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VOL. I. 








ran0latrt from tfjt JTourtfc German 15tJitto, 













MAR 2 7 1945 



Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1871, 

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 



205-213 East izth St., 



The wide adoption of UEBERWEG S HISTORY OF 
PHILOSOPHY, as a text book in the higher institutions 
of learning, has induced the publishers to issue the 
work in this smaller and less expensive form, in 
order to bring it more generally within the reach of 

As now produced the work contains all the matter 
of the original edition. 


DR. UEBERWEG S Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic, in three parts, 
was first published at Berlin, 1862 to 66. It met with such approval, not 
withstanding the competition with other able compends, that the first part 
has already reached a fourth edition (1871). Since Tennemann s Manual 
(1812, 5th edition by Wend, 1829),* no work has appeared so well adapted 
to meet the wants of students. Indeed, no work on the subject contains 
such a careful collection of authorities and citations, or so full a bibliogra 
phical apparatus. The opinions of the various schools and their contrasted 
principles, as well as the views of individual philosophers, are presented with 
clearness and precision. This is the great value of the work. It is not writ 
ten, like some histories of philosophy, to propound or fortify the special 
theories of the author. It shows a full mastery of the whole course of philo 
sophic thought, with independent investigations and criticisms. The various 
systems are given, as far as possible, in the phraseology of their authors, and 
this imparts variety to the style. It is eminently impartial. 

The undersigned selected it as the best work with which to begin the philo 
sophical division of their proposed Library, after a full comparison of it with 
other works of its class, and upon consultation with those best qualified to 
judge about its merits. It is more concise than Hitter s General History , 
and more full and authentic than Schwegler s Outline, which was first pre 
pared for an Encyclopaedia. The works of Fries, and Rixner, and Reinhold 
have been supplanted by more recent investigations. Hitter s History of 
Christian Philosophy (1858- 5 9), though very valuable, covers only a part 
of the ground, and presupposes some acquaintance with the sources which 
Ueberweg so fully cites. The well-known history of Morell is restricted to 
the later European systems. The able critical histories of modern philoso 
phy by Erdmann and Kuno Fischer are limited in their range, yet too ex 
tended for our object. The work with which we most carefully compared 
Ueberweg s Treatise, was Professor Erdmann s Compend of the Whole History 

* Translated by Rev. A. Johnson, revised and enlarged by T. R. Morell, London, 


of Philosophy , in two volumes (Berlin, 1866). This is the product of a master 
of philosophic systems, and it is elaborate in method, and finished in style. 
But it is perhaps better fitted to complete than to begin the study of the 
History of Philosophy. Its refined criticisms and its subtle transitions from 
one system to another, presuppose considerable acquaintance with recent Ger 
man speculations. And Professor Erdmann himself generously expressed to 
Dr. Schaff his appreciation of the special value of TJeberweg s Manual, say 
ing that he always kept it before him, and considered it indispensable oix 
account of its full literature of the subject. 

This translation of Ueberweg appears under the sanction, and with the 
aid of the author himself. He has carefully revised the proofs, and given to 
our edition the benefit of his latest emendations. He did not survive to see 
the completion of this work ; he died, after a painful illness of seven weeks, 
June 7, 1871, at Konigsberg, while yet in the prime of his career. In re 
peated letters to Dr. Schaff, who conducted the correspondence with him, he 
has expressed his great satisfaction with this translation, in comparison, too, 
with that of his System of Logic (3d edition, Bonn, 1868), recently issued in 
England.* His friend, Dr. Czolbe, wrote in behalf of his widow, that, " on 
the day of his death, he carefully corrected some of the proof-sheets of this 
translation, and was delighted with its excellency." 

The work has been translated from the latest printed editions ; the First 
Part, on Ancient Philosophy, is from the proof-sheets of the fourth edition, 
just now issued in German. For the Second and Third Parts, special notes, 
modifications, and additions were forwarded by the author. 

At our suggestion, Professor Morris has, in the majority of cases, trans 
lated the Greek and Latin citations ; retaining also the original text, when 
this seemed necessary. A long foot-note, 74, on the recent German discus 
sions concerning the date and authorship of the Gospels, which was hardly in 
place in a History of Philosophy, has been omitted with the consent of Dr. 

Dr. Noah Porter, President of Yale College, has examined this translation 
and enriched it by valuable additions, especially on the history of English 
and American Philosophy. 

The first volume, now issued, embraces the first and second parts of the 
original, viz., Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy ; the second and last volume 
will contain the history of Modern Philosophy, with a full alphabetical index. 
The sections have been numbered consecutively through both volumes. 

* System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines. By Dr. FKIEDRICH UEBERWEG, 
Prof, of Phil, in the University of Konigsberg. Translated from the German, with 
Notes and Appendices, by THOMAS M. LINDSAY, M.A., F.R.S.E., Examiner in Phi 
losophy to the University of Edinburgh. London : Longmans, Green & Co., 1871. 


Besides this work, and his System of Logic, Professor Ueberweg was the 
author of a treatise on The Development of Consciousness by Teachers, a 
series of applications of Beneke s Theory of Consciousness, in didactic rela 
tions (Berlin, 1853) ; Investigations on the Genuineness and Order of the 
Platonic Writings, including a sketch of the Life of Plato, a volume 
crowned by the Imperial Academy of Vienna, 1861 ; De Priore et Posteriore 
Forma Kantiance Critices Eationis Pwrce, a pamphlet published at Berlin, 
in 1862. The later labors of his life were chiefly given to his History of 
Philosophy. In 1869 he published in J. H. von Kirchmann s Philosophi- 
sche Bibliothek, an excellent German translation of Bishop Berkeley s treatise 
on the " Principles of Human Knowledge," with critical notes and illustra 
tions. This was, in part, the result of an animated metaphysical discussion ; 
for there are even now German as well as English advocates of the intense 
Subjectivism of Berkeley. The two chief philosophical journals of Germany 
have entered into this controversy, which was begun by a work of Collyns 
Simon, LL.D., entitled The Nature and Elements of the External World, 
or Universal Immaterialism, London, 1862, in which Berkeley s theory was 
acutely advocated. Dr. Ueberweg replied to it in Fichte and Ulrici s Zeit- 
schrift fur Philosophic, Bd. 55, and Prof. Dr. von Reichlin-Meldegg of 
Heidelberg in the same journal, Bd. 56, 1870. Dr. Simon s rejoinder ap 
peared, with comments by Ulrici, in the same volume. In Bergmann s 
Philosophische Monatshefte, Bd. v., May, 1870, Simon, Hoppe, and 
Schuppe in three articles controverted Ueberweg s positions ; his reply ap 
peared in August, with a rejoinder by Schuppe, February, 1871. In this 
controversy Dr. Ueberweg showed a full mastery of the subject. In Fichte s 
Zeitschrift, Bd. 57, 1870, he continued his investigations upon the Order of 
the Platonic Writings, by replying to Brandis and Steinhart, who had criti 
cised his views.* Such high-toned discussions contribute to the progress of 
thought and knowledge. 

Friedrich Ueberweg was born January 22, 1826, the son of a Lutheran 
clergyman near Solingen in Rhenish Prussia. His excellent mother was early 
left a poor widow, and devoted herself to her only son till her death in 1868. 
He was educated in the College at Elberfeld and the Universities of Gottin- 
gen and Berlin, and attained to extraordinary proficiency in philosophy, phi 
lology, and mathematics. In 1852 he commenced his academic career as 
Privatdocent in Bonn, and in 1862 he was called as Professor of Philosophy 
to the University of Kbnigsberg. There he labored with untiring industry 
till last summer, when (in the forty-sixth year of his age) he died in the midst 

* This essay is entitled : Ueber den Gegensatz swischen Methodikern und Geneti- 
tern und dessen Vermittelung M dem Problem der Ordnung der Schriften Plato s. 


of literary plans for the future, leaving a widow and four children and many 
friends and admirers to mourn his loss. He was a genuine German scholar, 
and ranked with the first in his profession. His History of Philosophy and 
his Logic will perpetuate his name and usefulness.* 

Ueberweg s History of Philosophy, while complete in itself, also forms a 
part of a select Theological and Philosophical Library, which the under 
signed projected some years since, and now intend to issue as rapidly as is 
possible with so large an undertaking. A prospectus of the whole accom 
panies the present volume. 


New York, Oct. 18, 1871. Editors. 

* Compare the fine tribute to his memory by his friend, Professor Fr. A. Lange, of 
Zurich: Friedri&h Ueberweg, Berlin, 1871. Also Dilthey: Zum Andenken an Fried. 
Ueberweg, in the " Preuss. Jahrbucher" for Sept. 1871, pp. 309-322 ; and Adolf Lasson : 
Zum Andenken an F. U., in Dr. Bergmann s " Philos. Monatshefte," vol. vil, No. 7, 
and separately published, Berlin, 1871. 





1. The Conception of Philosophy 1-5 

2. The Conception of History 

3. The Methods of Historical Treatment 5-6 

4. Sources and Aids 6-13 



5. General Character of Pre-Christian Antiquity and Philosophy 14 

6. Oriental Philosophy 14-17 


7. Sources and Aids for Greek Philosophy 18-24 

8. Beginnings of Greek Philosophy in Greek Poetry and Proverbial Wisdom . 24-26 
9. Periods of Development of Greek Philosophy 26-29 



10. Fourfold Division of the First Period 29-32 


11. The Earlier Ionic Natural Philosophers 32 

v 12. Thales of Miletus and Hippo 32-35 

t, 8 13. Anaximander of Miletus 35-37 



14. Anaximenes of Miletus and Diogenes of Apollonia 37-38 

/ 15. Heraclitus of Ephesus and Cratylus of Athens 38-42 


/ 16. Pythagoras of Samos and the Pythagoreans 42-49 


. 17. The Eleatic Philosophers 49-51 

18. Xenophones of Colophon 51-54 

. 19. Parmenides of Elea 54-57 

20. Zeno of Elea 57-59 

21. Melissus of Samos 59-GO 


22. The Later Natural Philosophers GO 

v 23. Empedocles of Agrigentum 60-G3 

24. Anaxagoras and Hermotimus of Clazomenae, Archelaus of Miletus, and 

Metrodorus of Lampsacus G3-G7 

25. The Atomists : Leucippus and Democritus 67-71 



26. The Three Divisions of the Second Period 71-72 


27. The Sophistic Philosophy 72-73 

28. Protagoras of Abdera 73-7G 

29. Gorgias of Leontini 76-77 

30. Hippias of Blis 77-78 

31. Prodicus of Ceos 78 

32. The Later Sophists 79-80 


33. Socrates of Athens 80-88 

34. The Disciples of Socrates 88-89 

35. Euclid of Megara and his School 88-91 

3G. Phsedo of Elis, Menedemus of Eretria, and their Schools 91 

37. Antisthenes of Athens and the Cynic School 92-94 



38. Aristippus of Gyrene and the Cyrenaic or Hedonic School 95-98 

39. Plato s Life < 98-104 

g 40. Plato s Writings 

41. Plato s Divisions of Philosophy and his Dialectic . . . . 116-123 

42. Plato s Natural Philosophy 

43. Plato s Ethics 

44. The Old, Middle, and New Academies . 133-137 

45. Aristotle s Life 137-139 

46. Aristotle s Writings 139-151 

g 47. Aristotle s Divisions of Philosophy and his Logic 151-157 

48. Aristotle s Metaphysics or First Philosophy 157-163 

49. Aristotle s Natural Philosophy 163-169 

50. The Aristotelian Ethics and ^Esthetics 169-180 

51. The Peripatetics 180-185 


52. The Leading Stoics 185-191 

53. The Stoic Division of Philosophy and the Stoic Logic . . 191-193 

64. The Physics of the Stoics 194-197 

55. The Stoic Ethics 197-200 

56. The Epicureans .... 201-203 

6 57. The Epicurean Division of Philosophy and the Canonic of the Epicureans . 203-205 

58. Epicurean Physics > 205-208 

59. Epicurean Ethics 208-212 

60. Skepticism 212-217 

61. Eclecticism. Cicero. The Sextians 217-222 



62. Divisions of the Third Period 222-223 


63. Aristobulus and Philo 223-232 


64. The Neo- Pythagoreans 232-234 

65. The Eclectic Platonists 234-238 


66. The Neo-Platonists 238-239 

67. Ammonius Saccas and his immediate Disciples. Potamo the Eclectic . . 239-240 



68. Plotinus, Amelius and Porphyry 240-252 

69. Jamblichus and the Syrian School 252-254 

70. The Athenian School and the later Neo-Platonic Commentators .... 255-259 


71. General Character of the Philosophy of the Christian Era 261 

72. Periods of Christian Philosophy 261-262 


73. Principal Divisions of the Patristic Philosophy 263-271 

74. The Christian Religion. Jesus and his Apostles. The New Testament . 264-271 

75. Jewish and Pauline Christianity 271-274 


76. The Apostolic Fathers 274-280 

77. The Gnostics 280-290 

78. Justin Martyr 290-294 

79. Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Hermias 294-299 

80. Irenaeus and Hippolytus 299-303 

81. Tertullian 303-306 

82. Monarchianism, Arianism, and Athanasianism 306-311 

83. Clement of Alexandria and Origen 311-319 

84. Minutius Felix, Arnobius, and Lactantius 319-325 


85. Gregory of Nyssa and other Disciples of Origen 325-333 

86. Saint Augustine 333-346 

87. Greek Fathers after Augustine s Time 347-352 

88. Latin Fathers after Augustine s Time 352-355 


89. Definition and Divisions of the Scholastic Philosophy 355-377 


90. Johannes Scotus (Erigena) 358-365 

91. Realism and Nominalism from the ninth until near the end of the eleventh 

century 365-371 

52. Roscellinus, the Nominalist, and William of Champeaux, the Realist . . 371-377 




1. PHILOSOPHY as a conception, historically, is an advance upon, 
as it is an outgrowth from, the conception of mental development in 
general and that of scientific culture in particular. The conception is 
ordinarily modified in the various systems of philosophy, according to 
the peculiar character of each ; yet in all of them philosophy is included 
under the generic notion of science, and, as a rule, is distinguished 
from the remaining sciences by the specific difference, that it is not 
occupied, like each of them, with any special, limited province of 
things, nor yet with the sum of these provinces taken in their full 
extent, but with the nature, laws, and connection of whatever ac 
tually is. With this common and fundamental characteristic of the 
various historical conceptions of philosophy corresponds our definition : 
Philosophy is the science of principles. 

On the conception of philosophy cf. the author s article in the ZeiUchriftfur Philosophic undphiloso- 
phische Kritik, ed. by Imm. Herm. Fichte, Ulrici, and Wirth, New Series, vol. xlii., Halle, 1863, pp. 185-199 ; 
also, among others. C. Hebler, in No. 44 of Virchow and von Holtzendorf s Sammlung gemeinverstdnd- 
licher wifwensch. Vortrdge, and Ed. Zeller, Akad em. Rede, Heidelberg, 186S. The historical development 
of the conception of philosophy and the various meanings of the word are specially treated of by li. Haym, 
in Ersch and timber s Encycl. der Win*, u. Kun*te, III. 24, Leipsic, 1848; and by Eisenmann in his 
Ueber Begriff und Bedeutuvg der ao^ia bit auf Sokrates, Progr. of the Wilh.-Gymn., Munich, 1S50; 
cf. Ed. Alberti, on the Platonic Conception of Philosophy, in tbeZeitschr.f. Philos., New Series, vol. li., 
Halle, 1867, pp. 29-52, 169-204. 

The word philosophy (tyikocofyia, love of wisdom) and its cognates do not occur ia 
Homer and Hesiod. Homer uses coQiij, the second word in the compound (71 XV. 412) 
with reference to the carpenter s art. In like manner, Hesiod speaks of one who is 
vavrOiL^ crEffofaafiFvoz (Op. 651). Later writers use ocxbia also for excellence in music and 
poetry. With Herodotus any one is 00665 who is distinguished from the mass of men by 
any kir/d of art or skill. The so-called seven wise men are termed by him cofyurra. 1 , 
" sophists " (I. 30 et a), and the same designation is given by him to Pythagoras (TV. 95). 


The compounds tbLkocotytiv and $iAocro<j>ia are first found in Herodotus. In Herod. I. 30, 
Croesus says to Solon: "I have heard that thou <f>tAooo(j>f:uv hast traveled over many lands 
for the purpose of observing;" ibid. I. 50, fytAocotyia is applied to the knowledge of the stars. 
Thucydides represents Pericles as saying in the Funeral Oration (II. 40) : <^iXoKa^ov/jn> 
LLCT EVT&eiai; nal fahoaofovfiev avev /zaAa/c/af, where QiXoacrfelv (philosophizing) signifies the 
striving after intellectual and, more especially, after scientific culture. Thus is confirmed 
for this period the allegation of Cicero : " Omnis rerum optimarum cognitio atque in vis 
cxercitatw pTiilosopliia nominata est." This more general signification, in which tho 
"philosopher" is identified with him who //ere/A^e iratdeiat AiaQopov /cat Trepirrj^ or who 
is educated above the mass of men, was long afterward retained by the word side by side 
with that given to it as a term of art. 

Pythagoras is cited as the first to designate by the word QcAocoQia philosophy as 
science. The statement in regard to this point, which we find in Cicero (Tusc. V. 3), 
Diogenes Laertius (I 12, VIII. 8), and others, and which (according to Diog. L. VIII. 8), 
was also contained in a work (dcadoxai), now no longer extant, written by Sosicrates of 
Alexandria, is derived from Heraclides of Pontus, a scholar of Plato. Cicero represents 
Pythagoras as saying, in a conversation with Leon, the ruler of Phlius: il Rarosesse quosdam, 
qui ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis rerum naturam studiose intuerentur : hos se apptllare 
sapientiae studiosos (id est enim philosophos)." Diog. Lae rt. (I. 12) adds, as the reason 
given by Heraclides for this designation, " that no man, but only God, is wise." "Whether 
the narrative is historically true, is uncertain; Meiners (Gesch. der Wiss. in Griech. u. 
Jtom.1. 119), and more recently Haym (in Ersch and Gruber s All-gem. Encyd. der Wiss. 
u. Kunste, Leips. 1848, III. 24, p. 3), Zeller (Philos. der Griechen, 3d ed., Vol. I., 1856, p. 1), 
and others have doubted it; probably it is only a Socratic and Platonic thought (see 
below) transferred by Heraclides to Pythagoras (perhaps as a poetic fiction, which sub 
sequent writers took to be historical). The modest disclaimer of Socrates in regard 
to the possession of wisdom, and the preference given by Plato and Aristotle to pure 
theory above all praxis and even above all cthico-political activity, are scarcely in accord 
with the unbroken confidence of Pythagoreanism in the power of scientific investigation 
and with the undivided unity of the theoretical and practical tendencies of that philosophy. 
The natural philosophers who call the universe noa/uos (which, according to Diog. Lae rt. 
VIII. 48, the Pythagoreans were the first to do), are in Xenophon (Memor. I. 1. 11) called 
tfodc crra/, in Plato (Gorg., p. 508 a, eel. Steph.), "wise men" (cro^o/), without the least intima 
tion that the Pythagoreans would themselves have desired to be named, not wise, but 
lovers of wisdom. It is also noticeable, though without demonstrative force, that in the 
preserved fragments of the probably spurious work ascribed to Philolaus the Pythagorean 
and devoted to the description of the astronomical and philosophical knowledge of the 
order which reigns in the universe, cotila, not <^/Wo0ta, is used (Stob. Ed. I. 23 ; cf. Boeckh, 
Philalaos, pp. 95 and 102 f.) 

Socrates calls himself in the Banquet of Xenophon (I. 5) a laborer in philosophy 
(avrovpybs rf/q QcfocoQicu;), in contrast to Callias, a disciple of the Sophists. In the Memora 
bilia aoyia is found often, fyiAoaofyia rarely. According to Xenoph. Mem. IV. 6. 7, crop/a is 
synonymous with k^torfifaj (science). Human wisdom is patchwork ; the gods have re 
served what is greatest to themselves (ibid, and I. 1. 8). We may ascribe this thought 
with aU the more confidence to the historical Socrates, since it reappears in the Apologia. 
of Plato (pp. 20 and 23 of the edition of Stephanus, whose paging accompanies most later 
editions), where Socrates says, he may perhaps be wise (ffoddf) in human wisdom, but this 
is very little, and in truth only God can be called wise. In the Platonic Apologia Socrates 
interprets (p. 25) the declaration of the oracle Jn reply to Chasrephon, that " no one was 


wiser than Socrates," as teaching that he among men was wisest who, like Socrates, dis 
claimed the possession of any wisdom of his own (on oirof . . . aoQuTaroc lariv, bang 
ucirep 2w/cpdr?7f iyvuiicv, on ovdevbg a^ioq ian rrf aTiTjdeia -rrob^ cofyiav) he calls (p. 28 sq.) 
that examination of himself and others by which he broke up the shameful self-deception 
of those who, without knowing, supposed themselves to know, his "philosophizing," and 
sees in it the mission of his life (^/Wo^ovvrd //e delv Ijjv nai t^tra^ovra e/mirrov re /cat 
rovf a^Aouc). Since the wisdom of Socrates was the consciousness of not knowing, and 
not the consciousness of a positive, gradual approximation to the knowledge of truth, it 
was impossible that QihoooQia, in distinction from cotyia, should become fixed in his termi 
nology as a technical term ; so far as wisdom seemed to him attainable, he could make use 
as well of the words <ro<^f and co(f>ia (avOpuTrivrj) to express it. In the Apologia Socrates ap 
plies the terms oofovg and fyihoaotyovvras to earlier thinkers, the former rather in an ironical 
sense (especially so, to the Sophists), but the latter more seriously (Apol, p. 23). Yet it 
remains uncertain whether Plato, in his Apologia (which appears to reproduce with fidelity 
the essential parts of the actual defense of Socrates), confined himself in every particular 
to the exact form of speech adopted by the historical Socrates. With the disciples of 
Socrates <j)iAoco<j>ia appears already as a technical designation. Xenophon (Memor, I. 1, 19) 
speaks of men, who asserted that they philosophized (pda/covrcf QthoooQEiv) by whom a 
Socratic school the school of Antisthenes is probably to be understood. 

Plato expresses in various places (Phcedr. p. 278 d, Conviv. p. 203 e ; cf. Lysis, p. 218 a, 
ed. Steph.) the sentiment ascribed by Heraclides of Pontus to Pythagoras, that wisdom 
belongs only to God, while it belongs to man to be rather a lover of wisdom (</><AO<TO^OC). 
In the Convivium (and the Lysis) this thought is developed to the effect that neither lie 
who is already wise (cro^df), nor he who is \inlearned (d/zaftfc), is a philosopher, but lie who 
stands between the two. The terminology becomes most distinct and definite in two 
dialogues of late origin, probably composed by one of Plato s disciples, namely, in the 
Sophistes (p. 217 a) and the Politicus (p. 257 a, b), where the Sophist, the statesman, and the 
philosopher (6 oofaoTfa, 6 TroAm/cdf, and 6 Mckro<i>of) are named in the preceding order, as the 
advancing order of their rank. Wisdom itself (aotyia), according to Plato (Theaetet. p. 145 e), 
is identical with iriaTt//t?j (true knowledge), while philosoph} r is termed in the dialogue 
Euthydemus (p. 288 d) the acquisition of such knowledge (/crr/tuf i-iar? //Li^). Knowledge 
(k-mcri/fj.^] respects the ideal, as that which truly is, while opinion or representation (66t-a) 
is concerned with the sensuous, as with that which is subject to change and generation (Rep. 
V. p. 477 a). Accordingly Plato defines (Rep. 480 b) those as philosophers, "who set their 
affections on that, which in each case really exists" (TOV avrb aoa. f/caorov TO bv aaTra^ofiivovf; 
bihoocxpovg /c/ltfTfov), or (Rep. VI. 484 a) who "are able to apprehend the eternal and immu 
table" ((j)i?i6ao<j)ni ol TOV aft Kara ravra uaavruq %OVTO 6wa.fJ.evot eydrrTfadai). In a wider 
sense Plato uses the terra philosophy so as to include under it the positive sciences also 
(Theaet. p. 143d): Trepi yeupeTpiav f) nva a/Jirjv tyikoootyiav. 

We find also the same double sense in Aristotle, fythocofyia in the wider signification 
(Mdaph. VI. 1, p. 1026 a, 18 ed. Bekker et al.) for which oo<j>ia but rarely occurs (Mel. 
IV. 3, p. 1005b, 1: tori ok cofyia nq K.OL f] 0tm/c^>, d/lA ov Trpurn, cf. Met. XI. 4, lOGlb, 
32) is science in general and includes mathematics and physics, and ethics and poetics. 
But m>uTrj (jufaooQia, or "first philosophy (Met. VI. 1, 1026 a, 24 and 30; XI. 4, 1061 b, 
19), which Aristotle also calls tro^m, and which he indicates as pre-eminently the science 
of the philosopher (f) TOV <j>ihoa6<j>ov iiriaT^/a^ Met. IV. 3, p. 1005 a, 21; cf. <t>ihoao<t>ia, Met. 
XI. 4, 1061 b, 25), is in his system that which we now term metaphysics, namely, the 
science of being as such (TO bv y 6v, Met. VI. 1, 1026a, 31; cf. XL 3, 1060 b, 31, and 
XI. 4, 1061 b, 26), and not of any single department of being the science, therefor*, 


which considers the ultimate grounds or principles of every thing that exists (in particular, 
the matter, form, efficient cause, and end of every thing). Met. I. 2, 982 b, 9: del jay ravrrp 
(rr/v TrioT7}ju.7tv) TUV ITOUTCJV aox^v KOI alrtuv elvai devour inr/v. In contrast with this " first 
philosophy," the special sciences are termed (in Met. IV. 1, 1003 a, 22) partial sciences 
(fTTKTTTjfiai ev f^epei fayoftevai). The plural tyLfaxjofyiai is used by Aristotle sometimes in the 
sense of "philosophical sciences" (Met. VI. 1, 1026 a, 18, where mathematics, physics, 
and theology are named as the three " theoretical philosophies ;" cf. Ethic. Nicomach. I. 4, 
1096 b, 31, where from ethics another branch of philosophy, d/vlz? tyihoaoty ia, is distinguished, 
which from the context must be metaphysics), and sometimes in the sense of "philosophi 
cal directions, systems, or ways of philosophizing" (Met. I. 6, 987 a, 29: fiera, tie TCH; 
tlp7][jLi>a<; (JHhooofias 7/ HMruvoc; tirsyzvero irpay/j.areia ). 

The Stoics (according to Plutarch, De Plac. Philos. I., Prooem.) denned wisdom (aofyid) as 
the science of divine and human things, but philosophy (<j>itoao<j>ia) as the striving after 
virtue (proficiency, theoretical and practical), in the three departments of physics, ethics, 
and logic. Cf. Senec. Epist. 89, 3 : Philosophic, sapientiae amor et affectatio ; ibid. 1 : philosophia 
studium virtutis est, sedper ipsam virtutem. The Stoic definition of philosophy removes the 
boundary which in Plato separates ideology, in Aristotle "first philosophy," from the other 
branches of philosophy, and covers the case of all scientific knowledge, together with its 
relations to practical morality. Still, positive sciences (as, notably, grammar, mathematics, 
and astronomy) begin with the Stoics already to assume an independent rank. 

Epicurus declared philosophy to be the rational pursuit of happiness (Sext. Empir. Adv. 
Math. XI. 169: ETTv /owpof e/ltye rr/v fahoootyiav kveoyetav elvai Jidyois /cat diahoyia/Liolc ri/v 
cvdai/Liova (3<ov Treonrotovcav). 

Since all subsequent definitions of philosophy until the modern period were more or 
less exact repetitions of those above cited and hence may here be omitted, we pass on to 
the definition which was received in the school of Leibnitz and Wolff. Christian Wolff 
presents (Philos. Rationalis, Disc.Praelim., 6), the following as a definition originating with 
himself: (Cognitio philosophica est) cognitio rationis eorum, quae sunt vel Jiunt, unde inttUigatur, 
cur sint velfiant; (ibid. 29) : philosophia est scienlia possibilium, quaienus esse possunt. This 
definition is obviously cognate with the Platonic and Aristotelian definitions, in so far as it 
makes philosophy conversant with the rational grounds (ratio] and the causes, through 
which existing objects and changes become possible. It does not contain the restriction to 
first causes, and hence Wolff s conception of philosophy is the wider one ; but it fails, on 
the other hand (as do Plato and Aristotle, when they use <j>i%,ooo<])ia in the broader signifi 
cation as synonymous with emoTy/urf) to mark the boundaries between philosophy and the 
positive (in particular, the mathematical) sciences. In this latter particular Kant seeks to 
reach a more accurate determination. 

Kant (Critique of Pure Reason, Doctrine of Method, chap. 3) divides knowledge in general, 
as to its form, into historical (cognitio ex datis), and rational (cognitio ex principiis), and the 
latter again into mathematical (rational cognition through the construction of concepts), 
and philosophical (rational cognition through concepts as such). Philosophy, in its scho 
lastic signification, is defined by him as the system of all the branches of philosophical 
knowledge, but in its cosmical signification, as the science of the relation of all knowledge 
to the essential ends of human reason (teleologia rationis humanae). 

Herbart (Introd. to Philos., 4 f.) defines philosophy as the elaboration of conceptions. 
This elaboration comprehends the three processes of the analysis, the correction and the 
completion of the conceptions, the latter process depending on the determination of their 
rank and value. This gives, as the leading branches of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, 
and aesthetics. (Under cesthttics Herbart includes ethics, as well as aesthetics in the nar- 


rower and popular signification of the word. What Herbart understands by esthetics 
might be expressed by the word Timology, a term, however, which he never employs.) 

According to Hegel, for whose doctrine Fichte, in respect of form, and Schelling, in 
respect of matter, prepared the way, philosophy is the science of the absolute in the form 
of dialectical development, or the science of the self-comprehending reason. 

The definition of philosophy given by us above meets the case even of those schools 
which declare the principles of things to be unknowable, since the inquiry into the 
iognoscibility of principles evidently belongs to the science of principles, and this science 
accordingly survives, even when its object is reduced to the attempt to demonstrate the 
incognoscibility of principles. 

Such definitions as limit philosophy to a definite province (as, in particular, the 
definition often put forward in recent times, that philosophy is "the science of spirit"), 
fail at least to correspond with the universal character of the great systems of philosophy 
up to the present time, and can hardly be assumed as the basis of an historical exposition. 

2. History in the objective sense is the process by which nature 
and spirit are developed. History in the subjective sense is the in 
vestigation and statement of this objective development. 

The Greek words Icropia and laropelv, being derived from elfiivai, signify, not history in 
the objective sense, but the subjective activity involved in the investigation of facts. The 
German word Geschichte involves a reference to that which has come to pass (das Gesche- 
hene), and has therefore primarily the objective signification. Yet, not all that has actually 
taken place falls within the province of history, but only that which is of essential signifi 
cance for the common development. Development may be defined as the gradual realiza 
tion, in a succession of phenomena, of the essence of the subject of development. As to 
its /orra, development generally begins through the evolution of contraries or oppositions, 
and ends in the disappearance and reconciliation of these contraries in a higher unity (as 
sufficiently illustrated, for example, in the progressive development which shows itself in 
Socrates, his so-called " one-sided disciples," and Plato). 

Through the study of history the whole life of the race is, in a manner, renewed on a 
reduced scale in the individual. The intellectual possessions of the present, like its mate 
rial possessions, repose in all cases on the acquisitions of the past ; every one participates, 
to a degree, in this common property, even without having a comprehensive knowledge of 
history, but each one s gain becomes all the more extensive and substantial the more this 
knowledge is expanded and deepened. Only that productive activity which follows upon 
a self-appropriating reproduction of the mental labor of the past, lays the foundation for 
true progress to higher stages. 

3. The methods of treating history (divided by Hegel into the 
naive, the reflecting, and the speculative) may be classed as the 
empirical, the critical, and the philosophical, according as the simple 
collocation of materials, the examination of the credibility of tradi 
tion, or the endeavor to reach an understanding of the causes and 
significance of events, is made the predominant feature. The 
philosophical method proceeds by explaining the connection and 
endeavoring to estimate the relative worth of the phenomena of his- 


tory. The genetic method investigates the causal connection of 
phenomena. The standard by which to estimate the relative worth 
or importance of phenomena may be found either immediately in the 
mental state and opinions of the individual student, or in the peculiar 
nature and tendency of the phenomena themselves, or, finally, by 
reference to the joint development in which both the historical object 
and the judging subject, each at its peculiar stage, are involved ; 
hence may be distinguished the material, the formal, and the specula 
tive estimate of systems. A perfect historical exposition depends on. 
the union of all the methodical elements now mentioned. 

The later historians of philosophy in ancient times, as also the earliest modern his 
torians, contented themselves, for the most part, with the method which consists in merely 
empirical compilation. The critical sifting of materials has been introduced chiefly in 
modern times, by philologists and philosophers. From the first, and before any attempts 
were made at a detailed and general historical delineation, philosophers sought to acquire 
an insight into the causal connection and the value of the different systems, and for the 
earliest philosophies the foundation for such insight was already laid by Plato and Aris 
totle; but the completion of the work thus begun, the widening and deepening of this 
insight, is a work, to the accomplishment of which every age has sought to furnish its 
contribution and to which each age will always be obliged to contribute, even after the great 
advances made by modern philosophers, who have sought to make the history of philosophy 
intelligible as a history of development. The subjective estimate of systems, by the 
application of the philosophical (and theological) doctrine of the historian as the norm 
of judgment, has, in modern times, been especially common among the Leibnitzians (Brucker 
and others) and Kantians (Tennemann, notably). The method of formal criticism, which tries 
the special doctrines of a system by its own assumed principle, and this principle itself 
by its capacity of development and application, has been employed by Schleiermacher (par 
ticularly in his "Critique of Previous Ethics") and his successors (especially by Brandis; 
less by Hitter, who is more given to "material" criticism). Last of all, the speculative 
method has been adopted by Hegel (in his " History of Philosophy and Philosophy of His 
tory ") and by his school. 

To the oft-treated question, whether the history of philosophy is to be understood 
from the stand-point of our own philosophical consciousness, or whether, on the contrary, 
the latter is to be formed, enlarged, and corrected through historical study, the answer is, 
that the case in question, of the relation of the mind to the historical object of its atten 
tion, is a case of natural action and reaction, and that consequently each form of that 
relation indicated in the question has its natural time and place ; the one must follow the 
other, each in its time. The stage of philosophical culture, which the individual, before his 
acquaintance (or at least before his more exact familiarity) with the history of philosophy, 
has already reached, should facilitate his understanding of that history, while it is at the 
same time elevated and refined by his historical studies. On the other hand, the philo 
sophic consciousness of the student, when perfected by historical and systematic discipline, 
must afterward show itself fruitful in a deeper and truer understanding of history. 

4. The most trustworthy and productive sources for our knowl 
edge of the history of philosophy are those philosophical works which 


have come down to us in their original form and completeness, and, 
next to these, the fragments of such works which have been pre 
served under conditions that render it impossible to doubt their genuine 
ness. In the case of philosophical doctrines which are no longer 
before us in the original language of their authors, those " reports " 
are to be held most authentic which are based immediately on the 
writings of the philosophers, or in which the oral deliverances of the 
latter are communicated by immediate disciples. If the tendency of 
the author (or so-called " reporter"), whose statements serve us as 
authorities, is less historical than philosophical, inclining him rather 
to inquire into the truth of the doctrines mentioned by him than 
simply to report them, it is indispensable, as a condition precedent 
to the employment of his statements as historical material, that we 
carefully ascertain the line of thought generally followed by the 
author of whom he treats, and that in its light we test the sense of 
each of the reporter s statements. Next to the sources whence the 
" reporter " drew, and the tendency of his work, his own philosophical 
culture and his capacity to appreciate the doctrines he reports, furnish 
the most essential criteria of his credibility. The value of the 
various histories of philosophy as aids to the attainment of a knowl 
edge and understanding of that history, is measured partly by the de 
gree of exactness shown by each historian in the communication of the 
original material and his acuteness in their appreciation, and partly by 
the degree of intelligence with which he sifts the essential from the 
non-essential in each philosopher s teachings, and exhibits the inner 
connection of single systems and the order of development of the 
different philosophical stand-points. 

On the literature of the history of philosophy, compare especially Job. Jonsius, J)e Scriptoribus His- 
toriae Philosophicae libri quatuor, Frankf. 1659 ; recogniti atque ad praesentem aetatem usque per ducti 
euro, Joh. Chr. Dorn, Jen. 1716. J. Alb. Fabricius, in the Bibl. Graeca, Hainb. 1705 sqq. Job. Andreaa 
Ortloff, I/andbucfi der Litteratur der Philosophic, 1. Abth. : Die Litteratur der Litter argeschichte und 
Geschichte der Philosophic, Erlangen, 1798. Ersch and Geissler, Bibliographisches Handbuch der 
philosophischen Litteratur der Deutschen von der Mitte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts bis auf di 
neueste Zeit, 3<1 ed., Leips. 1850. V. Ph. Gumposch, Die philosophitche Litteratur der Deutschen von 
1400-1850, Regensburg, 1851, pp. 846-362. Ad. Buchting, Bibliotheca philosophic^ Oder Veraeichnist 
der von 1S57-1S07 im deutschen Buchhandel erscJiienenen philos. Bucher und Zeitschriften, Nordhausen, 
1867. Cf. the copious citations of literature in Buhle s Gesehichte der Philos., and also in F. A. Carns a 
Jdeen zur Gesch. der Philos., Leipsic, 1809, pp. 21-90, in Tennemann s larger work and in his Manual of 
the History of Philosophy, 5th ed., revised by Amadeus Wendt, Leips., 1829, as also in other works on the 
history of philosophy ; see also the bibliographical citations in various monographs relating to literary 
history, such as Ompteda s on the Literature of International Law, etc., and the comprehensive work of 
Julius Petzholdt, Bibliotheca Bibttographica, Leips. 1866, of which pp. 458-468 are devoted to the history 
of the literature of philosophy. 

The writings of the early Greek philosophers of the pre-Socratic period exist now only 
in fragments. The complete works of Plato are still extant ; so also are the most impor- 


tant works of Aristotle, and certain others, which belong to the Stoic, Epicurean, Skeptic, 
and Neo- Platonic schools. "We possess the principal works of most of the philosophers of 
the Christian period in sufficient completeness. 

At the commencement of modern times the disappearance of respect for many species 
of authority, which had previously been accepted, gave special occasion for historical 
inquiry. Lord Bacon, who was unsatisfied by the Aristotelianism of the Scholastics and 
was disposed to favor the pre-Socratic philosophy, speaks of an expose, of the placita 
philosophorum as one of the desiderata of his times. Of the numerous general histories of 
philosophy, the following may here be mentioned: 

The History of Philosophy, by Thorn. Stanley, London, 1655; 2d ed. t 1687, 3d ed., 1701; 
translated into Latin by Gottfr. Olearius, Leipsic, 1711; also Venice, 1733. Stanley treats 
only of the history of philosophy before Christ, which is in his view the only philosophy ; 
for philosophy seeks for truth, which Christian theology possesses, so that with the latter 
the former becomes superfluous. Stanley follows in his exposition of Greek philosophy 
pretty closely the historical work of Diogenes Laertius. 

Jac. Thomasii (ob. 1684), Schediasma Historicum, quo varia discutiuntur ad hist, turn 
philos., turn ecclesiasticam pertinentia, Leipsic, 1 665 ; with the title : Origines Hist Philos. at 
Ecclesiast., ed. by Christian Thomasius, Halle, 1699. Jac. Thomasius first recommended 
disputed questions in the history of philosophy as themes for dissertations. 

J. Dan. Huetii, Demonstratio Evangelica; philosophiae veteris ac novae parallelismus, Am 
sterdam, 1679. 

Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, 1st ed., Rotterd. 1697. [English transla 
tion by Birch and Lockman, London, 1734-35, 2d ed., 1736-38. TV.] This very compre 
hensive work deserves to be mentioned here on account of the articles it contains on the 
history of philosophy. Bayle contributed essentially to the awakening of the spirit of 
investigation in this department of study. Yet, as a critic, he deals rather in a philosophical 
criticism of transmitted doctrines from his skeptical stand-point, than in an historical criticism 
of the fidelity of the accounts on which our knowledge of those doctrines is founded. The 
philosophical articles have been published in an abridged German translation by L. H. 
Jakob, 2 vols., Halle, 1797-98. 

The Acta Philosophorum, ed. Christ. Aug. Heumann, Halle, 1715 ff., contain several 
valuable papers of investigation on questions in the history of philosophy. 

Histoire Critique de la Philosophic, par Mr. D. (Deslandes), torn. I.-IIL, 1st ed., Paris, 
1730-36. Includes also modern philosophy. 

Joh. Jak. Brucker, Kurze Fragen aus der philosophischen Historic, 7 vols., Ulm, 1731-36, 
with additions, ibid. 1737. Historia Critica Philosophiae a mundi incunabulis ad nostratn 
usque aetatem deducta. 5 vols., Leips. 1742-44; 2d ed., 1766-67 ; English abridged transla 
tion by Wm. Enfield, Lond. 1791. Institutiones hist, philosophicae, usui acad. juventvtis ador- 
natae, 1st ed., Leips. 1747. Brucker s presentation, especially in his chief work, the Historia 
Crit. Philos., is clear and easily followed, though somewhat diffuse, and often interspersed 
with anecdotes, after the manner of Diogenes Laertius, and too rarely portrajnng the connec 
tion of ideas. Brucker wrote in the infancy of historical criticism ; still he often gives proof 
of a sound and sobsr insight in his treatment of the historical controversies current in his 
times ; least, it is true, in what relates to the earlier periods, far more in his exposition of 
the later. His philosophical judgment is imperfect, from the absence with him of the con. 
ceptions of successive development and relative truth. Truth, he argues, is one, but erroi 
is manifold, and the majority of systems are erroneous. The history of philosophy shows 
" infinita falsae philosophiae exempla." Neo-Platonism, for example, Brucker does not 
understand as a certain blending of Hellenism and Orientalism, with a predominance of the 


form of Hellenism, and still less as a progress from skepticism to mysticism made relatively 
necessary by the nature of things, but as the product of a conspiracy of bad men against 
Christianity "in id conjuravere pessimi homines, ut quam veritate vincere non possenl reli- 
gionem Christianam, fraude impedirent ;" and in like manner he sees in Christian Gnosti 
cism, not a similar blending, with a prevalence of the form of Orientalism, but the result 
of pride and willfulness, etc. Truth is, for him, identical with Protestant orthodoxy, and 
next to that with the Leibnitzian philosophy ; according to the measure of its material 
accordance with this norm every doctrine is judged either true or false. 

Agatopisto Cromaziano (Appiano Buonafede), Delia Istoria e detta Indole di ogni Filosojia, 
Lucca, 1766-81, also Yen. 1782-84, on which is based the work: Delia Restauratione di 
ogni FUosofia ne 1 Secoli XV., XVL, XVIL, Yen. 1785-89 (translated into German by Carl 
Heydenreich, Leipsic, 1791). 

Dietr. Tiedemann, Geist der specuLativen Philosophic, 7 vols., Marburg, 1791-97. By 
"speculative" Tiedemann means theoretical philosophy. The speculative element in the 
newer sense of this word is unknown to him. His work extends from Thales to Berkeley. 
Tiedemann belongs to the ablest thinkers among the opponents of the Kantian philosophy. 
His stand-point is the stand-point of Leibnitz and Wolff, modified by elements from that of 
Locke. In his interpretation and judgment of the various systems of philosophy, he seeks 
to avoid unfairness and partisanship. But his understanding of them has, occasionally, its 
limits. His principal merit consists in his application of the principle of judging systems 
according to their relative perfection. Tiedemann declares his intention not to make any one 
system the standard by which all others should be judged, since no one is universally 
admitted, but "to consider chiefly, whether a philosopher has said any thing new and has 
displayed acuteness in the support of his assertions, whether his line of thought is marked 
by inner harmony and close connection, and, finally, whether considerable objections have 
been or can be urged in opposition to his assertions." 

Georg Gustav Fulleborn, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic, sections 1-12, Ziilli- 
chau, 1791-99. 

Joh. Gottlieb Buhle, Lehrbitch der Geschichte der Philosophic und einer kritischen Littera- 
twr derselben, 8 vols., Gottingen, 1796-1804; Geschichte der neueren Philosophic seit der 
Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften, 6 vols., Gottingen, 1800-1805. Buhle 
writes as a disciple of Kant, but with a leaning toward the stand-point of Jacobi. He 
allows his philosophical stand-point rarely to appear. Buhle evinces great reading, and 
has, with critical insight, instituted valuable investigations, especially in the department 
of the history of the literature of philosophy. His " Gesch. der neueren Philosophic " 
contains many choice extracts from rare works. It forms the sixth part of the encyclo 
pedical work : t; Gesch. der Kttnste u. Wins, seit der Wiederherstellung derselben bis an das 
Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts." 

Degerando, Histoire Comparee des Systemes de la Philosophic, Tom. I.-IIL, Paris, 1804; 
2d edit., Tom. I.-IV., Paris, 1822-23. Translated into German by Tennemann, 2 vols., 
Marburg, 1806-1807. 

Friedr. Aug. Carus, Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophic, Leipsic, 1809. Fourth part of 
his posthumous works. 

Wilh. Gottlieb Tenneraann, Geschichte der Philosophic, 11 vols., Leipsic, 1798-1819. 
The work has never been wholly completed. It was to have filled thirteen volumes. The 
twelfth volume was to have treated of German theoretical philosophy from Leibnitz and 
Chr. Thomasius down to Kant, and the thirteenth of moral philosophy from Descartes 
to Kant. Tennemann s work is meritorious on account of the extent and independence of 
his study of authorities, and the completeness and clearness of his exposition; but it is 


marred by not a few misapprehensions, most of which are the result of a one-sided 
method of interpretation from the Kantian stand-point. In his judgments, the ineasuriug- 
rod of the Kantian Critique of the Reason is often applied with too little allowance to the 
earlier systems, although in principle, the idea, already expressed by Kant, of "the 
gradual development of the reason in its striving after science," is not foreign to him. 

Wilh. Gottlieb Tennemann, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic fur den akademischen 
Uhterricht, 1st ed., Leips. 1812; 5th ed., Leips. 1829; the last three editions revised by 
Amadeus Wendt. [English translation ("Manual of the History of Philosophy," etc.), 
by A. Johnson, Oxford, 1833. The same, revised, enlarged, and corrected by J. R. 
Morell, London, 1852. Tr.] From this much too brief exposition, it is impossible to 
derive a complete understanding of the different systems ; nevertheless it is of value as a 
repertory of notices concerning philosophers and their teachings ; especially valuable are 
the perhaps only too numerous literary references, in respect to which Tennemann aimed 
rather at completeness than at judicious selection. 

Jak. Friedr. Fries, Geschichte der Philosophic, 2 vols., Halle, 1837-4.0. His stand-point, a 
modified Kantianism. 

Friedr. Ast, Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophic, Landshut, 1807, 2d ed., 1825. 
He writes from Schelling s stand-point. 

Thadda Anselm Rixner, Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic zum Gebrauche seiner 
Vbrlesungen, 3 vols., Sulzbach, 1822-23, 2d ed., 1829. Supplementary volume by Victor 
Phil. Gumposch, 1850. The stand-point is that of Schelling. Its numerous citations from 
original sources would render the book an excellent basis for a first study of the history 
of philosophy, if Rixner s work was not disfigured by great negligence and lack of critical 
skill in the execution of his plan. Gumposch, who brings the national element especially 
into prominence, proceeds far more carefully. 

Ernst Reinhold, Handbuch der attgemeinen Geschichte d.r Philosophic, 2 parts in 3 vols., 
Gotha, 1828-30. Lehrbuchder Geschichte der Philosophic, Jena, 1836; 2d ed., 1839; 3d ed., 
1849. Geschichte der Philosophic nach den Hauptmomenten Hirer Entwickelung, 5th ed., 3 
vols., Jena, 1858. The presentation is compendious but not sufficiently exact. Reinhold 
thinks and often expresses himself too much in the modern way and too little in the style 
and spirit of the philosophers of whom he treats. 

Heinr. Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophic, 12 vols., Hamburg, 1829-53; Yols. I.-IY., new 
edition, 1836-38. [4 vols. translated. See below, ad 7. Tr.} The work reaches to 
and excludes Kant ; the Uebersicht iiber die Geschichte der neuesten deutschen Philosophic seit 
Kant (Brunswick, 1853), supplements and completes it. Ritter adopts substantially the 
stand-point of Schleiermacher. His professed object is, while adhering strictly to facts, 
to present the history of philosophy as "a self-developing whole;" not, however, viewing 
earlier systems as stepping-stones to any particular modern one, nor judging them from the 
stand-point of any particular system, but rather " from the point of view of the general 
intelligence of the periods to which they belong, respecting the object of the intellectual 
faculties respecting the right and the wrong in the modes of developing the reason." 

Under Ritter s supervision, the following work of Schleiermacher was published, 
after its author s death: Geschichte der Philosophic, Berlin, 1839 (Schleiermacher s Werke, 
III., 4, a). The work is a summary, drawn up by Schleiermacher for his lectures. It 
is not founded in all parts on original historical investigation, but it contains much that 
is very suggestive. 

G. W. Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophic, ed. by Karl Ludw. 
Michelet. 3 vols. (Werke, Vols. XIIL-XV.), Berlin, 1833-36; 2d ed., 1840-42. The 
stand-point here is the speculative, characterized above, 3. Yet Hegel, as matter of fact, 


has not in detail always maintained the idea of development in its purity, but has some 
times unhistorically represented the doctrines of philosophers, whom he esteemed, as 
approximating to his own (interpreted, e. g., many philosophemes of Plato agreeably to his 
own doctrine of immanence), and, ignoring their scientific motives, has misinterpreted those 
of philosophers whom he did not esteem (e.g. Locke); still further, he unjustifiably 
exaggerates in principle the legitimate and fundamental idea of a gradual development, 
observable in the progress of events in general, and particularly in the succession of 
philosophical systems, through the following assumptions : 

a. That every form of historical reality within its historic limits, and hence, in particu 
lar, every philosophical system, viewed as a determinate link in the complete evolution of 
philosophy, is to be considered in its place as wholly natural and legitimate ; while, never 
theless, side by side with the historically justified imperfection of individual forms, error 
and perversity, as not relatively legitimate elements, are found, and occasion aberrations in 
point of historic fact from the ideal norms of development (in particular, many temporary 
reactions, and, on the other hand, many false anticipations) ; 

b. That with the Hegelian system the development-process of philosophy has found an 
absolute terminus, beyond which thought has no essential advance to make ; 

c. That the nature of things is such that the historical sequence of the various philo 
sophical stand-points must, without essential variation, accord with the systematic sequence 
of the different categories, whether it be with those of logic alone, as appears from Vorl. 
tiber die Gesch. der Philosophie, Vol. I. p. 128, or with those of logic and the philosophy of 
nature? and mental philosophy, as is taught, ibid. p. 120, and Vol. III. p. 686 ff. 

G. Osw. Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic 1 Abtli. : Geschichte der 
griechischen Philosophic, 2 Abth. : Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Leipsic, 1838-41. 
Marbach s stand-point is the Hegelian ; but he often makes a somewhat forced application 
of the categories of Hegel s system to material furnished him chiefly by Tennemann and 
Rixner though in part drawn from the original sources and but slightly elaborated by 
himself. The book has remained uncompleted. 

Jul. Braniss, Geschichte der Philosophic seit Kant, first vol., Breslau, 1842. The first 
volume, the only one published, is a speculative survey of the history of philosophy down 
to the Middle Ages. Braniss owes his philosophical stand-point chiefly to Steffens, Schleier- 
macher, and Hegel. 

Christoph. "Wilh. Sigwart, Gesch. der Philosophie, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1854. 

Albert Schwegler, Gesch. der Philos. im Umriss, ein Leitfaden zur Uebersicht, Stuttgart, 
1348, 7th edition, ibid., 1870. Contains a clear presentation of the philosophical stand 
points, but is seriously imperfect from the omission of the author to describe with sufficient 
minuteness the principal doctrines which belong specially to each system and to the 
subordinate branches of each system, by which means alone a distinct picture can be 
presented. Schwegler s Compendium has been translated into English, with explanatory, 
critical, and supplementary annotations, by J. H. Stirling, Edinburgh, 1867 ; 2d ed. 1868. 
[American translation by J. H. Seelye, N. Y. 1856; 3d ed., 1864. TV.] 

Mart. v. Deutinger, Geschichte der Philosophie (1st vol.: Greek Philosophy. 1st div.: 
Till the time of Socrates. 2d div. : From Socrates till the end of Greek philosophy). 
Regensburg, 1852-53. 
^ Ludw. Noack, Geschichte der Philosophie in gedrdngter Uebersicht, Weimar, 1853. 

Wilh. Bauer, Geschichte der Philosophie fur gebildete Leser, Halle, 1863. 

F. Michelis, Geschichte der Philosophie von Tholes bis aufunsere Zeit, Braunsberg, 1865. 

Joh. Ed. Erdmanu, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 2 vols., Berlin, 1866,- 2d 
ed. ibid. 1869-70. 


F. Schmid (of Schwarzenberg), Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic von Tholes tig 
Schopenhauer, vom speculativ-monotheistischen Standpunkte, Erlangen, 1867. 

Conrad Hermann, Gesch. der Philos. in pragmatischer Behandlung, Leipsic, 1867. 

J. H. Scholten, Gesch. der Religion und Philosophic, translated from the Dutch origin;.! 
into French by A. Reville, Paris and Strasbourg, 1861 ; German translation under the 
above title by Ernst Rud. Redepenning, Elberfeld, 1868. 

E. Duhring, Krit. Gesch. der Philos., Berlin, 1869. 

Victor Cousin, Introduction d THistoire de la Philosophic and Cours de THistoire de la 
Philosophic Moderne in the (Euvres de V. C., Paris, 1846-48. Fragments Philosophiques, 
Paris, 1840-43. Histoire Generak de la Philosophic depuis les temps les plus recutts jusqu d la 
fin du XVIII. siecle, 5e ed., Paris, 1863. 

J. A. Nourrisson, Tableau des Progres de la Ptnsee Humaine depuis Tholes jusqu d 
Leibnitz, Paris, 1858; 2e edition, 1860. 

N. J. Laforet, Hist, de la Philosophic ; ~ premiere partie : Philos. Ancienne, Brussels and 
Paris, 1867. 

Robert Blakey, History of the Philosophy of Mind, from the earliest period to the present 
time, 4 vols., London, 1848. 

George Henry Lewes, A Biographical History of Philosophy, from its origin in Greece 
down to the present day, London, 1 846. The History of Philosophy from Thales to the present 
day, by George Henry Lewes, 3d edition (Vol. I. Ancient Philosophy; Vol. II. Modern 
Philosophy), London, 1866. 

Ed. Zeller, Vortrdge und Abhandlungen geschichtlichen Inhalts, Leipsic, 1865, containing: 
1. The development of monotheism among the Greeks; 2. Pythagoras and the legends 
concerning him ; 3. A plea for Xanthippe ; 4. The Platonic state in its significance for the 
succeeding time ; 5. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus ; 6. "Wolff s banishment from Halle, the 
struggle of pietism with philosophy; 7. Joh. Gottlieb Fichte as a political philosopher; 
8. Friedr. Schleiermacher ; 9. Primitive Christianity; 10. The historical school of Tubin 
gen; 11, Ferdinand Christian Baur ; 12. Strauss and Renan. 

Of works on the history of single philosophical disciplines and tendencies (from ancient 
till modern times), the following are specially worthy of mention : 

Ad. Trendelenburg, Historische Beitrage zur Philosophic, Vol. I. (History of the Doctrine 
of Categories), Berlin, 1846; Vol. II. (Miscellaneous Essays), ibid. 1855; Vol. III. (Misc. 
Essays), ibid. 1867. 

On Religious Philosophy : Karl Friedr. Staudlin, Gesch. und Geist des Skepticismus, 
vorziiglich in Riicksicht auf Moral und Religion, Leipsic, 1794-95; Imman. Berger, Geschichte 
der Religionsphilosophie, Berlin, 1800. 

On the History of Psychology : Friedr. Aug. Cams, Geschichte der Psychologie, Leipsic, 
1808. (Third part of the posthumous works.) The same subject, substantial^, is also 
treated of in Albert Stockl s Die speculat. Lehre vom Menschen und ihre Geschichte, Vol. I. 
(" Ancient Times "), Wiirzburg, 1858 ; Vol. II. ("Patristic Period," also under the title of 
Geschichte der Philosophic der patristischen Zeit), ibid. 1859; and Geschichte der Philosophic 
des Mittelalters (continuation of the preceding works), Mayence, 1864-65, and in Friedr. 
Albert Lange s Gescnichte des Materialismus, Iserlohn, 1866. 

On the History of Ethical and Political Theories : Christoph. Meiners, Geschichte der 
dlteren und neureren Ethik oder Lebensweisheit, Gottingen, 1800-1801. Karl Friedr. Staud 
lin, Geschichte der Moralphilosophie, Hanover, 1823; and Geschichte der Lehre von der 
Sittlichkeit der Schauspiele, vom Eide, vom Geioissen, etc., Gott. 1823 ff. Leop. v. Henning, 
Die Principien der Ethik in historischer Entwickelung, Berlin, 1825. Friedr. v. Raumer, Die 
geschicMiche Entwickelung der Begriffe von Stoat, Recht und Politik, Leipsic, 1826; 2d ed. 


1832; 3d ed. 1861. Joh. Jos. Rossbach, Die Perioden der Rechtsphilosophie, Regensburg, 
1842; Die Grundrichtungen in der Gesch. der Staatswissenschaft, Erlangen, 1842; Gescli. der 
Gesellschaft, Wvirzburg, 1868 fT. Heinr. Lintz, Entwurf einer Geschichte der Rechtsphilos., 
Dantzic, 1846. Emil Feuerlein, Die philosophisdte Sittenlehre in ihren gcschichllichen Haupt- 
formen, 2 vols., Tubingen, 1857-59. P. Janet, Histoire de la Philosophie Morale et Politique 
dans VAntiquite et les Temps Modernes, Paris, 1858. James Mackintosh, Dissertation on the 
Progress of Ethical Philosophy, London, 1830 ; new edition, ed. by "Will. "Whewell, London, 
1863. "W. Whewell, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, new edition, London, 1862. 
[Robert Blakey, History of Moral Science, second edition, Edinburgh, 1863. Ed.] Jahnel, 
De Conscientiae Notione, Berlin, 1862. Aug. Neander, Vorlesungen fiber die Gesch. derchrist. 
Ethik, ed. by Dr. Erdmann, Berlin, 1864. W. Gass, Die Lehre vom Gewissen, Berlin, 1869. 

On the History of Logic : Carl Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Yol. I. (Devel 
opment of Logic in Ancient Times), Leipsic, 1855 ; Yols. II.-IV. (Logic in the Middle 
Ages), ibid. 1 861-70. 

On the History of ^Esthetics : Robert Zimmermann, Geschichte der Aesthetik als philoso- 
phischer Wissenschaft, Yienna, 1858; cf. the historico-critical portions of Yischer s Aesthetik 
and Lotze s Gesch. der Aesthetik in Deutschland, Munich, 1868. 

More or less copious contributions to the history of philosophical doctrines may be 
found also in many of the works in which these doctrines are systematically expounded, 
as, for example, in Stahl a Philosophie des Rechts nach geschichtlicher Ansicht (1st ed., Heidel 
berg, 1830 ff.), of which the first volume, on the "Genesis of the Current Philosophy of 
Law" (3d ed., 1853), is critico- historical, and relates particularly to the time from 
Kant to Hegel ; cf. in like manner Immanuel Herm. Fichte s System der Ethik, the first or 
critical part of which (Leipsic, 1850) is a history of the philosophical doctrines of right, 
state, and morals in Germany, France, and England from 1750 till about 1850; the first 
volume of K. Hildenbrand s Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Slaatsphilosophie (Leips. 
I860), treats minutely of the history of theories in classical antiquity; much historical 
material is also contained in the works of "Warnkonig, Roder, Rossler, Trendelenburg, and 
others, on the philosophy of law. The works of Julius Schaller ( Gesch. der Naturphilosophie 
seit Baco), Rob. v. Mohl (Gesch. u. Lit. der Staatswissenschaften, Erlangen, 1855-58), J. C. 
Bluntschli (Gesch. des attg. Staatsrechti und der Politik seit dem 16 Jahrh. bis zur Gegenwart, 
Munich, 1864, etc.), and some others, relate to modem times. Cf. below, Yol. II. 1. 


5. THE general characteristic of the human mind in ante-Chris 
tian, and particularly in Hellenic antiquity, may be described as its 
comparatively unreflecting belief in its own harmony and of its one 
ness with nature. The sense of an opposition, as existing either 
among its own different functions and interests or between the 
mind and nature and as needing reconciliation, is as yet relatively 
undeveloped. The philosophy of antiquity, like that of every 
period, partakes necessarily, in what concerns its chronological be 
ginnings and its permanent basis, of the character of the period to 
which it belongs, while at the same time it tends, at least in its 
general and most fundamental direction, upward and beyond the 
level of the period, and so prepares the way for the transition to new 
and higher stages. 

For the solution of the difficult but necessary problem of a general historical and 
philosophical characterization of the great periods in the intellectual life of humanity, the 
Hegelian philosophy has labored most successfully. The conceptions which it employs for 
this end are derived from the nature of intellectual development in general, and they prove 
themselves empirically correct and just when compared with the particular phenomena of 
the different periods. Nevertheless, the opinion is scarcely to be approved, that philosophy 
always expresses itself most purely only in the universal consciousness of the time ; the 
truth is, rather, that it rises above the range of the general consciousness through the 
power of independent thought, generating and developing new germs, and anticipating in 
theory the essential character of developments yet to come (thus, e. g., the Platonic state 
anticipates some of the essential characteristics of the form of the Christian church, and 
the doctrine of natural right, in its development since Grotius, foreshadows the constitu 
tionalism of the modern state). 

6. Philosophy as science could originate neither among the 
peoples of the North, who were eminent for strength and courage, 
but devoid of culture, nor among the Orientals, who, though suscep 
tible of the elements of higher culture, were content simply to 
retain them in a spirit of passive resignation, but only among the 
Hellenes, who harmoniously combined the characteristics of both. 
The Romans, devoted to practical and particularly to political prob 
lems, scarcely occupied themselves with philosophy except in the 


appropriation of Hellenic ideas, and scarcely attained to any produc 
tive originality of their own. 

The sacred writinffs and poetry of the various Orienta* peoples, with their (Y-King, 
Chou-King ; the moral treatises of Confucius and his disciples ; the Vedas, the code of Many, the Sakontala of 
the poet Kalidasa, th Puranas or Theogonies, the ancient commentaries; Zoroaster s Zcndavesta, etc.) are 
the original sources from which our knowledge of their philosophical speculations is derived. Of modern 
works, treating of the religion and philosophy of these peoples, we name the following: 

Friedr. Creuzer, Si/mbolik und Mythologie der alien Volker, 4 vols., Leipsic and Darmstadt, 1810-12 ; 
2d ed., 6 vols., 1819 ff. ; Werke, 1. 1-4, ibid. 1836 seq. K. J. II. Windischmann, Die Philosophie im Fortgang 
der Weltgeschichte, volume I., sections 1-4 (on the "Foundations of Philosophy in the East"), Bonn, 
1827-34. Stuhr, Die Religionssysteme der heidnischen Volker den Orients, Berlin, 1830-38. Ed. 
Loth, Geschichte -unserer abenlandischen Philosophic, vol. I., Mannheim, 1846, 2d ed., 1862. (Roth s 
first volume is devoted to the speculations of the Persians and Egyptians, the second to the oldest Greek 
philosophy. The book, though written in a lively style, is drawn in large measure from inauthentio 
sources, and is not free from nrbitrary interpretations and too hazardous comparisons. It contains more 
poetry than historic truth.) Ad. Wuttke, Geschiclite des Heidenthums, 2 vols., Breslan, 1852-53. J. C. 
Bluntschli, Altasiatische Gottes- und Weltideen in ihren Wirkungen avf das Gemeinleben der Men- 
schen^f dnf Vortr dge, Nordlingen, 1866. Owing to the stability of Oriental ideas, expositions relating to 
modern times, such as Le.s Religions et les Philosophies dans FAsie centrale, par le co/nte de Gobineau 
(Paris, 1865), may be profitably consulted by students of their earlier history. Of. the mythological writings 
of Schwenck and others, and Wolfgang Menzel s Die vorchristliche UiiKterblichkeitslehre (Leipsic, 1870), 
Max Duncker s Gesch. der Arier (3d ed., 1867), etc., and numerous articles in the Zeitschrift der deutschen 
morgenldndischen Gesellschaft (ed. by L. Krehl), and in other learned reviews. 

G. Pauthier, Esquisse d une Histoire de la Philos. chinoie, Paris, 1844; Les Quatre Litres de Philos. 
Morale et Politique de la Chine, trad, du Chinois, Paris, 1S6S ; L. A. Martin, Histoire de la Morale, I. ; 
La Morale ches les Chinois, Paris, 1862; J. II. Plath, Die Religion und der Otiltus der alten Chinesen, in 
the Transactions of the Philos.-Philol. Div. of the Bavarian R. Acad. of Sciences, Vol. IX., pt. 3, pp. 731-960, 
Munich, 1863 ; Confucius und seiner Schiller Leben und Lehren, Trans, of the Munich Acad. of Sciences, 
XI. 2, Munich, 1867; T. Lcggc, 77te Life and Writings of Confucius, with crit. and exeget. notes (in the 
author s "Chinese Classics"), London, 1S67 [New York, 1870]. 

Colebrooke, Sways on the Vedas ; and On the Philosophy of the Hindus, in his Miscellaneous Essays, 
L pp. 9-113, 227-419, London, 1837; partial translation in German by Poley, Leipsic, 1847; new ed. of the 
Essays on the Rel. and Phil, of the IT., London, 1858; A. W r . v. Schlegel, Bhagavad-Gita, i. e, eoTreVioy 
jxe Aos, sive Krishna 6 et A rjunae colloquium de rebus divinis, JShuratiae episodium. Text, rec., adn. adj., 
Bonn, 1S2^; W. v. Tlumboldt, Ueber die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gita bekannte Episode des 
Mahabharata, Berlin, 1826. (Cf.HegeFs article in the Berlin Jahrbucher,fur wiss. Kritik, 1827.) Chr. Las- 
sen, Gymnosophifsta sive Indicae philosophiae documcnta, Bonn, 1S02; cf. his Ind. Alterthumskunde, 
I.-IV.,Leips. 1847-61; Othm. Frank, Die Philosophie der Hindu. Vddanta SaravonlSadananda, Sanskrit 
und ddutxcli, Munich, 1S35; Theod. Benfcy, Indien, in Ersch and Gruber s Encycl. sect. II., vol. 17, Leips. 
1S40; E. Koer, Yedanta-Sara or Essence of the Vedanta, Calcutta, 1845, and Die Lehrspriiche der 
Vaiceshika- Philosophie von Kandda, translak d into the German from the Sanscrit, in the Zeitschr der 
deutschen morgenlandischen Gcselhchaft, vol. XXI., 1SC7, pp. 309-420; Roth, Zur Liitcratur und 
Gescfdchte des Weda,S essays, Stuttgart, 1846; Alb. "Weber, Indische Literaturgexchichte, Berlin, 1852; 
IndiscJie Skizzen, Berlin, 1857: cf. Indische Studien, ed. by A. Weber, Vol. I. seq., Berlin, 18.10 seq. ; F. M. 
Muller, Beitrdge zur Kenntniss der indischen Philosophie, in the Oth and 7th vols. of the Zeitschrift der 
deutschen morgenldnd. Gesellnchaft, Leipsic, 1852-53; cf. his History of Ancient Indian Literature, 2d 
ed., London, 1860; Max Muller, Chips from a German Workshop, Lond. 1866, N. Y. 1867; II. II. Wilson, 
Essays and Lectures on the Religions of the Hindus, collected and edited by R. Rost, Lond. 1861-62. 

Eug. Burnouf, Introduction d ? Ifistoire du Bouddhisme indien, Paris, 1S44; C. F. Koppen, Die 
Religion des Buddha, 2 vols., Berlin, 1857-59; W. "Wassiljew, Der Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Ges- 
cJiichte und Litteratur, transl. into German fr. the Russian by Th. Benfcy, Leipsic, 1860; Barthelemy St. 
Hilaire, Bouddha et sa Religion, le ed., Paris, 1862; Jam. de Alwis, Buddhism, its Origin, History, and 
Doctrines, ite Scriptures and their Language, London, 1863; Emil Schlagintweit, Ueber den Gottcts- 
begriffder Buddhismus, in the Reports of the Bavar. Acad. of Sciences, 1864, Vol. I. 83-102; R. S. Hardy, 
Tlie Legends and. TJieories of the Buddhists compared, with History and Science, with Introductory 
Notices of the Life and System of Gotama Buddha, London, 1867. 

K. R. Lepsius. Das Todtenbuch der Aegypter, Leips. 1842 ; Die dgypt. Gotterkreisc, Berlin, 1851 ; M. 
Uhlemann, Thoth oder die Wissenschaft der alten Aegypter, Gottingen, 1855; Aegyptische Alterthitma- 
kunde, Leipsic, 1857-58; Chr. K. Josias von Bunsen, Aegyptens Stelle in der Weltgeschichte, Hamburg 


and Gotha, 1845-57. Cf. also, among other works, the article by L. Diestel, which is well adapted as an 
introduction to the study of early Oriental religions: Set- Typhon, Asahel und Satan, ein Beitrag zur 
Religionngeschichte des Orients, in the Zeitschrift fur historische Theologie, edited by Niedner, 1860, 
pp. 159-217 ; further, Ollivier Bauregard, Lea Divinites Egyptiennes, leur Origine, leur Culte tt son 
Expansion dans le Monde. Paris, 1866. 

J. G. Rhode, Die heilige Sage oder das gesammte Religion ssystem der alten Baktrer, Meder und 
Perser oder des Zendvolks, Frankf. on the M. 1820; Martin Haug, Die fftnf Gdtha" oder Sammlungen 
von Liedemund Spriichen Zarathu&tra 1 s, seiner junger und Nachfolger, Leips. 1858 and I860 (in the 
Transactions of the German Oriental Society) ; Essay on Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of 
the Par sees, Bombay, 1862. 

On the religious conceptions of the Jews, compare, among others, G. II. Ewald, in his Gesch. des Volkes 
Israel bis auf Chritttus, L. Herzfeld in his Gesch. des Volkes Jisrael von der Vollendung des eweiten 
Tempels bis zur Einsetzung des Makkdbders Schimon, and Georg Weber in Das Volk Israel in der 
alttestamentlichen Zeit, Leipsic, 1867 (the first volume of the work by Weber and Holtzman, entitled : 
Gesch. des Volkf.s Israel und der Entstehung des Christenthums, 2 vols., Leips. 1867). Alexander Kohut 
(among recent writers) treats specially of Jewish angelology and demonology in their dependence on Par- 
seeism, in the Abhandl.fur Kunde des Morgenlandes, ed. by Herm. Brockhaus; his work also published 
separately, Leipsic, 1S66. 

The so-called philosophy of the Orientals lacks in the tendency to strict demonstration, 
and hence in scientific character. Whatever philosophical elements are discoverable 
among them are so blended with religious notions, that a separate exposition is scarcely 
possible. Besides, even after the meritorious investigations of modern times, our knowl 
edge of Oriental thought remains far too incomplete and uncertain for a connected and 
authentic presentation. We omit, therefore, here the special consideration of the various 
theorems of Oriental philosophy, and confine ourselves to the following general state 

The doctrine of Confucius (551-479 B. c.), as also that of his followers (Meng-tseu, 
born 371 B. C., and others), is mainly a practical philosophy of utilitarian tendency. 
Its theoretical speculations (which are based on the generalized conception of the an 
tithesis of male and female, heaven and earth, etc.) are not scientifically wrought out. 
The rich but immoderate fancy of the Hindus generated, on the basis of a pantheistic 
conception of the world, a multiplicity of divinities, without investing them with har 
monious form and individual character. Their oldest gods of whom the Vedas treat 
group themselves about three supreme divinities of nature, Indra, Yaruni, and Agni. 
Later (perhaps about 1300 B. c.) supreme veneration was paid to the three divine beings, 
which constituted the Hindu Trimurti, viz. : to Brahma, as the original source of the 
world (which is a reflected picture in the mind of Brahma, produced by the deceiving 
Maja), to Vischnu, as preserver and governor, and to Siva, as destroyer and producer. 
The oldest body of Brahman doctrine is the Mimansa, which includes a theoretical part, 
the Brahmamimansa or Vedanta, and a practical part, the Karmamimansa. To the (uni- 
versalistic) Mimansa (" Investigation ") Kapila opposed the Saukhya (" Consideration," 
u Critique " an individualistic doctrine, which denied the world-soul and taught the 
existence of individual souls only). We find already in the Sankhya a theory of the kinds 
and the objects of knowledge. To the authors of the Xiaya-doctrine, which subsequently 
arose, the Syllogism was known. The age of these doctrines is uncertain. Jn opposition 
to the religion of Brahma arose (not far from 550 B. c.) Buddhism, which was an attempt 
at a moral reformation, hostile to castes, but the source of a new hierarchy. Its followers 
were required to make it their supreme aim to rise above the checkered world of changing 
appearance, with its pain and vain pleasure. But this end was to be reached, not so much 
through positive moral and intellectual discipline, as through another process, termed 
"entrance into Nirvana," whereby the soul was saved from the torments of transmigra 
tion and the individual was brought into unconscious unity with the All. The Persian reli- 


gion, founded or reformed by Zarathustra (Zoroaster), was opposed to the old Hindu religion, 
whose gods it regarded as evil demons. Over against the kingdom of light or of good was 
placed, in dualistic opposition, the kingdom of darkness or evil ; after a long contest the 
former was to triumph. The Egyptians are credited with the doctrines of the judgment 
of departed souls and of their transmigration, which doctrines Herodotus (II. 53, 81, 123) 
supposes to have passed from them to the Orphists and the Pythagoreans. Their 
mythology seems scarcely to have exercised any influence on the Grecian thinkers. Some 
what more considerable may have been the influence on the Greeks of the early astronomi 
cal observations of the Egyptians, and perhaps also of their geological observations and 
speculations. Certain geometrical propositions seem rather to have been merely discovered 
empirically by the Egyptians in the measurement of their fields, than to have been 
scientifically demonstrated by them; the discovery of the proofs and the creation of a 
system of geometry was the work of the Greeks. The Jewish monotheism, which scarcely 
exercised an (indirect ?) influence on Anaxagoras, became later an important factor in the 
evolution of Greek philosophy (i. e. from the time of Neo-Pythagoreanism and in part even 
earlier), when Jews, through the reception of elements of Greek culture, had acquired 
a disposition for scientific thought 


T. THE sources of our knowledge of the philosophy of the 
Greeks are contained partly in the philosophical works and frag 
ments which have come down from them to us, and partly in reports 
and occasional allusions. Modern historians have advanced grad 
ually in the employment of this material from the method of mere 
compilation to a more exact historical criticism and a purer and 
more profound philosophical comprehension. 

The earlier philosophemes are never mentioned by Plato and Aristotle in the form of 
mere repetition with historic intent, but always as incidental to the end of ascertaining 
philosophical truth. Plato sketches, with historical fidelity in the essential outlines, 
though with a poetic freedom of execution, vivid pictures of the various philosophies, 
which had preceded his own, as also of the persons who had been their representatives. 
Aristotle proceeds rather with realistic exactness both in outline and in details, and only 
departs occasionally from complete historic rigor in his reduction of earlier points of view 
to the fundamental conceptions of his own system. The increasing restriction of later 
classical authors to simple narrative is not calculated in general to impart to their state 
ments the advantage of greater fidelity, since they are generally lacking either in accurate 
knowledge of the proper authorities, or in full capacity for the clear comprehension of 
earlier philosophical opinions. 

Plato characterizes in various dialogues the doctrines of Heraclitus and Parmenides, 
of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Pythagoreans, of Protagoras, Gorgias, and other 
Sophists, and especially those of Socrates and of individual disciples of Socrates. Next to 
him, Xenophon (especially in the Memorabilia) is the most important authority for Socrates 
and his teaching. Aristotle, in all his writings, makes it his principle to consider, first 
of all, in the discussion of any problem, what results obtained by his predecessors are 
tenable, and presents, in particular, in the introduction to his " first philosophy " (Meta 
physics), a critical review of the principles of all earlier philosophers from Thales to Plato 
(Met. I. c. 3-10). In many places, also, Aristotle gives information concerning Plato s 
" unwritten doctrines," as delivered in the oral lectures of the latter. A number of minor 
works, in which Aristotle (according to Diog. L., Y. 25) had treated of the doctrines of 
various previous philosophers (rrepl TUV TLvSayopduv, irepl rrjq Apxvrov tpihoootyiac, Kept -f/<; 
I.Trevai-n-TTov nai Sevo/cpdrovf, etc.) are lost ; we find, however, in the Commentators many 
statements drawn from them. The like is true of the works of Theophrastus on earlier 
philosophers (Trepi ruv Avaayopoi>, irepl TUV Avat-i/uevovc;, Tregl ruv Ap^f/latw, Histories of 
Arithmetic, of Geometry, of Astronomy, Kegi TTJ$ A^o/cpmw aarpo/loymf, TUV kioyivovq 
tfwaywyjy, Trepi E//7re<5oK/l<wf, Meya^KOf, etc., and his comprehensive work, QvotKal 66ai, of 
which fragments are extant ; an abridgment of this work appears to have been used by 
later writers as a principal source of information, see Diog. L., Y. 42 seq. ; cf. Usener, 


Analecia Tfaophrastea, Leips. 1858). Of Platonists, Speusippus (rrepi <j> 

, Xenocrates (Trept ruv Happevitiov and Hv&ayopeia), and Heraclides of Pontus 
Hvdayopeiuv, Trpof TO. Zr/vowof, Hpa/cAe/rov f^jry^Gst^^ Trpof rbv A^o/cpfrov k^yt/cfi^ 
and, later, notably Clitomachus (about 140 B. c., Trept rd>t> aipioeuv), and of Aristotelians, 
besides Theophrastus and Eudemus (yeuftsTpiKal icTopiai, agt&fjurriKTj ioropia, irept rwv a<rrpo- 
/to) ov//va>v ioTopia). Aristoxenus (iffropf/cd i 7ro//v^ara, 7rep2 nin^aydpov xai rwv yvt^ifiuv 
ai)Tov, nAdrwvof /3tof), Dicaearch (/3* of E/Udrfof, also Trepi /?*<w), Phanias of Lesbos (TTE^I 
TUV LuKpaTtKtJv and Trpor roi)f (jo^7rdf), Clearchus, Strato, Duris of Samos, the pupil of 
Theophrastus (about 270 B. c.), and others either treated originally of earlier philosophers, 
or wrote works of more general content, or works pertaining to the history of special 
sciences, which contained material for the history of philosophy. Also Epicurus (rre^t 
aipeaeuv) and his disciples, Hermarchus, Metrodorus, and Colotes (in polemical works), and 
Idomeneus (rrepi TUV 2w/cp<mK<yv), and the Stoics Clean thes (On Heraclitus), Sphaerus (On 
Heraclitus, On Socrates, and On the Eretrian Philosophers), Chrysippus (On the Early 
Physiologists), Panaetius (On the Philosophical Schools or Sects, rre^t rtiv alpeceuv), and 
others wrote of philosophical doctrines and works. Of all these works, which served as 
authorities for later writers, we possess none. 

The Alexandrians followed in their works the narratives of the authors above named. 
Ptolemy Philadelphia (rag. 285-247 B. c.) founded the Alexandrian Library (for which 
preparations had already been begun under his father by Demetrius Phalereus, who came 
to Alexandria about 296 B. c., and) in which the writings of the philosophers were brought 
together, though not a few spurious works were included among them. Callimachus of 
Cyrene (about 294224 B. C.), while superintendent of this library (in which office he suc 
ceeded Zenodotus the Ephesian, who lived about 324-246 B. c.), drew up " tables " of cele 
brated authors and their works (TTLVCK^ ruv kv irany Trat^eia 6iaAa^ij>dv~cjv KOI uv ovveypa^av), 
Eratosthenes (276-194 B. c.), who received from Ptolemy Euergetes (reg. 247-222) the con 
trol of the Alexandrian Library, wrote concerning the various philosophical schools (rrepi TUV 
Kara fyitoaofyiav aipeaeuv), on which, as it seems, Apollodorus founded his (metrical) chron 
icle (composed in the second half of the second century B. c.), from which, again, Diogenes 
Laertius and others drew a large part of their chronological data. Aristophanes of Byzan 
tium (born about 264, died about 187 B. c., pupil of Zenodotus and Callimachus. successor, 
as librarian, of Apollonius, the successor of Eratosthenes, and teacher of Aristarchus, 
who lived about 212-140 B. c.) arranged most of the Platonic Dialogues in Trilogies, 
placing the others after them as separate works (a part of his supplement to the Tr/va/cec 
of Callimachus ; see Nauck s Sammlung der Fragments des Aristophanes von Byzanz). Be 
sides Eratosthenes, the following persons wrote either expressly or incidentally of the 
lives and succession of the philosophers and of their works and doctrines : Neanthes of 
Cyzicus (about 240 B. c., resided at the court of King Attains I. in Pergamus, and wrote 
fiovamd and Trepl evdof-uv dvdpwv), Antigonus Carystius (about 225, j3ioi, etc.), Hermippus 
(of Smyrna ? about 200 B. c.), the Callimachean (and Peripatetic), who, like Aristophanes 
of Byzantium in other departments, furnished in his biographico-literary opuscules, which 
were only too abundant in fables (Trepi rw;> ero^wv, Tregl fiayuv, ?repi Tlisftayopov, rre^t 
*Aprror/lot>f, rrepi Qeo^pdarov, pioi), a supplement to the irivauss of Callimachus (from which 
Favorinus and, indirectly, Diogenes Laertius drew largely), Sotion the Peripatetic (about 
190 B. c., Trept (hadoxuv TUV $ifa>c6<!pn>\ Satyrus (about 180 B. c., plot), Apollodorus of Athens 
(about 144 B. c., a pupil of Diogenes the Stoic, and author of the mythological 
and of the before-mentioned ^pow/cd, and perhaps also of the work Trcpt rtiv 
aiqkctuv\ and Alexander Polyhistor (in the time of Sulla, cbarfo^at TUV ^Xoffd^). From 
the dtadoxai of Sotion and the pioi of Satyrus, Heraclides Lembus (about 150 B. c.), the 


son of Serapion, compiled extracts, which are often mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (who 
distinguishes V. 93, 94 fourteen persons named Heraclides). Antisthenes of Rhodus 
(about 150 B.C.), the historian, and contemporary of Polybius, was probably the author of 
the Qitoaoipuv 6ia6oxai, to which Diogenes Laertius often alludes. Demetrius the Mague- 
siari, a teacher of Cicero, wrote a critical work on Homonymous Authors (Trepi o/uuvv/uuv 
TTOITJTUV Kal (rvyypaQfuv), from which Diogenes Laertius, perhaps through Diocles, drew 
many of his . statements (cf. Scheurleer, Z>e Demetrio Magnete, diss. inaug., Leyden, 
1858). Didymus Chalcenterus (in the second half of the first century B. c.) also 
labored in the field of the history of philosophy, as a compiler of sentences. Sosicrates 
wrote diadoxai, which Diogenes Laertius often mentions. Diocles Magnes, a friend of 
Epicureanism and opponent of Sotion, the partisan of the philosophy of Sextius, in the 
time of Augustus and Tiberius, was the author of works entitled (3ioi (ftihoactyuv and 
itri6po[i.T] tyihoooyuv, from which Diog. Laertius, at least in his account of the Stoics, and 
most likely also in that of the Epicureans, drew very largely. (According to Nietzsche, 
Diogenes derived mot of his data from Diocles Magnes and Favorinus.) 

Of the works of the ancients which have come down to us, those specially important 
for the history of philosophy are the works of Cicero, Lucretius, Seneca, Plutarch, the 
historian and Platonic philosopher, Galenus, the physician (born 131, died after 200 A. D.), 
Sextus the Skeptic (flourished about 200 A. D., a physician of the empirical school, and 
hence usually named Sextus Empiricus), the historical work (founded largely on the airo-]aovv^.ara and iravTodami laropia of Favorinus) by Diogenes of Laerta (in Cilicia, about 
220 A. D.), and the writings of numerous Neo-Platonists (but Porphyry s <j)tA6co<j>oe icropia 
is no longer extant) and commentators of Aristotle ; of similar importance are the works 
of certain of the Church Fathers, especially those of Justin Martyr (Apolog. and Dialog, 
cum Tryphone), Clemens of Alexandria (Exhortation to the Hellenes, Paedagogus, Stromata), 
Origen (Contra Celsum, etc.), and Eusebius (Praeparatio Evangelicd), and in part those of 
Tertullian, Lactantius, and Augustine. Many materials for the history of philosophy 
are found in Gellius (about 150 A. I)., in his Nodes Atticae], Athenaeus (about 200, 
Deipnosophistae), Flavins Philostratus (about 200), Eunapius of Sardis (about 400) 
Johannes Stobaeus (about 500), Photius (about 880, Lexicon and Bibliothecd), and 
Suidas (about 1000, Lexicon) ; the work treyl T<JV kv traideiq 6ia?ia/u.ijjdvT<jv oopcjv, ascribed 
to Hesychius of Miletus, appears to be a compilation from Diogenes Laertius and Suidas, 
dating from the 15th century (see Lehrs, in the Rhein. Mus. XVII., 1862, pp. 453-457). 
Cicero gives evidence in his writings of a tolerably extensive and exact acquaintance with 
the philosophical schools of his time, but his knowledge of Greek speculation was insuffi 
cient. A higher value belongs to most of the historical statements of the commentators 
of Aristotle, since these were founded on original works of the philosophers, which were 
then extant, or on various reports by Aristotle, Theophrastus, and other authors, which 
have not come down to us. 

Ciceronis Historia Philosophiae Antiquae ex Omnibus lllius Scriptis cottegit Fr. Gedike, 
Berlin. 1782, 1801, 1814. 

The works of Plutarch entitled ireol TUV TTQUTUV fyihoGoffloavruv aal TUV air avruv, napl 
Kvpyvaiuv, e/c/loy^ yihoaoyuv, and orpu^arelf laropiKoi are not preserved. Plutarch s 
"Moralia" contain valuable contributions to the history of philosophy, especially in what 
relates to the Stoic and Epicurean doctrines. The work entitled Plut. de Physicis Philo* 
sophorum Decretis Libri Quinque (ed. Dan. Beck, Leipsic, 1787, and contained also in Wyt- 
tonbach s and Diibner s editions of the " Moralia") is spurious. 

Claud. Galeni Liber irepl ^oao^ov iarooia<; (in the complete ed. of the Works of Galen, 
ad. Kuhn, vol. XIX.) The work is spurious. Leaving out the commencement, it agrees 


almost throughout with the Pseudo-Plutarchic work above-mentioned, of which it is a recen 
sion somewhat abridged. In the genuine writings of Galen, however, there is found, in 
addition to their medical contents, much that concerns the history of philosophy. 

Sexti Empirici Opera, Pyrrhoniarum Institutionum Libri Tres (irvpfa&vttot VTTOTVTCUGEIC, 
Skeptical Sketches) ; Contra Mathematicos sive Disciplin. Professores Libri sex, Contra Philoso- 
phos libri quinque; the two also together under the title: Adversus Math. Libri XL 
(Against the representatives of the positive sciences and against philosophical dogmatists.) 
Ed. Jo. Alb. Fabricius, Leipsic, 1718; reprinted ibid. 1842. Ex. rec. Imm. Bekker, Berlin, 

Flavii Philostrati Vitae Sophistarum. Ed. Car. Lud. Kayser, Heidelberg, 1838. Opera 
ed. Kayser, Zurich, 1844-46; ibid. 1853; ed. Ant. Westermann, Paris, 1849. 

Athenaei Deipnosophistae. Ed. Aug. Meineke, Leipsic, 1858-59. 

Diofjenis Laertii de Vitis, Dogmatibus et Apophthegmatibus Ckurorum Philosophorum libri 
decem (jrepl /3/wv, tioy/uaTuv /cat a7ro0$e} / / udrwi> rwv kv fytTiooofyiq tv6oK.Lp.rjca.vTuv {3tfi?iia 6sKa). 
Ed. Hiibner, 2 vols., Leips. 1828-31; Commentaries on the same, vols. I. and II., Leips. 
1830-33, containing the notes of Is. Casaubonus, Aeg. Menagius and others. The com 
mentary of Menagius on Diogenes Laertius appeared first in 1652. Diog. L. De Vitis, etc., 
ex Italicis codicibus nunc primum excussis recensuit C. Gabr. Cobet. Accedunt Olympiodori, 
Ammonii, Jamblichi, Porphyrii et aliorum Vitae Platonis, Aristotelis, Pytfiagorae, Plotini et 
Isidori, Ant. Westermanno, et Marini vita Prodi, J. F. Boissonnadio edentibus. Graece et 
Latine cum indicibus, Paris, 1850. Cf. Frdr. Bahnsch, De Diog. L. Fontibus, (diss.-inaug. 
Regimontanensis,) Gumbinnen, 1868 ; Frdr. Nietzsche, De Laertii Diogenis Fontibus, in 
the Rhtin. Museum, new series, XXIII. 1868, and XXIV. 1869. Diogenes Laertius dedi 
cated his work, according to III. 47, to a female admirer of Plato. His general attitude 
is that of an Eclectic, while in the different parts of his work he is influenced by 
the character of the sources from which he draws. Diogenes brings the history 
of Platonism down to Clitomachus, that of Aristotelianism to Lyco. that of Stoicism, 
in our text, to Chrysippus, though originally (as shown by Valentine Rose in tho 
Hermes, vol. I., Berlin, 1866, p. 370 ff.) it was continued to Cornutus ; he names the 
principal Epicureans down to Zeno of Sidon, Demetrius Laco, Diogenes Tarsensis, and 
Orion ; only the history of Skepticism is brought down by him to his own time, i. e., till 
near 220 A. D. 

Clementis Alexandrini Opera. Ed. Reinhold. Klotz, Leipsic, 1830-34. Origenis $1^000- 
tbovpeva, in Jac. Gronovii Thesaur. Antiquitatum Graecarum, torn. X., Leyden, 1701, pp. 
257292. Compendium Historiae Philosophicae Antiquae sive Philosophumena, quae sub 
Origenis nomine circumferuntur, ed. Jo. Christoph. Wolf, Hamb. 1706, 2d ed., ibid. 1716; 
also in the complete editions of Origen. Qptyzvovc. fyihacotyovfjieva rj Kara rcaauv alptoeuv 
f/Ury^of, Origenis Philosophumena, sive Omnium Ilaeresium Refutatio, e codice Parisino nunc 
primum ed. Emman. Miller, Oxford, 1851. S Hippolyti Refutationis Omnium ffaeresium 
Librorum Decem quae supersunt, ed. L. Duncker et F. G. Schneidewin, opus Schneidewino 
defuncto dbsolvit L. Duncker, Gott. 1859, ed. Patricius Cruice, Paris, 1860. Of this work, 
the first book, which seems to be founded in large measure on the abridgment made in the 
Alexandrian period, of the irepl QVGIKUV of Theophrastus, is identical with the ^/iocro- 
(jtovueva, which is all of the work that was known until recently. Books IV.-X., with 
the exception of the beginning of Book IV., were found in a cloister on Mount Athos 
in 1842. That Origen was not the author of the work is certain ; that it was written by 
the Church Father, Hippolytus, who lived about 220 A. D., and was a pupil of Irenaeus, is 
extremely probable. 

Eusebii Praeparatio Evangelica, ed. Viger, Paris, 1628; ed. Heinichen, Leips. 1842-43. 


Eusebius draws very largely from Pseudo- Plutarch, de Placitis Philosophorum, or more 
likely from a fuller edition of that work. 

Eunapii Sardiani Vitae Philosophorum et Sophistarum. Ed. J. F. Boissonade, Ainst. 
1322; Paris, 1849. 

Jo. Stobaci Florilegium, ed. Thorn. Gaisford, Oxford, 1822; Leipsic, 1823-23; ed. Aug. 
Meinecke, Leipsic, 1855-57. Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae, ed. Arnold Herni. Lud. Heeren, 
Gott., 1792-1801 ; ed. Thorn. Gaisford, Oxford, 1850; ed. Aug. Meineke, vol. I., Leips. 1860, 
Vol. II., ib. 1864. The Edogae agree with Pseudo-Plutarch, De Placitis Philos., and Pseudo- 
Galen in those parts which relate to the same topics, but they contain, in passages, fuller 
extracts from the common source from which each of these writers drew. Many of the 
statements of the Bishop Theodoret, who died in 457, were drawn from this compilation. 

Hesychii Miksii Opuscula, ed. Jo. Conr. Orelli, Le-ipsic, 1820. 

Simplicii Gomm. ad Arist. Physicas Auscultationes. Ed. Asulanus, Venice, 1526. 

Michael Hissman, in the Magazin fiir die Philosophic und Hire Geschichte, 6 vols. Gott. 
and Lemgo, 1778-83, brought together a number of essays taken from the Annals of 
various academies, many of which relate to ancient philosophy. Among these, attention 
may be directed to the articles on Tholes and Anaximander by the Abbe de Canaye, on Py 
thagoras by De la Nauze and by Freret, on Empedocles by Bonamy, on Anaxagoras by Abbe 
le Batteux and by Heinius, on Socrates by Abbe Fraguier, on Aristippus by Le Batteux, on 
Plato by Abbe Gamier, on Callisthenes by Sevin, on Euhemerus by Sevin, Fourmont, and 
Foucher, on Panaetius and on Athenodorus by Sevin, on Musonius and on Sextius by De 
Burigny, on Peregrinus the Cynic by Capperonier, and on Proclus by De Burigny. 

Chris toph. Meiners, Historia Doctrinae de Vero Deo, Lemgo, 1780. Geschichte des 
Ursprungs, Fortgangs und Verfalls der Wissencha/ten in Griechenland und JKom, Lemgo, 
1781-82. Grundriss der Gesch. der Weltweisheit, Lemgo, 1786; 2d ed. 1789. 

D. Tiedemann, Griechenlands erste Philosophen oder Ltben und Systeme des Orpheus, Phere- 
cydes, Tholes, und Pythagoras, Leipsic, 1781. 

Fr. Viet. Leberecht Plessing, Histor. und philos. Untersuchungen uber die Denkart, 
Tkeologie und Philosophic der altesten Volker, vorzuglich der Griechen, bis auf Aristot. Zeit, 
Elbing, 1785; M/iemonium oder Versuche zur Enthullung der Geheimnisse des Alterthums, 
Leipsic, 1787 ; Versuche zur Aufkldrung der Philosophic des altesten Alterthums, Leipsic, 

"Wilh. Traug. Krug, Geschichte der Philosophic alter Zeit, vornehmlich unter Griechen und 
Rdmern, Leipsic, 1815; 2d ed., 1827. 

Zeller writes of what has been done in the department of the history of ancient philoso 
phy since Buhle and Tennemann, in the Jahrbiicher der Gegenwart, July, 1843. 

Historia philosophiae Graeco-Romanae ex fontium locis coniexta. Locos coUegerunt, dis- 
posuerunt, notis auxerunt H. Ritter, L. Preller. Edidit L. Preller, Hamburg, 1838. Edit. 
II. recogn. et auxit L. Preller, Gotha, 1856. Ed. III. Gotha, 1864. Ed. IV., 1869. (A val 
uable compilation.) 

Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum, ed. F. W. Mullach, Paris, 1860-67. 

Christian Aug. Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch- Romischen Philosophic 
(Part L: Pre-Socratic Philosophy; Part II., 1st Div. : Socrates, the Imperfect Disciples of 
Socrates and Plato; Part II., 2d Div.: Aristotle; Part III., 1st Div.: Review of the Aris 
totelian System and Exposition of the Doctrines of his Immediate Successors, as transition 
to the third period of the development of Greek Philosophy), Berlin, 1835, 44, 53, 57, 60. 
Geschichte der Entwickelungen der griechischen Philosophic und ihrer Nachwirkungen im 
romischen Reiche, first half (till Aristotle), Berlin, 1862, second half (from the Stoics and 
Epicureans to the Neo-Platonists, constituting, with the " Ausfuhrungen," which appeared 


in 1866, the 2d division of the 3d part of the " ffandbuch") ib. 1864. An extremely care 
ful, comprehensive, and learned investigation. The " Geschichte der Entwickelungen" is a 
shorter and compendious treatment of the subject. 

Aug. Bernh. Krische, Forschungen aufdem Gebiete der alien Philosophic. 1st Yol. : Die 
theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker, eine Priifung der Darstellung Cicero s, Gottingen, 

Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, eine Untersuchung iiber Character, Gapg und 
Hauptmomente ihrer Entioickelung (Part I. : General Introduction, Pre-Socratic Philosophy. 
Part II.: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. Part III. : Post- Aristotelian Philosophy), Tubingen, 
1844, 46, 52. Second revised edition, with the title, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer 
gesch. Entwickelung dargestellt. Part I., Tub. 1856. Part II. (Socrates and th<i Socratic 
Schools, Plato and the Old Academy), Tub. 1856. Part II. 2d Div. (Aristotle and the Early 
Peripatetics), Tub. 1862. Part III. 1st Div. (Post- Aristotelian philosophy), 1st half, Leips. 
1865; 2dhalf, with a Register, ib. 1869. Third Edition, Part I., ib. 1869. ["Socrates 
and the Socratic Schools 1 (London, 1868) and "The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics" 
(Lond. 1869), are translations by Dr. Oswald Reichel from this work of Zeller. Tr.~\ This 
work gives evidence of the most admirable combination of philosophical profoundness 
and critical sagacity in the author. The philosophical stand-point of the author is a Hege- 
lianism modified by empirical and critical elements. 

Karl Prantl, Uebersicht der griechisch-romischen Philosophie, Stuttgart, 1854; new 
edition, 1863. 

A. Schwegler, Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, ed. by 0. Kostlin, Tubingen, 1859 ; 
second enlarged edition, ib. 1870 (1869). 

Ludwig Striimpell, Die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, zur Uebersicht, Repetition 
und Orientirung bei eigenen Studien entivorfen (1st Div.: The Theoret. Philos. of the 
Greeks; 2d Div.: Their Practical Philosophy), Leipsic, 1854-61. The stand-point is 

N. J. Schwarz, Manuel de VHistoire de la Philosophie Ancienne, Liege, 1842 ; 2. ed. 
Liege, 1846. Ch. Renouvier, Manuel de Philosophie Ancienne, Paris, 1845. Charles 
Leveque, Etudes de Philosophie Grtcque et Latine, Paris, 1864. L. Lenoel, Les Philoso- 
phes de FAntiquite, Paris, 1865. M. Morel, Hist, de la Sagesse et du Gout chez Us Grecs, 
Paris, 1865. 

Franco Fiorentino, Saggio Storico suUa Filosofia Greca, Florence, 1865. 

W. A. Butler, Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, edited by W. H. Thompson, 
2 vols., Cambridge, 1856; London, 1866. Lectures on Greek Philosophy, and other Philo 
sophical Remains of James Frederick Ferrier, ed. by Al. Grant and E. L. Lushington, 2 
vols., Edinb. and London, 1866. [Ritter s History of Ancient Philosophy, translated from 
the first volumes of Ritter s general histor}% mentioned above, 4, by Alex. J. "W. Morri 
son, 4 vols., Oxford, 1838-46. Walter Anderson, Tlie Philosophy of Ancient Greece investi 
gated in its Origin and Progress, p]dinb. 1791. TV.] 

Of ancient physical theories, Th. Henri Martin treats in La Foudre, I Electricite, et le 
Magnetisme chez les Anciens, Paris, 1866. Cf. also Charles Thurot, Recherches Historiques 
sur le Principe cPArchimede (Extrait de la Revue Archeologique), Paris, 1869. 

On Greek and Roman theories of law and of the state, cf. beside the work of K. 
Hildenbrand, cited above, p. 13 A. Veder, Historia Philosophiae Juris apud Veteres, Leyden, 
1832; Herm. Henkel, Lineamenta Artis Graecorum Politicae, Berl. 1847; Studien zu einer 
Geschichte der griechischen Lehre vom Stoat, in the Philologus, Vol. IX., 1S54, p. 402 seq. ; Zur 
Geschichte der griech. Staatswiss. (G. Pr.) Salzwedel, 1863 and 1866, Stendal, 1867 and 1869. 
M. Yoigt, Die Lehre vom Jus Naturak, Aequum et Bonum und Jus Gentium der Romer, 


Leips. 1866. (On Greek theories, pp. 81-176.) Cf. also the extensive work of Ihering: 
Geist des romischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwickelung, Leips. 1852 seq. 

Of the relation of Hellenic Ethics to Christianity, Neander treats in his Wiss. Abhand- 
lungen, ed. by J. Jacobi, Berlin, 1851; cf. his above-cited "Vorlesungen uber die Gesch. der 
christlichen Eihik." ~W. Wehrenpfennig (Progr. des JoachimsthaVschen Gymnasiums, Berlin, 
1856) writes of the diversity of ethical principles among the Hellenes and its causes. Ad 
Gamier, De la Morale dans VAntiquite, Paris, 1865. 

On ancient ./Esthetics, see Eduard Muller, Gesch. der Theorie der Kunst bei den Allen, 
Breslau, 1834-37. Cf. Zimmermann s Gesch. der Aesthetik and A. Kuhn, Die Idee des 
Schonen in ihrer Entwickelung bei den Alien bis in unsere Tage, 2d edit., Berlin, 1865. 

On the doctrine of Unity, see "Wegener, De Una sive Unitaie apud Graecorum Philosophos., 
Realschul-Progr., Potsdam, 1863. 

On ancient views of the. Immortality of the Soul, see Karl Arnold, Gymn.-Progr., 
Straubing, 1864. 

Of the Philosophy of Language among the ancients, treat Lersch (Bonn, 1841), and H. 
Steinthal (Geschichte der Sprachwiss. bei den Griechen und Romern, Berlin, 1863-64). Cf. 
Schomann. Die Lehre von den Redetheilen bei den Alien, Berlin, 1862. 

8. The efforts of the poetic fancy to represent to itself the nature 
and development of things divine and human precede, excite to, and 
prepare the way for philosophical inquiry. The influence of the 
theogonic and cosmogonic notions of Homer and Hesiod on the 
development of the earliest Greek philosophy was only remote and 
inconsiderable; but perhaps certain Orphic poesies, as also the 
Cosmology of Pherecydes of Syros (who first wrote in prose, about 
600 B. c.), and, on the other hand, the commencement of ethical reflec 
tion, which manifested itself in proverbs and poems, exercised a more 
direct and essential influence. 

The numerous works relating to those phases of intellectual development, which preceded the advent 
of philosophy, can not here be named with any degree of fullness ; it may suffice only to direct attention 
to K. F. Nagelsbach s Homer. Theologie (Nuremberg, 1840) and his Nachhomerixche Theologie, also to the 
works of Creuzer and Voss, the first volumes of Grote s History of Greece, the Populdre Aufsdtee of 
Lehrs, the works of Preller and others on Grecian Mythology, and various monographs, such as Eamdohr s 
Zur Homerischen Ethik (Programm des Gymnas. zu Liineberg), etc. Cf. Lobeck, De Carminibus 
Orphieis, Konigsb. 1824; De, Orphei Aetate, ib. 1826; Aglaophamus 8. de Theol. Styst. Graecorum 
Causis, 2 vols., ib. 1829; K. Eichhoff, De Onomacrito Atheniensi, Gymn.-Progr., Elberfeld, 1840; C. 
Haupt, Orpheus, Ifomerus, Onomacritus; sive Theologiae et Philosophiae Jnitia apud Graccos, Gymn.- 
Progr., Konigsberg in Neumark, 1864; J. A. Ilartung, Die Religion und MytJiolo>jie der Griechen, 
Leips. 1865 (Hartung detects in Epimenides, the Cretan, and Onomacritus a confusion in matters of be 
lief, due to the introduction of Egyptian, Phenician. and Phrygian superstitions); P. E. Schuster, De reteri* 
Orphicae theogoniae indcle atque origine, acceflit Hellanici theogonia Orphica, Leipsic, 1869. On 
Pherecydes, cf. Friedr. Wilh. Sturz (Gera,lT89; 1798), Leips. 1824; L. Preller, Die Tlieogonie des Ph. v. 
in the Rhein. Mus.f. Philol., new series, Vol. IV., 1846, pp. 377-389, and in Preller s Ausgew. ^lw/s., 
R. Kbhler, Berlin, 1864, pp. 350-361 ; R. Zimmermann, Ueber die Lehre des Ph. v. S. und ihr Verhaltnisis 
zu awsergriechischen Glaubenskreinen, in Fichte s Zeitechr. f. Philox. Vol. 24. No. 2, 1854, and Joh. Con 
rad, De Pherecydis Syrii Aetate atque Cosmologta (Diss. Bonnenais\ Ccblentz, 1856. Karl Dilthey, 
Griech. Fragmente (Part I. : Fragments by the seven wise men, their contemporaries, and the Pytha 
goreans), Darmstadt, 1835; H. Wipkemann, De Lacedaemoniorum Philo.tojjfiia et rbilowpbte deque 
frptemquos dtcunt Saprentibufi, Lac. diftripnliK ft imitntnribit^ Hersfeld. 1810: Otto Bernhardt. Die fneben 
Weiften. Grlecfienlands, Gymn.-Progr., Sorau, 18T)4: Frc. Aemil. Bohren, De Keptem Rapid) tibus, Bonn, 


The Homeric poems seem to imply an earlier form of religious ideas, the gods of which 
were personified forces of nature, and they recall in occasional particulars (e. g. II, VIII., 
19sq., myth of the oupij xpwsiii) Oriental speculations; but all such elements in them are 
without exception clothed in an ethical form. Homer draws thoroughly ideal pictures of 
human life, and the influence which his poetry in its pure nawtte exercised on the Hellenes 
(as also the less elevated influence of the more reflective poetry of Hesiod), was essentially 
ethical and religious. But when this education had accomplished its work in sufficient 
measure, the moral and religious consciousness of the race, increasing in depth and finding 
the earlier stadium insufficient, advanced to a more rigorously polemic attitude, and even 
proscribed the ideal of the past as a false, misleading, and pernicious agency (Xenophanes, 
Heraclitus, and Plato). After this followed a species of reconciliation which lasted during 
several centuries before the final rupture, but rested in part only on the delusive basis of 
allegorical interpretation. Greek philosophy made incomparably greater advances in 
that earlier polemic period than after its friendly return to the poetry of Homer and 

At a later time, when renewed speculation was again inclined to concede to the most 
ancient poetry the highest authority, the belief of earlier times, that the Homeric poetry 
was preceded by another of more speculative character, namely, the Orphic, found much 
credit. According to the primitive legend, Orpheus was the originator of the worship of 
Bacchus among the Thracians. Cosmogonic poems were early ascribed to him (by Ono- 
macritus, the favorite of the Pisistratidae, and others). Herodotus says (II. 53) : " Homer 
and Hesiod framed the theogony of the Hellenes ; but the poets, who are believed to have 
lived before them, in my opinion, were their successors;" in II. 81 (cf. 123), Herodotus 
declares the so-called Orphic and Bacchic doctrines to be Egyptian and Pythagorean. 
Those Orphic cosmogonies of which we have most precise knowledge date from an epoch 
much later still, and arose under the influence of the later philosophy. It is, however, 
susceptible of sufficiently convincing demonstration, that one of the Cosmogonies origi 
nated in a comparatively early period. Damascius, the Neo-Platonist, relates (De Princ. 
p. 382), that Eudemus, the Peripatetic, an immediate disciple of Aristotle, reported the 
substance of an Orphic theogony, in which nothing was said of the intelligible, owing to 
its being utterly inexpressible so Damascius explains it from his stand-point but the 
beginning was made with Night. We may certainly assume that Aristotle also was 
acquainted with this theogony (cf. also Plat. Tim., p. 40 e). Now Aristotle says, Metaph., 
XIV. 4, that the ancient poets and the latest (philosophical) OcoAoyoi represented (panthe- 
istically) what is highest and best as being not first, but second or subsequent in order 
of time, and resulting from a gradual development ; while those, who (in point of time and 
in their modes of thought and expression) stood between the poets and the philosophers 
(ol fiefiiyfievoi avreJv), like Pherecydes, who no longer employed exclusively the language 
of mythology, and the magi and some Greek philosophers, regarded (theistically) that 
which is most perfect, as first in order of time. "What "ancient" poets (apxaloi Koirjrai, 
whose time, for the rest, may reach down, in the case of some of them, into the sixth cen 
tury B. c.) are here meant, Aristotle indicates only by designating their principles : oiov 
NiWa nal Ovpavbv f/ Xdof ?/ QKEOVOV. Of these Xdof is undoubtedly to be referred to 
Hesiod (TTCLVTUV /J.EV Trpurtara Xdof ~yiveT\ avrap fTreira Tat Evpi OTepvoz K. r. 7 . Theog. V. 
116 sq. ; EK Xdeof $ "Epe/3df re u^atva re Nt>f cyevovro, ib. 123), fi/ceavdf to Homer (Q.K.eav6v 
re de<jv yivtciv /cat /njjTepa T^tfvv, II. XIV. 201; II XIV. 240: 2/ceavdc, vairep yivcois 
rrdvTEam TZTVK.TCII), and Nv KOL Ovpavdf, therefore, to some other well-known theogony, 
in all probability to the same Orphic theogony which was described by Eudemus ; and 
yi this oase this theogony must have arisen, at the latest, in the sixth century before 


Christ, since Aristotle reckons its author among the "ancient poets" (TroiTfrai apxalofj. 
But this theogony, and indeed all the theogonies, to which the Aristotelian testimony 
assigns a comparatively high antiquity, agree substantially, according to the same authority, 
with the theogonies of Homer and Hesiod in their religious conceptions. Zeus appears 
as the eternal ruler of all and as the soul of the world, in the following verse, which is, 
most likely, the 7ra%atb<; /idyof to which Plato refers in Leg., IV. 715 e: 

io & kn Trdv~a rirvKrat. 

Pherecydes, of the island of Syros (about 600-550 B. c.), wrote a theogony in prose, 
which is cited under the title of E7rrd//v^of, probably from the folds (fiv^ol^) of his noa/uo^. 
Diogenes Laertius cites, as follows, the opening words of this work (I. 119): Zrf f fiev nal 
Xpdvof if ad /cat X&jv rjv. Xdoviy 6s bvo^ia kyivsTo Trj, Trec6rj avry Zet C yifpaf 61601. 

The cosmologist, Epimenides, who was nearly contemporary with Pherecydes, describes 
the world as coming forth from night and air, and belongs consequently to those whom 
Aristotle designates as f/c VVKTOC yewuvrsq deoAoyoi. Acusilaus made Chaos first, Erebus 
and Night being its children. Hermotimus of Clazomenae appears to have been one of the 
theistical cosmologists (see below, 24). 

The so-called " Seven Wise Men," Thales, Bias, Pittacus, and Solon ; Cleomenes, Myson 
(or, according to others, Periander), and Chilon (Anacharsis, Epimenides, and others are 
also named), with the sayings attributed to them (Thales: " Know Thyself," or, " What is 
difficult? To know one s self; and what is easy? To advise another;" Solon: "Hold 
the beautiful and good more sacred than an oath; " "Speak not falsely;" "Practice dili 
gently things excellent ; " " Be slow in acquiring friends, but those thou hast taken, do not 
cast off; " " Learn to command by first learning to obey; " "Let thy advice be not what is 
most agreeable, but what is most honorable;" " Nothing in excess;" Bias: "The posses 
sion of power will bring out the man," cited by Arist., Eth. Nic., T. 3, and "The most are 
bad," etc.; Anacharsis: "Rule thy tongue, thy belly, thy sexual desires," etc.), are repre 
sentatives of a practical wisdom, which is not yet sufficiently reflective to be called philos* 
ophy, but which may pave the way for the philosophical inquiry after ethical principles. 
In the Platonic dialogue Protagoras (p. 343), the " Seven Wise Men " are spoken of aa 
exponents of Lacedaemonian culture expressing itself in moral maxims. The Aristotelian 
Dicaaarch (ap. Diog. Lae rt., I. 40) terms these men, with reason, "neither sages nor philos 
ophers, but rather men of broad common sense, and lawgivers (OVTE oo^ov^ OVTS ^t/loo-opoi f, 
OWETOV<; 6i -Lvag nai vojuoOETiKoir). Thales, who is occasionally mentioned as the wisest 
of the seven sages, was at once an astronomer and the founder of the Ionic Natural 

9. The Periods of Development of Greek (and its derivative, 
Roman) philosophy may be characterized, in respect of the object of 
inquiry in each, as follows : 1st Period : Prevailing direction of phil 
osophical inquiry toward the universe of nature, or predominance of 
Cosmology (from Thales to Anaxagoras and the Atomists); 2d Period : 
Prevailing direction of philosophical inquiry toward man, as a willing 
and thinking being, or predominance of Ethics and Logic accom 
panied, however, by the gradual resumption and a growing encour 
agement of natural philosophy (from the Sophists to the Stoics. Epicu 
reans, and Skeptics) ; 3d Period : Prevailing direction of philosophical 


inquiry to the subject of the divine nature and the relation of the 
world and man to it, or predominance of Theosophy, but not excluding 
physics, ethics, and logic (from Neo-Pythagoreanism till the exit of 
ancient philosophy in the Neo-Platonic school). As to the form of 
philosophy in the successive periods, the first period was charac 
terized, in the main, by the immediate direction of thought to things, 
though not without some attempts at mathematical and dialecti 
cal demonstration ; the second, by the introduction of the Definition as 
an organ of inquiry, and the third by the prevalence of the idea of 
mystical absorption in the Absolute. The germs of the peculiar con 
tent and also of the form of philosophy in each of the later periods are 
discernible partly at the culmination and partly at the termination of 
the period in each case next preceding ; the most eminent thinkers of 
the second (in most of its representatives, prevailingly anthropological) 
period rose nearest to a comprehensive philosophy. In the first period, 
the persons representing the same or similar types of philosophy were, 
as a rule (though by no means without exception), of the same race (the 
earliest natural philosophy having arisen and flourished among the 
lonians, while Pythagoreanism found its adherents chiefly among the 
Dorians). But in the second period philosophical types became inde 
pendent of race-distinctions, especially after the formation at Athens 
of a center of philosophical activity. The home of philosophy was 
now coextensive with the Hellenic world, including in the latter 
those nations subjected to the Macedonian or Roman supremacy, in 
which the Hellenic type of culture remained predominant. In the 
third period, the Hellenic mode of thought was blended with the 
Oriental and the representatives of philosophy (now become theos- 
ophy) were either Jews under Hellenic influence, Egyptians and 
other Orientals, or men Hellenic in race who were deeply impregnated 
with Orientalism. 

Diogenes of Laerta (whose arrangement is based on an unintelligent and exaggerated 
use of the distinction of Ionic and Italic philosophy) repeats (III. 56) an observation, 
which had been made by others before him, and which is worthy of note, to the effect 
that the first Adyof of the Greek philosophers was physical, while Ethics was added by 
Socrates, and Dialectic by Plato. 

Brucker follows substantially the arrangement of Diogenes Laertius, but begins a new 
period with philosophy under the Romans. In this period he includes, beside the Roman 
philosophers, the renewers of earlier schools, especially the Neo- Pythagoreans and the so- 
called " Eclectic Sect" (so termed by him after Diog. Lae rt., I. 21, where Potamo is spoken 
of as founder of an eclectic school), f. e. the Neo-Platonists, and also the later Peripatetics, 
Cynics, etc., and the Jewish, Arabian, and Christian philosophers down to the end of the 


Middle Ages, the restoration of the sciences, and the commencement of modern phi 

Tennemann divides Greek and Roman philosophy into three periods: 1. From Thaleg 
to Socrates beginning in fragmentary speculations concerning the external world : 2. 
From Socrates to the end of the contest between the Stoa and the Academy in which 
period speculation was called off from nature and directed to the human mind as the 
source of all truth ; 3. From philosophy under the Romans and the New Skepticism of 
JEnesidemus to John of Damascus the period of the marriage of the Western with the 
Oriental mind, when men looked outside of the mind for the source of certitude and 
declined into syncretism and fanaticism. 

Similarly, H. Ritter distinguishes three periods of philosophical development : Pre- 
Socratic Philosophy, the Socratic Schools (among which he includes the earlier Skeptics, 
Epicureans, and Stoics) and the Later Philosophy down to Neo-Platonism. The first 
period includes "the first awakening of the philosophic spirit," the second, "the most 
perfect bloom of philosophical systems," the third, "the downfall of Greek philosophy." 
More precisely, the first period is characterized, according to Ritter, by the one-sided scien 
tific interest, from which in it philosophical inquiry departs, its variety of direction being 
determined by variety of race ; the second, by the complete systematic division of philoso 
phy (or at least " of that which the Greeks generally understood by philosophy ") into its 
various branches, the different races no longer philosophizing each in its own way, but 
"this philosophy being brought forth, as it were, from the intellectual totality of the Greek 
nation;" the third, by the loss of the sense of the systematic order essential to Greek 
philosophy, although the tradition of it was preserved, and by the decadence of the 
peculiarity and vigor of the Greek mind, while scientific discipline was gradually covering 
a greater range of experiences and being extended to a greater number of men. Rittor s 
classification is based essentially on Schleiermacher s estimate of the philosophical signifi 
cance of Socrates, namely, that Socrates, by his principle of knowledge, rendered possible 
the union of the previously isolated branches of philosophical inquiry in an all-em oracing 
philosophical system, which union Plato was the first to realize. In accordance herewith, 
Schleiermacher divides Greek philosophy, in his Lectures edited by Ritter, into two 
periods, entitled " Pre-Socratic Philosophy," and " Philosophy from Socrates to the Neo- 
Platonists ;" yet he sometimes himself subdivides the latter period into two periods, one 
of bloom, the other of decay. 

Brandis agrees, on the whole, with Ritter in his appreciation of the development of 
Greek philosophy, yet with the not immaterial difference, that he transfers the Stoics and 
Epicureans and the Pyrrhonic and Academic Skeptics from the second period of develop 
ment ("the time of manly maturity") to the third (" the period of decline"). 

Hegel distinguishes three periods : 1. From Thales to Aristotle ; 2. Grecian philosophy 
in the Roman world; 3. The Neo-Platonic philosophy. The first period extends from 
the commencement of philosophizing thought till its development and perfection into a 
scientific whole and into the whole of science. In the second period philosophical 
science becomes split up into particular systems ; each system is a theory of the universe 
founded entirely on a one-sided principle, a partial truth being carried to the extreme 
in opposition to its complementary truth and so expanded into a totality in itself 
(systems of Stoicism and Epicureanism, of whose dogmatism Skepticism constitutes the 
negative face). The third period is, with reference to the preceding one, the affirmative 
period, in which what was before opposed becomes now harmoniously united in a divine 
ideal world. Hegel distributes the first period into three sections : a. From Thales to 
Anaxagoras, or from abstract thought, as immediately determined by its (external) object, 


to the idea of thought as determining itself; b. Sophists, Socrates, and disciples of 
Socrates thought which determines itself, is apprehended as present, as concrete in me 
principle of subjectivity ; c. Plato and Aristotle thought objective, the Idea, occupies the 
whole sphere of being (with Plato, only in the form of universality, but with Aristotle, as 
a fact confirmed in every sphere of real existence). 

Zeller s first period extends from Thales to the Sophists, inclusive. The second 
includes Socrates and his incomplete disciples, Plato and the Old Academy, Aristotle and 
the earlier Peripatetics. All Post- Aristotelian philosophy is included in the third. In the 
first period all philosophy takes an immediately objective direction. In the second period 
the fundamental notion is that of the objectivity of ideas or of thought as per se existing, 
in which Socrates recognized the supreme end of subjective endeavor, Plato the absolute, or 
substantial reality, and Aristotle not simply the essence, but also the forming and moving 
principle of the empirically real. In the third period all independent speculation centers 
in the question of the truth of subjective thought and the manner of life calculated to 
bring subjective satisfaction ; thought withdraws from the object-world into itself. Even 
Neo-Platonism, whose essential character is to be sought in the transcendent theosophy 
which it embodied and for which Skepticism prepared the way, furnishes, in Zeller s 
opinion, no exception to the subjective character of the third period, since its constant and 
all-controlling concern is the inward satisfaction of the subject. 

No division can be regarded as truly satisfactory, in which reference is not had, so far 
as practicable, at once to the prevailing object, the form and the geographical localization 
of philosophy in the different periods. 


10. The first period of Greek Philosophy includes, 1) the earlier 
Ionic Natural Philosophers, 2) the Pythagoreans, 3) the Eleatics, 4) the 
later Natural Philosophers. The Ionic "physiologists," predisposed 
thereto by their racial character as lonians, directed their attention to 

/ / . " 

the sphere of sensible phenomena and inquired after the material prin 
ciple of things and the manner of their generation and decay ; for 
them, matter was in itself living and psychically endowed. The Pytha 
goreans, whose doctrines nourished chiefly among the Greeks of Doric 
race, especially in Lower Italy, sought for a principle of things which 
should account at once for their form and substance, and found it in 
number and figure. The philosophy of the Eleatics turned on the 
unity and immutability of being. The later natural philosophers were 
led by the antithesis in which the Eleatic speculation stood to the 


earlier natural philosophy, to attempt a mediation ; to this end, they 
admitted, on the one hand, the Eleatic doctrine of the immutability of 
being, but affirmed, on the other, with the Pre-Eleatic philosophers, its 
plurality, and explained its apparent changes as due to the combina 
tion or severance of immutable, primitive elements. With the last 
representatives of natural philosophy and, especially, in the doctrine 
of Anaxagoras concerning the independent existence and world- 
disposing power of the divine mind (Nov?), the way was already being 
prepared for the transition to the following period. 

Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum (of the time before Socrates), ed. Fr. Guil. Mullach, Paris, 
I860, Vol. II., ibid. 1867. 

II. Kilter, Geschidite der Jonischen Philosophie, Berlin, 1821. Chr. A. Brandis, Ueber die Reihen- 
folge der lonischen Physiologen, in the Rhein. Mus., III. pp. 105 seq. Mallet, Histoire dela Philosophic 
Jonienne, Paris, 1842. K. F. Hermann, De Philoaophot um Jonicorum Aetatibus, Gott. 1S49. 

Ed. Roth, Gezchichte unserer abendldndischen Philosophic 2d vol. (Greek Philosophy. The earliest 
Ionic thinkers and Pythagoras), Mannheim, 1858, 2d ed., 1862. 

Aug. Gladisch, Die Pythagoreer und die ScJiinesen. Posen, 1841 ; Die Eleaten und die Indier, ibid. 
1844; Die Religion und die Philosophie in ihrer iceltgeschichthchen EnPwickelung, Breslau, 1852; 
Empedokles und die Aegypter, Leipsic, 1858; Herakleitos und Zoroaster, Leips. 1859; AnaaMgoi-a# und 
die Israelite^ Leipsic, 1854; Die Ilyperboreer und die alien /Sctiinesen, eine historteche Untersuchung, 
Leips. 1866. 

Max Schneidewin, Ueber die Keime erkenntnisstheoretischer und ethischer Philosopheme bei den 
vorsokrat. Denkern (G,-Progr.\ Arnstadt, 1868, and in Berginann s Philos. Monatshefte, Vol. II., Ber 
lin, 1869. 

As a result of the peculiar cosmological principles adopted by the Pythagoreans and 
Eleatics, Ethics appeared already in germ among the former and Dialectic among the 
latter. Yet the Pythagorean and Eleatic philosophies are scarcely, for that reason, to be 
termed (with Schleiermacher) respectively ethical and dialectical in their fundamental 
character. These philosophies are, rather, like the speculation of the lonians, essentially 
cosmological, and their ethical and dialectical tendencies result only from the manner in 
which they seek to solve the cosmological problem. The Pythagoreans brought, not 
ethics, but only the mathematico-philosophical theory of nature under a scientific form, and 
the Eleatics produced no theory of dialectics. 

In his work entitled Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren (Berlin, 1819, p. 40 sq.), Boeckh 
compares the different types of Greek philosophy in the first period with the characteristics 
of the races, in which the several types were developed, with the following result. In the 
materialistic view of the principles of things and of the manifold life and activity 
of the material elements, as held by the Ionic philosophers, Boeckh finds an expres 
sion of the sensuousness of the lonians, of their attachment to the external, of their 
sensibility to external impressions, and of their lively, mobile disposition. The Doric 
character, on the contrary, was marked by that inward depth, from which springs vigorous 
action, and by a quiet but persistent adherence to fixed and almost indestructible forms. 
This character manifested itself in the tendency to ethical reflection and speculation 
although the latter never rose to the form of a developed theory and more especially in 
the circumstance, that the Doric thinkers sought to explain the nature of things by 
adducing, not a material, but a formal principle, a principle which should account for their 
unity and order. Thus Pythagoras was said to be the first to call the world Cosmos, and, in 
conformity with the peculiarity of the Doric character, in conformity even with the spirit of 


the government under which they lived, the philosophy of the Dorians assumed, externally, 
the form of a confederation or order. Philosophy, says Boeckh, from its sensuous begin 
ning among the lonians, passed through the intermediate stage of Pythagoreanism (mathe 
matical intuition) to the non-sensuous doctrine of Plato, who had in the Eleatics able but 
too one-sided predecessors, and who, by the Socratic method of criticism, limiting and 
correcting not only the Eleatic philosophy, but also the other philosophies, the one by 
the other, evolved from them the most perfect system which the Hellenic mind was 
capable of producing. Boeckh draws the following parallel between the successive theories 
held in regard to the principles of things, and the degrees of the dialectical scale given by 
Plato (see below, 41): the poetic-mythical symbols of the period previous to the exist 
ence of philosophy proper, correspond with ei/caa/a, the lonians investigate the realm of 
things sensible, the aicrffyrd, the Pythagoreans investigate the mathematical order of 
things, the diavonrd, and the Eleatics the purely spiritual, intelligible, the VOJJTGL. The 
influence of Eleaticism on the doctrines of the later natural philosophers has been espe 
cially pointed out by Zeller (who, however, still separates Heraclitus from the earlier 

To what extent the philosophy of this period (and hence the genesis of Greek philos 
ophy in general) was affected by Oriental influences, is a problem whose definite solution 
can only be anticipated as the result of the further progress of Oriental and, especially, of 
Egyptological investigations. It is certain, however, that the Greeks did not meet with 
fully developed and completed philosophical systems among the Orientals. The only 
question can be whether and in what measure Oriental religious ideas occasioned in the 
speculation of Grecian thinkers (especially on the subject of God and the human soul) a 
deviation from the national type of Hellenic culture and gave it its direction toward the 
invisible, the inexperimental, the transcendent (a movement which culminated in Pytha 
goreanism and Platonism). In later antiquity, Jews, Neo-Pythagoreans, Neo-Platonists, 
and Christians unhistorically over-estimated the influence of the Orient in this regard. 
Modern criticism began early to set aside such estimates as exaggerated, and critics have 
manifested an increasing tendency to search for the explanation of the various philoso- 
phemes of the Greeks in the progressive, inner development of the Greek mind ; but, in 
their care not to exaggerate the results of external influences, they have verged perhaps too 
near to the opposite extreme. The labors of Roth and Gladisch mark a reaction against 
this extreme, both of them again laying stress on the influence of the Orient. But Roth s 
combinations, which by their audacity are capable of bribing the imagination, involve too 
much that is quite arbitrary. Gladisch concerns htmself, primarily, rather with the com 
parison of Greek philosophemes with Oriental religious doctrines, than with the demon 
stration of their genesis ; so far as he expresses himself in regard to the latter, he does 
not affirm a direct transference of the Oriental element in the time of the first Greek 
philosophers, but only maintains that this element entered into Greek philosophy through 
the medium of the Greek religion ; Oriental tradition, he argues, must have been received 
in a religious form by the Hellenes in very early antiquity, and so become blended with 
their intellectual life ; the regeneration of the Hindu consciousness in the Eleatics, of the 
Chinese in the Pythagoreans, etc., was, however, proximately an outgrowth from the 
Hellenic character itself. But this theory has little value. It is much easier either for those 
who deny altogether that any essential influence was exerted on the Greek mind from the 
East, or for those who affirm, on the contrary, that such an influence was directly trans 
mitted through the contact of the earlier Greek philosophers with Oriental nations, to 
explain the resemblance, so far as it exists, between the different Greek philosophies and 
various Oriental types of thought, than for Gladisch, from his stand-point, to explain th 


separate reproduction of the latter in the former. For the ethical and anthropomorphize 
character impressed by the Greek poets upon the mythology of their nation was of such a 
character as to efface, not merely all traces of the influence of different Oriental nations 
in the religion of the Greeks, but all traces of Oriental origin whatsoever. The hypothesis 
of a direct reception of Chinese doctrines by Pythagoras, or of Hindu doctrines by Xe- 
nophanes, would indeed belong to the realm of the fanciful. But that Pythagoras, and 
perhaps also Empedocles, appropriated to themselves Egyptian doctrines and usages 
directly from Egypt, that possibly Anaxagoras, or perhaps even Hermotimus, his prede 
cessor, came in contact with Jews, that Thales, as also, at a later epoch, Democritus, 
sought and found in Egypt or in Babylonia material for scientific theories, that Heraclitus 
was led to some of his speculations by a knowledge of Parseeism, and that therefore the 
later philosophers, so far as they join on to these, were indirectly (Plato also directly) 
affected in the shaping of their doctrines by Oriental influences, is quite conceivable, and 
some of these hypotheses have no slight degree of probability. 

11. The philosophy of the earlier Ionic physiologists is Hylozo- 
ism, i. e., the doctrine of the immediate unity of matter and life, 
according to which matter is by nature endowed with life, and life is 
inseparably connected with matter. 

This development-series includes, on the one hand, Thales, Anaxi- 
mander, and Anaximenes, who sought mainly the material principle 
of things, and, on the other, Heraclitus, who laid the principal stress 
on the process of development or of origin and decay. 

Kud. Seydel, Der Fortachritt der Metaphysik unter den dltesten Jonischen Philo8ophen ) Lei]>&. 1861. 
In justification of the inclusion of Heraclitus in this series, cf. below, ]5 and 22. 

12. Thales of Miletus, of Phenician descent and born in or 
about Olympiad 35 (640 B. c.), is distinguished by Aristotle as the 
originator of the Ionic Natural Philosophy (and hence indirectly also 
of Greek philosophy in general). The fundamental doctrine of his 
philosophy of nature is thus expressed : Water is the original source 
of all things. 

The later philosopher, Hippo of Samos, or of Rhegium, a physicist 
of the time of Pericles, also saw in water, or the moist, the principle 
of all things. 

Some of the earlier historians of philosophy as Brucker, notably treat very fully of Thales, but 
without the requisite degree of criticism. The opuscule of the Abbe de Canaye on Thales may be con 
sulted in the Memoires de Littirature, t. X., or in German, in Michael Hissman s Maga&in, Vol. I., pp. 
309-444; cf. further J. PI. Muller (Altd. 1719), Doderlin (1750), Ploucquet (Tub. 1763), Harless (Erlang.] 
1730-84), Flatt (De Theismo Thaleti Milesio abjudicando, Tub. 1785), Geo. Fr. Dan. Goess (Ueber den 
B&griffder Geschichte der Philosophie, und iiber das System des Thales, Erlangen, 1794), and, recently, 
F. Decker (De TJialete Mileteio, Inaugural Diss., Halle, 1865); cf. also, besides Ritter, Brandis, Zeller, and 
ether historians, Aug. Bernhard Krische, Forsehungen auf dem Oebiete der alien PMlott., I., pp. 84-42. It 
remained for the most recent investigators to return to the testimony of Aristotle, and measure later testi 
mony by his. 

On Hippo, cf. Schleiermacher ( Untersuchwig uber den Philosopher Nippon, read in the Berlin Acad. 


of Sciences on the 14th of Febr., 1820 ; published in Schleiermacher s Sdmmtliche Werke, Abth. III., vol. 3, 
Berlin, 1835, pp. 403-410), aud Wilh. Unrig (De Hippone Atheo, Giessen, 1848). 

For determining the time of Thales life, a datum is furnished in the report that he 
predicted an eclipse of the sun. which took place in the reign of the Lydian king Alyattes 
(Herod., I. 74). The date of this eclipse, according to the supposition of Daily (Pkilosoph. 
Transactions, 1811) and Oltmanns (Abh. der Berl. Akad. d. Wiss., 1812-13), is September 30, 
610 B. c., but, according to Bosanquet, Hind, Airy (Philos. Trans., vol. 143, p. 179 sq.). and( 
Jul. Zech (J. Zech s Astron. Untersuchungen uber die wichtigeren Finsternisse, wekhe von den 
Schriftstellern dcs class. Alterthums erwahnt werden, Leipsic, 1853), May 28, 585 B. c.* Tho 
latter date is defended by P. A. Hansen (Darlegung der theoret. Berechnung der in den Mond- 
tafeln angewandten Storungen, zweite abhandlung, in the 7th vol. of the Abhandlungen der 
maih.-phys. CL der K. Sachs. Ges. derWiss., Leips. 1864, pp. 379 sq.). With it agrees also the 
supposition adopted, according to Diog. Lae rt. (I. 22), by Demetrius Phalereus in his List 
of Archons (ava-ypaQq ruv apxovruv), that Thales was named cro^df, while Damasias was 

* Zech and others write 584; but the year denoted in astronomical usage by this number is the same as 
that designated in the ordinary and npprovable practice of historians as 585 B. c., i. e., the 5S5th year before 
the conventional point of departure of our chronology, which lies about 13% years before the d<xy of the 
Emperor Augustus s death (Aug. 19, A. D. 14). Zech follows the custom introduced among astronomers 
by Jacob Cassini (cf. Ideler s Ihmdbuch der Chronologie, p. 75, and Lehrbiich, p. 39 sq.) of designating 
every year before the birth of Christ by a number one less than the usual one. This mode of designation 
(which is in so far defensible, as according to it the 25th Dec. of the year a is removed by a years from 
the beginning of the era) is, it is true, convenient for the purposes of astronomical calculation, but deviates 
from historic usage, and is even itself in so far less appropriate, as it (not to mention how few days of the 
year fall after the 25th of December, which, as the presumptive birthday of Jesus, itself formed the point of 
departure in the new division of the years, according to the original and in principle unchanged intention) 
makes the year + 1 the first year after the beginning of the Christian era, but the year 1, the second 
year before the beginning of this era ; in the former every day is distant years and a fraction, but in the 
latter 1 year and a fraction from the commencement of our era. According to this astronomical usage, the 
year, near the end of which the birth of Jesus is placed, is numbered 0, the whole of it, with the exception 
of the last days of December, falling before the birth of Christ. According to this reckoning, the year a 
is the year after which, without counting that year itself, a years are counted till the birth of Christ; the 
year + a ought consistently to be the year, up to which, without counting that year, a years are reckoned 
from the same date ; and there ought, therefore, to be a year after Christ, which the astronomer is never 
theless as far as the historian from positing. The historical usage is perfectly consequent in making the 
year 1 after the birth of Christ follow immediately on the year 1 B. c. as the first year of the era; this usage 
we follow here without exception. 

The above are the Julian dates. It is customary to extend backward the Julian Calendar and not the 
Gregorian, in reckoning ancient time. Yet the reduction of all historical dates to Gregorian dates affords 
the by no means unessential advantage of making the equinoxes and solstices in the earliest historical 
times fall in the same months and on the same days as now. The historian, at least (who, for the rest, 
always deviates from the practice of the astronomer in the indication of years and days), ought to give 
ancient dates according to the Gregorian Calendar. In order to make the reduction, the provisions which 
were made at the introduction of the Gregorian Calendar (in 1582, when the 15th of October was made to 
follow immediately upon the 4th) for the future, and with reference to a portion of the past (viz. : that in 
every 400 years three intercalary days of the Julian Calendar should fall away, namely, in the years whose 
numbers are divisible by 100 and not by 400 without remainder), must be applied also to the earlier past. 
For the eclipse of Thales the Gregorian date, thus determined, is May 22, 585 B. c. 

In like manner the Julian dates in 39, 61, etc., should be reduced to the Gregorian. From the Julian 
date for the years 601 to 501 B. c. 6 days are to be subtracted, from 501 to 301 B. c. 5 days, 301 to 201, 4 days, 
201 to 101, 3 days, 101 B. c. to A. D. 100, 2 days, A. D. 100 to 200, 1 day. For the years A. D. 300 to 500, one 
day is to be added, 500 to 600, 2 days, etc. Yet it would be, perhaps, still better to carry out Madler s 
proposal and modify the Gregorian Calendar throughout, so that at the end of every 128 years an inter 
calary day of the Julian Calendar should fall away. The advantage of this reform would be greater 
exactness in the demarcation of the seasons of the year, less uncertainty in the citation of early historical 
dates, and perhaps also a diminution of the difficulty of harmonizing the Kusso-Greek and occidental 



Arclion at Athens (586-5 B. a). Apollodorus, in his Chronicle (according to Diog. Lae rk, 
1. 37), places his birth in Olympiad 35. 1 (640-639 B. C.). 

It is possible that Thales had learned of the Saros,, i. e. the period of the eclipses, dis 
covered after prolonged observation by the Chaldeans, and covering 233 synodic months, 
or 6585^ days, or that he even knew of the greater period of 600 years. Yet on the basis 
of this Saros, eclipses of the moon only, and not eclipses of the sun, could be foreknown 
with a sufficient degree of probability, for any determinate locality, and the prediction 
ascribed to Thales is therefore probably only a legend, which arose perhaps from his 
scientific explanation of the eclipse of the sun after it had taken place. Cf. Henri Martin, 
Sur quelqucs predictions d ech pses mentionnees par des auteurs anciens, in the Revue Archeo- 
logique, IX., 1864, pp. 170-199. 

Thales belonged (according to Diog. L., I. 22) to the family of the Thelides (EK TOV 
Qrjhidijv), whose ancestor was Cadmus the Phenician, and who emigrated (according to 
Herod., I. 146) from Thebes to Ionia. Thales distinguished himself not only in the region 
of scientific investigation, but also in political affairs ; he is reported, in particular, to have 
dissuaded the Milesians from allying themselves with Croesus against Cyrus (Herod., I. 
75; 170; Diog. L., I. 25). The writings which were in later times attributed to Thales 
(vavTiKrj aaTpoTivy ia and others), had (according to Diog. L., I. 23) already been declared 
spurious by some in antiquity. Aristotle speaks, probably, only from the reports of others, 
of his fundamental philosophical doctrine, and only conjecturally of the argumentation by 
which he supported it. 

Aristotle says, Metaph., I. 3 : " Of those who first philosophized, the majority assumed 
only material principles or elements, Thales, the originator of such philosophy (Qa?w 6 
rijq Toiamris apxvybc ^Ao<ro0/af), taking water for his principle. He was led to this, prob 
ably, by the observation, that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that heat itself is 
generated by moisture, and living beings live by it; but that by which any thing is 
generated is its principle; further, by the observation that the seed of all things is 
naturally moist; but the principle, in virtue of which the moist is moist, is water." In the 
same place and in De Coelo, II. 1 3, Aristotle reports that Thales represented the earth 
as floating on the water. It is possible that the geognostic observations (as of sea-shells 
in mountains) also lay at the bottom of Thales doctrine. 

Arist, DeAnima, L 2 : "According to Thales, the magnet is animated, because it attracts 
iron." Ibid. L 5 : " Thales believed that all things were filled with gods " (irdvra TrM/pq 6e(jv 
dvai). Aristotle does not in this place affirm that the doctrine had been professed by 
Thales, that "soul is mixed with all things," but only says conjecturally, that perhaps 
such a conception was the ground of his belief in the universal presence of the gods. 
Cicero s conception of the doctrine of Thales (De Nat. Deorum, I. 10) is unhistorical : 
" Thales Milesius aqzuzm dixit esse initium rerum, dewn autem earn rnentem, quae ex aqua 
cuncta fingerd;" for the Dualism here expressed, which stands in direct opposition to 
Hylozoism, belongs, according to the express testimony of Aristotle (Metaph., I. 3), to 
none of the earlier physiologists, Anaxagoras (and Hermotimus) being the first dualists. 

Thales is said to have first taught geometry in Hellas. Proclus says (Ad Euclid., p. 19) 
that arithmetic arose among the Phenicians and geometry among the Egj ptians, and adds : 
Qahijc de irpurov etc; Al-yvirrov fMwv ^trrjyaytv tl$ TTJV ~EMA6a rr/v deuplav ravrTjv KOL 
7roA/ld /zv avrbq evpe, TroAAwv Ae rdf ap%a TO H; 1 avrbv v^ij yrjGaro 1 roZf fj.ev Ka^oXiKurepov 
fTn/Sa/lAon , roZf tie aiG&q-iKuTepov. Proclus attributes to him, in particular, four propo 
sitions (following, for Nos. 3 and 4, according to his express statement, and probably also 
for Nos. 1 and 2. the authority of Eudemus, an immediate pupil of Aristotle): 1. That 
the circle is halved by its diameter (ib. p. 44) ; 2. That the angles at the base of an isosceles 


triangle are equal to each other (p. 67) ; 3. That the opposite angles formed by intersecting 
lines are equal to each other (p. 79) ; 4. That two triangles are congruent, when one side 
and two angles of the one are equal to the corresponding parts of the other (p. 92). The 
report (Plutarch., Conviv. Septem Sap., c. 2), that he taught the Egyptian priests how to 
measure at any time the height of the pyramids by their shadows presupposes that he 
was acquainted with the theorem of the proportionality of the sides of similar triangles. 
According to Diog. L., I. 24 sq., the proposition, that the angle inscribed in a semicircle is a 
right angle, was by some attributed to Thales, by others to Pythagoras. On the begin 
nings of geometry among the Egyptians, cf. Herod., II. 109; Plat., Phaedr., p. 274; Arist., 
Metaph., I L p. 981 b, 23; Strabo, XVII. 3 (ed. Mem.). 

The reason, according to Aristotle, why philosophy begins with Thales, is that in his 
attempt to explain the world, a scientific tendency is first manifested, in opposition to the 
mythical form, which prevailed in the works of the ancient poets, and, to a great extent, 
in those of Pherecydes also. Still, many problems remained too comprehensive for the 
immediate attainment of a strictly scientific solution. 

Of Hippo (who, according to a Scholion to Aristoph., Nub., 96, cited by Th. Bergk, 
Comm. de Reliquiis Comoediae Ait, Leips. 1838 was ridiculed by Cratinus in the rravo-rrTcu} 
Aristotle speaks seldom and not with praise. He calls him a very ordinary man 
((popTiKurepov, De Anima, I. 2), and says that on account of his shallowness (dia rr/v vreAeiav 
avrov TJJ<; diavo tas) he can scarcely be reckoned among the philosophers (Metaph., I. 3). 

13. Anaximander of Miletus, born Olymp. 42.2 (= 611 B. c.), 
first, among the Greeks, composed a work " on Nature." He teaches : 
" All things must in equity again decline into that whence they have 
their origin ; for they must give satisfaction and atonement for injus 
tice, each in the order of time." Anaximander first expressly gave to 
the assumed original material substance of things the name of prin 
ciple (aQ%rj). As such principle he posits a matter, undetermined in 
quality (and infinite in quantity), the d-rretpov. From it the elementary 
contraries, warm and cold, moist and dry, are first separated, in such 
manner that homogeneous elements are "brought together. Through 
an eternal motion, there arise, as condensations of air, innumerable 
worlds, heavenly divinities, in the center of which rests the earth, a 
cylinder in form and unmoved on account of its equal remoteness 
from all points in the celestial sphere. The earth, according to 
Anaximander, has been evolved from an originally fluid state. Living 
beings arose by gradual development out of the elementary moisture, 
under the influence of heat. Land animals had, in the beginning, the 
form of fishes, and only with the drying up of the surface of the earth 
did they acquire their present form. Anaximander is said to have 
described the soul as aeriform. 

Schleiermacher, Ueber Anaximandros (read in the Berlin Acad. of Sciences, Nov. 11, 1811), in the 
Abh. der philos. Cl., Berlin, 1815, and in Vol. II. of the 3d Div. of the Complete Works of /, Berlin, 1838, 
pp. 171-296. Cf, besides the essay by the Abbe de Canaye (German in Hissmann s Magazin), KrischeV 
Forschunffen, I., pp. 42-62, and Busgen, Ueber das annpov Ancwimanders (G. Pr.), Wiesbaden, 1867. 


For determining the time of Anaximander s birth we have only the statement of Apol 
lodorus to rest upon, who says (Diog. Lae rt., II. 2), that in the second year of the 58th 
Olymp. (547-546 B. c.) Anaximander was 64 years old; according to this, he must have 
been born in 01. 42.2 (611-610 B. c.). He occupied himself with astronomy and geography, 
made a geographical map (according to Eratosthenes, ap. Strabo, I. p. 7) and also an astro 
nomical globe (a<t>alpa, Diog. L., II. 2), and invented the sun-dial (yvu/btuv, Diog. L., II. 1), 
or rather, since this instrument was already in use among the Babylonians (Herod., II. 
109), made it known to the Greeks and, in particular, introduced it into Lacedamon. 
From a work of his, the following sentence (probably changed into the oratio obliqua by 
tho narrator) is preserved (ap. Simplicius, In Arist. Phys., fol. 6 a) : kt- uv 6 $ yeveaig fan 
Toig ov(n, /cat TTJV tjf&opav elg ravra yive<r&at Kara TO xp uv 6t66vat -yap avra rioiv KOL diKrjv r?~/i, 
a6iK.iar Kara rrfv TOV %p6vov ra^iv. (Definite individual existence, as such, is represented 
as an adtKia, injustice, which must be atoned for by extinction.) 

With the anetpov, or " Infinite," of Anaximander are connected several disputed questions. 
The most important is, whether the cnrecpov is to be understood as a mixture of all distinct 
elementary substances, from which the various individual things were mechanically sifted 
out (Ritter s view), or, as a simple and qualitatively indeterminate matter, in which the 
different material elements were contained only potentially (as Herbart and the majority 
of recent historians suppose). The Aristotelian references, taken by themselves, might 
seem to conduct to the former conclusion. Aristotle says, Phys., L 4: ol 6 SK. TOV evbf 
Tag IvavrtoTr/Tag eKicpiveo&cu (Aeyovcw), Mnrep Ava^i/navdpog {foot, /cat baoi 6 ev /cat 
<t>acw \vcu, ucirep E/zTreJo/cA^f /cat Avaf aydpag. The doctrine with which this is set in 
contrast, is (that of Anaximenes and other natural philosophers), that the manifold world of 
things was formed from the one original substance by condensation and rarefaction (Arist.. 
Metaph., XII. 2 : /cat TOUT kcrl TO Ava^ayopov ev . . ./cat E / u7T(5o/c/.foi>f TO fdypa /cat Avat-i* 
(MvSfxyv). In Metaph., I. 8 ( 19 and 20, ed. Schw.), Aristotle seems to attribute the theory 
of an aopicTov, or an indefinite, unqualified first substance, only to later, Post-Anaxagorean 
philosophers (with special reference to the Platonists). But the statement of Theophrastus, 
reported by Simplicius (Arist. Phys., fol. 33), that, provided the mixture asserted by Anax- 
agoras be conceived as one substance, undetermined in kind and quantity, it forms an 
arreipov like that of Anaximander (d Je Tig TTJV jilt-tv rutv a7rdvT<jv vTrohafioi fiiav elvcu tyvaiv 
aopivTov /cat /car eldog /cat /card //iyetfof, QaiveTai TO. au/MTiKa aTot^eia Trapair^riciug TTOMV 
Ava!;i[tdv6 p(f)), is decidedly favorable to the second view. And this view alone accords with 
the logical consequence of the system. For the first would require, in addition to the mix 
ture, a voi)f, or controlling mind, which yet Anaximander does not assume ; unmistakable 
witness is borne to his Hylozoism by Aristotle, in Phys., III. 4, according to which passage 
he taught of the cnreipov, that itself was the Divine, and that it embraced and governed 
all things. It is probable that Anaximander expressed himself with as little distinctness 
respecting the nature of his atreipov as did Hesiod respecting his Chaos, and that this 
accounts for the uncertainty in the statements of the different authorities. 

A second question in dispute is whether or not the aneipov of Anaximander is a sub 
stance intermediate between air and water, as the ancient commentators of Aristotle sup 
posed it to be. Aristotle says (De Coelo, III. 5), that all those who assume such a substance, 
represent things as having arisen from it by condensation and rarefaction ; but he denies of 
Anaximander that he taught this process of evolution (Phys., I. 4) ; hence he can not have 
regarded the airupov of Anaximander as such an intermediate substance, and all the less 
so,, if, as shown by the above citation, he supposed it to be only a mixture (uty//a). Who 
they are, that assumed a substance intermediate between air and water, and also who are 
meant by those who, according to Phys., I. 4, assumed one intermediate between fire and 


air, is unknown ; but probably Zeller is right in referring the latter assumption to Mer 
physiologists, whose doctrine had grown out of that of Anaximenes, or perhaps out of that 
of Anaximander and of Empedocles. 

14. Anaximenes of Miletus, younger than Anaximander, and 
perhaps also one of his personal disciples, posits air as the first prin 
ciple, and represents fire, wind, clouds, water, and earth as produced 
from it by condensation (TTVK-VUOL^ and rarefaction (jidvuoic; or 
apaiumg). The earth, which is flat and round like a plate, is sup 
ported by the air. " As our soul, which is air, holds us together, so 
breath and air encompass the universe." 

Diogenes of Apollonia, who lived in the fifth century before 
Christ, also sees in air the original essence and immanent ground of 
all things. So also Idaeus of Himera. 

Besides the historians of philosophy, Krische (Forschungen, I. pp. 52-57) treats especially of Anax 

Schleiermacher, Uffoer Diogenes von Apollonia (read in the Berlin Academy of Sciences, January 
29, 1811), in the Abh. der ph. C?., Berl. 1S14; reprinted in Schleiermacher s Werke, Abth. III. vol. 2, Berlin, 
1838, pp. 149-170. F. Panzerbieter, De Dioyenis A. Vita et Scriptis, Meiniugen, 1S23; Diogenes Apoi- 
loniates, Leipsic, 1830. Cf. Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 163-177. 

The birth of Anaximenes is placed by Apollodorus (Diog. Laert, II. 2) in the 63d 
Olympiad (528-524 B. c.). Yet perhaps here the time of his birth has been confounded 
with the time when he flourished or with the year of his death. According to Suidas, ho 
was living in the 55th Olympiad, in the time of Cyrus and Croesus. Diog. L. terms him 
(ibid.) a pupil of Anaximander. The dialect of his work was (according to the same locu:;) 
the pure Ionic. 

Aristotle testifies (Metaph., I. 3): "Anaximenes and Diogenes hold the air to be prior to 
water, and place it before all other simple bodies as their first principle." But this air, 
without detriment to its materiality, Anaximenes conceived, conformably to his hylozoistic 
stand-point, as animated. From the work composed by Anaximenes the following sentence 
is preserved (by Stobams, Ed. Phys., p. 296): olov rj -^v^r/ // fj/ue-epa ai/p ovaa cvyupctTel 
r/udf, /cat 6/lov rbv K.OC\IOV Trvevpa KOI a/)p irpiex i - It is not probable that Anaximenes 
discriminated fire from this animated air as something different and finer. On the contrary, 
he appears to have identified fire with the finest air, as was universally customary before 
Empedocles, as Heraclitus, in particular, explicitly conceives their relation, and as Diogenes 
of Apollonia, who followed Anaximenes in his speculation, did ; then irvKvuaic, or conden 
sation, was the first, and apaiuctc, rarefaction, the second process which it underwent, 
Anaximenes, according to the unanimous testimony of post- Aristotelian authorities, con 
ceived this air as infinite in extent, so that we must include him among those referred to 
in Arist., Phys., III. 4 (uairEp (paalv oi (^vcio^6 yot 1 TO et-u ocjjua rov /cooy/ov, ov f) ovoia // 
afjp fy dA/lo TL TOIOVTOV, cnretpov dvat). Anaximenes taught that all things arose from air 
through condensation and rarefaction, which mode of origin he seems, according to Theo- 
phrastus (in Simplic., Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 32), to have been the first to suggest ; when 
Aristotle (Phys., I. 4 ; De Coelo, III. 5) ascribes it also to those physiologists who assume, 
as a first principle, water or fire, or something between fire and air, or between water and 
air, it is probable that, beside Heraclitus, he has especially in view later philosophers ; no 


work by Thales was accessible to him, and it is hardly possible that any thing was known 
to him from any other source of such a doctrine as having been held by Thales. Anax- 
imenes is in advance of his predecessors, partly in his doctrine of condensation and rare 
faction, and partly because he chose for his principle, not a substance still imperfect and 
undeveloped, but that one which, as being the finest, might most naturally pass for the 
highest, in which direction Heraclitus, in naming that substance fire, went still another 
step further. 

We know nothing of Ida3us of Himera, except from a passage of Sext. Empir. (Adv. 
Math., IX. 360), in which he is associated with Anaximenes and Diogenes. 

Of the work of Diogenes of Apollonia (in Crete, a contemporary of Anaxagoras, 
Diog. L., IX. 57) there exist a number of fragments, which Panzerbieter has collected 
together. The doctrine of Diogenes is apparently to be understood as an attempt to 
defend the stand-point of hylozoism in opposition to the dualism of Anaxagoras, and at the 
same time to render the doctrine of hylozoism more perfect in itself. When Diogenes 
declares air to be the finest of substances, and yet represents other substances as arising 
from it by condensation and rarefaction, it is obvious that this can not mean that the 
original air is rarefied, but only that the formative process in general depends on conden 
sation and rarefaction, so that the former must have preceded the latter, just as, with 
Heraclitus, the "downward way" (066^ /cdr6j) goes before the "upward way" (060^ avu). 
The proof of the unity of substance, Diogenes finds in the fact of the assimilation of the 
substances of the earth by plants, and of the vegetable substances by animals (Simplic., 
Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 32 b). 

15. Heraclitus of Ephesus was probably younger than Pythagoras 
and Xenophaiies, whom he names and combats, but older than Par- 
menides, who on his part makes reference to Heraclitus, and seems to 
have arrived at his own metaphysical principle while arguing against 
him. Through his doctrine of fire as the fundamental form of existence 
and his doctrine of the constant flux of all things, Heraclitus gives the 
most direct expression to the notion involved in the Ionic philosophy 
generally, the notion of a constant process of the original, animated 
substance. Heraclitus assumes, as the substantial principle of things, 
ethereal fire, which he at once identifies with the divine Spirit, who 
knows and directs all things. The process of things is twofold, 
involving the transformation of all things into fire and then of 
fire into all other things. The latter movement is styled the " way 
downward," which leads from fire (identical with the finest air) to 
water, earth, and so to death; the former movement is the "way 
upward " from earth and water to fire and life. Both movements 
are everywhere intertwined with each other. All is identical and 
not identical. We step down a second time into the same stream 
and yet not into the same. All things flow. Finite things arise 
through strife and enmity out of the divine original fire, to which, on 
the contrary, harmony and peace lead back. Thus the Deity builds 


the world innumerable times in sport, and causes it at the determined 
period to disappear again in fire, that he may build it anew. 

Cratylus, the disciple of fleraclitus, and Plato s teacher at Athens, 
carried the views of Heraclitus concerning the flux of all things to 
the extreme. 

Th work of Heraclitus, on which numerous commentaries were written by the Stoics, and which was 
also, in the second and third centuries after Christ, much read by Christians, until it became suspected by 
the latter on account of its apparently favoring the Noetian heresy, is now extant only in fragments. Th 
44 Letters of Heraclitus " are spurious. 

Ileracliti Epistolae quae feruntur, ed. Ant. Westermann, Leipsic, 1867 (" University Programme"). 

Schleiermacher, Herakleitos, der Dunkle ton Ephesos, darge&tellt aus den Trummern seines Werkes, 
und den Zeugniasen der Alien, in Wolf and Buttuiann s Museum der Alterthumswissemtchaft, Vol. L, 
1SOT, pp. 313-533, and in Schleierm., Sammt. Werke, Abth. III., Vol. 2, Berlin, 1838, pp. 1-146. Cf. Th. L. 
Eichhoff, Diss. Her., Mayence, 1824. 

Jak. Bernays, Ileraditea, Bonn, 1848. ITeraklitishe Studien, in the Rhein. Mus., new series, VII. 
pp. 90-116, 1850; Neue Bfuchstiicke des Heraklit, ibid. IX. pp. 241-269, 1S54 ; J>ie Heraktitischen Briefe, 
Berlin, 1869. 

Ferd. Lassalle, Die Philosophie fferakleitos 1 des Dunkeln von Ephesos, 2 vols., Berlin, 1858. (The 
most thorough monograph on the subject, but the author is at tiuies too much given to Hegelianizing. 
Lassalle follows Hegel in styling the doctrine of Heraclitus " the philosophy of the logical law of the 
identity of contradictories." Cf., in reference to Lassalle s work, Ilaffaele Mariano, Lassalle e il suo 
Eraclito Saggio di jilosofia egheliana, Florence, 1865.) 

A. Gladisch, Herakleitos und Zoroaster, Leipsic, 1859; cf. his essays " iiber Ausspriiche des Ilerakl." 
in the Zeittchrift fur Alter thumswissenscha ft, 1846, No. 121 sq.and 1847, 26 sq. Bcttig, Ueber einen Aus- 
spruvh. lleraklit* lei Plat. Conviv. 137, fnd. lect., Berne, 1865. 

Heraclitus was a descendant of a noble Ephesian family. The rights of a fiaathcvc 
(king of sacrifices), which were hereditary in the family of Androclus, the founder of 
Ephesus and descendant of Codrus, he is reported to have resigned in favor of his younger 
brother. By the banishment of his friend Hermodorus, his aristocratic feeling was inten 
sified into the bitterest hatred of the Demos. (On Hermodorus, cf. Zeller, De Hermodoro 
Ephesio et de Hermodoro Platonis discipulo, Marb. 1859.) Heraclitus also expressed himself 
sharply respecting thinkers and poets whose opinions differed from his own, so far as he 
found them distinguished rather for multifarious knowledge than for rational discernment 
and ability to comprehend the all-directing reason. Thus he says (ap. Diog. L., IX. 1) : 
TTo^vuaBiri v6ov ov 6t6dcKt (or <j>vei f as we read in Procl., In Plat. Tim., p. 31). Haiodov -yap 
av e6i6a^e nal Hv6a-y6pjrt>, avdig re Eevoydvea. TS Kat EKaralov. His blame extended even to 
Homer: " Homer, he said, ought to have been driven from the lists and flogged, and 
Archilochus likewise. " It is, nevertheless, quite possible that those whom he censures 
exercised an essential influence on his opinions; at least, Heraclitus agreed with Xe- 
nophanes in the hypothesis that the stars were aerial phenomena, constantly being repro 
duced, and we might (as Susemihl remarks) suppose the Heraclitean doctrine of the world 
and of the fire-spirit related to the doctrine of Xenophanes, distinguishing the world, as 
something manifold and changeable, from the one immutable God : still the theological 
doctrines of these philosophers are very unlike, and their points of contact in natural 
philosophy are few. The surname of Heraclitus, 6 CKOTSIVO^, "the Obscure," is found first 
in the Pseudo- Aristotelian treatise De Mundo (c. 5). Yet we find already in the third book 
of the Aristotelian Rhetoric (c. 5) an intimation that the syntactical relation of words in 
Heraclitus was not always easy to determine, and Timon, the Sillograph (about 240 B. c.), 
terms him " a riddler " (aiviKTfc). Socrates is reported to have said, that it needed a 
Delian (excellent) diver .to sound the meaning of his work. Heraclitus flourished, accord- 


iiig to Diog. L., IX. 1 (Diog. probably follows Apollodorus), in the 69th Olympiad (5o!^500 
P. C.), or, according to another account (given by Eusebius, Chron,, ad 01. 80.2 and 81.2), 
in Olymp. 80 or 81 ; with this latter account agrees, far better than with the former, the 
apparently trustworthy report (ap. Strabo, XIV. 1, 25 ; cf. Plin., Hist. Natur., XXXIY. 
5, 21), that Hermodorus of Ephesus, the friend of Heraclitus, assisted the Eoman Decem 
virs in their legislation (about Olymp. 82.1). Epicharmus (whose life falls between 556 and 
460 B. c., according to Leop. Schmidt, Quaest. Epicharm., Bonn, 1846) notices his doctrine. 
That Parmenides combats his ideas, and in doing so alludes clearly to specific propositions 
and words of Heraclitus (in particular, to his doctrine of the coincidence of contraries and 
of the ebbing and flowing harmony of the world, which Heraclitus compares to the form 
and motion of the bow and the lyre) has been shown by Steinhart (Allg. Liti. Ztg., Halle, 
1845,p.892sq.,PM. W&rke, III., p. 394) and Jak. Bernays (Rhein. Museum, YIL,p. 114 sq.), 
though Zeller (Ph. d. Gr., I., 2d ed., p. 495, 3d ed., p. 548 sq.) disputes this. 

In view of these historical circumstances, the supposition is shown to be improbable, 
which has been held by some modern investigators, that the doctrine of Heraclitus origi 
nated in the endeavor to unite the members of the antithesis : being and non-being, which 
had been sharply distinguished and separated by the Eleatics (first by Parmenides). It 
can not be said with truth that the primary conception and the startinp;-point in the 
philosophy of Heraclitus was the abstract notion of becoming, as the unity of being and 
non-being, and that this notion was then only embodied in the concreter form of a physical 
conception or dogma. Heraclitus is from first to last a hylozoist, fire and soul are for him 
identical, the dry soul is the best, the moistened soul of the drunken is unwise. Having 
been first incited by Anaximenes, he then developed his doctrine independently. It is 
only correct to say that he attaches greater weight to the process of things than his pre 
decessors had done, as would be natural, considering the nature of the element which he 
regarded as the principle of being. The advance of Parmenides to the conception of 
being, first made it possible to extract the conception of becoming from the Heraclitean 
notion of the flux of things or the transformations of fire. This abstraction is a mental 
achievement which was first accomplished, not by Heraclitus himself, but by Parmenides 
and Plato, in the critique of his opinions. (For this reason Heraclitus, although younger than 
Pythagoras and Xenophanes, must be considered in connection with the earlier Ionic natural 
philosophers, and that as the thinker who gave to the tendency of their school its most 
perfect expression.) Aristotle, in his historical survey of the course of development in 
the earlier Greek philosophy (Metaph., 1. 3 sq.), simply places Heraclitus among the earlier 
lonians, without even noticing the actual diversity in stand-points ; for, after speaking of 
the principles of Thales and of Anaximenes and Diogenes, he proceeds : "iTnraaos 6e irvp 
6 Meraxrovrivof KO.I RpaK^stTo^ 6 E^soio^. The triad: fire (including air), water, earth, 
corresponds with the three "aggregate states" of matter (as they are now called); 
Empedocles (see below), separating air more distinctly from fire, first arrived at the 
distinction of the four so-called elements. 

Plato (or rather some Platonist) says (Soph., p. 242), after speaking of some of the 
earlier lonians and of the Eleatics : Iddef 6e nal ^itieTanai Ttveg vorepov povcai. By this 
he must mean either that the Sicilian doctrine, i. e.. the doctrine of Empedocles, was later 
than the Ionic, i. e., than that of Heraclitus, or (what is less probable) that both were 
later than the Eleatic , but in the latter case he could probably only mean : later than 
Xenophanes doctrine of unity. 

The opposition of Heraclitus to the ideas of the masses and of their leaders the poets, 
probably had principal reference (aside from their political differences) to the popular my 
thology. The multitude know nothing of the one ail- controlling divine fire-spirit. ("Ev TO 


coq6v kTTusTaG&aL yvufjtqv, rjrt ol eyKvj3epvr/oei \TJTE olrj Kvfapva del 1 i]Tt oiaKifri ? Kpafiaivei f~\ 
Trdvra 6id TrdvTuv.) Of this yvu/AT}, this eternal reason, the mass of men are ignorant 7 
(rov Myov Tov6 , edvrof dei, a^vveroi dvSpwKOi yiyvovrai). Out of the primitive substance, 
which Heraclitus (in what is certainly a noticeable coincidence with Parsee conceptions, 
to which G-ladisch is right in directing attention) conceives as the purest fire or light, and 
also as the Good, he represents individual objects as coming forth through the influence of 
strife or combat (which Homer, therefore, was wrong in wishing to see brought to an end). 
Thus with him is (Plut, Is. et Os., 48) Trd/le^of irarf/p TTUVTUV, "strife the father of all * 
things;" the world is the dispersed deity, the ev 6iaq>ep6/i.evov avrb avrti, but which, like 
the elastic frame of the bow and the lyre, in going apart comes together again (Plat., 
Sympos., 187 a; cf. Soph., 242 e). The universe is the elemental fire itself, which is now " 
extinguished and now kindled again (Clem., Sir., V. 599 : KOOJUOV TOV avrbv dirdvTuv ovre TH; 
6eav oijTe dv6p&Truv eTroirjcev, dA/l TJV del /cat earai Trvp detax>v, dirrofj-evov iieTpu Kal 
d7roaf3evvvfj.evov fieTpu). The double process of the (relative) materialization of the fire- 
spirit, and the re-spiritualization of earth and water, is constantly going on (rrvpbc 
dvTa/ueifieTat Trdvra /cat Trvp dirdvTuv, uoTrep %pvo~ov xprjfj.a~a /cat xpr}/j.dTuv %pvc6(; ), water and v 
earth are Trupof Tpoirai, modes of fire ; fire passes over into them in the 660$ /cdrcj, or "down 
ward way," and they pass over into fire in the 666? dvo>, the "upward way," but both 
ways are inseparable : 660$ dvu /cdrw fj.ii). The priests of Ormuzd (as Grladisch remarks) 
are actively on the side of the good principle, in the contest waged between good and evil ; 
but Heraclitus, as a thinker, is controlled by a theoretical interest, that of discerning the 
ground of their antagonism, and this he finds in the Tra/dvTpo-rria, the kvavria pvf/ (Plat, 
Crat, 413 e, 420 a), the ivavTioTpoirr/ (Diog. L., IX. 7), or iva.vTio6pofj.ia (Stob., Eclog., I. 60) of 
things, the yiveoOat Trdvra /car havrioTq-a, and says : ira/av-poKOf; dpfwvij/ /cda^ev, bnuGirep 
Aitpw KOI rot-ov (Plut., Is. et Os., 5) ; cf. Arist., Eth. N. VIII. 2 : Hpd/c/lefrof rb divO-ow cv^i- 
pov /cat f/c TUV dicupepovTw K.O/J^LCTTJV dpfwviav /cat Trdvra /car spiv -yiyveoOai. In other words, 
it is a law of the universe that in every thing contraries are united, as life and death, ^ 
waking and sleeping, youth and old age, and each contrary passes into its opposite. 
Unexpected things await man after death. Sext. Emp., Pyrrh. Hypotyp., III. 230 : ore /ztv 
yap r/fiei^ fa/nev, ~dq i^v^df rj[j.(Jv refivdvai /cat iv t/[ TE&dfy-dar ore 6s 7/fJ.el^ a7roi^v^<T/co/zev, 
rdf tyvxdq dvafliovv KOI (,rjv t " while we live, our souls are dead and buried in us ; but 
when we die, our souls are restored to life." When the power of peace and unity prevails 
in the All, all finite objects resolve themselves into pure fire, which is the Deity; but 
they come forth from it anew through variance. Schleiermacher (whom Hitter, Brandis, 
Bernays, and Zeller contradict in this point, while Lassalle agrees with him) was probably 
wrong in doubting that the doctrine of the periodical dissolution of the world in fire 
(inTTvpuats) was held already by Heraclitus (and borrowed from him by the Stoics); Aristotle 
ascribes it to him (Meteorol, I. 14, De Coelo, L 10, Phys., III. 5; cf. Metaph., XI. 10: 
RpaK^etTOf fyrjciv drravra yiyveadai TTOTC irvp\ and it is contained in the more recently dis 
covered fragment in Hippolytus, IX. 10 : Trdvra TO Trvp TreW6v Kptvel /cat /cara/l^erat. 

In view of the dictum of Heraclitus, "all things flow," Plato (Theaet., 181 a; cf. Crat., 
p. 402 a : OTI Trdvra ^wpet /cat ov6ev fievei) terms the Heraditeans playfully roi>f peovraf, 
" the flowing," at the same time having in view and censuring their inconstant character, 
which rendered all serious philosophical discussion with them impossible. Cratylus, a 
teacher of Plato, went beyond Heraclitus, who had said that no one could step down 
twice into the same stream, by asserting that this was not possible even once (Arist., Metaph., 
IV. 5), an extreme, as the last logical consequence of which, Aristotle reports that 
Cratylus thought he ought to say nothing more, but simply moved his finger. 

The changeable, which, for Heraclitus, is synonymous with the sum of all real things,^ 


is reduced by Parmenides to sensuous appearance, and by Plato to the complex of indi 
vidual objects subject to genesis and perceptible by the senses. But for the very reason 
that Heraclitus assumes no second province of reality, his cosmos is not identical with 
the mere world of the senses of later thinkers. Heraclitus does not distinguish from his 
cosmos the divine and eternal, as something separable from it. The Aoyof or the eternal, 
all-embracing order (yvoyzT?, din?], Eipapfiivri, TO ireptx ov W^f TMJLK.OV re bv /cat Qpevypss, 6 
Zeyf) is, according to him, immanent, as the %wov (KOIVOV), or universal principle, in change 
itself, and he calls upon each individual to follow in his thought and action this universal 
reason (Heracl., ap. Sext. Emp., VII. 133 : 6ib del i-n-eadai rci f-wp TOV Uyov <5t eovrog 
t-wov Z&ovaiv oi Tro/i/lot uq Idiav e^ovref ^povrjaiv. Ap. Stob., Serm., III. 84 : wov kari 
Tract TO <j>povsiv %vv vdu "ktyovraq iaxvpi&a&ai XPI T V w ndvTuv, oKtMJirep v6n^ 
Kal TroTiv iaxvpoTepw TpkfyovTat yap Trdvref oi dvdpuTTivoi VO/LLOI VTTO evbc TOV deiov, 
yap ToaovTov OKOOOV id&et Kal igapKei -rrdai not irepiyiveTai). This is the same law with 
that which keeps the heavenly bodies in their courses ; the sun, says Heraclitus, will not 
overstep its bounds, for, if it did, the Erinnyes, handmaids of diiai, would find it again (ap. 
Pint., De Exilio, 11). Without knowledge of the universal reason, the senses are untrust 
worthy witnesses. Mere abundance of knowledge profits nothing (Heracl., ap. Sext. Emp., 
YIL 126 : Kanol fidpTvpe^ avdpcj-rroiaiv o^a^ol Kal ura (3opf36pov i/n^df c^ovrof [according 
to Bernays conjecture, in place of the reading of the MSS. : papfidpovg ipvxdg exovruv] ; 
ap. Diog. L., IX. 1 : iro^.vfj.a &irj voov ov 6i6dani] ap. Procl., in Tim., p. 31: 7ro/lv//a#7 voov 
ov <f>vi). The rule for practical conduct is also contained in the law common to all, v 
proximately in the law of the state, absolutely in the law of nature (Heracl., ap. Clem. 
Alex., Strom., IV. 478 b: dinw bvo^a OVK. dv 7/rforav, ft rama ^ fjv. Ap. Diog. L., IX. 2: 
p.dxeada.1. %PT/ TOV dij/nov virep vopov OKU^ inrep ret^ovf. Ibid. : vfipiv XPV O^EWVELV ftdhAov 
r] Kvptia iTjv. Ap. Stobaeus, Serm., III. 84 : cufpovelv aptrrj pey ioTT], Kal coyirj dAj^m Aeyv 
Kal Koielv Kara fyvciv tiraiovTas}. 

The doctrine of Heraclitus may be termed monistic, inasmuch as it represents the 
eternal reason as immanent in the world of individuality and change ; and hylozoistic, inas 
much as it conceives all matter to be animated. Plato ascribes to the ideal an independent 
existence, separate from the sensible. Aristotle combats this Platonic ^wp^/zof and affirms 
the immanence of the universal in the individual, of the ideal in the sensible ; yet he too 
recognizes for mind (vovg) an existence apart from all matter. The Stoics, in their philoso 
phy of nature and in their theology, reproduced the doctrine of Heraclitus, in which also 
their ethics, notwithstanding its essentially Socratic and Cynic origin, found various points 
of union. 

16. Pythagoras of Samos, the son of Mnesarchus, was born 
about OI. 49.3 = 582 B. c. According to some accounts he was a 
pupil of Pherecydes and Anaximander and acquainted with the 
doctrines of the Egyptian priests. At Crotona, in Lower Italy, 
where he settled in OI. 62.4 = 529 B. c., he founded a society, whose 
aims and character were at once political, philosophical, and religious. 
All that can be traced back with certainty to Pythagoras himself is 
the doctrine of metempsychosis and the institution of certain religious 
and ethical regulations, and perhaps also the commencement of that 
mathematico-theological form of speculation, which was subsequently 
carried to a high degree of development. 


Philolaus, a contemporary of Socrates, passes for the first Pytha 
gorean who made public (in a written work) the philosophical system 
of the school. Of this work considerable fragments are still extant ; 
yet it is very doubtful whether the work is genuine or a counterfeit, 
dating at the latest from the last century before Christ, and only pos 
sessing a certain importance as an authority in regard to ancient 
Pythagoreanism, from its having been partially founded on earlier 

Of the earlier Pythagoreans, the most celebrated, beside Philo 
laus, were his disciples Siminias and Cebes (who, according to Plato s 
Phaedo* were friends of Socrates), Ocellus the Lucanian, Timseus of 
Locri, Echecrates and Acrio, Archytas of Tarentum, Lysis, and 
Eurytus. Alcmaeon of Crotona (a younger contemporary of Pythag 
oras), who held with the Pythagoreans the doctrine of contraries, 
Hippasus of Metapontum, who saw in fire the material principle of 
the world, Ecphantus, who combined the doctrine of atoms with the 
doctrine of a world-ordering spirit, and taught the revolution of the 
earth on its axis, Hippodamus of Miletus, an architect and politician, 
and others, are named as philosophers, whose doctrines were related 
to those of Pythagoreanism. The comic poet Epicharmus, who occa 
sionally alludes to disputed questions in philosophy, appears to have 
come under the influence of various philosophies, and among them, 
in particular, of Pythagoreanism. 

The reputed writings of Pythagoras are spurious (Carmen Aureum, ed. K. E. Gunthcr, Breslau, 1SL6; 
Th. Gaisford, In Poetae Minores Graeci, Oxford, 1814-20, Leipsic, 1823; Schneeberger, Die goldenen 
Spriiche des Pythagoras German translation, with introduction and annotations Miinnerstadt, 1862). So 
also are the works ascribed to Ocellus Lucanus (De Rerum Natura, ed. A. F. Guil. Kudolph, Leips. 1801 ; 
ed. Mullach, in Aristot. de Melissa, etc., Berlin, 1S45) and Timseus Locrus (who is credited with a work wept 
/n/xas Kotr/aw, which is only an abstract of Plato s Timaeus, of late origin, ed. J. J. de Gelder, Leyden, 
1336 ; cf. G. Anton, De Origine Lib. inser. jrepl i/o>xa? *6o>u> *eal <v <reco?, Berlin, 1852), ami, most probably, 
also all the philosophical fragments of Archytas of Tarentum (Fragm., ed. Conr. Orelli, in the 2d vol. of the 
Opuscula Graecorum veterum Sententiosa et Moralia, Leipsic, 1829 ; cf. Petersen, Hisior.-Phil. Studien 
Hamburg, 1832, p. 24; G. Hartenstein, De Archytae Tarentini Fragments Philosophies, Leipsic, 1833; 
Petersen, in the Zeitschr.fur Alterthum$wiss,\SZ, p. 878; O. F. Gruppe, Ueber die Fragmente des Archy 
tas und derulteren Pythagoreer, Berlin, 1840; F. Beckmann, De Pythagoreorum Reliquii*, Berlin, 1844 
and 50 ; Quaestiones Pythagor., I.-IV., Braunsberg (Lections-Katal.), 1852/55, 59, 68). The authenticity 
of the work of Philolaus, formerly sometimes questioned, but after Boeckh s collection of the fragments 
almost universally conceded, has been anew disputed, as to parts of the work, by Zeller and others, and 
wholly rejected by Val. Rose. Still more recently Schaarschmidt has undertaken to demonstrate the 
spuriousness of the work ; yet cf., per contra, Zeller in the third ed. of Part I. of his Philos. der Griech&n, 
p. 243 seq. The most complete collection of Pythagorean fragments is furnished by Mullach, in Vol. II. 
of his Fragm. Philos. Gr., 1867, 1-129. 

Jamblichus, De Vita Pythogorica liber ; acced. Malchus sive Porphyrius, de vita Pythagorae, ed. 
Kiessling, Leips. 1815-16; ed. Westermann, Paris, 1850. [English transl. of Jamblichus Life of Pythagoras, 
by Taylor, Lond. 1818. " The Life of Pythagoras with his Golden Verses, together with the Life of 
Hierocles and his Commentaries upon the Verses" (Engl. transl. from the French of Dacier, with the 
exception of the Golden Verses, which are translated from the Greek) by N. Kowe, Lond. 1707. TV.] 


Of the more modern writers on Pythagoreanism in general and on individual Pythagoreans, may be 
mentioned : Chr. Meiners, in his Gesch. der Kiinste und Wiss. in Gr. u. Rom, Vol. I., p. ITS sq. ; Aug. 
Boeckh, Disp. de Flatonico systemate coelesUum globorum et de vera indolt, astronomiae Philolaicae, 
Heidelb. 1810, also with additions and supplement in his El. Schr., III., Leips. 1866, pp. 266-342 ; Philolaus 
des Pythagoreers Lehren nebst den Bruchstucken seines Werkes, Berlin, 1819 ; J. A. Terpstra, De Sodalitii 
Pythag. Origine, Conditione, et Consilio, Utrecht, 1824 ; Ileinrich Eitter, Gesch. der PythagoreiscJien 
Philosophic,, Hamburg, 1826 ; Ernst Reinhold, Beitrag znr Erlduterung der Pylhagoreischen Metaphysik, 
Jena, 1S2T; Amadeus Wendt, Dererumprincipiis secundum Pythagorean,, Leips. 1827 ; Christ. Aug. Brandis, 
Ueber die ZahlenleJire der Pythagoreer und Platoniker, in the Rhein. Mus., 1828, p. 208 sq. and 568 sq.; Aug. 
Bernh. Krische, De societatis a Pythagor-a in urbe Crotoniatarum conditae scopo politico commentatio, 
Gottingen, 1830, cf. K rische s Forschungen, I. pp. 78-85 ; M. A. Unna, De Alcmaeone Crotoniata, in Chr. 
Petersen s Philol.-hist. Studien, Hamburg, 1832, pp. 41 -87 ; A. Gladisch, Die Pythagoreer und die Schinesen, 
Posen, 1841; F. H. Th. Allihn, De idea justi qualis fuerit apud Ilomerum et Ilesiodum et quomodo a 
Doriensibus veteribus et a PytJuigora exculta sit, Halle, 1847; G. Grote, History of Greece, Vol. IV. 
(London), pp. 525-551; Val. Rose, Comm de Arist. libr. ord. et auctor., Berlin, 1854, p. 2 (where the 
genuineness of the Philolaus fragments is denied) ; C. L. Heyder, Ethices Pythagoreae vindiciae, Frankfort- 
on-the-M. 1854; F. D. Gerlach, Zaleukos, Charondas, Pythagoras, Basel, 1858; L. Noack, Pythag. und die. 
Anfdnge abendl. Wiss., in the "Psyche" Vol. III., I860, No. 1; Monrad, Ueber die Pyth. Philos., in " Der 
Gedanke" (ed. by Michelet), Vol. III., 1862, No. 3; Vermehren, Die Pythag. Zahlen (G.-Pr.\ Gustrow, 
1S63; A. Laugel, Pythagore, sa doctrine et son histoire d apres la critique allemande, in Revue des 
Deux Mondes, XXXIV. annee, Par. 1S64, pp. 9C9-9S9 ; C. Schaarschmidt, Die angebliche Schriftstellerei 
des Philolaus und die JBruchstudte der ihm sugeschriebenen Sucher, Bonn, 1864; Ed. Zeller, Pythagoras 
und die Pythagorassage, in his Vortr. u. Abh., Leips. 1865, pp. 30-50; Georg Eathgebcr, Grossgriec!. en- 
land und Pythagoras, Gotha, 1S66; Adolf Rothenbucher, Das System der Pythagoreer nach denAngaben 
des Arist, Berlin, 1867; Mullach, De Pythagora ejusque discipulis et successoribus, in the Fraym. 
Philos. Gr., II. 1867, pp. I.-LVII. ; Eduard Baltzer, Pyth. der Weise von Samos, Nordhausen, 1868 (adopts 
the theory of Eoth) ; Albert Freiherr von Thimus, Die harmonikale Symbolik des Alterthums, part I., 
Cologne, 1868; F. Latendorf, Seb. Franci de Pyth. ejusque symbolis disputatio comm. ill, Berlin, 1868. 
Cf. also L. Prowe, Ueber die Abhangigkeit des Copernicus von den Gedanken gHechischer Philosophen 
und Astronomen, Thorn, 1865, and the works by Ideler, Boeckh, and others, cited below (p. 47). 

On Alcmaeon the Crotoniate, see Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 68-78. 

On Hippodamus of Miletus : C. F. Hermann, De Hippod. Milesio, ad Arist. Pol., II. 5, Marburg, 1841 ; 
L. Stein, in MohPs Zeitschr fur Staatswisaenschaft, 1853, 161 sq.; Rob. v. Mohl, Gesch. und Lift, der 
Staatswiss., Vol. I., Erl. 1855, p. 171 ; Karl Hildenbrand, Gesch. u. System der Rechts- und Staatsphilos., 
Vol. L, 1860, p. 59 sq. On Hippodamus and Phaleas: Herm. Henkel, Zur Gesch. der griech. Staatswiss. 
(G. Proyr.), Salzwedel, 1866. 

Epicharmi fragmenta. coll. H. Polman Krusemnn, Harlem, 1834; rec. Theod. Bergk, Poetae lyrici 
Graec., Leips. (1843, 53) 1866 ; ed. Mullach, Fragm. Ph. Gr., p. 135 seq.; cf. Grysar, De Doriensium comoedia, 
p. 84 sq.; Leop. Schmidt, Quaestiones Epicliarmeae, spec. J: de Epicharmi ratione philosophandi, 
Bonn, 1846; Jac. Bernays, Epicharmos und der aufafo/aeros Adyos, in the Rhein 3/us.f. Ph., new series, 
VIII. 1853, p. 280 sq.; Aug. O. Fr. Lorenz, Leben und Schriften des Koers Ep. nebst einer Fragmenten- 
sammlung, Berlin, 1864 (cf. Leop. Schmidt in the Gott. gel. Am., 1865, No. 24, pp. 931-958); G. Bernhardy, 
Grundr. der griech. Litt., 2d revised ed., II. b, 1859, pp. 458-467. 

" Of Pythagoreanism and its founder tradition has the more to tell us the farther it is 
removed in time from its subject, whereas it becomes more reticent in proportion as we 
approach chronologically nearer to that subject itself" (Zeller). Nevertheless, we possess 
several very old and entirely reliable data concerning Pythagoras. Xenophanes, the 
founder of the Eleatic school, ridicules the doctrine of Pythagoras in the following lines 
(op. Diog. L., VIII. 36) : Trori fj.iv crvfye hi^ouivov CKV/MKO^ Trapiovra 
3>aalv TrotKTipai nai rode 0dcr\9m 7rof 
Havaat, /z^f5c paTri\ t^eirj (pitov avipog tori 
rf/v eyvuv QdeygafievTjs aiuv. 

Heraclitus says (ap. Diog. L., VIII. 6) : " Of all men, Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus, 
most practiced inquiry (laropir/v ficurjCEv} his own wisdom was eclectic arid nothing better 


than polymathy and perverted art." Herodotus (II. 81 and 123) traces the doctrine of 
metempsychosis and certain religious regulations of the (Orphists and) Pythagoreans back 
to the Egyptians, thus implying, apparently, that Pythagoras visited the Egyptians. 
Isocrates (Laud. Busir., 28) is the first who expressly mentions such a visit. Cicero says 
of Pythagoras (De Fin., V. 29, 87): Aegyptum lustrwit." For the fact that the mathe 
matical sciences originated in Egypt and were there cultivated by the priests, we have 
Aristotle s testimony (Met., I. 1). From that country Pythagoras, according to the evidence 
of Callimachus (ap. Diodorus Siculus, in the Vaticanische Excerpte, VII.-X. 35), brought 
much of his mathematical knowledge and transplanted it into Hellas, while other portions 
of it were discovered by himself. Among other things, the discovery of the relation b( 
tween the hypotenuse and the sides of the right-angled triangle is ascribed to him by 
Diogenes Laertius (VIII. 12), on the authority of a mathematician named Apollo 
Diogenes cites in this connection the epigram : 

Hvi/co Tlvdayopw TO irepinfaes evparo y 
Kclv\ < OT 

Whether Pythagoras really traveled in Egypt is a matter not wholly free from doubt. 
It may nevertheless, be considered as very probable that he did. Many of the embellish 
ments added by later writers to their accounts of the life and journeys of Pythagoras, 
are easily recognized as fables. Diogenes Laertius relates (VIII. 3), following, apparently, 
the authority of Aristoxenus, that Pythagoras, hating the tyranny of Polycrates, emigrated 
to Crotona, in Lower Italy. According to Cicero (Rep., II. 1 5 ; cf. Tuscul, I. 16), Pythagoras 
came to Italy in 01. 62.4 (529 B. c.). He united himself to the aristocratic party in Crotona, 
where, as we are told, the depression caused by a defeat, suffered not long before in a 
contest with the Locrians and Rhegians on the river Sagra, had made the population SUE 
ceptible to moral influences, and he secured that party for his project of an ethical and 
religious reform. By this means the intimacy of the union of the members of the aris 
tocratic party and their power in the state were very considerably increased. 

The members of the Pythagorean society were subjected to a rigid ethico-religious 1 
men (the Ilttfayfywof rpoTroc rov /fc ov, which is mentioned already by Plato, Rep., X. p. 600 b). 
An examination as to fitness preceded admission. Disciples were bound for a long time 
to mute obedience, and unconditional submission to the authority of the doctrine pro 
pounded to them. Rigorous daily self-examination was required of all; the propagation 
among the people of the doctrines (in particular, probably, the theosophic speculations) 
of the school was prohibited. Further requirements imposed on members were moderation 
in the use of articles of food and simplicity in personal attire. The use of animal food was 
permitted, under certain limitations, a fact attested by Aristotle and by Aristoxenes (ap. 
Diog. L., VIII. 19 and 20); Heraclides of Pontus incorrectly assumes the contrary; bu 
certain Orphists and later Pythagoreans abstained wholly from the use of animal food. 
Aristoxenus (ap. Gellius, IV. 11) disputes the assertion that Pythagoras forbade the i 
of beans for food. According to Herod., II. 81, burial in woolen garments was ic 
in the Orphic- Pythagorean mysteries. 

The democratic party (perhaps also, at times, an unfriendly aristocratic fraction) reacts 
against the growing power of the society. It is related of Pythagoras that, after navmj 
lived in Crotona nearly twenty years, and soon after the victory gained in 510 B. c. by tl 
Crotoniates, on the river Traeis, over the Sybarites, who were living under the monarchica 
rule of Telys, he was banished by an opposition party under Cylon, and that he removed 
to Metapontum and soon afterward died there. Pythagoreanism found acceptance among 
the aristocracy of numerous Italian cities, and gave to their party an ideal point of support. 


But the persecutions were also several times renewed. In Crotona, as it appears, the 
partisans of Pythagoras and the " Cylonians " were, for a long time after the death of 
Pythagoras, living in opposition as political parties, till at length, about a century later, the 
Pythagoreans were surprised by their opponents while engaged in a deliberation in the 
"house of Milo" (who himself had died long before), and, the house being set on fire 
and surrounded, all perished, with the exception of Archippus and Lysis of Tarentum. 
(According to other accounts, the burning of the house, in which the Pythagoreans were 
assembled, took place on the occasion of the first reaction against the society, in the 
life-time of Pythagoras.) Lysis went to Thebes, and was there (soon after 400 B. c.) a 
teacher of the youthful Epaminondas. Diog. L. (VIII. 7) ascribes to him the authorship 
of a work commonly ascribed to Pythagoras. This work, according to Mullach s con 
jecture (Fragm. Ph. Gr., I. 413), was the " Carmen Aureum," a poem which, however, 
at least in its present form, is probably of later origin. Not long after this time all 
the political consequence and power of the Pythagoreans in Italy came to an end. At 
Tarentum the Pythagorean Archytas was still at the head of the state in the time of 

Among the authorities for the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, the indications furnished 
by Aristotle are the most important. Of still greater value for our knowledge of the 
Pythagorean system would be the fragments (collected by Boeckh) of the work of Philo- 
laus, a contemporary of Socrates, in case their authenticity were assured. All other 
pretended philosophical writings and fragments of writings by ancient Pythagoreans, are 
decidedly spurious. The contents of the fragments attributed to Philolaus agree in many 
respects quite well with the testimony of Aristotle, and afford besides a much more concrete 
conception of the Pythagorean system ; yet with them is mingled much that is of extra 
neous and later origin, and which is yet scarcely to be placed to the account of the authors 
in whom the fragments are found. Plato and Aristotle seem to have had no knowledge 
of any other than oral utterances of Philolaus. Only their statements and, in part, those 
of the earliest Aristotelians, but no later ones, are perfectly trustworthy. Timon the Sillo- 
graph (writer of satires, see below, 60) says (Gell., Nod. Att., III. 17) that Plato bought 
for much money a small book, on which he founded his dialogue Timaeus (containing his 
natural philosophy); but it is very doubtful what work is meant (perhaps a work of 
Archytas). A spurious letter from Plato to Dio contains the commission to buy Pytha 
gorean books. Neanthes of Cyzicus ascribes the first publication of Pythagorean doctrines 
to Philolaus and Empedocles. Hermippus says that Philolaus wrote a book which Plato 
bought in order to copy from it his Timaeus; Satyrus speaks of three books. The three 
books, of which the fragments above mentioned have come down to us, are (as Schaar- 
schmidt has shown) probably spurious, as also are the alleged writings of other ancient 
Pythagoreans and of Pythagoras himself. 

Charmed by the apodictical nature of that knowledge which we have of the mathe 
matical order immanent in things, the Pythagoreans exaggerated the power of the math 
ematical principle in their numerical speculation a speculation which overstepped the 
limits of exact mathematical science. 

The principles of numbers, limit and the unlimited, were viewed by the Pythagoreans, 
according to Aristotle, not as predicates of another substance, but as themselves the sub 
stance of things; at the same time things were looked upon as images of these principles 
immanent in them. It does not appear that these two statements are to be referred to 
different fractions of the Pythagoreans ; perhaps the mode of speech of some suggested 
the one interpretation, that of others the other. Yet the same persons might in a certain 
sense hold both of these doctrines. It is hardly supposable that any one of the ancient 


Pythagoreans made use of the exact phraseology employed by Aristotle. Aristotle seems, 
rather, at times to be expressing in his own language conceptions which he only found 
implied in their doctrines. The scale of created objects was symbolized by the series of 
numbers, the numbers four (rerpa/crvf) and ten (<Je/cezf) playing an especially prominent 

Of the special doctrines of the Pythagoreans, their astronomical and musical doctrines 
are the most worthy of remark. That the theory of a counter-earth (avri^uv) under the 
earth and the motion of both around a central fire, really belongs to the older Pytha 
goreans, we know (apart from the at least doubtful Philolaus-Fragments) from Aristotle 
(De Coelo, II. 13, and Metaph., I. 5). Diog. Lae rt. says (VIII. 85) that the circular motion of 
the earth was first taught by Philolaus, though others ascribed the doctrine to Hicetas. The 
doctrine of the earth and the counter-earth is ascribed to the Pythagorean Hicetas by 
Pseudo-Plutarch (Plac. Ph., III. 9); Cicero (Acad., II. 39) attributes to him, on the authority 
of Theophrastus, the doctrine that the earth moves circum axem. The rotation of the 
earth on its axis is also ascribed (Plac., III. 13 ; Hippol., Adv. Haer., I. 15) to Ecphantus 
(according to Boeckh s supposition, a pupil of Hicetas), who assigned to the material atoms 
magnitude, figure, and force, attributing their arrangement to God ; also to Plato s disciple, 
Heraclides of Heraclea on the Euxine, who (according to Stob., Eel., I. 440) held the world 
to be infinite. That the hypothesis of the sun s immobility and of the revolution of the 
earth around it agrees with the phenomena was shown later, 281 B. c., by Aristarchus of 
Samos, the astronomer; finally, Seleucus of Seleucia on the Tigris, in Babylonia (about 150 
B. c.), taught the infinite extension of the world and propounded the heliocentric system 
as his astronomical doctrine. (See Hut., Plac. Phil, II. 1, 13. 24 ; III. 17 ; Stob., Eclog. Phys., 
I. 26 ; cf. Lud. Ideler, Uebcr das Verhaltniss des Coperniais zum Alterthum, in Wolf and Butt- 
rnann s Mus. f. d. Alter thumswiss., II. 1810, pp. 393-454; Boeckh, De Plat, syst, etc., 1810, 
p. 12 (Kl. Schr., III. p. 273), Philolacs, p. 122, Das Kosm. System des Plato, p. 122 sq. and p. 
142 ; Sophus Huge, Der Chaldaer Seleukos, Dresden, 1865.) Yet accusations of heresy were 
not wanting even in antiquity for those who held the doctrine of the earth s motion. "Wit 
ness Aristarchus of Samos, who was charged with impiety by Cleanthes the Stoic, on 
account of his astronomical opinions. 

The doctrine of the harmony of the spheres (Arist., De Coclo, II. 9) was grounded on 
the assumption that the celestial spheres were separated from each other by intervals 
corresponding with the relative lengths of strings, arranged to produce harmonious 

The soul was, according to the Pythagoreans, a harmony ; chained to the body as a 
punishment, it dwelt in it as in a prison (Plat., Phaedo. p. 62 b). 

According to the statement of Eudemus, the Aristotelian, in his lectures on Physics 
(reported by Simplicius, Ad. Arist. Phys., 173 a), the Pythagoreans taught that in various 
cosmical periods the same persons and events return or are repeated : fi tit- rt<; Triarevatie 
roZf Tlvfla-yopeiois wf ird?uv TO. avrd dptftf.i<l> Kayu /LLvftoXoyTJGu TO paflAiov f^uv K.a0T?[ivoi<; OVTCJ, 
nal rd a/Ma -rravra bp.oi.u^ f$ei. (The same doctrine meets us again with the Stoics, but only 
in combination with the Ileraclitean doctrine of iicirbpuotf^ see below, 54.) 

Ethical notions bore among the Pythagoreans a mathematical form, symbols filling the 
place of definitions. Justice was defined by them (according to Arist., Elh. Nic., V. 8 ; cf. 
Magn. Moral., I. 1 ; I. 34) as apififj.c% Icanis Ico^ (square-number), by which it was intended 
to express the correspondence between action and suffering (TO avrtircTrovOoc;, i. e. a TIG 
i-iroirjof:, ratr avTnrafaiv), or, in other words, retribution. 

Some of the Pythagoreans (according to Arist., Met, I. 5) set forth a table of funda 
mental contraries, headed by that of limit and illimitation. The conceptions included in it 


are not properly categories, because not absolutely universal, i. e., formal ground-concep 
tions, equally applicable to nature and mind. The table is as follows : 

Limit. Illimitation. 

Odd. Even. 

One. Many. 

Right. Left. 

Male. Female. 

At rest. In motion. 

Straight. Bent. 

Light. Darkness. 

Good. Bad. 

Square. Oblong. 

Alcmaxm, the Crotoniate, was a physician, who (according to Arist., Metaph., I. 5) " was, 
in the flower of his age when Pythagoras was an old man," and taught that the majority 
of human things were in twos [in contraries] (tivat 6vo ra iroMa rutv avOputrfouv), yet did 
not fix on a specific number of contraries, but only gave in each case those which hap 
pened to occur to him. He taught that the soul was located in the brain, whither all 
sensations were conducted through canals from the organs of sensation (Theophr., De 
Sensu, 25 ; Plut., Plac. Ph., IV. 16, 17), and that the soul, like the stars, was the subject 
of eternal motion (Arist., De An., I. 2). 

Eurytus is mentioned, together with Fhilolaus, as among the Pythagoreans whom 
Plato met in Italy (D. L., III. 6). The system of numerical symbolism was further 
developed by Eurytus, whose speculations appear to have been delivered only orally (Ar., 
Met., XIV. 5, 1092 b, 10). Philolaus and Eurytus are spoken of as residents of Tarentum 
(Diog. L., VIII. 46); Xenophilus, of Chalcis in Thrace, and the Phliasians Phanto, Eche- 
crates, Diocles, and Polymnastus, pupils of Philolaus and Eurytus, and all personally 
known to Aristoxenus the Aristotelian, are said to have been the last of the Pythagoreans. 
Xenophilus is reported to have taught in Athens and to have died at an advanced age. 
The school disappeared (until the rise of Neo-Pythagoreanism), although the Orphic- 
Pythagorean Orgies were continued. 

Hippodamus of Miletus, a contemporary of Socrates, was (according to Arist., Polit., 
II. 8), like Phaleas, the Chalcedonian (Ar., Pol, II. 7), and (according to Diog. L., III. 37 and 
57) Protagoras, the Sophist, a forerunner of Plato in the construction of political theories. 
According to Aristotle, Hippodamus was the first private citizen who undertook to say 
any thing respecting the best form of constitution for the state. The territory of the state, 
he taught, should be divided into three portions: a sacred portion for the service 
of the gods, a common domain for the support of the military order, and a third portion 
to be held as private property. The various courts of justice should be subject to one 
court of appeal. "Whether, or to what extent, Hippodamus was connected with the 
Pythagorean school, are doubtful questions. Among the later forgeries under the names 
of early Pythagoreans, was one bearing the name of " Hippodamus the Pythagorean," and 
another ascribed to " Hippodamus the Thurian," by which the same person seems to be 
intended. Fragments of these forgeries are preserved in Stoba3us (Florileg., XLIII. 92-94, 
and XCVIII. 71). Phaleas desired that inequality of possessions among citizens should bo 
prevented, affirming that it easily led to revolutionary movements ; indeed, he is the first 
who expressly demanded that all citizens should have equal possessions (Arist., Pol, II. 7, 
1266b, 40). 


Epicharmus of Cos, son of Elothales (born about 550, died at Syracuse, about 460 B. c.), 
in the first of his poetical compositions cited by Diog. L. (III. 9-17), represents a map, 
versed in Eleatic, Pythagorean, and especially in Heraclitean philosophy, engaged in conver 
sation with one who was a stranger to philosophy and a partisan of the religious ideas of 
the ancient poets and the people. In another of the fragments preserved by Diogenes he 
discusses the difference between art and the artist, and between goodness and the man who 
is good, in terms which remind us of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. They are not to bo, 
taken, however, altogether in the Platonic sense, which respects the difference between 
the universal and the individual, but rather in the sense of the distinction between 
abstract and concrete. A third fragment concludes from instances of artistic skill in ani 
mals, that they, too, are possessed of reason. A fourth contains, in its expressions con 
cerning the diversity of tastes, much to remind one of the verses of the Eleatic philosopher 
Xenophanes, on the diversity of human conceptions of the gods. A philosophical system 
can not be ascribed to Epicharmus. Plato says (Theaet., p. 152 a), that the comic poet, 
Epicharmus, embraced, like Homer, that conception of the world to which Heraclitus 
gave the most general philosophical expression (the doctrine, which finds the real in. 
what is perceptible and changeable). Classical aphorisms of Epicharmus are: va0e xal 
jueuvaa amore iv, aftfpa ravra ruv qptvuv, and vov$ opg KOI vov$ CIKO UFI, raA/Uz /cw^d /cat 
rv0/la. The Roman poet Ennius composed a Pythagorizing didactic poem in imitation 
of one attributed to Epicharmus. Various forgeries under the name of Epicharmua 
were published at an early date. 

The author of the work ascribed to Philolaus sees in the principles of numbers the 
principles of things. These principles are the limiting and illimitation. They converge 
to harmony, which is unity in multiplicity and agreement in heterogeneity. Thus they 
generate in succession, first, unity, then the series of arithmetical or " monadic " numbers, 
then the "geometrical numbers." or "magnitudes," i. e., the forms of space: point, line, 
surface, and solid; next, material objects, then life, sensuous consciousness, and the higher 
psychical forces, as love, friendship, mind, and intelligence. Like is known by like, but it is 
by number that things are brought into harmonious relations to the soul. The understand 
ing, developed by mathematical study, is the organ of knowledge. Musical harmony 
depends on a certain numerical proportion in the lengths of musical strings. The octave, in 
particular, or harmony in the narrower sense, depends on the ratio 1 : 2, which includes 
the two ratios of the fourth (?, : 4) and the fifth (2 : 3 or 4 : G). The five regular solids the 
cube, the tetrahedron, the octahedron, the icosahedron, and the dodecahedron are respec 
tively the fundamental forms of earth, fire, air, water, and the fifth element, which encom 
passes all the rest. The soul is united by number and harmony with the body, which is its 
organ, aud at the same time also its prison. From the Hestia, i, e., from the central fire, 
around which earth and counter-earth daily revolve, the soul of the world spreads through 
the spheres of the counter-earth, the earth, the moon, the sun. the planets Me-rcury, Venus, 
Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and the fixed stars to " Olympus," the last sphere which includes 
all the others. The world is eternal, and ruled by the One, who is akin to it, and has 
supreme might and excellence. The director and ruler of all things is God ; he is one 
and eternal, enduring and immovable, ever like himself, and different from all things 
beside him. He encompasses and guards the universe. 

17. The foundation of the Eleatic doctrine of unity was laid in 
theological form by Xenophanes of Colophon, metaphysically devel 
oped as a doctrine of being by Parmenides of Elea, dialectically de 
fended in opposition to the vulgar belief in a plurality of objects 


and in revolution and change by Zeno of Elea, and finally, with 
some declension in vigor of thought, assimilated more nearly to the 
earlier natural philosophy by Melissus of Samos. 

The following authors treat especially of the Eleatic philosophers and their doctrines : Job. Gottfr. 
Walther, Eroffnete Eleatische Griiber, 2d ed., Mngdeburg and Leipsic, 1724 ; Geo. Gust Fulleborn, Liber de 
Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia Aristoteli vulgo tributus, passim ittustr. commentario, Halle, 1789 ; Job. 
Gottl. Buhle, Commentatio de ortu et progressu pantheismi inde a Xenophane primo ejus auctore usque 
ad Spinosam, Gdttingen, 1790, Comm. soc. Gott., voL X., p. 157 seq. ; G. Ludw. Spalding, Vindiciae philoso 
phorum Megarscorum subjecto commentario in primam partem libelli de Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia, 
Berlin, 1793; Fulleborn, Fragm.ente aus den Gedichten des Xenophanes und des Farm enides, in theZtet- 
iragt, eur Gesch. der Philos., " Stiicke" 6 and 7, Jena, 1 795 ; Amad. Peyron, Empedocl. et farm, frag- 
menta, Leips. 1810; Chr. Aug. Brandis, Comm. Eleat. pars l.Xenophanis, Parmenideset Melissi doctrina 
e propriis philosophorum reliquiis exposita, Alton. 1813 ; Viet. Cousin. Xenophane, fondateur de Vecolt 
d Elee, IA his Nouveaux fragmens philos., Paris, 1828, pp. 9-95 ; Rosenberg, De EL ph. primordiis, Berlin, 
1829; Sim. Karsten, Philosophorum Graecorum veterum operum reliquiae, Amsterdam, 1835 sq., vol. I., 1: 
Xenophanis Coloplionii carm. rel., I. 2: Parmenid.; Riaux, Essai sur Farm. d"Elee, Paris, 1S40; 
Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. SG-116; Theod. Bergk, Commentatio de Arist. libello de Xenophane, Zenon* 
et Gorgia, Marburg, 1843; Aug. Gladisch, Die Eleaten und die Indier, Posen, 1844; Frid. Guil. Aug. 
Mullach, Aristotelis de Melissa, Xenophane et Gorgia disputation es, cum Uleaticorum philos. frag- 
mentis, Berlin, 1845, also in Fraqm. ph. Gr., I. p. 101 seq.; E. Reinhold, De genuina Xenophanis disci- 
plina, Jena, 1847 ; Ueberwcg, Ueberden historischen Werth der Schri/t de Melissa, Zenone, Gorgia, in the 
Philol., VIII., 1S53, pp. 104-112 (where I sought to show that the second part of the work, i. e., chaps. 3 and 
4, does not contain a reliable account respecting Xenophnnos, but does so respecting Zeno; now, however, 
only my first, or negative, not the second, positive, thesis, seems to me tenable), also ibid. XXVI. 1868, 
pp. 709-711; E. F. Apelt, Parmenidis et Empedoclis doctrina de mundi structura, Jena, 1856; Conr. 
Yermehreu, Die Autorschaft der dem Aristoteles eugeschriebenen Schrift nepl Eevo^avovs, irepl Z^VCOFO*, 
repi Topyi ov, Jena, 1S62 ; Franz Kern, Quaestionum Xenophanearum capita duo (Progr. scholae For- 
ten&is), Naumburg, 1864: Symbolae criticae ad libellum. Aristotelicum de Xenophane, etc., Oldenburg, 
1S67; eo^paarou irepi M6Xi<T<rov, in the PMlologus, XXVI. 1863, pp. 271-289; Theodor Vatke, Farm, 
Yeliensis doctrina qualis fuerit (diss. inaug.\ Berl. 1864; Ileinrich Stein, Fragm. des Parmenides^ 
wept 4>vVew<r, in the Symb. philologorum Bonnensium in honorem Frid. Ritschelii coll., Leipsic, 1864-61, 
pp. 763-806; Paul buffer, De ph. Xen. Coloph. parte morali, dins, inaug., Leipsic, 1868 ; Th. Davidson, 
TJt,e Fragments of Farm., in the Journal of Specul. Philos., IV. 1, St Louis, Jan., 1870. 

That the first part (cap. 1, 2) of the treatise De Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia, transmitted to 
us among the writings of Aristotle, treats of Melissus and not of Xenophanes, Buhle has 
already demonstrated in the essay on pantheism above cited. In agreement with him and 
with Spalding with whom Fulleborn, who had before been of a different opinion, expresses 
his accord in his above-cited " Beitrdge " the same is assumed by Brandis and all later 
investigators, since this result is made perfectly manifest by a comparison of the part in 
question with the doctrines of Melissus as known to us from other sources. It is uncer 
tain to whom the second part (cap. 3, 4) relates, in the intention of the author, whether to 
Xenophanes or to Zeno; yet in no case are the contents of these chapters to be considered 
as historical.* The last part (cap. 5, 6) treats without doubt of Gorgias. Perhaps this 

* The view supported by me in one of my earliest essays (" Ueber den historischen Werth der Schri/t 
de JUeluso, Zenone, Gorgia," in Schneidewin s Philologus, VIII. 1S53, pp. 104-112), that the second part 
of the work (cap. 8, 4) relates to Zeno and contains a true report of his doctrines, I am now compelled to 
abandon, after more thorough comparison and exactor weighing of all the elements of the problem 
(assenting, as I do, substantially to the argumentation of Zeller in the 2d ed. of the first part of his Ph. d. Gr., 
p. 336 sq.). I can only hold fast, therefore, to the negative opinion, that a trustworthy report respecting 
Xenophanes is not to be found in the work. The teachings there developed (that God is eternal, one, 
tpherical, neither bounded nor unbounded, neither moved nor unmoved, might, in view of their dialectical 
form, and, in part also, in view of their nature, be more properly ascribed to Zeno than to Xenophanes. 
Both of these suppositions are, however, opposed, partly by other considerations, partly by the silence 
of Plato and Aristotle ; of Xenoph&nes, Aristotle says directly (Met,., I. 5), that he left the question 


section was intended by the author to be the first in a reverted order (see cap. 6, fin.}. The 
accounts respecting Melissus and Gorgias are substantially correct, though not so through 
out. The whole can not have been composed by Aristotle, nor by Theophrastus, but only 
by some later Aristotelian. 

The fragments preserved from the writings of the Eleatics are not very extensive, but 
they furnish us a fully authentic and, with respect to the fundamental ideas, a sufficiently 
complete view of the Eleatic philosophy. 

18. Xenophanes, of Colophon, in Asia Minor (born 569 B. c.), 
who removed later to Elea, in Lower Italy, combats in his poems the 
anthropomorphitic and anthropopathic representations of God pre 
sented by Homer and Hesiod, and enounces the doctrine of the one, 
all-controlling God-head. God is all eye, all ear, all intellect ; 
untroubled, he moves and directs all things by the power of his 

Xenophanes, according to his own statement (ap. Diog. L., IX. 19), began his wander 
ings through Hellas (as rhapsodist) at the age of twenty-five years, and lived to be more 
than ninety-two years old. If (as may be assumed with some probability from one of his 
fragments given by Athen., Deipnosoph., II. p. 54) it is true that lie left his native country 
soon after the expedition of the Persians under Harpagus against Ionia (544 B. c.), he must 
have been born about 5G9 B. c. Apollodorus (ap. Clem. Al., Strom., I. 301 c) gives 01. 40 
(620 B. c.) as the time of his birth ; more probable is the report (ap. Diog. L., IX. 20) that 
he flourished 01. 60 (540 B. c.). He outlived Pythagoras, whom he mentions after the 
death of the latter; he is himself named by Heraclitus. In his latter years he lived in 
Elea ( EA&z, Yt-A?, Velia), a Phocean colony. Fragments of his poems, though only a few 
fragments of his philosophical poems, are extant. In a fragment of some extent, pre 
served by Athenaeus (XI. p. 462), in which Xenophanes describes a cheerful feast, he 
demands first that the Deity (termed sometimes 9f6f, sometimes Geo/) be praised with pure 
and holy words, and that the banqueters be moderate and discourse of the proofs of 
virtue, and not of the contests of Titans and similar fables of the ancients (rrAdcr/zaTa 
TUV -rrpoTepuv) ; in another fragment (Ath., X. p. 413 seq.) he warns men not to think too 
highly of success in athletic contests, which he deems it wrong to prefer to intellectual 
culture (ovAf AiKaiov, trponpiveiv puyajv rr/f ayafrfjs coyitjc ). 

That the God of Xenophanes is the unity of the world is a supposition that was early 
current. We do not find this doctrine expressed in the fragments which have come 

of the ideal or material nature of the unity of God untouched, and said nothing definite concerning his 
limitation or non-limitation, whereas in chaps. 3 and 4 of the treatise De Xen., etc., it is said, on the one 
hand, that the Eleate there in question ascribed to God the spherical form, and on the other that he taught 
(the antinomy) that God is neither bounded nor unbounded. It is scarcely to be doubted that this latter 
statement arose from a misunderstanding cither of the report of Aristotle or more probably of a similar 
report by Theophrastus (which Simplic., In Fhyft^ fol. 5b, has preserved for us). Whether the (probably 
late) author of the work intends to treat of Xenopbanes or of Zeno, remains still a matter of doubt; the 
former supposition is. perhaps, attended with fewer difficulties than the latter. The author may have made 
\ise of a Pseudo-Xenophanean writing, or perhaps even of an inexact version of the doctrines and arguments 
of Xenophanes, which had been prepared partly on the authority of the misunderstood passage from Theo 
phrastus, partly from other sources. The misinterpretation was most easily possible at a time when such 
antinomies had already taken the form of philosophical dogmas (cf., for example, Plotinus, Ennead, V. 10, 
11. who teaches that God is neither bounded nor unbounded). With thin problem negative results are 
reached more easily and with greater certainty than positive ons. 


down to us, and it remains questionable whether Xenophanes pronounced himself posi 
tively in this sense, in speaking of the relation of God to the world, or whether such at 
conception was not rather thought to be implied in his teachings by other thinkers, who 
then expressed it iu the phraseology given above. In the (Platonic?) dialogue, Sophistes 
(p. 242), the leading interlocutor, a visitor from Elea, says : " The Eleatic race among us, 
from Xenophanes and even from still earlier times, assume in their philosophical dis 
courses that what is usually called All, is One"(f hog bvToq r&v KCLVTUV Kahov/tevuv). The 
"still earlier" philosophers are probably certain Orphists, who glorified Zeus as the all- 
ruling power, as beginning, middle, and end of all things. Aristotle says, Metaph., I. 5 : 
"Xenophanes, the first who professed the doctrine of unity Parmenides is called his 
disciple has not expressed himself clearly concerning the nature of the One, so that it is not 
plain whether he has in mind an ideal unity (like Parmenides, his successor) or a material 
one (like Melissus) ; he seems not to have been at all conscious of this distinction, but, with his 
regard fixed on the whole universe, he says only that God is the One." Theophrastus 
says (according to Simplic., Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 5b): v TO bv not nav Zevopavjjv vTrorideafiai. 
Timon the Sillograph (Sext. Empir., Eypotyp. Pyrrhon., I. 224) represents Xenophanes as 
saying, that whithersoever he turned his view, all things resolved themselves for him 
into unity. 

The following are all the philosophical fragments which have been preserved from the 
writings of Xenophanes. Ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., V. 601 c, and Euseb., Praeparat. Evang., 
Xril. 13: 

Elf $eof EV re $eolat. KCLI av&puiroi 
OVTS deuaq fivrfrolaiv dftouof OVTE vorjfia. 

Ap. Sextus Empir., Adv. Math,, IX. 144, cf. Diog. L., IX. 19: 

Or>Aof 6pa, ovfat tie voel, ovfa) 6e r aicovei. 
Ap. Simplic., Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 6 a: 


Ovde ftETEpxEG&ai fitv eirnrpeTrei o/l3,ore (or d/l/lo#ev) 
Ibid. : 

A/IA curavevfiE Trovoto voov <b(>Evl Travra 

Ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., Y. 601 c, and Euseb., Praepar. Evang., XIII. 13 : 
A/i^d (3poTol AoKEOvGt ^Eovg ~yvvaG"&(u (zSeiv TE ?) 
TTJV acpeTEpTjv r ala^rjaiv EXEI.V <buvf/v re OEfiaq re. 
A/l/l slrot X E ~ L P&S / fijov /3def ye heovTEC, 
Kal -ypd-tyat xeipeaai nal epya Tsfalv cnrsp &v6pe^ 
"ITTTTOI /H.EV & tTnroiai, j3o<; 6i TE fiovoiv 6[ioia 
Kat KE &(jv Idiaq eypaipov nai awyi/ar iiroiow 
o\6v TTEp /cat avrol (It^nf EI%OV CKO.OTOI.. 

Cf. Clem. Alex., Strom., VII. p. til b.: 6f 

9pd/cf re Trvppoyf nal -y^avKovg (soil. TOV$ &EOVS 6iaZuypafovatv), which is also reported 
by Theodoret., Grace. Affect, curat., Serm. III. p. 49, ed. Sylb. Ap. Sext. Empir., Adv. Math.. 
IX. 193 ; 

Hdvra i^eoZf avedriKav "OftTjpog i? f Hff/o(5<5f re, 

Oaaa Trap avdpuTrotatv ove/dea vral T/;oyof kariv, 

KAeVrav, /uoixevetv re /cnt d/l/l^/lovc cnraTEvecv. 


/bid. I. 289: 

/cara TOV 

0* TrAeZor ifyftiyt-avro fietiv dfieuioTia pya, 
TC /cat a 

Arist., 7?^., II. 23, p. 1399 b, 6: Hfvo^dv^f ^Xcyev OTI 6/zot wc aoefiovaiv ol yevtctiai 
roif tfeovf roZf d:roi?avtv "Aeyovoiv d^oT^pu^ -yap av/nftaivei //# elvat TOV tfcot^ 
irorf. /fcstf. 1400 b, 5: 2>. EAcdrajf ipuroaiv ei -&i>oai TT/ Atwcotfeo /cat dpqvuaiv, $ /^, 
cweftoiifavev, el uev $tov inroAafiftdvova^ dpTjvecv, el 6 av&puTrov, prj dvetv. 

[The verse, e/c yat^f yap Travra Kal tif yr/v Trdvra reAfvro, cited by Sext. Empir. (Adv. 
Math., X. 313, but on the authority of others: " Efvocfrdv^f df /car fv/ovf,") and by Stobaeus 
(Eel. Phys., I. p. 294, ed. Heeren) and others, seems to have been erroneously ascribed to 
Xenophanes. Aristotle testifies (J/et, I. 8, p. 989 a^ 5): "No philosopher has regarded 
earth in the sense in which Thales regarded water, Anaximenes air, and Heraclitus fire, 
as a unique material principle. Meiners (Hist. Doctr. de Vero Deo, p. 327), and after him 
Heeren, Karsten, and others, have held this verse to be a forgery.] Ap. Sext. Empir., Adv. 
Math., IX. 361; X. 313, and others: 

yap yaifff re KOI vdaroc 
Ap. Stobaeus, Florileg., XXIX. 41, ed. Gaisf., and Eclog., I. p. 224: 

QVTOI air apx^ -ndvra tieol tfvjyrolf Trapideit-av, 

Ap. Plutarch., Sympos., IX. p. 746 b: 

Tatira fadoS-aarai pev iom6ra rolf irvfioiotv. 
Ap. Seit. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 49 and 110, VIII. 326, and others: 

Kal TO. fiev ovv oa<j>e<; ovrtf dvryp Idev ov6e rif iarai 
EiJwf, dfi<f>l -&CUV re Kal aooa teyu irepl Trdvruv 
Et yap Kal TO uakicra TV^OI rereT^ap-ivov e nrtjv, 
OVK oi6e <5d/cof cJ enl iraoi rirvarat. 

The most noteworthy of the physical theorems of Xenophanes, after his fundamental 
doctrine, that earth and water are the elements of all created things, is the opinion, com 
bated by Empedocles (in the verses cited by Arist., De Coelo, II. 12, p. 204 a, 25: elirep 
(nreipova yfjq re flatty nal 6aifjiXo aidqp, u$ 6id TTOAAUV 6q yAucoTis prjOfvra fiaraiu^ eKKt^vrai 
frroudruv bMyov TOV Travrof tdovTuv), that the earth extends without limit downward, and 
the air upward ; the verses in which this view is expressed are communicated by Achilles 
Tatius in hia Isagoge ad Aratum (ap. Petav., Doctr. Temp., III. 76) : 

TatTjf; fikv Tode ire ipa^ dvw ?rapd irooalv oparai 
A tdepi tr pooTrhd^ov rd /cdro <5 e f anetpov 

With this doctrine the assertion, sometimes attributed to Xenophanes (but perhaps only 
through the false transference to him of a Parmenidean theorem), that the Deity is spherical, 
does not agree. Xenophanes held the stars (according to Stob., Eel, I. 522) to be fiery clouds : 
the rainbow also was termed by him a vi^ . Xenophanes (according to Origen, PUloso- 
phumena. or rather Hippolytus, Adv. Haereticos, I. 14) explained the fact that sea-animals 
were found petrified in the mines of Syracuse, in the marble quarries on the island of 
Paros, and in many other places both inland and on mountains, by the hypothesis, that 


the sea had once covered the land ; and this hypothesis was immediately enlarged by him 
into the theory of a periodical, alternate mixing and separation of earth and water. 
Xeniades of Corinth is incorrectly named (by Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., VIII. 53, et al.) as a 
disciple of Xenophanes. 

19. Parmenides of Elea, born about 515-510 B. c. (so that his 
youth falls in the time of the old age of Xenophanes), is the most 
important of the Eleatic philosophers. He founds the doctrine of unity 
on the conception of being. He teaches : Only being is, non-being is 
not ; there is no becoming. That which truly is exists in the form of 
a single and eternal sphere, whose space it fills continuously. Plu 
rality and change are an empty semblance. The existent alone ia 
thinkable, and only the thinkable is real. Of the one true existence, 
convincing knowledge is attainable by thought ; but the deceptions 
of the senses seduce men into mere opinion and into the deceitful, 
rhetorical display of discourse respecting the things, which are sup 
posed to be manifold and changing. In his (hypothetical) explanation 
of the world of appearance, Parmenides sets out from two opposed 
principles, which bear to each other, within the sphere of appearance, 
a relation similar to that which exists between being and non-being. 
These principles are light and night, with which the antithesis of fire 
and earth corresponds. 

That Parmenides received through Xenophanes the philosophical impulses which gave 
direction to his own thinking, we must suppose, even setting aside later evidence, from 
the following language of the (Platonic?) dialogue Sophistes (p. 242): "the Eleatic race 
of philosophers dating from the time of Xenophanes (and even earlier)." Aristotle says 
(Metaph., I. 5): " Parmenides is said (teyeTai) to have been his (Xenophanes ) pupiL Here 
Ae-yerai is, perhaps, not to be taken as signifying an uncertainty on the part of Aristotle 
with respect to the personal relation of the two philosophers, but as pointing to the half- 
truth of the term "pupil" (//a^rr/f), since Parmenides may have been incited to his 
inquiries more by the writings of Xenophanes than by his oral instruction, and since he 
does not stand merely in the relation of a scholar to his predecessor, having himself first 
created the metaphysical principles of Eleaticism. Theophrastus expresses the relation 
in which Parmenides stood to Xenophanes by the use of the term iiriyevopevos (in a 
passage in the first book of his Physics, as cited by Alexander Aphrodis., Schol. in Arist., 
ed. Brandis, p. 536 a, 10 : TOITCJ 6e en-fyevo/LiEvoz TLapfievidw Ili p^rof 6 EAedrjyc). Plato, 
Theaet., p. 180 e (cf. Soph-., p. 217 c) represents Socrates as saying that, while still very 
young, he met Parmenides, who was already advanced in years (irdw veo$ TTO.W rcpeafivTij), 
as the latter was expounding his philosophical doctrines. From this story the scenery in 
the (probably spurious) dialogue Parmenides is derived, while more specific statements are 
added as to the ages of Parmenides (65 years) and his companion Zeno (40 years) at the time 
alluded to by Socrates. "Whether a meeting between Socrates and Parmenides really took 
place, or was only imagined by Plato, is doubtful; but the former supposition is by far the 
more probable, since Plato would scarcely have allowed himself the fiction here merely for 
scenic effect ; still less would he have done so in tho narrative introduced in the Theaetetuj. 


But even if it were only a fiction, Plato would be careful not to offer too great violence 
in it to chronological possibility. The report of Diog. Laert. (IX. 23), that Parmenides 
" flourished" in 01. 69 (504-500 B. c.), must, therefore, be erroneous; at that time he can 
scarcely have been more than a few years old. The probable reference of Parmenides, 
in hia argumentation, to Heraclitus (see above, 15), of itself implies that the former 
was younger than Heraclitus. Parmenides appears not to have written his "work " before 
about 475-470. 

Parmenides is said to have exerted a salutary influence on the legislation and morals 
of his native city, where he supported the ethico-political doctrine and action of the 
Pythagoreans. (Diog. L. says [IX. 23] : Myerac 6k KOI vd//ouf delvai rotf irokiTaic, tjf Qqat 
Zirevannros kv rtJ wepl Qihoooyciv.) For the moral character and the philosophy of Par 
menides Plato expresses the highest respect. Aristotle places a lower estimate on his 
doctrine and argumentation, but admits that he was the ablest thinker among the 

In his Didactic Poem (the fragments of which are found in Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., 
VII. Ill ; Diog. Lae rt., IX. 22; Proclus, Comm. to Plato s Timaeus; Simpllcms, ad Arist. Phys., 
etc.), Parmenides represents the goddess of wisdom, to whose seat he is drawn by horses 
under the guidance of the virgin daughters of Helios, as opening up to him the double 
insight, not only into convincing truth, but also into the deceptive opinions of mortals (xP <-> 
6e ae irdvra TrvfieoOai, r//ztv aMfltiris Evireidfos drpE/cff f]rop, ij6k ftporuv (5oaf, ratf OVK evi 
Trtartf oAj7<%). Truth consists in the knowledge that being is, and non-being can not be ; 
deception lies in the belief that non-beiu^ also is and must be. Parmenides describes the 
goddess as saying (in a fragment preserved by Proclus in his Comm. on Plato s Timaeus, 
II. p. 105b, ed. Baa.): 

H /zfv, OTrwf eoriv TC /cat df OVK EOTI p) elvoi 
Hei6ov$ ear i /ctfoWtof, afafitir) yap bKTjdel. 
*H (T, d>f OVK. EOTIV re /cat <if xpeuv iorc fir) etvat, 
Irjv 6tj COL $pdu Travatreudea ifi^v drapTrov 
Ovre yap av yvoirjs r6 ye prj iov (ov yap e 

After this appear to have followed immediately the words (cited by Clem. Alex., Strom., VI. 
p. 627 b, and by Plotinus, Ennead., V. 1, 8) : 

TO yap avTb voelv kariv re /cat elvai. 

1. 1. : The predicate being belongs to thought itself; that I think something and that 
this, which I think, is (in my thought), are identical assertions; non-being that whicji is_ 
not can not bo thought, can, so to speak, not be reached, since every thing, wheri it is 
thought, exists as thought ; no thought can bo non-existent or without being, for there is 
nothing to which the predicate being does not belong, or which exists outside of the sphere 
of being. In this argumentation Parmenides mistakes the distinction between the subjective 
being of thought and an objective realm of being to which thought is directed, by direct 
ing his attention only to the fact that both are subjects of the predicate being. Says 
Parmenides (ap. Simplic., Ad Phys., fol. 31, in the third line, we write <n><5 rjv instead of 
, according to Bergk s conjecture, see Ind. Led. Hal., 1867-68) : 

[* A metrical translation of all the Parmenidean fragments cited in this section may be read in th 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, St. Louis, Jan., 1870, VoL IV., No. 1. The doctrine contained in them 
folly explained in the text. 2V.] 


EGTI voetv re Kat OVVEKEV EOTI v6rjfj.a 
Ov yap dvfv TOV kovTo<;, kv <y 7T<f>aTiGuevov EGTW, 
Evpfatic TO VOECV odd rjv -yap rj EGTIV rj carat 
"AA/lo irapEK TOV kovToq. 

Not the senses, which picture to us plurality and change, conduct to truth, but only 
thought, which recognizes the being of that which is, as necessary, and the existence of 
that which is not, as impossible. Farm., ap. Sext. Empir., VII. Ill : 

A/Ud cv rrjaff dij> 66ov 6iqoiog elpye vdyfia, 

M.Tj6 o j etfof Tro/KjTTEtpov otJov /card Trjv6e (3ida&u t 

No/tdv dovcoTTOi bfJifJia /cat Tfxqeooav anovrfv 

Kat yTiuGGav Kplvai 6e /loycj xo Xvdijpt.v 

Much severer still than his condemnation of the naive confidence of the mass of men 
in the illusory reports of the senses, is that with which Parmeuides visits a philosophical 
doctrine which, as he assumes, makes of this very illusion (not, indeed, as illusion, in 
which sense Parmenides himself proposes a theory of the sensible, but as supposed truth) 
the basis of a theory that falsifies thought, in that it declares non-being identical with 
being. It is very probable that the Heraclitean doctrine is the one on which Parmenides 
thus animadverts, however indignantly Heraclitus might have resented this association of 
his doctrine with the prejudice of the masses, who do not rise above the false appearances 
of the senses; the judgment of Plato (Theaei, p. 179) and Aristotle (De Anima, I. 2, p. 
405 a, 28 : kv KLvrjau 6 dvai TO, OVTO. /ca/ceZvof wero Kat ol TroA/toi ) agrees with that of Parmen 
ides with respect to the matter in question. Parmenides says (ap. Simplicius, Ad Phys. } foL 
19 a and 25 a): 

Xp# oe \tytiv Te votv T kbv /u.fievai ecTi yap etvtw, 
zv 6 OVK. ivat TO. <? Eyu <j>pd^G &at avuya. 

CKJ) 66ov TavTrjs fiityaios elpye vorjua, 
AvTap EireiT airb r^f, y 6rj fipoTol t66TE<; ovdev 
dinpavoi a/uqxavir} ydp kv 
TrAay/crov vdov, ol de 

T T^ff<pOT 

Olf TO -nifatv TE /cat OVK Eivai TUVTOV 

Kov TCJVTOV, iravTuv TE TraAtvrpoTrdf EGTI KE 

Parmenides (in a passage of some length, given by Simpl, Ad Phys., fol. Slab) ascribes 
to the truly existent all the predicates which are implied in the abstract conception of being, 
and then proceeds further to characterize it as a continuous sphere, extending uni 
formly from the center in all directions a description which we are scarcely authorized 
in interpreting as merely symbolical, in the conscious intention of Parmenides. That which 
truly is, is without origin and indestructible, a unique whole, only-begotten, immovable, 
and eternal-, it was not and will not be, but is, and forms a continuum. 

Movog fF Ti [tv&oc 66010 
ECTLV TavTy <F ETTI c^ar earn 
IIoA/ld [idli wf ayEVTjTov kbv /cat dvufa&pov mrtv, 
Ov/W, iiowoyEVEt; TE /cat drpe/zff rj& CLTE faaTov * 
Ot> TTOT Erjv ov6 arat, 7Tft vvv EGTIV 6/j.ov Trav, 
"Ev fwe^f. 

according to Bergk s conjecture. 


For what origin should it have ? How could it grow ? It can neither have arisen from 
the non-existent, since this has no existence, nor from the existent, since it is itself the 
exisient. There is, therefore, no becoming, and no decay (rwf ysvEcic fj.ev aTreafieorat KOI 
d-maros 6/te0pof). The truly existent is indivisible, everywhere like itself, and ever iden 
tical with itself. It exists independently, in and for itself (rcwrov T iv ruvry re fiivov naff 
iavro re Keirai), thinking, and comprehending in itself all thought ; it exists in the form of a 
well-rounded sphere (-dvrodev EVKVK?MV otiaipw tvaXiymov oy/cw /neaaodev iaoTratec iravrij). 

The Parmenidean doctrine of the apparent world is a cosmogony, suggesting, on the one 
hand, Anaximander s doctrine of the warm and the cold as the first-developed contraries and 
the Heraclitean doctrine of the transformations of fire, and, on the other, the Pythagorean 
opposition of "limit" and "the unlimited" (aireipov), and the Pythagorean doctrine of con 
traries generally. It is founded on the hypothesis of a universal mixture of warm and 
cold, light and dark. The warm and light is ethereal fire, which, as the positive and efficient 
principle, represents within the sphere of appearance the place of being; the cold and 
dark is air and its product, by condensation (see Euseb., Praepar. Evang., I. 8, 7 : Myei 
6e rrjv yijv rov TTVKVOV narap pvivro<; depof yeyovivai), earth. The combining or "mixing" 
of the contraries is effected by the all-controlling Deity (Aou/zwv fj navra Kvfapvg), at whose 
will Eros came into existence as first, in time, of the gods (irpuriorov fifv "Epora Oeuv 
HTjriaaro Trdvruv, Plat., Symp., 178 b, where, as Schanz has shown, the words from HcriotJcj 
to ofiofayel, together with 6f must be placed before Qrjai; Arist., Metaph., 1. 4, 984 b, 
26). That which fills space and that which thinks, are the same ; how a man shall think, 
depends on the " mixture " of his bodily organs ; a dead body perceives cold and silence 
(Parm., ap, Theophrast., De Sensu, 3, where, however, in the sentence: TO yap Trheov earl 
voTi/ia, the words TO jrheov mean, not the preponderating, but the full, or space which is 

If the verse in the long fragment, ap, Simplicius, in Phys., f. 31 a, et al. (also ap. Plat., 
Theaet., p. 180): olov anivrjrov r* epevai, rw TTCLVT bvo p kariv, baaa fiporol Karc&evTo TrsTroi &oTe^ 
elvat ahrfdri, yiyvecdai TE nai oAAwn^af, etc., could be emended (as is done by Gladisch, who 
seeks in it an analogue to the Maja of the Hindus) so as to read: roi irdv- bvap kcriv, 
Parmenides would appear as having explained the plurality and change attested by the 
senses, as a dream of the one true existence. But this conjecture is arbitrary ; and the 
words cited in the Soph., p. 242 : d>f evof ovrof runt irdvruv /caAoi^evwr, as also the doctrine 
of the Megarians concerning the many names of the One, which alone really exists, confirm 
the reading 6vo/z of the MSS. The sense of the passage is therefore : "All the manifold 
and changing world, which mortals suppose to be real, and which they call the sum of 
things, is in reality only the One, which alone truly is." 

In the philosophy of Parmenides no distinction is reached between appearance, or sem 
blance, and phenomenon. The terms being and appearance remain with him philosoph- , 
ically unreconciled ; the existence of a realm of mere appearance is incompatible with the 
fundamental principle of Parmenides. 

20. Zeno of Elea (born about 490-485 B. c.) defended the doctrine 
of Parmenides by an indirect demonstration, in which he sought to 
show that the supposition of the real existence of things manifold 
and changing, leads to contradictions. In particular, he opposed to 
the reality of motion four arguments : 1. Motion can not begin, 
because a body in motion can not arrive at another place until it has 


passed through an unlimited number of intermediate places. 2. 
Achilles can not overtake the tortoise, because as often as he reaches 
the place occupied by the tortoise at a previous moment, the latter 
has already left it. 3. The flying arrow is at rest ; for it is at every 
moment only in one place. 4. The half of a division of time is equal 
to the whole ; for the same point, moving with the same velocity, 
traverses an equal distance (i. e., when compared, in the one case, 
with a point at rest, in the other, with a point in motion) in the one 
case, in half of a given time, in the other, in the whole of that time. 

C. H. E. Lohse, De Aryumentis, quibus Zeno Eleaies nulluni esse motum demonstravit, Halle, 1794. 
Ch. L. Gerling, De Zenonis Eleatici paralogismis motum spectantibus, Marburg, 1825. 

Zeno, disciple and friend of Parmenides, is reported (by Strabo, VI. 1) to have joined his 
master in his ethico-political efforts, and at last (by Diog. Laert., IX. 26, and many others), 
after an unsuccessful enterprise against the tyrant Nearchus (or, according to others, 
Diomedon), to have been seized and put to death amid tortures, which he endured with 

In the (Platonic ?) dialogue Parmenides, a prose writing (avyypap/Lta) of Zeno is men 
tioned, which was distributed into several series of argumentations (hdyoi), in each of 
which a number of hypotheses (imoOiceis) were laid down with a view to their reductio in 
absurdum, and so to the indirect demonstration of the truth of the doctrine that Being is 
One. It is probably on account of this (indirect) method of demonstration from hypotheses, 
that Aristotle (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 7, and Diog. Laert., VIII. 57 ; IX. 
25) called Zeno the inventor of dialectic (svperf/v dftAexrusfa). 

If the manifold exists, argues Zeno (ap. Simplic., Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 30), it must be at 
the same time infinitely small and infinitely great ; the former, because its last divisions 
are without magnitude,, the latter, on account of the infinite number of these divisions. 
(In this argument Zeno leaves out of consideration the inverse ratio constantly maintained 
between magnitude and number of parts, as the division advances, whereby the same 
product is constantly maintained, and he isolates the notions of smallness and number, 
opposing the one to the other.) In a similar manner Zeno shows that the manifold, if it 
exists, must be at the same time numerically limited and unlimited. 

Zeno argues, further (according to Arist., Phys., IV. 3 ; cf. Simplic., In Phys., fol. 130 b), 
against the reality of space. If all that exists were in a given space, this space must be 
in another space, and so on in infinitum. 

Against the veracity of sensuous perception, Zeno directed (according to Arist., Phys., 
VII. 5, and Simplic. on this passage) the following argument : If a measure of millet-grains 
in falling produce a sound, each single grain and each smallest fraction of a grain must 
also produce a sound ; but if the latter is not the case, then the whole measure of grains, 
whose effect is but the sum of the effects of its parts, can also produce no sound. (The 
method of argumentation here employed is similar to that in the first argument against 

The arguments of Zeno against the reality of motion (cited by Arist., Phys., VI. 2, p. 233 a, 
21 and 9, p. 239 b, 5 seq., and the Commentators) have had no insignificant influence on 
the development of metaphysics in earlier and later times. Aristotle answers the two 
first (ibid. c. 2) with the observation (p. 233 a, 11) that the divisions of time and space are 
the same and equal (rdf avrdf yap /cat raq taay diatpeaeiq b XP&VOS diaipelrai nai 


for both time and space are continuous (awexty ; that a distance divisible in infinitwm- can 
therefore certainly be traversed in a finite time, since the latter is also in like manner 
divisible in infinitum, and the divisions of time correspond with the divisions of space ; the 
infinite in division (ameipov KOTO, diaipeaiv) is to be distinguished from the infinite in extent 
(aKtipov ToZf cff^arojf) ; his reply to the third argument (c. 9) is, that time does not consist 
of single indivisible points (conceived as discontinuous) or of "nows" (p. 239 b, 8: ov yap 
cvyneLTat 6 xp6vo$ EK ruv vvv TUV atiiaipirurv). In the fourth argument he points out what 
Zeno, as it seems, had but poorly concealed, viz., the change of the standard of comparison 
(p. 240 a, 2 : ro ^v napa mvovnevov, TO 6e Trap Tjpep.ovv). It can be questioned whether the 
Aristotelian answers are fully satisfactory for the first three arguments (for in the fourth 
the paralogism is obvious). Bayle has attacked them in his Dictionnaire Hist, et Crit. 
(Article, Ztn&n}. Hegel (Geschichte der Phil., I. p. 316 seq.) defends Aristotle against 
Bayle. Yet Hegel himself also sees in motion a contradiction ; nevertheless, he regards 
motion as a real fact. Herbart denies the reality of motion on account of the contradiction 
which, in his opinion, it involves.* 

21. Melissus of Samos attempts by a direct demonstration 
to establish the truth of the fundamental thought of the Eleatic 
philosophy, that only the One is. By unity, however, he understands 
rather the continuity of substance than the notional identity of being. 
That which is, the truly existent, is eternal, infinite, one, in all points 
the same or " like itself," unmoved and passionless. 

It is extremely probable that Melissus the philosopher is identical with Melissus the 
statesman and admiral, who commanded the fleet of the Samians on the occasion of their 
victory over the Athenians, 440 B. c. (Plut., Perid., c. 26; TJiemist, c. 2; Thucyd., I. 117). 

Several fragments of the work of Melissus, " On the Existent " (or " On Nature ") are 
found in Simplic., Ad Arist Phys. (fol. 7, 22, 24, and 34), and Id., in At-ist. De Coelo (fol. 
137); with them agrees almost exactly the section on this philosopher in the Pseudo- 
Aristotelian work, De Melisso, etc. Cf. the works of Brandis, Mullach, and others cited 
above ( 17). 

If nothing were, argues Melissus, how were it then even possible to speak of it, as 
of something being? But if any thing is, then it has either become or is eternal. In the 
former case, it must have arisen either from being or from non-being. But nothing can 
corae from non-being ; and being can not have arisen from being, for then there must 
have been being, before being came to be (became). Hence being did not become ; hence 
it is eternal. It will also not perish ; for being can not become non-being, and if being 
change to being, it has not perished. Therefore it always was and always will be. 

As without genesis, and indestructible, being has no beginning and no end ; it is, there 
fore, infinite. (It is eaav to perceive here the leap in argumentation from temporal 
infinity to the infinity of space, which very likely contributed essentially to draw on Me 
lissus Aristotle s reproach of feebleness of thought.) 

As infinite, being is One ; for if it were dual or plural, its members would mutually 
limit each other, and so it would not be infinite. 

As one, being is unchangeable ; for change would pluralize it. More particularly, it ia 

* In my "System der Lo<jik," 2d ed., Bonn, 1865, pp. 176, 86T seq., I have discussed these problem* 
more thoroughly than was possible or appropriate ia this place. 


unmoved; for there exists no empty space in which it can move, since such a space, if it 
existed, would be an existing nothing ; and being can not move within itself, for then the 
One would become a divisum, hence manifold. 

Notwithstanding the infinite extension which Melissus attributes to being, he will not 
have it called material, since whatever is material has parts, and so can not be a unity. 

22. While the later Natural Philosophers asserted with the 
Eleatics the immutability of substance, they assumed, in opposition 
to the Eleatics, a plurality of unchangeable substances, and reduced 
all development aod change, all apparent genesis and destruction, to 
a change in the relations of these substances to one another. In 
order to explain the orderly change of relations, Empedocles and 
Anaxagoras taught the existence of a spiritual force in addition to 
the material substances, while the Atomistic philosophers (Leucippus 
and Democritus) sought to comprehend all phenomena as products 
of matter and motion alone. The hylozoism of the earlier natural 
philosophers was thus superseded in principle by the severance of the 
moving cause from matter; yet its after-influence remained quite 
considerable, as seen chiefly in the doctrines of Empedocles, and also, 
but less prominently, in those of Anaxagoras and the Atomists. 
Anaxagoras (and Empedocles also, so far as love and hate are repre 
sented by him as independent forces, separate from the material 
elements) advanced in principle to a Dualism of mind and matter ; 
while the Atomists proceeded to Materialism. 

The earliest Greek philosophers advanced gradually but constantly from the sphere of 
sensuous intuition toward the sphere of abstractions. This movement culminated, with the 
Eleatic philosophers, in the most abstract of all conceptions, the conception of Being. But 
from the stand-point thus reached it was found impossible to furnish an explanation of 
phenomena ; hence the tendency among the philosophers immediately subsequent to the 
Eleatics, so to conceive the principle of things that, without denying the unity and con 
stancy of being, a way might yet be opened up leading to the plurality and change of the 
phenomenal world. In particular, they sought to account for the change and development 
or the becoming of things, which (like their being) remained unexplained in the conceptions 
of the earlier natural philosophers, lay reducing the same to the motion (combination and 
separation) of elements, whose quality is invariable. The boundary-line, which separates 
the earlier from the later natural philosophy, lies in the Eleatic philosophy, or more pre 
cisely in the ontology of Parmenides not in Xenophanes theological doctrine of unity. 
Heraclitus, who taught later than Xenophanes, but earlier than Parmenides, belongs, by 
the character of his doctrine, to the earlier philosophers, and is not to be associated with 
the group formed by Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. 

23. Empedocles of Agrigentum, born not long after 500 B. c., 
posits in his didactic poem " On Nature," as the material principles 
or " roots " of things, the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, to 


which he joins as moving forces two ideal principles : love as a uniting, 
and hate as a separating force. The periods of the formation of the 
world depend on the alternate prevalence of love and hate. During 
certain periods all heterogeneous elements are separated from each 
other by hate ; during others, they are everywhere united by love. 
We know things in their material and ideal elements by virtue of 
the like material and ideal elements in ourselves. 

