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Full text of "History of philosophy : from Thales to the present time"


Prescnte& to 

^be Xibrar^ 

of tbe 

IDiniver0itp of Toronto 
Bertram IR. 2)avi6 

from tbe booths of 

the late Konel Davia, lk.(r. 


Vol. il. 








CranglateB fiom tl)e Jfoun\) CSftman CUition, 





CIHftI) aiiTJitions 













BnUrad according to the Act of Congress, to the year 1873. 

la tbe Office of the Librarian of Congresa, at WasbinctoOi 




107. The Three Divisions of Modem Philosophy 1-4 



108. Chaxacter of the First Division 4-5 

109. The Renewal of Platonism and of other Ancient Philosophies . . . 5-15 

110. Protestantism and Philosophy 15-19 

111. Beginnings of Independent Investigation 19-31 



112. Character of the Second Division 31-33 

113. Bacon, Hobbes, and other English PhUosophers 33-41 

114. Descartes, Geulinx, Malebranche, and Contemporary Philoeophens . 41-55 

115. Spinoza 55-78 

116. Locke, Berkeley, and other English Philosophers 79-92 

117. Leibnitz and Contemporary Philosophers and the German Philoaopby 

of the 18th Century 92-122 

118. French Philosophy in the 18th Century 122-130 

119. Hume's Skepticism and its Opponents ...,, 180-135 






120. Characterization of the Third Division 135-137 

121. Kant's Life and Writings 137-154 

122. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Metaphysical Principles of 

Natural Science 154-180 

123. Kant's Ethics and Religious Philosophy 180-187 

124. Kant's Critique of the Faculty of Judgment 187-194 

125. Disciples and Opponents of Kant 194-204 

126. Fichte and Fichteans 204^213 

127. ScheUing 213-225 

128. Disciples and Fellows of Schelling 225-231 

129. Hegel 231-243 

130. Schleiennacher 244-254 

131. Schopenhauer 255-264 

132. Herbart 264-281 

133. Beneke 281-292 

134. The Present State of PhUosophy in Germany 292-337 

135. PhUosophy Outside of Germany 337-347 

Appendix I. On English and American Philosophy 348-460 

Appendix II. Historical Sketch of Modem Philosophy in Italy 461-516 

Addenda 517-535 





107. By Modern Philosophy is meant philosophy since the discon- 
tinuance of its condition of subserviency to theology (which character- 
ized it in its scholastic form), in its gradual development into an inde- 
pendent science, having for its subject the essence and laws of nature 
and mind, as enriched and deepened by prior growths, and exerting 
an influence upon contemporaneous investigations in positive science 
and upon social life, and being in turn reacted upon by these. Its 
chief di^^isions are : 1. The Transitional Period, beginning with the 
renewal of Platonism ; 2. The epoch of Empiricism, Dogmatism, and 
Skepticism, from Bacon and Descartes to the Encyclopedists and 
Hume ; and 3. The epoch of the Kantian Criticism and of the systems 
issuing from it, from Kant till the present time. 

Besides the authors of the comprehensive historical works cited above. Vol. I., 4, p. 8 seq. (Brucker, 
Tiedemann, Buhle in his Lefirbuch der Oesch. der Philos., Tennemann, Ernst Relnhold, Ritter, Hegel, and 
others), the following, in particular, treat of modem philosophy: Johann Gottlieb Buhle, Geschichte der 
Tieveren Phllosophie seit der Epochs der Wiederfieratellunff der Wiasensc/uiften, Gottingen, 1800-1805, forms 
the sixth division of the '' Geschichte der Kiinste und Wissenschqften seit der Wiederherstellung derselben bis 
un's Ende dea achtsehrUen Jahrhunderts,'^ other divisions of which were prepared by J. G. Eichhom, A. H. 
L. Heeren, A. G. Kastner, F. Murhard, J. G. Hoyer, J. P. Gmelin, and J. D. Piorillo. Immanuel Hermann 
Pichte, Beitrage zur CharaJtterUtik der neuem Philoaophie, Sulzbach, 1829, 2d ed., ib., l&ll. Joh. Ed. 
Erd mann , Versuch einer wisaenschaftlichen Darstellung der Oeschichte der neuem Philosophie, Riga und 
Leipsic, 1834-53 ; cf. the second VoL of Erdmann's Orundrits der Oeschichle der PhUosophie, Berlin, 1866 ; 
2d ed., 1870. Siatoire de la philosophie allemande depuia Leibnitz jusqu' a nos jours, par le baron Barchou 
de Penhoen, Paris, 1836. Hermann Ulrici, Geschichte und Kritik der Prindpien der neuem Philosophie, 
Leipsic, 1845. J. N. P. Gischinger, Specitlative Entwickelung der HaupUfysUme der neuem Philosophie, 
von Descartes bis Begel, Schaffhausen, 1853-54. Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neuem PhUosophiA, 
Mannheim, 1854 seq.; 3d ed., Vol. I,, Parts 1 and 2, ib., 1866; VoL II., >., 1867. Carl Schaarachmidt, 


Der Enlmickelungsgang der ntuem Speculation, als Elnleitutig in die Philosophie der Oeachichte kriUach 
darguttlH Bonn, 1857. Julius Schaller (Leipsic, 1841-44) treats especially of the History of Natural 
Philosophy since the time of Bacon. Julius Baumann treats of the doctrines of space, time, and mathe- 
matica in modem philosophy ( Ueber die Lehren von Raum, Zeit und Mathematik in der neiteren Philosophie, 
Berlin, 1868-69). Ludwig Noack has written on the Christian Mystics since the age of the Reformation 
(Konigsberg 1853), and on the English, French, and German Free-Thinkers (Bern, 1853-55); Will. Edw. 
Hartpole Lecky, History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe, 1st and 2d eds., 
London, 1865; 3d ed., 1866 [New York, 1865] ; (German translation, by Heinr. Jolowicz, imder the title: 
Cfeschichte der Erklilrung, eta, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1867-68). Cf. H. Dean, The History of Civilization, New 
York and London, 1869. The history of Ethics in modem times is specially discussed by J. Hatter, Hiitoire 
des doctrines morales et politiques des trois derniers siecles, Paris, 1836 ; H. F. W. Hinrichs, Gesch. der 
Rechts- und Staatsprincipien seit der Reformation, Leipsic, 1848-52 ; I. Herm. Fichte, l>ie philos. Lehren von 
RecfU, Stoat und Sitte sell dei- Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts, Leipsic, 1860 ; F. Vorlander, Oeschichte der philus. 
Moral, Rechts- und Staatslehre der Engldnder und Framosen mit Einschlusa des Macchiatell, Marburg, 
1855. [Sir J. Mackintosh, Gen. View of progress of Eth. Phil., etc., Lond., 3d ed.. 1862; Phil., 1832; W. 
Whewell, Lectures on Hist, of Mor. Phil, in Eng., Lond., 1862; R. Blakey, Hist, of Mor. Science, 2d ed., 
Edin., 1836.] Simon S. Laurie, Notes Expository and Critical on Certain British Theories of Morals, Edin- 
burgh, 1868. Robert von Mohl (in his Gesch. und Litt. der Staaistcissenschaften, in MonograpMen dargestellt. 
Vols. I.-III., Erlangen, 1855-58), and J. C. Bluntschli ( GescA. des allgem. Staatsrechts und der Politik seit dem 
16. Jahrh. bis zur Gegenwart, Munich 1864 ; VoL I. Hist of Sciences, etc.) treat also of the philosophical 
theories of politics. The History of .Esthetics in Germany, by H. Lotze, oocnpies the seventh voltmie of 
the Oesch. der ^yiss. in Deutschland, Munich, 1868. 

Important contributions to the history of philosophy are contained in various works on the history of litera- 
ture, such as Gervinus' Geschichte der poetischen Nationallitteratur der Deutschen, Hillebrand's Geschichte der 
deutschen NatioTiallitteratur seit Lessing, Julian Schmidt's Geschichte des geistigen Lebens in Deutschland von 
Leibnitz bis auf Lessing' s Tod, and Gesch. der deutschen Litt. seit Lessing's Tode, and Gesch. der f ram. Litteratur 
seit der Revolution im Jahr 1789, Aug. Koberstein's Grundrlss der Gesch. der deutschen Nationallitteratur, 
Herm. Hettner's Litteraturgesch. des 18. Jahrhunderts, also in works on the history of pedagogics, such as 
those by Karl von Raumer, Karl Schmidt, and others, the State and law (see above), and on theology and 
the natiiral sciences. Abundant literary references may be found in Gumposch, Die philos. Litt. der 
Deutsctien von 1400 bis 1850, Regensburg 1851, as also in the other works cited above, Vol. I., 4. Works 
relating to particular epochs, especially to the most modem philosophy, since the time of Kant, wUl be men- 
tioned below. 

Unity, servitude, freedom these are the three stages through which the philosophy 
of the Christian era has passed, in its relation to ecclesiastical theology. The stage 
of freedom corresponds with the general character of the modem era, which seeks 
to restore, in place of mediaeval antagonisms, harmonious unity (cf . above, Vol. L , 5 
and 72). Freedom, of thought in respect of form and substance has been secuied 
gradually by modem philosophy. The first movement in this direction consisted in a 
mere exchange of authorities, or in the reproduction of other ancient systems than that 
of Aristotle, without such modification and such adaptation to new and changed condi- 
tions, aa the scholastics had effected in the system of Aristotle. Then followed the era 
of independent investigation in the realm of nature, and finally, also, in the realm 
of mind. There was a transitional period marked by the endeavor of philosophy to 
become independent. The second epoch, the epoch of Empiricism and Dogmatism, 
was characterized by methodical investigations and comprehensive systems, which 
were based on the confident belief that the knowledge of natural and spiritual reality 
was independently attainable by means of experience or thought alone. Skepticism 
prepared the way for the third stadium in the history of modem philosophy, which was 
founded by Criticism. According to the critical philosophy, the investigation of the 
cognitive faculty of man is the necessary basis for all strictly scientific philosophizing, 
and the result arrived at by it is, that thought is incompetent to the cognition of the 
real world in its true nature, and that it must be restricted to the world of phenomena, 
beyond which the only guide is man's moral consciousness. This result has been 
denied by the following systems, although these systems are all lineal descendants from 


the Kantian philosophy, which is still of immediate (not merely of historical) signifi- 
cance for the philosophy of the present day. * 

* Tliere are some who have sought to discover a complete parallelism between the progress of develop- 
ment of ancient and that of modem philosophy, asserting, in general, that essentially the same philosophical 
problems have always recun-ed, and that the result of all attempts at their solution has been, without the 
intervention of some, special modifjing cause, essentially the same. But both these pre-suppositions have 
only a limited truth. Through the progressing development of philosophy itself, and through the diverse 
forms assumed by the forces which stand with it in relations of reciprocal action and reaction, especially by 
religion, the State, the arts, and the positive sciences, new philosophical problems have arisen, which may 
indeed be designated in the same general way with those which first arose, but which give to the later sys- 
tems, as a whole, a very materially different stamp. (The analogy between the studies pursued before and 
contemporaneously with the philosophy of any given period, and this philosophy itself, is a subject specially 
discussed by A. Helfferich, in Die Aiuilogien in der PMlosophie, ein Gedenkblatt aiif Fickte's Grab, 
Berlin, 1862. ) But still more than the character of isolated systems, is the order of their appearance dejiend- 
ent on the existence or non-existence of earlier philosophies and on external influences, so that sometimes, 
indeed, in the succession of single systems, but only in slight measure in the whole progress of development, 
an essential agreement is manifest. WhUe ancient philosophy began with cosmology and then confined its 
attention chiefly to logic and ethics, together with physics, at last substantially concentrating all its interest 
on theology, modem philosophy foimd all these branches already existing and was developed under their 
influence, as also under that of the existing forms of State and Church, which, on the other hand, were to an 
important extent determined by the influence of ancient philosophy ; the progress of modern philosophy has 
consisted in the gradual emancipation and deepening of the philosophizing spirit. The modem mind (as Kuno 
Fischer who assumes for the period of transition a parallelism in reverse order with the line of development 
of ancient philosophy justly remarks, Gesc/i. der tieueren P/iilos., 2d ed., Manheim, 1865, I., 1. p. 82) seeks 
"to find a way out of the theological conception of the world, with which it is filled, to the problems of cos- 
mology." Modem philosophy has from the beginning owed its existence in far greater measure to an 
interest in theology (though not for the mos* part to an interest in the specifically ecclesiastical form of 
theology) than did ancient philosophy previous to the time of Neo-Platonism. Still it may fairly be said that 
independent philosophical inquiry, in modem as in ancient times, was first directed chiefly to external 
nature ; then, in addition, to man as such, in his relation to nature and to God ; and finally (especially in 
Spinoza, ScheUing, and Hegel) to the Absolute. Conrad Hermann (in his ' Der pr-agmatische Zusammenhang 
in der Oeschichte der Philosophie, Dresden, 1863 " which work, however, also contains many arbitrary com- 
parisons) indicates the following parallel, which is worthy of notice: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle; Kant, 
Hegel, the Empiricism of to-day. The analogy (often previously noticed also by others) between Socrates and 
Kant is found in the fact that for both of these thinkers, man not the individual man in his individual 
peculiarity, but man viewed with reference to the universal and abiding elements of his nature is the 
theoretical and practical measure of things ; the analogy exists unmistakably, although the common formula 
under which the doctrines of the two philosophers can be brought applies to each in very different senses. 
The comparison of Hegel to Plato is indeed, with reference to the substance of their respective doc- 
trines, only partially justified ; only in so far, namely, as both concede to thought an objective tmth ; 
while on the other hand it is not pertinent, in so far as Plato gives to the idea a transcendent existence, whUe 
Hegel represents it as immanent in the phenomenal world (whence the favorite conception by HegeUans 
of Hegel as the modern Aristotle appears as the more appropriate one). But in respect of the methods 
involved, the comparison is indeed just, since the Hegelian dialectic, like the Platonic doctrine, and still more 
than the latter, places the knowledge of the Ideas in dualistic contrast with empirical knowledge, while post- 
HegeUan scientific Empiricism strives to overcome this dualism, and by exact investigation founded on 
experience to bring the rational reign of law in nature and mind within the sphere of ascertained knowledge. 
In respect of the whole historical development of philosophy, the parallels drawn by Kuno v. Reichlin- 
Meldegg (in his opuscule : Der Parallelismnn der alien mid neuen P/iilosopliie, akadfm. UabiliUitionfinchrift, 
Leipsic and Heidelberg, 1865) contain much that is plausible and interesting. This author distinguishes 
"three necessary stand-points, derivable from the nature of the human cognitive facult}', and recognizable as 
the same in antiquity and in modem times : the objective and the subjective stand-points and the stand-point of 
identity," which, whenever a people (or a class of peoples) philosophizes, must succeed each other in the "revolu- 
tion of thought " us the " stadia of commencement, development, and compromise." The author regards the first 
as represented in Greek philosophy by the natural philosophers from Thales to Democritus ; the second by the 
Sophists, Socrates and the disciples of Socrates, by Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics ; 
and the third by the Neo-Platonists ; but in modern philosophy the objective tendency i.s, he says, accom- 
panied by the subjective in the first period, which extends to the last philosophers before Hume and Kant ; the 
second period, to which Hmno, Kant, and Fichte belong, is characterized by subjectivism ; and the third, 



108. The first division of Modern Philosophy is characterized 
by the transition from mediaeval dependence on the authority of 
the Church and of Aristotle, first, to the independent choice of 
authorities, and then to the beginnings of original and imcontrolled 

founded by Schelling and Hegel, by the stand-point of identity. K. v. Reichlin-Meldegg compares, 
separately, the philosophers of the "period of preparation" down to Bacon, to the oldest Greek philosophers, 
and, in particular, Bruno to the Eleatics, though confessing that here the similarity is only imperfect ; he 
compares Descartes to Socrates, the first Cartesians to the imperfect disciples of Socrates, Spinoza, again, to the 
Eleatics, Leibnitz to Plato, Locke to the Stoics, the period of " enlightenment " to the Sophistic period, Hume to 
Cameades, and Kant to Aristotle : but adds that Kant was, " as it were, the Aristotle of modem times grown in- 
trospective, the great experimenter in the field of mind," and that the Aristotelian doctrine was an " objective 
Idealism," while Kant's was " subjective ideal Criticism ; " Schelling, finally, attempted to solve the opposition 
of ideal and real in the same way in which the Neo-Platonists attempted the same, namely, from the stand- 
point of identity, and Hegel completed Schelling's philosophy of the Absolute ; yet for Hegel the finite was 
not an miexplained declension from the infinite; on the contrary, Hegel's "pure being" contained in itself 
the universal immanent principle of motion and development. Hegel was a "Heraclitus of the mind." 
Herbart is to Spinoza what the Atomists were to the Eleatics. Since, adds R.-M., the stand-point of identity, 
which transcends the limit of human knowledge, is scientifically impossible, the highest attainable point for 
philosophy is Subjectivism ; the Kantian philosophy was the termination and completion of the German 
philosophy of mind. This attempt to discover a general parallelism is suggestive and instructive, but in 
numerous respects not convincing. By the "objective stand-point" is either understood simply the prevalent 
direction of philosophical inquiry to the external world, and by the "subjective stand-point " the prevalent 
direction of inquiry to the mind ; or, by the former, the doctrine that the Subject has its source in the Object, 
and by the latter, the doctrine that the Object has its source in the Subject which doctrines, again, admit of 
various modifications and may be intensified to the extreme assertions: there is nothing but mind, nothing 
exists besides matter ; from both doctrines should be distinguished, besides the " stand-point of identity," at least 
that of Dualism. Kant and Fichte, and in a certain way Hume also, are representatives of (complete or nearly 
complete) Subjectivism in the sense of a definite doctrine ; but a doctrine homogeneous with this cannot be as- 
cribed to the middle period of Greek philosophy, but only a prevalent direction of philosophical interest towards 
the Subject, which tendency was least exclusive in the case of the very philosophers who were most distinguished 
in this period, Plato and Aristotle, who also took up again and independently developed physics, which the 
Sophists and Socrates had left in the background; to "Subjectivism," as illustrated in Kant's doctrine, 
Aristotle offers rather a contrast than an analogy. Kant has more in common with Socrates than with 
Aristotle, and from this fact as a starting-point it is possible to follow out certain analogies backwards and 
forwards. But if the parallelism is to end with the assertion of an analogy between Schelling and Hegel and 
the Neo-Platonists, an a.sertion which certainly has much to recommend it, chiefly on account of th 
similar attitude of the parties compared with reference to positive religion, it would seem that Kant should 
be paralleled in his practical philosophy with the Stoics, and in his doctrine of cognition with the Skeptics ; 
Locke with Aristotle, Leibnitz with Plato, Spinoza with the Megarians (on account of his blending of Ethics 
with the metaphysical principle of unity), Descartes with Socrates, the natiual philosophers from Telesius to 
Bacon with the ancient natural philosophers from Thales to Democritus ; and also the Florentine Platonists, as 
forerunners of independent philosophical inquiry, say, with the priests of the Orphic mysteries, if, for the rest, 
the institution of such parallelisms, however skilfully executed, did not necessarily involve much that is only 
half true, whereby they inevitably degenerate into the trivial. The comparisons to which the institutiom 
of such parallelisms gives occasion, may, if points of difference are pointed out ^^ith the same care as points 
of similarity, have a high scientific value, but mark rather the transition from the historical ap- 
preciation of systems to critical reflection concerning the same, than the stage of historical appreciation 


investigation, yet without a complete emancipation of the new philo< 
sophical efforts from the domination of the mediaeval spirit, and with 
no rigidly methodical development of independent systems. 

