   τοξοτας  Άθη- 

2  ναίων.  και  αι  με:•  ν'/]€ς  ττερι  τας  ΟΧττας  τον 
Χόφον-  εκ  θαΧασσης  echd^puovv  οι  Be  \\.καρνάνες 
και  ΆμφίΧόχων  οΧί'/οι  (οΐ  yap  ττΧειους  ίητο 
Άαττρακίωτών  βία  κατείχοντο^  ες  τo^Apyoς  ηΒη 
ξννεΧηΧΐ'θότες  τταρεσκεναζοντο  ώς  μαχούμενοι 
τοις  εναντίοις,  καΐ  ήy^μόva  τού  τταντος  ξυμμα- 
χικού  αίροννται   Αημοσθενη  μετά   των  σφετερων 

3  στρατη'/ών.  ό  Βε  TrpoaayayMv  eyy^?  "'}'>  "Ολτττ;? 
εστρατοττεΒενσατο'  χαράδρα  Β  αυτούς  μβγάΧη 
Bielpyev.  καϊ  ημέρας  αεν  ττεντε  7]σύχαζον,  ττ}  Β 
€κττ]  ετάσσοντο  αμφότεροι  ως  ες  μάχην.  και 
(μείζον  yap  εyεvετo  κα\  ττεριεσχε  το  των  Πβλο- 
ΤΓοννησιων    στρατοττείον]    ό    Δημοσθένης    Βεισας 

1  Ά-νοαϊΐίόν,  for  6.y:oiKav  or  oyjoTvov  of  the  MSS.,  corrected 
by  0.  Mueller. 
'  -  τον  χόφον,  deleted  by  van  Herwerden,  followed  by  Hude. 

iS8 


BOOK    III.  cvi.  2-cvii.  3 

Phytia,  from  there  skirted  the  borders  of  Medeon, 
and  then  passed  through  Limnaea ;  and  finally  they 
reached  the  country  of  the  Agraeans,  being  now 
outside  of  Acarnania  and  in  a  friendly  country. 
Arriving  next  at  Mt.  Thyaraus,  which  belongs  to  the 
Agraeans,  they  went  through  the  pass  over  it  and 
came  down  into  Argive  territory  after  nightfall, 
whence  they  succeeded  in  passing  unobserved 
between  the  city  of  Argos  and  the  Acarnanian 
guard  at  Crenae,  finally  joining  the  Ambraciots  at 
Olpae. 

CVII.  After  the  two  armies  had  effected  a 
junction,  at  daybreak  they  took  post  at  a  place  called 
Metropolis  and  made  camp.  Not  long  afterwards 
the  Athenians  \vith  their  twenty  ships  arrived  in  the 
Ambracian  Gulf,  reinforcing  the  Argives  ;  and 
Demosthenes  also  came  Avith  tAvo  hundred  Messenian 
hoplites  and  sixty  Athenian  bowmen.  The  ships 
lay  at  sea  about  the  hill  of  Olpae,  blockading  it ;  but 
the  Acarnanians  and  a  few  of  the  Amphilochians — for 
most  of  these  were  kept  from  moving  by  the 
Ambraciots — had  already  gathered  at  Argos  and  were 
preparing  for  battle  Avith  their  opponents,  having 
chosen  Demosthenes  to  command  the  Avhole  allied 
force  in  concert  with  their  οΛνη  generals.  And  he, 
leading  them  close  to  Olpae,  encamped ;  and  a 
great  ravine  separated  the  two  armies.  For  five 
days  they  kept  quiet,  but  on  the  sixth  both  sides 
drew  up  in  order  of  battle.  Now  the  army  of  the 
Peloponnesians  was  larger  than  that  of  Demosthenes 
and  outflanked  it ;  he,   therefore,    fearing    that   he 


THUCYDIDES 

μη  κνκΧωθτ)  \οχίζ€ΐ  €ς  όΒόν  τίνα  κο'ιΧην  και 
Χο'χ^μώΒη  οπλίτα?  καΐ  Λ^ίλους  ξυναμφοτβρονί  €9 
τετρακόσιους,  όττως  κατά  το  v-nepe^ov  των  εναν- 
τίων iv  ττ)  ζυνόΖω  αυττ)  βζαναστάντβς  ούτοι  κατά 

4  νώτου  ^ί^νωνταυ.  irru  he  τταρεσκεύαστο  άμφο- 
τίροίς,  fjaav  βς  γείρας,  Δημοσθένης  μβν  το  he^iov 
κβρας  έ'χωζ^  μετά  ^Ιεσσηνίων  καϊ  'Αθηναίων 
οΧί^/ων  το  he  άΧΧο  \\καρνάνες  ώς  εκαστοί  τεταγ- 
μένοι  €7Γ€Ϊχον  καΐ  ΆμφίΧόχ^ων  οι  τταρόντες  άκον- 
τισταί'  ΙΙεΧοποννιίσιοι  δε  καϊ  Άμττρακίώται 
άναμίξ  τεταγμένοι  ττΧην  "Μαντινέων  ούτοι  he  ev 
τω  εύωνύμίύ  μαΧΧον  καϊ  ου  το  κέρας  άκρον  έχον- 
τες αθρόοι  ήσαν,  αΧΧ  ΚύρυΧοχος  εσχατον  είχε  το 
εύώνυμον  και  οι  μετ  αυτού,  κατά  ^Ιεσσηνίους  καϊ 
Αημοσθενη. 

CVIIL  Ω?  δ'  εν  χερσίν  ηΒη  οντες  ττεριέσχον 
τω  κέρα  οι  ΤΙεΧοττονι•7']σιοι  καϊ  εκνκΧούντο  το 
he^iov  των  εναντίων,  οι  εκ  της  ενεορας  Άκαρνάνες 
ετΓΓ/ενομενοι  αύτοΐς  κατά  νώτου  προσπίτττουσί 
τ€  καϊ  τρετΓουσιν,  ώστε  μήτε  ες  άΧκην  ύττομεΐναι 
φοβηθεντας  τε  ες  φυ^ην  καϊ  το  ττΧέον  τού  στρα- 
τεύματος καταστήσαΐ'  iTreihrj  yap  ειhov  το  κατ^ 
ΕύρύΧοχον  καϊ  ο  κράτιστον  ην  htaφθειpόμevov, 
ΤΓολλω  μάΧΧον  εφοβούντο.  καϊ  οι  Μεσσήνιοι 
οντες  ταύττ)   μετά  τού  Δημοσθένους  το   ττοΧύ  τού 

2  ερΎου    εττε^ήΧθον.     οι    he     Λμττρακιώται    καϊ    οι 

κατά  το  hεζιov  κέρας  ενικών  το  καθ'  εαυτούς  και 

"ττρος  το'ΆρΎος  επεΒίωξαν^  καϊ  <γάρ  μαχιμώτατοι 

^  ίπ^Ιΐωξαν,  for  άπίδίαι|αν  of  the  MSS.,  Haase's  conjecture. 

190 


BOOK    III.  cvn.  3-cviii.  2 

might  be  surrounded,  stationed  in  a  sunken  road 
overgrown  Λνϋΐι  biislies  an  ambush  of  hopHtes  and 
Hght-troops,  about  four  hundred  all  together,  his 
purpose  being  that  in  the  very  moment  of  collision 
these  troops  should  leap  from  their  hiding-place  and 
take  the  enemy  in  the  rear  at  the  point  where  his 
line  overlapped.  When  both  sides  were  ready 
they  came  to  close  quarters.  Demosthenes  with 
the  Messenians  and  a  few  Athenian  troops  had  the 
right  wing ;  the  rest  of  the  line  was  held  by  the 
Acarnanians,  arraj'ed  by  tribes,  and  such  Anijihi- 
lochian  javelin-men  as  were  present.  But  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  and  Ambraciots  were  mingled  together, 
except  the  Mantineans ;  these  were  massed  more  on 
the  left  wing,  though  not  at  its  extremity,  for  that 
])osition,  which  was  opposite  Demosthenes  and  the 
Messenians,  was  held  by  Eurylochus  and  the  troops 
under  him. 

C\  III.  When  finally  the  armies  were  at  close 
quarters  and  the  Peloponnesians  outflanked  with 
their  left  the  right  wing  of  their  oj)ponents  and 
were  about  to  encircle  it,  the  Acarnanians,  coming 
upon  them  from  their  ambush,  fell  upon  their  rear 
and  routed  them,  so  that  they  did  not  stand  to  make 
resistance  and  in  their  panic  caused  the  greater 
part  of  their  army  to  take  to  flight  also  ;  for  vv'hen 
they  saw  the  division  under  Eurylochus,  their  best 
troops,  being  cut  to  pieces,  they  were  far  more 
panic-stricken.  And  it  was  the  Messenians,  Λνΐιο 
Λvere  in  this  part  of  the  field  under  the  command 
of  Demosthenes,  that  bore  the  brunt  of  the  battle. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Ambraciots  and  those  on  the 
enemy's  right  wing  defeated  tlie  troops  op])osed  to 
themselves,  and  pursued  them  to  Argos  ;  and  indeed 

191 


THUCYDIDES 

των  ττβρί    €Κ€Ϊνα   τα    •χωρία    τνγχάνουσιν    δντες. 

3  €ΤΓαναχωρουι^τ€<;  Be  ώς  έώρων  το  jrXeov  νενικημυίνον 
καΐ  οι  άΧλοι  Ακαρνάνβς  σφίσι  ττροσβκείντο, 
χαλεττω?  Βιεσώζοντο  e?  τάς  "Ολττας,  καΐ  ττοΧλοΙ 
άττέθανον  αυτών,  ατάκτως  και  ούΒενΙ  κόσμω 
προστητΓΤοντβς  ττΧην  ^Ιαντινεων  ούτοι  he.  μά- 
Χιστα  ξυvτ€τayμevoι  τταντος  του  στρατοί)  ave^w- 
ρησαν.     καΐ  ή  μ€ν  μάχη  ετε\εύτα  e?  o-v/re. 

CIX.  Wevehaio^  he  Trj  ΰστ€ραία  Ε,ύρυ\όχου 
τβθνεώτος  καΐ  Μακαρίου  αυτός  τταρειΧηφώς  την 
άρχην  καΐ  άττορών  μβ'γάΧης  της  ^  ησσης  'γeyίvη- 
μένης  ότω  τροττω  η  μένων  ττοΧιορκι'/σεται,  €Κ  τ€ 
^ής  καϊ  €κ  θαΧάσσης  ταΐς  ^Αττικαΐς  ναυσίν 
aTTOKeKXrj μένος,  η  καϊ  άναχωρών  hLaσωθήσeτa^, 
ττροσφβρβί  λόγοι/  Trepl  σπονΒών  καϊ  αναχωρήσεως 
Αημοσθέΐ'€ΐ  και  τοις  ^ Ακαρνάνων  στρατη^οίς  καϊ 

2  TTepX  νεκρών  α  μα  αναιρέσεως.  οι  hk  νεκρούς 
μεν  άττέΒοσαν  καϊ  τροπαΐον  αύτοΙ  έστησαν  καϊ 
τους  εαυτών  τριακόσιους  μάΧιστα  άττοθανόντας 
άνείΧοντο'  άναχώρησιν  hi  εκ  μεν  του  ττροφανοΰς 
ουκ  έσττείσαντο  άττασι,  κρύφα  δε  Δημοσθένης 
μετά  των  ξυστpaτήyωv  των  "^  ^Ακαρνάνων  σττεν- 
Βονται  Μαντινεϋσι  καϊ  Mevehatω  και  τοις  αΧΧοις 
άρχουσι  τών  ΤίεΧοττοννησίων  καϊ  όσοι  αυτών 
ήσαν  α^ίολογώτατοί  άττοχωρεΐν  κατά  τάχος, 
βουΧόμενος  ■ψιΧώσαι  τους  Αμττρακιώτας  re  και 
τον    μισθοφόρον    οχΧον,^   μάΧιστα    he    ΑακεΒαι- 

^  τη  J  added  by  Hude. 

^  τών,  before  Άιιαρνάνων,  added  by  Kriigcr,  followed  by 
Hude. 

*  rhv  ξ^νικόν,  given  in  MSS.  after  οχΚον,  deleted  by  van 
Herwerden,  foUowcii  by  Hude. 

192 


BOOK    III.  cviii.  2-cix.  2 

these  are  the  best  fighters  of  all  the  peoples  of  that 
region.  When,  however,  they  returned  and  saw 
that  their  main  army  had  been  defeated,  and  the 
victorious  division  of  the  Acarnanians  began  to  press 
hard  upon  them,  they  made  their  escape  with 
difficulty  to  Olpae  ;  and  many  of  them  were  killed, 
for  they  rushed  on  with  broken  ranks  and  in  disorder^ 
all  except  the  Mantineans,  who  kept  their  ranks 
together  during  the  retreat  better  than  any  other 
part  of  the  army.  And  it  was  late  in  the  evening 
before  the  battle  ended. 

CIX.  On  the  next  day,  since  Eurylochus  and 
Macarius  had  been  slain,  Menedaius  had  on  his  own 
responsibility  assumed  the  command,  but  the  defeat 
had  been  so  serious  that  he  was  at  his  \vit's  end  how, 
if  he  remained,  he  could  stand  a  siege,  blockaded  as 
he  was  by  both  land  and  sea  by  the  Athenian  fleet, 
or,  if  he  retreated,  could  get  away  safely.  He  there- 
fore made  overtures  to  Demosthenes  and  the  Athe- 
nian generals  regarding  a  truce  for  his  retreat  and 
also  about  the  recovery  of  his  dead.  And  they  gave 
back  the  dead,  set  up  a  trophy  themselves,  and  took 
up  their  own  dead,  about  three  hundred  in  number. 
They  would  not,  however,  openly  agree  to  a  retreat 
for  the  whole  army,  but  Demosthenes  with  his 
Acarnanian  colleagues  secretly  agreed  that  the  Man- 
tineans and  Menedaius  and  the  other  Peloponnesian 
commanders  and  the  most  influential  men  among 
them  might  go  back  home,  if  they  did  so  speedily. 
Their  object  was  to  isolate  the  Ambraciots  and  the 
miscellaneous  crowd  of  mercenaries,^  and  above  all  to 

*  Opinions  differ  as  to  who  are  meant.  They  were  pro- 
bably mercenaries  from  the  neighbouring  Epirote  tribes  in 
the  pay  of  the  Ambraciots. 

193 


THUCYDIDES 

μονίους  καΐ  Ώ.€Χθ7Γθΐ'νησίου<;    ΒιαβαΧεΐν    e?  του^ 
€K€Lvr)    'χ^ρτρζων    " ΕΧληνας    ώ?    καταττροΒόντβς  το 

3  εαυτών  TrpovpyiaLTepov  έττοιησαντο.  και  οι  μ€ν 
τού?  τ€  νεκρούς  άνείΧοντο  καϊ  δία  τάχ^ονς  εθατττον, 
ώσττερ  ύττήρχ^β,  καΐ  την  άττοχ^ώρησίν  κρύφα  οίς 
eSehoTO  erre^ovXevov. 

ex.  Τω  δε  Αημοσθενεί  καΐ  το??  ^Ακαρνάσιν 
ayyeWeTUi  τους  ^Αμττρακιώτας  τους  βκ  της 
ττόλεως  τταν^ημίΧ  κατά  την  ιτρωτι^ν  €Κ  των 
^ΟΧττών  ayyeXiav  έττιβοηθεΐν  Βια  των  Αμφί- 
Χόχων,   βουΧομζνους   τοϊς    iv  "ΟΧτταις   ξυμμείζαι 

2  εΐόότας  ovoev  των  yeyevημevωv.  και  ττεμ-πει, 
ευθύς  του  στρατού  μέρος  τί  τάς  ό^ούς  ττροΧο- 
'χ^ιούντας  καϊ  τα  καρτερά  ττροκαταΧηψ  ο  μένους, 
καϊ  T7J  άΧΧη  στρατιά  άμα  τταρεσ κβυάζετο  βοη- 
θεΐν  ετΓ  αυτούς. 

CXI.  Έι/  τούτω  δ'  οΐ  ^ίαντινής  κα\  οίς  εσπειστο 
ττροφασιν  εττΐ  Χαγ^ανισμον  καϊ  φpυyάvωv  ξυΧ- 
Xoyrjv  εζεΧθ όντες  ΰτταττησαν  κατ  6XLyoυς,  άμα 
ξυXXεyovτες  βφ'  α  εξήΧθον  Βήθεν  ττροκεχωρη- 
κότες   δε    ή8η   άττωθεν   της    ΟΧττης   θάσσον   άττε- 

2  γ_ώρουν.  οι  δ  ^Αμττρακιώται  καϊ  οι  άΧΧοι  όσοι 
μεν  ^  ετυyχ^avov  ούτως  αθρόοι  ξυνεΧθοντες,  ώς 
εyvωσav  άττιόντας,  ωρμησαν  και  αύτοΙ  καϊ  εθεον 

3  Βρόμω,  εττικαταΧαβεΐν  βουΧόμενοι.  οι  Βε  ^ Ακαρ- 
νάνες  το  μεν  ττρωτον  καϊ  ττάντας  ενόμισαν  άτιεναι 

'   Hude  reads  'όσοι  μτ]  ΐτΰ-γχανον  tovtois  αθρόοι  ζυν(ξ(\θόντΐ5. 

^  As  distinguished  from  the  Ainbraciots  who  after  the 
battle  were  shut  up  in  Olpae  (oh.  cxi.  2). 

^  The  text  is  most  probabl}'  corrupt.  Classen  offers 
the  best  remedy  :  ol  5e  Άμττρακιώται  καϊ  οΊ  άλλοι  όσοι 
μον ού μΐνοί    iruyxavov    ovtws,    αθρόοι    ξυve\θo^'τΐs    ij    iyywaav 

194 


BOOK    III.  cix.  2-cxi.  3 

discredit  the  Lacedaemonians  and  the  Peloponnesians 
with  the  Hellenes  ot  this  region,  on  the  ground  that 
they  had  committed  an  act  of  treachery  through  pre- 
ference for  their  ΟΛνη  selfish  interests.  Accordingly 
the  Peloponnesians  took  uj)  their  dead  and  hastily 
buried  them  as  best  thev  could,  while  those  who  had 
permission  began  secretly  to  plan  their  retreat. 

ex.  Word  was  now  brought  to  Demosthenes  and 
the  Acarnanians  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  of 
Ambracia,^  in  response  to  the  first  message  that  came 
from  Olpae,  Avere  marching  in  full  force  through  the 
Amphilochian  territory,  wishing  to  join  the  forces 
in  Olpae,  and  that  they  were  quite  unaware  of  what 
had  happened.  So  he  immediately  sent  a  part  of  his 
army  to  forestall  these  troops  by  setting  ambuscades 
along  the  roads  and  occupying  the  strong  positions, 
and  at  the  same  time  began  preparations  to  lead  the 
rest  of  the  army  against  them. 

CXI.  In  the  meantime  the  Mantineans  and  the 
others  Avho  were  included  in  the  agreement,  leaving 
camp  on  the  pretext  of  gathering  pot-herbs  and  fire- 
wood, stole  away  in  small  groups,  gathering  at  the 
same  time  what  they  pretended  to  have  gone  to 
seek ;  then  when  they  had  already  got  some  distance 
from  Olpae  they  quickened  their  pace.  But  the 
Ambraciots  and  all  the  others  who  happened  to  have 
come  together  in  a  body,  Avhen  they  realized  that 
these  were  taking  their  departure,  also  set  out  them- 
selves and  ran  at  full  speed,  wishing  to  overtake 
them.2  But  the  Acarnanians  at  first  thought  that 
all  the  fugitives  Avere  going  away  Avithout  covenant 

awiovTas,  ϋρμ-ησαν  καΐ  αΰτοΙ  .  .  :  "But  the  Axnbraciots  and 
all  the  others  who  chanced  to  be  left  came  together  in  a 
body,  and  when  they  realised  that  they  were  taking  their 
departure  set  off  also  themselves  .  .  ." 


THUCYDIDES 

άστΓΟί^δους  ομοίως  καΐ  του?  ΤΙβΧοττοννησίον^;  eVe- 
Βίωκον,  και  ηνα<;  αυτών  των  στρατη<γών  κω\ΰ- 
οντας  καΐ  φάσκοντας  έσττεΐσθαί  αύτοΐ<ί  ηκόντισβ 
τις,  νομίσας  καταττροόίΖοσθαι  σφας•  βττβίτα 
μίντοι  τους  μβν  ^Ιαντινβας  καΐ  τους  ΐΙβΧοττον- 
νησίους  άφίβσαν,  τους  δ'  Αμττρακιώτας  βκτείνον. 
4  και  ην  ττολΧη  βρις  καΐ  ayvoia  eiVe  ^Αμττρακίώτης 
τις  έστιν  εϊτε  Υΐ€Χθ7τονν7]σιος.  καΐ  ές  διακόσιους 
μίν  τινας  αυτών  άττίκτειναν  οι  δ'  άΧλοι  Bie- 
φυyov  69  την  'Ay pa'iSa  ομορον  ουσαν,  καΐ  ΈαΧύν- 
θίος  αυτούς  ο  βασιΧβύς  τών  Aypaίωv  φίΧος  ων 
ύτΓβδε^ατο. 

CX1I.  QI  δ'  €«  της  ττόΧεως  Άμττρακιώται 
άφίκνοΰνταί  βττ  ΐΒομενήν.  eaTov  δε  Εύο  Χόφω  ή 
*18ομ€νη  ΰ\Ιτ7]Χώ'  τούτοιν  τον  μβν  μείζω  νυκτός 
i^nyevoμevης  οι  ττροαττοσταΧέντες  ίιττο  του  Αη- 
μοσθβνους  άττο  του  στρατοττίόου  εΧαθόν  τβ  καΐ 
έφθασαν  ττροκαταΧαβόντες,  τον  8"  βΧάσσω  ^  ετυ- 
yov    οι    Αμπρακίώταί    ττροαναβύντες    και    ηύΧί- 

2  σηντο.  6  δε  Αημοσθβνης  Βειπνήσας  εχ^ώρει  και 
το  άΧΧο  στράτευμα  άττο  εσττβρας  ευθύς,  αύτος 
μεν  το  ήμισυ  έχων  επι  της  εσβοΧης,  το  δ'  άΧΧο 

3  δίά  τών  ΆμφιΧοχικών  ορών.  και  άμα  ορθρω 
ετΓίπιτΓτει  τοις  Άμττρακίώταις  ετι  εν  ταΐς  εύναις 
και  ου  7ΓρθΎ]σθημενοις  τα  yεyεvημεva,  άΧΧα  ττοΧύ 

4  μάΧΧον    νομισασι    τους    εαυτών    εΙναί'    καΐ    yap 

τους  Μ,εσσηνίους  πρώτους  εττιτηΒες  6  Αημοσθενης 

ττρούταξε  και  7Γpoσayopεύείv  έκεΧευε,  ΑωρίΒα   τε 

yXo)σσav  Ιεντας  και  τοις  ττροφύλαζι  ττίστιν  τταρε- 

χομενους,  άμα  δε  και   ου   καθορωμένους   ττ]   όψει 

^  is  is  inserted  before  rhv  δ'  ^κάσσω  by  Hude,  following 
Kriiger. 

196 


BOOK    III.  CXI,  3  cxii.  4 

or  truce  and  therefore  set  oil"  in  pursuit  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  ;  and  when  some  of  the  generals  tried  to 
prevent  this,  saying  that  a  truce  had  been  made  Avith 
them,  someone  hurled  javehns  at  them,  believing 
that  they  liad  been  betra\ed.  Afterwards,  however, 
they  let  the  Mantineans  and  Peloponnesians  go,  but 
began  to  kill  the  Ambraciots.  And  there  was  much 
dispute  and  uncertainty  as  to  whether  a  man  was  an 
Ambraciot  or  a  Peloponnesian.  About  tAvo  hundred 
of  the  Ambraciots  \vere  slain  ;  the  rest  of  the  fugitives 
escaped  into  the  neighbouring  country  of  Agraea, 
and  were  received  by  Salynthius  the  king  of  the 
Agraeans,  Λνΐιο  was  friendly  to  them. 

CXII.  Meanwhile  the  troops  from  the  city  of 
Ambracia  arrived  at  Idomene.  Now  it  consists  of  two 
lofty  hills,  and  of  these  the  higher  had  already  been 
seized  unobserved  during  the  night  by  the  troops 
which  Demosthenes  had  sent  forAvard  from  his  main 
army  ;  but  the  loAver  had  previously,  as  it  chanced, 
been  ascended  by  the  Ambraciots,  λνΐιο  spent  the 
night  there.  After  dinner  Demosthenes  and  the 
rest  of  the  army  set  out  immediately  after  nightfall, 
he  himself  with  half  of  them  making  for  the  pass, 
while  the  rest  took  the  road  through  the  Amphilochian 
mountains.  And  at  dawn  he  fell  upon  the  Ambraciots, 
who  were  still  in  their  beds  and  had  no  knowledge 
at  all  of  what  had  previously  happened.  On  the 
contrary,  they  supposed  these  troops  to  be  their  ΟΛνη 
men,  for  Demosthenes  had  pur])osely  put  the  Mes- 
senians  in  front  and  directed  them  to  accost  the 
enemy  in  the  Doric  dialect,  thus  getting  themselves 
trusted  by  the  outposts  ;  besides,  they  were  indis- 
tinguishable  to  the  sight,  since   it  was    still    dark. 


197 


THUCYDIDES 

5  νυκτός  €Τί  οΰσης.  ως  ουν  eTreireae  τω  στρατβύ- 
ματι  αυτών,  τρεττουσι,  και  τους  μεν  ττοΧλους 
αυτού  Ζυίφθειραν,  οι  δε   ΧοίττοΙ   κατά   τα  ορη   ες 

6  φν/ην  ωρμησαν.  ττροκατείΧημμενων  δέ  των  όΒών, 
καΐ  αμα  των  μεν  ^ΑμφιΧοχ^ων  εμπείρων  όντων 
της  εαυτών  Ύης  καΐ  ψιΧών  ττρος  όττΧίτας,  τών  Βε 
άττείρων  καΐ  άνεττιστη  μόνων  oirr)  τράττωνται, 
εσττίτΓτοντες  ες   τε   γ^αράδρας   καΐ   τας    ττροΧεΧο- 

7  χισμενας  ενεΒρας  Βίεφθείροντο.  και  ες  ττάσαν 
ΙΒεαν  ■χωρ))σαντβς  της  φνγής  ετράττοντό  τίνες  καΐ 
ες  την  θάΧασσαν  ου  ττοΧύ  άττεγρυσαν,  καΙ  ώς 
εΙΒον  τάς  Άττικάς  ναΰς  τταραττΧεούσας  άμα  του 
ερηου  ττ}  ξυντυχ^ία,  ττροσένευσαν,  ηγισάμενοί  εν 
τω  αύτίκα  φόβω  κρείσσον  είναι  σφίσιν  υττο  τών 
εν  ταΐς   ναυσίν,   el   Bet,   Βιαφθαρήναι  η    ΰττο   τών 

8  βαρβάρων  καΐ  εγ^θίστων  ΆμφιΧόχ^ων.  οι  μεν 
ουν  Αμττρακίώταί  τοιουτω  τροττω  κακωθεντες 
oXiyot  ατΓο  ττοΧΧών  εσώθησαν  ες  την  ττόΧιν 
^Ακαρνάνες  δε  σκυΧεύσαντες  τους  νεκρούς  καΐ 
τροταΐα  στήσαντες  άττεχ^ώρησαν  ες"Apyoς. 

CXIir.  ΚαΙ  αύτοΐς  ττ)  υστεραία  ηΧθε  κήρυξ 
άτΓο  τών  ες  Ακραίους  καταφυ^οντων  εκ  της 
"ΟΧττης  ^Αμπρακιωτών,  άναίρεσιν  αΐτησων  τών 
νεκρών  ους  άπεκτεΐναν  ύστερον  τΡ]ς  ττρώτης  μά- 
χης, οτε  μετά  τών  Μ,αντινεων  και  τών  ύτΓοσττόν- 
2  Βων  ξυνεζησαν  ασττονΒοι.  ιΒών  δ'  6  Κϊ)ρυξ  τα 
οττΧα  τών  άτΓο  τΡ]ς  ττοΧεως  Αμττρακιωτών  εθαύ- 
μαζε  το  ττΧήθος•  ου  yap  ySei  τα  ττάθος,  αλλ'  ωετο 

198 


BOOK    III.  cxii.  4-cxiii.  2 

So  they  fell  upon  the  army  of  the  Ambraciots  and 
j)ut  them  to  rout,  slaying  the  majority  of  them  on 
the  spot ;  the  rest  took  to  flight  over  the  mountains. 
But  as  the  roads  had  already  been  occupied,  and  as, 
moreover,  the  Amphilochians  were  well  acquainted 
with  their  own  country  and  were  light  infantry  op- 
posing heavy-armed  troops,  whereas  the  Ambraciots 
were  ignorant  of  the  country  and  did  not  kno\v  which 
way  to  turn,  under  these  circumstances  the  fleeing 
men  fell  into  ravines  and  into  ambushes  which  had 
previously  been  set  for  them  and  perished.  And 
some  of  them,  after  resorting  to  every  manner  of 
flight,  even  turned  to  the  sea,  Avhich  was  not  far  dis- 
tant, and  seeing  the  Athenian  ships,  which  were  sail- 
ing along  the  coast  at  the  very  time  when  the  action 
was  taking  place,  swam  toward  them,  thinking  in 
the  panic  of  the  moment  that  it  Λvas  better  for  them 
to  be  slain,  if  slain  they  must  be,  by  the  crews  of  the 
ships  than  by  the  barbarian  and  detested  Amphiloch- 
ians. In  this  manner,  then,  the  Ambraciots  suffered 
disaster,  and  but  few  out  of  many  returned  in  safety 
to  their  city  ;  the  Acarnanians,  on  the  other  hand, 
after  stripping  the  dead  and  setting  up  trophies, 
returned  to  Argos. 

CXI II.  On  the  next  day  a  herald  came  to  the 
Athenians  from  the  Ambraciots  who  had  escaped 
from  Olpae  and  taken  refuge  among  the  Agraeans, 
to  ask  for  the  bodies  of  those  who  had  been  slain 
after  the  first  battle,  at  the  time  when  unprotected 
by  a  truce  these  attempted  to  leave  Olpae  along  with 
the  Mantineans  and  the  others  who  were  included 
in  the  truce.  Now  when  the  herald  saw  the  arms 
taken  from  the  Ambraciots  who  came  from  the 
city,  he  was  amazed  at  their  number ;  for  he  did 
not  know  of  the  recent  disaster,  but  thought  that 

199 


THUCYDIDES 

3  των  μετά  σφων  elvai.  και  τις  αυτόν  ηρβτο  ο  τι 
θαυμάζοι  καΐ  όποσοι  αυτών  τβθνάσιν,  οΙομ(;νο<; 
αν  ό  €ρωτών  elvai  τον  κήρυκα  άττο  των  ev  Ίδο- 
μβναΐς.      6   δ'    βφη   8ιακοσίου<ί   μάΧιστα.      ύττοΧα- 

4  βων  δ'  ό  ερωτών  elrrev  "  Ούκουν  τα  οττλα  ταυτί 
διακοσίων  ^  φαίνεται,  αλλά  ττΧεον  ή  •χ^ιΧίων. 
αύθις  δε  ειττεν  εκείνος•  "  Ουκ  άρα  τών  μεθ^  ημών 
μαχ^υ μένων  εστίν."  6  δ'  άπεκρίνατο•  "  Εϊττερ  ^ε 
νμεΐς  εν  ^ΙΒομεντ)  -χθες  εμά'χεσθε^^  "'Αλλ'  ημείς 
^γε  ούΒενΙ  εμαχ^ομεθα  χθες,  άΧΧα  ττρωην  εν  τη 
αποχωρήσει. '  "  Και  μεν  8η  τούτοις  ye  ημείς 
χθες  άττο  της  ττόΧεως  βοηθήσασι  της  ^Αμττρακιω- 

5  τών  εμαχόίχεθα."  ο  δε  κήρυξ  ώς  ηκουσε  καΐ 
ε'γνω  οτι  ή  άττο  της  ττόΧεως  βοήθεια  Βιεφθαρται, 
άνοιμώξας  καΐ  ε'«7Γλαγεΐ9  τω  με^γέθει  τών  τταρόν- 
των  κακών  άπήΧθεν  ευθύς  άττρακτος  καϊ   ούκετι 

6  άττητει  τους  νεκρούς,  ττάθος  yap  τούτο  μια  ττό- 
Xei  'ΕίΧΧηνίΒι  εν  ϊσαις  ημεραις  με^ιστον  Βη  τών 
κατά,  τον  ττοΧεμον  τόνΒε  ε^ενετο.  και  αριθμόν 
ουκ  kypa^jra  τών  αποθανόντων,  οιοτι  άττιστον  το 
τΓΧήθος  Xεyετaι  άποΧεσθαι  ώς  προς  το  μεyεθoς 
της  πόΧεως.  Άμπρακίαν  μέντοι  οίδα  οτι,  ει 
εβουΧηθησαν  Ακαρνάνες  και  ^ΑμφίΧοχοι  Άθη- 
ναιοις  καϊ  Αημοσθενει  πειθόμενοι  επεΧθεΐν,  αύ- 
τοβοεί  αν  εΙΧον   νυν  δ'    εΒεισαν  μη   οι   ^Αθηναίοι 

^  διακοσίων,  added  by  Krii^er. 
200 


BOOK    III.  cxiii.  2-6 

the  arms  belonged  to  the  men  of  his  own  division. 
And  someone  asked  him  why  he  was  amazed,  and 
how  many  of  his  comrades  had  been  slain,  the 
questioner  on  his  part  supposing  that  the  herald 
had  come  from  the  forces  which  had  fought  at 
Idomene.  The  herald  answered,  "  About  two 
hundred."  The  questioner  said  in  reply,  "These 
arms,  though,  are  clearly  not  those  of  two  hundred 
men,  but  of  more  than  a  thousand."  And  again 
the  herald  said,  "Tlien  they  are  not  the  arms  of 
our  comrades  in  the  battle."  The  other  answered, 
"  They  are,  if  it  was  you  who  fought  yesterday  at 
Idomene."  "  But  we  did  not  fight  with  anyone 
yesterday  ;  it  was  the  day  before  yesterday,  on  the 
retreat."  "And  it  is  certain  that  we  fought  yester- 
day with  these  men,  who  were  coming  to  your  aid 
from  the  city  of  the  Ambraciots."  When  the  herald 
heard  this  and  realized  that  the  force  which  was 
coming  to  their  relief  from  the  city  had  perished, 
he  lifted  up  his  voice  in  lamentation  and,  stunned 
by  the  magnitude  of  the  calamity  before  him, 
departed  at  once,  forgetting  his  errand  and  making 
no  request  for  the  dead.  Indeed  this  was  the 
greatest  calamity  that  befell  any  one  Hellenic  city 
in  an  equal  number  of  days  during  the  course  of 
this  Λvhole  war.  The  number  of  those  who  fell 
I  have  not  recorded,  seeing  that  the  multitude 
reported  to  have  perished  is  incredible  when  com- 
pared with  the  size  of  the  city.  I  know,  however, 
that  if  the  Acarnanians  and  Amphilochians  had 
been  \villing  to  heai-ken  to  the  Athenians  and  De- 
mosthenes and  had  made  an  attack  upon  Ambracia 
they  would  have  taken  it  at  the  first  onset ;  but  as 
it  was,  they  were  afraid  that  the  Athenians,  if  they 


THUCYDIDES 

βχοντβς     αυτήν     'χάλεττώτεροι     σφίσι     ττάροικοι 
ωσιν. 

CXIV.  Μετά  δε  ταύτα  τρίτον  μβρος  νβίμαντξΐ; 
των  σκυΧων  rot?  ^ΚΘηναιοί<;  τα  αΚΧα  κατά  τας 
ττόΧεις  hieCKovTO.  καϊ  τα  μ€ν  των  Αθηναίων 
TrXeovTa  εαλω,  τα  δε  νυν  άνακβίμενα  iv  τοις 
Άττί/ίοΐς  ίβροΐς  ^ημοσθενεί  εξτιρβθησαν  τριακό- 
σιαι  ττανοττΧίαι,  καί  αηων  αύτας  κατεττΧευσβν 
και  εηενετο  άμα  αύτω  μετά  την  εκ  της  ΑίτωΧίας 
ξυμφοραν  άπο  ταύτης  της  πράξεως  άΒεεστερα  η 

2  κάθοδος.  άττηΧθον  δε  καϊ  οι  εν  ταΐς  είκοσι  ναυ- 
σίν  \\θηναΐοί  ες  ^αύττακτον.  \\καρνάνες  δε  καΐ 
^ΑμφίΧοχοί  άττεΧθοντων  Αθηναίων  καϊ  Αημοσ- 
θενους  τοις  ώς  'ϊ,αΧύνθιον  καϊ  Ά'^/ραίους  καταφυ- 
yovaiv  Άμττρακιωταις  καϊ  ΐΙεΧοττοννησίοίς  άνα~ 
γ^ωρησιν  εσπείσαντο  εξ  ΟΙνιαΒών  οίττερ  καϊ  μεταν- 

3  έστησαν  τταρα  Ι,αΧυνθίου,  καϊ  ες  τον  εττειτα 
-χ^ρόνον  στΓονΒας  καϊ  ξυμμαχίαν  εττοιτισαντο  εκα- 
τόν ετη  ^ Ακαρνάνες  καϊ  ^ΑμφίΧοχ^οι  ττρος  Άμττρα- 
κιώτας  εττϊ  τοΐσΒε,  ώστε  /ιΐί;τε  ^Αμττρακίώτας 
μετά  ^Ακαρνάνων  στρατεύειν  εττϊ  ΐΙεΧοττοννησίους 
μήτε  ^Ακαρνάνας  μετά  ^Αμττρακιωτων  εττ  ^Αθη- 
ναίους, βοηθείν  δε  τ^  αΧΧηΧων,  καϊ  άποΒουναι 
*Αμττρακιύ>τας  οττόσα  ή  'χ^ωρΙα  η  όμηρους  ^Αμφι- 
Χοχ^ων    εχ^ουσι,   καϊ  εττϊ  Άνακτόριον  μη  βοηθείν 

Α  ΤΓοΧεμιον  ον  \\καρνάσιν.  ταύτα  ξυνθεμενοι  Sii- 
Χνσαν   τον    πόΧεμον,     μετά    Be  ταύτα   Ι^,ορίνθιοι 

202 


BOOK    III.  cxin.  6-cxiv.  4 

had   the  ίοΛνη  in   their  possession,  would  be  more 
troublesome  neighbours  than  the  Ambraciots. 

CXI\'.  After  tliis  the  Acarnanians  apportioned  a 
third  of  the  booty  to  the  Athenians  and  distributed 
the  rest  among  their  cities.  The  portion  which 
fell  to  the  Athenians  was  captured  from  them  on  the 
voyage  home  ;  but  the  dedicatory  offerings  ηολν  to 
be  seen  in  the  Athenian  temples,  consisting  of  three 
hundred  panoplies,  wei-e  set  apart  as  Demosthenes' 
share,  and  were  brought  home  by  him  when  he 
returned.  Furthermore,  his  return  could  now,  in 
consequence  of  this  exploit,  be  made  Avith  less 
apprehension  after  his  earlier  misfortune  in  Aetolia. 
The  Athenians  in  the  t\venty  ships  also  departed, 
retm-ning  to  Naupactus.  As  for  the  Acarnamans 
and  Amphilochians,  after  the  Athenians  and  Demos- 
thenes had  gone  home,  they  concluded  a  truce  with 
the  Ambraciots  and  Peloponnesians  who  had  taken 
refuge  with  Salynthius  and  the  Agraeans,  allowing 
them  to  withdraw  from  Oeniadae,  whither  they  had 
gone  after  leaving  Salynthius.  The  Acarnanians 
and  Ampliilochians  also  concluded  for  the  future  a 
treaty  of  alliance  with  the  Ambraciots  to  last  for 
one  hundred  years,  on  the  following  terms:  The' 
Ambraciots  were  not  to  join  the  Acarnanians  in  any 
expedition  against  the  Peloponnesians ;  nor  were 
the  Acarnanians  to  join  the  Ambraciots  against  the 
Athenians,  but  they  were  to  give  aid  in  defence 
of  one  another's  territory;  the  Ambraciots  were 
to  restore  all  places  or  hostages  belonging  to  the 
Amphilochians  which  they  now  held  ;  and  they 
were  not  to  give  aid  to  Anacfcorium,  which  was 
hostile  to  the  Acarnanians.  On  these  terms  of 
agreement  they  brought  the  war  to  an  end.     But 

203 


THUCYDIDES 

φυΧακην  eavTOiv  e?  την  ^Αμττρακίαν  άττίστει'Καν 
βς  τριακόσιους  όττλιτας  και  —evoKXe'ihav  τον  Eu- 
θυκ\ίου<ί  άρχοντα'  οΐ  κομιζόμενοι  ■χ^αΧε-τώζ  Βια 
τ?}?  τ]7Τ€ΐρον  άφίκοντο,  τα  pev  κατ  Αμττρακίαν 
ούτω?  iyeveTO. 

CXV.  Οί'  δ'  iv  ττ]  ΈικεΧία  ^Αθηναίοι  τον  αυτοΰ 
•χ£ΐμωνο<ί  e?  re  την  Ipepaiav  άττόίΒασιν  βττοιη- 
σαντο  εκ  τών  νεών  μετά  τών  Έ,ικεΧών  των  άνωθεν 
εσβεβΧηκότων  ες   τα   εσχ^ατα   της  Ίμεραίας  και 

2  tVl  τα?  Αιόλου  νήσους  εττΧευσαν.  άναγ^ωρή- 
σαντες  δέ  e?  Ύψ/ιον  ΥΙυθό^ωρον  τον  Ίσολό^γου, 
^Αθηναίων  στρατη^όν,  καταλαμβάνουσιν  εττΐ  τα? 

3  ναυς  Βιά^οχον  ων  ό  Αα';^»^?  ηρχ^εν.  οΐ  yap  iv 
ΈικεΧία  ξύμμαχοι  ττΧεύσαντες  εττεισαν  τους 
*  Αθηναίους  βοηθεΐν  σφίσι  ττΧείοσι  ναυσίν  της 
μεν  yap  yής  αύτων  οι  Έυρακόσιοι  ΐκράτουν,  της 
δε  θαΧάσσης  oXιyaις  νανσΐν  elpyόμεvoL  τταρε- 
σκευάζοντο   ναντικον    ζvvayeιpovτeς  ως  ου  ττερι- 

4  οψημενοί.  καΐ  εττΧήρουν  ναΰς  τεσσαράκοντα  οί 
^Αθηναίοι  ώ?  άτΓΟστεΧοΰντες  αύτοϊς,  άμα  μεν 
ηyoΰμεvoι  θασσον  τον  εκεί  ττόΧεμον  καταΧυθή- 
σεσθαι,  άμα  δέ  βουΧόμενοι  μεΧετην  του  ναυτικού 

5  ΤΓΟίεΙσθαί.  τον  μεν  οΰν  eva  τών  στpaτηyώv  απέ- 
στειλαν ΐΙυθόΒωρον  6XLyaίς  νανσί,  —οφοκΧεα  δε 
τον  ^ωστρατίζου  καΐ  ΚύρνμεΒοντα  τοι•  &ουκΧέους 

6  επΙ  τών  πλειόνων  νεών  άττοττεμψειν  εμεΧΧον.  ό 
δε  ΤΙνθόΒωρος  η8η  έχων  την  του  Αάχητος  τών 
νεών    αρχήν   εττΧενσε   τεΧευτώντος  του  χειμώνας 

204 


BOOK    III.  cxiv.  4-cxv.  6 

after  this  the  Corinthians  sent  to  Ambracia  a 
garrison  of  their  own  troops^  consisting  of  about 
three  hundred  hoplites,  under  the  command  of 
Xenocleidas  son  of  Eutliycles,  who,  making  their 
way  with  difficulty  across  he  mainland,  finally 
reached  their  destination.  Such  was  the  course  of 
events  at  Ambracia. 

CXV.  During  the  same  winter  the  Athenians  in 
Sicily  made  a  descent  from  their  ships  upon  the 
territory  of  Himera,  in  concert  with  the  Sicels 
from  the  interior  who  had  invaded  the  extreme 
border^  of  Himeraea;  and  they  also  sailed  against 
the  islands  of  Aeolus.  Returning  thence  to  Rhe- 
gium,  they  found  tiiat  Pythodorus  son  of  Isolochus, 
an  Athenian  general,  had  come  to  succeed  Laches 
in  command  of  the  fleet.  For  their  allies  in  Sicily 
had  sailed  to  Athens  and  persuaded  them  to  aid 
them  with  a  larger  fleet ;  for  though  their  territory 
was  dominated  by  the  Syracusans,  yet  since  they 
were  kept  from  the  sea  by  only  a  few  ships  they 
were  collecting  a  fleet  and  making  preparations 
with  the  determination  not  to  submit.  And  the 
Athenians  manned  forty  ships  to  send  to  them,  partly 
because  they  believed  that  the  war  in  Sicily  could 
sooner  be  brought  to  an  end  in  this  way,  and  partly 
because  they  wished  to  give  practice  to  their  fleet. 
Accordingly  they  despatciied  one  of  their  generals, 
Pythodorus,  Λvith  a  few  ships,  and  were  planning 
later  on  to  send  Sophocles  son  of  Sostratidas  and 
Eurymedon  son  of  Thucles  with  the  main  body 
of  the  fleet.  Pythodorus,  now  that  he  had  taken 
over  the  command  of  Laches'  ships,  sailed  toward 
the  end  of  the  winter  against  the  Locrian  fort  which 

*  i.e.  toward  the  interior. 

205 


THUCYDIDES 

€7γΙ  to  Κοκρων  φρούριον  ο  Trporepov  Αάχ^ης  elXev 
καΐ  νικηθβΐς  μίίχΐ]  inro  των  Αοκρών  άττεχώρησει». 
CXVI.  Έρρύη  Se  TTepl  αυτό  το  ea/j  τούτο  ό 
ρύαξ  του  'ττνρος  έκ  της  Αϊτνης,  ωσττβρ  και  ττρό- 
Tepov.  καΐ  yrjv  τίνα  βφθειρβ  των  Κ,αταναίων,  οι 
ύπο  Trj   Αϊτντ)    τω    ο  pet  οίκουσιν,  oirep  μί^ιστόν 

2  εστίν  ορός  iv  ττ}  "^ικζΧία.  λεγεταί  δε  ττεντη- 
κοστω  €Τ€ΐ  ρυήναι  τούτο  μβτα  το  ττρότβρον  ρεύμα, 
το  Be  ξύμτταν  τρΙς  yeyevyjaOai  το  ρεύμα  άφ'   ου 

3  Έ,ικεΧια  ύττο  ΕΧΧήνων  οικείται,  ταύτα  μεν  κατά 
τον  -χ^ειμώνα  τούτον  h/ενετο,  καΐ  έκτον  έτος  τω 
ΤΓοΧέμω  ετεΧεύτα  τω8ε  ον  Θουκυδίδης  ξυνε^ρα-^εν. 

^  cf.  ch.  xcix. 

^  The  eruption  of  Aetna  mentioned  in  the  Parian  Marble, 
lii.  67  f.,  as  contemporaneous  with  the  battle  of  Plataea 
(479  B.C.) ;  so  that  the  expression  "  fiftieth  year"  is  not  quite 
exact.     From   his   form  of    expression  in  what  follows,  it 


306 


BOOK    III.  cxv.  6-cxvi.  3 

Laches  had  previously  captured ;  ^  but  he  was 
defeated  in  battle  by  the  Locrians  and  returned  to 
Rhejrium. 

CXVI.  At  the  beginning  of  the  following  spring  425  b. 
the  stream  of  fire  burst  from  Aetna,  as  it  had  on 
former  occasions.  And  it  devastated  a  portion  of 
the  territory  of  the  Catanaeans  Λνΐιο  dwell  on  the 
slope  of  Mount  Aetna,  the  highest  mountain  in 
Sicily.  This  eruption  took  place,  it  is  said,  fifty 
years  after  the  last  preceding  one ;  ^  and  three 
eruptions  all  told  are  reported  to  have  occurred 
since  Sicily  has  been  inhabited  by  the  Hellenes.' 
Such  was  the  course  of  events  in  this  winter,  and 
therewith  ended  the  sixth  year  of  this  war  of  which 
Thucydides  composed  the  history. 

is  clear  that  Thucydides,  when  he  wrote  this  passage,  could 
have  had  no  knowledge  of  an  eruption  later  than  425  B.C. 
He  must  therefore  have  died  before  that  of  396  B.C.  or, 
if  he  lived  after  that  date,  never  revised  this  passage. 

*  i.e.,  since  the  eighth  century;   eee  the  account  at  the 
beginning  of  Book  vi. 


307 


BOOK  IV 


I.  Ύου  δ'  ίτη^ίγ'ομβνου  θβρους  irepl  σίτου  €κ- 
βο\ην  ^υρακοσίων  Ββκα  νή€^  ττΧίύσασαι  και 
ΑοκρίΒβζ  'ίσαι  ^Ιεσσιίνην  την  ev  'S.iKeXia  κατβΧα- 
βον,  αύτων  €^τayayoμevωv,  καΐ  άττβστη  ^Ιεσσήνη 

2  ^Αθηναίων,  βττραξαν  Be  τούτο  μάΧιστα  οι  μεν 
Ί,υρακόσιοί  6ρωντ€^  ττροσβοΧην  €χ^ον  το  γωρίον 
της  ΧικεΧίας  καΐ  φοβούμενοι  τους  \\.θηναίους  μη 
€ζ  αυτού  ορμώμενοι  ττοτβ  σφισι  μβιζονι  τταρα- 
σκευτ)  εττβΧθωσιν,  οι  δε  Αοκροι  κατά  εχθος  το 
'Υη^Ίνων,  βουΧομενοι  άμφοτερωθεν  αυτούς  κατα- 

3  ττοΧεμεΙν.  καΐ  εσεβεβΧήκβσαν  άμα  ες  την  'Ρτ^γί- 
νων  ο'ι  Αοκροι  ττανστρατια,  'ίνα  μη  εττιβοηθώσι 
τοις  ^Ιεσσηνιοις,  αμα  δε  και  ζυνεττα^όντων  'Ρϊ;γι- 
νων  φυ^άΒων,  οι  ήσαν  παρ"  αύτοίς•  το  yap 
'Ρί;γίοζ'  επί.  ττοΧύν  'χρόνον  εστασ'ιαζε  καΐ  άΒύνατα 
ην  εν  τω  τταρόντι  τους  Αοκρούς  άμύνεσθαι,  η  καϊ 

4  μαΧΧον  εττετίθεντο.      Βηώσαντες  δε  οι  μεν  Αοκροι 

τω     ττεζω    άττεχ^ώρησαν,    αϊ    δε    νήες    ^Ιεσσήν7]ν 

εφρούρουν   καϊ  άΧΧαι^   ττΧηρουμεναι  εμεΧΧον  αύ- 

τόσε     εyκaθopμcσάμεvaι     τον     ττόΧεμον    εντεύθεν 

τΓοιησεσθαι. 

^  αί,  in  the  MSS.  before  ■ηλ-ηροίμ.ΐναι,  deleted  by  Classen, 
followed  by  Hude. 

210 


BOOK  IV 

I.  The  next  summer,  about  the  time  of  the  earing  425  b.( 
of  the  grain,  ten  Syracusan  and  as  many  Locrian  ships 
sailed  to  Messene  in  Sicily  and  occupied  it,  going 
thither  on  the  invitation  of  the  inhabitants ;  and 
Messene  revolted  from  Athens.  The  chief  reason  for 
this  act,  on  the  ])art  of  the  Syracusans,  was  that  they 
saw  that  the  place  offex-ed  a  point  of  attack  upon 
Sicily  and  were  afraid  that  the  Athenians  might  some 
time  make  it  a  base  from  which  to  move  against  S^'ra- 
cuse  with  a  larger  force  ;  the  motive  of  the  Locrians 
was  their  hostility  to  the  Rhegians,  Λvhom  they  desired 
to  subdue  by  both  land  and  sea.  And,  indeed,  the 
Locrians  had  at  this  same  time  invaded  the  territory 
of  the  Rhegians  with  all  their  forces  in  order  to 
prevent  them  from  giving  any  aid  to  the  Messenians ; 
and,  besides,  some  Rhegians  who  were  living  in  exile 
among  the  Locrians  also  urged  them  to  make  the 
invasion ;  for  Rhegium  had  for  a  long  time  been  in 
a  state  of  revolution,  and  it  was  impossible  at  the 
moment  to  make  any  defence  against  the  Locrians, 
Λνΐιο  were  consequently  the  more  eager  to  attack. 
The  Locrians  first  ravaged  the  country  and  then 
withdrcAv  their  land  forces,  but  their  ships  continued 
guarding  Messene ;  and  still  other  ships  were  now 
being  manned  to  be  stationed  at  Messene  and  to 
carry  on  war  from  there. 


ail 


THUCYDIDES 

II.  'ΤτΓΟ  δε  Tot?  αυτούς  χρόνους  του  ηρος,  ττρϊν 
τον  σΐτον  €v  άκμτ}  elvai,  Τ\.ζ\θ7Γοννήσίοι  κάΙ  οΐ 
ξύμμαχοι    βσββαΧον    69    την    ^Αττικην   (rjyeiTO    δέ 

Α'γις   ο   'Αρχιδάμου,   ΑακεΖαιμονίων   βασιΧβύς), 

2  καΐ  €'γκαθ€ζόμ€νοί  βΒ^ουν  την  Ύην.  'Αθηναίοι  δέ 
τάς  τ€  τβσσαράκοντα  ναΰς  ές  %iKe\iav  άττεστει- 
Χαν,  ωστΓβρ  τταρβσκευάζοντο,  καΐ  στρατηγούς  τους 
υτΓοΧοίΤΓους  ΚύρυμέΒοντα  καΐ  ^οφοκΧβα'  ΐΐυθό- 
Βωρος  <yap  ο  τρίτος  αυτών  ήΒη  προαφΐκτο  ές  Έ,ικε- 

3  Χίαν.  eiTTov  he  τούτοις  καΐ  Κερκυραίων  αμα 
τταραττΧίοντας  των  ev  ττ}  ττόΧβι  έττιμεΧηθήναί,  ο'ί 
βΧχιστβύοντο  ύττο  των  ev  τω  opei  φυγάδων  καΐ 
ΐΙεΧοποννησίων  αύτόσε  νήες  εξηκοντα  Trapeire- 
ττΧεύκεσαν  τοΙς  ev  τω  opei  τιμωροί  και  Χιμού 
οντος  με^άΧου  εν  ττ)  ττοΧει  νομίζοντες  κατασχη- 

4  σειν  ραδίως  τα  ττρά'^/ματα.  Αημοσθένει  δέ  οντι 
iSicoTrj  μετά  την  άναχωρησιν  την  εζ  Ακαρνανίας 
αύτω  Βεηθεντί  είττον  χρησθαι  ταΐς  νανσϊ  ταύταις, 
ην  βούΧηται,  ττερί  την  ΐΙεΧοπόννησον. 

III.  Και  ώς  i'yivovTO  ττΧέοντες  κατά  την  Αακω- 
νικην  καϊ  εττυνθάνοντο  οτι  αΐ  νήες  ev  Κ,ερκύρα 
ηδη  βίσΐ  των  ΐΙεΧοττοννησίων,  ο  μεν  Έύρυμεδων 
καϊ  ^οφοκΧής  ηττεί^οντο  ες  την  Κερκνραν,  6  δε 
Αημοσθενης  ες  την  ϋύΧον  πρώτον  βκεΧευε  σπόν- 
τας αυτούς  και  ττράξαντας  α  δει  τον  ττΧουν 
ΤΓΟίεΐσθαι•  άντιΧε^όντων  he  κατά  τύχην  χειμών 
ετΓίΎενομενος  κατηνε'^/κε  τάς  ναΰς  εττΐ  την  ΐΙύΧον. 

2  καϊ    ο    Αημοσθενης    βύθύς    tj^lov    τειχίζεσθαι    το 


BOOK    IV.  II.  i-m,  2 

II.  About  the  same  time  that  spring,  before  the 
grain  Avas  ripe,  the  Peloponnesians  and  their  alhes 
made  an  invasion  of  Attica,  under  the  command  of 
Agis  son  of  Archidamus,  king  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians ;  and  encamping  there  they  ravaged  the 
land.  But  the  Athenians  despatched  the  forty  ships  ^ 
to  Sicily,  as  they  liad  previously  planned,  together 
with  the  two  remaining  generals,  Eurymedon  and 
Sophocles,  who  were  still  at  home  ;  for  Pythodorus, 
the  third  general,  had  already  arrived  in  Sicily, 
These  had  instructions,  as  they  sailed  past  Corcyra, 
to  have  a  care  for  the  inhabitants  of  the  city,  who 
were  being  plundered  by  the  exiles  on  the  moun- 
tain,2  and  the  Peloponnesians  Avith  sixty  ships  had 
already  sailed  thither,  with  the  purpose  of  aiding 
the  party  on  the  mountain  and  also  in  the  belief 
that,  since  a  great  famine  prevailed  in  the  city, 
they  Avould  easily  get  control  of  affairs.  Demos- 
thenes also,  who  had  retired  into  private  life  after 
his  return  from  Acarnania,•^  now,  at  his  own  request, 
received  permission  from  the  Athenians  to  use  the 
forty  ships  at  his  discretion  in  operations  about  the 
Peloponnesus. 

III.  Now  Λvhen  the  Athenians  arrived  off  the  coast 
of  Laconia  and  learned  that  the  Peloponnesian  fleet 
was  already  at  Corcyra,  Euryfnedon  and  Sophocles 
were  for  pressing  on  to  Corcyra,  but  Demosthenes 
urged  them  to  put  in  at  Pylos  first,  do  there  what 
was  to  be  done,  and  then  continue  their  voyage. 
They  objected  ;  but  a  storm  came  on,  as  it  happened, 
and  carried  the  fleet  to  Pylos.  And  Demosthenes 
at  once  urged  them  to  fortify  the  place,  as  it  was  for 


*  cf.  III.  cxv.  4.  »  cf.  III.  Ixxxv.  4. 

*  cf.  111.  cxiv.  1. 


213 


THUCYDIDES 

γ^ωρ'ον  (eVi  τούτο  yap  ξυνβκττΧευσαι),  και  tnre- 
φαίνβ  τΓοΧλην  βύττορίαν  ζύΧων  τβ  και  Χιθων  κα\ 
φύσει  καρτήρον  ον  καΐ  βρημον  αύτο  τ€  καΐ  βττΐ 
ΤΓοΧύ  τ/}?  χώρα?•  άπεχ^ει  yap  στα^ιονς  μάΧιστα  η 
Πύλο?  τ?}?  %7Γάρτης  τετρακόσιους  καΐ  βστιν  iv  ttj 
Ί^Ιεσσηνία  ττοτε   οΰστ)   y^,    καΧοΰσι    he   αύτην  οΐ 

3  Αακβ^αιμόνιοι  Κ.ορυφάσίον.  οι  Be  ττοΧΧάς  'έφα- 
σαν  elvai  άκρας  έρημους  της  ΐΙεΧοπονν7ίσου,  ην 
βούΧηταί  καταΧαμβάνων  την  ττοΧιν  Βαττανάν. 
τω  Be  Βιάφορόν  τί  e^ovei  elvai  τούτο  το  ■χωρίον 
έτερου  μαΧΧον,  Χιμενος  τε  προσόντος  και  τους 
^Ιεσσηνίους  οικείους  οντάς  αύτω  το  apy^aiov  καϊ 
ομόφωνους  τοις  ΚακεΒαι μονίοις  ττΧεΙστ  αν  βΧάττ- 
τειν  εξ  αυτού  ορμώμενους  καϊ  β€βαίους  άμα  τού 
'χλωρίου  φύΧακας  εσεσθαι. 

IV.  Ώ?  Be  ουκ  επειθεν  ούτε  τους  στpaτηyoύς 
ούτε  τους  στρατιώτας,  ύστερον  και  τοις  ταξιάρ- 
χοις  κοινώσας,  ησύχ^αζον  ύπο  άττΧοίας,  μέχρι 
αύτοίς  τοις  στρατιώταις  σχοΧάζουσιν   ορμή  ενε- 

2  ττεσε  ττεριστάσιν  εκτειγίσαι  το  χωρίον.  και 
εyχeLpήσavτeς  εlpyάζnvτo,  σιΒήρια  μεν  Χιθουρ^/α 
ουκ  έχοντες,  XoyάBηv  Be  φβροντες  Χίθους,  και 
ξυνετίθεσαν  ώς  εκαστόν  τι  ξυμβαίνοί'  καϊ  τοι 
ΊτηΧόν,  ει  που  Βέοι  χρησθαι,  cLyyείωv  άττορία  εττι 
του  νώτου  εφερον  eyκεκυφότeς  τε,  ώς  μάλιστα 
μεΧΧοι  ετημενειν,  καϊ  τώ  X^lpe  ες  τούττίσω  ξυμ- 


214 


BOOK    IV.  III.  2-iv.  2 

this  purpose  that  he  had  sailed  with  them ;  and  he 
showed  them  that  there  was  at  hand  an  abundance 
of  wood  and  stone,  that  the  position  was  naturally 
a  strong  one,  and  that  not  only  the  place  itself  but 
also  the  neighbouring  country  for  a  considerable 
distance  was  unoccuj)ied ;  for  Pylos  is  about  four 
hundred  stadia  distant  from  Sparta  and  lies  in  the 
land  that  Avas  once  Messenia  ;  but  the  Lacedaemon- 
ians call  the  place  Coryphasium.  Tlie  other  generals 
said  there  ΛνβΓβ  many  unoccupied  headlands  in 
the  Peloponnesus,  Λvhich  he  could  seize  if  he  wished 
to  put  the  city  to  expense.  Demosthenes,  however, 
thought  that  this  place  had  advantages  over  any 
other ;  not  only  was  there  a  harbour  close  by,  but 
also  the  Messenians,  who  originally  owned  this  land 
and  spoke  the  same  dialect  as  the  Lacedaemonians, 
would  do  them  the  greatest  injury  if  they  made  this 
place  their  base  of  operations,  and  would  at  the  same 
time  be  a  trustworthy  garrison  of  it. 

IV.  But  Demosthenes  could  not  win  either  the 
generals  or  the  soldiers  to  his  view,  nor  yet  the  com- 
manders of  divisions  to  whom  he  later  communicated 
his  plan  ;  the  army,  therefore,  since  the  weather  Avas 
unfavourable  for  sailing,  did  nothing.  But  at  length 
the  soldiers  themselves,  having  nothing  to  do,  were 
seized  with  the  impulse  to  station  themselves  around 
the  place  and  fortify  it.  So  they  set  their  hands  to 
this  task  and  went  to  work  ;  they  had  no  iron  tools 
for  working  stone,  but  picked  up  stones  and  put 
them  together  just  as  they  happened  to  fit ;  and 
Λvhere  mortar  was  needed,  for  want  of  hods,  they 
carried  it  on  their  backs,  bending  over  in  such  a 
way  as  would  make  it  stay  on  best,  and  clasping 
both  hands  behind  them  to  prevent  it  from  falling 


THUCYDIDES 

3  ττΛ.β/ίοί'τβ?,  07Γ  J9  μ^η  άττοτητττοι,.  τταντι  re  τρόττω 
ηττεί^/οντο  φθήΐ'αι  τους  ΑακεΒαιμονίους  τα  βττιμα- 
χώτατα  ίζβρ^/ασάμβνοί  ττρΧν  εττιβοηθησαι.  το 
yap  π\€ον  του  -χ^ωρίου  αύτο  καρτερον  ύττήρχ^ε  και 
ovhev  eSei  τείχ^ους.  V.  οι  Be  εορτήν  τίνα  ετυχ^ον 
a'yovTe<;,  καΐ  άμα  ττυνθανομενοι  ev  oXιyωpίa 
eiroiovvTO,  ώ?,  όταν  ε^εΧθωσιν,  ή  ουχ  νττομενοΰν- 
τας  σφας  η  ραΒίως  Χηψόμενοι  βία'  και  rt  καΐ 
αυτούς  6  στρατός  eVt  eV  ταΐς  \\.θηναίς  ων  εττεσ-χ^εν, 

2  τεί'χίσαντες  he  οΐ  \\Οηναΐοί  του  'χλωρίου  τα  ττρος 
ητΓβιρον  καΐ  α  μάΧιστα  eSet  ev  ήμεραις  βξ  τον  μεν 
Αημοσθενη  μετά  νέων  ττεντε  αυτοί)  φύΧακα  κατα- 
ΧείτΓουσι,  ταΐς  Βε  ττΧείοσι,  ναυσΐ  τον  ες  την  Kep- 
κυραν  ττΧοϋν  καΐ  ^ίκεΧίαν  ηττεί^οντο. 

VI.  01  δ'  εν  ττ)  ^Α,ττικτ)  οντες  ΤΙεΧοττοννήσιοι 
ώς  εττύθοντο  της  Πύλου  κατειΧημμενης,  άνεχ^ώ- 
ρουν  κατά  τάχ^ος  eV  οίκου,  νομίζοντες  μεν  οι 
ΑακεΒαιμονίΟί  και  Άγί?  ο  βασιΧευς  οίκεΐον  σφίσι 
το  ττερι  την  ΐΙύΧον  άμα  Βε  ττρω  εσβαΧόντες  και 
του  σίτου  ετι  'χΧωρου  οντος  εσττάνιζον  τροφής 
τοις  ττοΧΧοΐς,  γ^ειμών  τε  εττί^ενόμενος  μείζων  τταρα 
την    καθεστηκυιαν    ωραν    εττίεσε    το    στράτευμα. 

2  ώστε  ττοΧΧαχόθεν  ξυνεβη  άναχ^ωρήσαί  τε  θάσσον 
αυτούς  και  βραχ^υτάτην  γενέσθαι  την  εσβοΧην 
ταύτην  ημέρας  <γάρ  ττεντε  και  Βεκα  έμειναν  εν  ττ} 
Άττικη. 


2ΐ6 


BOOK    IV.  IV.  2-vi.  2 

off.  And  in  every  Λνην  they  made  haste  that  they 
might  comj)lete  the  fortification  of  the  most  vuhier- 
able  points  before  the  Lacedaemonians  came  out 
against  them  ;  for  the  greater  part  of  the  place  was 
so  strong  by  nature  that  it  had  no  need  of  a  wall. 
V.  As  for  the  Lacedaemonians,  they  happened  to  be 
celebrating  a  festival  when  they  got  Λvord  of  the 
undertaking,  and  made  light  of  it,  thinking  that  the 
Athenians  would  not  await  their  attack  when  they 
got  ready  to  take  the  field,  or,  if  they  should,  that 
they  could  easily  take  the  place  by  force ;  and  the 
fact  also  that  their  army  Avas  still  in  Attica  had  some- 
thing to  do  with  their  delay.  The  Athenians  in  six 
days  completed  the  wall  on  the  side  toward  the  land 
and  at  such  other  points  as  most  needed  it,  and  left 
Demostlienes  there  with  five  ships  to  defend  it ; 
they  then  took  the  main  body  of  the  fleet  and 
hastened  on  their  voyage  to  Corcyra  and  Sicily. 

VL  But  the  Peloponnesians  who  were  in  Attica, 
when  they  heard  that  Pylos  had  been  occu])ied,  re- 
turned home  in  haste  ;  for  King  Agis  and  the  Lace- 
daemonians thought  that  the  Athenian  operations  at 
Pylos  Λvere  a  matter  of  deep  concern  to  tiiem.  And 
at  the  same  time,  since  they  had  made  their  invasion 
early  in  the  season  Λvhen  the  grain  was  still  green, 
most  of  them  ^  were  short  of  food,  and  bad  weather, 
M'hich  came  on  Λvith  storms  of  greater  violence  than 
was  to  be  expected  so  late  in  the  spring,  distressed 
the  army.  Consequently  there  were  many  reasons 
Avhy  they  hastened  their  retirement  from  Attica  and 
made  this  the  shortest  of  their  invasions;  for  they 
remained  there  only  fifteen  days. 

'  Each  division  had  its  own  commissariat,  and  some  were 
better  provisioned  than  the  main  body.  Chassen  explains, 
"  were  short  of  food  for  so  large  an  army  "  (to.s  πολλοΐί). 

VOL.   II.  Η        ^^^ 


THUCYDIDES 

VII.  Κατά  δε  τον  αύτον  "χ^ρόνον  2<ιμωνίΒη<; 
^Αθηναίων  στpaτηJO^  ^Ηιόνα  την  eVt  &ράκης 
^Ιενζαυων  άττοίκιαν,  ττοΧβμιαν  δε  ουσαν,  ξυΧΧέ- 
ξα<;  ^Αθηναίους  τε  6XLyou<;  βκ  των  φρουρίων  και 
των  eKeivr]  ξυμμάχ^ων  ττΧήθος  ττροΒιζομβνην  κατέ- 
Χαββν.  καΐ  τταραχ^ρήμα  βτηβοηθησάντων  Χαλ,- 
κιδέων  και  3οτηαίων  βξβκρούσθη  τε  κα\  άπββαΧε 
τΓοΧΧονς  των  στρατιωτών. 

νΐΙΙ.  ^ Αναγ^ωρησάντων  δε  το)ν  €κ  της  Άττί«?}? 
ΐΙβΧοποννησίων  οΐ  Έπαρτιάται  αντοί  μεν  και  οι 
Ιη'^ΰτατα  των  ττεριοίκων  βυθυ<;  ββοήθουν  irrl  την 
Πυλοί/,  των  δε  άΧΧων  Αακε8αιμονίων  βραδύτερα 
ijiyveTO    ή    εξοΒος,    άρτι    άφτ/μενων    αφ"    ετέρας 

2  στρατείας.  ττεριψ/^εΧΧον  δε  κα\  κατά  την  Πελο- 
Ίτόννησον  βοηθείν  οτι  τάγιστα  εττι  ΐΙυΧον  καΐ  εττΐ 
τας  εν  ττ}  Κέρκυρα  ναΰς  σφών  τάς  εζήκοντα 
εττεμψαν,  α'Ι  ύττερενεχθεΐσαι  τον  Αευκα8ίων 
Ισθμον  κα\  Χαθοΰσαι  τας  εν  Ζακύνθω  ^Αττικας 
ναΰς  άφίκν'οΰνται  εττΙ  ΐΙύΧον    τταρην  δε  ηΒη  και  ό 

3  ττεζος  στρατός.  Δημοσθένης  δε  ττροσπΧεόντων 
ετι  των  ΥΙεΧθ7Γθνν7]σίων  ύτΓεκττεμττει  φθάσας  8ύο 
ναΰς  ayyelXai  ΈιύρυμέΒοντι  καΐ  τοις  εν  ταΐς  ναυσίν 
εν  Ζακύνθω  \\.θηναίοις  τταρεΐναι   ώς  του  γ^ωρίου 

4  KivhuveuovTq^.  καΐ  αΐ  μεν  νήες  κατά  τάγ^ος  εττΧεον 
κατα  τα  εττεσταΧμένα  ύττο  Δημοσθένους'  οι  δε 
ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι  τταρεσκευάζοντο  ως  τω  τειχ^ίσ- 
ματί  ττροσβαΧοΰντες  κατά  re  yrjv  καϊ  κατα  θά- 
Χασσαν,  εΧττίζοντες  ρφίως  αίρησειν  οικοδόμημα 
δίά    ταχ^εων    είργασμενον    καϊ    άνθρώττων    6\ίyωv 

2ΐ8 


PLAIN     OF      LYKOS 


'^4\Santa  Rosa 
Α<!•\'  Hi  ^i%  Landing 


PYLOS 

AND    ITS     ENVIROMQ 


SCALE 


?Stad,. 
Mile 


BOOK    IV.  vii.-viii.  4 

VII.  About  the  same  time  Simonides, an  Atlienlan 
general,  getting  together  a  few  Athenians  from  the 
garrisons  in  Thrace  and  a  large  force  from  the  allies 
in  that  neighbourhood,  got,  by  the  treachery  of  its 
inhabitants,  possession  of  Eion  in  Thrace,  a  colony 
of  the  Mendaeans  and  hostile  to  Athens.  But  suc- 
cour came  promptly  from  the  Chalcidians  and  the 
Bottiaeans  and  he  Avas  driven  out  with  the  loss  of 
many  of  his  soldiers. 

VIII.  On  the  return  of  the  Peloponnesians  from 
Attica,  the  Spartans  themselves  and  the  Perioeci\vho 
Λvere  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Pylos  at  once  came  to 
its  relief;  but  the  other  Lacedaemonians  Λvere  slower 
in  coming,  since  they  had  just  got  back  from  another 
campaign.  Word  was  also  sent  round  to  the  states 
of  the  Peloponnesus,  summoning  them  to  come  to 
the  relief  of  Pylos  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  also  to 
the  sixty  ships  that  Λvere  at  Corcyra.^  These  were 
hauled  across  the  Leucadian  isthmus,  and  Avithout 
being  discovered  by  the  Attic  ships,  Avhich  were  now 
at  Zacynthus,  reached  Pylos,  Avhere  their  land  forces 
had  already  arrived.  But  before  the  Peloponnesian 
fleet  had  yet  reached  Pylos,  Demosthenes  managed  to 
send  out  secretly  ahead  of  them  two  ships  which 
were  to  notify  Eurymedon  and  the  Athenian  fleet 
at  Zacynthus  to  come  at  once  to  his  aid,  as  the  place 
was  in  danger.  And  so  the  fleet  proceeded  in  haste 
in  compliance  with  Demosthenes'  summons  ;  mean- 
\vhile,  however,  the  Lacedaemonians  Λvere  busy  Avith 
their  preparations  to  attack  the  fortification  both  by 
land  and  by  sea,  and  they  thought  that  they  Avould 
have  no  dirticultv  in  capturing  a  structure  which  had 
been  built  hastily  and  was  occupied  by  only  a  few 

1  cf.  ch.  ii.  3. 

219 


THUCYDIDES 

5  ζνόντων.  ττροσΒεχόμβνοί  δε  την  άττο  τή<;  Ζακύν- 
θου των  Αττικών  νβών  βοήθβιαν  iv  νω  είχον,  ην 
αρα  μη  ττροτερον  eXojai,  και  τους  βσττΧους  του 
Χιμβνος  βμφάρξαι,  όπως  μη  η  τοις  ^Αθηναίοις 
εφορμίσασθαι  βς  αυτόν. 

6  Ή  yap  νήσος  ή  Έ,φακτηρία  καΧουμενη  τον  τ€ 
Χιμένα,  τταρατείνουσα  καΐ  iyyύς  ίτηκβιμ&νη,  €χυ- 
ρον  7Γ016Ϊ  καΐ  τους  ^σττΧους  στβνούς,  ttj  μεν  8υοΐν 
veotv  ΒιάττΧουν  κατά  το  τξί-χ^ισμα  των  'Αθηναίων 
καΐ  την  Πυλοί',  τη  δε  ττρος  την  αΧΧην  ηττειρον 
οκτώ  ή  ivvea•  ύΧώΒης  τε  καΐ  άτριβης  ττασα  υπ 
€ρημίας    ην    καΐ    μeyeθoς    ττερί    ττβντβ    κα\    Βεκα 

7  στα^ίους  μάΧιστα.  τους  μβν  ούν  ^σπΧους  ταΐς 
ναυσίν  άντιπρωροις  βύζην  KXyjaeiv  βμεΧΧον  την 
δέ   νήσον    ταύτην   φοβούμενοι   μη    €ξ    αυτής    τον 

^  The  harbour  of  Pylos  is  regaided  bj'  Classen  and  nearly 
all  recent  commentators  as  identical  with  the  modern  Bay  of 
NaΛ'arino,  the  ίσπληι  τοΰ  \ιμ(ΐ'05  being  the  entrances  north 
and  south  of  Sphacteria  or  Sphagia.  But  the  entrance  to 
the  harbour  of  Navarino  south  of  8phagia  is  now — and  must 
have  been  in  Tliucydides'  time — a  channel  more  than  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  Λvide.  and  deep  all  the  way  across,  so  that 
it  does  not  answer  to  Thucydides'  description  of  a  passage 
only  wide  enough  to  admit  eight  or  nine  triremes  ;  rather, 
as  Arnold  says,  "a  hundred  Greek  ships  miglit  have  found 
room  to  sail  abreast  quite  as  easily  as  eiglit  or  nine." 
Clearly,  then,  Thucydides  could  not  have  been  personally 
acquainted  with  the  scene,  and  was  misinformed  as  to  the 
breadth  of  the  harbour's  mouth,  as  Leake  supposed.  Or  we 
must  assume  that  the  dimensions  of  the  entrances  mentioned 
by  Thuc3'dides  were  rather  of  those  north  and  south  of 
Coryphasium,  the  modern  Palaeo-Kastro,  and  the  "  har- 
bour "  was  not  the  Bay  of  Navarino,  as  Thucydides  sup- 


BOOK    IV.  VIII.  4-7 

men.  But  since  they  expected  the  Athenian  fleet 
to  arrive  soon  from  Zacynthus,  it  was  their  intention, 
in  case  they  should  fail  to  take  the  place  before 
these  came,  to  block  up  the  entrances  to  the  harbour 
and  thus  make  it  impossible  for  the  Athenians  to 
anchor  inside  and  blockade  them. 

Now  the  island  called  Sphacteria  stretches  along 
the  mainland,  lying  quite  close  to  it,  and  thus  makes 
the  harbour  safe  and  the  entrances  to  it  narrow  ; 
on  one  side,  opposite  the  Athenian  fortifications 
and  Pylos,  there  is  only  room  for  two  ships  to  pass 
through,  on  the  other  side,  next  to  the  other  part 
of  the  mainland,  there  is  room  for  eight  or  nine.^ 
The  Λvhole  island  was  covered  with  timber  and,  since 
it  was  uninhabited,  had  no  roads,  its  length  being 
somewhere  near  fifteen  stadia.  Now  it  was  the 
intention  of  the  Lacedaemonians  to  close  up  the 
entrances  tight  by  means  of  ships  placed  Avith  their 
prows  outward  ;  and  as  for  the  island,  since  they 
were  afraid    that    the    Athenians   would    use    it   as 

posed,  but  the  Lagoon  or  Lake  of  Osniyn  Aga,  north  of  the 
bay,  and  now  cut  off  from  it  by  a  sandbar.  This  is  the  view 
of  Grundy — who  in  August,  1895,  spent  fourteen  days  there 
making  a  survey — as  to  the  lower  entrance.  The  upper 
entrance,  he  thinks,  was  closed  already  in  Thucydides'  time, 
and  the  historian  seems  never  to  have  apprehended  that 
fact.  Gruiidj''s  view  as  to  the  lagoon  being  the  harbour 
meant  by  Tliucydides  is  accepted  by  Steup,  but  he  does  not 
approve  of  Grundy's  assumption  that  Thucydides,  Avithout 
personal  knowledge  of  the  region,  following  at  different 
points  reports  of  dififerent  informants,  confused  statements 
with  reference  to  tlie  harbour  of  Pylos  and  as  to  the  bay  as 
referring  to  one  and  the  same.  See  Arnold  in  App.  to 
Book  IV.  on  Spliacteria ;  Grundy,  "Investigation  of  the 
Topography  of  the  Region  of  Sphacteria  and  P3'Ios,"  in 
Journal  of  Helien.  Studies,  xvi.  1-54  ;  Steup,  Δρρ.  on  iv. 
viii.  5. 


THUCYDIDES 

ΊτόΧβμον    σφίσι    ττοιώνται,,    όττ\ίτα^    Βίεβίβασαν 
ες  αύτην  καΐ  τταρά  την  ηττβιρον  αΧΧους    έταζαν 

8  οΰτω  •yap  τοις  ^ Αθηναίοις  τι']ν  τε  vPjaov  ττοΧεμίαν 
εσεσθαι  την  τε  ηττειρον  άττόβασιν  ουκ  εχουσαν 
(τα  yap  αυτής  της  Πύλου  εζω  του  βσττΧου  ττρος 
το  ττελαγο?  αΚιμενα  οντά  ουχ^  εζείν  όθεν  ορμώ- 
μενοι ώφεΧησουσί  τους  αυτών),  σφεΐς  δε  άνευ  τε 
ναυμα-χίας  καΐ  κινδύνου  εκττοΧιορκησειν  το  χ^ωρίον 
κατά  το  εΙκός,  σίτου  τε  ουκ  ενόντος  καΐ  Sl    6\LJης 

9  παρασκευής  κατείΧημμενον.  ώς  δ'  εΒόκεί  αύτοΐς 
ταύτα,  καΐ  Βιεβίβαζον  ες  την  νήσον  τους  όττΧίτας 
άτΓοκΧηρώσαντες  άττο  τταντων  τών  Χοχ^ων.  καΐ 
8ΰεβησαν  μεν  καΐ  άΧΧοι  ττροτερον  κατά  δ^αδο^ϊ/ι^, 
οΐ  he  τεΧευταΐοί  καΐ  ε^κατα\ηφθεντες  είκοσι  καϊ 
τετρακόσιοι  ήσαν  καϊ  Είλωτες  οΐ  ττερϊ  αυτούς' 
ηρχ6  δ'  αυτών  ^Έιττιτάδας  6  ΜοΧόβρου. 

IX.   Αημοσθενΐ]ς  8ε  ορών  τους  ΑακεΒαιμονίους 

μεΧΧοντας  ττροσβάΧΧειν  ναυσί  τε  άμα  καϊ  ττεζω, 

Ίταρεσκευάζετο    καϊ    αυτός,  καϊ   τας    τριήρεις    αΐ 

ττεριήσαν   αύτω   άπο   τών   καταΧειφθεισών    άνα- 

σττάσας    υττο    το    τείχισμα    προσεσταύρωσε,    καϊ 

τους  ναύτας  εξ  αυτών  ώττΧίσεν  άσττίσί  ^  φαυΧαις 

καΐ  οίσυίναις  ταΐς  ττοΧΧαΐς•   ου   yap  ην  οττΧα  εν 

'χωρίω    ερημω    ττορίσασθαι,  άλλα    καϊ  ταύτα  εκ 

^  τ6,  after  άσιτίσί  iu  the  MSS. ,  deleted  by  Hude  as  not 
read  by  Suidas. 

*  i.e.,  north  of  the  entrance,  on  the  western  side. 

*  Only  three :  uve  had  been  left  him  (eh.  v.  2),  but  two  of 
these  he  had  sent  to  warn  the  squadron  at  Zacynthus. 

22a 


BOOK    IV.  VIII.  7-ix.  i 

a  base  for  carrying  on  the  Avar  against  them,  they 
conveyed  some  hoplites  across,  at  the  same  time 
posting  others  along  the  mainland.  By  these 
measures,  they  thought,  the  Athenians  would  find 
not  only  the  island  hostile  to  them,  but  also  the 
mainland,  since  this  afforded  no  landing-place  ;  for 
there  were  no  harbours  along  the  shore  of  Pylos 
itself  outside  the  entrance,^  on  the  side  toAvard  the 
sea,  and  tlierefore  the  Athenians  would  have  no 
base  from  which  they  could  aid  their  countrynien. 
Consequently  the  Lacedaemonians  believed  that, 
without  running  the  risk  of  a  battle  at  sea,  they 
could  probably  reduce  the  place  by  siege,  since  it 
had  been  occupied  on  short  notice  and  \vas  not  sup- 
plied with  provisions.  As  soon  as  they  reached  this 
conclusion  they  proceeded  to  convey  the  hoplites 
over  to  the  island,  drafting  them  by  lot  from  all 
the  companies.  Several  detachments  had  before 
this  time  crossed  over,  one  group  relieving  another  ; 
the  last  to  do  so — and  this  is  the  force  that  was 
captured — numbering  four  hundred  and  tAventy, 
besides  the  Helots  who  accompanied  them,  and 
they  were  under  the  command  of  Epitadas  son  of 
Molobrus. 

IX.  MeanAvhile  Demosthenes  also,  seeing  that  the 
Lacedaemonians  intended  to  attack  him  by  sea  and 
by  land  at  the  same  time,  set  about  making  his 
preparations.  He  drew  ashore,  close  up  under  the 
fortification,  the  triremes  '^  remaining  to  him  out  of 
tliose  which  had  been  left  in  his  charge  and  en- 
closed them  in  a  stockade  ;  he  then  armed  their 
crcAvs  with  shields— poor  ones,  indeed,  most  of  which 
Avere  made  of  plaited  willow  ;  for  it  was  not  possible 
to  procure  arms  in  an  uninhabited  country,  and  such 

223 


THUCYDIDES 

\τ)στρικής  Ήίεσσηνίων  τριακοντερου  καϊ  κέΧητο^ 
€\αβον,  οΐ  €τυχον  παρα^βνόμβνοι.  όττΧϊταί  re 
των    Μ.€σσηνίων  τούτων    ώ?    τβσσαράκοντα    eye' 

2  νοντο,  0ί9  ixpTjTo  ^era  των  αΧΚων.  τους  μίν 
ουν  ττοΧλους  των  τε  άοττΧων  και  ωττΧισ μίνων  ev\ 
τα  τereιχισμeva  μάΧίστα  καϊ  e^vpa  του  γ^αψίου 
ττρος  την  }']7Teipov  βταξε,  irpoeiTTcov  αμύνασθαι 
τον  π€ζόν,  ην  ττροσβάΧτ)•  αύτος  Se  ά^τo\eξάμevo<i 
€Κ  Ίτάντων  ίξήκοντα  οττλί,τα?  καϊ  τοξότα<ϊ  6\Lyou<; 
ey^aipeL  έ'^ω  του  τίίχ^ους  eVl  την  θαΚασσαν,  τ) 
μάΧιστα  έκβίνους  ττροσεΒεχ^ετο  Treipaaeiv  άττο- 
βαίνβί,ν,  69  χωρία  μίν  xaXeTra  καϊ  ττετρώΒη  ττρος 
το  ττελαγο?  τετραμμένα,  σφίσο  δέ  του  TeLxou^ 
ταύττ]  άσθβνεστάτου  οντο<;  έσβιάσασθαι  ^  αύτού<; 

3  7'p/eLT0  προθυμησεσθαι•  ούτε  <γάρ  αύτοΙ  iXiri- 
ζοντές  ΤΓΟτε  ναυσΐ  κρατησεσθαι  ουκ  Ισχυρον 
€Τ€ίχιζον,  eKeivoi^  re  βιαζομίνοις  την  άττόβασιν 

4  άΧώσιμον  το  χωρίον  yLyveaOat.  κατά  τούτο  ουν 
7rp6<i  αύτην  την  θάΧασσαν  χωρησα<^  €ταξε  τους 
όπΧίτας  ώ?  εϊρζων,  ην  ^ύνηται,  καϊ  rrapeKeXeo- 
σατο  ToiaBe. 