Special works on Empedocles are the following: Frid. Guil. Sturz, De Empedoclis Agrigentini vita et 
philosophia epos., carminum reliq. coll., Leips. 1805; Arnadeus Peyron, Empedoclis et Parmenidis 
fragmenta, Leips. 1810; H. Ritter, Ueber die philosophised Lehre den Empedokles, in Wolfs Litera- 
rische Analekten, Vol. II., 1820, p. 411 seq. ; Lommatzsch, Die Weisheit des Ewpedokles, Berl. 1830; Simon 
Karsten, Emp. Agrig. carminum reliquiae (vol. 2 of the Reliquiae phil. vet. Graec.), Amst. 1888; Th. 
Bergk, Emp. fragmenta, in the Poet, lyr. Or., Leips. (1843, 53) 1S66; De prooemio EmpedocUs, Berl. 
1839; Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 116-129; Panzerbieter, Beitrage zur Kritik und Erlduterung des 
Empedokles, Meiningen, 1844, and Zeitochr. f. A. W., 1845, pp. 888 eeq. ; Raynaud, De Emp., Strasburg, 
1848; Mullach, DeEmp. prooemio, Berlin, 1850; Quaestionum Emp. specimen secundum, ib. 1852; Philos. 
Gr.fragm., XIV. seq., 15 seq. ; Heinrich Stein, Emp. Agrig. fragmenta ed., praemissa disp. de Empedocli* 
scriptis, Bonn, 1852; W. Hollenberg; Empedoclea, Berlin, 1853 (" Gymnasial-Programm"); E. F. Apelt, 
Parmenidis et Empedoclis doctrina de mundi structura, Jena, 1856; A Gladisch, Empedokles und 
die Aegypter, eine ftistor. Untersuchung, mit Erl duterungen aus den aegypt. Denkmdlem von H. 
Brugsch und Jos. Passalacqua, Leipaic, 1858; cf. Gladisch, Emp. und die alien Aegypter, in Noack s 
Jahrb. fur speeulat. Philos., 184T, Heft 4, No. 32, Heft 5, No. 41 ; Das mystische vierspeichige Rad bei 
den alien Aegyptern und ITellenen, in the Zeitschr. der deutschen morgenldnd. Gesellschaft, Vol. XV., 
Heft 2, p. 406 seq.; H. Winnefeld, Die Philosophic des Empedokles (" Donaueschinger Gymn.-Pro- 
gramm "), Rastatt, 1862. 

The testimony of Aristotle (Met., I. 3) requires us to consider Empedocles as a contem 
porary of Anaxagoras, but younger than the latter philosopher, who was born, probably, 
about 500 B. c. According to Aristotle (op. Diog. L., VIII. 52, 74), he lived sixty years, so 
that we may (with Zeller) adopt 492 and 432 as the approximate dates of his birth and 
death, respectively. His family belonged to the democratic party, for which Empedocles, 
like his father Meton, labored successfully. He visited numerous cities in Sicily and Italy 
in the character of physician, sacrificial priest, and thaumaturgist, claiming for himself 
magical powers. Aristotle is said (Diog. L., VIII. 57, IX. 25 ; Sext. Emp., VII. 6) to have 
termed him the inventor of rhetoric, as he called Zeno the inventor of dialectic. 

We know with certainty of only two works written by Empedocles : Kepi (fiffeue and 
Kadap[j.o i, (Diog. L., VIII. 77) ; the carping ?-o} oc (mentioned by Diog., ibid.) may have been a 
part of the tyvaiKa, and of the tragedy, which was ascribed to him by some, others deny 
that he was the author (Diog. L., VIII. 57). 

Empedocles combats the hypothesis of absolute generation and decay : nothing, which 
previously was not, can come into being, and nothing existing can be annihilated. The 
phenomena usually referred to those heads result respectively from the commingling and 
separation of elements (fJ-l^i^ 6tdhha;i<; re fiiyevTurv) j actual origination (<j>i>oi) is a name void 
of objective meaning. The mingling of elements is the work of Love (<f>doTw, oropyfj, A</>po- 
dirTj), their separation is effectuated by Hate (NeZ/cof) ; to the former Empedocles applies 
the predicate jjTrioQpuv (kindly disposed), the latter he terms destructive, baneful, furious 
(ovh6/j,evov, Avypov, paivo/uevov), so that obviously the opposition of these two forces was in 
his mind in a certain sense identical with that of good and evil. The primitive material 
elements, which remain unchanged in all mixture and separation, are fire (fri p, 
f, Zei>f dpyfc), air (aiOqp, ovpav6s, "Uprj ^epea/frof), water (vdup, 


c, Qahaooa, N^irnc), and earth (y% *0v, AZdowevf). Empedocles cal* these elements 
roots (ricGapa TUV Trdvruv pt^ufiara). 

In their original condition the elements are described by Empedocles as being all 
mingled together and forming one all-including sphere (o<palpos Aristotle, following the 
sense of Empedocles, terms the cQaipos the evdaiftovtaraToc fedc, Met, III. 4, p. ] 000 b, 3). 
In this sphere love is supreme and hate is powerless. By the gradual development, how- 
ever, of the influence of hate the elements become separated and individual things and 
beings come into existence. When the extreme of separation is reached, when hate alone 
rules and love is inactive, individual existence disappears again. Then follows a period when 
love regains its power and unites what was separated, while individual existences appear 
anew, till at last, love becoming, as at first, sole ruler, individual things again disappear and 
the original condition is restored. The changes thus described are then repeated in the 
same order, and continue without end to follow each other in periodical succession. Cf. 
Arist., Phys., VIII. 1 ; Plat. (?), Soph., p. 242. 

Of the members of the organic creation, the plants sprang first from the earth, while 
the latter was still in process of development. After them came the animals, their dif 
ferent parts having first formed themselves independently and then been joined by love ; 
subsequently, the ordinary method of reproduction took the place of this original genera- 
tion (Plutarch, De Plac. Philos., V. 19, 26). At first eyes, arms, etc., existed separately; 
as the result of their combination arose many monstrosities, which perished ; those com 
binations which were capable of subsisting, persisted, and propagated themselves. Em 
pedocles, in Arist., De Coelo, III. 2, and Simplic., Comm. in De Coelo, f. 144 b : 

fiev ndpaat 

Tvfivol 6 ir?idovTo (3pax iov(; 
Ofifjiara <T oZ fTrAavaro TrevijTevovra 
Avrap ifret Kara fiel^ov kfiicyfro daifiavi 
Tavrd re Gv^ni^TEGKov, OTTTJ owinvpoev 
"A/Ud re Trpdf roi<; Tro/lAd 6i7fi>K<; k^eyivovro. 

By the Saifiov^ the elements are apparently to be understood, Alduvevs, NTJOTH;, etc. This 
doctrine of Empedocles is thus expressed by Aristotle, Phys., II. 8 : OTTOV fiev ovv cnravra OWE fly 
hoirep nav d evend rov kyivero, ravra [lev kcudrj dirb TOV avTopdrov avardvra kTTLrrjdei^ baa 6e 
fir} ovTuq, dirufaro KO.I (nr6MvTai, Kaddrrep E/LtTredoK^ "teyei rd flovyevij dvdpoTrpupa, to which 
Aristotle replies, that the organisms constructed in apparent conformity to a plan, do not 
appear singly, as would be expected if their origin were fortuitous, but fj del r) wf ircl TO iroXv. 

Since the higher forms of life can only arise out of the lower, these latter must be 
regarded as the lower stages, through which the former must pass. Empedocles says (ap. 
Diog. L., VIII. 77): 

Hfiq yap TTOT kyu yv6/u.7jv novpdc re K6prj TE 
r" oluv6<; re nal elv aXl 

* This doctrine may be compared with the natural philosophy of Schilling and Oken and the theory 
of derivation as propounded by Lamarck and Darwin ; still, according to the latter, the progress from lower 
to higher in the development of species is rather a result of successive differentiations of simple forms, while 
the Empedoclean doctrine views it as resulting from the combination of heterogeneous forms ; but even 
this difference is only relative. Ernst Hackel, an investigator who has adopted the theory of Darwin and 
contributed to its further development, traces (in his Naturl. Schopftingsgenchichte, 2d ed., Berlin, 1870) the 
"genealogical tree of man" from the "monadic" forms of life down through primitive animals of one and 
of many cells, radiate infusoria, worms, fishes, reptiles, marsupialia. apes end orang-outangs, ending, 
finally, with u speech-endowed man." 


Erapedocles explains the workings of distant bodies on each other, and the possibility 
of the mixture of elements, by the hypothesis of effluxes (anoppoai) proceeding from all 
objects, and of pores (Trdpo/), into which these effluxes enter ; some effluxes are adapted 
to specific pores, for which others would be too large or too small. By this theory 
Empedocles also accounts for sensuous perception. In the case of seeing, a twofold 
efflux takes place: on the one hand, effluxes pass from the objects seen to the eye (Plat., 
Meno, p. 76; Arist., De Sensu et Sensibili, c. 2, p. 438 a, 4: ralq airoppoiatc ral<; curb ruv 
6pu[tvuv), while, on the other hand, effluxes from its own internal fire and water pass out 
through the pores of the eye (Emped. in Arist., p. 437 b, 26 seq. : " Delicate nets in the eye 
retain the mass of circumambient water, but the fire, wherever it extends, pierces through, 
as rays of light pass through a lantern," in reply to which Aristotle [p. 437 b, 13] objects, 
that we ought then to be able to see in the dark). The perceived image arises on the meeting 
of the two streams. Light needs a certain time in which to come from the sun to us 
(Arist, De An., II. 6 ; De Sensu, c. 6; Aristotle controverts this theory). Sounds arise in the 
trumpet-shaped auditory passage on the entrance of air in motion. The sensations of smett 
and taste depend also on the penetration of fine particles of matter into the appropriate organs 
(Arist., De Sensu, c. 2, 4; Theophr., De Sensu, 9). Empedocles ascribed sensation and 
desire (as did also Anaxagoras and Democritus) to plants (Pseudo- Arist., Trept tyvruv, I. 1). 

"We know each element of things through the corresponding element in ourselves, or 
like by like (f) yvuaiq TOV 6/j,oioi< rw O/UO/GJ, Emped., ap. Arist., De Anima, I. 2 ; Metaph., III. 4, 
1000 b, 6; Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 121, etc.): 

yairi fiv yap yalav oTTUTrajLifv, vdart 8 iidup, 
aiftepi & aifitpa 6lov, arap Trvpl Trvp ai J^Aov, 
aropyr/ 6e aropyriv. veiKos tie re veiKei Avypcr 
etc TOVTUV yap Kavra irtirrjyaGiv dp(ioa&VTa t 
KOI Tovrot<; (ppoveovGi KOI jjdovr ^(T oviutvTai. 

With the philosophemes peculiar to him, Empedocles united the Pythagorean doctrine of 
the transmigration of souls (but modified and adapted to his system in the sense above 
indicated) and a doctrine similar to that of Xenophanes concerning the spirituality of the 
Deity (unless the loci in which this is affirmed are taken, say, from a work falsely attributed 
to Empedocles). 

24. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (in Asia-Minor), born about 500 
B. c., reduced all origin and decay to a process of mingling and irn- 
mingling, but assumed as ultimate elements an unlimited number of 
primitive, qualitatively determinate substances, which were called by 
him seeds of things, by Aristotle, elements consisting of homogeneous 
parts, and by later writers (employing a term formed from the Aris 
totelian phraseology) Homceomeriae. Originally there existed, accord 
ing to Anaxagoras, an orderless mixture of these diminutive parts: 
" all things were together." But the divine mind, which, as the finest 
among all things, is simple, unmixed and passionless reason, brought 
order to them, and out of chaos formed the world. In the explana 
tion of individual existence, Anaxagoras confined himself, according 
to the testimony of Plato and Aristotle, to the search for mechanical 


causes, and only fell back on the agency of the divine reason, when 
he was unable to recognize the presence of such causes. 

Essentially the same doctrine of the world-ordering mind is 
ascribed, among earlier philosophers, to Hermotimus of Clazomenae, 
and among the later, to Archelaus of Miletus (or, according to 
others, of Athens). 

Of the legends of Hermotimus of Clazomenae treat Friedr. Aug. Cams, in Fulleborn s Beitrdge zur 
Geschicftte der Philos., Vol. III.. Art. 9, 1798, repr. in Carus Nachgel. Werke (Vol. IV.: Ideen zur Gesch. 
der Philos.), Leipsic, 1809, pp. 330-392; Ignat. Denzinger, De Hermot. Vlaeomenio comment, Liege, 1825. 

On Anaxagoras, cf. Friedr. Aug. Carus, De Anax. cosmotheologiae fontibus, Leipsic, 1797, and in 
Carus Ideen zur Gesch. der Philos., Leips. 1809, pp. 689-762, Anaxagoras aus Klazomena und sein Zeit 
geist, in Fulleborn s Beitr. zur Gesch. der Philos., Art. 10, 1799, and in Carus Ideen zur Gesch. der 
Philos., pp. 395-478; J. T. Hemsen, Ana. Claz., Gott. 1821 ; Ed. Schaubach, Anax. Claz.fragm., Leips. 
1827; Guil. Scborn, Anax. Claz. et Diogenis Appolloniatae fragmenta, Bonn, 1829; F. J. Clemens, De 
philosophia Anaxagorae Clazomenii, Berlin, 1S39; Fr. Breier, Die Philosophie des Anaxagoras von 
Klazomenae nach Aristoteles, Berlin, 1840 ; Kriscbe, Forschungen, I. pp. 60-68 ; C. M. Z6vort, Dissert, sur 
la vie et la doctrine d" 1 Anaxagore, Paris, 1848; Franz Hoffman, Ueber die Gottesidee des Anaxagoras, 
Sokrate8,und Platon, "Wiirzburg, 1860 ("Gluckwunsch-Programm" to the University of Berlin), cf. Mi- 
chelet, in " Der Gedanke," Vol. II., No. 1, pp. 33-44, and Hoffmann s reply in Fichte s Zeitschrift Jiir 
Ph. u. ph. Kritik, new series, Vol. 40, 1862, pp. 1-48; Aug. Gladisch, Anax. und die Israeliten, 
Leipsic, 1864, cf. Gladisch on Anax. und die alien Israeliten, in Niedner s Zeitschr. fur histor. Theol., 
1849, Heft 4, No. 14; C. Alexi, Anax. u. 8. PhilosopMe, nach den Fragmenten bei Simplicius ad Arist. 
(G.-Pr.), Neu-Ruppin, 1867; Heinr. Beckel, Anax. doctrina de rebus animatis (diss.), Munster, 1868. 

Anaxagoras was descended from a reputable family in Clazomense. From this cicy he 
removed to Athens. Here he lived a long time as the friend of Pericles, until, having 
been accused of impiety on account of his philosophical opinions by the political opponents 
of the great statesman, he found himself compelled to seek safety in Lampsacus, where he 
is said to have died soon afterward. The chronological data respecting him are in part 
discrepant. The accusation took place, according to Diodorus (IX. 38 sq.) and Plutarch 
(PericL, c. 38), in the last years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Allowing 
this date to be correct, it is inadmissible, with K. F. Hermann (De Philos. Ionic, actatibus, 
Gott. 1849, p. 13 seq.), to place the birth of the philosopher in Olymp. 61.3 (534 B. c.) ; it 
is more probable that the version of Apollodorus (ap. Diog. L., II. 7) is the correct one, 
and that Anaxagoras was born in Olymp. 70 (500-496). If he lived in all seventy-two 
years (as Diog., ibid., reports), the date of his death must be Olymp. 88 (for which we 
read in Diog., 78 probably an error). In Athens he is said to have lived thirty years; the 
statement referred (by Diog. L., II. 7) to Demetrius Phalereus, that he began to philosophize 
in the twentieth year of his life at Athens, while Callias (Calliades?) was archon, probably 
arose from a misinterpretation of the report that he began to philosophize while Callias 
was archon at Athens. The statement of Aristotle (Metaph., I. 3), that Anaxagoras was 
prior to Empedocles in point of age, but subsequent in respect of his (philosophical) per 
formances (rr] UKV rjhmiq Trporepoc, role ff Ipyoif wrrepof), is probably to be taken purely 
chronologically, and not as pointing to a relative inferiority or advance in philosophical 
insight. The difference of age can not have been great. Anaxagoras seems already to 
have known and to have accepted in a modified form the doctrines of Empedocles. 

The written work of Anaxagoras (irepl fvaeor) \ 3 mentioned by Plato (Phaedo, p. 97) 
and others. 

In the place of the four elements of Empedocles, Anaxagoras assumes the existence 
of an infinite number of elementary and original substances. Every thing that has parts 


qualitatively homogeneous with the whole, owes its origin, according to Anaxagoras (as 
reported by Aristotle, Met., I. 3), to the coming together (avyKptcts) of these parts from the 
state of dispersion among other elements, in which they had existed from the beginning. 
This combination of the homogeneous is, in his view, that which really takes place in what 
is called becoming or generation. Each primitive particle remains unchanged by this 
process. In like manner, that which is called destruction, is in fact only separation 
(didKptois). Every thing whose parts are homogeneous with the whole (e. g., flesh, blood, 
bones, gold, silver), Aristotle calls in his terminology o^/oto^epec, in opposition to the 
avouoioftepec (e. g., the animal, and, in general, the organism as a whole), the parts of which 
are of diverse quality. The expression TO o^otn/nepe^ TO, o/wiopspq does not denote 
originally the homogeneous parts themselves, but the whole, whose parts are homo 
geneous with each other ; but it can also be applied to the parts themselves as smaller 
wholes, since in that which has throughout the same quality the parts of every part muse 
be homogeneous with one another. In Metaph., I. 3, Aristotle calls the wholes, which, 
according to Anaxagoras, arise by the mingling together of homogeneous parts, 6//oo//ep?; 
in other places he gives the same name to the parts, e. g., De Coelo, III. 3 : flesh and bones, 
etc., consist aoparuv opoio/nspuv iravruv i/Opoioftevuv cf. De Gen. et Corr., I. ] : Anax 
agoras represents those substances which have like parts, e. g., bones, etc., as the ele 
mentary substances (TO. baotofjLcpij oToi%ela Tiftyotv, oiov barovv /cat aldpKa KOI fj.vt kdv). 
Lucretius says (I. 834 seq.) that, according to Anaxagoras, every rerum homoeomeria, e. g., 
bones, intestines, etc., consists of smallest substances of the same kind. The plural 6/j.oi- 
oftipetat is used by later writers (e. g., Plut., Pericl, c. 4 ; vovv (nroKpivovra rdf o/uoto/uepeias) 
to designate the primitive, ultimate particles themselves (cf. Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., X. 25 : 
oi yap dro/zouf \ir6vrtg rj IpotOftepeiaf rj 6y/covc, and Diog. L., II. 8 : apxar raf ouoio/uepeiac;), 
Anaxagoras himself calls these original constituents of things " seeds" (cTrepfiara\ and also 
less precisely (like the objects which they constitute), "things" (xpyjuara). But not every 
thing which appears to have like parts is held by Anaxagoras to possess them indeed. It is 
true that Aristotle in one place, immediately after referring to Empedocles, cites (Met., I. 3) 
water and fire as examples of substances of homogeneous parts. But where he expresses 
himself more exactly concerning the opinion of Anaxagoras (De Gen. et Corr., I. 1 ; De Coelo, 
III. 3), he says expressly that the latter regarded precisely those substances which with 
Empedocles passed for elementary, fire, air, water, and earth, as not internally homo 
geneous, but as compounds of numerous heterogeneous particles. 

Anaxagoras finds the moving and shaping force of the world neither (with the old 
lonians) in the nature of the matter assumed as principle itself, nor (with Empedocles) in 
impersonal psychical potencies, like love and hate, but in a world-ordering mind (vovs). 
(Anaxagoras, ap. Simplicius, in Ar. Fhys., fol. 35 a: 6/coZa fytfAAev eaecOat /cat 6/cota ff /cat 
aaGa vvv tart KOI oKolct carat, TrdvTo, 6i.tK.6au.T)Ge T oof.) This mind is distinguished from mate 
rial natures by its simplicity, independence, knowledge, and supreme power over matter. 
Every thing else is mixed with parts of all other things besides itself, but mind (v6or) ia^ 
pure, unmixed, and subject only to itself. All minds, whatever their relative power or 
station, are (qualitatively) alike. The mind is the finest of things (XsTrroraTov rrdvruv 
Xprjud-uv). Matter, which is inert and without order, it brings into motion, and there 
by creates out of chaos the orderly world. There is no fate (dfia.pfj.kvri) and no chance 

In the primitive condition of things the most heterogeneous substances were, according 

to Anaxagoras, everywhere intermingled (Anaxagoras, ap. Simplicius, in Arist. Phys., fol. 

33 b : bnov iravra xpyfiara ijv, aTreipa /cat TrAtjdog /cat a/zf/cpor^Tra, the first words of the work 

of Anaxagoras). "When matter had thus remained inert during an indeterminate period, 



the Mind worked upon it, communicating to it motion and order (Arist., Phys., YIII. 1, p. 
250 b, 24 : tynal -yap c/ceivof [ Avat-ayopac], ofiov irdvruv bvruv KOI TJPEHOVVTCJV rbv aireipov 
Xpovov, K LVTJGLV ifiirotijaai rbv vovv nai 6iaKplvai). 

The Mind first effected a revolving motion at a single point ; but ever-increasing masses 
were gradually brought within the sphere of this motion, which is still incessantly extending 
farther and farther in the infinite realm of matter. As the first consequence of this 
revolving motion, the elementary contraries, fire and air, water and earth, were separated 
from each other. But a complete separation of dissimilar and union of similar elements 
was far from being hereby attained, and it was necessary that within each of the masses 
resulting from this first act, the same process should be repeated. By this means alone 
could things originate, having parts really homogeneous, e. g., gold, blood, etc. But even 
these consist not entirely, but only prevailingly, of like parts. In gold, for example, 
however pure it may seem, there are, says Anaxagoras, not merely particles of gold, but 
also particles of other metals and of all other things ; but the denomination follows the 
predominant constituent. 

In the middle of the world rests the earth, which is shaped like a short section 
of a cylinder, and is supported by the air. The stars are material ; the moon is inhabited 
like the earth; the sun is a glowing mass of stone (jj.v6po^ dtdirvpo^, Diog. L., II. 12), and 
the stars are of like nature. The moon receives its light from the sun. The sky ia 
full of stones, which occasionally fall to the earth, when the force of iheir revolving 
motion is relaxed; witness the meteor of Aegospotomos (Diog. L., II. 8-12). Plants have 
souls ; they sorrow and rejoice. Plants and animals owe their origin to the fecundation 
of the earth, whence they sprung, by germs previously contained in the air (Theophrast., 
Hist. Plant., III. 1, 4 ; De Causis plantarum, I. 5, 2). In our perception of things by the 
senses, like is not known by like, but by unlike, e. g., heat by cold, cold by heat; that 
which is equally warm (etc.) with ourselves, makes no impression on us. The senses 
are too weak to know the truth; they do not sufficiently distinguish the constituents 
of things (Anaxagoras, ap. Sextus Empir., Adv. Math. VII. 90 : virb a^avporrjro^ avruv ov 
dwaroi ifffiev npiveiv rakrjdi^). By the mind we know the world of external objects ; 
every thing is known to the divine reason (Anax., ap. Simplic., in Phys., f. 33 : Trdvra eyvu 
voor). The highest satisfaction is found in the thinking knowledge of the universe. 

The explanation of phenomena sought by Anaxagoras was essentially the genetic and 
physical ; he did not investigate the nature of their order, which he referred to the vovg. 
For this reason Plato and Aristotle (whom, in this particular, Plotinus follows, Ennead., 
I. 4, 7) charge that his vovq plays a rather idle role. Plato, in the Phaedo (p. 97 c.), 
represents Socrates as saying that he had rejoiced to see the vovc designated as cause 
of the order of the world, and had supposed that as the reason why every thing is 
as it is, the fitness of its being so (the final cause) would be pointed out; but that 
in this expectation he had been fully deceived, since Anaxagoras specified only me 
chanical causes. Cf. Leg., XII. 967 b. Aristotle praises Anaxagoras in view of his 
principle ; in rising to the conception of a world-ordering mind, he was like a sober man 
coming among the drunken ; but he knew not how to make the most of this principle, and 
employed the vov<; only as a mechanical god for a make-shift, wherever the knowledge of 
natural causes failed him (Meiaph., I. 4). If, now, another thinker directed his attention 
only to that which the vov$ really was for Anaxagoras, not to the word and the possible 
content of the concept, he must consider a vovq as- cause of motion and distinct from mate 
rial objects, to be unnecessary (following a line of thought similar to that of Laplace and 
others, in modern times, who ridicule the "God" of the earlier astronomers, as only 
11 standing upon one side and giving things a push"). Such a philosopher would neces- 


arily deem it a more scientific procedure to reject the dualism of Anaxagoras, and find in 
things themselves the sufficient causes of their motions. It is thus that the doctrine of 
Democritus stands contrasted with the doctrine of Anaxagoras. On the other hand, the 
conception of the vov$ might occasion a real investigation of the nature of mind, and conse 
quently conduct beyond mere cosmology. In this way, though not till a later period, the 
Anaxagorean principle continued to exert an influence, not so much in "the teachings of 
the Sophists, as, rather, in those of Socrates and his continuators. 

Of Hermotimus, Aristotle says (Metaph., I. 3) that the hypothesis of a world- 
ordering mind was ascribed to him; but that nothing certain or precise was known 
in regard to his doctrine. Later writers repeat many miraculous legends concerning 
the man. Probably he belongs to the ancient "theologians" or cosmogonists. (See 
above, p. 26.) 

Archelaus, the most important among the disciples of Anaxagoras, appears to have 
interpreted the original medley of all substances as equivalent to air, and to have toned 
down the antithesis between mind and matter, thus receding again nearer to the older 
Ionic natural philosophy, and in this respect occupying a position relative to Anaxagoras 
similar to that of his contemporary, Diogenes of Apollonia (mentioned above, 14, pp. 
37 and 38). The doctrine that right and wrong are not natural distinctions (pvoei), but 
depend on human institution, is ascribed to Archelaus. 

Another disciple of Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, interpreted the Homeric 
poems allegorically ; by Zeus the vov$ was to be understood, by Athene art (rexvy). 

The fine verses, in which Euripides (ap. Clem. Alex., Strom., IV. 25, 157), with un 
mistakable reference to Anaxagoras, sings the praises of the investigator, may here be 
cited : 

rf)c, icropia^ 

iirl Trr/fioovvas, 

ddavdrov naOoptiv 

rjpu, ri$ re owiorrj 
KOI biry Kal oTfwf 
Toi$ Toiovroiz ovdfiroT 
Ipyuv neMrrjfjLa "irpooit,ei. 

25. Leucippus of Abdera (or Miletus, or Elea) and Democritus 

of Abdera, the latter, according to his own statement, forty years 

younger than Anaxagoras, were the founders of the Atomistic phi 

losophy. These philosophers posit, as principles of things, the "full" 

flnrj fkrj. "void," whi^hthfj identify respectively with being and non- 

being or something and nothing, the latter, as well as the former, 

. having existence. They characterize the " full " more particularly, 

[ as consisting of indivisible, primitive particles of matter, or ^toms, 

II which are distinguished from one another, not by their intrinsic 

ujqualities, but only geometrically, by their form, position, and arrange- 

Iment. Fire and the eoul are composed of round atoms. Sensation 

^s due to material images, which come from objects and reach the soul 


\ through the senses. The ethical end of man is happiness, which is 
1 attained through justice and culture. 

Of Democritus treat Schleiermacher, Ueber das Verzeichniss der Schriftcn des Demokrit bfi Diog. L. 
(EX. 45 seq.), read Jan. 9, 1815, and printed in his Sdmmtl. Werke, 3d div., Vol. 3, pp. 293-305: Geffera, 
Quaest. Dem., Gott. 1829 ; J. F. W. Burchard, Democriti pfiilosophiae de senitibus fragmenta, Minden, 
1330; Fragmente der Moral des Abderiten Demokritus, Minden, 1834 ; Papencordt, De atomicorum doc- 
trina Berlin, 1832; Frid. Heimsoeth. Democriti de anima doctrina, Bonn, 1835; Krische, Forschungen, 
I. pp. 142-163; Frid. Guil. Aug. Mullach, Quaestionem Democritearum spec. I-II., Berlin, 1835-42; Denw- 
criti operum fragmenta coll., rec., vertit, explic. ac de philosophi vita, scriptis et plac-itis commen 
tates est, Berlin, 1843; Fragm. ph. Gr., I. p. 330 seq. ; B. ten Brink, Anecdota Epicttarmi, Democriti, etc., 
in the Philologu*, VI. 1851, p. 577 seq. ; Democriti de se ipso testimonia, ib. p. 589 seq., VII., 1852, p. 354 
seq.; Democriti liber Trepl avOp&nov #v>ios, ibid. VIII, 1853, p. 414 seq. ; Ed. Johnson, Der Sensualismnx 
des Demokrit (G.-Pr.\ Plauen, 1868. 

Of the age of Leucippus and the circumstances of his life little is definitely known; it is 
also uncertain whether he wrote any thing himself, or whether Aristotle and others drew 
their information concerning his opinions from the writings of his pupil Democritiii*. 
Aristotle commonly names him in connection with Democritus. The statement (Diog. L., 
IX. 30), that he heard Zeno, the Eleatic, receives confirmation from the character of his 
doctrine. That the principles of his philosophy were largely derived from the Eleatics is 
also testified by Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr. } I. 8, 325 a, 26. 

Democritus of Abdera, in his work jutKpbg Am/co<r/zof, said (according to Diog. L., IX. 41) 
that he wrote this work 730 years after the capture of Troy, and that he was forty years 
younger than Anaxagoras. He must, according to the latter statement, have been born 
about 460 B. c., with which date agrees the statement of Apollodorus (ap. Diog. L., ibid.}, 
that he was born 01. 80 ; according to Thrasyllus (ibid.), 01. 77.3 = 470 B. c. ; but for the 
date of the capture of Troy Democritus appears to have assumed, instead of 1184, the 
year 1150, whence we derive, as the date of the composition of the work named, the year 
420 B. c. He is said to have died at a great age (ninety years old; according to others, 
one hundred, or even more). Desire for knowledge led him to undertake extended jour 
neys, Egypt and the Orient being among the places visited by him. Plato never mentions 
him, and speaks only with contempt of the materialistic doctrine. Plato desired, according 
to the narrative of Aristoxenus, the Aristotelian (in his IctToptKa vrrofj,vr//ua-a, see Diog. L., 
IX. 40), that the writings of Democritus should be burned, but was convinced by the 
Pythagoreans Amyclas and Clinias, of the uselessness of such a proceeding, since the 
books were already widely circulated. Aristotle speaks of Democritus with respect. 

Democritus wrote numerous works, among which the [liyas Am/cotr/zoc was the most 
celebrated. His style is greatly praised by Cicero, Plutarch, and Dionysius, for its clear 
ness and elevation. 

The Atomistic system was urged by Democritus, who perfected it and raised it to an 
acknowledged position, in opposition to the Anaxagorean (in the sense indicated above, at 
the end of 24). The relation between Leucippus and Anaxagoras is uncertain. Since 
Democritus is called by Aristotle (Metaph., I. 4) an haipoq (an intimate companion and 
disciple) of Leucippus, the difference between their ages can hardly have amounted to forty 
years, so that Leucippus must have been younger than Anaxagoras. If Anaxagoras did 
not make himself known by his philosophical productions in early life, it may be that 
Leucippus (who appears to be immediately associated with the doctrine of Parmenides by 
his polemic against it) preceded him in this respect ; yet this is not very probable, and can 
by no means be concluded from certain passages of Anaxagoras, in which he combata 
opinions (in particular the hypothesis of empty inter-atomic spaces) that are, it is true, 


found in the writings of the Atomists, but had already been propounded by earlier philos 
ophers (especially by Pythagoreans), and had also been, in part, combated by Parmenides 
and Empedocles. In view of this uncertainty respecting Leucippus and of the undoubted 
reference which Democritus constantly makes to Anaxagoras, we place the exposition of 
the Atomistic system immediately after that of the Anaxagorean. Besides, the nature of 
the doctrine of Homceomerife, which is a sort of qualitative Atomism, places it in the 
middle between the four qualitatively different elements of Empedocles and the reduction 
by Leucippus and Democritus of all apparent qualitative diversity to the merely formal 
diversity of an infinite number of atoms. 

In his account of the principles of the earlier philosophers, in the first book of the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle says (c. 4): " Leucippus and his associate, Democritus, assume as 
elements the full (TrA^pef, OTEPEOV, vacrdv) and the void (nn>6v, pavov). The former they . 
term being (6v), the latter, non-being (pj ov) ; hence they assert, further, that non-being 
exists as well as being." According to another account (Plutarch., Adv. Col, 4), Demoe- 
ritus expressed himself thus: firj //d/U,ov TO 6kv tj TO ^6ev elvai ( Thing is not more real 
than no-thing "), expressing by the singularly constructed word, (5ev, something (" thing "). 
The number of things in being (atoms) is infinitely great. Each of them is indivisible v 
(aTopov). Between them is empty space. In support of the doctrine of empty space, 
Democritus alleged, according to Aristotle (Phys., IV. 6), the following grounds : 1. Motion 
requires a vacuum ; for that which is full can receive nothing else into itself ; 2. Rarefac 
tion and condensation are impossible without the existence of empty intervals of space ; 
3. Organic growth depends on the penetration of nutriment into the vacant spaces of 
bodies; 4. The amount of water which can be poured into a vessel filled with ashes, 
although less than the vessel would contain if empty, is not just so much less as the space 
amounts to, which is taken up by the ashes ; hence the one must in part enter into the 
vacant interstices of the other. 

The atoms differ (according to Arist., Metaph., I. 4) in the three particulars of shape 
(OXWG, called pvap.6^ by the Atomists themselves, according to Aristotle), order (rd^f, or, 
in the language of the Atomists, 6ia6r)yT]\ and position (Ototc, Atomistic rpoTrjy). As an 
example of difference in shape, Aristotle cites the G-reek characters A and N, of order or 
sequence AN and NA, and of the difference of position Z and N. As being essentially 
characterized by their shape, Democritus seems to have called the atoms also I6ia^ and 
cxn^ ara (Arist., Phys., III. 4 ; Pint., Adv. Col., 8 ; Hesych., s. v. 161:0). These differences are 
sufficient, according to the Atomists, to explain the whole circle of phenomena ; are not the 
same letters employed in the composition of a tragedy and a comedy (Arist., De Gen. et Corr., 
1. 2) ? The magnitude of the atoms is diverse. The weight of each atom corresponds 
with its magnitude. 

The cause of the atoms is not to be asked after, for they are eternal, and hence uncaused 
(Arist., Phys., VIII. 1, p. 252 a, 35 : At/fj-onpiTog roi> ael OVK a%iol apxyv ^rjrtlv). (It was 
probably not the Atomists themselves, but later philosophers, who first hypostasized this 
very absence of a cause into a species of cause or efficient nature, TO awro//arov.) 

Democritus is said also to have declared the motion of the atoms to be primordial and 
eternal. But with this statement we find united the other, that the weight of the larger 
atoms urged them downward more rapidly than the others, by which means the smaller 
and lighter ones were forced upward, while through their collision with the descending 
atoms lateral movements were also produced. In this way arose a rotatory motion (A wj), 
which, extending farther and farther, occasioned the formation of worlds. In this process 
homogeneous elements came together (not in consequence of the agency of "love "and 
"hate," or an all- ruling " Mind," but) in obedience to natural necessity, in virtue of which 


things of like weight and shape must come to the same places, just as we observe in the 
winnowing of grain. Many atoms having become permanently united in the course of their 
revolutions, larger composite bodies and whole worlds came into existence. 

The earth was originally in motion, and continued thus, while it was yet small and 
light ; but gradually it came to rest. Organized beings arose from the moist earth. The 
soul consists of fine, smooth, and round atoms, which are also atoms of fire. Such atoms 
lare distributed throughout the whole body, but in particular organs they exercise par 
ticular functions. The brain is the seat of thought, the heart, of anger, the liver, of desire. 
When we draw in the breath we inhale soul-atoms from the air ; in the expiration of 
breath we exhale such atoms into the air, and life lasts as long as this double process is 

Sensuous perception is explained by effluxes of atoms from the things perceived, 
whereby images (dduha) are produced, which strike our senses. Through such etdw/la, 
says Democritus, even the gods manifest themselves to us. Perception is not wholly 
veracious ; it transforms the impressions received. The atoms are invisible on account 
of their smallness (only excepting, perhaps, those which come from the sun). Atoms and 
vacuity are all that exists in reality; qualitative differences exist only for MS, in the 
sensuous phenomenon (No^w yAv/ci> /cat vfytw niKpov, v6fj.u Oep/iov, vo/nu ifoxpfy V <>W XP 0i *l 
trey 6s aro^a /cat /cevov, Democritus, ap. Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 135). The asser 
tion of Democritus (ap. Diog. L., IX. 72), that in reality we know nothing, etc. (erefy de 
ovdev tfytev, kv /3v$cj yap rj a/b?#eta), must, as employed by him, probably be restricted to 
the case of sensuous phenomena ; for in view of the assurance with which Democritus 
professes the doctrine of atoms, this skeptical utterance can not be supposed to bear upon 
that doctrine itself. Democritus (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 138) also 
expressly distinguished from sensuous perception, which he called obscure knowledge 
(nKOTirj\ the genuine knowledge (yvrjcirj) acquired by the understanding through investiga 
tion. That kind of philosophical thinking by which Democritus went beyond the results of 
sensuous perception and recognized in the atoms the reality of things, was not made by 
him itself a subject of philosophical reflection, and the manner in which such thinking is 
effected was left by him without special explanation ; it is among the philosophers of the 
following period (with the earliest among whom Democritus was indeed contemporaneous) 
that reflection concerning the nature of thought itself begins. Yet it follows from the 
fundamental principles of Democritus that thought can not be independent of sensation or 
the vov<; of the i/ w /t r A and this inference was expressly drawn by Democritus (Cic., De Pin., 
I. 6 ; Plut., De PI. Philos., IV. 8 ; cf. Arist., De An., III. 3). The only expression which 
Democritus appears to have given to his views concerning the origin of true knowledge, is 
that implied in the principle which he enounced in agreement with Anaxagoras, that we 
should proceed in our inferences from phenomena (fiatvo/uEva) to the unknown (d<ty/la, see 
Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 140), and in his doctrine that thought arises when the 
motions of the soul are "symmetrical" (Theophr., De Sensu, 58). 

The soul is the noblest part of man ; he who loves its goods, loves what is most divine. 
He who loves the goods of the body, which is the tent of the soul, loves the merely human. 
The highest good is happiness (evearu, v6v/*ia, arapata, ada/upia). This is attained by 
avoiding extremes and observing the limits fixed by nature (jierpioTTjTt riptyios /cat piov 
^vfifierpiri). Not external goods secure happiness ; its seat is the soul (evdaifjiavir) V^C 
/cat /ca/co<5at//ov<J7 OVK kv (Joan^am O IKEEI ov6 kv XPV, $VXV & oiicrjTyptov daijuovo?). Not 
the act as such, but the will, determines moral character (ayadbv ov TO /rf aduteeiv, a/Ua 
ro fj.7fde ede Aeiv ^apttrrt/coc OVK 6 pteirutv irpoc rijv a[toi/3qv, aW 6 ev 6pgv 
The highest satisfaction comes from knowledge (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIV. 27, 3 ; 



Ifaye fiovfaaOai ^.aTikov p,iav evpelv atTiohoyiav, % rrjv Hspauv oi paaifaiav yeveaftai). The 
country of the wise and good is the whole world (avdpl ootyti rrdaa yfj ftarrj -^W 7&P 
ayadyg irarplg 6 fiyzTraf /c6(i//of). 

In the ethical theorems of Democritus, as also in those which relate to the difference 
between objective reality and our subjective apprehension of it, and which belong to the 
theory of cognition, the tendency to overstep the limits of cosmology becomes manifest a 
tendency not wanting to any of the older philosophers and peculiarly natural in those 
standing on the borders of the first period. Democritus, the contemporary of Socrates, but 
younger than he, went considerably farther in this direction than Anaxagoras or any 
other of the earlier thinkers. 

The first disciples and successors of Democritus (among whom Metrodorus of Chios is 
the most important) seem to have emphasized more strongly and developed to a greater 
extent the skeptical elements, which were contained more particularly in his doctrine 
of sensuous perception. 





26. To the Second Period of Greek Philosophy belong, 1) the 
Sophists, 2) Socrates, the imperfect disciples of Socrates, Plato v and 
Aristotle, 3) the a Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. The Sophists, a% 
speculators, regard mainly tkaupjh enomen a o.f perception, represen-) 
tation, and desire. Socrates considers principally the phenomena 
and laws of logical thinking and moral willing, and thus recognizes 
the essential relation of nian, the thinking subject, to the objective 
world ; the more precise investigation of this relation is undertaken 
by Plato and Aristotle, who also redirect attention to physical phi 
losophy, and who (as regards their political and ethical doctrines) 
regard man as essentially a social being, or the individual as an essen 
tial and a natural part of the body politic. The Stoics and Epicu 
reans, while indeed laying more stress upon the independence of the 
individual, leave him nevertheless subject to norms of thought and 
will having universal validity. Finally, Skepticism, which likewise 
seeks its end in the satisfaction of the needs of the individual subject, 
prepares the way for a new period, through the dissolution of all 
existing systems. 


The ethical and religious utterances of the poets, historians, etc., of this period contain philosophic*! 
matter, but not in philosophical form, and the exposition of them must be left to the historians of literature 
and of human culture in its more general development. 

In this period Athens became the center of Hellenic culture and, especially, of Hellenic 
philosophy. Pericles (in Thucyd., II. 41) describes Athens as a school of civilization for 
Greece. In the Platonic dialogue Protagoras (p. 337 d), the Sophist, Hippias of Elis, terms 
Athens "the Prytaneum of the wisdom of Hellas." Isocrates says (Panegyr., 50): "the 
Athenian state has caused the name Hellenes to become suggestive rather of intellectual 
culture than of historical descent." The susceptibility of the Athenians for art and 
science, their disposition for philosophical reflection, and the consequent establishment of 
the philosophical schools at Athens, are the most important circumstances in the historic 
connections of the second period of Greek philosophy. 

27. In the doctrine of the Sophists the transition was effected 
from philosophy as cosmology to philosophy as concerning itself with 
the thinking and willing subject. Yet the reflection of the Sophists 
extended only to the recognition of the subject in his immediate 
individual character, and was incompetent, therefore, to establish on 
a scientific basis the theory of cognition and science of morals, for 
which it prepared the way. The chief representatives of this ten 
dency were Protagoras the Individualist, Gorgias the Nihilist, Hippias 
the Polymathist, and Prodicus the Moralist. These men were followed 
by a younger generation of Sophists, who perverted the philosophi 
cal principle of subjectivism more and more, till it ended in mere 

On the Sophists, compare in addition to the several chapters -which treat of them in the above- 
cited works of Hegel, Brandis, Zeller, and others, and in Grote s History of Greece (V III. pp. 474-544), and 
K. F. Hermann s Geuch. u. Syst. der Platan. Philoxophie (pp. 179 seq. and 296 seq.) in particular, the 
following works: Jac.Geel, Historia critica sophistarum, qvi Socratis aetate Athenis floruerunt, in the 
Nova acta Utt. societ. Rlteno-Trajectinae, p. II., Utr. 1823; Herm. Koller, Die griechischen Sophistenzu 
Sokratei? und Plato s Zeit und ihr Einfluss auf Beredtsamkeit und Philosophic, Stuttg. 1832; W. G. 
F. Eoscher, De historicae doctrinae apud soj)histas majores vestigiis, Gott. 1838; W. Baumhauer, 
tyuam vim sophistae habuerint Athenis ad aetatis suae diaciplinam , mores ac studio, irnmutanda. 
Utrecht, 1844 ; H. Schildener, Die Sophisten, in Jahn s Archiv fur Philol., Vol. XVII., p. 385 seq. 
1851 ; Job. Frei, Beitrdge zur Geschichte der griechiscJien Sophistik. in the Rhein. Mus. f. Ph., new 
series, VII. I860, pp. 527-554, and VIII. 1853, pp. 268-279 ; A. J. Vitringa, De so2^histarum xcholis, quae, 
Socratis aetate Athenis floruerunt, in : Mnemosyne, II. 1853, pp. 223-237; Valat, Essai historique sur 
les sophistes grecs, in Z, Invextigateur, Paris, 1859, Sept., pp. 257-267, Nov., pp. 821-386, Dec,, pp. 353-361 ; 
Theod. Gomperz, Die griech. Sophitsten, in the Deutsche Jahrb., Vol. VII., Berl. 1863; N. Weckloin, Die 
Sophisten und die Sophistik nach den Angaben Plato s, Wurzburg, 1865; Martin Schanz, Beitrage zur 
vorsokratischen Philosophie aus Plato, I. Heft: Die Sophisten, Gottingen, 1867; Mullach, Fragmenta 
Ph. Graec., II., 1867, p. LVIII. seq., and " Sophifttarum Fragm.," ibid. p. 180 seq. ; H. Siebeck, Das Problem 
dee Wiwew bei Sokrates und der Sophistik, Halle, 1870. 

The Sophists are historically of importance not only as rhetoricians, grammarians, and 
diffusers of various forms of positive knowledge, but also (as, in particular, Hegel has 
shown) as representatives of a relatively legitimate philosophical stand-point. Their philo- 
eophical reflection centered in man, was subjective rather than objective in direction, and 
thus prepared the way for ethics and logic. That the Sophists should turn their attention 


primarily to the natural basis and condition of thought and will alone, . e., to perception 
and opinion, to sensuous pleasure and individual desire and will, was natural and neces 
sary ; their error consisted in treating this natural basis, beyond which their reflective obser 
vation did not extend, as comprehending all the subjective powers and data, and in ignoring 
or misapprehending the higher. It is none the less true that the doctrine of the Sophists 
marks a progress in philosophical thought. The sensualistic subjectivism of Protagoras is 
in one respect superior to the philosophical thinking of Parmenides; for the latter is only 
concerned with being in general, not (or at least only incidentally) with perception and 
thought themselves. The sensualism of the Sophists is not itself sensuous perception, 
but, essentially, reflective thinking concerning perception and opinion, and consequently 
the next step to that speculation concerning thought as such, which was instituted by 
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Without those "Sophists," these "philosophers" couldj 
not have become what they did become. In considering the judgments expressed by 
Plato and Aristotle concerning the doctrine of the Sophists, not only should the great J 
difference be borne in mind between the earlier and later generations of Sophists, but also 
the nature of the standard by which these philosophers judged them. Measured by the 
ideal principles of Plato, the thinking and the character of the Sophists appear reprehen 
sible ; but they were not opposed in principle to the opinions and practices of the times 
(the Sophists, as Plat., Rep., 493, says, taught ra TUV Tro/l/LtJv do-yfiara}, although many 
of the Sophists disputed in certain respects the authority of tradition. The Sophists, 
who cultivated chiefly rhetoric and much more rarely the pseudo-dialectical science of dis 
pute ("Eristic"), only prepared the way for the dialectical destruction of naive, traditional 
convictions. It was (as Grote correctly remarks) Socrates and his pupils, who first com 
pleted this work of destruction and at the same time undertook to furnish a positive 
substitute for what was destroyed. 

If the teaching of the Sophists were only criticism, and had only accomplished the sub 
version of cosmological philosophy, we should be obliged to include it (as Zeller and others 
do) in the first period. But since it is essentially characterized by reflection on certain 
phases of subjective life, it belongs unquestionably to the second period, Even Zeller, 
who places it in the first, admits (Ph. d. Gr., II. 1, 2d ed. p. 129 ; cf. also I. p. 725) that 
" the Sophists first conducted philosophy from objective investigation to ethics and dia 
lectic, and transferred thought to subjective ground." 

The essential point in which the Sophists were innovators was this : that they intro 
duced a new kind of instruction, not in any special department, as music or gymnastics, 
but with a view to the development of a certain universality of culture, a culture which 
should embrace all the interests of> life and which, in particular, should provide the 
recipients of it with political intelligence ; that, further, this instruction was founded on 
speculations concerning the nature of human volition and thought, and that by it, rather 
than by tradition or common opinion, they caused the views and practices of the citizens 
to be determined. This new branch of instruction was by no means given up by Socrates 
and his disciples ; it was only expanded and developed by them in another and more pro 
found mariner, so that, with all their opposition to the Sophists, they nevertheless stand 
witn them on the common ground of subjective philosophical speculation (cf. Plutarch s 
Lift of Themistocks, chap. 2). 

28. Protagoras of Abdera (born about 490), who figured as 
teacher of rhetoric in numerous Greek cities, especially at Athens, 
a.r\d was a contemporary of Socrates, although considerably older than 


he, transferred and applied the doctrine of Heraclitus respecting the 
eternal flux of all things to the knowing subject, and asserted : Man 
is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, of things 
that are not, that they are not. Just as each thing appears to each 
man, so is it for him. All truth is relative. The existence of the 
gods is uncertain. 

On Protagoras alone, cf. Geist, De Protagora Sophista, Giessen, 1827 ; Leonh. Spengel, De Protagora 
rhetore ejusque acriptis, in his Swa-ywyij Te^ic, Stuttg. 1828, p. 52 seq. ; Ludw. Ferd. Herbst, Protagora^ 
Leben wnd Sophistik aua den Quellen zwammengestellt, in Philol.-hist. Studien, ed. by Petersen, 1st 
part, Hamb. 1832, p. 88 seq. ; Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 130-142 ; Job. Frei, Quaestiones Protagoreae, 
Bonn, 1845: O.Weber, Quaestiones Protagoreae, Marburg, 1850; Jak. Bernays, Die KaTa/3aAAovTe? det 
Protagoras, in the Rhein.Mus. f. Phil., N. S., VII. 1850, pp. 464-468; A. J. Vitringa, De Protagorae vita 
tt philosophia, Groningen, 1853; Friedr. Blass, Die att. Eered&amkeit, Leipsic, 1868, pp. 28-29. Cf. the 
works cited, ad 27. 

Plato states (Protag., 317 c, seq.) that Protagoras was considerably older than Socrates. 
According to a statement in the Platonic dialogue Meno (p. 91 e), from which the similar 
statement of Apollodorus (ap. Diog. L., IX. 56) seems to have been copied, he lived about 
seventy years ; according to another version (ap. Diog. L., IX. 55), he lived more than 
ninety years. Probably he was born ca. 491, and died ca. 421-415 B. c. He called himself 
a ao0TT7/f, i. e., a teacher of wisdom (Plat., Protag., p. 316 d: o/JoAoyw re aofyioTr/s elvai Kal 
Traideveiv avdpu-rrovs). The word Sophist acquired its signification as a term of reproach 
especially through Aristophanes and afterward through the followers of Socrates, par 
ticularly Plato and Aristotle, who contrasted themselves, as "philosophers," with the 
" Sophists." Sophists like Protagoras stood in high consideration with the majority of 
cultivated people, as Plato s dialogue Protag. especially attests, although a respectable and 
well-to-do Athenian burgher could not himself have been a Sophist (man of letters), and 
earned money by public lessons. It is well known that at a later time rhetoricians were 
also called Sophists. Protagoras is said to have prepared the laws for the Athenian 
colony of Thurii (Heraclides, ap. Diog. L., IX. 50). He was first at Athens between 451 
and 445 B. c. (see Frei), next perhaps about 432, and again 01. 88.3 = 422-421 B. c., and 
shortly before his death. It is probable that Plato in his dialogue Protagoras has with 
poetic license transferred single circumstances from 422 to 432. On the occasion of his 
last sojourn at Athens (about 415 ? or 411 ?) he was accused and condemned as an atheist. 
The copies of his work were demanded of their private owners, and burned in the market 
place; he himself perished at sea on his passage to Sicily. The supposition of Epicurus, 
that he had been a pupil of Democritus (Diog. L., IX. 53 ; X. 8), is hardly consistent with 
the relation between their ages, and is improbable on other grounds. On the other hand, 
it is even affirmed that Democritus mentioned and opposed Protagoras in his writings 
(Diog. L., IX. 42 ; Plutarch., Adv. Coloten, IV. 2). 

In the doctrine of Protagoras Plato finds the inevitable consequence of the doctrine of 
Heraclitus (Theaet., p. 152 seq.). He admits its validity with reference to sensuous percep 
tion (aiaQrjaiq), but objects to any extension of it beyond this province as an illegitimate 
generalization of the theory of relativity. (For the rest, there is contained in the proposi 
tion, that all that is true, beautiful, and good, is such only for the knowing, feeling, and 
willing subject, a permanent truth. This truth Protagoras only one-sidedly exaggerated 
by ignoring the objective factor.) 

According to Diog. L., IX. 51, the original words of the fundamental theorem of Pro 
tagoras ("Man the measure of all things") were as follows: Trdvruv 


Tiiv [lev OVTUV <yf tori, Tuv 6e ova bvTuv o>f OVK iaTtv, It remains uncertain how 
far the manner in which Protagoras established this proposition agreed with that which 
we find reported in Plato s Theaetetus (p. 152 seq.). Diog. L. says of Protagoras that " he 
first showed how theses might be defended and attacked," and " he first said that on every 
subject contradictory affirmations could be maintained." It is to the equivocal pseudo- 
dialectical mode of discussion which is implied in these quotations, and which Protagoras 
seems to have followed in his work AvTihoyntd, that Plato alludes in terms of censure in 
Phaedo, p. 101 d, e. Aristotle says (Metaph., III. 2, 32, p. 998 a, 4) : itoirtp HpuTay6pa 
efayev i Aey^uv rot)f yeoyurpaf, oiiff at Kivr/oeis aal /U/cef TOV ovpavov b/Ltoiai, Trept uv f/ aarpo- 
"koyia TToietTai Tovg Attyot f, avre TO. ar/f^ela roZf aarpocg TTJV avrfyv e%et <f>i>Jiv, from which it 
appears that Protagoras sought to meet the objection urged against his sensualistic sub 
jectivism on the ground of the universal validity of geometrical propositions independently 
of individual opinion, by retorting that, in the sphere of objective reality, simple points, 
straight lines, and geometrical curves nowhere exist. In this he confounded with mere 
subjective experience, abstraction when employed as a means of confining the attention to 
special phases of objective reality. 

In illustration of the fundamental idea of Protagoras, a kindred utterance of Goethe 
may be compared, which will illustrate as well the relative truth of that idea, as the one- 
sidedness of disallowing an objective norm. " I have observed that I hold that thought to 
be true which is fruitful for me, which adjusts itself to the general direction of my thought, 
and at the same time furthers ine in it. Now, it is not only possible, but natural, that > 
such a thought should not chime in with the sense of another person, nor further him, 
perhaps even be a hinderance to him, and so he will hold it to be false ; when one is right 
thoroughly convinced of this he will never indulge in controversy" (Goethe- Zelterscher 
Briefwechsel, V. 354). Compare further the following in Goethe s Maximen und Reflexionen : 
" When I know my relation to myself and to the outer world, I say that I possess the 
truth. And thus each may have his own truth, and yet truth is ever the same." 

Protagoras won for himself considerable scientific distinction by his philological investi 
gations. He treated of the right use of words (bpdoerrua, Plat., Phaedr., 267 c), and he first 
distinguished the different forms of the sentence which correspond with the moods of the 
verb (Diog. L., IX. 53 : 6ielfa 6e TOV X6-yov Trpwrof eif rerrapa- tvxuXfjv, epuTijaiv, cnroKpimv, 
vro/b?v). (But the use of the imperative in such passages as Iliad, I. 1 : Mijvcv aside, ded, 
where not a command, but a request, was to be expressed, threw him into a perplexity, 
from which he could only rescue himself by censuring the Homeric form of expression ; v. 
Arist., Poet., c. 19, p. 1456 b, 15). Protagoras also distinguished the genders of nouns. 
Thoee who would perfect themselves in the art of discourse were required by him to 
combine practice with theory (Stob., Floril., XXIX. 80 : Hpura-y6pa<; efa-ye fj-qdev eivai pyre 

TXV7fV dvV [l&KTTfS fJ.r)T (UeAfTT/V O.VV TtXVTfS). 

A case, which would otherwise be lost, may be made victorious by the rhetorical art 
(TOV JJTTU /MJOV KpeiTTo TToieiv, Arist., Rhet., II. 24; Gell., N. A., V. 3). This utterance of 
Protagoras does not imply that the " weaker " side must necessarily be known to be unjust 
(as Aristophanes presupposes, who falsely attributes the doctrine to Socrates, Nub., 113). 
Still, to the prejudice of the moral character of the art of rhetoric, the difference is left 
unnoticed which subsists between cases where just arguments, which would otherwise^ 
remain unremarked, are brought to light, and cases in which the unjust is clothed with I 
the appearance of justice ; the Protagorean principle of the identity of appearance and I 
reality rendered such a distinction impossible. 

The sentence : TTO.VTUV ^p^dron jieTpov EOTIV avdpuTro^ formed, according to Sextus 
Kmpiricus, Adv. Math., VII. 560, the beginning of the work entitled Kara/JdAAovref (sc. 


With the same sentence began also, according to Plat., Theaet., p. 161 c, the 
No work bearing either of these titles is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in his 
list of the works of Protagoras (D. L.. IX. 55). We must, therefore, either assume with 
Bernays (Rhein. Mus., new series, VII. p. 467), that the Avrifo-yiai mentioned by Diogenes 
were identical with the KarafidhAovTEc or the AM/Oeia, or perhaps regard AvriAo-yiai or 
Kara/3d/t/lovrcf as having constituted the general title, while AA#fe* was the special name 
given to the first book. According to the exaggerated and undoubtedly calumniatory 
expression of the Aristotelian, Aristoxenus whom Phavorinus followed (cited by Diog. L., 
III. 37 and 57) Plato drew nearly all the positions of his theory of the ideal state from 
the AvTiAoyuta (AvTihoyiai) of Protagoras. This, while perhaps true of single positions, 
can not be true of the theory as a whole, owing to the difference of the fundamental 
principles assumed by Protagoras and Plato. Whether the myth, which Plato puts into 
the mouth of Protagoras, in the dialogue of the same name (p. 320 c, seq.), really belongs 
to him, is uncertain, thoiigh not improbable. 

Of the gods, Protagoras (according to Diog. L., IX. 51) affirmed that he did not know 
whether they existed or riot; for many things hindered this knowledge, such as the 
obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life. 

29. Gorgias of Leontini (in Sicily), who came to Athens as embas- 
sador from his native city in the year 427 B. c., was an elder contem 
porary of Socrates, whom he outlived. He taught chiefly the art of 
rhetoric. In philosophy he held a doctrine of nihilism, expressed 
in these three propositions : 1) Nothing exists ; 2) If any thing ex 
isted, it would he unknowable; 3) If any thing existed and were 
knowable, the knowledge of it could nevertheless not be communi 
cated to others. 

The following works treat specially of Gorgias : H. Ed. FOBS, De Gorgia LeonHno commentatio, inter- 
positus est Aristotetis de Gorgia liber emendating editufi, Halle, 1828 ; Leonh. Spengel, De, Gorgia rhetore, 
1828, in " Swa-yoj-yr) re^iv," Stuttg. 1828; Oratores Attici,ed. J. G. Baiterus et Herm. Sauppius,fasc. VII., 
Zurich, 1845, p. 129 seq.; Frei, Beitr.zur Gesch. der griech. Sophistik, in the Rhein. JUus., VII. 1860, p. 
527 seq. and VIII., 268 seq. ; Franz Susemihl, Ueber dan Verhalhiu,* (It* Gwgitt* nm EmjiedokleK, In the 
N. Jahrb. fur Ph., 1856, pp. 40-42, A. Baumstark, Gorgias von Leontium., in the Rhein. Mus. f. Philol., 
XV. 1860, pp. 624-626; Franz Kern, KriUsche Bemerkungen zum 3. Theil der pseud o- Artist otelwchen 
Schrift tt. Hv., n. Zfjv., it. Topytov, Oldenburg, 1869; Fried. Blass, Die att. Bereds. von Gory, bis eu Lysian, 
Leipsic, 1868, pp. 44-72. 

That Gorgias, in 01. 88.2 (in the summer of the year 427 B. c.), at the head of a Leon- 
tine embassy, sought to persuade the Athenians to send help against the Syracusans, is 
related by Diodorus (XII. 53; cf. Thucyd., III. 86). Plato compares him (Phaedr., p. 261) 
to Nestor, on account of his oratorical talent, and having reference also, as is probable, to 
his great age. The approximate dates of his birth and death may (according to Frei) be 
assumed as respectively 483 and 375 B. c. According to the account given in Athenseus, 
XL 505 d, he was still living when the Platonic dialogue Gorgias was written, and termed 
the author of it an Archilocus redivivus. He appears to have passed the last part of his life 
at Larissa, in Thessaly. 

According to the Platonic dialogue Meno (p. 76c) Gorgias agreed with Empedocles in 
the doctrine of effluxes from perceived objects and of pores ; and appears to have been in 
general, a disciple of Empedocles in natural philosophy. Corax and perhaps also Tisias 
were his predecessors and patterns in rhetoric; the rhetorical manner of Empedocles 


appears also to have exercised a powerful influence on him. Gorgias described rhetoric 
as the worker of conviction (xeidovc; drj^uovpyd^). He is said to have termed tragedy a salu 
tary deception (Plut., De Gloria Atheniensium, cap. 5 ; cf. De And. Poet., c. 1 : Topyias 6e rr/v 
rpayudiav ziirev cnrdrrfv, r/v b re airarrjaaq 6iKai6~Epo rov [JLTJ cnrarijaavrog /cat 6 (nrarrjdei^ 
Goyurepoq roi> pi aTrarydevros). In his philosophical argumentations Gorgias made use of 
the contradictory propositions of the earlier philosophers, yet in such a manner as to de 
grade their earnest tendency into a rhetorical word-play. 

In his Gorgias (p. 462 seq.) Plato defines sophistry (oofaariKr/, in the narrower sense of 
the term, and apparently with special reference to the political and ethical doctrine of Pro 
tagoras) as a corruption of the art of legislation, and rhetoric (as taught especially by 
Gorgias and his successors) as a corruption of justice (considered here in a narrower sense 
than in the Rep., namely, as denoting retribution and reward, avrnrefrovdo^) the charac 
teristic feature in each being flattery (/co/la/cc/a) ; these corruptions, he affirms, are not arts, 
but simply forms of quackery. Plato parallelizes the two arts named, which are included 
by him under the one name of politics, and their corruptions, as having reference all of them 
to the soul, with an equal number of " businesses " (eTriTijdevoei?), which have reference 
to the body, namely, the art of legislation with gymnastics, justice with the healing art, 
sophistry with the art of adornment, and rhetoric with the art of cookery. But in these 
depreciatory definitions and comparisons he refers less to the doctrines of Gorgias than to 
the practice of some of his successors, who were less scrupulous than Gorgias himself, 
about ignoring the dependence of true rhetoric on the knowledge of what is truly good 
and just, and who abandoned themselves exclusively to the chase after "joy and 

The main contents of the work of Gorgias, irepl rov fir/ ovrof rj irepl Qvaeac;, are found in 
Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 65 seq., and in the last chapters of the treatise, De Melissa, 
Xenophane (or Zenont) et Gorgia. 1) Nothing is ; for if any tiling were, its being must be 
either derived or eternal ; but it can not have been derived, whether from the existent or 
from the non-existent (according to the Eleatics) ; nor can it be eternal, for then it must be 
infinite ; but the infinite is nowhere, since it can neither be in itself nor in any thing else, and 
what is nowhere, is not. 2) If any thing were, it could not be known ; for if knowledge 
of the existent were possible, then all that is thought must be, and the non-existing could not 
even be thought of; but then error would be impossible, even though one should affirm 
that a contest with chariots took place on the sea, which is absurd. 3) If knowledge were 
possible, yet it could not be communicated ; for every sign differs from the thing it signifies ; 
how can any one communicate by words the notion of color, seeing that the ear hears 
not colors, but sounds ? And how can the same idea be in two persons, who are yet dif 
ferent from one another? 

In a certain sense every opinion is, according to Protagoras, true ; according to Gorgias, 
false. But each of these positions leads equally to the negation of objective truth, and 
implies the complete substitution of mere persuasion for conviction. 

30. Hippias of Elis, one of the younger contemporaries of Pro 
tagoras, and distinguished more for rhetorical talent and for his 
mathematical, astronomical, and archaeological acquisitions, than for 
his philosophical doctrines, exhibits the ethical stand-point of the 
Sophistic philosophy in the position ascribed to him by Plato, that 
the law is the tyrant of men, since it forces them to do many things 
contrary to nature. 


On Hippias cf. Leonh. Spengel, De Uippia Eleo ejusque scriptis, in "Svvaywyr) r* x v ," Stuttg. 1828; 
Osann Der Sophist Hippias als Archaolog, Jihein. Mus., N. B., II. 1843, p. 495 seq. ; C. Muller,///^. 
Elei fragment* coll., in Fragmenta historic. Graec., Vol. II., Paris, 1848; Jac. Mahly, Der Sophist H. 
c. E., Rh. Mus., N. S., XV. 1860, pp. 514-535, and XVI. 1861, pp. 38-49; F. Blase, Dieatt. ereds., Leips., 
1868, pp. 31-83. 

In the congress of Sophists which Plato represents in his dialogue Protagoras as being 
held in the house of Callias, shortly before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Hippias 
appears as a man in middle life, considerably younger than Protagoras. According to 
Prot., p. 318, he gave instruction in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Cf. also 
Pseudo-Plat., Hippias Major, p. 285 c. 

In Pro/., p. 387 c, Plato puts into the mouth of Hippias the doctrine above enunciated : 
6 & v<fy/oc, Tvpawo<; &v TUV avtipuTrav, Tro/tAd irapa rrjv <j>vaiv fiia&Tai.. He finds it contrary 
to nature that differences of country and laws should estrange from each other men of 
education, who are united by a natural kinship (Qvcei airyyeveic). In Xenophon (Memor., 
IV. 4) he contends against the duty of respecting the laws by urging their diversity and 
instability. Yet in his ethical deliverances Hippias seems as little as other Sophists 
to have placed himself in conscious and radical antagonism to the spirit of the Grecian 
people ; monitions and rules of life like those which in the dialogue, Hippias Major (p. 
286 a), he represents Nestor as giving to Neoptolemus, may have been uttered by him 
with a fair degree of good faith. 

31. Prodicus of Ceos, by his parenetical discourses on moral 
subjects (among which " Hercules at the Cross-roads " is the one best 
known) and by his distinctions of words of similar signification, pre 
pared the way for the ethical and logical efforts of Socrates. Yet he 
did not go materially beyond the stand-point of the older Sophists. 

Cf. on Prodicns, L. Spengel, De Prodieo Ceo, in " 2vf<ryoyrj rtx v v " P- ^6 seq. ; F. G. Welcker, Prodikot, 
der Vorgdnger des Sokrates, in the Rhein. Mus. f. Ph., 1. 1833, pp. 1-39 and 533-643 (cf. IV. 1836, p. 355 
seq.), and in Welcker s Kl. ScJir., II. pp. 393-541 : Hummel, De Prodieo sophista, Leyden, 1S47 ; E. Cougny, 
De Prodieo Ceio, Socratis magistro, Paris, 1858 ; Diemer, De Prod. Ceio(G.-Pr.\ Corbach, 1859 ; Kraemer, 
Die Allegorie des Prodikos und der Traum des Lukianos, in the N. Jahrb. f. Ph. und Pad., vol. 94, 
1866, pp. 439-443; F. Blass, Die att. Bereds., Leipsic, 1868, pp. 29-31. 

Prodicus appears from Plato s Protagoras to have been younger than Protagoras, and 
of about the same age with Hippias. Socrates recommended his instruction in many 
instances to young men, though, indeed, only to such as he found ill-adapted for dia 
lectical training (Plat., Theaet., 151 b), and he sometimes terms himself (Plat., Protag., 
341 a; cf. Charm., 163d, Crat, 384 b, Meno, 96 d), a pupil of Prodicus, though more 
sportively than seriously. Plato pictures him in the Protag. as effeminate, and as, in his 
distinctions of words, somewhat pedantic. Yet his most considerable philosophical merit 
is founded on his investigations of synonyms. 

The men of the earliest times, said Prodicus, deified whatever was useful to them, and 
BO bread was venerated as Demeter, wine as Dionysus, fire as Hephaestus, etc. (die., De 
Nat. Deorum, L 42, 118; Sextus Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 18, 51 seq.). 

Xenophon (Memor. II. 1. 21 seq.) has imitated the myth of Prodicus concerning the 
choice of Hercules between virtue and pleasure. Prodicus declared death to be desirable 
as an escape from the evils of life. His moral consciousness lacked philosophical basis 
and depth. 


32. Of the Later Sophists, in whom the evil consequences of 
granting exclusive recognition to the accidental opinion and ego 
tistic will of the individual became more and more conspicuous, 
the best-known are Polus the rhetorician, a pupil of Gorgias; 
Thrasymachus, who identified right with the personal interest of 
those who have might, and the pseudo-dialectical jugglers Euthy- 
demus and Dionysodorus. Many of the most cultivated men at 
Athens and in other Greek cities (as, notably, Critias, who stood at 
the head of the thirty oligarchical despots), favored Sophistic prin 
ciples, though not themselves assuming the functions of Sophists., 
i. e., of instructors in eloquence and polite learning. 

On the later Sophists, see Leonh. Spengel, De Polo rhetore, in his "Svi/aywyrj rcxviav," Stnttg. 1828, pp. 
84-88; Id. de Th.raxym.acho rhetore, ibid., pp. 93-98; C. F. Hermann, De Thrasymacho CJialcedonio 
sophista (Jnd. lect.), Gottingen, 1848-49; Nic. Bach, Oritiae Atheniensis tyranni carminum aliortimqut 
ingenii monumentorum quae supertsunt, Leips. 182T; Leonh. Spengel, De Critia, in " Suyaywyj} rexviv," 
Stuttg. 1828, p. 120 seq. Cf. also Vahlen, Der Sophist Lykophron, Goryias ; der Rhetor Polykrutes, in the 
Rhein Mus., N. 8., XXL, pp. 143-148. 

Our information concerning the later Sophists is derived mainly from the descriptions 
of them given by Plato in his dialogues. Polus figures in the Gorgias, Thrasymachus in 
the Republic, and Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in the Euthydemus. To these sources 
must be added a few notices in Aristotle and others, e. g., Polit., III. 10, p. 12SOb, 10, 
where it is mentioned that the Sophist Lycophron called the law eyywTTjfc rurv tiinaiuv. Yet 
in respect to some of the more important Sophists, still other accounts and even fragments 
of their writings have been preserved to us. 

Critias declared (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 54; cf. Plat., Leges, X., 889 e) 
that the belief in the existence of gods was the invention of a wise statesman, who, by 
thus disguising truth in falsehood, aimed at securing a more willing obedience on the part 
of the citizens (Stfayfi&rw apiarov tlariyrjaaro, ipevdei KaAv^af rrjv aMjdeiav Adycj). Critias 
regarded the blood as the seat and substratum of the soul (Arist., De Anima, I. 2). 

According to the account given by Plato in the Protarj. (p. 314 e, seq.), some of those 
who composed the circle of educated Athenians who met in the house of Callias, adhered 
particularly to Protagoras (such as Callias himself, Charmides, and others), others to Hip- 
pias (viz.: Eryximachus, Phaedrus. and others), and still others to Prodicus (Pausanias, 
Agathon, etc.), although they could not be regarded as, properly speaking, the disciples of 
those Sophists, or as standing exclusively under their influence. 

The Sophist Antiphon (apparently to be distinguished from Antiphon the orator) occupied 
himself with problems connected with the theory of cognition (Trepl ahqQeiaf}, with math 
ematics, astronomy, and meteorology, and with politics (see Arist.. De Soph. El., c. 11, p. 
172 a, 2; Phys., L 1, p. 185 a, 17 ; Sauppe, in the Oratores Attici, on the orator Antiphon: 
J. Bernays, in the JRhein. MILS., new series, IX. 255 seq.). Hippodamus of Miletus, the 
architect, and Phaleas, the Chalcedonian, also propounded political theories; see above, 16. 

Evenus of Paros, a contemporary of Socrates, is mentioned by Plato (Apol., 20 a; Phaedr., 
267 a; Phaedo, GO d) as a poet, rhetorician, and teacher of "human and political virtue. 
Cf. Spengel, 2way. re^vwv, 92 seq. ; Bergk. Lyr. Gr., 474 seq. 

To the time and school of the Sophists belongs Xeniades of Corinth, whom Sextus 
Empiricus (Hypotyp. Pyrrhon., II. 18; Adv. Math., VII. 48 and 63; VIII. 5) classes as a 


Skeptic, representing that (in his skepticism) he agreed with Xenophanes the Eleatic. 
Xeniacles affirmed (according to Sext, Adv. Math., VII. 53) that all was deception, every 
idea and opinion was false (KQ.VT elvai ipevdij, nal Traoav <f>avTaoiav nal 86$av i^Ev6odai) } and 
that whatever came into being, came forth from nothing, and whatever perished, passed 
into nothing. Sextus affirms (Adv. K, VII. 53) that Democritns referred to Xeniades in his 

The dithyrambic poet, Diagoras of Melos, must not be included among the Sophists. 
Of Diagoras it was said that he became an atheist because he saw that a crying injustice 
remained unpunished by the gods. Since Aristophanes alludes to the sentencing of 
Diagoras, in the "Birds" (v. 1073), which piece was represented on the stage in Olymp. 
91.2, we are led easily to the inference that the "injustice" referred to was the slaughter 
of the Melians by the Athenians (in 416 B. c. ; see Thucyd., V. 116); the allusion of Aris 
tophanes in the " Clouds " (v. 380) to the atheism of the Melian must, therefore, have been 
inserted in a second, revised edition of this comedy. Perhaps the prosecutions of religious 
offenders, which took place after the desecration of the images of Hermes, in the year 415, 
had some influence in bringing about the punishment of Diagoras. Diagoras is said to 
have perished by shipwreck, while attempting to escape. 

33. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete, was born 
in Olymp. 77.1-3, according to later tradition, on the 6th day of 
the month Thargelion (hence in 471-469 B. c., in May or June). He 
agreed with the Sophists in the general tendency to make man the 
special object of reflection and study. He differed from them by 
directing his attention not merely to the elementary functions of man 
as a logical and moral subject, viz., to perception, opinion, and sen 
suous and egotistical desire, but also to the highest intellectual 
functions which stand in essential relation to the sphere of objective 
reality, namely, to knowledge and virtue. Socrates made all virtue 
dependent on knowledge, i. ., on moral insight; regarding the former 
as flowing necessarily from the latter. Virtue, according to Socrates, 
could be taught, and all virtue was one. Aristotle (whose testimony 
is confirmed by Plato and Xenophon) testifies that Socrates first 
introduced induction and definition, together with the dialectical 
art of refuting false knowledge, as instruments of philosophical in 
quiry. The foundation of the Socratic Maieutic and Irony was 
dexterity in the employment of the methods of inductive definition 
in conversations relative to philosophical and, in particular, to moral 
problems, in the absence of systematically developed, substantive 
knowledge. The i; demonic sign," which was accepted by Socrates as 
the voice of God, was a conviction, resulting from practical tact, with 
reference to the suitableness or unsuitableness of given courses of 
action (including also their ethical relations). The world is governed 
by asupreme, divine intelligence.- 


The accusation of Socrates, which took place in the year 399 B. c. 
(Ol. 95.1), not long after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, and 
which was brought forward by Meletus, and supported by Anytus, the 
democratic politician, and Lycon, the orator, contained substantially 
the same charges which Aristophanes had made in the u Clouds." 
It ran thus : 4t Socrates is a public offender in that he does not rec 
ognize the gods which the state recognizes, but introduces new demo 
niacal beings ; he has also offended by corrupting the youth." This 
accusation was literally false ; but, considered with reference to its 
more profound basis, it rested on the correct assumption of an essen 
tial relationship between Socrates and the Sophists, as evidenced in 
their common tendency to emancipate the individual, and in their 
common opposition to an immediate, unreflecting submissio-4o the 
customs, law, and faith of the people and the state. But it mistook, 
on the one hand, what was legitimate in this tendency in general ; 
and, on the other, and this is the principal point, it ignored the 
specific difference between the Socratic and Sophistic stand-points, or 
the earnest desire and endeavor of Socrates, in distinction from the 
Sophists, to place truth and morality on a new and deeper foun 

After his condemnation, Socrates submitted his conduct, but not 
his convictions, to the decision of his judges. His death, justly 
immortalized by his disciples, assured to his ideal tendency the most 
general and lasting influence. 

Dan. Heinsius, De doctrina et martini* Socratis, Leyden, 1627. 

Freret, Observations sur let causes et ur quelquet circonstances de la condemnation de Socrate, an 
essay read in the year 1736, and published in the Memoires de FAcademie des Inscription*, T. 47 b, 209 seq. 
(Combats the old uncritical view of the Sophists as instigators of the accusation and sentence of Socrates, 
and points out the political causes of these transactions.) 

Sig. Fr. Dresig, Epistola de Socrate juste damnato, Leips. 1788. (As an opponent of the legally 
existing democracy, Socrates was justly condemned.) 

M. C. E. Kettner, Socrat. criminis majestatis accus. vind., Leipsic, 1738. 

Joh. Lnzac, Oratio de Socrate cive, Leyden, 1796; cf. Lect. Atticae : De Siyaju.ia Socratis, Leyden, 
1909 (wherein the mutual antipathy of the Peripatetics and Platonists is pointed out as one among other 
iinpuro sources of many unfavorable narrations respecting Socrates and his disciples). 

Georg Wiggers, Sokrates als Menscli, Burger und Philoxoph, Rostock, 1807, 2d ed., Nenstrelitz, 1811. 

Ludolph Dissen, De philosophia marali in Xenophontix de Socrate corn-menhir Us tradita, 1812, and 
in D. a Kleine Schriften, Gott. 1839, pp. 57-SS. (Dissen brings together in systematic order the Socratic 
thoughts contained in Xenophon, but considers the narrative of Xenophon inexact, on account of his having 
unjustly attributed to Socrates his own utilitarian stand-point.) , 

Friedr. Schleiermacher, Ueoer den Werth des Socrates als Philosophen, read in the Berlin Akad. der 
Wiss, July 27, 1815, published in the Abh. der philos. Clause, Berlin, 1818, p. 50 seq., and in Schleierrnacher s 
Sammtl. Werke, III. 2, 1838, pp. 287-308. (The idea of knowledge, says Schleiermacher, is the central point 
of the Socratic philosophy ; the proof of this is to be found in view of the discrepancy between the reports 
of the nearest witnesses, the too prosaic Xenophon and the idealizing Plato in the different character of 
Greek philosophy before and after Socrates. Before him, single departments of philosophy, so far as they 


were at all distinguished from each other, were developed by isolated groups of philosophers; while after 
him, all departments were logically discriminated and cultivated by every school. Socrates himself must, 
therefore, while having no system of his own, yet represent the logical principle which makes the construc 
tion of complete systems possible, *. ., the idea of knowledge.) 

Ferd. Delbruck, Sokrates, Cologne, 1819. 

W. Suvern, Ueber Aristophanes Wolken, Berl. 1826. (According to Suvern, Aristophanes confounded 
Socrates with the Sophists.) 

Ch. A. Brandis, Grundlinien der Lehre des Sokrates, in the Rhein. Mus., Vol. I., 1827, pp. 118-150. 

Herm. Theod. Rotscher, Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter, Berlin, 1827. (In this work Rotscher pub 
lished for the first time in a detailed and popular form particularly in the section on the " Clouds" the 
Hegelian view of Socrates, as the representative of the principle of subjectivity, in opposition to the prin 
ciple of " substantial morality," on which the ancient state, according to Hegel, was founded and of the 
attack of Aristophanes and the subsequent accusation and condemnation of Socrates, as representing the 
conflict of these two principles. Rotscher treats the narrative of Xenophonas the most impartial evidence 
in regard to the original teaching of Socrates. Cf. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geiates, p. 560 seq. ; Aesthe- 
iik, III. p. 537 seq. ; Vorluber die Gesch. der Phil, II. p. 81 seq.) 

Ch. A. Brandis, Ueber di vorgebliche Subjectivitdt der Sokratischen Lehre, Rhein. Mus., IL 1828, 
pp. 85-112. (In opposition to the view supported by Rotscher, concerning the stand-point of Socrates and 
the fidelity of the accounts of Xenophon.) 

P. W. Forchhamtner, Die Athener und Sokrates, die Gesetslichen und der Revolutionary Berlin, 
1837. (Forchhammer goes to an altogether untenable extreme in his recognition of the justification of the 
Athenians in condemning Socrates, yet his special elucidation of the political circumstances is a work 
of merit. Cf. in reference, to the same subject, Bendixen, Ueber den tieferen Schriftsinn des revolution- 
aren Sokrates und der gesetslichen Athener, Huysum, 1838.) 

C. F. Hermann, De Socratis magistris ft disciplinajuvenili, Marburg, 1837. 

Ph. Guil. van Heusde, Characterismi principnm philosophorum veterum, Socratis, Platonis, Aris- 
totelis, Amsterdam, 1809. " On the Cosmopolitanism of Socrates," u On Xanthippe" " On the Clouds of 
Aristophanes;" in the Verslagen en Med. of the K. Akad. van W., IV. 3, 1859; see the articles in the 
Philologus, XVI., pp. 383 seq. and 566 seq. 

J. W. Hanne, Sokrates als Genius der Humanitat, Brunswick, 1841. 

C. F. Hermann, De Socratis accusatoribus, Gott. 1854. 

Ernst von Lasaulx, Des Sokrates Leben, Lehre und Tod, nach den Zeugnissen der Alien dargestellt, 
Munich, 1857. 

[J. P. Potter, Characteristics of the Greek Philosophers, Socrates and Plato, London, 1845. R. D. 
Hampden, The Fathers of Greek Philosophy (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle articles reprinted from the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica}, Edinburgh, 1862. E. Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, translated 
from the German by O. Reichel, London, 1868. TV.] 

E. A. Alberti, Sokrates, ein Versuch uber ihn nach den Quellen, Gottingen, 1869. 

The political bearings of the trial of Socrates are very comprehensively and exactly developed in G. 
Grote s History of Greece, chap. 68 (Vol. VIII. pp. 551-684). 

Of the numerous lectures and essays on Socrates we name here the following : C. W. Brumbey, S. nach. 
Dlog. L., Lemgo, 1800; Friedr. Aug. Carus, Sokrates, in his Ideen zur Gesch. der Philos., Leipsic, 1809, 
pp. 514-555; F. Lelut, Du Demon de Socrate, Paris, 1836; Aug. Boeckh, De Socr. rerum phyicarvm 
studio, 1838; H. E. Hummel, De Theologia Socr., Gott. 1839; J. D. van Hoe veil, De Socr. philosophia, 
Groningen, 1S40 ; Zelier, Zur Ehrenrettung der Xanthippe, in the Morgeriblatt fur gebildete Leser, 1850, 
No. 265 seq., and in Zeller s Vortr dgt und Abhandlungen, Leipsic, 1865, pp. 51-61 ; Hurndall, De philos. 
mor. Socr., Heidelberg, 1853; C. M. Fleischer, De Socr. quam dicunt utopia, "Prosrr." of the Gymn. at 
Cleve, 1855; Hermann Kochly, Sokrates und seinVolk, akadem. Vortrag. gehalten 1855, in Kochly s^i a^/. 
Vortr. und Jteden, I., Zurich, 1859, pp. 219-3S6; cf. the review by K. Lehre in the N. Jahrb. f. Phil. u. 
Pad., Vol. LXXIX., 1859, pp. 555 seq. ; Seibert, Sokr. und Christus, in the Pad. Archiv., od. by Langbein. 
I., Stettin, 1859, pp. 291-307; L. Noack, Sokrates und die Sophisten, in Psyche, Vol. II., 1859; G. Mehring. 
Ueber Sokr.,in Fichte s Zeitschr. f. Philos., Vol. XXXVI., Halle, I860, pp. 81-119; F. Ueberweg, Ueber 
Sokr., in Gelzer s Protest. Monatsbl., Vol. XVI, No. 1, July, 1860; Steffensen, ibid., Vol. XVII., No. 2; 
A. Bohringer, Der philos. Stand punkt des Sokrates, Carlsruhe, I860, Ueber die Wolken des Aristophanes, 
ibid., 1863; H. Schmidt, Sokrates, Vortrag gehalten in Wittenberg, Halle, 1860; W. F. Volkmann, 
Die Lehre des Sokrates in ihrer histor. Stellung, in the Abh. der Bdhm. Ges. der Wiss., Fifth Series, 
Vol. XL, Prague, 1861, pp. 199-222; Bartelmann, De Socrate, (G.-Pr.), Oldenburg, 1862; Phil. Jak. 
Ditges, Die epagogische oder inductorische Methode des Sokrates und, der Begriff (G.-Pr.\ Cologne, 
1864; M. Carriere, S. u. s. Stellung in der Gesch. des menschl. Geistes. in "Westermann s Monatsh., 1864, 
No. 92; Bourneville, Socrate etait-ilfout reponse d M. Bally, membre de Tacad.,extr.du journal de 
med. mentale, June, 1864; Ch. H. Bertram, Der Sokrates des Xenophon und der des Aristophanes, 


(G.-Progr.), Magdeb. 1865; Franz Dittrich. De Socratis sententia, virtuUm esse scientiam, Index Lect. 
Lycti Hosiani, Braunsberg, 1868; Job. Peters, De Socrate qui est in Atticorum antiqua comoedia 
disput. (" Progr." of the Gymn. at Beutben), Leipsic, 1869 ; E. Chaignet, Vie de S., Paris, 1869 ; P. Montee, 
La philos. de S., Arras, 1869 ; H. Siebeck (see above, 27). 

On the intellectual development of Socrates and the relation thereto of Plat., Phaed., 95 e, eeq., see 
Boeckh in the Summer Catalogue, Berlin, 1838; Krische, Forschungen, I. p. 210; Susemihl in th Philolo- 
gu, XX., 1863, p. 226 seq. ; Ueberweg, ibid. XXL 1864, p. 20 seq., and Volquardsen, Rh. Mus., New Series, 
XIX. 1864, pp. 505-520. 

On the "Demon" of Socrates, cf. Kuhner, in his edition of the Memorabilia, (Btbl. Graec., cur. F. 
Jacobs et V. Chr. F. Eost, Scr. Orat. PeeZ.,) Vol. VIII., Gotha, 1841, pp. 18-25, where other earlier works 
we cited; of later writers, cf., besides Brandis, Zeller, and others, C. F. Volquardsen, Das Ddmonium den 
Sokrates und seine Interpreter Kiel, 1862; L. Breitenbach, Zeitschrift f. d. Gymnasialwesen, XVII. 1868, 
pp. 499-511 ; Chr. Cron, in the Eos, sudd. Zeitschr. fur Philol. u. Gymnasialwesen, ed. by L. Urlichs, B. 
Btark, and L. v. Jan, L, Wurzburg, 1864, pp. 169-179; P. W. Freynmller, Progr., Metten, 1864; Ferd. 
Fridr. Hiigli, Das Damonium des Sokrates, Berne, 1864. 

For determining the year of the birth of Socrates we find our surest data in the recorded 
pear of his death and the number of years that he is known to have lived. Socrates drank 
the cup of poison in the month of Thargelion, in 01. 95.1 (= 400-399). hence in May or 
June, 399 B. c. (on the 20th of Thargelion, ace. to K. F. Hermann, De Theoria Deliaea, in 
the Index. Led., Gott. 1846-47). At the time of his condemnation he was, according to 
fiis own account in Plat., ApoL, 17 d, more than seventy years old (irrj yeyovwf Trfaiu e/3<k>- 
nfjuovTa). He must, therefore, have been born at the latest in 469, or rather certainly 
before 469. In the Platonic dialogue Crito(p. 52 e), Socrates represents the laws of Athens 
as saying to him : " For the space of seventy years you have been at liberty, Socrates, to 
quit Athens, if you were dissatisfied with us." This also points to an age of more than 
seventy years. Hence 01. 70.1 or 2 is to be assumed as the year of his birth. (Cf. Boeckh, 
Corpus Inscript., II. p. 321, and K. F. Hermann, Plat. Philos., p. 666, Note 522). The 
statement of Apollodorus (Diog. L., II. 44), that Socrates was born in 01. 77.4, is accord 
ingly inexact. The 6th of the month Thargelion is given (by Apollodorus, ap. Diog. L., 
ibid., and others) as his birthday, and this day, like the 7th of the same month, as the birth 
day of Plato, was annually celebrated by the Platonists. But the immediate succession of 
these days one after the other, and still more their coincidence with the days on which the 
Delians celebrated the birth of (the maieutic) Artemis (6th of Thargelion) and Apollo (Thar 
gelion 7th), are enough to make it probable that the birthdays assigned to both of these 
philosophers, or at least that of Socrates, are not historical, but were arbitrarily chosen for 

The father of Socrates was a sculptor, and Socrates himself followed his father s occu 
pation for a time ; in the time of the Periegetes Pausanias (about A. D. 150), a work executed 
by Socrates (or at least ascribed to him), and representing the Graces attired, was standing 
at the entrance to the Acropolis. Plato makes him allude to his mother in T/ieaet., p. 
149 a, where he calls himself vtof [taiaq [idfa yewaiaq TS /cat jSAoovpag, ^aivapirrj^, and 
says of himself that he also practices her art of midwifery, when he entices the ideas of 
his collocutors into the light of day, and examines whether they are genuine and tenable. 
Socrates received at Athens in his youth the education prescribed by the laws (Plat., Crito, 
60 d), and made himself also acquainted with geometry and astronomy (Xen., Memor., IV. 7). 
That he " heard " Anaxagoras or Archelaus is reported only by untrustworthy authorities. 
Plato accounts (Phaedo, 97 f.) for his acquaintance with the opinions of Anaxagoras by 
supposing that he had read the work written by that philosopher. Socrates was also 
familiar with the doctrines of other natural philosophers (Mem., I. 1. 14; IV. 7. 6), although 
he did not accept them ; he read critically (according to Xen., Mem., I. 6. 14 ; cf. IV. 2. 1 
and 8) the writings of the early sages (roi>f drjcavpmx; ruv -Kakai oo<f>uv avdpuv, ovq intlvoi 


ev /fc/3/U off y/*ii/>avrer, av&irruv ttoivy avv rolq $i7mq diepxoficti, /ci av re opuwe* 
ayaOov, eideyofiEOa). The meeting with Parmenides, mentioned by Plato, is probably to DO 
regarded as historic (see above, 19). A material influence on his philosophical develop 
ment was exercised by the Sophists, to whose discourses he sometimes listened, and with 
whom he often conversed, and to whom, also, he not unfrequently directed others (Plat., 
Theaet, 151 b). He sometimes speaks of himself in Plato s works (Protag., 341 a; cf. 
Meno, 96 d; Charmides, 163d; Gratyl., 384 d; Hipp. Maj., 282 c) as a pupil of Prodicua, yet 
not without a shade of irony, aimed especially at the subtle word-distinctions of thai 
Sophist. A Platonic testimony respecting the course of the intellectual development ot 
Socrates may be regarded as contained substantially in Phaedo, p. 95 seq., although tho 
Platonic conception and representation of Socrates is here, as everywhere, influenced by 
the, not Socratic, but Platonic doctrine of ideas (see Boeckh, in the Sommer-Kataloij. 
der Univ., Berlin, 1838, and my Plat. Uhtersuchungen, Vienna, 1861, pp. 92-94, and later- 
works relative to the mental development of Socrates, cited above, p. 83). Plato transfers 
to Socrates from his own thought only that which (like the theory of ideas and the ideal 
of the state) would naturally follow from the views actually held by the historical Socrates-, 
Plato can not have ascribed to Socrates the history of his own mental development, ina- 
much as it was demonstrably other than that portrayed in the passage in question. 

Socrates (according to PI., Apol., 28 e) took part in three military campaigns, viz. : in 
the campaigns of Potidaea (between 432 and 429, cf. PI., Sympos., 219 e, and Charm., inrt.), 
Delium (424, cf. Symp., 221 a, Lack., 181 a), and Amphipolis (422). He demonstrated hid 
fidelity to the laws during his life under democratic and oligarchical rulers (Apol., p. 32), 
and at last by scorning to save his life by flight (PL, Onto. p. 44 seq.). Beyond this, 
Socrates kept himself remote from political affairs. His only vocation, as he believed, waft 
to strive, by means of his dialectic, to quicken the moral insight and influence the moral 
conduct of individuals, as he was convinced that this form of activity was most ad van* 
tageous for himself and his fellow-citizens (PL, Apol., p. 29 seq.). 

In the writings of the disciples of Socrates, the latter appears almost always as a man 
already advanced in years, such as they themselves had known him. In their delineations 
of his character, the leading feature is the utter discrepancy between the interior and the 
exterior which, to the Hellenic mind, accustomed to harmony, was an aroirov his simi- 
Jarity with Sileni and Satyrs in personal appearance and the homeliness of his conversa 
tional discourses, combined with the most sterling moral worth, the most complete self- 
control in pleasure and privation, and a masterly talent in philosophical dialogue (Xeri., 
Mem., IV. 4. 5 ; IV. 8. 11 et al.; Sympos., IV. 19; V. 5 ; Plat., Symp., pp. 215, 221). 

In their account of the life of Socrates, the two principal authorities, Xenophon and 
Plato, substantially agree, although the Platonic picture is sketched with the more delicate 
hand. As to their reports of his doctrine, it is, first of all, unquestionably true that Plato 
in his dialogues generally presents his own thoughts through the mouth of Socrates. But in 
a certain sense his dialogues can, nevertheless, serve as authorities for the Socratic teaching, 
because the groundwork of the philosophy of Plato is contained in that of Socrates, and 
because it is possible, in general, though not in all cases in detail, to discriminate between 
the Platonic and Socratic elements. Plato took care not to be led by his love of idealization 
too far from historic truth ; in some of his compositions (in the Apology, in Crito, and in 
part also in the Protagoras, Laches, etc.) he remains almost entirely faithful to it, and in 
others puts those doctrines which Socrates could not have professed into the mouth of 
other philosophers. Xenophon wrote the Memor. and the Symposium (for the so-called 
" Apology of Xenophon " is spurious) not so much in the spirit of a pure historian as in 
that of an apologist ; but his honorable defense of Socrates demands from us full confidence 


in his historic fidelity, so far as his intention is concerned. But it must be acknowledged 
that as much can not be said of his intellectual qualification for an exact and comprehensive 
understanding of the Socratic philosophy. Xenophon appears to attribute too uncon 
ditionally to Socrates the tendency, natural to himself, to connect all scientific activity with 
a practical purpose, and he thus gives too small a place to the dialectic of Socrates, as 
compared with his ethical teachings. The brief statements of Aristotle respecting the 
philosophical doctrines of Socrates are very valuable, since they are purely historical, and 
relate to the most important points of his teaching. 

We read in the Metaphysics of Aristotle (XIII. 4), that Socrates introduced the method 
of induction and definition (which sets out from the individual and ends in the definition 
of the general notion rovg r efraKTiKovg "X,6yov<; KOI TO opi^eaOat KadoAov). The field of 
investigation in which Socrates employed this method is designated by Aristotle as the 
ethical (Metaph., I. 6). The fundamental conception of Socrates was, according to the same 
authority, the inseparable union of theoretical insight with practical moral excellence (Arist., 
Eth. Nicom., VI. 13: 2w/cpdr^f typnvif/oeit; CJCTO elvat rcacaq raq dperdf. . . Aoyoi f rdf apzrag 
(Jiro elvai tnicrrj^aq yap dvat Trdcraf, cf. Xen., Mem., II. 9. 4 seq.). We find these state 
ments fully confirmed by Plato and Xenophon ; only Aristotle may have described Socrates 
ideas in more definite, technical language than was used by their author (Xen., Memor., 
I.I. 16: avrb<; ds Trepl ruv av&pcjTreiuv av ael fiieteyero, CKOTCUV, ri evcefiec, ri aaepcc- ri 
nahov, ri alaxpov ri 6 tK.aiov, ri adiitov ri au^poaitv^ ri uavia ri avdpeia, ri SeiXia ri Tro/Ur, 
ri Tro/lm/cof * ri ap%j) av&purcuv, r/f ap^iKOf av&purcuv, aal Trepl rtiv d/ltaw, a roi f fiev zldoraq 
r/yelro /caAovf naya&ov elvai, rovs 6 ayvoovvra$ avopaTroduSzic; av tiinaiuc K.eK^a &ot. Ib. 
IV. 6. 1 : anoTTuv avv rolg GWOVCI, ri e/taarov drj ruv ovrwv, oiJeTrwTror ifajyev. Tb. III. 
4. 9 seq. : ootyiav 6~ /cat cwppoavvrfv ov fiiupi^fv . . . kfyr) 6e ttal rf/v dtKaioavvrjv Kal rf/v a/JXrjv 
TTuaav aperi/v ao^iav dvai). Holding these opinions, Socrates was convinced that virtue 
was capable of being taught, that all virtue was in truth only one, and that no one was 
voluntarily wicked, all wickedness resulting merely from ignorance (Xen., Nemordb., III. 9 ; 
IV. 6; cf. Sympos., II. 12; Plat., Apol., 25 e, Protag., p. 329 b, seq., 352). The good I 
(ayaddv) is identical with the beautiful (/caAov) and the useful (cJoe/l^ov XP^ G1 ^ OV Mem., 
IY. 6. 8 and 9 ; Protag., 333 d, 353 c, seq.). Better than good fortune (evrvxia], which is 
accidental, is a correct praxis, arising from insight and self-discipline (Evrcpa^ia, Mem., III. 
9. 14). Self-knowledge, fulfillment of the requirement of the Delphian Apollo, "Know 
thyself," is the condition of practical excellence (Mem., IV. 2. 24). External goods do not 
advance their possessor. To want nothing is diving; to want the -least possible, brings I 
one nearest to divine perfection (Xen., Memor., I. 6. 10). Cicero s well-known declaration* 
(Acad. post, I. 4, 15; Tusc., V. 4. 10; cf. Diog. L., II. 21), that "Socrates called philosophy 
down from the heavens to earth, and introduced it into the cities and houses of men, \ 
compelling men to inquire concerning life and morals and things good and evil," indicate?, I 
in terms substantially correct, the progress of philosophy in Socrates from the cosmology 1 
and physics of his predecessors to anthropological ethics. Socrates, however, possessed 1 
no complete system of ethical f1nftrinps | hut only j-.h^ IJKtff instinct of inquiry, and could, 
therefore, naturally arrive at definite ethical theft&sm^ only in conversation with others. 
Hence his art was intellectual midwifery (as Plato terms it. Theaet., p. 149) ; he enticed 
forth thoughts from the mind of the respondent and subjected them to examination. With 
his confessed ignorance. which yet, as reposing on a lively and exact consciousness of 
the nature of true knowledge, stood higher than the pretended knowledge of his collocu 
tors, was connected the Socratic ironv (upuveia), or the apparent deference of Socrates 
to the superior intelligence and wisdom o> others, until these vanished into nothingness 
before that dialectical testing, in the course o\ which he compared the asserted general 


iruth with admitted particular facts. In this manner Socrates exercised the vocation 
which he believed had been indicated for him by the Delphic god, when, in reply to 
Chaerephon, the oracle declared that Socrates was the wisest of men the vocation, namely, 
of examining men (igeraoic, Plat, Apol., p. 20 seq.). He devoted his life especially to the 
education of youth. For the accomplishment of this end he relied on the aid of epwf, 
love, which, without excluding its sensuous element, he refined and utilized as an instru 
ment in the conduct of souls and the common development of his thoughts and those of 
his listeners. 

The fundamental thought in the political doctrine of Socrates is that authority prop 
erly belongs to the intelligent (eTrwrrd^evof), to him who possesses knowledge (Xenoph., 
Memorab., III. 9. 10; cf. III. 6. 14). The good ruler must be, as it were, a shepherd to 
those whom he rules (the iroiftrjv hativ, of Homer). His business, his " virtue," is to make 
them happy (TO EvSai/uovag iroielv uv av tfyijTai, Mem., III. 2. 4; cf. I. 2. 32). Socrates found 
fault with the appointment of officers by popular suffrage and by lot (Mem., I. 2.9; 
III. 9. 10). 

The peculiar philosophical significance of Socrates lies in his logically rigorous reflec 
tion upon moral questions; Ms combination of the spirit of research with that of doubt, 
and his dialectical method of demolishing seeming and conducting to true knowledge, 
feut since reflection, from its very nature, is occupied with the universal, while action in 
ivery specific case relates only to the particular, it is necessary for the existence of prac 
tical ability that the habit of reflection should be accompanied by a certain practical insight 
or tact, which also involves moral tact, although not exclusively, nor even mainly, confined 
to the latter. This tact respects chiefly the favorable or unfavorable result to be expected 
from a given action or course of action. Socrates recognized reflection as man s peculiar 
work; but that immediate conviction of the suitableness or unsuitableness of certain 
actions, of whose origin he was not conscious, but which he recognized as a sign pointing 
him to the right way, he piously ascribed, without subjecting it to psychological analysis, 
to divine agency. This divine leading is that which he designates as his daiuoptov. In the 
Apology of Plato (p. 31 d), Socrates says: " The reason of my remaining apart from public 
life is OTI /uoi deiov TL nai daifioviov yiyverai" and he goes on to explain that from his youth 
up he had been ever cognizant of a voice, which only warned, but never encouraged him. 
This voice he terms, in the Phaedrus, "his demonic and familiar sign " (TO 6aijj.6vi6v TE Kal 
TO eiudb<; anpelov). According to Xen., Memor., IV. 8. 5, this daiftoviov interposed its 
warning when he was about to reflect on the defense he should make before his judges, 
t. e., his practical tact showed him that it was worthier of him and better for his cause, 
that he should give himself exclusively over to the solemn inspiration of the moment, than 
by rhetorical preparation to prejudice his hopes of such inspiration. Less exact is the 
occasional statement of Xenophon, that Socrates was shown by the 6aiu6viov " what things 
he ought to do and what not" (a re xpti noieiv Kal a fir], Mem., I. 4. 15 ; IY. 3. 12). The 
power from which this voice emanated is designated as " the God " (6 6e6c, Mem., IV. 8. 6), 
or "the Gods" (oi 0eo/, Mem., I. 4. 15 ; IV. 3. 12), the same Gods who also speak to men 
by the oracles. 

Socrates defends the belief in the existence of gods on teleological grounds, arguing 
from the structure of organized beings, whose parts are subservient to the wants of the 
whole, and founding his reasoning on the general principle, that whatever exists for a use 
must be the work of intelligence (irpeirei uzv TO. CTT oxjteteia ycfvo^va yvupw epya elvai. 
Memor., I. 4. 4 seq. ; IV. 3. 3 seq ). The Wisdom (<j>p6vT]mc.\ says Socrates, which is present 
and rules in all that exists, determines all things according to its good pleasure. It is 
distinguished from the other gods as the ruler and disposer of the universe (6 rbv oAo 


K6a/j.ov GWTCLTTUV re KOI Gwt%uv). The gods, like the human soul, are invisible, but make 
known their existence unmistakably by their operations (Memor., IV. 3. 13). 

Aristophanes, in the " Clouds " (which were first represented in 423 B. c.), attributes to 
Socrates not only traits of character and doctrines which really belonged to him, but also 
Anaxagorean doctrines and Sophistic tendencies. The ground of the possibility of this 
misapprehension (or, if the expression is preferred, of this poetical license) is to be found, 
on the part of Socrates, not only in the fact that he stood, as a philosopher, in a certain 
antagonism to the general popular consciousness, and that the Anaxagorean theology had 
not remained without a considerable influence upon him, but more especially in the fact 
that, as a philosopher whose reflection was directed to the subjective processes and 
phenomena, and who made action dependent on such reflection, he moved in the same 
general sphere with the Sophists, being specifically differentiated from them only by the 
peculiar direction or kind of his philosophizing. On the part of Aristophanes, it is to b6 
found in the fact that he, as a poet and not a philosopher, and (so far as he is in earnest in 
his representations) as an anti-Sophistical moralist and patriotic citizen of the old school, 
with his conviction of the immorality and dangerousness of all philosophy, scarcely con 
sidered the significance of specific differences among philosophers as worthy of his atten 
tion, not to say, was unable to appreciate their essential importance. 

The same opinion respecting Socrates which we find in Aristophanes, seems also to have 
been entertained by his accusers. Meletus is described in Plato s Euthyphron (p. 2 b) as a 
young man, little known, and personally almost a stranger to Socrates. In the Platonic 
Apologia it is said of him that he joined in the accusation because he felt himself injured by 
Socrates demonstration of the ignorance of poets respecting the nature of their art (virep 
TCJV TToiTf-cjv axOo/uevos, Apol., p. 23 e). Perhaps he was a son of the poet Meletus, whom 
Aristophanes mentions in the "Frogs" (v. 1302). Anytus, a rich leather-dealer, was an 
influential demagogue, who had fled from Athens during the rule of the Thirty, and had 
returned fighting on the side of Thrasybulus ; Socrates says in the Apologia (p. 23 e) that 
he joined in the accusation as a representative of the tradesmen and politicians (virep TCJV 
6rjfj.tovpyuv Kal TUV irohiTincjv a^fl^uevof), and in the Meno (p. 94 e) it is intimated that he was 
displeased with the depreciatory judgment of Socrates respecting the Athenian statesmen. 
According to the Apology of Pseudo-Xenophon (29 seq.), he was angry with Socrates 
because the latter thought his son fitted for something better than the leather business, 
and had counseled him to educate this son for something higher. Lycon felt injured 
by what Socrates had said of the orators (vTrsp TCJV p?jT6pcjv, Apol, 23 e). The accusation 
ran as follows (Apol., p. 24 ; Xen., Mem., I. 1 ; Favorinus, ap. Diog. L., II. 40) : rdcfe 
t avTcjfj.6aa.To Mf/l^rof MeA^rov ILr#d>f 2<j/cpdm ZarfpoviGKov A/lwTre/csytfev adticel 
r/ 7T($yUf vofii^et i?oi)f ov vopi^cjv, eTepa de Kaiva 6a.ifj.6via etGrfyovfisvo^, adinel 6e 
KOI TOVS veovf diaydeipcjv . rifijjfia tfdvarof. The ordinary objections against all philosophers 
were directed against Socrates, without any special investigation of the peculiar tendency 
or aim of his teachings (Apol., 23 d). The particular charges which Xenophon (I. ch. 2.) 
cites and labors to refute, appear (as Cobet, Novae Lectiones, Leyden, 1858, p. 662 seq., 
seeks to demonstrate yet of. Biichsensehutz, in the Philologus, XXII., p. 691 seq.) to have 
been taken, not from the speeches of the accusers, but from a work by Polycrates, the 
rhetorician, written after the death of Socrates, in justification of the sentence. The 
conduct of Socrates is described by Plato with historic fidelity in the essential outlines, 
in the ApoL, in Orito, and in the first and last parts of the Phaedo. The Parrhesia of 
Socrates appeared to his judges as presumptuousness. His philosophical reflection seemed 
to them a violation of those ethical and religious foundations of the Athenian state, which 
the restored democracy were endeavoring to re-establish. The former intimacy of Socrates 



with Alcibiades, and especially with the hated aristocrat, Critias (cf. ^Eschinea, Adv. 
Timarch., 71), led to a mistrust of his doctrines and purposes. Nevertheless, the con 
demnation was voted by only a small majority of voices ; according to Apol, p. 36 a, he 
would have been acquitted if only three, or, according to another reading, thirty of the 
judges had been of a different mind; so that of the probably 500 or 501 judges, either 253 
or 280 must have voted for his condemnation, and 247-248 or 220-221 for his acquittal. 
But since, after the condemnation, he would not acknowledge himself guilty by expressing 
an opinion as to the punishment he should receive, but declared himself worthy, on the 
contrary, of being fed at the Prytaneum as a benefactor of the state, and at last only on 
the persuasion of his friends agreed to a fine of thirty minae, he was (according to Diog. L., 
II. 42) condemned to death by a majority increased by eighty votes. The execution of the 
sentence had to be delayed thirty days, until the return of the sacred ship, which had been 
sent only the day before the condemnation with an embassy to Delos. Socrates scorned 
as unlawful the means of escape which Crito had prepared for him. He drank the cup of 
poison in his prison, surrounded by his disciples and friends, with perfect steadfastness 
and tranquillity of soul, full of assurance that the death which was to attest his fidelity to 
his convictions would be most advantageous for him and for his work. 

The Athenians are reported soon afterward to have regretted their sentence. Yet a 
more general revulsion of opinion in favor of Socrates seems first to have taken place in 
consequence of the labors of his scholars. That the accusers were, some exiled, some put 
to death, as later writers relate (Diodorus, XIV. 37 ; Plut., De Invid., c. 6 ; Diog. L., II. 43, 
VI. 9 seq., and others) is probably only a fable, which was apparently founded on the fact 
that Anytus (banished, perhaps, for political reasons) died, not in Athens, but in Heraclea 
on the Pontus, where in later centuries his tomb was still pointed out. 

34. In the Socratic principle of knowledge and virtue, the prob 
lem for the successors of Socrates was indicated beforehand. That 
problem was the development of the philosophical disciplines termed 
dialectic and ethics. Of his immediate disciples (so far as they were 
of philosophical significance) the larger number, as " partial disciples 
of Socrates," turned their attention predominantly to the one or the 
other part of this double problem ; the Megaric or Eristic school of 
Euclid and the Elian school of Phaedo occupying themselves almost 
exclusively with dialectical investigations, and the Cynic school of 
Antisthenes and the Hedonic or Cyrenaic school of Aristippus treat 
ing, in different senses, principally of ethical questions. In each of 
these schools, at the same time, some one of the various types of pre- 
Socratic philosophy was continued and expanded. It was Plato, 
however, who first combined and developed into the unity of a com 
prehensive system the different sides of the Socratic spirit, as well as 
all the legitimate elements of earlier systems. 

K. F. Hermann, Die, philosophische, Stellung der dlteren Sokratiker und ihrer Schulen, in his 
Ges. Abhandlungen, Gottingen, 1849, pp. 227-255. 

On JEschines, cf. K. F. Hermann, De AescMnis Socratid reliquiis disp. aead., Gott. 1850. 
i e ii n Kr X ! n u Ph0n Cf A- Boeckh De ^multate, quam Plato cwm Xenophonte exercuisse fertur, Berlin, 
U ; Niebuhr, Kl. Sehriften, L, p. 467 seq. ; F. Delbruck, Xenophon, Bonn, 1829 ; Hirschig, De discipline 


Sooraticae in vitam et more* antiquorwn m et efficacitate, in Xenophontiz dec em mille Graecos a 
ANIU salvo* in patriam reducentis exemplo manifesto., in : Symbolae hit., III., Amsterdam, 1839 ; J. D. 
van Hoevell, De Xenophontis philozophia, Groning. 1840; J. H. Lindeman Q. Die Lebensansicht den Xen.^ 
Conitz, 1843; Die r&l.-sittl. Weltamtsdiauutig des Herodot, Tkucydides und Xenophon, Berlin, 1852; P. 
Werner, Xenoph. de rebus publ. sentent., Brealau, 1851 ; Engel, X. polit. Stellung und Wirfaamkeit, 
Stargard, 1853; A. Gamier, ffistoire de la Morale: Xenophon, Paris, 1857. 

Cf. also the articles by A. Hug, Plulol.. VII., 1852, pp. 638-695; and K. F. Hermann, Philol.. VIII., 
837 seq. ; and the opuscule of Georg Ferd. Rettig, Univ.-Pr., Berne, 1864, on the mutual relation of the 
Xenophontic and Platonic Symposia, and Arn. Hug s Die UnecMheit der dem Xenophon suffeschriebenen 
Apologie des Socrate*, in Herm. Kochly s Akad. VorVr. u. Redei., Zurich, 1859, pp. 430-439. See also H. 
Henkel, Xenophon und Isocrates (Progr.), Salzwedel, 1866 (cf. P. Sanneg, De Schola Jsocratea, dlst;., 
Halle, 1867) ; and A. Nicolai, Xenophon^ Cyropddie und seine Ansicht vom Staat (Progr.), Bernburg, 

Xenophon, who was born about 444 B. c. (according to Cobet, 430), died about 354 B. C., 
and belongs to the older disciples of Socrates. His Cyropaedia is a philosophical and political 
novel, illustrating the fundamental Socratic principle that authority is the prerogative of the 
intelligent, who alone are qualified to wield it ; but it is to be confessed that the " intelli 
gent " man, as depicted by Xenophon, is, as Erasmus justly says (cf. Hildebrand, Gesch. u. 
Syst. d. Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, I. p. 249), rather a prudent and skillfully calcu 
lating politician than a truly wise and just ruler." Xenophon and ^Eschines are scarcely 
to be reckoned among the representatives of any special philosophical type or school. 
They belong rather to the class of men who, following Socrates with sincere veneration, 
strove, through intercourse with him, to attain to whatever was beautiful and good (/caAo- 
ttayadia). Others, as, notably, Critias and Alcibiades, sought by association with Socrates 
to enlarge the range of their intelligence, yet without bringing themselves permanently 
under his moral influence. Few out of the great number of the companions of Socrates 
proposed to themselves as a life-work the development of his philosophical ideas. 

The expression "partial disciples of Socrates," is not to be understood as implying that 
the men so named had only reproduced certain sides of the Socratic philosophy. On the 
contrary, they expanded the doctrines of their master, each in a definite province of 
philosophy and in a specific direction, and even their renewal of earlier philosophemes may 
be described rather as a self-appropriating elaboration of the same than as a mere combina 
tion of them with Socratic doctrines. In like relation stands Plato to the entire body of 
Socratic and pre-Socratic philosophy. While Cicero s affirmation is true of the other 
companions of Socrates (De Orat., III. 16, 61): "ex iUiris (Socratis) variis et diversis et in 
omnem partem diffuses disputationibus alius cdiud apprehendit" Plato combined the various 
elements, the, so to speak, prismatically broken rays of the Socratic spirit in a new, higher, 
and richer unity. 

35. Euclid of Megara united the ethical principle of Socrates 
with the Eleatic theory of the One, to which alone true being could 
be ascribed. He teaches : The good is one, although called by many 
names, as intelligence, God, reason. The opposite of the good is 
without being. The good remains ever immutable and like itself. 
The supposition that Euclid, without detracting from the unity of the 
good or the truly existent, nor from the unity of virtue, also assumed 
a multiplicity of unchangeable essences, is very improbable. The 
method of demonstration employed by Euclid was, like that of Zeno, 
the indirect. The most noted of the followers of Euclid were Eubu- 


lides the Milesian, and Alexinus celebrated for the invention of the 
sophistical arguments known as the Liar, the Concealed, the Measure 
of Grain, the Horned Man, the Bald-head ; Diodorus Cronus known 
as the author of new arguments against motion, and of the assertion 
that only the necessary is real and only the real is possible ; and the 
disciple of Diodorus, Philo, the dialectician (a friend of Zeno of 
Cittium). Stilpo of Megara combined the Megaric philosophy with 
the Cynic. He argued against the doctrine of ideas. The dialectical 
doctrine, that nothing can be predicated except of itself, and the 
ethical doctrine, that the wise man is superior to pain, are ascribed 
to him. 

On the Megarians, cf. Georg Ludw. Spalding, Vindiciae philos. Megaricorum, Berlin, 1793 ; Ferd. 
Deycks, De Megaricorum doctrina, Bonn, 1827; Heinr. Bitter, Bemerkungen uber die Philos. der Mega- 
rischen Schule, in the Rhein. Mus. f. Philol, II. 1828, p. 295 seq. ; Henne, Ecole de Megare, Paris, 1843 ; 
Mallet, Histoire de fecole de Megareet de ecoles d^Elis et d Eretrie, Paris. 1845; Hartenstein, Veber dit 
Bedeutung der Megarischen Schule fur die Geschichte der metaphysisehen Probleme, in the VerhandL 
d&r sdchs. Oesellsch. der Wins., 1848, p. 190 seq. ; Prantl, Oesch. der Logik, I. p. 33 seq. 

Of Euclid the Megarian (who must not be confounded with the Alexandrian mathema 
tician, who lived a century later) it is related (Qell., Nod. Ait., VI. 10) that, at the time 
when the Athenians had forbidden the Megarians, under penalty of death, to enter their 
city, he often ventured, for the sake of intercourse with Socrates, under cover of evening 
to come to Athens. Since this interdict was issued in Olymp. 87.1, Euclid must have been 
one of the earliest disciples of Socrates, if this story is historical. He was present at the 
death of Socrates (Phaedo, p. 59 c), and the greater part of the companions of Socrates are 
reported to have gone to him at Megara soon afterward, perhaps in order that they too 
might not fall victims to the hatred of the democratic rulers in Athens against philosophy 
(Diog. L., II. 106; III. 6). Euclid appears to have lived and to have remained at the head 
of the school founded by him, during several decades after the death of Socrates. Early 
made familiar with the Eleatic philosophy, he modified the same, under the influence of 
the Socratic ethics, making the One identical with the good. The school of Euclid ia 
treated of by Diog. Lae rt., in his Vitae Philos.. II. 108 seq. 

The author of the dialogue Sophistes mentions (p. 246 b, seq.) a doctrine, according to 
which the sphere of true being was made up of a multiplicity of immaterial, absolutely 
unchangeable forms (<%), accessible only to thought. Many modern investigators (in par 
ticular Schleiermacher, Ast, Deycks, Brandis, K. F. Hermann, Zeller, Prantl, and others) refer 
this doctrine to the Megarians ; others (especially Ritten as above cited, Petersen, in the 
Zeitschriftfur Alterthumswiss, 1856, p. 892, and Mallet, ibid. XXXIV.) dispute this. In 
defense of the latter position may be urged the inconsequence which the doctrine would 
imply on the part of Euclid, if ascribed to him, and also the testimony of Aristotle (Metaph., 
I. 6 seq. ; XIII. 4), according to which Plato must be regarded as the proper author of the 
theory of ideas, whence it results that this theory can not have been professed by Euclid 
under any form. The passage in the Sophistes must, in case Plato was the author of that 
dialogue, be interpreted as representing the opinion of partial Platonists (cf. my Unter- 
suchungen uber die Echiheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften, Vienna, 1861, p. 277 seq.). 
But since the dialogue (as Schaarschmidt has shown, cf. TJeberweg in Bergmann s Philo*. 
Mon., III. p. 479) was probably composed by some Platoniat, who modified the doctrine oi 


Plato, the passage in question is rather to be considered as referring to Plato s theory of 
ideas, or perhaps to an interpretation of it, which the author of the dialogue thought inexact. 
Cf. Schaarschraidt, Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften, Bonn, 1866, p. 210 seq. 

The doctrine of Euclid (as given at the beginning of this section) is expressed by Diog. 
L., II. 106, in these words : ovroq ev TO ayadbv atrsfyaiveTo Tro/Uwf bvo/uaat K.ahov/j.evov ore 
/ /dp (f>p6v7jacv, ore de 6ebv KO,I d/U,ore vovv KO.I ra Tionrd. ra 6e dvriKELjUva rw dyaOfi avrjpei, 
pr/ elvai <j>dcKuv. Such a principle was not capable of being positively developed into 
a philosophical system ; it could only lead to a continued war with current opinions, 
which the Megarians sought to refute by a deductio ad absurdum. This is the philo 
sophical meaning of the Megaric " Eristic." 

Stilpo, who taught at Athens about 320 B. c., is said by Diog. L. (II. 119) to have 
assumed a polemical attitude with reference to the theory of ideas (avrfpei /cat ra el6rf). 
Such an attitude would be in logical accordance with the exclusive doctrine of unity, 
which Stilpo held with the earlier Megarians (according to Aristocles, see Euseb., Pr. Ev., 
XIV. 17. 1). Stilpo proclaimed insensibility (aTrddeia) as the proper end of all moral 
endeavor (cf. Senec., Ep. 9: hoc inter nos (Stoicos) et illos interest: noster sapiens vincit 
quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem). The sage is so sufficient 
to himself, that not even friends are necessary for his happiness. One of Stilpo s disciples 
was Zeno of Cittium, the founder of the Stoic school (see below, 52). On the other hand, 
the Skeptics, Pyrrho and Timon, seem also to have taken the doctrine of the Megarians 
for their point of departure (see 60). 

36. Phsedo of Elis, a favorite disciple of Socrates, founded, after 
the death of the latter, in his native city, a philosophical school, 
which appears to have resembled in tendency and character the 
Megaric school. Menedemus, who enjoyed the instructions of 
Platonists and Phsedonists and of Stilpo, transplanted the Elian 
school to his native city, Eretria, whence his followers received the 
name of Eretrians. 

L. Preller, Phaedons Lebensschiektale und Sehriften, in the Rhein. Mus.f. Philol., New Series, IV., 
1846, pp. 391-899, revised in Ersch and Gruber s Encykl., Sect. III., Vol. XXI., p. 35T seq., and now pub. 
lished in Preller s Kleine Schriften, ed. by E. Kohler. 

Phaedo, the founder of the Elian school, is the same person whom Plato represents in 
the dialogue named after him, as recounting to Echecrates the last conversations of Socrates. 
According to Diog. L., II. 105, he was ransomed from the condition of a prisoner of war 
by Crito, at the instance of Socrates. He is said to have written dialogues; yet the 
genuineness of most of the dialogues which bore his name was disputed. Of his doctrines 
we know little. - 

Of Phaedo s (indirect) disciple, Menedemus (who lived 352-276 B. c.), Heraclides 
(Lembus) says (ap. Diog. L., II. 135), that he espoused the opinions of Plato, but only 
sported with dialectic. Both statements are not to be taken in too rigorous a sense. 
Compare, however, Heinrich von Stein, Gesch. des Platonismus, II. G-ott. 1864, p. 202 seq. 
Respecting his ethical tendency, Cicero says (Acad., IV. 42, 129): a Menedemo Eretriaci 
appellaii, quorum omne bonum in tnente positum et mentis acie, qua rerum cerneretur. Like 
the Megarians, he regarded all virtues as one, though called by different names. He 
defined virtue as rational insight, with which he seems, like Socrates, to have considered 
right endeavor as inseparably connected. 


37. Antisthenes of Athene, at first a pupil of Gorgias, but after 
ward of Socrates, taught, after the death of the latter, in the gym 
nasium called Cynosarges, whence his school was called the Cynic 
school. Virtue, he taught, is the only good. Enjoyment, sought as 
an end, is an evil. The essence of virtue lies in self-control. Virtue 
is one. It is capable of being taught, and, when once acquired, can 
not be lost. The safest wall for a town is knowledge based on secure 
inferences. Virtue requires not many words, but only Socratic force. 
Antisthenes combats the Platonic theory of ideas. He grants the 
validity only of identical judgments. His assertion that contradiction 
is impossible, gives evidence of his lack of earnestness in the treatment 
of dialectical problems. The opposition to the political forms and 
the polytheism of the Hellenic race, which remained still undeveloped 
in Socrates, pronounced itself distinctly in the cosmopolitism of An 
tisthenes and in his doctrine of the unity of God. 