Of the intellectual movement in the transition-period, Jules Joly treats, in Ilisloire du mouvemeiU 
iTUellectuel au 16me siecle et pendant la premiere partie du Ylme, Paris, 1800. Cf. the works cite* 
109, 110, and 111. 

109. Among the events which introduced the transition from the 
Middle Ages to modern times, the earliest was the revival of classical 
studies. This revival was negatively occasioned by the one-sided char- 
acter and the gradual self -dissolution of scholasticism, and positively 
by the remains of ancient art and literature in Italy which were 
more and more appreciated as material prosperity increased and by 
the closer contact of the Western world, especially of Italy, with 
Greece, particularly after the flight of large numbers of learned 
Greeks to Italy, at the time when the Turks were threatening Europe 
and had taken Constantinopla The invention of the art of printing 
facilitated the spread of literary culture. The first important result 
in the field of philosophy of the renewed connection of "Western Eu- 
rope with Greece, was the introduction of the Platonic and Keo- 
Platonic philosophies into the West, their enthusiastic reception, and 
the attempt by means of these to supplant the scholastic- Aristotelian 
philosophy. Gemistus Pletho, the passionate disputant of the Aris- 
totelian doctrine, Bessarion, the more moderate Platonist, and Mar- 
silius Ficinus, the meritorious translator of Plato and Plotinus, were 
the most important of the renewers of Platonism. On the other hand, 
by returning to the original text, and by preferring Greek to Arabian 
commentators, classically educated Aristotelians were enabled to pre- 
sent the doctrine of Aristotle in greater purity than the Scholastics 
had done. In particular, in Northern Italy, where since the four- 
teenth century Averroes had been customarily followed in the in- 
terpretation of Aristotle, the authority of this commentator was 
disputed by a portion of the Aristotelians in favor of the Greek 
interpreters, particularly of Alexander Aphrodisiensis ; but it con- 
tinued to assert itself, especially at Padua, though in more limited 
measure, until near the middle of the seventeenth century. The Aver- 
roistic doctrine, that only the one universal reason common to the 
entire human race is immortal, agreed with the Alexandristic, which 
recognized only the world-ordering divine mind as the active immor- 
tal reason, in the denial of individual immortality ; still, most of the 
representatives of Averroism, especially in the later yeai*s of the 


school, were enabled so to accommodate this doctrine to the require 
ments of orthodoxy as to avoid a conflict with the Church. The Alex- 
andrists, among whom Pomponatius is the most noteworthy, inclined 
to Deism and Katuralism, but distinguished fi'om philosophical truth 
the theological truth taught by the Church, to which they professed 
submission; the Churcli, however, condemned the doctrine of the two- 
fold nature of truth. Beside the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines, 
other philosophies of antiquity were also renewed. Telesius and other 
relatively independent investigators of nature were considerably in- 
fluenced by the doctrines of the earlier of the Greek natural philoso- 
phers. Stoicism was renewed and developed by Lipsius and others, 
Epicureanism by Gassendi, and Skepticism by Montaigne, Charron, 
Sanchez, Le Yayer, and others. 

An authentic history of the renewal of classical literature in Italy is contained in Girolamo Tiraboschi'* 
Storia della Letteraiura Italiaym, 13 Vols., Modena, 1772-82; edition in 16 Vols., Milan, 1822-26; see espe- 
cially Tom. VI., 1, and VII., 2 (Vols. VII. and XI. of the Milan edition); the same subject is also treated bj 
Arnold Herm. Ludw. Heeren, Geschichte des SUidiums der class. LittercUur sett dem Wiederaufleben der 
Wissensckajten, 2 Vols., GOtt., 1797-1802 (cf. his Hist, of Class. Lit. in the Middle Ages); Ernst Aug. 
Erhard, Oesch. des Wiederaufbluhens wiss. Bildung, vornehmlich in Deutschland, Magdeburg, 1828-32; K. 
Hagen, Deutschlands litt. und relig. Verhdltnisse ivi Refwmationszeitalter, Erlangen, 1841-44; new edition, 
edited by his son, Herman Hagen, 3 Vols., Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1868; Ernest Kenan, Averrois et tAver- 
roisme, Par., 1852, p. 255 seq. ; GuUlaume Favre, Melanges d'/iist. litt., Geneva, 1856 ; Georg Voigt, Die 
Wiederbelebung des classische?! AUIierthums, Berlin, 1859 ; Jacob Burckhardt, Die Cultur der lienaissance in 
Italien (particularly the third section on Die Wiederenoeckung des Alterthnms), Basel, 1860, 2d ed., 1869; Job. 
Friedr. Schroder, Das Wiederaufbluheyi der class. Studien in Deutschland im 15. und zu Anfang des 16. Ja/ir- 
hundet-ts, Halle, 1864. 

On the philosophy of Dante compare A. F. Ozanam, Dante et hi philos. cathol. au Xlllme siccle, Paris, 

On Petrarch, cf. J. Bonifas, De Petrarcha phUosopho, Paris, 1863; Maggiolo, De la philos. morale d6 
Petrarque, Nanc}', 1864. 

On the Florentine Academy, cf. R. Sieveking, G<)tt., 1812. G. Gemistus Pletho's jrepi wv 'Apio-TOTcXijc 
irpbs XIAoTwca fita<^epeTat was printed at Paris in 1540, and at Basel in 1576. Cf., on Pletho, Leo Allatins, 
De Georgiis diatriba in Script. Byzant. Par. XIV., 1651, pp. 3a3-392, reprinted in Fabric, Bibi. Or. X, 
Hamburg, 1721 {De Georgiis, pp. 549-817), pp. 739-758, ed. nov., curante Gottlieb Christ. Harless, XII., 
Hamb., 1809 (De Georgiis, pp. 1-136), pp. 85-102; Boivin, Querelle des philosophes du XV. siccle, inMemoires 
de litterature de tAcad. des Inscriptions, Vol. II., pp. 715 seq. ; W. Gass., Gennadius und Pletho, Aristotel- 
ismus und Platojiistnus in der griechischen Kirche, nebst einer Abh. iiber die Bestreitiing des Islam im 
Mittelalter ; 2. Abth. : Gennadii et Plethonis scripta qucedam, edita et inedita, Breslau, 1844 ; also, nA^Oiovos 
I'dniui' cruyypa^fi% Ta croi^oijiiva, Plethon, troite des lois, ou recueil de.9 /raiments, en partie inedits, de cet 
ouvrage, par C. Alexandre, traduction par A. Pellissier, Paris, 1858, and A. Ellissen, Analekten der mittei- 
uiid neugriech. Litt., IV. 2: Plethons Denkschriften uber den Peloponnes, Leip.s., 1860. 

The translation of Plato by MarsUius Ficinus was printed at Florence, 1483-84, and the transL of Plotinus, 
by the same, ibid., 1492. His Theologia Platonica, Flor., 1482 ; complete Works, excepting the translations of 
Plato and Plotinus, Basel, 1576. 

John Pico of Mirandola, Works, Bologna, 1496. The same, together with the works of his nephew, John 
Francis Pico, Basel, 1572-73 and 1601. Cf. Georg DreydorfE, Das System des Joh. Pico von Mirandula und 
Concordia, Marburg, 1858. 

Johann Reuchlin, Capnion sice d verba mirijico (a conversation between a heathen, a Jew, and a 
Christian), Basel, 1494, Tubingen, 1514 ; De arte cabbalistica, Hagenau, 1517, 1530. On him cf. Meyerhofl, 
Berlin, 1&30. 

The best edition of the works of TJlrich von Hutten is that prepared by Biicking, Leips., 1858-59, 
together with Index bibliographicus Hnttenianus, Leips., 1868; on him cf. D. F. Strauss, Leips., 1858-60. 

Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim, De Occulta Philotophia, Cologne, 1510, 1531-33 ; Z) Iruxr 


titudiiie et VanitaU Scientiarum (Col., 1527, Par., 1520, Antw., 1530) ; his works were printed at Lyons in 1550 
and 1600, and in German, Stuttgard, 1856. A biography of Agrippa is contained in the first part of F. J. v. 
Bianco's Die atte UniversUut Kuln, Cologne, 1855. 

Laurentius Valla, Works, Basel, 1540-43 ; single works were printed earlier ; the controversial work 
entitled De dialecUca contra Aristoteleos, Venice, 1499. 

Rudolph Agricola, Opera, citra Alardi, Cologne, 15.39 ; De dialecUca inventiotie, published in 1480, and 
at Louvain, 1515, Strasburg, 1521, Cologne, 1527, Paris, 1538. 

P. Gassendi, Exercitationum paradoxicarum adv. Aristoteleos, Vol. I., Grenoble, 1624, Vol. II., Hagni^ 
1659 ; De vita, moribus st doctHna Epicuri, Leyden, 1647, Hague, 1656 ; Animadversionez in Diog. L. de vita 
et pfiilos. Epic., Leyden, 1649; Syntagma philos. Epicuri, Hague, 1655, 1659; Petri Gassendi opera, Lyons, 
1658, and norence, 1727. Cf. on him Ph. Damiron, in his Hist, de la pfiilos. au XVIT. siScle, Paris, 1840. 

Michel de Montaigne, Essais, Bourdeaux, 1580, very frequently reprinted ; recently, avec les notes de tout 
Us comtnentateurs, choisies et completees par M. J. V. Le Clerc, et une nonvelle etude sur M. par Prevosi- 
Paradol, Paris, 1865 ; on Montaigne see, among others, Eugfine Bimbenet, Les Es.sais de if. dans leurs rap- 
ports avec la legislation moderne, Orleans, 1864. Pierre Charron, De la Sage.sse, Bourdeaux, 1601, ed. 
by Renouard, Dijon, 1801 ; Trois verites centre tous les athees, idoldtres, juifs, ifahometans, hiveiiques et 
schismatiqu^, Paris, 1594 ; this latter and earlier work is more dogmatic than the former. Francis Sanchez, 
Tractatus de multicm et prima universali scientia, quod 7iihil scitur, Lyons, 1581, etc. ; Trcuctatxm philoso- 
pMci, Rotterdam, 1649 ; on him cf. Ludwig Gerkrath, Vienna, 1860. Franpois de la Mothe le Vayer, Cinq 
dialogues /aits d f imitation des anciens par JToratiiis Tubero, Mons, 1673, etc. ; CEuvres (not Including the 
abOTe Dialogues), Paris, 1653, etc. 

In the period at which we have now arrived, increased industrial and commercial 
activity resulted in an increase of material prosperity ; cities arose, and a class of free 
citizens came into existence ; the State was consolidated, and at the courts, among 
the nobUity and among the citizens, notwithstanding the continued existence of wars 
and feuds, leisure was found for the adornment of life by the arts of peace. At the 
same time and by a parallel movement there grew up a secular form of culture, as dis- 
tinguished from the previous prevailingly religious type. Poets extoUed force and 
beauty ; the manly courage which approves itself in severe contests, the delicacy of 
feeling which is conspicuous in the raptures and pains of love, the fervor of devotion, 
the fire of hate, the nobility of loyalty, the ignominy of treason every natural and 
moral feeling which is developed in the society of man with man, found expression in 
secular poetry in terms fitted deeply to move the heart. This humane culture opened 
up also the sense for ancient poetry and for ancient conceptions of the world and 
of human affairs. The love for ancient art and literature a sentiment which had 
never been entirely extinguished in Italy was the first to be reawakened there ; with 
the struggles of political parties was connected an intelligent interest in early Roman 
history ; the social life of the rising burgher-class and of the noble families who 
attained to wealth and power provided the leisure and cultivated the taste necessary 
for a resuscitation of the extant remains of ancient culture. The attention paid to 
Roman literature called forth the desire to know more of the literature of the Greeks, 
a knowledge which in Greece itself was stUl largely preserved. In the hope of satisfy- 
ing this desire, Greece had been visited long before the approach of the Turks and the 
capture of Constantinople (1453) had led to the emigration of Greek scholars to Italy ; 
the Greek Muses (says Heeren, Gesch. des Studiums der doss. Litt. seit dem Wisderaufle- 
ben der Wissensc?uiften, Vol. I., p. 283) would have been brought to Italy, if they had 
not fled thither for refuge. 

Dante AJighieri (1265-1321), for whose daring poem on the Last Judgment the 
scholastic combination of Christian theology with the Aristotelian philosophy furnished 
the speculative basis, cultivated his sense of poetic form especially by the study of 
Virgil. Francesco Petrarca (July 20, 1304, to July 18, 1374), the Binger of love, enter- 
tained the most enthusiastic passion for ancient literature; he was intimately ac- 


quainted with the Roman literature, and by his own labors in the collection of MSS. 
and by the zeal with which he inspired others to search for and study the works of the 
ancients, he did invaluable service for the preservation and propagation of these works. 
Petrarch was no friend of Aristotle ; Plato suited his taste ; but he had but Utile 
knowledge of either. He hated the infidel doctrines of Averroism. He preferred a 
popular and parenetic philosophy, Uke that of Cicero and Seneca, to the Aristotelic 
school-philosophy. In the Greek language he was instructed by Bernard Barlaam (died 
1348), whom love for the language and works of Homer, Plato, and Euclid had led 
from Calabria, in whose convents the Greek language had never become unknown, to 
Greece, whence he came as ambassador of the Emperor Andronicus the younger to 
Pope Benedict XII. , at Avignon. The instruction which he here gave to Petrarch, in 
the year 1389, was indeed, owing to the brief time during which it was continued, 
insufficient; but it became, through the stimulus which Petrarch received therefrom 
and communicated to others, the source of extremely important results. A friend 
of Petrarch was Giovanni Boccacio (John of Certaldo, 1313-1375), who learned Greek 
more thoroughly from Barlaam's pupil, Leontius Pilatus, in the yearg 1360-63. In 
Boccacio the interest in antiquity was already accompanied vdth a belief in the 
non-absolute character of Christianity ; the Christian religion, according to him, was 
only relatively true, and was thus on a par with other religions. Boccacio's Decamerone 
contains (I. Nov. 3) the story (subsequently revived and modified by Lessing, in his 
Nathan) of the three rings, the conception underlying which is found in the phi- 
losophy of Averroes. On Boccacio's recommendation, Leontius was appointed by the 
Florentines as a public instructor in the Greek language, with a fixed salary, at theu- 
university. He did not indeed accomplish aU that was expected of him, but the 
example was given and was speedily imitated at other universities. Johannes Malpighi 
of Ravenna, a pupil of Petrarch, gave instruction in Latin literature, with great success, 
at Padua, and from 1397 on, at Florence. The collecting of manuscripts became more 
and more a matter of pride with the rich and powerful, and the love for studies con- 
nected with antiquity was kindled in ever widening circles by the reading of classical 
works. Manuel Chrysoloras of Constantinople (died A. D. 1415, at Constance), a pupU 
of Pletho, was the first native Greek who appeared as a public teacher of the Greek 
language and literature in Italy (at Venice, afterwards at Florence). From him his 
nephew, Joh. Chiysoloras (who taught at Constantinople and also in Italy), Leonardus 
Aretinus, Franciscus Barbarus, Guarinus of Verona, and others, and from Johannes 
Chrysoloras, Francis Philelphus (1398-1481), the father of Marius Philelphus (bom 
A.D. 1426, at Constantinople, died in 1480, at Mantua on him cf. the work of Gui- 
llaume Favre, cited above), and others received their education. At Milan and other 
places, Constantinus Lascaris, from Constantinople, taught the Greek language. His 
son, Johannes Lascaris (1446-1535), as ambassador from Lorenzo de' Medici (bom 1448, 
died 1493) to Bajesid II., was instmmental in effecting the purchase of numerous 
manuscripts for the Medicean Library. His pupil, Marcus Musurus, labored zealously 
in preparing the Aldine edition of Greek classics. 

At the court of Cosmo de' Medici (bom 1389, died 1464) lived for a time (from 1438 
on) Georgius Gemistus Pletho (bom about A.D. 1355, died in the Peloponnesus in 1452), 
who had come from Constantinople and was the most influential renovator of the study 
of the Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy in the Occident. He changed his name 
Tt/jiffro? into the synonymous and more Attic HXij^wr, suggestive of nxdruv. Although 
he wrote commentaries on the Isagoge of Porphyry and the Categories and Analytics of 
Aristotle, he rejected with the greatest vehemence the Aristotelian doctrine that the 


first Bubstances are individuals, and that the universal is only of secondary nature. He 
regarded the objections of Aristotle to the Platonic doctrine of ideas as not pertinent, 
and argued against the Aristotelian theology, psychology, and ethics. In his treatise, 
written about the year 1440, at Florence, on the difference between the Platonic and 
AristoteUan philosophies, and in his " Compendium of the Dogmas of Zoroaster and Plato " 
perhaps an integrant part of his comprehensive work entitled v6iiu)v avyypaipf), which, in 
consequence of its condemnation by the Patriarch Gennadius, has come down to us 
only in fragments he exalts, in opposition to the tendency of Aristotelianism towards 
naturalism, the theosophic tendency of Platonism, without, however, distinguishing 
Plato's doctrine from the Neo-PIatonic, or taking into special consideration the devia- 
tion from the corresponding Christian dogmas of certain Platonic philosophemes (in 
particular, the Platonic doctrines of the pre-existence of the human soul before its 
terrestrial life, of the world-soul and the souls of the stars, numerous ethical and 
political dicta, and also the Neo-Platonic theory of the eternity of the world). Through 
Pletho's lectures Cosmo de' Medici became filled with a warm love for Platonism, and 
was led to found the Platonic Academy at Florence, of which Marsilius Ficinus was 
the first Director. 

