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H  I  S  T  O  li  Y 


OF    THE 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    MIND, 


I-ONDON  : 

r.  r.  noDusoN,  printkr,   1   gough  squark,  flret  street. 


'^HISTORY 


or    THE 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND  : 


KMBRACI.Vt;     THK 


OPINIONS  OF  ALL  WRITERS  ON  ]\IENTAL  SCIENCE 


FROM    THE 


EARLIEST    PERIOD   TO    THE    PRESENT    TIME. 

) 

By  Robert! BLAKE y,  a.m. 


AUTHOR    OF    HISTORY    OF    MORAL    SCIENCE, 
ESSAY    OX    MORAL    GOOD    AND    EVIL,    ESSAY'    ON    LOGIC,    &C. 


A'OLUME    1 


LONDON: 
LONGMAN,    BROWN,    GREEN,    AND    LONGMANS, 

PATEKNOSTER    ROW. 

1850. 


TO  y.   I 

HIS  ROYAL  HIGHNESS  PE.INCE  ALBEET, 

CHANCELLOR    OF   THE    UNIVERSITV    OF    CAMBRIDGE, 
&C.    &C.    &.C. 

THESE    VOLUMES 

A  RE 

(s'y    permission) 

MOST      RESPECTFULLY      DEDICATED, 

BY 

II  IS     ROYAL     HIGH  NESS'S 

VERY    OBEDIENT, 

HUMBLE    SERVANT, 

THE    AUTHOR. 


> 


^«:;m<>/l(> 


PREFACE, 


It  is  upAvards  of  twenty  years  since  I  first  formed 
the  intention  of  writing'  a  work  of  this  description. 
Having  been  an  ardent  cultivator  of  metaphysical 
literature  from  early  youth,  I  often  experienced  the 
want  of  some  guide  to  a  knowledge  of  authors,  and 
their  several  publications  on  this  species  of  philo- 
sophy ;  and  it  occurred  to  me  that  a  work,  which 
simply  brought  into  one  focus  the  multifarious  and 
scattered  elements  of  speculation  Avhich  every  civi- 
lized country  possessed,  could  not  fail  to  prove 
highly  useful,  not  only  to  the  mere  scholar  like 
myself,  but  even  to  those  more  advanced  in  philo- 
sophical knowledge  and  acquirements.  To  form 
a  plan,  however,  is  one  thing ;  but  to  execute  it, 
another.  I  soon  found  the  great  difficulties  which 
lay  in  my  path.  In  England  it  is  more  arduous  to 
write  a  history  of  philosophy,  than  in  any  other 
country  in  Europe ;  chiefly  from  the  deficiency 
of  works  on  the  literature  of  tlie  Middle  Ages. 
Nearly   all    Continental   lil;raries,   even    those   of 


Vi  PREFACE. 

small  towns    and  villages,   have  more  or   less  of 
this    species   of  literature;    but   in   England   the 
best  libraries  in  our  provincial  cities  are  almost 
entirely  without  works   of  this  description.     The 
time   required  for   reading   was  another  obstacle 
in  my  way  ;  for  more  urgent  and  pressing  pursuits 
engrossed  almost  every  hour  I  had  to  spare.     In 
consequence  of  these  and  other  impediments  which 
it  is  not  necessary  to  particularize,  I  have  some- 
times been  compelled  to  suspend  the  work  for  three 
or  four  years  together  ;  and  many  a  time  and  oft 
have  I  altogether  despaired  of  ever  being  able  to 
complete  it.  Circumstances  however  have  at  length 
enabled   me  to  do  so ;    and  after  a  good   deal  of 
anxiety,  I   now   present   it   to   the   philosophical 
world,  with  a  firm  persuasion  that  they  will  act  justly 
towards  it,  and  award  me  that   portion   of  com- 
mendation to  which  I  may  be  entitled,  however 
small  it  may  be ;  and  to  more  I  have  no  right  to 
aspire. 

There  are  two  modes  of  writing  a  history 
of  philosophy.  The  one  is  to  classify  authors 
under  general  heads,  in  conformity  with  a  prin- 
ciple of  resemblance  or  affinity  subsisting  among 
their  respective  speculative  opinions.  This  is 
called  philosophical  history.  The  other  is,  to 
follow  the  order  of  time,  and  give  a  distinct  and 
personal  outline  of  every  philosopher's  views,  in 


PREPACE.  Vll 

the  precise  order  in  which  chronoloi^y  develops 
them.  Both  plans  have  their  respective  advan- 
tages and  disadvantages  ;  and  it  is  a  nice  point  to 
determine  which  to  prefer.  To  me,  in  all  tlie 
purely  historical  works  of  a  classified  kind  that 
I  have  seen,  there  has  appeared  no  small  degree  of 
confusion ;  and  this  I  helieve  is  commonly  felt  as 
a  great  inconvenience  by  young  students,  when 
they  enter  upon  tlie  study  of  mental  science. 
Generalization  on  the  philosophy  of  mind  ought 
not  to  precede  observation  and  instruction,  but  to 
follow  them.  For  these  and  other  reasons,  I  have 
adopted  the  order  of  time,  as  nearly  as  the  nature 
of  the  subject  would  admit;  leaving  the  reader, 
except  in  some  few  special  cases,  to  select  and 
classify  wa-iters  according  to  his  own  opinions  and 
judgment.  The  historical  or  classified  arrange- 
ment is  certainly  more  dignified  and  imposing ;  but 
I  conceive  the  chronological  is  better  fitted  to  im- 
part elementary  and  correct  information,  and  to 
preserve  the  mind  from  many  false  notions  which 
an  arbitrary  or  imperfect  classification  is  apt  to 
create,  in  reference  to  particular  authors  and  their 
respective  systems. 

This  work  is  arranged  upon  a  plan  somewhat 
particular.  It  is  almost  exclusively  confined  to 
mental  science.  I  am  not  acquainted  with  any 
publication  precisely  of  the  same   kind,  with  the 


Vlll  PREFACE, 

exception   of   Stewart's    Dissertation,  prefixed   to 
the  Encyclopedia  Britannica.    Every  reader  knows 
that,  on   the    Continent,  religion,  morals,  and  po- 
litics, as  well  as  metaphysics,  are  comprehended 
under  the  general  term  Philosophy.     In  England, 
however,    we   have   commonly  kept    these   topics 
apart  from  each  other ;  allowing  each  to  rest  upon 
its    own    basis ;    and    this    I    consider    a   better 
plan   upon   the   whole.     It   is    obvious,   notwith- 
standing,   that    by    adopting    it,    I    have,    in    a 
corresponding   degree,    contracted   the    sphere    of 
discussion  and  observation ;  and,  therefore,  there 
must  necessarily  be  less  variety  in  my  statements 
and  reasonings  than  if  I  had  launched  freely,  on 
every  occasion   that    presented   itself,    into    mat- 
ters intimately  connected  with  the   fundamental 
principles  of  religion,  morals,  and   politics.     Not 
that   I  have   altogether  refrained  from  touching 
upon  these  respective  branches  of  knowledge ;  this 
it  would  have  been  impossible  for  me  to  do,  had  I 
wished ;    but  on   those   occasions  where  a  direct 
reference  is  made  to  any  of  them,  it  is  only  in 
order  to  illustrate  more  clearly  and  pointedly  the 
precise  nature  and  bearing  of  some  particular  me- 
taphysical principle  or  system.     My  aim  has  con- 
stantly been  to  furnish  a  history  of  Iletaphysical 
Philosophy^  and  nothing  more. 

I  ha  AC  been  desirous  of  combining  some  portion 


PREFACE.  IX 

of  elementary  instruction  on  the  science  of  mind, 
in  conjunction  with   the   historical  sketches   and 
details  I  have  given.     This  will  account  for  some 
short  chapters  or  dissertations  in  several  parts  of 
the  work,  apparently  unconnected  with  the  course 
of  simple   chronological   narration.     I  trust  that, 
though  this  method  may  be  considered  in  some 
measure  novel,  it  will  not  be  without  corresponding 
benefit,  particularly  to  young  students  and  general 
readers.     I  once  purposed  to  make  these  elemen- 
tary essays  more   numerous  ;   but  the    increasing 
pressure  of  purely  historical  matter  did  not  allow 
me  to  follow  this  course  to  a  greater  extent  than 
I  have  done.   A  considerable  portion  of  the  benefit 
and  pleasure  to  be  derived  from  a  historical  sketch 
of  any  branch  of  knowledge,  arises  from  our  know- 
ing something   of  its    leading    and  fundamental 
principles  ;  and  this  applies  to  the  science  of  mind 
more,  perhaps,  than  to  any  other. 

The  same  cause  which  limited  those  elementary 
statements  and  reflexions,  operated  in  curtailing 
the  development  and  discussion  of  several  systems 
of  metaphysical  speculation  treated  of  in  the  work. 
It  has  often  been  to  me  a  matter  of  deep  regret,  that 
my  limits  did  not  allow  me  to  illustrate  many  inte- 
resting and  important  principles  to  the  extent  I  de- 
sired, in  order  that  they  might  be  comprehensively 
and  accurately  understood.     This  will  account,  in 


X  PREFACE. 

many  instances,  for  the  imperfect  and  circum- 
scribed notice  of  several  theories,  and  their  col- 
lateral branches;  and  for  the  abrupt  discontinu- 
ance of  my  remarks,  when  perhaps  a  discussion 
had  just  reached  that  precise  point  at  which  it  be- 
came most  interesting  to  the  inquirer.  Consider- 
ing the  extent  of  the  ground  over  which  I  had  to 
travel,  and  the  numerous  historical  notices  required, 
these  imperfections,  however  much  to  be  lamented, 
were  unavoidable.  I^ifty,  instead  of  four  volumes, 
would  scarcely  have  sufficed  to  give  any  thing 
approaching  to  a  full  view  of  the  different  systems 
enumerated,  and  to  point  out  all  their  bearings  on 
each  other,  and  on  other  departments  of  human 
knowledge. 

One  of  the  chief  designs  of  this  work  has  been 
to  impart  to  it  a  universal  character  and  interest; 
to  make  it,  in  some  measure,  as  interesting  to  the 
philosopher  of  Paris  as  of  London.  With  this  vievf, 
a  copious  account  of  English  and  Foreign  philo- 
sophical publications  is  given ;  in  order  that  those 
who  feel  an  interest  in  mental  pursuits  may  have 
as  accurate  and  comprehensive  a  view  of  all  that 
has  been  written  on  the  philosophy  of  mind,  as  it 
was  practicable  in  such  a  limited  publication  to 
afford.  To  remedy  in  some  degree  the  imperfection 
of  more  extended  elucidations  and  comments,  on 
many  foreign  authors  in  particular,  lists  of  their 


PREFACE.  XI 

names  and  respective  various  publications  will  be 
found  in  the  Notes  appended  to  the  work. 

I  feel  myself  under  great  obligations  to  many 
philosophical  historians,  both  in  my  own  country 
and   abroad.     I  cannot,   however,  enumerate   all 
from  w^hom  I  have  received  assistance.     Among 
English  treatises,  I  have  consulted  Stanley,  Cud- 
worth,  and  Enfield,  with  some  slight  advantages. 
To  Dugald  Stewart's  Dissertation,  prefixed  to  the 
last  edition  of  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  I  lie 
under  considerable  obligations.     I  am  also  much 
indebted  to    Mr.    Ilallam ;    and   in   perusing  his 
"  Literature  of  the  Middle  Ages,"  I  have   often 
experienced  regret  that  he  has  not  treated  some 
mental  speculations  of  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth 
centuries  at  greater  length.     Every  thing  he  says 
is  so  excellent,  both  in  matter  and  in  stvle,  that 
on  many  occasions  his  brevity  has  been  felt  as  a 
painful  infliction.    I  tender  my  acknowledgments  to 
Mr.  Lewes  for  his  recent  able  and  useful  "Biographi- 
cal History  of  Philosophy,"  though  I  must  add  that 
I  cannot  concur  with  the  general  aim  and  spirit  of 
his  speculative  opinions.  In  examining  the  systems 
of  philosophy  of  the   present   age,   Mr.   Morell's 
historical   work,   which    is    well   entitled  to   the 
patronage  and  commendations  it  has  received,  has 
often  been  of  service  to  me;    and  I  have   felt  a 
peculiar  pleasure  in  the  perusal  of  his  writings, 


Xll  PREFACE. 

from  the  circumstance  that  his  opinions  and  my 
own  have  so  many  points  of  resemhlance.  To 
the  Erench  historians  I  owe  much ;  especially  to 
De  Gerando,  Cousin,  and  Damiron ;  and  likewise  to 
the  lahours  of  Brucker,  Emitter,  Michelet,  and  other 
distinguished  German  authors. 

Erom  the  wide  range  of  inquiry  I  have  taken, 
the  varied  topics  on  which  I  have  commented, 
their  innate  complexity  and  diversified  aspects, 
and,  ahove  all,  from  my  own  imperfections  and 
shortcomings  for  such  an  important  task,  it  is 
probable  I  may  have  fallen  into  errors,  both  as  to 
matters  of  fact  and  of  opinion.  To  candid  and 
dispassionate  criticism  I  cheerfully  commit  my 
labours  with  all  their  faults ;  having  every  reason  to 
believe,  that,  as  the  love  of  truth  has  ever  been  my 
polar  star  in  their  prosecution,  the  same  feeling 
animates  the  spirit  of  criticism  of  modern  times ; 
and  that  if  correction  be  needed,  it  will  only  pro- 
ceed from  generous  and  honourable  motives ;  and 
prove  as  beneficial  to  the  receiver,  as  commendable 
to  the  giver. 


London,  Oc/.  1818. 


CONTENTS. 


P  A  O  K . 

Introduction   xvii 

CHAPTER   T. 
On  the  Histories  of  Philosophy,  Ancient  and  Modern   1 

CHAPTER   II. 
Mental   Philosophy   of  Grefce.  —  The   Ionic  School: 
Thales — Anaximandcr — Anaxinieues — Ilermotinius  of  Cla- 
zoniene — Diogenes  of  Apollonia — Anaxagoras     5 

CHAPTER    III. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — The  Italian  School  of 
Metaphysics  :   Pythagoras    1 7 

CHAPTER    IV. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — The  Eleatic  School  of 
Metaphysics :    Xenophanes — Parmenides — Melissus — Zeno 
of  Elea — Ileraclitus    21 

CHAPTER   V. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — Second  Eleatic  School 
of  Philosophy  :  Empedocles — Leucippus — Democritus ....     35 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — The  Greek  Sophists: 
Protagoras — Gorgias     42 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — Socrates    Jl 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — The  Cyrenic  and  Cy- 
nical Schools 5y 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — The  Schools  of  Megara, 
Elis,  and  Eretria  :    Euchd     -V 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

PAOK. 

CHAPTER   X. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — Plato 59 

CHAPTER  XI. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — Aristotle    72 

CHAPTER    XII. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece.  — Analysis,  Synthesis, 
and  Analogy,  considered  in  relation  to  Greek  Philosophy  .  .    100 

CHAPTER   XIII. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — The  Sceptical  School 
of  Metaphysics  :   Pyrrho 121 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — Epicurus 126 

CHAPTER  XV. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — The  Stoical  School  of 
Metaphysics  :  Zeno — Chrysippus    130 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — On  the  Notions  com- 
monly adopted  by  the  Ancients,  up  to  the  Period  of  the  Stoics, 
on  the  Origin  of  our  Knowledge  and  the  Nature  of  Truth  136 

CHAPTER   XVII. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  Greece. — The  Second  Academy : 
Arcesilaus  — Carneades  — Philo  —  Antiochus — Clitomachus 
— Posidonius — Panoetius 143 

CHAPTER    XVIII. 
The  Alexandrian  School  of  Metaphysics ' 153 

CHAPTER    XIX. 
On  the  Notions  entertained  by  the  different  Schools  of  Philo- 
sophy on  the  Nature  of  General  Principles  and  Propositions, 
up  to  the  time  of  the  Foundation  of  the  Alexandrian  School   158 

CHAPTER   XX. 
The  Roman  School  of  Mental  Philosophy. — Lucre- 
tius— Cicero — Alcinous — Maximus  of  Tyre — Alexander  of 
A])hrodisias — Galen 166 


CONTENTS.  XV 

CHAPTER    XXI. 
TriE  Latkr   School  of  Metaphysical    Scepticism. — 
.I'Enesiclemus — Agrippa — Phavorinus — Se.xtas   Empiricus  .  .    182 

CHAPTER    XXII. 

On  the  Opinions  of  Ancient  Philosophers,  up  to  this  period  of 
History,  on  a  Deity  and  the  Human  Soul 1 1)  I 

CHAPTER    XXIII. 
Mental  Philosophy  of  India.  —  Sankhva  and  Yo2;a —   . 
Bhagavad-Gliita — Nyaya  and  Vaisechika — Vedanta 207 

CHAPTER    XXIV. 
The  Union   of  Eastern   Doctrines   with    those    or 
Greece  and  Rome. — Aristobulus — Philo — ApoUonius  of 
Tyana — Plutarch — Lucius  Apuleius — Xumenius   219 

CHAPTER  XXV, 
The  Gnostic  Metaphysicians 228 

CHAPTER    XXVI. 
The   Metaphysical  Principles  of  the   New  Plato- 
NiSTS.  — Ammonius  Saccas —  Longinns  —  Plotinus  —  Por- 
phyry— Jamblicus — Proclus — Marinus — Isidore  of  Gaza  .  .  229 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 
On  the  Metaphysical  DisQi;isrrioNS  of  the  Ancient 
Fathers  of  the  Church. — Justin  Martyr — Tatian — 
St.  Athenagoras — St.  Theophilus — St.  Pantsenus — Origen 
— St.  Clement — Herm#s — TertuUian — Arnobius — Irenseus 
— Lactantius — Anatolius —  St.  Augustine — Nemesius — St, 
Gregory  —  Synesius  —  Claudianus  ^lamertus — Boethius  — 
^lartin  Capella — Cassiodorus — St.  John  Damascenus    ....   244 

CHAPTER    XXVIII. 
Observations  and  Reflections,  from  Ascetic  Wri- 
ters, on  Matters  connected  with  Reasoning  and 
General   Knowledge, — St.   Peter  the  Anchorite — St. 

Alonzo  de  Vega — Pelagius 2/7 

CHAPTER   XXIX. 
On  the  Principle  of  Authority,  in  Matters  of  Philosophy  and 
Theology,  maintained  by  the  Fathers  of  the  Church 300 


/ 

/ 

/ 

xvi  CONTENTS. 

PAOK. 

CHAPTER  XXX. 
On  Moral  Evidence,  after  the  Full  Establishment  of  Christianity  3 1 1 

CHAPTER    XXXI. 
On  the  Opinions  of  the  Fathers  of  the  Church,  on 
THE  Liberty  and  Necessity  of  Human  Actions. — 

Isnatius  —  Justin  Martyr — Tatian — Ireneeus — Clement  of 
Alexandria  —  Tertullian — Origen — Cyprian  —  Eusebius  — 
Athanasius  —  Cyril  of  Jerusalem  —  Hilary  —  Epiphanius — 
Basil — Gregory  Nazianzen — Gregory  of  Nyssa — -Ambrose 
— Jerome — Augustine — Chrysostom — Theodoret 317 

CHAPTER    XXXII. 
On  the  Metaphysical  Notions  of  the  Arabians. — 

Alkendi  —  Alfarabi  —  Avicenna  —  Algazeli  —  Avicebron — 
Averroes — Theophilus 340 

CHAPTER    XXXIII. 
The  Persian  Sophists. — Avenpace 3(i4 

CHAPTER    XXXIV. 
The  Cabalistic  Metaphysics 364 

CHAPTER     XXXV. 
On  the  Philosophy  of  the  Jews. — Eben  Ezra — Moses 
Maimonides 3G9 

CHAPTER    XXXVI. 
On  Distinct  Faculties  of  the   Mind,  as  recognised  by  Philo- 
sophers up  to  the  Ninth  Century     .  .  • 3/5 

CHAPTER    XXXVII. 
General  Remarks  on  Faculties  of  the  Mind,  and  of  what  may 
be  urged  against  their  individual  Existence,  Nature,  and 
Operation 383 

CHAPTER    XXXVIII. 
On  Saxon  Metaphysics. — Alfred  the  Great — Alcuinus,  or 
Albinus  Flaccus — Bede    ,411 

Concluding  Remarks    433 

Notes  and  Illustrations   439 


INTRODUCTION 


Phi'losopiiy  is  a  conipreliensivo  term,  and,  in 
its  fullest  extent,  embraces  evorv  tliinj?  which 
a  man  can  know  and  feel.  Philosopliers  are 
however,  like  otlier  humbler  workmen,  obliged 
to  divide  their  labours  in  order  to  ensure  more 
successful  and  efTicient  execution ;  and  accord- 
ingly we  find  that,  from  the  first  dawn  ol'  any 
thing  like  science  and  literature,  all  knowledge 
has  been  classified  under  three  leading  divisions ; 
namely,  a  knowledge  of  external  bodies,  of  mental 
faculties  or  powers,  and  of  moral  duties  or  obliga- 
tions. In  no  possible  state  of  human  existence  can  • 
these  three  branches  of  thousrht  be  conceived  in  a 
state  of  complete  isolation  or  independent  opera- 
tion. There  is  a  bond,  an  indissoluble  union,  con- 
necting them ;  and  the  precise  limits  where  one  ends 
and  another  commences,  it  is  impossible  to  point 
out  Avith  any  thing  like  fractional  nicety.  But 
still  this  consideration  does  not  prevent  men 
from  making  useful  and  practical  divisions,  or 
from  designating  them  by  general  terms.  It  has 
accordingly  been  almost  universally  proclaimed 
in  all  ages,  that  pliilosopliy  may  be  substan- 
*  b 


Xviii  INTHODUCTION. 

tially  divided  into  three  leading  parts  ;— what  can 
be  known  of  nature,  of  God,  and  of  man. 

It  has  commonly  been  affirmed,  that  the  consi- 
deration of  visible  nature  is  prior  to  every  other 
inquiry.  Whether  this  be  correct  or  not,  is  of 
little  moment  to  our  present  purpose.  Man  is 
evidently  placed  in  an  immense  arena,  and  sees 
himself  surrounded  by  a  universe  of  infinite  extent 
and  variety.  He  feels  the  influence  of  external 
objects,  and  in  turn  exercises  his  power  over  them. 
What  is  the  order  and  result  of  this  reciprocity  of 
action,  is  a  matter  of  vital  moment  to  him ;  and 
he  therefore  institutes  inquiries  into  the  laws  which 
regulate  the  movements  and  properties  of  external 
thm2:s.  To  these  he  ffives  the  name  of  Natural  or 
JPhysical  FMlosojjhy.  This  science  has  matter, 
and  its  various  modifications,  for  its  basis. 

This  inquiry  into  material  bodies  can  scarcely  be 
conceived  in  operation  apart  from  some  considera- 
tion of  the  thinking  and  active  principle  which 
conducts  and  guides  it.  Here  the  origin  of  mental 
science  is  placed.  It  has  often  been  defined,  but  it 
is  one  of  those  branches  of  knowledge  not  suscep  - 
tible  of  a  formal  and  concise  definition.  Speaking 
generally,  it  has  mind,  both  human  and  Divine, 
for  its  object.  Aristotle  terms  it  the  first  philo- 
sophy, not  only  on  account  of  its  superiority  to  all 
other  branches  of  human  w  isdom,  but  also  as  being 
prior,  in  the  order  of  time,  to  the  whole  of  the  arts 
and  sciences.  We  cannot,  however,  lay  much 
stress  on  the  theories  which  attempt  to  account 
for  the  origin  of  speculative  philosophy ;  because 


INTRODUCTION.  XIX 

it  is  quite  obvious  that  speculations  as  to  tlie 
beginning  of  things,  their  nature,  and  the  laws 
which  govern  and  regulate  their  existence,  must 
have  been  coeval  with  the  very  first  rudiments  of 
human  thought.  Man  is  never  able  to  refer  to  any- 
period  in  the  liistory  of  his  species,  in  which  there 
was  not  some  system  of  philosophy  recognised. 
Every  child,  and  every  savage,  is  a  philosopher  in 
his  way ;  and  the  only  difference  between  tlie 
scholar  and  the  boor  is,  as  to  the  relative  degree 
in  which  each  is  able  to  investigate  and  arrang<^ 
the  phenomena  of  existence.  Both  are,  in  their 
respective  spheres,  placed  under  the  same  govern- 
ment, and  influenced  by  the  same  circumstances 
and  events.  But  whatever  opinion  may  be  adopted 
on  this  point,  certain  it  is,  that  mental  science  forms 
one  of  the  three  great  divisions  of  human  inquiry. 

Another  division  of  human  thought,  containing 
many  important  subdivisions,  and  which  is  clearly 
defined,  arises  from  the  very  first  wants  and  duties 
of  human  life.  This  department  of  knowledge 
relates  to  morals,  or  the  conduct  of  mankind.  In 
no  situation  of  life  can  we  conceive  a  total  suspen- 
sion of  the  principles  of  morality.  The  obligations 
and  bonds  of  connection  which  subsist  between 
man  and  those  around  him,  must  form  the  first 
elements  of  his  knowledge.  These,  like  the  physi- 
cal laws  of  the  universe,  are  of  a  fixed,  determined, 
and  eternal  character.  They  form  the  ground- 
work of  Moral  Philosophij . 

The  philosophy  which  springs  out  of  and  com- 
prehends a  knowledge  of  mental  systems,  may  be 

62 


XX  INTRODUCTION. 

viewed  under  several  aspects.  If  we  look  at  it 
merely  through  its  naked  or  abstract  principles,  it 
is  one  thing ;  if  exclusively  through  its  practical 
influence  on  the  condition  of  human  thought  in  a 
state  of  society,  it  is  another  thing ;  and  if  both 
these  be  amalgamated  with  other  branches  of 
physical  knowledge,  it  presents  again  altogether 
different  features.  Yet  all  possess  a  solid  sub- 
stratum of  truth  ;  and  the  propriety  or  obligation 
of  taking  any  particular  view  of  the  philosophy  of 
mind,  can  only  be  defended  upon  comprehensive 
considerations  of  what  is  in  accordance  with  the 
general  interest,  judgment,  and  happiness  of  man- 
kind. 

That  it  is  a  condition  of  human  existence  that 
some  system  of  mental  speculation  should  be  cul- 
tivated, and  be  made  to  serve  as  a  ground-work 
for  other  necessary  and  interesting  studies,  is  a 
position  as  irrefragably  true  as  important.  It  is  a 
law  of  human  thought  that  every  thing  shall  centre 
in  mind ;  in  a  knowledge  of  its  faculties  or  powers ; 
and  in  a  thorough  acquaintance  with  all  those  ge- 
neral conceptions  which  are  incorporated  in  every 
intellectual  manifestation  or  state  of  being.  We 
cannot  exile  ourselves  beyond  the  sphere  of  this 
influence  ;  for  if  we  could,  impenetrable  darkness 
and  ignorance  would  be  our  portion.  It  is  not  a 
matter  of  choice  whether  a  man  shall  be  ignorant 
of  mental  philosophy  or  not  ;  it  is  imperative  that 
lie  should  cultivate  it,  if  he  is  ever  to  attain  a 
complete  knowledge  of  other  sciences.  It  is  tlie 
portal  through  which   he  must  pass  to  the  inner 


INTRODUCTION.  XXI 

temple  of  intellectual  treasures.  Mental  pliilo- 
sopliy  is  not  itself  the  sum  of  all  knowledge,  but 
the  necessary  instrument  in  the  successful  pro- 
secution of  all  other  branches  of  human  wisdom. 
Without  it,  every  man  is  a  child,  an  intellectual 
imbecile,  and  can  have  nothing  valuable  or  abiding 
in  him.  To  illustrate  this  point  a  little  more  fully, 
we  shall  make  a  fe^  observations  on  the  indis- 
soluble and  dependent  connection  between  certain 
kinds  of  knowledge  and  the  philosophy  of  mind. 

We  shall  not  dwell  upon  the  obligations  which 
even  physical  science  lies  under  to  metaphysical 
pursuits.  We  may,  however,  barely  remark,  in 
reply  to  the  enthusiastic  admirers  of  the  positive 
philosophy,  that  they  are  not  in  a  position  to 
mould  their  own  facts,  nor  to  illustrate  or  me- 
thodise their  views,  even  in  reference  to  the  sim- 
plest phenomena  of  the  external  world,  nor  can 
tlieir  opinions  and  conclusions  be  enforced  upon 
the  attention  of  others,  without  the  virtual  recog- 
nition of  principles  which  have  an  exclusive  re- 
lationship with  mental  science.  It  is  only  by 
stepping  beyond  the  strict  limits  of  their  own 
sphere,  as  mere  .collectors  of  facts  and  observations, 
that  they  can  be  understood,  either  by  themselves 
or  by  others.  A  system  professing  to  be  founded 
ou  facts,  and  facts  alone,  is  an  inconceivable  thing 
to  the  mind  of  man.  The  truth  of  this  may  be 
readily  tested  by  the  most  superficial  consideration 
of  the  subject. 

Leaving,  however,  for  the  present,  this  part  of  the 
subject,  we  shall  direct  especial  attention  to  three 
great  divisions  of  human  knowledge  ;  namely,  mo- 


XXll  INTRODUCTION. 

rality,  religion,  and  politics.  A  profound  acquaint- 
ance with  all  or  any  of  these,  must  be  obtained 
through  the  channels  of  mental  science. 

The  science  of  morals  is  of  a  comprehensive 
character,  and  of  universal  interest.  It  affects 
all  classes  of  mankind,  from  the  king  to  the 
beggar.  All  its  principles  and  facts,  however, 
relate  to  mind ;  they  belong  tb  man's  internal  con- 
stitution ;  they  proceed  from  certain  a  priori  sug- 
gestions or  conditions  of  the  human  conscious- 
ness, and  are  not  matters  which  come  under  the 
cognizance  of  the  senses,  or  can  be  measured  or 
weighed.  What  is  involved  in  the  terms  moral 
freedom,  morcd  duty,  moral  ^responsibility ,  moral 
obligation,  moral  feelings,  moral  princip)les,  emo- 
tions, passions,  desires,  reioards,  and  punishments  ? 
Something,  undoubtedly,  of  a  purely  mental  cha- 
racter ;  which,  in  order  to  be  effectively  analyzed, 
and  brought  to  open  day  for  the  satisfaction  of 
man's  reason  and  interest,  requires  an  intellectual 
process  of  the  most  subtile  and  refined  kind. 
Here  nature  cannot  be  interrogated  by  material 
instruments  ;  we  must  deal  with  her  solely  through 
the  means  of  our  internal  consciousness,  and  those 
liabits  of  inward  analysis  and  deduction  which  can 
only  be  detected  and  efiiciently  wielded  by  the 
mental  philosopher.  Eor  a  man  to  write  pro- 
foundly and  correctly  on  the  principles  of  morals, 
without  a  respectable  portion  of  metaphysical 
learning,  would  be  as  impossible  as  for  a  man  born 
blind  to  write  intelligibly  and  philosophically  on 
light  and  colours. 

Theology  stands  in  nearlv  the  same  relation  as 


INTRODUCTION.  XXUl 

morality  to  mental  philosophy.  The  former  has 
to  deal  with  those  principles  of  the  mind  which 
constitute  the  foundation  of  natural  and  revealed 
religion.  Here  cause  and  effect,  existence,  intel- 
ligence, wisdom,  final  causes,  and  an  immense 
variety  of  other  abstract  conceptions  of  the  human 
understanding,  form  the  ground-work  of  theolo- 
gical science,  and  create  and  support  its  entire 
principle  of  vitality.  We  have  the  existence  of 
the  Supreme  Being,  His  moral  government,  the 
naind's  immateriality  and  immortality,  the  whole 
science  of  morality  as  contrasted  and  compared 
with  the  morality  of  the  Scriptures,  the  doctrines 
of  revealed  religion  considered  in  relation  to  the 
course  of  nature  and  the  inward  suggestions  of  the 
human  soul ;  and  a  thousand  other  matters,  any  one 
of  which  is  sufficient  to  occupy  the  active  mind  of 
man  during  a  whole  life  time,  in  order  to  fully  illus- 
trate and  enforce  it  in  all  its  bearings  and  rami- 
fications. But  in  this  extensive  field  of  speculation 
and  interest,  nothing  can  be  done  without  a  know- 
ledge of  mental  subjects.  Divines  may,  and  in  fact 
do,  regulate  their  acquirements  in  metaphysical  lore 
according  to  their  individual  circumstances,  tastes, 
and  mental  capabilities  ;  but  the  theologian  is  not 
to  be  envied  who  can  enter  a  pulpit,  or  commit  his 
theological  thoughts  to  the  public  through  the 
press,  totally  unacquainted  with  the  general  out- 
lines of  mental  speculations.  Indeed  this  fact 
is  so  well  understood,  that  among  nearly  every 
class  of  Christian  teachers,  it  is  now  an  established 
part  of  theological  tuition,  that  the  candidates  for 


XXiv  INTRODUCTION. 

the  office  of  the  ministry  shall  possess  a  competent 
knowledge  of  metaphysical  science,  before  they  can 
be  qualified  for  holy  orders. 

Politics  as  a  science,  not  viewed  through  the 
medium  of  party,  are  essentially  founded  on  men- 
tal knowledge,  and  their  general  principles  are  of 
a  spmtual  or  abstract  cast.  They  have  also  an  in- 
timate and  necessary  relationship  with  morality 
and  theology.  All  declarations  of  personal  rights 
and  freedom,  allegiance,  civil  and  criminal  codes  of 
laws  and  jurisprudence,  or  the  law  of  nations,  are 
severally  founded  on  abstract  principles  of  thought, 
and  have  their  seat  in  the  deep  and  inward  recesses 
of  the  soul.  We  have  only  to  look  at  the  constitu- 
tional charters  of  any  state  or  kingdom,  to  be  con- 
vinced of  the  refined  and  mental  abstractions  of 
which  they  are  composed.  The  science  of  juris- 
prudence, for  example,  is  chiefly  constituted  of  a 
multitude  of  recondite  maxims,  of  which,  unless  a 
man  has  some  knowledge  of  metaphysical  subjects, 
and  is  well  acquainted  with  the  rules  and  principles 
of  abstract  reasoning,  he  can  never  be  able  fully  to 
comprehend  the  justice  and  soundness,  nor  their 
applicability  to  the  state  of  human  affairs. 

If  such,  then,  be  the  intimate  connection  between 
these  three  most  important  departments  of  human 
knowledge,  and  the  philosophy  of  mind,  how  ne- 
cessary and  obligatory  is  it  that  we  should  assi- 
duously cultivate  it,  and  should  form  to  ourselves 
comprehensive  views  of  its  nature,  limits,  purposes, 
and  ends.  It  ought  to  constitute  an  important 
branch  of  every  young  man's  education,  particularly 


INTRODUCTION.  XXV 

if  he  be  destined  to  pursue  any  professional  occupa- 
tion. Unless  habits  of  inward  reflection  are  formed 
and  cultivated  in  earlv  life,  and  the  rules  of  mental 
analysis  and  deduction  are  familiarised  to  the  mind, 
it  is  impossible  to  rear  any  great  or  respectable 
superstructure  of  philosophical  expertness  upon 
the  best  and  most  enlightened  systems  of  public 
or  private  tuition.  Such  systems  may  make  ^full, 
but  not  a  clever  man. 

Of  late  years  a  lively  interest  has  been  awakened 
in  regard  to  the  history  of  speculative  opinions. 
The  European  mind  has  been  aroused  from  a  state 
of  comparative  apathy,  and  is  now  bent  on  testing 
every  principle  and  every  fact,  both  by  historical 
evidence  and  by  logical  deduction.  We  are  called 
upon  to  trace  opinions  from  the  most  remote  pe- 
riods of  time,  and  to  view  them  in  conjunction 
with  institutions  and  modes  of  thinking  of  the  pre- 
sent day.  This  extensive  inquiry  is  considered  by 
various  classes  of  men  in  different  lights,  and  with 
different  feelings;  some  mth  aversion,  and  some 
with  approval;  some  with  an  anxious  desire  to 
effect  social  improvements,  and  promote  know- 
ledge ;  and  some,  unhappily,  to  throw  impediments 
and  doubts  in  the  path  of  human  progress.  Still, 
however,  powerful  sympathies  have  been  awakened ; 
and  we  may  rationally  hope  that  it  only  requires 
time,  and  suitable  seasons  of  calm  and  dispas- 
sionate reflection,  to  realize  important  benefits 
from  their  exercise. 

In  Germany    the   spirit  of  speculative  inquiry 


XXVI  INTRODUCTION. 

has,  for  nearly  a  century,  displayed  remarkable 
activity.  It  lias  formed  one  of  the  leading  branches 
of  public  education,  and  conducted  its  cultiva- 
tors to  distinction  and  renown.  It  has  been  made 
subservient  to  the  elucidation  of  every  other  de- 
partment of  the  philosophy  of  human  nature,  and 
thrown  a  steady  light  on  many  problems  which 
had  previously  been  enshrouded  in  almost  impene- 
trable darkness.  In  Prance  the  same  activity  has 
prevailed  for  nearly  the  same  period.  Here,  too, 
speculative  philosophy  has  imparted  a  higher  tone 
to  the  general  current  of  literature  and  scientific 
investigations,  and  has  been  eminently  successful 
in  adding  to  the  general  stock  of  rational  and  en- 
lightened inquiry.  Italy  has  likewise  partaken  in 
some  measure  of  the  prevailing  enthusiasm,  and 
has  relaxed  the  hitherto  inflexible  severity  of  aus- 
tere injunctions  against  novel  doctrines  and  opi- 
nions ;  and  has,  consequently,  extended  the  bless- 
ings of  intellectual  liberty  among  her  people.  And 
the  same  may  be  remarked  of  several  other  conti- 
nental nations.  In  proportion  as  mental  philo- 
sophy has  broken  in  upon  the  dull  and  stupifying 
routine  of  antiquated  and  worn-out  systems  of  edu- 
cation and  academical  instruction,  in  the  same  pro- 
portion do  we  trace  a  favourable  change  in  the 
general  current  of  the  public  mind.  The  spirit  of 
man  feels  the  salutary  influences  of  unrestricted 
freedom,  and  enters  upon  that  state  which  is  most 
conducive  to  the  full  and  cfi'ective  exercise  of  all 
its  loftier  and  more  ennobling  powers  and  energies. 
True   it   is,   that    these   advantages    from    the 


INTRODUCTION.  XXVll 

ardent  cultivation  of  speculative  topics,  are  not 
invariably  obtained  without  some  serious  draw- 
backs and  inconveniences.  In  Germany  and 
Erance,  in  particular,  there  has  unquestionably 
been  manifested  at  intervals  a  philosophical  spirit 
but  little  in  harmony  with  the  progress  of  rational 
knowledge,  and  the  best  and  most  sacred  interests 
of  man.  The  unfettered  liberty  of  thought  has  in 
these  countries  occasionally  run  into  licentiousness. 
The  philosophic  mind  has  degraded  itself,  and  out- 
raged common  sense  and  common  feeling.  But 
still  Ave  must  hold  the  balance  with  a  steady  and 
even  hand.  It  seems  to  be  one  of  the  necessary 
conditions  of  human  progress,  that  no  great  ad- 
vances shall  be  made  in  the  intellectual  acquire- 
ments of  nations,  nor  in  the  firm  and  complete 
consolidation  of  those  important  abstract  principles 
which  lie  at  the  root  of  their  civilization,  pros- 
perity, and  freedom,  without  some  corresponding 
disadvantages,  though  of  an  evanescent  or  tran- 
sitory nature.  The  public  mind,  long  pent  up 
within  a  narrow  sphere,  often  rebounds  beyond  its 
wholesome  and  natural  limits,  when  its  fetters  are 
taken  off  and  all  forcible  restrictions  removed. 
It  revels  in  the  wild  and  frantic  enjoyment  of  its 
liberty,  and  feels  but  little  inclination  for  the 
moment  to  listen  to  the  dictates  of  soberness  and 
truth.  But  this  feverish  state  passes  over,  and 
seasons  of  solid  thought  and  reflection  succeed, 
bearing  the  fruits  of  real  wisdom  and  matured 
experience.  And  an  appeal  can  safely  be  made  to 
all  who  have  any  thing  like  a  competent  know^ledge 


XXVlll  INTRODUCTION. 

of  the  general  literature  of  Germany  and  Prance, 
that,  amid  much  speculative  inquiry  of  a  question- 
able kind,  and  not  a  little  positively  unsound  and 
injurious,  there  is  still  a  very  striking  improvement 
manifested  in  every  branch  of  general  informa- 
sion  in  these  countries  within  the  last  century, 
in  which  abstract  reasoning  is  especially  required, 
and  where  the  human  mind  is  called  forth  to  ex- 
ercise all  its  higher  powers  of  rationalistic  dex- 
terity. And  this  advancement  in  the  loftier  walks 
of  literature  and  science,  may  be  fairly  attributed 
to  the  impetus  given  to  the  general  intellect,  by 
the  ardent  study  of  the  principles  of  mental  phi- 
losophy. 

Mental  studies  have  not  been  much  cultivated 
in  Great  Britain  for  the  last  three  quarters  of  a 
century.  In  Scotland,  however,  they  have  main- 
tained a  respectable  footing  ;  and  almost  all  per- 
sons intended  for  the  church,  the  bar,  or  public 
offices  of  any  description,  make  it  a  point  to  go 
through  a  regular  course  of  study  in  metaphysical 
science.  In  England  it  is  otherwise.  Here  it  can 
be  scarcely  said  to  form  any  portion  of  acade- 
mical instruction.  This  may  be  attributed  to 
many  causes.  The  preponderance  of  mechanical 
and  commercial  pursuits  among  ns,  naturally  in- 
disposes the  great  masses  of  even  intelligent  and 
reflecting  people  to  view  speculative  or  purely  in- 
tellectual investigations  with  a  friendly  and  en- 
couraging eye.  What  is  material,  palpable,  and 
immediately  profitable,  becomes  the  grand  and 
engrossing  object  of  interest.   The  external  sources 


INTRODUCTION.  XXIX 

of  enjoyment  and  happiness  prevail  over  the  men- 
tal or  spiritual ;  and  this  sentiment  pervades 
the  whole  mass  of  the  people,  impartini^;  to 
the  national  mind  a  strong  material  tendency. 
Again,  those  who,  from  inclination  and  their 
position  in  society,  were  fitted  to  take  a  leading 
part  in  the  discussion  and  propagation  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  mental  philosophy,  have  for  more  than 
half  a  century  entertained  doubts  as  to  its  benefits, 
chiefly  from  the  circumstance  that  the  mystical 
and  idealistic  notions  so  rankly  prevalent  in  some 
parts  of  the  continent,  might  be  possibly  trans- 
planted into  England,  and  corrupt  the  mind  of  the 
nation,  and  withdraw  it  from  those  important  ob- 
jects on  which  it  ought  invariably  to  rest.  That 
there  is  something  plausible  in  these  apprehensions, 
must  be  conceded.  But  a  little  further  inquiry  into 
the  nature  of  all  speculative  doctrines,  and  into 
the  modes  and  degrees  in  which  they  influence 
the  current  thought  of  a  people,  would  cer- 
tainly have  the  effect  of  greatly  mitigating,  if  it 
did  not  entirely  remove,  any  such  anticipated 
sources  of  danger.  For  how  stands  the  real 
position  of  the  question  ?  There  is  no  stopping, 
successfully,  the  progress  of  inquiry  of  a  whole  na- 
tion ;  if  you  close  any  particular  avenue  of  thought, 
another  must  be  opened  in  its  stead.  It  becomes, 
therefore,  purely  a  question  as  to  the  choice  of 
evils.  If  we  have  eschewed  the  dangers  from 
mystical  and  idealistic  theories,  we  have  un- 
questionably encouraged  the  growth  of  a  cold  and 
lifeless  materialism,  which  operates,  in  a  thousand 


XXX  INTRODUCTION. 

unperceived  modes,  to  banish  all  lofty  moral  and 
religious  feelings  from  the  minds  of  men.  By  an 
undue  encouragement  of  physical  science,  with  a 
view  to  make  it  supply  the  whole  of  the  mental 
wants  of  the  nation,  we  insensibly,  though  power- 
fully, and  from  the  very  nature  of  things,  throw 
the  mind  of  man  entirely  upon  a  species  of  know- 
ledge calculated,  when  it  fully  and  exclusively 
engrosses  his  affections  and  energies,  to  limit  the 
powers  of  his  intellect,  and  to  strip  them  of  their 
most  ennobling  and  glorious  attril^utes.  By  con- 
sequently dwelling  on  material  phenomena,  and 
making  mere  secondary  causes  objects  of  the  mind's 
attention,  we  gradually  descend  from  the  lofty  and 
improving  regions  of  thought,  and  consider  the 
Supreme  Being,  and  all  the  wonders  of  intellec- 
tual nature,  as  only  results  and  modifications  of 
tlie  visible  things  around  us.  This  is  neither  a 
natural  nor  advantageous  mode  of  procedure.  The 
practical  and  the  theoretical  should  invariably  bo 
conjoined  in  the  intellectual  culture  of  all  men ; 
inasmuch  as  this  is  the  only  mode  which  nature  has 
appointed  for  steadily  preserving  a  hold  on  their 
affections,  and  preventing  them  from  lapsing  into 
any  irremediable  state  of  apathetic  indifference,  or 
sordid,  unqualified  selfishness. 

When  we  come  to  look  narrowly  at  the  influence 
of  physical  science  on  tlie  minds  of  the  masses  of 
the  people,  we  are  struck  with  its  limited  range, 
and  its  cold  and  evanescent  impressions.  The  laws 
of  the  material  world  seldom  occupy  more  than  a 


INTRODUCTION.  XXxi 

passing  moment's  reflection;  and  the  improve- 
ments which  mechanical  science  may  bring  to  tl\e 
workman's  fire-side,  he  accepts  and  uses  as  a 
mere  matter  of  course,  but  never  makes  them 
anxious  objects  of  his  thoughts  or  contemplations. 
He  is  under  an  almost  instinctive  conviction,  that 
it  is  an  affair  which  does  not  particularly  concern 
him.  And  the  same  thing  is  true  of  every  other 
class  of  society.  The  elements  of  thought  and 
reflection  are  of  another  cast.  They  relate  to  other 
objects  apart  from  the  laws  and  qualities  of  mate- 
rial bodies.  Does  the  intelligent  mechanic  dwell 
any  length  of  time  upon  the  principles  of  his  art ; 
upon  the  formulas  of  the  screw,  the  lever,  or  the 
inclined  plane  ?  Docs  he  make  them  the  con- 
stant objects  of  his  thought  and  solicitude  ?  By  no 
means.  His  mind  is  elsewhere.  He  lives  with 
his  wife,  his  family,  his  relations,  his  countrymen ; 
and,  it  is  hoped,  with  his  God.  It  is  the  l)onds, 
the  connections,  the  sympathies,  the  feelings,  the 
hopes,  the  fears,  the  cares,  and  anxieties,  which 
arise  out  of  the  relationship  he  stands  in  as  a 
son,  a  parent,  a  member  of  society,  and  an  immor- 
tal spirit,  which  fill  the  measure  of  his  thoughts, 
and  give  life  and  interest  to  his  existence.  What 
a  slender  hold  have  all  material  agents  upon  him  ? 
What  to  him  the  number  or  nature  of  the  laws 
which  regulate  their  movements ;  the  great  law  of 
gravitation,  or  the  atomic  theory  of  chemical 
affinities  ?  Scarcely  any  thing.  They  touch  but 
very  lightly  indeed  the  vital  and  stirring  principles 


XXXU  INTRODUCTION. 

of  his  being.  They  are  not  the  staple  articles  of 
his  intellectual  sustenance  and  strength.  The 
social,  the  moral,  the  political,  the  domestic  ties 
of  life,  are  the  objects  of  his  constant  interest  and 
unceasing  solicitude.  He  rests  upon  intellectual 
and  moral  manifestations ;  and  always  allows  the 
phenomena  of  the  material  world,  numerous  and 
wonderful  though  they  be,  to  hang  loosely  about 
him,  and  never  for  a  moment  suffers  them  to  be 
placed  in  competition  with  the  claims,  obligations, 
and  duties  of  humanity. 

It  is  not  the  natural  philosopher ;  it  is  not  the 
Newtons,  the  Laplaces,  the  Davys,  however  vene- 
rable their  names  may  in  the  abstract  be,  who  most 
excite  the  sympathies  of  mankind,  and  engross 
their  undivided  attention.  These  are  not  the  house- 
hold gods  which  universal  humanity  sympathe- 
tically worships.  It  is  men  who  develop  the  prin- 
ciples of  mind ;  who  make  human  nature  their 
study ;  who  unfold  the  latent  thoughts,  purposes, 
and  principles  of  human  feeling  and  action ;  who 
distinguish  themselves  as  lawgivers,  statesmen, 
historians,  theologians,  poets,  painters,  and  writers 
on  the  every-day  movements  and  phases  of  human 
life.  These  find  kindred  spirits  in  all  ages  and 
countries ;  and  enjoy  a  reputation  and  fame, 
founded  on  infinitely  more  noble  and  interesting 
objects,  than  those  on  which  rest  the  cold  and 
formal  approbations  conferred  on  the  physical 
philosopher,  or  the  zealous  disciple  of  positive 
science. 


INTRODUCTION.  XXXlll 

"VVe  contend,  therefore,  that  the  decided  pre- 
dilection for  physical  science  manifested  in  Eng- 
land, and  for  the  rules  and  principles  of  reasoning 
necessarily  involved  in  and  derived  from  it,  is  not 
grounded  upon  an  enlarged  conception  of  the  na- 
ture and  purposes  of  human  knowledge,  nor  of  the 
advantages  to  be  realised  by  the  national  mind 
from  its  extended  cultivation.  We  readily  admit, 
as  a  true  and  general  maxim,  that  all  knowledge 
is  more  or  less  improving ;  but  it  by  no  means 
follows  that  when  we  unduly  confine  the  public 
mind  within  certain  prescribed  limits,  and  only 
call  into  exercise  one  set  or  class  of  its  faculties  or 
powers,  we  are  doing  our  best  to  advance  the 
cause  of  popular  instruction,  and  to  elevate  the 
sentiments  of  the  nation  to  their  loftiest  point  of 
general  improvement.  On  the  contrary,  we  liumbly 
conceive  that  we  are,  by  sketching  out  and  ado[)t- 
ing  such  a  narrow  and  contracted  system,  milita- 
ting against  one  of  the  plainest  and  most  impera- 
tive dictates  or  laws  of  our  nature ;  and  if  we  ol)- 
stinately  persist  in  pursuing  such  a  course,  we 
must  fully  expect  to  reap  those  bitter  fruits 
which  are  the  inevitable  result  of  violating  one  of 
the  estabKshed  canons  of  nature's  decrees.  To 
effect  the  intellectual  refinement  of  a  people,  there 
must  be  a  judicious  combination  of  all  the  different 
elements  of  knowledge  and  thought ;  and  among 
the  chief  and  most  influential  of  these,  is  the  sci- 
ence of  human  nature. 

It  must   not,  however,  be  inferred  from  these 
remarks,    that,    in    order    to    comprehend    other 

c 


XXxiv  INTRODUCTION. 

branches  of  knowledge  and  science,  it  is  absolutely 
requisite  that  we  should  be  intimately  acquainted 
with  mental  philosophy,  and  be  able  to  trace  its  his- 
tory with  accuracyand  minuteness.  In  the  pursuitof 
information  we  are  frequently  obliged  to  take  many 
principles  for  granted,  without  being  able  to  prove 
their  truth.  All  that  we  contend  for  is,  that  the 
science  of  mind  is  more  or  less  a  necessary  ingre- 
dient in  all  human  investigations,  and  that  we 
cannot  hope  to  take  a  conspicuous  part  in  any 
department  of  general  knowledge,  without  either 
tacitly  or  experimentally  adopting  many  of  the 
most  essential  axioms  on  which  the  fundamental 
movements  of  the  intellect  depend.  The  active 
principles  of  intelligence  must  be  either  theore- 
tically or  practically  recognised  and  understood, 
before  we  can  successfully  apply  them  to  any 
purpose  whatever. 

Nosystem  of  education  can  be  considered  more  mea- 
gre and  imperfect,  than  that  which  entirely  excludes 
the  philosophy  of  mind  from  its  range  of  inquiry. 
One  of  the  chief  benefits  of  instruction  is  entirely 
lost ;  that  which  enables  us  to  cultivate  both  the 
active  and  reasoning  powers  of  the  mind,  and  to 
strengthen  and  mature  them  to  that  degree  of 
excellence  which  is  indispensably  requisite  to 
secure  us  against  adopting  the  most  erroneous 
opinions,  and  the  most  glaring  and  palpal)le 
absurdities. 

One  of  the  most  powerful  causes,  perhaps,  which 
have  operated  to  clieck  the  general  cultivation  of 
speculative  philosophy  among  a  certain  class  of  in- 


INTRODUCTION.  XXXV 

telligent  people,  not  only  in  England  but  in  other 
countries,  is  the  conception  that  its  history  pre- 
sents nothing  but  a  wild  chaos  of  abstruse  systems, 
of  conflicting  opinions,  and  unshapely  chimeras ; 
the  natural  tendency  of  which  is  to  lead  men  into 
error,  to  fill  their  minds  with  shadows  and  de- 
lusions, and  to  excite  false  hopes  and  expectations, 
l^his  is  the  popular  accusation  brought  against  the 
philosophy  of  mind,  and  on  which  rest  the  apathy 
and  scepticism  commonly  felt  and  expressed  as  to  its 
nature  and  benefits.  But  a  moment's  calm  reflection 
will  immediately  dissipate  this  rash  conclusion  and 
vulgar  prejudice.  That  there  are  various  and  con- 
flicting opinions  relative  to  some  of  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  the  science,  and  to  their  in- 
fluence upon,  and  applicability  to,  other  branches 
of  human  investigation,  is  an  indisputable  truth  ; 
but  this  admission  does  not  compromise  the  va- 
lidity and  importance  of  mind,  considered  as  an 
independent  and  legitimate  branch  of  philosophical 
inquiry.  We  find  the  same  spirit  of  disputation 
and  contention  prevailing  among  those  who  culti- 
vate every  kind  of  knowledge.  The  abstract  prin- 
ciples on  which  they  all  rest,  are  more  or  less 
matters  of  discussion,  and  are  subjected  to  a  va 
riety  of  judgments  and  opinions.  But  this  state 
of  things  proves  nothing.  It  is  the  very  nature, 
essence,  and  province  of  knowledge,  to  separate  the 
true  from  the  false,  the  hypothetical  and  con- 
jectural from  the  certain  and  conclusive,  the  good 
from  the  bad,  and  the  expedient  from  the  inexpe- 

c2 


XXXvi  TNTRODUCTIOX. 

dient.  How  great  is  the  importance  of  morality 
both  to  individuals  and  to  whole  nations  ;  it  is  the 
very  life  blood  of  their  social  and  confederated 
existence.  But  where  shall  we  find  a  theory  of 
morality  Avhich  is  not  open  to  a  difference  of  opi- 
nion, or  which  is  fully  adequate  to  account  for  all 
the  moral  manifestations,  rules,  principles,  obliga- 
tions, and  ideas  of  merit  and  demerit,  which  dis- 
play themselves  in  the  wide  arena  of  the  moral 
universe  ?  Again,  the  science  of  politics  is  of  the 
highest  possible  interest  to  man  ;  but  to  what  con- 
tentions, varieties  of  sentiment  and  opinion,  and 
bitter  conflicts,  does  it  not  give  rise  ?  Where  is  the 
writer  who  has  ever  penned  a  political  system  or 
theory  which  has  been  universally,  or  even  ge- 
nerally, received  ?  Why  the  very  abstract  maxims 
or  principles  on  which  all  societies  of  men  rest,  are 
at  the  present  moment,  in  spite  of  all  the  learning 
and  scientific  investigations  of  three  thousand 
years,  speculative  objects  of  the  most  opposite  and 
conflicting  nature,  among  the  able  and  intelligent 
legislative  philosophers  and  politicians  of  all  coun- 
tries. If,  again,  we  cast  an  eye  to  religion,  we 
find  the  primary  principles  of  both  natural  and  re- 
vealed theology  matters  of  every-day  and  eager 
discussion,  and  susceptible  of  being  viewed  through 
various  mediums ;  and  the  same  is  applicable  to 
legal  science.  Where  shall  we  find  a  greater  dis- 
similarity of  judgment  than  that  to  which  the  laws 
and  customs  of  various  people  give  rise  ?  Nay, 
we  shall  advance  a  step  further,  and  maintain 
that  even  physical  science,  which  prides  itself  on 


INTRODUCTION.  XXXVll 

its  2)osUive  results,  is  not  removed  beyond  the  pale 
of  differences  of  opinion, and  conflicting  judgments, 
relative  to  many  of  its  theories,  principles,  and 
conclusions.  Now,  taking  all  these  matters  into 
consideration,  would  a  man  act  wisely  or  con- 
sistently, were  he  to  conclude,  that,  because  in 
morals,  politics,  religion,  law,  and  physical  science, 
we  find  opposite  theories  and  conflicting  judg- 
ments supported  by  those  who  cultivate  these 
respective  departments  of  knowledge,  he  is  war- 
ranted in  afiirming  that  they  are  all  delusions,  and 
that  there  is  not  the  slightest  substratum  of  truth 
or  logical  validity  for  them  to  rest  upon  ?  Certainly 
not.  A  man  who  should  entertain  an  opinion  of 
this  sort,  and  endeavour  to  act  upon  it,  would  be 
deemed  unfit  to  be  reasoned  with  on  any  subject 
whatever. 

What  we  claim  therefore  from  ordinary  candour 
and  consistency  is,  that  mental  science  be  placed 
upon  the  same  footing  as  other  branches  of  know- 
ledge. That  there  are  differences  of  opinion  about 
its  fundamental  truths,  we  readily  admit ;  but  they 
are  neither  greater  in  number,  nor  more  discordant 
in  their  nature,  than  what  appertain  to  almost 
every  other  topic  of  philosophical  investigation. 
And  it  certainly  appears  the  height  of  incon- 
sistency for  us  to  assume  that  there  is  no  truth 
whatever  in  that  particular  science  the  principles 
of  which  are  absolutely  necessary  to  ascertain  and 
to  adjudge  the  amount  and  nature  of  truth  to  be 
found  in  every  other  subject.  Of  all  perverse 
modes  of  reasoning,  this  must  appear  to  be  the 


XXXVlll  INTllODUCTION. 

most  self-contradictory  and  unsatisfactory  to  every 
well-regulated  and  candid  mind. 

As  it  is  with  mental  science  alone  that  we  have 
immediately  to  do,  we  shall  just  briefly  notice  some 
of  those  general  maxims  or  elementary  principles, 
which   seem  to  have  been  either  logically  demon- 
strated or  tacitly  assumed,  in  almost  every  system 
of  speculation  alluded  to  in  this  history  of  philo- 
sophy.    A  voluminous  record  of  this  kind,  extend- 
ing over  more  than  two  thousand  years,  offers,  at 
first  sight,  a  somewhat  perplexing  aspect  to  even 
scientific  minds ;  but  a  little  examination  into  the 
matter,  and  an  ordinary  degree  of  exercise  of  the 
power  of  generalization,  will  soon  enable  the  intel- 
ligent   and  attentive    reader  to  detect,  amid  the 
crowd  of  objects  which  present  themselves,  some 
distinctive  land-marks  which  will  serve  to  lead  him 
out  of  the  apparent  labyrinth  of  endless  specula- 
tion, and  impart  to  his  mind  some  steadiness  of 
jiurpose.     The  diversity  of  systems  and  theories  is, 
strictly   speaking,  more    in   appearance   than   in 
reality ;  for  we  often  find,  that  though  their  ex- 
ternal dress  be  very  diversified,  yet  when  we  look 
narrowly  at  them,  we  soon  recognise  an  affinity  or 
sameness  among  the  principles  which  form  the 
nucleus  of  a  great  variety  of  speculative  fabrics. 
The  importance  of  these  varied  illustrations  of  the 
same   fundamental    positions,    cannot,    on  many 
occasions,  be  too  highly  estimated ;  but  still  it  is 
always  valuable  to  observe  the  philosophic  rule  of 
looking  at  the  elementary  propositions  on  which 
different  views  of  the  human  mind  profess  to  rest. 


INTRODUCTION.  XXXIX 

It  is  this  susceptibility  of  the  principles  of  mental 
science  to  be  viewed  throug-h  various  mediums, 
and  to  be  Illustrated  by  materials  drawn  even 
from  opposite  quarters,  that  imparts  so  much  real 
interest  to  tliis  branch  of  knowledge,  and  makes 
it  such  a  necessary  and  useful  instrument  for  the 
testing  of  truths  in  other  departments  of  human 
inquiry. 

And  here  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the  illustra- 
tions of  principles  connected  with  the  human 
mind  in  all  its  grand  aspects  and  divisions,  stand 
so  prominently  distinct, — possess  such  an  indivi- 
duality of  character,  in  their  susceptil)ility  of  being 
varied,  to  an  almost  infinite  extent,  in  every  thing 
belonging  to  the  mere  physical  investigations  of 
the  universe, — that  we  perceive  at  a  glance  the  ra- 
dical distinction  between  the  truths  of  natural  phi- 
losophy and  those  of  human  nature.  A  treatise 
on  Astronomv,  Ilvdrostatics,  or  Chemistrv,  is 
always  the  same,  with  the  exception  of  recent  dis- 
coveries, which  are  simply  stated  as  matters  of 
fact,  and  are  linked  to  the  general  mass  already 
accumulated.  Writers  in  any  of  these  depart- 
ments of  knowledge,  follow  each  other  in  a  beaten 
track,  and  have  no  latitude  whatever  for  invention. 
There  is  no  want  of  inclination  to  impart  novelty 
and  interest  to  physical  science  ;  but  its  cultivators 
have  no  room  to  effect  any  such  thing.  They  travel 
in  a  path  bounded  by  a  lofty  wall  on  each  side, 
which  shut  out  nine-tenths  of  nature  from  their 
view  ;  and,  consequently,  they  have  liberty  neither 
to  turn  to  the  right  hand  nor  to  the  left.     But 


xl  INTRODUCTION. 

wliat  different  circumstances  accompany  the  illus- 
trations of  truths   springing'  out  of  the  deep  re- 
cesses of  the  human   lieart   and    understanding. 
How  susceptible  are  they  of  infinite  variation,  and 
of  becoming    inexhaustible    sources   of  interest. 
Conviction  and  mental  pleasure  rush  at  once  into 
the  soul  from  a  thousand  channels ;  and  yet  the 
perfect  identity  between  the  leading  principles  of 
human  thought  and  action  is  never  weakened  or 
destroyed.     The  grand   outlines   of  humanity  are 
always  visible.     The  truths  of  mind,  of  religion, 
of  morals,  of  politics,   of  matters  of  intellectual 
taste,  of  the  every- day  movements  of  life,  passion, 
and   desire,  are   each   of  them   the  never-failing 
fountains  from  which  the  streams  of  human  wis- 
dom and  genius  perennially  flow,  to  gladden  and 
cheer  the  heart  of  man,  and  to  impart  to  him  that 
necessary  mental  sustenance,  the  ceaseless  cravings 
for  which  constitute  one  of  the  striking  character- 
istics of  his  being.     The  scientific  classifications  of 
the  natural  philosopher  die   almost  the  moment 
they  are  born ;  but  not  so  the  speculations  of  the 
mental  philosopher,  the  moralist,  the  divine,  the 
dramatic  writer,  or  the  poet ;  these  enjoy  a  per- 
petual youth,  and  time  itself  stamps  upon  their 
respective  eflPusions  the  seal  of  immortality. 

We  may  now  observe,  in  the  first  place,  that  one 
of  the  leading  positions  which  seem  to  be  esta- 
blished by  the  historical  statements  and  details  of 
philosophy  in  all  countries  and  ages,  is,  that  mind 
and  matter  are  two  separate  and  distinct  things. 
The  whole  current   of  speculation    scarcely  fur- 


INTRODUCTION.  xli 

nishes  us  Avitli  any  thiug  approaching  to  a  single 
comjilete  theory,  which  in  all  its  aspects,  and  in 
all  its  logical  deductions,  points  to  an  opposite 
principle.  The  mind  of  man,  in  every  state  of  ex- 
istence of  which  we  have  any  authentic  record,  has 
always  been  struggling  to  give  utterance  to  this 
fundamental  truth,  or  manifestation  of  its  inward 
consciousness.  It  assumes,  it  is  true,  a  variety  of 
appearances,  but  it  constantly  retains  the  unity  of 
its  character  intact.  Erom  the  banks  of  the 
Thames  to  the  banks  of  the  Ganges ;  from  the 
first  mutterino's  of  science  in  the  East,  to  the 
finished  philosophical  productions  of  the  present 
hour ;  this  truth  has  never  ceased  its  influence  over 
the  minds  of  countless  millions  of  our  race,  who 
have  passed  through  life  under  external  circum- 
stances and  with  speculative  theories  infinitely 
varied.  Here  there  is  a  solemn  unity  of  universal 
assent,  which  no  hardihood  of  assertion  can  deny, 
nor  captious  sophistry  gainsay. 

In  the  second  place,  it  may  be  observed,  that  we 
clearly  perceive,  from  the  whole  range  of  ancient 
philosophy,  that  the  religious  spirit  was  more  or  less 
incorporated  Avith  it ;  that  man  was  considered  as 
of  a  heavenly  origin,  and  as  possessing  a  more  refined 
and  elevated  nature  than  the  mere  animals  around 
him.  It  was  also  clearly  taught,  from  the  same 
authority,  that  all  investigations  into  the  structure 
of  his  intellect,  could  only  be  successfidly  pro- 
secuted by  constantly  keeping  in  view  this  double 
relationship  or  dependence.  Whenever,  therefore, 
we  set  out  in  our  philosophical  inquiries  into  the 


Xlii  INTRODUCTION. 

nature  of  mental  phenomena  upon  an  opposite 
tack,  and  contemplate  man  with  the  sole  view  of 
referring  them  to  the  same  laws,  and  subjecting 
them  to  the  same  logical  ordeal,  which  govern  and 
influence  other  creatures  around  us,  we  do,  in  fact, 
not  only  run  counter  to  the  universal  experience 
and  testimony  of  mankind,  most  indisputably  and 
unequivocally  expressed  ;  but  we  also  find  that  all 
doctrines,  founded  on  such  a  mode  of  investigation, 
are  not  only  lamentably  defective  in  point  of 
logical  merit,  but,  when  reduced  to  practice,  bear 
fruits  inimical  to  the  moral  and  intellectual  im- 
provement and  well-being  of  man. 

And  do  we  not  witness  the  verification  of  this 
truth  in  every  stage  of  the  history  of  speculative 
principles  ?  The  whole  course  of  human  progress, 
since  the  first  dawn  of  letters,  bears  testimony  to 
the  fact,  that  mankind  have  received  incalcuable  be- 
nefits from  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  the  theolo- 
gical principle.  Man  is  thus  viewed  as  fitted  for  a 
higher  destiny  than  other  terrestrial  and  animated 
beings ;  and  we  feel  assured  also,  that  in  proportion 
as  he  keeps  this  opinion  steadily  before  him  in  all  his 
philosophical  researches,  the  universe  around  him 
and  the  general  course  of  events  inspire  him  with 
a  firm  persuasion  that  he  is  endowed  with  faculties 
and  powers  expressly  fitted  for  exercise,  and  to  be 
eminently  productive  of  benefit  to  mankind,  and 
glory  to  the  Creator  of  his  existence.  This  con- 
clusion does  not  rest  upon  a  mere  theoretical  con- 
jecture ;  it  is  susceptible  of  incontrovertible  de- 
monstration, from  the  records  of  history,  as  well  as 


iNTiiODUCTioN.  xliii 

from  the  overpowering  feelings  and  convictions  of 
the  human  heart. 

Every  form  which  the  great  theological  principle 
assumes  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  rests  upon 
the  position  of  mind,  connected  with  a  creative  and 
y over ning power.  The  notions  of  mental  operations, 
and  those  of  a  Deity,  are  purely  elemental,  and 
seem  to  be  co-existent  in  the  inward  consciousness 
of  man.  Whether  this  primary  truth  can  be  fully 
demonstrated,  either  psychologically  or  ontologi- 
cally,  we  need  not  stop  here  to  determine ;  but 
certain  it  is,  that  the  history  of  men's  opinions 
strikingly  proves  that  it  lies  at  the  root  of  every 
form  of  speculation,  and  seems  to  be  one  of  those 
necessary  and  fundamental  axioms,  without  which 
all  reasoning  is  nugatory,  all  mental  conviction 
impossible,  and  human  life  a  dream. 

And  we  further  feel  confident,  that  a  candid  and 
accurate  consideration  of  theories  of  philosophy 
will  lead  the  mind  to  perceive,  that  there  is  nothing 
in  the  general  constitution  of  them  hostile  to  the 
leading  features  and  doctrines  of  the  Christian  sys- 
tem. In  fact,  there  exists  a  surprising  harmony 
between  all  speculative  theories  which  have  any 
degree  of  truth  or  solidity  in  them,  and  the  ele- 
mentary principles  of  revealed  theology ;  and  phi- 
losophic truth  and  theological  truth  will  be  found, 
in  almost  all  cases,  to  act  and  re-act  on  each  other, 
to  the  mutual  elucidation  and  advantage  of  both. 
What  may  be  termed  the  metaphysics  of  the  Bible, 
if  such  an  expression  may  be  allowed,  are  in  strict 
keeping   with    every  thing   which   has   been  ob- 


Xliv  INTRODUCTION. 

served  and  recorded,  by  the  universal  assent  of 
mankind,  relative  to  intellectual  plienomena. 
There  is  no  radical  or  constitutional  discrepancy 
between  them.  The  authoritative  declarations  of 
Scripture  are  intelligible  only  because  they  rest 
on  the  general  perceptions  and  judgments  of  men; 
and  the  high  purposes  and  hopes  with  which  Reve- 
lation is  conversant,  are,  in  every  case,  powerfully 
and  universally  responded  to  by  the  most  charac- 
teristic feelings  and  impulses  of  human  nature. 

The  religious  principle  is,  therefore,  a  necessary 
and  wholesome  ingredient  in  every  system  of 
speculative  thought  or  inquiry.  Nothing  is  in- 
telligible without  it.  It  speaks  with  a  thousand 
tongues ;  and  like  the  universal  ether,  to  which  it 
has  often  been  made  to  claim  affinity,  pervades  all 
nature,  and  is  ever  present  to  the  mind  of  man. 
Its  manifestations  are  sometimes  faintly  traceable 
in  his  mental  physiology,  and  even  oftimes  they 
become  the  sport  of  the  wildest  vagaries  and  most 
fantastical  caprice ;  but  we  think  not,  we  act  not, 
without  their  co-operation,  or  beyond  the  pale  of 
their  influence. 

In  the  third  place,  the  existence  and  certainty  of  a 
number  of  a  priori  mental  principles  or  conceptions, 
are  decidedly  recognised  in  every  system  of  philoso- 
phy of  which  there  are  any  full  or  regularly  classified 
details.  These  original  ideas  become  the  life-spring 
of  thought,  and  the  steady  guides  of  the  under- 
standmg.  They  depend  upon  nothing  capricious, 
variable,  evanescent,  or  transitory ;  they  form  the 
primitive  foundations  of  all  human  observation, 


INTRODUCTION.  xlv 

experience,  and  reasoning.  From  whence  they  are 
derived,  and  how  regulated  and  guided,  it  is  not 
our  province  here  to  inquire ;  it  is  sufficient  to  state 
that  there  will  not  be  found,  in  all  the  historical 
sketches  of  systems  of  which  we  have  any  account, 
a  single  instance  where  their  existence  is  not  tacitly 
or  expressly  acknowledged. 

In   the   fourth   place,   we   shall   find,   from  an 
accurate  study  of  history,  that  philosopliy  is  of  a 
progressive  character.     Though  its  principles  are 
abstract,  and  of  ana  piHori  description,  yet  their  full 
and  complete  development  rests  with  time.     We 
find  this  depicted  on  the  lineaments  of  philosophi- 
cal speculation,  from  the  remotest  ages  to  the  present 
hour.     Unquestionably  there  have  been  very  great 
vicissitudes  in  the  progress  of  mental  knowledge. 
Sometimes  it  would  seem  to  have  been  almost  sta- 
tionary ;    then  to  have  made  a  sudden  bound  in  a 
forward  direction ;  and  again  to  lia^e  relapsed  into 
a  state  of  quietude  and  apatliy.     But  still,  on  the 
whole,  a  decided  and  permanent  progress  was  in- 
variably secured.      This  onward  course  was  not, 
however,  characterised  by  the  discovery  and  de- 
velopment of  neto  truths  or  principles  of  human 
nature,      but      in     illustrating     the      individual 
operations  of  those  already  known,  and  in  more 
accurately  tracing  out  their  respective  bearings  on 
other  important  and  collateral  branches  of  human 
investigation.     There  is  not,  in  fact,  a  principle  of 
the  human  mind  in  our  most  approved  modern 
treatises  on  its  nature  and  faculties,  which  may  not 
be  found  among  the  speculations  of  the  Grecian 
philosophers :    but   still  we  have   greatly  the  ad- 


Xlvi  INTRODUCTION. 

vantage  over  the  ancients,  in  the  copiousness  of 
illustrations ;  the  nicer  processes  of  analytical  and 
deductive  reasoning ;  in  displaying  the  power  and 
influence  ofmental  science  over  other  subjects;  and, 
above  all,  in  those  refined  yet  solid  distinctions, 
which  we  can  now  make  on  almost  every  topic 
connected  with  man,  as  a  thinking,  moral,  religious, 
and  social  being.  It  is  this  expansiveness  or  am- 
plification of  the  primary  elements  of  mind,  which 
constitutes  the  progressive  character  of  philoso- 
phical speculations  on  its  powers  or  faculties ; 
inasmuch  as  it  more  completely  opens  out  to  our 
view  the  whole  arcana  of  thought,  in  many  of  those 
sudden  and  rapid  operations  which  were  inade- 
quately comprehended  by  antiquity,  and  ap- 
peared in  the  eyes  of  some  of  the  ancient  sages 
as  partaking  of  the  character  of  individual  and 
instinctive  imj)ulses. 

Besides  this,  there  is  a  progressive  character 
stamped  upon  every  thing  we  behold.  The  Avhole 
economy  of  human  nature  proclaims  it.  We 
instinctively  follow  it  from  the  cradle  to  the  grave. 
There  is  no  human  being  without  a  regularly 
formed  system  of  speculative  or  theoretical  know- 
ledge, relative  to  his  own  nature  and  to  that  of  the 
beings  around  him,  however  crude  or  limited  it 
may  be ;  and  when  we  come  to  analyse  this  theory, 
we  find  it  made  up  of  varied  materials,  some 
illustrative  of  this  principle,  and  some  of  that. 
Order,  method,  selection,  revisal,  are  conspicuous 
everywhere;  and  the  sum  total  of  an  ordinary 
man's  views  of  himself,  and  of  human  life  generally, 
is  a  perfect  epitome  of  the  more  elaborate  and  sja- 


INTRODUCTION.  xlvii 

tematic  treatises  of  the  philosopher.  We  recognise 
in  both  the  progressive  character  of  the  mind ;  one 
truth  is  made  predominant  here,  and  another 
there ;  one  subject  is  considered  in  this  light,  and 
another  in  that ;  weeding  out  the  errors  of  yester- 
day by  the  fuller  experience  of  to-day ;  and,  in  fact, 
invariably  labouring  towards  a  state  of  ideal  har- 
mony and  perfection,  and  always  making  a  decided 
step  towards  its  attainment.  This  is  the  condition 
of  humanity,  and  the  whole  body  of  human  know- 
ledge, and  particularly  mental  philosophy,  is 
marvellously  confirmatory  of  the  fact. 

Indeed,  to  plead  for  the  eclectic,  or  progressive, 
philosophy,  is  but  a  very  trite  and  common-place 
affair;  since  it  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  to 
argue  for  that  wholesome  equilibrium  among 
the  leading  branches  of  man's  knowledge  and 
springs  of  action,  which  all  ages  of  the  world,  and 
all  sects  of  philosophers,  have  more  or  less  recog- 
nised as  one  of  the  indispensable  conditions  of 
human  thought,  power,  and  happiness.  To  be 
convinced  of  the  utility  of  this,  we  have  only  to 
conceive  for  a  moment,  man,  as  now  constituted, 
under  the  exclusive  control  of  any  one  of  the  three 
grand  divisions  of  human  investigation,  nature, 
mind,  and  God.  Were  he  merely  incessantly  look- 
ing at  the  material  changes  and  operations  of  things 
around  him,  he  would  be  nothing  more  than  a  mere 
statue  or  vegetable  excrescence ;  he  might  be  said 
to  exist,  but  not  to  live.  Again,  were  men  entirely 
engrossed  by  the  feelings  and  movements  of  their 
minds,   and   to  take  no  heed  of  external  things, 


Xlviii  INTRODUCTION. 

they  could  liot  exist  a  single  day.  And,  finally, 
were  we  continually  making  the  nature,  attril)utes, 
and  mode  of  government  of  the  Deity,  exclusive 
objects  of  our  perpetual  contemplation,  we  should 
only  he  attempting  to  do  what  is  impossible.  So 
that  every  thing  depends  upon  a  due  and  propor- 
tional sul3ordination  of  one  thing  to  another ;  and 
this  is  the  reason  why  the  progressive  character  is 
imposed  upon  human  knowledge,  in  order  that  it 
might  be  reared  up  into  an  immense  and  splendid 
temple,  by  the  aggregate  and  universal  thought  of 
mankind. 

Let  us  just  cast  a  glance  over  the  speculative 
opinions  of  mankind,  and  we  shall  instantly 
perceive  the  progressive  character  of  mental 
philosophy.  In  Greece  there  was  a  system  of 
great  intellectual  excellence,  embracing  within 
its  range  nearly  all  the  primary  principles  of  a 
comprehensive  and  matured  body  of  thought. 
These  were  discussed  by  the  Greeks  in  a  manner 
and  with  a  tact  peculiarly  their  own  ;  but  towards 
the  latter  years  of  their  political  glory  and  inde- 
pendence, their  speculations  seemed  to  have  been 
nearly  worn  out,  and  to  have  become  decidedly 
tame  and  insipid.  The  Christian  dispensation 
gave  new  life  to  human  speculation.  The  Greek 
philosophybecame  amalgamated  with  it ;  and  novel 
and  highly  interesting  philosophical  combinations 
were  the  result.  New  light  was  thrown  on  a  thou- 
sand important  questions  connected  with  the  na- 
ture of  man,  with  which  the  Greek  mind  was  unable 
to  grapple   alone.     The   philosophy  of  the  Chris- 


INTRODUCTION.  xllX 

tian  Fatliers  was  followed  by  that  of  the  School- 
men ;  and,  as  far  as  the  science  of  human  nature 
was  concerned,  there  was  another  step  gained  in  a 
forward  direction,  Por  though  we  are  apt  to  talk 
glibly,  and  with  no  small  degree  of  self-compla- 
cency, of  the  dark  ages ;  yet  no  one  who  is  even 
tolerably  acquainted  with  the  nature  and  history 
of  the  philosophy  of  this  period,  can  be  ignorant 
that,  independently  of  mere  abstract  investigations 
on  mind,  and  of  the  principles  of  doctrinal  theo- 
logy, all  the  most  important  laws  and  institutions 
of  European  society  were  dug  out  of  the  mines  of 
this  ponderous  and  inexhaustible  mass  of  human 
speculation.  And  we  need  scarcely  add,  that  since 
the  days  of  the  Scholastic  inquiries,  we  have  made 
considerable  progress,  particularly  in  all  our  phi- 
losophical methods  of  investigation  and  reasoning, 
in  shewing  the  mental  dependencies,  bearings,  and 
relationships  which  subsist  among  all  branches  of 
knowledge ;  and  in  what  way,  and  to  what  degree, 
they  can  be  advantageously  cultivated  and  applied. 
It  must  be  interesting  to  all  cultivators  of  the 
science  of  intellect  to  have  some  general  idea  of 
the  present  state  of  speculation,  both  at  home  and 
abroad ;  and  to  observe  those  philosophical  ten- 
dencies which  the  mental  investigations  of  parti- 
cular countries  decidedly  manifest.  There  never 
was,  however,  a  period  in  the  history  of  mankind, 
when  it  was  more  difficult  to  predict,  with  any 
thing  approaching  to  certainty  or  probability,  the 
turn  which  the  speculative  ideas  of  nations  may 

d 


1  INTRODUCTION. 

take,  than  at  the  present  moment.*  We  see  men's 
minds  in  every  direction  moved  and  agitated  in  a 
remarkable  manner.  The  first  principles  of  all 
human  knowledge  are  called  in  question,  and  sub- 
jected to  the  most  rigid  logical  ordeal.  What  was 
mere  theory,  thrown  with  off-hand  indifference 
upon  the  surface  of  intellectual  society  but  a  few 
years  ago,  is  now  brought  upon  the  arena  of  prac- 
tical life,  and  is  attempted  to  be  made  the  ground- 
work of  sweeping  legislative  enactments  and  social 
innovations.  The  horizon  of  thought  seems  dark, 
overcharged,  and  threatening;  and  the  prophetic 
power  of  the  most  comprehensive  and  penetrating 
sagacity  is  almost  entirely  paralyzed.  At  such 
a  moment  we  instinctively  fall  back  upon  the 
eternal  law  of  progressive  improvement,  and  dwell 
upon  the  anticipations  derived  from  a  species  of  opti- 
mism, more  or  less  vigorous  in  every  human  breast, 
that  '*  all  things  are  for  the  best."  Hopeless  despair 
is  never  a  justifiable  sentiment  either  in  nations  or 
individuals.  On  the  contrary,  we  are  called  upon 
to  look  at  the  cheering  side  of  things,  from  many 
weighty  considerations.  We  therefore  place  un- 
limited confidence  in  the  imperishable  nature  of 
mind.  All  its  movements  have  for  their  grand 
aim,  the  ultimate  increase  of  man's  real  know- 
ledge, and  the  promotion  of  his  happiness.  There 
may  be  seasons  of  mental  aberration  ;  of  reckless 
and  discontented  movements  of  the  inner  man ; 
but  these  are    but  transitory,   and    last  only  for 

*  September,  1848. 


INTRODUCTION.  U 

a  season.  The  intellectual  apparatus  of  a  nation 
soon  rights  itself.  The  influence  of  error  is 
commonly  prompt  in  its  manifestations,  and  the 
progress  of  truth  slow.  Pifty  or  a  hundred  years 
are  but  as  a  hand's-breadth  in  the  life  of  a  whole 
people  ;  and  on  this  account  we  are  called  upon  to 
check  impatience  and  cherish  hope.  In  the  men- 
tal commotion  of  kingdoms,  "  the  darkest  hour  is 
nearest  to  the  dawn;"  and  after  a  few  convulsive 
throes  and  struggles,  a  brighter  era  arises ;  and 
more  refined,  spiritual,  and  rational  views  occupy 
the  mind  of  the  nation. 

As  we  have  already  noticed,  the  philosophy  of 
mind  has  been  assiduously  cultivated  in  many 
continental  countries,  within  the  last  century.  In 
Germany  this  has  been  particularly  the  case.  But 
Germany  is  just  one  of  those  places  where  it  is 
extremely  difficult  to  draw  general  conclusions 
from  the  intellectual  movements  of  its  philo- 
sophers. Though  speculation  has  there  a  decidedly 
national  character,  yet  its  details  are  so  multifa-  ftr 

rious  and  incongruous,  that  anything  like  accurate 
generalization  becomes  almost  impossible;  and 
anticipations  of  its  future  progress  and  prospects 
are  difficult  to  realize.  Philosophical  inquirers  have 
there  taken  unusual  directions;  have  penetrated 
into  every  arcanum  of  the  material  and  spiritual 
world  ;  have  by  turns  doubted  all  things  and  de- 
fended all  things;  have  moulded  and  theorised 
every  aspect  or  phase  of  human  thought  and  life 
into  a  thousand  forms  ;  so  that  we  have  but  a  very 
feeble  guarantee  indeed  for  the  fulfilment  of  any 

d2 


Hi  INTRODUCTION. 

prediction  wliich  may  be  hazarded  ou  the  move- 
ments of  spirits  so  bold,  ambitious,  and  versatile. 

Looking,  however,  at  the  general  features  of 
German  speculation  within  the  last  thirty  years, 
we  perceive  a  manifest  change  for  the  better.  We 
see  common  sense  and  reason  more  generally  re- 
cognised ;  and  a  growing  desire  among  all  the 
leading  minds  of  the  country  to  weed  out  of  the 
national  philosophy  whatever  is  wild,  incompre- 
hensible, unsound,  and  irrational.  The  nation  has 
become  sick  of  speculation  for  the  mere  sake  of 
speculating,  and  of  doubt  for  the  mere  sake  of 
doubting.  Sober  and  thinking  men  sigh  for 
something  solid  and  satisfying;  something  more 
valuable  than  the  fantastical  absurdities  of  by-gone 
times.  Every  year  we  witness  a  decided  move- 
ment towards  a  healthier  state  of  things.  The 
waters  are  subsiding  to  their  natural  level,  leaving 
in  every  direction  large  portions  of  speculative 
debris  behind  them.  Spiritualism  is  gradually 
becoming  more  material,  and  materialism  more 
spiritual ;  so  that  the  absurdities  from  the  ex- 
tremes of  both  sources  of  inquiry  mil  soon  lie 
obliterated  l3y  doctrines  of  a  more  intermediate  and 
reconcileable  complexion.  Idealism  will  be  made 
subservient  to  lofty  and  interesting  purposes,  and 
will  ultimately  coerce  empirical  facts  and  principles 
into  wholesome  and  fruitful  channels  of  thought 
and  action.  On  the  other  hand,  the  natural 
tendency  of  pure  spiritualism  to  degenerate  into 
rhapsodical  and  incomprehensible  vagaries,  will 
receive  a  wholesome  check  by  the  power  of  deduc- 


INTRODUCTION.  liii 

tive  reasoning  and  accurate  observation.  And 
thus  do  we  hope,  that  ere  many  years  pass  away, 
sound  and  enlightened  systems  of  mental  philo- 
sophy will  be  everywhere  prevalent  in  the  high 
seats  of  intelligence  throughout  the  whole  of  the 
Germanic  empire. 

Perhaps  we  may  take  upon  us  to  add,  before 
closing  our  observations  on  Germany,  that  the  con- 
flict in  this  country,  at  the  present  moment,  lies 
between  a  rational  spiritualism  and  an  absolute 
and  uncompromising  materialism.  The  latter  is 
the  last  enemy  which  the  spirit  of  reform  has  to 
vanquish.  The  venerable  and  learned  Baron  Hum- 
boldt leads  the  way  in  the  empirical  philosophy  of 
his  country  ;  and  we  cannot  but  feel  deep  regret  in 
witnessing  a  long  and  arduous  life  spent  in  the 
promotion  of  physical  science,  having  nothing 
better  to  cheer  it,  or  to  leave  as  a  legacy  to  man- 
kind, even  at  the  grave's  mouth,  than  a  material 
and  primordial  necessity,  and  a  deep  *'  sense  of 
insecurity"  in  every  philosophical  system  which 
professes  to  maintain  that  there  is  any  thing  in 
the  universe  save  mere  objective  existences.* 
Splendid  and  influential,  however,  as  the  Baron's 
acquirements  and  reputation  unquestionably  are, 
we  have  no  apprehension  of  anything  like  a 
general  adoption  of  his  opinions.  They  may  cap- 
tivate or  dazzle  the  unreflecting  and  superficial  for 
a  season,  but  they  carry  within  themselves  the 
seeds  of  a  mortal  dissolution.  No  man,  be  his 
spirit   ever  so  "  deeply  mersed  in  matter,"    can 

*  !?ee  lluniboklt's  Cosmos,  Londou,  1845. 


liv  INTRODUCTION. 

impress  upon  the  minds  of  men,  for  any  length  of 
time,  the  idea  that  the  universe  is  a  Godless  uni- 
verse. The  bare  attempt  is  a  violent  outrage  on 
one  of  the  most  powerful  and  overwhelming  con- 
victions of  the  human  soul. 

Looking  now  at  Erance,  we  clearly  perceive  that 
since  the  commencement  of  the  present  century,  a 
great  change  for  the  better  has  been  effected  in 
the  speculative  philosophy  of  the  country.  Por 
some  years  in  the  latter  part  of  the  last,  and  the 
beginning  of  the  present  century,  we  find  ultra- 
materialism  everywhere  prevalent,  and  the  philo- 
sophical intellect  of  the  nation  sunk  to  a  low  ebb. 
But  in  due  course  of  time,  the  principles  and 
spirit  of  the  Scotch  philosophy  began  to  gain 
ground,  and  to  shake  and  supplant  tlie  low  and 
grovelling  views  of  the  mechanical  philosophers. 
This  was  one  important  step  gained  in  a  right 
direction.  By  slow  degrees  the  idealism  of  Ger- 
many came  to  the  rescue,  and  greatly  aided,  under 
the  peculiar  circumstances  in  which  Prance  was 
placed,  the  good  work  of  mental  spirituality  and 
regeneration.  Nor  ought  we  to  pass  over,  without 
special  notice,  the  great  benefits  derived  from  the 
Paris  translations  of  the  Greek  metaphysicians, 
which  have  had  a  direct  and  powerful  tendency  to 
induce  the  young  and  rising  thinkers  of  Prance 
to  consult  authorities  on  matters  of  abstract  specu- 
lation admirably  calculated  to  elevate  and  imjirove 
the  general  tone  of  academical  studies,  and  guide 
them  into  more  refined,  rational,  and  wholesome 
channels. 


INTRODUCTION.  Iv 

In  casting  a  retrospective  eye  on  France  for  the 
last  forty  years,  to  the  time  when  the  speculations 
of  Destutt-Tracy,  Cahanis,  and  Volney  constituted 
the  staple  elements  of  the  national  thought,  what 
surprising  strides  she  has  made  in  mental  inquiries. 
How  varied  and  discursive,  intelligent  and  able,  have 
been  the  numerous  publications  which  have  issued 
from  her  press.     The  philosophical  disquisitions  of 
her  able  thinkers  undoubtedly  possess,  like  those  of 
Germanv,  a  distinctive  and  national  character,  and 
have  frequently  been  directed   into    questionable 
channels ;  yet  the  Ereuchman  has  never  wandered 
so  far  from  real  life,  nor  thrown  around  his  lucu- 
brations such  a  halo  of  mysticism,  as  his  German 
brethren.     The  Gaulic  i)hilosopher  has  always  been 
the  more  rational  and  unpretending  of  the  two. 
And  there  is  scarcely  a  modern  French  publication, 
of  any  note  whatever,  on  the  human  mind,  and  on 
its  various  faculties  and  powers,  which  does  not  dis- 
play great  ability,  and  a  sincere  and  anxious  desire 
to  arrive  at  truth.   The  whole  tenor  of  philosophical 
investigation  and  criticism  has  been  changed  for 
the  better  within  these  few  years.     Great  truths 
on  religion,  morals,    mind,    politics,    and   human 
knowledge  generally,  have  been  discussed  in  a  truly 
enlightened  spirit ;  and  many  valuable  additions 
made  to  the  common  stock  of  sober  and  rational 
discussion.     Numerous  verifications  of  this  truth 
might  be  adduced  from  her  literature,  and  from 
her  social  and  religious  institutions.     And  though 
she  be  now  under   a  cloud,  there  is   no   ground 
for  dejection  or  despair  as  to  the  future  advance- 
ment of  the  nation  in  mental  philosophy,  or  the 


Ivi  INTKODUCTION. 

soundness  of  many  of  its  leading  j)i'i^^ipl^^* 
Every  thing  betokens  that  she  will  steadily  and 
firmly  retain  the  great  truths  she  has  so  ably  and 
enthusiastically  laboured  to  illustrate  and  pro- 
mulgate; and  gradually  leave  behind  that  old 
leaven  of  materialism  and  folly,  which  the  last 
century  bequeathed,  and  which  has  been  prolific  of 
so  many  evils,  both  speculative  and  practical,  to 
her  character  and  institutions  as  a  great  nation. 

In  Italy  there  is  a  bright  and  cheering  prospect 
that  this  first  regenerator  of  speculative  philosophy 
in  Europe  will  speedily  occupy  a  conspicuous  and 
honorable  position  in  mental  science  among  other 
continental  countries.  Within  the  last  quarter  of 
a  century  the  numerous  publications  which  have 
appeared  in  different  states  of  the  kingdom,  are 
characterised  by  an  enlightened  spirit,  and  by 
great  good  sense  and  pliilosophical  acumen.  The 
predominance  of  a  state  and  influential  theology 
has,  doubtless,  given  a  formal  and  limited  range 
to  her  philosophy  ;  but  still  there  is  so  much  real 
heart  and  pith  in  it,  that  it  would  betray  a  narrow 
spirit  indeed  to  refuse  our  hearty  commendations 
of  its  general  merits.  Speaking  with  some  reser- 
vations, the  ordinary  bent  of  ItaKan  metaphysics 
at  the  present  moment  is  decidedly  of  an  eclectic 
and  common- sense  complexion.  Ontology  and 
psychology  go  hand  in  hand  ;  and  though  a  priori 
truths  of  the  mind  are  highly  valued  and  uni- 
versally recognised  as  necessary  and  important 
elements  of  all  reasoning,  yet  they  are  not  placed 
in  opposition,  to  the  actual  exclusion  of  external 
and  sensational  sources  of  knowledge.  The  leading 


INTllODUCTION.  Ivii 

Italian  philosophers  of  the  present  day,  among 
whom  we  place  Gioberti,  Mamiani,  and  Tomaseo, 
— now  severally  and  actively  engaged  in  achieving 
the  social  reformation  and  political  independence 
of  their  country — are  all  influenced  by  lofty  views 
of  the  nature  of  philosophic  truth,  and  deeply 
convinced  of  its  immense  importance  in  regene- 
rating the  institutions  and  improving  the  intel- 
lectual faculties  of  a  nation,  and  in  preserving  it 
from  error  and  mischievous  delusions.  In  no  part 
of  the  Euroj)ean  continent  do  we  find  mental 
speculations  impressed  with  a  more  subdued, 
sober,  candid,  and  discriminating  tone,  and  more 
in  accordance  with  the  highest  purposes  and  best 
interests  of  man,  than  in  the  writings  of  the  modern 
cultivators  of  philosophy  in  this  interesting  and 
intelligent  country. 

The  progress  of  mental  philosophy  in  Belgium 
and  Holland  is  at  the  present  moment  highly 
satisfactory  and  encouraging.  The  deep  thinkers 
of  these  countries,  especially  the  Belgian  writers, 
have  more  or  less  looked  up  to  France  as  a  monitor 
and  guide,  without,  however,  making  the  least 
compromise  of  their  own  intellectual  independence. 
Thesre  has  always  been  less  philosophy  of  a  mate- 
rialistic tendency  in  the  Netherlands  than  in 
Prance ;  and  the  present  treatises  on  the  human 
mind  are  seldom  tinged,  in  any  deep  degree,  with 
unsound  or  irreligious  opinions  in  this  part  of  the 
continent.  Although  great  liberty  of  discussion 
is  allowed  and  enjoyed,  yet  everything  from  the 
philosophic  press  of  the  two  kingdoms  is  charac- 
terised by  a  sober  and  rational   spii-it,  becoming 


Iviii  INTHODUCTION. 

reflective  and  intelligent  communities.  At  no 
former  period  in  the  history  of  these  European 
states,  was  mental  philosophy  more  assiduously 
and  profoundly  cultivated  than  it  is  at  the  present 
time ;  and  by  philosophers  too,  such  as  Van 
Meenen,  Van  Heusde,  Van  De  Weyer,  Gruyer, 
Ubaghs,  E/ciffenberg,  Tiberghien,  Quetelet,  and 
others,  of  vast  literary  attainments,  and  possessing 
a  most  accurate  and  comprehensive  acquaintance 
with  the  whole  speculative  thinldng  of  Europe. 
Everything  from  their  pens  bespeaks  the  innate 
power  to  grapple  with  questions  of  the  greatest 
magnitude  and  complexity  ;  and  they  have  all 
besides  manifested  a  strong  desire  to  support  and 
defend  the  cause  of  truth  generally,  by  a  course  of 
discussion  at  once  candid,  enlightened,  and  for- 
bearing. 

In  other  northern  nations,  and  in  some  of  the 
southern,  with  whose  respective  literature  we  are  in 
Great  Britain  but  partially  and  imperfectly  ac- 
quainted, we  see  much  to  encourage  hope  as  to  the 
future  progress  of  the  philosophy  of  mind.  Every 
year  affords  some  additional  proof  of  its  more 
general  improvement  and  diffusion.  In  Sweden 
and  Denmark,  works  are  regularly  issuing  fiM)m 
the  press  which  display  an  intimate  knowledge  of 
speculative  systems,  and  great  powers  of  abstract 
reasoning  on  topics  connected  with  human  nature. 
Even  Russia  is  gradually  extending  encourage- 
ment and  protection  to  subjects  of  speculation, 
which  a  very  few  years  since  were  not  admitted 
within  the  pale  of  her  Universities.  And  the 
same  may  be  remarked  of  Spain  and  Portugal ; 


INTRODUCTION.  lix 

in  both  of  which  we  perceive  one  bulwark  after 
another  against  enlightened  philosophical  discus- 
sion slowly  giving  way,  and  the  avenues  to  scien- 
tific and  reflective  investigations  becoming  daily 
less  obstructed  by  narrow  prejudices,  intolerance, 
and  bigotry. 

In  the  Western  hemisphere,  we  find  the  active 
spirits  of  the  United  States  cultivating  a  know- 
ledge of  mental  science  in  every  direction.  Their 
continent  has  become  a  vast  emporium  for  the 
speculations  of  all  the  European  kingdoms ;  and 
there  is  scarcely  a  work  of  any  note  published  in 
the  Old  World,  on  the  science  of  human  nature, 
which  does  not  speedily  find  its  way  here,  and 
which  does  not  go  tlirough  a  regular  critical  ordeal 
in  the  chief  periodicals  of  the  country.  AVhere 
there  is  such  a  regular  influx  of  novel  opinions,  it 
becomes  hazardous  to  venture  on  general  con- 
clusions as  to  the  preponderance  of  particular  me- 
taphysical views  and  systems ;  but  we  may  afiirm, 
without  speaking  dogmatically  on  the  subject,  that 
within  the  last  twenty  years,  there  has  been  more 
or  less  a  visible  increase  in  the  spiritual  notions  of 
mind  throughout  all  the  more  enlightened  and  in- 
tellectual portions  of  the  States.  In  the  Reviews 
and  Magazines  of  the  country  we  see  this  change 
daily  verified ;  and  still  more  striking  manifesta- 
tions of  it  may  be  found  in  the  general  tone  of  the 
lectures  delivered  on  mental  studies,  in  the  several 
chief  places  of  academical  instruction  throughout 
the  whole  Union.  The  theological  spirit  of  the 
nation  is  actively  roused  to  a  deep  sense  of  the 
utility  and   importance  of  metaphysical  studies ; 


Ix  INTllODUCTION,     , 

and  seems  resolutely  bent  on  clearing  them  from 
all  the  dross  and  mischievous  elements  which  may 
be  more  or  less  incorporated  with  them  when  newly 
imported  from  every  quarter  of  the  world. 

It  has  become  almost  a  common  remark,  that 
in  Great  Britain  mental  philosophy  has  been  en- 
tirely stationary  for  nearly  the  last  half  century. 
There  is  unquestionably  much  truth  in  this ;  but 
there  have  been  latent  signs  of  life  in  the  study, 
of  late  years,  which  promise  better  things  at  no 
very  distant  day.  Several  publications  have  made 
their  appearance  which  bespeak  great  ability  and 
knowledge ;  and  though  they  do  not  treat  us  Avith 
elaborated  systems,  yet  their  general  tendency  is 
on  the  side  of  improvement ;  and  in  many  instances 
they  are  calculated  to  throw  new  and  interesting- 
light  on  several  individual  sections  of  the  science 
of  universal  mmd.  The  recent  movements  in 
theological  literature  and  speculation  have  had  no 
small  degree  of  influence  in  imparting  more 
spiritual  views  to  some  English  treatises  on  meta- 
physical subjects. 

It  is  therefore  cheering  to  those  who  feel  a 
lively  interest  in  such  studies,  and  are  deeply  im- 
pressed Avith  their  absolute  utility  and  importance, 
to  witness  so  many  indications  of  their  progress 
and  extension,  in  every  direction  to  which  Ave  can 
direct  the  intellectual  eye.  We  know  that  great 
ideas  are  never  lost ;  and  Ave  consequently  feel  an 
inward  and  firm  conviction,  that  the  advances 
Avhich  Ave  are,  in  this  age,  effecting  in  the  first  of 
aU  branches  of  human  knowledge,  Avill  never  be 
efi'aced  by  any  future  retrograde  movements  Avhat- 


INTRODUCTION.  Ixi 

ever,  in  the  minds  of  individuals  or  of  nations. 
The  whole  progress  of  human  society  speaks  loudly 
against  any  such  catastrophe. 

But  whatever  the  unreflecting  and  superficial 
may  think  of  mental  philosophy,  or  of  its  future 
destination,  we  are  firmly  impressed  with  the  belief 
that  to  those  who  are  acquainted  with  its  prin- 
ciples, and  imbued  with  its  spirit,  it  cannot  fail 
to  recommend  itself,  from  the  comprehensiveness 
of  its  range,  the  lofty  aim  of  its  disquisitions, 
and  the  firm  and  decided  tone  which  it  imparts  to 
tlie  intellect.  It  greatly  quickens  the  reflective 
powers  of  man,  and  enables  him  to  wield  them 
with  ease  and  energy.  It  gives  an  ever-living 
freshness  to  old  truths,  and  reduces,  by  subtile  and 
mysterious  agencies,  the  most  discordant  thoughts 
and  materials  into  a  state  of  logical  harmony, 
beauty,  and  order.  It  has  the  universe  for  its 
object — aU  matter  and  all  mind  ;  and  its  spirit  is 
a  universal  presence.  It  is  as  sublime,  boundless, 
and  inexhaustible  as  the  ocean.  We  can  traverse  by 
its  means  the  whole  region  of  human  knowledge ; 
and  no  soil  and  no  age  is  exempt  from  its  pene- 
trating glance.  The  science  of  mind  is,  from  its 
very  nature  and  essence,  universal  and  difi'usive. 
Its  ramifications  and  connections  are  infinite; 
and  these  reveal  to  us  the  hidden  and  interesting 
analogies  subsisting  among  all  topics  of  investiga- 
tion, and  shed  a  lustre  over  our  path  as  we  travel 
from  one  great  truth  of  human  nature  to  another. 
It  exacts  an  intellectual  tribute  from  every  pro- 
vince of  inquiry ;    and  expends   its   treasures  in 


Iviii  INTRODUCTION. 

rearing  a  splendid  temple,  more  colossal  and  du- 
rable than  tlie  material  universe  itself. 

The  philosophy  of  man  is  the  sublimest  of  stu- 
dies, and  its  spirit  is  the  most  elevating  and 
transcendental  of  all  the  gifts  of  God.  The  over- 
whelming grandeur  of  its  themes — themes  which 
have  "thoughts  that  wander  through  eternity" 
for  their  object — fills  the  mind  with  holy  and  im- 
proving contemplations,  and  removes  it  from  all 
that  is  tame,  earthly,  formal,  and  material.  Its 
speculations  are  the  sacred  vehicles  of  the  most 
important  and  vital  truths ;  and  its  reasonings 
relate  to  "things  which  speak  not  of  earth." 
It  deals  with  mighty  passions,  affections,  and 
thoughts  which  stretch  into  futurity ;  which  have 
all  mind  and  creative  energy  for  their  object ;  and 
which  give  expression  and  thrilling  interest  to 
those  lofty  and  refined  aspirations  which  seek  after 
something  more  pure  and  consoling  than  the  ordi- 
nary movements  and  concerns  of  life  aflTord.  These 
aspirations  are  the  germs  of  the  inward  man,  which 
are  bound  up  in  the  soul  just  as  the  living  and 
fructifying  principle  is  incrusted  in  the  seed.  They 
constitute  the  vivifying  energy  which  makes  all 
things  new;  which  moulds  the  combinations  of 
matter  and  mind  into  an  endless  variety  of  forms ; 
and  develops  them,  by  virtue  of  new  afiinities  and 
the  immutable  laws  of  intellect,  into  those  splendid 
and  beautiful  creations  of  philosophical  thought, 
which  the  mere  matter-of-fact  man  can  neither 
grasp  nor  comprehend,  and  without  which  the 
universe  itself  would  be  a  chaos,  and  human  life 
an  incomprehensible  enigma. 


PllOM  THE  EARLIEST  PEKIOD  OP 

MENTAL  SPECULATION 

TO   THE    COMMENCEMENT    OP    THE 

SCHOLASTIC  PHILOSOPHY. 


HISTORY   OF    PHILOSOPHY, 

ETC.  ETC. 


CHAPTER  I. 


ON    THE    HISTORIES  OF    PHILOSOPHY,   ANCIENT  AND 

MODERN. 

It  is  not  intended  to  give  in  this  chapter  any 
thing  lilve  a  lengtliened  account  of  the  numerous 
Histories  of  Philosophy,  hut  only  to  bring  before  the 
reader's  attention  a  few  of  the  principal  of  them, 
with  a  view  of  fixing  in  his  mind  some  of  the  lead- 
ing periods  of  history  when  certain  works  were 
published.  It  must  also  be  premised,  that  what  is 
generally  meant  by  Histories  of  Philosophy,  is  not 
limited  to  liistories  of  mental  philosophy  alone,  but 
embraces  morals,  poUtics,  rehgion,  and  even  phy- 
sical science.  Metaphysics  are,  m  all  histories  of 
philosophy  wliich  have  yet  appeared,  mixed  up  and 
blended  with  other  subjects.  On  this  account,  if  a 
person  wishes  to  trace  out  for  himself  the  history 
of  opinions  relative  to  the  human  mind,  he  will  have 
to  select  them  from  amonj^st  a  vast  varietv  of  other 
topics,  with  which  they  are  historically  classed. 

*  B 


2  HISTOKIES    OF    PHILOSOPHY, 

Three  of  the  most  distingiiished  ancient  histo- 
rians of  philosophy  are  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  Cicero. 
Though  not  professed  chroniclers  of  previons  opi- 
nions, yet  their  treasures  are  uncommonly  valuable, 
as  frequent  allusion  is  made,  in  unfolding  their  in- 
di^ddual  opinions,  to  the  \dews  and  systems  of  other 
speculative  men  who  had  preceded  them,  but  of 
whose  labours  we  have  little  or  no  account  direct 
from  themselves.  Plato,  in  his  dialogues,  brings 
contemporary  writers  on  the  stage,  and  paints  their 
characters  and  systems  in  his  otmi  way.  Aristotle, 
again,  in  lajdng  down  his  own  systems,  furnishes 
us  with  the  individual  systems  of  other  metaphysi- 
cians and  philosophers.  And  Cicero,  in  his  specu- 
lative traditions,  has  handed  down  many  opinions 
exceedingly  interesting  to  all  speculative  minds.* 

Hippocrates  was  an  eminent  Greek  physician. 
He  alludes  to  the  great  advantage  of  an  accurate 
knowledge  of  the  human  faculties,  relative  to  the 
history  of  opinions.  Xenophon  is  well  known  as  a 
A'aluable  historian  of  philosophic  opinions ;  and 
Lucretius  gives  us  an  account  of  the  metaphysical 
ideas  of  Democritus  and  Epiciuais.  "We  have 
the  system  of  the  Stoics  expoimded  by  Seneca,  and 
the  Sceptical  Philosophy  by  Sextus  Empiricus. 
If  Plutarch  be  the  author  of  the  book  entitled  De 
Tlacitis  Fhilosopliorimi,  he  has  added  to  the  useful 
documents  of  ancient  philosophy ;  and  to  the  book 
of  Galen,  TJie  Philosophical  History^  we  are  equally 
indebted. 

*  Gedike  has  collected  together  all  the  passages  of  Cicero  relative  to 
Philosophy.     Berhn,  17B2. 


ANCIENT   AND    MODERN.  3 

Diofjenes  Laertius  is  an  historian  of  ffreat  merit. 
In  his  work,  "^ Lives  of  the  Philosophers,"  we  have 
many  valuable  extracts  from  the  writings  of  the 
ancients,  and  many  interesting  facts  respecting 
their  lives  and  opinions.  We  find  in  several  of 
the  early  Pathers  of  the  Church,  some  valua1)le 
sketches  of  philosophical  opinions  and  systems,  par- 
ticularly in  Eusehius,  St.  Clement  of  Alexandria, 
and  Ejiiphanius. 

In  the  fourth  century,  we  have  the  "  Lives  of  the 
Philosophers  and  Sophists,"  by  Eunapius,  a  general 
writer  and  a  physician.  He  is  zealously  attached  to 
the  Eclectic  philosophy,  and  displays  great  virulence 
against  the  Christians  of  his  day.  A  little  after 
liim  we  find  John  Stoba^us,  who  made  large  extracts 
from  the  philosophy  of  the  ancients.  Both  these 
works  are  of  great  value  to  the  historian.* 

In  the  middle  of  the  sixth  century,  Hesychius,  a 
grammarian  of  Alexandiia,  composed  an  "  Abridg- 
ment of  the  lAves  of  Fhllosophers,'"  arranged  in 
alphabetical  order,  f  The  work  is  cliiefly  taken 
from  Diogenes  Laertius.  A  long  intellectual  niglit, 
of  several  centuries'  duration,  here  intervenes,  in 
which  nothing  was  accomplished  in  philosophical 
history  worthy  of  any  especial  notice. 

An  Englishman,  of  the  name  of  Burley,  in  the 
fifteenth  century,  published  ^'Lices  of  the  Philo- 
sophers,'" and  the  book  is  amongst  the  early  speci- 
mens of  printing  in  this  country.  In  Italy,  Pici- 
nus,  under  the  patronage  of  Cosmo  de  Medicis,  and 

*  See  an  edition  of  Stobseus,  by  Ileeren.     Gottingen,  1792. 

t  Ilesych.  Milet.  interpvete  Iladriano  Juno.     Anvers,  1572.  8vo. 

B  2 


4  HISTORIES   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

Pouiponius,  otherwise  styled  Peter  Calabria,  re- 
vived a  knowledge  of  the  works  of  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle with  great  eclat.  After  the  partial  revival  of 
learning  in  Europe,  we  have  John  Louis  Yives,  a 
Spaniard  by  birth,  but  educated  at  Paris  and  Lou- 
vain,  who  wrote  a  work  "  On  the  Origin  of  Sects, 
and  the  Merits  of  Philosophers. ^^  Daniel  Chry- 
trius  published  his  treatise,  "  A  List  of  Philoso- 
phers, and  their  princijml  Sects,  from  Thales  to 
Cicero:''  nearly  at  the  same  time  we  have  William 
Morel's  "  Table  of  the  order  of  Succession,  Doc- 
trines, and  date  of  the  Ancient  Philosophers ;''  and 
also,  the  "  Chronological  Library  of  Classical  Phi- 
losophers,'' by  J.  J.  Pries. 

It  would  prove  tedious,  as  well  as  unprofitable, 
to  give  an  individual  and  detailed  account,  from 
this  period,  of  all  the  writings  which  contain  an 
account  of  philosophical  opinions,  down  to  our  own 
day.  It  will  sutficiently  answer  all  the  ends  we 
have  in  view  to  furnish  the  reader  with  a  bare 
enumeration  of  works,  of  such  a  character  and  ex- 
tent, as  will  prove  amply  useful  for  all  ordinary 
purposes  of  reference  or  consultation,  both  as  to 
the  history  of  philosophy  in  general,  and  metaphy- 
sics in  particular.  This  we  shall  do  in  a  note  at 
the  end  of  this  volume.* 

*  See  Note  A.  at  the  end  of  this  Volume. 


THE    IONIC    SCHOOL. 


CHAPTER   II. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


THE    TOXIC    SCHOOL. 

The  philosophy  of  Greece  is  full  of  interest  to 
every  iiiquiring  mind.    It  has  peculiar  claims  upon 
our  attention ;  for  it  exhibits  the  innate  power  of 
the  mind  of  man  to  grapple  with  those  interesting 
and  abstruse    questions   which  spring  out  of  his 
existence,  and   which   force   themselves  upon  his 
notice  by  the  powerful  and  irresistible  law  of  his 
nature.     Among   the  Grecian  sages   we  perceive 
what  has   been  accomplished  by   the  speculative 
faculties,  unaided  and  undirected  by  the  genius  of 
revelation ;  and  how  far,  and  in  what  degree,  the 
errors    and    shortcomings    of  these    philosophers 
may  be  profitable  to  our 'instruction  in  more  in- 
telligent and  enlightened  times.      Mutilated  and 
circumscribed  as  the  Grecian  philosophy  has  come 
down  to  us,  still  we  perceive  that,  take  it  as  a 
whole,  it  is  a  noble  monument  of  thought ;    and 
that   its   powerful   influence    has    been   felt    and 
acknowledged   in   every   stage    of  literature    and 
civilization.     Amidst  a  vast  deal  that  is  crude  and 


6        MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

fantastical,  we  can  still  recognise  truths  of  great 
moment,  and  universal  application ;  and  the  man- 
ner in  which  they  are  often  developed  and  illus- 
trated, affords  the  most  indisputable  evidence  of 
the  superior  powers  of  the  Grecian  understanding. 
Many  speculations  might  be  hazarded  on  what 
some  modern  writers  have  considered  the  origin  of 
the   Greek   philosophic  spirit.     But   these   would 
inevitably  lead  us  into  too  wide  a  field  of  discussion 
and  controversy  for  our  present  purpose.     Suffice 
it  to  remark,  that  there  seem  to  have  been  three 
leading  influences  operating  on  the  general  mass 
of  their  speculative   notions  of  mind,  and  which 
communicated  to  them  that  peculiar  feature  by 
which  they  are  distinguished ;  namely,  a  religious 
feeKng  or  sentiment,  a  love  of  poetry,  and  those 
habits    and   customs    which    arose    out    of  their 
popular  civil  and  political  institutions. 

The  religious  feeKng  or  sentiment  has   an  in- 
separable affinity  to  the  true   philosophic    spmt. 
Wliatever  attempts  are  made  to  form  conceptions 
of  creative  power,  wisdom,  and  intelligence,  dii'ectly 
lead   to  the   formation   and  exercise  of  all  those 
habits  of  mental  culture  and  accurate  analysis,  on 
wliich  true  philosophy  rests.     In  every  department 
of  Grecian  speculation  we   find   that   mental  in- 
quiries were  viewed  through  the  medium  of  theolo- 
gical principles ;  and  we  also  find  that,  in  projoor- 
tiou  as  rational  notions  of  natural  religion  were 
recognised,  a  corresponding  degree  of  clearness  and 
rationality  pervaded  the  popular  stream  of  philoso- 
phical discussion.     This  fact  is  illustrated  in  everv 


THE    IONIC    SCHOOL.  7 

age  of  Grecian  literature.  "Wlienever  low  and 
grovelling  ideas  prevailed  on  the  nature  of  deity 
and  a  presiding  mind  over  the  affairs  of  the  Avorld, 
in  an  exact  proportion  do  we  find  the  system  of 
mental  speculation,  fantastical,  irrational,  and 
untenahle.  And  this  arises  from  the  established 
laws  of  human  thought.  It  is  impossible  to  con- 
ceive an  opposite  state  of  things.  The  same 
powers  which  enable  us  to  investigate  the  laws  of 
human  intelligence,  and  develop  their  mutual  rela- 
tions and  dependencies,  are  precisely  those  which, 
when  judiciously  used,  direct  to  all  those  primary 
truths  on  which  the  religious  feeHngs  and  senti- 
ments of  mankind  rest. 

The  same  thing  may  be  remarked  of  the  ima- 
ginative or  poetic  feeling.  Tliis  is  closely  allied 
to  relii]^ion.  There  can  be  no  true  or  sublime 
poetry  apart  from  theological  sentiment,  though 
that  sentiment  may,  occasionally,  be  grossly  per- 
verted. Poetry  has  also  the  human  mind  for 
its  domain  and  object.  It  treats  of  the  ideal ;  it 
lives  in  the  reahns  of  thought.  AYhatever,  there- 
fore, is  favourable  to  its  successful  cultivation, 
must  necessarily  prove  conducive  to  the  exercise  of 
all  those  refined  powers  of  analysis  and  inward 
reflection,  which  have  the  mind  for  their  common 
centre  of  operation.  The  creative  energies  of  the 
poet  directly  lead  to  those  abstract  and  sublime 
topics,  which  belong  exclusively  to  the  province  of 
the  metaphysician. 

Social   and   political    institutions   have   human 
nature  for  their  basis,  and  they  likewise  greatly 


8  MENTAL   PHILOSOPHY   OF    GREECE. 

influence  mental  disquisitions.  Where  freedom  is 
the  ground-work  of  a  commonwealth,  and  the 
people  have  elevated  conceptions  of  their  rights 
and  duties,  a  sound  mental  philosophy  will  in- 
variably be  found  to  flourish.  The  whole  history 
of  Greece  is  a  striking  confirmation  of  this  position. 


Thales.     64i0  b.  c. 

Thales  was  one  of  the  most  early  sages  of 
Greece  who  turned  their  attention  to  mental  pur- 
suits. None  of  his  discourses  or  writings  have 
been  transmitted  du-ectly  from  himself,  but  only 
through  the  medium  of  Aristotle,  Plutarch,  and 
Strabo.  Thales,  even  in  his  early  day,  soon  seized 
upon  a  mental  proposition  which  has  subsequently, 
in  divers  shapes  and  forms,  filled  the  world  of  phi- 
losophy with  discussion;  namely,  the  spontaneity 
of  the  mind  of  man.  Aristotle  tells  us  that  Thales 
maintained  that  "the  essence  of  the  soul,  or  thinl^- 
ing  principle  of  man,  was  motion ;  a  spontaneous 
motion,  a  self -moving  power."  Plutarch  says  that 
Thales'  definition  of  mind  was  "that  it  was  a  thing 
possessing  self-contained  or  perpetual  motion." 
Strabo  mentions  the  same  thing ;  "  that  mind,  ac- 
cording to  Thales,  was  that  which  contained  self- 
will  or  motion."* 

This  early  fragment  of  metapyhsical  philosophy 
is  extremely  valual)le,  inasmuch  as  it  indicates, 
that  this  distinguished  man  had  deeply  studied  the 


*  Arist.  De  Anima.  1.     Plut.  De  PI.  Ph.  4.  2. 


THALES.  9 

nature  of  liis  own  inincl ;  and  that  the  same  dif- 
ficulties presented  themselves  to  him  wliich  have 
in  all  subsequent  ages  been  so  perplexing  to  spe- 
culators on  the  abstract  natui'e  of  mind,  and  of  its 
various  powers  and  faculties. . 

Thales  is  considered  one  of  what  are  called  the 
Seven  Sages  of  Greece;  philosophers  who  wandered 
about  from  place  to  place,  promulgating  their  doc- 
trines and  opinions.  All  accounts  of  him  agree 
that  he  was  passionately  fond  of  speculating  into 
the  origin  of  all  things,  and  that  he  founded  the 
theory,  that  loater  was  the  primary  principle  of  the 
world.  Plutarch  states  the  philosopher's  reasons 
for  tliis  belief.  Pirst,  because  natural  seed,  the 
principle  of  all  Kving  things,  is  humid ;  whence  it 
is  highly  probable  that  humidity  or  moistiu*e  is 
also  the  principle  of  all  other  things.  Secondly, 
because  all  kinds  of  plants  are  nourished  by  mois- 
ture, T\^thout  which  they  wither  and  decay.  And, 
thii'dlv,  because  fii'e,  even  the  sun  itself  and  the 
stars,  are  nourished  and  supported  by  vapours  pro- 
ceeding from  water,  and  consequently  the  Avhole 
world  consists  of  the  same.* 

There  has  been  considerable  dispute  among  the 
learned,  whether  this  principle  of  water  was  a 
purely  passive  principle  or  agent,  or  an  active  and 
creative  one.  It  must  ever  be  a  doubtful  point  to 
determine  what  Thales'  real  opinion  was ;  but  it 
does  seem  probable  that  the  philosopher  only  con- 
sidered his  machinery  of  watery  vapours  to  be  the 

*  Arist.  Met.  1.  1 .     Diog.  Laert.  1.  1.     Plut.  PI.  Ph.  1.  1.  c.  7. 


10  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GREECE. 

instrmnents  in  the  liand  of  a  living  and  active 
power.  Erom  liis  definition  of  what  he  considers 
the  nature  or  essence  of  the  mind  of  man,  akeady 
staf  ed,  tliis  probability  is  considerably  strengthened. 
The  same  reasons,  and  the  same  trains  of  thoua^it, 
which  brought  him  to  the  general  conclusion,  that 
mind,  and  creative  or  active  power,  were  identical, 
would  naturally  force  the  conclusion  on  liis  under- 
standing that  the  world  and  every  thing  he  beheld 
in  it  were  the  result  of  an  active  and  efficient 
agent.  This  process  of  reasoning  seems  natural 
and  consistent. 


Anaximander.     610  b.  c. 

This  philosopher  was  a  disciple  and  friend  of 
Thales,  and  embraced  and  extended  the  general 
principles  of  his  system.  Anaximander  cultivated 
physical  inqumes  to  a  considerable  extent,  as  well 
as  topics  connected  with  human  nature.  It  is  said, 
that  he  was  the  first  philosopher  of  antiquity  who 
announced  the  famous  axiom  that  "  Out  of  notliing, 
nothing  can  be  made."  It  is  impossible,  however, 
to  ascertain  in  what  sense  he  understood  this  gene- 
ral proposition ;  whether  as  a  sunple  physical  fact, 
or  as  a  principle  on  which  a  comprehensive  theory 
of  philosophical  speculation  could  be  established. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  but  such  an  acute  reasoner 
as  x^naximander  would  readily  perceive  that  this 
famous  axiom  of  his  cut,  like  a  two-edged  sword, 
both  wavs  ;  that  it  had  necessarilv  two  distinct 
meanings  attached  to  it ;  and  that  it  might  serve 


ANAXIMANDER.  11 

both  for  rational  and  irrational  speculations  on  the 
nature  and  constitution  of  all  mental  and  physical 
phenomena. 