Χ.  ""AvSpeς  οι  ξυναράμενοί  τοΟδε  του  κινδύ- 
νου, μηΒίΙς  υμών  ev  τη  TOiaSe  avayKr]  ξυνετος 
βουΧβσθω  Βοκβΐν  elvai,  eκXoyιζόμevo(;  άτταν  το 
ττεριεστος  ήμας  Seivov,  μάΧΧον  η  άττερισκέτττως 
eveX7ri<i  όμόσε  χωρήσαι  τοις  εναντίοις  καϊ  έκ 
τούτων   αν  7Γepιyevόμevoς.      όσα  yap   eV   άvάyκηv 

^  ίσβίάσασθ^ι :  80  Hude,  after  Leeuwen,  for  ίνίσπάσασθαί. 
224 


BOOK    IV.  IX.  I -χ.  I 

as  they  liad  they  took  from  a  thirty-oared  privateer 
and  a  light  boat  belonging  to  some  Messenians  who 
chanced  to  come  along,  and  included  among  them 
about  forty  hoplites,  whom  Demosthenes  used  along 
with  the  rest.  He  then  posted  the  greater  part 
of  his  troops,  the  unarmed  as  well  as  the  armed,  at 
the  best  fortified  and  strongest  points  of  the  place, 
on  the  side  toward  the  mainland,  giving  them  orders 
to  ward  off  the  enemy's  infantry  if  it  should  attack. 
But  he  himself  selected  from  the  whole  body  of 
his  troops  sixty  hoplites  and  a  few  archers,  and 
with  them  salHed  forth  from  the  fort  to  the  point 
on  the  seashore  where  he  tliought  that  the  enemy 
would  be  most  likely  to  attempt  a  landing.  The 
ground,  indeed,  was  difficult  of  access  and  rocky 
where  it  faced  the  sea,  yet  since  the  Athenian 
wall  was  \veakest  at  this  place  the  enemy  would, 
he  thought,  be  only  too  eager  to  make  an  assault 
tliere  ;  in  fact  the  Athenians  themselves  had  left 
their  fortification  weak  at  this  spot  merely  because 
they  never  expected  to  be  defeated  at  sea,  and 
Demosthenes  knew  that  if  the  enemy  could  force 
a  landing  there  the  place  could  be  taken.  Accordingly 
he  posted  his  hoplites  at  this  point,  taking  them  to 
the  very  brink  of  the  sea,  determined  to  keep  the 
enemy  off  if  he  could  ;  and  then  he  exhorted  them 
as  follows  : 

X.  "  Soldiers,  my  comrades  in  this  present 
hazard,  let  no  one  of  you  at  such  a  time  of  necessity 
seek  to  prove  his  keenness  of  wit  by  calculating  the 
full  extent  of  the  danger  that  encompasses  us  ;  let 
him  rather  come  to  grips  with  the  enemy  in  a  spirit 
of  unreflecting  confidence  that  he  will  survive  even 
these  perils.      For  whenever  it  has   come,  as   now 

225 


THUCYDIDES 

άφΐκται   ωσττβρ   rc'iSe,    ΧοΎΐσμον   ήκιστα   et'Se^o- 

2  μένα,  κινδύνου  του  τα'χίστου  ττροσΒεΐται.  e'yoi  he 
καϊ  τα  ττΧβίω  όρώ  ττρο?  ημών  οντά,  ην  εθεΧωμεν  ye 
μβΐναι  καϊ  μη  τω  7r\7']0ei  αυτών  KaTawXayevre'i 
τα     νττάρχοντα     ημίν     κρείσσω     καταττροζοΰναι. 

3  τον  τ€  yap  •χλωρίου  το  Βυσεμβατον  ημετερον 
νομίζω,  ο  ^  μενόντων  μεν  ημών  ξύμμα-χον  γίγ^^' 
ται,  ΰτΓοχωρησασί  ^  he  καίττερ  γ^αΧεττον  ον  ev- 
ΤΓορον  εσται  μηΖενο'ζ  κωΧύοντο<;,  καϊ  τον  ττόΧεμιον 
Βεινότερον  εξομεν  μη  ραΒίας  αύτω  πάΧιν  ονση<; 
τη<;  άνα'χ^ω ρήσεων,  ην  καϊ  ύφ'  τ}μών  βιάζηται•  εττΐ 
yap  ταΐ<ί  ναυσΐ  ραστοί  είσιν  άμννεσθαι,  αϊτο- 
ί βάντες  δ'  εν  τω  ϊσω  ήΒη.   τό  τε  ττΧήθος  αυτών  ουκ 

ayav  Set  φοβεΐσθαί'  κατ  oXiyov  yap  μα-χ^εΐται 
καίττερ  ττοΧύ  ον  απορία  της  προσορμίσεως,  καϊ 
ουκ  εν  yfj  στρατός  εστίν  εκ  του  όμοιου  μείζων, 
άλΧ'  άττό  νεών,  αίς  ττοΧΧα  τα  καίρια  Βεΐ  εν  τη 
5  θαΧάσστ)  ξυμβηναι.  ώστε  τας  τούτων  άττοριας 
άντιττάΧους  ιρ/ούμαί  τω  ημετερω  ττ'Χηθεί,  καΐ  άμα 
άξιώ  υμάς,  ^Αθηναίους  οντάς  και  επισταμένους 
εμπειρία  την  ναυτικην  eV  άΧΧους  άποβασιν  ότι, 
€1  τις  ύπομενοί  καϊ  μη  φόβω  ροθίου  καϊ  νεών 
δεινότητας  κατάπΧου  ύποχ^ωροίη,  ουκ  αν  ποτέ 
βιάζοιτο,  και  αυτούς  νυν  μεΐναί  τε  καϊ  άμννομε- 

1  ο,  Dion.  Hal.,  MSS.  omit. 

-  ύποχαιρήσασι,  tlie  genitive  Λνα3  to  be  exjiected  after 
μΐνάντων,  and  Poppo  conjecturea  ύποχωρησάντων.  It  is 
dative  of  relation. 

220 


BOOK    IV.  χ.  1-5 

with  us,  to  a  case  of  necessity,  where  there  is  no  room 
for  reflection,  Avhat  is  needed  is  to  accept  the  hazard 
with  the  least  possible  delay.  Ho\vever,  as  I  seethe 
matter,  the  odds  are  on  our  side,  if  we  are  resolved 
to  stand  our  ground  and  are  not  so  terrified  by 
their  numbers  as  to  sacrifice  the  advantages  we 
possess.  As  regards  the  ])osition,  the  difficulty  of 
approach  I  regard  as  in  our  favour,  since  if  we  stand 
firm  that  becomes  a  support,  but  once  we  give  way, 
even  though  the  ground  be  rugged  it  will  be  easy  of 
access  Avhen  there  is  none  to  resist ;  and  Λνε  shall 
then  find  the  enemy  more  formidable,  since  it  Avill 
be  no  easy  matter  for  them  to  turn  and  retreat,  if 
they  should  be  hard-pressed  by  us ;  for  though  very 
easily  repelled  while  on  board  tlieir  ships,  when  once 
they  have  landed  they  are  on  an  equal  footing  with 
us.  And,  as  regards  their  numbers,  we  need  have 
no  very  great  fear;  for  however  numerous  they  are, 
they  will  have  to  fight  in  small  detachments  on  ac- 
count of  the  dirticulty  of  bringing  their  ships  to 
shore.  And  we  have  not  to  deal  with  an  army, 
which,  though  superior  in  numbers,  is  fighting  on 
land  under  like  conditions  with  ourselves,  but  fight- 
ing on  ships,  and  these  require  many  favouring  cir- 
cumstances on  the  sea.i  I  therefore  consider  that 
their  disadvantages  counterbalance  our  inferiority 
in  point  of  numbers.  At  the  same  time  I  call  now 
upon  you,  Avho  are  Athenians  and  know  by  ex- 
perience that  it  is  imjiossible  to  force  a  landing 
from  ships  against  an  enemy  on  shore,  if  the 
latter  but  stand  their  ground  and  do  not  give 
way  through  fear  of  the  splashing  oars  and  of  the 
awe-inspiring  sight  of  ships  bearing  down  upon 
them — I  call  upon  you,  in  your  turn  to  stand  your 
'  e.g.  a  fair  wind,  space  for  maiiujuvring,  etc. 


THUCYDIDES 

νον^    Trap    αυτήν    την    ραχίαν    σωζ€ΐν    νμας    re 
αυτούς  καΐ  το  χ^ωρων.' 

XI.  Ύοσαΰτα  του  ^ημοσθ€νου<;  παρακβΧευσα- 
μενου  οι  Αθηναίοι  βθαρσησάν  τε  μαΚΧον  και 
€7Γΐκαταβάντ€<;  ετάζαντο  ιταρ    αυτήν  την  θαλ,ασ- 

2  σαν.  οι  δε  Αακεδαιμόνιοι  αραντες  τω  τε  κατά 
ιγήν  στρατω  ττροσεβαΧλ,ον  τω  τειχισματι  και 
τα?9  ναυσίν  αμα  οΰσαι<ί  τεσσαρακοντα  και  τρισι, 
ναύαρΎος  he  αυτών  εττεττΧει  @ρασυμ7]\ώα<;  ο 
ΚρατησικΧεους,     Έ,τταρτιάτης.      ιτροσεβαΧλε    Be 

3  ^ττερ  6  Αημοσθένη<;  ττροσεΖεχετο.  καΐ  οΐ  μεν 
^Αθ-ηναΐοι  άμφοτέρωθεν,  εκ  τε  yή<;  καΐ  εκ  θαΧάσ- 
σ7]<;,  -ημύνοντο'  οι  δε  κατ  6\iya<;  ναΰ<;  8ιε\όμενοι, 
8ιότι  ουκ  ην  ττ\είοσι  ττροσσ'χε'ίν,  καΐ  άναπαύοντες 
εν  τω  μέρει  τους  εττίττΧους  εποιονντο,  προθυμία 
τ€  ττάση  'χρώμενοι  καΐ  τταρακεΧευσμω,  ει  ττω? 
ώσάμενοι  eXoiev  το  τείχισμα.     πάντων  Be  φανε- 

4  ρώτατος  Βρασίδας  iyeveTO.  τριήραρχων  yap  και 
όρων  του  χωρίου  χαΧεττοΰ  οντος  τους  τριήραρχους 
και  κυβερνήτας,  ει  που  καΐ  Βοκοίη  δυνατόν  είναι 
σχεΐν,  άποκνοΰντας  καΐ  φυΧασσ  ο  μένους  των  νεών 
μη  ξυντρίψωσιν,  ε  βόα  Xeyωv  ώς  ουκ  είκο^  εϊη 
ξύΧων  φειΒομενους  τους  ποΧεμιους  εν  τη  χωρά 
περίίΒεΙν  τείχος  πεποιημενους,  αλλά  τάς  τε  σφε- 
τερας  ναΰς  βιαζημενους  την  άπόβασιν  KaTayvu- 
ναι  εκεΧευε  καΐ  τους  ξυμμάχους  μη  άποκνήσαι 
άντΙ  μεyάXωv  εύεpyeσιώv  τας  ναΰς  τοις  ΑακεΒαι- 
μονίοις  εν  τω  παρόντι  επιΒουναι,  όκείΧαντας  δε 
κα\  τταντϊ  τρόπω  άποβάντας  των  τε  ανδρών  καΐ 

228 


BOOK    IV.  χ.  c-xi.  4 

ground,  and,  warding  oii  liie  foe  at  the  very  water's 
edge,  to  save  both  yourselves  and  the  strongliold." 

XL  Thus  encouraged  by  Demosthenes,  the  Athen- 
ians became  yet  more  confident  and  going  still 
nearer  the  water  took  up  their  position  at  the  very 
brink  of  the  sea.  The  Lacedaemonians,  on  the 
other  hand,  moved  forward,  and  attacked  the  forti- 
fication at  the  same  time  with  their  land-army  and 
with  their  ships,  of  which  there  were  forty-three,  the 
admiral  in  connnand  of  them  being  Thrasymelidas 
son  of  Cratesicles,  a  Spartan.  And  he  attacked  just 
where  Demosthenes  expected.  The  Athenians,  on 
their  part,  proceeded  to  defend  themselves  in  both 
directions,  by  land  and  by  sea ;  but  the  enemy, 
dividing  their  ships  into  small  detachments,  because 
it  was  impossible  for  a  larger  number  to  approach 
the  shore,  and  resting  by  turns,  kept  charging  upon 
the  Athenians,  showing  no  lack  of  zeal  and  cheering 
each  other  on,  in  the  hope  that  they  might  force  the 
enemy  back  and  take  the  fortification.  Brasidas 
showed  himself  most  conspicuous  of  all.  Being 
captain  of  a  galley,  he  noticed  that  the  captains  and 
pilots,  because  the  shore  was  rocky,  were  inclined  to 
hesitate  and  be  careful  of  their  ships,  even  when  it 
seemed  to  be  practicable  to  make  a  landing,  for  fear 
of  dashing  them  to  pieces.  He  would  therefore  shout 
that  it  ill  became  them  through  being  thrifty  of 
timber  to  allow  their  enemy  to  have  built  a  fort  in 
their  country  ;  nay,  he  urged,  they  must  break  their 
own  ships  so  as  to  force  a  landing  ;  and  the  allies 
he  bade,  in  return  for  great  benefits  received  from 
the  Lacedaemonians,  not  to  shrink  from  making 
them  a  free  gift  of  their  shi~>s  in  the  present  emer- 
gency, but  to  run  them  aground,  get  ashore  in  any 

329 


THUCYDIDES 

τον  χω/otou  κρατήσαι.  XII.  καΐ  6  μβν  τους  Τ6 
αΧΧους  τοιαύτα  ίττίσ-ττερ-χβ  καΐ  τον  εαυτού  κυβερ- 
νητην  avayKaaa<;  oKetXai  την  ναύν  e^copei  eVl 
την  ατΓοβάθραν  καΐ  ττειρώμεΐ'ος  άττοβαίνειν  ave- 
κόττη  ύτΓΟ  των  ^Αθηναίων,  καΐ  τραυματισθείς 
7Γθλ?ν,ά  έΧίΤΓοψυχ^ησύ  τε  καΐ  ττβσοντο'ί  αυτού  e? 
την  τταρεξβιρεσίαν  η  ασττις•  ττβριβρρύη  ες  την 
θάλασσαν,  κα\  εζενεχθείσης  αυτής  ες  την  yr]V  οι 
'Αθηναίοι  άνεΧόμενοι  ύστερον  ττρος  το  τροτταΐον 
εγ^ρησαντο  ο  εστ7]σαν  της  -προσβοΧής  ταύτης. 

2  Οί  δ'  αΧλ,οι  προυθυμουντο  μεν,  αδύνατοι  δ'  ήσαν 
ατΓοβήναι    των   τε  'χλωρίων   χαλβ7Γ0Τ7;τί   κα\   των 

3  Αθηναίων  μενόντων  και  ούΒεν  υττο'χωρουντων.  ες 
τοΰτό  τε  ττεριεστη  η  τύχΐ]  ώστε  ^Αθηναίους  μεν  εκ 
•γης  τε  καΐ  ταύτης  Αακωνικής  άμύνεσθαι  εκείνους 
επιπΧεοντας,  ΑακεΒαιμονιους  δέ  εκ  νέων  τε  καΐ  ες 
την  εαυτών  ττοΧεμιαν  ούσαν  επ  ' Αθηΐ'αιους  άπο- 
βαίνειν  ετΓΐ  ποΧύ  yap  εττοίει  της  δόξης  εν  τω 
τότ6  τοις  μεν  ηττειρώταις  μάΧιστα  είναι  καΐ  τα 
ττεζα  κρατίστοις,  τοις  Βε  θαΧασσίοις  τε  καΐ  ταΐς 
νανσΐ  πΧεΐστον  ττρονχειν. 

XIII.  Ύαύτην  μεν  ούν  την  ημεραν  καΐ  της 
ύστεραίας  μέρος  τι  ττροσβοΧας  ττοιησάμενοι  εττε- 
τταυντο'  και  τη  τρίτη  εττΐ  ξύΧα  ες  μηχανας  τταρε- 
•πεμψαν  των  νεών  τινας  ες  Άσινην,  εΧττίζοντες  το 
κατά  τον  Χιμενα  τεΐ^ζος  ΰ^ψος  μεν  εχ^ον,  άττο. 
2  βάσεως  δε  μάΧιστα  ούσης  εΧεΐν  αν  ■'  μηχ^αναΐς.  εν 
τούτω  δε  α'ι  εκ  της  Ζακύνθου  νήες  των  ^Αθηναίων 

1  tiu  added  by  Madvig. 
330 


BOOK    IV.  XI.  4-xin.  2 

way  they  could,  and  master  both  the  men  and  the 
place.  XII.  And  he  not  only  urged  on  the  rest  in 
this  way,  but,  compelling  his  own  pilot  to  beach  his 
ship,  he  made  for  the  gangway  ;  and  in  trying  to 
land  he  was  knocked  back  by  the  Athenians,  and 
after  receiving  many  wounds  fainted  away.  As  he 
fell  into  the  forward  part  of  the  ship  his  shield 
slipped  off  into  the  sea,  and,  being  carried  ashore, 
was  picked  up  by  the  Athenians,  who  afterward 
used  it  for  the  trophy  Avhich  they  set  up  in  com- 
memoration of  this  attack. 

The  crews  of  the  other  Peloponnesian  ships  showed 
no  lack  of  zeal,  but  were  unable  to  land,  both  by 
reason  of  the  difficulty  of  the  ground  and  because  the 
Athenians  stood  firm  and  would  not  give  Λvay  at  all. 
In  such  fashion  had  fortune  swung  round  that  the 
Athenians,  fighting  on  land,  and  Laconian  land  at 
that,  Avere  trying  to  ward  off  a  Lacedaemonian  attack 
from  the  sea,  while  the  Lacedaemonians,  fighting  in 
ships,  were  trying  to  effect  a  landing  upon  their  own 
territory,  now  hostile,  in  the  face  of  the  Athenians. 
For  at  this  time  it  Avas  the  special  renoAvn  ot  the 
Lacedaemonians  that  they  were  a  land  power  and 
invincible  with  their  army,  and  of  the  Athenians  that 
they  \vere  seamen  and  vastly  superior  Avith  their 
fleet. 

XIII.  After  making  attacks  that  day  and  part  of 
the  next  the  Peloponnesians  desisted.  On  the  third 
day  they  sent  some  of  the  ships  to  Asine  for  Avood 
Avith  which  to  make  engines,  hoping  that  by  means 
of  engines  they  should  be  able  to  take  the  wall 
opposite  tlie  harbour  in  spite  of  its  height,  since  here 
it  was  quite  practicable  to  make  a  landing.  Mean- 
while, the  Athenian  fleet  from   Zacynthus  arrived, 

231 


THUCYDIDES 

TrapayiyvovTac  7Γ€ντηκοντα'     ττ ροσεβοηθησαν  yap 
των  re  φρονρίΒων  tiv€<;  αντοΐς  των  βκ  Κανπάκτου 

3  καΐ  ΧΓαί  τέσσαρες,  ώ?  δε  elhov  την  Τ€  ηττβιρον 
όττΧίτών  τΓβρίττΧεων  την  τε  νήσον,  ev  τε  τω  Xipevc 
οΰσα<ϊ  τα?  ναΰ<;  και  ουκ  eKTrXeovaaf,  αττορήσαντζς 
07777  καθορμίσωνται,  τότε  pev  €<?  ΐίρωτην  την 
νήσον,  ή  ου  ττοΧύ  άττε^εί  έρημα  ούσα,  eirXevaav 
καΐ  ηύΧίσαντο,  ττ)  δ'  ΰστεραια  τταρασκευασάμενοι 
ώς  €7Γΐ  ναυμαγίαν  ανηηοντο,  ην  μβν  άντβκττΧβΙν 
ΐθεΧωσι  σφίσιν  ε?  την  εύρυχ^ωρίαν,  el  δε  μη,  ώς 
αυτοί  ετΓβσττΧευσούμενοι. 

4  Και  οΐ  μβν  ούτε  άντανη^οντο  ούτε  α  διενοηθη- 
σαν,  φάρζαί  τού<ί  εσττΧους,  ετνχ^ον  ποίήσαντε^, 
ησυχάζοντ€<;  δ'  ev  τη  yfj  τας  τε  ναϋ<ί  εττΧηρουν 
καΧ  τταρεσκευάζοντο,  i)v  ε'σττλε'τ;  τίς,  ώς  iv  τω 
Χιμβνι  οντι  ου  σμικρω  νανμαχ^ήσοντες.  XIV.  οΐ  δ' 
Αθηναίοι  '^/νοντβς  καθ^  εκάτβρον  τον  εσττΧουν 
ωρμησαν  ε'π  αυτούς,  και  τας  μεν  ττΧείους  και 
μετεώρους  ηζη  των  νέων  καΐ  άντιττρωρους  ττροσ- 
ττεσόντες  ες  φυyηv  κατέστησαν,  και  έττιδιώκοντες 
ώς  δίά  βραχ^εος  έτρωσαν  μεν  ποΧΧάς,  ττεντε  δε 
εΧαβον  και  μίαν  τούτων  αύτοΐς  άνΒράσιν  ταΐς  δε 
Χοιτταΐς  εν  τη  yrj  κaτa^τεφευyυίaις  ενεβαΧΧον.  αΐ 
δε  και  ττΧηροΰμεναι  ετι  ττρίν  άvάyεσθaι  εκότττοντο• 
και  τινας  καΐ   άναδούμενοι  κενας  ειΧκον  των  άν- 

2  δ^3ώ^'  ε'ς  φυyηv  ώρμη μένων,     α  όρώντες  οι  ΑακεΒαι- 


«32 


BOOK  IV.  XIII.  2-xiv.  2 

now  numbering  fifty  ships,  for  it  had  been  reinforced 
by  some  of  the  ships  on  guard  at  Naupactus  and  by 
four  Chian  vessels.  But  they  saw  that  both  the  main- 
land and  the  island  were  full  of  hoplites,  and  that 
the  Lacedaemonian  ships  were  in  the  harbour  and 
not  intending  to  come  out ;  they  therefore,  being  at 
a  loss  where  to  anchor,  sailed  for  the  present  to 
Prote,  an  uninhabited  island  not  far  from  Pylos,  and 
bivouacked  there.  The  next  day  they  set  sail,  having 
first  made  preparations  to  give  battle  in  case  the 
enemy  should  be  inclined  to  come  out  into  the  open 
water  to  meet  them  ;  if  not,  they  intended  to  sail 
into  the  harbour  themselves. 

Now  the  Lacedaemonians  did  not  put  out  to  meet 
the  Athenians,  and  someho\v  they  had  neglected  to 
block  up  the  entrances  as  they  had  purposed  ;  on 
the  contrary,  they  remained  inactive  on  the  shore, 
engaged  in  manning  their  ships  and  making  readv, 
in  case  any  one  sailed  into  the  harbour,  to  fight 
there,  since  there  was  plenty  of  room.  XIV.  As  for 
the  Athenians,  when  they  saw  the  situation,  they 
rushed  in  upon  them  by  both  entrances  and  falling 
upon  their  ships,  most  of  which  were  by  now  afloat 
and  facing  forward,  put  them  to  flight,  and  since 
there  Avas  only  a  short  distance  for  the  pursuit,^  not 
only  damaged  many  of  them  but  also  captured  five, 
one  of  them  with  all  iier  crew  ;  the  rest  they  kept  on 
ramming  even  after  they  had  fled  to  the  shore.  Yet 
other  ships  were  being  cut  to  pieces  while  still  being 
manned,  before  they  could  put  to  sea;  and  some  they 
took  in  tow  empty,  their  crews  having  taken  to  flight, 
and  began  to   haul  them  away.     At  this  sight  the 

^  Or,  "giving  chase  so  far  as  the  short  distance  allowed, 
not  onl}•  damncTpd  ..." 

233 


THUCYDIDES 

μόνίοι  και  7Γ€ρια\'γοΰντ€<;  τω  ττάθβι,  οτιττβρ  αυτών 
οΐ  avSpe<;  άττέΧαμβάνοντο  iv  ttj  νήσω,  τταρεβοή- 
θουν,  καΙ  βττεσβαίνοντβς  €<?  την  θάλασσαν  ξύν 
TOL<i  οττλοις  άνθεΐΧκον  έτηΧαμβανόμβνοι  των  ιβών 
κα\  iv  τούτω   κβκω\νσθαί  iSoKei   €καστο<ζ   ω  μή 

3  TU'i  κα\  αύτος  έ'/ογω  τταρήν.  iyeveTo  re  6  θόρυβος 
/ζεγα?,  καΐ  άντηΧΚα'^/ μενού  του  εκατβρων  τρόττου 
Trepl  τα?  ναύ<ζ'  οϊ  τε  <γάρ  Αακεδαιμόνιοι  υττο  ττρο- 
θνμίας  καΐ  εκττ\ήζεως  ώς  είττεΐν  άΧλο  ούΒεν  η  εκ 
7%  εναυμά'χ^ουν,  οΧ  τε  ^Αθηναίοι  κρατούντες  καΐ 
βονΧόμενοι   TTj   τταρούστ]    τύχΐ]   ώ?   εττΐ    ττΧεΙστον 

4  εττεζεΧθεϊν  αττο  νεών  εττεζομάχ^ουν.  ττοΧυν  τε  ττόνον 
τταρασχ^οντες  α\\ΐ]\οις  και  τραυματισαντες  8ιε- 
κρίθησαν,   καΐ   οΐ   Χακε^αιμόνιοί  τας  κενάς  ναυς 

5  ττΧην  των  το  ττρώτον  Χηφθεισών  Βιεσωσαν.  κατα- 
στάντες  δε  εκάτεροί  ες  το  στρατόττεΒον  οι  μεν  τρο- 
τταΐόν  τε  έστησαν  καΐ  νεκρούς  άπεΒοσαν  και 
ναυα'^/ίων  εκράτησαν,  καΐ  την  νήσον  ευθύς  ττερι- 
έττΧεον  και  εν  φι/Χακΐ)  εΐ'χον,  ως  των  ανδρών 
άττειΧημμενων  οι  δ'  εν  ttj  ήττειρωΤΙεΧοττοννήσιοι 
καΐ  από  ττάντων  ήδη  βεβοηθηκότες  εμενον  κατά 
γ^ώραν  επΙ  ττ}  ΐΙύΧω. 

XV.  Έ<?  δε  την  Χττάρτην  ώς  τ^^έΧθη  τά  ^ε^ενη- 
μενα  περί  Πύλοι^,  εδοξεν  αύτοΐς  ώς  εττϊ  ξυμφορά 
με^άΧτ]  τα  τεΧη  καταβάντας  ες  το  στρατόττεδον 
2  βουΧεύειν  παραχρήμα  ορώντας  6  τι  αν  δοκτ}.  κα\ 
ώς  βίδον  αδύνατον  ον  τίμωρεΐν  τοις  άνδράσι  καΐ 
234 


BOOK    IV.  XIV.  2-xv.  2 

Lacedaemonian  soldiers  on  the  shore,  beside  them 
selves  with  grief  at  the  impending  calamity,  in  that 
their  comrades  were  being  cut  off  on  the  island, 
rushed  to  the  rescue,  and  going  down  into  the  sea  in 
full  armour  took  hold  of  the  ships  and  tried  to  drag 
them  back.  Indeed,  each  man  felt  that  no  progress 
was  being  made  where  he  himself  was  not  at  hand  to 
help.  The  tumult  that  arose  was  great,  especially 
since  in  this  battle  for  the  ships  each  side  adopted 
the  other's  manner  of  fighting;  for  the  Lacedae- 
monians in  their  eagerness  and  excitement  were  virtu- 
ally waging  a  sea-fight  from  the  land,  while  the 
Athenians,  Λνΐιο  were  winning  and  wanted  to  follow 
up  their  success  to  the  utmost  while  their  good 
fortune  lasted,  were  fighting  a  land-battle  from  their 
ships.  Finally,  after  causing  each  other  great  distress 
and  inflicting  much  damage,  they  separated,  the 
Lacedaemonians  saving  all  their  empty  ships  except 
those  which  had  been  taken  at  first.  Both  sides  then 
returned  to  their  camps.  The  Athenians  thereupon 
set  up  a  trophy,  gave  back  the  dead,  secured  posses- 
sion of  the  Λvrecks,  and  immediately  began  to  sail  round 
the  island  and  keep  it  under  guard,  considering  that 
the  men  on  it  were  now  cut  off;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Peloponnesians  on  the  mainland,  and  the  rein- 
forcements that  had  noAv  arrived  from  all  directions, 
remained  in  position  at  Pylos. 

XV.  At  Sparta,  when  they  received  the  news  of 
what  had  happened  at  Pylos,  regarding  it  as  a  great 
calamity  thev  decided  that  the  magistrates  should  go 
doAvn  to  the  camp,  see  tlie  situation  for  themselves, 
and  then  determine  on  the  spot  what  should  be 
done.  ΝοΛν  when  these  saw  that  no  help  could  be 
given  to  the  men  on  the  island,  and  at  the  same 

235 


THUCYDIDES 

KLvhvveveiv  ουκ  ββούΧοι^το  η  ΰττο  Χίμοΰ  τι  τταθείν 
αυτούς  ή  νττο  ττΧηθου•;  βιασθέντας  κρατηθηναι,^ 
βΒοξβν  αντοΐς  προ<;  τους  στρατηγούς  των  ^Αθη- 
ναίων, ην  βθβΧωσι,  σττονζας  ττοιησαμβνους  τα 
TTepl  ΥίνΧον  άτΓοστβΐΧαι  ες•  τα?  ^Αθήνας  πρέ- 
σβεις TrepX  ξυμβάσεως  καΐ  τους  ανΒρας  ώς  τάχ^ιστα 
ττειράσθαί  κομίσασθαι. 

ΧΛ^Ι.  Αεξαμβνων  8e  των  στρατη^ο)ν  τον  \oyov 
eyiyvovTo  σττονΒαΙ  TOiaiSe'  Αακβδαίμονίους  μεν 
τάς  ναΰς  iv  αίς  €νανμά'χ^7]σαν  καΐ  τας  ev  τ-ρ 
Αακωνικτ}  ττάσας,  οσαι  ήσαν  μακραί,  τταραΒουναι 
κομίσαντας  ες  Πυλοί»  ' Αθηναίο ις,  καΐ  όπλα  μη 
ετηφερειν  τω  τειχίσματι  μήτε  κατά  ιγήν  μήτε 
κατά  θαλ,ασσαν,  ^Αθηναίους  δε  τοις  εν  τη  νήσω 
άι>8ράσι  σΐτον  εάν  τους  εν  τη  ηττείρω  ΑακεΒαι- 
μονίονς  εσττέμτΓείν  τακτον  και  μεμα^μενον,  δύο 
■χοίνικας  εκάστω  ^  Αττικας  άΧφίτων  και  Βνο 
κοτύΧας  οϊνου  και  κρέας,  θεράττοντι  δε  τούτων 
ημίσεα'  ταΰτα  δε  όρώντων  των  ^Αθηναίων  εσττεμ- 
■πειν  καί  ττΧοΐον  μηΒβν  εσττΧεΐν  Χάθρα'  φυΧάσσειν 
δε  καϊ  την  ϊ'ησον  Αθηναίους  μηδέν  ησσον,  οσα  μη 
άτΓοβαίνοντας,  καϊ  οττΧα  μη  εττιφερειν  τω  Πελο- 
ττοννησίων  στρατω  μήτε  κατά  ^ήν  μήτε  κατά 
2  θάΧασσαν.  ο  τι  δ'  αν  τούτων  τταραβαίνωσιν 
εκάτεροι  καϊ  οτιούν,  τότε  ΧεΧύσθαι  τας  σττονδάς. 
εσπεΐσθαι  δε  αύτας  μεχ^ρι  ου  εττανεΧθωσιν  οι  εκ 
τ ών^ Αθηνών  Αακεδαι μονίων  πρέσβεις'  άττοστεΐΧαι 
δε  αυτούς  τριήρει  Αθηναίους  καϊ  ττάΧιν  κομίσαι. 
εΧθόντων  δε  τάς  τε  σττοζ'δας•  ΧεΧύσθαι  ταύτας  καϊ 
τάς  ναΰς  άττοδοΰναι^ Αθηναίους  όμοιας  οΐασπερ  αϊ' 

'   κρατηθηΐ'αι,  CG,  ^  κρατΎ)θτ)ναι,  ABFM. 
236 


BOOK      IV.    XV.   2-XVI.   2 

time  were  unwilling  to  run  the  risk  of  their  being 
starved  to  death  or  forced  to  succumb  to  superior 
numbers,  they  decided,  so  far  as  Pylos  was  con- 
cerned, to  conclude  a  truce  with  the  Athenian 
generals,  if  they  should  consent,  and  to  send  envoys 
to  Athens  to  propose  an  agreement,  and  thus  try  to 
recover  their  men  as  quickly  as  possible. 

XVI.  The  generals  accepted  the  proposal  and  a 
truce  was  concluded  upon  the  following  terms  :  The 
Lacedaemonians  Avere  to  surrender  to  the  Athenians 
the  ships  in  which  they  had  fought  the  battle,  and 
were  to  bring  to  Pylos  and  deliver  to  them  all  the 
other  ships  of  Avar  which  Avere  in  Laconia,  and  they 
were  not  to  attack  the  fortification  either  by  land  or  by 
sea.  The  Athenians  were  to  permit  the  Lacedaemon- 
ians on  the  mainland  to  send  flour  to  the  men  on  the 
island,  a  fixed  amount  and  already-kneaded,  for  each 
soldier  two  quarts  ^  of  barley-meal  and  a  pint  of  wine 
and  a  ration  of  meat,  and  for  each  servant  half  as 
much ;  and  they  were  to  send  these  things  to  the 
island  under  the  supervision  of  the  Athenians,  and 
no  boat  was  to  sail  thither  secretly.  The  Athenians 
were  to  go  on  guarding  the  island  as  before,  but 
without  landing  on  it,  and  were  not  to  attack  the 
anny  of  the  Peloponnesians  either  by  land  or  sea.  If 
either  party  should  violate  this  agreement  in  any 
particular  whatsoever,  the  truce  should  forthwith  be 
at  an  end.  The  truce  was  to  hold  good  until  the 
Lacedaemonian  envoys  should  get  back  from  Athens  ; 
and  the  Athenians  were  to  conduct  them  thither  in  a 
trireme  and  bring  them  back.  On  their  return  this 
truce  was  to  be  at  an  end,  and  the  Athenians  were 
then  to  restore  the  ships  in  as  good  condition  as  Avhen 

^  The  choinix  wa^  about   two   pints,    dry   measure  ;   the 
cotyle,  about  half  &  piut. 


THUCYDIDES 

3  τταραΚάβωσιν.  at  μεν  σττονΒαΙ  eirl  τούτοις  iye- 
νοντο,  καΐ  αΐ  νήες  τταρβ^όθησαν  οΰσαι  Trepl 
ίξιίκοντα,  καϊ  οΐ  ττρεσ/Βεις  άττβστάΧησαν.  άφικό- 
μενοι  δε  ες  τας  \\θηνα<ί  βλ,βξαν  ToidSe. 

XVII.  "'Επεμψαν  ημάς  ΑακεΒαιμόνιοο,  ω 
Αθηναίοι,  ΊτβρΙ  των  iv  rfj  νήσω  άντρων  πρήζον- 
τας 6  τί  αν  ύμΐν  τε  ώφβΧιμον  ον  το  αύτο  πείθωμεν 
καϊ  ημίν  ες   την  ξυμφοραν  ^   ώς   εκ   των  παρόντων 

2  κόσμον  μάλιστα  μεΧΧη  οϊσειν,  τους  δε  Xoyoυς 
μακροτερους  ου  πάρα  το  εΐωθος  μηκυνοΰμεν,  αλλ' 
επιχώριον  ον  ημΐν  ου  μεν  βραγείς  άρκώσι  μη 
ποΧΧοΙς  χρήσθαι,  πΧείοσι  δε  εν  ω  αν  καιρός  77 
διδάσκοντας    τι    των    προύρ^ου    Χό^οις    το     δέον 

3  πράσσειν.  Χάβετε  δε  αυτούς  μη  ποΧεμίως  μηΚ 
ως  άξύνετοι  διδασκόμενοι,  ΰπομνησιν  δε  του  καΧώς 

4  βουΧεύσασθαι  προς  είδότας  η^ησάμενοι.  ύμΐν 
<yap  εύτυχίαν  την  παρούσαν  εξεστι  καΧώς  θεσθαι, 
εχουσι  μεν  ων  κρατείτε,  προσΧαβονσι  δε  τιμήν 
καϊ  δόξαν,  καϊ  μη  παθεΐν  όπερ  οι  άήθως  τι  άηα- 
θον  Χαμβάνοντες  των  ανθρώπων  αΐεΐ  jap  τον 
πΧέονος  εΧπίδι  ορέγονται  δια  το  καϊ  τα  παρόντα 

5  άδοκήτως  εύτυχήσαι.  οίς  δε  πΧεΐσται  μεταβοΧαΙ 
εττ'  αμφότερα  ζυμβεβηκασι,  δίκαιοι  είσι  καϊ 
άπιστότατοι  είναι  ταΐς  ενπ ρα^ίαις'  ο  τϊ)  τε  υμέ- 
τερα πόΧει  δι  εμπειρίαν  καϊ  ημΐν  μάΧιστ  αν  εκ 
του  εικότος  προσείη. 

^  6ί  την  ^υμψοράν,  bracketed  by  Hude. 
238 


BOOK    IV.  XVI.  2-xvii.  5 

they  received  them.  The  truce  was  concluded  on 
these  terms,  the  ships,  sixty  in  number,  were  delivered 
up,  and  the  envoys  dispatched.  When  they  arrived  at 
Athens  they  spoke  as  follows  : 

XVII.  ''The  Lacedaemonians,  men  of  Athens,  have 
sent  us  to  arrange,  in  behalf  of  our  men  on  the 
island,  such  terms  as  we  may  show  to  be  at  once 
advantageous  to  you  and  also  most  likely  under 
present  circumstances,  in  view  of  our  misfortune,  to 
bring  credit  to  ourselves.  If  we  speak  at  some 
length  Λve  shall  not  be  departing  from  our  custom  ; 
on  the  contrary,  though  it  is  the  fashion  of  our 
country  not  to  use  many  words  where  few  suffice, 
yet,  whenever  occasion  arises  to  expound  an  im- 
portant matter  and  thereby  to  accomplish  by  speech 
the  end  we  have  in  view,  we  use  words  more  freely. 
And  do  not  receive  what  Λve  say  in  a  hostile  spirit, 
nor  feel  that  you  are  being  instructed  as  though  you 
were  Avithout  understanding,  but  regard  our  words 
as  merely  a  reminder  to  men  who  know  how  to  come 
to  a  good  decision.  For  it  is  in  your  power  to  turn 
your  present  favourable  fortune  to  good  account, 
not  only  keeping  what  you  have  got,  but  acquiring 
honour  and  reputation  besides.  You  may  thus  avoid 
the  experience  of  those  who  achieve  some  unwonted 
success  ;  for  these  are  always  led  on  by  hope  to 
grasp  at  more  because  of  their  unexpected  good 
fortune  in  the  present.  And  yet  those  who  have 
most  often  undergone  a  change  of  fortune  for  better 
or  for  Avorse  have  best  reason  to  be  distrustful  of 
prosperity;  and  this  Avould  naturally  hold  true  of 
both  your  state  and  ours  in  an  exceptional  degree, 
in  view  of  our  past  experience. 

239 


THUCYDIDES 

XVIII.  "  Τνώτε  δέ  και  e?  τά9  ημετέρας  νυν 
ζυμφορας  άττιΒοντες,  οίτινες  αξίωμα  μέ^γιστον  των 
ΕΧληνων  βχοντες  ηκομβν  τταρ  ύμας,  ττρότερον 
αύτοΙ  κυριώτεροί  νομίζοντας  elvat  Sovvai  εφ'  α  νυν 

2  άφ^γμάνοι  υμάς  αΐτούμ^θα.  καίτοι  ούτβ  Βυνάμεως 
ένίβία  βττάθομβν  αυτό  ούτε  μβίζονος  7Γροσ<^βνομενη^ 
υβρίσαντες,  άττο  δε  των  alel  ΰτταρχ^όντων  ηνωμτ] 
σφαΧέντες,  εν  ω  ττάσι  το   αύτο    ομοίως   ύττάρχ^ει. 

3  ώστε  ουκ  εικός  ύμας  8ια  την  παρουσαν  νυν  ρώμην 
ΊτόΧεώς  τε    καΐ    των  ττροσ^β'^ενημενων  και   το   της 

4  τύχ^ης  οΐεσθαι  aiel  μεθ  υμών  εσεσθαι.  σωφρόνων 
Βε  άνΒρών  ο'ίτινες  τα,'^αθα  ες  άμφιβοΧον  ^  άσφα- 
\ώς  εθεντο  (^καΐ  ταΐς  ξυμφοραΐς  οι  αύτοι  εύζυνε• 
τώτερον  αν  ττροσφεροιντο),  τον  τε  ττόΧεμον 
νομίσωσι  μη  καθ  όσον  αΐ'  τις  αυτού  μίρος  βού- 
Χηται  μεταγειρίζειν,  τούτω  ξυνεΐναι,  αλλ'  ως  αν 
αΙ  τύ)(αι  αυτών  η^ήσωνται,  και  εΧάχ^ιστ  αν  οι 
τοιούτοι  ΤΓταίοντες  8ιά  το  μη  τω  ορθουμενω  αυτού 
τΓίστεύοντες  επαίρεσθαι  εν  τω  εύτυγ^είν  αν  μάΧιστα 

5  καταΧύοιντο'  ο  νύν  ύμΐν,  ώ  'Αθηναίοι,  καΧώς  έχει 
ττρός  ημάς  ττραζαι,  και  μηττοτε  ύστερον,  ην  άρα  μη 
ττειθόμενοι  σφαΧήτε,  α  ττοΧΧα  ενΒεχεται,  νομι- 
αθηναι  τύχϊ]  καϊ  τα  νύν  ττροχωρήσαντα  κρατήσαι, 

'  αμφίβοΧον,  MSS. ;  Hude  reads  αναμφίβολοι'. 


^  Or,  "  make  sure  of    their  advantages  having   regard  to 
changes  of  luck." 

240 


BOOK    IV.  xvm.  1-5 

XVIII.  "To  be  convinced  of  this,  you  need  onlv 
look  at  our  present  misfortunes.  We  ΛνΠο  of  all  the 
Hellenes  formerly  were  held  in  the  highest  con- 
sideration have  come  before  you,  although  we  have 
been  wont  to  regard  ourselves  as  better  entitled  to 
confer  such  favours  as  we  have  now  come  to  beg  of 
you.  And  yet  it  was  neither  through  lack  of  poΛver 
that  we  met  with  this  misfortune,  nor  because  our 
power  became  too  great  and  we  waxed  insolent;  nay, 
our  resources  were  what  they  always  Λvere  and  we 
merely  erred  in  judgment — a  thing  to  Λvhich  all  are 
alike  liable.  Accordingly  there  is  no  reason  Λvhy 
you,  because  of  the  strength  both  of  your  city  and  of 
its  new  acquisitions  at  the  pi'esent  moment,  should 
expect  that  the  favour  of  fortune  Λνϊΐΐ  alwaj's  be  with 
you.  Prudent  men  take  the  safe  course  of  account- 
ing prosperity  mutable^  —  the  same  men,  too,  would 
deal  more  sagaciously  with  misfortunes — and  con- 
sider that  when  anyone  is  at  Avar  he  may  not  limit  his 
participation  to  whatever  portion  of  it  he  may  choose 
to  carry  on,^  but  that  he  must  follow  Avhere  his  for- 
tune leads.  Such  men  are  least  likely  to  come  to 
grief,  since  the  ν  do  not  allow  themselves  to  become 
elated  by  overconfidence  in  military  success,  and  are 
therefore  most  likely  to  seize  the  moment  of  good 
fortune  for  concluding  peace.  And  this,  Athenians, 
is  the  policy  which  it  is  good  for  you  to  adopt  towards 
us  to-day,  and  not  at  some  future  time,  should  you 
perchance  through  rejecting  our  overtures  incur 
disaster — and  of  this  there  are  many  possibilities  — 
be  credited  with  having  won  even  your  present  suc- 
cesses through  good  fortune,  Avhen  it  is  ])ossible  to 

*  i.e.  in  warfare  one  cannot  accept  only  the  successes  and 
avoid  the  reverses  by  stopping  before  the  latter  set  in  ;  one 
is  in  the  hands  of  fortune. 

241 


THUCYDIDES 

βζον  ακίνΖυνον  Ζόκησιν  ίσ^ζύο^  καϊ  ξυνίσβως  e?  το 
eireira  καταΚητβΙν . 

XIX.  "  Αακ€Εαίμόΐ'ίθί  Se  ύμας  ττροκαΧοΰνται 
€9  σττονΒας  καϊ  Βιάλυσιν  ποΧέμον,  ΒιΒόντες  μβν 
είρήνην  καϊ  ζυμμαχ^ιαν  και  αΚΧην  φιΧίαν  ττοΧΧην 
καϊ  οΙκ€ίότητα  e?  άλΛ-ί/λου?  ύπάρχ^ειν,  άνται- 
τοΰντ€<;  δε  τούζ  €κ  της  νήσου  άνδρας,  καϊ  άμεινον 
τυούμβνοί  άμφοτ€ροί<;  μη  BtaKivSvveveaOat,  et're 
βία  άν^  Βιαφύγοιεί'  τταρατυχ^ονση^  τίνος  σωτιιρ[α<; 
etre  κα\  6κττο\ίορκηθ€ντ€ς  μάΧλον  αν  "χ^ειρωθεΐεν. 

2  νομίζομίν  re  τας  /χ,εγαλα?  βχΘραζ  μάΧιστ^  αν 
Βίολύβσθαί  βεβαίως,  ουκ  ήν  άνταμυνόμενός  τις 
καϊ  επικρατήσας  τα  ττΧείω  του  ττοΧεμου  κατ 
apuyKijV  ορκοις  iyιcaτa\aμβάvωv  μη  άττο  του 
Ισου  ζυμβ\],  αλλ,  ην,  τταρον  το  αύτο  Ζράσαι  προς 
το    επιεικές,    καϊ    αρεττ]    αύτον    νικησας  πάρα  α 

3  προσεΒβχ^ετο  μετρίως  ξυναΧλαΎη.  οφείΧων  '^/αρ 
ηΒΐ]  ό  ενάντιος  μη  άνταμύνεσθαι  ως  βιασθείς, 
αλλ'    άνταποΒούναι     αρετήν,     ετοιμότερος     εστίν 

4  αίσ'χυνί)  εμμενειν  οίς  ξννέθετο.  καϊ  μάΧλον  προς 
τους  μειζόνως  εχ^θρούς  τούτο  Βρώσιν  οΐ  άνθρωποι 
■η  προς  τους  μέτρια  Βιενε-χθεντας'  πεφύκασί  τε 
τοις  μεν  εκουσίως  ενΒοϋσιν  άνθησσάσθαι  μεθ' 
7)8ονΡ]ς,  προς  8ε  τα  νπεραυχ^ούντα  καϊ  παρά 
<γνώμην  ΒιακινΕυνενειν. 

^  αν,  Kriiger's  conjecture. 
242 


BOOK    IV.  χνιπ.  5-xix.  4 

leave  to  posterity  an  unhazarded  reputation  at  once 
for  strength  and  sagacity. 

XIX.  "The  Lacedaemonians  therefore  invite  you 
to  accept  terms  and  bring  tlie  war  to  an  end,  offering 
you  peace  and  alliance,  and  apart  from  this  the 
maintenance  of  hearty  friendsliip  and  intimacy  one 
with  the  other ;  and  asking  on  their  side  merely  the 
return  of  the  men  on  the  island.  They  think  it 
better  for  both  parties  not  to  take  the  risk  either  of 
the  besieged  making  their  escape  in  spite  of  you, 
should  some  chance  of  safety  present  itself,  or  of 
their  being  reduced  by  siege  to  a  still  harder  lot. 
We  believe,  too,  that  a  permanent  reconciliation  of 
bitter  enmities  is  more  likely  to  be  secured,  not  Avhen 
one  party  seeks  revenge  and,  because  he  has  gained 
a  decided  mastery  in  the  war,  tries  to  bind  his 
opponent  by  compulsory  oaths  and  thus  makes  peace 
with  him  on  unequal  terms,  but  when,  having  it  in 
his  power  to  secure  the  same  result  by  clemency,  he 
vanquishes  his  foe  by  generosity  also,  offering  him 
terms  of  reconciliation  which  are  moderate  beyond 
all  his  expectations.  For  the  adversary,  finding 
himself  ηοΛν  under  obligation  to  repay  the  generosity 
in  kind,  instead  of  striving  for  vengeance  for  having 
had  terms  forced  upon  him,  is  moved  by  a  sense  of 
honour  and  is  more  ready  to  abide  by  his  agree- 
ments. Furthermore,  men  are  more  inclined  to  act 
thus  toward  their  more  serious  enemies  than  toward 
those  with  whom  they  have  had  but  trifling  dif- 
ferences. And,  finally,  it  is  natural  for  men  cheer- 
fully to  accept  defeat  at  the  hands  of  those  who  first 
make  willing  concessions,  but  to  fight  to  the  bitter 
end,  even  contrary  to  their  better  judgment,  against 
an  overbearing  foe. 

243 


THUCYDIDES 

XX.  **Ήμΐν  8e  καλώς  e'inep  ττοτέ,  βχ^ει  άμφο- 
τέροίς  η  ^vvaWayrj,  ττρίν  τι  άνήκζστον  Sia  μέσου 
^ενόμβνον  ημάς  καταΧαββΐν,  ev  φ  ανάγκη  aihtov 
ημίν^    βγθραν    ττρος    ττ}    κοιί'τ}    καΐ    ISiav    €)(^eiv, 

2  υμάς  ^  Be  στβρηθήναι  ών  νυν  ττροκαΚούμβθα.  €Τί 
δ'  όντων  άκριτων  και  ύμΐν  μίν  8όξης  καΐ  ημετέρας 
φιλίας  ττροσ'γΐ'γνομένης,  ημΐν  δε  ττρο  αίσχ^ροΰ 
τίνος  της  ξυμφοράς  μ€τρίο)ς  κατατιθέμενης  8ια\- 
Χα^ώμεν,  καΐ  αυτοί  τ€  άντι  πολέμου  είρηνην 
ελωμεθα  καΐ  τοις  άλλοις  '  ΕΧλησιν  άνάτταυσιν 
κακών  7τοΐ7]σωμεν'  οι  καΐ  εν  τούτω  υμάς  αΐτιω- 
τέρους  riyqaovTai.  'πολεμούνται  μεν  yap  ασαφώς 
ότΓοτέρων  άρξάντων  καταδύσεως  he  γενομένης, 
ης    νυν    υμείς  το  ττλεον  κύριοι  εστε,   την    χάριν 

3  ύμΐν  ττροσθήσουσιν,  ην  re  ιγνώτε,  ΑακεΒαι- 
μονίοις  εζεστιν  ύμΐν  φίλους  γενέσθαι  βεβαίως, 
αυτών  τε  ττροκαλεσαμενων  χαρισαμένοις  τε  μάλ- 

i  Χον  η  βιασαμά'οις.^  καΐ  εν  τούτω  τα  ενόντα 
άηαθα  σκοττείτε  οσα  εικός  elvar  ημών  yap  και 
νμών  ταύτα  \eyovτωv  το  ye  άλλο  'Ειλληνικον 
ϊστε  ΟΤΙ  ύπο8εέστερον  ον  τά  μεyιστa  τιμιίσει." 

XXI.  Οί'  μεν  ουν  Αακεδαιμόνιοι  τοσαυτα 
eiTTOv,  νομίζοντες  τους  'Αθηναίους  εν  τω  ττρΙν 
'χ^ρόνω  σττονΖών  μεν  εττιθυμεΐν,  σφών  he  εναν- 
τιουμενων  κωλύεσθαι,  διδομένης  δέ  εΙρηνης  άσμέ- 

^  ΎΐμΊν,  with  F.  Haase  and  Classen  ;  Hude  retains  the  MSS. 
reading  ΰμίν,  with  Stahl,  following  tlie  Scholiast. 
^  Hude  reads  r;^as,  with  C 
*  Hude  reads  βιασαμίνων,  with  C. 

^  Or,  reading  άιδίον  ΰμΊν  .  .  .  ημαί  Se,  as  Hude  does,  "  you 
Athenians  would  have  our  undying  hatred  .  .  .  and  we 
Spartans  would  be  deprived  of  the  advantages  we  now  offer." 

244 


BOOK    IV.  XX.  I -XXI.  I 

XX.  "Now,  if  ever,  reconciliation  is  desirable  for 
us  both,  before  some  irreparable  disaster  has  come 
upon  either  of  us  and  prevented  it ;  should  that 
befall,  we  shall  inevitably  cherish  toward  each  other 
an  undying  personal  hatred,  over  and  above  that 
which  we  now  feel  as  public  enemies,  and  you  ^  will 
be  deprived  of  the  advantages^  we  now  offer.  While, 
therefore,  the  issue  of  the  war  is  still  in  doubt,  while 
your  reputation  is  enhanced  and  you  may  have  our 
friendship  also,  and  Avhile  our  disaster  admits  of  a 
reasonable  settlement  and  no  disgrace  as  yet  has 
befallen  us,  let  us  be  reconciled ;  and  let  us  for 
ourselves  choose  peace  instead  of  Avar,  and  give  a 
respite  from  evils  to  all  the  other  Hellenes.  And 
they  will  count  you  especially  the  authors  of  the 
peace ;  for  although  they  were  drawn  into  the  war 
without  knowing  which  of  us  began  it,  yet  if  a 
settlement  is  effected,  the  decision  of  which  at  this 
time  rests  chiefly  with  you,  it  is  to  you  they  will 
ascribe  their  gratitude.  And  so,  if  you  decide  for 
peace,  it  is  in  your  power  to  win  the  steadfast 
friendship  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  which  they  freely 
offer  and  you  may  secure  by  acting,  not  \vith  violence, 
but  with  generosity.  Pray  consider  all  the  advantages 
which  may  well  be  involved  in  such  a  course  ;  for  if 
you  and  we  agree  be  assured  that  the  rest  of  the 
Hellenic  world,  since  it  will  be  inferior  to  us  in 
power,  will  pay  us  the  greatest  deference." 

XXI.  Such  were  the  words  of  the  Lacedaemonians. 
They  thought  that,  since  the  Athenians  had  at  an 
earlier  period  ^  been  eager  to  end  the  war  and  had 
been  prevented   by  the  opposition  of  Sparta,  they 

^  i.e.  peace,  alliance,  intimate  friendship  (ch.  xix.  1). 
'  is.  after  the  plague  and  the  second  invasion  of  Attica, 
in  430  B.o.     cf.  II.  lix- 

245 


THUCYDIDES 

νονς    Se^eaOal   re    και    τους   avSpa<;    άττοΒώσβίν. 

2  οι  Be  τας  μεν  airovha^,  εχ^ορτες  τους  avhpa^  ev  τη 
νήσω,  ηόη  σφίσιν  βνομιζον  ετοίμον;  είναι,  οπόταν 
βονλωνταίΤΓΟίεΐσθαι  ττρος  αυτούς,  του  δε  ττΧεονος 

3  oj peyovTO.  μάλιστα  δε  αυτούς  ivrjje  ΚΧεων  ο 
ΚΧεαινετον,  άνηρ  Βημα'γω'γος  κατ  εκείνον  τον 
•χρόνον  ών '  τω  ττΧηθει  -η ιθ ανώτατος•  καΐ  εττεισεν 
ατΐοκρίνασθαι  ώς  χρη  τα  μεν  δττλα  και  σφάς 
αυτούς  τους  εν  τγι  νήσω  τταραΒοντας  7τρο)τον 
κομισθηναι  ''Αθηναζε,  εΧθόντων  8ε  άττοΒόντας 
ΑακεΒαιμονίους  ^ίσαιαν  καΐ  ΐΐη'γας  καΐ  Ύροζήνα 
και  ^ Α'χ^αιίαν,  α  ου  ττοΧεμω  εΧαβον,  αΧΧ  αττο 
της  ττροτερας  ξυμβάσεο)ς  ^Αθηναίων  ζv'yχωpy]- 
σάντων  κατά  ξυμφορας  και  εν  τω  τότε  Βεομενων 
τι  μάΧΧον  στΓοζ'δώζ',  κομίσασθαι  τους  άνδρας  καϊ 
σττονΒάς  ττοιησασθαι  όττΰσον  αν  Soktj  γ^ρονον 
άμφοτεροις. 

XXII.  Οι  δε  τι-ρος  μεν  την  άττόκρισιν  ού8εν 
άντεΐτΓον,  ξυνέ8ρους  δε  σφισιν  εκεΧευον  εΧεσθαι 
οΐτινες  Χεγοντες  καϊ  ακουοντες  ττερι  έκαστου 
ξυμβήσηνται    κατά    ησυγίαν    6    τί   αν    -πείθωσιν 

2  άΧΧήΧους'  Κλε'ωι^  δε  ενταύθα  δ?;  ττοΧύς  ενεκειτο, 
Χε^ων  ^ιηνώσκειν  μεν  και  ττρότερον  ούδεν  εν  νω 
ε'χ^οντας  Βίκαιον  αυτούς,  σαφές  δ  είναι  και  νυν, 
οΐτινες  τω  μεν  ττΧηθει  ού8εν  εθεΧουσιν  ειπείν, 
6XL•J0ις  δε  ανΒράσι  ξύνεΒροι  βούΧονται  ^ί^νεσθαΐ' 
αλλά  εϊ  τι  ύ^ιες  διανοούνται,  Χε^ειν  εκεΧευσεν  ~ 

3  απασιν.  όρωντες  δε  οΊ  ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι  ούτε  σφισιν 
οΙόν   τ€   ον  εν  πΧηθει   ειπείν,  εϊ  τι  καϊ  ύπο  της 


^  «-αϊ,  before  τω  πληθα,  deleted  by  Kriiger. 
^  Hude  inserts  4v  before  απασιν,  with  Cobet. 


246 


BOOK    IV.  xxi.  i-xxii.  3 

would,  if  peace  were  offered  to  them,  gladly  accept 
it  and  give  up  the  men.  But  the  Athenians  believed 
that,  since  they  held  the  men  on  the  island,  peace 
could  be  theirs  the  moment  they  cared  to  make  it, 
and  meanwhile  they  were  greedy  for  more.  They 
were  urged  to  this  course  chiefly  by  Cleon  son  of 
Cleaenetus,  a  popular  leader  at  that  time  Avho  had 
very  great  influence  with  the  multitude.  He  per- 
suaded them  to  reply  that  the  men  on  the  island 
must  first  give  up  themselves  and  their  arms  and  be 
brought  to  Athens ;  on  their  arrival,  the  Lacedae- 
monians must  give  back  Nisaea,  Pegae,  Troezen,  and 
Achaea,  Λvhich  had  not  been  taken  in  war  but  had 
been  ceded  by  the  Athenians  ^  in  an  agreement 
made  some  time  before  as  a  result  of  misfortunes, 
when  they  Λvere  somewhat  more  eager  for  peace 
than  ηοΛν.  They  could  then  recover  the  men  and 
make  a  treaty  which  should  be  binding  for  as  long  a 
time  as  both  parties  should  agree. 

XXII.  To  this  reply  the  envoys  said  nothing, 
but  they  requested  the  appointment  of  commis- 
sioners who  should  confer  with  them,  and  after 
a  full  discussion  of  all  the  details  should  at  their 
leisure  agree  upon  such  terms  as  they  could  mutually 
approve.  Thereupon  Cleon  attacked  them  violently, 
saying  that  he  had  known  before  this  that  they  had 
no  honourable  intention,  and  now  it  was  clear, 
since  the}'  were  unwilling  to  speak  out  before  the 
people,  but  wished  to  meet  a  few  men  in  conference  ; 
he  bade  them,  on  the  contrary,  if  their  purpose  was 
honest,  to  declare  it  there  before  them  all.  But  the 
Lacedaemonians,  seeing  that  it  Avas  impossible  to 
announce  in  full  assembly  such  concessions  as  they 

^  cf.  I.  cxv.  1. 

247 


THUCYDIDES 

ξνμφορας  iBofcei  αντοΐς  ξνγ-χωρβΐν,  μη  6?  τους 
ξυμμάχ^ονς  Βιαβ\ΐ]θώσιν  είττόντα  καΐ  ου  τυ- 
'χ^οντβς,  ούτε  του?  \\θηναίου^  βπΐ  μετρίοις  ττοιη- 
σοντας  α  ττρονκαΧούντο,  άν^-χωρησαν  €κ  των 
*  Αθηνών  άττρακτοι. 

^Χ.111.  ^Αφίκομενων  δε  αυτών  ΒιεΧβΧυντο^ 
€ύθύ<ί  αϊ  aiTovhal  αΐ  ττερί  Πύλοί',  και  τάς  ναΰ^ 
οι  Αακ€8αιμόνιοι  άτττ/τουν,  καθάττβρ  ζυνβκβίτο'  οι 
δ'  ^Αθηναίοι  ί^κΧηματα  βχοντες  έττώρομήν  re  τω 
τειχισματί  τταράσττονΒον  καΐ  άλλα  ουκ  άξιόίΧο^α 
Βοκονντα  elvat  ουκ  άττβΒίΒοσαν,  ισχυριζόμενοι 
οτί  Βη  εΐρητο,  eav  και  οτιοΰν  τταραβαθτ},  ΧεΧύσθαι 
τας  στΓονΒάς.  οι  δέ  ΑακεΒαιμόνωι  avTeXeyov  τε 
και  άΒίκημα  €ΤΓΐκαΧεσαντ€'ζ  το  τών  νεών  άττέΧ- 
2  θόντ€<;  €9  ττόΧεμον  καθίσταντο.  καΐ  τα  ττερι 
ΐΙύΧον  ύττ'  αμφοτέρων  κατά  κράτο<ί  εττοΧεμεΐτο, 
'Αθηναίοι  μεν  Βυοΐν  νεοΐν  εναντίαιν  αιεί  την  νησον 
ττερητΧεοντες  τή^  ημέρας  (της  8ε  νυκτός  και 
απασαι  ττεριώρμουν,  ττΧην  τα  ττρος  το  ττεΧα'γος, 
οττότε  άνεμος  εϊη'  και  εκ  τών  Άθηΐ'ών  αύτοΐς 
€Ϊκησι  νήες  αφικοντο  ες  την  φυΧακήν,  ώστε  αϊ 
ττασαι  k.j38o μι] κοντά  εyevoι'τo),  ΐΙεΧοττοννησιοι  δε 
εν  τ€  rfj  ηττείρω  στρατοττε^ευομενοι  και  ττροσ- 
βοΧας  ποιούμενοι  τω  τείχ^ι,  σκοπουντες  καιρόν 
εϊ  τις  τταραττεσοι  ώστε  τους  άνΒρας  σώσαι. 

XXIV.  Έι»  τούτω  δε  "^  εν  ttj  "^ικεΧία  Έ,υρα- 
κόσιοι  και  οΐ  ξύμμαχοι  -προς  ταΐς  εν  }^1εσσηνη 
φρουρούσαις  ναυσΐ  το  άλλο  ναυτικον  ο  παρεσκευ- 
άζοντο  ττροσκομισαντες  τον  ττόΧεμον  εττοιούντο  εκ 

1  With  Cobet,  for  SkAvouto  of  the  MSS. 
"^  o'l    of    the    MSS.,    before    iv    τρ    2ικ<λία,    deleted    by 
nude. 

248 


BOOK    IV.  XXII.  3-xxiv.  i 

might  think  it  best  to  make  in  view  of  their  mis- 
fortune, lest  they  might  be  discredited  with  their 
allies  if  they  proposed  them  and  were  rebuffed,  and 
seeing  also  that  the  Athenians  Λvould  not  grant 
their  proposals  on  tolerable  conditions,  withdrew  from 
Athens,  their  mission  a  failure. 

XXIII.  When  they  returned,  the  truce  at  Pylos 
was  terminated  at  once,  and  the  Lacedaemonians 
demanded  the  return  of  their  ships  according  to 
the  agreement ;  but  the  Athenians  accused  them  of 
having  made  a  raid  against  the  fort  in  violation  of 
the  truce,  and  of  other  acts  that  do  not  seem  worth 
mentioning,  and  refused  to  give  up  the  ships,  stoutly 
maintaining  that  it  had  been  stipulated  that,  if  the^e 
should  be  any  violation  of  the  truce  whatsoever,  it 
should  be  at  an  end  forthwith.  The  Lacedaemonians 
contradicted  this,  and  after  protesting  that  the  deten- 
tion of  the  ships  was  an  act  of  injustice  uent  away 
and  renewed  the  war.  And  so  the  warfare  at  Pylos 
was  carried  on  vigorously  by  both  sides.  The 
Athenians  kept  sailing  round  the  island  by  day  with 
two  ships  going  in  opposite  directions,  and  at  night 
their  whole  fleet  lay  at  anchor  on  all  sides  of  it, 
except  to  seaward  when  there  was  a  wind ;  while 
to  assist  them  in  the  blockade  twenty  additional 
ships  came  from  Athens,  so  that  they  now  had 
seventy  in  all.  As  for  the  Peloponnesians,  they 
were  encamped  on  the  mainland,  and  kept  making 
assaults  upon  the  fort,  watching  for  any  opportunity 
which  might  offer  of  rescuing  their  men. 

XXIV.  Meanwhile  in  Sicily  the  Syracusans  and 
their  allies,  having  reinforced  the  ships  which  were 
keeping  guard  at  Messene  by  bringing  up  the  other 
naval  force  which  they  had  been  equipping,^  were 

»  c/.  ch.  i.  4. 

249 

vm      II  τ  ^~ 


THUCYDIDES 

2  της  Λί€σσηι^η<;  («rat  μάΧιστα  βνψ/ον  οι  Χοκροί  Ίων 
'Ρη'^ίνων  κατά  βχ^θραν,  καΐ  αύτοΙ    he   ξσεβββΧή- 

3  κβσαν  ττανΒημβΙ  βς-  την  γτ}^  αυτών),  και  ναυ- 
μα'χίας  άττοττειράσθαι  ββούΧοντο,  ορώντες  τοις 
^ Αθηναίοις  τας  pev  τταρούσας  ναΰς  οΧίΎας,  ταΐς 
δβ    TrXeioai  και  μεΧλ,ονσαις    ήζειν  ττυνθανομβνυί 

4  την  vPjaov  ττοΧιορκβΐσθαι.  el  jap  κρατήσείοί' 
τω  ναυτικω,  το  'Ρή^ιον  ηλπίζον  ττεζ^  τε  και 
ναυσίν  Ιφορμοΰντες  ραΒίως  ^ειρώσεσθαι,  καΐ  ηΒη 
σφών  Ισ^ζυρα  τα  πράγματα  jijveaOaL.  ζύνε^^υς 
•yap  κείμενου  του  τε  'Ρί/γίου  ακρωτηρίου  της 
^Ιταλίας  της  τε  Μεσσήνης  της  ΧίκεΧίας,  τοις 
^ Αθηναίο ίς  •*■  ουκ  αν  elvat  εφορμεΐν  καΐ  τοΰ 
πορθμοί)  κρατεΐν.  εστί  8ε  ο  ττορθμος  η  μεταζυ 
'Ρηγίου  θάΧασσα  και  Μεσσήνης,  ηττερ  βρα-χυ- 
τατον  ^ικεΧία  της  ηττείρου  άττέγει•  και  εστίν  ή 
^άρυβ8ις  κΧηθεισα  τούτο,  η  ^ΟΒυσσεύς  Χέζεται 
Ζιο^ττΧεΰσαι,  hia  στενότητα  δε  κα\  εκ  με^αΧων 
ττεΧα^ών,  τοΰ  τε  Ύυρσηνικοΰ  και  τοΰ  ΧικεΧικοΰ, 
εσπίτΓτουσα  η  ΘάΧασσα  ες  αύτο  ^  και  ροώΒης 
ούσα   εΐκότως  ^χ^αΧεττη   ενομισθη. 

XXV.  'El•"  τούτω  ουν  τω  μεταξύ  οι  ^υρακόσιοι 
και  οΐ  ξύμμαχ^οί  ναυσ]ν  ολίγω  ττΧειοσιν  η  τριά- 
κοντα ηνα^κάσθησαν  οψε  τΓ]ς  ημέρας  νανμα-χ^ησαι 
ττερί  ττΧοίου  ΒιαττΧεοντος,  άντεττανα^όμενοι  ττρός 
τε  ^Αθηναίων  ναΰς  εκκαίΒεκα  καΐ  'Ρη^ίνας  οκτώ. 
2  καΐ  νικηθεντες  υττο  των  ^Αθηναίων  8ιά  τά'χους 
άττέττΧευσαν  ώς  έκαστοι  ετυγ^ον  ες  τα  οικεία  στρα- 

1  τε,   after  'Ativyalois  in  all  MSS.  except  Cod.  Danicus,  is 
bracketed  by  all  later  editors. 

'  ahrh   theMSiS. ;  Hude  emends  to  ταύτίί. 

250 


BOOK    IV.  xxiv.  i-xxv.  2 

carrying  on  the  war  from  Messene.  To  this  they  were 
instigated  chiefly  by  the  Locrians  on  account  of 
their  hatred  of  the  Rhegians,  whose  territory  they 
had  themselves  invaded  in  full  force.  The  Syra- 
cusans  wanted  also  to  try  their  fortune  in  a  sea-fight, 
seeing  that  the  Athenians  had  only  a  few  ships  at 
hand,  and  hearing  that  the  most  of  their  fleet,  the 
ships  that  were  on  the  way  to  Sicily,  were  employed 
in  blockading  the  island  of  Sphacteria.  For,  in 
case  they  won  a  victory  \vith  the  fleet,  they  could 
then  invest  Rhegium  both  by  land  and  by  sea  and,  as 
they  believed,  capture  it  without  difliculty;  and  from 
that  moment  their  situation  would  be  a  strong  one, 
since  Rhegium,  the  extreme  point  of  Italy,  and 
Messene  in  Sicily  are  only  a  short  distance  apart, 
and  so  the  Athenians  would  not  be  able  to  keep  a 
fleet  there  ^  and  command  the  strait.  Now  the  strait 
is  that  arm  of  the  sea  between  Rhegium  and  Messene, 
at  the  point  Λvhere  Sicily  is  nearest  the  mainland  ; 
and  it  is  the  Charybdis,  so  called,  through  which 
Odysseus  is  said  to  have  sailed.  On  account  of  its 
narrowness  and  because  the  water  falls  into  it  from 
tΛvo  great  seas,  the  Etruscan  and  the  Sicilian,  and 
is  full  of  currents,  it  has  naturally  been  considered 
dangerous. 

XXV^.  Now  it  was  in  this  strait  that  the  Syracusans 
and  their  allies  were  compelled  one  day  toward  evening 
to  fight  for  a  vessel  which  was  making  the  passage  ; 
and  with  thirty  odd  ships  they  put  out  against 
sixteen  Athenian  and  eight  Rhegian  ships.  They 
were  defeated  by  the  Athenians,  and  hastily  sailed 
back,  each  contingent  as  best  it  could,  to  their  own 

^  i.e.  in  case  Rhegium  were  takeu  by  tlie  Syracusans. 


THUCYDIDES 

τόττεδα^  μίαν  ναυν  άιτο\βσαντζ<;'   και  νυζ  iireyi- 

3  vera  τω  ep'^/ω.  μετά  δε  τούτο  οι  μίν  ΑοκροΙ 
άττήΧθον  €Κ  τή<;  'Ρητινών,  eVt  Be  την  ΐΙέλωρίΒα 
τή<ϊ  ^ΐ€σσηνη<;  ^uWeyelaai  αϊ  των  'Ζυρακοσίων 
καΐ   ξνμμάχ^ων  νήβς  ωρμουν  καΐ   6  ττβζος  αυτοί'; 

4  τταρην.  ττροσττΧεύσαντβ•^  δε  οΐ  ^Αθηναίοι  και 
'Ρψ/ΐνοι  όρώντβς  τα?  ναΰ^  κβνάς  ζνββαΧον,  και 
χ€ΐρΙ  σι8ηρα  βττιβΧηθείση  μίαν  ναυν  αύτοΙ  άττώ- 

5  Χβσαν  των  άντρων  άττοκοΧυμβησάντων.  και  μετά 
τούτο  των  Χυρακοσίων  έσβάντων  €9  τά?  ναύ<ί  καΐ 
τταραττΧβόντων  άπο  κάΧω  e?  την  Μεσσήνην,  αυθι^ 
7ΓροσβαΧόντ€<;  οΐ  ^Αθηναίοι,  άττοσιμωσάντωι• 
εκείνων  καϊ  προεμβαΧόντων,  ετεραν  ναυν  άττοΧ- 

6  Χύουσιν.  καϊ  εν  τω  τταράπΧω  καϊ  ττ}  ναυμαγία 
τοωντοτρόττω  ιγενομεντ]  ουκ  εΧασσον  έχοντες  οΊ 
Χυρακόσιοί  τταρεκομίσθησαν  ες  τον  εν  ττ}  Μεσ- 
σ7]νΐ]  Χίμενα. 

7  ΚαΙ  οΐ  μεν  ^Αθηναίοι,  Κ,αμαρίνης  άγγεΧθείσης 
ητροΒίΒοσθαι  "ϊ,νρακοσίοις  ύττ  ^Αρχίου  καϊ  των 
μετ  αυτού,  εττΧευσαν  εκεΐσε'  ^Ιεσσηνιοι  δ'  εν 
τούτω  ττανΒημεϊ  κατά  yrjv  καϊ  ταΐς  ναυσϊν  αμα 
εστράτευσαν  εττΐ  Νάξον  την  Χ,αΧκώικην  ομορον 

8  ουσαν.      καϊ    τη    πρώτη    ήμερα    τειχήρεις   ττοιή 
σαντες  τους  Ν  άξιους  εδηουν  την  γην,  τη  δ'  υστε- 
ραία   ταΐς   μεν   ναυσΐ   ττερίπΧεύσαντες   κατά   τον 
^ Ακ^σίνην  ττοταμον  την  'γήν  ε8ηουν,  τω  δε  ττεζω 

9  ττρος  την  ττοΧιν  ττρησεβαΧΧον.^  εν  τούτω  δε  οι 
ΧικεΧοΙ '     ύττερ    των    άκρων    ττοΧΧοΙ    κατεβαινον 

'  τό  Τι  ft•  τί)  Μίσσ-ηνιι  και  iv  τφ  'Ρηγίφ,  in  the  MSS. 
after  arpaTOneba,  rejected  by  Hude,  after  Stahl  and  van 
Herwerden. 

*  For  fiTeBaWov  of  the  MSS. ,  Pnppo's  correction,  accepted 
by  most  editors. 

252 


BOOK    IV.  XXV.  2-9 

camps,  having  lost  one  ship  ;  and  night  came  on 
while  they  were  in  action.  After  this  the  Locrians 
left  the  territory  of  the  Rhegians ;  and  the  ships  of 
the  Syracusans  and  their  allies  assembled  at  Peloris 
in  Messene,  where  they  anchored  and  were  joined  by 
their  land-forces.  The  Athenians  and  the  Rhegians 
sailed  up,  and  seeing  that  the  Syracusan  ships  were 
unmanned  attacked  them  ;  but  they  themselves  lost 
one  ship,  which  was  caught  by  a  grappling-iron  cast 
upon  it,  the  creAv  having  leaped  overboard.  After 
this  the  Syracusans  embarked  and  their  ships  wei'e 
being  towed  along  the  shore  by  ropes  toward  Messene 
when  the  Athenians  attacked  again,  but  lost  another 
ship,  since  the  Syracusans  made  a  sudden  turn  out- 
wards and  charged  them  first.  In  the  passage 
along  the  shore,  then,  and  in  the  sea-fight  that 
followed  in  this  unusual  fashion,  the  Syracusans  had 
the  best  of  it,  and  at  length  gained  the  harbour  at 
Messene. 

But  the  Athenians,  on  the  report  that  Camarina 
was  to  be  betrayed  to  the  Syracusans  by  Archias  and 
his  faction,  sailed  thither.  The  Messenians  mean- 
while took  all  their  land-forces  and  also  the  allied 
fleet  and  made  an  expedition  against  Naxos,  the 
Chalcidian  settlement  on  their  borders.  On  the  first 
day  they  confined  the  Naxians  within  their  walls  and 
ravaged  their  lands  ;  on  the  next  day,  while  their 
fleet  sailed  roimd  to  the  river  Acesines  and  ravaged 
the  land  there,  their  army  assaulted  the  city  of  Naxos. 
.Meanwhile  the  Sicels  came  down  over  the  heights  in 


*  0.',  before  ύπβρ,  Kriiger's  suggestion  following  a  scholium 
(αντί  ToD  ol  iirl  των  άκρων  uvrts  κ.τ.λ.),  is  adopted  by 
Hude. 

253 


THUCYDIDES 

βοηθονντ€<;  eVt  τους  M€aai-ivi<w^.  καΐ  οι  ^άξιοι 
ώ?  elhov,  Θαρσησαντε<ί  και  τταρακβΧβυόμβνοι  ev 
βαντοΐς  ως  οι  Aeovrivot  σφίσι  καΐ  οι  άΧλοι 
"ΚλΧηνες  ξύμμαχοι  e?  τιμωρίαν  €7Γ€ρχονται,  ίκ- 
8ραμόντ€ς  άφνω  βκ  της  ττόΧβως  ΤΓροσττίτΓΤουσι 
τοις  ^Ιεσσηνιοίς,  και  τρεψαντβς  άττίκτςινάν  re 
υττβρ  χιΧίους  και  οι  Χοιττοι  γ^αΧβττοίς  άττςγ^ώρησαν 
eir     οίκον    καΧ   'yap    οι  βάρβαροι    iv  ταΐς  68οΐς 

10  βτΓΐπβσόντβς  τους  ττΧβίστους  Ζύφθειραν.  κα\  αΐ 
νήες  σγοΰσαι  e?  την  ^Ιεσσηνην  ύστερον  eir  οϊκου 
€κασται  8ΐ€κρίθησαν.  AeovTivoi  δε  βύθύς  και  οι 
ξνμμα•χοι  μβτα  ^Αθηναίων  e?  την  ^Ιεσσήνην  ως 
κβκακωμβνην  εστράτευον,  και  ττροσβάΧΧοντβς  οΊ 
μ€ν^ Αθηναίοι  κατά,  τον  Χιμίνα  ταΐς  ναυσίν  eVet- 

11  ρων,  ό  δέ  ττεζος  ττρος  την  πόΧιν.  εττεκΒρομην  8e 
ΤΓΟιησάμβνοι  οι  ΑΙβσσηνιοι  και  Αοκρών  τίνες  μετά 
τον  ΑημοτέΧους,  οι  μετά  το  ττάθος  ε^^ κατ εΧε'ιφθ ή- 
σαν φρουροί,  εξατΓίναίως  ττροσττεσόντες  τρέττουσι 
τον  στρατεύματος  των  Αεοντινων  το  ττοΧύ  και 
άττεκτειναν  ποΧΧούς.  ΙΒόντες  8ε  οι  ^Αθηναίοι  καΐ 
άττοβάντες  αττο  των  νέων  έβοηθουν,  καΐ  κατεΒίω- 
ζαν  τους  ^Ιεσσηνίους  ττάΧιν  ες  την  ττόΧιν,  τε- 
ταραΎμενοις  εττί'γενο/.ιενοι•    και  τροτταΐον  στΐ]σαν- 

12  τες  άνεχώρησαν  ες  το  'IPtjyiov.  μετά  8ε  τούτο  οι 
μεν  εν  τη  ^ικεΧία  "ΈΑ,Χηνες  άνεν  των  ^Αθηναίων 
κατά  γηρ  εστράτενον  εττ    άΧΧηΧονς. 

XXVI.  Έζ^  8ε  τη  Πύλω  ετι  εττοΧιορκουν  τους 

εν  τη   νήσω  Αακε8αι μονίους  οΐ  ^Αθηναίοι,  κα\  το 

εν  τη  ηττείρω   στρατοττε8ον  των  ΤΙεΧοττοννησιων 

2  κατά  -χ^ωραν  εμενεν.     επίπονος  δ    ην  τοις  ^Αθη- 

ναίοις  ή  φυΧακη  σίτου  τε  απορία  και  ν8ατος'  ου 


254 


BOOK    IV.  XXV.  9-xxvi.  2 

large  numbers  to  help  in  resisting  the  Messenians. 
When  the  Naxians  saw  them  coming,  they  took  heart, 
and  calHng  to  each  other  that  the  Leontines  and  their 
other  Hellenic  allies  were  approaching  to  defend 
them  rushed  suddenly  out  of  the  city  and  fell  upon 
the  Messenians,  putting  them  to  flight  and  killing 
over  a  thousand  of  them.  The  rest  got  back  home  with 
difliculty  ;  for  the  barbarians  attacked  them  in  the 
roads  and  killed  most  of  them.  And  the  allied  fleet, 
after  putting  in  at  Messene,  dispersed  to  their 
several  homes.  Thereupon  the  Leontines  and  their 
allies,  in  company  with  the  Athenians,  immediately 
made  an  expedition  against  Messene,  believing  it  to 
be  weakened,  and  attempted  an  assault  upon  it,  the 
Athenians  attacking  Λvith  their  ships  on  the  side  of 
the  harbour,  while  the  land  forces  moved  against  the 
toAvn.  But  the  Messenians  and  some  of  the  Locrians, 
Λνΐιο,  under  the  command  of  Demoteles,  had  been 
eft  there  as  a  garrison  after  the  disaster  at  Naxos, 
made  a  sortie,  and  falling  suddenly  upon  them  routed 
the  larger  part  of  the  army  of  the  Leontines  and 
killed  many  of  them.  Seeing  this  the  Athenians 
disembarked  and  came  to  their  aid,  and  attacking  the 
Messenians  while  they  were  in  disorder  pursued  them 
back  into  the  city ;  they  then  set  up  a  trophy  and  with- 
drew to  Rhegium.  After  this  the  Hellenes  in  Sicily, 
without  the  cooperation  of  the  Athenians,  continued 
to  make  expeditions  against  one  another  by  land. 

XXVL  At  Pylos,  meanwhile,  the  Athenians  were 
still  besieging  the  Lacedaemonians  on  the  island,  and 
the  army  of  the  Peloponnesians  on  the  mainland 
remained  in  its  former  position.  The  blockade,  how- 
ever, was  harassing  to  the  Athenians  on  account  of 
the  lack  of  both  food  and  water ;  for  there  \vas  only 

255 


THUCYDIDES 

70/3  TjV  κρήνη  ΟΤΙ  μη  μία  ev  αύτη  rfj  άκροττόΧβι 
της  Πύλου  και  αΰτη  ου  μβΎοΚη,  άλλα  8ιαμώμ€νοι 
τον  κάγΧηκα  οι  ττΧεΐστοι  ΙττΙ  τη  θαΧάσση  eirivov 

3  οίον  βίκος  ΰ8ωρ.  στενο-χωρία  re  iv  oXiyo)  στρατο- 
ττε^ίνομίνοις  Ι'^'ιηνξ.το,  καΐ  των  νέων  ουκ  βχονσών 
ορμον  αΐ  μεν  σΐτον  ev  τη  yf}  ηρουντο  κατά  μέρος, 

4  αΐ  Be  μετέωροι  ώρμουν.  άθυμίαν  τβ  ττΧείστην  ό 
χ^ρόνος  τταρεΐχε  -πάρα  Xoyov  εττι^ι^νόμενος,  ους 
ωοντο  ήμερων  ολίγων  εκ7Γθ\ιορκήσειν,  εν  νήσω  τε 

5  ερήμη  και  ν8ατι  αλμυρω  •χ^ρωμενους.  αίτιον  Be 
ην  οΐ  ΑακίΒαιμόνιοι  ττροεητόντες  ες  την  νήσον 
eaayetv  σΐτον  τε  τον  βονΧόμενον  άΧηΧεμενον  καΐ 
οίνον  και  τυρον  καΐ  ει  τι  άΧΧο  βρώμα,  oV)  αν  ες 
ττοΧιορκίαν  ξυμφερη,  τάξαντες  άpyυpΊoυ  ττολλοΟ 
και  των  Ε^ΙΧώτων  τω  εσayayόvτι  εΧευθερίαν  υττι- 

6  σχνούμενοί.  καΐ  εσψ/ον  άλΧοι  τε  τταρακινΒυνεύ- 
οντες  και  μάΧιστα  οί  Είλωτες,  άπαιροντες  άττο 
της  ΤΙεΧοττοννήσου  όττόθεν  τύχοιεν  καΐ  καταττΧε- 
οντες  ετι  νυκτός  e?  τα  ττρος  το  τrεXayoς  της  νήσου. 

7  μάΧιστα  Βε  ετήρουν  άνεμω  καταφέρεσθαΐ'  ραον 
yap  την  φυΧακην  των  τριηρών  εΧάνθανον,  όττότε 
ττνεΰμα  εκ  ττόντου  εϊη•  άπορον  yap  ey'iyveTO  ττερι- 
ορμείν,  τοις  Βε  άφειΒής  6  κατάπΧους  καθειστήκεΐ' 
εττώκεΧΧον  yap  τα  ττΧοΐα  τετιμημενα  γ^ρημάτων, 
και   οι   όττΧΐται   ττερί   τας   κατάρσεις    της    νήσου 


^  The  reference  is  to  the  ships   which  kept  up  a  patrol 
round  the  island.     There  was  no  anchorage  near  the  shore 

256 


BOOK    IV.  XXVI.  2-7 

one  spring,  high  up  on  the  acropolis  of  Pylos,  and  a 
small  one  at  that,  and  the  soldiers  for  the  most  part 
scraped  aΛvay  the  shingle  upon  the  beach  and  drank 
water  such  as  one  might  expect  to  find  there.  And 
there  Λvas  scant  room  for  tliem,  encamping  as  they 
did  in  a  small  space,  and  since  there  Avas  no  anchor- 
age for  the  ships,^  the  crews  Avould  take  their  food  on 
land  by  turns,  Avhile  the  rest  of  the  fleet  lay  at  anchor 
out  at  sea.  Very  great  discouragement,  too,  was 
caused  by  the  surprisingly  lung  duration  of  the  siege, 
whereas  they  had  expected  to  reduce  the  enemy  in 
a  few  days,  since  they  w  ere  on  a  desert  island  and 
had  only  brackish  water  to  drink.  But  the  cause  of 
their  holding  out  Λvas  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had 
called  for  volunteers  to  convey  to  the  island  ground 
corn  and  wine  and  cheese  and  other  food  such  as  might 
be  serviceable  in  a  siege,  fixing  a  high  price  and 
also  promising  freedom  to  any  Helot  Avho  should 
get  food  in.  Many  took  the  risk,  especially  the 
Helots,  and  actually  brought  it  in,  putting  out  from 
any  and  every  point  in  the  Peloponnesus  and  coming 
to  shore  during  the  night  on  the  side  of  the  island 
facing  the  sea.  If  possible  they  Λvaited  for  a  Λvind 
to  bear  them  to  the  shore  ;  for  they  found  it  easier 
to  elude  the  guard  of  triremes  when  the  breeze  was 
from  the  sea,  since  then  it  Λvas  impossible  for  the 
ships  to  lie  at  their  moorings  off  the  island,  whereas 
they  themselves  ran  ashore  regardless  of  conse- 
quences, as  a  value  had  been  set  upon  the  boats 
which  they  drove  upon  the  beach,  and  the  hop- 
lites  would  be  on  watch   for  them  at  the   landing- 

on  the  seaward  side  (ch.  viii.  8),  so  at  meal-times  the  crewa 
of  one  part  of  the  fleet  would  make  a  landing  someAvhere  and 
eat,  Avhile  the  other  part  would  be  out  at  sea  on  guard. 

257 


THUCYDIDES 

έφυλασσον.      όσοι  he  <yaXy']vr]  KivSuuevaecav,  η\ί- 

8  σκόντο,  iaeveov  δε  καΐ  κατά  τον  Χιμβνα  κοΧνμ- 
βηταΐ  νφνΒροι,  καΧωΒίω  iv  άσκοΐ<;  βφβλκοντες 
μήκωνα  μβμβΧίτωμένην  καΐ  Χίνον  σττβρμα  κζ,κομ- 
μβνον      ων     το     ττρώτον     Χανθανόντων    φυΧακαΙ 

9  ύστερον  eyevovTO.  τταντί  re  τρόπω  εκάτβροι 
€Τ6γνώντο,  οι  μβν  βσπεμττζίν  τα  σιτία,  οΐ  he  μη 
Χανθάνβίν  σφαν. 