A pupil of Gemistus Pletho was Bessarion of Trebizond, who was bom in 1395, 
became Archbishop of Nicsea in 1436, and subsequently Patriarch of Constantinople, 
which position was lost to him through his leaning in favor of the union of the Greek 
and Latin Churches, was made a Cardinal by Pope Eugene TV., and died 1473. Like 
his master, yet with greater moderation and impartiaUty, Bessarion defended the 
doctrines of Platonism. His best-known work, '"' Adversus Calumniatorem Platonis" 
(Rome [1469], Venice, 1503 and 1516), was a rejoinder to the Uomparatio Aristotdvi 
et Platonis of George of Trebizond, the Aristotehan, who, moved by Pletho's attack 
on Aristotelianism, had fought passionately against Platonism. In a letter dated 
May 19, 1463, and addressed to Michael Apostolius, a still young and passionate de- 
fender of Platonism, who had reviled Aristotle and Theodore Gaza, the Aristotelian 
and opponent of Pletho, Bessarion afl&rms his love and reverence for both Plato and 

Aristotle (ifil &i (piXovvra jxtv Xa^i HXdrcji'a, <pi\owra 6' 'ApiaTuTiXri xat a)j o-o^ojraro) at36ftcva 

UaTcpo}), and he even blames Pletho, whom he held in great esteem, for the violence of 
his opposition to Aristotle ; he exhorts Michael to look up with respect to those great 
philosophers of antiquity, and to conduct aU disputes, after the example of Aristotle, 
with moderation, making use rather of arguments than of invectives. Bessarion's 
translations of Xenophon's Memorabilia and of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, and 
of the extant fragment of the Metaphysics of Theophrastus, are often, through 
their strict literaLness, un-Latin (though not to the same degree with earlier 
translations used by the Scholastics) ; but they led the way to better ones by later 

MarsUius Ficinus was bom at Florence, in 1433, and appointed by Cosmo de Medici 
teacher of philosophy at the Academy of Florence, where he died in 1499. He won 
lasting credit especially by his translations of the works of Plato and Plotinas, and 
also of some works by Porphyry and other Neo-Platonists translations which, so far as 
it was then possible, were both faithful and elegant. 

John Pico of Mirandola (1463-94) blended with his Neo-Platonism cabalistic 
doctrines. He propoiinded nine hundred theses (printed, Rome, 1486, Cologne, 1619), 
concerning which he thought to dispute at Rome ; but the disputation was forbidden. 
Of like character was tbe philosophy of his nephew, John Fraaicis Pico of Mirandola 
(died 1533). 


Through Ficinus and Pico, Johann Reuchlia (1455-1522) was won over to Neo- 
Platonism and the Cabala. "With the study of the classical languages Reuchlin joined 
that of the Hebrew; the latter he saved from the fanaticism of the Dominicans of 
Cologne, who intended to commit to the flames all except the canonical Jewish litera- 
ture. His contest against the " Dunkelmiinner," or Obscurants, in which also Ulrich 
von Hutten (1488-1523) took part, prepared the way for the Reformation. 

Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, of Nettesheim (1486-1535), who followed Reuchlin and 
Raymundus Lullus, combined mysticism and magic with scepticism. 

Among the Aristotelians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Georgius Schola- 
rius, with the surname (which he appears to have assumed on becoming a monk) Gen- 
nadius (bom at Constantinople for a time, from 1453 on, Patriarch under Sultan Mo- 
hammeddied about 1464), came forward as an opponent of Pletho, whom he accused of 
ethnicism, especially on account of his work, " nJ^/uv avyypa^fi " (which he sentenced to 
be destroyed). Gennadius had previously already combated the Platonism of Pletho, 
and defended Aristotelianism. Not only Pletho's deviations from Christian dogma, but 
also his attacks on the degenerate system of monasticism and his utterances (in imitation 
of Plato's polemic against the Orphic priests of atonement) against offerings and prayers 
intended to influence God to do things not right, were calculated to excite the indignation 
of Gennadius. Gennadius wrote commentaries on the Isagoge of Porphyry, the Categ. 
and the De Interpret., and translated into Greek various scholastic writings, especially 
those of Thomas Aquinas, and, among other things, the ^^ De Sex PHncipiis " of Gilber- 
tua Porretanus (see above. Vol. I., 94, p. 399), which was accepted an serving to 
complete the De Categ. of Aristotle. In several MSS. , also, the translation of (the greater 
part of) the logical Compendium of Petrus Hispanus is attributed to him ; but according 
to other authorities this Compendium had already been translated into Greek, about 
A.D. 1350, by Maximus Planudes. On the other hand, the same Greek text in another 
(Munich) MS. is designated, and was hence published by Ehinger (Wittenberg, 1597) as 
a work of the Greek philosopher Psellus (living in the 11th century), from which, if the 
etatement of this MS. is true, the Compendium of Petrus Hispanus must have been 
translated (see above. Vol. I., 95, p. 404). 

George of Trebizond (1396-1486), against whom the above-mentioned work of Bes- 
sarion was directed, taught rhetoric and philosophy at Venice and Rome. In his Com- 
paratia PlaUmis et Aristotdis (printed at Venice, 1523) he censures the doctrine of Pletho 
as unchristian ; he charges him with having intended to found a new religion, neither 
Christian nor Mohammedan, but Neo-Platonic and heathen, and treats him as a new 
and more dangerous Mohammed ; in Aristotle only, and not in Plato, does George of 
Trebizond find definite and tenable philosophical theorems, given in systematic form 
and suitable for teaching. George of Trebizond translated several of the works of 
Aristotle, and wrote commentaries on them. 

Theodoras Gaza (born at Thessalonica, died 1478) went about 1430 to Italy, and 
taught there the Greek language and literature. He was a learned Aristotelian and an 
opponent of Pletho, though on friendly terms with Bessarion. He translated, in par- 
ticular, works on physical science by Aristotle and Theophrastus. 

Laurentius Valla (bom at Rome in 1415, where he died in 1465), the translator of the 
Hiad, and of Herodotus and Thucydides, made vigorous and successful war on the uncriti- 
cal method employed in history and the vapid subtleties prevalent in philosophy. From 
Cicero and QuintUian he borrowed logical and rhetorical principles. 

Rudolph Agricola (1442-85) studied scholastic philosophy at Louvain, but enjoyed 
afterwards in Italy the instruction of classically educated Greeks, especially that of 


'rheodore Gaza. Like Valla, he fought against scholastic insipidity, drew from the 
Tmtings of Aristotle a purer Aristotelianism, and philosophized in purer Latin. Hia 
logico-rhetorical work, entitled De Dialcctica Inventiojie^ was founded on Aristotle and 
Cicero. Melancthon said of it : nee vero uUa extant recentia scripta de locis et usu diaiec- 
ticcs mdiora et locupletiora RudolpM libris ; Ramus also expressed a favorable judg- 
ment on this work. 

Johannes Argyropulus (who came from Constantinople, and died at Rome in 1486) 
lived at the court of Cosmo de' Medici, whose son Peter and grandson Lorenzo he in- 
structed in Greek. He was aftersvards, till the year 1479, teacher of the Greek language 
at the Academy of Florence, in which office he was succeeded by Demetrius Chalco- 
condylas (1434-1511), a pupU of Theodore Gaza. Of the works of Aristotle, Johannes 
Argyropulus translated the Organon, Auscultationes Phys., Be Coelo, Be Anirna, and 
Bjihica Nicli07n., into Latin, or he at least revised earlier translations of them. 

Angelus Politianus (Angelo PoUziano, 1454^1494), a pupil of Christopher Landinus 
ji Roman, and of Argyropulus in Greek literature, gave lectures at Florence on work* 
of Aristotle, and translated the Enchiridu/n of Epictetus and Plato's Charmides, but was 
rather a philologist and poet than a philosopher. Cf. Jacob Miihly, Angelus Politiamcs, 
ein Culturbild aus der Benamance, Leipsic, 1864. 

Hermolaus Barbaras (Ermolao Barbaro) of Venice (1454^1493), a nephew of Fran- 
cis Barbaras and pupil of Guarinus, translated works of Aristotle and Commentaries by 
Themistius, and prepared a Compendium Sdentm Naturalis ex Anstotele (printed in 
1547). He belongs to the Hellenistic Anti- Scholastics ; Albert and Thomas were, like 
Averroes, " barbarian philosophers," in his opinion. 

An AristoteUanism derived directly from the original sources was taught by 
James Faber (Jacques Lefevre, from Etaples iu Picardy, Faber Staptdensis), 
amid much applause, at the University of Paris, about the year 1500. He wrote 
Latin paraphrases in elucidation of some of Aristotle's works. Reuchlin says that 
"he restored Aristotle to the Gauls." He was, at the same time, a zealous mathe- 
matician and an admirer of Nicolaus Cusanus, whose works he pubUshed and 
whose doctrines were of still greater influence on the mind of Faber's pupil Bovillus 
(see below, 111). 

Desiderius Erasmus (1467-1536) deserves mention in a history of philosophy, both 
on account of his opposition to scholastic barbarism, and, positively, on account of the 
edition of Aristotle which he assisted in editing, and more particularly on account of his 
having laid the foundations of Patrology by his editions of Jerome, Hilarius, Ambro- 
sius, and Augustine. 

Joh. Ludovicus Vives (bom at Valencia in 1492, died at Bruges in 1540), a younger 
contemporary and friend of Erasmus, exerted considerable influence as an opponent of 
the Scholastics, especially by his work entitled Be Causis Corruptarur,i Artium ( Antw. , 
1531, and Opera, Bas. , 1555; Valenc, 1783). The genuine disciples of Aristotle, 
says Vives, interrogate Nature herself, as the ancients also did ; only through direct in- 
vestigation by the way of experiment can Nature be known. 

Marius Nizolius, of Bersello (1498-1576), combated scholasticism in his Thesaurus 
Ciceronianus, and particularly in his Antibarbarus sive de veris principiis et vera rations 
phUosophandi contra pseudo-philosophos (Parm., 1553, ed. G. W. Leibnitz, Frankfort, 
1670 and 1674). Nizolius maintained the nominalistic doctrines that only individual 
things are real substances, that species and genera are only subjective conceptions by 
means of which several objects are considered together, and that all knowledge must 
^oceed from sensation, which alone has immediate certainty. 


Not only scholasticism, but also the dialectical doctrine of Aristotle himself, waa 
opposed by Petrus Ramus (Pierre de la Ramee, bom in 1515, mtirdered during the 
night of St. Bartholomew, 1573, at the instigation of his scholastic opponent, Char- 
pentier) in his Animadmrsiones in Dicdecticam Aristotelis (Paris, 1534, etc.), which was 
io\lov;e<!i hj "his Imtitutiones Died. (Par., 1543), a positive attempt to provide an im- 
proved logic, but of little importance. He sought, in imitation of Cicero (and Quin- 
tilian), to blend logic with rhetoric. Cf. on him Ch. Waddiugton, liamus, sa vie, ses 
ecrits et ses opinions, Paris, 1855; Charles Desmaze, P. B., professeur au College de 
France, sa vie, ses ecrits, sa mort, Paris, 1864; M. Cantor, P. B., einwiss. Martyr er dcs 
16. Jahrh., in Gelzer's Prot. MonatsU. ,'W o\. XXX., No. 2, August, 1867. 

The Humanists hated scholastic Aristotelianism, and, most of all, the Averroism 
prevalent in Northern Italy (especially at Padua and Venice), regarding them as bar- 
barous. Many of them also, particularly the Platonists, opposed Averroism as the 
enemy of religious faith. But soon other opponents of Averroism went back to the text 
of Aristotle and to the works of Greek commentators, especially to those of Alexander 
of Aphrodisias, in order to replace the mystical and pantheistic interpretation of Aris- 
totle by a deistic and naturalistic one. These men agreed, however, with the Averro- 
ists who affirmed that there was but one immortal intellect, and that this was present 
in all the members of the human race in denying miracles and personal immortality. 
For this reason, both they and the Averroists were together opposed by such defenders 
of the Christian faith and the doctrines of Plato as Marsilius Ficinus, J. A. Marta, 
Casp. Contarini, and, later, Anton Sirmond, and they were officially condemned by a 
Lateran Council (at the session of Dec. 19, 1513), which required of aU Professors 
that they should leave no errors, which might be found in the works to be interpreted, 
without refutation. The same council condemned the distinction between two orders 
of truth, and pronounced everything false which was in conflict with revelation. There 
were also at Padua pure Aristotelians who were not Alexandrists, but adopted the 
theory of the immortality of souls. Among these was Nicolaus Leonicus Thomteus 
(bom 1456), who taught at Padua from 1497 on. But Averroism was at that time the 
predominant philosophy in Northern Italy, as was Naturalism, which was based on Alex- 
ander's interpretation of Aristotle, among the Peripatetic opponents of Averroism. Mar- 
silius Ficinus says in the preface to his translation of Plotinus, though not without 
some rhetorical exaggeration : ' ' Nearly the whole world is occupied by the Peripate- 
tics, who are divided into two sects, the Alexandrists and the Averroists. The former 
believe the human intellect to be mortal ; the latter contend that it is one in all men. 
Both parties alike overturn from its foundation all religion, especially because they seem 
to deny that human affairs are controlled by a divine providence, and also to have 
equally fallen away from the teachings of Aristotle, their master." 

Averroism reigned in the school at Padua from the first half of the 14th till near the 
middle of the 17th century, though in different acceptations at different times. While 
the heterodox elements of the Averroistic doctrine were made prominent by a few, 
they were toned down by others. At the beginning of the 16th century Averroisir 
appeared, in comparison with Alexandrism, as the doctrine least at variance with the 
teaching of the Church. At the time of the reaction in the Church it was reduced and 
confined to the careful employment of the Commentaries of Averroes in explaining the 
Aristotelian writings, the doctrines which were in disaccord with the faith of the Church 
being rendered less offensive by a liberal interpretation. Many interpreted the unity 
of the intellect as meaning merely the identity of the highest logical principles (the 
principle of contradiction, etc. ). The Averroists of this later period pretended to be, at 


the same time, good Catholics. Averroism had become a matter of erudition and bore 
no longer an offensive character. Numerous impressions of the Commentaries of Aver- 
roes give evidence of the continuing interest in them. The first edition of the works 
of Averroes, which appeared at Padua in 1472, reproduced the old Latin translations 
made in the 13th century; new translations were subsequently made on the basis 
of Hebrew translations, and were employed for the edition of 1552-53, which, how- 
ever, contains some of the earlier translations. 

The Averroistic doctrine of the unity of the immortal reason in the whole human 
race was professed in the last decennia of the 15th century, by Nicoletto Vemias, who 
occupied the professorial chair at Padua from 1471 to 1499 ; but in Ms old age he was 
couverted to the belief in the immortality of each individual soul. In 1495 Petrus Pom- 
ponatius (died in 1525) commenced teaching philosophy in the same city. In his lec- 
tures and works (De immortaUtate anirruE^ Bologna, 1516, Ven. , 1525, Basel, 1634, ed. 
Chr. G. Bardili, Tiib., 1791 ; De fato, libero arbitrio, prcedestinatione, promdentia Dd 
libri quinque, Basel, 1525, 1556, 1567 ; De naturaiium effectiium admirandorum causis s. 
de incantationibus liber, written in 1520, Basel, 1556, 1567 ; on him cf. Francesco 
Fiorentino, Pietro Pomponnzzi, Florence, 1868; G. Spicker, in an Inaugural Dissert., 
Munich, 1868; Ludwig Muggenthaler, Inaug. Dissert., Munich, 1868; and B. Podesti, 
Bologna, 1868) Pomponatius rejected the Averroistic doctrine, and recognized the 
Thomistic arguments against the same as sufficient to refute it, yet believed the true 
meaning of Aristotle to be, not, as Thomas had affirmed, that there was a plurahty of 
immortal intellects, but that the human soul, including the rational faculty, was mor- 
tal. For this interpretation he referred to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who identifies the 
active immortal intellect with the divine mind, and declares the individual reason of 
each man to be mortal. By the human understanding the universal is known only in 
the particular, thought is impossible without the representative image {<l>avTaana), which 
is rooted in sensation and is never without relation to time and space, hence is constantly 
dependent on bodily organs and disappears with them. Virtue is independent of the be- 
lief in immortality ; it is most genuine when practised without reference to reward or 
punishment. Of the liberty to profess this doctrine Pomponatius sought to assure him- 
self by distinguishing two orders of truth, the philosophical and the theological (where- 
by he, like other thinkers of the Middle Ages and of the transition-period, anticipated, 
in a manner sufficient for the immediate exigency, though philosophicaUy undeveloped, 
the modem distinction between symbolical representation and speculative thinking). 
Consistency in philosophic thought leads, according to him, to the doctrine of the mor- 
tality of human souls ; but immortality only is admissible in the circle of theological 
articles of faith. In like manner Pomponatius disposed of the doctrines of miracles 
and of the freedom of the will. 

At Padua and, from 1509 on, at Bologna, Pomponatius had an opponent in Alexander 
AchiHini (died 1518), who held fast, in general, to the Averroistic phraseology and doc- 
trine, though pretending not to affirm the unity of intellect in a sense opposed to the 
teaching of the Church. 