Anaximander  considered  the  infinite  as  the  first 
principle  of  things.  All  things  are  produced  by, 
and  immerge  into  it.  Of  course  there  have  been 
many  different  notions  of  what  is  here  meant  by 
infinite.  Aristotle  and  Plutarch  materiahze  the 
term,  and  make  it  stand  for  mcdter  in  general; 
and  the  learned  Cudworth  coincides  with  this  in- 
terpretation. Others  again  think  it  highly  pro- 
bable that  a  guiding  and  intelligent  principle  was 
still  recognised  by  Anaximander,  and  that  by  infi- 
nite was  merely  meant  that  seemingly  endless  and 
concatenated  series  of  phenomena,  which  a  contem- 
plation of  the  world  every  way  naturally  suggests 
to  most  inquiring  minds.* 

The  historian  Hitter  observes,  that  Anaximander 
"  is  represented  as  arguing,  that  the  primary  sub- 
stance must  have  been  infinite  to  be  all-sufficient 
for  the  limitless  variety  of  produced  things  with 
which  we  are  encompassed.  Now,  although  Aris- 
totle expressly  characterises  this  infinite  as  a  mix- 
ture, we  must  not  think  of  it  as  a  mere  multiplicity 
of  primary  material  elements  ;  for  to  the  mind  of 
Anaximander  it  was  Unity  immortal  and  imperish- 
able ;  an  ever-producing  energy.  This  production 
of  individual  thins^s  he  derived  from  an  eternal 
motion  of  the  infinite y  \ 


*  Pint.  1.  1.     Arist.  Plivs   1   1.     Cudworth,  c.  ."5. 
t  Ritter,  Hist.  Phil.     Oxford,  183!). 


12       MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

This  interpretation  is  very  fanciful,  but  it  is 
natural  in  E/itter.  Such  a  term  as  infinite^  is  too 
good  a  tiling  for  a  German  to  let  pass,  without  at- 
tempting to  make  something  grand  and  mysterious 
out  of  it.  The  word  enables  him  to  revel  in  luxu- 
rious profundity.* 

Anaximenes.     556  b.c. 

Anaximenes  was  a  companion  and  disciple  of 
Anaximander,  and  a  promulgator  of  his  system  of 
philosophy.  The  former  indulged  in  speculations 
as  to  the  origin  of  the  world,  and  maintained  the 
doctrine,  that  air  is  the  vivifying  principle  of  the 
universe,  of  which  all  things  are  engendered,  and 
into  which  all  things  are  resolved.  Our  soul  or 
spirit  is  air ;  for  spirit  and  air  are  two  names  signi- 
fying the  same  tiling. 

Air  he  considers  as  the  living  Deity,  because  it  is 
ever  in  motion.  Some  authors  consider  that  air 
should  not  be  taken  in  its  common  signification,  but 
as  a  subtile  ether,  penetrating  all  material  bodies, 
and  communicating  to  them  that  motion  and  life 
necessary  for  their  production  and  reproduction.! 

Hermotimus,  op  Clazomene.     520  b.c. 

Hermotimus  of  Clazomene  was  a  distinguished 
early  metaphysician.     He  entered  deeply  into  all 

*  See  Note  B.  at  the  end  of  this  Volume. 

t  Simplicius  ad  Phy.  lib.  1.     Lactantius,  lib.  1. 


HEKMOTIMUS — DIOGENES.  13 

the  mental  speculations  known  in  his  day.  He  dis- 
played great  original  powers  of  thinking ;  and  if  we 
are  to  believe  Aristotle,  Plutarch,  Sextus  Empiricus, 
ApoUonius,  and  several  others,  he  was  the  original 
propounder  of  the  system  of  Anaxagoras.  Her- 
motimus  clearly  perceived  the  important  distinction 
between  mental  subjects  and  physical  inquiries ;  and 
he  seems  to  have  kept  this  essential  distinction  per- 
petually before  his  eyes,  in  all  liis  abstract  specu- 
lations. 

Pliny,  in  his  Natural  History,  mentions,  that 
Hermotimus  entertained  the  idea  that  the  soul  often 
quits  the  l)ody,  and  wanders  to  a  great  distance  from 
it,  in  order  to  obtain  that  knowledge  which  is  denied 
to  it  whilst  residing  in  its  earthly  tenement.  It 
was  from  this  singular  notion  that  his  enemies  as- 
sassinated him,  that  his  own  soul  might  wing  its 
way  to  that  situation  destined  for  its  reception  in  a 
future  state  of  existence. 

Diogenes,  of  Apollonia.     500  e.g. 

Diogenes  was  a  follower  and  disciple  of  Anaxi- 
menes  ;  but  gave  a  more  spiritual  interpretation  to 
his  master's  doctrines  on  the  origin  of  the  universe. 
The  subtile  ether  which  Anaximenes  employed  to 
create  and  sustain  the  world,  became,  in  the  hands 
of  his  pupil,  endowed  with  a  species  of  wisdom  and 
intelligence.  It  was  not  blindness  and  fatality; 
it  operated  by  a  settled  plan  or  method.  The 
wisdom  and  order  displayed  in  every  part  of  nature, 
seem  to  have  made  a  deep   impression  upon  the 


14      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

mind  of  Diogenes ;  for  he  affirms  tliey  give  evident 
testimonies  for  the  existence  of  a  ruling  principle 

of  REASON. 


Anaxagoras.     500  b.  c. 

Anaxagoras  was  one  of  the  most  renowned  phi- 
losophers of  his  day,  and  succeeded  in  unfolding 
more  just  and  comprehensive  principles  of  theism, 
and  of  the  general  government  of  the  world,  than 
any  preceding  speculator.     His  opinions  on  mental 
suhjects  are  hut  few,  and  limited  in  their  range,  and 
are  handed  do^^Ti  to  us  hy  Aristotle  and  Sextus 
Empiricus.     Anaxagoras  clearly  pointed  out  how 
the  judgment  may  occasionally  he  led  astray  from 
the  truth,  hy  the  delusive  appearances  furnished  hy 
the  external  senses.     The  judgment,   or  reasoning 
power,  is  the  governing  principle  in  man,  and  is  in- 
tended to  correct  the  errors  which  first  impressions 
may  create  in  his  mind.     In  pointing  out  the  im- 
perfections of  our  sensations  as  infallihle  guides  to 
truth,  he  has  heen  accused  hy  some  ancient  philo- 
sophers with  manifesting  a  decided  leaning  to  scep- 
ticism;   hut  this  accusation  is  without  any  solid 
foundation.     What   he  says  may  he  conceded  hy 
every  right-thinking  man.     He  only  shows  that, 
on  many  occasions,  such  sensations  or  notions  as 
relate  to  colours,  the  appearances  of  ohjects  seen 
through  various  mecUa  hy  the  eye,  may  undergo  a 
multitude  of  changes ;  and  yet  the  mind  may  de- 
duce the  truth  respecting  them  from  a  variety  of 
different  considerations  suhmitted  to  the  reasoning 


ANAXAGOllAS.  15 

faculty.      On  this  principle  there  cannot  be  two 
opinions. 

Anaxagoras,  like  his  predecessors,  had  his  theory 
as  to  the  origin  of  the  world.  He  held  that  the 
material  principle  of  all  things  is  one  and  many,  of 
infinite  parts,  similar  and  contrary,  continuous  to  the 
touch,  sustaining  themselves,  not  contained  by  any 
other.  Every  indi^ddual  thing  in  nature  is  consti- 
tuted of  particles  peculiar  to  itself;  and  it  is  just  this 
atomic  construction  which  makes  it  what  it  really 
is.  Bone,  for  example,  is  made  from  a  certain  spe- 
cific form  of  its  particles ;  gold  and  silver,  and,  in 
fact,  everything  else,  from  the  same  principle  of 
individual  adaptation.  Lucretius  describes  this 
process  in  the  following  lines  : 

"  With  Anaxagoras,  great  Nature's  law 
Is  similarity ;  and  every  compound  form 
Consists  of  parts  minute,  each  like  a  whole ; 
And  bone  is  made  of  bone,  and  flesh  of  flesh ; 
And  blood,  and  fire,  and  earth,  and  massy  gold. 
Are,  in  their  smallest  portions,  still  the  same."* 

Anaxagoras  is  more  decidedly  theistical  than  any 
of  his  predecessors.  His  distinction  between  mind 
and  matter,  between  the  Creator  and  the  thing 
created,  is  clearly  annunciated.  Plato  affirms  that 
he  taught  the  existence  of  a  regulating  mind  over 
all  things ;  and  Aristotle  declares  that  mind  is  the 
supreme  and  ruling  element,  and  possesses  within 
itseK  all  creative  power  and  thought.  Plutarch 
gives  his  testimony  to  the  same  effect.     He  says, 

*  Plut.  PL  Ph.  1.     Arist.  Phys.  3,  4. 


16      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

"  the  Ionic  philosophers  who  flourished  before  the 
days  of  Anaxagoras,  made  a  blind  fatality  or  destiny 
the  first  elemental  principle  in  nature ;  but  Anax- 
agoras maintained  that  a  pure  mind,  free  from  all 
material  influences,  governs  the  universe."  Cicero 
says  that  the  Grecian  sage  afiirmed  the  existence  of 
an  "infinite  mind,  not  inclosed  in  any  body ;  "  and 
Lactantius  and  Saint  Augustine  declare  the  same 
thing.* 

There  were  several  distinguished  disciples  of 
Anaxagoras ;  among  the  number  may  be  mentioned, 
l?eriGles,  son  of  Xantippus ;  Archelcms,  son  of  Apol- 
lodorus;  Euripides ,  his  biographer;  Socrates,  son 
of  Sophroniscus ;  and  Metrodorus,  of  Lampsacum. 
Some  few  metaphysical  opinions  are  ascribed  to 
these  persons,  but  they  are  not  entitled  to  any  par- 
ticular enumeration. 


***  Vide  Heuman.  Act.  Phil.  i.  16;  iii.  165,  173.  Burnet,  Arch. 
1-  10.  Cudworth,  Int.  Sjst.  c.  1.  Cyril  cont.  Julian.  1.  1.  Velesii  Phil. 
Sac.  c.  31.  August.  De  Civit.  Dei,  1.  8.  Scaliger,  Ep.  306.  Themistii 
Orat.26.  MorhofF.  Polyh.  t.  2.  Lipsii  Phys.  1. 2.  Thomasii  Obser.  Hal. 
t.  2.  MuUerus,  De  aqua  principio  rerum  ex  mente  Thaletis.  1718.  Bud- 
dseus  de  Phil.  Mor.  Thalet.  §  10.  Brucker  Hist,  de  Ideis,  sect.  1.  Gro- 
tius  de  Verit.  1.  1.  Dickenson  Phy.  c.  4.  Thomas.  Hist.  Ath.  c.  4.  Le 
Clerc,  Bibl.  Choisie,  t.  2.  Schmidius  de  Vit.  Anaximenis,  p.  1.  Plouc- 
quet.  Diss.  De  Thalet.  et  Anaxag.  1.2.  Bayle.  Thalet.  Ritter,  Hist.  Phil. 
Oxford,  1839.  Tennemann.  Hist.  Phil.  Renouvier,  Mon.  de  la  Phil,  an- 
cienne.  Cousin,  Cours  de  Phil.  Degerando,  Hist.  Comparee  des  Sys- 
t^mes.     Enfield's  Hist.  Philosophy. 


*  Arist.  De  Anima.  1.  1.     Plut.  1.  1.     Cicero  de  Nat.  Deor.  1. 1.     Au- 
gust, de  Civ.  Dei,  1.  8.     Lact.  1.  .'5. 


rrALIAN    SCHOOL    OF    HklETAPHYSICS.  17 


CHAPTER    III. 
MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF   GREECE. 


THE    ITALIAN    SCHOOL   OF    METAPHYSICS. 

Among  the  leading  philosophers  on  the  science 
of  the  human  mind  in  the  Italian  school,  stands 
Pythagoras,  a  man  of  vast  capacity,  extensive  infor- 
mation, indefatigable  industry,  and  great  original 
powers  of  thought.  lie  was  born  in  the  Isle  of 
Samos,  and  received  his  early  education  there. 

P}i;hagoras  was  the  founder  of  a  school  of  specu- 
lative philosophy,  and  his  principal  followers  and 
admirers  were  Ocellus,  Timaeus,  Archytas,  Philo- 
laus,  Ilipparchus,  and  Ptolemy. 

The  Pythagoreans  speculated  deeply  on  the 
origin  of  the  world,  and  on  the  principles  of  natural 
theism.  On  the  human  mind  their  inquiries  seem 
not  to  have  been  directed  with  much  judgment, 
nor  sio^nalised  bv  much  success.  This  sect  of  me- 
taphysicians  maintained  that  man  had  some  affi- 
nity not  only  witli  the  gods,  but  Tvdth  the  animal 
creation;  and  that  the  same  principle  of  intelli- 
gence runs  through  the  whole  of  living  existence, 


* 


c 


18  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OP    GTIEECE. 

and  unites  the  different  parts  into  one  uniform 
compound.  We  are  distinguished  from  the  hrute 
creation  by  the  possession  of  language.  The  hu- 
man soul  is  di\dded,  by  these  Pythagoreans,  into 
two  parts,  or  rather  two  leading  faculties";  i  the 
one  embraces  all  the  physical  wants  of  the  body, 
and  all  the  blind  and  impetuous  passions  or  im- 
pulses ;  and  the  other  those  controlling  and  modi- 
fying powers,  which  guide  and  propel  mankind  to 
wtuous  and  noble  deeds,  and  which  are  commonly 
denominated  wisdom,  judgment,  or  reason. 

The  soul  is  in  an  imperfect  state.  It  has  three 
elemental  divisions :  Heason,  Intelligence,  and 
Desire.  The  inferior  creation  possess  the  two  last 
attributes,  but  are  denied  the  first ;  reason.  The 
soul  is  a  monad — one.  It  may  have  many  aspects, 
but  its  essence  or  unity  remains  the  same.  In 
proportion  as  the  rational,  intelligent,  or  sensual 
principles  predominate,  so  is  the  character  of  man 
proportionally  affected.  He  may  be  a  profound 
philosopher,  a  man  of  the  world,  or  a  low  and 
i3eastly  creature.  "  This  soul,  which  can  look  be- 
fore and  after,  can  shrink  and  shrivel  itself  into  an 
incapacity  of  contemplating  aught  but  the  present 
moment.  Of  what  depths  of  degeneracy  it  is  capable ! 
What  a  beast  it  may  become !  And,  if  something 
lower  than  itself,  why  not  something  higher  ?  And 
if  something  higher  and  lower,  may  there  not  be  a 
law  accurately  determining  its  elevation  and  de- 
scent ?  Each  soul  has  its  peculiar  evil  tastes, 
brinffinsT  it  to  the  likeness  of  different  creatures  be- 
neath  itself;  may  it  not  be  under  the  necessity  of 


PYTHAGORAS.  19 

abiding  in  the  condition  of  that  thing  to  which  it 
has  adapted  and  reduced  itself?"* 

There  has  always  existed  considerable  doubt  as 
to  what  the  real  opinions  of  Pythagoras  were.  He 
was  a  public  teacher  of  philosophy,  but  left  no 
written  records  of  his  \dews.  Conjecture  has, 
therefore,  to  supply  the  place  of  positive  informa- 
tion. His  school  was  a  school  of  mathematics  also; 
and  to  his  blending  the  two  sciences  together  no 
small  portion  of  his  obscurity  may  be  attributed. 
The  essence  of  the  universe  was  Nmnher ;  but 
whether  numbers  were  real  things,  or  merely  sym- 
bolieal  representations,  has  been  the  great  source 
of  contention  among  the  commentators  and  critics 
on  the  Pythagorean  system.  Some  maintain  that 
the  philosopher  considered  numbers  as  the  real 
2wlnciples  of  things,  or  the  cause  of  all  material 
existences,  or  the  final  nature  of  things.  Others 
again  contend  that  these  references  to  numbers 
were  only  a  sort  of  mathematical  formula,  to  be 
symbolieallij  applied.  It  would  be  useless  to  enter 
into  this  controversy ;  for  the  reasons  and  autho- 
rities on  each  side  seem  to  be  nearly  balanced. 
For  myself,  I  confess  I  am  inclined  to  join  with 
Emitter,  and  to  think  that  the  numbers  of  Pvtha- 
goras  were  purely  s\axLbolical  representations.  The 
other  hj^othesis  appears  to  me  so  utterly  incom- 
prehensible and  absurd,  that  for  the  credit  of  the 
human  intellect  we  should  throw  it  aside. 

The  doctrine  of  the  Transmigration  of  Souls  is 
invariably  connected  with  the  philosophy  of  the 

*  Encv.  Metrop.  Art.  Moral  and  Metaphy.  Philos. 

c  2 


20      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OP  GREECE. 

Pythagoreans.  It  was  tliis  notion  wMcli  induced 
them  to  abstain  from  animal  food,  and  to  exckide 
animal  sacrifices  from  all  their  religious  ceremo- 
nies. Ovid  represents  Pythagoras  as  speaking  in 
the  following  strain,  rendered  into  our  vernacular 
tongue  by  the  immortal  Dryden. 

"  What  then  is  death^  but  ancient  matter  drest 
In  some  new  figure,  and  a  varied  vest  ? 
Thus  all  things  are  but  altered,  nothing  dies ; 
And  here  and  there  th'  unbodied  spirit  flies. 
By  time,  or  force,  or  sickness  dispossessed. 
And  lodges  where  it  lights,  in  man  or  beast ; 
Or  hunts  without,  till  ready  limbs  it  find, 
And  actuates  those  according  to  theii-  kind ; 
From  tenement  to  tenement  is  tost. 
The  soul  is  still  the  same,  the  figure  only  lost ; 
And  as  the  softened  wax  new  seals  receives. 
Their  face  assumes,  and  that  impression  leaves  ; 
Now  called  by  one,  now  by  another  name. 
The  form  is  only  changed,  the  wax  is  still  the  same  : 
So  death,  thus  call'd,  can  but  the  form  deface, 
Th^  immortal  soul  flies  out  in  empty  space. 
To  seek  her  fortune  in  some  other  place." 


***  Vide  Arist.  Met.  1.  1.  6.  Sextus  Empiricus,  folio,  Paris,  1621. 
Meiners,  Histoire  des  Sciences  dans  la  Grece,  t.  2.  (French  Translation). 
Justin.  Hist.  20.  4.  Dioge.  Laert.  8.  Leipsic.  1833.  Kitter,  Hist.  Anc 
Phil.  Oxford.  Tenneraann,  Manuel  de  I'Hist.  de  la  Philosophic,  by  Cousin, 
Paris,  18.30.  Schwartz,  Manuel  de  1'  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic  Ancienne. 
Liege.  1842.  Renouvicr,  Manuel  de  Philosophic  Ancienne.  Paris,  1844. 
Tissot.  Hist.  Abregee  de  la  Philosophie.  Dijon.  1840.  Hist.  Abre'gce  de 
la  Philosophie,  par  Bouvier,  Eveque  de  Mans;  Paris,  1844. 


ELEATIC    SCHOOL    OF    METAPHYSICS.  21 


CHAPTEH  IV. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


THE    ELEATIC    SCHOOL    OF    METAPHYSICS. 

The  Eleatic  Scliool  of  metaphysicians  took  its 
rise  from  the  Italian  and  Ionian  speculations. 
It  differed,  however,  essentially  from  both.  It 
had  more  boldness,  more  originality,  and  more 
system.  The  Eleatics  affected  a  more  complete 
severance  between  mental  objects  and  the  rules  of 
reasoning  applicable  to  them,  and  to  the  ordinary 
principles  of  natural  theology  and  morality,  with 
which  they  had  previously  been  associated. 

The  philosophical  predecessors  of  the  Eleatics  were 
not  so  ambitious  as  the  latter.  The  former  con- 
tented themselves  with  taking  the  constitution  of 
things  just  as  they  found  it,  and  modestly  at- 
tempted only  to  ascertain  the  laws  which  regulated 
their  action  on  one  another,  in  all  their  mutual 
relationships.  The  Eleatics,  however,  took  higher 
ground.  They  attempted  to  explain  the  origin  of 
all  things ;  and,  by  arguments  a  priori,  to  deduce 
the  whole  complicated  and  multifarious  phenomena 
of  matter  and  mind,  from  certain  abstract  principles. 


22  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GREECE. 


Xenophanes.     456  b.c. 

Xenoplianes  was  tlie  most  distingidslied  pliilo- 
sopher  of  this  scliool.  Considerable  difference  of 
opinion  has  existed,  both  in  ancient  and  modern 
times,  as  to  the  precise  notions  he  entertained  on 
the  mental  laws  of  our  constitution.  By  one 
class  of  historians  he  has  been  accused  of  complete 
scepticism;  and  by  others,  as  a  defender  of  the 
infallible  certainty  of  human  knowledge.  The 
mass  of  evidence,  and  the  general  current  of  pro- 
bability, are  in  favour  of  the  latter  hypothesis. 

There  is,  unquestionably,  a  great  deal  of  material 
necessity  intermixed  with  all  the  mental  specula- 
tions of  Xenophanes.  He  affirms  that  nothing 
which  exists  can  possibly  change.  Every  thing  is 
one  being,  and  is  not  susceptible  of  diversities  of 
form  or  essence.  Thought,  according  to  him,  is 
the  only  real  substance;  permanent  and  immu- 
table in  its  nature  and  properties. 

The  spirit  of  Xenophanes'  mental  jihilosophy 
bears  a  very  close  affinity  to  some  modern  systems, 
founded  upon  a  particular  apj)lication  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  necessary  connexion.  Those  who  will  cast 
their  eye  over  both,  will  instantly  recognise  the 
almost  complete  identity.  The  principle  is  the 
same  in  both  the  ancient  and  modern  theories ; 
only  the  proofs  and  illustrations  are  somewhat 
chfferent.  The  reasoning  of  Xenojihanes  was  of  an 
a  priori  description ;  whereas  the  modern  adopters 
of  his  peculiar  views  employ  both  a  priori  argu- 


XENOPHANES.  23 

ments,   and    proof   di'awn  from   every-day    expe- 
rience. 

The  Patliers  of  the  Church,  St.  Clement  oi 
Alexandria,  and  Eusebius,  have  preserved  some 
verses  of  Xenophanes,  in  which  he  expresses  him- 
self with  great  freedom  on  the  superstitious  notions 
which  the  generality  of  mankind  entertain  as  to 
the  natui'e  of  the  gods.  He  seems,  however,  to 
have  had  just  and  elevated  conceptions  of  the 
Pirst  Great  Cause,  from  other  verses  mentioned 
by  Sextus  Empiricus,  where  he  says,  "  God  sees 
all,  hears  all,  knows  all ;  and  His  wisdom  governs 
all  things  without  effort." 

The  Unity  of  the  Divine  nature  is,  then,  de- 
cidedly affirmed  by  Xenophanes.  Deity  is  self- 
existent,  and  consequently  eternal;  immoveable, 
unmoved,  and  without  change. 

The  peculiar  expression  that  "  God  is  a  sphere," 
used  by  Xenophanes,  is  thus  explamed  by  M. 
Cousin.  "  The  word  sphericcd  is  simply  a  Greek 
locution  to  pomt  out  the  absolute  equality  and 
unity  of  the  Deity,  and  of  which  the  conception  of 
a  sphere  may  be  an  image.  The  at^ai^iKoq  of  the 
Greeks  is  the  rotundus  of  the  Latins.  It  is  a 
metaphorical  expression  similar  to  that  of  square, 
meaning  perfect  and  coniplete ;  a  mode  of  speak- 
ing which  though  now  considered  in  some  measure 
obsolete,  had  at  the  early  age  of  mathematical 
science,  something  dignified  and  noble  in  it,  and 
is  found  in  most  elevated  poetical  compositions. 
Simonides  speaks  of  a  'man  square  to  his  feet, 
his  hands,  and  his  mind,'  meaning  a  complete. 


24      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

perfect,  or  accomplished  man;  and  the  same  me- 
taphorical expression  is  used  by  Aristotle.  We 
cannot,  therefore,  be  surprised  that  Xenophanes, 
who  was  a  poet  as  well  as  a  philosopher,  writing 
in  verse,  and  not  being  successful  in  fixing  upon 
the  metapliysical  term  which  fully  expressed  liis 
ideas,  should  have  borrowed  from  the  language  of 
imagination  that  word  which  would  most  fully 
denote  his  meanino'." 

Professor  Pulleborn  di-aws  the  following  parallel 
between  Xenophanes  and  Spinoza.     "  Though  the 
system  of  Xenophanes  does  not  display  the  same 
ability  and  profundity  as  that  of  Spinoza,  yet  we 
cannot  fail  to  perceive  that  they  both  moved  in  the 
same  direction,  and  adopted  the  same  principles. 
The  only  difference  which  distinguishes  them  lies 
in   the   proofs   they  respectively   employ.     Xeno- 
phanes belonged  to  a  period   when  philosophical 
studies  were  but  as  it  were  in  their  infancy,  and 
the  forms  of  language,  as  a  medium  of  abstract 
reasoning,    but    imperfectly    understood.       After 
developing   a   general   principle    essential    to    his 
system,    he    clothed    it    with    other    attributes, 
and  took  a  circuitous  route.     Spinoza,  on  the  con- 
trary,   always   went   direct    to    his    object.      The 
former  dealt  exclusively  in  reasonings  a  priori,  and 
rejected  exj)erience ;    whilst    the   latter   used   the 
a  priori  instrument  in  conjunction  with  that  of 
observation  and  experiment." 

"  In  Sj^inoza's  day  the  ideas  of  unity,  substance, 
and  the  like,  were  determined  with  some  precision, 
particularly  by  the  writings  of  Descartes  ;  and  the 


XENOPHANES.  25 

Jewish  philosopher  had  a  more  definite  idea  of 
necessary  connection^  than  the  ancients  possessed. 
When  they  embraced  a  general  principle  or  propo- 
sition, they  pushed  it  to  its  utmost  limits,  without 
reservation  or  qualification ;  and  hence  a  host  of 
absurd  and  iiTational  deductions  was  the  conse- 
quence. That  mathematical  form  which  Spinoza 
employed  with  so  much  effect  in  the  exposition  of 
his  views,  was  not  used  by  Xenophanes."* 

The  scepticism  wliich  has  been  attributed  to 
Xenophanes,  and  which  certain  expressions  as- 
cribed to  him  apparently  countenance,  was  certainly 
of  a  loose  and  indefinite  character.  It  was  not 
dogmatical.  It  evidently  arose  in  the  philo- 
sopher's mind  from  a  deep  conviction  of  the 
circumscribed  and  imperfect  faculties  of  man  to 
embrace  the  wide  expanse  of  Creation.  He  was, 
as  every  man  ever  must  be,  no  matter  how  sound 
and  orthodox  his  theological  opinions,  overawed 
and  confounded  by  the  mere  attempt  to  inquire 
into  the  great  problem  of  existence.  He  essayed 
it  again  and  again ;  but  at  every  fresh  eff'ort  a  new 
host  of  insurmountable  difficulties  and  perplexities 
presented  themselves ; 

"Alps  on  Alps  arose  ;" 
which  compelled  him  to  fall  back  on  his  own  puny 
littleness    and    insufficiency,    and    exclaim,    when 
smarting  under  the  bitter  feelings  of  defeat,  that 
^^  error  is  spread  over  all  things. ^^"X 

*  Fulleborn,  Dissertat.  De  Xenoplia.     Halle,  1/89. 
t  Vide  Arist.  De  Xenopha.  chap.  I.  Metapliy.     Diogenes   Laert.  9. 
Sextus  Enipiricus,  Pynhon.  1.22.     Cicero.  Academ.  Qiisest.  2.  37- 


26  mental  philosophy  of  greece. 

Parmenedes.     430  b.c. 

Parmenides  Avas  a  disciple  and  follower  of  Xe- 
noplianes,  and  considerably  extended  the  range  of 
his  philosophical  system.  The  former  consolidated 
and  arranged  the  thoughts  of  the  latter,  and,  with 
great  judgment,  spii'it,  and  boldness,  gave  them 
a  more  complete  and  systematic  form.  Some 
recent  historians  have  affirmed  that  Parmenides 
was  the  first  pliilosopher  who  attempted  to  found  a 
regular  theory  of  human  knowledge. 

This  philosopher  composed  a  Poem  "  On  Nature^'' 
in  the  prologue  to  which  he  represents  the  goddess 
of  wisdom  directing  the  philosophical  inquirer  to 
truth  and  happiness.  The  goddess  speaks  nearly 
in  these  words :  "I  hail  thee,  O  thou,  whom  the 
heralds  of  the  goddess  have  conducted  to  my  habi- 
tation. Rejoice,  and  count  it  not  a  misfortune 
that  thou  hast  been  conducted  by  a  path  un- 
known to  mortals.  Thou  slialt  discern  the  immu- 
table and  eternal  things  which  truth  teaches ;  and 
thou  shall  form  just  conclusions,  both  as  to  the 
phenomena  of  nature  around  thee,  and  the  varied 
and  conflicting  elements  of  human  opinions.  Keep 
steadily  in  this  path ;  and  never  allow  thyseK  to 
become  the  slave  of  tliv  outward  senses ;  of  thine 
eye  and  thine  ear.  It  is  by  shunning  such  guides, 
by  the  force  of  reason,  that  thou  shalt  be  able  to 
comprehend  what  I  shall  announce  to  thee.  If 
we  suifer  ourselves  to  be  directed  bv  mere  senti- 
ment  or  feeling,  we  shall  infallibly  be  misled  from 
the  true  path." 


PAHMENIDES.  27 

In  the  book  "  On  Nature ,'  we  find  mental 
speculations  treated  under  tlie  head  of  "  The 
Intelligible,''  or  "  The  Truth;'  or  the  "  JJnitij  of 
Existence y  The  allegorical  form  is  kept  up,  and 
the  goddess  "  reveals  what  reason  will  discover  in 
its  researches.  E-eason  teaches  that  ichich  exists. 
The  existence  of  a  nonentity.  Speech,  thought,  and 
existence,  are  all  positive  realities.  Men,  blinded 
by  their  senses,  confound  them  by  turns ;  and 
separate  existence  from  creation.  Eollow  then  the 
path,  which  points  out  the  reality  of  things. 
Many  reasons  prove  that  that  which  has  never 
begun,  cannot  cease  to  exist.  Existence  is  a  whole ; 
it  is  one ;  it  is  immutable ;  it  is  infinite.  Eor  does 
any  one  ask  me  from  whence  is  this  existence  de- 
rived? Erom  what  source  does  its  perpetual  stream 
of  creation  flow  ?  Erom  whence  doth  it  proceed  ? 
These  are  questions  we  cannot  answer.  Eor  no 
person  can  conceive  or  tell  why  a  thing  exists, 
or  what  power  is  able  to  call  it  into  being,  or  why 
it  has  appeared  at  a  particular  time,  neither  sooner 
nor  later.  It  is  necessary,  then,  that  existence 
should  always  be,  or  never  be ;  for  tliis  maxim  is 
eternally  true,  that  a  thing  cannot  by  itself  be 
created  out  of  nothing.  Existence  is  founded  upon 
itself;  it  universally  reposes  on  itself,  and  is  in- 
vested with  unmutability ;  the  chains  of  necessary 
power  envelop  it.  Thought,  and  the  object  of 
thought,  are  one  and  the  same.  We  cannot  have 
the  thought,  with  the  object  which  is  cognizant  to 
the  mind." 

This    Poem   ends   with   the   following  remark; 


28      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

"The  unclerstanding  is  to  man,  wliat  the  bodily 
members  are  to  his  frame ;  for  the  thinking  prin- 
ciple possesses  the  same  unity  of  nature  and 
design,  as  the  organs  of  the  outward  man ;  all  is 
filled  by  thought." 

The  general  features  of  the  speculative  system 
of  Parmenides,  have  no  small  resemblance  to  those 
which  have  been  designated,  by  some  modern 
thinkers,  by  the  term  common  sense.  He  was  less 
addicted  to  paradox  than  his  predecessors ;  and 
seemed  to  seize  those  general  principles  of  mind 
which  display  themselves  in  the  every-day  move- 
ments of  the  mass  of  mankind,  and  which  form 
the  ground-work  of  that  universal  sjrmpathy  and 
harmony  Avhich  subsist  throughout  the  whole 
region  of  thought.* 

Melissus.     424  B.C. 

Melissus  of  Samos  expoimded  the  doctrines  of 
Parmenides.  On  the  real  existence  of  thinjjs,  he 
remarks,  "We  cannot  determine  the  quantity  of 
any  thing  without  taking  for  granted  its  existence. 
But  that  which  is  real  cannot  be  finite ;  it  must 
be  infinite ;  not  in  sjmce,  but  in  time.  It  fills  all 
time,  and  must  always  be  the  same  in  itself." 

Aristotle  calls  the  unity  of  Parmenides  a  rational 
unity,  but  that  of  MeKssus  a  material  one.f 


*  Arist.  Met.  1.  1.   Sextus  Empiricus  1.  9.    Diogenes  Laert.  1. !).    Plato 
in  Parmen.  1.  11.     Plat.  adv.  Colut.  1.  6.     Eusebius  1.  1. 
t  Tissot,  Ilist.  Abre'gee  de  la  Phil.  p.  106.  Dijon,  1840. 


ZENO.  29 

The  German  historian  Emitter  makes  the  following 
remarks  on  Melissus.  "  As,  however,  the  develop- 
ment given  hy  Melissns  to  his  theory  of  being 
strongly  resembles  the  method  in  which  it  was 
carried  out  by  Parmenides,  we  may  here  pass  over 
much,  and  only  bring  forward  what  is  peculiarly 
his  own,  and  what  is  requisite  to  indicate  its  re- 
lation to  other  philosophical  doctrines.  This  con- 
sists chiefly  in  the  manner  in  which,  as  an  Ionian 
and  living  among  lonians,  he  necessarily  put  most 
prominently  forward  those  points  which  it  was 
indispensable  to  establish  against  the  Ionic  phi- 
losophy. Melissus,  in  common  with  Parmenides, 
does  not  found  his  argument  on  the  notion  of  the 
Deity,  but  on  that  of  being.  On  the  former  point  he 
recedes  so  far  from  Xenophanes,  that  he  expressly 
declares,  '  men  must  not  speak  of  the  gods,  for  of 
them  we  have  absolutely  no  knoAvledge.'*  Accord- 
ingly, the  central  point  of  the  whole  system — the 
notion  of  the  perfect  one — was  even  still  more  lost 
sight  of  by  him  than  by  Parmenides ;  and  the 
whole  argumentation  bears  the  appearance  of  an 
empty  sophism.  On  this  account  he  was  much 
less  esteemed  by  the  ancients  than  Parmenides ; 
and  Aristotle  is  of  opinion  that  his  principles 
present  little  or  no  difiiculty."t 

Zeno,  of  Elea.     450  b.  c. 
Zeno  was  the  able,  bold,  and  successful  defender 

*  Diog.  Laert.  1.  1.  9.  24.  t  Ritter,  Hist.  Phil.  p.  481. 


30      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

of  the  Eleatic  pliilosopliy.  He  possessed  in  a  high 
degree  all  the  mental  requisites  for  an  expert  and 
formidable  controversialist.  He  was  remarkably 
acute,  knew  well  how  to  handle  general  principles, 
so  as  to  confound  and  annoy  an  adversary,  and 
had,  besides,  a  copious  fund  of  information  on  all 
the  current  topics  of  the  day.  He  may  be  con- 
sidered as  the  founder  of  that  general  system  of 
philosophical  discussion,  so  prevalent  for  many 
subsequent  ages,  in  all  the  countries  of  the  East. 

Among  his  controversial  discussions  we  find  the 
following,  tending  to  invalidate  the  systems  of 
those  who  founded  all  science  on  pure  experience. 
"  Every  body  constantly  occupies  a  portion  of  space 
equal  to  itself;  it  is  then  constantly  in  repose. 
Now  if  it  move  itself,  it  should  move  in  every 
instant ;  it  would  then  be  both  in  motion  and  at 
rest  at  the  same  time." 

Zeno  attempted  to  establish  the  doctrine  of 
perfect  and  ahsolute  unity.  On  the  divisibility  of 
matter,  he  observes,  "When  we  arrive  at  the 
utmost  boundaries  of  divisibility,  we  shall  then 
only  have  a  mathematical  point;  which  is  really 
nothing." 

On  the  successful  cultivation  of  the  art  of 
reasoning,  and  investigating  truth,  and  communi- 
cating it  to  others,  he  laid  down  many  excellent 
principles  and  rules.  He  divided  this  art  into 
three  distinct  branches  ;  the  first,  the  art  of  draw- 
ing consequences  or  inferences  from  principles ; 
secondly,  the  art  of  dialectics  ;  and  thirdly,  tlie  art 
of  speaking. 


HERACLITLS.  31 

Of  the  importance  of  the  dialectics  of  Zeno,  we 
have  the  testimony  of  M.  Cousin,  who  says,  "  The 
polemical  method  entirely  disconcerted  the  dis- 
ciples of  the  Ionic  philosophy,  and  excited  a 
lively  curiosity  and  interest  for  the  stability  of  the 
doctrines  of  the  Italian  school ;  and  thus  was  sowti 
in  the  capital  of  Greek  civilization  and  refinement, 
the  prolific  germ  of  a  more  lofty  development  of 
philosophy."  Hitter  also  observes,  "  On  account 
of  the  readiness  and  scientific  skill  with  which 
Zeno  indicated  the  contraries  of  all  things,  he  has 
been  called  bv  Plato  the  Eleatic  Palamedes.  The 
dialogistic  form  of  his  composition  was  calculated 
to  give  rise  to  a  sophistical  tendency,  as  was  shewn 
in  latter  times  ;  but  even  in  his  reasonings  there  is 
often  so  close  a  trenching  upon  subtile  and  falla- 
cious distinctions,  that  he  has  frequently  been 
classed  among  the  Sophists ;  nevertheless,  when 
we  consider  the  serious  end  which  he  pursued,  we 
cannot  but  suppose  that  he  merely  employed  those 
fallacious  artifices  as  a  by-play  and  relief  to  his 
dialogue,  or  in  mocking  defiance  of  the  want  of 
skill  and  the  helplessness  of  his  opponents."* 


Heraclitus.     460  b.  c. 

Heraclitus  belonged  to  the  school  of  the  Eleatics, 
and  signalised  himself  by  his  profound  study  of 
the  general  laws  of  the  universe.  On  mental  sub- 
jects he  observes,  "The  human  soul,  such  as  is 

*  Arist.  Met.  1.  1.     Pioge.  Laert.  1.  3.     Sext.  Emp.  Math.  /.     Plato, 
Parm  p   127.     Strabo  6.  I. 


32       MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OP  GREECE. 

endowed  with  reason,  is  an  emanation  from  the 
universal  mind;  but  it  is  united  to  an  animal 
nature,  in  common  with  the  inferior  orders  of 
creation.  Man  breathes  the  universal  soul  or 
mind,  and  readily  unites  with  creative  intelligence, 
in  a  state  of  watching ;  sleep  l^eing  an  immediate 
and  temporary  suspension  of  this  communication." 

This  metaphysician  established  the  maxim  which 
exercised,  in  subsequent  ages,  a  great  influence 
over  speculative  minds,  "that  a  thing  can  only  be 
known  by  the  same  thing."  "  Conception  is 
founded  only  upon  the  similitude  between  the 
agent  and  the  object."  This  principle  was  con- 
sidered, when  viewed  in  all  its  bearings  and  rami- 
fications, as  destructive  of  the  evidence  of  the 
senses ;  and  places  the  discovery  of  truth  solely  in 
the  faculty  of  reason.  But  in  opposition  to  this 
conclusion  from  his  premises,  Heraclitus  maintained 
that  the  senses  were  the  apertures  through  which 
we  inhaled  the  divine  reason. 

"  Our  sensations,"  says  he,  "  do  not  appertain 
to  external  objects  ;  they  reside  only  in  ourselves ; 
for  they  vary  amongst  individuals,  and  even  in  the 
same  individual,  from  the  varied  condition  of  the 
organs  themselves.  These  senses  cannot,  then, 
communicate  any  certain  knowledge  of  external 
things,  since  their  operation  is  so  unsteady  and 
fluctuating.  The  understanding  alone  possesses 
the  power  of  teaching  us  the  absolute  nature  of 
objects;  it  alone  can  impart  truth  to  us." 
,  He  argues  however  in  another  place  for  the 
testimony  of  the  senses  ;    for  he  remarks,  "  The 


HERACLITUS.       .  33 

judgments  wliich  mankind  in  general  form,  possess 
the  certain  testimony  of  truth ;  this  common  light 
wliich  diffuses  itself  over  all  at  once,  is  nothing 
else  but  the  Divine  E-eason,  shed  over  all  our  under- 
standings by  a  direct  and  immediate  effusion." 

On  the  nature  of  memory  he  observes,  "the 
mind  represents  to  itself  the  universe  such  as  it 
has  been  preserved  by  the  memory  ;  we  arrive  then 
at  truth  when  we  borrow  from  memory  that  true 
and  veritable  sketch  which  has  been  deposited  and 
confided  with  it.  Wisdom  is  then  accessible  to  all 
men." 

His  notions  on  the  origin  of  the  world  did  not  ma- 
terially differ  from  those  which  had  been  promulgat- 
ed by  many  of  his  predecessors.  Fire,  or  an  ethereal 
exhalation,  is  the  principle  of  existence  and  life.  This 
agent  consists  of  two  indivisible  portions  or  atoms, 
which  are  simple  in  their  natures,  and  eternal,  and 
indestructible.  The  particles  of  which  this  ethe- 
real exhalation  consists,  are  in  perpetual  motion. 
From  the  various  modes  in  which  these  two  con- 
stituent elements  are  combined,  we  have  the  result 
of  all  the  numerous  and  diversified  forms  of  ma- 
terial existences.  There  is  a  rational  or  thinking 
principle  incorporated  with  this  primary  fire,  and 
this  principle  animates  the  whole,  and  preserves 
and  changes  the  face  of  nature  at  its  will.  *  This 
principle,  in  fact,  is  God,  the  maker  of  all  things. 

There  is  a  story  told  about  the  writings  of  He- 
racUtus,  that  they  were  deposited  in  the  temple  of 

*  Clem.  Alex.  Prot.  p.  42.     Tertull.  Contr.  Marcion. 
*  D 


34       MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

Diana,  at  Ephesus,  and  remained  tliere  unknown 
for  a  considerable  period.  At  length  they  were 
discovered  and  published ;  and  the  poet  Euripides 
made  known  their  contents  to  a  public  audience 
in  the  same  celebrated  temple.  This  circumstance 
excited  a  lively  feeling  amongst  the  philosophers 
of  the  day,  some  of  whom  immediately  declared 
themselves  Heraclitus's  disciples.  Among  the 
number  was  Hippocrates,  the  famous  physician. 

We  shall  close  tliis  notice  of  Heraclitus  with  a 
few  observations  of  Emitter's  upon  the  system  of  the 
Grecian  philosopher.  "  The  notion  of  life  implies 
that  of  alteration,  which  by  the  ancients  was  gene- 
rally conceived  as  motion.  The  Universal  Life  is 
therefore  an  eternal  motion,  and  consequently  tends, 
as  every  motion  must,  towards  some  end;  even 
though  this  end,  in  the  course  of  the  evolution  of 
life,  presents  itself  to  us  a  mere  transition  to  some 
ulterior  end.  Heraclitus  on  this  ground  supposed 
a  certain  longing  to  be  inherent  in  fire,  to  gratify 
which  it  constantly  transformed  itself  into  some 
determinate  form  of  being,  without,  however,  any 
wish  to  maintain  it,  but  in  the  mere  desire  of  trans- 
muting itself  from  one  form,  into  another.  There- 
fore to  make  worlds  is  Jove's  pastime." 


EMPEDOCLES.  85 


CHAPTEU   V. 
MENTx\L  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


THE    SECOND    ELEATIC    SCHOOL    OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

This  second  scliool  of  Eleatics  was  distinguished 
by  many  important  and  subtile  speculations  on 
mental  subjects ;  but  its  general  scope  and  tenor 
had  a  decided  leaning  to  the  most  objectionable 
forms  of  materialism.  They  were  devoted  and 
zealous  students  of  philosophy,  but  they  adopted 
general  principles  ^\dtliout  sufficient  discrimination, 
and  supported  them  by  fictions  and  fallacies  dis- 
creditable to  discerning  minds. 


EMPEDOCLES.    444   B.  C. 

This  philosopher  was  born  at  Agrigentmn,  in 
Sicily,  about  the  year  400.  Erom  his  youth  he 
devoted  himself  to  medical  pursuits  with  great  zeal 
and  success.  He  travelled  also  a  great  deal,  and 
became,  by  his  skill  in  medicine,  and  the  boldness 
and  singularity  of  his  character,  a  well  known  per- 
sonage, even  beyond  the  limits  of  his  oami  country. 

He  prosecuted  the  science  of  mind  with  some 

D  2 


36      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

success.  His  theory  of  sensation  is  worthy  of 
notice,  principally  from  its  singularity.  He  fol- 
lowed the  general  maxim  of  his  predecessors,  that 
the  same  thing  could  only  he  perceived  by  the  same 
thing.  He  attached  to  each  of  the  senses  a 
particular  element ;  thus,  the  fire  could  only  be 
perceived  by  the  fire,  that  is,  sight ;  the  air  by  the 
air,  which  is  the  ear.  To  the  w^hole  of  the  senses 
he  joined  other  two — ^namely,  discord,  wliich  is  per- 
ceived by  discord,  and  love,  which  is  perceived  by 
love.  He  explained  the  general  phenomena  of 
sensation  by  affirming  that  there  was  a  complete 
identity  between  the  object  perceived  and  the 
sensation  itself.  The  colours  of  objects,  for 
example,  were  certain  forms,  proceeding  from 
things  external,  and  transmitted  to  us  through  the 
medium  of  the  organ  of  sight.* 

Empedocles  makes  a  distinction  between  divine 
and  human  knowledge,  and  yet  he  rather  inconsis- 
tently attempts  to  resolve  all  kinds  of  knowledge 
into  the  Divine  Mind.  However,  it  would  appear 
that,  according  to  his  idea,  man  has  some  portion 
of  this  divine  intelKgence  given  him  to  balance  his 
sensual  knowledge.  How  it  operates,  what  are  its 
limits,  what  influences  it  exerts,  or  in  what  degree 
it  counteracts  material  agents,  we  can  form  no 
conception,  neither  from  the  philosopher's  own 
language,  nor  from  any  of  his  commentators. 

The  system  of  the  universe,  as  promulgated  by 
Empedocles,    is   dimly   shadowed  forth.      World- 

*  Arist.  De  Sensu,  cjip.  -1.     I'lut.  <le  Placit.  Phil.  A. 


LEUCIPPUS.  37 

making  mth  him  is  a  very  crude  and  bungling 
affair.  He  collects  all  the  elemental  principles  to- 
gether, separates  them,  descants  upon  them  indivi- 
dually, and  then  mixes  them  in  such  confusion, 
that  it  becomes  in  the  end  impossible  to  obtain 
even  a  gKmpse  of  his  system. 

Letjcippus.     428  b.  c. 

Leucippus  belonged  to  this  school,  and  struck 
out  a  new  system  of  philosophy.  He  was  a  subtile 
observer  of  the  laws  of  the  human  mind.  His 
whole  theory  of  human  knowledge  and  the  consti- 
tution of  nature,  is  founded  upon  an  obvious  train 
of  thought,  when  contemplating  the  world  around 
us.  We  incessantly  see  an  endless  variety  of 
forms,  and  a  perpetual  change  of  motion  amongst 
all  bodies,  whether  animate  or  inanimate.  We  see 
one  thing  slowly  but  steadily  amalgamating  with 
another  thing,  and  the  forms  and  properties  of 
both  changed.  These  multifarious  changes  of  na- 
tiu-e  almost  naturallv  excite  the  mind  to  suffffes- 
tions  of  thought  foimded  upon  the  gratuitous 
assimiption,  that  a  system  of  motion  amongst  the 
inanimate  particles  of  matter,  whether  organized 
or  imorganized,  must  be  the  efficient  cause  of  all 
the  varied  forms  of  creation.  There  seems  to  be 
no  other  feasible  solution  of  the  phenomena  we  be- 
hold, save  a  theory  of  this  description ;  the  mind 
rests  for  the  moment  upon  it,  and  seems  to  feel 
a  temporary  pleasure  and  satisfaction  that  it  affords 
a  probable  solution  of  philosophical  difficulties  of 
such  magnitude.     Hence  it  is  that  this  theory  of 


38       MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

Leucippus,  and  modifications  of  it,  have  prevailed 
since  the  first  daT\Ti  of  letters  amongst  men,  and 
will,  ill  all  hnman  probability,  keep  its  ground  till 
the  end  of  time. 

Leucippus  supposes  that  every  atom  of  matter  is 
invested  with  a  peculiar  principle  of  motion  ;  and 
that  a  number  of  these  atoms  produce  a  kind  of 
vortex.  Huet  and  Bayle  have  both  remarked,  that 
this  theory  is  very  similar  to  that  broached  by 
Descartes  in  modern  times. 

Leucippus  says,  "  There  are  then  two  principles 
in  all  things,  one  primitive,  and  the  other  positive  : 
space,  and  a  vacuum."  "  Thus,"  he  adds,  "  the 
whole  train  of  events  we  see  are  subjected  to  a 
principle  of  necessity." 

These  few  words  embody  the  whole  system  of  this 
Eleatic  philosopher,  as  it  has  been  handed  down 
to  us  through  the  wi'itings  of  the  ancients.  He 
thought  it  fully  accounted  for  all  the  diversified 
appearances  of  the  universe,  both  physical,  mental, 
and  moral.  * 

The  metaphysical  views  of  Leucippus  are,  of 
course,  founded  upon  the  same  material  basis. 
Life,  thought,  motion,  are  all  one  thing ;  respira- 
tion is  the  condition,  and  heat  the  sign  of  them. 
The  soul,  in  which  these  three  properties  of  life, 
thought,  and  motion  reside,  is  itself  only  an  aggre- 
gation of  atoms ;  a  compound  of  fiery  particles 
which  circulate  in  all  bodies. 

We  must,  notwithstanding  tliis  system  of  mate- 
rialism, award  the  high  honour  to  Leucii)pus  of 
being  the  first  philosopher  Avho  clearly  detected. 


DEMOCRITUS.  39 

and  fully  explained,  that  important  principle  in 
metaphysics,  so  highly  valued  in  recent  times  ; 
namely,  the  distinction  between  the  primary  and 
secondary  qualities  of  matter. 

The  whole  system  of  Leucippus  is  also  worthy 
of  remark  as  being  the  first  regular  theory  founded 
ujion  materialism  in  its  most  absolute  sense. 

Democritus.     460  b.  c. 

Democritus  followed  in  the  same  path  of  specu- 
lation as  Leucippus ;  and  more  fully  developed  his 
system.  The  ^dews  of  the  latter,  relative  to  the 
distinction  between  the  'primary  and  secondary 
qualities  of  matter,  were,  however,  not  entertained 
by  Democritus,  who  stoutly  contended  that  the 
secondary  qualities  were  nothing  but  mere  modifi- 
cations of  the  thinking  principle.  "Honey,"  says 
he,  "  is  in  itself  neither  sweet  nor  sour,  but  it  pro- 
duces upon  the  organ  of  taste  an  impression  to 
which  we  give  the  name  of  sweet ;  and  from  hence 
is  derived  the  varied  class  of  sensations  which  dif- 
ferent individuals  experience.  It  is  precisely  the 
same  with  colours,  sounds,  and  odours. ' '  He  thought 
that  the  sense  of  touch  was  the  onlv  one  which 
really  taught  us  the  knowledge  of  external  objects. 

He  maintained,  likewise,  that  all  human  intelli- 
gence was  of  a  passive  character.  "  All  our  per- 
ceptions come  to  us  from  without,  and  the  ol^jects 
which  produce  them  emit  certain  emanations  re- 
sembKng  them,  and  like  images  are  imprinted  on 
the  soul."  Again,  for  example,  water,  which  com- 
poses the  principle  of  life  or  vitality,  furnishes  as 


40      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OP  GREECE. 

it  were  by  reflection,  a  copy  of  its  properties  to  the 
mind ;  the  air  transmits  them  through  the  ear,  by 
an  internal  movement  of  particles,  precisely  similar ; 
and  thus  it  is  with  all  the  other  organs  of  sense. 

Democritus  aflirmed  that  there  were  two  kinds 
of  knowledge,  the  genuine  and  the  abstract.  The 
first  has  its  foundation  in  the  mind  ;  and  the  latter 
from  the  operation  of  the  external  senses.  The 
abstract  or  obscure  species  of  knowledge  is  acquired 
by  the  influence  of  external  agents  on  the  thinking 
faculty  (vovg),  and  thus  conceptions  are  generated.* 
Bodies  operate,  however,  only  by  contact.  There 
must  be  an  impression  on  the  soul  from  without,  f 
This  is  indispensable.  An  external  object  is  made 
kno^vn  to  us  by  a  sense,  through  the  medium  of 
certain  eflQ.uxes  filled  with  sensation  and  impres- 
sion, which  the  philosopher  calls  images  (t'/^wXa) ; 
these  drop  as  it  were  from  the  object,  and  after 
assimilating  themselves  with  the  surrounding  air, 
enter  into  the  organ  of  sensation  through  certain 
channels  or  pores.  This  process  communicates 
certain  figures  corresponding  to  the  external  ob- 
jects from  whence  they  come.  But  it  is  only  the 
external  covering  or  surface  of  these  objects  which 
we  perceive ;  and  this  is  the  chief  reason  of  the 
mass  of  obscurity  which  hangs  over  their  real 
nature  or  properties.  There  is  always,  therefore, 
a  cloudiness  and  haziness  hanging  over  everything 
around  us ;  and  it  is  in  vain  to  think  of  ever  re- 
mo\dng  it  from  the  sensuous  organization  of  man. 

*  Arist.  de  Aniiiia.  1.  2.  t  Arist  de  Sensu,  2. 


DEMOCRITUS.  41 

We  have  only,  in  fact,  a  one-sicled  glimpse  of  na- 
tural objects.* 

We  must  not,  however,  suppose  that  all  know- 
ledge was  confined  to  this  imperfect  sensuous 
operation.  There  was  a  higher  principle  of  intelli- 
gence ;  something  which  guided  and  directed  us 
to  truth,  independent  of  the  impressions  from 
external  objects.  There  were  certain  internal 
perceptions  or  elements  of  thought  which  seemed 
to  form  part  of  the  construction  of  the  mind  itself. 
This  has  been  considered  by  some  writers  as  the 
faculty  of  reflection  (Siavota),  which  forms  such  an 
important  element  in  modern  metaphysical  science. 
Whatever  opinion  may  be  formed  on  this  point, 
certain  it  is,  that  Democritus  seems  to  have  been 
constrained  to  admit,  though  in.  rather  ambiguous 
language,  the  existence  of  certain  primary  elements 
of  thought,  apart  from  the  mere  mechanism  of 
sensation. 

Condorcct,  in  his  Sketch  of  the  Progress  of  the 
Human  Mind,  has  the  following  remarks  relative  to 
the  philosophy  of  Democritus. 

"  Democritus  regarded  all  the  phenomena  of  the 
universe  as  the  result  of  the  combinations  and 
movements  of  simple  bodies,  possessing  a  deter- 
mined and  fixed  shape,  and  having  received  a 
primary  impulsion,  from  whence  was  imparted  a 
quantity  of  motion,  which  modified  itself  in  every 
distinct  atom,  but  which,  in  the  entu^e  mass, 
always  preserved  an  aggregate  harmony." 

*  Theophr.  dc  Sensu,  63. 


42  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GREECE. 


CHAPTER    VI. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


THE    GREEK    SOPHISTS. 

We  come  now  to  notice  that  class  of  speculative 
persons  whom  historians  have  distinguished  by  the 
term  Sojyhists.  They  occupied  a  prominent  station 
among  the  learned  Greeks,  although  they  did  not 
form  any  distinct  school  or  party,  properly  so 
called.  The  spiiit  of  their  system  encouraged  an 
independent  tone  of  thinking,  and  but  little  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  constraint  or  authority  of  any 
federal  head  whatever. 

There  were  two  species  of  Sophists  :  the  one 
generally  exercised  the  profession  of  Rhetorician, 
and  the  other  confined  themselves  to  the  instruc- 
tion of  their  pupils  in  all  the  branches  of  mental 
philosophy. 

The  philosophy  of  the  Sophists  comes  down  to 
us  under  great  disadvantages,  both  for  their  repu- 
tation and  our  own  conviction.  They  left  no  writ- 
ings of  any  moment  behind  them ;  and  what  re 
cords  there  were,  have  all  perished.  We  have  their 
oj)inions,  systems,   and    characters,  only  through 


THE    GKEEK    SOPHISTS.  43 

somewhat  suspicious  and  prejudiced  channels. 
It  is  therefore  by  way  of  inference  alone  that  we 
can  approximate  to  the  truth. 

The  philosophical   system   which   the    Sophists 
adopted,  if  it  can   be   called   a   system,   was  the 
natural  result  of  the  peculiar  state  of  speculative 
science  in  this   age.     Men  of  active   habits   and 
inquiring  minds,  had  seen  one  sect  of  reasoners 
after   another  usurping   public   attention,  by   at- 
tempting to  solve  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  the 
world,  and   the   constitution  of  all   things,  both 
physical  and  mental.     Their  opinions  were  marked 
by  great  subtility,  inconsistency,  and  extravagance. 
They  seemed  to   agree   only   to   differ   from   one 
another.    Nothing  had  been  satisfactorily  proved; 
no    one   general   principle   established ;    nor   was 
there  a  single  philosophical  resting-place  for  the 
sole  of  the  foot.     This  state  of  things  natm^ally 
created   a   reaction.      Men   of  bold   and   stirring 
habits    shook    off    the    cobwebs     of    speculative 
subtility,  seized  hold  of  the  reality  of  things  around 
them,  and  made  a  straightforward  appeal  to  the 
feelings,  opinions,  and  common  sense  of  mankind. 
It  is  easy  to  see  that  an  enterprise  of  this  kind, 
under    such    circumstances,    was    sure   to   prove 
successful.      Mankind    listened,    and    they    even 
fancied  they  obtained  instruction.     All  the  recluse 
and  subtile  philosophers  were  deeply  shocked  by 
this    Gothic   irruption   into  then*  territory.     The 
withering  jeers  of  the  multitude  were  keenly  felt 
by  the   speculative   recluse.     He   had   no   means 


44      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

of  repelling  the  attack.  His  weapons  were  too 
refined  for  sucli  rude  and  vulgar  warfare ;  for, 
under  such  circumstances,  his  retaliation  would  in 
reality  have  been  "  to  chop  blocks  with  a  razor." 

We  can  readily  therefore  imagine,  that  no  good 
feeling  would  exist  between  the  disciples  of  the  old 
schools  of  Greece,  and  the  Sophists.  There  was 
no  communion  of  fellowship  and  sympathy  between 
them.  It  may  readily  be  conceded — indeed  the 
matter  seems  quite  ob^vdous — that  the  majority  of 
the  Sophists  would  be  shallow  and  declamatory 
personages,  dealing  in  generalities,  and  avoiding 
every  thing  like  abstruse  reasoning  and  deduction. 
But  still  they  could  not  propagate  their  views 
without  spreading  useful  truths  far  and  wide. 
They  would  doubtless  make  a  liberal  use  of  ridicule 
and  banter  in  their  popular  orations ;  and  would, 
on  many  occasions,  push  their  principles  to  an 
extravagant  length.  And  there  can  be  no  doubt 
but  that  many  of  the  expressions  and  propositions, 
which  Plato  and  Aristotle  have  handed  down  to 
us,  as  falling  from  the  lips  of  the  Sophists,  were 
uttered  in  the  heat  of  extemporary  oratory,  or 
when  smartmg  under  some  unmerited  persecu- 
tion. Making,  however,  every  allowance,  there  is 
reasonable  groimd  for  supposing  that  their  ser- 
vices in  the  cause  of  true  knowledge  were  con- 
siderable, and  that  they  by  no  means  merit  that 
contempt  and  derision  which  many  ancient  and 
modern  philosophers  have  heaped  upon  them. 


PROTAaORAS.  45 


Protagoras.     475  B.C. 

Protagoras  was  one  of  the  most  eminent  and 
early  of  the  Sophists.  His  metaphysical  notions 
may  be  gathered  from  what  Sextus  Empiricus  has 
told  us  of  them.  They  are  in  substance  the  follow- 
ing, Man  is  the  standard  of  the  truth  of  all 
things.  He  is  the  proper  criterion  of  the  reality 
of  every  thing  which  exists.  This  is  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  all  human  knowledge.  Matter 
is  in  a  perpetual  flux  and  reflux ;  it  is  constantly 
changing  its  forms.  Our  bodily  senses,  which 
are  affected  by  and  perceive  these  changes,  undergo 
also  a  modification  from  old  age,  disease,  and 
other  circumstances.  The  foundation  of  every 
thing  which  the  senses  can  perceive,  or  be  affected 
by,  resides  in  matter.  But  men  at  different  times, 
and  under  different  circumstances,  derive  various 
impressions  from  external  objects.  Those  whose 
organs  are  in  a  healthy  and  \agorous  state,  perceive 
objects  just  in  the  same  manner  as  other  persons 
do  who  are  in  a  similar  situation,  and  whose  sen- 
suous faculties  are  in  a  snnilarlv  ors^anised  con- 
dition.  On  the  other  hand,  those  whose  organs 
are  impaired  or  diseased,  recognise  external  objects 
in  precisely  the  same  way  as  those  who  labour 
under  corresponding  imperfections  and  infirmities. 
Man,  then,  is  the  sole  criterion  of  the  truth  of 
things.  We  are  perpetually  in  the  habit  of  making 
references  to  our  own  individual  feelings  and  per- 


4G      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

ceptions  as  the  infallible  test  of  truth  and  false- 
hood.* 

Plato,  in  one  of  his  works,  gives  the  most  un- 
equivocal evidence  that  the  above  is  the  sum  and 
substance  of  the  system  of  Protagoras.  In  the 
passages  quoted  by  Plato,  he  makes  the  Sophist 
take  his  stand  upon  the  common  and  every-day 
feelings  of  himian  nature ;  and  supposes  one  man 
to  test  the  truth  of  his  sensations  and  feelings,  by  a 
direct  appeal  to  the  consciousness  of  his  neighbour. 
Tliis  is  the  first  great  effort  which  was  made  to 
bring  the  ordinary  emotions  and  opinions  of  man- 
kind to  bear  upon  the  extreme  subtility  and  ab- 
stract refinement  of  the  various  schools  of  philo- 
sophy which  had,  up  to  this  period,  prevailed 
throughout  Greece.  Protagoras  spoke  a  language 
responded  to  by  all  mankind.  A  fine  field  was 
open  to  his  rhetorical  talents ;  and  there  is  little 
doubt  but  that  the  common  sense  tone  of  his  philo- 
sophical discussions  must  have  produced  a  power- 
ful influence  on  the  inquisitive  spirit  of  his  day.f 

On  the  merits  of  Protagoras  and  his  system, 
philosophical  historians  are  widely  at  difference. 
Degerando  observes,  "  Les  autres  Sophistes  adop- 
taient  indifferemment  toutes  les  opinions ;  Prota- 
goras essayait  de  prouver  que  chacune  a  des  fonde- 
mens  legitimes.  La  plupart  des  autres  Sophistes 
n'eurent  que  des  audit eurs  ;  Protagoras  exer9a  une 
influence  importante  sur  la   marche    de    I'esprit 


*  Arist.  Met.  3.  5.     Diog.  Laert.  !).  50.     Cicero,  Acad.  Qua^st.  4. 
Plato.  Theat.  2. 


GORGIAS.  47 

liumaiii.  La  plupart  des  autres  Sopliistes  furent 
bientot  oubliees  et  meritaient  de  I'etre  ;  Protagoras 
a  pose  des  problemes  qui  subsistent  encore,  et  qui 
peut-etre  ne  sont  pas  entierement  resolus.  Enfin, 
il  soumit  a  des  regies  I'art  que  professaient  les 
Sophistes ;  il  decouvrit  plusieurs  formes  de  raison- 
nement,  et  on  convient  que  sa  methode  se  rap- 
prochait  a  quelques  egards  de  celle  de  Socrate."* 

Emitter  observes  :  "  In  all  these  propositions  and 
reasonings  of  Protagoras  we  recognize  at  once  the 
endeavour  to  resolve  conception  into  sensation, 
and  to  deny  the  universality  of  pure  intellectual 
thought.  It  was  in  this  sense  that  the  ancients 
understood  the  position,  that  all  is  in  a  continual 
state  of  incipiency ;  for  since  every  sensation  is 
nothinsr  more  than  the  result  of  the  concurrent 
activities  of  the  percipient  and  the  perceptible, 
and  thought  merely  sensation,  the  former  must 
consequently  be  a  production  of  the  constant  varia- 
tion of  these  changeable  activities.  All,  therefore, 
according  to  Protagoras,  lives  merely  in  the  sensi- 
ble changeableness,  and  is  in  fact  this  mutability 
itself.  The  sensible  is  indeed  true,  so  far  as  it  is 
sensibly  perceived.  But  nothing  in  itself  is  cold  or 
hot,  nor  generally  has  any  sensible  quality ;  but  is  of 
such  or  such  qualities,  according  as  it  is  perceived 
as  such."t 

GORGIAS.      452  B.  c. 

Gorgias  was  another  Sophist  of  distinction.  In 
addition  to  the  general  current  of  opinions  held  l)y 

*  Ilistoire  Comparee,  vol.  2.  p.  S3,     t  Hist.  Philosophy,  vol   2.  p.  5/6. 


48       MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

his  predecessors,  he  advanced  many  original  propo- 
sitions of  his  own,  and  pushed  them  to  a  great 
length.  In  a  hook  entitled  "  On  ichat  is  not,  or 
on  Nature i'^  he  attempts  to  estahlish  three  distinct 
principles  or  axioms,  all,  however,  directed  against 
the  stability  of  human  knowledge.  They  are  the 
following.  '  Pirst, — That  nothing  exists.  Second, 
— That  if  anything  really  exists,  it  cannot  be 
known  to  man.  Third, — That  if  he  could  know  it 
he  has  not  the  power  of  communicating  that  know- 
ledge to  others. 

The  first  proposition,  that  nothing  exists,  Gorgias 
attempts  to  establish  by  the  following  arguments. 
At  first  nothing  existed.  Then  reality  had  no  ex- 
istence. Now  everything  must  have  either  been 
eternal,  or  must  have  been  made ;  or  must  have 
possessed  the  characters  of  being  both  eternal  and 
created.  If  matter  be  eternal  it  could  not  have 
been  created,  and  must  be  infinite  ;  but  that  which 
is  infinite  has  no  parts ;  it  must  also  be  different 
from  that  which  contains  it ;  and  nmst  also  be 
comprised  in  space.  This  space  must  then  be  a 
different  and  a  greater  thing  than  it ;  which  is  a 
notion  not  in  unison  with  infinity.  If  matter  has 
been  produced,  it  must  have  either  been  created 
from  that  which  previously  existed,  or  from  no- 
tliing.  On  the  first  supposition  it  has  not  been 
created,  it  has  only  been  changed  in  its  form ;  and 
on  the  other  hand  it  is  contradictory  to  say  that 
a  thing  has  been  created  which  never  existed. 

On  the  second  proposition,  that  if  anything  should 
even  have  a  real  existence,  we  could  not  know  it ; 


GORGIAS.  49 

he,  in  substance,  argues  as  follows :  We  cannot 
know  what  things  are  in  themselves  ;  for  it  would 
be  necessary,  for  this  purpose,  that  there  should  be 
a  perfect  relationship  established  between  our  con- 
ceptions and  those  external  realities ;  that  what 
they  offer  to  our  senses  should  be  the  very  qualities 
themselves,  under  the  self-same  form  that  they  are 
perceived ;  but  all  this  is  absm-d.  If  we  could 
conceive,  for  example,  that  a  man  could  walk  upon 
the  winds,  or  a  chariot  drive  along  the  siu^face  of 
the  sea,  we  should  then  be  entitled  to  conclude 
that  a  man  might  fly,  and  that  a  chariot  might 
ride  upon  the  surface  of  the  waters.  That,  there- 
fore, which  really  exists  escapes  our  knowledge. 
Each  sense  only  perceives  that  which  belongs  to 
its  own  province  ;  a  thing  is  called  visible  because 
it  is  the  object  of  sight ;  but  it  does  not  cease  to 
exist  because  it  cannot  be  seen.  Wliat  then  can 
be  conceived  may  exist,  though  it  may  not  affect 
our  senses,  because  it  is  beyond  the  limit  of  their 
range. 

The  third  proposition,  that  if  anything  really 
existed^  loe  could  not  communicate  its  existence  to 
others^  he  defined  in  this  manner.  The  means  we 
have  of  communicating  with  others,  is  through  the 
medium  of  language.  But  language  is  not  identi- 
cal with  external  things,  or  real  objects.  We  only 
transmit  to  others  om-  own  words.  Now  that 
which  is  visible  is  not  felt  by  the  ear,  nor  does  the 
ear  see  external  objects  ;  the  province  of  these  two  . 
senses  is  quite  separate  and  different.  We  say, 
indeed,  that  language  is  formed  from  the  impres- 

*   ,  '  E 


50      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

sions  we  receive  from  external  objects,  through 
the  medium  of  the  senses ;  as  colour,  for  example, 
is  derived  from  the  act  of  vision.  It  does  not, 
however,  follow  from  this  that  our  words  really 
and  fully  express  the  qualities  or  properties  of 
things  without  us ;  hut  simply  the  effect  they  pro- 
duce upon  our  organs  of  sensation.  Even  admit- 
ting that  the  objects  of  sense  really  exist,  we  are 
not  from  hence  entitled  to  say  that  they  are  the 
objects  of  language.  Om'  sensations  and  words 
are  two  different  things.  * 

There  were  several  other  Sophists  distinguished 
in  their  day  as  bold  and  reckless  declaimers.  Pro- 
dicus,  Hippias,  Euthydemus,  Thrasymachus,  and 
Callicles,  are  the  chief  names  mentioned  by  Xeno- 
phon  and  Plato.  Some  of  these  Sophists  were 
charged  with  blasphemy  by  the  civil  authorities,  de- 
nounced as  corrupters  of  youth,  and  condemned  to 
public  execution. 

*  Arist.  de  Gorg.     Plato,  Meno.  p.  7^.    Sext.  Empiricus  1. 1. 85. 


SOCRATES.  51 


CHAPTER   VII. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


Socrates.    400  b.  c. 

The  name  of  Socrates  forms  a  landmark  in 
mental  philosophy.  Though  not  strictly  a  meta- 
physician, yet  his  influence  as  a  pubKc  teacher 
produced  a  marked  effect  upon  all  the  subsequent 
speculations  on  mind.  His  powers  were  not  of  a 
system-making  or  speculative  cast,  but  were  of  the 
highest  order  of  common  sense.  In  fact,  he  was  a 
sober-minded,  rational  sophist,  who  had  as  thorough 
a  contempt  for  pure  quibbling,  as  for  shallow  and 
empty  declamation.  His  scholastic  acquirements, 
and  his  knowledge  of  the  world,  were  so  happUy 
balanced,  that  he  exercised  all  the  influence  and 
power  of  a  monarch  over  opposite  and  conflicting 
systems  and  parties. 

Besides  the  mode  of  reasoning  adopted  by  So- 
crates, metaphysical  science  received  great  indirect 
assistance  from  the  soundness  and  consistency  of 
his  ideas  upon  matters  connected  with  natural 
theology.  These  were  in  strict  keeping  with  his 
lofty  ideas  of  the  reasoning  faculty,  and  the  various 

e  2 


52      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OP  GREECE. 

important  offices  to  wliicli  it  must  be  applied.  His 
notion  of  the  soul  of  man,  according  to  Xenoplion, 
was,  that  it  was  allied  by  its  nature  to  the  divine 
mind,  not  by  essence,  but  by  virtue  of  its  nature. 
Man  was  elevated  beyond  all  the  ranks  of  animated 
beings,  and  this  by  the  power  of  his  reason.* 

The   influence  of  Socrates   upon   metaphysical 
science  arises  from  his  peculiar  method  of  instruc- 
tion.    This  was  based  upon  the  general  workings 
and  principles  of  his  own  mind.     "  Know  thyself," 
was   the  key- stone  to  his  philosophy.     The  first 
step  in  the  pursuit  of  useful  knowledge  was  a  rigid 
examination    into   man's   nature.      This   he   ever 
steadfastly  kept  in  view.     He  took  his  stand  upon 
the  perfect  and  absolute  certainty  of  human  know- 
ledge, and  never  for  a  moment  allowed  his  thoughts 
to  wander  into  the  regions  of  doubt  and  perplexity. 
He  took  the  world  of  thought  just  as  he  found  it ; 
and  all  its  daily  and  varied  manifestations  consti- 
tuted the  materials  of  his  method.     Every  pupil  of 
Socrates   was   early  initiated  into  the  invaluable 
habit  of  looking  into  his  own  mind  ;  of  practically 
operating  upon  his  own  consciousness  ;  and  of  de- 
ducing  rules  and   principles  for  the   government 
and  direction  of  his  reasoning  powers.     This  dia- 
lectic discipline  enabled  the  student  to  place  every 
idea  and  thought  in  a  variety  of  aspects,  and  to 
fortify  his   logical   conclusions  by  numerous   and 
apposite  illustrations. 

Erom  what  we  learn  of  Socrates,  it  is  quite  ob- 

*  Xenoph.  Memora.  1.  I. 


SOCRATES.  53 

\dous  that  he  was  well  acquainted  with  several 
metaphysical  theories,  though  it  does  not  appear 
that  he  ever  formally  reduced  his  o^vn  thoughts 
upon  the  subject  to  regular  order  or  method. 
"VThen  developing  his  mode  of  instruction  he  always 
proceeds  upon  propositions  generally  received  as 
true  or  self-evident.  Aristotle  savs,  that  Socrates, 
in  studying  the  moral  virtues,  was  the  first  who, 
in  giving  a  definition  of  them,  sought  to  conform 
them  to  reason,  and  establish  them  upon  the  rea- 
lities of  things.  Socrates  rendered  two  essential 
ser\ices  to  true  knowledge, — the  introduction  of  the 
inductive  method  of  reasoning,  and  an  accurate 
mode  of  using  general  terms.  But  Socrates  did 
not  separate  universal  ideas  from  particular  facts ; 
his  successors  did  tliis,  and  gave  them  the  name  of 
ideas.* 

Emitter,  in  his  History  of  Philosophy,  has  the 
follo^\ing  observations  on  Socrates,  which  I  think 
sound  and  correct.  "  It  is  clear  that  the  ultimate 
object  of  the  Socratic  method  was  to  apprehend  in 
the  thought  the  essence  of  a  thing,  and  that 
strongly  impressed  mth  the  character  which  pre- 
dominates in  the  Platonic  and  Aristotelian,  it 
made  the  explication  of  terms  the  centre  of  its 
system,  and  sought  to  exhibit,  in  the  definition, 
the  real  nature  of  the  object.  Consequently, 
although  we  must  hesitate  before  we  assert,  with 
a  later  writer,  t  that  Socrates  was  the  first  to  es- 
tablish the  doctrine  of  ideas,  still  we  cannot  deny 

*  Arist.  Metaphysic.  1.  6,  chap.  4.  t  Aristocles,  ap.  Euseb.  10.  3. 


54      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

that  the  connection  which  he  discovered  between 
the  idea  and  its  object,  must  naturally  have 
awakened  investigations  calculated  to  call  the 
ideal  theory  into  existence."* 

*  See  also  the  following  works  :  Olearius,  De  Genio  Socratis.  Vie 
tie  Socrate,  Amsterdam  1699.  Gilbert  Cooper's  Life  of  Socrates,  Lon- 
don, 1749.  Wasser,  De  Vita,  Factis,  et  Philosophia  Socratis.  Menzius, 
Dissert,  de  Socratis  methodo  docendi,  &c.  Leipsic,  1740.  Lossius,  De 
arte  Obstetrica  Socratis,  Erfurt,  17B5.  Simon,  Dissert,  de  Socratis  me- 
ntis in  Philosophiam,  &c.,  Wittembergh,  1797.  Heller,  Socrates. 
Franckfort,  1789.  M.  Stapfer,  De  Philosophia  Socratis,  Berne,  1786. 
Dr.  Wigger's  Life  of  Socrates. 


THE   CYRENIC   AND   CYNICAL   SCHOOLS.  55 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


THE    CYRENIC   AND   CYNICAL    SCHOOLS. 

The  Cyrenic  and  Cynical  Schools  of  Philosophy 
formed  a  rather  singular  feature  in  the  history  of 
mental  inquiries.  The  members  of  them  professed 
to  reject  all  formal  rules  of  abstract  reasoning,  to 
study  nature  A^ath  all  possible  simplicity  of  design, 
not  to  avail  themselves  of  any  aid  from  mathema- 
tical forms  or  principles,  but  to  be  solely  guided  by 
the  common  and  every-day  rules  and  maxims  of 
life. 

Their  views  relative  to  the  nature  of  the  human 
mind,  and  all  its  powers  and  faculties,  approached 
very  nearly  to  those  systems  in  modern  times,  de- 
nominated by  the  general  term  "  idealism."  We 
cannot  in  substance,  say  they,  perceive  and  know 
anything  save  our  own  impressions, — not  the  ex- 
ternal causes  of  them.  When  we  are  affected  by 
the  image  of  white,  or  the  taste  of  siveetness,  we 
can  very  truly  affirm  the  effect  these  produce  upon 
ourselves,  but  not  that  the  object  of  whiteness  or 
sweetness  has  any  real  existence.     The  words  we 


56      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

use  to  designate  these  sensations  do  not  designate 
the  objects,  but  simply  our  feelings  at  the  moment. 
The  intervening  links,  the  motion,  the  transforma- 
tions, involved  in  this  act  of  sensation,  form  a 
complete  barrier  to  our  knowledge  of  what  external 
things  are  in  their  own  nature.  Hence  it  follows 
that  there  is  really  nothing  in  common  amongst 
men  relative  to  their  sensations,  except  the  mere 
language  they  use  to  point  them  out ;  for  there  is 
no  invariable  or  unalterable  law  of  sensation  for  the 
whole  species.  We  employ  the  terms  white  and 
sweetness,  but  they  stand  for  different  feelings  in 
different  persons.  Every  man  judges  for  himself, 
and  not  for  his  neighbour  ;  he  can  only  know  that 
which  affects  himself  personally.  Though  our  de- 
cisions are  expressed  in  the  same  language,  there 
is  still  no  infallible  criterion  to  judge  of  other 
men's  feelings,  sensations,  or  emotions. 

The  three  principal  pliilosophers  of  these  two 
schools  were  Aristippus,  Antisthenes,  and  Dioge- 
nes ;  but  the  metaphysical  gleanings  from  them 
are  very  scanty.  Their  principal  disquisitions  re- 
lated to  morals.  What  we  have  already  mentioned 
embodies  nearly  every  notion  attributed  to  them 
on  mental  inquiries.* 

*  Ai'ist.  Metaph.  1.  8.  chap.  29.  Cicero,  De  Nat.  Deor.   Diog,  Laert.  6. 
Lactantius.  Divin.  Inst.  I.  5.     Clemens  Ales.  Admon.  Sect.  46. 


EUCLID.  57 


CHAPTER  IX. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


THE    SCHOOLS   OF   MEGAHA,    ELIS,    AND   ERETRIA. 

These  schools  were  branches  or  offshoots  from 
the  Eleatic  Philosophy,  and  always  retained  the 
fundamental  lineaments  of  the  parent  establish- 
ment. 

Euclid.    400  b.c. 

Euclid  was  the  most  distinguished  philosopher 
of  the  school  of  Megara.  He  was  imbued  with  a 
subtile  spu'it,  and  enjoyed  knotty  and  puzzling 
questions.  In  dialectics  he  took  the  opposite 
principle  to  Socrates;  for  he  did  not  attack  the 
premises,  but  the  conclusion.  He  is  charged  with 
having  renounced  all  analogical  reasoning;  but 
this  is  absurd,  he  could  not  do  so,  were  he  ever  so 
confirmed  a  sceptic.  Analogy  constitutes  the 
foundation  of  nine-tenths  of  aU  hmnan  knowledge. 
The  rule  which  Euchd  laid  down  as  to  reasoning 
was  a  solid  and  substantial  one ;  that  in  any 
inferences  drawn  from  two  cases,  or  sets  of  circum- 
stances, it  is  necessary  that  every  thing  in  these 


58      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

cases  and  circumstances  should  be  identical.  Any- 
little  variation  may  make  the  greatest  difference 
in  the  deductive  reasoning.  To  every  man,  there- 
fore, who  wishes  to  cultivate  truth,  this  maxim  of 
Euclid  is  invaluable.  It  is  for  want  of  its  know- 
ledge and  observance,  that  such  erroneous  reason- 
ings, on  every  thing  connected  with  human  na- 
ture, are  presented  to  our  notice  in  the  ordinary 
concerns  of  life. 

The  other  distinguished  disciples  of  the  Megarean 
school  were  Eubulides,  Diodorus,  and  Alexinus. 
Their  metaphysical  opinions  are  unimportant. 
E-itter  observes,  "  The  majority  of  the  later  mem- 
bers of  the  Megaric  school  are  famous  either  for 
the  refutation  of  opposite  doctrines,  or  for  the 
invention  and  application  of  certain  fallacies ;  on 
wliich  account  they  were  occasionally  called  Eristici 
and  Dialectici.  Still  it  may  be  presumed  that 
they  did  not  employ  these  fallacies  for  the  purpose 
of  delusion,  but  of  instructing  rash  and  hasty 
thinkers,  and  exemplifying  the  superficial  vanity 
of  common  opinion.  At  all  events  it  is  certain 
that  they  were  mainly  occupied  with  the  forms  of 
thought,  more  perhaps  with  a  view  to  the  dis- 
covery of  particular  rules,  than  to  the  foundation 
of  a  scientific  system  or  method." 

Phsedo  of  Elis,  a  scholar  of  Socrates,  was  the 
founder  of  the  Elian  school.  That  of  Eretria 
sprung  out  of  it.  The  leading  doctriae  of  both 
was,  that  what  was  good,  and  what  was  true,  were 
based  upon  reason  and  intelligence.* 

*  Ciceio.  Qu.  Acad,  2.  42.    Diog.  Laert.  1.  2.     Pint.  adv.  Colot.  23. 


PLATO.  59 


CHAPTEE    X. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


Plato.     430  b.c. 

We  come  to  notice,  at  as  full  a  length  as  is 
consistent  with  the  limited  plan  of  this  work,  one 
of  the  most  eminent  metaphysicians  and  general 
philosophers  of  whom  antiquity  can  boast.  Under 
his  auspices  the  nature  and  powers  of  the  human 
mind  were  fully  investigated,  and  clothed  with  a 
clearness  and  facility  of  expression,  which  have 
served  as  shining  lights  to  illumine  the  paths  of 
mental  philosophy  for  more  than  two  thousand 
years. 

The  powers  of  Plato's  mind  were  of  the  highest 
order.  He  possessed  a  more  than  ordinary  share 
of  that  mental  energy,  so  requisite  an  ingredient 
for  all  great  enterprises  of  philosophy.  In  all  the 
learning  of  his  age  he  was  profoundly  skilled, 
as  well  as  in  the  lighter  departments  of  polite 
literature.  He  was  a  great  writer,  orator,  and 
politician ;  and  possessed,  besides,  the  power  of 
enduring  mental  labour  to  a  surprising  extent. 

This  distinguished  philosopher  improved  all  these 


60       MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OP  GEEECE. 

talents  and  acquirements  by  varied  and  extended 
travelling.  In  Italy  he  devoted  ninch  of  his  time  to 
the  sages  of  the  Pythagorean  School;  at  Cyrene  he 
studied  geometry ;  and  in  Egypt  he  contracted  an 
acquaintance  with  the  priests,  studied  astronomy 
with  them,  and  attempted  to  penetrate  into  the 
sacred  mysteries  of  which  they  were  the  sole 
depositaries.  He  overran  the  whole  of  Greece,  re- 
sided thrice  in  Sicily,  and  made  himself  acquainted, 
in  all  the  countries  he  visited,  with  their  forms  of 
government,  laws,  manners,  and  social  institutions. 

The  speculations  of  Plato  constitute  an  impor- 
tant epoch  in  the  liistory  of  mental  science ;  and 
chiefly  for  the  following  reason.  He  was  the  first 
heathen  philosopher  who  possessed  enlarged  and 
refined  conceptions  of  a  first  universal  cause,  and 
of  a  clivme  providence.  The  loftiness  and  purity  of 
his  principles  of  natural  theology,  gave  a  tone  and 
elevation  to  all  his  mental  investigations,  and 
preserved  him  also,  in  a  great  measure,  from  all 
those  extravagant  conceits  and  paradoxes  which 
so  materially  mar  the  speculations  of  his  prede- 
cessors. He  cultivated  the  science  of  mind  in 
conjunction  with  the  dignified  investigations  of  a 
comparatively  pure  theism,  and  niade,  in  some  de- 
gree, the  former  co-operate  towards  the  elucidation 
of  the  latter. 

Plato  was  the  first  metaphysician  who  cleai'ly 
and  forcibly  laid  doTVTi  the  general  principle  that  a 
knowledge  of  the  laws  of  mind  was  an  indispen- 
sable qualification  for  prosecuting,  with  success, 
physical  inquiries.     He  says,  "  Philosophers  have 


PLATO.  61 

laboured  for  the  establishment  of  science,  but  have 
neglected  to  ask  themselves,  beforehand,  what 
that  science  is ;  they  have  speculated  upon  tilings, 
and  have  omitted  to  examine  the  nature  and 
offices  of  that  principle  of  intelligence  which 
alone  can  exercise  itself  upon  siu'rounding  objects. 
What  has  been  the  consequence  ?  ^^ly,  they  have 
transferred  their  own  sensations  to  objects  ;  have 
been  entangled  in  all  manner  of  contradictions  ; 
and  have  bewildered  themselves  in  clouds  of  diffi- 
culties and  embarrassments." 

There  are,  in  a  certain  sense,  two  souls  in  man  ; 
we  give  the  name  of  soul  to  that  physical  life  and 
spontaneous  activity,  to  that  organic  power  we 
possess  in  common  with  the  animal  and  vegetable 
creation.  But  in  a  rigorous  sense  we  apply  the 
word  soul  only  to  designate  the  principle  of  sensi- 
bility and  thought ;  this  principle  is  one  and 
simple;  for  the  subject  which  judges  is  identical 
with  that  which  conceives  and  thinks ;  therefore, 
all  knowledge,  judgment,  and  science,  appear  to  be 
involved  in  this  notion  of  mental  identity  or  union. 
This  soul  which  thinks,  feels,  reasons,  and  judges, 
exists  only  in  man ;  it  emanates  from  the  supreme 
intelligence ;  it  is  immaterial ;  it  falls  upon  the 
organs  of  sense,  and  is  not  subject  to  change. 
Body  and  soul,  though  different  in  their  nature 
and  essence,  are  nevertheless  linked  together  by  a 
powerful  bond  of  union,  and  exercise  on  each  other 
a  reciprocal  influence ;  and  the  health  and  happi- 
ness of  man  consists,  in  a  great  measure,  in  pre- 
serving this  constant  harmony. 


62       MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

We  can  only  thorouglily  understand  the  facul- 
ties of  the  mind  by  carefully  studying  the  effects 
they  produce.  We  ought  then  to  distinguish  as 
many  faculties  of  the  mind  as  there  are  different 
and  distinct  mental  operations.  I  distinguish  at 
first  two  principal  faculties,  that  of  feeling  and 
thinking .  To  feel  is  to  be  affected  by  an  external 
impression ;  to  think  is  to  operate  upon  our  ideas. 
The  faculty  of  thinking  divides  itself  again  into 
two  others,  the  understanding  and  reason.  The 
understanding  is  that  power  which  combines  sensi- 
ble images  ;  reason  is  that  supreme  faculty  which 
regulates  all  others,  directs  to  an  end  or  object, 
marks  the  relations  of  things,  and  forms  conclu- 
sions from  the  whole.  The  understanding  and 
reason  exercise  themselves  both  under  an  active 
Sind passive  form;  under  the  latter  form  they  re- 
ceive and  preserve  notions ;  and  under  the  former 
they  are  united,  separated,  combined,  and  placed 
in  logical  and  methodical  order.  These  two  powers 
are  equally  exercised  on  external  objects  and  intel- 
lectual notions.  Wliat  is  eminently  characteristic 
of  the  power  of  thought,  is  that  ability  of  uniting, 
judging,  and  concluding  relative  to  sensations  and 
ideas.  Thought  is  a  species  of  inward  self-instruc- 
tor; it  interrogates  itself  and  furnishes  the  answers. 
This  self-instructor,  through  the  means  of  language, 
forms  the  Judgment,  which  consists  in  the  uniting 
of  ideas  together,  in  the  same  manner  as  discourses 
are  formed  through  the  instrumentality  of  nouns 
and  verbs. 

The  understanding  is   closely  linked  to   sensa- 


PLATO.  63 

tion ;  for  every  sensation  is  but  a  confused  judg- 
ment, which  the  understanding  has  afterwards  to 
develop.  The  latter  power  unites  in  one  image 
the  detached  and  apparently  unconnected  impres- 
sions to  which  sensation  gives  birth;  the  senses 
furnish  the  materials,  and  the  understanding  ela- 
borates them.  Though  sensibility  and  reason  be 
two  separate  powers,  opposite  in  their  nature,  yet 
they  possess  mutual  relationships ;  they  appertain 
to  the  same  tliinking  being,  which  unites,  by  an 
act  of  mental  consciousness,  the  objects  of  thought 
furnished  from  both  sources. 

Let  us  consider  more  in  detail  the  particular 
functions  attached  to  each  of  these  faculties,  and 
the  fruits  of  their  joint  and  separate  exercise. 
There  are  in  our  minds  images^  notions^  and  ideas  ; 
the  first  belong  to  sensation,  the  second  to  the  un- 
derstanding, and  the  third  to  reason.  Let  us  com- 
mence then  with  sensible  images,  for  they  develop 
themselves  in  man  a  considerable  time  before  the 
faculty  of  thinking.  The  infant  experiences  sen- 
sations at  its  birth,  but  the  indications  of  thought 
manifest  themselves  much  later,  and  in  some  indi- 
viduals are  hardly  ever  recognized  at  all.  Besides, 
the  soul  and  reason  cannot  be  conceived  without 
life  and  thought,  nor  these  again  without  the  influ- 
ence of  external  things  upon  the  organs  of  sense. 
There  are  three  things  involved  in  every  individual 
external  perception; — the  object  perceived,  the 
subject  which  perceives  it,  and  the  perception 
itself  which  bears  a  mutual  relation  to  both.  Co- 
lours, smells,  &c.,  reside  not  in  the  objects, — they 


64  MENTAL   PHILOvSOPHY   OF    GREECE. 

have  their  seat  only  in  ourselves.  Sensations  are 
then  only  a  certain  kind  of  affections  or  modifica- 
tions of  the  power  of  sensibility ;  the  soul  is  pas- 
sive in  receiving  them.  An  external  object  acts 
upon  the  organs  of  sense ;  certain  fibres  receive  and 
transmit  this  impression  to  the  soul.  Sensibility 
is  the  faculty  of  being  affected,  modified,  and 
changed  in  its  condition  by  this  process  of  sensa- 
tion. External  impressions  are  remarked  and 
noticed  from  their  diversity  and  the  changes  they 
undergo.  In  fine,  external  objects  which  affect 
the  soul,  leave  certain  traces  behind  them,  the  me- 
mory preserves  them,  and  imagination  revives 
them. 

Sensible  perceptions  are  then  the  effect  of  the 
combined  action  of  external  objects  upon  our  organs 
of  sense ;  and  it  is  necessary  also  that  these  percep- 
tions should  be  united  in  a  centre  or  common  focus, 
and  the  result  of  this  concentration  is  the  power  of 
consciousness.  Each  sense  transmits  to  us  only  a 
particular  species  of  impressions;  the  sight,  co'- 
lours ;  the  ear,  sounds ;  and  so  on.  Now  we  have 
the  power  of  comparing  these  divers  classes  of  im- 
pressions, and  judging  of  their  analogy  and  distinct- 
ness. "Wliat  is  the  faculty  which  makes  this  com- 
parison ?  It  can  be  neither  one  sense  nor  another ; 
it  must  have  its  source  in  the  soul  itself.  It  is  the 
understanding  which  performs  this  office.  At  the 
moment  when  our  senses  are  apprised  of  the  ex- 
istence of  an  external  ol)ject,  we  appreciate  not  at 
first  all  its  divers  qualities  of  greatness,  smallness, 
&c.      This   operation   belongs   to  the  judgment, 


PLATO.  65 

wliicli  is  seated,  as  it  were,  in  the  centre  of  the 
soul,  to  take  cognizance  of  these  impressions.  It 
is  in  this  that  the  power  of  abstraction  consists. 
The  understanding  forms  notions  then ;  that  is  to 
say,  perceptions  of  relations  and  generic  qualities, 
whether  as  distinguished  from  or  combined  with 
objects  possessing  a  common  resemblance  or  differ- 
ence ;  it  isolates  them  from  the  particular  incidents 
belonging  to  them,  and  thus  produces  all  those 
abstract  notions,  without  which  there  could  be  no 
clear  perception  whatever.  These  abstract  notions 
are  partly  the  fruits  of  external  sensations,  and 
partly  of  the  internal  power  of  thinking ;  and,  un- 
der this  second  relation,  are  grounded  upon  our 
own  mental  nature.  Sensation  furnishes  us  with 
what  is  particular  and  individual ;  the  understand- 
ing with  what  is  common  and  general.  The  senses 
furnish  us  with  confused  perceptions  in  the  concrete 
form,  and  the  understanding  clear  perceptions  in 
the  abstract  form. 

Such  is  the  general  outline  of  the  metaphysical 
system  of  Plato.  It  has  many  very  valuable  prin- 
ciples involved  in  it ;  and  it  must  be  considered 
by  aU  intelligent  and  candid  judges,  as  the  most 
important  step  in  the  path  of  speculative  inquiry 
which  had,  up  to  his  own  time,  been  taken  by  any 
philosopher,  on  the  nature  and  powers  of  the  human 
mind. 

The  great  dispute  about  Plato's  metaphysical 
system,  has  arisen  from  doubts  as  to  what  he  means 
by  the  word  idea.  Controversies  innumerable  fill 
the  annals  of  philosoj)hy  on  this  point ;  and  to  this 


66  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

hour  the  question  remains  as  unlikely  to  be  solved 
as  when  first  propounded.  To  wade  through  these 
controversies  can  be  neither  pleasant  nor  profit- 
able. Were  I  to  hazard  an  opinion  I  would  say, 
that,  from  all  I  have  read  upon  the  subject,  I 
am  fully  convinced  that  Plato  meant  by  the  word 
idea,  just  the  same  thing — neither  more  nor  less, 
than  what  we  do  in  common  conversation  or  dis- 
course at  the  present  hour.  It  is  conceded  on  all 
hands,  that  he  employed  the  word  to  designate  al- 
most all  things,  both  particular  and  general ;  and 
this  can  only  be  accounted  for  upon  rational 
grounds,  that  he  understood  it  to  mean,  according 
to  Locke's  definition,  tvhatever  it  is  that  is  the 
object  of  a  man  when  he  thinks.  If  Plato  had  been 
asked  to  give  a  definition  of  this  word,  this  must, 
from  the  mere  nature  of  the  tiling,  have  been  what 
he  would  have  said.  Idea  is  the  simple  sign  of 
thought.  It  may  be  general,  it  may  be  particular, 
it  may  be  true,  it  may  be  false ;  but  it  is,  in  all  its 
phases,  just  that,  and  no  more,  which  occupies  the 
mind,  or  is  in  the  mind,  at  the  time  Ipeing.  How 
could  Plato,  or  any  man  else,  give  a  different  defi- 
nition ?  The  thing  is  impossible.  To  define  idea 
is  to  define  what  is  the  essence  of  thought.* 

The  scientific  method  of  Plato  is  essentially  the 
same  as  that  of  Socrates,  with  some  additions  and 
improvements.  In  fact,  Plato's  method  is  the  best 
which  he  could  form  out  of  all  preceding  systems, 
and  that  of  his  great  master  in  particular.     His 

*  See  Note  B.  in  the  A|)i)entlix  to  this  Volume. 


PLATO. 


67 


object,  like  that  of  Socrates,  was,  ^liich  was  the 
best  mode  of  seeking  after,  as  well  as  of  communi- 
cating:, knowledge  ?     On  this  point,  the  following 
observations  from  Mr.  John  Mill  are  very  judicious. 
Contrasting  Plato    with  Socrates,  he  says,   "No 
doubt  the  disciple  pushed  his  mere  inquiries  and 
speculations  over  a  more  extended  surface,  and  to  a 
greater  depth  below  the  surface,  than  there  is  any 
reason  to  beheve  the  master  did.     But  though  he 
continually  starts  more  original  and  valuable  ideas, 
it  is  seldom  that  these,  when  they  relate  to  the 
results  of  inquiry,  are  stated  with  any  air  of  con- 
viction,  as  if  they  amounted  to   fixed   opinions. 
But  when  the  topic  under  consideration  is  the  pro- 
per mode  of  philosophising — either  the  moral  spirit 
in  which  truth  should  be  sought,   or  the  intel- 
lectual processes  and  methods  by  which  it  is  to  be 
attained ;  or  when  the  subject  matter  is  not  any 
particular  scientific  principle,  but  knowledge  in  the 
abstract, — the  differences  between  knowledge  and 
ignorance,  and  between  knowledge  and  mere  opi- 
nion,— then  the  views  inculcated  are  definite  and 
consistent,  are  always  the  same,  and  are  put  forth 
with  the  appearance  of  earnest  and  matured  be- 
lief.    Even  in  treating  of  other  subjects,  and  even 
when  the  opinions  advanced  have  the  least  sem- 
blance of  being  seriously  entertained,  the  discourse 
itself  has  generally  a  very  strong  tendency  to  illus- 
trate the  conception  which  does  seem  to  be  really 
entertained  of  the  nature  of  some  part  or  other  of 
the  process  of  philosophising.     The  inference  we 
would  draw  is,  that,  on  the  science  of  the  investi- 

F  2 


68       MENTAL  PniLOSOPHY  OP  GREECE. 

gation  of  science,  the  theory  of  the  pursuit  of  truth, 
Plato  had  not  only  satisfied  himself  that  his  prede- 
cessors were  in  error,  and  Jioio,  hut  had  also  adopted 
definite  views  of  his  own;  while,  on  all  or  most 
other  suhjects,  he  contented  himself  with  confuting 
the  absurdities  of  others,  pointing  out  the  proper 
course  for  inquiry,  and  the  spirit  in  which  it  should 
be  conducted,  and  throwing  out  a  variety  of  ideas 
of  his  o^Ti,  of  the  value  of  which  he  was  not  quite 
certain,  and  which  he  left  to  the  appreciation  of  any 
subsequent  inquirer  competent  to  sit  in  judgment 
upon  them." 

Plato  has  always  been  a  great  favourite  with  the 
philosophic  poets  of  all  countries.  Every  thing  he 
said,  and  every  thing  about  him,  strengthened  this 
prepossession.  The  Platonic  orb,  though  burning 
in  a  sepulchre,  has  been  as  a  sliining  light  to  their 
path.  Milton,  Young,  Thomson,  Akenside,  as 
well  as  Shakspeare  and  Pope,  are  conspicuous  in- 
stances in  our  own  country.  The  four  first  poets 
were  unusually  proficient  in  Platonic  knowledge. 
They  drank  its  spirit  at  its  source,  the  genuine 
living  fountain.  Shakspeare' s  all-searching  genius 
derived  its  intelligence  and  direction  from  such 
scattered  glimpses  as  shone,  to  his  acute  percep- 
tions, in  the  pages  of  the  olden  and  less  learned 
philosophers  of  the  middle  ages.  The  philosophic 
light  was  subdued,  but  it  had  much  resemblance  to 
those  roseate  hues  that  linger  on  the  mountain 
tops  long  after  sun-set ;  and  men  of  upward  ten- 
dencies of  soul,  like  Shakspeare,  are  the  cliff's  which 
catch  them. 


PLATO.  69 

Pope  knew  little  of  Platonism  himself,  and  wliat 
he  did  know  was  solely  from  the  Discourses  of 
Bolingbroke,  who  studied  it  in  the  Latin  version 
of  the  monk  Picinus,  with  all  the  facility,  but  le- 
vity, of  his  natural  temperament ;  and  who  seems 
to  have  retailed  it,  so  far  as  he  had  mastered  it,  to 
his  admiring  pupil  as  msdom  of  his  owti.  How 
little  Warhurton  really  knew  of  the  Grecian  sage 
may  be  guessed  at  from  this,  that  though  the  editor 
of  Pope,  he  did  not  know  that  his  most  brilliant 
work,  "  The  Essay  on  Man,"  was  but  depraved  and 
corrupted  Platonism. 

Goethe  has  the  following  remarks  on  Plato,  of 
whom,  like  all  minds  of  an  imaginative  kind,  he 
was  passionately  fond.  "  Plato  was  a  happy  and 
beneficent  spirit,  sent  into  this  world  to  sojourn  in 
it  for  a  season.  He  did  not  seek  so  much  to  make 
himself  profoundly  acquainted  with  it,  as  to  com- 
municate with  gracefuhiess  those  treasures  of  wis- 
dom of  which  mankind  stood  so  much  in  need. 
He  penetrated  into  the  abyss  of  speculation,  mofe 
from  the  lofty  grandeur  of  his  nature  than  from 
any  vain  desire  for  abstraction.  He  took  his  flight 
to  celestial  regions,  his  soul  glo"vving  with  desire 
to  participate  again  in  its  divine  nature.  Every 
thing  he  said  had  a  relation  with  the  good,  the 
beautiful,  and  the  immutably  true  ;  and  he  ardently 
desu-ed  to  inspire  all  those  who  heard  him  with  the 
same  lofty  and  noble  sentiments." 

The  same  principle  which  has  so  powerfully  acted 
on  the  philosophical  spirit  of  poetry,  from  Plato's 
speculations,  has  also  exercised  a  great  influence  on 


70      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GHEECE. 

the  current  of  theological  thought,  from  the  first 
introduction  of  Christianity  to  the  present  hour. 
Plato  has  always  been  a  much  greater  favourite 
with  divines  of  all  denominations  than  his  pupil 
Aristotle.  There  is  doubtless  spirituality  in  the  sys- 
tem of  the  Stagirite ;  but  it  is  not  the  spirituality 
of  Plato.  The  deity  of  Aristotle  is  indeed  an  active 
creation,  but  no  more.  It  exercises  no  providential 
care  or  interest  over  human  affau's.  In  the  eyes 
of  Aristotle  the  soul  is  distinct  from  the  body,  but 
without  a  body  it  cannot  exist.  The  understanding 
is  connected  with  the  soul,  as  the  soul  is  with  the 
body,  and  they  must  all  three  perish  together. 
We  can  readily  see,  therefore,  that  Christian  phi- 
losophy could  never  have  any  very  close  alliance 
with  opinions  of  this  description.  In  Plato,  how- 
ever, we  see  the  creation  of  the  world,  and  its 
government,  referred  directly  to  the  Deity  himself; 
and  the  immortality  of  the  soul  is  unqualifiedly 
maintained.  These  theological  principles  consti- 
tute the  great  bond  between  him  and  all  Christian 
philosophers ;  and  that  bond  will  remain  unsevered 
till  the  end  of  time. 

***  It  is  impossible  to  enumerate  a  fiftieth  part  of  the  authors  who  have 
written  on  the  works  of  Plato.  Patricius  counts,  among  the  ancients 
alone,  sixty-five  commentators  on  the  Platonic  Philosophy,  before  the  time 
of  Ammonius  Saccas  in  the  year  220.  We  shall  give  the  follovting  list  of 
publications  on  the  subject,  which  will,  it  is  hoped,  be  found  ample 
enough  for  any  rational  purpose  of  consultation  or  reference.  Apu- 
leius,  De  Dogmat.  Platonis ;  Alcinous,  De  Doctrina  Platonis ;  Diog. 
Laertius,  Olympiodorus,  Ilesychius.  Guarini  di  Verona,  Vita  Platonis ; 
Marsilius  Ficinus,  Vita  Platonis;  Melancthon,  Oratio  de  Vita  Platonis; 
L'Abbe  Fleury,  Discours  sur  Platon  ;  Dacier,  Vie  de  Platon  ;  Sam.  Par- 
ker, A  Free  and  Impartial  Censure  of  Platonic  Philosophy,  London,  16()6 ; 


PLATO.  71 

Bernardi,  ia  the  second  book  of  his  Serainarium  Totius  Philos.  Venice, 
1599;  Coclenius,  Idea  Phil.  Platonicse,  Marbourg,  1612;  Patricius,  Plato 
Mysticus  et  Exotericus,  Venice,  1591 ;  Keuke,  Disser.  De  Philos.  Pla- 
tonis,  Helmstadt,  1776;  Weigenmeier,  Disser.  De  Philos.  Platonis,  Tu- 
bingen, 1623;  The  Articles  of  the  Abbes  Fraguier,  Garnier,  Sallier,  and 
Arnaud,  in  the  Memoirs  of  the  Academy  of  Inscriptions,  Paris ;  Tenne- 
mann.  System  of  Platonic  Philosophy,  in  German,  Leipsic,  1792,  4  vols.; 
Remarks  on  the  Life  and  Writings  of  Plato,  London,  1760.  The  fol- 
lowing works  are  on  the  Platonic  Theory  of  Ideas  :  Scipione  Agnelli, 
Venice,  1615,  fol. ;  Thomasius,  LSth  Letter;  Sibeth,  Rostock,  1720 ; 
Schulz,  Wittemberg,  1 755 ;  Fachse,  Leipsic,  1 795 ;  Schants,  London, 
1795  ;  Bartstedt,  Erlangen,  1761.  M.  Cousin  has  given  a  translation  of 
Plato's  AYorks,  in  French,  in  13  vols.;  and  the  reader  will  find  an  English 
translation  by  Floyer,  Sydenham,  and  Thomas  Taylor,  in  5  vols.,  Lon- 
don, 1804. 


72  MENTAL    PlIILOSOPnY   OF    GREECE. 


CHAPTER  XI. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


Aristotle.     384  b.  c. 

The  successor  of  Plato  was  Aristotle,  his  pupil ; 
a  genius  of  transcendent  powers  and  boundless  re- 
putation. He  stands  alone,  without  a  single  com- 
petitor, in  the  history  of  the  philosophy  of  the 
human  mind  ;  and  his  speculations  have  been  the 
fruitful  source  of  more  extensive  and  varied  discus- 
sion, explanation,  and  comment,  than  the  writings 
of  any  other  human  being  that  ever  figured  on  the 
stage  of  life. 

The  extensive  range  of  his  inquiry  precludes  the 
possibility  of  giving  here  anything  approacliing 
even  to  an  outline  of  his  labours.  The  extent  of 
his  acquired  knowledge,  the  systematic  turn  of  his 
mind,  his  indefatigable  application  to  study,  his 
unrivalled  power  of  analysis,  liis  sagacity  in  detect- 
ing general  principles  from  a  chaos  of  particular 
facts,  his  ardent  love  of  truth,  and  his  clear  and 
forcible  language,  have  been,  ever  since  his  own 
day,  the  theme  of  admiration  of  all  the  lovers  of 
learning  in  every  civilized  country. 


ARISTOTLE.  73 

In  the  following  observations  under  the  head  of 
Aristotle,  we  shall  confine  ourselves  to  four  points, 
namely,  liis  theory  of  Sensation,  his  Categories,  the 
Syllogistic  theory,  and  a  few  cursory  remarks  as 
to  the  nature  and  principles  of  Logic  in  general. 
These  four  divisions  will  embrace  the  leading  topics 
which  the  writings  of  Aristotle,  considered  exclu- 
sively in  the  light  of  a  metaphysician,  usually  sug- 
gest to  the  minds  of  philosophical  readers. 

SENSATION. 

Aristotle's  theory  of  sensation  may  be  developed 
in  the  folloAving  observations. — 

Sensation  is  the  feeling  or  emotion  we  experience 
from  external  objects  acting  upon  our  organs  of 
sense.  This  sensation  or  feeling  is,  in  the  first 
instance,  passive  and  transitory,  and  is  always  to  be 
distinguished  from  those  universal  feelings  which, 
when  once  brought  under  the  influence  of  the  will, 
have  a  permanent  residence  in  the  mind.  Of  the 
five  senses,  Aristotle  considered  that  of  touch  to 
be  the  most  important,  inasmuch  as  it  is  diffused 
over  the  whole  body,  and  cannot  be  destroyed  but 
mtli  life  itself.  The  sense  of  taste  he  considers  a 
species  of  touch,  for  an  especial  object, — the  nutri- 
tion and  support  of  the  body.*  The  three  other 
senses  reside  in  particular  organs,  which  may  be 
impaired,  andeven  destroyed,  without  the  risk  of 
life  itseK. 

The  eye  and  the  ear  are  appropriated  to  colours 

*  De  Anima.  1.  2.  c.  3. 


74      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

and  sounds  ;  and  motion  and  form  are  conveyed  to 
the  mind  through  more  senses  than  one.  A  third 
class  of  perceptions  are  communicated  to  the  mind 
through  the  united  action  of  all  the  senses. 

The  real  qualities  and  properties  of  external 
bodies  are  made  known  to  us  through  the  senses  ; 
but  those  qualities  and  properties,  such  as  they 
appear  to  us,  have  no  actual  existence  until  they 
are  perceived.  Previous  to  sensation,  they  exist 
only  in  what  Aristotle  calls  their  causes  ;  that  is,  in 
their  fitnesses  or  susceptibilities  to  produce  certain 
effects  upon  our  organs  of  sense.  Were  man 
differently  constituted,  the  world  would  probably 
assume  a  very  different  aspect ;  for  then  sensation 
might  not  only  inform  us  of  the  nature  of  external 
things,  considered  in  themselves,  but  also  consi- 
dered in  relation  to  the  peculiar  organization  of  the 
individual  senses. 

The  powers  of  imagination  and  memory  depend 
upon  the  senses,  and  are,  in  a  certain  degree, 
common  to  man  with  many  other  animals.  As 
sensation  is  created  by  certain  motions  excited  in 
the  organs ;  so  imagination  and  memory,  which  are 
copies  of  sensation,  exert  their  power  and  energy 
tlirough  the  medium  of  fainter  motions,  which  are 
representatives  of  the  former.* 

Aristotle  considers  that  the  perceptions  of  ima- 
gination and  memory  are  amenable  to  a  certain 
law  of  order  and  progression,  and  differ  in  this 
respect  from  mere  sensations.    The  movements  and 

*  Rhetor.  1.  1.  c.  11 


ARISTOTLE.  75 

influences  of  the  latter  seem  more  capricious  and 
wayward.  Reminiscences  are  in  some  degree  un- 
der the  influence  of  the  human  vnll ;  and  the  prin- 
ciples which  seem  to  govern  them  are  four  in  num- 
ber,— proximity  in  time,  continuity  in  place,  re- 
semblance or  similarity,  and  contrariety  or  contrast. 
And  to  shew,  he  says,  how  much  the  will  has  to 
do  with  the  act  of  remembrance,  we  are  conscious 
of  hunting  cihoitt,  as  it  toere,  among  our  thoughts, 
until  we  meet  with  connecting  cu'cumstances,  which 
bring  the  past  perceptions  sought  after  present  be- 
fore the  mind.* 

This  faculty  of  reminiscence,  and  the  poAver  the 
will  seems  to  have  over  the  train  of  our  ideas,  is, 
in  Aristotle's  conception,  a  boundary  line  between 
man  and  the  other  sentient  members  of  creation. 
The  divine  principle  of  reason  is  recognized  in  man 
by  the  power  which  he  possesses  of  nioulding  the 
more  common  sensations  and  emotions  into  more 
elevated  and  harmonious  compounds.  Every  spe- 
cific act  of  remembrance  implies  comparison ;  and 
every  act  of  comparison,  expressed  in  the  simplest 
manner,  indicates  a  substance  diff'erent  and  separ- 
able from  mere  matter.  This  substance  we  may 
not  be  able  fully  to  detect  or  describe  ;  but  still  we 
are  convinced  of  its  existence,  by  the  mere  power 
of  those  attributes  which  we  conceive  to  belong  to 
it,  and  wliicli  manifest  their  influence  by  the  irre- 
sistible feeluis^s  of  consciousness. 

Between  the  nature  and  properties  of  mind  and 

*  De  Memor.  p.  682. 


76      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GHEECE. 

those  of  matter,  there  is  a  wide  and  palpahle  dis- 
tinction. It  is  not  sense  or  fancy  wliich  has  the 
power  to  recognize  its  own  heing  or  existence  ;  it 
is  the  intellectual  nature  alone.  It  is  this  which 
ennohles  man,  and  confers  on  him  a  resemhlance 
to  his  Creator.  It  is  this  which,  when  separated 
from  the  body,  is  invested  with  an  immortal  and 
divine  nature,  and  which  does  not  decay  mth  the 
bodily  tenement  it  inhabits.* 

THE   CATEGORIES   OF   ARISTOTLE. 

The  different  Categories,  according  to  Aristotle, 
comprehend  all  of  which  we  can  have  the  least 
knowledge.  They  are  ten  in  number,  namely, 
Quantity,  Quality,  Relation,  Action,  Passion, 
The  Where,  The  When,  Position  in  Space, 
Possession,  and  Substance. 

Quantity. — Quantity  is  divided  into  discrete  and 
continued.  Discrete  is  that  whose  parts  can  really 
be  separated,  as  number,  &c.  Continued  is  that 
whose  parts  cannot  be  separated.  These  are  again 
divided  into  successive  and  permanent.  Successive 
quantity  is  that  which  comes  by  succession,  as  time 
and  motion.  The  parts  of  these  cannot  be  divided 
as  those  of  number,  but  run  onwards  in  a  continued 
series.  Permanent  quantity  is  that  wliich  remains 
always  the  same,  as  space,  which  never  changes  as 

*  De  Anima,  1.  3.  c.  6.  Yarious  interpretations  have  been  put  upon 
Aristotle's  expressions  in  this  part  of  his  work.  We  refer  the  critic  to 
Dr.  Gillies'  translation  of  the  "  Ethics  and  Politics,"  vol.  L  p.  57,  and 
Note ;  and  also  to  Lord  Mouboddo's  "  Ancient  Metajjliysics,"  vol.  2. 
p.  165. 


ARISTOTLE.  77 

time  and  motion  do,  but  has  always  a  lasting  and 
permanent  existence.  Its  category  is  long,  broad, 
and  deep.  And  here  we  may  ol) serve,  that  quantity 
when  considered  l)arely  as  extended,  without  breadth 
or  depth,  is  called  a  line ;  when  it  has  both  length 
and  breadth,  a  surface ;  and  when  it  has  length, 
breadth,  and  depth,  it  is  denominated  a  solid. 

Quality. — Tliis  is  divided  into  four  kinds.  Pirst, 
liahits,  which  are  such  endowTnents  as  are  either 
created  or  very  materially  strengthened,  by  repeated 
acts  of  the  mind.  "V\Tien  a  man  is  \irtuous,  we  say 
he  possesses  the  habit  of  virtue.  In  a  similar  qua- 
lified sense  we  apply  the  word  habit  to  ivisdom, 
temj^erance,  learning^  &c.  Those  endoTMnents 
wliich  are  acquu*ed  by  different  acts  of  the  mind 
are  also  considered  as  qualities,  but  they  are  usu- 
ally called  habits.  Secondly,  natural poicers,  which 
relate  more  particularly  to  our  bodies,  such  as  the 
power  of  walking,  riding,  &c.  These  powers  are 
possessed  more  or  less  by  all  mankind,  and  can  be 
exercised  as  occasion  requires.  Thu-dly,  sensible 
qualities,  which  are  those  we  acquire  by  our  senses 
from  the  operation  of  external  objects,  such  as  co- 
lours, tastes,  smells,  sounds,  &c.  Yovl^lHAj,  figure 
midifoi'm  are  also  ranked  under  this  category  ;  all 
external  objects  must  be  possessed  of  these. 

Relation. — This  indicates  the  relative  con- 
nexion of  one  thing  with  another,  as  parent  and 
child,  master  and  servant.  It  also  denotes  resem- 
blance, equality,  greatness,  smallness,  &c. 

Action. — This  is  either  internal  or  external. 
Internal  action  is  when  I  think  of  a  particular 


'78  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GllEECE. 

thing  confined  witliin  myself,  and  effect  nothing 
without  me.  External  action  regards  something 
without,  as  when  I  cut  a  piece  of  wood  or  hew  a 
stone. 

Passion. — After  action,  passion  naturally  fol- 
lows ;  and  is  always  expressed  hy  a  verb. 

The  Where. — This  answers  to  the  question, 
"Where  was  such  thing  done  ?  If  one  ask  where 
such  a  battle  was  fought,  I  tell  him  it  was  in  such 
a  country,  and  near  such  a  city. 

The  When. — This  category  gives  answers  to 
questions  relative  to  tbne.  As,  How  long  is  it 
since  he  died  ?     One  hundred  years  ago. 

Position  in  Space. — This  relates  to  standing, 
sitting,  before,  beliind,  right,  left,  &c. 

Possession. — This  involves  the  whole  rights  of 
property. 

Substance. — Tliis  is  divided  into  two  kinds,  sjn- 
ritual  and  temporal.  Spiritual  is  divided  into  liv- 
ing creatures,  as  men,  beasts,  birds,  &c. ;  and  tem- 
poral into  inanimate  tilings,  as  metals,  minerals, 
earth,  air,  stone,  &c.  Both  orders  may  be  subdi- 
vided again  into  almost  endless  classes  and  varieties. 

These  are  the  famous  categories  of  Aristotle, 
and  every  one  must  see  how  defective  they  really 
are,  as  a  philosophical  classification  of  things. 
Tliis  list  was  considered  for  many  centuries  as  the 
most  perfect  and  complete  arrangement  of  the 
phenomena  of  nature  that  ever  was  made.  On 
this  point  Dr.  Gillies  observes,  "  The  reduction  of 
things  to  genera  or  classes,  by  applying  to  them 
common  names,  is  the  foundation  of  division  and 


ARISTOTLE.  79 

definition,  whicli  have  been  called  by  a  just  meta- 
phor the  firm  handles  of  science.  Each  of  the 
categories,  or  classes,  above  mentioned,  that  of 
substance  for  example,  may  be  variously  divided 
according  to  the  intent  of  the  division,  which  may 
be  undertaken  for  explaining  the  works  of  art  or 
of  nature  ;  for  delineating  the  institutions  of  civil 
policy,  or  describing  the  structure  of  plants  and 
animals ;  in  a  word,  for  examining  any  object, 
whether  material  or  intellectual,  about  which 
human  thought  is  conversant.  But  for  whatever 
purpose  the  division  is  intended,  it  can  be  perspi- 
cuous and  satisfactory  only  when  it  descends  from 
the  more  general  classes  or  terms  to  those  which 
are  less  general,  until  it  arrives  at  the  lowest 
species  of  all,  which  rejects  all  further  partition  but 
into  individuals  only.  The  intermediate  terms 
between  the  highest  genus  and  the  lowest  species, 
stand  each  of  them  in  two  distinct  relations,  and 
therefore  receive  two  diff'erent  names,  that  of 
genus  with  respect  to  the  less  general  terms  which 
they  contain,  and  that  of  species  with  respect  to 
the  more  general  terms  under  which  they  are  con- 
tained. Such  is  Aristotle's  own  doctrine  concerning 
classification  and  division ;  a  doctrine  continually 
exemplified  in  his  works  throughout,  moral  as  well 
as  physical ;  and  admirably  illustrated  by  some 
modern  writers,  especially  on  the  subjects  of  na- 
tural history. 

Syllogism. 
Our  observations  in  this  division  shall  be  con- 


80      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OP  GUEECE. 

fined  to  three  distinct  heads ;  namely,  first,  to  show 
what  the  syllogism  is,  according  to  the  usual  ex- 
planations given  of  it  hy  logicians  and  metaphy- 
sicians ;  secondly,  to  inquire  into  its  nature  and 
ohject ;  and  thirdly,  to  state,  as  briefly  as  possible, 
what  are  the  general  opinions  of  the  learned  on  its 
real  luerits,  as  an  instriunent  for  the  discovery  and 
communication  of  truth. 

The  process  of  reasoning  involved  in  the  syllo- 
gism, has,  by  some  logicians,  been  looked  upon  as 
simply  a  process  of  comparison.  When  we  com- 
pare two  things  of  dissimilar  qualities  together,  we 
cannot  affirm  or  do  anything  respecting  them,  with- 
out endeavouring  to  find  some  intermediate  ideas, 
to  reconcile  as  it  were  to  the  mind  these  dissimilar 
or  contrary  qualities.  But,  it  may  be  asked,  by 
what  process  is  this  efi'ected  ?  And  how  do  these 
intermediate  ideas  come  to  discover  the  relations 
of  things  of  an  incongruous  and  opposite  nature  ? 
No  rational  answer  can  be  given  to  these  questions, 
except  this,  that  such  is  the  constitution  of  our 
nature,  that  when  two  ideas  are  presented  to  our 
attention,  from  which  no  reasoning  conclusion  can 
be  adduced,  it  so  happens  that  when  one  or  more 
intermediate  ideas  are  presented  to  our  minds,  and 
contemplated  by  them  in  conjunction  with  the 
other  two  ideas,  we  instantaneously,  as  it  were, 
draw  a  logical  inference  from  the  whole. 

It  is  from  this  cause  that  those  writers  who  have 
argued  in  favour  of  the  use  of  syllogisms  have 
founded  their  doctrine  on  the  principle,  that  every 
act  of  reasoning  assumes  the  form  of  a  syllogism. 


ARISTOTLE.  81 

Tliey  consider  reasoning  to  be  merely  an  operation 
of  the  mind,  which  deducts  some  unknown  propo- 
sitions from  other  propositions  which  have  been 
rendered  familiar  by  a  previous  exercise  of  reason- 
ing, or  are  intuitively  certain.  In  every  simple 
process  of  reasoning,  two  members  or  parts  are 
employed;  and  these  members  or  parts  must  of 
themselves  be  obvious  to  the  understanding,  and 
we  assent  to  their  truth  immediately  upon  their 
enunciation.  In  a  syllogism,  the  premises  are 
assumed  to  be  self-e\'ident  truths  ;  and  if  this  were 
not  the  case,  we  could  never  draw  any  logical  in- 
ference from  them.  In  the  major  of  a  syllogism, 
the  connexion  between  the  subject  and  the  predi- 
cate could  not  be  observed  by  the  mind,  by  a  mere 
attention  to  the  ideas  themselves  which  compose 
the  major ;  for  this  proposition  requires  as  much 
proof  as  the  conclusion  cbawn  from  it.  In  tliis 
case  the  mind  must  find  out  fresh  matter  to  trace 
the  connexion  wanted,  and  furnish  another  syllo- 
gism to  establish  the  first  point  in  the  general 
one.  And  should  it  so  happen,  that  this  second 
syllogism  is  not  found  sufficient  to  establish  the 
truth  of  the  first,  we  must  have  recourse  to  a 
thii'd,  and  a  fourth,  and  so  on,  till  it  be  discovered. 
We  go  on  in  this  manner,  till  we  arrive  at  perfect 
intuitive  truths,  and  here  we  are  compelled  to  rest 
satisfied. 