XXVII.  'Ey  he  ταΐς  ^Χθηναί<ί  ττυνθανόμενοι 
TTepl  της  στρατιάς  οτ(  τaλaί7Γωpeΐτaί  καΐ  σίτος 
τοις  ev  τ^  νήσω  ότι  εσττλεΖ,  ηττόρουν  και  ehehoL- 
κεσαν  μη  σφών  -χειμων  την  φυΧακην  ίττιΧάβοι, 
6ρώντ€ς  των  τ€  e^nτηheίωv  την  irepl  την  TleXo- 
ΤΓοννησον  κoμιhηv  ahvvaTOv  εσομέρην,  άμα  ev 
■χωρίω  ερήμω  καΐ  ούδ'  iv  Oepei  οίοί  τβ  οντες  Ικανά 
ττεριτΓβμττειν,  τον  re  €φορμον  'χλωρίων  άΧιμένων 
όντων  ουκ  εσομενον,  άΧΧ  ?)  σφών  άνεντων  την 
φνλακην  ττερίΎενήσεσθαι  τους  άvhρaς  η  τοις  ττΧοί- 
οις  ά  τον  σίτον  αύτοΐς  rjye  γ^ειμωνα  τηρήσαντας 

2  εκττΧεύσεσθαι.  πάντων  τε  βφοβοΰντο  μάΧιστα 
τους  ΑακεΒαιμονίονς,  ότι  βγ^οντάς  τι  Ισ-χυρον  αυ- 
τούς ενόμιζον  ούκβτι  σφίσιν  εττικηρυκεύεσθαι•  καΐ 

3  μετεμίΧοντο  τάς  σττονΒάς  ου  Βεξάμενοι.  ΚΧέων 
he  yvoύς  αυτών  την  ες  αύτον  νττοψίαν  ττερί  της 
κωΧύμης  της  ξυμβάσεως  ου  τάΧηθί)  εφη  Xeyeiv 
τους  εζα^^έΧΧοντας.^  τταραινούντων  δε  τών  άφι^- 

1  So  the  MSS. :  Ifiide  adopts  Kriiger's  conjecture,  eVoy- 
258 


BOOK    IV.   XXVI.  7-xxvii.  3 

places  on  the  island.  All,  on  the  other  hand,  who 
made  the  venture  in  calm  weather  were  captured. 
At  the  harbour,  too,  there  Avere  divers  who  SΛvam  to 
the  island  under  water,  towing  after  them  by  a  cord 
skins  filled  Avith  poppy-seed  mixed  Avith  honey  and 
bruised  linseed ;  at  first  they  were  not  discovered,  but 
afterwards  watches  were  set  for  them.  And  so  both 
sides  kept  resorting  to  every  device,  the  one  to  get 
food  in,  the  other  to  catch  them  doing  it. 

XXVII.  At  Athens,  meanwhile,  Avhen  they  heard 
that  their  army  Avas  in  distress  and  that  food  was 
being  brought  in  to  the  men  on  the  island,  they  were 
perplexed  and  became  apprehensive  that  the  Avinter 
would  overtake  them  while  still  engaged  in  the 
blockade.  They  saw  that  conveyance  of  supplies 
round  the  Peloponnesus  Avould  be  impossible — Pylos 
being  a  desolate  place  at  best,  to  which  they  \vere 
unable  even  in  summer  to  send  round  adequate  sup- 
plies— and  that,  since  there  were  no  harbours  in  the 
neighbourhood,  the  blockade  would  be  a  failure. 
Either  their  ολνη  troops  Avould  relax  their  >vatch  and 
the  men  on  the  island  would  escape,  or  else,  waiting 
for  bad  weather,  they  would  sail  away  in  the  boats 
which  brought  them  food.  Above  all  they  were 
alarmed  about  the  attitude  of  the  Lacedaemonians, 
thinking  that  it  was  because  they  had  some  ground  for 
confidence  that  they  w  ere  no  longer  making  overtures 
to  them  ;  and  they  repented  having  rejected  their 
proposals  for  peace.  But  Cleon,  knowing  that  their 
suspicions  were  directed  against  him  because  he  had 
prevented  the  agreement,  said  that  the  messengers 
who  had  come  from  Pylos  Avere  not  telling  the  truth. 
Whereupon  these  messengers  advised,  if  their  οΛνη 


259 


THUCYDIDES 

μζνων,   el    μη    σφίσι    Triarevovat,    κατασκόττου^ 
Tivas   τΓβμψαι,    'ρρέθη    κατάσκοτΓθ<;    αύτ6<ί    μβτα 

4  Θβογει^ου?  ύττο  ^Αθηναίων,  καΐ  jvov'i  'ότι  αναη- 
κασθησίται  ή  ταύτα  Xeyeiv  oh  διββαΧλβν  η  τά- 
ναντία  είττων  ψευΒης  φανήσβσθαι,^  Traprjvei  Τ0Γ9 
^Αθηναιοις,  ορών  αυτούς  και  ώρμημενου<;  τί  το 
TrXeov  ττ)  ^νωμτ)  στρατ€υ€ΐν,  ώς  χρη  κατασκόττους 
μ€ν  μη  ττβμττείν  μη8ε  ΒιαμβΧλβιν  καιρόν  παριεντας, 
et  Be  8οκ€ί  αύτοΐς  άΧηθΡ]  elvai  τα  άγγελλό//.€ΐ^α, 

5  7r\etv  eVt  του?  άνδρας,  καΐ  €9  ^ικίαν  τον  Νικη- 
ράτου  στρατηΎον  οντά  αττεσημαινεν,  εχθρός  ων 
καΐ  ετητιμών,  ράΒιον  elvac  παρασκευή,  el  ανΒρες 
εΐεν  οι  στρατηγοί,  ττΧεύσαντας  ΧαβεΙν  τους  εν 
ττ}  νήσω,  καΐ  αυτός  γ'  αν,  el  ηρχ€,  ττοιήσαί 
τούτο. 

XXVIII.  Ό  δε  Νικίας  των  τε  ^Αθηναίων  τι 
ντΓοθορυβησάντων  ες  τον  ΚΧεωνα,ιν  τ^ού  καΐ  νυν 
ττΧεΐ,  εΐ  ράΒίόν  ye  αύτω  φαίνεται,  καΐ  άμα  όρων 
αύτον  εττιτιμώντα,  εκεΧευεν  ήντινα  βούΧεται  Ζύ- 

2  ναμιν  Χαβόντα  το  εττΐ  σφάς  είναι  εττιχειρεΐν.  6  Be 
το  μεν  πρώτον  οΐόμενος  αύτον  Xoya>  μόνον  άφιεναι, 
έτοιμος  ην,  yvoύς  Be  τω  οντι  τταραΒωσείοντα  άνε- 
χώρει  καΐ  ούκ  εφη  αύτος  αλλ'  εκείνον  στρατη- 
yεlv,   ΒεΒίώς  ηΒη   καΐ  ούκ   αν   οΐόμενός   οι    αύτον 

3  τοΧμήσαι  ίιττοχωρησαι.  αύθις  Βε  ό  Νικίας  εκε- 
Χευε  καΐ  εξίστατο  της  εττΐ  Πύλω  αρχής  καϊ  μάρ- 

^  So  all  MSS.  eyice^t'&  (•γίντ]σΐσθαι)•.  Hude  adopts,  with 
Kriiger,  Rauchenstein's  conjecture  φαν-ησΐται. 

200 


BOOK    IV.  XXVII.  3-xxviii.  3 

reports  were  not  believed,  that  commissioners  be  sent 
to  see  for  themselves,  and  Cleon  himself  was  chosen  by 
the  Athenians,  with  Theagenes  as  his  colleague. 
Realizing  now  that  he  would  either  be  obliged  to  bring 
the  same  report  as  the  messengers  whose  word  he 
was  impugning,  or,  if  he  contradicted  them,  be  con- 
victed of  falsehood,  and  also  seeing  that  the  Athenians 
were  now  somewhat  more  inclined  to  send  an  ex- 
pedition, he  told  them  that  they  ought  not  to  send 
commissioners,  or  by  dallying  to  let  slip  a  favourable 
opportunity,  but  urged  them,  if  they  themselves 
thought  the  reports  to  be  true,  to  send  a  fleet  and 
fetch  the  men.  And  pointing  at  Nicias  son  of 
Niceratus,  who  was  one  of  the  generals  and  an 
enemy  of  his,  and  taunting  him,  he  said  that  it  was 
an  easy  matter,  if  the  generals  were  men,  to  sail 
there  with  a  proper  force  and  take  the  men  on  the 
island,  declaring  that  this  Λvas  what  he  himself  would 
have  done  had  he  been  in  command. 

XXVIIl.  The  Athenians  thereupon  began  to 
clamour  against  Cleon,  asking  him  why  he  did  not  sail 
even  now,  if  it  seemed  to  him  so  easy  a  thing ;  and 
Nicias,  noticing  this  and  Cleon's  taunt,  told  him  that 
as  far  as  the  generals  were  concerned  he  might  take 
whatever  force  he  wished  and  make  the  attempt. 
As  for  Cleon,  he  was  at  first  ready  to  go,  thinking  it 
was  only  in  pretence  that  Nicias  offered  to  relinquish 
the  command ;  but  Λvhen  he  realized  that  Nicias 
really  desired  to  yield  the  command  to  him,  he 
tried  to  back  out,  saying  that  not  he  but  Nicias  was 
general ;  for  by  now  he  was  alarmed,  and  never 
thought  that  Nicias  would  go  so  far  as  to  retire  in 
his  favour.  But  again  Nicias  urged  him  to  go  and 
offered   to   resign   his    command   of  the    expedition 

261 


THUCYDIDES 

τνρας  τους  ^  Αθηναίους  έττοιβΐτο.  οι  Be,  οίον  ογΧος 
φίΧβΐ  TTOielv,  όσω  μίιΧλον  6  ΚΧέων  ύττεφευγε  τον 
ττΧοΰν  καΐ  €ξαν€χώρ€ί  τα  είρημενα,  τοσω  εττβκε- 
Χεύοντο    τω    Νικία   τταραδίΒόναι   την    άρχ^ην   καΐ 

4  βκείνω  βττββόων  TrXetv  ώστε  ουκ  έχων  οττω?  των 
είρημβνων  έ'τί  i^aTraWayT],  υφίσταται  τον  ττΧοΰν, 
καΐ  τταρελθων  οΰτε  φοβεΐσθαι  βφη  ΑακεΒαιμοΐ'ίους 
ττΆ-βύσβαθαί  τ€  Χαβων  etc  μβν  της  ττόλβω?  ούοβνα, 
Αημνίους  δέ  καΐ  Ίμβρίονς  τους  τταρόντας  και 
ττέλταστάς  οΐ  ήσαν  €κ  τε  Αϊνου  βββοηθηκότβς  και 
αΧΧοθβν  τοξύτας  τετρακόσιους'  ταύτα  he  έχων 
εφη^  ττρος  τοις  εν  ΤΙύΧω  στρατιώταις  εντός  ημε- 
ρών   εϊκοσι    η    άξειν    Αακε8αιμονίους    ζώντας    η 

5  αυτού  άττοκτενείν  τοις  δε  ^Αθηναίοις  ενεττεσε 
μεν  τι  και  γε'λωτο?  τ^  κουφοΧογια  αυτού,  άσμε- 
νοις  δ'  όμως  iyiyveTO  τοις  σώφροσι  τών  άνθρώττων, 
Χο^ίζομενοις  Βυοΐν  α^αθοίν  τού  έτερου  τεύξεσθαι, 
ή  1\Χεωνος  αττα^^Κα^ήσεσθαι,  ο  μάΧΧον  ήΧττιζον, 
ή  σφαΧεΐσι  '^/νώμης  ΑακεΒαιμονίους  σφίσι  χειρώ- 
σεσθαι.'^ 

XXIX.  Καί.  ττάντα  Βιαττραξάμενος  εν  ttj 
εκκΧησία  καΐ  ψηφισαμένων  Αθηναίων  αύτω  τον 
ττΧούν,  τών  τε  εν  ΥΙύΧω  στρατηγών  ενα  ττροσεΧο- 
μενος,  Αημοσθένη,  την  άνα^ω^ην  hia  τάχους 
2  ετΓοιεΐτο.  τον  δε  Αημοσθενη  ττροσεΧαβε  ττυνθανό- 
μενος  την  άττόβασιν  αύτον  ες  την  νήσον  Βιανοεΐ- 
σθαί.  οι  ηαρ  στρατιώται  κακοτταθούντες  τού 
χωρίου  τη  απορία  καΐ  μάΧΧον  ποΧιορκουμενοι  η 
ΤΓοΧιορκούντες  ώρμηντο  Ζιακινδυνεύσαι.  καΐ  αύτω 


'  Omitted  by  Hude,  followiug  Μ. 
^  χαρώσασθαι  ABFM. 


262 


BOOK    IV'.  xxvm.  3-x.\ix.  2 

against  Pylos^  calling  the  Athenians  to  Λvitness  that 
he  did  so.  And  the  moi-e  Cleon  tried  to  evade  the 
expedition  and  to  back  out  of  his  Ολνη  proposal,  the 
more  insistently  the  Athenians,  as  is  the  way  with  a 
crowd,  urged  Nicias  to  give  up  the  command  and 
shouted  to  Cleon  to  sail.  And  so,  not  knoAving  ΙιοΛν 
he  could  any  longer  escape  from  his  own  proposal, 
he  undertook  the  expedition,  and,  coming  forward, 
said  that  he  was  not  afraid  of  the  Lacedaemonians, 
and  that  he  would  sail  without  taking  a  single 
Athenian  soldier,  but  only  the  Lemnian  and  Imbrian 
troops  which  were  in  Athens  and  a  body  of  targeteers 
which  had  come  from  Aenos,  and  four  hundred 
archers  from  other  places.  With  these,  in  addition 
to  the  troops  now  at  Pylos,  he  said  that  Λvithin 
twenty  days  he  would  either  bring  back  the  Lace- 
daemonians alive  or  slay  them  on  the  spot.  At  this 
vain  talk  of  his  there  was  a  burst  of  laughter  on  the 
part  of  the  Athenians,  but  nevertheless  the  sensible 
men  among  them  were  glad,  for  they  reflected  that 
they  Avere  bound  to  obtain  one  of  two  good  things — 
either  they  would  get  rid  of  Cleon,  which  they 
preferred,  or  if  they  Avere  disappointed  in  this,  he 
ΛνουΜ  subdue  the  Lacedaemonians  for  them. 

XXIX.  When  he  had  arranged  everything  in  the 
assembly  and  the  Athenians  had  voted  in  favour  of 
his  expedition,  he  chose  as  his  colleague  Demos- 
thenes, one  of  the  generals  at  Pylos,  and  made  haste 
to  set  sail.  He  selected  Demosthenes  because  he  had 
heard  that  he  was  planning  to  make  his  landing  on 
the  island.  For  his  soldiers,  who  were  suffering 
because  of  the  discomforts  of  their  position,  where 
they  were  rather  besieged  than  besiegers,  were  eager 
to  run  all  risks.    And  Demosthenes  himself  had  also 

263 


THUCYDIDES 

€Τί   ρώμην    και    η   νήσος  εμττρησθβΐσα   παρβσχ^εν. 

3  irporepoi'  μβΐ)  yap  ούση<;  αυτής  ύΧω^ονς  iirc  το 
ποΧύ  και  άτριβοΰς  Sta  την  aiel  βρημιαν  βφοβείτο 
καϊ  ττρος  των  ττοΧεμιων  τούτο  ενομιζε  μΰΧΧον 
€ίΐαΐ'  τΓοΧΧω  yap  αν  στρατοττβΖφ  άττοβάντί  βξ 
αφανούς  'χλωρίου  ττροσβάΧΧοντας  αυτούς  βΧάττ- 
Τ6ΐν.  σφίσι  μβν  yap  τας  ίκείνων  αμαρτίας  καϊ 
τταρασκβυην  ύττο  της  ΰΧης  ουκ  αν  ομοίως  8ήΧα 
eivai,  του  Se  αυτών  στρατοττέΒου  καταφανή  αν 
elvai  πάντα  τα  αμαρτήματα,  ώστε  ττροσττίτττειν 
αν     αυτούς     άττροσΒοκήτως    fi     βούΧοιντο'     eV 

4  εκβίνοις  yap  eivai  αν  την  εττιχείρησιν.  el  δ' 
αΰ  69  Βασύ  'χ^ωρίον  βιάζοιτο  ομόσε  ιίναι,  τους 
έΧάσσους,  έμπειρους  Be  της  γ^ώρας,  κρείσσους 
ενόμιζε  τών  πΧεονων  άπειρων  Χανθάνειν  τε  αν 
το  εαυτών  στρατόπεΒον  ποΧύ  ον  Βιαφθειρόμενον, 
ουκ  ούσης  τής  προσόψεως  y  χρήν  άΧΧήΧοις 
επιβοηθεΐν. 

XXX.    Άττό   δε   του   ΑίτωΧικοΰ  πάθους,   ο  Βια 
την    νΧην    μέρος    τι   iyt'veTO,    ούχ    ήκιστα    αυτόν 

2  ταύτα  εσηει.  τών  Be  στρατιωτών  άvayκaσθεvτωv 
Βια  την  στενοχ^ωρίαν  τής  νήσου  τοις  εσχ^άτοις 
προσίσχοντας  άριστοποιεΐσθαι  Βια  προφυΧακής 
και  εμπρήσαντός  τίνος  κατά  μικρόν  τής  ύΧης 
άκοντος  και  άπο  τούτου   πνεύματος  επιyεvoμεvoυ 

3  το    ποΧύ    αυτής    εΧαθε    κατακανθεν.       ούτω    Βη 


264 


BOOK    IV.  xxix.  2-xxx.  3 

been  emboldened  by  a  conflagration  which  had  swept 
the  island.  For  hitherto,  since  the  island  was  for 
the  most  part  covered  with  woods  and  had  no  roads, 
having  never  been  inhabited,  he  had  been  afraid  to 
land,  thinking  that  the  terrain  was  rather  in  the 
enemy's  favour ;  for  they  could  attack  from  an  un- 
seen position  and  inflict  damage  upon  a  large  army 
after  it  had  landed.  To  his  own  troops,  indeed,  the 
mistakes  and  the  preparations  of  the  enemy  would 
not  be  equally  clear  by  reason  of  the  woods,  whereas 
all  their  own  mistakes  would  be  manifest  to  their 
opponents,  and  so  they  could  fall  upon  them  un- 
expectedly Avherever  they  wished,  since  the  power 
of  attack  would  rest  with  them.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  should  force  his  way  into  the  thicket  and 
there  close  with  the  enemy,  the  smaller  force  which 
was  acquainted  with  the  ground  would,  he  thouglit, 
be  stronger  than  the  larger  number  who  were  un- 
acquainted with  it ;  and  his  own  army,  though  large, 
would  be  destroyed  piece-meal  before  he  knew  it, 
because  there  was  no  possible  way  of  seeing  the 
points  at  which  the  detachments  should  assist  one 
another. 

XXX.  It  was  especially  owing  to  his  experience 
in  Aetolia,^  when  his  reverse  was  in  some  measure 
due  to  the  forest,  that  these  thoughts  occurred  to 
Demosthenes.  But  the  soldiers  were  so  cramped  in 
their  quarters  that  they  were  obliged  to  land  on  the 
edge  of  the  island  and  take  their  meals  under  cover 
of  a  picket,  and  one  of  their  number  accidentally  set 
fire  to  a  small  portion  of  the  forest,  and  from  this, 
when  a  breeze  had  sprung  up,  most  of  the  forest  was 
burned  before  they  knew  it.     Thus  it  happened  that 

*  cf.  HI.  xcvii. ,  xcviiL 

265 


THUCYDIDES 

Ίού^  re  ΑακβΒαίμονίους  μάΧλον  κατώων  ττΧείους 
οντάς,  ύτΓΟί'οών  ττροτβρον  1\άσσοσι  τον  σΐτον 
αύτον<ί^  βσττβμτΓβιν,  την  τε  νησον  βυαττοβατω- 
Tepav  ονσαν,  τότε  ώ?  eV  άζιοχ^ρβων  τους  αθη- 
ναίους μαλΧον  στΓουΒην  ττοιεΐσθαί  την  eVi^et- 
ρησιν  τταρεσκβνάζβτο,  στρατιάν  τ€  μεταττβμττων 
βκ  των  e^/^/ϋς  ζυμμάγ^ων  καΐ  τα  άλλα  ίτοιμάζίορ. 

4  ΚΧβων  Se  €K€Lva)  Τ€  ττροπεμψας  ay/e\ov  ως 
ήξων  καΐ  βχ^ων  στρατιάν  ην  γτησατο,  άφικνεΐται 
€ς  Πύλοι^.  καΐ  άμα  '^/βνόμενοι  τ-ίμττονσι  ττρώτον 
ες  το  ev  τ[]  ήττείρφ  στρατόττβΒον  κήρυκα,  ττροκα- 
Χούμβνοι,  el  βούΧοιντο,  άνευ  κινούνον  τους  ev  τη 
νήσω  άνδρας  σφίσι  τά  τε  οττλα  καΐ  σφάς  αυτούς 
κεΧεύείν  τταραΒοΰναί,  εφ'  ώ  φυΧακη  τη  μετρία 
τηρήσονται,  εως  αν  τι  ττερί  του  ττλεοι^ο?  ζυμβαθη. 
XXXI.  ου  IT  ροσΖεζα  μένων  8β  αΰ  μίαν  μεν 
ήμεραν  εττέσχον,  ττ}  δ'  ύστεραία  tivjjyayovTo  μεν 
νυκτός  επ  ολί'^/ας  ναΰς  τους  όττΧίτας  ττάντας 
επιβιβάσαντες,  ττρο  Βε  της  εω  oXiyov  άττεβαινον 
της  νήσου  εκατέρωθεν,  εκ  τε  τοΰ  ττεΧά^ους  καΐ 
ττρος  τοΰ  Χιμενος,  οκτακόσιοι  μαΧιστα  οντες 
όττΧΐταί,    καΐ     ε'χώρουν     8ρόμω    εττΐ     το     ττρώτον 

2  φυΧακτήριον  της  νήσου,  ώδε  yap  Βιετετά'χ^ατο' 
εν  ταύτη  μεν  τη  ττρωτη  -  φνΧακη  ώς  τριάκοντα 
ήσαν  όττΧΐται,   μέσον   Be  και   όμαΧώτατον  τε  καΐ 

^  Bekker's  conjecture  for  αυτοΰ  of  the  MSS.     Hude  reads 
ai/Toae,  wiVii  Kriiger. 

-  Hude  deletes,  Λvith  Kriiger. 

266 


BOOK    IV    λ.νχ.  3-.XXXI.  2 

Demosthenes,  who  could  now  get  a  better  view  of 
tlie  Lacedaemonians,  found  that  they  were  more 
numerous  than  he  had  thought;  for  he  had  previously 
suspected  that  the  number  for  which  they  xvere 
sending  provisions  Avas  smaller  than  they  stated.^ 
He  also  found  that  the  island  \vas  less  difficult  to 
make  a  landing  upon  than  he  had  supposed.  He 
now,  therefore,  believing  that  the  object  in  view  Avas 
Avell  worth  a  more  serious  effort  on  the  part  of  the 
Athenians,  began  preparations  for  the  attempt,  sum- 
moning troops  from  the  allies  in  the  neighbourhood 
and  getting  everything  else  ready. 

Cleon,  meanwhile,  having  first  sent  word  to  De- 
mosthenes that  he  would  soon  be  there,  arrived  at 
P3dos,  bringing  the  army  for  xvhich  he  had  asked.  As 
soon  as  they  had  joined  forces,  they  sent  a  herald  to 
the  enemy's  camp  on  the  mainland,  giving  them  the 
option,  if  they  wished  to  avoid  a  conflict,  of  ordering 
the  men  on  the  island  to  surrender  themselves  and 
their  arms,  on  condition  that  they  should  be  held  in 
mild  custody  until  some  agreement  should  be  reached 
about  the  main  question.^  XXXI.  This  offer  being 
rejected,  the  Athenians  waited  for  one  day,  but  on 
the  next  day  \vhile  it  was  still  dark  they  embarked 
all  their  hoplites  on  a  few  vessels  and  put  off,  landing 
a  little  before  daAvn  on  both  sides  of  the  island,  on 
the  side  toΛvard  the  open  sea  and  on  that  facing  the 
harbour,  their  number  being  about  eight  hundred, 
all  hoj)lites.  They  then  advanced  at  a  run  against 
the  first  guard-post  on  the  island.  For  the  forces  of 
the  enemy  were  disposed  as  follows  :  in  this,  the 
fii-st  post,  there  were  about  thirty  hoplites ;  the 
central  and  most  level  part  of  the  island,  near  their 
*  cf.  ch.  xvi.  1.  ^  i.e.  a  general  peace. 

267 


THUCYDIDES 

Trepl  TO  vhwp  01  TrXecaroi  αύτων  και  Ε7Γίτάδα9  ό 
άρχ^ων  βίχ^β,  μβρο'ζ  Be  tl  ου  ττοΧύ  αύτο  ^  το 
βσγ^ατον  βφύΧασσβ  της  νήσου  το  ττρος  την  ΐΙύΧον, 
ο  ην  €Κ  Τ6  θαλάσσης  αττοκρημνον  καΐ  ifc  της  γης 
ηκιστα  έττίμα'χ^ον'  καϊ  jap  τι  καΐ  βρυμα  αυτόθι 
ην  τταΧαιον  Χίθων  Χο^άΒην  ττβττοιημβνον,  ο  ivo- 
μιζον  σφίσιν  ώφεΧιμον  αν  eivai,  el  καταΧαμβάνοι 
άναχώρησις  βιαιοτέρα.  ούτω  μίν  τεταγμένοι 
ήσαν. 

XXXII.  Ot  δε  ^Αθηναίοι  τους  μίν  ττρώτους 
φνΧακας,  οίς  (.ττίΒραμον,  eu^u?  Βιαφθβίρουσιν,  ev 
τ€  ταΐς  eύvaΐς  'έτι  κάναΧαμβύνοντας  τα  ό'ττλα  καϊ 
Χαθόντες  την  άττόβασιν,  οίομένων  αυτών  τάς 
ναΰς  κατά  το  'έθος  ές  'έφορμον  της  νυκτός  TrXeiv. 

2  αμα  Be  έ'ω  'γΐ'γνομένη  καϊ  6  άΧΧος  στρατός  άττέ- 
βαινον,  €κ  μέν  νβών  ββΒομήκοντα  καϊ  oXiya» 
^ΓXeιόvωv  'πάvτeς  ττΧην  θαΧαμιών,  ώς  έκαστοι 
έσκευασμένοι,  τοξόται  Be  οκτακόσιοι  καϊ  ττεΧ- 
τασταΐ  ουκ  έΧάσσους  τούτων,  ΑΙεσσηνίων  Τ€  οΐ 
βζβοηθηκότες  καϊ  οι  άΧΧοι  όσοι  irepi  ΐΙύΧον  xaTel- 
χον  ττάντες  ττΧην  των  έττι  του  τειχ^ους  φυΧάκων. 

3  Αημοσθένους  Be  τάζαντος  Βιέστησαν  κατά  Βια- 
κοσίους  καϊ  ττΧείους,  εστί  Β  η  έΧάσσους,  των 
'χωρίων  τα  μετεωροτατα  Χαβοι^τες,  οττως  οτι 
ττΧείστη  απορία  η  τοις  ττοΧεμίοις  πανταχόθεν 
κεκνκΧωμέΐΌΐς   καϊ  μη   εχωσι  ττρυς  ο  τι  άντιτά- 

^  αυτί),  Bauer's  correction  ;  MSS.  αΰτοΰ. 


^  cf.  ch.  xxvi   4. 

-  Not  hewn,  but  brought  just  as  they  picked  them  out. 

''  cf.  ch.  xxiii.  2. 

*  The  βαλα^Γται,  or  oarsmen  of  the  lowest  tier.     At  this 

268 


BOOK    IV.  XXXI.  2-xxxii  3 

water  supply,^  was  held  by  the  main  body  of  troops, 
under  the  command  of  Epitadas;  and  a  small  detach- 
ment guarded  the  very  extremity  of  the  island  where 
it  looks  toward  Pylos.  This  point  was  precipitous  on 
the  side  toward  the  sea  and  least  assailable  toward 
the  land  ;  there  was  also  here  an  old  fortification, 
built  of  stones  picked  up,^  which  the  Lacedaemonians 
thought  Avould  be  useful  to  them  in  case  they  should 
have  to  retreat  under  strong  pressure.  Such,  then, 
was  the  disposition  of  the  enemy's  forces. 

XXXII.  As  for  the  Athenians,  they  immediately 
destroyed  the  men  of  the  first  post,  upon  whom  they 
charged  at  full  speed,  finding  them  still  in  their  beds 
or  endeavouring  to  snatch  up  their  arms  ;  for  they 
had  not  noticed  the  Athenians'  landing,  supposing 
that  the  ships  were  merely  sailing  as  usual  to  their 
watch-station  for  the  night.^  Then  as  soon  as  day 
dawned  the  rest  of  the  army  began  to  disembark. 
These  were  the  crews  of  somewhat  more  than  seventy 
ships  (with  the  single  exception  of  the  rowers  of  the 
lowest  benches^),  equipped  each  in  his  own  way, 
besides  eight  liundred  archers  and  as  many  targeteers, 
and  also  the  Messenians  who  had  come  to  reinforce 
them,  and  all  the  others  who  were  on  duty  about  Pylos 
except  the  men  left  to  guard  the  fort.  Under 
Demosthenes'  direction  they  were  divided  into  com- 
panies of  two  hundred  more  or  less,  which  occupied 
the  highest  points  of  the  island,  in  order  that  the 
enemy,  being  surrounded  on  all  sides,  might  be  in 
the  greatest  possible  perplexity  and  not  know  which 

time  a  trireme  was  manned  by  fifty-four  θαλαμϊται,  fifty-four 
ζυ-γϊται  (occupants  of  the  middle  bank),  sixty-two  θμανΐται 
(upper  bank',  and  thirty  ιτΐρίνίψ  (reserve  oarsmen),  including 
ΰπηρ(ται  and  4πιβάται. 

209 


THUCYDIDES 

ξωνται,  akX  άμφίβοΧοι  ^ί'γνωνταί  τω  7rX?/^et, 
€L  μ€ν  Tot?  ττροσθεν  βτηοιβν,  ύττο  των  κατόττίν 
βαΧλόμβνοί,  el  oe  τοΐ<;  TrXajioi^,  ύττο  των  €κατέ- 

4  ρωθίν  τταρατβτα'^/μβνων.  κατά  νώτου  τε  alei 
epeWov  αύτοΐς,  f]  -χ^ωρήσβιαν,  οΐ  πολίμιοι,  εσβσθαί 
■ψιΧοί,  και,  οι  ατΓορωτατοι,  τοζβνμασι  καΐ  άκον- 
τίοις  καΐ  Χιθοις  καΐ  σφξνΒόναις  €Κ  ττοΧλον 
έχοντες  άΧκήν  οΐς  μηδέ  εττεΧ,θεϊν  οΙόν  τε  ην 
φεύ'^/οντες  τε  yap  εκράτουν  καΐ  άναχωροΰσιν 
επεκειντο.  τοιανττ}  μεν  γ'ώμτ]  ό  Δημοσθένης  τό 
τε  ττρώτον  την  άττόβασιν  εττενόει  καΐ  εν  τω  epyo) 
εταξεν. 

XXXIII.  Οί'  Βε  ττερί  τον  Έττίτάδα^»  καΐ  οττερ 
ην  ττΧεΐστον  των  εν  τη  νήσω,  ώς  εΐΒον  τό  τε 
ττρωτον  φυλακτήριον  Βιεφθαρμενον  καΐ  στρατον 
σφίσιν  ετΓΐόντα,  ξυνετάξαντο  και  τοις  όττΧίταις 
των  ^Αθηναίων  iirfjaav,  βονΧόμενοι  ες  χείρας 
εΧθεΐν   εξ  εναντίας  yap  ουτοί  καθειστήκεσαν,  εκ 

2  TrXay'iov  Se  οι  yp-iXol  καΐ  κατά  νώτου,  τοις  μεν 
ουν  όττΧιταις  ουκ  εΖυνήθησαν  ττροσμεΐξαι  ού8ε  τη 
σφετέρα  εμττειρία  χρ7)σασθαι•  οί  yap  -ψιΧοΙ 
εκατέρωθεν  βάΧΧοντες  elpyov,  και  άμα  εκείνοι 
ουκ  άντεττησαν,  αλλ'  ησύχαζαν,  τους  δε  ψ•ιΧούς, 
η  μάΧιστα  αύτοΐς  ιτροσθεοντες  ττροσκεοιντο,  έτρε- 
παν, καΐ  οι  ύτΓοστρεφοντες  ημύνοι>το,  άνθρωποι 
κούφως    τε    εσκευασμενοι     καΐ     ττροΧαμβύνοντες 


270 


BOOK    IV.  XXXII.  3-XXX111.  2 

attack  to  face,  but  be  exposed  to  missiles  on  every 
side  from  the  host  of  their  opponents — if  they 
attacked  those  in  front,  from  those  behind ;  if  those 
on  either  flank,  from  those  arrayed  on  the  other. 
And  they  would  ahvays  find  in  their  rear,  \vhichever 
way  they  moved,  the  light-armed  troops  of  the  enemy, 
which  Avere  the  most  difficult  to  deal  with,  since  they 
fought  at  long  range  with  arrows,  javelins,  stones, 
and  slings.  Nay,  they  could  not  even  get  at  them, 
for  they  Avere  victorious  even  as  they  fled,  and  as 
soon  as  their  pursuers  turned  they  were  hard  upon 
them  again.  Such  was  the  idea  which  Demosthenes 
had  in  mind  when  he  devised  the  plan  of  landing, 
and  such  were  his  tactics  when  he  put  this  into 
effect. 

XXXIII.  ΝοΛν  when  the  troops  under  Epitadas, 
constituting  the  main  body  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
on  the  island,  saw  that  the  first  outpost  was  de- 
stroyed and  that  an  army  was  advancing  against 
them,  they  drew  up  in  line  and  set  out  to  attack  the 
Athenian  hoplites,  wishing  to  come  to  close  quarters 
with  them ;  for  these  Avere  stationed  directly  in  front 
of  them,  while  the  light-armed  troops  were  on  their 
flank  and  rear.  They  were  not  able,  however,  to 
engage  with  the  hoplites  or  to  avail  themselves  of 
their  own  peculiar  skill  in  fighting;  for  the  light- 
armed  troops  kept  attacking  them  Avith  missiles  from 
either  side  and  thus  held  them  in  check,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  hoplites  did  not  advance  against  them, 
but  remained  quiet.  They  did,  however,  put  the 
light-armed  troops  to  flight  wherever  they  pressed 
most  closely  upon  them  in  their  charges  ;  and  then 
these  latter  would  wheel  about  and  keep  fighting, 
being  lightly  equipped  and  therefore  finding  it  easy 

271 


THUCYDIDES 

ραΒίω<;  της  φνγής  -χλωρίων  τ€  'χ^αλβττοτητί  καί 
υττο  της  ττρϊν  ερημιάς  τραγβων  όντων,  iv  οίς 
οί  Αακ^Βαίμόνίοι  ουκ  eBvvavro  Βιωκβιν  οττλα 
εχοντβς. 

XXXIV.  θρόνου  μεν  ουν  τίνα  υΧί^ον  ούτω 
προς  αΚΧηΧους  ηκροβο\ίσαντο•  των  δε  AaKeSat- 
μονίωνούκέτι  οξέως  βττεκθείν  f)  ττροσπυτττοιβν  δυνα- 
μένων, Ύνόντες  αυτούς  οι  λΙτιΧοΪ  βραδύτερους  η8η 
οντάς  τω  άμύνασθαι,  καΧ  αυτοί  ττ}  τ€  6\frei  του 
θαρσείν  το  ττΧεΙστον  είΧηφότες  ττοΧΧαττΧάσιοί 
φαινόμενοι  καΐ  ξυνειθισμένοι  μάΧΧον  μηκέτί 
δεινούς  αυτούς  ομοίως  σφισί  φαινεσθαι,  οτί  ουκ 
ευθύς  άξια  της  προσδοκίας  εττεττόνθεσαν,  ωσττερ 
οτε  πρώτον  άπεβαινον  ττ)  'γνώμτ]  δεδουΧωμενοι  ώς 
επΙ  Αακεδαι μ.ονίους,  καταφρονησαντε<  καΐ  εμβοή- 
σαντες  άθροοι  οψμησαν  έπ  αυτούς  και  εβαΧΧον 
Χίθοίς  τε  καΐ  τοξεύμασι  καΐ  άκοντίοις,  ώς  έκαστος 

2  τι  πρόχειρον  ειγεν.  γενομένης  δε  της  βοής  άμα 
Τ7}  επιδρομγι  εκπΧηξις  τε  ενεπεσεν  άνθρώποις 
άηθεσι  τοιαύτης  μά^ης  καΧ  ο  κονιορτος  της  νΧης 
νεωστι  κεκαυμενης  ε'χωρει  ποΧύς  άνω,  άπορόν  τε 
ην  ιδεΐν  το  προ  αυτού  ύπο  των  τοξευμάτων  καΐ 
Χίθων  άπο  ποΧΧών  ανθρώπων  μετά  τυύ  κονιορτοΰ 

3  άμα  φερομένων,  τό  τ  ε  ερ^ον  ενταύθα  -χ^αΧεπον 
τοις  Αακεδαιμονιοις  καθίστατο.  ούτε  yap  οι 
πΐΧοι  εστε^γον  τα  τοζεύματα,  δοράτιά  τε  εναπε- 


BOOK    IV'.  XXXIII.  2-xxxiv.  3 

to  take  to  flight  in  good  time,  since  the  ground  Avas 
difficult  and,  because  it  had  never  been  inhabited, 
was  naturally  rough.  Over  such  a  terrain  the  Lace- 
daemonians, Avho  Avere  in  heavy  armour,  were  unable 
to  pursue  them, 

XXXIV.  For  some  little  time  they  skirmished  thus 
with  one  another ;  but  Avhen  the  Lacedaemonians 
were  no  longer  able  to  dash  out  promptly  at  the  point 
where  they  Λvere  attacked,  the  light-armed  troops 
noticed  that  they  were  slackening  in  their  defence, 
and  also  conceived  the  greatest  confidence  in  them- 
selves, now  that  they  could  see  that  they  were 
undoubtedly  many  times  more  numerous  than  the 
enemy, and,  since  their  losses  had  from  the  outset  been 
less  heavy  than  they  had  expected,  they  had  gradu- 
ally become  accustomed  to  regarding  their  opponents 
as  less  formidable  than  they  had  seemed  at  their  first 
landing  Λvhen  their  own  spirits  were  oppressed  by 
the  thought  that  they  were  going  to  fight  against 
Lacedaemonians.  Conceiving,  therefore,  a  contempt 
for  them,  with  a  shout  they  charged  upon  them  in  a 
body,  hurling  at  them  stones,  arrows  or  javelins, 
whichever  each  man  had  at  hand.  The  shouting 
with  which  the  Athenians  accompanied  their  charge 
caused  consternation  among  the  Lacedaemonians, 
who  Avere  unaccustomed  to  this  manner  of  fighting  ; 
and  the  dust  from  the  neAvly-burned  forest  rose  in 
clouds  to  the  sky,  so  that  a  man  could  not  see  what 
was  in  front  of  him  by  reason  of  the  arroAvs  and 
stones,  hurled,  in  the  midst  of  the  dust,  by  many 
hands.  And  so  the  battle  began  to  go  hard  with 
the  Lacedaemonians;  for  their  felt  cuirasses  afforded 
them  no  protection  against  the  arrows,  and  the  points 
of  the  javelins  broke  olf  and  clung  there  when  the 

273 


THUCYDIDES 

κ€κ\αστο  βαΚλομβνων,  ^Ι'χ^όν  τε  ovZev  σφίσιν 
αύτοΐς  'χρήσασθαι  άττοκεκΧτ] μίνοί  μβν  rfj  6ψ€ί 
του  ττροοράν,  νπο  Se  της  μβίζονος  βοής  των 
■ποΧβμίων  τα  ev  αντοΐς  ΤΓαραγ^/€Χλ.όμ€να  ουκ 
€σακούοντ€ς,  κινδύνου  τ€  ττανταχόθβν  ττβρίβστώτο? 
και  ουκ  βχ^οντβς  iXTriSa  καθ^  6  τι  χρη  άμυνο- 
μβνους  σωθήναι. 

ΧΧΧΛ^.  Τελο?  δε  τ ραν ματ ιζο μίνων  ηΒΐ]  ττοΧλων 
Sia  το  ael  ev  τω  αύτω  άναστρίφεσθαι,  ζυ'γκΧϊ/- 
σαντβς  βγ^ώρησαν  ές  το  βσχ^ατον  βρνμα  της  νήσου, 

2  ο  ου  τΓοΧύ  αττβΐχβ,  καΐ  τους  βαυτών  φύΧακας.  ως 
δε  eviSoaav,  ενταύθα  ή8η  ττοΧΚω  βτί  TrXeovt  βοτ} 
τβθαρσηκοτ^ς  οι  ψιΧοΙ  βττβκβιντο,  καΐ  των  Αακβ- 
Βαιμονίων  όσοι  μεν  ύττοχ^ωροϋντες  εΎκατεΧαμβά- 
νοντο,  άτΓβθνγσκον,  οι  δε  ττοΧΧοΙ  Βιαφυιγόντες  ες 
το    ερυμα    μετά    των    ταυττ)    φυΧάκων    ετάξαντο 

3  Ίταρα  τταν  ως  άμυνούμενοι  /ιττερ  ην  εττίμαχον.  καΐ 
οι  Αθηναίοι  επισττόμενοι  ττεριοζον  μεν  αυτών  καΐ 
κύκΧωσιν  -χ^ωριου  Ισχυι  ουκ  ειχ^ον,  ττροσιοντες  δε 
εξ  εναντίας  ώσασθαι  εττειρώντο,  καΐ  γ^ρονον  μεν 
■ποΧύν  και  της  ημέρας  το  πΧεΐστον  ταΧαιττωρού- 
μενοι  αμφότεροι  ύττο  τε  της  μάχης  καΐ  δίψης  και 
ηΧίον  άντεΐχον,  ττειρώμενοι  οι  μεν  εζεΧάσασθαι 
εκ  του  μετεώρου,  οί  δε  μη  ivSovvar  ραον  δ'  οι 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι  ημύνοντο  η  εν  τω  -πριν,  ουκ  ούσης 
σφών  της  κυκΧώσεως  ες  τα  TrXdyia. 

XXXVI.  Εττείδλ)  δε  άττεραντον  ην,  ττροσεΧθών 
ό  των  ^ίεσσηνίων  στρατηγός  ΚΧεωνί  καΐ  Αημο- 
274 


BOOK    IV.  XXXIV.  3-XXXVI.  I 

men  were  struck.  They  Avere,  therefore,  quite  at 
their  wits'  end,  since  the  dust  shut  off  their  view 
ahead  and  they  could  not  hear  the  \vord  of  command 
on  their  own  side  because  the  enemy's  shouts  Avere 
louder.  Danger  encompassed  them  on  every  side  and 
they  desjjaired  of  any  means  of  defence  availing  to 
save  them. 

XXXV^  At  last  when  they  saw  that  their  men 
were  being  Avounded  in  large  numbers  because  they 
had  to  move  backwards  and  forwards  always  on  the 
same  ground,  they  closed  ranks  and  fell  back  to  the 
farthermost  fortification  on  the  island,  which  was  not 
far  distant,  and  to  their  own  garrison  stationed  there. 
But  the  moment  they  began  to  give  way,  tlie  light- 
armed  troops,  now  emboldened,  fell  upon  them  with 
a  louder  outcry  than  ever.  Those  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians who  were  intercepted  in  their  retreat  were 
slain,  but  the  majority  of  them  escaped  to  the  fortifi- 
cation, where  they  ranged  themselves  with  the 
garrison  there,  resolved  to  defend  it  at  every  point 
where  it  was  assailable.  The  Athenians  followed, 
but  the  position  was  so  strong  that  they  could  not 
outflank  and  surround  the  defenders.  They,  there- 
fore, tried  to  dislodge  them  by  a  frontal  attack. 
Now  for  a  long  time,  and  indeed  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  day,  in  spite  of  the  distress  from  the  battle, 
from  thirst,  and  from  the  heat  of  the  sun,  both  sides 
held  out,  the  one  trying  to  drive  the  enemy  from  the 
heights,  the  other  merely  to  hold  their  ground  ;  the 
Lacedaemonians,  however,  now  found  it  easier  than 
before  to  defend  themselves,  since  they  could  not  be 
taken  in  flank. 

XXXVL   But  when  the  business  seemed  intermin- 
able, tlie  general  ^  of  the  Messenians  came  to  Cleon 
*  Naniud  (-'onion,  according  to  Paus.  iv.  xxvi.  2. 

275 


THUCYDIDES 

aOevei  άλλως  εφη  πονεΐν  σφάς•  el  Se  βονΧονται 
εαυτω  Souvat  των  τοξοτών  μβρος  τι  καΐ  των 
ψιΧών  Trepiievai  κατά  νώτου  αύτοΐς  όΒω  ^  αν 
αύτ09     εύρτ],    Βοκβΐν    βιάσασθαι  ^     την     βφοΒον, 

2  Χαβων  δε  α  γιτησατο,  εκ  του  άφανοΰς  όρμησα<; 
ώστε  μη  Ihelv  εκείνους,  κατά  το  αίεϊ  παρεΐκον 
του  κρημνώ8ου<;  της  νήσου  ττροβαίνων  καΐ  y  oi 
ΑακεΒαιμόνιοί  γ^ωρΊου  ίσγύί  ττιστευσαντες  ουκ 
εφύΧασσον,  -χαΧεττως  τε  καΐ  μόΧις  ττεριεΧθων 
εΧαθε,  καΐ  εττΐ  του  μετεώρου  εξαττίνης  αναφανείς 
κατά  νώτου  αυτών  τους  μεν  τω  άΖοκητω  εζε- 
ττΧηξε,  τους  δε  α  ττροσεΕεχ^οντο    ίΒόντας   ττοΧΧω 

3  μαΧΧον  εττέρρωσεν.  καΐ  οΐ  ΑακεΒαιμόνιοί  βαΧΧό- 
μενοί  τ€  άμφοτερωθεν  η8η  καΐ  ηΐ'^/νόμενοι  εν  τω 
αύτω  ξυμτΓτώματι,  ώς  μικρόν  /χεγάλω  είκάσαι, 
τω  εν  θερμοπύΧαις  (εκείνοι  τε  <yap  τ^  άτραπω 
ττεριεΧθόντων  των  ΐίερσών  Βιεφθάρησαν  ουτοί 
τε),  άμφίβοΧοί  η8η  οντες  ούκέτί  άντεΐχον,  άΧΧά 
ΤΓοΧΧοΐς  τε  oXlyoi  μαχόμενοι  καΐ  ασθένεια  σω- 
μάτων Βια  την  σιτοΒείαν  υττεχώρουν  και  οι 
^Αθηναίοι  εκράτουν  ή8η  των  εφό8ων. 

XXXVII.  Γνούς  δε  6  Κ,Χεων  καϊ  6  Δημοσθένης, 
ei  καϊ  όττοσονοΰν  μαΧΧον  ενΖωσουσι,  Βιαφθαρη- 
σομενους  αυτούς  ύττο  της  σφετερας  στρατιάς, 
ετταυσαν  την  μάχ^ην  καϊ  τους  εαυτών  άττεΐρζαν, 
βουΧόμενοί  άηαηείν  αυτούς  "" Χθηναίοις  ζώντας,  el 

1  As  the  MS8. ;  Hude  βιάσίσθαι,  after  Madvig. 
276 


BOOK    IV.  XXXVI.  I -XXXVII.  i 

and  Demosthenes  and  said  that  their  side  was 
wasting  its  pains ;  but  if  they  \vere  willing  to  give 
him  a  portion  of  their  bowmen  and  light-armed 
troops,  so  that  he  could  get  round  in  the  enemy's 
rear  by  some  path  or  other  which  he  might  himself 
discover,  he  thought  that  he  could  force  the  approach. 
Obtaining  what  he  asked  for,  he  started  from  a  point 
out  of  the  enemy's  sight,  so  as  not  to  be  observed  by 
them,  and  advanced  along  the  precipitous  shore  of 
the  island,  wherever  it  offered  a  foothold,  to  a  point 
where  the  Lacedaemonians,  trusting  to  the  strength 
of  the  position,  maintained  no  guard.  Thus  with  great 
difficulty  he  barely  succeeded  in  getting  round 
unobserved  and  suddenly  appeared  on  the  high 
ground  in  the  enemy's  rear,  striking  them  with 
consternation  by  this  unexpected  move,  but  far  more 
encouraging  his  friends,  who  now  saw  what  they 
were  expecting.  The  Lacedaemonians  ΛνεΓβ  now 
assailed  on  both  sides,  and — to  compare  a  small  affair 
with  a  great  one — were  in  the  same  evil  case  as 
they  had  been  at  Thermopylae  ;  for  there  they  had 
perished  when  the  Persians  got  in  their  rear  by  the 
path,i  and  here  they  were  caught  in  the  same  way. 
Since,  then,  they  Λvere  noAv  assailed  on  both  sides 
they  no  longer  held  out,  but,  fighting  few  against 
many  and  withal  weak  in  body  from  lack  of  food, 
they  began  to  give  way.  And  the  Athenians  by  this 
time  were  in  possession  of  the  approaches. 

XXXVIL  But  Cleon  and  Demosthenes,  realizing 
that  if  the  enemy  should  give  back  ever  so  little 
more  they  would  be  destroyed  by  the  Athenian  army, 
put  a  stop  to  the  battle  and  held  back  their  own 
men,  wishing  to  deliver  them  alive  to  the  Athenians 
1  cf.  Hdt.  vii.  213. 

«77 


THUCYDIDES 

ττω?  τον  κηρν^ματο<;  άκούσαντ£<;  €7Γΐκ\ασθεί€ν 
TTJ  ιγνώμτ]^  καΐ  ησσηθεΐβν  του  τταρόντος  Seivov, 
2  βκηρυζάν  τβ,  el  βοϋΧονται,  τα  6π\α  τταρα^ουναι 
και  σφάς  αυτούς  ΐ^θηναίοις  ώστε  βουΧβΰσαί  6  τι 
αν  εκείνοις  SoKrj. 

ΧΧΧΛ'^ΙΙΙ.  Οί  δέ  άκούσαντ€<;  τταρεΐσαν  τας 
ασττίδας•  οΐ  ττΧβΐστοί-  καΐ  τας  'χβϊρα<ζ  άνεσβίσαν 
8η\ονντ€<;  ττροσίβσθαι  τα  κβκηρν^/μβνα.  μετά  δε 
ταύτα  Ύενομίρης  τή•ς  άνοκωχ^ής  ξννηΧθον  ες  Χορούς 
6  τε  Κ,Χεων  καΐ  ο  Δημοσθένης  καΐ  εκείνων  Χτύφων 
6  Φάρακος,  των  ττρότερον  άρχ^όντων  του  μεν 
ττρώτου  τεθν7]κότος,  Έττίταδου,  του  δε  μετ^  αύτον 
Ίττττα'γρετου  εφ^ρημενου  εν  τοις  νεκροΐς  ετι  ζώντος 
κειμένου  ώς  τεθνεώτος.  αύτος  τρίτος  εφ^ρημένος 

2  άρ'χειν  κατά  νόμον,  εΐ  νι  εκείνοι  ττάσχοίει/.  έλε^ε 
δε  ό  Χτύφων  καΐ  οΐ  μετ  αυτού  οτι  βούΧονται 
Βιακηρνκεύσασθαι  ττρος  τους  εν  τΐ]  ηττειρω  Αακε- 

3  δαιμόνιους  6  τι  χρη  σφάς  ττοιεΐν.  και  εκείνων 
μεν  ούδένα  άφιέντων,  αυτών  δε  των  ^Αθηναίων 
καΧούντων  εκ  της  ηττείρου  κήρυκας  καΐ  γενομένων 
επερωτήσεων  h\ς  η  τρις,  6  τεΧευταΐος  ΒιαττΧεύσας 
αύτοΐς  άττο  τών  εκ  της  ηπείρου  Αακε8αιμονίωι^ 
ανηρ  άττηγγειΧεν  οτι  "  Αακε8αιμόνιοι  κεΧεύουσιν 
υμάς  αυτούς  ττερί  υμών  αυτών  βουΧεύεσθαι  μηΒέν 
αίσχρον  ΊΓΟιούντας"  οί  δε  καθ^  εαυτούς  βου- 
Χευσάμενοι  τα  οττΧα  τταρέδοσαν  καΐ  σφάς  αυτούς. 

^  After  τί)  "γνωμ-ρ  the  MSS.  have  τά  3πλα  irapaSodvai,  which 
most  recent  editors  delete,  after  Kriiger. 

278 


BOOK    IV.  xxxvii.  i-xxxviii.  3 

and  in  hopes  that  possibly,  when  they  heard  the 
herald's  proclamation,  they  would  be  broken  in  spirit 
and  submit  to  the  present  danger.  Accordingly,  they 
caused  the  herald  to  ])roclaim  that  they  might,  if 
they  wished,  surrender  themselves  and  their  arms 
to  the  Athenians,  these  to  decide  their  fate  as  should 
seem  good  to  them. 

XXXVIII.  When  the  Lacedaemonians  heard  this, 
most  of  them  lowered  their  shields  and  waved  their 
hands,  indicating  that  they  accepted  the  terms 
proposed.  An  armistice  was  then  arranged  and  a 
conference  Λvas  held,  Cleon  and  Demosthenes  repre- 
senting the  Athenians  and  Styphon  son  of  Pharax 
the  Lacedaemonians.  Of  the  earlier  Lacedaemonian 
commanders  the  first,  Ej)itadas,  had  been  slain  and 
Hippagretas,  who  had  been  chosen  as  next  in  suc- 
cession, now  lay  among  the  fallen  and  was  accounted 
dead,  though  he  was  still  alive;  and  Styphon  was 
third  in  succession,  having  been  originally  chosen, 
as  the  law  prescribed,  to  be  in  command  in  case 
anything  should  happen  to  the  other  two.  He 
then,  and  those  with  him,  said  that  they  wished  to 
send  a  herald  over  to  the  Lacedaemonians  on  the 
mainland  to  ask  what  they  must  do.  The  Athenians, 
however,  would  not  let  any  of  them  go,  but  them- 
selves summoned  heralds  from  the  mainland ;  then, 
after  interrogatories  had  been  exchanged  two  or 
three  times,  the  last  man  who  came  over  to  them 
from  the  Lacedaemonians  on  the  mainland  brought 
this  message  :  ''The  Lacedaemonians  bid  you  decide 
your  case  for  yourselves,  but  do  nothing  dishonour- 
able." So  they  took  counsel  Avith  one  another  and 
then  surrendered  themselves  and  their  arms.   Durinji 


279 


THUCYDIDES 

4  καΐ  ταύτην  μεν  την  ημέραν  καϊ  την  €πιονσαν 
νύκτα  iv  ψυΧακτ}  el-χον  αύτού<;  οί  ΑθηναΙοί'  τι)  δ' 
υστβραία  οί  μεν  ^ λθηναίοι  τροτταΐον  στησαντε<ζ  iv 
rfj  νήσω  ταλλα  Βιεσκβυάζοντο  ώς  ες  ττΧοΰν  καϊ 
τους  άνδρας  τοΐς  τριηράρχοις  Βίέ8οσαν  ες  φυΧα- 
κήν,  οί  δέ  ΛακεΒαιμόνιοί  κήρυκα  ττεμψαντες  τους 

ο  νεκρούς  Βιεκομίσαντο,  αττεθανον  δ'  εν  Tr}  νήσφ 
καϊ  ζώντες  εΧήφθ ήσαν  τοσοίΒε-  είκοσι  μεν  όττΧΐται 
διέβησαν  καϊ  τετρακόσιοι  οί  πάντες'  τούτων 
ζώντες  εκομισθ7]σαν  οκτώ  άττοδέοντες  τριακόσιοι, 
οί  δε  άΧΧοι  αττεθανον.  καϊ  Έ-τταρτιαται  τούτων 
ήσαν  τών  ζώντων  ττερί  είκοσι  και  εκατόν.  * Α,θη- 
ναίων  όε  ου  ττοΧΧοΙ  Βιεφθάρησαν  ή  yap  μάχη  ου 
σταδία  >]ν. 

XXXIX.  θρόνος  δβ  ό  ζύμττας  ε^ενετο  όσον  οί 
άνδρες  εν  ttj  νήσω  εττοΧιορκήθησαν,  άττό  της 
ναυμαχίας  μ^χρι  της  εν  ττ}  νήσω  μάχης,  εβδομή- 

2  κοντά  ημεραι  καϊ  δύο.  τούτων  ττερΙ  είκοσι 
ημέρας,  εν  αίς  οι  -πρέσβεις  ττερϊ  τών  σττονδών  αίτη- 
σαν, εσιτοδοτούντο,  τάς  δε  άΧΧας  τοις  εσττΧεουσι 
Χάθρα  διετρεφοντο'  καϊ  ην  σΐτός  τις  εν  ττ)  νήσω 
καϊ  άΧΧα  βρώματα  ε^κατεΧήφθη'  ό  ηάρ  άρχων 
ΈτΓίτάδας  εΐ'δεεστέρως  εκάστω  τταρείχεν  η  ττρος 
την  εξουσίαν. 

3  Οί  μεν  δη  ^Αθηναίοι  καϊ  οί  ΐΙεΧοττοννήσιοι 
άνεχώρησαν  τω  στρατω  εκ  της  ΏύΧου  εκάτεροι 
εττ  οϊκου,  καϊ  του  Κ,Χεωνος  καίττερ  μανιώδης 
ούσα  η  ύττόσχεσις  αττεβη'  εντός  yap  εϊκοσι 
ημερών  ηyayε  τους  άνδρας,  ώσττερ  υττεστη. 
XL.  Ίταρά  yvώμηv  τε  δη  μάΧιστα  τών  κατά  τον 
ττόΧεμον  τούτο   τοις  "ΚΧΧησιν  εyevετo'  τους  yap 


2δθ 


BOOK    IV.  XXXVIII.  4-xL.  i 

that  day  and  the  following  night  the  Athenians  kept 
them  under  guard  ;  but  on  the  next  day,  after  setting 
up  a  trophy  on  the  island,  they  made  all  their 
preparations  to  sail,  distributing  the  prisoners  among 
the  trierarchs  for  safe-keeping  ;  and  the  Lacedae- 
monians sent  a  herald  and  brought  their  dead  to  the 
mainland.  The  number  of  those  who  had  been 
killed  or  taken  alive  on  the  island  was  as  follows : 
four  hundred  and  twenty  hoplites  had  crossed  over 
in  all  ;  of  these  two  hundred  and  ninety  two  were 
brought  to  Athens  alive ;  all  the  rest  had  been  slain. 
Of  those  who  survived  one  hundred  and  twenty 
were  Spartans.^  Of  the  Athenians,  however,  not 
many  perished  ;  for  it  was  not  a  pitched  battle. 

XXXIX.  The  time  during  which  the  men  on  the 
island  were  under  blockade,  from  the  sea  fight  up  to 
the  battle  on  the  island,  amounted  all  told  to  seventy- 
two  days.  For  about  twenty  of  these  days,  the 
period  during  which  the  envoys  were  absent  nego- 
tiating the  truce,  they  were  regularly  provisioned, 
but  the  rest  of  the  time  they  lived  on  Avhat  was 
smuggled  in.  And  indeed  some  grain  Avas  found 
on  the  island  at  the  time  of  the  capture,  as  well  as 
other  articles  of  food  ;  for  the  commander  Epitadas 
was  accustomed  to  give  each  man  a  scantier  ration 
than  his  supplies  would  have  allowed. 

The  Athenians  and  Peloponnesians  now  withdrew 
from  Pylos  and  returned  home  with  their  respective 
forces,  and  Cleon's  promise,  mad  as  it  was,  had  been 
fulfilled  ;  for  within  twenty  days  he  brought  the  men 
as  he  had  undertaken  to  do.  XL.  Of  all  the  events 
of  this  war  this  came  as  the  greatest  surprise  to  the 
Hellenic  world  ;  for  men  could  not  conceive  that  the 

1  i.e.  citizens  of  Sparta,  the  rest  being  from  the  neigh- 
bouring towns  of  the  Perioeci  ;  cf.  oh.  viii.  1. 

281 
voi.   η  Κ 


THUCYDIDES 

ΑακεΒαιμοΐ'ίον;  ovre  \ιμγ  οΰτ*  civayKij  ού^βμιά 
ηζίονν  τα  οττΧα  τταραΖυύναί,  ά\\α  βχ^οντα^;  καϊ 
2  μαχ^ομίνους  έως  β8ύναντο  άττοθι>τ]σκ€ίν,  άττι- 
σ~ονΐ'Τ€<;  ^  μη  eh>aL  τους  τταρα^όντα'^  τοις  τεθνβω- 
σιν  ομοίους.  και  τίνος  έρομένου  ττοτε  ύστερον 
των  \\θηναίων  ξυμμάχων  δί'  άχ^θηΒόνα  ^  eva  των 
εκ  της  νήσου  αΙχμαΧωτων  εΐ  οι  τεθιεώτες  αυτών 
καΧοί  KayaOoL,  αττεκρινατο  αυτω  ττοΧΧοΰ  αν  αζιον 
elvat  τον  ατρακτον,  Xeyωv  τον  οίστόν,  εΐ  τους 
άyaθυύς  hιeyίyvωσκε,  ΖήΧωσιν  ττοίούμ^νος  οτι  6 
εvτυyχ^άvωv  τοις  τε  Χίθοις  καϊ  τοζεύμασι  Βιεφ- 
θείρετο. 

XLT.  Κομισθά'των  Be  των  άΐ'Βρών  οι  \\θηναΐοι 
εβούΧευσαν  Βεσμοΐς  μεν  αυτούς  φυλάσσειν  μ^χρι 
ού  τι  ξυμβώσιν,  ην  δ  οΐ  ΤΙεΧοττοννήσιοι,  ττρο 
τούτου    ες     την    yrjv     εσβάΧΧωσιν,    εξayayόvτες 

2  άτΓΟΚτεΐναι.  της  Βε  ΤΙύΧου  φυλακην  κατεστή- 
σαντο,  Α-αΙ  οι  εκ  της  Ναυττάκτου  ^Ιεσσήιιοί  ώς 
ες  ττατρίΒα  ταύτην  {εστί  yap  η  ΥΙύΧος  της  ^Ιεσση- 
Ί'ίόος  ττοτε  ούσης  yής)  ττεμψαντες  σφών  αυτών 
τους  ετΓίτηΒειοτάτονς  εΧτ]ζοντό  τε  την  Αακωνικήν 

3  καϊ  Ίτλεϊστα  εβΧατττον  ομόφωνοι  οντες.  οι  8ε 
Αακεοαιμονιοι  άμαθεΐς  οντες  εν  τω  ττρΧν  "χ^ρόνω 
Χ]]στείας  καΐ  τοΰ  τοιούτον  ττοΧεμον,  τών  τε 
ΚίΧώτων  αύτομοΧούντων  καϊ  φοβούμενοι  μη  καΐ 
εττΐ  μακρότερον  σφισι  τι  νεωτερισθτ}  τών  κατά 
την  'χ^ίόραν,  ού  ραΒιως  εφερον,  άΧΧά,  καίττερ  ού 
βουΧόμενοι  ενΒ7]Χοι  είναι  τοις  \\θηναίοις,  εττρεσ- 

^  So  Hude,  with  Μ  ;  most  other  MSS.  Λτηστονντίί  re. 
^  hi  άχθηΒόνα,  deleted  by  Hude,  after  Rutherford, 
282 


BOOK    IV.  XL.  i-xLi.  3 

Lacedaemonians  would  ever  be  induced  by  hunger 
or  any  other  compulsion  to  give  up  their  arms,  but 
thought  that  they  Avould  keep  them  till  they  died, 
fighting  as  long  as  they  were  able  ;  and  they  could 
not  believe  that  those  who  had  surrendered  were  as 
brave  as  those  who  had  fallen.  And  when  one  of  the 
Athenian  allies  sometime  afterwards  sneeringly  asked 
one  of  the  captives  taken  on  the  island,  Avhether  the 
Lacedaemonians  Λνΐιο  had  been  slain  were  brave  men 
and  true,^  the  answer  was,  that  the  shaft,  meaning 
the  arrow,  would  be  worth  a  great  deal  if  it  could 
distinguish  the  brave,  intimating  that  it  was  a  mere 
matter  of  chance  who  was  hit  and  killed  by  stones 
and  bow-shots. 

XLL  VViien  the  captives  were  brought  to  Athens, 
the  Athenians  determined  to  keep  them  in  prison 
until  some  agreement  should  be  reached,  but  if 
before  that  the  Peloponnesians  should  invade  their 
territory,  to  bring  them  out  and  put  them  to  death. 
They  also  placed  a  garrison  in  Pylos,  and  the  Messen- 
ians  at  Naupactus,  regarding  this  territory  as  their 
fatherland — for  Pylos  belongs  to  the  country  that 
was  once  Messenia — sent  thither  such  of  their  own 
number  as  were  best  fitted  for  the  task  and  proceeded 
to  ravage  the  Laconian  territory,  and  they  did  a 
great  deal  of  damage,  since  they  were  men  of  the 
same  speech  as  the  inhabitants.  As  for  the  Lace- 
daemonians, they  had  never  before  experienced  pre- 
datory warfare  of  this  kind,  and  therefore,  when  the 
Helots  began  to  desert  and  there  was  reason  to  fear 
that  the  revolutionary  movement  might  gain  still 
further  headway  in  their  territory,  they  were  uneasy, 
and,  in  spite  of  their  desire  not  to  betray  their  alarm 

'  Implying  that  the  survivors  were  not. 

283 


THUCYDIDES 

βεύοντο  Trap  αυτούς  κα\  εττειρώντο  την  re  ΤΙύΧον 
4  καΐ  Touv  avhpa^  κομίζβσθαι.  οΐ  Be  μβιζόνων  re 
(upe'^fovro  και  ττοΧΧακι^  φοιτώντων  αυτούς  αττρακ- 
Tovi  άπ€7Γ6/χ7Γ0Ζ/.  ταύτα  μεν  τα  irepl  Πυλοζ^ 
yevopeva. 

XLII,  Ύοΰ  δ  αυτού  θερου•^  μετά  ταύτα  ευθύς 
Αθηναίοι  e?  την  Κορινθίαν  εστράτευσαν  ναυσίν 
oySot'jKovTa  καΐ  Βισχ^ιΧίοις  όττΧίταις  εαυτών  και 
εν  ίΤΓΤΓ αγωγοί?  ναυσΐ  Βιακοσίοις  ΙττΎτεύσιν  ηκο- 
Χουθονν  Βε  και  των  ζυμμά-^ων  \\ι\ησιοί  καΐ 
"ΑνΒριοι    καΐ    Κ.αρύστιοι,    εστρατψ/ει   Βε    οικίας 

2  ό  Νικηράτου  τρίτος  αυτός.  ττΧεοιτες  Βε  άμα  εω 
εσ'χ^ον  μεταξύ  Χερσονήσου  τε  και  'Petrol/  ες  τον 
aiyiaXov  τού  'χλωρίου  ύττερ  ου  6  Έ^o\ύyειoς  Χόφος 
εστίν,  εφ'  ον  Αωριής  το  ττάΧαι  ιΒρυθεντες  τοις  εν 
τη  ττόΧει  Κ,ορινθίοις  εποΧεμουν  ούσιν  ΑίοΧεύσιν 
και  κώμη  νύν  eV  αυτού  'S.oXoyeia  καΧουμενη 
εστίν.  άτΓο  Βε  τού  alyiaXo^  τούτου  ένθα  αϊ  νήες 
κατεσγον  η  μεν  κώμη  αύτη  ΒώΒεκα  σταΒίους 
άττεχ^ει,    η   Be    Ιίορινθίων    ττοΧις    εζήκοντα,   ό    Be 

3  Ισθμός  είκοσι.  Κορίνθιοι  Βε  ττροττυθόμενοι  εξ 
"Αργονς  ΟΤΙ  η  στρατιά,  ηξει  των  Αθηναίων  εκ 
ττΧείονος  εβοήθησαν  ες  Ισθμον  πάντες  ττΧην  των 
εξω  ισθμού'  και  ev  \Αμπρακία  και  εν  ΑενκάΒι 
άττήσαν  αυτών  ττεντακόσιοι  φρουροί'  οι  δ'  άΧΧοι 
ττανΒημεΙ    επετήρουν    τους   ^Αθηναίους    οΐ    κατα- 

^  At  the  time  when  the  Dorians,  under  the  leadership  of 
the  Heracleidae,  got  possession  of  the  Pelopouuesus  {cf.  i. 
xii.  3).     See  Busolt,  Gr.  ae^ch.  i^.  208. 

284 


BOOK    IV.  xu.  3-xLii.  3 

to  the  Athenians,  kept  sending  envoys  to  them  in  the 
endeavour  to  recover  Pylos  and  the  prisoners.  But 
the  Athenians  constantly  made  greater  demands  and 
the  envoys,  althougli  they  came  again  and  again,  were 
always  sent  home  unsuccessful.  Such  were  the 
events  at  Pylos. 

XLII.  During  the  same  summer  and  directly  after 
these  events  the  Athenians  made  an  expedition  into 
Corinthian  territory  with  eighty  ships  and  two 
thousand  Athenian  hoplites,  together  with  two  hun- 
dred cavalry  on  board  horse-transports;  allied  forces 
also  went  with  them,  namely  Milesian,  Andrian,  and 
Carvstian  troops,  the  whole  being  under  the  command 
of  Nicias  son  of  Niceratus  and  two  others.  These 
sailed  and  at  day-break  landed  midway  between  the 
peninsula  Cliersonesus  and  the  stream  Rheitus,  at 
a  point  on  the  beach  over  which  rises  the  Solygeian 
hill — the  iiill  where  the  Dorians  in  olden  times  ^ 
established  themselves  when  they  made  Λvar  upon  the 
Corinthians  in  the  city,  who  were  Aeolians;  and  there 
is  still  on  the  hill  a  village  called  Solygeia.  From 
this  point  on  the  beach  where  the  ships  put  in  to  shore 
this  village  is  twelve  stadia  distant,  the  city  of  Corinth 
sixty,  and  the  Isthmus  twenty.  But  the  Corinthians, 
having  previous  information  from  Argos  that  the 
Athenian  army  would  come,  had  long  before  occu- 
pied the  Isthmus  witli  all  their  forces,  except  those 
who  dwelt  north  of  the  Isthmus  and  five  hun- 
dred Corinthians  w  ho  were  away  doing  garrison  duty 
in  Ambracia  -  and  Leucas ;  all  the  rest  to  a  man 
were  now  there,  watching  to  see  where  the  Athenians 

-  Three  hundred  of  these  had  been  sent  the  previous 
winter  to  Ambracia,  which  Avas  a  Corintliian  colony  ;  c/.  iii. 
cxiv.  4. 

285 


THUCYDIDES 

4  σχ^ησονσιν.  ώς  Be  αυτού?  βΧαθον  ρυκτός  κατά• 
ττΧίύσαντες  και  τα  σημεία αύτοΐς  ήρθη,  καταΧι- 
ΤΓοζ'τε?  τοι)?  ήμίσεις  αΰτων  ev  Keyxpeid,  ην  άρα 
οι  Αθηναίοι  eVl  τον  Κρομμνωνα  ΐωσιν,  εβοήθουν 
κατά  τα^ο?. 

XLIII.  Kat  Βάττο?  μβν  ο  έ'τε/30?  το^ν  στρατη- 
γών {Βνο  <γαρ  ήσαν  ev  τη  μ^Ίχη  οι  7ταρόντε<ί) 
Χαβων  Χόχον  ηΧθβν  εττΐ  την  XoXvyeiav  κώμην 
φυΧάξων   άτβίχιστον   ονσαν,    Ανκόφρων    Se    τοϊς 

2  ά'λλοί?  ξυνεβαΧβν.  καΐ  ττρώτα  μεν  τω  Ββξιω 
κέρα  των  Αθηναίων  ευθύς  άττοβεβηκότι  ττρο  τ?;? 
Ύ^ερσονησον  οι  Ιίαρινθιοί  εττέκειντο,  εττειτα  Be  και 
τω  άΧΧω  στρατενματι.      κ  αϊ   ην   ι)  μάχη  καρτερά 

3  και  εν  χερσί  ττάσα.  καΐ  το  μεν  Βεζών  κερα<;  των 
^Αθηναίων  καΐ  Καρυστίων  (ούτοι  yap  τταρα- 
τεταγμενοι  ήσαν  εσχ^ατοι)  εΒέξαντό  Τ€  τους 
Κορινθίους  και  εώσαντο  μόΧις'  οι  Βε  ύττοχωρή- 
σαντες  ττρος  αίμασιάν  (ην  yap  το  χωρίον  ττρόσ- 
αντες  ττάν)  βάΧΧοντες  τοΐς  Χίθοις  καθύττερθεν 
οντες  καΐ  τταιανισαντες  εττησαν  αύθις,  Βεζαμενων 
Βε    των  \\θηναίων  εν   χερσίν   ην  ττάΧιν    ?]   μάχη. 

4  Χοχος  οε  τις  των  Κορινθίων  εττιβοηθήσας  τω 
εύωνυμω  κέρα  εαυτών  έτρεψε  τών  ^Αθηναίων  το 
Βεξίον  κέρας  και  εττεΒίωξεν  ες  την  θάΧασσαν 
πάλιν  Βε  άττο  τών  νεών  άνεστρεψαν  οι  τε  ^Αθη- 
ναίοι και  οι  Καρύστιοι.  το  Βε  άΧΧο  στρατόττεΒον 
άμφοτέρωθεν  εμάχετο  ξννεχώς,  μάΧιστα  Be  το 
Βεξιον  κέρας    τών    Κορινθίων,  εφ'    ω   ό  Αυκόφρων 


'  The  Corinthian  eastern  haven,   seventy  stadia  from  the 
city. 
^  The  chief  place  on  this  coastline  between  the  Isthmus 

286 


BOOK    IV.  xLii.  3-XU11.  4 

would  land.  But  when  the  Athenians  eluded  them 
by  making  their  landing  by  night  and  the  Corin- 
thians were  notified  by  the  raising  of  fire-signals^  these 
left  half  of  their  troops  at  Cenchraeae/  in  case  the 
Athenians  should  after  all  go  against  Crommyon^^ 
and  in  haste  rushed  to  the  defence. 

XLIII.  Thereupon  Battus,oneof  the  twoCorinthian 
generals  present  at  the  battle,  took  a  company  and 
went  to  the  village  of  Solygeia,  whicli  was  unwalled, 
to  guard  it,  Avhile  Lycophron  attacked  with  the 
remainder  of  their  troops.  Now  at  first  the  Corinth- 
ians assailed  the  right  Aving  of  the  Athenians,  which 
had  just  disembarked  in  front  of  Chersonesus,  and 
afterAvards  engaged  the  rest  of  the  army  also.  The 
battle  was  stubbornly  contested  throughout  and 
fought  at  close  quarters.  The  Athenian  right 
wing,  at  whose  extremity  were  stationed  the 
Carystians,  received  the  charge  of  the  Corinthians 
and  drove  them  back,  though  with  difficulty ;  but 
tlie  latter  retreated  to  a  stone  fence  and,  since 
the  ground  was  everywhere  a  steep  slope,  pelted 
the  Athenians  with  stones,  being  on  higher  ground, 
and  then,  raising  the  paean,  charged  a  second 
time.  The  Athenians  received  the  charge  and  the 
battle  was  again  waged  at  close  quarters.  Then  a 
company  of  the  Corinthians,  reinforcing  their  own 
left  wing,  routed  the  right  wing  of  the  Athenians 
and  pursued  it  to  the  sea ;  but  again  upon  reaching 
the  ships  the  Athenians  and  Caiystians  rallied.  The 
other  divisions  of  the  two  armies  were  continuously 
engaged,  especially  the  right  Λving  of  the  Corinthians, 
where    Lycophron    was    in     command     against    the 

and  Wegara,  some  120  stadia  from  Corinth,  known  as  the 
haunt  of  the  wild  boar  killed  by  Theseus  (Paus.  i.  xxvii.  9  ; 
II.  i.  3). 

287 


THUCYDIDES 

ων  κατά  ro  εύωννμον  των  Αθηναίων  ημύνετο' 
ηΧτηζον  yap  αυτου•^  εττί.  την  XoXvyeiav  κώμην 
Treipaaeiv. 

XLIV.  Χρόνον  μβν  ουν  ττόΧυν  αντ^Ιγον  ουκ  ivBi- 
Βόντβς  ά\Χη\οι^'  €7Γ€ίτα  (ήσαν  yap  τοις  Άθηναίοις 
οι  ίττΊτής  ωφεΚιμοί  ξυμμαχ^όμβνοι,  των  έτερων  ουκ 
εχόντων  ϊτητους)  ετράττοντο  οΐ  Κ,ορίνθιοί  καΐ 
ΰττε'χ^ώρησαν  ττρο?  τον  Χοφον  καΐ  εθεντο  τα  οττλα 

2  κα\  ούκέτί  κατεβαινον,  αλλ,'  ησύγ^αζον.  εν  he  ττ} 
τροτΓΤ]  ταύτη  κατά  το  8εζιον  κέρας  οι  πλείστοι  re 
αυτών  άττεθανον  καΐ  Αυκόφρων  ο  στρατηγός,  η 
δε  άΧλη  στρατιά  τυντω  τω  τρόπω  ου  κατά  δίωξιν 
TToWrjV  ούΒε  ταγείας  φυγτ}?  γενομένης,  εττεϊ 
εβίάσθη,  ετταναχ^ωρησασα  ττρος  τα  μετέωρα 
ΙΒρύθη.     οΐ  ^ε   Αθηναίοι,  ώς  ούκέτι  αύτοΐς  έπτυσαν 

3  e*f  μά'χΐ'ΐν,  τους  τε  νεκρούς  εσκύΧευον  καϊ  τους 
εαυτών   άνηροΰντο,  τροτταΐον  τε   ευθέως   έστησαν. 

4  τοις  δ'  ημίσεσί  τών  Κ^ορίνθίων,  οΊ  εν  τη  \^.ε'/\ρ€ΐα 
εκάθηντο  φύλακες,  μη  εττΐ  τον  Κ.ρομμυώια  ττΧευ- 
σωσι,  τούτοις  ου  κατίίόηλος  ή  μάχη  ην  ύττο  του 
ορούς  του  ^Ονείου'  κονιορτον  δε  ώς  elhov  καϊ  ώς 
έγνωσαν,  εβοήθουν  ευθύς,  εβοήθησαν  δε  καϊ  οι  εκ 
της  ττόΧεως   πρεσβύτεροι   τών   Κ.ορινθίων    αίσθο- 

5  μενοι  το  ηε^ενημενον.  ιΒόντες  δε  οι  ^Αθηναίοι 
ξύμπαντας  αυτούς  επιοντας  καϊ  νομισαντες  τών 
iyyii^  άστυyειτovωv  ΪΙεΧοποννησίων  βοήθειαν 
επιέναι,  άνεχώρουν  κατά  τάχος  επΙ  τάς  ναΰς, 
έχοντες  τά  σκυΧεύματα  και  τους  εαυτών  νεκρούς 
πΧην  Βυοΐν,  ους  εyκaτελιπov  ου  δυνάμενοι  εύρεΐν. 

28S 


BOOK    IV.  xLiii.  4-xMV.  5 

Athenian  left  and  kept  it  in  check  ;  for  they  ex- 
pected the  Athenians  to  make  an  attempt  against 
the  village  of  Solygeia. 

XLIV.  For  a  long  time  they  held  out,  neither  side 
yielding  to  the  other.  Then  as  the  Athenians  had 
an  advantage  in  the  support  of  their  cavalry,  whereas 
the  other  side  had  no  horses,  the  Corinthians  turned 
and  retired  to  the  hill,  where  they  halted,  and  did 
not  come  down  again  but  remained  quiet.  In  this 
repulse  it  was  on  their  right  wing  that  most  of  the 
Corinthians  that  Avere  lost  were  killed,  among  them 
Lycophron  the  general.  But  the  rest  of  the  Corinthian 
army  retired  in  this  manner — there  was  no  long 
pursuit  nor  hasty  flight,  but  when  it  Avas  forced 
back,  it  withdre\v  to  the  higher  ground  and  there 
established  itself.  As  for  the  Athenians,  when  the 
enemy  no  longer  came  against  them  and  offered 
battle,  they  stripped  the  corpses,  took  up  their  own 
dead,  and  straightway  set  up  a  trophy.  Meanwhile 
the  other  half  of  the  Corinthian  forces,  which  was 
stationed  at  Cenchraeae  as  a  garrison  to  prevent  the 
Athenians  from  making  a  descent  upon  Crommyon, 
were  unable  to  see  the  battle  because  Mt.  Oneium 
intervened  ;  but  Avhen  they  saw  the  cloud  of  dust  and 
realized  Avhat  was  going  on,  they  rushed  thither  at 
once,  as  did  also  the  older  men  in  the  city  of  Corinth 
Λvhen  they  perceived  what  had  happened.  But  the 
Athenians,  seeing  the  whole  throng  advancing  and 
thinking  it  to  be  a  detachment  of  the  neighbouring 
Peloponnesians  coming  to  assist  the  Corinthians,  with- 
drew in  haste  to  their  ships,  having  their  spoils  and 
the  bodies  of  their  own  dead,  except  tΛvo,  which  they 
left  behind  because  they  were  not  able  to  find  them. 


THUCYDIDES 

6  KUL  αναβάντα  €7γΙ  τα?  ναυς  βττεραιώθησαν  e?  τάς 
€7ηκ€ΐμ€να<;  νήσους,  etc  δ'  αυτών  €7ηκηρνκ€υσά- 
μενοι  τους  ν€κρού<ί  ού<;  eyKaTeXiirov  ύποσ7ΓΟΐ'Βον<ί 
άνείΧοντο.  uTiWavov  Se  Κορινθίων  μ€ν  ev  rfj 
μύχ'Τ)  haiteKa  καϊ  Βιακόσιοι,  \\θΐ}ναίων  Be  οΧί'γω 
εΧάσσους  ττβντηκοντα. 

XLV.  "Αραντ€ς  Be  βκ  των  νήσων  οι  ^Αθηναίοι 
eirXevaav  αυθημερόν  €9  Κρομμνώνα  της  Κοριν- 
θίας' αττεχβί  Be  της  ττοΧεως  εϊκοσι  καϊ  εκατόν 
σταΒίους.  καϊ  καθορμισάμενοι  T/^i/ τε  ^ήΐ'  εΒ^ωσαν 

2  καϊ  την  νύκτα  ηυΧίσαντο.  ttj  δ'  ΰστεραία  τταρα- 
ττΧεύσαντες  ες  την  "'Έ.ττίΒαυρίαν  ττρώτον  καϊ  άττό- 
βασίν  τίνα  ττοιησάμενοι  άφίκοντο  ες  \\εθανα^  την 
μεταξύ  ΈττιΒαύρου  καϊ  Ύροζηνος,  καϊ  άττοΧαβόν- 
τες  τον  της  ■χ^ερσονήσου  ίσθμον  ετείχ^ισαν  εν  rj  η 
^\εθανα  εστί.  καϊ  φρούριον  καταστησάμενοι 
εΧήστευον  τον  εττειτα  ■χρόνον  την  τε  Ύροζηνίαν 
ηην  καϊ  ' ΑΧιάΒα  και  Κτηόαυριαν.  ταΐς  Βε  ναυσίν, 
irreiBr]  εξ(:τείχισαν  το  γ^ωριον,  αττέττΧενσαν  εττ 
οϊκου. 

XLVI.  Κατά  Βε  τον  αύτον  •χ^ρόνον,  καθ'  ον  ^ 
ταύτα  ε'γί-'/νετο,  καΐ  ΈύρνμεΒων  καϊ  ΈοφοκΧης, 
εττείΒη  εκ  t>}s  Πύλου  άττηραν  ες  την  Έ,ίκεΧίαν 
ναυσΙν  λθηναίων,  άφικόμενοί  ες  Κερκυραν  εστρά- 
τευσαν  μετά  tcov  εκ  της  ττοΧεως  εττί  τους  εν  τω 
ορεί  της  Ίστώνης  Κερκυραίων  καθιΒρυμενους,  ο'Ι 
τότε  μετά   την  στασιν  Βιαβάντες  ε  κρατούν  τε  της 

2  ^ης  και   ττοΧΧα  εβΧατττον.     ττροσβαΧόντε^   Βε  το 

'  MSS.  give  νΐΐθώνη,  but  Strabo  states  that  the  true  name  is 
Me'iai'a.  Lowcr  dowp.  the  MS"^.  read  4v  w  ή  Μ(θώνχ\  ΐστί,  which 
many  editors  bracket.  If  it  is  retained,  iv  fj  must  he  read  for 
eV  Φ,  as  Μ''''αΐ'α  lay,  not  on  the  Isthmus,  liut  on  the  west  coast 
of  the  peninsula.        ^  καθ'  Όν,  with  CGM,  omitted  by  ABEF. 

290 


BOOK    IV.  xLiv.  6-xLvi.  2 

So  they  embarked  and  crossed  over  to  the  adjacent 
islands,  and  sending  thence  a  herald  recovered  under 
truce  the  bodies  Avhich  they  had  left  beliind.  There 
\vere  slain  in  this  battle  two  hundred  and  twelve 
of  the  Corinthians,  and  of  the  Athenians  somewhat 
fewer  than  fifty. 

XLV.  Setting  out  from  the  islands,  the  Athenians 
sailed  the  same  day  to  Cromniyon  in  Corinthian 
territory,  Avhich  is  distant  a  hundred  and  twenty 
stadia  from  the  city,  and  coming  to  anchor  ravaged 
the  land  and  bivouacked  during  the  night.  The  next 
day  sailing  along  the  coast  they  came  first  to  the 
territory  of  Epidaurus,  where  they  made  a  landing, 
and  then  to  Mcthana,  between  Epidaurus  and 
Troezen,  Avhere  they  walled  off  the  neck  of  the 
peninsula  on  which  Methana  lies.  Here  they  left 
a  garrison,  which  afterward  occupied  itself  with 
marauding  excursions  into  the  territory  of  Troezen, 
Halieis,  and  Epidaurus.  But  the  fleet  sailed  back 
to  Athens  as  soon  as  the  fortifications  at  Methana 
had  been  completed. 

XLVI.  It  was  at  this  time,  while  these  events 
were  occurring,  that  Eurymedon  and  Sophocles,^ 
setting  sail  from  Pylos  for  Sicily  with  an  Athenian 
fleet,  arrived  at  Corcyra.  Thei'e  they  took  part  with 
the  men  from  the  city  -  in  an  expedition  against 
the  Corcyraeans  Λνΐιο  had  established  themselves  on 
Mt.  Istone,  and  who  at  this  time,  after  crossing  over 
thither  subsequently  to  the  revolution,  were  domin- 
ating the  country  and  doing  a  great  deal  of  damage. 
The  stronghold  was  taken  by  assault,  but  the  men  in 

^  cf.  cli.  viii.  3  ;  xxix.  1. 

"^  The  democrats  who  had  held  the  city  since  427  B.C.  {cf. 
III.  Ixxxv.). 

291 


THUCYDIDES 

μ€ν  τβίχισμα  elXov,  οι  Be  av8p€<;  καταττεφενγότες 
άθρόοί  Ίτρος  μβτβωρόν  η  ξυνεβησαν  ωστβ  τους 
μβν  €7Γΐκούρου<;  τταραΒοΰναι,  Trepl  Be  σφών  τα 
δττλ,α  τταραΒόντων  τον  ^Αθηναίων  Βημον  Bcajvowai. 