A pupU of Vemias, Augustinus Niphus (Agostino Nifo, 1473-1546 ; he wrote Commen- 
taries on Aristotle, in 14 folio volumes, and Opuscula inoralia et poUtica, Par., 1654), who 
at first avowed the Averroistic doctrine of the unity of the intellect, but afterwards had 
the prudence to modify his Averroism and bring it into unison with the teachings of the 
Church, and who in 1495-97 published the works of Averroes, accompanied by re- 
futatory remarks relative to various passages, wrote, at the instance of Pope Leo X., a 
work in refutation of tne De Imrnortalitate A)iimm of Pomponatius. Since, however, 


great interest was felt in these transactions at the Roman court, Pomponatius was en- 
abled imder the protection of Cardinal Bembo (and indirectly of the Pope himself) to 
prepare his Defensorium contra Niphum. Interest in philosophical subjects led the Ro- 
man court at that time beyond the limits of its ecclesiastical and political interest the 
" unbelief " prevalent at the court of the Pope, coupled \vith a general laxity of morals, 
gave offence to Luther and others, and became one of the causes of that division of the 
Church, which the reaction that soon followed on the part of subsequent Popes, in the 
direction of the most rigid adherence to the faith of the Church, was unable to remedy. 

Simon Porta of Naples (died 1555 ; to be distinguished from the eminent physicist, 
Giambattista Porta of Naples, who Lived 1540-1615, and is celebrated especially for 
his work entitled Magia Naturcdis, Naples, 1589, etc.), a pupil of Pomponatius, wrote, 
like the latter, in agreement with the Alexandrists on the question of immortality (De 
rerum naturalibus prindpm, de anima et mente Jiumana, Flor., 1551). Gasparo Con- 
tarini (148,. -1542), likewise a pupil of Pomponatius, opposed his doctrine. Zimara, 
a Neapolitan scholar (died 1532), contributed to the elucidation of the text of Aristotle 
and Averroes ; his Notes were included in the later editions of Averroes. Jacobus 
ZabareUa (bom at Padua, 1532, where he taught philosophy from 1564 till his death in 
1589) followed for the most part Averroes in the interpretation of Aristotle. In psy- 
chology he adopted rather the views of Alexander, but thought that the individual 
intellect, though perishable by nature, became, when perfected by divine illumination, 
a partaker of immortality. ZabareUa was opposed by Francis Piccolomini (1520-1604), 
a disciple of Zimara. Andreas Caesalpinus (1509-1603, physician-in-ordinary to Poi)e 
Clement VIII.) took the easy step from Averroism to Pantheism ; his God was the 
"universal soul" {''anima universalis^'''' QucBStiones Perip., Venice, 1571; Dmmo- 
num Investigatia Peripat.^ ib.^ 1583). ZabareUa's successor in the professorial chair at 
Padua, Cesare Cremonini (bom 1552, died 1631\ was the last important representa^ 
tive of Averroistic Aristotelianism tempered with Alexandristic psychology. 

An attempt to revive the Stoic philosophy was made by Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) 
in his Manuductio ad Stoicam phihsopJiiam, PJiysiologia Stoicorum^ and other works. 
Casp. Schoppe (Scioppius), Thomas Gataker, and Daniel Heinsius also contributed to 
the exegetical literature of Stoicism. 

Gassendi (1592-1655) sought to defend Epicureanism against xmjustified attacks, and 
to show that it contained the best doctrine of physics, and yet at the same time to com- 
bine with it Christian theology. Gassendi's Atomism is less a doctrine of dead Nature 
than is that of Epicurus. Gassendi ascribed to the atoms force, and even sensation: 
just as a boy is moved by the image of an apple to turn aside from his way and ap- 
proach the apple-tree, so the stone thrown into the air is moved, by the influence of the 
earth reaching to it, to pass out of the direct line and to approach the earth. From its 
relation to the investigation of nature in modem times, Gassendi's renewal of Epicurean- 
ism is of far greater historical importance than the renewal of any other ancient 
system; not unjustly does F. A. Lange {Gesch. des Materialismits und Kritik seiner 
Bedeutung in der Gegenwart, Iserlohn, 1866, p. 118 seq.) consider Gassendi as the one 
who may properly be styled the renewer in modem times of systematic materiaUsm. 

Ancient skepticism was revived, and, in part, in a peculiar manner further developed 
by JVIichel de Montaigne. The scepticism of this clever man of the world was more or 
less directed to doctrines of Christianity, but was generally brought in the end, by a 
whether sincere or merely prudent recognition of the necessity of a revelation, on 
account of the weakness of human reason, into harmony with theology. Other support- 
\b of a hke tendency were Pierre Charron (1541-1603), who defined it as man's prov- 


ince merely to search for the truth, which dwells in the bosom of God ; Francis San- 
chez (Sanctius, bom 15(52, died at Toulouse, 1G33), teacher of medicine and i)hilosoi>hy; 
Fran9ois de la Mothe le Vayer (1586-1672), who applied the arguments of the ancient 
skeptics especially to theology, hniitiag the latter to the sphere of simple faith ; and the 
pupils of the latter, Sam. Sorbiere (1615-1670), who translated the IlyjMyposes Pyr- 
rlione^ of Sext. Empiricus, and Simon Foucher, Canonicus of Dijon (1644-90 ; of. on 
hun, F. Rabbe, Dabbe Simon Foucher, chamme de la cJtapelle de Dijon, Dijon, 1807), 
who wrote a Histoire des Academiciens (Par., 1090), a Dissert. depMlos. Academica (Par., 
1693), and a skeptical critique of Malebranche's Recfierche de la VcHte ; and also by 
Joseph GlanviU (died 1680), Hieronymus Himhaym (died at Prague, 1679), and Pierre 
Daniel Huet (1633-1721), and his younger contemporary, Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), 
to whom attention will be directed in the following, second, principal division. 

110. Side by side with this return of learned culture from scholas- 
ticism to the early Roman and Greek literature, stands, as its analogue, 
the return of the religious consciousness from the doctrines of the 
Catholic Church to the letter of the Bible. To the participants in this 
movement, the original, after the authority of tradition had been 
denied by them, appeared as the pure, genuine, and true, and what- 
ever additions liad been made to it were reo-arded not as constitutiuCT 
a real advance upon the original, but rather as the result of emascu- 
lation and degeneration. Yet they did not, in point of fact, rest satis- 
fied with the mere renewal of earlier forms, but went forward to a 
new reformatory development, for which the negation of the (till then) 
prevalent form of culture cleared the way. Acknowledging the 
authority of the Holy Scriptures, and of the dogmas of the Church in 
its earliest days. Protestantism rejected the mediaeval hierarchy and the 
scholastic tendency to rationalize Christian dogmas. The individual 
conscience found itself in conflict with the wav of salvation marked 
out by the Church. By this way it was unable to attain to inward 
peace and reconciliation with God. It could not advance beyond that 
stadium in the religious life in which the sentiment of the law and of 
sin, and of their antagonism, is predominant. This religious sentiment 
was rendered invincible by that form of Christian morals which cul- 
minated in the monastic vows, whereby the moral significance of labor, 
marriage, independence, and of all the natural bases of the spiritual 
life was underestimated ; and by indulgences and other means of pro- 
pitiation this same sentiment of antagonism was rather concealed than 
removed. Further, the reliijious conviction of the individual was 
found to be rather prejudiced than confirmed by the reasoning of the 
schools. It M-as felt that not the work prescribed by the Church, but 
personal faith alone possessed beatifying virtue; human reason was 


believed to conflict with that faith which the Iloly Ghost produces. 
In the first heat of the conflict the Reformers resrarded the head oi 
the Catholic Church as Antichrist, and Aristotle, the chief of the 
Catholic School-philosophy, as a "godless bulwark of the Papists." 
The logical consequence of these conceptions would have been the an- 
nihilation of all philosophy in favor of immediate, unquestioning faith ; 
but in proportion as Protestantism gained fixed consistence, the neces^ 
sity of a determinate order of instruction became equally apparent 
with that of a new ecclesiastical order. Melanchthon, Luther's asso- 
ciate, perceived the indispensableness of Aristotle as the master of 
scientific form, and Luther allowed the use of the text of Aristotelian 
writings, when not burdened with scholastic commentaries. There 
arose thus at the Protestant universities a new Aristotelianism, which 
was distinguished from Scholasticism by its simplicity and freedom 
from empty subtilties, but which, owing to the necessity of modifying 
the naturalistic elements in the Aristotelian philosophy, and especially 
in the Aristotelian psychology, so as to make them harmonize with 
religious faith, soon became, in its measure, itself scholastic. The 
erection of a new, independent philosophy on the basis of the general- 
ized Protestant principle, was reserved for a later time. 

On the philosophical notions peculiar to the time of the Reformation compare, especially, Mor. Carriere 
Stuttg. and Tiib., 18^7. Six complete editions of Luther's Works have been published, as follows: Witten- 
berg, 1539-58 ; Jena, 1555-58, together with two supplementary volumes publ. at Eisleben, 1564-65 ; Alten- 
burg, 1661-64, together with supplementary voL publ. at Halle in 1702 ; Leipsic, 1729-40 ; Halle, 1740-53 
(Walch's edition, the most complete one up to that time), and lastly, Erlangen and Frankfor1>on-the-Main, 
commenced in 1826 (67 vols, of writings in German and 30 in Latin had appeared up to 1867 and ten more 
were wanting, after the publication of which this edition will be not only the most correct, but also the most 
complete in existence). Of the numerous works on Luther, we may here mention, on aocoimt of their 
philosophical bearings, those of Chr. H. Weisse (Mart. Luth., Leips, 1845, and Die Christologie Luther'', 
Leips., 1853). Melanchthon's Works, published by his son-in-law, Peucer, at Wittenberg, 1562-64, have been 
republished by Bretschneider and BindseU in their Corpus He/oi'matorum, Halle and Brunswick, 1834 seq., 
in 28 volumes, to which Annales Vita et Indices (Brunswick, 1860) form a supplement; VoL XIII. contains 
the philosophical works, with the exception of the ethical ones, which may be found in VoL XVI ; the Scripta 
Vara Argumenti in Vol. XX. also include some philosophical writings. On Melanchthon, compare, among 
others, Joachim Camerarius. De vita Mel. narratio, 1566 (republ. by G-eorg. Theod. Strobel, 1777, and by 
August!, 1819) ; Friedr. Galle, Charakteristik M.'s als Theologen, Halle, 1840 ; Karl Matthes, Ph. M., sein 
Leben und Wirken, Altenburg, 1841 ; Ledderhose, M. iiach. s. dussem u. innem Leben, Heidelb., 1847 ; Adolf 
Planck. Mel. prmceptor Germanioe, Nordlingen, 1860 ; Constant. Schlottman, De Philippo MelaJicht/iorie reip. 
Ueterice reformatore comrn., Bonn, 1860 ; Bernhardt, Phil, MelancJUhon als Mathenuaiker und Physiker, 
Wittenberg, 1865 ; Pansch, Mel. alu Schulmann, Eutin, 1866. W. L. O. v. Eberstein has written of th 
nature of the logic and metaphysics of the so-called pure Peripateticians (HaUe 1800), and J. H. ab. Elswich 
in particular of AristoteUanism among the Protestants, in De varia Aristoielis in scholia Prolestantium 
fortuna schediasma, annexed to his edition (Wittenb. 1720) of Launoy's De varia Arist. fortuna in Acad. 
Parisiensi (see above, Vol I, 89, p. 356). 

Martin Luther (Nov. 10, 1483-Feb. 18, 1546) held that philosophy, as weU as 
religion, needed to be reformed. He says (Epist. Vol. 1., 64, ed. de Wette; cf. F. X. 
Schmid, Nic Taurellus, P- 4): "I believe it impossible that the church should be 
reformed, without completely eradicating canons, decretals, scholastic theology, philoso- 


phy, aaid log^c, as they are now received and taught, and instituting others in their 

The new philosophy should not control theology. "The Sorbonne," he says, 
' ' has propounded the extremely reprehensible doctrine, that whatever is demonstrated 
as true in philosophy, must also be accepted as true in theology. " Luther held that it 
was by no means sufficient to return from the Aristotle of the Scholastics to the real 
Aristotle- the former was a weapon of the Papists, the latter was naturalistic in 
tendency and denied the immortality of the soul, whUe his metaphysical subtleties 
were of no service to the science of nature. He not only expected no help from 
Aristotle, but held him in such horror, that he affirmed: "if Aristotle had not been of 
flesh, I should not hesitate to affirm him to have been truly a devil. " Melanchthon 
also (Feb. 16, 1497 April 19, 1560 ; his curious idea of making his Grecized name more 
euphonious by the ungrammatical omission of the letters ch, should be excused in the 
man, but not perpetuated in practice) shared for a time the feeUng of Luther. But 
the Reformation could not long continue without philosophy; experience taught its 
necessity. By merely appealing to the earhest documents of Christianity an authority 
had indeed been found which was sufficient to justify to the religious consciousness the 
negation of the later or non-original ecclesiastical development. But since the actual 
restoration of decayed forms could only have consisted with a state of torpidity (like 
that illustrated in the religious life of the Caraites), from which the Reformation in its 
first stadium was separated by a world-wide interval, it followed that no Church could 
be built up on the principle of a simple return to the embryonic state ; whenever the 
attempt was seriously made to carry out this principle, the result was fanatical sects 
Iconoclasts and Anabaptists. A developed theological system and a regulated order of 
instruction were viteUy necessary even for a Protestant Church, but were unattainable 
without the aid of philosophical conceptions and norms. Yet a new philosophy could 
not be created ; Luther's genius was religious, and not philosophical, and Melanchthon's 
nature was rather reproductive and regulative than productive. Consequently, since 
philosophy was indispensable, it was necessary to choose from the philosophies of 
antiquity. Said Melanchthon: "We must choose some kind of philosophy, which 
shall be as little infected as possible with sophistry, and which retains a correct 
method." He found the Epicureans too atheistic, the Stoics too fatalistic in their 
theology and too extravagant in their ethics, Plato and the Neo-Platonists either 
too indefinite or too heretical ; Aristotle alone, as the teacher of form, met the wants 
of the young, as he had those of the old Church. Accordingly Melanchthon con- 
fessed: "We cannot do without the monuments of Aristotle"; "I plainly perceive 
that if Aristotle, who is the unique and only author of method, shall be neglected, a 
great confusion in doctrine will follow" ; "Yet he, who chiefly follows Aristotle as his 
leader and seeks out some one simple and, so far as possible, unsophistical doctrine, 
can also sometimes adopt something from other authors." Luther, too, revised his 
previous opinions on the subject. In 1526, already, he admitted that the books of 
Aristotle on logic, rhetoric, and poetics, might, if read without scholastic additions, be 
useful " as a discipline for young people in correct speaking and preaching. " In the 
" JJnterricht der Vmtataren im Kurfarstentlium zu Saclisea (1528; written by Me- 
lanchthon, and expressing the common opinions of Luther and Melanchthon) and in the 
" TJnterricht dtr Vidtataren an die Pfarrherm in R&rzog Ilcinrich's zu Sac/isen Fiirsten- 
thum (15^9, Vol. X. in Welch's edition ; cf. Trendelenburg Erl'iut. zii den Elenienten der 
Aristot. Logik^ Preface) it is required that grammatical instruction should be followed 
by instruction in logic and rhetoric. But the logical instruction could only be founded 



on Aristotle. Melanchthon prepared a number of manuals for the use of instructors. 
Classically educated, publicly praised in his early youth by Erasmus of Rotterdam," 
related to Reuchlin, and on terms of friendship with him, in whose contest with the 
Dominicans he also took part, it was impossible that he should find pleasure in the 
insipid subtilties of the Scholastics. Following the example of Valla and Rud. 
Agxicola, he went back to the text of Aristotle, but modified and toned down the ideas 
of Aristotle; his style is more elegant than profound. In the year 1520 appeared his 
first manual entitled Compendiaria dialectices ratio; m. 1522 the first edition of the 
Loci theologici (in which, with reference to the dogmas peculiar to the Reformation, 
especially the doctrines of original sin and predestination, more rigid ground is taken 
than in the later editions, while in reference to the doctrine of the Trinity and other 
dogmas derived from the Catholic Church, less rigid ground is taken) ; in 1527 the 
Dicdectica Ph. M. ab atictore adaucta et recognita ; va. 1529 the third edition, entitled 
De Dialecta Libri guatuor (also in 1533, etc.) ; and finally, in 1547, the Erotemata Dla- 
lec. (also in 1550, 1552, etc.). Melanchthon defines {Dial.., I. I. init.) dialectic as " the art 
and way of teaching " ; he is concerned not so much with the method of investigation 
(since, in his view, the most important truths are given either in the form of innate 
principles or by revelation), as with that of instruction. He treats (conformably to the 
serial order of the works in Aristotle's Organon: Isagoge of Porphyry, Categ. De 
Interpret., Analyt., Top.) first of the five Prmdicabilia: species, genus, differentia, 
proprium, accidens ; then of the ten categories or Prcedicamenta : substantia, quantitas, 
qualitas, relatio, actio, passio, quando, ubi, situs, Juibitus; next (in the second Book) of the 
various species of propositions, and then of syllogisms (Book III.), and ends with the 
Topica (Book IV.). He lays principal stress on the doctrines of definition, division, and 
argumentation. He extols dialectic as a noble gift of God {Erotemata Dialectices, epist. 
dedicat^ma p. VII. : ''lit numerarum notitia et donum Dei ingens est et valde necessaria 
horn, vitoe, ita veram docendi et ratiocinandi mam sdamus Dei danum esse et in exponenda 
doctrina codesti et in inquisitione veritatis et in aliis rebus necessariam"). Mel. de 
Rhetor. Libri Tres. were published at Wittenberg in 1519, and the Philosophic moraUs 
Epitome, ibid., 1587; Melanchthon had previously published commentaries on single 
books of Aristotle's Ethics. Subsequently (Witt., 1550) appeared the work: Ethica 
doctrincB dementa et enarratio libri quinti Ethicorum {Aristotelis). In ethics as in 
logic, Melanchthon follows chiefly Aristotle, but gives to the subject, in the last-named 
work, rather a theological turn, the will of God being there presented as the highest 
law of morals. In his Commentarius de Anima (Wittenberg, 1540, 1542, 1548, 1558, 
1560, etc.), as also in his Initia doctrinw physiccB, dictata in Academia Witebergensi (ibid. 
1^1549), Melanchthon adopts as the basis of his exposition the ideas of Aristotle. Me- 
lanchthon retained (even after the promulgation of the Copemican System, to which 
Osiander, the greatest of the Lutheran theologians of the period of the Reformation, 
was friendly, and notwithstanding that he himself confessed the eminence and sound- 
ness of Copernicus in other respects) the Aristotehco-Ptolemaic astronomy, even 
maintaining that the civil authorities were bound to suppress the new "so wicked 
and atheistic opinion." To the stars he ascribed an influence not only on the tempera- 
tiire {ortus Pleiadum ae Hyadum regvlariter pluvias affert, etc.), but also on human 
destinies. Natural causes, he says, operate with necessity, except when God in- 
terruptfi {int&rrumpit) the regular mode of action. In defining the soul Melanchthon 
defends the false reading hScUxcia against Amerbach (1504r-57), whom the quarrel about 
evTe\cx"a led finally to leave Wittenberg and to become a Catholic. Psychical life is 
classified by Melanchthon, after Aristotle, as vegetative (the epewTKcdc of Aristotle), 


sensitive including the vis appetitiva und hcomotioa {luadrtTtKSv, opcxriKov, KifnriKov^ nark 
to'ttoi) and rational (i/oi)ri5i') ; to the rational soul belong the intellect and the -will. 
Melanchthon includes memory among the functions of the intellect (herein departing 
from Aristotle), and thus vindicates for the latter a share in the immortality at- 
tributed by Aristotle to the active intellect (i-oOs rroi7jriiis). The theory that ideas like 
those of number and order, and of geometrical, physical, and moral principles, are 
innate he would not give up, yet represents the intellect as being excited to activity 
through the senses. Of the philosophical proofs offered by Plato, Xenophon, and 
Cicero, for the immortality of the soul, he says : hmc argumenta cogitare prodest, sed 
tamen sciamns, patefactwnes divinas intuendas esse. In addition to the experience of 
the senses, the principles of the intellect and syllogistic inference, the divine revelation 
contained in the Bible constitutes a fourth and the highest criterion of truth. Me- 
lanchthon is unfriendly to theological speculations; the interpretation of the three 
persons in God as representing intellect, thought, and wiU or mens, cogitatio and 
voluntas {in qua sunt latitia- et amor) he admits only as containing a partially perti- 
nent comparison. The joint author with Luther of the Reformation approved the 
execution of heretics ; the burning of Servetus was a " pious and memorable example 
for all posterity." 