To the school of Antisthenes belong Diogenes of Sin ope, Crates 
of Thebes, Hipparchia, the wife of Crates, Metrocles, her brother, 
and others. 

The Cynics are treated of and the fragments of their writings are brought together in Mullach s 
Fragm. Philos. Gr., II. pp. 261-395. 

The fragments extant of the works of Antisthenes have been edited by Aug. Wilh. "Winckelmann, 
Zurich, 1842. Cf. Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 234-246; Chappuis, Antisthene, Paris, 1854; Ad. Muller, 
De Antisthenis Oynici vita et wriptis (" Progr." of the Vitzth.-G.\ Dresden, 1860. 

On Diogenes, cf. Karl Wilh. Gottling, I), der Cyniker oder die Philosophic des griechischen Pro 
letariats, in his Ges. AbhandL, Vol. I., Halle, 1851 ; Hermann, 2ur Gesch. und Eritik des Diogenes von 
Kinope (G.-Pr.), Heilbronn, 1860; Wehrmann, Ueber den Cyniker D., in the Pddag. Archiv., 1861, pp. 

On Crates, cf. Postumus, De Crat., Gron. 1823. The 38 (spurious) letters ascribed to him are edited ly 
Boissonade in Notices et Extraits de Manuscrits de la Bibliotheque du Roi, t. IX., Paris, 1827. 

F. V. Fritsche treats of the fragments by Demonax, in De Fragm. Demonactis Philos., Rostock and 
Leipsic, 1866. Cf. Lucian, in his Vita Demonactis, and A. Kecknagel, Comm. de Demonactis philo*., 
Nuremberg, 1857. 

Antisthenes, born at Athens in Olymp. 84.1 (444 B. c.), was the son of an Athenian 
father and a Thracian mother (Diog. L., VI. 1). For this reason he was restricted to 
the gymnasium called Cynosarges. In the rhetorical form of his dialogical writings 
Antisthenes betrayed the influence of Gorgias instruction. He went to Socrates first in 
later life, for which reason he is designated in the Sophistes (p. 251 b, where without doubt 
he is referred to) as the "late learner" (oi/^aftfr). Plato (Theaet., 155 e ; cf. Soph., 251 b, 
seq.) and Aristotle (Metaph., XIII. 3) criticise him as lacking in culture. Before becoming 
a disciple of Socrates, he had already given instruction in rhetoric (Diog. L., VI. 2), an 
occupation which he also afterward resumed. He appears to have lived thirty years after 
the death of Socrates (D iodorus, XV. 76). In external appearance Antisthenes, most of all 
the disciples of Socrates, resembled his master, with whom he stood on terms of intimate 
personal friendship. The titles of numerous works by Antisthenes are given in Diog. 
I., VI. 15-18. 


Antisthenes holds fast to the Socratic principle of the unity of virtue and knowledge. 
He emphasizes chiefly its practical side, though not wholly neglecting its dialectical 

Antisthenes (according to Diog. L.. VI. 3) first defined definition (Adyoc) as the expres 
sion of the essence of the thing defined: Ad/of karlv 6 rb ri fjv r/ eari 6^Mv (where the 
Imperfect rjv seems to point to the priority of objective existence before the subjective acts 
of knowing and naming). The simple, said Antisthenes, is indefinable : it can only be 
named and compared ; but the composite admits of an exposition, in which the component 
parts are enumerated conformably to the actual order and manner of their combination. 
Knowledge is correct opinion based on definition (L e., logically accounted for), 66!-a aXiidfa 
fiera Zoyov (Plat., Theaet., p. 201 seq., where indeed Antisthenes is not named, but is prob 
ably meant ; Arist., Metaph., VIII. 3). According to Simplic., Ad Arist. Categ., f. 66 b, 45, 
the following argument against the Platonic doctrine of ideas was attributed to Antis 
thenes: u HMruv, linrov [iev opti, nnroTqTa <P ov% opw, "0 Plato, I see horses, but no 
horseness " (because, Plato is said to have replied, you have no eye for it). According to 
Ammon. Ad Porphyr. Isag., 22 b, Antisthenes said that the ideas were EV i/>iAaZf CTrtvotai?, 
from which it is hardly to be inferred that Antisthenes attempted to transform the doctrine 
of ideas in a subjective sense (as the Stoics did later) ; he meant probably only to describe 
Plato s theory of ideas as an empty fancy. Somewhat sophistical is the doctrine attributed 
to Antisthenes in Arist, Top., I. 11, and Met, V. 29 (cf. Plat., Euthyd., 285 e), that it is 
impossible to contradict one s self (OVK ecrriv avnteysiv), -together with the argument: 
either the same thing is subject of the two supposed contradictory affirmations and 
then, since each thing has only one ot/ceZof ?ioyof, these affirmations are equivalent, and 
not contradictory or the affirmations relate to different subjects, and consequently 
there is no contradiction. The last result of this dialectical tendency was reached in 
the doctrine that only identical judgments are valid (Plat.? Soph., 251 b; Arist., Metaph., 

V. 29). 

According to Diog. L., VI. 104 seq., Antisthenes recognized virtue as the supreme end 
of human life ; whatever is intermediate between virtue and vice was indifferent (adidfopov). 
Virtue is sufficient to secure happiness (Diog. L., VII. 11 : avrdpKrj 6e TT/V dper^v irpos 
evdaifj.oviav, fjLTjdevbq irpoa^eo/uev^v b~i fir/ 2o>/cpar</c^f la^vo^, rfjv T aperr/v TUV zpyw elvai, 
\irjre "kbyuw Trheiaruv deo^tivrjv p/re //ai^^aron ). Pleasure is pernicious. A frequent saying 
of Antisthenes (according to Diog. L., VI. 3) was : paveiqv /udhhov rj t /cOeiffv, " I would 
rather be mad than glad." The good is beautiful, evil is hateful (ibid. 12). He who has 
once become wise and virtuous, can not afterward cease to be such (Diog. L., VI. 105 : T?/V 
aperrjv didanrijv elvai /cat avaTc6ft^rjTov virdpxetv; also in Xen., Mem., I. 2. 19: on OVK dv 
irore 6 diKaiot; adiKoq ykvoiro K. T. /I., the principal reference is probably to Antisthenes). 
The good is proper to us (ot/ceZov). the bad is something foreign (^eviKov, aT^orpiov, Diog. L., 

VI. 12; Plat., Conviv., p. 205 e; cf. Charmides, p. 163 c). 

No actual or possible form of government was pleasing to the Cynic. The Cynic 
restricts his sage to the subjective consciousness of his own virtue, isolating him from 
existing society, in order to make him a citizen of the world (Antisthenes, ap. Diog. L., 
VI. 1 1 : TOV oo(t>ov ov /card TOVC neifiivovq vofiovq TrohiTevaeadai, a/Jla /card TOV Tfjq aperij^. 
Ibid. 12 ; rti aofyu %evov ovdev ov& cnropov). He demands that men return to the simplicity 
of a natural state. Whether it is to this position of Antisthenes that Plato refers in his 
picture of a natural political state (Rep., II. 372 a) which he yet terms a society of swine 
and in his examination of the identification of the art of conducting men with the art of 
the shepherd (Poltt., p. 267d-275c), is doubtful; perhaps in the latter passage the only 
Deference is (as suggested by Henkel, Zur Gesch. der gr. Staatswiss, II., p. 22, Salzwedel, 


1866) to the Homeric idea of the TTOI^V /tawv, " shepherd of the people," which appears in 
various passages of Xenophon s Memor. and Cyrop. (cf. Politicus, p. 301 d, and Rep., VII. 
p. 520 b, with Xen., Cyrop., V. 1, 24, with reference to the comparison of the human ruler 
with the queen-bee). That Antisthenes can not have anticipated Plato in the doctrine of 
the community of women and children, follows from Arist., Pol, II. 4. 1, where it is affirmed 
that Plato first proposed this innovation. 

The religious faith of the people, according to the Cynics, is as little binding on the sage 
as are their laws. Says Cicero (De Nat. Deorum, I. 13, 32): Antisthenes in eo libro qui 
physicus inscrilritur, populares deos mulios, naturakm unum esse (dicit). The one God is not 
known through images. Virtue is the only true worship. Antisthenes interpreted the 
Homeric poems allegorically and in accordance with his philosophy. 

Diogenes of Sinope, through his extreme exaggeration of the principles of his teacher, 
developed a personality that is even comical. He is said himself not to have repelled the 
epithet "Dog," which was applied to him, but only to have replied that he did not, like 
other dogs, bite his enemies, but only his friends, in order that he might save them. He 
was also called " Socrates raving " (Scjupdr^ /uaivopevos}. "With the immorality of the times 
he rejected also its morality and culture. As tutor of the sons of Xeniades, at Corinth, he 
proceeded not without skill, on the principle of conformity to nature, in a manner similar 
to that demanded in modern times by Rousseau. He acquired the enduring love and 
respect of his pupils and of their father (Diog. L., VI. 30 seq., 74 seq.). Diog. L. (VI. 80) 
cites the titles of many works ascribed to Diogenes, but says that Sosicrates and Satyrus 
pronounced them all spurious. Diogenes designates, as the end to which all effort should 
tend, evifoxfa Ka i TOVOS ^vx^S (i Q opposition to mere physical force, Stob., Florileg., 
VII. 18). Of the disciples of Diogenes, Crates of Thebes, a contemporary of Theophrastus 
the Aristotelian, is the most important (Diog. L., VI. 86 seq.) ; through his influence Hip- 
parchia and her brother Metrocles were won over to Cynicism. Monimus the Syracusan 
was also a pupil of Diogenes. Menippus of Sinope, who seems to have lived in the third 
century before Christ, and is mentioned by Lucian (Bis Accm., 33) as "one of the an 
cient dogs who barked a great deal " (cf. Diog. L., 99 seq.), was probably one of the 
earlier Cynics. There were probably several Cynics who bore the name Menippus. 

Cynicism, in its later days, degenerated more and more into insolence and indecency. 
It became ennobled, on the other hand, in the Stoic philosophy, through the recognition 
and attention given to mental culture. The Cynic s conception of virtue is imperfect from 
its failure to determine the positive end of moral activity, so that at last nothing remained 
but ostentatious asceticism. " The Cynics excluded themselves from the sphere in which 
is true freedom " (Hegel). 

After Cynicism had for a long time been lost in Stoicism which (as Zeller happily 
expresses it) u gave to the doctrine of the independence of the virtuous will the basis of a 
comprehensive, scientific theory of the universe, and so adapted the doctrine itself more 
fully to the requirements of nature and human life " it was renewed in the first century 
after Christ under the form of a mere preaching of morals. But it was accompanied in 
this phase of its existence by much empty, ostentatious display of staves and wallets, of 
uncut beards and hair, and ragged cloaks. Of the better class of Cynics in this later 
period were Demetrius, the friend of Seneca and of Thrasea Paetus, (Enomaus of Gadara 
(in the time of Hadrian), who (according to Euseb., Praeparat. Evang., V. 18 seq.) attacked 
the system of oracles with special violence, and Demonax of Cyprus (praised by Lucian, 
born about A. i>. 50, died about 150), who, though holding fast to the moral and religious 
principles of Cynicism, advocated them rather with a Socratic mildness than with the 
vulgar Cynic rudeness. 


38. Aristippus of Gyrene, the founder of the Cyrenaic or He- 
donic school, and termed by Aristotle a Sophist, sees in pleasure, 
which he defines as the sensation of gentle motion, the end of life. 
The sage aims to enjoy pleasure, without being controlled by it. 
Intellectual culture alone fits one for true enjoyment. No one kind 
of pleasure is superior to another ; only the degree and duration of 
pleasure determines its worth. We can know only our sensations, 
not that which causes them. 

The most eminent members of the Cyrenaic school were Arete, 
the daughter of Aristippus, and her son, Aristippus the younger, 
surnamed the " mother- taught" (p/Tpodtdatfrof), who first put the 
doctrine of Hedonism into systematic form, and was probably the 
author of the comparison of the three sensational conditions of 
trouble, pleasure, and indifference, to tempest, gentle wind, and sea- 
calm, respectively ; also Theodorus, surnamed the Atheist, who 
taught that the particular pleasure of the moment was indifferent, 
and that constant cheerfulness was the end sought by the true sage, 
and his scholars Bio and Euhemerus, who explained the belief in the 
existence of gods as having begun with the veneration of distin 
guished men ; further, Hegesias, surnamed the " death-counseling " 
(TTeioiOdvaroc;)^ who accepted the avoidance of trouble as the highest 
attainable good, despaired of positive happiness, and considered life 
to be intrinsically valueless, and Anniceris (the younger), who again 
made the feeling of pleasure the end of life, but included in his 
system, in addition to idiopathic pleasure, the pleasure of sympathy, 
and demanded a partial sacrifice of the former to the latter. 

The Cyrenaics are treated of, and the fragments of their writings are brought together in Mullach s 
Fragm. Ph. Or., II. pp. 397-438. 

Amadeus Wendt, De philosophia Cyrenaica, Gott. 1841 ; Henr. de Stein, De philosophia Cyrenaica, 
Part I.: De vita Arixtippi. Gott. 1855 (cf. his Gesch. den Platonismua, II. Gott. 1864, pp. 60-64). 

On Aristippns, cf. C. M. Wieland, Ariatipp und einige seiner Zeitgenossen, 4 vols., Leipsic, 1800-1602; 
J. F. Thrige, De Arintippo philosopho Cyrenaico aliisqiie Oyrenaicit, in his Ites Cyrenensium, Copenh. 

There exist early monographs on individual members of the Cyrenaic school, one, in particular, on 
Arete, by J. G. Eck (Leipsic, 1776), and another on Hegesias nei<ri9a^aro<;, by J. J. Rambach (Quedlin- 
burg, 1771). The fragments of the iepd avaypa^ri of Euhemerus have been collected by Wessoling (in 
Diod. &i.c. Bibl. Hist., torn. II., p. 623 seq.) Of Euhemerus, with special reference to Ennins, who shared 
in his views, Krahner treats in his Gnindlinien znr Ge*ch. des Verfalls der rdm. Ktaatsreligion (G.- 
Progr.\ Halle, 1837 ; cf. also Ganes, Quaestione* Euhemereai (G.-Pr.), Kempen, I860, and Otto Sieroka. De 
Euhemero (Dias. lnaug.\ Konigsberg, 1869. 

Aristippus of Gyrene was led by the fame of Socrates to seek his acquaintance, and 
joined himself permanently to the circle of Socrates disciples. In criticism of an (oral) 
utterance of Plato, which he thought to have been too confidently delivered, he is reported 
to have appealed to the more modest manner of Socrates (Arist., Rhet., II. 23, p. 1398 b, 29: 


Trpbe Uhdruva kirayye^TiK^Tepdv n EITTOVTO. u<; uero aAAa firjv o / eraZpof fatjv, 
ed>?j OVOEV TotovTov, Aiyw rbv ^uKparrfv). Perhaps, before the period of his intercourse with 
Socrates he had become familiar with the philosophy of Protagoras, of whose influence his 
doctrine shows considerable traces. The customs of his rich and luxurious native city 
were most likely of the greatest influence in determining him to the love of pleasure. That 
he. together with Cleombrotus, was absent in JEgma, at the time of Socrates death, is 
remarked by Plato (Phaedo, 59 c), obviously with reproachful intent. Aristippus is said to 
have sojourned often at the courts of the elder and younger Dionysii in Sicily ; several 
anecdotes are connected with his residence there and his meeting with Plato, which, though 
historically uncertain, are at least not unhappily invented, and illustrate the accommo 
dating servility of the witty Hedonist, occasionally in contrast with the uncompromising 
Parrhesia of the rigid moralist and idealist (Diog. L., II. 78 et al). Aristippus seems to 
have taught in various places, and particularly in his native city. He first, among the 
.companions of Socrates, imitated the Sophists in demanding payment for his instructions 
(Diog. L., II. 65). It is perhaps for this reason, but probably also on account of his doc 
trine of pleasure and his contempt for pure science, that Aristotle calls him a Sophist 
(Metaph., III. 2). 

According to the suppositions of H. von Stein (in the work cited above), Aristippus 
was born about 435 B. c., resided in Athens during a series of years commencing with 416, 
in 399 was in ^Egina, in 389-388 was with Plato at the court of the elder Dionysius, and 
in 361 with the same at the court of the younger Dionysius, and, finally, after 356 was, 
apparently, again in Athens. Yon Stein remarks, however (Gesch. des Platonismus, II., 
p. 61), on the uncertainty of the accounts on which these dates are founded. According 
to Diog. L., II. 83, Aristippus was older than .^Eschines. 

The fundamental features of the Cyrenaic doctrine are certainly due to Aristippus. 
Xenophon (Memor., II. 1) represents him as discussing them with Socrates; Plato refers 
probably to them in Rep., VI. 505 b (perhaps also in Gorg., 491 e, seq.), and most fully in 
the Philebus, although Aristippus is not there named. But the systematic elaboration of 
his doctrines seems to have been the work of his grandson, Aristippus firjrpofiidaKTo^. 
Aristotle names, as representing the doctrine of pleasure (Eth. Nic., X. 2), not Aristippus, 
but Eudoxus. 

The principle of Hedonism is described in the dialogue Phikbus, p. 66 c, in these words : 
rayadbv irideTo r/6ov^v slvai r:aaav nal TravrsTif/. Pleasure is the sensation of gentle 
motion (Diog. L., II. 85 : T/lof cnretyaive ( ApiGTnnroc) rrjv "kelav nivqaiv etc aiaQrjctv avafitdo- 
HEVIIV). Violent motion produces pain, rest or very slight motion, indifference. That all 
pleasure belongs to the category of things becoming (yfveovf) and not to that of things 
being (ovcia), is mentioned by Plato in the dialogue PMlebus (p. 53 c, cf. 42 d) as the correct 
observation of certain "elegants" (KO//I/W), among whom Aristippus is probably to be 
understood as included. Yet the opposing of yevzais to ovoia is certainly not to be ascribed 
to Aristippus, but only probably the reduction of pleasure to motion (Kivyotc), from which 
Plato drew the above conclusion. No pleasure, says Aristippus, is as such bad, though it 
may often arise from bad causes, and no pleasure is different from another in quality or 
worth (Diog. L., II. 87 : ftr/ dta&petv r]6ovi t v ifiovyr, c f. Phileb., p. 12 d). Virtue is a good 
as a means to pleasure (Cic., De Offic., III. 33, 116). 

The Socratic element in the doctrine of Aristippus appears in the principle of self- 
determination directed ly knowledge (the manner of life of the wise, says Aristippus, ay. 
Diog. L., 68, would experience no change, though all existing laws were abrogated), and 
in the control of pleasure as a thing to be acquired through knowledge and culture. The 
Cynics sought for independence through abstinence from enjoyment. Aristippus through 


the control of enjoyment in the midst of enjoyment. Thus Aristippus is cited by Stob. 
(Fhr., 17, 18) as saying that "not he who abstains, but he who enjoys without being car 
ried away, is master of his pleasures." Similarly, in Diog. L., II. 75, Aristippus is said to 
have required his disciples to govern, and not be governed by their pleasures." And, 
accordingly, he is further said to have expressed his relation to Lais, by saying: ex u , ^ K 
?xo,uai. In a similar sense Horace says (Epist., I. 1, 18): nunc in Aristippi furtim prae- 
cepta reldbor, et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor. The Cynic sage knows how to deal 
with himself, but Aristippus knows how to deal with men (Diog. L., YI. 6, 58 ; II. 68, 102). 
To enjoy the present, says the Cyrenaic, is the true business of man; only the present is 
in our power. 

With the Hedonic character of the ethics of Aristippus corresponds, in his theory of 
cognition, the restriction of our knowledge to sensations. The Cyrenaics distinguished 
(according to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VII. 91) TO Trdflof and TO inTog viroKsipevov KOI rov 
Tradovc TroirjTiit6v (the affection, and the " thing in itseh"." which is external to us and affects 
us); the former exists in our consciousness (TO Ttadoq r/juv tari (j>acvo/j. vov) of the "thing 
in itself," on the contrary, we know nothing, except that it exists. Whether the sensa 
tions of other men agree with our own, we do not know; the affirmative is not proved by 
the identity of names employed. The subjectivism of the Protagorean doctrine of knowl 
edge finds in these propositions its consistent completion. It is improbable that the 
motive of ethical Hedonism was contained in this logical doctrine ; that motive must rather 
be sought, in part, in the personal love of pleasure of Aristippus, and in part in the eudse- 
monistic element in the moral speculations of Socrates, which coutained certain germs, not 
only for the doctrine of Antisthenes, but also for that of Aristippus (see, in particular, 
Xenophon, Memorab., I. 6. 7, respecting Kaprepelv in immediate connection with the ques 
tion, ibid. I. 6. 8 : rov 6e ///} fiovfaveiv yac-pl firjtik VTTVU nal "hayvtiq olei rt dAAo alnurepov 
dvai rj TO iTepa % tv TOVTCJV r/6iai). The essence of virtue lies, according to Socrates, in 
knowledge, in practical insight. But it is asked, what is the object of this insight ? If 
the reply is, the Good, then the second question arises, in what the Good consists. If it 
consists in virtue itself, the definition moves in a circle. If in the useful, the useful is 
relative and its value is determined by that for which it is useful. But what is this last 
something, in whose service the useful stands ? If Eudaemonia, then it must be stated in 
what the essence of Eudaemonia consists. The most obvious answer is : Pleasure, and 
this answer was given by Aristippus, while the Cynics found no answer not involving 
them in the circle, and so did not advance beyond their objectless insight and aimless 
asceticism. Plato s answer was : the Idea of the Good (Rep., YI. p. 505). 

Later Cyrenaics (according to Sext. E., Adv. Math., VII. 11) divided their system of 
doctrines into five parts : 1) Concerning that which is to be desired and shunned (goods 
and evils, atprrd KOI QevnTa) ; 2) Concerning the passions (nady) 3) Concerning actions 
; 4) Concerning natural causes (airia) 5) Concerning the guaranties of truth 
. Hence it appears that these later Cyrenaics also treated the theory of knowledge, 
not as the foundation, but rather as the complement of ethics. 

As the control of pleasure aimed at by Aristippus was in reality incompatible with the 
principle that the pleasure of the moment is the highest good, some modifications in his 
doctrine could not but arise. Accordingly we find Theodorus d0eo? (Diog. L , II. 97 seq.), 
not, indeed, advancing to a principle specifically different from pleasure, but yet sub 
stituting for the isolated sensation a state of constant cheerfulness (xapa), as the " end " 
(re/lof). But mere reflection on our general condition is not sufficient to elevate us above 
the changes of fortune, since our general condition is not under our control, and so 
Hegeaias TretatOdvaTos (Diog. L., II. 93 aeq.) despaired altogether of attaining that result. 


Anniceris the Younger (ibid. 96 seq. ; Clem., Strom., II. 417 b.) sought to ennoble the Hedonic 
principle, by reckoning among the things which afford pleasure, friendship, thankfulness, 
and piety toward parents and fatherland, social intercourse, and the strife after honors ; 
yet he declared all labor for the benefit of others to be conditioned on the pleasure which 
our good will brings to ourselves. Later, Epicureanism reigned in the place of the 
Cyrenaic doctrine. 

Euhemerus, who lived (300 B. c.) at the court of Cassander, and favored the principles 
of the Cyrenaic school, exerted great influence by his work lepa avaypa^ in which 
(according to Cic., De Nat De&rum, I. 42; Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 17, and others) he 
developed the opinion that the Gods (as also the Heroes) were distinguished men, to 
whom divine honors had been rendered after their death. In proof of this opinion he 
referred to the tomb of Zeus, which was then pointed out in Crete. It is indisputable 
that Euhemerism contains a partial truth, but unjustly generalized ; riot only historical 
events, but natural phenomena and ethical considerations, served as a basis for the myths 
of the Gods, and the form of the mythological conceptions of the ancients was conditioned 
on various psychological motives. The one-sided explanation of Euhemerus strips the 
myths of the most essential part of their religious character. But for this very reason it 
found a more ready hearing at a time when the power of the ancient religious faith over 
the minds of men was gone, and in the last centuries of antiquity it was favored by many 
representatives of the new Christian faith. 

39. Plato, born in Athens (or JEgina) on the 7th of Thargelion, 
in the first year of the 88th Olympiad (May 26 or 27, 427 B. c.) or 
perhaps on the 7th of Thargelion, Olymp. 87.4 (June 5 or 6, 428), and 
originally named Aristocles, was the son of Aristo and Perictione (or 
Potone). The former was a descendant of Codrus ; the ancestor of 
Perictione was Dropides, a near relative of Solon, and she was cousin 
to Critlas, who, after the unfortunate termination of the Pelopon- 
nesian war, became one of the Thirty oligarchical Tyrants. From 
Olymp. 93.1 till 95.1 (408 or 407 to 399 B. c.) Plato was a pupil of 
Socrates. After the condemnation of the latter, he went with others 
of Socrates disciples to Megara, to the house of Euclid. From there 
it is said that he undertook a long journey, in the course of which he 
visited Gyrene and Egypt, and perhaps Asia Minor, whence he seems 
to have returned to Athens ; it is possible, however, that previous to 
this journey he had already returned to Athens and lived there a 
certain length of time. When he was about forty years old he visited 
the Pythagoreans in Italy, and went to Sicily, where he formed 
relations of friendship with Dio, the brother-in-law of the tyrant 
Dionysius I. Here, by his openness of speech, he so offended the 
tyrant, that the latter caused him to be sold as a prisoner of war in 
JEgina, by Pollis, the Spartan embassador. Ransomed by Anniceris, 
he founded (387 or 386 B. c.) his philosophical school in the Academy. 
Plato undertook a second journey to Syracuse about 367 B. c., after 


the death of the elder Dionysius, and a third in the year 361. The 
object of the second journey was to endeavor, in company with Dio, 
to bring the younger Dionysius, on whom the tyranny of his father 
had devolved, under the influence of his ethical and, so far as circum 
stances permitted it, of his political theories. The object of the third 
was to effect a reconciliation between Dionysius and Dio. In each 
case he failed to accomplish the desired results. Henceforth he lived 
exclusively devoted to his occupation as a philosophical teacher until 
his death, which took place Olymp. 108.1 (348-347, probably in the 
second half of the Olympiadic year, near his birthday, hence in May 
or June, 347 B. c.). 

Data relative to Plato s life were recorded in antiquity by some of the immediate disciples of the 
philosopher, in particular by Speusippus (nXdrwi/o? eyKumov, Diog. L., IV. 5; cf. nXanovo? irept SeiTrvov, 
Diog. L., III. 2, cited also by Apuleius, De Hdbitudine Doctrinarum Plat.), Hermodorus (Simplic., Ad 
Arist. Phys., 64 b, 56 b; cf. Diog. L., II. 106; III. 6), Phillippus the Opuntian (Suidas, . h. .), and 
Xenocrates (cited by Simplicius in the Scholia to Aristotle, ed. by Brandis, pp. 470 a. 27, and 474 a, 12). 
Aristoxenns, the Peripatetic, also wrote a. lifa of Plato (Diog. L., V. 85). Of later writers, Favorinus (in 
the time of Trajan and Hadrian) wrote wepi H\ar<ai>o<;, from which work Diogenes L. drew largely. All 
these works have been lost. The following are extant: 

Apuleins Madaurensis, De doctrina et nativitate Platonis (in the Opera Apul. ed. Oudendorp, Ley- 
den, 1786; ed. G. F. Hildebrand, Leipsic, 1842, 1843). 

Diogenes Laertius, De Vita et Doctr. Philos. (see above). Book III. is entirely given to Plato; 
1-45 treat of his life. 

Ofympiorfori Vita Platonis (in several of the complete editions of Plato s works, also in Didoi s 
edition of Diog. L., and in the Bioypa^oi, ed. "Westermann, Brunswick, 1845). This Vita forms the begin 
ning of the IIpoAeyojxeva TTJ? IIAaTwi/o? $(Ao<ro<i as, ed. K. F. Hermann, in the sixth volume of Hermann s 
edition of Plato s works. Cf. Theophil Roeper, Lectiones Abulpharagianae alterae : de Ilonaini, ut 
fertur, vita Platonis (Pr.), Dantzic, 1867. 

More trustworthy than these and other late and unimportant compilations, is, in general (though not 
in all parts), the seventh of the Letters, which have come down to us under the name of Plato. This 
letter is indeed inauthentic, like all the others, and perhaps was not even composed by an immediate dis 
ciple of Plato ; but it dates from a comparatively early epoch, and was known to Aristophanes of Byzan 
tium, by whom it must have been considered Platonic. Cf., besides other earlier investigations, in particular, 
Herm. Thorn Karsten, De Platonis qnaeferuntur, epistolis, praecipue tertia, septima. octava, Traj. ad 
Rhen., 1864, with whom, in his rejection of the authenticity of these letters, H. Sauppe agrees, in his review 
in the Golt. Gel. Anzeigen, 1866, No. 23, pp. 881-892. Farther, many passages in Plato s own writings, and 
In the works of Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, are important as furnishing data for the biography of Plato. 
Of modern works on the life of Plato, those most worthy of mention are : Marsilius Ficinus, Vita 
Platonis, prefixed to his translation of Plato s writings. Remarks on the Life and Writings of Plato, 
Edinb. 1760; German translation with annotations and additions by K. Morgenstern, Leipsic, 1797. "W. G. 
Tennemann, System der Platon. Philosophie, 4 vols., Leipfsic, 1792-95. (The first volume begins with an 
account of Plato s life.) Friedr. Ast, Plato s Leben und Schriften, Leipsic, 1816. K. F. Hermann, 
Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie, first part (the only one published), Heidelb. 1839. 
(Pages 1-126, "On Plato s life and external relations;" pp. 127-340, "Plato s predecessors and contempo 
raries considered with reference to their influence on his doctrine ; " pp. 841-718, " Plato s literary 
works as authorities for the interpretation of his system, sifted and arranged.") George Grote, PlaU 
and the other Companions of Socrates, London, 1865, 2d ed. 1867. A critique of the traditional accounts 
of the life of Plato, in which the same are represented as almost altogether unhistorical, or at least as 
almost wholly untrustworthy, is given by Heinrich von Stein, in Sieben Bucherzur Gesch. des Platonismus, 
Part II. (Gott. 1864), in Section 17, on "The biographical myth and the literary tradition" (pp. 158-197): 
Schaarschmidt adopts these results, and goes still farther in his work : Die Sammlung der Platonischen 
Schriften, Bonn, 1866, p. 61 seq. On the basis of the transmitted records accepted without critical sifting, 
E. Welper has written a novel (Plato und seine Zeit, hist.-biograph. Lebensbild, Cassel, 1866), the com 
parison of which with the traditional accounts may assist one to a clearer intelligence of the way in which 


given facts are accustomed to be enlarged upon under the influence of a too luxuriant inventive faculty, 
and so to a more correct estimation of the value of tradition itself. 

(Of. the literature in 40 and 41.) 

That Plato was born in Olymp. 88.1 (427 B. c., when Diotimus was Archon) is directly 
affirmed by Apollodorus, kv xpovtuolq, ap. Diog. L., III. 2 (i. e., if by Olymp. 88 the first 
year of that Olympiad is to be understood); cf. also Hippol., Refut. ffaer., L 8. We are 
also conducted indirectly to this result by the statement of Hermodorus, an immediate 
disciple of Plato, given in Diog. L., II. 106, and III. 6, a statement which gives rise to 
doubts in its transmitted form (cf., among others, Schaarschmidt, in the work above cited, 
p. 66), but which is yet the most trustworthy of all the chronological statements relating to 
this subject, and probably forms the basis of the statement of Apollodorus. The purport 
of it is that Plato, at the age of twenty-eight years, soon after the execution of Socrates, 
went to Megara, to the house of Euclid. But Socrates drank the hemlock in the second 
half of the month of Thargelion, Olymp. 95.1 (in May or June, 399 B. c.). For the year 
429 (87.3, the year when Apollodorus was Archon) as the year of Plato s birth, we 
have the evidence of Athenseus (Deipnosoph., Y. 17, p. 217); for 428, we have the state 
ment in Diog. L., III. 3, that Plato was born in the same Archontic year in which Pericles 
died (i. e., in the second half of the archonship of Epameinon, 01. 87.4 = 429-428, in the 
first half of which Pericles died), and also the statement (Pseudo- Plutarch., Vit. laocr.. 2, 
p. 836), that Isocrates was born seven years before Plato assuming it to be established 
that Isocrates was born in Olymp. 86.1 (436-435 B. C.). That Plato was born on the 7th of 
Thargelion (Diog. L., III. 2) seems likewise to rest on the authority of Apollodorus, so 
that if the celebration of Plato s birth was transferred to this day on account of its being 
; the birthday of the Delian Apollo, the change must have been made by the Academics 
soon after Plato s death. This day, in the Olympiadic year 88.1, included if Boeckh is 
correct in assuming that the octennial cycle was then in vogue at Athens the time from 
the evening of May 26th to the evening of May 27th, 427 B. c. (or, if the Metonic cycle had 
already been adopted, May 29-30). Plato s birthplace was Athens, or, according to some, 
JEg ma, whither his father had gone as a Kleruch (Diog. L., III. 3). 

The following table represents the genealogy of Plato, so far as it is known to us (see 
Charm., 154 seq., Tim., 20 d, Apol, 24 a, De Hep., init., Farm., init., et al.):~- 

, a relative of SdAwv. 





1) with Apt 

1 r 

Mriof. Xa/c/Ji 

drj. HspiKTidvq married 

2) with 

I I 

I I 

HXdrov. ThavKov. Horuvq. Avrvpuv. 


It should be remarked that the second marriage of Perictione and the existence of 
Antiphon are facts known only on the evidence of the dialogue Parmenides whose genii- 
ineness is, to say the least, very doubtful, and whose historical statements are therefore 
not to be taken as positively trustworthy and on that of later writers (especially Plu 
tarch), whose only authority was this dialogue. Pyrilampes appears, from Charm., 158 a, 
to have been an uncle of the mother of Perictione. 

Plato received his early education from teachers of repute. Dionysius (who is men 
tioned in the spurious dialogue Anterastae) is reported to have instructed him in reading 
and writing ; Aristo of Argos, in gymnastics (Diog. L., III. 4), and Draco, a pupil of Damon, 
and Metellus (or Megillus) of Agrigentum, in music (Plutarch, De Mus., 17). The report 
concerning Aristo (who is said to have given to his pupil the name of Plato) seems to be 
historical ; the others are more doubtful. Plato is said to have taken part in several 
military campaigns. By Athenian law he would be required to perform military service 
from his eighteenth year (409 B. c.). According to Aristoxenus (ap. Diog. L., III. 8) he 
was engaged at Tanagra, Corinth, and Delium an account which is unhistorical if refer 
ence is intended to the well-known battles at Tanagra and Delium ; but perhaps it alludes 
to minor engagements in the years 409-405. In the battle at Corinth (394) Plato may 
have taken part. Perhaps, like his brothers, he was present and participated in an 
encounter which took place near Megara in the year 409 (Rep., II. p. 368; Diod. Sic., 
XIII. 65). The poetical essays of his youth were discontinued after he became more 
intimately acquainted with Socrates. Before that time he had been already instructed in 
the Heraclitean philosophy by Cratylus (Arist., Metaph., I. 6). The intimacy of Socrates 
with Critias and Charmides may have led early to Plato s acquaintance with him ; the 
philosophical intercourse of Plato with Socrates began, according to Diog. L. (III. 6), who, 
perhaps, follows the authority of Hermodorus, in Plato s twentieth year. A young man, 
endowed with a luxuriant fancy, he received the logical discipline to which Socrates sub 
jected him as a kindness worthy of all gratitude ; the moral force of Socrates character 
filled him with awe, and the steadfastness with which he suffered death for the cause of 
truth and justice, finally transfigured, in his mind, into a pure ideal, the image of his 
master. We may assume that, while Plato was associated with Socrates, he also familiar 
ized himself with other philosophical systems. But whether he had at that time already 
conceived the leading traits of his own system, founded on the theory of ideas, is uncer 
tain ; certain historical indications are wanting in regard to this subject. Nevertheless, 
the Aristotelian account of the genesis of the theory of ideas from Heraclitean and Socratic 
doctrines (see below, 41) makes it very probable that Plato had this theory already in 
his mind during the period of his personal intercourse with Socrates; the doctrine of 
Euclid, the Megarian, may also have had its influence on him at the same period. Re 
specting the precise character of the intercourse between Socrates and Plato, we have no 
specific accounts. Xenophon (who recounts conversations of Socrates with Aristippus and 
Antisthenes) mentions Plato only once (Mem., III. 6. 1), where he says that for his sake, 
as also for that of Charmides, Socrates was well-disposed toward Glaucon. According to 
Plat, Apol., p. 34 a, 38 b, Plato was present at the trial of Socrates, and announced him 
self as ready to guarantee the payment of any fine ; according to Phaedo, 59 b, he was ill 
on the day of Socrates death, and was thereby hindered from being present at the last 
conversations of his master. 

Plato found his life s vocation, not in participating in the political contests of the parties 
then existing at Athens, but in founding a philosophical school. This task demanded the 
unconditional application of his undivided powers, and in the execution of it Plato accom 
plished a work infinitely more advantageous for humanity than any which he could have 


accomplished if he had chosen rather to exercise the civic virtues of a patriotic popular 
orator. Plato could consecrate himself to no political activity which failed to correspond 
with the sense and spirit of his philosophical principles. He could not, like Demosthenes, 
exhort the Athenians to maintain their democracy and to guard themselves against a 
foreign monarch, because democracy did not appear to him a good form of government; 
he could only consent to co-operate for the establishment of an aristocracy or a monarchy 
founded upon the philosophical education of the ruling class, for only a political activity 
directed to this end could seem to him useful or obligatory. A work of this latter kind he 
did once undertake, when the state of things in Sicily appeared to him (erroneously, it ia 
true) favorable to the solution of the political problem as he conceived it. Of. Ferd. Del- 
briick, Vertheidigung Plato s gegen einen Angriff (Niebuhr s, in the Rh. Mus. fur Philol, 
Gesch. u. griech. Philos., I. p. 196) auf seine Biirgertugend, Bonn, 1828. 

It is possible that the intercourse of Plato with Euclid of Megara also exercised a 
considerable influence on the formation of his own system. Whether Plato, after his 
sojourn with Euclid, next lived in Athens, and in the year 394 participated in the 
Corinthian campaign, is uncertain. He is said, when at Gyrene, to have visited Theodorus, 
the mathematician (Diog. L., III. 6), whose acquaintance he seems to have made at Athens 
shortly before the death of Socrates (Theaet., p. 143 b, seq.) ; he remained, as we are credibly 
informed, a certain time at Gyrene, perfecting himself in mathematics under the direction 
of Theodorus. According to Cic., De Fin., V. 29, Plato went to Egypt for the purpose of 
obtaining instruction from the priests in mathematics and astronomy, in which particular his 
example was followed by his pupil, Eudoxus, the astronomer, who for a considerable period 
took up his residence in Egypt, the land of ancient experiences. It is uncertain whether the 
accounts of Plato s visits to Gyrene and Egypt are historical or legendary. Their only basis 
may have been Plato s mention of Theodorus (in the Theaetetus) and the references to Egypt 
in Plato s works (Phaedr., p. 247 c; Rep., IY. 435 ; Tim., 21 e ; Leges, II. 656 d, 657 a, V. 747 c, 
VIL 799 a, 819 a ; cf. Pol, 264 c, 290 d). But even admitting this, the inference in favor, 
at least, of a journey to Egypt, has strong support. From the picture given by Plato of 
the Heracliteans in Ionia (Theaet., 179 seq.), Schleiermacher (PL W., II. 1, p. 185) infers that 
he had probably been in Asia Minor ; but other evidence for this conclusion is wanting. 
Plutarch, in the dialogue De genio Socratis (irepl rov ^unparov^ 6atfj.ovim<), c. 7, p. 579, 
represents Simmias as saying: "At Memphis, the home of the prophet X6vowj>^, we 
remained for a time philosophizing, Plato and EJUoTnwv and I. When we had started 
on our return from Egypt, we were met near Caria by certain Delians, who requested 
from Plato, as a man acquainted with geometry, the solution of the problem proposed to 
them by Apollo, viz. : how to double a cubiform altar. Plato indicated as a condition of 
the solution of the problem, that they must find two mean proportionals, and directed the 
petitioners, for the rest, to Eudoxus of Cnidos and Helicon of Cyzicum. He also instructed 
them that the god demanded not so much the altar, as that they should occupy themselves 
with the study of mathematics." But this narrative can not be regarded as historical ; the 
whole dialogue is interspersed with free inventions from Plutarch s hand. Plato seems to 
have gone to Italy and Sicily (about 390 ?) from Athens (Epist, VII. p. 326 b, seq.). It is 
uncertain whether he was at Athens about 394 B. c. and took part in the Corinthian cam 
paign. On the occasion of his first arrival at Syracuse, he was, according to the 7th Letter 
(p. 324 b), about forty years old. Among the Pythagoreans Plato probably sought to 
acquire, not only a more exact knowledge of their doctrine, but also a view of their scientific, 
ethical, and political life in common, and their manner of educating their youth. At Syracuse 
he won over to his doctrines and to his theory of life, the youthful Dio, then about twenty 
years old, whose sister was married to Dionysius (the elder) ; but the tyrant himself 


thought Plato s admonitions " senile " (Diog. L., III. 18), and revenged himself on him by 
treating him as a prisoner of war. The sale of Plato at ^Egina (in case it is historical) 
must have taken place shortly before the end of the Corinthian war, 387 B. c. Anniceria 
is reported to have ransomed him and afterward to have refused to allow the friends of 
Plato to make up to him the price of the ransom, and so, as the story goes, the sum was 
applied to the purchase of the garden of the Academy, where Plato united around him a circle 
of friends devoted to philosophy. His instructions, as we must infer from the form of his 
writings and from an express declaration in the Phaedrus (p. 275 seq.), were generally con 
veyed in the form of dialogues ; yet he seems, besides, to have delivered connected lectures. 
Nothing but the hope of attaining an important political and philosophical result (Epist., 
VII., p. 329) could determine Plato twice to interrupt his scholastic activity by journeys 
to Sicily. The object of Plato in undertaking his second journey to Sicily, not long 
after the accession of the younger Dionysius to power (367 B. c.), was to unite with Dio in 
an attempt to win over the young ruler to philosophy, and to move him to transform his 
tyranny into a legally-ordered monarchy. This plan was frustrated through the fickle 
ness of the youth, his suspicion that Dio wished to get him out of the way in order to 
possess himself of supreme power, and the counter-efforts of a political psrty, who 
sought to maintain the existing form of government unchanged. Dio was banished, and 
Plato was left without influence. He undertook his third journey to Sicily in the hope of 
effecting a reconciliation between Dionysius and Dio. Not only did he fail to accomplish 
this result, but his own life came at last into danger through the mistrust of the tyrant, 
the intercession of the Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum being all that saved it. Dio, 
supported by friends and pupils of Plato, undertook in Olymp. 105.3 (358-57) a successful 
expedition to Sicily against Dionysius, but was murdered in 353 by a traitor among his 
companions in arms, Callippus (who was himself put to death in 350). Dionysius, who had 
asserted his power successfully in Locri in Italy, was restored, in 346, to power in Syra 
cuse, until, in 343, he was driven out by Timoleon. Returning to Athens (in 361 or 360), 
Plato resumed his doctrinal labors both orally and in writing. According to Dionys., De 
Compos. Verb., p. 208, Plato labored till into his eightieth year in perfecting his writings. 
An account, perhaps based on numerical speculations, and reported by Seneca (Epist., 58. 
31), represents him as having died on his birthday, at the exact age of eighty-one years. 
Cicero says (De Senect., V. 13): uno et octogesimo anno scribens est mortuus, by which he may 
mean that Plato had just entered upon his eighty-first year. He died in the year when 
Theophilus was Archon (Olymp. 108.1). 

In his "School of Athens," Raphael (as he is commonly interpreted another interpreta 
tion is given by H. Grimm, Neue Essays, cf. Preuss. Jahrb., 1864, Nos. 1 and 2) represents 
Plato as pointing toward heaven, while Aristotle turns his regards upon the earth. In the 
spirit of this representation, Goethe characterizes Plato as follows : " Plato s relation to the 
world is that of a superior spirit, whose good pleasure it is to dwell in it for a time. It ia 
not so much his concern to become acquainted with it for the world and its nature are 
things which he presupposes as kindly to communicate to it that which he brings with 
him, and of which it stands in so great need. He penetrates into its depths, more that he 
may replenish them from the fullness of his own nature, than that he may fathom their 
mysteries. He scales its heights as one yearning after renewed participation in the source 
of his being. All that he utters has reference to something eternally complete, good, 
true, beautiful, whose furtherance he strives to promote in every bosom. Whatever of 
earthly knowledge he appropriates here and there, evaporates in his method and in his 
discourse." Cf. below, 45, Goethe s characterization of Aristotle. " In Plato s phi 
losophy," says Boeckh, "the expanding roots and branches of earlier philosophy ar 


developed into the full blossom, out of which the subsequent fruit was s\owly brought 
to maturity." 

40. As works of Plato, thirty-six compositions (in fifty-six books) 
have been transmitted to us (the " Epistles " being counted as one) ; 
beside these, several works, which in ancient times were already 
designated as spurious, bear his name. The Alexandrian gram 
marian, Aristophanes of Byzantium, arranged several of the Platonic 
writings in Trilogies, and the Neo-Pythagorean Thrasyllus (in the 
time of the Ernperor Tiberius) arranged all those which he considered 
genuine in nine Tetralogies. Schleiermacher assumes that Plato 
composed all his works (with the exception of a few occasional com 
positions) in a didactic order. This would necessarily presuppose a 
plan, of which the outlines were conceived and fixed at the begin 
ning. Schleiermacher divides the works into three groups: ele 
mentary, mediatory or preparatory, and constructive dialogues. As 
Plato s first composition he names the Phaedrus, as his latest writ 
ings, the Republic, Timaeus, and the Laws. K. F. Hermann, on the 
other hand, denies this unity of literary plan, and considers the 
writings of Plato separately as documents exponential of his own 
philosophical development. He assumes three " literary periods " in 
the life of Plato, the first reaching to the time immediately following 
the death of Socrates, the second covering the time of Plato s resi 
dence at Megara and of the journeys which he made directly after 
ward, and the third beginning with the return of Plato to Athens 
after his first journey to Sicily and extending to the time of his death. 
The earliest compositions of Plato were, according to him, the shorter 
ethical dialogues which most bear a Socratic type, such as Hippias 
Minor, Lysis, and the Protagoras; in designating the latest he agrees 
with Schleiermacher. He styles the Phaedrus (with Socher and 
Stallbaum) the " inaugural programme of Plato s doctrinal activity at 
the Academy." Ed. Munk judges that Plato intended in his writings 
to draw an idealized picture of the life of Socrates as the genuine 
philosopher, and that he indicated their order through the increasing 
age of Socrates in the successive dialogues. This view is incom 
patible with Hermann s principle, but, on the hypothesis of a single 
plan held in view from the beginning, is very plausible, though not 
the only possible view ; it is, however, incapable of being maintained 
throughout without the aid of excessively violent suppositions. 

In any case, the point of departure in inquiring into the genuine- 


ness of the Platonic writings must be the passages in Aristotle in 
which these are alluded to. Judged by this standard, the works best 
attested as belonging to Plato are the Republic, Timaeus, and the 
Laws, all of which are mentioned in Aristotle by their titles, with 
Plato s name. Next to these come, judged by the same standard, 
the Phaedo, the Banquet (cited under the title of " Erotic Dis 
courses"), Phaedrus, and Gorgias, which are mentioned by Aris 
totle by their titles, and with evident reference to Plato as their 
author, although he is not expressly named. The Meno, Hippias 
(meaning Hippias Minor\ and Menexenus (cited as the "Epitaphic" 
Discourse), are mentioned by Aristotle by their titles as extant, but 
not, apparently, with unquestionable reference to Plato as their 
author. Aristotle refers to passages in the Theaetetus and the Phile- 
lus, which he cites as Plato s works, but without naming these titles ; 
he also refers to doctrines contained in the Sophist es, but which 
seem rather to be cited as oral deliverances of Plato or (in some in 
stances) as the doctrines of Plato s disciples. Without naming Plato 
or the titles, Aristotle appears also to refer to passages in the Polit- 
icus, the Apologia, Lysis, Laches, and perhaps the Protagoras; 
possibly also to passages in the Euthydemus and the Cratylus. Re 
specting the time of the composition of the dialogues, only a few data 
can be found which are fully certain. From an anachronism in the 
Banquet, it appears beyond question that that dialogue was written 
after (and probably very soon after) 385 B. c., and it is expressly 
stated by Aristotle that the Laws were composed later than the 
Republic. In view of the idealizing character of the Platonic dia 
logues, the only natural supposition is that Plato wrote none of them 
until after the death of Socrates. According to an ancient and not 
improbable, but also not sufficiently well-authenticated account, the 
dialogue Phaedrus was the earliest of Plato s compositions. It is 
a matter of question whether the Protagoras and Gorgias preceded 
or followed the Phaedrus, but we may assume that the Phaedrus 
was composed before the Banquet. It is most probable that Plato 
began to write his dialogues in about his fortieth year, on the occasion 
of the founding of his school in the garden of the Academy, and in the 
following order: Phaedrus, Banquet, Protagoras, together with a num 
ber of shorter ethical dialogues, Gorgias, and then perhaps Meno; 
these dialogues were perhaps immediately followed by the Republic, 
together with the Timaeus and the Critias fragment, then by the 


Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Philebus, and Laws, which latter Plato 
is said to have left unfinished. The Apology appears to have been 
written soon after the trial of Socrates and in substantial agreement 
with his actual defense. 

The works of Plato were published first in Latin in the translation of Marsilius Ficinus, Florence, 
14S3-1484, reprinted at Venice, 1491, etc. In Greek, they were first published at Venice, in 1513, by Aldus 
Manutius (with the co-operation of Marcus Masurus). This edition was followed by the edition of 
Johannes Oporinus and Simon Grynaeus, Easileae apud Joh. Valderum, 1534. Then came the edition 
asileae apud Henricum Petri, 1556, and afterward that of Henricus Stephanus, with the translation of 
Joh. Serranus, 3 vols., Par. 1578. The paging and side-numbers of this edition are printed in all modern 
editions, and are those usually followed in citation. The edition of Stephanus was reproduced at Lyons, 
1590, with the translation of Ficinus, and also, in Greek alone, at Frankfort, 1602. Subsequent complete 
editions are the edition published at Zweibrucken, in 1781-87 (instituted by the so-called Bipontines, G. Ch. 
Croll, Fr. Chr. Exter, and J. Val. Embser, and to which belong the Argumenta dial. Plat, expos, et ill. a. 
D. Tiedemanno, Zweibr., 1786), the Tauchnitz edition, edited by Chr. Dan. Beck (Leipsic, 1813-19, 1829 
and 1850), and the editions of Bekker (Berlin, 1816-17, with Commentary and Scholia, ibid. 1823, and Lon 
don, 1826), Ast (Leipsic, 1819-32), Gottfr. Stallbaum (Leipsic, 1821-25; 1883 seq., and in one vol., Leipsic, 
1850 and 1867), and Baiter, Orelli, and Winckelmann (Zurich, 1839-42; 1861 seq.); Greek and German 
edition, Leipsic, 1841 seq., Greek and Latin edition, ed. by Ch. Schneider and K. B. Hirschig, Par. 1846-56, 
Greek alone, ed. K. F. Hermann, Leipsic, 1851-53. 

Platen s Werke, by F. Schleiermacher (Translations and Introductions), I. 1 and 2, II. 1-8, Berlin, 
1804-10; new and improved edition, ibid. 1817-24; III. 1 (Republic), ibid. 1828; 3d ed. of I. and II. and 
2d ed. of III. 1, ibid. 1855-62. [Schleiermacher 8 Introductions, to the Dialogues of Plato, translated by 
W. Dobson, Cambridge and London, 1836. Tr.] (Euvres de Platon, French translation by Victor Cousin, 
8 vols., Paris, 1825-40. Translated into Italian by Kug. Bonghi, Opere di Platone nuovamente tradotte, 
Milan, 1857. Platoris Sdmmtliche Werke, translated by Hieron. Muller, with introductions by Karl Stein- 
hart, S vols., Leipsic, 1850-66. (Cf. Steinhart s Aphorismen ilber den gegenwartigen Stand der PI. For 
schungen, in the Verh. der 25. Philol.- Vers. in Halle, Leipsic, 1868, pp. 54-70.) [There are two complete 
translations of the works of Plato in English : The Works of Plato (with notes, abstract of Greek Com 
mentaries, etc. nine of the dialogues translated byF. Sydenham), by Thomas Taylor, 5 vols., London, 1804; 
and Plato (in Bohn s Classical Library), translated by Cary, Davis, and Burges, 6 vols., London, 1852 seq. ; 
cf. Summary and Analysis of the Dialogues of Plato, by Alfred Day (Bonn s L.), London, 1870. Tr.] 

For ancient Commentaries on Plato, see below 65, 70. Timaei Leaeicon voc. Platonic., ed. D. 
Kuhnken, Leyden, 1789, it. ed., cur. G. A. Koch, Leipsic, 1823. For the works of Ast and K. F. Hermann 
on Plato, see above, 39 ; cf. also Ast s Lexicon Platonicum, Leipsic, 1834-39. Jos. Socher, Ueber Plafonds 
Schriften, Munich, 1820. Ed. Zeller, Platonische Studien (on the Leges, Menexenus, Hippias Minor, Par- 
menides, and on Aristotle s representation of the Platonic philosophy), Tubingen, 1839. Franz Susemihl, 
Prodromus Plat. Forschungen (Grei/sw. ffab.-Schr.), G5tt. 1852. By the same, Die genet. Entwickelung 
der Platon. PMlosophie, einleitend dargestellt, 2 parts, Leipsic, 1855-60. Cf. his numerous reviews of 
modern works on Plato, in several volumes of Jahn s Jahrbilcher f. Phil. u. Pad., and his original articles 
in the same review and in the Philologus, especially his Platonische Forschungen in the second supple 
mentary volume to the Philologus, 1863, and in the Philologus, Vol. XX , Gott., 1863, and also the intro 
ductions to his translations of several of Plato s dialogues. G. F. W. Suckow, Die wiss. und kiinstlerische 
Form der Platonisclien Schriften in ihrer Usher verborgcnen Eigenthumlichkeit dargestellt, Berlin, 
1855. Ed. Munk, Die naturliche Ordnung der Platonischen Schriften, Berlin, 1856. Sigurd Ribbing, 
Genetiskframstdllning af Plato s ideeldrajemte bif ogade under sokningarom de Platonska skrifternaa 
dkthet och inbordex sammanhang, Upsala, 1858, in German, Leipsic, 1863-64. H. Bonitz, Platon. Studien, 
Vols. I. and II. (on the Gorg., Theaet., Euthyd.. and Soph.), Vienna, 1858-60; Friedrich Ueberweg, Vnter- 
suchungen uber die Ecfitheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften und uber die Hauptmomente aus 
Plato s Leben, Vienna, 1861; and Ueber den Gegensatss switchen Genetikern und Methodikem und 
dessen Vermittlung (in the Zeitschr. fur Phil. u. philos. Krit., vol. 57, Halle, 1870). G. Grote, Plato, 
etc. (see above, 39, p. 96) ; 2d edition, Lond., 1867. Cf., on this work by Grote, J. St. Mill, in the Edinb. 
Review, April, 1866; Paul Janet, in the Journal des Savans, June, 1866, pp. 881-395, and Feb., 1867, pp. 
114-132; Charles de Remusat, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. 73, 1868, pp. 48-77, and D. Peipers, in 
the Gott. gelehrt. Anz., 1869, pp. 81-120, and ibid., 1870, pp. 561-610. Carl Schaarschmidt, Die Sammlung 
der Platonischen Schriften, eur Scheidung der echten von den unechlen untersucht. Bonn. 1866. 

Of the numerous editions and translations of and commentaries on single dialogues or collections of 


dialogues all of which can not here be cited (see Engelmann s Bibliotheca Script. Class., 5th ed., Leipsic, 
1858, and also various lists of works in different volumes of the Philologus, and in works on the history 
of literature) we may mention here : 

Dialogi selecti euro. Ludov. Frid. Heindorfii, ad apparatum Inman. Bekkeri lect. denuo emend. 
Phil. Buttinann, Berlin, 1802-28. Dialogorum delectus ex rec. et cum lat. interpret. F. Aug. Wolfii 
(Euthyphron, Apologia Crito), Berlin, 1812. Symposion, ed. F. A. Wolf, Leipsic, 1782. Phaedo, ed. 
D. Wyttenbach, Leyden, 1810; Leipsic, 1824 [T. D. Woolsey], etc. The Republic has been edited by 
Ast, K. Schneider, and others, the Leges by Ast, Schulthess, etc., Euthydemus and Laches by Badhain, 
Jena, 1855. 

GriechiKche Prosaiker in neuer Uebers. hrsg. von C. N. v. Osiander und O. Schwab (containing 
Plato s works, translated by L. Georgii, Franz Suseniihl, J. Deuschle, and others), Stuttgart (J. B. Metz- 
ler), 1S53 seq. PL 8 Werke, transl. by K. Prantl and others, Stuttgart (Karl Hoffmann), 1854 seq. PL s 
ausgewdhlte Schriften, fur den Schulgebrauch erkldrt, by Christian Cron and Jul. Deuschle, Leips. 1857 
seq. PL s Phaedrus und Gastmahl, iibs mit einl. Vorwort von K. Lehrs, Leips. 1870. The Banquet has 
also been translated and explained by (among others) Ed. Zeller (Marburg, 1857), the Gorgia* by a. Schult 
hess (new, revised edition by S. Vogelin, Zurich, 1S57), the Republic by F. C. Wolf (Altona, 1799), Kleuker 
(Vienna, 1805), K. Schneider (Breslau, 1889), and others, [including Davies and Vaughan, The Republic of 
Plato, 4th ed., Cambridge, 1868 ; cf. also, W. WheweU, Platonic Dialogues for English. Readers, 3 vote., 
1859-60. Tr.]. 

On the Phaedrus compare the introductions of the various editors and translators of that dialogue, as 
also the appropriate parts in the comprehensive works of Ast, Socher, F. Hermann, Brandis, Zeller, Suse- 
mihl, Munk, Grote, etc., and, in particular, A. B. Krische, Ueber PL s Phaedr., G5tt. 1848; Jul. Deuschle, 
Ueber den innern Gedankeneus. im PI. Phaedrus, in the Zeitschr. f. die Alterthumswias, 1854, pp. 
25-44; Die PI. Mythen, insbes. der Mythus im Phaedr., Hanan, 1854; Lipke, De Phaedri consilio (G.- 
Pr.), Wesel, 1856; C. K. Volquardsen, PL s Phaedrus, PlSs erste Schrift, Kiel, 1862; F. Bresler, Ueber den 
PI. Phaedr. (G.-Pr.), Dantzic, 1867; Rud. Kuhner, PI. de eloquentia in Phaedro dialog o judicium (G.~ 
Pr.), Spandau, 1868 ; Carl Schmelzer, Zu PI. Phaedrus (Progr.), Guben, 1868 ; L. B. Forster, Quaestio de 
PI. Phaedro, Berlin, 1869. Cf. also Lehrs 1 Introduction to his translation of the Phaedrus and the Sym- 
posion, Leipsic, 1860. 

Of the Platonic Symposion treat (besides Schleiermacher, Steinhart, etc.) : F. A. Wolf, in his Ver- 
mischte Schr., pp. 2S8-339 ; Carl Fortlage. Philosophische Meditationen iiber Plato s Sympos., Heidelberg, 
1835 , Ferd. Delbrtick, De Plat. Symposio, Bonn, 1839 : Albert Schwegler, Ueber die Compos, des PL 
Symp., Tubingen, 1843; Ed. Wunder, Blicke in PlSs Symp., in the PhiloL, V. pp. 6S2 soq. ; Franz Suse- 
mihl, Ueber die Compos, des PL Gastmahl*, in the PhiloL, VI. 1851, pp. 177 seq., and VIII. 1853, pp. 
153-159 ; Ed. Zeller, in his Translation of the Symp., Marburg, 1859. On the relation of the Platonic to the 
Xenophontic Symposion, see Boeckh, De simultate, quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur, 
Berlin, 1811 (cf. Boeckh, in v. Eaumer s Antiquar. Briefe, Leips. 1851, p. 40 seq.); K. F. Hermann, Num 
PI. an Xenoph. Convivium suum prius scripserit, atque de amsttio horum libellorum, Marb. 1834; 
Vermuthung, dass PL Symposion alter tei als das Xenophontische, gerechtfertigt, ib. 1841 ; Zur Frag 
iiber das Zeifoerhdltnisa der beiden Symposien, in the PhiloL, VIII. pp. 329-333. Arn. Hug areues on 
decisive grounds in favor of the priority in time of the Banquet of Xenophon, in the PhiloL, VII. pp. 
638-695; Georg Ferd. Rettig (argues in the same sense), Progr., Berne, 1864. 

Of the dialogue Protagoras write (besides Schleiermacher, Steinhart, Susemihl, Grote, etc.) Conr. G. 
Fehmer, PL Protag. nach seinem innern Zusammenhang entwickelt (Progr.\ Zeitz, 1839 ; W. Natt- 
mann, De PL Protag., Emmerich, 1855; Kroschel, Zu den chronol. Verh. des PL Protag., in the Zeitschr. 
f. d. Gymnasiahcesen, XL 1857, pp. 561-567; Richard Schone, Ueber PL Protag., ein Beitragsur Losung 
der PL Frage, Leips. 1S62 ; Meinardus, Wie ist PL Protag. aufzufas&en f (G.-Pr.), Oldenburg, 1864 ; Wai- 
deck, Analyse des PI. Protag. (G.-Pr.), Corbach, 1868. 

On the order of ideas in the Gorgias&nA the tendency of the dialogue compare, in particular, Job. Bake, 
De Gorg. PL consilio et ingenio, in B. s Scholica Hypomnemata, III. pp. 1-26, Leyden, 1844 ; Herm. 
Bonitz. in his above-mentioned Studien; Ludw. Paul, Itt die Scene fur den Gorg. im Hause des Kal- 
Ukles? (Festgruss an die 27 PhiloL- Vers.), Kiel, 1869. [The Gorgias of Plato, T. D. Woolsey, Boston, 
1842, 2d edition, 1848. Tr.} 

In regard to the Meno, Euthyphron, Crito, and other minor dialogues, as the Philebus, Parmenides, 
Sophistes. etc^, it may suffice here to refer to the works of Schaarschtnidt and Grote, of whom the former 
disputes, while the latter defends, the authenticity of all these dialogues. [Recent translations of three of 
these dialogues are: Philebus, a Dialogue of Plato, etc., translated by Edward Poste, London, (since) 
I860; The Sophistes of Plato, translated and preceded by an Intr. on Ancient and Modern Philosophy, by 
E. W. Mackay, Lond. 1868 ; Plato s Meno, transl. by Mackay, with an Essay on the Moral Education of the 
Greeks. London, 1869. Tr.] 


The principal works relating to the Republic are cited ad 43, and those relating to the Timaew and 
Phaedo, ad 42. 

The epuriousness of all the Letters attributed to Plato has been demonstrated most decisively by Herm. 
Thorn. Karsten (see above, 39, p. 99). 

The Aristotelian citations from Plato form the only sufficient external criterion and 
certificate of the genuineness of the works of Plato. Every dialogue which is unques 
tionably attested as Platonic by Aristotle, must be regarded as genuine, or has at least the 
most decided presumption in its favor. Of course, the converse is not true, that the 
silence of Aristotle proves the spuriousness of a dialogue, although under specific circum 
stances this silence is certainly to be considered as an important element in the evidence. 
The question of genuineness in connection with those dialogues which are not proved 
authentic by Aristotle s testimony, must be decided mainly on internal grounds. The 
libraries of Plato s pupils, while sufficient to assure the preservation of all that was 
genuine among the works attributed to Plato, were insufficient to assure the exclusion 
of all that was spurious. On the one hand, works published by immediate disciples of 
Plato (for example, Leges, Epinomis, Sophistes, and Politicus), which were found in the 
libraries with no exact indication of the name of the author, or the name of the author 
having been lost, were early received as works of Plato ; among these were some that 
were written in the spirit of Plato s doctrine and under his name, being founded on 
his posthumous literary remains or on his oral utterances; on the other hand, some 
works, which may have been composed from sixty to one hundred years after Plato s 
death (for example, a part of the Letters), were received into the Alexandrian Library as 
works presumably Platonic. Still others of Plato s "Works" are forgeries of even later 

The trilogies, as arranged by Aristophanes of Byzantium are (according to Diog. L., 
III. 61.) the following : 1) Rep., Timaeus, Critias ; 2) Sophista, Politicus, Cratylus ; 3) Leges, 
Minos, Epinomis; 4) Theaet., Euthyphro, Apologia; 5) Crito, Phaedo, Epistolae; besides 
these, there were other dialogues which Aristophanes received as genuine, and enumerated 
separately. It is not known which these were. The tetralogies proposed by Thrasyllus 
were (according to Diog L., 56 seq.): 1) Euthyphron, Apologia, Crito, Phaedo ; 2) Cratylus, 
Theaetetus. Sophista, Poiiticus; 3) Parmenides, Philebus, Convivium, Phaedrus; 4) Alci- 
biades I. and II., Hipparchus, Anterastae ; 5) Theages, Charmides, Laches, Lysis ; 6) 
Euthydemus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno ; 7) Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, lo, Menexenus ; 
8) Clitophon, Rep., Timaeus, Critias; 9) Minos, Leges, P^pinomis, Epistolae. 

As dialogues confessedly spurious, Diog. L. names the following: Mido, Eryxias, 
Halcyo, eight dialogues without an introduction (a/c^aAo* if) Sisyphus, Axiochus, Phaeaces, 
Demodocus, Chelidon, Hebdome, Epimenides. Of these are preserved: 1) Axiochus; 2) 
Concerning what is just (one of the dialogues without exordium) ; 3) Concerning virtue 
(ditto); 4) Demodocus; 5) Sisyphus; 6) Eryxias; 7) Halcyo (which usually accompanies 
Lucian s works) ; to these are to be added the Definitiones, which are likewise spurious. 

Schleiermacher places in the first, or elementary division of the Platonic works, as chief 
works : Phaedrus, Protagoras, Parmenides ; as adjuncts : Lysis, Laches, Charmides, Euthy 
phron ; as occasional writings : Apologia and Crito ; and as semi-genuine or spurious : lo, 
Hippias Minor, Hipparchus, Minos, Alcibiades II. In the second division, which contains the 
dialogues indirectly dialectical in form, dialogues devoted principally to the explanation of 
knowledge and of intelligent action, Schleiermacher classes as chief works : Theaetetus, 
Sophistes, Politicus, Phaedo, Philebus ; as adjuncts : G-orgias, Meno, Euthydemus, Craty 
lus, Convivium ; as semi-genuine or spurious : Theages, Erastae, Alcibiades L, Menexenus, 
Hippias Major, Clitopho. The third, constructive division, finally, contains, according to 


Schleiermacher, as chief works the dialogues : Republic, Timaeus, and Critias ; and as an 
adjunct, the Leges. Brandis agrees substantially with Schleiermacher, but holds that 
the Protagoras may have been composed before the Phaedrus, and places (with Zeller) 
Parmenides immediately after Sophistes and Politicus. 

K. F. Hermann includes in the first of the three development-periods which he ascribes 
to Plato, the following dialogues: Hipp. Min., lo, Alcib. I., Charm., Lysis, Laches, Protag., 
Euthyd. The Apol., Crito, Gorgias, Euthyphro, Meno, Hipp. Major belong to a "transition 
period." In the second, or Megaric period, he places Cratylus, Theaet., Soph., Politicus, 
Parmenides, and in the third period, the period of maturity, Phaedrus, Menexenus, Con- 
vivium, Phaedo, Phileb., Rep., Tim., Critias, Leges. 

Steinhart (in his introductions to the Platonic dialogues accompanying Miiller s trans 
lation) adopts substantially the arrangement of Hermann, modifying it only in a few minor 
points. Susemihl, who at first (in his Prodromus Platon. Forschungeri) was more inclined 
to the view of Schleiermacher, approached subsequently nearer to that of Hermann, 
adopting an intermediate and conciliatory position between them. He holds that a definite 
plan underlies the Platonic writings, but that this was not wholly developed in Plato s 
mind at the very beginning of his literary activity. He believes that it was developed 
gradually, like his philosophy, during the first stadia of his literary activity, becoming 
constantly clearer and more complete. Susemihl differs from Hermann, in ascribing the 
development of philosophical doctrine in Plato s mind less to external influences and more 
to Plato s originality. Susemihl regards the Phaedrus as earlier than the dialogues of 
Hermann s "Megaric period," or, at least, than a part of them. 

Munk holds fast to the fundamental idea of Schleiermacher, that all the dialogues of 
Plato were composed with reference to a determinate plan, but believes that they were 
nearly all written after the death of Socrates. He emphasizes more the artistic side of this 
plan than the didactic, and supposes that Plato designed in the succession of his writings 
to present an idealized portrait of Socrates as the genuine philosopher ; he believes, accord 
ingly, that by the chronological succession of the scenes or "situations," and especially 
by the increasing age at which Socrates figures in the successive dialogues, Plato indicated 
the order in which he himself intended them to be studied, and that this order agrees in 
general with the time of their composition. Munk s theory is an hypothesis worthy of 
consideration. Many of the results of special investigation accord very well with it, 
while others seem to oppose it, though without being sufficient to set aside entirely 
the principle involved. But it is beyond question that the manner in which Munk has 
carried through and applied his principle in detail, is imperfect, and leaves room for 
numerous corrections. Munk has neglected the question of the genuineness of the 
dialogues, and has often either made too light work of the investigation of their chrono 
logical succession or conducted it from too exclusive a stand-point. He has, nevertheless, 
furnished many very valuable contributions to this department of special investigation. 
He distinguishes three series of writings : I. Socrates consecration to philosophy and his 
contests against false wisdom ; time of composition 389-384 B. c. : Parm. (time of the 
action, 446), Protag. (434), Charm. (432), Laches (421), Gorgias (420), lo (420), Hippias I. 
(420), Cratylus (420), Euthyd. (420), Sympos. (41 7). II. Socrates teaches true wisdom ; 
time of composition, 383-370: Phaedrus (410), Philebus (410), Rep., Tim., and Critias (409, 
see Munk in Jahn s Jahrb., 79, p. 791). III. S. demonstrates the truth of his teachings by 
the criticism of opposite opinions and by his death as a martyr ; time of composition, after 
370: Meno (405), Theaet. (on the day when the accusation was brought forward by 
Meletus), Soph, and Politicus (one day later), Euthyphron (the same day with Theaet.)^ 
Apok)g. (one day after the embassy to Delos), Crito (two days before the death of Socrates), 


Phaedo (on the day of Socrates death). These writings form, according to Munk, a Cyclus 
complete in itself; they were preceded by a few youthful compositions, viz. : Alcib. I., 
Lysis, and Hippias II., and followed by Menexenus (composed after 387) and Leges (begun 
in 367). 

Grote holds that all those dialogues which were considered genuine by Thrasyllus are 
really such, because it is to be presupposed that they were preserved in the Alexandrian 
Library as Platonic writings (which is, indeed, very probable), and because it is further to 
be assumed that this Library received them in the beginning from Platonists of the 
Academy (which is probably true of many of these writings, but scarcely of all), and that 
these Platonists possessed a complete and correct collection of the genuine Platonic 
writings. (This latter supposition, however, is very doubtful, and is not proved ; for in 
those early times the productive philosophical interest generally took precedence of the 
literary and antiquarian ; it is quite conceivable that among Plato s remains, as also hi 
book-collections belonging to Platonists, were included copies of the dialogical writings 
of Plato s disciples which, from all the indications, we must suppose to have been very 
numerous some of them without precise indications as to their authorship, and that this 
gave occasion, earlier or later, to errors, and even to imposture. The supposition that a 
complete collection of the genuine writings of Plato was in the possession of the School, and 
that this served as the norma, for the Platonic canon, would prove too much, since from it 
would follow the genuineness of the entire collection transmitted ; but surely the genuine 
ness of all the contents of that collection can not be satisfactorily defended, as, e. g., that 
of Minos and the Epistles, which are certainly spurious, yet belong to the writings con 
sidered genuine by Aristophanes of Byzantium.) Grote assumes, further, that all the 
dialogues of Plato and those of the other companions of Socrates were composed after the 
death of Socrates ; he supports this altogether reasonable opinion with the most cogent 
arguments. Grote rejects the hypothesis of Schleiermacher and Munk, of a didactic or 
artistic plan comprehending, with few exceptions, all the dialogues; he denies all 
" peremptory and intentional sequence or interdependence;" each dialogue, he argues, is 
the product of the " state of Plato s mind at the time when it was composed;" in the com 
position of the dialogues of research or inquiry, it is not necessary to suppose that Plato 
was already in possession of the solutions contained in the constructive dialogues ; the 
disturbing of prejudices and pointing out of difficulties has in itself a very great worth ; 
"the dialogues of research present an end in themselves." Here Grote seems to go too 
far. That, for example, in the Protagoras, the Platonic Socrates hypothetical! y develops 
opinions which were not held by Plato himself, and that this is intimated by Plato by the 
early age at which he brings forward Socrates in the dialogue named thereby suggesting 
a more advanced and mature stadium in Socrates life, to be set forth in other dialogues 
all this would have to be admitted, even though Schleiermacher s and Munk s view of an 
artistic and didactic plan underlying all the dialogues, were justly rejected. Grote does 
not believe that the chronological sequence of most of the dialogues can be determined ; 
he considers them in his work in the following order : Apologia (early, and essentially 
faithful), Crito, Euthyphron, Ale. I. and II., Hippias Major and Minor, Hipparchus, Minos, 
Theages, Erastae, Ion, Laches, Charmides, Lysis, Euthydemus, Meno, Protagoras, Gorgias, 
Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposion, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Cratylus, 
Philebus, Menexenus, Clitopho (which Grote defends as genuine, but fragmentary, and 
first made public after Plato s death), Rep., Tim., and Critias, Leges, and Epinomis. 
Grote s work is rich in suggestion and instruction ; the author of the " History of Greece " 
maintains here his masterly superiority in historical presentation, but his acceptance as 
genuine of all the dialogues accredited by Thrasyllus has caused him to lose sight of the 


essential unity present in Plato s thought and works, and to admit in its stead a multi- 
fariousness abounding in change and contradiction. 

Schaarschmidt s investigations relate chiefly to the question of the genuineness or spu- 
riousness of Plato s works, and incidentally only to that of their chronological order. The 
result he arrives at is, that the authenticity of the following dialogues only is fully assured : 
Phaedrus, Protagoras, Banquet, Gorgias, Republic, and Timaeus, Theaetetus, Phaedo, Laws. 
In Plato s genuine works he sees dramatic dialogues, which are not intended to instruct 
the reader in the solution of the fundamental questions of philosophy themselves, but 
rather from the stand-point of the writer s own experience, to impress in a living, impres 
sive manner on the heart of the reader that the dialectical labor necessary to the solution 
of those questions is the moral concern and duty of every man, and to offer, in the exam 
ple of the most remarkable investigator of ideas, samples of the art by which one elevates 
himself into the ideal region and in its light contemplates the essence of the soul, the best 
form of the state, or even of the cosmos, as the expression of the most perfect harmony. 
The Socratic dialogue, which with Xenophon and other followers of Socrates served to 
recall their late master s discussions concerning ideas, was elevated by Plato, who used the 
greatest liberty in modifying its content as well as its shape, to a philosophical drama, in 
which Socrates and his collocutors acquire a typical character as representatives of various 
intellectual tendencies and ethical states. 

In all the dialogues of Plato, Socrates appears to such a degree and in such a manner 
idealized, that it is impossible to suppose any of them to have been composed before that 
event of Socrates death, which transfigured the image of Socrates in the mind of Plato. 
The Apology appears to have been written at an early period by Plato, and to present not 
merely the sense and spirit, but nearly the very words of Socrates s defense (as Schleier- 
macher assumes). Setting aside this dialogue (and the Crito?), the ideal picture of 
Socrates, as presented in those dialogues, in which Plato represents him as a man not 
yet advanced in years, approaches nearest to his historical figure. This is true without 
exception, if we set aside as spurious the dialogue Parmeriides, which treats of the ideas, 
and the One (ev), which can neither be nor not be. The time of the action of this 
dialogue is about 450, and in it the early training of Socrates is depicted unhistorically, 
with a certain idealization, as in Phaedo, p. 95 e, seq., not conformable to the tendency, 
early characteristic of Socrates, to "examine" subjects dialectically and in their ethical 
bearings, nor in a manner which accords with the Protagoras and the other dialogues, 
but with a mixture of later ideas, and such as were foreign to Socrates. The unjustified 
reproach is here directed against Socrates, that he had in earlier life assumed the ex 
istence of .ideas, for the purposes of preparatory dialectical exercises (conducted in the 
method of two-sided discussions respecting particular conceptions). Socrates appears as a 
man of middle age, probably not yet forty years old, and forcing the recognition of his 
mastership in philosophy, in discussions with Protagoras, who was by many years his 
senior (and incidentally also with Hippias and Prodicus), in the artistically very finished 
dialogue Protagoras. The date of this dialogue must be regarded as about 432 B. c., 
although it contains portions pointing anachronistically to a later period. It was certainly 
composed after the death of Socrates, and perhaps later than the Phaedrus. In the dia 
logue Protagoras the relation of virtue to knowledge, the unity or plurality of the virtues, 
and the cultivation of virtue are made subjects of investigation, and the conceit of the 
Sophists, in presuming to be wise and to make others wise, is annihilated by the e^eraat^ 
of Socrates, whose dialectic is based on an earnest striving after truth and morality. A 
dialogue more peculiarly Platonic in content and form is the Gorgias (on the questions : 
What is rhetoric ? conversation between Socrates and Gorgias, cc. 2-1 5 ; "What worth 


and what real power does rhetoric possess ? conversation between Socrates and Polus, cc 
16-36; Is the proper business of life political rhetoric or philosophy? conversation 
between Socrates and Callicles, cc. 57-83 ; the whole is at the same time a justification by 
Plato of himself in adopting the philosopher s vocation). The time at which Plato would 
represent the conversations as being held, is probably 427 B. c., though anachronistic 
reference is made in them to events of a later date. In these dialogues, as also in the 
following, whose authenticity in part is not fully certified, Laches (on Courage), Lysia 
(on Friendship), Charmides (on Temperance), Euthyphro (on Piety), Hippias Minor (on 
"Willful Wrong-doing), and in others, which are of very doubtful authenticity or are 
decidedly spurious, the specifically Platonic theory of ideas is contained only by implication, 
but not formally developed and established. This may be explained by supposing that 
Plato in these dialogues intentionally confined himself to mere suggestions or intimations, 
being guided in this by the didactic principle of a gradual exposition of his doctrines. Or, 
it may be explained by the hypothesis, that Plato had himself not yet arrived at the theory 
of ideas in its developed form (according to the principle of gradual development assumed 
by K. F. Hermann) ; but the circumstance that Plato in the Protagoras and also in Gor- 
gias (and Laches, etc.) introduces Socrates as a man still in middle age, is decidedly favor 
able to the first supposition. The theory of ideas, with all the theoretical positions 
which it involves, is first expressly set forth in the Phaedrus and the Convivium, though 
in mythical form not in the form of dialectical development. The dialogue Phaedrus 
criticises ostentatious eloquence (that of Lysias in particular) from the stand-point of 
philosophy, and the false art of instruction and education from the stand-point of that 
art which is true. It does this first by the collocation of discourses concerning love, 
the first Lysianic, the second in form only, and the third in both form and tendency, 
Platonic and Socratic, and then by a general consideration, founded on these examples, 
of the rhetorical and the philosophical or dialectical methods. But the examples, in 
respect of their subjects, are not arbitrarily chosen. They treat directly of the true end 
of life and of the way which conducts to it, love, taken in the philosophical sense, being 
here represented as the united striving of souls to reach the goal of philosophy, i. e., the 
knowledge of ideas, and to attain to that practical conduct of life which corresponds with 
such knowledge; while an unphilosophical rhetoric is portrayed as pursuing ends alto- 
gether inferior. The Phaedrus is also a justification of Plato s doctrinal activity as a 
teacher. In it, philosophical authorship is represented as secondary to, and dependent 
upon oral schooling in dialectic. It is held that the former should follow the latter 
only as vff<fy*W7<T4?, and is nothing but a Tray/cd/b; iraidid, a kind of philosophical poesy 
(cf. .Rep., p. 602), not to be compared with the serious earnestness of a life devoted, 
in common with others, to inquiry and to the work of education (a declaration, which, 
although its immediate occasion was Plato s poetical imitation of the Socratic dialectic, 
none the less implies beyond a doubt the existence already of a circle of companions of 
like mind with Plato, and also a circle of scholars and co-investigators, who recognized 
Plato as their leader). The Convivium contains a series of discourses respecting love, 
which set forth the various conceptions of the same, ending with the highest philosophical 
conception of love, as maintained by Socrates, and all in the form of encomia addressed to 
Eros. At last Alcibiades steps in, extolling Socrates as one who, in his relations with 
himself, had exemplified the genuine, pedagogical love in a manner fully commensurate 
with the requirement of philosophy. The Convivium was composed 385-384, or at least 
not earlier (as appears from an historical allusion contained in it) ; the action falls in the 
year 417. The relation of this dialogue to the Symposion of Xenophon is discussed on 
the one side by K. F. Hermann (Progr., Marb. 1841 ; Gott. 1844-45), who considers the 


Platonic composition the earlier ; on the other, by A. Hug (in the Philol, VII. 1852, p. 638 
seq., to which Hermann responds, ibid., Vol. VIII.), Gr. Ferd. Rettig (Progr., Berne, 1864), 
and Boeckh (De simultate, quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur, Berlin, 1811, and in 
v. Raumer s Antiquar. Brief e, Leipsic, 1851, p. 40 seq.). The Phaedrus appears to have 
been written not long before the Banquet ; the time of the action in Plato s intention may 
be perhaps most surely determined from the circumstance that Isocrates (born 435) is 
named in it as a young beginner, of whom great expectations might justly be entertained; 
with this is to be joined the fact that Lysias, who is represented as living at Athens, is 
known from other sources to have returned thither from Lower Italy in the year 411 ; 
yet it is uncertain whether Plato knew and took into consideration this time of the return 
of Lysias, of which he nowhere makes mention himself. According to Diog. L., III. 38, 
the Phaedrus was Plato s earliest composition ; yet this statement, though possibly correct, 
is not sufficiently well authenticated. The date of the composition of the Phaedrus falls 
undoubtedly within the years 396-384 B. c., according to the present state of investiga 
tions ; but nearly all the data on which are founded the various attempts at a more exact 
determination of it are very uncertain. In case Plato made this dialogue first public on his 
return after long journeys, and wrote the Protagoras, as also the Gorgias, at a later period, 
it would seem beyond doubt that in these latter dialogues, which are filled with elementary 
inquiries in the field of dialectic and ethics, Plato consciously and with artistic intention 
represented the age of Socrates as such, that notwithstanding their possibly later compo 
sition, they could be used as preparatory for the development of ideas contained in the 
Phaedrus each of the dialogues, of course, being considered in its relation to the ideal 
picture of the Platonic Socrates, as presented by all the dialogues taken together. 

In a letter addressed to me, and which its author has kindly permitted me to publish, 
Susemihl expresses his belief that the date of the composition of the Phaedrus may be 
fixed at 389 or 388. He reasons as follows: "Isocrates must have been at that time a 
well-known author and perhaps also already a teacher of eloquence ; but up to 392 he 
neither engaged in giving instruction as such a teacher, nor in any other occupation except 
the composition of judicial discourses, a work which he afterward entirely discontinued ; 
and since the criticism of Lysias in the Phaedrus turns on one of the ostentatious discourses 
of that orator, it is hardly possible not to suppose that the Isocrates who is contrasted 
with him, had already begun to compose such discourses, when the dialogue was written. 
Now the oldest of these, the Encomium of Busiris, seems to date from 390-389. On the 
other hand, it is difficult to suppose that long after 390 or 389 Plato should not have be 
come so undeceived respecting the character and merits of Isocrates, as to render it impos 
sible for him still to express himself respecting him in such terms as those here employed 
by him. Spengel, indeed (Isokr. und PL, p. 15 seq. ; 347 seq.), thinks that when Isocratea 
composed his work against the Sophists, which is beyond question to be considered as a 
sort of inaugural programme of his course as an instructor, he can have been at the most 
not more than forty years old, since he says in Antid., 195, that he wrote this work 
? and anfid^urv \ but it is to be noticed, 1) that he there judges himself ( 9) 
only at the age of eighty-two years ; 2) that if Isocrates opened his school 
at Athens as early as 496, he must at the same time have been writing judicial discourses 
during a period of at least two years, which contradicts the express testimony of Aristotle, 
in Cic., Brutus, 12, 48 (Fragm., 119, Rose)." 

Of very uncertain authenticity are the Hippias Major (On the Beautiful), lo (Concerning 

Inspiration and Reflection), Meno (Can Virtue be Taught?), and Menexenus (a Adj-of iiri- 

ra^ioq on fallen Athenians with Socrates as the speaker). It is possible that Plato early 

commenced writing on the dialogue on justice, which he afterward enlarged into the work 



respecting justice in the life of the individual and in the state (The State, Politeia, Res- 
publica). This work was followed by the Timaeus (containing Plato s natural philosophy, 
with Timasus the Pythagorean as spokesman) and Critias (a fragment of an unfinished 
work, containing an imaginary political story of the primitive times) ; the time of these 
dialogues falls in the year 409 B. C. The Phaedo, which presents the dying Socrates 
demonstrating the immortality of the soul, seems to have been commenced later than 
the Timaeus and to close up the Cyclus, by showing how the noblest and the abiding 
good for the immortal soul consists in philosophical knowledge and in action founded 
on such knowledge (somewhat as in the Banquet, where Plato advances from the 
praise of Eros to that of the person of the true Erotic). To the dialogues of late com 
position, the Theaetettis (which stands in the closest relation to Rep., Y, 474 seq., and 
Tim., p. 51) seems to belong. In this dialogue Plato shows how knowledge (k-rrLc-^fjuj) 
differs from sense-perception (aladrjci^, ch. 8-30), and from correct judgment or opinion 
(66t-a aA^c, chs. 31-38). The definition of ITTLCTTJIJ.^ as 66t-a akrfirjq //era %6-yov (ch. 39 
seq.), he finds unsatisfactory on account of the ambiguity of the term Myoq. He thus 
indirectly props up the theory of ideas by maintaining that the difference between knowl 
edge on the one hand, and sensuous perception and opinion on the other, is founded 
on a difference between the objects of knowledge and those of sensation and opinion 
(hence on the difference between the ideas and the individual objects existing in time and 
space). Of uncertain, yet extremely probable authenticity is the dialogue analogous in 
character to the Theaetetus, entitled Cratylus (irepl bpdoryroc bvofidruv. Whether the 
names of things belong to them Qvaei, by natural adaptation, or are given to them 
arbitrarily and by common consent) ; see, on the one hand, Schaarschmidt, Ueber die 
Unechtheit des Dialogs Kratylos, in the Rhein. Mus., N. S., XX. 1865, pp. 321-356; and hia 
work : Die Sammlung, etc., p. 245 seq. ; on the other hand, Alberti, in the Rhein. Mus., XXI., 

1866, pp. 180-209; and in the Go tt. Gel Anz., 1867, pp. 721-758; and especially Benfey 
in the Nachrichten von dcr Kgl. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Gottingen, No. 8, March 7, 1866: " Auszug 
einer Abliandlung iibcr die Aufgabe des Platon. Dialogs Kratylus" or the work itself, which 
has since been published at Gottingen, 1866; also Lehrs, in the Rhin. Mus., TS. S., XXII. 

1867, pp. 436-440. It is also questionable whether Plato himself, or, what would appear 
more probable, an early Platonist composed the Euthydemus, a dialogue richly spiced with 
pleasantry, and the subject of which Bonitz (Platon. Studien, Heft 2, Yienna, 1860, p. 32 seq.) 
happily describes as follows: "The vocation of philosophy, as the true educatrix of youth, 
is defended and justified in opposition to the seeming wisdom which seeks to take its place, 
in a contest in which each is brought forward in its own defense. 1 Schaarschmidt at 
tempts to demonstrate its spuriousness (in his work above cited, pp. 326-342). The Philebus, 
treating of the Good, is one of the latest compositions of Plato ; in it we perceive already 
something of the Pythagorizing manner, toward which Plato inclined hi his later years, 
and which prevailed still more among the first Academics. The Sophistes (on the Sophist 
and the field of his knowledge, the Non-Existent) and the Politicus (the Statesman and 
the field of his knowledge and action) were composed, in all probability, not by Plato, but 
by one of his scholars (see Schaarschmidt, Rhein. Mus., N". S., XYIII. pp. 1-28, and XIX. 
pp. 63-96, 1862 and 63 : yet cf. Hayduck, Ueber die Echtheit des Soph, und Pol, I (Greifsw. 
Gymn.-Progr.), 1864, and Ed. Alberti, Rhein. Mus., 1866, No. 2, p. 130 seq. ; and on the other 
side again, Schaarschmidt, Die Sammlung, etc., pp. 181-245). The dialogues Sophistes 
and Politicus are formally connected with the Theaetetus of Plato, as constituting with it 
one whole. They purport to furnish that continuation of the inquiry begun in the 
Theaetetus, which was declared necessary at the end of this dialogue, and in which the 
subject of Ideas was to be more especially treated of. But their relation to the Theaetetus 


Is only superficial, and the continuation alluded to was furnished rather in the investiga 
tions conducted by Plato in the midst of his disciples and in the teachings he then and 
there communicated to them, the so-called aypa<j>a doynara. The last work of .Plato, made 
public, according to ancient accounts, by one of his disciples, Philip the Opuntian, from 
Plato s rough draught, is the Leges (Concerning the second-best state). By the guest from 
Athens, who leads in the conversation, Plato seems to have intended himself. 

Adhuc sub judice lis est. The immediate problem is now the exact investigation of the 
composition of the dialogues taken singly, as introductory to which work, besides Schleier- 
macher s Introductions and the works of Brandis, Steinhart, Susemihl, and others, such 
essays as Trendelenburg s De Plat. Philebi consilio (Berlin, 1837), and Bonitz s Platonische 
Studien (Vienna, 1858-60), may be profitably consulted. 

41. The division of philosophy into Ethics, Physics, and Dia 
lectic, though not expressly enunciated by Plato, was practically 
involved in his treatment of the diiferent classes of philosophical 
problems in different dialogues, and may be made the basis of an 
exposition of his doctrine. We begin with the Dialectic of Plato. 

The Platonic philosophy centers in the Theory of Ideas. The 
Platonic Idea (Wea or eMo?) is the pure, archetypal essence, in which 
those things which are together subsumed under the same concept, 
participate. ^Esthetically and ethically, it is the perfect in its kind, 
to which the given reality remains perpetually inferior. Logically 
and ontologically considered, it is the object of the concept. As the 
objects of the outer world are severally known through corresponding 
mental representations, so the idea is known through the concept. 
The Idea is not the essence immanent in the various similar individual 
objects, as such, but rather this essence conceived as perfect in its 
kind, immutable, unique, and independent, or existing per se. The 
idea respects the universal ; but it is also represented by Plato as a 
spaceless and timeless archetype of individuals. The more Plato in 
his speculation and in his language gives place to his fancy, so much 
the more does he individualize his Ideas; the more he confines 
himself to pure cogitation, BO much the more does he approach the 
apprehension of the idea under the form of universality. Let the 
individuals which share in the same essence or belong to the same 
class, be conceived as freed from the limits of space and time, from 
materiality and individual deficiency, and so reduced to a unity, 
which is the ground of their existence, and this unity (objective and 
real, not merely thought by us through abstraction) will be the Pla 
tonic idea. 

To express the relation of individuals to their corresponding ideas, 


Plato employs the term " participation " (n/e0etf), and also " imita 
tion" (pifjtriais, biioiuou;). The idea is the archetype (na^ddeij^a^ indi 
vidual objects are images (eMw/la, dpoi^ara) ; the idea, though existing 
independently (avro KO.& avrd), has also a certain community (noivuvia) 
with things ; it is in some sense present (irapovoia) in them ; but the 
specific nature of this community Plato has neglected more precisely 
to define. 

The attribution to the ideas of independent, singular existence, 
or the hypostatizing of the ideas, implied a certain separation of them 
from individual things. Thus understood, the doctrine was described 
and combated by Aristotle as a %G)pi&iv (separation of the ideal 
from the real). This view of the ideas seems to have grown upon 
Plato, so that at last we find him considering the ideas (and espe 
cially the highest among them, the idea of the Good) as efficient 
causes, which impart to individuals their existence and essence. 
Plato calls them figuratively (in the Timaeus) Gods, and appears, in 
speaking of the World-Builder (the Demiurgos), who shapes a rt 
things for good, to intend the idea of the Good. The (unconsciously 
mythical) personification of the ideas became complete in the asser 
tion, that movement, life, animation, and reason belonged to them ; 
yet this doctrine (enounced in the dialogue Sophistes) can scarcely 
have been that of Plato himself, who held fast to the immutability 
of the ideas, but only of a portion of his disciples. 

A plurality of ideas is assumed by Plato, corresponding with the 
plurality of concepts. All the relations which subsist between con 
cepts find, according to Plato, their analog a in the relations of the 
ideas to each other. The higher or more general concept is related 
to the lower or less general ones ranged under it, as each of the latter 
is to the individual notions which it includes ; accordingly, in Plato s 
view, that idea which is the object of the higher concept, is so related 
to those ideas, which are the objects of the lower concepts, as is each 
of these ideas to the group of individual objects corresponding to it. 

The highest idea is the Idea of the Good. As the cause of being 
and cognition, it is as the sun in the kingdom of ideas. Plato 
appears to identify it with the supreme Deity. That the idea of the 
good, and not that of Being, should be conceived as the highest, is in 
consonance with the ethical character of the doctrine of ideas, accord 
ing to which the idea is the perfect in its kind; and it is not in 
conflict with the logical and ontological purport of that doctrine, 

because the good may be considered as an idea quite as universal as 
being, since every thing, in so far as it is truly existent, is also neces 
sarily good. 

As mathematical cognition holds a middle place between philo 
sophical and sensible cognition, so mathematical objects form a mean 
between sensuous things and ideas. 

The method of cognition by which the ideas are apprehended, is 
Dialectic, which proceeds in a twofold direction, rising first to the 
universal and then returning from the universal to the particular. 
A forerunner of dialectical cognition, and, in the event of the latter 
being unattainable, its substitute, is the mythical method in treating 
of the ideas. 

The work of drawing up a complete system of the ideas was not 
accomplished by Plato. As a step in this direction, however, we 
may regard the reduction of the ideas to numbers, which Plato 
undertook in his old age, after having originally developed the theory 
of ideas apart from all consideration of the relations of numbers. 
Such also was the stoicheiology connected with this reduction, or the 
doctrine of the singular or limiting element, of the undetermined 
element determinable by the former, and of the third element result 
ing from the mixture of the first two, the three constituting the 
elements of all that exists. 

On the System of Plato in general, cf., in addition to the above-cited works of Tennemann and K. F. 
Hermann and the histories of Ritter, Brandis, and Zeller, the following: Phil. Guil. van Heusde, JniUn 
Philosophiae Platonicae, Utrecht, 1827-86; ed. IL, Leyden, 1842; C. Beck, Plate?* Philosophic im 
Abriss ihrer genetischen Entvtickehvng, Stuttgart, 1858; A. Arnold, System der Platonischen Philo 
sophic ate Einleitwig in da* Studiumdes Plato imd der Philosophic Hberhatipt, Erfurt, 1858. (Forms 
the third part of Plat. Werkc, einzeln erkldrt und in ihrem Zusammenhange dargestellt, Erfurt, 
1836 seq.) 

On the whole Platonic philosophy in its relations to Judaism and Christianity, see Car. Frid. Standlin, 
De philosophiae Platonicae cum doctnna religionis Judaica et Christiana cognatione, Gott. 1819 ; C. 
Ackermann, Das ChristlicJte in Plato und in der Platonischen Philosophic, Hamburg, 1835 [translated by 
B. R. Aebury : Tfte Christian Element in Plato, Edinburgh, 1861. Tr.] ; Ferd. Christ. Baur, Das Christliche 
des Platonism ufi oder Sokrates und Christu*, in the Ztschr.fiir Theol, 1S3T, No. 8, pp. 1-154, and sepa 
rately, Tub. 1837. (Baur shows how the practicable elements in the Platonic ideal state were realized by 
the Christian church, which result he attributes to the inner relationship of the two, as each recognizing the 
substantiality of the ideal; but Platonism, he adds, was wanting in the sense of the unity of the divine and 
the human, in positive or substantial import, and in a recognition of the phenomena of subjective con 
sciousness. Baur s conception of "substantiality," however, wavers between that of unconsciousness [the 
ancient conception] and transcendence [a more modern one]. It may well be asked, whether more of 
" unity" is not visible in Plato s dialectic than in the dogmas of the church ?) A. Neander, Tf iss. Abhand- 
lungen, ed. by J. L. Jacobi, Berlin, 1861, p. 169 seq. ; J. Dollinger, Heidenthwm und Judenthum, Regensburg, 
1857, p. 295 seq. ; R. Ehlers, De m ac potentate, guam philosophia antiqua, imprimis Platonica et Stoica, 
MI doctor, apologetarwn saec II. halmerit, Gott, 1859; F. Michelis, Die Philosophic Plato s in ihrer 
innern Besdehwng zwr geoffenbarten Wahrheit, Muiister, 1859-60 ; Deitrich Becker, Das philos. System 
Plato s in semer Beziehung eum chrisUichen Dogma, Freiburg, 1862 ; Heinr. von Stein, Sieben Bucket 
*ur Geschichte des Platoniitmus, Parts L and IL, Gott, 1862-64; Alfred Fouillee, La philosophic ds 


Platon: Exposition, histoire et critique de la theorie des idees (Outrage cowrown* par FAcad. de 
Sciences Morales et PoUUques), Paris, 1869. (Of. the literature to 43.) 

Among the earlier monographs on Plato s theory of ideas may be mentioned those of Jak. Brucker 
(1T48), Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1786), Friedrich Victor Leberecht Plessing, Job.. Friedr. Dammann, Th. 
Fahse (1795) ; among the more recent, those of Job. Friedr. Herbart (De Platonici Systematic Fundamento 
Gott., 1805, reproduced in Vol. I. of Herbart s Kl, Schr., 1842, p. 67 seq., and in Vol. XII. of his Compl. Works 
1852, p. 61 seq. ; cf. Boeckh, Jenaer Lit.-Zeitung, 1808, No. 224.), Christ. Aug. Brandis (Diatribe Academica 
de perditis Aristotelis libris de Ideis et de Bono, Bonn, 1823), Ad. Trendelenburg (Platonis de Ideis et Nu- 
meris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata, Leipa. 1826), H. Eichter (De Id. PL, Leips. 1827), Ludolf Wien- 
borg (De primitivo id. PI. sensu, Altona, 1829), K. F. Hermann (Marb. Lect.-Kat., 1832-1833 and 1839), 
Herm. Bonitz (Disp. Platanicae duae ; De Idea Boni ; De Animae Mundanae apud Plat. Elemmtis, 
Dresden, 1837), Zeller (Ueber die Aristot. Darstellung der Platon. Philosophic, in Z. s Plat. Studien, Tub. 
1S39, pp. 197-300), Franz Ebbeu (De PI. id. doctrina, Bonn, 1849), J. F. Nourrisson (Quid, PI. de idei&ten- 
serit, Paris, 1852, Expos, de la theorie platonicienne des idees, Paris, 1858), Graser (Torgau, 1861), S. Rib 
bing (see above, 40), Th. Maguire (An Essay on the Platonic Idea, London, 1866), Herm. Cohen (Die 
plat. Ideenlehre, psychologisch entwickelt, in the " Zeitschr. fur Volkerpsychologie und Spraehu-iss," ed. 
by M. Lazarus and H. Steintbal, Vol. IV., Berlin, 1866, pp. 403-464); cf. Max Schneidewin s Disquisitionum 
philos. de Platonis Theateti parte priori specimen (Inaug.-Diss.), Gottingen, 1865, and other opuscules 
by the same author on the Theaetetus, Soph., Parm., etc., and Ad. Trendelenburg s Das Ebenmaass, ein 
Band der Verwandtschaft Zwischen der griechischen Archaeologie und Philosophie, Berlin, 1865. (The 
rising of the idea above the phenomenal which is in conformity with the tendency of nature herself ia 
illustrated by Trendelenburg by an example from the plastic art of the Greeks, where the facial angle of 
Camper exceeds, in its approach to a right angle, the limits actually observed in nature; in this sense, 
says T-, the idea is "the fundamental form or type, elevated above the mutation of phenomena, the arche 
type, toward which all things tend.") 

On the mathematical passages in Plato s writings, Theodorus of Soli (Plutarch, De Def. Orac., ch. 82) 
and Theo. of Smyrna (rfav Kara. jAa0jj/oiaTiKT)i ^pryen /xwi <is TTQV TOW nXaTwros avayvtiHiiv) in ancient times, 
and in modern times Mollweide (Gott. 1805, and Leipsic, 1813), C. E. Chr. Schneider (De Numero Plat^ 
Breslau, 1822), J. J. Fries (PVs Zahl [Sep., 546], Heidelberg, 1828), C. F. Wex (De loco mathem. in 
Platonis Menone, Halle, 1825), Job. Wolfg. Muller (Commentar iiber zwei Stellen in PL s Meno u. 
Theaet., Nuremberg, 1797; Prufung der von We versuchten Erkl., ibid. 1826), C. F. Hermann (De 
Numero Platonis, Marburg, 1S3S), E. F. August (Berlin, 1829 and 1844), and others, have written ; Adolph 
Benecke appears to have given the correct explanation of the geometrical hypothesis advanced in the Meno, 
in the Progr. des Elbinger Gymn., 1867. His merits in respect of the advancement of mathematics have 
been discussed (though, for the most part, without sufficiently critical investigation) by the historians of 
mathematics, especially by Montucla, Bossut, Chasles, Arneth, and in the monograph by C. Blass, De, Plat, 
mathematico (Diss.-Inaug.), Bonn, 1861 ; cf. also Finger, De primordiis geometriae apud Graecos, Heidel 
berg, 1831, and Bretschneider, in his work on the Geometry of Euclid, Leipsic, 1870. 

Of the Platonic Dialectic treat : Joh. Jac. Engel, Versuch einer Methode, die Vfrnunftlehre aus PL Dia- 
logen su entwickeln, Berlin, 1780 ; Joh. Jac. Heinr. Nast, De meth. PL philos. docendi dialogicae, Stuttgard, 
1787; Analysis logica dial. PL qui inscr. Meno, ibid., 1792-93 ; Jac. Borellus, De methodo Socr. docendi 
exemplo e dial. Plat, qui inscr. Euthyphro illustrata, Upsala, 1798; Fr. Hoffmann, Die Dialektik PlCs, 
Munich, 1832; Karl Kiesel, in Gymn. Programmes, Cologne, 1840, Dusseldorf, 1851 and 1868; Th. Wilh. 
Danzel (Hamburg, 1841, and Leipsic, 1845), K. Kuhn (Berlin, 1843), K. Gunther (in the PhiMogus. V. 1850, 
p. 36 seq.), Kuno Fischer, De Parm. Plat., Stuttg., 1851; Karl Eichhoff, Logica trium dial. PL escpUc. 
(Meno, Crito,Phaedo), G.-Pr., Duisburg, 1854; Ed. Alberti, Zur Dial, des PL, vom Theaet. bis sum Parm., 
Leips. 1856 (from Suppl., Vol. I., to the N. Jahrb. f. Phil. u. Pad.) ; H. Druon, An fuerit intema s. eso- 
terica PL doctr., Paris, 1860; Holzer, Grundzuge der Erkenntnisslehre in Plato s Staat. (G.-Pr.), Cottbus, 
1861 ; C. Martinius, Ueber die Fragestellung in den Dialogen Plato^s, in the Zeitschr. f. d. Gymn.- Wesen. 
Berlin, 1866, pp. 97-119 and 497-516; Eud. Alex. Reinhold Kleinpaul, Der Begr. der Erk. in PL s Theaet. 
(Diss.-Lips.\ Gotha, 1867; Josef Steger, Plat. Studien, I., Innsbruck, 1869 ; W. Weicker, Amor Platonicus et 
disserendi ratio Socratica qua necessitudine inter sese contineantur (G.-Pr.), Zwickau, 1869; Karl TJphues, 
Die philos. Untersuchungen des PL Soph. u. Parm. (Dissert), Miinster, 1869 ; Elem. d#r Platon Ph. auf 
Qrund des Soph. u. mit liucksicht auf die Scholastik, Soest, 1870. 

On the use of myths by Plato, cf. C. Crome (Gymn.-Progr., Dflssaldorf, 1S85), Alb. Jahn (Berne, 1839), 
Schwanitz (Leips., 1852, Jena, 1S63, Frankf.-on-the-M., 1864), Jnl. Deuschle (Hanau, 1854), Halm (Die pad a - 
goyischen Mythen Plato\G.-Pr., Parchim, 1860), A. Fischer (Diss. Inaug., Konigsberg, 1865). 

On Plato s philosophy of language, cf. Friedr. Michelis (De enundationis natwa diss., Bonn, 1849), 
Jul. Deuschle (Marburg, 1852), Charles Lenormaat (Sur le Cratyle de PL, Athens, 1861) ; cf. Ed. Alberti 
Die Sprachphilosopliie vor Plato, in PhiloL, XI. Gott. 1856, pp. 681-705. 


The division of philosophy into Ethics, Physics, and Dialectic (ascribed to Plato by Cic., 
Acad. Post., I. 5, 19) was first formally propounded (according to Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., 
VII. 16) by Xenocrates, the pupil of Plato ; but Plato, as Sextus correctly says, was poten 
tially its originator ( ap^-y6^). Several of Plato s dialogues were devoted to ethics 
(from the Protag. to the Rep.}, one (Timaeus) was devoted especially to physics, and one 
(Tlieaetetus, with which Cratylus, on Language, and some other dialogues belong, if genu 
ine) to the theory of cognition; these dialogues were supplemented by oral lectures on 
the ideas and their elements (ffro^Za), in which were communicated the " unwritten 
doctrines," which were taken down by Aristotle, Hermodorus, and others, and were prob 
ably used by the author of the Soph, and the Pol. 

Of the genesis of the theory of ideas we find an account in Arist., Met., I. 6 and 9 (cf. 
XIII. 4 seq.). Aristotle describes this theory as the joint product of the Heraclitean doctrine 
of the constant flux of things and of the Socratic fondness for definition. The doctrine, 
says Aristotle, that the sensuous is subject to perpetual change, was derived by Plato 
from Cratylus the Heraclitean, and was ever afterward maintained by him. Accordingly, 
when Plato had learned through Socrates of conceptions which, when once rightly defined, 
remain ever invariable, he believed that their counterparts must not be sought in the sen 
suous world, but that there must be other existences which were the objects of conceptual 
cognition, and these objects he named ideas. The reduction of these ideas to (ideal) num 
bers is spoken of in Met., XIII. 4, as a later modification of the original doctrine. Aristotle 
here gives to the logical and metaphysical side of the theory of ideas a prominence which 
belongs equally to the no less essential ethical and esthetic side ; in this he was undoubt 
edly influenced by the prevalent shape assumed by the theory in the later phases of its 
development, in which the idea of that perfection, which transcends all experience, became 
gradually superseded by the idea of universality so, already, in connection with the idea 
of table, in Rep., X. 596. 

In the Phaedrus of Plato the doctrine of ideas is presented symbolically, and yet in 
such form that the author of the dialogue must unquestionably have been already in pos 
session of the theory in its logical form, although reserving its scientific presentation and 
demonstration for later dialogues. According to the myth in the Phaedrus (p. 247 seq.), 
the pure essences, or the ideas, sit enthroned in a place beyond the vault of heaven in 
particular the ideas of justice, temperance, science, etc. They are colorless, without figure, 
imperceptible by any sense, and accessible only to the contemplative view of the reason 
(voi)f). Plato portrays the process by which one rises to the knowledge of the ideas as an 
upward journey of the soul to the super-celestial region. In the Conviv. (p. 211 seq.) Plato 
defines the idea of the beautiful in opposition to individual beautiful objects, in a manner 
which may be taken as descriptive of the relation of each idea to the individual objects 
corresponding to it. In contradistinction to beautiful bodies, arts, sciences (naXa crw/zara, 
iTUTqdevnaTa, //aflr/^ara), he terms the idea of the beautiful, the beautiful per se (avrb TO 
K.a Xov), and applies to it the predicates uncorrupted, pure, unmixed (elXiKpivlg, nadapov, 
au.iK.Tnv). This Beautiful per se is eternal, without origin or decay, neither increasing nor 
decreasing, remaining absolutely like itself (/card ravrd %ov, fiovosider ael 6v), not in one 
respect beautiful, but in another ugly ; not now beautiful, but at another time not so ; not 
beautiful in comparison with one object, but, in comparison with another, ugly ; not appear 
ing beautiful in one place or to certain persons, but in another place or to other persons 
ugly. Neither can it be represented by the fancy, as if it were a material thing ; nor is it a 
(subjective) conception or a form of knowledge (ovde TL<; Attyoc, ovSe -Lq k-KLCT^pi) it is not in 
any other object, nor in any living being, not on earth nor in the heavens, but it exists as a 
substance of and by itself (avTo naff avro fistf avTov). Every thing else that is beautiful 


participates in it (eKslvov pertx")- According to Rep., p. 523 seq., those sensible objects, 
which appear in one respect small, in another large, etc., and, in short, all those objects to 
which contrary predicates appear applicable, are the occasion of our calling in the aid of 
reason for their consideration; reason solves the contradiction, by separating those con 
traries which appear united (forming a ovyKexv/J.evov, concretum, a concrete object), conceiving 
Greatness as an idea by itself, and Smallness, in like manner, as another, and, in general, 
viewing the opposed predicates apart (ra 6vo Ksxupicpwa). Analogous to this are the 
explanations given in the Phaedo (p. 102): Simmias is large in comparison with Socrates, 
small in comparison with Phsedo ; but the idea of largeness and also the property of large 
ness are never at the same time identical with smallness; on the contrary, the idea 
remains permanently what it is, and so does the quality, unless it ceases to exist. The 
idea has with the individual objects corresponding to it a certain community (KOIVUVIO), it is 
present with them (irapovaia) but the character of this community (which, according to 
the comparison in the Republic between the idea of the Good and the sun, may be con 
ceived as analogous to the community between the sun and the earth, through the rays 
of the former extending to the latter) Plato declines more precisely to define (Phaedo, 
p. 100 d : on OVK aAAo rt iroiel aiirb /ca/lov 77 kxetvov rov naTiCv elre Tcapovcia elre noivuvia 
[tire] DTI-;/ dij /cat OTTOJ- irpocyevouivT], for which irpoffyevofttvov is probably to be read). 
Tim., p. 51 seq. (cf. Pep., V. 474 seq.): If scientific cognition and correct opinion (vovq and 
66t;a akrjdfa) are two different species of knowledge, then there exist ideas which possess 
absolute being and are cognizable, not through sense-perception, but only by thought (ddrj 
voovueva) ; but if, as it appears to some, both are identical, then the talk of ideas is mere 
talk (/loyof, or perhaps : ideas are nothing objective, they are simply subjective conceptions), 
and only the sensible exists. But in fact both are different, both in their origin (through 
conviction ; through persuasion) and in their nature (certainty and immutability ; uncer 
tainty and change). There are, therefore, also two different classes of objects: the one 
includes that which remains perpetually like itself, has not become and can not pass away, 
never from any source receives any thing into itself, nor itself passes into any thing else (OVTE 
i iavrb ia6e^6fj.vov a/l/lo aXXoOev, ovre avrb elg aA/16 TTOI iov) the other class covers the 
realm of individual objects, which are homonymous (6/auvvua) with the ideas and similar 
(bpota) to them, which become and perish at definite places, and are always in motion (7re<j>opij- 
liivcv ad). The difference between knowledge, on the one hand, and sensible perception 
and correct opinion, on the other, is considered at length and demonstrated in the dialogue 
I Theaetelus^ The (fantastical) tendency, which in the Platonic theory of ideas accompanies 
the logically legitimate recognition of a relation in the subjective conception to objective 
reality, culminates in the Sophistes (p. 248), with the attribution to ideas of motion, life, 
animation, and reason. This tendency to hypostatize or give substance to that phase of 
objective reality, which is known through the concept, appears, however, not to have been 
pushed to this extreme by Plato, but by a fraction of his Pythagorizing disciples, who (ac 
cording to Soph., 248 b) were often disputing with an opposite fraction, and among whom 
the inclination to hypostatize and personify abstractions was strongest. From the stand 
point reached in the Platonic exposition which was marked by the free and natural inter 
play of fancy, even in the severest operations of thought, so that in it doctrines scientifically 
valid appear interwoven with poetic fiction an advance in one of two directions was pos 
sible. Either the poetic element could be critically sifted out and the doctrine of ideas 
could be transformed into the doctrine of the essence or essential nature known through and 
corresponding with the concept (?} Kara "kbyw ovaia) which was done by Aristotle or the 
poetic element might, and did, become dogmatically fixed and, in scholastic fashion, seem 
ingly rationalized, as by some of the Platonists, in the Sophistes and Politicus, until its 


inevitable replacement by Skepticism took place, as in the Middle Academy and in the 
dialogue Parmenides. This dialogue may have been composed in the time immediately 
following Plato s death, but perhaps not till the time of the Middle Academy, and it 
finds a tenable position neither in the admission nor in the rejection of the ideas and 
the One. 

Myths, in which the truly existent was represented in the form of the perpetually 
becoming and the psychical in the form of the perceptible, were employed by Plato as a 
means of facilitating in his readers the subjective apprehension of his doctrines ; they were 
also a necessary element in the poetico-philosophical style of Plato ; but the dialectical 
method was considered as alone adequate to the object-matter of pure philosophical cog 
nition. The allegorical or mythical style was possible in treating of the ideal itself, and 
for the representation of its relation to the sensible it was in so far necessary for Plato, 
as he was unable, on account of the (as Deuschle terms it) "not genetical, but ontical" 
(ontological) character of his doctrine of ideas, to conceive this relation in a purely 
scientific form; but the cognition and representation of the sensible was, according to 
Plato, necessarily not figurative, but only probable. Such were the. ekoref /uvdoi (Tim., 
p. 59 et al.\ with which Plato believed we must content ourselves in the department 
of natural philosophy, while dialectic in all its rigor could be applied only in the 
field of ethics and in the investigation of cognition and the ideas. Owing to the char 
acter which Plato thus ascribed to natural philosophy, the style appropriate to it 
was that of continuous discourse ; hence in the Timaeus Plato could and was obliged 
to content himself with this style, which may have been already employed by the 

It is impossible, according to the dialogue Cratylus, that the consideration of words 
should be of assistance in the investigation of the essence of things, because the con 
structors of language were not sufficiently acquainted with the true and permanent essence 
of things, but remained satisfied with the popular opinion, which Heraclitus afterward ex 
pressed in its most general form, but which, in fact, is true only of objects of sense, viz. : 
that all things are in constant movement. 

The two cognitive processes, which together constitute the dialectical procedure, are 
described by Plato (Phaedr., 265 seq.) as the collective consideration of separate individuals 
and their reduction to unity of essence, on the one hand, and, on the other, the resolution 
of unity into plurality, following the order that exists in nature. The first process finds 
its term in definition, or the knowledge of the essence of the thing defined (and accord 
ingly in Plato, Rep., VII. 534, he is termed a dialectician, who attains to this conception of 
the essence, TOV "koyav TM^avovra TJJC ovaias) ; the second is the division of the generic 
concept into its subordinate specific concepts. In Rep., VI. p. 510, VII. p. 533, Plato con 
trasts deduction, which, from certain general presuppositions, that are. however, not neces 
sarily ultimate or expressive of first principles, derives conclusions that depend on them, 
with the process of rising to the unconditioned (kit apxrfv avvTrdderov, which principle, since 
it is absolutely the highest, can not serve as a basis for a further progress), a process 
which is accomplished by the suppression of all that is merely hypothetical. The 
former procedure rules, according to Plato, in the mathematics, the latter in philosophy. 
In the Phaedo (p. 101 d) it is recognized as legitimate in a philosophical investigation 
to base provisional inferences on v-rroOfaeic ; but it is requisite that these hypotheses 
be themselves subsequently justified, by being deduced from others more general and 
more nearly approaching the nature of principles, till at last the investigation finds its 
legitimate terminus in the inavdv, viz., the absolutely highest and self-demonstrating 


Plato, recapitulating, schematizes as follows, De Rep., VII. pp. 509 seq. and 533 


yvof (ovffia). I Oparov yevoc 


I Adfa. 

Not? (or voipis or c;rm$pa?). \ Aidvoia. \ HUmf. \ 

The highest object of knowledge (fieytarov fjLadrjfw.) is the idea of the good (Rep., VL 
505 a). This idea is supreme in the realm of vooi< and difficult of cognition ; it is the 
cause of all truth and beauty. To it objects owe their being and cognoscibility and the 
mind its power of cognition (Rep., YL 508 seq.). It is superior to the Idea of Being, 
Rep., VI. p. 509 b : /cat roZf yij-vucKOfttvou; -oivw p.ti povov TO -yiyi>tJGKo6ai (the power of 
being known) dxivcu i>~b rov ayaBov ^apfivat, a/~/.a nal TO elvai re nal rrjv oi oiav (being, 
taken predicativelv) v^r* eneivov avroi Trpooelvcu, ova ovcia^ bvro$ rov ajaBov, aA/. f~i 
i-!TKeiva rfjq ovaias Trpeafteig KOI owduei vtrept xovroc (the Idea of Good bestows not only 
cognoscibility, but also being; it is not identical with being, but, on the contrary, is 
exalted above it). Every thing which exists and is knowable, has received from God, 
who is the Idea of the Good, its existence and its ability to be known, because he knew 
that it was better that it should exist, than that it should not exist (cf. Phaedo, p. 97 c). 
(So far as we are to understand by being," objective being or objective reality, d?.r?6eia, 
this being is not the most general idea, but is inferior in generality to the Good.) In the 
Phttebus (p. 22) the Idea of the Good is identified with the divine reason. The general 
character of the Platonic teaching requires us to identify it also with the world-builder 
(dtfuwwpyof), who (according to Tim., 28 seq.), the absolutely good, contemplating the ideas 
(i. e., himself and the other ideas), makes all generated things, as far as practicable, 
also good. 

Of the reduction of the ideas to (ideal) numbers, of which Aristotle speaks, some traces 
are found in certain of the later dialogues, mostly in the Phtttbus, in which the ideas are 
termed evddsg or //ovd<5ec, and (in Pythagorizing fashion) TTE/XZC and a-Eipov are considered 
as elements of things. Akin to this doctrine is the doctrine of the different elements of the 
world-soul, in the Timaeus, and of " the same " (ravrbv) and " the other " (darepov) in the 
Sophistes. According to the Aristotelian accounts (Metaph., I. 6 ; XIV. 1, 1087 b, 12 et al., 
also in the fragments of the works De Bono and De Jdeis], as also according to Hermodorus 
(Simplic., Ad Arist. Phys., fol. 54 b and 56 b), Plato posited two elements (crro^em) ae 
present in the ideas and in all existing things, namely, a form-giving (rfpaf) and a form- 
receiving, and. in itself, formless element (cnreipov). but the aireipov, or infinite, which the 
Pythagoreans had already opposed to the TrerrepaGitfvov, or the finite, was divided by Plato 
into a duad, namely, into the great and small (or more and less). In every class of object* 
(ideas, mathematical and sensible objects) Plato seems to have assumed such elements, and 
to have regarded the objects themselves as a mixture of both elements (JJLLKTOV). In the 
things which are perceived by the senses the aTretpov appears to represent the matter which 
constitutes them (described in the Timaeus), and the Trtpcf their shape and quality. In 
the soul of the world the Trcpof is the singular, self-identical (rav-bv) and indivisible 
(duzpec) element, and the cnreipov the heterogeneous (6/drepov) and divisible (utptcrov) one. 
In numbers and geometrical figures and hi the ideas Trtpcc represents unity (ev), while of 
the airetpov several kinds are distinguished: as being the "indefinite duad" (aopicroq 6vd^ 


the great and small constitute the form-receiving element or substratum (the vA^), from 
which through the iv numbers are formed ; long and short, broad and narrow, high and 
low, are the species of the great and small, from which the form-giving principle, whose 
nature is unity, produces lines, surfaces, and solids (Arist.. Mdaph., XIII. 9). From the 
One and from the cnreipov, when divided into the duad of great and small numbers arise, 
says Aristotle (Metaph., I. 6), in a natural manner (evyvi*; ) ; but the derivation of the ideas 
from these depends on the reduction of the ideas to numbers. From these (ideal) numbers 
Plato distinguishes the numbers of mathematics, which stand between the ideas and 
sensible things. The ideal numbers seem to have had with Plato essentially the sense 
of expressions to denote higher and lower degrees of generality and what was for him 
the same thing higher and lower degrees of worth; a relation of succession (a irporepov 
KOI vorepov) subsisted among them, but they could not be added (a^vfi3/jjroi). The ev 
(the One) was identified by Plato with the idea of the good (according to Aristotle, op. 
Aristox., Harm. Element, II. p. 30, Jtfeii., cf. Arist., Met., I. 6, XIV. 4). 