3  καί  αυτούς  €ς  την  νησον  οι  στρατη'^οΐ  την  Πτι/- 
χίαν  e?  φυΧακην  Βιβκόμισαν  ύττοσπόνΒους,  μέχρι 
ου   Αθηναζε  ττεμφθωσιν,  ωστ   εάν  τις  άλω  άποΒι- 

4  Βρύσκων,  αττασι  \ε\ύσθαι  τας  σττονΒάς.  οι  Βε  τον 
Βημον  ττροστάταί  των  Κερκνραίων,  ΒεΒιοτες  μη  οι 
Άθηναΐοί    τονς    εΧθόντας    ονκ   άποκτείνωσι,  μη- 

δ  χανώνται  τοιόνΒε  τι•  των  εν  τη  νήσω  ττείθουσι 
τινας  6\ίyovς,  ύττοπεμψαντες  φίΧονς  καϊ  ΒίΒά- 
ζαντες  ως  κατ  εΰνοιαν  Βη  Χε^ειν  ότι  κράηστον 
αύτοΐς  εϊη  ως  τάχιστα  αττοΒράναι,  ττΧοΐοΐ'  Βε  τι 
αύτοΙ  ετοιμάσειν  μεΧΧειν  yap  Βη  τους  στρατη. 
γοι/ς•  των  ^Αθηναίων  τταραΒώσειν  αυτούς  τω  Βήμω 
των  Κ,ερκυραίων.  XLVII.  ά>ς  Βε  εττείσθησαν  και 
μηχανησαμενων  το  ττΧοΐον  εκττΧεοντες  εΧήφθησαν, 
εΧέΧνντό    τε    αϊ    σττονΒαΙ    καΧ    τοις    Κερκυραίοις 

2  τταρεΒΙΒοντο  οι  ττάντες.  ζννεΧάβοντο  Βε  του  τοι- 
ούτου ούχ  ήκιστα,  ώστε  ακριβή  την  ττροφασιν 
γενέσθαι  καϊ  τους  τεχνησαμενους  άΒεεστερον 
ε^χειρησαι,  οι  στρατηγοί  των  \\θηναίων  κατά- 
ΒηΧοι  οντες  τους  άνΒρας  μη  αν  βούΧεσθαι  ύττ 
άΧΧων  κομισθεντας,  Βιοτι  αύτοΙ  ες  ΈιΐκεΧιαν 
επΧεον,    την     τιμήν    τοις     ά^ουσι     ττροσποίήσαι. 

3  ΊταράΧαβόντες  Be  αυτούς  οι  Κ.ερκυραΐοι   ες  οίκημα 


293 


BOOK    IV.  xLvi.  2-xLvn.  3 

it  fled  in  a  body  to  some  high  ground  and  there 
capituhited,  on  condition  that  they  should  surrender 
tlieir  mercenary  troops  and  give  up  tlieir  arms, 
leaving  it  to  the  Athenian  people  to  decide  upon 
their  own  fate.  The  generals  accordingly  conveyed 
the  men  under  truce  to  the  island  of  Ptychia^  to  be 
kept  under  custody  there  until  they  should  be  sent 
to  Athens,  and  the  understanding  was  that  if  anyone 
should  be  caught  trying  to  run  away  the  truce  should 
be  regarded  as  broken  for  them  all.  But  the  leaders 
of  the  popular  party  at  Corcyra  were  afraid  that  the 
Athenians  Avould  not  put  them  to  death  on  their 
arrival  at  Athens,  and  therefore  resorted  to  the 
folloAving  stratagem.  They  first  tried  to  persuade  a 
few  of  the  men  on  the  island  to  run  away,  by  secretly 
sending  thither  friends  who  were  instructed  to  say, 
Avith  a  shoAV  of  good  will,  that  the  best  course  for 
them  was  to  do  this  with  no  loss  of  time,  and 
promising  to  have  a  boat  ready  ;  for  the  Athenian 
generals,  they  explained,  were  intending  to  deliver 
them  up  to  the  Corcyraean  populace.  XLVII.  And 
Avhen  the  men  had  been  persuaded,  and  were  caught 
sailing  away  in  the  boat  which  the  others  had  pro- 
vided, the  truce  was  broken  and  the  Avhole  party 
was  delivered  up  to  the  Corcyraeans.  But  what 
chiefly  contributed  to  such  a  result,  so  that  the 
pretext  seemed  quite  plausible  and  that  those  who 
devised  the  scheme  felt  little  fear  about  putting  it 
into  effect,  was  the  fact  that  the  Athenian  generals 
shoΛved  that  they  ΛνοηΜ  not  be  willing,  as  they 
were  bound  for  Sicily  themselves,  to  have  the  men 
conveyed  to  Athens  by  others,  who  would  thus 
get  the  credit  for  conducting  them.  Now  the 
Corcyraeans  took  over  the  prisoners  and  shut  them 

^  cf.  III.  Ixxv.  5  ;  now  called  Vido. 

293 


THUCYDIDES 

jxeya  κατβψξαν,  καΐ  varepov  e^ayovre^  κατά, 
βΐκοσι  av8pa<i  Siijyov  8ιά  Βυοΐν  στοί')(^θίν  όττΧηών 
βκατέρωθβν  τταρατεταγμβνων,  SeSe/i-eVoi/9  re  προς 
άΧΧιίΧους  καΐ  τταιομ6νον<;  καΧ  κεντουμεΐ'ονς  νπο 
των  TTapaTeTay μίνων,  et  ττου  τις  τίνα  iSoc  εγ^θρον 
eavTov'  μaστιyoφόpoι  re  τταριόντβς  βττβτά-χννον 
τή<;  ό8οΰ  τους  σχ^οΧαίτερον  ττροϊόντας. 

XLVIII.  ΚαΙ  e?  μβν  ανΒρας  έξηκοντα  εΧαθον 
τους  iv  τω  οΐκήματί  τούτω  τω  τρόττω  eζayayόvτeς 
καϊ  Βιαφθείραντίς  (ωοντο  yap  αυτούς  μβταστη- 
σοντά•;  ττοι  άΧΧοσ^  e^ayetv)'  ώς  Be  ΐ}σθοντο  και 
τις  αύτοΐς  εδί^λωσε,  τους  τ€  Αθηναίους  βττβκα- 
Χούντο  καϊ  ΐκέΧβυον  σφάς,  ei  βουΧονται,  αυτούς 
8ίαφθ€ίρειν,  €Κ  τε  του  οικήματος  ούκβτί  ηθβΧον 
i^tevai,  ούδ'  eaievai  βφασαν  κατά    Βύναμιν  ττεριό- 

2  -^βσθαι  ούΒβνα.  οι  δε  Κ-ερκυραΐοι  κατά  μβν  τάς 
θύρας  ούδ'  αύτοΙ  Btevoouvro  βιάζεσθαι,  άναβάντβς 
δε  ε'ττΐ  το  τeyoς  του  οικήματος  καϊ  ΒιβΧόντες  την 
οροφήν  εβαΧΧην  τω   κβράμγ   καϊ    ετοξευον  κάτω. 

3  οι  δε  ζφυΧάσσοντό  τε  ώς  εΒύναντο  καϊ  άμα  οΐ 
ΤΓοΧΧοΙ  σφάς  αυτούς  Βιεφθειρον,  οίστούς  τε  ους 
άφίεσαν  εκείνοι  ες  τάς  σφayάς  καθιεντες  καϊ  εκ 
κΧίνών  τίνων,  αϊ  ετυχ^ον  αύτοΐς  ενούσαι,  τοις 
σττάρτοίς  καϊ  εκ  των  ιματίων  τταραιρήματα  ττοιούν- 
τες  ά^τayχ^oμεvoι.  τταντί  τε  ^  τροττω  το  ττοΧύ  της 
νυκτός  {ε■π■εyεvετo  yap  νύξ  τω  τταθήματι)  άνα- 
Χούντες   σφΰς   αυτούς    και    βαΧΧόμενοι    ύττο   των 

^  τ€  added  by  Poppo. 
294 


BOOK    IV.  xLvii.  3-xLvni.  3 

up  in  a  large  building  ;  afterwards  they  led  them 
out  in  groups  of  twenty  and  marciied  them  down 
between  two  lines  of  hoplites  stationed  on  either 
side,  the  prisoners  l)eing  bound  to  one  another 
and  receiving  blows  and  stabs  from  the  men  who 
stood  in  the  lines,  if  any  of  these  perchance  saw 
among  them  a  personal  enemy ;  and  men  with 
scourges  walked  by  their  sides  to  quicken  the  steps 
of  such  as  proceeded  too  slowly  on  the  Avay. 

XLVIII.  In  this  manner  about  sixty  men  were  led 
out  and  killed  Λvithout  the  knowledge  of  the  men 
Avho  remained  in  the  house,  who  supposed  that  their 
companions  were  being  led  out  in  order  to  be  trans- 
ferred to  some  other  place.  But  when  they  perceived 
what  was  going  on,  or  were  told  by  somebody,  they 
appealed  to  the  Athenians  and  urged  them,  if  they 
wished  to  kill  them,  to  do  so  with  their  own  hands  ; 
and  they  refused  thenceforth  to  leave  the  house, 
and  declared  that  they  would  not  allow  anyone  to 
enter  if  they  could  j)revent  it.  Nor  had  the  Cor- 
cyraeans  themselves  any  intention  of  trying  to  force 
their  way  in  by  the  doors,  but  climbing  on  to  the 
top  of  the  building  and  breaking  through  the  roof 
they  hurled  tiles  and  shot  arrows  upon  them  from 
above.  The  men  inside  tried  to  defend  themselves 
as  best  as  they  could,  and  at  the  same  time  most 
of  them  set  to  ΛνοΓΐ<  to  destroy  themselves  by 
thrusting  into  their  throats  the  arrows  which  the 
enemy  had  shot  or  by  strangling  themselves  with 
the  cords  from  some  beds  that  happened  to  be  in  the 
place  or  witii  strips  made  from  their  own  garments. 
Thus  for  the  greater  part  of  the  night — for  night  fell 
upon  their  misery — dispatching  themselves  in  every 
fashion  and  struck  by  the  missiles   of  the    men  on 

295 


THUCYDIDES 

4  άνω    Βιεφθάρησαν.      και     αυτούς    οι     K.€pKvpacoi, 

eTTeihi]  i)^epa  iyevero,  φορμηΕοι>  iirl  άμαξας 
€7Γίβα\όντ€ς  άττήηαηον  βξω  της  πόΧβως.  τάς 
δέ    Ύνναΐκας,    οσαι  ev    τω    τ€ίχ^ίσματί    βάΧωσαν, 

δ  ηνΒρατΓοΒίσαντο,  τοίούτω  pev  τροττω  οι  €κ  του 
ορούς  Κβρκνραΐοι  υττο  του  Βήμου  Βιβφθάρησαν,  καΐ 
η  στάσις  ττοΧΧη  '^βνομίνη  €Τ€\εύτησ€ν  €ς  τούτο, 
όσα  'ye  κατά  τον  ττόΧβμον  τόΐ'δε•      ου  yap   βτι   ην 

6  ύπόΧοιτΓον  των  βτβρων  6  τι  καΐ  a^ioXoyov.  οι  δε 
Άθηναΐοί  €ς  την  Έ,ικβΧίαν,  ϊναττβρ  το  πρώτον  ώρ- 
μηντο,  άττοττΧβύσαντβς  μβτα  των  eVet  ξυμμά^χ^ων 
ετΓοΧβμουν. 

XLIX.  ΚαΙ  οί  ev  ττ}  Ναυττάκτω  ^Αθηναίοι  και 
^Ακαρνάνες  άμα  τεΧευτώντος  του  θέρους  στρατευ- 
σύμβνοι  ^Ανακτόρων  "Κορινθίων  πόΧιν,  η  κείται. 
εττΐ  τω  στόματι  του  ^Αμττρακικοΰ  κόΧττου,  εΧαβον 
ΊτροΖοσία•  καΐ  βκπεμψαντες  Κορινθίους  ^  αύτοΙ 
^ Ακαρνΰνες  οίκητορας '"  άττο  πάντων  εσγ^ον  το 
■χ^ωριον.     και  το  θέρος  ετεΧεύτα. 

L.  Ύού  δ'  ε^Γιyιyvoμεvoυ  -χ^ειμώνος  ^Αριστείδης  6 
Αρχ^ιπττον,  εΙς  των  άpyυpoXόyωv  νεών  Αθηναίων 
στpaτηyός,  at  έζεττέμφθησαν  ττρος  τους  ζυμ- 
μάχ^ους,  Αρταφέρνη,  avhpa  ΤΙερσην,  τταρά  βασι- 
Χεως  ττορευόμενον  ες    Αακε8αίμονα   ξυΧΧαμβάνει 

2  ev  ^Wiovi  TJ7  εττ\  Έτρυμονι.  και  αυτοί)  κομισβεντος 
οί  ^Αθηναίοι  τάς  μεν  εττιστοΧάς  μετaypaψάμεvoι 
εκ  των  Ασσυρίων  y ραμμάτων  άvεyvωσav,  εν  αίς 
ττοΧΧών  άΧΧων  yεypaμμέvωv  κεφάΧαιον  ην  ττρος 
ΑακεΒαιμονίους  ου  yιyvωσκειv  6  τι  βούλονταΐ' 
ΤΓοΧΧών   yap   εΧθόντων   πρέσβεων  ούΒενα   ταύτα 


'  Hiule  deletes  Κορινθίου!,  after  Dobree. 
'  Hude  reads  oi/cTjTopes,  with  CE. 


296 


BOOK      IV.      XLVIII.    3-L.    2 

the  roof,  they  perislied.  When  day  came  the  Corcv- 
raeans  loaded  tlie  bodies  on  Λvagons,  laving  them 
lengthwise  and  crosswise,  and  hauled  them  out  of  the 
city  ;  but  the  women  who  had  been  captured  in  the 
fort  Λvere  sold  into  captivity.  In  such  fashion  the 
Corcyraeans  from  the  mountain  were  destroyed  by 
the  popular  i)arty,  and  the  revolution,  which  had 
lasted  long,  ended  thus,  so  far  at  least  as  this  Avar 
Avas  concerned ;  for  there  Avere  no  longer  enough 
of  the  oligarchs  left  to  be  of  any  account.  But  the 
Athenians  sailed  for  Sicily,  whither  they  had  set  out 
in  the  first  place,  and  proceeded  to  carry  on  the  war 
in  conjunction  with  their  allies  in  the  island. 

XLIX.  At  the  end  of  the  same  summer  the 
Athenians  at  Naupactus  and  tlie  Acarnanians  made 
a  camjiaign,  and  took  by  the  treachery  of  its  in- 
habitants Anactorium,  a  city  belonging  to  the  Cor- 
inthians which  is  situated  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Ambracian  Gulf;  and  the  Acarnanians,  expelling  the 
Corinthians,  occupied  the  place  with  colonists  drawn 
from  all  their  tribes.      And  the  summer  ended. 

L.  During  the  following  winter  Aristides  ^  son  of 
Archippus,  one  of  the  commanders  of  the  Athenian 
ships  which  had  been  sent  to  the  allies  to  collect  the 
revenues,  arrested  at  Eion  on  the  Strymon  Arta- 
phernes,  a  Persian,  who  was  on  his  Avay  from  the 
King  to  Lacedaemon.  He  was  conveyed  to  Athens, 
and  the  Athenians  caused  his  letters  to  be  transcribed 
from  the  Assyrian  characters  and  read  them.  Many 
other  matters  were  touched  upon  therein,  but  the  most 
important,  with  reterence  to  the  Lacedaemonians, 
was  that  the  King  did  not  know  Avhat  they  wanted  ; 
for  though  many  envoys  had  come  to  him,  no  two 
*  Mentioned  again  cli.  Ixxv.  1  as  general  in  these  Avaters. 

297 


THUCYDIDES 

\eyeiv'  el  ovv  τί  βούΧονται  σαφές  Xeyeiv,  ττβμψαι 
3  μβτα  του  Τίέρσον  αν8ρα<ί  ώς  αυτόν,  τον  8e  Αρτα- 
φέρνη ύστερον  οι  ^Αθηναίοι  αττοστίΧΧουσί  τριηρει 
€<ί"Κφεσον  καΐ  ττρεσβεί'ί  άμα•  ο'ι  ττυθόμενοί  αυτόθι 
βασίΧεα  ^ Αρτοζερζην  τον  Έ,ερζου  νεωστί  τεθνη- 
κότα  [κατά  yap  τούτον  τον  γ^ρόνον  ετεΧεύτησεν) 
€7γ'  οίκου  άνβχ^ώρησαν. 

LI.  Ύοϋ  δ'  αυτού  -χειμώνο^  καΐ  ^ΐοί  το  τείχος 
ττεριεΙΧον  το  καινον  κβΧευσάντων  ^ \θηναιων  και 
ύτΓοτΓτευσάντων  e<>  αυτούς  τι  νεωτεριεΐν,  ττοιη- 
σάμενοί  μεντοί  ττρος  ^Αθηναίους  τηστεις  καΐ 
βεβαιότητα  εκ  των  Βυνατώΐ'  pj]8ev  ττερί  σφάς 
νεώτερον  βουΧ^ύσειν.  κα\  ό  χβιμων  ετβΧευτα,  και 
εβ8ομον  έτος  τω  ττοΧεμω  ετεΧεύτα  τωΒε  ον 
ΘουΛτυοί'δ?;?  ^υι  έypaψev. 

LTI.  Ύοΰ  δ'  επLytyvoμevoυ  θίρους  ευθύς  του  τε 
ηΧίου  εκ\ίττες  τι   eyei'6T0  ττερΙ   νουμηνίαν  και    του 

2  αύτοΰ  μηνός  Ιστάμενου  εσεισεν.  και  οι  Murt- 
Χηναίων  φυyάhες  και  των  άΧΧων  Αεσβιων,  ορμώ- 
μενοι οι  ΤΓοΧΧοι  εκ  της  ηττείρου  και  μισθωσάμενοι 
εκ  τε  ΥΙεΧ'πτοννησου  εττικουρικόν  και  αύτοθεν 
ξυvayείpavτeς,  αίροΰσι  Ροίτειον,  και  Χαβοντες 
ΒισχιΧίους  στατηρας  Φωκαΐ'τας    άττεΒοσαν  τταλιν, 

3  ού^εν  ά8ικησαΐ'τες•  και  μετά  τούτο  eVt  "ΑντανΒρον 
στρατενσαντες  ττροΒοσίας  yεvoμεvης  Χαμβάνουοι 
την  ττόλιν.      και  ην  αυτών  ι)  Βιάνοια  τάς  τε  άΧΧας 

'  After  a  reign  of  forty  years  (4G5-4"25  β  c. ). 
298 


BOOK    IV.  L.  2-Ln.  3 

told  the  same  tale  ;  if  therefore  they  had  any  de- 
finite proposal  to  make,  they  should  send  men  to 
him  in  company  Avith  the  Persian.  As  for  Arta- 
phernes,  the  Athenians  afterwards  sent  him  to 
Ephesus  in  a  trireme,  together  with  some  envoys ; 
these,  however,  hearing  there  of  the  recent  death 
of  King  Artaxerxes  son  of  Xerxes — for  he  died  about 
that  time^ — returned  to  Athens. 

LI.  The  same  winter  the  Chians  demolished  their 
IleΛV  Λvall  at  the  bidding  of  the  Athenians,  who 
suspected  them  of  planning  an  insurrection  against 
themselves  ;  they,  however,  obtained  from  the  Athen- 
ians pledges  and  such  security  as  they  could  that 
they  would  adopt  no  harsh  measures  against  them. 
And  the  winter  ended,  and  with  it  the  seventh  year 
of  this  Avar  of  Avhich  Thucydides  composed  the 
history. 

LI  I.  At  the  very  beginning  of  the  next  summer  a  424  b.c. 
partial  eclipse  of  the  sun  took  place  at  new  moon, 
and  in  the  eai-ly  part  of  the  same  month  an  earth- 
(|uake.  Also  the  citizens  of  Mytilene  and  of  the  other 
cities  of  Lesbos  who  were  in  exile,  the  majority  of 
them  setting  out  from  the  mainland,  hired  some 
mercenaries  from  the  Peloponnesus,  gathered  still 
others  on  the  spot,  and  took  Rhoeteum  ;  but  they 
restored  it  again  without  having  done  any  damage, 
on  receiving  two  thousand  Phocaean  staters.-  After 
this  they  made  an  expedition  against  Antandros  and 
took  the  city  through  treachery  on  the  part  of  the 
inhabitants.      It  was,  in  fact,  their  plan  to  free  the 

-  The  Phocaean  stater  was  notorious  for  the  badness  of  the 
gold  (or  rather  electron)  ;  cf.  Dem.  xi.  .'ίΠ.  It  was  worth  about 
twenty-three  silver  drachmas.  See  Hultsch,  Gr.  und  roin. 
Metrolo'jie-,  184. 

299 


THUCYDIDES 

ττοΧεί'ζ  τας  Ακταία<;  καΧονμέΐ'ας,  α?  ττροτβρον 
^ΙυτίΧηναίων  νβμομένων  Άθηναϊοο  βΐ^χ^ον,  eXev- 
θ βρουν,  καΐ  πάντων  μάΧιστα  την"Ανταν8ρον•  καΐ 
κρατννάμβνοι  αυτήν  (ναυ<;  re  'yap  εύπορία  ην 
ΤΓΟίεΐσθαι,  αύτόθβν  ξύΧων  Ιηταρ'χ^οντων  και  της 
"ΙΒης  εττικειμβρης,  καΐ  τα  άΧΧα  σκεύη)  ραΒίως  αττ' 
αυτής  ορμώμενοι  την  τε  Αβσβον  iyyv<i  ούσαν 
κακώσειν  καϊ  τα  iv  τη  ήττείρω  ΑίοΧικα  ττοΧίσματα 
4  'χειρώσβσθαί.  και  οΙ  μεν  ταύτα  τταρασκευάζεσθαι 
εμεΧΧον, 

LIII.  Αθηναίου  8ε  εν  τω  αύτω  θ  βρει  εζηκοντα 
ναυσΐ  καϊ  Βίσχ^ιΧίοις  όιτΧίταίς  Ιτητενσί  τε  oXiyoi^ 
καϊ  των  ζυμμά'χ^ων  ^ΙίΧησίους  καϊ  άΧΧους  τινας 
άγοντες  εστράτευσαν  εττΐ  Κ,ύθηρα•  εστρατη^εο  he 
αύτων   Νικίας   ο    'ί^ικηράτου    καϊ   Νικοστρατος    ο 

2  Αιβιτρεφους  καϊ  ΑύτοκΧής  ο  ΎοΧμαυου.  τα  he 
Κύθηρα  νήσος  εστίν,  εττίκειται  δε  τη  Αακωνικη 
κατά  ^ίαΧεαν  Αακε8αιμόνιθί  δ  εισΐ  των  ττεριοί- 
κων,  καϊ  κνθηρο8ίκης  αρχή  ^κ  της  ^ττάρτης  8ιε- 
βαινεν  αύτόσε  κατά  έτος,  όττΧιτών  τε  φρουράν 
ΒιεττεμτΓον  αίεΐ  καϊ  ττοΧΧήν  επιμέΧειαν   εττοίονντο. 

3  ην  jap  αύτοΐς  των  τε  άττ'  ΑΙ^ύτττου  καϊ  Αιβύης 
6Χκά8ων  ιτροσβοΧή,  καϊ  ΧησταΙ  άμα  την  Αακω- 
νικην  ησσον  εΧύτΓουν  εκ  θαΧάσσης,  ηττερ  μόνον 
οΐόν  τε  ην  κάκου ρ^εΐσθαι•  ττάσα  yap  άΐ'εχεί 
ττρος  το  ^ικεΧικον  καϊ  Υνρητίκον  ^τeXayoς.  LIV. 
κατασχόντες   ουν  οΐ  ^Αθηναίοι   τω   στρατω    8εκα 


'  i.e.  of  the  ά\-ττ)  or  promontory  of  the  inainlaml  north  of 
Lesbos.  These  had  been  taken  from  Mytilene  by  Paches 
{cf.  III.  1.  3).     They  are  mentioned  also  CI. A.  i.  37. 

^  i.e.  if  Cythera  were  well  guarded. 

300 


BOOK    IV.  Lii.  3-Liv.  I 

rest  of  the  cities  known  as  the  Actaean  cities,^  which 
had  liitherto  been  in  the  possession  of  the  Athenians, 
though  inhabited  by  Mjtilenaeans,  and  above  all 
Antandros.  Having  strengthened  this  place,  where 
there  was  every  facility  for  building  ships — timber 
being  available  on  the  spot  and  Ida  being  near  at  hand 
— as  well  as  for  providing  other  equipments  of  war, 
they  could  easily,  making  it  the  base  of  their  opera- 
tions, not  only  ravage  Lesbos,  which  was  near,  but 
also  master  tlie  Aeolic  towns  on  the  mainland.  Such 
Avere  the  plans  upon  which  they  were  preparing  to 
embark. 

LIII.  During  the  same  summer  the  Athenians 
with  sixty  ships,  two  thousand  hoj)lites,  and  a  small 
detachment  of  cavalry,  taking  with  them  also  some 
Milesians  and  others  of  their  allies,  made  an  expedi- 
tion against  Cythera.  In  command  of  the  expedition 
were  Nicias  son  of  Niceratus,  Nicostratus  son  of 
Dieitrephes,  and  Autocles  son  of  Tolmaeus.  Now 
Cytiiera  is  an  island  adjacent  to  Laconia,  lying  off 
Malea ;  its  inhabitants  are  Lacedaemonians  of  the 
class  of  the  Perioeci,  and  an  official  called  the  Bailiff 
of  Cythera  used  to  cross  over  thither  once  a  year 
from  Sparta;  they  also  used  regularly  to  send  over  a 
garrison  of  hoplitcs  and  paid  much  attention  to  the 
})lace.  For  it  served  tiiem  as  a  port  of  call  for  mer- 
chant ships  from  Egypt  and  Libya,  and,  moreover, 
pirates  would  be  less  likely  to  annoy  Laconia  from 
the  sea,2  on  Avhich  side  alone  it  could  be  harmed  ; 
for  the  whole  coast  runs  out  towards  the  Sicilian  and 
the  Cretan  seas.^  LIV.  So  then  the  Atiienians,  putting 
in  at  Cythera  with  their  armament,  consisting  of  ten 

^  Otliers  take  πάση  of  the  island,  which  forms  as  it  were 
a  bastion  "  running  out  into  the  Sicilian  and  Cretan  seas." 

301 


THUCYDIDES 

μβν  νανσΐ  καΐ  δίσχιλιοί?  ^ίιΧησίων  όττλίταις 
την  έττΐ  θαΧάσστ)  ττόΧΐρ  Έ,κάνΒειαν  καΧου- 
μένην  αφοΰσι,  τω  δε  αλλω  στρατεύματι  άττο- 
βάντ€<ζ  της  νήσου  ες  τα  ττρος  ^laXeav  τετ  ραμ- 
μένα ε-χ^ώρονν  eirl  την  άττο  θαΚάσσης  ^  ττοΧιν 
των    }ίυθηρίων,  και    ηνρον    ευθύς  αυτούς  εστρα- 

2  τοττεΒευμενους  απαντάς.  καΐ  μάχης  'γενομένης 
oXljov  μεν  τίνα  'χρύνον  ύττεστησαν  οι  Κυθήρωι, 
εττειτα  τραττόμενοι  κατέφυγαν  ες  την  ανω  ττόΧιν, 
καΐ  ύστερον  ξυνέβησαν  προς  Νικίαν  καϊ  τους 
ξυνάρχ^αντας     Αβηναίοις    επιτρέψαι     περί     σφών 

3  αυτών  πΧην  θανάτου,  ήσαν  δε  τί^ες•  κα\  •^/ενόμενοί 
τω  Κικία  XoyoL  πρότερον  προς  τινας  των  Κυθη- 
ρίων,  hi  ο  καϊ  θάσσον  καΐ  επιτηΒειοτερον  τό  Τ€ 
παραυτίκα  καϊ  το  έπειτα  τα  -  της  ομοΧογίας 
επράχθη  αύτοΐς'  άνεστησαν  yap  αν^  οι  'Αθηναίοι 
Κ.υθηρίους,  ΑακεΒαιμονίους  τε  οντάς   και    έπϊ   τη 

4  Αακωνικη  της  νήσου  ούτως  επικείμενης,  μετά  δε 
την  ξΰμβασιν  οΐ  'Αθηναίοι  την  τε  ^κάνΒειαν  το 
επΙ  τω  Χιμένι  πόΧισμα  παραΧαβοντες  καϊ  των 
Κυθήρων  φνΧακήν  ττοιησάμενοι  επΧευσαν  ες  τε 
' Ασίνην  καϊ  "Ελος  και  τα  πΧεΐστα  των  περί 
θάΧασσαν,  και  αποβάσεις  ποιούμενοι  καϊ  εναυΧι- 

1  Stahl's  conjecture  for  €7ri  θαλάσστ?  of  the  MSS.,  which  is 
deleted  by  Hiide,  following  Kriii;er. 

■■2  τα,  omitted  by  the  best  M.'^.S.    "av,  added  by  Heilniann. 

^  An  incredibly  large  number.  In  v'lii.  xxv.  2,  where 
thev  are  in  their  own  land,  tlie  Milesians  can  oppose  to  the 
enemy  oiilv  800  hoplites.  Nor  would  ten  sliips  suffice  for  so 
many  epibatae.  Perliaps  there  is  a  confusion  in  the  numeri- 
cal sign,  due  to  a  copyist. 

■^  Tiie  haven  of  Cythera,  some  ten  stadia  distant  from  that 
city. 

30  7 


BOOK    IV.  Liv.  1-4 

ships  and  two  thousand  Milesian  hoplites,^  took  the 
cit}^  by  the  sea  called  Scandeia^;  then,  with  the  rest 
of  their  forces  landinjr  on  the  part  of  the  island 
which  looks  toward  Malea,  they  advanced  against 
the  city  of  Cythera  which  is  away  from  the  sea,^ 
where  they  found  that  all  the  inhabitants  had  im- 
mediately established  themselves  in  camp.  A  fight 
ensued,  in  which  the  Cytherians  stood  their  ground 
for  some  little  time,  then  turned  and  fled  to  the 
upper  town,  but  afterwards  capitulated  to  Nicias 
and  his  colleagues,  agreeing  to  leave  the  question  of 
their  own  fate,  except  as  to  a  penalty  of  death,  to 
the  arbitration  of  the  Athenians.  Some  negotiations 
between  Nicias  and  certain  of  the  Cytherians  had 
already  taken  place,  and  for  this  reason  the  settlement 
of  the  terms,  both  for  the  present  and  the  future, 
was  arranged  more  speedily  and  with  better  advan- 
tage to  them ;  for  otherwise  the  Athenians  would 
have  expelled  the  inhabitants,  since  they  were  Lace- 
daemonians and  the  island  lay  in  that  position  on 
the  coast  of  Laconia.  After  the  capitulation  the 
Athenians  took  possession  of  Scandeia,  the  toAvn  at 
the  harbour,  and  having  taken  precautions  for 
guarding  Cythera,  then  sailed  to  Asine,  Helus,  and 
most  of  the  other  towns  on  the  seacoast ;  here  they 
made   raids  or    bivouacked   at  whatever  place  they 

^  It  seems  necessary  to  adopt  Stahl's  conjecture  airh  θαλάσ- 
σης, or  delete  iirl  θα^άσστι.  "One  division  of  the  Athenian 
force  landed  at  Scandeia,  another,  disembarking  on  the 
N.  Ε  coast,  marched  on  the  capital  The  second  force  found 
the  Cytherians  prepared  to  meet  them  ;  in  the  baltle  which 
ensued  the  Cytherians  were  routed,  and  fled  to  the  upper 
city,  i.e.  the  capital.  This  explanation  is  borne  out  by 
existing  remains.  See  Frazer's  Pausanias,  iii.  385,  386  ;  also 
Weil  in  MiUhtil.  d.  Arch.  Inst.  inAthtn.  v.  224-2-13."  (Spratt  ) 


THUCYDIDES 

ζομενοι  των  'χλωρίων  ου  καιρο<ί  εϊη  ihijovv  την  ιγήν 
7)μίρα<ί  μάΧιστα  βτττά. 

LV.  Οί  δε  ΑακβΒαιμόνίΟί,  ίΒόντες  μίν  τους 
Αθήναιον;  τα  }ίύθηρα  βχ^οντας,  ττροσ^εχόμβνηι  Be 
καΐ  €9  την  <yr)v  σφών  αποβάσεις  τοιαύτας  ττοιησε- 
σθαι,  άθροα  μεν  ούΒαμοΰ  τι)  δυνάμει  άντετάζαντο, 
κατά  he  την  -χώραν  φρουράς  Βιβττεμψαν,  όττΧιτων 
ττΧήθος,  ως  εκασταχ^οσβ  eSei,  καΐ  τα  άΧλα  iv 
φυΧακτ]  TToWfj  ήσαν,  φοβούμενα  μη  σφίσι 
νεώτβρον  TL  '^ενηται  των  ττερί  την  κατάστασιν, 
Ύβ-γενημενου  μεν  του  εν  τη  νήσω  ττάθους  άνεΧττίστου 
καϊ  μεγάΧου,  ΙΙύΧου  8ε  ε'χ^ομενης  και  1ζ.υθήρων 
καϊ     ττανταχ^όθεν     σφάς      ττεριεστώτος     ττοΧεμου 

2  τα'χεος  και  άττροφυΧάκτου,  ώστε  τταρα  το  εΐωθος 
ίτητέας  τετρακόσιους  κατεστήσαντο  καϊ  τοξύτας, 
ες  re  τα  ιτοΧεμικά,  εϊττερ  ττοτε,  μάΧιστα  8η  οκνη- 
ρότεροι iyei'ovTO  ξυνεστ&τες  τταρα  την  ύττάρχ^ου- 
σαν  σφών  Iheav  της  7ταρασκευΡ]ς  ναυτικω  ajcovi, 
καϊ  τούτω  προς  Αθηναίους,  οίς  το  μή  εττί'χειρού- 
μενον  αΐεΐ  εΧΧιπες   ην  της   Βοκήσεώς   τι   πράξειν 

3  κα\  αμα  τα  της  τύχΐ]ς  ποΧΧά  καϊ  εν  ολ/γω  ζυμ- 
βάντα  πάρα  Xoyov  αύτοΐς  εκπΧηξιν  με^ίστην 
παρεΙ)(ε,  καϊ  εΒέΒισαν  μή  ποτέ  αύθις  ξιμφορά  τις 

4  αύτοΐς  περιτύχη  οία  καϊ  εν  τη  νήσω,  άτοΧμότεροι 
8ε  δί'  αύτο  ες  τας  μάχας  ήσαν  και  παν  6  τι  κινή- 
σειαν  ωοντο  άμκρτησεσθαι  hia  το  την  yvώμηv 
ανεχ^εγγνην  '^ε^ενήσθαι  εκ  της  πρΙν  άηθείας  του 
κακοπρα^εϊν. 

504 


BOOK    IV.  Liv.  4-Lv.  4 

found    convenient,  and  ravaged  the  land  for  about 
seven  days. 

LV.  The  Lacedaemonians,  though  they  saw  the 
Athenians  in  possession  of  Cythera  and  expected 
them  to  make  sucli  descents  upon  their  own  territory, 
nowhere  massed  their  forces  to  oppose  them,  but 
sent  garrisons  here  and  there  throughout  the  country, 
determining  the  number  of  hophtes  by  the  strengtii 
needed  at  each  point,  and  otherwise  were  very 
watchful,  fearing  lest  some  revolution  should  take 
place  w  Inch  Λvould  affect  their  constitution  ;  for  the 
calamity  Avhich  had  befallen  them  at  the  island  of 
Sphacteria  had  been  great  and  unexpected,  Pvlos 
and  Cythera  were  occupied,  and  on  all  sides  they 
were  encompassed  by  a  Λν3Γ  Avhich  moved  with  a 
SAviftness  which  defied  precaution.  Consequently 
they  organized,  contrary  to  their  custom,  a  force  of 
four  hundred  cavalry  and  bowmen,  and  in  military 
matters  they  now  became  more  timid  than  at  anj' 
time  before  they  were  involved  in  a  naval  struggle 
which  was  outside  their  own  existing  scheme  of 
military  organisation,  and  that  too  against  Atiienians, 
with  whom  an  attempt  foregone  was  always  so  much 
lost  of  what  they  had  reckoned  on  accomplishing.^ 
Besides,  the  reverses  of  fortune,  which  had  befallen 
them  unexpectedly  in  such  numbers  and  in  so  short 
a  time,  caused  very  great  consternation,  and  they 
were  afraid  that  some  time  a  calamity  might  again 
come  upon  them  like  that  Avhich  had  happened  on 
the  island  ;  and  on  this  account  they  show^ed  less 
s])irit  in  their  fighting,  and  whatever  move  they  might 
make  they  thought  would  be  a  failure,  because  they 
had  lost  all  self-confidence  in  consequence  of  having 
been  hitherto  unused  to  adversity. 

'  c/.  I.  Ixx.  7. 

305 


THUCYDIDES 

LVI.  Ύοΐς  Se  \\θηναίοι<ί  rare  την  τταραθαλάσ- 
σιθ]>  Β)]θΰσι  τα  μβν  ττολλα  ησύχ^ασαν,  ώ?  καθ' 
βκάστην  φρονραν  yiyvoiTO  Τί9  άττόβασι^,  ττΧήθβι 
re  έλασσον?  έκαστοι  ηγούμενοι  elvai  καΐ  iv  τω 
τοιούτφ•  μία  δε  φρουρά,  ηττερ  καΐ  ημύνατο  π€ρΙ 
Κοτνρταν  καΐ  \\φροΒιτ[αΐ',  τον  μβν  οχΧον  των 
ψιΧών  εσκβΖασμίνον  εφο3ησβν  εττώρομτ},  των  δε 
όττΧιτών  Btξaμ€vωv  υιτε)(^ώρησβ  ττάΧιν,  καΐ  άνΒρες 
τ€  τίνες  άττεθανον  αυτών  oXiyot  καΙοττΧα  εΧηφθη, 
τροτταΐον  τε  στησαντες  οι  Αθηναίοι  άττεττΧευσαν 
2  ε'?  Κ^ύθηρα.  εκ  δε  αυτών  ττερίβττΧευσαν  ες  Έττί- 
Βαυρον  την  Αιμηράν,  και  Βηώσαντες  μέρος  τι  της 
γης  άφικνουνται  εττΐ  ^υρβαν,  η  εστί  μεν  της 
Κ,υνουρίας  ι^/ής  καΧουμενης,  μεθόρια  δε  της 
^Αρ^είας  καΐ  Αακωνικής.  νεμόμενοι  δε  αυτήν 
ehooav  ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι  Αι^ινήταις  εκπεσοΰσιν 
ενοικείν  Βιά  τε  τάς  ύττο  τον  σεισμον  σφίσι  γενο- 
μενας  καΐ  τών  Έ,ΊΧώτων  την  εττανάστασιν  ευερ- 
γεσίας καΐ  ΟΤΙ  'Αθηναίων  ύττακούοντες  όμως  ττρος 
την  εκείνων  ^νώμην   αιει  εστάσιν. 

LVI1.  ΥΙροσττΧεοντων  ουν  ετι  τών  'Αθηναίων 
0L  AlyivrjTai  το  μεν  εττΐ  τη  θαΧάσση  ο  ετυχ^ον 
οΙκοΒο  μουντές  τείχος  εκΧείττουσιν,  ες  δε  την 
άνω  ττόΧιν,  εν  ή  ωκουν,  άττεχώρησαν  άπε- 
■γουσαν    σταΒίους    μάΧιστα   Βεκα   της  θαΧάσσης. 

2  κα\  αύτοΐς  τών  ΑακεΒηιμονίων  φρουρά  μία 
τών  ττερί  την  χώραν,  ηττερ  και  ξυνετειχιζε, 
ζννεσεΧθεΙν  μεν  ες  το  τείχος  ουκ  ηθεΧησαν  Βεο- 
μενων  τών  Αιγινητών,  άΧΧ  αντοΐς  κινΒυνος 
έφαίνετο  ες  το  τείχος  κατακΧηεσθαΐ'  άναχωρη- 
σαντες  δε  εττΐ  τα  μετέωρα  ώς  ουκ  ενομιζον  άξιόμα- 

3  χοι  είναι,   ήσύχαζον.      εν  τούτω   δε  οι  'Αθηναίοι 

3οό 


BOOK    IV.  Lvi.  i-LVii.  3 

LVI.  Accordingly,  while  the  Athenians  were  at 
that  time  ravaging  their  seaboard,  they  generally 
kept  quiet  when  any  descent  Λvas  made  upon  any 
particular  garrison,  each  thinking  itself  interior  in 
number  and  there  being  such  depression.  One 
garrison,  however,  Avhich  offered  resistance  in  the 
region  of  Cotyrta  and  Aphrodisia,  frightened  the 
scattered  crowd  of  light-armed  troops  by  a  charge, 
but  when  it  encountered  hoplites  retreated  again,  a 
few  of  their  men  being  killed  and  some  of  their  arms 
taken  ;  and  the  Athenians,  after  setting  up  a  trophy, 
sailed  back  to  Cythera.  From  there  they  sailed  to 
Epidaurus  Limera,  and  after  ravaging  some  part  of 
the  land  came  to  Thyrea,  which  belongs  to  the  dis- 
trict called  Cynuria,  on  the  border  between  the  Argive 
and  Laconian  territories.  This  district  the  Lace- 
daemonians who  occupied  it  had  given  to  the  ex- 
pelled Aeginetans  to  dwell  in,  on  account  of  the 
kind  services  shown  themselves  at  the  time  of  the 
earthquake  and  the  uprising  of  the  Helots,  and  be- 
cause they  had  always  sided  with  their  policy,  in 
spite  of  being  subject  to  the  Athenians. 

LV'II.  While,  then,  the  Athenians  were  still  sailing 
up,  the  Aeginetans  left  the  fort  by  the  sea  which 
tliey  happened  to  be  building  and  withdrew  to  the 
upper  town,  where  they  dwelt,  at  a  distance  of  about 
ten  stadia  from  the  sea.  Now  a  detachment  of  the 
Lacedaemonian  troops  which  were  distributed  in  gar- 
risons about  the  country  Avas  assisting  the  Aeginetans 
to  build  this  fort.  But  they  refused  to  enter  the 
fort  with  them,  as  they  requested,  since  it  seemed  to 
them  dangerous  to  be  cooped  up  in  it ;  but  retreat- 
ing to  high  gro'ind  they  kept  quiet,  thinking  them- 
selves   no    match   for   the    enemy.      Meanwhile    the 


THUCYDIDES 

κατασχόντες  καΐ  γ/ύρήσαντες  βύθίις  ττάστ)  rfj 
στρατιά  αίρούσι  την  ^vpeav.  καΐ  την  re  ττόΧιν 
κατζκαυσαν  καΐ  τα  ενόντα  βξβτζόρθησαν,  τους  τ€ 
Αί'^/ινήτας,  οσοί  μη  ev  χερσί  8ιεφθάρησαν,  ayovT€<; 
άφί,κοντο  69  τάς  Ά^?;ί'ας  καΐ  τον  άρχ^οντα  ος  παρ' 
αυτοΐς     ην     των     ΑακβΒαιμονίων,    Ύάνταλον    τον 

4  ΐΙατροκΧεους'  εζω^ρήθη  yap  τβτρωμβνος.  η^οι< 
he  τινας  καΐ  i/c  των  Κ,υθήρων  civSpa^;  oXiyov^,  ους 
iSoKei  άσφαΧβΙας  βνεκα  μεταστησαι.  καΐ  τούτους 
μεν  οΐ  ^Αθηναίοι  εβοϋΧεύσαντο  καταθεσθαι  ες  τας 
νήσους,  καΐ  τους  άΧΧους  Κυθηρίους  οίκοΰντας  την 
εαυτών  φόρον  τέσσαρα  τάΧαντα  φερειν,  Alyίvητaς 
δέ    άτΓΟκτεΙναι    ττάντας    οσοί    εάΧωσαν     Sia    την 

5  ττροτεραν  αΐεί  ττοτε  ε\θραν,  ΎάνταΧον  8ε  τταρά 
τους  άΧΧονς  τους  εν  τΐ]  νήσω^  ΑακεΒαιμονίους 
ΛταταδΓ/σαί. 

LVIII.  Ύοΰ  δ'  αυτοί)  θέρους  εν  ΖΐκεΧία  }ζ.αμα- 
ριναίους  καΐ  ΓεΧώοις  εκεχειρία  yίyvετaι  πρώτον 
προς  άΧΧ7']Χους•  είτα  καΐ  οι  άΧΧοί  Έ,ικεΧίώται 
ζυνεΧθοντες  ες  ΤεΧαν,  απο  πασών  τών  πόΧεων 
πρέσβεις,  ες  Xυyoυς  κατέστησαν  άΧΧήΧοις,  ει 
πως  ξυvaXXayεΐεv .  καΐ  άΧΧαι  τε  ποΧΧαΙ  yvώμaι 
iXiyovTO  εττ  αμφότερα,  Βιαφερομενων  καΐ  άξιούν- 
των,  ώς  έκαστοι  τι  εΧασσούσθαι  ενομιζον,  καΐ 
'Έ,ρμοκράτης  ο  '  Ερμωνος  Έυρακόσίος,  οσπερ  και 
έπεισε  μάΧιστα  αυτούς,  ες  το  κοινον  τοιούτους 
Βη  Xoyoυς  είπεν. 

LIX.  "  Ούτε  πόΧεως  ων  εΧαχίστης,  ω  Έ,ικε- 
XiojTai,  τους  Χό^νς  ποιήσομαι  ούτε  πονουμενης 
μάΧιστα  τω   ποΧεμω,  ες  κοινον   όε  την  δοκοΰσάν 

^  Tuhs  €v  rfi  ΐ'-ησψ,  Tlufle  deletes,  after  van  Herwerden. 
308 


BOOK    IV.  Lvii.  3-Lix.  i 

Athenians  landed,  and  advancing  straightway  with 
tlieir  whole  force  took  Thyrea.  They  burned  the 
city  and  pillaged  what  was  in  it ;  but  they  carried  to 
Atliens  all  the  Aeginetans  Avho  did  not  perish  in 
the  action,  together  with  their  Lacedaemonian 
commander  who  was  present,  Tantalus  son  of  Patro- 
cles,  who  was  wounded  and  taken  prisoner.  They 
brought  also  a  few  men  from  Cythera,  whom  they 
thought  best  to  remove  for  the  sake  of  safety. 
These  the  Athenians  determined  to  place  for  safe- 
keeping on  the  islands,  and  to  permit  the  rest  of  the 
Cytherians  to  occupy  their  own  territory  on  pavment 
of  a  tribute  of  four  talents,^  but  to  put  to  death  all 
the  Aeginetans  who  had  been  captured,  because 
of  their  former  inveterate  enmity,  and  to  imprison 
Tantalus  along  with  the  other  Lacedaemonians  cap- 
tured on  the  island  of  Sphacteria. 

LNTIL  During  the  same  summer,  in  Sicily,  an 
armistice  was  first  concluded  bet\veen  the  Cama- 
rinaeans  and  Geloans  ;  then  representatives  from  all 
the  other  Sicilian  cities  came  together  in  Gela  and 
held  a  conference,  to  see  Avhether  they  might  not 
become  reconciled.  Many  opinions  were  expressed 
for  and  against,  the  several  envoys  dis])uting  and 
making  demands  according  as  they  believed  that 
their  own  rights  Avere  being  prejudiced  ;  and  among 
the  rest  Hermocrates  son  of  Hermon,  the  Syracusan, 
whose  word  proved  to  have  the  greatest  weight  with 
the  others,  spoke  in  the  general  interest  ^  words  to 
this  effect: 

LIX.  "The  city  Λvhich  I  represent,  Siceliots,  is 
not  the  weakest,  nor  is  it  suffering  most  in  the  Avar;  but 
I  propose  to  speak  in  the  general  interest,  declaring 

1  £800,  $3,840.  *  Or,  "  before  the  meeting." 

309 


THUCYDIDES 

μοι    βζΧτίστην    ηνώμην    elvai    άττοφαίνόμβνος   τη 

2  1.ικ€\ία  ττάστ).  καΐ  πβρί  μβν  του  ττοΧβμβΐν  ώ? 
χαΧετΓον  τι  αν  τί?  ττάν  το  evov  ζκΧβ-γων  iv  βΙΒόσι 
μακρη'^/οροίη;  ouoei?  yap  ούτε  αμαθία  άτα^κά- 
ζβται  αύτο  hpav,  οΰτε  φοβφ,  ην  οϊηταί  τι  irXeov 
σ^^ήσειν,  άποτρεττεται.  ζυμβαίνει  8e  τοΐ<;  μεν 
τα  κερ8η  μείζω  φαίνεσθαί  των  δεινών,  οι  δε  τους 
κινδύνους  εθεΧουσιν  ύφιστασθαι  ττρο  του  αύτίκα 

3  TL  εΧασσοΰσθαΐ'  αύτα  δε  ταύτα  ει  μη  εν  καιρώ 
τύχ^οιεν    εκάτεροι     ττράσσοντες,    αι     τταραινεσεις 

4  τών  ζυναΧΧα^ών  ωφέλιμοι,  ο  και  ημΐν  εν  τω 
τταροΐ'τι  ττειθομενοις  ττΧειστου  αν  άξιον  γένοιτο' 
τα  yap  ϊ8ια  έκαστοι  ευ  βουΧόμενοι  Si]  θεσθαι  το 
τε  ττροίτον  εττοΧεμησαμεν  καΐ  νυν  ττρος  άΧΧήΧους 
Si  άντιΧο^ιών  ττειρώμεθα  καταΧΧα^/ήναι  και,  ην 
άρα  μη  ττρο'χωρήση  ΐσον  εχάστω  εχ^αντι  άττεΧθεΐν, 
ττάΧΐν  ΊΤοΧεμησομεν. 

LX.  "  Καίτοι  ηνώναι  γ^ρη  'ότι  ου  ττερί  τών 
lSLωv  μόνον,  εΐ  σωφρονοΰμεν,  ή  ζύνοόος  εσται, 
αλλ'  εΐ  εττιΙ-'ίουΧευομενην  την  ττάσαν  ^ικεΧίαν, 
ώς  εyω  κρίνω,  ύττ'  Αθηναίων  8υν)]σομ6θα  ετι 
Sιaσώσ^aι,  καΐ  8ιαΧΧακτας  ττοΧυ  τών  εμών  Xoyωv 
άvayκa^oτeρoυς  ττερΙ  τώυ8ε  Αθηναίους  νομίσαι, 
οΐ   8ύ!'αμιν   έχοντες  με-/ίστην   τών   ΈΧΧιμ'ων  τάς 


3ΙΟ 


BOOK    IV.  Lix.  i-LX.  I 

the  opinion  which  seems  to  me  the  best  for  Sicily  as 
a  whole.  As  for  the  miseries  wliich  war  entails,  why 
should  one  by  expressl}'^  stating  all  that  can  be  said 
make  a  long  harangue  in  the  jjresence  of  those  who 
know  ?  For  no  one  is  eitiier  forced  to  make  war 
through  ignorance  of  Avhat  it  is,  or  deterred  from 
making  it  by  fear,  if  he  thinks  he  will  get  some 
advantage  from  it.  What  really  happens  is  this,  that 
to  one  side  the  gains  appear  greater  than  the  terrors, 
while  the  other  deliberately  prefers  to  undergo  the 
dangers  rather  than  submit  to  a  temporary  dis- 
advantage ;  but  if  it  should  turn  out  that  these  two 
lines  of  action  are  both  inopportune,  each  for  the 
side  which  adopts  it,  then  some  profit  may  come 
from  exhortations  which  advise  a  compromise.  And 
so  Avith  us  at  the  present  time,  if  we  could  be 
persuaded  of  the  wisdom  of  this  course  it  would  be 
to  our  great  advantage  ;  for  each  of  us  began  the 
war  in  the  first  place  because  we  desired  to  promote 
our  private  interests.  So  now  let  us  endeavour  by 
setting  forth  our  conflicting  claims  to  become  recon- 
ciled with  each  other ;  and  then,  if  we  do  not 
after  all  succeed  in  securing,  each  of  us,  what  is  fair 
and  just  before  Ave  part,  we  shall  go  to  war  again. 

LX.  "  And  yet  we  should  recognise  the  fact  that 
the  subject  of  our  conference  Λνϋΐ  not,  if  we  are  Avise, 
be  our  private  interests  merely,  but  rather  the  ques- 
tion Avhether  we  shall  still  be  able  to  save  Sicily 
as  a  Avhole,  for  it  is  against  it,  in  my  judgment,  that 
the  Athenians  are  plotting  ;  and  we  must  consider 
that  we  have  an  argument  far  more  cogent  to  bring 
us  together  on  these  matters  than  my  words,  namely, 
the  Athenians,  who  possess  a  military  poAver  greater 
than  that  of  any  other  Hellenic  state  and  are  now  at 

311 


THUCYDIDES 

re  αμαρτία<;  ημ,ων  τηρονσιν  oXiyai^  ναυσϊ  παρόν- 
Τ€9,  και  ονόματι  βννόμω  ξνμμαχ^ίας  το  φύσ€ΐ 
ΤΓοΧζμίον  evTrpeiTco^  e?  το  ξυμφβρον  καθίστανται. 
2  ττοΧβμον  lyap  αίρομενων  ημών  και  €7Γayoμevωv 
αυτού';,  avSpa<;  οΐ  καΐ  τοις  μη  βτΓίκαΧουμέΐΌκ; 
αύτοΙ  βπιστρατβνονσι,  κακώ;  τ€  ιιμάς  αυτού'; 
■ποιούντων  τέλεσα  τοις  οίκ^ίοις,  και  της  άρχ^ης 
αμα  ττροκοτττόντων  βκβίνοις,  €ΐκός,  όταν  γνώσιν 
ημάς  Τ€τρυχ^ω μένους,  καΐ  ττΧβονι  ττοτε  στοΧω 
βΧθοντας  αυτούς  τάδβ  ττάντα  ττειρασασθαι  ύττο 
σφας  ττοιβΐσθαι. 

LXI.  "  Καίτοι  TTJ  €αυτών  έκαστους,  ei  σωφρο- 
νονμβν,  %ρη  τα  μη  ττροσηκοντα  έττικτωμενους 
μάΧλον  η  τα  έτοιμα  βΧάτττοντας  ξυμμύχους  τ€ 
έττα^έσθαι  καΐ  τους  κΐΐ'Βύνους  ττροσΧαμβάνβιν, 
νομίσαι  τ€  στάσιν  μύΧιστα  φθβιρειν  τας  ττοΧεις 
και  την  ^iKeXiav,  ης  ye  οι  βνοικοι  ξυμτταντες  μεν 

2  έττιβουΧβυόμβθα,  κατά  ττόΧβις  δε  Βιέσταμβν.  α 
χρη  yvόvτaς  καΐ  ίόιωτην  ιΒιώττ)  KaTaXXayrjvai 
και  ττόΧιν  TToXei,  καΐ  ττειρασθαι  Kowfj  σωζειν  την 
•πασαν  "Σ,ικβΧίαν,  -παρβστάναι  Se  μηΒενΙ  ώς  οι 
μέν  Αωριής    ημών   ττοΧέμιοι    τοις   ^ Αθηναίοις,    το 

3  he  ^αΧκώικον  ττ)  Ίάδί  ξυyyeveίa  άσφαΧές,  ου 
yap  τοις  εθνεσιν,  οτι  8ίχα  ττέφυκβ,  του  έτερου 
εχθει    εττίασιν,     άΧΧα    των    εν    ^ικεΧια    aya9o)v 

4  εφιέμβνοι,  α  κοινή  κεκτήμ^θα.  εΒήΧωσαν  Be  νυν 
εν  ττ)  του  \αΧκιΒικού  yevoυς  τταρακΧησεί'  τοις 
yap    ούΒεττωτΓοτε     σφίσι     κατά     το     ξυμμαχικον 

312 


BOOK    IV.  Lx.  i-Lxi.  4 

hand  Avith  a  few  ships  watching  for  our  mistakes, 
and  under  the  lawful  name  of  alliance  are  speciously 
trying  to  turn  to  their  own  advantage  our  natural 
hostility  to  them.  For  if  we  begin  war  and  call  them 
in — men  who  of  their  own  accord  are  ready  enough 
to  intrude  their  forces  even  on  those  who  do  not  ask 
for  their  intervention — and  if  we  spend  our  own 
revenues  in  doing  hurt  to  ourselves,  and  at  the  same 
time  pave  the  Λvay  for  their  supremacy,  we  may  well 
expect  them,  when  they  see  that  we  are  worn  out, 
to  come  sometime  with  a  larger  armament  and  try 
to  bring  everything  here  under  their  sway. 

LXI.  "And  yet,  if  we  are  prudent,  we  ought,  eacii 
of  us  in  behalf  of  his  own  state,  to  call  in  allies  and 
incur  dangers  only  when  we  are  seeking  to  win 
what  does  not  belong  to  us  and  not  when  we  imperil 
what  is  already  ours  ;  and  we  should  remember  that 
faction  is  the  chief  cause  of  ruin  to  states  and 
indeed  to  Sicily,  seeing  that  we  her  inhabitants,  al- 
though we  are  all  being  plotted  against,  are  disunited, 
each  city  by  itself.  Recognizing  these  facts,  we  must 
be  reconciled  with  each  other,  citizen  with  citizen 
and  state  with  state,  and  join  in  a  common  effort  to 
save  all  Sicily.  And  let  no  one  imagine  that  only 
the  Dorians  among  us  are  enemies  of  the  Athenians, 
Λvhile  the  Chalcidians,  because  of  their  kinship  with 
the  lonians,  are  safe.  For  it  is  not  through  hatred 
of  one  of  the  two  races  into  which  we  are  divided  that 
they  will  attack  us,  but  because  they  covet  the  good 
things  of  Sicily  which  we  possess  in  common.  lliey 
have  just  made  this  clear  by  their  response  to  the 
appeal  Avhich  the  people  of  Chalcidic  stock  made  to 
them  ;  ^  for  to  those  who  have  never  given  them  aid 
'  cf.  III.  Ixxxvi.  3. 
VOL.  IT.  τ        313 


THUCYDIDES 

Ίτροσβοηθήσασίν   avrol    το    Ζίκαιον    μαΧλον   της 

5  ξυνθήκης  ττροθύμως  τταρίσχοντο.  και  τους  μίν 
^Αθηναίους  ταύτα  ifKeoveKTelv  re  και  τΓρυνοεΐσθαι 
ΤΓοΧΧη  ξυ-^^ΐ'ώμη,  καΐ  ού  τοις  άρχ^ειν  βουΧομβνοις 
μέμφομαι,  αλλά  τοις  νττακούβιν  ετοιμοτεροις 
ουσιν  Ίτίφυκβ  yap  το  άνθρίίττζίον  Βια  τταντο^ 
άρχ^βιν    μα'     του    βϊκοντος,    φυΧάσσεσθαι    oe    το 

6  βττίόν.  όσοι  δε  <γιyvώσκoι>τeς  αύτα  μη  ορθώς 
ττροσκοτΓούμβν,  μηΒβ  τοΰτό  τις  ττρβσβύτατον  ήκει 
κρίνας,    το    κοινώς   φοβ^ρον   απαντάς    el•   θέσθαι, 

7  άμαρτάΐ'ομεν.  τάχ^ιστα  δ'  αν  άπαΧλαγη  αυτού 
yevoiTO,  €ΐ  ττρος  άΧλήΧους  ξυμβαΐμεν  ου  yap 
άπο   της  αυτών  όρμώνται    Αθηναίοι,  αλλ    e/c  της 

8  τών  ΐττίκαΧβσαμίνων.  και  ούτως  ου  ττοΧβμος 
τΓοΧβμω,  βίρήντ}  δε  ΒιαφοραΙ  άττρα^μονως  τταύ- 
ονται,  οϊ  τ  ΙττΊκΧητοι  ξύττρβττώς  ahiKOi  βΧθόντβς 
εΰλόγω?  αττρακτοι  άτηασιν. 

LXII.  "  ΚαΙ  τα  μεν  ττρος  τους  ^Αθηναίους 
τοσούτον  ά^αθον  ev  βουΧευομίνοις  βύρίσκβταΐ' 
2  την  δε  ύτΓΟ  πάντων  όμοΧη^ουμβνην  άριστον  eivai 
elpy-ινην  ττώς  ού  -χρη  καϊ  iv  ήμϊν  αύτοΐς  ττοιή- 
σασθαι;  η  SoKei  ye,  ει  τω  τί  βστιν  aya0ov  η  et 
τω  τα  εναντία,  ούχ  ησνχ^ία  μάΧΧον  η  ττόΧεμος  το 
μεν  τταύσαι  αν  εκατερω,  το  Se  ξννΒιασώσαι,  καϊ 
τας  τιμάς  καϊ  Χαμττρότητας  άκιν^υνοτερας  εχείν 
την  είρήνην,  άΧΧα  τε  όσα  εν  μήκει  Xoyωv  αν  τις 


3Μ 


BOOK    IV.  Lxi.  4  Lxii    2 

according  to  the  terms  of  their  alHance  they  of  their 
own  accord  have  fulfilled  an  ally's  obligations  \vith 
a  zeal  exceeding  their  compact.  That  the  Athenians 
entertain  these  designs  of  aggrandisement  is  quite 
pardonable ;  and  I  have  no  word  of  blame  for  those 
who  wish  to  rule,  but  only  for  those  who  are  too 
ready  to  submit ;  for  it  is  an  instinct  of  man's  nature 
always  to  rule  those  who  yield,  but  to  guard  against 
those  who  are  ready  to  attack.  If  any  of  us,  know- 
ing how  matters  really  stand,  fails  to  take  proper 
precautions,  or  if  anyone  has  come  here  not  ac- 
counting it  of  paramount  importance  that  we  must 
all  together  deal  wisely  Avith  the  common  peril,  we 
are  making  a  mistake.  The  speediest  relief  from  this 
peril  would  be  gained  by  our  entering  into  an 
understanding  Avith  one  another  ;  for  the  base  from 
which  the  Athenians  pro])ose  to  move  is  not  their 
own  territory,  but  that  of  the  people  Λνΐιο  asked 
tiiem  to  intervene.  And  if  we  follow  this  course, 
war  will  not  end  in  another  war,  but  without  trouble 
quarrels  will  end  quietly  in  peace,  and  those  who 
have  been  invited  to  intervene,  liaving  come  with 
a  fair  pretext  for  injustice,  will  depart  home  with  a 
fair  plea   for  failure. 

LXII.  "So  far,  then,  as  the  Athenians  are  con- 
cerned, this  is  the  great  advantage  we  win  if  we  are 
well  advised  ;  but  as  to  the  question  of  peace,  which 
all  men  agree  is  a  most  desirable  thing,  why  should 
we  not  make  it  here  among  ourselves?  Or,  think 
you,  if  one  person  now  enjoys  a  blessing  and  another 
labours  under  adversity,  it  is  not  tranquillity  far 
more  than  war  that  Λνίΐΐ  j)ut  an  end  to  the  latter 
and  perpetuate  the  former  .''  And  has  not  peace  its 
honours  and  less  hazardous  splendours,  and  all  the 

315 


THUCYDIDES 

ΒιεΧθοι  ωστΓβρ  irepi  του  ττοΧβμεΐν;^  α  γρη  σκεψα- 
μένονς  μη  τους  e/ioi"?  λόγους  virepihelv,  την  δε 
αυτοί)  τίνα  σωτηρίαν  μαΚΧον  αττ   αυτών  προϊ^βΐν. 

3  και  €Ϊ  τις  βεβαίως  τι  η  τω  ^ικαίω  η  βία  ττράξβιν 
oterai,  τω  rrap  έΧττίΒα  μη  χαλεπως  σφαΧλβσθω, 
<γνούς  ort  ττΧειους  τ'/δ>7,  καΐ  τιμωριαις  μετιοντες 
τους  άΖικοΰντας  καΐ  βΧττίσαντες  βτβροί  Βυνάμει  τι 
ττΧεονβκτήσείν,  οι  μεν  ούχ^  όσον  ουκ  ημύναντο 
αλλ'  οι)δ'  βσώθησαν,  τους  δ'  άντΧ  του  TrXeov  ey^eiv 

4  ΤΓ ροσ καταΧίττεΐν  τα  αυτών  ξυνββη.  τιμωρία  yap 
ουκ  €ύτυ)(€Ϊ  ζικαιως,  δτί  καϊ  ά8ίκεΙταί•  οΰδε  Ισχύς 
βέβαιον,  8ωτι  καϊ  βΰεΧττι.  το  δε  άστάθμητον  του 
μέΧΧοντος  ως  eVt  ττΧεΐστον  κρατεί,  ττάντων  τε 
σφαΧερώτατον  ον  'όμως  καϊ  χρησιμωτατον  φαίνε- 
ται• εξ  ϊσου  yap  8ε8ιΰτες  ττρομηθία  μάΧΧον  εττ 
άΧΧηΧους  ερχομεθα. 

LXIII.  "  Kali'i3i^ToD  αφανούς  τε  τούτου  Sia  το 
άτεκμαρτον  Βέος  καϊ  Βια  το  η8η,  φοβερούς  τταρόν- 
τας  ^Αθηναίους,  κατ  αμφότερα  εκττΧα^εντες,  καϊ 
το  εΧΧίττες  της  γνώμης  ων  έκαστος  τι  ωήθημεν 
ττράξειν  ταΐς  κωΧύμαις  ταύταις  Ικανως  νομίσαντες 
είρχθήναί,  τους  εφεστωτας  ττοΧεμίους  εκ  της 
χώρας  άτΓοπεμττωμεν,  καϊ  αύτοΙ  μάΧιστα  μεν  ες 
aihiov  ξυμβωμεν,  el  δε  μή,  χρόνον  ώς  ττΧεΐστον 
σπεισάμενοι  τας  ιΒιας  Βιαφοράς  ες  αύθις  άνα- 
^  wanep  τΓ(ρϊ  του  -ποΧΐμΐΊν,  deleted  by  Hude,  after  Kriiger. 

^  i.e.  "  most  of  our  plans  are  baffled  by  the  uncertainty  of 

the  future." 

316 


BOOK     IV.    LXII.   2-LXIII.   I 

other  advantages  on  Avhich  one  might  dilate  as  easily 
as  on  the  liorrors  of  Avar?  Considering  these  things, 
you  should  not  overlook  my  advice,  but  should  i-ather 
look  forward  each  to  his  own  salvation  thereby. 
And  if  any  of  you  cherishes  the  confident  beliet 
that  he  can  gain  anything  either  by  insisting  on 
liis  rights  or  by  an  appeal  to  force,  let  him  not, 
through  the  baffling  of  his  hopes,  suffer  a  grievous 
disappointment ;  for  he  knows  that  many  men  ere 
now,  whether  pursuing  with  vengeance  those  who 
have  wronged  them,  or  in  other  cases,  hoping  to  gain 
some  advantage  by  the  exercise  of  po\ver,  have,  on 
the  one  hand,  not  only  not  avenged  themselves  but 
have  not  even  come  out  whole,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  instead  of  gaining  more,  have  sacrificed  what 
was  their  own.  For  revenge  has  no  right  to  ex- 
pect success  just  because  a  wrong  has  been  done; 
nor  is  strength  sure  just  because  it  is  confident. 
But  as  regards  the  future,  it  is  uncertainty  that  for 
the  most  part  prevails,^  and  this  uncertainty,  utterly 
treacherous  as  it  is,  proves  nevertheless  to  be  also 
most  salutary;  for  since  both  sides  alike  fear  it, 
we  proceed  with  a  greater  caution  in  attacking  one 
another. 

LXIII.  "  So  let  us  now,  taking  alarin  on  account  of 
both  these  things — the  vague  fear  of  this  hidden 
future  and  the  immediate  fear  of  the  dread  Athenian 
presence — and  charging  to  these  obstacles,  as  effectu- 
ally blocking  our  Avay,  any  failure  in  the  plans  wiiich 
any  one  of  us  had  hoped  to  realize,  let  us  dismiss 
from  the  country  the  enemy  λνΐιο  is  at  our  gates,  and  if 
possible  let  us  make  peace  among  ourselves  for  ever- 
more ;  but  if  that  may  not  be,  let  us  conclude  a  truce 
for  the   longest  practicable  period,  and  put  off  our 


THUCYDIDES. 

2  βαΧώμβθα.  το  ξύ;ηταν  re  8η  'γνωμ€ν  ττιθόμβνοι 
μ^'.ν  €μοΙ  ττόΧιν  e^ovre^  βκαστο<;  eXevOepav,  άφ'  η^; 
αυτοκράτορα^  οιηβς  τον  βυ  καΐ  κακώς  Βρώι^τα 
i^  ϊσου  άρετί)  άμυνούμβθα,  ην  δ'  άττιστησαντες 
άΧΧοίς  υττακούσίύμβν,  ου  rrepl  του  τιμωρήσασθαί 
Τίνα,  άΧΧα  καΐ  ayav  el  τύχοιμεν,  φίλοι  μβν  αν 
τοις  €-χθίστοί<;,  διάφοροι  δέ  oh  ου  'χρη  κατ 
άνά-γκην  ^ί'γνοίμβθα. 

LXIV.  "  Καί,  εγώ  μεν,  άπερ  και  άρχ^όμβνος 
βιτΓον,  ΤΓοΧιν  τ€  μβ'^/ιστην  Ίταρβχομενο•;  και  βττιών 
τω  μάΧΧον  η  αμυνόμενος^  άξίώ  προϊδόμενος^ 
αυτών  ζυ'γχωρεΐν,  καΐ  μ?]  τους  ενάντιους  ούτω 
κακο)ς  8ράν  ώστε  αύτος  τα  ττΧε'ιω  βΧάτττεσθαι, 
μη8ε  μωρία  φιΧονικών  τιηείσθαι  της  τ€  οικείας 
<^νώμης    ομοίως     αυτοκράτωρ    είναι    καΐ    ης    ουκ 

2  άργ^ω  τύχ^ης,  άΧΧ  όσον  είκος  ήσσάσθαι.  καΐ 
τους  άΧΧονς  Βικαιώ  ταϋτό  μοι  ποιήσαι,  νφ^  υμών 
αυτών   καΐ  μη  ύττο   τών   ττοΧεμιων   τοΰτο  τταθεΐν 

3  ούΒεν  yap  αισχ^ρον  οικείους  οΙκειων  ήσσάσθαι, 
η  Αωριά  τίνα  ίίωριώς  η  ΧαΧκιΒεα  τών  ζυ^^ενών, 
το  τε  ξύμτταν  γείτονας  οντάς  και  ζυνοικους  μιας 
'χώρας  και  ττεριρρύτου  και  όνομα  εν  κεκΧημενους 
%ικεΧιώτας'  οΐ  ττοΧεμήσομεν  τε,  οΐμαι,  όταν 
ξυμβη,  καϊ   ξν/χωρησόμεθά  y€  ττάΧιν  καθ^   ημάς 

4  αυτούς  Χό^οις  κοινοΐς  -χρώμενοί'  τους  8ε  άΧΧο- 
φύΧους  εττεΧθόντας  αθρόοι  αΐεί,  ην  σωφρονώμεν, 
άμυνούμεθα,  εϊττερ  καϊ  καθ^  εκάστους  βΧαπτο- 
μενοι     ξύμτταντες     κιν8υνεύομεν,     ξυμμάχους     8ε 


*    α.μυΐ'όμ(ΐ'0$,  Hude    followed    by    Steup,  for    αμυνούμΐΐΌί   of 

the  MSS. 

^  ^Γpoϊ^6μevos  .  .  .  ίστΐ  avrhj,  Reiske  and  Dobree,  for  irpoei- 
So.uiVous  .  .  .  ware  avToiis  of  the  jMSS. 


BOOK    IV.  Lxiii.  i-Lxiv.  4 

private  differences  to  some  other  day.  In  fine,  let  us 
feel  assured  that  it'  my  advice  is  folloΛved  we  shall 
each  keep  our  city  free,  and  from  it,  since  we  shall 
be  arbiters  of  our  own  destiny,  we  shall  with  equal 
valour  ward  off"  both  him  Λvho  comes  to  benefit  and 
him  who  comes  to  harm.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
my  advice  is  rejected  and  we  give  heed  to  others,  it 
will  not  be  a  question  of  our  taking  vengeance  on 
anybody,  but,  even  if  we  should  be  never  so  success- 
ful, we  should  perforce  become  friends  to  our 
bitterest  foes  and  at  variance  with  those  with  whom 
we  should  not  be. 

LXIV.  "  As  for  me,  as  I  said  in  the  beginning, 
although  1  represent  a  most  powerful  city  and  am 
more  ready  for  attacking  another  than  for  self- 
defence,  I  deem  it  my  duty,  with  these  dangers  in 
view,  to  make  concessions,  and  not  to  harm  mv 
enemies  in  such  a  way  as  to  receive  more  injury 
myself,  or  in  foolish  obstinacy  to  think  that  I  am  as 
absokitely  master  of  Fortune,  which  I  do  not  control, 
as  of  my  own  judgment ;  nay,  so  far  as  is  reasonable 
I  will  give  way.  And  I  require  of  the  rest  of  you  to 
follow  my  example  and  submit  to  this,  not  at  the 
hands  of  the  enemy,  but  of  youi'selves.  For  there  is  no 
disgrace  in  kinsmen  giving  Avay  to  kinsmen,  a  Dorian 
to  a  Dorian  or  a  Chalcidian  to  men  of  the  same  race, 
since  we  are,  in  a  word,  neighbours  and  together  are 
dwellers  in  a  single  land  encircled  by  the  sea  and  are 
called  by  a  single  name,  Siceliots.  We  shall  go  to 
war,  no  doubt,  whenever  occasion  arises — yes,  and 
we  shall  make  peace  again  by  taking  common  counsel 
among  ourselves  ;  but  Avhen  alien  peoples  invade  us, 
we  shall  always  act  in  concert,  if  we  are  prudent, 
and  repel  them,  seeing  that  any  injury  suff'ered 
by   one  of   us  brings  danger  to  us    all  ;    but  never 

319 


THUCYDIDES 

ovBeTTOTe  το  Χοιττον  έτταζόμ.βθα  ovhe  ΒιαΧλακτάς. 
5  τ.ίδί  jap  TTOioDfTe?  ev  τ€  τω  τταρόνη  6υοΐν  άγα- 
θοΐν  ου  στερήσομεν  την  ΧικεΧίαν,  ^Αθηναίων  τε 
άτταΧΧαγήναι  καΐ  οΙκειου  ττοΧβμου,  και  €ς  το 
€7Γ€ΐτα  καθ  ημάς  αυτούς  εΧευθβραν  νβμούμεθα 
καΐ  ύτΓΟ  άΧΧων  ήσσον  βττιβονΧβυομύνην.^^ 

LXV.  Ύοιαύτα  του  Κρμοκράτους  αιτοντος  irei- 
θόμβνοι  οι  ^ίκεΧίώται  αύτοΙ  μβν  κατά  σφάς  αυτούς 
ζυνηνβχ^θησαν  'γΐ'ώμτ]  ώστε  άπαΧλύσσεσθαί  του 
τΓοΧέμου  βχ^οντες  α  έκαστοι  εχ^ουσι,  τοις  Βε 
Καμαριναίοις  ^Ιορ^αντινην  είναι  αρ^ύριοί'  τακτον 

2  τοις  Ένρακοσιοις  άποΒονσιν  οι  Βε  των  Αθηναίων 
ξύμμαχοι  παρακαΧεσαντες  αυτών  τούς  εν  τέΧει 
οντάς  εΙτΓον  ότι  ζυμβήσονται  καϊ  αΐ  σττονΒαΙ 
έσονται  κάκείνοις  κοιναί.  ετταινεσάντων  Βε  αυτών 
ετΓοιοϋντο  την  ομοΧο^ιαν,  και  αΐ  νήες  τών  ^Αθη- 
ναίων   άττεττΧευσαν     μετά     ταύτα     εκ     Ί,ικεΧίας. 

3  εΧθύντας  Βε  τους  στρατη'^ούς  οι  εν  τη  ττόΧει 
'Αθηναίοι  τούς  μεν  φν^η  εζημιωσαν,  ΤΙυθοΒωρον 
και  Έ,οφοκΧεα,  τον  Βε  τρίτον  Ι^ύρυμεΒοντα  χρή- 
ματα εττράζαντο,  ώς  εξόν  αύτοΐς  τά  εν  ^ικεΧία 
καταστρέψασθαι    Βώροις    ττεισθεντες    άττοχωρη- 

4  σειαν.  ούτω  ττ]  Ύε  τταρούση  ευτυχία  χρώμενοι 
ηζίουν  σφίσι  μηΒεν  εναντιοΰσθαι,  άΧΧα  και 
τά  Βυνατά  εν  ϊσω  καϊ  τά  άττορώτερα  με^άΧη 
Τ€  ομοίως  και  ενΒεεστερα  τταρασκευη  κατερ- 
'γάζεσθαι.  αιτία  δ'  ην  η  τταρά  Xoyov  τών 
ττΧειόνων  εύττραηια  αύτοίς  ύττοτιθείσα  ίσχύν 
της  εΧτΓΐΒος. 

LXVI.  Toy  δ'  αυτού  θέρους  Ί^ίεyapής  οι  εν  τη 
ητόΧει   πιεζόμενοι   ύττό  Τ6  'Αθηναίων  τω   ποΧεμω, 


320 


BOOK    IV.  Lxiv.  4-Lxvi.  i 

lienceforth  shall  we  ask  outsiders  to  intervene,  either 
as  allies  or  as  mediators.  If  we  follow  this  policy, 
we  shall  at  the  present  time  not  rob  Sicily  of  two 
desirable  things — getting  rid  of  the  Athenians  and 
escaping  from  civil  war — and  for  the  future  we  shall 
dwell  here  by  ourselves  in  a  land  that  is  free  and  less 
exposed  to  the  plotting  of  others." 

LXV.  After  Hermocrates  had  spoken  to  this  effect 
the  Siceliots,  accepting  his  advice,  came  to  an 
understanding  among  themselves.  They  agreed  to 
end  the  war,  each  city  keeping  what  it  had,  except 
that  the  Camarinaeans  were  to  have  Morgantina 
on  payment  of  a  stated  sum  of  money  to  the 
Syracusans.  The  Sicilian  allies  of  the  Athenians 
then  summoned  the  Athenian  generals  and  said 
that  they  proposed  to  make  peace  and  that  the 
treaty  would  also  include  them.  And  when  the 
generals  assented,  they  proceeded  to  make  the 
agreement,  whereuj)on  the  Athenian  Heet  sailed  away 
from  Sicilv.  But  Avhen  it  arrived  at  Athens,  the 
Athenians  sentenced  to  exile  two  of  the  generals, 
Pythodorus  and  Sophocles,  and  fined  Eurymedon, 
the  third,  on  the  charge  that  Λvhen  it  had  been  in 
their  poΛver  to  subdue  Sicily  they  had  been  bribed  to 
withdra\v  from  it.  To  such  an  extent,  because  of 
their  present  good  fortune,  did  they  expect  to  be 
thAvarted  in  nothing,  and  believed  that,  no  matter 
whether  their  forces  were  powerful  or  deficient,  they 
could  equally  achieve  what  Avas  easy  and  what  was 
difficult.  The  cause  of  this  was  the  amazing  success 
Λvhich  attended  most  of  their  undertakings  and 
inspired  them  with  strong  confidence. 

LXVI.  The  same  summer  the  people  of  the  city  of 
Megara,  being  harassed  in  the  >var  by  the  Athenians, 

321 


THUCYDIDES 

alei  κατά  βτος  βκαστον  Sw  εσβαΧλοντων  τταν- 
στρατίά  69  την  -χ^ώραν,  καΐ  ύττο  των  σφετερων 
φυ•^/ά8ων  των  €Κ  Πϊ/γώι;,  οΐ  στασιασάντων  e'/c- 
ττεσόι^τες  ύττό  του  ττΧι'ιθονς  ^αλβττοι  ήσαν  \τ}- 
στεύοντβ^,  βττοίοΰντο  ΧοΎους  iv  άΧΧήΧοις  ώ?  •χ^ρη 
Ββζαμενους  τοι)?  φεύγοι^τα?  μη   αμφοτβρωθβν  την 

2  πόΧιν  φθζίρζίν.  οι  Be  φίΧοί  των  εξω  τον  θρονν 
αίσθομενοι  φανβρως  μάΧΧον  ή  ττροτερον  καΐ  αύτοΙ 

3  ηξίουν  τούτου  τον  λόγοι»  βχεσθαι.  yvovTe^  Be 
οι  τον  Βημον  ττροστάταί  ου  Βννατον  τον  Βήμον 
εσόμενον  νττο  των  κακών  μετά  σφών  καρτερεΐν, 
ποιούνται  X6-yov<i  Βείσαντε^  ττρος  τους  των  αθη- 
ναίων στρατη'γού'ϊ,  Ιτητοκράτη  τε  τον  ^Κριφρονο'ί 
καί  Δημοσθένη  τον  'ΆΧκισθενου'ζ,  βουΧομενοι 
ενΒούναι  την  ττοΧιν  καΐ  νο μίζοντε<ί  εΧάσσω  σφισι 
τον  κίνΒυνον  η  τον<;  εκπεσοντα'ζ  ύττο  σφών  κατεΧ- 

4  θεΐν.  ^υνίβησάν  τεττ  ρώτα  μέντα  μακρά  τεί'χτ)  εΧεϊν 
^ΚΘηναίου<ί  {ην  Be  σταΒίων  μάΧιστα  οκτώ  άττο  τ•^? 
ττόλεω?  επΙ  την  ^ίσαιαν  τον  Χιμενα  αυτών),  οττω? 
μη  εττιβοηθήσωσιν  εκ  της  ^ισαίας  οί  ΐΙεΧοττον- 
νήσιοι,  εν  y  αύτοϊ  μόνοι  ^φρουρούν  βεβαιότητας 
ένεκα  των  ^Ιε'γάρων,  εττειτα  Βε  καΐ  την  άνω  ττοΧιν 
Ίτειράσεσθαι  ενΒοΰναί'  ραον  δ'  ήΒη  εμεΧΧον  ττροσ- 
'χ^ωρησειν  τούτου  Jε'γ€vημεvoυ. 

LXVII.  Ot  ονν  'Αθηναίοι,  εττειΒη  άττό  τε  τών 
εpyωv  καΐ  τών  Χο'γων  τταρεσκεύαστο  άμφοτεροις, 
νττο  νύκτα  ττΧεύσαντες  ες  ^ίινωαν  την  Μεγαρέων 
νησον  όττΧίταις  εζακοσίοις,   ων  Ίτητοκράτης  ηρ- 

322 


BOOK    IV.  Lxvi.  i-Lxvn.  i 

who  regularly  invaded  their  country  in  full  force 
twice  every  year,  and  also  by  their  own  exiles  in  Pegae, 
who  had  been  expelled  in  a  revolution  by  the  popular 
party  and  kept  annoying  them  by  raiding  the  country, 
began  to  say  to  one  another  that  they  ought  to 
receive  the  fugitives  back,  so  that  the  city  should  not 
be  exposed  to  ruin  from  both  directions  at  once. 
And  the  friends  of  the  exiles,  noticing  the  murmuring 
of  the  people,  all  began  more  openly  than  before  to 
urge  that  this  proposal  be  adopted.  But  the  leaders 
of  the  popular  party,  realizing  that  the  populace 
under  the  pressure  of  their  distress  would  not  be 
able  to  hold  out  Λvith  them,  became  frightened  and 
made  overtures  to  the  Athenian  generals,  Hippocrates 
son  of  Ariphronand  Demosthenes  son  of  Alcisthenes, 
proposing  to  surrender  the  city  to  them  ;  for  they 
thought  that  this  course  would  be  less  dangerous  to 
themselves  than  the  restoration  of  the  citizens  \vhom 
they  had  banished.  They  agreed,  in  the  first  place, 
that  the  Athenians  should  take  possession  of  the 
long  walls  (the  distance  between  the  city  and  the 
harbour  at  Nisaeawas  about  eight  stadia),  in  order  to 
prevent  the  Peloponnesians  from  sending  reinforce- 
ments from  Nisaea,  where  they  formed  the  sole 
garrison  to  keep  their  hold  on  Megara,  and,  in  the 
second  place,  that  they  would  do  their  best  to  hand 
over  to  them  the  upper-town  as  well,  believing  that, 
as  soon  as  this  was  done,  their  fellow-citizens  would 
more  readily  go  over  to  the  Athenian  side. 

LXVII.  So,  then,  as  soon  as  due  preparations,  both 
in  word  and  act,  had  been  made  by  both  parties,  the 
Athenians  sailed  under  cover  of  night  to  Minoa,  the 
island  which  lies  off"  Megara,  taking  six  hundred 
hoplites  under  the  command  of  Hippocrates,  and  took 

323 


THUCYDIDES 

Xev,  iv  ορύ^ματι  εκαθβζοντο,  όθβν  ίττΧίνθευον  τα 

2  τεί-χ^η  καΐ  άττεΐχ^βν  ου  ττολυ*  οι  8e  μετά  του 
ΑημοσθεΐΌυς  του  έτερου  στρατηγοΰ  Ώ.\αταιή<ζ 
τ€  yfrcXol  καΐ  έτεροι  -περίττοΧοι  ενήΒρευσαν  ες  το 
^ΕνυάΧίον,  6  εστίν  εΧασσον  αττωθεν.  και  -ησθετο 
ού8εΙς  εΐ  μη  ο'ι  άΐ'Βρες  οις  εττιμεΧες  ην  εί8έναι  την 

3  νύκτα  ταύτην.  και  εττεώη  εως  εμεΧλε  ηί^νεσθαι, 
ο'ι  ττροΒώόΐ'τες  των  Με-'/αρέων  ^  ούτοι  ToiovSe 
ετΓοίησαν.  άκάτιον  άμφηρικον  ώ?  Χησται,  εκ 
τΓοΧλοΟ  τεθεραττευκοτες  την  άνοίξιν  των  ττυΧών, 
ειωθεσαν  εττΐ  ίιμάξη,  ττείθοντες  τον  άργ^οντα,  Βια 
της  τάφρου  κατακομίζειν  της  νυκτός  επΙ  την 
θάΧασσαν  και  εκττΧεΐν  καΐ  7rp\v  ημεραν  είναι 
ττάΧιν  αύτο  τη  άμάξη  κομ'ισαντες  ες  το  τείχος 
κατά  τας  ττύΧας  εσψ/ον,  οττως  τοις  εκ  της  ^Ιινωας 
Άθηναίοις   αφανής    Βη    εϊη    η    φυΧακη,   μη   οντος 

4  εν  τω  Χιμενι  ττΧοίου  φανερού  μηΖενός.  και  τότ6 
7Γ ρος  ταΐς  ττύλαις  η8η  ην  η  άμαξα,  και  άνοιχ- 
θεισών  κατά  το  ειωθος  ώς  τω  άκατιω  οι  ^Αθηναίοι 
(εJίyvετo  yap  άττο  ξυνθηματος  το  τοιούτον) 
ΙΒόντες  εθεον  δρόμω  εκ  της  ενέδρας,  βουΧόμενοι 
φθάσαι  ττρίν  ξυ^κΧησθηναι  πάΧιν  τας  ττύΧας 
καΐ  έως  έτι  ή  α  μάζα  εν  αύταΐς  ην,  κωΧνμα  ούσα 
ττροσθεΐναί'  και  αύτοΐς  αμα  καΐ  οι  ξυμπράσσοντες 
'Mεy αρής  τους  κατά  ττύΧας  φύΧακας  κτείνουσιν. 