Until the rise of the Cartesian and Leibnitzian philosophies, the Peripatetic doctrine 
reigned in the Protestant schools. The doctrine of Ramus to which a few, including 
Rudolf Goclenius, made concessions made but slight headway against it. Among its 
teachers were Joachim Camerarius (1500-1574), Jacob Schegk, and Philip Scherbius. 
Still there were some men who resumed the opposition which Luther had at first 
directed against it; among these we may mention in particular Nicolaus TaureUua 
(see below, 111). In order, however, that the impidse to the emancipation of the 
spirit from every external, unspiritual power, and to its positive replenishment with the 
highest truths might accomplish its work in all the spheres of spiritual life, it was 
necessary that the Protestant principle should become generalized and deepened, so 
that it might extend beyond the merely religious sphere, and that, even within this 
sphere, the limitations with which the principle was burdened, and which more and 
more checked and falsified the reformatory movement, might be removed from it. Such 
a development was impossible by the way of a merely immanent development of eccle- 
siastical Protestantism on the basis of its historical beginnings ; it was necessary that 
other factors should concur with this one for the production of the desired result. Cf . 
in particular 111 and the remarks under 114 on the genesis of Cartesianism. 

111. The modern mind, dissatisfied with Scholasticism, not only 
went back to the classical literature of ante-Christian antiquity and tcv 
the writings constituting the biblical revelation, but, setting out from 
the sciences of antiquity, also directed its endeavors more and more to 
independent investigation of the realities of nature and mind, as also 
to the problem of moral self-determination independently of external 
norms. In the fields of mathematics, mechanics, geography, and astron- 
omy, the science and speculation of the ancients were first restored, 
and then, partly by a gradual progress, and partly by rapid and bold 
discoveries, materially extended. With the assured results of investi- 
gation were connected manifold and largely turbulent attempts to 


establish on the basis of the new science new theological and philv 
sophical conceptions, in which attempts were involved the germs ol 
later and more matured doctrines. Physical philosophy in the transi- 
tional period was more or less blended with a form of theosophy 
which rested at first upon the foundation of N eo-Platonisra and the 
Cabala, but which gradually, and especially on the soil of Protestant- 
ism, attained a more independent character. A physical philosophy 
thus blended with theosophy, not yet freed from scholastic notions nor 
contradicting the affirmations of ecclesiastical theology, and yet resting 
on tlie new basis of mathematical and astronomical studies, was maio- 
tained about the middle of the fifteenth century by Nicolaus Cusanua, 
in whom the mysticism of Eckhart was renewed, and from whom, later, 
Giordano Bruno derived the fundamental features of his own bolder 
and more independent doctrine. Physics, in its combination with 
theosophy, continued to be taught, and was further developed in the 
sixteenth century, and also even in the seventeenth. Among its pro- 
fessors were Paracelsus, the physician ; Cardanus, the mathematician 
and astrologer; Bernardinus Telesius, the founder of the Academia 
Cosentina for the investigation of nature, and his followers, Fran- 
cescus Patritius, the Platoiiizing opponent of Aristotle, Andreas Ce- 
salpinus, the Averroistic Aristotelian, Nicolaus Taurellus, the opponent 
of the latter and an independent German thinker, Carolus Bovilliis, 
a supporter of the Catholic Church and disciple of Nicolaus of 
Cusa, Giordano Bruno and Lucilio Vanini, the anti-ecclesiastieal 
free-thinkers, and Thomas Campanella, the Catholic opponent of 
Aristotle. The religious element prevailed with Schwenckfeldt 
and Valentin Weigel, Protestant theologians, and with Jacob Bohme, 
the theosophist, among whose followers have been H. More, John 
Pordage, Pierre Poiret, and, in more modern times, St. Martin, and 
whose principles were employed by Baader and by Schelling by 
the latter on the occasion of his passing over in his speculations from 
physical philosophy to theosophy. The theories of law and civil 
government were developed in an independent manner, without def- 
erence to Aristotelian or to ecclesiastical authority, and in a form more 
adapted to the changed political conditions of modern times, by the 
following men : Machiavelli, who placed an undue estimate on politi- 
cal power, to the attainment and retention of which he would have all 
other aims in life subordinated ; Thomas Morus, the Utopian theorizer, 
who sought the diminution of social inequality and a mitigation of 


the severities of legislation ; Jean Bodin, the protagonist of tolerance ; 
Gentilis, the liberal Professor of natural law, and Hugo Grotius, the 
founder of the theory of international law. 

Of several of the natural philosophers of the transitional period, Thadd. Ans. Rixner and Thadd. Siber 
treat in their Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Phys-iologie im tceiteren nnd enyeren Sinne (Leben uiui Meinungen 
heruhmter Physiker im 16. uiid 17. Ja/irfi.), Sulzbach, 1819-26. Cf. works on the history of physical philos- 
ophy, and monographs, such as Max Parchappe's Galilee, Paris, 1866, etc. The philosophers of law and 
statesmen of the same period are especially treated of by C. von Kaltenborn, in Die Vorldu/er des Hugo Oro- 
tius, Leipsic, 1848. Cf. also Joh. Jac. Smauss, Neues System des Reclits der Natur, Book I., pp. 1-370 ; 
Historie des Rechts der Natur (of especial value for the time before Grotius) ; L. A. Wamkcinig, Rechtsphi- 
losophie all Naturlehre des Rechts, Freiburg im Breisgau, IS.'jg (vrith new title-page, ibid., 1854) ; H. F. W. 
Hinrichs, Gesch. der Rechts- und Staatsprincipien seit der Reformation, Leips., 1848-52 ; Hob. von Mohl, Ge- 
schicJite und Litteratur der Staatswissensc/iaften, Erlangen, 1855-1858 ; Wheaton's History of Iniemutional 
Law, and other works relating to the history of law and the philosophy of law, and politics. 

The Works of Nicolaus of Cusa were published in the fifteenth century, probably at Basel, and in the 
sixteenth by Jacob Faber Stapulensis, Paris, 1514, also Has., 1565; a German translation of his most important 
works by F. A. Scharpff, was publ. at Freiburg in 1862. Of him treat Harzheim (VitaN. de C, Treves, 
1730), P. A. Scharpff (Der Card. N. v. C, Mayence, 184.3), Fr. J. Clemens (Giordano Bruno und Nic. Cus., 
Bonn, 1846). J. M. Diix (Der deutsche Card. N. v. C. u. die Kirche s. Zeit. Regensburg, 1847), Rob. Zimmer- 
mann (Der Card. Nic. Cusanus als Vorldufer Leibnitzens, from the Transactions of the Acad, of Sciences at 
Vienna for 1852, Vienna : BraumuUer, 1852), Jager (Der Slreit des Cardinals X. C. mit dem Herzoge Sieg- 
mund von Oesterreich, Insbruck. 1861); T. Stumpf (Die polit. Ideen des JY. von C, Cologne, 1865). Cf. 
Kraus, Verzeichniss der Handschriften, die N. C. besass, in Naumann's Serapeum, 1864, Nos. ".3 and m. 
and 1865, Nos. 2-7 ; Jos. Klein, Ueber ei7ie Handschrift des Nic. v. Cues, Berlin, 1866 ; Clem. I id. Brock- 
haus, Nicolai Cusani de concilii universalis potestate sententia (Diss, inaug.) Leips., 1867. 

The Works of Paracelsus were printed. Has., 1589, Strasb., 1616-18, and Geneva, 1658 ; of him treat J. J. 
Loo.s in Vol. I. of Daub and Creuzer's Stiidien, Kurt Sprengel in Part 3d of his Gesch. der Arzneilztnde, Rix- 
ner and Siber in the first part of Beitrdge zur Gesch. der Physiol. , Sulzbach, 1819. Rob. Fludd, Hist, macro- 
et microcosnii metaph., physica et technica, Oppenheim, 1617. Philos. Mosaica, Gudce, 1638. Bapt. Hel- 
mont. Opera, Amsterdam, 1648, etc. Franc. Merc. Helm. Opusc. Philos, Amsterdam, 1690. Cf. on J. B. v. 
Helmont, Rixner and Siber's Beitr., No. VII., Spiess, H.'s System der Medicin, Frankfort, 1840, and M. 
Rommelaere, Etudes sur J. B. Helmont, Bruxelles, 1868. Joh. Marc. Marcia Kronland, Ideanim operatricum 
idea s. hypothesis et detectio illius orcultce virtutis, quoe semina fecundat et ex iisdem corpora organica 
producit, Prague, 16-34; Philosophia vetus restituta: de m,utationibus, quae inuniversojiunt, de partium 
universi constitutione, de statu hominis secundum, naturam et prceter naturam, de curatione morborum, 
Prague, 1662; on Marcus Marci see Guhrauer, in Vol. XXI. of Fichte's Zeitsch. f. Ph., Halle, 1852, pp. 

Cardanus' work, De Subtilitate, appeared first in print in 1552, his De Varietate Rerum in 1556, his 
Arcana Eternitatis not till after his death, in his collected works : Eieronymi Cardani ifediolanensis 
opera omnia cura Caroli Sponii, Lyons, 1663. Cardanus' rule for solving equations of the third degree is 
found in his work (publ. 1543), entitled : Ars magna s. de regulis algebraicis. C. wrote an autobiography, 
which first appeared at Bas., 1543, and again, continued, ibid., 1575 ; his natural philosoi)hy is minutely ex- 
pounded in the above-cited BeUr. zur Gesch. der Physiol., by RLxner and Siber, No. II. Scaliger's Exerd- 
tatione?. Exoteric(e, in reply to C."s De Subtilitate, was published Par., 1557; C. replied in an Apologia, 
which is subjoined to the later editions of his De Subtilitate. 

The two first Books of Bemardinus Telesius' principal work, De Natura juxta propria Principia, ap- 
peared at Rome in 1565, the whole work, in nine Books, at Naples in 1586, and again at Geneva in 1588 with 
Anilr. CiBsalpinus' Qucestiones Peripateticce ; certain minor works by Telesius were published together at 
Venice in 1590. An extended summary oi his natural philosophy is contained in the third part of the above- 
cited Beitrdge of Rixner and Siber. 

Franciscus Patritius, Discussionef peripateticce, quibus Aristotelicce philosophia universce historia ntque 
dogmata cum veterum placitis collata eleganter et erudite declarantur. Pars I IV., Venice, 1571-81, Basel, 
1581 ; Nora de universis philosophia in qua Ari.stMtelira methodo nan per motum, sed per lucem et liimina ad 
primam causam nscenditur, deitule propria Pntritii methodo tota incontemplationemrenit diriiiiitas. postre- 
mo methodo Plaionica rerum universitax a londitore Deo deduritur. Forrara, 1591, Venice, 1593, Lond., 1611. 
Rixner and Siber treat of him in the fourth part of the " Beitrdge " cited above. 

Petrus Ramus, Scholarum phys. libri octo, Pari-s 1565 ; Schol. metaphys. libri quatuordedm. Par., 1566. 
Sebastian Basso, Philosophia naturalis adv. Aristotelem libr. duodecim. Par., 1621 (also 1649). Claude Quil- 


lermet de Berigard (or Bauregard), Circuli Pisani seu de veterum et peripateilca pMlosopMa dialogi, TJdine, 
1643 47, Padua, 1661. Sennerti PAystco, Wittenberg, 1618; Opera omnia, Venice, 1641 etc. Jfagneni 
Democritus reviviscens, Pavia, 1646, etc. Jfaignani cur.rus pliilosophicus, Tonlonse, 1652, and Lyons, 1673. 

Nicolaus Taurellus, Philosophia iriump/ius, hoc est, metaphysica philosophaiuli niethodus, qua divini- 
tus inditis menti jiotitiis humarwR raUones eo deducuntur. ut Jlrmissimis i/ide construciis demonstratioiiibxis 
aperte rei Veritas eliuxscat et qu<^ diu p/iilosophorum sepuUafuit authoritate philosophia victrix erumpat ; 
qucestionibus enim vel sexcentin ea, quibus cum revelata nobis veritate philosophia pugnare videbatur, adeo 
vei-e conciliantur, ut nonjldei solum servire dicenda sit, sed ejus esse JundameiUum, Basel, 1573 ; Alpes 
ccesce, hoc est, Andrece Ccesalpini [tali moiistrosa et superba dogmata discussa et excussa, Frankf., 15iyr, a 
po\eimca,\ Sijfiopis Arist. ifetaph., Hanau, 1596; 7)6 mii/ido, Amberg, 1603; Uranoiogia, Amb., 1603, De re- 
rum ceternitate: metaph. universalis partes quatuor, in quibus placita Aristotelis, Vallesii, Piccolominei, 
Ccesalpini, soci^tatis Conimbricensis aliorumque discutiuntur, examinantur et refutantur, Marburg, 1604. 
On N. Taurellus have written, specially, Jac. Willi. FeuerUn, Di-^s. apologetica pro Nic. Taurello philosopho 
Altdorjino atheismi et deismi injuste accusato et ipsius Taurelli Synopsis Arist. metaphysices recusa cum 
annot. editoris, Nuremberg, 1734; F. X. Schmid of Schwarzenberg, Xic. Taur., der erste detUsche Philosoph, 
axtsden Quellen dargestelU, Erlangen, 1860, new ed. ib., 1864. 

On Carolus Bovillus, see Joseph Dippel, Versuch einer sj/st. Darstellung der Philosophie des C. B. Tiebst 
einem kurzen Lebensabriss, Wurzburg, 1S65. 

The Italian works of Giordano Bruno have been edited by Ad. Wagner, Leipsic, 1829, the Latin, in part 
(egpecially those on Logic), by A. F. Gfrbrer, Stuttg., 1834 ; -lord. Br. de urribris idearum edit. nov. cur. Salva- 
tor Torgini, BerL, 1868. On Bruno cf., besides F. H. Jacobi (cited below), and ScheUing in his Dialogue en- 
titled Bruno Oder uber das nalurliche und g'dttliche Princip der Binge (Berlin 1802), Rixner and Siber in the 
above-cited Beitriige, Part 5, Sulzbach, 1824 ; Steflens, in his Xacligel. Schriften, Berlin, 1846, pp. 4376, 
Falkson, O. Bruno (written in the form of a romance), Hamburg, 1846, Chr. Bartholmess, Jordano Bruno, 
Paris, 1846 47, F. J. Clemens, Giordano Bruno und Nicolaus von Cusa, Bonn, 1847, Joh. Andr. Scartazzini, 
Giordano Bruno, ein Blutzeuge des Wissens (a lecture), Biel, 1867 ; Domenico Berti, Vita di G. Br., Mor- 
ence, 1868. Cf. also M. Carrifire, Diephilos. Weltanschauung der liefomiationszeit, Stuttg., 1849, p. 365 seq., 
and in the Zeitschr. f. Philos., new series, 54, 1, Halle, 1869, pp. 128-1.34 : and, on the relation of his doctrine 
to that of Spinoza, Schaarschmidt, Descartes uiul Spinoza, Bonn, 1850, p. 181 seq. 

A complete edition of the works of CampaneUa was commenced (never completed) at Paris by their au- 
thor ; but recently (Turin, 1854) the Opere di Tommaso CampaneUa, have been published by Alessandro 
d'Ancona, prefaced by an essay on C.'s life and doctrine. Of him treat Rixner and Siber in Part 6 of the 
above-cited Beitriige ; also Baldachini, Vita e Filosofla di Tommaso Campayiella, Naples, 1840 43 ; Manuani, 
In his Dialoghi di Scienza Prima, Par., 1846 ; Spaventa, in the Cimento, 1854, and in Carattere e Sviluppo 
delta Filosofla Ital. dal Seeole XVI. sino al Nostre Tempo, Modena, 1860. Cf. Strater's BHefe uber ital. 
Philos. in ^'' Der Gedanke,'''' Berlin, 1864 65; Sigwart, Thomas Camp. u. seine politischen Ideen, in the 
Preuss. Jahrb., 1866, No. 11, and Silvestro Centofanti in the Archivo storico ItaXiano, Vol. I. p. 1, 1866. 