Erom  these  remarks,  it  is  maintained,  therefore, 
that  every  single  process  of  reasoning  is  founded 
upon  intuitive  propositions  ;  and  if  tliis  be  not  the 
case,    syllogisms   must   be   employed   to   lay   the 


82       MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

foundation.  By  this  view  of  the  matter,  every 
train  of  reasoning  consists  of  a  greater  or  lesser 
number  of  syllogisms.  These  may  not,  in  many 
cases,  be  put  into  a  formal  shape ;  but  it  is  entirely 
from  the  natural  connexion  which  subsists  among 
the  propositions,  that  the  force  and  conclusiveness 
of  general  reasoning  proceed. 

To    show   the   nature   of  the    syllogism    more 
clearly,  we  shall  here  give  an  example.     Let  us 
take  the  proposition,  and  form  it  into  the  shape  of 
a  syllogism — that  man  ought  to  practise  justice. 
Now,  we  want  to  discover  the  relation  which  ought 
to  subsist  between  man  and  Justice ;  for  the  mind 
does  not  perceive  tliis  relation,  as  the  proposition 
at  present  stands.     By  considering  the  matter  a 
little,  we  soon  learn,  that  for  man  to  be  under  an 
obligation  to  do  a  thing,  he  must  have  the  sagacity 
to   perceive,    and   the    power    to  execute    it.     A 
creature  must  have  the  faculty  of  distinguishing 
good  from  evil,  as  well  as  the  liberty  of  choosing 
either,  otherwise  he  lies  under  no  obligation  to 
perform  the  one  or  refrain  from  the  other.     Now, 
these  are  the  middle  terms  or  ideas,  wliich  must  be 
compared  by  the  mind  with  the  first  term  in  the 
proposition,  namely  man  ;  and  when  we  have  made 
this  comparison,  we  find  that  it  may  be  affirmed  of 
him,  that  he  is  a  being  who  can  distinguish  good 
from  evil,  and  that  he  has  the  liberty  of  choice  in 
his   actions.     We  have   here,  then,    two   distinct 
judgments  that  man  can  distinguish  good  from  evil, 
and  that  he  has  the  poicer  of  himself  to  do  either  ; 
and  a  third  judgment  immediately  suggests  itself, 


ARISTOTLE.  83 

that  man  ought  to  practise  justice.     The  argument 
may  now  be  put  into  the  shape  of  a  syllogism,  thus — 

"  Every  creature  possessed  of  reason  and  liberty 
ought  to  practise  justice  ; 
Man   is   a   creature    possessed    of    reason   and 

liberty, 
Therefore  man  ought  to  practise  justice." 

In  this  syllogism  three  distinct  parts  or  proposi- 
tions are  involved ;  and  they  are  so  arranged  as  to 
agree  with  the  mode  which  our  minds  naturally 
follow  in  the  arrangement  of  our  ideas  in  reason- 
ing.    The  first  two  propositions  are  denominated 
the  premises,  because  they  go  before,  or  lay  the 
foundation  for,   the   other   proposition,   which  is 
called  the  conclusion,  in  consequence  of  its  naturally 
groA\TLQg   out   of  the  premises.      But  there   is   a 
matter   here   which   the   reader   will   do    well   to 
consider  thoroughly,  and  make  himself  master  of. 
The  two  terms  man  and  Justice,  which  express  the 
two  ideas  whose  connexion  or  relation  we  wish  to 
find  out,  are  called  the  extremes ;  and  the  inter- 
mediate idea,  by  which  this  connexion  or  relation 
is  discovered,  namely,  a  being  possessed  of  reason 
and  liberty,  takes  the  name  of  the  middle  term. 
Now  we  are  to  understand  that  before  the  premises 
of  a  syllogism  can  be  established,  the  terms  called 
the  extremes,   and  the    middle    term,    must    be 
compared   together ;  for   out   of  this   comparison 
proceeds  the  very  essence  of  the  syllogism.     The 
conclusion  is  the  proposition  which  arises  from  the 
extremes    being    considered    either   in   connexion 

G  2 


84      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

with,  or  separated  from,  that  wliich  appears  the 
result  of  this  comparison. 

E/easoning  in  common  life  has  been  affirmed  to 
be  nothing'  more  than  merely  ascribing  the  general 
qualities  of  tilings  to  their  objects  in  matters  with 
which  we  are  concerned.  We  refer  a  particular 
object  to  some  general  head  or  class,  which  general 
head  or  class  possesses  some  fixed  attribute  or 
quality.  We  then  ascribe  that  attribute  or  quality 
to  the  particular  object  we  have  placed  under  the 
general  assortment  of  things.  Thus,  if  I  scrutinize 
the  character  of  my  friend  John,  and  find  it  to  be 
virtuous,  I  then  begin  to  reflect  that  a  virtuous 
character  is  worthy  of  esteem  and  reward ;  and  I 
draw  the  conclusion,  that  the  conduct  of  John  is 
worthy  of  esteem  and  reward.  This  is  the  common 
process  which  the  mind  follows  in  forming  judg- 
ments of  tliis  description.  If  we  wish  to  arrange 
the  process  of  reasoning  in  the  form  of  a  syllogism, 
it  will  stand  thus  : — 

"  Every  virtuous  man  is  worthy  of  esteem  and 
reward ; 
John  is  a  virtuous  man. 
Therefore  John  is  worthy  of  esteem  and  reward." 

These  few  remarks  apply  to  syllogisms  in  ge- 
neral. But  we  come  now  to  speak  of  the  diffe- 
rent kinds  or  sorts  of  syllogisms.  There  are  four 
general  assortments,  which  take  tlieu'  rise  from  the 
particular  situation  wliich  the  middle  term  holds 
in  the  syllogism.  1st,  That  in  which  the  middle 
term  is  the  subject  of  the  major  proposition,  and 


ARISTOTLE.  85 

the  predicate  of  the  minor.  2nd,  That  in  which 
the  middle  term  becomes  the  predicate  of  both 
premises.  3rd,  That  in  which  the  middle  term 
becomes  the  subject  of  both  premises.  And,  4th, 
That  in  wliich  the  middle  term  is  the  predicate  of 
the  major  proposition,  and  the  subject  of  the 
mmor.  These  four  different  classes  or  assortments 
become  divided  again  according  to  what  logicians 
call  their  anodes,  which  are  determined  by  the 
quantity  and  quality  of  the  propositions  framed  into 
syllogisms.  By  quantity  is  meant  the  consideration 
of  propositions  as  they  relate  to  universals  or  par- 
ticulars ;  and  by  qtiallty^  whether  these  proposi- 
tions be  of  an  affirmatice  or  negative  description. 
All  the  possible  modes  of  syllogisms  may  be  found 
by  ascertaining  how  many  combinations  may 
be  made  out  of  these  four  general  kinds.  The 
number  will  be  sixty-four,  which,  multiplied  by 
four,  will  give  two  hundred  and  fifty-six. 

Each  of  these  figures  has  rules  peculiar  to  itself; 
but  there  are  some  rules  which  are  common  to  all 
syllogisms ;  and  Aristotle  enumerates  the  follow- 
ing. 1st,  Every  syllogism  must  have  only  three 
terms  or  propositions.  2nd,  The  middle  term  must 
be  taken  universally  in  one  of  the  premises.  3rd, 
If  one  of  the  extremes  be  particular  in  one  of  the 
premises,  it  must  also  be  particular  in  the  conclu- 
sion. 4th,  The  conclusion  must  be  particular^  if 
either  of  the  premises  be  particular  ;  and  negative ^ 
if  either  of  the  premises  be  negative.  5tli,  No  term 
can  be  taken  universally  in  the  conclusion,  if  it  be 
not  taken  universally  in  the  premises. 


86      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OP  GREECE. 

Without  drawing  out  these  general  remarks  on 
the  natiu'e  of  syllogisms  to  a  greater  length,  we 
shall  now  advert  to  a  few  only  of  the  different 
kinds  of  syllogisms.  These  will  he  sufficient  for 
common  purposes,  as  well  as  to  illustrate  the 
leading  principles  of  the  syllogistic  theory. 

There  is  a  kind  of  syllogism  in  which  the 
numher  of  propositions  is  more  than  three.  This 
syllogism  is  technically  called  a  sorites;  which 
means  a  numher  of  propositions  piled  up  one  upon 
another,  in  which  the  predicate  of  the  first  pro- 
position is  made  the  suhject  of  the  second,  and 
so  on,  till  in  the  conclusion  the  predicate  is 
attributed  to  the  first  suhject :  thus, 

"  Man  is  an  animal. 
Every  animal  is  a  body. 
Every  body  is  a  substance. 
Therefore,  every  man  is  a  substance." 

Now  this  particular  combination  of  propositions, 
it  must  appear  obvious  to  the  reader,  may  be  con- 
tinued to  almost  any  length  we  desire,  without 
weakening  the  premises  or  grounds  on  which 
the  conclusion  rests.  The  reason  of  this  is,  that 
this  kind  of  compound  syllogisms  may  be  divided 
into  as  many  simple  ones  as  there  are  middle 
terms  in  the  sorites.  When  such  a  division  takes 
place,  and  the  simple  syllogisms  follow  one 
another,  the  last  in  the  series  becomes  the  con- 
clusion of  the  compound  syllogism  or  sorites. 
This  method,  therefore,  of  constructing  syllogisms 
is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  joinmg  together 


ARISTOTLE.  87 

several  simple  syllogisms;  and  consequently  the 
sorites  must  stand  upon  the  same  ground,  in 
respect  to  logical  stability,  as  do  the  individual 
parts  of  which  it  is  composed. 

There  is  another  kind  of  syllogisms,  called  by 
logicians  entliymeme\  where  one  of  the  parts  is 
omitted,  and  is  left  for  the  mind  to  supply  upon 
the  spur  of  the  moment.  This  happens  when  one 
or  more  of  the  premises  is  a  self-evident  truth,  and 
familiar  to  the  mind  of  every  one.  Such,  for 
instance,  is  the  foUo^ving : 

"  Everv  man  must  breathe. 
Therefore  the  king  must  breathe." 

This  syllogism  has  the  appearance  of  being 
imperfect,  as  having  only  two  propositions;  but 
this  is  not  the  case.  It  is  really  complete ;  for  the 
minor  proposition,  evenj  Idng  is  a  man,  is  omitted, 
and  the  reader  is  suppossd  to  supply  the  ellipsis  in 
liis  own  mind. 

Ealse  syllogisms  are  called  paralogisms ;  and  a 
false  syllogism,  the  error  or  fallacy  of  which  is  not 
very  readily  perceived  by  the  mind,  is  called  a 
sophism.  The  following  kinds  of  sophisms  are 
generally  treated  of  by  writers  on  logic. 

Iffuoixitio  eleuchi,  or  a  mistake  of  the  question, 
is  a  term  applied  to  a  proposition  which  has  no 
necessary  connexion  with  the  subject  in-  dispute. 
If,  for  example,  a  man  should  Tvish  to  establish 
the  position,  that  God  is  infinitely  good  and 
merciful,  and  begin  by  demonstratmg  His  om- 
niscience,  this    would  be    a   deviation  from  the 


88      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OP  GREECE. 

question  under  consideration;  for  God's  omni- 
science may  be  granted,  and  yet  His  goodness  and 
mercy  may  still  remain  subjects  of  discussion.  In 
like  manner,  a  man  may  argue  that  all  religion  is 
a  delusion;  for  he  has  seen  some  persons  who 
have  made  loud  professions  of  piety  and  devotion 
in  public,  who  were,  nevertheless,  very  profligate 
and  wicked  in  their  general  conduct.  This  also  is 
an  ignoratio  elenchi,  or  a  mistake  of  the  question ; 
for  a  hypocritical  professor  of  a  system  is  here 
made  the  test  or  standard  by  wliich  the  nature 
and  truth  of  that  system  are  to  be  estimated. 

Fetitio  prmcijni,  or  begging  the  question,  is  a 
term  employed  to  denote  the  taking  for  granted 
the  proposition  you  wish  to  prove.  If  a  man  were 
to  maintain  that  a  certain  act  of  his  was  not  in 
the  least  immoral,  because  it  was  not  contrary  to 
the  acknowledged  rules  of  morality,  nor  to  com- 
mands of  Scripture ;  he  would  here  be  begging  the 
question,  and  assuming  in  the  outset  the  very 
thing  he  was  desirous  to  prove — the  harmless 
nature  of  the  act.  This  mode  of  reasoning  is  also 
sometimes  called  arguing  idem  per  idem. 

Arguing  in  a  circle  is  when  the  premises  are  de- 
monstrated by  the  conclusion,  and  the  conclusion 
by  the  premises.  If,  for  instance,  it  be  affirmed 
that  the  authority  of  any  particular  church  proves 
the  truth  of  the  sacred  Scriptures,  and  the 
Scriptures  the  authority  of  that  church ;  this 
would  be  arguing  in  a  circle. 

Non  causa  pro  causa^  the  assigning  of  a  false 
cause  for  any  effect.     Thus  when  a  person  ascribes 


ARISTOTLE.  89 

certain  events  to  good  or  ill  luck,  to  the  influence 
of  the  planets,  or  the  Hke. 

Fallacia  accidentis,  arguing  from  what  is  local 
and  incidental  to  what  is  general  and  essential. 
If,  for  example,  a  person  were  to  maintain  that  a 
bank-note  of  any  country  is  of  a  value  as  universal 
and  absolute  as  a  piece  of  gold,  this  would  be  a 
fallacia  accidentis;  for  paper  money  has  only  a 
local,  but  gold  a  general  value.  And  further,  if  a 
man  were  to  say  that  any  particular  amusement  is 
dangerous  or  immoral  because  it  is  liable  to  be 
abused,  this  is  arguing  from  what  is  particular  and 
accidental,  to  what  is  general  and  essential. 

Sophisms  of  eqiiiuocation,  are  those  which  are 
formed  by  the  employment  of  ambiguous  terms,  or 
terms  which  are  of  doubtful  meaning.  The  follow- 
ing is  an  old  example. — 

"  He  that  says  you  are  an  animal  says  true  ; 
He  that  says  you  are  a  goose,  says  you  arc  an 

animal ; 
Therefore,  he  that  says  you  are  a  goose  says  true." 

We  shall  add  to  these  remarks  on  the  nature 
of  the  syllogistic  theory,  a  few  observations  from 
Dr.  Ueid,  Avho  wrote  an  Analijsis  of  Aristotle's 
Logic.  The  following  extract  forms  a  compendium 
of  the  precise  mode  of  reasoning  exemplified  in 
three  forms  of  the  syllogism. 

"In  the  first  figure,  the  conclusion  afiirms  or 
denies  something  of  a  certain  species  or  individual; 
and  the  argument  to  prove  this  conclusion  is,  that 
the  same  thing  may  be  affirmed  or  denied  of  the 


90  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GllEECE. 

whole  genus  to  wliicli  that  species  or  individual 
belongs. 

"  In  the  second  figure,  the  conclusion  is,  that 
some  species  or  individual  does  not  belong  to  such 
a  genus ;  and  the  argument  is,  that  some  attribute 
common  to  the  whole  genus  does  not  belong  to 
that  species  or  individual. 

"In  the  third  figure,  the  conclusion  is,  that 
such  an  attribute  belongs  to  part  of  a  genus ;  and 
the  argument  is,  that  the  attribute  in  question 
belongs  to  a  species  or  individual  which  is  part  of 
that  genus. 

"I  apprehend  that,  in  this  short  view,  every 
conclusion  that  falls  within  the  compass  of  the 
three  figures,  as  well  as  the  mean  of  proof,  is 
comprehended.  The  rules  of  all  the  figures  might 
be  easily  deduced  from  it;  and  it  appears  that 
there  is  only  one  principle  of  reasoning  in  all  the 
three ;  so  that  it  is  not  strange,  that  a  syllogism 
of  one  figure  should  be  reduced  to  one  of  another 
figure. 

"The  general  principle  in  which  the  whole 
terminates,  and  of  which  every  categorical  syllo- 
gism is  only  a  particular  application,  is  this,  that 
what  is  affirmed  or  denied  of  the  whole  genus  may 
be  affirmed  or  denied  of  every  species  and  individual 
belonging  to  it.  This  is  a  principle  of  undoubted 
certainty  indeed,  but  of  no  great  depth.  Aristotle 
and  all  the  logicians  assume  it  as  an  axiom,  or 
first  principle,  from  which  the  syllogistic  system, 
as  it  were,  takes  its  departure  ;  and  after  a  tedious 
voyage,   and   great   expense   of  demonstration,  it 


ARISTOTLE.  91 

lands  at  last  in  this  principle,  as  its  ultimate 
conclusion.  O  ciiras  homimim !  O  quantum  est 
in  rebus  inane .'" 

That  one  of  the  principles  on  which  the  syllogism 
rests  is,  that  the  same  word  is  invariably  used  in 
the  same  sense,  is  quite  obvious.    Indeed  the  truth 
of  this  position  has  been  attested  by  a  number  of 
enlightened  philosophers.     Lord  Bacon  says,  "A 
syllogism  consists  of  propositions,  propositions  of 
words,  and  words  are  the  signs  of  notions  ;  there- 
fore, if  our  notions,  the  basis  of  all,  are  confined, 
and  over  hastily  taken  from  things,  notliing  that  is 
built  on  them  can  be  firm."*     Professor  Stewart 
remarks,  that  "the  whole  theory  of  the  syllogism 
proceeds  on  the  supposition,  that  the  same  word  is 
always  to  be  employed  in  the  same   sense ;  and 
that,  consequently,  it  takes  for  granted,  in  every 
rule  wliich  it  furnishes  for  the   guidance  of  oui* 
reasoning  powers,  that  the  nicest,  and  by  far  the 
most  difficult  part  of  the  logical  process,  has  been 
previously  brought  to  a  successful  termination." f 
We  find  M.  Turgot  making  the  same  remark : — 
"Tout    I'artifice    de    ce    calcul    ingenieux,    dont 
Aristote  nous  a  donne   les   regies,  tout  I'art  du 
Syllogisme,  est  fonde  sur  I'usage  des  mots  dans  le 
meme  sens ;  I'emploi  d'un  memo  mot  dans  deux 
sens  difi'erens  fait  de  tout   raisonnement   un  so- 
pliisme;    et   ce   genre   de   sophisme,  peut-etre   le 
plus   commun  de  tout,   est   une   des   sources   les 
plus  ordinaires  de  nos  erreurs.":j: 


Nov.  Org.,  part  1.  f  Elements  of  M.  Phil.  vol.  1,  p.  35fi. 

(Euv.  de  M.  Turgot,  torn.  3,  p.  66. 


92      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OP  GREECE. 

The  nature  as  well  as  the  utility  of  the  syllogis- 
tic theory  has  heen   long   and  keenly   contested. 
!For  many  ages  it  was  considered  almost  sinful  to 
call   in  question   either   its   truth   or   usefulness. 
There  was  no  language  too  eulogistic  to  sound  its 
praise.     The  syllogism  was  considered  the  noblest 
and  most  useful  invention  ever  produced  by  man  ; 
the  universal  organ  of  science;    the   eye   of  the 
intellect ;  and,  like  the  sun,  the  light  of  the  world. 
It  was  called  the  "  ars  artium,  scientia  scientiarum, 
organum    organorum,   instrumentum    instrumen- 
torum,   ancilla,  clavis,  testa,  murus  philosophise, 
docendi  discendique  magistra,  veri  falsique  discep- 
tatrix  et  judex."    Aristotle  himself  was  extolled  in 
the  same  extravagant  terms.     Pather  Par  dies,  a 
Prench  writer,  says,  "  Que  si,  dans  sa  physique,  il 
a  parle  en  homme,  dans  sa  morale  il  a  parle  en 
Dieu ;    qu'il    y   a    sujet    de   douter    si,    dans   ses 
morales,   il    tient   plus   du  jurisconsulte   que   du 
pretre ;  plus  du  pretre,  que  du  prophete  ;  plus  du 
prophete  que  de  Dieu."    Averroes,  an  Arabian  phi- 
losopher, declares  that  "  Nature  was  not  altogether 
complete  till  Aristotle  was  born ;"  and  that  in  liim 
"  she    received    the    finishing   stroke,   and   could 
advance  no  further !" 

The  language  of  modern  times  is,  however,  more 
subdued  and  modified.  We  are  not  all  in  the  same 
way  of  tliinking  on  Aristotle's  merits  as  a  logician. 
There  is  a  diversity  of  opinion  as  to  the  nature  and 
importance  of  the  syllogistic  theory.  But  the  dis- 
pute, though  still  undecided,  is  now  carried  on 
with  more  calmness  and  liberality  than  in  bygone 
times.     And  perhaps  the  day  is  not  far  distant 


ARISTOTLE.  93 

when  an  unanimous  and  settled  opinion  will  be 
formed  by  all  speculative  thinkers,  as  to  the  true 
nature  of  the  logical  writings  of  Aristotle,  and  of 
that  portion  of  praise  to  which  they  are  justly 
entitled.  , 

On  the  general  value  of  the  syllogistic  art,  I 
cannot  refrain  from  giving  the  opinion  of  the  late 
Professor  Stewart.  He  says  : — "  The  remarks  which 
were  long  ago  made  by  Lord  Bacon  on  the  inutility 
of  the  syllogism  as  an  organ  of  scientific  discovery, 
together  Tvith  the  acute  strictures  in  Locke's  Essay 
on  this  form  of  reasoning,  are  so  decisive  in  point 
of  argument,  and,  at  the  same  time,  so  familiarly 
knoAvn  to  all  who  turn  ^heir  attention  to  philo- 
sophical inquires,  as  to  render  it  perfectly  unneces- 
sary for  me,  on  the  present  occasion,  to  add  any 
thing  in  sujiport  of  them.  I  shall,  therefore,  in 
the  sequel,  confine  myself  to  a  few  general  and 
miscellaneous  reflections  on  one  or  two  points 
overlooked  by  these  eminent  writers ;  but  to  which 
it  is  of  essential  importance  to  attend,  in  order  to 
estimate  justly  the  value  of  the  Aristotelian  logic, 
considered  as  a  branch  of  education. 

"It  is  an  observation  which  has  been  often  re- 
peated since  Bacon's  time,  and  Avhich,  it  is  astonish- 
ing, was  so  long  in  forcing  itself  on  the  notice  of 
philosophers,  that  in  all  our  reasonings  about  the 
established  order  of  the  universe,  experience  is  our 
sole  guide,  and  knowledge  is  to  be  acquired  only 
by  ascending  from  particulars  to  generals ;  whereas 
the  syllogism  leads  us  invariably  from  universals 
to  particulars,  the  truth  of  which,  instead  of  being 


94      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

a  consequence  of  the  universal  proposition,  is  im- 
plied and  presupposed  in  the  very  terms  of  its 
enunciation.  The  syllogistic  art,  therefore,  it  has 
been  justly  concluded,  can  be  of  no  use  in  extendi/ng 
qur  knoioledge  of  nature. 

"  It  isj  not,  however,  merely   as   a  useless   or 
inefficient  organ  for  the  discovery  of  truth,  that 
this  act  is  exceptionahle.     The  importance  of  the 
very  ohject  at  wliich  it  professedly  aims,  is  not  a 
little  douhtful.     To  exercise  with  correctness  the 
powers  of  deduction  and  of  argumentation ;  or,  in 
other  words,  to  make  a  legitimate  inference  from 
the  premises  before  us,  would  seem  to  be  an  in- 
tellectual process  which  requires  but  little  assist- 
ance from  rule.     The  strongest  evidence  of  this  is, 
the  facility  with  which  men  of  the  most  moderate 
capacity  learn,  in  the  course  of  a  few  months,  to 
comprehend  the  longest  mathematical  demonstra- 
tions ;  a  facility  which,  when  contrasted  with  the 
difficulty  of  enlightening  their  minds  on  questions 
of  morals  or  politics,  affords  a  sufficient  proof  that 
it  is  not  from  any  inability  to  conduct  a  mere 
logical  process  that  our  speculative   errors  arise. 
The  fact  is,  that,  in  most  sciences,  our  reasonings 
consist  of  a  very  few  steps ;  and  yet,  how  liable 
are  the  most  cautious  and  the  most  sagacious  to 
form  erroneous  conclusions ! 

"The  fundamental  idea  on  wliich  Aristotle 
evidently  proceeded,  and  in  which  he  has  been  so 
implicitly  followed  by  many  even  of  those  who  have 
rejected  his  syllogistic  theory,  takes  for  granted, 
that  the  discovery  of  truth  chiefly  depends  on  this 


ARISTOTLE,  95 

reasoning  faculty  which  constitutes  the  intellectual 
superiority  of  one  man  ahove  another.  The  simi- 
larity between  the  words  reason  and  reasoning,  of 
which  I  formerly  took  notice,  and  the  confusion 
which  it  has  occasioned  in  their  appropriate  mean- 
ings, has  contributed  powerfully  to  encourage  and 
to  perpetuate  this  unfortunate  mistake."* 

Logic. 
The  principle  laid  do^ii  by  Aristotle,  is,  that  all 
reasoning  whatever  rests  on  one  simple  principle  : 
that  "what  is  predicated,  either  affirmatively  or 
negatively,  of  a  term  distributed,  may  be  predicated 
in  like  manner  of  anything  contained  under  that 
term."     This,  I  conceive,  must  ever  be  considered 
a  very  inadequate  definition  of  what  a  process  of 
reasoning  is,  metapliysically  considered.     All  rea- 
soning is  called  2^  process ;  now  we  want  to  know 
what  this  process  is.     But  we  shall  look  in  vain 
for  any  thing  in  the  logical  works  of  Aristotle,  or 
of  his  commentators,  ancient  or  modern,  wliich 
throws  light  on  this  curious  process.     To  afiirm, 
or    deny,    or    predicate    anything    of   one    or    of 
many  things,  is  not  a  process ;  it  seems,  from  an 
appeal  to  consciousness,  to  be  a  simple  act  of  the 
mind;  consequent,  however,  upon  other  previous 
acts  or  perceptions  of  the  thinking  principle.     It 
may  be  safely  afiirmed,  that  the  whole  theory  of 
reasoning,  considered  as  invoMng  mental  pheno- 
mena, is  very  imperfectly  understood,  even  from 

*  Elements  of  the  Pliil.  of  the  Mind,  p.  42/.     Edit.  183G. 


96      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

the  WTitings  of  our  ablest  and  most  perspicuous 
writers.  This  subject  will,  however,  come  under 
the  reader's  attention  in  a  subsequent  part  of 
this  work. 

Aristotle  dissented  from  Plato's  notion  relative 
to  the  nature  of  ideas,  and  in  many  parts  seems  to 
condemn  it  rather  severely.  But  it  is  still  a  mat- 
ter of  great  difficulty  to  determine  the  precise 
character  and  import  of  Aristotle's  objections  to  his 
master's  theory.  The  former  agrees  with  the  latter, 
that  the  essences  of  things  are  expressed  in  our 
notions  of  them,  but  that  this  essence  is  not  found 
in  the  general  ideas  which  we  form.  This  contro- 
versy has  given  rise  to  considerable  discussion  in 
Germany  ;  and  to  those  who  may  feel  any  interest 
in  it,  we  refer  them  to  the  end  of  the  volume.* 

To  these  remarks  I  would  add  the  foUomng 
observations  from  Mr.  Stewart,  whose  opinion  on 
the  subject  in  question,  is  entitled  to  great  respect. 
"On  most  of  these  points,  the  i^liilosopliy  of  Aris- 
totle seems  to  have  coincided  xjery  nearly  icith  that 
of  Flato.  The  language,  however,  which  these  plii- 
losophers  employed  on  this  subject  was  different, 
and  gave  to  their  doctrines  the  appearance  of  a 
wider  diversity  than  probably  existed  between  their 
opinions.  While  Plato  was  led,  by  his  passion  for 
the  marvellous  and  the  mysterious,  to  insist  on  the 
incomprehensible  union  of  the  same  idea  or  essence 
with  a  number  of  individuals,  without  multipli- 
cation or  division;  Aristotle,  more  cautious,  and 

*  See  Note  C.  at  the  end  of  this  Volume. 


ARISTOTLE.  1)7 

aiming  at  greater  perspicuity,  contented  himself 
with  saying,  tliat  all  individuals  are  composed  of 
matter  and  form ;  and  that  it  is  in  consequence  of 
possessing  a  common  form,  that  different  indivi- 
duals belong  to  the  same  genus.  But  they  both 
agreed,  that  as  the  matter  or  individual  natures 
of  objects  were  perceived  by  sense,  so  the  general 
idea,  or  essence,  or  form,  was  perceived  by  the 
intellect ;  and  that  as  the  attention  of  the  vulgar 
was  chiefly  engrossed  with  the  former,  so  the  latter 
furnished  to  the  philosopher  the  materials  of  his 
speculations. 

"The  chief  diff'erence  between  the  opinions  of 
Plato  and  Aristotle  on  the  subject  of  ideas,  relates 
to  the  mode  of  their  existence.  That  the  matter 
of  which  things  are  made,  existed  from  eternity, 
was  a  principle  which  both  admitted;  but  Plato 
further  taught,  that  of  every  species  of  things, 
there  is  an  idea  of  form  w^hich  also  existed  from 
eternity;  and  that  this  idea  is  the  exemplar  or 
model  according^  to  which  the  individuals  of  the 
species  were  made;  whereas  Aristotle  held,  that, 
although  matter  may  exist  without  form,  yet  that 
form  could  not  exist  without  matter."* 

On  the  subtile,  though  important,  doctrine  of 
Cause  and  Effect,  Aristotle's  opinion  is  worthy  of 
a  passing  notice.  He  divides  all  causes  into  four 
kinds ;  the  material,  the  formal,  the  efficient,  and 
the  Jinal.  Material  causes  relate  to  the  substance 
or   matter   out   of  which   things   were   originally 

*  Philos.  of  Mind.   Vol.   1.  p.  88.     See    also    Brucker,   Dr.    Reid, 
Harris's  Hermes,  and  the  work,  "  Origin  and  Progress  of  Language." 

*  H 


98      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

made ;  the  formal  designate  that  inward  structure 
or  form,  on  which  rest  the  outward  figure  and 
diversified  appearances  of  things ;  the  efficient 
cause  is  the  instrument  of  motion  or  change ;  and 
the  final  cause  is  the  end  or  purpose  which  certain 
things  were  made  to  accomplish. 

"A  student  passing  from  the  works  of  Plato," 
it  has  heen  well  said,  "  to  those  of  Aristotle,  is 
struck  first  of  all  with  the  entire  ahsence  of  that 
dramatic  form  and  that  dramatic  feeling  with 
which  he  has  been  familiar.  The  living  human 
beings  with  whom  he  has  conversed  have  passed 
away.  Protagoras,  and  Prodicus,  and  Hippias  are 
no  longer  lounging  upon  their  couches  in  the 
midst  of  groups  of  admiring  pupils ;  we  have  no 
walks  along  the  walls  of  the  city;  no  readings 
beside  the  Ilissus ;  no  lively  symposia,  giving 
occasion  to  high  discourses  about  love ;  no  Critias 
recalling  the  stories  he  had  heard  in  the  days  of 
his  youth,  before  he  l3ecame  a  tyrant  of  ancient 
and  glorious  republics ;  above  all  no  Socrates  form- 
ing a  centre  to  these  various  groups,  while  yet  he 
stands  out  clear  and  distinct  in  his  individual 
character,  showing  that  the  most  subtle  of  dialec- 
ticians may  be  the  most  thorouglily  humorous  and 
humane  of  men.  Some  little  sorrow  for  the  loss 
of  those  clear  and  beautiful  pictures  will  perhaps 
be  felt  by  every  one;  but  by  far  the  greater 
portion  of  readers  will  believe  that  they  have  an 
ample  compensation,  in  the  precision  and  philoso- 
phical dignity  of  the  treatise,  for  the  richness  and 
variety  of  the  dialogue.     To  hear  solemn  disquisi- 


ARISTOTLE.  99 

tions  solemnly  treated;  to  hear  opinions  calmly 
discussed  without  interruptions  or  personalities  ; 
above  all,  to  have  a  profound  and  considerate  judge, 
able  and  not  unwilling  to  pronounce  a  positive 
decision  upon  the  evidence  before  him ;  this  they 
think  a  great  advantage,  and  this,  and  far  more 
than  this,  they  expect,  not  wrongfully,  to  find  in 
Aristotle."* 

***  The  Commentators  on  Aristotle  are  still  more  numerous  than  on 

Plato.     The  following  may  be  consulted  with  advantage :  The  ancient 

Commentators,  Simplicius,  Alexander  Aphrodisicus,  Ammouius  son  of 

Hermeas,  Porphyry,  and  Themistius.     Among  the  moderns  :  Bernardi, 

Seminarium   Philos.  Peripat.,  Lyons,   1599;    Crassot,   Institutiones  in 

Universam  Aristotelis  Philosophiam,  Paris,  1619;  La  Ramee,  Animad- 

versiones   Aristot.   Paris,  1518;    Gassendi,   Exercitationes   Paradoxicae, 

Grenoble,  1624;  Delaunay,  De   vari.  Philosoph.    Arist.    Paris,  1653; 

Charpentier,  Descriptio  universEC  artis  Disserendi  ex  Ai'istotelis  Logico 

Organo,  Paris  1564;  Mazzoni,  Italian  translation,  Venice,  1547;  Back- 

mann,  German  translation,  Nordhausen,   1629;  French  translation  by 

Charpentier,  1574.    The  English  reader  will  find  Gillies'  translation  of 

several  of  Aristotle's  works  useful ;  and  the  translation  of  all  his  works 

by  Taylor,  in  9  Volumes,  may  also  be  beneficially  consulted. 

*  Ency.  Metropoli.  Art.  Moral  and  Met.  Phil. 


h2 


100      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


CHAPTER   XII. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


ON    ANALYSIS,    SYNTHESIS,    AND     ANALOGY,     CONSI- 
DERED IN  RELATION  TO  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  almost  all  the  speculations  of  the  ancient 
philosophers,  we  find  more  or  less  attention  given 
to  the  powers  of  Analysis,  Synthesis,  and  Analogy. 
The  degrees  of  importance  assigned  to  these 
respective  powers  were  various ;  some  referring 
nearly  the  whole  phenomena  of  thought  to  them ; 
while  others  again  confer  upon  them  hut  a  passing 
notice.  To  enter  into  all  the  discussions  on  the 
nature  and  limitations  of  the  faculties  we  find  in 
the  writings  of  the  sages  of  antiquity,  is  out  of  our 
power ;  but  we  shall  hazard  a  few  general  observa- 
tions on  these  constituent  principles  of  thought, 
which  exercise  so  marked  an  influence  over  the 
mental  movements  of  all  mankind. 

By  analysis  we  must  understand  the  dividing 
and  separating  a  general  truth  or  proposition  into 
its   elementary   or   component    parts.     This   is   a 


ANALYSIS,    SYNTHESIS,    ANALOGY.  101 

mental  process  carried  on  to  a  great  extent  by  all 
men,  without  their  being,  in  ordinary  cases,  in  the 
least  degree  conscious  of  its  operation.  Wlien  a 
beautiful  and  extensive  landscape  bursts  suddenly 
upon  our  view,  the  mind  is  occupied  with  the  con- 
sideration of  the  whole  taken  together ;  but  after 
a  certain  time  has  elapsed,  we  begin  to  examine 
the  different  parts  of  which  this  landscape  is 
composed;  to  reflect  upon  and  examine  them, 
and  to  apportion  out  to  each  individual  part,  ac- 
cording to  our  knowledge  and  taste,  its  due  propor- 
tion of  influence  in  the  general  effect  produced. 
We  examine  the  landscape  by  piece-meal ;  begin- 
ning, in  ordinary  cases,  with  the  most  important 
parts,  and  descending  in  the  scale  of  promi- 
nency, till  our  observations  have  assumed  a  suffi- 
cient degree  of  minuteness  to  gratify  the  spmt 
of  inquiry,  or  to  grasp  the  mental  object  of  which 
we  are  in  search. 

Those  who  can  attend  to  the  operations  of  their 
o\\Ti  minds,  wdll  readily  perceive  the  vast  use  of 
this  power  of  analysis,  and  how  necessary  its  culti- 
vation and  exercise  are  to  our  making  any  progress 
in  many  important  branches  of  human  knowledge. 
Referring  again,  by  way  of  illustration,  to  an  in- 
teresting landscape,  we  know  that  the  artist  who 
can  furnish  a  representation  of  it,  must  be  greatly 
indebted  to  this  power  of  analysis.  He  must 
carefully  attend  to  the  effects  of  the  scene  as  a 
whole ;  and  yet  he  must,  at  every  step  of  his  per- 
formance, be  carrying  on  a  most  accurate  and 
minute  process  of  analytical  division.     He  must 


102  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OP    GREECE. 

give  to  every  part  of  the  landscape  a  proper  degree 
of  attention.  The  general  aspect  is  grasped  as  a 
whole  by  his  mind ;  and  then  it  is  parcelled  ont 
among  the  rocks,  and  prominences,  and  waterfalls, 
and  woods,  and  buildings,  &c.,  in  suitable  propor- 
tions, according  to  the  principles  of  art.  Indeed, 
it  is  to  this  habit  of  analyzing  his  ideas  of  the 
sublime  and  beautiful  in  external  nature,  that  he 
owes  his  skill ;  for  if  he  had  no  art  to  separate  his 
general  conceptions  into  theu'  component  parts, 
and  apportion  out  to  each  its  suitable  situation,  as 
to  dimensions,  light,  shade,  distance,  colour,  &c., 
his  canvass  would  l3e  one  miiform  representation 
of  shapeless  nonentities. 

And  the  case  is  precisely  the  same  with  one 
who,  instead  of  representing  a  landscape  on  can- 
vass, presents  you  with  a  verbal  description  of  it. 
No  general  language  can  possibly  convey  to  you 
the  most  distant  conception  of  the  landscape,  till 
the  describer  descends  into  particulars,  and  divides 
the  object  which  occupies  his  thoughts  into  its  se- 
veral parts.  He  must  talk  to  you  of  the  conical- 
topped  mountain ;  the  rugged  and  prominent  cliff, 
overhanging  the  banks  of  the  river ;  the  weeping 
willows  shading  the  waters  from  your  view ;  and 
the  tremendous  roar  of  the  mountain  torrent,  as  it 
dashes  from  rock  to  rock.  There  must  be  indivi- 
duality embodied  in  every  part  of  his  description, 
that  it  may  be  understood  and  relished  by  those  to 
whom  it  is  addressed;  and  when  the  whole  has 
been  analyzed  into  sufficiently  minute  portions, 
these  are  all  summed  up,  as  it  were,  by  the  mind, 


ANALYSIS,    SYNTHESIS,    ANALOGY.  103 

and  united  into  one  general  and  uniform  represen- 
tation. 

The  same  power  of  the  mind  we  are  here  de- 
scribing, is  called  into  active  exercise  in  tlie  efforts 
made  in  the  current  literature  of  all  ci\dlized  na- 
tions to  delineate  human  character,  in  its  various 
forms  and  aspects.  But  here,  as  in  painting  and 
descriptive  writing,  general  ideas  must  be  resolved 
into  their  individual  parts,  before  our  descriptions 
of  character  can  be  rendered  intelligible,  or  in 
unison  with  nature.  In  drawing  a  mental  or  moral 
portrait,  we  must  begin  with  the  leading  and  more 
conspicuous  traits  of  character,  and  gradually  de- 
scend to  the  more  hidden  and*  minute  principles  of 
action  and  passion;  filling  up  the  sketch,  as  we 
proceed,  with  the  little  angular  prominences  and 
'  whimsical  eccentricities,  which  diversify  the  wide 
and  extended  range  of  human  nature.  In  those 
Avritings  descriptive  of  men's  habits  of  thinking, 
powers  of  mind,  moral  principles,  passions  and 
sentiments,  we  immediately  recognise  the  hand  of 
a  master,  if  the  description  display  a  minute  and 
skilful  exercise  of  the  power  of  analyzing.  We  are 
never  deceived  in  this  matter,  but  promptly  pro- 
nounce the  portrait  to  be  admirably  drawn,  when 
all  the  parts  wliich  constitute  the  picture  pass  in 
review  before  our  minds,  and  become  invested  with 
an  evident  unity  of  design  and  appearance. 

In  subjects  of  an  abstract  and  profound  nature, 
the  mind  follows  the  same  plan  to  arrive  at  truth. 
The  process  employed  in  abstruse  sciences  has  fre- 
quently been  illustrated  by  a  piece  of  machinery. 


104     MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

Let  US  take  the  steaiii-engine  for  an  example.  We 
wish  to  make  ourselves  well  acquainted  with  its 
nature  and  mode  of  operation.  If  we  wish  to  ob- 
tain this  information  by  the  analytic  method,  we 
take  the  engine  to  pieces,  and  examine  its  parts 
separately.  When  we  have  seen  the  action  and 
use  of  all  the  parts  of  which  it  is  composed,  com- 
pared them  together,  and  seen  their  mutual  de- 
pendence and  relationship,  we  then  discern  the 
nature  and  use  of  a  steam-engine.  We  have  \m- 
ravelled  the  mystery,  and  can  now  discover  the 
cause  of  those  phenomena  which  so  often  puzzled 
us. 

Before  proceeding  farther,  however,  we  would 
call  the  attention  of  the  reader  to  a  few  remarks  in 
reference  to  the  j)ower  of  analysis.  The  analytic 
method  is  never  used  alone,  but  generally  conjoin- 
ed with  the  synthetic  method.  They  are  often 
alternately  employed  by  the  mind ;  and  these  alter- 
nations are,  in  the  majority  of  instances,  so  quick 
and  rapid,  that  we  cannot  perceive  them,  even  by 
the  strongest  efforts  of  consciousness.  The  manner 
in  which  we  exert  these  faculties  is  this.  We  first 
take  the  general  proposition  as  a  whole,  divide  it 
into  its  elementary  parts;  we  then  sum  up  all 
these  parts  again,  to  form  afresh  the  original  pro- 
position. Thus  we  employ  both  analysis  and  syn- 
thesis. These  two  operations  are  strictly  distin- 
guishable from  each  other,  from  the  point  at  which 
they  set  out  in  the  reasoning  process.  If  we  begin 
at  the  top,  and  descend,  it  is  analysis;  if  at  the 
bottom,  and  ascend,  it  is  synthesis. 


ANALYSIS,    SYNTHESIS,    ANALOGY.  105 

Analysis  by  itself  would  never,  however,  lead  us 
to  truth.  And  here  we  must  notice  a  peculiarly 
important  principle,  arising  out  of  the  mechanism 
of  the  understanding,  in  relation  to  this  analyzing 
process.  Were  we  to  go  on  to  analyze  every  object 
presented  to  our  minds,  we  would  never  get  any 
nearer  the  truth.  There  is  a  limit  beyond  which 
our  division  of  objects  must  cease ;  but  this  limit 
cannot  be  specifically  pomted  out  by  any  precise 
rules  or  precepts  of  logic.  This  discriminating 
power  is  under  the  control  of  the  superior  faculties 
of  the  mind ;  and  commonly  goes  by  the  name  of 
judgment^  taste,  &c.  To  be  entirely  destitute  of 
this  power,  is  to  be  entirely  destitute  of  intellec- 
tual acumen ;  and  on  the  contrary,  to  possess  this 
power,  and  to  know  how  to  regulate  it  properly, 
constitute  the  distinguishing  properties  of  a  ra- 
tional being. 

Let  us  suppose  that  a  painter,  when  he  endea- 
vours to  represent  a  landscape,  should  direct  his 
attention  so  minutely  to  evcrytliing  which  com- 
posed the  rural  scene  before  him,  as  to  dwell  upon 
every  leaf  of  a  tree,  every  blade  of  grass,  and  every 
minute  object  which  came  within  the  sphere  of  liis 
vision,  he  could  never  by  this  means  complete  a 
picture  at  all.  The  analysis  would  be  too  minute, 
and  carried  beyond  its  legitimate  boundaries. 
Agam,  should  a  man,  when  he  wishes  to  make 
himself  acquainted  with  a  piece  of  machinery,  such, 
for  instance,  as  the  steam-engine  already  referred 
to,  dwell  with  fastidious  and  scrutinizing  minute- 
ness on  the  nature,  configuration,  and  properties 


106  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OP    GREECE. 

of  all  the  fibres  of  wood  which  compose  the  frame- 
work of  the  machine,  or  the  grains  of  metal,  or  the 
shape  and  number  of  the  nails  which  have  been 
employed  in  the  construction  of  the  boiler ;  if,  in 
fact,  he  were  to  attempt  to  analyze  every  thing  re- 
lating to  the  object  of  his  inquiries,  he  might  so 
employ  himself  for  a  thousand  years,  and  be  no 
nearer  a  correct  understanding  of  the  nature  and 
power  of  the  engine,  than  the  first  day  he  com- 
menced his  investigations.  Thus  it  appears  that 
an  unlimited  analysis  can  lead  to  nothing.  But 
this  power  is  wisely  placed  under  the  control  of 
the  judgment ;  and,  while  she  occupies  her  supre- 
macy, the  power  of  analysis  is  carried  just  to  that 
point  which  is  necessary  to  make  us  perceive  the 
truth  of  the  general  propositions  of  which  the  mind 
is  in  search. 

These  two  powers  of  analysis  and  synthesis  enter 
into  every  process  of  reasoning,  however  limited  or 
unimportant.  We  are  almost  every  moment  of 
our  lives  employing  them.  These  operations,  how- 
ever, are  frequently  so  subtle  and  rapid,  that  it  can 
only  be  from  long  attention  to  the  inward  workings 
of  our  own  minds,  that  a  habit  can  be  permanently 
formed  of  readily  recognising  their  existence  and 
influence  upon  our  intellectual  movements.  Erom 
the  writings  of  logicians  and  metaphysicians,  the 
reader  might  be  led  to  imagine  that  the  analytic 
and  synthetic  methods  of  reasoning  are  purely 
matters  of  art^  and  only  of  very  recent  invention. 
But  this  is  a  great  mistake.  The  division  of  our 
general  conceptions  or  ideas  into  their  component 


ANALYSIS,    SYNTHESIS,    ANALOGY.  107 

parts,  and  the  power  of  again  uniting  them  into 
their  former  state  of  aggregation,  are  faculties  inti- 
mately blended  with  the  very  earliest  movements 
of  the  mind  of  man,  however  rude  or  unenlightened 
it  may  be.  We  recognise  the  application  of  these 
intellectual  instruments  in  the  savage,  as  well  as  in 
the  philosopher,  as  far  as  their  respective  degrees 
of  knowledge  require  that  application. 

These  remarks  will  be  sufficient  to  illustrate  the 
analytic  method  of  reasoning ;  we  come  now  to  the 
synthetic  method,  or  that  of  induction.  We  here 
reverse  the  order  followed  in  analysis.  In  seeking 
knowledge  for  ourselves,  or  in  communicating  it  to 
others,  by  the  synthetic  plan,  we  begin  with  the 
simple  and  elementary  parts  of  which  general 
truths  or  propositions  are  composed.  In  abstract 
science,  we  commence  with  intuitive  or  self-evident 
truths  or  axioms,  and  advance  by  regular  steps  up- 
wards, carrying  evidence  and  conviction  along  with 
us ;  so  that,  at  every  interval  of  our  reasoning,  we 
have  a  clear  view  of  the  ground  wliicli  we  have 
immediately  gone  over,  and  the  reasons  which,  at 
every  point,  have  commanded  our  assent. 

In  natural  philosophy  the  synthetic  method  is 
generally  adopted.  In  making  experiments  and 
observations  upon  various  objects,  we  notice  the 
result ;  and  by  comparing  and  judging,  we  come 
to  the  knowledge  of  those  quantities  or  properties 
of  bodies  which  are  common  to  many  apparently 
different  sul) stances.  As  we  follow  up  this  process 
we  come  to  generalize  still  more,  until  we  arrive  at 


108  MENTAL   PHILOSOPHY   OP    GREECE. 

what  we  call  the  ultimate  principles  of  bodies,  or 
general  laAVs  of  nature. 

What  generally  passes  under  the  denomination 
of  method,  is  simply  the  exercise  of  these  two 
powers  of  analysis  and  induction.  Our  all-wise 
Creator  has  assigned  them  a  conspicuous  place 
among  our  intellectual  principles.  There  is  in  man 
a  love  of  order  and  arrangement,  which  manifests 
itself  at  a  very  early  period  of  life.  At  the  first 
dawn  of  reason,  ere  the  mental  powers  have  ac- 
quu^ed  almost  any  strength,  we  find  the  young 
child  begin  to  make  selections  of  material  objects, 
and  to  arrange  and  classify  them  according  to  a 
particular  standard  fixed  in  his  mind,  as  to  colour, 
size,  &c.  Some  faint  traces  of  this  power  are 
discernible  in  the  inferior  creation ;  but  it  is  vastly 
pre-eminent  in  man.  It  gradually  develops  itself 
as  he  advances  to  manliood  ;  enables  him  to  divide 
and  methodize  his  thoughts  and  sentiments ;  and 
becomes  of  vital  importance  in  the  proper  discharge 
of  those  numerous  duties  which  fall  to  his  lot  to 
perform. 

Analysis  and  induction,  however,  viewed  singly, 
cannot  be  regarded  as  instruments  either  for  the  dis- 
covery or  promulgation  of  truth.  Another  power 
is  absolutely  necessary, — that  of  analogy ;  and  to 
it,  therefore,  we  shall  call  the  attention  of  the 
reader. 

We  have,  in  the  preceding  remarks,  pointed  out 
at  some  length  the  importance  of  the  two  opera- 
tions of  the  mind,  called  analysis  and  synthesis. 
But   we   must  here   observe,  that  these  faculties 


ANALYSIS,  SYNTHESIS,  ANALOGY.  109 

.would  be  of  very  little  use  if  we  did  not  pos- 
sess the  power  of  reasoning  from  analogy.  If 
we  required  to  analyze  every  object  which  came 
before  us,  and  to  resolve  it  into  its  general  prin- 
ciples, before  we  could  pronounce  with  certainty 
any  thing  respecting  it,  our  actual  knowledge 
would  be  exceedingly  circumscribed  indeed.  Here, 
however,  another  operation  of  the  mind  is  brought 
into  ]olay,  which  relieves  us  from  an  inconceivable 
degree  of  trouble,  enlarges  our  knowledge,  and 
expands  our  reasoning  powers  to  an  almost  indefi- 
nite extent.  This  process  is  analogy.  If  we  ana- 
lyze a  portion  of  matter  into  its  elementary  parts, 
we  firmly  believe  that  another,  possessing  the  same 
external  appearances  as  the  former,  is  composed  of 
like  materials.  If  Ave  see  a  man  following  a  certain 
line  of  conduct,  and  bringing  upon  himself  and 
others  poverty  and  disease,  we  immediately  draw 
the  conclusion  that  the  like  will  happen  to  others 
if  they  tread  in  the  same  steps.  In  these  respec- 
tive instances  we  do  not  institute  an  inquiry  into 
every  indi\ddual  object  upon  which  we  reason  and 
decide  ;  Ijut  we  di'aw  our  conclusions  from  what  we 
have  actually  experienced,  and  apply  them  to 
objects  of  a  similar  nature,  which  we  may,  never- 
theless, never  have  submitted  to  personal  examina- 
tion. 

The  term  analogy  is  generally  used,  both  in 
common  language  and  in  systems  of  logic  and 
philosophy,  to  denote  a  certain  degree  of  relation, 
agreement,  or  resemblance  in  some  points,  between 
two  or  more  objects,  which  in  other  respects  have 


110  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GREECE. 

little  in  common,  or  possess  altogether  different 
properties  or  quaKties.  It  must  he  ohvious,  from 
the  immense  variety  of  the  works  of  creation,  that 
the  ohjects  which  hear  a  relation  or  resemhlauce  to 
one  another  must  be  numerous  beyond  the  possi- 
bility of  calculation,  and  we  shall  tind  that  analogy 
or  resemblance  is  of  every  degree,  from  nearly 
complete  identity  to  direct  opposition  or  contra- 
riety. 

A  great  portion  of  the  reasoning  of  mankind  is 
founded  upon  analogy.  It  is  in  constant  and  uni- 
versal use,  and  is  employed  alike  by  the  rustic  and 
the  philosopher.  It  is  one  of  those  instruments 
which  the  Almighty  has  placed  in  our  hands  to 
secure  our  comfort  and  welfare,  and  to  develop  for 
our  information  the  laws  of  nature ;  but,  like  all 
other  gifts  from  the  same  munificent  source,  it 
requu'es  to  be  judiciously  applied  to  the  proper  and 
legitimate  ]ourposes  for  which  it  was  given. 

In  almost  every  department  of  human  know- 
ledge analogical  reasonings  are  employed  to  a  great 
extent,  and  are  found  to  be  of  vast  utility.  In 
the  science  of  comparative  anatomy,  for  example, 
it  is  of  singular  importance  to  trace  out  the  resem- 
blances between  the  structiu^es  of  different  animals, 
their  organs  of  sensation,  digestion,  and  motion; 
and  from  this  analogical  inquiry  we  may  draw 
useful  conclusions  for  the  government  of  our  own 
conduct  and  constitution,  and  the  promotion  of 
our  interests.  Por  example,  we  make  experiments 
with  certain  kinds  of  food  on  the  digestive  organs 
of  dogs,  and  from  these  we  infer   or  draio  con- 


ANALYSIS,  SYNTHESIS,    ANALOGY.  Ill 

elusions  that  such  and  such  effects  will  result  to 
ourselves  from  taking  these  same  kinds  of  food; 
and  these  experiments  have  often  led  to  the  forma- 
tion of  rules  of  diet  and  regimen  of  considerable 
importance  to  our  bodily  health.  Many  highly 
beneficial  discoveries  in  medicine  may  be  traced  to 
experiments  and  observations  made  upon  the  in- 
ferior animals,  founded  upon  the  resemblance  be- 
tween their  functions  of  life  and  our  own. 

In  chemical  science  we  may  perceive  the  won- 
derful effects  produced  by  the  operation  of  the 
principle  of  analogy.  Many  of  the  most  splendid 
and  important  discoveries  in  this  science  were  the 
result  of  analogical  reasonings.  It  was  from  this 
source  that  Dr.  Priestley  proved  the  compound 
nature  of  atmospheric  air ;  and  it  is  related  that  it 
was  in  consequence  of  hints  which  he  had  given, 
when  on  a  visit  to  Paris,  to  Lavoisier,  founded 
entirely  upon  analogical  conjectures,  that  the  latter 
philosopher  was  induced  to  commence  experiments, 
with  the  View  of  proving  the  compound  nature  of 
water,  and  of  reducing  it  to  its  constituent  ele- 
ments. Indeed  the  whole  history  of  this  impor- 
tant and  useful  department  of  human  knowledge 
exhibits  very  striking  and  incontestable  proofs, 
how  much  of  the  science  owed  its  existence  to 
mere  hints  and  conjectures,  founded,  in  many 
cases,  upon  slight  resemblances  or  analogies. 

In  the  science  of  astronomy  we  find  that  analogy 
has  been  the  principal  instrument  in  conducting 
us  to  important  discoveries  and  improvements. 
The  law  of  gravitation,  as  unfolded  by  Sir  Isaac 


112  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GREECE. 

Newton,  was  discovered  by  a  train  of  analogical 
reasoning  founded  on  one  of  the  most  trifling  cir- 
cumstances which  daily  present  themselves  to  our 
notice.  While  Sir  Isaac  sat  ruminating  under  a 
tree  in  his  garden,  an  apple  happened  to  drop  from 
it,  and  hit  him  on  the  head.  He  conceived  that 
the  same  law  which  determined  the  fall  of  the 
apple  might  possibly  be  that  which  moved  the 
heavenly  bodies  in  their  orbits.  This  led  to  in- 
quiry, and  inquiry  ended  in  a  full  and  settled  con- 
viction, that  the  law  which  regulates  the  motion 
of  terrestrial  bodies  is  the  same  which  regulates 
the  movements  of  the  sun,  moon,  and  whole  plane- 
tary system.  And  it  is  by  observing  the  motions 
of  the  planets  which  belong  to  our  solar  system, 
and  by  comparing  their  annual  and  diurnal  motions 
with  the  corresponding  motions  of  the  earth,  that 
we  come  to  the  well-grounded  conclusion  that 
these  planets  are  the  habitations  of  various  orders 
of  living  beings ;  for  we  are  confident  that  the  sun 
imparts  both  light  and  heat  to  the  planets  as  well 
as  to  our  globe ;  and  as  his  inflaence  gives  birth  to 
the  various  animated  beings  with  which  we  are 
conversant,  "analogy,"  says  La  Place,  "induces 
us  to  believe  that  his  influence  produces  similar 
effects  on  the  planets ;  for  it  is  not  natural  to  sup- 
pose that  matter,  of  which  we  see  the  fecundity 
develop  itself  in  such  various  ways,  should  be 
sterile  upon  a  planet  so  large  as  Jupiter,  which 
like  the  earth  has  its  days,  its  nights,  and  its  years, 
and  on  which  observation  discovers  changes  that 
indicate  very  active  forces.     Man,  formed  for  the 


ANALYSIS,    SYNTHESIS,    ANALOGY.  113 

temperature  which  he  enjoys  upon  earth,  could 
not,  according  to  all  appearance,  live  upon  the 
other  planets;  hut  may  there  not  he  a  diver- 
sity of  organization  suited  to  the  various  tempe- 
ratures of  the  glohes  of  this  universe  ?  If  the 
difference  of  elements  and  climates  causes  such 
variety  in  the  productions  of  the  earth,  hoAV  in- 
finitely diversified  must  be  the  productions  of  the 
planets  and  their  satellites.  The  most  active  imagi- 
nation cannot  form  any  just  idea  of  them,  hut  still 
their  existence  is  extreihely  probable." 

It  would  be  impossible  in  this  chapter  to  advert 
to  all  the  advantas^es  which  analo£:ical  reasonino* 
has  conferred,  and  is  daily  conferring,  upon  science. 
But  these  advantages  are  not  exclusively  confined 
to  matters  of  abstract  speculation ;  they  influence 
us  also,  to  a  wonderful  extent,  even  in  our  common 
and  every-day  occupations,  opinions,  and  language. 
Nearly    the   whole   of  oiu'   knowledge   of  human 
nature   is   founded   upon   analogy;    though   it   is 
commonly,    but    very   erroneously,    attributed    to 
experience.     We  conclude,  that  any  given  line  of 
conduct  Avill  be   pleasant   or   disagreeable  to  our 
fellow-men,  merely  because  we  conceive  them  to  be 
of  a  similar  construction  with  ourselves  in  body, 
mind,  and  moral  feelings.     "Wlien  we  confer  bene- 
fits upon  our  neighbour,  we  conceive  that  he  will 
feel  grateful,  because  we  presume  that  his  nature 
is  similar  to  our  own;  and  for  the  same  reason, 
when  we  inflict  an  injury  upon  him,  we  conceive 
that  he   will  feel  and  express  indignation.     The 


* 


114      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

food  wliicli  is  palatable  and  noimshing  to  us, 
or  that  which  is  unpleasant  and  pernicious,"  we 
judge  will  produce  like  effects  upon  other  people, 
solely  because  we  ground  our  conclusions  upon  the 
analogical  hypothesis  that  there  is  a  close  simi- 
larity among  all  men  in  the  organs  of  digestion  and 
general  powers  of  life. 

The  whole  structure  of  metaphorical  language 
is  grounded  on  the  resemblance  or  analogy  which 
the  imagination  conceives  to  exist  among  different 
objects.  We  say  that  vii'tue  is  fair  and  beautiful, 
that  the  mind  is  strong  and  robust,  active  and 
lively,  precisely  because  we  conceive  there  is  some- 
thing in  the  moral  and  mental  qualifications 
angilogous  to  the  material  objects  which  we  clothe 
with  these  attributes.  Metaphorical  expressions 
will  always  be  found  most  numerous  in  the 
writings  of  those  authors  who  are  led,  from  the 
habits  of  theu'  minds,  into  extensive  comparisons 
and  a  minute  examination  of  the  works  of  nature. 
The  poet  is  a  well  known  instance  of  this.  It  is 
from  metaphors  and  similes  that  a  great  deal  of  the 
pleasure  which  poetry  affords  us  is  derived.  We 
clothe  the  objects  of  nature,  both  animate  and 
inanimate,  with  various  properties  and  attributes ; 
but  all  these  must  in  true  poetry  be  founded  upon 
some  real  or  apparent  analogy  or  resemblance, 
otherwise  we  derive  no  pleasure  from  poetical 
metaphors  ;  on  the  contrary,  nothing  so  readily 
disgusts  and  puts  us  out  of  humour  with  our 
author,   as  when   his  similes  and  metaphors   do 


ANALYSIS,    SYNTHESIS,    ANALOGY.  115 

not  suggest  to  our  minds  some  natural  or  fancied 
resemblance  to  the  objects  which  they  are  designed 
to  represent. 

But  though  analogy  is  one  of  the  most  powerful 
and  general  operations  to  which  the  mind  resorts, 
and  the  exercise  of  it  seems  indispensable  to  our 
comfort,  nay,  to  our  very  existence,  yet  it  is  not 
placed  beyond  the  reach  of  misapplication.  Ana- 
logy frequently  leads  us  into  gross  errors,  both  in 
speculation  and  practice;  and  we  ought  at  all 
times,  in  using  it,  to  exercise  a  \dgilant  circum- 
spection over  all  conclusions  which  seem  to  rest 
exclusively  on  analogical  reasonings ;  and  more 
especially  if  these  conclusions  involve  subjects  of 
deep  interest  to  our  present  or  future  well-being. 
Were  we  able,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  to  trace 
the  remote  or  hidden  springs  of  those  actions 
which  hiu'iy  the  unthinking  and  profligate  part 
of  mankind  to  a  course  of  life  destructive  of  their 
virtue,  their  comfort,  and  existence,  we  should  find 
that  a  great  part  of  their  misfortunes  might  he 
fairly  attributed  to  erroneous  or  fanciful  analogies, 
or  miscalculations  as  to  the  effects  of  any  given 
line  of  conduct. 

In  our  abstract  and  speculative  opinions,  we  are 
also  greatly  affected  by  erroneous  or  doubtful  re- 
semblances ;  and  no  one  can  take  up  a  book  on 
controversial  topics  of  any  description,  without  no- 
ticing that  the  differences  of  opinion  may,  in  nine 
cases  out  of  ten,  be  attributable  to  some  false  ana- 
logies incidentally  introduced,  as  it  were,  into  the 

I  2 


116  MENTAL   PHILOSOniY    OF    GREECE. 

discussion,  and  made  the  ground- work  of  tlie  wliole 
matter  of  dispute.    To  give  an  example  of  this  kind 
of  influence  on  our  speculative  conclusions,  arising 
from  erroneous  analogies,  will  perhaps  prove  more 
strikingly  illustrative  of  the  truth  of  these  remarks, 
than  any  general  observations  T^liich  could  be  made 
upon  the  subject.     The  quotation  I  am  about  to 
give  relates  to  the  long  and  keenly  contested  ques- 
tion on  liberty  and  necessity ;  and  the  extract  is 
the  more  valuable  as  having  come  from  the  pen  of 
a  very  able  and  accomplished  American  writer,  the 
Reverend  Jonathan  Edwards.     Of  course  it  would 
be  altogether  out  of  place  here  to  express  any  opi- 
nion on  the  questions  under  dispute ;  it  is  simply 
our  duty  to  notice  how  false  analogies  may  impose 
upon  the  strongest  minds,  and  vitiate  a  long  chain 
of  close  and  argumentative  reasoning.     •"  There  is 
a  vast  difference,"   says  he,   "  between  the  sun's 
being  the  cause  of  the  lightsomeness  and  warmth 
of  the  atmosphere  and  the  brightness  of  gold  and 
diamonds,  by  its  presence  and  positive  influence, 
and  its  being  the  occasion  of.  darkness  and  frost  in 
the  night  by  its  motion,  whereby  it  descends  below 
the  horizon."     "  If  the  sun  were  the  proper  cause 
of  cold  and  darkness,  it  would  be  the  fountain  of 
these  things,  as  it  is  the  fountain  of  light  and  heat ; 
and  then  something  might  be  argued  from  the  na- 
ture of  cold  and  darkness  to  a  likeness  of  nature  in 
the  sun ;  and  it  might  be  justly  inferred,  that  the 
sun  itself  is  dark  and  cold,  and  that  his  beams  are 
black  and  frosty.     But,  from  its  being  the  cause, 
no  otherwise  than  by  its  departure,  no  such  thing 


ANALYSIS,    SYNTHESIS,  ANALOGY.  117 

can  be  inierred,  but  the  contrary  ;  it  may  justly  be 
argued,  that  the  sun  is  a  bright  and  hot  body,  if 
cold  and  darkness  are  found  to  be  the  consequence 
of  its  withdrawnient ;  and  the  more  constantly  and 
necessarily  these  effects  are  connected  vdila.  and 
confined  to  its  absence,  the  more  strongly  does  it 
argue  the  sun  to  be  the  fountain  of  light  and  heat. 
So,  inasmuch  as  sin  is  not  the  fruit  of  any  positive 
agency  or  influence  of  the  Most  High,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  arises  from  the  withholding  of  his  action 
and  energy,  and  under  certain  circumstances  ne- 
cessarily follows  on  the  want  of  his  influence ;  this 
is  no  argiunent  that  he  is  sinful,  or  his  operation 
evil,  but,  on  the  contrary,  that  he  and  his  agency 
are  altogether  good  and  holy,  and  that  he  is  the 
fountain  of  all  holiness.  It  would  be  strange  ar- 
guing indeed,  that  because  men  never  commit  sin 
but  only  when  God  leaves  them  to  themselves,  and 
necessarily  sin  when  he  does  so,  their  sin,  therefore, 
is  not  from  themselves,  but  from  God,  and  so  God 
must  be  a  sinful  being ;  as  strange  as  it  would  be 
to  argue,  that  because  it  is  always  dark  when  the 
sun  is  gone,  and  never  dark  when  the  sun  is  pre- 
sent, all  darkness,  therefore,  is  from  the  sun,  and 
his  disk  and  beams  must  needs  be  black." 

Now  the  whole  of  this  argument  from  analogy 
is  foim^ded  upon  the  assumed  principle,  that  there 
is  a  reseynhlance  of  the  sun,  a  created  and  depen- 
dent olDJect,  to  the  Almighty  Creator  of  that  same 
object,  and  of  every  thing  else.  But  a  moment's 
consideration  ^vill  convince  us,  that  there  can  really 
be  no  resemblance  between  the  principle  on  which 


118     MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

the  movements  and  energies  of  a  dependent  crea- 
ture rest,  and  the  principle  on  which  depends  the 
active  power  of  the  Being  who  made  that  creature. 
The  two  objects  have  nothing  in  common ;  that  is, 
the  sun  wants  the  essential  attributes  of  self-mo- 
tion, will,  and  intelligence,  which  must  be  consi- 
dered as  inherent  qualities  in  the  divine  nature. 

We  cannot  fail  to  view  with  wonder  and  admira- 
tion that  subtile  power  of  mind,  which,  in  general 
cases,  balances  so  nicely,  and  promptly  too,  the 
different  degrees  of  evidence  which  result  from  dif- 
ferent degrees  of  analogy  existing  among  various 
objects.  Where  the  analogy  or  resemblance  be- 
tween two  or  more  objects  is  almost  perfect,  the 
mind  readily,  and  upon  the  spur  of  the  moment, 
reasons  upon  both,  and  draws  similar  conclusions 
from  them ;  and  when  this  analogy  or  resemblance 
becomes  fainter  and  more  imperceptible,  then  we 
advance  in  our  reasoning  with  more  hesitation,  and 
our  conclusions  are  encompassed  with  a  greater 
portion  of  doubt  and  uncertainty.  How  surprising 
is  this  power  of  the  mind,  and  how  subtile  and 
dexterous  are  its  movements  ! 

Now,  looking  at  the  great  importance  of  analogy, 
both  as  it  influences  our  abstract  and  speculative 
principles  and  reasonings,  and  as  it  bears  upon  our 
practical  conduct,  we  ought  to  be  perpetually  upon 
our  guard  to  employ  this  mighty  engine  in  a  pro- 
per manner.  In  this  consists  the  greater  part  of 
that  which  generally  goes  under  the  denomination 
of  judgment.  Let  us  be  cautious  in  drawing  ana- 
logical inferences  and  conclusions  from  certain  sets 


ANALYSIS,    SYNTHESIS,  ANALOGY.  119 

of  facts  or  circumstances,  which  are  not  in  all  par- 
ticulars alike.  It  is  from  the  neglect  of  this  pre- 
caution that  we  are  so  frequently  involved  in  diffi- 
culties and  perplexities  in  our  reasonings,  and 
thus  led  into  error  on  many  important  subjects. 
In  all  our  speculations  we  shall  do  well  to  keep 
this  precaution  steadily  in  our  mind's  eye,  and  we 
shall  thereby  be  prevented  from  falling  into  many 
mistakes  of  moment,  both  as  it  regards  our  ab- 
stract principles  and  our  actual  comfort  and 
happiness. 

Looking  over  the  Grecian  metaphysical  systems 
as  a  whole,  we  may  plainly  perceive,  that  they  are 
varied  in  character,  almost  solely  from  the  propor- 
tion in  which  Analysis,  Synthesis,  and  Analogy, 
are  mingled  together.  Where  the  synthetic  prin- 
ciple predominates,  we  see  a  more  determined  love 
of  system,  and  often  a  reckless  habit  of  generaliz- 
ing. In  the  early  philosophers  of  Greece,  this  is 
very  observable.  On  the  other  hand,  when  anlaysis 
unduly  prevails,  we  see  the  genius  of  philosophy 
bolstering  up  its  influence  by  minute,  unimportant, 
and  frivolous  particularities.  Again,  when  we  see 
the  speculative  habit  resting  principally  on  Analogy, 
we  find  theories  and  systems  full  of  crudities  and 
inconsistencies.  It  is  when  all  these  three  great 
prmciples  of  our  mind  are  rightly  adjusted  and 
proportioned,  that  the  happiest  results  may  be 
anticipated.  And  what  is  true  of  individuals,  is 
true  in  respect  of  the  philosophical  spirit  of  a 
whole  people. 

It  may  be  remarked,  that  aU  readers  of  Grecian 


120  MENTAL   PHILOSOPHY   OP    GREECE. 

Philosopliy  will  readily  recognise  the  great  know- 
ledge wliicli  the  sages  of  that  country  generally  dis- 
play, in  their  appreciation  of  the  nature  and  use  of 
these  principles  of  Analysis,  Synthesis,  and  Analogy. 
They  mix  and  blend  them,  so  to  speak,  with  con- 
summate skill.  In  all  the  most  valuable  portions 
of  their  "\Tritings  we  see  the  right  application  of 
these  general  powers  of  thought.  It  is  only  when 
very  abstruse  theories  are  developed,  and  fanciful 
systems  advocated,  that  we  perceive  any  derange- 
ment in  the  management  of  the  reasoning  faculties. 
The  works  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  furnish  us  with 
innumerable  examples  of  the  beautiful  application 
of  Analysis,  Synthesis,  and  Analogy ;  especially  in 
those  sections  of  their  respective  treatises,  which 
depend  upon  a  correct  observation  of  nature's 
operations,  and  the  every-day  appearances  she 
presents  to  our  view.  In  all  the  various  dialec- 
tical systems  of  Greece,  we  see  no  errors  from  the 
application  of  these  rudiments  of  reasoning ;  it  is 
only  when  ultimate  principles  of  being  and  of 
thought  are  brought  into  play,  that  we  find  room 
for  dissent  or  censure.* 

*  See  the  Author's  "  Essay  on  Logic,"  Second  Edit.  1848,  publislied 
by  Saunders,  6  Charing  Cross. 


THE    SCEPTICAL    SCHOOL    OF    METAPHYSICS.       121 


CHAPTER  XIII. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


THE    SCEPTICAL    SCHOOL    OF    METAPHYSICS. 

Pyrrho.     340  B.  C. 

Pyrrho  stands  at  the  head  ofthe  ancient  Sceptics. 
We  are  not,  however,  to  understand  by  the  term 
sceptic,  as  here  used  in  reference  to  the  personal 
opinions  of  Pyrrho  himself,  that  he  embraced  the 
notions  commonly  indicated  by  the  generic  term 
Pyrrhonism  in  modern  times.  He  did  not  deny 
the  absolute  existence  of  truth;  but  only  showed 
that  in  seeking  after  it  we  often  feel  a  difficulty  in 
seizing  hold  of  it,  from  the  mass  of  error  which 
commonly  surrounds  it. 

Pyrrho  formed  part  of  the  court  of  Alexander 
the  Great,  in  his  grand  expedition  to  Asia.  The 
personal  friend  of  the  philosopher  was  Anaxarchus, 
from  whom  he  derived  a  knowledge  of  the  specula- 
tive opinions  of  the  Eleatics.  Pyrrho  also  learned 
the  Indian  doctrine  of  the  Gymnosophists.  He 
attended  the  philosophical  school  of  Megara,  and 
studied  with  great  care  and  zeal  the  writings  of 


122  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GEEECE. 

Democritus.  He  was  greatly  esteemed  by  all  his 
contemporaries  for  the  piuity  and  simplicity  of  liis 
life  and  conversation. 

The  Te}i  Tropes^  so  often  alluded  to  in  the  philo- 
sophical writings  of  the  ancients,  and  which  con- 
tain the  general  tenets  of  what  goes  nnder  the 
name  of  Pyrrhonism,  are  attributed  to  Pyrrho  as 
their  author.  The  principles  of  doubt  involved  in 
these  rules  go  simply  to  recommend  a  suspension 
of  assent,  rather  then  a  positive  denial  of  matters 
submitted  to  the  judgment.  His  scepticism  was 
more  of  a  passive  than  an  active  type.  A  Prench 
historian  of  philosophy,  and  a  Catholic  bishop, 
makes  the  foUoT^Tno^  observations  on  Pvrrho. 
"  Que  Pyrrhon  ait  ete  amene,  par  son  doute 
universel,  a  ne  pouvoir  agir,  a  ne  croupe  a  rien 
dans  la  pratique,  a  ne  pas  se  detourner  pour  eviter 
un  precipice,  comme  le  raconte  Diogene  Laerce, 
ces  assertions  sont  sans  fondement  et  tout-a-fait 
invraisemblables.  Ce  pliilosophe  reconnaissait,  au 
contraire,  I'autorite  du  bons  sens,  des  lois,  des 
usages ;  il  admettait  des  regies  de  morale,  et  pre- 
tendait  que  ces  regies  avaient  leur  fondement  dans 
le  coeur.  II  voulait  qu'on  suivlt  les  apparences, 
sans  se  mettre  en  peiae  de  la  realite;  qu'on  agit 
comme  le  commun  des  hommes,  qu'on  evitat 
soigneusement  les  discussions  epuieuses  qui  ne 
pouvaient  enfanter  que  le  doute,  et  qu'on  demeiu^at 
dans  ce  repos  d'esprit  qui  seul  pent  faire  le 
bonheur  de  I'homme."* 

*  Bouvier,  Hist.  Abregce  de  la  Philosophic.  Vol.  1.  p    184.  Paris.  1844. 


PYRRHO.  123 

The  strong  hold  of  the  Sceptics  was  the  variahle 
nature  of  our  ideas  of  pure  sensation.  These  al- 
ways afforded  them  weapons  against  the  attacks 
of  their  adversaries.  The  sceptics  carried  their 
analogical  reasonings  from  tliis  source  into  every 
department  of  human  knowledge,  but  particularly 
into  our  notions  of  what  constituted  good  and  evil. 
Here  too,  they  received  fresh  succour,  from  the 
apparently  discordant  opinions  and  judgments  of 
mankind  upon  the  rules  and  obligations  of  mora- 
lity. People  in  different  countries  have  different 
notions  of  what  is  proper  and  beneficial ;  and  this 
diversity  is  strictly  analogous  to  the  variable  sensa- 
tions of  external  things,  produced  by  the  operation 
of  the  senses.  It  would  be  idle  to  deny,  that 
such  analogical  reasonings  would  have  a  powerful 
effect  upon  popular  opinion ;  but  still  the  nature 
of  all  similar  logical  declamations  exercises  a  per- 
nicious iniiuence  over  the  progress  of  sound  and 
rational  knowledge.* 

The  more  abstract  scepticism  among  the  Greek 
and  Uoman  philosophy  has  a  great  uniformity  of 
character,  because  it  was  grounded  upon  "vdews  and 
argmnents  which  lay  very  open  to  common  remark 
and  observation.  The  following  may  be  stated  as 
the  principal  springs,  out   of  which  the  various 


*  On  the  Sceptics,  see  Sextus  Empiricus,  Pyrrh.  1.  Diog.  Laert  9.  74. 
Cicero,  De  Fini.  2.  13.  Epictet.  Fragm.  ed.  Schweigh.  Bayle,  Diction. 
Huet,  Traite  de  la  faiblesse  de  I'esprit  humain ;  Ploucquet,  Disser.  de 
Epoche  Pyrrhonis,  1758;  Beausobre,  Le  Pyrrhonisme  raisonnable, 
Berlin,  1753;  Langheinrich,  Disser.  De  Timon.  &c.,  Leipsic,  1720. 


121  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GREECE. 

currents  of  sceptical  opinions  flowed,  in  almost 
every  period  of  tlie  ancient  pliilosopliy. 

1st.  The  great  diversity  in  animal  nature,  as  to 
its  origin,  organization,  &c.  ;  tlie  differences  in 
wliicli  external  objects  are  viewed  by  the  inferior 
creation;  all  of  which  go  to  show  what  a  vast 
variation  there  must  necessarily  be  in  the  concep- 
tions formed  of  the  qualities  and  properties  of 
external  bodies,  through  organs  of  sense  so  much 
varied.  The  question  then  is,  as  animals  are 
deprived  of  reason,  what  grounds  have  we  to 
prefer  our  perceptions  to  theirs  when  we  are  in  the 
search  of  truth  ? 

2nd.  The  diversity  of  character  is  very  great  in 
human  nature;  and  the  differences  among  men, 
both  in  mental  and  bodily  qualifications,  are  varied 
beyond  all  conception.  This  contrariety,  joined 
to  the  interminable  disputes  among  philosophers 
themselves,  and  the  differences  in  tastes  and  aflFec- 
tions  particularly  noticed  by  physicians,  render  all 
attempts  to  arrive  at  the  truth  of  things  hopeless. 

3rd.  There  is  a  great  difference  m  the  organs 
of  sense,  and  every  organ  has  its  appropriate  ob- 
jects. Do  the  qualities  of  these  objects  belong  to 
the  particular  conformation  of  our  senses,  or  only 
to  the  objects  themselves  ?  Have  they  only  as 
many  and  such  qualities  and  properties  as  we 
perceive,  and  have  they  none  which  we  do  not 
perceive  ?  What  are  the  constituent  elements  of 
objects,  have  they  just  such  and  such  qualities  and 
no  other  ? 

4th.  The  various   ways  in  which  our   physical 


PYRUHO.  125 

organs  are  affected,  by  disease,  sleep,  old  age, 
sadness,  fear,  cold,  heat,  and  a  thousand  other 
circumstances,  must  necessarily  create  a  great  di- 
versity of  judgment  relative  to  things  around  us. 

5th.  The  differences  from  variation  in  the  quan- 
tities of  things,  produce  often  opposite  judgments 
and  conclusions.  A  little  more  heat,  a  more  rapid 
motion,  or  a  little  more  wine  or  spirit,  creates 
divers  changes  in  our  opinions.  The  general 
aggregation  or  di\dsion  of  homogeneous  J)odies 
greatly  modifies  sensation. 

6th.  The  various  kinds  of  education  among  men, 
and  the  different  laws  and  conventional  rules  of 
society,  beget  opposite  opinions  and  conclusions  on 
the  most  important  subjects. 

7th.  Erom  the  interminable  mixtures  and  com- 
binations of  things,  it  is  next  to  impossible  to  form 
a  correct  opinion  of  the  mass  of  objects  around  us. 
Colours,  density,  and  forms,  are  for  ever  changing; 
and  the  eye  can  only  judge  of  that  which  is,  at  tlie 
moment,  an  object  of  vision. 

8th.  The  relations  of  things  one  with  another  are 
continually  changing.  We  seldom  see  an  object 
precisely  in  the  same  point  of  \iew  tvnce  in  succes- 
sion. 

9th.  All  relations,  and  objects,  opinions,  notions, 
and  principles,  are  connected  together,  and  have 
mutual  dependencies  one  upon  another;  so  that 
the  mind  of  man  can  never  be  certain  that  the 
conclusions  it  forms  are  the  really  true  ones.  All 
things  are  not  perceived,  therefore  our  judgments 
are  onesided. 


12G  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GREECE. 


CHAPTEE  XIV. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


Epicuuus.     341  B.  C. 

EpiCURirs  was  the  founder  of  that  school  of  phi- 
losophy which  has  gone  nncler  his  name  for  many 
centuries.  He  was  a  philosopher  of  great  parts, 
and  cultivated  inquiries  into  the  nature  of  the 
human  mind,  in  conjunction  with  speculations  on 
the  principal  questions  of  morals. 

The  foUomng  is  the  suhstance  of  the  metaphy- 
sical theory  of  Epicurus.  The  soul  is  corporeal;  it 
is  composed  of  the  most  refined  and  suhtile  matter; 
it  is  inherent  in  the  whole  of  bodies,  and  forms  a 
constituent  element  of  their  nature  or  essence. 
We  can  distinguish  three  separate  or  distinct 
elements  in  the  soul.  The  senses;  the  appetites, 
diflPused  over  the  whole  organization  of  man ;  and 
intelligence  or  reason,  placed  in  a  sort  of  inter- 
mediate position  between  the  senses  and  the  ap- 
petites, sharpening  the  former,  and  guiding  and 
regulating  the  latter.  The  senses  are  a  kind  of 
soul  within  a  soul.  They  form  the  organs  or  in- 
struments  hy  which  the  soul   seizes  hold,   as   it 


EPICURUS.  127 

were,  of  external  objects.  It  is  thus  that  objects 
vastly  varied  act  upon  us,  and  that  we  are  enabled 
to  distinguish  the  differences  amongst  them.  Porms, 
colom's,  sounds,  smells,  and  tastes,  which  affect 
severally  the  five  senses,  are  composed  of  cor- 
puscles, disposed  in  different  orders,  endowed  with 
different  motions,  and  these  corpuscles  are  received 
into  the  various  organs  of  sensation,  by  pores  or 
canals  proportional)ly  suited  to  their  nature.  These 
elementary  corpuscles  penetrate  even  into  the  sen- 
sorium  itself,  strike  and  affect  it,  and  give  bii-th, 
in  our  sentient  being,  to  images  similar  to  these 
external  things.  These  images  may  be  compared 
to  the  impression  of  the  seal  left  on  wax. 

The  principle  of  intelligence  or  reason  exercises 
supreme  authority  over  the  senses.  Its  province 
is,  whilst  the  senses  are  affected  by  external  objects, 
to  think,  to  perceive,  to  conceive,  to  reflect,  to 
meditate,  to  discuss,  and  to  deliberate.  Heason  is 
not  passive.  But  how  is  this  thought  excited  ? 
By  a  phenomenon  analogous  to  that  which  produces 
sensation ;  by  airy  or  sjnrittml  essences,  which  pre- 
sent themselves  to  reason.  These  spiritual  essences 
are  disengaged  from  bodies,  or  are  formed  in  the 
air,  and  seize  hold  of  the  mind,  and  fix  themselves 
in  it.  But  in  the  multitude  of  intelligences,  these 
essences  choose  those  whose  attention  is  excited, 
and  such  as  direct  themselves  to  particular  forms 
of  thought ;  to  others  they  remain  perfect  strangers. 
Attention  is  then  reason's  principal  instrument ;  by 
it,  judgments  and  conclusions  are  formed. 

The  appetites  and  passions  relate  primarily  to 


128  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OF    GREECE, 

pleasure  and  pain;  and  from  these  follow  hope 
and  fear.  The  soul  naturally  expands  itself  when 
under  the  influence  of  pleasurable  feelings,  and,  on 
the  contrary,  shrinks  from  what  is  painful  and  un- 
pleasant. This  pleasure  and  pain  result  also  from 
the  subtile  and  minute  corpuscles  of  bodies,  which 
introduce  themselves  into  our  organs  of  sensation. 
When  there  is  a  natural  harmony  between  these 
subtile  corpuscles  and  our  internal  thinking  prin- 
ciple, pleasure  is  produced ;  but,  in  a  contrary 
state  of  things,  when  this  harmony  does  not  exist, 
the  delicate  organs  of  sense  are  wounded,  and  pain 
and  suffering  are  the  consequence. 

Again,  it  is  by  an  action  enth'ely  mechanical 
that  the  soul  puts  the  divers  members  of  the  body 
in  motion.  The  whole  system  of  mental  pheno- 
mena may  be  compared  to  a  macliine  of  wheels 
and  springs,  the  two  ends  of  which  rest  upon 
external  objects.  But  there  is,  nevertheless,  this 
essential  characteristic  relative  to  voluntary  motion, 
that  the  soul  judges  beforehand,  and  wishes  the 
effect  which  it  produces. 

Of  the  absolute  certainty  of  our  knowledge  from 
the  senses,  Epicurus  was  a  strenuous  advocate. 
Sensations  are  the  criterion  of  truth;  the  only 
test  of  certainty ;  they  never  deceive  us.  Wlienever 
there  is  error,  it  may  be  traced  to  the  judgment ; 
it  arises,  from  our  hasty  or  premature  decisions 
upon  objects  which  act  externally  on  the  senses. 

The  circumstance  of  the  perfect  freedom  of  the 
human  mind  to  act  or  not  act,  just  as  the  will 
pleases,   is  a  curious,   and   apparently   an   incon- 


EPICURUS.  ^  129 

sistent  item  in  tlic  metapliysical  system  of  Epi- 
curus. All  other  phenomena  seem  pretty  tightly 
chained  down  to  the  principle  of  necessity  or  fate ; 
but  the  mind,  or  intelligent  principle,  he  sets  at 
complete  liljerty. 

The  notions  of  Epicurus  as  to  the  formation  of 
the  world,  are  nearly  the  same  as  those  of  Dcmo- 
critus,  with  whose  system  he  was  intimately  con- 
versant. His  primary  elements  arc  the  atoms  of 
Democritus.  The  atoms  of  Epicurus  harmonize 
and  repel  each  other,  and  generate  a  rebounding 
and  oscillatino;  motion.  Thev  combine  and  form 
various  systems,  which  constitute  what  we  deno- 
minate visible  bodies  or  Avorlds.  These  primary 
atoms  are  infinite  in  number,  and,  therefore,  an 
infinite  nimiber  of  worlds  may  be  framed  out  of 
them.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  such  notions  arc 
vague  and  childish. 

*:^*  Diog.  Laert.  10.  Cicero  De  Nat.  Deo.  1.  25.  Sextus  Empi.  Math. 
7.  See  also  the  works  of  Gassendi,  the  modern  commentator  on  the 
Philosophy  of  Epicurns  :  and  the  following  works  : — Sorbiere,  Lettrcs  sur 
la  Vie,  &c.,  Paris  16G0;  Jacques  Rondel,  La  Vie  d'Epic.  Paris  IHJO; 
Pierre  de  Villemaudy,  Manuductio  ad  Philosophiae  Aristotelia;,  Epicurese 
et  Cartesianse  Parallclismum,  Ainsteidam  U)S1 ;  L'Abbs  Batteux,  Morale 
d' Epicure,  La  Haye,  1686;  Temple's  Essay  on  the  Gardens  of  Epicurus, 
London  1696.  TragilU  Arnkiel,  De  Philoso.  et  Schola  Epicuri.  1671  ; 
Faust.  Diss,  de  Deo  Epicuri,  Strasburg,  1655. 


* 


K 


130     MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


CHAPTER   XV. 
MENTAL  rniLOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


THE    STOICAL    SCHOOL    OF    METAPHYSICS. 

As  we  proceed  dovm.  the  stream  of  time,  we  find 
the  discussions  and  speculations  on  the  nature  of 
the  human  mind  hecoming  more  diversified,  pro- 
found, and  important.  The  Stoical  School  of  Phi- 
losophy, especially  in  reference  to  the  principles 
and  practice  of  morals,  has  long  maintained  a  con- 
sideral)le  portion  of  respect  and  attention  among 
the  learned  in  all  countries  ;  and  the  discussions  of 
this  school  on  the  laws  of  mind  are  also  well  en- 
titled to  a  careful  and  attentive  notice. 

Zeno.     362  B.  c. 

Zeno  was  one  of  the  most  able  and  distinguished 
masters  of  this  school.  He  followed  the  profession 
of  a  merchant  for  some  time,  but  relinquished  it, 
and  attended  all  the  most  celebrated  seminaries  of 
learning  and  philosophy. 

The  idea  of  this  philosopher,  as  to  the  abstract 
nature  of  the  evidence  which  our  senses  furnish 


ZENO.  131 

US,  was,  that  knowledge  was  certain  and  immuta- 
ble.    In  this  respect  he  vigorously  opposed  the 
general  doctrines  of  the  Sceptics,  in  all  their  shapes 
and  forms.    The  train  of  thought  which  appears  to 
have  been  in  his  mind  on  this  occasion,  is  exceed- 
ingly curious  and  interesting ;  as  it  seems,  as  far  as 
we  are  able  to  judge  of  the  matter,  to  have  led  him 
to  precisely  the  same  conclusions  which  several 
metaphysicians  of  modern  times  have  propounded 
with  all  the  pomp  and  display  of  new  discoveries. 
I  allude  here  to  the  doctrine  of  ultimate  truths, 
or,  as  some  term  it,  the  doctrine  of  common  sense. 
Zeno  maintained  that  evidence,  and  evidence  alone, 
was  the  foundation  of  his  theory  of  human  know- 
ledge,— the  very  key-stone  of  his  system ;  and  he 
points  out  a  guide  to  the  use  of  this  instrument. 
He   calls  it  right  judgment,   or  healthy   reason. 
This  right  judgment,  or  healthy  reason,  is  partly 
founded  on  an  accurate  knowledge  of  things,  and 
partly  upon  the  condition  and  state  of  the  soul,  as 
to  its  exemption  from  corruption.     Nature  has  fur- 
nished us  with  a  kind  of  model  or  expression  of 
herself,  by  which  the  mind  gathers  together  the 
divers   notions  of  tilings.     These  notions  furnish 
the  elementary  principles  of  all  science.     By  their 
assistance  an  extensive  field  is  opened  for  the  pro- 
secution and  investigation  of  truth.     As  nature  is 
the  same  in  all  mankind,  those  primary  notions 
form  a  sort  of  common  sense,  which  appertains  to 
the  entire  mass  of  humanity. 

Zeno  distinguished  eight  faculties  of  the  soul ; 
the  five  senses,  generation,  language,  and  thought. 

K  2 


132     MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GUEECE. 

It  will  be  perceived  by  tlie  reader,  that  lie  here 
classifies  generation,  a  physical  power,  with  the 
other  faculties  which  essentially  constitute  our 
thinking  principle.  The  reason  of  this  is  not 
stated.  These  eight  powers  or  faculties  are,  accord- 
ing to  Zeno,  a  kind  of  governess  to  our  soul,  to 
lead  and  guide  us  in  all  matters  of  knowledge  and 
life.  We  can  say,  under  this  point  of  \iew,  that 
there  is  in  the  soul  only  one  faculty,  from  which 
all  others  are  derived.  Tliis  faculty  is  passive  when 
it  receives  external  impressions,  and  active  when  it 
unites,  separates,  and  combines  them,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  forming  general  notions  and  judgments  from 
them.  Thus  the  nature  and  operations  of  the  soul 
form  one  perfect  whole,  like  a  smaller  universe. 

The  Stoics  introduced  in  their  school  the  famous 
maxim,  "  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  understanding 
which  has  not  been  previously  in  the  senses.^'  They 
did  not  admit  of  innate  ideas.  They  distinguished 
natural  ideas  from  artificial  notions.  The  former 
were  obtained  without  any  eff^ort  of  the  mind  itself, 
and  were  denominated  anticipations ;  the  latter 
were  the  work  of  the  remote  spontaneity  of  the 
mind,  and  were  called  notions. 

Artificial  notions  were  derived  from  several 
sources,  namely,  from  analogy,  composition,  pro- 
portion, opposition,  transposition,  repetition,  and 
privation. 

Zeno  differed  from  Plato  as  to  the  latter' s  theory 
of  ideas.  The  Stoic  coincided  with  Aristotle,  but 
did  not  implicitly  adopt  all  his  opinions  on  mental 
speculations. 


CHRYSIPPUS.  133 

His  notions  as  to  the  origin  of  things  were,  that 
there  were  two  principles.  The  one  is  primordial 
matter,  which  is  the  passive  material  of  which  all 
thin^rs  are  formed.  The  second  is  the  active  ele- 
ment  which  moulds  and  forms  every  thing  ;  this  is 
Reason,  Destiny,  God.  The  laws  of  matter  are 
imprinted  on  it  by  this  intelligent  and  active 
principle. 

Chrtsippus.     250  b.  c. 

Chrysippns  was  another  distinguished  pliiloso- 
plier  of  the  Stoical  school.  On  many  points  he 
entertained  correct  views  as  to  several  important 
principles  of  mental  philosophy. 

He  agreed  with  Zeno  as  to  the  difference  between 
sensible  perceptions  of  external  objects,  and  notions 
of  the  mind  created  by  its  reflecting  on  its  own 
poAvers,  or  consciousness.  These  notions  are  not 
propagated  immediately  from  the  senses ;  they 
exclusively  appertain  to  thought.  They  institute, 
as  it  were,  a  comparison  between  objects  of  sense  ; 
they  seize  the  common  and  general  features  or  cha- 
racteristics which  belong  to  them ;  the  one  opera- 
tion is  founded  upon  natural  causes,  and  the  other 
upon  the  reflective  faculty  of  the  understanding 
alone. 

Chrysippns  attempted  to  make  a  catalogue  of 
im.demonstrable  or  elementary  truths.  His  idea 
was,  that  all  other  truths  should  be  arranged 
under  some  one  of  these.  These  general  truths 
may  be  reduced  to  two  kinds  ;  those  which  include 
propositions   necessarily   involved  in  propositions 


134     MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

previously  admitted  as  true;  and  consequences 
which  result  from  disjunctive  propositions.  The 
minor  details  of  this  system  of  reasoning  are  com- 
prehended under  the  heads  of  simple  and  complex 
maxims;  possible  and  impossible;  necessaiy  and 
contingent ;  probable,  paradoxical,  rational,  and 
empirical. 

On  the  doctrine  of  Causation,  Chrysippus  divided 
causes  into  two  descriptions ;  those  which  he  con- 
sidered purely  mechanical,  which  belonged  to  the 
aggregate  masses  of  matter  ;  and  those  which  were 
organic,  and  constituted  the  principles  of  vegetable 
and  animal  life. 

Most  of  the  opinions  of  Zeno  and  the  Stoics  of 
tliis  period  generally,  on  the  nature  of  the  Deity, 
are  extremely  rational.  They  clothe  the  Divine 
nature  with  noble  and  sublime  attributes.  They 
regard  Him  as  infinitely  perfect,  and  every  way 
worthy  of  adoration  and  homage.  It  must,  how- 
ever, be  stated,  that  there  is  a  great  drawback  to 
this  species  of  theism.  Though  they  invest  the 
Deity  with  these  attributes,  they  nevertheless  be- 
lieve Him  to  be  essentially  connected  with  matter. 
They  say  that  the  Deity  constitutes  both  the  visible 
and  the  invisible  world ;  that  God  is  the  soul  of  the 
world ;  that  He  penetrates  all  parts  of  it ;  that  He 
is  the  Kving  and  vivifying  principle  of  it ;  in  fact, 
that  the  world  was  composed  of  God,  who  was  the 
soul  of  it,  and  matter,  which  was  its  body. 

Zeno  and  his  school  were  strict  and  absolute 
necessitarians.  Every  thing  was  linked  together 
by  an  inexorable  fatality.     They  made  some  little 


CHEYSIPPUS.  135 

display  of  allowing  the  Pirst  Cause  a  degree  of 
liberty  or  choice ;  hut  it  was  evidently  a  mere  piece 
of  philosophical  delusion.  Cicero  accuses  them  of 
this  fruitless  attempt  to  reconcile  liberty  with 
necessity.*  Both  Zeno  and  Chrysippus  saw  the 
chfficulty,  that  if  they  did  not  invest  man  with 
personal  freedom,  it  was  impossible  to  conceive  how 
actions  could  be  considered  either  praiseworthy  or 
blameable,  or  entitled  to  rewards  or  punishments. 
They  were,  therefore,  obliged  to  cede  a  form  of 
liberty,  to  harmonize,  in  some  measure,  this  moral 
responsibility  with  the  other  parts  of  their  system,  f 
The  Stoical  doctrines,  as  a  whole,  present  much 
that  is  praiseworthy  and  valuable.  The  philo- 
sophers of  this  school  set  themselves  against  the 
whole  mass  of  vain  and  conceited  quibbling  which 
too  often  usurped  the  name  and  authority  of 
philosophy  and  true  wisdom.  They  took  human 
life  and  human  nature  as  they  found  them.  The 
whole  of  their  doctrines  were  grounded  on  the 
more  obvious  and  striking  principles  of  men's 
thoughts  and  actions.  They  say,  in  substance,  If 
your  system  be  against  common  sense,  it  must  be 
erroneous ;  we  may  not  perhaps  be  able  to  rebut 
all  your  refined  and  subtile  arguments,  but  be  you 
assured,  that  nature  has  not  left  the  first  princi- 
ples of  speculation  and  action  to  be  trifled  with  hj 
the  weak  and  puny  sophistry  of  man.  Upon  these 
grounds  the  whole  of  their  public  teaching  was 
based. 

*  C  icero,  Noctes  Atticse,  4.  2.  15. 

t  Cicero,  De  Fato,  10.  12.     Nemesius,  De  uatura  Ilominis.  c.  2. 


136  MENTAL    PHILOSOniY    OF    GllEECE. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


ON  THE  NOTIONS  COMMONLY  ADOPTED  BY  THE 
ANCIENTS,  UP  TO  THE  PERIOD  OF  THE  STOICS, 
ON  THE  ORIGIN  OF  OTJR  KNOWLEDGE,  AND  THE 
NATURE    OF   TRUTH. 

We  sliall  attempt,  in  tliis  chapter,  to  give  a 
general  but  concise  view  of  some  important  and 
elementary  principles  discussed  by  the  ancient 
sages ;  simply  with  a  view  of  fixing  the  ordinary 
reader's  attention  more  firmly  on  the  real  amount 
of  progress  which  the  philosophy  of  the  mind  had 
made,  up  to  this  point  of  history. 

The  first  question  with  the  philosophers  of 
Greece  was,  Erom  whence  is  our  knowledge  de- 
rived ?  Does  it  proceed  from  ourselves  ?  Does  it 
emanate  from  any  physical  channel  or  source  we 
can  recognize  ?  Does  it  own  a  di\dne  or  heavenly 
origin?  Theu'  inquiries  soon,  however,  brought 
them  to  something  which  seemed  to  point  out 
what  appeared  to  indicate,  in  some  measure,  a 
probalde   solution    of  the   great   problem.       This 


ORIGIN    OF    KNOWLEDGE.  137 

something  was  Sensation.  They  saw  that  an 
affection  of  the  senses  was  prior  to  thought.  This 
conclusion  was  established  not  only  from  every 
man's  hom-ly  experience,  but  from  a  consideration 
of  the  infant  years  of  mankind,  when  the  deve- 
lopment of  sensation  was  more  strikingly  and 
pointedly  marked,  as  an  anterior  operation  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  existence  and  qualities  of  ex- 
ternal objects.  No  man  could  be  ignorant,  much 
less  a  philosopher,  that  a  mountain,  or  lake,  or 
river,  must  be  seen  by  the  eye  before  a  person  can 
possibly  have  an  ideci  of  it ;  that  sounds  must  be 
heard  by  the  ear,  before  we  can  have  an  idea  of 
them,  or  be  able  to  feel  the  exquisite  pleasures 
which  are  derived  from  their  mechanical  combina- 
tion in  the  art  of  music.  And  the  like  may  be 
remarked  in  reference  to  the  other  three  organs  of 
sensation.  This  being  the  precise  state  of  the 
case,  inquiring  men  took  their  stand  on  Sensation. 
They  perceived  that  it  was,  in  some  way  or  other, 
indissolubly  and  invariably  conjoined  Avith  know- 
ledge ;  this  they  were  in  no  position  to  deny, 
either  as  philosophers  or  men.  Nature  decided 
with  peremptory  authority.  She  pointed  her 
finger  to  the  final  cause  of  this  great  source  of 
knowledge,  that  this  peculiar  organization  of  our 
senses  shall  be  the  medium  of  that  information  of 
the  qualities  and  properties  of  external  bodies  and 
agencies  which  is  absolutely  requisite  for  the 
support  and  enjoyment  of  animal  existence. 

We  find,  therefore,  no  difference  worth  mention- 
ing among  the  various  schools  of  philosophy  as  to 


138      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GUEECE. 

common  and  every-day  operations  of  sensation, 
considered  as  mere  phenomena  of  existence.  Its 
necessary  connection  with  knowledge  coukl  not  be 
denied.  But  a  little  inquiry  below  the  surface  of 
things  suggested  another  important  question,  Are 
there  any  thoughts,  or  ideas,  or  notions,  or  prin- 
ciples in  our  minds,  which  do  not  seem  to  have 
their  origin  in  this  peculiar  affection  of  our 
senses,  either  from  their  separate  or  collective 
operations  ?  We  have  the  colours  and  confor- 
mation of  bodies  by  the  eye,  sounds  by  the  ear, 
smells  by  the  nose,  tastes  by  the  mouth,  and  feeling 
by  the  touch  ;  but  does  any  one,  or  do  all  of  these 
produce  those  ideas,  for  example,  which  I  have  of 
myself,  of  being  or  existence  in  general,  of  space, 
of  time,  of  number,  of  infinity,  of  right,  of  obliga- 
tion, of  cause  and  effect,  and  of  a  thousand  others 
which  are  in  every  man's  mind,  and  which  form 
as  it  were  the  pabulum  of  his  mental  existence  ? 
This  is  the  point  of  departure  of  mental  philoso- 
phy. To  solve  this  problem  has  been  the  great 
object  of  all  metaphysicians  from  the  earliest  re- 
cords of  speculation ;  and  the  question  is  still  ask- 
ed from  a  thousand  different  quarters,  even  at  the 
present  hour. 

The  first  step  which  philosophers  took  to  throw 
some  light  on  this  intricate  question  was,  to  divide 
our  sensations  into  two  classes  ;  the  one  related  to 
the  simple  or  secondary  qualities  of  material  bo- 
dies, and  the  other  to  their  primary  ones.  Our 
simple  ideas  or  notions  of  the  secondary  qualities 
or  properties  of  things,  arc  only  conditionally  or 


ORIGIN    OF    KNOWLEDGE.  139 

relatively  uniform.     Let  us,  for  example,  take  the 
sensation  of  warmth.     Take  a  bason  of  water  heat- 
ed to  a  certain  degree,  and  put  a  cold  hand  into  it, 
and  a  warm  one.     The  water  will  feel  quite  warm 
to  the  cold  hand,  but  cold  or  chilly  to  the  warm 
one.     Does  then  this  sensation  belong,  as  an  inhe- 
rent quality,  to  water  ?   Does  it  form  a  constituent 
portion  of  its  nature  ?  If  this  were  granted,  it  would 
make  the  water  both  hot  and  cold  at  the  same 
time,  which  is  absurd.     Such  sensations  are  called 
s'miple   or  secondary  ones,  because  they   depend 
upon  and  are  apparently  regulated   by  the  phy- 
sical state  or  condition  of  the  organs  of  sense.   But 
whether  water  be  hot  or  cold,  warm  or  chilly,  it 
always  occupies  space,  it  has  a  certain  volume  or 
bulk,  and  a  certain  density  or  weight.   These  quali- 
ties appertain  to  it,  independently  of  our  sensations, 
or  the  state  of  our  organs  of  feeling,  taste,  smell, 
or  sight.   These,  therefore,  are  termed  the  iwimary 
qualities  of  matter,  and  seem  to  form  the  ground- 
work of  a  mighty  structure  of  intellectual  mechan- 
ism and  contrivance. 

We  come  now  to  the  third  step  in  the  progress 
of  inquiry.  Was  there  any  inward  principle  in 
man  which  could  elaborate  or  concoct  any  ideas  or 
notions  out  of  the  ordinary  sensations  which  our 
senses  produced ;  or  did  these  ordinary  sensations 
merely  operate  as  exciting  causes  to  the  mind, 
forming  out  of  its  otvh  resources  notions  or  ideas 
which  did  not  seem  to  have  any  immediate  or 
necessary  connexion  mth  the  process  of  sensa- 
tion ?     This  was  a  puzzling  question  to  the  inquir- 


140  MENTAL   PHILOSOPHY   OF    GPvEECE. 

ing  philosoplier.  It  was  clear  to  him  that  there 
were  certain  notions  in  our  minds,  and  very  familiar 
ones  too,  which  did  not  seem  to  owe  their  exist- 
ence to  the  operation  of  external  objects  on  the 
senses ;  but  how  to  account  for  them,  constituted 
the  difficulty.  There  were  two  modes  of  attempting- 
to  remove  the  perplexity ;  the  one  supposed  that 
the  mind,  as  by  some  chemical  laboratory,  distilled, 
as  it  were,  these  more  rarefied  notions  from  the 
mass  of  common  ones  which  flowed  throu£?h  the 
senses;  and  the  other,  that  these  refined  ideas 
were  di'awTi  from  the  internal  resources  of  the 
mind  itself,  independent  of  sensation.  These  two 
theories  both  came  under  the  notice  of  the  ancients, 
wliose  systems  we  have  previously  glanced  at.  The 
evidence  preponderates  in  favour  of  the  solution  that 
those  general  abstract  notions  which  we  possess,  and 
which  seem  to  be  so  necessary  for  the  acquirement 
and  cultivation  of  knowledge,  owe  Iheir  existence 
to  the  mind  itself;  and  that  the  operation  which 
evolves  them  is  called  reflection.  We  find  that  the 
most  acute  and  comprehensive  reasoners  on  men- 
tal subjects,  from  Thales  down  to  the  time  of  the 
Stoics,  were  obliged  to  admit  this  inward  power  of 
reflection,  to  be  enabled  to  make  any  progress  in 
the  study  of  mind  themselves,  or  to  convey  their 
information  and  knowledge  to  others. 

The  abstract  nature  or  character  of  truth,  Avas 
another  stumbling  block  to  all  the  ancient  sages 
of  Greece.  Are  our  sensations  to  be  taken  as  the 
evidence  of  truth  ?  They  are  variable  and  imcer- 
tain.     Do  our  more  abstract  and  refined  notions  or 


NATUHE    OF    TRUTH.  141 

ideas  afford  more  evidence  ?  We  cannot  rely  upon 
them  either.  Is  there  any  criterion  by  which  we 
can  determine  a  thing  to  be  true  or  false  ?  Some 
lay  down  one  test,  and  some  another.  The  Aca- 
demics maintained  there  was  no  criterion  of  truth 
whatever.  The  Dogmatists  all  agree  upon  a  cri- 
terion of  truth,  but  differ  about  that  in  which  it 
consists.  Plato  would  allow  no  criterion  from  the 
testimony  of  the  senses  ;  for,  says  he,  "  from  them 
we  have  nothing  but  opinion."  He  affu'med,  how- 
ever, that  we  had  a  criterion  from  pure  intellect, 
which  afforded  a  test  for  certain  knowledge.  Aris- 
totle differs  in  some  degree  from  his  master.  The 
former  allows  that  the  pure  mind  confers  upon  us 
certain  conviction,  although  the  evidence  from  the 
senses  was  sometimes  very  variable  and  uncertain. 
Among  all  the  sects  of  philosophers  none  contended 
so  zealously  and  boldly  for  a  criterion  of  truth  as 
the  Epicureans.  They  established  thek  test  on 
three  principles ;  sensation,  anticipation,  and  pas- 
sion. Subsequently,  the  most  indefatigable  hunters 
after  a  criterion  of  certainty  were  the  Stoics.  They 
suggested  several  modes  by  which  this  great  desi- 
deratum might  be  found.'  Some  amongst  them,  in 
order  to  conquer  what  they  conceived  as  prejudices, 
went  so  far  as  to  distrust  the  intimations  from 
their  own  senses,  and  to  contend  that  the  ordinary 
principles  of  action  among  men  ought  not  to  be 
implicitly  relied  on.  They  conjectured  that  some 
wicked  demon  might  insinuate  falsehood  through 
this  channel,  and  make  men  the  objects  of  their 


142  MENTAL   PHILOSOPHY   OF   GREECE. 

wicked  and  malicious  sport.  After  laying  aside, 
however,  all  the  usual  maxims  received  among 
men,  they  seem  to  have  heen  driven  into  a  corner 
at  last,  and  compelled  to  admit,  that  truth  might 
rest  upon  the  evidence  of  their  own  minds. 


THE    SECOND   ACADEMY.  143^ 


CHAPTER  XVII. 
MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 


The  Second  Academy. 

The  philosophers  of  the  Second  Academy  dif- 
fered in  several  points  from  Zeno  and  his  followers. 
The  former  especially  directed  their  discussions 
towards  those  parts  of  the  mental  philosophy  of 
the  Stoics  which  related  to  the  foundations  of  hu- 
man knowledge,  and  the  nature  of  truth  in  general. 
This  conflict  of  opinions  is  exceedingly  interesting. 
The  truth  of  important  principles  was  at  stake; 
and  the  various  combatants  brouq-ht  to  the  task 
great  natural  acuteness,  and  a  perfect  knowledge 
of  aU  preceding  systems. 

Arcesilaus.     315  b.  c. 

According  to  Sextus  Empiricus,  Arcesilaus  di- 
rected his  logical  attacks  against  Zeno's  theory  of 
perception.  The  liistorian  teUs  us  that  *'  The  Sto- 
ics maintained  three  tilings  ;  science,  opinion,  and 
comprehension ;  the  last  of  which  occupied  an  in- 
termediate place  between  the  other  two.     Upon 


144  MENTAL   PniLOSOPTIY   OF    GREECE. 

tliis  point  they  were  attacked  by  Arcesilans.  As 
comprehension  has  to  be  sustained  by  science  and 
opinion,  it  cannot  be  the  arbiter  of  their  nature  or 
essence.  Now  this  comprehension  resides  either 
in  wisdom  or  folly.  If  it  resides  in  wisdom,  it  is 
science  itself ;  if  in  folly,  it  is  no  opinion,  but  mere 
empty  jargon.  This  comprehension,  by  which  we 
pretend  to  derive  the  power  of  giving  assent  to 
visi]3le  things,  exists  nowhere.  We  do  not  give 
assent  to  what  we  merely  see,  but  to  reason  alone. 
Men  only  affirm  formal  or  implied  propositions. 
Besides,  are  there  not  thousands  of  delusions  from 
visual  objects,  as  well  as  true  representations  ?  If 
then  wisdom  gives  its  assent  upon  the  strength  of 
this  criterion  of  the  Stoics,  it  only  gives  an  assent 
to  a  very  illusory  opinion." 

This  philosopher  seems,  however,  to  have  limited 
liis  observations  to  the  phenomena  of  external 
things,  and  not  to  have  carried  his  doubts  to  the 
existence  of  the  mind  itself.  But  on  this  point 
there  is  a  diversity  of  opinion. 


Cahneades.    215  B.  c. 

This  philosopher,  according  to  Sextus  Empiricus, 
not  only  opposed  the  Stoics  in  their  general  tenets, 
but  seems  to  have  founded  upon  their  own  cri- 
terion a  system  that  went  to  establish  contrary 
propositions.  Lactantius  also  mentions  that  Car- 
neades  had  an  intuitive  quickness  in  perceiving  the 
weak  sides  of  his  adversaries'  doctrines,  and  designed 
their  overthrow  by  the  inward  consciousness  that 
he  would  prove  successful. 


CAENEADES.  145 

On  the  nature  of  perception  Garneades  has  the 
following  observations.  "  The  criterion  which 
pronounces  upon  truth  can  consist  only  in  an  ad- 
hesion to  the  mind  which  creates  the  evidence  of 
the  object.  The  senses  begin  to  indicate  the  exist- 
ence of  objects  only  when  they  are  affected  by 
them,  whilst  the  former  undergo  divers  alterations 
in  comino*  in  contact  wdth  the  latter.  It  is  in 
these  affections,  and  in  these  divers  modifications 
of  feeling  produced  by  external  bodies,  that  we 
must  seek  for  the  foundations  of  truth.  Vision, 
for  example,  shows  us  two  things  at  once ;  a  mo- 
dification of  feeling  we  experience,  and  the  object 
which  exercises  itself  upon  us.  It  is  thus  that 
light  shows  itself,  and  manifests  the  object  which 
strikes  our  eyes.  But  the  sense  of  vision  does  not 
invariably  teach  us  the  real  nature  of  objects,  but 
sometimes  deceives  us.  All  \dsual  things  cannot, 
then,  be  taken  as  an  infallible  standard  of  trutli, 
but  those  things  are  only  true  which  are  proved  to 
be  so  in  themselves." 

Garneades  established  the  proposition,  that  a 
chain  of  probable  evidences  is  connected  with  the 
exercise  of  aU  our  organs  of  sensation ;  but  this  is 
more  strikingly  indicated  from  the  exercise  of  the 
organ  of  sight.  He  says,  "  Perception  represents 
two  tilings  at  once ;  the  external  object  perceived, 
and  the  subject  which  perceives  it.  Vision  must 
then  be  considered  under  two  distinct  relations. 
First,  relatively  to  the  object  perceived.  This  may 
be  either  true  or  false ;  true,  if  in  conformity  with 
it ;  and  false  if  otherwise.  Secondly,  relatively  to 
*  L 


146     MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

the  subject  perceiving.  That  which  is  true  appears 
to  differ  from  that  which  is  false.  That  which 
bears  the  appearance  of  truth  is  probable.  Some- 
times this  indication  of  truth  is  faint  and  weak ; 
it  may  be  from  the  smallness  of  the  object,  or  from 
the  weakness  and  confused  operation  of  the  senses 
themselves.  Sometimes  this  appearance  is  very 
striking  and  evident ;  in  such  cases  this  distinct- 
ness is  a  sure  criterion  of  truth ;  it  is  sufficiently 
manifested  by  itself." 

On  the  doctrine  of  necessary  connection  Car- 
neades  seems  to  have  been  inclined  to  the  li- 
berty of  human  thoughts  and  actions.  He  says, 
"From  the  proposition,  that  there  is  no  effect 
without  a  cause,  it  does  not  follow  that  every  thing 
which  happens  arises  from  external  causes.  Now 
our  walls  are  subjected  to  no  antecedent  cause. 
Such  is  the  nature  of  all  voluntary  actions,  that 
the  cause  of  them  arises  from  the  will  itself." 

E-itter  observes,  that  "  Carneades  laboured  to 
prove  that  all  previous  attempts  of  philosophy  to 
establish  a  criterion  of  truth  had  miscarried,  and 
moreover  that  it  was  impossible  to  find  such  a 
criterion.  Eor,  he  argued,  it  must  be  placed  either 
in  sensation,  or  in  conception,  or  in  reason.  Now 
as  to  the  last,  he  mamtained  that  it  could  not  be 
found  in  reason  independently  of  both  sensation 
and  conception,  for  that  which  is  the  object  of  any 
judgment  of  the  reason  must  first  appear  to  the 
mind  in  a  conception,  which  is  impossible  unless 
it  has  been  first  of  all  presented  to  it  by  some 
irrational  sensation ;  so  that  every  operation  of  the 


PHILO — ANTIOCHUS.  147 

reason  is  originally  dependent  upon  sensation,  which 
is  irrational,  and  consequently  the  truth  of  ra- 
tional cognition  depends  upon  that  of  sensation.* 


PHILO.     100  B.  c. 

Philo's  metaphysical  disquisitions  related  chiefly 
to  the  abstract  nature  of  truth  and  e\idence. 
Sextus  Empiricus  informs  us,  that  this  philosopher 
maintained  that  the  reality  of  objects  could  be 
known  from  that  comprehensive  perception  on 
which  the  Stoics  founded  their  criterion. 

Philo  remarked  that  a  logical  consequence  might 
be  true,  though  it  was  united  to  a  false  sup- 
position. He  distinguishes  three  species  of  truths; 
first,  that  which  is  deduced  from  a  self-evident 
proposition ;  secondly,  that  wliich  is  deduced  from 
a  false  proposition,  though  conditionally  true  ;  and, 
tliirdly,  from  a  proposition  from  which  the  con- 
clusion presents  not  only  a  hypothetical,  but  a 
real  truth,  in  spite  of  any  absurdity  contained  in 
the  proposition  itself ;  as  the  earth  moves ^  therefore 
it  exists. 


Antiochus.     86  B.  c. 

This  philosopher  of  the  Second  Academy  seemed 
to  be  actuated,  in  all  his  mental  inquiries,  with  a 
sincere  and  ardent  love  of  truth.  He  set  himself 
to  correct  the  general  principles  of  the  school,  and 

*  Hist.  Phil.  Vol.  3.  p.  614.  Oxford  1839. 
L  2 


148      MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  GREECE. 

to  banish  tliat  species  of  loose  and  imdefined  scep- 
ticism wliich  had,  ever  since  the  foundation  of  the 
academy,  hung  around  it,  and  engaged  it  in  per- 
petual quibbling  discussions  and  irrational  specula- 
tions. 

"Philosophy,"  says  Antiochus  "has  two  prin- 
cipal objects  in  \dew;  truth  and  happiness.  He 
can  have  no  pretensions  to  true  "uasdom,  who  does 
not  keep  this  double  end  in  ^iew ;  who  is  ignorant 
from  where  he  sets  out,  and  whither  he  is  going. 
A  real  philosopher  ought  to  establish  himself  upon 
sound  principles." 

Cicero,  who  enjoyed  the  personal  friendship  of 
this  philosopher,  tells  us,  that,  on  the  long  con- 
tested point,  the  real  foundation  of  human  know- 
ledge, Antiochus  makes  the  following  remarks. 
"  The  testimony  of  the  senses  is  worthy  of  all  con- 
fidence, if  they  are  themselves  free  to  act,  are  in  a 
healthy  state,  and  no  obstacle  intervenes  to  ob- 
struct the  faithful  perceptions  they  furnish.  If 
this  were  not  the  case,  of  what  use  would  be  our 
deductions  from  them  ?  What  would  be  the  founda- 
tion of  memory  ?  What  distinction  would  there 
be  between  knowledge  and  ignorance,  between  the 
lettered  and  the  unlettered  man?  What  would 
there  be  attached  to  reason  ?  Of  what  use  would  it 
prove  to  exercise  its  powers  and  faculties  ?  Scepti- 
cism is  at  direct  variance  with  the  whole  nature  of 
man,  his  desires,  powers,  and  destination.  Desii^es 
influence  the  will,  and  suppose  certain  judgments 
in  the  mind.  If  men  wish  to  act,  they  must  hold 
by  the  truth  presented  to  them.     But  above  all, 


ANTIOCHUS.  149 

virtue  is  the  best  testimony  to  the  certainty  of 
human  knowledge.  How  could  men  resolve  to 
suifer  inconceivable  torments  rather  than  desert 
their  duty  ?  or  why  should  they  bring  upon  them- 
selves the  vengeance  of  rigorous  laws,  unless  they 
were  imder  the  control  of  clear,  fixed,  and  deter- 
mined principles  ?" 

The  predecessors  of  Antiochus  in  the  new 
academy  had  made  a  fine  and  subtile  distinction, 
in  theu'  metaphysical  system,  between  a  clear  'per- 
ception^ and  a  real  perception.  This  distinction 
was  combated  by  Antiochus.  He  argued.  How 
could  we  affirm  that  an  object,  for  example,  was 
white,  if  we  happened  to  take  it  for  black  ?  Or 
how  would  we  know  when  a  perception  was  a 
clear  perception  imprinted  on  our  minds,  if  we 
were  not  certain  whether  it  was  a  real  one  or  not  ? 
Such  a  mode  of  reasoning  Avould  go  to  establish 
that  there  is  neither  colour,  nor  body,  nor  truth, 
nor  reasoning,  nor'  sensation,  nor  any  thing  truly 
seen  by  the  mind.  We  are  so  constituted  that 
our  minds  give  their  assent  to  testimony,  just  as 
the  scale  of  the  balance  is  influenced  by  greater  or 
lesser  weights. 

Antiochus  exercised  great  influence  in  his  day  ; 
and  w^as  certainly  a  metaphysician  of  no  mean 
order.  He  was  not,  however,  successful  in  fram- 
ing any  peculiar  system ;  but  his  aim  seemed  to  be 
to  arrive  at  a  species  of  eclecticism  in  reference  to 
all  pre\aous  speculations  on  the  nature  and  facul- 
ties of  the  human  mind.* 

*  Sextus  Empi.  Pyrrho.  1.  2'ib.    Nemeskis  ap.  Euseb.  14.  9.     Stobaeus 
Eclec.  2.  p.  38.  et  seq. 


150         mental  philosophy  of  greece. 

Clitomachus.     125  b.  c. 

Tills  metaphysician  was  a  disciple  of  Carneades, 
and  wrote  four  books  on  tlie  reasons  which  ought 
to  induce  us  to  suspend  our  assent  to  the  general 
truth  of  things.  Cicero  tells  us  that  he  distin- 
guished vision  into  two  kinds ;  the  one  embraces 
all  things  which  we  perceive,  and  those  which 
we  perceive  but  indistinctly;  the  second,  those 
which  are  probable,  and  those  which  are  not 
probable. 

POSLDONIUS. 