42. The world (<5 KOC^O?) is not eternal, bat generated ; for it is 
perceptible by the senses and is corporeal. Time began with the 
world. The world is the most beautiful of all generated things ; it 
was created by the best of artificers and modeled after an eternal 
and the most excellent of patterns. Matter, which existed from 
eternity, together with God, being absolutely devoid of quality and 
possessing no proper reality, was at first in disorder and assumed a 
variety of changing and irrational shapes, until God, who is abso 
lutely good and without envy, came forth as world-builder, and 
transformed all for ends of good. He formed first the soul of the 
world, by creating from two elements of opposite nature, the one 
indivisible and immutable, the other divisible and mutable, a third 
intermediate substance, and then combining the three in one whole, 
and distributing this whole through space in harmonious proportions. 
To the soul of the world he then joined its body. In thus bringing 
order and proportion to the chaotic and heaving mass of matter, he 
caused it to assume determinate mathematical forms. The earth 
arose from cubiform elements, and fire from elements having the 
shape of pyramids ; between these two came, as intermediate terms 
of a geometrical proportion, water, whose elements are icosahedral in 
form, and air. with octahedral elements. The dodecahedron is re 
lated to ,1; i)rni of the universe. Plato knew of the inclination 
of the ecliptic. Of the elements of the world-soul, the better, i. e., 
the unchangeable element, was distributed by the Demiurgus in the 
direction of the celestial equator. The other, the changeable element, 
he placed in the direction of the ecliptic. The divine part of the hu 
man soul, having its seat in the head, was made like the world-soul. 


The first or indivisible element of this soul in man is, as in the soul 
of the world, the instrument of rational cognition, the other element 
is the organ of sensuous perception and representation. With the 
soul, whose seat is in the head, are combined in man two other 
souls, which Plato in the Phaedrus seems to conceive as pre-existing 
before the terrestrial life of man, but in the Timaeus describes as tied 
to the body, and mortal. These are the courageous soul (TO 0v/jo<$e?, 
irascibility), and the appetitive soul (TO imdvpriTutfo, disposition to 
seek for sensual pleasure and for the means of its gratification). 
Thus the whole or collective soul resembles the composite force of a 
driver and two steeds. The appetitive soul is possessed also by 
plants, and courage is an attribute of the (nobler) animals. The soul 
in general (according to the Phaedrus\ or the cognitive soul alone 
(according to the Timaeus) is immortal. With this doctrine Plato 
connects (in the Phaedo, which contains his arguments for immor 
tality) the ethical admonition to seek, through a life of purity and 
conformity to reason, the only possible deliverance from evil, and also 
a number of "probable arguments" in support of the doctrines of 
the transmigration of the soul through the bodies of men and animals 
for a cosmical period of ten thousand years, of the purification of 
those who were good citizens, but not philosophers, of the temporary 
punishments of sinners who are not past all healing, of the eternal 
damnation of incurable offenders, and of the blessedness of those whose 
lives were pre-eminently pure and pleasing to God. 

The following authors (in addition to the editors and commentators of the Timaeus and the historians 
of Greek philosophy) treat especially of the Platonic theology: Marsilius Ficinus (Theologia Platonica, 
Florence, 1482), Puffendorf (De theol. PL, Leipsic, 1653), Oelrichs (Doctr. PI. de deo, Marburg, 1788), Horstel 
(PL doctr. de deo, Leipsic, 1804), Theoph. Hartmann (De diis Tim. PL, Breslau, 1840), Krische (Forschun- 
gen I., pp. 181-204), J. Bilharz (1st PL s Speculation Theismwt Carlsruhe and Freiburg, 1842), Htinr. 
Schiirmann (De deo Plat., Munster, 1845), Ant. Erdtman (De deo et ideis, Miinster, 1855), II. L. Ahrcns 
(De duodecim deis PL, Hanover, 1864), G. F. Rettig (atria im Philebus die personl. Gottheit des Plato, 
oder: Plato Jcein Pantheist, Berne, 1866), and Karl Stumpf (VerMltniss den Platonischen Gottets zur 
Idee, des Guten, in the Ztschr. f. Philos., Vol. 54, Nos. 1 and 2, Halle, 1869, published also separately). 
Cf., also, the works on Plato s doctrine of ideas, cited above, 41. 

Plato s Natural Philosophy is discussed by the various editors and translators of the Timaeus, among 
whom Chalcidius (of the fourth century A. D. ; his translation, together with Cicero s translation of a part 
of the Timaeus, is edited by Mullach, in Vol. 2 of his Fragm. Philos. Graec., Paris, 1867, pp. 147-258), of 
ancient translators, and Martin (Etudes mr le Timee de Platon, 2 torn., Paris, 1841), among modern trans 
lators are the most important; also, in particular, by Aug. Boeckh (De Plat, corporis mundani fabrica, 
Heidelb., 1809, and De Plat, system, coelestiwin globorum et de tcra indole astronomiae Philolaicae, ibid. 
1810, both which works are printed in the third volume of the complete works of Boeckh, edited by F. 
Ascherson, Leipsic, 1866, accompanied with many additions ; see also B. s Untersucliungen iiber das kos- 
m.ische System des Platon mit Bezug auf Gruppe s " Koxmische Systeme der Grieeken? Berlin, 1852), 
Eeinganum (PL s Ansicht von der Gestalt der Erde, in the Ztschr. f. die A. Wiss., 1841, No. 90), J. S. 
Konitzer ( Ueber Verhaltmiss, Formund Wesen der Elementarkwper nach Plato s Timaeus, Neu-Euppin, 
1846), Wolfgang Hocheder (Das kosmische System des Plato mit Eeeug auf die neuesten Auffassungen de 


selben, Progr., Aschaffenburg, 1855; cf., per contra, Susemihl, in Jahrb. f. cl. Philol., Vol. 75, 1857, pp. 
598-602), A. Hundert (De Platonis altero rerum principio, Progr., Cleve, 1857), Felix Bobertag (Z> 
inateria PL quam fere vacant meletemata, Breslau, 1864), Franz Susemihl (Zur Platonischen Escha* 
toiogie und Astronomie, in the Philologus, Vol. XV., 1860, pp. 417-434), G. Grote (Plato s Doctrine re 
specting tlie Rotation of the Earth and Aristotle s Comment upon that Doctrine, London, I860; German 
transl. by Jos. Holzamer, Prague, 1861 ; cf., on this work by Grote, Heinr. v. Stein, in the Gdtt. Ann., 1862, 
p. 1438, Friedr. Ueberweg, in the Z&itschr.f. Philos., Vol. XLII., 1863, pp. 177-182, and particularly Boeckh, 
in the third volume of his collected works, 1866, pp. 294-820), C. Goebel (De coelestibus ap. Plat, motlbus, 
G.-Pr., Wernigerode, 1869). 

On the Psychology of Plato: Aug. Boeckh ( Ueber die Bildung der Weltseele im Timaeus, in Daub and 
Creuzer s Studien, Vol. III., 1807, pp. 1-95, repr. with suppl. in the 3d vol, of hia Ges. kl. Schriften, Leips. 
1866, pp. 109-180). Henn. Bonitz (Disput. Plat. Duae: de an. mund. elem., see above, 41), F. Ueberweg 
( Ueber die Platonische Weltseele, in the Rhein. Mus. f. Ph., new series, Vol. IX., 1853. pp. 37-84), Franz 
Susemihl (Platon. Forschungen, III., in Philologus, Supplementband IT., Heft 2, 1861, pp. 219-250), 
Chaignet (De la psychologie de Platon, Paris, 1862), J. P. Wohlstein (Materie und Weltseele in dem 
Plat. System, Inaug.-Disa., Marburg, 1863), Hartung (Auslegung des Mdrchen^ von der Seele, I., Erfurt, 

On the Platonic doctrine of immortality and the related doctrines of pre-existence and reminiscence : 
Joach. Oporinus (Ifistor. crit. doctr. de immortalitate, Hamb. 1735, p. 185 seq.), Chr. Ernst von Windheim 
(Examen argumentorum PI. pro immort. animae hum., Gott. 1749), J. C. Gottleber (Argum. aliquot in 
PL Phaedone de anim. immort. discussio, spec., I.-IV., Altdorf, 1765-67), Moses Mendelssohn (Phadon, 
1st edition, Berlin, 1764), Gust. Fried. Wiggers (Examen argum. PL pro. imm. anim. hum., Rostock, 1803), 
F. Pettavel (Disp. Acad., Berlin, 1815), Kunhardt (Ueber PL Phaedon, Lubeck, 1817), Adalb. Schmidt 
(Argum. pro imm. anim., Halle, 1827; PL s Un^terblichkeitslehre, Progr., Halle, 1835), J. W. Braut 
(Ueber die aya/ii/Tjo-is, Brandenb. 1832), C. F. Hermann (De immortalitatis notione in Plat. Phaed., Marb. 
1835; De partibus animae immortalibus sec. Platonem, Gott. 1850), Ludw. Hase (Pr., Magdeb. 1843), 
Voijttlander (De animorum praeexistentia, Diss., Berlin, 1844), K. Ph. Fischer (PL de immort. an. doctr.< 
Erlangen, 1845), Herm. Schmidt (G.-Progr., Wittenb. 1845; Halle, 1850-52; Zur Kritik und Erkl. v. PL s 
Phaedon, in the PhiloL, V. 1850, p. 710 eq.; Z&itschr.f. Gymn.-Wesen, II. 1848, Nos. 10 and 11, and VI. 
1852, Nos. 5, 6, 7; PL s Phaedon erkl., G.-Pr., Wittenberg, 1854), Franz Susemihl (Philologus, V. 1850, p. 
385 seq.; Jahn s Jahrb., Vol. 73, 1856, pp. 286-240; Philologus, XV., and Suppl., Vol. II., 219 seq.) M. 
8[>eck (G.-Pr., Breslau, 1858). L. H. O. Muller (Die Eschatologie Plato s und Cicero s im Verhaltniss 
eum Christenthum, Jever, 1854), K. Eichhoff (G.-Pr., Buisburg, 1854, pp. 11-18), A. J. Knhlert (G.-Pr. von 
Czernowits. Vienna, 1855). Ch. Prince (Pr., Weufrhatel, 1859), Bucher (PL spec. Bew f. d. Umterbl. der 
menschl. Seele, Inaug. Diss., Gott. 1861), Drosihn (Die Mythen uber Prd- und Post-Existenz, G.-Pr., 
Coslin, 1861), K. Silberschlag (Die Grundlehren PL uber das Verhaltniss des Menschen zu Gott und das 
Leben nach dem Tode in ihrer Beziehung zu den Mythen des AJterthums, in the Deutsch. Mus., 1862, 
No. 41), F. Gloel (De argumentorum in Plat. Phaedone cohaerentia, G.-Pr., Magdeb. 1868). Alb. Bischoff 
(PL s Phaedon eine Reihe von Betrachtungen zur Erkldrung und Beurtheilung des Gesprdchs, Er 
langen, 1866; cf. F. Mezger, in the Zeitschrift fur luth. Theologie, 1868, No. 1, pp. 80-86), A. Boelke (Ueber 
PL s Beweisefur die Umterbl. der Seele Rostock and Berlin, 1869), Paul Zimmermanu (Die Unsterbl. 
der Seele in Plato s Phaedo, Leipsic, 1869). 

Plato opens the exposition of his physics in the Tim. (p. 28 seq.) with the affirmation 
that since the world bears the form of yeveoit (development, becoming) and not that of 
true being (ovaia), nothing absolutely certain can be laid down in this field of investigation, 
but only what is probable (eiK6-e nvdot). Our knowledge of nature bears not the charac 
ters of science (kTnarrjf.Lrf) or of the knowledge of truth (aM/6eia), but those of belief (THO-TV^). 
Plato says (TVm., p. 29 c): "What being is to becoming, that is truth to faith" (5, n Trep 
irpbq yeveaiv ovoia, TOVTO Trpdf TTIGTIV atyOcia). What Plato says in the Phaedo r p. 114d, 
explains his idea of the probable: "Firmly to assert that this is exactly as I have expressed 
it, befits not a man of intelligence ; yet that it is either so or something like it (on f/ ravf 
ecrnv f] roiavr O.TTO) must certainly be assumed. 

Plato raises in Tim., p. 28 a, the question whether the world is without origin, eternal 
ab initio, or whether it had a beginning, and answers it by saying, that on account of the 
visibility of the world, the second, and not the first, alternative must be adopted as the 
truth. But the world is the best of generated, as its author is of eternal existences. 


God s goodness is the reason of the construction of the world. Phaedrws, p. 247 a : " Envy 
stands outside of the divine choir." Timaeus, p. 29 e : He (God) was good ; but the good 
are never envious with regard to any thing. Being, therefore, without envy, he planned 
all things so that they should be as nearly as possible like himself: " ayadbq rjv (6 drjpiovp- 
yof, the supreme God, the constructor of the world), ayadti 6k ovddg Trzpl ovdevo^ oiidEiro-f: 
iyyiyverai <j>66vo(;. rovrov 6 c/crdf uv -rravra on pokier a effovtydq yevtcQai Trapa-rrtyota ai Tti. 
(Cf. also Arist., Metaph., I. 2, p. 983 b, 2. Yet the notion of the envy of the gods, which 
Plato and Aristotle combat, involves also an ethical and religious element in so far as by 
" envy " it is intended to indicate the reaction of the universal order against all individual 
disproportion or excess.) 

The adaptation and order of the world have their ground in the world-constructing 
reason; whatever of blind necessity is manifest in it arises from the nature of matter. 
Mechanical causes are only ^wairta (concomitants) of the final causes. 

When matter (as de%afivr], or form-receiving principle) assumed orderly shapes, there 
arose first the four elements : fire, air, water, and earth. Between the two extremes, fire 
and earth, of which the former was necessary for the visibility, the latter for the palpa 
bility of things, a bond of connection was needed ; but the most beautiful of bonds is pro 
portion, which in the present case, where solid bodies are concerned, must be twofold. 
(In the case of plane figures one intermediate term is sufficient ; the side of a square, 
whose contents are the double of a given square, is determined by the proportion 
1 : x : : x : 2, where x = V2, the side of the given square being = 1 ; and this given square, 
whose contents = 1 x 1, is to the rectangle, one of whose sides = 1, the other = V2, 
and whose contents therefore = 1 x y2, as the latter is to the square whose con 
tents = V2 x V2 = 2. But in the case of solids, two intermediate terms are necessary ; 
the length of the side of a cube whose contents = 2, is determined by the two propor 
tions : J : x : : x : ?/, and x : y : : y : 2, where x 3 V 2 and y = s y 2 2 , and the cube, whose 
contents = 1 x 1 x 1 , is to the parallelepiped, whose contents = lxlx 3 v 2, as the 
latter is to the parallelepiped 1 x * |/2 x 4/2 ; and the latter again stands in a like relation 
to the cube whose contents = 3 V2 x 3 V2 x 3 V2 = 2. Whatever is true, in this respect, 
of squares and cubes, is applicable to all mutually similar forms, though only to such. 
A comprehensive and exact examination and explanation of all these relations is given by 
Boeckh in the Comm. acad. de Platonica corporis mundani fdbrica conflati ex dementis 
geometrica ratione concinnatis, Heidelberg, 1809, reprinted in Boeckh s Ges. kl. Schr., Vol. 
III., pp. 229-252, together with an annexed Excursus, pp. 253-265.) Fire must accord 
ingly be related to air, as air to water, and air to water, as water to earth. 

The distances of the celestial spheres from each other are proportioned to the different 
lengths of the strings which produce harmonious tones. The earth is at rest in the center 
of the universe. It is wound around the (adamantine) bar or distaff (^/la/cdr^), which 
Plato (according to Grote, doctrinally, according to Boeckh, mythically) represents as 
extending from one end of the axis of the world to the other ; the sky and also the 
planets revolve around this distaff once in every twenty-four hours ; but the planets have 
besides a motion paculiar to themselves, which is occasioned by the ctyovfivhot, which lie 
about the spindle and together constitute the whorl, since these, while participating in the 
revolving motion of the heavens, rotate at the same time, but more slowly, in the opposite 
direction; the earth remains unmoved. If the distaff (faaKaTrj) of the spindle (drpa/crof) is 
conceived as motionless (as it is by Boeckh), the earth is to be regarded as simply rolled 
into a ball around it and firmly attached to it ; but if it is included in the daily rotation of 
the heavens, the earth must not be conceived (as it is by Grote) as partaking in this motion, 
but the (absolute) rest of the earth must be explained by a (relative) motion of the same 


around the distaff in the opposite direction. If the distance of the moon from the earth 
is represented by 1, then that of the sun = 2, that of Yenus = 3, that of Mercury = 4, 
that of Mars = 8, that of Jupiter = 9, that of Saturn = 27. The inclination of the ecliptic 
is explained by Plato as a result of the inferior perfection of the spheres underneath the 
sphere of the fixed stars. According to a statement of Theophrastus (see Plutarch., Plat. 
Qu., 8, cf. Numa, ch. 1 1), Plato in his old age no longer attributed to the earth (but to the 
central fire probably) the occupancy of the center of the world; this account, in itself alto 
gether credible as an oral utterance of Plato, is nevertheless not easily reconciled with the 
fact that in the Leges which was written after the Rep., and beyond question also after 
the Timaeus, and that, too, according to late but apparently trustworthy tradition, not by 
Plato, but by Philip the Opuntian, from a sketch made by Plato the doctrine contained 
in the Tima&as is reaffirmed. Cf. Boeckh, Das kosmische System des Plato, Berlin, 1852, 
pp. 144-150. 

The soul of the world is older than its body ; for its office is to rule, and it is not 
fitting that the younger should rule the older. It must unite in itself the elements of all 
orders of ideal and material existences, in order that it may be able to know and under 
stand them (Tim., p. 34 seq.). Plato says (Tim., p. 35 seq.), that the Indivisible in the soul 
enables it to have knowledge of the ideas, while the Divisible mediates its knowledge of 
sensible objects. The third or mixed element ma} T be considered as the organ of mathe 
matical knowledge (or perhaps of all particular, distinct acts of cognition ?) These cogni 
tive faculties pertain exclusively to that part (AoyioriKov) of the human soul which resides 
in the head. 

The hypothesis that the human soul has three parts (eTrtOv^TtKov, dvfweidcg, hoyiariKov) 
seems to have been framed in intentional correspondence with the natural gradation : plant, 
animal, man (Tim., 77 b; Rep., IV. 441 b); this distinction, however, of the orders of the 
natural kingdom was not so distinctly marked or attended to by Plato as by Aristotle. 
The supremacy of each of these different parts, taken in their order, is illustrated in the 
gain-loving Phenicians and Egyptians, the courageous Barbarians of the North, and the 
culture-loving Hellenes (Rep., IV. 435 e to 436 a). 

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is founded by Plato, in the Phaedrus (p. 245), 
on the nature of the soul, as the self-moving principle of all motion ; in the Rep. (X. 609), 
on the fact, that the life of the soul is not destroyed by moral badness, which yet, as the 
natural evil and enemy of the soul, ought, if any thing could effect this, to effect its 
destruction ; in the Tim. (p. 41), on the goodness of God, who, notwithstanding that the 
nature of the soul, as a generated essence, subjects it to the possibility of destruction, can 
not will that what has been put together in so beautiful a manner should again be dis 
solved; in the Phaedo, finally (pp. 62-107), this doctrine is supported, partly by an 
argument drawn from the nature of the subjective activity of the philosopher, whose 
striving after knowledge involves the desire for incorporeal existence, i. e., the desire to 
die, and partly on a series of objective arguments. The first of these arguments is founded 
on the cosmological law of the transition of contraries into each other, according to which 
law, just as the living die, so the dead must return to life ; the second, on the nature of 
knowledge, as a species of reminiscence (cf. Meno, p. 80 seq., where the pre-existence of the 
soul is inferred from the nature of the act of mathematical and philosophical learning, 
whose only satisfactory explanation, it is argued, is found in the hypothesis of the soul s 
recollection of ideas which had been perceived by the intellect in a pre-terrestrial life) ; the 
third, on the relationship between the soul, as an invisible essence, and the ideas, as 
invisible, simple, and indestructible objects; the fourth argument, in reply to the objection 
(of Simmias), that the soul is perhaps only the resultante and, as it were, the harmony of the 


functions of the body, is based partly on the previously demonstrated pre-existence of the 
soul and partly on the qualification of the soul to rule the body, and on its nature as a sub 
stance, so that, says Plato, while one harmony can be more a harmony than another, one 
soul can not be more or less soul than any other, and the soul, if virtuous, may have har 
mony for its attribute : the fifth argument, finally, and the one which Plato himself deemed 
decisive, was in reply to the objection (of Cebes), that although the soul perhaps survived 
the body, it might yet be not absolutely indestructible, and was founded on the necessary 
participation of the soul in the idea of life, whence the inference that the soul can never bo 
lifeless, a dead soul would be a contradiction, and consequently immortality and imper- 
ishableness must be predicated of it. In this argument, it is assumed that that, whose 
nature is such that, so long as it exists, it neither is nor can be dead, can never cease to 
exist; this assumption is connected with the double sense in which afidvaroc is employed, 
a. in the sense, which results from the general tenor of the argument, viz. : not dead ; b. in 
the sense corresponding to ordinary usage: immortal. 

43. The highest good is, according to Plato, not pleasure, nor 
knowledge alone, but the greatest possible likeness to God, as the 
absolutely good. The virtue of the human soul is its fitness for its 
proper work. It includes various particular virtues, which form a 
system based on the classification of the faculties or parts of the 
human soul. The virtue of the cognitive part of the soul is the 
knowledge of the good, or wisdom (oo<f>ia) that of the courageous 
part is valor (avdpta), which consists in preserving correct and legiti 
mate ideas of what is to be feared and what is not to be feared ; the 
virtue of the appetitive part is temperance (moderation or self-control, 
self-direction, oGHppoavvrj^ which consists in the agreement of the 
better and worse parts of the soul, as to which should rule ; justice, 
finally (SiKaioavvrf^ is the universal virtue, and consists in the fulfill 
ment by each part of its peculiar function. Piety (doLOTrjg) is justice 
with reference to the gods. One of the ramifications of wisdom is 
philosophical love, or the joint striving of two souls for the attain 
ment of philosophical knowledge. Yirtue should be desired, not 
from motives of reward and punishment, but because it is in itself 
the health and beauty of the soul. To do injustice is worse than to 
suffer injustice. 

The state is the individual on a large scale. The highest mis 
sion of the state is the training of the citizens to virtue. In the ideal 
state each of the three principal functions and corresponding virtues 
of the soul is represented by a particular class of citizens. These are, 
1) the rulers, whose virtue is wisdom ; 2) the guardians or warriors, 
whose virtue is valor ; and 3) .the manual laborers and tradesmen, 
whose virtue is self-restraint and willing obedience. The rulers and 


warriors are to labor only for the realization of the true and the 
good ; all individual interests whatsoever are forbidden them, and they 
are all required to form in the strictest sense one family, without mar 
riage and without private property. The condition of the realization 
of the ideal state is that philosophers should at some time become 
rulers, or that rulers should philosophize rightly. The Laws contains 
a later draught by Plato of the second-best form of the state, which, 
he says, it would be more easy to realize. In this scheme, the theory 
of ideas disappears from the programme for the education of the 
rulers, and the chief stress is laid on their mathematical schooling ; 
the kind of religious worship here prescribed was also less alien to 
the general beliefs of the Hellenic people, and marriage and private 
property were allowed as a concession to individual interests. 

In the Platonic state, that Art alone finds a place which consists 
in the imitation of the good. In this category are included philo 
sophical dramas, such as Plato s own dialogues, the narration of 
myths (expurgated and ethically applied), and, in particular, reli 
gious lyrics (containing the praises of gods and also of noble men). 
All art which is devoted to the imitation of the phenomenal world, 
in which good and bad are commingled, is excluded. Art and the 
Beautiful hold their place in Plato s system only in subordination to 
the good. The Beautiful, whose essence lies, according to Plato, in 
the fitness and symmetry resulting from the relation of the concept 
to the plurality of phenomena, is nevertheless for him, though not the 
highest of ideas, yet that one which imparts to its sensible copies the 
highest brilliancy, since it, most of all ideas, shines through its copies. 

The education of youth was regulated by Plato in accordance with 
the principle of a gradual advance to the cognition of the ideas and 
to the corresponding practical activity in the state, so that only the 
best-qualified persons could rise to the highest stations, while the rest 
were destined to exercise inferior practical functions. The cognition 
of the idea of the good was reserved as a final topic of instruction 
for the most mature. 

The following axithors, in addition to the authors cited above, ad 41, treat of Plato a Ethics and 
Politics in their relation to the national character of the Greeks and to Christianity : Grotefend (Commentatio 
in qua doctrina Platonis ethica cum, Christiana comparatur ita, itt utriusque turn consensus, turn dit- 
erimen easponatur, Gott. 1821), I. Ogienski (Pericles et Plato, Breslaii, 1838), Jul. Guil. Ludw. Mehlia 
(Comparatio Plat, doctrinae de rep. cum Christiana de regno divino docfrina, Gott. 1845), K. F. Her 
mann (Die hist. Elemente des Platon. Staatsideals, Gott. 1849, pp. 132-159), P. F. Stuhr ( Vom Staatsleben 
nach Platon., Arist. und christlichen Grundsatzen, Part I., Berlin, 1850), Ed. Kretzschmar (Der Eampf 
des Plato urn die relig. und sittlichen Principien des Stuatslebens, Leipsic, 1852), W. Wehrenpfennig 
(Die Verschiedenheit der ethiscfien Principien lei den Jfellenen, Berlin, 1856, p. 40 seq.), W. Wiegand 


(Einleitung in Plato s Gottesstaat fur Freunde der Akademie, G.-Pr., Worms, 1858), Ed. Zellor (Der 
Platon. Staat in seiner Eedentung fur die Folgezeit, in Von Sybel s Hist. Zeitschr., Vol. I., 1859, No. 1, 
pp. 108-12C, and in Zeller s Vortr. u. Abh. gesch. Inhalts, Leipsic, 1865, pp. 62-81), Hildenbrand (Gesch. u. 
System der Rechts und Staatsphilosophie, Leipsic, 1860, I. 151 seq., 156 Beq., 166 6eq.), S. Lommatzsch 
(Quomodo PL et Arist. relig. ac reip. principia conjunxerint, Diss. Inaug., Berlin, 1S63), Eman. 
Grundey (De Plat, principiis ethicis, Diss. Inaug., Berlin, 1865); an essay on the leading characteristics 
of Plato s theory of the state is contained in Glaser s Jahrb.filr Gesellschafts- und Staatswissenschaften, 
Vol. VI., No. 4, 1866, pp. 309-318; cf. also Bertrand Eobidou, La Rep. de Platon, comparee aux idees et 
aux etats modernes, Paris, 1869. 

On Plato s doctrine of the highest good, cf. Ad. Trendelenburg (De PI. Philebi convilio, Berlin, 1837), 
Theod. Wehrmann (Plat, de summo bono doctrina, Berlin, 1813), Wenkel (Pi. Lehre torn h. G. und der 
Gliickseligkeit, G.-Pr. , Sondershausen, 1857), G. Loewe (De bonorum apud Platonem gradibus, Diss. 
Ealensis, Berlin, 1861), Franz Susemihl ( Ueber die Giitertafel im Philebus, in the Philology*, Suppl., 
Vol. II., Gottingen, 1863, pp. 97-132), Kud. Hirzel (De bonis in fine Philebi enumerates, Diss. Berolinen- 
*is, Leipsic, 1868). 

On his doctrine of pleasure, cf. O. Kalmus (Halberstadt, 1857), H. Anton (in Fichte s Zeitschr. f. 
Philos., new series, Vol. 33, Halle, 1858, pp. 65-81 and 213-238), W. E. Krnnichfeld (Plutoni* et Arist. de 
tlSovrj sententiae quomodo turn con^entiant, turn dissentiant, Berlin, 1859), W. Kiister (in the Progr. of 
the Sophien-gymnasium at Berlin, 1868). 

On his doctrine of justice: W. Ogienski ( Welches ist der Sinn des PlatoniscJien TO. tavrov Trparreivf 
Progr., Trzemeszno, 1845), W. Jahns (Inaug. Diss., Breslau, 1850), and J. F. Amen (PI. dejmtitiae doctrina, 
G.-Pr., Berlin, 1854). 

On his doctrine of (nxfrpocrvvi) : K. Hoffmeister (Essen, 1827) ; and on his doctrine in regard to falsehood: 
Th. Kelch (Dixqu. in PL de mendacio doctr. [De Rep., II. III.], Elbing, 1820). 

On Plato s theory of the state, cf. Crl. Morgenstern (De Plat. rep. commentationes tres, Halle [Bruns 
wick], 1794), C. L. Porschke (De Plat, poetas e rep. bene const, esse esepell., Konigsb. 1803), G. de Geer 
(Pol. Plat, princip., Diss., Utrecht, 1810), Friedr. Koppen (Politik nach PL Grund&dtzen, Leipsic, 1818, 
Rechtslehre nach PL Grds., ibid. 1819). Havestadt (De eth. et pol. disciplinae in PL dial, cohaerentia, 
Inauff.-Dissert., Munster, 1845), Voigtlr.nd (Die eth, Tendenzen des PL Staats, G.-Pr., Schleusingen, 
1853). On Plato s politics as compared with Aristotle s, see Gust. Pinzger (De i ls, quae Ar. in PL Politia 
repr., Leipsic, 1S22), and others (see below, ad 50) ; the mutual relation of Plato s Politics and Ethics 
is also discussed in various compositions relating to the Platonic dialogue De RepubL, particularly in the 
Introductions to that dialogue by Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, in Susemihl s work, Vol. II., 
p. 58 seq., and in monographs by A. G. Gernhard (in the Act. soc. Graecae, I., Leipsic, 1836; Pr., 
Weimar, 1837; ibid. 1829, 1840), E. Manicus (G.-Pr., Schlesw. 1854), G. F. Eettig (Prolegom. ad Plat, 
remp., Berne, 1845. and Ueber Steinharfs, SusemihFs und Stallbaum s Einl. z. PL Staat, in the Rhein. 
Mm., new series, XVI. 1861, pp. 161-197), A. O. Wigand (Das eu-eite Such des Platon. Gottesstaates, 
oder Plato^s eigene Ansichl von dem Wesen der Gerechtigkeit, Worms, 1868); also in writings relative 
to the Politicus, especially the Introductions of the various editors, and in Deuschle s Beitrdge zur 
Erkl. des Pol. (G.-Pr.~), Magdeb. 1857; cf. A. H. Eaabe, De poetica PL pJiilos. natura, praesertim in 
amoris expositione conspicua, Eotterdam, 1866. Of the community of goods in Plato s theory, E. v. 
Voorthuysen has treated (Utrecht, 1850) ; cf. Thonissen (Le Socialisme. t. I., Paris, 1852, p. 41 seq.). On the 
principles of criminal law, according to Plato, see Platner, in the Zeitschr. fur Alterthumswiss., 1S44, 
Nos. 85 and 86. 

On Plato s aesthetics, cf. Ed. Muller ( Ueber das Nachahmende in der Kunst nach Plato, Eatibor, 
1831 ; Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten, Breslau, 1834, pp. 27-129), Arnold Euge (Die Plat. 
Aesthetik, Halle, 1832), Wilh. Abeken (De /uuM^o-eeos apud Platonem et Arist. notione, Gott. 1836), Bassow 
( Ueber die Beurtheilunff des Ilomerischen Epos bei Plato und bei Aristoteles, Stettin, 1850), Ch. L6vfeque 
(Platon, fondateur de Testhetique, Paris, 1857), K. Justi (Die dsthet. Elemente in der Platonischen 
Philos., Marburg, 1860), Th. Strater (Studien sur Geschichte der Aesthetik, Heft 1: Die Idee des Sclibnen 
bei Plato, Bonn, 1861 ; cf. Boumann s review of this work in Michelet s Journal Der Gedanke. Vol. VI., 
Berlin, 1865, pp. 14-25), Jos. Eeber (PL und die Poesie, Jnang.-Diss., Munich, 1864), Max Eemy (PI. 
doct. de arUbus liberal., Halle, 1864), A. H. Eaabe (De poetica Plat, philos. natura, in amoris eypositione 
conspicua, Eotterdam, 1866), C. von Jan (Die Tonarten bei PL, in the N. Jahrb.f. Ph. und Pad., 95, 1867, 
pp. 615-826). 

On Plato s doctrine of education, cf. Anne den Tex (De vi musices ad eacol. horn,, e sent. Plat., Utr. 
1816), G. A. Blnme (De Platonis liberorum eduo. disciplina, Halle, 1818), Ch. Schneider (De gymnastica 
in civ. Plat^ Breslau, 1817), Ad. Bartholom. Kayssler (Fragment* aus Plato s und Goethe s Padagogik, 
Breslau, 1821), C. Stoy (De auctoritate in rebus paedag. a Plat. civ. principibus tributa, Jen. 18S2), 
Alexander Kapp (Platon"s Erzichungslehre, Minden, 1888), Wiese (In optima Plat, civitate quali it 


puttrorum inttituUo, Prenzlav. 1834), E. Snethlage (Das etJiische Princip. der Plat. Erziehung, Berlin, 
1834), W. Baumgarten-Crusius (Dinciplina juvenilia Plat, cum nostra comp., Meissen, 1836), K. H. Lach- 
mann (Plat. Vorst. von Rechtund Erziehung, Hirschberg, 1849), Arens (Die relig. Erziehung des Plat. 
Staatsburgerff, Oldenburg, 1853), Bomback (Entwickelung der Plat. Erziehungslehre, Eottweil, 1854), Vol- 
quardsen (Plat. Idee des person!. Geistes und seine Lehren ilber Erziehung, etc., Berlin, 1860), Baunard 
(Quid apud Graecos de institutions puerorum senserit Plato. Orleans, 1860), Hahn (Die pddagog. 
Mythen Plato s, Parchim, 1860), L. Wittmann (Erziehung und Unterricht bei Plato, Giessen, 1S68), Cuers 
(PI. u. Arist. Ansichten uber den pddagog. Bildungsgehalt der Kiinste, in the 2f. Jahrb. /. Philol. und 
Pddag., Vol. 98, 1868, pp. 521-553). 

The possession of the Good, according to Plato, is happiness (Sympos., 240 e : K.TIJCU 
yap ayaOtiv oi v6aifj.oveg ev6aifiov^. Sympos., p. 202 e : evdaipovas rovq rayaSa KOI 
neHTTjuevovt;. Cf. Gorg., p. 508 b. : 6iK.aiorsvvrj<; Kal Gaxbpoavvrjs KTr/ast v6ai[j.ovE$ oi 
Kanias 6e oi adfaot aB^ioi). Happiness depends on culture and justice or on the possession of 
moral beauty and goodness (Gorg., p. 470 d). Rep., IV. p. 420 b: "Our object in found 
ing the state is, that not a class, but that all may be made as happy as possible." The 
ethical end of man is described by Plato as resemblance to God, the absolutely good, in 
Rep., X. 613 a; Theaet., 176. Through his psychological doctrine of the different faculties 
or parts of the soul, Plato was enabled to do what for other disciples of Socrates, such 
as Euclid and Antisthenes, was, as it seems, impossible, viz. : to demonstrate a plurality 
of virtues as comprehended within the one general conception of virtue. The parallel 
between virtue in the state and in the individual is introduced by Plato with the remark, 
that in the former we read, as it were, in larger characters the same writing, which in 
the latter is written in smaller ones (Rep., II. p. 368). 

The Platonic theory of the state borrows many of its special provisions from the Hel 
lenic, and especially from the Doric legislation. But its essential tendency is not (as K. F. 
Hermann and others affirm) toward the restoration and intensification of the Old- Hellenic 
principle of the unreflecting subordination of the individual to the whole. It is rather an 
advance upon all Hellenic forms whatever and an anticipation of institutions which were 
afterward approximately realized, notably in the Hierarchy of the Middle Ages.* 

* As Plato s theory of ideas points beyond the sensible phenomenon and sees the truly real only in 
absolutely existent essences, exalted above time and space and figured as dwelling beyond the heavens, so 
Plato s ethico-political ideal points beyond the terrestrial ends of political society (on which, however, the 
genesis of the state originally depends, Rep., II. p. 369 seq.) to the cognition and realization of a transcend 
ent ideal good. The sensible may, indeed, participate in the ideal : the latter may shine through the former 
and lend It proportion and beauty (Phaedr., Sympos.) ; but the ultimate and supreme duty of man is, 
nevertheless, to escape from the sensible world to the ideal (Theaet., p. 176 a: ireipivOat. xPV evOev&tv 
eicclo-t <euyeu/ OTL TaxtoTa, by which is attained 6/xoiwo-is 0eo) Kara TO Swarov). Thus, while the class of 
philosophers in the state are not, indeed, to pass their lives in pure contemplation alone, and while they are 
not to have their own ideal good only in view, but are to have a care for their fellow-citizens who exercise 
the inferior functions, their supreme destination and at the same time their fullest satisfaction are to be 
found in contemplation itself, culminating in cognition of the idea of the good (Rep., VII. p. 519). Plato 
seeks to assure the supremacy of the idea in the state, not by requiring the consciousness of all to be filled 
and permeated by it, and so developing a universal community of mind and spirit, but by providing a par 
ticular class, who are to live for it, and to whom the other classes owe unconditional obedience, the members 
of that class being alienated from sensible and individual interests by the extermination of these interests, so 
far as possible. Precisely the same motives gave rise, at a later epoch, to the Mediaeval Hierarchy. If it be 
assumed that Platonism was among the causes which led to the development of that hierarchy, its influence 
must be conceived as mainly indirect and exerted through the doctrines of Philo, the Neo-Platonists, and 
the Church Fathers, all of whom had been especially attracted and influenced by the Platonic doctrine of 
the ultra-phenomenal world. But an equally influential cause was the example of the Jewish hierarchy. 
Whatever judgment may be passed on the question of historic dependence, and setting aside many specific 
differences, the general character of the Platonic state and that of the Christian Hierarchy of the Middle 
Ages are essentially the same. In the former the philosophers occupy nearly the same position with refer 
ence to the other classes which in the latter the priests occupied with reference to the laity. In ordering 


In Plato s ideal state it was impossible that ancient Greek art, especially the Homeric 
poetry, whicn ran jowuter to Plato s rigid conception of moral dignity in the control of the 
passions, should find a place. If the phenomenal is an imitation of the ideal, that art, 
which in turn imitates the phenomenal, can only be of inferior worth. Only that art 
which imitates the good can be recognized as fully legitimate. Beauty is the shining of 
the ideal through the sensible. The Idea, which is the One as opposed to the plurality of 
phenomena, manifests itself in the phenomenal in the relations of proportion. The deri 
vation of beauty from the ideal is emphasized by Plato in the Phaedrus, Symposion, and 
Republic, while its formal side is especially considered in dialogues of later composition 
( Timaeus and PMebus ; Hippias Major is probably spurious). 

The various forms of government are ranked in the Republic as follows : The Ideal 
State (government of the philosophically cultivated), Timocracy (ascendency of the 0v- 
(Mei6e<; over the Juryumicfo, of military prowess over culture), Oligarchy (participation ir 
the government conditioned on the amount of one s possessions, which minister to firiOvpia^ 
Democracy (freedom, abolition of distinctions of worth), Tyranny (complete perversion of 
justice through the supremacy of the bad). In the Politicus, six forms are enumerated, in 
the following order : Monarchy (legal government of one individual), Aristocracy (legal 
government of the rich), Legal Democracy, Illegal Democracy, Oligarchy (lawless govern 
ment of the rich), Tyranny (lawless government of one person). The character of the 
citizens coresponds naturally with the character of the government. To take part in the 
government of bad states is impossible for the philosopher, because it would degrade him. 
So long as such states continue to exist, he can only withdraw himself from public life, 
and lead, in the company of a few friends, a life of contemplation (Theaet, p. 173 seq. ; 
compare what is said, perhaps in opposition to Isocrates, in Rep., VI. p. 487 seq., respect 
ing the reason why the ablest philosophers could be of no service to the states as then 
actually constituted). 

For the education of the children of the rulers and warriors of the ideal state, Plato 
provides in the Rep. as follows: Prom the 1st to the 2d year, care of the body; from 3 to 
6, narration of myths; from 7 to 10, gymnastics; from 10 to 13, reading and writing; from 
14 to 16, poetry and music; from 16 to 18, mathematical sciences; from 18 to 20, military 
exercises. Then follows a first sifting. Persons possessing an inferior capacity for 
science, but capable of bravery, remain simply warriors ; the rest go on, until the age of 
30, learning the sciences in a more exact and universal form than was possible in their 
earlier, youthful years. In this period, topics previously learned separately are appre 
hended in their mutual relations as parts of one whole ; this at the same time furnishes 
the test of the talent for dialectic, for the dialectician must be able to comprehend many 
things in one view (6 yap ^WOTTTLKO^ dm/U/m/cof GTLV). Then comes a second sifting. 
The less promising are assigned to practical public offices. The rest pursue, from the age 
of 30 to 35, the study of dialectic, and then assume and hold positions of authority until 
the 50th year. After this they attain finally to the highest degree in philosophy, the con 
templation of the idea of the good ; at the same time they are received into the number of 
rulers and fill in turn the highest offices of the state, being charged with the superin 
tendence of the entire government. Most of the time in this last period of their lives 
they are permitted to devote to philosophical contemplation. 

the strict subordination of the individual to the whole, the Platonic state agreed no less with the Grecian 
state in its early historic form than with the Church of the Middle Ages. But in the kind and the sense of 
the subordination thus required it was more akin to the latter. For the subordination required by the 
Platonic state is by no means unreflecting, bounded by mere custom and subserving simply the power and 
greatness of the state. It rests on the authority of a finished system of doctrines, and its tendency is, in 
the highest degree, toward the promotion of purely spiritual ends. 


44. It is the custom of historians to distinguish, among the pro 
fessed disciples of Plato, three, or, by a more circumstantial division, 
five consecutive tendencies or schools. These are the Old, Middle, 
and New Academies : the Old Academy including the first school, the 
Middle Academy including the second and third schools, and the 
New Academy, the fourth and fifth. To the first Academy belong : 
Speusippus, Plato s sister s son and the successor of Plato as Scho- 
larch (which office he held from 347 to 339), who pantheistically 
represents the Best or Divine as first indeed in rank, but as chrono 
logically the last product of development, and who finds the principle 
of ethics in the happiness of a life conformed to nature ; Xenocrates 
of Chalcedon, who succeeded Speusippus in the directorship of the 
Academy (339-314), and who identifies ideas with numbers, and 
founds on the doctrine of numbers a mystical theology ; Heraclides 
of Pontus, who distinguished himself especially in astronomy, teach 
ing the daily rotation of the earth on its axis from West to East and 
the immobility of the firmament of the fixed stars ; Philip the Opun- 
tian, author of the Epinomi8 (which is a continuation of the Laws of 
Plato) ; Hermodoms, who was likewise one of Plato s immediate dis 
ciples, and who contributed to the spread of Plato s doctrines, espe 
cially his unwritten ones ; and Polemo, Grantor, and Crates, who 
redirect attention chiefly to ethical inquiries. In the Middle Academy 
a skeptical tendency becomes more and more prominent. The heads 
of this Academy were Arcesilas (315-241 B. c.), the founder of what 
is called the second Academy, and Carneades (214-129), the founder 
of the third Academic school. The New Academy returned to Dog 
matism. It commenced with Philo of Larissa, founder of the fourth 
school, who lived at the time of the first Mithridatic war. His pupil, 
Antiochus of Ascalon, founded a fifth school by combining the doc 
trines of Plato with certain Aristotelian and more particularly with 
certain Stoic theses, thus preparing the way for the transition to Neo- 

On the Old Academy, cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., 2d ed., II. a, pp. 641-698. On Speusippus, Ravaisson, 
Speiutipp. Plac., Paris, 1838; M. A. Fischer, De Sp. vita, East. 1845; Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 247-258. 
On Xenocrates: Wynpersse, Diatribe de Xenocrate Chalcedonio, Leyden, 1822; Krische, Forschungen, I. 
pp. 311-524. On Heraclides : Roulez, De Vit. et Script Heraclidis Pontici, Louvain,lS28; E. Deswert, De. 
Heraclide Pont., ibid. 1880; Franz Schmidt, De Ueraclidae Pont, et Dicaearchi Messenii dialogis d^ptr- 
ditis (Diss. 7nau0.),Breslau,1867 ; cf. Miiller, Fragm. Hist. Gr., II. p. 197 seq. ; Krische, Forschungen, 1. pp. 
324-336. On Endoxus : L. Ideler, Ueber Eudaxw, in the Abh. der erl. Akad d. Wiss., 1828, 1830 ; Aug. 
Boeckb, Ueber die vierjdhrigen Sonnenkreise der Alten, vorzuglich den Eudoxischen, Berlin, 18G3; cf., 
George Cornewall Lewis, Historical Survey of the Ancient Astronomy, ch. III., sect. 8, p. 146 seq. On 
Eudoxus of Cnidus, the geographer (about 255 B. c.), who must be distinguished from Eudoxus the philobo- 


pher, and who was the author of a yis ireptofios, as also on Geminus the astronomer (about 187 B. c.), cf. H. 
Brandts, in the Jahrb. f. Ph., LXIV. 1862, p. 268 seq., and in the Jahrb. dee Vereins fur Erdkimde m 
Leipzig, Leips. 1866. On Hermodorus, cf. Ed. Zeller, De Hermodoro Ephesio et Hermodoro Platonis di- 
cipulo, Marb. 1859. On Grantor: F. Schneider, De Crantoris Solennis philosophi Academicorum philo- 
iophiae addicH libro, qm wept TreVflovs inscribitor commentatio, in the Zeituchr.fur die Alterttiurnvwits, 
1836, Nos. 104, 105; M. Herm. Ed. Meier, Ueber die Schrift de Krantornepi TreVflovs, Halle, 1840; Frid. 
Kayser, De Grantor e Academico diss., Heidelb., 1841. On the later Academics: Fr. Dor. Gerlach, Com 
mentatio exlribens Academicorum jwtiiorum, imprimis Arcesilae atque Cameadis de probabilitafo 
disputationes, Gott. 1815; I. Kud. Thorbecke, In dogmaticis oppugnandis numquid inter academicos et 
tcepticos interfuerit, Zwollae Batav., 1820; Kich. Brodersen, De Arcesilao philosopho academico, Altona, 
1821; Aug. Geffers, De Arcesila (G.-Pr.). Gott. 1841 ; Id., De Arcesilae successor ibus, ibid. 1845; cf. Zeller, 
Ph. d. Gr., 2d ed., III. a, p. 448 seq. ; Eoulez, De Carneade, annal. Gandav., 1824-25 : C. J. Grysar, Die 
Academiker Philo itnd AnUochus, Cologne, 1849 ; C. F. Hermann, Dixputatio de Philone Larrissaeo, 
Gott. 1851 ; Disput. altera, ibid. 1855; Krische, in the Gott. Stud., II. 1845, pp. 126-200; Zeller, Ph. d. 
Or., 2d ed., III. a, p. 522; David d Allemand, De Antiocho Ascalonita, Paris, 1856; cf. Krische, Gott. Stud., 
II. 160-1 TO ; Zeller, PA. d. Gr., 2d ed., III. a, pp. 530-540. 

That Speusippus was the immediate successor of Plato in the leadership of the Acad 
emy is testified by Diog. L., IV. 1. Aristotle not unfrequently makes mention of his 
opinions, especially in the Metaph., but often without naming him ; he expressly ascribes to 
him, with the Pythagoreans, a doctrine of pantheistic character (Metaph., XII. 7 : i 7ro^a/z- 
fidvovaiv . . . ol Tlvdayopeioi /cat ^Trevafmro^, TO Ka?^tc~ov /cat apiarov pr] kv apxy elvai, 6ca TO 
/cat T&V fyvT<Jv /cat TUV u(*)V rdf ap^df atria fiev elvai, TO de Kalibv Kal T&eiov kv roZf K TOVTUV). 
According to Stob., Ed., I. p. 58, he rejected the (Platonic) identification of the one (ev), the 
good (ayaQov), and the reason (vot>f). He assumed (like Pseudo-Philolaus, who perhaps 
followed his example, but who, however, illogically joined the doctrine of this assumption 
with other heterogeneous doctrines) a rising gradation of existences, positing the abstract 
as the earliest and most elementary, and the more concrete as later and higher. Aristotle 
says (Met., VII. 2) that Speusippus, commencing with the " One " (v), assumed a greater 
number of classes of essences than Plato, and that for each class, namely, for numbers, 
the geometrical figures, and the soul, he posited different principles. Speusippus seems to 
have denied the existence of Ideas (whereas Xenocrates identified them with mathematical 
objects). The soul was defined by him (Stob., Ed. Phys., I. 1 ; Pint., De Anim. Procr., 22) as 
extension shaped harmoniously by number, hence, as in some sense, a higher unity of the 
arithmetical and the geometrical. According to Cic. (Nat. D., I. 1 3) he assumed a vis ani- 
tnalis, qua omnia regantur. His ethical principle is thus expressed by Clem. Alex. (Strom., 
II. 418 d) : liTTEvannrog TTJV evtiai/uoviav fyrjolv k!-iv elvai re^emv ev Tolg KOTO (fociv f%ov(rcv t 
f/ e$iv ayaftuev. 

Xenocrates of Chalcedon (396-314 B. c.) distinguished (according to Sext. Empir., Adv. 
Math., VII. 147) three classes of essences: the sensible, the intelligible, and the inter 
mediate, the latter being the objects of opinion (66% a) ; the intelligible lay beyond the 
heavens (c/crof ovpavov), the sensible within the heavens (EVTOS ovpavov], while the dot-acTov, 
or matter of opinion, was identical with the heavens themselves, since these could be both 
perceived and scientifically contemplated. (To him are to be referred the words in Arist., 
Met., VII. 2 : ivtot <$ TO, (itv eldrj Kal TOV$ api&/uov<; rrjv amrfv i^eiv <paal tyvaiv, TO, 6e aAAa 
kxofitva^ "ypa/n/na^ /cat 7Ti7T(5a, /*XP l ^pof TT/V TOV ovpavov ovaiav /cat rd alrf&rjTa). Out of 
the "One" and the "Indefinite Duad" he constructed all existences (Theophrast., Met., 3, 
p. 312). He defined the soul as self-moving number, apid/uov avTov v<j> eavTov KIVOVHEVOV 
(Plut., De An. Procr., 1, cf, Arist., De An., I. 2, 4 ; Analyt. Post., II. 4). In the symbolical 
use of the names of the gods, Xenocrates indulged in an almost childish play. Happiness 
wus described by him (according to Clem.. Strom., II. p. 419 a) as resulting from our pos 
session of the virtue proper to us (oi/ct-taf dper^f) and of power devoted to its service. 


Among the earliest disciples of Plato belongs Eudoxus of Cnidus, who was subse 
quently distinguished as a mathematician and astronomer (and lived about 406353 B. c.). 
He heard Plato perhaps about 383, and went to Egypt probably about 378 (not first in 362) 
with a letter of recommendation from Agesilaus to King Nektanebus. At Heliopolis he 
studied astronomy ; at Tarentum, under Archytas, geometry ; and in Sicily, under Philistion, 
medicine (as Diog. L., VIII. 86, reports, following the Hivanes of Callimachus). He after 
ward taught in Cyzicus and Athens, and finally returned to Cnidus, his native city, where 
he erected an astronomical observatory. At Athens Menaechmus and Helicon were 
among his pupils in geometry ; Helicon accompanied Plato in his third voyage to Sicily 
(361 B. c. ; see Pseudo-Plat., Ep., XIIL p. 360 d; Plutarch, Dion., ch. 19). In ethics 
Eudoxus maintained the Hedonic doctrine (Arist., Eth. N., X. 2, 3). 

Heraclides of Heraclea on the Pontus, to whom (according to Suidas) Plato intrusted 
the direction of the Academy during his last journey to Sicily, occupied himself, among 
other things, with the question thus propounded (according to Simplic., In Arist. De Coeto, 
f. 119) by Plato (in a form distinguished for its logical merits) : rivuv vTroredeiativ O/J.O.AUV 
nai rerayfj-svuv Kivfjaeuv 6tacu6ri ra Trepl rag Ktvr/aEis riJv Tr^avcj/nsvuv fyaivofizva, or " what 
uniform and regulated motions can be assumed (to explain the phenomena of the universe), 
whose consequences will not be in contradiction with the phenomena." The form of this 
question gives evidence of a consciousness already very highly developed, of the correct 
method of investigation, and involves only the error of supposing that mathematical 
regularity as such necessarily belongs to the actual movements of nature, so that the 
research for real forces, from whose activity these motions arise, seemed unnecessary. 
Eudoxus is said to have proposed several hypotheses in reply to the above Platonic ques 
tion, but decided in favor of the immobility of the earth. Heraclides, on the contrary (with 
Ecphantus the Pythagorean, whom he also followed in his doctrine of atoms), decided for 
the theory of the revolution of the earth on its axis (Plut., Plac. Philos., III. 13). Hera 
clides regarded the world as infinite in extent (Stob., Ed., I. 440). 

Hermodorus was an immediate pupil of Plato, and we are indebted to him for a number 
of notices respecting the life and doctrines of his master (see above, 39, p. 100, and 
41). From his work on Plato, Dercyllides (see below, 65) borrowed data relative to 
the Platonic Stoicheiology. Perhaps it was these "unwritten doctrines " which constituted 
the Xoyof, with which Hermodorus traded in Sicily, whence the saying to which Cicero 
alludes (Ad Att, XIIL 21 : "hoyotaiv Ep/uodupoe epiropeverai). 

Philip the Opuntian, the mathematician and astronomer (cf. Boeckh, Sonnenkreise, p. 
34 seq.), is the reputed author of the Epinomis. The revision and publication of the manu 
script of the Leges, which was left by Plato unfinished, are also ascribed to him (Diog. L., 
III. 37, and Suidas sub voce ^Aomxpof). 

Polemo, who followed Xenocrates as head of the school (314-270). gave his atten 
tion mainly to ethics. He demanded (according to Diog. L., IV. 18) that men should 
exercise themselves more in right acting than in dialectic. Cicero gives (Acad. Pr., II. 43) 
the following as his ethical principle : honeste vivere, fruentem rebiis -iis, quas primas homini 
natura conciliet. To his influence on Zeno, Cicero bears witness, De Fin., IV. 16, 45. 

Grantor is termed by Proclus (Ad Tim., p. 24) the earliest expounder of Platonic 
writings. As the living tradition of Plato s doctrines died out, his disciples began 
more and more to consult his written works. Grantor s work on Sorrow (irepl Trevdov^) 
is praised by Cicero (Tusc., I. 48, 115; cf. III. 6, 12). He assigns (in a fragment, ap. 
Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., XL 51-58) the first place among good things to virtue, the 
second to health, the third to pleasure, and the fourth to riches. He combats the Stoic 
requirement that the natural feelings should be suppressed (in accord with Plat., Eep. f 


X. 603 e). Grantor died before Polemo (Diog. Laer., IV. 27). Crates directed the school 
after Polemo. 

The successor of Crates was Arcesilas or Arcesilaus, who was born, about 315 B. c., at 
Pitane in JSolia, and had at first attended upon the instructions of Theophraetus, but after 
ward became a pupil of Crantor, Polemo, and Crates. Of his habit of abstaining (fTro^r/) 
from judgment and of disputing on both sides, Cicero tells us (De Orat., III. 18 : quern ferunt 
primum instituisse, non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id quod quisque se sentire dixisset, 
disputare; cf. Diog. L., IV. 28: Trpwrof 6e etf f/carepov iirexupvow). He is said (Cic., 
Acad. Post., I. 12) to have taught that we can know nothing, not even the fact of our 
inability to know. But this (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 234 seq., and others) 
was only for the discipline and testing of his pupils, to the best-endowed of whom he was 
accustomed afterward to communicate the Platonic doctrines. Of this explanation (ac 
cepted by Geffers, disputed by Zeller) we may admit that, in view of the nature of the 
case, it is credible, in so far as a head of the Academy could hardly break at once and 
completely with the theory of ideas and the doctrines founded on it ; only this explanation 
does not necessarily imply an unconditional assent to that theory and to those doctrines. 
According to Cic., Acad. Post., I. 12, Arcesilas combated unceasingly the Stoic Zeno. He 
contested especially (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 233 seq., Adv. Math., VII. 
153 seq.) the /cardA^f and cvyKaraBecig of the Stoics (see below, 53), yet recognized the 
attainability of the probable (TO evAoyov), and found in the latter the norm for practical 
conduct. Aristo, the Stoic, parodying Iliad, VI. 181, said (according to Diog. L., IV. 33, 
and Sext. Emp., Pyrrhon. Hypotypos., I. 232) that Arcesilas was: 

Adrwv, OTTidev Hvppuv, fiiac 

or, " Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, arrd Diodorus in the middle." 

Arcesilas was followed in the leadership of the school (241 B. c.) by Lacydes, Lacydes 
(in 215) by Telecles and Evander, the latter by Hegesinus, and he by Carneades. 

Carneades of Cyrene (214-129; he came as an embassador to Rome in the year 155 
B. c., together with Diogenes the Stoic and Critolaus the Peripatetic) went still farther in 
the direction of Skepticism. He disputed, in particular, the theses of Chrysippus the Stoic. 
Expanding the skeptical arguments of Arcesilas, he declared knowledge to be impossible, 
and the results of dogmatic philosophy to be uncertain. His pupil, Clitomachus (who fol 
lowed him in the presidency of the School, 129 B. c.), is related (Cic., Acad. Pr., II. ch. 45) 
to have said: "it had never become clear to him what the personal opinion of Carneades 
(in ethics) was." Cicero (De Orat., I. 11) calls Carneades, as an orator, hominem omnium 
in -dicendo, ut ferebant, acerrimum et copiosissimum. While at Rome he is said to have 
delivered on one day a discourse in praise of justice, and on the next to have demonstrated, 
on the contrary, that justice was incompatible with the actual circumstances in which men 
live, and in particular to have hazarded the observation, that if the Romans wished to 
practice justice in their political relations, they would be obliged to restore to the rightful 
owners all that they had taken away by force of arms, and then return to their huts 
(Laetaut., Inst., V. 14 seq.). To the doctrine of cognition his most important contribution 
was the theory of probability (z/uQaoic, iriQavorris). He distinguished three principal 
degrees of probability : a representation may be, namely, either 1) probable, when con 
sidered by itself alone ; or 2) probable and unimpeached, when compared with others ; 
or 3) probable, unimpeached, and in all respects confirmed (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., 
VII. 166), 

Philo of Larissa, a pupil of Clitomachus, came in the time of the first Mithridatio 
war to Rome, where Cicero heard him (Cic., Brut., 89). He appears to have given hii 


attention chiefly to Ethics, and, in treating the subject, to have inclined toward the 
method of the Stoics, although remaining in general their opponent. 

Antiochus of Ascalon, Philo s disciple, sought to show that the chief doctrines of the 
Stoics were to be found already in Plato (Sext. Emp., Pyrrh. Hyp., I. 235). He differed 
from the Stoics in rejecting the doctrine of the equality of all vices, and in holding that 
virtue alone, though producing a happy life, is not productive of the happiest of lives ; in 
other respects he agreed with them almost entirely (Cic., Acad. Pr., II. 43). 

45. Aristotle, born 384 B. c. (Olymp. 99.1) at Stagira (or Sta- 
geiros) in Thrace, and son of the physician Nicomachus, became in 
his eighteenth year (367) a pupil of Plato, and remained such for 
twenty years. After Plato s death (347) he repaired with Xenocrates 
to the court of Hermias, the ruler of Atarneus and Assos in Mysia. 
He remained there nearly three years, at the expiration of which 
time he went to Mitylene and afterward (343) to the court of Philip, 
king of Macedonia, where he lived more than seven years, until the 
death of that monarch. He was the most influential tutor of Alexan 
der from the thirteenth to the sixteenth years of the life of the latter 
(343-340). Soon after Alexander s accession to the throne, Aristotle 
founded his school in the Lyceum, over which he presided twelve 
years. After the death of Alexander, the anti-Macedonian party at 
Athens preferred an accusation against Aristotle, for which religion 
was called upon to furnish the pretext. To avoid persecution, Aris 
totle retired to Chalcis, where he soon afterward died, Olymp. 114.3 
(322 B. c.) in the sixty-third year of his age 

On the life of Aristotle, compare Dionys. Hal., Epist. ad Animaeum, I. 5; Diog. Laert., V. 1-85 ; 
Suidas (the work edited by Menagius agrees in its biographical part word for word with the first and 
larger part of the article by Suidas; but there is appended to it a list of the writings of Aristotle, which 
reproduces, with some omissions aud some additions, the catalogue of Diogenes Laertius ; cf. Curt 
Wachsmuth, De> Fontibus Suidae^io. Symbola philol. Bonnensium, I. p. 138); (Pseudo-) Hesychius; 
(Pseudo-) Ammonias, Vita Arist., with which the Vita e cod. Marciano, published by L. Eobbe, Leyden, 
1861, agrees almost throughout; an old Latin work on the life of Aristotle, ed. Nunnez, Barcelona, 1594, 
Leyden, 1621, 1631, Helmst 1666, is a third redaction of the same Vita. The Biographies of Aristotle 
by Aristoxenus, Aristocles, Timotheus, Hermippus, Apollodorus, and others are lost The chronology 
of Aristotle s life, as given by Diogenes L., is taken from the XP * 1 ** of Apollodorus; Dionys. Halic. 
appears to have drawn from the same source. J. G. Buhle, Vita Aristotelis per annos digesta, in the 
first volume of the Bipontine edition of the works of Aristotle. Ad. Stahr, Aristotelia (Part I., on the 
life of Aristotle of Stagira), Halle, 1830. George Henry Lewes, Aristotle, a Chapter from the History of 
Science, London, 1864 (translated into German by Victor Carus, Leipsic, 1865); the first chapter is on the 
life of Aristotle. Cf. Aug. Boeckh, Hermias von Atarneus, in the Abh. der Akad. der Wiss. hist.-phil. 
Cl., Berlin, 1858, pp. 133-157. 

On Aristotle s relations with Alexander, cf. K. Zell (Arist. ala Lehrer des Alexander, in: Ferien- 
tchriften, Freiburg, 1826), Frid. Guil. Car. Hegel (De Aristotele et Alexandra mayno, Berlin, 1837), 
P. C. Engelbrecht (Ueber die wichtigsten Lebensumstande des Aristoteles und sein Verhdltniss su 
Alexander dem Growen, besonders in Beziehung auf seine Naturstudien, Eisleben, 1845), Rob. Geier 
(Alexander und Aristoteles in ihren gegenseitigen Beziehungen, Halle, 1856), Egger (Aristote consider* 
comme preoepteur d Alexandre, Caen, 1862, ExtraUdes Mem. de FAcad. de Caen\ Mor. Carriere (Alexan 
der und Aristoteles, in Westermann s Monatsh., Febr., 1865). 


Not only Aristotle s father, but also his ancestors, were physicians ; they traced their 
pedigree to Machaon, the son of Asclepius. The father, Nicomachus, resided as physician- 
in-ordinary at the court of the Macedonian king Amyntas at Pella. From a comparison 
of the statements respecting the time of Aristotle s death, and his age at that time, as also 
respecting the age of Aristotle at the time of his coming to Athens and the date of his con 
nection with Plato, it appears probable that his birth occurred in the first half of the Olym- 
piadic year, hence in 384 B. c. Soon after the first arrival of Aristotle in Athens, Plato 
undertook his visit to Dio and the younger Dionysius, from which he returned three years 
later. Kespectiug the details of the early education of Aristotle we are not informed. It is 
easily supposable that he early, and while Plato was yet living, came to entertain opinions 
deviating from those of his master, and that he also gave open expression to them. It is 
possible that the anecdote is genuine which represents Plato as having said that Xenocratea 
needed the spur, but Aristotle the bridle. But it is improbable that Plato was himself 
the author of the comparison of Aristotle to a foal kicking at its mother ; for Plato was 
not a partisan of the principle of authority, and was certainly not offended by opposition 
in argumentation. Plato is said to have called the house of Aristotle the reader s house, 
and Aristotle himself, on account of his ready wit, the soul of the school. It is probable 
that Aristotle did not set up a school of his own during the life-tune of Plato. If he had 
done so, it is unlikely that he would have immediately afterward given it up. At that 
time he gave instruction, however, in rhetoric in opposition to Isocrates, and is reported 
to have said, in parody of a verse of Philoctetus : " It is disgraceful to be silent, and 
allow Isocrates to speak " (alaxpov ciu-nav, IconpaTj} J kav "keyeiv, Cic., De Orat., III. 35 
et al; Quinct, III. 1. 14). The stories of an offensive bearing of Aristotle toward Plato 
are refuted by the friendly relation which continued, after Plato s death, to subsist be 
tween Aristotle and Xenocrates, Plato s devoted disciple, when they went in company to 
Atarneus, at the invitation of Hermias. Some verses of an elegy by Aristotle on the 
early death of his friend Eudemus are also preserved (ap. Olympiodor. in Plat. Gwg., 
166), in which he calls Plato a man whom the bad might not even praise (av6p6s, bv oi>6 
alvelv rolai nano iai 0e/w?), and who first showed by word and deed, how a man may be at 
once good and happy (o>f ayadot; re KCU eiifiaifiuv a/za yiverai avr/p). After the unhappv 
end of Hermias, as a Persian captive, Aristotle married Pythias, the niece (or adopted 
daughter) of Hermias. He was subsequently married to Herpyllis. 

As the tutor of a prince, Aristotle was more fortunate than Plato ; it must be confessed, 
however, that in this capacity he also labored under more favorable circumstances than 
Plato. "Without losing himself in the pursuit of impracticable ideals, Aristotle seems to 
have fostered the high spirit of his ward. Alexander always retained sentiments of re 
spect and love for his teacher, although in his last years a certain coldness existed between 
the two (Plut, Alex., ch. 8). 

Aristotle returned to Athens not long before the entrance of Alexander upon his 
Asiatic campaign (in the second half of Olymp. 111.2, or the spring of 334), perhaps in the 
year 335 B. c. He taught in a gymnasium called the Lyceum (consecrated to Apollo 
AvKof), in whose avenues of shade-trees (Trep nraToi, whence the name Peripatetics) he 
walked, while communing with his more intimate disciples upon philosophical problems ; 
for more promiscuous audiences he lectured sitting (Diog. L., Y. 3). It is possible that 
he also again gave rhetorical instruction, as in the period of his first residence at Athens. 
Gellius says (N. A., XX. 5) : efwr^/cd dicebantur, quae ad rTietoricas meditationes facvlta- 
temque argutiarum civiliumque rerun, notitiam conducebant; aKpoariKa aui&m vocabantur, in 
quibus phihsophia remotwr subtiliorque agitdbatur. For his investigations in natural science 
facilities are said to have been tendered him by Philip and, more especially, by Alexander 


(Aelian., Far. Hist., IV. 19; Athen., IX. 398 e; Plin., Hist. Nat, VIII. 16, 44). The accu 
sation brought against Aristotle was founded on the impiety (aaefata) which his enemies 
pretended to discover in his hymn in eulogy of Hermias ; it was designated by them as a 
Peean, and its author was charged with having deified a man. But in fact this hymn 
(which is preserved in Diog. L., V. 7) is a hymn to virtue, and Hermias, who had suf 
fered a death full of torments at the hands of the Persians, was only lauded in it as a 
martyr to virtue. Quitting Athens (late in the summer of 323), Aristotle is related to 
have said, alluding to the fate of Socrates, that he would not give the Athenians the 
opportunity of sinning a second time against philosophy. His death was not caused (as 
some report) by a self-administered poison nor by his throwing himself into the Euripus 
(for which no cause existed), but by disease (Diog. L., Y. 10, following Apollodorus ; the 
disease appears to have been located principally in the stomach, according to Censorinus, 
De Die Nat., 14, 16). His death (according to Gell., JV. A., XVII. 21, 35) occurred shortly 
before that of Demosthenes, hence late in the summer of 322 B. c. 

Goethe ( Werke, Vol. 53, p. 85) characterizes Aristotle, in contrast with Plato (cf. above, 
39), in these words: " Aristotle stands to the world in the relation pre-eminently of a great 
architect. Here he is, and here he must work and create. He informs himself about the 
surface of the earth, but only so far as is necessary to find a foundation for his structure, 
and from the surface to the center all besides is to him indifferent. He draws an immense 
circle for the base of his building, collects materials from all sides, arranges them, piles 
them up in layers, and so rises in regular form, like a pyramid, toward the sky, while 
Plato seeks the heavens like an obelisk or, better, like a pointed flame." This charac 
terization of Aristotle is, indeed, not so happy as that of Plato, cited above. The empirical 
basis, the orderly rise, the sober, clear insight of the reason, and the healthy, practical 
instinct, are traits rightly expressed ; but when Goethe seems to assume that knowledge 
was of interest to Aristotle only so far as it was of practical significance, he runs counter 
to the doctrine and practice of this philosopher. Further, the methods both of Plato and 
of Aristotle include, together with the process of ascending to the universal, the reverse 
process of descending by division and deduction to the particular. 

46. The writings of Aristotle were composed partly in popular, 
partly in acroamatic form ; the latter in great part, and a very few 
fragments of the former, are all that have come down to us. Aris 
totle wrote most of the works of the latter class during his last resi 
dence in Athens. In point of subject-matter they are divided into 
logical, ethical, physical, and metaphysical works. His logical works 
have received the general title of Organon. The doctrine embodied 
in his metaphysical writings was called by Aristotle First Philosophy 
(i. e., the philosophy of first or ultimate principles). Of those works 
which relate to physics or natural science, the Physics (Ausculta- 
tiones Physicae), and also the Natural History of Animals (a com 
parative Physiology), are of especial philosophical importance. Still 
more important are his psychological works (three books on the Soul 
and several minor treatises). Among his ethical works the funda 
mental one is his Ethics , which treats of the duties of the individual, 


and which exists in a threefold form : Nicomachean Ethics (Aris* 
totle s work), Eudemean Ethics (written by Eudemus), and Mac/na 
Moralia (consisting of extracts from the two first). The Politica is 
a theory of the state on the basis of the Ethics. The Rhetoric and 
Poetic join on partly to the logical, and still more closely to the 
ethical works. 

The works of Aristotle were first printed in a Latin translation, together with the Commentaries of the 
Arabian philosopher, Averroes (about 1180), at Venice, 1489, and afterward, ibid. 1496, 1507, 1538, 1550-52, 
Basel, 1588, and often afterward; in Greek, first, Venetiis apud Aldum Manutium, 1495-98; again, under 
the supervision of Erasmus and Simon Grynaeus, Basel, 1531, 1539, and 1550 (this third Basel edition is 
termed the laengriniatia, from Isengrin, one of its editors) ; other editions were edited by Joh. Bapt. 
Cumotius, Venetiis apud Aldi Jilios, 1551-53; Friedrich Sylburg, Francf. 1584-87; Isaac Casaubonus, 
Greek and Latin, Lyons, 1590, etc. (1596, 1597, 1605, 1646) ; Du Val, Greek and Latin, Paris, 1619, etc. (1629, 
1639, 1654); the last complete edition in the 17th century appeared (in Latin) at Rome, 1668. Single 
works, in particular the Nicom. Ethics, were very frequently edited till toward the middle of the seven 
teenth century; after this epoch editions of single works appeared but rarely, and no more complete edi 
tions were published till near the end of the eighteenth century, when an edition of the works of Aristotle 
in Greek and Latin was commenced by Buhlc, BiponU et Argentorati, 1791-1800. This edition was never 
completed. The first volume contains several essays, which are still of value, particularly as relating to 
the various editions of Aristotle and to his Greek and Latin commentators. Until the rise of Cartesianism 
and other modern philosophies, the doctrine of Aristotle, more or less freely interpreted, it is true, in indi 
vidual points, was received as the true philosophy. Logic, ethics, etc., were learned from his writings at 
Catholic universities throughout the second half of the Middle Ages, and at Protestant universities, almost 
in the same sense in which geometry was learned from the elements of Euclid. Afterward, Aristotelianism 
came to be widely considered as a false doctrine, and (after sustaining attacks of constantly increasing 
frequency and virulence, beginning from the close of the Middle Ages) became even more and more univer 
sally neglected, except where, as at the schools of the Jesuits, tradition retained unconditional authority. 
Thus the existing editions were quite sufficient to meet the diminished interest felt in their contents. 
Leibnitz endeavored especially to appreciate justly the measure of philosophical truth contained in the 
doctrines of Aristotle, disapproving equally the two extremes of unconditional submission to their 
authority, and of absolute rejection. But he made of his own monadic doctrine and of his religious convic 
tions too immediate a standard of judgment (See, among others, the monograph of Dan. Jacoby, D 
Leibnitii studiis Aristotelicis, inest ineditum Leibnitii, Diss. Inaug., Berlin, 1867.) In the last decades 
of the eighteenth century the historic instinct became more and more awakened, and to this fact the works 
of Aristotle owed the new appreciation of their great value as documents exponential of the historical de 
velopment of philosophy. Thus the interest in the works of Aristotle was renewed, and this interest has 
gone on constantly increasing during the nineteenth century up to the present day. The most important 
complete edition of the present century is that prepared under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences at 
Berlin, Yols. I. and II., Aristoteles Graece ex rec. Imm. Bekkeri, Berlin, 1831; Vol. III., Ariototeles 
Latine interpretibus variis, ibid. 1831 ; Vol. IV., Scholia in Aristotelem collegit Christ. Aug. Brandie, 
ibid. 1836; Bekker s text was reprinted at Oxford in 1837, and Bekker has himself published the principal 
works of Aristotle separately, followed, with few exceptions, the text of the complete edition, but, unfor 
tunately, without annexing the Varietas lect. contained in the latter. Didot has published at Paris 
an edition, edited by Dubner, Bussemaker, and Heitz (1848-69), which is valuable. Stereotyped editions 
were published by Tauchnitz, at Leipsic, in 1831-32 and 1843. German translations of most of Aristotle s 
works are contained in Metzler s collection (translated by K. L. Both, K. Zell, L. Spengel, Chr. Walz, F. A. 
Kreuz. Ph. H. Kiilb, J. Eieckher, and C. F. Schnitzer), in Hoffmann s Library of Translations (translated 
by A. Karsch, Ad. Stahr, and Karl Stahr), and in Engelmann s collection (Greek and German together). Of 
the editions of separate works the following may be mentioned: 

Arist. Organon, ed. Th. Waitz, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1844-46. Arist. Categor. gr. cum versione Arabica 
Isaaoi Iloneini fil., ed. JuL Theod. Zenker, Leipsic, 1846. Soph. Eleuchi, ed. Edw. Poste, London, 1866. 

Arist. fflh. Nicom., ed. C. Zell, 2 vols., Heidelberg, 1820; ed. A. Coray, Paris, 1822; ed. Cardwell, Oxford, 
1828-30; ed. C. L. Michelet, Berlin, 1829-35, 2d edition, 1848; further, separate editions of the text of 
Bekker, 1831, 1845, 1861 ; the edition of W. E. Jelf, Oxford and London, 1856, reproducing for the most part 
Bekker s text; the edition of Eogers, edit, altera, London, 1865, and The Ethics of Aristotle illustrated 
with Essays and Notes, by Sir Alex. Grant, London, 1856-68, 2d edition, 1866. Books VIII. and IX. (On 


Friendship), published separately, Giessen, 1847, edited by Ad. Theod. Herm. Fritache, who also published 
an edition of the Eud. Eth., Regensburg, 1859. 

Polit.^ ed. Herm. Coming, Helrast. 1656, Brunswick, 1730, ed. J. G. Schneider, Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 
1809; C. Gottling, Jena, 1824; Ad. Stahr, Leipsic, 1839; B. St. Hilaire, Paris, 1837, 2d ed. 1848; I. Bekker, 
Berlin (1831), 1S55; Eaton, Oxford, 1855; K. Congreve, London, 1855 and 1862; Rhet., ed. Spengel, 
Leipsic, 1867. 

Poet., ed. G. Hermann, Leipsic, 1802; Franz Ritter, Cologne, 1839; E. Egger (in his Essai sur 
Chistoire de la critique chez les Greca, Paris, 1849); B. St. Hilaire, Paris, 1858; I. Bekker (Ar. 
Poet, ab I. B. tertium ed., Berlin, 1859) ; Franz Susemihl (Poet., in Greek and German, Leipsic, 1865) ; 
Joh. Vahlen, Berlin, 1867; F. Ueberweg (with translation and commentary), Berlin, 1869. 

The Physics of Aristotle has been published, Greek and German together, with explanatory notes, by C. 
Prtntl, Leipsic, 1854; also the works De Coelo and De Generation* et Corruptione have been edited by the 
same, Leipsic, 1857. Arist. iiber die Farben, erl. durch eine Uebersicht uber die Farbenlehre der Alien, 
von Carl Prantl, Munich, 1849. Meteorolog., ed. Jul. Lud. Idoler, Leipsic, 1834-36. B. St. Hilaire has edited 
and published, in Greek and French, and with explanatory notes, the Physica of Arist., Paris, 1862 ; the 
Meteorolog., Paris, 1867 ; the De Coelo, Paris, 1866 ; De Gen. et Con:, together with the work De Melisso, 
Xenophane, Gorgia (with an Introd. sur lea origines de la philos. grecqne), Paris, 1866. De Animal. 
Histor., ed. J. G. Schneider, Leipsic, 1811. Vier Siicher uber die Theile der Thiere, Greek and German, 
with explanatory notes, by A v. Frantzius, Leipsic, 1853 ; ed. Bern. Langkavel, Leipsic, 1868. Ueber die 
Zeugung und Entwickelung der Thiere, Greek and German, by Aubert and Wimmer, Leipsic, 1860 ; 
Thierkwnde, Greek and German, by the same, ibid. 1868. 

Arist. DeAnima libritres, ed. F. Ad. Trendelenburg, Jena, 1833; ed. Earth. St. Hilaire, Paris, 1S46; 
td. A. Torstrik, Berlin, 1862 (cf. R. Noetel s review in the Z. f. G. W., XVIII., Berlin, 1864, pp. 131-144). 

Arist. Mttaph., ed. Brandis, Berlin, 1823; ed. Schwegler, Tub. 1847-48; ed. H. Bonitz, Bonn, 1848-49. 

Many valuable contributions to the exegesis of Aristotle s works are contained in those ancient com* 
mentaries and paraphrases which have come down to us, especially in those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
the exegete (see below, 51) of Dexippus and Theraistius (see below, 69), and of Syrianus, Ammonias 
Hermiae filing, Simplicius, and Philoponus (see below, 70); also in the writings of Boethius (ibid.) and 
others. Scholia to Aristotle have been published by Brandis, Berlin, 1836 (in Bekker s edition of the text), 
to the Metaphysics, by Brandis, ibid. 1887, to the De Anima (extracts from an anonymous commentary 
on Aristotle s De Animd), by Spengel, Munich, 1847, and a paraphrase of the Soph. Elench., by Spengel, 
ibid. 1842. An old Hebrew translation of the Commentary of Averroes on the Rhetoric was published 
by J. Goldenthal, at Leipsic, in 1842. 

Of modern writers on the works of Aristotle, we name the following : J. G. Buhle, Commentatio de 
libroritm Aristotelis distributione in exotericos et acroamaticos, Gott. 1788 (contained also in the first 
vol. of Buhle s edition of Aristotle, Biponti, 1791, pp. 105-152), and Ueber die Echtheit der Metaph. des 
Aristoteles, in the Bibl.f. alte Litt. u. Kunst, No. 4, Gott 1788, pp. 1-42; Ueber die Ordnung und Folge 
der Aristot. Schriften iiberhaupt, ibid. No. 10, 1794, 33-47. 

Am. Jourdain, Recherche* critiques sur Vdge et Porigine des traductions latines d Aristote et sur les 
commentaires grecs ou arabes employes par les docteurs scholastiques, Paris, 1819, 2d ed. 1843. 

Franc. Nicol. Titze, De Aristotelis operum serie et distinctione, Leipsic, 1826. 

Ch. A. Brandis, Ueber die ScJiicksale der Aristotelischen Bucher und einige Kriterien ihrer Echtheit, 
in the Rhein. Mus., I. 1827, pp. 236-254, 259-286 (cf. Kopp, Nachtrag zu Br. Unters. uber die Schicksale 
der Arist. Bucher, ibid. III. 1, 1829) ; Ueber die Reihenfolge der Bucher des Arist. Organons und ihr 
griech. Ausleger, in the Abh. der Berl. Akad. der Wiss., 1833; Ueber die Arist. Metaphysik, ibid. 1834; 
Ueber Aristoteles Rhetorik und die griech. Ausleger deraelben, in the Philologus, IV., 1849, p. 1 seq. 

Ad. Stahr, Aristotelia, Vol. II. : Die der Arist. Schriften, etc., Leipsic, 1832; Aristoteles 
bei den Rdmern, ibid. 1834. 

Leonh. Spengel (On Aristotle s Poetic; On the 7th Book of the Physics; On the mutual relation of 
the three works on Ethics attributed to Aristotle ; On the Politics of Aristotle ; On the order of Aristotle s 
works in natural science; On the Rhetoric of Aristotle), in the Abh. der bair. Akad.. der Wiss., 1837, 
1841, 43, 47, 48, 51; Ueber Kclflapo-t? rS>v iraOwdTw bei Arist., ibid. Vol. IX. Munich, 1859; Aristot. 
Studien : Nik. Ethik; Eudem. Ethik; grosse Ethik; Politik; Poetik, in Vols. X. and XI. of the Trans, 
of the Bavar. Acad. of Sciences. Munich. 1863-66 (cf. Bonitz, in the Zeitscfir. f. ostr.-Gymn. 1866, pp. 

Jacob Bernays, Ergdnzung zu Aristoteles Poetik, in the Rhein. Sfus.fur Ph., new series, VIII., 1853, 
pp. 561-596 ; Grundzuge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles uber Wirkung der Tragodie, in the 
Abh. der hist, philos. Ges zu Breslau, Breslau, 1858 ; Die Dialoge des Arist. in ihrem Verhdltniss zu 
seinen ubrigen Werken, Berlin, 1868. Cf. P. W. Forchhammer, Aristottlcs und die exottriachen Reden, 
Kiel, 1864. 


Herm. Bonitz, Arist. Studien, I.-V., Vienna, 1862-1867. 

Valentin Rose, De Arist. librorum ordine et auctoritate, Berlin, 1854 ; Aristoteles pseudepigraphus 
(a collection of the fragments of the lost works, almost all of which are regarded by Rose as spurious), 
Leipsic, 1863. 

Emil Heitz, Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, Leipsic, 1865. 

Rud. Eucken, De, Arist. dicendi ratione, pars I. : Observations de particularism usu, Gott. 1666 
("observations," which may be useful as assisting to determine the authorship of particular works i.nd 
books as e. g., the "observation" that the combination KO.V ei, where av remains without influence upon 
the construction, is employed by Aristotle and Eudemus in cases where Theophrastus would use xat ei > 
TIS, and that Eudemus approaches, in general, much more nearly than Theophrastus to Aristotle in mode 
of expression, etc. ; but cf. the review of Eucken s dissertation by Bonitz in the Zeitschrift fur osterr. 
Gymn., 1866, pp. 804-S12); Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Aristotelen, Berlin. 1869; Beitrage z. Verst. 
des Arist. in the Neue Jahrb.f. Philol. u. Pad. Vol. 99, 1869. pp. 243-252 and 817-820. 

Of the Logic and logical writings of Aristotle write: Philipp Gumposch. Leipsic, 1889, F. Th. Waitz, 
De Ar. libri n. ep/urji/eias cap. decimo, Marb. 1844, Ad. Textor, De Herm. Ar. (Inaugural Diss.), Berlin, 
1870(cf. 47, below). 

Of the Metaphysics : C. L. Michelet, Eocamen critique de Fouvrage d^Aristote intitule Metaphysique. 
ouvr. cour. par Pacad. des sc. mor. et pol., Paris, 1836; Felix Ravaisson, Evsai sur la Metaphysique 
tfAristote, Paris, 1887-46; Brummerstadt, Ueber Inhalt und Zusammenhang der metaph. Sucker det 
Arist., Rostock, 1841 ; J. C. Glaser, Die Metaph. des Arist. nach Composition, Inhalt und Methode, 
Berlin, 1841; Herm. Bonitz, Observ. Criticae in Arist. libros meta.physicos, Berlin. 1842; Wilh. Christ, 
Studia in Arist. libros metaph. collata, Berlin, 1853. Cf. Krische, For&chungen auf dem Gebiete der 
alien Philosophie 1, 1840, pp. 263-276; and Bonitz and Schwegler, in their commentaries on the Met. of 
Aristotle (cf. below, 48). 

Of Aristotle s physical works: C. Prantl, De Ar. librorum ad hist, animal. pert, ordine atque dispo- 
sitione, Munich, 1843; Symbolae criticae in Arist. phy. auscultationes, Berlin, 1843; H. Thiel, De Zool. 
Ar. I. ordine ac distrib. (G.-Pr.), Breslau, 1855; Sonnenburg, Z-u Ar. Thiergeschicltte (G.-Pr.), Bonn, 
1857 ; Ch. Thurot, Obs. crit. on Ar. De Part. Animalium, in the Revue arch., 1867, pp. 233-242 ; on the 
Meteorol., ibid. 1869, pp. 415-420. Cf. various works by Barth61emy St. Hilaire, Jessen, and others (see 
49, below). 

Of the Ethics and Politics: Wilh. Gottlieb Tennemann, Bern, uber die sogen. grosse Ethik des 
Arist.. Erfurt, 1798; F. Schleiermacher, Ueber die griech. Scholien zur Nikomachischen Ethik des Arist. 
(read on May 16, 1816), in 8. s Sammtliche Werke, III. 2, 1833, pp. 309-326; Ueber die. ethischen Werke 
des Aristoteles (read December 4, 1817), ibid. III. 3, 1835, 306-333 ; W. Van Swinderen, De Ar. Pol. libris, 
Groningen, 1824; Herm. Bonitz, Obs. Crit. in Arist. quae feruntur Magna Moralia et Eth. Eudemia, 
Berlin, 1844; A. M. Fischer, De Ethicis Nicom. et Eudem., Bonn, 1847; Ad. Trendelenburg, Ueber Stellen 
in der Nik.-Eihik, in the Monatsber. der Berliner Acad. d. Wiss., 1850, and in Trendelenburg s Hist. Beitr. 
zur Philos., II., Berlin, 1855; Zur Arist. Ethik, in Hist. Beitr., III., Berlin. 1867; Job. Petr. Nickes, De 
Arist. Politicorum libris (dixs. inaug.), Bonn, 1851 ; J. Bendixen, Comm. de Ethicorwn Nicomacheorum 
integritate, Ploena, 1854; Bemerkungen sum 1. Buch der Nikom. Ethik, in the Philol., X. 1855, pp. 
199-210, 263-292; Uebersicht uber die neueste die, Aristotelische Ethik und Politik betreffende Litt. ibid. 
XL 1856, pp. 351-378, 544-582, XIV. 1859, 332-372, XVI. I860, 465-522; cf. XIII. 1858, pp. 264-301; 
II. Hampke, Ueber dasfunfte Buch der Nik. Eth., ibid. XVI. pp. 60-84; G. Teichmuller, Zur Frage uber 
die Reihenfolge der Bilcher in der Arist. Politik, ibid. pp. 164-166; Christian Pansch, De Ethicis Nicom. 
genuino Arist. libro diss., Bonn, 1833 (cf. Trendelenburg s review of this work, and, in particular, his de 
fense against Pansch of the genuineness of the 10th Book of the Nicom. Ethics, in the Jahrb.fur wiss. 
Kritik, 1834, p. 358 seq., and Spengel, in the Abh. der bair. Akad., III. p. 518 seq ); Chr. Pansch, De Ar. 
Eth. Nic., VII. 12-15 and X. 1-5 (G.-Pr.), Eutin, 1858; H. S. Anton, Quae intercedat ratio inter Eth. JV zc 
Vll. 12-15 et X. 1-5, Dantzic, 1858; F. Munscher, Quaest. crit. et exeaet. in Arist. Eth. Nicom., Marburg] 
1861 ; R. Noetel, Quaest. Ar. (de libro V. Eth. Nic.\ ( G.-Pr.), Berlin, 1862 ; F. Hacker, Das V. Bvch der Nik. 
Ethik., in the Zeitschr.f. d. G.-W., XVI. pp. 513-560; Beitr. z. Kritik u. Erkl. des VII. Buchesder Nik. 
Ethik, in the Zeitschr.f. d. G.-W., Berlin, 1809 (cf. 1863); H. Rassow, Observation es criticae in Ar-istote- 
lem, Berlin, 1858; Emendationes Aristoteleae, Weimar, 1861; Beitrage zur Erkldrung und Te&tkritik 
der Nik. Ethik des Arist., Weimar, 1862 and 18CS; Bemerkungen uber einige Stellen der PoUtik des 
Aristoteles, Weimar, 1864; Joh. Imelmann, Obs. cr. in Ar. E. N. (Diss.), Halle, 1864; Moritz Verraehren, 
Aristotelische ScJiriftstellen, Heft I.: sur Nikom. Ethik, Leipsic, 1864; W. Oncken, Die Wiederbelebung 
der Arist. Politik in der dbendldndischen Lesewelt, in the Festschrift zur Begriissung der 24. Vers. 
deutscher Philol. u. Scliulm. eu Heidelberg, Leipsic, 1865, pp. 1-18; Die Staatslehre des Arist., Leipsic, 
1870; Susemihl, Zum ersten. zweiten und vierten Buche der Politik, in the Jahrb.f. Ph. u. Pad., Vol. 
XCIII. pp. 327-333, Rhein. Mas., N. 8., XX. 1865, pp. 504-517 ; XXI. 1866, pp. 551-573 ; and Zum 8, 7. . & 


Bttche, in the Philologus, XXV. pp. 385-415; XXIX, pp. 97-119; De Arist. Politicorum Hbris J. 
et II,, Greifswald, 1867; Appendix, ibid. 1869; d. n. Lit. . Ar. Pol, Jahrb.f. Ph., XCIX. pp. 593-610, and 
CI. (1870), pp. 343-350; Ewald Bocker, De quibusdam Pol. Ar. loci* (Inaug. Diss.), Greifsw. 1867 (of. 
below, 50). 

To the Poetic and Rhetoric of Aristotle relate (beside the works already cited of Spengel, Bernays, 
and others) the following: Max Schmidt, .Do tempore quo ab Arist. 1. de arte rhet.conscr. et ed. sint, 
Halle, 1837; Franz Susemihl, Studien zur Aristotel. Poetik, in the Rh. Mas., XVIII. p. 366 seq., 471 seq., 
XIX. p. 197 seq., XXII. p. 217 seq.; cf. Jahn s Jahrb., 89, p. 504 seq., and 95, pp. 159-184 and 221-28C; 
Job. Vahlen, Zur Kritik Arist. Schriften (Poetic and Rhetoric), Vienna, 1861, in the Sitzungsbericltte of 
the Vienna Acad. of Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 59-148; also, Arist. Lehre von der Rangfolge der TJieile 
der Tragodie, in the " Gratulationschrift" entitled Symbola philologoriim Bonnensium in honorem 
Frid. Ritschelii collecta, Leipsic, 1864, pp. 155-184; BeitrOge zur Arid. Poetik, Vienna, 1865-1 867 
(from the "Sitzungsberichte" of the Academy); Gust Teiehmuller. Arist. Forschungen, I.: Seitraye 
sur Erkl drung der Poetik des Arist. (Halle, 1867), II. : Arist. Philo*. der Kunst (ibid. 1869), (cf. 
below, 50). 

Aristotle probably composed a number of works in dialogue during his first residence at 
Athens and in the life-time of Plato. Of this class was the dialogue Eudemus, some frag 
ments of which are preserved (ap. Plutarch, Dio, 22; Consol. ad Apol, ch. 27; Cic., De 
Div., I. 25, 53, etc.; cf. J. Bernays, in the Rhein. MILS. f. Phil., new series, XVI. 1861, pp. 
236-246). Eudemus was a member of the Platonic circle, a friend of Aristotle, and a 
participant in the campaign of Dio against Dionysius in Sicily, where he fell, 353 B. c. To 
his memory Aristotle dedicated the dialogue named after him, a work in imitation of 
Plato s Phaedo ; in it Aristotle presented arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul. 
The first twenty-seven volumes in the catalogue of the works of Aristotle, as given by 
Diog. Lae rt., V. 22-27 (cf. Anonym. Menag., 61 seq.) are writings in dialogue. They are: 
On Justice, On Poets, On Philosophy, Politicus, Gryllus, Nerinthus, Sophist, Menexenus, 
Eroticus, Symposion, On Riches, Protrepticus, etc. By subsequent writers these works 
were termed exoteric, and in distinction from them the more strictly scientific ones were 
termed esoteric. In Aristotle s works the word esoteric does not occur (yet cf. Analyt. Post., 
I. 10, p. 76 b, 27, 6 eau Aoyof as 6 ev ry i/^/tf/, in opposition to efw /Iftyof) ; but exoteric is 
employed in the sense of "outwardly directed, addressed to the respondent (rrpbc, erepov)," 
arguing from what appears to him to be true, in contrast to that which interests the 
thinker who looks only at the essential (T& QiTioaoQu /cat &TOVVTI nafi eavrbv fitXet see 
Top., VIII. 1, 151b, 9; Anal Post, I. 10, 76 b, 24; Pol, VII. 3, 1325 b, 29, and compare 
Thurot, in Jahn s Jahrb., 81, 1860, p. 749 seq., and in his Etudes sur Aristote, Paris, 1860, 
p. 214 seq. ; cf. also Gr. Thomas, De Ar. ef A. deque Ciceronis Aristotelio more, Grott. 1860, and 
Stahr, in his Arist., II. pp. 235-279) ; sometimes Aristotle (as Jak. Bernays has shown, Dia- 
loge des Arist., Berlin, 1863, pp. 29-93) applies the epithet in question to his dialogical writ 
ings; yet he also employs it (Phys., IV. 10, 217 b, 19) in reference to those explanatory 
parts of his strictly scientific works, with which, in conformity to his dialectical method, he 
usually prefaces the parts devoted to rigid demonstration (a-ro^i^ig), or to those parts which 
are rather " dialectical," i. e., controversial, than " apodictical," or purely scientific (Pol, I. 5, 
p. 1254 a, 33). The general signification of the word is in both cases the same, the applica 
tion only being difierent. Dialogues are also termed by Aristotle ev Koirti yi-yvofievoi Zoyoi 
("arguments carried on in common," i. e., by means of disputation with a respondent, 
whether in real ^a/ie/crt/caZf ow66oi<;, Top., VIII. 5, or in dialogical writings), or &- 
6o/j.voi Tidyot, i. e., 2,6-yot given to the public, in distinction from unpublished speculations, 
instituted primarily by the philosopher for his own benefit, and then communicated, 
whether orally or in writing, to the (private) circle of pupils associated with him in 
strictly scientific speculation. Rigidly philosophical speculations are termed by Aristotle, 
in Pol, III. 12, p. 1282 b, 19 et al (cf. End. Eth., I. 8, 1217 b, 23), ol Kara yi/aoofiav 


and closely related to this is the expression 6t6aaKa/iiKoi toyoi, denned in De Soph. Elenchis, 
c 2 p. 165 b, as oi EK ruv olneiuv dpxuv inaarov ^a^rj^aroq /cat OVK EK rov rov airoKpivo- 
(iivov 6o%uv avMffyi&fiwot (which latter Uyot, although as TreipaariKoi they must be classed 
as exoteric, do nevertheless not wander from the precise matter in hand, like the efadev 
Myoi, Pol, II. 6, 1264 b, 39; cf. Eih. End., VII. 1, 1235 a, 4 and 5, 1239 b, or the 7&ytn> $u 
TOV irp&yparos, W., I. 1, 1354 b, 27, 1353 a, 2). The e?vrepiKa are denned by Simpliciua 
(In Phys., 386 b, 25) as ra HOLVO. nal 61 i>66t;uv Trepatv6/j.eva, by Philoponus, as Aoyoi ^ 
airodeiK.TLK.ol /J.rj6e Trpof rovg yvrjaiovg rtiv anpoaruv elp^fievoi, a/Ua Trpbg rov<; Tro/t/uwf EK Trtda- 
vuv upwfthoi. In view of the fact that Aristotle here and there in his strictly scientific 
writings addresses himself to the " hearers," and that at least many of these writings stand 
in the closest relation to his oral lectures (anpoacetc, which were intended to be read publicly 
or were taken down from his extemporaneous lectures), they were called by later genera 
tions acroamatic or (metaphorically) aKpodcei^. Philosophical occupation with a specific 
group of objects was called a Trpaynarda, and hence the rigidly philosophical writings, 
directed strictly and alone to the object of inquiry, leaving out all dialogical ornamentation, 
were termed by the successors of Aristotle "pragmatic." His works of this sort appear, 
either wholly or for the most part, not to have been made public by Aristotle himself, so 
long as he was engaged in lecturing on the subjects of which they treat, but to have 
been first published by his scholars a part of them by Andronicus of Rhodes. 

As secondary works and forerunners of his strictly scientific writings we must regard 
the vTro/Livfi/udTa, or the resumes drawn up by Aristotle for his personal use, and some of 
which attained to publicity. Among the lost works of this kind belong abstracts of the 
writings of Archytas, of the Platonic Republic, of the Leges, the Tim., etc., mentioned by 
Diog. L. in his list of Aristotle s works. The work De Melissa, de Xenophane (or de Zenone), 
de Gorgia, which has come down to us, bears also the character of a v7r6/uv??/Lia, but its 
authenticity is at least doubtful (see above, 17). In the same class belong also the works 
De Bono and De Ideis, of which fragments are extant, collected and edited by Brandis (Bonn, 
1823) ; they are memoirs of Plato s oral teachings, written down from memory with the aid, 
perhaps, of transcripts of Plato s lectures made at or near the time of their delivery. Cf. 
the works of Brandis, Bournot, and others, cited above, 41. 

Aristotle s logical works are the KciTTjyopiai (whose authenticity is not wholly certain, 
see Spengel, Miinchener Gel. Anz., 1845, No. 5, and Prantl, in the first volume of his Gesch. 
der Logik), on the fundamental forms of the mentally representable, and the corresponding 
fundamental forms of mental representations and words, or on the fundamental forms of 
"affirmations concerning the existent;" rczpl epprrvticK; (De Interpretatione, whose genuine 
ness is disputed by Andronicus of Rhodus, though, apparently, on insufficient grounds), on 
the Proposition and the Judgment ; ava^vrma Trporepa, on the Syllogism ; dva Avrina vorepa, 
respecting Proof, Definition, Division, and the Cognition of Principles; the roTund, on 
Dialectical or Examining Inferences, such as usually arise in disputations from provisional 
or probable premises (evdoga) ; and -rrepl oofyicriKuv e/ley^wv, on the Fallacies of the Sophists 
in their refutations and on the exposure of the deceptive appearance in these fallacies. 
These works were termed by the Aristotelians bpyaviKa, i. e., works treating of method, 
the "organon" of investigation. In the Topica, VIII. 14, 163 b. 11, Aristotle remarks 
that it is an important aid (bpyavov) to the attainment of scientific knowledge, to be able to 
draw the consequences which follow from each one of two contradictory propositions, and 
in Met., IV. 3, 1005 b, 4, he adds that the study of the doctrine of the bv ij bv (or of being 
aa such, i. e. the study of ontology or metaphysics, TrpuTTj fyikoGofyia) must not be com 
menced until one is already familiar with Analytics ; these remarks of Aristotle indicate 
the origin and significance of the term "Organon," as above applied. 


To the works on Trpurjj tyikocotyia some arranger of the works of Aristotle (Andronicus 
of Rhodes, as there is scarcely any reason to doubt), on the ground of certain didactic 
utterances of Aristotle respecting the rrp6repov irpbc, j^af and the Trporspov Qvaet, or the 
prior for ns" and the "prior by nature," assigned a place after those on physics, and 
hence gave to them, as arranged in fourteen books, the general title, ra fiera ra ^vaind 
(works coming after those relating to Physics), the books being numbered A, a, B, F, etc., 
up to N = I., II., III., IV., etc., to XIV.; in determining the order of the books, he seems 
to have been guided chiefly by the citations contained in them. The "Metaphysics" is 
made up of an extended, connected, but not completely finished exposition of doctrine 
(Book I. : Philosophical and historico-critical Introduction, and Books III. ; IV. ; VI., VII., 
VIII. ; IX.), and of several smaller and in part spurious treatises. Some ancient authorities 
attribute the authorship of Book II. (a) to Pasicles of Rhodes, a son of a brother of Eude- 
mus and an auditor of Aristotle. According to others, Book I. (A) was his composition (see 
Asclep., Schol in Arist. ed Br., p. 520 a, 6). Book V. (A) contains an inquiry nepl rov Troca^ug, 
respecting the various significations of philosophical terms, and is cited by this title in VI. 
4, VII. 1, and X. 1. Book X. treats of the one and the many, the identical and the 
opposed, etc. Book XI. contains, in chaps. 1-8, p. 1065 a, 26, a shorter presentation of 
the substance of III., IV., and VI. ; if genuine, it must be regarded as a preliminary 
sketch ; if not, it is an abstract made by an early Aristotelian ; chaps. 1 and 2 correspond 
with Book III. (amipiai, doubts, difficulties), 3-6 with IV. (the problem of metaphysics and 
the principle of contradiction), and 7 and 8, up to the place indicated, with VI. (introduc 
tory remarks on the doctrine of substance) ; the rest of Book XL is a compilation from the 
Physics, and hence decidedly spurious. The first five chapters of Sook XII. contain a 
sketch of the doctrine of substance (more fully detailed in Books VII. and VIII.) and of 
the doctrine of potentiality and actuality (discussed more fully in Book IX.) ; chaps. 6-10 
are a somewhat more detailed, but still very compressed exposition of Aristotle s theology. 
The last two books (XIII. and XIV.) contain a critique of the theory of ideas and of the 
number-doctrine, which in parts (XIII. 4 and 5) agrees verbally with portions of the first 
book (I. 6 and 9). An hypothesis has been suggested by Titze, and modified and expanded 
by Grlaser and others, to the effect that Books L, IX. chs. 1-8, and XII., constituted origi 
nally a shorter draught of the whole rcpurij (ptAocoQia, of which the first book was retained 
by Aristotle in his larger work, while the rest were altered and enlarged ; but this theory 
is very uncertain, and it is quite as possible that the whole of Book K (XI.) and at least the 
first part of Book A (XII.) are spurious. In the relation of Books I., XIII. and XIV.. to 
each other and to the whole there is much that is puzzling; in particular, it would seem 
that Aristotle can not have intended the repetition of the critique of the theory of ideas. 
The parts of Book XIII. which agree with parts in the first book appear to have been 
written later than the latter, and not by Aristotle, but by some revising Aristotelian ; the 
genuineness of Book XIII., as far as ch. 9, p. 1086 a, 21, is at least doubtful. The begin 
ning of the Metaph. is said (by Albertus Magnus, see Jourdain, Recherches Critiques) to have 
been regarded by the Arabians as the work of Theophrastus. The natural termination of 
the Metaphysics is with the doctrine of God, or the theology of Aristotle (XII. 6-10). 

The series of works on natural science opens with the- ^vcinf; oKpoaaic. in eight books 
(called also tyvoiKa. or ra irepl (fwaeuc., of which V., VI., and VIII. treat specially of motion, 
while VII. seems not to belong in this connection, and was probably not written by Aris 
totle at all) ; to this should be joined rrepl ovpavov in four and Trepl yfveaeuc ital yOopac in 
two books ; also the fiereupo^oymd (or rcepl ftereupuv) in four books, of which the fourth 
appears to be an independent treatise. The book irepl KOO/UOV is spurious. The opuscule 
TTf/oi xpuaaruv was composed in the Peripatetic school. The original work on plants ia 


lost ; the one which exists under that title in our editions is spurious perhaps the work 
of Nicolaus of Damascus. The History of Animals (irepl ra faa icropiai, of which the tenth 
book is spurious), together with certain related works on the parts, generation, and 
locomotion of animals (the irepl cJoi> lavijctuq is not genuine), is preserved, but the 
Anatomy of Animals (avaTopai) is lost. To the three books Kepi inxw join on the 
opuscules : Trepl aiadr/aeuc nal aio&jrr&v, Trepl fivrjfi^ ital avapvf/aeuc, Trepl VTTVOV nal kyprj- 
y6pGuc, Trepi iwTrvicw, irepl fiavTutw rrjq kv rolg VTTVOIC, Trepl /naKpopio-qros ndi /5pa^^<5r^rof, 
trepl Cjfc *<" davarov (with which the Kepi veoTTjroq /cat yrjpw of our editions must ap 
parently be classed). The fyvcioyvu[j.iKa is spurious. The collection of Tr/jo/W^uarrc is a 
conglomerate gradually brought together on the basis of Aristotle s notes (cf. Carl Prantl, 
Ueber die Problems des Arist., in the Abh. der Akad. d. W., Munich, 1850). The Trepl 
Oav/uaaiuv aKovo/udruv is spurious (cf. H. Schrader, Ueber die Quellen der pseudo-arist Schrift 
IT. 6. d., in the Jahrb. f. PhUol u. Pad., Vol. 97, 1867, pp. 217-232); so, perhaps, is also 
the Trcpt ard/Liuv ypafi/nuv. 

Three works in our Corpus Aristoteleum treat of ethics in general : ijdiKa TXutDft&xua in 
ten books, jjdiidi Evd^fteta in seven books, and rjdtm ^eydAa (perhaps corrupted from ifiuuw 
Ketiahaia or from rfltK&v fieya^uv ttetydhaia, according to Trendelenburg s conjecture, Beit- 
rage zur Philos., Vol. II., Berlin, 1855, p. 352 seq.). The three works on ethics correspond 
with each other in content as follows: Eth. Nic., L, II., III. 1-7, Eth. End., I., II., Magn. 
Mor., I. 1-19, contain general preparatory considerations; Eth. Nic., III. 8-15 and IV., Eth. 
End., III., Magn. Mor., I. 20-23, treat of the different ethical virtues, with the exception of 
justice ; Eth. Me., V., with which Eth. End., IV., is identical, and Magn. Mor., I. 34, and II., 
imY., relate to justice and equity; Elh. Nic., VL, with which Eth. End., V., is identical, and 
Magn. Mor., I. 35 (cf. II. 2, 3), relate to the dianoetic virtues ; Eth. Nic., VII., identical 
with Eth. End., VI., and Magn. Mor., II. 4-7, to continence, incontinence, and pleasure ; 
Eth. Nic., VIII., IX., Eth. End., VII. 1-12 (or 13 init, where there is evidently a gap), and 
Magn. Mor., II. 11-17, treat of friendship ; Eth. End., VII. 13 (where the text is full of gaps 
and alterations) treats of the power of wisdom ((ppovqatc, practical wisdom) ; Magn. Mor., II. 
10, of the signification of bpdbs Aoyof, and of the power of ethical knowledge; Eth. End., 
VII. 14, 15, and Magn. Mor., II. 8, 9, of prosperity and na^onayadia (honor, the union 
of the beautiful and the good) ; Eth. Nic., X., of pleasure and happiness. That the 
so-called Magna Moralia, the shortest of these works, is not the oldest of them (as 
Schleiermacher believed), but that the Nicomachean Ethics (from which the citations 
in Pol, II. 2. III. 9 and 12, IV. 41, VII. 1 and 13, are made) is the original work of 
Aristotle, while the Eudemian Ethics is a work of his pupil, Eudemus, based on the 
work of Aristotle, and that the Magna Moralia is an abstract from both, but principally 
from the Eudemian Ethics, has been almost universally allowed since Spengel s investi 
gation of the subject (see above, p. 141); Barthelemy St. Hilaire, however (Morale 
d Aristote, Paris, 1856), sees in the Eudemian Ethics not so much an original work of 
Eudemus, as rather a mere redaction of a series of lectures on Ethics by Aristotle, exe 
cuted by one of his auditors (probably by Eudemus, who, it is supposed, wrote them down 
for his own use, as they were delivered) ; he is inclined to assign to the Magn. Moral also 
the same date and kind of origin. But there can hardly be a doubt that this latter work 
belongs to a later period, such are the marks of Stoic influences in thought and termi 
nology which it contains (see Ramsauer, Zur Charakteristik der Magna Moralia [ G.-Pr.], 
Oldenburg, 1858, and Spengel, Arist. Studien, I., Munich, 1863, p. 17, and Trendelenburg, 
Einige Belege fur die nacharist. Alfassungszeit der Magna Mor., in his Histor. Beitr., III. p. 
433 seq.); the following citation contained in it (II. 6, 1201 b, 25): uairep tya/jev iv rolq 
, is ground for the conjecture, that the author published it under the name of 


Aristotle ; still, other Analytica (paraphrases of the Aristotelian work) may be meant. Of 
the Eudemian Ethics, Spengel and Zeller, in particular, have shown that the author, though 
generally following Aristotle, has introduced original matter, which appears occasionally 
in the light of an intentional correction of Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics appears 
to have been published after the death of Aristotle by his son Nicomachus. To which 
work the books common to the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (Nic., V.-VIL, Eud., 
IV.- VI) originally belonged, is a matter of dispute. It may be shown, as well on 
internal grounds as from references in the Politico,, that the first of these books (Eth. 
Nic., y.=Eth. Eudem., IV.)* was originally a part of the Nicomachean Ethics.f The pres 
ent Book VI. of the Nic. Eth. ( B. V. of the End.} agrees in many respects better with 
the books belonging to the Eud. than with those which belong to the Nic. Eth, (cf. Alb. 
Max. Fischer, De Eth. Nic. et Eud., diss. inaug., Bonn, 1847, and Fritzsche in his edition of 
the Eud. Ethics) ; yet at least a book of essentially similar content must have belonged 
originally to the Nic. Eth., to which book Aristotle refers in Metaph., I. 1, 981 b, 25. But 
the last of these identical books (Eth. Nic. VII. = Eth. Eud., VI.) belongs very probably 
either wholly or at least in its last chapters (Eth. Nic., VII. 12-15, which, like B. X. of 
the Nic., though not altogether in the same sense, treats of pleasure) not to the Nico- 
machean Ethics, and is also not to be viewed as an earlier draught of Aristotle s, but as a 
later revision, probably executed by Eudemus. The opuscule irepl aperuv Kal naKiuv is 
probably spurious. The eight books of the irohtriKd join on to the Ethics. According to 
Barth. St. Hilaire and others the original order of the Books was I., II. , I EL, VII., VEIL, 
IV., VI., V. : yet the theory that Book V. and VI., ha-ve been made to exchange places, is 
improbable ; Hildenbrand, Zeller, and others, oppose, while Spengel, and, in a recent work, 
Oncken (Staatsl. des Arist., I. 98 seq.) defend it. That Books VII. and VIII. should follow 
immediately after III. is extremely probable, was long ago affirmed, among others, by 
Nicolas d Oresme (died in 1382) and by Conring (who edited the Politics in 1656) to be 
the order intended by Aristotle. In B. I. Aristotle treats of the household, omitting, 
however, to give rules for the , moral education and training of children, since these 
depend on the ends pursued by the state. In B. II. he criticises various philosophical 
ideals and existing forms of the state. In B. III. he discusses the conception of the 
state, and distinguishes, as the different possible forms of government, monarchy and 

* With the possible exception of chs. 11, 12, 15. 

t In the second half the order has been considerably disturbed. The section, c. 10, p. 1184 a, 23-1184 a, 
15, must be misplaced ; Hildenbrand conjectures that it belongs at the end of c. 8. This conjecture is 
opposed by the expression eipr/rai irporepov, p. 1134 a, 24, which implies a greater separation from c. 8, and 
by the general plan evidently adopted by Aristotle in the whole work, in accordance with which the special 
and particularly the political bearings of each topic are not considered until each topic has been treated of 
in general terms; according to this method the passage in question should not come before c.9, and perhaps 
not before c. 10. C. 15 must follow immediately after c. 12, and hence Zeller would place this chapter, with 
the exception of the last sentence, between cc. 12 and 13; but since c. 13 in respect of subject-matter (not 
formally, indeed ; perhaps some words have fallen away from the beginning) joins on to c. 10 (Spengel 
asserts this corijecturally ; Hermann Adolph Fechner, Hatnpke, and others are more positive), the correct 
order is rather to be rei-tored by placing cc. 11 and 12 after 13 and 14. As the correct order, therefore, we 
would propose the following : cc. 8, 9, 10, excepting the section above indicated, 13, 14, then that section 
from c. 10, and finally 11, 12, 15. The defective arrangement may have arisen from the misplacement of a 
few leaves in an original codex. Originally, a leaf numbered, e. g.. a, contained say c. 8 post med. to c. 10, 
p. 1184 a, 23, leaf a + /., c. 10, 1135 a, 15 to c. 10, fin., p. 1136 a, 9. leaf a + II., c. 13 and 14, p. 1137 a, 4 to 
1138 a, 8, leaf a + ///., the passage now standing in c. 10, p. 1134 a, 23 to 1135 a, 15, leaf a + IV., cc. 11 and 
12, p. 1136 a, 10 to 1137 a, 4, and, finally, leaf a + F, the conclusion of the whole book, c. 15, p. 1188 a, 4 to 
1138 b, 14. The leaves then fell into the false order: a, a + 7/7., a + 7., a + 77., a + 77., a + F. The 
author of the Magna Moralia seems to have found this arrangement already existing. Perhaps at the 
place where this confusion arose, two books of the Eud. Ethics were inserted into the Ni, Eth. A differ 
ent order is proposed by Trendelenburg, Hist. BtMr. zwr PMloe., III. pp. 418-425. 


tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, politeia (a commonwealth of free citizens) and de 
mocracy. He then treats (III. 14-17) of the first of the above forms, which under 
certain conditions is reckoned by him as the best possible, and (III. 18, and its con 
tinuation : VII. and VIII.) of the good state, which is favored in respect of its external 
conditions, and is based on the supremacy of the best men, i. ., citizens who are virtuously 
educated. In Books IV. and V. follows the inquiry concerning the other forms of the 
state besides monarchy and aristocracy, B. V. being especially occupied with the investi 
gation of the causes of the preservation and destruction of governments; B. V. thus 
contains what, according to IV. 2, was to follow after the characterization and the descrip 
tion of the genesis of the different forms of the state, viz.: the science of Political Nosology 
and Therapeutics. In B. VI. Aristotle treats supplementarily of the particular kinds of 
democracy and oligarchy and of the different offices in the state, the discussion having 
been very likely originally extended to other topics, including, in particular, the subject 
of laws. At least the second Book of the Economics is spurious. The iroAirslai, a descrip 
tion of the constitution of some 158 states, is lost. The Poetic (-Kepi TTOIVTIKW) is incom 
plete in its present form. The Rhetoric, in three books, has been preserved. The Rhetor 
ad Alex, is spurious (according to Spengel who edited it in 1844 Victorius, Buhle, and 
others, who found their rejection of it on Quintil., III. 4, 9). 

The chronological order in which the works of rigidly philosophical form were written 
can be for the most part, though not in all instances, determined with certainty ; the 
interest belonging to the investigation of this subject is rather one of method than of 
development, since Aristotle seems to have composed these works (except, perhaps, those 
on logic) during his second residence at Athens, hence at a time when his philosophical 
development was already substantially complete. Frequently one work is cited in another. 
But these citations are in so many cases reciprocal, that it is scarcely possible to infer any 
thing from them as to the historical sequence of the works ; such inferences can be drawn 
with perfect certainty only when a work is announced as yet to be written. The logical 
writings were probably composed the earliest (in Anal. Post., II. 12, anticipatory reference 
is made to the Physics: /LLCLAAOV 6s (baveptis kv roZf K.ado hov irepl nivrjceui; 6sl faxOqvat rrepl 
avruv), and in the following order: Categories, Topica, Analytica, and still later the De 
Interpret., in which work the previous existence not only of the Analytica, but also of the 
Psychology, is affirmed by implication. Whether the ethical works (Eth. Nic. and Polit.) 
were written before (Rose) or after (Zeller) the physical and psychological, is question 
able, though the former alternative is by far the more probable ; Eth. Nic., 1.13, 1102 a, 26, 
presupposes only popular expositions of psychological problems (in the early dialogical 
works) and not the three books irepl V^W, an d VI. 4, init., points only to works of the 
same character on the difference between iroirjoig and Trpdf/f; VI. 13, 1144 a, 9, on the 
contrary, appears to imply the previous existence of the De Anima; but this book was 
also apparently not written by Aristotle, but by Eudemus. Aristotle could compose his 
ethical works before his psychological works, because (according to Eth. N., I. 13), though 
OeupqTEOv TGJ TroAm/ccJ Trepl ipvxifc, yet this is necessary only ifi boov kavcif %t Trpof TO, 
!;rjTovfj.eva, and ethics (Eth. N., II. 2) is not a purely scientific but a practical doctrine. The 
Ethics and Politics were followed by the Poetic (to which anticipatory reference is made, 
Pol., VIII. 7), and the Rhetoric (which appears to be referred to, by anticipation, in Eth., II. 
7, p. 1108 b, 6); according to Rhet., I. 11, p. 1372 a, 1 ; III. 2, p. 1404 b, 7, the Poetic, pre 
ceded the Rhetoric. That the Rhet. was composed immediately after the logical works 
(Rose) is scarcely to be credited ; it must have been preceded not only by the logical br.t 
also by the ethico-political works, in accordance with the Aristotelian dicta, Rhet., I. 2, 
( 1356 a, 25, and 4, 1359 b, 9 : TJJV prjropi^v olov irapafvtc ri rtfr dialeKTiKw wat. /cat TJ?C rrepi 


fjv 6inai6v ken Trpoaayopsveiv TTO^-IT LKTJV, and fj prjropLKr] ovyKEtrcu en rt T? 
I rr/f -rrepl ra ifirj iroAiTinijc.. The works relating to physics were com 
posed in the following order : Auscult. physicae, De Coelo, De Gener. et Corr., Meteorologica ; 
then followed the works relating to organic nature and psychical life. That the Metaphysics 
is of later date than the Physics (which Rose incorrectly places after the former) follows 
with certainty from Phys., I. 9, p. 192 a, 36: Trjq irpuTw QtXocoQias ipyov iorl diopicai, MOTE fie 
ineivov rbv naipbv (nrondcOu ; in it the Analytics, Ethics, and Physics are cited. According to 
the statement of Asclepius (Schol in Arist., p. 519 b, 33), the Metaph. was not first edited 
immediately after the death of Aristotle by Eudemus, to whom Aristotle is said to have 
sent it, but very much later, from an imperfect copy, which was completed by additions from 
other Aristotelian works. From this review it results inductively that Aristotle advanced 
in a strictly methodical manner in the composition of his works from the Trporepov Trpof j^udf 
to the itporepov tyvaet, in accordance with the didactic requirement, to which, with special 
reference to logic (analytics) and metaphysics (first philosophy), he gives expression in 
Met, IV. 3, p. 1005 b, 4, namely, that one must be familiar with the former before "hear 
ing " the latter. 

According to Strabo (XIII. 1, 54) and Plutarch (Vit. SulL, ch. 26) a strange fortune 
befell the works of Aristotle in the two centuries following the death of Theophrastus. 
The whole of the extensive library of Aristotle, including his own works, came first into 
the possession of Theophrastus, who left them to his pupil, Neleus of Skepsis in Troas ; 
after his death they passed into the hands of his relatives in Troas, who, fearing lest the 
princes of Pergamus might seek to take them away for their own library, concealed them 
in a cellar or pit (6iupv), where they suffered considerable injury from dampness. Accord 
ing to Athenaeus, Deipnos., I. 3, this same library had been acquired by purchase for the 
Alexandrian Library in the time of Ptolemaeus Philadelphia ; but this, at least, can not be 
true of the original MSS. of Arist. and Theophrastus. These manuscripts were finally 
discovered (about 100 B. c.) by Apellicon of Teos, a wealthy bibliophile, who bought them 
and carried them to Athens ; he sought as well as possible to fill up the gaps, and gave 
the works to the public. Soon afterward, at the taking of Athens by the Romans (86 B. c.), 
the manuscripts fell into the hands of Sulla. A grammarian named Tyrannion, from 
Amisos in Pontus (on him see Planer, De lyranmone grammatico, Berlin, 1852), made use 
of them, and from him Andronicus of Rhodes, the Peripatetic, received copies, on the basis 
of which he (about 70 B. c.) set on foot a new edition of the works of Aristotle, and drew 
up a catalogue of them. Strabo brings the narrative, at least in the text of the Geographica 
as we now possess it, only down to Tyrannion ; what relates to Andronicus is found in 
Plutarch. Strabo and Plutarch assume that in the period preceding their discovery by 
Apellicon, the principal works of Aristotle were inaccessible to students, or, in other 
words, that they existed only in the original manuscripts, and thus they explain the 
deviation of the later Peripatetics from Aristotle in doctrine ; and by the numerous 
hiatuses in the badly disfigured manuscripts, which no one knew how to fill out correctly, 
they explain the unfortunate condition of the text of Aristotle in later times. But the 
supposition that all the philosophical works of Aristotle remained concealed from the 
public after the death of Aristotle is in itself scarcely credible, and is refuted by the traces 
(which Brandis, Spengel, Stahr, Zeller, and others have, with more or less of success, 
pointed out) of an acquaintance with some of the most important of the strictly philo 
sophical works of Aristotle in the third and second centuries before Christ. The depo 
sitions of Strabo and Plutarch respecting the fortune of the manuscripts are, however, 
of unquestionable authority, and it is quite possible that not only some rough draughts 
made by Aristotle, which were not intended for publication, but also some of the larger 


works, in particular the Metaphysics, and perhaps aiso the Politico, were first made public 
after their discovery by Apellicon. (This is asserted in reference to the Psychology by E. 
Essen, in his Der Kdkr zu Skepsis, Stargard, 1866: the supposition is possible, that in the 
.twofold recension in which parts of the second Book of the Psychology have come down 
to us. and in which perhaps the entire work at one time existed, we possess, on the one 
hand, the form which the work received from Alexandrian tradition, and, on the other, the 
form in which it appeared after its revision by Andronicus ; still, it appears more probable 
that the one form is the Aristotelian, and that the other is the paraphrase of some Aris 
totelian.) The theory that several of the chief philosophical works of Aristotle were 
unknown in the time from Theophrastus and Neleus to Apellicon and Andronicus, receives 
a certain confirmation from the list of Aristotle s works in Diog. L., Y. 22-27, in case this 
list was (as Nietzsche argues) not derived from the work of Androuicus on the works of 
Aristotle, but, through the works of Demetrius Magnes, and Diocles, from the work of 
Hermippus the Callimachean (at least, for the most part, and aside from certain additions 
taken from authorities belonging to the time after Andronicus). 