LuciUo Vanini, Amphitheatrum, oetemm providentim, Lyons, 1615 ; De admtrandis naturce regina 
deoeque mortalium arcanis libri quatuor. Par., 1616. On LucUio Vanini, cf. Leben und Schicksale, Charakter 
nnd Meinungen des L. V., elites Atheisten im 17 Jahrh., von W. D. F., Leips., 1800, and Emile Vaisse, i. 
v., sa vie, sa doctrine, sa mort, Extrait des Memoires de CAcad. imperiale des sc. de Toulouse. 

Of Jacob Bohme's principal work, entitled " Aurora Oder die Morgenrothe im Aufgang," an epitome 
was first printed in 1634 ; the work was published in a more nearly complete form at Amst., 1656 etc. Hifl 
Works, collected by Betke, were published, Amst., 1675, more complete ed. by Gichtel, ibid., 1682 etc. ; and 
more recently by K. W. Schiebler, Leips. 183147, 2d ed., 1861 seq. Of him treat Adelung in his Gesch. der 
menschl. Narrheit, II, p. 210 ; J. G. Ratze, Blumenlese aus J. B.'s Schriften, Leipsic, 1829 ; Umbreit, J. B., 
Heidelberg, 1S35 ; Wilh. Ludw. Wullen, J. B.'s Leben und Lehre, Stuttg., 1836, Bluthen aus B.'s Jfvstik, 
Stuttg., 1838 ; Bamberger, Die Lehre des deutschen Philosophen J. B., Mimich, 1844 ; Chr. Ferd. Baur, Zur 
Oeschichte der protestaniischen Mystik, in Theol. Jahrh., 1848, p. 453 seq. 1849, p. 85 seq. ; H. A. Fechner, J. 
B., sein Leben und seine Schriften, Gorlitz, 1857 ; Alb. Pelp, J. B., der deutsche Philosoph, der Vm-lauSer 
ctiristlicher Wissemchaft, Leipsic, 1860. Louis Claude St. Martin (1743-1804) translated several of Bohme's 
works into French: VAurort naissante, Les Irois principes de VesseTice divine, De la triple vie de Thomme, 
Quara7ite questions sur Tame, avec une notice sur J. B., Paris, 1800. On St. Martin (whose poems F. Beck 
has translated and annotated, Munich, 1863) cf. Matter, St. M., lephilosophe inconnu, son jnaltre MaHinez de 
Parqualio, et leurs groupes, Paris, 1862, 2d ed., 1864. 

MacchiaveUi's Works, first published at Rome, 1531-32, have since been up to the most recent times very 
frequently republished, also repeatedly translated into French and English, and into German by Ziegler, 
Carlsruhe, 1832-41. Istoria Fiorentine, Florence 15-32 ; German translation by Eeumont, Leipsic, 1846 [Eng- 
lish translation by C. E. Lester, 2 Vols., New York, 1845 ; another translation was published In London in 
1847.-7y.] ; cf. A. Ranke, Zur Kritik neuerer Ge.'icMchtsschreiber, Berl. and Leipsic, 1821. [English transL 
of n Principe, by J. S. Ryerley, London, ISlO.-Tr.] Th literature relating to Macchiavelli is brought to 


gcther by Robert von Mohl {Gesch. u. LiU. der Staaisicistensch/jften, Vol. Ill, Erlangen 1858s pp. Bia-591X 
who with preat organizing talent gives a luminous summary of the manifold opinions of the different authors. 
Eapecially noteworthy among the attempts at refutation is the youthful composition of Frederick the Great ; 
Anti-Macchiavelli, on which cf. besides Mohl (who here judges unfairly; although it was the intention of 
Frederick in writing the work to furnish an historical cstimat/.^ and refutation of Machiavelli, and although his 
work viewed in this light is very weak, yet as an expression of the author's views of the conduct, ia ethical and 
political regards, which befits a prince whose dominion is already secured, and of his reflections with reference 
to his own future conduct as a ruler, the work is well worthy of attention ; Mohl errs in considering the work 
only in the former aspect), Trendelenburg, 3f. und A.-M., Vortrag sum Geddchtniss F.'s d. G., gehalten am 
35. Jan. 1855 in der k. Akad. der Wiss., Berlin, 1855, and Thcod. Bernhardt, MacchtaveilC* Buck vom Fiirsten 
und F.''s d. Gr. Antimacchiavelli, Brunswick 18C4. 

Thomas Moms, De optima reip. statu deque nova insula Utopia, Louvain, 1516 etc., German transl. by 
Oettinger, Leips., 1846. [The above is contained in Vol. II. of More's Complete Works, Louvain, 1566. This 
Vol. contained all his Latin works. The first, and the only other volume, containing M.'s English works, was 
printed at London, 155n.-7V.] On More cf. Rudhart, Nuremberg, 1829. 2d ed., 1855, and Mackintosh, L\fe oj 
Sir Th. M., London, 1S30, 2d cd., 1844. 

Jean Bodin, Six livres de la reptiblique, Paris, 1577 (Latin version by the cnthor, 1584) ; Colloquium 
heptaplomeres, German abridgment, with the Latin text in part, Berl., 1841 ; complete edition from MS. in 
the Library at Giessen, ed. L. Noack, Schwerin, 1857. A notice on the history of the work was published by 
E. G. Vogel, in the Serapeum, I&IO, Nos. 8-10. Cf., on Bodin, H. Baudrillart, J. B. et son temps, tableau des 
theories politique-^ et des idies economiques du seizieme siicle, Paris, 1853, and N. Planchenault (president du 
tribunal civil (t Angers), Etudei sur Jean Bodin, magistrat et publiciste, Angers, 1858. 

On Hugo Grotius cf., among the more recent WTiters, H. Luden, BT. O. nach seinen Schicksalen und 
Schriften, Berlin, 1806; Charles Butler, Life of IT. Gr., London, 1826; Friedr. Creuzer, Luther und Grotius 
Oder Glaubeund Wissenschaft, Heidelberg, 1846; cf. Ompteda, LiU. des Volkerrechts, Vol. I, p. 174, seq.; Stahl, 
Gesch. der EecfUsphilnsophie, p. 158 seq., v. Kaltenbom, Kritik des Volkerrechts, p. 37 seq. ; Robert von 
Mohl, Die Gesch. und Lift, der Staat.9wiss., I, p. 229 seq. ; Hartenstein, inAbh. der sdchs. Gesellsch. der TFiss., 
1860, and in Hartenstein'a Hist.-philos. Abh., Leipsic, 1870 ; Ad. Franck, Du droit de la guene et de lapaix 
par Grotius, in the Journal des Savants, July, 1867, pp. 428-441. The principal work of Grotius, " On the 
Jmw of War and Peace,"'' has been translated and annotated by Von Kirchmann and published in his Philot. 
Bibliothek, Vol. 16, Berlin, 1869. 

Nicolaus Cusanus (Nicol. Chrypffs or Krebs), bom in 1401 at Cusa, in the arch bi- 
shopric of Treves, was educated in his youth among the Brothers of the Common Life, 
studied law and mathematics at Padua, then applied himself to theology, filled ecclesi- 
astical oflBces, was a member of the Council of Basel, became in 1448 Cardinal, in 1450 
Bishop of Brixen, and died in 1464 at Todi in Umbria. He occupies a middle position 
between Scholasticism and Modem Philosophy. Familiar with the former, he, like the 
greater part of the Nominalists before him, lacked its conviction that the fundamental 
propositions of theology were demonstrable by the scholasticaUy educated reason. His 
wisdom, he affirmed, was the knowledge of his ignorance of which subject he treats 
in his work (written in 1440), De Docta Ignorantia. In the subsequent work, De Con- 
jecturis, complementary to the above, he aflirms that all human knowing is mere con- 
jecture. With the Mystics he seeks to overcome doubt and the difficulties arising from 
the inadequacy of human conceptions in theology, by the theory of man's immediate 
knowledge or intuition of God (intuitio, speculatio, visio sine comprehemione, compre- 
Iiensic incomprehensibUis), a theory grounded on the Neo-Platonic doctrine that the 
8oul in the state of ecstasy (raptiis) has power to transcend all finite limitations. He 
teaches that by intellectual intuition (intuitio inteUectu.ali.s) the unity of contradictories 
(coincidentia contradictorium) is perceived (which principle, founded in the pseudo- 
Dionysian mystical philosophy, had already reappeared with Eckhart and his disciples, 
and was again taken up by Bruno). But wdth the skepticism and mysticism of Nico- 
laus of Cusa was combined the spirit and practice of mechanical and astronomical in- 
vestigation on the basis of observation and mathematics. From the influence of this 
DJactice on his philosophic thought arises the essential community of his doctrine 


with modem philosophy. In 1436, already, Nicolaus had written a work, De .Repara- 
tions Calendarii^ in which he proposed a reform of the calendar similar to that of 
Gregory. His astronomical doctrine included the idea of the rotation of the earth on 
its axis, whereby he became a fore-runner of Copernicus (whose work on the paths of 
the celestial bodies appeared in 1543 ; cf. , among other works, Franz Hipler, Nicolam, 
Copernicus^ und Martin Luther^ Braunsberg, 1868). In connection with his doctrine of 
the motion of the earth Nicolaus advanced to the theory of the boundlessness of the 
universe in both time and space, thus essentially transcending the limits of the medie- 
val imagination, whose conceptions of the universe were boiinded by the apparent 
sphere of the fixed stars. In the philosophical deduction of his theology and cosmo- 
logy Nicolaus Cusanus follows chiefly the numerical speculation of the Pythagoreans 
and the Platonic natural philosophy. Number, he teaches, is unfolded reason {ratio 
explicata, and rationalis fabriccB naturale qiLoddam puUulans principium). Nicolaus Cu- 
sanus defines God as the unity, which is without otherness (the Jc, the ravrov without 
tTs.pov)^ and (with Plato) holds the world to be the best of generated things. The world 
is a soul-possessing and articulate whole. Every thing mirrors forth in its place the 
universe. Every being preserves its existence by virtue of its community with all 
others. Man's ethical work is to love every thing according to its place in the order of 
the whole. God is triune, since he is at once thinking subject, object of thought, and 
thought [intelligens, i?itdligibile, intdligere) ; as being unitas, cequalitas, and cannexio, he 
is Father, Son, and Spirit (ab unitate gignitur unitatis mqualitas; connexio vero ab 
unitate procedit et ab unitatis cpqualitate). God is the absolute maximum; the world 
is the unfolded maximum^ the image of God's perfection. In love to God man becomes 
one with God. In the God-man the opposition of the infinite and the finite is reconciled. 

The Platonists of the next following time, and especially those of them who made 
much of the Cabala such as Pico of Mirandula, Reuchlin, and especially Agrippa 
of Nettesheim, and also Franciscus Georgius Venetus (F. G. Zorzi of Venice), author 
of the work De Tiarmonia mundi totius cantica (Ven., 1525) give evidence in their 
works of the influence upon them of the new science of mathematics and the new 
spirit of natural investigation, which were being developed in their times. StUl, their 
attempts to make use of natural science for the control of nature assumed, for the 
most part (as notably in the case of Agrippa), the form of the practice of magic. 

The consciousness clothing itself in the forms of mysticism of a natural caus- 
ality imparted by God to things, also lay at the bottom of the then widely-extended 
belief in astrology (a belief shared by Melanchthon). But the union of the independ- 
ent study of nature with theosophy appears in this period most marked in the works 
of Philippus Theophrastus (Bombast) Hohener, or von Hohenheim, who called himself 
(translating the name Hohener or "von Hohenheim") Aureolus Theophrastus Para- 
cdsus (bom 1493 at Einsiedeln in Switzerland, died in 1541 at Salzburg). He intended 
to reform the science of medicine ; diseases were to be healed rather by an excitation 
and strengthening of the vital principle (Archeus) in its struggle with the principle of 
disease and by the removal of obstacles, than by direct chemical reactions. Cold was 
not to be opposed by heat, nor dryness by moisture, but the noxious working of a 
principle was to be neutralized by its salutary working (an anticipation of the homeo- 
pathic doctrine). The doctrines of Paracelsus contain an extravagant mixture of chem- 
istry and theosophy. To the same school with Paracelsus belonged Robert Fludd {de 
Fluctibus, 1574-1637), Joh. Baptista van Helmont (1577-1664) and his son. Franc. Mer- 
curius von Helmont (1618-'99), Marcus Marci of Kronland (died 1676), who renewed 
the Platonic doctrine of idem operatrices, and others. 


Hieronymus Cardanua (1501-1576), mathematician, physician, and philosopher, 
followed Nicolaus Cusamis in blending theology with the doctrine of number. He 
ascribed to the world a soul, which he identified with light and warmth. Truth, he 
said, was accessible only to a few. He divided men into three classes : those who arc 
deceived but do not deceive, those who are deceived and who deceive others, and those 
who are neither deceived nor deceive. Dogmas useful for ends of public morals the 
State ought to maintain by rigid laws and severe penalties. When the people reflect 
concerning religion, nothing but tumults can arise from it. (Only the openness with 
which he confesses this doctrine is peculiar to Cardanus; as matter of fact, every 
power ideaUy condemned, but still outwardly dominant, has acted upon it.) These 
laws, it is true, are not binding on the wise ; for himself Cardanus follows the prin- 
ciple : " Truth is to be preferred before all things, nor is it wrong for the sake of truth 
to oppose the laws " {Veritas omnibus anteponenda neque impium duxerim propter Ulam 
adcersari legibus). For the rest, Cardanus was a visionary, and fuU of puerile super- 
stitions. His opponent, Julius Cassar Scaliger (1484-1558), a pupil of Pomponatius. 
judges him thus : eum in quibiLsdam interdum plus homine sapere^ in plurimis minut 
giiovis puero inteUigere, "in some things occasionally wiser than a man, but in most 
things less intelligent than any boy." 

Bemardinus Telesius (bom at Cosenza 1508, died ib. 1588) became one of the found- 
ers of modem philosophy by undertaking to combat the Aristotelian philosophy, not in 
the interest of Platonism, or any other ancient system, but in the interest of natural 
science, founded on original investigation of nature ; but for support in this undertak- 
ing he resorted to the ante-Socratic natural philosophy, and especially to that pro- 
pounded (but only as doctrine of appearances) by Parmenides. Syllogisms were, in his 
view, an imperfect substitute for sensation, in the matter of cognition. He founded 
at Naples a society of natural investigators, the Academia Telesiana or Cosentina, after 
the model of which numerous other learned societies have been formed. 

Franciscus Patritius, bom at Clissa in Dalmatia in 1529, taught the Platonic philos- 
ophy at Ferrara in the years 1576-93, and died at Rome in 1597. He blended Nec- 
Platonic with Telesian opinions. In his Discussiones Peripat. he explains and at the 
same time combats the Aristotelian doctrine. Many works attributed to Aristotle were 
considered by him as spurious. He entertained the wish that the Pope would employ 
his authority for the suppression of Aristotelianism, and in favor of the modified 
Platonism, the doctrine of emanations of light, which he had developed. He trans- 
lated the commentary of Philoponus on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, and also Hermes 
Trismegistus and the Oracles of Zoroaster ; his own doctrine was developed by him in 
the work entitled, Nova de universi^ jMlosophia, etc. 

Among those who agreed with Telesius and Patritius hx their opposition to the Aris- 
totelian physics and metaphysics, and in the atterupt to reform these doctrines, were 
Petrus Ramus, the above-named ( 109, p. 12) opponent of the Logic of Aristotle, and 
who published (after the publication by his antagonist, Jac. Carpentarius, of a Descrip- 
tio xiniversm naturm ex Aristotele, Par., 1562) ScJwUirum phys. libr. octo, and Scholnrvm 
metnphys libr. quatuordedm ; also Sebastian Basso, author of Phik)sop]n<r naturalis adv. 
Aristotelem libr. dvodecim, and Claude Guillermet de Berigard (or Bauregard, who, 
about the year 1667, held a Professorship at Padua), in his work, Circuli Pisani, etc. 
As Gassendi (above, 109, p. 15), from Epicurus, so Sennert and Magnenus drew from 
Democritus in their endeavors for reform in the department of physics, while Maignan 
followed Empedocles. 

Among the above-named (109, pp. 10-15) Aristotelians, Andreas Csesalpinus (1519- 


1603), who developed Averroistic Aristotelianism into pantheism, should here be again 
mentioned as an independent investigator, to whom animal and vegetable physiology 
are indebted for important enlargements. 

As a representative of the Protestant Church, Nicolaus Taurellus (bom 1547 at 
Mompelgard, died at Altdorf in 1606) combated not only the Averroistic Aristotelian- 
ism of Caesalpinus, but also Aristotelianism in general, and all human authority in 
philosophy {'' maximam 'philosophim inaculam inussit authoritas''^)^ and undertook to 
frame a new body of doctrine, in which there should be no conflict between philosophi- 
cal and theological truth. Taurellus will not, he says, while he believes as a Christian, 
think as a heathen, or be indebted to Christ for faith, but to Aristotle for intelligence. 
He holds that but for man's fall philosophy would have sufficed {dicam uno verba quod 
res est : sipeccatum non esset, sola viguisset philosophia), but that in consequence of the 
fall, revelation became necessary, which completes philosophical knowledge by that 
which relates to the state of grace. Taurellus regards the doctrine of the temporal and 
atomic origin of the world (conceived as first made up of Tincombined atoms, and this 
doctrine in opposition to the theory of the creation of the world from aU eternity), as 
also the dogma of the Trinity, not (with the Aristotelians) as merely revealed and theo- 
logical, but (with Platonists) as also phUosophicaUy justifiable doctrines. But his 
Christianity is confined to fundamental dogmas ; he will not be called a Lutheran 
or a Calvin ist, but a Christian. The appropriation of salvation through Christ is, in 
his view, the work of human freedom. Those who convince themselves that Christ 
died for them will be saved, and all others will be eternally damned. The triumph 
of philosophy emancipated from Aristotelianism and in harmony with theology, is 
celebrated by Taurellus in the work: Philosophm triumphus^ and in other works. 
Schegk and his pupil and successor, Scherbius, the Altdorf Aristotelians, defended 
against Taurellus, as also against Ramus, the Aristotelian doctrine; but Goclenius, 
Professor at Marburg, although admitting some of the doctrines of Ramus into his 
logic, was favorably disposed toward Taurellus. In general, Taurellus found little 
sympathy among his contemporaries. Leibnitz esteemed him highly as a vigorous 
thinker, and compared him to Scaliger, the acute opponent of Cardanus. 