This  pliilosopher  established  a  philosophical 
school  at  Rhodes,  where,  it  is  said,  he  had  Pom- 
pey  and  Cicero  for  his  hearers.  He  was  partial  to 
the  system  of  Aristotle,  whose  general  arrange- 
ment of  mental  speculation  seemed  to  coincide 
with  his  views.  He  opposed  Chrysijipus  on  the 
division  of  the  soul.  His  great  anxiety  appeared 
to  be  to  reconcile  if  possible  all  the  conflicting 
theories  of  human  nature,  and  to  reduce  them  to 
some  common-sense  level.  It  was  j)robably  with 
this  view  that  he  revived  the  Platonic  division  of 
the  mental  powers  or  faculties. 

The  direct  influence  which  the  bodily  organiza- 
tion exercises  over  the  mind,  engaged  the  attention 
of  Posidonius.  He  thought  this  influence  was  very 
considerable,  and  that  previous  pliilosophers  had 
not  made  due  allowances  for  it  in  their  systems  of 
the  mind.* 

*  Galen,  1.  4.  pp.  143.  153.     Plutarch,  Fragio.  1.  (^. 


PAN^TIUS.  151 

Human  nature,  in  the  opinion  of  Posidonius, 
was  a  compound  material,  in  wliicli  the  desires  of 
the  creature  corresponded  to  vegetable  life ;  the 
violent  passions,  as  anger,  &c.,  to  the  brutish  or 
animal  life ;  but  reason  was  the  exclusive  attribute 
of  man.*  The  doctrine  of  physical  temperaments 
is  here  clearly  shadowed  forth ;  and  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  both  the  Sceptics  and  Stoics  gene- 
rally, in  their  public  teachings  and  dissertations, 
must  have  dwelt  very  often  on  the  striking  con- 
nection which  subsists  between  the  bodily  organiza- 
tion and  the  mental  habits  and  acquirements.  This 
was  one  of  those  prominent  topics  which  the  every- 
day intercourse  of  human  life  must  have  forced 
upon  their  attention. 


PAXiETIUS. 

Pansetius  was  a  jiopular  teacher  of  mental  and 
general  philosophy,  and  endeavoured  to  communi- 
cate his  opinions  with  all  possible  simplicity  and 
clearness.  This  spread  his  fame  in  every  direc- 
tion; and  many  of  the  most  celebrated  Roman 
lawyers  attended  his  lectures,  and  became  his  phi- 
losophical disciples  and  advocates.! 

His  metaphysical  opinions  are  but  little  known. 
His  talents  and  acqukements  did  not  lie  in  abstract 
questions  and  theories.  The  system  of  logic  he 
taught  had  an  especial  reference  to  grammar,  and 
did  not  rest  upon  a  full  development  of  those  prm- 

*  Galen,  ibid.  p.  170. 

t  Van.  Lynden,  De   Panactio    Khodio,  Liigd.  1802.  p.  50. 


152  MENTAL   PHILOSOPHY   OF   GUEECE. 

ciples  of  reasoning  so  commonly  incorporated  with 
many  other  ancient  systems  of  Logic. 

Pansetius  was  passionately  fond  of  Plato,  and 
considered  him  the  greatest  philosopher  that  ever 
lived. 

The  notions  of  Pansetins  on  the  soul  differed 
from  those  entertained  by  some  of  the  earlier  mas- 
ters of  the  Stoical  school.  He  only  admitted  it  to 
have  six  parts ;  and  referred  the  faculty  of  speech 
to  voluntary  motion,  and  maintained  that  gene- 
ration belongs  not  to  the  soul  but  to  vegetable 
nature. 

None  of  the  speculative  works  of  Pansetius  have 
come  down  to  us.  Only  two  physical  treatises 
have  survived.* 

*  Cicero,  De  Fini.  4.  28.  Idem  De  Divina.  1.  3.  Nemesius,  De 
Natur.  Horn.  15.  p.  96.  Clem.  Alexand.  Strom.  2.  p.  416.  Stobseus 
Eclec.  2.  p.  114.     Diog.  Laert.  7-  92. 


ALEXANDRIAN  SCHOOL  OF  METAPHYSICS.       153 


CHAPTER    XYIII. 
THE  ALEXANDRIAN  SCHOOL  OF  METAPHYSICS. 


The  formation  of  the  Alexandrian  School  of 
philosophy  forms  an  important  era  in  the  history  of 
mental  speculations.  A  vast  number  of  the  most 
subtile  reasoners,  and  the  most  renowned  men  of 
whom  the  history  of  letters  can  boast,  attended, 
in  some  part  of  their  lives,  at  the  Alexandrian 
Seminary.  This  school  of  learning  claims  also 
peculiar  attention  from  its  connexion  with  the 
early  introduction  of  the  Christian  faith,  and  with 
the  reciprocal  influence  which  philosophy  and  re- 
ligion exercised  upon  each  other,  at  this  eventful 
period  of  the  history  of  the  human  race. 

The  doctrines  of  the  Grecian  philosophy  were 
gradually  introduced  into  Alexandria  by  the  inter- 
course maintained  with  the  most  eminent  men  in 
Athens.  Antiochus  corresponded  with  Heraclitus 
of  Tyre,  who  taught  at  that  time  in  Alexandria ; 
Strabo,  the  geographer,  had  amalgamated  the 
doctrines  of  Zeno  with  those  of  Aristotle;  and 
Ammonius   attempted  to  reconcile  the  doctrines 


154  ALEXANDRIAN    SCHOOL 

of  Plato  with  those  of  his  distinguished  pupil. 
These  learned  men  soon  established  a  taste  for 
abstract  speculation  and  useful  knowledge;  and 
metaphysics  formed  a  very  conspicuous  portion  of 
their  general  system  of  public  instruction. 

It   is   impossible    to    think   of  the    School    of 
Alexandria  without  emotion.     To  the  di^dne,  the 
philosopher,  and  the  lover  of  general  science,  she 
is,  and  ever  must  be,  an  object  of  supreme  interest 
and  regard.     Every  movement  of  her  mind,  from 
her   earliest   establishment,   has   been   fruitful  of 
important    results,    and   has,    in    every   civilized 
country,  left  indelible  memorials  of  her  influence. 
She  was  destined  to  play  an  interesting  part  in  the 
history  of  speculative  opinions.     She  succoured  the 
exiled  sages  of  Greece,  and  furnished  them  with 
new  weapons  to  combat  their  enemies,  and  even  to 
overthrow  their  own  systems.      She  changed  the 
whole  current  of  men's  thoughts.  Old  theories  were 
renounced,  and  new  ones  adopted,  which  created 
and  fostered  whole  families  of  illustrious  men.    Her 
name  is  inseparably  connected  with  the  greatest 
event   this   world    ever    witnessed;  the   rise   and 
progress  of  that  Christian  system,  which  is  destined 
for  ever  to  hold  the  flambeau  to  that  philosophy 
which  she,  in  her  early  years,  considered  as  fixed 
on  a  rock  of  adamant.     She  is  still  glorious  even  in 
her  ruins. 

The  philosopher  Potamon  was  one  of  the  most 
distinguished  among  the  early  founders  of  the 
Alexandrian  School,  for  his  cultivation  of  mental 


OF    METAPHYSICS.  155 

science.  He  had  studied  wdtli  great  care  and 
success  the  most  important  writings  of  Grecian 
literature,  and  was  highly  esteemed  among  his 
contemporaries  for  his  skill  and  judgment  on  all 
knotty  and  dithcult  questions.  According  to 
Diogenes  Laertius,  he  was  the  founder  of  the 
Eclectic  sect  of  philosophers.  The  historian 
ohserves  :  "  But  a  short  time  since  a  new  sect 
called  Eclectic  had  heen  introduced  hy  Potamon 
of  Alexandi'ia,  who  selected  from  each  school  of 
philosophy  that  which  he  considered  the  most 
worthy  and  important.  He  thought  there  were 
two  criteria  of  truth.  One  resided  in  the  same  fa- 
culty which  judges ;  that  is  reason,  which  presides 
over  the  whole  system  of  intellectual  laws  or  move- 
ments.  The  second  consisted  in  those  perceptions 
which  serve  as  the  measure  or  instruments  hy 
wliicli  knowledge  is  communicated ;  or,  in  other 
words,  in  the  certainty  and  evidence  of  the  received 
impressions  from  external  ohjects." 

The  Stoical  pliilosophy  was  zealously  studied 
and  cultivated  at  Alexandria.  Aristotle  had  many 
disciples  and  commentators ;  and  the  doctrines  of 
Plato  were  hoth  openly  and  secretly  cherished  by 
many  philosophers,  of  a  more  enthusiastic  and 
imaginative  temperament.  Here  every  thing  he- 
longing  to  philosophy  was  to  be  foiuid ;  and  the 
wide  interchange  of  opinions  was  greatly  promoted 
by  the  trading  and  commercial  importance  of  the 
city.  Here  were  men  of  all  nations  collected 
together  for  the  purposes  of  traffic ;  and  the  proxi- 


156  ALEXANDRIAN    SCHOOL 

mity  to  the  seat  of  eastern  speculation  soon  led  to 
the  gradual  introduction  of  principles  and  theories 
with  which  the  Grecian  sages  had  previously  been 
unacquainted.  This  famous  seminary  of  philoso- 
phy and  learning  soon  gave  evident  proofs  of  new 
doctrines  and  new  systems.  The  spirit  of  inquiry 
received  a  powerful  impetus;  and  those  seeds 
were  profusely  sown,  which  were  afterwards  to 
yield  such  a  rank  and  luxurious  harvest. 

We  shall  have  to  enumerate,  in  subsequent 
parts  of  our  history,  some  of  the  most  eminent 
pliilosophers  who  flourished  at  this  notable  seat 
of  learning. 

We  may  allude  generally  to  one  or  two  doctrines 
which  took  their  rise  at  this  famous  seat  of  learnins', 
and  which  are  commonly  connected  with  its  history.. 
The  one  is  what  is  called  the  Alexandrian  Trmity, 
and  the  other  the  doctrine  of  Myianations. 

It  must  be  observed,  in  reference  to  the  first 
doctrine,  the  Alexandrian  Trinity,  that  many 
writers  have  supposed  that  it  arose  directly  from 
the  Scriptm-e  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  and  was  not 
an  original  theory  or  speculation  either  from  Alex- 
andria or  from  any  other  place.  This,  on  the 
other  hand,  has  been  stoutly  denied.  It  would 
be  contrary  to  the  spirit  and  object  of  this  work, 
to  enter  into  any  controversy  on  the  question; 
therefore  we  shall  refer  the  reader  to  ecclesias- 
tical historians  for  a  full  statement  of  arguments 
on  the  point  in  dispute. 

The  metaphysical  doctrine  of  the  Alexandrian 


OF    METAPHYSICS.  157 

Trinity  is  this.  God  is  of  a  threefold  nature,  and 
at  the  same  time  but  one.  His  essence  contains 
three  distinct  elements,  substances,  or  persons,  and 
these  three  make,  or  constitute.  One  Being. 
These  three  distinct  persons  or  substances  have 
also  distinct  and  individual  attributes.  The  first 
is  Unitij ;  the  second  is  Intelligence  ;  and  the  third, 
the  Universal  soul,  or  the  vivifjdng  cause  of  life 
and  motion. 

This  theory  of  the  Divine  Nature  produced  many 
heresies  in  religion,  and  led  to  a  great  mass  of  idle 
speculation  on  the  nature  of  the  human  mind. 
We  shall  have  frequent  opportunities  of  alluding 
to  this  doctrine,  in  the  com^se  of  our  subsequent 
inquiries  into  pliilosophical  systems  of  a  later  date. 

The  theory  of  Emanation  arose  naturally  enough 
out  of  the  Alexandrian  Trinity.  Something  was 
wanted  to  manifest  the  connexion  between  divine 
and  earthly  natures;  and  hence  the  doctrine  of 
Emanation,  which  was  invented  to  explain  the 
phenomenon.  The  human  soul  is  identified  with 
the  Infinite  ;  andi  the  world,  and  every  thing  in  it, 
is  an  Emanation  from  this  Great  Eirst  Cause. 
This  opinion  was  a  prolific  soiu'ce  of  contention 
for  several  centuries,  in  all  the  schools  of  philosophy 
and  theology. 


158  NOTIONS    OF    THE    ANCIENTS 


CHAPTER    XIX. 


ON  THE  NOTIONS  ENTERTAINED  BY  THE  DIFFE- 
RENT SCHOOLS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  ON  THE  NATURE 
OF  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROPOSITIONS,  UP 
TO  THE  TIME  OF  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  THE  ALEX- 
ANDRIAN   SCHOOL. 

It  must  appear  to  the  attentive  reader,  tliat  a 
considerable  portion  of  that  controversial  matter 
which  formed  so  essential  a  part  of  the  philoso- 
phical disquisitions  of  the  ancient  sages  of  Greece 
and  Rome,  consisted  in  the  nature,  extent,  and 
application  of  general  principles  and  propositions. 
To  examine  these  in  all  theu^  abstract  nakedness ; 
to  estimate  then'  influence  and  power  over  indivi- 
dual minds,  and  masses  of  men ;  to  see  the  mode 
of  their  operation  in  detecting  truth  and  falsehood; 
to  point  out  their  relationsliip  to  the  various 
individual  powers  of  the  mind;  and,  in  fine,  to 
view  all  theu'  manifold  offices  in  the  general  phe- 
nomena of  thought,  was  the  perpetual  aim  of  nearly 
all  the  profound  speculators  on  human  nature,  of 
whom,  in  ancient  times,  we  have  any  record. 


ON    GENERAL   PRINCIPLES.  159 

On  a  subject  so  recondite,  and  far  removed  from 
ordinary  observation,  and  tbe  common  trains  of 
thought,  we  might  fairly  expect  to  find  a  consider- 
able diversity  of  opinion.  This  anticipation  we 
find  realized  by  unquestionable  facts.  Some  schools 
of  philosophy  treated  of  general  principles  and 
propositions  in  a  plain  and  common  sense  manner, 
making  them  comparatively  easy  of  comprehension; 
and,  at  the  same  time,  calculated  to  promote  the 
cause  of  sound  and  rational  knowledge.  Others, 
again,  sublimated  and  refined  to  a  great  extent,  and 
placed  those  elementary  rules  of  reasoning  and 
truth  at  a  considerable  distance  from  the  grasp  of 
ordinary  minds.  While  no  small  number  of  inqui- 
sitive thinkers  were  led  to  form  theories  and 
systems,  which  had  the  evident  tendency  to  call 
in  question  all  truth  and  knowledge,  and  submerge 
the  human  mind  in  the  slough  of  irredeemable  and 
universal  scepticism. 

But  though  these  \iews  were  opposite  in  their 
nature  and  tendency,  yet  necessity,  and  the  force 
of  nature,  kept  the  generality  of  philosophers 
within  certain  bounds,  and  gave  to  all  theu'  dis- 
cussions a  portion  of  uniformity  and  system.  They 
could  not  labour,  nor  convey  their  views  to  others, 
without  making  use  of  certain  formal  and  recog- 
nized instruments  of  thought.  This  laid  them 
under  obligations  to  arrange  and  systematize  their 
weapons  of  reasoning  and  argumentation.  It  will, 
therefore,  prove  of  advantage  to  the  general  reader 
to  present  him  with  a  bird's-eye  view  of  this  in- 


160  NOTIONS    OF    THE    ANCIENTS 

tellectual  armoury,  so  far  as  the  common  opinions, 
statements,  and  systems  of  the  ancient  sages 
will  afford  us  materials. 

It  may  he  remarked  here,  in  passing,  that  ge- 
neral principles  and  propositions,  for  the  purpose 
of  mental  instruction,  are  not  confined  to  mere 
metaphysical  knowledge.  They  embrace  a  wider 
range.  They  claim  a  connexion  with  the  whole 
circle  of  the  sciences  ;  and  are  applicable  to  the 
discussion  of  every  topic  relating  to  human  nature. 

It  was  a  generally  received  opinion  amongst  the 
ancients,  that  all  knowledge  was  founded  upon 
certam  ultimate  or  first  principles,  which  were 
supposed,  by  several  men  of  distinguished  renown, 
to  have  been  imprinted  on  the  mind  at  its  forma- 
tion, by  the  hand  of  the  Supreme  Being  himself. 
These  elementary  principles  went,  at  various  pe- 
riods of  history,  under  divers  names ;  but  on  the 
whole  they  were  considered,  by  a  decided  majority 
of  speculators  on  the  mind,  to  be  of  a  really  innate 
character.  These  principles  may  be  divided  into 
three  classes  or  sorts ;  namely.  Speculative,  Prac- 
tical, and  Theological. 

Speculative  principles  were,  in  the  systems  of 
the  ancients,  those  which  related  to  the  nature  and 
constitution  of  things,  and  concerning  which  the 
mind,  or  the  more  elevated  part  of  the  intellect, 
had  to  exercise  its  contemplative  or  thinking 
powers ;  as,  for  example,  when  we  say  that  a  whole 
is  greater  than  a  part,  or  that  two  and  three  make 
five.     These  purely  speculative  principles  are  ex- 


ON    GENERAL    PRINCIPLES.  161 

ceeclingly  numerous,  and  must  always,  from  the 
natiu'e  of  the  mind  itself,  be  the  ground- work  of  a 
great  portion  of  pliilosophical  discussion.  Accord- 
ingly we  find  that  they  formed,  so  to  speak,  the 
stock  in  trade  of  a  considerable  number  of  the 
ancient  schools  of  philosophy ;  and  though  these 
principles  are  in  appearance  distantly  removed  from 
the  ordinary  \T.ews  and  affairs  of  men,  yet  this  cir- 
cumstance did  not  prevent  them  in  bygone  times, 
and  will  not  prevent  them  now,  from  exciting  the 
most  lively  and  ardent  feelings,  foLinded  on  intel- 
lectual rivalry,  superiority,  and  distinction. 

Practical  principles  were,  in  the  eyes  of  the  an- 
cients, those  which  required  something  to  be  done ; 
which  led  to  some  immediate  action,  and  which 
were  determined  in  their  nature  and  influence  by 
the  suggestions  of  nature,  or  the  necessities  men 
foimd  themselves  under  to  reduce  them  to  applica- 
tion. Such,  for  example,  as  that  parents  should 
be  honoured  and  obeyed;  honesty  and  integrity 
observed ;  and  contracts  fulfilled.  These  practical 
principles  were  of  every-day  use,  and  formed  the 
basis  of  human  society,  confederation,  and  brother- 
hood. They  constituted  the  materials  of  that 
which  had,  more  or  less,  been  incorporated  into  all 
systems  of  philosophy,  and  must  always  be  invested 
with  paramount  interest ;  namely,  the  common- 
sense  feelings  and  opinions  of  mankind. 

Theological  princip^les  were  such,  in  the  ancient 
systems  of  speculation,  as  related  to  divine  or  ce- 
lestial things ;  as  the  existence,  nature,  and  mode 
of  action  of  the   Great  First   Cause;    and  these 
*  M 


162  NOTIONS    OF   THE    ANCIENTS 

principles  also  embraced  all  those  rules  of  conduct 
and  trains  of  thought,  which  were  grounded  upon 
that  sense  of  duty  wliich  prompted  mankind  to 
feel  a  desire  to  worship  and  obey  the  Creator  and 
Sustainer  of  the  universe. 

There  are  three  attributes,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
ancients,  belonging  to  all  innate  or  ultimate  prin- 
ciples or  propositions ;  namely,  that  they  are  self- 
evident,  universal,  and  the  source  of  many  con- 
clusions. 

1st.  Self-evident  principles  are  such  as  the  mind 
readily  gives  its  assent  to,  as  soon  as  the  terms,  or 
any  form  of  words  in  wliich  they  are  embodied,  are 
expressed  and  understood.  All  negative  propositions 
are  self-evident ;  as  a  square  is  not  a  circle,  nor  a 
man  a  horse.  But  then  these  propositions,  and  all 
others  of  a  similar  nature,  wanted  one  important 
qualification  requisite  to  all  innate  principles ;  that 
they  are  not  the  source  of  a  number  of  conclusions. 
Keither  from  the  proposition  that  a  square  is  not  a 
circle,  nor  a  man  a  horse,  is  there  any  conclusion 
necessarily  deducible. 

2nd.  Universal  propositions  are  such  as  are 
agreed  to  by  persons  of  all  nations  and  creeds. 

3rd.  Principles  are  said  to  be  the  som^ce  of  a 
number  of  conclusions,  from  which  we  can  deduce 
a  great  many  truths. 

Innate  ideas  may  also  be  further  subdivided,  in 
accordance  with  the  ancient  philosophy,  into  four 
descriptions,  immediate,  common,  external,  and 
immutahle. 

1st.  Immediate  principles  are  those,  the  truth  of 


ON    GENERAL    PRINCIPLES.  163 

which  we  can  perceive  without  the  help  of  any 
intermediate  ideas,  such  as  those  which  constitute 
the  evidence  on  which  mathematical  conclusions 
are  grounded. 

2nd.  Common  principles  are  such  as  are  agreed 
upon  by  all  mankind. 

3rd.  External  principles  are  those  which  ever 
have  been,  and  always  must  be,  true.  Though,  for 
example,  a  triangle  had  never  been  formed  or  de- 
scribed, yet  it  needs  must  have  been  eternally  true 
that  its  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right  ones. 

4th.  Immutable  principles  are  those  which  re- 
main always  the  same.  We  cannot  conceive  how 
even  Omnipotence  Himself  could  reverse  their  na- 
ture. The  terms  in  which  such  propositions  are 
couched  may  be  reversed ;  but  their  mental  nature 
or  essence  seems  to  be  unchanged  and  unchange- 
able. A  square  may  be  called  a  circle,  and  a  circle 
a  square ;  but  still  to  the  mind's  eye,  or  to  the 
eye  of  the  understanding,  the  nature  of  these  two 
mathematical  conceptions  remains  the  same.  We 
conceive  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  Almighty 
Himself  to  make  two  contradictory  propositions, 
both  true  and  false  at  the  same  time,  nor  cause 
the  same  individual  to  be  at  two  different  places  at 
the  same  moment.  This  does  not  argue  any  im- 
perfection in  the  Supreme  Being  ;  on  the  contrary, 
to  make  Him  the  author  of  an  absurdity,  ought  to 
be  considered  as  a  manifest  and  great  imperfection. 

Aristotle,  and  the  Peripatetics  generally,  main- 
tained the  idea  that  there  were  two  principles,  of  a 
seemingly  discordant  and  contradictory  nature,  on 

M  2 


164  NOTIONS    or    THE    ANCIENTS 

which  a  great  part,  if  not  the  whole,  of  our  know- 
ledge was  huilt.  The  first  of  these  principles  was, 
"Whatever  is,  is;"  and  the  second,  "It  is  im- 
possible for  the  same  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be." 
The  first  proposition  was  called  a  direct  one,  be- 
cause it  was  thought  to  form  the  basis  of  all  direct 
or  certain  information.  The  second  was  termed 
indirect,  and  was  conceived  to  be  the  ground  of 
all  indirect  demonstrations,  or  such  as  led  to  ab- 
surd and  ridiculous  consequences  or  conclusions. 
Some  of  the  ancient  Sages,  who  were  smitten  with 
a  love  of  system  to  a  great  extent,  went  so  far  as 
to  declare  that  the  first  proposition,  that  "What- 
ever is,  is,"  embodied  the  sum  and  substance  of  all 
human  knowledge. 

The  discussion,  in  the  different  schools  of  philo- 
sophy, relative  to  the  general  doctrine  of  ultimate 
or  first  principles,  gave  rise  to  a  variety  of  opinions 
and  systems.  One  class  of  reasoners,  deeply  im- 
pressed with  the  importance  of  truth,  were  anxious 
to  divest  themselves  of  prejudices  and  partiali- 
ties of  every  kind,  in  order  to  guard  against  error 
more  effectually.  They  attempted  the  study  of 
nature  with  minds  like  a  tabula  rasa.  This  led 
them  formally  to  renounce  all  established  princi- 
ples. They  supported  tliis  course  of  proceeding 
by  urging  that,  from  personal  experience,  their 
various  organs  of  sensation  deceived  them,  and 
conveyed  to  their  minds  false  impressions  of  exter- 
nal objects ;  and,  in  fact,  that  these  faculties  of 
perception  were  so  capricious  in  their  operations, 
that  no  positive  or  legitimate  conclusions  could  be 


ON    GENERAL   PRINCIPLES.  165 

drawn  from  them.  These  reasoners  also  main- 
tained, that  they  had  been  induced  to  place  faith 
in  a  variety  of  things  from  the  prejudices  of  edu- 
cation; and  that  they  were  daily  called  upon  to 
renounce  some  favourite  principle  or  other,  which 
a  more  extended  acquaintance  with  the  maxims  of 
philosophy  showed  to  be  perfectly  absurd  or  ridi- 
culous. Even  with  respect  to  self-e^ddent  maxims 
and  propositions,  they  felt  themselves  not  fully 
justified  in  placing  implicit  confidence  in  them. 
This  brought  all  such  reasoners  to  the  verge  of 
complete  scepticism.  The  existence  of  a  material 
universe  seemed  almost  to  vanish  from  their  belief. 
The  reader  will  readily  recognise  from  the  pre- 
ceding remarks,  that  the  speculative  principles 
greatly  predominated  in  the  seats  of  learning  at 
particular  periods.  They  also  gave  way  at  in- 
tervals to  investigations  of  a  practical  or  common- 
sense  character  ;  and  very  often  both  were  blended 
in  the  elucidation  of  theological  principles,  relative 
to  the  existence  of  nature,  and  the  modes  of  opex'a- 
tion  of  the  Divine  or  Supreme  Mind. 


166  ROMAN    SCHOOL. 


CHAPTER     XX. 
THE  ROMAN  SCHOOL  OF  MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


The  E-oman  School  of  metaphysics,  considered  in 
itself,  is  but  of  little  moment.  In  viewing  it, 
however,  in  conjunction  with  various  Grecian 
systems,  it  becomes  more  interesting,  and  has  a 
higher  claim  to  our  regard. 

The  Roman  people  were  altogether  different 
from  the  Grecians.  The  warlike  character,  the 
rude  and  abrupt  manners,  and  the  enterprising 
restlessness  of  the  former,  present  a  striking  con- 
trast to  the  mild,  refined,  and  effemmate  ci\Tlization 
of  the  Greek  republics.  The  Roman  was,  therefore, 
a  man  whom  both  nature  and  education  had  in  a 
great  measure  unfitted  for  very  abstract  specula- 
tion. His  forte  lay  in  activity  and  martial  ardour. 
Pure  speculation  hung  always  loosely  about  him, 
because  it  proved  but  a  drag  or  incumbrance  to 
his  movements.  The  theatre  of  his  action  was 
confined  to  the  bustle  and  turmoil  of  public  life ; 
and  his  only  hope  of  fame  and  distinction  rested  on 


OF   MENTAL   PHILOSOPHY.  167 

tlie  active  and  efficient  discharge  of  duties  which 
society  imposed  upon  him.  Not  so  the  Greek. 
His  soul  was  fashioned  in  a  softer  mould.  Luxu- 
rious ease,  and  contemplative  equanimity,  were  the 
grand  objects  of  his  life.  He  lay  upon  his  couch, 
or  sauntered  in  his  garden,  with  his  soul  buried  in 
sublime  speculation ;  and  to  solve  a  problem  or 
develop  a  theory,  afforded  him  more  intense  grati- 
fication, than  the  possession  of  a  crown  or  the 
subjugation  of  an  empire. 

Some   philosophical   historians   have   expressed 
their  surprise  that  the  E-omans  added  so  little  to 
the   science  of  mind.     Why  should  tliey  be  sur- 
prised at  this  result  ?     Do  men  "  gather  grapes 
of  thorns,   or   figs  of  thistles  ?"     It   is   no   easy 
matter  to  change  the  frame-work  of  a  nation's 
mind.     Many   ages   of  discipline  and   favourable 
external  circumstances,  are  requisite  to  effect  such 
a   result.     AYe   may   readily   imiagine   witli   what 
wonder  the  inhabitants  of  Rome  would  first  listen 
to  the  development  of  Grecian  metaphysics,  con- 
veyed  through    the   medium    of  a   different   and 
unknown  tongue ;  couched  in  a  dialectic  form  to 
which  they  were  entire  strangers ;  and  aiming  at 
nothing  short  of  accoimting  for  the  origin  of  the 
universe,  and  every  tiling  in  it.     The  seeds  of  such 
knowledge  must  have  fallen  upon  many  hard  and 
stony    places.       Several    ages    must    have    been 
required  to  cultivate  and  enrich  the  soil  for  their 
reception   and   fruition.      Our    surprise   therefore 
ouc^ht  to  be  that  the  Romans  reallv  made  so  much 
progress  in   the  knowledge  of  the  philosophy  of 


168  ROMAN    SCHOOL. 

Greece,  as  they  actually  did,  considering  the 
manifold  obstacles  from  political  institutions, 
social  habits,  difference  of  language,  and  consti- 
tutional temperament. 

The  Romans  first  became  acquainted  with  the 
mental  speculations  of  the  Greeks,  through  the 
channels  of  political  relationship.  The  consular 
and  ambassadorial  dignities  carried  the  seeds  of  the 
new  pliilosophy  to  Rome.  Scipio  long  patronized 
the  Stoic  Pangetius,  who  seems  to  have  been 
extremely  zealous  and  successful  in  disseminating 
his  views  in  the  metropolis  of  the  world.  It  is 
said  that  he  fully  developed  both  the  Platonic  and 
Stoical  systems ;  and  made  many  converts  of  rank 
and  influence.  A  knowledo;e  of  other  schools  and 
sects  followed.  The  doctrines  of  the  Epicureans, 
and  of  the  New  Academy,  were  promidgated  ;  and 
Sylla  brought  to  Rome  the  works  of  Aristotle, 
which  became  generally  accessible,  through  the 
means  of  a  translation,  eff'ected  bv  Tyrannion  and 
Andronicus  of  Rhodes. 


Lucretius. 

The  first  fruit  of  Grecian  speculation  among  the 
Romans,  was  that  of  Lucretius.  He  was  a  disciple 
and  admirer  of  Epicurus.  His  poem,  De  Rerum 
Natiira,  contains  all  the  leading  views  and  princi- 
ples of  the  Epicurean  pliilosophy.  We  have  the 
religious  veneration  and  fear  of  the  gods  ridiculed ; 
the  necessity  of  emancipating  the  mind  from  all 
notions  of  a  Divine  Nature;  but,  at  the  same  time. 


LUCRETIUS.  169 

to  endow  it  with  that  resolute  and  inflexible  deter- 
mination and  self-government,  that  will  enable  it 
to  triumph  even  over  destiny  itself.  Nature  is  the 
only  Deity  which  the  poet  can  recognise ;  but  even 
here,  we  find  that  strildng  circumstance  occur, 
which  demonstrates  tliat  poets  cannot  go  on  long 
without  some  active  or  creative  power ;  and  hence 
it  is  that  we  find  him  gi^^ing  life,  vitality,  and  in- 
telligence, to  this  very  principle  or  abstraction 
which  he  calls  nature.  In  fact,  he  makes  a  Deity 
of  it,  both  in  its  essence  and  offices.  It  is  only 
through  the  instrumentality  of  this  \dvifying  or 
active  principle,  that  he  has  been  able  to  make 
any  thing  like  a  readable  poem  out  of  the  Epicu- 
rean system.  He  personifies  Nature.  He  repre- 
sents her  as  a  ruling  unity,  who  makes  her  power 
and  influence  felt  in  every  direction.  Even  when 
this  power  and  influence  are  delegated  to  inferior 
agents,  as  the  sun  or  stars,  the  same  vital  principle 
goes  with  them,  and  discharges  the  active  duties 
of  their  office.  This  is  not  ascribable  to  any  poetic 
license,  but  arises  from  the  very  nature  of  things 
themselves.  There  is  no  other  course  open  to  the 
poet,  no  matter  what  his  notions  of  fatality  may  be. 
Lucretius'  notions  on  the  human  soul  are  very 
perplexed  and  irrational.  His  theory  of  the  nature 
of  the  primordial  atoms  of  which  all  things  consist, 
is  the  only  key  we  have  as  to  what  liis  opinions 
really  were.  He  talks  of  atoms  having  a  principle 
of  self  motion*  ;  and  these  are  the  elements  out  of 

*  "Prima  moventur  enim  per  se  primordia  rerum."  b.  2.   132. 


170  ROMAN  SCHOOL. 

which  the  voluntary  powers  are  fabricated.  The 
different  forms  of  the  atoms,  and  the  direction 
they  take,  either  straight  or  oblique,  determine 
the  individual  character  of  the  soul.  These  forms 
are  finite,  but  the  seeds  of  each  configuration  are 
innumerable ;  and  hence,  by  inference,  the  immense 
variety  in  animated  creatures. 

Cicero.    106  b.  c. 

Cicero   is   the    most    distinguished    civilian    in 
E/Oman  history.     As  an  historian,  a  politician,    a 
statesman,  and  an  orator,  he  is  unrivalled ;  as  a  phi- 
losopher he  holds  a  respectable  station.     We  esti- 
mate him  in  this  last  character,  not  so  much  for 
what  he  has  left  us  of  his   otvti   speculations,  as 
for   what   he  has   given  us  of  the   opinions   and 
systems  of  others.     He  was  not  a  profound  and 
subtile  genius,  who  could  frame  a  system,  and  work 
it  out  with  the  most  refined  and  elaborate  illustra- 
tions ;  but  he  had  a  powerful  and  brilliant  judgment, 
and  keen  intellectual  perception,  which  could  pene- 
trate into  matters  of  the  most  recondite  nature. 
Still,  however,  he  was   no  theorist.     He  knew  a 
great  deal  of  many  systems ;  felt  some  partialities 
for  particular  ones  ;  but  he  never  assumed  the  cha- 
racter of  a  philosophical  partisan,  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  word.     He  dived  a  little  into  this  system, 
and  a  little   into  that,  but  never  appeared  as  a 
thorough-paced  proselyte,    determined   to   defend 
certain  dogmas,  whether  they  were  true  or  not. 
The  structure  of  his  mind,  and  the  habits  of  his 


CICEUO.  171 

life,  were  quite  in  opposition  to  a  eliaracter  of 
this  description.  He  was  in  every  sense  of  the  ex- 
pression, a  man  of  the  world.  Knowledge  was  to 
him  an  instrument  for  use,  not  an  object  of  mere 
curiosity  or  display.  It  was  to  promote  his  views 
and  fame  as  a  lawyer,  an  orator,  a  statesman,  and  a 
politician,  that  lie  cultivated  an  acquaintance  with 
philosophy  ;  and  in  every  movement  of  his  active 
mind,  of  which  we  have  any  literary  memorial  left, 
we  may  fairly  discern  how  adi'oitly  he  turned  tliis 
acquaintanceship  to  a  profitable  and  honourable  use. 

We  shall  consider  him  chiefly  as  a  metaphysician. 
His  genius  embraced  every  section  of  Greek  philo- 
sophy. He  had  studied  with  considerable  care  and 
success  both  Aristotle  and  Plato,  as  well  as  the 
Epicurean  and  the  Stoical  systems.  Por  a  critical 
knowledge,  he  sufficiently  mastered  the  most  im- 
portant theories  connected  with  the  nature  and 
faculties  of  the  human  miderstanding.* 

On  the  nature  of  the  human  soul,  this  celebrated 
man  observes  :  "  The  soul  is  derived  immediately 
from  the  Di^dnity.  It  retains  ties  of  relationship 
with  celestial  beings ;  and  hence  it  comes  to  pass 
that  amidst  all  animated  nature,  man  is  the  only 
creature  which  possesses  the  knowledge  of  a  Supreme 
Being.  The  possession  of  this  knowledge  is  then 
sufficient  to  entitle  man  to  point  to  Ms  upward 
origin.  Nature  has  placed  in  us  certain  necessary 
and  elementary  notions,  Avliich  form  the  basis  of  all 
true  wisdom  and  science. "f 

On  the  nature  of  the  organs  of  sensation  Cicero 

*  See  Note  D.  at  the  end  of  this  Volume.         t  De  Legibus  1.  8.  9, 


172  ROMAN    SCHOOL. 

remarks,  "Our  senses  have  been  conferred  upon 
us,  in  our  present  state  of  being,  to  act  the  part  of 
so  many  satellites  or  messengers,  each  of  which  is 
invested  "with  its  own  proper  function,  and  the  per- 
fection of  each  sense  consists  in  percei^dng,  mth 
promptness  and  certainty,  those  things  which  nature 
submits  to  them." 

It  is  not  possible,  however,  to  determine  whether 
Cicero  considered  our  sensations  as  affording  us  a 
standard  of  truth,  or  whether  they  were  fallacious, 
and  not  to  be  depended  upon.  He  is  wdshful  to 
steer  a  kind  of  middle  course  between  conflicting 
systems.  He  could  not  go  the  whole  length  of  say- 
ing, that  the  impressions  by  the  senses  were  stamped 
mth  infallible  certainty;  neither,  on  the  other  hand, 
would  his  movements  among  men  of  the  world,  and 
an  active  participation  in  all  its  duties,  allow  him 
to  consider  these  impressions,  in  the  vast  majority 
of  cases,  as  uncertain  and  illusory.  To  solve  the 
difficulty  in  some  measure,  he  instituted  a  species 
fdi  iwohahility ,  which  was  to  serve  the  common  and 
ordinary  purpose  of  guiding  men  to  safe  and  rational 
conclusions,  on  all  matters  appertaining  to  the 
mere  phenomena  of  sensation.  There  is,  however, 
great  vagueness  and  uncertainty  on  every  thing  the 
philosopher  has  advanced  on  this  question.  In 
some  places  he  considers  the  senses  as  the  mere 
channels  through  wliich  objects  are  conveyed  to  the 
mind ;  and  that  it  is  the  peculiar  province  of  this 
intelligent  principle,  to  procure  information,  to 
combine,  and  compare,  and  to  judge.*   This  position 

*  Tusc.  1.  20. 


CICERO.  173 

is,  however,  laid  down  with  so  many  qualifications 
and  reservations,  that  it  becomes  quite  obvious 
that  he  had  no  decided  or  systematic  opinions  on 
the  subject  of  sensation  generally.* 

On  the  difficulties  which  present  themselves  in 
all  investigations  after  truth,  Cicero  thus  expresses 
himself:  "All  knowledge  is  encircled  with  diffi- 
culties. Such  is  the  natural  obscurity  of  things, 
and  the  constitutional  weakness  of  the  principle  of 
intelligence,  that  the  most  sagacious  minds  of  an- 
tiquity have  doubted  whether  we  ever  can  arrive  at 
truth  at  all.  The  most  part  of  mankind  em- 
brace opinions  without  having  the  power  of  choosing 
them.  They  judge  of  what  they  do  not  know ;  and 
attach  themselves  to  some  favourite  system,  as 
mariners  do  to  a  rock  in  a  tempestuous  sea.  But 
a  philosopher  will  only  give  his  assent  after  he  has 
patiently  heard  both  sides,  and  after  a  careful 
re\dew  of  all  the  opinions  which  have  previously 
been  advanced  on  the  subject." 

Cicero  seems  to  have  established  his  metaphysi- 
cal creed  upon  the  general  principles  of  Plato's 
system.  Though  well  grounded  in  various  other 
doctrines  relative  to  the  mind,  he  decidedly  gives 
the  preference  to  those  of  this  eminent  Grecian 
sage.  Cicero  almost  always  had  a  fondness  for  Plato. 
They  had  many  things  in  common.  There  were 
the  same  elevation  of  thought,  and  warmth  of  feel- 
ing, displayed  in  both ;  and  the  same  deference 
paid  to  the  common-sense  feelings  and  sentiments 
of  mankind.     This  must  have  proved  a  powerful 

*  De  Finibns.  2.  12. 


174  ROMAN  SCHOOL. 

bond  of  union.  And  there  can  be  no  rational  doubt 
but  that  the  predilection  which  the  great  orator  and 
statesman  manifested  for  Plato's  views  of  the  human 
understanding,  arose  from  an  inward  and  powerful 
conviction  that  they  were  more  in  unison  with  the 
duties  and  destinies  of  man,  than  those  of  any  other 
of  the  Grecian  philosophers.* 

The  immediate  followers  of  Cicero  in  pliilo- 
sophical  disquisitions,  were  not  signalized  by  any 
advancements  in  the  study  of  mind.  Indeed  it 
was  in  a  great  measure  neglected  by  all  the  latter 
disciples  of  the  Stoical  School  at  Rome.  The 
speculations  of  the  learned  men  who  still  adliered 
to  the  forms  of  philosophy,  were  directed  to  the 
principles  which  regulate  the  ordinary  current  of 
human  life,  and  into  the  nature  of  public  and 
private  good  and  evil.  The  Stoical  school,  for  a 
long  period  after  the  death  of  Cicero,  clearly  indi- 
cates how  disinclined  the  Romans  were  to  abstract 
studies,  and  what  a  faint  relish  they  displayed  for 
all  the  most  sul3lime  speculations  which  formed  the 
intellectual  glory  of  Athens.  With  the  exception 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of  the  human  will, 
we  can  scarcely  recognize  a  single  speculation 
of  a  metaphysical  character,  brought  prominently 

*  Vide,  The  Memoirs  of  Gauthier  tie  Sibert,  on  the  Philosophy  of 
Cicero,  iu  the  27th  book  of  the  Academy  of  Inscrijjtions,  Paris ;  Facci- 
olati.  Vita  C  iceronis  Litteraria,  Paris,  1760  ;  Middleton's  Life  of  Cicero, 
London  ;  Hulsemann,  De  Indole  Philosophica  M.TulliiCiceronis,  Luxem- 
burg, 1 700  ;  Meniers,  Oratio  de  Phil.  Ciceronis,  Leipsic  ;  Adam  Bursius, 
Dialectica  Ciceronis,  Zamosck,  1604  ;  Janson  de  Nares,  Brevis  et 
distincta  Quajst.  in  Ciceronis  Philosophia,  Pavia,  loJ)/  ;  Waldin,  Oratio  de 
Phil.  Ciceronis   Platonica,  Jena,  \753. 


ALCINOUS.  175 

forward  on  the  stage  of  public  discussion,  for  a 
long  series  of  years.  To  this  doctrine,  however, 
the  Stoics  were  enthusiastically  attached.  Indeed 
it  forms  the  grand  key- stone  to  then-  whole  sys- 
tem of  morals.  A  few  scattered  thoughts  on  the 
philosophy  of  mind  may  he  found  connected  with 
the  names  of  Q.  Sextus,  Demetrius,  Demonax  of 
Cyprus,  (Enomaus  of  Gadara,  Athenodorus  of 
Tarsus,  Seneca,  Musonius  Rufus,  Epictetus,  and 
M.  Aurelius  Antoninus. 


ALCINOUS. 

Amongst  the  most  eminent  metaphysicians 
who  adorned  the  school  of  the  new  Platonists  at 
Rome,  Alcinous  took  a  distinguished  rank.  His 
"  Introduction  to  the  Fhllosophj  of  JBlato^^  is  the 
very  best  summary  of  Plato's  system  which  has 
ever  been  given. 


Alcinous  maintains  that  that  w^liich  has  for  its 
object  intelligent  things,  is  science,  or  scientific 
reason ;  that  which  embraces  sensible  things,  or 
sensations,  is  doxatical  reason,  or  opinion. 

It  foUow^s  then  from  this,  that  all  which  flows 
from  the  exercise  of  this  scientific  reason,  is  solid 
and  immutable,  because  it  is  itself  founded  upon  a 
basis  which  embodies  these  two  qualities.  On  the 
other  hand,  factitious  reason  or  opinion  offers  only 
general  probabilities,  and  resemblances,  because 
it  is  founded  only  upon  uncertain  data. 

The  understanding  is  the  foundation  of  science, 
Avhich  has  for  its  objects  intelligent  tilings;  and 


176  ROMAN    SCHOOL. 

sensation  is  the  link  wMcli  connects  the  under- 
standing with  our  senses. 

Sensation  is  an  impression  which  the  soul  re- 
ceives from  external  objects,  and  which  impression 
indicates  its  passive  nature. 

When,  then,  the  soul  receives,  through  the 
instrumentality  of  the  senses,  a  sensible  impres- 
sion,— that  is  to  say,  a  sensation, — instead  of  its 
being  destroyed,  or  erased  by  time,  it  remains  and 
is  treasured  up  there  ;  and  the  continuation  of  its 
future  existence,  is  that  effect  of  sensation  which 
produces  what  we  term  memory. 

When  we  recognize  a  sensible  object,  whilst  the 
presence  of  that  object  produces  in  us  a  sensation, 
and  this  sensation  is  imprinted  on  the  memory ; 
when  we  perceive  again  tliis  identical  object,  we 
compare  the  preceding  sensation,  which  has  been 
preserved  by  the  memory,  with  the  new  sensation ; 
and  we  thus  say  to  ourselves,  for  example,  Socrates^ 
horse,  fire  ;  and  so  of  other  things. 

When,  then,  we  compare  a  previous  sensation 
with  another  just  experienced,  the  effect  of  this  act 
of  comparison  is  termed  opinion.  When  the  two 
objects  compared  are  in  unison,  the  result  of  the 
comparison  is  truth ;  on  the  contrary,  when  there 
is  want  of  agreement,  the  opinion  is  false  and 
erroneous.* 

Maximus  of  Tyre. 
This  writer  on  the  mind  follows  nearly  the  same 

*  Introrliiction  to  the  Philosophy  of  Plato. 


MAXIMUS    OF    TYRE.  177 

path  as  Alcinous.     The  distinction  between  reason 
and  the  mere  sentient  principle,  he  points  out  in 
^the  following  manner. 

"Let  us  inquire  what  that  is  in  man  to  which 
we  apply  the  terms  to  know,  to  learn,  to  app^^eliend, 
and  other  phrases  of  a  similar  nature  which  indi- 
cate that  the  soul  is  in  a  contemplative  state  of 
existence.  Do  we  call  by  the  name  of  science  that 
which  the  senses  assemble  as  in  a  contemplative 
picture-frame,  and  which  we  commonly  designate 
by  the  name  of  experience  ;  that,  in  fact,  which  is 
submitted  to  the  eyes  of  the  mind,  and  which  reason, 
after  due  examination,  stamps  with  its  own  seal  ? 
Such  a  science  as  this,  it  must  be  owned,  is  common 
to  brutes  ;  for  they  receive  sensations,  acquire  ex- 
perience, and  possess  a  species  of  wisdom.  The 
superiority  of  man  is  derived  from  his  reason,  and 
liis  relation  to  science  is  nothing  but  this  reason 
bringing  under  its  power,  for  a  sufficient  length  of 
time,  the  multitudinous  objects  submitted  to  its 
notice ;  and  in  its  active  powers  detecting  resem- 
blances and  contrarieties  ;  separating,  uniting,  dis- 
tinguishing, and  producing  an  harmonious  whole, 
out  of  a  mass  of  incongruous  and  diversified  ma- 
terials. The  soul  of  man  is  a  compound  of  mortal 
and  immortal  elements.  The  latter  qualities  Linite 
him  with  the  gods.  Instinct  is  the  gift  of  the 
former  ;  intelligence  that  of  the  latter.  Prudence 
or  sagacity  holds  a  situation  between  them  both  ; 
and  establishes  the  supremacy  of  our  immortal 
nature  upon  that  which  we  possess  in  common  with 
the  animal  creation.     Experience  has  created  the 

*  N 


178  HOMAN    SCHOOL. 

arts  ;  prudence  or  sagacity  governs  the  passions  and 
emotions  of  the  soul ;  and  intelligence  represents 
the  laws  of  tliis  external  habitation  of  ours — laws 
which  have  been  created  by  God  himself.  I  call 
true  science  the  harmonious  combination  of  these 
three  faculties  or  powers." 

We  find  Maximus  entertaining  the  '^most  lofty 
ideas  of  the  nature  of  the  soul.  He  had  evidentlv 
drunk  deep  in  the  Platonic  philosophy.  It  is  only 
the  internal  and  intelligent  parts  of  the  man  which 
command  liis  admiration  and  respect ;  it  is  these 
alone  which  raise  him  to  the  dignity  of  claiming  an 
affinity  with  Deity  itself.  There  is  a  genuine  spiri- 
tuality and  life  in  his  mental  speculations,  which 
are  not  displayed  in  the  lucubrations  of  his  pre- 
decessors.* 

Maximus  did  not  fail  to  notice  the  various  sources 
of  error  mankind  had  to  contend  against  in  their 
pursuit  of  truth.  Not  only  the  passions  of  the  soul 
blind  and  misdirect  the  reason,  but  even  philosophy 
herself,  infallible  as  she  is  commonly  considered, 
is  but  a  frail  and  uncertain  guide.  The  rivaby  of 
different  and  opposing  sects,  the  influence  of  am- 
bitious singularity,  and  the  strong  prepossessions  in 
favour  of  particular  studies  and  sciences,  distract 
the  judgment  of  the  most  sedate  and  able  men,  and 
convert  them  into  instruments  of  delusion.  The  phi- 
losophy of  Thales  was  viewed  through  the  medium 
of  astronomy ;  of  Pythagoras,  through  music ;  of 
Heraclitus,  through  solitude  ;  of  Socrates,  througli 

*  Maximus  Tvr.  Diss.  12.  U.  17 


ALEXANDER. GALEN.  179 

the  moral  affections ;  and  of  Epicurus,  through  vo- 
luptuousness. Thus  mankind  are  bewildered  and 
tossed  from  one  set  of  doctrines  to  another.* 


Alexander  op  Aphrodisias. 

This  metaphysician  was  a  distinguished  com- 
mentator on  Aristotle,  to  whose  ideas  he  added  some 
notions  of  his  own.  He  attacks  the  Platonists, 
the  Stoics,  and  the  Epicureans,  and  seems  to  have 
been  a  stout  and  resolute  defender  of  the  perfect 
stability  of  human  knowledge. 

Alexander  was  a  strenuous  advocate  for  free-will. 
He  maintains  that  this  power  was  given  to  man, 
and  is  one  of  the  marks  which  distinguish  him 
from  mere  animal  nature.  He  points  out,  with 
great  force,  the  moral  and  social  evils  which  follow 
the  doctrines  of  necessary  connexion,  when  they 
are  once  brought  into  active  operation  in  the  con- 
duct of  individuals  or  whole  bodies  of  men. 


Galen. 

This  distinguished  physician  did  not  confine  his 
inquiries  to  those  topics  more  immediately  con- 
nected with  the  physical  constitution  of  man  ;  but 
with  indefatigable  labour  investigated  those  hidden 
springs  of  mental  action,  which  always  exercise  a 
greater  or  lesser  influence  over  the  bodily  powers 
of  human  nature.     He  seems  to  have  freed  himself 

*  Diss.  25. 

n  2 


180  KOMAN    SCHOOL. 

from  the  trammels  of  systems,  and  to  have  prose- 
cuted his  inqumes  under  the  influence  of  a  sincere 
and  ardent  love  of  truth. 

On  the  abstract  nature  of  evidence  he  makes 
some  profound  and  just  remarks.  He  saw  the 
great  error  which  pervaded  many  of  the  systems 
promulgated  by  the  ancients,  which  principally 
consisted  in  an  absurd  and  ridiculous  aj^plication  of 
general  terms,  without  making  those  perpetual  re- 
ferences to  facts,  which  are  indis^Densable  for  the 
foundation  of  comprehensive  branches  of  science 
and  knowledge.  In  his  definition  of  synthesis  and 
analysis,  he  points  out  the  nature  of  both  these  in- 
struments, the  limits  of  each,  and  the  most  ap- 
proved rules  for  the  advantageous  combination  of 
both. 

He  distinguished  four  kinds  of  demonstration. 
The  first  produced  all  science ;  it  seized  the  reality 
of  things,  and  investigated  their  nature  completely ; 
the  second,  that  logical  process  on  which  dialec- 
tics were  founded  ;  the  third,  that  which  embraced 
foreign  testimony,  grounded  upon  the  probability 
of  the  statements  advanced  ;  and  the  fourth  rested 
on  commonly  received  notions  or  opinions. 

Galen  remarks,  that  evidence  is  the  source  of  all 
intellectual  light ;  if  there  were  no  evidence,  there 
could  be  no  exercise  of  the  human  understanding.- 
This  power  is  to  the  soul  what  the  eye  is  to  the 
body.  To  perceive,  is  to  comprehend,  to  know,  to 
be  assured  of  the  existence  of  things.  It  is  necessary, 
then,  to  commence  all  our  inquiries  with  essential 
and  fundamental  things,  and  to  take  our  departure 


GALEN.  181 

from  those  things  that  are  easy  of  comprehensiorij 
and  are  immediately  around  us. 

This  philosopher  considered  that  the  common 
source  of  error  amongst  men,  arose  from  a  too  hasty 
generalisation.  The  successful  search  after  truth 
essentially  consists  in  an  extensive  and  careful  in- 
vestigation, and  an  exact  comparison  as  to  the 
differences  and  resemblances  of  thinors. 


182  LATER   SCHOOL   OF    SCEPTICISM. 


CHAPTER   XXI. 
THE  LATEK  SCHOOL  OF  METAPHYSICAL  SCEPTICISM. 


At  stated  periods  in  the  history  of  mental  phi- 
losophy we  find  that  certain  men  invariably  at- 
tempted to  gain  distinction  and  notoriety,  by  call- 
ing in  question  the  fundamental  maxims  of  know- 
ledge, truth,  and  reasoning.  We  find  all  shades 
and  degrees  of  scepticism;  from  the  humble  and 
simple  doubter,  to  the  absolute  and  dogmatical 
disbeliever  in  even  his  own  personal  existence. 
The  nature  of  mental  inquiry  is  favourable  to  tliis 
intellectual  disease ;  chiefly  from  the  abstract  na- 
ture of  its  principles,  the  uncertainty  and  imper- 
fections of  language,  the  difficulty  attending  a  close 
and  consecutive  examination  of  the  phenomena  of 
thought,  and  the  variable  motives  which  may 
influence  the  judgments  of  the  metaphysician 
throughout  the  whole  course  of  his  investigations. 


tEnesidemus. 
^nesidemus  was  a  reviver  of  the  doctrines  of  the 


^NESIDEMUS.  183 

Pyrrlionians.  He  was  a  contemporary  of  Cicero,  was 
a  native  of  Crete,  and  taught  philosophy  at  Alex- 
andria. He  wrote  a  work  to  point  out  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  doctrines  of  the  Academicians, 
and  those  of  the  followers  of  Pyrrho.  In  the  se- 
cond book  of  this  work  ^nesidemus  treats  of  truth, 
causation,  action,  chance,  motion,  production,  de- 
struction, with  a  view  of  showing  the  imperfections 
of  om'  knowledge  on  all  these  matters.  In  the 
third  book  he  treats  of  our  sensations,  and  endea- 
vours to  show  that  there  is  a  great  want  of  uniformity 
amongst  them.  The  fourth  book  is  occupied  with 
the  imperfections  of  signs ;  and  the  fifth  points  out 
the  uncertainty  accompanying  all  those  deductions 
which  we  make  from  sensible  tilings,  to  matters 
removed  from  the  senses.  The  sixth  attacks  the 
ordinary  maxims  respecting  cause  and  effect ;  and 
the  other  three  books  are  confi.ned  to  questions  as 
to  good  and  evil,  and  the  end  and  destiny  of  man. 

On  the  subject  of  causation,  this  philosopher 
makes  the  following  remarks  :  "  Bodies  cannot  be 
the  cause  of  other  bodies ;  for  if  they  act,  they 
must  either  act  by  themselves,  or  by  others,  as 
intermediate  agents.  If  by  themselves,  they  can 
only  produce  that  which  ah'eady  forms  a  part  of 
their  own  nature  or  essence ;  if  they  act  through 
the  instrumentality  of  others,  then  these  become 
necessarily  one  and  the  same  substance.  That 
which  is  incorporeal  cannot,  moreover,  be  the 
cause  of  another  incorporeal  substance;  and  for 
this  reason,  beings  cannot  produce  that  which 
forms  no  part  of  their  own  nature.     Besides,  that 


18i  LATER    SCHOOL    OF    SCEPTICISM. 

which  is  incorporeal  cannot  he  in  contact  with,  or 
act  upon,  or  he  acted  upon  hy,  that  which  is  material. 
Bodies  cannot  he  the  cause  of  incorporeal  natures, 
nor  can  the  latter  be  the  cause  of  the  former,  for 
they  contain  opposite  properties  or  principles.  A 
body  at  rest  cannot  be  the  cause  of  another  body 
also  at  rest,  nor  can  a  body  in  motion  be  the  cause 
of  another  that  moves  itself."* 

What  JGnesidemus  meant  by  being  or  essence,  is 
difficult  to  conjecture.  His  views  on  the  primary 
causes  of  things  seem  at  variance  with  the  general 
scope  of  his  speculations.  The  essence  (ovaia)  was 
the  primeval  body ;  but  whether  it  included  a  se- 
condary body,  is  uncertain,  f  He  also  considered 
air  as  the  principle  of  all  things.  There  seems, 
however,  to  have  been  great  confusion  in  his  mind 
on  every  topic  of  speculation. 

Agrippa. 

This  ancient  writer  was  the  successor  of  ^Ene- 
sidemus,  and  cultivated  his  system  with  great 
zeal  and  success.  He  made  additional  maxims 
to  the  theory  of  Pyrrho.  These  maxims  are  five 
in  number.  The  first  relates  to  the  differences 
amongst  the  various  schools  of  philosophy,  on  the 
truth  of  theu'  respective  elementary  principles. 
The  second  arises  from  the  notion  of  infinity  in- 
volved in  every  chain  of  proofs,  that  one  depends 
upon  another  ad  infinitum.     The  third  maxim,  of 

*  Photius,  Bibl.  pp.  642.  648.         t  Sextus  Empiri.,  Pyrrb.  3.  138. 


PHAVORINUS — SEXTTJS   EMPIRICUS.  185 

doubt,  refers  to  the  uncertainty  we  must  always 
labour  under  as  to  the  real  nature  of  objects  ;  inas- 
much as  we  can  only  speak  or  judge  of  things  by 
our  own  individual  sensations  or  perceptions. 
Fourthly,  we  are  led  into  doubt  and  error  from  the 
hasty  adoption  of  purely  gratuitous  principles. 
And  the  fifth  maxim  is  the  common  practice  of 
reasoning  in  a  circle.  There  seems,  however,  no- 
thing novel  in  all  these  maxims.  They  have  been 
repeated  over  and  over  again  by  many  preceding 
philosophers.* 

Phavomnus. 

This  philosopher  wrote  a  treatise  on  Vision,  as 
well  as  upon  the  Academical  propositions,  and  the 
views  of  Pyrrho.  Philostratus  informs  us  that 
these  works  were  of  high  merit.  It  was  against 
this  philosopher  that  Galen  directed  his  metaphy- 
sical writings.  The  latter  remarks,  "That  some 
recent  writers,  and  amongst  the  number  is  Pha- 
vorinus,  carry  their  doubts  to  such  a  pitch,  as  to 
call  in  question  the  existence  of  the  sun."t 


Sextus  Empimcus. 

Sextus  was  not  only  a  most  profound  metaphy- 
sician himself,  but  he  was,  on  the  whole,  a  most 
able  and  candid  historian  of  mental  theories  and 
systems  generally.     He  had  paid  great  attention 

*  Diog.  Laert.  9.  88.     Sextus  Empiricus,  Pyrrh.  1.  pp.  164  —178. 
t  Diog.  Laert.  9.  87. 


186  LATER   SCHOOL   OF    SCEPTICISM. 

to  this  department  of  knowledge ;  and  it  is  chiefly 
to  him  that  we  owe  any  information  at  all  of  the 
views  and  writings  of  several  eminent  philosophers 
of  ancient  times. 

His  own  personal  opinions  seem  to  have  classed 
him  amongst  the  Sceptics ;  but  it  has  long  been  a 
question,  since  his  day,  what  was  his  degree  of 
doubt,  and  how  far  he  carried  out  his  scepticism 
on  the  fundamentals  of  human  science  and  know- 
ledge. On  this  point  it  will  be  difficult  to  form  a 
correct  opinion.  We  have  only  a  few  scattered 
observations  of  his  own,  and  very  slender  probabi- 
lities to  guide  us.  It  would  seem,  however,  that 
he  did  not  carry  his  system,  of  doubt  to  such  a 
length  as  to  invalidate  the  testimony  of  our  senses, 
or  the  elementary  principles  of  reason.  On  this 
subject  he  remarks,  "  We  never  examine  how  sen- 
sible things  fall  under  our  senses,  nor  how  intelli- 
gent perceptions  arise  in  the  understanding  and 
are  there  perceived  by  it;  we  receive  both  in  a 
simple  and  absolute  manner,  as  a  matter  unac- 
countable and  undefinable." 

Sextus  remarks  also,  that  the  philosophers  who 
preceded  him  had  maintained  three  standards 
of  truth,  or  rather  we  should  say,  three  instru- 
ments for  the  discovery  of  truth  and  falsehood. 
The  first  is  that  wliich  belongs  to  man,  and  which 
forms  his  power  of  judgment ;  the  second,  the 
means  he  employs  for  judging,  that  is,  Ms  senses 
and  understanding ;  and  the  third,  that  action  or 
power  by  which  he  applies  these  objects  or  instru- 
ments.    The  first  principle  he  rejects,  on  account 


SEXTUS  EMPimCUS.  187 

of  the  compound  nature  of  man,  possessing  a  body, 
as  well  as  a  soul,  wliich  must,  in  his  opinion,  give 
rise  to  many  operations  we  never  can  know  any- 
thing about.  The  second  criterio7i  he  also  refuses 
liis  assent  to,  principally  on  the  ground  of  the 
conflicting  and  variable  nature  of  our  organs  of 
sense,  and  the  sources  of  delusion  to  wliich  the  un- 
derstanding is  liable  from  this  and  other  causes. 
The  tliird  standard  is  rejected  likewise,  from  the 
doubt  thrown  over  our  organs  of  vision. 

The  notions  entertained  by  Sextus  on  the  human 
soul,  are  of  a  material  complexion.  He  thought 
we  knew  little  or  nothing  about  it.*  All  the 
higher  kinds  of  thought  were  but  the  relations  to 
the  sensible  particles  of  matter.  Our  sensations 
seemed  to  be  the  only  ground  he  had  for  anytliing 
approaching  to  truth  and  certainty.  But  Sex- 
tus was  not  apparently  consistent  even  in  this 
position :  for  he  maintained  that  man  did  not 
know  anytliing  whatever  of  himself.  We  have  no 
sure  means  of  arri\dng  at  the  truth  of  our  own 
natures,  either  bodily  or  mental,  f  Every  thing 
is  tainted  with  doubt.  If  the  mind  can  know  any 
thins?  of  man,  it  must  know  him  onlv  throua^h 
three  channels,  the  body,  the  senses,  or  itself.  If 
the  body  compels  the  mind  to  think,  then  the  body 
moves  without  any  reason,  and  consequently  our 
minds  must  be  moved  or  impelled  irrationally. 
The  same  objection  lies  against  the  position  that 
the  senses  can  be  known  by  the  mind,  for  they  are 

*  Pyrrh.  Hyp.  3.  51.  t  Pyrrh.  2.  29. 


188  LATER   SCHOOL   OF    SCEPTICISM. 

themselves  irrational  in  their  movements  and 
operations.  If  we  learned  what  the  senses  were 
through  the  medium  of  the  imderstanding,  this 
would  reduce  all  to  the  same  uniform  nature  or 
essence.  As  to  the  mind  taking  notice  of  its  own 
thoughts,  feelings,  opinions,  and  emotions,  this  is 
evidently  impossihle,  for  we  should  have  neither  a 
suhject  to  know,  or  an  ohject  to  he  known.  Eor  the 
mind  to  know  itself,  it  must  know  what  its  real  suh- 
stance  is,  all  its  laws  of  action,  where  its  proper  lo- 
cation is ;  and,  in  fact,  in  what  mode  it  operates  on 
matter,  and  matter  operates  on  it. 

These  douhts  and  objections  are  reiterated  over 
and  over  again  by  this  learned  Sceptic,  but  there 
is  little  method  or  ingenuity  displayed  in  the  ar- 
rano;ement  of  his  views. 

The  ideas  of  Sextus  on  cause  and  efiTect,  are 
clothed  in  the  same  mystification  as  his  other 
notions  on  the  foundations  of  truth  in  general. 
Causation  from  the  contact  of  material  bodies  is 
considered  very  doubtful.  No  two  bodies  can 
touch  each  other;  it  may  be  conjectured  that  they 
may  touch  each  other  at  theu^  surfaces,  but  the 
bodies  themselves  can  never  come  in  contact.* 
The  same  thing  may  be  affirmed  of  all  mixtures  of 
material  elements,  and  the  various  changes  they 
seem  to  undergo  in  consequence.  There  is  no  real 
contact  of  the  particles  in  such  cases. 

On  cause  and  effect  generally,  the  objections 
urged  by  Sextus  are  very  subtile,  and  fairly  stated, 

'  Pynhoa.  Hyp.  3.  12. 


SEXTUS    EMPIRICUS.  189 

In  modem  times  we  have  seen  them  often  brought 
upon  the  stage  of  philosophical  discussion.  If 
one  thing,  says  Sextus,  can  be  the  cause  of  another 
thing,  one  of  the  following  circumstances  must 
take  place ;  either  the  quiescent  must  be  the  cause 
of  the  quiescent,  or  the  moved  of  the  thing  in 
motion;  or  a  moving  cause  produce  a  quiescent 
effect,  or  a  quiescent  cause  a  moved  effect.  Now 
this  cannot  be,  because  it  is  maintained,  as  a 
general  maxim,  that  like  things  can  only  produce 
like  things.  Again,  it  is  affirmed  that  cause  and 
effect  must  have  a  co-existent  nature.  That  a 
cause  cannot  be  posterior  to  an  effect  is  quite  true ; 
neither  can  an  effect  be  subsequent  to  a  cause,  for 
this  reason,  that  if  the  cause  be  anterior  to  the 
effect,  there  must  be  a  certain  time  when  it  was 
deprived  of,  or  separated  from,  the  effect,  therefore 
making  it  no  cause  at  all.  If  again  the  effect  be 
posterior  to  the  cause,  then  it  must  exist  when  its 
cause  ceases  to  exist,  which  would  make  it,  in  fact, 
an  effect  without  a  cause,  which  is  a  thing  impos- 
sible to  be  conceived. 

Besides  these  objections,  it  is  urged  by  the 
Sceptics,  that  our  ordinary  theory  of  causation 
involves  the  position  that  all  causes  are  active 
principles,  and  all  effects  are  passive  ones.  Now 
this  cannot  be  proved.  Indeed  this  theory  of 
cause  and  effect  contains  many  contradictory  con- 
clusions ;  and  it  is  from  the  consideration  of  these, 
that  Sextus  sees  it  is  impossible  to  extricate  him- 
self from  this  labyrinth  of  doubt  and  perplexity. 

On  the  nature  of  Deitv,  the  whole  of  the  doubts 


190  LATER   SCHOOL   OF    SCEPTICISM. 

and  speculations  of  Sextus  are  of  a  material 
nature  and  tendency.  There  is  nothing  of  novelty 
"in  them.*  • 


*  See  the  three  works  of  Sextus  Empiricus ;  the  PjTi-honistie  Hypoty- 
poses,  that  against  Encyclic  Sciences,  and  that  against  the  Philosophical 
Sects.     The  two  last  are  joined  in  one  called  Adversus  Mathematicos. 


i 


OPINIONS    ON    A    DEITY   AND    THE    SOUL.       191 


CHAPTER    XXII. 

ON  THE  OPINIONS  OF  THE  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHERS, 
UP  TO  THIS  PERIOD  OF  HISTORY,  ON  A  DEITY, 
AND    THE    HUMAN    SOUL. 


As  we  have  now  arrived  at  what  may  be  strictly 
called  the  termination  of  heathen  speculations  on 
the  mental  nature  of  man,  it  will  prove  of  advan- 
tage to  take  a  retrospective  view  of  the  general 
notions  entertained  by  the  sages  of  antiquity  on 
the  nature  of  a  First  Great  Cause,  and  of  the  hu- 
man soul.  These  are  two  branches  of  knowledge 
so  nearly  allied  to  metaphysics,  so  closely  inter- 
woven with  all  the  inquisitive  powers  of  men's 
minds,  so  vitaUy  important  to  the  right  application 
of  aU  speculations  on  human  nature,  and  so  deeply 
momentous  to  the  present  and  future  interests  of 
mankind,  that  no  apology  can  be  necessary  here 
for  giving  these  topics  the  fullest  consideration 
possible.  Indeed,  unless  these  important  doc- 
trines were  founded  in  truth,  and  taken  with  us  as 
guides  throughout  life,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive 
what  could  really  be  the  ol)ject  in  instituting  any 


192         OPINIONS    OF   ANCIENT    PHILOSOPHERS 

investigations  into  tlie  laws  of  either  matter  or 
mind.  The  doctrines  of  a  Deity,  and  the  spiri- 
tuality of  the  human  soul,  are  the  true  vivifying 
principles  of  intellectual  existence;  and  without 
them  all  speculation  would  only  present  a  melan- 
choly and  dreary  wilderness,  without  a  single  ob- 
ject of  substantial  interest  for  the  eye  of  man  to 
dwell  upon. 

Among  the  various  modern  writers  on  the  prin- 
ciples of  natural  theology,  and  the  evidences  of 
Christianity,  there  are  evidently  two  classes,  cha- 
racterized by  strong  marks  of  difference.  One  por- 
tion have  always  shown  a  marked  jealousy  against 
allowing  the  heathen  philosophers  the  smallest 
credit  for  any  knowledge  of  a  Supreme  Being ;  and 
the  other  have  been  apt  to  misconceive  and  over- 
rate the  importance  of  that  heathen  knowledge. 
The  former  writers  have,  in  substance,  maintained 
that  Christianity  should  have  the  sole  undi\dded 
honour  of  revealing  to  man  the  existence  and  attri- 
butes of  a  Deity ;  that  human  reason  had  no  just 
claim  to  such  a  magnificent  discovery;  and  that 
had  it  not  been  for  the  direct  and  positive  declara- 
tions of  Holy  Writ,  no  knowledge  would  have  been 
found  at  this  day  among  the  human  race,  on  this 
interesting  and  all-absorbing  topic.  Now  I  con- 
ceive there  can  be  no  good  grounds  for  depreciating 
ancient  knowledge  on  the  nature  of  a  Deity.  There 
is  nothing  here  to  detract  from  the  merit  of  Chris- 
tianity ;  but  on  the  contrary,  to  strengthen  its 
evidences,  and  to  make  them  take  a  firmer  hold  of 
the  human  understanding.     It  is  quite  obvious,  as 


ON    A   DEITY    AND    THE    SOUL.  193 

a  matter  of  fact,  that  many  of  the  sages  of  anti- 
quity had  very  clear  and  elevated  notions  of  a  Su- 
preme Being  ;  and  these  notions  had  heen  worked 
out  by  the  pure  force  of  their  natural  mental  fa- 
culties, and  their  accurate  modes  of  interrogating 
nature.  And  this  is  perfectly  in  accordance  with 
the  declarations  and  spirit  of  Revelation  itself ;  for 
it  declares  that  God  did  not  leave  himself  without 
a  witness ;  inasmuch  as  he  had  given  to  every  man 
a  Kght  to  guide  him  to  a  knowledge  of  Himself. 

We  find,  on  the  other  hand,  that  some  theolo- 
gical writers  have  descanted  on  the  nature  of  the 
knowledge  wliich  the  heathen  possessed  of  a  Su- 
preme Being,  as  if  that  knowledge  was  every  thing 
that  could  be  desired ;  and  that  the  subsequent 
revelations  from  heaven  on  this  grand  subject, 
were  nothing  more  than  a  simple  recapitulation  of 
the  opinions  of  Aristotle  or  Plato.  This  is  errmg 
on  the  opposite  side.  We  should,  therefore,  hold 
the  balance  fairly  between  both  parties.  The  opi- 
nions of  the  ancient  philosophers  are  well  worthy 
our  special  regard ;  but  we  must  amalgamate  them 
with  the  more  full  and  comprehensive  develop- 
ments of  the  Divine  nature  and  attributes,  which 
the  Christian  system  unfolds. 

There  is  one  very  obvious  difference  between  the 
Deity  of  the  heathen  philosophers  and  the  Deity  of 
the  Christians.  The  former  is  invariably  repre- 
sented as  a  Being  very  far  removed  from  all  hu- 
man sympathy  and  regard.  He  rules  and  governs 
the  world  by  general  laws,  but  takes  no  interest  in 
the  petty  affau's  of  man.  Now  the  Christian  sys- 
*  o 


194        OPINIONS    OF    ANCIENT    PHILOSOPHERS 

tern  brings  the  Deity,  so  to  speak,  nearer  to  man- 
kind ;  institutes  a  close  and  mutual  sympathy  be- 
tween them;  and  represents  both  under  the  fa- 
miliar and  interesting  relationship  of  Father  and 
children.  When  this  difference  of  character  is  duly 
estimated  by  the  practical  consequences  wliich  must 
follow  from  it  in  our  modes  of  worship,  the  result 
must  display  the  great  defects  in  the  speculative 
systems  of  the  ancient  world,  in  reference  to  the 
existence  and  attributes  of  the  Author  of  the 
universe. 

We  find  that  those  ancient  philosophers  who 
discussed  the  nature  of  the  Great  Pirst  Cause,  pur- 
sued the  same  line  of  argumentation  which  has 
commonly  been  employed  by  all  theological  writers 
in  modern  times.  There  is  a  very  interesting  and 
striking  resemblance  on  this  point.  The  proofs  of 
a  Deity  furnished  by  the  ancients,  may  be  classified 
under  three  distinct  heads ;  namely,  Immcm  testi- 
mony;  the  order  and  constitution  of  the  loorld ;  and 
the  'jjerniciotts  consequences  of  Atheism.  Under 
the  first  head  they  showed  the  almost  universal 
opinion  entertained  by  all  mankind  on  the  sub- 
ject of  a  Pirst  Cause,  and  that  nien  of  the  greatest 
wisdom  and  penetration  had  given  their  cordial  as- 
sent to  it.  In  the  second  place,  they  considered 
the  order  and  wisdom  displayed  in  the  constitution 
of  every  department  of  nature,  '^'\1lere  intelligence 
is  so  strikingly  imprinted  on  every  thing  around 
us,  it  is  but  reasonable  to  suppose  that  an  intelli- 
gent cause  must  be  the  creating  and  sustaining 
principle  of  action.     Again,  nothing  is  so  perni- 


ON   A   DEITY   AND    THE    SOUL.  195 

cious  as  the  doctrine  of  Atheism.  Every  noble 
principle,  and  every  disinterested  feeling,  become 
paralyzed  under  its  withering  and  hateful  influ- 
ence. It  destroys  all  religion,  all  morality,  all 
wisdom  and  justice  among  men. 

One  of  the  most  early  notions  respecting  the 
Deity  entertained  by  the  ancient  philosophers,  was 
that  the  all-creating  Cause  was  not  different  in 
nature  or  essence  from  the  universe  itself.  They 
imagined  the  Divinity  to  pervade  all  space,  to  be 
every  way  present,  and  that  no  change  or  move- 
ment could  be  produced  but  by  His  direct  will  or 
influence.  We  find  traces  of  this  opinion  through- 
out the  whole  range  of  heathen  philosophy.  It 
does  not  appear,  however,  that  they  deduced  any 
atheistical  inferences  from  it.  The  reasonable  sup- 
position is  that  very  elevated  and  transcendental 
notions  of  supreme  power  led  inquirers  to  this  train 
of  thought,  and  by  not  mshing  to  mix  the  actions 
of  the  Deity  with  every  petty  mundane  afiair,  they ' 
talked  of  this  Spirit  pervading  and  forming  part  of 
the  whole  frame  of  universal  creation. 

Some  philosophers — and  the  Stoics  were  of  this 
number — considered  that  the  Deitv  consisted  of 
more  than  one  person.  Cicero,  in  his  Treatise  on 
the  Nature  of  the  Gods,  says  that  all  the  theology 
of  the  Stoics  may  be  divided  into  four  parts ; 
namely,  first,  that  there  are  gods  ;  secondly,  that 
their  nature  may  be  defined ;  thirdly,  that  the  gods 
govern  the  world ;  and  fourthly,  that  they  especially 
interest  themselves  with  the  affairs  of  men. 

Akin  to  this  last  opinion,  was  the  one  generally 

o  2 


196        OPINIONS    OF    ANCIENT    PHILOSOPHERS 

prevalent  amongst  the  Eastern  nations,  wliicli 
embraced,  in  divers  sliapes  and  forms,  the  two 
principles  of  good  and  evil.  This  idea  was  the 
groundwork  of  many  systems  of  theology. 

There  was  a  notion  almost  universally  enter- 
tained amongst  all  classes  of  the  ancient  philoso- 
phers, that  the  Deity  acted  under  the  influence  of 
an  irrevocable  fate  or  destiny.  The  affairs  of  the 
world,  and  the  constitution  of  things  in  general, 
could  not  be  otherwise  managed  than  we  find 
them.  They  were  always  more  or  less  scrupulous 
in  admitting  the  application  of  this  doctrine,  in  all 
its  fulness,  to  the  superior  or  intellectual  part  of 
man,  but  seem  to  have  tacitly  acquiesced  in  it,  in 
reference  to  the  Deity.  There  were,  however, 
many  qualifications  and  modifications  of  the  doc- 
trine of  necessity,  when  thus  applied  to  the  influ- 
ence of  the  universal  Cause. 

Another  opinion,  somewhat  curious,  was  adopted, 
that  the  Deity  and  the  Creator  of  the  world  were 
two  Separate  Beings  ;  the  latter,  however,  only  the 
agent  or  instrument  in  the  hands  of  the  former. 
This  notion,  it  may  be  observed,  was  confined  to  a 
very  small  section  of  the  philosophical  world  of 
antiquity. 

The  Deity  of  the  ancients  was  almost  invariably 
associated  with  a  high  degree  of  intelligence.  He 
was  the  centre  of  all  thought,  truth,  and  wisdom. 
The  intelligent  principle  is  always  the  leading 
and  prominent  attribute  of  his  nature  ;  and  good- 
ness and  benevolence  were  made  to  occupy  a  sub- 
ordinate station  in  the  character  of  the  Divinity. 


ON    A   DEITY    AND    THE    SOTJL.  197 

This  notion  gave  a  great  variety  of  colourings  to 
tlieir  theological  systems. 

There  were,  as  we  have  already  noticed,  three 
leading  arguments  used  by  the  ancients  for  the 
existence  of  a  Deity,  namely,  testimony,  the  con- 
stitution of  the  world,  and  the  evils  of  atheism ; 
yet,  in  addition  to  these,  there  were  other  powerful 
influences  which  seemed  to  have  a  great  effect  upon 
all  their  reasonings  on  this  interesting  question. 
Among  these,  the  origin  of  mcJtion  occupied  a  con- 
spicuous place.  We  find  that,  whenever  a  reasoner 
was  placed  in  any  real  or  apparent  dilemma  on  the 
nature  and  existence  of  Deity,  he  invariably  took 
shelter  in  the  origin  of  motion.  He  demanded, 
how  could  a  body  move  itself  ?  There  must  be  a 
first  cause,  or  you  cannot  advance  a  single  step 
in  accounting  for  anything.  Yoar  philosophy  is 
puerility  and  nonsense  without  it.  Every  reader 
of  the  works  of  the  Grecian  sages  can  readily  bring 
to  his  recollection  innumerable  instances  of  the 
adoption  of  this  line  of  argumentation.* 

The  opinions  of  the  ancient  philosophers  on  the 
nature  of  the  human  soul  were  exceedingly  diversi- 
fied, often  contradictory,  and  sometimes  unintelli- 
gible. We  can  do  little  more  here,  therefore,  Avith 
any  hope  of  profit,  than  just  present  the  reader 
with  a  few  general  remarks,  on  some  of  the  leading 
systems  which  obtained  currency  amongst  the  spe- 
culators of  antiquity. 

There  were  a  few  of  the  ancient  philosophers 

*  See  Note  E.  at  the  end  of  this  Vohime. 


198        OPINIONS    OF    ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHEHS 

who  maintained  that  the  soul  was  propagated  by 
parents  to  their  chikben  by  the  ordinary  laws  of 
generation.  Against  this  opinion  it  was  contended, 
that  if  the  soul  were  created  in  this  manner,  it 
must  either  be  from  the  body  or  from  the  soul  of 
the  parents.  If  it  proceeded  from  the  body,  the 
soul  wonld  then  be  a  material  substance  ;  and  the 
effect,  in  this  case,  would  be  vastly  more  noble  and 
exalted  than  the  cause.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  our 
thinking  principle  proceeded  from  the  soul  of  our 
parents,  then  the  difficulty  presented  itself,  that  by 
thus  making  the  soul  a  simple  uncompounded 
substance,  it  could  not  possibly  be  dissolvable  or 
communicative.  Again,  it  was  asked,  If  the  soul 
be  propagated  from  parents,  by  the  ordinary  laws 
of  generation,  is  it  from  the  soul  of  one  of  them, 
or  from  both  ?  There  is  no  reason  why  it  should 
be  from  the  one  parent  more  than  the  other ;  and 
if  we  say  it  is  from  both,  then  vre  are  immediately 
betrayed  into  the  absurdity,  that  the  soul  is  made 
up  of  parts.  Its  unity  is  hereby  destroyed,  which 
is  one  of  the  leading  attributes  attached  to  the 
soul  or  mind  of  man.  The  opponents  of  this 
theory  always  insisted,  that  it  was  impossible  to 
conceive  how  the  souls  of  two  parents  should  be 
so  united,  as  necessarily  to  produce  a  new  soul. 
On  the  other  hand  the  advocates  of  the  theory 
attempted  to  illustrate  their  principles  in  the 
followmg  manner.  The  soul  exerts  a  thought ; 
that  thought  becomes  the  germ  or  seed  of  another 
soul.  There  was  no  greater  difficulty  involved  in 
this  simple  assumption  than  there  is  when  speak- 


ON    A   DEITY   AND   THE    SOUL.  199 

ing  of  the  (jerm  or  seed  of  material  things.  But 
here  it  was  objected,  that  if  by  a  thought  one  spirit 
could  produce  another,  then  one  superior  intel- 
lectual nature  could  produce  its  own  kind  in  like 
manner;  which  would  end  in  chaotic  confusion. 
Besides,  this  theory  involved  the  notion,  that  the 
soul  was  capable  of  an  act  of  creation,  which  is 
the  especial  prerogative  of  the  Divinity  itself ;  for 
whatever  can  produce  a  substance  out  of  nothing, 
possesses  undoubtedly  a  power  of  creation.  If  the 
soul  of  man  had  the  power  of  creating  another  soul 
from  a  simple  thought,  and  if  that  thought  be  main- 
tained at  the  same  time  to  have  nothing  in  itself  of 
a  substantial  form,  then  the  soul  would  possess  that 
same  creative  power  which  we  consider  as  the  sole 
attribute  of  the  Deitv.  To  avoid  this  conclusion, 
it  was  contended  that  though  the  soul  had  not  the 
absolute  power  of  creation,  yet  it  possessed  a  power 
to  multiply  itself,  and  so  produce  other  souls,  in 
precisely  the  same  manner  as  a  candle  is  lighted 
from  another,  Avithout  diminishing  its  substance. 

There  was  a  very  commonly  prevailing  o])iuion 
amongst  the  ancients,  that  the  souls  of  men  were 
originally  made  l3y  the  divinity  himself  at  the 
creation  of  all  things  ;  and  existed  in  a  prior  state, 
Avhere  they  were  completely  happy,  and  might  have 
continued  so  for  ever,  had  they  not  committed 
some  heinous  offence  against  their  Creator,  and 
thereby  lost  their  primitive  integrity  and  purity. 
In  consequence  of  this,  they  were  placed  in  bodies 
as  punishments  for  their  former  crimes.  This 
doctrine  was  objected  to  on  the  general  ground. 


200         OPINIONS    or    ANCIENT    PHILOSOPHERS 

that  if  this  were  the  real  state  of  the  case,  how 
comes  it  to  pass  that  men  had  no  remembrance 
whatever  of  any  former  state  of  existence  ?  To 
this  it  was  answered,  that  eternal  oblivion  consti- 
tuted one  of  the  chief  elements  of  the  punishment 
inflicted  upon  them  for  then'  disobedience. 

The  doctrine  of  the  Qiietempsycliosis,  or  transmi- 
gration of  souls,  c\MniQi\.  a  kindred  alliance  with  the 
above  doctrine.  It  maintained  that  the  souls  of 
men  passed  after  death  into  the  bodies  of  other 
living  animals,  whose  habits,  modes  of  life,  and 
dispositions,  bore  a  suitable  resemblance  to  those 
moral  pursuits  and  intellectual  qualities,  which 
defined  the  characters  of  individuals  on  earth.  If  a 
man  led  a  debased  and  sensual  life,  he  was  doomed, 
after  death,to  be  imprisoned  in  some  wretched  beast, 
there  to  perform  a  species  of  penance  for  several 
ages.  If,  on  the  contrary,  he  lived  a  sober,  tem- 
perate, and  virtuous  life,  he  was  more  fortunate 
in  being  sent  to  some  happy  and  peaceful  animal. 
Some  of  the  ancient  philosophers  pretended  to  have 
had  visions  on  this  subject.  One  describes  the  soul 
of  Orpheus,  who  was  musical,  melancholy,  and  a 
hater  of  the  fair  sex,  as  entering  into  a  swan ;  the 
soul  of  Ajax,  represented  full  of  anger  and  ferocity, 
into  a  lion;  the  soul  of  Agamemnon,  who  was 
soaring  and  ambitious,  into  an  eagle ;  and  the  soul 
of  the  scoffer  Thersites,  into  a  monkey.  This  doc- 
trine of  transmigration  has  often  been  alluded  to  by 
modern  writers  of  great  note.  How  fine  is  Dry  den' s 
translation  of  Pythagoras'  speech,  in  the  fifteenth 
book  of  Ovid's  Metamorphoses,  touching  the  im- 


ON    A   DEITY   AND    THE    SOUL.  201 

propriety  of  eatiiig  animal  food.  And  most  literary 
readers  must  know  the  famous  prologue  which 
Congreve  fixed  to  one  of  his  very  best  comedies,  in 
which  the  following  lines  occur,  with  respect  to 
the  supposed  consequences  of  this  grand  doctrine 
of  transmigration : — 

"  Thus  Aristotle's  soul  of  old  that  was. 
May  now  be  damn'd  to  animate  an  ass ; 
Or,  in  this  very  house,  for  ought  we  know. 
Is  doing  painful  penance  in  some  beau." 

There  were  a  considerable  number  of  the  ancient 
sages  who  strenuously  maintained  that  the  j)ower 
or  faculty  of  thinking  was  an  inherent  and  essential 
property  of  the  soul,  and  if  this  thought  were  taken 
away  from  it,  its  nature  would  be  entirely  destroyed. 
They  affirmed,  that  the  soul  was  a  substance  alto- 
gether distinct  and  different  from  matter,  the  con- 
stitutional properties  of  which  were  solidity  and 
extension.  If  the  soul  be  neither  solid  nor  ex- 
tended, then,  said  they,  we  cannot  conceive  how  it 
can  exist,  when  it  does  not  think.  It  may  be  true 
indeed,  that  a  body  when  put  in  motion  may  con- 
tinue to  move  in  a  straight  line,  until  it  comes  in 
contact  with  some  other  body  which  may  give  it 
another  direction  ;  but  this  case  does  not  apply  to 
the  general  argument,  for  a  body  when  moving  is 
entirely  passive,  whereas  the  soul  of  man  is  per- 
petually active  in  all  its  creations ;  and,  therefore, 
it  must  be  concluded,  that  constant  thinking  is  an 
essential  attribute  of  the  mental  nature  of  man. 

This  opinion  was  qualified,  in  some  degree,  l)y 
asserting  that  the  essential  principle  of  the  soul 


202        OPINIONS   OF   ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHERS 

was  not  perpetual  cogitation,  bnt  only  a  communi- 
cated power  to  think.  Thought  was  considered  re- 
latively to  the  soul,  what  motion  is  to  the  body ;  as 
it  is  not  always  necessary  that  the  body  should  be  in 
motion,  neither  is  it  necessary  for  the  soul  always 
to  think.  To  account  for  the  soul's  existence  when 
it  does  not  think,  we  have  only  to  suppose  that 
though  the  soul  is  not  solid,  so  as  to  offer  resistance 
to  bodies,  yet  it  is  extended ;  and  it  is  as  easy  to 
conceive  how  the  Divinity  might  communicate  a 
power  of  thinking  to  extended  matter,  as  to  ac- 
commodate an  immaterial  substance,  so  as  to  har- 
monise with  a  material  one. 

We  must  here  notice  those  persons  who  adopted 
the  atomic  or  corpuscular  theory  of  matter,  for  their 
notions  of  the  nature  of  the  soul  were  in  a  great 
measure  peculiar  to  themselves.  They  accounted 
for  the  soul's  influence  over  the  body  upon  similar 
principles  with  those  which  in  modern  times  have 
been  ascribed  to  the  doctrine  of  attraction  and 
gravitation.  It  was  a  fundamental  pro^iosition  with 
these  reasoners  that  the  seat  of  the  soul  was  in  the 
head,  and  that  the  thinking  principle  is  not  gene- 
rally diffused  throughout  the  various  parts  of  the 
bod}^  The  soul  is  limited  to  this  locality,  and 
it  is  also  maintained  that  the  soul  does  not  act  upon 
the  body  immediately .  There  are  certain  nerves, 
canals,  or  channels,  distributed  through  almost 
every  part  of  the  body,  even  the  most  remote.  All 
these  conduits  are  much  of  the  same  nature  as  the 
strings  of  a  musical  instrument ;  so  that  Avhen  one 
end  of  any  of  them  is  moved,  the  others  partake  of 


ON    A   DEITY   AND    THE   SOUL.  203 

the  motion.  All  these  canals  or  channels  of  sen- 
sation have  a  connexion  with  the  head,  and  con- 
sequently with  the  soul  itself.  Wlien  the  soul 
wishes  to  move  any  particular  part  of  the  hody, 
there  is  a  motion  immediately  communicated 
through  these  nerves  or  canals,  which  in  their  turn 
move  the  soul,  and  then  the  sensation  of  pain  or 
pleasiu-e  is  produced.  This  was  the  ordinary  pro- 
cess by  which  these  mental  speculators  endeavoured 
to  account  for  the  manner  in  which  the  soul  moved 
the  hody,  and  the  way  in  which  external  things  excite 
sensations  in  the  mind.  They  would  not  allow  pure 
spirit  to  move  bodies  immediately ,  nor  bodies  to  act 
on  spirit  immediately ;  but  the  action  and  re-action 
must  be  solely  through  the  intervention  of  a  third 
medium. 

There  was  a  small  section  of  philosophers 
amongst  the  various  schools  of  learning,  who  seemed 
to  have  adopted  that  hypothesis  respecting  the 
nature  of  the  soul,  which  is  now  pretty  generally 
maintained  as  the  most  orthodox  one.  This  view  is 
grounded  on  the  notion,  that  at  the  organization  of 
the  body,  Avhen  the  receptacle  is  properly  furnished, 
the  soul  is  immediately  created  by  God  himself, 
and  infused  into  the  body ;  like  a  person  taking  pos- 
session of  his  new  habitation,  when  all  things  are 
in  readiness  for  his  reception. 

Several  metaphysicians  of  antiquity,  of  great 
note,  were  exceedingly  puzzled,  by  their  inability 
to  conceive  how  the  soul  could  act  upon  the  body, 
or  the  body  upon  the  soul ;  or  in  other  words,  how 
a  spiritual  substance  could  have  any  influence  over 


204         OPINIONS   OF   ANCIENT   PHILOSOPHERS 

a  material  one,  so  as  to  move  and  act  upon  it. 
This  difficulty  led  these  reasoners  to  adopt  the 
notion — a  notion  which  has  formed  the  foundation 
of  several  metaphysical  systems  in  modern  times 
— that  all  our  actions  were  brought  about  by  the 
direct  interference  of  God  himself.  This  was  con- 
ceived to  be  effected  in  two  ways.  Pirst,  whenever 
there  was  an  impression  upon  any  of  our  organs  of 
sense  from  external  objects,  there  was  a  sensation 
suitable  to  this  impression  excited  in  the  soul  by 
the  Deity  himself.  Second,  whenever  the  soul 
wishes  to  move  any  particular  member  of  the  body, 
immediately  upon  the  existence  of  this  volition, 
God  excites  a  corresponding  motion  in  that  par- 
ticular member.  According  to  this  doctrine,  the 
will  of  the  soul  is  not  the  immediate  cause  of  the 
motion  of  the  body,  but  only  the  exciting  cause  of 
the  Divinity's  creating  that  motion ;  and  the  im- 
pression made  by  a  body  upon  any  organ  of  sense, 
is  not  the  cause  of  the  sensation,  but  only  an 
inducement  for  Divine  interference  to  effect  that 
purpose.  When,  for  example,  I  wish  to  move  my 
finger,  or  any  other  member  of  the  body,  it  is  not 
my  soul  which  moves  my  finger,  or  the  member; 
but  the  Deity,  upon  my  volition,  takes  the  occasion 
to  move  either  the  one  or  the  other. 

A  portion  of  the  ancients  considered  the  soul 
and  body  to  be  but  of  one  substance.  They  main- 
tained that  the  particles  of  which  the  soul  consists, 
are  not  different  in  nature,  but  are  only  of  a  finer 
and  more  subtile  kind  than  those  of  the  body. 

There  was  a  very  influential  theory  amongst  a 


ON    A   DEITY   AND    THE    SOITL.  205 

number  of  the  ancients,  respecting  the  nature  and 
operations  of  the  human  soul,  grounded  upon  a 
very  subtile  and  refined  principle  of  concord  or 
harmony  between  the  soul  and  the  body.  The 
soul  being  a  thinking  or  spiritual  substance,  could 
not  act  upon  the  body,  nor  could  the  body  act  upon 
it,  but  only  through  the  medium  of  a  certain  con- 
stituted asfreement  l^etween  the  volitions  of  the 
soul  and  the  motions  of  the  body.  This  theory 
may  be  illustrated  in  this  way.  The  Divinity  has 
decreed  that  every  soul  should  have  a  certain  train 
of  thought  and  desires,  and  no  other ;  and  that 
all  mental  operations  should  go  on  according  to  a 
regular  and  circular  order  or  plan.  A  thought  may 
produce  a  desire,  and  a  desire  a  will,  and  an  effort 
of  the  will  a  motion  of  the  body,  and  so  on,  in  a 
regular  progression.  In  every  body  there  are  cer- 
tain sprmgs  for  producing  every  species  of  action, 
and  every  body  must  perform  certain  actions  agree- 
ably to  its  natui'C,  and  no  other.  This  is  a  binding 
and  unerring  law;  and,  consequently,  it  is  impossible 
for  any  given  body  to  perform  any  other  kinds  of 
motion  than  those  it  was  destined  to  perform  from 
the  beginning.  Now  among  so  many  souls,  possess- 
ing an  immense  variety  of  different  thoughts  and 
volitions,  and  so  manv  bodies  with  such  different 
springs  or  principles  of  action,  the  Deity  chooses 
one  soul  Avhose  thous^hts  and  volitions  mio'ht  cor- 
respond  to  the  motions  of  some  suitable  body. 
Here  is  a  mutual  sympathy  created ;  which  may 
be  compared  to  two  pendulums  which  do  not  act 
upon  each  other,  but  when  one  is  down  the  other 


206      OPINIONS    ON    A   DEITY    AND    THE    SOUL. 

is  clown  also,  and  vice  versa.  Por  example,  wlien 
the  soul  had  a  desire  to  eat,  the  human  hody  was 
so  modelled  from  the  beginning  of  time,  as  to  take 
victuals  at  a  certain  period,  and  in  a  certain  given 
way  or  manner ;  and  when  the  soul  willed  to  go 
in  any  particular  direction,  the  feet  were  deter- 
mined to  move  in  this  same  direction. 

Another  prevailing  notion  was,  that  the  soul  of 
man  was  a  real  part  of  the  divine  nature;  not 
different  in  nature  or  essence,  but  only  in  degree. 
This  svstem  had  varied  and  extensive  ramifications, 
and  formed  the  nucleus  of  many  doctrines  on 
natural  theology. 


MENTAL   PHILOSOPnY   OF   INDIA.  207 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


MENTAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  INDL\. 


The  positive  knowledge  we  shall  be  able  to 
derive  from  the  Indian  philosophy,  ^vill  not  be 
great  in  amount,  nor  very  satisfactory  in  its  nature. 
The  obscurity  which  hangs  over  it  is  so  murky  and 
dense,  that  even  those  who  have  devoted  nearly  a 
whole  lifetime  to  its  consideration,  have  not  been 
able  to  reduce  it  to  anything  like  system,  or  to 
recognise  what  are  its  first  or  elementary  prin- 
ciples. 

The  few  observations  we  shall  make  on  the  sub- 
ject, are  suggested  from  a  perusal  of  the  "  Trans- 
actions of  the  Royal  Asiatic  Society."  The  members 
of  this  Society  have  displayed  the  most  commend- 
able zeal  in  all  their  inquiries  on  this  subject ;  and 
the  only  regret  one  feels  is,  that  their  labours 
should  have  proved  so  comparatively  barren  and 
fruitless. 


208  MENTAL    PaiLOSOPIIY    OF    INDIA. 


The  Sankhya  and  Yoga. 

This  is  considered  the  best  known  of  all  the 
systems  of  Indian  speculation  on  philosophy. 
There  are  three  kinds  of  knowledge  which  are 
here  recognised,  namely,  perception,  mediate  know- 
ledge, arising  from  the  varions  forms  of  the  Syllo- 
gism, and  traditional  knowledge.  The  first,  percep- 
tion, appertains  to  sensible  objects;  but  this  faculty 
is  not  of  itseK  sufficient  to  account  for  all  the 
various  kinds  of  thought ;  therefore,  recourse  must 
be  had  to  the  second  species  of  knowledge,  reason- 
ing or  demonstration,  which  assumes  two  forms, 
either  going  from  cause  to  effect,  or  from  the  effect 
to  the  cause.  The  Sankhya  acknowledges  no 
intuitive  knowledge  whatever ;  this  is  reserved  for 
beings  of  a  higher  grade  than  man. 

All  objects  of  scientific  knowledge  are  either 
creative  and  not  created,  or  both  creative  and 
created,  or  created  and  not  creative,  or  neither 
creative  nor  created.*  Creation  is  the  first  prin- 
ciple of  things,  without  it  nothing  could  exist. 
This  creative  energy  is  supposed  to  be  a  subtile 
fluid  or  essence,  which  operates  in  and  through 
the  senses.  This  fluid  or  essence  possesses,  how- 
ever, perfect  unity  of  nature ;  it  is  one  and  not 
many.  The  evidence  for  this  creative  unity  arises 
chiefly  from  the  uniform  appearances  of  nature, 
from  the  singleness  of  design  imprinted  upon  every 

*  Colebrooke,  Isvara- Crishnas,  1.  p.  31. 


THE    SANKHYA   AND    YOGA.  209 

tiling,  and  from  the  impossibility  of  conceiving  a 
creative  power  acting  harmoniously,  without  being 
invested  with  unity  of  conception  and  purpose. 
This  creative  energy  or  power  is  not,  however, 
possessed  of  intelligence;  it  is  a  blind  corporeal 
body,  but  of  a  very  subtile  nature,  so  as  to  elude 
all  human  perception. 

That  object  which  is  neither  created  nor  creates, 
is  the  soul  of  man.  The  evidence  for  the  existence 
of  this  soul  arises  from  many  considerations.  We 
find  a  blind  corporeal  body  in  existence,  whose 
physical  capabilities  may  be  likened  to  a  musical 
instrument,  such  as  an  organ  for  example.  Now 
this  piece  of  workmanship  owes  its  existence  to 
some  designing  agent,  and  is  made  for  some 
pur2:)ose.  This  purpose  is  to  aiford  a  suitable  place 
of  residence  for  the  soul.  The  e^ddence  of  the 
existence  of  a  soul  is  also  evinced  from  the  con- 
sideration of  its  various  feelings  and  emotions,  and 
its  numerous  sources  of  pleasure  and  pain.  We  see, 
too,  that  the  blind  incorporeal  matter  cannot  move 
or  direct  itself,  and,  therefore,  this  argues  the 
necessity  for  a  soul.  All  the  higher  feelings  of 
which  the  soul  is  susceptible  afford  likewise  con- 
vincing proofs  of  its  separate  nature  and  superior 
excellence. 

It  is  almost  needless  to  observe,  that  there  are 
paljoable  contradictions  involved  in  all  these  opi- 
nions and  statements.  Matter  or  body  is  consider- 
ed a  blind  and  immoveable  thing,  and  the  soul  as  a 
vivifying  energy,  and  possessed  of  intelligence. 
Now  this  creative  or  living  power,  which  is  the 


210  MENTAL    PHILOSOPHY    OP    INDIA. 

first  principle  of  tilings, — the  source  of  all  being, — ■ 
is  denied  intelligence,  which  is  conferred  upon  a 
more  humble  and  subordinate  agent,  the  soul  of 
man.  This  is  obviously  very  contradictory  and 
inconsistent. 

The  principle  of  all  corporeal  things  is  simple 
unity ;  but  the  principle  of  all  thinking  creations 
is  multiple.  All  bodies  may  assume  different 
forms,  still  they  are  but  one;  a  multiplicity  of 
souls  have  all  distinct  natures,  which  is  evinced  l3y 
the  different  parts  they  are  made  to  act  in  the 
drama  of  existence. 

The  first  emanation  which  arises  from  the 
creative  principle  of  things,  is  mind.  All  rational 
and  thinking  beings  are  minor  emanations  from 
this  great  3I'md.  It  overrules  all.  A  Deity  means 
this  first-created  Being,  or  mental  energy.  It  has 
divers  modes  of  manifestation.  There  are  five 
elementary  energies  which  are  productive  or  cre- 
ative of  things  above  sensible  objects,  and  which 
energies  are  not  perceptible  to  man.  Those  which 
produce  sensible  objects  are  of  a  subordinate  or 
grosser  character.  These  create  the  five  senses ; 
and  to  correspond  to  these,  five  other  organs  of 
activity  are  framed,  which  are,  as  it  were,  the 
material  instruments  by  which  these  senses  act. 
These  active  organs  are,  the  tongue,  the  organ  of 
speech ;  the  hands,  the  feet,  the  alimentary  and 
secretive  organs,  and  the  organs  of  generation. 
These  active  instruments  are  made  parallel  to  other 
elements  of  an  ethereal  and  active  nature. 


EHAGAVAD-GHITA — NYAYA.  211 


The  Bhagavad-Ghita. 

This  record  of  Indian  speculation  is  more  of  a 
theological  nature  than  the  preceding  one  we  have 
mentioned.  There  seems  one  simple  and  absorbing 
principle,  which  is  that  God,  or  the  Supreme  Mind 
or  Soul,  is  the  Creator  of  all  things.  Creation  is 
just  a  manifestation  of  the  existence  and  nature  of 
this  first  great  principle.  All  souls  emanate  from 
it;  and  maintain  a  perpetual  sympathy  with  it, 
in  all  states  of  their  existence.  "  The  great  Deity 
is  my  womb,  in  it  I  lay  my  fruit,  and  the  origin  of 
all  things  emanates  therefrom.  The  Deity  is  the 
great  womb ;  and  I  the  seed-giving  father."  Such 
are  the  terms  employed  to  express  tliis  connection 
between  heavenly  and  earthly  natures. 

The  Ntata  and  the  Vaisechika. 

This  branch  of  specidation  is  considered  by  ori- 
ental scholars  as  one  of  the  most  intellectual  systems 
of  Indian  philosophy.  It  attempts  to  develop  more 
fully  the  principles  and  rules  of  reasoning,  than  the 
systems  we  have  just  glanced  at ;  but  it  must  be  con- 
fessed, that  after  one  or  two  elementary  maxims  are 
laid  down,we  are  lost  in  the  wild  and  irregular  super- 
structure which  is  built  upon  these  maxims  of  the 
Nyaya.  European  thought  has  not  yet  been  able  to 
penetrate  into  the  mysterious  arcana  of  their  logic. 
A  species  of  syllogism  is  used,  consisting  of  five, 
instead  of  our  three  parts.    The  following  is  given-  by 

p  2 


212  MENTAL    PHILOSOniY    OF    INDIA. 

Colebrooke  as  an  an  example.  1.  Tlie  hill  is  fieiy. 
2.  Because  it  smokes.  3.  Whatever  smokes  is  fieiy, 
e.  g.  a  kitchen  hearth.  4.  The  hill  also  smokes. 
5.  Therefore  it  is  fiery.* 

According  to  tliis  branch  of  Indian  speculation, 
the  soul  is  possessed  of  altogether  different  pro- 
perties from  the  body.  Thought  is  the  grand  dis- 
tinctive attribute  of  the  former.  This  is  displayed 
in  knowledge,  desire,  aversion,  and  the  pleasures 
and  pains  of  our  internal  mental  structure.  Body 
has  none  of  these  qualities  or  afPections.  There  is, 
however,  a  bond  of  union  between  it  and  the  soul, 
and  this  bond  is  manifested  by  the  connections 
which  exist  between  our  external  senses  and  our 
physical  organs.  These  senses  are  five  in  number, 
and  are  not  mere  modifications  of  consciousness  or 
internal  feeling,  but  they  possess  a  corporeal  nature. 
To  correspond  with  these  five  senses,  there  are  five 
elements  provided,  which  sympathise  or  keep  up 
a  constant  intercourse  with  these  senses  thi'ough 
the  instrumentality  of  some  subtile  powers  or 
other,  T\  hich  are  not  clearly  defined. 

The  act  of  perception  is  considered  a  compound 
act,  but  of  homogeneous  parts  alone.  Hetero- 
geneous or  dissimilar  agencies  cannot  act  together, 
or  be  combined  into  one  whole. 

The  atomic  theory  of  the  Indians  bears  a  strong 
resemblance  to  that  of  Greece.  It  is  afiirmed  by 
the  philosophical  schools  of  the  former,  that  an 
extreme  point  or  limit  must  be  arrived  at,  otherwise 

*  Colebrooke,  1.  p.  116;  and  also  Windischmann,  p.  32.  38. 


THE    VEDANTA.  213 

investiijations  would  be  endless  and  inconclusive. 
If  all  bodies  consist  of  an  infinite  number  of  parts, 
all  must  be  alike  infinite,  and  then  we  must  concede 
the  conclusion  that  a  part  is  equal  to  a  whole.  To 
avoid  so  absurd  a  conclusion,  it  must  be  assumed 
that  all  compound  bodies  are  the  result  of  a  union 
among  corresponding  parts  ;  and  when  these  parts 
are  separated,  we  must  come  to  some  atom  whose 
di\ision  ceases.*  Certain  dimensions  are  never- 
theless given  to  this  ultimate  atom,  for  its  magni- 
tude is  defined  to  be  the  sixth  part  of  a  particle 
floating  in  the  sunbeam. 

On  matters  of  theology,  the  Nyaya  is  very  ob- 
scure. It  maintains  that  the  soul  is  the  highest  of 
created  things,  but  that  it  is  fettered  by  the  body, 
which  is  essentiallv  the  source  and  active  instru- 
ment  of  all  evil.  It  is  on  this  ground  that  the 
Metempsychosis  is  advocated.  The  soul  which  has 
committed  any  sin  or  fault,  is,  after  death,  again 
united  to  a  body.  In  this  philosophy,  the  existence 
of  a  Eirst  Cause  is  obscurely  stated.  What  notions 
are  entertamed  seem  to  be  of  a  material  character. 
The  portion  of  Divine  intelKgence  and  wisdom  is 
small,  and  undefined  in  its  operations. 

The  Vedanta. 

The  Vedanta  claims  to  be  the  orthodox  expounder 
of  the  religion  of  the  Brahmins.  A  peculiarity  in 
this  system  of  speculation  on  human  knowledge  is, 

*  Wiadischraanu,  p.  1924.    Colebrooke,  b.  I.  p.  105. 


214  MENTAL   PHILOSOPKY    OF    INDIA. 

that  it  is  maintained  that  there  are  other  sources 
of  information  besides  what  is  derived  from  per- 
ception ;  and  these  sources  are  revelation  and  tra- 
dition. The  knowledge  conveyed  in  tliis  revelation 
is  eternal ;  and  the  language  in  wliich  it  is  con- 
veyed, is  also  immortal,  and  not  of  human  invention. 
All  matter  by  its  nature  is  inert,  and  cannot  move 
itself,  nor  eflPect  spontaneously  any  change  in  its 
structure.  There  must,  therefore,  be  a  spirit  of 
some  kind ;  and  this  spirit  must  be  endowed  with 
self-existence  and  a  creative  energy.  It  exists  in 
itself,  and  can  perceive,  reflect  upon,  and  be  con- 
scious of  its  own  powers.  The  properties  of  the 
body  are  all  deficient  in  these  attributes.  They 
cannot  feel,  or  be  sentient  of  their  own  natiu'es ; 
they  are  only  the  instruments  through  which  the 
soul  feels,  and  thinks,  and  understands. 

On  the  natiu'e  of  matter  and  mind,  which  this 
school  of  philosophy  held,  Sir  William  Jones  makes 
the  following  remarks  : — "The  difficulties  attending 
the  vulscar  notion  of  material  substances,  induced 
many  of  the  wisest  among  the  ancients,  as  well  as 
the  Hindoo  philosophers,  to  believe  that  the  whole 
creation  was  rather  an  energy  than  a  work,  by 
which  the  Infinite  Mind,  who  is  present  at  all  times 
and  in  all  places,  exliibits  to  his  creatures  a  set  of 
perceptions  like  a  wonderful  picture,  or  piece  of 
music,  always  varied,  yet  always  uniform."* 

"The  Vedantis,"  the  same  author  observes, 
"  unable  to  form  a  distinct  idea  of  brute  matter, 

*  Introduction  to  a  Translation  of  some  Hindoo  verses. 


TIIE    VEDANTA.  215 

independent  of  mind,  or  to  conceive  that  the  work 
of  supreme  goodness  was  left  a  moment  to  itself, 
imagine  that  the  Deity  is  ever  present  to  his  work, 
and  constantly  supports  a  series  of  perceptions, 
which  in  one  sense  they  call  illusory,  though  they 
cannot  but  admit  the  reality  of  all  created  forms, 
as  far  as  the  happiness  of  creatures  can  be  affected 
by  them." 

"  The  word  Maya,  or  delusion,  has  a  subtile  and 
recondite  sense  in  the  Vedanta  philosophy,  where 
it  signifies  the  system  of  perceptions,  whether  of 
secondary  or  primary  qualities,  which  the  Deity  was 
believed,  by  Epicharmus,  Plato,  and  many  truly 
pious  men,  to  raise,  by  his  omnipresent  spirit,  in  the 
minds  of  his  creatures ;  but  which  had  not,  in  their 
opinion,  any  existence  independent  of  mind."* 

On  the  nature  and  existence  of  a  Pirst  Cause, 
the  Vedanta  is  very  confused ;  and  Oriental  scholars 
are  at  variance  on  the  precise  doctrines  of  this 
branch  of  the  Indian  system.  It  is  generally  laid 
down,  that  where  there  are  decisive  marks  of  de- 
sign and  contrivance  in  the  construction  and  ar- 
rangement of  external  objects,  there  must  be  a 
designing  and  intelligent  cause.  But  at  the  same 
time  this  principle  is  clogged  with  so  many  quali- 
fications and  restrictions,  that  at  length  it  becomes 
difficult  to  say  what  is  really  meant  by  Indian  sa- 
vants. Mr.  Kennedy  controverts  the  opinion  of 
Colebrooke,  that,  according  to  the  Vedanta,  God  is 
not  only  the  efficient  but  material  cause  of  the 

*  Dissertation  on  the  Gods  of  Greece,  Italy,  and  India. 


21G  MENTAL   PHILOSOPHY   OF   INDIA. 

universe.  The  former  gentleman  insists  that  the 
Indian  philosophy  does  not  acknowledge  the  idea 
of  matter  at  all,  nay,  absolutely  denies  its  very 
existence.*  It  is  observed  by  Emitter,  that  "  It 
vidll  at  once  occur  to  the  reader,  that  the  strongest 
argument  on  wliich  the  Vedanta  could  have  rested, 
must  have  been  the  view  which  pervades  the  whole 
philosophy  of  India,  that  the  multiplicity  of  phe- 
nomena does  not  destroy  the  unity  of  the  essence. 
Thus  it  was  held,  that  as  the  essence  of  the  soul 
may  remain  intact,  notwithstanding  that  the  most 
diversified  phenomena  are  mirrored  upon  it ;  so  the 
Supreme  Mind  or  Spirit  is  not  altered  in  its  essence 
by  the  change  of  the  mundane  objects  which  arise 
out  of  itself.  In  this  view  the  identity  of  the  es- 
sence is  so  firmly  maintained,  as  to  exclude  every 
possible  change  that  can  happen  to  or  in  it.  Ac- 
cordingly it  is  said  of  God,  that  although  he  can 
transmute  liimself  into  all,  and  create  all  things 
out  of  liimself,  he  is  nevertheless  without  shape  or 
form ;  not  affected  by  the  states  of  the  universe  ; 
without  passion  or  change ;  and  similar  to  the  clear 
crystal,  which  apparently  receives  into  itself  dif- 
ferent colours,  but  in  reality  is  equally  transparent 
at  all  times ;  or  to  the  light  of  the  sun  or  moon, 
which,  although  it  is  invariable  in  itself,  neverthe- 
less appears  different  according  as  it  shines  upon 
different  objects.  The  Mind  or  Spirit  may  be  com- 
pared to  pure  space,  wherein  all  exists  and  goes 
through  change  after  change,  but  which  is  not  it- 

*  Royal  Asiatic  Soc.  3.  p.  412. 


THE   VEDANTA.  217 

self  changed  thereby.  In  these  there  is  no  differ- 
ence between  the  recipient,  the  perceived,  and  the 
perception ;  it  is  without  multiplicity,  and  he  who 
believes  it  must  be  multiple,  dies  death  upon 
death."* 

We  have  given  a  short  sketch  of  the  mental  spe- 
culations of  an  imperfectly  civilized  portion  of  our 
race ;  and  every  candid  reader  must  allow,  that  in 
one  point  of  ^dew  this  Indian  philosophy  does  not 
flag  far  behind  that  of  more  polished  and  intellec- 
tual nations ;  that  is,  in  reference  to  the  notions 
entertained  as  to  a  first  or  creative  principle.  To 
the  Indian  understanding,  mind  is  indispensable  to 
enable  even  the  savage  to  conceive  any  active  or 
creative  power  in  nature  at  all ;  and  on  this  ac-* 
count  he  is  placed  on  precisely  the  same  footing 
as  the  most  favoured  people  among  whom  the  arts 
and  sciences  flourish  in  the  highest  degree  of  vi- 
gour and  perfection.  The  savage  and  the  civilized 
man  are  nearly,  if  not  identically,  on  a  level  as  to  tlie 
first  step  in  philosophy  ;  but  the  great  discrepancy 
between  then*  respective  views  arises  from  the  dif- 
ferent ways  in  which  each  analyzes  and  illustrates 
the  principle.  Both  admit  sunply  that  a  mind  is 
indispensable  to  the  solution  of  the  phenomena  of 
existence ;  but  when  each  attempts  to  describe  in 
what  way  and  manner  this  mind  operates  and  dis- 
plays itself,  then  we  recognise  the  great  disparity 
between  ignorance  and  intelligence.  The  man  of 
civilization  and  science  gives  some  plausible  and 

*  Hist.  Phil.,  vol.  4.  p.  \\o%. 


218  MENTAL   PHILOSOPHY   OF   INDIA. 

rational  theory  for  liis  views  and  opinions ;  but  the 
savage,  or  half  civilized,  run  riot  in  the  wildest  ex- 
cesses of  ignorant  conjecture  and  superstitious  fears. 
Both  set  out  from  the  same  starting  point ;  but  they 
take  opposite  directions,  and,  of  course,  the  longer 
and  farther  they  travel,  the  greater  is  the  interval 
of  space  which  separates  them  from  each  other.* 

*  See  Royal  Asiatic  Society,  Vol.  1.  pp.  19.43.  92.  118.  439.  466. 
679.;  and  Vol.  2.  pp.  1.39. 


UNION   OF   EASTERN   DOCTRINES.  219 


CHAPTER    XXIV. 


THE  UNION    OF   EASTERN  DOCTRINES  WITH  THOSE 
OF  GREECE  AND  ROME. 


We  come  now  to  a  marked  and  important  epoch 
in  the  history  of  mental  speculation,  namely,  the 
amalgamation  of  the  Greek  doctrines  with  that 
great  and  varied  mass  of  refined  and  attenuated 
philosophy  which  prevailed  in  many  of  the  more 
intelligent  and  civilized  parts  of  the  Asiatic  conti- 
nent. This  alliance  caused  an  obvious  change  in  the 
mode  of  conducting  investigations  into  the  laws  of 
the  human  mind ;  and  made,  moreover,  these  in- 
vestigations more  subservient  to  other  branches  of 
knowledge,  than  they  had  liitherto  been  in  the 
divers  schools  of  pliilosophy  at  Athens,  Rome,  and 
Alexandria.  Discussions  on  the  nature  of  mind 
took  now  a  more  lofty  a  priori  station ;  were  sub- 
limated into  endless  refinements  ;  were  more  com- 
pletely shrouded  in  mysterious  allegories,  and  en- 
veloped in  the  gorgeous  pomp  of  Eastern  metaphor 
and  imagery.  All  this  proved  a  source  of  inter- 
minable and  unprofitable  inquiries  and  discussions ; 


220  UNION    OF    EASTERN   DOCTRINES. 

clouded  the  whole  horizon  of  the  philosophy  of 
nimd ;  and  ushered  in  a  long  and  dreary  night  of 
wrangling,  douht,  and  obscurity. 

What  were  the  precise  causes  of  this  union,  do 
not  very  clearly  appear  from  any  historical  records 
we  possess.  Certain  it  is,  that  a  mixture  took  place 
between  some  of  the  leading  systems  of  Greece, 
and  the  peculiar  views  of  Oriental  nations ;  and 
that  Alexandria  was  the  principal  seat  of  learning 
where  tliis  union  manifested  itself.  The  doctrines 
of  Plato  and  Pythagoras  seem  to  have  been  great 
favourites,  but  there  are  also  evident  traces  of  some 
of  the  opinions  which  exclusively  belong  to  the 
Stoical  school  of  philosophy. 

The  chief  difference  between  what  is  termed 
Oriental  philosophy  and  Grecian,  arises  from 
this ;  the  Oriental  chiefly  relates  to  notions  or  j)rin- 
ciples  immediately  connected  Tvith  Di\"inity,  and 
endeavours  to  develop  those  laws  connected  with 
the  creation  and  regulation  of  mundane  afiairs. 
The'Greek  speculation  follows  a  different  route.  It 
starts  with  man,  his  mind,  his  feelings,  his  moral 
emotions,  and  social  and  physical  existence.  It  is 
obvious  that  a  different  result  would  be  effected  by 
these  varied  modes  of  inquiry;  and  as  general 
principles  in  both  cases  became  more  minutely 
analyzed,  the  divergency  from  the  respective  points 
of  departure,  would  necessarily  become  wider  and 
more  palpable.  Now  this  is  precisely  what  we  find. 
Both  the  Oriental  and  Grecian  streams  of  know- 
led":e  took  their  rise  from  nearlv  identical  locali- 
ties,  from  a  united  desire  to  know  the  origin  of  all 


ARISTOBULUS.  221 

tilings ;  but  they  flowed  through  diversified  regions 
of  thought,  and  at  their  point  of  junction  we  see 
them  tinged  with  the  respective  intellectual  strata 
over  which  they  had  passed.  The  Oriental  was  thick 
and  turbid,  and  the  Greek  comparatively  pellucid 
and  clear. 

Amstobulus. 

After  the  Jews  returned  from  their  capti^dty  at 
Babylon,  they  brought  with  them  many  of  the 
pecuKar  philosophical  notions  prevalent  among  the 
Babylonians,  and  other  neighbouring  nations.  This 
importation  of  speculative  novelties,  changed  and 
corrupted  the  simple  philosophy  of  the  HebrcAV 
people;  and  their  learned  men  made  various  at- 
t  tempts  to  unite  the  foreign  with  their  ovsti  peculiar 
abstract  views  of  human  nature. 

Aristobulus  was  one  of  the  first  among  the 
learned  Babbins  who  made  this  attempt  at  amalga- 
mation. His  views  on  metaphysical  subjects  were 
precisely  those  of  Plato,  with  a  little  admixtiu*e  of 
Asiatic  hyperbole,  and  metaphor.  He  endeavoured 
to  explain  the  doctrines  of  the  Jewish  faith  through 
the  means  of  the  abstract  principles  of  the  Greek 
philosophy.  There  are  none  of  his  writings  extant; 
therefore  we  cannot  furnish  the  reader  with  any 
details  as  to  his  peculiar  ^dews  on  the  nature  of  the 
faculties  of  the  human  mind. 


Philo. 
Philo  was  a  distinguished  Jewish  writer.     He 


222  UNION   OF   EASTERN   DOCTRINES. 

had  studied  with  great  care  and  success  all  the 
principal  Greek  systems  on  the  human  mind ;  and 
he  was,  also,  partially  versed  in  the  mystic  philoso- 
phy of  the  East. 

He  maintained  that  there  were  two  distinct  souls 
in  human  nature ;  the  one  a  reasonable,  and  the 
other  an  irrational  or  animal  soul.  To  the  reason- 
able soul  he  attributed  three  separate  faculties, 
understanding,  sensation,  and  speech ;  and  to  the 
irrational  soul,  the  sensual  passions  and  affections. 
Pliilo  affirms  that  the  understanding  is  not  only  a 
divine  spirit,  but  an  inseparable  portion  of  the 
divine  essence  itself.  It  is  also  the  loord,  analogous 
to  the  Deity  ;  it  bears  his  image,  and  virtually  con- 
tains in  it  all  forms.  The  soul  pre-exists  in  bodies, 
and  is  possessed  of  complete  liberty  of  action.  God 
has  given  to  man  prudence  to  govern  his  reason, 
courage  to  restrain  his  passions,  and  temperance  to 
repress  his  sensual  desires.  Sometimes  the  soul, 
invested  with  the  senses,  only  sees  sensible  objects ; 
sometimes,  by  taking  a  spontaneous  flight,  it  dis- 
euffasres  itself  from  material  influences,  and  elevates 
itself  to  the  perception  of  intelligent  things.  It  is 
this  deliverance  from  the  bondage  of  the  body,  that 
the  truly  wise  always  aspire  after;  this  conflict 
between  the  senses  and  the  free  exercise  of  the 
understanding,  constitutes  wisdom  in  its  loftiest 
acceptation.  It  is  from  this  contemplation  of  the 
divine  essence  that  man  obtains  all  his  true  know- 
ledge, and  arrives  at  virtuous  excellence. 