The edition set on foot by Andronicus gave new life to the study of the works of 
Aristotle. The Peripatetics of the following period distinguished themselves particularly 
as paraphrasts and commentators, as did also several of the Neo-Platonists, such as 
Themistius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. From the Greeks the writings of Aristotle passed 
(with the exception of the dialogical works, which were suffered to perish) into the hands 
of the Syrians and Arabians (see below, 95 and 96). In the Christian schools some of 
the logical works of Aristotle and various expositions of the Aristotelian Logic by Boethius 
and others, were employed as text-books; St. Augustine s recommendatien of dialectic 
served as an authority for their use. The principal works of Aristotle on logic were, 
however, not known even to the Scholastics until about the middle of the twelfth century, 
and then only in Latin translations. In the second half of the twelfth and in the course 
of the thirteenth century the physical, metaphysical, and ethical writings of Aristotle 
became also known in the Western world, at first (until near the year 1225) only through 
the agency of the Arabs, but afterward by means of direct translations from the Greek 
(see below, 98) ; some works, in particular, the Politics, in place of which the Arabians 
knew only of spurious works on the same subject, became known only through the latter 
channel. The translations from the Arabian are distorted to the extent of being com 
pletely unintelligible ; the direct translations from the Greek, and especially the translation 
of all or, at least, of very many of the works of Aristotle, which was made in about 1260- 
1270 by Wilhelm von Moerbecke, by request of Thomas Aquinas, are executed with such 
literal fidelity, as in many instances to enable us to infer from their form what was the 
reading of Codices on which they are based, but they are done without taste and not 
unfrequently express no meaning. The reading of the physical writings of Aristotle was 
forbidden in 1209 by a Provincial Council at Paris, on account of the doctrine of the 
eternity of the world and some other doctrines which they contained, but which, in fact, 
were misconceived and misrepresented ; the reading of the physical and metaphysical 
writings was prohibited in 1215, by Robert of Courcon, the papal legate, on the occasion 
of his sanctioning the statutes of the University of Paris. This prohibition, which was 
renewed in a limited form in April, 1231, by Pope Gregory IX., remained formally in force 
until the year 1237 (according to the testimony of Roger Bacon, as cited by Emile Charles, 
Roger Bacon, Paris, 1861, pp. 314 and 412). But soon afterward, the judgment of the 
church concerning the works of Aristotle became more favorable. The Scholastics from 
this time on, depended, in philosophical respects, chiefly on the authority of Aristotle, 
although not abstaining from modifying in a measure some of his doctrines. In par- 


ticular, the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, which became the prevalent philosophy among 
the teachers of the church, was Aristotelianism, and even other Scholastic systems, as 
those of Scotus and Occam, which were opposed to the system of St. Thomas, remained 
substantially true to the teaching of Aristotle. In 1254 the Physics and Metaphysics of 
Aristotle were included among the topics to be taught by the Faculty of Arts at Paris. 
The Ethics and Politics of Aristotle were likewise held in high estimation, although the 
Politics at least was studied with less zeal. At the revival of classical studies in the 
fifteenth century the renewal of Platonism detracted somewhat from the prestige and 
authority of Aristotle. Still the study of Aristotle received an essential impulse from the 
extending knowledge of the Greek language. New translations of his works, more cor 
rect, more intelligible, and expressed in purer Latin, supplanted the old ones, and soon 
numerous Latin and Greek editions of his works were published. At the Protestant 
universities the works of Aristotle were zealously studied, owing especially to the influ 
ence of Melanchthon. In the sixteenth century nearly all of the works of Aristotle were 
frequently edited, translated, and commentated; in the seventeenth century considerably 
fewer, and during the greater part of the eighteenth century, with few exceptions, almost 
none. But toward the end of the eighteenth century a new interest in these works was 
awakened, an interest which still continues and seems even to be constantly increasing, 
and which manifests itself in numerous (above-cited) literary works. 

47. The divisions of philosophy, according to Aristotle, are theo 
retical, practical, and poetic. Theoretical philosophy is the scientific 
cognition of the existent, the end of the cognition being found in it 
self. Practical philosophy is that form of knowledge which relates to 
action or conduct, and which prescribes rules for the latter. Poetic 
philosophy is a form of knowledge having reference to the shaping 
of material, or to the technically correct and artistic creation of 
works of art. Theoretical philosophy, again, is subdivided into 
mathematics, physics, and " first philosophy " (ontology or meta 

The analytical and dialectical investigations (in the " Organon ") 
were apparently intended as a methodological propaedeutic to phi 
losophy, and not as a body of properly philosophical doctrine. Aris 
totle s conduct of them is, however, none the less for this reason 
strictly scientific. 

The various species of mental representations and of " dicta " (or 
parts of speech) correspond, according to Aristotle, with definite 
forms of that which exists. The most universal forms of existence 
are substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, pos 
session, action, passion. The forms of representations, and so of 
possible affirmations or "dicta respecting the existent," which are 
conditioned by these forms of the representable, are termed by Aris 
totle categories. The concept should represent the real essence of 


the objects included under it. Truth in a logical judgment is the 
correspondence of the combination of mental representations with a 
combination of things, or (in the case of the negative judgment) the 
correspondence of a separation of representations in the mind with a 
separation of things; falsity in judgments is the variation of the ideal 
combination or separation from the real relation of the things to 
which the judgments relate. Inference, or the derivation of one judg 
ment from others, has two forms, the syllogism, which descends from 
the universal to the particular, and induction, which rises to the 
universal from a comparison of the single and particular. A scien 
tific inference or a proof is an inference from true and certain 
principles ; a dialectical inference is a tentative inference from what 
appears true or even from mere (uncertain) indications ; a sophistical 
inference is a paralogism or fallacy, depending on false premises or 
deceptive combination. The principle of contradiction and excluded 
middle is with Aristotle an ultimate metaphysical and logical prin 
ciple, on which the possibility of demonstration and of all certain 
knowledge depends. Principles are known immediately by the rea 
son. The prior and more knowable for us is the sensible, or that 
which in the order of conceptions is less general and hence less 
removed from the sphere of sensuous perception ; but the really prior 
and more knowable are the principles, or at least those conceptions 
which are least removed in point of generality from principles. 

Of the more modern works on the whole System of Aristotle may be named : Franz Biese, Die Philoso 
phic des Aristoteles (Vol. I., Logic and Metaphysics ; Vol. II., The Special Sciences), Berlin. 1835-42 ; Chr. 
Aug. Brandis, Aristoteles, seine akademischen Zeitgenossen und n dchsten NacJtfolger, Berlin, 1853-57, or 
2d div. of the 2d part of his Handbuch der Gesch. der Grech.-Rom. Philos., and Uebersicht uber das 
Arist. Lehrgebande, 1st div. of the 3d part, Berlin, 1860 ; Ed. Zeller, Aristoteles und. die alien Peri- 
patetiker, Tubingen, 1861, 2d div. of the 2d part of the 2d ed. of his " Philos. der Griechen." Ch. Thurot 
(Etudes sur Aristote, Paris, 1860) treats of the Politics, Dialectic, and Khetoric of Aristotle. Cf. F. Meunier. 
Ar. a-t-il eu deux doctrines, Fune ostensible, Pautre secrete ? Paris, 1864. Otto Caspari s Die Irrthilmer 
der altclass. Philosophic in ihrer Bedeutung fur das philos. Princip (Heidelberg, 1868) treats prin 
cipally of Platonism and Aristotelianism, and in particular of the theory of ideas and the theory of knowl 
edge. [Thomas Taylor, Diss. on the Philos. of Aristotle, London, 1813. TV.] 

Of special works relating to the Aristotelian Logic may be named : F. J. C. Fraucke, De Arist. Us argu- 
mentandi modis, qui recedunt a perfecta sylogismi forma, Eostock, 1824; Car. Weinboltz, De Finibm 
atque Pretio Logicae Aristotelicae. ib., 1825 ; Ad. Trendelenburg, De Arist. categoriis proluxio ttcademica, 
Berlin, 1833, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, ib., 1846, pp. 1-195, 209-217, Elementa logices Aristoteleae, 
ib., 1836, 6th ed, 1868, Eilduterungen sur Arist. Logik, Berlin, 1842, 2d ed., 1861 (cf. on these works Max 
Schmidt and G. H. Heidtmann, in the Zeitschr.f. d. Gymnasiakcesen, V. VI. VII. 1851- 53); Phil. Gum- 
posch, Ueber die Logik und die logischen Sehriften des Aristoteles, Leipsic, 1839 ; Herm. Eassow, Aris- 
totelis de notionis definition* doctrina, Berlin, 1843; H. Hettner, De logices Aristotelicae zpeculativo 
principio, Halle, 1843 ; Car. Kuhn, De notionis dejinitione quaUm Arist. constituent, Halle, 1844; A. 
Vera, Platonis, Aristotelis et IJegelii de medio termino doctrina, Paris, 1845 ; A. L. Gastmann, De methodo 
philos. Arist., Groningen, 1845; C. L. W. Heyder, Kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung der Ari*- 
totelischen und Hegefschen Dialektik (1 Bd., 1 Abth. ; die Methodologie der Arist. Philos. und der 
friiheren Systeme), Erlangen, 1845; G. Ph. Chr. Kaiser, De logica Pauli Apostoli logices Aristoteleat 


mendatriee (Progr.), Erlangen, 1847 ; Carl Prantl, Ueber die Entwickelung der Aristotelischen Logik aus 
der Platonischen Philosophie, in the Abh. der Bair. Akad. der Wiss., hist.-phil. Classe, Vol. Vll., part 
1st, pp. 129-211, Munich, 1853 (c the sections on the same topic in Prantl s Gesch. der Logik); H. Bonitz, 
Ueber die Kategorien des Aristoteles, in the Sitewigsberichte der Wiener Akad. der Wiss., hisl.-philol. 
Cl., Vol. X., 1863, pp. 591-645; A. F. C. Kersten, Quo jure Kantius Arist. categorias rejec&rit (Progr. of 
the Realgymn. at Cologne), Berlin, 1S53; E. Essen, Die Definition nacfi Aristoteles (G.-Pr.\ Stargard, 
1864; J. Hermann, Quae Arist. de ultimis cognoscendi principiis docuerit, Berlin, 1864; Aristotle on 
Fallacies, or the Sophistic Elenchi, with a translation and notes, by Edward Poste, London, 1866; [77*<5 
Logic of Science, a trannl. of the Later Analytics of Aristotle, with an Introd. and Notes, by the same, 
London. TV.]; Wilh. Schuppe, Die Arist. Kategorien (in the " Progr." of the Gleiwitz Gymn. on the 
occasion of the celebration of the founding of the institution, April 29, 1S66), Gleiwitz, 1866; A. Wentzke, 
Die Kategorien des Vrtheils im Anchluss an Arist., erldutert und begriindet (G.-Pr.), Culm, 1868; 
Friedr. Zelle, Der Unterschied in der Aiiffassung der Logik bei Arist. und bei Kant, Berlin, 1870; Fried. 
Ferd. Kauipe, Die Erkenntnitatheorie des Arist., Leipsic, 1870. 

Of the Aristotelian conception of philosophy we have treated above (p. 3 seq.). We 
find a division of the system of philosophy, not very different from that adopted by Plato 
in the Topicn (1. 14, p. 105 b, 19) : "Philosophical problems and theorems are either ethical, 
physical, or logical (fjOiKai, <j>, or Aoy*/cat)," where by " logical " theorems are to be 
understood such as have a universal reference, or in which the specifically physical or 
ethical character is left out of consideration ; theorems, in other words, which belong to 
metaphysics (or ontology). But this division is given here by Aristotle only as a pro 
visional sketch (wf TvTrv 7repMa/3fh>). Where Aristotle expresses his opinion more 
exactly, he divides philosophy (in the sense of scientific knowledge in general) in the 
manner indicated at the beginning of this paragraph, Metaph^ VI. 1 : ndaa didvoia rj 
TTpaK.TiK.ij i] iroiqTiKT) f) deupTjTinf). Metaph., XI. 7 : 6r/hov TOIVW, on rpia jkvrj rtiv $e- 
prjTLKuv tcri - <f>voiKT?, fiad Tifj.aTiK.ii, Qto /MyiKTj (the latter identical with irpuTr) fyiAocofyia, which 
with Aristotle culminates in theology). To each of the different branches of philosophy 
Aristotle assigns a definite rank, the first place being given to the theoretical sciences. 
Of these latter, again, he pronounces "theology" (Oeoho-yiKr/) to be the highest, because it 
has the highest of objects following the principle, that the value of each science is in 
accordance with the value of its peculiar object : (3e7\.Ticjv 6e %eipcjv SKCKTT?} "kkytTai 
/card TO OIKEIOV ETuaTTjrov (Metaph., XI. 7). Aristotelians divided practical philosophy into 
Ethics (in the narrower sense), (Economics, and Politics (Eth. Eudem., I. 8: TroAm/o?, 
oiK.ovofj.LK.Tj KOI ^p6vT]cic_\ and in like manner Aristotle (Eth. Nic., VI. 9) co-ordinates olK.ovofj.ia 
and KohiTeia with ^povr/atg (moral insight, on which morality in the individual is held 
to depend). But where he defines himself more exactly, Aristotle describes (Economics, 
together with Rhetoric and Generalship, as sciences auxiliary to Politics. By Politics, in 
the broader sense of the term, Aristotle understands the whole of the ethical sciences, 
among which Ethics and the Doctrine of the State (Politics in the narrower sense) are 
included (Eth. N.. I. 1 ; X. 10 ; Rhet., I. 2). Poetic philosophy in its general conception is 
equivalent with Aristotle to technology in general, i. e., the doctrine of shapes or images 
iu any material ; but the special doctrine of the " imitative " arts, regarded in its philo 
sophical bearings, is the same with our modern "Esthetics," of which only the theory of 
Poetry (Poetics) was actually worked out by Aristotle. As Logic in the modern sense, or the 
Aristotelian Analytics, has no place in this division, Aristotle may be supposed to have re 
garded it only as a propasdeutic doctrine. With this agrees his above-cited declaration (Met., 
IV. 3) of the necessity of being acquainted with it before studying metaphysics, a declara 
tion which indeed places logic in a propa3deutic relation only to metaphysics (and in so far 
favors the supposition that Aristotle included it in vrpcjTTj QihoaoQia, as a formal introduc 
tion to the same), but which implies, nevertheless, a like propasdeutic relation to ethics and 
physics, in so far as the logical method, with which the student of philosophy must be 


previously familiar, is not only the method of metaphysics, but also of every philosophical 
discipline, including, therefore, ethics and physics. (This method is, of course, also the 
method of logic itself; on the circle thus resulting and its solution, cf. my System of 
Logic, 4.) 

The Analytica of Aristotle (together with the other works accompanying it) contain an 
exposition of the forms of inference and of cognitive thought in general, thought being 
resolved, as it were, into content and form, and the latter being made the special subject 
of consideration. Truth in knowledge is the agreement of knowledge with reality ( Categ., 
c. 12: TV -yap elvai TO irpajfj-a f] p.rj ahr)dr)$ 6 /Idyof rj i^evd^g /Uyera/). This dictum is 
thus particularized, in Met, IV. 7, with reference to the various possible cases : " Affirming 
non-existence of the existent, or existence of the non-existent, is falsehood; but affirming 
existence of the existent, and non-existence of the non-existent, is truth." As the con 
tent, so also the forms of thought are viewed by Aristotle in their relation to reality. The 
various kinds of words or of expressions, considered apart from all grammatical connection 
(TO. Kara firjdefjiiav av/nTr^oKTjv fay6fj.sva, De Cat, c. 4), represent so many ways of making 
"affirmations concerning the existent," or so many categories (JKVTJ ruv naTr/yopi&v, /car?/- 
yopiai TOV ovrof or ruv bvruv), and denote, accordingly, either 1) substance (ovaia or ri ion), 
as examples of which Aristotle mentions man, horse, or 2) quantity (TTOOOV), e. g., two or 
three yards long, or 3) quality (TRXOV), e. g., white, grammatical, or 4) relation (xpoq TI\ e. g., 
double, half, greater, or 5) place (nov), e. g., in the Lyceum, in the market-place, or 6) tune 
(TTOTC), e. g., yesterday, last year, or 7) position (utioOat), e. g., lies, sits, or 8) possession 
(e^eiv), e. g., is shod, armed, or 9) action (TTOIEIV), e. g., cuts, burns, or 10) passion (TTCIGXEIV), 
e. g., is cut, burnt. The correspondence of the forms of speech with the forms of being is 
expressly affirmed by Aristotle (Metaph., V. 7 : oaax^ -yap Aeyera*, rooavrax^ TO elvat 
OTjfiaivzL). The forms of representations (or categories) and the parts of speech being 
alike conditioned on the forms of existence, the former correspond with the latter. Thus, 
in particular (according to Trenclelenburg), the category of Substance corresponds with the 
Substantive (ovofia), while the other categories, collectively, correspond with the pf/t*a, in 
the wider sense (of Predicate) in which Aristotle employs this term ; and, more particularly, 
the categories of Quantity, Quality, and Relation with the Adjective and Numeral and 
certain Adverbs, the categories of place and time with the Adverbs (or Adverbial Expres 
sions) of place and time, the category of Position with the Intransitive Verb, that of Pos 
session with the Perf. Pass., that of Action with the Active Verb, and that of Passion with 
the Pass. Verb. While, however, this correspondence exists in a measure de facto, it is 
less evident that it was expressly indicated by Aristotle ; least of all is it certain that the 
Aristotelian categories arose from the observation of the different parts of speech. The 
theory of the parts of speech is in its first beginnings with Aristotle, and was first developed 
by later writers ; besides, the correspondence in question is not in all respects exact (Zeller, 
Ph. d. Gr., II. 2, 2d ed., p. 190 seq.). Aristotle seems to have had in view more the parts 
of the sentence than the different kinds of words, or rather he seems not yet to have distin 
guished between the two. (Cf., on the relation of the forms of reality to the forms of 
representations and the parts of speech, in the Aristotelian theory of categories, Ueber- 
weg, System der Logik, 47, 2d ed., Bonn, 1865, p. 92.) In all the works of Aristotle com 
posed after the De Cat. (supposing this to be genuine) and the Topica, the number of 
categories is reduced from ten to eight, Kelodat and e%Eiv being omitted, probably because 
Aristotle found that both might be subsumed under other categories. So Anal. Post, I. 22, 
p. 83 a, 21 and b, 15 (in which latter passage there can be no doubt that a full enumera 
tion was intended), Phys. V. 1 (where likewise completeness is necessarily implied), and 
Met., V. 7. Prantl, in his Gesch. der Logik (I. p. 207), gives a schematized harmony of all 


the passages in Aristotle where categories are mentioned. According to Prantl (p. 209), 
the essential import of the doctrine of categories is perceived, when we regard it, not as a 
complete enumeration of the forms of existence and thought, but as an expression of the 
truth that substance (ovcia) appears, determined in respect of space and time (rrov, TTOTS) 
and quality (noiov), in the world of things numerable and measurable (rrocov), and that 
within the sphere of manifold existence it shows itself active according to its determinate 
character (ITOIEIV, Trdaxeiv, irpog TL). In Analyt. Post., I. 22, all the other categories are 
contrasted with Substance, as accidents (cvLi^e^Kora}. In Met, XIV. 2, p. 1089 b, 23, 
three classes are distinguished: TO, ftlv yap ovaiai, TO. <Je natty, TO. de Trp6g TL, substances, 
attributes, and relations. Ovcia, as a category, denotes the independent, the substantial. 
But in another sense it signifies the essential; this latter is the object of the concept 
(Adyof). The concept is an expression of the essence of the objects which it denotes (/loyoc 
rfjq ovciac, Cat., 1 ; 6 Aoyof ri)v ovciav opi&i, De Part. Anim., IV. 6), and the essence 
corresponds to the concept (rj /card Adyov ovcia). That, in any thing, which is extraneous 
to the essence (ovcia) of the thing which exists, so to speak, as an appendage to the 
essence is accidental (cnyi/fr/^pcrff). Accidents are of two kinds, some being necessarily 
connected with the essential, so that we can deduce them apodictically from the latter, 
and others being not thus deducible ; the former belong to the object, in which they 
inhere, as such, or to the conception of the object (CV^E^KO^ na& avr6 , thus it is a 
necessary accident of the triangle that the sum of all its angles should be equal to two 
right angles); the latter are truly accidental (cvu^e^noq in the ordinary sense). In Defi 
nition (optcjuos) we cognize the essence of the thing defined (Anal. Post., II. 3). Through 
the combination (criyzTr/lo/a/) of representations determined according to the specified cate 
gories arise the Judgment and its expression, the Proposition (rnroQavcis), which latter 
may be either an affirmation (naTatyaoLq) or a negation (dir6<j>acic.). Every proposition ia 
necessarily either true or false ; not so are the uncombined elements of the proposition 
(De Cat, c. 4). Hence the Principle of Contradiction and of Excluded Third or Middle, in 
its logical form (De Cat, c. 10): "Of the affirmation and the negation of the same thing, 
the one is always false, the other true ; " Met, IV. 7 : " Between the two terms of a con 
tradiction there is no mean ; it is necessary either to affirm or to deny every predicate of 
every subject." The metaphysical or ontological form of the principle of contradiction 
(i. e., as applied to Being itself), on which the validity of the logical form depends, is thus 
expressed (Metap?i., IV. 3) : TO avrb dfta virapxeiv re nal [if/ vrcapxeiv aovvaTov rw avrti 
nal Kara TO avrd, "The same thing can not at the same time and in the same respect 
belong and not belong to the same thing." Of the principle in this form, no proof, accord 
ing 10 Aristotle, is possible, but only a subjective conviction, that no one can deny it in 
thought. To dirav <j>dvat fj cnro<j>dvai [the principle of excluded middle] is expressly declared 
by Aristotle (Anal. Post, I. 11) to be the principle of indirect proof. He defines the Syl 
logism (Top., I. 1 ; cf. Anal. Pri., I. 1) as a form of ratiocination, in which, from certain 
premises and through the force of those premises, there follows necessarily a conclusion 
different from the premises (ECTI 6fj cvTi^o ytc/j.df Adyof v <j TS&ZVTUV nvuv erepdv TL TUV 
nei/uevuv ff avdyKrjc; cvuflaiveL 6id TUV Kecftevuv). He assumes (Anal. Pri., I. 46, cf. 32 ; 
cf. the citations ad 103 in my System of Logic) three syllogistic figures, according as the 
middle term (opof picos) is either subject in one of the premises (Tcpordce^) and predicate 
in the other (first figure), or predicate in both premises (second figure), or subject in both 
(third figure). A syllogism which is correct in form has either apodictic or dialectic 
validity, according to the relation of the premises to objective truth. Top., LI: " Arro- 
cfo|ff [real demonstration] takes place when we conclude from true and ultimate premises, 
or at least from premises which have been proved true on the ground of other true and 


ultimate premises; the Dialectic Syllogism, on the contrary, concludes f evd6^av and 

ivdo^a are principles which appear true to the mass of men, or to the educated, or to indi 
viduals whose opinion is specially worthy of respect." An additional form of inference is 
the Eristic Syllogism, which concludes from premises having only an apparent or alleged, 
but no real probability. With the dialectical syllogism agrees, in the want of a strictly 
scientific or apodictical character, the Rhetorical Syllogism, but it differs from the former 
in its use the former being an instrument of examination, while the latter (which concludes 
"from probabilities or signs," and produces only a subjective conviction f EIKOTOV r/ 
erj/jLEuw) is an instrument of persuasion. In the province of demonstration rhetoric occu 
pies the same place as dialectic in the province of examination, inasmuch as each is con 
versant with material which in some sense is the property of all men, and which belongs 
to no particular science (KOIVCL rpo-nov rivd drrdvTuv EOTI -yvupifrw /cat avdefuiif e-mGTr/fj.jjf 
afyupicnivris), and as each deals only with the probable, whence Rhetoric forms the natural 
counterpart of Dialectic (Rhet.1. 1 : rj prrropturi dvrtcrrpo^of ry dta AEKTiny, cf. Cic., Orat, c. 32: 
quasi ex alteraparte respondens dialecticae; Dialectic teaches k&rd&iv /cat VTTE^EIV hoyov, and 
Rhetoric cnroloyeiaBat /cat KaTvyopuv). A form of investigation akin to the dialectical is 
the logical, i. e., the investigation of a topic in the light of universal conceptions alone 
(especially in the light of metaphysical conceptions, or such as belong to "first phi 
losophy "), in distinction from that method which looks rather to the particular or to that 
which is peculiar (OIKEIOV) to the subject of investigation, and which, therefore, in the depart 
ment of physics, " investigates physically " (pvoutu? &TEIV. JDe Gen. et Corr., 3] 6 a, 10, et al\ 
in the department of analytics, " analytically " (dvahvTiKus ^rclv], etc. (See Thurot, Etudes 
sur Aristote, Paris, 1860, p. 118 seq.) The Middle Term in that syllogism which is most 
important as an instrument of cognition, corresponds with and expresses an objective cause 
(Analyt. Post, II. 2: TO /J.EV yap alrtov TO [MECOV, cf. my Syst of Logic, 101). In Induction 
(kirayuyT], 6 et- kirayuy^ cv7^oyio}i6g) we conclude from the observation that a more gen 
eral concept includes (several or) all of the individuals included under another concept of 
inferior extension, that the former concept is a predicate of the latter (Anal. Pri., II. 23). 
Induction leads from the particular to the universal (OTTO TCJV nadinacTa ETTI TO, naQo^ov 
i(f>o6o, Top., I. 10). The term ETrayuyq, for Induction, suggests the ranging of particular 
cases together in files, like troops. The Complete Induction, according to Aristotle, is the 
only strictly scientific induction ; the Incomplete Induction, which with a syllogism sub 
joined constitutes the Analogical Inference (Trapd6iy/j.a), is principally of use to the orator. 
Considered absolutely, the Syllogism proper, which arrives through the middle term at 
the major term as the predicate of the minor (6 did TOV [IEOOV ovAAoy/opJf), is more 
rigorous, prior in nature, and more demonstrative (fivcei Trpdrepof /cat yvupi/nuTEpof, Anal. 
Pri., II. 23; PICLGTIKUTEPOV /cat Trpof TOV$ dvTtAoytnovc kvepyECTepov, Top., I. 12); but the 
Inductive Syllogism easier for us to understand (rjiilv hapysaTEpo^ Anal Pri., II. 23 ; iri-&a- 
vu~epov /cat cra^torepov /cat /cara rfjv alc&rjGiv yvupip.uTepov /cat Tolq TioTJiolq noiv6v, Top., 
I. 12). Universally, "the prior and more cognizable for us" is what lies nearest to the 
sphere of sensation, but " the absolutely prior and more cognizable " is what is most 
remote from that sphere (Analyt. Post, I. 2 : Trpof ^/zaf [IEV Trpdrepa /cat yvopi/iuTEpa rd 
EyyvTEpov TTJC attri^aewf, aTr/lwf 6~ Trpdrepa /cat yvapifiu-spa rd TroppuTEpov). The limits 
of knowledge are, on the one hand, the individual, on the other, the most general. In 
itself it is better because more scientific to pass from the "prior in nature" to the 
"prior for us," from the condition to the conditioned; but for those who can not follow 
this order, the inverse one must be employed (Top., YI. 4). The most general principles 
are insusceptible of demonstration, because all (direct) demonstration presupposes, as its 
basis or premise, something more general than that which is to be proved ; and some- 


thing, also, which must be at least as obvious and certain, or even more so, than the thing 
to be proved; the most general truths, therefore, must be immediately certain (Anal. Post, 
I. 2 ; cf. my System of Logic, 135). The absolutely first truths hi science must consist 
of indemonstrable definitions (rd irpura opaifiol eoovrai ava-nodeiKTOt, Anal Post., II. 3). 
These principles (as they are called, or apx ai } are the objects of reason (vovs) whatever is 
universally and necessarily derived from them is the object of science (eiriaTTj/mi), while 
opinion (fi6t-a), whose characteristic is instability (afieflacov), is concerned with whatever is 
subject to variation (Anal. Post., I. 33 ; II. 19). 

48. In the " First Philosophy," or, as it was subsequently 
termed, the Metaphysics of Aristotle, the principles common to all 
spheres of reality are considered. The number of these principles, 
as given by Aristotle, is four, viz. : Form or Essence, Matter or Sub 
stratum, Moving or Efficient Cause, and End. The principle of 
Form or Essence is the Aristotelian substitute for the Platonic Idea. 
Aristotle argues against the Platonic (or, at least, what he held as 
the Platonic) view, that the Ideas exist for themselves apart from the 
concrete objects which are copied from them, affirming, however, on 
his own part, that the logical, subjective concept has a real, objective 
correlate, in the essence immanent in the objects of the concept. As 
the one apart from and beside the many the Idea does not exist ; none 
the less must a unity be assumed as (objectively) present in the many. 
The word substance (ovoia) in its primary and proper signification 
belongs to the concrete and individual ; only in a secondary sense can 
it be applied to the Genus. But although the universal has no inde 
pendent existence apart from the individual, it is yet first in worth 
and rank, most significant, most knowable by nature and the proper 
subject of knowledge. This, however, is true, not of every common 
notion, but only of such notions as represent the Essential in the 
individual objects. These universal notions combine in one whole all 
the essential attributes of their objects, both the generic and the 
specific attributes ; they represent the essential Form, to denote which 
Aristotle employs the expressions el6o$, ^opy??/, rj Kara rov Xojov ovaia 
and TO rt j\v elvai [form, intelligible or notional essence. Tr. \. The 
matter in which form inheres is not absolutely non-existent ; it exists as 
possibility or capacity (dvvafiig, potentia). Form, on the contrary, is 
the accomplishment, the realization (evre/U^em, t-vepyem, actus) of this 
possibility. Relatively, however, matter may be styled non-existent, 
in so far as it denotes the as yet uneifectuated existence of the finished 
shape or thing (in which form and matter are united). The opposite 
of entelechy or actuality is deprivation, want, non-possession (are^at^]. 


No matter exists altogether deprived of form ; the idea of mere mat 
ter is a pure abstraction. But there does exist an immaterial form- 
principle, and this principle is the form which has " separable " or 
independent existence (%(*)piar6v), in distinction from the inseparable 
forms which inhere in matter. Form, in the organic creation, is at 
once form, end, and moving cause. Matter is the passive, deter- 
minable factor, and is the ultimate source of imperfection in things. 
But it is also the principle of individuation in things, form being 
not (as Plato asserts) the ground of unity, but only of homo 
geneous plurality. Motion or change (iUvgffif) is the passage of 
potentiality into reality. All motion implies an actual moving cause. 
Now, in the sphere of existence we find included that which is per 
petually moved and that which both moves and is moved ; there 
exists, therefore, a t&rtium quid, which is always imparting motion 
but is itself unmoved. This tertium is God, the immaterial and 
eternal Form, the pure Actuality in which is no potentiality, the self- 
thinking Reason or absolute Spirit, who, as absolutely perfect, is 
loved by all, and into the image of whose perfection all things seek 
to come. 

Scholia graeca in Arist. Metaphys-ica ed., Ch. A. Brandis, Berlin, 1887. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis 
commentarius in libros Metaphys. Arist., rec. Herm. Bonitz, Berlin, 1847. 

On the metaphysical principles of Aristotle, as compared with those of Plato, the following authors 
may be consulted : Chr. Herm. Weisse, De Platonis et Aristotelis in constituendis sutnmis philos. prin- 
cipiis differentia, Leipsic, 1828; M. Carriere, De Aristotele Platonis amico ejusque doctrinae junto 
censore, Gott. 1837; Th. Waitz, Plato und Aristoteles, in the Transactions of the 6th Reunion of German 
philologists at Cassel, 1848; F. Michelis, De Aristotele Platonis in, idearwm doctrina adversaria, 
Braunsberg, 1864; cf. Ed. Zeller. Plat. Studien (Tub. 1887, pp. 197-300: On Aristotle s account of Plato s 
Philosophy), Ueberweg, Platon. Untersudiungen (Vienna, 1861, pp. 177-180), and W. Rosenkranz, Die 
Plat. Ideenlehre und Hire Bekdmpfung durch Aristoteles, Mayence, 1869 (reprinted from Eosenkranz s 
W issenschaft des Wissens, Mayence, 1868-1869). F. Brentano treats of the various significations of exist 
ence according to Aristotle ( Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Scienden nach Aristoteles, Freiburg 
in Breisgau, 1862). G. v. Hertling treats of the Aristotelian conception of the One (in a Diss. Brl.\ 
Freiburg, 1864. Osc. Weissenfels, De casu et substantia Arist. (diss. inaug.), Berlin, 1866. K. G. Micbaelis, 
ZMT ErTddrung von Arist. Metaph. Z., 9 (G.-Pr.\ Neu-Strelitz, 1866. G. Heyne, De Arist. cam et con- 
tinaente (diss. inaug.\ Halle, 1866. On the form-principle, see F. A. Trendelenburg (TO evl elvai, TO 
iya0<3 eii/ai, TO ri fr elvai bei Aristoteles, in the Rhein. Mus.f. Ph., II. 1828, p. 457 seq. ; cf. T. s edition of 
the De Anima, pp. 192 seq., 471 seq. ; Gesch. der Kategorienlehre, p. 34 seq.) ; see also the works hy Biese, 
Heyder, Kflhn, Rassow, Waitz, and Schwegler, already cited (the passages bearing on this subject are indi 
cated by Schwegler in his edition of Aristotle s Met., Vol. IV. p. 369 seq.), and C. Th. Anton, De discrimine 
inter Aristotelicum rt eo-rt et -ri J,v elvai (Progr.), Gorlitz, 1847. A. de Roaldes, Les Penseurs dujovr et 
Aristotele, traite des etres substantiels, Meaux, 1868. On the Aristotelian expression o TTOTC Sy (which 
points to the substratum, or i>iro<eei/u.e>ov, e. g. : o TTOTC ov </>epd/mei/dv CO-TI, "whatever it may be [. ., any 
object, such as a stone, a piece of wood, a point] that is involved in progressive motion "), see Ad. Torstrik, 
in the RJiein. Mus., new series, XII. 1857, pp. 161-173. G. Engel writes of the ilXrj of Arist. in the Rhein. 
Mus.f. Ph., new series, VII. 1850, pp. 391-418. On the Entelechy of Aristotle, see J. P. F. Ancillon, Re- 
cherches critiques et philof,ophiques sur Fentelechie tfAristote, in the Transactions of the Berlin A cad. 
of Sciences, Philos. Class, 1804-11. On the Aristotelian doctrine of necessity, works have been published 
by Ferd. Kuttner (Diss., Berlin, 1853), and Bug. Pappenheim (Diss. Halensin, Berlin, 1856). Of his doc 
trine otJlnaUty treat M. Carriere (Teleologiae Arist. lineamenta, Berlin, 1838), and Gustav Schneider 


(Qua* fit causae finalls apud Arist. ms atgue natura, diss. inaug., Berlin, 1864, and more fully in hig 
De Causa finali Aristotelea, Berlin, 1865); cf. Trendelenburg, Log. Untersuch, 2d ed., Leipsic, 1862, II. 
p. 65 seq. 

The Theology of Aristotle is discussed by Vater ( Vindiciae theologian Arist., Halle, 1795), Simon 
(De deo Arist., Paris, 1839), Krische (Forsdiungen, I. pp. 253-311), C. Zell (De Arist. patriarum 
religionum aestimatore, lleidelb. 1847; Arist. in seinem VerJulltniss zur griech. Staatsreligion, in 
Ferienschriften, new series, Vol. I., Heidelb. 1857, pp. 291-392; Das Verhaltniss der Arist. Philos. zur 
Religion, Mayence, 1863), E. Reinhold (Arist. theologia contra falsam Ilegelianam interprttationem 
defenditur, Jena, 1848), O. II. Weichelt (Theologumena Aristotelea, Berlin, 1852), F. v. Reinohl 
(Darstellung des Arist. Gottetbegri/s und Vergleichung desselben mit dm Platonischen, Jena, 1854), 
A. L. Kym (Die Gotteslehre des Aristoteles und das Christenthum, Zurich, 1862), J. P. Romang (Die 
Gottesl. des Ar. u. d. Chr., in the Protest. Kirchenzeitung, 1862, No. 42), F. G. Starke (Aristotelis de 
unitate Dei sententia [G.-Pr.], Neu-Ruppin, 1864), L. F. Goetz (Der Arist. GottesbegHf, contained in 
Festgabe, den alien Crucianern zur Eimceihung des neiien Sc?iulgeb. geicidmet, etc., Dresden, 1866, pp. 
87-67). Other works, both new and old, are cited by Schwegler in his edition of the Metaphysics, Yol. IV. 
p. 257. The Psewdo-Aristotelian work, Theologia, of Neo-Platonic origin, translated in the ninth century 
into Arabic, known to the Scholastics in a Latin re-translation, first printed at Rome in 1519, and included 
in Du Val s and other editions of Aristotle (1629, II. pp. 1035 seq., and 1639, pp. 603 seq.) is the subject of an 
essay by Haneberg in the Reports of the Munich Acad. of Sci., 1S62, I. pp. 1-12; Haneberg treats (ibid. 
1862, I. pp. 361-388) of the book De Causis, included in the early Latin editions of Aristotle ( Venet. 1496 
and 1550-1552) as a work of Aristotle, but which in reality was extracted from Neo-Platonic works, and in 
particular from the Instit. Theol. of Proclus or one of hia disciples. Cf. below, 97. 

Reviewing the various orders of human knowledge (Metaph., L, cc. 1 and 2), Aristotle 
remarks that the experienced man (e/nretpos) is justly considered wiser than he whose 
knowledge is restricted to single perceptions and recollections; the man of theoretic 
knowledge (6 re^v/r^), than the merely experienced; the director of an undertaking 
involving the application of art or skill, than he who is engaged in it merely as a manual 
laborer; and, finally, he whose life is devoted to science (which relates to being ov 
as art, T^X 1 * 7 !, does to becoming, yeveols, Anal. Pos., II. 19), than lie who seeks knowl 
edge only in view of its application to practical uses : but in the sphere of scientific 
knowledge, he adds, that is the highest which respects the highest or ultimate reasons 
and causes of things: this highest in knowledge is "first philosophy," or wisdom, in the 
strict and absolute sense of the word (cro<&z, see above, 1, pp. 3 and 4). 

The four formal principles of Aristotle, form, matter, efficient cause, and end, are enu 
merated in Met., I. 3 (cf. V. 2; VIII. 4; Phys., II. 3), in the following terms: ra alrta 
leyeTat rerpa^wf, uv p-lav fikv alriav (&a/iV elvat rrjv ovciav Kai TO ri i]v dvat, . . . krepav 
tie Tifv vfyv nal TO VTroK.Eifj.Evov, TP LTIJV 6e bftev 1} apx?/ TJJS Kivqoeuc;, TETapTTjv 6s TT/V avn- 
Ki/LtV7]V atTtav rawTT?, TO ov f.VKd KOL rayai?<5v, TtAof "yap yevecEGM; Kai KivrjCEU^ Tracrjs 
TOVT koTiv. The oldest Greek philosophers, as Aristotle attempts in a comprehensive 
review of their doctrines (Hetaph., I. 3 seq.) to demonstrate, inquired only after the mate 
rial principle. Empedocles and Anaxagoras, he add.s, inquired, further, after the cause of 
motion. The principle of essence or form was not clearly stated by any among the earlier 
philosophers, though the authors of the theory of ideas came nearest to it. The prin 
ciple of finality was enounced by earlier philosophers only in a partial or comparative 
sese, and not as a complete and independent principle. 

Aristotle opposes numerous objections (Metaph., I. 9, XIII. and XIV.) to the Platonic 
theory of ideas, some of which relate to the demonstrative force of the arguments for that 
theory, while others are urged against the tenableness of the theory itself. The argument 
founded on the real existence of scientific knowledge, says Aristotle, is not stringent ; the 
reality of the universal does indeed follow from the fact in question, but not its detached 
existence ; did this follow, however, then from the same premises much else would fol 
low, which the Platonists neither do nor can admit, such as the existence of ideas of 


works of art, of the non-substantial, of the attributive and the relative ; for these things, 
too, possess ideal unity (TO v6j}ua ev). But if the existence of ideas is assumed, the 
assumption is useless and leads to the impossible. The theory of ideas is useless ; for 
the ideas are only an aimless duplication of sensible things (a sort of alcdi^ra aitiia, 
eternal sensibles), to which they are of no service, since they are not the causes of any 
motion in them, nor of any change whatever; neither do they help things to exist, 
nor us to know things, since they are not immanent in the common objects of our 
knowledge. But the hypothesis of the existence of ideas leads also to the impossible. 
It is affirmed of these ideas that they express the essence of their respective objects; 
but it is impossible that an essence and that of which it is the essence should exist 
apart (66^ eiev av advvarov, elvai x u P^ r tf v ovaiav KOI ov rj ovaia) ; furthermore, the 
imitation of the ideas in individual objects, which Plato teaches, is inconceivable, and 
the expression contains only a poetic metaphor ; to which must be added, finally, that 
since the idea is represented as substantial, both it and the individuals which participate 
in it must be modeled after a common prototype, e. g., individual men and the idea of man 
(the avTodvdpuTro^ after a third man (rpirog dvdpuTrog, Met., I. 9 ; VII. 13 ; cf. De Soph. EL, 
c. 22). The result of Aristotle s critique of the Platonic theory of ideas is, however, not 
merely negative. Aristotle is not, for example (as used often to be assumed), the author 
of the doctrine called Nominalism in the Middle Ages, the doctrine which explains the 
concept as a mere subjective product, and the universal as merely a subjective community 
in representation and grammatical designation. Aristotle admits that the subjective con 
cept is related to an objective reality, and in this sense he is a Realist ; but in place of the 
transcendent existence, which Plato ascribed to the ideas in contradistinction to individual 
objects, he teaches the immanence of the essence or the noumenon in the phenomenon. 
Accordingly he says (Met., XIII. 9, 1086 b, 2-7): Socrates, through his efforts to determine 
the concepts of things (to define them), led to the creation of the theory of ideas ; but he 
did not separate the universal from the individuals included under it, and in this he was 
right ; for without the universal, knowledge is impossible ; it is only its isolation apart 
from the world of real things, that is the cause of the incongruities which attach to the 
theory of ideas. (Cf. Anal. Post., I. 11 : eldrj per ovv elvai T) ev ri irapa TO. TtoJCka OVK avdynT), 
el cnr66eit;cg earat elvai uivroi EV Kara rco^tiv cA^i^f EITTEIV avdyKT). De Anima, III. 4 : 
kv roif %ovaiv vTirjv 6wduei inacrov iart TUV vorjruv. Ibid., III. 8 : kv roZf ddeai rolg ale- 
ftrj-ols TO. voqrd EGTIV.} More negative is the critique which Aristotle directs against the 
reduction of the ideas to (ideal) numbers, and against the derivation of them from certain 
elements (crro^em, Met., XIV. 1) ; in the efforts to effect this he finds very much that is 
arbitrary and preposterous : qualitative differences are construed as resulting from quanti 
tative differences, and that which can only be a function or state (rrddo^) of another thing, 
is made the principle or an element of the latter ; thus the quantitative is confounded 
with the qualitative, and the accidental with the substantial, in a manner which leads to 
numerous contradictions. 

The opinion of Aristotle, that the individual alone has substantial existence (as ovaia). 
the universal being immanent (iwTrdpxov) in it, seems, when taken in conjunction with the 
doctrine that (conceptual or scientific) knowledge is of the ovaia and, more particularly, that 
definition is a form of cognition of the ovaia (ovaiac yvwpiapo s), to involve the consequence 
that the individual is the proper object of knowledge, while in fact Aristotle teaches that 
not the individual as such, but rather the universal and ultimate, is in logical strictness the 
object of science. This apparent contradiction is removed, if we bear in mind the distinc 
tion between the different meanings of ovaia, viz.: "the individual substance," and "the 
essential." Substance, ovaia, in the sense of the essential, is termed by Aristotle (Metaph., 


I. 3 et al), TI Kara TOV %6yov ovaia, i. e., the essence which corresponds with and is cog 
nized through -the concept; but ovaia in the sense of the individual substance is defined 
(Metaph., A r . 8 ; XIY. 5 et al.) as that which can not be predicated of any thing else, but of 
which any thing else may be predicated (namely, as its accident), or as that which exists 
independently and separately (xupiorov). In Categ., 5, individual things are called "first 
substances" (irp&Tai ovaiai), and species, "second substances" (tievrepcu ovaiai). In Met., 
YIII. 2, Aristotle distinguishes in the sphere of ovaia aladrjTTj (sensible being): 1) matter 
(i A?7), 2) form (//op</>//), 3) the product of both (// K TOVTUV, the individual thing itself as a 
whole). The individual substance (the r66e TI) is the whole (auvo^ov) resulting from the 
union of the material substratum (vTroKei/j-evov, vhf) with the ideal essence or form ; it is 
the subject of mere states (TtdBrf) and relations (rrpof TI), that are distinguished according 
to the nine categories which, together with ovaia (individual substance), make up the 
system of ten categories. The more immediate subject of scientific inquiry is, indeed, the 
individual, but its ultimate and more appropriate subject is the universal in the sense of 
the essential. It is true that, according to Aristotelian principles, if the universal is the 
proper object of knowledge, it can only be such because it possesses reality in a higher 
sense than the individual; but such reality does belong to it, since it constitutes the 
essential in all individual substances. If the universal exists only in the individual, it 
follows, indeed, that the former can not be known without the latter, and that this was 
Aristotle s belief is coafirmed by the importance which he concedes to experience and 
induction in his theory of cognition and in his actual investigations in all departments 
of inquiry; but it does not follow that the individual, considered on the side of its 
individuality, must be the object of knowledge, for it can very well be this in view 
simply of the universal, which is immanent in it. Knowledge is concerned pre-eminently 
with the ideal essence (/card TOV "kbyov ovoia or TI rjv elvai) of individual substances (TUV 
ovattiv, Metaph., VII. 4, 1030 b, 5). In the case of the highest, i. e., the divine and imma 
terial sphere of being, however, this difference between the universal and the individual, 
according to Aristotle, does not exist. 

The expression TO T L fji> elvai, is with Aristotle the general formula for expressions of 
the following kind : TCJ ayaftu slvai, TO ivl tlva.i, TO avOpuTrv elvat., so that the T L f]v is to 
be considered as used substantively in the Dative. The use of dvat in theSe expressions, 
gives to them the force of abstract nouns, e. g., TO ayadbv, the Good, TO aya6(J dvai, the 
being good, goodness. (Similarly in the formula: earl fiev TUVTO, TO 6s elvai ov TCLVTO 
[e. g., Eth. Nic., V. 3 Jin.], i. e.. "the object is the same, but the ideal essence is not the 
same." So De Anima. III. 7 : nal ov% eTepov TO bpenTtKov nal ^EVKTIKOV OVT aAAr//l<jv OVTE 
TOV aiaOyTiKov, a/^d TO elvai aAAo). The Dative here is apparently the Dative of posses 
sion. The question TI COT/, "what is it?" can be answered by ayadov, iv, avOpuTroc;, 
"good," "one," "man," or by any other concrete term (although Aristotle uses that 
interrogative formula in so comprehensive a signification, that it can also receive an 
abstract answer) ; then TI EGTL is made to stand for the answer itself, and is hence em 
ployed as a general expression for aya66v, ev, avdputros, and the like concrete terms. Now, 
as a general formula to represent combinations of single Datives with elvat, we might, 
perhaps, expect to find the expression TO TI EGTI dvai-, but since the putting of the ques 
tion is to be conceived as already past, Aristotle chose the Imperfect f/v. (Another 
explanation of this Imperfect attributes to it an objective signification, as denoting the 
originally, eternally existent, the prius of individual existence ; but this Platonizing ex 
planation can not be admitted, because the abstract, which finds its expression in dvai, 
ought then, according to this view, to precede the concrete, while here priority is in 
the expression T L fjv, ascribed, if to either, to the concrete.) To T L rjv elvai denotes, accord 


ingly, the essence conceived as separate from its substrate, or, as Aristotle defines it 
(Met VII. 7, p. 1032 b, 14), ovoiav avev v /inc. The form of thought which corresponds with 
and may be said to express the ri jv elvai, is the Concept, Aoyo? (Eth. N., II. 6 : TOV Uyo* 
ri fyf elvat teyovra), whose content is given in the Definition (6 opiate, Top., VII. 5 ; 

Metaph., V. 8). 

Of the four principles : matter (TI vA?), form (TO ddoc), moving cause (TO WEV TJ Kivwt\ 
and end or final cause (TO ov evena), the three latter, according to Phys., II. 7, are often one 
and the same in fact ; for essence (form) and end are in themselves identical, since the 
proximate end of every object consists in the full development of its proper form (i. e. t the 
immanent end of every object, by the recognition of which the Aristotelian doctrine of 
finality is radically distinguished from the superficial utilitarian Teleology of later philoso 
phers), and the cause of motion is at least identical in kind with the essence and the end ; 
for, says Aristotle, man is begotten by man, and in general one fully developed organism 
begets another of the same species, so that though the causa efficients is not the form itself 
which is yet to be produced, yet it is a form of similar nature. In the organic creation, 
the soul is the unity of those three principles (De An., II. p. 415 b, 9: ouoiug 6 rj i/n^j? 
/card Tovg diupiafiivov^ Tpoirovq Tpei ama- nal yap S$fv r/ nivrjai^ avrr/ /cat ov evena /cat 
ug ovcia TUV kfj-tyvx^v GUfj-aTurv rj t/w^r/ ama). In the case of products, whose causes are 
external to the products themselves (Mechanism), as, for example, in the construction of a 
house, the three causes which stand opposed to matter are distinguished from each other 
not only in conception, but in reality. Examined in their relation to the phenomena of 
generation and growth, matter and form are opposed to each other as potentiality (di>vaiuic\ 
and actuality (or, as Aristotle terms it, "entelechy," evreAe^or). Of entelechy in general, 
Aristotle distinguishes two species : "first entelechy," by which the state of being com 
plete or finished is to be understood, and "energy," which denotes the real activity of 
that which is thus complete; yet in practice he does not bind himself strictly to the 
observance of this distinction (cf. Trendelenburg, ad De Anima, p. 296 seq., and Schwegler, 
Met., Vol. IV., p. 221 seq.). Motion or development is the actualization of the possible, qud 
possible (f/ TOV dwaTnv, 77 owaTov ivTehexeia . . . H LVIJCI^ torn-, Phys., III. 1). p]specially 
worthy of notice is the relativity, which Aristotle attributes to these notions, when he em 
ploys them in concrete cases : the same thing, he says, can be in one respect matter and 
potentiality, in another, form and actuality, e. g., the hewn stone can be the former in rela 
tion to the house, the latter in comparison with the unhewn stone, the sensuous side of 
the soul (or i/^/) can be the former in comparison with the intelligent mind (vov<;\ the 
latter when compared with the body. Thus the apparent dualism of matter and form 
tends at least to disappear in the reduction of the world to a gradation of existences. 

The very highest place in the scale of being is occupied by the immaterial spirit, called 
God. The proof of the necessity of assuming such a principle is derived by Aristotle 
from the development in nature of objects whose form and structure indicate design, and is 
founded on Aristotle s general principle, that all transition (nivrjoi^) from the potential to 
the actual depends on an actual cause. (Met., IX. 8 : Potentiality is always preceded in time 
by some form of actuality, ad -yap e/c TOV 6wdfj,ei ovrog yiyveTai TO ivepyeta ov VTTO svepyeia 
De Gen. Animal., II. 1 : baa (frvcei yiyvcTat rj T%VTI, VTT evepyeia ovrof yiyvETai K Toi> 
OVTOC.) Every particular object which is the result of development, implies an actual 
moving cause; so the world as a whole demands an absolutely first mover to give form to 
the naturally passive matter which constitutes it. This principle, the first mover (irpuTov 
nivovv) must (according to Met., XII. 6 seq.) be one, whose essence is pure energy, since, if it 
were in any respect merely potential, it could not unceasingly communicate motion to all 
things ; it must be eternal, pure, immaterial form, since otherwise it would be burdened 


with potentiality (rd ri fjv elvat ova EX EI v^-wv TO KP&TOV evretexeia yap). Being free from 
matter, it is without plurality and without parts. It is absolute spirit (vov(f), which thinks 
itself, aud whose thought is therefore the thought of thought (vdrjai^ VOT/OEUS). Its agency as 
the cause of motion is not active and formative, but passive, for it remains itself unmoved ; 
it acts by virtue of the attraction which the loved exerts upon the loving, for it is the Good 
per se and the end toward which all things tend (mvel ov nivovpevov . . . KIVEI d>f tpa/j-evov). 
Not at any given time did God shape the orderly world ; he conditions and determines the 
order of the world eternally, in that he exists as the most perfect being, and all things else 
seek to become like him ; the world as an articulate whole has always existed and will 
never perish. As being an " actual " principle, God is not a final product of development ; 
he is the eternal prius of all development. Thought, which is the mode of his activity, con 
stitutes the highest, best, and most blessed life (Metaph., XII. 7 : i) tieupia TO 
apiarov . . . nai <y^ fie ye linrrrapxei rj yap vov ivepyeta u?} "... VOTE C,ufj nal aluv 
/cat ai6io$ virdpxei rai tfftj). The world has its principle in God. and this principle exists not 
merely as a form immanent in the world, like the order in an army, but also as an absolute 
self-existent substance, like the general in an army. Aristotle concludes his theology (Met., 
XII. 10 jf?n.) and marks his opposition to the (Speusippic) doctrine of a plurality of inde 
pendent and co-existent principles, by citing the following line from Homer (77ms, II. 204): 

QVK ayadbv iro^vKoipavirj elf Koipavo fcrrcj. 

In essential agreement with this scientific justification of the belief in God s existence, 
though differing from it in form, was the substance of the popular reflections contained in 
the third book of the dialogue "Concerning Philosophy." Cicero (De Nat. Deorum, II. 
37, 95) has preserved from it a paragraph of some length, translated into Latin, and it may 
here be cited entire, as furnishing also a specimen of the style of Aristotle in his popular 
(exoteric) writings (to which is to be referred Cicero s praise in Acad. Pr., II, 119: flumen 
orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles ; cf. Cic., De Orat, I. 49, Top., 1, De Invent, II. 2, Brut, 
31, Ad Att., II. 1, 1, De Fin., I. 5, 14; Dionys. Halic., De Verborum Copia, 241, p. 187 of 
Reiske s edition, and De Censura Vet Script, 4, p. 430) : " Imagine men who have always 
dwelt beneath the earth in good and well-illuminated habitations, habitations adorned with 
statues and paintings and well furnished with every thing which is usually at the com 
mand of those who are deemed fortunate. Suppose these men never to have come up to 
the surface of the earth, but to have gathered from an obscure legend that a Deity and 
divine powers exist. If the earth were once to be opened for these men, so that they 
could ascend out of their concealed abodes to the regions inhabited by us, and if they 
were to step forth and suddenly see before them the earth and the sea and skies, and 
perceive the masses of the clouds and the violence of the winds ; and if then they were 
to look up at the sun and become cognizant of its magnitude and also of its workings, that 
he is the author of day, in that he sheds his light over the entire heavens ; and if after 
ward, when night had overshadowed the earth, they were to see the whole sky beset and 
adorned with stars, and should contemplate the changing light of the moon in its increase 
and decrease, the rising and setting of all these heavenly bodies, and their course to all 
eternity inviolable and unalterable : truly, they would then believe that Gods really exist, 
and that these mighty works originate with them." 

49. Nature is the complex of objects having a material constitu 
tion and involved in necessary motion or change. Change (peTafioXrj) 
or motion (icivrjai^ in the broader sense, includes, on the one hand, 


origin and decay (or motion from the relatively non-existent to the 
existent, and conversely) ; and, on the other, motion in the narrower 
sense, which again is divisible into three species : quantitative mo 
tion, qualitative motion, and motion in space ; or increase and de 
crease, qualitative transformation, and change of place ; the latter 
accompanies all other species of motion. The universal conditions 
of all change of place and of all motion, of whatever kind, are place 
and time. Place (ro-rrog) is defined as the inner limit of the inclosing 
body. Time is the measure (or number) of motion with reference to 
the earlier and later. No place is empty. Space is limited; the 
world possesses only a finite extension ; outside of it is no place. 
Time is unlimited ; the world was always, and always will be. The 
primum motum is heaven. The sphere, to which the fixed stars 
are attached, has, since it is in immediate contact with the Deity, the 
best of all possible motions, namely, the motion of uniform circular 
rotation. Aristotle seeks to explain the movements of the planets by 
the theory of numerous spheres moved, in various senses, by unmoved^ 
immaterial beings, who are, as it were, a sort of inferior gods. The 
earth, which is spherical, reposes unmoved at the center of the world. 
The five material elements ether, fire, air, water, and earth occupy 
in the universe determinate places, suited to their natures. The ether 
fills the celestial spaces, and of it the spheres and the stars are formed. 
The other elements belong to the terrestrial world ; they are distin 
guished from each other by their relative heaviness or lightness, and 
also by their relative warmth or coldness and dryness or moisture ; 
they are commingled in all terrestrial bodies. Nature, guided by the 
principle of finality and proceeding by the way of an ever-increasing 
subjection of matter to form, produces on the earth a scale of living 
beings. Each superior degree in this scale unites in itself the charac 
ters of the inferior degrees, adding to them its own peculiar and more 
excellent virtue. The vital force, or the soul, in the widest sense of 
this word, is the entelechy of the body. The vital force of the plant 
is nothing more than a constructing force ; the animal possesses this, 
and the faculties of sensation, desire, and locomotion besides ; man 
combines with all these the faculty of reason. Reason is partly 
passive, subject to determining influences and of temporary duration, 
partly active, determining, and immortal. 

Aleasandri Aphrodisiensi* Quaestionum Naturalium e,t Morali-wm ad Aristotelis philosophiam illua- 
trandam libri quatuor, esc recens. Leonh. Spengel, Munich, 1842. 

The content of the writings of Ariatotle on natural science is treated of by George Henry Lewes in his 


Aristotle, o Chapter from the History of Science, London, 1864, German translation by J. V. Cams, Leips. 
1865; cf. J. B. Meyer s account of the book in the Gbtt. gel. Am., 1865, pp. 1445-1474. 

On the character of the Aristotelian Physics in general, cf. C. M. Zevort (Paris, 1846), Barthelemy St. 
Hilaire (in the Introd. to his edit of the Phys., Paris, 1862), Ch. Leveque (La Physique d Aristote et la 
Science Contemporaine, Paris, 1S63). On Aristotle s doctrine of the eternity of the world, see the article 
by H. Siebeck, Zeitsclirift fur exacte Philosophie, IX. 1869, pp. 1-33 and 131-154. 

On the Arist doctrine of space and time : G. E. Wolter (Bonn, 1848), and Otto Ule, on Aristotle s 
and Kant s doctrines of space (Halle, 1850) ; on the doctrine of time alone (Phys., A. 10 seq.) : Ad. Torstrik, 
Philologus, voL 26, 1S68, pp. 446-523; on the doctrine of continuity: G. Schilling (Giessen, 1840). 

On the mathematical knowledge of Arist. : A. Burja (in Mem. de FAcad. de Berlin, 1790- 91); on his 
mechanical problems: F. Th. Poselger (in Abh. der Berl. Akad., 1829), Euelle (Etude sur un passage 
d Aristote relatif d la mechanique, in the Revue Arcfieol.. 1857, XIV., pp. 7-21); on his meteorology : J. 
L. Ideler (Berlin, 1832), and Suhle (G.-Pr., Bernb. 1864); on his theory of light: E. F. Eberhard (Coburg, 
1836), and Prantl (Arist. iiber die Farben erldutert durch eine Uebers-icht uber die Farbenlehre der 
Alien, Munich, 1849); on his geography: B. L. Konigsmann (Schleswig, 1803-1806). 

On the botany of Aristotle : Henschel (Breslau, 1824), F. Wimmer (Phytologiae Arist. Fragm., Breslau, 
1838), Jessen (Ueber des Arist. Pflanzc-nwerke, in the Rh. Mus., new series, XIV., 1859, pp. 88-101). On 
the Zoology of A., cf., besides the annotations of J. G. Schneider in his edition of the Ilistoria Animalium. 
(Leips. 181 1), the works of A. F. A. Wiegmann (Obser-v. zoologicae criticae in Arist. historiam animalium, 
Berlin, 1826), Karl Zell (Ueber den Sinn des Geschmacks, in: Ferienschriften, S. Sammlung, Freiburg, 
1S33), Joh. Muller (Ueber den glatten Uai des Arist., Akad., Berlin, 1842), Jurgen Bona Meyer (Deprin- 
cipiis Arist. in distribut. animalium adhibitis, Berlin, 1854; Arist. 77iierA"itnd e, Berlin, 1855), Sonnen- 
burg (Zu Aristot. Thiergexchichte, G.-Pr., Bonn, 1857), C. J. Sundeval (Die TJderarten des Aristot., 
Stockholm, 1863), Langkavel (Zu De Part. An., G.-Pr., Berlin, 1868), Aubert (Die Ccphalopoden de 
Arist. in zoologischer, anatomischer und gescJiichtlicher Beziehung, in the Zeitschr. f. utiss. Zoologie, 
XII., Leips. 1S(J2, p. 372 seq. ; cf. the edition with translation and notes of Aristotle s work on the Genera 
tion and Development of Animals, by II. Aubert and Fr. Wimmer, Leipsic, I860), Henri Philibert (Le 
Principe de la Vie sui oant Aristote, Chaumont, 1865; Arist. philosopJiia zoologica, thesis Pariiensis, 
Chaumont and Paris, 1865), Charles Thurot (Observations critiques sur le traite a" 1 Arist. De Partibus 
Animalium, in the Revue Crit., new series, 1867, pp. 223-242). The two following authors treat specially 
of Aristotle s doctrines of human anatomy and physiology : Andr. Westphal (De anatomia Aristotelis, 
imprimis num cadavera seciierit humana, Greifswald, 1745), and L. M. Philippson (i/Arj avQptairivy], 
pars I. : de internarum humani corporis partium cognitione Aristotelis cum. Platonis sententiis com- 
parata ; pars II. : philosophorum vetenim uxque ad Theophrastum doctrina de sensu, Berlin, 1831). 
Of Aristotle s physiognomies treat E. Taube (G.-Pr., Gleiwitz, 1866), and J. Henrychowski (Diss. Inaug., 
Breslau, 1868). 

The following authors treat of the Psychology of Aristotle: Joh. Heinr. Deinhardt (Der Begriff der 
Seelt mit Riicksicht auf Aristoteles, Hamburg, 1840), Gust. Hartenstein (De psychol. vulg. wig. ab 
Aristotele repetenda, Leipsio, 1840), Car. Phil. Fischer (De principiis Aristotelicae de anima doctri- 
nae diss., Erlangen, 1845), B. St. Hilaire (in his edition of the De Anima, Paris, 1846), Wilh. Schrader 
(Arist. de voluntate doctrina, Progr. des Brandenb. Gi-mn., Brandenburg, 1847, and Die Un-cttr- 
blichkeitslehre des Aristoteles, in N. Jahrb. f. Philol u. Pad., Vol. 81, 1860, pp. 89-104), W. Wolff 
( Von dem Begriff des Arist. uber die Seele und dessen Anu-endung ait/die heutige Psychologic, Progr., 
Bayreuth, 1845), Gsell-Fels (Psychol. Plat, et Arist, Progr.. Wur/burg, 1854), Hugo Anton (Doctrina 
de nat. horn, ab Arist. in scriptis ethicis proposita, Berlin, 1852, and De hominis habitu natural* 
quam Arist. in Eth. Nic. proposuerit doctrinam, Erfurt, 1860). W. F. Volkmann (Die Grundzuge 
der Aristotelischen Psychologie, Prague, 1858), Herm. Beck (Arist. de sensuum actione, Berlin, 186 ), 
Pansch (De Aristotelis animae definition* diss., Greifswald, 1861), Wilh. Biehl (Die Arist. Dcfinit. 
der Seele, in Verh. der Augsburger Philologen-Vers. for the year 1862, Leipsic, 1863, pp. 94-102), J. 
Freudenthal (Ueber den Begriff des Wortes ^avratria bei Arist., Gottingen, 1863), A. Gratacap (Arist. 
de sensibus doctrina, diss. ph., Montpellier, 1866). Leonh. Schneider (Die Unterblichkeitslehre (its 
Aristoteles, Passau, 1867), Eugen Eberhard (Die Arist. Definition der Seele und ihr Werth fur die 
Gegenwart, Berlin, 1868), [George Grote, in the Supplement to the third edition of Bain s Senses and the 
Intellect, London, 1869. TV.] 

Aristotle s doctrine of the vous is discussed in works by F. G. Starke (Neu-Euppin, 1838), F. H. Chr. 
Eibbentrop (Breslau, 1840). Jul. Wolf (Arist. de intellectu agente et patiente doctrina, Berlin, 1844), and 
others, and, recently, by Wilh. Biel (Gymn.-Pr., Linz, 1864), and Franz Brentano (Die Psychologie des 
Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom vovs TTOIT/TIKO?, nebst einer Beilage iiber das Wirken des 
Arist. Gottes, Mayence, 1867). Cf., also, Prantl, Gesch. d. Log., I. p. 108 seq., and F. F. Kampe, I>i 
Erkenntnisslehre des A., Leipsic, 1870, pp. 3-60. 


Aristotle designates (Phys., II. 1) as the universal character of all which is by nature, 
that it has in itself the principle of motion and rest, while in the products of human art 
there is no tendency to change. All natural existences (De Coelo, I. 1) are either them 
selves bodies, or have bodies or are principles of things having bodies (e. g., body ; man ; 
oul). The word motion (nivrjoig) is sometimes used by Aristotle (e. g., Phys., III. 1) as 
S3 r nonymous with change (//ra/3o/b?) ; but, on the other hand, he says (Phys., V. 1), that 
though all motion is change, yet the converse is not true, all change is not motion, such 
changes, namely, as aflfect the existence of objects, i. e., generation and decease (yevems and 
(j>dopa) are not motions. Motion proper exists in the three categories of quantity (/card TO 
Troaov or Kara piyedoc;), quality (/card TO iroiov or /card Trdflof), and place (/card TO TTOV or /card 
TOTTOV) : in the first case it is increase and decrease (avfyatc /cat yOiai?) ; in the second, 
alteration (aTJiaioatf) ; in the third, change of place (<popd). Aristotle defines roTroj* (Phys., 
IV. 4, p. 212 a, 20), as the first and unmoved boundary of the inclosing body on the side 
of the inclosed (TO TOV irepis^ovTo^ irepa^ anivnTov Trpwrov). ToVof may be compared to an 
unmoved vessel, containing the object whose rdrrof it is. Aristotle understands, therefore, 
by rdTroc, not so much the space through which a body is extended, as, rather, the limit by 
which it is bounded, and this conceived as fixed and immovable ; his chief argument for 
the non-existence of an unfilled rdVof and for the non-existence of a rdVof outside of the 
world, is founded on the above definition, in accordance with which no void within or 
region without the world is possible. All motion must, according to Aristotle, take place 
in a plenum by means of an exchange of places (avTnrepioTaots). The motion of the world, 
as a whole, is not an advancing, but simply a rotary motion. The definition of time [re 
cited above] is worded as follows (Phys., IV. 11, pp. 219 b, 1, 220 a, 24): 6 #p6wf apiBpbq 
ecru nivyaeuc; /card TO irpoTepov nal vaTspov. For the measure of time the uniform circular 
motion is especially appropriate, since it is most easily numbered. Hence time is repre 
sented (ch. 14) as connected with the motion of the celestial spheres, since by these all 
other motions are measured. But time is (ch. 11, p. 219 b, 8) the number which is reck 
oned, not that by means of which we reckon. Without a reckoning soul there would be 
no number, hence no time, but only motion, and in it an earlier and later. 

All motion in nature is directed to an end. " God and nature do nothing in vain " (6 0eof 
Kai rj tyvGic ovdsv jj.dTrjv TTOLOVOIV, De Coelo, I. 4). Nevertheless, a certain room is left by 
Aristotle (Phys., II. 4-6) for the play of the accidental (avTo/uaTov) or the advent of results, 
which were not intended, in consequence of some secondary effect following from the 
means used to bring about another end ; under the aird^arov falls, as a concept of nar 
rower extension, chance (r/ TVXV), the emergence of a result which was not (consciously) 
intended, but which might have been intended (e. g., the finding of a treasure while 
plowing the ground). Nature does not always attain her ends, on account of the obstacles 
offered by matter. The degree of perfection in things varies according as they are more or 
less removed from the direct influence of God (cf. 48). God acts directly on the firmament 
of the fixed stars, which he touches, without being touched by it. (The notion of contact 
(d0#), which Aristotle (Phys., V. 3) defines as the juxtaposition of d/cpa or (De Gen. et Corr., 

* [TOTTOS is the Greek word for space. It signifies, properly, however, rather place than space, and this 
is the signification which it has with Aristotle. Aristotle s conception of space is not that of indefinite 
extension. He disallows the idea of unfilled space, and aa nothing can occupy space but the world, and as 
the world is, in Aristotle s view, a bounded sphere, it follows that space in general must be the "place" 
occupied by the world, and that its limits are the limits of the world. Aristotle remarks, however, that not 
the world, but only its parts, are in space which follows from his definition. The place of any thing. h 
defines, is the inner surface of the body surrounding it that surface being conceived as fixed and immova 
ble. As nothing exists outside of the world, e xcept God, who is pure thought and not in space, the world 
naturally can not le in space, i. e., its "place" can not be defined. TV.] 


I. 6) eo%ara, is here intermediate in signification between contiguity in space and ideal 
affection.) God moves the world from its circumference. The motion of the heaven of 
the fixed stars is better than that of the planetary spheres ; the obliquity of the ecliptic 
marks an imperfection of the lower regions ; less perfect still are the motions which are 
accomplished on the earth. Each motion of a surrounding sphere is communicated to the 
spheres included in it, so, in particular, that of the sphere of the fixed stars to all the rest ; 
when this effect ought not to be produced, as in fact it is not by the planetary spheres on 
those still inferior, retroacting spheres, or spheres with a counter-motion, are requisite. 
The whole number of spheres assumed by Aristotle is 47, or according to another con 
struction, 55 (Met., XII. 8). 

The nature of the Ether (which extends from the heaven of the fixed stars down 
to the moon, Meteor., I. 3) adapts it especially for circular motion ; to the other elements, 
the upward motion (i. e., from the center of the world toward its circumference) or 
the downward (i. e., from the circumference to the center) is natural. Of these other 
elements, earth is the one to which the attribute of heaviness belongs, and its natural 
place in the world is, consequently, the lowest, viz. : the center of the world ; fire is the 
light element, and its place is the sphere next adjoining the sphere of the ether. Fire 
is warm and dry, air is warm and moist (fluid), water is cold and moist (fluid), and 
earth is cold and dry. Ether is the first element in rank (Meteor., I. 3 ; De Coelo, I. 3 ; 
cf. De Gen. An., II. 3); but if we enumerate, beginning with the elements directly 
known by the senses, it is the fifth, the subsequently so-called TrtyzTrrov croixciov, quinta 

In all organic creations, even in the lowest animals, Aristotle (De Part. An., I. 5) finds 
something admirable, full of purpose, beautiful and divine. The plants are less perfect 
than the animals (Phys., II. 8) ; among the latter, those which have blood are more perfect 
than the bloodless, the tame than the wild, etc. (De Gen. An., II. 1 ; Pol, I. 5). The 
lowest organisms may arise by original generation (generatio spontanea sive aequivoca, i. e., 
by " generation " only homonymously so called [opuvv/uug], and consisting in evolution from 
the heterogeneous). But in the case of all higher organisms, like is generated by like ; in 
those which have attained their full development, the germs of new organisms of the same 
name and species are developed (Metaph., XII. 3 : licdoTrj EK GWCJVV/LKJV yiyvtrai % ovaia 
. . . av6pcj7ro -yap avdpunov yewa). In the act of generation Aristotle teaches that the 
form-giving or animating principle proceeds from the male, and the form-receiving or 
material principle from the female. 

The two general classes in which Aristotle includes all animals, namely, animals having 
blood and bloodless animals, correspond with what Cuvier termed the Vertebrates and the 
Invertebrates. The latter are classified by Aristotle as either Testacea, Crustacea, Mollusks. 
or Insects ; and the former as Fishes, Amphibious Animals, Birds, and Mammalia : the ape 
is viewed by him as an intermediate form between man and other viviparous animals. 
Aristotle founds the division of his anatomical investigations on the distinction of 
avo/Lioiofiepi?, i. e., organs, whose parts are not like the organs themselves (e. g., the hand ; 
the hand does not consist of hands), and 6/uoiouep^, i. e., substances, whose parts are like 
the substances themselves (e. g., flesh, blood ; the parts of a piece of flesh or of a mass of 
blood are like the wholes to which they belong). Aristotle had a far more exact knowl 
edge of the internal organs of animals than of those of the human body. The (physio 
logical) work on the Senses and the work on the Generation and Development of 
Animals are followed in the " History of Animals " by a collection of observations on 
the habits of life, and, in particular, on the psychical functions of the different classes 
of animals. 


Aristotle defines the soul as the first entelechy of a physical, potentially living and 
organic body (De Anima, II. 1 : eorlv ovv ^v^V vreAx * V irp^rrj </"<*? (jtvainov Sur /v 
IXOVTOS dwapec TOWVTOV tie b dv % bpyavmov). "First entelechy" is related to "second," 
as knowledge (enwra^o/) to speculation (Veupeiv). Neither is mere potentiality ; both are 
realized potentialities ; but while knowledge may be ours as a passive possession, specula 
tion is, as it were, knowledge in activity, or knowledge put to its most characteristic use ; 
so the soul is not (like the divine mind) always engaged in the active manifestation of its 
own essence, but is always present, as the developed force capable of such manifestation. 
As the entelechy of the body the soul is at once its form (principium formans), its prin 
ciple of motion and its end. Each organ exists (De Part. An., I. 5) in view of an end, and 
this end is an activity; the whole body exists for the soul. The vegetable soul, i. e., the 
vital principle of the plant, is (according to De An., II. 1 et al.) a nourishing soul, TO 
OpsTTTiKov, the faculty of material assimilation and reproduction. The animal possesses in 
addition to this the sensitive, appetitive and locomotive faculties (TO aio&JiTindv, TO ope/cn/cov, 
TO KivqTiKov /card TOTTOV). The corporeo-psychical functions of animals (at least of the 
more highly developed animals) have a common center (JUOOTJK), which is wanting in 
plants ; the central organ is the heart, which is viewed by Aristotle as the seat of sensa 
tion, the brain being an organ of subordinate importance. Sensuous perception (alcdqai^ 
is the result of qualities which exist potentially in the objects perceived and actually in the 
perceiving being. The seeing of colors depends on a certain motion of the medium of 
vision (air or water). "With sensuous perception are connected imaginative representation 
(<pav-aoia), which is a psychical after-effect of sensation (De An., III. 3), or a sort of weak 
ened sensation (Rhet., I. 11, 1370 a, 28), and also (involuntary) memory (iivij^rf), which is 
to be explained by the persistence (jJ-ovij) of the sensible impression (De Memor., ch. 1 ; Anal. 
Post., II. 19), and (voluntary) recollection (avd/uvyots), which depends on the co-operation 
of the will and implies the power of combining mental representations (De Memor., ch. 2). 
Out of these theoretical functions, combined with the feeling of the agreeable and the 
disagreeable, springs desire (6pe^); whatever, says Aristotle, is capable of sensation, is 
also capable of pleasure and pain and of the feeling of the agreeable and disagreeable, and 
whatever is capable of these, is capable also of desire (De An., II. 3, p. 414 b, 4). The 
human soul, uniting in itself all the faculties of the other orders of animate existence, is a 
Microcosm (De An., III. 8). The faculty by which it is distinguished from those orders is 
reason (yov^). The other parts of the soul are inseparable from the body, and are hence 
perishable (De An., II. 2) ; but the vovc exists before the body, into which it enters from 
without as something divine and immortal (De Gen. Animal, II. 3 : Mineral TOV vovv fiovov 
BvpaOev, eTreicisvat /cat 6clov dvat povov). But the concept or notion is impossible without 
the representative image (QdvTaapa). This stands to the concept in a relation similar to 
that in which the mathematical figure stands to that which is demonstrated by means of 
it, and only by the aid of such an image, joined with the feeling of the agreeable or dis 
agreeable, can the reason act upon the appetitive faculty, i. e., become practical reason 
(De An., III. 10). The voi>f, therefore, in man, has need of a ovva^tq, or what may be called 
an unfilled region of thought, a tabula rasa, before it can manifest its form-giving activity 
(De An., III. 4 : \yov<; ZGTL\ ypa/njudTEiov, cj [i7}$v virdpxet svepyeig Accord 
ingly, a distinction must be made between the passive reason (voi)f ^aBr/TLKO^), as the form- 
receiving, and the active reason (vov? Tro^rt/cof), as the form-giving principle ; substantial, 
eternal existence belongs only to the latter (De Anima, III. 5 : 6 vov? x u P lffr C *<" aira&fa 
tal dfj,tyfc T?I ovaia hv evepyeig, . , . 6 6s Tra&yTtKOf vov? ydapTog). How the active reason 
is related, on the one hand, to individual existence, on the other, to God, is not made per 
fectly clear; a certain latitude is left for a naturalistic and pantheistic or for a mor 


spiritualistic and theistic interpretation, and each of these interpretations has found 
numerous representatives both in ancient and later times ; yet it is scarcely possible to 
develop either of them in all its consequences, without running counter to other portions 
of Aristotle s teaching. . 

50. The end of human activity, or the highest good for man, is 
happiness. This depends on the rational or virtuous activity of the 
soul throughout the whole of its life. With activity pleasure is 
joined, as its blossom and natural culmination. Virtue is a pro 
ficiency in willing what is conformed to reason, developed from the 
state of a natural potentiality by practical action. The development 
of virtue requires the existence of a faculty of virtue, and requires 
also exercise and intelligence. All virtues are either ethical or 
dianoetic. Ethical virtue is that permanent direction of the will (or 
state of mind), which guards the mean proper for us, as determined 
for us by the reason of the intelligent ; hence it is the subordination 
of appetite to reason. Bravery is the mean between cowardice and 
temerity ; temperance, the mean between inordinate desire and stupid 
indifference ; generosity, the mean between prodigality and parsimony, 
etc. The highest among the ethical virtues is justice or righteous 
ness. This, in the most extended sense of the word, is the union 
of all ethical virtues, BO far as they regard our fellow-men; in the 
narrower sense, it respects the equitable (toov) in matters of gain or 
loss. Justice in this latter sense is either distributive or commuta 
tive ; the former respects the partition of possessions and honors, the 
latter relates to contracts and the reparation of inflicted wrongs. 
Equity is a complementary rectification of legal justice by reference 
to the individuality of the accused. Dianoetic virtue is the correct 
functioning of the theoretical reason, either in itself or in reference 
to the inferior psychical functions. The dianoetic virtues are reason, 
science, art, and practical intelligence. The highest stage of reason 
and science is wisdom in the absolute sense of the term, the highest 
stage of art is wisdom in the relative sense. A life devoted only to 
sensual enjoyment is brutish, an ethico-political life is human, but a 
scientific life is divine. 

Man has need of man for the attainment of the practical ends of 
life. Only in the state is the ethical problem capable of solution. 
Man is by nature a political being. The state originated for the 
protection of life, but ought to exist for the promotion of morally 
upright living ; its principal business is the development of moral 


capacity in the young and in all its citizens. The state is prior to 
the individual in that sense in which in general the whole is prior to 
the part and the end prior to the means. Its basis is the family. 
He who is capable only of obedience and not of intelligence must be 
a servant (slave). The concord of the citizens must be founded on 
unanimity of sentiment, not on an artificial annihilation of individual 
interests. The most practicable form of the state is, in general, a 
government in which monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic ele 
ments are combined ; but in all individual cases this form must be 
accommodated to the given circumstances. Monarchy, Aristocracy, 
and Timocracy (or a Republic) are, under the appropriate circum 
stances, good forms of government ; Democracy, Oligarchy, and 
Tyranny are degenerate forms, of which the latter, as being the cor 
ruption of the most excellent form, is the worst. The distinguishing 
mark of good and bad forms of government is found in the object 
pursued by the rulers, according as this object is either the public 
good or the private interest of the rulers. It is right that the 
Hellenes should rule over the barbarians, the cultured over the 

Art is of two kinds, useful and imitative. The latter serves 
three ends : recreation and (refined) entertainment, temporary eman 
cipation from the control of certain passions by means of their excita 
tion and subsequent subsidence, and, last and chiefly, moral culture. 

Of the ethics of Aristotle in general write Chr. Garve ( Uebers. und Erlaut., Berlin, 1798-1802), Schleier- 
macher (in various passages of his Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre, Berlin, 1S03 ; cf. 
Ueber die wiss. Behandlung des Tugendbegriffs, in the Abh. der Acad., Berlin, 1S20), K. L. Michelet 
(Die EtMk des Arist. in ihrem Verhaltniss eum System der Moral, Berlin, 182T; cf. his Syst. der pMlos. 
Moral, 1828, pp. 195-237), Hartenstein ( Ueber den wiss. Werth der Arist. Ethik, in the Berichte uber die 
Verhandlungen der K. Sachs. Gesellsch. der Wiss. zu Leipzig, philol.-hist. cl., 1859, pp. 49-107, and in 
H. s ffist.-philos. Abh., Leipsic, 1870), Trendelenburg (Ueber Herbarfs praktisdie PMlos. und die EtMk 
der Alien, in the Abh. der Eerl. Akad., 1856; cf. the 10th essay in T. s Hist. Eeitr. zur Philos., Vol. II., 
Berlin, 1855, Ueber einige Stellen im 5 u. 6, Buche der Nikomach. Ethik, and the 9th nrticle in Vol. III. 
of the same, Berlin, 1867; Zur Arist. Ethik., pp. 399-444), Dielitz (Qiiaestiones Aristoteleae, Progr. of the 
Sophien-gymn, Berlin, 1867). 

Of the relation of Aristotle s ethics and politics to the corresponding doctrines of Plato, and of Aris 
totle s critique of the latter, treat Pinzger (Leipsic, 1822), H. W. Broecker (Leipsic, 1824), W. Orges (Berlin, 
1343), St. Matthies (Greifswald, 1848), A. J. Kahlert (Czernovvitz, 1854), W. Pierson (in the Jiheln. Mus. f. 
Ph., new series, XIII., 1S5S, pp. 1-48 and 209-247) ; also, Fr. Guil. Engelhardt, Loci Platon.ici, quorum Aris- 
toteles in conscribendis Politicis oidetur memor fuisse, Dantzic, 1858; Siegfr. Lommatzsch, Quomodo 
Plato et Arist. religionis et reip. principia conjwnxerint, Berlin, 1863; C. W. Schmidt, Ueber die Ein- 
fourfe des Arist. in der Nik. EtUk gegen Plat. Lehre von der Lust (G.-Pr.), Bunzlau, 1864; Kalmus, Ar. 
de tolupt. doctr. (G.-Pr.\ Pyritz, 1862; Kassow, Die Rep. de* Plato und der beste Staat des Arist., 
Weimar, 1866. Cf. the dissertations by Gust. Goldmann (Berlin, 1868), and Adolf Ehrlich (Halle, 1868). and 
the opuscule of Henn. Henkel on Plato s Laws and the Politics of Aristotle (Gym.-Pror,r\ Seehauser, 
On Kant s Ethics as compared with Aristotle s, see Trauff. Bruckner, De tribus ethicex locis, guibu* 
dtfert Zantius ab Aristotele, diss. inaug., Beriin, 1866, and Trendelenburg, Der Widerstreit swischen 

K und Arist. in der Ethik, in his ffistor. Eeitrage sur Philosophic, Vol. III., 1867, pp. 171-214. 


Ch. E. Luthart, Die Ethik des Arist. in ihrem Unterschied von der Moral des Christenthums, Leipsic, 
1869. Wilh. Oncken, Die Staatslehre des Arist. in hM.-pol Umrissen, Leipsic, 1870; Ar. u. s. L.v. Stoat, 
in Virchow and Holtzeudorff s Sammlung gemeinverstdndliche wiss. Vortrdge, No. 103. Berlin, 1870. 

Of the ethical and political principles of Ariatotle treat Starke (Neu-Ruppin, 1888 and 1850), Holm 
(Berlin, 1853), Ueberweg (Das Arist., Kantische und Herbartsche Moral-princip., in Fichte s Z., Vol. 24, 
Halle, 1854, p. 71 seq.); on the method and the bases of Aristotle s Ethics, cf. Rud. Eucken (G.-Pr., Frank- 
fort-on-the-Mitin, 1870); on points of contact between the Ethics and Politics, J. Munier (G.-Pr., Mayence, 
1853), Schiitz (Potsd. 1860) ; on the Highest Good, Kruhl (Breslau, 1832 and 1833), Afzelius (Holmiae, 1838), 
Axel Nyblaus (Lund, 1863), Wenkel (Die Lehre des Arist. iiber das hochste Gut Oder die Gliick- 
seligkeit, G.-Pr., Sondershausen. 1864); on the Eudaemonia of Arist., Herm. Hampke (De Eudaemonia, 
Arist. moralis disciplinae principio, dies, inaug. Berol., Brandenb, 1858). G. Teichmuller (Die Einhett 
der Ar. Eiiddmonie, from the Melanges graeco-romains, I., II., St. Petersburg, 1859, in the Bulletin 
hist.-phil., t. XVI., of the Imperial Acad. of Sciences, ibid. 1859), E. Laas (Dies. Brl., 1859), Chr. A. 
Thilo (in the Zeitschrift fur exacte Philos., Vol. II., Leipsic, 1861, pp. 271-303), Karl Knappe (Grundssuge 
der Arist. Lehre von der Euddm., G.-Pr., Wittenberg, 1864-66); on A. s conception of virtue, Nielander 
(G.-Pr., Herford, 1861); on the theory of Duties, Carl. Aug. Mann (Diss. inaug., Berlin, 1867): on the 
conceptions (aeo-orrj? and 6p0b? \6yos, G. Glogau (Halle, 1869); on the place of Sensation in Aristotle s 
doctrine, Roth (in TJieolog. Studien und Krit., 1850, Vol. I., p. 625 seq.)-. on Justice, A. G. Kastner 
(Leipsic, 1737), C. A. v. Droste-Hulshoff (Bonn, 1826), Herm. Ad. Fechner (Breslauer Diss., Leipsic, 1855), 
Freyschmidt (Die Arist. Lehre von der Gerechtigkeit und das moderne Staaterecht, G.-Pr., Berlin, 
1867), and Trendelenburg (in the above-cited works) ; cf. also the articles of H. Hampke (in Philol., 
XVI. 1860, pp. 60-84) and F. Hacker (in Mutzell s Zeitschr. fur das Gymnialwesen, Berlin, 1862, pp. 513- 
560) on the fifth book of the Nicom. Ethics, which treats of justice; on the place given to practical prudence 
in A. s doctrine, Liidke (Stralsund, 1862) ; on the principle of division and arrangement followed in the 
classification of moral virtues in the Nic. Eth., F. Hacker (Progr. des Coin. Real.-Gymn., Berlin, 1863, and 
in MiitzelPs Zeitschr fur G.- W., XVII., Berlin, 1863, pp. 821-843) ; on the Dianoetic Virtues, Prantl (Munich, 
1852), and A. Kuhn (Berlin, 1860); on Imputation, according to Aristotle, Afzelius (Upsalae, 1841); on 
Friendship, Breier (De aiic.principwm, ad Ar. Eth. Nic., 1158 a, G.-Pr., Lubeck, 1858) ; on Slavery, W. T. 
Krug (Leips. 1818), C. Gottling (Jena, 1821), Ludw. Schiller (Erlangen, 1847), S. L. Steinheim (Hamburg, 
1853), and Wilh. Uhde(Z>m. inaug., Berlin, 1856); on the Arist. conception of Politics, Jul. Findeisen 
(Diss. inaug., Berlin, 1868); on Aristotle s Classification of Forms of Government, G. Teichmuller (Progr. 
of the School of St. Ann at St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg and Berlin, 1859); on Aristotle s Theory of the 
State, J. Bendixen (Progr. der Ploner Gelehrtenschule, Hamburg, 1868); on the economic doctrines in the 
" Politics" of Aristotle, Ludwig Schneider (Gymn.- Progr., Deutsch Crone, 1868). 

Of the Arist. doctrine of poetry and art in general, treat Leasing (in his Ilanib. Dramaturgie, Stuck 37 
seq., 46 seq., 74 seq.), Ed. Muller (G. d. Th. d. Kunst. b. d.A., II. pp. 1-1S3, 346-395, and 417), Wilh. Schrader 
(De artis apud Arist. notione ac m, Berlin, 1843), Franz Susemihl ( Vortrag, Griefsw. 1862), Th. Strater (in 
Fichte s Z. f. Ph., new series, Vol. XL., pp. 219-247; Vol. XLI., pp. 204-223,1862); of the conception of 
imitation, E. Muller (in the volume above cited, pp. 1-23 and 346-361; also, in Die Idee der Aesthetikin 
ihrem historischen Ursprung, Ratibor, 1840), and W. Abeken (Gott. 1836) ; of A. s Poetics and modern 
dramatists, F. v. Raumer (read in the Berlin Acad. d. Wits., 1828) ; of his doctrine of the tragedy, Lobel 
(Leips. 17S6), A. Boeckh (Ges. Rl. Schriften, I. p. 180 seq., a discourse delivered in 1830), Starke (Neu- 
Ruppin, 1880), G. W. Nitzsch (Kiel, 1846), Heinrich Weil (in Verhandl. der 10 Versammlung deutscher 
Philologen, Basel, 1848, pp. 131-141), Wassmuth (Saarbrucken, 1852), Klein (Bonn, 1856), Jakob Bernuys 
(Breslau, 1858, see above, ad 46, and in the Rh. Mus., new series, XIV. pp. 367-877, and XV. p. 606 seq.), 
Ad. Stahr (Arist u. d. Wirkung der Trag., Berlin, 1859, and notes to his translation of the Poetics, Stutt 
gart, 1860), Leonh. Spengel ( Ueber dje Kadap<n? rStv na6-i)fj.aTu>v, Munich, 1859, in Vol. IX. of the Abh. der 
Miinchener Akad. d. Wiss., pp. 1-SO, cf. Rh. Mus., new series, XV. pp. 458-462) ; of these works and of 
other works by Liepert (Arist. und der Zweck der Kunst, G.-Pr., Passau, 1862), Geyer, and others, a 
critical account is given by F. Ueberweg (in Fichte s Zeitschr. fur PhUos., Vol. 36, 1860, pp. 260-291; a 
2>O8itive complement to that article is furnished in my article on Die Lehre des A. voti dem Wesen und der 
Wirkung der Kunst, ibid., Vol. 50, 1867, pp. 16-89, and in Notes 23 and 25 to my transl. of A/s Poetics, 
Berlin, 1869), Franz Susemihl (in N. Jahrb. filr Philol. u. Pddag., Vol. 85, 1862, pp. 395-425, and in his 
edition and transl. of the Poetics), and A. Doring (in Philol., XXL, 1864, pp. 496-534, and XXVII., 1868, 
pp. 689-728). Gerh. Zillgenz, Arist. und das deutscJie Drama, Wuraburg, 1865. Paul Graf York von 
Wartenburg, Die Katharsis des Arist. und der Oedipus Colonus des Sophokles, Berlin, 1866. Cf. also R. 
Wachsmuth, De Arist. Studiis Homericis, Berlin, 1863, and the contributions to the critique and elucida 
tion of Arist/s Poetics, by Vahlen, Susemihl, Teichmuller, and others (see above, p. 143). On Lessing s 
conception of the Aristotelian doctrine of Tragedy, cf. K. A. F. Sundeljn, Upsala, 1868. 

On the Rhetoric of Aristotle in its relation to Plato s Gorgias, cf. H. Anton (in Rh. Mus. f. Ph., new 


series, Vol. XIV., 1869), and in its relation to Plato s PJiaedrus and Gorgias, Georg Richard WiecLman 
(Platonis et Arist. de arte rhetorica doctrinae inter sc. comparatae, dtes. inaug., Berlin, 1864), and Spen 
gel ( Ueber dan Studium der Rhet&rik bei den Alien, in the Abhandl. d&r Munch. Akad. d. W., 1842, and 
*Ueber die Rlietorik des Arist, ibid., 1851 ; cf. also Spengel, Philol , XVIII. 1862, pp. 604-646 and the litera 
ture there cited by him, p. 605 seq., on the Pseudo-Arist., so-called JKhetorica ad Aleaxmdrum, as the 
author of which, the rhetorician Anaximenes, a contemporary of Arist., is named by Victorius and, in 
modern times, by Spengel), Usener (Quaestiones Anaximeneae, Gott. 1866), and others. Sal. Kalischer, De 
Arist. Rhetor, et Eth. Nicom. (Diss. inaug.), Halle, 1868. 

On the Aristotelian Theory of Education, cf. J.C. Orelli (in his Philol. Beitr. aus d. Schweis. Zurich, 
1819, I. pp. 61-130), Alex. Kapp ( Arist. Staatspddagogik. Hamm, 1837), Fr. Chr. Schulze (Naumburg, 1844), 
Sal. Lefmann (De Arist. in hominum educatione principiis, Berlin, 1864), Frid. Alb. Janke (Artitotelet 
doctrinae paedagogicae pater, diss. inaug., Halle, 1866). 

In accordance with his general metaphysical doctrines respecting the relation of 
essence to end, Aristotle can determine the essence of morality only by considering what 
is the object or aim of moral activity ; the fundamental conception of his Ethics is accord 
ingly that of the highest good, or rather, since ethics relates to human conduct, of the 
highest practical good attainable by man as an active being (TO irdvruv a,K.p6rarov TUV 
irpciKTuv ayaduv. Eth. Nic., 1. 2) ; it is unnecessary, he observes, for the purposes of ethics, 
to speculate, after the manner of Plato, about the idea of the Good (ibid. I. 4). The aim of 
all moral action, says Aristotle, is admitted on all hands to be happiness or eudaemonia 
(ev6cufj,ovia, TO sv ,rjv or KV rrpciTTEiv). Eudaemonia results from the performance of the pecu 
liar work which belongs to man as man (Eth. Nic., I. 6; X. 7). The peculiar work of man 
can not consist in merely living, for plants also live, nor in having sensations, for these are 
shared by man with the brute creation; it can only consist in a life of action, under the 
control of reason ((o^ TipanTiufi TLC; TOV "koyav exovToc.). Since now. it is in the sphere of the 
characteristic activity of each living being that we are to search for its peculiar excellence, 
it follows that man s rational activity (iwxw kvepyeLa nard "koyov), and none other, is at the 
same time honorable and virtuous activity (iri XW tvspysia /COT apsryv Eth. Nic., II. 5 : 
TJ TOV avdpuKov aperrj drj av t-i a<j) rjq ayatibs av&pi^rrog yiveTat nat a<j> fa ev TO eavrov 
epyov aTrodwo-ei). The greatest happiness is connected with the highest of the virtues 
(Eth. Nic., I. 6 ; X. 7). Nevertheless, for complete happiness a sufficient provision of ex 
ternal goods is essential, since these are necessary for the active manifestation of virtue, 
just as the equipping of the chorus is necessary for the representation of a dramatic work 
of art (Eth. Nic., I. 11). 

Pleasure is the complement of activity, it is the end in which activity naturally dis 
charges itself and comes to rest ; pleasure is to activity what beauty is to the perfect 
physical development of youth (Eth. Nic., X. 4: TeAetoZ 6e rr/v ivipyeiav fj r/dovij oi>x C n 
*c kvmapxovca, <z/U o>f ETri-ytyv6/j,v6v rt TS^O^ olov ToZf a.Kfj.aioif rj hpa). Pleasure is 
united with Eudaemonia, and exists in the highest degree in connection with that highest 
Eudaemonia, which results from knowledge (Eth. N., X. 7). " 

Morality presupposes freedom. This exists whenever the will of the agent meets no 
obstacles and he is able to deliberate intelligently. It is destroyed by ignorance or con 
straint (Eth. Nic., III., init.). 

The reason must, on the one hand, be obeyed by the lower functions (especially by the 
irddrj, the passions), and, on the other, must rightly develop its own activities ; on this 
double requirement is founded the distinction of the two kinds of virtues, the practical or 
ethical and the dianoetic virtues (rjBinai and diavoijrtKal or fo-yiKai dperai. or at fiev TOV 
r/Sovq, al 6e rfjc, 6iavoia<; dpeTai). The inclusion of the dianoetic or intellectual in the 
sphere of virtue is explained by the broader signification of the latter term in Greek (as 
equivalent to ability). T H0of [whence the English ethics], which denotes originally the 


natural bent of man in mind and disposition (temperament), signifies here the moral 

Aristotle s [above-cited] definition of ethical virtue (or the virtue of character) is worded 
in the original as follows (Eth. Nic., II. 6) : e*f irpoaipeTiKTj iv HCOTTJTI vvoa ry irpds r}ua$ 
upiofiivrj (the MSS., to judge from the earlier editions, appear to have had upiGjuevri, and 
that is probably the correct reading, although Bekker retains the Nominative) Adyw Kal wf 
av 6 <j>p6vi[j,o opioecev. Yirtue is a e^ig [usually translated habitus in Latin and habitude in 
English], and the latter is to tivvauu; [power, potentiality] as proficiency is to endowment ; 
the ethical Svvafiit; is originally undetermined and may be determined in either of the two 
opposite moral directions ; its actual development must take place in a definite direction, 
and the eft? then has the corresponding character. (According to the Aristotelian defini 
tion from which the subsequent definition of the Stoics deviated all el-tig were also 
diaOecreis, but not all 6ta6aei<; were et-ets, Categ., 8, p. 9 a, 10 ; dtddeaif is defined, Met., V. 
19, as TOV f^ovrof upr) rdtf, fj Kara r6irav TJ /card dvva/utv f/ /car etdof ; the f*f is changed 
with difficulty, while those tiiatieaeig, which are pre-eminently so-called and are not eeic, 
such as warmth, coldness, disease, health, are easily changeable, according to Categ., ch. 8, 
p. 8 b, 35. Of. Trendelenburg, Gesch. der Kategorienlehre, p. 95 seq., and Comm. ad De 
Anima, II. 5, 5.) The "*f irpoaipeTiKfj," direction of the will or the disposition. The 
function of the reason in connection with the desires, which are prone to err through 
excess or omission (vTrepfiohfj and e^Xei-^tcf), on the side of the too much or the too little, is to 
determine the right proportion or the mean (UEGOTW) ; in this connection Aristotle himself 
(Eth. Nic., II. 5) recalls the Pythagorean doctrine (which was also adopted by Plato in 
another reference) of limit and the unlimited (iripaq and a-rceipov). 

In enumerating the particular virtues, Aristotle follows the order of the rank or dignity 
of the functions to which they have reference, advancing from the necessary and useful to 
the beautiful (cf. Pol, VII. 14, p. 1333 a, 30). These functions are 1) physical life, 2) 
sensuous, animal enjoyment, 3) the social life of man in its various relations (possession 
and honor, social community in word and action, and, above all, political community), 4) the 
speculative functions. 

The ethical virtues are courage, temperance, liberality and magnificence, high-minded- 
ness and love of honor, mildness, truthfulness, urbanity and friendship, and justice (Eth. 
Nic., II. 7 ; cf. the less rigorous exposition in Rhet., I. 9). 

Courage (avdpeia) is a mean between fearing and daring (ueaoTw irepl 0<5/?ouf nal 
Bd ppTJ); but not every such mean is courage, at least not courage in the proper sense 
of the term. In the strict sense, he only is courageous who is not afraid of an honorable 
death (6 TTC/JI TOV mlJbv davarov acfofc, III. 9), and, in general, he only who is ready to 
face danger for the sake of the morally beautiful (/caAdv, Eth. Nic., III. 10, p. 1115 b, 12 : 
ax; <5eZ 6e Kal e!>f 6 Adyof, inro/nevel (6 av6pelo<; ra <^o/3epa) TOV KaXov, TOVTO yap 
reAof rijs apETJjs ). Genuine courage does not flow from passionateness (dvpoc), although 
the latter may co-operate with the former, but from giving to the befitting (which de 
pends on the moral end) the preference over life. The extremes, between which courage 
is the mean, are represented by the foolhardy man and the coward (Eth. Nic., II. 7, 
and III. 10). 

Temperance (cufypoavvri) guards the proper mean in respect of pleasures and pains 
(ueo6T7}$ Trepl rj6ova(; Kal "kviras), but rather in respect of pleasures than of pains ; and also 
not in respect of pleasures of every sort, but in respect of the lowest pleasures, which are 
common to man with the animal, those of touch and taste ; and yet more particularly, in 
respect of the "enjoyment which arises wholly through the sense of touch, whether in 
meats, in drinks, or in what are termed venereal pleasures " (aTrdhavaiq, f/ yivtrat. naoa 6t 


Kal h otriois Kal kv irorolc icai rots d<f>potiiffiot$ fa-yofisvoic, III. 13). The extremes 
are intemperance and insensibility (II. 7, and III. 14). 

Liberality (ifavOepioTw) observes the proper mean in giving and receiving (fieoor^ Kepi 
66oiv xpwafav Kal Juftitv), especially in giving, and in cases where it is a question of 
comparatively small values (IV. 1) ; when greater values are involved, the right mean is 
magnificence (/ueya/loTrpfTma, IV. 4) or " princeliness." The extremes are prodigality and 
stinginess (II. 7 and IV. 1), and meanness and vulgarity (bad taste, IV. 4). 

The proper mean in matters of honor and dishonor (juecoTTjc irepl TI/LC^V Kal dri/u.iav\ in 
cases of importance, is highmindedness (/zeya^t/n^m, IV. 7); in cases of less consequence, 
ambition (phaTtpia), or, more exactly, the correct mean between ambition and indifference 
(d(j>itoTi/Ltia, IV. 10). The high-minded or high-spirited man (//eyaAoi/n^of) is he, who. being 
indeed worthy of great things, holds himself to be worthy of them (6 /nE-ydhuv avrbv 
diuv dwc uv). He who erroneously holds himself to be worthy of great things, especially 
he who incorrectly thinks himself deserving of high honor, is vain (xavvos), while he who 
underrates his own worth is mean-spirited (fj.iKp6^xo^). The ambitious (^tAdr^of) and the 
unambitious err in regard to the measure and manner in which, the reason for which, and 
the time when honor should be sought. Praiseworthy is only the correct mean, which, in 
opposition to the one or the other extreme, is termed sometimes ambition, sometimes 

Mildness (Trpadrw) is the proper mean in seeking for revenge (uec6r^ Trepl bpyrjv, II. 7, 
and IV. 11). Opy^ is the desire of revenge (//<jpzf bpe^iq\ it is the passion of the 6vfi6^- 
the 6vfi6<; is the potentiality, which may be developed either into opyrj or into 7rpdvvoi 
(placability; metaphorically, &vfj.6q denotes bpyfj itself). Excess in regard to anger is 
irascibility, when the anger quickly rises and goes quickly away (whereas those who are 
TTtKpoi, bitter, in their wrath, cherish it a long time) ; deficiency in this respect is aopyrjoia. 

Truthfulness (or sincerity), facility in social intercourse, and friendliness (oA^&io, evrpa- 
Trifaia and fyihia) are means in the management of one s words and actions in society 
(fj-eaoTTfreg Trepl Zoycw Kal irpd&uv Koivaviav). The first of these three virtues regards 
veracity (the aTiTjde^) in discourse and action ; the other two end in the agreeable (fjtiv), the 
one (evrpaTr&eia), being in place in social pastimes (ev ral^ Traidialg) and the other (friend 
ship), in all other social relations (II. 7 and IV. 12-14). The obsequious man praises and 
yields, in order not to render himself disagreeable to his companions, and the flatterer 
(K.67ia^) does the same from motives of self-interest. The fretful and the cross man care 
not, whether their conduct is offensive to others. The right mean of conduct in this 
respect has no particular name. It most resembles friendship, from which, however, it is 
distinguished, in that it is to be followed not merely among acquaintances and friends 
(whom we love), but also, so far as is becoming, in our intercourse with all whom we may 
meet. The candid man holds the mean between the braggart (aha&v) and the dissembler 
(dpuw), in that he gives himself out for just what he is, and neither boasts nor belittles 
himself. Those who indulge in well-timed mirth, are witty and elegant ; those who carry 
mirthfulness to excess, are buffoons and rude ; while those who hate all mirth, appear un 
cultivated, clownish, and stiff. 

Supplementary Aristotle treats of certain other "means," which are not regarded by 
him as properly virtues, and, in particular, of shame (the r]6o$ of the aidrjpwv ), which he 
considers as only relatively praiseworthy (^ atduc it- inrodececjc zTrtetKEc;), and more becom 
ing to youth than to riper age (IV. ch. 15). Shame is the fear of ill-repute (<&<5/3of afiot-ia<;) 
and is rather a passive emotion (Trdflof) than a developed virtue (f*f). The extremes are 
represented by the timid and the shameless. Nemesis, or just indignation, is a mean 
(a /4CT<5rj7f irepl rd irafirj), whose extremes are envy (<p66vos) and spitefulness 


To justice (diKaiocvvrj) he devotes a minute consideration (Eth. N., Y.). Justice in the 
most general sense is the practice of all virtue toward others (TTJS o^m o.perfj^ XP^^ npf 
d/Aov, V. 5); it is "perfect virtue, yet not absolutely, but with reference to others" 
(apery /jv refold, a/lA ovx aflr^wf, a^Ad rcpbq erepov, Y. 3). It is the most perfect virtue, 
because it is the perfect exercise of all (perfect) virtue (ori rf)c, refold? dper^ xpfak CTl 
refold- refold 6 1 iariv, etc. for refold is to be repeated in this passage, 1129b, 31; cf. 
the similar turn of expression in Cic., Tuscul., I. 45 : nemo parum diu vixit, qui virtutis 
perfectae perfecto functus est munere), and because he, who possesses it, is able to practice 
virtue as well in regard to others as in regard to himself. But justice, viewed as a single 
virtue among others, respects the equal and the unequal (laov and aviaov), and is further 
divisible into two species (mty), of which the one is applied in the distribution (h rale, 
diavonaic) of honors or possessions among the members of a society, while the other takes 
the form of commutation in intercourse or trade (ev roZf owahfoty/nacnv). Commutation 
may be either voluntary or involuntary ; the former is settled by contract, the latter by the 
principles of penal justice. Distributive justice (rb ev rai 6iavofj.alg diKatov or TO diave/uqriKov 
diKdtov) rests on a geometrical proportion : just as the persons in question, with their indi 
vidual worth (d/a), are to each other, so also must that be, which is dealt out to each 
(A : B = a : /?, where B = e . A, and j3 = e . a). Commutative justice (TO ev roig cw 
fiinaiov or rb tiiopdurmov, b yiverai ev roiq avvdTifoty/j.dai KO.I TOI eKovaloi? /cat ro7f 
is, indeed, likewise an equalizing principle (Iffov), but proceeds by arithmetical and not 
by geometrical proportion, since it regards not the moral worth of the persons involved, 
but only the advantage gained or injury suffered by them ; commutative justice removes 
the difference between the original possession and the diminished (or increased) possession, 
as occasioned by loss (or gain), by causing an equal gain (or loss), the latter increasing (or 
diminishing) the amount of the possession by so much as the first loss (or gain) diminished (or 
increased) it. The amount as thus restored (undiminished and unaugmented) is a mean be 
tween the less and the greater according to arithmetical proportion (a y : a = a : a + y). 
Jn connection with this doctrine of Aristotle, cf. Plato, Leges, YI. p. 757, where the geo 
metrically proportional is recognized as the principle of political justice, but the arithmeti 
cally proportional, as a political principle, is rejected : it is this arithmetical equality whose 
place in the economy of trade is justly vindicated by Aristotle. (Trendelenburg directs 
attention to this difference, Das Ebenmaass, etc., p. 17.) 

Equity (rb ententes) is a species of justice, not mere legality, but an emendation of legal 
justice, or a supplementing of the law, where the latter fails through the generality of its 
provisions (kiravopdufj-a v6fj,oi< $ ehfo nrei 6ia rb KdOofo-v). The provisions of the law are 
necessarily general, and framed with reference to ordinary circumstances. But not every 
particular case can be brought within the scope of these general provisions, and in such 
instances it is the part of equity to supply the deficiencies of the law by special action, 
and that, too, in the spirit of the lawgiver, who, if he were present, would demand the 
same action. 

The dianoetic virtues are divided by Aristotle into two classes. These correspond 
with the two intellectual functions, of which the one exercised by the scientific faculty 
(rb eTTLGTijiJH)viK.6v}, is the consideration of the necessary, and the other, exercised by 
the faculty of deliberation (rb fo-yioTiKov), is the consideration of that which can be 
changed (by our action). The one includes the best or the praiseworthy k&iq of the 
scientific faculty, the other includes those of the deliberating faculty. The work of the 
scientific faculty is to search for the truth as such; the work of the practical reason 
(&dvom), which subserves the interests of practical action or artistic creation, is to 
discover that truth, which corresponds with correct execution. The best efeie or virtues 


of each faculty are therefore those, through which we approach nearest to the truth. 
These are 

A. With reference to that which is capable of variation: art and practical wisdom 
(TExyn and fypdvijcis}, which are related to each other as notelv and Trpdrretv. lipdrrecv 
(action, conduct) has its end in itself, while Troielv (formation, creation) ends in a positive 
product (sp-yov) distinct from the productive act (tvpya, Eth. Me., I. 1 ; VI. 5). Hence 
the value of the products of art is to be found in these products themselves, while the 
worth of the works of virtue lies in the intention. Art, as a virtue, is creative ability 
under true intellectual direction (i^ig //era /loyov aX.rj-&ovq TroiTjriKy, VI. 4) ; practical wisdom 
(or Qpovqaiz) is practical ability, under rational direction, in the choice of things good and 
in the avoidance of things which are evil for man (et-ic akrr&ris /nerd %6-yov irpa.KriK.rj irepi 
rd dv&pomj oyai^d /cat /ca/ca, VI. 5). 

B. "With reference to that which can not be changed by our agency: science and reason 
(smfrrrjfM? and voif), the latter directed to principles, the former to that which is demon 
strable from principles. Science is a demonstrative f*? (cnroSeiKTinf/, VI. 3) ; reason appre 
hends the principles of science (apxft, or dpxai, rov eirumrrov, VI. 6). 

In connection with the dianoetic virtues, another conception, expressed by the word 
co<j)ia (wisdom), is considered by Aristotle. This word, however, does not denote with him 
a fifth virtue distinct from those already named, but the highest potencies of three of 
them, namely, of art, science, and reason. In the sphere of art, it has a relative significa 
tion (cro^cif rr/v dvdptavroTrouav, wise, skilled in the art of sculpture, etc.) ; in the sphere of 
science and reason, it is taken absolutely (5/lwf, ov Kara pepoc, ovff dAAo TI <ro0of), and is 
defined as the science and the reason of those things which have by their nature the 
highest worth or rank (kiuarrjur] K.O.I vov$ ruv rt.fjLtura.ruv ry (jtvaei, VI. 7). In one passage 
(Eth. Me., VI. 7) co<j)ia, in the relative sense of the word, is termed the " virtue of art " 
(aperrj rt^^f) ; but it does not follow from this, that art itself is not a virtue, nor 
that science and reason are not virtues until they rise to absolute wisdom, for all these 
l&iS participate necessarily in truth, and all, which do this, are virtues (Eth. Me., VI. 
2 seq.). 

To practical wisdom (Qpfyyatf) belong prudence (ei>/?ov/Ua), which finds out the right 
means for the end fixed upon (VI. 1 0), and understanding (cvveais), which is exercised in 
passing correct judgments on that respecting which ^povr/oi^ gives practical precepts. 
Zvvsoic is critical (npiriKJ/), typovrjcLc; is imperative (kTnraK.riK.Tj) ; correct discrimination (Kpiotc) 
is the function of the evyvupuv, or the man of good sense (VI. 11). 

EyitpdrEia (of which Book VII. of the Me. Ethics treats) is moral strength or self-control. 
"Where this is wanting, that discrepancy arises between insight and action, which would 
be impossible if (as Socrates taught) knowledge possessed an absolute power over the will. 
The occasion for self-control arises in connection with whatever is pleasurable or painful ; 
in the latter case it is endurance (Kaprepid). 

Friendship (tyihia) is of three kinds, according as it is based on the agreeable, the useful, 
or the good. The last is the noblest and most enduring (Eth. Me., VIII. and IX.). The 
love of truth should have precedence before love to the persons of our friends (Eth. N. } I. 
4, 1096 a, 16; cf. Plat., Rep., X. 595 b, c). 

The natural community, to which the individual primarily belongs, is the family. The 
domestic economy includes, when complete, husband, wife, children, and servants. To the 
servants the master of the house should be an absolute ruler, not forgetting, however, to 
temper his rule with mildness, so that the man in the servant may also be respected. To 
the wife and children he must be as one who rules over freemen ; to the former as an 
archon in a free commonwealth, to the latter as a king by right of affection and seniority 


(Pdlit^ I. ch. 4). It becomes him to care more for his family, as human beings, and for their 
virtue, than for gain (Pol, I. 5). 

The character of the family life is essentially dependent on the character of the civil 
government. Man is by nature a political animal (Pol., I. 2). The state is the most com 
prehensive human society. This society should not be an undifferentiated unity, but an 
articulated whole (Pol, II. 1 seq.). The end of the state is good living (ev qv), i. e., the 
morality of the citizens and their happiness as founded on virtue (Pol, VII. 8). The end 
of the state is of a higher order than are the actual causes which may have led to its 
existence (Pol., I. 2 : r] TTO^ . . . yivofj-evi) [tev ovv TOV ^ijv eve/ca, ovaa 6e TOV ev {,rjv). 

Since the highest virtue is intellectual, it follows that the pre-eminent duty of the state 
is, not to train the citizens to military excellence, but to train them for the right use of 
peace (Pol, VII. 2). 

The various Forms of Government are ranked by Aristotle (as he himself intimate^ 
Pol., IV. 2) in the same order as by the author of the Politicus (p. 302 seq.), whom he de 
nominates as Tif TUV Trporspov (one who, before Aristotle, had treated of the same subject, 
by whom he can scarcely mean Plato, but rather some Platonist). But the point of view 
from which he enumerates them is not (as in the Politicus) that of legality or illegality, but 
that of the measure in which, in each, the rulers seek the common advantage of all, or 
only their own profit. When the rulers seek rather the good of all, than their own profit, 
their government is good ; otherwise it is bad. In either case three forms of government 
are possible, according as the number of rulers is one, a few, or many. Hence these six 
forms of government, whose names are monarchy, aristocracy, and polity (rroXiTsia, "the 
common name for all polities "), on the one hand ; and tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy, 
on the other (Pol, III. 7). The placing of the government in the hands of all the citizens 
is justified by the principle, that power belongs to the free as such. The rule of the few, 
or of only one, may result either from wealth or from education, or both. For every par 
ticular state, that form must be sought which corresponds with the given conditions (r) e\ 
TUV vTroKet/j.v(jv apicTij). The very best form of government, is the aristocracy of intel 
lectual eminence and moral worth, whether these qualities, in their highest development, 
be found in a few persons, or only in one. 

None but a brave people is capable of freedom, and only among cultured nations is a 
comprehensive and enduring political union possible. It is only where courage and cul 
ture are combined (as in the Hellenes, who are thus distinguished from the Northern and 
Oriental nations), that a state can exist at once large and free, and it is only in this case 
that a nation is justified in extending its rule over peoples less advanced (Pol , VII. 7). 

The laws must accord with the form of the government (Pol., III. 11). 

The lawgiver must care most of all for the education of the young (Pol, VIII. 1 seq.). 
The supreme end of all discipline should be virtue. Things which are serviceable for 
external ends may, however, and should also be made a subject of instruction, except 
where they tend to render the learner vulgar (i. e., disposed to seek external gain on its 
own account). Grammar, gymnastics, music, and drawing are the general elementary 
topics of instruction. 

Art (rexvy), in the wider sense of the term, as signifying that skill in giving form to 
any material, which results from or at least depends on the knowledge of rules, has a 
twofold object : it has either to complete what nature has been unable to complete, or it 
may imitate (Phys., II. 8: o/lwf re rj TEXVTJ ra [lev erriTefal, a rj <j)i>at aSwarel cnrspyd- 
oaadai, TO. fie (ttfieiTai). Nature has left man naked and unarmed, but has imparted to him 
the ability to acquire nearly all varieties of artistic skill, and has given him the hand, as 
the instrument of instruments (Zte Part. An., IV. 10). The useful arts subserve the ends of 


practical life. Imitative art supplies a refined amusement (diayuyij) and recreation (aveaic, 
rf/s awrovicu; avcnravaig) ; it emancipates (nadapciq) the soul from the pressure of pent-up 
feelings, through a harmless (and in other respects positively beneficial) excitation of 
them (Pol, VIII. 7). By uddapaig (purification) is not to be understood a purification of 
the feelings from the bad that is in them, but rather the temporary removal, discharge, 
nullification of the feelings or passions themselves (cf. Pol., II. 1267 a, 5-7, where the satis 
faction of a passionate desire is represented as producing a "healing effect "). While the 
representation draws to its artistic conclusion, the feelings excited in the susceptible spec 
tator and auditor become, by a corresponding and natural movement, stilled. Works of 
art, in which subjects of more than ordinary beauty or elevation are imitated, may serve 
as a means of ethical culture (jratSeia, ft6fiifai$)] so, in particular, certain kinds of music and 
painting, and, unquestionably, certain descriptions of poetry also. Art attains its ends by 
imitation (/ui/nqcis). That which it imitates, however, is not so much the particular, with 
which the accidental is largely connected, as, rather, the essence of its particular object, 
and, as it were, the tendency of nature in its formation ; in other words, art must idealize 
its subjects, each in its peculiar character. When this requirement is rightly met, the 
resulting work of art is beautiful, although the object imitated may be not (as in the case 
of the Tragedy) more beautiful and noble than ordinary objects, but (as in the case of the 
Comedy) only equal or even inferior to the latter in these respects. The good, when as 
such it is also agreeable, is beautiful (Rhet,, I. 9). Beauty implies a certain magnitude and 
order (Poet., ch. 7). 