Carolus BovUlus (Charles Bouille, bom about 1470 or 1475, at Sancourt near Amiens, 
died about 1553, an immediate pupil of Faber Stapulensis, see above, 109, p. ll)devel- 
oped a philosophico-theological system, catholic in spirit, and founded on the principles 
of Nicolaus Cusanus. 

Giordano Bruno, bom in the year 1548 at Nola in the province of Naples, developed 
the doctrine of Nicolaus Cusanus in an anti-ecclesiastical direction. He was instructed 
in his youth in the humanities and in dialectic at Naples. He entered the Dominican 
Order, but quitted it upon arriving at convictions in conflict with the dogmatic teach- 
ings of the Church, and repaired to the Republic of Genoa, thence to Venice, and soon 
afterwards to Geneva. The reformed orthodoxy of Geneva, however, proved no more 
congenial to him than that of Catholicism, and leaving that city he went by way of 
Lyons to Toulouse, thence to Paris, and from Paris to Oxford and London. According 
to the theory of Falkson {G. Bruno, p. 289) and of Benno Tschischwitz {Shakespeare's 
Hamlet, Halle, 1868), Shakespeare became acquainted with a comedy entitled el Can- 
ddajo, written by Bruno while residing in London (1583-1586), and perhaps with others 
of his writings, and derived from them some of the ideas particularly on the subject 
of the tndestructiblity of the material elements and the relativity of evil which he 
expresses by the mouth of the Danish Prince. From London Bruno journeyed by way 
of Paris to Wittenberg, thence to Prague, Helmstadt, Frankfort-on-the-Mainwhere 


he remained till 1591 Zurich, and Venice; here, on the 23d of May, 1592, having been 
denounced by the traitor Moccnigo, he was arrested by the Inquisition, and in 1593 was 
delivered to the Roman authorities. In Rome ho suffered several years' confinement 
in the dungeons of the Inquisition. At last, since he remained unmoved in hLs convic- 
tions, and with noble fidelity to truth scornfully refused to be guilty of a hypocritical 
submission, he was condemned to the stake (with the customary mocking formula : 
" Delivered to the secular authorities with the request that they would punish him as 
mildly as possible and without effusion of blood"). Bruno replied to his judges : " I 
suspect that you pronounce my sentence with greater fear than I receive it." He was 
burned at Rome in the Campofiore on the 17th of February, 1600, a martyr to scien- 
tific convictions founded on the free investigations of the new epoch. Emancipated 
Italy has honored bim with a statue, before which, on the 7th of January, 1865, the 
Papal Bncyclica of December 8, 1864, was burned by students. With the Copemican 
system of the universe, whose truth had become certainty for him, he considered the 
dogmas of the Church to be incompatible. And indeed soon afterwards (March 5, 
1616) the Copernican doctrine, which had at first been not unfavorably received on the 
part of the ecclesiastical authorities, was described by the Index-Congregation as 
'^ falsa ilia doctrina Pythagorka, Divirueque Scripturm omnino adversans." Bruno's 
astronomical views are an expansion of the Copemican doctrine. For him the universe 
is infinite in time and space ; our solar system is one of innumerable worlds (for which 
doctrine he also cites the authority of Epicurus and Lucretius), and God the original 
and immanent cause of the universe. Power, wisdom, and love are his attributes. The 
stars are moved, not by a prime mover {primus motor), but by the souls immanent in 
them. Bruno opposes the doctrine of a dualism of matter and form ; the form, moving 
cause, and end of organic beings are identical not only with each other, but also with 
the constituent matter of the organisms ; matter contains in herself the forms of 
things, and brings them forth from wdthin herself. The elementary parts of all that 
exists are the minima or monads, which are to be conceived as points, not absolutely 
vmextended, but spherical ; they are at once psychical and material. The soul is a 
monad. It is never entirely without a body. God is the monad of monads ; he is the 
Minimum, because all things are external to him, and at the same time the Maximum, 
since aU things are in him. God caused the worlds to come forth out of himself, not 
by an arbitrary act of will, but by an inner necessity, hence without compulsion, and 
hence also freely. The worlds are nature realized, God is nature working. God is 
present in things in like manner as being in the things that are, or beauty in beautiful 
objects. Each of the worlds is perfect in its kind ; there is no absolute evil. All indi- 
vidual objects are subject to change, but the universe remains in its absolute perfection 
ever like itself. Inimically disposed towards Scholasticism, Bruno held in high honor 
the attempts at new speculation, which he found in the works of Raymundus Lullius 
and Nicolaus Cusanus. When treading on neutral groimd in philosophy he often de- 
fended the art of Raymundus. Of Nicolaus Cusanus, from whom he took the prinei- 
pium coincidentuB oppositonim, he speaks in his works in terms of great respect, not 
forgetting, however, to mention that Nicolaus, too, was hampered by his priest's gown. 
He was pleased with the new path opened up by Telesius, but did not by personal and 
special investigations follow it himself. Bruno demands that, beginning with the low- 
est and most conditioned, we rise in our speculations by a regular ascent to the high- 
est, but he did not himself always proceed according to this method. It was his pecu- 
liar merit that he laid hold upon the first results of modem natural science, and with 
the aid of a powerful fancy combined them in a complete system of the universe. 


eyatem corresponding with the spirit of modem science. Those works of Giordano 
Bruno, in which he chiefly develops his system, were written in Italian. Of these the 
most important is the Ddla Causa^ Principio ed Uiw, Venice (or London), 1584 ; an 
abstract of this work is appended by F. H. Jacobi to his work on the doctrine of 
Spinoza ( Werke, vol. iv. AbtJi. 1). In the same year appeared the DeW Injinito Universo 
e Mondi. Of his Latin works the more important are : Jordani Bi^uni de compendiosa 
architectura etcomplemento artis LidUi, Yenice, 1580; Paris, 1582. De triplici minimo 
(L 6. on the mathematical, physical, and metaphysical Minimum) et mensura libri 
guingue, Frank., 1591. De monads, numero et figura liber, item de immenso et infg- 
urabiliet de innumerabilibxis, seu de universo et mundis libri octo, Frank., 1591. 

Galileo Galilei (1564-1641) acquired by his investigation of the laws of falling 
bodies a lasting title to esteem not only as a physicist, but also as a speculative philoso- 
pher. Worthy of note are his maxims of method : independence of authority in mat- 
ters of science, dout)t, and the founding of inferences on observations and exijeriments. 

Thomas CampaneUa (bom at Stilo in Calabria in 1568, died at Paris in 1639), 
although a Dominican of the strongest ecclesiastical sympathies and a zealot for a 
universal Catholic monarchy, did not, since he appeared as an innovator, escape sus- 
picion and persecution. Accused of conspiring against the Spanish government, he 
was kept in strict confinement from 1599 to 1626, after which he passed three years in 
the prisons of the Romish Inquisition ; finally released, he passed the last years of his 
life (1634-1639) at Paris, where he met with an honorable reception. Campanella 
recognizes a twofold divine revelation, in the Bible and in nattire. In a Canzone 
(translated into German by Herder) he describes the world as the second book in which 
the eternal mind wrote down its own thoughts, the living mirror, which shows the 
reflection of God's countenance ; human books are but dead copies of life, and are 
full of error and deception. He argues especially against the study of nature from the 
works of Aristotle, and demands that (with Telesius) we should ourselves explore 
nature {De gentilismo non retinendo ; TJtruin liceat novam post gentiles condere philoso- 
fhiam ; Utrum liceat Aristoteli con.tradicere ; Utrum liceat jurare in verba magistri, 
Par. , 1636). The foundation of all knowledge is perception and faith ; out of the lat- 
ter grows theology, out of the former, under scientific manipulation, philosophy. 
Campanella (like Augustine and several Scholastics, especially Nominalists, and like 
Descartes subsequently) sets out from the certainty which we have of our own exist- 
ence, seeking to deduce from it, first of aU, the existence of God. From our notion of 
God he attempts to establish God's existence ; not, however, ontologicaUy (like An- 
selm), but psychologically. As a finite being -so he reasons I cannot myself have 
produced in me the idea of an infinite being, superior to the world ; I can only have 
received it through the agency of that being, who therefore must realty exist. This 
infinite being, or the Deity, whose " primalities " are power, wisdom, and love, pro- 
duced in succession the ideas, angels, the immortal souls of men, spaoe and the world 
of perishable things, by mingling in increasing measures non-being with his pure being. 
All these existences have souls; there exists nothing without sensation. Space is 
animate, for it dreads a vacuum and craves replenishment. Plants grieve, when they 
wUt, and experience pleasure after refreshing rain. AU the free movements of natural 
objects are the result of sympathy or antipathy. The planets revolve around the sun, 
and the sun itself around the earth. The world is God's living image {mvndus est Dei 
Ttva statua). CampaneUa's theory of the state (in the Civitas Soils) is founded on the 
Platonic Rep. j but the philosophers called to rule are regarded by him as priests, and 
(in his later works) this Platonic doctrine becomes the groundwork for the theory 


of a universal rule of the Pope ; he demands the subordination of the State to the 
Church, and such persecution of heretics as was practised by Philiji II. of Spain. 

Setting out from the Alexandrism of Pomponatius, Lucilio Vaniai, the Neapolitan 
(born about 1585, burned at Toulouse in 1619), developed in his Amj)Jiitheatrum, 
^EternoB ProvidentuB, and in his De admirandis naturcE, etc., a naturalistic doctrine. 
That he aflBrmed his submission to the Church did not save him from a rather horrible 
than tragic doom. 

In England it was Bacon of Verulam (1561-1626), above all others, that successfully 
conducted the contest against Scholasticism. Bacon stands on the boundary-line 
between the period of transition and the period of modem times, but may partly 
since he discarded the theosophic element and sought a methodology for the pure 
investigation of nature, and partly because of his essential connection \vith a new and 
essentially modem development-series, culminating ia Locke be more appropriately 
treated of below ( 113). 

The natural philosophy of aU the thinkers thus far named contained more or 
less of the theosophical element. Theosophy became predominant in the doctrines 
of Valentin Weigel and Jacob Bohme. Valentra Weigel (bom in 1533 at Hayna, 
near Dresden, died after 1594 ; of. on him Jui Otto Opel, Leipsic, 1864) shaped 
his doctrine after that of Nicolaus Cusanus and of Paracelsus, and in part after 
that of Caspar Schwenckfeld of Ossing (1490-1561), who aimed at the spiritualization 
of Lutheranism. In a similar relation to Weigel and Paracelsus stood the shoe- 
maker of Gorlitz, Jacob Bohme (1575-1624), who by the idea which dawned upon 
him in the midst of the dogmatic strife concerning original sin, evil, and free-will 
of a ' ' dark " negative principle in God (into which, in his hands, Eckhart's doctrine 
of the unrevealable absolute became transformed), acquired philosophical significance, 
and, in particular, offered a welcome starting-point for the speculation of Baader, Schel- 
ling, and Hegel, who took up again this same idea. However, in the development of 
his theosophy Bohme either seeks to minister solely to the ends of religious edification, 
or, when pretending to philosophize, proceeds fantastically, giving to chemical terms, 
which were not understood, psychological and theosophical significance, and identifying 
minerals with human feelings and divine personalities. 

Nicolo MacchiaveUi (bom at Florence in 1469, died 1527), author of the History of 
Florence from 1215 to 1494, introduced into the philosophy of law and politics an essen- 
tially modem principle, by setting forth as the ideal, which the statesman must seek by 
the most judicious means to attain, the independence and power of the nation, and, so 
far as compatible therewith, the freedom of the citizen. This principle was announced 
by him with special reference to the case of Italy. With a prejudiced enthusiasm for 
this ideal, MacchiaveUi measures the value of means exclusively with reference to their 
adaptation to the ends proposed, depreciating that moral valuation of them which re- 
gards them in themselves and in relation to other moral goods. Macchiavelli's fault lies 
not in the conviction (on which, among other thiags. all moral justification of war must 
be founded) that a means which involves physical and moral evils must nevertheless be 
willed on moral grounds, when the end attainable only through this means outweighs 
these evils by the physical and moral goods involved in it, but only in the narrowness of 
view implied in appreciating all means -with sole reference to one end. This narrowness 
is the relatively necessarj' correlate to that extreme which was illustrated by represent- 
atives of the ecclesiastical principle, who estimated all human relations exclusively 
from the point of \-iew of their relation to the doctrine of the Church, regarded as abso- 
lute truth, and to the society of the Church, regarded as synonjTnous %\-ith the kingdom 


of God. Macchiavelli makes war on the Church as the obstacle to the unity and free- 
dom of his country. He prefers before the Christian religion which, he says, diverts 
the regard of men from political interests and beguiles them into passivity the religion 
of Ancient Rome, which favored manliness and political activity. Macchiavelli's custom 
of subordinating all else to the one end pursued by him, has impressed upon his differ- 
ent works a different character. Of the two sides of his political ideal, namely, civil 
freedom, and the independence, greatness, and power of the state, the former is made 
prominent in the Discord sopra la prima decade di Tito Livio, and the latter in II Prin- 
cipe^ and that in such manner that in the Principe republican freedom is at least pro- 
visionally sacrificed to the absolute power of the prince. Still Macchiavelli reduces the 
discrepancy by distinguishing between corrupt and unhappy times, which need despotic 
remedies, and times when there exists that genuine public spirit which is the condition 
of freedom. " Whoever reads with a shudder M.'s Prince should not forget that M. 
for long years previously had seen his warmly -loved land bleeding under the mercenary 
hordes of all nations, and that he in vain recommended, in a special work, the introduc- 
tion of armies of native militia " (Karl Kniess, Das moderne Kriegswesen,'ein Vortrag, 
Berlin, 1867, p. 19). 

In free imitation of Plato's ideal state, Thomas Morus (bom at London 1480, behead- 
ed 1535) gave expression in fantastic form, in his work, De Optimo Reip., etc., to philo- 
sophical thoughts respecting the origin and mission of the state. He demands, among 
other things, equality of possessions and religious tolerance. 

The philosophy of law and the state among Catholics and Protestants in this period 
was substantially the Aristotelian, modified among the former by Scholasticism and 
canonical law, and among the latter especially by biblical doctrines. Luther has in view 
only the criminal law when he says (in an address to Duke John of Saxony) : " If all 
men were good Christians there would be no necessity or use for princes, kings, lords, 
swords, or laws. For, what good end could they serve ? The just man does of himself 
all and more than all that aU laws require. But the unjust do nothing as they ought; 
for this reason they need the law, to teach, force, and urge them on to do well." Me- 
lanchthon (in his Philosophic Morcdis libri duo, 1538), Joh. Oldendorp (eiVayw^ii, sive el&- 
mentaris introductio juris naturalis, gentium et civilis, Cologne, 1539), Nic. Hemming 
{Delege nature methodus apodictica, 1562, etc.), Benedict Winkler {Principiorum juris 
libri quinque, Leips., 1615), and others, found in the decalogue the outhnes of natural 
law (jus naturale), Hemming, in particular, in the second table of the law, the first 
being, according to him, of an ethical nature and relating to the vita spiritualis. (Olden- 
dorp's, Hemming' s, and Winkler's works on natural law are given in outline in v. Kal- 
tenbom's work cited above.) As in ethics, so in the theory of law and politics, Protes- 
tants laid emphasis on the divine order, and Catholics, and more particularly Jesuits 
(such as Ferd. Vasquez, Lud. Molina, Mariana, and BeUarmin ; also Suarez and others), 
on the part of human freedom. The state is (like language), according to the Scho- 
lastico -Jesuitic doctrine, of human origin. Luther calls magistrates a sign of divine 
grace, for if uncontrolled the peoples of the earth would destroy each other by assas- 
sination and massacre. In their offices and in their secular government magistrates 
cannot be without sin, but Luther neither sanctions the resort to private vengeance on 
the part of those who have grievances, nor makes any mention of constitutional guar- 
anties, but simply directs us to pray to God for those in authority. The early Prot- 
estant doctrine was favorable to political absolutism, but was nevertheless conducive 
to the social and religious freedom of the individual. 

The merit of having vindicated the equal claim of all religious confessions to polit- 


ical toleration, and of having' founded the theories of natural law and of politics on 
ethnography and the study of history, belongs especially to Joan Bodin (bom at Angers 
1530, died 1596 or 1597). His views on these topics are expressed in his Six Livrcs de 
la Bi'pubUque, as also in his Juris Universi Distributio and his Colloquium Ileptaplorneres 
de abditi'S rcrum sublimium arcaiiis (very recently for the first time i>ublished entire). 
The Colloquium is an impartisan dialogue on the various religions and confessions, and 
in it the demand of tolerance for all is based on the recognition, by the author, of the 
relative truth contained in each one of them. Bodin's ethics rest on a deistic basis. 

Albericus Gentilis (bom in 1551, in the district of Ancona, died, while a Professor 
at Oxford, in 1611) wrote among other works, De legationibus libri tres (Lond., 1585, 
etc.), Dejure belli libri tres (Leyden, 1588, etc.), and Dejustititi beUicd (1590). In these 
works he deduced the principles of legal right from nature, and particularly from hu- 
man nature ; took his stand ^vith More and Bodin in favor of tolerance, and among 
other things demanded that the commerce of the sea be made free. He thus became 
a predecessor of Hugo Grotius. 