Philo  dwells  upon  some  of  the  sceptical  argu- 
ments of  the  Academic  School  of  Greece,  by  repre- 


PHiLO.  223 

sentiiig  the  great  difficulty  there  is  in  man's  ability 
to  detect  the  truth  in  matters  of  abstract  specula- 
tion. The  impressions  from  the  senses  are  not 
always  to  be  relied  on;  and  even  those  more  refined 
thoudits  which  seem  to  have  their  source  out  of 
the  mind  itself,  may  lead  us  into  error  and  delusion. 
Man  cannot  penetate  into  the  arcana  of  nature ; 
and  the  only  kind  of  knowledge  which  is  calculated 
to  improve  and  delight,  is  that  which  arises  from  a 
contemplation  of  the  powers  and  faculties  of  the 
soul.*  But  even  here  our  desire  for  knowledge 
receives  a  severe  check ;  for  it  is  as  unreasonable 
for  the  soul  to  know  itself,  as  it  is  for  the  human 
eye  to  direct  its  powers  to  its  own  movements.  We 
know  not  the  nature  of  the  soul;  it  may  be  blood,  or 
air,  or  fire,  or  it  may  have  no  material  quality  what- 
ever. How  little  then  can  we  really  know  of  the 
matter  !  All  true  science  will  teach  man  humility, 
and  will  force  him  to  acknowledge  that  he  indeed 
knows  nothincf.  God  alone  is  the  source  of  all 
knowledge. 

Considerable  difference  of  opinion  exists  among 
philosophical  liistorians  as  to  the  proportion  of 
heathen  notions  incorporated  with  Philo's  owai 
Jewish  system.  This  is  a  controversy  not  easily 
decided.  The  majority  of  the  German  critics  refer  a 
great  portion  of  his  philosophy  to  an  eastern  origin ; 
but  there  is  really  no  solid  ground  for  this.  The 
theological  principles  involved  in  the  Jewish  Scrip- 
tures were  sufficient  of  themselves  to   give  that 

*   De  Ebriet.  40.  p.  382. 


221  UNION    OF    EASTERN    DOCTRINES,    &C 


peculiar  cast  to  a  speculative  system,  which  we 
recognise  in  the  writings  of  this  distinguished 
Rabhi.  In  every  thing  he  advances  there  is  a 
great  portion  of  common  sense;  few  thoughts  of 
fanatic  absurdity  or  oriental  mysticism  are  percep- 
table.  His  views  are  just  such  as  an  inquisitive 
mind  might  be  supposed  to  entertain,  who  had  the 
revealed  system  of  Moses,  and  the  Grecian  philoso- 
phy to  guide  him  ;  without  availing  himself  of  any 
speculations  from  the  Magi,  or  the  Gymnosophists.* 

APOLLONIUS    OF    TYANA. 

There  is  very  little  known  of  this  philosopher. 
He  was  a  sort  of  marvel-monger,  and  dealt  in  mi- 
racles, soothsayings,  and  omens.  On  metaphysical 
questions  he  seems  to  have  made  Pythagoras  his 
model  and  guide.  Apollonius  recommends  that  we 
should  adopt  a  pure  worship  of  the  Supreme  God, 
a  sort  of  personal  and  inward  movement  of  the  soul 
towards  Him,  apart  from  all  parade  or  external  ce- 
remony. He  also  maintains  that  the  anunal  crea- 
tion bore  an  affinity  to  man,  and  that  the  doctrine 
of  the  Metempsychosis  was  well  founded.  He  un- 
dertook long  journeys  into  India  and  Upper  Egypt 
to  consult  the  Magi ;  and  he  affirms,  that  the  result 
of  his  personal  inquiries  and  investigations  was, 
that  Pythagoras  derived  his  philosophical  opinions 
from  Indian  sages. 

*  See  Dahne's  Theol.  Studien  u.  Kritiken,  Jahrg.  1833.  p  984.  The 
same  author  treats  very  fully  of  Philo  in  his  Geschichtliche  Darstellung 
(\.  Jiulisch-Alexandrinischen  Religiosen  Philosophic,  Ilalle,  1834. 


plutaech — luciits  apuleius.  225 

Pltjtarch. 

Tills  philosopher  is  better  knowii  for  his  biogra- 
phical laboiu's  and  moral  disquisitions,  than  for  his 
metaphysics.  He  was  not,  hoAvever,  altogether 
unacquainted  \^ith  the  science  of  mind,  and  its  kin- 
dred doctrines  as  to  the  origin  of  the  world  and 
the  nature  of  the  human  soul.  The  systems  of 
Plato  and  Aristotle  were  great  favourites  with  him, 
but  especially  that  of  Plato,  whose  views  of  life,  and 
speculative  ideas  on  the  Deity  and  the  human  soul, 
were  more  in  unison  with  his  own.  He  adopts 
Plato's  division  of  the  soul  into  five  members  ;  the 
nutritive,  the  sensitive,  the  sensual,  the  irascible, 
and  the  rational. 


LiTcius  Apuleius. 

This  philosopher  was  a  public  teacher  of  the  doc- 
trines of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  in  the  time  of  Anto- 
ninus, at  the  city  of  Madaura,  in  Numidia.  He 
endeavoured  to  reconcile  the  opinions  of  Plato  and 
the  Stagirite,  and  steered  a  sort  of  middle  path 
between  them  on  controversial  points.  His  notions 
of  the  Deity  are  rather  singular.  He  maintains 
that  it  would  be  highly  derogatory  to  the  Almighty 
to  guide  and  regulate  the  affairs  of  this  world ;  and 
for  tliis  reason  Apuleius  thinks  that  mundane  con- 
cerns are  all  committed  to  the  superintendence  of 
a  host  of  angelic  ministers.  These  ministers  have 
thek  abode  in  the  air,  and  fill  up  that  great  void 
between  heaven  and  earth. 
*  •         Q 


226  UNION    OF    EASTERN    DOCTRINES. 

All  the  clivers  forms  of  religion  among  men,  even 
the  most  ignoble  and  degrading  rites  and  ceremo- 
nies, have  their  respective  representatives  among 
these  aerial  ministers  or  agents.  They  know  every- 
thing, doAvn  to  the  intents  and  purposes  of  the 
human  heart.  He  likewise  affirms  that  the  Divine 
Mind  is  constituted  of  a  kind  of  trinity  of  faculties, 
and  is  immutable  and  eternal.  All  ideas  reside  in 
this  divine  E-eason. 


NUMENIUS. 

The  metaphysical  opinions  of  this  learned  man 
are  but  very  imperfectly  known.  He  was  born  at 
Apamea  in  Syria,  and  is  supposed,  on  this  account, 
to  have  entertained  a  marked  predilection  for  Ori- 
ental ideas.  He  was  a  great  favourite  with  the 
New  Platonists,  who  considered  his  system,  (if  his 
peculiar  views  are  entitled  to  that  designation),  as 
singularly  profound  and  valual3le.  He  held  the 
character  of  Moses  in  high  veneration,  and  was  no 
doul3t  well  acquainted  mtli  his  writings.  The  phi- 
losophical opinions  of  the  Egyptians,  the  Magi,  and 
the  Brahmins,  he  studied  carefullv,  and  is  even  said 
to  have  made  free  with  the  personal  history  of  our 
Saviour.* 

His  opinion  on  the  general  constitution  of  things 
seems  to  have  been,  that  there  could  be  no  cor- 
poreal substance,  unless  there  was  some  incor- 
poreal agent  previously  existing.    This  is  nothing 

*  Eusebius,  Pr.  Ev.  9.  pp.  /•  8. 


NUMENIUS.  227 

more  nor  less  than  saying,  that  mind  must  have 
existed  prior  to  matter.  Everything,  according  to 
Numenius,  which  is  corporeal,  is  subject  to  decom- 
position and  decay ;  an  immaterial  soul  or  princixile 
is,  therefore,  requisite  to  secure  immortaKty. 

On  the  nature  of  the  Divine  essence,  we  have  a 
good  deal  of  refined  and  mysterious  speculation. 
This  is  a  point  on  which  both  Numenius  and  most 
of  his  commentators  have  been  sadly  puzzled.  The 
philosopher  attempted  to  explain  the  connection 
which  subsists  between  a  spiritual  and  creative 
mind,  and  the  material  universe.  This  was  an 
arduous  task,  and  we  cannot  wonder  that  he  should 
fail.  Indeed  all  his  conjectures  and  fancies  on  this 
subject  are  not  worth  the  trouble  of  exposition  or 
comment.* 

*  Eusebius,  Pr.  Ev.  15.  17- 


Q  2 


228  THE    GNOSTIC    METAPHYSICIANS. 


CHAPTER  XXV 
THE  GNOSTIC  METAPHYSICIANS. 


The  mental  disquisitions  of  the  Gnostic  sect  of  plii- 
losopliers  are  but  very  imperfectly  understood.  They 
were  generally  incorporated  with  their  peculiar 
doctrines  on  the  nature  of  the  Supreme  Being,  the 
creation  of  the  world,  the  nature  and  origin  of  good 
and  evil,  and  the  future  destiny  of  the  human  race. 
These  Gnostic  speculators  were  divided  into  many 
different  sects  or  parties ;  but  they  all  seemed  to 
maintain  that  man  was  a  being  compounded  of  two 
distinct  souls ;  the  one  intelligent,  and  the  other 
sensitive.  The  ordinary  division  of  the  mind  into 
various  faculties  or  powers,  appears  to  have  obtained 
their  general  assent.  The  practical  application  of 
their  metaphysical  principles  was,  that  man  should 
cultivate  his  intelligent  at  the  expense  of  his  sensi- 
tive faculties.  "  Man,"  say  they,  "  is  only  a  passive 
instrument  in  the  hands  of  the  Divinity.  Science 
comes  solely  from  this  source  ;  and  reason  should 
detach  itself  not  only  from  the  influence  of  the 
senses,  but  even  from  itself.  The  ascetic,  or  he  who 
elevates  himself  to  God,  alone  possesses  true  know- 
ledge.    All  is  then  pure  ecstasy. 


THE   NEW   PLATONISTS.  229 


CHAPTER  XXVI.  ; 

THE  METAPHYSICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  NEW 

PLATONISTS. 


The  philosopliical  scliool  of  the  New  Platonists 
was  formed  from  the  m.ixture  of  the  doctrines  of 
Plato,  with  the  traditions  and  mysteries  of  the  East. 
This  school  is  sometimes  termed  by  historians,  the 
Alexandrian  School  of  Plulosophy.  The  opinions 
which  were  promulgated  by  these  learned  men, 
exercised  a  very  marked  and  powerful  influence  over 
the  whole  philosophy  of  the  mind  for  many  sub- 
sequent centuries,  and  even  over  the  moral  and 
religious  principles  of  a  large  portion  of  the  civilized 
world. 

Ammonius  Saccas.     a.  d.  200. 

Ammonius  Saccas  was  the  founder  of  this  school 
of  philosophy  at  Alexandria.  It  is  said  that  he  was 
the  son  of  Christian  parents,  and  had  received  a 
Christian  education ;  but  that  when  he  became  of  riper 
age,  he  gave  himself  up  to  the  study  of  the  Greek  phi- 


230        PRINCIPLES   OF   THE   NEW  PLATONISTS. 

losopliy,  and  afterwards  to  the  observance  of  tlie 
rites  and  ceremonies  of  Paganism.* 

The  principal  aim  in  his  philosophical  studies  was 
to  reconcile  the  discrepancies  between  the  Platonic 
and  the  Aristotelian  systems.  How  far  he  was  able 
to  accomplish  this  task,  does  not  very  clearly  appear, 
from  any  historical  accounts  which  we  have  of 
him. 

There  are  two  philosophical  fragments  of  Am- 
monius  Saccas,  preserved  by  Nemesius,  Bishop  of 
Emessa,  in  which  some  of  his  opinions  on  inte- 
resting and  important  questions  may  be  found. 

On  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  Ammonius  seems 
to  have  a  fixed  and  decided  opinion.  He  advocates 
its  spirituality  and  indestructibility.  A  corporeal 
body,  according  to  his  notion,  must  have  some 
principle  or  essence,  by  which  its  individual  parts 
can  be  held  together  and  sustained ;  for  it  is  quite 
obvious,  that  this  principle  or  essence  must  be  of  a 
different  nature  from  that  wliicli  has  no  life  in  itself, 
and  which  cannot  communicate  life,  activity,  and 
motion.  There  may  be  a  mode  of  the  two  natures, 
corporeal  and  spiritual,  acting  on  each  other,  but 
their  real  essences  must  necessarily  be  diametrically 
opposite,  t 

On  the  nature  of  the  Deity,  Ammonius  held  that 
he  was  eternal  and  immutable,  the  cause  of  all 


*  See  on  this  point,  Essai  Historique  sur  la  vie,  &c.  d' Ammonius  Saccas, 
])ar  M.  Dehaut,  Bruxelles,  \S36. 

t  See  the  learned  and  critical  Essai  of  Dehaut,  already  mentioned, 
p.  135. 


LONGINUS PLOTINUS.  231 

things,  the  substance  of  all  substances,  the  being  of 
all  beings,  the  essence  of  all  essences,  and  the  arche- 
type of  all  intellectual  perception  and  power.  The 
Deity  does  not  possess  relative,  but  Sihsohite  unit i/ ; 
and  He  is  not  pure  intelligence,  for  He  is  above  all 
intelligence,  and  had  a  prior  existence  to  it. 

LONGINTJS. 

Lono-inus,  the  author  of  the  treatise  "  On  the 
Suljlime,"  cultivated  philosophy  among  the  New 
Platonists.  He  did  not,  however,  adopt  their  most 
extravagant  and  mystical  doctrines.  He  rejected 
the  theories  of  Epicurus  and  Chrysippus,  because 
they  had  a  dii'ect  tendency  to  materialize  the 
human  mind.  Longinus  affirms  it  is  foolish  to 
think  that  the  phenomena  of  thought  and  intelli- 
gence can  be  the  result  of  simple  mechanical  action, 
or  of  a  mere  combination  of  material  atoms. 


Plotinus.     206  A.D. 

Plotinus  was  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  renowned 
of  the  New  Platonician  Metaphysicians.  He  was  a 
writer  of  vast  acquired  information,  and  of  a  vigor- 
ous and  powerful  mind.  His  mental  speculations 
are  contained  in  a  treatise,  called  the  "  Mieade.'' 
This  is  truly  considered  one  of  the  most  interesting 
books  on  abstract  science  of  which  antiquity  can 
boast.  It  contains  nine  parts.  The  first  treats  of 
morals ;  the  second  of  physics ;  the  third,  general 
considerations  on  the  laws  of  the  universe;  the 


232         PRINCIPLES    OP   THE    NEW    PLATONISTS. 

fourth,  on  the  human  soul;  the  fifth,  on  intelK- 
gence ;  and  the  sixth  is  a  summary  of  the  whole. 
Some  of  the  chapters  or  parts  are  douhle  ones. 

This  speculative  work  of  Plotinus  is  confessedly 
one  of  the  most  abstruse  which  antiquity  has  handed 
down  to  us.  It  is  extremely  difficult  to  obtain  a 
right  conception  of  its  leading  principles,  or  the 
end  which  the  author  had  in  view  to  establish. 
The  theory  seems  grounded  on  a  peculiar  notion 
of  unity ;  but  the  exact  meaning  to  be  applied  to 
this  word  is  not  easily  divined.  Plotinus  calls  it 
absolute,  j^^rfect,  and  primordial  unity.  He  tells 
us  again  that  this  unity  is  necessary,  immutable, 
and  infinite  ;  it  is  not  numerical  unity ;  not  the  in- 
divisible point  of  the  arithmetician  and  geometri- 
cian. It  is  universal  unity,  perfect  in  its  own  sim- 
plicity. It  is  the  highest  degree  of  perfection ;  it 
is  the  beau  ideal,  the  only  true  beauty ;  it  is  the 
supreme  good,  the  highest  excellence. 

After  this  subtile  and  laboured  attempt  to  explain 
a  very  remote  abstraction  of  the  mind,  Plotinus 
endeavours  to  point  out  how  this  principle  of  unity 
operated  in  the  production  of  the  universe.  "  At 
first,  from  its  own  bosom  proceeds  the  supreme  in- 
telligence ;  a  secondary,  subordinate,  but  perfect 
principle.  It  proceeds  from  its  source  without  ex- 
ternal action  or  internal  volition ;  without  the  first 
principle  of  unity  being  either  modified  or  affected ; 
in  fact,  it  emanates  like  light  from  the  sun.  This 
intelligence  is  the  image,  the  reflection  of  unity ; 
the  luminous  crown  or  glory  of  it .  This  intelligence 
embraces  the  object  conceived,  the  subject  which 


PLOTINUS.  233 

conceives  it,  and  the  action  of  conception  itself; 
the  whole  of  these  three  things  are  embodied  in 
itself.  This  principle  of  supreme  intelligence  con- 
stantly contemplates  itself;  this  contemplation  is 
its  essence." 

"  The  universal  soul  is  the  third  priaciple,  suljor- 
dinate  to  the  other  two.  This  soul  is  thought, 
speech,  an  image  of  intelligence,  the  exercise  of  its 
spontaneity  ;  for  intelligence  acts  only  by  thought. 
But  this  thought  is  determined  only  because  it  is 
infinite.  All  chis  train  of  events  or  cu'cumstances 
acts  not  in  time,  but  in  eternity ;  and  the  three 
principles,  primordial  unity,  supreme  intelligence, 
and  the  universal  soul,  though  forming  a  hierarchy 
of  separate  and  independent  dignities  or  orders,  are 
nevertheless  co-eternal  mth  each  other." 

On  the  nature  of  existence  generally  Plotinus 
maintained,  that  natural  beings  were  not  the  true 
beings.  The  real  universe  admitted  neither  of  al- 
teration nor  transformation ;  it  is  identical  with 
the  Deity;  it  is  the  Divinity  itself,  such  as  he 
manifests  himself,  and  is  eternal  and  immutable 
like  him. 

On  the  nature  of  the  human  mmd  in  particular, 
this  subtile  philosopher  observes,  "  The  human  mind 
has  two  ordinary  modes  of  acting,  and  knowing ; 
the  one  by  a  participation  in  intelligence  and  the 
other  by  forms.  It  enjoys  the  former  when  filled 
and  illuminated  with  intelligence,  which  enables  it 
to  see  and  feel  immediately.  It  enjoys  the  second, 
by  means  of  certain  characters,  or  certain  laws 
which  have  been  engraven  on  our  natures.     Eor 


234         PRINCIPLES    OF    THE    NEW    PLATONISTS. 

the  Supreme  Being  has  imprinted  on  the  himian 
mind  the  rational  form  of  things.  True  knowledge 
is  that,  when  the  object  conceived  or  known  is 
identical  with  the  subject  which  conceives  or  knows 
it." 

"  The  faculties  of  the  soul  are  of  two  kinds.  The 
one,  derived  from  above,  constitutes  reason;  the 
other,  descending  to  the  inferior  regions,  forms  sen- 
sibility and  vegetation." 

"  Reason  is  placed  in  an  intermediate  position 
between  the  understanding  and  the  senses.  It  acts 
not  by  the  agency  of  the  bodily  organs,  but  solely 
by  the  force  of  intelligence." 

Plotinus  entertained  some  curious  notions  as  to 
the  nature  of  memory.  He  affirmed  this  faculty 
did  not  consist  in  preserving  impressions  received 
from  the  senses,  but  solely  in  an  innate  develop- 
ment of  self-power  or  energy.  And  the  power  of 
memory  was  in  strict  proportion  with  the  internal 
strength  of  this  power.  According  to  this  opinion 
it  is  not  necessary  to  place  confidence  in  memory, 
to  recal  the  impressions  which  externals  may  have 
made  upon  it ;  for  the  mind  possesses  in  itself  for 
the  retaining  of  knowledge,  a  sufficient  power  by 
its  intercourse  with  superior  intelligences. 

On  the  nature  of  sensation,  he  remarks,  "  The 
perceptions  we  obtain  from  external  objects  are 
always  obscure ;  while,  on  the  contrary,  those  we 
receive  from  reflection  are  always  clear  and  lumi- 
nous." 

r 

The  general  outline  of  the  doctrine  of  Plotinus 
bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  some  modern  specu- 


PonrHYUY.  235 

lations  on  the  human  mind,  Avhich  we  shall  have 
to  notice  in  a  subsequent  part  of  this  work. 

Plotinus  seems  to  have  followed  in  the  wake  of 
Ammonius  Saccas,  and  to  have  moulded  his  philo- 
sophical system  upon  the  principles  of  that  learned 
person.  Plotinus  was  of  an  ardent  and  imagina- 
tive mind;  and  this  led  him,  in  conjunction  mth 
the  general  tone  and  character  of  the  philosophy 
of  the  times,  into  mystical  and  fanatical  specula- 
tions. These  shed  a  cloudv  haziness  over  the  more 
rational  and  solid  portions  of  his  system;  for  it  was 
not  so  devoid  of  valuable  disquisitions  as  some 
historians  have  imagined.  There  is  a  strong  under- 
current of  common  sense  in  his  writings ;  and  his 
ideas  of  the  philosophy  of  the  mind  in  particular, 
show  that  he  had  culled  from  the  systems  of  Plato 
and  Aristotle  some  of  the  best  and  soundest 
maxims  on  this  branch  of  kno^^  ledge,  and  that  he 
fully  appreciated  their  intrinsic  worth  and  impor-' 
tance. 


Porphyry. 

Porphyiy  was  the  pupil  and  personal  friend  of 
.Plotinus,  and  embraced  essentially  the  same  prin- 
ciples, as  to  the  natiu'e  of  the  human  mind  and 
its  modes  of  operation. 

With  the  view  of  reconciling  the  doctrines  of 
Aristotle  with  those  of  Plato,  which  was  one  of  the 
grand  aims  of  the  new  Platonists,  Porphyry  wrote 
a  work  on  the  Fredicahles  of  Aristotle,  and  endea- 
voured to   enter   into  a  minute   analysis   of  the 


236         PEINCIPLES    OF   THE   NEW   PLATONISTS. 

notions  we  commonly  attach  to  particular  generic 
terms  of  reasoning;  such  as  genus,  species,  con- 
trariety, identity,  8fC.  This  is  considered  a  very  ex- 
cellent work  of  its  kind,  and  it  shows  the  profound 
attention  with  which  he  had  studied  the  metaphy- 
sical works  of  the  Stagirite. 

The  ideas  Porphyry  entertained  on  the  nature  of 
general  terms,  may  be  inferred  from  the  following 
remarks  on  this  eagerly  contested  point.  "  Genus 
is  the  principal,  which  contains  the  species  and  the 
individuals  placed  under  it ;  and  involves  an  idea 
of  multitude,  or  number."  ^^  If  genus  and  species 
possessed  each  a  separate  and  independent  exist- 
ence, or  were  two  distinct  and  separate  notions 
of  the  mind,  then,  on  the  first  supposition,  they 
would  have  a  corporeal  existence;  and  on  the  second, 
they  would  be  of  an  incorporeal  nature,  for  they 
would  be  separated  from  sensible  or  external 
thin2:s." 

Porphpy  compared  the  human  mind,  in  re- 
ference to  sensation,  to  the  harmonv  elicited  from 
the  cords  or  strings  of  a  musical  instrument.  The 
senses  are  the  agitated  cords,  and  the  soul  is  the 
musician  who  moves  them.  The  human  soul 
has  reasons  contained  within  itself  for  all  things ; 
and  it  is  on  this  account,  and  by  this  special  reason, 
that  it  can  always  operate  on  the  senses,  whether 
there  be  an  external  exciting  cause,  or  merely  the 
internal  suggestions  of  its  ovm.  nature  or  will.  If 
there  be  an  external  exciting  cause,  then  this  leads 
the  mind  to  the  cognizance  of  external  objects  ;  if 
only  an  internal  suggestion,  then  we  are  led  to  the 


JAMBLICUS.  237 

contemplation  of  more  intelligent  ideas.  Sensa- 
tion never  takes  place  without  a  modification  being 
experienced  by  the  organs  of  sense ;  and  the  under- 
standing in  its  turn  never  receives  assistance  from 
its  own  imaginative  workings,  without  these  intel- 
lectual objects  receiving  an  intellectual  impres- 
sion. The  human  understanding  is  essentially 
uniform,  of  perfect  unity  of  parts,  one  and  indi- 
vidual in  every  thing  which  constitutes  it. 


Jamblictjs. 

This  philosopher  composed  a  work,  addressed  to 
Porphyry,  "  Upon  tJie  Egyptian  My  steries^'"  in  which 
there  are  a  great  number  of  curious  and  important 
remarks  on  divers  topics  connected  with  the  mind 
of  man.  The  fundamental  system  of  the  new  Pla- 
tonicians  is  strenuously  upheld.  Jamblicus  main- 
tains the  existence  of  an  intellectual  and  a  sensible 
world ;  but  considers  the  former  as  containing  in 
itseK  the  whole  of  the  latter ;  or  perhaps,  to  speak 
more  plainly,  that  the  sensible  or  external  world  is 
only  the  shadow  of  the  intellectual  one.  "  The 
Gods,"  says  he,  "  which  compose  tliis  superior  re- 
gion, contemplate  their  own  divine  ideas  ;  the  stars, 
or  visible  Gods,  are  only  the  images  created  by 
divine  and  intellectual  realities.  A  bond  of  union 
associates  these  two  orders  of  existences  into  one 
indissoluble  whole ;  the  visible  Gods  being  con- 
tained within  the  intellectual  ones.  The  farther  we 
ascend  in  this  chain  of  existence,  the  more  we  de- 
velop first  causes  by  their  genus  and  essence, — the 


238  PRINCIPLES    OF    THE    NEW   PLATONISTS. 

more  we  shall  be  directed  to  the  consideration  of 
parts  of  the  stupendous  whole,  and  the  better  able 
to  detect  that  sublime  and  perfect  unity  of  design 
and  purpose,  so  visibly  imprinted  upon  every  thing 
we  behold." 

"This  knowledge  of  the  Gods  is  intimately 
blended  with  our  own  individual  being.  It  is  an- 
terior to  every  mental  act  of  examining,  judging, 
and  reasoning.  It  has  been  co-existent,  from  the 
beginning  of  time,  with  a  certain  predisposition  in 
our  souls  towards  that  which  is  good.  It  is  the  same 
with  all  those  superior  intelKgences  which  fill  up 
the  intervening  space  between  the  Gods  and  the 
human  soul ;  which  form  the  intermediate  link 
between  both,  in  that  immense  chain  which  binds 
the  most  elevated  things  with  the  most  common, 
and  sustains  the  harmony  and  order  of  the  whole 
creation." 


Peoclijs.     412.  A.D. 

Proclus  was  one  of  the  great  shining  lights 
amongst  the  metaphysical  philosophers  of  the  new 
Platonic  School.  He  was  a  man  of  great  and 
varied  accomplishments,  and  gathered  around  him 
a  lively  and  intense  interest  during  his  scholastic 
reign.  He  was  born  at  Constantinople,  in  412  of 
the  Christian  era,  and  at  an  early  age  was  sent  to 
Alexandria  to  study  pliilosophy,  oratory,  and  belles- 
lettres. 

Proclus  adopted  the  system  of  Plato  in  all  its 
fulness  and  in  all  its  bearings.      The  latter  says, 


PROCLUS.  239 

that  "  unitv  and  variety  are  the  essential  characters 
of  human  thought;"  and  this  principle  serves  Pro- 
clus  to  workout  a  very  extended,  subtile,  and  elevated 
commentary,  in  reference  to  the  whole  constitution 
of  nature. 

According  to  this  philosopher  the  human  mind 
may  he  considered  under  three  points  of  view,  the 
essence  of  every  thing,  identity,  and  diversity. 
These  elementary  forms  give  rise  to  three  other 
princi]iles  of  a  prolific  nature.  "The  world,"  he 
says,  "  is  composed  of  harmony.  Now  harmony  is 
unity  in  variety.  Unity  and  variety  exist  then 
primarily  in  the  conceptions  of  the  Grand  Architect; 
or  rather  the  Grand  Architect  is  only  the  highest 
unitv,  which  embraces  in  its  bosom  all  other  divine 
unities.  Similitude  is  the  limit  which  determines 
diversity  from  infinity.  Similitude  assembles,  diver- 
sity disperses.  These  three  tilings,  essence,  identity, 
and  diversity,  produce  by  theu'  action  all  the  forms 
or  unities  which  reside  in  individual  tliin<?s." 

Proclus  distinguished  five  orders  of  faculties  in 
the  human  soul.  The  first  is  confined  to  the  exer- 
cise of  the  external  senses.  The  second  is  that 
which  displays  the  soul's  connexion  mth  the  body, 
and  yet  preserves  her  own  individuality.  The  third 
consists  in  rectifying  and  testing  our  opinions  and 
conclusions,  by  the  aid  of  superior  intelligences  and 
wisdom.  The  fourth  detaches  the  soul  from  all  in- 
ferior and  grovelling  impressions,  renders  it  peace- 
able and  tranquil,  looks  into  its  own  powers,  feel- 
ings, and  emotions,  and  observes  the  harmonious 
action  of  the  whole  inward  man.     And  the  fifth 


240       PRINCIPLES  OF  THE   NEW  PLATONISTS. 

power  is  that  which  excites  and  sustains  our 
sympathies  with  all  our  kindred  of  mankind,  and 
with  aU  those  angeUc  forms,  in  which  superior  de- 
grees of  intelligences  reside. 

In  accordance  with  these  five  powers,  there  are 
five  branches  of  knowledge.  The  first  relates  to 
matters  of  a  very  humble  character ;  to  material 
objects  and  such  as  influence  us  by  the  force  of 
physical  destray.  The  second  order  of  intelligent 
tilings  has  for  its  object  all  general  notions,  which 
form  the  basis  of  reasoning.  The  third  embraces 
absolute  unity,  or  the  power  of  analysing  and  dis- 
cus sing  general  principles,  a  knowledge  of  causes, 
and  conclusions  and  inferences  draivn  from  them. 
This  branch  of  knowledge  also  embraces  all  mathe- 
matical forms,  and  numbers.  The  fourth  di\dsion 
includes  all  theories,  resolutions,  compositions  of 
reasoning,  definitions  and  demonstrations,  and  all 
systems  of  speculative  truth.  The  fifth  class  of 
things  relates  to  matters  of  a  high  and  lofty  cha- 
racter; to  a  divine  exaltation,  gradually  assimi- 
latiug  the  human  mind  to  the  nature  of  the  divine 
Being  and  his  attributes. 

Proclus  sought  above  all  things  to  give  order  and 
logical  method  to  his  speculations.  Consequential 
reasoning  was,  in  his  opinion,  indispensable  to  all 
useful  human  learning.  It  was  one  of  the  great 
lal)ours  of  his  life  to  give  his  master  Plato's  pliilo- 
sophy  in  a  logical  form,  and  he  has  left  us  a  strik- 
ing memorial  of  his  zeal  and  industry  in  this  direc- 
tion. But  his  great  work  of  method  is  his  "  Me- 
ments  of  Theology,''  which  he  has  treated  of  at 


MARINUS — ISIDORE.  241 

sreat  leno-tli,  and  which  embodies  the  chief  ele- 
ments  of  the  Platonic  system,  as  defined  and  illus- 
trated bv  Proclus  and  his  immediate  successors.  It 
is  impossible  to  look  over  the  methodical  propo- 
sitions of  this  Treatise,  without  recognizing  it  as 
the  prolific  parent  of  many  subsequent  theories, 
both  in  theology  and  philosophy.  It  is  an  exceed- 
ingly interesting  exposition  of  an  ancient  system, 
and  treated  in  a  manner  the  most  profound  and 
logical.  The  whole  of  the  propositions  will  be 
found  at  the  end  of  this  volume.* 


Marinus. 

This  philosopher  was  a  disciple  and  biographer  of 
Proclus.  The  former  filled  the  chair  of  Instruction 
at  the  death  of  the  latter. 

Little  is  recorded  of  the  mental  speculations  of 
this  writer.  He  examined  with  considerable  pro- 
fundity the  nature  of  our  abstract  concejitions, 
and  the  laws  of  thought  which  seem  to  accompany 
their  development. 

Isidore  of  Gaza. 

This  member  of  the  new  Platonic  theory  suc- 
ceeded the  preceding  philosopher  in  the  chair  of 
Philosophy.  He  appears  to  have  given  to  his  meta- 
physical speculations  a  decidedly  rehgious  turn.  He 
remarks,  "that  human  knowledge  and  reasoning  are 

*  See  Note  F.  at  the  end  of  this  Vohirae. 
*  R 


242       PRINCIPLES   OF   THE    NEW   PLATONISTS. 

but  feelDle  succours  for  that  sublime  wisdom  whicli 
is  alone  agreeable  to  the  Divinity.  To  enlighten 
the  reason  is  the  privilege  of  God  himself ;  man  can- 
not confer  it ;  but  he  must  receive  it  as  a  gift."* 


With  the  name  of  Proclus  the  ancient  Grecian 
system  of  philosophy  may  be  said  to  terminate. 
It  had  run  a  long  and  noble  course ;  was  charac- 
terised by  profound  thought,  patient  investigation, 
comprehensive  views,  noble  aspirations,  and  inde- 
fatigable zeal ;  and  was  destined  to  leave  the  im- 
print of  its  existence  upon  the  minds  of  all  succeed- 
ina:  asres  of  civilized  men.  But  it  was  henceforth 
to  shine  only  with  a  borrowed  light.  Its  own 
effulgence  was  to  be  obscured  by  brighter  rays  of 
truth ;  and  it  was  to  be  used  only  as  an  instrument 
for  the  illustration  or  defence  of  more  sublime 
doctrines,  and  more  lofty  views  of  the  future  destiny 
of  man.  Another  power  had  been  established, 
which  was  hourly  on  the  increase,  and  which 
should  solicit  the  suffrages  of  manlvind,  and  place 

*  See  I'Histoire  de  I'EclecticIsme,  by  Beausobre,  Avignon,  1/66 ;  Ole- 
arius,  Dissert,  de  Eclecticis ;  Cudwortb's  Intellectual  System ;  Mos- 
heim's  Ecclesiastical  History ;  Tbe  Histories  of  Philosophy  by  Brucker, 
Tiedemann,  Buhle,  and  Tennemann;  Victor  Cousin's  Translation  of 
the  works  of  Proclus ;  Taylor's  Translation  of  Proclus ;  Eeussling,  De 
tribus  Hypostasibus  Plotini,  Wittenberg,  1690;  Hebenftreet,  Dissert, 
de  Jamblichi  Philos.  Leipsic,  1764;  Fichte,  Dissert.  De  Philos.  Novae 
Platonicse  origine,  Beroliai,  1818;  Fabricius,  Biblioth.  Grec.  Articles, 
Proclus,  Marinus;  Stobaeus  b.  1.  Articles,  De  Gradibus,  De  Anim.  Viri- 
bus,  De  eo  quod  est  in  nostra  potestate  ;  De  Gerando,  Hist.  Comparee, 
vol.  3  ;  Ritter's  His.  of  Philosophy,  vol.  4. 


PRINCIPLES    OF    THE    NEW    PLATONISTS.        243 

speculative  pliilosopliy  upon  anotlier  and  a  firmer 
basis.  The  great  problems  which  Grecian  inge- 
nuity raised,  were  to  be  solved  in  a  manner,  and 
with  a  clearness  and  conclusiveness,  of  which  the 
disciples  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  had  no  conception. 
The  lofty  hopes  which  many  of  the  Grecian  sages 
entertained  were  to  be  realized  to  their  more  for- 
tunate successors ;  and  those  bright  rays  of  light, 
which  gleamed  in  the  distance,  and  which  they  but 
distantly  recognised,  were  to  shine,  to  all  future 
philosophers,  "more  and  more  unto  the  perfect 
day." 

But  though  the  independence  of  the  Grecian 
speculation  was  to  be  destroyed  for  ever,  it  was 
still  to  be  a  useful  and  often  melded  instrument 
in  the  hands  of  future  cultivators  of  philosophy. 
This  honour  was,  however,  to  be  confined  to  the 
two  great  pillars  of  Grecian  thought,  Plato  and 
Aristotle.  The  smaller  sects  were  to  be  compara- 
tively forgotten  in  the  new  order  of  things.  The 
Stoics,  the  Epicureans,  the  Pythagoreans,  the 
Sophists,  the  Sceptics,  were  to  pass  away,  but 
Plato  and  Aristotle  were  to  remain ;  and  for  many 
centuries  were  to  divide  the  opinions  and  applause 
of  the  learned  and  contemplative.  We  shall  have 
frequent  occasion,  in  our  historical  progress,  to 
record  the  influence  of  theii*  respective  systems, 
and  the  favourable  or  unfavourable  judgments  of 
rival  partizans.  But  that  undi\dded  and  despotic 
power  they  for  many  huncbed  years  exercised  over 
the  minds  of  men,  was  now  to  crumble  gradually  to 
the  dust,  without  any  hope  of  future  resuscitation. 

ii2 


244  DISQUISITIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS. 


CHAPTETl    XXVII. 

ON  THE  METAPHYSICAL  DISQUISITIONS  OF  THE 
ANCIENT  FATHERS  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


It  is  necessary  we  should  fall  back  a  little  upon 
the  regular  course  of  time,  and  notice  at  some 
length  the  labours  of  the  first  promulgators  of 
Christianity  in  the  field  of  mental  philosophy. 
These  labours  constitute  an  important  epoch  in  the 
history  of  the  human  mind. 

The  establishment  of  the  Christian  dispensation 
must  always  be  considered  the  most  important  and 
interesting  event  in  the  history  of  the  philosophy 
of  human  nature  in  all  its  departments.  Science 
no  longer  stood  alone,  upon  its  own  abstract  prin- 
ciples and  merits,  as  an  intellectual  exercise ;  but 
all  its  doctrines  were,  in  the  future  ages  of  the 
world,  to  be  discussed  in  reference  to  the  great 
truths  revealed  to  mankind  in  the  Holy  Scriptures. 
Heligion  and  Philosophy,  it  is  true,  had  to  wage 
many  bitter  and  protracted  conflicts;  they  had 
both  to  undergo  a  most  rigid  scrutiny  before  the 
tribunal  of  human  reason ;  they  were  frequently 
placed,  by  the  over-heated  zeal  and  mistaken  views 


DISQUISITIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS.  245 

of  tlieir  respective  advocates,  in  direct  opposition 
to  one  another;  but  still  we  find,  that  as  time 
rolled  on,  their  points  of  difference  became  gra- 
dually less,  and  both  seemed  calculated  to  throw 
additional  light  upon,  and  to  give  natural  suj^port 
to,  each  other. 

And  this  was  nothing  but  a  natural  consequence 
from  the  constituted  order  of  things.  Eevealed 
religion  did  not  profess  to  make  man  an  entirely 
new  creature ;  to  give  him  a  new  body  and  a  new 
mind,  endowed  with  various  faculties  wliich  were 
never  before  recognized  in  the  human  species.  No! 
it  only  assumed  to  direct  his  ordinary  bodily  and 
mental  fimctions,  to  objects  and  pursuits  more 
sublime  and  important,  and  which  were  but  dimly, 
and  in  many  cases  not  at  all,  shadowed  forth  by 
the  mere  Kght  of  natm-e.  The  relative  position, 
therefore,  in  which  religion  and  philosophy  stood  to- 
wards each  other,  was  a  natural  position.  Philoso- 
phy professed  to  investigate  all  those  powers  of  body 
and  mind  which  distinguish  our  species  from  the 
inferior  creation ;  and  to  unfold  the  laws  wliich  go- 
vern their  mutual  dependencies  and  relationships. 
The  heathen  philosophers  had  to  labour  in  the  same 
vineyard  as  the  professors  of  Christianity.  That 
both  parties  should  form  different  opinions  as  to 
the  value  of  their  own  exertions  and  the  merits  of 
theii"  respective  modes  of  cultm-e,  is  quite  natural. 
Revealed  religion  was  not  a  mere  simple  fact,  or 
mental  conception,  or  intimation  from  heaven;  but 
it  appealed  to  human  reason,  based  itself  upon  prin- 
ciples, laid  do\^Ti  abstract  propositions,  and  openly 


246  DISQUISITIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS. 

clialleno:ecl  the  liuman  race  to  their  discussion.  It 
did  not  set  itself  in  opposition  to  human  learning, 
bnt  only  declared  that  that  was  insufficient  of  itself 
to  produce  certain  results,  and  guide  to  certain  ends. 

These  general  remarks  will  be  fully  borne  out, 
by  a  brief  summary  of  the  philosophy  of  the  an- 
cient Pathers  of  the  Church,  relative  to  man's 
moral  and  mental  natures,  and  to  those  opinions 
and  principles  connected  with  the  important  doc- 
trines of  natural  and  revealed  religion.  It  cannot 
fail  to  prove  extremely  interesting  to  all  reflective 
minds,  to  have  laid  before  them  an  intellectual 
chart  of  the  opinions  of  these  distinguished  men 
on  points  of  faith  and  speculation,  which  must  al- 
ways, as  long  as  the  world  lasts,  exercise  a  very 
powerful  influence  over  the  minds  of  the  general 
mass  of  manldnd. 

Here  we  may  briefly  notice,  in  passing,  that 
many  distinguished  writers  have  entertained  a  very 
low  estimate  of  the  opinions  of  the  Eathers,  and 
have  upbraided  them  with  numerous  and  palpable 
contradictions.  It  must  be  admitted  there  is  some 
truth  for  these  accusations.  But  to  form  a  just 
estimate  of  the  Pathers,  we  ought  always  to  keep 
before  us  their  exact  position  relative  to  religious 
doctrines  and  other  opinions  connected  with  sub- 
jects closely  allied  to  them.  We  know  that  many 
of  the  Pathers  had  been  either  educated  in  Pagan 
systems,  or  were  more  or  less  brought  into  close 
fellowship  with  them,  in  their  daily  commimications 
with  those  around  them.  This  circumstance  must 
have  exerted  a  powerful  influence  over  the  every- 


DISQUISITIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS.  247 

day  current  of  their  thoughts  and  opinions.  They 
would  daily  meet  ^dth  men  who  had  to  be  converted 
through  a  formal  refutation  of  these  false  systems ; 
and  this  could  only  be  done  by  means  of  an  accurate 
acquaintance  with  them,  and  an  effort  on  the  part 
of  religious  teachers  to  accommodate  their  owti  doc- 
trines to  the  minds  of  their  pupils.  There  would 
always  be  going  on  a  sort  of  compromise  of  prin- 
ciples and  opinions,  with  a  view  of  obtaining  a  hold 
of  the  minds  of  men,  and  subjecting  them  to  a 
peaceable  course  of  instruction  and  con^dction. 
Teachers  would  occasionally  diverge  a  little  to  gain 
a  victory  over  the  stubborn  and  deep-rooted  pre- 
judices of  a  convert.  This  would  be  done  with  the 
best  intentions,  and  frequently  with  the  most  happy 
effect.  Many  of  the  Pathers  went  from  country  to 
country,  from  district  to  district,  and  from  town 
town  to,  making  converts,  and  imparting  instruc- 
tion as  they  well  could.  And  it  is  quite  ob^dous 
that  their  public  addresses  must  have  varied  con- 
siderably from  each  other,  on  account  of  the  diver- 
sity of  heathen  notions,  rites,  and  ceremonies,  enter- 
tained and  practised  by  their  hearers.  If  therefore 
these  addresses  were  afterwards  published,  it  is 
quite  a  thing  to  be  expected  that  considerable  dis- 
crepancies would  be  apparent  upon  the  face  of  them ; 
not  springing  from  any  defection  of  doctrinal  purity, 
or  from  the  lack  of  soim.d  knowledge,  but  from 
casual  and  incidental  cu'cumstances.  This  would 
naturally,  in  after  times,  give  rise  to  observation 
and  comment,  and  a  difference  of  opinion  would 


248  DISQUISITIONS  or  the  tathers. 

thus  be  formed.  A  Pather  would  appear  under  the 
disadvantage  of  self-contradiction,  and  inconsistency 
of  statement,  and  thus  his  authority  and  influence 
would  become  weakened  from  no  justifiable  cause 
whatever. 


Justin  Martyk.     99  a.  d. 

Justin  Martyr  was  one  of  the  early  Pathers  of 
the  Church  who  successfully  cultivated  philosophy 
with  a  view  of  extending  and  illustrating  the  Chris- 
tian system.  He  had  been  educated  in  foreign 
schools  of  learning,  and,  for  a  considerable  period 
of  his  life,  had  followed  the  heathen  modes  of  wor- 
ship. He  especially  studied  the  doctrines  of  Aris- 
totle, Plato,  and  Pythagoras,  and  was  minutely 
acquainted  with  all  the  various  divisions  and  mo- 
difications of  these  different  schools  of  philosophy. 
After  his  conversion  to  Christianity,  he  still  con- 
tinued to  cultivate  profane  learning ;  and  his  re- 
marks upon  the  use  of  speculative  doctrines  are 
admirable.  He  says,  "  Philosophy  is  a  very  noble 
thing,  and  very  agreeable  to  God,  since  it  leads  us 
to  Him ;  and  truly  happy  are  those  who  avail  them- 
selves of  such  an  aid.  Though  the  doctrines  of 
Plato,  and  the  Stoics,  as  well  as  the  writings  of 
historians  and  poets,  are  not  in  strict  conformity 
with  the  Gospel,  yet  they  do,  nevertheless,  bear  a 
certain  relationship  to  it ;  and  what  good  and  just 
things  have  been  here  said,  are  calculated  to  ad- 
vance Christianity.     The  writings  which  existed 


JUSTIN    MARTYR — TATIAN.  249 

previous  to  the  Gospel  gave  us  a  glimpse  of  those 
great  truths  which  it  has  revealed ;  and  have  vastly 
aided  the  Divine  reason  wliicli  is  implanted  in  us 
from  our  hirth.  This  reason  is  the  germ  or  seed 
which  Christianity  is  to  fructify." 

Again,  he  says,  "  Socrates  exhorted  men  to  raise 
themselves  above  mythological  fables,  and  to  search 
again  for  the  unknown  God,  whose  existence  it  was 
reserved  for  the  Gospel  alone  fidly  to  demonstrate." 
"  The  true  philosopher  is  neither  a  Platonist,  Pe- 
ripatetic, nor  a  Stoic,  nor  a  Pythagorean.  If  he 
belongs  to  any  of  these  sects,  he  has  substituted 
human  authoritv  for  reason." 

It  is  mentioned  by  Eusebius  that  St.  Justin  had 
written  a  work  upon  the  nature  of  the  human  soul, 
in  Avhich  he  had  unfolded  the  various  opinions 
which  the  Pagans  held  of  this  subject ;  and  that  he 
intended  to  write  another  Treatise,  to  expose  the 
fallacy  of  these  opinions,  and  also  to  show  what  were 
his  own  notions  on  this  important  doctrine.  None 
of  these  works,  however,  have  descended  down  to 
our  times.* 


Tatian.     170  A.  D. 

Tatian,  who  was  St.  Justin's  disciple,  paid  great 
attention  to  mental  philosophy  in  all  its  branches. 
He  had  travelled  a  great  deal,  and  visited  many 
eminent  seats  of  learning,  and  possessed  a  very  ac- 
curate knowledge  of  aU  the  subtile  and  distinguished 


Apologia.  Sect.  13.  15.  46.     Benedictine  Eilition. 


250  DISQUISITIONS  OF  THE  FATHERS. 

controversies  of  his  clay.  He  maintains  that  there 
are  in  man  two  distinct  mental  principles.  "  The 
one  is  the  soul,  the  other  is  superior  to  the  soul ; 
it  is  the  understanding,  the  image  of  God.  The 
soul  in  itself  is  full  of  darkness ;  alone  it  is  sub- 
jected to  matter,  and  is  confounded  with  it ;  and  it 
is  not  simple  but  compound ;  the  mind  or  under- 
standing uniting  itself  with  it,  gives  light,  power, 
and  life  to  it.  It  elevates  and  purifies  it.  This 
mind  is  the  di^dne  reason,  or  Logos.  It  is  not 
communicated  to  all,  hut  only  to  those  who  live  in 
accordance  with  the  dictates  of  justice  and  wisdom. 
The  soul,  being  an  emanation  from  the  Deity,  is 
light ;  it  only  becomes  obscured  by  its  connection 
with  matter." 

The  peculiar  philosophical  opinions  of  Tatian  are 
expounded  in  his  Gratia  ad  Grcecos,  the  only  ge- 
nuine treatise  we  have  of  this  waiter.  In  this 
apologetical  work  we  find  that  the  author  was 
deeply  skilled  in  Oriental  systems ;  for  the  general 
tone  of  all  his  speculations  on  mind  and  matter 
bears  a  great  resemblance  to  those  opinions  pro- 
mulgated  in   the  early  days  of  the  Alexandrian 

Academv^ 

Tatian  considered  that  matter  was  the  som-ce  of 
all  imperfection  and  evil.  In  this  respect  he  fol- 
lows Plato.  This  opinion  had  probably  led  him 
to  the  Gnostic  idea  that  our  Saviour  had  no  real 
body.* 

*  See  the  Oxford  Edition  of  the  "  Oratio."     1700. 


ST.  ATHENAGORAS.  251 


St.  Athekagoras.     172  a.  d. 

The  attachment  of  St.  Athenagoras  to  specula- 
tive learning  is  well  known.  Even  after  he  had 
been  converted  from  Paganism  to  Christianity, 
he  still  wore  the  costmne  used  in  the  East  in  his 
o^vn  day  by  the  studious  and  philosophic.  In  his 
Apology,  addressed  to  the  Emperor,  Marcus  Aure- 
lius,  in  the  year  176,  he  enters  very  fully  into  se- 
veral speculative  theories,  and  compares  them  with 
the  general  principles  of  the  Christian  faith.  In 
the  writings  of  the  poets  and  historians  he  found 
the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  Deity  recognised, 
and  several  other  important  truths,  which  were 
more  fully  and  clearly  revealed  in  the  Gospel.  His 
grand  aim  was  to  reconcile  the  Christian  creed 
with  the  doctrines  of  the  founder  of  the  Academy. 
"  Plato,"  says  he,  "  contemplated,  with  a  lofty 
stretch  of  thought,  that  eternal  intelligence  and 
Divinity  which  reason  alone  can  conceive;  that 
Being  who  is  the  only  true  one,  who  is  unchange- 
able, full  of  goodness  and  truth.  He  saw  in  Him 
infinite  power,  that  glorious  Source  of  all  perfec- 
tion, that  celestial  Uuler,  the  universal  Cause  which 
is  every  way  present.  The  Idea  is  the  first  crea- 
tion of  the  celestial  Ruler;  it  is  the  type  of  all 
creation.  This  type  was  necessary  to  shapeless 
matter,  to  that  nature  which  invoked  and  oflTered 
itself  to  it,  and  which  was  again  plimged  into  con- 
fusion and  chaos  to  receive  that  consolidation  of 
parts,  and  form  and  beauty,  Avhich  we  now  behold. 


252  DISQUISITIONS  OF  THE  FATHERS. 

Though  this  faculty  of  reason  be  the  same  in  all 
men,  yet  it  takes  different  directions,  elevating 
some  to  sublime  conceptions,  to  heavenly  things, 
and  to  the  great  Author  of  all ;  while  on  the  other 
hand  the  same  reason  produces  worldly  and  gro- 
velling pursuits,  vain  imaginations,  and  the  sug- 
gestions of  evil  spii'its.  AVhile  the  soul  is  soft  and 
flexible,  and  has  not  embraced  sound  princij)les, 
nor  contemplated  the  truth,  nor  carried  its  thought 
up  to  the  great  Creator  of  the  universe,  it  is  sus- 
ceptible of  false  opinions,  and  of  the  influence  of 
malicious  spirits,  thirsting  for  the  blood  of  their 
victims,  and  filling  their  imaginations  with  delu- 
sions, from  which  spring  all  kinds  of  idolatry  and 
superstitions."* 

St.  Theophilus.     172  a.  d. 

St.  Theophilus  was  one  of  the  Alexandrian  Fa- 
thers, and  manifested  a  passionate  attachment  to 
the  philosophy  of  Plato.  He  became  bishop  of 
Aiitioch  in  170,  and  governed  his  diocese  for  thir- 
teen years  with  great  zeal  and  prudence.  He  was 
a  zealous  disputer  with  heretics,  and  it  is  in  these 
controversial  writings  that  we  find  the  philosophical 
opinions  which  he  seems  to  have  entertained.  He 
had  evidently  studied  deeply  both  Aristotle  and 
Plato ;  for  the  latter  of  whom,  as  just  stated,  he 
shows  a  decided  preference.  St.  Theophilus  points 
out  to  his  opponents  the  great  defects  in  all  liea- 

*  Legatio  pro  Lhristianis.  Sect.  5.  G.  8.  15. 


ST.  PANTiENUS— ORIGEN.  253 

then  speculations,  and  how  much  superior  the  phi- 
losophy of  Christianity  was,  to  anything  which 
mortal  man  had  been  able  to  discover. 

St.  Theophilus  has  furnished  us  with  an  historical 
chronology  from  the  creation  of  the  world  to  his 
own  time ;  and  he  endeavours  to  prove  that  the 
history  of  Moses  is  the  most  ancient  and  authentic 
account  we  have  of  the  early  days  of  the  hmnan 
race.* 


St.  Pant.enijs.     180  a.  d. 

The  first  school  opened  at  Alexandria  for  the  in- 
struction of  Christians  in  philosophy,  was  by  St. 
Pantsenus.  He  belonged  to  the  sect  of  the  Stoics, 
and  on  account  of  his  great  knowledge  and  talent, 
was  appointed  to  carry  the  Gospel  into  India,  and 
to  convert  the  Brahmins  from  their  idolatry.  He 
was  well  acquainted  with  the  works  of  Aristotle 
and  Plato;  but  manifested  a  decided  preference 
for  the  philosophy  of  the  Stoics.  He  thought  the 
system  of  the  latter,  considered  in  relation  to  prac- 
tical life,  more  in  accordance  with  the  important 
practical  precepts  of  the  Christian  faith.* 

Origen.     185  A.  D. 

The  famous  Origen,  a  disciple  of  St.  Clement's, 
was  a  prodigy  of  learning  and  science.     Prom    the 

*  See  Gesner's  Edition  of  the  works  of  St.  Theojihilus.  Zurich,  1546  ; 
also  Du  Pin,  Lardner,  Mosheim,  and  Cave. 

t  See  Cave,  Lardner,  Milner,  Du  Pin,  and  Mosheim. 


254  DISQUISITIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS. 

accounts  of  Eiisebius,  he  had  studied  almost  every 
system  of  speculation,  and  made  himself  completely 
master  of  the  whole  circle  of  knowledge  in  his  own 
times.  There  was  nothing  too  varied  or  profound  for 
the  versatility  and  grasp  of  his  mind.  His  wonder- 
ful activity  and  zeal  showed  he  possessed  an  intel- 
lect susceptible  of  great  mental  labour  and  appli- 
cation. He  was  intimately  skilled  in  the  doctrines 
of  the  Stoics,  the  Epicureans,  the  Platonists,  and 
the  Pythagoreans  ;  and  also  with  the  traditionary 
knowledge  of  the  Hebrews  as  well  as  all  the 
heathen  systems  of  speculation  celebrated  in  his 
own  day.  He  divided  ail  human  science  into  three 
kinds';  namely,  first,  profane  wisdom,  which  com- 
prehended natural  philosophy,  mathematics,  and 
what  came  under  the  denomination  at  that  time  of 
the  fine  arts,  as  poetry,  rhetoric,  grammar,  music, 
and  medicine  ;  secondly,  the  tvlsdom  of  the  p>rinces 
of  this  icorld,  which  embraced  all  the  mysteries  and 
speculative  theories  of  the  Egyptians,  the  Chal- 
deans, and  the  Brahmins  ;  and  thirdly,  that  wisdom 
which  was  especially  revealed  to  man  in  the  Holy 
Scriptures. 

Origen  seems  to  have  entertained  the  opinion  of 
the  alisolute  reality  of  all  moral  distinctions.  He 
remarks  that,  "  if  the  reality  of  the  Gospel  is  in 
accordance  with  that  of  the  Greeks,  it  is  because 
the  notions  of  moral  rectitude  are  destined  to  regu- 
late human  life,  and  are  engraved  on  the  soul  of 
man  by  the  finger  of  the  Deity  himself,  in  the  same 
manner  as  He  has  recorded  theiu  upon  the  minds 
of  the  prophets  and  of  our  Lord  and  Saviour." 


ST.    CLEMENT.  255 

This  clistingiiislied  Father  of  the  Church  believed 
in  the  fact,  that  all  the  Grecian  pliilosophy  had 
been  originally  derived  from  the  Hebrew  nation. 
His  notion  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  was 
grounded  on  the  supposition  of  its  pre-existence  in 
a  former  more  elevated  sphere ;  and  that  when  it 
took  up  its  abode  in  a  material  body,  it  still  had  the 
faculty  of  recognising  a  Divine  Being,  of  obeying 
his  laws,  and  of  preparing  itself  for  a  life  of  full  en- 
joyment with  him  for  ever.  This  notion  was  com- 
mon both  to  the  Gnostics  and  to  the  new  Pla- 
tonists.* 


St.  Clement.     218.  a.  d. 

We  come  now  to  St.  Clement  of  Alexandria, 
who  was  the  shining  light  and  glory  of  his  age. 
His  acquisitions  and  labours  were  prodigious.  He 
knew  all  the  learning  of  the  Greeks,  the  Sp'ians, 
the  Egyptians,  and  the  Hebrews ;  and  had  visited 
every  seminary  of  knowledge  wliich  was  of  any 
note  in  his  own  day.  He  viewed  the  philosophy 
of  human  nature  throuo^h  a  candid  and  enlis-htened 
medium ;  and  he  embraced  every  opportunity  of 
shelving  how  nearly,  on  many  points,  the  princijiles 
enforced  by  the  ancient  philosophers  were  allied 
to  those  laid  down  in  the  Sacred  Scriptures.  He 
contended  it  was  a  most  mistaken,  as  well  as  a 
mischievous,  opinion,  that  Christianity  opposed 
itseK  to  the  cultivation  of  himian  knowledge.  On 
the  contrary,  he  zealously  and  eloquently  contended 

*  Seethe  Works  of  Origen  by  the  Benedictines.      Paris,  1783. 


256  DISQUISITIONS    OF    THE    FATHEKS. 

that  it  was  only  by  tlie  cultivation  of  science  and 
useful  information,  that  revealed  truth  could  either 
he  promulgated  or  understood. 

St.  Clement  openly  declared  himself  favourable 
to   the   Greek   philosophy,    even   in   spite  of  the 
opinions  of  some  of  his  brethren,  who  were  hostile 
to   the   speculative   system  of  this  country.     He 
says,  "  The  Grecian  philosophy  forms  the  man  to 
virtue,  and  teaches  him,  also,  that  it  proceeds  from 
God  himself.  Those,  then,  who  would  judge  harshly 
of  the  philosophy  of  Greece,  ought  to  be  prepared 
to  prove  their  statements ;  and  in  order  to  enable 
them  to  do  this,  they  must  study  and  examine  it. 
If  it  does  not  rest  on  a  perfectly  solid  foimdation  ; 
if  it  does  not  always  conduct  to  satisfactory  con- 
clusions ;  it  is  ornamental  at  least,  and  exercises 
the  student  in  detecting  truth  from  falsehood.    As 
the  labourer  first  waters  the  bosom  of  the  earth, 
before  he  commits  the  seed  to  it ;  in  like  manner 
when  we  extract  out  of  the  writings  of  the  Greeks 
what  we  can  advantageously  borrow  from  them, 
we   are   watering   the   earth,   that   the   sun   may 
exercise   his   influence   in   giving  vitality   to  the 
intellectual  seed.    I  do  not  give  the  name  of  philo- 
sophy to  the  particular  doctrines  of  the  Portico  nor 
of  Epicurus,  nor  of  Plato,  nor  of  Aristotle,  but  to 
what  appertains  to  justice  and  sound  religion  in 
all  these  diflerent   schools.     I  give  the  name  of 
philosophy  to  that  which  is  really  excellent  in  all 
their  doctrines ;  and  above  all  to  that  of  Socrates, 
such  as  Plato  describes  him  to  have  been.     The 
opinions  of  Plato  upon  ideas,  is  the  true  Christian 
and  orthodox  philosophy.    Those  intellectual  lights 


HERMAS TERTULLIAN,  &C.  257 

amongst  the  Greeks  have  heen  communicated  by- 
God  himself.  But  they  have  not  been  charmed  by 
their  power,  but  have  mingled  them  with  human 
errors  and  delusions."* 

St.  Clement  frequently  remarks  that  true  wis- 
dom or  philosophy  is  the  right  understanding  of 
human  and  divine  things;  and  severely  rebukes 
those  who  fall  into  habits  of  snarling  disputation 
or  captious  scepticism.  He  however  strenuously 
recommended  fixed  rules  of  reasoning,  and  parti- 
cularly the  Greek  system  of  dialectics.  On  this 
subject  he  remarks,  that  "  Dialectics  form  a  sort 
of  rampart  for  the  protection  of  truth  against 
the  assaults  of  sophistry.  The  cause  of  all  error 
and  false  judgment  is,  that  we  cannot  detect  the 
reasons  on  which  the  accordance  or  differences  of 
things  amongst  themselves  are  founded ;  and  thus 
we  erroneously  classify  things  together  which 
ought  to  be  separated.  It  becomes  necessary, 
then,  to  apply  the  art  of  dialectics,  as  a  useful  in- 
strument to  conduct  us  to  truth,  to  enable  us  to 
demonstrate  it  to  others,  and  to  protect  and  defend 
it  from  captious  argumentations.  But  we  must 
guard  against  the  abuse  of  this  art."t 

Hermas — Tertullian — Arnobius — Iren^us — 

LACTANTirS,    &C. 

We  must  here  make  an  allusion  to  several  of  the 

*  Stromal .  lib.  1.  Ed.  Paris,  1641. 

t  See  the  Oxford  Edition  of  the  Works  of  St.  Clement,  1/15;  also 
Du  Pin,  Blount's  Censura,  Fabricius,  Mosheim,  Lardner,  &c. 


258  DISQTJISITIONS   OF   THE   FATHERS. 

learned  Fathers,  who  entertained  strong  prejudices 
against  all  kinds  of  profane  philosophy  whatever. 
They  were  led  to  form  notions  of  its  dangerous  ten- 
dency to  revealed  religion,  from  the  many  examples 
of  eminent  and  learned  individuals  forming  semi- 
naries of  learning  under  the  auspices  of  revealed 
religion,  and  imparting  to  numerous  classes  of  per- 
sons, who  afterwards  took  an  active  part  in  ec- 
clesiastical affairs,  those  peculiar  doctrines  which 
emanated  from  these  different  schools  of  instruction. 
These  philosophical  establishments  became  on  many 
occasions,  and  from  the  sheer  force  of  particular 
circumstances,  formidable  instruments  in  the  hands 
of  zealous  sects  and  parties ;  and  hence  arose  certain 
feelings  of  jealousy  against  both  them  and  theu' 
principal  professors.     Hermas,  Tertullian,   Arno- 
bius,  Irenaeus,  and  Lactantius,  were  the  leading 
Fathers  of  the  Church,  who,  with  various  modifica- 
tions, adopted  these   opinions   as  to  the  general 
tendency  of  human  learning  in  matters  of  rehgion. 
Hermas  wrote  a  treatise  to  refute  the  Pagan 
philosophers,  which  contains  a  considerable  portion 
of  the  Grecian  metaphysics.     Irenseus  waged  war 
most  zealously  against  all  the  religious  heresies  of 
his  own  times ;  and  attributed  them  to  the  pesti- 
lential influence  of  the  Gnostic  system,  Tertullian 
entertained  a  determined  hostility  to  the  doctrines 
of  Plato,  which  he  regarded  as  the  prolific  source 
of  all  the  heresies  which  harassed  the  Christian 
Church.     "  Heresies,"  says  he,  "  are  the  individual 
opinions  of  men  and  demons.      They  have   their 
source  in  that  insatiable  curiosity  for  human  science 


HERMAS — ^Tertullian,  &c.  259 

which  our  Lord  himself  severely  reprobated,  while 
he  promulgated  those  views  which  appeared  fool- 
ishness in  the  eyes  of  the  world.    This  modern  phi- 
losophy presumptuously  attempts  to  interpret  the 
Divine  nature,  to  mislead  unwary  spirits."    Of  the 
Academicians,  TertuUian  says,  "Who  art  thou,  im- 
pudent Academician  ?     You  overturn   every  con- 
dition  of  life;  you   derange  the   whole  order  of 
nature ;  you  remove  a  divine  superintending  Pro- 
vidence.    It  must  have  given,  according  to  your 
doctrine,  the  senses  to  men  as  the  most  fallacious 
organs  for  comprehending  and  admiring  His    stu- 
pendous and  marvellous  works.  Is  not  every  thing 
under  the   control    of    the     senses  ?     Is  it   not 
through  their  ministration,  that  all  men  receive 
that  subordinate  instruction  which  embraces  the 
sciences,  the  common  affairs  of  society,  the  relations 
of  things,  the  joys,  the  sorrows,  the  hopes,  the  fears, 
the  wants,  and  every  thing  which  ornaments  human 
life ;  since  it  is  only  by  these  same  identical  senses, 
that  man  can  be  distinguished  as  a  rational  crea- 
ture, capable  of  knowledge,    even   to    commence 
Academician  himself."* 

Arnobius,  an  African  by  birth,  and,  during  a  part 
of  his  life,  a  zealous  advocate  for  Paganism,  expres- 
sed, after  his  conversion  to  the  Christian  faith,  his 
decided  hostility  to  all  kinds  of  philosophy.  The 
science  of  Logic  fell  especially  under  his  displeasure. 
He  maintained  that  with  all  its  display  of  metho- 
dical arrangement  and  demonstrative  conclusions. 


*  Tertullian,  De  Prsescript.  cap.  7- 

s  2 


260  DISQUISITIONS   OF   THE    FATHERS. 

it  was  but  a  very  inefficient  instrument  for  guiding 
us  to  truth.*     Lactantius  followed  in   liis  wake 
with  the  same  class  of  opinions.     This  venerable 
Father  entered  very  fully  into  all  the  heathen  sys- 
tems, with  a  design  to  collect  together,  and  place 
in  one  point  of  view,  the  numerous  contradictions 
and  discrepancies  to  be  found  in  these  various  spe- 
culative theories.     By  this  plan  he  made  a  consi- 
derable display  in  favour  of  liis  own  peculiar  opi- 
nions.   On  the  nature  and  use  of  human  knowledge 
generally,  the  following  quotations  will  furnish  us 
with  his  views;  and  they  embody,  in  point  of  prin- 
ciple, the  real  essence  of  his  writings  on  this  siibject. 
"  Science,"  says  he,  "  cannot  be  derived  from  hu- 
man intelligence,  nor  could  it  be  unfolded  by  the 
mere  effort  of  thought.    It  is  the  prerogative  of  the 
Deity  himself,  and  not  that  of  man  to  possess  sci- 
ence properly  so  called.     Man  can  only  receive  that 
knowled2:e  which  comes  from  without.     This  is  the 
reason  why  the  Di\ine  Mind  has  given  him  organs 
of  sensation,  through  which  knowledge  is  conveyed 
to  the  soul."     "  The  human  soul  is  shut  out  in  the 
obscure  abode  in  the  body,  from  the  means  of  ac- 
quiring knowledge.     Thus  ignorance  is  the  lot  of 
humanity,  as  wisdom  is  the  inherent  attribute  of 
the  Deity.     We  need,  then,  a  light  to  dissipate  the 
dark  clouds  which  envelope  human  thought.     The 
Deity  is  this  light  of  the  human  soul ;  and  he  who 
receives  it  in  his  heart,  will  immediately  discover 
the  mysteries  of  truth ;  but  on  the  other  hand,  he 

*  TertuUian,  De  Prfescript.  lib.  2.  cap.  9. 


ANATOLIUS — ST.    AUGUSTINE.  261 

who  is  deprived  of  this  celestial  light,  must  always 
remain  full  of  error." 

On  the  nature  and  offices  of  Logic,  Lanctantius 
has  the  following  remarks.  "  That  portion  of  phi- 
losophy which  we  call  Logic,  is  that  which  contains 
dialectics,  and  the  rules  of  reasoning.  The  Divine 
reason  has  no  need  of  any  such  assistance,  it  re- 
sides not  in  forms  of  words  but  in  the  heart,  and  it 
is  of  little  moment  what  language  we  employ ;  for 
it  is  things  we  seek,  and  not  words."* 


■■o'- 


Anatolius.    226  a.  d. 

This  Christian  writer  was  a  public  teacher  at 
Alexandria,  and  obtained  great  celebrity  from  his 
extensive  knowledge  in  philosophical  systems.  He 
studied  Aristotle  profoundly,  and  endeavoured  to 
amalgamate  his  opinions  with  those  of  other  Gre- 
cian and  heathen  speculations.  It  is  however 
unknown  whether  he  succeeded  in  this  enterprise, 
as  none  of  his  commentaries  upon  Aristotle  have 
sm-vived  to  oiu'  times.  He  was  a  profound  mathe- 
matician, and  made  an  attempt  to  explain  subjects 
of  mental  pliilosophy  upon  mathematical  prin- 
ciples, f 

St.  Augustine.     354  a.  d. 
St.  Augustine  comes  next  in  order,  as  a  disciple 

*  De  Ira  Dei,  cap.  1. ;  Divin.  Inst.  lib.  2.  cap.  3. ;  lib.  3.  cap.  16. 
t  See  the  fragments  of  Anatolius'  Philosophy  in  Fabricius,  BibK. 
Grec,  Vol.  2.  pp.  274—277. 


262  DISQUISITIONS   OF   THE    FATHERS. 

of  Plato.  He  had  at  first  been  attaclied  to  the 
Aristotelian  theory,  but  it  did  not  correspond  with 
his  wishes,  and  he  exchanged  it  for  the  doctrines  of 
Plato;  these  were  more  in  accordance  with  the 
nature  of  liis  mind,  being  a  man  of  a  lively  and 
active  imagination,  and  warm  feelings. 

We  shall  only  make  a  few  brief  remarks  on, 
and  quotations  from,  St.  Augustine's  work  ^'Against 
the  Academicians^^  which  is  the  most  important 
connected  with  the  history  of  philosophy.  He 
commences  the  work  by  urging  the  most  powerful 
inducements  to  study  philosophy,  and  to  excite  in 
the  student's  bosom  an  ardent  love  of  truth.  Then 
follow  copious  outlines  of  the  heathen  notions  on 
speculative  topics,  showing  theu'  various  changes 
and  modifications  during  many  centuries.  These 
he  examines  and  discusses  with  great  care,  and 
minuteness.  The  opinion  entertained  by  the  Aca- 
demicians, that  happiness  consisted  in  seeking  after 
truth,  he  attempts  to  refute ;  and  endeavours  to 
establish  the  opposite  theory,  that  happiness  arises 
from  the  possession  of  truth  itself.  In  the  third 
book,  he  attempts  to  define  the  indefinable  notion 
which  the  Academicians  entertained  about  probabi- 
lity and  resemblance ;  and  he  finishes  by  refusing 
his  assent  to  the  philosophy  of  the  Academy,  which 
maintained  that  the  human  mind  had  not  the  power 
of  seizing  hold  of  real  truth. 

This  work  of  Agustine's  is  written  in  the  form  of 
dialogue,  and  is  exceedingly  interesting.  The  lead- 
ing idea  throughout  the  whole  treatise  is,  that  the 
Academicians  have  been  obliged,  in  spite  of  them- 


ST.    AUGUSTINE.  263 

selves,  to  admit  the  existence  of  sucli  a  thing  as 
truth;  which  showed,  at  once,  that  their  whole 
reasoning  rested  upon  a  sceptical  foundation. 

In  St.  Augustine's  work  "  On  Order,''  he  has 
developed  that  -argument  for  a  superintending 
Providence,  which  has  in  recent  times  been  so  ad- 
mirably handled  by  many  learned  and  able  men. 
He  says,  "Order  is  wisdom  and  perfection;  disorder 
is  evil.  Order  is  that  law  by  which  the  Almighty 
executes  all  which  he  had  ordained.  The  wisdom 
embodied  in  this  order  is  united  to  the  Deity,  be- 
cause that  he  conceives  himself  every  thing  of 
which  He  is  the  source." 

This  venerable  Father,  in  his  soliloquies,  attempts 
to  furnish  us  with  the  distinctive  characters  of 
truth  and  falsehood.  "Truth,"  says  he,  "is  supe- 
rior to  right ;  it  is  eternal  and  immutable.  There 
is  truth  in  God,  and  in  the  human  mind.  Trutfi 
is  the  source  of  all  intelligence  or  wisdom." 

In  St.  Augustine's  book  "  On  the  Quantity  of  the 
Soul,"  that  is,  on  its  power  or  nature,  he  has  given 
us  a  full  discussion  of  every  thing  which  the  light 
of  nature  and  revelation  estabhshes  respecting  our 
spiritual  frame.  He  treats  of  the  origin  of  the 
soul,  of  its  nature,  what  are  its  faculties  or  powers, 
why  it  was  placed  in  the  body,  what  is  its  condition 
while  it  is  placed  here,  and  what  will  be  its  condi- 
tion in  a  future  life.  The  soul  is  a  substance  en- 
dowed with  reason,  and  placed  in  the  body  for  the 
purpose  of  guiding  and  directing  it.  "  The  soul 
derives  its  origin  from  God ;  it  is  simple  and  im- 
material; and  what  proves  tliis  is,  that  it  can  con- 


264  DISQUISITIONS   OF    THE    FATHERS. 

ceive  ideas  of  abstract  quantities  and  dimensions 
which  are  not  corporeal ;  though  it  is  susceptible 
of  feeling  through  the  agency  of  the  body,  it  is  not 
extended  over  the  body." 

St.  Augustine  distinguishes  the  visual  perceptions 
of  objects,  from  the  judgments  which  accompany 
them.  On  the  subject  of  sensation  generally  he 
has  the  following  remarks — "  Sensation  is  produced 
from  external  objects,  which  act  upon  the  soul. 
Sensation  is  not  science ;  and  science  itself  differs 
from  reason.  By  reason  we  seek  and  develop 
science,  and  reasoning  is  the  instrument  which  con- 
ducts us  to  it."  Again  he  remarks,  "  The  exercise 
of  the  faculties  of  the  soul  may  be  divided  into 
seven  distinct  stages.  In  the  first,  these  powers  are 
manifested  in  that  life  or  being  which  belongs  to 
vegetable  existence.  In  the  second,  these  powers 
give  birth  to  sensation;  they  move  and  direct  bodies, 
and  form  the  foundation  of  animal  life.  In  the 
third,  they  rise  above  the  brute  creation ;  they  com- 
pare material  objects  with  one  another ;  act  upon 
them ;  change  their  natm'e  and  appearances  :  apply 
them  to  human  wants ;  and  create  all  that  mul- 
tiplicity of  objects  and  pursuits,  which  we  deno- 
minate the  arts  of  life.  The  fourth  stage  of  these 
powers  of  the  soul,  displays  itself  in  giving  birth  to 
a  moral  world  ;  enabling  us  to  detach  and  contem- 
plate our  minds  apart  from  external  and  sensible 
things ;  and  in  recognizing  the  principles  of  justice 
and  virtue.  The  fifth  period  is  marked  by  the  soul's 
reflecting  upon  its  own  powers,  enjoying  it  self  fully 
in  its  own  innate  liberty  and  ease.      The  sixth,  or 


ST.    AUGUSTINE.  265 

last  stage,  is  characterised  by  a  kind  of  sudden 
bound,  by  which  the  soul  at  once  aspires  to  really 
superior  things ;  purified  by  this  long  course  of  j)ro- 
bation,  it  steadily  dii-ects  its  eye,  with  a  calm  and 
confident  assurance,  towards  the  region  of  pure  and 
exalted  intellect.  In  fine,  intuition,  the  contem- 
plation of  truth  itself,  is  the  last  act,  the  summit 
of  the  ladder,  the  sublime  end  of  all  its  efforts,  and 
is  thus  carried  to  the  Great  First  Cause,  to  the 
Supreme  Author  of  all  things. 

St.  Augustine  has  been  accused,  in  modern 
times,  of  a  decided  leaning  to  Pantheism ;  but  this 
accusation  rests  upon  a  very  slender  fovmdation. 
The  fact  is,  that  the  same  charge  might,  with  equal 
justice,  be  brought  against  many  hundreds  of  able 
and  orthodox  divines,  of  almost  every  Christian 
church,  and  in  every  period  of  ecclesiastical  history. 
Everything  depends  upon  the  meaning  which  is 
attached  to  the  word  Pantheism.  It  is  almost  unpos- 
sible  to  tie  men  down  to  anything  likea  fixed  defi- 
nition of  words  of  this  description ;  particularly 
when  employed  under  the  heat  and  excitement  of 
sectarian  controversies.* 

There  are  none  of  the  Fathers  of  the  Church 
whose  lives  are  so  full  of  interest,  relative  to  spe- 

*  The  following  is  the  passage  from  St.  Augustine,  on  which  this  ac- 
cusation rests.  "  SubstantiaUter  Deus  ubique  diffusus  est.  Sed  sic  est 
Deus  per  cuncta  diffusus,  ut  non  sit  quahtas  mundi,  sed  substantia  crea- 
trix  mundi,  sine  labore  regens  et  sine  onere  continens  mundum.  Non 
tamen  per  spatia  locorum,  quasi  mole  diffusa,  ita  ut  in  dimidio  mundi 
corpore  sit  dimithus,  atque  ita  per  totum  totus;  sed  in  solo  coelo  totus,  et 
in  sola  terra  totus,  et  in  ccelo  et  in  terra  totus,  et  nuUo  contentus  loco, 
sed  in  se  ipso  ubique  totus." 


266         DISQUISITIONS  or  the  fathers. 

dilative  opinions,  as  that  of  St.  Augustine.  His 
mind  underwent  many  changes ;  and  these  changes 
exercised  a  powerful  influence  over  his  active  ener- 
gies and  pursuits.* 


Nemesius.    356  a.  d. 

The  writings  of  Nemesius  are  well  worthy  of 
especial  notice  at  this  period  of  the  Christian 
Church.  He  was  Bishop  of  Emessa,  a  city  of 
Phenicia,  and  wrote  a  book  in  the  Greek  language, 
in  forty-four  Chapters,  called,  "  On  the  Natui^e  of 
Man.^^  This  is  unquestionably  one  of  the  very 
best  productions  of  Christian  pliilosophy  of  which 
the  early  Christian  Church  can  boast.  The  author 
combated,  with  great  power  and  zeal,  the  doctrine 
of  fatality  involved  in  the  system  of  the  Stoics ; 
and  he  also  showed  himself  greatly  averse  to  the 
speculative  opinions  of  the  Manicheans.  He  adopted 
however  the  doctrine  of  the  pre-existence  of  souls, 
which  had  been  revived  by  Origen,  and  which  was 
afterwards,  in  the  year  551,  condemned  at  the 
Council  of  Constantinople.  Nemesius  also  studied 
anatomy  and  physiology;  and  we  find  it  stated 
in  the  Oxford  edition  of  his  works,  in  1671, 
that  he  made  important  discoveries  on  the  nature 
and  uses  of  the  bile;  and  that  he  was  well  ac- 


*  See  Confessions,  lib.  1.  2.  3.  4.  7-  8.  9.  The  best  edition  of  St.  Au- 
gustine's vvoiks  is  that  published  by  the  BenetUctines  at  Antwerp,  1703, 
in  12  vols,  folio. 


NEMESIUS.  267 

quainted  with  that  important  fact,  the  circulation 
of  the  blood. 

On  the  nature  of  the  human  soul,  Nemesius  en- 
tered very  fully,  and  discussed  the  various  opinions 
which  preceding  philosophers  had  expressed  on 
tliis  interesting  but  abstruse  subject.  He  main- 
tains that  the  soul  is  immaterial,  and  that  it  is  not 
the  result  of  a  peculiar  organization  of  body.  "  The 
soul,"  says  he,  "is  united  to  the  body."  Again, 
"  A  portion  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul  are  destined 
to  serve,  and  another  to  command.  The  organs 
of  sense,  their  movements,  and  the  appetites  which 
belong  to  them,  compose  the  first  class,  and  reason 
the  second." 

Nemesius  advances  a  theory  of  sensation  in 
which  both  intellectual  and  physiological  facts  are 
stated  with  great  clearness  and  effect.  He  had 
evidently  been  a  very  attentive  and  discriminating 
observer  of  nature.  He  distinguishes  sensations 
from  conclusions  of  the  understanding  which  ac- 
company them ;  and  affirms  that  all  our  errors  are 
solely  confined  to  the  latter  and  not  to  the  former. 
The  judgment  and  the  memory  are,  in  his  opinion, 
the  two  principal  faculties  which  conduct  the  mind 
to  important  abstract  truths.  He  rejected  the  theory 
of  Porphyry,  who  maintained  that  the  soul  saw 
every  thing  through  sensation,  as  through  a  mir- 
ror. "The  memory,"  says  Nemesius  "preserves 
the  perceptions  obtained  by  the  senses;  and  the 
understanding  combines  and  arranges  these  mate- 
rials furnished  by  the  senses  and  the  memory." 
Again  he  remarks,  "  We  are  conscious  of  the  ex- 


268  DISQUISITIONS   OF   THE    FATHERS. 

istence  of  things  whicli  we  have  been  accustomed 
to  think  and  judge  of;  as,  for  example,  reason  inti- 
mates to  us  the  existence  of  the  sea,  and  the  sand 
on  the  sea  shore ;  though  we  cannot  fix  or  define 
the  limits  of  the  sea,  nor  number  the  individual 
grains  of  sand.  We  can  conceive  the  general  ideas 
of  the  sea  and  of  the  sand,  but  not  the  individual 
parts  of  which  they  are  composed." 

To  the  doctrines  of  voluntary  and  involuntary 
actions,  Nemesius  had  paid  considerable  attention. 
He  has  made  many  judicious  remarks  on  this  ab- 
struse branch  of  the  philosophy  of  mind. 

St.  Gregory.    372  a.  d. 

St.  Gregory,  bishop  of  Nyssa,  wrote  a  work  on 
the  immortality  of  the  soul,  which  has  been  often 
highly  praised  by  learned  divines  since  his  day. 
He  argued  strenuously  against  the  Platonic  notion 
that  the  soul  was  composed  of  many  different  parts, 
a  sort  of  little  municipality  or  commonwealth.  He 
allows,  however,  three  distinct  parts  or  principles 
of  the  soul,  namely,  the  vegetable  life,  the  sensitive 
life,  and  the  intellectual  life.  He  also  refuted  several 
heretical  opinions  on  tliis  subject,  which  had  gained 
a  considerable  portion  of  popularity  in  the  East. 

Stnesius.     410  A.  D. 

The  learned  Synesius  was  the  ornament  and 
philosopliical  light  of  the  age.  He  was  an  Afri- 
can, born   at   Cyrene  of  illustrious  parents.     He 


CLAUDIANUS    MAMERTUS.  269 

studied  the  sciences  with  great  success ;  and  hav- 
ing embraced  the  doctrines  of  Aristotle,  he  gave  to 
that  system  of  philosophy  additional  charms  and 
interest,  by  his  ingenious  illustrations  and  the 
fervour  of  his  fancv.  His  mind  was  enerrossed 
with  the  most  lively  feelings  of  philosophical  and 
religious  adoration  of  the  works  of  nature ;  and  his 
reflections  on  the  attributes  of  the  Supreme  Mind 
and  of  the  human  soul,  are  at  once  just  and  sub- 
lime. 

SjTiesius,  after  having  been  for  several  years  an 
Aristotelian,  began  to  study  with  great  minuteness 
the  pliilosophy  of  Plato ;  and  more  especially  those 
views  of  it  which  were  rife  in  the  Alexandrian 
school.  He  became,  in  consequence,  more  ideal 
and  mystified  in  his  opinions  on  the  nature  of  a 
Deity,  the  human  soul,  and  the  intellectual  prin- 
ciple. His  orthodoxy  in  matters  of  religion  was 
generally  questioned.  It  is  certain  he  entertained 
doubts  on  the  doctrine  of  the  E/Csurrection. 

Clatjdianus  MAMEHTrs.     450  a.  d. 

This  Christian  writer  was  a  learned  Presbvter  at 
Vienna.  He  was  deeply  versed  in  the  dialectic 
system  of  Aristotle,  and  displayed  great  eloquence 
in  his  philosophical  discourses.  His  work  "  On 
the  State  of  the  Soul,"  is  a  curious  v/ork.  It  is 
grounded  on  the  principles  of  two  divisions,  the 
senses  and  the  powers  of  reflection.* 

*  Fabricius,  Bibli.  lat.  t.  2,  p.  642. 


270  DISQUISITIONS   OP   THE    FATHERS. 


BOETHIUS.      A.  D.  470. 

Boetliius  was  famous  for  his  virtues,  talents,  civil 
distinctions,  and  misfortunes.  He  was  born  at  Home 
in  the  year  470 ;  and  studied  philosophy  and  general 
learning  at  Athens.  In  the  year  525  he  suffered 
an  icrnominious  death,  without  the  forms  of  law,  for 
an  alleged  treasonable  correspondence. 

Boethius  studied  the  doctrines  of  Aristotle,  and 
made  himself  completely  master  of  them  in  all 
their  ramifications.  He  translated  the  Categories 
at  Rome,  and  several  other  tracts  of  the  Stagirite, 
and  also  the  Commentaries  of  Porphyry.  But 
though  nominally  belonging  to  the  school  of  Aris- 
totle, yet  in  spirit  he  was  a  real  Platonist.  The 
sublime  doctrines  of  the  latter  class  of  philosophers, 
seemed  to  have  entirely  engrossed  his  mind,  and  to 
have  led  him,  in  all  liis  speculations,  to  give  that 
form  and  expression  to  his  thoughts,  which  were 
widely  removed  from  the  dryness  and  technicality  of 
the  AristoteKan  theory.  He  loved  to  roam  amongst 
the  lofty  doctrines  of  the  Grecian  sages.  The  stu- 
pendous operations  of  nature ;  the  mysterious  union 
of  the  soul  and  body ;  the  nature  and  attributes  of 
the  Divine  Mind ;  the  immortality  of  the  soul ;  and 
a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments ;  filled 
his  comprehensive  intellect  with  the  most  exalted 
conceptions,  calculated  to  elevate  and  dignify  the 
human  mind,  and  console  and  cheer  the  heart  of 
man.  Never  was  there  a  genius  better  fitted,  both 
from  its  worldly  afflictions,  and  from  its  own  rich 


MARTIN    CAPELLA — CASSIODORUS.  271 

and  inexhaustible  resources  to  unfold  "  Tlie  Conso- 
lations of  JPJiilosophfj  ;  a  work  which  must  always 
remain  an  imperishable  monument  to  his  name,  as 
well  as  a  tender  memorial  to  his  virtuous  and  un- 
merited suifering.* 

Martin  Capella.     474  a.  d. 

Martin  Capella,  who  was  an  African  by  bii'th, 
wrote  a  book,  entitled  "  Satyricon,  or  the  Me-union 
of  Philosophy  loith  Mercury.''''  Part  relates  to  my- 
thology and  part  to  the  fine  arts.  He  also  wrote  on 
grammar,  dialectics,  rhetoric,  geometry,  arithmetic, 
astronomy,  and  music.  He  adopted  all  the  rules 
and  maxims  of  philosophy  taught  by  Aristotle  and 
the  Stoics.  His  writings  are  a  sort  of  common 
gathering  of  all  the  opinions  and  systems  which 
history  had  handed  down,  as  prevalent  at  different 
periods  amongst  the  Greeks  and  Romans. 

Cassiodorus.     480   a.  d. 

Cassiodorus,  who  was  a  contemporary  of  Boethius, 
wrote  several  works  on  metaphysics  and  on  other 
kindred  branches  of  knowledge.  He  was  an  ardent 
admirer  of  Aristotle,  and  conceived  his  philosophy 
to  embrace  the  whole  of  what  mankind  could  ever 
know  of  the  laws  and  principles  of  the  human 
mind.  The  works  of  Cassiodorus  formed  the  text 
books  in  the  schools  in  the  East,  for  a  considerable 
period  after  his  death. 

*  See  Fabricius,  Bib.  Lat.;  ami  Vies  des  Saints,  Vol.  1.  par  Baillet. 


272  DISQUISITIONS    OF   THE    FATHERS. 

Erom  the  beginning  of  the  fifth  to  the  end  of  the 
sixth  century,  the  discussions  amongst  the  learned 
Eathers  were  not  so  detached  and  independent  of 
each  other,  as  they  previously  had  been.  There 
was  more  of  unity  and  party,  and  fewer  individual 
theories  struggling  for  distinction  and  public  favour. 
Nearly  the  whole  of  the  writings  of  the  priesthood 
on  philosophy  in  general,  were  divided,  or  rather 
amalgamated,  into  two  leading  divisions ;  those 
which  were  in  favour  of  the  theory  of  Plato,  and 
those  who  contended  for  the  supremacy  of  Aristotle. 
Under  these  two  banners,  the  general  mass  of  dis- 
putants and  writers  were  arrayed,  and  many  were 
the  varied  aspects  of  party  success,  during  this  long 
and  conflicting  struggle. 

There  were  several  distinguished  expounders  of 
the  leading  principles  of  the  Platonic  doctrine  at 
this  period.  In  their  writings  against  the  Mani- 
chean  heresy,  as  well  as  in  many  other  tracts,  they 
showed  the  harmony  which  existed  between  this 
Grecian  system,  and  the  leading  principles  of  na- 
ture and  revealed  religion.  Their  opinions  were  at 
once  truly  enlightened  and  liberal ;  and  manifested 
how  carefully  they  had  studied  both  the  philoso- 
phical tenets  of  heathenism,  and  the  theological 
doctrines  contained  in  the  Holy  Scriptures. 

In  the  7tli  and  8th  centuries  the  two  most  emi- 
nent men,  in  reference  to  the  cultivation  of  the  philo- 
sophy of  human  nature,  were  John  the  Grammarian 
and  St.  John  Damascenus.  The  first  composed 
extensive  and  erudite  commentaries  upon  the  works 
of  Aristotle  ;  and  the  second  attempted  to  simplify 
the  Greek  philosopher's  doctrines,  so  as  to  render 


ST.    JOHN    DAMASCENTJS.  273 

them  more  comm.oiily  understood.  His  general  re- 
marks as  to  the  nature  of  pliilosophy,  are  very  ad- 
mirable. "Philosophy,"  says  he,  "is  the  science 
of  things  which  are  just  what  we  find  them  to  be. 
It  is  divided  into  two  parts,  speculative  and  prac- 
tical. Speculative  philosophy  comprehends  theo- 
logy, physiology,  and  mathematics  ;  practical  phi- 
losophy comprehends  etliics,  economics,  and  poli- 
tics. Theology  has  for  its  object  that  which  is  im- 
material, such  as  the  Deity,  angels,  and  the  souls 
of  men.  Physiology  embraces  a  knowledge  of  ma- 
terial things,  as  of  animals,  plants,  minerals,  &c. 
Mathematics  consist  in  things  which,  though  not 
strictly  corporeal  themselves,  have  a  relation  to 
external  bodies,  as  number,  proportions,  figures, 
and  the  revolutions  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  Dia- 
lectics,  or  the  art  of  reasoning,  is  more  an  instru- 
ment of  philosophy,  than  one  of  its  leading  divi- 
sions. It  is,  from  its  very  nature,  a  preliminary 
acquisition.  The  Sceptics  were  guilty  of  self-con- 
tradiction when  they  afiirmed  that  philosophy  had 
no  claim  to  a  knowledge  of  things.  There  is  no- 
thing more  excellent  than  knoAvledge ;  it  is  the 
light  of  an  intelligent  soul.  Seek  it,  explore  for  it, 
by  unremitting  investigations ;  and  at  the  same 
time  consult  the  works  of  the  ancient  heathens, 
where  you  will  find  many  important  truths,  which 
you  must  disentangle  from  the  errors  with  which 
they  are  associated." 

He  has  the  following  observations  on  method. 
"  There  are  four  dialectic  or  logical  methods.     The 


274  DISQUISITIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS. 

first  is  the  di^dsion  wliich  separates  genus  and  spe- 
cies ;  the  second  is  the  definition  which  defines  the 
sul)ject  by  the  genus ;  the  third  is  analysis,  wliich 
decomposes  every  part ;  and  the  fourth  is  demon- 
stration, which  establishes  the  truth  by  means  of 
the  last  term."  St.  John  Damascenus  also  dis- 
tinj?uishes  analysis  into  three  distinct  kinds ;  na- 
tural,  logical,  and  mathematical.  The  first  resolves 
compound  ideas  into  their  simple  elements ;  the 
second  resolves  the  syllogism  into  its  different 
parts ;  and  the  third  consists  in  admitting  the  cor- 
rectness of  a  certain  principle,  in  order  to  arrive  at 
a  knowledge  of  an  important  truth. 

On  the  doctrine  of  Sensation,  St.  John  Damas- 
cenus maintains  that  the  faculty  of  sight  informs  us 
of  the  magnitude,  position,  and  distance  of  objects. 

"  Imagination,"  says  he,  "  is  a  faculty  belonging 
to  the  irrational  di^dsion  of  the  soul,  which  operates 
through  the  organs  of  sense.  TVTien  the  soul  per- 
ceives external  objects  by  the  organs  of  sense,  it 
forms  to  itseK  an  opinion  or  judgment ;  when  it 
knows,  by  thought,  things  which  appertain  to  the 
understanding,  it  conceives  a  notion.  Such  notions 
cannot  proceed  from  the  senses ;  they  can  be  ob- 
tained only  by  instruction.  Memory  is  the  image 
which  has  been  left  by  objects  offered  to  the  senses, 
and  seized  by  the  action  of  the  soul,  or  preserved 
from  that  which  has  been  perceived  through  the 
senses,  or  the  inward  process  of  thought." 


DISQUISITIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS.  275 

A  long  darkness  in  tlie  Lower  Empire  now  suc- 
ceeded to  the  comparative  light  which  we  have  just 
described.  Leo,  the  philosopher,  obtained  con- 
siderable reputation  in  the  Byzantine  Empire  for 
his  various  writings.  Photius  flourished  at  Con- 
stantinople, in  general  philosophy,  oratory,  and 
poetry.  Leo  VI.,  son  of  the  Emperor  Basil,  dis- 
tinguished himself  in  general  literature. 

There  were  a  great  number  of  commentators  on 
Aristotle  in  the  latter  centuries  of  theLower Empire. 
David  was  an  eminent  critic  and  expounder  of  the 
pliilosophy  of  the  Stagirite ;  Eustratius  composed 
treatises  on  dialectics  and  morals.  Nicephorus,  a 
learned  monk,  cultivated  general  philosophy  with 
divinity.  George  Pachymera  composed  an  Epitome 
of  the  PJdlosophy  of  Aristotle,  and  a  Compendium  of 
his  Logic.  Theodoras  Metachita  stood  at  the  head  of 
the  school  at  Constantinople,  for  his  eloquence  and 
profundity.  Magentinus  illustrated  the  doctrines 
of  many  of  the  Pythagorean  philosophers.  George 
Cyprius,  surnamed  Gregory,  obtained  well  merited 
honours  from  the  patrons  of  learning  in  his  own 
day.  Michael  Psellus  cultivated  philosophy,  me- 
dicine, and  mathematics,  and  obtained  the  title  of 
the  "Prince  of  Philosophers."  He  composed  and 
published  an  "  Exposition  of  the  Chaldean  Oracles^'' 
and  a  "  Treatise  on  the  Faculties  of  the  SoulP 

*jt*  The  following,  among  many  others,  are  interesting  works  on  the 
philosophical  principles  and  opinions  of  the  Fathers  of  the  Church. 
Thomasius,  Origin.  Hist.  Ecclesi.  et  Phil.  Mosheim,  De  Turbata  per 
Platonicos  Recentiores  Ecdesia.  (This  work  has  occasioned  considerable 
discussion  among  learned  ecclesiastics  of  modern  times ;  particularly 
Baltus  and  the   Benedictines  of  Saint  Maur.)     Huet,  Origenia.     Clerc, 

T    2 


276  DISQUISITIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS. 

Biblioth.  Select.  Brucker,  Hist.  Crit.  Phil.  Carus,  L'Etude  de  I'homme 
et  la  Psychologic  en  particulier.  Jean-Baptiste  Crispus,  De  Ethnicis  Phi- 
losophis  caute  Legendis.  Souverain,  Le  Platonisme  Devoile.  Baltus, 
Defense  des  Saints  Peres;  Jugemens  des  Saints  Peres  sur  la  Morale 
de  la  Philosophic  Paiennc,  (Strasburg).  Barbeyrac,  Traite  de  la  Morale 
des  Peres  de  I'Eglise.  StandHn,  Progr.  de  Patrum  EcclesifE  Doctrina 
Morali.  Eberhard,  Spirit  of  Primitive  Christianity,  (in  German). 
Roessler,  De  Originibus  Philosophise  Ecclcsiasticse.  The  fourth  Volume 
of  the  Bibliotheque  des  Peres  de  I'Eglise.  Tennemann,  Grundriss  der 
Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  the  seventh  Volume.  Cave's  Lives  of  the 
Fathers,  and  Ecclesiastical  Antiquities.  Whiston's  Primitive  Christianity. 
Fabricius,  Biblioth.  Grec.  Lardner's  Account  of  the  Christian  Fathers. 
Journal  des  Savans,  1734.  Tillemont,  Mem.  Ecclesi.  Gaudentius,  Diss, 
de  Compar.  Dogm.  Orig.  cum  Dogm.  Platonis. 


ST.    PETER    THE    ANCHORITE.  277 


CHAPTER    XXVIII. 

■ 

OBSERVATIONS  AND  REFLECTIONS,  FROM  ASCETIC 
WRITERS,  ON  MATTERS  CONNECTED  WITH  REA- 
SONING AND  GENERAL  KNOWLEDGE. 


As  we  are  just  upon  tlie  eve  of  entering  into  a 
long  night  of  comparative  stillness  and  unprofit- 
able discussion,  we  shall  lay  before  the  reader  a  few 
scattered  fragments,  culled  from  ascetic  sources, 
on  matters  bearing  a.  certain  relationship  to  mental 
studies.  These  fragments,  though  very  scanty  and 
limited  in  their  range  of  inquiry,  will  be  found  not 
altogether  devoid  of  interest,  considering  the  pe- 
riod and  the  circumstances  under  which  they  were 
written. 

St.  Peter  the  Anchorite.     410  a.  d. 
On  Simian  Wisdom  and  Learning. 

"  It  has  often  appeared  to  me  that  there  are 
among  the  learned  of  this  world,  and  even  among 
some  of  our  ablest  divines,  many  odd  and  curious 
notions  about  the  nature  of  human  wisdom  and 


278  ASCETIC    WRITERS. 

learning.  I  have  long  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
there  is  no  learning  nor  wit  of  men  that  is  not 
grounded  in  religion — Kttle  that  is  not  decidedly  of 
a  religious  character ;  and  my  reasons  for  this  opi- 
nion I  shall  state  to  you  as  briefly  as  I  can. 

"  Men  pride  themselves  on  theii*  wisdom  in  ob- 
serving the  causes  of  things,  and  their  effects.  A 
physician,  for  example,  is  called  a  learned  man  in 
proportion  to  his  knowledge  of  the  cause  of  human 
ailments,  and  the  effects  that  particular  drugs  have 
upon  them.  And,  again,  a  man  is  called  a  wise 
legislator  who  is  acquainted  with  the  causes  of  so- 
cial happiness  and  prosperity,  and  with  the  effects 
which  particular  measures  have  upon  the  welfare 
of  the  community.  Here  causes  and  effects  are  the 
materials  of  Avisdom.  Now  I  conceive  that  no 
man  can  be  intimately  conversant  about  these, 
make  them  daily  objects  of  his  attention  and  no- 
tice, and  pride  himself  on  his  mode  of  arranging 
them  in  Ms  mind,  without  his  thinking  often  of 
the  First  Great  Cause,  which  made  and  sustains 
all  things.  I  know  well  there  are  thousands  of 
learned  men  who  never  directly  refer  theu"  wisdom 
to  the  Deity ;  but  still  the  thought  is  in  their 
minds,  whether  they  give  formal  utterance  to  it  or 
no.  And  this  is  the  thing  to  look  at.  If  there 
were  not  indirectly  a  reference  made  to  this  know- 
ledge of  Deity,  it  is  difficult  for  me  to  see  how  there 
could  be  anything  like  wisdom  in  the  world,  or 
why  men  should  pride  themselves  upon  possess- 
ing it,  and  demand  praise  from  others  for  it. 


SAINT    PETER   THE    ANCHOUITE.  279 

"  You  have  heard  me  often  mention  in  conversa- 
tion, that  I  very  much  douhted  if  there  were  ever 
such  a  being  as  an  Atheist;  and  it  is  upon  the 
strength  of  this  doubt  that  I  am  now  offering  my 
opinions.  All  the  philosojjhers  I  have  read  of  who 
have  been  charged  with  denying  the  existence  of  a 
God,  always  had  a  notion  of  supreme  power  about 
them.  This  notion  mav  have  assumed  various  forms, 
but  it  is  always  in  the  mind  of  man,  and  influences 
him  without  his  knowing  it.  It  is  never  destroyed, 
and  I  question  much  whether  it  be  ever  very  much 
weakened.  The  natural  man,  it  is  true,  does  not 
know  God  as  we  Christians  know  Him;  but  he 
does  know  Him  notwithstanding.  We  are  not  in 
a  precise  situation  to  estimate  the  influence  which 
this  primary  notion  of  the  Deity  may  have  over  the 
other  faculties  of  the  mind,  nor  over  the  judgments 
we  form  of  things.  We  cannot  do  this  either  wiA 
other  people  or  ourselves.  But  I  hold  it  evident 
that  the  whole  frame-work  of  our  nature  rests  upon 
it ;  and  there  would  be  nothing  in  the  miiverse  we 
could  call  wisdom  or  learning,  unless  it  were  based 
upon  this  fundamental  principle  of  theology. 

"Learning  and  wisdom  Avould  not  be  placed 
against  each  other  in  the  world's  estimation,  if  men 
would  only  base  their  knowledge  upon  religion. 
They  ought  to  commence  with  it,  and  descend 
to  other  branches  of  information ;  and  not  begin 
with  the  latter,  with  a  vicAV  of  obtaining  a  know- 
ledge of  the  former.  This  is  inverting  the  natural 
order  of  things.     Most  of  the  heathens,  and  even 


280  ASCETIC    WRITEliS. 

some  good  Patliers  of  the  Church,  have  maintained 
that  Socrates  was  the  wisest  man  of  ancient  times ; 
and  the  proof  that  is  adduced  for  this  is,  that  he 
connected  his  knowledge  with  some  definite  notions 
of  a  God.  This  has  often  struck  me  as  a  very  curi- 
ous circumstance;  hut  it  is  very  confirmatory  of 
what  I  am  now  contending  for.  If  we  couhl  make 
ourselves  acquainted  with  every  thing  in  this  world, 
and  yet  had  no  notion  of  what  lay  beyond  it,  what 
men  call  wisdom  would  he  hut  a  poor  and  miserable 
thing  indeed.  And  in  all  the  Pagan  writers  we  find 
that  continual  references  were  made  to  the  wisdom, 
favour,  and  applause  of  the  gods,  when  they  were 
intent  on  doing  great  things.  The  Deity  must  be 
the  fountain  of  all  knowledge  and  wisdom,  and  in 
proportion  as  men  direct  their  minds  to  him,  they 
will  make  real  progress  in  knowledge ;  but  if  they 
tleglect  liim,  all  they  can  know  is  but  dross  and 
emptiness."* 

St.  Alonzo  de  Vega.     530  a.  d. 

Nature  of  Unbelief. 
"  In  moving  much  in  the  world,  in  the  early  part 
of  my  life,  it  has  often  been  my  lot  to  meet  with 
men  who  refused  to  give  credence  to  the  Gospel ; 
and  the  variety  of  reasons  they  adduced  often  at- 
tracted my  notice.  But  I  have  almost  uniformly 
found  that,  at  bottom,  such  men  did  not  approve 


*  Dies  y  siete  Coloqnios  y  Discursos  Yarios,  Salamanca,  1593,  Vol.  1. 
)))).  310 — 314.     Flos  Sanctorum,  Madrid,  1710, 


ST.    ALONZO    DE    VEGA.  281 

of  religion  in  theii*  lives,  and  this,  I  conceive,  made 
them  averse  to  its  truths.  Some  exceptions  to 
this  rule  I  have  met  with ;  and  when  the  parties 
were  men  of  intelligence  and  learning,  I  have  felt 
no  small  degree  of  interest  in  discussing  points  of 
doctrine  with  them. 

"In  all  my  encounters  of  this  kind,  I  have 
noticed  that  their  oT)j  actions  were  much  of  the 
same  cast  as  those  which  the  old  pliilosophers  used 
to  employ  in  their  discussions  and  wranglings  with 
one  another,  on  the  general  doctrines  of  a  Deity 
and  a  superintending  Pro\ddence.  The  latter,  as 
well  as  modern  douhters,  always  wanted  to  know 
the  reasons  for  things  being  constituted  as  they 
are.  Now  this  is  a  silly  notion,  because  it  is  just 
as  pertinent  against  as  for  those  who  use  it.  It 
is  a  two-edged  sword.  Therefore,  whenever  I 
have  met  with  persons  who  followed  this  line  df 
argumentation,  I  have  endeavoured  to  turn  their 
own  weapons  upon  themselves,  and  this  has  often 
made  them  plead  for  mercy.  I  adopted  this  mode 
of  warfare,  from  an  accident  which  befel  me  in  one 
of  my  travels,  and  which  I  shall  here  relate. 

"  Going  once  over  one  of  the  most  wild  and 
mountainous  parts  of  Spain,  I  was  accompanied  by 
a  physician,  with  whom  I  had  become  acquainted 
in  the  last  town  in  which  I  had  rested.  He  was  a 
very  intelligent  man ;  knew  Hippocrates  and  Galen 
by  heart ;  was  fond  of  disputation ;  but  would  not 
listen  to  my  doctrines  of  religion.  We  were  be- 
nighted in  the  midst  of  one  of  the  mountain  passes; 


282  ASCETIC    WRITERS. 

but,  after  a  good  deal  of  suffering  and  fatigue,  were 
seen  by  a  shepherd,  who  took  us  to  his  humble 
dwelling,   and  succoured  us  for  the  night.     The 
badness  of  the  weather  prevented  us  from  leaving 
our  quarters  the  next  day.     To  beguile  the  hours, 
my  friend,  the  physician,  began  to  converse  with 
the  shepherd,  with  a  view  of  sounding  the  depth 
of  his  knowledge  of  sundry  matters.     The  physi- 
cian found  him  a  keen  and  witty  man  by  nature. 
This  gave  some  zest  to  the  conversation.    My  com- 
panion attempted  to  explain   several  things  dis- 
tinctly connected  with  his  own  profession,  but  the 
shepherd  would  not  believe  his  statements,  and 
always  met  his  declarations  and  reasonings  with 
the  inquiry,  why  such  and  such  a  thing  was  made 
in  this  or  that  particular  manner,  rather  than  in 
some  other  ?     When   the  physician  attempted  a 
solution  of  any  question,  the  shepherd  laughed  and 
shook  his  head  in  derision.     When  the  physician 
affirmed  that  such  and  such  things  were  true  in  phi- 
losophy, the  shepherd  denied  the  truth  of  the  state- 
ment, and  asked,  with  no  small  portion  of  ironical 
wit,  why  should  the  thing  be  in  that  way,  when 
another  way,  apparently  much  simpler,  would  have 
answered  the  purpose  ?     I  saw  my  friend  was  ex- 
ceedingly annoyed ;  but  I  enjoyed  the  dispute  my- 
self; for  it  so  happened  that  when  I  attempted  to 
unfold  any   theological   principle  or  doctrine,    he 
dexterously  employed  the  same  line  of  argument 
against  me  which  the  simple  and  untutored  shepherd 
now  used  against  liimself.     The  physician  was  in 


ST.    ALONZO    DE    VEGA.  283 

the  habit  of  asking  me  why  the  Almighty  had  not 
made  us  so  as  not  to  have  needed  the  costly  sacri- 
fice of  His  own  Son  ?  why  we  could  not  see  the 
truth  of  another  life  in  a  much  clearer  light  than 
we  do  ?  why  there  should  l)e  any  evil  at  all  in  the 
world  ?  These  and  many  more  questions  of  a  simi- 
lar nature  he  urged  to  haflB.e  and  confute  me.  Now, 
I  fancied  he  had  thought  of  this  in  his  conflict  with 
the  shepherd,  and  had  felt  inward  mortification  in 
consequence.  Por  my  part,  I  felt  a  secret  pleastlre 
at  his  discomfiture,  and  I  endeavoured  to  draw  a 
useful  lesson  from  it.  I  have  found  such  argu- 
ments as  these  used  by  the  shepherd,  to  question 
the  truth  of  jDlain  prmciples  of  knowledge,  almost 
universally  employed  among  doubters  of  the  Gospel. 
When  the  real  nature  of  these  arguments  is  ex- 
amined, they  will  be  found  a  very  weak  subterfuge 
for  error  and  delusion."* 

On  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul. 

*'  All  my  readuig  and  reflection  have  convinced 
me  that  man  lives  after  his  earthly  career ;  and  my 
reasons  for  this  opinion  are  drawn  more  from 
human  testimony,  and  the  nature  of  things,  than 
directly  from  the  Scriptures  themselves.  The  opi- 
nion of  another  life  is  universal ;  no  people  are 
devoid  of  it.  Idolatry  of  all  kinds  is  a  striking 
manifestation  of  it.  It  was  the  creed  of  the  Egyp- 
tians, and  Chaldeans,  and  Persians,  and  Greeks, 

*  Los  Padres  del  Disierto.  Madrid  1564.  Vol.  1    pp.  200.  202. 


284  ASCETIC    WRITERS. 

and  Romans,  and  Jews,  and  is  interwoven  with  all 
Pagan  rites  and  ceremonies." 

"  Socrates  says,  '  I  hope  there  will  be  something 
after  death,  and  that  the  future  life  will  he  better 
for  vii'tuous  men  than  for  the  wicked.'  Plato,  in 
his  letters,  remarks,  '  That  we  ought  to  assent  to 
the  ancient  and  sacred  opinion,  that  the  soul  of 
man  is  immortal ;  and  that  after  this  life  it  will  be 
judged  and  punished  severely.'  Aristotle  spoke  of 
the  happiness  of  a  future  state  as  an  opinion  of  very 
great  antiquity,  even  in  his  day.  Cicero  says  '  that 
the  immortality  of  tlie  soul  has  been  adopted  and 
defended  by  the  most  distinguished  men.'  And  a 
like  opinion  may  be  found  in  Homer,  Thales,  Py- 
thagoras, and  Zeno."* 


Pelagius.     768  a.  d. 

Pelagius  was  born  in  some  part  of  Sj^-ia,  but 
the  exact  place  is  not  known.  The  events  of  his 
life  are  but  briefly  related  by  his  Spanish  bio- 
graphers. 

It  would  appear  that  this  recluse  was  born  of 
rich  and  influential  parents,  who  gave  him  a  very 
learned  education.  He  was  employed,  in  the  early 
part  of  his  life,  in  the  service  of  Prince  Abdalrah- 
man,  who,  in  750,  at  the  revolution  of  the  Caliphate 
at  Damascus,  having  fled  from  the  massacre  of  his 
family,  came  into  Spain,  and  fixed  liis  residence  at 

*  Los  Padres  del  Disierto,  Vol.  1.  p.  250. 


PELAGITJS.  285 

Cordova.  Here  he  found  an  independent  kingdom, 
where  the  arts  and  sciences  were  introduced  and 
cultivated  with  assiduity,  during  a  period  when 
most  other  kingdoms  of  Europe  were  involved  in 
heathen  darkness,  barbarity,  and  ignorance.  * 

Pelagius,  for  several  years  after  the  establishment 
of  Prince  Abdalrahman  in  Spain,  laboured  with 
uncommon  zeal  and  effect  in  promoting  a  know- 
ledge of  all  kinds  of  science,  and  a  love  of  general 
literature.  In  this  laudable  undertaking  he  met 
with  every  degree  of  encouragement  from  his  mu- 
nificent and  intelligent  patron,  who  kept  him  about 
his  own  person,  and  consulted  him  in  every  under- 
taking for  the  welfare  of  his  kingdom. 

At  the  age  of  fifty-three  he  was  tiredof  all  public 
life,  and  determined  to  withdraw  into  solitude  to 
devote  himself  exclusively  to  the  perusal  of  the 
Holy  Scriptures,  to  which  he  thought  he  had  not 
paid  so  much  attention  as  he  ought.  This  resolve 
gave  Prince  Abdalrahman  great  pain.  He  used 
every  art  of  persuasion  to  induce  Pelagius  to  change 
his  mind,  but  all  to  no  purpose. 

He  sought  out  one  of  the  most  barren  and  deso- 
late places  in  the  country,  where  to  fix  his  dwelling 
place,  wliich  was  a  cave  hewn  out  of  a  soKd  rock. 
Here  he  lived  upon  the  wild  fruits  of  the  earth, 
and  drank  nothino^  stronsrer  than  water.  In  the 
heat  of  summer  he  had  a  kind  of  cradle  erected 
upon  a  lofty  tree  which  over-hung  his  cell,  wherein 
he  slept  during  the  night.  His  mental  occupations 
were  the  reading  of  the  Scriptures,  and  the  study  of 


286  ASCETIC    WRITERS. 

some  of  tlie  most  distinguished  of  the  Grecian  and 
Roman  philosophers,  of  whose  writings  he  was 
passionately  fond. 

It  is  related  that  once  in  every  year  he  paid  a 
-v^sit  to  the  Prince,  his  kind  patron,  who  was  always 
delighted  to  see  and  converse  with  him.  It  is  not 
known  in  what  year  he  died,  but  his  age  is  stated 
to  he  eighty-two.  He  was  buried  with  great  pomp, 
and  many  thousands  of  persons,  from  aU  parts  of 
the  country,  came  to  pay  their  respects  to  the  ashes 
of  this  singular  and  talented  man. 

His  literary  remains  are  under  the  head  of  "Prag- 
ments,"  from  which  the  following  extracts  are  made. 
His  knowledge  of  philosophy  is  singularly  great  for 
the  time  in  wliich  he  lived. 

On  matters  relating  to  Knowledge  in  general^ 
and  Reasoning . 

The  human  mind  is  divided  into  two  faculties, 
viz.  the  judgment,  and  the  memory.  Philosophy 
is  of  use  to  inform  and  rectify  the  mind  ;  but  it 
will  be  necessary  to  give  a  definition  of  the  word 
philosophy,  and  to  show  whence  it  had  its  origin. 
The  ancients  who  employed  their  time  in  the  search 
of  knowledge  were  called  Sophoi,  l3efore  Pythagoras 
existed,  who,  out  of  an  air  of  modesty,  refused  the 
name,  as  being  proper  to  immortal  gods  only ;  in- 
stead of  which,  he  assumed  the  name  of  philosopher, 
and  which,  since  his  time,  has  been  attributed  to 
the  former  characters,  and  hence  arose  this  desig- 
nation. 


PELAGIUS.  287 

Vulgar  knowledge  is  that  by  which  we  know 
only  the  bare  existence  of  things,  without  being  able 
to  give  reasons  why  they  are  so  and  so.  Solid  know- 
ledge is  that  of  which  we  know  the  causes  and 
effects ;  as  that  the  sun  melts  snow,  and  the  frost 
,  congeals  water. 

Aristotle  divided  his  works  into  two  kinds,  exo- 
terica  and  acroamatica ;  the  former  he  wrote  for 
the  vulgar,  without  giving  any  reason  for  what  he 
affirmed — as,  God  was  to  be  worshipped,  or  the 
soul  was  immortal,  which  men  were  to  believe 
upon  his  word.  The  latter  he  taught  his  disciples, 
to  whom  he  proved  every  thing  he  said  with  the 
strongest  arguments  he  could  advance. 

Prom  hence  may  be  drawn  the  following  four 
corollaries : — 

First —  Vtilgar  knowledge  is  that  which  we  wholly 
acquire  by  the  senses,  and  is  the  foundation  of  all 
solid  knowledge ;  for  we  must  know  a  thing  is  so, 
before  we  can  offer  a  reason  for  it.  Vulgar  know- 
ledge is  the  least  degree  of  knowledge  we  can 
conceive. 

Second — Solid  knowledge  does  not  depend  so  ex- 
clusively upon  our  senses,  but  upon  right  reason ; 
that  is,  by  deducing  some  truths  from  others  by  a 
necessary  conclusion.  But  there  are  some  parts  of 
learning  which  cannot  be  called  philosophy  ;  such 
as  mathematical  arts ;  and  even  theology,  because 
acquired  by  revelation.  As  to  mathematical  arts, 
though  they  be  deduced  from  some  principles  of 
philosophy,  yet  it  commonly  happens  that  the  arts 


288  ASCETIC    WRITERS. 

are  themselves  illustrated  by  an  inquiry  into  the 
nature  of  things,  and  by  practice  and  experience. 
It  may  be  said,  since  right  reason  is  the  faculty  of 
deducing  some  truths  from  others,  how  comes  it  to 
pass  that  we  embrace  false  opinions  ?  We  answer, 
by  an  unavoidable  mistake,  or  erroneous  judgment, 
from  whence  many  errors  proceed.  But  a  philoso- 
pher ought  not  to  receive  any  doctrine  but  what 
can  be  deduced  from  seK-evident  truths,  principles, 
and  axioms.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  some 
doctrines  which  cannot  be  demonstrated  by  axioms 
and  definitions  ;  in  that  respect  they  have  recourse 
to  probability  and  analogy. 

Philosophy  is  divided  by  some  writers  on  meta- 
physics into  subjective  and  objective. 

Pirst — Objective  is  a  system  or  collection  of  so 
many  dogmas  or  opinions. 

Second— Subjective  is  a  faculty,  or  a  certain 
habit  of  deducing  some  truths  from  others.  If  we 
understand  philosophy  in  the  second  sense,  viz. 
subjectively,  sceptics  may  be  recorded  among  phi- 
losophers, as  being  always  searcliing  after  truth,  but 
never  coming  to  a  resolution  on  the  certainty  of 
any  thing.  But  if  we  place  philosophy  in  the  for- 
mer, (where  we  may  with  more  propriety,)  they 
have  no  claim  to  be  classed  with  philosophers. 

Philosophy  by  some  is  divided  into  true  and 
false. 

True  philosophy  is  that  which  is  founded  upon 
right  reason.  Pliilosophy  does  not  deserve  the 
name  of  false,  because  there  is  no  such  thing.  Phi- 


PELAGIUS.  289 

losopliy  is  by  others  called  eclectic ;  this  name  was 
given  to  those  who,  out  of  doctrines  and  opinions 
which  they  had  heard  or  read,  chose  what  they 
thought  l)est,  and  most  agreeable  to  truth  and 
reason. 

The  objects  of  philosophy  are  truth  and  goodness ; 
and  the  end  of  it,  the  true  happiness  of  mankind. 

Philosophy  is  again  divided  into  instrimie)ital, 
theoretical,  and  practical.  The  first  part  of  philo- 
sophy is  logic,  which  is  instrumental,  or,  as  Aristotle 
called  it,  organon,  a  machine,  because  it  is  to  the 
mind  what  an  instrument  is  to  the  body.  I  cannot 
cleave  a  piece  of  wood  with  my  hand,  but  easily 
with  an  axe ;  so  logic  affords  proper  help  and  as- 
sistance to  the  mind  for  investigating  truth,  and 
distinguishing  it  from  falsehood. 

But  it  is  necessary  to  give  the  derivation ,  of  the 
word  logic.  It  comes  from  the  word  logos,  i.  e. 
sermo,  or  ratio ;  and  it  is  very  probable  it  comes 
from  logos  in  the  last  sense,  because  it  is  the  art  of 
reasoning.  Though  some  who  occupy  themselves 
in  trifling  speculations,  call  it  sermo,  because, 
say  they,  thoughts  are  the  internal  speeches  of 
mind.  The  object  of  logic  is  truth  in  general ;  and 
the  end  of  it,  the  investigating  of  truth,  and  com- 
municating it  to  others. 

Logic  may  be  defined  the  science  for  discovering 
and  propagating  truth.  A  science  is  any  part  of 
learning  which  depends  upon  seK-evident  truths  or 
undoubted  principles.  Hence  logic  may  justly  be 
termed  a  science,  because  it  is  founded  upon  axioms 
or  self-evident  principles.  Truth  is,  as  it  were,  hid- 
*  u 


290  ASCETIC  WRITERS. 

den  in  a  pit,  and  logic  is  the  ladder  by  wliicli  we 
may  descend  to  searcli  for  it.  Truth  is  Ijlended 
with  falsehood,  and  therefore  logic  is  rendered 
more  necessary,  which  teaches  the  method  of  in- 
vestigating truth. 

Logic  is  conversant  about  three  things  : — 

Pirst — The  nature  of  the  human  understanding. 

Second — The  nature  of  truth. 

Third — The  method  of  investigating  truth  and 
communicating  it  to  others. 

The  nature  of  the  human  understanding,  which 
is  divided  into  two  principal  faculties,  the  under- 
standing and  the  will.  The  understanding  is  chiefly 
conversant  about  truth ;  the  will,  about  goodness. 

In  the  understanding  mind  there  are  certain  ideas 
which  experience  tells  us  are  infinite  in  their  num- 
ber. Plato,  and  the  philosophers  of  his  time,  were 
of  opinion,  that  these  ideas  were  stamped  or  im- 
printed iipon  the  mind  of  man  from  its  first  forma- 
tion, ])y  the  Author  of  nature ;  and  these  were 
called  innate  truths  or  ideas. 