5  καΐ  ττρωτον  μεν  οι  ττερί  τον  Αημοσθένη  ΐΙΧαταιης 
τε  και  ττερίτϊοΧοι  έσεδραμον  ου  νυν  το  τροτταΐόν 
εστί,  καΐ    ευθύς   εντός    των  ττυΧων  (r/σθοντο  yap 

^  οί  προδιδοΓτίϊ  τώΐ'  Meyapf αιΐ',  deleted  liy  Hude. 

324 


BOOK    IV.  i.xvii.  1-5 

cover  in  a  ditch,  not  far  from  tlie  town,  where  bricks 
had  been  made  for  the  walls.  A  second  company  con- 
sistinor  of  light-armed  Plataeans  and  frontier-patrols 
undertlie  command  of  the  other  general,  Demosthenes, 
set  an  ambuscade  at  Enyalius,  Λvhicil  is  somewliat 
nearer.  And  all  that  night  no  one  perceived  what 
was  going  on  except  the  men  whose  business  it  was 
to  know.  Then,  at  the  approach  of  dawn,  these 
would-be  Megarian  traitors  began  their  work  as 
folloΛvs.  For  a  long  time  before  this  they  had  been 
carefully  preparing  for  the  opening  of  the  gates  by 
regularly  assuming  the  guise  of  pirates  and  taking  a 
sculling  boat,  drawn  on  a  cart,  through  the  ditch  and 
down  to  the  sea,  where  they  Avould  put  out.  This 
they  did  every  night,  first  securing  the  consent  of  the 
commander.!  Then  before  daybreak  they  would  cart 
the  boat  back  into  the  fortifications,  taking  it  in  by 
way  of  the  gates,  their  object  being,  as  they  pretended, 
to  keep  the  Athenian  garrison,  which  was  stationed  at 
Minoa,  in  the  dark,  as  no  boat  would  be  visible  in  the 
harbour.  On  the  night  in  question  the  cart  was  already 
at  the  gates,  and  Avhen  these  were  opened  as  usual  as 
if  to  let  the  boat  pass  through,  the  Athenians,  who 
were  acting  throughout  in  accordance  with  an  agree- 
ment, seeing  it,  ran  at  top  speed  from  their  ambush, 
wishing  to  get  there  before  the  gates  were  closed 
again  and  Λvhile  the  cart  was  still  in  the  passage,  thus 
forming  an  obstacle  to  the  shutting  of  the  gates  ;  and 
at  the  same  time  their  Megarian  accomplices  killed  the 
guards  at  the  gates.  And  first  the  Plataeans  and  the 
patrols  under  Demosthenes'  command  rushed  into  the 
place  where  the  trophy  now  stands,  and  as  soon  as  they 
were  inside  the  gates  the  Plataeans  engaged  Λvith  the 
*  i.e.,  of  the  Peloponnesian  garrison. 

325 


THUCYDIDES 

οί  βγγύτατα  ΥΙ^ΧοττοννήσιΟί)  μαγ^ομβνοι  τους 
ΤΓροσβοηθουρτας  οι  ϊίΧαταιής  βκράτησαν  καΐ  τοις 
των  ^Αθηναίων  όττλίται?  βττίφβρομΙΐΌΐς  βββαίους 
τας  ττνΧας  τταρέσχον.  LXVIII.  eireira  δέ  κα\ 
Ύων  \\.θηναίων  ηΒη  ό   aUl  βντος  yiyuopevo^  χωρεί 

2  eVi  το  τβΐχος.  καΐ  οι  TieXoirovvrjaioi  φρουροί  το 
pep  ττρώτον  άντίσχόντβς  τ/μύνοντο  όλίγοί,  καΐ 
άτΓβθανόν  TLve<i  αυτών,  οι  he  ττΧβίους  e?  φυ^ην 
κατέστησαν,  φoβηθevτe<;  ev  νυκτί  τε  ττοΧβμίων 
ττροσττεπτωκοτων  καΐ  τωι•  προ8ι8ύντων  ^Ιε^αρεων 
αντιμαχομένων   νομισαντες    τους    απαντάς    σφάς 

3  Μεγα/?€α?  ττροΒέΒωκεναι.  ξυνέττεσε  yap  και  τον 
των  ^Αθηναίων  κήρυκα  αφ  εαυτού  γνώμης  κη- 
ρύζαί  τον  βουΧομενον  ύναι  ^ίε-γαρεων  μετά 
^Αθηναίων  θησόμενον  τα  ό'ττλα.  οι  δ  ώ?  ήκουσαν, 
ουκέτί   άνεμενον,  άΧΧα   τω   οντι   νομισαντες  κοινί] 

4  ττοΧεμεΙσθαι  κατέφυ^ον  ες  την  Κισαιαν.  άμα  Βε 
εω  εαΧωκότων  7/3/;  των  τειχών  και  των  εν  ttj 
ττόλεί  ^ϊε^αρίων  θορυβουμενων  οι  ττρος  τους 
^Αθηναίους  ττράζαντες  και  άΧΧο  μετ  αυτών 
ττΧήθος,   ο   ξυνιίΒει,   εφασαν   χρ?]ναι  ανοι^ειν   τάς 

5  ττύΧας  και  εττεξιέναι  ες  μάχην.  ξυνέκειτο  Βε 
αύτοΐς  τών  ττυΧών  άνοιχθεισών  εσττηττειν  τους 
^Αθηναίους,  αύτοΙ  Βε  ΒιάΒηΧοι  εμεΧΧον  εσεσθαι 
(Χίπα  yap  άΧείψβσθαι),  οττως  μη  άΒικώνται. 
άσφάΧεια  Βε  αύτοΐς  μαΧΧον  ε^ί^νετο  της  ανοίξεως• 
και  yap  οί  από  της  ^ΕΧευο'ΐνος  κατά  το  'ξυyκεί- 
μενον   τετ ρακισ χίΧιοι  όπΧΐται  τών   Αθηναίων  και 

320 


BOOK    IV.  Lxvii.  5-LXV111.  5 

reinforcements  which  came  up  — for  the  nearest 
Peloponnesians  had  become  aware  of  wliat  w'as  going 
on — and  defeated  tliem,  thus  securing  the  gates  for 
the  onrusliing  Athenian  hoplites.  LXVII  I.  After 
that  every  Athenian  who  got  inside  immediately  made 
for  the  wall.  A  few  of  the  Peloponnesian  garrison  at 
first  stood  their  ground  and  defended  themselves^ 
some  of  them  being  killed^  but  most  of  them  took  to 
flight,  being  seized  with  panic,  both  because  the 
enemy  had  attacked  them  at  night,  and  also 
because  they  thought  the  Megarian  traitors  were 
fighting  against  them  ;  and  they  supposed  that  all  the 
Megarians  had  betrayed  them.  For  it  so  happened 
also  that  the  Athenian  herald,  acting  on  his  own 
responsibilit}•,  made  a  proclamation  that  any  Megarian 
who  so  desired  might  espouse  the  cause  of  the 
Athenians.  VV'hen  the  garrison  heard  this  proclam- 
ation it  no  longer  held  out,  but,  verily  believing  that 
a  concerted  attack  was  being  made  upon  them,  fled  to 
Nisaea.  And  at  daybreak,  when  the  walls  had  already 
been  taken  and  the  Megarians  in  the  city  were  in  a 
tumult,  those  Avho  had  negotiated  with  the  Athenians, 
and  a  large  number  besides  who  were  privy  to  the 
plot,  expressed  the  opinion  that  they  ought  to  open 
the  gates  and  go  out  to  battle.  It  had,  in  fact,  been 
agreed  between  them  and  the  Athenians,  that  as  soon 
as  the  gates  were  opened  the  Athenians  should  rush 
in,  and,  in  order  that  they  might  themselves  escape 
injury,  they  were  to  be  distinguished  from  the  rest  by 
being  anointed  with  oil.  They  were  also  to  have 
additional  security  in  thus  opening  the  gates,  since 
the  men  who  according  to  the  compact  were  to 
march  by  night  from  Eleusis,  four  thousand  Athenian 


327 


THUCYDIDES 

ίπττής  ΐζακοσιοι  οι  την  νύκτα  ττορευσόμενοί  ^ 
G  τταρησαν.  ά\η\ίμμ€νων  δε  αυτών  καΐ  όντων  ηΒη 
ττερί  τας  ττιίλα?  KaTayopevei  τί?  ξυν€ί8ώ<ϊ  τοΐς 
6τέροίς  το  βτΓΐβούλευμα.  καΐ  οΊ  ξυστραφέντβς 
αθρόοι  ηΧθον  καΐ  ουκ  'ύφασαν  -χρήναι  ούτ€ 
eTre^ievai  (ουδέ  yap  ττροτερον  ττω  του  το  Ισχ^ύοντ€<ϊ 
μάΧΚον  το\μησαι)  ούτε  69  κίνΒυνον  φανερον  την 
ττόΧιν  KUTayayelv.  ec  τε  μη  ττείσβταί  τις,  αυτοί) 
την  μά'χ^ην  ίσεσθαι.  εΒήΧουν  δέ  ούΒεν  ότι  ϊσασι 
τα  ττρασσόμβνα,  ά\\α  ώ?  τα  βεΧτιστα  βουΧεύ- 
οντε<ί  Ισγυρίζοντο,  καΐ  αμα  ττερι  τας  ττυΧας 
τταρέμενον  φυΧάσσηντες,  ώστε  ουκ  εyeveτo  τοΐ<ζ 
ετΓΐβουΧεύουσ ι  ττραζαι  ο  εμβΧΧοί'. 

LXIX.  Τνόντες  δε  οι  τών  Αθηναίων  aTpaTijyol 
ότι  εναντίωμά  τι  εyεvετo  καΐ  την  ττοΧιν  βία  ούχ^ 
οίοι  τε  έσονται  Χαβεΐν,  την  ^ίσαιαν  ευθύς  περιε- 
τεί-χ^ιζον,  νομίζοντες,  ει  ττρίν  εττιβοηθΐ^σαι  τινας 
εξεΧοιεν,  θάσσον  αν  καϊ  τα  ^liyapa  ττροσχ^ωρη- 
2  σαι  (^Γapεyh>ετo  δε  σί^ηοΰς  τε  εκ  τών  Αθηνών 
τα'χυ  καϊ  Xίθoυpyol  καϊ  τάΧΧα  εττιτήΒεια)•  άρζά- 
μενοι  δ'  άττο  του  τείχ^ους  ο  είχ^ον  καϊ  8ιθίκο8ομή- 
σαντες  το  ττρος  Μεγαρεας,άττ^  εκείνου  εκατέρωθεν 
ες  θάΧασσαν  της  ^ισαίας'^  τάφρον  τε  καϊ  τειχ^η 
8ιε\ομ€νΐ]  ηyεv  '^  η  στρατιά,  εκ  τε  του  ττροαστειου 
Χίθοις  καϊ  ττΧίνθοις  'χ^ρώμενοι,  καΐ  κότττοντες  τα 
BivSpa   καϊ    ύΧην    άττεσταύρουν    ει   ττη   Βεοιτό   τΐ' 

^  τΓορΐυσόμΐΐΌΐ,   Rutherford's  conjecture  for  wopeuaufvot  of 
the  MiS8.  ^   Ilude  deletes  ttjs  Νισα/α5,  after  iStahl. 

3  ^yev  addeil  by  btahl  and  Rauchenatein. 
328 


BOOK    IV.  Lxviii.  5-L\ix.  2 

Iioplites  and  six  hundred  cavalry,  were  now  at  hand.' 
But  after  they  had  anointed  themselves  and  were 
already  near  the  gates,  an  accomplice  divulged  the 
plot  to  the  other  party.  And  they,  gathering  in  a 
body,  came  and  declared  that  they  ought  neither  to 
march  out  to  fight — for  they  had  never  ventured  to  do 
such  a  thing  before,  even  when  they  were  stronger 
— nor  to  bring  the  city  into  manifest  danger ;  and, 
they  added,  should  anyone  refuse  to  obe}',  the  fight 
would  take  place  on  the  spot.  But  they  gave  no  signs 
whatever  that  they  were  aware  of  the  plot  which  Avas 
going  on,  but  stoutly  maintained  that  their  advice 
was  for  the  best,  and  at  the  same  time  stayed  about 
the  gates  keeping  watch,  so  that  the  plotters  had 
no  opportunity  to  carry  out  their  intentions. 

LXIX.  The  Athenian  generals,  however,  saw  that 
some  obstacle  had  arisen  and  that  they  would  not  be 
able  to  take  the  city  by  force,  and  therefore  at  once 
began  to  invest  Nisaea  Avith  a  wall,  thinking  that,  if 
they  could  take  this  town  before  any  succour  came, 
Megara  also  would  soon  capitulate.  A  supply  of  iron 
quickly  arrived  from  Athens,  as  well  as  stonemasons 
and  whatever  else  Avas  needed.  Beginning  then  at 
the  part  of  the  fortification  Avhich  they  already  held 
and  building  a  cross-wall  on  the  side  of  it  facing 
Megara,  from  that  point  they  built  out  on  either  side 
of  Nisaea  as  far  as  the  sea,  the  army  apportioning 
among  them  the  ditch  and  the  walls  and  using  stones 
and  bricks  from  the  suburbs.  Moreover,  they  cut 
down  fruit-trees  and  forest-wood  and  built  stockades 

^  Or,  retaining  ττορβυόμίνοι  with  the  MSS.  and  rejecting  ol 
before  την  νύκτα,  "  since  the  men  from  Eleusis,  four  thousatid 
Athenian  hoplites  and  six  hundred  cavalry,  according  to  the 
compact  had  marched  all  night  and  were  now  at  hand." 

329 


THUCYDIDES 

και  al   OLKLat    του  ττροαστβίον  eTrciX^ei^  \αμβά- 
ΐ'ουσαι    αύται    ύττήρ•χ^οι>   βρυμα.      καϊ  ταύτην   pei> 

3  την  ημβραν  όΧην  είρ^άζοντο•  ττ]  Be  υστβραίαττέρΐ 
ΒβίΧην  το  Τ€Ϊχο<;  όσον  ουκ  αττετετβλεστο,  καΐ  οι  iv 
TTJ  Νισαία  Βείσαντες,  σίτου  τβ  άττορία  (βφ'  ήμίραν 
yap  t'/c  τή<;  άνω  ττοΧεως  e-χ^ρωντο)  καϊ  τού<{  YleXo- 
ποννησίου<;  ου  νομίζοντα  τα  γι/  €'πιβοηθησ€ίν,  τους 
Τ€  Μεγαρε'α?  ττοΧβμίους  ηγούμενοι,  ξυνββησαν 
τοις  \\θηναίοις  ρητου  μβν  βκαστον  αργυρίου  άττο- 
Χυθηναι  οττΧα  τταραΒόντας,  τοΐς  δβ  ΑακεΒαι- 
μονιοις,  τω  τ€  άρχ^οντι  καϊ  βϊ  τις  άΧΧος  €νήν, 
γ^ρήσθαι^ Αθηναίους  6  τι  αν  βούΧωνται.     €πΙ  τού- 

4  τοις  όμοΧο^ησαντβς  e^PjXOov.  καϊ  οΐ  ^Αθηναίοι 
τα  μακρά  τβίχη  άττορρήζαντβς  άττο  της  των 
Μεγαρεωΐ'  ττόΧβως  καϊ  την  Νίσαιαν  τταραΧαβοντβς 
ταΧΧα  τταρβσ κ€υάζοντο. 

LXX.  Β/9ασίδα?  δε  6  ΎεΧΧιΒος  ΑακβΒαιμόνιος 
κατά,  τούτον  τον  γ^ρόνον  €τύ-γχ^αν€  ττερί  Έικυώνα 
καϊ  Κ,όρινθον  ων,  iirl  &ράκης  στρατβίαν  τταρα- 
σκβυαζομίρος.  καΧ  ως  ησθβτο  των  τειχών  την 
άΧωσιν,  Βείσας  irepi  re  τοΙς  iv  τη  Νισαία  Πβλο- 
ττοννησίοις  καϊ  μη  τα  Μέγαρα  Χηφθη,  ττβμττει  βς 
τ€  τους  Βοιωτούς  κεΧεύ'ον  κατά  τάχος  στρατιά 
άτταντήσαι  eVt  ΎριττοΒισκον  (εστί  δε  κώμη  της 
Μεγαριδο?  όνομα  τούτο  έχουσα  ύττο  τω  opei  τη 
Vepaveia),  καΐ  αύτος  έχων  ηΧθεν  ετττακοσίους  μεν 
και  ΒισχιΧίους  Κορινθίων  οττΧιτας,  ΦΧειασίων  δε 
τετρακοσίους,  Χικυωνίων  δε   εξακόσιους  καϊ   τους 

33° 


BOOK     IV.    LXIX.   2-LXX.    I 

wherever  they  were  needed ;  and  the  houses  of  the 
suburbs  with  the  addition  of  battlements  of  tlieni- 
selves  furnished  a  rampart.  They  worked  the 
whole  of  this  first  duy,  but  on  the  next  day  toward 
evening  when  the  Avail  \vas  all  but  finished  the  garri- 
son of  Nisaea,  becoming  alarmed  by  the  shortage  of 
food,  seeing  that  they  received  provisions  from  the 
upper-city  for  only  a  day  at  a  time,  and  not  antici- 
j)ating  any  speedy  relief  from  the  Peloponnesians, 
and  believing  the  Megarians  to  be  hostile,  capitulated 
to  the  Athenians  on  condition  that  they  should  give 
up  their  arms  and  pay  a  ransom  of  a  stipulated 
amount  for  each  man  ;  as  for  the  Lacedaemonians 
in  the  garrison,  the  commander  or  anyone  else, 
they  were  to  be  disposed  of  as  the  Athenians  might 
wish.  On  these  terms  thev  came  to  an  agreement 
and  marched  out.  The  Athenians  then  made  a 
breach  in  the  long  walls  in  order  to  separate  them 
from  the  wall  of  the  city  of  Megara,  took  posses- 
sion of  Nisaea,  and  proceeded  with  their  other 
preparations. 

LXX.  At  this  time  Brasidas  son  of  Tellis,  a  Lace- 
daemonian, happened  to  be  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Sicyon  and  Corinth,  preparing  a  force  for  use  in 
the  region  of  Thrace.  And  when  he  heard  of  the 
capture  of  the  walls,  fearing  for  the  safety  of  the 
Peloponnesians  in  Nisaea  and  apprehensive  lest  Me- 
gara should  be  taken,  he  sent  to  the  Boeotians 
requesting  them  to  come  in  haste  with  an  army  and 
to  meet  him  at  Tripodiscus,  which  is  the  name  of  a 
village  in  the  district  of  Megara  at  the  foot  of  Mount 
(leraneia.  He  himself  set  out  with  two  thousand 
seven  hundred  Corinthian  hoplites,  four  hundred  from 
Phlius,  seven  hundred  from  Sicyon,  and  such  troops 

331 


THUCYDIDES 

μβθ^  αΰτοϋ  όσοι  ηΒη  ξννβιΧεγμενοι  ήσαν,  οιομβνος 
2  την  Νίσαιαν  en  καταληψεσθαι  άνάΧωτον.  ώ?  he 
eTrvOero,  (ervy^e  'yap  νυκτός  έπΙ  τον  ΎριττοΒίσκον 
έξεΧθών)  ά7Γο\έξα<ί  τριακόσιους  του  στρατού,  ττρίν 
€Κ7Γυστος  <γ€νέσθαι,  ττροσΡ^Χθε  τι)  των  Meyapeωv 
TToXei  Χαθων  τους  ^Αθηναίους  οντάς  irepl  την 
θάΧασσαν,  βονΧόμβνος  μεν  τω  λόγω  καΐ  α  μα  el 
Βύναιτο  epy(p  της  Νίσαυας  7Γ€ΐράσαι,  το  Be  yueyi- 
στον,  την  των  Μεγαρεω?^  ttoXlv  εσεΧθων  βεβαίώ- 
σασθαι.  και  ηζίου  Βεζασθαι  σφάς  λέγων  ev 
iXiriSi  elvai  άναΧαβεΙν  Νίσαιαν.  LXXI.  αϊ  Be 
των  M€yapeωv  στάσεις  φοβούμεναι,  οΐ  μεν  μη 
τους  φεύγοντας  σφισιν  εσα^α^ων  αυτούς  εκβάΧη, 
οι  Be  μη  αύτο  τούτο  6  Βημος  Βείσας  εττΊθηται 
σφίσι  καΐ  ή  ττόΧις  εν  μάχη  καθ  αυτήν  ούσα  εγ^/υς 
εφεΒρβνόντων  ^Αθηναίων  άττόΧηται,  ουκ  εΒεξαντο, 
αλλ'  άμφοτεροις  εΒόκβι  ήσυχ^άσασι  το  μεΧΧον 
2  ττερίίΒεΐν.  ηΧττιζον  yap  καΐ  μαχ^ην  εκατεροι 
εσεσθαι  των  τε  ^Αθηναίων  καΐ  των  ττροσβοηθη- 
σάντων,  και  ούτω  σφίσιν  άσφαΧεστερως  εχ^ειν, 
οις  τις  eti]  εΰνους,  κρατήσασι  ττροσχ^ωρησαι•  ο  Be 
Έρασίόας  ώς  ουκ  εττειθεν,  άνε)(ωρησε  πάΧιν  ες  το 
άΧΧο  στράτευμα. 

LXXII.  "Αμα  Βε  τη  εω  οι  Βοίωτοί  τταρήσαν, 
Βιανενοημενηι  μεν  και  τΓρ\ν  Τ^ρασίΒαν  ττεμψαι 
βοηθεΐν  €7γΙ  τα  Μέγαρα,  ώί  ουκ  άΧΧοτριου  οντος 
του  κινΒύνου,  κα\  ηΒη  οντες  ττανστρατιά  Πλα- 
ταιάσιν  εττειΒη  Βε  καΐ  Ί)λβεν  ο  άγγελο?,  ττοΧΧω 
μάΧΧον   ερρώσθ>]σαν,   καΐ    άττοστείΧαντες   Βιακο- 

332 


BOOK    IV.  Lxx.  i-LXxii.  i 

of  his  own  as  had  ah-eady  been  levied,  thinkinof  that 
he  would  arrive  before  Nisaea  had  been  taken. 
But  wlien  he  learned  the  truth — for  he  happened  to 
liave  gone  out  by  night  to  Tripodiscus — he  selected 
three  hundred  of  his  ΟΛνη  army,  and  before  his 
approach  was  known  reached  the  city  of  Megara  un- 
observed by  the  Athenians,  who  were  down  by  the  sea. 
His  plan  was,  ostensibly — and  really,  too,  if  it  should 
prove  possible — to  make  an  attempt  upon  Nisaea,  but 
most  of  all  to  get  into  the  city  of  Megara  and  secure 
it.  And  he  demanded  that  they  should  receive  him, 
saving  that  he  was  in  hopes  of  recovering  Nisaea. 
LXXI.  But  the  rival  factions  of  Megara  were  afraid, 
the  one  that  he  might  bring  in  the  exiles  and  drive 
them  out,  the  other  that  the  populace,  fearing  this 
very  thing,  might  attack  them,  and  that  the  city, 
being  at  war  Avith  itself,  while  the  Athenians  Avere 
King  in  wait  near  at  hand,  might  be  ruined.  They, 
therefore,  did  not  admit  Brasidas,  both  parties 
thinking  it  best  to  wait  and  see  Λvhat  would  happen. 
For  each  party  expected  that  there  would  be  a  battle 
between  the  Athenians  and  the  relieving  army,  and 
so  it  Λvas  safer  for  them  not  to  join  the  side  Avhich 
anyone  favoured  until  it  was  victorious.  So  then 
Brasidas,  when  he  could  not  persuade  them,  Λvith- 
drew  once  more  to  his  own  army. 

LXXI  I.  At  daybreak  the  Boeotians  arrived.  They 
iiad  intended,  even  before  Brasidas  summoned  them, 
to  go  to  the  aid  of  Megara,  feeling  that  the  danger 
was  not  alien  to  them,  and  were  already  at  Plataea 
with  all  their  forces ;  but  when  the  summons  actually 
came,  they  were  greatly  strengthened  in  their  pur- 
pose, and  sent  on  two  thousand  two  hundred  hophtes 


333 


THUCYDIDES 

σίον<ϊ  fcai  8ισχ^ι\ίους  οττΧίτας  και  ίττττεα?  εξακο- 

2  σίους  τοις  ττΧβίοσιν  άττήΧθον  ττάΧιν.  τταρόντος 
8e  ή8η  ζυμτταΐ'τος  του  στρατβυματος,  οττλιτών 
ουκ  βΧασσον  βξακισχ^ιΧίων,  καΐ  των  \\θηναίων 
των  μ€ν  οπΧιτών  irepi  Τ6  τ?;^  ^ίσαιαν  όντων  και 
την  θάΧασσαν  ev  τάζει,  των  8e  ψιΧων  άνα  το 
πεΒίον  eaKehaa μίνων,  οΐ  ιτητής  οί  των  Βοιωτών 
α7Γροσ8οκητοί<ζ  βττιττεσοντες  τοις  "^ιΧοΐς  βτρεψαν 
€7γΙ  την  ΘάΧασσαν  {ev  'yap  τω  ττρο  του  ούΒβμία 
βοήθεια  ττω  τοί'ζ  ^Ίε'γαρεΰσιν  ούΒαμόθεν  εττήΧθεν)' 

3  άντετΓβζεΧάσαντες  δε  καΐ  οί  των  ^Αθηναίων  €9 
^^εΐρας  ήσαν,  καΐ  eyeveTO  ΙτηΓομα'χ^ια  iirl  ττοΧύ,  ev 

4  f]  άξιούσιν  εκάτβροι  ούχ^  ησσους  γενέσθαι,  τον 
μεν  yap  ϊτττταρ'χ^ον  των  Βοίωτώ^  και  άΧΧου<;  τινάς 
ου  7ΓθΧΧού<ζ  7Γρ6<ί  αύτην  την  Ί^ισαιαν  ττροσεΧά- 
σαζ'τα?  ^  οί  Αθηναίοι  καΐ  άττοκτείναντες  εσκύΧευ- 
σαν,  και  των  τε  νεκρών  τούτων  κρατήσαντες 
ύτΓοσττόνΒους  άττέΒοσαν  καΐ  τροτταϊον  έστησαν 
ου  ^  μεντοι  εν  yε  τω  παντί  έργω  βεβαίως  ουδέτε- 
ροι τεΧευτήσαντες  άττεκρίθησαν  αλλ'  ^  οί  μεν 
Βοίωτοι  ττρος  τους  εαυτών,  οί  8ε  εττι  την  Νίσαιαν. 

LXXIII.  ΛΙετα  δε  τούτο  Βρασίδας  και  το 
στράτευμα  εγ^ωρουν  eyyυτεpω  της  θαΧάσσης  καΐ 
της  των  ^leyapεωv  ττοΧεως,  και  καταΧαβόντες 
■χωρίον  ετΓΐτι']8ειον  τταραταζάμενοι  ι/σύχ^αζον, 
οίομενοι  σφίσιν  εττιεναι  τους  ^Αθηναίους  καΐ  τους 
^leyapεaς  εττιστάμενοι  ττεριορωμενους  όττοτέρων  η 
2  νίκη  εσται.  καΧώς  Be  ενομιζον  σφίσιν  αμφότερα 
εχειν,  άμα  μεν  το   μη    εττιχειρίΐν  προτέρους   μη8ε 

^  Portus'  correction  for  προσ^λάσαρτ^ί  of  the  MSS. 
'  Hufle  adopts  Rutherford's  conjecture  oiSfv. 
^  αλλ",  Hude  deletes,  as  not  translated  by  Valla. 

334 


BOOK    IV.  Lxxii.  i-Lxxiii.  2 

and  six  hundred  cavalry,  returning  home  with  the 
larger  part  of  their  army.  Then,  finally,  λνΐιεη  their 
whole  army  was  at  hand,  consisting  of  not  less  than 
six  thousand  hoplites,  and  the  Athenian  hoplites  were 
in  line  about  Nisaea  and  the  sea,  while  the  light- 
armed  troops  were  scattered  up  and  down  the  plain, 
the  Boeotian  cavalry  fell  upon  the  latter  and  drove 
them  to  the  sea.  The  attack  was  unexpected,  for 
hitherto  no  reinforcements  had  ever  come  to  the 
Megarians  from  any  quarter.  But  the  Athenian 
horsemen  charged  upon  them  in  turn  and  a  prolonged 
cavalry  action  ensued,  in  which  both  sides  claimed  to 
have  held  their  own.  The  Athenians  did  succeed  in 
killing  the  commander  of  the  Boeotian  cavalry  and  a 
few  others  who  had  charged  to  the  very  Avails  of 
Nisaea  and  despoiled  them,  and  having  got  possession 
of  their  bodies  they  gave  them  back  under  a  truce 
and  set  up  a  trophy  ;  in  the  action  as  a  whole,  how- 
ever, neither  side  finally  gained  a  decisive  advantage, 
and  so  they  separated,  the  Boeotians  going  to  their 
own  army,  the  Athenians  to  Nisaea. 

LXXllI.  After  this  Brasidas  and  his  army  advan- 
ced nearer  to  the  sea  and  the  city  of  Megara,  and 
there,  taking  up  an  advantageous  position,  they  drew 
up  their  lines  and  kept  quiet,  thinking  that  the 
Athenians  Avould  come  against  them,  and  feeling 
assured  that  the  Megarians  would  wait  to  see  which 
side  would  be  victorious.  And  they  thought  that 
matters  stood  well  with  them  in  both  of  two  re- 
spects :    in  the  first  place,  they  were  not  forcing  an 


335 


THUCYDIDES 

μά\ης  καΐ  klvSvvov  εκοντας  αρξαι,  enreiSyj  ye  iv 
φαν€ρω  eSei^av  έτοιμοι  6ρτ€<ϊ  άμύνεσθαι,  καΐ 
αύτοΐ<ί  ώσττερ  άκονιτί  την  νίκην  Ζίκαίω^  άνατίθε- 
σθαΐ'    iv   τω    αύτω   δε    καΐ   ττρος   τους    λίβγαρεας 

3  ορθώς  ζυμβαίνειν  ει,  μεν  yap  μη  ώφθησαν 
ελθόντβς,  ουκ  αν  εν  τύχτ]  yiyveaOaL  σφίσιν,  αλλά 
σαφώς  αν  ώσττερ  ησσηθβντων  στερηθηναι  ευθύς 
της  ττόΧεως'  νυν  8ε  καν  τυχ^εΐν  αυτούς  'Αθηναίους 
μη  βουΧηθέντας  ά^ωνίζεσθαι,  ώστε  άμα•χτ]τΙ  αν 
ττερΓ/ενεσθαί   αύτοΐς   ων  ένεκα  ηΧθον.     οττερ  καΐ 

4  εηενετο.  οι  yap  ^lεyapης,  ώς  οι  ^Αθηναίοι 
ετάξαντο  μεν  τταρα  τα  μακρά,  τείχη  εξεΧθόντες, 
ησύγαζον  8ε  και  αύτοΙ  μη  εττιόντων,  Xoyιζόμevoι 
καΐ  οι  εκείνων  στpaτηyol  μη  άντιτταΧον  elvai 
σφίσι  τον  κιν8υνον,  εττειΒη  καΐ  τα  ττΧείω  αύτοΐς 
ΤΓρουκεχωρι']κει,  άρξασι  μάχης  προς  ττΧείονας 
αυτών  η  ΧαβεΙν  νικησαντας  ylεyapa  η  σφαΧεντας 
τω  ^βελτίστω  του  όττΧιτικοΰ  βΧαφθήναι,  τόΐς  8ε 
ξυμττάσης  της  8υνάμεως  καΐ  τών  παρόντων  μέρος 
εκαστον  κινΒυνεύειν  είκοτως  εθεΧειν  τοΧμάν, 
χρόνον  he  επισχόντες  και  ώς  ούΒεν  αφ'  εκατερων 
επεχειρεΐτο,  άπήΧθον  πρότεροι  οι  ^Αθηναίοι  ες 
την  ^ισαιαν  και  αύθις  οι  ΐίελοποννησ ιοι  οθενπερ 
ώρμηθησαν     ούτω  8η  τω  μεν  1^ρασί8α  αύτω   και 


^  Apparentlj'  there  is  an  anacolutlion,  the  sentence  be- 
ginning as  if  τφ  Βοαιτίδα  άιοί-,ουσι  ras  πύλαι  were  to  be  the 
predicate,  but  after  the  long  parenthesis  tlie  subject  ie 
resumed  in  partitive  form,  ai  τών  (ptvyovraiv  φίλοι  Meyaprjs. 


BOOK    IV.  Lxxiii.  2-4 

engagement  and  had  not  deliberately  courted  the 
risk  of  a  battle,  although  they  had  at  least  plainly 
shown  that  they  were  ready  to  defend  themselves, 
so  that  the  victory  Λvould  justly  be  accredited  to 
them  almost  without  a  blo\v ;  and  at  the  same  time 
they  thought  that  things  were  turning  out  right  as 
regards  the  Megarians  also.  For  if  they  had  failed 
to  put  in  an  appearance  there  Λνου^Ι  have  been  no 
chance  for  them,  but  they  would  clearly  have  lost 
the  city  at  once  just  as  though  they  had  been  de- 
feated ;  but  by  this  move  there  was  the  possible 
chance  that  the  Athenians  themselves  >vould  not  care 
to  fight,  with  the  result  that  they  Λvould  have  gained 
what  they  came  for  Λvithout  a  battle.  And  this  is 
just  Avhat  happened.  For  the  Megarians  did  \vhat 
was  expected  of  them.^  When  the  Athenians  came 
out  and  drew  up  their  lines  before  the  long  walls, 
they  too  kept  quiet,  since  the  Peloponnesians  did 
not  attack,  and  their  generals  also  reckoned  that 
they  Avere  running  an  unequal  risk,  now  that  almost 
all  their  plans  had  turned  out  \vell,  to  begin  a  battle 
against  larger  numbers,  and  either  be  victorious  and 
take  Megara,  or,  if  defeated,  have  the  flower  of  their 
hoplite  force  damaged  ;  whereas  the  Peloponnesians 
would  naturally  be  willing  to  risk  an  engagement 
which  Avould  involve,  for  each  contingent^  only  a 
portion  of  the  entire  army  or  of  the  troops  there  at 
hand. 2  Both  armies  therefore  Avaited  for  some  time, 
and  when  no  attack  Avas  made  from  either  side,  the 
Athenians  were  the  first  to  withdraw,  retiring  to 
Nisaea,  and  next  the  Peloponnesians,  returning  to 
the  place  from  Λvllich  they  had  set  out.  So  then, 
finally,  the  Megarians  who  Λvere  friends  of  the  exiles 

^  The  text  is  clearly  corrupt,  but  the  general  sense  seems 
to  be  that  given  above. 

337 


THUCYDIDES 

το?9  άτΓο  των  ττοΧεων  άρ^χ^ουσιν  ο  Ι  των  φβν/όντων 
φίΧοί  \leyapPj^,  ώς  βτηκρατήσαντί  καΐ  των 
^Αθηναίων  ούκέτι  βθεΧησάντων  μάχεσθαι,  θαρ- 
σοΰντβς  μάΧλον  avoiyouai  re  τας  ττύΧας  καΐ 
Βεζάμζνοι  κατατΓβττΧη^ μίνων  η8η  των  ττρό?  του<{ 
^Αθηναίους  ττρα^άντων  e?  λόγου?    'έρχονται. 

LXXIV.  Και  ύστερον  ο  μ^ν  ζιαΧυθβντων  των 
ζυμμάχων  κατά  7roXei<i  εττανεΧθων  καΐ  αύτο?  e? 
τί]ν   Κόρινθον,  την  βττΐ   Θράκης  στρατείαν  τταρε- 

2  σκεύαζεν,  ΐναττερ  καΐ  το  ττροίτον  οψμητο'  οΐ  δε 
εν  TTj  ττόΧεί  ^Ιε^αρη^,  άττοχωρησάντων  καΐ  των 
^Αθηναίων  εττ  οϊκου,  οσοί  μεν  το)ν  ττ ραμμάτων  ττρος 
τους  Αθηναίους  μάΧιστα  μετίσχον,  εΙΒότες  ότι 
ώφθησαν  εύθυς  υττεζηΧθον,  οί  δε  άΧΧοι  κοινοΧο- 
^ησάμενου  τοις  των  φευηόντων  φίΧοις  κα,τάηουσι 
τους  εκ  Ύί•η-ιων,  όρκόίσαντες  ττίστεσί  με^άΧαις 
μηΒεν  μνησικακησειν,  βουΧεύσειν  Βε  ττ}  ττόΧει  τα 

3  άριστα,  οί  δε  εττειδη  εν  ταΐς  άρχαΐς  iyivovTO  καϊ 
εξετασιν  οττΧων  εττοιησαντο,  Ζιαστησαντες  τους 
Χόχους  εξεΧεξαντο  των  re  εχθρών  καΐ  οΐ  εΖόκουν 
μάΧιστα  ζυμττραζαι  τα  προς  τους  ^Αθηναίους, 
άνδρας  ώς  εκατόν,  καϊ  τούτων  ττέρι  άνα'^κάσαντες 
τον  Ζημον  ψήφον  φανεράν  διενε^κεΐν,  ώς  κατε- 
>γνώσθησαν,     εκτειναν,     καϊ     ες     οΧι^αρχίαν    τα 

4  μάΧιστα  κατέστησαν  την  ττοΧιν.  καϊ  πΧεΐστον 
Βη  χρόνον  αύτη  ύττ^  εΧαχίστων  γενομένη  εκ  στά- 
σεως μετάστασις  ζυνεμεινεν. 


338 


BOOK    IV.   Lxxiii.  4-LXXIV.  4 

plucked  up  courage,  and  opened  the  gates  to  Brasidas 
and  the  commanders  from  the  various  cities,  in  the 
feehng  that  he  had  won  the  victory  and  that  the 
Athenians  had  finally  declined  battle.^  And  receiving 
them  into  the  town  they  entered  into  a  conference 
with  them,  tlie  party  which  had  been  intriguing  with 
the  Athenians  being  now  quite  co\ved. 

LXXIV.  Afterwards,  when  the  Peloponnesian 
allies  had  been  dismissed  to  their  several  cities, 
Brasidas  \vent  back  to  Corinth  and  began  prepara- 
tions for  the  expedition  to  Thrace,  whither  he  had 
originally  been  bound.  But  when  the  Athenians 
also  returned  home,  all  the  Megarians  Λvho  had  been 
most  implicated  in  the  negotiations  with  the  Athen- 
ians, knowing  that  they  had  been  detected,  immed- 
iately Λvithdrew  secretly  from  the  city,  while  the 
rest,  communicating  with  the  friends  of  the  exiles, 
brought  them  back  from  Pegae,  after  first  binding 
them  on  their  oath  by  strong  pledges  not  to  harbour 
ill-will,  but  to  consult  for  the  best  interests  of  the 
city.  But  as  soon  as  these  men  attained  office  and 
had  made  an  inspection  of  arms,  separating  the 
companies  they  selected  about  one  hundred  of  their 
personal  enemies  and  of  those  who  seemed  to  have 
had  the  largest  part  in  the  negotiations  Avith  the 
Athenians,  and  compelling  the  popular  assembly  to 
take  an  open  vote  concerning  these,  when  they  had 
been  condemned,  slew  them,  and  established  an 
extreme  oligarchy  in  the  city.  And  there  was  never 
a  change  of  government,  effected  by  so  small  a 
number  of  men  through  the  triumph  of  a  faction, 
that  lasted  so  long. 

^  Or,  adopting  Rutherford's  conjecture,  fOeX-qa όντων,  "and 
that  the  Atlieuians  would  not  care  to  fight  again." 

339 


THUCYDIDES 

LXXV.  Του  Β  αυτού  θβρονς  της  *Αντάν8ρου 
ντΓΟ  τών  ^ΙυτιΧηναίων,  ώσττερ  Βιβνοοΰντο,  μβΧ- 
\ουση<ϊ  κατασκευάζβσθαι,  οι  τών  apyvpoXuywv 
Αθηναίων  νεών  στρατηγοί,  ΑημοΒοκος  καΐ  ^Αρι- 
στεώ7]<;,  οντε•^  ττερί  'ΈΛΧήσιτοντον  (ό  yap  τρίτος 
αυτών  Αύμαχος  Se/ca  ναυσΧν  e?  τον  Τίόντον 
eae7T€7r\euKeL)  ώς  Ύ]σθάνοντο  την  τταρασκβυην  τον 
'χλωρίου  καΐ  iSofcei  αύτοΐς  Betvov  elvac  μη  ωσττβρ 
τα  Άναια  eirl  ττ)  'ϊ.άμω  ^ενηται,  evOa  οΐ  φεύ^ον- 
τ€9  τών  Έ,αμίων  καταστάντες  τους  τε  ΐΙεΧοττον- 
νησίους  ωφελούν  ες  τα  ναυτικά  κυβερνητας  ττεμ- 
ΤΓοντες  καΐ  τους  εν  ττ}  ττοΧει  Έ,αμίους  ες  ταραχην 
καθίστασαν  και  τους  εζιοντας  εΒεχ^οντο-  ούτω  Βη 
ζυναγείραντες  άττο  τών  ξυμμάχ^ων  στρατιαν  και 
ττΧευσαντες,  μάχη  τε  νικήσαντες  τους  εκ  της 
ΆντάνΒρου     έττεζεΧθ  όντας,     άνάΧαμβάνουσν     το 

2  'χωρίον  -παΚιν.  καΐ  ου  ποΧύ  ύστερον  ες  τον 
ΐΐόντον  εσττΧεύσας  Αάμαχος,  εν  τη  ΉρακΧεώτιΒι 
όρμισας  ες  τον  ΤίάΧητα  ποταμον  άττοΧΧυσί  τας 
ναύς  ΰΒατος  άνωθεν  <γενομενου  καΐ  κατεΧθόντος 
αίφνιΒίον  του  ρεύματος'  αύτος  Βε  καΐ  η  στρατιά 
ττεζχι  Βίά  Έιθυΐ'ών  θρακών,  οϊ  είσι  πέραν  εν  τη 
Άσ/α,  άφίκνεΐται  ες  ΚαΧχηΒόνα,  την  εττΐ  τω 
στόματί  του  ΥΙοντου  ^Ιεγαρεων  άττοικιαν. 

ΣιΧΧΎΙ.  Έν  Βε  τω  αύτω  θέρει  καΐ  Δημοσθένης 
*  Αθηναίων  στρατηγός  τεσσαράκοντα  ναυσίν  άφίκ- 
νεΐται   ες    Ναύττακτον,    ευθύς    μετά    την    εκ    της 

2  ^ίεγαρίΒος  άναχώρησιν.  τω  yap  Ίπττοκράτει  καΐ 
εκείνω  τά  Βοίώτία  πράγματα  άττό   τίνων  άνΒρών 

340 


BOOK    IV.  L.xxv.  i-Lxxvi.  2 

LXX\^  During  the  same  summer,  when  Antandros 
was  about  to  be  strengthened^  by  the  Mytilenaeans 
as  they  had  planned,  the  generals  in  command  of  the 
Athenian  ships  which  were  collecting  the  tribute, 
namely,  Demodocus  and  Aristides,  who  were  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Hellespont — for  Lamachus, 
their  colleague,  had  sailed  into  the  Pontus  with  ten 
ships — heard  of  the  fortification  of  the  place  and 
thought  that  there  was  danger  of  its  becoming  a 
menace  to  Lesbos,  just  as  Anaea  was  to  Samos- ;  for 
the  Samian  exiles,  establishing  themselves  at  Anaea, 
kept  aiding  the  Peloponnesians  by  sending  them 
pilots  for  their  fleet,  and  also  brought  the  Samians  Avho 
lived  in  the  city  into  a  state  of  turmoil  and  continu- 
ally offered  a  refuge  to  those  who  were  sent  into  exile. 
The  Athenian  generals,  therefore,  collected  an  araiy 
from  among  the  allies,  sailed  thither,  defeated  in 
battle  those  who  came  out  against  them  from  Ant- 
andros, and  recovered  the  city.  And  not  long  after- 
Avards  Lamachus,  Λνΐιο  had  sailed  into  the  Pontus  and 
anchored  in  the  river  Cales  in  Heraclean  territory, 
lost  his  ships  in  consequence  of  a  rain  Λvhich  fell  in 
the  uplands  and  brought  down  a  sudden  flood.  He 
and  his  army,  however,  going  by  land  through  the 
Bithynian  Tliracians,  who  were  on  the  otiier  side,  in 
Asia,  arrived  at  Chalcedon,  the  Megarian  colony  at 
the  moutii  of  the  Pontus. 
— — '  LXXVL  During  the  same  summer,  immediately 
after  the  Athenians  retired  from  Megara,  Demos- 
thenes, the  Athenian  general,  arrived  with  forty 
ships  at  Naupactus.  For  he  and  Hippocrates  were  en- 
gaged in  negotiations  about  affairs  in  Boeotia,  at  the 

*  cj.  ch.  lii.  3.  *  cf.  III.  xix.  2,  xxxii.  2. 

341 


THUCYDIDES 

ev  ταΐς  ττόΧεσιΐ'  βττρασσετο,  βουΧομβνων  μ€τα- 
στησαι  τον  κόσμον  καϊ  βς  Βημοκρατίαΐ'  ωσττβρ 
οι  ^Αθηναίοι  ^  Tpe-yjrar  κα\  ΏτοιοΒ'όρου  μάΧιστ 
άνΒρος    φυγά8(ι^     i/c     &ηβων    εσψ/ουμίνον     rahe 

3  avTOL<i  τταρεσκευάσθη.  %ίφα<;  μεν  epeWov  ηνες 
ΤΓροΒώσβιν  (αϊ  δε  Έ,ΐφαι  εΐσΐ  της  θεστηκής  yrj<i  ev 
τω  Κ.ρισαίω  κοΧττω  βπιθαΧασσιΒιοι)'  ^αιρώνειαν 
Βέ,  ή  €9  ^Οργ^ομενον  τον  ^livveiov  ττρότερον  καΚού- 
μβνον,  νυν  δε  Ώοιωτιον,  ξυντβΧεΐ,  άΧλοί  εξ  'Ορχο- 
μενού ενε^ί^οσαν,  καΐ  οι  ^Ορχομενίων  φυγάΒες 
ξυνεττρασσον  τα  μάλιστα  καϊ  ανΒρας  εμισθοΰντο 
εκ  ΙΙεΧοττοννήσου  (εστί  δε  ?;  Χαιρώνεια  εσχατον 
της  Βοίωτιας  ττρος  ττ]  ΦανοτίΒι  της  ΦωκίΒος),  καϊ 

4  Φωκεων  μετείχαν  τίνες,  τους  οε  ^Αθηναίους  ε8ει 
ΑήΧιον  καταΧαβεΙν,  το  εν  ττ}  Tavaypaia  προς 
Κΰβοιαν  τετραμμένον  ΆττόΧΧωνος  ιερόν,  άμα  δε 
ταύτα  εν  ήμερα  ρηττ}  ηι^νεσθαι,  οττω-τ  μη  ξυμβοη- 
θησωσιν  εττΐ   το   ΑιίΧιον    οΊ   Βοίωτοί  αθρόοι,  αλλ' 

5  εττΧ  τα  σφετερα  αυτών  έκαστοι  κινούμενα,  και  ει 
κατορθοΐτο  ή  ττεΐρα  και  το  ArjXiov  τειχισθείη, 
ραόίως  ήΧττιζοί',  ει  και  μη  τταραυτίκα  νεωτερίζοιτό 
τι  των  κατά  τας  ττοΧιτείας  τοις  Ί^οιωτοΐς,  ε'γο- 
μενων  τούτων  των  χωρίων  και  \7]στευομενης  της 
"/ής  καϊ  ούσης  εκάστοις  hia  βραχεος  άττοστροφης, 
ου  μενεΐν  κατά  χώραν  τα  ττρά^ματα,  άΧΧη  χρόνω 
των   Αθηναίων  μεν  ττροσιόντων  τοις  άφεστηκόσι, 

*  ωσπιρ  οί  ΆθηναΊοι,  bracketed  by  Hude,  after  Rutherford. 
342 


BOOK    IV.  Lxxvi.  2-5 

instance  of  certain  men  in  several  cities  λνΐιο  wislied 
to  bring  about  a  change  in  their  form  of  govern- 
ment and  to  transform  it  into  a  democracy,  such  as 
the  Athenians  had.  The  leading  spirit  in  these 
transactions  was  Ptoeodorus,  an  exile  from  Thebes, 
through  whom  Demosthenes  and  Hippocrates  had 
brouglit  about  the  following  state  of  affairs.  Siphae, 
a  town  on  the  shore  of  the  Crisaean  Gulf  in  the  terri- 
tory of  rhespiae,was  to  be  betrayed  by  certain  men  ; 
and  Chaeronea,  a  city  Avhich  is  tributary  to  Orcho- 
menus — the  city  which  was  formerly  called  Minyan, 
but  is  now  called  Boeotian — was  to  be  put  into  the 
liands  of  the  Athenians  by  others,  the  fugitives  from 
Orchomenus,  who  also  took  into  their  pay  some  Pelo- 
ponnesians,  being  especially  active  in  the  conspiracy. 
Some  Phocians  also  had  a  share  in  the  plot,  Chaeronea 
being  on  the  borders  of  Boeotia,  and  adjacent  to 
Phanotis,  which  is  in  Phocis.  The  Athenians  were 
to  occupy  Delium,  the  sanctuary  of  Apollo  which  is 
in  the  territory  of  Tanagra  and  opposite  Euboea ; 
and  all  these  events  were  to  take  place  simultaneously 
on  an  appointed  day,  in  order  that  the  Boeotians 
might  not  concentrate  their  forces  at  Delium,  but 
that  the  several  states  might  be  occupied  Λvith  their 
own  disaffected  districts.  And  if  the  attempt  should 
succeed  and  Delium  should  be  fortified,  they  con- 
fidentlv  expected,  even  if  no  immediate  change 
occurred  in  the  constitutions  of  the  Boeotian  st-ites, 
nevertheless,  so  long  as  these  places  were  in  their 
possession,  from  which  Boeotian  territory  could  be 
ravaged  and  where  everyone  might  find  a  convenient 
place  of  refuge,  the  situation  would  not  remain  as  it 
was,  but  in  time,  when  the  Athenians  should  come 
to  the  support  of  the  rebels  and  the  forces  of  the 

343 


THUCYDIDES 

Τ0Ϊ9  Se   ουκ  ούσης   αθρόας    της   Βυνύμβως,   κατα- 
στήσειν  αύτα  €ς  το  inLTijBeiov. 

LXXVII.  Η  μξν  ουν  βπιβουΧη  τοιαύτη  τταρε- 
σκευάζβτο'  ο  Se  ΊτΓττοκράτης  αύτος  μβν  €κ  της 
ττόλβω?  Βύναμιν  €)(^ων,  όττότε  καιρός  βίη,  ε/χβλλε 
στρατβυβιν  ές  τους  Έοιωτούς,  τον  δέ  Δημοσθένη 
7ΓροατΓεστ€ί\€  ταΐς  τεσσαράκοντα  ναυσίν  βς  την 
Καύττακτον,οττως  εζ  έκβινων  των  'χωρίων  στ ρατον 
ξνΧλβξας  ^Ακαρνύνων  τε  καΐ  των  άΧλων  ζυμ- 
μάχων  TrXeoi  iiri  τας  ^ίφας  ως  ττροΒοθησομβνας' 
ημέρα   δ    αύτοΐς   ει  ρητό    ή    eSei    ταύτα   πράσσβιν. 

2  καΐ  ο  μεν  Αημοσθβνης  άφικόμενος,  ΟΙνιάΒας  Be 
ντΓΟ  τ€  Ακαρνανων  ττάντων  κατηνα-γκασ μίνους 
καταΧαβων  ες  την  'Αθηναίων  ξυμμαχίαν  καΐ 
αντος  άναστησας  το  ξυμμαχικον  το  εκείνη  ττάν, 
εττΐ  Έ,αΧύΐ'θίον  καΐ  Ακραίους  στρατεύσας  πρώτον 
και  ττρησιτοιησά μένος  ταΧΧα  ητοίμάζετο  ως  επΙ 
τας  Σίφα?,  όταν  Βέη,  άτταντησόμενος. 

LXXVIII,  Βρασίδας  δέ  κατά  τον  αντον  χρόνον 
του  θέρους  ττορευόμενος  ετττακοσίοις  καΐ  χιΧιοις 
οττΧίταις  ες  τα  εττΐ  ('^ρακης  εττειΒ'η  iyeveTO  εν 
ΗρακΧεια  τ  Ρ)  εν  Ύραχΐνί  και,  ττροττεμψαντος 
αυτού  α~/^εΧον  ες  ΦάρσαΧον  τταρα  τους  εττίτη- 
ΒεΙους  ά^ιούντος  Βίά^ειν  εαυτόν  καΐ  την  στρατιάν, 
ηΧθον  ες  ^\ε\ίτείαν  της  ^Αχαιίας  ΥΙάναιρος  τε  καΐ 
Αωρος  καΐ  ' λττττοΧο'χίΒας  καΐ  ΎορύΧαος  καΐ  Έτρό- 
φακός  17 ρόζενος  ων  \αΧκίΒεων,  τότε  Βη  εττορέύετο. 

2  Tjyov  Be  καΐ  aXXot  (ύεσσαΧών  αύτον  καΐ  εκ  Ααρί- 

344 


BOOK    IV.  Lxxvi.  5-LXXV111.  2 

oligarchs  were  scattered,  they  could  settle  matters 
to  their  own  advantage. 

LXXVII.  Such  Avas  the  plot  which  was  then  under 
Avay.  It  Avas  the  purpose  of  Hippocrates,  when  the 
proper  moment  should  arrive,  to  take  troops  from 
Athens  and  in  person  make  an  expedition  into 
Boeotia  ;  meanwhile  he  was  sending  Demosthenes 
in  advance  with  a  fleet  of  forty  ships  to  Naupactus, 
in  order  that  he  should  first  collect  in  this  region 
an  army  of  Acarnanians  and  of  other  allies  of 
Athens  and  then  sail  to  Siphae,  in  expectation  of 
its  being  betrayed ;  and  a  day  was  agreed  upon 
between  the  two  generals  for  doing  these  two 
things  simultaneously.  Upon  his  arrival  at  Nau- 
pactus, Demosthenes  found  that  Oeniadae  had  al- 
ready been  forced  by  all  the  rest  of  the  Acarnanians 
to  join  the  Athenian  alliance ;  he  himself  then 
raised  all  the  allied  forces  in  that  district,  and  after 
first  making  an  expedition  against  Salynthius  and 
the  Agraeans  ^  and  securing  these,  proceeded  with 
his  other  preparations  so  as  to  be  present  at  Siphae 
when  needed. 

LXXV^III.  About  the  same  time  in  the  course  of 
this  summer,  Brasidas,  Avho  was  on  his  way  to  Thrace 
with  one  thousand  seven  hundred  hoplites,  reached 
Heracleia  in  Trachis  and  sent  forAvard  a  messenger 
to  his  friends  at  Pharsalus  requesting  them  to 
conduct  him  and  his  army  through.  Accordingly  he 
Avas  met  at  Meliteia  in  Achaia  by  Panaerus,  Dorus, 
Hippolochidas,  Torylaiis,  and  Strophacus,  who  was 
proxenus  of  the  Chalcidians,  and  then  proceeded 
on  his  march.  He  Avas  conducted  by  several  Thes- 
salians  also,  among  whom  were  Niconidas  of  Larisa,  a 
*  cf.  III.  cxi.  4 ;  cxiv.  2. 

„..    ..  »     345 


THUCYDIDES 

σης  ΝίΑτοι^ιδας  Ώβρ^ίκκα  €7Γΐτη8€ΐο<;  wv.  την  yap 
%ζσσα\ίαν  άΧΧως  τ€  ουκ  εΰττορον  ην  Sitevat  avev 
ά^ω^ον  καί  μβτα  6tt\o)V  ye  δ?;',  καΐ  τοις  ττάσί  ye 
ομοίως  'ΚΧλησίν  ΰττοπτον  KaOeLaniKeL  την  των 
7Γ€\ας  μη  ^τe^σavτaς  Biievar  τοις  re  * Αθηναίοις 
aiei  7Γ0Τ€  το  ττΧηθος  των  Θεσσαλωι»  euvovv  υπηρ- 

3  χ€ν.  ώστ€  el  μη  8νναστ€ία  μάΧΧον  η  Ισονομία 
€χ^ρώντο  το  eyx^o^piov  ^  οι  Θβσσαλοι,  ουκ  αν  ττοτε 
ΤΓ porjX0ev,  ewel  καΐ  τότβ  7Γορ€υομά'ω  αντω  άτταν- 
τήσαντ€ς  άΧΧοι  των  τάναντία  τούτοις  βουΧομ€νων 
irrl  τω  ^JLvnrei  ττοταμω  €κώΧνον  καΐ  άΒικβΐν  εφα- 

4  σαν  avev  του  πάντων  κοινού  τΓορ€υομ€νον.  οί  8e 
άyovτeς  ouTe  ακόντων  'έφασαν  Βιάξβιν,  αΙφνιΒιόν 
τ€  'πapayevόμevov  ξ&νοι  6ντ€ς  κομίζ€ΐν.  eXeye  δε 
καΐ  αντος  6  3ρασί8ας  τη  θβσσαΧών  yfj  καΐ  αύτοΐς 
φίΧος  ων  levai  καΐ  ^ Κθηναίοις  'πoXeμίoις  ονσι  καΐ 
ουκ  ζκeίvoις  οττΧα  βττιφέρειν,  ΘεσσαλοΓς  τε  ουκ 
elhevai  καΐ  Αακ€8αιμονίοις  βγθραν  ουσαν  ώστε  τη 
άΧΧηΧων  yfi  μη  γ^^ρήσθαι,  νύν  re  ακόντων  εκείνων 
ουκ    αν    ττροεΧθβΐν    (ούδε    yap    αν  Βύνασθαι),    ου 

5  μέντοι  άξιονν  ye  eϊpyeσθaι.  καί  οί  μεν  άκούσαντες 
ταύτα  άττήΧθον  ό  8ε  κεΧευόντων  των  άyωyon', 
ττρίν  τι  ττΧβον  ζυστηναι  το  κωΧύσον,  εχ^ώρει  ού8εν 
ετΓίσγων   8ρόμω.      καΐ    ταύτη   μεν  τη   ήμερα,  η   εκ 


^  rh  eyxiipiijf,  Hude  changes  to  ΐ^χωρίψ,  after  τψ  4'/χωρίψ 
of  Dion.  Hal. 

346 


BOOK    IV.  Lxxviii.  2-s 

friend  of  Perdiccas.  Indeed,  Thessaly  was  not  in  any 
case  an  easy  country  to  traverse  without  an  escort, 
and  especially  Avith  an  armed  force ;  and  among 
all  the  Hellenes  alike  to  traverse  the  territory  of 
neighbours  without  their  consent  was  looked  on 
with  suspicion.  Besides,  the  common  people  of 
Thessaly  had  always  been  well  disposed  to  the 
Athenians.  H,  therefore,  the  Thessalians  had  not 
been  under  the  sway  of  a  few  powerful  men,  as  is 
usual  in  that  country,  rather  than  under  a  free 
democracy,  Brasidas  would  not  have  made  headway  ; 
even  as  it  was,  he  Avas  confronted  on  his  march, 
when  he  reached  the  river  Enipeus,  by  other  Thes- 
salians belonging  to  the  opposite  party.  These  tried 
to  stop  him,  warning  him  that  he  was  doing  Avrong  in 
proceeding  without  the  consent  of  the  whole  people. 
But  his  conductors  reassured  them,  saying  that,  it 
they  were  unwilling,  they  would  not  conduct  him 
further,  and  that  they  were  merely  plaving  the 
part  of  hosts  in  escorting  an  unexpected  visitor. 
Brasidas  himself  explained  that  he  came  as  a  friend 
to  Thessaly  and  its  inhabitants  and  Avas  bearing  arms 
against  the  Athenians,  who  were  enemies,  and  not 
against  them  ;  moreover,  he  was  not  aware  of  any 
such  hostility  between  the  Thessalians  and  the  Lace- 
daemonians as  to  debar  them  from  access  to  each 
other's  territory,  but  if  in  tiiis  instance  they  were 
unwilling,  he  \vould  go  no  further,  nor  indeed  could 
he  do  so  ;  he  hoped,  however,  that  they  Avould  not  bar 
his  progress.  On  hearing  this  the  Thessalians  de- 
parted ;  but  Brasidas,  taking  the  advice  of  his  escort, 
i)efore  a  larger  force  could  be  collected  to  hinder 
liim,  set  out  at  full  speed  and  Avithout  making  any 
lialt.      In  fact,  he  finished  the  journey  to  Pharsalus 

347 


THUCYDIDES 

ττ}?  MeXireta?  άφώρμησβν,  e?  ΦάρσαΧον  re  eriXeae 
και  iaTparoTreSevaaro  eVt  τω  Άττίδαι^ ω  ττοταμω, 
eKeWev  he  ες  Φάκιον,  καΐ  βξ  αυτοί)  e?  ΥΙερραιβίαν- 
6  αττό  δε  τοι^τοι;  ί/δ?/  οί  yu.ei'  Θεσσαλώζ/  α^ω'^οΧ  ττάΧιν 
άττήΧθον,  οί  δε  ΥΙβρραιβοΙ  αυτόν,  ϋττηκοα  οντες 
Θεσσαλών,  κατέστησαν  ε'ς  Δίον  τ%  ΠερδίΛΑΤοί' 
'''/'Χ'}'»'  ^  ^'^ο  "''ί^  ^ΟΧύριτω  ^Ιακζ^ονίας  προς 
Θεσσαλούς  ττόΧισμα  κείται. 

LXXIX.  Τούτω  τω  τρόπω  ΈρασίΒας  Θεσ- 
σαΧίαν  φθάσας  ΒιεΒραμε  πριν  τίνα  κωΧύβιν  παρα- 
σκευάσασθαι,  και  άφίκετο   ώς  ΤΙερΒίκκαν  καϊ  ε'ς 

2  την  Ύ>.αΧκώικην.  εκ  '^αρ  της  ΏεΧοποννησον,  ώς 
τα  των  Αθηναίων  ηυτυγει,  Βείσαντες  ο'ί  τε  ε'πι 
Θράκης  άφεστώτες  Αθηναίων  καΐ  ΐίερζίκκας 
ε ^7)y ayov  τον  στρατον,  οί  μεν  ΙίαΧκώής  νομίζον- 
τες  επΧ  σφας  πρώτον  όρμησειν  τους  ^Αθηναίους 
(καϊ  αμα  αϊ  πΧησιό-χωροι  πόΧεις  αύτων  αϊ  ουκ 
άφεστηκυΐαι  ξννεπηΎον  κρύφα),  ΤΙερΒΐκκας  δε 
πολέμιος  μεν  ουκ  ων  εκ  του  φανερού,  φοβούμενος 
δε  καϊ  αύτος  τα  παΧαια  διάφορα  των  ^Αθηναίων 
καϊ  μάΧιστα  βουΧόμενος   Αρράβαιον  τον  Αυ^κη- 

3  στωζ'  βασιΧεα  παραστήσασθαι.  ξυνεβη  δε  αύτοίς 
ώστε  ράον  εκ  της  ΥΙεΧοπονν7']σου  στρατον  εξα^α- 
•γεΐν,  η  των  ΑακεΒαιμονίων  εν  τω  παρόντι  κακο- 
πραηία. 

LXXX.  Ύων  jap  Αθηναίων  ε^κειμένων  τ?} 
ΠελοτΓΟί'ί'τ^σω  καϊ  ούχ  ηκιστα  ττ}  εκείνων  yfj, 
ήΧπιζον  άποτρεψειν  αυτούς  μάΧιστα,  ει  άντι- 
πσραΧυποΐεν    πεμψαντες    επΙ    τους     ξνμμάχους 

34δ 


BOOK     IV,    LXXVIII.   5-LXXX.    I 

on  the  same  day  on  Λνΐιίοΐι  he  had  set  out  from 
Meliteia,  and  encamped  on  the  river  Apidanus ; 
thence  he  proceeded  to  Pliacium,  and  from  there  to 
Perrhaebia.  Here  his  Thessalian  escort  at  length 
turned  back,  and  the  Perrhaebians,  who  are  subjects 
of  the  ThessaHans,  brought  him  safely  to  Dium  in  the 
dominions  of  Perdiccas,  a  small  town  in  Macedonia  at 
the  foot  of  Mt.  Olympus,  facing  Thessaly. 

LXXIX.  It  Avas  in  this  manner  that  Brasidas 
succeeded  in  rushing  through  Thessaly  before  anyone 
could  get  ready  to  hinder  him  and  reached  Perdiccas 
and  the  Chalcidic  peninsula.  The  reason  why  the 
peoples  in  Thrace  Avho  had  revolted  from  Athens 
had,  in  conjunction  with  Perdiccas,  brought  this  army 
all  the  way  from  the  Peloponnesus  was  that  they 
were  filled  with  alarm  at  the  success  of  the  Athenians. 
The  Chalcidians  thought  that  the  Athenians  would 
take  the  field  against  them  first,  and  the  cities  in  this 
neighbourhood  which  had  not  yet  revolted  neverthe- 
less took  part  secretly  in  inviting  the  Peloponnesians 
to  intervene.  As  for  Perdiccas,  although  he  was 
not  yet  openly  hostile  to  Athens,  he  also  was  afraid 
of  the  long-standing  differences  between  himself  and 
the  Athenians,  and  above  all  he  was  anxious  to 
reduce  Arrhabaeus,  the  king  of  the  Lyncestians.  A 
further  circumstance  Avliich  rendered  it  easier  for 
them  to  procure  an  army  from  the  Peloponnesus 
Avas  the  evil  fortune  Avhich  at  the  present  time 
attended  the  Lacedaemonians. 

LXXX.  For  since  the  Athenians  kept  harassing  the 
Peloponnesians,  and  especially  the  territory  of  the 
Lacedaemonians,  the  latter  thought  that  the  best 
Avay  of  diverting  them  Avould  be  to  retaliate  by 
sending  an  army  agauist  their  allies,  especially  since 

349 


THUCYDIDES 

αυτών    στρατιάν,   άΧΧως    re    καΐ   βτοιμων   όντων 
τρ€φ€ίν    τ€   και    67γΙ    αποστάσει   σφά<;   ζττικαΧου- 

2  μένων.  καΐ  άμα  των  ΈιΙΧώτων  βουΧομενοίς  ην 
€7γΪ  ττροψάσβί  βκτΓβμψαι,  μη  τι  ττρο'ζ    τα  τταροντα 

3  της  ΤίύΧον  εχ^ομίνη'^  νβωτερίσωσιν.  iirel  καΐ  το8ε 
εττραξαν  φοβούμενοι  αυτών  την  νεότητα  καΧ  το 
πΧήθος  (αΐεΐ  yap  τα  πολλά  ΑακεΒαιμονίοις  ττρος 
τους  Είλωτας  της  φυΧακής  ττερι  μάΧιστα  καθε- 
στηκεν)'  ττροεΐτΓον  αυτών  όσοι  ά^ιοΰσιν  εν  τοις 
ττοΧεμίοίς  ηεηενησθαι  σφίσιν  άριστοι,  κρίνεσθαι, 
ώς  εΧευθερώσοντες,  ττεΐραν  ποιούμενοι  και  ήηού- 
μενοι  τούτους  σφίσιν  ύττο  φρονήματος,  οϊπερ  και 
ηξίωσαν  πρώτος  έκαστος  εΧευθερούσθαι,  μάΧιστα 

4  αν  και  έπιθέσθαι.  και  προκρινάντων  ες  Βισχ^ιΧίους 
οΐ  μεν  εστεφανώσαντο  τε  και  τα  Ιερά  περιήΧθον 
ώς  ηΧευθερωμενοι,  οΐ  8ε  ού  ποΧΧω  ύστερον  ηφάνι- 
σάν    τε    αυτούς    καΐ    ούόείς    τισθετο    οτω    τρόπω 

5  έκαστος  Βιεφθάρη.  καΐ  τότβ  προθύμως  τω  ΈρασίΒα 
αυτών  ξυνεπεμψαν  επτακόσιους  όπΧίτας,  τους  δ' 
άΧΧονς  εκ  τ/}?  ΤΙεΧοποννησου  μισθώ  πείσας  εζη- 
ηα'^εν. 

LXXXI.  Κύτόν  τε  ΈρασίΒαν  βουΧόμενον  ^ 
αάΧιστα  ΑακεΒαιμονιοι  άπέστειΧαν  {προυθυμή- 
θησαν  he  καΐ  οι  ^αΧκιόής),  άνΒρα  εν  τε  ττ}  Έ,ττάρττ] 

'  βουχόμίΐ'ον,  with  the  MSS.  Hude  reads  βουλόμΐνοι. 
35° 


BOOK    IV.  Lxxx.  i-Lxxxi.  i 

these  allies  Avere  ready  to  maintain  an  army  and 
were  calling  upon  the  Lacedaemonians  for  help  in 
order  that  they  might  revolt.  Furthermore,  the 
Lacedaemonians  \vere  glad  to  have  an  excuse  for 
sending  out  some  of  the  Helots,  in  order  to  forestall 
their  attempting  a  revolt  at  the  present  juncture 
when  Pylos  Λvas  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy. 
Indeed,  through  fear  of  their  youth  ^  and  numbers 
— for  in  fact  most  of  their  measures  have  always 
been  adopted  by  the  Lacedaemonians  with  a  view 
to  guarding  against  the  Helots — they  had  once  even 
resorted  to  the  following  device.  They  made  pro- 
clamation that  all  Helots  who  claimed  to  have  ren- 
dered the  Lacedaemonians  the  best  service  in  Λvar 
should  be  set  apart,  ostensibly  to  be  set  free.  They 
were,  in  fact,  merely  testing  them,  thinking  that  those 
who  claimed,  each  for  himself,  the  first  right  to  be  set 
free  would  be  precisely  the  men  of  high  spirit  Λνΐιο 
would  be  the  most  likely  to  attack  their  masters. 
About  two  thousand  of  them  were  selected  and 
these  put  crowns  on  their  heads  and  made  the 
rounds  of  the  temples,  as  though  they  were  already 
free,  but  the  Spartans  not  long  afterwards  made  away 
with  them,  and  nobody  ever  knew  in  what  way  each 
one  perished.  So,  on  the  present  occasion,  the  Spartans 
gladly  sent  with  Brasidas  seven  hundred  Helots  as 
hoplites,  the  rest  of  his  forces  being  drawn  from  the 
IVloponnesus  by  the  inducement  of  pay. 

LXXXI.  As  for  Brasidas  himself,  the  Lacedae- 
monians sent  him  chiefly  at  his  own  desire,  though 
the  Chalcidians  also  were  eager  to  have  him.  He 
was  a  man  esteemed  at  Sparta  as  being  energetic  in 

*  Most  MSS.  read  νβόττιτα,  Β  σκαιότητα,  but  some  word 
meaning  "boldness  " or  " recklessness "  seems  to  be  required. 
Hude  adopts  Widinann's  conjecture  καικ5τ7)τα. 

351 


THUCYDIDES 

Βοκοΰντα  Ζραστηρίον  eivai  €9  τα  πάντα  καϋττειΒη 
βξ?]\Θβ  ττΧβίστου  άξιον  ΑακεΕαιμονίοί^  ''/€νόμ€νον. 

2  τό  re  yap  τταραυτίκα  εαυτόν  τταρασγων  δίκαιον 
καΐ  μετριον  βς  τα<;  ττόΧβις  αττίστησβ  τα  ττολ,λά,  τά 
δε  ττροΒοσία  etXe  των  -χ^ωρίων,  ώστε  rot?  Αακε- 
Εαιμονίοις  ybyveaOat  ξυμβαίνβίν  Τ€  βονΧομβνοα, 
οττερ  έτΓοίησαν,  άνταττόΒοσιν  καΐ  άττοΒοχ^ην  χωρίων 
καΐ  του  ΤΓολβμου  άττό  ττ)?  ΐΙεΧοττοννησου  Χώφησιν 
έ'<?  Τ€  τον  'χρόνω  ύστερον  μετά  τα  εκ  Έ,ίκεΧίας 
ττόΧεμον  η  τότε  ϋρασί8ου  άρετη  καΐ  ζύνεσις,  των 
μεν  ττειρα  αίσθομενων,  των  δε  άκο^  νομισαντων, 
μάΧιστα  εττιθυμίαν  ενεττοίει  τοις  ^Αθηναίων  ζνμ- 

3  μάγοις  ες  τους  Λακεδαιμονίους,  πρώτος  yap  εξεΧ- 
θων  καϊ  Βόξας  είναι  κατά,  πάντα  άyaθoς  ελπίδα 
εyκaτεXιπε  βέβαιον  ως  καϊ  οΐ  αλΧοι  τοιούτοι 
elaiv. 

LXXXII.  Τότε  δ'  ουν  άφικομενου  αυτού  ες  τά 
επΙ  ®ράκης  οι  \\.θηναΐοί  πυθόμενοι  τον  τε  ΤΙερ- 
8ίκκαν  ποΧεμιον  ποιούνται,  νομίσαντες  αίτιον 
είναι  της  παρόδου,  κα\  των  ταύττ}  ξυμμάχ^ων 
φυΧακην  πΧεονα  κατεστήσαντο.  LXXXIII.  Περ- 
Βίκκας  δε  ΈρασίΒαν  καϊ  την  στρατιάν  ευθύς  Χαβων 
μετά  της  εαυτού  Βυνάμεως  στρατεύει  επΙ  Αρ- 
ράβαιον  τον  βρομερού,  Aυyκηστώv  ^ίακε^όνων 
βασίΧεα,  ομορον  οντά,  Βιαφοράς  τε  αύτω  ούσης 
2  καϊ  βουΧόμενος  καταστρέψασθαι.  έπεί  δε  iyeveTO 
τω  στρατω  μετά  του  Βρασί8ου  επΙ  Ty  εσβοΧτ}  της 


352 


BOOK     IV.    LXXXI.   I-LXXXIII.   2 

everything  he  did,  and  indeed,  after  he  had  gone 
abroad,  he  proved  invaluable  to  the  Lacedaemonians. 
For,  at  the  present  crisis,  by  showing  himself  just 
and  moderate  in  his  dealings  Λvith  the  cities  he 
caused  most  of  the  places  to  revolt,  and  secured 
possession  of  otliers  by  the  treachery  of  their  in- 
habitants, so  that  when  the  Lacedaemonians  wished 
to  make  terms  with  Athens,  as  they  did  ultimately,^ 
they  had  places  to  offer  in  exchange  for  places  they 
Avished  to  recover  and  were  able  to  secure  for  the 
Peloponnesus  a  respite  from  the  war;  and  in  the 
later  part  of  the  war,  after  the  events  in  Sicily,  it 
was  the  virtue  and  tact  Avhich  Brasidas  had  displayed 
at  this  time — qualities  of  which  some  had  had  ex- 
perience, Λvhile  others  knew  of  them  by  report — that 
did  most  to  inspire  in  the  allies  of  the  Athenians  a 
sentiment  favourable  to  the  Lacedaemonians.  For 
since  he  was  the  first  Lacedaemonian  abroad  who 
gained  a  reputation  for  being  in  all  respects  a  good 
man,  he  left  behind  him  a  confident  belief  that  the 
other  Lacedaemonians  also  were  of  the  same  stamp. 

LXXXII.  On  the  arrival  of  Brasidas  in  Thrace  at 
the  time  referred  to,^  the  Athenians,  on  hearing  of 
it,  declared  Perdiccas  an  enemy,  regarding  him  as 
responsible  for  his  coming,  and  they  established  a 
stricter  watch  over  their  allies  in  that  region. 
LXXXIIL  But  Perdiccas  immediately  took  Brasidas 
and  his  army,  together  with  his  own  forces,  and 
made  an  expedition  against  his  neighbour  Arrha- 
baeus,  son  of  Bromerus,  king  of  the  Lyncestian 
Macedonians  ;  for  he  had  a  quarrel  Λvith  him  and 
Avished  to  subdue  him.  But  Avhen  he  and  Brasidas 
arrived  with  their  combined  armies  at  the  pass  leading 

»  421  B.C.;  ej.  V.  xvii.  ^  cf.  ch.  Ixxix.  1. 

353 


THUCYDIDES 

AvjKOV,    UpaaiSwi     eV    Χόλους  ^   βφη   βονΧέσθαί 
ττρώτον  βΧθων  ττρο  ττοΧβμον  ^Αρραβαίον  ζύ μμα'χον 

3  Αακε^αιμονίων,  ην  Βύν7]ται,  ττοιήσαι.  καϊ  yap  τι 
KuV  Αρράβαιος  (.ττεκηρυκεύετο,  ίτοΐμος  ων  ΒρασίΒα 
μέσω  Βικασττ}  βτΓίτρβττβίν'  καϊ  οι  ^ζ,άΧκιΒβων 
πρεσββις  ξυμτταρόντες  βΒίΒασκον  αύτον  μη  ύττε^- 
eXeiv  τω    ΐΙερΒίκκα   τα   οεινά,   ίνα    ττροθυμοτερω 

4  e'X^oiev  καϊ  e?  τα  εαυτών  γ^ρησθαι.  αμα  Be  τι  καϊ 
είρηκεσαν  τοιούτον  οι  τταρα  του  ΊΊερΒίκκου  iv  ττ} 
ΑακεΒαίμονι,  ώ?  ττοΧλα  αύτοΐς  των  ττερί  αύτον 
'χλωρίων  ξύμμαγ^α  ττοιησοι,  ώστε  εκ  του  τοιούτου 
κοινή    μάΧλον    ο    Βρασίδα?    τα    του     Αρραβαίου 

5  ηξίου  ττράσσειν.  ΤίεμΒίκκας  Be  ούτε  Βικαστην  εφη 
Ί^ρασίΒαν  τών  σφετερων  Βιαφορών  αηαηείν,  μάΧ- 
Χον  Βε  καθαιρετην  ων  αν  αύτο<ζ  άττοφαινη  ττοΧε- 
μίων,  άΒικησειν  τε  ει  αυτού   τρέφοντας    το   ήμισυ 

6  του  στρατού  ξυνέσται  Αρραβαίω.  ό  Βε  άκοντος 
και  εκ  Βιαφορΰς  ξυγγί''/νεται,  καϊ  ττεισθείς  τοΐς 
λόγοί?  αττψιαηε  την  στρατιαν  ττρϊν  εσβαΧεΐν  e? 
την  χώραν.  ΐΙερΒίκκας  Βε  μετά,  τούτο  τρίτον 
μέρος  ανθ"  ημίσεος  τ/]?  τροφ?ις  εΒιΒου,  νομίζων 
άΒικεΐσθαι. 

LXXXIV.  'Ey  Be  τω  αύτω  θερει  ευθύς  ο 
ΈρασίΒας  ε)(ων  καϊ  ΚαΧκιΒέας  εττι  "ΑκαιΌον  την 
\\νΒρίων  άτΓΟίκίαν  oXiyov  ττρο  τρυγητού  εστρά- 
2  τευσεν.  οι  Βε  ττερΙ  τού  Βέχεσθαι  αύτον  κατ 
'  is  Aoyovs,  van  Herwerden's  correction  for  Aoyois  of  the  MSS. 
354 


BOOK      IV.    LXXXIII.    2-LXXXIV.   2 

to  Lyncus,  Brasidas  said  that  he  wished,  before 
appealing  to  arms,  to  have  a  conference  with  Arrha- 
baeus  and  make  him  an  ally  of  the  Lacedaemonians, 
if  he  could.  For  it  seemed  that  Arrhabaeus  had 
made  some  overtures  and  was  ready  to  submit  the 
question  at  issue  to  Brasidas'  arbitration ;  the  Chalci- 
dian  envoys  who  were  present  also  kept  urging  him 
not  to  remove  the  difficulties  from  the  path  of 
Perdiccas,  since  they  wished  to  have  in  him  a  more 
zealous  helper  in  their  ΟΛνη  affairs.  Furthermore, 
the  envoys  of  Perdiccas,  when  they  were  at  Lace- 
daemon,  had  given  a  hint  to  the  effect  that  he  would 
bring  many  of  the  places  in  his  neighbourhood  into 
alliance  Λvith  the  Lacedaemonians;  consequently 
Brasidas  was  inclined  to  insist  upon  having  a  freer 
hand  in  dealing  with  Arrhabaeus.  But  Perdiccas  said 
that  he  had  not  brought  Brasidas  to  be  a  judge  of 
their  quarrels,  but  rather  to  be  a  destroyer  of  any 
enemies  whom  he  himself  might  designate,  and  that 
Brasidas  Avould  do  wrong  if,  when  he  himself  main- 
tained half  the  army,  he  should  parley  with  Arrha- 
baeus. But  Brasidas,  in  spite  of  Perdiccas  and  after 
a  quarrel  with  him,  held  the  conference,  and  finding 
the  king's  arguments  convincing,  withdrew  his  army 
without  invading  his  country.  After  this  Pei'diccas 
contributed  only  a  third  instead  of  one-half  of  the 
maintenance,  considering  himself  to  be  aggrieved. 

LXXXIV.  Immediately  afterwards  during  the 
same  summer  and  a  short  time  before  the  vintage 
season,  Brasidas  took  some  Chalcidians  in  addition 
to  his  own  force  and  made  an  expedition  against 
Acanthus,  the  colony  of  the  Andrians.  But  on  the 
question    of    admitting    him    the    Acanthians  were 


355 


THUCYDIDES 

αΚΧηΧονί  βστασίαζον,  οι  re  μετά  των  ΙίαΧκιΒεων 
ξυνετταΎοντες  καΐ  6  8ημο<;.  όμως  Be  Βιά  τού 
καρτΓον  το  δεο?  έ'τί  εξω  οντος  ττεισθεν  το  ττΧηθος 
ΰτΓο  τον  Βρασιδοι;  Βεξασθαί  re  αυτόν  μόνον  καΐ 
άκούσαντες  βουΧεύσασθαι,  Βεγεταΐ'  καΐ  καταστάς 
ετΓί  το  ττΧήθος  (ην  Be  ούΒε  άΒύνατος,  ώ?  ΑακεΒαί- 
μόνως,  είττεΐν)  eXeye  τοιάΒε. 

LXXXV.  "  Ή  μεν  εκττεμψίς  μου  καΐ  τή<ζ 
στρατιάς  υττο  ΑακεΕαιμονίων,  ώ  ^Ακύνθιοί, 
'γε'γενηται  την  αΐτίαν  ετταΧηθεύουσα  ην  αρχόμενοι 
του  τΓοΧεμου  ττροείττομεν,  ^Αθηναίοις  εΧευθερούντες 
•2  την  Ελλάδα  ττοΧεμήσειν  el  Be  χρόι  ω  εττήΧθομεν, 
σφαΧεντες  της  άττο  του  εκεί  ττοΧέμου  Βόξης,  y 
Βιά  τάχους  αύτοΙ  άνευ  τον  υμετέρου  κινΒύνου 
ήΧττίσαμεν  ^Αθηναίους  καθαφησειν,  μηΒεΙς 
μεμφθΐ]•  νυν  yap,  ore  παρεσχ^εν,  άφι^μενοι  καΐ 
μετά    υμών  ττειρασόμεθα   κατερ^άζεσθαι   αυτούς. 

3  θαυμάζω  Βε  τη  τε  άττοκΧτισει  μου  των  ττυΧών  καΐ 

4  εΐ  μη  άσμενοις  υμίν  άφΐ^μαι.  ημείς  μεν  yap  οι 
ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι  οΐόμενοί  τε  τταρα  ξυμμάγονς,  καΐ 
ττρίν  εpyω  άφικεσθαι,  τη  yovv  yvώμη  ηξειν  καΐ 
βονΧομενοις  εσεσθαι,  κίνΒυνόν  τε  τοσόνΒε  άνερρί- 
ψαμεν  Βιά  της  άΧΧοτρίας  ττοΧΧών  ημερών  οΒον 
ίόντες     καΐ     ττάν     το     ττροθνμον     τταρεσ'χ^όμεθα•  ^ 

5  υμείς  Βε  εΐ  τι  αΧΧο  εν  νω  έχετε  η  el  €ΐ•αντιώσεσθ€ 
τη   7  ε   υμέτερα   αυτών  εΧενθερία  καΐ  τών  άΧΧων 

^  Rutherford's  correction  for  τταρΐχάμΐνοι  of  the  MSS. 
356 


BOOK    IV.  ι.χλ'χιν.  2-L\xxv.  5 

divided  among  themselves,  on  the  one  side  being 
those  Avho,  in  concert  with  the  Chalcidians,  asked 
him  to  intervene,  and  on  the  other  side  the  popular 
party.  However,  Avhen  Brasidas  urged  them  to 
admit  him  unattended  and  then,  after  hearing  what 
he  had  to  say,  to  deliberate  on  the  matter,  the 
populace  consented,  for  they  had  fears  concerning 
the  grapes,  Λvhich  had  not  yet  been  gathered.  So  he 
came  before  the  people — and  indeed,  for  a  Lace- 
daemonian, he  Λvas  not  wanting  in  ability  as  a 
speaker- — and  addressed  them  as  follows  : 

LXXXV.  "Citizens  of  Acanthus,  the  Lacedae- 
monians have  sent  me  and  my  army  to  prove  the 
truth  of  Λvhat  Λνο  proclaimed  at  the  beginning  to  be 
the  cause  of  the  Avar,  Avhen  we  said  that  we  Avere 
going  to  Avar  Avith  the  Athenians  for  the  liberation 
of  Hellas.  But  if  Ave  have  arrived  late,  disap- 
pointed as  we  have  been  Avith  regard  to  the  Avar 
at  home,  Avhere  aa'c  had  hoped  to  destroy  the 
Athenians  quite  speedily,  by  our  own  efforts  and 
Avithout  involving  you  in  the  danger,  do  not  blame 
us ;  for  Ave  are  here  noAv,  having  come  as  soon  as 
opportunity  offered,  and  together  Avith  you  Ave  shall 
try  to  subdue  them.  But  I  am  amazed  at  the  closing 
of  your  gates  against  me,  and  that  my  coming  has 
been  unAvelcome  to  you.  For  Ave  Lacedaemonians, 
thinking,  even  before  Ave  actually  came,  that  Ave 
should  find  ourselves  among  men  Avho  were  allies  in 
spirit  at  least  and  that  Ave  should  be  Avelcomed,  have 
hazarded  the  great  danger  of  travelling  a  journey  of 
many  days  through  an  alien  territory  and  have  shoAvn 
all  possible  zeal.  But  if  you  have  aught  else  in  mind, 
or  intend  to  stand  in  the  Avay  of  your  own  freedom 
and  that  of  the  rest  of  the  Hellenes,  that  would  be 

357 


THUCYDIDES 

6  'ΈΧΧήνων,  heivov  αν  €Ϊη.  καϊ  yap  ονχ  οτν  αυτοί 
άνθίστασθβ,  ά\\α  καϊ  οΓ?  αν  βττίω,  ησσον  τις 
βμοί  Ίτρόσεισι,  δυσχ^βρες  ποιούμενοι  el  eVt  ους 
ττρωτον  ήΧθον  υμάς,  καϊ  ττοΧιν  άξιοχρβων  τταρβ'χ^ο- 
μζνους  καϊ  ξννβσιν  Βοκοΰιτας  βχβιν,  μη  ehe^aade, 
καϊ  την  αΐτίαν  ου  δό^ω  ^  ττιστην  αττοΖβικνύναι, 
αλλ'  Τ)  ahiKov  την  έΧευθβριαν  βττιφβρειν  η  άσθβνης 
καϊ  αδύνατος  τιμωρήσαι  τα  ττρος    Αθηναίους,  ην 

7  βττίωσιν,  άφιχθαι.  καίτοι  στρατιά  ye  ttjS'  ην  νυν 
έ'χω  €ΤγΪ  Ί^ίσαιαν  €μοΰ  βοηθησαντος  ουκ  ήθίΧη- 
σαν  ^Αθηναίοι  ττΧβονες  οντες  ττροσμεΐξαι,  ώστε 
ουκ  βίκος  νηιττ]'^  ye  αυτούς  τω  iv  Νισαι,α^ 
στρατω    'ίσον   πΧηθος  εφ'    υμάς  άττοστβΐΧαι. 