The Tragedy is defined by Aristotle as the imitative representation of a weighty, 
finished, and more or less extended action, in language beautified by various species of 
ornamentation [meter and song], which are distributed separately to the different parts of 
the work [the dialogical and choral], acted and not merely recited, and, by exciting pity and 
fear, purging the mind of such passions* (BOTIV ovv Tpayutiia [ti/uqms irpd^eu^ oirovdaiag 
nal re/tei of, jusye^o^ i^ova^r, r/dvcy/evcj Aoy^> X U P*-S ZKdaru ruv elduv kv rolq fwpiotq fip&vruv 
nal ov 61 aTray/f/U ao, 61 eAsov KCLI fyoflov Trtpaivovaa rrfv ruv TOLOVTUV Tra &Tj^a.Tuv nd&apaiv, 
Poet., ch. 6). The definition requires that the subject-matter of the tragedy should be 
serious and morally elevated (rrpd^eug cTrov6al.a^), and that its form should be esthetically 
pleasing (r/dva/uevu Aoyc.)). The last words indicate the cathartic operation of tragedy : the 
fear excited in the spectator by the tragical events represented and the consequent flow of 
sympathy in him are followed by the satisfaction and subsidence of the tendency to foster 
such feelings (i. e., feelings of fear and pity).f The TrapaaKsvd^etv Trddrj and the Ka6apai(;, 

* That, among other things, pity and also fear and menace should be included among the moral ele 
ments of the tragedy had already been said by Plato, Phaedr., p. 268, where the addition of the third 
element (menace, aTreiArj-rucai pijaeis) indicates plainly that at least Plato did not contemplate the excitation 
In the spectator of fear on his own account an interpretation erroneously given by Lessiug to the "fear" 
of Aristotle. Cf. Ar., Poet., 11, p. 1452 a, 38 ; 13, p. 1458 a, 4. 

t The KaOapcrts riav iraflij/u.aTtoi is as has been shown, in particular by J. Bernays not a purification of 
the emotions, but a (temporary) emancipation of the individual from their influence; yet I would not define 
it, more specifically (with Bernays), as a relief from permanent emotional tendencies (fearfulness, sym 
pathetic disposition, etc.), obtained by giving way to them for the time, nor (with Heinrich Weil, who 
regards rtav roiovruv Traflrj/maTan as the subjective Genitive, with man understood as the object) as merely 
a deliverance from the uneasiness which attends the want of, or the exhaustion which follows, emotional ex 
citement, but rather (as shown by me in Fichte s Zeitxchrift, Vol. 36, 1860, and in an article on Aristotle s 
doctrine of the nature and effect of art, ibid., Vol. 50, 1867, and also by A. Boring, who argues from the 
medical use of the term, in the Philol., XXI. 1864), as a temporary removal, elimination, nullification of the 
emotions themselves. In Plato, Phaedo, p. 69 c, K<i0ap<ns TWV rjSoi/wv = a deliverance (of the soul)/rom 
lusts; the KaOapr^ MToSiwv /xafl>j/aao-t o<oi/ (Soph., p. 230 e) is one who delivers from such opinions as 
obstruct one s advance to true insight; the same construction occurs in Arist., Hist. A mm., VI. 18 (na.9- 


the excitation and the natural subsidence of the feelings and their final counterpoise, 
tranquil ization, and emancipation, will be the more surely and completely accomplished in 

vioiv), which passage is rightly cited by Boring (PhiloL, XXI. p. 526) in illustration of the medical 
use of the term. Against Bernays 1 interpretation it may be urged that neither his argument for the ren 
dering of Kd0ap<ri? as "relief obtained by giving way to," nor that for the rendering of TraflTj/aara as "emo 
tional dispositions,"" can be regarded as demonstrative, and that, according to Pol., VIII. 7, p. 1842 a, 1 seq., 
it is not the jrei0ij/u.a, but the TraOos, a form of motion" (<eivi)<ns), which is spoken of as the object of Where Plato aims at the permanent deliverance of man from the emotions by their extirpation, 
Aristotle proposes instead, a temporary relief, to be obtained through their very excitation (by artificial 
means) and subsequent subsidence. After hearing music, witnessing the representation of a tragedy, 
etc., the emotions excited in us are again quieted by their very exhaustion, are in a sense purged out of 
us (itaffaipeTou.) ; but although it is only the emotions immediately excited by the given work of art which 
are thus affected directly, yet indirectly all other similar emotions, which fall into the same concept with 
them and into which the emotional tendency might have been developed had it not been thus diverted, 
are similarly purged away; we are temporarily freed (or "cleansed 11 ) from all of them, until the neces 
sity arises anew for their excitation and exhaustion. The object is here not to extirpate the feelings 
(iradrj) once for all, nor to generate apathy or even moderated emotion, nor is it to effect a (qualitative) 
improvement (purification) of the emotions, but rather to bring about a provisional satisfaction of a 
regularly recurring emotional instinct, an instinct which is in itself altogether normal, but which by 
long continuance would become an impediment in the way of other functions, especially the fxa0T)<ris (or 
function of cognitive learning), for which reason it must be appeased (according to Aristotle, by allowing 
it just and proper satisfaction) and the soul freed or as if cleansed from it. This instinct is not entirely 
wanting in any man, not even in those in whom it is abnormally feeble, but its nature is most easily recog 
nized in cases where it appears with abnormal strength (as in enthusiasts), whence Aristotle, in explaining 
the concept of Catharsis (Pol., VIII. 7), begins with such casee. (Cf. Plat.. Leges, VII. p. 790 seq.) With 
the Catharsis of the feelings is necessarily connected a degree of pleasure (cov$i e<r0ai ^tO 17801/779), whether 
the feeling itself was originally inspiriting or depressing. (Cf. numerous utterances by poets respecting the 
relief which arises from the expression of the feelings as, e. g., Goethe s words concerning the " divine 
worth of tones and tears," concerning the emotional relief arising from the production of works of art, 
J3sch., Choeph. Parod., Sir. 65: SC aiwi/oc 6" Ivytioio-i jSooxeTat *ce ap, etc. [ u the heart fed with cries of pain "], 
and others.) The object of art is not to transform actually existing emotions (those of common life), but to 
excite and exhaust emotions existing only in potentiality in an audience which is not yet moved, but is 
already waiting to be moved. In itself the Catharsis may operate indifferently on emotions of a noble or 
ignoble character ; but as the man of coarser type craves a coarser species of excitation, so the more refined 
craves an excitation of a nobler kind (Arist., Pol., VIII. 7 : iroiei Se TJIV ijSovriv e^ao-roc.? TO Kara <f>vtrt.i> oiitelov). 
Aristotle requires that the need of both classes of the public be satisfied. The proposed excitation of the 
emotions, regarded as a mere means of recreation, is termed aveo-is or Traio ta, but as a means of refined enter 
tainment through the enjoyment of a work of art it is Staywyrj. Atayuyi; presupposes a degree of mental cul 
ture. Still, works of high art, which leave the uncultivated man unmoved at the moment when they afford 
the purest enjoyment to the cultivated, may serve as a means of culture for the former, accustoming him t 
be glad and to mourn as and when he ought (^cupeii/ KO.I \vnel<rQa.i 6p0u>? or ol? Sel) and so refining his disposi 
tion. This effect can not be produced by every kind of art, but only by that which idealizes, i. e., which repro 
duces its objects in forms more excellent and more beautiful than those which they commonly or actually 
possess; nor can it be produced in every person, but only in one who is capable of cultivation, hence chiefly 
in the young. Aristotle terms this the ethical effect of art (Trpo? aperi)v TraiSei a, /aa^o-is). In this connection 
he lays particular stress on certain kinds of music. The Tragedy (like the Epos) bears, according to its defini 
tion (as jutju.Tj<ri? rpaea>5 <r it o v 8 a t a ), that elevated, noble character, which makes the " purification " effected 
by it subservient to "refined entertainment." This character renders it capable of serving the ends of 
tthical culture. Still, Aristotle has at least not expressly considered the Tragedy as a means of education for 
the young, but seems rather, in treating of it, to presuppose the existence of a public possessing in general a 
sufficient degree of culture (even though not wholly free from deficiencies in this respect) to appreciate it as 
a means of "refined entertainment" (fiurywyTj) ; but in view of the variability in the mean degree of culture 
of this public, Aristotle can not have meant completely to exclude from among the effects of the Tragedy, 
Its effect as an instrument of ethical discipline. With the "Catharsis" effected by any art are in reality 
always joined by a casual nexus the other effects of the same, the latter effects flow from the "Catharsis," 
but are generically different from it. The cathartic, hedonic, and ethico-disciplinary effects are co-ordinate 
in conception, and any interpretation of " Catharsis," which includes in its conception the notion of " puri 
fication," " refinement," " emancipation from the goadings of low and selfish impulses," etc., is to be con- 


the spectator, the more complete the work of art is in itself, or the more true it is to the 
objective norms, which are founded in the nature of the object represented, and, especially, 
the less it is wanting (in what Goethe demands in the interests of its cathartic operation, 
namely) in the element of a reconciling rounding off or finale. The feeling awakened by 
the tragedy, though painful, yet contains in itself an elevating and pleasurable element, 
inasmuch as it is a feeling of sympathy with what is noble. This mixed character of the 
feeling is not expressly affirmed by Aristotle in the parts of the Poetica which are now 
extant, but it is affirmed in the Rhetoric (I. 11, 1370 b, 24-28), where, in the threnody, 
Aristotle finds involved not only the sentiment of sadness, but also the pleasure of 
memory and, so to speak, the pleasure of bringing before the mind in the present those 
things which the hero did in his life, and what sort of a man he was. 

Auxiliary and subordinate to Politics is Rhetoric, the art of persuasion (6vvafj.i -rrepi 
eKaarov TOV OeopyGcit TO evde^ojuevov irtdavov, Rhet, I. 2). The business of Rhetoric is not 
so much to persuade, as to furnish a knowledge of those considerations which, in connec 
tion with any subject in hand, are persuasive. It is of no use to attempt to convince the 
masses of men by scientific arguments. The basis of one s argumentation must be that 
which is known to all (K.OLVO). The rhetorical art must indeed be able to give an appear 
ance of equal credibility to contradictory assertions. But the intention (xpoaipfatc) of the 
orator must be to arrive at the true and the just. The rhetorical faculty, which may be 
developed and applied either in a good or in a bad sense, should be employed by us only 
in the good sense. The possibility of being perverted to wrong uses, belongs to rhetoric 
in company with every thing that is good, except virtue ; but this fact does not destroy its 
utility (Rhet., I. 1). 

51. The disciples of Aristotle in the next two to three centuries 
after his death, particularly Theophrastus of Lesbus, Eudemus of 
Rhodes, Aristoxeims the Musician, Dicsearch, Clearchus of Soli, 
and also Strato the Physicist, Lyco, Aristo, Hieronymus, Critolaus, 
Diodorus, Staseas, and Cratippus (which latter was heard at Athens 
by Cicero s son Marcus), abandoned, for the most part, metaphysical 
speculation, and applied themselves either to the study of nature or 
to a more popular treatment of Ethics, at the same time modifying in 
many ways the teaching of Aristotle mostly in a naturalistic direc 
tion. The later Peripatetics returned again to the peculiar concep 
tions of Aristotle ; their merits are founded chiefly in their exegesis 
of his works. The most noteworthy exegetes were Andronicus of 

tdered as un-Aristotelian, because it effaces the strongly-marked opposition in which Aristotle places Ko.6a.p- 
<r^ to /uia^<ns. (Cf., in confirmation, Arist, Pol., VII. 6, 1341 a, 21 ; ove evnv o avAbs ^KOV, aMa na\\or 
opyiaorcxov, wore irpb? TOVS TOIOVTOV? avrat Katpoi>? \pt\areov, ei> 01? ^ Oewpia Ka.Qa.pviv /uaAAoc SVVO.TOLI rj 
/w.a^Tjcru . Ib. 7, 1341 b, 36 : <f>afji(v fie ou ftias ercicev ux/>eAeias rr) /not/o-uerj xP*?0"0at Seii/, aAXa <cat irteiovw \a.piV 
ical yap rraiSeta? evexev Ka.1 Kadapo-etd?, rpirov fie Trpbs 5ia.ya>v T i (/ > W P<>? o.v*<riv re KO.I Trpb? TTJV TTJS <Tvvrovia.<; 
di dirauo-if. Ib. 1342 a, 8 : c Se TCOV iep<av jmeAwv opw/aei TOVTOVS, OTO.V xprjo-wj/Tai rots e opyiaov<ri rrjc ^iv\i\v 
/xe Aecri, KaOiarajAeVous aia-Trep iarpetas rv^ovra? Ka.1 /eaflapcrews. rauTO STJ rovro avayKaiov 7ra.o~\eiv KO.I TOV? 
A.eJ!U.oi/as Ka.1 TOW? 4>o/3ijTt*coi>s KOL TOWS 6Xw? (6X015 TOV??) ira0T}Ti<oii?, TOW? fie dAAov? Ka.9 cxrov eiri|3dAAi TOH/ 
TOIOVTWV eKaaru *cai yivecrOai TWO. Ka.0a.p<Tiv Kal (cov</>e^e<rdai ve(f ^5o^, o/moi to? 5e KO.I TO. f*e\y TO. 


Rhodes, the arranger of the works of Aristotle (about 70 B. c.), 
Boethus of Si don (who lived in the time of Caesar), Nicolaus of 
Damascus (who taught at Rome under Augustus and Tiberius), 
Alexander of ^Egse (a teacher of Nero), Aspasius and Adrastus of 
Aphrodisias (about 120 A. D.), Alexander of Aphrodisias (about 200 
A. D.), who was called the Exegete KO,T e|o^v; and among the still 
later interpreters (of the school of the Neo-Platonists), Porphyrius 
(in the third century), Themistius (in the fourth), and Philoponus 
and Simplicius (in the sixth century after Christ). 

A. Trendelenburg, Ueber die Darstellung der Peripatetischen Ethik bei Stobaeus, pp. 155-158, in the 
Monthly Reports of the Berl. Akad. d. Wus., February, 1858 ; H. Meurer, Peripateticorum philosophia 
moralis secundum Stobaeum, Weimar, 1859. Cf. Meineke, in Mutzell s Zeitechr. f. d. G.-W., 1859, p. 
563 seq. 

The extant works of Theophrastus were first printed with those of Aristotle at Venice, 1495-98. 
Theophrasti Eresii quae supersunt, ed. Jo. Gottlob Schneider, Leipsic, 1818-21 ; ed. Fr. Wimmer, Bres- 
lau, 1842; Leipsic, 1 854; Paris, 1S66. On the works of Theophrastus compare Herm. Usener (Analecta 
Tkeophrastea \diss. Honnensus], Leipsic, 185S, and lift. Mus., XVI. pp. 259 seq. and 470 seq.); on his 
Phytology works have been published by Kurt Sprengel ( Altoaa, 1822) and E. Meyer (Gesch. der Botamik, 
I. S seq.1 ; on his Psychology, cf. Philippson (i/Arj avQpuirivri, 2 vols., Berlin, 1881), on his Theology, Krische 
(Forschungen, I., pp. 339-349); on his delineation of human "characters," cf., among later writers, Carl 
Zell (Freiburg, 1823-25), Pinzger (Ratibor, 1833-39), H. E. Foss (Progr., Halle and Altenburg, 1834, 36, 61), 
Fr. Hanow (Dies. Bonn., Leips. 1858); cf. also TJi. Charact., ed. Foss, Leips. 1858; ed. Eug. Petersen, Leips. 
1859 ; Jac. Bernays, Theophrastos 1 Schrift uber Frommigkeit, ein Beiirag eur Religionsgesch, mit krit. 
und erkl. Bemerkungen zu Porphyries Schrift uber Enthalteamkeit, Berlin, 1866 ; Theophr. Charact. et 
Philodemi de VWis Mb. X., ed. T. L. Ussing, Hanau, 1868. 

On Eudemus, see A. Th. H. Fritzsche (De Eud. Rhodii philosophi Peripatetici vita et scriptis, in his 
edition of the Eud. Ethics, Regensburg, 1851). The Fragments of End. have been edited by Spengel 
(Eudemi Rhodii Peripatetici fragmenta quae wpersunt, Berlin, 1866, 2d edition, 1870). 

Fragments from the writings of later Peripatetics (Aristoxenus, Dicauarch, Phanias, Clearchus, De- 
inetrius, Strabo, and others) have been collected together by Carl Muller in his Fragm. Historicorurn 
Graee., Vol. II., Paris, 1848. 

Aristotoenus 1 Grundzuge der Rhythmik, Greek and German, ed. by Heinr. Feussner, Hanau, 1840; 
Elem. rhythm, fragmentum, ed. J. B. Bartels (diss.\ Bonn, 1854; Aristoxeni Harmon, quae supersunt, in 
Greek and German, by Paul Marquard, Berlin, 1868. Of Aristoxenus treat W. L. Mahne (Amst. 1793), 
Hirsch (Ar. u. s. Grundzuge d. Rhythm., G.-Pr., Thorn, 1859), Paul Marquard (De Ar. Tarentini Ele- 
mentis harmonicis, diss. inaug., Bonn, 1863). Carl von Jan (in the PhUol-, Vol. 29, 1869, pp. 300-318), and 
Bernh. Brill (ArSs rhythm, und metr. Measimgen, m. ein. Vorw. v. k. Lehrs, Leipsic, 1870). 

Dicaearchi quae supersunt, ed. Max. Fuhr, Darmst. 1841. Of Dicnearch treat Aug. Buttmann (Berlin, 
1832), F. Osann (in Beitr. zur griech. u. rom. Litterativrgesch., Vol. 11^ Cassel, 1839), A. F. Nake (in Opuac. 
philol, I. Bonn, 1842), Mich. Kutorga (in Melanges gr.-rom. de FAcad. de St. Peterfib., I. 1850), and 
Franz Schmidt (De Heraclidis Pontici et Dicaearchi Mewenii dialogis deperditis, diss. inaug., Bres- 
lau, 1867). 

On Clearchus, cf. J. Bapt. Verraert (De Clearcho Solensi, Gandavi, 1828). 

On Phanias of Eresus, cf. Aug. Voisin (Gandavi, 1824), I. F. Ebert (Konigsberg, 1825), A. Boeckh (in 
Corp. inscr. Graec., Vol. II., Berlin, 1843, p. 304 seq.). 

On Demetrius of Phalerus: H. Dohrn (Kiel, 1825), Th. Herwig (Rinteln, 1850), Ch. Ostermann (Her- 
feld, 1847, and Fulda, 1857); cf. Grauert (Hint. u. philol. Analekten., L p. 810 seq.). 

On Strato of Lampsacus : C. Nauwerck (Berlin, 1836) ; cf. Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 349-358. 

On Lyco: Creuzer (in the Wiener Jahrb., 1833, Vol. 61, p. 209 seq.). 

On Aristo of Ceos: J. G. Hubmann (in Jahn s Jahrb., 8. Supplementbd., 1834, p. 102 seq.), F. Ritschl (in 
the Rhein. MUK., new series, I. 1842, p. 193 seq.), Krische (Forschungen, I. p. 405 seq.). 

Later Peripatetics are treated of by Brandis (Ueber die griech. Ausleger des Arist. Org., in the Alh. 
der Berl. Akad. d. Wiss., 1833, p. 273 seq.), and Zumpt ( Ueber den Bestand derphilos. Schulen in Athtn, 
ibid. 1842, p. 96 seq.). On Adrastus, cf. Martin, Theo. Smyrnaeus Astronom., Paris, 1849, p. 74 seq. 


On Nicolaus of Damascus, cf. Conrad Trieber (Quaest. Laconic., p. 1 ; Zte Nicol. Dam. Laconicit, 
Digs. Getting., Berlin, 1867). 

Some of the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias were printed in the 3d volume of the Aldine edition 
of Aristotle, Venice, 1 495-98. Ale&andri Aphrodisiensis de anima, d/ato, in Themist. opera, Venet. 
1534 : Defato. ed. Orelli, Zurich, 1824; Q uaest. nat. et mor., ed. L. Spengel, Munich, 1842; Comm. in Ai-ist. 
metaph., ed. H. Bonitz, Berlin, 1847. On Alexander of Aphrodisias, cf. Usener (Alex. Aphr. quaeferuntur 
problemat. lib. III. et IV., Programm of the Joachimsth. Gym. of Berlin, 1859), and Nourisson (De la 
liberte et du hasard, ess. mr Al d Aphr., suivi du traite du destin et du libre powvoir, trad, en fr., 
Paris, 1870). 

Aristotle is reported (by Gell., N. A., XIII. 5), shortly before his death, to have 
returned to the question, whom he considered worthy to succeed him in the office of 
instructor, the allegorical answer, that the Lesbian and Rhodian wines were both excel 
lent, but that the former was the more agreeable (fjtiiov 6 Ac afiioc;) thus he is said to 
have decided as between Eudemus of Rhodes and Theophrastus of Lesbos, in favor of the 
latter. During thirty-five years after the death of Aristotle, Theophrastus was the leader 
of the Peripatetic School, and as he died while retaining that office, at the age of eighty- 
five (Diog. L., V. 36, 40, 58), he must have been born in 373 or 372 B. c., and died in 288 or 
287. His original name was Tyrtamus, and it is said that the name of Theophrastus 
was given him by Aristotle, on account of the charm of his discourse. Theophrastus 
and Eudemus, in their works, mainly supplement the works of Aristotle, although, in 
some cases, they attempt to correct him. Of the two, Eudemus seems to have followed 
Aristotle the more faithfully, and Theophrastus to have proceeded the more independently. 
In the details, in which they deviate from Aristotle, Eudemus shows rather a theological, 
Theophrastus a naturalistic bias ; the affinities of the former are thus relatively Platonic, 
those of Theophrastus Stratonic. Subsequent writers (e. g., Proclus, in his work On 
Euclid) drew considerably from the lost work of Eudemus on the History of Mathe 
matical and Astronomical Doctrines. In Logic, the doctrines of the problematical judg 
ment and the syllogism were specially developed by Theophrastus and Eudemus. In 
Metaphysics and Psychology, Theophrastus manifests a certain leaning toward the hypoth 
esis of immanence in connection with problems which Aristotle would have solved by the 
doctrine of transcendence ; yet, on the whole, Theophrastus remained true to the ideas of 
Aristotle. Thus he, like Aristotle (according to Simpl., in Phys., f. 225), treats the reason 
(vovq) as the better and diviner part of man, affirming that it is implanted in man from 
without in a perfect state, and is not developed from within : so also he admits the substan 
tial existence Ciwpjcr/zof) nature of the reason. Yet he teaches that that faculty is in 
some sense congenital (cfyi^wof) with man, but how, our reports do not clearly inform us. 
He, too, terms the activity of thought a species of motion (idvTiGi$\ but not motion in space. 
In Ethics, Theophrastus laid great emphasis on the "Choregia" of virtue, or on external 
goods as essential to the cultivation of virtue ; without such goods perfect happiness, he 
taught, was unattainable. The reproach was very often brought against him in later times 
(particularly by the Stoics), that he had approved the poetic maxim : vitam regit fortuna non 
sapientia; but this he applied, without doubt, only to the external life of man. Theophrastus 
held fast to the doctrine that virtue is worthy to be sought on its own account, and that 
without it all external goods are valueless (Cic., Tusc., V. 9 ; De Leg., 1. 13). He held that a 
slight deviation from the rules of morals was permissible and required, when such devia 
tion would result in warding off a great evil from a friend or in securing for him a great 
good. He opposed the sacrifice of animals. All ethical relations resulted, according to 
him (cf. Ar., Eth. N., VIII. 1), from the community (oiKeiorw) which exists among all living 
beings. The principal merit of Theophrastus consists in the enlargement which he gave 
to natural science, especially to Botany (Phytology), in the fidelity to nature with which 


he executed his delineation of Human Characters, and next to these things, in his contri 
butions to the constitution and criticism of the history of the sciences. 

Aristoxenus of Tarentum, the "Musician," is said to have renewed the theory con 
demned by Plato, but which received an essentially new signification through Aristotle s 
conception of entelechy, namely, that the soul is the harmony of the body (animam ipsius 
corporis intentionem quandam esse; velut in cantu et fidibus quae harmonia dicitur, sic ex 
corporis totius natura et figura varios motus cieri tamquam in cantu sonos, Cic., Tiisc., I. 10. 20). 
He is chiefly of significance on account of his theory of music, which, however, was not 
founded on philosophico-mathematical speculations, but on the acute perceptions of the ear. 
Besides his Elements of Harmonics, he wrote, among other things, biographies of philoso 
phers, particularly of Pythagoras and Plato. 

Dica3arch of Messene (in Sicily) gave the preference to the practical as compared with 
the theoretic life (Cic., AdAtt., II. 76). He devoted himself more to empirical investigation 
than to speculation. His B/ of EAAd<5of, of which some fragments have been preserved, 
was a geographico-historical description of Greece. According to Dica3arch, there exist 
no individual substantial souls, but only, in its stead, one universal, vital, and sensitive force, 
which is diffused through all existing organisms, and is transiently individualized in differ 
ent bodies (Cic., Tusc., I. 10, 21 ; 31 ; 37). 

Strato of Lampsacus, the Physicist (who succeeded Theophrastus as the head of 
the School in 288 or 287 B. c., and continued to occupy that position for eighteen years), 
transformed the doctrines of Aristotle into a consistent Naturalism. Perception and 
thought are immanent in each other (Plut., De Sol. Animal., ch. 3); there exists no vov$ 
absolutely separate or separable from the body. The seat of thought is in the head, 
between the eyebrows ; the (material) traces (vTrouovr/) of the images of perception remain 
there permanently; in the case of memory these traces become again active (Plut., De 
Plac., IV. 23). The formation of the world is the result of natural forces (Cic., De Nat. 
Dear., I. 13. 35; Acad. Pr., II. 38. 121). 

Cicero names as other and later Peripatetics : Lyco, the pupil of Strato, Aristo of Ceos, 
the pupil of Lyco, Hieronymus, Critolaus, and Diodorus (De Fin., V. 5), but does not 
attribute to them any great significance. A disciple and heir of Aristo of Ceos was 
Aristo of Cos (Strabo, XIV. 2. 19). Callipho, also, whom Cicero (De Fin., V. 25), men 
tions as older than Diodorus, appears to have been a Peripatetic, who taught in the second 
century B. c. Besides these may be mentioned the more erudite than philosophical 
Alexandrians : Hermippus (perhaps identical with the Hermippus of Smyrna, mentioned 
by Athenajus, VII. 327 ; cf. A. Lozynski, Hermippi Srnyrnaei Peripatetici Fragmenta, Bonn, 
1832; Preller, in Jahn s Jahrb., XVII. 1836. p. 159 seq.; Muller, Fragm. Hist. Gr., III. 
35 seq.), whose Riot appear to have been composed about 200 B. c. ; Satyrus, who likewise 
wrote a collection of biographies ; Sotion (of whom Panzerbieter treats in Jahn s Jahrb., 
Supplementbd. V., 1837, p. 211 seq.), the author of the Aiadoxai ruv tyiXocofyuv, of which 
Diog. Laertius made much use (date, about 190 B. c.), and Heraclides Lembus (see Muller, 
III. 167 seq.), who, about 150 B. c., compiled a book of extracts from the Eioi of Satyrus 
and the Aiadoxai of Sotion. To the first century B. c. belong Staseas of Naples (Cic., 
De Fin., V. 25 ; De Orat., I. 22), and Cratippus, who taught at Athens (Cic., De Off., I. 
1 et al.}. 

Andronicus of Rhodes, the (above-mentioned, p. 149) editor and expositor of the Aris 
totelian writings (about 70 B. c.), Boethus of Sidon (together with Sosigenes, the mathema 
tician, of the time of Julius Cassar), and Nicolaus of Damascus (under Augustus and 
Tiberius) were particularly influential in promoting the study and intelligent under 
standing of the works of Aristotle. Andronicus arranged the works of Aristotle and 


Theophrastus according to their subject-matter (Porphyr., Vita Plotini, 24: Avdp&viitos 6 ra AptoroT^ov^ not Qeotypdarov etf irpayfMTeias dielte rdf oliceiaf wroOioEts 
rif ravrbv (rwaya-yuv). In his exposition of the doctrine of Aristotle (according to the testi 
mony of the Neo-Platonist, Ammonius) he set out with logic, as the doctrine of demon 
stration (aicddeifa, or that form of philosophizing which is employed in all systems of 
philosophy, and must therefore be first known, cf. Arist., Met., IV. 3, 1005b, 11); the 
customary arrangement of the works of Aristotle (which in all probability originated with 
him), following this principle, begins with the Logic (Analytics) or " Organon." His 
pupil, Boethus (among whose friends belonged Strabo the geographer, an adherent of 
Stoicism), judged, on the other hand, that Physics was the doctrine most closely related to 
us and most easily understood, and maintained, therefore, that philosophical instruction 
should commence with it. Each of them held fast to the axiom, that the irpayfMTe uu 
(complexes of related bodies of investigation, hence separate bodies of philosophical doc 
trine, branch-sciences of philosophy) were to be arranged according to the principle of an 
advance from the irporepov irpbg ypas (the prior for us) to the frporepov Qvaei (the prior by 
nature). Diodotus, the brother of Boethus, was also a Peripatetic philosopher (Strabo, XVI. 
2. 24). Boethus seems, at least in some respects, to have been followed by Xenarchus, 
who taught at Alexandria, Athens, and Rome. Nicolaus of Damascus set forth the Peri 
patetic philosophy in compendia, following in the Metaphysics a different order from that 
followed by Andronicus in his edition of Aristotle s Metaphysics. The Alexandrian Peri 
patetic, Aristo, who lived at about this same time, seems to have occupied himself chiefly 
with logic and physics. Apuleius (De Dogm. PL, III.) ascribes to him a computation of 
the syllogistic figures, and he may also have been the author of an exegesis of the 
Categories, which is mentioned by Simplicius, as also of a work on the Nile, mentioned by 
Strabo (XVII. 1, 5), and with which was connected a dispute between this Peripatetic and 
the eclectic Platonist, Eudorus, on a question of priority (see below, 65). 

In many of the Peripatetics of this later period we find an approximation toward 
Stoicism, so in particular in the author of the work De Hundo (irepl KOC/LIOV), which con 
tains many doctrines taken from the Stoic Posidonius, and was probably composed in the 
first century B. c., or near the time of the birth of Christ ; and so, also, in other regards, 
in the work of Aristocles of Messene (in Sicily), the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias. 
Through this sort of Eclecticism the way was prepared for the later blending together of 
the leading systems in Neo-Platonism. 

The principal merit of the Peripatetics of the times of the emperors rests on their 
exegesis of the works of Aristotle. Explanatory notes to the Categories, as also to the De 
Coelo, were written both by Alexander of -5Cge, who was one of Nero s teachers, and by 
Aspasius, and by the latter, also, to the De Interpretations, the Physics, the Metaphysics, and 
the Nicomachean Ethics. Adrastus wrote concerning the order of the works of Aristotle 
(Trepl TJJC rdfewf TUV Aptarore^Mv^ GvyypafjLpaTuv), and an exposition of Aristotle s Categories 
and Physics, as also of the Timaeus of Plato, and perhaps of the Ethics of Aristotle and 
Theophrastus; also a work on Harmonics, in three books, and a treatise on the sun, 
which may have constituted a part of the astronomical work from which Theo s Astrono 
my (see below, 65) was, for the most part, borrowed. Herminus wrote commentaries 
on the Categories and other logical writings of Aristotle. Aristocles wrote an historico- 
critical work on philosophy. Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Exegete, expounded the 
Peripatetic philosophy at Athens, from the year 198 to 211, in the reign of Septimus 
Severus. He was a pupil of Herminus, of Aristocles of Messene, and of Sosigenes, the 
Peripatetic (not to be confounded with the astronomer of the same name, of the time of 
Julius Csesar). He distinguished in man a material or physical reason (vovs vTunoc or 


j>vciK.6(;), and an acquired or developed reason (vov$ eTri/c-nyrof or vov$ naff egiv), but identi 
fied the vov$ TTOLJJTLKO^ (the " active intellect "), through whose agency the potential intel 
lect in man becomes actual, with God. Of Alexander s Commentaries there are still 
extant the Commentaries on Book I. of the Analyt. Priora, the Topics, the Meteorology, 
the De Sensu, and Books I.-V. of the Metaphysics, together with an abridgment of his 
commentary on the remaining books of the Metaphysics ; his commentaries on several of 
the logical and phj^sical works, and on the Psychology of Aristotle, are lost. Of his other 
writings the following are preserved: Trepl 0v^f, Trept ei/Liapftevrjg, fyvamuv KOI qdtnuv 
aTTopitiv nal hvaeuv, Trept p ^ewf. The "Problems" and the work "On Fevers," are spuri 
ous. Some other works by him have been lost. 

52. Zeno of Citium (on the island of Cyprus), a pupil of Crates, 
the Cynic, and afterward of Stilpo, the Megarian, and of Xenocrates 
and Polemo, the Academics, by giving to the Cynic Ethics a more 
elevated character, and combining it with an Heraclitean physics and 
a modified Aristotelian logic, founded, about 308 B. c., a philosophical 
school, which was called, from the place where it assembled, the 
Stoic. To this school belonged Zeno s disciples : Persseus, Aristo of 
Chios, Herillus of Carthage, Cleanthes, Zeno s successor in the office 
of teacher and one of his most important disciples, and also Sphserus, 
from the Bosphorus, a pupil of Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, who suc 
ceeded Cleanthes as teacher of the school, and who first brought the 
Stoic doctrine to a state of complete systematic development, Zeno of 
Tarsus, the successor of Chrysippus, Diogenes the Babylonian, An- 
tipater of Tarsus, Pansetius of Rhodes, who was the principal agent in 
the propagation of Stoicism at Rome, and Posidonius of Rhodes, a 
teacher of Cicero. Of the Roman Stoics may be mentioned : L. An- 
naeus Cornutus (first century after Christ) and A. Persius Flaccus, the 
satirist, L. Annseus Seneca, C. Musonius Rufus, the slave Epictetus 
of Phrygia, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, in the second 
century after Christ, and others. 

Writers on the Stoic Philosophy in general, are Justus Lipsius (Manuductio ad Stoieam philoso- 
phia/m, Antw. 1604, and later), Dan. Heinsius (in his Orat., Leyden, 1627), Gataker (De disciplina Stoica 
cum secUs aliis collata, prefixed to his edition of the works of Antoninus, Cambridge, 1653), and others, of 
whom the most important is Dietr. Tiedemann (System der stoischen Philosophic, 3 vols., Leips. 1776). A 
survey of the whole historical development of Stoicism is given by L. Noack (Aus der Stoa sum Eaiser- 
thum, ein Slick auf den Weltlauf der stoischen Philosophic, in the Psyche, Vol. V., Heft 1, 1862, pp. 1-24). 
Cf. D. Zimmermann, Quae ratio philosophise Stoicae sit cum religione Romana, Erlangen, 1858; L. v. 
Arren, Quid ad informandos mores valere potuerit priorum St. doctrina, Colmar, 1859 ; F. Ravaisson, 
JStsai ur le Stmcisme,. Paris. 1856 ; P. Leferriere, Memoire concernant Tinflu&nce du Stolcisme sur la 
doctrine des juriscownMea remains, Paris, 1860 ; J. Donrif, Du Stolcisme et du Christianisme consi- 
deres dans leurs rapports, leurs differences et ^influence respective quils out eacercee sur lea mwurs, 
Paris, 1863. The most thorough investigation of the subject of Stoicism and its representatives, is that of 
Zeller, Ph. d. Or., 2d ed., III. 1, 1865, pp. 26-340. 498-522, 606-684. [See The Stoics, Epicureans, and 
Skeptics, translated from Zeller s Philos. der Griechen, by O. Keichel, London, 1869. TV.] 


Zeno s works (on the State, the Life according to Nature, etc.), a list of which is found in Diog. Lrt., 
VII. 4, have all been lost Of Zeno treat Hemingius Foreilus (Upsala, 1700), and G. F. Jenichen (Leips. 
1724) ; on his theology, cf. Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 365-404. 

There exist dissertations on Arista of Chios, by G. Buchner (Leips. 1725), J. B. Carpzow (Leips. 1742), 
and J. F. Hiller (Viteb. 1761), and a more recent one by N. Baal (Cologne, 1852); on his theology, see 
Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 404-415. 

On Herillus, cf. W. Tr. Krug (Ilerilli de summo bono sententia explosa, non e&plodenda, in Symb. 
ad hist, philos., p. III., Leips. 1822), and Saal (De Aristone Chio et Herillo Carthaginiensi, Cologne, 1852). 

On Persseus, see Krische, Forschungen,, I. pp. 436-443. 

The hymn of Cleanthcs to the supreme God has been edited by H. H. Cludius (Gott. 1786), J. F. H. 
Schwabe (Jena, 1819), Peterson (Kiel, 1825), Sturz and Merzdorf (Cleanthis hymnus in Jovern, ed. 
Sturz, Leips. 1785, ed. nov. cur., Merzdorf. Leips. 1835), and others. The other works of Cleanthes (the 
titles of which are given by Diog. L., VII., 174 seq.) have been lost. Cf. Gottl. Chr. Friedr. Mohnike 
(Kleanthes der Stalker, Vol. I., Greifswald, 1814), Wilh. Traugott Krug (De Cleanthe divinitaUs assertor* 
ac predicatore, Leipsic, 1819) ; Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 415-436. 

On Chrysippus have written F. N. G. Baguet (Louvain,1822), Chr. Petersen (Phil. Chrys. fund amenta, 
Altona and Hamb. 1827; cf. Trendelenburg s review in the Berl. Jahrb. f. wise. Kritik, 1827, 217 seq.), 
Krische (Forschungen, I. 443-481), Th. Bergk (De Chrysippi libris irepl airo^avnu^v, Cassel, 1841), and 
Nicolai (De logicis Chrysippi libris, Quedlinburg, 1859). The titles of the works of Chrysippus are 
recorded in Diog. Lae rt., VII. 189 seq. 

On Diogenes the Babylonian, cf. Krische, Forschungen, I. pp. 482-491 ; on Antipater of Tarsus: A. 
Waillot (Leodii, 1824), and F.Jacobs (Jena, 1827); on Pansetius: C. G. Ludovoci (Leips. 1734), and also 
F. G. van Lynden (Leyden, 1802), whose work is the more complete of the two. The fragments of Posi- 
donius have been edited by J. Bake (Leyden, 1810), and C. Muller (in Fragm. Hist. Gr., III. Paris, 1819, 
p. 245 seq.). Paul Topelmann (in his Diss. Bonn., 1867), and R. Scheppig (De Posidonio Apamensi, rerum, 
gentium, terrarum scriptore, Berlin, 1870) treat of Posidonius. 

Of Stoicism among the Romans, Hollenberg (Leips. 1793), C. Aubertin (De sap. doctoribus. qui a Cic. 
morte ad Neronis princ. Eomae <vig., Paris, 1857), and Ferraz (De Stoica discipline apud poetas Ro- 
manos, Paris, 1863) have written. Cf. also, C. Martha, Les Moralistes sous F empire Romain, philosopher 
etpoetes, Paris, 1864, 2. ed., 1866; P. Montee, Le Stoicisme d Rome, Paris, 1865; Franz Knickenberg, De 
ratione Stoica in Persii satiris apparente, dits.phil., Munster, 1867; Herm. Schiller, Diestoische Oppo 
sition unter Nero ("Programm" of the Wertheim Lyceum), Wertheim, 1867; Lud. Borchert, Num Antis- 
tius Labeo, auctor scholae ProcuUanorum, Stoicae philos. fuerit addictus (Diss. inaug. jur.), Berlin, 

Of the philosophical writings of L. Annaeus Seneca, the following are extant : Quaestionum Natu- 
ralium Libri VII, and a series of moral and religious treatises. De providentia, De bremtate vitae, and 
consolatory writings addressed ad Ilelviam matrem, ad Marciam and ad Polybium ; also De vita beata, 
De otio aut secessu sapientis, De animi tranquillitate, De constantia, De ira, De dementia, De benefieiis, 
and the Epistolae ad Lucilium. Editions of them by Gronovius (Amsterdam, 1662), Ruhkopf (Leips. 
1797-1811), Schweighauser (Zweibrucken, 1809), Vogel (Leipsic, 1829), Fickert (Leipsic, 1842-45), Haase 
(ibid. 1852-53), and others. Cf. E. Caro (Quid de beata vita senserit Seneca, Paris, 1852), Werner (De 
Senecae philosophic, Breslau, 1825), Wolffiin (in the Philologus, Vol. VIII., 1853, p. 184 seq.), II. L. 
Lehmann (Z. Annaeus Seneca und seine philos. Scfiriften, Philologus, Vol. VIII., 1853, pp. 309-828), F. L. 
Bohm (Annaeus Seneca und sein Werth auch fur unsere Zeit, Progr. of the Fr.-Wilh.-Gymn. of Berlin, 
1856), C. Aubertin (Sur les rapports supposes entre Seneque et St. Paul, Paris, 1857 and 1869), Fickert (G.-Pr., 
Breslau, 1857), H. Doergens (Antonin. cum Sen. ph. compar., Leips. 1857), Baur (Seneca und Paulus, das 
Verh dltniss des Stoicismus sum Christenthum nach den Schriften Seneca^s, in the Zeitschr. f. wiss. 77ieol.. 
Vol. I., 1858, Nos. 2 and 3), Holzherr (Der Philosoph Annaeus Seneca, " Rastatter Schulprogr." Tub. 1858 
and 59), Rich. Volkmann (Zur Gesch. der Beurtheilung /Seneca s, in Pad. Archiv., 1^ Stettin, 1859, pp. 
589-610). W. Bernhardt (Die Anschaiiung des Seneca vom Universum, Wittenberg, 1861), Siedler (Die 
religios-sittliche Weltanschauung des Philosophen Lucius Annaeus Seneca, " Schulpr.." Fraustadt, 1863). 
Cf. Bernhardy, Grundr. der roni. Lift., 4th ed., p. 811 seq. ; Octav. Greard, De litteris et Utter arum 
studio quid censuerit Seneca (Diss.), Paris, 1867; Ed. Goguel, Seneque, Strasbourg, 1868. 

Z. Annaei Phurnuti (Comuti\ De natura deorum I. (irepi -n)? TUV 0ew/ </>vo-ws), ed. Frid. Osann ; adj. 
est. J. de Villoison, De theologia physica Stoicorum commentatio, Gott. 1844. Cf. Martini, De L. Annaeo 
Cornuto, Leyden, 1825. 

C. Musonii Rufi reliquiae, et apophthegmata, ed. J. Venhuizen Peerlkamp, Harlem, 1822, praeced. 
Petri Nieutolandii diss. de Mus. Rufo (which appeared first in 1783). Cf. Moser, in Daub and Creuzer s 
Studien, VI. 74 seq., Babler in the N. Schweizeritches Mwewn, IV. 1, 1864, pp. 23-87 ; Otto Bernhardt, 
3nt Mus. Rufus (G.-Pr.), Sorau, 1866. 


The teachings of Epictetua (recorded by Arriau) in the Atarpi/Soi and the Encheiridion have been 
edited by Joh. Schweighauser (Leipa. 1799); the same, together with the commentary of Simplicius on the 
Encheiridion^ ibid. 1800. German tranelationa of the Conversations of Epictetu* have been made by J. M. 
Schultz (Altona, 1801-3), and K. Enk (Vienna, 1866); Enk has also translated Simplicius commentary on 
the Manual^ Vienna, 1S6T (1S66). [The Works of Epictetus, Engl. transl. by T. W. Higginsoii, founded on 
Mrs. Carter s version, Boston, 1865. TV.] Works on Epictetus have been written by Beyer (Marburg, 
1T95), Perlett (Erfurt, 1T9S). Spangeuberg (Hanau, 1849), Winnefeld (in the Zeitschr. f. Philos., new aeries, 
Vol. 49, 1866, pp. 1-32 and 193-226), and Gust. Grosch (Die Sittenlehre des Epiktet, G.-Pr., Wernigerode, 
136T). With the Encheiridion* a work entitled Tabula (7riVo), falsely attributed to the Cebes, who 
appears in Plato s Phaedo, but in reality a product of the later Eclectic Stoicism, has often been published 
(by Schweighauser, Leipsic, 1798, and others). 

The work entitled ra. ei? ecu/rov, by the Emperor Marc. Aurelius Antoninus, has been edited by J. M. 
Schultz (Schleswig, 1802), and others. Cf. N. Bach, De M. Aurel. Ant. imperatore philosophante, H. Doer- 
gens (see above, ad Seneca), F. C. Schneider s translation of the Meditations (Breslau, 1857, 2d ed., 1S65), 
M. E. de Suckau, Etude sur Marc Aurele. sa me et sa doctrine (Paris, 1858). M. Noel des Vergers, Essai 
sur Marc- Aurele (Paris, I860), Max KSnigsbeck, De Stoicismo Marci Antonini (Konigsberg, Pr., 1861), 
Ed. Zeller, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (in Zcller s Vortr. u. Abh., Leipe. 1865, pp. 82-107), Arn. Bodek, 
M. Aur. Ant. als Freund und Zeitgenosse des Jiabbi Jehuda ha-Nasi (Leips. 1868), and J. Schuster, 
Ethices Stoicae apud M. Aur. Ant. fund amenta (in the Schriften der Univ. su Kiel aus dem Jahre 1868, 
Vol. XV., Kiel, 1869). [Engl. translation of the Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, Boston, 1864. TV.] 

Besides the works and fragments of works by the Stoics themselves, the statements of Cicero, Plu 
tarch, Diog. L. (Book VII.), Stobams, and Simplicius, are especially useful as aids to the knowledge of 

The Stoics classed themselves among the followers of Socrates ; and they were, in 
reality, so nearly related to Socrates in their doctrines and their theory of life, and were 
to such a degree mere continuators of previous types of thought, that, although they may 
be distinguished from the previous schools, they can not be regarded as introducing a new 
period in Greek philosophy. "Socrates sat for the portrait of the Stoic sage; the Stoics 
strove earnestly to build up their inner man after the pattern of the virtuous wise man, 
whose lineaments they borrowed from the transfigured and lofty form of Socrates " (Noack, 
Psyche, V., 1., 1862, p. 13). The productive element in the Stoic philosophy is indeed not to 
be deemed insignificant, especially in the field of ethics, where their rigorous discrimination 
and severance of the morally good from the agreeable, and the rank of indifference to 
which they reduced the latter, mark at once the merit and the onesidedness of the Stoics. 
But this element is less characteristic of their philosophy as a whole, than is the fact that 
in the latter those elements of humane culture were conserved, which were bequeathed to 
the Stoics by their predecessors, and by their agency these elements gained a wider range 
of influence. The modifications introduced by the Stoics into the form and content of phi 
losophy were, for the most part, only such as grew out of their tendency to philosophize 
for the many. But the extensive diffusion of a philosophy, together with the modifica 
tions of doctrine involved in such diffusion, is insufficient, when taken in connection with 
an inferior activity in the development of philosophic thought, to authorize us in regarding 
that philosophy as inaugurating a new period. 

The life of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, falls nearly between 350 and 258 
B. c. ; for the exact determination of the dates our authorities are too contradictory. A 
son of Mnaseas, who was a merchant of Cittium (an Hellenic city, but inhabited partly by 
Phenicians), he too was occupied in his early life (according to Diog. L., VII. 1 seq., until 
his 30th, or, more likely, according to Persseus as cited by Diog. L., VII. 28, until his 
22d year) in commerce. A shipwreck is said to have been the occasion of his residing for 
a while at Athens. The reading of works written by the disciples of Socrates (especially 
the reading of Xenophon s Memorabilia and the Platonic Apology, see Diog. L., VII. 3, and 
Themist., Orat. 23, p. 295 e) filled him with admiration for the strength of character dia- 


played in Socrates, and in Crates the Cynic he thought he had found the man who, of all 
men then living, most resembled Socrates. Accordingly he joined himself to Crates as his 
pupil. It is said that the writings of Zeno, especially the earliest of them, contained ideas 
which savored of the harshness and coarseness of Cynicism and for which later Stoics 
(probably Chrysippus, in particular) sought to substitute others more mild and refined. 
Of Zeno s work on the State, it was said (Diog. L., VII. 4) that he wrote it iiri rfc TOV 
KVVOC ovpdc. Not deriving permanent satisfaction from the Cynic philosopher, he is said to 
have addressed himself to Stilpo, from whom Crates in vain sought again to tear him 
away (Diog. L., VII. 24) ; then he heard Xenocrates, and after the death of the latter 
(Olymp. 116.3 = 314 B. c.), Polemo. Not long after 310 B. c. he founded his own philo 
sophical school in the Srda iroiKity (a portico adorned with paintings of Polygnotus), 
whence the school received the name of Stoic. According to Apollonius (ap. Diog. L., 
VII. 28), he taught 58 } r ears, which agrees with the statement that he lived 98 years ; 
but according to the testimony of Persaeus (ibid.) he died at the age of 72 years (for which 
Zumpt reads 92, in view of Diog. L., VII. 9, where Zeno in a letter to Antigonus calls 
himself 80 years old). The Athenians held Zeno in high respect, and honored him (accord 
ing to Diog. L,, VII. 10) with a golden chaplet, a tomb built at the public expense, and 
(Diog. L., VII. 6) also with a monument of brass, on account of the virtue and temperance 
of which he gave proofs in his doctrine and life, and to the practice of which he directed 
the young. The titles of Zeno s works are cited in Diog. L., VII. 4. 

Cleanthes of Assus in Troas was (according to Diog. L., VII. 168) originally a pugilist, 
and, while in attendance on the instructions of Zeno, earned his living by carrying water 
and kneading dough in the night. He grasped philosophical doctrines slowly and with 
difficulty, but held faithfully to that which he had once taken in, whence Zeno is said to 
have compared him to a hard tablet, on which it was difficult to write, but which retained 
permanently the characters once inscribed on it. According to Diog. L. (VII. 176), he 
remained nineteen years the pupil of Zeno, whom he then succeeded as director of the 
school. For the titles of his written works, see Diog. L., VII. 174, 175. 

Noteworthy pupils of Zeno, besides Cleanthes, were Persaeus of Cittium, to whom we 
owe several valuable literary notices (he repaired in 278 B. c., with his pupil Aratus of 
Soli, from Athens to the court of the Macedonian king Antigonus Gonatas) ; Aristo of 
Chios, who undervalued the theoretical, rejected logic as useless, and physics as a science 
beyond the reach of man, and declared all things except virtue and vice to be indifferent ; 
and Herillus of Carthage, who, on the contrary, denned the chief business of man as 
knowledge (Eicurrjifui), but recognized besides it another secondary end (wrorea/f, Diog. L., 
VII. 165): according to him, the gifts of fortune are treasures of the unwise, but the 
highest good of the wise man is knowledge. 

Chrysippus of Soli or Tarsus in Oicilia (282-209 B. c.), the successor of Cleanthes, 
became, through his elaboration of the system on all its sides, a sort of second founder of 
the Stoic school, so that it was said (Diog. L., VII. 183) that "without Chrysippus, the 
Stoa had not existed " (Ei HTJ yap TJV XpvotTnro^ OVK av ijv 2rod). Yet hi his works he was 
very diffuse. He is said to have written daily five hundred lines, and to have composed 
seven hundred and five books, which were largely filled with citations from other authors, 
especially from poets, and with numerous repetitions and corrections of what had gone 
before (Diog. L., VII. 180 seq.) 

After Chrysippus, Sphaerus from the Bosphorus was one of the most celebrated of 
the disciples of Cleanthes. The Stoic Boethus appears to have been a contemporary and 
condisciple of Chrysippus (as may be inferred from Diog. L., VII. 54). 

The successors of Chrysippus were Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes the Babylonian (from 


Seleucia on the Tigris), of whom Crates of Mallos, perhaps also Aristarchus and certainly 
Apollodorus, the author of the XpoviKd (written after 144 B. c.) and other works, were pupils. 
The next leader of the school after them was Antipater of Tarsus. Diogenes went (accord 
ing to Gell., N. A., XV. 11) in the year 155 B. c., together with Carneades, the Academic, 
and Critolaus, the Peripatetic, to Rome, as an embassador of the Athenians, commissioned 
to procure the remission of a pecuniary fine which had been laid upon them. Through 
the public discourses of these philosophers Greek philosophy was first made known at 
Rome ; but it was unfavorably received by the Senate. " The Peripatetic, Critolaus, 
fascinated the Roman youth by the cleverness and aptness of his style ; the Academic, 
Carneades, by his forcible delivery and brilliant acuteness ; the Stoic, Diogenes, by the 
mild and tranquil flow of his discourses." (On the sending of these men to Rome in the 
year 155 B. c., cf. Wiskeman, G.-Pr., Hersfeld, 1867.) The elder Cato was unwilling that 
the public policy of Rome, which for the Roman youth was the supreme norm of judgment 
and action, and was possessed of unconditional authority, should, through the influence of 
foreign philosophers, become subordinated in the consciousness of these youth to a more 
universal ethical norm. He insisted on the earliest possible dismissal of these embas- 
sadors. In his view, the condemnation of Socrates, as the author of such corrupting 
speculation, was just and was well done. A decree of the Senate, in the year 150 B. c., 
ordered the banishment from Rome of all foreign philosophers and teachers of rhetoric. 

Pansetius of Rhodes (about 180-111 B. c.), a disciple of Diogenes, won over to Greek 
philosophy such members of the Roman aristocracy as La3lius and Scipio (the latter of 
whom, according to Cic., Acad., II. 2. 5, et al., he accompanied on his diplomatic journey to 
Alexandria, 143 B. c.). He toned down the harsher elements of the Stoic doctrine (Cic., 
De Fin., TV. 28), aimed at a less rugged and more brilliant rhetorical style, and, in addition 
to the authority of the earlier Stoics, appealed also to that of Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, 
Theophrastus, and Dicasarch. Inclined more to doubt than to inflexible dogmatism, he 
denied the possibility of astrological prognostications, combated all forms of divination, 
abandoned the doctrine of the destruction of the world by fire, on which Boethus and 
other Stoics had already had doubts, and with Socratic modesty confessed that he was 
still far from having attained to perfect wisdom. His work irepl TOV Kadr/novrog forms the 
basis of Cicero s De Officiis (Cic., De Off., III. 2; Ad Att., XVI. 11). With him begins 
the leaning of Stoicism toward Eclecticism (a change largely due to Roman influences). 
Among the disciples of Panajtius were the celebrated jurist and Pontifex Maximus, Q. 
Mucius Scasvola (died 82 B.C.), who distinguished three theologies: the theology of tho 
poets, the theology of the philosophers, and the theology of statesmen. The first was 
anthropomorphic and anthropopathic, and therefore false and ignoble. The second was 
rational and true, but impracticable. The third, on which the maintenance of the estab 
lished cultus depended, was indispensable. (Of a similar nature were the opinions of M. 
Terentius Yarro [115-25 B. c.], who, educated by Antiochus of Ascalon, the Academic, 
was, like the latter, an eclectic in philosophy, but interpreted the religious myths alle- 
gorically, as did the Stoics, and conceived God as the soul of the universe.) 

Posidonius of Apamea (in Syria), whose school was located at Rhodes, where,among 
others, Cicero and Pompey heard him, was a disciple of Panaetius, and was regarded as the 
man of the most comprehensive and thorough learning (KoXvfiadKcraro^ and iTrtarrfjuoviKu- 
raroq) among all the Stoics. He returned again toward dogmatism, blended Aristotelian 
and Platonic with Stoic doctrines, and took such pleasure in high-sounding discourse, that 
Strabo (III. p. 147) avers he was "inspired with hyperboles." About the same time 
lived the Stoic Apollodorus Ephillus, or, rather, Ephelus (o 0^/lof, lentiginosus). 

The Stoic Athenodorus of Tarsus was superintendent of the Pergamean Library, and 


afterward a companion and friend of the younger Cato (Uticensis), who approved the 
Stoic principles by his life. Besides him, Antipater of Tyre, who died at Athens about 
45 B. c., was also a teacher of the younger Cato. The Stoic Apollonides, a friend of Cato, 
was with the latter during his last days. 

Diodotus was (about 85 B. c.) a teacher of Cicero, and afterward (until his death, about 
60 B. c.) a member of his family and his friend. Athenodorus, the son of Sandon, and 
perhaps a pupil of Posidonius, was (together with Arius of Alexandria, who is probably 
identical with the eclectic Platonist, Arius Didymus) a teacher of Octavianus Augustus. 
The Stoic Heraclitus (or Heraclides), the author of the "Homeric Allegories" (ed. Mehler, 
Leyden, 1851), seems to have lived near or in the time of Augustus. Under Tiberius, 
Attalus, one of Seneca s tutors, taught at Rome. An instructor of Nero was Chseremon, 
who appears afterward to have presided over a school at Alexandria, 

L. Annaeus Seneca, born at Cordova (in Spain), was the son of M. Annasus Seneca, the 
rhetorician, and lived A. D. 3-65. In philosophy, his attention was mainly directed to 
Ethics, which science, however, assumed in his hands rather the form of exhortation to 
virtue than that of investigation into the nature of virtue. Seneca resembled the Cynics 
of his time in the slight worth which he attributed to speculative investigations and 
systematic connection. The conception of earnest, laborious inquiry, as an ethical end 
possessing an independent worth in itself, is absent from his philosophy ; he knows only 
the antithesis: facere docet philosophia, non dicere; philosophiam oUedamentum facere, quum 
remedium sit, etc., and thus illustrates the Stoic distaste for the Aristotelian conception of 
philosophizing, carried to its extreme. By his hopeless complaints over the corruptness 
and misery of human life, and by his indulgent concessions to human frailty, he is far 
removed from the spirit of the earlier Stoa. 

L. Anna3us Cornutus (or Phurnutus) lived about A. l>. 20-66 or 68 at Rome. He wrote 
in the Greek language. A. Persius Flaccus, the satirist (A. D. 34-62), was his pupil and 
friend. M. Annasus Lucanus (39-65), the son of Seneca s brother, was also among his 
scholars. To the Stoic circle belonged, further, the well-known Republicans Thrasea 
Paetus (Tac., Ann., XVI. 21 seq.; Hist, IV. 10, 40) and Helvidius Priscus (Ann., XVI. 
28-35 ; Hist., IV. 5 seq. ; 9, 53). 

C. Musonius Rufus of Volsinii, a Stoic of nearly the same type as Seneca, was, 
with other philosophers, banished from Rome by Nero (Tacitus, Annal, XV. 71). He was 
afterward recalled, probably by Galba. When Vespasian ordered the banishment of all 
philosophers from Rome, Musonius was allowed to remain. He stood also in relations of 
personal intimacy to Titus. His pupil Pollio (perhaps, according to Zeller, III. 1, 1865, 
p. 653, identical with Valerius Pollio, the grammarian, who lived under Hadrian) wrote 
aTTOfj.vT]fj.ovv^.aTa Mot>crWoi>, from which, probably, Stobasus drew what he communicates 
respecting his teachings. Musonius reduced philosophy to the simplest moral teachings. 
One of his finest sayings is : "If thou doest good painfully, thy pain is transient, but the 
good will endure ; if thou doest evil with pleasure, thy pleasure will be transient, but the 
evil will endure." 

Epictetus of Hieropolis (in Phrygia) was a slave of Epaphroditus, who belonged to the 
body-guard of the Emperor Nero. He was afterward set free, became a disciple of 
Musonius Rufus, and was subsequently a teacher of philosophy at Rome, until the proscrip 
tion of philosophers throughout Italy by Domitian in the year 94 (Gell., N. A., XIV. 11 ; 
cf. Suet., Domit., 10). after which he lived at Nicopolis in Epirus. There he was heard by 
Arrian, who recorded his discourses. Epictetus emphasizes chiefly the necessity of holding 
the mind independent of all external goods, since these are not under our control. To this 
end we should bear and forbear (ave^ov nal cTre^ot;). Man should invariably strive to find 


11 his goods in himself. He should fear most of all the god (6e6s or datpuv) within his 
own breast. 

The Sentences of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius are founded largely on those of Epic- 
tetus. His predilection for solitary contemplation, "in which man is alone in the presence 
of his Genius," gives to his views a certain relationship with the Neo- Platonic philosophy, 
which was soon afterward to arise. 

53. The Stoics make Logic and Physics in reality ancillary to 
Ethics, although they generally ascribe to Physics (including The 
ology) a higher rank than to Ethics. Under Logic many of the Stoics 
include Dialectic and Rhetoric. The Stoic Dialectic is a theory of 
cognition. It is founded on the Analytics of Aristotle, which it sup 
plements by certain investigations respecting the criterion of truth, 
the nature of sensuous perception, and certain forms of the syllogism 
(the hypothetical syllogism, in particular). Its changes in terminology, 
however, mark no scientific progress, their only use being perhaps to 
facilitate the work of elementary instruction ; greater intelligibility 
was not unfrequently purchased at the cost of profundity. The fun 
damental criterion of truth, with the Stoics, is sensuous distinctness 
in the mental representation. All knowledge arises from sensuous 
perception ; the soul resembles originally a piece of blank paper, on 
which representations are afterward inscribed by the senses. In place 
of the Platonic theory of ideas and the Aristotelian doctrine of the 
conceptual essences of things, the Stoics teach the doctrine of subjec 
tive concepts, formed through abstraction ; in the sphere of objective 
reality only concrete individuals exist. For the ten categories of 
Aristotle the Stoics substitute four class-conceptions, to which they 
attribute the highest generality, viz. : Substratum, Essential Attri 
bute or Quality, Condition, and Relation. 

The Stoic conception of irpdAij^i? is treated of by Roorda (Leyden, 1828, from the Annales Acad. Lug- 
dun., 1 822-23), the Stoic doctrine of categories by Trendelenburg (Gesch. der Kategorienlehre, Berlin, 1846, 
pp. 217-232); cf. Prantl, in his Gench. d. Logik, Zeller, in his Ph. d. Gr., etc., also, J. II. Kitter, De St. 
doctr. pracs. de eorum logica, Breslau, 1849, and Nicolai, De Log. Chrys. Ubrix, G.-Tr., Quedl. 1859. 

The three parts into which philosophy was divided by the Stoics corresponded with 
the three species of virtue (aperj?), which, according to them, the philosopher must seek to 
acquire, namely : thoroughness in the knowledge of nature, in moral culture, and in logical 
discipline (Plutarch, De Plac. Philos., I. Proem : apera^ rdf yeviKurara^ rpsig fyvciKTjv, fj&iitf/v, 
Zayiicfjv). The Stoics employed the term Logic to denote the doctrine of /Idyoff, i. e., of 
thought and discourse, and divided it into Dialectic and Rhetoric (Diog. L., YII. 41 : TO 6k 
?M" [itpo<; <paalv ivioi eig 6 vo diaipeiG &at 7rmr^//af, elf prjropiKijv Kal elf 6iahEK.TiK.fjv). 
Cleanthes enumerated six divisions of philosophy: Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, 
Physics, and Theology; he does not appear to have reduced these, in any case, to the 
three above-named. To illustrate the nature and mutual relation of logic, ethics, and 


physics, the Stoics (according to Diog. L., VII. 40, and Sext Emp., Adv. Math., VII. 17 
seq.) compared the first to the bones and sinews of the body, the shell of an egg, or the 
fence inclosing a garden ; ethics, to the flesh of the body, the white of the egg (and the 
trees in the garden ?) ; and physics (especially when viewed as theology), to the soul, the 
yolk of the egg (and the fruits of the garden?) ; some, however (e. g., Posidonius), preferred 
the comparison of physics to flesh, the white of the egg, and the trees in the garden, and 
ethics to the soul, the yolk of the egg, and the fruits of the garden. 

In Dialectic the Stoics included the doctrine of language (grammar), and the doctrine of 
that which language expresses, representations and thoughts (theory of cognition, includ 
ing the Aristotelian Logic as modified by them). In Grammar the Stoics accomplished 
very meritorious results, but these are in part of more significance for the history of 
positive philological inquiry than for the history of philosophy. Cf. the above-cited works 
of Lersch and Steinthal (p. 24). 

The fundamental question in the Stoic theory of cognition relates to the means by 
which truth is to be known as such (npiTTjpiov). A similar question was not unknown to 
Aristotle (Metaph., IV. 6 : rt f 6 Kpivuv TOV vyiaivovTa /cat oAof rbv irepl l/caara Kpivovra 
6/>#tJf|), but he classed it with such idle questions as whether we are now awake or 
asleep. "With the Stoics, on the contrary, and in Post- Aristotelian philosophy generally, 
the question as to the criterion of truth acquired a constantly increasing importance. 
The theories of the earliest Stoics respecting the conditions of the veracity of our cog 
nitions, are rather indefinite. Zeno (according to Cic., Acad., II. 47) likened perception 
to the outstretched fingers, assent (ovyKar66eatf) to the hand half closed, the mental 
apprehension of the object itself (Kard/jf^) to the hand fully closed (the fist), and knowl 
edge to the grasping of the fist by the other hand, whereby it was more completely and 
surely closed. With this accords the Stoic definition of knowledge as the certain arid 
incontestable apprehension, through the concept, of the thing known (/cardA^f off^a/jfc 
Kal d/uETaTTTUTos VTTO Adyov, Stob., Eel Eth., II. 128), together with the consequent defini 
tion of science as the system of such " apprehensions." The Stoic Boethus (Diog. L., VII. 
54) named, as criteria: reason, sensation, desire, and science. But Chrysippus, in opposi 
tion to Boethus, and with him Antipater of Tarsus, Apollodorus, and others, proposed as 
a criterion the KaTafyirTiKrj fyavTacia, i. e., that representation which, being produced in us 
by a real object, is able, as it were, to take hold of or grasp (naTa^afiftavtLv) that object. The 
word KaTahaftjSdveiv is also used in the work ascribed to Philolaus, to denote the grasping 
of an object (vrrb TOV 6/uoiov TO o/notov KaTa^afij3dveo~6at irtyvnev, see Boeckh, Philol., p. 192), 
and in the same sense it is employed by Posidonius, the Stoic, as cited in Sext., Adv. M., 
VII. 93: "light," he says, "is apprehended by the luminous eye, sound by the aeriform 
ear, and the nature of the All by the related Adyof in us ; " the expression tyavTaaia /caro- 
"krj nTiK.r] is therefore to be explained, not as signifying a representation by which the soul is 
taken possession of or affected, but one by which the soul grasps the object of representation 
(TO vTrdpxov). In Sext. Emp., Adv. M., VII. 244, the yavrama /cara/l^rri/o? is defined as a 
representation coming from the object and agreeing with it, impressed and sealed on the 
mind and incapable of existing without the existence of its object (rj diro TOV virdpxovTog 
Kal /car airo TO virdpxov haTro/uE/j.ay/u.evij /cat haTreotipayianEvr], OTTO IO. OVK. av JEVOLTO airb (JLTJ 
vTcdpxovTor}. There remains, it is true, in every case the second question, whether a 
given representation is of the kind described or not ; it depends on our free determination 
either to allow or to deny to a representation that assent (cvyKaTdOeaif), by which we 
declare it true, and in this none but the sage will be sure never to commit an error. The 
next distinguishing element of correct representations is sensuous distinctness (evdpyeia), 
which is usually wanting in representations which do not arise from an object, i. *., in the 


mere images of the fancy (<pavrda/uara). But since it sometimes happens that false repre 
sentations appear with all the force of true ones, the later Stoics (according to Sext. Emp., 
Adv. Math., VII. 253) found themselves constrained to add that the above description 
applied only to those representations against which no contrary instance could be alleged 
(uTjdev sloven Ivcrrj^a). 

Representation (tyavTaaia) was defined by Zeno as an impression on the soul (rvTruaig ev 
V lMff/), and Cleanthes compared it to the impression made by a seal on wax ; but Chry- 
sippus opposed the definition of Zeno, taken in its literal sense, and himself defined ^avracia 
as an alteration in the soul (irepoiiMJ^ Vw/fi Sext. Emp., Adv. M., VII. 228 seq.). The 
yavTaoia is a state (irdtfos) produced in the soul, to which it announces both its own 
existence and that of its object (Plutarch, De Plac. Philos., IV. 12). Through our percep 
tions of external objects and also of internal states (such as virtuousness and viciousness, 
see Clirysippus, reported in Plut., De St. Repugn., 19, 2), the originally vacant soul is filled 
with images and as if with written characters (Plut., De Plac. Ph., IV. 11 : hcirep xapriov 
ivepybv sig cnroypa<bT]v). 

After perceiving an object, the memory (jivrj^rj) of it remains behind, though the object 
be removed. From the combination of similar memories arises experience (k^Kipia, defined 
as TO TUV 6//ofJd)v Trhrjdor). The concept (evvoia) is formed from single perceptions by 
generalization, which act may be either spontaneous and unconscious (dvsTrtTs^i^Tug) or 
conscious and methodical (<5f f/peTspac; 6idaaK.ah.ia(; nal impe /.eiag ) ; in the former case 
"common ideas" or "anticipations" (nmval iwoiai or TrpoTifrpeic;) are formed, in the latter, 
artificial concepts. " Common ideas " are general notions developed in the course of 
nature in all men (tort 6" T] Trpo/^nc iwota <J>VGIKT) TOV /ca$d/,ot>, Diog. L., VII. 54). 
These ideas (although termed E^VTOL TrpoA^cic) were not viewed by at least the earlier 
Stoics as innate, but only as the natural outgrowth from perceptions. Rationality is a 
product of the progressing development of the individual; it is gradually "agglomer 
ated " (owadpoifcrai) out of his perceptions and representations until about the fourteenth 
year of life. The technically-correct formation of concepts, judgments, and inferences 
depends on the observance of certain rules, which it is the business of Dialectic to teach. 

In their theory of the concept the Stoics maintain the doctrine which was afterward 
denominated Nominalism (or Conceptualism). They hold that the individual alone pos 
sesses real existence, and that the universal exists only in us, in the form of subjective 
thought (Plut., De Plac. Ph., I. 10: ol airo Zr/vuvos ZTUIKOI kvvorjfiara j/fterepa Tag itieag 
iyaaav). That Zeno put forth this doctrine in express opposition to the Platonic theory of 
ideas, is affirmed by Stob., Eel, I. 332. 

The four most general concepts (ra yew/cwrara), which with the Stoics take the place of 
the ten categories of Aristotle, are: 1. TO i"rroK(.f*evov (the substratum); 2. TO TTOLOV, or ( 
more exactly, TO iroibv VTrondfiEvov (essential quality) ; 3. TO irug %ov, or, more exactly, 
TO Trwf e%ov iroibv vTTOKeijLievov (accidental state or condition) ; 4. ~u Trpof; TI TTCJ^ %ov, or 
more exactly, TO Trpof TI TTCJ^ %ov TTOIOV vTroKei/aevov (relation). 

In their doctrine of the Syllogism the Stoics began with the hypothetical syllogism 
which (according to Boe th., De Syllog. Ifypoth., p. 606) was first considered by the two Aris 
totelians, Theophrastus and Eudemus (most fully by the latter). Clirysippus (according 
to Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., VIII. 223) placed at the head of his doctrine of the syllogism, 
five " non-apodictic syllogisms" (Gv^oyia/u.ol avairodEiKTot), in which the Major Premise 
posited two terms as either standing or falling together, while the Minor Premise 
categorically affirmed or denied one of these terms, and the Conclusion (tKi<popd} 
stated what then resulted for the other term. Cf. Prantl, Gesch. der Log., I. pp. 467-496; 
Zeller, Philos. der Gr., 2d ed., III. p. 98 seq. 


54. Physics, with the Stoics, includes not only Cosmology, but also 
Theology. The Stoics teach that whatever is real is material. Matter 
and force are the two ultimate principles. Matter is per se motionless 
and unformed, though capable of receiving all motions and all forms. 
Force is the active, moving, and molding principle. It is inseparably 
joined with matter. The working force in the universe is God. The 
world is bounded and spherical. It possesses a general unity, while 
containing the greatest variety in its several parts. The beauty and 
adaptation of the world can only have come from a thinking mind, 
and prove, therefore, the existence of Deity. Since the world con 
tains parts endowed with self-consciousness, the world as a whole, 
which must be more perfect than any of its parts, can not be uncon 
scious; the consciousness which belongs to the universe is Deity. The 
latter permeates the world as an all-pervading breath, as artistically 
creative fire, as the soul and reason of the All, and contains the rational 
germs of all things (Adyot a-rre^ariKoi). The formation of the world 
takes place by the transformation of the divine original lire into air 
and water ; of this water, one part becomes earth, another part remains 
water, and a third part is changed by evaporation to air, which, again, 
is subsequently rekindled into fire. The two denser elements, earth 
and water, are mainly passive ; the two finer ones, air and fire, are 
mainly active. At the end of a certain cosmical period all things are 
reabsorbed into the Deity, the whole universe being resolved into fire 
in a general conflagration. The evolution of the world then begins 
anew, and so on without end. The rise and decay of the world are 
controlled by an absolute necessity, which is only another expression 
for the subjection of nature to law or for the divine reason ; this 
necessity is at once fate (elpaftiKvr] ) and the providence (Trpdvom), 
which governs all things. The human soul is a part of the Deity, or 
an emanation from the same ; the soul and its source act and react 
upon each other. The soul is the warm breath in us. Although it 
outlives the body, it is yet perishable, and can only endure, at the 
longest, till the termination of the world-period in which it exists. 
Its parts are the five senses, the faculty of speech, the generative 
faculty, and the governing force (TO fjyepoviKov), which is situated in 
the heart, and to which belong representations, desires, and under 

Of the natural philosophy, psychology, and theology of the Stoics, treat Justus Lipsius (Physiologia 
St&icorum, Antw. 1610), Jac. Thomasius (De Stoic, mundi exmtione, Leipsic, 1672), Mich. Sonntag (D 
palingeneaia Stoic., Jena, 1700), Joh. Mich. Kern (Stoicorwm Dogmata de Deo, Gott. 1761), Ch. Meiner* 


\ Somm. de Stoicorwm, sententia de animorum post mortem statu et fatis, in his Verm. philo. Schriften^ 
Axsips. 1775-76. Vol. II., pp. 265 seq.), Th. A. Suabedissen (Cur pauci semper fuerint physiologiae Stoi- 
i^nmi sectatores, Cassel, 1813), D. Zimmermann (Qutie ratio philosophiae Stoicae sit cum, religione Ro- 
mana, Erlangen, 1858), E. Ehlers (Vis aepotestas, quam philoaophia antiqua, imprimis Platonica et 
Stoica, in doctr. apologetarwm sec. 11. habiwrit, Gott. 1859), O. Heine (Stoicorum defato doctrina, 
comm. Portensis, Nuremberg, 1859) cf. O. Heine (Stobaei Eclog. locinonnulli ad St.phUos. perUn. emend., 
G. Pr., Hirschberg, 1869) C. Wachsmuth (Die Antichten der Stoiker ilber Mantik und Ddmonen, Berlin, 
1860), F. Winter (Stoicorum pantheismus et principia doctr. ethicae quomodo sint inter se apta ac con- 
neaxi, G.-Pr., Wittenberg, 1863). 

Theology and all other doctrines which Aristotle included under metaphysics, were 
assigned by the Stoics, for whom every thing real was material, to physics. But although 
they accorded to physics, as comprehending speculative theology, the highest rank among 
the philosophical disciplines, yet it was cultivated by them in fact with less zeal than was 
ethics. This is specially evidenced by the fact that they proceeded more independently in 
logic and ethics than in physics, for which they went back substantially to the Heraclitean 
natural philosophy. 

Instead of the four Aristotelian apxal or principles (matter, form, working cause, and 
final cause, which, indeed, Aristotle had himself already reduced, in a certain aspect, to 
two), the Stoics name two principles: TO TTOIOVV and TO iracx ov , or the active and the passive 
principles. These principles are regarded by them as inseparably united in all forms of 
existence, including the highest. Hence they conceive the human and even the divine 
spirit, not as immaterial intelligence (vov<;\ but rather as force, embodied in the finest and 
highest material substances. The Stoics, therefore, differ from Aristotle, as Aristotle 
differed from Plato, and as Theophrastus (in a measure) and more especially Strato of 
Lampsacus and his followers differed from Aristotle, namely, in the increased tendency 
which they manifest to substitute the idea of immanence for that of transcendence. 

According to Diog. L., VII. 134, the Stoics defined the passive principle as unqualified 
substance (cnroio^ ovaid) or matter (vAjy), and the active principle as the reason immanent 
in matter (6 h amy /tdyof) or Deity (6 0edf). The former is the constituent, the latter 
the formative principle of things (Senec., Epist., 65. 2 : dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, du0 esse 
in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. Materia jacet iners, res ad 
omnia parata, cessatura, si nemo moveat. Causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et 
quocumque vult, versat; ex itta varia opera producit. Esse debet ergo, unde aliquid fiat, deinde, 
a quo fiat: hoc causa est, illud materia). The highest rational force dwells in the finest 
matter. The principle of life is heat (Cic., De Nat. Deorum, II. 9 : [according to the doc 
trine of the Stoics] omne quod vivit, sive animal, sive terra editum, id vivitpropter inclusum 
in eo calorem. Ex quo intelligi debet, earn caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem 
inutidum pertinentem). This vital heat the Stoics derived from TO Trvev/iia 6if/Kov 6c bhov 
KOC/LWV (the spirit that pervades the whole world) or TO irvp TE^vtKdv (the artistically crea 
tive or forming fire, in distinction from fire that consumes). Says Plutarch (De Stoic. Repugn., 
41) : " Chrysippus teaches, in the first book of his irepl irpovoiac;, that at certain periods the 
whole world is resolved into fire, which fire is identical with the soul of the world, the gov 
erning principle or Zeus; but at other times a part of this fire, a germ, as it were, detached 
from the whole mass, becomes changed into denser substances, and so leads to the existence 
of concrete objects distinct from Zeus." Again (ibid. 38) : " There was a beginning to the 
existence of the sun and moon and the other gods, but Zeus is eternal." That part of the 
Deity which goes forth from him for the formation of the world, is called 
rtKoc., or " seminal reason " of the world, and is resolved into a plurality of Myoi 
(Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 101 ; Plutarch., Plac. Ph., L ?). That the Stoic Boethus, and 
also Pansetius and Posidonius, abandoned the dogma of the burning up of the world, and 


affirmed its imperishability, and that Diogenes, the Babylonian, in his old age, advanced at 
least so far as to entertain doubts of that dogma, is asserted by the author of the work 
which goes under the name of Philo, and is entitled irepl atiBapaiaq noofwv, pp. 497 (ed 
Mangey) and 502 (pp. 492-497 stand, in the manuscripts and published editions of the 
work, by several leaves too near the beginning, as is shown by J. Bernays in the 
Monatsber. d&r Berliner Akad. d. W., 1863, pp. 34-40; this section should be advanced to 
p. 502). 

Diog. L. (VII. 140) mentions, as doctrines of the Stoics, the unity, finiteness, and 
sphericity of the world. Beyond the world exists an unlimited void. Time (ibid. 141) is 
the extension of the motion of the world (6iaarrifM rye TOV n6cp.ov Kivf/oeuc). It is infinite 
both in the direction of the past and of the future. 

All individual things are different from each other (Senec., Epist., 113, 13: exegit 
a se [divini artifids ingenium], ut, quae ada erant, et dissimilia essent et imparia). No 
two leaves, no two living beings are exactly alike. This view was expressed subse 
quently by Leibnitz in his principium identitatis indiscernibilium, in connection with hia 

The new world, which comes forth after each general conflagration, becomes, in conse 
quence of the necessity which governs all things, in all respects similar to that which 
preceded it (Nemes., De Nat. Horn., ch. 38). Yet not all of the Stoics seem to have under 
stood this necessity in so rigorous a sense. Cleanthes, in his " Hymn to Zeus," excepts 
from the influence of the divinely determined Necessity, all evil actions, saying: "Nothing 
takes place without thee, Deity, except that which bad men do through their own want 
of reason ; but even that which is evil is overruled by thee for good, and is made to har 
monize with the plan of the world." Of. also Cleanthes, as cited by Epictetus, Manual, 52: 

A-yov <5e /j. u ZEV nal av y" 
"Oirot iroff i/ulv el/ul 

1 do/cvof rjv 6e [J.f] 
-yevo/uevoc, ovtisv TJTTOV 

Chrysippus sought (according to Cic., De Fato., 18), by distinguishing between "prin 
cipal" and "auxiliary" causes, to maintain the doctrine of fate, and yet to escape from 
that of necessity, asserting that fate related only to auxiliary causes, while the appetitus 
remained in our own power. 

The human soul, as defined by the Stoics, is an inborn breath (Diog. L., VII. 156: TO 
ffv/LHpves TTvevfia), or, more explicitly, an inborn breath extending continuously through 
the whole body (Chrysippus ap. Galen., H. et Plat. Plac., ed. Kvihn, Vol. V., p. 287 : Ttvevfta 
<jv/u<j>v-ov j](uv awexec iravrl rw auuan dirjuov). It is a part severed from the Deity (airoa- 
Tcaa/ua TOV 6eov, Epict., Diss., I. 14. 6). Its eight parts (the r]yfj.ovi.K.6v, or governing part, 
the five senses, the faculty of speech, and the generative force) are enumerated by Plu 
tarch, De Plac. Ph., IV. 4 (cf. Diog. L., VII. 157 seq.). That the hegemonicon, or governing 
part, was situated in the breast, and not in the head, was inferred by Chrysippus and 
others, chiefly from the circumstance that the voice, by which thoughts are expressed, 
arises from the breast. Yet on this point the Stoics were not all agreed (Galen., Hipp. 
et, Plat. Pl^ III. 1, p. 290 seq.). 

Cleanthes asserted (Diog. L., VII. 157) that all souls would continue to exist until the 
general conflagration of the world, but Chrysippus admitted this only for the souls of the 
wise. Pana3tius appears (according to Cic., Tusc., I. 32) to have denied the doctrine of 
immortality altogether. But the later Stoics returned, for the most part, to the earlier 


As the most important document of the Stoic Theology, the " Hymn of Cleanthes to 
Zeus " (op. Stob., Eel, I. p. 30) may here find a place : 

dtfavdrow, Tro/lwjvtyze, 7ray/cparf aiei, 
ZEV, QVOECX dpxvye, vofwv /zera Trdvra /ci>/&pv<jv, 
Xatpe G yap Travreaai fie/nts dvyroloi irpoaavdav. 
E/c GOV yap yivos EG/J.EV, Ifft pipTjua "ka^ovrtq 
Moi)voi, boa cj re KOI ep^et -&VT/T ETTI yaiav. 
T(JJ GE Kadv/u-VT/Gd), Kat cbv /cpdrof alkv aeiau. 
2oi 6fj rrdf ode Koa/iog ehioaonevos yalav 
Heifierac y KZV ayr$ nal EKUV VTTO oelo Kpareirai. 
lolov x i $ vrroepybv CIKLVIJTOL^ kvl 
A/z^^/c^, Trvpdevra, ael a>ovr 
lov yap virb Tr/irjyys QVOECJS TTCIVT Eppiyaaiv. 
T i2^ ov KarEv&vvEis KOIVOV Adyov, 6f 6ia -rravruv 
fyoirg fuyvvuEvos fiEyaAotg //</cpo!f TE ^deaa^v, 
"Of r6oao yEyaug i>7rarof fiaatAEvg 6ia Travrdf. 
Ovdt TL yiyvErai epyov ETTI %-&ovt cov di^a, 6alfj.ov 
Ovre /car ai&Eptov &EIOV ?rd/lov, our ivi Trdvrw, 

oTrdtra pe^ovoi nanol a^erip^iv avoiai. 

av rd TTEpiaaa ErrioTaoat apna &Elvai J 
Kat noodle TO, axocr/m, /cat ov I)M ool <J)&M kariv. 
T flt5e ^dp ig EI> aVavra am^p/zo/caf fcri^/ld /ca/c 
*i2<n? cva yiyvEcr&ai irdvruv "Xoyov auv Eovra, 
"Ov ^wyovrff ECJOIV boot fivrfruv K.CIK.OL slow, 
Aya^opoi, ot r* aya&uv /LIEV asl K.TTJGLV TTO&EOV 
OVT kaopuoi -&EOV KOIVOV vd//ov, oire K.AVOVOLV, 

T i2^ /CeV TTEf&O/LtEVOt GVV V<J j3lOV CT1?/ldv EXOIEV. 

Avroi (T aii? op/xcjGiv O.VEV /caAoi) dAAof TT 
Oi //fv iTrfp <5df^f (TTrovd^v tivcepiGTov 
Oi tT f?r2 Kp6oavva rcrpa/z/zevof ovdEvl 

if avEaiv Kat (T<y//arof r)dm spya. 
Zet> Trdvdwpe, K&aivEQEc; dp^ ^/cepawe, 

fv puov cnreipocvvw cnro hvyprjc, 
"Hv ay, Trdrep, anEtiaoov ifaxfft aTro, Jof (Jf tcvpfjoat. 

77 iriavvo<; cv 6 iKTjg fiEra Trdvra /cv/^epvof, 
dv Tifj.r)&VTs d[ti/3&/u.Ea&d GE, 

TO. GO. Epya 6irjVK^ Wf ETTEOIKE 
QVT/TOV OVT\ E7TEI OVTE /3pOTOZf ytpaf d/lAo TL fll$OV, 

QVTE i^eoZf, 57 KOIVOV a,Et vd/zov v (Ji/c?; V/JLVE IV. 

55. The supreme end of life, or the highest good, is virtue, i. ., 
a life conformed to nature (o^oAoyov^tvw^ rjy ^vcre^ ^v), the agreement 
of human conduct with the all-controlling law of nature, or of the 
human with the divine will. Not contemplation, but action, is the 
supreme problem for man. But action implies, as its sphere, human 
society. All other things exist for man and the gods, but man exists 
for society. Virtue is sufficient for happiness. It alone is a good in 


the full sense of that word ; all that is not virtue or vice is neither a 
good nor an evil, but a something intermediate ; but among things 
intermediate, some are to be preferred and others to be rejected, while 
others still are absolutely indifferent. Pleasure follows upon activity, 
;but should never be made the end of human endeavor. The cardinal 
virtues are practical wisdom (ypovrjois), courage, discretion, and jus 
tice. Only he who unites in himself all virtues can be said truly to 
possess virtue as such. To the perfect performance of duty (or 
aTo p0a>^a), it is essential that one should do right with the right dis 
position, the disposition possessed by the sage ; right action as such, 
without reference to disposition, is the befitting (icaOfjKov^. The sage 
alone attains to the complete performance of his duty. The sage is 
without passion, although not without feeling; he is not indulgent, 
but just toward himself and others ; he alone is free ; he is king and 
lord, and is inferior in inner worth to no other rational being, not 
even to Zeus himself; he is lord also over his own life, and can law 
fully bring it to an end according to his own free self-determination. 
The later Stoics confessed that no individual corresponded fully with 
their ideal, and that in fact it was possible only to discriminate 
between fools and those who were advancing (toward wisdom). 

On the moral philosophy of the Stoics, cf. C. Scioppius (El&menta Stoicae PhilosopJuae Morali^, May- 
encc, 1606), Job. Earth. Niemeyer (De Stoicorum an-aflei a, Helmst. 1679), Jos. Franz Budde (De Erroribu* 
Stoicorum in Philos. Morali, Halle, 1695-96), C. A. Heumann (De avroxeipia Philosophorum, niaxime 
Stoicorum, Jena, 1703), Joh. Jac. Dornfeld (De fine hominis Stoico, Leipsic, 1720), Christoph Meiners 
(Ueber die Apathie der Stalker, in his Verm, philos. Schriften, Leips. 1775-76, 2d part, p. 180 seq.), Joh. 
Neeb ( Verhdltniss der Stoischen Moral eur Religion, Mayence, 1791), C. Ph. Couz (Abhandlungen liber 
die Geschichte und das Eigenthiimliche der spdteren stoischen Philosophic, nebst eineni Versuche fiber 
ehristliche, KanUsche und Stoische Moral, Tub. 1794), J. A. L. Wegschneider (Ethices Stoicorum recen- 
tiorum fundamenta cum principiis ethicez Kantianae compar., Hamb. 1797), Ant. Kress (De Stoicorum 
supremo ethico principio, Witt., 1797), Christian Garve (in the Introductory Essay prefixed to his transl. 
of Aristotle s Ethics, Vol. L, Breslau, 1798, pp. 54-89), E. G. Lilie (De Stoicoi^um philosophia morali, 
Altona, 1SOO), Wilh. Traug. Krug (Zenonis et Epicuri cfc summo bono doctrina cum Kantiana comp., 
Wittenb., 1SOO), Klippel (Doctrinae Stoicorum ethicae atque Christ, expositio, Gott 1823), J. C. F. Meyer 
(Stoicorum doctrina ethica cum Christ, comp., Gott. 1823), Deichmann (De paradoxo Stoicorum. omnia 
peccata paria esse, Marb. 1833), Wilh. Traug. Krug (De formulis, quibus pJdlosophi Stoici summum 
bonum de/ftnierunt, Leips. 1834), M. M. a Baumhauer (jrepl rijs evAo-yov eaywy7Js, -veterum philos., prae- 
cipue Stoic., doctrina de morte voluntaria, Utrecht, 1842), Munding (Die Grundsatse der stoischen 
Moral, Eottweil, 1846, u Programm"), F. Eavaisson (De la morale des St., Paris, 1850), Guil. Gidioneen (De 
eo quod Stoici naturae convenienter vivendum esse principium ponunt, Leips. 1852), M. Heinze (Stoi- 
corum de affecUbus doctrina, Berlin, 1861, Stoicorum ethica ad origines suas relata, Naumburg, 1862), 
Winter (Stoicorum pantheismus et principia doctrina e ethicae quomodo sint inter se apta et connexa, 
O.-Pr., Wittenb. 1868), Kuster (Die Grundesiige der stoischen Tugendlehre, Progr. of the Werder-Gymn., 
Berlin, 1864). 

According to Stob., Eel., IT. p. 122, the ethical end, as defined by Zeno, was harmony 
with one s self (TO o^oXoyov/zevwc C^v, TOVTO ft eori xai? eva "kbyw Kal avuqbvuq C^v), Cleanthes 
beiag the first to define it as conformity to nature (by adding r^ Qvaei to 


Still, Diog. L. (VII. 87) says that Zeno, in his work irepl av&puTtov tyvaeus, expressed 
the principle of morals as dfj.o^oyovp,ivu<; TTJ <pvaec $ijv, and this statement is all the more 
credible, because Speusippus (agreeably to his naturalistic modified Platonism) had already 
denned happiness as a perfect e^tg ("habitude") in things according to nature (according 
to Clem. Alex., Strom., II. p. 418 d), and Polemo (according to Cic., Acad. Pr., II. 42) had 
demanded that men live virtuously, enjoying the things provided by nature (honeste vivere, 
fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini natura conciliet), and Heraclitus also (ap. Stob., Serm., 
III. 84, see above ad 15, p. 42) had enounced the ethical postulate, that men should be 
guided by nature in their actions (ah,7]$ea Aeysiv KOI TTOIEIV Kara ty uoLv ktraiovra^). The 
"nature," which we are to follow, is with Cleanthes principally the nature of the universe; 
Chrysippus, on the contrary, defines it as the nature of man and of the universe combined, 
our natures being parts of universal nature. The formula of Chrysippus was: "Live 
according to your experience of the course of nature (/car ifiTreipiav TUV <j)vaei cn>/nfiaiv6vTuv 
or d/coAoi#wf r?? Qvoei ?jv, Diog. L., VII. 87 seq.). A general leaning toward the anthro 
pological conception of the principle of morals is manifest in the formulas employed by the 
later Stoics, especially in the following dictum of certain of the latest of them: " The end 
of man is to live agreeably to the natural constitution of man " (TKAOS iivai TO $ijv anoXov- 
#wf TII TOV av&puirov KaTacKsvy, Clem. Alex., Strom., II. p. 476). The formula of Diogenes 
Babylonius demanded the use of prudence and reason in selecting things according to 
nature (TO evhoytaTelv kv TIJ TUV /card <pvoiv f/c/lop)) ; that of Antipater of Tarsus required 
the unvarying choice of things conformable, and rejection of things non-conformable to 
nature, to the end of attaining those things which are to be preferred ffiv K^-yofj.vovg 
fuv TO. /card tyvaiv, aTre/c/teyo/zevoff 6e TO, -rcapa fyvciv 6ir]VK(J<; K.CU aTrapa/^drwf Trpof TO Ttry- 
%aveiv TUV irpor]yp.Evov /card (f>vaiv); Pansetius recommended following the impulses of 
nature (TO L,f/v /card rdf dcdo//tvaf r /ulv Tffi fyvoeug CKpop/Lid^J, and Posidonius required men 
to live, having in view the true nature and order of all things (TO (,ijv fteupovvTa TT/V TUV 
OAUV oAtj-frtiav not Ta!-iv). Seneca was of opinion that the simple 6/no^o-yovjUEvu^ was suffi 
cient, since wisdom consisted "in always willing and rejecting the same things," and that 
the limitation "rightly" was also unnecessary, since "it was impossible for one to be 
always pleased with any thing which was not right." 

The true object of the original vital instinct in man is not pleasure, but self-conservation 
(Diog. L., VII. 85, expressing the doctrine of the first book of the inpl T/MV of Chry 
sippus : Trpwrov ot/celov iivai iravri wo> TTJV CLVTOV avcrraaiv KCLI TT/V TCLVTTJS cwe idr/cnv). Plea 
sure is the natural result (iTuyewTj/ua) of successful endeavor to secure what is in harmony 
with our nature. Of the various elements of human nature, the highest is reason, through 
which we know the all-controlling law and order of the universe. Yet the highest duty 
of man is not simply to know, but to follow obediently the divine order of nature. Chry 
sippus (ap. Plutarch., JDe St. Repugn., ch. 2) censures those philosophers who regard the 
speculative life as having its end in itself, and affirms that in reality they practice only a 
finer species of Hedonism. (This only proves that to Chrysippus, as to the most of his 
contemporaries, the earnest labor of purely scientific investigation had become unfamiliar 
and incomprehensible.) Nevertheless, the Stoics affirm that the right praxis of him, whose 
life is conformed to reason (j3iog /Loyf/cdf), is founded on speculation (deupia) and intimately 
blended with it (Diog. L., VII. 130). 

Virtue (recta ratio, Cic., Ttisc., IV. 34) is a diddsat^ i. e., a property in which (as in 
straightness) no distinction of more or less is possible (Diog. L., VII. 98 ; Simplic., in Ar. 
Cat, fol. 61 b). It is possible to approximate toward virtue ; but he who only thus 
approximates is as really unvirtuous as the thoroughly vicious ; between virtue and vice 
/cat /ca/ci a) there is no mean (Diog. L., VII. 127). Cleanthes (in agreement with the 


Cynics) declared that virtue could not be lost (ava^^rov), while Chrysippus affirmed 
the contrary (airopfarrfv, l)iog. L., VII. 127). Virtue is sufficient for happiness (Cic., 
Parad., 2 ; Diog. L., VII. 127), not because it renders us insensible to pain, but because it 
makes us superior to it (Sen., Ep., 9). In his practical relation to external things, man is 
to be guided by the distinction between things to be preferred (Trporj-yneva) and things not 
to be preferred (arrpoTrpoTj-yjuha, Diog. L., VII. 105 ; Cic., JDe Fin., III. 50). The former are 
not goods, but things possessing a certain value and which we naturally strive to possess ; 
among these are included the primary objects of our natural instincts (prima naturae). In 
our efforts to obtain them we are to be guided by their relative worth. An action 
(kvipyrifLa), which is conformed to the nature of the agent and which is therefore rationally 
justifiable, is befitting (nadrjuov) ; when it results from a virtuous disposition or from obe 
dience to reason, it is Kaflf/Kov in the absolute sense, or morally right action (Kardpdupa, 
Diog. L., VII. 107 seq. ; Stob., Eel., II. 158). No act as such is either praiseworthy or 
disgraceful : even those actions which are regarded as the most criminal are good when 
done with a right intention ; in the opposite case they are wrong (Orig., c. Gels, IV. 45 ; 
correct, by this passage in Origen, the statements of Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 190; 
Pyrrh. Hyp., III. 245). Since life belongs in the class of things indifferent, suicide is per 
missible, as a rational means of terminating life (evhoyo<; k^ayuyrj; cf. Cic., De Fin., III. 60; 
Sen., Ep., 12; De Prov., ch. 6; Diog. L., VII. 130). 

All virtues were reduced by Zeno to fpfoqotf, practical wisdom, which, however, took in 
various circumstances the form of (distributive) justice, prudence, and courage (Plut., De 
Stoic. Repugn., 7; Plut., Virt.Mor., ch. 2: 6pi6fj.evo<; rt/v typovijCLv iv fiev airovfj.rjrfoi^ 6iKai- 
vcvvTjv, iv 6s aipsTEotc GGxbpovvvrjv, kv 6e v-rrofteverio^ avtipiav}. Later Stoics, adopting the Pla 
tonic enumeration of four cardinal virtues, defined moral insight as the knowledge of things 
good, bad, and indifferent; courage as the knowledge of things to be feared, of things not to 
be feared, and of things neither to be feared nor not to be feared ; prudence (self-restraint) 
as the knowledge of things to be sought or avoided, and of things neither to be sought nor 
avoided; and justice as the distribution to every person of that which belongs to him (suum 
cuique tribuens). In every action of the sage all virtues are united (Stob,, Eel, II. 102 seq.). 

The emotions, of which the principal forms are fear, trouble, desire, and pleasure (with 
reference to a future or present supposed evil or good), result from the failure to pass 
the right practical judgment as to what is good and what evil ; no emotion is either natural 
or useful (Cic., Tusc,, III. 9, and IV. 19; Sen., Ep., 116). 

The sage combines in himself all perfections, and is inferior to Zeus himself only in 
things non-essential. Seneca, De Prov., 1 : Bonus ipse iempore tantum a Deo differt. Chry 
sippus (according to Plut, Adv. St., 33): " Zeus is not superior to Dio in virtue, and both 
Zeus and Dio, in so far as they are wise, are equally profited the one by the other." The 
fool should be classed with the demented (Cic., Paradox., 4; Tusc., III. 5). Without 
prejudice to his moral independence, the sage is a practical member of that community, in 
which all rational beings are included. He interests himself actively in the affairs of the 
state, doing this with all the more willingness the more the latter approximates to the 
ideal state which includes all men (Stob., Eel, II. 186). 

The distinction between the wise and the unwise was conceived most absolutely by 
Zeno, who is said to have divided men peremptorily into two classes, the good (aTrov6aloi) 
and the bad (Qavfot, Stob., Eel, II. 198). With the confession, that in reality no sage, but 
only men progressing (TTPOKOTTTUV) toward wisdom could be found, goes hand in hand 
among the later Stoics (particularly from and after the time of Pansetius) a leaning toward 
Eclecticism ; while, on the other hand, elements of Stoic doctrine were incorporated into 
the speculations of Platonists and Aristotelians. 


56. Epicurus (341-270 B. c.) belonged to the Athenian Demos, 
Gargettos, and was a pupil of Nausiphanes, the Democritean. 
Adopting, but modifying, the Hedonic doctrine of Aristippus, and 
combining it with an atomistic physics, he founded the philosophy 
which bears his name. To the Epicurean school belong Metro- 
dorus of Lampsacus, who died before Epicurus, Hermarchus of 
Mitylene, who succeeded Epicurus in the leadership of the school, 
Polyaenus, Timocrates, Leon tens and his wife Themistia, Colotes of 
Lampsacus and Idomeneus, Polystratus, the successor of Hermarchus, 
and his successor, Dionysius ; also Basilides, Apollodorus, " the pro 
fuse," author of more than four hundred books, and his pupil, Zeno 
of Sidon (born about 150 B. c.), whom Cicero distinguishes among the 
Epicureans, on account of the logical rigor, the dignity, and the 
adornment of his style, and whose lectures formed the principal basis 
of the works of Philodemus, his pupil ; two Ptolemies of Alexandria, 
Demetrius the Laconian, Diogenes of Tarsus, Orion, Phaedrus, con 
temporary with Cicero, but older than he, Philodemus of Gadara 
in Coelesyria (about 60 B. c.), T. Lucretius Carus (95-52 B. c.), 
author of the didactic poem De Rerum Natura, and many others. 
Epicureanism had very many adherents in the later Roman period, 
but these were, for the most part, men of no originality or indepen 
dence as thinkers. 

Epicuri irepl <f>v<rea>? /3 , 10, in fferculanentium voluminum quae supersunt, torn. II., Naples, 1809; 
torn. X., 3850. Epicuri fragmenta librorum II. et XI. de, natura, voluminibus papyraceis ex Ilerculano 
erutis reperta. ex torn. II. volum. JJercul. emendatius, ed. J. Conr. Orellius, Leips. ISIS. New fragments 
from the same work (which serve In part to correct and complete passages of Book XL, previously pub 
lished) are contained in the sixth volume of the Ilercul. voll. collectio altera, of which the first part ap 
peared at Naples in 1S66. Metrodori Epicurei de tensionibus comin., in the Hercul. voll., Neapol., torn. 
VI., 1S39. Idomenei Lampsaceni fragmenta, in Fragm. hint. Graee., vol. II., Paris, 1S4S. noAvarparov 
jrpi aAoyov KaTcu^potTjo-eto? (in part well preserved) in the Ilercul., Vol. IV., Naples, 1832. Phaedri 
Epicurei, vulgo Anonymi Herculanensis, De Natura Deorum fragmentum, ed. Drummond (ITercu- 
lanenxui, London, 1S10) ; ed. Petersen, Hamburg, 1S33. (The title should be, rather: ^lAoSiy/nou wept 
v<re/3eias) ; cf. Volum. Hercul. collect, alt., torn. II., 1862; Spengel, Aus den Ilerculan. Rollen: Philod. irepi 
<v<re/3eia?, from the Trans, of the Munich Acad. (1864), Philol.-philos. Class, X. 1, pp. 127-167; Sauppe, De 
Philod. libra De Pietate, Gottingen, 18G4. 

Philodemi de Musica, de Vitiis, and other works, in the Herculanens. volum., torn. I., III., IV., V., VL, 
VIIL, IX., X., XL, 1793-1S55. *cAo6^/u.ov Trepl KOXICOC, Aj/wvv/aou Trepl op-y^s, etc., in the Herculanensium 
voluminum, p. I., II., Oxford, 1824-25. Leonh. Spengel, Das vierte Buck der Rhetorik des Philodemus in, 
den Herculanensischen Rollen, in the Trans, of the Bavarian Academy (philos. Cl.), Vol. III., 1st div., p. 
207 seq., Munich, 1840. Philodemi irep\ KO.KMV liber decimus, ad vol. Ilercul. exempla Neapolitanum et 
Oxoniente diatinxit, supplevit, txplicanit Herm. Sauppe, Leips. 1853. Philod. Abh. iiber den Hochmuth 
and Theophr. Ilaush. u. Charakterbilder ; Greek text and German translation by J. A. Hartung, Leips. 
1857. Ilerculanensium voluminum quae wpersimt collectio altera. Tom. I. seq. : Philodemi trepl KOLKIUV 
teal TWI/ avTiKeifjifvojv apeTtav, et: Trepl opyijs, etc., Nap. 1861 seq. Philodemi Epicurei de ira liber, epapyro 
Jlercul. ad fidem exemplorum Oxoniensis et Neapolitani, ed. Theod. Gomperz, Leips. 1864. Hercu- 
lanische Studien, by Theod. Gomperz, First Part: Philod em iiber Inductionsschlusse (*iAo5^/nov wepi 
o-jMC"y cai o-Tj/neiwcrewv), nach der Oxforder und Neapolitaner Abschrift hrsg., Leips. 1865; Second Part: 


Fhilodem uber Frommigkeit , ibid. 1866 (cf. Phaedr., above). Theophrasti Charactered et Philodemi da 
eittia liber decimus, ed. J. L. Ussing, Leipsic, 1868. 

Kecent editions of the De Berum Natura of T. Lucretius Carus are those of C. Lachmann (Berlin, 
1st ed., 1850, with Commentary), Jak. Bernays (Leips. 1852, 2d ed., 1857), and H. A. J. Munro (Cambr. 
1866) ; translations (in German) by Knebel (Leips. 1821, 2d ed., 1831), Gust. Bossart-Oerden (Berl. 1865), 
Brieger (Book I., 1-369, Posen, 1806), and W. Binder (Stuttgart, 1868), and (in French) by M. de Ponger- 
ville(Pa ris > 1866 )< t En S L transl - b 7 J - S - Watson and J - M - Good ^ in John s Classical Library. TV.] 

Besides the works of the Epicureans, the principal source of our knowledge of Epicureanism is Book X. 
of the historical work of Diogenes of Laerta, together with Cicero s accounts (De Fin., I., De Nat. Deorwm, 
I., etc.). Modern writers on Epicureanism are: P. Gassendi (Exercitationum paradoxicarum adv. Aris- 
toteleos, liber /., Grenoble, 1624; II. The Hague, 1659; De vita muribus et doctrina Epicuri, Lyons, 
1647; Animadv. in Diog. L., X., Leyd., 1649 ; Syntagma philosophiae Epicuri. The Hague, 1655), Sam. de 
Sorbiere (Paris, 1660), Jacques Rondel (Paris, 1679), G. Ploucquet (Tub. 1755), Batteux (Paris, 1758), War- 
nekros (Greifsw. 1795), H. Wygmans (Leyden, 1834), L. Preller (in the Philol, XIV., 1859, pp. 69-90), and 
on the doctrine of Lucretius, in particular, A. J. Eeisacker (Bonn, 1847, and Cologne, 1855), Herm. Lotze (in 
the Philologus, VII., 1852, pp. 696-732), F. A. Marcker (Berlin, 1853), W. Christ (Munich, 1855), E. Hallier 
(Jena, 1857), J. Guil. Braun (L. de atomis doctr., diss. inaug., Munster, 1857), E. de Suckau (De Lucr. 
metaph. et mor. doctr., Paris, 1857), T. Mont6e (Etude sur L. cons. c. moraliste, Paris, 1860), Susemihl and 
Brieger (in the Philologus, XIV., XXIII., and XXIV.), Hildebrandt(7 T . Lucr. deprimordiis doctrina. G.- 
Pr., Magdeb. 1864), H. Sauppe (Comm. de Lucretii cod. Victoriano, Gottinsren, 1864). Rud. Bouterwek (Lu- 
cret. quaest. gramm. et crit., Halle, 1861 ; De Lucr. codice Victoriano, Halle, 1865), E. Heine (De Lucr. 
carmine de rerum natura, diss. inaug., Halle, 1865), Th. Bindseil (Ad Lucr. de rerum nat. carm. Ubr. I. 
6t II., qui sunt de atomis, diss. inaug.. Halle, 1865 ; Quaest. Lucr., G.-Pr., Anclam, 1867). Cf., also, H. Pur- 
mann (G.-Pr., Cottbus, 1867), Jul. Jessen (Diss., Gott. 186S). and C. Martha (Le Poemede Lucrece, Paris, 
1868), and Bockemuller (Lucretiana, G.-Pr., Stade, 1869). 

According to Apollodorus (ap. Diog. L., X. 14), Epicurus was born Olymp. 109.3, 
during the archonship of Sosigenes, in the month of Gamelion (hence in December, 342, or 
in January, 341 B. c.). He passed his youth in Samos (according to Diog. L., X. 1), 
whither a colony had been sent from Athens, and it appears, also, that the place of 
his birth was not Athens, but Samos, since the colony was sent out in Olympiad 
107.1 (352-51). His father, a school-teacher (ypa////aro&<Ma/ca/lof), was drawn thither as a 
Kleruchos.* Epicurus is said to have turned his attention toward philosophy at the age 
of fourteen years, because his early instructors in language and literature could give him no 
intelligence respecting the nature of Hesiod s Chaos (Diog. L., X. 2). According to another 
and quite credible account (ibid. 2-4), he was at first an elementary teacher or an assistant 
to his father. At Samos Epicurus heard the Platonist Pamphilus, who, however, failed to 
convince him. Better success attended the efforts of Nausiphanes, the Democritean, who 
had also passed through the school of the Skeptics and who recommended a Skeptical bias, 
which should, however, do no prejudice to the acceptation of his own doctrine. According 
to Diog. L., X. 7 and 14, the Canonic (Logic) of Epicurus is founded on principles which 
he learned from Nausiphanes. Epicurus made himself acquainted with the writings of 
Democritus at an early age (Diog. L., X. 2). For some time he called himself a Democ 
ritean (Plut., Adv. Coloi, 3, after the accounts of Leonteus and other Epicureans) ; but he 
afterward attached so great importance to the points of difference between himself and 
Democritus, that he conceived himself justified in regarding himself as the author of the 
true doctrine in physics as well as in ethics, and in opprobriously designating Democritus 
by the name of AqpoKptrog (Diog. L., X. 2). In the autumn of 323, when he was eighteen 
years old, Epicurus went for the first time to Athens, but remained there only a short 
time. Xenocrates was then teaching in the Academy, while Aristotle was in Chalcis. It 
was asserted by some that Epicurus attended the lessons of Xenocrates ; others denied it 

[* -A- Kleruchos was a settler, to whom colonial possessions had been allotted, aud who retained abroad 
the rights of Athenian citizenship. Tr.] 


(Cic., De Nat. Deor., 1. 26). According to Apollodorus (ap. Diog. L., X. 14), Epicurus com 
menced as a teacher of philosophy at the age of thirty-two (310 or 309 B. c.), in Mitylene, 
taught soon afterward at Lampsacus, and founded some years later (306 B. c., according to 
Diog. L., X. 2) his school at Athens, over which he presided until his death in Olymp. 
127.2 (270 B. c.). 

A cheerful, social tone prevailed in the school of Epicurus. Coarseness was pro 
scribed. But in the choice of means of amusement no excess of scrupulousness was 
observed. Aspersive gossip respecting other philosophers, especially respecting the 
chiefs of other schools, seems to have formed a favorite source of entertainment ; Epi 
curus himself, as is known, did not hesitate uncritically to incorporate into his writings a 
mass of evil reports, which were, for the most part, unfounded. He embodied the prin 
ciples of his philosophy in brief formulae (icvpiai 66!-at), which he gave to his scholars, to 
be learned by heart. 

In the composition of his extremely numerous works, Epicurus was very careless, and 
so proved his saying, that "it was no labor to write." The only merit allowed to them was 
that they were easy to be understood (Cic., De Fin., I. 5) ; hi every other respect their form 
was universally condemned (Cic., De Nat. Deorum, I. 26 ; Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., I. 1 et al.). 
They are said to have filled in all nearly three hundred volumes (Diog. L., X. 26). A list of 
the most important works of Epicurus is given hi Diog. L., X. 27 and 28. Diogenes names, 
in particular, besides the nvptai 66ai, 1) works directed against other philosophical schools, 
e.g., "Against the Megarians," "On Sects" (irepl aipiceurv); 2) logical works, e.g., "On the 
Criterium or Canon;" 3) physical and theological works, e.g., " On Nature," in thirty-seven 
books (of which considerable remains have been found at Herculaneum ; a part of them 
are yet to be published). "On the Atoms and Empty Space," "On Plants," "Abridgment 
of the works on Physics," u Chaeredemus, or On the Gods," etc. ; 4) works on moral sub 
jects, e. g., " On the End of Action " (irepl reAovf), " On Upright Action," " On Piety," 
" On Presents and Gratitude," etc., besides several whose nature is not evident from their 
titles (such as " Neocles to Themista," "Symposion," etc.), and Letters. Some of the 
latter have been preserved by Diogenes Laertius. 

The most important of the immediate disciples of Epicurus was Metrodorus of Lamp 
sacus. His works, which were largely polemical, are named in Diog. L., X. 24. The 
other more considerable Epicureans (Hermarchus, etc.) are also named, ibid. X. 22 seq. In 
tke very front rank of the Epicureans belongs the Roman poet Lucretius. Horace also 
subscribed to the practical philosophy of the Epicureans. In the time of the emperors 
the Epicurean philosophy was very widely accepted. (Whether in the passage, Diog. L., 
X. 9, in which the Epicurean philosophy is spoken of as almost the only one still surviving, 
reference is intended to the time of Diogenes himself or to that of Diocles, his voucher, is 

57. Epicurus treats logic, in so far as he admits it at all into 
his system, as ancillary to physics, and the latter, again, as ancillary 
to ethics. He considers the dialectical method incorrect and mis 
leading. His logic, termed by him Canonic, proposes to teach the 
norms (Kanones) of cognition, and the means of testing and knowing 
the truth (criteria). As criteria Epicurus designates perceptions, 
representations, and feelings. All perceptions are true and irre 
futable, Representations are remembered images of past perceptions. 


Beliefs are true or false, according as they are confirmed or refuted 
by perception. The feelings of pleasure and pain are criteria indi 
cating what is to be sought or avoided. A theory of the concept 
and of the syllogism was omitted by Epicurus as superfluous, since 
no technical definitions, divisions, or syllogisms, could supply the 
place of perception. 

On the proltpsis of Epicurus, cf. Job. Mich. Kern (Gott. 1756) and Roorda (Epicureorum et Stoicorum 
de Antieipationibus Doctrina, Leyden, 1823, reprinted from the Annal. Acad. Lvgd., 1822-28). Gom- 
pertz, in his Iferculan. Studien (see above, 56), treats of the Epicurean doctrine of the analogical and the 
inductive inference. 

According to Diog. Laert., X. 29, Epicurus divided philosophy into three parts: r6 TC 
navoviKJbv KOI (jtvoinbv nai ydinov. Logic, or "Canonics," was placed before physics, as an 
introduction to the same (according to Diog. L., X. 30; Cic., Acad., II. 30; De Fin., I. 7; 
Sen., Epist., 89). 

Rejecting dialectic, Epicurus (according to Diog. L., X. 31) declared it sufficient: roi c 
QVGIKOVC. x u P tv Kara ro ^? T *J V irpa-yfidrav <$oyyovq (that the investigators of nature should 
observe the natural names of things ; cf. Cic., De Fin., II. 2, 6 : Epicurum, qui crebro dicat, 
diligenter oportere exprimi, quae vis subjecta sit vocibus). To the three criteria of Epicurus 
above mentioned (which were designated by him in a work entitled "Canon," in the fol 
lowing terms : npirqpta r^q a^^eia^ eivai rdf aia&Tjazig Kai rag 7rpo%qifjet /cat ra iraO^ 
Bee Diog. L., X. 31), the Epicureans added: KCU rdf ^avracTina^ trrtfioAac; TTJC. tiiavoiac (the 
intuitive apprehensions of the intellect). [Rather the imaginative, i. e., representative 
operations of the intellect. Ed.] This latter criterion appears, however, from Diog. L., 
X. 38, not to have been unfamiliar to Epicurus himself. No perception can be proved 
false, whether by other perceptions (whose authority can not be greater than that of the 
perception in question), or by reason, which is simply an outgrowth from perceptions. 
The hallucinations of the insane, even, and dreams are true (d/lr/ft?) ; for they produce an 
impression (/civet yap), which the non-existing could not do (Diog. L., X. 32). It is ob 
vious, in connection with this latter argument, that in Epicurus conception of truth 
(aAr/Oeia), the latter, in the sense of agreement of the psychical image with a real object, is 
confounded with psychical reality. 

Mental representations (TrpoTir/^etc) are general and permanent images preserved in the 
memory, or the remembrance of numerous similar perceptions of the same object (nadoMnfj 
voxels, p-vr) TOV TTo/l/ld/cff ^(jdev 0affvTOf, Diog. L., X. 33). They emerge in consciousness 
when the words are employed which designate their respective objects. Opinion (66^0) or 
belief (i>7roA^i/;<f) arises from the persistence of the impressions made on us by objects. It 
relates either to the future (n-poo/j-evov) or to the imperceptible (dJ^Aov). It may be true 
or false. It is true, when perception testifies in its favor (av eirinaprvpijTai, as, e. g., when 
fa correct assumption respecting the shape of a tower is verified by observing it near at 
hand), or, if direct evidence of this kind is impossible (as, e. #., in regard to the theory 
of atoms), when perception does not witness against it (rj firj avrt^apTvp^Tai) in all other 
cases it is false (Diog. L., X. 33 seq. ; 50 seq. ; Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., VII. 211 seq.). 
Epicurus demanded that investigators should advance from the phenomenal to the search 
for the unknown (i. e., to the search for causes which do not fall under the observation of 
the senses, such as, in particular, the existence and nature of atoms. Diog. L., X. 33 : irepl 
TUV adrfiuv aTcb TUV ^aivofJiivuv xp*l oijfMtiovadai). But he did not develop more minutely 


the logical theory of this path of investigation (which Zeno, the Epicurean, and Philo- 
demus afterward attempted to do). 

The feelings (iraQi?) are the criteria for practical conduct (Diog. L., X. 34). 

Epicurus treated only of the most elementary processes of knowledge with any con 
siderable degree of attention ; he neglected those logical operations which conduct beyond 
the deliverances of mere perception. Of the mathematical sciences he affirmed (according 
to Cic., De Fin., I. 21, 71): a falsis initiis profecla vera non possunt, et si essent vera, nihA 
afferrenl, quo jucundius, i. e., quo melius viveremus. Cicero says further (De Fin., I. 7, 22): 
"In another part of philosophy, which is called logic, our philosopher (Epicurus) seems to 
me weak and deficient ; he rejects definition ; he gives no instruction respecting division 
and distribution ; he does not tell how reasoning is to be effected and brought to a right 
conclusion ; nor does he show in what manner fallacies are to be resolved and ambiguities 
brought to light." Still, the work of Philodemus, recently published, irepl (rq/neiuv /cat 
ffij/ueijjosuv, which is founded on the lectures of Zeno the Epicurean, his teacher, contains 
a respectable attempt at a theory of analogical and inductive inference. (See Th. Gomperz, 
in the above-cited Herculan. Sludien, No. 1, Preface, where an essay on the content and 
worth of this work is promised in the numbers yet to come.) The inference from 
analogy (6 /card rrjv 6fioi6T7jra Tp6iroq) is described as the way from the known to the 
unknown. Zeno requires that different individuals of the same genus be examined, with a 
view to discovering the constant attributes; these may then be ascribed to the other 
individuals of the same genus. According to Proclus, in EucL, 55, 59, 60, Zeno (who had 
also heard Carneades) disputed the validity of mathematical demonstration, while Posi- 
donius the Stoic defended it. 

58. The Natural Philosophy of Epicurus agrees substantially with 
that of Democritus. According to Epicurus, every thing which takes 
place has its natural causes; the intervention of the Gods is unneces 
sary for the explanation of phenomena. Yet it is not possible in every 
particular instance to designate with complete certainty the real natu 
ral cause. Nothing can come from the non -existing, and nothing 
which exists can pass into non-existence. Atoms and space exist from 
eternity. The former have a specific form, magnitude, and weight. 
In virtue of their gravity, the atoms were originally affected with a 
downward motion, all falling with equal rapidity. The first collisions 
of atoms with each other were due to an accidental deviation of single 
atoms from the vertical line of descent ; thus some of them became 
permanently entangled and combined with each other, while others 
rebounded with an upward or side motion, whence, ultimately, the 
vortical motion, by which the worlds were formed. The earth, 
together with all the stars visible to us, form but one of an infinite 
number of existing worlds. The stars have not souls. Their real 
and apparent magnitudes are about the same. In the intermundane 
spaces dwell the gods. Animals and men are products of the earth ; 
the rise of man to the higher stages of culture has been gradual. 


Words were formed originally, not by an arbitrary, but by a natural 
process, in correspondence with our sensations and ideas. The soul 
is material and composed of exceedingly fine atoms. It is nearly 
allied in nature to air and fire, and is dispersed through the whole 
body. The rational soul is situated in the breast. Its corporeal 
envelope is a condition of the subsistence of the soul. The possibility 
of sensuous perception depends on the existence of material images, 
coming from the surfaces of things. Opinion or belief is due to the 
continued working of impressions on us. The will is excited, but not 
necessarily determined by ideas. Freedom of the will is contingency 
(independence of causes) in self-determination. 

The Epicurean physics is specially discussed by G. Charleton (Physiologia Epicureo-Gassendo-Charle- 
toniana, London, 1654), and Ploucquet (I>e cosmogonia Epicuri, Tub. 1755); the theology of Epicurus, 
by Job.. Fausti (Strasburg, 1685), J. H. Kroninayer (Jena, 1713), J. C. Schwarz (Cob. 1718), J. A. F. Bielke 
(Jena, 1741), Christoph Meiners (in his Verm, phtios. Schriften, Leips. 1775-76, II. p. 45 seq.), G. F. Schoe- 
mann (Schediasma dt, Epicuri theologia. ind. schol, Greifswald, 1664) ; bis doctrine of the mortality of 
the soul, by Jos. Reisacker (Der Todesgedanke l>ei den Griechen, eine historische Entwickelung, mit 
beeonderer Rueksicht auf Epicwr tind den romischen JHchter Lucres, G.-Pr., Trier, 1862). Cf., also, F. 
A. Lange s Geschichte des Materialismus and his N. BeHr dge eur Gesch. des Mat, Winterthnr, 186T. 

At the head of his physics Epicurus places the principle: "Nothing can come from 
nothing," together with its correlate: "The existent can not become non-existent" (ovdev 
yivtrat EK TOV pf] ovrof, and ov6ev <}>&eipeTai ei$ TO fifj 6v, Ep., ap. Diog. L., X. 38). Of 
things corporeal, some are composite and some (all others) are the constituent parts of 
which the former are compounded (ib., 40 seq.). Continued division of the composite must 
at last bring us to ultimate indivisible and unchangeable elements (aro^a nal afiera^Tfra), 
unless every thing is to be resolved into the non-existent. All these indivisible and primi 
tive elements are indeed of various magnitudes, but they are too small to be separately 
visible. They have no qualities beyond magnitude, shape, and gravity. Their number is 
infinite. Farther, if that which we call vacuum and space or place did not exist, there 
would be nothing in which bodies could exist and move. Whatever is material has three 
dimensions and the power of resistance (TO Tpixy diaaTaTbv peTa avrtTmiar;, Sext. Emp., 
Adv. Math., I. 21 et ai.) ; empty space is intangible nature (fyvau; avafyfa, ib. X. 2 ; Diog. L., 
X. 40); it is TOTTOC ("place"), viewed as that in which a body is contained, and %upa 
("room"), viewed as that which admits the passage of bodies through it. 

The most considerable of the points of difference between the Epicurean and the 
Democritean physics is, that Epicurus, in order to explain how the atoms first came in 
contact with each other, ascribes to them a certain power of individual or arbitrary self- 
determination, in virtue of which they deviated slightly from the direct line of fall (Lucret, 
II. 216 seq. ; Oic., De Fin., I. 6, De Nat Dear., I. 25, etc.). He thus attributes in some sort 
to atoms that species of freedom (or rather that independence of law) which he attributes 
to the human will. 

The motion of the atoms is not directed by the idea of finality. The Empedoclean 
opinion (Arist., Phys., II. 8, De Part. Anim., I. 1), that among the numerous fortuitous 
creations of nature which first arose, only a few were capable of prolonged life and con 
served their existence, while the rest perished, was renewed by the Epicureans. Lucretius 
says (De Rerum Nat, I., 1020 eeq.): 


Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum 
Ordine se quaeque atque sagaci mente locarunt, 
Nee quos quaeque darent motus pepigere profecto : 
Sed quia multa modis muUis mutata per omn 
JEx infinite vexantur percita plagis, 
Omne genus motus et coetus experiundo, 
Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras, 
Qualibus haec rebus consistit summa creata. 

The theory of a iivine guidance of the affairs of nature was also expressly denied by 
Epicurus himself. Says Epicurus (ap. Diog. L., X. 76 seq.): "It must not be supposed 
that the motions of the stars, their rising and setting, their eclipses and the like, are 
effected and regulated, or that they have been once for all regulated by a being possessing 
at the same time complete blessedness and immortality ; for labor and care and anger and 
favor are not compatible with happiness and self-sufficiency." 

A world (/c<5o/zof) is a section of the infinite universe, containing stars, an earth, and 
every variety of phenomena (irepioxrj TH; ovpavov, acrpa re KOI yfp> xai irdvra TO. <f>acv6/ueva 
TTEpiexovaa, airoTopqv e^ovffa arrb TOV cnreipov, Epic., ap. Diog. L., X. 88). The number 
of such worlds is infinite ; they are not eternal ab initio, nor will they endure forever 
(ibid. 88, 89). 

The real and apparent magnitudes of the sun and the other heavenly bodies are the 
same ; for if the effect of distance were to reduce (apparently) their (real) magnitude, the 
same must be true of their brilliancy, which nevertheless remains evidently undiminished. 
The gods of the popular faith exist, and are imperishable and blessed beings. We possess 
a distinct knowledge of them, for they often appear to men and leave behind representa 
tive images (irpoMpfctf) in the mind. But the opinions of the mass of men respecting the 
gods are false assumptions (vTro%qi}>te i/;m5eZf), containing much that is incongruous with 
the idea of their immortality and blessedness (Epic., ap. Diog. L., X. 123 seq. ; Cic., De 
Nat. Deor.. I. 18 seq.). The gods are formed of the finest of atoms, and dwell in the void 
spaces between the different worlds (Cic., De Nat. Deor., IT. 23 ; De Div., II. 17 ; Lucret., 
I. 59; III. 18 seq.; V. 147 seq.). The sage finds his motive for revering them, not in 
fear, but in admiration of their excellence. 