The  idea  we  have  of  immaterial  things  comes 
from  the  inward  man;  that  is,  by  reflecting  on 
what  passes  in  the  human  mind.  Hence  some  are 
to  be  found  fault  with  in  saying  we  have  our  ideas 
of  immaterial  things  from  material  things,  as  the 
passions  of  hope  and  fear,  joy,  anger,  &c.  These 
could  never  be  acquired  by  material  objects.  Thus, 
suppose  a  man  void  of  any  of  the  passions,  as  for 
example,  anger ;  he  could  never  form  an  idea  of  it 
from  merely  seeing  a  man  in  a  rage,  with  his 
countenance  changed,  and  speaking  loudly;    but 


PELAGIUS.  291 

tliat  which  gives  him  an  idea  of  it,  is  by  reflecting 
on  what  passed  in  his  o\Yn  mind  when  he  was 
affected  with  this  passion ;  for,  until  he  feel  it 
himself,  he  can  never  have  a  just  idea  of  it.  ^^Tien 
the  mind  is  furnished  with  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  ideas,  the  first  thing  which  occupies  it  is, 
the  comparing  two  of  them  together,  to  see  whether 
they  be  equal  or  unequal,  whether  they  agree  or 
disagree ;  as  when  we  see  a  child  that  knows  the 
difference  between  a  book  and  a  leaf  of  paper,  by 
lifting  and  comparing  them  together.  But  when 
the  objects  cannot  be  removed  and  applied  to  one 
another,  as  two  buildings,  we  must  have  recourse 
to  some  intermediate  measure,  as  a  rope,  yard, 
&c.,  and  measure  the  one,  and  then  the  other,  and 
see  whether  they  agree  or  disagree. 

There  are  three  acts  of  the  mind,  which  are  called 
perception,  judgment,  and  reasoning.  First,  Per- 
ception is  that  which  we  barely  perceive,  without 
passing  any  judgment  upon  it,  as  the  fire,  a  house, 
the  sun,  moon,  or  stars,  &c.  This  is  called  percep- 
tion, and  sometimes  apprehension.  Second,  Judg- 
ment is  the  comparing  of  two  ideas  together,  as,  I 
have  an  idea  of  Grod,  and  another  of  justice,  and 
can  judge  that  God  is  just,  for  I  see  that  these  ideas 
agree.  Third,  E;easoning  is  the  third  act  of  the 
mind :  it  takes  place  when  two  thmgs  cannot  be 
afiirmed  to  agree  or  disagree  without  the  help  of 
some  intermediate  idea,  as  for  example,  I  want 
to  compare  my  soul  with  matter.  I  cannot  do  it 
immediately,  but  I  find  out  an  intermediate  idea,  a 
middle  term,  which  is  tJiinhing.     I  first  compare 

u  2 


292  ASCETIC   WRITERS. 

tliinldng  with  matter,  and  I  find  it  does  not  agree 
with  it,  then  I  conclude  that  my  soul  is  not  matter. 
If  we  were  only  endued  with  these  three  faculties, 
all  our  knowledge  would  be  very  confined,  and  would 
depend  upon  things  present ;  for  example,  if  I  were 
shut  up  in  a  room  tallciug  with  a  man,  then  all  my 
knowledge  would  he  confined  mthin  these  walls  ; 
but  the  Author  of  Nature  hath  endowed  us  with  an 
act  of  the  mind  called  the  imagination,  whereby  we 
can  excite  the  ideas  that  were  formerly  in  our  mind 
from  the  world  around  us  :  the  imagination  is  the 
knowledge  of  things  absent  as  if  they  were  present. 
I  can  form  an  idea  of  a  horse  or  an  ape,  though 
they  do  not  immediately  aff'ect  my  senses  :  thus 
the  imagination  brings  into  our  mind  the  ideas  we 
formerly  had.  By  the  help  of  the  imagination  we 
can  excite  the  ideas  of  objects,  corporeal  things, 
and  exert  certain  faculties  about  them.  I  think 
there  are  four  such  faculties,  viz.  Compounding,  Dis- 
cerning, 'Recalling,  and  Retaining. 

Pirst — Compounding  is  the  combining  or  gather- 
ing our  ideas  into  one  collection,  as  the  idea  of  a 
unit ;  and  ]3y  joining  as  many  ideas  to  it  as  make  a 
dozen,  or  a  score,  I  have  as  distinct  an  idea  of  these 
numbers  as  I  have  of  a  unit.  Wliat  would  be  our 
condition  if  we  wanted  this  faculty  ?  We  should 
then  have  no  idea,  for  example,  of  the  college,  be- 
cause it  consisted  of  many  houses  ;  but  only  of  our 
room  ;  and  so  of  other  things  which  consist  of  parts. 

Second — Discerning,  or  distinguishing,  is  the 
separating  our  ideas  from  one  another.  I  have  an 
idea  of  two  men  being  intimate  friends ;  I  cannot 


PELAGIUS.  293 

distill  guisli  tlie  one  from  the  other,  in  their  friend- 
ship. 

Third — Recalling  is  the  bringing  back  into  our 
minds  the  ideas  we  formerly  had.  By  this  act  we 
remember  our  former  acts.  It  is  commonly  called 
the  memory,  which  is,  as  it  were,  the  repository  of 
all  our  ideas. 

Pourth — Retaining  is  the  keeping  in  our  mind 
the  idea  of  an  absent  corporeal  object  excited  in 
our  mind  bv  the  imas^ination.  I  have  the  idea  of 
a  triangle,  and  can  retain  it  in  my  mind  until  I 
have  compared  all  its  parts.  But  it  is  almost  im- 
possible for  one  to  keep  his  thoughts  for  a  month 
or  two  fixed  upon  one  object,  on  account  of  the 
vast  number  of  ideas  that  crowd  in  upon  us :  no 
sooner  does  one  disappear  than  another  appears. 
Hence,  this  faculty  of  retaining  is  so  imperfect  in 
some  men,  that  it  renders  them  very  unfit  for  ac- 
quiring knowledge,  because  they  cannot  keep  in 
their  minds  any  thing  so  long  as  to  examine  and 
consider  its  properties  and  qualities. 

Thus,  then,  that  faculty  which  keeps  and  retains 
an  idea  for  some  time  is  exceedingly  useful  to 
man ;  and  without  which  all  our  ideas  would  be 
jumbled  together  as  a  chaos. 

There  are  three  /  other  faculties :  Comparing^ 
Naming,  and  Ranging  of  oiu'  ideas  into  different 
classes. 

Pirst — Comparing  our  ideas  together;  namely, 
two  triangles  together  to  find  the  difference. 

Second — Naming  is  an  act  of  the  mind,  by  which 
we  express  om*  ideas  by  articulate  sounds,  called 


294i  ASCETIC   WRITERS. 

words,  in  order  to  distinguish  one  thing  from 
another.  Words  are  nothing  else  but  the  marks 
of  our  thoughts,  by  which  we  keep  converse,  and 
communicate  our  knowledge  one  with  another. 

Third — Hanging,  or  reducing  our  ideas  into  pro- 
per classes.     To  illustrate  these,  we  observe  that 
many  things  produced  by  nature  have  a  certain 
resemblance  one  with  another;    as,  when  we  ob- 
serve a  certain  rank  of  beings  of  an  erect  form, 
with   their   heads  set,  so  as   to  make   them  look 
towards  heaven ;  these  we  commonly  comprehend 
under  one  general  class  called  men :    so  also   as 
to  horses,  birds,  and  fishes.     If  we  had  not  this 
faculty  we  should  be  obliged  to  give  a  name  to 
every  individual,  which,  in  the  first  place,  would 
be  impossible,  because  no  man  could  be  endowed 
with  such  a  memory  as  to  find  a  name  to  every 
grain  of  sand,  or  single  hair ;  and  even  if  we  were, 
it  would  be  idle  and  superfluous,  because  by  nam- 
ing the  hairs  of  our  head  we  could  not  convey  any 
diff^erent  idea  to  ourselves   or  others.     However, 
there  are  some  classes  that  occur  in  common  con- 
versation, of  which  we  are  obliged  to  call  every 
individual  thing  by  a  particular  name,  for  distinc- 
tion sake,  in  order  to  excite  the  same  idea  which 
is  in  the  minds  of  others.     Hence,  every  man  is 
called  by  a  particular  name;  and  it  is  even  the 
same   with    horses    sometimes.     In   like   manner 
sportsmen  distinguish  dogs ;  and  we  call  countries 
and  kingdoms  by  particular  names,  for  no  other 
reason  than  because  they  frequently  occur  in  com- 
mon conversation ;  and  we  thus  communicate  a  dis- 


PELAGIUS.  295 

tinct  idea  of  them  into  the  minds  of  others.  The 
shepherd  calls  his  dog  by  name ;  but  he  need  not 
use  this  formality  to  his  sheep.  But  we  may  pro- 
ceed further.  All  those  who  have  life,  and  are 
endued  with  spontaneous  motion,  we  call  by  the 
name  animal.  Yet  some  who  are  more  speculative 
have  found  out  a  more  general  name,  under  which 
we  may  comprehend  all  things  which  have  life, 
whether  rational,  sensitive,  vegetative,  called  by  the 
name  vivens.  Some  have  gone  further,  and  have 
comprehended  all  things  material  under  one  name, 
called  substance.  But  there  is  another  power  of 
the  mind  wliereby  we  make  one  singular  idea 
universal.  Every  idea  as  it  enters  the  mind  is 
single,  and  we  make  it  complex  by  making  that 
simple  idea  represent  a  whole  class  of  things ;  as 
when  I  have  the  idea  of  a  book,  by  abstraction  I 
can  make  it  represent  all  books,  of  different  sizes.  If 
we  had  not  this  act  of  the  imagination,  we  could  not 
have  a  general  idea,  but  only  l3e  conversant  about 
individuals ;  as  we  could  not  have  the  idea  of  a 
triangle  in  general,  but  only  of  some  certain  one. 
Thus  it  is  by  the  act  of  compounding  we  combine  our 
ideas,  excited  in  the  mind  by  the  imagination,  into 
one  collection ;  then  by  an  act  Ave  can  imagine  a 
pole  which  reached  from  our  eyes  to  the  stars  ;  and 
first  having  a  notion  of  gold,  and  then  of  a  mount, 
we  can  form  the  idea  of  a  golden  mountain,  a  sea 
of  milk,  &c.,  which  are  called  creatures  in  the  mind^ 
but  not  in  the  nature  of  things. 

Again,  ideas  which  contradict  and  destroy  one 
another,  which  neither  exist  in  the  mind  nor  in  the 


296  ASCETIC   WRITERS. 

nature  of  things,  are  called  nonentia,  as  a  square 
circle,  since  the  imagination  may  compound  ideas 
which  cannot  exist  in  nature.  To  prevent  being 
led  into  errors  and  mistakes,  there  is  need  of  the 
judgment  to  distinguish  these  ideas  from  real  ones ; 
hence  it  is  that  he  whose  judgment  predominates 
is  fit  for  philosophy,  the  civil  laws,  &c. ;  and  he 
who  excels  in  the  acts  of  the  imasrination  is  best 
qualified  for  poetry  and  oratory ;  and  he  that  ex- 
cels in  memory  is  fit  for  acquiring  the  languages. 
Since  the  mind  of  man  is  endued  Tvdth  such  acts  or 
faculties,  how  comes  it  to  pass  that  we  often  em- 
brace falsehood  and  fall  into  errors  ?  It  has  been 
a  question  much  agitated  among  philosophers, 
what  is  the  source  and  spring  of  all  errors  and 
mistakes  P  One  of  the  ancient  philosophers  im- 
putes it  to  the  depravity  of  the  will ;  but  others 
say  that  it  is  the  limited  natui'e  of  the  human 
mind,  and  the  understanding  being  so  narrowly 
confined  is  the  source  of  all  errors  and  mistakes. 
The  prejudices  of  autliority  and  'precipitancy  aj;e 
the  chief  leadino'  causes  of  error. 

First,  the  prejudice  of  authority  is  defined  to  be 
the  embracing  of  or  rejecting  an  opinion  without 
thoroughly  examining  into  it,  upon  the  qualifica- 
tions or  endowments  of  the  persons  who  maintain 
it,  as  children  are  obliged  to  obey  their  superiors, 
parents,'  and  nurses,  and  to  believe  for  truth  what- 
ever they  say,  since  they  cannot  search  into  the 
arguments  upon  which  the  doctrine  is  supposed  to 
rest.  So  when  they  come  to  the  years  of  maturity, 
and  are  able  to  converse  with  their  acquaintances, 


PELAGIUS.  297 

and  the  doctrines  are  never  contradicted  which 
were  tokl  them  by  their  nurses,  parents,  or  others, 
in  their  tender  years,  they  make  such  impression 
upon  their  minds,  that  they  think  them  sacred, 
and  a  thing  unpardonable  to  part  with  them  as 
long  as  they  live.  Another  instance  is  this ;  many 
follow  the  opinion  of  Zeno,  who  said  there  was  no 
vacuum.  In  this  country,  we  believe  the  contrary. 
Besides,  there  is  a  prejudice  in  religion,  as  we  see 
from  experience;  for  almost  whatever  doctrines 
prevail  in  the  country  where  we  are  brought  up, 
we  adhere  to  without  examining  them,  chiefly  be- 
cause the  minister  or  people  around  us  maintain 
them. 

There  are  more  prejudices,  as  those  of  antiquity, 
honour,  fame,  and  probability ;  and  there  is  a  pre- 
judice which  is  still  more  ridiculous,  as  we  see  most 
common  people  believe  what  theu'  rich  superiors 
say,  because  they  are  rich,  and  for  no  other  reason. 
Thus  far  concerning  the  prejudice  of  authority. 

Second.  The  next  grand  prejudice  is  that  of 
'precipitancy  or  rashness.  It  is  defined  to  be  a  re- 
jecting or  embracing  an  opinion  without  acearately 
considering  it,  as  we  see  most  people  are  averse  to 
reasoning  or  entering  into  a  long  series  of  argu- 
ments whereby  they  may  prove  the  principle  they 
embrace,  and  are  content  with  a  superficial  know- 
ledge of  them ;  and  their  minds  are  often  changed 
with  the  books  they  read,  or  by  the  arguments 
they  hear  advanced  about  any  subject.  Por  ex- 
ample, when  they  hear  the  argument  raised  to 
prove  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  they  easily  as- 


298  ASCETIC   WRITERS. 

sent  to  it ;  and  when  tliey  hear  the  argument  as- 
serted, to  prove  the  contrary,  they  as  easily  embrace 
it,  and  alter  their  opinions  as  often  as  they  hear 
different  arguments  offered. 

Under  this  class  may  be  comprehended  that 
prejudice  which  is  called  a  spirit  of  contradiction. 
We  see  a  great  many  show  their  wit  and  learning 
in  contradicting  whatever  arguments  they  hear 
advanced  either  on  the  right  or  wrong  side  of  the 
question;  and  also  a  great  many  debates  g^rise 
about  the  meaning  of  words  in  matters  of  religion.* 

On  the  Thinking  Principle  of  Animals. 

It  has  been  often  a  keenly  agitated  question 
whether  the  lower  orders  of  creation  perceive  ideas 
as  we  do.  Some  of  the  ancient  philosophers,  who 
abounded  in  nice  distinctions,  particularly  those 
who  resided  at  Alexandria,  divided  souls  into  three 
kinds — rational^  sensitive,  and  vegetative.  The  first 
was  given  to  man,  the  second  to  animals,  and  the 
third  to  plants. 

There  were  two  philosophers  who  made  no 
small  noise  in  Arabia,  about  fifty  years  ago,  that 
maintained  that  animals  were  susceptible  of  sensa- 
tions from  external  objects,  and,  consequently,  that 
they  had  a  sensitive  soul,  but  were  deprived  of  a 
perceptive  one,  whereby  they  are  prevented  from 
reflecting  upon  their  own  inward  sensations,  and 
from  comparing  two  or  more  ideas  together. 


*  See  Los  Padres  del  Disierto.  Madrid  15G4.  2  A"ol.  Art.  St.  Pelagiiis. 


PELAGirs.  299 

I  have  often  perused  with  amusement  the  treatise 
on  this  subject,  composed  by  the  good  Nemesius, 
Bishop  of  Emessa,  who  was  a  decided  advocate  for 
giving  certain  animals  credit  for  a  great  share  of 
artifice  and  prudent  calculation.  He  cited  a  variety 
of  instances  which  had  come  under  his  own  per- 
sonal observations,  wherein  great  msdom  and  fore- 
thought were  clearly  manifested  in  the  animal 
nature.  But  it  must  be  allowed  on  all  hands,  that 
there  is  something  pre-eminent  about  man,  over 
all  classes  of  the  living  creation.* 


*  See  Los  Padres  del  Disierto.     Madrid  1564.  2  Vol.  Art.  St.  Pelagius. 


300  PUINCIPLE    OP   AUTHORITY 


CHAPTER   XXIX. 

ON  THE  PRINCIPLE  .OF  AUTHORITY,  IN  MATTERS 
OF  PPIILOSOPHY  AND  THEOLOGY,  MAINTAINED 
BY  THE  FATHERS  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


In  cultivating  an  acquaintance  witli  pliilosopliy, 
it  was  natural  for  the  Eatliers  of  the  Church  to 
view  all  its  principles  through  the  medium  of  the 
doctrines  contained  in  revelation.  A  rigid  exami- 
nation of  every  abstract  proposition  grounded  on 
human  nature,  would  he  instituted  with  a  view  of 
ascertaining  all  its  hearings  upon  vital  questions 
of  faith  and  duty.  This  practice,  so  natural  to 
men  placed  in  their  situation,  would  almost  insen- 
sibly suggest  rules  and  maxims  of  religious  autho- 
rity. Human  nature,  in  its  widest  range,  was  the 
common  arena  of  disputation,  both  for  philosophers 
and  theologians.  It  was  the  source  from  which 
both  drew  all  their  materials,  though  they  received 
them  through  different  channels.  Philosophers  spe- 
culated in  the  closet ;  theologians  in  society ;  the 
one  illustrated  their  principles  by  mental  abstrac- 
tions, the  other  by  the  every  day  scenes  of  life  and 
character.     The  theologian  would,  in  consequence. 


MAINTAINED    BY    THE    FATHERS.  301 

be  powerfully  iuclined  to  appeal  to  human  autho- 
rity, in  support  of  his  general  views  and  abstract 
principles  of  human  nature.  The  ordinary  modes 
of  thinking  and  l^eling  among  mankind  would  be 
constantly  referred  to,  and  become  invested,  in 
his  eyes,  with  an  authority  in  matters  of  specula- 
tion, from  which  there  could  be  no  philosophical 
appeal. 

The  every-day  discharge  of  the  arduous  and 
important  duties  of  the  Clergy,  would  invariably 
strengthen  this  principle  of  authority.  A  Divine 
Revelation  is  of  itself  an  act  of  authority  of  the  most 
comprehensive  and  decided  nature.  It  is  opposed 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  infallibility  of  human  reason ; 
it  deiines  limits  to  speculative  inquiries ;  it  directs 
them  into  particular  channels ;  and  renders  them 
subordinate  to  certain  ulterior  purposes  and  ends. 
This  revelation,  therefore,  involved  the  doctrine  of 
authority,  in  all  its  fulness  and  purity,  and  could 
not  but  prove  powerfully  influential  on  the  minds 
of  those,  whose  herculean  labours  were  du'ected 
towards  its  extensive  promulgation  among  man- 
kind. 

It  must  have  proved,  also,  not  a  little  influential 
on  the  minds  of  the  Eathers,  that  many  of  the 
ancient  heathen  philosophers,  whose  writings  were 
famiKar  to  them,  acknowledge  the  necessity  of  some 
divine  authority  and  communication,  to  direct  men 
to  sound  and  wholesome  conclusions  on  philoso- 
phical doctrines  and  systems.  The  Pathers  were 
acquainted  with  the  declarations,  on  this  point,  of 


302  PRINCIPLE    OF    AUTHORITY 

Pythagoras,*  Socrates, f  Plato, J  Aristotle, §  Hip- 
pocrates, 1|  Cicero,^  Catullus,**  and  Seneca.ff 

Indeed  this  question  of  religious  authority  has 
always,  since  the  introduction  oi  Christianity,  heen 
more  or  less  a  suhject  of  discussion ;  and  has  exer- 
cised over  speculative  philosophy  a  much  more  ex- 
tensive influence,  hoth  directly  and  indirectly,  than 
is  commonly  imagined.  In  our  o\^ti  day,  especially 
in  continental  countries,  it  is  quite  a  popular  con- 
troversy ;  and  it  may  be  considered  as  a  singular 
thing,  in  the  history  of  modern  speculation,  to  find 
some  of  the  most  distinguished  of  the  German  me- 
taphysicians maintaining  the  necessity  of  a  divine 
revelation  to  guide  mankind  in  their  philosophical 
inquiries.  To  hear  this  from  Pichte,  Schelling, 
Hegel,  and  Herder,  whose  speculative  systems  lead, 
by  a  short  route,  to  absolute  pantheism,  must 
be  considered  as  something  both  curious  and  in- 
structive. 

St.  Justin,  after  having  alluded  to  the  disputes 
among  philosophers,  and  the  uncertainty  of  almost 
every  fundamental  principle  which  they  have  at- 
tempted to  establish,  attributes  this  unsatisfactory 
state  of  affairs,  to  the  opinions  they  entertained  as 
to  the  infallibility  of  human  reason,  and  the  vain 
attempt  to  dispense  with  instruction.  "  Quod  a 
peritis  dlscere   noluerint,  sed  esse  existimaverint 

*   Deinoph.  Lact.  Pythagoras.  f  Memorab.  Socrat.  1.  4. 

X  Phfcdo.'p.  83.  §  De  Alundo.  Cap.  4, 

II  Book.  3.  II  De  Legg.  1.  7-  2.  14. 

**  Liber  64.  Ver.  385  et  seq.  ft  Lpis.  JJO. 


MAINTAINED    BY    THE    FATHERS.  303 

mentis  liumanse  solertia  claram  coelestiuni  reriim 
cognitionem  assequi  posse,  cum  ue  terrestrium. 
quiclem  potuerint."  And  he  concludes  T\-ith  refer- 
ring to  the  doctrines  of  the  ancients,  who  had  faith- 
fully transmitted  the  truth  to  us,  which  they  had 
originally  received  from  God  himself.  "  Quocirca, 
ciim  veri  nihil  de  E^eligione  a  doctorihus  vestris 
(Grsecis)  prgecipi  posse  constet,  et  idoneum  satis 
documentum  vobif  ignorationis  ipsi  suae  per  dissi- 
dentes  inter  se  factiones  exhibuerint,  reliquum  esse 
opinor,  ut  ad  majores  nostros  revertamur,  qui  et 
magistros  vestros  longe  tempore  anteverterunt,  et 
nihil  de  suis  ipsorum  cogitationibus  et  placitis 
docuerunt ;  minim e  ipsi  mutuis  dissensionibus  in- 
vicem  conflictantes,  aut  alii  aliorum  dicta  evertere 
in  anunum  inducentes  ;  quippe  qui  omni  conten- 
tionis  studio  et  factionum  dissidio  liberi,  sicuti  a 
Deo  acceperunt,  ita  nobis  doctrinam  tradidermit." 

Hernias  descants  upon  the  errors  and  contradic- 
tory systems  of  philosophers ;  and  contrasts  their 
pretended  knowledge,  ^^dth  the  certainty  of  that 
which  is  transmitted  to  all  mankind  by  tradition. 
*'  Beatus  apostolus  Paulus,  Corinthiis,  qui  juxta 
Laconicam  Grseciam  habitant,  scribens,  cluu  pro- 
nunciavit  sapientiam  mundi  hujus  apud  Deimi 
stultitiam  esse,  prseter  rei  yeritatem  locutus  non 
est.  Videtur  enim  mihi  ab  anc^elorum  defec- 
tione  principium  repetiisse,  cur  philosophorum 
decreta  inter  se  neque  consentiant  neque  appro- 
bentur." 

Clement  of  Alexandria  maintains  that  the  first 
principles  of  philosophy  are  obtained  by  faith,  and 


304  PRINCIPLE   OF   AUTHORITY 

not  by  demonstration.  "  Ostensmn  est  principil 
Tiniversorum  esse  earn,  quae  fide  liabetur,  scientiam, 
non  autem  demonstrationem."  [Stromat.  lib.  2.) 
He  says,  besides,  that  common  sense  should  form 
the  basis  of  all  demonstration,  and  that  the  human 
mind,  in  all  its  investigations,  ought  to  set  out 
from  an  immutable  principle,  which  can  only  be 
established  by  faith.  "  Si  ejus  quod  est  certuni  et 
extra  controversiam  referatur  fides  ad  id  quod 
omnes  confitentur,  illud  est  constituendum  doc- 
trinjB  principium. ...  Si  est  demonstratio,  omnino 
necesse  est  prius  esse  aliquid  ex  se  credibile  quod 
quidem  dicitur  primum  et  indemonstrabile.  Ad 
fidem  ergo  indemonstrabilem  reducitur  omnis  de- 
monstratio."    {Ibid.  lib.  8.) 

In  opposition  to  the  incredulity,  that  faith  is  the 
foundation  of  all  our  knowledge  and  movements, 
St.  Theophilus  of  Antioch  says,  "  Quid,  obsecro, 
incredulus  es  ?  Non  animadvertis  actiones  omnes 
antecedere  •  fidem  ?  Quis,  cedo,  agricola  metere 
potest,  nisi  prius  semen  credat  sulcis  ?  Quis  mare 
poterit  trajicere,  nisi  prius  semetipsum  credat  navi 
et  gubernatori  ?  Quis,  morbis  implicitus,  sanitatem 
recuperare  poterit,  nisi  semetipsum  prius  credat 
medico  ?  Quam  artem,  quam  scientiam  quis  dis- 
cere  poterit,  nisi  prius  semetipsum  tradiderit  et 
credlderit  prseceptori  ?  Si  igitur  agricola  credit 
telluri,  navigaturus  navi,  infirmus  medico,  tune 
refugis  temetipsum  credere  Deo,  a  quo  tot  fidei 
arrhabones  accepisti." 

Tertullian  calls  philosophers  the  'patriarchs  of 
heretics. 


MAINTAINED    BY    THE    FATHERS.  305 

Origen  proclaims  that  all  human  things  depend 
upon  faith.  Quomodo  Deo  credere  non  sit  ration! 
cousentaneum  magis,  ciim  a  fide  omnia  hummia 
pendeant?     {Cont.  Celsus,  lib.  1.) 

Arnohius  says,  in  his  work  against  the  Gentiles, 
that  we  can  explain  nothing  without  faith,  which 
is  the  foundation  of  the  social  and  scientific  order 
of  things.  "  Itaque  cum  nobis  intenditis  aversionem 
a  religione  priorum,  causam  convenit  ut  inspiciatis, 
non  factum  ;  nee  quid  reliquerimus  opponere,  sed 
secuti  quid  simus  potissunum,  contueri.  Nam  si 
niutare  sententiam  culpa  est  ulla  vel  crimen,  et  a 
veteribus  institutis  in  alias  res  novas  voluntatesque 
migrare,  criminatio  ista  et  vos  spectat,  qui  toties 
vitam  consuetudinemque  mutastis ;  qui  in  mores 
alios  atque  alios  ritus,  priorum  condemnatione 
transistis." 

St.  Augustine  wrote  a  book  on  the  utUitij,  or 
necessity,  of  faith.  He  urges  that  every  one  ought 
to  commence  bv  faith ;  for  without  it  there  can  be  no 
soKd  foundation  for  rational  religion.  He  says  that 
the  medicine  of  the  soul  consists  of  two  ingredients, 
mithority  and  reason.  Authority  acts  by  faith,  and 
prepares  the  way  for  reason,  and  by  this  means  in- 
tellectual knowledge  is  created.  [See  De  ut'ilit.  cre- 
dendi,  &c.] 

In  the  works  of  Theoderet  there  are  long  and 
numerous  passages  to  be  found,  in  favour  of  the 
same  doctrine. 

Vincent  of  Lerins  maintains  that  faith  is  in 
strict  conformity  Avith  human  nature.  Faith  is  the 
basis  upon  which  the  natural  order  of  things  rests. 


306  PRINCIPLE    OF    AUTHOUITY 

It  guides  US  in  all  our  actions ;  is  common  to  all 
men ;  and  it  may  safely  be  concluded,  from  these 
facts,  that  if  it  be  necessary  in  matters  of  human 
knowledge,  how  much  more  necessary  must  it  be  in 
matters  appertaining  to  heavenly  things. 

Lactantius  estabhshes  the  necessity  of  attending 
to  traditionary  and  revealed  knowledge,  as  helps  to 
reason  and  judgment.    (See  Dwin.  Inst.  lib.  1.  3.  7.) 

St.  Hilary  says,  "Non  est  de  Deo  humanis  judiciis 
sentiendum;  a  Deo  dlscendum  est,  quod  de  Deo 
intelligendum  sit ;  quia  non  nisi  autore  cognosci- 
tur."     {De  Tr'm.  lib.  5.) 

We  have  the  principle  of  authority  still  more 
minutely  and  forcibly  stated  by  St.  Peter  the 
Anchorite,  who  lived  about  the  middle  of  the  fifth 
century.  This  pious  recluse  states  his  case  in  the 
following  manner. — 

"  To  the  ears  of  the  enemies  of  our  holy  faith, 
and  to  those  latitudinarian  people  who  never  care 
much  about  any  thing  serious,  the  authority  of  the 
Church  is  a  matter  of  ridicule  and  mockery.  But 
not  so  to  the  humble  and  intelligent  Christian.  It 
is  his  constant  theme  of  exultation,  the  foundation 
of  all  his  hopes,  and  the  never-failing  stimulant  to 
all  his  exertions.  Without  authority,  human  and 
Divine,  such  a  thing  as  a  Church  could  not  exist, 
any  more  than  the  human  body  could  exist  without 
a  soul." 

"  But  men  even  of  intelligence  and  piety  greatly 
perplex  themselves  and  others,  with  abstruse  specu- 
lations upon  the  nature  of  ecclesiastical  authority, 
and  from    whom  it    derives    its  life  and  power; 


MAINTAINED    RY    THE    FATHETIS.  307 

whereas  the  matter  appears  somewhat  plain  to  me. 
It  is  quite  obvious  that  the  spmtual  authority  of 
the  Church,  (for  I  am  only  considering  it  in  this 
light)  must  be  involved  in  every  revelation  from 
heaven.    This  revelation  must  be  simply  the  decla- 
rations'or  commands  of  the  Deity  to  men.  Authority 
is  here  implied  in  the  very  act  of  revelation,  and 
arises  from  the  relative  situation  of  the  lawgiver, 
and  those  who  receive  his  commands  or  precepts. 
To  argue,  therefore,  that  church  authority  has  no 
foundation,  is  in  fact  to  argue  that  there  was  no 
revelation  at  all.    And  it  has  often  appeared  to  me 
that  this  is  the  only  consistent  result  to  which  a 
man  can  arrive,  if  he  doubt  at  all  the  obligations 
and   injunctions   of  ecclesiastical   authority.     No 
communication  from  heaven,  no  matter  for  what 
end,  could  ever  be  of  ])encfit  to  any  save  those  who 
immediately  heard  it,  if  the  principle  of  authority 
be  once  shaken  or  denied.    Por  in  order  to  transmit 
the  revelation  from  those  to  whom  it  was  imme- 
diately given,  to  the  next  generation,  reliance,  the 
most  perfect  and  unconditional,  must  be  placed  upon 
the  words  and  declarations  of  men ;  otherwise  the 
thinc^  revealed  is  at  an  end.     There  is  no  channel 
for   its   perpetuity   to   succeeding   races   of  men. 
Authority,  which  is  simply  faith  in  the  declarations 
of  a  particular  set  of  men  relative  to  a  particular 
matter,  is  the  verv  essence  of  all  revealed  truth, 
and  the  vital  principle  by  which  alone  its  life  can 
be  preserved." 

"  Now  if  this  be  the  nature  of  church  authority, 
when  considered  in  relation  to  those  who  imme- 

x2 


308  PRINCIPLE    OP    AUTHOEITY 

diatelv  receive  a  Divine  communication,  it  must  still 
retain  all  its  leading  attributes,  when  descending 
the  stream  of  time,  among  succeeding  ages  of  men. 
The  perfect  unity  of  its  nature  can  never  he  de- 
stroyed. There  is  the  same  obligation  for  us  to  be 
guided  by  the  authority  of  St.  Athanasius  or  St. 
Augustine,  as  lay  upon  them  to  respect  the  authority 
of  the  Church  under  St.  Justin  or  Irenaeus ;  and 
the  latter  to  respect  the  authority  of  the  Apostles 
and  their  immediate  successors.  All  is  suspended 
as  it  were  by  a  chain,  the  first  link  of  which  is  fixed 
in  the  heavens,  and  +he  last  touches  the  earth.  But 
I  think  I  hear  a  question  put  to  me,  '  Pray  do  you 
say  that  every  thing  which  a  nmnber  of  the  clergy 
affirm  is  to  be  the  unerring  rule  of  my  faith  and 
conduct  ?  Is  my  judgment  or  reason  to  have  no 
part  in  the  matter  ?'  Now  I  would  answer  to 
this  very  natural  and  pertinent  question,  that  you 
are  under  no  obligation  to  attend  to  what  they 
command,  if  they  tender  you  no  proofs  of  their 
authority.  But  then  the  clergy  of  the  Church  always 
carry  the  instruments  of  their  power  mth  them ; 
that  is,  the  word  of  God,  of  which  they  are  the  ex- 
pounders and  interpreters.  This  word,  as  they  now 
give  it  to  you,  they  received  from  their  immediate 
predecessors,  who  again  received  it  from  theirs ;  and 
so  on,  till  they  came  to  the  Apostles  and  Prophets 
themselves,  who  were  the  recipients  of  the  direct 
wiU  of  God." 

"  I  can  conceive  it  consistent  for  a  man  who  im- 
piously denies  the  existence  of  a  divine  revelation, 
to  deny  also  religious  authority ;  but  for  any  one 


MAINTAINED    BY    THE    FATHERS.  309 

to  pretend  to  believe  the  divine  origin  of  the  Scrip- 
tures, and  yet  deny  the  authority  and  power  of  the 
Church  in  matters  of  religious  opinion  and  belief, 
is  to  me  one  of  the  most  contradictory  things 
imaginable.  Indeed,  it  seems  to  me  unreasonable 
for  men  to  object  to  Church  authority,  inasmuch 
as  the  same  thing  is  to  be  found  in  ordinary  life. 
What  is  called  public  opinion,  the  general  voice  of 
the  world,  common  sense,  and  such  like  things, 
are  nothing  but  modes  of  expression  to  indicate 
human  authority  displaying  itself  in  matters  of 
general  and  universal  interest.  Much  of  the  every- 
day knowledge  of  the  world,  which  we  have  all 
more  or  less  to  be  acquainted  with,  and  to  put  in 
practice,  is  derived  from  sheer  acts  of  human  au- 
thority. Men  are  guided  in  their  conduct  by  it, 
and  pay  a  hallowed  reverence  to  its  injunctions. 
If  this  were  not  the  case,  the  world  would  l)e  in  a 
most  lamentable  condition.  The  analogy  is  com- 
plete between  hmnan  authority  in  worldly  aifairs, 
and  religious  authority  in  matters  of  theology.  In 
the  concerns  of  life  there  are  certain  latitudes  al- 
lowed for  a  difference  of  opinion  and  conduct ;  but 
essential  and  vital  principles  are  of  universal  appli- 
cation, and  objects  of  universal  belief.  So  in  mat- 
ters of  theology,  a  certain  sphere  is  permitted  for 
non-essentials ;  but  general  and  vital  doctrines  are 
of  paramount  obligation  and  necessity  for  man's 
salvation."* 

*  Dies  y  siete  Coloquios  y  Discursos  varios,  Salamanca,  1593.  Vol.  1 
pp.  310.  316.  Flos  Sanctorum,  Madrid,  1710.  2  vols.  Origen  de  lo 
Frayles  Ermitanos,  Barcelo.  1628. 


310        AUTHORITY  OF  THE  FATHERS. 

Every  one  aequamted  with  the  philosophical 
doctrines  zealoLisly  promulgated  both  on  the  conti- 
nent of  Europe  and  in  Great  Britain  within  the 
last  century,  vnR  readily  recognise,  in  these  state- 
ments, the  outlines  or  germs  of  some  favourite  theo- 
ries of  metaphysical  theology.  These  will  he  more 
fully  developed  in  another  part  of  this  Work. 


ON    MOHAL    EVIDENCE.  311 


CHAPTER    XXX. 

ON  MORAL  EVIDENCE,  AFTER  THE  FULL  ESTABLISH- 
MENT OF  CHRISTIANITY. 


There  was  no  department  of  human  knowledge 
which  received  such  a  marked  accession  of  improve- 
ment, after  the  introduction  and  establishment  of  the 
Christian  dispensation,  as  the  principles,  rules,  and 
maxims  appertaining  to  moral  evidence.  Here,  in 
a  comparatively  short  space  of  time,  great  altera- 
tions were  effected ;  general  principles  of  evidence 
were  more  firmly  grounded  in  the  minds  of  men ; 
their  various  applications  and  modifications  were 
more  clearly  defined ;  and  the  whole  framework  of 
reasoning,  on  subjects  connected  with  human  na- 
ture, was  more  widely  and  securely  extended  over 
its  former  foundation.  All  this  had  a  weighty  in- 
fluence over  the  moral,  religious,  intellectual,  and 
social  condition  of  mankind. 

The  introduction  of  Christianity  threw  an  im- 
portant element  into  the  arena  of  human  disputa- 
tion. Here  a  great  number  of  new  principles  were 
announced ;  new  doctrines  unfolded ;  novel  motives 


312  ON   MOHAL   EVIDENCE. 

to  human  action  enforced ;  a  fresh  catalogue  of 
future  rewards  and  punishments  published ;  an  im- 
mense variety  of  mii'acles,  facts,  supernatural  ap- 
pearances, historical  declarations,  personal  narra- 
tives, deeds,  exploits,  sayings,  and  observations, 
were  made  known ;  and  more  full  and  conclusive 
illustrations  of  all  those  elementary  and  abstract 
principles  of  theology,  morals,  and  civil  institutions, 
which  the  pure  light  of  nature  had  previously  sug- 
gested to  men's  minds,  were  furnished  to  the  think- 
ing part  of  mankind.  This  immense  augmentation 
of  materials  for  reasoning  overwhelmed  the  narrow 
framework  which  heathen  philosophy  and  logic  had 
erected,  and  compelled  the  application  of  a  more 
comprehensive  and  accurate  instrument  for  the  in- 
vestigation and  establishment  of  truth,  than  had 
liitherto  been  employed. 

It  is  quite  obvious  to  ordinary  readers,  that  the 
modes  of  reasoning  generally  prevalent  amongst 
the  heathen  sages,  were  marred  and  disfigured  by 
a  perpetual  inclination  for  sophistical  wrangling 
and  ingenious  trifling.  These  were  their  great  lo- 
gical besetting  sins.  When,  therefore,  Christianity 
took  a  firm  hold  of  men's  minds,  these  imperfec- 
tions were  gradually  removed.  Men  disputed  and 
argued  under  the  influence  of  more  powerful  and 
lofty  motives  than  hitherto.  Truth  was  not  now  a 
mere  toy  or  plaything,  but  a  matter  of  deep  and 
universal  concern ;  and  on  this  account  it  was  to 
be  enforced  and  promulgated  with  becoming  seri- 
ousness, and  under  the  most  weighty  and  biading 
obligations.    Hence  it  is,  that  we  perceive  the  great 


ON    MORAL    EVIDENCE.  313 

change  wliicli  men's  minds  underwent  by  reason  of 
the  Christian  faith,  and  how  firmly  and  judiciously 
were  important  bulwarks  erected,  to  preserve  men 
from  falling  again  into  the  sea  of  universal  scep- 
ticism and  doubt. 

It  is  a  difficult  matter  to  give  a  full  and  precise 
definition  of  what  is  meant  by  moral  evidence.  It 
is  not  confined  to  matters  of  mere  morals,  but  em- 
braces a  wider  range,  and  is  commonly  understood  to 
comprehend  all  those  topics  connected  Avith  the  na- 
ture of  man  as  a  moral,  an  intellectual,  a  religious, 
and  a  sociable  being.  It  is  in  this  acceptation  that 
we  emplov  the  term  moral  evidence.  It  must  be 
obvious,  that  the  principles  connected  mth  subjects 
so  important  and  varied  must  be  very  numerous, 
and  would  require,  for  their  full  development,  a 
space  far  beyond  what  can  be  allotted.  Our  re- 
marks must,  therefore,  be  of  a  very  general  nature ; 
but,  it  is  confidently  hoped,  they  will  not  be  alto- 
gether unsuitable  or  unprofitable. 

The  fu'st  principle  which  was  firmly  established, 
relative  to  the  nature  of  moral  proof,  at  the  period 
of  the  establishment  of  Christianity,  was  the  de- 
fining of  the  nature  of  moral  evidence  from  other 
kinds  and  descriptions  of  e\ddence.  This  was  a 
most  important  matter ;  not  only  to  the  moral, 
intellectual,  and  social  interests  of  mankind,  but 
also  to  their  religious  welfare  and  interests.  This 
distinction  lay  at  the  foundation  of  all  theological 
discussions,  and  proved  of  incalculable  value  to  the 
Ancient  Pathers  in  their  disputes  with  the  heathen 
philosophers,  and  in  their  systematic  expositions  of 


311  ON    MORAL    EVIDENCE, 

Gospel  truth.  It  was  clearly  pointed  out  that  mo- 
ral evidence  differed  essentially  from  demonstrative 
evidence.  That  no  facts  or  arguments  grounded  on 
human  nature,  stood  in  the  same  relation  to  abstract 
truth,  as  arithmetical  numbers  or  mathematical 
forms. 

Moral  evidence,  at  this  period,  vras  considered  to 
consist  of  two  leading  parts  or  divisions ;  namely, 
observation  or  experience,  and  testimony. 

Experience  was  considered  as  particular  and  ge- 
neral ;  particular  when  applied  to  a  man's  own  ob- 
servation, and  general  when  derived  from  the  com- 
mon observation  of  mankind.  These  two  kinds  are 
mixed  and  blended  together  in  a  variety  of  propor- 
tions ;  and  this  amalgamation  gives  rise  to  a  vast 
portion  of  our  knowledge,  and  to  the  diversified 
means  of  applying  it  to  our  circumstances  in  life. 

Testimony  was  considered  of  two  kinds,  divine 
and  human.  Divine  testimony  was  looked  upon 
as  the  highest  degree  of  moral  evidence ;  for  nothing 
could  be  considered  as  untrue,  if  revealed  from  God 
himself.  This  was,  in  all  its  leading  features,  a  new 
species  of  evidence,  arising  out  of  revealed  religion, 
of  which  mankind  had  no  conception  till  the  intro- 
duction of  the  Christian  system. 

Human  testimony  is  of  various  kinds  ;  single  and 
compound,  direct  and  indirect,  written  and  unwrit- 
ten. But  all  human  testimony  must  be  modified 
by  experience ;  and  it  is  only  when  taken  in  con- 
junction with  it,  that  this  species  of  evidence  can 
lead  us  to  safe  conclusions. 

This  mixture  of  experience  with  testimony  gives 


ON    MORAL    EVIDENCE.  315 

rise  to  a  multitude  of  rules  respecting  the  evidence 
of  things  in  general.  The  nature  of  the  matters 
submitted  to  our  judgment ;  the  character  and  num- 
ber of  the  observers ;  what  were  their  opportunities 
for  careful  observations  ;  are  all  important  elements 
arising  out  of  this  combination. 

Besides  these  there  is  analogy,  which  is  often  mis- 
taken for  experience.  It  is  an  im23ortant  branch 
of  moral  evidence.  In  addition,  we  have  the  ^j^'^- 
stmiptive,  ov  internal  evidence  of  things,  which  forms 
a  considerable  portion  of  what  goes  under  the  de- 
nomination of  moral  evidence. 

Certain  rules  of  application  arise  out  of  these 
general  principles.  These  are  very  numerous,  and 
of  infinite  utility  for  the  advancement  of  truth. 
There  is,  1st.  The  necessary  personal  qualifications 
to  discuss  any  particular  question.  A  man  may  be 
wholly  incapable  of  discussing  a  question,  from  ig- 
norance, the  force  of  prejudice,  interested  views, 
and  manv  other  causes.  2nd.  We  must  be  sruided 
in  all  our  inquiries  by  strict  rules  of  evidence  ;  these 
must  not,  on  any  account,  be  lost  sight  of.  3rd. 
"We  should  in  all  discussions  endeavour  to  look  out 
for,  and  make  our  observations  and  illustrations 
subservient  to,  some  general  principle,  on  which 
the  whole  question  may  rest.  This  is  of  singular 
importance ;  as  it  strengthens  the  mind,  and  gives 
it  a  just  confidence  in  its  own  movements. 

These  were  some  of  the  leading  principles  re- 
specting moral  evidence,  which  are  conspicuously 
illustrated  by  the  writings  of  the  learned,  after  the 
introduction  of  Christianity.     From  its  first  an- 


316  ON    MORAL    EVIDENCE. 

nouncement,  till  its  firm  establishment  in  all  the 
seats  of  learning  and  science,  we  find  a  gradual  pro- 
gress was  made  towards  rational  and  enlightened 
principles  of  discussion.  The  peculiar  nature  of 
the  Gospel  aided  this ;  because  it  contained  every 
variety  of  fact  and  doctrine  which  were  calculated 
to  excite  profound  and  interesting  disputes  amongst 
the  learned  men  of  the  day,  whether  Christian  or 
heathen. 


HUMAN    ACTION.  317 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

ON  THE  OPINIONS  OF  THE  FATHERS  OF  THE 
CHURCH,  ON  THE  LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY  OF 
HUMAN  ACTIONS. 


The  doctrine  of  the  necessity  or  lil^erty  of  the 
human  will,  decidedly  belongs  to  the  science  of 
metaphysics.  It  is  not  only  a  very  curious  and  in- 
teresting question,  when  considered  in  reference  to 
the  variety  and  forcible  nature  of  opposing  argu- 
ments involved  in  it ;  hut  it  is  also  of  the  highest 
importance  to  our  welfare  as  moral  and  religious 
agents.  It  cannot  therefore  be  considered  out  of 
place,  in  a  history  of  this  kind,  to  give  a  succinct 
outline  of  the  sentiments  of  the  Philosophical 
Eathers  of  the  Church,  on  this  interesting  topic ;  a 
topic  which  it  requires  no  keen  prophetic  powers  to 
divine,  will  ever  remain  a  standing  subject  of  dis- 
cussion amongst  mankind.  As  the  question  is  so 
intimately  blended  with  theological  and  moral  doc- 
trines and  principles  of  the  utmost  moment,  it  can- 
not Imt  prove  of  use  to  students  of  theology  and  the 
kindred  science  of  morals,  as  well  as  to  the  general 
reader,  to  have  an  epitome  of  the  opinions  of  the 


318  OPINIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS 

early  sages  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  on  a  doc- 
trine of  such  importance  and  interest. 

It  is  a  common,  but  a  very  superficial  notion, 
that  the  doctrines  of  free-will  and  necessary  con- 
nexion, are  purely  speculative  crotchets,  and  have 
little  or  no  legitimate  bearing,  either  directly  or 
indirectly,  upon  any  portion  of  really  useful  human 
knowledge.  Now,  it  so  happens,  that  these  doc- 
trines are  vitally  interwoven  with  all  natural 
and  revealed  religion;  and  there  has  not  been 
a  single  controversy  about  the  principles  of  either, 
or  their  application  to  human  conduct,  that  has 
not  arisen  directly  out  of  these  philosophical 
doctrines.  And  a  moment's  consideration  must 
prove  sufficient  to  convince  us  that  this  could  not  be 
otherwise.  E^eligion  is  a  system  of  duties  and  obliga- 
tions, and  of  rewards  and  punishments.  This  must 
of  course  relate  to  a  code  of  laws,  and  to  beings  who 
have  to  attend  to  it,  and  to  reap  the  fruits  of  their 
observance  or  neglect  of  it.  Here  the  elements  of 
j)Ower  in  the  lawgiver  to  enact  and  enforce,  and  in 
the  agent  to  obey,  are  at  once  appealed  to,  and  our 
constitutional  notions  of  the  nature  and  limits  of 
both,  become  the  subject  of  eager  discussion  and 
intense  interest.  This  is  the  prolific  germ  of  all  the 
different  systems  and  views  of  religious  truth ;  and 
a  firm  foundation  is  here  laid,  as  long  as  the  human 
mind  is  constituted  as  it  now  is,  for  an  extensively 
varied  outline  of  religious  doctrine  and  l)elief. 

It  woLild  necessarily  lead  us  too  much  into  detail, 
were  we  to  illustrate  this  position  by  a  reference  to 
all  the  religious  controversies  for  the  last  eighteen 


ON    HUMAN    ACTION.  319 

liundred  years.  The  bare  enumeration  of  tliem 
would  be  scarcely  possible  within  the  limits  of  an 
ordinary  volume.  But  we  may  be  allowed  to  glance 
at  some  of  the  more  prominent  ones,  with  which 
every  theological  student  is  supposed  to  be  fami- 
liarly acquainted. 

On  the  very  first  introduction  of  Christianity, 
we  find  that  the  doctrines  of  grace,  original  sin,  and 
predestination,  were  eager  topics  of  discussion  in  the 
religious  community.  Dr.  Priestley,  in  his  "  Cor- 
ruptions of  Christianity,"  boldly  afiirms  that  these 
doctrines  were  scarcely  knowai  until  the  fourth  cen- 
tury, but  this  is  evidently  a  great  mistake.  Though 
they  might  not  have  at  first  assumed  that  j)recise 
form  and  character  with  which  they  have,  in  recent 
times,  been  invested,  yet  the  ^;rw?ci7;/^  on  which 
these  doctrines  rest,  as  on  a  common  centre,  were 
debated  by  the  early  Christians  with  keen  perti- 
nacity. The  Gnostic  heresy,  introduced  into  the 
Christian  church  in  the  first  centurv,  did  in  fact 
embrace,  in  point  of  principle,  the  whole  of  these 
doctrines  within  itself.  Here  we  distinctly  find 
that  the  principtle  of  evil  was  necessarily  confined 
to,  and  formed  a  component  part  of,  all  material 
objects ;  that  the  divine  influence  upon  man's 
life  and  conduct,  was  under  the  direction  of  this 
mechanical  association ;  and  that  all  diseases,  trou- 
bles, wars,  devastations,  and  \dces,  were  necessarily 
under  the  control  of  a  certain  species  of  malignant 
demons  or  spirits.  The  doctrines  of  Simon  Magus 
were  essentially  the  same  as  those  of  the  Gnostics. 
He  held  the  eternity  of  matter,  and  the  influence 


320  OPINIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS 

of  the  evil  ])rmciple  over  the  minds  of  men.  The 
systems  of  philosophical  theology  advocated  by 
Menander  and  Cerinthus,  who  lived  a  little  after 
Simon  Magus,  are  precisely  similar  to  his  in  all 
their  leading  features.  The  Gnostic  Theory  was 
the  parent  of  this  entire  and  numerous  brood  of 
heretical  notions. 

The  famous  Pelagian  controversy,  in  the  fourth 
century,  related  to  the  powers  of  the  human  will. 
This  celebrated  dispute  branched  out  into  various 
ramifications,  and  kept  the  minds  of  speculative 
disputants  in  full  activity  for  some  centuries  after- 
wards. Some  took  a  certain  portion  of  human 
liberty,  and  others  took  a  little  less,  into  their 
respective  systems,  and  this  discretionary  licence 
gave  rise  to  numerous  distinctions,  ^\  hich  the  lapse 
of  ages  has  buried  in  forgetfulness. 

Then  follow  the  fierce  and  long  continued  con- 
tests of  the  Schoolmen.  Here  we  find  the  doctrines 
of  liberty  and  necessity  fully  entered  into  and  dis- 
cussed in  all  their  bearings  and  dependences. 
The  learning  and  genius  employed  on  this  occasion, 
have  been  the  theme  of  admiration  of  all  the  specu- 
lative theologians  of  modern  times. 

The  Protestant  Reformation  brought  the  doc- 
trines of  free-will  and  necessity  again  into  the  field 
of  controversy,  with  all  the  stirring  interest  which 
belonged  to  this  singular  and  important  event. 
The  Roman  Catholic  notions  of  human  merit,  and 
the  discipline  of  the  Church  founded  upon  them, 
were  the  especial  topics  of  opposition  by  all  the 
leading  Reformers ;  and  this  circumstance  naturally 


ON    HUMAN    ACTION.  321 

led  them  to  advance  principles  of  an  opposite  com- 
plexion. Religious  controversies  of  a  very  extended 
nature  were  the  fruits  of  this  conflict. 

The  writings  of  Luther,  Calvin,  Erasmus,  Zuin- 
glius,  Melancthon,  and  others,  as  well  as  the  proceed- 
ings of  the  Council  of  Trent,  go  to  prove  the  deep  in- 
terest involved,  at  the  time  of  the  Reformation,  in  the 
doctrines  of  free-will  and  fate,  and  the  intimate  rela- 
tionship conceived  to  exist  between  these  doctrines 
and  the  principles  of  natural  and  revealed  religion. 

Prom  the  period  of  the  Reformation  to  the  pre- 
sent hour,  theological  controversies  have  run  in  the 
same  channel.  There  may  have  been  a  change  of 
names  amongst  them,  and  subtle  and  refined  dis- 
tinctions made  in  modern  times ;  but  the  essentials 
of  discussion  are  precisely  similar  to  those  Avhich 
have  gone  the  round  of  the  Christian  world  for  tlie 
last  eighteen  hundred  years.  The  doctrines  of  jus- 
tification, redemption,  faith,  election,  the  influence 
of  the  Holy  Spirit,  &c.  &c.  are  to  be  received  on  the 
authority  of  Holy  Scripture.  A  spirit  of  true  philo- 
sophy should  lead  us  at  once  to  embrace  whatever 
the  Sacred  Record  teaches;  while  the  disputes  which 
have  ever  agitated  mankind  upon  these  subjects  are 
obviously  grounded,  to  a  very  great  extent,  upon 
peculiar  and  partial  views  of  the  doctrine  of  human 
freedom  and  necessary  connexion:  and  owe  tlieir 
very  existence  to  the  deep-rooted  hold  these  philo- 
sophical speculations  have  on  the  primary  elements 
of  the  human  mind. 

We  shall  now  give  a  short  account  of  the  opinions 
*  y 


322  OPINIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS 

of  the  Christian  Fathers  of  the  Church  as  to  their 
conceptions  of  free-wilL  These  quotations  will 
clearly  show  that  there  was  but  one  opinion  amongst 
them  as  to  the  intimate  connexion  which  exists 
between  this  doctrine,  and  man's  moral  and  reli- 
gious obligations  to  obey  the  divine  commands. 

Ignatius. — "  I  do  not  s^  ^Iv  of  two  natures  of 
men,  but  that  the  one  man  is  sometimes  of  God. 
sometimes  of  the  devil.  If  any  one  be  pious,  he  is 
a  man  of  God  ;  but  if  any  one  be  impious,  he  is  a 
man  of  the  devil,  being  made  so,  not  by  nature, 
but  by  his  own  will." 

Justin  Maiityr. — "  God  foreknows  some  who 
would  be  saved  by  repentance,  and  some,  perhaps, 
who  are  not  yet  born.  But  lest  any  one  should  ima- 
gine that  I  am  asserting  that  things  happen  accord- 
ing to  the  necessity  of  fate,  because  I  have  said  that 
things  are  foreknown,  I  proceed  to  refute  that 
opinion  also.  That  punishments  and  chastisements 
and  good  rewards  are  given  according  to  the  worth 
of  the  actions  of  every  one,  having  learned  it  from 
the  prophets,  w^e  declare  it  to  be  true ;  since  if  it 
were  not  so,  but  all  things  happen  according  to 
fate,  nothing  would  be  in  our  own  power  ;  for  if  it 
were  decreed  bv  fate  that  one  should  be  cood  and 
another  bad,  no  praise  would  be  due  to  the  former, 
or  blame  to  the  latter.  And  again,  if  mankind  had 
not  the  power,  by  free-will,  to  avoid  what  is  dis- 
graceful, and  to  choose  what  is  good,  they  would 
not  be  responsible  for  their  actions.   But  that  man 


ON    HUMAN    ACTION.  323 

does  what  is  right,  and  what  is  wrong,  by  his  own 
free  choice,  we  thus  prove  :  we  see  the  same  person 
passing  from  one  thing  to  that  which  is  contrary 
to  it ;  hut  if  it  were  fated  that  we  shoukl  he  either 
had  or  good,  he  would  not  he  capable  of  doing  con- 
trary things,  or  so  often  change ;  but  neither  would 
some  be  good  and  others  bad,  since  we  should  so 
declare  fate  to  be  the  cause  of  bad  things,  and  to 
act  contrary  to  itself.     Or  that  which  was  before 
mentioned  would  appear  to  be  true,  that  neither 
virtue  nor  vice  is  in  reality  anything,  but  is  only 
imagined  to  be  good  or  bad ;  which  in  truth  is  the 
highest  impiety  and  injustice.     But  we  say  that 
there  is  this  immutable  fate,  namely,  to  those  who 
choose  what  is  good,  a  worthy  reward;  to  those 
who  choose  the  contrary,  a  worthy  punishment. 
For  God  has  not  created  man  like  other  things,  as 
trees  and  four-footed  beasts,  incapable  of  acting  by 
choice ;  for  then  he  could  not  desu'e  reward  or  praise, 
not  ha\dng  chosen   good  of  himself,  but  being  made 
so ;  nor  if  he  were  bad,  would  he  deserve  punish- 
ment, not  being  such  of  himself,  but  miable  to  be 
anything  except  that  which  he  was  made." 

Tatian. — "  The  Word,  before  the  formation  of 
men,  created  angels.  But  each  species  of  these 
created  beings  was  endowed  with  power  over 
themselves,  not  ha\ang  natural  goodness  excejDt 
only  from  God,  being  perfected  by  men  through 
the  freedom  of  choice ;  that  he  who  is  wicked  may 
be  justly  punished,  being  made  wicked  by  himself; 

y2 


324  OPINIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS 

and  that  he  who  is  just  may  deservedly  be  iDraised 
on  account  of  his  good  actions,  not  having,  through 
his  power  over  himself,  transgressed  the  will  of 
God.  Such  is  the  nature  of  angels  and  men.  But 
the  power  of  the  Word  having  in  itself  the  fore- 
knowledge of  what  would  happen,  not  according  to 
fate,  hut  by  the  determination  of  free  agents,  fore- 
told future  events,  and  guarded  against  wickedness 
hy  prohibitions,  and  commended  those  who  should 
persevere  in  goodness. 

"  Free-will  destroyed  us.  Being  free  we  became 
slaves  ;  we  were  sold  because  of  sin.  No  evil  pro- 
ceeds from  God.  We  have  produced  wickedness, 
but  those  who  have  produced  it  have  it  in  their  power 
again  to  renounce  it." 

luEN^TJS. — "  John  the  Baptist,  speaking  of  Christ, 
says,  '  He  shall  baptize  you  with  the  Holy  Ghost, 
and  with  fire  :  whose  fan  is  in  his  hand,  and  he  will 
thoroughly  purge  his  floor,  and  gather  his  wheat 
into  the  garner ;  but  he  will  burn  up  the  chaff  with 
unquenchable  fire.'  He  therefore  w^ho  made  the 
w^heat,  and  who  made  the  chaff,  are  not  different 
persons,  but  one  and  the  same  person,  judging, 
that  is,  separating  them.  But  the  corn  and  chaff 
being  inanimate  and  irrational,  are  made  such  by 
nature.  But  man,  being  endowed  with  reason,  and 
in  this  respect  like  to  God,  being  made  free  in  his 
will,  and  having  power  over  himself,  is  himself  the 
cause  that  sometimes  he  becomes  wheat  and  some- 
times chaff.     Wherefore  he  will  also  be  justly  con- 


ON    HUMAN    ACTION.  325 

demned ;  because  being  made  rational,  he  lost  true 
reason,  and  living  irrationally,  he  opposed  the  justice 
of  God, -delivering  himsell*  up  to  every  earthly  spi- 
rit, and  serving  all  lusts." 

Clement  of  Alexandria. — "Neither  praise,  nor 
dispraise,  nor  honours,  nor  punishments,  would  be 
just,  if  the  soul  had  not  the  power  of  desiring  and 
rejecting,  and  if  vice  were  involuntary. 

"  As,  therefore,  he  is  to  be  commended  who  uses 
his  power  in  leading  a  virtuous  life,  so  much  more 
is  he  to  be  venerated  and  adored  who  has  given  us 
this  free  and  sovereign  power,  and  has  permitted  us 
to  live,  not  ha^dng  allowed  what  we  choose  or  what 
we  avoid  to  be  subject  to  a  slavish  necessity. 

"  That  thing  is  in  our  own  power,  of  which  we 
are  equally  masters,  as  of  its  opposite ;  as,  to  phi- 
losophize or  not ;  to  believe  or  not. 

"  '  Por  therein  is  the  righteousness  of  God  re- 
vealed from  faith  to  faith.'  The  Apostle  therefore 
seems  to  announce  two  faiths,  or  rather  one  which 
admits  of  increase  and  perfection ;  for  a  common 
faith  is  laid  as  a  foundation. 

"  Since  some  are  without  faith  and  others  con- 
tentious, all  do  not  obtain  the  perfection  of  good. 
Nor  is  it  possible  to  obtain  it  without  our  own 
exertion.  The  whole,  however,  does  not  depend 
upon  our  own  will,  for  instance  our  future  destiny ; 
*  for  we  are  saved  by  grace,'  not  indeed  without 
good  works.  But  those  who  are  naturally  disposed 
to  good,  must  apply  some  attention  to  it. 

"  Faith,  although  it  be  a  voluntary  consent  of 


326  OPINIONS    OF   THE    FATHERS 

the  soul,  is,  however,  the  worker  of  good  things, 
and  the  foundation  of  a  right  conduct. 

"  His  will  is,  that  we  should  be  saved  by  our- 
selves. This  then  is  the  nature  of  the  soul,  to  move 
by  itself.  Then  we  who  are  rational,  philosophy 
itself  being  rational,  have  some  relation  to  it.  Wit- 
ness, indeed,  is  a  tendency  to  virtue,  but  it  is  not 
virtue.  All  men  then,  as  I  said,  are  qualified  by 
nature  for  the  acquisition  of  virtue.  But  one  man 
makes  a  greater  progress,  another  less,  both  in 
knowledge  and  practice.  Therefore  some  men  have 
attained  even  to  perfect  virtue,  but  others  have 
gone  only  a  certain  length ;  and  again  others,  being 
neglected,  though  they  had  otherwise  a  good  na- 
tural disposition,  have  turned  in  an  opposite  di- 
rection. 

*'  Wlierefore,  when  we  hear  '  Thy  faith  hath 
made  thee  whole,'  we  do  not  understand  him  to  say 
that  men  will  be  saved,  however  they  have  believed, 
unless  good  works  also  shall  follow." 

Tertullian. — "  Every  one  has  a  right  belonging 
to  man,  and  a  natural  power,  to  worship  that  which 
he  shall  think  right ;  nor  is  any  one  injured  or  be- 
nefited by  the  religion  of  another.  Nor  is  it  any 
part  of  religion  to  force  religion,  which  ought  to  be 
taken  up  spontaneously,  not  by  force. 

"  I  find  that  man  was  formed  by  God  with  free- 
will, and  with  power  over  himself,  observing  in  him 
no  image  or  likeness  to  God  more  than  in  this 
respect ;  for  he  was  not  formed  after  God,  who  is 
uniform,  in  face  and  bodilv  lines,  which  are  so  va- 


ON    HUMAN    ACTION.  327 

rioiis  in  mankind  ;  but  in  that  substance  which  he 
derived  from  God  himself,  that  is,  the  soul,  answer- 
ing to  the  form  of  God ;  and  he  was  stamped  Avitli 
freedom  and  power  of  his  will.  The  law  also  itself, 
which  was  then  imposed  by  God,  confirmed  this 
condition  of  man.  Por  a  law  would  not  have  been 
imposed  on  a  person  who  had  not  in  his  power  the 
obedience  due  to  the  law ;  nor  again  Avould  trans- 
gression have  been  threatened  mth  death,  if  the 
contempt  also  of  the  law  were  not  placed  to  the 
account  of  man's  free-will.  The  same  tinner  also 
you  may  find  in  the  subsequent  laws  of  the  Crea- 
tor, when  he  sets  before  men  good  and  evil,  life  and 
death,  and  likewise  the  whole  order  of  discipline, 
arranged  by  precepts  ;  God  dissuading,  and  threat- 
ening, and  exhorting,  and  man  being  free  and  at 
liberty  to  obey  or  to  despise.  Por  it  was  necessary 
that  the  image  and  likeness  of  God  should  be  form- 
ed with  a  free  will  in  his  own  power,  in  which  this 
very  thing,  namely,  freedom  of  will  and  power, 
misrht  be  considered  as  the  imac^e  and  likeness  of 
God.  He  who  shoidd  be  found  to  be  good  or  bad 
by  necessity,  and  not  voluntarily,  could  not  mtli 
justice  receive  the  retribution  of  either  good  or  evil. 
"Therefore,  though  we  have  learnt  from  the 
commands  of  God  both  what  he  wills  and  what  he 
forbids,  yet  we  have  a  will  and  power  to  choose 
either,  as  it  is  written,  '  Behold  I  have  set  before 
you  good  and  evil ;  for  you  have  tasted  of  the  tree 
of  knowledge.'  Therefore  that  which  is  sul)ject  to 
our  own  T\ill,  we  ought  not  to  refer  to  the  will  of 
God ;  he  who  wills  no  evil,  wills  that  we  should 


328  OPINIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS 

have  a  will.    Thus  it  is  our  own  will,  when  we  will 
evil,  contrary  to  the  will  of  God,  who  wills  that 
which  is  good.     Moreover,  if  you  ask  whence  that 
will  conies  hy  which  we  will  anything  contrary  to 
the  will  of  God,  I  ^vill  tell  you  ;  it  conies  from  our- 
selves.    And  not  without  reason;    for  you  must 
resemble  the  origin  from  which  you  sprang,  since 
Adam,   the  author  both  of  our  race  and  of  sin, 
willed  that  in  which  he  sinned.     Eor  the  devil  did 
not  communicate  to  him  the  will  to  sin,  but  sup- 
plied matter  for  the  will.     But  the  will  of  God  di- 
rected him  to  obedience.     Wherefore  if  you  do  not 
obey  God,  who  having  given  you  a  command,  has 
formed  you  ^ith  a  free  power,  you  will  voluntarily 
fall,  by  the  freedom  of  your  Avill,  into  that  which 
God  does  not  will.     And  thus  you  think  that  you 
are  destroyed  by  the  devil,  who  although  he  wills 
you  to  will  that  which  God  does  not  will,  yet  he 
does  not  cause  you  to  will :  because  neither  did  he 
compel  our  first  parents  to  the  will  of  sin ;  nor 
were  they  unwilling,  nor  ignorant  of  what  God 
forbade ;  for  he  forbade  it  to  be  done  when  he  made 
death  the  consequence  of  doing  it.     Therefore  the 
only  work  of  the  devil  is,  to  tempt  that  which  is  in 
you,  whether  you  ^vill.    But  when  you  have  willed, 
it  follows  that  he  turns  it  to  his  own  purpose  (sibi 
subjungit,)  not  having  caused  the  will  in  you,  but 
having  taken  an  opportunity  to  work  upon  your 
will.     Therefore,  since  the  will  is  in  ourselves  only, 
and  by  it  our  disposition  towards  God  is  proved,  I 
say  that  we  must  deeply  and  earnestly  consider  the 
will  of  God."  '       - 


ON    HUMAN    ACTION.  329 


Origen. — "Moreover,  because  the  soul,  having 
substance  and  life  in  itseK,  when  it  departs  out  of  this 
world,  will  be  disposedof  accordingtoitsmerits,  either 
enjoying  the  inheritance  of  eternal  life  and  bliss,  if 
its  conduct  shall  have  procured  this  for  it,  or  suffer- 
ing eternal  fire  and  punishment,  if  the  guilt  of  its 
sins  shall  have  thrust  it  into  that  condition ;  and 
because  there  w^ill  be  a  time  of  the  resurrection  of 
the  dead,  when  this  body,  '  which  is  sot\ti  in  cor- 
ruption, will  be  raised  in  incorruption ;  and  that 
which  is  sown  in  dishonour  ^^dll  be  raised  in  glory  ;' 
this  also  is  settled  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Church, 
that  every  rational  soul  has  free-will,  and  that  it 
has  to  contend  against  the  devil  and  his  angels,  and 
the  powers  which  oppose  it,  because  they  strive  to 
burden  it  with  sins  :  but  we,  if  we  live  rightly  and 
prudently,  endeavour  to  rescue  ourselves  from  this 
kind  of  burden.     "Whence,  consequently,  we  may 
understand  that  we  are  not  subject  to  necessity,  so 
as  to  be  compelled  by  aU  means  to  do  either  bad  or 
good  things,  although  it  be  against  our  will.     Eor 
if  we  be  masters  of  our  wiU,  some  powers,  perhaps, 
may  urge  us  to  sin,  and  others  assist  us  to  safety ; 
yet  we  are  not  compelled  by  necessity  to  act  either 
rightly  or  wTongly. 

"  I  assert  that  man  is  endoAved  with  free-will, 
declaring  that  this  is  the  greatest  gift  conferred 
upon  him  by  God,  because  all  other  tilings  are  by 
necessity  obedient  to  the  command  of  God.  Eor  if 
you  speak  of  the  heaven,  it  stands  bearing  the  Lord, 


330  OPINIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS 

not  moved  from  its  appointed  place.  And  if  you 
choose  to  speak  of  the  sun,  it  performs  its  appoint- 
ed motion,  not  refusing  its  course,  but  by  necessity 
serving  the  Lord.  And  in  like  manner  you  see  the 
earth  fixed,  and  hearing  the  command  of  him  who 
ordered.  In  like  manner  other  things  by  necessity 
serve  the  Creator,  not  any  one  of  them  being  able 
to  do  any  other  thing  than  that  for  which  it  was 
made.  Wherefore  we  do  not  praise  these  things 
which  are  thus  obedient  to  the  Lord ;  nor  is  any 
hope  of  better  things  laid  up  for  them,  because  they 
have  voluntarily  observed  what  they  are  command- 
ed. But  it  is  the  will  of  God  that  man  should  obey 
the  understanding,  and  he  has  received  ]iower  to 
subject  himself,  not  being  governed  by  the  necessity 
of  nature,  or  destitute  of  power ;  which  I  say  is 
being  endowed  with  free-will,  for  the  sake  of  better 
things,  that  he  may  receive  better  things  from  Him 
Avho  is  more  excellent  (which  is  the  consequence  of 
obedience),  and  moreover,  as  it  were,  a  debt  from 
the  Creator.  Eor  I  do  not  say  that  man  was  thus 
made  to  his  injury,  but  for  the  sake  of  better  things. 
For  if  he  had  been  made  like  one  of  the  elements, 
or  any  thing  of  that  kind,  there  would  have  been  a 
necessity  that  he  should  serve  God;  he  would  no 
longer  receive  a  suitable  reward  of  his  choice,  but 
man  would  be  as  an  instrument  of  his  Creator,  and 
he  who  uses  it  would  be  the  cause  of  these  thinsrs. 
But  neither  would  man  have  arrived  at  suj^erior 
knowledge,  knowing  nothing  else  but  that  only  for 
which  he  was  formed.     I  say  therefore  that  God 


ON   HUMAN   ACTION.  331 

has  thus  honoui'ed  man ;  it  being  his  will  that  he 
should  know  better  things,  he  has  given  him  the 
power  to  be  able  to  do  what  he  chooses." 

Cypeian. — "That  a  man  has  free-will  to  believe  or 
not  to  believe,  we  read  in  Deuteronomy,  '  I  have  set 
before  you  life  and  death,  blessing  and  cursing ; 
therefore  choose  life,  that  both  thou  and  thy  seed 
may  live!'  Also  in  Isaiah,  'If  ye  be  willing  and 
obedient,  ye  shall  eat  the  good  of  the  land ;  but  if 
ye  refuse  and  rebel,  ye  shall  be  devoured  with  the 
sword  ;  for  the  mouth  of  the  Lord  hath  spoken  it.' 
Also  in  St.  Luke's  Gospel,  '  The  kingdom  of  God  is 
within  you.'  " 

EusEBius. — "So  that  it  must  be  altogether  ac- 
knowledged that  we  have  liberty,  and  the  free-will 
of  a  rational  and  intelligent  nature. 

*'  The  Creator  of  all  things  has  impressed  a  na- 
tural law  upon  the  soul  of  every  man,  as  an  assist- 
ant and  ally  in  his  conduct,  pointing  out  to  him 
the  right  way  by  this  law ;  but,  by  the  free  liberty 
with  which  he  is  endowed,  making  the  choice  of 
what  is  best  worthy  of  praise  and  acceptance,  and 
of  greater  rewards,  on  account  of  his  good  conduct, 
because  he  has  acted  rightly,  not  by  force,  but  from 
his  own  free-will,  when  he  had  it  in  liis  power  to 
act  otherwise.  As  again,  making  him  who  chooses 
what  is  worst,  deserving  of  blame  and  punishment, 
as  having  by  his  OAvn  motion  neglected  the  natural 
law,  and  becoming  the  origin  and  foundation  of 
wickedness,  and  misusing  himself,  not  from  any 


332  OPINIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS 

extraneous  necessity,  but  from  free-will  and  judg- 
ment. The  fault  is  in  him  who  chooses,  not  in  God. 
Eor  God  has  not  made  nature,  or  the  substance  of 
the  soul,  bad ;  for  he  who  is  good  can  make  nothing 
but  what  is  good.  Every  thing  is  good  which  is 
according  to  nature.  Every  rational  soul  has  na- 
turally a  good  free-will  formed  for  the  choice  of 
what  is  good.  But  when  a  man  acts  wrongly, 
nature  is  not  to  be  l)lamed;  for  what  is  wrong 
takes  place  not  according  to  nature,  but  contrary 
to  nature ;  it  being  the  work  of  choice  and  not  of 
nature.  Eor  when  a  person  who  had  the  power  of 
choosing  what  is  good,  did  not  choose  it,  but  vo- 
luntarily turned  away  from  what  was  worst,  what 
room  for  escape  could  be  left  to  him  who  is  become 
the  cause  of  his  own  internal  disease,  having  neg- 
lected the  innate  law,  as  it  were  his  Saviour  and 
physician  ?' 


)'> 


Athanasius. — "  Eor  the  knowledge  and  accurate 
comprehension  of  the  way  of  truth,  we  have  need 
of  nothing  but  ourselves.  Not,  as  God  is  above  ail 
things,  so  is  the  way  which  leads  to  these  things, 
remote  or  extraneous  to  ourselves  ;  but  it  is  in  our- 
selves, and  it  is  possible  to  find  its  beginning  of 
ourselves." 

Cyril  of  Jerusalem. — "  God  requires  nothing 
else  of  us  but  a  good  will.  Do  you  say.  How 
are  my  sins  blotted  out  ?  I  say  to  you,  by  will- 
ing, by  believing.  What  can  be  more  concise  than 
this  ?      But   if  your   lips    declare  a   willingness, 


ON    HUMAN   ACTION.  333 

and  your  heart  does  not,  he  who  judges  knows  the 
heart.  From  this  day,  therefore,  cease  from  every 
evil  work.  Let  not  your  tongue  utter  irreverent 
words  ;  let  not  your  eyes  sin ;  let  not  your  thoughts 
Avander  about  vain  things." 

Hilary. — "What,  therefore,  we  are,  is  rather 
our  own  gain  than  His  who  formed  us  what  we 
are;  because  God,  not  grudging  his  own  eternal 
goodness,  takes  us  into  the  perception  and  use  of 
liis  own  blessed  goodness.      But  he  who   is  per- 
fect and  good  used  his  goodness  towards  us,  and 
his  blessedness,  not  without  reason  and  method. 
Por  he  permitted  to  every  one  of  us  the  liberty  of 
life  and  sense,  not  fixing  necessity  either  way,  so 
that  the  law  should  compel  every  one  to  be  by 
nature  good  or  bad ;  but  he  who  had  benevolently 
created  us  to  enjoy  his  blessedness,  appointed  us  a 
qualification  for  it,  through  the  merit  of  an  inno- 
cent and  honest  life.    Eor  Avhat  honour  and  reward 
could  the  necessity  of  goodness  deserve,  when  a 
certain  force,  interwoven  in  our  nature,  would  not 
sufi'er  us  to  be  bad  ?     Goodness,  therefore,  is  per- 
mitted to  the  will ;  that  the  will  of  goodness  might 
obtain  to  itself  a  reward ;  and  that  there  might  be 
again  and  enjojTuent  of  this  eternal  blessedness 
from  merit,  and  not  an  indiscriminate  necessity  by 
law.     And   though  he  invited  us  to  the  will  of 
goodness,  that  is,  to  live  well  and  honestly  by  the 
hope  of  deserving  and  experiencing  his  goodness, 
yet  he  added  a  punishment  for  shunning  and  de- 
spising it;  so  that  when  he  had  left  us  a  liberty  of 


334  OPINIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS 

will  to  deserve  goodness,  because  a  necessity  of 
nature  did  not  admit  of  desert,  the  terror  of  punish- 
ment threatened  on  the  other  hand  proved  this 
very  liberty.  And  thus  lil3erty  was  permitted  for 
the  deserving  of  reward,  with  a  due  reward  to 
equity  and  justice ;  and  the  power  of  liberty  is, 
through  the  goodness  of  God,  restrained  by  the 
fear  commmiicated  to  us ;  that  the  hope  of  deserv- 
ing might  admonish  us  to  a  good  will,  and  the 
punishment  of  apj^ointed  revenge  might  dissuade 
us  from  a  bad  will." 

Epiphanius. — "  How  does  he  seem  to  retain  the 
freedom  of  his  will  in  this  world  ?  Eor  to  believe 
or  not  to  believe  is  in  oiu'  own  power.  But  where 
it  is  in  our  power  to  believe  or  not  to  believe,  it 
is  in  our  power  to  act  rightly  or  to  sin ;  to  do  good 
good  or  to  do  e^dl." 

Basil. — "  These  things  are  in  our  own  power, 
as  to  subdue  the  passions,  or  to  indulge  in  plea- 
sures ;  as  to  restrain  anger,  or  to  attack  him 
who  provokes  us ;  to  speak  truth  or  falsehood ;  to 
be  meek  and  gentle,  or  proud  and  overbearing. 
Do  not  then  seek  the  origin  of  those  things,  of 
which  you  are  yourself  the  master,  from  any  other 
quarter ;  but  know  that  that  which  is  in  itself  evil, 
derived  its  origin  from  voluntary  lapses.  For  if  it 
had  been  involuntary,  and  not  m  our  own  power, 
those  who  act  unjustly  would  not  have  had  so  great 
fear  of  the  laws  hanging  over  them." 

"If  the  origin  of  vicious  and  virtuous  actions  be 


ON    HUMAN    ACTION.  335 

not  in  ourselves,  but  there  is  an  innate  necessity, 
there  is  no  need  of  legislators  to  prescribe  what  we 
are  to  do  and  what  we  are  to  avoid ;  there  is  no 
need  of  judges  to  honour  virtue  and  to  punish 
wickedness.  Eor  it  is  not  the  injustice  of  the  thief 
or  of  the  murderer,  who  could  not  restrain  his  hand 
even  if  he  would,  because  of  the  insuperable  neces- 
sity which  urges  him  to  the  action." 

Gregory  Nazianzen. — "  The  good  derived  from 
nature  has  no  claim  to  acceptance ;  but  that 
which  proceeds  from  free-will  is  deserving  of  praise. 
Wliat  merit  has  fire  in  burning  ?  For  the  burn- 
ing comes  from  nature.  What  merit  has  water  in 
descending?  Por  this  it  has  from  the  Creator. 
What  merit  has  snow  in  being  cold  ?  Or  the  sun 
in  shining  ?  Por  it  shines  whether  it  will  or  not. 
Give  me  a  virtuous  will.  Give  me  the  becom- 
ing spiritual,  from  being  carnal ;  the  being  raised 
by  reason,  from  being  depressed  by  the  weight  of 
the  flesh ;  the  being  found  heavenly,  from  having 
been  low-minded;  the  appearing  superior  to  the 
flesh,  after  havmg  been  found  to  the  flesh." 

Gregory  oe  Nyssa.— "  Since  man  was  made 
in  the  likeness  of  God,  and  was  blessed  in  being 
honoured  with  free-will,  (for  to  have  power  over 
himself,  and  to  be  subject  to  no  master,  is  peculiar 
to  the  blessedness  of  God),  to  be  forcibly  impelled 
to  anything  by  necessity,  would  have  deprived 
him  of  his  dignity.  Por  if  voluntarily,  according  to 
the  motion  of  free-will,  they  directed  the  human 


336  OPINIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS 

nature  to  anything  improper,  and  were  driven 
from  it  forcibly  and  by  necessity,  such  a  pro- 
ceeding would  have  taken  away  from  them  the 
pre-eminent  good,  and  would  have  deprived 
them  of  the  honour  of  being  like  to  God.  Por 
the  free  will  is  likeness  to  God.  Therefore, 
that  both  power  might  remain  to  human  na- 
ture, and  that  evil  might  be  done  away,  the  wis- 
dom of  God  devised  this  mode,  to  suffer  man  to 
pursue  those  things  which  he  wished ;  that  having 
tasted  the  evils  which  he  desired,  and  learned  by 
experience  what  exchange  he  had  made,  he  might 
voluntarily  return  by  his  own  desire  to  his  former 
blessedness,  shaking  off  from  his  nature  every- 
thing which  disturbs  the  passions  or  is  inconsistent 
with  reason,  as  a  burden." 

Ambrose. — "We  are  not  constrained  to  obedience 
by  a  servile  necessity,  but  by  free-will,  whether  we 
lean  to  virtue,  or  are  inclined  to  vice. 

"  No  one  is  under  any  ol3ligation  to  commit 
a  fault,  unless  he  inclines  to  it  from  his  own 
will." 

Jerome. — "Do  not  think  that  there  are  only  good 
or  only  bad  things  in  the  world,  since  this  world  con- 
sists of  different  things,  contrary  to  each  other,  hot 
and  cold,  dry  and  moist,hard  and  soft,  dark  and  light, 
bad  and  good.  But  God  has  done  this,  that  wis- 
dom maybe  displayed  in  choosing  good  and  avoiding 
evil,  and  that  free-will  may  be  left  to  man. 

'"  If  ye  be  willing  and  obedient,  ye  shall  eat  the 
good  of  the  land ;  but  if  ye  refuse  and  rebel,  ye 


ON    HUMAN    ACTION.  337 

shall  be  devoured  with  the  sword ;  for  the  mouth 
of  the  Lord  hath  spoken  it.'  He  preserves  free- 
will, that  either  way  there  may  he  punishment  or 
reward,  not  from  an  antecedent  decree  of  God,  hut 
according  to  the  merit  of  every  individual. 

"  He  gave  them  free-will ;  he  gave  them  the 
liberty  of  their  own  mind,  and  that  every  one  might 
Kve,  not  under  the  absolute  command  of  God,  but 
under  his  own  direction  ;  that  is,  not  by  necessity 
but  by  mil,  that  there  might  be  room  for  virtue, 
that  we  might  be  distinguished  from  other  animals, 
while,  after  the  example  of  God,  it  was  permitted 
us  to  do  what  we  will.  Whence  both  the  judgment 
against  sinners  is  equitable,  and  a  just  reward  is 
given  to  the  holy  or  just." 

Augustine. — "Pree-will  is  given  to  the  soul, 
which  they  who  endeavour  to  weaken  by  trifling 
reasoning,  are  blind  "to  such  a  degree,  that  they  do 
not  even  understand  that  they  saw  those  vain  and 
sacrilegious  things  with  their  own  vnR. 

"  Every  one  is  author  of  his  own  sin.  Whence, 
if  you  doubt,  attend  to  what  is  said  above,  that  sins 
are  avenged  by  the  justice  of  God ;  for  they  would 
not  be  justly  avenged,  unless  they  were  committed 
with  the  will. 

"  Lastly,  if  we  do  not  act  wrongly  with  the  will, 
no  one  is  to  be  reproved  at  all,  or  admonished ; 
and  if  you  take  away  these  things,  the  Christian 
law  and  the  whole  discipline  of  religion  must 
necessarily  be  destroyed.  Therefore  sin  is  com- 
mitted by  the  will.  And  because  there  is  no  doubt 
*  z 


338  OPINIONS    OF    THE    FATHERS 

but  sin  is  committed,  I  perceive  that  not  even  this 
is  to  be  doubted,  that  souls  have  free-will.  Eor 
God  judged  that  his  servants  would  be  better  if 
they  served  him  freely  ;  which  would  be  impossible 
if  they  served  Mm  not  with  the  will,  but  from 
necessity." 

Chrtsostom. — "  God,  from  the  first  formation 
of  man,  implanted  in  him  the  law  of  nature.  And 
what  is  the  law  of  nature  ?  He  framed  it  for  his 
conscience,  and  enabled  us  to  know  from  ourselves 
the  difference  between  good  and  evil. 

"  Since  he  has  made  us  masters  of  the  choice  of 
bad  and  good  actions,  and  wishes  us  to  be  volun- 
tarily good ;  therefore  if  we  be  not  willing,  he  does 
not  force,  he  does  not  compel ;  for  to  be  good  by 
force  is  not  to  be  good  at  all. 

"When  you  hear  these  tilings,  do  not  imagine 
that  the  calling  carries  with  it  necessity,  for  God 
does  not  compel,  but  leaves  men  masters  of  their 
free-will,  even  after  they  are  called." 

Theodoret. — "  God  created  the  whole  nature  of 
incorporeal  things,  making  it  rational  and  immortal. 
Free-will  is  peculiar  to  what  is  rational.  But  of  these 
some  have  preserved  a  good  disposition  towards 
the  Creator,  but  others  have  fallen  into  wickedness. 
This  we  may  also  find  among  men.  Eor  some 
indeed  are  lovers  of  virtue,  but  others  are  workers 
of  wickedness.  If,  therefore,  any  one  complains  of 
the  creation  of  mcked  persons,  he  deprives  the 
champions  of  virtue  of  the  prizes  of  victory.     Por 


ON    HUMAN    ACTION.  339 

if  they  had  not  the  desire  of  virtue  in  the  choice  of 
the  will,  hut  were  unalterably  fixed  by  nature, 
those  who  successfully  struggle  for  piety  would  be 
unknown.  But  since  the  will  has  the  choice  of 
what  is  good,  and  of  the  contrary,  some  justly  ob- 
tain the  crown  of  victory,  and  others  suffer  punish- 
ment for  their  voluntary  offences."* 


*  See  the  Author's  work  on  "Free  Will,"  second  edit.,  1848,  pubhshed 
by  Saunders,  Charing  Cross ;  and  also  the  writings  of  Drs.  Copple- 
stone,  Hampden,  and  Whately,  who  have  treated  the  bearing  of  the  doc- 
trine of  Necessity  on  Theological  doctrines,  at  considerable  length. — 
See  also  Note  G.  at  the  end  of  the  Volume. 


z  2 


310  AJIABIAN    METAPHYSICS. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

ON  THE  METAPHYSICAL  NOTIONS  OF  THE 
ARABIANS. 


We  shaU  now  take  a  retrospective  view  of  the 
state  of  metaphysical  knowledge  amongst  the  Ara- 
bians, soon  after  the  introduction  of  Christianity. 
This  does  not  promise  to  be  a  very  fruitful  field  of 
inquiry ;  but  still  the  subject  is  well  worthy  of  a 
particular  notice.  We  shall  also  allude  to  the 
notions  of  the  Jews  on  mental  subjects ;  at  least 
that  portion  of  this  ancient  and  interesting  people, 
who  resided  in  the  East,  and  mingled  with  the 
Arabs  and  other  kindred  oriental  tribes. 

The  Arabs,  in  point  of  philosophy,  must  always 
appear  a  curiously  constituted  people.  In  the  early 
parts  of  their  history,  they  were  the  bold,  courage- 
ous, and  fierce  conquerors  of  the  East ;  and  it  was 
a  considerable  time  after  these  successful  invasions 
had  been  made,  that  the  attention  of  the  people 
was  directed  towards  the  cultivation  of  letters  and 
philosophy.  Wandering  in  arid  deserts,  and  lead- 
ing a  pastoral  life,  their  minds  sQcm  to  have  been 


ARABIAN    METAPHYSICS.  341 

insensibly  trained  to  severe  habits  of  inward  con- 
templation ;    and  the  charms  of  poetry,  and  the 
mental  mechanism  of  numbers,   appear   to   have 
formed  the  primitive  elements  of  their  early  learn- 
ing.    This  habit  of  inward  reflexion,  however,  pro- 
duced other  fruits  in  the  due  course  of  time.     It 
led  the  Arabs  to  dwell  upon  the  nature  and  powers 
of  their  own  understandings ;  to  scan  all  the  pecu- 
liarities of  thek  actions ;  to  watch  all  their  subtile 
movements ;  and  to  pourtray  the  divers  important 
ends  and  purposes  which  the  inward  macliines  were 
so  admirably  fitted  to  accomplish.    The  intellectual 
history  of  this  people  is  still  buried  in  comparative 
obscurity ;  although  there  are,  in  many  of  the  public 
libraries  throughout  Europe,  an  immense  number 
of  Arabian  manuscripts,  which,  if  brought  to  the 
light  of  day,   would  undoubtedly  tend  materially 
to  dissipate  the  thick  clouds  which  at  present  en- 
velop the  philosophical  opinions  and  acquirements 
of  this  singular  race  of  mankind. 

All  the  modes  of  life  and  intellectual  habits  of 
the  Arabs  peculiarly  fitted  them  for  entering  into 
the  subtile  questions  connected  with  metaphysical 
disquisitions.  This  is  strikingly  conspicuous  in 
all  their  writings.  They  invariably  manifested  a 
decided  preference  for  abstract  forms  of  disputa- 
tion, and  rigid  rules  of  investigation.  Aristotle, 
on  this  account,  proved  their  great  master,  their 
guide,  the  object  of  their  most  devoted  veneration 
and  attachment.  His  dry  and  formal  rules  accorded 
admirably  with  the  genius  of  their  minds.  Plato, 
and  his  commentators  and  disciples,  were  never, 


342  ARABIAN    METAPHYSICS. 

consequently,  relished,  if  we  except  Plotiniis  and 
Proclus.  The  Platonic  system  abounded  too  much 
with  imaginative  and  lively  theories  and  senti- 
ments, and  breathed  moreover  too  ardently  the 
spirit  of  liberty  and  freedom,  to  suit  the  taste  of 
the  slavish  worshippers  of  the  Koran. 

It  is  remarked  by  a  Prench  writer  of  great  learn- 
ing and  genius,  "  That  there  is,  between  the  philo- 
sophical productions  of  the  Greeks  and  Arabs,  the 
same  difference,  or  rather  the  same  contrast,  wliich 
exists  between  the  literary  works,  the  manners, 
genius,  and  civil  institutions  of  the  two  peoples. 
The  philosophy  of  the  Greeks  had  in  it  something 
brilliant,  fascinating,  and  lively,  like  the  beautiful 
views  in  Attica  and  Asia  Minor ;  that  of  the  Arabs 
had  something  grave,  monotonous,  and  arid,  like 
the  deserts  they  inhabit.  Pull  of  charms,  even  in 
its  errors,  the  former  excited  an  enthusiasm  simi- 
lar to  that  which  inspired  it ;  the  latter,  dull  and 
malancholy,  even  whilst  they  seized  hold  of  truth, 
breathed  the  habit  of  resignation,  and  the  influence 
of  fanaticism.  The  Greeks  displayed  an  easy  eleva- 
tion and  spontaneity  of  thought,  though  a  certain 
restlessness  of  spirit;  while  the  Arabs  displayed 
mdomitable  patience,  and  bore  upon  them  the  im- 
print of  rigorous  formalities.  The  Athenians  prided 
themselves  on  harmonious  co-ordinations ;  the  in- 
habitants of  the  desert  on  complicated  combina- 
tions. The  genius  of  poetry  seemed  to  preside  in 
the  meditations  of  the  Greeks  ;  the  laws  of  calcula- 
tion in  those  of  the  Arabs.  The  Greeks  imagined, 
invented,  created  matter;  the  Arabs  laboured  at 


ARABIAN    METAPHYSICS.  343 

what  was  placed  in  their  hands,  and  imprinted 
form  upon  it.  Intellectual  light  seemed  to  spring 
up  among  the  Greeks  as  by  enchantment ;  among 
the  descendants  of  Ishmael,  it  was  the  fruit  of 
painful  conquest. 

We  shall  mention  here  the  three  famous  Arabian 
Caliphs  who  exercised   such  a  marked   influence 
over  the  intellectual  progress  of  their  countrymen ; 
namely,  Almanzor,  Alraschid,  and  Almamon.   His- 
torians described  the  first,  Almanzor,  as  having 
been  a  very    enlightened   and   intelligent  prince. 
He  was  passionately  fond  of  learning  and  philoso- 
phy.    He  studied  politics  in  conjunction  with  in- 
tellectual learning  and  astronomy ;  and  he  trans- 
lated into  the  Syriac  and  Arabic  languages  several 
treatises  of  Grecian  literature.  Alraschid  was  equally 
distinguished  for  his  wisdom  and  love  of  knowledge; 
and  in  addition  to  his  taste  for  the  abstract  doc- 
trines of  philosophy,  he  had  a  thorough  knowledge  of 
poetry  and  the  belles  lettres.     Almamon,  who  flou- 
rished in  the  9th  century,  was  still  more  reno\^^led 
then  either  of  his  two  predecessors.     He  endea- 
voured to  obtain  knowledge  from  all  parts  of  the 
then  known   world.     He  invited  learned  men  to 
his  Court,  without  any  reference  to  their  religious 
opinions.      He   penetrated   into   all   the   abstruse 
doctrines  of  the  Chaldeans,  the  Persians,  and  the 
Greeks.     Public  schools  of  philosophy  were  esta- 
blished, and  those  of  Bagdad  and  Bassora  obtained 
especial   distinction.     The   doctrines   of  Aristotle 
were  taught  and  expounded  within  the  walls  of 
Tunis,  Tripoli,  and  other  African  cities. 


34<1  ARABIAN    METAPHYSICS. 


Alkendi. 

Alkendi,  who  attended  the  Court  of  Almamon, 
was  a  distinguished  philosopher.  He  inspired  the 
Arabs  with  an  enthusiastic  veneration  for  the  doc- 
trines of  Aristotle,  and  furnished  them  with  trans- 
lations and  commentaries  upon  several  of  his  works. 
Alkendi  published  a  "  Treatise  on  the  Study  ofFhi- 
losopliy  i"  containing  questions  on  logic  and  meta- 
physics. He  also  cultivated  mathematics  and  phy- 
sics with  singular  success.  There  is  besides  a  book 
ascribed  to  his  pen,  ^'■ZTpon  the  Compositions  of 
Medicines.'" 

Alfarabi. 

AKarabi  obtained  well  merited  fame  at  the 
school  of  Bagdad.  His  mind  embraced  a  wide  range 
of  study.  He  was  a  mathematician,  an  astronomer, 
a  physician,  and  a  philosopher ;  and  devoted  his 
whole  life  to  study  and  learning.  "  He  penetrates" 
says  Albufarage,  "  into  the  most  profound  points 
of  logic  ;  but  in  his  endeavours  to  revive  them,  he 
renders  them  difficult  of  comprehension.  He  sug- 
gested ingenious  but  subtile  speculations ;  and 
completed  the  investigations  of  Alkendi  upon  the 
arts  of  analysis  and  method."  Alfarabi  added  very 
useful  commentaries  to  Aristotle's  art  of  thinking, 
and  made  the  Arabs  acquainted  with  his  rhetoric. 

We  must  also  notice  here  two  tracts  of  Alfarabi, 
the  first  "  JJpofi  the  Sciences'^  and  the  second  "  TJp)0}i 


ALrARABI.  345 

the  Understanding.'"  The  first  is  a  sort  of  dictionary 
or  methodical  classification  of  various  branches  of 
knowledge;  embracing  the  leading  and  fundamental 
principles  of  these  sciences,  and  their  relative  con- 
nexion mth  one  another.  At  the  head  of  all  these 
departments  of  knowledge,  he  places  divine  wisdom, 
which  he  divides  mto  three  parts,  the  last  of  which 
embraces  immaterial  objects.  "This  science,"  says 
ho,  "  demonstrates  that  these  objects,  in  their  aggre- 
gate number,  are  gradually  elevated  to  the  height 
of  perfection.  The  ascending  scale  terminates  at 
the  first  principle  anterior  to  all  things ;  this  is 
that  primordial  unity,  which  confers  existence  and 
design  upon  every  thing  we  see.  Truth  flows  from 
it  as  its  source." 

In  Alfarabi'swork,  ''On  the  Understanding,"  we 
find,  in  substance,  the  following  propositions  and 
principles  laid  down.  These  form  the  latent  germs 
of  several  subsequent  abstract  systems  of  mental 
philosophy,  which  enjoyed  considerable  notoriety 
in  the  East,  This  philosopher  took  Aristotle  for 
his  guide.  The  former  maintains  that  the  human 
understanding  is  that  faculty  of  the  soul  by  -which 
men  acquire  the  certainty  of  universal  and  neces- 
sary truths  and  propositions.  These  are  not,  as 
commonly  imagined,  obtained  by  labour  or  atten- 
tive meditation,  but  arise  out  of  the  native  resources 
of  his  own  mind,  without  his  knowing  from  whence 
they  came,  or  from  what  derived.  The  understand- 
ing is,  however,  itself  composed  of  three  distinct 
powers  or  faculties ;  namely,  the  understanding  of 
power,  the  understanding  in  action,  and  the  active 


346  ARABIAN    METAPHYSICS. 

understanding.  It  is  by  this  macliinery  tliat  all  its 
important  functions  are  performed.  The  under- 
standing  of  poioer  separates  the/brms  of  substances 
from  those  tilings  in  which  they  reside,  and  trans- 
fers them  to  itself.  These  forms  are  distinguished 
from  corporeal  forms  in  this,  that  the  former  is 
imprinted  only  upon  the  surface,  but  the  latter 
penetrates  into  the  very  depth  of  things.  "When 
the  understanding  has  received  these/orms,  it  then 
becomes  the  understanding  in  action^  and  the  forms 
are  'perceived  in  reality^  and  become  the  forms  of 
the  understanding  itself.  In  this  new  state  these 
forms  are  not  what  they  were  when  they  resided  in 
theu'  substances.  There  they  were  bound  to  cer- 
tain conditions  which  are  now  removed.  Here 
they  are  considered  under  new  relations,  and  re- 
ceived into  the  understanding  in  action  ;  they  enter 
into  the  universality  of  existing  things,  which  be- 
come the  exclusive  province  of  intelligence.  "When 
then  the  soul  embraces  all  intelligent  tilings,  by  a 
glance  of  the  unde^'standhig  in  action  it  perceives 
itself,  it  perceives  its  own  act,  and  recognises  its  own 
proper  essence.  It  has  here  acquired  noilim^  fi^om 
loithout,  but  only  from  an  inward  act  of  reflexion. 

The  province  of  the  active  understa/nding  is,  to 
recognise  that  which  is  most  perfect  in  itself.  It 
grasps,  in  an  abstract  manner,  the  forms  which 
belong  to  substances ;  not  such,  however,  as  resid- 
ed in  them  previously  to  their  being  detached  from 
these  substances,  but,  penetrating  into  the  nature 
of  all  sul)stances,  the  active  understanding  im- 
prints these  forms  on  itself,  such  as  they  really  are 


AVICENNA.  317 

in  their  abstract  natures.  These  forms  are  indivi- 
sible. The  active  understanding^  so  to  speak,  sub- 
stantializes itself  in  man  ;  its  essence,  action,  reality, 
are  identical.  There  is  here  no  need  of  the  common 
substances  of  bodies ;  no  need  of  assistance  from 
any  corporeal  organs ;  no  need  of  either  senses  or 
imagination ;  for  its  own  action  embraces  all  bo- 
dies, and  the  powers  which  manifest  themselves  in 
them  are  simply  the  materials  upon  which  the  ac- 
tive understanding  exercises  itself.* 

AviCENNA. 

Avicenna  was  another  most  distinguished  Ara- 
bian metaphysician.  A  great  part  of  his  life 
was  spent  in  public  turmoils  and  engagements ; 
but  still  he  was  enabled  to  devote  a  considerable 
portion  of  his  time  to  the  cultivation  of  learning 
and  science.  He  also  studied  medicine ;  and  gained 
such  celebrity  in  this  important  branch  of  know- 
ledge, as  induced  some  liistorians  to  call  him  the 
Eippocrates  of  the  Arabs. 

Avicenna  was  a  zealous  disciple  of  Aristotle,  and 
lost  no  opportunity  of  inculcating  and  expounding 
his  doctrines.  Professor  Tiedemann  makes  the  fol- 
lowing remarks  upon  him.  "  We  find  in  the  views 
of  Avicenna  a  remarkable  clearness  and  precision ; 
in  all  his  reasonings  a  profound  acuteness ;  and  in 
all  his  thoughts  a  natural  and  pleasing  connection." 

In  Avicenna' s  Treatise  on  Logic,  we  find  he 
adopts  the  principles  of  Aristotle,  but  does  not  fol- 

*  Alfarabi,  De  Scicntia.  Paris,  16:38.  pp.  35.  62. 


348  ARABIAN   METAPHYSICS. 

low  him  slavishly  in  every  abstract  doctrine.  The 
Arabian  philosopher  maintains  that  "All  know- 
ledge consists  in  representation  and  conviction.  We 
may  represent  things  to  ourselves  very  well,  with- 
out, however,  persuading  ourselves  of  their  truth. 
E-epresentation  is  acquired  by  definition,  or  some 
similar  thing ;  but  conviction  is  derived  from  rea- 
soning." 

Avicenna  qualified  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle  re- 
specting his  division  of  the  negative,  sensible,  and 
rational  soul.      The  former    remarks   that   those 
distinctions  indicate  rather  three  modes  of  action, 
than  three  distinct  things.     "  The  vegetable  soul 
has  three  faculties ;  nutrition,  augmentation,  and 
generation ;  the  sensitive  has  two  faculties,  those  of 
apprehension  and  motives;    the  latter  excites  or 
produces  motion,  and  creates  appetites.     The  fa- 
culty of  apprehension  is  a  compound  one.    It  exer- 
cises  itself  both  externally  and  internally.     We 
commonly  attach  to  it  five  external  senses,  and  five 
internal  ones.     The  bodily  or  external  senses  em- 
brace hearing,  seeing,  touching,  tasting,  and  smell- 
ing ;  the  five  internal  ones  are,  first,  \dsion  ox  fan- 
tasy, the  second,  imagination,  the  third,  cogitative, 
the  fourth,  estimatwe,  and  the  fifth,  memory.     The 
rational  soul  is  divided  into  two  grand  parts ;  the 
one  embraces  the  faculty  of  knowledge,  and  the 
other  of  activity.     These  two  rule  and  guide  the 
whole  inward  man. 

Avicenna  points  out,  in  few  words,  the  process 
by  which  children  learn  to  distinguish  one  object 
from  another.  "  The  first  image,"  says  he,  "  which 
is  traced  in  the  mind  of  an  infant,  is  the  particular 


ALGAZELI.  349 

form  of  a  man  or  a  woman.  But  it  cannot  distin- 
guish between  the  man  who  is  its  parent,  and  him 
who  is  not ;  nor  between  its  mother  and  a  stranger. 
Nevertheless  it  soon  learns  to  recognise  this  differ- 
ence, and  to  make  proper  distinctions  amongst  par- 
ticular objects.  Eor  a  short  time  after  its  birth  it 
has  only  very  confused  notions  of  single  objects."* 

Algazeli. 

Algazeli,  in  the  eleventh  century,  obtained  great 
honour  as  a  philosopher  at  Bagdad  and  Alexandria. 
He  was  a  person  of  great  penetration  and  sagacity, 
and  his  powers  of  imagination  were  far  above  the 
common  order.  He  cultivated  theology  with  unre- 
mitting ardour ;  and  his  work  on  the  "  Religions 
Sciences  "  enjoyed  unrivalled  popularity  throughout 
the  whole  Eastern  republic  of  letters. 

In  all  his  disquisitions  on  mental  subjects,  he 
followed  a  most  independent  course,  and  manifest- 
ed a  becoming  anxiety  to  examine  everything  for 
himself,  and  to  take  nothing  on  trust.  As  might 
naturally  be  expected,  from  this  turn  of  mind,  and 
from  the  nature  of  philosophy  herself  in  this  age 
and  country,  he  differed  in  many  respects  from  his 
contemporaries.  He  combatted  the  new  Platonists 
upon  the  eternity  of  the  world,  a  universal  ema- 
nation, absolute  identity,  perfect  unity,  the  non- 
existence of  matter,  and  the  migration  of  souls. 
The  general  proposition  of  this  school,  that  "  In- 


*  See  Logique  d'Avicene,   translated  by  Vattier,  Paris ;  Metaphj's. 
Trait.  2.  chap.  1. ;  and  also  Note  H.  at  the  end  of  the  Volume. 


350  ARABIAN    METAPHYSICS. 

telligence  can  only  know  itself,"  he  argued  against 
with  great  zeal  and  effect. 

On  the  intricate  question  of  cause  and  effect, 
Algazeli  made  some  remarkably  subtile  and  curious 
observations.  It  is  quite  evident  that  the  theory 
of  Hume  is  here  anticipated. 

On  the  general  nature  of  the  human  understand- 
ing we  find  the  following  is,  in  substance,  an  epi- 
tome of  the  system  x)f  Algazel.  The  human  soul 
has  two  faces,  the  one  by  which  it  directs  its  atten- 
tion to  the  wide  region  of  superior  things,  there 
extracts  the  light  of  knowledge,  and,  by  virtue  of 
its  own  distinctive  character,  receives  the  emana- 
tions from  this  superior  light.  The  other  face  is 
dii'ccted  towards  inferior  things,  under  the  govern- 
ment and  guidance  of  proper  organs.  Sensibility 
and  imagination  can  only  exercise  themselves  upon 
material  objects  ;  they  can  seize  only  individual 
things  ;  they  perceive  or  conceive  them  under  cer- 
tain conditions,  as  time,  place,  figure,  &c.  The 
faculty  of  estimation  depends  then  upon  substances 
or  external  things,  since  it  derives  from  this  source 
the  perceptions  on  which  it  rests.  But  we  have 
also  another  faculty  which  seizes  the  essential  pro- 
perties of  things,  and  strips  them,  as  it  were,  of 
their  particular  qualities  or  accidents.  This  is  sum- 
mary or  general  abstraction.  This  faculty  differs 
from  the  preceding ;  it  is  the  understanding ;  and 
it  gradually  elevates  and  develops  itself,  in  propor- 
tion as  it  is  exercised. 

The  following  remarks  display  the  judicious  and 
accurate  observer  of  mental  habits  and  phenomena. 
"The  understanding  can   perceive  itself;    it  can 


AVICEBRON.  351 

perceive  its  own  perception  ;  it  can  perceive  what 
it  produces ;  it  can  pass  from  the  strong  to  the 
weak,  from  the  obscure  to  the  luminous,  without 
any  essential  change  of  its  nature.  It  is  strength- 
ened, instead  of  being  weakened,  by  years.  The 
derangement  of  the  organs  of  sensation  may,  it 
is  true,  act  upon  the  intellectual  faculties  in  two 
modes ;  viz.  by  causing  a  distraction  of  the  mind, 
when  accompanied  by  pain  ;  and  by  depriving  the 
mind  of  the  assistance  of  these  organs  for  the  in- 
vestigation of  external  objects.  But  our  intellectual 
power  can,  by  virtue  of  its  own  innate  energy, 
emancipate  itself  from  this  double  dependance."* 

AviCEBRON. 

This  was  a  very  acute  and  distinguished  Arabian 
philosopher.  The  only  account  of  his  writings  is 
from  Albert  the  Great,  Thomas  Aquinas,  and  Wil- 
liam of  Paris.  We  gather  from  these  three  sources, 
the  following  short  outline  of  the  leading  views  en- 
tertained by  this  writer. 

He  attempted  to  penetrate  into  the  original 
cause  of  all  things.  He  wished  to  investigate  what 
was  the  quality  of  the  jii^st  matter,  and  the  first 
form,  which  produced  all  things.  The  quality  of 
the  first  matter  is  to  receive,  to  be  the  subject,  to 
contain ybrm  in  itself,  to  exist  by  itself;  that  is  to 
say,  not  to  exist  in  anything  else.  The  nature  of 
the  first  form  is  to  be  in  another  thing,  to  give 
reality  to  matter,  to  determine  its  power,  and  to 

*  Logica  et  Philos.  Cologne.  150(). 


352  ARABIAN    METAPHYSICS. 

form  a  portion  of  its  essential  nature  in  this  com- 
pound state.  Matter  is  thus  maintained  to  reside 
in  intellectual  things,  comprised  under  quantity, 
combination,  and  contrast.  The  author  attempts 
then  to  prove  that  this  first  or  primary  matter  is 
purely  spiritual,  as  it  expresses  the  highest  and 
most  refined  abstraction,  after  being  stripped  of  all 
its  variety  of  particular  forms.  The  Supreme  Being 
is  not,  however,  included  in  this  spiritualised 
matter,  for  He  is  above  all  forms  or  qualities. 

The  2)ri7nari/ foi'm  is  intellectuality.  Intelligence 
occupies  the  first  rank  in  the  order  of  beings ;  it  is 
itself  composed  of  matter  smdform  ;  its  form,  then, 
presides  in  all  things.  The  primary  form  imposes 
limits  to  the  modifications  of  matter.  Intellectu- 
ality is  such,  that  it  comprehends  all  things  ;  it  is 
that  from  which  all  forms  proceed,  and  from  which 
every  thing  in  heaven  or  in  earth  takes  its  rise. 

These  two  elementary  principles  being  laid  down, 
there  is  an  affent  to .  carry  them  into  operation. 
This  is  termed  the  ^;riwi«rj/  agent.  His  act  con- 
stitutes the  light  of  intelligence.  It  resides  in  per- 
fect simplicity  or  absolute  unity.  It  cannot  act  im- 
mediately ;  because  the  will  is  the  instrument  of 
action.  This  will  contains  within  itself  the  reason 
or  word  for  everything  which  exists.  It  chooses  out 
of  the  general  treasure  those  figures  or  types  it 
wishes  to  act  with.  It  determines  the  first  or 
primary  matter;  it  imprints  upon  it  the  first 
act  of  intellectual  light.  This  intellectual  light  is 
varied  according  to  the  variety  of  figures  or  types. 
It  produces,  by  degrees,  matter,  under  the  relations 
of  quantity,  combination,  and  contrariety.     It  is 


AVERROES.  353 

thus  that  the  will  always  proceeds  from  unity ;  for 
intellectuality  penetrates  all  things  by  vu'tue  of  its 
own  simplicity.  All  form  is,  at  the  commencement, 
the  author  of  its  own  archetype. 

AvERROES, 

This  was,  without  doubt,  one  of  the  most 
able  and  subtile  of  all  the  Arabian  philoso- 
phers. He  had  studied  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle 
with  peculiar  care  and  attention,  and  became  en- 
thusiastically enamoured  of  his  doctrines.  By  un- 
wearied zeal,  great  learning,  intense  application, 
and  a  profound  subtility,  he  imprinted  his  mind 
upon  his  own  age;  and  long  after  his  death,  re- 
tained the  distinction  of  being  one  of  the  most  able 
and  original  commentators  on  the  Aristotelian  phi- 
losophy. 

"We  find,  in  his  remarks  upon  Aristotle's  meta- 
physics, that  he  was  an  admirer  of  the  doctrine  of 
an  intelligent  hierarchy  and  universal  emanation. 
He  remarks,  "  that  motion  can  be  imparted  only  by 
intelligence;  all  motion  presupposes  a  motive  which 
appertains  to  a  spiritual  or  immaterial  being.  The 
celestial  spheres  have  their  intelligent  attributes, 
derived  from  the  Supreme  Power,  the  first  princi- 
ple of  all  things.  This  motion  is  communicated 
successively  into  all  regions ;  from  the  highest  de- 
gree of  creation,  even  into  our  own  sublunary  world, 
this  nation  is  conducted  and  transmitted  by  a  suc- 
cession of  intelligent  agents." 
*  2  a 


354  ARABIAN    METAPHYSICS. 

On  the  sj^iritual  or  immaterial  nature  of  mental 
perception,  this  metaphysician  entertained  some 
very  refined  notions.  He  conceives  that  our  organs 
of  sensation  only  perceive  the  sensible  qualities  of 
matter,  detached  from  matter  itself.  This  consti- 
tutes, in  his  opinion,  the  act  of  perception,  a  spiritual 
or  immaterial  act.  Some  of  these  qualities  of  matter 
are  universal,  and  some  particular  and  individual. 
But  these  two  kinds  of  qualities  are  not  perceived 
in  the  same  manner.  The  mind  seizes  hold  of  ge- 
neral or  universal  ideas,  without  any  direct  com- 
munication, so  to  speak,  with  matter  itself ;  there 
is  no  intermediate  agency  requisite  to  obtain  these 
ideas.  On  the  contrary,  to  obtain  individual  or 
particular  qualities,  there  must  be  an  intermediate 
agent  to  communicate  with  matter,  for  without 
this  intermediation,  the  mind  would  not  be  able 
to  distinguish  these  particular,  from  general  or  uni- 
versal, qualities.  Nature  has  provided /orwzs,  to 
act  as  these  agents,  which  hold  a  middle  station 
between  corporeal  and  material ;  these  forms  are 
material  relatively  to  objects,  but  spiritual  rela- 
tively to  the  soul.  As  interposing  instruments  they 
are  thus  of  a  mixed  character.  Now  these  inter- 
mediate assents  are  the  instruments  of  the  senses  ; 
those  things  which  perception  requires,  to  detect  or 
seize  hold  of  universal  or  general  qualities.  The 
act  of  perception  is  so  much  the  more  perfect,  in 
exact  proportion  as  the  intermediate  agent  is  re- 
fined and  subtile.  This  mental  operation  may  be 
illustrated,  more  particularly,  by  a  reference  to  the 
senses  of  sight,  hearing,  and  smelling.    The  air,  by 


AVERROES.  355 

the  aid  of  light,  receives  the  forms  of  objects,  and 
bears  thera  to  the  retina  of  the  eye  ;  from  thence 
they  are  transmitted  to  the  common  sensorlum^ 
which  also  receives  the  forms  of  the  objects.  Erom 
there  these  forms  are  again  transported  to  the  im- 
agination, where  a  new  and  spiritual  character  is 
given  to  them.  Here,  then,  are  three  successive 
orders  of  i\iQs,Q  forms  of  external  objects  :  the  first 
is  corporeal ;  the  second  resides  in  the  organs  of 
sensation  ;  and  the  third  is  the  faculty  of  the  ima- 
gination. The  second  is  spiritual,  and  the  third 
is  still  more  so ;  and  this  is  the  reason  why  the 
imagination  has  need  of  the  presence  of  external 
objects,  in  order  that  this  form  should  be  presented 
to  itself.  This  process  is  what  Aristotle  wished  to 
illustrate  by  the  mirror  with  a  double  face.  If  the 
spectator  place  this  mirror  opposite  to  him,  he  will 
see,  on  one  of  its  faces,  his  own  image ;  and  if  he 
place  the  mirror  in  such  a  position  that  this  image 
it  retains  may  be  reflected  upon  the  surface  of  the 
water,  he  will  perceive  a  second  image  similar  to 
the  first.  Now  in  the  process  of  sensation  i\\Q,form 
perceived  is  like  the  image  of  the  spectator ;  the 
mirror  is  like  the  air  which  transmits  the  form ; 
the  water  is  the  eve  or  the  organs  of  sense.  One  of 
the  faces  of  the  mirror  is  the  sensitive  faculty ; 
and  the  other  face  is  the  imaginative  one.  If  the 
spectator  turn  the  mirror  and  consider  only  the 
second  face,  then  the  reflected  part  will  not  be  upon 
the  water,  and  there  will,  consequently,  be  no  more 
than  one  image.  Similar  phenomena  take  place  in 
the  process  of  perception  in  reference  to  both  hearing 

2  A  2 


356  ARABIAN    METAPHYSICS. 

and  smelling.  Bnt  this  faculty  of  perception  is  not 
tjie  same  in  all  animals  ;  man  alone  is  able  to  seize 
hold  of  the  proper  qualities  of  objects,  with  all 
their  shades  and  degrees,  resemblance  and  contra- 
riety. He  can  extract  the  juice  from  the  fruits, 
whilst  the  brute  creation  have  to  stop  and  peel  off 
the  bark.  As  a  proof  of  this,  man  is  the  only  ani- 
mate creature  who  can  appreciate  fully  the  har- 
mony of  sounds  in  all  their  multiplied  variety. 

The  way  in  which  we  obtain  abstract  notions,  is 
described  by  Averroes  in  this  manner.  In  our 
common  organs  of  sense  reside  the  images,  the  cha- 
racter of  which  is  precisely  the  same  here  as  in  sen- 
sible objects ;  and  the  relation  of  these  images  to 
the  material  understanding  is  the  same  as  these 
sensible  objects  are  to  the  senses  themselves.  This 
may  be  comprehended  more  distinctly  by  saying, 
that  this  image  is  to  reason,  what  the  sensible  ob- 
ject is  to  sensation.  The  soul  can  then  conceive 
nothing  without  the  assistance  of  the  imagination; 
nor  the  material  understanding,  without  the  help 
of  sensation.  Here  we  perceive  two  images  asso- 
ciated together,  and  our  intelligent  notions  become 
corrupted  through  the  influence  of  this  contagious 
contact.  As  to  these  intelligent  notions,  they  are  the 
qualities  of  the/brms  of  imagination  detached  from 
matter ;  and  must  needs  have  different  qualities 
from  the  latter. 

The  material  understanding  is  a  notion  peculiar 
to  this  Arabian  philosopher.  He  explains  its  na- 
ture and  operation  in  the  following  manner.  The 
faculty  of  imagination  retains  the  forms  which  have 


theophiltjS.  357 

been  made  upon  it ;  these  forms  are  transmitted  to 
the  material  understanding,  there  to  become  the 
objects  of  thought.  But  an  agent  is  requisite  to 
impress  them  upon  the  latter,  and  that  agent  ap- 
pertains to  the  active  understanding.  This  material 
understanding  conceives  abstract  notions,  so  that 
the  abstract  understandino;  makes  one  with  it.  To 
conceive  abstract  notions  or  ideas,  is  no  other  thing 
than  simplv  to  conceive  a  thinsc  subsistmo^  bv  itself.* 

Theophilus. 

This  author  was  a  native  of  Seville,  and  a  physi- 
cian and  philosopher.  His  work  entitled  FMloso- 
'plius  Autodid actus,  is  a  very  curious  one,  and  has 
been  translated  into  Prench,  English,  German,  and 
Dutch.  He  obtained  great  reputation  and  respect 
amongst  all  the  leading  tribes  of  the  Arabs,  and 
also  among  the  Jews.  The  learned  Leibnitz  de- 
clared he  had  perused  this  publication  with  delight, 
and  found  it  abounding  with  elevated  and  just  con- 
ceptions of  human  nature  in  general. 

Thisphilosopherremarks,  thatman  possessesthree 
relations  of  similitude  or  affinity  ;  namely,  one  Avith 
the  animal  creation,  another  with  celestial  beings, 
and  the  third  with  the  necessary  and  divine  Being. 
To  these  three  orders  of  relationship  appertain  three 
modes  of  action.  The  first  exercises  itseKupon  our 
material  organs  ;  the  second  upon  the  vital  spirit ; 
and  the  third  upon  its  own  essential  essence. 

The  first  mode  of  action  is  directed  towards  sen- 

*  Commeut.  in  Aristot.  Metaph.  lib.  4.  cap.  2.     See  also  Note  I.  at 
'  the  end  of  the  Volume. 


358  ARABIAN    METAPHYSICS. 

sible  objects.    Far  from  acquiring  instruction  here, 
we  often  meet  with  great  obstacles;  for  external 
things  are  a  kind  of  veil  which  envelops  true  sci- 
ence and  knowledge.     The  second  only  obtains  an 
imperfect  intuition,  or  a  confused  assemblage  of 
objects ;  but  when  directed  upon  its  own  essence, 
it  then  confers  knowledge.     By  the  third  action  we 
acquire  complete  and  perfect  intuition.     Its  atten- 
tion is  absorbed  in  the  contemplation  of  necessary 
existence.     It  annihilates  itself ;  it  vanishes  like  a 
vapour.     Its  own  essence,  and  all  other  essences  of 
things,  disappear  before  that  one  Being,  who  at 
once  possesses  unity,  truth,  grandeur,  sublimity  and 
power. 

Celestial  bodies  have  three  attributes  ;  one  by 
which  they  throw  light,  heat,  and  rarefaction  over 
inferior  substances ;  the  second  relates  to  their  own 
nature,  their  happiness,  holiness,  purity,  and  power 
of  rapid  motion  ;  and  the  third  refers  to  the   Su- 
preme Being,  whose  will  they  execute,  whose  power 
they  recognise,  and  whose  presence  they  perpetually 
enjoy.     Man  ought  to  imitate  these  three  kinds 
of  attributes.     To  conform  himself  to  the  first,  he 
ought  to  extend  a  benevolent  protection  to  all  ani- 
mal natures,  and  to  all  plants,  and  endeavour  to 
preserve  them  in  a  perfect  condition.     To  bring 
himself  under  the  influence  of  the  second  attribute, 
he  should  preserve  himself  from  all  impurities ; 
practise  ablutions ;  pay  great  attention  to  the  pro- 
prieties of  the  body  and  of  dress ;  and  use  suitable 
exercise,  and  even  circular  movements,  though  he 
should  thereby  experience  giddiness  of  the  head. 
In  reference  to  the  third  attribute,  he  should 


THEOPHILUS.  359 

shun  all  obstacles  from  sensible  objects ;  shut  his 
eyes  and  ears ;  repress  all  flights  of  imagination ; 
and  reduce  all  his  faculties  to  a  certain  state  of 
languor,  until  he  approaches  a  state  of  pure  intel- 
lectuality. 

Arrived  at  this  high  state  of  perfection,  man  will 
learn  that  his  own  essence  does  not  differ  from  the 
essence  of  the  Supreme  Being ;  that  there  is  really 
but  one  universal  essence.  The  Divine  Essence  is 
like  the  rays  of  the  material  sun  which  expand  over 
opaque  bodies,  and  which  appear  to  proceed  from 
the  eye,  though  they  are  only  reflected  from  its  sur- 
face. All  beings  distinct  from  mere  matter,  which 
possess  this  knowledge,  are  identified  with  the  di- 
vine essence;  for  knowledge  is  nothing  but  this 
essence  itself.  These  beings  are,  therefore,  not  dif- 
ferent, they  are  only  one  and  the  same.  Multipli- 
city, variety,  and  aggregation  appertain  only  to 
bodies.  The  sensible  world  is  only  the  shadow  of 
the  Divine  world. 