LXXXVI.  "Αυτός  τβ  ουκ  εττΐ  κακω,  εττ'  eXev- 
θερώσει  δε  των  'ΚΧΧιίνων  τταρέΧηΧυθα,  ορκοις  τβ 
ΑακβΒαιμονίων  καταΧαβων  τα  τεΧη  τοις  μεηίστοις 
η  μην  ους  αν  έ'γωγε  7Γpoσayάyωμaι  ξυμμάχ^ους 
εσεσθαι  αυτόνομους,  καϊ  αμα  ούχ  ίνα  ξυμμάχους 
υμάς  ε-χ^ωμεν  η  βία  η  αττάττ)  τι ροσΧαβοντες,  άΧΧα 
τουναντίον    υμίν    ΒεΒουΧωμενοις     ύττο    ^Αθηναίων 

2  ξυμμαχήσοντες.  οΰκουν  άξιω  ουτ  αύτος  ύττοττ- 
τεύεσθαι,  πίστεις  ye  ΒιΒούς  τας  μεyLστaς,  ούτε 
τιμωρός  αδύνατος  νομισθήναι,  ττροσχ^ωρεΐν  δε 
υμάς  θαρσησαντας. 

3  "  \\αϊ  εϊ  τις  Ιδία  τίνα  δεδιως  αρα,  μη  εγώ  τισι 
ττροσθώ     την     ττοΧιν,    άττρόθυμός     εστί,    ττάντων 

^  Sauppe's  correction  for  ουχ  'ίξω  of  the  MSS. 
^  So  the  \IiSS.  ;  Hude  emends  to  ν-ηίττην. 
^  For    if  Νισαία  Hude  adopts  e/ie?,  Λvith  £,   against  the 
other  MSS. 

358 


BOOK    IV.  Lxxw.  5-LXXXV1.  3 

monstrous.  For  it  is  not  merely  that  you  yourselves 
oppose  me,  but  that  all  to  whom  I  may  apply  Λνϋΐ  be 
less  inclined  to  join  me,  raising  the  objection  that 
you  to  whom  I  first  came,  representing  as  you  do  an 
important  city  and  reputed  to  be  men  of  sense,  did 
not  receive  me.  And  it  will  seem  ^  that  the  reason 
Avhich  I  give  for  your  refusal  is  not  to  be  believed, 
but  tiiat  either  the  freedom  I  offered  you  is  not 
honourable,  or  that  when  I  came  to  you  I  was  power- 
less and  unable  to  defend  you  against  the  Athenians 
if  they  should  attack  you.  And  yet  when  I  brought 
aid  to  Nisaea  with  the  very  army  which  I  ηοΛν  have, 
the  Athenians  \vere  unΛvilling,  though  superior  in 
numbers,  to  engage  us,  so  that  they  are  not 
likely  to  send  against  you  by  sea  a  number  equal  to 
the  armament  they  had  at  Nisaea. 

LXXXVI.  "  As  for  myself,  I  have  come  here  not 
to  harm  but  to  liberate  the  Hellenes,  having  bound 
the  government  of  the  Lacedaemonians  by  the  most 
solemn  oaths  that  in  very  truth  those  whom  I  should 
Avin  as  allies  should  enjoy  their  own  laws  ;  and 
further,  we  are  come,  not  that  we  may  have  you  as 
allies,  winning  you  over  either  by  force  or  fraud,  but 
to  offer  our  alliance  to  you  who  have  been  enslaved 
by  the  Athenians.  I  claim,  therefore,  that  I  ought 
not  either  myself  to  be  suspected,  offering  as  I  do 
the  most  solemn  pledges,  or  to  be  accounted  an 
impotent  champion,  but  that  you  should  boldly  come 
over  to  me. 

"  And  if  anyone,  possibly,  being  privately  afraid  of 
somebody  is  half-hearted  through  fear  that  I  may 
put    the    city    into    the    hands    of    some    party    or 

^  Or,  reading  ονχ  ΐξω,  "  And  I  shall  have  to  submit  to  the 
charge  of  not  being  able  to  give  a  reason  fur  your  refusal 
that  can  be  believed,  but  of  offering,  etc." 

359 


THUCYDIDES 

4  μάΧιστα  ττιστευσάτω.  ου  yap  ζυστασίάσων 
ηκω,  ouSe  αν  σαφή  ^  την  ekevOepLav  νομίζω  βττι.- 
φβρβιν,  et  το  ττάτριον  Tra/jet?  το  ττΧβον  τοΓς 
6\iyoi<;    η    το    έλασσον    τοί?    ττασί    8ουΧώσαιμΐ. 

δ  'χ^αΧεττωτίρα  '^/αρ  αν  τή'ζ  άΧΧοφυΧου  άρχή<ϊ  βϊη, 
κα\  ημίν  τοΐ<;  Αακβ^αιμονίοίς  ουκ  αν  άντΙ  ττόνων 
χάρι<;  καθίσταίτο,  άντΙ  8e  τιμής  καΐ  Βόξης  αΙτία 
μΰΧΧον  049  τ£  τους  ^Αθηναίους  ^ηκΧημασι 
κατατίοΧ^μουμ^ν,   αυτοΧ    αν    φαινοίμεθα   έχθίονα 

6  η  ο  μη  υττοΖβίζας  άρβτην  κατακτωμενοι.  άττάττ) 
<γαρ  ευττρεττβΐ  αίσχιον  ^  τοΐς  γε  iv  άζιώματι 
ΊτΧβονεκτήσαι  ή  βία  βμφανεΐ•  το  μβν  yap  ισχύος 
Βίκαίώσβι,  ην  η  τύχη  βδωκβν,  βττβρχεται,  το  δε 
γνώμης  αδίκου  €πίβουΧη.  LXXXVIL  οΰτω 
ττοΧΧην  ΤΓβριωττην  των  ήμΐν  ^  ες  τά  μί^ιστα 
διαφόρων  ΤΓΟίούμεθα,  καϊ  ουκ  αν  μβίζω  ττρος 
τοις  ορκοις  βββαίωσιν  Χάβοιτβ,  ή  *  οίς  τα  epya 
Ικ  των  Xoywv  άναθρονμενα  Ζοκησιν  άνα^καιαν 
τταρβχεταί  ό^ς  και  ζυμφαρει  ομοίως  ως  βίττον. 

2  "  Εϊ  δ'  €μοΰ  ταύτα  ττροϊσχομβνου  άΒύΐ'ατοί  μ€ν 
φήσ€Τ6  elvai,  evvoi.  δ'  οντες  αξιώσετε  μη  κακού- 
μενοι  όιωθεΐσθαι,  καϊ  την  εΧενθεριαν  μη  άκίνΒυνον 
ύμΐν  φαίνβσθαι,  Βίκαιόν  τε  είναι,  οις  καϊ  8υνατ6ν 
Βεχεσθαι  αυτήν,  τούτοις  καϊ  εττιφερειν,  άκοντα  8ε 

^  tiv  σ-αφη,  Bauer's  correction  for  a(ra(|)7J  of  the  MSS. 

^  Hude  writes  αίσχιόΐ'  τι,  after  Stobaeiis. 

^  Hude  writes  νμΐν,  with  Stahl.  ■*  Deleted  by  Hude 

360 


BOOK   IV.  Lxxxvi.  3-LXXXV11.  2 

other,^  let  him  most  of  all  have  confidence.  For  I 
am  not  come  to  join  a  faction,  nor  do  I  think  that 
the  freedom  I  am  offering  would  be  a  real  one  if, 
regardless  of  your  ancestral  institutions,  1  should 
enslave  tlie  majority  to  the  few  or  the  minority  to 
the  multitude.  That  would  be  more  galling  than 
foreign  rule,  and  for  us  Lacedaemonians  the  result 
Λvould  be,  not  thanks  for  our  pains,  but,  instead  of 
honour  and  glor}^  only  reproach  ;  and  the  very 
charges  on  Avhich  we  are  waging  Λvar  to  the  death 
against  the  Athenians  Ave  should  be  found  to  be 
bringing  home  to  ourselves  in  a  more  odious  form 
than  the  poAver  which  has  made  no  display  of  virtue. 
For  it  is  more  shameful,  at  least  to  men  of  reputa- 
tion, to  gain  advantage  by  specious  deceit  than  by 
open  force ;  for  the  one  makes  assault  by  the 
assertion  of  power,  Avhich  is  the  gift  of  fortune, 
the  other  by  the  intrigues  of  deliberate  injustice. 
LXXXV  II.  Consequently  we  Lacedaemonians  use 
great  circumspection  as  regards  matters  that  con- 
cern us  in  the  highest  degree  - ;  and  you  could  not 
get  better  security,  in  addition  to  our  oaths,  than 
where  you  have  men  whose  actions  scrutinized  in 
the  light  of  their  professions  furnish  the  irresistible 
conviction  that  their  interests  are  indeed  exactly  as 
they  have  said. 

"  But  if  you  meet  these  offers  of  mine  Avith  the  plea 
that  you  cannot  join  us,  but,  because  you  are  Avell- 
disposed  to  us, claim  that  you  should  not  suffer  by  your 
refusal,  and  maintain  tliat  the  liberty  I  offer  seems  to 
you  to  be  not  without  its  dangers,  and  that  it  is  right 
to  offer  it  to  those  Λνΐιο  can  receive  it  but  not  to  force 


i  e.  the  dreaded  oXlyot. 

Referring  to  Sparta's  reputation  for  justioe. 


361 


THUCYDIDES 

μη^€να  ττροσανα^/κάζβίν,  μάρτυρας  μβν  θεούς  καΐ 
ηρως  τους  β'^/χ^ωρίους  ττοίήσομαι  ώ?  eV  ά^αθω 
ήκων  ου  ττβίθω,  yrjv  Be  την  ύμετέραν  Βτ)ων  πβιρά- 

3  σομαι  βιάζεσθαι,  καΐ  ουκ  άΒικβΐν  έ'τί  νομιώ, 
ττροσβΐναί  he  τι  μοι  καΐ  κατά,  Βύο  άνά^κας  το 
εύ\ο^ον,  των  μεν  Αακ€8αιμονίων,  οττως  μη  τω 
ΰμετερω  ζΰνω,  el  μη  ττροσα-χθησεσθε,  τοις  άττο 
υμών  'χρήμασι  φζρομβνοίς  παρ  'Αθηναίους  βΧάττ- 
τωνται,    οι    δε  "ΚΧΧηνες    'ίνα   μη   κωΧύωνταί   υφ^ 

4  υμών  ΒουΧαας  άτταΧΧα^ήναί.  ου  yap  ζη  εΐκότως 
y  αν  τάδε  ττράσσοιμεν,  οι)δε  οφβΙΧομβν  οι  Αακβ- 
Βαιμόνιοί  μη  κοινού  τίνος  αηαθού  αίτια  τους  μη 

5  βουΧομίνους  ^Χβυθβροΰν  ούδ'  αΰ  αρχής  εφιβμξθα, 
τταύσαι,  δε  μαΧΧον  ετέρους  σττβύόοντες  τους 
ττΧείους  αν  άζικοΐμεν,  et  ζυμττασιν  αύτονομίαν 
€πίφ€ροντ€ς  υμάς  τους  ενάντιου μίνους  ττερύδοιμεν. 

6  ττρος  ταύτα  βουΧβυβσθ e  el•,  καΐ  ά^ωνισασθε  τοις 
τε  "ΚΧΧησιν  άρξαι  ττρώτοι  εΧευθεριας  και  άί8ιον 
Βόζαν  καταθέσθαι,  και  αύτοΙ  τά  τε  iSia  μη 
βΧαφθήναι  καΐ  ξυμττάση  τη  ττόΧει  το  κάΧΧιστον 
όνομα  ττεριθεΐναι. 

LXXXVIII.  Ό  μεν  Βρασίδας  τοσαύτα  είττεν. 
οι  δε  Άκάνθιοι,  ττοΧΧών  Χεχθεντων  ττρότερον  ε'π' 
αμφότερα,  κρύφα  8ιαψηφισάμενοι,  Βιά  τε  το 
ετταγωγά  είττεΐν  τον  V>paaihav  καϊ  ττβρί  του 
καρπού  φόβω  έγνωσαν  οι  πΧειους  άφιστασθαι 
^Αθηναίων,  καϊ  πιστώσαντες  αύτον  τοις  ορκοις 
ους  τά  τεΧη  των  ΑακεΒαιμονίων  ομόσαντα  αυτόν 
εξέπεμψαν,  η  μην  εσεσθαι  ξυμμάχους  αυτόνομους 

362 


BOOK      IV.    LXXXVII.    2-LXXXVIII.    I 

it  on  anyone  ajrainst  his  will,  I  shall  make  the  gods 
and  heroes  of  your  country  my  Λνϋη655ε5  that,  though 
I  come  for  your  good,  I  cannot  persuade  you,  and  I 
shall  try,  by  ravaging  your  territory,  to  compel  you  ; 
and  in  that  case  I  shall  not  consider  that  I  am  doing 
wrong,  but  that  I  have  some  justification,  for  two 
compelling  I'easons :  first,  in  the  interest  of  the 
Lacedaemonians,  that  with  all  your  professed  good- 
will toward  them  they  may  not,  in  case  you  shall 
not  be  brought  over,  be  injured  by  the  money  you 
pay  as  tribute  to  the  Athenians  ;  secondly,  that  the 
Hellenes  may  not  be  prevented  by  you  from  escaping 
bondage.  For  otherwise  we  should  not  be  justified 
in  acting  thus,  nor  are  we  Lacedaemonians  bound, 
except  on  the  plea  of  some  common  good,  to  confer 
liberty  on  those  who  do  not  wish  it.  Nor,  again,  are 
we  seeking  after  empire,  but  rather  we  are  eager 
to  stop  others  from  acquiring  it ;  and  we  should 
do  wrong  to  the  majority,  if,  when  we  are  bringing 
independence  to  all,  we  permitted  you  to  stand  in 
the  Avay.  In  view  of  these  things,  deliberate  Avisely, 
and  strive  to  be  the  first  to  inaugurate  freedom 
for  the  Hellenes  and  to  lay  up  for  yourselves  un- 
d3'ing  fame  ;  thus  you  will  save  your  own  property 
from  injury  and  confer  upon  your  whole  state  the 
fairest  name." 

LXXXVHL  Such  was  the  speech  of  Brasidas.  But 
the  Acanthians,  after  much  had  been  said  on  both 
sides  of  the  question,  took  a  secret  vote,  and,  on 
account  of  Brasidas'  impassioned  words  and  their  fears 
about  the  harvest,  the  majority  decided  to  revolt  from 
the  Athenians;  then  having  bound  him  with  the 
oaths  which  the  authorities  of  the  Lacedaemonians 
swore  when  they  sent  him  out,  namely,  that  those 

363 


THUCYDIDES 

ους  αν  ττροσα'γά'γηται,  οΰτω  Βεχ^ονται  τον  στρατον. 

2  καΐ  ου  πο\ύ  ΰστβρον  καΐ  Χτάγίρο?  ΆνΒρίων 
άττοίκία  ξυναττέστη.  ταύτα  μβν  ονν  iv  τω  Oepev 
τούτω  iyeveTO. 

LXXXIX,  Ύου  δ^  βττί'γΐ'^/ΓομβΓου  χβιμώνος  €νθύ<; 
άρ'χ^ομβνου,  ώς  τω  Ιτητοκράτει  καΐ  Αημοσθβνβί 
στρατψ/οΐς  ούσιν  'Αθηναίων  τα  iv  τοις  Βοιωτοΐς 
evehihoTO  καϊ  eBei  τον  μ€ν  Αημοσθβνη  ταΐς  ναυσίν 
€9  τα?  Σιφη?  άπαντήσαι,  τον  δ  eVl  το  ΑηΧιον, 
ηβνομίνης  ζιαμαρτίας  των  ι) μερών  βς  ας  eSet 
αμφότερους  στρατεύειν,  ό  μβν  Αημοσθενης  ττρό- 
τβρον  ττΧεύσας  ττρος  τάς  Χίφας  καϊ  'έχων  iv  ταΐς 
ναυσΙν  Άκαρνάνας  και  των  εκεί  ττοΧλούς  Συμ- 
μάχων, αττρακτος  ^ί^νεται  μηνυθεντος  του 
εττίβουΧεύματος  ύττο  Νικόμαχου,  άνΒρος  Φωκεως 
i.K  Φανοτεως,  ος  ΑακεΒαιμονίοίς  είττεν,  iκεtvoι  δε 

2  Βο/ωτοί?•  καϊ  βοηθείας  γενομένης  ττάντων 
Ώαωτών  {ου  yap  ττω  Ιττττοκράτης  παρεΧύττεο  εν 
τη  yfi  ώ;-)  ττροκαταΧαμβάνονται  αϊ  τε  'Χΐφαι  καϊ 
η  Χαιρώνεια.  ώς  8ε  τίσθοντο  οι  ττράσσοντες 
το  αμάρτημα,  ού8εν  iκίvησav  των  εν  ταΐς 
ττόΧεσιν. 

XC.  Ό  δε  Ίτητοκράτης  άναστησας  ^Αθηναίους 
7ταν8ημεί,  αυτούς  καϊ  τβνς  μέτοικους  καϊ  ξένων 
οσοί  ιταρησαν,  ύστερος  άφικνείται  εττΐ  το  ΑηΧιον, 
ηΒη  των  Βοίωτωμ  άΐ'ακεχωρηκοτοιν  αττο  των 
Έιφών    καΐ  καθίσας  τον  στρατον  ΑιίΧιον  ετειχιζε 

2  τοιω8ε  τρόττω}  τάφρον  μεν  κύκΧω  ττερί  το  Ιερον 
και  τον  νέων  εσκατττον,  iK  δε  του  opύyμaτoς 
άνεβαΧΧον  άντΙ  τείχους  τον  χουν,  καί  σταυρούς 

^  rh  Uphv  τον  'Att6,\\o!vos,  after  τρόπφ  in  the  MSS.,  deleted 
by  Dobree. 

364 


BOOK    IV.  Lxxxvni.  i-xc.  2 

whom  he  might  win  over  should  be  autonomous  allies, 
they  finally  received  the  army.  And  not  long  after- 
wards Stagirus/  a  colony  of  the  Andrians,  joined 
in  the  revolt.  Such  then,  were  the  events  of  that 
summer. 

LXXXIX.  At  the  very  beginning  of  the  following 
winter,^  when  the  places  in  Boeotia  Avere  to  be 
delivered  to  Hippocrates  and  Demosthenes,  the 
Athenian  generals,  Demosthenes  was  to  have  been 
present  Avith  his  ships  at  Siphae,  the  other  general 
at  Delium.  But  a  mistake  Λvas  made  as  to  the  days 
when  both  were  to  start,  and  Demosthenes  sailed 
too  soon  to  Siphae,  having  Acarnanians  and  many 
allies  from  that  region  on  board,  and  so  proved 
unsuccessful ;  for  the  plot  had  been  betrayed  by 
Nicomachus,  a  Phocian  from  Phanotis,  Λνΐιο  told  the 
Lacedaemonians,  and  they  the  Boeotians.  Accord- 
ingly succour  came  from  all  the  Boeotians — for 
Hippocrates  was  not  yet  in  their  country  to  annoy 
them — and  both  Siphae  and  Chaeroneia  v/ere  occu- 
pied in  advance ;  and  the  conspirators,  learning  of 
the  mistake,  attempted  no  disturbance  in  the  towns. 

XC.  Meanwhile  Hippocrates  levied  all  the  forces 
of  Athens,  both  citizens  and  resident  aliens,  and  such 
foreigners  as  Avere  in  the  citv.  But  he  arrived  at 
Delium  too  late,  after  the  Boeotians  had  already  with- 
drawn from  Siphae.  Then,  after  settling  his  army  in 
camp,  he  proceeded  to  fortify  Delium  in  the  following 
manner.  They  dug  a  ditch  round  the  temple  and 
the  sacred  precinct  and  threw  up  the  earth  from 
the   ditch  to  serve  for  a  Λvall,  fixing  stakes  along 

'  About  twelve  miles  north  of  Acanthus,  known  also  as 
Stageira,  the  birthplace  of  Aristotle. 

-  Resumption  of  the  narrative  of  eh.  Ixxix. 


THUCYDIDES 

παρακαταττηγννντβ';  άμΊτέΧον  κοτττ^ντε'ί  την  ττβρί 
το  lepov  βσέβαΧλον  καΐ  Χίθους  άμα  καΧ  πΚίνθον 
εκ  των  οΙκοττβΖων  των  €77^9  καθαιρονντβς,  και 
ιταντί  τρόττίύ  εμβτεώριζον  το  βρυμα.  Trvpyov^  re 
ξν\ίνον<ί  κατέστησαν  fj  καιροί  ην  καϊ  του  ιερού 
οικοδόμημα    ού8εν   ύττήρχεν    ήπερ   yap  ην    στοά 

3  κατεττεπτώκει.  ήρ-<^ρα  ^e  άρξάμενοί  τρίτη  ως 
οίκοθεν  ωρμησαν  ταυτην  τε  είρ-γάζοντο   και  την 

4  τετάρτην  και  της  πεμτττης  μεχ^ρι  άριστον,  έπειτα, 
ώς  τα  ττΧεΐστα  άττετετεΧεστο,  το  μεν  στρατόττεΒον 
ΤΓροαττεχωρησεν  αττο  τοΰ  ^ηΧιου  οίον  Βέκα 
σταόίονς  ώς  εττ  οίκου  ττορευόμενον,  και  οι  μεν 
-φ-ιΧοι  οι  ττΧεΐστοι  ευθύς  ε'χ^ώρουν,  ο'ι  δ'  ότΐΧΙται 
θέμενοι  τα  ό'ττλα  ησύγ^αζον  Ίτητοκράτης  όε 
υπομένων  ετι  καθίστατο  φυΧακάς  τε  και  τα  περί 
το  προτει\ισμα,  όσα  ην  ύποΧοιπα,  ως  χρην 
επιτεΧέσαι. 

XCI.  Οι  8ε  Βοίωτοι  εν  ταΐς  ήμεραις  ταύταις 
ζυνεΧε^οντο  ες  την  Tavaypav  καϊ  βττε/δ  / 
από  πασών  των  ποΧεων  παρήσαν  καϊ  ησθά- 
νοντο  τους  Αθηναίους  προχ^ωρονντας  επ'  οϊκου, 
των  άΧΧων  βοιωταρχ^ών,  οι  είσιν  ενΒεκα,  ου 
ζυνεπαινούντων  μάχ^εσθαι,  επειΒη  ουκ  εν  τη 
Ι^οιωτία  ετι  είσι  (μάΧιστα  yap  εν  μεθορίοις  της 
^Ω,ρωπίας  οι  Αθηναίοι  ήσαν,  οτε  εθεντο  τα  οπΧα), 
TlayώvBaς  ό  ΑίοΧά8ου  βοιωταρ'χ^ών  εκ  &ηβών 
μετ  ^ΑριανθιΒου  του  Αυσιμαχ^ίΒον  και  ηyεμovίaς 
ούσης  αυτού  βουΧομενος  την  μα-χ^ην  ποιήσαι  καϊ 
νομίζων  αμεινον  είναι  κινΒυνεύσαι,  προσκαΧών 
εκάστους  κατά  Χοχ^ονς,  όπως  μη  αθρόοι  εκΧίποιεν 
τά  όπΧα,  έπειθε  τους  J^oιωτoύς  Ιέναι  επϊ  τους 
^Αθηναίους  καϊ  τον  aytova  ποιεΐσθαι,  Xέyωv  τοιά3ε, 

366 


BOOK    IV.  xc.  2-xci. 

it ;  and  cutting  down  the  grape-vines  round  the 
sanctuary,  they  threw  them  in,  as  well  as  stones 
and  bricks  from  the  neighbouring  homesteads  which 
they  pulled  doAvn,  and  in  every  Λvay  strove  to 
increase  the  height  of  the  fortification.  Wooden 
towers,  too,  were  erected  wherever  there  Avas  occasion 
for  them  and  no  temple-structure  Λν38  ready  to  hand  ; 
for  the  cloister  that  once  existed  had  fallen  down. 
Beginning  on  the  third  day  after  they  started  from 
home,  they  worked  that  day  and  the  fourth  and  until 
dinner-time  on  the  fifth.  Then,  when  most  of  it  had 
been  finished,  the  main  body  withdrew  from  Delium 
about  ten  stadia  on  their  way  home  ;  and  most  of 
the  light-armed  troops  went  straight  on,  while  the 
hoj)lites  grounded  arms  and  halted  there.  Hippocra- 
tes, however,  remained  behind  and  was  busy  posting- 
pickets  and  arranging  to  complete  whatever  was 
unfinished  about  the  outwork. 

XCI.  But  during  these  days  the  Boeotians  Λvere 
gathering  at  Tanagra  ;  and  when  they  had  come  in 
from  all  the  cities  and  perceived  that  the  Athenians 
were  going  home,  the  rest  of  the  eleven  Boeotarchs 
disapproved  of  fighting,  as  the  enemy  were  no  longer 
in  Boeotia — for  the  Athenians  were  just  about  on  the 
borders  of  Oropia  when  they  halted.  But  Pagondas 
son  of  Aeolidas,  who,  with  Arianthidas  son  of  Lysi- 
machidas,  was  Boeotarch  from  Thebes  and  then  in 
chief  command,  wishing  to  bring  on  the  battle  and 
thinking  it  was  better  to  take  the  risk,  called  the 
men  by  companies  one  after  another,  that  they  might 
not  leave  their  arms  all  at  once,  and  tried  to  persuade 
the  Boeotians  to  go  against  the  Athenians  and  bring 
on  the  contest^  speaking  as  follows  : 


367 


THUCYDIDES 

XCIT.  "\ρήν  μ.ίν,  ω  άνορβς  Έοιωτοί,  μηΒ^  €9 
βττίνοίάν  τίνα  ημών  βΧθβΐν  των  άρχ^όντων  ώ?  ουκ 
eLKo^  ^ Χθηναίοι<ί,  ην  άρα  μη  iv  τΐ]  Βοιωτία  eVi 
καταΧάβωμεν  αυτού';,  hia  μάχ^ης  eXOetv.  την 
jap  ϋοίωτίαν  e/c  της  ομόρου  εΧθοντες  ret^o? 
€νοίκοΒομησάμ€νοί  μέΧΧουσί  φθβίρειν,  καΐ  είσΐ 
^ήτΓου  ττοΧέμιοι  ev   ω  re  αν  ■χ^ωρίω  καταΧηφθώσι 

2  καΐ  όθβν  €7Τ€Χθόντ€<;  ττολβμια  ehpaaav.  νυνί  δ 
et  τω  καΐ  άσφαΧίστ€ρον  eho^ev  elvai,  μετα- 
ιγνώτω.  ου  yap  το  ττρομηθές,  οις  αν  αΧΧος  εττίτ), 
irepl  της  σφβτβρας  ομοίως  ένΒεχβται  Χο^ισμον  και 
'όστις  τα  μεν  εαυτού  έχει,  του  ττΧείονος  δε  ορε^ό- 

3  μένος  εκών  tlvl  επέρχεται,  ττάτριόν  τε  ίιμίν 
στρατον  άΧΧάφυΧον  εττεΧθόντα  και  εν  ttj  οικεία 
και  εν  τη  τών  ττεΧας  ομοίως  άμύνεσθαΐ'  ^Αθη- 
ναίους   δε    καΐ    ττροσετι     όμορους    οντάς     ττοΧΧω 

4  μάΧιστα  8εΐ.  ττρός  τε  yap  τους  άστυyείτovaς 
ττασι  το  άντίτταΧον  καΐ  εΧεύθερον  καθίσταται,  καΐ 
ττρος  τούτους^  yε  Βΐ],  οϊ  καΐ  μη  τους  ^γγύ?,  άλ,λά 
καΐ  τους  άττωθεν  ττειρώνται  8ουΧοΰσθαι,  ττώς  ου 
χρη  καΐ  εττΐ  το  εσχατον  άyώvoς  εΧθεΐν  (τταρά- 
8εLyμa  δε  εχομεν  τους  τε  άντιττερας  Κύβοεας  και 
της  άΧΧης  Ε,ΧΧάΒος  το  ττοΧύ  ώς  αύτοΐς  διάκειται), 
καΐ  yvoivai  ότι  τοις  μεν  άΧΧοις  οι  ττΧησιόχωροι 
ττερί  yής  όρων  τας  μάχας  ττοιουνται,  ημίν  δε  ες 
ττάσαν,  ην  νικηθώμεν,  εις  ορός  ουκ  άντίΧεκτος 
τrayt']σετaι•     εσεΧθοντες    yap    βια     τα     ημέτερα 

5  εζουσιν.     τοσούτω    εττικινόυνοτεραν    έτερων    την 

^  Duk(ji's  correction  for  ταύτοα  of  the  AISS. 
368 


BOOK    IV.  xcii.  1-5 

XCII.  ''It  should  never,  men  of  Boeotia,  have 
even  entered  the  mind  of  any  of  us  who  are  in 
command  that  we  ought  not  to  come  to  battle  with 
the  Athenians  unless  we  should  overtake  them  while 
still  on  Boeotian  soil.  For  it  was  to  ravage  Boeotia 
that  they  came  from  across  the  frontier  and  built  a 
fort  in  our  territory,  and  they  are  assuredly  equally 
our  enemies  wherever  they  may  be  caught,  and 
especially  on  that  soil  from  which  they  advanced  to 
do  the  work  of  enemies.  But  as  matters  stand,  if 
anyone  did  indeed  tliink  that  course  safer,  let  him 
change  his  mind.  For  where  men  are  attacked 
prudence  does  not  admit  of  such  nice  calculation 
regarding  their  own  land  as  is  permitted  to  those 
who,  secure  in  their  own  possessions,  in  their  greed 
for  more  wantonly  attack  others.  Furthermore,  it 
is  hereditary  Λvith  you  Λvhen  an  alien  army  comes 
against  you  to  ward  it  off,  alike  in  your  own  land 
and  in  that  of  your  neighbours;  and  most  of  all 
when  the  invaders  are  Athenians  and  moreover 
upon  your  borders.  For  in  dealing  with  neigh- 
bours, it  is  always  equality  of  force  that  guarantees 
liberty ;  and  when  the  contest  is  against  men  like 
these,  who  are  trying  to  enslave  not  only  those 
near  by  but  those  far  away,  is  it  not  necessary  to 
fight  to  the  vei'y  last .''  VVe  have  as  a  warning  ex- 
ample their  policy  toAvard  the  Euboeans  across  the 
strait  as  Λν^Ι  as  toward  the  greater  part  of  Hellas, 
and  must  realize  that,  whereas  others  make  war 
with  their  neighbours  about  territorial  boundaries, 
for  us,  if  we  are  conquered,  one  boundary  beyond  dis- 
pute will  be  fixed  for  our  whole  land  ;  for  they  will 
come  and  take  by  force  all  that  we  have.  So  much 
more  dangerous  is  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Athenians 

369 


THUCYDIDES 

Ίταροίκησιν  TcovBe  βχομβν.  βΐώθασί  re  οι  Ισ•χυο<ί 
ητυυ  θράσβι  τοις  πεΧας,  ωσττβρ  Αθηναίοι  νυν, 
€ττιοντ€<;  τον  μ€ν  ησυ-χ^άζοντα  καΐ  βν  Trj  ίαυτοΰ 
μόνον  άμννόμβνον  άοεέστ€ρον  βιτιστρατεύβιν,  τον 
he   βζω    όρων    ττροατταντώντα    και,    ην    καιρός    rj, 

6  ΤΓοΧέμου  αρ-χοντα  ησσον  βτοίμως  κατβχ^βιν.  ττβΐ- 
ραν  δε  €χ^ομεν  ημείς  αυτού  ες  τούσ8ε'  νικήσαντες 
yap  εν  Κορώνεια  αυτούς,  οτε  την  ^ην  ημών 
στασιαζόντων     κατεσχ^ον,     ττοΧΧην     άΒειαν     ττ} 

7  Βοιωτία  μέχρι  τοΰ^ε  κατεστήσαμεν.  ων  -χρη 
μνησθεντας  ημάς  τους  τε  πρεσβυτέρους  ομοιω- 
θη}•αι  τοις  ττρίν  ερ^οις,  τους  τε  νεωτέρους  ττατερων 
των  τότε  αβαθών  γενομένων  τταϊ^ας  ττειράσθαι  μη 
αισχΰναι  τάς  ττροσηκούσας  άρετάς,  ττιστεύσαντας 
Be  τω  θεω  ττρος  ημών  εσεσθαι,  ου  το  ιερόν  άνόμως 
τειχίσαντες  νέμονται,  και  τοις  ιεροΐς  α  ήμΐν 
θυσαμένοις  κα\α  φαίνεται,  ομοσε  χωρήσαι  τοΐσΒε 
και  Βεΐζαι  ότι  ών  μεν  εφιενται  ττρος  τους  μη 
αμυνόμενους  εττιόντες  κτάσθων,  οΐς  8ε  ^ενναΐον 
την  τε  αυτών  αΐεΐ  εΧευθερούν  μάχη  και  την 
άΧΧων  μη  8ου\οΰσθαι  άΜκως,  άναντα^ώνιστοι 
άπ'  αυτών  ουκ  άττιασιν. 

XCIII.  Ύοιαύτα  6  HayώvBaς  τοις  Έοιωτοΐς 
•παραινεσας  εττεισεν  levai  εττΐ  τους  'Αθηναίους. 
κα\  κατά  τάχος  άναστησας  η-γε  τον  στρατόν  (η8η 
yap  και  της  ημέρας  οψέ  ην),  και  εττειΒη  προσέ- 
μειζεν  677'^?  "^οΰ  στρατεύματος  αυτών,  ες  χωρίον 
καθίσας  όθεν  Χόφου  οντος  μεταξύ  ουκ  εθεώρουν 
άΧΧήΧους,    'έτασσε  τε   και   τταρεσκευάζετο   ώς    ες 

370 


BOOK    IV.  xcii.  s-xn II.  i 

than  that  of  otliers.  Besides,  people  who  in  the  con- 
fidence of  strength  attack  their  neighbours,  as  the 
Atlienians  now  do,  are  wont  to  march  more  fearlessly 
against  one  who  keeps  quiet  and  defends  himself 
only  in  his  own  land,  but  are  less  ready  to  grapple 
with  him  Λνΐιο  meets  them  outside  of  his  own 
boundaries  and,  if  opportunity  offers,  makes  the  first 
attack.  We  have  a  proof  of  this  in  tiiese  Athenians; 
for  at  Coronea,^  when  owing  to  our  internal  dissen- 
sions they  had  occupied  our  land,  we  defeated  them 
and  won  for  Boeotia  great  security  \vhich  lias  lasted 
to  this  day.  Remembering  these  things,  let  the 
older  men  among  us  emulate  their  former  deeds,  and 
the  younger,  sons  of  fathers  Λνΐιο  then  were  brave,  try 
not  to  disgrace  the  virtues  which  are  their  heritage. 
Trusting  that  the  god  Avhose  sanctuary  they  have 
impiously  fortified  and  now  occujiy  will  be  on  our 
side,  and  relying  on  the  sacrifices,  which  appear  to  be 
propitious  to  us,  who  have  offered  them,  let  us  ad- 
vance to  meet  them  and  show  that  if  they  would 
get  what  they  covet  they  must  attack  those  who 
will  not  defend  themselves,  but  that  men  whose 
noble  spirit  impels  them  always  to  fight  for  the 
liberty  of  their  own  land  and  not  to  enslave  that  of 
others  unjustly  Avill  never  let  them  depart  without 
a  battle." 

XCIII.  With  such  exhortations  Pagondas  per- 
suaded the  Boeotians  to  attack  the  Athenians,  then 
quickly  broke  camp  and  led  on  his  army,  for  it  was 
already  late  in  tiie  day.  When  he  dreΛv  near  their 
army  he  halted  at  a  place  from  which,  because  of  an 
intervening  hill,  the  two  armies  could  not  see  each 
otlier,  and  there  drew  up  and  prepared  for  battle. 
'  447  B.C.;  cf.  I.  cxiii.  2  ;  in.  Ixii.  5. 


THUCYDIDES 

2  μάγιιν.  τω  he  ΊτΓττοκράτεί^  ονη  ττβρΧ  το  ύι,ηΧιον 
ώ?  αύτω  ψρ/ξ\θη  οτι  ΈοίωτοΙ  έττβρχ^ονται,  ττεμττβι 
69  το  στράτευμα  κβΚ,βύων  €?  τάζιν  καθίστασθαι, 
και  αύτος  ου  ττολλω  ύστερον  βττηΧθβ,  καταΧιττών 
ώ<;  τριακόσιους  /τΓττεας  ττβρί  το  ΑηΧιον,  οττω<ζ 
φύΧακβ<ί  Τ€  άμα  elev,  et  τις  εττίοι  αύτω,  και  τοις 
Βοιωτοΐς  καιρόν   φυΧάζαντες    iniyevoivTO    iv    Ty 

3  μά'χτ).  Βοίωτοι  he  ττρος  τούτους  αντικατέστησαν 
τους  άμυνουμενους,  κα\  e^Γειhη  καΧώς  αύτοΐς 
είχεν,  υττερεφάνησαν  του  Χόφου  καΐ  εθεντο  τα 
ΟΊτΧα  τεταγμένοι  ωσττερ  εμεΧΧον,  οττΧΐται 
ετΓτακισχίΧιοί  μάΧιστα  καΐ  ψιΧοΙ  ύπερ  μύριους, 
ίτΓττής    hε    yiXioi    και     πεΧτασται    "πεντακόσιοι. 

4  είγον  he.  he^iov  μεν  κέρας  Θηβαίοι  και  οι  ζύμ- 
μοροι  αύτοΐς•  μέσοι  δε  ΆΧιάρτιοι  και  }ίορωναΐοί 
καΐ  Κ,ωτταιης  καΐ  οι  άΧΧοι  οι  ττερί  την  Χ'ιμνην 
το  hε  εύώνυμον  είχον  ©εσττιής  καΐ  Tavaypaioi 
καϊ  ^Ορχομίνιοι.  εττι  he  τω  κέρα  εκατέρω  οΐ 
ίτΓττής  καϊ  ψιΧοι  ήσαν,  έττ  άσ'πίhaς  he  ττέντε 
μεν  και  είκοσι  Θηβαίοι  ετάξαντο,  οΐ  hε  άΧΧοι  ως 

δ  έκαστοι  ετυγ^ον.  αύτη  μεν  ^^oιωτώv  τταρασκευη 
και  hιάκoσμoς  ην. 

XCIV.  Αθηναίοι  he  οι  μεν  όττΧΐται  eVt  οκτώ 
ττάν  το  στρατόττεΒον  ετάξαί'το  οντες  ττΧηθει 
ίσοτταΧεΐς  τοις  εναντΊοις,  ίπττής  δε  εφ'  εκατέρω 
τω  κέρα.  ψιΧοΙ  hέ  εκ  Ίταρασκίυής  μεν  ώττΧι- 
σμένοι  ούτε  τότε  τταρήσαν  ούτε  εηένοντο  τ•ρ 
ΊτόΧει•  οΐττερ  hε  ξυνεσέβαΧον,  οντες  ττοΧΧα- 
ττΧάσιοι  των  εναντίων,  άοττΧοί  τε  ττοΧΧοϊ  ήκοΧού- 
θησαν,   ατε  ττανστρατιάς   ξένων   των   παρόντων^ 

^  Hude inserts  en  before  ο^-τι,  with  Rntberford,  and  deletes 
αϋτφ  before  ή77€'λ0η,  with  Kriiger.  ^  Deleted  by  Hude. 

372 


BOOK    IV.  xciii.  i-xciv.  i 

Meanwhile  Hippocrates,  who  was  at  Delium,  on  being 
informed  that  the  Boeotians  were  coming  on,  sent 
orders  to  the  army  to  fall  in  line,  and  himself  not 
long  afterwards  joined  them,  leaving  about  three 
hundred  cavalry  at  Delium,  to  guard  it  in  case  of 
attack  and  also  to  watch  for  an  opportunity  to  fall 
upon  the  Boeotians  in  the  course  of  the  battle.  But 
the  Boeotians  set  a  detachment  to  Λvard  these  off. 
Then  when  everything  was  ready  they  appeared 
over  the  hill  and  halted,  drawn  up  in  the  order  in 
which  they  Λvere  to  fight,  about  seven  thousand 
hoplites,  over  ten  thousand  light-armed  troops,  one 
thousand  cavalry,  and  five  hundred  peltasts.  On 
the  right  Λvere  the  Thebans  and  their  allies ;  in  the 
centre  the  Haliartians,  Coronaeans,  Copaeans,  and 
the  other  people  around  the  lake ;  ^  on  the  left  the 
Thespians,  Tanagraeans  and  Orchomenians.  On 
either  wing  \vere  the  cavalry  and  the  light-armed 
troops.  The  Thebans  Avere  marshalled  in  ranks 
twenty-five  shields  deep,  the  rest  as  chance  directed 
in  each  case.  Such  were  the  preparations  of  the 
Boeotians  and  their  order  of  battle. 

XCIV.  On  the  Athenian  side  the  Avhole  body  of 
hoplites,  Λνΐιο  were  equal  in  number  to  those  of  the 
enemy,  were  marshalled  eight  deep,  and  the  cavalry 
on  either  wing.  But  light-armed  troops,  regularly 
armed,  were  neither  then  present,  nor  did  the  city 
possess  any ;  but  such  lighter  forces  as  had  joined 
in  the  invasion,  Avhile  they  Avere  many  times  more 
numerous  than  the  enemy,  followed  in  large  part 
without  arms,  as  there  had  been  a  levy  in  mass  of 
strangers  that  were  in  Athens  as  Avell  as  of  citizens ; 

*  Lake  Copaia. 

373 


THUCYDIDES 

καΐ  αστών  'γενομένη^;,  καΐ  ώ?  το  πρώτον  ωρμησαν 
2  eV'  οίκου,  ου  irapeyevovTO  ότι  μη  oXljol.  καθε- 
στώτων Be  e<?  την  τάξιν  καΐ  ήΒη  μεΧλόντων 
ξυΐ'ΐβναι,  'ΙτΓττοκράτης  ο  στρατί/γος  εττιτταριων  το 
στρατότΓβΒον  τών  ^ Χθηιαίων  TrapeKeXeveTo  τβ  καΐ 
eXeye  τοιάΒε. 

XCV.  "Ώ  ^Αθηναίοι,  δί'  οΧίηου  μεν  η  τταραί- 
veaL<i  yiyveTai,  το  ίσον  δε  προς  ye  τού<;  ayaOoxj'i 
ανζρας  Βύναται   καΐ    ύπόμνησι,ν    μαΧΧον    έχει    η 

2  επικεΧευσιν.  παρασττ}  8ε  μηΒενΙ  υμών  ως  εν  τη 
άΧΧοτρία  ου  προσήκον  τοσόνΒε  κινΒυνον  avappt- 
πτοΰμεν.  εν  yap  τη  τούτων  υπέρ  της  ημετέρας  ο 
άyώv  εσταΐ'  και  ην  νικήσω  μεν,  ου  μΐ]  ποτέ  ΰμίν 
ΥΙεΧοποννησ tot  ες  την  γ^ώραν  άνευ  της  τώνΒε 
ίππου  εσβάΧωσιν,  εν  Be  μια  μάχη  τηνΒε  τε 
προσκτάσθε    καΐ     εκείνην    μάΧΧον     εΧευθεροΰτε' 

3  χωρήσατε  ουν  άξίως  ες  αυτούς  της  τε  ποΧεως, 
ην  έκαστος  πατρίΒα  έχων  πρώτην  εν  τοΐς  ΕιΧΧη- 
σιν  άyάXXετaι,  και  τών  πάτερων,  ο'ί  τούσΒε  μάχη 
κρατούντες  μετά  ^ΙυρωνιΒου  εν  Οίνοφύτοις  την 
Βοιωτίαν  ποτέ  εσχον.'^ 

XCVI•  Τοιαύτα  τού  'Ιπποκράτους  παρακβ- 
Χευομενου  και  μέχρι  μεν  μέσου  τού  στρατοπεΒον 
επεΧθόντος,  το  Βέ  πΧέον  ούκετι  φθάσαντος,  οι 
Βοίωτοι,  παρακεΧευσαμενου  καϊ  σφίσιν  ώς  Βιά 
ταχέων  καϊ  ενταύθα  ΐlayώvBoυ,  παιανισαντες 
επησαν   άπο   τού   Χόφου.      άντεπησαν  Βε  καϊ    οι 

2  ^Αθηναίοι  καϊ  προσέμειξαν  Βρόμω.  καϊ  εκατερων 
τών  στρατοπέΒων  τα  έσχατα  ουκ  ηΧθεν  ες  χείρας, 
άΧΧά  το  αύτο  επαθεν  ρύακες  yap  εκώΧυσαν. 
το   Βε   άΧΧο  καρτέρι  μ-άχη  καϊ  ώθισμώ  άσπίΒων 

3  ξννειστήκει.     και  το  μεν  εύώνυμον  τών  Βοίωτώι/ 

374 


BOOK    IV.  xciv.  i-xcvi.  3 

and,  having  once  started  homewards,  tliey  were  not 
present  at  the  action,  except  a  few.  When  they 
were  arranged  in  line  and  were  about  to  engage, 
Hippocrates  the  general,  passing  along  the  Athenian 
line,  exhorted  them  and  spoke  as  follows  : 

XCV.  "  Men  of  Athens,  my  exhortation  λ\^11  not  be 
long,  but  to  brave  men  it  will  mean  as  much,  and 
Λνϋΐ  be  a  reminder  rather  than  an  appeal.  Let  none 
of  you  think  that  because  Ave  are  on  foreign  soil  it 
is  without  cause  that  yve  are  hazarding  this  great 
danger.  For  though  the  contest  is  on  Boeotian 
soil,  it  Avill  be  in  defence  of  our  own  ;  and,  if  we 
win,  the  Peloponnesians,  deprived  of  the  Boeotian 
cavalry,  Λνϋΐ  never  again  invade  your  territory,  and 
in  one  battle  you  not  only  Avin  this  land  but  make 
more  sure  the  freedom  of  your  ολνη.  Advance  to 
meet  them,  therefore,  in  a  spirit  Avorthy  both  of  that 
state,  the  foremost  in  Hellas,  which  every  one  of 
you  is  proud  to  claim  as  his  fatherland,  and  of  the 
fathers  who  under  Myronides  vanquished  these  men 
at  Oenophyta,^  and  became  at  one  time  masters  of 
Boeotia." 

XCV^I.  Hippocrates  was  thus  exhorting  his  men 
and  had  got  as  far  as  the  centre  of  the  army,  but  no 
further,  Avhen  the  Boeotians,  after  they  too  had  again 
been  briefly  harangued  by  Pagondas,  raised  the  paean 
and  came  on  from  the  hill.  And  the  Athenians  also 
advanced  against  them  and  met  them  on  a  run. 
The  extremities  of  the  line  on  either  side  never 
came  to  close  quarters,  for  both  had  the  same  diffi- 
culty— theyAvere  hindered  by  sAvollen  torrents.  The 
rest  Avere  engaged  in  stubborn  conflict,  Avith  shield 
pressed  against  shield.     And  the  Boeotian  left,  as 

*  456  B.C. 

375 


THUCYDIDES 

καΐ  μ€χρι  μβσου  ησσάτο  ύττο  των  Αθηναίων,  καϊ 
iirUaav  τους  re  αλΧους  ravry  καΐ  ούχ  ήκιστα 
τού^  ΘβστΓίά?.  ύττοχ^ωρησάντωΐ'  yap  αύτοΐ'ζ  των 
τταρατβταΎμβνων  καϊ  κνκΧωθβντβς  ^  ev  οΧί^ω, 
οϊττβρ  Βιβφθάρησαν  ©εσπιών,  iv  -χ^ερσίν  αμυνό- 
μενοι, κατεκότη^σαν  και  τινβς  καϊ  των  Αθηναίων 
δια  την  κύκΚωσιν  ταραχθ€ντε<;  η<^νόησάν  τβ  καϊ 

4  ciTreKTeivav  άΧΚήΧους.  το  μεν  οΰν  ταύτη  ησσάτο 
των  Έοιωτών  καϊ  ττρος  το  μαχόμβνον  κaτeφvye, 
το  8e  Βεξιόν,  η  οί  Θηβαίοι,  ήσαν,  εκράτβι  των 
^Αθηναίων  καϊ  ωσάμβνοι  κατά  βρα-χυ  το  πρώτον 

5  εττηκολονθουν.  καϊ  ζυνεβη,  Yiaycovhov  ττεριττεμ- 
■ψαντο'ζ  δυο  τε\η  των  Ιππέων  εκ  του  αφανούς 
ττερί  τον  Χόφον,  ώ?  επόνει  το  εύώνυμον  αυτών, 
και     ΰπερφανεντων     αίφνώίω<;,     το    νικών    τών 

Αθηναίων      κέρας,     νόμισαν      αΧΧο      στράτευμα 

6  επιεναι,  e?  φόβον  καταστήναί'  καϊ  άμφοτερωθεν 
η^η,  υπό  τε  του  τοιούτου  καϊ  υπο  τών  ('^)ηβαίων 
εφεπομενων  καϊ  παραρρη^νύντων,  φυ^η  καθει- 
στηκει    παντός    του    στρατού     τών    ^Αθηναίων. 

7  κα\  ο'ι  μεν  προς  το  Δί;λίόΐ'  τ€  καϊ  την  θάΧασσαν 
ώρμησαν,  οί  δέ  επϊ  του  ^Ω,ρωποΰ,  άΧΧοι  δε  προς 
ΤΙάρΐ'ηθα  το  ορός,   οί  8e    ώς   έκαστοι  τίνα  είχον 

8  εΧπίζα  σωτηρίας.  ΈοιωτοΙ  8ε  εφεπομενοιεκτεινον, 
και  μάΧιστα  οί  ίππης  οϊ  τε  αυτών  καϊ  οί  Αοκροϊ 
βεβοηθηκότες  άρτι  της  τροπής  ηι^νομΑνης' 
νυκτός  8ε  επιΧαβούσης  το  ερ^ον  ραον  το  πΧηθος 
τών  φευ^οντων  8ιεσώθη.  καϊ  τη  υστεραία  οΐ  τε 
εκ  του  ^Ω,ρωποΰ  καϊ  οί  εκ  του  ΑηΧίου  φυΧακην 
ε^καταΧιπόντες  (είγον  yap  αυτό  ομ,ως  ετι) 
άπεκομίσθησαν  κατά  ΘάΧασσαν  επ   οίκου. 

^  Kriiger's  correction  for  κυκλωθίντων  of  the  MSS. 


BOOK    IV.  xcvi.  3-8 

far  as  the  centre,  Avas  worsted  by  tlie  Athenians, 
who  pressed  liard  upon  all  the  rest  in  that  quai'ter, 
and  especially  u])on  the  Thespians.  For  when  they 
sa\v  that  the  ranks  on  either  side  had  given  way  and 
that  they  were  surrounded,  those  of  the  Thespians 
who  perished  Avere  cut  down  fighting  hand  to  hand. 
And  some  also  of  the  Athenians,  getting  into  con- 
fusion owing  to  their  surrounding  the  enemy,  mis- 
took and  killed  one  another.  Here,  then,  the 
Boeotians  were  defeated  and  fled  to  the  part  of 
their  army  which  was  still  fighting  ;  but  the  right 
wing,  where  tlie  Thebans  were,  had  the  better  of  the 
Athenians,  and  pushing  them  back  step  by  step  at 
first  followed  after  them.  It  happened  also  that 
Pagondas,  when  their  left  was  in  distress,  sent  two 
squadrons  of  cavalry  round  the  hill  from  a  point  out 
of  sight,  and  when  these  suddenly  appeared,  the 
victorious  wing  of  the  Athenians,  thinking  that 
another  army  was  coming  on,  Avas  thrown  into  a 
panic.  At  this  time,  consequently,  owing  both 
to  this  manoeuvre  ^  and  to  the  Thebans  following 
them  up  and  breaking  their  line,  a  rout  of  the 
whole  Athenian  army  ensued.  Some  hastened  to 
Delium  and  the  sea,  others  toward  Oropus,  others  to 
Mt.  Parnes,  others  wherever  each  had  any  hope  of 
safety.  And  the  Boeotians,  especially  their  cavalry 
and  that  of  the  Locrians  Avho  had  come  up  just  as 
tlie  rout  began,  followed  after  and  slew  them  ;  but 
when  night  closed  down  upon  the  action  the  mass  of 
the  fugitives  escaped  more  easily.  On  the  next  day 
the  troops  from  Oropus  and  those  from  Delium,  leav- 
ing a  garrison  at  the  latter  place,  which  they  still 
held,  Avere  conveyed  home  by  sea.^ 

*  i.e.  the  attack  of  the  two  squadrons  of  cavalry. 
^  It  is  interesting  to  know  that  Socrates  fought  in  the  battle 
of  Delium  and  saved  Alcibiades'  life  (Plato,  Sym^h  221  e). 

vnr..  II.  V       37  7 


THUCYDIDES 

XCVII.  ΚαΙ  OL  ΒοίωτοΙ  τροτταίον  σΎησαντε<; 
και  του?  εαυτών  ανεΧομενοι  νεκρούς  τους  re  των 
τΓοΧεμίων  σκυΧευσαντες  καΐ  φυΧακην  καταΧι- 
ττόντες    άνεχώρησαν    €9    την    Tavaypav,    καΐ    τω 

2  Αη\ίω  εττεβουΚευον  ως  ττροσβαΧοΰντες.  εκ  he 
των  Αθηναίων  κΡ]ρυξ  ττορενυμενος  εττΐ  τους 
νεκρούς  άπαντα  κηρυκί  Βοίωτω,  ος  αύτον  άπο- 
στρε-^ρ-ας  καΐ  είττων  οτι  ούΒεν  ττράξβϋ  ττρίν  αν 
αύτος  άνα'χ^ωρηστ]  ττάΧιν,  καταστάς  εττΐ  τούς 
^Αθηναίους  έλεγε  τα  τταρα  των  Ιβοιωτών,  οτι  ου 
Βίκαίως   Βράσειαν  παραβαίνοντες  τα  νόμιμα   των 

3  ' \ί\\ηνων•  ττασι  yap  eivai  καθεστηκος  ίόντας  eVl 
την  άΧΧηΧων  Ιερών  των  ενόντων  άπέ)(^εσθαί, 
\\θηναίους  δέ  AijXiov  τειγίσαντας  ενοίκεΐν,  και 
όσα  I'll  θρωτΓΟί  εν  βεβήΧω  Βρώσι  ττάντα  ηίηνεσθαι 
αυτόθι,  ύ8ωρ  τε  b  ην  άψαυστον  σφισί  πΧην  προς 
τα  ιερά   γ^ερνιβί  'χρήσθαι,  άνασπ άσαντας   ί/Βρεύ- 

4  εσθαΐ'  ώστε  υπέρ  τε  του  θεού  καΐ  εαυτών 
Βο/ωτούς,  επίκαΧου μένους  τούς  όμωχ^ετας  δαί- 
μονας και  τον  Άττόλλω,  προα'/ορεύειν  αυτούς  εκ 
του  ιερού  άττιόντας  άποφερεσθαι  τα  σφετερα 
αυτών. 

XCVIII.  Ύοσαΰτα  τον  κήρυκος  είπόντος  οι 
*  Αθηναίοι  πεμψαντες  πάρα  τούς  Έοίωτούς  εαυτών 
κήρυκα  του  μεν  Ιερού  οΰτε  άΒικήσαι  εφασαν  ovSev 
οΰτε  τού  Χοιπού  εκόντες  βΧάψειν  ούΒε  yap  την 
άρχ^ην  εσεΧθεΐν  επΙ  τούτω,  αλλ'  ίνα  εζ  αυτού  τούς 
2  αΒικούντας  μάΧΧον  σφάς  άμννωνται.  τον  8ε 
378 


BOOK    IV.  xcvii.  i-xcviii.  2 

XCVII.  The  Boeotians  set  up  a  trophy  and  took 
up  their  own  dead  ;  tlien,  liaving  stripped  the  dead 
of  the  enemy  and  left  a  guard  over  them,  they 
retired  to  Tanagra,  and  there  j)lanned  an  assault 
upon  Delium.  MeanΛvhile  a  herald  from  Athens, 
coming  to  ask  for  their  dead,  met  a  Boeotian  herald, 
w  lio  turned  him  back,  telling  him  he  Avould  accom- 
plish nothing  until  he  himself  returned.^  The 
latter  then  came  before  the  Athenians  and  gave 
them  the  message  from  the  Boeotians  :  that  they 
had  not  done  right  in  transgressing  the  usages  of  the 
Hellenes ;  for  it  was  an  established  custom  of  them 
all,  when  invading  one  another's  country  to  abstain 
from  the  sanctuaries  therein,  whereas  the  Athenians 
had  fortified  Delium  and  now  dwelt  in  it,  doing 
there  whatsoever  men  do  in  a  profane  place,  even 
drawing  for  common  use  the  Avater  which  was  un- 
touched by  themselves  except  for  use  in  lustrations 
connected  Λvith  the  sacrifices.  VVlierefore  the  Boeo- 
tians, in  behalf  of  the  god  and  of  themselves,  in- 
voking the  deities  worshipj)ed  at  the  common  altars 
and  also  Apollo,  gave  them  notice  to  come  out  them- 
selves from  the  temple  and  carry  off  what  belonged 
to  them. 2 

XCVIII.  When  the  herald  had  spoken,  the 
Athenians  sent  a  herald  of  their  own  to  the 
Boeotians,  saying  that  they  had  done  no  injury  to 
the  temple,  and  would  not  damage  it  wilfully  in 
the  future ;  for  they  had  not  entered  it  at  the 
outset  with  any  such  intent,  but  rather  that  from 
it  they  might  defend  themselves  against  those 
who  were  wronging  them.      And    the    laAv    of  the 

*  i.e.  to  the  Boeotian  camp  from  tlie  Athenian,  to  which  he 
was  carrying  a  message.  ^  ,•  j_  their  dead. 

379 


THUCYDIDES 

νόμον  τοΐ<ί''ΚΧ\ησίν  elvai,  ων  αν  rj  το  κράτο<;  τή<; 
<γης  €/ίαστϊ/9,  ην  τ€  ττΧέονοζ  ϊ']ν  τε  βραχυτβρα<ί, 
τούτων  καΐ  τα  lepa  aleX  ηίηνξ,σθαι,  τρόττοΐ'^ί 
θ^ραττευομενα     οίς     αν     ττρο     του  ^     ειωθοσί     καϊ 

3  Βύνωνται.  καϊ  yap  Έοιωτούς  καϊ  τού<ϊ  ττολλου? 
των  άΧλων,  oaoc  εξαναστησαντε•^  τίνα  βία 
νέμονται     'yrjv,     άΧλοτρίοις     Ιβροΐς     το     ιτρωτον 

4  €7Γ€\θοντας  οικεία  νυν  κεκτήσθαι,  καϊ  αυτοί,  el 
μεν  €πΙ  ττΧεον  ^υνηθ?]ναυ  τή<;  εκείνων  κρατήσαι, 
τουτ    αν   εγειν   νυν  δε  εν  ω  μέρει  είσίν,  εκόντες 

5  είναι  ώς  εκ  αφετέρου  ουκ  άττιεναι.  ϋ^ωρ  τε 
εν  τ?;  avayKj]  κινήσαι,  ην  ουκ  αυτοί  ΰβρει 
ττροσθεσθαι,  αλλ'  εκείνους  ττροτερου'ζ  εττΧ  την 
σφετέραν  εΧθόντας  αμυνόμενοι    βίάζεσθαι    χρη- 

6  σθαι.  ττάν  δ'  είκος  είναι  το  ττοΧεμω  καϊ  8εινω  τινι 
κατειρ^όμενον  ξύ^^νωμον  τι  ^ι^νεσθαι  καϊ  ττρος 
του  θεοΰ.  καΐ  jap  των  ακουσίων  αμαρτημάτων 
καταφυ^ην  είναι  τού<;  βωμούς,  τταρανομίαν  τε 
€7Γ4    τοις  μη  ανάγκη  κακοΐς  ονομασθήναι  καϊ  ουκ 

7  εττΐ  τοις  άπο  των  ζυμφορων  τι  τοΧμήσασιν.  τους 
τε  νεκρούς  ττοΧύ  μειζυνως  εκείνους  άντϊ  ιερών 
άξιοΰντας   aTToSiSovai    άσεβεΐν  ή  τους  μη  εθεΧον- 

8  τας  ΙεροΙς  τα  ττρέττοντα  κομίζεσθαι.  σαφώς  τε 
εκεΧευον     σφίσιν    είττεΐν    μη     άττιουσιν     εκ     της 

^  Stahl's  conjecture  for  wphs  to7s  of  the  MSS. 
380 


BOOK    IV.  xcMii.  2-8 

Hellenes  Λναβ,  they  said^  that  whosoever  had  dominion 
over  any  country,  be  it  larger  or  smaller,  to  them 
the  sanctuaries  also  always  belonged,  to  be  tended, 
so  far  as  might  be  possible,  with  whatsoever  rites 
had  hitherto  been  customary.^  Indeed  the  Boeotians, 
and  most  others  who  had  driven  out  any  people 
and  taken  forcible  possession  of  their  country,  had 
at  first  attacked  the  temples  as  alien  but  ηοΛν  pos- 
sessed them  as  their  ΟΛνη.  And  they  themselves, 
if  they  had  been  able  to  conquer  more  of  the 
Boeotian  territory,  would  have  held  it ;  but  as  it 
\vas,  they  would  not  depart  from  that  portion  in 
which  they  were,  at  least  of  their  free  will,  consider- 
ing it  their  ΟΛνη.  The  Λvater,  moreover,  they  had 
disturbed  in  tlieir  sore  need,  Avhich  they  had  not 
wantonly  brought  upon  themselves  ;  they  had  been 
forced  to  use  the  Avater  Avhile  defending  themselves 
against  the  Boeotians  Avho  had  first  invaded  their 
land.  And  anything  done  under  the  constraint  of 
\var  and  danger  might  reasonably  meet  with  some 
indulgence,  even  from  the  god.  For  altars  were  a 
refuge  in  cases  of  involuntary  misdeeds,  and  trans- 
gression was  a  term  applied  to  those  who  do  evil 
without  compulsion  and  not  to  those  Λvho  are  driven 
by  misfortunes  to  some  act  of  daring.  Moreover,  the 
Boeotians  in  presuming  to  give  up  the  bodies  of 
the  dead  in  return  for  temples  Avere  impious  in  a 
much  higher  degree  than  they  who  refused  by  the 
exchange  of  temples  to  procure  that  which  they  had 
a  right  to  recover.  And  they  bade  the  Boeotians 
plainly  tell  them  they  might  take  up  their  dead,  not 

'  Or,  reading  irpht  to7s  (Ιωθόσι  Avith  the  MSS.,  "to  be 
tended,  besides  the  visual  rites,  with  such  others  as  tliey 
might  be  able  to  use." 

38» 


THUCYDIDES 

Βοιωτών  ^ής  (ου  yap  ev  rfj  ζκβίνων  en  elvai, 
ev  fj  Se  Bopl  βκτήσανΎο),  άΧλα  κατά  τα  ττάτρια 
Tov<i  ΐ'€κρού<;  airevhovaiv  αναιρείσθαι. 

XCIX.  Οί  he  ΒοίωτοΙ  άττ€κρίναντο,  el  μίν  ev 
TTJ  Βοιωτία  eiaiv,  άττιόντας  e/c  της  eavToJv  άττοφέ- 
peaOai  τά  at^eTepa,  el  he  ev  τγι  €Κ€ίΐ'ων,  αυτούς 
yiyvcaaKeiv  το  ττοιητ^ν,  voμLζovτeς  την  μεν 
'Ω,ρωπίαν,  ev  y  τους  νεκρούς  ev  μεθορίοις  της 
μά-χτ^ς  γενομένης  κεΐσθαι  ξυνίβη,  \\.θηναίων  κατά 
το  ΰττήκοον  eivai,  καϊ  ουκ  αν  αυτούς  βία  σφο)ν 
κρατήσαι  αυτών  (ούδ'  αΰ  eairevhovTO  8ήθεν  ύπερ 
της  εκείνων^)'  το  he  "  εκ  της  εαυτών^^  εύττρεττες 
είναι  άποκρίνασθαι  "  άττιοντας  καϊ  άττοΧαβεΐν 
α  άτταιτούσιν.^'  ό  he  κήρυζ  των  Αθηναίων 
άκουσας  άττήΧθεν  άττρακτος. 

C.  ΚαΙ  οι  Βοιωτοί  ευθύς  μεταττεμ^^τάμενοι 
εκ  τε  του  ^ΙηΧιώς  κόΧττου  άκοντιστάς  καϊ 
σφεν8ονητας,  καϊ  βεβοηθηκότων  αύτοΐς  μετά 
την  μά-χιιν  Κορινθίων  τε  8ισγ^ι\ίων  όπΧιτών 
καϊ  τών  εκ  Ί^ισαίας  εξεΧηΧυθότων  Πελοττον- 
νησίων  φρουρών  και  ^Ιε^αρεων  αμα,  εστρά- 
τευσαν  εττι  το  ΑήΧιον  και  ττροσεβαΧον  τω 
τειγ^ισματί,  ά\\ω  τε  τροττω  ττειράσαντες  καϊ 
μηχ^ανην  ττροση^α^ον,  ήττερ  eiXev  αυτό,  Toiavhe. 
2  Kepaiav  με^άΧην  διχα  ττρισαντες  εκοίΧαναν 
αττασαν  καϊ  ξυΐ'ήρμοσαν  ττάΧιν  ακριβώς  ώσττερ 
αύΧόν,-  καϊ  eV  άκραν  Χεβητά  τε  ηρτι^σαν  άΧΰσεσι 
καϊ  άκροφυσιον  αττο  της  κεραίας  σιhηpoυv  ες 
αύτον  νεύον   καθείτο,  καϊ   εσεσώήρωτο  iirt  με^α 


^  Parenthetical  according  to  Poppo. 
*  ίίσττίρ  αυλόν,  deleted  by  Hude. 


382 


BOOK    IV.  xcviii.  8-c.  2 

"  on  condition  of  quitting  Boeotia  " — for  they  were 
no  longer  in  Boeotian  territory,  but  in  land  which 
they  had  won  by  the  spear, — but  'On  making  a 
truce  according  to  ancestral  custom." 

XCIX.  Tlie  Boeotians  made  answer,  if  they  were 
in  Boeotia,  they  might  carry  off  their  dead  on 
quitting  their  land  ;  but  if  they  Λvcre  in  their  own 
territory,  they  could  determine  themselves  what  to 
do.  For  they  thought  that  though  Oropia,  in  which 
the  bodies  happened  to  be  lying — for  the  battle 
occurred  on  the  boundaries  —  belonged  to  the 
Athenians  by  right  of  its  subjection,  yet  that  they 
could  not  get  possession  of  the  bodies  without  their 
leave  (nor  indeed  Λvere  they  going  to  make  a  truce, 
forsooth,  about  territory  belonging  to  the  Athenians); 
but  they  thought  it  was  fair  to  answer,  "when  they 
had  quitted  Boeotian  territory  they  could  get  back 
what  they  asked  for."  And  the  herald  of  the  Athen- 
ians, on  hearing  this,  went  away  Avithout  accomplish- 
ing his  object. 

C.  The  Boeotians  sent  off  at  once  for  darters 
and  slingers  from  the  Maliac  Gulf,  and  with  two 
thousand  Corinthian  hoplites,  Λνΐιο  reinforced  them 
after  the  battle,  as  well  as  the  Peloponnesian  garrison 
which  had  evacuated  Nisaea,  and  some  Megarians 
also,  made  an  expedition  against  Delium  and  attacked 
the  fortification.  After  trying  other  forms  of  assault 
they  took  it  by  bringing  up  an  engine  made  in  the 
following  manner.  Having  saAved  in  two  a  great 
beam  they  hollowed  it  throughout,  and  fitted  it 
together  again  nicely  like  a  pipe  ;  then  they  hung  a 
cauldron  at  one  end  of  it  with  chains,  and  into  the 
cauldron  an  iron  bellows-pipe  was  let  down  in  a  curve^ 
from  the  beam,  Avhich  was  itself  in  great  part  plated 
*  i.e.  it  was  bent  into  the  cauldron. 

383 


THUCYDIDES 

3  και  τον  aWov  ζΰΚου.  ττροση^ον  Ze  βκ  ττοΧλού 
άμάξαι<ί  τώ  τύγ^βι,  fj  μάλιστα  ττ)  άμττέΧω  και 
τοΓ?  ξύ\οι<;  ωκοόομητο•  καΐ  οπότε  εϊη  i'y^v<i, 
φύσας  μβΎαΧα^  βσθβρτβ^;  e?  το  προς  εαυτών  άκρον 

4  της  κεραίας  βφύσων.  η  δε  ττνοη  Ιονσα  στεηανως 
Ις  τον  Χεβητα,  βχοντα  άνθρακας  tg  ημμβνους 
καΐ  θείον  καΐ  ττίσσαν,  φλόγα  eVotei  με^άΧην  και 
ηψβ  του  τείχους,  ώστε  μη^ενα  ετι  eV  αυτού 
μεΐναι,  άΧΧά  άττοΧιττ όντας  ες  φυ^ην  καταστήναι 

5  και  το  τείχισμα  τούτω  τω  τρόττω  άλώναι.  τών 
8ε  φρουρών  οι  μεν  άττεθανον,  διακόσιοι  8ε 
εΧίίφθησαν  τών  8ε  άΧΧων  το  πΧήθος  ες  τάς 
ναΰς  εσβαν  άττεκομίσθη  εττ"  οϊκου. 

CT.  Ύοΐ)  8ε  ΑηΧίου  εβδόμτ)  καΐ  8εκάτΎ)  ^  ήμερα 
Χηφθεΐ'τος  μετά  την  μάχην  καΐ  του  αττό  τών 
^Αθηναίων  κηρυκος  ού8εν  εττισταμενου  τών 
'^ε'^/ενη μένων  εΧθόντος  ου  ττοΧύ  ύστερον  αύθις 
ττερί     τών     νεκρών,    άττέδοσαν     οι    Βοίωτοι    καΐ 

2  ούκετι  ταύτα  άττεκρίναντο.  άττεθανον  8ε  Έοιωτών 
μεν  εν  τι]  μάχτ]  οΧί^ω  εΧάσσους  ττεντακοσίων, 
^Αθηναίων  8ε  oXiyrp  εΧάσσους  'χιλίων  και 
Ίττττοκράτης  ο  στρατηγός,  -ψιλών  8ε  καΐ  σκευο- 
φόρων  ΤΓοΧύς  αριθμός. 

3  Μετά  δε  την  μάχην  ταύτην  καΐ  6  Δημοσθένης 
ολιγω  ύστερον,  ώς  αύτω  τότε  ττΧεΰσαντι  τά  ττερϊ 
τάς  ^ίφας  της  προδοσίας  περί  ού  προυχώρησεν, 
έχων  τον  στρατον  επΙ  τών  νεών  to)v  τε  ^ Ακαρ- 
νάνων  καΐ  Άypaίωv,  καΐ  \\.θηναίων  τετρακοσίους 
όπΧίτας,  άπόβασιν  εποιησατο  ες  την  Έ,ικυωνίαν. 

4  καΐ  πρΙν  πάσας  τάς  ναΰς  καταπΧεύσαι  βοηθη- 
σαΐ'τες  οι  Έ,ικυώνίοι  τους  άποβεβηκότας  έτρεψαν 
και  κατε8ίωξαν  ες   τάς  ναΰς,  καΐ  τους   μεν  άπε- 

'  Kriiger's  correction  for  ίπτακαι^ΐκάτ^  of  the  MSS. 

384 


BOOK    IV.  c.  2-ci.  4 

with  iron.  This  engine  they  brought  up  from  a  distance 
on  carts  to  the  part  of  the  Avail  where  it  was  built 
chiefly  of  vines  and  Avood ;  and  Avhen  it  Avas  near, 
they  inserted  a  large  bellows  into  the  end  of  the 
beam  next  to  them  and  blew  through  it.  And  the 
blast  passing  through  the  air-tight  tube  into  the 
cauldron,  which  contained  lighted  coals,  sulphur,  and 
pitch,  made  a  great  blaze  and  set  fire  to  the  wall, 
so  that  no  one  could  stay  on  it  longer,  but  all  left 
it  and  took  to  flight ;  and  in  this  way  the  fortifica- 
tion was  taken.  Of  the  garrison  some  were  slain, 
and  two  hundred  were  captured  ;  but  most  of  the 
rest  got  on  board  their  ships  and  were  conveyed 
home. 

CI.  So  Delium  Avas  taken  seventeen  days  after  the 
battle,  and  when  the  Athenian  herald,  who  kneAv 
nothing  of  what  had  happened,  came  back  not  long 
after  to  ask  for  the  dead,  the  Boeotians  did  not  again 
make  the  same  answer  but  gave  them  up.  And 
there  were  slain  in  the  battle,  of  the  Boeotians  a 
little  more  than  five  hundred,  of  the  Athenians  a 
little  less  than  one  thousand,  including  Hippocrates 
their  general,  besides  a  great  number  of  light-armed 
troops  and  baggage-carriers. 

Not  long  after  this  battle  Demosthenes,  since  he 
had  failed  in  his  negotiations  about  the  betrayal  of 
Siphae,  when  he  sailed  thither  at  the  time  mentioned 
above,^  took  on  his  ships  his  force  of  Acarnanians 
and  Agraeans  and  four  hundred  Athenian  hoplites 
and  made  a  descent  upon  the  territory  of  Sicyon. 
But  before  all  his  ships  had  come  to  shore  the 
Sicyonians  came  to  the  rescue,  and  routing  those 
who  had  disembarked  pursued  them  to  their  ships, 

*  ς/",  ch.  Ixxxix.  1. 


THUCYDIDES 

κτειναν,  τον^  δβ  ζώντας  βΧαβον.  τροτταΐον  δε 
στήσαντβ'ζ  τους  νβκρους  ύττοσττονΒους  άπέΒοσαν. 
5  ^Αττέθανε  Be  και  Έ/ΐτάλκης  ^ΟΒρυσών  βασιΧβύς 
ύπο  τας  αντας  ημέρας  τοΐς  επί  ΑηΧίω,  στρατεύσας 
€ττΙ  ΎρίβαΧλούς  καΐ  νικηθβΐς  μάχτ}•  Έ,βύθης  δε  ό 
ΧτταραΒόκον  άΒέλφώονς  ων  αυτού  εβασίΧενσεν 
ΌΒρυσών  τε  καΐ  της  αΧΧης  Θράκης  ήσττερ  καΐ 
εκείνος. 

CII.  ΤοΟ  δ'  αυτού  χειμώνας  Βρασίδα?  έ'χων 
τους  eTTt  @ράκης  ζυμμάχ^ους  εστράτευσεν  ες 
ΆμφίτΓοΧιν     την     εττΐ     Έ^τρυμόνι    ττοταμω    ^Κθη- 

2  ναίων  άττοικίαν.  το  δε  γ^ωρίον  τούτο  ε'φ'  ου  νύν 
η  ττόΧίς  εστίν  εττείρασβ  μεν  ττρότερον  καΐ  *Αρί- 
σταηορας  ό  ^ιΧησιος  φεύ'γων  βασιΧεα  Ααρεΐον 
κατοίκίσαι,  άΧΧα  υττο  ^Υ^Βώνων  εξεκρούσθη, 
εττειτα  δε  καΐ  οι  Αθηναίοι  ετεσι  δύο  καΐ  τριά- 
κοντα ύστερον,  έποικους  μύριους  σφών  re  αυτών 
καΐ    τών   άΧΧων    τον    βουΧόμενον  πεμψαντες,  οι 

3  ζιεφθάρησαν  εν  Αραβησκώ  ύπο  ©ρακών.  καΐ 
αύθις  ενός  Βεοντι  τριακοστώ  ετει  ελθόντες  οι 
^Αθηναίοι,  "Α'γνωνος  τού  Νικίον  οικιστού  εκπεμ- 
φθέντος,  Ήδώ^ας  εξεΧάσαντες  έκτισαν  το  ■χωρίον 
τούτο,    όπερ    προτερον      Κννεα     ο8οι    εκαΧούντο. 

4  ώρμώντο  δε  εκ  της  ^Ηιόνος,  ην  αύτοΙ  είχον  εμ- 
πόρων επΙ  τω  στόματι  τού  ποταμού  επιθαΧάσ- 
σιον,  πέντε  καϊ  εϊκοσι  σταΕίους  άπεγον  άπο  της 
νύν  πόΧεως,  ην  Αμφ'ιποΧιν  " Αηνων  ώνόμασεν, 
ΟΤΙ  εττ'  αμφότερα  περιρρέοντος  τού  Έ,τρυμόνος  ' 
τεί-χει  μακρώ  άποΧαβών  εκ  ποταμού  ες  ποταμον 

'  δια  rb  -κΐριίχΐΐν  αύτ-ην  ("  with  a  view  to  enclosing  it")  in 
the  MSS.  after  :S,TpvfW!'os,  deleted  by  Dobree. 

386 


BOOK    IV.  CT.  4-cn.  4 

killing  some  and  taking  others  alive.  Then  setting 
up  a  trophy  they  gave  up  the  dead  under  truce. 

Sitalces,^  too,  king  of  the  Odrysians,  was  killed 
about  the  same  time  as  the  events  at  Delium,  having 
made  an  expedition  against  the  Triballi,^  who 
defeated  him  in  battle.  Seuthes  ^  son  of  Sparadocus, 
his  nephew,  now  became  king  of  the  Odrysians  and 
of  the  rest  of  Thrace  over  which  Sitalces  had 
reigned. 

CI  I.  During  the  same  winter,  Brasidas,  with  his 
allies  in  Thrace,  made  an  expedition  against  Amphi- 
polis,  the  Athenian  colony  on  the  river  Strymon. 
This  place,  where  the  city  now  stands,  Aristagoras  ^ 
the  Milesian  had  tried  to  colonize  before,^  when 
fleeing  from  the  Persian  king,  but  he  had  been 
beaten  back  by  the  Edonians.  Thirty-two  years 
after\vards  the  Athenians  also  made  another  attempt, 
sending  out  ten  thousand  settlers  of  their  own 
citizens  and  any  others  who  wished  to  go ;  but 
these  were  destroyed  by  the  Thracians  at  Drabescus. 
Again,  twenty-nine  years  later,  the  Athenians,  send- 
ing out  Hagnon  son  of  Nicias  as  leader  of  the 
colony,  drove  out  the  Edonians  and  settled  the 
place,  which  was  previously  called  Ennea-Hodoi  or 
Nine-Ways.  Their  base  of  operations  was  Eion,  a 
commercial  seaport  which  they  already  held,  at  the 
mouth  of  the  river,  twenty-five  stadia  distant  from 
the  present  city  of  Amphipolis,^  to  which  Hagnon 
gave  that  name,  because,  as  the  Strymon  flows  round 
it  on  both  sides,  he  cut  off  the  site  by  a  long  Λvall 
running  from  one  point  of  the  river  to  another,  and 

*  cf.  II.  Ixvii.,  xcv. ,  ci.  ^  cf.  Ii.  xcvi. 

3  cf.  II.  ci.  5.         *  cf.  Hdt.  v.  126.         ^  497  B.C. 

*  The  name  means  "a  city  looking  both  ways." 

387 


THUCYDIDES 

περιφανή     e?    θάΧασσάν    re     καί    την    ηττειρον 
ωκισεν. 

cm.  ΈττΙ  ταντην  ουν  ο  Βρασίδα?  άρας  βξ 
^ΑρνόύΡ  τί}<?  XaX/ciSi/ci}?  βτΓορευετο  τω  στρατω. 
καΐ  άφικόμβνο^  ττβρϊ  ^βίΧην  έπΙ  τον  ΑύΧωνα  καΐ 
Έρομίσκον,  fj  η  ΈόΧβη  Χίμνη  έξίησιν  €9  Θά- 
Χασσάν, καΐ  8€ΐ7Γνο7Γθίησάμβνο<ί  €'χ^ώρ€ΐ  την  νύκτα. 

2  χ^ειμων  δε  ην  καΐ  ύττίνειφβν'  77  ''^'^^  μαΧΧον 
ωρμησ€,   βουΧόμβνος   Χαθεΐν  του<ί    iv    ττ]    Άμφι- 

3  TToXei  ττΧην  των  ττροΒώόντων.  ήσαν  yap  Άρ- 
'^/ίΧίων  Τ€  iv  αυτή  οίκήτορ€ς  (βί'σΐ  δε  ol  ^ApylXcoi 
^Αν8ρίων  άττοικοί)  καΐ  άΧΧοι  οϊ  ζυνεττρασσον 
ταΰτα,  οΐ  μίν  ΙΙβρΒίκκα  ττβιθόμβνοί,  οι  δε  Χαλ«ί- 

4  heuaiv.  μάΧιστα  δε  οι  ^ApyiXiot,  ε'γγυ?  τε  ττροσοι- 
κοΰντ€<ζ  καΐ  aleL  7γοτ6  τοΓ?  ^Αθηναίοις  οντες 
ΰτΓΟΤΓΤοι  καΐ  βττιβονΧζΰοντες  τω  'χ^ωρίω,  βττβώή 
7ταρέτνχ^€ν  ό  καιρός  καΐ  Β/οασιδα?  ήΧθβν,  βττραξάν 
re  €κ  irXeiovo'^  ττρος  τους  έμττοΧιτεύοντας  σφών 
€Κ€Ϊ  όπως  ivhod  ήσβται  ή  ττοΧις,  καΐ  τοτ€  Βεξάμενοί 
αύτον  τή  TToXei  kul  άττοστάντβς  των  Αθηναίων 
iK€Lvr}  τή  ννκτΐ  κατβστησαν  τον  στρατον  ττρο  βω 
€7γΙ  την  ^ίφυραν  του  ποταμού  (απέχει  δε  το  πό- 

5  Χισμα  πΧβον  της  Βιαβάσβως)•  καΐ  ου  καθεΐτο 
τείχη  ωσπερ  νυν,  φυΧακή  δε'  τις  βραχεία  καθει- 
στήκει,  ήν  βιασάμενος  ραΒίως  ο  Βρασίδας,  άμα 
μεν  τής  προδοσίας  ούσης,  αμα  δε  καΐ  χειμώνος 
οντος  καΐ  απροσδόκητος  προσπεσών,  Βιεβη  την 
'γεφυραν,  καΐ  τα  εζω  των  ΑμφιποΧιτών  Οίκούντων 
κατά  πάν  το  χωρίον  ευθύς  είχεν. 

388 


BOOK    IV.  en.  4-cin.  5 

so   established   a   city   Avhich  was  conspicuous  both 
seaward  and  landward. 

cm.  Against  this  place  Brasidas  marched  Λvith  his 
army,  setting  out  from  Arnae  in  Chalcidice.  Arriving 
about  dusk  at  Aulon  and  Bromiscus/  where  the  lake 
Bolbe  has  its  outlet  into  the  sea,  he  took  supper  and 
then  proceeded  by  night.  The  Aveather  Avas  bad 
and  somewhat  snoAvy,  and  for  this  reason  he  made 
the  more  haste,  wishing  to  escape  the  notice  of  the 
people  in  Amphipolis,  except  those  who  were  to 
betray  it.  For  there  were  in  the  place  some  settlers 
from  Argilus,  an  Andrian  colony  ;  these  and  some 
others  were  his  accomplices  in  this  intrigue,  some 
instigated  by  Perdiccas,  others  by  the  Chalcidians. 
But  the  chief  plotters  were  the  Argilians,  who  dwelt 
near  by,  were  always  suspected  by  the  Athenians, 
and  were  secret  enemies  of  the  place ;  now  that 
opportunity  offered  and  Brasidas  had  come,  they  had 
some  time  before  negotiated  \vith  their  countrymen 
who  resided  in  Amphipolis  with  a  view  to  the  sur- 
render of  the  place.  So  at  this  time  they  received 
Brasidas  into  their  toAvn,  revolted  from  the  Athenians 
that  same  niglit,  and  before  dawn  brought  his  army 
doAvn  to  the  bridge  over  the  river,  Avhich  is  some  dis- 
tance from  the  toAvn  and  not  connected  with  it  by 
walls  as  now.  Brasidas  easily  forced  the  small  guard 
stationed  at  the  bridge,  partly  because  there  Avas 
treachery,  partly  because  he  had  fallen  upon  them  in 
stormy  weather  and  unexpectedly  ;  and  as  soon  as 
he  had  crossed  the  bridge  he  was  at  once  master  of 
the  property  of  the  Amphipolitans  outside  the  walls  ; 
for  they  had  houses  all  over  the  neighbourhood. 

^  According  to  tradition,  the  scene  of  the  death  of  Euri- 
pides. 

389 


THUCYDIDES 

CIV.  Ύης  Be  Βιαβάσεως  αυτού  άφνω  τοις  iv 
Τ7)  πόλβί  'γβ'γεί'ημβνης,  καΐ  των  βξω  ποΧλων  μίν 
αΚισκομίνων,  των  he  καΐ  /caτaφeυyόι'τωv  ε? 
το  τεΐ;^09,  οΐ  ΆμφιττοΧΐταί  e?  θόρυβον  ^e'yav 
κατέστησαν,    αλλω?    re    κα\    ά\\η\οι^    ΰποτΓτοι 

2  οντες.  και  XeyeTai  ΒρασίΒαν,  el  ηθέΧησε  μη  εφ' 
άρττα^ην    τω     στρατω    τραπεσθαι,     άΧΧ'     ευθύς 

3  'χωρήσαι  ττρος  την  ττόΧιν,  Βοκεΐν  αν  εΧεΐν.  νυν 
8ε  ο  μεν  ΙΒρύσας  τον  στρατόν,  εττβΐ  ^  τα  ef  ω 
εττεΒραμε    καΐ    ού8εν     αύτω    αττο    των     'ivhov     ώ? 

4  ττροσεδεχ^ετο  άττέβαινεν,  ήσύχαζ€ν'  ο'ι  he  ενάντιοι 
τοις  7Γρο8ιΒοΰσι,  κρατούντες  τω  ιτΧηθεί  ώστε  μη 
αντίκα  τάς  ττνΧας  άνοί^εσθαι,  ττεμττουσί  μετά, 
ΚύκΧεους  τού  στρατηγού,  ος  εκ  των  ^Αθηνών 
τταρήν  αύτοΐς  φύ\αζ  τού  'χλωρίου,  εττΐ  τον  έτερον 
στρατη^ον  των  εττΐ  Θράκης,  &oυκυhίhηv  τον 
Όλόρου,  ος  Tahe  ^uveypayjrev,  οντά  ττερί  &άσον 
(εστί  δε  ή  νήσος  Ωαρίων  άττοικία,  αττέγουσα  της 
Ά/χφίττόλεως    ημίσεος    ημέρας    μάΧιστα    ττΧούν), 

5  κεΧεύοντες  σφίσι  βοηθεΐν.  καΐ  ο  μεν  άκουσας 
κατά  τάγ^ος  ετττά  ναυσιν  αΐ  ετυχ^ον  τταρούσαι 
εττΧει,  και  εβούΧετο  φθάσαι  μάΧιστα  μεν  ούν 
την  ^ΑμφίποΧιν,  ττρίν  τι  evhovvai,  ει  δε  μη,  την 
Ήιόνα  ττροκαταΧαβων. 