The Soul is defined by Epicurus (ap. Diog. L., X. 63) as a otifia fairTopepes Trap oAov rb 
aQpoiofia 7rapG7rap/j.vov (see above, p. 206). It is most similar in nature to air ; its atoms 
are very different from those of fire ; yet in its composition a certain portion of warm 
substance is united with the aeriform. In death the atoms of the soul are scattered (Epic., 
ap. Diog. L., X. 64 seq. ; Lucr., III. 418 seq.). After this resolution of the soul into its 
constituent atoms, sensation ceases; the cessation of which is death (criprja^ aiaOfjoeus). 
"When death comes, we no longer exist, and so long as we exist, death does not come, 
so that for us death is of no concern (6 ddvaroc ovdev rrpb^ ??//, Epic., ap. Diog. L., X. 
124 seq.; Lucret., III. 842 seq.). Nothing is immaterial except empty space, which can 
effect nothing ; the soul, therefore, which is the agent of distinct operations, is material 
(Epic., ibid. X. 67). 

The doctrine of material effluxes from things and of images (eZdbAa), which were sup 
posed necessary to perception, was shared by Epicurus with Democritus. These images, 
types (TVTTOI), were represented as coming from the surface of things and making their way 
through the intervening air to the visual faculty or the understanding (c<c rr/v otpiv % rrfv 
iiavoiav, Diog. L., X. 46-49; Epicuri fragm. libr. II. et XL, de natura, Lucret., IY. 33 seq.). 

There is no fate (rifj.ap/j.fvri ) in the world. That which depends on us is not subject to 


the influence of any external power (TO nap r/fuv adioKorov), and it is our power of fre 
self-determination which makes us proper subjects of praise and blame (Epic., ap. Diog. L., 
X. 133; cf. Cic., Acad., II. 30 ; De Fato, 10. 21 ; De Nat. Deorum, I. 25). 

The interest of Epicurus in his natural philosophy turns essentially on the disproof of 
theological explanations and the establishment of the naturalistic principle, and not on the 
determination of completed scientific truth. 

59. The Epicurean Ethics is founded on the Ethics of the Cyre- 
naics. In it the highest good is denned as happiness. Happiness, 
according to Epicurus, is synonymous with pleasure, for this is what 
every being naturally seeks to acquire. Pleasure may result either 
from motion or from rest. The former alone was recognized by the 
Cyrenaics ; but this pleasure, according to Epicurus, is only necessary 
when lack of it gives us pain. The pleasure of rest is freedom from 
pain. Pleasure and pain, further, are either mental or bodily. The 
more powerful sensations are not, as the Cyrenaics affirmed, bodily, 
but mental ; for while the former are confined to the moment, the 
latter are connected with the past and future, through memory and 
hope, which thus increase the pleasure of the moment. Of the 
desires, some are natural and necessary, others natural but not ne 
cessary, and still others neither natural nor necessary. Not every 
species of pleasure is to be sought after, nor is every pain to be 
shunned ; for the means employed to secure a certain pleasure are 
often followed by pains greater than the pleasure produced, or involve 
the loss of other pleasures, and that, whose immediate effect is pain 
ful, often serves to ward off greater pain, or is followed by a pleas 
ure more than commensurate with the pain immediately produced. 
Whenever a question arises as to the expediency of doing or omit 
ting any action, the degrees of pleasure and pain which can be foreseen 
as sure to result, whether directly or indirectly, from the commission 
of the act, must be weighed and compared, and the question must be 
decided according to the preponderance of pleasure or pain in the 
foreseen result. The correct insight necessary for this comparison is 
the cardinal virtue. From it flow all other virtues. The virtuous 
man is not necessarily he who is in the possession of pleasure, but he 
who is able to proceed rightly in the quest of pleasure. But since the 
attainment of the highest possible amount of pleasure in connection 
with .the smallest possible amount of pain, depends on a correct 
praxis, and since the latter, in turn, is dependent on correct insight, 
it follows that the virtuous man alone is able to attain the end de 
scribed ; on the other hand, the virtuous man will attain it without 


failure. Yirtue, then, is the only possible and the perfectly sure way 
to happiness. The sage, who as such possesses virtue, is consequently 
always happy. Duration of existence does not affect the measure of 
his happiness. 

The Moral Philosophy of the Epicureans is specially treated of by Des Contures (Paris, 1685, another 
edition, enlarged by Rondel. Hague, 1686), Batteux (Paris, 1758), and Garve (in connection with his transl. 
of Aristotle s Ethics. Vol. I., Breslau, 1798, pp. 90-119) cf., also, E. Plainer, Ueber die stoische imd Epi- 
kureixehe Erklarung vom Ursprung des Vergnugen, in the Neue Bibl. der schonen Wiss., Vol. 19. 

Epicurus own declarations respecting the principles of ethics may be read in Book X. 
of Diogenes L., especially in the letter from Epicurus to Menoaceus (X. 122-135). Exact 
ness in definition and rigid deduction do not there appear as arts in which Epicurus was 
pre-eminent. He utters his ideas loosely, in the order in which they occur to him, and with 
all the mdeterminateuess of unelahorated thought. He takes no pains to be exact and 
systematic, his only aim being to provide rules of easy practical application. The principle 
of pleasure comes to view in the course of the progress of his discussion in the following 
terms (X. 128): r/dovyv apxyv /cot rc/ .of teyopev elvat rov /Ltaitapiu<; tfiv, and in defense of it 
Epicurus adds (X. 129), that in pleasure we are cognizant of the good which is first among 
all goods and congenial to our nature (ayatibv irpurov /ecu ovyjevtKov), the beginning of all our 
choosing and avoiding, and the end of all our action, sensation being the criterion by which 
we judge of every good. But previously to the formulation of this doctrine, many rules of 
conduct are given, the various species of desires are discussed, pleasure and freedom from 
pain are discoursed upon, and, in particular, the principle, by which we are to be guided 
in our acts of choice or avoidance, is defined (X. 128) as health and mental tranquillity 
(rj rov o<j/Ltaro(; vyieia KCU rj rrj^ i/ n /V7f OTapoa), in which happiness becomes complete (kirst 
TOVTO rov fj.aK.api.uq Cfjv earl rf/lof). Epicurus nowhere states in the form of a definition 
what we are to understand by pleasure (/}dov//), and what lie says of the relation of posi 
tive to negative pleasure (as the absence of pain) is very indefinite. In the letter referred 
to, after an exhortation to all men to philosophize in every period of life, to the end that 
fear may be banished and happiness (rr/v v6aiftoviav~) attained (X. 122), follows, first (123- 
127). instruction respecting the gods and respecting death, and then (127) a classification 
of desires (evt&vfiiat). Of the latter, we are told that some are natural ((frwutuii), others 
empty (Ksvat). Of the natural desires, some are necessary (avaynalai), while the others 
are not necessary (QvaiKai fiovov). Those which are natural and necessary, are necessary 
either for our happiness (Trpof evdatuoviav, which is obviously taken in a narrower sense 
than before), or for the preservation of the body in an untroubled condition (xpb<; T//V rov 
atj/Ltaroc aoxAyciav), or for life itself (rrpbg avrb TO rjv). (In another place, .Diog. L., X. 
149, the desires are classified simply as either natural and necessary, or natural and not 
necessarjr, or neither natural nor necessary : desires of the first class aim at the removal 
of pain ; those of the second at the diversification of pleasure ; and those of the third at the 
gratification of vanity, ambition, and empty conceits generally. This classification is criti 
cised with unjust severity by Cicero, De F., II. ch. 9.) Proper attention to these distinc 
tions, according to Epicurus (ap. Diog. L., X. 128), will lead to the right conduct of life, 
to health and serenity, and consequently to happiness (/*anapu.)(; ^fjv). For, he continues, 
the object of all our actions is to prevent pain either of the body or of the mind (OKI, 
HTJTE a^yu/uev, pfyre rap^u/j.n>}, "We have need of pleasure (rjtiovf/) then, when its absenc 
brings us pain, and only then. Pleasure is, therefore, the starting-point and the end of 
happiness. (How the two statements: "Pleasure is the ethical principle" and i: We 


have need of it only when its absence brings us pain," can be reconciled, or how one ie 
the consequence of the other, it is difficult to say ; for if really the end of all our action 
is only to secure our freedom from pain, and if we have no need of pleasure except 
when its absence would be painful, pleasure is obviously not an end but a means.) After 
the (above-given) brief justification of the hedonic principle (X. 129), Epicurus labors 
to disprove the mistaken idea that all kinds of pleasure are worthy to be sought after. 
He admits that every pleasure, without distinction, is a natural and therefore a good thing, 
and that every pain is an evil, but demands that, before deciding in favor of a given 
pleasure or against a certain pain, we weigh its consequences (ovjqttTpqffis), and that we 
then adopt or reject it according to the preponderance of pleasure or pain in the result. 
In the light of this principle, Epicurus then recommends, with special emphasis, modera 
tion, the accustoming of one s self to a simple manner of life, abstinence from costly and 
intemperate enjoyments, or, at most, only a rare indulgence in them, so that health may be 
preserved and the charm of pleasure may remain undiminished. To give greater force to 
his recommendations, he returns to the proposition, that the proper end of life is freedom 
from bodily and mental suffering (juqre akytlv Kara aw//a, /ur/re rapdrreaBai Kara ijrvxyv). 
Right calculation is the essence of practical wisdom, which is the highest result of phi 
losophy and the source of all other virtues (Diog. L., X. 132). It is impossible to live 
agreeably (r/dewf) without living prudently, decently, and uprightly (<j>povi[i.u<; nal Ka/M<; 
KOL diKaius). Conversely, it is impossible that a life thus directed should not be at 
the same time an agreeable one: the virtues and pleasure grow together inseparably 
(cvjjLTTe&vKacLv at (ipeTal TW tyv r/t^wf, X. 132). Epicurus concludes his letter by portray 
ing the happy life of the sage, who, concerning the gods, holds that opinion which is 
demanded by reason and piety, does not fear death, rightly values all natural goods, knows 
that there is no such thing as fate, but by his insight is raised above the contingencies of 
life, deeming it better to fail of his end in single instances after intelligent deliberation, 
than to be fortunate without intelligence (xpetTrov dvai vojui^uv evAoy/frwf arvjtiv, f] 
a/loy/crrwf evrvxeiv), the man who, in one word, lives like a god among men in the enjoy 
ment of immortal goods (X. 133135). 

The Epicureans deny that the laws of ethics are innate in man, or that they were 
invented and violently imposed on him by his first rulers ; on the contrary, they are the 
result of the judgment of eminent and leading men respecting what is useful (cvfitiepov) to 
society (Hermarchus, ap. Porphyr., De Alstin., I. chs. 7-13; cf. Bernays, Theophr. Schrift 
uber Frommigkeit, Berlin, 1866, p. 8 seq.). 

Epicurus distinguishes (ap. Diog. L., X. 136) between two species of pleasure, viz. : the 
pleasure of rest, naracTrj /uariKr/ T^OVTJ (stabilitas volupta-tis, Cic., De Fin., II. 3), and the 
pleasure of motion, r/ Kara Kivrjoiv fjfiovrj (voiuptas in motu, Cic., ibid.) ; the former is defined 
as freedom from trouble and labor (arapa^ia cnrovJa), the latter as joy and cheerfulness 
(x a P a K(l ^ evQpocvvq). In his conception of the "pleasure of rest," Epicurus varies, some 
times identifying the latter with the momentary satisfaction which arises from the removal 
of a pain, and sometimes with the mere absence of pain. This uncertainty is the more 
unfortunate, since the term T/Aovr/ (like volvptas and "pleasure") never receives in the 
ordinary usage the signification of absence of pain; Cicero s severe censure (De Fin., II. 
2 seq.) of the carelessness and obscurity of Epicurus in the employment of this term is, 
therefore, not ungrounded. Yet Cicero s account appears to be not wholly free from mis 
apprehensions. Thus it can only be ascribed to an inexact apprehension of the doctrine of 
Epicurus, that Cicero should suppose that Epicurus identified the highest pleasure with 
the absence of pain as such (De Fin., I. 11; II. 3 seq.)-, Epicurus (ap. Diog. L., X. 141) 
only says that the complete removal of pain is inseparably connected with the highest 


intensification of pleasure (for which, indeed, it would be more exact to say that the latter 
always involves the former, but not conversely). 

It would appear from the accounts of Cicero (De Fin., I. 7 and 17 ; II. 30) that Epicu 
rus derived all psychical pleasure from the memory of past or the hope of future corporeal 
pleasures. This doctrine is not to be found in any of the writings of Epicurus now at 
hand, and it is quite possible that in this point he has been misunderstood. Memory 
and hope are, indeed, according to Epicurus, the ground of the higher worth of psychical 
pleasure, but he can scarcely have taught that they were the only source of such pleasure. 
It is right to say only (according to Epicurus), that all psychical pleasure originates in one 
way or another in sensuous pleasure. In a letter quoted by Diog. L. (X. 22), Epicurus 
declares with reference to himself, that his bodily pains are outweighed in his old age by 
the pleasure which the recollection of his philosophical discoveries affords him. 

The alleged averment of Epicurus in his work irepl re/lovf (see Diog. L., X. 6), that he 
did not know what he should understand by the good, if sensuous pleasures were taken 
away (fubaipijv fifv ra^ 6ia %v7i(i)v 7]6ova<;, a^aipuv 6 Kat rag 6t a&podiaicjv /cat rdf 61 a/cpoa- 
[taTorv ecru rdf did uopyf/q), is compatible not only with the doctrine that sensuous plea 
sures are the only real ones, but also witli the doctrine that they are the necessary basis 
of all other pleasures, so that with them all others would disappear. If we adopt the 
latter as the doctrine of Epicurus, the word a<i>atpdv in the passage above quoted must 
not be understood in the Aristotelian sense, as denoting merely mental abstraction, but 
as signifying an attempt (of course only in thought) at real removal. In what manner 
intellectual pleasures are dependent on sensuous pleasures is left undetermined. 

Epicurus says expressly that no kind of pleasure deserves in itself to be rejected, 
though many a pleasure must be sacrificed on account of its consequences (Diog. L., X. 
141, cf. 142). The conception of a distinction in the worth of different pleasures, as 
determined by their quality, according to which the one pleasure could be termed refined, 
the other less refined, or unrefined, finds no place in the Epicurean system. Hence the 
conception of honor remains inexplicable in the Epicurean theory, and in the praxis of the 
Epicureans it was, so far as possible, placed in the background. It was these deficiencies 
that occasioned the most weighty and annihilating objections of Cicero (De Fin., II.) 
against Epicureanism. Yet these causes also secured for the system its most extensive 
acceptation at the time, when the thirst for pleasure and despotism had broken down the 
antique sentiment of honor. 

In principle the Epicurean ethics is a system of egoism ; for the advantage of the indi 
vidual, which is treated as identical with the happiness of the individual, is required in 
all cases to furnish the law of action. Even Friendship is explained by this principle. 
Friendship, according to Epicurus, is the best means of assuring to man all the enjoyments 
of life. Some of the Epicureans (according to Cic., De Fin., I. 20) added to this two 
other theories of friendship, some asserting that it began in the idea of profit, which in 
the natural progress of friendly intercourse became changed into a sentiment of unselfish 
good-will, and others affirming that a covenant among the wise men bound them to love 
each his friend as himself. Epicurus himself is the author of the aphorism (ascribed to 
to him in Plutarch. Non Posse Suaviter Vivi sec. Epicurum, 15. 4): "It is more pleasant to 
do than to receive good " (TO tv iroielv ij6uov rov KCLGXEIV). Yet through the great weight 
which, both in theory and in their actual life with each other, was laid by the Epicureans 
on friendship (a social development which only became possible after the dissolution of the 
bond which in earlier times had so closely united each individual citizen to the civil com 
munity), Epicureanism aided in softening down the asperity and exclusiveness of ancient 
manners and in cultivating the social virtues of companionableness, compatibility, friendli- 


ness, gentleness, beneficence, and gratitude, and so performed a work whose merit should 
not be underestimated. 

If we compare the Epicurean teaching with the Cyrenaic, we discover, along with their 
agreement in their general principle, the principle of Hedonism, two main differences (of 
which Diog. L. treats, X. 136, 137). The Cyrenaics posit only the positive pleasure which 
is connected with gentle motion (Afia KIVTJOIS), where Epicurus posits not only this, but 
also the negative pleasure connected with repose (naTacTrjuariKJi //rWr/). Farther, tho 
Cyrenaics affirm that the worst pains are bodily, while Epicurus affirms them to be psy 
chical, since the soul suffers from that which is past and from that which is to come : in 
like manner, to the former, bodily pleasure seems the greater; to the latter, psychical. 
The ethical teachings of the principal representatives of the Cyrenaic school after Aris- 
tippus were all incorporated into the Epicurean system. Thus Epicurus agreed with 
Theodorus that the ethical "end "was a general state rather than particular pleasures, 
with Hegesias, that the principal thing was to avert suffering, and with Anniceris, that 
the sage should zealously cultivate friendship. 

That by which Epicureanism is scientifically justified, is its endeavor to reach objective 
knowledge by rigidly excluding (or attempting to exclude) mythical forms and conceptions. 
Its deficiency lies in its restriction to those most elementary and lowest spheres of inves 
tigation, in which alone, as things then were, knowledge having even the show of exact 
ness and free from poetic and semi-poetic forms was possible, and in its explaining away 
whatever was not susceptible of scientific explanation in accordance with the insufficient 
hypotheses of the system. The indecisiveness of the struggle between Epicureanism and 
the more ideal philosophical schools, and the rise of Skepticism and Eclecticism, can be 
otherwise explained than by the hypothesis of an abatement of the desire for knowledge. 
They were rather (and to-day something of the same kind is being repeated) the natural 
result of the distribution of different advantages and deficiencies among these various 
schools : the idealistic philosophers sacrificed (as they still do to a great extent to-day), 
in many respects, scientific purity and rigor of form to an unconsciously poetical, or at 
least half-poetic, manner of apprehending the highest objects of knowledge ; while Epi 
cureanism (like all exclusively realistic systems), in its endeavor to present a perfectly clear 
and intelligible account of things on the principle of immanent natural causality, ignored 
largely the existence and importance of objects which were then incapable of explanation 
under a form so strictly scientific. Cf., further, respecting the significance of Epicu 
reanism, the sections on this subject in A. Lange s Gesch. des Mater ialismus, Iserlohn, 1 866, 
and in his Neue Beitrdge zur Gesch. des Materialismus, "Winterthur, 1867. 

60. The results of the great philosophical systems were not only 
reproduced or appropriated and developed in the schools which fol 
lowed, but were subjected to a critical revision and re-examination, 
which led either to their being remodeled and blended together in 
new systems, or to doubt in regard to all of them and in regard to 
the cognoscibility of any thing, i. e., to Eclecticism and Skepticism. 

There appeared in succession three Skeptical schools or groups of 
philosophers : 1) Pyrrho of Elis (in the time of Alexander the Great) 
and his earliest followers; 2) the so-called Middle Academy, or the 
second and third Academic Schools ; 3) the Later Skeptics, beginning 
with ^Enesidemus, who again made the teaching of Pyrrho the basis 


of their own teaching. The skepticism of the Middle Academy, 
issuing from the Platonic Dialectic, was less radical than that of the 
Pyrrhonists, since it was directed principally against a determinate 
form of doctrine, namely, against the dogmatism of the Stoics, and 
was at least so far from absolutely denying the possibility of knowl 
edge, that it admitted the existence of probabilities, of which various 
degrees were distinguished. 

The earlier school of Skeptics, among whom, next to Pyrrho, 
Timon of Phlius, the Sillograph, was the most important, asserted that 
of every two mutually contradictory propositions, one was not more 
true than the other. They sought, by withholding their judgment in 
all cases, to secure peace of mind, and esteemed every thing except 
virtue indifferent. Among the later Skeptics, the most noteworthy 
was ^Enesidemus, who went back to Pyrrho in philosophy, was the 
author often skeptical " tropes," and attempted, on the basis of Skep 
ticism, to revive the philosophy of Heraclitus. Beside him we may 
mention, in particular, Agrippa, who reduced the ten tropes to five, 
Favorinus, who ^eems to have wavered between the Academic and 
the Pyrrhonic form of doubt, and Sextus, who belonged to the em 
pirical school of physicians, and composed the works, still extant, 
entitled "Pyrrhonic Sketches" and u Against the Dogmatists." 

Of the Skepticism of Pyrrho treat Joh. Arrhenius (Ups. 170S), G. Ploucquet (Tub. 1758), Kindervater 
(An P. doctr. omnis tollatur virtus, Leipsic, 17S9), J. G. Munch (De Notione atque Indole Scepticism-^ 
nominatim Pyrrhonismi. Altd. 1796), E. Brodersen (De philos. Pyrrhonis. Kiel, 1819), J. E. Thorbecke 
(Quid inter academ. et *cept. interf., Leyden, 1621); on Timon, see Jos. F. Langheinrich (Di#s. tree d* 
Timone sillographo, ace. ej-imd-em friigmnnta. Leips. 1 720-24), and, of more recent writers, Wachsmuth (/> 
Timone Phliatio ceterixque sillographi* Graecis, Leips. 1859); ct, respecting the general subject of SUloi 
among the Greeks, Franz Anton Wolke (Warschau, 1820), and Friedr. Paul (Berlin, 1S21). Fragments of 
the writings of Timon are found in the Anthology published by F. Jacobs, from the Palatine Codex (Leipe. 
1813-17). Cf. D. Zimmermann, Dartellung der Pyrrh. Ph., Erl. 1841 ; Ueber l r r*pr. u. Bedeutwng der 
Pyrrh. Ph., ib. 1843; Commentatio, quti Timonis P/Masii tsillorum reliquiae a Stvto Empiric tradlUie. 
easplanantur (G.-Pr.\ ib. 1866. Saisset treats of ^Enesidemus, in Le Scepticitsme : Aenetideme, Pancal, 
Kant, 2d ed., Paris, 1867. 

For the literature relating to the Middle Academy, see aboTe, 44, p. 134. For the editions of the two 
works of Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrhon-. Jnstitut. Libr. III., and Contra Mathematical Libri Xl.\ see above, 
7, p. 21. Cf. L. Kayser, Ufber Seatu* Empir. Schrift wpo* XOVKCOU?, in the lihein. Mus.f. Ph.. uew 
series, VII. 1850, pp. 161-190; C. Jourdain, JS&rt. Empir. et la Philonophie ScolasHqne, Paris. 1858. 

Cf. Tafel, Gesch. des Skepticixmu*, Tubingen, 1S34; Norman Maccoll, The Greek Skeptics from Pyrrho 
to Seactus, London and Cambridge, 1869. 

Pyrrho of Elis (about 360-270 B. c.) is said (Diog. L., IX. 61, cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Math., 
VII. 13) to have been a pupil of Bryso (or Dry so), who was a son and disciple of Stilpo; 
yet this statement is very doubtful, since Bryso, if he was really a son of Stilpo. must have 
been younger than Pyrrho ; according to other accounts, Bryso was a disciple of Socrates 
or of Euclid of Megara, Socrates disciple. Perhaps this Bryso, disciple of Socrates, was the 
Bryso of Heraclea, from whose dialogues, according to Theopompus, ap. Athenseus, XI. 
p. 508, Plato was said to have borrowed considerably (perhaps, in particular, in the Theae- 


cetus ?). He seems to have thought highly of the doctrines of Democritus, but to have hated 
most other philosophers, regarding them as Sophists (Diog. L., IX. 67 and 69). He accom 
panied Auaxarchus, the Democritean, of the suite of Alexander the Great, on his military 
campaigns, as far as India. He became of the opinion, that nothing was beautiful or hate 
ful, just or unjust, in reality (TT? ahrjOsia, Diog. L., IX. 61, for which we find fyvcei, ib. 101, 
and in Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., XI. 140) ; in itself every thing was just as much and just 
as little (ovdsv //a/1/.ov) the one as the other ; every thing depended on human institution 
and custom. Hence Pyrrho taught that real things were inaccessible to human knowledge 
or incomprehensible (a/cara/l^ a), and that it was our duty to abstain from judging (ETTO^T/). 
The external circumstances of human life are all indifferent (a6ta<j>opov) it becomes the 
wise man, whatever may befall him, always to preserve complete tranquillity of mind, and 
to allow nothing to disturb his equanimity (arapa^ia, Diog. L., IX. 61, 62, 66-68; cf. 
Cic., De Fin., II. 13; III. 3 and 4; IV. 16: Pyrrho, qui virtute constitute,, nihil omnino 
quod appetendum sit, relinquat). The Pyrrhonists were termed (according to Diog. L., IX. 
69) doubters (cnroprjrinoi}, skeptics (CKETTTLKOI), suspenders of judgment (e^e/m/ox), and 
inquirers (^T^TLKOL). Pyrrho himself developed his views only orally (Diog. L., Proem, 16; 
IX. 102). It was thus easy for his name to become a typical one, and for many views to 
be ascribed to him 07 later disciples and writers, which were only the views of the school. 
The most correct reports of his doctrines are those which are derived from the writings of 
Timon, his disciple (termed by Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., I. 53 : 6 ^po^rjrij^ ruv 

As immediate disciples of Pyrrho, Diog. L. (IX. 67, 69) names, among others, Philo of 
Athens, Nausiphanes of Teos, the Democritean, who afterward became a teacher of Epi 
curus, and, as the most eminent of all, Timon of Phlius. Timon (born about 325, died 
about 235 B. a), whom (according to Diog. L.. IX. 109) Stilpo, the Megarian, had instructed 
before Pyrrho, was the author of satirical poems, 2f /Uo<, in three books, in which he 
treated and reviled as babblers all the Greek philosophers, except Xenophanes, who, he 
said, had sought for the real truth, disengaged from useless subtleties, and Pyrrho, who 
found it. In opposition to the assertion, that the truth was known through the co-opera 
tion of the senses and the intellect, Timon, who held both to be deceptive, repeated the 
verse: "Attagas and Numenius " (two notorious cheaters) "came together" (mrvijWw 
Arrayaf re KO.I ^ov/u^viog). According to Aristocles (ap. Euseb., Praepar. Evang., XIY. 18), 
Timon appears to have developed the main thesis of skepticism in the following manner : 
He who would attain to happiness must consider three things : 1) the nature of things, 
2) how we are to conduct ourselves with reference to them, 3) the (theoretical and prac 
tical) result flowing from this conduct. There exist no fixed differences among things : all 
things are unstable and can not be judged of by us. Owing to the instability of things our 
perceptions and representations are neither true nor false, and can therefore not be relied 
upon. Adopting this view, we become non-committal (we decide, say nothing) or free 
from all theoretical bias (aqacia), and thus secure imperturbableness of mind (arapa^ia). 
This state of mind follows our suspension of judgment (CTTO^//) as its shadow (cr/adf rpdnov, 
Diog. L., IX. 107). The subject of doubt is not what appears (the phenomenon), but what 
is. Says Timon (ap. Diog., IX. 105): "That a thing is sweet I do not affirm, but only 
admit that it appears so." In his work entitled UvOuv, Timon (according to Diog. L., IX. 
76) explained his expression, ovdev ^d/l/lov, as equivalent to prfev opi&iv or (nrpocOeTzlv (we 
determine nothing and assent to nothing). The grounds for every proposition and its 
contradictory opposite show themselves equally strong (icoaOeveia T&V h6yuv). Another 
expression for the skeptical withholding of one s judgment Is apprj/ta, or equilibrium 
(ibid. 74). The ovdw fia^ov is intended by the Skeptics to be taken, not in the positive 


seuse of asserting real equality, but only in a privative sense (ov derm^, a/U. 
as when it is said, "Scylla exists no more than the Chimsera," *. e., neither exists (ibid. 75). 
All these principles, after being first applied against the assertions of the dogmatists, 
were finally to be applied to themselves, in order that in the end not even these prin 
ciples should retain the character of fixed assertions ; just as every other /l<tyof, or asser 
tion, could be met by a contradictory assertion, so also could these (ib., 76, given, apparently, 
as an affirmation of Timon). In this position, obviously, Skepticism, carrying its own prin 
ciple to the extreme, at last destroys itself; besides, the Skeptics, while arguing against the 
force of logical forms, could not but employ them themselves, thus conceding to them in 
fact the force which their theory denied them (except, of course, in so far as the employ 
ment of them from the Skeptical stand-point was declared to be merely hypothetical, and 
intended merely to show that if they were valid they might be turned against themselves, 
and were thus self-destructive). 

The later Skeptics, who styled themselves Pyrrhonists, were accustomed to define the 
difference between the members of the Middle Academy (see above, 44) and the Pyrrho- 
nistic doubters, by saying that the Academics of the schools of Arcesilas and Carneadea 
asserted that they knew only one thing, viz. : that nothing was knowable, while the Pyr 
rhonists denied even this one supposed certainty (Sext. Emp., Hypotyp. Pyrrhon., I. 3, 226, 
233 ; cf. Gell., N. A., XL 5, 8). But this appreciation is incorrect in what concerns the 
Academics ; for neither Arcesilas (Cic., Acad. Post., I. 12, 45) nor Carneades (Cic., Acad. 
Pr., II. 9, 28) ascribed to the theses of Skepticism complete certainty. It is correct only 
to say, in general, that the Skepticism of the Academics was less radical than that of the 
Pyrrhonists, but not for the reason above cited, but because it admitted a theory of proba 
bility (against which Sext. Emp. contends, Adv. Math., VII. 435 seq.), and, in what con 
cerns Arcesilas, because this philosopher (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 234, 
and others) employed his method of negative criticism only as a preliminary to the com 
munication of Plato s teachings (provided, for the rest, that this statement is exact or 
referred to the right person). There existed besides a very important difference between 
the Academic and the Pyrrhonic Skeptics, in that the latter only, and not the Academics, 
saw in ataraxy the supreme end of philosophy. 

After that the Academy (in the persons of Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon, 
and their successors) had gone over to an eclectic dogmatism, the Skeptical doctrine of 
Pyrrho was renewed, especially by ^Enesidemus. JEnesidemus of Cnossus appears to 
have taught at Alexandria in the first century after Christ. He wrote Hv ppwveiuv hoyuv 
OKTU fiiftAia (Diog. L., IX. 116), of which Photius (Bibl. cod., 212) prepared an abridgment, 
which is still extant, but is very brief. His stand-point is not that of pure Skepticism, 
since he proposed, by the employment of the skeptical principle, to lay the foundation for 
a renewed Heraclitism. He proposed (according to Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 210) to 
show first that contradictory predicates appeared to be applicable to the same thing, in 
order to break the ground for the doctrine that such predicates were in reality thus appli 
cable. With him doubt was not doctrinal, but directive (aywy??). The ten ways (rporrot) 
of justifying doubt, which, according to Sext. Empir., Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 36, were traditional 
among the earlier Skeptics (irapa -01$ apxncoTepo^ GneKTmoiq), appear to have been first 
enumerated in his work, and not in that of Timon ; Sextus treats Agrippa as the first of 
the " Later Skeptics." The ten tropes (otherwise termed AOJOL or TOTTOI) were, according 
to Sext. Empir. (Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 36 seq.) and Diog. L. (IX. 79 seq.) severally as follows : 
The first was derived from the different constitution of the various classes of animated 
beings, resulting in differences in their modes of apprehending the same objects, of which 
modes it was impossible to decide which, if either, was correct ; the second was draw* 


from the different constitution o. different men, whence ttie same result as before ; the 
third, from the different structure of the several organs of sense ; the fourth, from the 
variability of our physical and mental conditions ; the fifth, from the diversities of appear 
ance due to position, distance, and place ; the sixth, from the fact that no object can be 
perceived by itself alone, apart from all others ; the seventh, from the various appearance 
of objects as determined by quantity, size of parts, and the like ; the eighth, from the gen 
eral relativity of all our knowledge (and this, as is correctly remarked by Sext. Empir. 
[Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 39 ; cf. Gell., XI. 5, 7], is the substance of all skeptical tropes) ; the ninth, 
from the variations in our notions of objects, according as we perceive them more or less 
frequently; and the tenth, from diversities of culture, customs, laws, mythical notions, and 
philosophical theories. 

The later Skeptics, beginning with Agrippa (the fifth successor of ^Enesidemus), and in 
cluding Sextus, the empirical, or, as he preferred to be called (see Hyp. Pyrrh., I. 236 seq. ; 
Adv. Math., VIII. 327), the methodical physician (about 200 A. D.). and his pupil Saturninus 
(Diog. L., IX. 11C), and others (with whom, among others, Favorinus of Arelate, the gram 
marian and antiquarian, who lived at "Rome and Athens under Hadrian, and was the teacher 
of A. GTellius, seems to have agreed), enumerated, as reasons for "CTTO^," or the suspen 
sion of judgment, five tropes (see Sext. Emp., Hyp. Pyrr., I. 164 seq. ; Diog. L., IX. 88 seq.). 
The first of these was founded on the discrepancy of human opinions respecting the same 
objects ; the second pointed to the regress in infinitum involved in proof, since whatever is 
proved, is proved by that which itself needs proof, and so on without end ; the third was 
taken from the relativity of things, all of which vary in appearance according to the con 
stitution of the percipient and according to their relations to other things with which they 
are combined ; the fourth called attention to the arbitrariness of the fundamental prin 
ciples of the dogmatists, who, in order to avoid the regressus in infinitum, set out in their 
proofs from some pre-supposition, whose truth they illegitimately assumed; the fifth 
pointed out the usual circle in demonstration, where that on which the proof rests must 
itself be established by that which is to be proved. According to Sext. Empir., Hyp. 
Pyrrh., I. 178 seq., still later Skeptics maintained the two following tropes: 1) Nothing 
is certain of itself, as is proved by the discrepancy of opinions concerning all that is per 
ceptible or thinkable ; and, therefore, 2) nothing can be made certain by proof, since the 
latter derives no certainty from itself, and, if based on other proof, leads us either to a 
regressus in infinitum, or to a circle in demonstration. 

To disprove the possibility of demonstration, Sextus advanced a series of arguments, of 
which the most noticeable was this (Hyp. Pyrrh., II. 134 seq.), that every syllogism moves 
in a circle, since the major premise, on which the proof of the conclusion depends, depends 
for its own certainty on a complete induction, in which the conclusion must have been 
already contained. (Cf. Hegel, Log., II. p. 151 seq.; EncycL, 190 seq., and the remarks 
in my System of Logic, under 101.) 

Of special interest and importance are the skeptical arguments against the validity of 
the notion of causality, reported, apparently after yEnesidemus, in Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., 
IX. 207 seq. A cause is a relativum, for it is not to be conceived without that which it 
causes ; but the relative has no existence (ov% vTrdpxei) except in thought (tTrivoeiTat fi6vov). 
Further, in each case cause and effect must be either synchronous, or the former must pre 
cede or follow the latter. They can not be synchronous, for then cause and effect would 
as such be indistinguishable, and each could with equal reason be claimed as the cause 
of the other. Nor can the cause precede its effect, since a cause is no cause until that 
exists of which it is the cause. Lastly, the supposition that the cause follows its effect 
is without sense, and may be abandoned to those fools who habitually invert the natural 


order of things. Other arguments against causality are also adduced by Sextus; the 
characteristic fact in connection with them is that that argument is not included among 
them, which in modern times (since Hume) has had most weight, namely, that the origin 
of the notion of causality can not be so accounted for, as to justify our relying upon it as 
a form of cognition. (Cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., 1st ed., III. p. 474; 2d ed., III. b, p. 38 seq.) 

Theology, also, and especially the Stoic doctrine of providence, were among the objects 
of Skeptical attack in the later period of Skepticism. The arguments employed in this 
connection were derived especially from Carneades (Sext. Empir., Adv. Math., IX. 137 seq.: 
Hyp. Pyrrh., III. 2 seq.), and were drawn principally from the evil in the world, which God 
either could not or would not prevent, both of which suppositions were incompatible with 
the idea of God. Yet the Skeptics explained that their intention was not to destroy the 
belief in the existence of gods, but simply to combat the arguments and the pretended 
knowledge of the dogmatic philosophers. 

61. A tendency, more or less decided, toward Eclecticism, is 
manifest in all the dogmatic philosophy of the later portion of an 
tiquity, and especially in the period of the propagation of Greek 
philosophy in the Roman world. The most important and influen 
tial representative of this tendency is Cicero, who, in what pertains 
to the theory of cognition, confessed his adhesion to the skepticism of 
the Middle Academy, took no interest in physics, and in ethics 
wavered between the Stoic and the Peripatetic doctrines. 

The school of the Sextians, who flourished for a short time at 
"Rome, about the beginning of the Christian era, seems to have occu 
pied a position intermediate between Pythagoreanism, Cynicism, and 

Edward Zeller (in No. 24 of the first series of the Sammlung yemeinver stand lic?>er wigs. Vortrage, ed. 
by Rud. Virchow and Fr. v. Holtzendorf, Berlin, 1866) treats of religion and philosophy among the Romans. 

Among the earlier treatises on the philosophy of Cicero may be mentioned those of Jason de Nores 
(Cie. PhUo. de Vita et Moribus, Padua, 1J97), Ant Bucher (Ethica Ciceroniana, Hamb. 1610), J. C. Wai- 
din (De philosophia Ciceronis Platonica, Jena. 1753), Chr. Meinere (Orat. de philos. Oiceronis, ejusqu4 
in universam philos. mentis, in his Verm, philos. Schr., Vol. I., 1775, p. 274 seq.), H. C. F. Hfllsemann 
(De indole philosophica Oiceronis, Liineh. 1799), Gedike s Collation of those passages in Cicero which 
relate to the history of philosophy (Berlin, 1782, 1801, 1814) which is more valuable as an expose of Cicero s 
philosophical conceptions, than as a contribution to the history of philosophy and the annotations and dis- 
cussions appended by Christian Garve to his translation of the De Officiis (Breslau, 1783, 6th ed., ib. 1819), 
as also Krische s Forschungen (Gott. 1840, see above, p. 23) and Hitter s minute exposition of the phi 
losophy of Cicero in his Gesch. der PMlos., IV. pp. 106-176 [Morrison s English translation of R. s Hist, of 
Philos , London, 1846, Vol. IV.. pp. 99-160. TV.] More recent works worthy of mention are those of J. F. 
Herbart ( Ueber die Philos. dee Oic., Werke, Vol. XII., pp. 167-182), Kari Salom. Zachariae (Staatswissen- 
schaftliche Betrachtungen iiber Cicero s wiedergefundenes Werk <vom Staate, Heidelb. 1823), Lotheisen 
(Cicero s Grundsdtze imd Beurtheilung des Schonen, Brieg, 1825), Raph. Kuhner (M. Tnlii Ciceronie in 
philosophiam ejunque paries merita, Hamburg, 1825), J. A.. C. van Heusde (M. Tullius Cicero ^>i\on\ar(av, 
Traj. ad Rhen. 1S36), Baumhauer (De Aristotelia vi in Oic. scriptis, Utrecht, 1841), C. F. Hermann (De 
interpret atione Timaei dialogi a Oic. relicta, Progr., Gott. 1S42). J. Klein (Defontibus Topicorum Oice 
ronis. Bonn, 1844), Legeay (M. Tullius Cicero philonophiae historicus, Leyden, 1846), C. Crome (Quid 
Graeci* Cicero in philosophia, quid sibi debuerit, G.-Pr., Dusseldorf, 1855), Havestadt (De Oic. primis 
principiis philosophiae morally G.-Pr., Emmerich, 1857), A. Desjardins (De scientia cimli apud Oic., 
Beauvais, 1857), Burmeister (Oic. als Neu-Akademiker, G.-Pr., Oldenburg, 1860), Hofig (Cicero s Ansicht 
von der Staatsreligion, G.-Pr., Krotoschin, 1S68), C. M. Bernhardt (De Cicerone Graecae philosophic 


interpret*, " Progr." of the Fr.-Wilh.-Gymn., Berlin, 1865), F. Hasler (Ueber das Verfuiltniwt der heid- 
nischen und christlichen Ethik auf Grwnd einer Vergleichung des Oiceronianischen Buches De Officii* 
mit dem gleichnamigen des heiligen Ambrosius, Munich, 1866), G. Barzelotti (Dette dottrine Jilosofictit 
net Libri di Cicerone, Florence, 1867), J. Walter (De An. Immort. quae praec. Oic. trad., Prague, 1867), 
G. Zietschmann (De Tuse. qu. fonMbits. Dins., Halle, 1863). The inaugural dissertation of Hugo Jentscb 
(Aristotelis ex arte rhetorica, quaeritur quid habeat Cicero, Berlin, 1866) contains noteworthy contribu 
tions to the solution of the question, to what extent Cicero had read and understood Aristotle. 

On the philosopher Sextius, see De Burigny (Memoires de FAead. des Inscript., XXXI.), Lasteyrit 
(Sentences de Sextius, Paris, 1842), and Meinrad Ott (Character und Urapr-ung der Spriiche des Philow 
phen Seactius, G.-I r., liottweil, 1861, and Die syrischen " auserlesenen Spriiche des Ilerrn Xistua^ 
Bischofs von Rom." nicht eine Xistusschrift, sondern eine iiberarbeitete Sextiusschrift, G.-Pr., liottweil 
and Tubingen, 1S62 and 1863). 

"When criticism had demonstrated the presence of untenable elements in all the great 
systems, the ineradicable need of philosophical convictions could not but lead either to 
the construction of new systems or to Eclecticism. In the latter it would necessarily 
end, if the philosophizing subject retained a naive confidence in his own " Unbefangeriheit" 
i. e., in the directness of his natural perceptions of truth or in his sagacious tact in the ap 
preciation of philosophical doctrines, while yet lacking the creative power requisite to the 
founding of a system. In particular, Eclecticism would naturally find acceptance with 
those who sought in philosophy not knowledge as such, but rather a general theoretical 
preparation for practical life and the basis of rational convictions in religion and morals, 
and for whom, therefore, rigid unity and systematic connection in philosophical thought 
were not unconditionally necessary. Hence the philosophy of the Romans was almost 
universally eclectic, even in the case of those who professed their adhesion to some one of 
the Hellenic systems. The special representative of Eclecticism is Cicero. 

M. Tullius Cicero (Jan. 3d, 106 Dec. 7th, 43 B. c.) pursued his philosophical studies 
especially at Athens and Rhodes. In his youth, he heard, first, Phaedrus the Epicurean 
and Philo the Academic, and was also instructed by Diodotus the Stoic (who was after 
ward, with Tyrannic, an inmate of his house, Tusc., V. 39, Epist., passim). He after 
ward heard Antiochus of Askalon, the Academic, Zeno the Epicurean, and lastly (at 
Rhodes), Posidonius the Stoic. In his latter years Cicero turned his attention again to 
philosophy, especially during the last three years of his life. Tusc.. V. 2 : Philosophise 
in sinum quum a primis temporibus aetatis nostra voluntas studiumque nos compulisset, his 
gravissimis casibus in eundtm portum, ex quo eramus egressi magna jactati t&inpestate con- 

Cicero gives a list of his philosophical writings in De Div., II. 1. In his work entitled 
Hortensius, he had, as he here says, urged the study of philosophy ; in the Academics he 
had indicated what he considered the most modest, consequent, and elegant mode of phi 
losophizing (namely, that pursued by the Middle Academy) ; in the five books De Finibus 
Bonorum et Malorum he had treated of the foundation of ethics, the doctrine of the highest 
good, and of evil, after which he had written the five books of Tusculan Disputations, in 
which he had shown what things were necessary to the greatest happiness in life ; then 
had followed the three books De Natura Deorum, to which were to be joined the tiien 
unfinished work De Divinatione and the projected work De Fato. Among his philosophical 
works were also to be reckoned the six books De Republica (previously composed) and the 
works entitled Consolatio and De Senectute ; to these might be added his rhetorical writings : 
the three books De Oratore, and Brutus (De Claris Oratoribus), constituting a fourth, and 
the Orator, constituting a fifth book on the same general topic. 

Cicero composed the work De Rep. (in six books) in the years 54-52 B. c. About the 
third part of it has come down to us, most of which was first published by A. Mai, from 


the Palimpsest in the Vatican (Rome, 1st ed., 1822); a part of Book VI., the dream of 
Scipio, is preserved in Macrobiua. Complementary to this work was the De Legibus, 
begun in 52 B. c., but never finished, and now extant only in a fragmentary form. Pos 
sibly as early as the beginning of the year 46 B. c., but perhaps later, Cicero wrote th 
small work called Paradoxa, which is not mentioned by him in De Div., II. 1. The Con- 
solatio and Hortensius were composed in 45 B. c., of both of which only a few fragments 
remain to us ; in the same year the Academics (now incomplete) and the De Finibus (which 
we possess entire) were written, and the Tusculan. Disp. and the De Nat. Deor. were begun ; 
the two last-named works were not completed till the following year. The date of the 
Cato Major sive De Senectute falls in the beginning of 44 B. c. ; that of the De Divinations 
(above-cited, intended as a complement to the work on the Nature of the Gods) falls in the 
same year, as also do the De Faio (which has not come down to us entire), the lost work 
De Gloria, and the extant works: Laelius s. De Amicitia and De Officiis ; the treatise De 
Virtutibus (not extant) was probably composed immediately after the De Officiis. Among 
the youthful works of Cicero were the translations (now lost) of Xenophon s (Economicus 
and Plato s Protagoras (which latter was still existing in the times of Priscianus and Dona- 
tus) ; but his translation of Plato s Timaeus, of which a considerable fragment is preserved, 
was written, after the Academica, in 45 (or 44) B. c. Of the rhetorical works, which are 
classed by Cicero himself with his philosophical works, the De Oratore was written in the 
year 55, and Brutus and the Orator in 46 B. c. 

That Cicero in his philosophical writings depended on Grecian sources appears from 
his own confession, since he says of the former (Ad Atticum, XII. 52) : (nroypatya sunt, 
minore laborefiunt, verba tantum affero, quibus abundo (yet cf. De Fin., I. 2. 6; 3. 7 ; De Off., 
I. 2. 6, where Cicero alleges his relative independence). It is still possible to point out the 
foreign sources of most of his writings (generally by the aid of passages in these writings 
themselves or in Cicero s Epistles). The works De Rep. and De Legibus are in form imita 
tions of the works of Plato bearing the same names ; their contents are founded partly on 
Cicero s own political experiences and partly on Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic doctrines, 
and, to a not inconsiderable extent, on the writings of Polybius. The Paradoxa discuss cer 
tain well-known Stoic principles. The Consolatio is founded on Grantor s work irepl irhQovc,, 
the (lost) Hortensius, probably on the IIporpeTm/cof, which Aristotle had addressed to Themi- 
aon, king in one of the cities of Cyprus (see Bernays, Die Dialogedes Arist., p. 116 seq.), or, it 
may be, ont\\& Protrepticus of Philo of Larissa, the Academic (see Krische, Utber Cicero s Aca 
demica, Gott. Studien, II., 1845, p. 191); the De Finibus (the best of the extant philosophical 
writings of Cicero), on the works of Phsedrus, Chrysippus, Carneades, Antiochus, as also 
on the results of the studies pursued by Cicero in his youth, when he listened to lectures 
and engaged in philosophical discussions ; the Academica, on the writings and in part also 
on the discourses of the more distinguished of the Academics ; the Tusc. Disp., on the works 
of Plato and Grantor, and on Stoic and Peripatetic writings ; the first book of the De Natura 
Deorum, on an Epicurean work, which has been discovered in the Herculanean Rolls, and 
was at first considered to be a treatise of Phasdrus Trept Oe&v, but has now been recognized 
as the work of Philodemus 7TEplevae/3eiac] Cicero s critique of the Epicurean stand-point is 
founded on a work by Posidonius the Stoic ; the second book of the De Nat. Deor. is founded 
particularly on the works of Cleanthes and Chrysippus ; the third, on those of Carneades 
and Clitomachus, the Academics ; the first of the two books De Divinatione is based on 
Chrysippus work irepi ^ptja/nuv, on the irepl /uavrtnw of Posidonius, and on works com 
posed by Diogenes and Antipater ; the second book, on the works of Carneades and of 
Panaetius the Stoic ; the treatise De Fato, on writings of Chrysippus, Posidonius, Cleanthes, 
and Carneades ; and the Cato Major, on writings of Plato. Xenophon, Hippocrates, and 


Aristo of Chins. The Laeliua of Cicero reposes especially upon the work of Theophrastua 
on Friendship, and also on the Ethics of Aristotle and the writings of Chrysippus ; the two 
first books of the De Officiis were drawn principally from Panaitius ; the third, from Posi- 
donius ; but besides the writings of these men, those of Plato and Aristotle, and also those 
of the Stoics, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tyre, and Hecato, were employed in the 
composition of the De Officiis. 

From Skepticism, which Cicero was unable scientifically to refute, and to which he was 
ever being invited by the conflict of philosophical authorities, he was disposed to take 
refuge in the immediate certainty of the moral consciousness, the consensus gentium and the 
doctrine of innate ideas (notiones innaloe, natura nobis insitae). Characteristic are such decla 
rations as the following from the De Legibus, I. 13 : Perturbatricem autem liarum omnium 
rerum Academiam hanc ab Arcesila et Carneade recentem exoremus ut sileat, nam si invaserit 
in haec, quae satis scite nobis instructa et composita videntur, nimias edet ruinas; quam quidtm 
eyo placare cupio, submovere non audeo. In physics Cicero does not advance beyond the 
stadium of doubt ; still he regards the field of physical investigation as furnishing agreeable 
li pastime " for the mind, and one not to be despised (Acad.. II. 41). That which most inter 
ests him in natural science is its relation to the question of God s existence. The following 
noticeable passage is directed against atheistic atomism (De Nat. Deor., II. 37) : Hoc (viz., 
the formation of the world by an accidental combination of atoms) qui existimat fieri potuisse, 
non intelligo cur non idem puttt, si innumerabiles unius et viginti formae litter arum vel aureae 
vel quales libet aliquo conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis annales Ennii, ut deinceps 
legi possint, effici. Cicero would have mythology purged of every thing unworthy of the 
gods (the story of the abduction of Ganymede, for example, Tusc., I. 26; IV. 33), but 
would, as far as possible, hold fast to that in which the beliefs of different peoples agree 
(Tusc., I. 13); he is particularly attached to the belief in providence and immortality (fuse., 
I. 1. 2 seq. ; 49 et al), but is not altogether free from uncertainty on these subjects, and 
with dispassionate impartiality allows the Academic philosopher, in his De Natura Deorum.^ 
to develop the grounds of doubt with the same minuteness and thoroughness with which 
the Stoic develops his arguments for dogmatism. Cicero defines the morally good (honestum) 
as that which is intrinsically praiseworthy (De Fin., II. 14 ; De Off., I. 4), in accordance 
with the etymology of the word, which to him, the Roman, represents the Greek nakhv. 
The most important problem in ethics with him is the question whether virtue is alone 
sufficient to secure happiness. He is inclined to answer this question, with the Stoics, 
in the affirmative, though the recollection of his own weakness and of the general frailty 
of mankind often fills him with doubts; but then he reproaches himself for judging of 
the power of virtue, not by its nature, but by our effeminacy (Tusc., V. 1). Cicero is not 
altogether disinclined (De Fin., V. 26 seq.) to the distinction made by Antiochus of Aska- 
lon between the vita beata, which is made sure under all circumstances by virtue, and the 
vita beatissima, to which external goods are necessary, although he entertains ethical and 
logical scruples respecting it, and elsewhere (Tusc., V. 13) rejects it; but he contents him 
self with the thought that all which is not virtue, whether it deserves the name of a good 
or not, is at all events vastly inferior to virtue in worth, and is of vanishing consequence in 
comparison with it (De Fin., Y. 32 ; De Off., III. 3). From this point of view the difference 
between the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines sinks, in his view, to a mere difference of words, 
which Carneades (according to Cic., De Fin., III. 12) had already declared it to be. Cicero 
is more decided in opposing the Peripatetic doctrine, that virtue requires the reduction of 
the Kafiri (translated by Cicero perturbationes) to their right proportions ; he demands, with 
the Stoics, that the sage should be without TrdSr). But he makes his demonstration easier, 
by including in the concept TrdBor (perturbatio) the mark of faultiness (Tusc., V. 6 : aversa a 


recta ratione animi commotio), so that, in fact, he only proves what is self-evident, viz. : that 
that which is faulty is not to be suffered; but he misses the real point in dispute (Tusc., 
IV. 17 seq.). In another particular, also, he stands on the side of the Stoics, namely, in 
regarding practical virtue as the highest virtue. Cf. De Off., I. 44 : omne offieium, quod 
ad conjunctionem hominum et ad societatem tuendam valet, anteponendum est illi officio, 
quod cognitione et scientia continetur. fb., 45 : agere considerate pluris est, quam cogitare 

Cicero s political ideal is a government made up of monarchical, aristocratic, and demo 
cratic elements. He finds it realized approximately in the Koman state (De Rep., I. 29 ; 
II. 23 seq.). Cicero approves of auguries and the like, as an accommodation to popular 
belief, as also of deceiving the people by allowing them only the appearance of political 
liberty, since he regards the mass of men as radically unreasonable and unfit for freedom 
(De Nat. Deor., III. 2 ; De Divinat., II. 12, 33, 72 ; De Leg., II. 7 ; III. 12 et al). 

Cicero is most attractive in those parts of his works, in which in an elevated rhetorical 
style, and without touching upon subtle matters of dispute, he sets forth the truths and sen 
timents which are universally affirmed by the moral consciousness of man. His praise of 
disinterested virtue, for example (De Fin., II. 4 ; V. 22), is very successful ; so, in particular, 
is the manner in which the idea of the moral community of mankind (on which idea, taken 
by Cicero from the spurious letter of Archytas, Plato founds in the Rep. his demand that 
philosophers should enter practically into the affairs of the state) : non nobis solum natl 
sumus ortusque nosfri partem patria vindicat, partem amid, etc. (De Off., I. 7 ; cf. De 
Fin., II. 14), and the Aristotelian doctrine of man as a " political animal " (De Fin., V. 
23) are presented. And, again, in his Tusculan Disp s, the weakness of Cicero s argumen 
tation and the dullness of his dialectic, especially as compared with the Platonic dialectic 
which he makes his model, are not more marked than the rhetorical perfection of the pas 
sages in which he discourses of the dignity of the human mind (Tusc., I. 24 seq.; cf. De 
Leg., I. 7 seq.). So, too, his enthusiastic panegyric of philosophy (Tusc., V. 2 : vitae phi- 
losophia dux! virtutis indagatrix expultnxque vitiorum, etc. ; cf. De Leg., I. 22 seq. ; Acad., 
I. 2 ; Tusc., I. 26 ; II. 1 and 4 ; De Off., II. 2) contains much that is felicitous in thought and 
expression (e. g., est autem unus dies bene et ex praeceptis tuis actus peccanti immortalitati ante- 
ponendus, etc.) ; and although it is somewhat defaced by rhetorical exaggeration, it was 
inspired by a conviction which was deeply rooted in Cicero s mind at the time when he 
wrote the works just cited. 

Seneca. (Nat. Quaest., VII. 32) says of the school of the Sextians, that after having com 
menced its existence with great eclat, it soon disappeared. Q. Sextius (born about 70 B. c.) 
was the founder of the school, and Sextius, his son, Sotion of Alexandria (whose instruc 
tions Seneca enjoyed about 18-20 A. D.), Cornelius Celsus, L. Crassitius of Tarentum, and 
Papirius Fabianus, are named as his disciples. Q. Sextius and Sotion wrote in Greek. 
Sotion inspired his pupil, Seneca, with admiration for Pythagoras (Sen., Ep., 108); absti 
nence from animal food, daily self-examination, and a leaning toward the doctrine of the 
transmigration of souls, are among the Pythagorean elements in the philosophy of the 
Sextians. Their teaching seems to have consisted principally of exhortations to moral 
excellence, to energy of soul, and to independence with reference to external things. The 
sage, says Sextius, goes through life armed by his virtues against all the contingencies of 
fortune, wary and ready for battle, like a well-ordered army when the foe is near (Sen., 
Ep., 59). Virtue and the happiness which flows from it are not ideals without reality (as 
they had come to be regarded by the later Stoics), but goods attainable by men (Sen., Ep., 
64). (The collection of aphorisms, which has come down to us in the Latin translation of 
Rufinus, is the work of a Christian, who wrote not long before A. D. 200. It is first cited 


by Orig., c. Celsum, VIII. 30, under the title : I^rov yvujMi. A Syriac version of it exists 
and is published in the Anakda Syriaca of P. de Lagarde, Leipsic, 1858. It appears to be 
founded on a few of the .authentic sayings of Q. Sextius.) 



62. To the Third Period of Greek philosophy, or the period of 
the predominance of theosophy, belong: 1) the Jewish-Greek phi 
losophers, 2) the Neo-Pythagoreans and the Pythagorizing Platon- 
ists, 3) the Neo-Platonists. The Jewish-Greek philosophers sought 
to blend Judaism with Hellenism. The philosophy of the Neo- 
Pythagoreans, Pythagorizing Platonists, and Neo-Platonists was 
theosophic. To this the previous development of Greek philosophy 
itself was alone sufficient to conduct them, when physical and mental 
investigation had ended in Skepticism and Eclecticism. This state 
of Greek philosophy (especially, in view of the close contact in this 
period of the West with the East) could not but induce a greater 
susceptibility to Oriental influences than had hitherto existed, and 
such influences did operate, in no insignificant measure, to determine 
the form and substance of the speculation of the period. 

On the Greek philosophers of this period, cf. the first section of E. W. Holler s Qescliichte der Kosmo- 
Joffie in der griecfiischen Kircht, bis auf Origenes, Halle, 1860 (pp. 5-111). 

The influence of the Orient was an important co-operating factor in determining the 
character of the philosophy of this period (see Ritter, History of Philosophy^ IV. p. 330 
seq.) : but there were also internal causes to which Zeller rightly directs attention (Ph. d. 
Gr., 2d ed., Vol. III. b, pp. 56 seq., 368 seq.) which produced a leaning toward a mythical 
theology. "The feeling of alienation from God and the yearning after a higher revelation 
are universal characteristics of the last centuries of the ancient world ; this yearning was, 
in the first place, but an expression of the consciousness of the decline of the classical 
nations and of their culture, the presentiment of the approach of a new era, and it called 
into life not only Christianity, but also, before it, pagan and Jewish Alexandrianism, and 
other related developments." But this same feeling of exhaustion and this yearning after 
extraneous aid, accompanied, as they were, by a diminished power of original thought, led, 
in religion, to the adoption of Oriental forms of worship and Oriental dogmas, and, above 
all, in speculation, to sympathy with the Oriental tendency to conceive God as the tran 
scendent rather than as the immanent cause ef the world, and to regard self-abnegation as 


the essential form of morality, -while, under the same influence, special emphasis was 
placed on the kindred elements in Greek, and especially in the Platonic philosophy. Neo- 
Platonism is a philosophy of syncretism. Its elements are partly Oriental (Alexandrian- 
Jewish, in particular) and partly Hellenic ; its form is Hellenic. The religious philosophy 
of the Alexandrian Jews and the Gnosis of early Christianity are products of the same ele 
ments, but under an Oriental form. Robert Zimmermann rightly remarks (Gesch. der 
Aesthetik, Vienna, 1858, p. 123), that Plato s attempt to translate Oriental mysticism into 
scientific speculation, ends in Neo-Platonism with a re-translation of thought into images. 

The traits common to the speculations of the Jewish-Greek philosophers and the Neo- 
Pythagoreans, the later Platonists and Neo-Platonists, are aptly enumerated by Zeller 
(Philos. der Griechen, 1st ed., III. p. 566 seq., 2d ed., III. b., p. 214) as follows: "The dualistic 
opposition of the divine and the earthly ; an abstract conception of God, excluding all knowl 
edge of the divine nature ; contempt for the world of the senses, on the ground of the Pla 
tonic doctrines of matter and of the descent of the soul from a superior world into the body; 
the theory of intermediate potencies or beings, through whom God acts upon the world of 
phenomena; the requirement of an ascetic self-emancipation from the bondage of sense, and 
faith in a higher revelation to man, when in a state called Enthusiasm." From Plato s own 
doctrine these later forms of Greek philosophy, notwithstanding all their intended agreement 
with and actual dependence on it, are yet very essentially distinguished by the principle of 
revelation contained in them. To the Neo-Platonists the writings of Plato, the " God- 
enlightened " (Procl., Theol. Plat, I. 1), became a kind of revealed record. The most 
obscure and abstruse of them (e. g., the Pseudo-Platonic Parmenides, with its dry schema 
tism and its sophistical play with the conceptions of One and Being) were to many of these 
philosophers the most welcome, and were regarded by them as the most sublime docu 
ments of Platonic theology, because they offered the freest room for the play of their 
unbridled imaginings concerning God and divine things. 

Granting that theosophical speculation, in comparison with the investigation of nature 
and man, may appear as the higher and more important work, still Neo-Platonism remains 
decidedly inferior to its precursors in the earlier Greek philosophy, since it did not solve 
its problem with the same measure of scientific perfection with which they solved theirs. 

63. There is as yet no distinct evidence of a combination of 
Jewish theology with Greek philosophemes in the Septuagint, or in the 
doctrines of the Essenes. Such a combination existed, possibly, in the 
doctrine of the Therapeutes, who held certain doctrines and usages in 
common with the Pythagoreans, and certainly in the teachings of Aris- 
tobulus (about 160 B. c.), who appealed to (spurious) Orphic poems, 
into which Jewish doctrines had been incorporated, in support of the 
assertion (in which he agrees with Pseudo-Aristeas), that the Greek 
poets and philosophers borrowed their wisdom from a very ancient 
translation of the Pentateuch. The biblical writings, says Aristo- 
bulus (who interprets them allegorically), were inspired by the Spirit 
of God. God is invisible ; he sits enthroned in the heavens, and is 
not in contact with the earth, but only acts upon it by his power. 
He formed the world out of material previously existing. In de- 


fending the observance of the Sabbath, Aristobulus employs a Pytha- 
gorizing numerical symbolism. The personification of the wisdom 
of God as an intermediate essence between God and the world, and 
pre-existing before the heavens and the earth, seems to have begun 
already with him. In the Book of Wisdom (of Pseudo-Solomon) 
wisdom is distinguished from the divine essence itself, as the power 
of God which works in the world. But Philo (born about 25 B. c.) 
was the first who set up a complete system of theosophy. With him 
the expounding of the books of the Old Testament is synonymous 
with the philosophy of his nation ; but in his own exposition he alle- 
gorically introduces into those documents philosophical ideas, partly 
derived from the natural, internal development of Jewish notions, 
and partly appropriated from Hellenic philosophy. He teaches that 
God is incorporeal, invisible, and cognizable only through the reason ; 
that he is the most universal of beings, the being to whom alone being, 
as such, truly pertains ; that he is more excellent than virtue, than 
science, or even than the good per se and the beautiful per se. He is 
one and simple, imperishable and eternal; his existence is absolute 
and separate from the world ; the world is his work. God alone is 
free ; every thing finite is involved in necessity. God is not in con 
tact with matter ; if he were he would be defiled. He who holds the 
world itself to be God the Lord has fallen into error and sacrilege. 
In his essence, God is incomprehensible; we can only know that he 
is, not what he is. All names which are intended to express the 
separate attributes of God are appropriate only in a figurative sense, 
since God is in truth unqualified and pure being. God is present 
in the world only by his operations, not by his essence. The Logos, 
a being intermediate between God and the world, dwells with God 
as his wisdom (ooyia) and as the place of the Ideas. The Logos is dif 
fused through the world of the senses as divine reason revealing itself 
in the world. This one divine rational potency is divided into numer 
ous subsidiary or partial potencies (6vvdfieig^ Adyo^) 5 which are minister 
ing spirits and instruments of the divine will, immortal souls, demons, 
or angels ; they are identical with the general and specific essences, 
the ideas ; but the Logos, whose parts they are, is the idea of ideas, 
the most universal of all things except God. The Logos does not exist 
from eternity, like God, and yet its genesis is not like our own and 
that of all other created beings ; it is the first-begotten son of God, 
and is for us, who are imperfect, a God ; the wisdom of God is its 


mother ; it is the older and the world is the younger son of God. 
Through the agency of the Logos, God created the world and has 
revealed himself to it. The Logos is also the representative of the 
world before God, acting as its high-priest, intercessor, and Para 
clete. The Jews are the nation to whom God revealed himself; from 
them the Greeks borrowed their wisdom. Knowledge and virtue are 
gifts of God, to be obtained only by self-abnegation on the part of 
man. A life of contemplation is superior to one of practical, political 
occupation. The various minor sciences serve as a preparatory train 
ing for the knowledge of God. Of the philosophical disciplines, 
logic and physics are of little worth. The highest step in phi 
losophy is the intuition of God, to which the sage attains through 
divine illumination, when, completely renouncing himself and leaving 
behind his finite self-consciousness, he resigns himself unresistingly to 
the divine influence. 

On Judaism under the influence of Greek civilization, cf. the sections relating to this subject in Isaak 
Marcus Jost s Gesch. den Judenthiim8(Vo\. I., Leips. 1S5T, pp. 99-108; 344-3G1, etc.), and in the comprehen 
sive work of II. Gratz, Geachichte der Juden (Vol. III., Leips. 1866, pp. 298-342), as also in the works of 
Ewald (see above, p. 16) and others, and II. Schultz, Diejudische Religionsphilosophie bis ziir Zerstorung 
Jerusalem^ (in Gelzcr s Prot. MonatsU., Vol. 24, No. 4, Oct., 1864), and "Wilhel. Clemens, Die Thernpeuten 
(Progr. of the Gymn. Fridericanum), Konigsberg, 1869. 

Of Aristobulus and Aristcas treat Gerh. Jo. Vosa (De hist. Graec., Frankfort-on-the-Main, 167T, I. ch. 10, 
p. 55 seq.), Is. Voss (De LXX. Interpret., The Hague, 1661; Observ. ad Pomp. Mel., London, 1686), Fabric. 
(Sibl. Gr., III., p. 469), Eich. Simon (Hist. crit. d, V. T., Paris, 1678, II. 2. p. 189 ; III. 23, p. 479), Humfred 
Hody (Contra historiam Aristeae dn LXX. interpretibut, etc., Oxford, 16S5, and De bibliorum text, orig., 
versionibus, etc., ibid. 1705), Nic. de Nourry (Paris, 1708), Ant. van Dale (Amsterdam, 1705), Ludov. Casp. 
Valckenaer, De Aristolndo Judaeo philosopho Pcripatetico Alexandrino.ed.Jo. Luzac, Leyden, 1806; cf. 
Lobeck, Aglaophamus, I. p. 44-7 ; Matter, .fitoai hixtor. #ur Fecole d? Atexandrie, Paris, 1820, vol. II. p. 121 seq. ; 
cf., also, the works of Gfrorer (II. 71 seq.) and Dahne (II. 73 seq.) cited below ; Georgii, in Illgen s Zeitschrift 
/. hist. Theol., 1839, No. 8, p. 86, and Rob. Binde, Aristobulisdie Stndien (Gymn. Progr.), Glogau, 1869. 

On Pseudo-Phocylides (a poem of Jewish origin, devoted to moral philosophy), cf. Jak. Bernays, Veber 
das Phokylideische Gedicht, ein Seitrag zur hellenistischen Litt, Berlin, 1856 ; Otto Goram, De Pseudo- 
Phocylide^ in the Philol., XIV., 1859, pp. 91-112; Leopold Schmidt, in Jahn s Jahrb., Vol. 75, 1857, p. 510 
seq. where Schmid seeks to point out separately the Hellenistic or Jewish-Alexandrian and the purely 
Jewish elements in the principal passage of the poem, and excludes all but the last-named as interpolated. 

Philo s works have been edited by Thorn. Mangey (London, 1742), A. P. Pfeiffer (Erlangen, 1785-92, 
2d ed., 1820), and C. E. Ilichter (Leips. 1828-30), among others; a stereotyped edition was published at 
Leipsic in 1851-53 ; Philo s book on the creation of the world has been published, preceded by a careful intro 
duction by J. G. Muller (Berlin, 1841); Philonea, ed. C. Tischendorf, Leipsic, 1868. On Philo s doctrine, cf., 
especially, August Gfrorer, Philo und die alexandrinische Theosophie, Stuttgart, 1831 (also under the 
title: Kritische Gescliichte de* Christenthums, Vol. I.); Aug. Ferd. Dahne, Geacltichtliche Darstelhing 
derjudiseh-ale<Kandrini8chen Religionsphilosophie, Halle, 1834. See also Christian Ludw. Georgii, Ueber 
die neuesteii Gegens dtze in Auffasfning der Alevandrinischen Religionsphilosophie, in-sbesortdere des 
j dd. Alexandrinismus, in Illgen s Zeitschrift f. hist. Theol., 1839, No. 3, pp. 3-98, and No. 4, pp. 8-98. Gross 
man has written a number of works on Philo (Leips. 1829, 1830 seq.); other writers on the same subject 
are II. Planck (De interpr. Phil, alleg., Gott. 1807), W. Scheffer (Quaest. Philon., Marburg, 1829, 1831), Fr. 
Creuzer (in Ullman and Umbreit s Theol. Stud. u. Krit., Jahrgang V., Vol. I., 1832, pp. 3-43, and in Creu- 
zer s work, Zwr Gesch. der griech. u. rom. Litt., Darmst. and Leips. 1847, pp. 407-44C), F. Keferstein (Ph: 
Lehre von dem. gottl. Mittelu-esen, Leips. 1846), J. Bucher (Philonische Studien, Tub. 1S4S), M. Wolff (Dit 
Philonische Philosophie, etc., Leips. 1849 ; 2d ed., Gothenburg, 1858), L. Noack (Psyche, Vol. II., No. 5, 
1859), Z. Frankel (Zur Ethik des Philo, in the Monatschr. fur Gesch. u. Wiss. desJudenthtim^July, 1867), 
and Ferd. Delaunay (Philon d? Alexandrie, Paris, 1867). 


For us, the earliest document of Jewish- Alexandrian culture is the Septuagint. The 
oldest parts of it, among which the translation of the Pentateuch belongs, reach back into 
the earliest period of the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus (who was king from 284 to 247 
B. a). Aristobulus says (ap. Eusebius, Praepar. Evang., XIII. 12, in a fragment of his 
dedicatory epistle to the king, who according to Euseb.. Praepar. Ev., IX. 6, with which 
Clem. Alex., Strom., I. p. 342, is to be compared was Ptolemy Philometor), that before 
the time of Alexander, and also before the supremacy of the Persians in Egypt, the four 
last books of the Pentateuch had been already translated, Demetrius Phalereus taking the 
lead in the matter. According to a statement of Hermippus the Callimachean (Diog. L., 
Y. 78), Demetrius lived at the court of Ptolemasus Lagi only, but under Philadelphus was 
obliged to avoid the country. This account is not in contradiction with that of Aris 
tobulus (and E. Simon, Hody, and others, are consequently at fault in arguing from the 
Bupposed contradiction, that the fragments of Aristobulus are spurious); we may, rather 
conclude from the two reports that preparations were made for the translation by Demetrius 
during the life of Ptolema3us Lagi (but probably not till the last part of his reign), and that it 
may have then been begun, but that it was principally accomplished under Philadelphus ; 
Josephus (Ant., XII. 2) places the commencement of the translation in the year 285 B. c. 
"Whether certain parts of the Pentateuch were really translated into Greek still earlier is 
doubtful, but they were certainly not translated at so early an epoch as that named by Aris 
tobulus. The translation of the principal canonical writings may have been completed under 
Ptolemy Euergetes, the successor of Philadelphus, soon after his accession to the throne 
(247). Parts were added to the Hagiographa at least as late as 130 u. c. (according to the 
Prologue of Siracides), and without doubt also very much later. Dahne (II. pp. 1-72) pro 
fesses to have discovered in the Septuagint numerous traces of the Jewish-Alexandrian 
philosophy, which was subsequently more fully developed by Philo ; according to him, the 
authors of this translation of the Bible knew and approved the principal doctrines of thia 
philosophy, contrived to suggest them by apparently insignificant deviations from the 
original text, and, foreseeing the method of allegorical interpretation, which was subse 
quently to be adopted, endeavored by the construction of their translation to facilitate it. 
But the passages on which Dahne founds his argumentation by no means force us to this 
very doubtful hypothesis (see Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., 1st ed., III., pp. 569-573, 2d ed., IILb., p. 
215 seq.); we find only that, as a rule, the notion of the sensible manifestation of God is 
suppressed, anthropopathic ideas, such as the idea of God s repenting, are toned down in 
their expression, the distance between God, in his essence, and the world, is increased, and 
the ideas of mediating links between the two (in the form of divine potencies, angels, the 
divine 66^a, the Messias as a heavenly mediator) appear more fully developed than in the 
original text. In these peculiarities germs of the later religious philosophy may undoubt 
edly be seen, but not as yet this philosophy itself. It is scarcely necessary, either, to see 
in them a union of Greek philosophemes with Jewish ideas. 

Such a union is first discoverable with certainty in the fragments of Aristobulus, the 
Alexandrian, who (according to Clem. Al. and Eusebius) was usually styled a Peripatetic. 
The passages in Eusebius, cited above, establish beyond a doubt that he lived under Ptole- 
masus Philometor (181-145 B. c.), notwithstanding several evidently erroneous authorities, 
which place him under Ptol. Philadelphus. He wrote a commentary on the Pentateuch, and 
dedicated it to Ptolemy (Philometor). Fragments of the same and of the dedicatory epistle 
are preserved in Clem. Alex., Strom., I. (12 and) 25; (Y. 20:) VI. 37, and in Euseb., Praepar. 
Ev., VII. 13 and 14; VIII. 6 and 10; IX. 6, and XIII. 12. In the fragments furnished us by 
Eusebius, Aristobulus cites a number of passages purporting to have been taken from the 
poems of Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, and Linus, but which were evidently brought Into the 


form in which they are cited by some Jew, and perhaps by Aristobulus himself. (Yet of. 
Jost, Gesch. des Judenthums, I., p. 369 seq., who disputes the latter supposition.) The 
most extensive and important fragment is one which purports to be taken from the tepof 
M>yo<; of Orpheus (Eus., Praep. Ev., XIII. 12); the same fragment, in another form, has been 
preserved by Justin Martyr, De Monarchia (p. 37, Paris edition, 1742), so that it is still pos 
sible to point out precisely the changes made in it by some Jew. The main doctrines of 
the poem are thus recapitulated by Aristobulus : All created things exist and are upheld 
by divine power, and God is over all things (dtaKpareiadai deia 6wdfj,Ei TO. irdvra KOI jevrjra. 
vtrdpxeiv nal kirl irdvruv dvat TOV 6e6v). But in the God who accomplishes and rules over 
all things (/cdoyzo*o TVTTCJT^ . . . avrov & VTTO Trdvra re/UZra*, kv 6 avroi avrbg ireptvicaeTai), 
Aristobulus recognizes not, with the Grecian poets and philosophers (especially the Stoics), 
the Deity himself, but only the Divine potency (6vvafii^\ by whom the world is governed ; 
God himself is an extra-mundane being ; he is enthroned in the heavens, and the earth is 
under his feet; he is invisible, not only to the senses, but to the eye of the human soul 
the vovq alone perceives him (ov6e nq avrov eiaopda Tpv%uv QVTJTUV, vti 6 EiaopdaraiJ. In 
these theological and psychological propositions it is possible to discover a reversion to the 
Aristotelian doctrine and a modification of the Stoic, and, in so far, a justification of the 
denomination Peripatetic as applied to Aristobulus ; but they bear, at least to an equal 
extent, the impress of the religious faith of the Jewish nation. In interpreting the seven 
days work of creation, Aristobulus interprets, metaphorically, the light, which was created 
on the first day, as symbolizing the wisdom by which all things are illumined, which some 
of the (Peripatetic) philosophers had compared to a torch ; but, he adds, one of his own 
nation (Solomon, Prov. viii. 22 seq.?) had testified of it more distinctly and finely, that it 
existed before the heavens and the earth. Aristobulus then endeavors to show how the 
whole order of the world rests on the number seven : 61 ifidofidSuv 6e nal rrdf 6 n6afj.o^ 
nvKteirai (Aristob., op. Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIII. 12). 

Aristeas is the nominal author of a letter to Philocrates, in which are narrated the 
circumstances attending the translation of the sacred writings of the Hebrews by the 
seventy (or seventy-two) interpreters (ed. Sim. Schard, Basel, 1561; ed. Bernard, Ox 
ford, 1692, and in the editions of Josephus ; also in Hody, De Bibl. Text Orig., Oxford, 
1705, pp. i.-xxxvi.). The letter states that Aristeas had been sent by the king of Egypt 
to Eleazar, the high-priest, at Jerusalem, to ask for a copy of the law and for men who 
would translate it. The letter is spurious, and the narrative full of fables. It was probably 
written in the time of the Asmoneans. In this letter, a distinction is made between the 
power (Jwa//if) or government (Swaoreia) of God, which is in all places (tita Travruv iariv, 
Trdvra rdnov Tr/l^poZ), and God himself, the greatest of beings (//ey^rof), the lord over all 
things (6 Kvptevuv aTTavruv 0eof), who stands in need of nothing (aTrpocrrfe^f), and is enthroned 
in the heavens. All virtue is said to descend from God. God is truly honored, not by gifts 
and offerings, but by purity of soul (tyvxns KodapidrijTi). The allegorical form of interpreta 
tion appears already brought to a considerable degree of perfection in Pseudo- Aristeas. 

In the Second Book of the Maccabees (ii. 39) which is an extract from the history of the 
Syrian wars, written by Jason of Gyrene the distinction made between God himself, who 
dwells in the heavens, and the divine* power, ruling in the temple at Jerusalem, recalls 
the similar Alexandrian dogma. Non- Alexandrian, on the contrary, are the belief in the 
resurrection, by divine favor, of the bodies of the just (vii. 9-14 ; xiv. 46), and in creation 
out of nothing (vii. 28), if, indeed, the latter doctrine is to be understood here in its strict 
dogmatic sense. Some have attempted, further, to point out analogies with Alexandrian 
doctrines in the third and fourth Books of Maccabees, in the third Book of Ezra, in the 
Jewish portions of the Sibyllines, and m the Wisdom of Siracides. The Pseudo-Solomonic 


Book of Wisdom, which appears to have been composed before the time of Philo, describe* 
wisdom as the reflected splendor of the divine light, as a mirror of the divine efficiency, an 
efflux of the divine glory, and as a spirit diffused through the whole world, fashioning ai. 
things with art and uniting itself to those souls who are pleasing to God. The pre- 
existence of individual souls is taught (i. 20, in the words : ayaObg uv qMov eif ou/ua 
a/uiavTov) ; the resurrection of all men, of the good to blessedness and of the bad to judg 
ment, is taught, and men are referred for happiness to the future life. God created the 
world from a pre-existing matter (xi. 18). 

At what time the society of Essenes arose in Palestine arid of Therapeutes in Egypt, is 
uncertain. Josephus first mentions the Essenes in his account of the times of Jonathan 
the Maccabean (about 160 B. c.) ; there existed, he says, at that time, three sects (alpt-aei^) 
among the Jews, the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Essenes (Ant., XIII. 5). It seems 
necessary to regard the name of the Essenes as derived from chaschah, to be silent, mys . 
terious (conservers of secret doctrines, mystics). They sought to attain to the highest de~ 
gree of holiness by the most rigid abstemiousness (after the example of the Nazarites), 
and transmitted to their successors a secret doctrine respecting angels and the creation 
(from which, as it appears, the Cabbala subsequently arose ; cf. below, 97). The Thera- 
peutes (who were more given to mere contemplation in monastic retirement) sprung froro 
the Essenes (rather than the latter from the former). The doctrine of the Therapeutes was 
related to the Pythagorean, and more especially to the Neo-Pythagorean doctrine. That 
the body is a prison for the (pre-existent and post-existent) soul also the doctrine of con. 
traries which are everywhere present in the world, are tenets belonging to ancient Pytha. 
goreanism ; not so the Therapeutic inhibition of the oath, of bloody offerings, and of the use 
of meat and wine (at least, according to the testimony of Aristoxenus the Aristotelian, not 
the earliest Pythagoreans, but only the Orphists and a part of the Pythagoreans of the fifth 
and fourth centuries B. c., abstained from the use of meat), and the recommendation of 
celibacy, the doctrine of angels (demons), magic, and prophecy traits which reappear in 
Neo-Pythagoreanism, and are unmistakably of Oriental origin. It is conceivable that (as 
Zeller assumes) these doctrines and customs were derived from the East by the Orphists 
and Pythagoreans, that before the time of the Maccabees they passed from the latter to 
the Jews in Palestine (the Essenes), and that the latter again delivered them to the Jews 
in Egypt (the Therapeutes). Still, it is improbable that Pythagoreanism, at a time when it 
had become nearly or quite extinguished (cf. Zeller, I., 2d edition, p. 215, 3d edition, p. 
251), could have exerted so powerful influence on a portion of the Jewish nation, and it is 
more natural to suppose (with Hilgenfeld) that the Therapeutic doctrine of abstinence was 
transmitted without Grecian intervention from the Parsees after they, for their part, had 
submitted in their doctrine to a Buddhistic influence to the Jews of Palestine and from 
the latter to the Egyptian Jews. The existence of the Therapeutic sect may, however, on 
its part, have been among the causes which induced the rise of Neo-Pythagoreanism at 

Philo the Jew lived at Alexandria, which he calls "our Alexandria" (fifierepa Ahet-av- 
6peia) in his work De Legatione ad Cajum (ed. Mangey, vol. II. 567). According to Josephus 
(Ant, XVIII. 8 ; XX. 5), he was descended from one of the most illustrious families of the 
country; Eusebius (Hist. EccL II. 4) and Hieronymus (Catal. Scriptorum Eccks.) report that 
he belonged to a sacerdotal family. His brother held the office of Alabarches (superinten 
dent of the Jews at Alexandria). In the first half of the year 40 Philo was at Rome as an 
ambassador from the Alexandrian Jews to the Emperor Caius ; he was then already ad 
vanced in years (De Legat. ad Cajum, ed. Mang., II. 592), and at the period when he wrote 
his account of this embassy probably soon after the death of Caius (A. D. 41) and during the 


reign of Claudius he classed himself among the old men (yepovref). His birth falls, con* 
sequently, in the third decade before Christ. 

The allegorical method of interpreting the sacred Scriptures, which had long prevailed 
among the more cultivated of the Alexandrian Jews, was adopted by Philo without restric 
tion. His principle, that the prophets were only involuntary instruments of the spirit 
which spoke through them, was favorable to the freest use of this mode of exegesis. 
Philo criticises the attitude of those who merely hold fast to the literal sense of Scriptures 
as low, unworthy, and superstitious ; he denies, in opposition, obviously, to a claim of the 
orthodox, that this is "unvarnished piety without ostentation" (aKab/MirtaTov evoifatav 
ftera arv<f>ia^ affirming this honorable description as applicable, rather, to his mystical 
method of interpretation, and describing his opponents as being affected with the incurable 
disease of word-picking, and blinded by the deceptive influence of custom (De Cherubim, 
ed. Mang., I. 146). God can certainly not be said properly to go to and fro, or to have feet 
with which to walk forwards, he, the uncreated author of all things, who fills all, etc. ; the 
anthropomorphize representations of Scripture are only permitted as an accommodation to 
the wants of the sensuous man, while for the discerning and spiritual it declares that God is 
not like a man, nor like the heavens, nor like the world ( QuodDeus sit immutabilis, ed. Mang., 
I. 280 seq.). Philo does not reject the literal sense in every case ; he often, especially in 
the case of historical statements, assumes both this and the higher or allegorical sense as 
equally true ; but the latter, in his view, is never absent. Yet, with the same positiveness 
with which Philo combats the literalists, does he also oppose those Symbolists, who ad 
vanced to a consequence which threatened to overthrow the positive content of Judaism, 
by ascribing not only to the doctrines, but also to the commands, of the ceremonial law, a 
merely figurative character, and by teaching that the literal observance of the latter was 
superfluous, and that it was only necessary to observe the moral precepts, which alone they 
were intended to inculcate. Philo recognizes, it is true, that even in the commands of 
Scripture the literal sense is always accompanied by another, more profound and higher ; 
but, he says, they are to be observed according to the former as well as the latter sense, 
since both belong together, like soul and body. " Although circumcision properly sym 
bolizes the removal of all passion and sensuality and impious thoughts, yet we may not 
therefore set aside the practice enjoined ; for in that case we should be obliged to give up 
the public worship of God in the temple, and a thousand other necessary solemnities " (De 
Migratione Abrahami, ed. Mang., I. 450). Yet the inference rejected by Philo appeared 
later in the doctrine, that (Christian) faith, even without the works of the law, was suffi 
cient to salvation. That the idea of God, which was alone worthy of Him, would one 
day create for itself another and more adequate "body" than that of the Mosaic cere 
monial law, was a conviction to which Philo was unable to attain. 

The theology of Philo is a blending of Platonism and Judaism. While Philo contends 
that God is to be worshipped as a personal being, he yet conceives Him at the same 
time as the most general of existences: TO yevtuurarov kariv 6 0edf (Legis Alleg., II.). God 
is the only truly existent being, TO ov (De Somn., I. 655, Mang.). But Philo, similarly to 
the Neo-Platonists of a later epoch, advances upon the Platonic doctrine by representing 
God as exalted not only above all human knowledge and virtue as Plato had done but 
also above the idea of the Good (xpeiTTuv rt rj apeTTj nai upe iTTUv rj fTrvorr)//;?, nal KpeiTTuv rj 
avTo TayaBbv ml avTo TO naXov, De Mundi Opifido, I. 2, ed. Mang.) with which Plato identifies 
Him and by teaching that we do not arrive at the Absolute by scientific demonstration 
(Aoywv dTrodetfa), but by an immediate subjective certainty (hap-ye ia, De post. Caini, 48, p. 
258 Mang.). Still, a certain kind of knowledge of God, which, however, is only second in 
rank, results from the aesthetic and teleological view of the world, as founded on the Socratie 


principle that " no work of skill makes itself" (ovdev ruv rtxyutuv epyuv 
God is one and simple : 6 debs fj.6vo^ karl /cat v, ov ov-yapi/na, <j>vai$ dirty . . . rera/crat ovi 
6 0eof Kara TO ev /cat TTJV fiovada, //dA/lov 6e /cat rj /zovdf /card TOV iva deov (Legis Atteg., 
II. ; ed. Mang., I. 66 seq.). God is the only free nature (rj ^6vrj efevdepa <jw0i, De Somn., 
II.), full of himself and sufficient to himself (avro eavrov TrA^pef /cat iavrti inavov, De Nom. 
Mutat., I. 582). Notwithstanding the pantheistically-sounding neuters which Philo applies 
to God, he ascribes to him the purest blessedness : " He is without grief or fear, not 
subject to evils, unyielding, painless, never wearied, filled with unmixed happiness" (De 
Cherubim, I. 154). God is everywhere by his power (rdc dwdpeie CLVTOV dia yjfc /cat I darof, 
aepof re /cat ovpavov retvaf), but in no place with his essence, since space and place 
were first given to the material world by him (De Linguarwrn Conf.. I. 425). Speaking 
figuratively, Philo describes God as enthroned on the outermost border of the heavens 
in an extra-mundane place (roTro? /zera/cdo/itof), as in a sacred citadel (Genes., 28, 15 ; De Vit. 
Mos., II. 164, etc.). God is the place of the world, for it is He that contains and encom 
passes ah 1 things (De Somniis; I.). 

In creating the world, God employed as instruments incorporeal potencies or ideas, 
since he could not come in contact with polluting matter (ef eice ivy? (r^f ovaia^) irdvr 
iyzwTjoev 6 deog, OVK (j>airT6[tevo avrfa" ov -yap j}v 0e/ztf cnreipov /cat ir<j>vp[tevij<; V^JK 
fyaveiv TOV Iduova /cat fuucdptov dXAd ratf aaujudrot^ dwapeaiv, uv ervpov bvop.a at I6eai t 
Karexpr/GaTo Trpb<; TO "yevot; KKCUTTOV TT/V dpfioTTovaav Aa/3etv /j.op^r]v, De Sacrificantibus, II. 
261). These potencies surround God as ministering spirits, just as a monarch is sur 
rounded by the members of his court. The highest of the divine potencies, the creative 
(noiT]TiK.Ti), bears also, according to Philo, in Scripture the name of God (de6$) the second 
or ruling (/3aoY/lt/a/) potency, is called Lord (/cvptoc, De Vita Mosis, II., 150 et al.). These 
are followed by the foreseeing potency, the law-giving, and many others. They are all 
conceived by Philo, not only as of the nature of divine qualities, but also as relatively 
independent, personal beings, who can appear to men and who have favored some of them 
(e. g., Abraham) with their more intimate intercourse (De Vita Abrah., II. 17 seq.). 

The highest of ah 1 the divine forces is the Logos (Word). The world of ideas (b in ruv 
i6eo)v Koafiog) has its place (r^Trof) in the divine Logos, just as the plan of a city is in the 
soul of the master-builder (De Mundi Opificio, I. 4). Philo also uses sometimes the name 
Sophia (Wisdom), which with Aristobulus and other earlier speculators was the name for 
the highest of the potencies intermediate between God and the world (e. g., Legis Alleg., II. : 
rj TOV deov aofyia, f/v axpav /cat irpurionjv eTe/Liev OTTO rwv zavrov <Wd//v), but Logos is the 
term more commonly employed by him. Sometimes he seems to conceive Sophia as the 
highest of the potencies into which the Logos is divided, and as the source of all the rest, 
For the Logos is two-fold in its nature, and that, too, in man as well as in the All. In man 
there is a /loyof tvdiadeToq and a /loyof irpotiopiKos the former is the reason which dwells in 
man, the latter is the spoken word ; the former is, as it were, the source, the latter the out 
flowing stream. (Cf. Plat. ? Soph., 263 e : didvoia is the interior discourse of the mind , 
and Arist. : 6 ECU Aoyof, see above, p. 143.) But of the Logoi which belong to the All, 
the one which corresponds with the hdiddfTo^ in man, dwells in the incorporeal and 
archetypal ideas of which the intelligible world consists; the other, corresponding with 
the 7rpo0opt/cdf in man, is diffused in the form of germs (the /l<5yoc o7repfj,artK6^) in the things 
which are seen, and which are imitations and copies of the ideas, and constitute the 
world of sensuous perception (De Vita Mosis, III., ed. Mang., II. 154). In other words: 
in God dwells reason, thought (Iwoia as evaTroKei/nevq v6jjm<;), and its expression (fitavorjoir 
as vo^EOf 6to6ot or p^/ua deov, Quod Deus sit immut., I. 278, ed. Mang., in commenting 
on Genesis, vi. 6). This reason is God s wisdom (Sophia). Yet, in other passages, Philo 


calls Sophia the mother of the Logos (De Profugis, 562, Mang.). He sees the symbol of 
the two-fold Logos in the double breast-plate (6iirhovv Aoyeiov) of the high-priest. Ordi 
narily, however, he speaks only of the divine Logos without qualification or distinction, 
styling him Son and Paraclete, the Mediator between God and man, etc. (De Vita Mosis^ 
II. 155, ed. Mang.; Quis Rerum Divin. Haeres sit, I. 501 seq., et pass.). 

The creation of the world was due to God s attribute of love. He created it, through 
the instrumentality of the Logos, out of unqualified matter, which is therefore of the 
nature of the unreal (6 6eb^ alnov, OVK bpyavov, TO 6e -yiyvojuevov M bpyavov [lev, virb 6e 
TOV aiTiov TTCLVTUC yiyvtrai evprjaeiq alrtov TOV noa/uov rbv deov, bpyavov oe Adyov deov, 
vkrfv 6e ra rirrapa GToi%eta). 

The business of man is to follow and imitate God (De Caritate, II. 404, et pass.). Th 
soul must strive to become the dwelling-place of God, his holy temple, and so to become 
strong, whereas it was before weak, and wise, whereas before it was foolish (De Somn., 
I. 23). The highest blessedness is to abide in God (rrepas evdai/uoviac TO a/c/lmjf /cat 
appTTuq kv fj.6v(f) deti OT-qvai). 

Phiio traces the doctrine of ideas back to Moses : Mwtxre wf karl TO doyfia rotro, ova kfiov 
for, he says, Moses teaches (Gen., i. 27) that God created man in the image of God, and 
if this is true of man, it must certainly be true also of the entire sensible cosmos (D 
Mundi Opificio, Mang., I. 4). Obvious as are the signs of Platonic influences in Philo s 
doctrine of ideas (Philo himself names Plato, and testifies his esteem for him), and of Stoic 
influence in his Logos-doctrine, yet in fact the transformation of the ideas into divine 
thoughts, having their seat in the Logos of God, is an outcome of Philo s religious concep 
tions, and the doctrine, thus transformed, may therefore be said to come from " Moses." 
(This transformation of the Platonic theory of ideas not only exercised a controlling influ 
ence on the philosophy of later thinkers, but it has also interfered with the correct his 
torical comprehension of Platonism even down to our own times.) 

As in what he says of the ideas and forces generally, so also in his utterances respect 
ing the Logos, Philo wavers between the attributive and substantive conception of it ; the 
latter, according to which the Logos is hypostatized to a person, is already developed in 
his doctrine to too firm a consistency for us to suppose that the personification was for 
Philo s own consciousness a mere poetic fiction (all the more, since in Plato the ideas are 
not mere attributes, but possess an independent and almost a personal existence), and yet 
not to a consistency of so absolute a character that Philo could be interpreted as teaching, 
as a positive doctrine, the existence beside God of a second person, in no way reducible 
to a mere attribute or function of the first person. Yet so far as Philo personifies, 
whether it be poetically or doctrinally, he owns to a certain subordinationism. The Logos is 
for him, as it were, a chariot-driver, whom the other divine forces (dwdfj,ei<;) must obey ; 
but God, as the master of the chariot, prescribes to the Logos the course which is to be 
maintained. Philo vacillates consequently between the two conceptions, the analoga of 
which reappear later in the Christian church in Monarchianism and Arianism ; but a doc 
trine analogous to Athanasianism is entirely foreign to him, and would contradict his 
religious as well as his philosophical consciousness. It was impossible that he should 
conceive of the Logos as incarnated, on account of the impurity of matter in his view a 
consideration revived at a later epoch by the Docetans and for this reason, if for no 
other, it was impossible for Philo to go farther and identify the Logos with the expected 
Messias, to which course, nevertheless, he was powerfully moved by the practical and 
spiritual interest connected with redemption through the Messias. The incarnation of 
the Logos in Christ forms the fundamental speculative, as the invalidity of the positive 
Mosaic law and the new commandment of love form the fundamental practical, doctrine by 


which Christianity separated from Alexandrian theosophy. The representatives of this 
theosophy being, for the most part, men of more theoretical culture than force of will, could 
not accept the doctrine of the incarnation without a sense of their infidelity to their prin 
ciples, and did not possess the martyr s courage which is rarely developed in the lap of 
material and intellectual wealth necessary for the practical renunciation of the ceremonial 
law, although this course was demanded as a logical consequence of their own views. 

64. Cicero names as the first renewer of Pythagoreanism, P. 
Nigidius Figulus, who appears to Lave lived in the first half of the 
last century before Christ, at Alexandria. In the time of Augustus 
there originated several works falsely attributed to the earlier Pytha 
goreans, but containing Neo-Pythagorean ideas. About the same 
time Sotion, the di-sciple of Sextius, the Pythagorizing Eclectic, lived 
at Alexandria. The chief representatives of Neo-Pythagoreanism 
are Apollonius of Tyana, in the time of Nero, Moderatus of Gades, 
also in the time of Nero, and Nicomachus of Gerasa, in the time of 
the Antonines. Also, Secundus of Athens (under Hadrian) appears 
to be by his own doctrine not far removed from this group of philoso 

To Neo-Pythagoreanism relates in fact the greater part of the literature cited above, ad 16, pp. 43 and 
44. Cf. also Ilieron. Schellbergcr, Die, goldenen Spriiche des Pyth. iris Deutsche ubertragen mit Einl. 
u. Anm. (G.-Pr.), Munnerstadt, 1862, and, respecting the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, in general, 
Vermehren, Die pyth. Zahlen, Gustrow, 1863. Zeller, in Ph. d. Gr., III., 2d edition, p. 85 seq., gives a 
summary of the pseudonymous literature (after Beckmann, Mullach, and Orelli). 

On the subject of the general revolution of philosophy among the Greeks in this period from Skep 
ticism to Mysticism, cf. Heinr. W. J. Thiersch, Politik und Philosophie in ihrem Verhdltniss zur Religion 
unter Trajanus, ITadrianus und den beiden Antoninen, Marburg, 1853, and Zeller, as cited above, ad C2. 

Lutterbeck (Die neiitest. Lehrbegriffe, Vol. I., 1852, p. 370 seq.) treats of Nigidius Figidus and the Neo- 
Pythagorean school. Cf. also Biioheler, in the Rh. Mus., new series, XIII., p. 177 seq., and Klein, Diss., 
Bonn, 1861. 

Philostratorum quae sujiersunt omnia: vita Apollonii Tyanensis, etc. Accedunt Apollonii Tyan. 
epistolae, Eusebii liber adv. Ilieroclem, etc.,ed. Godofr. Olearius, Leipsic, 1709; ed. C. L. Kayser, Zurich 
(1844, 1846), 1853 : ed. Ant. Westennann, Paris, 1848. Iwan Miilier, Comm., qua de Philostr. in componenda 
memoria Apollonii T. fide quaeritur, Zweibrucken, 1858-60. Of Apollonius treat: J. C. Herzog (Leips. 
1719), S. G. Klose (Viteb. 1723-24), J. L. Mosheim (in his Ccmment., Hamb. 1751, p. 847 seq.), J. B. Luder- 
wald (Halle, 1793), Ferd. Chr. Baur (Apollonius und Christus, Tubinger Zeitschrift fur Theol., 1832), A. 
Wellaur (in Jahn n s Archiv, Vol. X., 1844, pp. 418-467); Neander (Gexch. der CJiristl. Religion, TJieil I., 
p. 172), L. Noack (in his Psyche, Vol. 1., No. 2, Giessen, 1858), P. M. Mervoyer (Etude sur A. de T., Paris, 
1862), A. Chassang (Le merveilleux dans Fantiquite, A. de T., sa vie, MS voyages, sesprodiges, par Phi- 
lostrate, et ses lettres, outrages traduits du grec, anec introduction, notes et eclaircissements, Paris, 1862, 
2d ed. 1864); cf. Iwan Muller (Zur Apollonius- Litter atur, in the Zeitschr. fur luth. Theol. u. Kirhe, ed. by 
Delitzsch and Guericke, Vol. 24, 1865, pp. 412-423 and p. 592). 

NicomacM Geraseni arithmeticae, libr. 1L, ed. Frid. Ast, in his edition of Jamblictii Chalcidenais 
theologumena arithmeticae, Leips. 1817. (An earlier edition of this work, NtKo/^dxov Tepao-rji/ov opi0/uTj- 
TIK^S ^i^At a 6vo, was published at Paris in 1538.) NIKO/LUXX<W repao-TjvoO TlvOayopinov api^/aT/TtKTj eHrayuyi i, 
NicomacJii Geraseni Pythagorei introductionis arithmeticae libr. II. rec. Ricardus I/oche, accedunt 
codicis Cizensis problemata arithm. Leips. 1866. luavvov ypa/x^an/cou AAefavfipea)? (TOV *tAoir6foi;) 
eis TO npitrov 1% NiKo M axov ipi/mr)Ti*c^s eio-a-ywy^?. Primum ed. Eich. Hoche, Leipsic, 1864; in libr. II. 
Nic. introd. arithm. ed. idem (G.-Pr.\ Wesel, 1867. The EyxeipiW ApMOVut^t of Nicomachus has been 
edited by Meibom in his Musici Graeci. In the Bibl. of Photins (cod. 187) there is an extract from a work 
purporting to have been written by him, and entitled " Theologumena Arith."" 


Sfcundi (Atheniensis Sophintae) Sententiae, ed. Lucas Holstenius, together with the Sentences ol 
Demophilus and Democrates, Leyden, 1639, p. 810 seq. ; ed. J. A. Schier (together with the Bio? 2e<c. <J>iAo- 
<ro<ov), in DemopMli, Democr. et Sec. Sent., Leips., 1754, p. 71 seq.; Gr. et. Lot., ed. J. C. Orelli, in Opus- 
cula Graecorum vet. sentenUosa et moralia, Leips. 1819-21, Vol. I., p. 208 seq. Tischendorf has recognized 
a part of the Bt o? 2e/couf6ov <tAo<ro<ov on a sheet of papyrus discovered in Egypt, and belonging, as T. sup 
poses, to the second, or, at the latest, to the third century of the present era ; cf. Hermann Sauppe, in the 
PJiiloL, XVII., 1861, pp. 149-154; Eud. Eeicke has published an old Latin translation of this Life, from a 
Codex in the Konigsberg Library, in the Plrilologus, Vol. XVIII., 1862, pp. 528-534. 

The return to older systems was, at Alexandria, a result in part of the learned investiga 
tions carried on in connection with the Library, and in this respect Neo-Pythagoreanism 
stands side by side with the renewal at Alexandria of the Homeric form of poetry. A 
consideration of more essential significance is, that a philosophy which conceived the 
divine under the form of the transcendent (or which at least admitted this conception side 
by side with the conception previously prevalent and gave to the former a constantly 
increasing weight) corresponded far better with the autocratic form of government and 
the Oriental conception of life than did the systems of the period next preceding, systems 
which presuppose a certain freedom in social and political life, and which at the time now 
under consideration had already been shaken to the foundation, even in their merely 
theoretical bearings, by the spirit of doubt. The satisfaction which was not found either 
in nature or in the individual subject, was now sought in an absolute object, represented as 
beyond the spheres of both. But for the purposes of this search, Pythagoreanism and 
also Platonism offered the appropriate points of support. Added to this, finally, was the 
influence of Oriental religious ideas, Egyptian, Chaldaic, and Jewish (the influence of the 
latter being the most important) arising through the meeting of various nationalities at 
the same place and in the same political union. 

Of P. Nigidius Figulus, who was also a grammarian (G-ell., N. A., XIX. 4), Cicero 
tells us (Tim., 1) that he renewed the Pythagorean philosophy; but he cannot have 
exerted a very considerable influence, since Seneca (Quaest. Nat., VII. 32) knew nothing 
of the existence of a Neo-Pythagorean School. The school of the Sextians has been 
already mentioned ( 61). That the predilection of the Libyan king lobates (probably 
Juba II. of the time of Augustus) for Pythagorean writings gave occasion to forgeries, is 
reported by David the Armenian (Schol. in Arist, p. 28 a, 13). Philo cites, already, the 
work attributed to Ocellus Lucanus. The work entitled Trpof TOV$ arrexo/uevovs TUV aapKuv 
mentioned by Porphyry and written by Sextius Clodius, the teacher of Marcus Antonius 
the Triumvir, seems to have been directed against those Neo-Pythagoreans who abstained 
from the use of meat (see Jac. Bernays, Theophr. Schrift uber Frommigkeit, Berlin, 186d, 
P- 12). 

A fragment from the work of Apollonius of Tyana on Sacrifices is preserved in Euse- 
bius (Praep. Ev., IV. 13). In it Apollonius distinguishes between the one God, who exists 
separate from all things, and the other gods ; to the former no offerings whatever should 
be brought, nay, more, he is not even to be named with words, but only to be apprehended 
by the reason. All earthly things are, on account of their material constitution, impure, 
and unworthy to come in contact with the supreme God. To the inferior gods Apollonius 
seems to have required the bringing of bloodless offerings. The work on Apollonius 
of Tyana, written by Flavius Philostratus (at the instance of the Empress Julia Domna, 
the wife of Septimius Severus), is a philosophico-religious romance, in which the Neo- 
Pythagorean ideal is portrayed in the person of Apollonius, and is claimed to be superior 
to that of other schools and sects (referring especially to Stoicism, and, as it would appear, 
to Christianity). 

Moderatus of Gades, who was nearly contemporaneous with Apollonius, sought to 


justify the incorporation into Pythagoreanism of Platonic and neo-theological doctrines, 
through the hypothesis that the ancient Pythagoreans themselves intentionally expressed 
the highest truths in signs, and for that purpose made use of numbers. The number one 
was the symbol of unity and equality, and of the cause of the harmony and duration of all 
things, while two was the symbol of difference and inequality, of division and change, etc. 
(Moderatus, ap. Porphyr. Vit. Pythag., 48 seq.). 

Nicomachus of Gerasa. in Arabia, who seems to have lived about 140 or 150 A. D., 
teaches (in Arithm. Introduct., I. 6) the pre-existence of numbers before the formation of the 
world, in the mind of the Creator, where they constituted an archetype, in conformity with 
which He ordered all things. Nicomachus thus reduces the Pythagorean numbers, as 
Philo reduces the Ideas, to thoughts of God. Nicomachus defines number as definite 
quantity (irAydoc; upiapevov, I. 7). In the Qiofaryovpeva apedfafTiitA, Nicomachus, accord 
ing to Photius, Cod., 187, expounded the mystical signification of the first ten numbers, 
according to which the number one was God, reason, the principle of form and goodness, 
and two, the principle of inequality and change, of matter and evil, etc. The ethical 
problem for man, he teaches, is solved by retirement from the contact of impurity and 
reunion with God. 

To Secundus of Athens, the silent philosopher, who lived under Hadrian, are ascribed 
(in the Vita Secundi, a work of the second century after Christ, much read in the Middle 
Ages) certain answers (which he is reported to have made in writing) to philosophical 
questions raised by the PJmperor, answers conceived in an ascetic and fantastic spirit, 
which is akin to the spirit of Neo- Pythagoreanism. 

65. Among the Pythagorizing and Eclectic Platonists, who, 
through their renewal and further development of the Platonic prin 
ciple of transcendence, in especial opposition to Stoic Pantheism 
and Epicurean Naturalism, became the precursors of Neo-Platonism, 
the best-known are Eudorus and Arius Didymus (in the time of Au 
gustus), Dercyllides and Thrasyllus (in the time of Tiberius), Theon 
of Smyrna and Plutarch of Chaeronea (in Trajan s time), Maximus 
of Tyre (under the Antonines), Apuleius of Mad aura (in Numidia), 
Alcinous, Albinus, and Severus (of nearly the same epoch), Calvisius 
Taurus and Atticus, Galenus, the physician (131-200 A. D.), Celsus, 
the opponent of Christianity (about 200 A. D.), and Kumenius of Apa- 
mea (toward the end of the second century of the present era). 

On Eudorus, cf. ESper, in the Philologus, VII., 1852, p. 684 seq. ; on Arius Didymus, Meineke, in Mut- 
zell s Zeitschr. fur das Gymn.-W., Berlin, 1859, p. 563 seq. ; on Thrasyllus, Seviu (Mem. de facad. des 
inscript., torn. X.\ K. F. Hermann (Ind. Schol., Gott. 1852), and Mflller (Fragm. hist. Gr., III. 501); on 
Plutarch, among others, K. Eichhoff (Gymn.-Progr^ Elberfeld, 1833), Theod. Hilmar Schreiter (Doctr. Pllt- 
tarchi et theologica et moralis, in Hlgen s Zeitschr. fur hist. Theol., Vol. VI., Leips. 1836, pp. 1-162), Ed. 
Muller (in his Gesch. d&r TJieorie der Kunst lei den Alten, Vol. II., Berlin, 1837, pp. 207-224), G. W. Nitzsch 
(Ind. Led., Kiel, 1849), Pohl (Die Damonologie des Plutarch, G.-Pr^ Breslan, 1861), Bazin (De Plutarcho 
Stoicorum Adversaria, Thesis Parisiensis, Nice, 1866), O. Greard (De la Morale de Plutarque, Paris, 
1867). Rich. Volkmann (Leben, Schriften und Philos. des Plutarch, 2 parts, Berlin, 1869) ; on Apuleius, 
Prantl (Gesch. der Logik, I., pp. 578-591). Editions of Albinus work on Plato have been published by 
Schneider (Ind. Left., Breslau, 1852), and K. F. Hermann (in Vol. VI. of his edition of the works of Plato) 
and editions of Alcinous 1 work on the same by Orelli (in Alex. Aphrod. de Fato, etc., 1824), and K. F. Her 
mann (in Vol. VI. of Plato s works). The philosophical treatises of Plutarch, Apuleius, and Galen are found 


fn the complete editions of their works, Plutarch s MoraUa in Didot s collection, edited by Dubner, Paris, 
1341 (as Vols. III. and IV. of his works), and separately, ed. Wyttenbach (Oxford, 1795-1830, Leips. 1796- 
1834). On Calvisius Taurus, cf. Bezier, La Philosophic de Taurus, Havre, 1869. On the philosophical 
opinions of Galen, cf. Kurt Spengel, Beitr. eur Gesch. der Medecin, I. 117-195. On Celsus, the opponent 
of Christianity, cf. F. A. Philippi, De Celai, adversarii ChrisUanorum, philosophandi genere, Berlin, 
1836, C. W. Bindemann, Ueber Celsus und seine Schrift gegen die Christen, in the Zeitschr. fur hist. 
TheoL, 1842, G. Baumgarten-Crusius, De Scriptoribus saeculi, II. p. cAr., qui novam religionem impug- 
nuntnt, Meissen, 1845, Redepenning, Orig., Vol. II., Bonn, 1846, pp. 130-156, F. Chr. Baur, Das Christen- 
t ium in den drei ersten Jahrh., pp. 368-395, and Von Engelhardt, Celsus oder die alteste krltik l>ibl. 
Gesch. u. chr-istl. Lehre vom Standpunkte des Heidenthums, in the Dorpater Zeitschr. f. Th. u. Kirche, 
Vol. XI. 1869, pp. 287-344. 

Eudorus of Alexandria (about 25 B. c.) wrote commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato 
and also on works of Aristotle, and a work on the Parts of Philosophy (Siatpeaic; TOV Kara 
fthoaoQiav Adyov), in which (as in the Pseudo-Plutarchic Placita Philos., a work founded, as 
is likely, in part on the works of Eudorus and Arius) the views of different philosophers 
on the various problems (irpoflM/paTa) of philosophy are brought together (Plutarch, 
De Anim. Procreat., 3 ; Simplic., Ad Arist. Categ., Schol., ed. Br., p. 61 a, 25 et al. ; Stob., 
Ed., II. 46 seq.). This Platonist wrote also concerning the Pythagorean doctrine (Simplic., 
in Phys., 39 a, where, notwithstanding the duality of the elements assumed by the Pytha 
goreans, namely, the number One and the "indefinite duad," the doctrine is ascribed to 
them that the One is the principle of all things). 

Arius Didymus, a learned Academic of the time of Augustus and a pupil of Antiochus 
of Ascalon, wrote wept ruv apeaKovruv Hhdruvi and other works (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XI. 23 ; 
XV. 15 seq.). Stobaeus cites (Florileg., 103. 28) " from the Epitome of Didymus," a pas 
sage concerning the Peripatetic doctrine of Eudaemonia, and his account of the Peripatetic 
Ethics (Ed., II. pp. 242-334), in which this passage is again cited, and also his account of 
the Stoic doctrine, and other things, which were probably taken from the Epitome of Arius 
(see Meineke, as above cited, and Zeller, Ph. d. Gr., III. a, 2d ed., 1865, p. 546). In this 
account the Peripatetic Ethics is assimilated to that of the Stoics, in the same manner 
in which, according to Cicero, this was done by Antiochus of Ascalon. Didymus wrote 
also irepi IIvdayopiK^ fyihooofyias. 

Thrasyllus, known as the arranger of the Platonic dialogues, was a grammarian, who 
lived in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, and died A. D. 36, while holding the office 
of astrologer to the latter. He combined with Platonism a N"eo-Pythagorean numerical 
speculation and the practice of magic, after the manner of the Chaldeans. Schol. in Juven., 
VI. 576 : Thrasyllus multarum artium scientiam professus postremo se dedit Platonicae sectae, 
et deinde mathesi, qua praecipue viguit apud Tiberium. The mathesis here spoken of was a 
superstitious, mystical doctrine, founded on speculations with numbers, and combined with 
astrology. Albinus (Introd. in Platon. Dialogos, ch. 6), names, besides Thrasyllus, Dercyllides, 
as one of the authors of the division of the Platonic dialogues into Tetralogies; the first 
tetralogy, at least (Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo), was arranged by Dercyllides. Ac 
cording to Porphyry, op. Simplic. ad Arist. Phys., f. 54 (Schol, ed. Brandis, p. 344 a), Dercyl 
lides composed a work on Plato s philosophy, in the eleventh book of which he cited, from 
Hermodorus on Plato, a passage representing that Plato reduced matter, and the infinite 
or indefinite, to the More and Less (Magnitude and Smallness, etc.). The problem here 
discussed relates to one of the most important points of contact between Platonism and 

Theon of Smyrna (in the second century A. D.) wrote a work, which is still extant, 
explaining the mathematical doctrine of Plato (ed. Bullialdus, Paris, 1644; ed. J. J. de 
G-elder, Leyden, 1827; Astronomia, ed. Th. H. Martin, Paris, 1849). H 


was more a mathematician than a philosopher. His astronomical doctrines were for the 
most part borrowed from a work by Adrastus the Peripatetic. 

Plutarch of Chasronea (born about 50, died about 125 A. D.), a pupil of Ammonius of 
Alexandria, who taught at Athens under Nero and Vespasian, developed his philosophical 
opinions in the form of an exposition of passages from Plato. In this exposition he be 
lieved that he had reproduced Plato s meaning, and only that, just as subsequently the 
Neo-Platonists believed in regard to their work ; but his doctrines are far less removed 
from pure Platonism than theirs. He opposed the monism of the Stoics, and had recourse 
to the Platonic hypothesis of two cosmical principles, namely, God, as the author of all 
good, and matter, as the condition of the existence of evil. For the formation of the 
world it was necessary, he taught, that the " monad " (//ovdf) should be combined with the 
indefinite duad " (dvdf aopioros), or the form-giving with the form-receiving principle. 
The Ideas, according to him, were intermediate between God and the world ; matter was 
the chaotic substrate of creation, the ideas were the patterns and God the efficient cause 
(// [iev ovv v^Tf TUV v7iOKtfi,vcjv aTCLKTOTaTov ioTiv f] & Idea Tcjv TTapadeiyjuaTuv KCLA^IOTOV 
v tie $eof TUV alriuv apiarov, Quaest. Conv., VIII. 2. 4). God s essence is unknown to us 
(De Pyth. Orac., 20) ; he sees, but is not seen (De Js. et Osir., 75), he is one and free from 
all differentiation (treporj/c), he is the existent (6v), and has no genesis (De El apud Delpfi. 
20 ; De Is. et Osir., 78). Only God s workings can be known by us. In itself matter is not 
bad, but indifferent ; it is the common place for good and evil ; there is in it a yearning 
after the divine ; but it also contains another principle, the evil world-soul, which coexists 
with the good one, and is the cause of all disorderly motions in the world (De Is., 45 seq. ; 
De An. Procreat., ch. 6 seq.). The gods are good. Of the demons (who are necessary as 
mediators between the divine and human), some are good and others are evil; in the 
human soul both qualities are combined. Besides the one supreme God, Plutarch recog 
nizes as real the popular divinities of the Hellenic and Non-Hellenic faiths. The moral 
element in Plutarch is elevated and without asperity. 

Maximus of Tyre, who lived about one half-century after Plutarch, was more favorable 
to Syncretism in religion and to a superstitious demonology. 

Apuleius of Madaura, born probably between 126 and 132 A. D., taught that, besides 
God, the Ideas and Matter were the original principles of things. He discriminates as 
belonging to the sphere of the supra-sensible, or truly existent God and his reason, which 
contains the ideal forms, and the soul ; from these are contradistinguished all that is sen 
sible or material. The belief in demons receives the same favor from him as from Maxi 
mus. The third book of his work De Dog-mate Platonis contains logical theorems, in which 
Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines are blended together. Marcianus Capella, who between 
A. D. 330 and 439 (and probably between 410 and 439) wrote a manual of the " seven 
liberal arts" (edited by Franz Eyssenhardt, Leipsic, 1866), also Isidorus, (see below, 88), 
borrowed much from this work of Apuleius. 

Alcinous, who lived probably at about the same time with Apuleius, likewise names 
in his outline of the Platonic teaching (dg TO, TOV HAO.TUVOS 66-y^ara iaayuyij\ God, the 
ideas, and matter as the first principles. He uncritically mixes Aristotelian and Stoic with 
Platonic opinions. 

Albinus (whose instruction Galenus sought at Smyrna, in 151-152 A. D.) wrote an in 
troduction to the Platonic Dialogues, which is of little value, and also commentaries on 
some of the works of Plato. Cf. Alberti, Ueber des Alb. Isagoge, in the Rh. Mus., new series, 
XIII. pp. 76-110. 

Severus, from whose writings Eusebius (Pr. Ev., XIII. 17) has preserved us a frag 
ment, combated single doctrines of Plato. In particular, he denied the genesis of the world 


(Prod, in Tim., II. 88), and affirmed the soul to be simple, like a mathematical figure, anc 
not compounded of two substances, the one capable the other incapable of being acted 
upon. With his Platonism were blended Stoic doctrines. 

Calvisius Taurus (who taught at Athens about 150 A. D.) wrote against the Stoics and 
on the difference between the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle (A. Gellius, N. A., XII. 5 ; 
Suidas, s. v, Tavpog). Gellius (born about 130), who was his pupil (in about the year 160), 
often mentions him. 

Atticus (said to have flourished about 176 A. D.) opposed the combination of Platonic 
with Aristotelian doctrines, and disputed violently against Aristotle (Euseb., Praep. Ev., 
XI. 1 et al). He held to the literal sense of the Timaeus (especially as to the doctrine 
of the temporal origin of the world). In his interpretation of the ethics of Plato, he 
seems to have assimilated it to that of the Stoics. A pupil of Atticus was Harpocration 
(Procl., in Tim., II. 93 b). 

Claudius Galenus (in the second half of the second century), the well-known teacher of 
medicine, cultivated also philosophy, and occupied himself with the minute exposition of 
works of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Chrysippus. Galenus extols philosophy (which 
with him is identical with religion) as the greatest of divine goods (Protrept., ch. 1). In 
logic he follows Aristotle. The fourth syllogistic figure, named after him, was not first 
brought to light or " discovered " by him, but was obtained by a repartition into two 
figures of the modes included by Theophrastus and Eudemus in the first figure. In meta 
physics, Galenus added to the four Aristotelian principles, matter, form, moving cause, and 
final cause, a fifth principle, namely, the instrument or means (6t ov), which by (Plato and) 
Aristotle, as it appears, had been subsumed under the concept of the moving cause. With 
all his inclination to assent to the Platonic views respecting the immateriality of the soul, 
he was unable, in regard to this question, and, in general, in regard to all questions which 
conduct beyond the limits of experience, to overcome his tendency to doubt. The thing of 
principal importance, in his estimation, was to have a religious conviction of the existence 
of the gods and of an over-ruling providence. 

Celsus (perhaps about 200), the opponent of Christianity, whose arguments were con 
troverted by Origen, was a Platonist; he cannot have been an Epicurean. He does not 
deny the influence of the gods on the world, but only that God works directly on the 
world of sense. In antagonism to the divine causality stands that of matter, which latter 
is the source of an irresistible physical necessity. From this Celsus is to be distinguished 
the Epicurean of the same name, who lived about 170 A. D., and is mentioned by Lucian in 
the Pseudomantis. 

Numenius of Apamea in Syria, who lived in the second half of the second century 
after Christ, combined Pythagorean and Platonic opinions in such manner that, while him 
self conceding to Pythagoras the highest authority and asserting that Plato borrowed the 
essential parts of his teachings from him, he made in fact the Platonic element predominant 
in his doctrine. Numenius traces the philosophy of the Greeks back to the wisdom 
of the Orientals, and calls Plato an Attic-speaking Moses (Mwva^ CLTTLKL^UV, Clem. Alex., 
Strom., I. 342 ; Euseb., Praep. Ev., XI. 10). He was without doubt well acquainted with 
the doctrines of Philo and with the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy in general. He wrote, 
among other things, Trepl TUV HAdrwvoc airoppTjTuv, Trepi rayaSov, and rcepl rye ruv Atfacty- 
/zat/tejv Trpof HAdrwva dtaaraoew (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIII. 5; XIV. 5). The most note 
worthy deviation of Numenius from Plato (but which was not recognized by him as such) 
consists in this : that he (following, perhaps, the precedent of the Christian Gnostics, espe 
cially the Yalentinians, and indirectly influenced by the distinction made by the Jewish- 
Alexandrian philosophers between God himself and his power working in the world, the 


Logos) distinguished the world-builder (drj^iovpyog) as a second God, from the highest deity. 
The first God is good in and through himself; he is pure thought-activity (vovs) and the 
principle of being (ovcia^ ap%r], Euseb., Pr. Ev., XI. 22). The second God (6 devrepoc; 6to<; 
6 6rjfj,iovpy6g feof) is good by participation in the essence of the first (juerovaia rov 
he looks toward the supersensuous archetypes and thereby acquires knowledge 
he works upon matter and thus forms the world, he being the principle of genesis or 
becoming (yeWaewf apxri). The world, the production of the Demiurgos, is the third 
God. Numenius terms the three Gods, respectively, father, son, and grandson (Trdmror, 
*yovof, and aTroyovoc, Procl., in Plat. Tim., II. 93). Numenius ascribes this doctrine not 
only to Plato, but also even to Socrates (Euseb., Pr. Ev., XIV. 5). The descent of the soul 
from its incorporeal pre-existent condition into the body implies, according to him, pre 
vious moral delinquency. Cronius, who is often named in connection with Numenius, 
and is described by Porphyry (De Antro Nymph., 21) as his friend (eralpo^), seems to have 
shared with him in his opinions. He gave to the Homeric poems an allegorical and mythi 
cal interpretation. Harpocration also followed Numenius in his doctrine of the three 
highest gods. 

The writings of the pretended Hermes Trismegistus (ed. Gust. Parthey, Berlin, 1854: 
cf., respecting him, Baumgarten-Crusius, Progr., Jena, 1827; B. J. Hilgers, Bonn, 1855, 
and Louis Menard, Hermes Trismegiste, traduction complete, precedee d une etude sur Vorigine 
des livres hermetigues, Paris, 1866, 2d ed., 1868), which in religious and philosophical 
regards bear an entirely syncretistic character, belong to the time of Neo-Platonism. 

66. Among the adherents of Neo-Platonism, a system founded on 
the principle of the transcendence of the Deity, and in which, not 
withstanding its filiation upon Plato, the whole of philosophical science 
was brought under a new systematic form, belong, 1) the Alexandrian- 
Roman school of Ammomus Sacc