Theophilus  further  remarks,  "  In  considering  the 
number  of  his  organs,  and  the  variety  of  their  func- 
tions, man  would  appear  to  be  a  compound  being ; 
but  in  lookinsc  asjain  at  the  secret  tie  which  unites 
all  these  organs,  and  their  principle  of  action,  man 
shows  himself  to  be  truly  but  an  individual  being. 
This  unity  is  derived  from  the  unity  of  the  vital 
principle. ^^ 

This  philosopher  led  a  life  of  singular  abstraction, 
and  enjoyed  fits  of  pure  intellectual  ecstasy.  In 
one  of  these  he  afiirms  that  he  saw  the  supreme 
and  celestial  sphere,  in  which  the  essence  of  im- 


360  AKABIAN    METAPHYSICS. 

materiality  resided.  All  joy  and  beauty  dwelt  here, 
and  the  sight  was  the  most  ravishing  imaginable. 
He  perceived  a  spiritual  Being,  who  was  neither  the 
first  of  beings,  nor  the  sphere  itself;  without,  how- 
ever, its  being  different  from  both.  It  was  like 
the  image  of  the  sun  produced  in  a  mirror,  which 
is  neither  the  sun  itself,  nor  the  mirror.* 


***  See  Geor.  Elmacinus,  Historia  Saracen.  Lugd.  1625;  Assemani, 
Historia  Arabum.  Rome  1/19;  Bayle — articles,  Alchabitius,  Alchindus, 
Averroes,  Almacin;  Peringer,  Historia  Linguae  et  Erudit.  Arabum,  Al- 
pini,  1694  ;  Ludovicus,  De  Historia  Rationalis  Philos.  apud  Arabos  et 
Turcas ;  Nagel,  De  Studio  Philos.  Graecse  inter  Arabos ;  Fabricius,  Bib. 
Graec.  De  Viris  quibusdam  illustribus  apud  Arabos ;  The  Histories  of 
Philosophy  by  Brucker,  Tiedemann,  and  Tennemann;  Bodiiguez  de 
Castro,  Bibl.  Espagnole,  book  1st. 


*  'I 


Theoph.  Philosophus  Autodidactus,  edition  by  Pocock. 


THE    PERSIAN    SOPHISTS.  361 


CHAPTEE,   XXXIII. 
THE   PERSIAN  SOPHISTS. 


The  metaphysical  notions  of  the  Persian  So- 
pliists  are  but  very  imperfectly  kno^^Ti.  They  are 
shrouded  and  enveloped  in  a  mighty  maze  of  ec- 
static rapture  and  frantic  abstraction.  Their  phi- 
losophy is  but  a  jumT)le  of  most  of  the  opinions  of 
the  Oriental  nations,  -with  a  few  slight  peculiarities 
belonging  to  the  Persian  nation. 

The  Sophists  considered  the  human  mind  to  be 
under  the  direct  influence  of  the  Divine  nature. 
This  influence  they  designated  by  the  terms  ema- 
nation, call,  proclamation,  attraction,  &c.  They 
declared  that  the  path  which  conducted  to  God,  was 
the  commencement  of  that  which  introduced  you 
to  the  bosom  of  the  Eternal  himself,  and  which 
placed  you  in  full  possession  of  the  true  spiritual 
absorption. 

The  doctrine  of  absolute  unitv,  maintained  and 
enforced  by  the  New  Platonists,  was  also  a  fa- 
vourite pliilosophical  dogma  of  the  Persian  So- 
phists.   They  affirmed  that  every  man  whose  heart 


362  THE    PERSIAN    SOPHISTS. 

was  free  from  doubt,  knew,  with  the  most  perfect 
certainty,  that  there  was  but  one  Being  in  all  na- 
ture. I  and  the  Divinity  are  the  same  thing.  The 
Sophists  also  represented  the  body  as  a  sort  of 
prison-house  for  the  mind  or  soul.  "  Do  you  wish 
to  enjoy  true  liberty  ?"  say  they,  "  then  disengage 
yourself  from  the  vain  illusions  which  obstruct  you, 
and  take  refuge  in  the  Divine  essence,  where  truth 
exclusively  resides."  On  the  doctrine  of  Divine 
emanations  they  remark  that  "This  universe  is 
only  a  small  meandering  rivulet  from  the  ocean  of 
Divine  Beauty  and  Perfection."  Pour  species  of 
Divine  manifestation  are  distinguished;  namely, 
iirst,  the  contemplative  mind  sees  the  absolute  es- 
sence, under  the  figure  or  representation  of  some 
corporeal  being;  secondly,  he  sees  this  absohtte 
unity  under  one  of  its  attributes  of  action,  as  the 
giving  of  what  is  needful ;  the  third  appears  under 
the  form  of  one  of  the  attributes  which  constitute 
its  own  essence,  as  science  or  life;  and  in  the 
fourth,  the  contemplative  spirit  loses  its  conscious- 
ness in  its  existence. 

The  Sophists  enveloped  their  disquisitions  on  the 
mind  of  man  with  a  crowd  of  fables  and  allegories. 
To  assist  the  flights  of  contemplative  ardour  and 
ecstasy,  they  recommended  the  practice  of  ab- 
stinence, watchings,  silence,  restraint  of  the  appe- 
tites ;  a  renouncement,  in  fact,  of  all  bodily  plea- 
sures. They  urged  that  men  should  bring  themselves 
to  a  state  of  apathetic  insensibility,  in  order  that 
they  might  fully  realize  the  delights  of  celestial 
beatitude. 


AVENPACE.  363 


AVENPACE. 


Little  is  now  known  of  the  metaphysical  specu- 
lations of  this  author.  He  was  a  physician,  cul- 
tivated mathematical  learning,  and  had  studied  the 
works  of  Aristotle  with  great  zeal  and  attention. 

His  peculiar  ideas  on  the  mind  of  man  are  con- 
tained in  a  letter  entitled  "  The  Conjunction  of  the 
Understanding  loith  Man."  In  this  fragment  he 
supposes  that  all  intelligent  things  are  produced  or 
created ;  and  that  everything  which  is  produced  of 
this  intellectual  natiu'e,  is  possessed  of  an  essential 
character  or  quality.  The  understanding  has  the 
power,  by  virtue  of  its  own  peculiar  natm-e,  to  de- 
tach this  essential  character  from  things,  and  make 
it  an  object  of  abstraction.  He  concludes  that  the 
human  understanding  is  a  uniform  thing  in  all 
mankind ;  and  that  it  is  a  separate  and  independent 
thino'  from  matter  in  all  its  forms  and  modifica- 
tions.  It  may  be  remarked  here,  that  this  writer's 
notions  are  but  very  imperfectly  expomided,  and 
seem  shrouded  in  a  more  than  usual  portion  of 
mvsticism.* 

*  See  IMalcolm's  History  of  Persia;  Journal  des  Savans,  1821  et 
1822  ;  Sufismus,  sive  Theosophiee  Persarum  Pantheistica.  Berlin,  1821  ; 
and  Note  J.  at  the  end  of  the  Volume. 


364  CABALISTIC   METAPHYSICS. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

THE  CABALISTIC    METAPHYSICS. 


The  origin  of  those  speculative  opinions,  which 
sprang  from  the  minds  of  what  are  termed  the  Ca- 
balistic Philosophers,  is  enveloped  in  great  obscu- 
rity. Several  learned  and  lengthened  controversies 
have  arisen  out  of  their  history,  relative  to  their 
precise  opinions  on  many  important  doctrines  which 
they  profess  to  discuss.  It  seems,  however,  to  be 
pretty  generally  considered  at  the  present  day,  that 
thek  speculative  views  are  a  compound  of  theo- 
logical, philosophical,  and  mystical  opinions ;  and 
that  a  great  portion  of  the  attention  which  this  sect 
excited  in  their  own  day,  as  well  as  that  which  they 
have  subsequently  obtained  from  modern  histo- 
rians, arose  from  the  allegorical,  mysterious,  and 
symbolical  language  in  which  they  clothed  all  their 
thoughts  and  principles. 

The  chief  divisions  of  the  Cabalistic  doctrines  are 
the  following. 

Out  of  nothing,  nothing  can  be  produced;  be- 
cause the  distance  between  existence  and  non-exist- 


CABALISTIC    METAPHYSICS.  365 

ence  is  infinite.  Matter,  though  achnitted  to  be 
something,  is  an  imperfect  thing,  and  cannot  he 
self-existent.  The  Creator  of  all  things  is  a  Spirit, 
eternal,  uncreated,  and  of  infinite  intelligence,  hav- 
ing witlun  itself  all  life  and  motion,  as  attributes 
of  its  nature.  This  Creative  Spirit  fills  all  space, 
and  is  called  En-Soph,  the  Infinite  Deity.  This 
spiritual  power  is  the  fountain  of  all  created  exist- 
ences, which  emanate  from  it,  but  are  neverthe- 
less united  with  it.  The  universe,  and  everything 
we  behold  in  it,  is  an  emanation,  which  displays 
the  attributes  and  properties  of  this  Pirst  Cause  to 
human  intelligence. 

Anterior  to  creation,  all  space  was  filled  mth 
the  Or  Haen-Soph,  or  Infinite  Intellectual  Light. 
When  the  Divine  volition  willed  the  creation  of 
nature,  the  eternal  light  hitherto  difiiised  through 
infinite  space,  withdrew  to  an  equal  distance,  in 
every  direction,  from  a  central  point,  as  a  sphere 
of  operations  where  all  things  were  to  be  created. 
There  are  traces  left  in  this  vacated  space  of  the 
existence  of  the  Divine  essence,  and  these  traces  or 
detached  portions  of  Infinite  Intelligence  are  to 
l)ecome  the  seeds  of  future  worlds.  Erom  a  cer- 
tain point  in  the  concave  surface  of  the  eternal 
Kght  which  envelops  the  opaque  sphere,  the  crea- 
tive emanation  is  first  exerted,  and  the  rays  of  in- 
telligence or  mind  emerge  in  straight  Knes  into 
the  abyss  of  darkness  or  non-entity.  This  beam  of 
light  effected  a  communication  between  creative 
agency  and  non-entity,  through  the  means  of  which 
future   worlds   can   be   produced.      Through    the 


'^GQ  CABALISTIC    METAPHYSICS. 

opening  caused  by  this  beam  of  light,  various 
streams  of  intelligence  flow,  in  clivers  distances 
from  the  centre,  and  are  separated  from  each  other 
by  dark  portions  of  space.  There  are  ten  of  these 
circles  of  light,  which  are  called  Sephir^  or 
Splendoks. 

The  first  emanation  from  the  Living  Eountain, 
is  the  rectilineal  beam,  and  this  is  the  source  of 
all  other  emanations,  or  creative  existences.  This 
rectilineal  emanation  is  designated  by  the  name  of 
Adam  Caijmus,  the  first  man,  the  primary  effect 
of  Divine  power,  the  Son  of  God.  These  Sephirse 
are  fountains  from  which  flow  every  created  thing 
subordinate  to  this  Adam  Cadmus,  and  are  named 
in  the  following  order  :  Intelligence,  or  the  Crown, 
Knowledge,  Wisdom,  Strength,  Beauty,  Greatness, 
Glory,  Stability,  Victory,  Dominion.  These  must 
not,  however,  be  considered  in  the  light  of  mere 
agents  or  instruments  of  the  Divine  operations, 
but  simply  media  though  which  creative  energy 
manifests  its  power.  They  are  not  detached  por- 
tions of  the  Divine  Essence,  but  purely  attributes, 
virtues,  or  powers,  possessing  an  individual  but  de- 
pendent existence,  through  the  mediation  of  Adam 
Cadmus,  the  primary  emanation. 

In  the  Ensophic  world,  or  world  of  infinity,  there 
are  four  inferior  worlds  or  emanations,  depending, 
however,  upon  the  superior  one.  These  have  ap- 
propriate designations.  Aziluth,  is  the  world  of 
emanation  which  produces  the  Sephirse ;  Brish, 
embraces  certain  sj)iritual  natures  or  forms  which 
derive  their  essence  from  the  Sephirae;  Jezirah, 


CABALISTIC    METAPHYSICS.  867 

or  the  world  of  forms ;  and  Asiah,  or  the  visible 
and  material  world,  comprehending  every  thing 
susceptible  of  motion,  composition,  division,  or  de- 
composition. 

These  derivative  or  secondary  worlds  may  be 
considered  as  evolutions  or  expansions  of  the  Divine 
nature,  and  possess  more  or  less  splendour,  in  pro- 
portion to  their  distance  from  the  centre  of  Eternal 
Light.  The  last  and  most  remote  emanation  is 
MATTER,  which  is  produced  by  a  species  of  re-action 
of  the  divine  light,  in  receding  from  the  fountain, 
whereby  it  becomes  so  attenuated  as  to  be  absorbed 
in  darkness,  and  nothing  but  an  opaque  substance 
is  left  as  a  residue.  This  matter  or  residue  is  only 
one  degree  removed  from  non-entity.  It  has  no 
separate  or  independent  existence,  but  is  purely  a 
modification  of  the  emanative  power  of  the  Eternal 
Light. 

These  derivative  or  secondarv  worlds  have  vari- 
ous  orders  of  creative  beings.  Those  in  Aziluth, 
are  superior  to  spirits,  and  are  denomiated  Persons. 
The  beinsrs  of  the  second  world  are  called  Thrones, 
on  account  of  the  authority  they  exercise  over  other 
natures  of  an  Angelic  order,  which  inhabit  the 
third  world.  The  fourth  region  is  that  devoted  to 
evil  spirits,  the  refuse  of  emanation.  These  are 
the  Authors  of  evil ;  but  they  are  always  aspiring 
towards  the  Sephirse,  and  will,  in  the  revolution  of 
ages,  return  once  more  into  the  fountain  of  Eternal 
Light. 

The  human  soul,  which  proceeds  by  emanation, 
is  of  the  same  order  as  the  Eternal  Mind.     When 


368  CABALISTIC    METAPHYSICS. 

united  with  tlie  body,  it  forms  a  complex  creation, 
endowed  with  reason,  and  capable  of  action.  This 
soul  consists  of  four  parts,  the  principle  of  vitality, 
the  principle  of  motion,  the  power  of  intelligence, 
and  the  divine  principle  by  which  it  can  contem- 
plate, and  hold  intercourse  with,  the  Ensophic 
world. 

All  souls  were  created  at  once,  and  existed  in 
the  first  emanation,  Adam  Cadmus.  Every  hu- 
man soul  has  two  guardian  angels,  created  by 
emanation  at  the  time  of  the  production  of  souls. 
The  human  mind  is  connected  with  the  Divine 
nature,  lilve  the  radii  of  a  circle  with  their  centre. 

The  Divine  energy  upholds  all  things.  When 
this  energy  is  exerted,  new  forms  of  life  and  being 
are  produced ;  when  it  is  withheld  or  lies  dormant, 
the  streams  of  life  return  again  to  their  proper 
fountain  from  whence  they  came.* 

*  See  Enfield's  His.  Philo.  Vol.  2.  p.  220 ;  Menasseh  Ben  Israel,  De 
Great,  p.  27  ;  Reimann,  His.  Theol.  Jud. ;  Budd,  Introd.  Philos.  Heb. ; 
Burgonovo,  Select.  Cabb.  Dogm.;  Basnage,  Hist. ;  Brucker,  Hist.  Crit. 
Philos. ;  Wolf,  Bibliotheca  Hsebr. ;  Hottinger,  Biblioth.  Orient. ;  Morus, 
Fundamenta  Philos.  sive  Cabbal. ;  Helmont,  Dialogi  Cabalistici. 


ox    THE    PHILOSOPHY   OF    THE    JEWS.  3G9 


CHAPTEH    XXXV. 
ON  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  JEWS. 


The  metaphysical  opinions  of  the  Jews  after  their 
complete  dispersion  over  almost  every  civilized 
country  in  the  world,  are  not  of  very  great  import- 
tance.  The  principal  service  they  rendered  to  mental 
philosophy,  was  their  diffusing  the  knowledge  of 
many  of  the  speculative  opinions  of  the  Greeks, 
among  those  nations  they  visited  for  the  purposes 
of  mercantile  traffic  and  gain.  This  tended  in 
many  cases  to  keep  alive  an  interest  in  those 
ancient  mental  theories  and  systems,  even  among 
a  class  of  but  comparatively  learned  people,  and 
very  incompetent  to  appreciate,  to  the  full  extent, 
their  nature  and  worth. 

At  what  precise  time  the  Jews  became  acquainted 
with  the  speculative  philosophy  of  other  eastern 
nations,  it  is  a  difficult  matter  to  determine.  But 
certain  it  is,  that  there  were  learned  persons  among 
the  Jews  who  obtained  considerable  notoriety  for 
their  knowledge  of  foreign  speculation,  and  for 
their  amalgamation  of  it  with  their  own  Hebrew 
notions.    Simon  Magus,  Dositheus,  and  Menander, 

*  2b 


370  ON    THE    PHILOSOPHY    OP    THE    JEWS. 

are  instances  of  this.  It  is  commonly  affirmed 
that  they  were  all  three  well  acquainted  with 
Oriental  opinions  as  to  the  nature  of  Deity  and 
the  human  soul ;  and  that  they  zealously  laboured 
to  form  something  approaching  to  systematical 
theories,  out  of  the  miscellaneous  and  scattered 
fragments  of  philosophy  they  had  collected  to- 
gether, from  divers  eastern  nations. 

It  is  well  known  that  the  Jews  were,  at  a  later 
period  of  their  history,  divided  into  several  sects, 
who  grounded  their  differences  in  rites  and  ceremo- 
nies upon  certain  speculative  tenets.  The  chief  of 
these  sects  were  the  Sadducees,  the  Karseites,  the 
Pharisees,  and  the  Essenes.  The  Sadducees  main- 
tained the  materiality  of  the  human  soul.  It  died 
with  the  body.  Neither  had  angels  or  spirits  any 
separate  existence  from  the  corporeal  frames  or  vest- 
ments in  which  they  were  enveloped.  They  believed 
in  the  existence  of  the  true  God,  the  supreme  and 
intelligent  Governor  of  the  universe.  His  perpe- 
tual and  providential  care  was  also  a  tenet  of  their 
creed.  The  human  a\t11  was,  however,  free  from 
any  interference  or  control  from  this  cause ;  and 
this  was  the  reason  for  the  obligatory  nature  of  all 
moral  and  religious  institutions.  The  homogene- 
ous nature  of  man  was  a  point  they  zealously  main- 
tained, without  any  conditions  or  compromise  what- 
ever.* 

The  speculative  tenets  of  the  Karseites  were  some- 
what different  from  those  of  the  Sadducees.  The  for- 
mer affirmed  that  all  created  existences  derived  tlieir 

*  Josei)lms.     DeBfll.    J  1.  2  o  V2. 


ON    THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE    JEWS.  371 

Origin  from  an  uncreated  and  eternal  Deity,  to  whom 
they  bear  no  resemblance  whatever.  The  Supreme 
Being  rules  and  governs  every  thing ;  the  human 
mind  is  under  His  influence  to  a  certain  extent, 
but  at  the  same  time  its  voluntary  powers  and  ener- 
gies are  maintained  to  their  full  extent  unimpaired. 
The  human  soul  is  immortal,  and,  if  virtuous,  goes 
after  death  to  dwell  with  celestial  intelligence  for 
ever ;  but  if  unworthy  and  wicked,  is  subjected  to 
suffering  and  disgrace.* 

The  Pharisees  were  a  powerful  and  influential 
sect  among  the  Jews.  Their  metaphysical  opinions 
were  that  the  universe  is  the  work  of  one  intelligent 
and  eternal  God,  who  governs  all  things  by  the 
word  of  his  power.  Man  is  under  the  divine  in- 
fluence, but  still  his  will  is  free  to  act.  The  soul 
is  spiritual  and  immortal,  and  will  be  rewarded  in 
a  future  life  accordins^  to  merits  or  demerits  in  this 
life.  There  are  other  spiritual  existences  besides 
man ;  as  good  and  bad  angels. f 

The  opinions  of  the  Essenes  were  that  the  hu- 
man soul  was  immortal,  that  it  was  constituted  of 
a  very  subtile  kind  of  ether ;  that  it  was  in  a  state 
of  exile  or  imprisonment  in  this  earthly  body ;  and 
that  when  it  was  released  by  death,  it  would,  if 
good,  wing  its  way  to  celestial  and  happy  regions 
beyond  the  ocean,  and,  if  bad,  to  where  there  was 
unceasing  lamentation  and  woe.  The  Deity,  by  in- 
finite wisdom,  created  all  things,  and  by  His  provi- 
dential care  maintains  and  supports  them.  I 

*  R.  Japhet.  Lev.    Conf.    Wolf.  Bill.  Heh. 

t  JosepliTis.  Ant.  .Tud.  1.  \3.  c.  9.        +  Josephus.  De  Bell.  J.  1.  2.  c  12. 

2  B  2 


372  ON    THE    PHILOSOPHY   OF    THE    JEWS. 

After  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem,  and  tlie  dis- 
persion of  its  inhabitants,  little  is  known  of  the 
speculations  of  the  learned  among  the  Jews.  Their 
peculiar  philosophical  notions  seem,  for  a  long  pe- 
riod, to  have  been  buried  in  oblivion.  It  is  stated, 
however,  that  so  early  as  the  year  one  hundred  and 
thirty-eight  of  our  era,  a  Jewish  school  was  estab- 
lished by  Akibha,  at  Lydda  or  Dioscopolis,  and 
that  he  had  as  many  as  twenty-four  thousand  stu- 
dents.* The  peculiar  opinions  he  held  Avere  sup- 
posed to  have  been  a  compound  of  Pythagorean  and 
Cabalistic  speculations ;  but  we  have  no  detailed 
account  of  them.  After  Akibha,  Simeon  Ben  Ja- 
chai  flourished,  at  the  commencement  of  the  third 
century,  and  taught  the  Cabalistic  doctrines  with 
great  pojoularity  among  the  Jewish  people.!  After 
this  we  hear  almost  nothing  of  the  public  teaching 
of  this  peculiar  nation,  until  the  beginning  of  the 
tenth  century,  when  the  Schools  of  Sora  and  Pum- 
beditha  were  renovated  under  the  auspices  of  Uabbi 
Saadias  Gaon,  a  native  of  Egypt,  well  skilled  in 
most  of  the  philosophical  opinions  and  systems  which 
had  been  promulgated  for  many  centuries  previous 
in  the  Alexandrian  Academy.  |  This  Jewish  writer 
composed  two  works,  one  called  "  The  Philosopher's 
Stone,"  and  the  other  "  A  Compendium  of  Jewish 
Theology ;"  the  latter  illustrated  at  great  length  by 
a  series  of  abstract  and  logical  statements  and 
proofs. 

*    Zemncli  David,  ad  An.  IMiindi.  .'57(10.      Dayle.  Liglitfoot,  Hor.  Heb. 
t  2.  ]).  4A^). 
.    t  Woir.Bib  :  Hel).  Chap.  1.  j..  70:.'.  +  Gauzii  Zemach  David,  p.  51. 


EBEN  EZRA. — MOSES  MAIMONIDES.     373 

Through  the  influence  of  the  Arabians  and  Chris- 
tians, the  Jews  became  acquainted  with  the  Greek 
philosophy,  particularly  the  works  of  Aristotle.  This 
gave,  in  some  measure,  a  new  impulse  and  direc- 
tion to  theu'  speculative  labours  and  views.  Seve- 
ral learned  men  sprang  up  amongst  them,  who  dis- 
played great  natural  aptness  for  general  philoso- 
phical and  mental  speculations. 

Eben  Ezra. 

This  was  a  very  learned  and  talented  Jew,  in 
Spain,  who  flourished  about  the  middle  of  the 
twelth  century,  and  who  cultivated  an  acquaintance 
with  many  branches  of  philosophy.  He  was  a  native 
of  Toledo,  and  his  contemporaries  conferred  upon 
him  the  name  of  the  "  admirable,"  on  account  of 
his  varied  and  profound  acquirements.  In  his  writ- 
ings, he  treats  of  philosophy,  astronomy,  medicine, 
poetry,  grammar,  theology,  and  the  interpretation 
of  the  sacred  books  of  the  Cabalistic  Science. 


MosES  Maimonides. 

This  philosopher  was  a  native  of  Cordova,  in 
Spain,  and  had  studied  all  the  Grecian  metaphysics, 
with  great  attention  and  success.  Among  his  own 
sect  of  the  Jews,  he  excited  a  spirit  of  opposition  ; 
and  a  charge  was  brought  against  him  of  having 
imbibed  some  of  the  doctrines  and  opinions  of 
Islamism.  On  this  account,  he  fled  from  Spain 
to  Egypt.  He  established  a  philosophical  school  at 


374^  ON    THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE    JEWS. 

Caii'o,  where  his  fame  soon  procured  him  a  large 
crowd  of  students  and  admirers. 

A  very  just  remark  was  made  by  this  learned 
man,  relative  to  the  study  of  theology,  which  has 
called  forth  imqualiiied  approbation  from  sound 
thinkers  of  almost  every  age  since  his  day.  "  The- 
ology," says  he,  "  ought  to  be  preceded  by  the 
study  of  other  philosophical  branches  of  knowledge. 
God  can  be  known  only  by  his  works,  and  the  in- 
vestigation of  the  laws  of  nature  is  the  route  which 
will  conduct  our  reason  to  Him." 

Maimonides  was  the  author  of  a  work  on  Logic, 
called  Miloth  Higayon.  This  treatise  was  origi- 
nally written  in  Arabic,  but  was  afterwards  trans- 
lated into  Hebrew,  by  Moses  Eben  Tibbon.  Mai- 
monides follows  Aristotle's  method,  though  he  en- 
deavours to  make  it  applicable  to  his  own  peculiar 
theological  views. 

Tliis  learned  Jew  was  also  the  writer  of  a  work 
On  Psychology,  in  which  the  various  powers  and 
faculties  of  the  mind  are  examined  and  commented 
on.  This  work  presents  a  curious  medley  of  no- 
tions ;  and  is,  on  the  whole,  the  most  unintelligible 
of  all  Maimonides'  speculations.* 

***  See  Zeltner,  Diss,  de  Beruria,  Altdorf,  1/14  ;  Rabbi  Moses  Mik- 
kozi ;  Zeraach  David,  Hist.  Misha.  and  the  writings  of  Wolf,  Basnage, 
Rowland,  Lightfoot,  Hottinger,  Buddaeus,  and  Prideaux. 


*  See  Scheycr's  "  Psychology  of  Maimonides,"  Frankfort,  1H45. 


ON   DISTINCT    FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.        375 


CHAPTER   XXXVI. 

ON  DISTINCT  FACULTIES  OF  THE  MIND,  AS  RECOG- 
NISED BY  PHILOSOPHERS  UP  TO  THE  NINTH 
CENTURY. 


At  this  point  of  the  liistory  of  mental  philosophy, 
we  shall  make  a  few  remarks  upon  the  different 
faculties  of  the  mind,  which  metaphysicians  have 
noticed,  and  attempted  in  their  writings  to  define. 
The  number  and  names  of  these  faculties  have  oc- 
casionally undergone  changes,  in  accordance  with 
divers  general  theoretical  systems ;  but  still  we 
shall  be  able  to  give  such  an  outKne,  as  will  answer 
the  purpose  of  fixing  the  reader's  attention  upon  the 
more  obvious  divisions  of  our  intellectual  structure. 

The  operation  which  has  generally  been  recog- 
nised by  almost  all  previous  writers,  is  that  of  per- 
ception. There  has  been  great  uniformity  in  the 
language  employed,  to  describe  the  nature  and 
limits  of  this  faculty.  There  can  be  no  act  of  per- 
ception unless  the  mind  receives  an  impression 
from  external  objects.      This  seems  to  have  been 


376        ON    DISTINCT   FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND. 

unanimously  agreed  to  by  all  reasoners.  This  power 
has  sometimes  been  considered  under  two  aspects ; 
the  one  mediate  and  the  other  immediate.  When, 
for  example,  we  read  a  book,  the  letters  are  what 
we  perceive  mimedlately ;  while  the  ideas  which 
are  signified  by  them  are  what  may  be  considered 
as  perceived  mediately. 

It  is  clear  from  the  speculations  of  almost  every 
writer  on  the  mind,  up  to  this  stage  of  history,  that 
perception  claimed  and  obtained  priority  of  con- 
sideration before  any  other  mental  power.  It  is 
also  well  known,  that  whatever  opinion  there  might 
be  entertained  by  different  sects  of  philosophers,  as 
to  the  evidence  which  perception  affords  us  to  arrive 
at  truth,  or  to  form  a  decision  as  to  a  knowledge 
of  things,  there  never  was  any  doubt  but  that  it 
was  really  and  truly  through  the  influence  of  our 
organs  of  perception,  that  we  owed  all  the  informa- 
tion we  had  of  external  nature. 

The  next  important  faculty  of  the  mind  noticed 
and  discussed  by  the  ancient  philosophers  was  that 
of  memory.  This  fills  an  important  office  in  their 
ideas  of  the  mental  economy.  It  consists  in  re- 
taining those  simple  and  complex  ideas  or  notions, 
which  Ave  receive  from  sensation  and  reflexion. 
Aristotle  and  others  paid  great  attention  to  this 
power.  Its  mode  of  operation  was  well  observed 
by  nearly  all  the  ancients  ;  and  the  various  degrees 
of  retention  enjoyed  among  men,  were  accurately 
noticed,  in  the  very  early  periods  of  intellectual 
history.  Memory  was  seen  under  two  phases ;  the 
one  merely  keeping  the  idea  for  some  time  before 


ON    DISTINCT    FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.         377 

it,  dwelling  upon  it,  and  turning  it,  as  it  were, 
over  on  every  side.  This  was  called  contempla- 
tion ;  and  the  same  term  is  used  now  to  express  this 
phenomenon  of  memory.  We  have  again  another 
form  of  memory,  namely,  the  power  of  reviving 
certain  past  ideas  or  trains  of  thought,  after  they 
have  been  for  a  long  period  absent  from  the  mind's 
perception.  The  Grecian  philosophers  dwelt  often 
on  this  exhibition  of  memory ;  and  seem  to  have 
marked  the  laws  of  recurrence  with  great  accuracy. 
They  considered  memory  as  a  kind  of  store-house 
or  repository  of  ideas  or  notions.  Our  language 
of  the  present  day,  is  strikingly  expressive  of  the 
same  thing. 

TVliat  are  called  the  laios  of  memory  were  accu- 
rately and  scientifically  investigated  by  the  ancient 
metaphysicians.  The  modes  in  which  they  dis- 
cussed their  philosophical  principles  led  them  by  a 
direct  route  to  pay  great  attention  to  those  laws. 
Attention  and  repetition  were  found  powerful  as- 
sistants to  remembrance.  When  attention  becomes 
interestedly  and  intensely  fixed,  retention  and  ac- 
curacy are  the  necessary  results ;  and  repetition 
formed  in  ancient  times,  as  it  does  now,  an  ex- 
ercise of  the  highest  importance  in  the  divers  plans 
of  scientific  and  ordinarv  education. 

In  all  the  historical  epochs  of  philosophy,  we 
find  certain  plans  and  suggestions  for  aiding  and 
strengthening  the  power  of  memory.  The  every- 
day practical  importance  of  the  faculty,  naturally 
gave  rise  to  these  projects  for  increasing  its  power 
and  usefulness.     Cicero  speaks  of  artificial  means 


378      ON    DISTINCT    FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND. 

of  strengtliening  the  retentive  principle,  and  that 
he  found  them  of  service  in  his  own  case,  in  the 
delivering  of  his  public  orations.  Several  other 
distinguished  men  of  antiquity  availed  themselves 
of  these  mechanical  aids  to  remembrance. 

Of  all  the  ancients,  Aristotle  seems  to  have 
viewed  memory  in  its  widest  signification.  His 
rules  and  definitions  of  it  became  quite  philosophical 
canons  in  succeeding  ages ;  and  we  find,  throughout 
all  the  scholastic  writings,  his  notions  of  this  men- 
tal power  were  invariably  adopted  by  the  school- 
men of  all  parties. 

The  judgment  was  an  important  intellectual 
power  among  the  ancient  pliilosophers.  They  did 
not  define  it  very  accurately;  but  it  seemed  to 
stand  for  that  prompt  internal  perception  of  truth, 
which  results  from  a  calm  and  dispassionate  consi- 
deration of  evidence.  Among  the  sceptical  sects  of 
antiquity,  we  seldom  find  suspicion  thrown  upon 
the  judgment  itself,  but  chiefly  on  the  materials 
which  were  supposed  to  be  submitted  to  its  notice, 
through  the  channel  of  the  external  senses.  The 
power  itself  generally  escaped  unscathed;  and  where 
there  was  doubt  as  to  the  reality  of  its  determina- 
tions, that  doubt  was  attriljuted,  by  the  Scej^tics, 
to  deceptive  elements  thrown  in  the  path  of  the 
judgment,  to  warp  or  distort  its  decisions. 

Judgment  was  often  denominated  a  perceiving 
or  discerning  of  truth ;  just  as  we  speak,  in  ordi- 
nary language,  of  that  power  at  the  present  time. 
The  various  kinds  of  judgment,  or  rather,  perhaps, 
the  various  topics  on  which  it  was  exercised,  were 


ON    DISTINCT   FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.       379 

often  subjects  of  remark  and  observation  among- 
the  ancients;  and  distinctive  names  or  epithets 
were  given  to  these  efforts  of  the  judgment,  when 
directed  to  particular  departments  of  knowledge. 

Abstraction  was  a  power  of  the  mind  which  the 
earliest  metaphysicians  recognised.  They  consider- 
ed it  much  in  the  same  light  as  we  do  at  present. 
With  them,  as  wdth  us,  it  was  the  withdrawal  of 
an  idea  or  general  notion  from  others  with  which 
it  might  be  accidentally  or  necessarily  connected, 
and  considering  it  apart.  The  mathematical  stu- 
dies of  the  ancients  were  highly  instrumental  in 
bringing  this  faculty  of  the  mind  perpetually  before 
them,  and  of  impressing  them  with  a  lively  convic- 
tion of  its  great  usefulness  and  importance. 

Reasoning,  in  the  general  opinion  of  the  ancients, 
was  related  more  intimately  to  the  dialectic  art, 
than  to  the  judgment.  Reasoning  was  of  a  more 
light  and  artistic  character  than  the  latter.  Gra- 
vity and  circiunspection  were  the  characteristics  of 
the  judgment.  Reasoning,  on  the  contrary,  seemed 
not  to  have  much  necessary  connection  with  truth, 
and  not  by  any  means  to  possess  a  very  lively  and 
disinterested  affection  for  her.  Mere  reasoners  were 
always  plentiful,  and  to  be  found  every  where,  and 
ready  armed  upon  all  questions ;  but  men  of  judg- 
ment were  more  rare.  E/casoning  often  coquetted 
with  error,  but  judgment  showed  more  steadiness 
and  fidelity.  The  former  often  brought  temporary 
discredit  upon  philosophy  by  attempting  to  show 
"  the  weaker  to  be  the  stronger  reason ;"  but  the 
power  of  the  judgment  was  a  prudent  and  faithful 


380       ON    DISTINCT    FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND. 

friend,  whose  opinion  was  always  valuable,  and  car- 
ried lasting  esteem  and  respect  with  it. 

Imagination  was  a  well  known  and  universally 
recognised  faculty  of  the  mind  among  the  ancients. 
It  stands  prominently  out  from  the  other  faculties, 
and  enjoys  a  more  striking  individuality  of  charac- 
ter. It  is  the  source  of  many  pleasures  and  pains, 
and  exercises  a  powerful  influence  on  the  weal  or 
woe  of  mankind.  This  the  olden  philosophers  were 
not  slow  to  perceive ;  but  I  think  we  have  no  very 
decided  evidence  to  show,  that  they  were  so  fuUy 
sensible  of  the  immense  power  of  this  faculty,  in 
contributing  to  our  rational  pleasures,  as  more  mo- 
dern speculators  on  the  mind  have  proved  them- 
selves to  be.  The  cultivation  of  imaginative  excel- 
lencies in  the  last  two  centuries,  has  far  exceeded 
anything  which  the  ancients  ever  performed,  or 
had  any  conception  could  be  achieved. 

But  perhaps  the  most  common  division  of  the 
mental  faculties  which  the  ancient  metaphysicians 
made,  was  that  which  placed  them  under  two 
classes, — those  of  the  understanding^  and  those  of 
the  icill.  We  meet  with  this  classification  every 
way,  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  And  we  cannot 
help  suspecting  that  this  division  must  have  pre- 
sented some  obvious  advantages,  or  been  considered 
as  the  most  natural  arrangement,  when  we  find  it 
so  generally  adopted.  At  bottom,  the  faculties  of 
the  understanding  and  the  icill  stand  for  those 
which  we  in  modern  times  call  the  intellectual  and 
actioe  powers  of  man.  Our  mode  of  treating  and 
illustrating  these  does  not  differ  from  that  adopted 


ON    DISTINCT    FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.       381 

by  the  ancient  sages  of  Greece,  nor  from  that 
which  all  the  Fathers  of  the  Church  recognised. 

And  it  may  be  observed,  in  passing,  that  there  is 
notlimg  in  nature  more  distinctly  marked  than  the 
active  and  contemplative  powers  of  the  mind,  There 
is  no  mistake  about  their  respective  modes  of  ac- 
tion ;  but  there  is  a  great  variety  of  human  cha- 
racter resulting  from  the  irregular  manner  in  which 
they  are  distributed  among  mankind.  The  active 
and  speculative  powers  are  never  found  in  full  per- 
fection in  any  single  individual.  Indeed  this  is 
impossible ;  for  it  falls  little  short  of  demanding 
that  a  man  should  be  moving  and  still,  at  one  and 
the  same  moment.  Wherever  a  mind  is  naturally 
inclined  to  speculation  or  contemplation,  there  is  a 
corresponding  depression  of  his  active  energies ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  where  physical  and  men- 
tal activity  is  the  prominent  feature,  there  the  spe- 
culative powers  become  correspondingly  inert.  And 
this  is  a  wise  and  providential  arrangement.  It 
seems  impossible  to  conceive  how  the  affairs  of  the 
world  could  be  carried  on,  were  this  not  the  case. 
The  most  profound  and  the  most  important  specu- 
lative principles  or  systems  would  l^e  a  dead  letter, 
if  they  were  not  matm^ed  and  nourished  by  the 
every-day  active  powers  of  the  mass  of  mankind. 
And  again,  if  action  Avere  not  regulated  and  guided 
by  contemplative  minds,  no  beneficial  end  could 
be  attained. 

In  discussing  systems  of  education,  the  active 
and  speculative  powers  of  individuals  should  be 
carefully  studied.    The  active  greatly  preponderate 


382      ON    DISTINCT    FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND. 

over  the  passive  or  contemplative  powers.  Still 
they  ought  both  to  be  provided  for  in  all  compre- 
hensive schemes  of  instruction,  either  public  or 
private.  If  this  be  neglected,  or  imperfectly  at- 
tended to,  no  happy  result  can  possibly  follow. 


REMARKS    ON    FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.       383 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

GENERAL  REMARKS  ON  FACULTIES  OF  THE  MIND, 
AND  OF  WHAT  MAY  BE  URGED  AGAINST  THEIR 
INDIVIDUAL  EXISTENCE,  NATURE,  AND  OPERA- 
TION. 


It  must  be  obvious  to  every  reader  of  the  history 
of  mental  philosophy,  that  there  were,  in  almost 
every  age,  a  small  number  of  persons  Avho  seemed 
inclined  to  adopt  the  absolute  unity,  or  singleness 
of  the  mind  of  man.  It  is  difficult  to  emT)ody  the 
general  arguments  for  this  opinion,  principally 
from  their  extreme  subtility,  and  the  imperfections 
of  language.  But  the  fact  is  quite  clear,  that  the 
usual  doctrine  of  separate  faculties,  was  not  very 
cordially  embraced  by  some,  at  least,  of  the  emi- 
nent sages  of  antiquity. 

As  this  abstract  question  is  interesting  to  all 
expounders  of  metaphysical  doctrines,  I  shall  state 
what  I  conceive  to  be  the  chief  arguments  against 
distinct  faculties  or  powers  of  the  mind.  This 
shall  be  done  fully,  without  confining  myself  to 
what  may  be  considered  as  the  exclusive  opinions 


384  GENERAL    REMARKS    ON 

of  the  ancients  on  this  point.  Allusions  to  modern 
writers  and  modern  opinions  will  be  made,  in  order 
that  the  reader  may  have  as  full  a  view  of  the 
arguments  on  each  side,  as  I  am  able  to  furnish. 
I  beg  to  state,  however,  that  I  do  not  wish  to  have 
the  following  observations  considered  as  my  own 
individual  sentiments  on  this  subject ;  but  simply 
as  conveying  a  few  thoughts  on  a  mental  hypo- 
thesis opposite  to  that  which  is  most  commonly 
adopted  by  writers  on  the  human  mind. 

Judging  from  a  cursory  glance,  there  appears  to 
be  little  foundation  for  the  doctrine  of  distinct  or 
separate  faculties  of  the  mind.  Were  it  composed 
or  made  up  of  parts  or  principles  independent  of 
each  other,  we  should  instantly  be  able  to  recog- 
nise them,  and  point  out  their  specific  differences, 
as  readily  as  we  do  between  an  arm  or  a  leg  of  our 
own  bodies.  When  we  attend  carefully,  however, 
to  what  passes  in  our  own  mind,  and  l)ring  the 
matter  in  dispute  to  the  test  of  consciousness,  we 
can  perceive  no  real  difference  between  many  men- 
tal operations  which  are  commonly  referred  to  dis- 
tinct faculties.  Let  us  take  a  case  for  illustration. 
Almost  all  metaphysicians  agree  that  judgment 
and  imagination  are  very  different  powers  from 
each  other.  But  in  what  does  that  difference  con- 
sist ?  What  is  it  that  constitutes  them  two  dis- 
tinct faculties  ?  Can  theii*  specific  differences  be 
clearly  pointed  out  ?  I  think  not.  When  a  person 
proposes,  for  example,  a  question  to  me,  that  two 
and  three  make  five,  I  readily  solve  it ;  but  I  can- 
not do  this  without  bringing  to  my  recollection 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.  385 

(by  an  effort  similar  to  that  which  is  called  imagi- 
nation) what  the  terms  two  and  three  stand  for. 
Now  what  is  this  effort  of  the  mind  which  suggests 
the  ideas  we  have  attached  to  the  words  tioo  and 
three  ?     Is  it  not  the  same  mental  power  as  that 
which  forms  other  combinations  which  are  usually 
referred  to  imag-ination  ?     Let  any  one  attend  to 
what  passes  in  his  own  mind,  when  he  goes  over 
again  a»y  simple  proposition  in  geometry  without 
having  the  diagram  before  him.     He  will  perceive 
that  he  cannot  take  a  single  step  in  the  process  of 
demonstration  without  employing  what  is  termed 
the  faculty  of  imagination.     At  first  he  will  form  a 
conception  of  the  diagram ;  and  then  commence  to 
show  the  numerous  relations  which  subsist  between 
the  divers  parts  of  it.    But  the  same  mental  power 
which  is  here  employed,  may  also  be  perceived, 
when   a   person  desires  me  to  furnish  him  with 
an  account  of  an  accident  which  befel  a  mutual 
friend  in  America,  or  any  other  distant  part  of  the 
world.     The  ideas  a1)out  which  the  mind  is  em- 
ployed in  these  two  cases  are  very  different ;  but 
still  that  faculty  of  the  mind  by  which  I  solve  the 
geometrical  problem,  and  that  by  whicli  I  give  an 
account   of  the   accident  which  befel  my  friend, 
seem,  as  far  as  the  testimony  of  consciousness  goes, 
to  be  one  and  the  same.     When  the  request   is 
made  to  give  a  faithful  account  of  the  accident  in 
question,  I  immediately  form  a  conception  of  my 
friend's  person,  similar  to  what  I  do  of  the  dia- 
gram; and  then  begin  to  relate  the  various  and 
serious  circumstances  attending  the  accident,  by  the 
*  2  c 


386  GENERAL    REMARKS    ON 

same  mental  processes,  to  all  appearance,  which 
were  used  in  solving  the  proposition  in  geometry. 

Shall  we  say,  then,  there  is  no   difference  be- 
tween imagination  and  judgment ;    two  faculties 
which  have  been  distinguished  by  mankind  in  all 
ages  ?     The  true  answer  to  this  question,  I  appre- 
hend, is,  that  though  mankind  have  always  made 
such  a  distinction  in  our  mental  nomenclature,  yet 
that  distinction  arises  solely  from  the  circumstance 
that  the  ideas  the  mind  is  employed  about,   are 
(if  I  may  be  allowed  such  phraseology)  true  in  the 
one   case,   and   false   in   the   other;    or   in    other 
words,  that  real  and  fictitious  representations  con- 
stitute the  onlv  difference  between  these  two  men- 
tal  powers.     Even  philosophers  themselves  point 
out  no  palpable  distinction,  save  what  arises  from 
the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  ideas  employed  in 
both  cases.     A  writer,  for  example,  who  gives  an 
account  of  any  transaction  just  as  it  happened, 
without  adding  the  slightest   colourable  circum- 
stance, (if  ever  such  a  T^a^iter  did  exist),  would  be 
called,  in  the  language  of  philosophical  criticism,  a 
Avriter  without  any  imagination.     Another  author, 
however,  w^ho  gives  a  description  of  the  same  trans- 
action, but  amplifies  and  distorts  every  incident 
which  really  took  place,  would  be  called  a  man 
of  a  fine  and  lively  imagination.     But  what  is  the 
difference  between  them  ?     Only  this,  that  the  one 
gives,  or  is  supposed  to  give,  a  real  representation 
of  facts ;  and  the  other,  a  fictitious  one,  or  at  least 
a  narrative  mixed  with  a  goodly  portion  of  fictitious 
circumstances. 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.  387 

It  appears,  then,  that  the  word  imagination  is 
employed  by  mankind  to  denote  what  has  no  foun- 
dation in  truth ;  and  this  is  all  they  mean  when 
they  speak  about  the  faculty  of  imagination.  We 
very  frequently  find,  when  we  A^dsh  to  convince 
individuals  of  the  truth  of  any  proposition  in  na- 
tural or  moral  philosophy,  with  which  they  are 
previously  unacquainted,  and  which  seems  contrary 
to  their  experience,  they  will  immediately  charge 
you  with  dealing  in  fiction,  and  employing  the  fa- 
culty of  imagination  instead  of  that  of  reasoning. 
Why  ought  the  exercise  of  the  imagination  to  be 
so  strictly  guarded  against  in  philosophical  disqui- 
sitions ?  Why  the  philosopher  will  tell  you,  be- 
cause it  would  lead  you  from  the  truth. 

The  word  imagination  may  also  be  considered, 
in  many  cases,  as  only  another  word  for  invention, 
mien  a  man  sits  do^\Ti  to  A^Tite  a  novel  or  a  play, 
he  must  be  conscious,  if  he  be  capable,  or  in  the 
habit,  of  reflectmg  on  what  passes  in  his  mind,  that 
he  employs  no  other  intellectual  faculty  than  if  he 
were  to  sit  doA\Ti  and  write  a  book  on  metaphysics, 
or  any  other  branch  of  philosophy,  in  which  inven- 
tion is  said  chiefly  to  be  employed.  By  way  of  illus- 
tration :  to  say  that  the  one  author  has  invented  a 
novel  or  a  play,  and  of  the  other  that  he  has  imagined 
a  book  on  metaphysics,  would  be  a  departure  from 
both  common  and  philosophical  language,  but  it 
would  be  no  very  absurd  statement  of  the  fact ; 
and  the  phrase  would  enable  us  to  form  as  correct 
notions  respecting  the  faculty  by  which  the  former 
author  composed  his  novel  or  play,  or  the  latter 

2c  2 


388  GENERAL    REMARKS    ON 

his  treatise  on  the  miiicl,  as  if  we  were  to  use  the 
common  phraseology  that  the  novelist  had  been 
exercising  his  imagination,  and  the  metaphysician 
his  invention. 

It  may  be  objected  to  these  observations,  that 
imagination,  and  what  in  some  systems  of  men- 
tal philosophy  is  called  conception,  are  here  con- 
founded together.  But  I  would  observe,  that  their 
difference  has  not  been  clearly  pointed  out,  even 
by  those  who  have  so  ably  and  zealously  contended 
they  were  distinct  faculties.  Mr.  Dugald  Stewart, 
in  his  chapter  on  Conception,*  says,  "  The  business 
of  conception,  according  to  the  account  I  have 
given  of  it,  is  to  present  us  with  an  exact  transcript 
of  what  we  have  felt  or  perceived.  But  we  have, 
moreover,  a  power  of  modifjdng  our  conceptions, 
by  combining  the  parts  of  different  ones  together 
so  as  to  form  new  wholes  of  our  o^vn  creation.  I 
I  shall  employ  the  word  imagination  to  express 
this  power  ;  and  I  apprehend  that  this  is  the  pro- 
per sense  of  the  word,  if  imagination  be  the  power 
which  gives  birth  to  the  productions  of  the  poet 
and  the  painter.  This  is  not  a  simple  faculty  of 
the  mind.  It  pre-supposes  abstraction,  to  sej)arate 
from  each  other  qualities  and  circumstances  which 
have  been  perceived  in  conjunction ;  and  also  judg- 
ment and  taste  to  direct  us  in  forming  the  combi- 
nations. If  they  are  made  wholly  at  random,  they 
are  proofs  of  insanity."  A  little  farther  on  in  the 
chapter  he  says,  "  A  talent  for  lively  description, 

*  Philosophy  of  the  lliimnn  Mind.     Vol.  1.  p.  VAb. 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.  389 

at  least  in  the  case  of  sensible  objects,  depends 
chiefly  on  the  degree  in  which  the  describer  pos- 
sesses the  power  of  conception." — "  Nor  is  it  merely 
to  the  accuracy  of  our  descriptions  that  this  power 
is  subservient ;  it  contributes  more  than  any  thing 
else  to  render  them  striking  and  expressive  to 
others,  by  guiding  us  to  a  selection  of  such  circum- 
stances as  are  most  prominent  and  characteristic  ; 
insomuch  that  I  think  it  may  reasonably  be  doubted 
if  a  person  would  not  write  a  happier  description  of 
an  object  from  the  conception,  than  from  the  actual 
perception  of  it.  It  has  been  remarked,  that  the  per- 
fection of  description  does  not  consist  in  a  minute 
specification  of  circumstances,  but  in  a  judicious 
selection  of  them ;  and  that  the  best  rule  for  making 
the  selection  is,  to  attend  to  the  particulars  that 
make  the  deepest  impression  on  our  own  minds." 

Conception,  according  to  the  above,  is  that  fa- 
culty which  presents  us  with  an  exact  transcript  of 
what  we  have  felt  or  perceived ;  and  the  power  of 
modifying  our  conceptions  is  called  imagination, 
which  is  not  a  simple  faculty,  for  it  pre-supposes 
abstraction,  judgment,  and  taste.  Now,  if  a  talent 
for  lively  description  arises  from  possessing  the 
power  of  conception  in  a  high  degree,  and  this 
power  is  said  to  present  us  with  an  exact  transcript 
of  what  we  have  felt  or  perceived,  how  can  we  con- 
sistently say  that,  in  exercising  this  faculty,  we 
make  a  ^^  judicious  selection''  of  our  feelings  ?  Does 
not  ^  ^\judicious  selection'"'  ^vQ-s\ii\)])0'&Q  the  exer- 
cise of  abstraction,  judgment,  and  taste  ?     Surely. 


390  GENERAL    REMARKS    ON 

Then  wherein  does  the  difference  lie  between  ima- 
gination and  conception  ? 

It  is  said  that  tliese  faculties  of  the  mind,  sucli 
as  judgment,  imagination,  memory,  and  taste,  never 
exert  their  power  separately,  but  are  always  more 
or  less  combined  with  one  another.     There  is  no 
reasoning  without  memory ;  and  there  can  be  no 
taste  without  imagination,  judgment,  and  memory. 
If  this  be  the  case,  how  can  we  ascertain  the  exist- 
ence of  any  mental  faculties  at  all  ?    If  these  facul- 
ties are  never  perceived  in  a  simple  form,  we  can 
never  be  certain  that  there  are  any  independent 
faculties  whatever.     Wliat  should  we  think  of  a 
chemist  who  should  strenuously  maintain  that  a 
certain  substance  was  composed  of  a  number  of 
other   substances,  T^diich  he  might    call   primary 
ones,  when  the  substance  in  question  had  resisted 
all  the  chemical  processes  hitherto  known  to  de- 
compose it  ? 

Mr.  Locke  appears  to  have  been  fully  aware  of 
the  impropriety  of  talking  about  the  faculties  of 
the  mind,  and  of  the  difficulty  of  proving  their 
existence.  In  one  place  he  says,*  "  But  the  fault 
has  been  that  faculties  have  been  spoken  of  and 
represented  as  so  many  distinct  agents ;  for  it  being 
asked,  what  it  was  that  digested  the  meat  on  our 
stomachs,  it  was  a  ready  and  very  satisfactory  an- 
swer to  say,  that  it  was  the  digestive  faculty .  What 
was  it  that  made  anything  come  out  of  the  body  ? 

*  Kssay  on  the  Human  Understanding,  "^'ol.  1 .  book  2.  chap.  21 . 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.  391 

T\iQ  expulsive  faculty.  What  moyed  ?  Hha  motive 
faculty.  And  so  in  the  mind,  the  intellectual  fa- 
culty, or  the  understanding  understood  ;  for  fa- 
culty, ability,  and  power,  I  think,  are  hut  different 
names  for  the  same  things ;  which  ways  of  speak- 
ing, when  put  in  more  intelligihle  words,  will,  I 
think,  amount  to  thus  much ; — that  digestion  is 
performed  by  something  that  is  able  to  digest; 
motion,  by  something  able  to  move ;  and  under- 
standing, by  something  able  to  understand." 

It  may  be  alleged,  that  though  we  can  form  no 
abstract  notion  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  any 
more  than  we  can  form  an  abstract  notion  of  the 
principle  of  gravitation,  or  of  the  screw  or  the  lever, 
yet  the  hypothesis,  which  is  founded  on  the  exist- 
ence of  independent  mental  faculties,  may  be  fa- 
vourable to  a  proper  classification  of  intellectual 
phenomena,  and  may  assist  us  in  our  researches  of 
the  mind,  in  the  same  way  as  the  principle  of  gra- 
vitation, of  which  we  have  no  conception,  has  been 
instrumental  in  aiding  us  in  our  physical  investiga- 
tions.     To  this  it  may  be  replied,  that  it  is  a  very 
doubtful  proposition  that  gratuitous  principles  can 
ever  be  instrumental  in  the  discovery  of  truth — the 
end  and  object  of  all  pliilosophy.    It  is  an  establish- 
ed maxim  with  those  philosophers  who  maintain 
the  doctrine  of  mental  faculties,  that  we  ought  to 
be  very  cautious  in  reasoning  from  material  pheno- 
mena to  those  of  the  mind,  for  we  may  fancy  there 
is  an  analogy  in  a  case  where,  for  any  thing  we  can 
tell,  there  may  not  be  the  slightest  resemblance. 
Therefore,  if  we  have  taken  a  principle  for  granted 


392  GENERAL    REMARKS    ON 

in  our  physical  researches,  of  which  we  have  no 
idea,  we  are  not  fully  warranted  in  doing  the  same 
in  investigating  the  human  mind ;  for  such  a  mode 
of  proceeding  would  lead  to  the  grossest  ahsurdities. 
Why  are  Hartley's  System  of  Vibrations  and  Aris- 
totle's Ideal  System  rejected  by  many  modern  phi- 
losophers ?  Because  in  the  one  case,  we  cannot 
perceive  any  vibrations ;  and  in  the  other,  are  not 
conscious  of  any  images,  or  forms,  or  species  of  ex- 
ternal objects  being  transmitted  by  the  channel  of 
the  senses  to  the  immediate  seat  of  thought.  Upon 
the  same  principle  of  reasoning,  why  ought  we  to 
say  that  there  are  distinct  faculties  of  the  mind, 
when  these  faculties  cannot  be  perceived. 

The  fact  seems  to  be,  that  philosophers  in  gene- 
ral have  called  certain  kinds  of  ideas,  and  their 
various  combinations,  by  the  name  of  faculties,  with- 
out ascertaining  the  existence,  or  informing  us  of  the 
nature  of  those  faculties  or  powers,  by  which  these 
ideas  are  generated,  and  their  combination  effected. 
A  knowledge  of  the  faculties  and  powers  seems  evi- 
dently above  the  reach  of  human  sagacity.  The 
great  progress  the  science  of  natui*al  philosophy 
has  made,  is  chiefly  ascribed  to  that  mode  of  reason- 
ing which,  recommended  by  Bacon,  commences  with 
an  examination  of  facts,  and  gradually  mounts  up 
to  the  more  general  laws  of  nature.  But  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  human  mind  does  not  seem  to  be 
capable  of  receiving  much  aid  by  a  similar  mode  of 
investigation.  We  can  only  view  the  mind  in  a 
naked  state.  We  are  beings  that  are  conscious 
of  ideas,  or  feelings,  or  perceptions,  and  this  is  all 


FACULTIES    or    THE    MIND.  393 

we  know  of  our  minds ;  and  whatever  may  be  urged 
in  favour  of  general  laws  or  principles  of  the  mind, 
the  existence  of  such  laws  or  princijiles  must  be 
always  problematical  at  best ;  for  we  can  never  be 
conscious  of  their  mode  of  operation;  and  what  we 
are  not  conscious  of,  we  have  little  grounds  to  be- 
lieve can  have  any  existence. 

There  is  a  great  difference  in  prosecuting  the 
study  of  natural  or  experimental  pliilosophy,  and 
the  philosophy  of  the  human  mind.  In  the  for- 
mer, a  person  may  be  put  in  possession  of  the  va- 
rious improvements  and  discoveries  that  have  been 
made  during  many  ages,  without  undergoing  a 
hundredth  part  of  the  bodily  and  mental  toil  that 
was  found  necessaiT  before  the  orio^inal  inventors 
could  bring  these  improvements  and  discoveries  to 
light.  But  in  the  science  of  the  human  mind  there 
has  no  method  been  yet  found  to  facilitate,  in  an 
equal  degree,  the  knowledge  of  discoveries  in  this 
department  of  human  inquiry.  As  much  time  and 
attention  are  frequently  necessary  to  enable  us  to 
form  correct  notions  of  intellectual  appearances, 
treated  of  by  metaphysical  writers,  as  would  bring 
these  appearances  to  our  view  by  our  own  individual 
and  unassisted  efforts. 

There  are  many  causes  of  this  difference.  One 
of  the  principal,  however,  is,  that  no  one  can  un- 
derstand what  another  writes  on  metaphysics  un- 
less he  has  pre\dously  learned  the  art  of  scrutinizing 
his  own  thoughts ;  or,  as  some  say,  of  exercising 
his  own  consciousness.  This  art  bears,  in  a  great 
measure,  the  same  relation  to  the  science  of  the 


394  GENERAL    REMARKS    ON 

raind,  as  experiment  does  to  natural  philosophy. 
To  many  it  is  an  art  hoth  difficult  in  its  attainment 
and  difficult  in  its  practice.     But  it  is  necessary ; 
and  until  a  person  has  learned  it,  and  can  practise 
it  with  ease  and  dexterity,  he  cannot  reasonahly 
hope  to  reap  much  pleasure  or  improvement  from 
perusing  treatises  on  the  human  mind.     Without 
this  preliminary   knowledge,  such  writings  must 
necessarily  appear  almost  unintelligihle,  and  will 
speedily  disgust  the  reader  with  a  constant  repeti- 
tion of  words  and  phrases  to  which  he  can  attach 
no  clear  or  definite  notions ;     and  which  cannot 
fail  to  produce  disappointment,  inasmuch  as  they 
pretend  to  he  descriptive  of  mental  operations,  whose 
existence,  for  want  of  reflecting  on  his  own  mind, 
he  is  unahle  to  perceive. 

To  those,  however,  who  are  in  the  hahit  of  exer- 
cising their  consciousness,  I  suhmit  the  few  fol- 
lowing observations  on  abstraction.    I  know  they 
will  differ  from  the  opinions  of  many  eminent  phi- 
losophers of  the  present  day ;  but  in  inquiries  of 
this  nature,  authority  considered  merely  as  such, 
however  great  and  weighty,  must  go  for  nothing, 
where  not  supported  by  the  evidence  of  conscious- 
ness.    It  is  to  this  power  that  all  appeals  must 
be  made  for  determinino;  the  truth  or  falsehood  of 
propositions  in  metaphysics ;    for  without  such  a 
tribunal,  this  science  would  soon  relapse  into  that 
state  of  comparative  confusion,  from  which  it  has 
so  lately  been  rescued. 

It  appears  to  me  that  general  principles,  which 
are  said  to  be  formed  by  the  faculty  of  abstrac- 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.  395 

tion,  are  nothing  but  certain  words  representing  a 
number  of  individual  thoughts,  perceptions,  or,  if 
you   will,   observations ;   and  that  it  requires  no 
other  faculty  to  speak  or  think  of  such  general 
principles,  than  to  speak  or  think  of  any  one  of 
the  individual  thoughts  or  perceptions  that  com- 
pose them.    All  projected  bodies,  for  example,  have 
a  tendency  to  fall  to  earth  again.    This  is  a  general 
principle  in  natural  philosophy,  and  is  formed,  it  is 
commonly  said,  by  abstraction.    But  when  we  come 
to  examine  how  the  mind  arrives  at  this  conclusion 
or  general  principle,  we  shall  see  there  is  nothing 
that  ought  to  induce  us  to  attribute  its  formation 
to  any  other  operation  of  the  mind  than  that  by 
which  we  perceive  and  speak  about  individual  ob- 
jects.    Let  us  suppose  a  being  possessed  of  all  the 
susceptibilities  of  knowledge  which  we  possess,  to 
make   his   appearance   on   this    globe.     The   first 
time  he  saw  a  stone  thrown  up  into  the  air,  he 
would  2)e)^cewe  that  after  a  certain  time  had  elapsed, 
it  would  fall  again  to  the  ground.     A  second  time 
he  would  perceive  the  same  result ;  and  if  similar 
experiments  were  made  with  projected  bodies  a 
thousand  times  with  different  substances,  and  "with 
different  velocities,  he  would  perceive  the    same 
effect,  that  all  these  bodies  would  ultimately  return 
to  the  earth  from  whence  they  were  thrown.  Hence 
he  would  conclude,  that  all  projected  bodies  would 
return  to  the  earth  again  :  which  is  nothing  more 
than  an  expression  of  a  number  of  individual  per- 
ceptions.— The  first  time  he  saAV  the  stone  fall,  it 
was,  agreeably  to  the  common  theory,  by  the  faculty 


396  GENERAL    ilEMARKS    ON 

of  perception ;  and  is  there  not  every  reason  to 
believe  that  the  last  time,  as  well  as  the  interme- 
diate ones,  were  perceived  by  the  same  power  ? 

In  like  manner,  it  may  also  be  slio^vn,  that 
general  principles  in  morals  and  politics  are  formed 
in  the  same  way  as  the  preceding.  When  we  say 
that  all  men  are  more  or  less  influenced  in  their 
actions  by  self-love,  we  only  mean  that  we,  as  well 
as  others,  have  always  perceived  that  the  greater 
part  of  the  exertions  of  mankind  tend  to  the  grati- 
fication of  some  passion  or  appetite.  Unless  the 
individual  observations,  on  which  general  principles 
are  founded,  have  come  under  our  view,  we  cannot 
be  said  to  understand  them,  or  give  a  rational 
assent  to  them.  On  the  contrary,  in  proportion  to 
the  number  of  our  indi^ddual  observations,  the 
truth  of  such  moral  principles  will  be  more  uni- 
versally acknowledged. 

The  resemblance  and  disagreement  among  the 
objects  of  nature  form  the  foundation  on  which  all 
abstract  or  general  reasoning  is  built.  But  the 
mere  circumstance  of  the  mind  expressing  a  re- 
semblance or  analogy  among  a  number  of  indi- 
vidual objects,  cannot  warrant  us  in  maintaining 
there  is  any  other  faculty  employed  for  tliis  pur- 
pose, than  that  which  enables  us  to  affirm  or  deny 
any  thing  about  any  individual  object  of  thought 
or  perception.  Here  is  certainly  a  difference  of 
effect,  but  if  we  attend  to  our  consciousness,  no 
difference  of  cause  is  observable.  The  perception 
of  reseml)lance  of  colour,  for  instance,  between  two 
or  more  objects,   is  perceived  as   quickly,  and  is 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.  397 

as  much  an  individual  object  of  thought,  as  the 
figure,  density,  or  any  other  quality  of  the  objects. 
That  faculty  by  which  we  perceive  the  figure  and 
other  qualities,  and  that  by  which  we  perceive  the 
resemblance  of  colour,  must,  I  think,  be  considered 
as  one  and  the  same. 

The  manner  in  which  general  terms  are  said  to 
originate,  throws  no  light  upon  the  faculty  of 
abstraction.  The  commonly  received  theory  of  the 
origin  of  these  terms  is  that  mentioned  by  Locke, 
Condillac,  and  Adam  Smith.  The  last  author,  in  a 
Dissertation  on  Languages,  prefixed  to  his  Tlieory 
of  Moral  Sentiments,  says;  "The  assignation  of 
particular  names  to  denote  particular  objects — that 
is,  the  institution  of  nouns  substantial,  would  pro- 
bably be  one  of  the  first  steps  towards  the  forma- 
tion of  language.  The  particular  cave,  whose  cover- 
ing sheltered  the  savage  from  the  weather ;  the 
particular  tree,  whose  fruit  relieved  his  hunger ;  the 
particular  fountain  whose  water  allayed  his  thirst, 
would  first  be  denominated  by  the  words  cave, 
tree,  fountain  ;  or,  by  whatever  other  appellations 
he  might  think  proper,  in  that  primitive  jargon, 
to  mark  them.  Afterwards  when  the  more  en- 
larged experience  of  this  savage  had  led  him  to 
observe,  and  his  necessary  occasions  obliged  him  to 
make  mention  of,  other  caves,  and  other  trees,  and 
other  fountains,  he  would  naturally  bestow  upon 
each  of  those  new  objects,  the  same  name  by  which 
he  had  been  accustomed  to  express  the  similar  he 
was  first  acquainted  with.  And  thus  these  words, 
which  were  originally  the  proper  names  of  indivi- 


398       .  GENERAL    REMARKS    ON 

duals,  would  each  of  them  insensibly  become  the 
common  name  of  a  multitude.  What  constitutes 
a  species ^^''  he  continues,  "  is  merely  a  number  of 
objects  bearing  a  certain  degree  of  resemblance  to 
one  another ;  and,  on  that  account,  denominated 
by  a  single  appellation,  which  may  be  applied  to 
express  any  one  of  them,"  Condillac  also  says,* 
"  A  child  calls  by  the  name  of  tree,  the  first  tree 
which  we  show  him.  A  second  tree  which  he  sees 
recals  to  him  the  same  idea,  and  he  designates  it 
by  the  same  name ;  he  gives  the  same  name  to  a 
third,  the  same  to  a  fourth.  Thus  we  find  that  the 
word  tree,  applied  at  first  to  an  individual  object, 
becomes  the  name  of  a  class  or  genus,  an  abstract 
idea,t  comprehending  all  trees  in  general." 

There  is  nothing  in  these  passages  respecting  the 
origin  of  general  names  that  requires  any  other  fa- 
culty than  that  which  treats  of  individual  objects. 
What  constitutes  a  species,  says  Mr.  Smith,  is 
only  a  single  name  given  to  a  number  of  objects 
bearing  a  certain  degree  of  similarity  to  one  an- 
other. But  why  should  we  suppose  that  a  different 
faculty  is  required  to  give  a  name  to  an  individual 

*  "  Un  enfant  appelle  du  nom  d'Arbre  le  i^remier  arbre  que  nous  lui 
montrons.  —  Un  second  arbre  qu'il  voit  ensuite  lui  rappelle  la  meme  idee ; 
il  lui  donne  le  meme  nom  ;  de  meme  a  un  troisieme,  a  un  quatrieme ;  et 
voilii  le  mot  d'Arbre,  donne  d'abord  a  un  individu,  qui  devient  pour  lui 
un  nom  de  classe  ou  de  genre,  une  idee  abstraite  qui  comprend  tons  les 
arbres  en  general."  See  also  Locke,  Essay  on  the  Human  Under- 
standing, Book  ii.  c.  ii.  sect.  9 ;  and  Book  iii.  c  iii.  sect.  7. 

t  Abstract  idea,  or  abstract  term,  for  I  am  doubtful  whether  "  idee" 
means,  in  this  passage,  precisely  what  we  should  understand  by  idea, 
when  speaking  simply  of  the  act  of  percention. 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.  399 

object  from  that  which  gives  a  name  to  a  multi- 
tude of  objects  that  bear  a  certain  degree  of  resem- 
blance ?     The  savage  and  the  child,  upon  the  as- 
sumed theory  now  stated,  give  the  name  of  tree  to 
the  first  tree  they  perceive,  or  that  is  pointed  out 
to  them ;  and  when  a  number  of  trees  of  various 
kinds  are  exhibited  to  their  view,  thev  denominate 
them  by  the  term  tree^  because  they  resemble,  in  a 
variety  of  particulars,   the  tree  or  trees  they  al- 
ready know.    But  I  see  no  reason  for  creating  a  fa- 
culty for  the  purpose  of  giving  this  number  of  trees 
a  common  name,  merely  because  their  resemblance 
is  not  so  complete  as  to  amount  to  identity.     To 
say  that  where  the  resemblance  between  two  or 
'more  objects  is  so  great  as  to  constitute  them  of 
the  same  kind,  we  assign  names  to  them  by  means 
of  one  faculty  of  the  mind ;  and  where  that  resem- 
blance is  not  so  evident,  we  give  names  to  ol)jects 
by  means  of  another  faculty  of  the  mind ;  is,  in 
my  opinion,  neither  philosophical  nor  just.     Be- 
sides, may  it  not  be  asked,  that  as  no  two  objects 
in  nature  are  precisely  the  same  in  all  particulars, 
at  what  point  of  resemblance  does  the  one  faculty 
cease  to  act  and  the  other  begin  ? 

Mr.  Locke  seems  to  have  employed  the  word  ab- 
straction  in  a  more  limited  sense  than  modern  phi- 
losophers have  done.  He  says,  "  The  acts  of  the 
mind,  wherein  it  exerts  its  power  over  its  simple 
ideas,  are  these  : — Pirst,  combining  several  simple 
ideas  into  one  compound  one.  Secondly,  bringino* 
two  ideas  together,  and  setting  them  by  one  an- 
other; bv  which  we  come  at  all  ideas  of  relation. 


400  GENERAL    REMARKS    ON 

Thirdly,  separating'  our  ideas  from  other  ideas  that 
accompany  them  in  their  real  existence."  To  this 
last  act  of  the  mind  he  gives  the  name  of  abstrac- 
tion ;  to  the  other  two  acts  he  gives  no  names 
whatever.*  I  believe  that  most  metaphysicians 
since  Mr.  Locke's  time  have  referred  all  these  dif- 
ferent acts  of  the  mind  to  abstraction.  The  dis- 
tinctions, however,  this  philosopher  has  here  point- 
ed out,  would  certainly  justify  us  in  referring  them 
to  distinct  faculties,  as  much  as  manv  other  dis- 
tinctions  that  are  commonly  referred  to  separate 
principles.  It  may  be  considered  as  something 
curious  that  he  should  say  in  his  third  and  fourth 
books  that  general  ideas  are  fictitious  contrivances 
of  the  mind. 

Mr.  Stewart  observes,!  "This  poAver  of  consider- 
ing certain  qualities  or  attributes  of  an  object  apart 
from  the  rest ;  or,  as  I  would  rather  choose  to  de- 
fine it,  the  power  which  the  understanding  has  of 
separating  the  combinations  which  are  presented 
to  it,  is  distinguished  by  logicians  by  the  name  of 
ahstr action.'''  Had  the  celebrated  author  confined 
himseK  to  the  fii'st  part  of  this  sentence,  as  con- 
veying what  he  meant  by  the  faculty  of  abstrac- 
tion, his  definition  would  have  been  intelligible 
enough :  but  being  desirous  to  define  it  better,  he 
has  only  rendered  it  more  obscure.  Eor  what  is 
meant  by  combinations  presented  to  the  mind  I  am 
at  a  loss  to  conjecture.    If  Mr.  Stewart  means  that 

*  Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding,  Book  2.  c.  12.  sect.  1. 
t  Elements    of    tlie    Philosophy    of    the    Human    Mind,    Vol.     1. 
)).  156. 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.  401 

certain  thoughts  are  presented  to  the  mind  in  a 
complex  or  compounded  state,  and  that  the  mind 
has  the  power  of  analysing  them  into  their  elemen- 
tary parts,  then  I  differ  from  him.  The  thoughts 
of  man  must  be  considered  as  individual  objects, 
apparently  incapable  of  analysis.  If  they  can  be 
analysed,  they  can  be  subdivided ;  and  what  is  ca- 
pable of  subdivision,  may  be  divided  ad  infinitum. 
Then  if  thoughts  are  infinitely  divisible,  they  must 
be  infinitely  extended;  and  what  is  infinitely  di- 
visible and  extended,  can  have  no  elementary  parts ; 
consequently  thoughts  must  be  nothing  at  all. — 
What  a  fine  doctrine  for  the  Sceptics ! 

But  if  the  first  part  of  this  sentence  be  a  defini- 
tion of  what  Mr.  Stewart  calls  abstraction,  viz.  the 
power  of  considering  certain  qualities  or  attributes 
of  an  object  apart  from  the  rest,  then  I  say  that 
the  mind  never  does  anything  else  but  abstract ; — 
with  this  qualification,  however,  that  the  mind  only 
considers  one  quality  or  attribute  of  an  object  at 
the  same  instant,  and  not  more  than  one,  as  Mr. 
Stewart  here  affirms.  It  is  a  commonly  received 
maxim,  that  the  mind  can  only  be  occupied  with 
one  idea  at  the  same  time.  When  a  tree  comes 
before  my  view,  I  do  not  in  the  same  instant  of 
time  contemplate  its  height,  its  thickness,  its  figure, 
its  extension,  the  colour  of  its  bark  and  leaves,  and 
the  disposition  of  its  branches.  If  I  attend  to  one 
of  these  qualities  or  attributes,  the  rest  must  be 
excluded  from  my  mind  at  the  moment  the  other 
is  under  contemplation.  These  attributes  must 
come  into  my  mind  in  succession,  and  cannot  all 
*  '  2d 


402  GENERAL   REMARKS   ON 

be  present  to  it,  so  to  speak,  at  the  same  indiyidual 
point  of  time.  This  is  sufficient,  I  think,  to  shew, 
that  the  human  mind  is  always  employed  about  in- 
dividual objects,  and  that  what  are  called  complex 
or  general  ideas  have  really  no  existence,  in  the 
sense  in  which  they  are  commonly  considered. 

Such  phrases  as  compoimding  and  decompounding 
our  ideas,  seimrating  the  combinations  of  sense,  and 
many  others  of  a  like  description,  have  absolutely 
no  meaning  when  applied  to  the  mind.  When  con- 
fined to  the  science  of  chemistry,  they  may  be  very 
correctly  and  very  usefully  employed ;  but  there  is 
not  the  slightest  analogy  to  justify  their  application 
in  mental  philosophy.  Are  we  ever  conscious  of  this 
composition  and  decomposition  among  our  ideas  ? 
Sulphate  of  iron  and  nut-galls  are  two  distinct 
substances  ;  but  when  joined  together  they  make 
another  substance  very  different  from  either,  and 
which  much  resembles,  in  its  properties  and  appear- 
ance, the  ink  I  write  with.  Do  we  ever  see  a  sim- 
ple idea.  A,  for  example,  entering  into  combination 
with  another  simple  idea,  B,  and  forming,  by  their 
union,  another  totally  different  idea,  C  ?  I  think 
every  one  who  has  paid  the  slightest  attention  to  his 
own  mind,  must  answer  this  in  the  negative.  Yet, 
unless  there  be  appearances  of  this  description  ob- 
servable in  our  mind,  such  phrases,  making  every 
allowance  for  metaphorical  language,  ought  to  be 
employed  only  in  a  qualified  sense ;  for  instead  of 
enlightening  and  guiding  our  judgment,  they  are 
apt,  in  such  inquiries,  to  darken  and  lead  it  astray. 

If  we  examine  the  svstem  of  mental  faculties  a 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.  403 

little  more  narrowly,  we  shall  find,  that  instead 
of  its  proving  conclusive,  it  is  pregnant  with  dif- 
ficulties, which   are    apparently   insurmountable. 
There  are  very  few,  if  any,  of  the  faculties,  accord- 
ing to  the  received  theory  on  the  subject,  which 
can  be  considered  as  acting  simply ;  for  we  find  by 
appeals  to   our  consciousness,  that  they  seem  to 
be  incapable  of  being  conceived  in  a  single  state. 
What  is  called  the  faculty  of  attention  is  defined 
to  be  that  by  which  we  simply  think  of  a  particular 
thing  or  object.     The  faculty  of  reason  is  also  said 
to  be  that  by  which  we  are  able  to  draw  inferences 
from  premises.   This  is  considered  a  simple  faculty, 
not  a  compound  one.      Now,  it  is  utterly  incon- 
ceivable  how   a   man   w^ould   draw   an  inference 
from  premises,  without  paying  attention  to  that 
inference  and  those  premises ;  or,  in  other  words, 
T\dthout  thinking  of  them.      Again,  perception  is 
defined  to  be  the  faculty  by  which   we   perceive 
things.     Now,   we   cannot   draw^  inferences  from 
premises,  unless  we  perceive  these  inferences  and 
premises.  Here,  then,  we  have  the  faculty  of  reason, 
considered  a  simple  faculty,  compounded  of  atten- 
tion and  perception.      How  many  questions  arise 
from  these  considerations,  which  it  w^ould  be  very 
difiicult  to  solve  ?    Might  we  not  ask.  What  is  the 
nature  of  this  faculty  of  reason,  when  influenced  by 
these  faculties  of  attention  and  perception  ?    What 
effects  would  it  produce  if  acting  by  vii'tue  of  its 
own  inherent  power  ?     And  by  what  means  shall 
we  be  able  to  perceive  in  what  respect  it  differs 
from  the  other  powers  combined  with  it  ? 

2d  2 


404  GENEHAL    REMARKS    ON 

Eor  the  sake  of  further  illustration,  we  will  take 
another  faculty,  memory  for  instance,  and  we  shall 
find  that  we  cannot  look  upon  it  as  a  simple  faculty. 
It  implies  perception,  attention,  and  consciousness. 
When  a  past  idea  is  present  to  the  mind,  we  must 
perceive  it,  and  we  must  also  attend  to  it,  otherwise 
the  words  perception  and  attention  have  no  meaning. 
And  there  appears  to  he  so  close  a  connection  he- 
tween  consciousness  and  memory,  that  we  might, 
without  producing  an  ambiguity,  define  this  latter 
faculty,  that  by  wliich  we  are  conscious  of  a  past 
idea.  This  definition  would  he  in  unison  with  th3 
established  mode  of  speaking  among  the  generality 
of  mankind ;  for  when  their  memory  is  taxed  to 
remember  any  past  event,  they  say,  "  I  am  not 
conscious  of  having  said  or  done  such  a  thing." 
A  phrase  can  mean  nothing  more  or  less  than,  "  I  do 
not  remember  having  said  or  done  such  a  thing."* 

It  must  appear  evident,  upon  the  slightest  con- 
sideration, that  distinct  mental  faculties  can  in  no 
way  be  useful  in  explaining  mental  appearances, 
until  the  nature  of  these  faculties  themselves  is 
well  understood,  and  we  are  able  to  furnish  a  satis- 
factory explanation  of  those  laws  which  regulate 
the   simple  powers  of  which  they  are  said  to  be 

*  It  may  be  worth  while  to  remark  here  in  passing,  that  Mr.  Stewart, 
in  treating  of  attention  as  being  a  distinct  faculty  of  the  mind,  says, 
though  several  authors  have  spoken  of  attention  in  general  terms,  he 
was  not  aware  that  any  author,  ancient  or  modem,  had  spoken  of  it  as 
a  separate  faculty.  But  if  he  will  look  into  Condillac's  "  Precis  des 
Lemons  Prelim inaires,  vol.  8  of  his  works,  he  will  find  attention  not  only 
enumerated  among  the  mental  facidties,  but  an  attempt  is  made  to  re- 
solve several  other  faculties  into  it. 


PACULTIES   OF    THE    MINJJ.  405 

compounded.  This  is  absolutely  necessary  as  a 
preliminaty  step.  That  wiiich  is  to  serve  as  an 
explanation,  ought  to  be  clearer  and  more  evident 
than  the  thing  to  be  explained,  otherwise  no  ex- 
planation can  be  effected.  It  certainly  cannot  be 
considered  as  an  infallible  method  of  arriving  at 
truth,  to  take  a  principle  for  granted,  and  after- 
wards prove  the  truth  of  the  inferences  drawn 
from  it.  We  should  demonstrate  the  truth  of  the 
principle  first,  and  the  truth  of  the  inferences  will 
consequently  be  estabKshed.  Now,  has  any  meta- 
physician ever  undertaken  to  show  in  what  manner 
the  faculties  of  abstraction,  judgment,  and  taste, 
act  upon  the  faculty  of  imagination,  so  as  to  make 
it  form  imaginary  appearances  ?  Or  in  what  way 
the  faculties  of  consciousness,  perception,  and  atten- 
jtion  act  upon  memory,  by  which  we  are  capable  of 
bringing  to  our  recollection  past  events  ?  No  one, 
as  far  as  my  information  goes,  has  ever  undertaken 
any  such  thing. 

If  by  mental  faculty  is  simply  meant,  the  power 
the  mind  has  to  do  any  particular  thing,  then  no 
one  will  deny  that  the  mind  has  faculties  who  does 
not  deny  the  active  state  of  the  mind.  But  then 
the  faculties  of  the  understanding  must  in  conse- 
quence be  multiplied  to  an  enormous  degree,  for 
every  distinct  act  of  the  mind.  I  see  a  table  before 
me,  which  I  am  said  to  perceive  by  the  faculty  of 
perception ;  I  look  out  of  my  room  window  and  see 
a  man  standing  in  the  street ;  but  can  any  one  pro- 
duce a  single  argument  to  prove  that  I  perceive 
the  man  in  the  street  by  the  same  faculty  by  which 


406  GENERAL    REMARKS    OK 

I  perceived  the  table  ?  Again,  when  I  have  medi- 
tated on  the  properties  of  a  triangle,  and  have  come 
to  the  conclusion,  that  the  three  angles  are  equal 
to  two  right  ones  ;  how  do  I  know  that  I  come  to 
this  conclusion  by  the  same  mental  faculty  by 
which  I  determined  that  the  square  of  four  is  six- 
teen ?  It  may  be  said  there  is  a  difference  in  the 
processes  of  the  mind  in  the  two  cases  ;  but  then, 
I  reply,  that  these  processes  are  not  discoverable 
by  consciousness,  and  consequently  the  only  test  of 
their  existence  is  wanting.  The  mind  can  be  con- 
scious only  of  its  ideas ;  and  therefore  it  follows 
clearly,  that  if  we  were  conscious  of  any  such  mental 
processes,  they  must  necessarily  be  themselves  com- 
posed of  ideas,  othermse  they  could  not  be  objects 
of  our  consciousness.  Here,  then,  upon  this  posi- 
tion, that  we  are  conscious  of  these  processes,  when 
we  are  endeavouring  to  prove  that  ideas  are  the 
result  of  certain  distinct  and  individual  powers  or 
faculties  inherent  in  the  mind,  we  are  only  all  the 
time  striving  to  prove,  that  one  set  of  ideas  are  the 
cause  of  the  existence  of  another  set :  a  principle 
that  fact  and  experience  declare  we  know  nothing 
about. 

The  system  of  faculties  appears  to  have  been 
established  with  a  view  of  satisfying  one  of  the 
most  powerful  propensities  of  the  human  mind, 
viz.  a  desire  to  know  the  true  cause  of  every  event 
which  falls  under  its  notice.  But  those  who  have 
correct  views  of  mental  and  material  philosophy, 
know  that  philosophers  do  not  set  out  in  their  in- 
quiries with  a  view  of  ascertaining  the  causes  of 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.  407 

the  phenomena  which  fall  under  their  ohservation, 
but  to  observe  those  laws  which  regulate  their  con- 
stant conjunction. 

We  shall  here  give  a  quotation  from  a  very  acute 
Avriter  on  mental  subjects,  relative  to  distinct  facul- 
ties of  the  mind.  "  If,"  says  he,  "  the  mind  pos- 
sesses powers,  it  may  be  asked,  upon  what  they 
are  exercised?  The  answer  must  be,  upon  the 
objects  of  mental  perception ;  which  are  sensations 
and  ideas.  Now,  in  what  manner  are  we  to  under- 
stand the  action  of  the  intellect,  by  means  of  its 
powers  upon  ideas  ?  Nothing  seems  more  obvious, 
though  nothing  be  really  less  so,  than  the  action 
and  reaction  of  bodies ;  but  when  we  argue  in  this 
instance  analogically  from  the  material  to  the  im- 
material world,  it  must  be  confessed  that  we  are 
utterly  forsaken  by  the  light  of  reason.  To  suppose 
the  existence  of  power  at  all,  may  perhaps  be 
nothing  else  than  the  hypothesis  of  men  who  admit 
the  occult  assertion  of  something,  wliich  is  no 
object  of  the  understanding,  for  the  purpose  of 
accounting  for  events.  In  attributing  powers  to 
the  mind,  it  would  be  well  to  consider  Avhat  we 
mean  by  the  mind;  and,  before  we  assert  that 
this  acts  by  its  powers  upon  ideas,  how  our  souls 
can  be  shown  to  be  different  from  our  thoughts 
and  feelings.  It  is  yet  more  embarrassing  to  con- 
ceive what  is  meant  by  the  action  of  powers  upon 
ideas.  Bodies  are  said  to  impinge  upon  and  to  impel 
each  other,  to  transmit  powers  and  to  communicate 
motion ;  but,  when  this  mode  of  reasoning  is  ap- 
plied to  our  intellectual  nature,  a  very  little  reflec- 


408  GENERAL    REMARKS    ON 

tion  may  suffice- to  convince  us  that  the  analogy  is 
altogether  inadmissible."* 

To  put  what  may  be  further  urged  against  the 
faculty  of  abstraction  in  as  small  a  compass  and  in 
as  clear  a  light  as  possible,  we  shall  just  state  the 
following.  Suppose  a  certain  piece  of  matter  to  be 
possessed  only  of  four  qualities,  namely,  extension, 
hardness,  colour,  and  figure;  and  that  we  desig- 
nate our  ideas  corresponding  to  those  qualities  by 
the  letters  A,  B,  C,  and  D.  In  former  times,  and 
particularly  among  the  Schoolmen,  it  was  a  pre- 
vailing opinion,  of  a  numerous  party  of  them  at 
least,  that  besides  the  four  simple  and  individual 
ideas  denoted  by  these  four  letters,  which  com- 
posed all  substances,  we  had  another  idea  (which 
we  call  E)  made  up  of,  or  comprehending,  the 
other  four  simple  ideas  ;  and  this  idea  E  was  called 
substance  in  general,  or  an  abstract  general  con- 
ception. The  faculty  of  abstraction  was  confined 
almost  exclusively  to  the  producing  of  these  general 
notions.  But  it  is  long  since  this  doctrine  of  ab- 
stract general  conceptions  began  to  lose  ground  in 
England,  and  at  the  present  day  its  advocates  are 
few  in  number.  In  consequence  of  this,  the  pro- 
vince of  abstraction  is  considerably  curtailed ;  and 
is  now,  I  believe,  generally  understood  to  be  that 
faculty  by  which  we  think  of  one  quality  or  part 
of  an  object,  distinct  from  the  rest  of  the  qualities 
or  parts  which  compose  it.  Now,  when  we  talk 
about  considering  a  quality  of  an  object  separately 

*  Academical  Questions  bv  Sir  William  Drnmmond. 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    MIND.  409 

from  the  other  qualities  which  belong  to  it,  we 
evidently  go  upon  the  principle,  that  we  are  able 
to  think  of  all  the  different  qualities  of  an  object 
at  the  same  moment  of  time ;  a  mere  gratuitous 
assumption,  unsupported  by  one  single  argument 
from  an  appeal  to  mere  consciousness.  But  waving 
this  objection,  nay,  let  us  even  take  it  for  granted 
that  we  can  pay  attention  to  many  things  at  a  time, 
still  this  does  not  by  any  means  go  to  prove  that 
the  facultv  bv  which  we  attend  to  several  thing-s  is 
different  from  that  by  which  we  attend  to  an  indi- 
vidual thing.  If  we  can  perceive  and  attend  to 
A,  B,  C,  and  D  at  the  same  moment,  there  is  the 
highest  possible  probability  that  we  perceive  and 
attend  to  them  by  the  same  faculty  by  which  we 
perceive  and  attend  to  either  A,  or  B,  or  C,  or  D, 
separately.  There  is  nothing  to  lessen  this  proba- 
bility, unless  one  thing  can  be  shoA\Ta,  and  that  is, 
if  we  are  conscious  of  a  difference  in  the  perceiving 
faculties  in  the  two  cases  here  mentioned.  If  when 
we  perceive  and  attend  to  A,  B,  C,  and  D,  jointly, 
we  are  conscious  that  the  same  faculty  does  not 
enable  us  to  perceive  and  attend  to  any  of  them 
separately ;  then  we  ought  to  come  to  the  conclu- 
sion, that  a  number  of  things  are  not  perceived' 
and  attended  to  by  the  same  power  by  which  we 
perceive  and  attend  to  an  individual  thing.  This 
is  the  only  way  by  which  the  question  can  be 
settled. 

These  observations  will  not,  I  hope,  be  considered 
out  of  place,  when  we  remember,  that  upon  this 
question  of  distinct  and  independent  mental  facul- 


410  GENERAL    HEMAEKS. 

ties,  many  important  conclusions  in  philosophy 
depend.  It  must  ever  vary  the  complexion  of 
metaphysical  theories.  It  forms  a  point  of  depar- 
ture for  abstract  speculation ;  and  systems  diverge 
or  approximate  to  each  other,  in  exact  proportion 
as  we  consider  the  mind  as  being  constituted  of  a 
collection  of  faculties  or  powers,  or  as  merely  dis- 
playing a  series  of  states,  operations,  or  phenomena. 
It  is  contended  by  some  philosophers,  that  the  dis- 
pute is  only  a  dispute  about  words ;  but  this,  I  ap- 
prehend, is  an  erroneous  opinion.  The  question  lies 
deeper  than  verbal  ambiguities.  It  rests  upon  the 
very  nature  of  things ;  and  from  the  first  moment 
of  our  being  able  to  contemplate,  by  consciousness, 
the  operations  of  our  own  minds,  and  to  draw  con- 
clusions respecting  them,  we  are  presented  with  this 
knotty  controversy  in  all  its  complicated  difficulties. 


ALFRED   THE    GREAT.  411 


CHAPTER   XXXVIII. 
ON  SAXON  METAPHYSICS. 


There  are  but  very  few  writers  on  mental  phi- 
losophy, in  Saxon  literature,  of  whom  we  have  any 
authentic  accounts.  There  are  only  three  of  whom 
we  shall  take  any  notice ;  namely,  Alfred ,  Alcui- 
mis,  and  Bede. 

Alfred  the  Great. 

On  Chance. — "  It  is  nought  when  men  say  any 
thing  happens  by  chance,  because  every  thing  comes 
from  some  other  things  or  causes,  therefore  it  has 
not  happened  from  chance ;  but  if  it  came  not  from 
any  thing,  then  it  would  have  occurred  from  chance. 

"Then  said  I,  Whence  first  came  the  name? 
Then  quoth  he,  My  darling  Aristotle,  mentioned 
it  in  the  book  that  is  called  Phisica.  Then  said  I, 
How  does  he  explain  it  ?  He  answered,  Men 
said  formerly,  when  any  tiling  happened  to  them 
unexpectedly,  that  this  was  by  chance.  As  if  any 
one  should  dig  the  earth,  and  find  there  a  treasure 


412  SAXON    METAPHYSICS. 

of  gold,  and  should  then  say  that  this  happened  by 
chance.  But  yet,  I  know  that  if  the  digger  had 
not  dug  into  the  earth,  and  no  man  before  had 
hidden  the  gold  there,  he  would  by  no  means  have 
found  it.     Therefore  it  was  not  found  by  chance." 

On  the  Preedom  of  the  Will. — "  I  would  ask 
thee,  whether  we  have  any  freedom  or  any  power, 
what  we  should  do,  or  what  we  should  not  do  ?  or 
does  the  divine  pre-ordination  or  fate  compel  us  to 
that  which  we  wish  ? 

"  Then  said  he,  We  have  much  power.  There 
is  no  rational  creature  wliicli  has  not  freedom.  He 
that  hath  reason  may  judge  and  discriminate  what 
he  should  will,  and  what  he  should  shun;  and 
every  man  hath  this  freedom,  that  he  knows  what 
he  should  will  and  what  he  should  not  will.  Yet 
all  rational  creatures  have  not  a  like  freedom. 
Angels  have  right  judgments  and  good  will,  and 
all  that  they  desire  they  obtain  very  easily,  because 
they  wish  nothing  wrong.  But  no  creature  hath 
freedom  and  reason,  except  angels  and  men.  Men 
have  always  freedom,  and  the  more  of  it  as  they 
lead  their  minds  towards  divine  things.  But  they 
have  less  freedom  when  they  incline  their  minds 
near  to  this  world's  wealth  and  honours.  They 
have  no  freedom,  when  they  themselves  subject 
their  own  wills  to  the  vices ;  but,  so  soon  as  they 
turn  away  their  mind  from  good,  they  are  blinded 
with  unwiseness." 

Why  Men  have  Freedom  of  AVill. — "  I  said, 
I  am  sometimes  very  much  disturbed !  Quoth  he, 
At  what  ?     I  answered : 


ALFRED    THE    GREAT.  413 

"  It  is  at  this  which  thou  savest,  that  God  g-ives 
to  every  one  freedom  to  do  e^dl,  as  well  as  good, 
whichsoever  he  will:  and  thou  savest  also,  that 
God  knoweth  every  thing  before  it  happens ;  and 
thou  also  sayest,  that  nothing  happens,  but  that 
God  wills,  or  consents  to  it ;  and  thou  sayest  that 
it  shall  all  go  as  he  has  appointed.  Now,  I  wonder 
at  this :  why  he  should  consent  that  evil  men 
should  have  freedom  that  they  may  do  evil,  as  well 
as  good,  whichsoever  they  will,  when  he  knew 
before  that  they  would  do  evil. 

"Then  quoth  he,  I  may  very  easily  answer 
thee  this  remark.  How  would  it  now  look  to  you, 
if  there  were  any  powerful  king,  and  he  had  no 
freedom  in  all  his  kingdom,  l)ut  that  all  were 
slaves  ? 

"  Then  said  I,  It  would  not  be  thought  Ijy  me 
right,  nor  also  reasonable,  if  servile  men  only 
should  attend  upon  him. 

"  Then  quoth  he,  It  would  be  more  unnatural, 
if  God,  in  all  his  kingdom,  had  no  free  creature 
under  his  power.  Therefore  he  made  two  rational 
creatures  free;  angels  and  men.  He  gave  them 
the  great  gift  of  freedom.  Hence  they  could  do 
evil  as  well  as  good,  whichsoever  they  would.  He 
gave  this  very  fixed  gift,  and  a  very  fixed  law  with 
that  gift,  to  every  man  unto  his  end.  The  freedom 
is,  that  man  may  do  what  he  will ;  and  the  law  is, 
that  he  will  render  to  every  man  according  to  his 
works,  either  in  tliis  world  or  the  future  one ;  good 
or  evil,  whichsoever  he  doeth.     Men  mav  obtain 


414  SAXON    METAPHYSICS. 

through  this  freedom  whatsoever  they  will;  hut 
they  cannot  escape  death,  though  they  may  by 
good  conduct  hinder  it,  so  that  it  shall  come  later, 
indeed,  they  may  defer  it  to  old  age,  if  they  do 
not  want  good  mil  for  good  works. 

"Then  said  I,  Thou  has  well  removed  that 
doubt." 

On  the  Divine  Pore-appointment. — "  But  I 
am  yet  grieved  with  much  more  trouble,  even  to 
sadness. 

"  What  is  thy  grief  about  ? 

"  It  is  about  the  Divine  pre-ordination.  Because 
we  heard  it,  some  while  since,  said,  that  all  shall 
happen  as  God,  at  the  beginning,  had  appointed, 
and  that  no  man  can  change  it.  Now  me-thinketh, 
that  he  errs,  when  he  honoui'eth  the  good,  and 
also  when  he  punishes  the  evil ;  if  it  be  true,  that 
it  was  so  shaped  by  him,  that  they  cannot  do 
otherwise.  We  laboiu'  unnecessarily  when  we  pray, 
and  when  we  fast,  or  give  alms,  if  we  have  no  more 
merit  from  it,  than  those  that  in  all  things  proceed 
according  to  their  own  ^vill,  and  run  after  their 
bodily  pleasures. 

"  I  tell  thee,  if  this  be  true,  we  ought  to  say, 
that  it  was  an  unnecessary  commandment  in  the 
divine  books,  that  God  should  order  man  to  forsake 
evil  and  do  good ;  and,  again,  the  saying  which  he 
expressed,  that  the  more  a  man  laboureth  the 
greater  reward  he  shall  receive.  I  woncler  why 
thou  hast  forgotten  all  that  we  spoke  about  before. 
We  said  before,  that  the  Divine  Providence  wrought 


ALFRED    THE    GREAT.  415 

every  good  and  no  evil,  nor  appointed  any  to  be 
made,  nor  ever  made  any ;  but  that  indeed  we  are 
directed  to  good. 

"It  is  thought  evil  by  common  people  that  He 
should  avenge  or  punish  any  one  for  his  evil. 

"  But  did  we  not  also  say  in  this  same  book, 
that  God  had  appointed  freedom  to  be  given  to 
men,  and  made  them  free ;  and  that  if  they  held 
this  freedom  well,  he  would  greatly  dignify  them 
with  everlasting  power ;  and  if  they  misused  this 
freedom,  that  he  would  then  punish  them  with 
death  ? 

"  He  has  appointed  that  if  they  sin  in  any  thing 
through  this  freedom,  they  shall,  by  penitence,  com- 
pensate for  it,  to  recover  that  freedom  ;  and  if  any 
of  them  will  be  so  hard-hearted,  that  he  will  do  no 
repentance,  that  he  shall  then  have  a  just  punish- 
ment. He  has  appointed  all  creatures  to  be  ser- 
vants, except  angels  and  men,  and  hence  they  are 
the  servants  of  these  other  creatures.  They  have 
their  ministerial  duties  till  doomsday.  But  men 
and  angels,  they  are  free.  He  dispenses  with  their 
servitude. 

"  What !  can  men  say,  that  the  divine  Providence 
has  appointed  this,  that  they  should  not  fulfil  their 
duties,  or  how  ?  May  they  neglect  them ;  that 
they  may  not  do  good?  Now  it  is  written  that 
God  will  render  to  every  man  according  to  his 
works.  Why  then  should  any  man  be  idle,  that  he 
work  not  ?' 

"  Then  said  I,  It  is  obvious  enough  to  me,  that 


416  SAXON    METAPHYSICS. 

G-od  knew  it  all  before,  both  good  and  evil,  before 
it  happened.  But  I  know  not,  whether  that  shall 
all  happen  unchangeably,  Avhich  he  knows  and  has 
appointed. 

"Then,  quoth  he.  There  is  no  need  that  all 
should  happen  uncliaugeahly  :  though  some  of  it 
shall  happen  unchangeably.  This  will  be  that, 
which  will  be  best  for  our  necessities ;  and  that  will 
be  his  will.  But  there  are  some  so  directed  that 
there  is  no  necessity  for  this  ;  and  though  its  being 
done  would  neither  injure,  nor  benefit,  nor  be  any 
harm,  yet  it  will  not  be  done. 

"  Think  now,  by  thyself,  whether  thou  hast  ap- 
pointed anything  so  firmly,  that  thou  thinkest  that 
it  shall  never  be  changed  by  thy  will,  nor  that  thou 
canst  be  without  it ;  or  whether  thou  again  art  so 
divided  in  opinion  on  any  thouglit,  whether  it  shall 
happen  to  help  thee,  or  whether  it  shall  not.  Many 
are  the  things  which  God  knows  before  they  hap- 
pen, and  he  knows  also  whether  it  vnR  hurt  his 
creatures  that  they  should  happen.  But  he  knows 
not  this  for  the  purpose  of  willing  that  they  should 
happen,  but  that  he  may  take  previous  care  that 
they  should  not  happen.  Thus  a  good  ship-steerer 
perceives  many  a  stormy  wind  before  it  occurs,  and 
folds  his  sail,  and  awhile  also  lays  down  his  mast, 
and  then  abides  the  beating,  if,  before  the  threaten- 
ing of  the  adverse  wind,  he  can  guard  himself  against 
the  weather." 

On  Human  Nature  and  its  best  interests. — 
*'  Then  said  I,  Thou  hast  very  well  helped  me  hy  this 


ALFRED    THE    GREAT.  417 

speech.  I  wonder  why  so  many  wise  men  shoukl 
have  laboured  so  much  on  the  subject,  and  have 
found  out  so  little  that  was  wise. 

"  Then  quoth  he,  Why  wonderest  thou  so  much? 
Is  it  so  easy  to  be  understood  ?  How  knowest 
thou  not,  that  many  things  are  not  understood  so 
as  they  exist ;  but  according  to  the  quality  of  the  un- 
derstanding of  him  that  inquires  after  them.  Such 
is  wisdom.  No  man  from  this  world  can  under- 
stand it,  such  as  it  really  is;  though  every  one 
strives  according  to  the  quality  of  his  understand- 
ing, that  he  may  perceive  it  if  he  can.  Wisdom 
may  entirely  comprehend  us,  such  as  we  are,  though 
we  may  not  wholly  comprehend  that,  such  as  it  is 
in  itself;  because  wisdom  is  God.  He  seetli  all 
our  works,  both  good  and  evil,  before  they  are  done, 
or,  for  this  purpose,  thought.  But  he  compels  us 
not  to  tliis,  that  we  must  necessarily  do  the  good, 
nor  prevents  us  from  doing  evil;  because  he  has 
given  us  freedom.  I  can  teach  thee  also  some 
examples,  by  which  thou  mayest  the  easier  under- 
stand this  speech.  What !  thou  knowest  the  light, 
and  the  hearing,  and  the  taste :  they  perceive  the 
body  of  man,  and  yet  they  perceive  it  not  alike. 
The  ears  perceive  so  that  they  hear,  but  they  per- 
ceive not  yet  the  body  entirely  as  it  is ;  our  sense 
of  feeling  must  touch  it,  and  feel  that  it  is  the  body. 
We  cannot  feel  whether  this  be  black  or  white, 
fak  or  not  fau^;  but  the  light  at  the  beginning 
turns  to  these  points ;  and  as  the  eyes  look  on 
things,  they  perceive  all  the  appearance  of  the  body. 
But  I  will  give  thee  some  further  explanation,  that 
*  2  E 


418  SAXON    METAPHYSICS. 

thou  mayest  know  that  which  thou  wonderest  at. 

"  Then  said  I,  What  is  this  ? 

"  He  said,  It  is  that  man  understands  only 
that  which  he  separately  perceives  in  others.  He 
perceives  separately  through  his  eyes ;  separately 
through  his  ears  ;  separately  through  his  nostrils  ; 
separately  hy  his  reason ;  separately  by  his  wise 
comprehension.  There  are  many  living  things  that 
are  unmoving,  such  as  shell-fish  are ;  and  these 
have  yet  some  portion  of  perception ;  or  they  would 
not  else  live,  if  they  had  no  grain  of  perception. 
Some  can  see,  some  can  hear,  some  taste,  some 
smell ;  but  the  moving  animals  are  more  like  man, 
because  they  have  all  that  the  unmoving  creatures 
have,  and  also  more  too.  This  is,  that  they  obey  men. 
They  love  what  loves  them,  and  hate  what  hates 
them ;  and  they  fly  from  what  they  hate,  and  seek 
what  they  love.  But  men  have  all  that  we  have 
before  mentioned,  and  also  add  to  them  the  great 
gift  of  reason.  Angels  have  a  still  wiser  under- 
standing. 

"  Hence  are  these  creatures  thus  made,  that  the 
unmoving  shall  not  exalt  themselves  above  the 
moving  ones,  nor  contend  with  them ;  nor  the 
moving  ones  above  men ;  nor  men  above  angels ; 
nor  angels  strive  against  God. 

"  But  this  is  miserable,  that  the  greatest  part  of 
men  look  not  to  that  which  is  given  to  them,  that 
is,  reason;  nor  seek  that  which  is  above  them, 
which  is  what  angels  and  wise  men  have ;  this  is 
a  wise  understanding.  But  most  men  now  move 
with  cattle,  in  this,  that  thev  desire  the  lusts  of 


ALFRED    THE    GREAT.  419 

tlie  world  like  cattle.  If  we  now  had  any  portion 
of  an  unhesitating  understanding,  such  as  angels 
have,  then  we  might  perceive  that  such  an  under- 
standing would  be  much  better  than  our  reason. 
Though  we  investigate  many  things,  we  have  little 
ready  knowledge  free  from  doubt.  But  to  angels 
there  is  no  doubt  of  any  of  those  things  which  they 
know,  because  theii*  ready  knowledge  is  much  bet- 
ter than  our  reasoning ;  as  our  reasoning  is  better 
than  the  perceptions  of  animals.  Any  portion  of 
understanding  that  is  given  to  them,  is  either  to 
those  that  are  prone,  or  to  those  that  are  erect. 
But  let  us  now  elevate  our  minds  as  supremely  as 
we  may  towards  the  high  roof  of  the  highest  un- 
derstanding, that  thou  mayest  most  swiftly  and 
most  easily  come  to  thine  own  kindred,  from  whence 
thou  camest  before.  There  mav  thv  mind  and  thv 
reason  see  openly  that  which  they  now  doubt 
about ; — every  thing,  whether  of  the  Divine  pre- 
science, which  we  have  been  discoursing  on,  or  of 
our  freedom,  or  of  all  such  things. 

On  THE  Divine  Nature. — "  I  would  ask  thee 
first  one  thing,  Whether  thinkest  thou  that  any 
thing  in  this  world  is  so  good  as  that  it  may  give  us 
full  happiness  ?  I  ask  this  of  thee ;  I  do  not  wish 
that  any  false  likeness  should  deceive  you  and  me, 
instead  of  the  true  comfort ;  for  no  man  can  deny 
that  some  good  must  be  the  most  superior,  just  as 
there  is  some  great  and  deep  fountain  from  which 
many  brooks  and  rivers  run.  Hence  men  say  of 
some  advantages,  that  they  are  not  entirely  with- 

2  e  2 


420  SAXON  mi<:tapiiysics. 

out.  Yet  every  thing  would  go  to  nought,  if  it  had 
not  some  good  in  it. 

"  Erom  this  you  may  understand,  that  from  the 
greatest  good  come  the  less  goods ;  not  the  greatest 
from  the  less ;  no  more  than  the  river  can  be  the 
spring  and  source,  though  the  spring  may  flow  into 
a  river.  As  the  river  may  return  again  to  the 
spring,  so  every  good  cometh  from  God,  and  re- 
turns to  him;  and  he  is  the  full  and  the  perfect 
good ;  and  there  is  no  deficiency  of  will  in  him. 
Now  you  may  clearly  understand  that  this  is  God 
himself. 

"  Then  answered  I,  and  said,  Thou  hast  very 
rightly  and  very  rationally  overcome  and  convinced 
me;  I  cannot  deny  this,  nor  indeed  think  otherwise, 
but  that  it  is  all  so  as  thou  sayest. 

"  Then  said  Wisdom,  Now  I  would  that  thou 
shouldest  think  carefully  till  thou  understand  where 
true  happiness  is.  How  !  knowest  thou  not,  that 
all  mankind  are  \^dth  one  mind  consenting  that 
God  is  the  beginning  of  all  good  things,  and  the 
governor  of  all  creatures  ?  He  is  the  supreme 
good.  No  man  now  doubts  this,  because  he  knows 
nothing  better,  and  indeed  nothing  equally  good. 
Hence  every  reasoning  tells  us,  and  all  men  con- 
fess the  same,  that  God  is  the  highest  good.  Thus 
they  signify  that  all  good  is  in  him  ;  for  if  it  were 
not,  then  he  would  not  be  that  which  he  is  called  ; 
but  something  has  existed  before  him  or  is  more 
excellent.  Then  that  would  be  better  than  he  is  ; 
but  nothing  Avas  ever  before  him,  nor  more  excel- 


ALFRED    THE    GREAT.  421 

lent  than  lie  is,  nor  more  precious  than  hinisell'. 
Hence  he  is  the  beginning,  and  the  fountain,  and 
the  roof  of  all  good.  Tliis  is  clear  enough.  Now 
it  is  openly  shown,  that  the  true  felicities  are  in 
no  other  existing  tiling  but  in  God, 

"  Then  said  I,  I  am  consenting  to  this. 

"Then  he  answered,  I  conjure  thee  that  thou 
rationally  understand  this;  that  God  is  full  of 
every  perfection,  and  of  every  good,  and  of  every 
happiness. 

"  I  then  replied,  I  cannot  fully  understand  it. 
"Wherefore  tell  me  again,  the  same  that  didst  men- 
tion before. 

"  He  saidj  Then  I  will  say  it  again.  I  would 
not  that  thou  shouldest  think  this,  that  God  is  the 
father  and  the  origin  of  all  creatures,  and  yet  that 
his  supreme  goodness,  of  which  he  is  full,  comes  to 
him  from  any  where  from  without.  I  also  would 
not  have  thee  think  that  any  other  can  be  his  good 
and  happiness  but  liimself ;  because,  if  thou  sup- 
posest  that  the  good  which  he  hath  comes  to  him 
any  where  from  without,  then  that  thing  from 
which  it  comes  to  him  would  be  better  than  he,  if 
there  were  such.  But  it  is  very  silly,  and  a  very 
great  sin,  that  men  should  think  so  of  God ;  either 
to  suppose  again,  that  anything  were  before  him, 
or  better  than  he  is,  or  like  him.  But  we  should 
agree  that  he  is  the  best  of  all  things. 

"  If  thou  believest  that  God  exists  so  as  men 
are,  either  he  is  a  man  that  hath  soul  and  body,  or 
his  goodness  is  that  which  gathereth  good  else- 
where, and  then  holds  it  together,  and  rules  it.     If 


422  SAXON    METAPHYSICS. 

thou  then  believest  that  it  is  so  with  God,  then 
shalt  thou  necessarily  believe  that  some  power  is 
greater  than  his,  which  it  so  unites  as  that  it  mak- 
eth  the  course  of  things.  But  whatever  thing  is 
divided  from  others  is  distinct, — is  another  thing, 
though  they  may  be  placed  together.  If,  then,  any 
thing  be  divided  from  the  highest  good,  it  will  not 
be  that  highest  good.  Yet  it  would  be  a  great  sin 
to  think  of  God,  that  there  could  be  any  good  with- 
out him,  or  any  separated  from  him.  Hence  no- 
thing is  better  than  He  is,  or  even  as  good.  What 
thing  can  be  better  than  its  creator  ?  Hence  I 
say,  with  juster  reason,  that  He  is  the  supreme 
good  in  his  own  nature,  which  is  the  origin  of  all 
things. 

"  Then  I  said.  Now  thou  hast  very  rightly  con- 
vinced me.  Then  quoth  he.  Did  I  not  before  tell 
thee  that  the  supreme  good  and  the  highest  hap- 
piness were  one  ?  I  answered.  So  it  is.  He  re- 
plied. Shall  we  then  say  that  this  is  any  thing  else 
but  God  ?  I  said,  I  cannot  deny  this ;  because  I 
assented  to  it  before. 

"  He  is  the  stem  and  foundation  of  all  blessings. 
From  him  all  good  cometh,  and  every  thing  tends 
to  Him  again.  He  governs  them  all.  Thus  He 
is  the  beginning  and  the  support  of  all  blessings. 
They  come  from  Him  so  as  the  light  and  bright- 
ness of  the  planets  come  from  the  sun ;  some  are 
brighter,  some  are  less  bright.  So  also  the  moon  : 
she  enlightens  as  much  as  the  sun  shines  on  her. 
When  he  shineth  all  over  her,  then  is  she  all 
bright. 


ALFRED    THE    GREAT.  423 

"  When  I  heard  these  observations  I  was  then 
astonished,  and  much  awed,  and  exclaimed,  This 
is  a  wonderful,  and  delightful,  and  reasonable  obser- 
vation, which  thou  expressest  to  me. 

"  He  answered.  It  is  not  more  pleasant  nor 
wiser  than  the  thing  that  thy  discourse  was  about. 
We  will  now  talk  about  that ;  because  me-thinketh 
it  good  that  we  connect  this  with  the  former.  Then 
replied  I,  What  is  that  ? 

''  What  I  expressed  to  thee  before  was,  that  God 
was  happiness ;  and  that  from  this  true  felicity  come 
all  the  other  goods  that  we  discoursed  about  be- 
fore ;  and  return  to  Him.  Thus,  from  the  sea  the 
water  cometh  into  the  earth,  and  there  freshens 
itself.  It  proceedeth  then  up  into  a  spring ;  it  goeth 
then  into  a  brook ;  then  into  a  river ;  then  along 
the  river  till  it  floweth  again  into  the  sea.  But  I 
would  now  ask  thee  how  thou  hast  understood  this 
assertion  ?  Whether  dost  thou  suppose  that  the 
five  goods  which  we  have  often  mentioned  before, 
that  is,  power,  dignities,  celebrity,  abundance,  and 
bliss :  I  would  know  whether  you  suppose  that 
those  goods  were  limbs  of  the  true  felicity,  so  as 
a  man's  limbs  are  those  of  one  person,  and  belong 
all  to  one  body  ?  Or  dost  thou  think  that  some  one 
of  the  five  goods  makes  the  true  felicity,  and  after- 
wards that  the  four  others  become  its  goods ;  as 
now  the  soul  and  body  compose  one  man  ? 

"  The  one  man  hath  many  limbs,  and  yet  to 
these  two,  that  is,  to  the  soul  and  the  body,  belong 
all  this  man's  comforts,  both  spiritual  and  corporeal. 
It  is  noAV  the  good  of  the  body  that  a  man  be  fair 


424  SAXON    METAPHYSICS. 

and  strong',  and  long  and  broad,  witli  many  other 
excellencies  besides  these.  Yet  they  are  not  the 
body  itself;  because,  thongh  he  should  lose  any  of 
these  good  things,  he  would  still  be  what  he  was 
before.  Then  the  excellencies  of  the  soul  are,  pru- 
dence, moderation,  patience,  righteousness,  and 
wisdom,  and  many  such  virtues  ;  and  yet,  as  the 
soul  is  one  thing,  so  the  wtues  are  another. 

"  I  then  said,  I  wish  that  thou  wouldest  explain 
to  me  yet  more  clearly,  about  the  other  goods  that 
belong  to  the  true  felicity. 

"  He  answered,  Did  I  not  inform  thee  before, 
that  the  true  happiness  is  God?  Yes,  I  replied. 
Thou  hast  said  he  was  the  supreme  good.  Then 
quoth  he.  Art  thou  now  consenting  that  power, 
and  dignities,  and  fame,  and  plenty,  and  joy,  and 
happiness,  and  the  supreme  good,  are  all  one ;  and 
that  this  one  must  be  the  Deity  ? 

"  I  said.  How  should  I  now  deny  this  ?  Then 
he  answered.  Whether  dost  thou  think  that  those 
things  which  are  the  limbs  of  the  true  felicity  is 
that  felicity  itself  ? 

"  I  replied,  I  know  not  what  thou  wouldest  say ; 
but  it  will  please  me  better  that  thou  should  speak 
to  me  some  while  about  it  than  ask  me.  He  then 
said,  How  !  couldest  thou  not  reflect  that  if  these 
goods  were  limbs  of  the  true  felicity,  they  would  be 
somewhat  distinct  from  it  as  a  man's  linibs  are 
from  his  body  ?  But  the  nature  of  these  limbs  is,  that 
they  make  up  one  body,  and  yet  are  not  wholly  alike. 

"  I  then  remarked.  Thou  needest  no  more  speak 
about  it.      TliOLi  hast  explained  it  to  me   clearly 


ALFRED    THE    GREAT.  425 

enough  that  these  goods  are   no   whit   separated 
from  the  true  felicity. 

"  Then  quoth  he.  Thou  comprehendest  it  right 
enough.  Thou  now  understandest  that  all  good  is 
the  same  that  happiness  is,  and  this  happiness  is 
the  supreme  good,  and  the  supreme  good  is  God, 
and  God  is  always  inseparably  one. 

"  I  said,  There  is  no  doubt  of  it.  But  I  wish 
vou  now  to  discourse  to  me  a  little  on  what  is 
unknown. 

"  Well !  O  men  !  Every  one  of  you  that  be  free 
tend  to  this  good,  and  to  this  felicity ;  and  he  that 
is  now  in  bondage  with  the  fruitless  love  of  this 
world,  let  him  seek  liberty,  that  he  may  come  to 
this  felicity.  Por  this  is  the  only  rest  of  all  our 
labours.  This  is  the  only  port  always  calm  after 
the  storms  and  billows  of  our  toils.  This  is  the 
only  station  of  peace ;  the  only  comforter  of  grief 
after  all  the  sorrows  of  the  present  life.  The  golden 
stones  and  the  silvery  ones,  and  jewels  of  all  kinds, 
and  all  the  riches  before  us,  will  not  enlighten  the 
eyes  of  the  mind,  nor  improve  their  acuteness  to 
perceive  the  appearance  of  the  true  felicity.  They 
rather  blind  the  mind's  eyes  than  make  them 
sharper ;  because  all  things  that  please  here,  in  this 
present  life,  are  earthly ;  because  they  are  flying. 
But  the  admirable  brightness  that  brightens  all 
things  and  governs  all;  it  will  not  destroy  the 
soul,  but  will  enlighten  it.  If,  then,  any  man 
could  perceive  the  splendour  of  the  heavenly  light 
with  the  pure  eyes  of  his  mind,  he  would  then  say 


42G  SAXON    METAPHYSICS. 

that  the  radiance  of  the  shining  of  the  sun  is  not 
superior  to  this;  is  not  to  be  compared  to  the 
everlasting  brightness  of  God." 

Description  of  the  Deity. — "  Hence  we 
should  with  all  power  inquire  after  God,  that  we 
may  know  what  he  is.  Though  it  should  not  be 
our  lot  to  know  wiiat  He  is,  yet  we  should,  from 
the  dignity  of  the  understanding  which  he  has 
given  us,  try  to  explore  it. 

"  Every  creature,  both  rational  and  irrational,  dis- 
covers this,  that  God  is  eternal.  Because  so  many 
creatures,  so  great  and  so  fair,  could  never  be  sub- 
ject to  less  creatures  and  to  less  power  than  they 
all  are,  nor  indeed  to  many  equal  ones. 

"  Then  said  I,  What  is  eternity  ? 

"  He  answered.  Thou  hast  asked  me  a  great  and 
difficult  tiling  to  comprehend.  If  thou  wilt  under- 
stand it,  thou  must  first  have  the  eyes  of  thy  mind 
clean  and  lucid.  I  may  not  conceal  from  thee  what 
I  know  of  this. 

"  Know  thou  that  there  are  three  things  in  this 
world ;  one  is  temporary ;  to  this  there  is  both  a 
beginning  and  an  end;  and  I  do  not  know  any 
creature  that  is  temporary,  but  hath  his  beginning 
and  his  end.  Another  thing  is  eternal,  which  hath 
a  beginning,  but  hath  not  an  end :  I  know  not 
when  it  began,  but  I  know  that  it  will  never  end : 
such  are  angels  and  the  souls  of  men.  The  third 
thing  is  eternal,  both  without  end,  and  without 
beginning ;  this  is  God.  Between  these  three  there 
is  a  verv  great  discrimination.     If  we  were  to  in- 


ALFRED    THE    GREAT.  427 

vestigate  all  this  subject,  we  should  come  late  to 
the  end  of  this  book,  or  never. 

"  But  one  thing  thou  must  necessarily  know  of 
this  previously,  Why  is  God  called  the  Highest 
Eternity  ? 

"  Then  said  I,  Why  ? 

*'  Then  quoth  he.  Because  we  know  very  little 
of  that  which  was  before  us,  except  by  memory  and 
by  asking;  and  yet  we  know  less  of  that  which 
will  be  after  us.  That  alone  exists  rationally  to  us 
which  is  present ;  but  to  Him  all  is  present,  as 
well  that  which  was  before  as  that  which  now  is, 
and  that  which  after  us  will  be.  All  of  it  is  pre- 
sent to  Him. 

"  His  riches  increase  not,  nor  do  they  ever  dimi- 
nish. He  never  remembers  anything,  because  he 
never  forgets  aught ;  He  seeks  nothing,  nor  in- 
quires, because  He  knows  it  all ;  He  searches  for 
nothing,  because  He  loses  nothing;  He  pursues 
no  creature,  because  none  can  fly  from  Him ;  He 
dreads  nothing,  because  He  knows  no  one  more 
powerful  than  himself,  nor  even  like  him.  He  is 
always  giving  and  never  wants.  He  is  always  Al- 
mighty, because  he  always  wishes  good,  and  never 
evil.  To  Him  there  is  no  need  of  anything.  He 
is  always  seeing ;  He  never  sleeps ;  He  is  always 
alike  mild  and  kind ;  He  will  always  be  eternal. 
Hence  there  never  was  a  time  that  He  was  not, 
nor  ever  will  be.  He  is  always  free.  He  is  not 
compelled  to  any  work.  From  His  divine  power 
He  is  every  where  present.  His  greatness  no  man 
can  measure.     He  is  not  to  be  conceived  bodilv, 


428  SAXON    METAPHYSICS. 

but  spiritually,  so  as  now  wisdom  is  and  reason. 
But  He  is  wisdom ;  He  is  reason  itself."* 


Alctjinus,  or  Albinus  Elaccus. 