CV.  Έν  τούτω  δε  ό  Ίipaσίhaς  δεδίώ?  και  την 
άττο  της  ^άσον  των  νέων  βοήθειαν  και  ττυνθανο- 
μενος  τον  Soυκυhίhηv  κτησ'ιν  τε  εχειν  των  χρυ- 
σείων  μετάΧΧων  εργασίας  εν  τη  ττερΙ  ταύτα 
SpaKT]  καΐ  αττ  αυτού  hύvaσθaι  εν  τοις  ττρώτοις 
των  ήττειρωτών,  ηττεί^ετο  προκατασχεΐν,  ει 
hύι•atτo,  την  ττόΧιν,  μη  αφικνονμενου  αυτού  το 
ττΧήθος  των  ΆμφιττοΧιτών,  έΧττίσαν  εκ  θαΧάσσης 
*  eirei,  with  F  and  (ex  corr.)  C  ;  other  MSS.  έιτί. 

390 


BOOK    IV.  CIV.  i-cv.  I 

CIV.  His  crossing  had  surprised  the  people  inside 
the  city,  and  of  those  outside  many  were  captured, 
while  others  took  refuge  Avithin  the  walls ;  hence 
the  Aniphipolitans  \vere  throAvn  into  great  confusion, 
especially  as  they  Λvere  suspicious  of  each  other. 
Indeed  the  general  impression  was,  it  is  said,  that  if 
Brasidas,  instead  of  turning  to  pillage  with  his  army, 
had  decided  to  march  straight  against  the  city,  he 
could  have  taken  it.  But  as  it  was,  when  he  had 
overrun  the  country  outside  and  found  that  none  of 
his  plans  were  being  carried  out  by  his  friends 
within  the  city,  he  merely  settled  his  army  in  camp 
and  kept  quiet.  Meanwhile  the  opponents  of  the 
traitors,  being  numerous  enough  to  prevent  the  gates 
being  opened  to  him  at  once,  acting  in  concert  with 
Eucles  the  general,  who  had  come  from  Athens  as 
warden  of  the  place,  sent  to  the  other  commander 
of  the  Thracian  district,  Thucydides  son  of  Olorus, 
the  author  of  this  history,  who  was  at  Thasos,  a 
Parian  colony,  about  a  half-day's  sail  from  Amphi- 
polis,  and  urged  him  to  come  to  their  aid.  And  he, 
on  hearing  this,  sailed  in  haste  with  seven  ships 
which  happened  to  be  at  hand,  Avishing  above  all  to 
secure  Amphipolis  before  it  yielded,  or,  failing  in 
that,  to  seize  Eion. 

CV.  Meanwhile,  Brasidas,  fearing  the  arrival  of 
the  ships  from  Thasos,  and  hearing  that  Thucydides 
possessed  the  right  of  working  the  gold-mines  in  that 
part  of  Thrace  and  in  consequence  had  influence 
among  the  first  men  of  the  mainland,  made  haste  to 
seize  the  city  if  possible  before  he  should  come ;  for 
he  was  afraid  that,  if  Thucydides  should  arrive,  the 
popular  party  in  Amphipolis,  in  the  expectation  that 


39' 


THUCYDIDES 

ξυμμαχίκον  καί  άττο  της  Θράκης  ayeipavTa  αυτόν 
2  rrepLTTOLijaeLv  σφάς,  ούκέτί  ττροσγ^ωροίη.  καϊ  την 
ξύμβασιν  μβτρίαν  εττοιεΐτο,  κήρυγμα  τόδε  av6L- 
πών,  ^ΑμφίτΓοΧιτών  καϊ  ^Αθηναίων  των  ενόντων 
τον  μεν  βουΧόμενον  εττΐ  τοις  Ιαυτοΰ  της  ϊσης  καϊ 
όμοιας  μετέχοντα  μενειν,  τον  8ε  μη  εθεΚοντα 
άτηεναι  τα  εαυτού  εκφερόμενον  ττεντε  ημερών. 

CVI.  01  δε  τΓοΧΧοΙ  ακούσαντες  άΧΧοιοτεροί 
iyevovTO  τας  <γνώμας,  άΧΧως  re  καϊ  βραχ^ύ  μεν 
^Αθηναίων  εμτΓοΧίτενον,  το  8ε  ττΧεον  ξύμμεικτον, 
καϊ  των  εξω  Χηφθεντων  συχνοΐς  οΙκεΐου  εν8ον 
ήσαν  καϊ  το  κηρυ'^μα  ττρος  τον  φόβον  δίκαιον 
είναι  εΧάμβανον,  οι  μεν  Αθηναίοι  8ια  το  άσμενοι 
άν  ε^εΧθεΐν,  ηγούμενοι  ουκ  εν  ομοίω  σφίσι  τά 
8εινα  elvai  καϊ  άμα  ου  προσ8εχ^όμενοι  βοήθειαν 
εν  τύ-χ^ει,  ό  8ε  άΧΧος  ομιΧος  ττόΧεώς  τε  εν  τω 
ϊσω  ου  στερισκομενοι   καϊ  κινδύνου   τταρα   8όζαν 

2  άφιεμενοι.  ώστε  των  ττρασσόντων  τω  Βρασίδα 
η8η  καϊ  έκ  του  φανερού  8ια8ικαιούντων  αυτά, 
εττειδη  καϊ  το  ττΧηθος  εώρων  τετραμμενον  καϊ  του 
παρόντος  ^Αθ^ρ'αίων  στρατηγού  ούκετι  άκροώ- 
μενον,  iyiveTO  η  όμοΧογία  καϊ  ττροσεδεξαντο  εφ' 

3  οϊς  έκήρυζεν.  καϊ  οι  μεν  την  ττόΧιν  τοιούτω 
τρόττω  τταρεδοσαν,  ο  8ε  @ουκυ8ίόης  καϊ  αϊ  νήες 
ταύττ)   ττ)   ήμερα   6\fre   κατεπΧεον  ες  την  ^Ηιόνα. 

4  και  την  μεν  ΆμφίττοΧιν  Βρασίδας  άρτι  είχε,  την 
δε  ^Ηιονα  τταρα  νύχτα  iy ενετό  Χαβεΐν  el  yap 
μη  εβοήθησαν  αϊ  νήες  δια  τάχυυς,  c μα  έ'ω  άν 
είχετο. 

393 


BOOK    IV.  cv.  i-cvi.  4 

he  would  collect  an  allied  force  from  the  islands 
and  from  Thrace  and  relieve  them,  would  refuse  to 
yield.  Accordingly,  he  offered  moderate  terms, 
making  proclamation  to  this  effect,  that  any  citizen 
of  Ainphipolis  or  any  resident  Athenian,  if  he  chose, 
might  remain  there,  retaining  possession  of  his  own 
property  and  enjo\ing  full  equality;  but  that  anyone 
who  Λvas  not  inclined  to  stay  might  go  away  within 
five  days  and  take  his  property  with  him. 

CVI.  On  hearing  this  the  majority  became  irreso- 
lute, especially  as  few  of  the  citizens  were  Athenians, 
the  greater  number  being  a  mixed  multitude,  and  a 
considerable  number  of  those  who  had  been  captured 
outside  had  relatives  inside  the  city.  As  compared 
with  their  fears  they  conceived  the  proclamation  to 
be  fair — the  Athenians,  because  they  were  only  too 
glad  to  be  able  to  leave,  since  they  realized  that 
their  share  of  the  dangers  was  greater,  and  besides, 
did  not  expect  any  speedy  relief;  the  general 
multitude,  because  they  were  not  to  lose  their  civil 
rights  but  to  retain  them  as  before  and  also,  con- 
trary to  their  expectation,  were  to  be  released  from 
peril.  And  so,  as  the  partisans  of  Brasidas  were 
already  quite  openly  justifying  his  proposals,  since 
these  saw  that  the  populace  had  changed  its  attitude 
and  no  longer  hearkened  to  the  Athenian  general 
who  Avas  in  the  city,  the  capitulation  was  made,  and 
Brasidas  Avas  received  on  the  terms  of  his  proclama- 
tion. In  this  way  they  gave  up  the  city,  and  on  the 
evening  of  the  same  day  Thuc ydides  and  his  ships 
sailed  into  Eion.  Brasidas  had  just  got  possession  of 
Amphipolis,  and  he  missed  taking  Eion  only  by  a 
night;  for  if  the  ships  had  not  come  to  the  rescue 
with  all  speed,  it  would  have  been  taken  at  dawn. 

393 


THUCYDIDES 

CVII.  Μετά  δέ  τούτο  ό  μεν  τα  iv  rfj  Ήίόι/ί 
καθίστατο,  οττω?  καΐ  το  αντίκα,  ην  βτητ)  ο 
Βρασ/δας,  καΐ  το  έ'ττείτα  άσφαΧώς  βςβι,  Ζεξάμενο^ 
τους  ζθ€\ήσαντα<;  €7η)(^ωρήσαί  άνωθεν  κατά  τα? 

2  στΓοζ^δά?•  ό  δε  ττρος  μεν  την  ^Hioj'a  κατά  τε  τον 
ττοταμον  ττολλοΓς  ττλοίΟί?  αφνω  καταττΧευσας,  εΐ 
ττω?  τί)ί''  ττρούχ^ουσαν  άκραν  άττο  του  τείχ^ους 
Χαβων  κρατοίη  του  εσττΧου,  καΐ  κατά  ^ήν  άττο- 
ττείράσα?  αμα,  άμφοτερωθεν  άπεκρούσθη,  τα   δε 

3  ττερί  την  ^ ΑμφίττοΧιν  εξηρτύετο.  καΐ  ^Ιύρκινός 
τε  αύτω  ττροσεχώρησεν,  Η.8ωνίκη  ττόΧα,  ΐΐιτ- 
τακοΰ  του  Ήδώί^ω^  βασίΧέως  άττοθανόντος  ύπο 
των  Τοάξιοζ  ττα'ώων  καΐ  Έραυρού<;  της  Ύυναικο^ 
αντοΰ,  καΐ  ΤαΧηψος  ου  ττοΧΧω  ύστερον  κα] 
ΟΙσύμη'  είσΐ  δε  αύται  λασίων  άττουκι,αί.  τταρων 
δε  καΧ  ΤΙερΒίκκας  ευθύς  μετά  την  άΧωσυν  ^^γ- 
καθίστη  ταύτα. 

CVIII.  'Κγ^ομένης  δε  της  ^ΑμφιττόΧεως  οι 
^Αθηναίοι  ες  μεηα  δεο?  κατέστησαν,  άΧΧως  τε 
καΐ  δτι  η  ττόΧις  ην  αύτοΐς  ώφεΧιμος  ζυΧων  τε 
ναυττηγισίμων  ττομιτη  καΐ  'χ^ρημάτων  ττροσοΒω, 
καΐ  ότι  μέχρι  μεν  του  Στρυμόνος  ην  πάροδος 
@εσσαΧων  Βια^όντων  επΙ  τους  ξυμμάχ^ους  σφών 
τοις  ΑακεΒαίμονίοις,  της  δε  γέφυρας  μη  κρα- 
τούντων, άνωθεν  μεν  με^άΧης  οΰσης  επι  ττοΧυ 
Χίμνης  του  ττοταμοΰ,  τα  δε  προς  ^Ηιόνα  τριήρεσι 
τηρουμένων,^  ουκ  αν  8ύνασθαι  ττροεΧθεΐν  τότε  δε 
^  Hude  emends  to  τν,ρουιχίνβυ. 

394 


BOOK    IV.  cvii.  i-cvni.  i 

CVII.  After  this  Thucydides  proceeded  to  arrange 
matters  at  Eion,  in  order  to  insure  its  safety  for  the 
present,  if  Brasidas  should  attack,  and  also  for  the 
future,  receiving  those  who  chose  to  come  thither 
from  the  upper  town  according  to  the  terms  of  the 
truce.^  And  Brasidas  suddenly  sailed  down  the 
river  to  Eion  Λvith  many  boats,  in  the  hope  that  by 
taking  the  point  which  juts  out  from  the  wall  he 
might  gain  command  of  the  entrance,  and  at  the 
same  time  he  made  an  attempt  by  land ;  but  he  was 
beaten  back  at  both  points,  and  then  proceeded  to 
put  lOatters  in  order  at  Amphipolis.  Myrcinus  also, 
an  Edonian  town,  came  over  to  him,  Pittacus,  the 
king  of  the  Edonians,  having  been  killed  by  the 
sons  of  Goaxis  and  his  own  wife  Brauro ;  and  not 
long  afterwards  Galepsus  and  Oesyme,  colonies  of 
the  Thasians,  also  came  over.  Perdiccas,^  too,  came 
to  Amphipolis  directly  after  its  capture  and  joined  in 
arranging  these  matters. 

CVII  I.  The  Athenians  were  greatly  alarmed  by 
the  capture  of  Amphipolis.  The  chief  reason  was 
that  the  city  was  useful  to  them  for  the  importation 
of  timber  for  ship-building  and  for  the  revenue  it 
produced,  and  also  that,  whereas  hitherto  the  Lace- 
daemonians had  possessed,  under  the  guidance  of 
the  Thessalians,  access  to  the  Athenian  allies  as  far 
as  the  Strymon,  yet  as  long  as  they  did  not  con- 
trol the  bridge — the  river  for  a  long  way  above 
the  town  being  a  great  lake  and  triremes  being 
on  guard  in  the  direction  of  Eion — they  could  not 
have  advanced  further  ;  but  now  at  last  the  matter 

^  cf.  ch.  cv.  2. 

*  Now  evidently  reconciled  with  Brasidas,  with  whom  he 
had  quarrelled  (ch.  Ixxxvi.  3) ;  cf.  ch.  ciii.  3. 

39.«) 


THUCYDIDES 

paSia^    ηΒη    'γε'γενήσθαί.^     καϊ    τους    ξυμμά^χ^ους 

2  βφοβοΰντο  μη  άτΓοστώσιν.  ό  yap  Βρασίδας  ev 
Τ6  TOi?  αΧλοις  μετριον  ίαυτον  τταρβΐχε  καϊ  iv 
τοί9    λογοί9    τταντα-χ^ου    eSijXov    ώ?    βΧβνθερώσων 

3  την  'ΚλΧάΒα  εκττβμφθείη.  καϊ  at  ττόλεί?  ττυν- 
θανομβί'αι  αί  των  ^Κθηναιων  ΰττήκοοι^  της  re 
ΆμφίττόΧβως  την  αΧωσιν  καϊ  α  τταρβγζται,  την 
re  eKGLvov  πραότητα,  μάΧιστα  Βη  έττήρθησαν  e? 
το  νεωτβρίζειν,  καϊ  ίττβκηρυκβύοντο  ττρος  αυτόν 
κρύφα,  iiTiTrapiivai  re  KeXeuovTe^  καϊ  βουΧόμβνοι 

4  αυτοί  βκαστοι  ττρώτοι  άττοστήναι.  καϊ  yap  καϊ 
a8eia  βφαίνβτο  αύτοΐς,  ζψευσμβνοίς^  μβν  της 
^Αθηναίων  8υνάμ€ως  έττΐ  τοσούτον  οση  ύστερον 
Ζιβφάνη,  το  δε  ττΧέον  βούΧησει,  κρίνοντες  ασαφβΐ 
■η  ττρονοία  άσφαΧεΐ,  είωθότες  οι  άνθρωττοί  ου  μεν 
ετΓίθυμοΰσίν  ελττί'δί  άττερίσκετττω  Βι8όναι,  ο  δε 
μη  ττροσίενταί  \oyισμω   αύτοκράτορι  διωθεΐσθαι. 

5  άμα  δε  των  ^Αθηναίων  iv  τοις  Βοιωτοΐς  νεωστί 
ττζττΧη^μενων  καΐ  του  Έρασίδου  εφοΧκα  καϊ  ου  τα 
οντά  \eyovτoς,  ως  αύτω  εττϊ  Ι^ίσαιαν  ττ}  εαυτού 
μόντ)  στρατιά  ^  ουκ  ηθεΧησαν  οι  ^Αθηναΐοί  ζυμ- 
βαΧεΐν,   εθάρσουν  καΐ   ετηστευον   μηδένα   αν  εττΐ 

6  σφας  βοηθησαι.      το   δε  με^ιστον,   δια  το  ήδονην 

έχον  εν  τω  αύτίκα  καϊ  ότι,  το  ττρώτον  Αακεδαι- 

μονίων     ορ^ώντων     εμεΧΧον     ττειράσεσθαί,     κιν- 

δυνεύειν  τταντϊ  τρόττω  έτοιμοι  ήσαν.     ων  αίσθανό- 

^  Kistemacher's  correction  for  ραδία  or  ρ^διαι  of  the  MSS. 
^  Supply  in  thought  here  ϊνόμιζον  before  yiyevrtaeai.   Most 
MS8.  have  ίνάμίζΐν  (Vulg.  ένομίζίτο) ;  Kistemacher  deletes. 
'  at  τών  'Αθηναίων  υπήκοοι,  Hude  deletes. 

*  Hude  reads  (■^ΐυσμίνοι,  with  E. 

*  Linwood,  followed  by  Stahl  and  Hude,  inserts  βοηθ-η- 
σαρτι,  as  indeed  seems  to  have  been  in  the  mind  of  the 
author. 


BOOK    IV.  cvm.  1-6 

liad  become  easy.^  And  they  feared,  too,  the  re- 
volt of  their  allies.  For  Brasidas  in  other  things 
showed  himself  moderate,  and  in  his  declarations 
everywhere  made  plain  that  he  had  been  sent  out 
for  the  liberation  of  Hellas.  And  the  cities  that 
were  subject  to  Athens,  heai-ing  of  the  capture  of 
Amphipolis  and  the  assurances  that  were  offered, 
and  of  the  gentleness  of  Brasidas,  were  more  than 
ever  incited  to  revolution,  and  sent  secret  messen- 
gers to  him,  urging  him  to  come  on  to  them,  and 
wishing  each  for  itself  to  be  the  first  to  revolt. 
For  it  seemed  to  them  that  there  was  little  ground 
for  fear,  since  they  estimated  the  Athenian  power 
to  be  far  less  great  than  it  afterwards  proved  to  be, 
and  in  their  judgment  Λvere  moved  more  by  illusive 
wishing  than  by  cautious  foresight ;  for  men  are  wont, 
when  they  desire  a  thing,  to  trust  to  unreflecting  hope, 
but  to  reject  by  arbitrary  judgment  whatever  they 
do  not  care  for.  Furthermore,  because  of  the  recent 
defeat  of  the  Athenians  in  Boeotia  and  the  enticing 
but  untrue  statements  of  Brasidas,"  that  the 
Athenians  had  been  unwilling  to  engage  him  when 
he  came  to  the  relief  of  Nisaea  with  only  his  own 
army,  they  grew  bold,  and  believed  that  nobody 
would  come  against  them.  Above  all,  they  were 
so  moved  by  the  pleasurable  anticipations  of  the 
moment,  and  by  the  fact  that  they  were  now  for  the 
first  time  going  to  have  a  proof  of  what  the  Lace- 
daemonians would  do  Avhen  on  their  mettle,  that 
they  were  ready  to  take  any  risk.     Being  aware  of 

*  Or,  retaining  ραδία  of  the  M8S.  and  the  Vulgate  reading 
(ΐ/ομίζΐτο,  "but  now  the  access  was  thought  to  have  become 
easy." 

^'  cf.  oh.  Ixxiii.;  Ixxxv.  7. 

397 


THUCYDIDES 

μβνοι  oi  βζν  ^Αθηναίου  φυΧακάς,  ώς  βξ  oXiyov  καΧ 
iv  ■χ^είμωνί,  ζίέττβμττον  e?  τα?  TroXet?,  ο  δε  e?  την 
ΑακεΒαίμονα  €φΐ€μενος  στραηάν  re  προσαττο- 
areWeiv  CKeXeue  καΐ  αύτΌς  ev  τω  Έ,τρυμόνι 
7  ναντΓη^ίαν  τρίτιρων  τταρβσκβυάζβτο.  Οί  δε  Λα/ce- 
^αιμόνιοι  τα  μεν  και  φθάνω  άττο  των  ττρώτων 
άνΒρών  ούχ  υπηρέτησαν  αντω,  τά  Be  καΐ  βονΧό- 
/χεί'Οί  μάΧλον  τους  τε  αν8ρας  τους  e«  της  νήσου 
κομίσασθαί  καΐ  τον  7ΓΟ\€μον  κατα\ϋσαι, 

CIX.  Ύοΰ  δ'  αυτού  γβΐμο^νος  Μεγαρτ}?  τε  τά 
μακρά  τείχη,  α  σφών  οί  Αθηναίοι  είχαν,  κατά- 
σκαψαν έχοντες  ες  έδαφος,  καϊ  Β/οασιδας  μετά  την 
^ΑμφιττόΧεως     αλωσιν      έχων     τους     ξυμμάχους 

2  στρατεύει  ε'ττΐ  την  ^Ακτήν  καΧουμένην.  έστι  δε 
άτΓο  του  βασιΧέως  Βίορύ^ματος  εσω  ττρούχουσα, 
καΐ  ό  "Αθως  αύτης  ορός  ύψηΧον    τεΧευτά   ες    το 

3  AlyaLov  ττελαγο?.  ττόλεί?  δε  εχεί  "Ζάνην  μεν 
^ΑνΒρίων  άττοικίαν  τταρ  αυτήν  την  Βιώρυχα,  ες 
το  ττρος  Έΰβοιαν  ττέΧα^ος  τετραμμένην,  τάς  δε 
άΧΧας  &υσσον  καϊ  ΚΧεωνας  καϊ   Ακροθωους  καϊ 

4  ^ΟΧόφυζον  καϊ  Αΐον  αΐ  οικούνται  ζυμμείκτοις 
εθνεσί  βαρβάρων  8Γ/Χώσσων,  και  τι  καϊ  Χαλ- 
KihiKov  ενι  βραχύ,  το  δε  πΧεΙστυν  ΐΙεΧασ^ικόν, 
των  καϊ  Αημνόν  ττοτε  καϊ  ^Αθήνας  Ύυρσηνών 
οίκησάντων,  καϊ  ΒισαΧτικον  καϊ  Ι^ρηστωνικον 
καϊ  Ήδώί^ε?'   κατά  δε  μικρά  ττοΧίσματα  οίκούσιν. 

δ  καϊ  οί  μεν  ττΧείους  προσεχώρησαΐ'  τω  ΈρασίΒα, 
"Σάνη  δε  καϊ  Αΐον  άντέστη,  καϊ  αυτών  την  χώραν 
εμμείνας  τω  ο  τρατω  eZrjov, 

398 


BOOK    IV.  cviii.  6-cix.  5 

these  things,  the  Athenians,  so  far  as  was  possible  at 
short  notice  and  in  the  winter  season,  sent  out  gar- 
risons among  the  cities;  while  Brasidas  sent  to  Lace- 
daemon  and  urgently  begged  them  to  send  him 
reinforcements,  and  Avas  himself  making  preparations 
for  building  ships  in  the  Strymon.  The  Lacedae- 
monians, however,  did  not  comply  with  his  request, 
partly  on  account  of  the  jealousy  of  the  foremost 
men,  partly  also  because  they  wished  rather  to  re- 
cover the  men  taken  on  the  island  and  to  bring 
the  war  to  an  end. 

CIX.  The  same  Avinter  the  Megarians  took  and 
razed  to  the  ground  their  long  walls  ^  \vhich  the 
Athenians  had  held  ;  and  Brasidas,  after  the  capture 
of  Amphipolis,  made  an  expedition  Avith  his  allies 
against  the  district  called  Acte.  It  is  a  promontory 
projecting  from  the  King's  canal  '^  on  the  inner  side 
of  the  isthmus,  and  its  terminus  at  the  Aegean  Sea 
is  the  lofty  Mt.  Athos.  Of  the  cities  it  contains,  one  is 
Sane,  an  Andrian  colony  close  to  the  canal,  facing  the 
sea  Λvhich  is  toward  Euboea  ;  the  others  are  Thyssus, 
Cleonae,  Acrothoi,  Olophyxus  and  Dium,  which  are 
inhabited  by  mixed  barbarian  tribes  speaking  two 
languages.  There  is  in  it  also  a  small  Chalcidic 
element ;  but  the  greatest  part  is  Ptlasgic — belong- 
ing to  those  Etruscans  that  once  inhabited  Lemnos 
and  Athens^ — Bisaltic,  Crestonic,  and  Edonian  ;  and 
they  live  in  small  toΛvns.  Most  of  these  yielded  to 
Brasidas,  but  Sane  and  Dium  held  out  against  him  ; 
so  he  waited  there  Λvith  his  army  and  laid  waste  thtir 
territory. 

1  cf.  ch.  Ixix.  4.         2  Xerxes'  canal ;  c/.  Hdt.  vii.  22  flF. 
^  According  to  Herodotus  (vi,  137  fiF.),  they  were  expelled 
from  Attica,  and  afterwards,  by  Miltiades,  from  Lemnos. 

399 


THUCYDIDES 

ex.  Ώ?  δ*  ουκ  εσηκουον,  €h3u<;  arparevei  iirl 
Ύορωνην  την  ^αλκιΒίκήν,  κατεχομ^νην  ύπο 
'Αθηναίων  καΧ  αύτον  avSpe^  oXiyoi  i-m'iyovTO, 
βτοΐμοι  6ντ€<;  την  ττόΧιν  τταρα^οΰναι.  και  άφικό- 
μενα  νυκτός  βτί  καΐ  irepl  ορθρον  τω  στρατω 
βκαθίζετο    Ίτρος    το    AcocrKOpeiov,    ο    άττεχεί    της 

2  πόΧεως  τρεις  μάλιστα  σταδίους.  την  μεν  ουν 
αΚΚην  ΤΓολίν  των  Ύορωνηίων  καΐ  τους  'Αθηναίους 
τους  εμφρουροΰντας  βΧαθεν  οι  δε  ττράσσοντες 
αύτώ  εΙΒότες  οτι  ηζοι,  καΐ  ττροεΧθοντες  τίνες 
αυτών  \άθρα  oXtyoi  ετήρουν  την  ττρόσοΒον,  καϊ 
ώς  'ησθοντο  τταρόντα,  εσκομίζουσι  παρ  αυτούς 
εγχειρίδια  'έχοντας  άνΖρας  ψιλούς  επτά  {τοσούτοι 
<γαρ  μόνοι  άντρων  είκοσι  το  πρώτον  ταγβεντων  ου 
κατεΒεισαν  εσβλθείν  ηρχ^  δέ  αυτών  Αυσίστρατος 
Όλννθιος),  οΐ  ΕιαΒύντες  Βια  του  προς  το  πέλαγος 
τείχους  καϊ  λαθόντες  τους  τε  επΙ  του  άνωτάτω 
φυλακτηρίου  φρουρούς,  ούσης  της  πόλεως  προς 
Χόφον,  άναβάντες  διέφθειραν  καϊ  την  κατά  Κανα- 
στραΐον  πυΧίΒα  Βι-ηρουν. 

CXI.  Ό  8ε  ΈρασίΒας  τω  μεν  άλλω  στρατω 
ησύχαζεν  oXiyov  ττροέλθών,  εκατόν  δε  πελταστας 
προπεμπει,  όπως,  οπότε  πυΧαι  τιΐ'ες  άνοιχθεΐεν 
καϊ     το     σημείον     άρθείη     ο      ζυνεκεηο,     πρώτοι 

2  εσΒράμοιεν.  καϊ  οι  μεν  χρόνου  iyyιyvoμ€Voυ  και 
θαυμάζοντες  κατά  μικρόν  ετυχον  iyyvς  της 
πόλεως  προσεΧθόντες•  οι  Be  των  Ύορωναίων 
ενΒοθεν  παρασκευάζοντας  μετά  των  εσεληλυ- 
400 


BOOK    IV.  ex.  i-cxi.  2 

ex.  Since,  however,  they  would  not  yield  he 
marched  at  once  against  Torone,^  in  Chalcidice, 
which  was  held  by  the  Athenians ;  for  a  few  men, 
who  Λvere  ready  to  betray  the  town,  had  invited 
him  over.  Arriving  with  his  army  toward  dawn, 
but  while  it  Λvas  still  dark,  he  encamped  near 
the  temple  of  the  Dioscuri,  which  is  about  three 
stadia  distant  from  the  city.  The  rest  of  the  town 
of  Torone  and  the  Athenians  of  the  garrison  were 
unaware  of  his  approach,  but  his  partisans,  knowing 
that  he  would  come,  and  some  few  of  them  having 
secretly  gone  forward  to  meet  him,  Avere  watching 
for  his  approach  ;  and  when  they  perceived  that  he 
was  there,  they  introduced  into  the  town  seven 
light-armed  men  with  daggers,  under  the  command 
of  Lysistratus  an  Olynthian,  these  men  alone  of  the 
twenty  first  assigned  to  the  task  not  being  afraid  to 
enter.  These  slipped  through  the  seaward  wall  and 
escaping  the  notice  of  the  guard  at  the  uppermost 
watch-post  of  the  town,  which  is  on  the  slope  of  a 
hill,  went  up  and  slew  these  sentinels,  and  broke 
open  the  postern  on  the  side  towards  the  promon- 
tory of  Canastraeum. 

CXI.  Meanwhile  Brasidas,  having  gone  forward  a 
little,  kept  quiet  with  the  rest  of  his  army,  but  sent 
forward  one  hundred  targeteers,  in  order  that  as  soon 
as  any  gates  were  opened  and  the  signal  agreed  upon 
was  raised  they  might  rush  in  first.  These  now,  as 
time  elapsed,  were  wondering  at  the  delay  and  had 
come  up  little  by  little  close  to  the  toAvn.  Mean- 
while the  Toronaeans  inside  Λvho  were  co-operating 
with  the  party  which  had  entered,  when  the  postern 

*  The  chief  town  on  the  Sithoniaa  peninsula.  See  Map 
at  1.  Ivi. 

40  X 


THUCYDIDES 

θότων,  ω<;  αύτοΐ<;  η  τ€  ττυΧίς  Βιτίρητο  καΐ  αΐ  κατά 
την  ayopav  ττύλαι  του  μοχΧοΰ  Βίακοττεντος  άν€ω- 
jovTO,  ττρωτον  μ€ν  κατά  την  ττυΧίΒα  τινα<; 
TrepiayayovTe^  βσβκομισαν,  όττως  κατά,  νώτου  καΐ 
άμφοτερωθβν  τους  iv  τη  ττόλεί  ouSev  β/δότα? 
ίξαττίνης  φοβησειαν,  βττβίτα  το  σημεΐόν  Τ€  του 
■πυρός,  ώ?  el  ρητό,  άνέσ-χον  και  8ιά  των  κατά  την 
ajopav  ττυΧών  τους  Χοιττούς  η8η  των  ττέΧταστών 
eaehe-yovTO.  CXII.  καΐ  ό  Έρασί^ας  ΙΒών  το 
ζύνθημα  εθβι  Βρόμφ,  άναστησας  τον  στρατον 
€μβοήσαντάς    τβ    άθρόον    καΐ    €κπ\ηξιν    ττοΧλην 

2  τοις  iv  τη  ττόλβί  τταρασγ^ύντας.  και  οι  μεν  κατά 
τας  πύΧας  εύθυς  εσεπιτττον,  οι  δε  κατά  Βοκούς 
τετραγώνους,  α'Ι  ετυχ^ον  τω  τεί'χεί  ττβτττωκότί 
κάνοικοΒομουμενω  ττρος  Χυθων  άνοΧκην  ττροσκεί- 

3  μεναι.  ΒρασίΒας  μεν  οΰν  καΐ  το  ττΧήθος  ευθύς 
ανω  και  εττί  τα  μετέωρα  της  ττόΧεως  ετράττετο, 
βουΧόμενος  κατ  άκρας  καϊ  βεβαίως  έΧεΐν  αυτήν 
ό  δε  άΧΧος  ομίΧος  κατά  πάντα  ομοίως  εσκεΒάν- 
νυντο. 

CXIII.  Ύών  Be  Ύορωναίων  <γιyvoμεvης  της 
άΧώσεως  το  μεν  ττοΧύ  ούΒεν  εΙΒος  εθορυβεΐτο,  οί 
Be  πρασσοντες  και  οίς  ταύτα  ήρεσκε  μετά  των 
2  εσεΧθόντων  ευθύς  ήσαν.  οΐ  Be  ^Αθηναίοι  (ετνχον 
ηαρ  εν  τη  ayopa  οπΧΐται  καθεύΒοντες  ώς 
πεντήκοντα)  επειΒη  ησθοντο,  οΐ  μεν  τίνες  oXljol 
Βιαφθειρονται  εν  'χερσίν  αυτών,  των  Be  Χοιπών  οί 
μεν  πεζή,  οί  Βε  ες  τάς  ναύς,  at  εφρούρουν  Βύο, 
καταφυΎοντες  Βιασωζονταί  ες  την  Αήκυθον  το 
φρουρίον,  ο  εΐ'χ^ον  αύτοΙ  καταλαβόντες,  άκρον  της 
ΤΓολεως  ες  την  θάΧασσαν  άττείΧημμένον  εν  στενώ 


402 


BOOK    IV.  CXI.  2-cxni.  2 

had  been  broken  down  and  the  gates  near  the 
market-place  had  been  opened  by  cutting  the  bar, 
first  brought  some  men  around  to  the  postern  and 
let  them  in,  in  order  that  they  might  take  the 
townsmen  unawares  by  a  sudden  attack  in  their 
rear  and  on  both  sides  and  throΛv  them  into  a 
panic  ;  after  that  they  raised  the  fire-signal  agreed 
upon  and  received  the  rest  of  the  tai-geteers  through 
the  gates  near  the  market-place.  CXIl.  Brasidas,  on 
seeing  the  signal,  set  off  at  a  run,  calling  up  his  force, 
and  they  with  one  voice  raised  a  shout  and  caused 
great  dismay  to  the  toAvnsmen.  Some  burst  in  imme- 
diately by  the  gates,  others  over  some  square  beams 
which  chanced  to  have  been  placed,  for  the  purpose 
of  drawing  up  stones,  against  the  wall  that  had  fallen 
in  and  was  now  being  rebuilt.  Brasidas,  then,  and 
the  main  body  made  at  once  for  the  high  points  of 
the  town,  wishing  to  make  its  capture  complete  and 
decisive  ;  but  the  rest  of  the  multitude  ^  scattered 
in  all  directions. 

CXIII.  While  the  capture  was  being  effected,  most 
of  the  Toronaeans,  who  kneΛv  nothing  of  the  plot, 
were  in  a  tumult,  but  the  conspirators  and  such  as 
were  in  sympathy  with  the  movement  at  once 
joined  those  who  had  entered.  When  the  Athenians 
became  aware  of  it — for  about  fifty  of  their  hoplites 
happened  to  be  sleeping  in  the  market-place — though 
some  few  of  them  Avere  slain  in  hand-to-hand  conflict, 
the  rest  fled,  some  by  land,  others  to  the  two  ships 
which  were  on  guard,  and  got  safely  into  the  fort  of 
Lecythus,  which  had  been  occupied  and  was  held 
by  their  own  men.  It  is  the  citadel  of  the  city, 
projecting  into   the  sea — a  separate   section  ^  on    a 

'   Macedonian  and  Tliraciau  irregulars. 

*  There  was  probably  a  wall  across  the  isthmus. 

403 


THUCYDIDES 

3  ίσθμω.  κατέφνγον  δε  καΐ  των  Ύορωναιων  e? 
αυτούς  οσοί  ήσαν  σφυσιν  έτητήΒβιοί, 

CXIV.  Τζ'^ενημίνης  he  ημέρας  η8η  καΐ  βεβαίως 
της  πόΧβως  €-χομενης  ο  ΙΒρασίδας  τοις  μβν  μ€τα 
των  ^Αθηναίων  Ύορωναίοις  καταττβφβυ^όσι  κή- 
ρν^μα  βτΓοιήσατο  τον  βουΧόμενον  eVt  τά  εαυτού 
εσεΚθόντα  άοεώς  ττοΧιτεύειν,  τοις  Be  Άθηναίοις 
κήρυκα  ττροσπεμψας  i^ievai  εκεΧευεν  εκ  της 
Α.ηκύθου  ϋποσττόνΒους  καϊ  τα  εαυτών  ε'χ^οντας  ώς 

2  ούσης  'ΚαΧκώεων.  οι  δε  εκΧείψειν  μεν  ουκ 
εφασαν,  σττείσασθαί  δε  σφισιν  εκεΧευον  ήμεραν 
τους  νεκρούς  άνεΧεσθαι.  6  δε  εσττείσατο  δυο. 
εν  ταύταις  δε  αυτός  τε  τας  ε'γγύς  οικίας  εκρατύ- 

3  νατο  καϊ  ^ ΚθηναΙοι  τα  σφετερα.  καϊ  ξύΧΧο'γον 
των  Ύορωναιων  ττοιησας  εΧεξε  τοις  εν  ttj  ^ Ακάνθω 
τταρατΓΧησία,  ότι  ου  Βίκαιον  εΐη  ούτε  τους  ττρά- 
ξαντας  προς  αύτον  την  Χηψιν  της  ττόΧεως  'χ^είρονς 
ουδέ  ττροΒότας  η^εΐσθαι  {ου  yap  εττΐ  ΒουΧεία  ούΒε 
-χ^ρήμασι  ττεισθεντας  Βρασαι  τούτο,  αλλ'  επΙ 
άηαθω  και  εΧευθερία  της  ττοΧεως),  ούτε  τους  μη 
μετασχ^όντας  οϊεσθαί  μη  των  αυτών  τεύξεσθαΐ' 
άφΐ-χθαι  yap  ου  Βιαφθερών  ούτε  ττόΧιν  ούτε  ΙΒιώ- 

4  την  ούΒενα.  το  δε  κηpυyμa  ττοιησασθαι  τούτου 
ένεκα  τοις  τταρ'  ^Αθηναίους  κaτaπεφeυyόσιv,  ώς 
ηyoύμεpoς  ούΒεν  'χείρους  τη  εκείνων  φίΧία•  ούΒ^ 
αν  σφών  ττειρασαμενους  αυτούς  των  ΑακεΒαι- 
μονίων  ^  Βοκεΐν  ησσον,  άΧ\α  ττοΧΧω  μάΧΧον,  οσω 

^  των  Ααΐ{(ζαίμί)ΐ'ίωΐ',  deleted  by  Cobet,  followed  by  Hude. 
404 


BOOK    IV.  cxiii.  2-cxiv.  4 

narrow  isthmus.    And  such  of  the  Toronaeans  as  Λvere 
friendly  to  the  Athenians  took  refuge  there  also. 

CXIV.  When  day  had  come  and  the  toΛvn  Avas 
securely  in  his  possession,  Brasidas  made  proclamation 
to  the  Toronaeans  who  had  taken  refuge  with  the 
Athenians,  that  whoever  wished  might  return  to  his 
property  and  exercise  citizenship  without  fear  ;  but 
to  the  Athenians  he  sent  a  herald,  ordering  them  to 
come  out  of  Lecythus  under  truce,  bringing  all  their 
property,  as  the  place  belonged  to  the  Chalcidians. 
They,  however,  refused  to  leave,  but  requested  him 
to  make  a  truce  with  them  for  a  day,  that  they 
might  take  up  their  dead.  He  granted  a  truce  for 
two  days,  during  which  he  himself  fortified  the 
houses  near  by  and  the  Athenians  strengthened 
their  defences.  Then  calling  a  meeting  of  the 
Toronaeans,  Brasidas  spoke  to  them  much  as  he  had 
done  to  the  people  at  Acanthus.^  He  said  that  it 
was  not  just  either  to  regard  as  villains  or  as 
traitors  those  who  had  negotiated  with  him  for 
the  capture  of  the  town — for  they  had  done  this, 
not  to  enslave  it,  nor  because  they  were  bribed, 
but  for  the  Avelfare  and  freedom  of  the  city — or  to 
think  that  those  \vho  had  not  taken  part  ΛνοηΗ  not 
get  the  same  treatment  as  the  others ;  for  he  had 
not  come  to  destroy  either  the  city  or  any  private 
citizen.  He  explained  that  he  made  his  proclama- 
tion to  those  who  had  taken  refuge  with  the  Athen- 
ians for  the  reason  that  he  thought  none  the  Avorse 
of  them  for  their  friendship  with  these  ;  and  when 
they  had  proved  his  countrymen, the  Lacdaemonians, 
they  would  not,  he  thought,  be  less  but  rather  far 
more  kindly  disposed  toward  them  than  toward  the 
•  c/.  cha.  Ixxxv.-lxxxvii. 

405 


THUCYDIDES 

Βικαιότ€ρα  ττράσσουσυν,  evvov<;  αν  σφίσι  Ύ^νβσθαι, 
5  άτΓ€ΐρία  he  νυν  7Γ€φοβήσθαι.  τους  τ€  πάντας 
τταρασκευάζβσθαυ  βκβλβυεν  ώ?  βββαίου<ί  re  iao- 
μ€νους  ζυμμαι^ους  κα\  το  άττο  τοΟδβ  ΐ'βη  6  Τί  αν 
άμαρτάνωσιν  αΐτίαν  e^ovraf  τα  Be  ττρότβρα  ου 
σφεΐ'ζ  άΒικβΐσθαί,  αλλ'  εκ€ΐ,νου<}  μάΧΧον  υττ  άΧ\ων 
κρεισσόνων,  καΐ  ξυ^/νώμην  elvai  εϊτι  ΐ]ναντιοΰντο. 
CXV.  ΚαΙ  ό  p.ev  τοιαύτα  είττων  καΐ  παραθαρ- 
συνας  ΒίεΧθουσών  των  σττονΒων  τα?  ττροσβοΧας 
eTTOietTO  τΐ}  Αηκύθω'  οι  δε  ^Αθηναίοι  ημύνοντο  re 
βκ  φαύΧου  τ€ΐχ^ίσματος  καΐ  αττ'  οικιών  επάΧξεις 
εχ^ουσών,    καϊ    μίαν     μεν    ημίραν    άττεκρούσαντο• 

2  τη  δ  ύστβραία  μηχ^ανής  μεΧ\ουσ)]ς  προσάζεσθαί 
αυτοΓ?  άττο  των  εναντίων,  άφ'  η<ί  πυρ  ενήσειν 
Βιενοουντο  e?  τά  ξύΧινα  τταραφρά^ματα,  καϊ 
ττροσιόντο'ζ  ηΒη  του  στρατεύματος,  fj  ωοντο 
μάλιστα  αυτούς  ττροσκομιεΐν  την  μηχ^ανην  καϊ  ην 
ετΓΐμα'χ^ώτατον,  ττύρ^ον  ζύΧινον  εττ  οΐκΐ]μα  άντε- 
στησαν,  καϊ  ΰΒατος  αμφορέας  ποΧΧους  και  -πίθους 
άνεφόρησαν  και   Χιθους  με^άΧους,   ανθρωττοι    τε 

3  ΤΓοΧΧοΙ  άνίβησαν.  το  Be  οίκημα  Χαβον  μείζον 
ά-χθος  εζαττίνης  κατερρά^η  καΐ  ψόφου  ττοΧΧοΰ 
γενομένου  τους  μεν  εγγύς  καϊ  ορώντας  των 
'Αθηναίων  εΧύττησε  μάΧΧον  ή  έφόβησεν,  οι  Be 
άττωθεν,  καϊ  μάΧιστα  οι  Βια  ττΧείστου,  νομίσαντες 
ταύτϊ]  βαΧωκεναι  ηΒη  το  'χ^ωρίον,  φυΎΐ)  ες  την 
θάΧασσαν  καϊ  τάς  ναυς  ώρμησαν. 

CXVI.   ΚαΙ     ό     ΉρασίΒας     ώς    ησθετο    αυτούς 
άτΓοΧείττ οντάς  τε  τας  εττάΧξεις  και  το  <^ι^νόμ6νον 

4θ6 


BOOK    IV.  cxiv.  4-c.\vi,  i 

Athenians,  inasmuch  as  their  conduct  was  more  just ; 
whereas  now  they  had  been  afraid  of  them  through 
inexperience.  Moreover,  he  told  them  all  to  prepare 
to  show  themselves  staunch  allies  and  to  be  held 
responsible  for  whatever  mistakes  they  might  make 
from  this  time  on  ;  as  to  their  former  actions, 
it  was  not  the  Lacedaemonians  who  had  been 
wronged  by  thenij  but  the  Toronaeans  rather  by 
others  ^  Λνΐιο  Avere  stronger,  and  it  was  pardonable  if 
the  Toronaeans  had  made  any  opposition  to  him. 

CXV.  Having  said  such  things  and  encouraged 
them,  when  the  truce  expired  he  proceeded  to  make 
assaults  upon  Lecythus ;  but  the  Athenians  defended 
themselves  from  a  paltry  fort  and  from  such  liouses 
as  had  battlements,  and  beat  them  back  for  one  day. 
On  the  next  day,  however,  Avhen  the  enemy  ΛνβΓβ 
about  to  bring  against  them  an  engine  from  which 
it  was  intended  to  throw  fire  upon  the  wooden 
defences,  and  the  army  was  already  coming  up,  they 
set  up  a  wooden  tower  on  a  house  at  the  point 
where  they  thought  the  enemy  most  likely  to  bring 
up  his  engine  and  where  the  wall  was  most  assail- 
able, and  carried  up  many  jars  and  casks  ot  water 
and  big  stones,  and  many  men  also  ascended.  But 
the  house,  being  over-weighted,  collapsed  suddenly 
and  with  a  great  noise,  annoying  rather  than  fright- 
ening the  Athenians  who  were  near  and  saw  it  ;  but 
those  who  \vere  at  a  distance,  and  especially  those 
furthest  off,  thinking  that  in  that  quarter  the  place 
had  already  been  taken,  set  off  in  flight  for  the  sea 
and  their  ships. 

CXVI.  When  Brasidas  perceived  that  they  were 
leaving  the  battlements  and  saw  what  was  going  on, 

'  The  Atheniana. 

407 


THUCYDIDES 

όρων,  €7Γ ίφ€ρόμ€νο<ί  τω  στρατω  €ύθύ<ϊ  το  τείχισμα 
Χαμβάνει,     καϊ    οσονς     ί^κατεΧαβε     8ύφθ€ΐρ€Ρ. 

2  καϊ  οΐ  μβν  ^Αθηναίοι  τοΐ<;  τε  ττΧοίοις  καϊ  ταΐ<; 
ναυσΐ  τούτω  τω  τροττω  βκΧίττοντβς  το  'χωρυον  e? 
ΤίαΧΧηνην  Βί^κομίσθησαν  6  δε  Β/^ασίδα?  (βστι 
<yap  iv  ττ}  Αηκύθω  ^Αθηναίας  lepov,  καϊ  €τυχ^€ 
κηρύξαζ,  οτ€  βμβΧΧβ  ττροσβάΧΧβίν,  τω  έττιβάντι 
ττρώτω  του  τβίγ^ου<ί  τριάκοντα  μνα<ζ  αργυρίου 
8ώσ€ίΐ')  νομίσας  αΧΧω  τινί  τρόπω  ή  άνθρωττείω 
την  άΧωσιν  <γενβσθαι,  τάς  τε  τριάκοντα  μνας  τΐ] 
θεω  άττέΒωκβν  e?  το  ιερόν  καϊ  την  Αηκυθον 
καθεΧων  καϊ  ανασκεύασαν  τεμενά  άνήκεν  άπαν. 

3  καϊ  6  μεν  το  Χοιττον  του  •χ^ειμώνος  ά  τε  είχε  των 
■χωρίων  καθίστατο  καϊ  τοΐζ  άΧΧοις  εττεβούλενεν 
καϊ  του  χειμώνας  ΒιεΧθόντο'ζ  oySoov  έτος  ετεΧευτα 
τω  ΤΓοΧεμω, 

CXVII.  ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι  δε  καϊ  ^Αθηναίοι  άμα 
ηρι  του  ετΓΐ'γΐ'γνομενου  θέρους  ευθύς  εκεχειρίαν 
εττοιησαντο  ενιαύσιον,  νομίσαντες  ^Αθηναίοι  μεν 
ουκ  αν  ετι  τον  ί^ρασίΒαν  σφών  ττροσαποστήσαι 
ούΒεν  Ίτρίν  Ίταρασκευάσαιντο  καθ^  ησυχιαν,  και 
άμα,  εΐ  καΧως  σφίσιν  εχοι,  καν  ξυμβηναι  τα 
ττΧείω,  ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι  δε  ταύτα  τους  Αθηναίους 
ηγούμενοι  άττερ  εΒέΒισαν  φοβεΐσθαι,  καϊ  <γενομενης 
άνοκωχής  κακών  καϊ  ταΧαιττωρίας  μάΧΧον  εττιθυ- 
μησειν  αυτούς  ττειρασαμενους  ξνναΧΧα'γήναί  τε 
καϊ    τους    άνΒρας    σφίσιν    άττοοόντας    σττονΒας 


4θ8 


BOOK    IV.  cxvi.  i-cxvii.  i 

he  bore  down  at  once  with  the  army  and  took  the 
fort,  destroying  all  that  he  found  in  it.  And  so  the 
Athenians  left  the  place  in  their  small  boats  and  ships 
and  were  thus  conveyed  to  Pallene.  Now  there  is  a 
temple  of  Athena  in  Lecythus,  and  it  chanced  that 
Brasidas,  when  he  was  on  the  point  of  making  the 
assault,  had  proclaimed  that  he  would  give  thirty 
minas^  in  silver  to  him  who  first  mounted  the  wall  ; 
but  thinking  now  that  the  capture  had  been  effected 
by  some  other  means  than  human,  he  paid  the  thirty 
minas  to  the  goddess  for  the  temple,  and  after  razing 
Lecythus  and  clearing  the  ground  consecrated  the 
whole  place  as  a  sacred  precinct.  Then  for  the  rest 
of  the  winter  he  proceeded  to  set  in  order  the 
affairs  of  the  places  that  he  held  and  to  plot  against 
the  other  towns  ;  and  Avith  the  conclusion  of  this 
winter  ended  the  eighth  year  of  the  war. 

CXVI  I.  But  at  the  opening  of  spring  in  the  fol-  423  β.α 
lowing  summer  season,  the  Lacedaemonians  and 
Athenians  at  once  concluded  an  armistice  for  a  year. 
The  Athenians  believed  that  Brasidas  would  thus  not 
be  able  to  cause  any  more  of  their  allies  to  revolt 
and  tliey  meanwhile  could  make  preparations  at 
their  leisure,  and  at  the  same  time  that,  should  it 
be  to  their  advantage,  they  might  make  further 
agreements  ;  the  Lacedaemonians,  on  their  part, 
thought  that  the  Athenians  were  moved  by  precisely 
the  fears  which  actuated  them,'^  and  that,  when  once 
they  had  enjoyed  a  respite  from  troubles  and  hard- 
ships, they  would,  after  such  an  experience,  be  more 
anxious  to  be  reconciled,  restore  their  men  and  make 

»  £122,  $580. 

'  i.e  ,  if  an  armistice  did  not    intervene,  Brasidas   might 
detach  still  other  allies  from  them. 


Ο 


409 


THUCYDIDES 

2  τΓοιησασθαι,  και  69  τον  ττλβιω  ■χ^οονον.  τους  yap 
Βη  αΐ'^ρας  ΤΓβρΙ  ΤΓΧείονος  βττοιοΰντο  κομίσασθαι, 
eo)?  ^  €τι  Βρασί8α<ί  ηύτύχ^βί.  και  βμβΧΧον  βττί 
μείζον  'χωρησαντος  αυτού  καΐ  άντίτταΧα  κατα- 
στήσαντος  των  μβν  στβρεσθαι,  τοις  Β  εκ  του  Ισου 
αμυνόμενοι      κινΒυνεύειν,      el^     καΐ     κρατησειαν. 

3  ylyveTai  ουν  ΙκεγειρΙα  αύτοΐς  re  καΐ  τοις  ζνμ- 
μάχ^οις  i']8e• 

CXVIII.  "  Tlepl  μεν  του  Ιερού  καΐ  του  μαντείου 
του  ^ΑτΓοΧΧωνος  τού  Υίυθίου  8οκεΐ  ημΐν  "χ^ρησθαί 
τον    βουΧόμενον    άΒόΧως    καϊ     αδεώ?    κατά    τους 

2  ττατρίους  νομούς,  τοις  μεν  ΑακεΒαιμονωις  ταύτα 
Βοκεΐ  καϊ  τοις  ξυμμάχοις  τοις  τταρούσιν  Βοίωτού? 
δε  και  Φωκεας  πείσειν  φασίν  ες  Βύναμιν  ττροσκη- 
ρυκευόμενηι. 

3  "  Περί.  δε  των  'χρημάτων  των  τού  θεού  επιμε- 
Χεσθαί  οττως  τους  άΒικοΰντας  εξευρησομεν,  ορθώς 
καϊ  Βίκαίως  τοΐς  ττατρίοις  νόμοίς  χρώμενοι  καϊ 
ύμεϊς    καϊ   ημείς   καϊ  των   αΧΧων   οι   βουΧόμενοι, 

4  τοΙς  πατρίοις  νόμοος  γ^ρώμενοι  ττάντες.  ττερί  μεν 
ουν  τούτων  εΒοξε  ΑακεΒαιμονίοίς  καϊ  τοΐς  άΧΧοις 
ξυμμάχοις   κατά,  ταύτα. 

"  Τάδε  δε  εΒοξε  ΑακεΒαιμονίοις  καϊ  τοΐς  άΧΧοις 
ξυμμάχ^οις,  εάν  σττονΒας  ττοιώνταί  οΐ  Αθηναίοι, 
εττϊ  της  αυτών  μενειν  εκατερους  εχ^οντας  αττερ  νύν 
εγ^ομεν,  τους  μεν  εν  τω  Κορυφασιω  εντός  της 
ΈουφράΒος  καϊ  τού  Ύομεως  μένοντας,  τους  Be  εν 


*  i'ojj,  so  Hude  and  van  Herwerden  from  schol.  on  Ar. 
Pax  479  ;  MSS.  &s. 

^  ίΐ  καΐ  Kpar-qafiav,  Madvig's  conjecture,  for  καΐ  κράτησαν 
of  the  MSS. 

410 


BOOK    IV.  cxvii.  i-cxviii.  4 

a  truce  for  a  longer  time.  For  it  was  tlT^ir  men  they 
made  a  special  point  of  recovering,  while  Brasidas 
was  still  in  good  luck.  If  he  were  still  further  suc- 
cessful and  estaljli^hed  the  contending  forces  on  an 
even  footing,  the  likelihood  was  that  they  would  still 
be  deprived  of  these  men,  and  it  would  be  doubtful 
Λvhether,  fighting  on  equal  terms,  they  could 
prevail  with  the  remainder.  Accordingly  an  armis- 
tice was  concluded  for  them  and  their  allies  on  the 
following  terms  : 

CXVIII.  "Concerning  the  temple  and  oracle  of  the 
Pythian  Apollo,  we  agree  that  whosoever  Λνίΐΐ 
shall  consult  it  without  fraud  and  without  fear, 
according  to  the  usages  of  our  forefathers.  These 
things  seem  good  to  the  Lacedaemonians  and  the 
allies  that  are  present ;  and  they  promise  to  send 
heralds  to  the  Boeotians  and  Phocians  and  persuade 
them  so  far  as  they  can. 

"  Concerning  the  treasure  of  the  god  we  agree  to 
take  care  to  find  out  all  wrong-doers,  rightly  and 
justly  following  the  usages  of  our  forefathers,  you  and 
we  and  all  others  that  wish  to  do  so,  all  following  the 
usages  of  our  forefathers.  Concerning  these  things, 
then,  it  is  so  agreed  by  the  Lacedaemonians  and 
the  rest  of  the  confederates  on  such  terms. 

"  The  folloAving  agreements  also  are  made  by  the 
Lacedaemonians  and  the  rest  of  the  confederates, 
that  in  case  the  Athenians  make  a  treaty,  we  shall 
each  of  us  remain  on  our  own  territory,  keeping 
Avhat  we  ποΛν  have  :  the  Atlienian  garrison  in  Cory- 
phasium  ^  shall  keep  within  Buphras  and  Tomeus ; 

^  The  Lacedaemonian  name  of  Pylos  (ch.  iii.  2).  Buphras 
and  Tomeus  were  two  high  points  on  the  coast. 

411 


THUCYDIDES 

Κυθϊίροις  μη  ζττιμισ^ομ,ενου'ζ  €ς  την  ξυμμαχίαν, 
μήτε  ημάς  ττρος  αυτούς  μήτ€  αυτούς  ττρος  ημάς, 
τους  δ'  ii^  Νίσαία  καΐ  Μίτωα  μη  υττβρβαινοντας 
την  ό8ον  την  άτΓΟ  των  ττυΧών  των  πάρα  ^  του 
NtVoL•  iirl  το  ΤΙοσβίΒώνιον,  άττο  Be  του  Υίοσβι- 
Βωνίου  ευθύς  iirl  την  ^εφυραν  την  ες  ^Ιινωαν 
(μηΒε  ΜεΎαρεας  κα\  τους  ξυμμάχους  ύττερβαίνειν 
την  όΒον  ταύτην),  καΐ  την  νησον,  ηνττερ  εΧαβον 
οι  ^Αθηναίοι,  έχοντας,  py]Bk  εττιμισ^ομίνους  prjBe- 
τερους  μηΒετβρωσε,  και  τα  εν  Ύροζηνι,  Όσαττερ 
νυν  εχουσι  καθ^  α  -  ζυνίθεντο  προς   Αθΐ]ναίους. 

"  Καί.  τη  θαΧάσση  χρωμενους,  οσα  αν  κατά 
την  εαυτών  καί  κατά  την  ξυμμαχίαν,  ΑακεΒαι- 
μονίους  καΐ  τους  ξυμμάχους  πΧεΐν  μη  μακρά  νηί, 
άΧΧω  Βε  κωπηρει  πΧοίω  ες  πεντακόσια  ταΧαντα 
ayovTi   μέτρα. 

"  Κ,ήρυκι  Be  καΐ  πρεσβεία  καΐ  ακοΧουθοις, 
οπόσοίς  αν  Βοκη,  περί  καταΧνσεως  του  ποΧεμου 
καΐ  Βικών  ες  ΤΙεΧοπόννησον  καΐ  \\θήναζε  σπονΒας 
είναι  Ιοΰσι  καΐ  άπιοΰσι,  καΐ  κατά  'γήν  καί  κατά 
ϋάΧασσαν. 

"  Ύούς  Βε  αύτομόΧους  μη  Βεχεσθαι  εν  τούτω  τω 
χρόνω,  μήτε  εΧεύθερον  μήτε  ΒοΰΧον,  μήτε  υμάς 
μήτε   ημάς. 

"  Αίκας  τε  BiBovat  υμάς  τε  ήμΐν  καί  ημάς  υμΐν 
κατά  τα  πάτρια,  τά  άμφίΧο^α  Βίκη  ΒιαΧυοντας 
άνευ   πο\εμου. 

^    Μ  reads  a-nh  τοϋ  Νίσαίου. 

■^  KirchhoflPs  correction  for  καΐ  οίο  of  the  MSS. 

1  cf.  chs.  liii.,  liv.  ^     cf.  ch.  Ixix. 

^  cf.  III.  li  ;  IV.  Ixvii. 

*  Lit.  "the  crates  leading  from   the  shrine  [or  statue,  as 
■παρά  might  in  i         :]  of  Xisus." 
412 


BOOK    IV.  cxviii.  4-S 

that  in  Cythera^  shall  have  no  communication  with 
the  territory  of  the  Lacedaemonian  allies,  neither  we 
\vith  them  nor  they  with  us;  that  in  Nisaea•^  and 
Minoa  ^  shall  not  cross  the  road  leading  from  the 
gates  of  the  shrine  of  Nisus*  to  the  Poseidonium, 
and  from  the  Poseidonium  straight  to  the  bridge  ^ 
at  Minoa  (nor  shall  the  Megarians  or  their  allies 
cross  this  road) ;  as  to  the  island''  which  the  Athen- 
ians took,  they  shall  retain  it,  and  neither  party  shall 
communicate  with  the  other;  and  finally,  in  the 
territory  of  Troezen,'^  the  Athenians  shall  retain 
whatever  they  now  have  in  accordance  Avith  the 
agreements  which  the  Troezenians  have  made  with 
the  Athenians. 

"  As  to  the  use  of  the  sea,  in  so  far  as  they  use  it 
along  their  own  coast  and  along  that  of  their  con- 
federacy, the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  may 
sail,  not  with  a  ship  of  war,  but  with  any  rowing- 
vessel  up  to  five  hundred  talents  burden.^ 

"  There  shall  be  safe  conduct  for  herald  and  envoys 
and  their  attendants,  as  many  as  shall  seem  proper, 
on  their  way  to  the  Peloponnesus  and  to  Athens  for 
the  purpose  of  bringing  the  war  to  an  end  and  for  the 
arbitration  of  disputes,  both  going  and  coming,  by 
land  and  by  sea. 

"  Deserters  shall  not  be  received  during  this  time, 
whether  freemen  or  slaves,  either  by  you  or  by  us. 

"  You  shall  give  satisfaction  to  us  and  we  to  you 
according  to  our  ancestral  customs,  settling  disputed 
points  by  arbitration  without  war. 

^  Connecting  Minoa  with  the  mainland  ;  cf.  III.  li.  3. 

*  Probably  Atalante  is  meant ;  tf.  in.  Ixxxix.  3  ;  V.  xviii.  7. 
'  The  Athenian  fuitification  on  the  isthmus  of  Methana  ; 

cf.  ch.  xlv.  2 

*  About  12i  tons. 


THUCYDIDES 

"  To??  μίν  \ακ€Βαιμονίοι<;  καΐ   τοις   ξυμμάγ^οι^; 

9  ταύτα    8οκ€Ϊ     el    δε    η    νμίν    είτε    κάΧλιον    εί.'τ€ 

BiKaiorepop  τούτων  Βοκεΐ  elvai,   ίόντ€ς  ες  Ααꀕ 

Βαίμονα   Βι8άσκ€Τ€'     ούΒβνος  <γάρ  άποστησονται, 

οσα    αν    Βίκαια    Χβ'^/ητε,    οΰτβ    oi   Αακεζαιμόνιοι 

10  ούτ€  οι  ξύμμαχοι.  οι  δε  Ιόντες  τ€\ος  εχοζ'τε? 
ιόντων,  f)TTep  και  υμβΐς  ημάς  ε'/ίελεύετε.  αϊ  δε 
στΓοί'Βαϊ  ένιαυτον  €σονται" 

11  "Εδο^εΐ'  τω  8ημω.  'Ακαμαντίς  eTrpvraveve, 
ΦαίνίΤΓΤΓος  €<^/ραμμάτ€ν€,  ΝίΛΤίάδτ;"?  ε'ττεστατεί. 
Αάχης  είπε,  τνχτ]  άγα^^  Trj  \\θηναίων,  ττοιείσθαι 
την  εκεγ^ειριαν,  καθ^  α  ζνγχ^ωρούσι  Αακε^αιμόνιοι 
και   οΐ    ξύμμα-χ^οι  αύτων  και   ώμοΧο^ησαν   ev   τω 

12  Βημω  την^  βκβ'χειριαν  elvai  ένιαυτόν,  άρχ^βιν  δε 
τήνΒβ  την  ημβραν,  τετράδα  ε'ττι  δε'/ία  του  ^ΕΧαφη- 

13  βοΧίώνος  μηνός,  iv  τούτω  τω  -χρόνω  Ιόντας  ώς 
αλλί^λους  ττρέσββις  καΐ  κήρυκας  ττοιεΐσθαι  τους 
Xόyoυς,  καθ"  ο  τι  εσταί  η  κατάλυσις  του  ττοΧβμου. 

14  ζκκΧησίαν  δε  ττοιησαντας  τους  στρατηΎούς  καΐ 
τους  τΓρυτύνείς~  ττρώτον  ττερϊτης  εΙρηνης  βουΧεύ- 
σασθαι  Αθηναίους  καθ^  6  τι  αν  ^σίη^  ή  ττρεσββία 
rrepi  της  καταΧύσεως  του  ττοΧβμου.  σττβίσασθαι 
δε  αύτίκα  μαΧα  τας  πρεσβείας  iv  τω  όημω  τας 
παρούσας  η  μην  βμμενβΐν  iv  ταΐς  σττονΒαΙς  τον 
βνιαυτον. 

CXIX.   Ταύτα     ζννίθβντο     ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι    καΐ 
ώμοσαν^    καΐ    οι    ζύμμαγ^οι     Αθηναίοις   και   τοις 

1  Hude  inserts  δ',  after  Kirchhoff. 

2  The  change  of  subject  implies  a  relative  clause ;    some- 
thing like  iV  ρ  may  have  dropped  out. 

^  Hude  reads  av  elaiv,  after  Kirchhoff. 
*  κα'ί  ώαοσαν  (Vulg.  καί  ώμοΚόγησαν)  deleted  by  Hude,  after 
Kirchhoff. 

414 


BOOK    IV.  cxvm.  8  c.vix.  i 

"To  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  these 
things  seem  good ;  but  if  anything  seems  to  you 
fairer  or  juster  than  these  things,  come  to  Lace- 
daemon  and  set  forth  your  view ;  for  neither  the 
Lacedaemonians  nor  their  allies  will  reject  any  just 
proposal  you  may  make.  And  let  those  who  come 
come  Λvith  full  powers,  as  you  also  desired  of  us. 
And  the  truce  shall  be  for  a  year." 

1  Decreed  hy  the  people.  The  tribe  Acamantis 
held  the  prytany,  Phaenippus  was  clerk,  Niciades 
tvas  president.  Laches,  invoking  good  fortune  for 
the  people  of  Athens,  moved  to  conclude  the  armistice 
according  to  the  terms  to  which  the  Lacedae- 
monians and  their  allies  had  consented ;  and  it 
was  agreed  in  the  popular  assembly  that  the 
aiTnistice  should  be  for  a  year,  and  should  begin  on 
that  day,  the  fourteenth  of  the  month  Elaphebolion. 
During  this  time  envoys  and  hei*alds  were  to  go 
from  one  state  to  the  other  and  discuss  proposals 
looking  to  the  termination  of  the  war.  And  the 
generals  and  prytanes  were  to  call  an  assembly 
in  Avhich  the  Athenians  should  deliberate  first  of  all 
about  peace,  on  what  terms  the  Lacedaemonian  em- 
bassy for  ending  the  war  should  be  admitted.  And 
the  embassies  now  present  should  pledge  themselves 
at  once,  in  the  presence  of  the  people,  to  abide  by 
the  truce  for  the  year. 

CXIX.  These  agreements  the  Lacedaemonians  and 
their  allies  made  with  the  Athenians  and  their  allies 

'  The  prescript  of  the  Athenian  decree  which  ratiiied  the 
trace  is  quoted  verbatim  (italics  above). 


THUCYDIDES 

ξυμμάγ^οις     μηνός     iv    ΑακεΙ>αίμονι     Τεραστίου 

2  δωδε/ίάτ?;.  ζυνβτίθεντο  he  καΐ€στ.€ΐ>Βοΐ'τοΑακ€- 
Βαιμονιων  μεν  οί'δε•  Ύανρο<;  ^Άχ^εημίΒα,  \\θή- 
ναως  ΤίερικΧείΒα,  ΦιΧοχαρί^ας  ^ΕρυξίΧάΒα• 
Κ.ορίνθίων      δέ      Αίνεας      ^Ω,κύτου,       Κύφαμίδας 

Αριστωνύμον  ^ικυωνιων  he  Ααμότιμος  Ναι>- 
κράτους,  ^Ονάσιμος  ΜεΎακΧεους•  Meyapεωv  hk 
Κίκασος  ΚεκάΧου,  \1ενεκράτης  ΆμφίΒώρον 
'Κττίδανρίων  he^  Αμφίας  Εύτταλίόα•^  ^Αθηναίων  he 
οί  στρατηγοί  Νικοστρατος  ίλιειτρεφους,  Nt/cta? 
Νικηράτον,  ΑύτοκΧήςΤοΧμαι,ου. 

3  Η  μεν  hr]  εκεχ^ειρυα  αύτη  iyeveTO,  Α-αί  ζυντ}σαν 
εν  ανττ]  ττερί  των  μειζόνων  a-novhcov  hia  τταντος 
ες  X6yovς. 

CXX.  ΪΙερΙ  hk  τας  ημέρας  ταύτας  αΐς  εττηρ- 
■γοντο  "ΐ-κιωνη  εν  τι]  ΧΧαΧΧηντ}  ττόΧις  άττεστη  αττ 
^Αθηναίων  ττρος  Ώρασίδαν.  φασϊ  hk  οι  ^κιωναΐοί 
ΐΙεΧΧηνης  μεν  είναυ  εκ  Υ\.εΧθ7Γοννησου,  ττΧεοντας 
δ'  από  Τροίας  σφων  τους  ττρώτους  κατενεχθ ήναι 
ες  το  γ^ωρίον  τούτο  τω  -χ^ίΐμώνι  ω  εχρησαντο 
2  Άχαίοί,  και  αυτού  οι,κησαι.  άποστάσι  δ'  αύτοΐς 
6  Bpaσίhaς  διεττΧευσε  ΐ'υκτο<ί  ες  την  ^κιώνην, 
τριηρεί  μεν  φιλία  ττροπΧεούστ},  αύτος  he  εν  κεΧη- 
τίω   άττωθεν   εφεττόμενος,   οττως,    ει  μεν    τινι    του 

*  Hude's    conjecture ;     Bekker    Εύπαίδα,    for    Εΰπαιίδα   of 
most  MSS. 

^  Grote  is  probably  right  in  assuming  that  the  twelfth  of 
Gerastius  correspoiuled  to  the  fourteenth  of  Elaphebolion. 
*  These  consisted  of  formal  libations. 

416 


BOOK    IV.  cxix.  i-cxx.  2 

and  ratified  them  by  oath  at  Lacedaemon  on  the 
twelftli  day  of  the  Spartan  month  Gerastius.^  And 
those  Avho  concluded  and  ratified  the  truce  on  be- 
half of  the  Lacedaemonians  were  the  following : 
Taurus  son  of  Echetimidas,  Athenaeus  son  of  Peri- 
cleidas,  Philocharidas  son  of  Eryxilaidas;  on  behalf  of 
the  Corinthians,  Aeneas  son  of  Ocylus.  Euphaniidas 
son  of  Aristonymus  ;  on  behalf  of  the  Sicyonians, 
Damotimus  son  of  Naucrates,  Onasimus  son  of 
Megacles;  on  behalf  of  the  Megarians,  Nicasus  son 
of  CecaluSj  Menecrates  son  of  Amphidorus  ;  on  be- 
half of  the  Epidaurians,  Amphias  son  of  Eupalidas; 
on  behalf  of  the  Athenians,  the  generals  Nicostratus 
son  of  DieitrepheSj  Nicias  son  of  Niceratus,  Autocles 
son  of  Tonnaeus. 

Such,  then,  were  the  terms  on  Avhich  the  armistice 
was  concluded,  and  during  its  continuance  they 
were  constantly  conferring  about  a  truce  of  longer 
duration. 

CXX.  About  the  very  time  Λvhen  they  were 
performing  the  rites  of  confirmation,-  Scione,  a  city 
in  Pallene,  revolted  from  the  Athenians  and  Λvent 
over  to  Brasidas.  The  Scionaeans  assert  that  they 
came  originally  from  Pellene  ^  in  the  Peloponnesus, 
and  that  the  first  settlers  in  Scione  were  driven  to 
this  place  on  their  way  back  from  Trov  by  the  storm* 
Avhich  the  Achaeans  encountered,  and  settled  here. 
On  their  revolt,  Brasidas  crossed  over^  by  night  to 
Scione,  a  friendly  trireme  sailing  ahead  and  he 
himself  following  in  a  skiff  at  some  distance  behind. 
His  idea  was  that,  if  he  should  meet  with  any  boat 

2  Pellene  was  in  Aehaea,  near  Sicyon  ;  the  people  are 
meulioned  as  allies  of  Sparta  in  11.  ix.  2. 

*  Referred  to  again  in  vi.  ii.  3.  *  i.e.  from  Torone. 


THUCYDIDES 

κβΧητοζ  μβίζοίΊ  ττΧοίω  ττβρίτν/χ^άνοι,  η  τριήρης 
άμνιοί  αύτω,^  άντηταΚον  δε  άΧΧης  τριηρονζ 
εττι^/ενομενη•?  ου  ττρος  το  εΧασσον  νομιζων 
τρεψεσθαι,    άΧΧ     eVi     την    νανν,    καΐ    iv    τούτω 

3  abrhv  όιασωσβιν.  7Γ€ραιωθβΙς  Be  και  ^vXXoyov 
ττοίησα'ί  των  Χκιωναίων  eXeyev  α  τε  eV  ttj 
Ακάνθω  καϊ  Ύορώντ],  καΐ  ττροσβτι  ττάντων-  άζιω- 
τάτου?  αυτούς  eivai  βτταίνου,  οϊτινες  της  Παλ- 
Χηνης  iv  τω  Ισθμω  άττειΧημμβνης  ύπο  Αθηναίων 
ΐίοτεί^αιαν  εχόντων  κα\  δντβς  ούΒεν  άΧΧο  ή 
νησιώται  αύτεττά^^εΧτοι  εχώρησαν  ττρος  την 
εΧευθεριαν  και  ουκ  άνβμειναν  άτοΧμυα  άvάyκηv 
σφίσι  TTpoayeveaOaL  irepl  του  φανερώς  οΙκειου 
ayaOod'  σημεΐόν  τ  eivai  του  καΐ  άΧΧο  τί  αν 
αυτούς  των  μeyLστωv  ανδρείως  ύπομεΐναι•  ει  τε^ 
τεθησεταί  κατά  νουν  τα  7Γρά'•/ματα,  ττιστοτάτους 
τε  τη  άΧηθεία  ^yy'^aeaOaL  αυτούς  Αακεόαιμονυων 
φίΧους  καϊ  τάΧΧα  τιμησ€ίν. 

CXXI.  Καί  οί  μεν  'Σ.κιωναΐοι  εττηρθησάν  τε 
τοις  \όyoις  καϊ  θαρσησαντες  ττάντες  ομοίως,  καϊ 
οίς  ττρότερον  μη  ηρεσκε  τα  ττρασσόμενα,  τον  τε 
πόΧεμον  8ίενοοϋντο  ττροθύμως  οΧσειν  και  τον 
ΏρασιΒαν  τά  τ  άΧΧα  καΧως  ε^εζαντο  καϊ  δη- 
μοσία μεν  χρυσω  στεφάνω  ανεΒησαν  ώς  εΧευθε- 
ρούντα   την     EXXaSa,    ιΒία    8ε    εταινίουν    τε  καϊ 

2  προσηρχοντο  ωσιτερ  ί/ί^λ/;τ,^.  ο  Βε  τό  τε  τταραυ- 
τίκα  φυΧακήν  τίνα  αύτοίς  iyKaTaXtircov  Βιεβη 
ττάΧιν   καϊ   ύστερον    ου  ττοΧΧω  στρατιαν    ττΧείω 

1  The  corrected  reading  of  two  minor  MSS.;  all  the  better 
MSS   αυτί).     Hude  deletes,  after  Poppo. 

-  τταντων,  Hude  adopts  Krliger's  conjecture,  φάσκων. 
*  T€  added  by  Kriiger. 

418 


BOOK    IV.  cxx.  2-cxxi.  2 

larger  than  a  skifF,  the  trireme  would  protect  him, 
but  if  another  trireme  of  equal  strength  should  come 
along  it  would  turn,  not  against  the  smaller  boat, 
but  against  the  ship,  and  in  the  meantime  he  could 
get  safely  across.  He  succeeded  in  crossing,  and 
having  called  a  meeting  of  the  Scionaeans  repeated 
what  he  had  said  at  Acanthus  and  Torone,  adding 
that  their  οΛνη  conduct  had  been  most  praise- 
worthy of  all  because,  when  Pallene  Avas  cut  off  at 
the  isthmus  by  the  Athenians  who  held  Potidaea 
and  when  they  were  nothing  but  islanders,  they  had 
not  supinely  a\vaited  the  compulsion  of  necessity  in 
a  matter  that  was  manifestly  for  their  own  good,  but 
had  of  their  own  free  will  taken  the  side  of  freedom  ; 
and  that,  he  said,  \vas  a  proof  that  they  would  endure 
like  men  any  other  peril  however  great ;  and  if 
things  should  be  settled  according  to  his  wish,  he 
ΛΥουΜ  consider  them  in  very  truth  most  loyal  friends 
of  the  Lacedaemonians  and  Avould  honour  them  in 
other  respects. 

CXXI.  The  Scionaeans  were  elated  at  his  words, 
and  all  alike,  even  those  who  before  were  not 
satisfied  with  what  was  being  done,  took  courage 
and  determined  to  carry  on  the  war  Λvith  spirit. 
Brasidas  they  not  only  welcomed  with  other  honours 
but  publicly  crowned  him  Λvith  a  golden  crown  as 
liberator  of  Hellas,  and  privately  decked  him  with 
garlands  and  made  offerings  as  for  a  victor  in  the 
games.  And  he,  leaving  them  a  guard  for  the  present, 
crossed  back,  but  not  long  afterwards  he  led  over  a 


419 


THUCYDIDES 

βττεραίωσβ,  βονΧόμενος  μ€τ  avTOJv  της  re  Μένδης 
καΐ  της  ΤΙοτ€ΐ8αίας  άττοττβιράσαι,  ηγούμενος  και 
τους  Αθηναίους  βοηθησαι  αν  ως  €ς  νησον  και 
βου\ομ€νος  φθασαΐ'  και  τι  αύτω  και  ίττράσσετο 
€9  τας  πόλεις  ταύτας  ττροΒοσιας  irepi. 

CXXII.  Και-  ό  μεν  εμεΧΧεν  ε^γ^βιρήσειν  ταΐς 
ΤΓοΧεσι  ταυταις'  ev  τούτφ  Be  τριήρει  οι  την 
εκεγειρίαν  ττερια'γ'γεΧΧοντες  άφικνοΰνται  τταρ 
αυτόν,    ^Αθηναίων    μεν    ^Αριστώννμος,     Αακεδαι- 

2  μονίων  he  Αθηναίος,  και  η  μεν  στρατιά  ττάΧιν 
Βιεβη  ες  Ύορώνην,  οΐ  δβ  τω  ^  Βρασ/όα  avrjyyeXXov 
την  ξυνθήκην,  και  εΒεξαντο  ττάντες  οι  εττΐ  (Θράκης 

3  ξνμμα•χ^οι  ΑακεΒαιμονίων  τα  ττεττρα^μενα.  ^Αρι- 
στώνυμος  δε  τοΙς  μεν  αΧΧοις  κατ^νει,  "Σ,κιω- 
ναίους  Be  αίσθό μένος  εκ  Χο^ισμοΰ  των  ημερών 
ΟΤΙ  ύστερον  αφεστηκοιεν,  ουκ  εφη  ενσττόνΒους 
εσεσθαι.        Βρασίδας     Βε     άντεΧε^ε     ττοΧΧά,     ως 

4  ττροτερον,  και  ουκ  άφίει  την  ττοΧιν.  ώς  δ'  άττήγ- 
'γεΧΧεν  ες  τας  ^Αθήνας  ο  ^ Αριστώνυμος  ττερί 
αυτών,  οι  ^Αθηναίοι  ευθύς  έτοιμοι  τ,σαν  στρα- 
τεύειν  εττΐ  την  ^κιώνην.  οί  Βε  ΑακεΒαιμόνιοι 
πρέσβεις  πεμψαντες  τταραβησεσθαι  εφασαν  αυ- 
τούς τας  σπονΒάς,  και  της  πόΧεως  άντεποιοΰντο 
Βρασίδα  ττιστεύοντες,  Βίκη   τε   ετίαμοι  ήσαν  περί 

5  αυτής  κρίνεσθαι.  οι  Βε  Βίκτ)  μεν  ουκ  ηθεΧον 
κινΒυνεύειν,  στρατεύειν  Be  ώς  τάχ^ιστα,  όρ^ην 
ποιούμενοι  ει  και  οί  ev  ταις  νήσοις  ηΒη  οντες 
άζιούσι   σφών  άφιστασθαι,  τη   κατά  ^ην  Αακε- 

6  Βαιμονίων  Ισγ^ύι  άνωφεΧεΙ  ττιστεύοντες•  el^^e  Be 
και    7)    άΧηθεια   περί    της    αποστάσεως  μάΧΧον  η 

^  τψ  deleted  by  Hude,  after  Stahl. 
420 


BOOK    IV.  cxxi.  2-cxxii.  6 

larger  army,  wishincr  in  concert  with  them  to  make 
an  attempt  upon  Mende  and  Potidaea;  lor  he  thought 
the  Athenians  would  bring  succour  to  Pallene  as 
though  it  were  an  island,  and  he  wished  to  anticipate 
them  ;  besides,  he  was  negotiating  >vith  these  towns 
with  a  view  to  their  betrayal. 

CXXIi.  So  he  was  about  to  attack  these  toAvns  ; 
but  in  the  meantime  those  who  were  carrying  round 
the  news  of  the  armistice  arrived  at  his  head- 
quarters in  a  trireme,  Aristonymus  from  Athens 
and  Athenaeus  from  Lacedaemon.  Whereupon  his 
army  crossed  back  to  Torone  ;  and  the  messengers 
formally  announced  the  agreement  to  Brasidas,  and 
all  the  Thracian  allies  of  the  Lacedaemonians  ac- 
quiesced in  what  had  been  done.  Aristonymus 
assented  for  the  other  places,  but,  finding  on  a  cal- 
culation of  the  days  that  the  Scionaeans  had  re- 
volted after  the  agreement,  he  said  that  they  would 
not  be  included  in  the  truce.  Brasidas,  however, 
earnestly  maintained  that  they  had  revolted  before, 
and  Avould  not  give  up  the  city.  Whereupon  Aris- 
tonymus sent  Avord  to  Athens  about  these  matters, 
and  the  Athenians  were  ready  at  once  to  make  an 
expedition  against  Scione.  But  the  Lacedaemonians 
sent  envoys,  saying  that  the  Athenians  would  be 
violating  the  truce,  and  trusting  the  \vord  of  Brasidas 
they  laid  claim  to  the  town  and  Λvere  ready  to 
arbitrate  about  it.  The  Athenians,  however,  were 
inclined,  not  to  risk  arbitration,  but  to  make  an  ex- 
pedition as  quickly  as  possible,  being  enraged  to 
think  that  even  the  inhabitants  of  the  islands  now 
presumed  to  revolt,  relying  on  the  strength  which 
the  Lacedaemonians  had  on  land,  useless  though  it 
was    to    them.'       Moreover,    the    truth    about    the 

^  Because  the  Athenians  commanded  the  sea. 

421 


THUCYDIDES 

οί  'Αθηναίοι  βΖίκαιουν  δύο  ηαρ  ημβραις  ύστερον 
άττέστησαν  οί  ^Κίωναΐοι.  ψήφισμα  τ'  €ύθύ<; 
€7Γθίησαντο,  Κλεωί'ος  Ύνώμί]  7Γ€ίσθ€ντ€<;,  Χκιω- 
ναίους  i^eXeiv  re  καΐ  άττοκτεΐναι.  καΐ  ταλλα 
ησυ'χ^άζοντί^  e?  τούτο  τταρβσκβυάζοντο. 

CXXIII.  Έί^  τούτω  δε  ^ϊίν^η  αφίσταται 
αυτών,  ττόλί?  iv  rfj  ΐΙαΧληντ],  'Κρετριών  αποικία. 
καΐ  αυτούς  eSi^aTo  6  Βρασίδας,  ου  νομίζων 
άΒίκεΐν,  OTC  iv  rfj  εκεχειρία  φανερώ'ζ  ττροσε- 
■χ^ώρησαν  εστί  yap    α    και    αυτός    ενεκάΧει    τοις 

2  Άθηναίοις  τταραβαίνειν  τάς  σττηνΒάς.  8c  ο  καΐ 
οι  Μεν^αΐοΐ  μάΧλον  ετόΧμησαν,  την  τ€  του 
Έρασίδου  ^νώμην  ορώντες  ετοιμην,  τεκμαιρόμενοι 
και  άτΓΟ  της  %κιώνης  ότι  ου  ττρουΒίδου,  και  άμα 
των  ττρασσόντων  σφίσιν  ^  οΧί^ων  τε  όντων  καΐ 
ως  τότε  εμεΧΧησαν,  ούκετι  άνέντων,  άΧ\α  περϊ 
σφίσιν  αύτοΐς  φοβούμενων  το  κατάΒηΧον  καΐ 
καταβιασαμενων    rrapa    ιγνώμην     τους    ττοΧΧούς. 

3  οί  δε  Άθηΐ'αΐοι  ευθύς  ττυθόμενοι,  ττοΧΧω  ετι 
μάΧΧον  ορ^ισθεντες  τταρεσκευάζοντο  ε'ττ    άμφοτε- 

4  ρας  τας  ττόΧεις.  καΐ  Βρασίδας  ττροσΒεχόμενος 
τον  εττίπΧουν  αυτών  ύττεκκομίζει  ες  ΌΧννθον  την 
^αΧκιδικην  ιταΐδας  καΐ  <γυναΐκας  τών  Έ^κιωναίων 
καΐ  ^ΙενΒαίων,  και  τών  ΏεΧοττοννησιων  αύτοΐς 
πεντακόσιους  οττΧίτας  διεττεμψε  καΐ  ττεΧταστάς 
τριακόσιους  Χ,αΧκιδέων,  άρχοντα  τε  τών  απάντων 
ΐΙοΧυδαμίδαν.  και  οί  μεν  τα  περϊ  σφάς  αυτούς, 
ώς  εν  τάχει  παρεσομενων  τών  Αθηναίων,  κοιντ} 
ηύτρεπίζοντο. 

CXXIV.  Βρασίδας  δε  καΐ  ΤΙερδίκκας  εν  τούτω 
στρατεύουσιν    αμα    επΙ    Άρράβαιον  το   δεύτερον 

^  σφίσιν,  Kriiger  deletes,  followed  by  Hude. 
422 


BOOK   IV.  cxxii.  6-cxxiv.  i 

revolt  was  rather  as  the  Athenians  claimed  ;  for  the 
Scionaeans  revolted  two  days  after  the  agreement. 
The  Athenians,  then,  immediately  passed  a  vote,  on 
the  motion  of  Cleon,  to  destroy  Scione  and  put  the 
citizens  to  death.  And  so,  keeping  quiet  in  other 
matters,  they  made  preparations  for  this. 

CXXIII.  Meanwhile  Mende  revolted  from  them, 
a  city  in  Pallene,  and  an  Eretrian  colony.  And 
Brasidas  received  them,  thinking  they  were  not 
doing  wrong  in  coming  over  to  him,  though  clearly 
it  was  in  the  time  of  the  armistice ;  for  there  were  some 
points  in  which  he  himself  charged  the  Athenians 
with  breaking  the  truce.  Wherefore  the  Mendaeans 
also  became  more  bold,  for  they  saw  the  resolute 
attitude  of  Brasidas,  and  also  inferred  it  from  the 
fact  that  he  did  not  give  up  Scione.  Moreover,  the 
conspirators  among  them  were  few  in  number,  and, 
once  they  had  formed  the  design,  from  that  moment 
showed  no  slackness,  but  were  in  fear  of  their  lives 
in  case  of  detection  and  coerced  the  multitude  even 
against  their  will.  But  the  Athenians,  when  they 
heard  the  news,  were  far  more  enraged,  and  straight- 
way made  preparations  against  both  cities.  And 
Brasidas,  expecting  their  coming,  conveyed  away  to 
Olynthus  in  Chalcidice  the  women  and  cliikh-en  of  the 
Scionaeans  and  Mendaeans,  and  sent  over  to  protect 
them  five  hundred  Peloponnesian  hoplites  and  three 
hundred  Chalcidian  targeteers,  with  Polydamidas 
as  commander  of  the  whole.  And  the  two  cities 
together  made  preparations  for  their  defence,  in  the 
belief  that  the  Athenians  would  soon  be  at  hand. 

CXXIV.     Brasidas     and      Perdiccas      meanwhile 
marched  together  a  second  time  ^  to  Lyncus  against 
*  cf.  ch.  l.xxxiii. 

423 


THUCYDIDES 

€9  AvyKov.  καΐ  yyov  ό  μεν  ων  βκράτ€ΐ  Ma^e- 
^όνων  την  ούναμιν  καϊ  των  εν^ίκούντων  'Έ\\ηνο)ν 
οττΧίτας,  ο  8e  Trpof  τοις  αυτού  ττερίΧοίττοις  t6)V 
ΥΙεΚοττοννησίων  \a\KtBea^  καϊ  ^Ακανθίονς  καϊ 
των  άΧΧων  κατά  6νναμιν  εκάστων,  ξύμτταν  Se 
το  οπΧιτικον  των  Ιΐ,ΧΧιίνων  τρισχίΧιοι  μάΧιστα, 
ίτητή^  δ'  οΐ  ττάντβς  ηκοΧούθουν  \\ακεΖόνων  ζυν 
X.aXKiBeuaiv    oXiyov  e?  'χ^ιΧίους,  καϊ  άΧΧος  ομιΧος 

2  των    βαρβάρων    ττοΧύς.       εσβαΧόντες    8ε    ες  την 

Αρραβαίου  και  εΰρορτες  άντεστρατοττεΒευμενους 
αύτοίς     τοΐ'9      Αυ^κηστά<ί,      αντεκαθεζοντο      καϊ 

3  αυτοί,  καϊ  εγβντων  των  μεν  ττεζών  Χόφον  εκατέ- 
ρωθεν, ττεοίου  δε  του  μέσου  οντος,  οι  ΙτΓττής  ες 
αύτο  καταΒραμόντες  ίτητομάχ^ησαν  ττρώτα  αμφο- 
τέρων, εττειτα  Be  καϊ  6  Βρασίδας  καϊ  ό  ϋερΒίκκας, 
ττροεΧθοντων  ττροτέρων  άπο  του  Χόφου  μετά  τοίν 
ιττττεων  των  Αυ^κηστων  οττΧιτών  καϊ  ετοίμων 
όντων  μάγ^εσθαί,  άντετταη απόντες  καϊ  αύτοϊ  ξυν- 
έβαΧον  καϊ  έτρεψαν  τους  Αυ^κηστάς,  καϊ  ττοΧ- 
Χούς    μεν    Βιεφθειραν,    οι   8e  Χοιττοϊ  Sιaφυyόvτeς 

4  ττρος  τα  μετέωρα  ι)σύχ^αζον.  μετά  Βε  τούτο 
τροτταΐον  στήσαντες  Βύο  μεν  ή  τρεις  ημέρας 
εττέσγ^ον,  τους  ]ΧΧυρίούς  μένοντες,  οΐ  ετυχ^ον 
τω  ΐΙερΒικκα  μισθού  μέΧΧυντες  ηξειν.  εττειτα 
ο  ΙΙερΒίκκας  εβούΧετο  ττροϊεναί  επϊ  τάς  τον 
Αρραβαίου  κώμας  καϊ  μη  καθήσθαι,  ΒρασίΒας  Be 

της  τε  ^Ιέι  Βης  ττεριορώμενος,  μη  των  ^ λθηναίων 
ττροτερον  εττιτΐΧενσάντων  τι  πάθη,  καϊ  άμα  των 
ΊΧΧυριών  ου  τταρόντων,  ου  πρόθυμος  ην,  άΧΧα 
άναχωρεΐν  μάΧλον. 

CXXV.    Καϊ.    εν     τούτω     Βιαφερομενων     αυτών 
ηγγεΧθη   οτί   καϊ   οι   ΊΧΧυριοϊ    μετ    ^Αρραβαίου, 

424 


BOOK    IV.  cxxiv.  i-cxxv.  i 

Arrhabaeus.  The  latter  led  the  force  of  the  Mace- 
donians, over  whom  he  held  sway,  and  a  body  of 
Hellenic  hoplites  resident  among  them  ;  the  former 
led  not  only  the  Peloponnesian  troops  which  were  left 
in  the  country,  but  also  such  forces  from  Chalcidice, 
Acanthus  and  the  other  tOΛvns  as  they  could  each 
furnish.  The  total  Hellenic  force  was  about  three 
thousand  ;  the  cavalry  that  went  with  them,  Mace- 
donians and  Chalcidians,  were  all  told  a  little  less 
than  one  thousand,  and  there  was  besides  a  great 
multitude  of  barbarians.  Invading  the  country  of 
Arrhabaeus  and  finding  the  Lyncestians  encamped 
against  them,  they  also  took  up  a  position  facing 
them.  The  infantry  occupied  a  hill  on  either  side, 
with  a  plain  between,  while  the  cavalry  of  both 
armies  at  first  galloped  down  into  the  plain  and 
engaged  in  battle ;  then  Brasidas  and  Perdiccas, 
after  the  Lyncestian  hoplites  had  come  forward  from 
the  hill  in  conjunction  Avith  their  own  cavalry  and 
■were  ready  to  fight,  advanced  also  in  their  turn  and 
joined  battle,  routing  the  Lyncestians  and  destroying 
many,  Avhile  the  rest  escaped  to  the  high  places  and 
kept  quiet.  After  this  they  set  up  a  trophy  and 
halted  for  two  or  three  days,  awaiting  the  Illyrians, 
who  had  been  hired  by  Perdiccas  and  were  momen- 
tarily expected.  Then  Perdiccas  wished,  on  their 
arrival,  to  go  forward  against  the  villages  of  Arrha- 
baeus instead  of  sitting  idle  ;  but  Brasidas  was  soli- 
citous about  Mende,  fearing  that  it  might  suffer  some 
harm  if  the  Athenians  should  sail  there  before  his  re- 
turn ;  and,  besides,  the  Illyrians  had  not  appeared,  so 
that  he  was  not  eager  to  go  on,  but  rather  to  retreat. 
CXXV.  Meanwhile,  as  they  were  disputing,  it  was 
announced  that  the  Illyrians  had  betrayed  Perdiccas 

.,..    ,.  Ρ       425 


THUCYDIDES 

ττροΒόντβς  ΐΙβρΒίκκαν,  ye'y€vy]vrat'  ώστε  η8η  άμφο- 
Tepofi  μβν  Βοκουι>  άνα-χ^ωρείν  8ια  το  δε'ος  αυτών, 
όντων  άνθρώττων  μα)(ίμων,  κυρωθεν  δε  ouSev  €κ 
της  Βιαφοράς  όττηνίκα  χρη  όρμάσθαι,  νυκτό<;  re 
έτΓί'γβνομένης,  οί  μβν  Μα/ίεδόζ/ες  καΐ  το  ττΧήθος 
των  βαρβάρων  €ύθύ<ί  φοβΐ]θίντε'ί,  οττβρ  φίλεΐ 
μβ^αΚ,α  στρατοττεΒα  άσαφώ'ζ  eKTrXyiyvvaOat,  καΐ 
νομίσαντ6ς  ττοΧλαττΧασίους  μβν  η  ηΚθον  εττιεναι, 
όσον  δε  ονττω  τταρβΐναι,  καταστάντβ'^  ε'ς  αΙφνίΒιον 
φνγην  βχώρουν  ε'ττ'  οΐκον,  καΐ  τον  ΐΙερΒίκκαν  το 
ττρώτον  ουκ  αίσθανομενον,  ως  εγι^ω,  ηνά^κασαν 
ττρίν    τον     Ί^ρασίΒαν    ίΒεΐν    (άττωθεν     yap    ττοΧύ 

2  άΧΧιίΧων  εστρατοπε^βύοντο)  τΐροαττζΧθβΐν.  Β/οα- 
σίδα<?  δε  άμα  ττ)  εω  ώ?  είδε  τους  ΜακβΒόνας 
ττροκεχωρηκότας,^  τους  τε  ΊΧΧυριούς  καΐ  τον 
^Αρράβαιον  μβΧΧοντας  εττιβναι,  ξυvayayωv  καΐ 
αύτος  €ς  τeτpάyωvov  τάξίν  τους  οττΧίτας  καΐ  τον 
ψίΧον    όμιΧον    βς    μέσον    Χαβών,    SievoetTO    άνα- 

3  χωρεΐν.  €κ8ρόμους  δε,  ει  ττ//  ττροσβάΧΧοίβν 
αύτοΐς,  βταξβ  τους  νεωτάτους,  καΐ  αύτος  XoyάSaς 
έχων  τριακόσιους  τεΧευταΐος  yvώμηv  βΐχβν  υττο- 
χωρών    τοις    των    ενάντιων    ττρώτοι,ς   ττροσκεισο- 

4  μενοις  ανθιστάμενος  άμυΐ'εσθαι.  καΐ  ττρΙν  τους 
ποΧεμίους  ε'γγυ?  είναι,  ώς  hca  ταχέων  τταρεκεΧεύ- 
σατο  τοις  στρατιώταις  τοιάΒε. 

CXXVI.  "  Ει  μεν  μη  ίητώτττευον,  άνΒρες 
ΤΙεΧοτΓοννιίσίΟί,  υμάς  τω  τε  μεμονώσθαι  καΐ  ό'τί 
βάρβαροι  οί  επιόντες  καΐ  ττοΧΧοΙ  εκττΧηξιν  εχειν, 
ουκ    αν    ομοίως    διΒαχην    άμα    τη    τταρακεΧεύσει 


^  Hude    adopts    van    Herwerden's    conjecture,    νροανακΐ- 
χωρ7)κάτα5. 

426 


BOOK    IV.  cxxv.  i-cxxvi.  i 

and  taken  sides  with  Arrhabaeus ;  consequently, 
because  of  their  fear  of  these  people,  who  were 
Avarlike,  both  generals  now  agreed  that  it  Λν38  best 
to  retreat.  But  in  consequence  of  their  dispute 
nothing  had  been  determined  as  to  when  they  should 
set  out ;  and  when  niglit  came  on  the  Macedonians 
and  the  mass  of  the  barbarians  immediately  took 
fright,  as  large  armies  are  Λvont  to  be  smitten  with 
unaccountable  panic,  and  thinking  that  the  advanc- 
ing enemy  were  many  times  more  numerous  than 
they  really  were  and  were  all  but  on  them,  betook 
themselves  to  sudden  flight  and  hastened  home- 
wards. Perdiccas,  Λvho  at  first  was  not  aware  of 
their  movement,  was  compelled,  Avhen  he  did  learn 
of  it,  to  go  away  without  seeing  Brasidas  ;  for  they 
were  encamped  far  away  from  each  otlier.  But  at 
daybreak,  Λνΐιεη  Brasidas  saw  that  the  Macedonians 
had  already  decamped  and  that  the  Illyrians  and 
Arrhabaeus  were  about  to  come  against  him,  he 
formed  his  hoplites  into  a  square,  put  the  crowd  of 
light-armed  troops  in  the  centre,  and  was  himself 
intending  to  retreat.  He  so  stationed  the  youngest 
of  his  troops  that  they  might  dash  out  against 
the  enemy,  in  case  they  attacked  at  any  point,  and 
proposed  to  take  himself  three  hundred  picked  men 
and,  bringing  up  the  rear,  to  make  a  stand  and  beat  off 
the  foremost  of  the  enemy  whenever  they  pressed 
him  hard.  And  before  the  enemy  were  near  he 
exhorted  his  soldiers,  so  far  as  haste  allowed,  in  the 
following  Λvords  : 

CXXVI.  "  Did  I  not  suspect,  men  of  Peloponnesus, 
that  you  are  in  a  state  of  panic  because  you  have 
been  left  alone,  and  because  your  assailants  are 
barbarous    and    numerous,    I    should    not    offer   you 

427 


THUCYDIDES 

ίΐΓθΐούμ.ηΐ'•  νυν  he  ττρος  μβν  την  aiTokeL^iv  των 
ημ€Τ€ρων  καΐ  το  ττΧήθος  των  ενάντιων  βρα'χεΖ 
ύπομν^ίματί  καΐ   τταραινεσει   τα    μeyίστa    ireipa- 

2  σομαι  TreiOeiv.  άηαθοί^  <yap  elvai  ύμΐν  ττροσηκζΐ 
τα  ΤΓοΧίμια  ου  Βια  ξυμμάχ^ων  τταρουσιαν  €κά- 
στοτ€,  άΧΧά  St  olfceiav  άρετην,  και  μηΒεν  τιΧηθα 
ττβφοί^ησθαί  έτερων,  o'lye  μη^ε  άπο  ττοΧιτειών 
τοιούτων  ηκετε,  εν  αίς  ου  ^  ττοΧΧοΙ  ολί,γωι;  άρ- 
■χ^ουσιν,  αΧΧα  ττΧειονων  μάΧΧον  εΧασσους,  ουκ 
άΧΧω  τινϊ  κτησάμενοι  την  Βυναστείαν  ή  τω  μα'χό- 

3  μενοι  κρατεΐν.  βαρβάρους  he  οΐχ;  νυν  άττειρία 
hehiTe,  μαθεΐν  χρή,  εξ  ων  τε  ιτροη^ώνισθε  τοΐ<; 
^laKehoaiv  αύτων  και  άφ^  ων  εγώ  είκάζων  τε  καΐ 

4  αλ,λωι;  άκοτ}  ετησταμαι,  ου  heivov^  εσομενους.  καΐ 
yap  όσα  μεν  τω  οντί  ασθενή  οντά  των  ποΧεμίων 
hόκησιv  έχει  ισχύον,  hiha^rj  άΧηθης  ττροσ^ενομενη' 
ττερί  αύτων  εθάρσυνε  μάΧΧον  τους  αμυνόμενους• 
οΐς  hε  βεβαίως  τι  πρόσεστιν  αγαθόν,  μη  'IΓpoειhώς 

δ  τις  αν  αύτοΐς  τοΧμηροτερον  προσφεροιτο.  ούτοι 
he  την  μεΧΧησιν  μεν  εγουσι  τοις  άττείροις  φο- 
βεράν  και  yap  ττΧηθει  όψεως  hειvol  και  βοής 
μεyeθει  αφόρητοι,  ή  τε  hia  κενής  εττανύσεισις 
των  οττΧων  έχει  τίνα  hήXωσιv  άττειΧής.  ττροσ- 
μεΐξοΛ  hk  τοις  ύττομενουσιν  αύτα  ούχ  όμοιοι•  ούτε 


'  οπ,  Huile  delete?,  after  Stephanus. 

^  Hiule  adopts  π^ο-,ΐίομίνη,  after  Bekker. 


42S 


BOOK    IV.  cxxvi.  1-5 

instruction  combined  with  encouragement.  But  as  it 
is,  in  view  of  our  abandonment  by  our  allies  and  of 
the  multitude  of  our  opponents,  I  shall  try  by  a 
brief  reminder  and  by  advice  to  impress  upon  you 
the  most  important  considerations.  For  it  is  proper 
that  you  should  be  brave  in  war,  not  because  of  the 
presence  of  allies  eacli  and  every  time,  but  because 
of  innate  valour  ;  nor  should  you  be  afraid  of  any 
number  of  aliens,  you  who  do  not  come  from  states 
like  theirs,  but  states  in  Avhich,  not  the  many  rule 
the  few,  but  rather  the  minority  rule  the  majority, 
having  acquired  their  power  by  no  other  means  but 
superiority  in  fighting.  And  as  for  the  barbarians, 
whom  now  in  your  inexperience  you  fear,  you  ought 
to  know,  both  from  the  contest  you  have  already 
had  with  the  Macedonians  among  them,^  and  may 
gather  from  the  knowledge  1  gain  by  infei'ence  and 
from  reports  of  others,  that  they  will  not  be  formid- 
able. For  whenever  the  enemy's  power  conveys  an 
impression  of  strength,  but  is  in  reality  weak,  correct 
information  about  them,  when  once  it  has  been 
gained,  tends  rather  to  embolden  their  opponents  ; 
whereas,  wlien  the  enemy  possesses  some  solid  ad- 
vantage, if  one  has  no  previous  knoAvledge  of  it, 
one  would  be  only  too  bold  in  attacking  them. 
Now  as  for  these  Illyrians,  for  those  Avho  have  had 
no  experience  of  them,  the  menace  of  their  attack 
has  terror  ;  for  their  number  is  indeed  dreadful  to 
behold  and  the  loudness  of  their  battle-cry  is  in- 
tolerable, and  the  idle  brandishing  of  their  arms  has 
a  threatening  effect.      But  for  hand  to  hand  fighting, 

*  i.e.  the  Lyncestians,  who,  according  to  ch.  Ixxxiii.  1  and 
II.  xcix.  2,  belonged  to  the  Macedonians,  and  had  been  beaten, 
as  stated  in  ch.  cxxiv.  3. 

429 


THUCYDIDES 

•yap  ταξίΐ'  €χοντ€<;  αίσ'χννθεΐεν  αν  \ητείν  τίνα 
-χώραν  βιαζόμβνοι,  η  re  φν•^/η  καΐ  η  €φο8ο<;  αυτών 
ϊσην  βχουσα  Βόξαν  του  κάλου  ave^eXeyKrov  και 
το  uvSpetov  β-χει  {αυτοκράτωρ  he  μ-άχ^η  μαλιστ 
αν  καΐ  ττρόφασιν  του  σωζεσθαί  τινί  ττρεττοντως 
ττορίσβιβ),  του  τε  e?  χεΐρας  iXOelv  ττιστότ^ρον  το 
€κφοβί']σ6ΐν^  υμάς  άκίν8ύνω<;  ψ/οΰνται•  εκείνω  yap 

6  αν  Ίτρο  τούτου  εχρώντο.  σαφώς  re  ττάν  το 
ΤΓρονττάργ^ον  Beivbv  άττ  αυτών  οράτε  epytp  μεν 
βρα'χυ  6ν,  όψει  Be  καΐ  άκοτ)  κατασττερ-χον.  ο 
ύτΓομείναντες  εττίφερομενον  και,  Όταν  καίρο<;  rj, 
κόσμω  καΐ  τάξει  αύθις  υτrayayovτες,  €<;  τε  το 
άσφαΧες  θάσσον  άφίξεσθε  καΐ  yvώσεσθε  το 
Χοιττον  δτί  οι  τοίοΰτοι  δχΧοι  τοις  μεν  την  ττρώτην 
εφοΒον  Βεζαμενοις  άττωθεν  άττειΧαΐς  το  άνΒρεΐον 
μεΧΧ^ίσει  εττικομιτουσιν,  οΐ  δ'  αν  εϊξωσιν  αύτοΐς, 
κατά  7Γ08ας  το  εΰψυχ^ον  εν  τω  άσφαΧεΙ  οξείς 
ενδείκνυνται..^ 

CXXVII.  Τοιαύτα  ό  ΈρασίΒας  τταραινεσας 
ΰ'π^ηyε  το  στράτευμα,  οι  δε  βάρβαροι  ιΒόντες 
ΤΓοΧΧτ)  βοτ]  καΐ  θορυβώ  ττροσεκειντο,  νομισαντες 
φεύyεtv  τε  αύτον  καΐ   καταΧαβόντες  Βιαφθερεΐν. 

2  καΐ  ώς  αύτοΐς  αϊ  τε  εκΒρομαι  oirrj  ττροστητΓτοιεν 
άττηντων,  και  αυτός  έχων  τους  XoyάBaς  επικει- 
μενοις  ΰφίστατο,  ττ}  τε  ττρώττ}  ορμΐ)  τταρα  yvωμηv 

^  Ilude  emends  to  4κφοβησαί,  after  Torstrick. 


BOOK    IV,  cx.wi.  5-cxxvn.  2 

if  their  opponents  but  endure  such  threats,  they  are 
not  the  men  they  seem ;  for  having  no  regular  order, 
they  Avould  not  be  ashamed  to  abandon  any  position 
\vhen  hard  pressed  ;  and  since  flight  and  attack  are 
considered  equally  honourable  with  them,  their 
courage  cannot  be  put  to  the  test.  Besides,  a  mode 
of  fighting  in  which  everyone  is  his  own  master  Λνϋΐ 
provide  a  man  the  best  excuse  for  saving  himself 
becomingly.  They  think,  too,  that  it  is  a  less  risky 
game  to  try  to  frighten  you  from  a  safe  distance 
than  to  meet  you  hand  to  hand ;  otherwise  they 
Avould  not  have  taken  this  course  in  preference  to 
that.  And  so  you  clearly  see  that  all  that  was  at 
first  formidable  about  them  is  but  little  in  reality, 
startling  merely  to  eye  and  ear.  If  you  withstand 
all  this  in  the  first  onrush,  and  then,  whenever 
opportunity  offers,  \vithdraw  again  in  orderly  array, 
you  will  the  sooner  reach  safety,  and  will  hereafter 
know  that  mobs  like  these,  if  an  adversary  but 
sustain  their  first  onset,  merely  make  a  flourish  of 
valour  with  threats  from  afar  in  menace  ^  of  attack, 
but  if  one  yields  to  them,  they  are  right  upon  his 
heels,  quick  enough  to  display  their  courage  Avhen 
all  is  safe." 

CXXVII.  After  such  words  of  admonition,  Brasidas 
began  to  withdraw  his  army.  On  seeing  this  the 
barbarians  came  on  with  a  mighty  shouting  and  up- 
roar, thinking  that  he  was  fleeing  and  that  they 
could  overtake  and  destroy  his  army.  But  the 
troops  who  had  been  selected  to  dash  out  met  them 
wherever  they  charged,  and  Brasidas  himself  with 
his  picked  men  sustained  their  attack  ;  and  so  the 
Peloponnesians  to  their  surprise  withstood  their  first 
*  Possibly  μ(\λ-ησ(ΐ  =  "  without  coming  to  action." 


THUCYDIDES 

αντεστησαν  καΐ  το  Χοιττον  βτηφβρομβνους  μ€ν 
^ζ'χ^όμενοί  ημννοντο,  ησυχ^αζόντων  he  αυτοί  ύττβ^γώ- 
ρουν,  τότε  Βη  των  μβτα  του  ΈρασίΒου  'ΚΧληνων 
iv  T7J  εύρυχ^ωρία  οι  ttoWoI  των  βαρβάρων  aire- 
σγοντο,  μέρος  ce  τί  καταΧιττόντες  αύτοΐς  βττακο- 
\ουθουν  ττροσβάΧλειν,  οι  ΧοιποΙ  "χ^ωρησαντες 
Βρόμω  eVt  τε  τους  φεν^/οντας  τό)ν  ^ίακεΒονων 
οΐς  εντύχ^οιεν  εκτεινον  και  την  εσβοΧην,  η  εστί 
μεταξύ  hvolv  Χόφοιν  στενή  ες  την  ^Αρραβαίου, 
φθάσαντες  ττροκατέΧαβον,  εΙΒότες  ουκ  ουσαν 
αΧΧην  τω  ΈρασίΒα  άνα^ώρησίν.  καϊ  ττροσιοντος 
αύτου  ες  αύτο  η8η  το  άττορον  της  οΒοΰ  κνκΧοΰνται 
ώς  άτΓοΧηψο μενοί. 

CXXVIII.  Ό  Βε  ^νούς  ιτροείττε  τοις  μεΰ'  αύτου 
τριακοσίοις,  ον  ωετο  μάΧΧον  αν  εΧεΐν  των  Χόφοιν, 
χωρήσαντας  ττρος  αύτον  Βρόμω  ώς  τάχιστα 
έκαστος  Βύναται  άνευ  τάξεως,  ττειρασαι  άττ 
αύτου  εκκρούσαι  τους  ηΒη  εττόντας  ^  βαρβάρους, 
ττρίν    καϊ    την    ττΧειονα    κύκΧωσιν    σφών   αύτοσε 

2  Ίτροσμεΐζαι.  και  οί  μεν  ττροσττεσόντες  εκράτησάν 
τε  των  εττΐ  του  Χόφου,  καϊ  η  ττΧείων  ηΒη  στρατιά 
των  'ΚΧΧηνων  ραον  ττρος  αύτον  εττορεύοντο'  οι 
yap  βάρβαροι  καϊ  εφοβηθησαν,  τ?}?  τροττής 
αύτοίς  ενταύθα  'γενομέν7]ς  σφών  άττο  του  μετεώρου, 
καϊ  ες  το  ττΧεον  ούκετ  εττηκοΧούθουν,  νομίζοντες 
καϊ  εν  μεθορίοις  είναι  αυτούς  ηΒη   καϊ  Βιαττεφευ- 

3  ηεναι.  Ιί^ρασίΒας  Be  ώς  άντεΧάβετο  των  μετεώ- 
ρων, κατά  άσφάΧειαν  μαΧΧον  ιών  αυθημερόν 
άφικνεΐται   ες   "Αρνισαν   ττρώτον   της    ΤΙερΒίκκον 

4  αρχής,  καϊ  αύτοΙ  ορ^ιζόμενοι  οΐ  στρατιώται  Trj 
ττροαναχωρησει  των   ΜακεΒόνων,   οσοις  ένετυχον 

^  Poppo's  correction  for  iiriovTas  of  the  MSS. 


BOOK    IV.  cxxvn.  2-cxxviii.  4 

onset  and  continued  to  receive  their  attacks  and 
repulse  them,  but  when  they  ceased,  tliemselves 
retired.  Thereupon  most  of  the  barbarians  re- 
frained from  attacking  the  Hellenes  under  Brasidas 
in  the  open  country,  and  leaving  a  portion  of  their 
force  to  follow  and  harass  them,  the  rest,  advancing 
on  the  run  after  the  fleeing  Macedonians,  slew  them 
as  they  came  upon  them,  and  getting  ahead  of  them 
occupied  the  narrow  pass  between  two  hills  Avhich 
led  into  the  country  of  Arrhabaeus,  knowing  that 
there  was  no  other  wa}'  of  retreat  for  Brasidas.  And 
just  as  he  was  coming  to  the  most  difficult  part  of 
the  road,  they  began  to  encircle  him  with  a  view 
to  cutting  him  off. 

CXX\1[I.  But  he  perceived  their  intention  and 
told  his  three  hundred  to  break  ranks  and  go  at  a 
run,  each  as  fast  as  he  could,  to  that  one  of  the  hills 
which  he  thought  could  be  taken  more  easily  and 
try  to  dislodge  the  barbarians  already  there  before 
the  larger  outflanking  body  could  come  up.  They 
accordingly  attacked  and  overcame  the  men  on  the 
hill,  and  so  the  main  body  of  the  Hellenes  now  more 
easily  made  their  way  to  it ;  for  the  barbarians,  find- 
ing that  their  ΟΛνη  men  had  been  dislodged  from 
the  high  ground,  became  alarmed  and  followed  no 
further,  thinking  that  the  enemy  were  already  on 
the  frontier  and  had  made  good  their  escape. 
Brasidas,  however,  when  he  had  gained  the  heights^ 
proceeded  in  more  security  and  arrived  the  same 
day  at  Arnisa,  the  first  town  in  the  dominions  of 
Perdiccas.  As  for  his  soldiers,  they  were  enraged 
at  the  Macedonians  for  having  gone  ahead  in  retreat, 
and   whenever    they    came    upon    any   ox-teams   of 


433 


THUCYDIDES 

κατά  την  όΒον  ζevy€σιv  αυτών  βοβικοΐς  η  el'  τινι 
σκεύβι  έκττετττωκότι,  οία  h>  νυκτερινή  καϊ  φοβέρα 
άνα'χωρήσει  €ίκο<ί  ην  ξυμβήναι,  τά  μεν  ύττυΧν- 
οντβς  κατβκοπτον,  των  Be  οίκειωσιν  βποιοΰντο. 
5  άτΓΟ  τούτου  τβ  ττρώτον  ΤίερΒίκκας  ΈρασίΒαν  Τ€ 
ΤΓοΧεμιον  βνόμισβ  καϊ  i<i  το  Xolttov  ΥΙεΧοττον- 
νησίων  ττ)  μεν  Ύνώμτ]  Si'  ^Αθηναίους  ου  ξύνΐ]θ€<; 
μίσος  ^Ιχ^,  των  Βε  αναγκαίων  ξυμφόρων  Βια- 
ναστας  ^  βττρασσεν  οτω  τροττω  τάχ^ιστα  τοις  μεν 
ζυμβησεταί,  των  Be  άτταΧλάζεταί. 

CXXIX.  Βρασίδα?  Be  άιαχωρησας  εκ  Ma«e- 
Βονίας  €?  Ύορώνην  καταΧαμβάνει  Αθηναίους 
ΜενΒην  ηΒη  έχοντας,  καϊ  αυτού  ησνχάζων  ες  μεν 
την  ΐΙαΧΧήνην  άΒύνατος  ηΒη  ενόμίζεν  είναι  Bta• 
βάς  τίμωρεΐΐ',  την  Βε   Ύορώνην  εν  φυΧακη   είχεν. 

2  ύτΓο  <yap  τον  αύτον  'χρονον  τοις  εν  ttj  Αύ^κω 
εξέττΧευσαν  επί  τε  την  ΜενΒην  και  την  ^κιώνην  οι 
"Αθηναίοι,  ωσττερ  τταρεσκενάζι,ντο,  νανσΐ  μεν 
πεντήκοντα,  ών  ήσαν  Βέκα  ϋΐαι,  οττΧίταις  Βε 
χιΧίοις  εαυτών  καϊ  τοξοταις  εζακοσιοις  καϊ  @ραξΙ 
μισθωτοΐς  χιΧίοις  καϊ  άΧΧοις  τών  αυτόθεν  ζυμ- 
μάχ^ων  ττεΧτασταΐς'  εστρατιί^ει  Βε  Νικίας  6 
Νικηράτου     καϊ     Νικόστρατος     6      Αιειτρεφους. 

3  άραντες  Be  εκ  ΤΙοτειΒαίας  ταΐς  ναυσι  καϊ  σχοντες 
κατά  το  ΐΙοσειΒώνιον  εχώρουν  ες  τους  ^ϊενΒαιους. 
οι  Βε  αυτοί  τε  καϊ  Έκιωναίων  τριακόσιοι  βεβοη- 
θηκότες  ΤΙεΧοτΓοννησίων  τε  οι  εττίκουροι,  ξύμτταν- 
Τ€ς  "^  επτακόσιοι  οπΧΙται,  καϊ  ΥΙοΧνΒαμίΒας  ο 
άρχων  αυτών,  ετυχον  εζεστρατοπεΒευμενοι  εξω  της 

1  Hude  adopts  Madvig's  correction,  τφ  Se  avayKoiif  ξυμφόρψ 
διαστάι,  "However,  such  was  the  urgency  of  his  situation 
that  he  stood  aside  and  began  to  devise  how  ..." 

*  5e,  iu  the  MSS.  after  ζύμπαντΐ5,  deleted  by  Kriiger, 

434 


BOOK    IV.  cxxviii.  4-cxxix.  3 

theirs  in  the  road  or  upon  any  baggage  that  had 
been  dropped,  as  was  likely  to  happen  in  a  retreat 
made  by  night  and  in  a  panic,  of  tlieir  own  accord 
they  loosed  the  oxen  and  slaughtered  them,  but 
appropriated  the  baggage.  And  from  this  time 
Perdiccas  began  to  regard  Brasidas  as  an  enemy,  and 
thenceforth  he  cherished  a  hatred  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesians,  which  was  indeed  not  consistent  with  his 
feeling  against  the  Athenians.  However,  disregard- 
ing his  own  urgent  interests,  he  was  devising  how 
he  might  in  the  quickest  Avay  come  to  terms  with 
the  latter  and  get  rid  of  the  former. 

CXXIX.  Returning  from  Macedonia  to  Torone, 
Brasidas  found  the  Athenians  already  in  possession 
of  Mende  ;  and  thinking  it  now  impossible  to  cross 
over  to  Pallene  and  give  aid,  he  remained  quiet 
Λvhere  he  was,  but  kept  watch  over  Torone.  For 
about  the  same  time  as  the  events  in  Lyncus  the 
Athenians  had  sailed  against  Mtnde  and  Scione,  as 
they  had  been  preparing  to  do,^  with  fifty  ships,  of 
which  ten  were  Chian,  and  v.'uh  one  thousand  hop- 
lites  of  their  own,  six  hundred  bowmen,  a  thousand 
Thracian  mercenaries,  and  in  addition  targeteers 
from  their  allies  in  that  neighbourhood.  They  were 
under  the  command  of  Nicias  son  of  Niceratus  and 
Nicostratus  son  of  Diitrephes.  Setting  out  with  the 
fleet  from  Potidaea  and  putting  in  at  the  temple  of 
Poseidon,  they  advanced  into  the  country  of  the 
Mendaeans.  Now  these  and  three  hundred  Scion- 
aeans  who  had  come  to  their  support,  and  the 
Peloponnesian  auxiliaries,  seven  hundred  hoplites  in 
all,  with  Polydamidas  as  their  commander,  had  just 

*  qf,  ch.  cxxii.  6 ;  cxxiii.  3. 

435 


THUCYDIDES 

4  ττόλεω?  eVl  Χόφου  καρτεροΰ.  καΐ  αύτοΐ<;  Νικίας 
μβν,  ^Ιεθωναιους  re  ^χ^ων  είκοσι  καϊ  εκατόν  ψιΧού^ 
και  Xoyaca^  των  Αθηναίων  οττΧιτών  έξηκοντα  καΐ 
τους  τοξότας  απαντάς,  κατά,  άτραττόν  τίνα  τον 
Χόφου  ττειρωμενος  ττροσβήναι  και  τραυμάτιζα  μένος 
ύτΓ  αυτών  ουκ  εΒυνήθΐ]  βιάσασθαι•  Ί^ικόστρατος 
be  αΧΧτ]  έ'φόδω  εκ  πλείονος  παντί  τω  άΧΧφ  στρα- 
τοττεδω  επιών  τω  Χοφω  οντι  8υσπροσβάτω  και 
πάνυ   εθορυβήθη,   καϊ  ες   oXiyov  αφίκετο   πάν  το 

5  στράτευμα  τών  ^Αθηναίων  νικηθήναι.  καϊ  ταύττ) 
μεν  ττι  ήμερα,  ώς  ουκ  ενεΒοσαν  οι  Μ.εν8αΐοι  καϊ  οι 
ξυμμα^οι,  οί  Αθηναίοι  άνα'χ^ωρησαντες  εστρατο- 
πεΒεύσαντο,  καϊ  οί  Μ.εν8αΐοι  νυκτός  επεΧθούσης 
ες  την  ποΧιν  άπηΧθον. 

CXXX.  Ύη  δ'  υστεραΐα  οι  μεν  ^Αθηναίοι  περι- 
πΧεύσαντες  ες  το  προς  Έ,κιώνης  τό  τε  προάστειον 
εΐΧον  καϊ  την  ήμεραν  άπασαν  ε^ηουν  την  yf/v 
ούδενος  επεξιοντος  (ην  yap  τι  καϊ  στασιασμοΰ  εν 
τη   πόΧει),  οί   δε  τριακόσιοι   τών  Χκιωναίων  της 

2  επιούσης  νυκτός  άπεχ^ώρησαν  eV  οίκου,  καϊ  τη 
επιyιyvoμέvr]  ήμερα  Ί^ικίας  μεν  τω  ήμίσει  του 
στρατού  προϊών  άμα  ες  τα  μεθόρια  τών  ^κιωναίων 
την  yijv  ehrjov,  Νικόστρατος  Be  τοις  Χοιποΐς  κατά 
τάς  άνω  πύΧας,  η  επΙ  ΐΙοτειΒαιας  ερχ^ονται,  προσ- 

3  εκάθητο  τη  πόΧει.  ό  δε  ΤίοΧυΕαμίΒας  (ετυχ^ε  yap 
ταύτη  τοις  ΜενΒαίοις  καϊ  επικούροις  εντός  τον 
τείγ^ους    τά   οπΧα    κείμενα)  διατάσσει    τε    ώς    ες 

4  μάχ^ην  καϊ  παρηνει  τοις  ΜενΒαίοις  επεξιεναι.  και 
τίνος  αύτώ  τών  από  του  Βήμου  άντειπόντος  κατά 
το  στασιωτικόν  οτι  ουκ  επεξεισιν  ουδέ  8εοιτο 
ποΧεμεΐν,  καϊ  ώς  άντείπεν  επισπασθεντος   τε  τη 

430 


BOOK    IV.  cxxix.  3-cxx\.  4 

encamped  outside  tlie  city  in  a  strong  position  on  a 
hill.  Nicias  tried  to  reach  them  by  a  path  up  the  hill, 
having  with  him  one  hundred  and  twenty  light-armed 
Methonaeans,  sixty  picked  men  of  the  Athenian 
hopliteSj  and  all  the  boAvmen,  but  his  troops  suffered 
in  the  attempt  and  he  was  unable  to  carry  this 
position.  Nicostratus,  however,  with  all  the  rest  of 
the  army,  advancing  against  the  hill,  which  was 
difficult  of  access,  by  another  and  longer  route,  was 
thrown  into  utter  confusion,  and  the  whole  Athenian 
army  narrowly  escaped  defeat.  So  on  this  day, 
as  the  Mendaeans  and  their  allies  did  not  yield, 
the  Athenians  withdrew  and  encamped,  and  the 
Mendaeans,  when  night  came  on,  returned  to  the 
city. 

CXXX.  On  the  next  day  the  Athenians  sailed 
round  to  the  side  of  the  town  facing  Scione  and  took 
the  suburb,  and  all  that  day  they  ravaged  the  land. 
No  one  came  out  against  them,  as  there  was  some 
sort  of  uprising  in  the  town  ;  and  during  the  fol- 
lowing night  the  three  hundred  Scionaeans  returned 
home.  On  the  next  day  Nicias  with  half  of  the 
army  advanced  as  far  as  the  boundary  of  the 
Scionaeans  and  ravaged  the  land,  while  Nicostratus 
with  the  rest  sat  down  before  the  city  at  the 
upper  gates,  on  the  road  leading  to  Potidaea.  But 
it  chanced  that  in  that  quarter  of  the  town,  inside 
the  walls,  the  arms  of  the  Mendaeans  and  their 
auxiliaries  were  deposited,  and  Polydamidas  was 
there  drawing  his  troops  up  for  battle  and  exhorting 
the  Mendaeans  to  make  a  sortie.  Some  one  of  the 
popular  party  mutinously  answered  him  that  he 
would  not  go  out  and  had  no  use  for  war,  but  no 
sooner  had   he  answered   than    Polydamidas    seized 

437 


THUCYDIDES 

χειρί  ύτΓ  αυτού  καί  θορυβηθίντο'ζ}  ο  Βήμο•;  €υθυ<; 
άναΚαβων  τα  οττλα  Trepiopyr]^  βχώρβι  iirl  τ€ 
ΏβΧοποννησίους  και  τοι)?  τα  βναντία  σφίσι   yuer' 

5  αυτών  ττράξαντας.  καϊ  ΤΓροσττβσόντβ'ί  τρβττουσιν 
άμα  μ€ν  μά'χτ]  αΙφνιΒίω,  άμα  8e  τοις  Άθηναίοι.<; 
των  ττυΧών  άνοΐ'^/ομίνων  φοβηθίντων  ωηθησαν 
yap  αττο  ΤΓροειρημενου  τίνος  αύτοΐς  την  βττί'χείρη- 

6  σιν  yevkaOai.  καϊ  οι  μεν  e9  την  ακρόττόΧιν,  όσοι 
μη  αύτίκα  Βιβφθάρησαν,  κaτeφυyov,  ηνπερ  καϊ  το 
•πρότερον  αυτοί  εΐ'χ^ον  οΐ  8e  \\θηναΐοι  (η8η  yap  καϊ 
6  οικίας  ετΓαναστρβψας  ττρος  ττ)  ττόλει  ην)  iarre- 
σ6ντ€<;  €9  την  ττόΧιν,'  άτε  ουκ  άπο  ζυμβάσεως 
άνοί-χθεΐσαν,  άττάση  τη  στρατιά  ώ?  κατά  κράτος 
βΧόιτβς  δίήρττασαν,  και  μόΧις  οί  στpaτηyol  κατέ- 
(τχον  ώστε  μη  καϊ  τους  ανθρώπους  Βιαφθείρεσθαι. 

7  καϊ  τους  μβν  Μει/δαίους  μετά  ταύτα  ττοΧιτεύειν 
€Κ€\€υον  ώσττερ  βιώθεσαν,  αυτούς  κριναντας  ev 
σφίσιν  αύτοΐς  βί  τινας  rjyouvTai  αιτίους  είναι  της 
άτΓοστάσεως'  τους  δ'  εν  τη  άκρηττοΧει  άττετει- 
'χ^ισαν  εκατέρωθεν  τεί'χει  ες  θάΧασσαν  καϊ  φυΧανην 
ετΓίκαθίσταντο}  εττειΒη  δε  τά  ττερϊ  την  Μέν8ην 
κατεσγ^ον,  εττϊ  την  Έ,κιώνην  εχ^ώρουν. 

CXXXI.  Οί  8ε  άντεττε^εΧθόντες  αύτοϊ  και 
ΤΙεΧοτΓοννήσιοι  ί^ρύθησαν  εττΙ  Χόφου  καρτερού 
ττρο  της  ττΙΧεως,  ον  εΐ  μη  εΧοιεν  οί  ενάντιοι,  ουκ 
2  εyίyvετo  σφών  ττεριτείχισις.  ττροσβαΧόντες  δ 
αύτω  κατά  κράτος  οί  ^Αθηναίοι  καϊ  μάγ^η  εκκρού• 
σαντες  τους  εττόντας*  εστρατοττεΒευσαντο  τε  και 
ες   τον  ττεριτειγ^ισμύν  τροπαΐον  στήσαντες   τταρε- 

^  θορυβ-ηθίΐ'τοί,  Hude  καταθορυβ-ηβίντοί. 
-  την  Μίνδην  πόλιν,  MSS.;   Dobree  deletes  M€Vδ7)^'. 
^  Poppo's  correction  for  (π^καθίσαντο  of  the  MSS. 
*  Dobree's  correction  for  inwvTas  of  the  MSS. 

43δ 


BOOK    IV.  cxxx.  4-cxxxi.  2 

him  with  violence  and  roughly  handled  him ; 
whereupon  the  populace  in  great  anger  at  once 
caught  up  their  arms  and  advanced  upon  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  and  the  opposite  party  who  were  in 
league  with  them.  Falling  upon  them  they  put 
them  to  rout,  partly  by  the  suddenness  of  their 
onslaught,  partly  because  the  others  were  terrified 
when  the  gates  Avere  opened  to  the  Athenians ;  for 
they  thought  that  the  attack  had  been  made  upon 
them  by  a  preconcerted  agreement.  Those  of  the 
Peloponnesians  Avho  were  not  killed  on  the  spot 
took  refuge  on  the  acropolis,  Λvhich  they  already 
had  possession  of;  but  the  Athenians — for  Nicias 
had  already  turned  back  and  Λvas  near  the  city — 
burst  into  the  city  Avith  their  whole  force,  and,  as 
the  gates  had  been  opened  without  an  agreement, 
plundered  the  city  as  though  they  had  taken  it  by 
storm  ;  and  the  generals  with  difficulty  kept  them 
from  destroying  the  inhabitants  also.  They  then 
directed  the  Mendaeans  henceforth  to  retain  their 
former  constitution,  and  bring  to  trial  among  them- 
selves any  whom  they  thought  guilty  of  the  revolt; 
but  the  men  on  the  acropolis  they  fenced  off  Λvith 
a  wall  extending  on  either  side  down  to  the  sea,  and 
set  a  guard  over  them.  And  Λvhen  they  had  thus 
secured  Mende,  they  proceeded  against  Scione. 

CXXX  I.  The  Scionaeans  and  the  Peloponnesians 
had  come  out  against  them  and  taken  position  on  a 
strong  hill  before  the  city,  which  had  to  be  taken  by 
the  enemy  before  the  city  could  be  invested  with  a 
wall.  So  the  Athenians  made  a  furious  assault  upon 
the  hill  and  dislodged  those  that  were  upon  it ;  they 
then  encamped  and,  after  raising  a  trophy,  prepared 


439 


THUCYDIDES 

3  σκ€νάζοντο.  καΐ  αυτών  ου  ττοΧύ  ύστερον  ηοη  ev 
epyw  όντων  οί  εκ  τή'ί  άκροττόΧεως  iv  ττ}  ^lev8r} 
7Γθ\ιορκούμ€νοί  βττίκουροί  βίασύμενοι  τταρά  θά- 
\ασσαν  την  φυΧακην  νυκτο<ί  άφικνούνται,  καΐ 
Βιαφν^/οντε^  οί  πΧεΐστοί  το  βττΐ  ττ}  'Σκιώιτ}  στρα- 
ToTTeSov  βσηΧθον  ές  αυτήν. 

CXXXII.  ΥΙζριτεΐ'χ^ιζομβνης  Be  τή<;  ^κιώνη<ί 
ΥίβρΒίκκας  τοις  των  'Αθηναίων  στρατη-γοΐς  εττί- 
κηρυκευσάμενος  όμοΧο'γίαν  ττοιείται  ττρος  τους 
\\θηναίους  8ta  την  του  ϋρασίΒου  βχθραν  ττερι 
τ/)?    €Κ    ττ}?    Αύ^κου    άναχ^ωρήσεω^,    ευθύς    τότε 

2  άρξάμενος  ττράσσείν.  καΐ  ετύγχανε  yap  τότε 
^ΙσχαΎορας  ό  ΑακεΒαιμόνιος  στρατιαν  μεΧΧων 
ττεζτ)  τΓορενσειν  ώς  ΒρασίΒαν,  ό  δε  ^  ΤΙερΒίκκας, 
άμα  μεν  κεΧεύοντος  του  Νικίου,  εττειΒη  ξυνεβε- 
βήκει,  ενΕηΧόν  τι  ττοιεΐν  τοις  Άθηναίοίς  βε- 
βαιότητος  περί,  άμα  δ'  αύτος  ούκετί  βουΧόμενο<^ 
ΥΙεΧοττοννησιους  ες  την  αυτού  άφικνεΐσθαι, 
τταρασκευάσας  τους  εν  θεσσαΧία  ξένους,  χρώ- 
μενος  αίεΐ  τοΐς  ττρώτοίς,  8ι.εκώΧυσε  το  στράτευμα 
καΐ  την  τταρασκευήν,  ώστε  μη8ε  ττείράσθαι  &εσ- 

3  σαΧών.  Ίσγαγόρας  μέντοι  καΐ  \\μεινίας  κα] 
^Αρίστεύς  αυτοί  τε  ώς  ΈρασίΒαν  άφίκοντο,  εττιΒεΐι 
ττεμψάντων  ΑακεΒαιμονίων  τα  7Γpάyμaτa,  κα\ 
τών  ήβώντων  αυτών "  παρανόμως  άνΒρας  i^i'jjoi 
εκ  Έττάρτης,  ώστε  τών  πόΧεων  άρχοντας  καθι- 
στάναι  καϊ  μη  τοις  εντυχούσιν  επιτρεττειν.  κα\ 
}ίΧεαρί8αν  μεν  τον  ΚΧεωνύμου  καθιστησιν  εν 
^ΑμφίττόΧει,  ΙΙασιτεΧίδαν  ^  δέ  τόΐ'  Ή'γ7]σάνδρου 
εν  Ύορώντ). 

^  56,  deleted  by  Hiule,  following  Dobree. 
2  αυτών,  Hudc  reads  αϋτω,  after  Staid. 
^  Dobii'c's  correction  for  'EitiTe\iSav  of  the  MSS.  ;  ef.  v.  3. 
440 


BOOK    IV.  cxxxi.  2-cx\.\ii.  3 

for  the  circumvallation.  But  not  long  afterwards, 
when  they  were  ah-eady  at  work,  the  auxiliaries  who 
were  besieged  on  the  acropolis  of  Mende  forced 
their  Λvay  by  night  along  the  shore  through  the 
guard  and  reached  Scione  ;  and  most  of  them  escaped 
through  the  besieging  army  and  got  into  the  city. 

CXXXII.  While  the  circumvallation  of  Scione  was 
in  progress,  Perdiccas  sent  a  herald  to  the  Athenian 
generals  and  made  an  agreement  with  them  ;  he 
was  moved  to  this  by  tlie  hatred  he  bore  Brasidas 
for  his  retreat  from  Lyncus,  at  which  time  indeed  he 
had  begun  his  negotiations.^  Now  it  happened  at 
that  time  that  Iscliagoras,  the  Lacedaemonian,  was 
on  the  point  of  taking  an  army  by  land  to  join 
Brasidas,  but  Perdiccas,  partly  because  Nicias  urged 
him,  since  he  had  made  terms  with  the  Athenians, 
to  give  them  some  token  of  his  sincerity,  partly  also 
because  he  himself  no  longer  wished  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  to  enter  his  territory,  now  worked  upon  his 
friends  in  Thessaly,  with  the  foremost  of  Λvhom  he 
was  always  on  good  terms,  and  effectually  stopped 
the  army  and  the  expedition,  to  such  a  degree  that 
they  did  not  even  try  to  obtain  permission  from  the 
Thessalians.  Ischagoras,  however,  with  Ameinias 
and  Aristeus,  came  by  themselves  to  Brasidas,  having 
been  commissioned  by  the  Lacedaemonians  to  look 
into  the  situation.  And  they  brought  from  Sparta, 
contrary  to  custom,  some  of  their  young  men,  in- 
tending to  place  them  as  governors  over  the  cities 
instead  of  entrusting  these  to  anybody  that  might 
chance  to  offer.  Accordingly,  they  placed  at  Amphi- 
polis  Clearidas  son  of  Cleonymus  and  at  Torone 
Pasitelidas  son  of  Hegesander. 

*  cf.  ch.  cxxviii.  6. 

441 


THUCYDIDES 

CXXXIII.  Έν  Be  τω  αύτω  Oepei  (^ηβαΐοι 
ΘεστΓίώι^  τ€Ϊχ^ο<;  irepielXov  βττικαΧβσαντβς  άττικι- 
σμόν,  βουΧόμενοί  μεν  καΐ  αι,ει,  7Γ(ΐρ€στηκο<ζ  Be 
ραον  €7Γ€ΐ^η  και  ev  rfj  ττρος  Άθηραίους  μάχτ]  6  τι 

2  ην  αυτών  άνθος  αττολώλει.  καΐ  ο  vea><;  της  "Ηρας 
του  αύτοΰ  θέρους  ivApyec  κατεκαύθη,  ΚρυσιΒος 
της  ιέρειας  Χύγνον  τίνα  θείσης  ημμένον  προς  τα 
στέμματα    καΐ    εττίκαταΒαρθ ούσης,    ώστε   εΧαθεν 

3  άφθεντα  ττάντα  και  καταφΧεχ^θεντα.  καΐ  7]  \ρυσις 
μεν  εύβύς  τΡις  νυκτός  Βείσασα  τους  Άρ^είους  ες 
ΦΧειούντα  φεύγει'  οι  8ε  άλΧην  ίερειαν  εκ  του 
νόμου  του  ττροκείμενου  κατεστήσαιτο  ΦαεινίΒα 
όνομα.  €τη  8ε  ή  ΧρυσΙς  τυύ  ττοΧεμου  τούδε 
εττεΧαβεν    οκτώ   καΐ  ενατον   εκ   μέσου,   οτε    εττε- 

4  φευγβί.  κα\  η  γκιώνη  του  θέρους  ηζη  τεΧευτώντος 
τΓβριετετείχ^ιστό  τε  τταντεΧώς,  καΧ  οί  ^Αθηναίοι  eV 
αύτη  φυΧακην  καταΧιττόντες  άνεχ^ώρησαν  τω  άλΧω 
στρατω. 

CXXXIV.    ΈιΡ   8ε  τω   εττιόντι   'χ^ειμώνί   τα   μεν 

^Αθηναίων    καΐ   ΑακεΒαιμονίων   ήσύχ^αζε    Sia  την 

εκεχειρίαν,  ^Ιαντινής  8ε  καΐ  Ύeyεάτaι  καΐ  οί  ζύμ- 

μαγοι    εκατερων   ξυνεβαΧον  εν  Ααοδοκείω  ^    της 

^ΟρεσθίΒος,  καΐ  νυκη  άμφιΖηριτος  ε^ένετο'     κέρας 

yap  εκάτεροί  τρεψαντες  το   καθ^  αυτούς  τροτταΐά 

τ€    αμφότεροι    έστησαν  καΐ    σκΰΧα    ες    ΑεΧφούς 

2  άττέττεμ^αν.      Βιαφθαρέντων  μέντοι  ττοΧΧών   εκα- 

τέροίς  και   ά^-χωμαΧου  της  μύχ^ης   γενομένης   καΧ 

*  Bursian'a  correction  for  Λαοδι/ίί^  of  llie  MSS. 

442 


BOOK    IV.  cxxxiii.  i-cxxxiv.  2 

CXXXIII.  In  tlie  same  summer  the  Thebans 
dismantled  the  Λvall  of  the  Thespians,  accusing  them 
of  favouring  the  Athenians.  Indeed  they  had  al- 
\vays  wished  to  do  this,  but  now  found  it  easier, 
since  the  flower  of  the  Thespians  had  perished  in  the 
battle  with  the  Athenians.^  In  this  same  summer, 
too,  the  temple  of  Hera  at  Argos  was  burned  down, 
Chrysis-  the  priestess  having  placed  a  lighted  torch 
near  the  garlands  and  then  gone  to  sleep,  so  that 
the  whole  place  took  fire  and  was  ablaze  before  she 
WAS  aware.  And  Chrysis  that  very  night,  in  fear  of 
the  Argives,  fled  to  Phlius ;  but  they  appointed 
another  priestess  according  to  the  custom  prescribed, 
Phiieinis  byname.  Chrysis  had  been  priestess  during 
eight  years  of  this  war  and  half  of  the  ninth  when 
she  fled.  To\vard  the  close  of  the  summer  Scione 
was  at  length  completely  invested,  and  the  Athenians, 
leaving  a  guard  there,  withdrew  with  the  rest  of 
their  army. 

CXXXIV.  In  the  following  winter,  on  account  of 
the  armistice,  matters  were  quiet  with  the  Athenians 
and  the  Lacedaemonians  ;  but  the  Mantineans  and 
the  Tegeans  with  their  respective  allies  fought  a 
battle  at  Laodoceum  in  the  district  of  Oresthis. 
The  victory  was  disputed ;  for  each  side  routed  the 
wing  opposed  to  themselves,  and  both  set  up  trophies^ 
and  sent  spoils  to  Delphi.  Certain  it  is  at  any  rate 
that  after  many  had  fallen  on  both  sides  and  night 
had  cut  short  the  action,  the  issue  of  battle  being 

'  At  Delium  ;  cf.  cli.  xciii.  4  ;  xcvi.  3. 

"  The  same  who  in  431  B.C.  had  held  her  office  forty-eight 
years  ;  cf.  ii.  ii.  1. 

'  It  seems  that  the  Mantineans  and  Tegeans  each  defeated 
the  other's  allies,  which  vreve  on  the  left  wings  of  the 
opposing  armies. 

443 


THUCYDIDES 

άφ€\ομενη<ί  νυκτός  το  epyov  οι  TeyeuTai  μεν 
€πηυ\ίσαντο  re  καΧ  evOv'i  έστησαν  τροτταΐον, 
Μαΐ'Τί/'τ}*»  δε  άττεχώρησάν  τε  e'f  ]^ovκo\ιώva  καΧ 
ύστερον  άντεστησαν. 

CXXXV.  Άττεττείρασε  8ε  του  αυτού  γ^ειμωνος 
καΐ  6  Βρασίδας  τεΧευτώντος  καΧ  π/3ο?  εαρ  ηζη 
Ποτείδα/α?.  ττροσεΧθων  yap  νυκτός  καΧ  κΧιμακα 
ττροσθβΧ^;  f^^Xpi-  Ρ-^^  τούτου  εΧαθεν  του  yap 
κωΒωνος  τταρενεχθεντος  ούτως  ες  το  Ζίάκενον, 
ττρΧν  εττανεΧθεΐν  τον  τταραΒιδόντα  αυτόν,  η  ττροσ- 
θεσις  εyεvετo'  εττειτα  μεντοί  ευθύς  αίσθομενων, 
ττρΧν  ΤΓροσβηναι,  ά^Γήyayε  ττάΧιν  κατά  τάχους  την 
2  στρατιαν  καΧ  ουκ  άνεμεινεν  ημεραν  yεvεσθaι.  και 
6  -χ^ειμων  ετεΧεύτα,  καΧ  ενατον  έτος  τω  ττοΧεμω 
ετεΧεύτα  τωδε  ον  θουκυΒίΒί]ς  ^uviypaxjrev. 


BOOK    IV.    cxxxiv.  2-c.\'xxv,  2 

still  undecided,  the  Tegeans  bivouacked  on  the  field 
and  set  up  a  trophy  at  once,  while  the  Mantineans 
retreated  to  Bucolion,  and  afterwards  set  up  a  rival 
trophy. 

CXXXV.  ToAvard  the  close  of  the  same  winter, 
when  spring  Avas  near  at  hand,  Brasidas  made  an  at- 
tempt on  Potidaea.  He  came  up  by  night  and  placed 
a  ladder  against  the  wall,  up  to  this  point  escaping 
detection  ;  for  the  ladder  was  planted  precisely  at  the 
interval  of  time  after  the  bell  had  been  carried  by 
and  before  the  patrol  who  passed  it  on  had  come 
back.i  The  guards,  however,  discovered  it  imme- 
diately, before  an  ascent  could  be  made,  and  Brasidas 
made  haste  to  lead  his  army  back  again,  not  wait- 
ing for  day  to  come.  So  ended  the  winter  and  with 
it  the  ninth  year  of  this  war  of  which  Thucydides 
wrote  the  history. 

'  It  appears  that  the  bell  was  passed  from  one  sentinel  to 
the  next.  Another,  and  probably  more  common,  way  of 
testing  the  watclifulness  of  the  sentinels  was  to  have  a  patrol 
with  a  bell  make  the  round,  each  sentinel  having  to  answer 
the  sitrnal. 


445 


Pris-ted  in  Great  Britain  bt 

Richard  clay  and  Compant,  Ltd., 

Bungay,  Suffolk 


THE   LOEB   CLASSICAL 
LIBRARY 

VOLUMES    ALREADY    PUBLISHED 

Latin  Authors 

Ammianus  Marcellinus.     Translated  by  J.  C.  Rolfe.      3  Vols. 

(Netv  3rd  Imp.,  revised.) 
Apuleius:    The  Golden  Ass  (Metamorphoses).     VV.  Adling- 

ton(1566).     Revised  by  S.  Gaselee.     {1th  Imp.) 
S.    Augustine:     City    of    God.       7    Vols.      Vol.    I.      G.  E. 

McCracken. 
St.  Augustine,  Confessions  of.     W.  Watts  (1631).     2  Vols. 

(Vol.  I.  nth  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  Qth  Imp.) 
St.  Augustine,  Select  Letters.     J.  H.  Baxter.     (2nd  Imp.) 
AusONius.     H.  G.  Evelyn  White.      2  Vols.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Bede.     J.  E.  King.      2  Vols.     (2nd  Imp.) 
BoETHius :     Tracts    and    De    Consolatione    Philosophiae. 

Rev.  H.  F.  Stewart  and  E.  K.  Rand.     (&th  Imp.) 
Caesar:    Alexandrian,  African  and  Spanish  \Vars.     A.  G. 

Way. 
Caesar:   Civil  Wars.     A.  G.  Peskett.     (Qth  Imp  ) 
Caesar:   Gallic  War.     H.  J.  Edwards.     (ΙΙίΛ  Imp.) 
Cato:   De  Re  Rustica;   Varko:   De  Re  Rustica.     H.  B.  Ash 

and  W.  D.  Hooper.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Catullus.     F.  W.  Cornish;    Tibullus.     J.  Β.  Postgate;    Per- 
vigilium Veneris.     J.  W.  Mackail.     (IZth  Imp.) 
Celsus:     De   Medicina.     W.   G.    Spencer.     3   Vols.     (Vol.   I. 

3rd  Imp.  revised.  Vols.  II.  and  III.  2nd  Imp.) 
Cicero:    Brutus,  and  Orator.     G.  L.  Hendrickson  and  H.  M. 

Hubbell.     (3rd  Imp.) 
[Cicero]:   Ad  Herennium.     H.  Caplan. 
Cicero  :    de   Fato;    Paradoxa  Stoicorum;    De  Partitione 

Oratoria.     H.     Rackham     (With     De     Oratore.     Vol.     II.) 

(2nd  Imp.) 
Cicero:    De  Finibus.     H.  Rackham.     (4th  Imp.  revised.) 
Cicero :   De  Inventione,  etc.     H.  M.  Hubbell. 
Cicero:    De  Natura  Deorum  and  Academica.     H.  Rackham. 

(3rd  Imp.) 
Cicero :    De  Officiis.     Walter  Miller.     (1th  Imp.) 
Cicero  :    De  Oratore.     2  Vols.     E.  W.  Sutton  and  H.  Rack- 
ham.    (3rd  Imp.) 
Cicero  :   De  Republica  and  De  Legibus  ;   Somnium  Scipionis. 

Clinton  W.  Keyes.     (4th  Imp.) 
Cicero:     De    Senectute,    De    Amicitia,    De    Divinatione. 

W.  A.  Falconer.     (6/Λ  Imp.) 
Cicero  :  In  Catilinam,  Pro  Placco,  Pro  Murena,  Pro  Sulla. 

Louis  E.  Lord.     (3rd  Imp.  revised.) 

1 


Cicero:     Letters    to    Atticus.     E.    O.    Winstedt.     3    Vols. 

(Vol.  I.  Ith  Imp.,  Vols.  II.  and  III.  4<Λ  Imp.) 
Cicero :    Letters  to  His  Friends.     W.  Glynn  Williams.     3 

Vols.     (Vols.  I.  and  II.  3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  III.  2nd  Imp.  revised.) 
Cicero :    Philippics.     ΛΥ.  C.  A.  Ker.     {4th  Imp.  revised.) 
Cicero:    Pro  Archia,  Post  Reditum,  De  Domo,  De  Harus- 

PICUM  Responsis,  Pro  Plaxcio.     N.  H.  AVatts.     {5ih  Imp.) 
Cicero  :    Pro  Caecina,  Pro  Lege  Manilia,   Pro   Cluentio, 

Pro  Rabirio.     H.  Grose  Hodge.     {2rd  Imp.) 
Cicero  :     Pro    Caelio,    De    Provinciis    Consularibus.     Pro 

Balbo.     R.  Gardner. 
Cicero:   Pro  Milone,  In  Pisonem,  Pro  Scauro,  Pro  Fonteio. 

Pro  Rabirio  Posttjmo,  Pro  Marcello,  Pro  Ligario,  Pro 

Rege  Deiotaro.     X.  H.  λνβίΐβ.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Cicero  :    Pro  Quinctio,   Pro   Roscio  Amekino,   Pro  Roscio 

CoMOEDO,  Contra  Rullum.     J.  H.  Freese.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Cicero:    Pro  Sestio,  In  Vatinium.     R.  Gardner. 
Cicero  :  TuscuLAN  Disputations.     J.E.King,     {ith  Imp.) 
Cicero:    Verrine  Orations.      L.  H.  G.  Greenwood.      2  Vols. 

(Vol.  I.  3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  2)id  Imp.) 
Clatjdian.     M.  Platnauer.     2  Vols.     (2?!d  Imp.) 
Columella:    De  Re  Rustica.     De  Arboribus.     H.  B.  Ash, 

E.  S.  Forster  and  E.  Heffner.      3  Vols.  (Vol.  I.  2?!d  Imp.) 
Curtius,  Q.:    History  of  Alexander.     J.  C.  Rolfe.     2  Vols. 

(2nd  Imp.) 
Florus.     E.  S.  Forster  and  Cornelius  Nepos.     J.  C.  Rolfe. 

{2nd  Imp.) 
Frontinus  :    Stratagems  and  Aqueducts.     C.  E.  Bennett  and 

M.  B.  McElwain.     {2nd  Imp.) 
Fronto:     Correspondence.      C.    R.    Haines.      2    Vols.    (3rd 

Imp.) 
Gellius,  J.  C.  Rolfe.      3  Vols.      (Vol.  I.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  II.  and 

III.  2nd  Imp.) 
Horace:     Odes    and    Epodes.     C.    E.    Bennett.     {\4th    Imp. 

revised.) 
Horace:   Satires,  Epistles,  Ars  Poetica.     H.  R.  Fairclough. 

(9ίΛ  Imp.  revised.) 
Jerome:    Selected  Letters.     F.  A.  Wright.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Juvenal  and  Persius.     G.  G.  Ramsay.     (8?Λ  Imp.) 
Livy.     B.  O.  Foster,  F.  G.  Moore.   Evan  T.  Sage,  and  A.  C. 

Schlesinger  and  R.  M.  Geer  (General  Index).      14  Vols.     (Vol. 

I.   5th  Imp.,   Vol.   V.  Ath  Imp.,  Vols.  II.-IV.,  VI.  and  VII.. 

IX.-XII.  3rd  hnp.,  Vol.  VIII..  2nd  Imp.  revised.) 
LucAN.     J.  D.  Duff,     {ith  Imp.) 
Lucretius.     W.  H.  D.  Rouse.     (Ith  Imp.  revised.) 
Martial.     W.  C.  A.  Ker.     2  Vols.  (Vol.  I.  6th  Imp.,  Vol.  II. 

4th  Imp.  revised.) 
Minor    Latin    Poets:     from   Publilius    Syrus    to   Rutiuus 

Namatianus,     including    Grattius,    Caxpurnius    Siculus, 

Nemesiajsus,  Avianus,  and  others  with   "  Aetna  "  and  the 

"Phoenix."     J.    Wight    Dufi    and    Arnold    Μ.    Duff.     (3rd 

Im,p.) 


Ovid:    The  Art  of  Love  and  Other  Poems.     J.  H.  Mozley. 

(4iA  Imp.) 
Ovid:    Fasti.      Sir  James  G.  Frazer.     {2nd  Imp.) 
Ολίο:   Heroides  and  Amores.     Grant  Showerman.     (Ith  Imp.) 
Ovid:    Metamorphoses.      F.  J.  Miller.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.   ΙΙίΛ 

Imp.,  Vol.  II.  \Oth  Imp.) 
Ovid:   Tristia  and  Ex  Ponto.      A.  L.  Wheeler.     (2rd  Imp.) 
Persius.     Cf.  Juvenal. 
Petronius.        M.       Heseltine,       Seneca       Apocolocyntosis. 

W.  H.  D.  Rouse.     (9i/i  Im.p.  revised.) 
Plautus.     Paul  Nixon.      5  Vols.     {Vo\.l.  &th  Imp. ,11.  5th  Imp., 

III.  4<A  Imp.,  IV.  and  V.  2nd  Imp.) 
Pliny:    Letters.     Melraoth's  Translation  revised  by  W.  M.  L. 

Hutchinson.      2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  Tth  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  6th  Imp.) 
Pliny:    Natural  History.     H.  Rackham  and  W.  H.  S.  Jones. 

10  Vols.     Vols.  I.-V.  and  IX.     H.  Rackham.     Vols.  VI.  and 

VII.     \V.  H.  S.  Jones.     (Vol.  I.  4i/i  Imp.,  Vols.  II.  and  III. 

'6rd  Im,p.,  Vol.  IV.  2nd  Imp.) 
Propertius.     H.  E.  Butler.     (7ίΛ.  Imp.) 
Prudentius.     H.  J.  Thomson.      2  Λ'ΌΙβ. 
Quintilian.     H.    E.    Butler.     4   Vols.     (Vols.    I.    and   IV.    Uh 

Imp.,  Vols.  II.  and  III.  Zrd  Im,p.) 
Remains  of  Old  Latin.     E.  H.  Warmington.     4  vols.     Vol.  I. 

(Ennius     and     Caecilius.)     Vol.     II.     (Livius,     Naevius, 

Pacuvius,  Accius.)     Vol.  III.     (Lucilius  and  Laws  of  XII 

Tables.)     (2nd  Imp.)     (Archaic  Inscriptions.) 
Sallust.     J.  C.  Rolfe.     (4ίΛ  Imp.  revised.) 
Scriptures  Historiae  Augustae.     D.  Magie.      3  Vols.  (Vol.  I. 

'Srd  Imp.  revised.  Vols.  II.  and  III.  2?id  Imp.) 
Seneca:    Apocolocyntosis.     Cf.  Petronius. 
Seneca:     Epistulab    Morales.     R.    M.    Guramere.     3    Vols. 

(Vol.  I.  4th  Imp.,  Vols.  II.  and  III.  2nd  Imp.) 
Seneca:     Moral  Essays.     J.   W.   Basore.      3   Vols.     (Vol.   II. 

4th  Imp.,  Vols.  I.  and  III.  2nd  Imp.  revised.) 
Seneca:    Tragedies.     F.  J.  Miller.      2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  4th  Imp. 

Vol.  II.  3r(i  Imp.  revised.) 
SiDONius:     Poems   and   Letters.      W.   B.   Anderson.      2  Vols. 

(Vol.  I.  2nd  Imp.) 
SiLius    Italicus.     J.    D.    Duff.     2    Vols.     (Vol.    I.    2nd    Imp. 

Vol.  II.  3rd  Imp.) 
Statius.     J.  H.  Mozley.     2  Vols.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Suetonius.     J.  C.  Rolfe.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  Ith  Imp.,  Vol.  II. 

Qth  Imp.  revised.) 
Tacitus:     Dialogues.     Sir    Wm.    Peterson.     Agricola    and 

Germania.     Maurice  Hutton.     {Tth  Imp.) 
Tacitus  :   Histories  and  Annals.    C.  H.  Moore  and  J.  Jackson. 

4  Vols..    (Vols.  I.  and  II.  4i/i  7mp.    Vols.  III.  and  IV.  3rd /mp.) 
Terence.     John  Sargeaunt.      2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.   ith  Imp.,   Vol. 

II.  Ith  Imp.) 
Tertullian:    Apologia  and  De  Spbctaculis.     T.  R.  Glover. 

MiNUCius  Felix.     G.  H.  Rendall.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Valerius  Flaccus.     J.  Η.  Mozley.     (3rd  Imp.  revised.) 
3 


Vabbo:   De  Lingua  Latina.      R.  G.  Kent.      2  Vols.     (3rd  Imp. 

revised.) 
Velleius  Paterculus  and  Res  Gestae  Divi  Auousti.     F.  W. 

Shipley.     (2nd  Imp.) 
ViBGiL.  '  H.  R.  Fairclough.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  Ι9/Λ  Imp.,  Vol.  II. 

14ίΛ  Imp.  revised.) 
ViTRUvrus:   De  Architectura.     F.  Granger.     2  Vols.     (Vol.1. 

Srd  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  2nd  Imp.) 


Greek  Authors 

Achilles  Tatius.     S.  Gaselee.     {2nd  hnp.) 

Aelian  :   On  the  Nature  of  Animals.     3  Vols.     Vols.  I.  and  II. 

A.  F.  Scholfield. 
Aeneas    Tacticus,     Asclepiodotus     and     Onasander.     The 

Illinois  Greek  Club.     {2nd  Imp.) 
Aeschines.     C.  D.  Adams.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Aeschylus.     H.  Weir  Smyth.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  Ith  Imp.,  Vol. 

II.  6th  Imp.  revised.) 
AxciPHRON,   Aelian,   Philostratus   Letters.     A.   R.   Benner 

and  F.  H.  Fobes. 
Andocides,  Antiphon,  Cf.  Minor  Attic  Orators. 
Apollodorus.     Sir  James  G.  Frazer.      2  Vols.     {3rd  Imp.) 
Apollonius  Rhodius.     R.  C.  Seaton.     {5th  Imp.) 
The   Apostolic   Fathers.     Kirsopp   Lake.     2  Vols.     (Vol.   I. 

8th  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  Gth  Imp.) 
Appian:    Roman  History.     Horace  White.     4  Vols.     (Vol.  I. 

Ath  Imp.,  Vols.  II.-IV.  3rd  Imp.) 
Aratus.     Cf.  Callimachus. 
Aristophanes.     Benjamin    Bickley    Rogers.     3    Vols.     Verse 

trans.     {5th  Imp.) 
Aristotle:    Art  of  Rhetoric.     J.  H.  Freese.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Aristotle:      Athenian     Constitution,     Eudemian     Ethics, 

Vices  and  Virtues.     H.  Rackham.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Aristotle:     Generation    of    Animals.     A.    L.    Pock.     {2nd 

Imp.) 
Aristotle:    Metaphysics.     H.  Tredennick.     2  Vols.  (4<Λ  Zmp.) 
Aristotle:    JIeteorologica.     H.  D.  P.  Lee. 
Aristotle:     Minor    Works.     W.    S.    Hett.     On    Colours,    On 

Things  Heard,  On  Phj-siognomies,  On  Plants,  On  Marvellous 

Things   Heard,   Mechanical   Problems,    On   Indivisible   Lines, 

On  Situations  and  Names  of  Winds,  On  Mellissus,  Xenophanes, 

and  Gorgias.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Aristotle:    Nicomachean  Ethics.     H.  Rackham.     {6th  Imp. 

revised. ) 
Aristotle:    Oeconomica  and  Magna  Moraxia.     G.  C.  Arm- 
strong;   (with  Metaphysics,  Vol.  II.).     {Hh  Imp.) 
Aristotle:    On  the  Heavens.     W.  K.  C.  Guthrie.     (3rd  Imp. 

revised. ) 
Aristotle:    On  the   Soul,   Pabva  Naturalia,   On   Breath. 

W.  S.  Hett.     {2>id  Imp.  revised.) 


Abistotle:     ORGANON-^Categories,    On    Interpretation,    Prior 

Analytics.     H.  P.  Cooke  and  H.  Tredennick.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Aristotle:    Organon — Posterior  Analytics,  Topics.     H.  Tre- 
dennick and  E.  S.  Forster. 
Aristotle  :    Organon — On  Sophistical  Refutations. 

On  Coming  to  be  and  Passing  Away,  On  the  Cosmos.     E.  S. 

Forster  and  D.  J.  Furley. 
Aristotle:    Parts   of  Animals.     A.  L.  Peck;    Motion  and 

Progression  OF  Animals.     E.  S.  Forster.     ('kth  Imp.  revised.) 
Aristotle:    Physics.     Rev.  P.  Wicksteed  and  F.  M.  Cornford. 

2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  2nd  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  3rd  Imp.) 
Aristotle:     Poetics    and    Longinus.     W.    Hamilton    Fyfe; 

Demetrius  on  Style.     W.  Rhys  Roberts.     (5th  Imp.  revised.) 
Aristotle:   Politics.     H.  Rackham.     (-ith  Imp.  revised.) 
Aristotle:  Problems.    W.S.Hett.    2  Vols.    {2nd  Imp.  revised.) 
Aristotle:     Rhetorica   Ad    Alexandbum    (with   Problems. 

Vol.  II.).     H.  Rackham. 
Arrian:    History  of  Alexander  and  Indica.     Rev.  E.  IlifEe 

Robson.     2  Vols.     {3rd  Imp.) 
Athenaeus:       Deipnosophistae.     C.     B.     Gulick.     7     Vols. 

(Vols.  I.-IV.,  VI.  and  VII.  2nd  Imp.,  Vol.  V.  3rd  lynp.) 
St.  Basil:    Letters.     R.  J.  Deferrari.     4  Vols.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Callimachus:    Fragments.     C.  A.  Trypanis. 
Callimachus,  Hymns  and  Epigrams,  and  Lycophron.     A.  W. 

Mair;   Aratus.     G.  R.  Mair.     (2i!d.  Imp.) 
Clement  of  Alexandria.    Rev.  G.  W.  Butterworth.    {3rd  Imp.) 
CoLLUTHUs.     Cf.  Oppian. 
Daphnis    and     Chloe.     Thornley's    Translation     revised     by 

J.  M.  Edmonds;    and  Parthenius.     S.  Gaselee.     {ith  Imp.) 
Demosthenes  I.:    Olynthiacs,  Philippics  and  Minor  Ora- 
tions.    I.-XVII.  and  XX.     J.  H.  Vince.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Demosthenes   II.:    De   Corona   and   De   Falsa   Legatione. 

C.  A.  Vince  and  J.  H.  Vince.     (3rd  Imp.  revised.) 
Demosthenes     III.:      Meidias,     Androtion,     Aristocrates, 

TiMOCRATES   and   Aristogeiton,    I.   and    II.     J.   H.    Vince 

(27id  Imp.) 
Demosthenes  IV .-VI.:    Private  Orations  and  In  Neaeram. 

A.  T.  Murray.     (Vol.  IV.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  V.  and  VI.  2nd  Imp.) 
Demosthenes  VII. :  Funeral  Speech,  Erotic  Essay,  Exordia 

and  Letters.     N.  W.  and  N.  J.  DeWitt. 
Dio  Cassius:    Roman  History.     E.  Gary.     9  Vols.     (Vols.  I. 

and  II.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  III.-IX.  2nd  Imp.) 
Dio  Chrysostom.    J.  W.  Cohoon  and  H.  Lamar  Crosby.    5  Vols. 

(Vols.  I.-IV.  2nd  Imp.) 
DioDOBUs  SicuLUs.     12  Vols.     Vols.  I.-VI.     C.  H.  Oldfather. 

Vol.  VII.     C.  L.  Sherman.     Vols.  IX.  and  X.     R.  M.  Geer. 

Vol.  XI.     F.  Walton.     (Vols.  I.-IV.  2r!d  Imp.) 
Diogenes  Laertius.     R.  D.  Hicks.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  4ίΛ  Imp., 

Vol.  II.  3rd  Imp.) 
DiONYSius    of   Halicarnassus:     Roman   Antiquities.     Spel- 

man's  translation  revised  by  E.  Gary.      7  Vols.     (Vols.  I.-V. 

2nd  Imp.) 

6 


Epictetus.     W.  a.  Oldfather.      2  Vols.     (3rd  Imp.) 
EuKiPiDES.     A.  S.Way.     4  Vols.     (Vols.  Land  IV.  7<Λ  7mp.,  Vol. 

II.  Sth  Imp.,  Vol.  III.  Gih  Imp.)     Verse  trans. 
EusEBius:      Ecclesiastical    History.     Kirsopp     Lake     and 

J.  E.  L.  Oulton.  2  Vols.  (Vol.  I.  3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  11.  5th  Imp.) 
Galen  :  On  the  Natural  Faculties.  A.  J.  Brock.  (4ίΛ  Imp.) 
The  Greek  Anthology.     W.  R.  Paton.     5  Vols.     (Vols.  I.-IV. 

bth  Imp.,  Vol.  V.  3rd  Imp.) 
Greek  Elegy  and  Iambus   with    the   Anackeontea.     J.    M. 

Edmonds.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  2nd  Imp.) 
The   Greek   Bucolic   Poets   (Theocritus,    Bion,    Moschus). 

J.  JI.  Edmonds,     (lih  Imp.  revised.) 
Greek  Mathematical  \\"orks.     Ivor  Thomas.     2  Vols.     (3rci 

Imp.) 
Herodes.     Cf.  Theophrastus:   Characters. 
Herodotus.     A.  D.  Godley.     4  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  Ath  Imp.,  Vols. 

II.  and  III.  bth  Imp.,  Vol.  IV.  3rd  Imp.) 
Hesiod    and    The   Homeric   Hymns.     H.   G.    Evelyn   White. 

(ItJi  Imp.  revised  and  enlarged.) 
Hippocrates  and  the  Fragments  of  Heracleitus.     W.  H.  S. 

Jones  and  E.  T.  Withington.     4  Vols.     (Vol.  I.     4<Λ  Imp., 

Vols.  Il.-IV.  3rd  Imp.) 
Homer:    Iliad.     A.T.Murray.      2  Vols.     (Ith  Imp.) 
Homer:    Odyssey.     A.  T.  Murray.     2  Vols.      {8th  Imp.) 
IsAEUs.     E.  W.  Forster.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Isocrates.     George    Norlin   and    LaRue   Van    Hook.      3   Vols. 

(2nd  Imp.) 
St.  John  Damascene:    Barlaam  and  Ioasaph.     Rev.  G.  R. 

Woodward  and  Harold  Mattingly.     (3rd  Im,p.  revised.) 
JosEPHUS.     H.  St.  J.  Thackeray  and  Ralph  Marcus.     9  Vols. 

Vols.  I.-VII.     (Vols.  V.  and  VI.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  I.-IV.  and  VII. 

2>!d  Imp.) 
Julian       Wilmer    Cave    Wright.      3    Vols.     (Vols.    I.    and    II. 

3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  III.  2r!d  hnp.) 
LuciAN.     A.  M.  Harmon.     8  Vols.     Vols.  I.-V.  (Vols.  I.  and 

II.  4ih  Imp.,  Vol.  III.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  IV.  and  V.  2?id  Imp.) 
Lycophron.     Cf.  Callimachus. 
Lyra  Graeca.     J.  M.   Edmonds.      3  Vols.     (Vol.   I.   bth  Imp. 

Vol.  II   revised  and  enlarged,  and  III.  ^th  Imp.) 
Lysias.     W.  R.  M.  Lamb.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Manetho.     W.  G.  Waddell:    Ptolemy:    Tetrabiblos.     F.  E. 

Robbins.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Marcus  Aurelius.     C.  R.  Haines.     (4<Λ.  Imp.  revised.) 
Menander.     F.  G.  Allinson.     (3rd  Imp.  revised.) 
Minor    Attic    Orators    (Antiphon,    Andocides,    Lycurgus, 

Demades,  Dinarchus,  Hypereides).     K.  J.  Maidment  and 

J.  O.  Burrt.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  2nd  Imp.) 
Nonnos:   Dionysiaca.     W.  H.  D.  Rouse.      3  Vols.      {27id  Imp.) 
Oppian,  Colluthus,  Tryphiodorus.     A.  W.  Mair.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Papyri.     Non-Literary  Selections.     A.  S.  Hunt  and  C.  C. 

Edgar.       2     Vols.       (2i?d     Imp.)      Literary     Selections. 

(Poetrj').     D.  L.  Page.      (3rd  Imp.) 


Pakthenids.     Cf.  Daphnis  and  Chloe. 

Pausanias:    Description   of   Greece.      W.   H.   S.   Jones.     5 

Vols,   and   Companion   Vol.   arranged   by   R.    E.   Wycherley. 

(Vols.  I.  and  III.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  11.,  IV.  and  V.  2nd  Imp.) 
Philo.      10  Vols.     Vols.  I.-V.;    F.  H.  Colson  and  Rev.  G.  H. 

Whitaker.      Vols.  VI.-IX.;   F.  H.  Colson.     (Vols.  I.,  III.,  V.- 

VII.,  3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  IV.  4i/i  Imp.,  Vols.  II.,   VIII.,  and  IX. 

2nd  Imp.) 
Philo:    two  supplementary  Vols.      {Translation  only.)      Ralph 

Marcus. 
Philostratus  :    The  Life  of  Appollonius  of  Tyana.     F.  C. 

Conybeare.      2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  4i/i  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  3rd  Imp.) 
Philostratus:      Imagines;      Callistratus:      Descriptions. 

A.  Fairbanks.     (2nd  Imp.) 

Philostr.\tus     and     Eunapius:      Lives     of    the     Sophists. 

Wilmer  Cave  Wright.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Pindar.     Sir  J.  E.  Sandys.     (Sth  Imp.  revised.) 
Plato:    Charmides,   Alcibiades,   Hipparchus,  The   Lovers, 

Theages,    Minos    and    Epinomis.     W.    R.    M.    Lamb.     {2nd 

Imp.) 
Plato:     Cratylus,   Parmenidbs,    Greater   Hippias,    Lesser 

Hippias.     H.  N.  Fowler,     {ith  Imp.) 
Plato:     Euthyphro,    Apology,    Crito,    Phaedo,    Phaedrus. 

H.  N.  Fowler,     (llth  Imp.) 
Plato:   Laches,  Protagoras,  Meno,  Euthydemus.     W.  R.  M. 

Lamb.     (3rd  Imp.  revised.) 
Plato:    Laws.      Rev.  R.  G.  Bury.      2  Vols.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Plato:    Lysis,  Symposium  Gorgias.     W.  R.  M.  Lamb.     {5th 

Imp.  revised.) 
Plato:    Republic.     Paul  Shorey.     2  Vols.  (Vol.  I.  5th  Imp., 

Vol.  II.  ith  Imp.) 
Plato:   Statesman,  Philebus.    H.  N.  Fowler;   Ion.    W.  R.  M. 

Lamb,     {ith  Imp.) 
Plato:    Theaetetus  and  Sophist.     H.  N.  Fowler.     (4</i  Imp.) 
Plato:    Timaeus,  Critias,  Clitopho,  Menexenus,  Epistulae. 

Rev.  R.  G.  Bury.     (3rd  hnp.) 
Plutarch:     Moralia.      14  Vols.     Vols.   I.-V.     F.  C.   Babbitt. 

Vol.  VI.     W.  C.  Helmbold.     Vol.  VII.      P.  H.  De  Lacey  and 

B.  Einarson.     Vol.     X.     H.     N.     Fowler.     Vol.     XII.      H. 
Cherniss  and  W.  C.  Helmbold.    (Vols.  I.-VI.  and  X.  2nd  Imp.) 

Plutarch:      The    Parallel    Lives.       B.    Perrin.       11     Vols. 

(Vols.  I.,  II.,  VI.,  and  XI.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  III.-V.  and  VIII.-X. 

2nd  Imp.,  Vol.  VII.,  4<Λ  Imp.) 
Polybius.     λν.  R.  Paton.      6  Vols.     (2nd  Imp.) 
Procopius:    History  of  the  Wars.     H.  B.  Dewing.      7  Vols. 

(Vol.  I.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  II.-VII.  2nd  Imp.) 
Ptolemy:   Tetrabiblos.     Cf.  Manetho. 

QuiNTUs  Smyrnaeus.      a.  S.  Way.      Verse  trans.     (3rd  Imp.) 
Sextus  Empiricus.      Rev.  R.  G.  Bury.     4  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  ith 

Imp.,  Vols.  II.  and  III.  2nd  Imp.) 
Sophocles.     F.  Storr.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  ΙΟίΛ /mp.     Vol.  II.  6iA 

Imp.)     Verse  trans. 

7 


Stkabo;  Geography.     Horace  L.  Jones.      8  Vols.     (Vols.  I.,  V., 

and  VIII.  3rd  Imp.,  Vols.  II.,  III..  IV.,  VI..  and  VII.  2nd  Imp.) 
Theophrastus  :      Characters.     J.    M.    Edmonds.      Herodes, 

etc.      A.  D.  Knox.      {3rd  Imp.) 
Theophrastus:     Enquiry    into    Plants.      Sir    Arthur    Hort, 

Rart.      2  Vols,     {,2nd  Imp.) 
Thucydides.     C.  F.  Smith.     4  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  Uh  Imp.,  Vols. 

II.  and  IV.  4ί/ί  Imp.,  Vol.  III.,  "ird  Imp.  revised.) 
Tryphiodobus.     Cf.  Oppian. 
Xenophon:     Cyropaedia.      Walter   Miller.      2   Vols.      (Vol.   I. 

Ath  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  3rd  Imp.) 
Xenophon:    Hellenica,  Anabasis,  Apology,  and  Symposium. 

C.  L.  Brownson  and  O.  J.  Todd.      3  Vols.     (Vols.  I.  and  III 

3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  ith  Imp.) 
Xenophon:   Memor.\bilia  and  Oeconomicus.     E.  C.  Marchant 

(3rd  Imp.) 
Xenophon:    Scbipta  Minora.     E.  C.  Marchant.     (3rd  Imp.) 


IN    PREPARATION 


Greek  Authors 

Aristotle:    History  of  Animals.     A.  L.  Peck. 
Plotinus:    a.  H.  Armstrong. 


Latin  Authors 

Babrius  and  Phaedrus.      Ben  E.  Perry. 
DESCRIPTIVE   PROSPECTUS    Oy  APPLICATION 


London  WILLIAM   HEINEMANN  LTD 

Cambridge,  Mass.  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY   PRESS 


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