This  was  an  English  prelate,  and  a  disciple,  some 
say,  of  Bede's.  He  went  on  an  embassy  from  Offa 
to  the  court  of  Charlemagne,  and  was  the  principal 
agent  in  the  formation  of  the  public  schools  esta- 
tablished  by  the  Emperor.  Alcuinus  was  considered 
one  of  the  most  learned  men  of  his  time ;  though 
some  historians  have  maintained  that  he  knew  little 
of  philosophy  in  general ;  and  even  in  theology  it- 
self he  was  by  no  means  a  proficient.  His  narrow 
views  have  been  ascribed  as  the  reason  why  these 
schools  were  limited  in  their  scope,  and  so  unpro- 
ductive of  real  knowledge.  An  Italian  historian, 
Eather  Andrea,  makes  the  following  remarks  upon 
these  early  seminaries  of  learning.  "  They  learn 
there  to  read,  to  sing,  and  to  calculate,  and  nothing 
more.  The  schools  have  regularly  established  mas- 
ters, but  it  is  sufficient  if  they  know  grammar.  If 
any  of  them  pretends  to  a  little  knowledge  of  ma- 
thematics or  astronomy,  he  is  considered  an  oracle. 
Books  are  given  to  consult,  but  they  are  all  eccle- 
siastical ones.  If  in  some  schools  the  fine  arts 
are  cultivated,  it  is  only  with  the  view  of  making 
them  subservient  to  the  illustration  of  the  sacred 
l3ooks."t 

The  opinions  of  Alcuinus  on  the  human  soul  are 


*  Turner's  Anglo-Saxon  History,  pp.  41 — 51. 

t  Dcir  origiuc,  progresso  c  state  att.  d'ogni  letter,  torn.  1.  c.  7. 


ALCUINUS.  429 

well  entitled  to  notice.  He  divides  it  into  three 
parts,  the  appetites,  the  rational  part,  and  the 
irascible.  Two  of  these  appertain  to  the  inferior 
creation  as  well  as  to  ourselves.  But  reason  be- 
longs alone  to  men ;  and  it  is  by  tliis  power  that 
he  judges,  counsels,  and  excels  in  wisdom.  The 
faculty  of  reason  is  that  which  directs  and  governs 
the  whole  moral  nature  of  man ;  and  all  our  vir- 
tues, as  prudence,  justice,  temperance,  and  forti- 
tude, pre-suppose  its  active  vigilance.  Wlien  these 
virtues  are  sanctified  by  a  holy  and  pure  benevo- 
lence, they  bring  the  soul  nearer  to  the  Divine  na- 
ture,* 

Memory,  will,  and  intelligence  are  all  distinct 
powers,  but  are,  nevertheless,  united  into  one. 
Unity  does  not  destroy  their  individuality.  "  I 
perceive  that  I  perceive,  will,  and  remember;  I 
will  to  remember,  perceive,  and  will;  and  I  re- 
member that  I  have  willed,  perceived,  and  recol- 
lected, "f 

"  We  may  remark  the  wonderful  svsdftness  of  the 
soul  in  forming  things  which  it  has  perceived  by 
the  senses.  Prom  these,  as  from  certain  messen- 
gers, it  forms  figures  in  itself,  with  inexpressil^le 
celerity,  of  whatever  it  has  perceived  of  sensible 
things  ;  and  it  lays  up  these  forms  in  the  treasury 
of  its  memory. 

"  Thus,  he  who  has  seen  Rome  figures  Rome  in 
his  mind,  and  its  form ;  and  when  he  shall  hear 
the  name  of  Eome,  or  remember  it,  immediately  the 

*  Opera,  pp.  770..  t  Ibid.  p.  773. 


430  SAXON    METAPHYSICS, 

animus  of  it  will  occur  to  the  menioiy,  where  its 
form  lies  concealed.  The  soul  there  recognises  it, 
where  it  had  hidden  it. 

"  It  is  yet  more  wonderful,  that  if  unknown 
things  be  read  or  heard  of  by  the  ears  of  the  soul, 
it  immediately  forms  a  figure  of  the  unknown 
thing;  as  of  Jerusalem.  When  seen  it  may  be 
very  different  from  the  figure  of  our  fancy ;  but 
whatever  the  soul  has  been,  in  other  cities  that  are 
known  to  it,  it  imagines  that  it  may  be  in  Jerusa- 
lem. Prom  known  species  it  imagines  the  un- 
known. It  does  not  fancy  walls,  houses,  and  streets 
in  a  man ;  nor  the  limbs  of  a  man  in  a  city,  but 
buildings,  as  are  usual  in  cities.  So  in  every  thing 
the  mind  from  the  known  forms  the  unknown. 

"  While  I  think  of  Jerusalem,  I  cannot,  at  that 
moment,  think  of  Home ;  or  when  I  think  of  any 
other  single  thing,  I  cannot  then  think  of  many ; 
but  that  thing  only  is  present  to  my  mind  whicli 
I  deliberate  upon,  till,  sooner  or  later,  this  departs 
and  another  occurs. 

"  This  lively  and  heavenly  faculty,  which  is 
called  mens,  or  animus,  is  of  such  great  mobility 
that  it  does  not  even  rest  in  sleep.  In  a  moment, 
if  it  chooses,  it  surveys  heaven ;  it  flies  over  the 
sea,  and  wanders  through  regions  and  cities.  It 
places  in  its  sight,  by  thinking,  all  things  that  it 
likes,  however  far  removed." 

"The  mind,  or  soul,  is  the  intellectual  spirit, 
always  in  motion,  always  living,  and  capable  of 
willing  both  good  and  evil.  By  the  benignity  of 
its  Creator  it  is  ennobled  with  free  will.    Created  to 


ALCUINUS.  431 

rule  tlie  movements  of  the  flesli,  it  is  invisible, 
incorporeal,  without  weight  or  colour,  circum- 
scribed, yet  entire  in  every  member  of  its  flesh.  It 
is  now  afiiicted  Avith  the  cares,  and  grieved  with 
the  pains  of  the  body ;  now  it  sports  with  joy ; 
now  thinks  of  known  things ;  and  now  seeks  to 
explore  those  which  are  unknown.  It  wills  some 
things ;  it  does  not  will  others.  Love  is  natural  to 
it. 

"  It  is  called  by  various  names ;  the  soul,  while 
it  vivifies ;  the  spirit,  when  it  contemplates ;  sen- 
sibility, wliile  it  feels ;  the  mind,  when  it  knows ; 
the  intellect,  when  it  understands ;  the  reason, 
while  it  discriminates;  the  will,  when  it  consents; 
the  memory,  when  it  remembers;  but  these  are 
not  as  distinct  in  substance  as  in  names ;  they  are 
but  one  soul.  Virtue  is  its  beauty;  vice  its  de- 
formity. It  is  often  so  affected  by  some  object  of 
knowledge,  that,  though  its  eyes  be  open,  it  sees 
not  the  things  before  it,  nor  hears  a  sounding 
voice,  nor  feels  a  touching  body. 

"As  to  what  the  soul  is,  nothing  better  occurs 
to  us  to  say  than  that  it  is  the  spirit  of  life ;  but 
not  of  that  kind  of  life  which  is  in  cattle,  which  is 
without  a  rational  mind.  The  beauty  and  orna- 
ment of  the  human  soul  is  the  study  of  wisdom. 
What  is  more  blessed  to  the  soul  than  to  love  the 
Supreme  Good,  which  is  God  ?  What  is  happier 
to  it  than  to  prepare  itself  to  be  worthy  of  ever- 
lasting beatitude,  knowing  itself  most  truly  to  be 
immortal." 


432  SAXON    METAPHYSICS. 


Bede. 


The  history  of  this  singular  and  learned  man, 
is  well  known  to  most  readers.  We  shall  here 
transcrihe  a  few  remarks  upon  some  of  the  meta- 
physical topics  he  discusses  in  his  works. 

He  compares  the  three  inseparable  essences  of 
the  Trinity  to  the  circularity,  light,  and  heat  of 
the  Sun.  The  globular  body  of  the  Sun  never  leaves 
the  heavens ;  but  its  light,  which  he  compares  to 
the  Pilial  Personality,  and  its  heat,  which  he  ap- 
plies to  the  Spii'itual  Essence,  descend  to  earth, 
and  diffuse  themselves  everywhere,  animating  the 
mind,  and  pervading  and  softening  the  heart.  Yet, 
although  universally  present,  light  seems  never  to 
quit  the  sun,  for  there  we  always  behold  it ;  and 
heat  is  its  unceasing  companion.  As  circles  have 
neither  beginning  nor  end,  such  is  the  Deity. 
Nothing  is  above;  nothing  is  below;  nothing  is 
bevond  him:  no  term  concludes  him;  no  time 
confines  him. 

He  pui'sues  the  same  analogies  in  other  parts  of 
nature.  In  water  he  traces  the  spring,  its  flow- 
ing river,  and  terminating  lake.  They  differ  in 
form,  but  are  one  in  substance,  and  are  always 
inseparable.  No  river  can  flow  without  its  spring, 
and  must  issue  into  some  collecting  locality. 

"  His  \iew  of  nature  is  not  unpleasing.  "  Ob- 
serve how  all  things  are  made  to  suit,  and  are 
governed;  heat  by  cold,  cold  by  heat;  day  by 
night ;  and  winter  by  summer.  See  how  the 
heavens  and  the  earth  are  respectively  adorned : 


BEDE.  433 

the  heavens  by  the  sun,  the  moon,  and  stars ;  the 
earth  by  its  beautiful  flowers,  and  its  herbs,  trees, 
and  fruits.  From  these  mankind  derive  all  their 
food;  their  lovely  jewels ;  the  various  pictures  so 
delectably  woven  in  their  hangings  and  valuable 
cloths  ;  their  variegated  colours ;  the  sweet  melody 
of  strings  and  organs ;  the  splendour  of  gold  and 
silver,  and  the  other  metals ;  the  pleasant  streams 
of  water,  so  necessary  to  bring  sliips,  and  agitate 
our  mills ;  the  fragrant  aroma  of  myrrh ;  and, 
lastly,  the  interesting  countenance  peculiar  to  the 
human  form."* 

*:,:*  The  preceding  pages  have  been  taken  chiefly  from  Mr.  Sharon 
Turner's  History,  and  the  Literature  of  the  Middle  Ages  in  Lardner's  Cy- 
clopedia. As  the  authors  of  both  these  works  have  paid  great  attention 
to  every  thing  connected  with  the  Saxon  period  of  our  history,  what  is 
here  stated  may  be  fully  relied  on ;  and  contains,  in  fact,  every  thing 
which  can  be  found  associated  with  the  names  of  those  ancient  worthies, 
which  bears  upon  the  philosophy  of  mind. 


We  have  now  sketched  out  the  history  of  the 
philosophy  of  mind,  for  nearly  fifteen  centuries, 
and  traced  its  ramifications  and  bearings  among 
the  crash  of  empires  and  the  mouldering  remains' 
of  mighty  kingdoms.  We  saw  it  in  Greece  as  a 
grain  of  mustard  seed.  In  the  days  of  Socrates, 
and  Plato,  and  Aristotle,  it  was  a  plant  of  gigan- 
tic growth,  and  its  shade  long  formed  a  philoso- 
phical retreat  for  the  ardent  and  speculative  minds 
of  men.  The  Grecian  metaphysics  for  some  ages 
retained  their   compactness   and   system ;    but  as 

*  Bede  de  Subst.  vol.  ii.  p.  308. 

*  2f 


434  HEMARKS. 

time  rolled  on,  tliey  were  spKt  into  cletached  frag- 
ments, and  gave  birth  to  various  and  contending 
sects,  who  vied  with  each  other  in  giving  new 
colourings  to  old  truths  and  antiquated  doctrines. 
The  rage  for  novelty  became  strong;  and  men 
racked  their  minds  to  give  old  theories  in  a  new 
form.  Every  philosopher  was  ambitious  of  forming 
a  school  of  his  own,  which  might  establish  his 
present  fame,  and  hand  down  his  name  with  honour 
and  applause  to  future  generations.  Still,  however, 
the  divergency  from  the  olden  system  of  Grecian 
speculation,  was  not  so  great  among  the  multitude 
of  new  sects,  as  what  at  first  sight  might  lead  one 
to  imasjine.  The  frame-work  of  Plato  and  Aristotle 
was  never  essentially  broken  or  disjointed;  nor 
were  their  leading  views  and  doctrines  of  mind 
supplanted  by  other  original  systems.  The  various 
sects  and  parties  were  merely  commentators  and 
expounders  of  the  two  great  champions  of  Grecian 
intellect ;  and  though,  on  many  occasions,  they  dis- 
played consummate  genius  and  skill,  they  never 
could  make  any  considerable  inroad  upon  the  phi- 
losophical arrangements  of  these  two  wonderful  ex- 
pounders of  abstract  thought. 

Through  the  influence  of  political  changes  and 
vicissitudes,  we  find  the  Grecian  philosophy  of  in- 
tellects transplanted  to  the  Etonian  capital,  among 
minds  of  a  bolder  and  fiercer  stamp.  Here  it  en- 
joyed an  exotic  existence  but  for  a  short  period.  It 
then  found  its  wav  to  Alexandria,  where  it  came  in 
contact  with  some  novel  systems,  and  was  gradually 
subjected  to  many  transformations  and  changes  of 


REMARKS.  435 

character.  It  became  enveloped  in  the  mysterious 
cosmogony  of  the  East ;  and  that  regular  and  con- 
solidated system  of  Grecian  thought,  which  had 
common  sense  and  the  every-day  feelings  of  man- 
kind for  its  basis,  became  so  corrupted  and  debased, 
as  scarcely  to  present  a  single  feature  of  its  original 
grandeur  and  simplicity.  Everything  became  crude, 
unintelKgible,  fanatical,  and  childish. 

Christianity,  however,  came  to  the  rescue ;  and 
gradually,  though  slowly,  stripped  off  the  myste- 
rious allegories  of  the  East,  and  took  the  "  divine 
Plato"  and  the  erudite  Stagirite  under  her  guid- 
ance and  protection.      There  was    an   active  and 
living   sympathy  between  them  that  no  adverse 
circumstance   could    weaken,   nor    time    destroy. 
They  imparted  mutual  light  and  strength  to  each 
other.     And  as  the  Christian  system  became  more 
firmly  rooted  in  the  minds  of  men,  and  more  widely 
extended,  in  the  same  proportion  do  we  perceive 
the  champions  of  the  Church  embrace  with  cordi- 
ality all  the  leading  principles  of  Grecian  specula- 
tion on  human  nature.  The  cause  of  this  is  obvious ; 
the  great  truths  involved  in  both  bore  a  striking 
affinity  or  relationship  to  each  other.      They  both 
took  man  as  they  found  him;  they  analyzed  his 
nature  and  powers ;  they  laid  down  rules  for  liis 
government ;  and  both  aimed  at  the  permanent  re- 
finement and  ameKoration  of  his  condition.    These 
constituted  the  secret  and  powerful  bond  of  union 
between  human  and  divine  knowledge ;  between  the 
sages  of  Greece  and  the  disciples  of  the  Cross. 

2  f2 


NOTES 


AND 


ILLUSTRATIONS. 


NOTES  AND  ILLUSTHATIONS. 


NOTE   A.— Page  4. 

We  beg  to  give  here  a  short  Catalogue  of  Works  on  the  History 
of  Philosophy,  It  might  have  been  considerably  extended  ;  but 
the  list,  it  is  hoped,  will  be  found  sufficient  for  ordinary  purposes 
of  reference. — 

Adelung,  J.  C,  Geschichte  der  philosophie  fiir  Liebhaber.  Leipz. 
1786,  1787,  1807. 

^^?r«5,  Cours  de  Philosophie.     Paris,  1838. 

Anderson,  Wm.,  The  Philosophy  of  Ancient  Greece  Investi- 
gated.    London,  1794. 

Ast,  Frid.,  Grundriss  einer  Geschichte  der  Philosophie.  Lands- 
hut.      1825. 

Berchon  de  Penhoen,  (Le  Baron),  Ilistoire  de  la  Philosophie 
Allemande.     Paris,  1836. 

Berchetti,  Filosofia  dcgli  Antichi  Popoli.  Perugia,  1818. 

Blessig,  Joh.  Law.,  Diss,  de  Origine  Philosophic  apud  Romanes. 
Strasburg,  1770. 

Born,  Fri.  Gloh.,  Institutiones  Histori.  Philos.     Leipsic,  1798. 

Boiivier,  Histoire  Abregee  de  la  Philosophie.     Paris,  1844. 

Boioen,  Francis,  Critical  Essays  on  a  few  Subjects  connected 
with  the  History  and  present  Condition  of  Speculative  Philosophy. 
Boston  (U.  S.)  1842. 

Brandis,  Handb.  der  Gesch.  der  Griech.  und  Rom.  Philosophie. 
Berlin,  1835. 

Brueker,  Joh.  Jah.,  Kurze  Fragen  aus  der  Philosophischen 
Historie.  Ulm,  1/31. — Idem,  Ilistoria  Critica  Philosophise  a 
Mundi  incunabulis,  etc.     Lips.  1742. 


440  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

Buddeus,  J.  F.,  Historia  Philosophica,  Succincta  delineatio. 
Halle,  1712. 

Buhle,  Joh.  Glieb.,  Geschichte  des  Philosophirenden  Verstandes. 
Lemgo,  1793. — Lehrbuch  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic  und 
einer  Kiit.  Literatur  derselben.     Gotting.    1796,  1804. 

Biirigtiy,  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic  Payenne.     La  Haye,  \724. 

Buschiny,  Ant.  Fr.,  Vergleichung  der  Griech.  Philos.  mit  der 
Neuern.     Berlin,  1785. 

Ccqjasso,  J.  B..,  Hist.  Phil.  Synopsis.     Neap.  1728. 

Capajigue,  Histoire  Philosophique  des  Juifs,  depuis  la  Decadence 
des  Machabees  jusqu'a  nos  jours.     Bruxelles. 

Cai'us,  F?'.  Aug.,  Ideen  zur  Geschichte  der  Philosophic.  Lands- 
hut,  1808. — Idem,  Hauptrnomente  der  Gesch.  der  Philos.  Mu- 
nich, 1829, 

Cousin,  Cours  de  I'Histoire  de  la  Philosophic.  Paris,  1829. 
— Idem.  Fragmens  Philosophiques.     Paris,  1839. 

Cro)iiaziano,  Agatojnsto,  (Ajunaiio  Bnonafede,)  Delia  istoria 
e  della  indole  di  ogni  filosofia.     Lucca,  1766,  1771- 

Dacier,  Bibliotheque  des  Anciens  Philosophcs.     Paris,  1796. 

Damii'on,  Cours  de  la  Philosophic.     Paris,  1839. 

De  Gerando,  Histoire  Comparee  des  Systemes  de  Philosophic. 
Paris,  1846.  6  vol. 

Deslandes,  M.  D.,  Andr.  Fr.  Boiwemi,  Histoire  Critique  de  la 
Philosophic,  ou  Ton  traite  de  son  origine,  de  ses  progres,  et  des 
diverses  revolutions  qui  lui  sont  arrivees  jusqu'a  notre  temps. 
Paris,  1730,  1756.     Leipz.  1770. 

Diderot,  Histoire  Generale  des  Dogmes  et  Opinions  Philoso- 
phiques.    London,  1769. 

Dntens,  Recherches  sur  I'Origine  des  Decouvertes  attribuees 
aux  ISIodcrnes,  &c.     Paris,  1766. 

Eberhard,  Joh.  Aug.,  AUgemeine  Geschichte  der  Philosophie. 
Halle,  1788. — Idem,  Auszug  aus  der  Allgeui.  Geschichte.  Halle, 
1798. 

Enfield,  Will.,  History  of  Philosophy  from  the  earliest  Times, 
&c.     Loud.  1791. 

Erdmann,  Versuch  einer  Wiss.  Darst.  der  Gesch.  der  Neuern, 
Philos.     Riga,  1834. 

Ernesti,  Encyklopiidisclies  Handbuch  einer  Allgem.  Geschichte 
der  Philosophie.     Lemgo.  1807. 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  Ml 

Feuerbach,  Die  Neuern  Philos.  v.  Bacon,  Spinoza,  &c.  Anspach, 
1833. 

Formey,  Abrege  de  I'histoire  de  la  Philos.     Amsterd.  1768. 

Fries,  Geschichte  der  Philos.     Halle,  1837. 

Ftdleborn,  Von  der  Verschiedenheit  der  Alien  und  Neuern  Phi- 
iosophie. — Idetn,  Kurze  Geschichte  der  Philos. 

F^nelon,  Be  la  Motte,  Abrege  des  Vies  des  Anciens  Philosophes. 
Paris,  1795. 

Gaudentius,  Paganimis,  De  Philosophiag  apud  Romanos  Origiue 
et  Progressu.     Pisa,  1634.        ^ 

Gaudentius,  De  la  Philosophic  Payenne.     La  Haye,  1724. 

Gedike,  Frid.,  Ciceronis  Historia  Philosophies.     Berlin,  1782. 

Gentzkenius,  F.,  Hist.  Phil,  in  usum  lect.     Hamb.  1724,  1734. 

Gmeiner,  Fr.  Xav.,  Ljiterargesch.  des  Ursprungs  und  Fort- 
gangs  der  Philosophic,  wie  audi  aller  philos.  Secten  und  Sys- 
teme.     Griez.  1789. 

Goclenius,  Lexicon  Philosophicum.     Franck.  1613. 

Goess,  Ge.  Frid.  Dan.,  Die  Erziehungswissenschaft  nach  den 
Grundsiitzen  der  Griechen  und  Romer.  Anspach,  1808. — Idem, 
De  Variis,  quibus  usi  sunt  Grseci  et  Romani  Philosopliise  Defini- 
tionibus  Comm.     Ulm,  1811. 

Gravius,  Historica  Philosophica.     1674. 

Guillon,  Histoire  Abregee  de  la  Philosophie.     Paris,  1835. 

Gurlitts,  Joh.,  Abriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie.  Leipsic, 
1788. 

Hallam,  Literature  of  the  Middle  Ages.     London,  1839. 

Hamerskold,  L.,  Grundziige  der  Geschichte  der  Philos.  Stock- 
holm, 1828. 

Hegel,  G.  W.  F.,Vorlesungen  iiber  die  Geschichte  der  Philo- 
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Hehieccius,  Jo.  GottL,  Elementa  Hist.  Philosophicze.  Berlin, 
1743. 

Henry,  Br.,  An  Epitome  of  the  History  of  Philosophy.  New 
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Hilaire,  Saint,  M.  Barth.  De  I'Ecole  d'Alexandrie.     Paris,  1845. 
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442  NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

Hippeau,  Histoire  Abregee  de  la  Philosopbie.     Paris,  1839. 

Histoire  Critique  de  I'Eclectisme  ou  des  Nouveaux  Platoniciens, 
1766. 

Historia  Philosophise.     Lipsise,  1711. 

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Hornie,  Ge.,  Historia  Philosophica.     Lugd.  1655. 

Huet,  Traite  Philosophique  de  la  Faiblesse  de  I'Esprit  Humain. 
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Kayssler,  A.,  Beitrage  zur  Kritischeii  Geschichte  Neuern  Philo- 
sopbie.    Halle,  1804.  « 

Krause,  K.  Char.  Fr.,  Vorl.  iib.  die  Grundw.  der  AViss.  etc. 
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Krug,  Wilh.  Franz,  Geschichte  der  Philosophic.     Leipsic,  1828. 

Lapena,  Ensayo  Sobre  la  Historia  de  la  Filosofia.  Burgos, 
1807.     3  vol. 

Le  Maitre,  Rod.,  Les  Divins  Mysteres  de  la  Philosophic  Plato- 
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Lewis,  Biographical  History  of  Philosophy.     London,  1846. 

Lodtmann,  Kurzer  Abriss  der  Geschichte  der  Weltweisheit. 
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Maleville,  GuilL,  Histoire  Critique  de  I'Eclectisme,  ou  des  Nou- 
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Mai-tini,  Storia  della  Filosofia.     Torino,  1839. 

Martini,  Lorenzo,  Storia  della  Filosofia.     Milano,  1840. 

Matter,  Jacques,  Essai  Historique  sur  I'Ecole  d'Alexandrie. 
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Meiner,  Ch.,  Geschichte  des  Ursprungs,  Fortgangs,  und  Ver- 
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1838. 

Naigeon,  Dictionnaire  de  Philosophic,  Ancienne  et  Moderne. 
Paris,  1791. 

Olearius,  Historia  Philosophise.     Lipsise,  1711.     Venet.  1733. 

Pelvert,  Exposition  Succincte  et  Comparaison  de  la  Doctrine  des 
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NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  443 

Plessi?iff,  Fr.  Vict.  Lebrecht,  Hlstorische  und  Pliilosophische 
Untersuchungen  iiber  die  Denkart  Tlieologie  und  Philosophie  der 
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Elbing,  1785. 

Plexiacus,  Lexicon  Philosophicum.     Hagse,  1716. 

Posself,  Handbuch  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie.      1840. 

Pullenbe?'ff,  P.  J.,  Kurze  Darstellung  des  Haupt-Inh.  der  Ge- 
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Rapin,  R4n^,  Reflexions  sur  la  Philosophie  Ancienne  et  Mo- 
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Reinhardus,  Laur.,  Compendium  Hist.  Philosophicse.  Lipsise, 
1735. 

RemholJ,  E.,  Geschichte  der  Philosophie.  Gotha,  1828—30.— 
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Uenouvier,  CAar.,  Manuel  de  Philosophie  Ancienne.    Paris,  1844. 

Ritter,H.,  Geschichte  der  Philosophie.     Hamburg,  1829. 

Rixner,  Ans.  Thadd.,  Handbuch  der  Geschichte  der  Philos. 
Stulzbach,  1823. 

Sacchi,  Storia  Delia  Filosofia  Greca.     Pavia,  1818. 

Sanchez,  Historia  Moral  y  Filosofica.     Madrid. 

Schaller,  Karl  Aug.,  Handbuch  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie. 
Halle,  1809. 

Schwartz,  N.  J.,  Manuel  de  I'Histoire  de  la  Philosophie  Anci- 
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Simon,  M.  Jules,  Histoire  de  I'Ecole  d'Alexandrie.     Paris,  1845. 

Snell,  Phil.  Ludtv.,  Kurzer  Abriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philo- 
sophie.     1819. 

Socher,  Geo.,  Gruudriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophischen 
Systems  von  den  Griechen  bis  auf  Kant.     Miinchen,  1808. 

Stanley,  Thomas,  History  of  Philosophy.  Lond.,  1655,  folio; 
Ed.  3.   1701—4. 

Steck,  Erh.  Gottl.,  Die  Geschichte  der  Philosophie.    Riga,  1808. 

Tennemann,  Wilh.  Gottl.,  Geschichte  der  Philosophie.  Leipz. 
1798 — 1819. — 7<?e/rt,  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philos.  Leip- 
sic,  1819. 

Tiedemann,  Histoire  de  la  Philosophie  Speculative.  Marbourgh, 
1791. 

Tissot,  Histoire  Abregee  de  la  Philosophie.     Paris,  1840. 


444  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

VacheroU  M.  Et.,  Histoire  Critique  de  I'EcoIe  d'Alexaudrie. 
3  vols.  Paris,  1846. 

Vollbeding,  John  Christ.,  Kurze  Uebersicht  der  Geschichte  der 
Philos.     Berlin,  1798. 

Vossius,  De  Philosophia  et  Philosophorum  Sectis.      1658. 

JFalch,  F.  G.,  Erliiuterungen  der  Philosophie  von  Verf.  Halle, 
1738. 

Weiller,  Karl.,  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie.  Miiu- 
chen,  1818. 

Werdennann,  J.  L.  G.,  Geschichte  der  Philos.     Leipsic,  1798. 

Willm,  J.,  Histoire  de  la  Philosophie  Allemande.  4  vols.  Paris, 
1846. 

Windischmann,  Carl.  Joh.  H.,  Die  Philosophie  im  Fortgang  der 
Weltgeschichte.  Bonn,  1838. — Idem,  Krit.  Betrachtungen  Uber 
die  Schicksale  der  Philosophie.     Frankfort,  1828. 


NOTE  B.— Page  12. 

"  The  reason  why  Anaximander  regarded  the  primary  substance 
as  infinite,  finds  a  natural  explanation  in  the  infinite  variety  of  the 
evolutions  of  the  world,  which  have  their  ground  in  it.  He  is  re- 
presented as  arguing  that  the  primary  substance  must  have  been 
infinite,  to  be  all-sufficient  for  the  limitless  variety  of  produced 
things  with  which  we  are  encompassed.  Now  although  Aristotle 
expressly  characterises  this  infinite  as  a  mixture,  we  must  not, 
nevertheless,  think  of  it  as  a  mere  multiplicity  of  primary  material 
elements ;  for  to  the  mind  of  Anaximander  it  was  a  unity,  im- 
mortal and  imperishable,  an  ever-producing  energy.  This  pro- 
duction of  individual  things  was  derived  by  Anaximander  from  an 
eternal  motion  of  the  infinite  ;  from  which  it  would  appear  that  he 
ascribed  to  it  an  inherent  vital  energy,  without,  however,  employing 
the  terms  life  and  production  in  any  acceptation  except  the  only 
one  allowable  byjthe  character  of  his  philosophy, — in  the  sense,  i.  e. 
of  motion,  by  which  the  primary  elements  of  the  infinite  separate 
themselves  one  from  another. 

•'  According]^to  Anaximander,  it  was  not  by  any  continuous  trans- 
mutation of  the  primary  substance  into  a  variety  of  secondary  states, 


NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  445 

that  the  sensible  qualities  of  things  begin  to  be  ;  but  by  separation, 
according  to  their  kind,  of  opposite  elements,  which  in  the  infinite 
are  confusedly  and  separately  combined  into  unity  ;  which  secretion 
is  effected  by  the  eternal  motion.     According  to  this,  the  primary 
being  of  Anaximander  is  undoubtedly  a  unity  ;  but  it  comprises 
within  itself  the  multiplicity  of  elements  out  of  which  things  are 
composed ;  and  these  need  only  to  be  divided,  in  order  to  their 
appearing  as  separate  phenomena  of  nature.     Thus  on  the  decom- 
position of  the  infinite,  the  kindred  elements  were  attracted  to- 
gether ;  so  that  what  in  the  All  was  gold,  without,  however,  appear- 
ing to  be  such,  in  consequence  of  being  blended  with  its  opposite, 
now  appears  gold  ;  and  what  was  earth,  earth ;   for  nothing  new  is 
produced,  or   assumes  other  qualities   different  from  those  it  pre- 
viously had ;  but  all  was  antecedently  the  same  as  subsequently  it 
exhibited  itself  to  be.     This  is  evidently  founded  on  the  grand 
principle  of  the  mechanical  theory  of  physics,  that  nothing  alters 
its  qualities,  but  ever  remains  identical,  and  only  moves  among  the 
other  elements,  whereby,  in  the  altered  mixture,  the  same  element 
appears  different  at  different  times.     We  shall  see  these  same  con- 
ceptions occurring  again  in  the  more  detailed  explanations  of  nature 
given   by  Anaximander,  and   thereby  his  whole  theory  placed  in 
direct  opposition  to  that  of  the  Ionian  dynamicists. 

"The  issuing  of  individual  things  from  out  of  the  infinite  All  was 
thus  explained  by  Anaximander :  The  central  point  in  the  cosmo- 
pceia  was  the  earth  ;  for,  being  of  cylindrical  form  with  a  base  in 
the  ratio  1  :  3  to  its  altitude,  it  was  retained  in  the  centre  by  the 
air,  and  by  the  equality  of  its  distances  from  all  the  limits  of  the 
world  ;  the  stars,  on  the  other  hand,  moved  round  it  at  equal  dis- 
tances from  each  other, — the  planets  and  fixed  stars  lowest,  then 
the  moon,  and  ultimately  the  sun  ;  each  one  of  these  bodies  being 
borne  on  wheel-like  ring  (its  sphere).  According  to  this  view 
of  the  system  of  the  world,  the  motion  of  the  infinite  productive 
unity,  which  comprises  within  itself  all  opposites,  appears  to 
have  suggested  first  of  all  the  opposition  the  centre  and  circum- 
ference, and  then  again  to  have  referred  this  to  a  further  oppo- 
sition between  the  earth  and  the  heavens,  of  which  the  former 
indicated  to  his  mind  the  cold,  the  latter  the  warm  :  so  that  in  the 
first  place  the  cold  elements  separate  themselves  from  the  warm, 
the  former  constituting  the  centre,  and  the  latter  the  circumference 


446  NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

of  the  world.  This  representation  is  everywhere  paramount  with 
Anaximander  ;  all  formation,  either  of  the  universe  or  individuali- 
ties, must  necessarily  evolve  itself  in  the  contrariety  of  the  inner 
and  the  outer,  inasmuch  as  the  outer  surrounds  and  encloses  the 
inner,  as  the  bark  does  the  tree.  The  earth,  therefore,  in  its  first 
formation,  was  supposed  to  be  a  mixture  of  cold,  watery,  and  earthy 
elements,  which  had  been  separated  out  of  the  infinite  from  the 
warm  and  fiery,  by  means  of  the  eternal  motion.  The  heaven,  on 
the  contrary,  he  considered  as  a  hollow  fiery  sphere,  which  con- 
tains the  atmospheric  air.  The  system  of  the  world,  however,  after 
this  first  formation,  proceeded  to  evolve  itself  to  a  further  degree  ; 
aud  whilst  the  earth  was  improved  by  the  force  of  fire,  occasioning 
the  division  of  the  land  and  the  waters,  the  heavens  likewise  ex- 
perienced a  further  separation.  The  revolution  by  which  this  was 
brought  about,  is  described  by  Anaximander  as  a  disruption  of  the 
heavenly  sphere,  by  which  means  several  single  fiery  systems  were 
formed — the  present  heavenly  bodies — which,  being  thereupon  en- 
closed in  aerial  spheres,  are  onlj'  visible  through  certain  apertures. 
Here  again  we  meet  with  the  opposition  between  the  outer  and  the 
inner,  the  enclosing  air  and  the  enclosed  fire ;  only  the  fire  in  the 
compass  of  the  world  presents  itself  differently  from  what  it  does 
in  the  centre,  or  rather  in  the  world  itself, — for  with  respect  to  the 
latter,  the  inner  core  of  the  world,  in  its  narrow  sense,  is  the  cold ; 
and  the  water,  or  the  heaven,  is  the  warm  ;  but  contrariwise,  in  the 
heavenly  bodies  the  inner  is  the  warm,  and  the  enclosing  integu- 
ment the  cold.  It  is  impossible  not  to  see  in  all  this  an  intentional 
pursuit  of  contrariety,  which  again  is  further  evident  from  the  mode 
in  which,  attached  to  the  polytheist  conceptions  of  his  country- 
men, he  designates  the  universe  and  the  heaven — by  which  latter 
term  he  understands  the  stars — as  gods.  When,  however,  he 
speaks  of  an  infinity  of  co -existent  worlds,  he  must,  consistently 
with  his  entire  theory,  employ  the  term  world  in  a  subordinate 
acceptation,  for  the  oneliness  of  the  world  or  universe  was  a  staple 
point  in  all  his  speculations, — since  he  supposed,  on  the  one  hand, 
an  influential  action  of  the  heavenly  bodies  on  the  formation  of  the 
earth,  and  on  the  other,  that  the  earth  and  the  heavenly  bodies, 
maintaining  certain  definite  distances,  constituted  one  orderly 
system , 

"  In  all  these  formations  the  mode  of  production  is  evidently  me- 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  447 

chanical ;  thus  it  is  the  eternal  motion  which  separates  the  contra- 
ries, and  collects  the  warm  elements  in  the  circumference,  and  the 
cold  elements  in  the  centre.  Again,  the  opposition  of  heavy  and 
light  seems  to  have  played  its  part  in  the  system  of  Anaximander, 
and  to  have  been  looked  upon  by  him  as  the  cause  of  motion. 
And  the  mathematical  laws  also,  which  are  so  naturally  allied 
to  the  mechanical  physiology,  are  employed  in  his  theory  to  deter- 
mine the  ratio  of  the  earth's  altitude  and  base,  to  calculate  the 
distance  of  the  intervals  between  the  subordinate  worlds,  and  to 
compare  the  size  of  the  earth  with  that  of  the  sun. 

"  But  there  is  yet  another  point  which  displays  still  more  re- 
markably the  close  affinity  of  his  whole  view  with  the  mechanical 
tlieory  of  nature  ;  which  indeed — as  we  shall  see  the  same  point 
occur  in  an  exactly  similar  manner  with  all  the  mechanical  philoso- 
phers of  the  Ionian  school,  and  nothing  similar  being  to  be  found 
among  the  dynamicists — affords  a  test  whereby  to  recognise  in  the 
details  the  historical  connexion  of  the  various  expositions  of  this 
theory,  which  is,  however,  otherwise  sufficiently  manifest  from  the 
general  view.  The  greatest  difficulty  for  the  mechanical  theory  of 
nature  must  have  been  to  account  for  the  organical  construction  of 
living  beings,  since  this  view  does  not  recognise  an  original  vital 
energy  really  capable  of  transmuting  itself  into  other  changeable 
states.  Hence  we  invariably  find  the  mechanicists  occupied  in 
framing  hypotheses  which  might  serve  to  explain  on  mechanical 
laws  the  phenomena  of  animal  and  vegetable  life.  Those  put  for- 
ward by  Anaximander  for  this  purpose  have  been  very  inaccurately 
reported  to  us ;  sufficiently,  however,  for  us  too  see  that  they  com- 
pletely coincide  with  his  whole  notion  of  a  progressive  formation  of 
the  world  by  means  of  the  gradually  evolved  contrarieties  of  heat 
and  cold ;  and  also  bear  the  greatest  resemblance  to  a  very  ancient 
representation  of  the  origin  of  men  and  brutes,  which  in  its  general 
features  has  been  transmitted  by  Diodorus  Siculus." — Ritter,  Hist. 
Phil.  Yol.  l.pp.  163—172. 


NOTE  B.— Page  66. 
**  As,  however,  in  the  midst  of  these  logical  or  dialectical  disqui- 
sitions, we  have  fallen  upon  that  which  from  of  old,  has  ever  been 


448  NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

considered  at  once  the  centre  and  the  difficulty  of  the  Platonic  sys- 
tem— his  theory  of  ideas,  it  is  indispensable  to  ascertain  precisely 
the  true  Platonic  sense  of  the  term  idea.     This  is  the  more  neces- 
sary, the  greater  the  disposition  that  has  been  evinced  in  modern 
times  to  take  a  very  partial  view  of  the  subject,  and  to  explain  the 
ideas  either  by  the  general  properties  of  objects,  or  by  the  general 
notions  of  genus  and  species,  and  even  to  confine  them  exclusively 
to  the  ideal  conceptions  of  the  good,  the  beautiful,  and  the  just. 
The  expressions  of  Plato,  hov^ever,  far  transcend  all  these  narrow 
limitations,  and  there  is  no  species  of  being  which  he  does  not 
comprise  within  his  idea.     In  order,  however,  to  determine  from 
his  own  writings  the  extent  of  the  term  as  employed  by  him,  it  is 
necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  he  speaks  in  the  same  sense  of  his 
Vc?eff,  and  of  the  permanent  essence,  unity,  or  absolute  being,  which, 
to  his  mind,  indicated  the  objective  of  the  ideas.     Now  we   find 
that  he  comprises  therein  not  merely  the  highest  and  most  perfect 
within  his  own  knowledge,  the  beautiful  and  the  good,  justice  and 
science,  but  even  their  contraries — every  species  of  vice,  evil,  and  in- 
justice.   Moreover,  he  speaks  of  ideas  of  resemblance  and  difference, 
of  the  one  and  the  manifold,  of  magnitude,  of  health,  and  strength, 
and  even  of  speed  and  slowness  ;  so,  too,  of  the  unity  of  man  and  of 
beast,  of  the  sphere,  in  and  by  itself,  the  circle,  in  and  by  itself;  of  a 
bed  and  a  stable,  even  of  the  name  or  the  noun.  And  lest,  perchance, 
this  should  be  misunderstood  to  refer  merely  to  the  general  character 
of  genus  and  species,  the  individual  soul  is  represented  as  an  idea  ; 
and  what  Socrates  is,  and  what  Simmias  is,  is  distinguished  from 
what  is  common  to  both.     What,  however,  is  still  more  calculated 
to  excite  surprise,  is  the  attribution  of  an  essence  even  to  the  sen- 
sible and  the  inchoate,  so  that  it  is  requisite  to  consider  as  an  idea 
that  which  to  all  appearance  is  the  most  to  its  nature.     Thus  an 
essence  is  attributed  to  a  colour  and  a  sound,  and  prototypes  are 
given  to  the  different  species  of  life,  and  a  permanence  of  essence  is 
ascribed,  not  merely  to  things,  but  also  to  their  actions  and  activi- 
ties.    This  is,  however,  perfectly  consistent  with  the  comprehensive 
and  searching  character  of  Plato's  mind,  which  would  not  allow  of 
science  being  limited  to  any  close  and  narrow  domain,  or  of  aught 
being  excluded  from  the  sphere  of  right  knowledge.    This  extensive 
view  of  science  is  exhibited  in  a  manner  truly  philosophical,  in  the  re- 
proof which  tlie  young  Socrates  is  made  to  receive  from  Parmenides, 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTKATIONS.  449 

for  evincing  a  disinclination  to  recognise,  .-is  possible,  the  reality  of 
the  ideas  of  man,  fire,   water,  nay,  even  of  hair  and  of  clay,  and 
other  equally  mean  and  paltry  objects  ;  for  Parmenides  observes,  it 
is  unbecoming  a  true  philosopher  to  defer  to  the   opinion  of  the 
many,  and  to  consider  any  object  as  wholly  despicable.     In  another 
sense,  the  Platonic  acceptation  of  Idea  is  still  more  extensive  ;  for 
among  the  ideas  after  which  the  sensible  world  was  formed,  he  even 
reckons  the  tribes  of  mortal  creatures  ;  which,  however,  to  his  mind, 
indicate  nothing  more  than  different  grades  in  the  development  of 
one  and  the  same  living  essence ;  since  the  soul,  in  its  migration, 
passes  from  one  to  the  other.     Hence  we  may  clearly  infer,  that 
the  Ideas  may  indicate  certain  natural  grades  of  development — and 
not  merely  the  essence  of  things,  which,  in  every  possible  relation, 
invariably  remains  identical  with  itself.     "We  have,  however,  from 
Plato  himself,  as  general  a  determination  of  the  province  of  Ideas 
as  could  be  desired  ;  for  he  expressly  declares,  that  an  Idea  may  be 
attributed  to  whatever,  as  a  plurality,  may  be  indicated  by  the  same 
name.     It  must  be  manifest  to  all,  whose  notions  of  the  theory  are 
tolerably  clear  and  precise,  that  this  expression  cannot  be  under- 
stood as  exclusively  referring  to  species  and  genera,  which,  in  the 
individual,  appear  as  the  manifold,  but  also  to  such  individuals  as, 
expressed  by  one  common  name,  exhibit  themselves  in  many  phe- 
nomena.    Furthermore,  it  could  not   escape  Plato's   observation, 
that  every  property,  every  condition,  and  every  relation  of  things, 
expressed  by  a  term,  can  be  valid  by  many ;  and  finally,  that  even 
the  variable  activities,  as  also  generation  or  becoming,  can  be  ex- 
pressed by  a  noun,  and  combined  with   many  verbs  ;  so   that,  in 
fact,  it  must  be  admitted  that  according  to  him  there  is  nothing 
which  does  not  participate  in  Ideas,  or  may  not  be  comprehended 
in  an  Idea." 

"  Now,  that  the  term  Idea  should  have  been  used  by  Plato  in 
this  wide  and  general  sense,  will  surprise  no  one  who  has  con- 
sidered, however  slightly,  the  basis  on  which  his  whole  theory  rests. 
This,  indeed,  is  the  Idea  of  science,  for  the  reality  of  which  that  of 
the  Ideas  is  indispensable.  If,  then,  Plato  maintained  that  there 
must  necessarily  be  Ideas  to  exhibit  the  unalterable  and  eternal 
truth  of  the  objects  of  every  science,  in  order  that  the  science  itself 
should  be  possible,  he  was  constrained  to  find  Ideas  wherever  there 
is  a  true  essence,  and  scientific  investigation  is  possible.  But  what 
*  2  G 


450  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

was  there  to  which,  in  Plato's  opinion,  scientific  inquiry  might  not 
attach  itself,  or  in  which  some  truth  might  not  yet  be  found  ?  For 
consistently  with  the  comprehensive  view  he  entertained  of  science, 
he  must  have  clearly  seen  that  there  is  a  truth  to  be  discovered, 
even  in  individuals,  even  in  the  qualities  and  properties  of  things, 
and  in  all  that  comes  into  being,  and  that  consequently  an  idea 
must  be  found  for  them  all.  We  must,  therefore,  dismiss  all  nar- 
row views  of  the  Platonic  Idece,  and  understand  by  them  whatever 
exhibits  an  eternal  truth, — a  persistent  something  which  forms  the 
basis  of  the  mutability  of  the  sensible.  As  the  ideal  theory  was 
the  conjoint  result  of  the  controversy  against  the  sensuous  presen- 
tation interpreted  by  the  Sophists,  and  against  the  denial  of  all  dis- 
tinction to  which  the  Eleatic  theory  manifestly  tended,  there 
were  two  points  principally  which  it  is  of  importance  to  it  to 
establish  clearly  and  firmly, — first,  that  the  sensible  is  not  the  true, 
but  that  science  alone,  which  teaches  that  there  is  an  unchangeable 
truth,  can  adequately  express  the  unchangeable  essence  of  things  ; 
and  secondly,  that  truth,  or  the  real  and  true  being,  is  not  indis- 
tinguishably  one  and  identical,  but  that  it  comprises  a  multitude  of 
separate  notions,  every  one  of  which  expresses,  in  a  manner  pecu- 
liar to  itselfj  the  eternal  essence  of  things ;  and  although  it  consti- 
tutes in  itself  a  true  unity,  nevertheless,  in  reference  to  others, 
it  appears  as  a  multiplicity. 

"  But  there  is  yet  a  third  point  which  is  immediately  implied  in 
the  Ideal  theory,  viz.  that  the  true  and  the  real  are  exhibited  in 
general  notions  as  elements  of  science,  which  are  so  related  to  each 
other  that  every  higher  notion  embraces  and  combines  under  it 
several  lower ;  consequently,  that  the  elements  of  truth  cannot  be 
so  separated  from  each  other  as  not  to  be  nevertheless  held  together 
by  some  higher  bond.  Now,  as  Plato  maintained  this  coherency 
of  ideas  to  be  indispensable  to  science,  he  naturally  proceeded  to 
show  that  all  those  theories  are  subversive  of  it,  which  consider  any 
special  truth  to  exist  absolutely  in  and  of  itself.  This  connexion 
of  the  individual  essences  he  supposed  to  be  similar  to  that  by 
which  individual  ideas  are  comprehended  under  the  more  general ; 
which  in  his  mind  is  a  true  and  a  real  connexion,  and  not  merely 
conceptual.  Here,  then,  we  have  the  reality  of  the  general  ex- 
pressly asserted,  which  however  is  not  a  mere  abstract  generality, 
but  one  in  which  the  special  and  the  individual  are  comprised. 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  451 

That  this  must  possess  a  verity,  and  consequently  reahty,  needs 
not,  according  to  Plato,  any  other  voucher  than  the  truth  and 
reahty  of  science,  of  which  the  general  is  the  constituent." — Ritter, 
Hist.  Philos.  Vol.  ii.  p.  1/0—172. 


NOTE  C— Page  9Q. 

"  But,  although  Aristotle  agreed  with  Plato  in  thinking  that  the 
essences  of  things  are  expressed  in  the  notions,  he  nevertheless 
impugned  the  Platonic  theory  of  ideas,  in  so  far  as  it  taught  that 
this  essence  is  to  be  found  in  the  general  ideas.     This  controversy 
is  carried  on  by  Aristotle  in  very  different  ways.     At   times  he 
attacks  the  manner  in  which  Plato  attempts  to  gain,  by  means  of 
ideas,  and  of  the  mathematical  notion  of  numbers,  a  transition  from 
the  becoming,  to  the  eternal  verity.     In  this  attack  Aristotle  con- 
fines himself  to  bringing  forward  a  variety   of  doubts,   which  the 
vagueness  of  Plato's  views,  and  those  of  his  disciples,  on  this  sub- 
ject, naturally  give  rise  to,  and  which,  although  they  do  not  enter 
deeply  into  the  spirit  of  the  doctrine,  are  nevertheless  well  fitted 
to  awaken  attention  to  its  weakness.     This  mode  of  the  contro- 
versy does  not,  however,  concern  us  in  the  present  place,  where 
our  first  object  is  that  which  relates  to  the  notion  of  essence.     In 
this  respect  Aristotle  objects  to  the  ideal  theory,  that  it  possesses  an 
essence  which  has  no  part  in  motion  or  change  ;  for  the  ideas  are 
said  to  indicate  the  eternal  alone,  and  that,  consequently,  it  renders 
all  investigation   into  nature  impossible.     This  objection  was  in 
some  measure  connected  with  his  conviction,  that  the  ideal  theory 
had  its  origin  in  logical,  as  opposed  to  physical,  researches.     Simi- 
larly, Aristotle  urged  that  ethical  investigations  also  are  impossible 
in  the  ideal  theory,  since  these  investigations  are  not  concerned 
about  the  good  in  itself,  but  the  good  which  is  the  end  and  result 
of  human  conduct  and  actions.     From  admitting  Slich  grounds  of 
science  Aristotle  was  prevented,  by  his  doctrine  that  we  must  rise 
from  the  better  known  to  us,  or  from  that  which  is  more  nearly 
allied  to  the  sensible,  to  the  knowledge  of  what  is  better  known  in 
and  by  itself.     On  this  ground  he  likewise  shews,  that  if  the  ideas 
are  contained,  or  ought  to  be,  in  us,  that  they  must  be  moveable, 
or  sensible,  since  there  is  in  the  soul  a  movement  and  perception  of 

2  G  2 


452  NOTES   AND   ILLUSTRATIONS. 

forms.     Herein  is  apparent  the  endeavour  of  Aristotle  to  find  such 
an  essence  as  would  facilitate  the  explanation  of  experience,  and 
the  sensuous  phenomenon  of  becoming ;  for  he  regards  it  as  the 
great  defect  of  the  ideal  theory,  that  it  rends  the  universal  from 
the  material,  in  order  to  make  the  sole  ground  of  the  special.     It 
did  not  indeed  escape  Aristotle,  that  Plato's  doctrine  does  not  alto- 
gether neglect  phenomena,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  it  attempts  to 
reconcile  sensation  with  the  ideal;  but  he  considered  that  it  accom- 
plishes this  not  only  very  vaguely,  but  even  very  strangely.    Thus  he 
says,  that  what  the  Platonists  call  a  participation  of  objects  in  the 
ideas,  is  a  mere  vague,  idle  talk  ;  and  he  designates  as  absurd  the 
position  of  the  ideal  theory,  that  even  general  notions  indicate  an 
essence,  or  entity,  since,  according  to  such  a  view,  a  single  essence 
might  be   composed  of  several  diiferent  essences ;  a  consequence 
which  would  imperil  the  legitimacy  of  the  principle  of  contradiction. 
At  times,  indeed,  he  evidently  misinterprets  the  Platonic  doctrine, 
and  is  of  opinion  that  Plato  considered  the  ideas  to  be  altogether 
separate  from  sensible  things,  to  which  he  may  perhaps  have  been 
misled  by  the  fact,  that  Plato  does  not  assign  a  place  to  the  ideas, 
but  evidently  looks  upon  them  as  existing  wholly  without  the  rela- 
tions  of  space.     But  the  principal  defect  which  he  imputes  to 
Plato's  theory  is,  that  it  confounds  the  grounds  of  all  things,  and, 
by  a  necessary  consequence,  teaches  concerning  things,  doctrines 
which  do  not  coincide  with  phenomena.     In  opposition  to  this  view, 
Aristotle  observes,  that  it  is  necessary  to  assume  different  grounds 
of  entity,  a  sensible  for  the  sensible,  a  perishable  for  the  perishable, 
and  an  eternal  for  what  is  eternal,  and  generally  to  admit  for  every 
class  of  objects  a  peculiar  and  correspondent  ground.     From  this 
confusion  of  the  grounds  of  Plato  it  has  necessarily  resulted,  that  he 
could  not  assume  any  properly  supra-sensible  grounds  of  things,  but 
believed  that,  by  adding  to  the  sensible  ground  the  words  "in  and 
by  itself,"  he  could   elevate  it  into  the  supra-sensible.      In  this 
respect  Aristotle  compares  the  ideal  theory  to  humanizing  represen- 
tations of  the  Deity  ;   for,  in  the  same  manner  that  these  form  at 
most  but  eternal  men,   the  Platonic  doctrine  makes  the  sensible 
species  of  things  conceived  as  eternal,  to  be  the  ground  of  things. 
The  great  absurdity  of  the  doctrine  is,  that  it  assimilates  in  species, 
things,  like  the  perishable  and  imperishable,  which  are  generically 
different. 


NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  453 

"  It  cannot  be  denied  that,  by  following  out  these  consequences, 
Aristotle  did  not  attack  Plato  in  the  true  spirit  of  his  theory.  This 
spirit  Aristotle  misunderstood,  in  consequence  of  following  a  very 
different  notion  of  essence  from  that  which  Plato  did.  While  the 
latter  viewed  the  essence  of  things  in  a  very  general  light,  and 
without  any  proximate  determination,  as  that  which  exhibits  itself 
in  sensible  phenomena  as  the  abiding  law,  which  admits  of  being 
apprehended  in  a  scientific  notion,  Aristotle  sought  to  discover 
some  ground  which,  as  absolutely  subsisting,  should  furnish  the 
ground  of  all  things.  The  principal  object  of  Plato  was  to  discover 
and  to  trace  the  true  and  the  real  in  all  sensible  objects,  aud  this 
he  considered  to  be  the  essence  ;  Aristotle,  on  the  contrary,  sought 
to  explain  the  origin  of  sensations  by  the  mutual  action  and  passion 
of  things  on  their  essences.  And  if  Plato  looked  upon  the  true 
not  merely  as  individual,  but  also  as  universal,  still  Aristotle  does 
not  deviate  from  him  in  this  respect ;  he  only  objects  to  Plato's 
giving  to  the  universal  the  term  essence.  Moreover,  he  took  too 
narrow  a  view  of  the  ideal  theory,  when  he  believed  that  Plato  did 
not  admit  ideas  of  individual  objects  as  well  as  of  the  universal. 
Here  again  he  was  probably  deceived  by  the  language  of  Plato, 
who,  in  truth,  does  consider  every  particular  idea  as  a  universal, 
but  at  the  same  time  regards  every  individual  entity  as  universal  or 
general,  since  it  also  comprises  under  itself  a  multiplicity  of  sensuous 
determinations.  That  on  this  point  there  subsisted  nothing  more 
than  a  verbal  misunderstanding  between  Plato  and  Aristotle  is  clear 
from  the  fact,  that  the  latter  even  looked  upon  the  general,  although 
it  may  be  predicated  of  many  things,  as  something  which,  not 
merely  in  name,  but  also  in  being,  is  one  and  the  same,  and  as 
only  cognizable  by  the  intellect  indeed,  but  still  actually  present  in 
the  sensible.  Aristotle  found  it  necessary  to  maintain  this,  because, 
otherwise,  any  inference  from  a  universal  truth  would  be  impos- 
sible. He  held  that  science,  as  Plato  had  previously  shewn,  is 
dependent  on  the  universal,  only  this  universal  is  not  something 
extrinsical  to  things.  We  cannot  deny  that  this  account  still  leaves 
a  difference  of  view  between  Aristotle  and  Plato;  which,  however,  does 
not  consist  in  this,  that  while  one  denied  the  existence  of  the  general, 
the  other  denied  that  of  the  individual ;  but  merely  in  the  different 
directions  they  respectively  followed  in  their  attempts  to  explain 
phenomena.     Plato  sought  to  deduce  the  individual  from  the  uni- 


454  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

versal ;  but  Aristotle,  on  the  contrary,  believed  tbat  the  universal 
has  its  grounding  in  the  individual.  Logically,  the  tendency  of 
the  latter  is  mainly  expressed  in  his  endeavour  to  find  an  ultimate 
subject  of  the  proposition,  an  "  hypostasis  "  of  which  all  else  may 
be  predicated  j  such  are  individual  objects,  for  ideas  are  merely 
idle  words,  and  the  general  is  not  anything  subsisting  absolutely 
in  and  for  itself,  but  it  is  invariably  predicated  of  something  else." — 
{Ritter,  Vol.  iii.  p.  108.) 


NOTE  D.— Page  1/1. 

*'  II  fut  aussi  le   prince  des   philosophes  romains,   ce   citoyen 
illustre,  qui  fut  le  prince  des  orateurs.     Le  premier,  il  cleva  sur 
cette  terre  nouvelle  un  monument  a  la  science  de  la  sagesse  ;  et 
tjuel  monument !     C'est  un  portique  majestueux  qui  introduit  h 
toutes  les  branches  de  la  science.     Ciceron  est  historien  et  peintre 
tout  ensemble  ;  il  fait  revivre  les  ecoles  diverses  en  meme  temps 
qu'il  en  raconte  I'origine,     S'emparant  ensuite  de  leur  heritage,  il 
eleve  la  philosophic  a  la  plus  haute  dignite,  lui  assigne  son  veritable 
but,  lui  prete  le  plus  noble  langage,  I'arrache  aux  subtilites  des 
ecoles  pour  la  transporter  sur  la  scene  de  la  socicte,  I'anime  d'une  vie 
toute  nouvelle.  Ce  n'est  pas  a  I'intelligence  seule  qu'il  s'adresse,  c'est 
Tame  tout  enticre  qu'il  interesse  a  ses  doctes  lecons.     Comment  les 
anciennes  preventions  qui  repoussaient  les  etudes  philosophiques  ne  se 
seraient-elles  pas  dissipces,  lorsque  leur  cause  obtenait  un  tel  apo- 
logiste,   lorsqu'elles  recevaient   de  la  bouche  de  ce  grand  homme 
les   plus  magnifiques    eloges,  lorsqu'on  apprenait  de    lui  qu'elles 
avaient  ete  sa  lumiere  dans  les  affaires  publiques,   son  delassement 
dans  ses  travaux,  sa  consolation  dans  I'adversite ;  qu'il  avait  trouve 
en  elles  et  un  guide  pour  son  genie,  et  une  source  inalte'rable  de 
bonheur,  et  le  vrai  fondement  de  la  vertu ;  lorsque  Ciceron  lui-meme, 
si  justement  fier  des  services  qu'il  avait  rendus  a  son  pays,  placait 
au  ^premier  rang  de  ces  services  le  bonheur  d' avoir  pu  introduire  ces 
concitoyens  a  I'etude  de  cette  science  ?     II  nous  apprend  qu'avant 
lui  divers  ecrivains    s'etaient    dej^  exerces  sur  le  meme  sujet ;  mais 
ils  etaient  restes  dans  une  obscurite  dont  I'orateur  romain  croit  in- 
utile de  les  tirer.     II  est  cependaut  singulier  qu'il  ne  fasse  jamais 
mention  du  pocme  de  Lucrece.     Ciceron  nous  confie  lui-meme  qu'il 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  455 

s'est  propose  quatre  vues  principales :  faire  connaitre  aux  Ro- 
xnains  les  doctrines  des  Grecs,  y  puiser  librement  ce  qui  lui  parais- 
sait  digne  d'estime,  les  revetir  des  ornements  du  style  et  de  tout 
I'eclat  qu'elles  peuvent  emprunter  k  I'art  oratoire,  et  les  rapporter 
aux  resultats  de  I'utilitc  la  i)lus  relevce  et  la  plus  etendue  ;  aussi 
trouvons-nous  dans  la  philosophie  de  Ciceron  les  quatre  caracteres 
essentiels  qui  distiuguent  les  travaux  des  philosophes  remains  pen- 
dant le  cours  de  cette  periode ;  una  science  empruntee  aux  sages 
de  la  Grece,  mais  composee  d'un  choix  de  matc'riaux  fait  dans  les 
diflFcrentes  ecoles,  una  science  rendue  accessible,  attrayante,  mise  a 
la  portce  de  tons  les  hommes  iustruits,  une  science  cminemment 
pratique  et  appliquee  aux  besoins  gcneraux  de  la  socictc,  comme  a 
ceux  de  la  morale  privee ;  en  sorte  que  Ciceron  n'a  pas  ete  le  vrai 
fondateur  de  la  philosophie  h  Rome,  mais  qu'il  est  en  quelque  sorta 
pour  nous  comme  le  representant  de  tons  ceux  qui  I'ont  cultivee 
apr^s  lui.  En  tracant  rapidement  ici  le  resume  de  ce  qu'il  a  fait 
pour  elle,  nous  expliquerons  done  mieux  que  par  une  froide  nomen- 
clature bibliographique,  le  point  de  vue  dans  lequel  les  Romaius  se 
sent  places  pour  I'etude  de  cette  science,  et  I'esprit  dans  lequel  ils 
I'ont  traitee. 

"  L'ecole  d'Epicure  est  la  seule  a  laquelle  Ciceron  n'ait  voulu  payer 
aucun  tribut,  et  I'eloignement  qu'il  montra  pour  elle  est  justifie  en 
partie  par  Tabus  qu'on  commencait  a  en  faire,  par  la  pressentiment 
de  celui  qu'on  en  ferait  par  la  suite.  II  lone  Pythagore,  il  rand 
a  Socrate  une  sorta  da  culte,  il  professe  pour  Platon  I'admira- 
tion  la  plus  constante ;  il  associe  Aristote  aux  hommages  dont  il 
environne  le  fondateur  de  I'Academie,  il  se  plait  a  voir  dans  ces  deux 
philosophes  plutot  deux  aUie's  que  deux  rivaux ;  il  s'est  pe'netre  des 
austeres  maximes  de  Ze'non,  il  s'est  range  a  la  suite  de  Carneade  et 
de  Philon  dans  les  rangs  de  la  moyenne  Acade'mie  ;  mais  ca  qu'il 
y  a  surtout  cherche,  c'est  I'avantage  qu'offre  cette  ecole  de  pouvoir 
comparer,  discuter  hbrement  toutes  les  doctrines,  les  opposer  entre 
elles,  et  faire  un  choix  judicieux.  II  cherche  lui-meme  comment 
on  peut  composer,  de  I'enseignement  des  sages  de  la  Grece  depuis 
Socrate,  un  systeme  unique  ou  du  moins  principal,  modifie  seule- 
ment  par  les  additions  ou  les  corrections  de  ses  sucesseurs ;  il  va 
quelquefois  jusqu'a  forcer  ca  rapprochement,  et  jusqu'a  supposer 
que  la  doctrine  des  Stoiciens  ne  difFere  que  dans  les  termes  da  cel- 
les  da  Platon  et  d' Aristote.     On  est  force  de  reconnaitre  toutefois 


456  NOTES   AND   ILLUSTRATIONS. 

que,  dans  ses  vastes  recherches,  il  n'a  pas  toujours  exactement  saisi, 
fidelement  rendu,  la  veritable  pensee  des  auteurs  dont  il  se  rendait 

I'interprete. 

"En  general,  Ciceron  suit  la  moyenne  Academie  dans  les  ques- 
tions speculatives,  Platon  dans  la  psychologie  ;  Aristote  et  Ze'non 
surtout  le  guident  dans  la  morale  ;  il  s'attache  de  pre'ference  a  Avis- 
tote  dans  la  politique  ;  mais  c'est  Platon  qu'il  prend  constamment 
pour  modele  dans  sa  methode  ;  il  se  plait  a  imiter  la  forme  de  ses 
dialogues  :  s'il  ne  I'egale  pas  dans  I'extreme  delicatesse  de  ses  ana- 
lyses,  il  I'egale  souvent  en  ele'vation,  il  le  surpasse  en  clarte,  et 
ofFre  lui-meme  a  1' eloquence  philosophique  un  modele  qui  n'a  jamais 
ete  eo-ale  jusqu'a  ce  jour." — De  Gerando,  Histoire  Conipar^e  des 
Systemes  de  Philosojihie,  Vol.ii.  p.  178.) 


NOTE  E.— Page  197. 

We  shall  here  cite  a  few  passages  from  the  writings  of  some  of 
the  Greek  and  Roman  sages,  on  the  nature  of  a  Deity.     Plato,  on 
Cause  and  Effect,  reasons  thus  :^-"  Whatever  is  produced,  must 
be  produced  by  some  cause ;  for  it  is  impossible  that  anything  should 
be  produced  or  made  without  a  cause."   (Timseus,  p.  28).       "  The 
Universe  received  its  origin,  not  from  any  fortuitous  concourse  of 
atoms,  but  from  a  prudent  potent  first  cause."  (Tim.  p.  265.) 
"  We   must  take  it  for  granted  that  nothing  can  make  itself." 
(Thetetetus).     "  God  is  the  primary  and  principal  mover  in  nature, 
(like  the  soul  to  the  body)  who  moves  himself,  and  all  things  that 
are,  were,  or  shall  b^  in  the  world."  (Leg.  x.  p.  894).     Plato 
states  the  argument  for  a  Deity,  drawn  from  the  order,  harmony, 
and  beauty  of  the  world,  in  the  following  words  :  "  The  admirable 
order  of  the  universe,  and  the  regular  motion  of  the  stars  and  other 
celestial  bodies,  ordered  by  the  Divine  mind,  demonstrate  an  intel- 
ligent cause.      For   no   mortal  man  who   shall  look   into   these 
things  with  a  diligent,  inquisitive  eye,  can  so  far  be  an  Atheist,  as 
not  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being."   (Leg.  xii. 
p.  966).     Cicero  says,  "  that  Nature  herself  has  impressed  a  notion 
of  a  Deity  on  the  minds  of  all  men."  (De  Nat.  Deor.  lib.  1). 
"  For  God  is  the  first  Being  and  Cause  of  things."  (Simplicius  in 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  457 

Epict.  c.  1,  p.  9).  Seneca,  although  he  speaks  of  a  pluraUty  of 
gods,  asserts  the  existence  of  a  supreme  Deity  in  language  which 
cannot  be  mistaken  :  "  The  Framer  and  Former  of  the  universe  ;  the 
Governor,  Disposer,  and  Keeper  thereof;  Him  upon  whom  all 
things  depend ;  the  Mind  and  Spirit  of  the  world  ;  the  Artificer 
and  Lord  of  this  whole  mundane  fabric  ;  to  whom  every  name  be- 
longeth  ;  from  whom  all  things  spring  ;  by  whose  Spirit  we  live  ; 
who  is  in  all  his  parts,  and  sustains  himself  by  his  own  power  ; 
by  whose  counsel  the  world  is  provided  for,  and  guided  in  all  its 
movements ;  by  whose  decree  all  things  are  done ;  the  Divine 
Spirit  that  is  diffused  through  all  things,  both  great  and  small ; 
the  God  whose  power  extendeth  to  all  things ;  the  greatest  and 
most  powerful  God,  who  supports  himself  and  maintains  all  things  ; 
who  is  present  everywhere  ;  the  God  of  heaven  whom  we  worship 
and  adore."  (Nat.  2,  lib.  2.)^ 


NOTE  F.— Page  241. 

Exposition  of  Theology  by  Proclus. 
Prop.  1.  All  multitude  participates  in  a  certain  respect  of  the 

ONE. 

Prop.  2.  Everything  which  participates  of  the  one,  is  both  one 
and  not  one. 

Prop.  3.  Everything  which  becomes  one,  becomes  so  through  the 
participation  of  the  one,  and  is  one,  so  far  as  it  suffers  the  partici- 
pation of  the  one. 

Prop.  4.  Everything  which  is  united  is  different  from  the  one 
itself. 

Prop.  5.  All  multitude  is  posterior  to  the  07ie. 

Prop.  6.  Every  multitude  consists  either  of  things  united,  or  of 
unities. 

Prop.  7.  Everything  productive  of  another  is  more  excellent 
than  the  nature  of  the  thing  produced. 

Prop.  8.  That  which  is  primarily  good,  and  which  is  no  other 
than  the  good  itself,  is  the  leader  of  all  things  that  in  any  way 
whatever  participate  of  good. 

Prop.  9.  Everything  which  is  sufficient  to  itself,  either  according 


458  NOTES   AND   ILLUSTRATIONS. 

to  essence,  or  according  to  energy,  is  more  excellent  than  that 
which  is  not  sufficient  to  itself,  but  has  the  cause  of  its  perfection 
suspended  from  another  cause. 

Prop.  10.  Everything  which  is  sufficient  to  itself  is  inferior  to 
that  which  is  simply  good. 

Prop.  11.  All  beings  proceed  from  one  first  cause. 

Prop.  12.  The  principle  and  first  cause  of  all  beings  is  the 
good. 

Prop.  13.  Every  good  has  the  power  of  uniting  its  participants, 
and  every  union  is  good  ;  and  the  good  is  the  same  with  the  one. 

Prop.  14.  Every  being  is  either  immoveable  or  moved.  And  if 
moved,  it  is  either  moved  by  itself  or  by  another.  And  if  indeed 
it  is  moved  by  itself,  it  is  self-motive ;  but  if  by  another,  it  is  alter- 
motive.  Everything,  therefore,  is  either  immoveable,  or  self-motive, 
or  alter-motive. 

Prop.  15.  Everything  which  is  converted  to  itself  is  incorporeal. 

Prop.  16.  Everything  which  is  converted  to  itself,  has  an  essence 
separate  from  all  body. 

Prop.  17.  Everything  which  moves  itself  primarily,  isconvertive 
to  itself. 

Prop.  18.  Everything  which  imparts  existence  to  others,  is  it- 
self that  primarily  which  it  communicates  to  the  natures  that  are 
supplied  by  it  with  existence. 

Prop.  19.  Everything  which  is  primarily  inherent  in  a  certain 
nature  of  beings,  is  present  to  all  the  beings  that  are  arranged  ac- 
cording to  that  nature,  and  this  conformably  to  one  reason  and 
after  the  same  manner. 

Prop.  20.  The  essence  of  soul  is  beyond  all  bodies,  the  intel- 
lectual nature  is  beyond  all  souls,  and  the  one  is  beyond  all  intel- 
lectual hypostases. 

Prop.  21.  Every  order  beginning  from  a  monad,  proceeds  into  a 
multitude  of  every  order,  and  is  referred  to  one  monad. 

Prop.  22.  Everything  which  subsists  primarily  and  principally  in 
each  order  is  one,  and_is  neither  two,  nor  more  than  two,  but  is  only 
begotten. 

Prop.  23.  Every  imparticipable  gives  substance  from  itself  to 
things  which  are  participated.  And  all  participated  hypostases  are 
extended  to  imparticipable  hyparxes. 

Prop.  24.  Every  thing  which  participates  is   inferior   to  that 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  459 

which  is  participated  ;  and  that  which  is  participated  is  inferior  to 
that  which  is  imparticipable. 

Prop.  25.  Every  thing  perfect  proceeds  to  the  generation  of  those 
things  which  it  is  able  to  produce,  imitating  the  one  principle  of  all. 

Prop.  26.  Every  cause  which  is  productive  of  other  things,  it- 
self abiding  in  itself,  produces  the  natures  posterior  to  itself,  and 
such  as  are  successive. 

Prop.  27.  Every  producing  cause,  on  accouut  of  its  perfection, 
and  abundance  of  power,  is  productive  of  secondary  natures. 

Prop.  28.  Every  producing  cause  gives  substance  to  things  simi- 
lar to  itself,  prior  to  such  as  are  dissimilar. 

Prop.  29.  Every  progression  is  effected  through  a  similitude  of 
secondary  to  first  natures. 

Prop.  30.  Everything  which  is  produced  from  a  certain  thing 
without  a  medium,  abides  in  its  producing  cause,  and  proceeds 
from  it. 

Prop.  31.  Everything  which  proceeds  from  a  certain  thing  essen- 
tially, is  converted  to  that  from  which  it  proceeds. 

Prop.  32.  All  conversion  is  effected  through  the  similitude  of 
the  things  converted  to  that  which  they  are  converted. 

Prop.  33.  Everything  which  proceeds  from  a  certain  thing  and 
is  converted  to  it,  has  a  circular  energy. 

Prop.  34.  Everything  which  is  converted  according  to  nature, 
makes  its  conversion  to  that,  from  which  also  it  had  the  progression 
of  its  proper  hypostasis. 

Prop.  35.  Everything  caused,  abides  in,  proceeds  from,  and  re- 
turns or  is  converted  to,  its  cause. 

Prop.  36.  Of  all  things  which  are  multiplied  according  to  pro- 
gression, the  first  are  more  perfect  than  the  second,  the  second  than 
those  posterior  to  them,  and  after  the  same  manner  successively. 

Prop.  37.  Of  all  things  which  subsist  according  to  conversion, 
the  first  are  more  imperfect  than  the  second,  and  the  second  than 
those  that  follow  ;  but  the  last  are  the  most  perfect. 

Prop.  38.  Everything  which  proceeds  from  certain  numerous 
causes,  is  converted  through  as  many  causes  as  those  are  through 
which  it  proceeds,  and  all  conevrsion  is  through  the  same  things  as 
those  through  which  progression  is  effected. 

Prop.  39.  Every  being  is  either  alone  essentially  converted, 
or  vitally,  or  also  gnostically. 


460  NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

Prop.  40.  Of  all  things  which  proceed,  from  another  cause,  those 
which  exist  from  themselves,  and  which  are  allotted  a  self-subsis- 
tent  essence,  are  the  leaders. 

Prop.  4 1 .  Everything  which  is  in  another,  is  alone  produced  by 
another ;  but  everything  which  is  in  itself  is  self-subsistent. 

Prop.  42.     Everything  self-subsistent  is  convertive  to  itself. 

Prop.  43.     Everything  convertive  to  itself  is  self-subsistent. 

Prop.  44.  Everything  which  is  convertive  to  itself  according  to 
energy,  is  also  converted  to  itself  essentially. 

Prop.  45.     Everything  self-subsistent  is  unbegotten. 

Prop.  46. 

Prop.  47.     Everything  self-subsistent  is  incorruptible. 

Prop.  48.  Everything  which  is  not  perpetual,  is  either  a  com- 
posite, or  subsists  in  another. 

Prop.  49.     Everything  self-subsistent  is  perpetual. 

Prop.  50.  Everything  which  is  measured  by  time,  either  accord- 
ing to  essence,  or  according  to  energy,  is  generation,  so  far  as  it  is 
measured,  by  time. 

Prop.  5 1 .  Everything  self-subsistent  is  essentially  exempt  from 
the  natures  which  are  measured  by  time. 

Prop.  52.  Everything  eternal  is  a  whole  which  subsists  at  once. 
And  whether  it  has  its  essence  alone  eternal,  it  will  possess  the 
whole  at  once  present,  nor  will  it  have  this  thing  pertaining  to  itself 
now  subsisting,  but  that  afterwards  which  as  yet  is  not ;  but  as 
much  as  is  possible  it  now  possesses  the  whole  without  diminution 
and.  without  extension  ;  or  whether  it  has  its  energy  as  well  as  its 
essence  at  once  present,  it  possesses  this  also  collectively,  abiding 
in  the  same  measure  of  perfection,  and,  as  it  were,  fixed  immoveably 
and  without  transition,  according  to  one  and  the  same  boundary. 

Prop.  53.  Eternity  subsists  prior  to  all  eternal  natures,  and 
time  exists  prior  to  everything  which  subsists  according  to  time. 

Prop.  54.  Every  eternity  is  the  measure  of  eternal  natures,  and 
every  time  is  the  measure  of  things  in  time  ;  and  these  are  the  only 
two  measures  of  life  and  motion  in  beings. 

Prop.  55.  Everything  which  subsists  according  to  time,  either 
subsists  through  the  whole  of  time,  or  has  its  hypostasis  once  in  a 
part  of  time, 

Prop.  56.     Everything  which  is  produced  by  secondary  natures. 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  461    - 

is  produced  in  a  great  degree  by  prior  and  more  casual  natures, 
by  whom  such  as  are  secondary  were  also  produced. 

Prop.  57.  Every  cause  both  energizes  prior  to  the  thing  caused, 
and  gives  subsistence  to  a  greater  number  of  effects  posterior  to  it. 

Prop.  58.  Everything  that  is  produced  by  many,  is  more  com- 
pounded than  that  which  is  produced  by  fewer  causes. 

Prop.  59.  Everything  which  is  essentially  simple,  is  either 
better  or  worse  than  composite  natures. 

Prop.  60.  Everything  which  is  the  cause  of  a  greater  number 
of  effects,  is  better  than  that  which  is  allotted  a  power  of  producing 
a  less  number,  and  which  produces  the  parts  of  those  things  to  the 
wholes  of  which  the  other  gives  subsistence. 

Prop.  61.  Every  power  which  is  imparticipable  is  greater,  but 
when  divided  is  less. 

Prop.  62.  Every  multitude  which  is  nearer  to  the  one,  is  less  in 
quantity  than  things  more  remote  from  it,  but  is  greater  in  power. 

Prop.  63.  Everything  which  is  imparticipable  gives  subsistence 
to  two-fold  orders  of  participated  natures,  one  indeed  in  things 
which  sometimes  participate,  but  the  other  in  things  which  always 
and  connascently  participate. 

Prop.  64.  Every  monad  which  ranks  as  a  principle,  gives  sub- 
sistence to  a  two-fold  number ;  one  indeed  of  self-perfect  hypos- 
tasis, but  the  other  of  illuminations  which  possess  their  hypostasis 
in  other  things. 

Prop.  65.  Everything  which  has  any  subsistence  whatever, 
either  subsists  according  to  cause,  so  as  to  have  the  form  of  a  prin- 
ciple, or  according  to  hyparxis,  or  according  to  participation,  after 
the  manner  of  an  image. 

Prop.  66.  All  beings,  with  reference  to  each  other,  are  either 
wholes,  or  parts,  or  the  same,  or  different. 

Prop.  67.  Every  wholeness  (6\oTr]Q)  is  either  prior  to  parts,  or 
consists  of  parts,  or  is  in  a  part. 

Prop.  68.  Every  whole  which  is  in  a  part,  is  a  part  of  that 
whole  which  consists  of  parts. 

Prop.  69.  Every  whole  which  consists  of  parts,  participates  of 
the  wholeness  which  is  prior  to  parts. 

Prop.  70.  Everything  which  is  more  total  among  principal, 
illuminates  participants,  prior  to  partial  natures,  and  when  these 
fail,  still  continues  to  impart  its  illuminations. 


462  NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

Prop.  71.  All  things  which,  among  nrincipal  causes,  possess  a 
more  total  and  a  higher,  in  their  effects,  according  to  the  illumina- 
tions proceeding  from  them,  become  in  a  certain  respect  subjects  to 
the  communications  of  more  partial  causes.  And  the  illumina- 
tions indeed,  from  higher  causes,  receive  the  progressions  from  se- 
condary causes  ;  but  the  latter  are  established  in  the  former.  And 
thus  some  participations  precede  others,  and  some  representations 
extend  after  others,  beginning  from  on  high,  to  the  same  subject, 
more  total  causes  having  a  prior  energy,  but  such  as  are  more  par- 
tial, supplying  their  participants  with  their  communications  poste- 
rior to  the  energies  of  more  total  causes. 

Prop.  72.  All  things  which  in  their  participants  have  the  rela- 
tion of  a  subject,  proceed  from  more  perfect  and  total  causes. 

Prop.  73.  Every  whole  is  at  the  same  time  a  certain  being,  and 
participates  of  being,  but  not  every  being  is  a  whole. 

Prop.  74.  Every  form  is  a  certain  whole,  for  it  consists  of  many 
things,  each  of  which  gives  completion  to  the  form ;  but  not  every 
whole  is  a  form. 

Prop.  75.  Every  cause  which  is  properly  so  called,  is  exempt 
from  its  effect. 

Prop.  76.  Every  thing  which  is  generated  from  an  immoveable 
cause  has  an  immutable  hyparxis  ;  but  every  thing  which  is  gene- 
rated from  a  moveable  cause  has  a  mutable  hyparxis. 

Prop.  77.  Every  thing  which  is  in  capacity  proceeds  from  that 
which  is  in  energy.  And  that  which  is  in  capacity  proceeds  into 
energy.  That  also  which  is  in  a  certain  respect  in  a  capacity,  so 
far  as  it  is  in  capacity,  is  the  offspring  of  that  which  is  in  a  certain 
respect  in  energy.  But  that  which  is  all  things  in  capacity,  pro- 
ceeds from  that  which  is  all  things  in  energy. 

Prop.  78.     Every  power  is  either  perfect  or  imperfect. 
Prop.  79.     Every  thing  which  is  generated,  is  generated  from  a 
two-fold  power. 

Prop.  80.  Every  body  is  naturally  adapted  of  itself  to  suflFer  ; 
but  every  thing  incorporeal  to  act.  And  the  former  indeed  is  es- 
sentially efficacious,  but  the  latter  is  impassive.  That  which  is  in- 
corporeal, however,  suffers  through  its  communion  with  body  j 
just  as  bodies  are  able  to  act  through  the  participation  of  incor- 
poreals. 

Prop.  81.     Every  thing  which    is    participated    in  a  separable 


NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  463 

manner,  is  present  with  its  participants  by  a  certain  inseparable 
power  which  it  inserts  in  it. 

Prop.  82.  Every  thing  incorporeal,  which  is  converted  to  itself, 
when  it  is  participated  by  other  things,  is  participated  in  a  sepa- 
rable manner. 

Prop.  83.  Every  thing  which  has  a  knowledge  of  itself,  is  en- 
tirely converted  to  itself. 

Prop.  84.  Every  thing  which  always  is,  possesses  an  infinite 
power. 

Prop.  85.  Every  thing  which  is  always  becoming  to  be,  or  ris- 
ing into  existence,  (aei  yivofxevov,)  possesses  an  infinite  power  of 
becoming  to  be. 

Prop.  86.  Every  thing  which  is  truly  being,  (ojtwc  ov,)  is  infi- 
nite, neither  according  to  multitude  nor  according  to  magnitude, 
but  according  to  power  alone. 

Prop.  87.  Every  thing  eternal  indeed  is  being,  but  not  every 
being  is  eternal. 

Prop.  88.  Every  thing  which  is  truly  being,  is  either  prior  to 
eternity,  or  in  eternity,  or  participates  of  eternity. 

Prop.  89.  Every  thing  which  is  primarily  being  consists  of 
bound  and  infinity. 

Prop.  90.  The  first  bound  and  the  first  infinity  subsist  by 
themselves,  prior  to  every  thing  which  consists  of  bound  and  the 
infinite. 

Prop.  91.  Every  power  is  either  finite  or  infinite.  But  every 
finite  power  indeed  derives  its  substance  from  infinite  power.  And 
infinite  power  subsists  from  the  first  infinity. 

Prop.  92.  Every  multitude  of  infinite  powers  is  suspended  from 
one  first  infinity,  which  does  not  subsist  as  a  participated  power, 
nor  in  things  which  are  endued  with  power,  but  subsists  by  itself, 
not  being  the  power  of  a  certain  participant,  but  the  cause  of  all 
beings. 

Prop.  93.  Every  infinite  which  is  in  (true)  beings,  is  neither 
infinite  to  the  natures  that  are  above  beings,  nor  is  it  infinite 
to  itself. 

Prop.  94.  Every  perpetuity  is  indeed  a  certain  infinity,  but  not 
every  infinity  is  perpetuity. 

Prop.  9.5.  Every  power  which  is  more  single,  is  more  infinite 
than  that  which  is  multiplied. 


464  NOTES   AND   ILLrSTRATTONS. 

Prop.  96.  The  power  which  is  infinite  of  every  finite  body,  is 
incorporeal. 

Prop.  97.  In  each  series  of  things,  every  cause  which  has  the 
relation  of  a  leader,  imparts  to  the  whole  series  the  peculiarity  of 
itself ;  and  that  which  the  cause  is  primarily,  the  series  is  accord- 
ing to  diminution. 

Prop.  98.  Every  separate  cause  is  at  one  and  the  same  time 
every  where  and  no  where. 

Prop.  99.  Every  imparticipable,  so  far  as  it  is  imparticipable, 
does  not  derive  its  existence  from  another  cause  :  but  it  is  itself 
the  principle  and  cause  of  all  its  participants.  And  thus  every 
principle  in  each  series  is  unbegotten. 

Prop.  100.  Every  series  of  wholes  is  extended  to  an  impartici- 
pable cause  and  principle.  But  all  imparticipables  are  suspended 
from  the  one  principle  of  all  things. 

Prop.  101.  Imparticipable  intellect  is  the  leader  of  all  things 
that  participate  of  intellect,  imparticipable  life  of  all  things  that 
participate  of  life,  and  imparticipable  being  of  all  things  that  parti- 
cipate of  being.  But  of  these,  being  is  prior  to  life,  but  life  is 
prior  to  intellect. 

Prop.  102.  All  beings  which  exist  in  any  manner  whatever, 
consist  of  bound,  and  the  infinite  through  that  which  is  primarily 
being.  But  all  living  beings  are  motive  of  themselves  through  the 
first  life.  And  all  gnostic  beings  participate  of  knowledge,  through 
the  first  intellect. 

Prop.  103.     All  things  are  in  all,  but  appropriately  in  each. 

Prop.  104.  Every  thing  which  is  primarily  eternal,  has  both  its 
essence  and  its  energy  eternal. 

Prop.  105.  Every  thing  immortal  is  perpetual;  but  not  every 
thing  perpetual  is  immortal. 

Prop.  106.  The  medium  of  every  thing  which  is  entirely  eter- 
nal, both  in  essence  and  energy,  and  of  every  thing  which  has  its 
essence  in  time,  is  that  which  is  partly  indeed  eternal,  and  partly 
is  measured  by  time. 

Prop.  107.  Every  thing  which  is  partly  eternal,  and  partly 
temporal,  is,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  being  and  generation. 

Prop.  108.  Every  thing  which  is  partial  in  each  order,  is  able 
to  participate  in  a  two-fold  respect  of  the  monad  which  is  in  the 
proximately  superior  order,  viz.,  either  through  its  own  wholeness. 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  tL65 

or  through  that  which  is  partial  in  the  superior  order,  and  co-ordi- 
nate with  the  thing  according  to  an  analogy  to  the  whole  series. 

Prop.  109.  Every  partial  intellect  participates  of  the  unity 
which  is  above  intellect  and  the  first,  both  through  the  intellect 
which  ranks  as  a  whole,  and  through  the  partial  unity  which  is 
co-ordinate  with  this  partial  intellect.  Every  partial  soul,  likewise, 
participates  of  the  intellect  which  is  a  whole,  through  the  soul 
which  ranks  as  a  whole,  and  through  a  partial  intellect.  And  every 
partial  nature  of  body  participates  of  the  soul,  which  is  a  whole 
through  the  wholeness  of  nature,  and  a  partial  soul. 

Prop.  110.  Of  all  things  that  are  arranged  in  each  series,  such 
as  are  first,  and  are  conjoined  with  their  monad,  are  able  to  parti- 
cipate of  the  natures  which  are  proximately  established  in  the  supe- 
rior series,  through  analogy.  But  such  as  are  more  imperfect  and 
remote  from  their  proper  principle,  are  not  naturally  adapted  to 
enjoy  these  natures. 

Prop.  111.  Of  every  intellectual  series,  some  things  are  divine 
intellects,  receiving  the  participations  of  the  Gods  ;  but  others  are 
intellects  alone.  And  of  every  physical  series,  some  things  are 
intellectual  souls,  suspended  from  their  proper  intellects  ;  but  others 
are  souls  alone.  Of  all  corporeal  natures,  likewise,  some  have 
souls  supernally  presiding  over  them,  but  others  are  natures  alone, 
destitute  of  the  presence  of  souls. 

Prop.  112.  Of  every  order,  those  things  that,  are  first  have  the 
form  of  the  natures  prior  to  them. 

Prop.  113.     Every  divine  number  is  unical. 
Prop.  114.     Every  God  is  a  self-perfect  unity,  and  every  self- 
perfect  unity  is  a  God. 

Prop.  115.  Every  God  is  super-essential,  super-vital,  and 
super-intellectu;)l. 

Prop.  116.     Every  deity  except  the  one  is  participable. 
Prop.  117.     Every  God  is  the  measure  of  beings. 
Prop.  118.     Everything    which   is  in    the   Gods   pre-exists  in 
them  according  to  their  peculiarities.     And  the  peculiarity  of  the 
Gods  is  unical  and  super-essential.     Hence,   all  things  are  con- 
tained in  them  unically  and  super-essentially. 

Prop.    119.     Every   God   subsists  according  to   super-essential 
goodness,  and  is  good  neither  according  to  participation  nor  accord- 
*  2  H 


4>GG  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

ing  to  essence,  but  super-essentially  ;  since  habits  and  essences  are 
allotted  secondary  and  manifold  orders  from  the  Gods. 

Prop.  120.  Every  God  possesses  in  his  own  hyparxis  a  provi- 
dential inspection  of  the  vrhole  of  things.  And  a  providential 
energy  is  primarily  in  the  Gods. 

Prop.  121.  Every  divine  nature  has  indeed  for  its  hyparxis 
goodness,  but  possesses  a  power  which  is  unsubdued,  and  at  once 
incomprehensible  by  all  secondary  natures. 

Prop.  122.  Every  thing  divine  provides  for  secondary  natures, 
and  is  exempt  from  the  subjects  of  his  providential  care,  providence 
neither  relaxing  the  unmingled  and  unical  transcendency  of  that 
which  is  divine,  nor  a  separate  union  abolishing  providence. 

Prop.  123.  Every  thing  divine  is  itself  indeed,  on  account  of 
its  super-essential  union,  ineffable  and  unknown  to  all  secondary 
natures  ;  but  it  is  comprehended  and  known  by  its  participants. 
Hence,  that  which  is  first  is  alone  perfectly  unknown,  as  being  im- 
participable. 

Prop.  1 24.  Every  God  knows  participable  natures  imparticipably, 
temporal  natures  without  time,  things  which  are  not  necessary  ne- 
cessarily, mutable  natures  immutably  ;  and,  in  short,  all  things  in  a 
manner  more  excellent  than  the  order  of  the  things  known. 

Prop.  125.  Every  God,  from  that  order  from  which  he  began 
tc  unfold  himself  into  light,  proceeds  through  all  secondary  natures  ; 
always,  indeed,  multiplying  and  dividing  the  communications  of 
himself,  but  preserving  the  peculiarity  of  his  own  hypostasis. 

Prop.  126.  Every  God  who  is  nearer  to  the  one  is  more  total, 
but  the  God  who  is  more  remote  from  it  is  more  partial. 

Prop.  127.  Everything  divine  is  especially  primarily  simple, 
and  on  this  account  most  sufficient  to  itself. 

Prop.  128.  Every  God,  when  participated  by  natures  nearer 
to  himself,  is  participated  without  a  medium;  but  when  partici- 
pated by  natures  more  remote  from  himself,  the  participation  is 
through  a  less  or  greater  number  of  media. 

Prop.  123.  Every  divine  body  is  divine  through  a  deified  soul. 
But  every  soul  is  divine  through  a  divine  intellect.  And  every 
intellect  is  divine  through  the  participation  of  a  divine  unity.  And 
unity  indeed  is  of  itself  a  God ;  intellect  is  most  divine ;  soul  is 
divine  ;  but  body  is  deiform. 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  467 

Prop,  130.  In  every  divine  order,  such  things  as  are  first  are 
in  a  greater  degree  exempt  from  the  natures  proximately  arranged 
under  them,  than  these  latter  are  from  beings  subsequent.  And 
secondary  natures  in  a  greater  degree  adhere  to  their  proximate 
superiors,  than  follovs'ing  natures  to  those. 

Prop,  131,     Every  God  begins  his  own  energy  from  himself. 

Prop,  132,  All  the  orders  of  the  Gods  are  bound  in  union  by 
a  medium. 

Prop.  133.  Every  God  is  a  benificent  unity,  or  a  unific  (kuo- 
TTOLoc)  goodness  ;  and  each,  so  far  as  a  God  possesses  this  hyparxis. 
The  first  God,  however,  is  simply  good,  and  simply  one.  But  each 
posterior  to  the  first,  is  a  certain  goodness,  and  a  certain  unity. 

Prop.  134.  Every  divine  intellect  intellectually  perceives  in- 
deed as  intellect,  but  energizes  providentially  as  God. 

Prop.  135.  Every  divine  unity  is  participated  by  some  being 
immediately,  or  without  a  medium  ;  and  every  deified  nature  is 
extended  to  one  divine  unity.  As  many  also  as  are  the  partici- 
pated unities,  so  many  are  the  participating  genera  of  beings. 

Prop.  136.  Every  God  who  is  more  total,  and  arranged  nearer 
to  the  first,  is  participated  by  a  more  total  genus  of  beings.  But 
the  God  who  is  more  partial,  and  more  remote  from  the  first,  is 
participated  by  a  more  partial  genus  of  beings.  And  as  being  is  to 
being,  so  is  one  divine  unity  to  another. 

Prop.  137.  Every  unity  in  conjunction  with  the  one  gives  sub- 
sistence to  the  being  which  participates  of  it. 

Prop.  138.  Of  all  the  deified  natures  which  participate  of  the 
divine  peculiarity,  the  first  and  highest  is  beinff  itself. 

Prop.  139,  All  things  which  participate  of  the  divine  unities, 
originate  indeed  from  being,  but  end  in  a  corporeal  nature. 

Prop.  140.  All  the  powers  of  divine  natures,  having  a  supernal 
origin,  and  proceeding  through  an  appropriate  medium,  extend  as 
far  as  to  the  last  of  things,  and  to  places  about  the  earth. 

Prop.  141.  Every  providence  of  the  Gods  is  twofold,  one  indeed 
being  exempt  from  the  natures  for  which  it  provides,  but  the  other 
being  co-arranged  with  them. 

Prop.  142.  The  Gods  are  present  with  all  things  after  the  same 
manner,  but  all  things  are  not  after  the  same  manner  present  with 
the  Gods.  But  everything  participates  of  their  presence  according 
to  its  own  order  and  power.     And  this  is  accomplished  by  some 

2  11  2 


468  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

things  uniformly,  but  by  others  manifoldly;  by  some  things  eter- 
nally, but  by  others  according  to  time  ;  and  by  some  things  incor- 
poreally,  but  by  others  corporeally. 

Prop.  143.  All  inferior  natures  fail  before  the  presence  of  the 
Gods,  though  that  which  participates  of  them  may  be  adapted  to 
participation.  Everything  foreign  indeed  from  divine  light  becomes 
far  removed  from  it.  But  all  things  are  illuminated  at  once  by 
the  Gods. 

Prop.  144.  All  beings,  and  all  the  distributions  of  beings,  ex- 
tend as  far  in  their  progressions  as  the  orders  of  the  Gods. 

Prop.  145.  The  peculiarity  of  every  divine  order  pervades 
all  secondary  natures,  and  imparts  itself  to  all  the  subordinate  ge- 
nera of  beings. 

Prop,  146.  The  ends  of  all  the  divine  progressions  are  assimi- 
lated to  their  principles,  preserving  a  circle  without  a  beginning 
and  without  an  end,  through  conversion  to  their  principles. 

Prop.  147.  The  summits  of  all  the  divine  orders  are  assimi- 
lated to  the  ends  of  the  natures  (proximately)  situated  above 
them. 

Prop.  148.  Every  divine  order  is  united  to  itself  in  a  threefold 
manner,  from  the  summit  which  is  in  it,  from  its  middle,  and  from 
its  end. 

Prop.  149.  Every  multitude  of  the  divine  unities  is  bounded 
according  to  number. 

Prop.  150.  Everything  which  proceeds  in  the  divine  orders,  is 
not  naturally  adapted  to  receive  all  the  powers  of  its  producing 
cause.  Nor,  in  short,  are  secondary  natures  able  to  receive  all  the 
powers  of  the  natures  prior  to  themselves,  but  the  latter  have 
certain  powers  exempt  from  things  in  an  inferior  order,  and  incom- 
prehensible by  the  beings  themselves. 

Prop.  151.  Everything  paternal  in  the  Gods  is  of  a  primary 
nature,  and  is  pre-established  in  the  rank  of  the  good,  according  to 
all  divine  orders. 

Prop.  152.  Everything  which  is  generative  in  the  Gods,  pro- 
ceeds according  to  the  infinity  of  divine  power,  multiplying  itself, 
proceeding  through  all  things,  and  transcendently  exhibiting  the 
never-failing  indications  in  the  progressions  of  secondary  natures. 

Prop.  153.  Everything  which  is  perfect  in  the  Gods,  is  the 
cause  of  divine  perfection. 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTUATIONS.  469 

Prop.  154.  Everything  which  is  of  a  guardian  nature  in  the 
Gods,  preserves  everything  in  its  proper  order,  and  is  uniformly 
exempt  from  secondary,  and  estabhshed  in  primary  nature. 

Prop.  155.  Everything  vivific  in  the  Gods,  is  a  generative 
cause,  but  every  generative  cause  is  not  vivific. 

Prop.  156.  Every  cause  of  purity  is  comprehended  in  the  guar- 
dian order.  But,  on  the  contrary,  not  everything  of  a  guardian 
order  is  the  same  with  the  purifying  genus; 

Prop.  157.  Every  paternal  cause  is  the  supplier  of  being  to 
things,  and  gives  subsistence  to  the  hyparxes  of  beings.  But  every 
thing  which  is  fabricative  of  the  production  of  form,  exists  prior  to 
composite  natures,  and  precedes  their  order  and  division  according 
to  number,  and  is  also  of  the  same  co-ordination  with  the  paternal 
cause,  in  the  more  partial  genera  of  things. 

Prop.  158,  Every  elevating  cause  in  the  Gods,  differs  both  from 
a  purifying  cause,  and  from  the  convertive  genera. 

Prop.  159.  Every  order  of  the  Gods  consists  of  the  first  prin- 
ciples, bound  and  infinity.  But  one  order  is  in  a  greater  degree 
derived  from  bound,  another  from  infinity. 

Prop.  160.  Every  divine  intellect  is  uniform,  or  has  the  form 
of  the  one,  and  is  perfect.  And  the  first  intellect  subsists  from  it- 
self, and  produces  other  intellects. 

Prop.  161.  Everything  which  is  truly  being,  and  is  suspended 
from  the  Gods,  is  divine  and  imparticipable. 

Prop.  162.  Every  multitude  of  unities  which  illuminates  truly 
existing  being,  is  occult  and  intelligible ;  occult  indeed,  as  being 
conjoined  with  unity ;  but  intelligible,  as  participated  by  being. 

Prop.  163.  Every  multitude  of  unities  which  is  participated  by 
imparticipable  intellect,  is  intellectual. 

Prop.  164.  Every  multitude  of  unities  which  is  participated  by 
every  imparticipable  soul,  is  supermundane. 

Prop.  165.  Every  multitude  of  unities  which  is  participated  by 
a  certain  sensible  body  is  mundane. 

Prop.  166.  Every  intellect  is  either  imparticipable  or  participable. 
And  if  participable,  it  is  either  participated  by  supermundane,  or  by 
mundane  souls. 

Prop.  167.  Every  intellect  intellectually  perceives  it.  But  the 
first  intellect  indeed  perceives  itself  alone  ;  and  in  this,  intellect  and 
the  intelligible  are  one  in  number.     But  each  of  the  subsequent  in- 


470  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

tellects  perceives  itself,  and  the  natures  prior  to  itself.  And  the 
intelHgible  to  each  of  these  is  partly  that  which  it  is,  and  partly 
that  from  which  it  is  derived. 

Prop.  168.  Every  intellect  knows  in  energy  that  which  it  intel- 
lectually perceives,  and  it  is  not  the  peculiarity  of  one  part  of  it  to 
perceive^  and  of  another  to  perceive  that  it  perceives. 

Prop.  169.     Every  intellect  has  its  essence,  power,  and  energy. 

Prop.  170.  Every  intellect  at  once  intellectually  perceives  all 
things.  But  imparticipable  intellect  indeed  simply  perceives  all 
things.  And  each  of  the  intellects  posterior  to  it  perceives  all 
things,  according  to  order. 

Prop.  171.     Every  intellect  is  an  imparticipable  essence. 

Prop.  1/2.  Every  intellect  is  proximately  the  producing  cause, 
being  perpetual  and  immutable  according  to  essence. 

Prop.  173.  Every  intellect  is  intellectually  both  the  things 
which  are  prior  and  posterior  to  itself. 

Prop.  174.  Every  intellect  gives  subsistence  to  things  posterior 
to  itself,  by  intellection ;  and  its  fabrication  consists  in  intellection, 
and  its  intellection  or  intelligence  in  fabrication. 

Prop.  175.  Every  intellect  is  primarily  participated  by  those 
natures  which  are  intellectual,  both  according  to  essence  and  ac- 
cording to  energy. 

Prop.  176.  All  intellectual  forms  are  in  each  other,  and  each 
is  at  the  same  time  separate  and  distinct  from  the  rest. 

Prop.  177.  Every  intellect  being  a  plenitude  of  forms,  one  in- 
deed is  comprehensive  of  more  total,  but  another  of  more  partial 
forms.  And  the  superior  intellects  contain  in  a  more  total  manner 
such  things  as  those  posterior  to  them  contain  more  partially. 
But  the  inferior  intellects  contain  more  partially  such  things  as 
those  that  are  prior  to  them  contain  more  totally. 

Prop.  178.  Every  intellectual  form  gives  subsistence  to  eternal 
natures. 

Prop.  179.     Every  intellectual  number  is  bounded. 

Prop.  180.  Every  intellect  is  a  whole,  so  far  as  each  consists  of 
parts  and  is  united  to  other  things,  and  at  the  same  time  separated 
from  them.  But  imparticipable  intellect  indeed  is  simply  a  whole, 
as  containing  all  parts  in  itself  totally.  But  each  partial  intellect 
possesses  the  whole  as  in  a  part,  and  thus  in  all  things  partially. 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTllATIONS.  471 

Prop.  181.  Every  participated  intellect  is  either  divine,  as  be- 
ing suspended  from  the  Gods,  or  is  intellectual  only. 

Prop.  182.  Every  (divine)  participated  intellect  is  participated 
by  divine  souls. 

Prop.  183.  Every  intellect  which  is  participated  indeed,  but 
is  intellectual  alone,  is  participated  by  souls  which  are  neither  di- 
vine nor  subsisting  in  a  mutation  from  intellect  into  a  privation  of 
intellect. 

Prop.  184,  Every  soul  is  either  divine  or  is  changed  from  in- 
tellect, or  always  remains  as  a  medium  between  these,  but  is  in- 
ferior to  divine  souls. 

Prop.  185.  All  (divine)  souls  are  indeed  Gods  psychically.  But 
all  those  that  participate  of  an  intellectual  intellect,  are  the  perpetual 
attendants  of  the  Gods.  And  all  those  that  are  the  recipients  of 
mutation,  are  sometimes  only  the  attendants  of  the  Gods. 

Prop.  186.  Every  soul  is  both  an  incorporeal  essence,  and  se- 
parate from  body. 

Prop.  187.     Every  soul  is  indestructible,  and  incorruptible. 

Prop.  188.     Every  soul  is  both  life  and  vital. 

Prop.  189.     Every  soul  is  self-vital. 

Prop.  190.  Every  soul  is  a  medium  between  imparticipable  na- 
tures, and  the  natures  which  are  divisible  about  bodies. 

Prop.  191.  Every  participate  soul  has  indeed  an  eternal  essence, 
but  its  energy  accompanies  by  time. 

Prop.  192.  Every  participable  soul  ranks  among  the  number  of 
(truly  existing)  beings,  and  is  the  first  of  generated  natures. 

Prop.  193.     Every  soul  subsists  proximately  from  intellect. 

Prop.  194.  Every  soul  contains  all  the  forms  which  intellect 
primarily  possesses. 

Prop.  1  95.  Every  soul  is  all  things,  containing  indeed  sensibles 
paradigmatically,  and  after  the  manner  of  an  exemplar  ;  but  intelli- 
gibles  iconically,  or  after  the  manner  of  an  image. 

Prop.  196.  Every  participable  soul  primarily  uses  a  perpetual 
body  which  possesses  an  unbegotten  and  incorruptible  hypostasis. 

Prop.  197.  Every  soul  is  an  essence  vital  and  gnostic,  and  a 
life  essential  and  gnostic,  and  is  knowledge,  essence,  and  life.  All 
things  likewise  subsist  in,  at  once,  the  essential,  the  vital,  and  the 
gnostic ;  and  all  things  are  in  all,  and  each  is  separate  from  the 
rest. 


472  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

Prop.  198.  Everything  which  participates  of  time  and  is  always 
moved,  is  measured  by  periods. 

Prop.  199.  Every  mmidane  soul  uses  periods  of  its  proper  life, 
and  restitutions  to  its  former  state. 

Prop.  200.  Every  period  of  soul  is  measured  by  time.  The 
period  of  other  souls  indeed  by  a  certain  time  ;  but  that  of  the  first 
soul,  since  it  is  measured  by  time,  is  measured  by  the  whole  of 
time. 

Prop.  201.  All  divine  souls  have  triple  energies  ;  some  indeed 
as  souls  ;  but  others  as  receiving  a  divine  intellect ;  and  others  are 
suspended  from  the  Gods.  And  they  provide  indeed  for  the  whole 
of  things  as  Gods;  but  they  know  all  things  through  an  intellectual 
life,  and  they  move  bodies  through  a  self-moved  hyparxis. 

Prop.  202.  All  souls  attending  upon,  and  always  following  the 
Gods,  are  inferior  to  divine,  but  more  eminent  than  particular  souls. 

Prop.  203.  Of  every  psychical  multitude,  divine  souls  indeed 
being  greater  in  power  than  other  souls,  are  contracted  according 
to  number.  But  those  that  always  follow  divine  souls  have  a 
middle  order  among  all  souls,  both  in  power  and  quantity.  And 
partial  souls  indeed  are  inferior  in  power  to  the  others,  but  proceed 
into  a  greater  number. 

Prop.  204.  Every  divine  soul  is  the  leader  of  many  souls  that 
always  follow  the  Gods  ;  and  of  a  still  greater  number  of  such  as 
sometimes  receive  this  order. 

Prop,  205.  Every  partial  soul  has  the  same  ratio  to  the  soul 
under  which  it  is  essentially  arranged,  as  the  vehicle  of  the  one  to 
the  vehicle  of  the  other. 

Prop.  206.  Every  partial  soul  is  able  to  descend  infinitely  into 
generation,  and  to  ascend  from  generation  to  real  being. 

Prop^  207.  The  vehicle  of  every  partial  soul  is  fabricated  by  an 
immoveable  cause. 

Prop.  208.  The  vehicle  of  every  partial  soul  is  immaterial,  essen- 
tially indivisible,  and  impassive. 

Prop.  209.  The  vehicle  of  every  partial  soul  descends  indeed 
with  the  addition  of  more  material  vestments,  but  becomes  united 
to  the  soul  by  an  abolition  of  everything  material,  and  a  recurrence 
to  its  proper  form,  analogous  to  the  soul  that  uses  it. 

Prop.  210.  Every  connascent  vehicle  to  the  soul,  always  pos- 
sesses both  the  same  figure  and  magnitude.     But  it  is  seen  to  be 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  473 

greater  and  less,  and  of  dissimilar  figure,  through  the  additions  and 
abolitions  of  other  bodies. 

Prop,  211.  Every  partial  soul  descending  into  generation,  de- 
scends wholly,  nor  does  one  part  of  it  remain  on  high,  and  another 
part  descend. 


NOTE  G.— Page  339. 

The  controversy  between  the  Calvinists  and  Arminians, 
grounded  on  a  particular  view  of  the  doctrines  of  necessary  con- 
nexion and  free  will,  seems,  at  the  present  day,  to  be  as  far  re- 
moved from  a  settlement  as  ever.  Indeed,  an  agreement  on  the 
point  is  almost  hopeless.  This  arises  not  from  sectarian  or  party 
feelings,  but  solely  from  some  leading  metaphysical  ideas,  of  oppo- 
sing character  and  influence,  which  lie  at  the  bottom  of  the  dispute. 
We  shall  hazard,  however,  a  few  general  observations  on  the  sub- 
ject, chiefly  with  the  view  of  directing  the  attention  of  the  reader 
to  the  leading  principles  and  difficulties  involved  in  this  interesting, 
though  perplexing,  theological  question. 

It  is  common  with  Calvinistic  writers  to  maintain,  that  their 
theory  is  altogether  different  from  the  principle  of  necessary  con- 
nexion, advocated  by  many  philosophers.  Let  us  see  how  this  is. 
The  Calvinists  aflfirm,  that  the  Deity  must  have  foreseen  all  events, 
and  by  virtue  of  His  Omniscience^^ nothing  could  have  happened 
otherwise  than  it  has  done,  or  will  do  in  future.  The  doctrine 
which  is  called  philosophical  necessity  may  be  defined  to  be  that 
which  asserts  that  all  the  phenomena  of  the  moral  world,  like  that 
of  the  physical,  are  regulated  by  fixed  and  immutable  laws ;  or,  in 
other  words,  the  human  mind  is  first  excited  to  action,  and  conti- 
nually influenced  by  motives ;  that  these  motives  originate  from, 
and  depend  upon,  the  circumstances  in  which  man  is  placed,  and 
over  which  circumstances  he  has  not  the  least  absolute  control. 

Now  then,  taking  these  two  doctrines  as  thus  explained,  may  it 
not  be  asked,  what  diff'erence  is  there  between  every  thing  being 
done  by  the  immediate  agency  of  the  Almighty,  and  every  thing 
being  done  by  necessary  and  fixed  laws  which  He  has  created  and 
ordained  ?  In  both  cases  the  freedom  of  the  human  will  is  com- 
j)letely  excluded  ;  so  that,  as  far  as  it  is  concerned,  these  two  doc- 


474  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

trines  are  one  and  the  same.  Yet  it  does  seem  somewhat  strange 
that  Calvinists  should  look  upon  the  first  doctrine,  that  every  thing 
is  regulated  by  the  immediate  interposition  of  Almighty  power,  as 
the  very  foundation  of  Christian  orthodoxy  ;  and  that  the  other 
doctrine,  that  God  governs  the  world  by  fixed  laws,  is  to  be  con- 
sidered as  atheistical  and  dangerous  to  the  interests  of  morals  and 
religion.  There  is  a  great  apparent  inconsistency  in  this.  It  is 
not  in  the  power  of  the  most  subtile  theological  disputant  to  point 
out  any  difference  between  Calvinism  and  necessity,  {so  far  as  both 
relate  to  the  human  will,  which  is  the  only  point  which  can  render 
them  interesting,)  that  seems  not  purely  arbitrary  and  absurd.  The 
only  perceptible  difference  is,  that  the  two  doctrines  in  question 
are  designated  by  different  names. 

Calvinists  would,  we  conceive,  stand  upon  firmer  ground,  if  they 
would  take  their  main  principle  in  all  its  sweeping  fulness  and 
integrity,  and  not  fritter  it  away,  with  useless  illogical  qualifica- 
tions. They  complain  that  Arminians  reason  disingenuously  with 
them,  by  drawing  inferences  from  their  doctrines,  which  they  are 
not  warranted  to  do.  But  then  the  Calvinists  do  the  very  same 
thing  with  their  antagonists,  the  philosophical  necessarians ;  and 
even  with  the  Arminians  too.  The  doctrine  of  predestination  is 
this,  that  certain  individuals  will  be  doomed  to  everlasting  punish- 
ment, and  a  certain  nvimber  to  everlasting  life.  So  far  there  is  no 
ambiguity  nor  inconsistency  in  the  principle  laid  down.  But  when 
iVrminians  or  others  draw  inferences  from  this  maxim  of  theology, 
that  such  a  view  of  the  Divine  procedure,  appears  inimical  to  cor- 
rect notions  of  the  attributes  of  the  Deity,  such  as  justice  and 
mercy,  the  Calvinistic  complains  that  the  proceedings  are  un- 
fair and  illogical.  Now  the  only  way  in  which  Calvinists  have 
argued  against  both  philosophical  necessarians,  and  Arminians  is, 
by  urging  the  force  of  inferences  against  the  truth  of  a  principle. 
This  has  been  the  invariable  practice  followed  in  every  stage  of  this 
keenly  contested  point,  for  many  hundreds  of  years. 

Most  Calvinistic  writers  meet  their  opponents  with  such  qualifi- 
cations of  Divine  decrees  as  the  following  :  "  So  far  as  the  Divine 
government  is  concerned,  the  rational  mind  is  in  all  its  delibera- 
tions and  decisions  voluntary ,  and  even  free,  in  the  more  common 
and  less  accurate  sense  of  the  words.  The  secret  purposes  of  the 
Divinity  have  no  influence  in  determining  the  human  will,  and  of 


NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  475 

consequence  can  never  destroy  a  responsibility  to  the  Divine  law. 
"  That  the  soul  always  chooses  that  which,  all  things  considered,  is 
the  most  agreeable,  is  an  identical  truth."  "  The  will  is  ulti- 
mately governed  by  the  understanding."  "  The  activity  of  mind 
implies  a  general  capacity  of  volition."  "  The  mind  is  chiefly 
regulated  by  its  own  innate  predilections."* 

These  admissions,  which  are  merely  a  repetition  of  what  has 
been  over  and  over  again  said,  show  how  difficult  a  matter  it  is,  to 
get  rid  of  the  freedom  of  the  human  will ;  and  how  impossible  it  is 
for  Calvinists  to  carry  out  their  main  principle  to  all  its  logical  con- 
sequences. 

On  the  Arminian  side  of  the  dispute  we  again  meet  with  the 
same  difficulty  viewed  under  another  aspect.  To  make  the  human 
will  independent  of  the  Divine  omnipotence  and  government,  is 
another  stumbling-block.  The  advocates  of  this  theory,  like  their 
antagonists,  shrink  from  the  inferences  of  their  own  principle,  and 
take  shelter  in  qualifications  and  compromises.  The  only  course, 
therefore,  which  is  left  to  both  parties,  is  to  agree  to  differ. 


NOTE  H.— Page  349 


&"• 


It  has  been  noticed  by  some  historians,  that  there  are  some  parts 
of  the  writings  of  Avicenna  which  would  seem  to  countenance  a 
recent  theory,  maintained  by  Drs.  Gall  and  Spurzheim.  We  shall 
here  quote  a  few  sentences  from  the  fifth  volume  of  Avicenna's 
works,  which  may  be  considered  to  bear  such  an  interpretation. 

"  Virium  autem  apprehendentium,  occultarum,  vitalium,  prima 
est  fantasia,  quae  est  sensus  communis,  quse  est  vis  ordinata  in 
prima  concavitate  cerebri,  recipiens  per  seipsam  formas  omnes,  quae 
imprimmitur  quinque  sensibus  et  redduntur  ei.  Post  banc,  et 
imaginatio,  vel  quae  est  etiam  formans,  quae  est  vis  ordinata  in  ex- 
tremo  anterioris  concavitatis  cerebri,  retinens  quod  recipit  sensus 
communis  a  quinque  sensibus,  et  remanet  in  ea  post  remotionem 
illorum  sensibilium.  Post  banc,  est  vis  quae  vocatur  imaginativa, 
comparatione  animae  humanae,  quae  est  vis  ordinata  in  media  con- 
cavitate cerebri,  ubi  est  nervus,  et  solet  componere  aliquid  de  eo 
quod  est  in  imaginatione  cum  alio,  et  deinde  aliquid  ab  alio,  secun- 
dum quod  vult.  Deinde  est  vis  estimativa,  quae  est  vis  ordinata  in 

*  Sermons  on  Election.     London,  1822. 


476  NOTES   AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

summa  media  concavitate  cerebri,  apprehendens  intentiones,  non 
sensatus,  quse  sunt  in  singulis  sensibilibus,  sicut  vis  quae  est  in  ove 
dijudicans  quod  a  lupo  fugiendum  est ;  videtur  etiam  hsec  vis  op- 
erari  in  imaginationis  compositionem  et  divisionem.  Deindeestvis 
memorialis  et  remiriiscibilis,  quae  est  vis  ordinata  in  posteriore  con- 
cavitate cerebri,  retinens  quod  apprehendit  vis  sestimationis,  de  in- 
tentionibus  non  sensatis  singulorum  sensibilium." — De  Anima. 


NOTE  I.— Page  357. 

Mr.  Hallam  observes  that  the  general  doctrine  held  by  AveiToes 
was,  "  that  there  is  one  common  intelligence,  active,  immortal,  in- 
divisible, unconnected  with  matter,  the  soul  of  the  human  kind ; 
which  is  not  in  any  one  man,  because  it  has  no  material  form,  but 
which  yet  assists  in  the  rational  operations  of  each  man's  personal 
soul,  and  from  those  operations  which  are  all  conversant  with  par- 
ticulars, derives  its  own  knowledge  of  universals.  Thus,  if  I  un- 
derstand what  is  meant,  which  is  rather  subtile,  it  might  be  said, 
that  as  in  the  common  theory  particular  sensations  furnish  means 
to  the  soul  of  forming  general  ideas,  so,  in  that  of  Averroes,  the 
ideas  and  judgments  of  separate  human  souls  furnish  collectively 
the  means  of  that  knowledge  of  universals,  which  the  one  great 
soul  of  mankind  alone  can  embrace.  This  was  a  theory  built,  as 
some  have  said,  on  the  bad  Arabic  version  of  Aristotle  which  Aver- 
roes used.  But,  whatever  might  have  first  suggested  it  to  the 
philosopher  of  Cordova,  it  seems  little  else  than  an  expansion  of 
the  Realist  hypothesis,  urged  to  a  degree  of  apparent  paradox. 
For  if  the  human  soul,  as  an  universal,  possesses  an  objective 
reality,  it  must  surely  be  intelligent ;  and,  being  such,  it  may  seem 
no  extravagant  hypothesis ;  though  incapable  of  that  demonstra- 
tion, we  now  require  in  philosophy  to  suppose  that  it  acts  upon  the 
subordinate  intelligences  of  the  same  species,  and  receives  impres- 
sions from  them.  By  this  also  they  would  reconcile  the  knowledge 
we  were  supposed  to  possess  of  the  reality  of  universals,  with  the 
acknowledged  impossibility,  at  least  in  many  cases,  of  representing 
them  to  the  mind."     {Lit.  Middle  Ages,  Vol.  1,  p.  196.) 


NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS.  477 


NOTE  J.— Page  363. 

4 

Le  Livre  des  Conseils,  par  Ferideddin  Attar,  quoique  essentielle- 
ment  destine  a  offrir  uii  recueil  de  Preceptes  moraux  et  de  Conseils 
pratiques,  renferme  aussi  quelques  vues  sur  la  connaissance  de 
Dieu,  suivant  le  langage  des  Arabes,  sur  la  vie  spirituelle  et  con- 
templative. C'est  en  effet  par  la  contemplation  que  cette  connais- 
sance s'acquiert.  Celui  qui  connait  veritablement  Dieu  par  la 
contemplation,  est  convaincu  que  la  veritable  existence  consiste 
dans  I'aneantissement.  Si  tu  connais  bien  ton  ^me  sujette  aux 
passions,  tu  connaitras  le  Dieu  Trcs-Haut  et  veritable  dans  ses  dons. 
Celui-la  seul  possede  la  science  qui  connait  Dieu.  La  contempla- 
tion consiste  a  disparaitre  et  a  s'aneantir  devant  Dieu.  La  con- 
templation ne  s'occupe  ni  de  ce  monde,  ni  de  la  vie  future  ;  toutes 
ses  facultes  sont  absorbees  dans  le  desir  de  son  union  avec  Dieu. 
Ce  monde  est  semblable  a  un  fantome  que  voit  un  homme  durant 
son  sommeil ;  lorsqu'il  est  eveille,  il  ne  lui  reste  aucun  profit  de  ces 
douces  illusions." 

"Quoi  que  cette  theosopbie  mystique  se  soit  particulierement, 
nous  la  voyons  se  produire  aussi  parmi  les  Maures  d'Espagne  ;  elle 
trouve,  au  milieu  du  douzieme  siecle,  un  sectateur  dans  Iban 
Baiiah,  que  S.  Thomas  a  appele  Avenpace,  et  qui  est  plus  connu 
sous  ce  dernier  nom.  Avenpace,  disciple  du  philosophe  et  medeciu 
Avenzoar,  avait  ecrit  des  lettres  philosophiques  et  theologiques,  au 
nombre  desquelles  il  en  est  une  sur  le  detachement  des  choses  hu- 
tnaines  et  I'union  de  V amour  avec  Dieu.  Ses  opinions  lui  attirerent, 
de  la  part  des  docteurs  musulraans,  une  accusation  d'here'sie.  II 
avait  cultive  les  sciences  mathematiques ;  car  il  avait  commente 
Euclide.  11  avait  egalement  travaille  sur  Aristote ;  Averrhoes  le 
cite  souvent,  et  c'est  par  ces  citations  seules  que  nous  connaissons 
aujourd'hui  ses  idees  philosophiques,  Avenpace,  dit  Averrhoes, 
s'occupa  beaucoup  de  I'entendement,  et  particulierement  dans  la 
lettre  qu'il  intitula :  De  la  Conjonction  de  V entendenient  avec 
Vhomme,  et  dans  son  Traite  de  I'Ame.  Voici  le  fondemeut  qu'il 
etablit:  d'abord  il  supposa  que  les  intelligibles  sont  produits  ou 
crees  ;  que  tout  ce  qui  est  produit  a  une  quidditi  (une  qualite  essen- 
tielle ;)  que  I'entendement  est  capable  par  sa  nature  de  de'tacher 
cette  quiddite  ;  qu'il  en  abstrait  ainsi  les  formes  des  intelligibles, 
en  quoi  il  Concorde  avec  Alfarabi.     II  ajouta  que  les  intelligibles  ne 


478  NOTES    AND    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

comportent  point  la  pluralite,  si  ce  n'est  a  raison  de  la  reunion  des 
formes  spirihielles  par  lesquelles  elles  subsistent  dans  chaque  in- 
dividu  ;  d'ou  il  suit  que  I'intelligible  depouille  de  ces  formes,  est  un 
pour  tous  les  hommes.  La  quiddite,  I'intelligible,  et  la  forme, 
n'ont  point  elles-memes  de  forme  spirituelle  ;  elles  ne  subsistent 
dans  aucun  individu  ;  elles  ne  sont  point  la  quiddity  d'un  individu 
particulier,  d'ovi  il  conclut  encore  que  I'entendement  est  unique 
cbez  tous  les  hommes,  et  qu'il  constitue  une  substance  separee  et 
distincte." — Histoire  Compar^e  par  De  Gerando.  Tom.  4,  p.  286. 


PKINTEn    BV  C.   F.  HODGSON,  1,  UOUOU    SQUAIiE,  FI.EBT  STKKKT,  LONIlO.V. 


University  of  California 


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trom  whtehjlwasbonwred. 


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