Hugo Grotius (Huig de Groot, bom at Delft 1583, died 1645, at Rostock), by his 
work : Mare liberurn seu dejure, quod Batavis competit ad Indica commercia (Leyden, 
1609), in which, in order to vindicate the claim of the Netherlanders to free trade in 
the East Indies, he develops philosophically the outlines of maritime law, and by his 
principal work, on Jurisprudence, De Jure Belli et Pads (Paris, 1G25, 1632, etc.), con- 
tributed to the permanent advancement of the science of natural law, and founded 
scientifically the doctrine of international law, or the law of nations. As in the law of 
persons, so in that of nations, or international law, Grotius distinguishes between jus 
naturale and jus voluiitarium (or civile) : the latter is based on positive provisions ; the 
former flows with necessity from the nature of man. By the^'s divinum Grotius un- 
derstands the precepts of the Old and New Testaments ; from this he distinguishes 
the law of nature as a. jus Jiumamwi. Man is endowed with reason and language, and 
therefore intended to live in society ; whatever is necessary to the subsistence of so- 
ciety comes within the sphere of natural right (and also, whatever furthers the pleas- 
ures of social life belongs, as /its naturale laxius, within the sphere of natural right in 
the -wider sense j. It is on the basis of this principle of society that, in questions of 
natural right, reason decides, with whose affirmations tradition generally agrees in 
civilized nations, furnishing in this sense an empirical criterion of natural right. Civil 
society rests on the free consent of its members, hence on contract. The right to 
punish belongs only in so far to the state, as the principle of the custodia societatis de- 
mands it : the object of punishment is not retribution {quiapeccatum est), but simply 
the prevention of violations of the law by deterring and improving men {ne peccetur). 
Grotius demands that all positive religions should be tolerated, and that those only 
who deny what mere Deism even admits, viz., God and immortality, should not be 
tolerated. Still he defends in his De Veritate Beligionis CJiristiance (1G19) the Christian 
dogmas common to the various confessions. The extensive biblical studies of Grotius 
(the fruits of which are communicated especially in the Anrwt. in iVl 7'., Amst., 1641- 
1646, etc., and Aniwt. in V. T., Par., 1(>44, etc.) are of great philological, exegetical, 
and historical value ; the religious standpoint of the author is a wavering one, reten- 
tion in principle of faith in revelation, combined with an actual approximation to that 
critico-historical and rationalistic style of treatment which is incompatible with the 
continued existence of such faith. Chancellor Samuel Cocceji published in 1751, in 
five quarto volumes, hia o^v^^ and his father's commentaries on Grot, de Jure Belli ac 



112. The Second Division in the history of Modern Philosophy 
is characterized by the coexistence, in developed form and in relations 
of mutual antagonism, of Empiricism and Dogmatism, while Skep- 
ticism attains to a more independent development than in the tran- 
sitional period. According to the doctrine of Empiricism, the only 
method of philosophical inquiry is experiment and the combination 
of facts ascertained by experiment, and ^philosophical knowledge is 
limited to the objects of experience. Dogmatism is the philosophy of 
those who believe themselves able in thought to transcend the limits 
of all experience, and to demonstrate philosophically the fundamental 
doctrines of theology, in particular the doctrines of God's existence 
and of the immortality of the human soul and who have not, there- 
fore, through critique of the faculty of cognition, been brought to deny 
the possibility of transcending in speculation the sphere of experience. 
The principle of Skepticism is universal doubt, or at least doubt with 
regard to the validity of all judgments respecting that which lies 
beyond the range of experience. It differs from the later Critical 
Philosophy in not recognizing, on the ground of a critique of the 
reason, the existence of a province inaccessible, indeed, to human 
reason, but whose existence is rendered sure on other grounds. 

On the philosophy of this period, cf. besides the sections relating thereto in the larger historical 
works cited above (pp. 1, 2), as also the Gench. des 18. Jahrhimderts, by Schlosser, and other historical works 
especially Ludw. Feuerbach, Gesch. der 7ieueren Philosophie von Baco bis Spinoza, Ansbach, 1833, 2d ed., 
1844, together with his works which relate especially to Leibnitz and Bayle ; Damiron, Essat sur Vhist. de la 
philos. au XVIIme silcle. Par., 1846; Do. au XVIIIme slide. Par., 1858-64. 

The foregoing definitions belong to Kant. The historic correctness of Kant's 
characterization of the types of philosophy which next preceded his owti, may and 
must be admitted, even though Kant's philosophical standpoint be no longer re- 
garded as philosophic truth or as the absolute standard of measurement for earlier 
systems. Kant's Criticism does not restrict the means of knowledge in philoso- 
phy to experience ; it only declares that the objects of that knowledge are contained 
solely within the sphere of experience. 

It is true that Empiricism proceeds "dogmatically" in this more general sense; 
that it foxinds itself on the belief that the objective world is not absolutely beyond the 
reach of our faculties of knowledge, but that it is, on the contrary, cognizable so far 
as our experience reaches. But Empiricism does not for this reason fall within the 
definition of Dogmatism as above given the definition which since Kant's time it haa 
been customary to connect with this word. Nor is it a more pertinent objection to 


the above definitions, that the conception of Empiricism is rendered too narrow, being 
applicable only to the school which prevailed from Bacon to Locke ; it applies no less 
to the Sensualism of Condillac and the Materialism of Holbach, by which phOosophical 
knowledge was limited, in both form and context, to the Empirical. "Realism" and 
" Idealism," however, are terms of very indefinite and wavering signification. 

To the empirical school belong Bacon and Hobbes and several of their contem- 
poraries, Locke and the English and Scotch philosophers, whose doctrines, whether 
similar or opposed to his, were more or less nearly related to his doctrine, the 
French Sensualists and Materialists of the eighteenth century, and in part, also, the 
leaders of the German "clearing-up" period. The Coryphaji of the dogmatic school 
were Descartes, Spiuoza, and Leibnitz. Skepticism reached its culminating point in 
Hume. That Spinoza is to be classed among the dogmatists, is correctly remarked by 
Kant, who, in a note to his essay entitled, ' ' Was heisst sich im Denken orientiren ? " 
says that Spinoza proceeded so dogmatically with reference to the cognition of super- 
sensible objects, that he even vied with the mathematicians in the rigor of his demon- 
strations. Cf. below, 130. 

Since the philosophers of these different directions exercised an important reciprocal 
influence on each other, it is scarcely possible to present the whole history of each of 
the principal schools in uninterrupted sequence ; the chronological order wiU, therefore, 
so far as it corresponds with the genetical, be the more appropriate one. 

113. Bacon of Yerulam (1561-1626) stripped off from natural phi- 
losophy the theosophical character which it bore during the Transitional 
Period, and limited it in its method to experiment and induction. 
The fundamental traits of this method he made a part of the phi- 
losophic consciousness of mankind, as emancipated in its investiga- 
tions from the restriction to any particular department of natural 
science. He thus became the founder not, indeed, of the empirical 
method of natural investigation, but of the empirical line of modern 
philosophers. It was Bacon's highest aim to increase the power of 
man by enlarging the range of his knowledge. Just as the art of 
printing, powder, and the compass had transformed civilized life, and 
given to modern times their superiority over all preceding ages, so 
through ever new and fruitful discoveries the new path once opened 
was to be consciously pursued still further ; whatever was conducive 
to this end was to be adopted and fostered, and that which would lead 
away from it was to be avoided. Religious controversies, says Bacon, 
are pernicious. Let rehgion remain untouched, but let it not (after 
the manner of the Scholastics) be mixed up with science ; the min- 
gling of science with religion leads to unbelief, and the mingling of 
religion with science, to extravagance. The mind must be freed from 
superstition and from prejudice of every kind, in order that, as a 
perfect mirror, it may so apprehend things as they are. Knowledge 

must begin ^vith experience. It should set out with observation and 


experiment, whence through induction it sliould rise methodically 
first to propositions of inferior, and then to others of higher generality, 
in order finally from these to redescend to the particular, and to arrive 
at discoveries which shall increase the power of man over nature. 
Bacon's liistorical significance arises from the following facts : that he 
indicated some of the essential ends and means of modern culture; 
that he vigorously though one-sidedly emphasized the value of 
genuine self -acquired knowledge of nature ; that he overthrew the 
Scholastic method of beginning in philosophy with conceptions and 
principles supposed to be given by the reason or by divine revela- 
tion, and with it the disputatious, inexperimental science which was 
founded on this method ; and that he indicated the fundamental 
features of the method of experimental, and inductive inquiry. 

The development by Bacon in detail of the principles of his 
method, though containing some important merits, was in many 
respects a failure ; and his attempts by personal investigation to apply 
in practice the method for which he had found the most general 
philosophical expression, were rude, and not to be compared with 
the achievements of earlier and contemporaneous investigators of 
nature. Bacon narrowly over-estimated the importance of the ma- 
terial elements of civihzation. lie attempted to supply the want of 
religious and moral culture on his own part, by an unconditional 
submission to dogmas to which he was himself indifferent, and by 
seeking after power with little reference to the means which he might 
employ. For this he paid the penalty in disgraceful weakness of 

Ilobbes (1588-1679), the political philosopher and friend of Bacon, 
developed, in application of Bacon's principles, a theory of the state 
as founded on the unconditional subordination of all actions and eyen 
of all opinions to the will of an absolute monarch. Ignoring the 
power of public spirit in political affairs, whereby the union of free- 
dom and unity is rendered possible, Hobbes regarded this form of 
absolutism as the only means by which it was possible for man to 
emerge from his natural state, a state of universal war. Hobbes' 
older contemporary, Herbert of Cherbury, founded a form of ration- 
alism, the basis of which was a universal religion, or religion of na- 
ture, formed by abstraction from the positive religions, and regarded 
as containino; alone the elements of all relia-ion. In the next-succeed- 
ing period there prevailed among the English philosophers a renewed 


Platonism, equally removed from the Aristotelianism of the Scho- 
lastics and from the naturalism of Hobbes, but friendly to mysticism 
and in part also to Cartesianisni. Some, like Joseph Glanville, 
favored skepticism in science, in order to assure rehgious faith against 
all attacks. 

The first draught of Bacon's work, De iHgnitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, was written in EngUsh, and 
published under the title, The Tioo Books of Francis Bacon on the Projicience arui Advancement of Learning, 
Divine and Human, Lond., 1005. The Latin version, much more full and elaborate, appeared, ibid. 1C3;3, 
Leyden, 1652, Strasburg, 1654, etc., and in the German transl. of Joh. Herm. Pfingsten, Pesth, 17y3. In the 
year 1612 appeared the work, Cogitaia et Visa, which was subsequently worked over into the Novum Or- 
ganum Scientiarum, first publ., London, 1620, and very frequently since then ; recently, Leipsio, 1837 and 
ISM ; translated into German by G. W. Bartholdy, Berlin, 1793, and by Briick, Leipsic, 1830. The Essays, 
Moral, Economical, and Political, which appeared first in 1597, have in recent times been edited (not to men- 
tion other editions) by W. A. Wright (Lond. 1862), and Rich. Whately (6th ed., Lond. 1864 [reprinted at 
New York. TV.]); their title in the Latin translation is Sermones FUleles. Bacon's Works, collected by 
William Rawlay, and accompanied with a biography of Bacon, were published at Amst., in 166.3, and at P'rank- 
fort-on-the-M., 1665 ; a completer edition was that of Mallet, likewise accommpanied with a biography, Lond. 
1740 and 1765. Latin editions of his Works have appeared at Franld., 1666, Amst., 1684, Leips., 1694, Ley- 
den. 1696, and Amst., 1730. French ed. by F. Riau.x : CE'uvres de Bacon, Paiis, 1852. The most recent edi- 
tions of his Works are those of Montague, London, 1825-34, Henry G. Bohn, London, 1846, and R. L. Ellis, J. 
Spedding, and D. D. Heath, London, 1858-59, with a supplement (Vols. VIII. and IX. of the Works) entitled : 
Tlie Letters and Life of FraJicis Bacon, including all his occasional Woi-ks, newly collected, revised and set in 
chro7iological order, with a commentary biographical and histmHcal, by James Spedding, London, 1862-68. Of 
the numerous works on Bacon may be mentioned the following : Analyse de la philosophie du chancellier 
Fraticois Bacon, avec sa vie, Leyden, 1756 and 1778 ; J. B. de VauzeUes, Eistoire de la vie et des outrages de 
Fr. Bacon, Paris. 1833 ; Jos. de Maistre, Examen de la philosophie de Bacon, Par., 1836, 7th ed., Lyons and 
Paris, 1865. 8th ed., ibid., 1868; Macaulay, in the Edinb. Review, 18.37, translated into German by Biilau, 
Leips., 1850; John CampbeU, The Lives of the Lord Chancellors of England, vol. II., London, 1845, chap. 51 ; 
M. Napier, Lord Bacon and Sir Walter Raleigh, Cambridge, 1853 ; Charlas de R6musat, Bacon, sa vie, son 
temps, sa philosophie et son influence jusqu" a nos jours, 2d ed.. Par., 1858, new edition, 1S6S; Kuno Fischer, 
Franz Baco von Verulam, die Realphilosophie und ihr Zeitalter, Leipsic, 1856, translated into English by John 
Oxenford, London 1857; cf. J. B. Meyer, B.'s Utilismus jiach K. Fischer, Whewell und Ch. de Remusat, in 
the Ztschr. f. Ph. u. ph. Krit., N. S. Vol. 36, 1860, pp. 242-247 ; K. F. H. Marx, Franz B. und das letste ZieX 
der drstlichen Kunst, in the Abh. der k. Ges. der Wiss. zu Gdttingen, Vol. IX., 1860 ; C. L. Craik, Lord Bacon, 
his Writings and his Philosophy, new edition, London, 1860 ; H. Dixon, The Persotml Bi.itoi-y of Lord Bacon, 
from unpublished letters and documents, London, 1861, an attempt to defend the character of Bacon, to which 
reply was made in Lord Bacon^s Life and Writings, an An.'ticer to Mr. II. DixovCs Pers. Hist, of L. B., Lon- 
don, 1861 ; AdoU Lasson, Montaigne und Bacon, in the Archiv f. neuere Spr. u. Lift., XXXI., pp. 259-276, 
Ueber B.'s wis.senschaftliche Principien, Progranim der Louisenst. Realschule zu Berlin, Autumn 1860 ; 
Justus von Liebig, Ueber Francis Bacon von Verulam und die Methode der \atrirforschung, Munich, 1863. 
Lasson and Liebig dispute (in part after the precedent set by Brewster, Whewell, and others) the opinion that 
Bacon either founded, practised, or even properly indicated the method of modern natural investigation. That 
which both of them censure in Bacon, is almost without exception justly censured ; but his positive merits, the 
empha.sis laid by him on natural science as a valuable element of general civilization, and his designation of the 
general principles of inductive inquiry, have been with equal justice emphasized by others. C. Sigwart, Ein 
Philosoph und ein Naturfwsclier ilber B., in Haym's Preuss. Jahrb., Vol. XII., No. 2, August, 1863; cf. his 
answer to a rejoinder by Liebig publ. in the Axigsb. Allg. Zeitu7ig, in Preuss. Jahrb., XIII., No. 1, Jan. 1864 ; 
Heinr. BiJhmer, Ueber B. und die Verbindung der Philosophie mit der Naturiciss., Erlangen, 1864 (1863). E. 
WohlwiU, B. V. V. und die Gesckichte der Naturwissenschaft, in the D. Jahrb. f. Pol. u. Litt., Vol. IX., No. 
3, Dec., 1863, und Vol. X., No. 2, Febr., 1864. George Henry Lewes says, in his work on Aristotle, p. 113 
(London, 1864, German transl. by Cams, Leipsic, 1865) : "Grandly as Bacon traces the various streams of error 
to their sources, he is himself borne along by these very streams, whenever he quits the position of a critic and 
attempts to investigate the order of nature for himself." Alb. Desjardins, Dejure apud Franciscum B., Par., 
1862 ; Const. Schlottmann, B.^s Lehre ton den Idolen und ihre Bedeutung fur die Gegenwart, in Qelzer'a 
Prot. Monatsbl., Vol. 21, Febr. 1863 ; Th. Merz, B.'s Stellung in der CuUurgeschichie, in Gelaer's Prot. Mo- 
natsbl.. Vol. 24, No. 3, Sept. 1864 ; H. v. Bamberger, Ueber B. v. V. bes. torn medicinlschen StandpunJcte, 
Wursburger Qratulationsschrift zum 50(ijhhriiien Juhiliinm der UnitersitSt zu Wien, Wvirzburg, 1SC6. 


Ed. Chaigne et Ch. Sedail, Vlnjluence des travaux de B. d. V. et de Descartes sur la marche de 
Vesprit humain, Bordeaux, 1865 ; Karl Gruninger, Liebig wider Baco, (G. Pr.), Basel, 1866. Aug. Domer, 
De Baconis Philosophia (Inaug. Dissert.), Berlin, 1867. 

The Works of Hobbes, in collection made by himself, were published in Latin, Amst., 1668 ; the liret 
EngUsh complete edition of his moral and political Works appeared at London, in 1T50. [Complete works, 
Molesworth ed., 16 vols., Lond., 1839-1855.] Notices respecting the life of Hobbes are found partly in his 
own writings, particularly in his Autobiography ( The Life of Thomas Hobbes, written by himself in a Latin 
Poem, and translated into English, Lond., 1680), and partly in the compilation published by Richard 
Bathurst, entitled : Th. II. Angli Malmesburiensis vita, CarolopoH apud Eleutheriuni Anglicum, 1681 ; 
among the historians of philosophy Buhle treats minutely of the life, works, and doctrine of Hobbes, Gesch. 
der neueren Philosophie, Vol. III., Gott., 1802, pp. 22.3-.S25. A monograph on his theory of the state, written 
by Heinrich Niischeler, has been published by Kym, Zurich, 1865. 

Francis Bacon, son of Nicholas Bacon, the Keeper of the Great Seal of England, 
was bom at Loudon on the 23d of January, 1561. He studied at Cambridge, passed 
two years in Paris as companion of the English ambassador, and afterwards practised 
law. Thus prepared, he entered Parliament in 1595, and became in 1604 the salaried 
legal adviser of the crown, in 1617 Keeper of the Great Seal, in 1619 Lord Chancellor 
and Baron of Verulam, and in 1620 Viscount of St. Albans. But in 1621, having been 
condemned by Parliament for receiving bribes, he was deprived of aU his oflBces. and 
thenceforward he lived in retirement at Highgate until his death, which took plao 
April 9, 1626. 

Bacon's plan for the reorganization of the sciences embraced, ia the first place, 
a general review of the whole field of the sciences (or the (jhohus intellectualis) , next the 
doctrine of method, and finally the exposition of the sciences themselves and their 
application to new discoveries. Accordingly the general work to which Bacon gives the 
name of Instauratio Magna begins with the treatise De Dignitate et Aiigmentis Seientia 
rum. To this is joiued, as the second principal part, the Noimm Organon. But to 
the exposition of natural history (which Bacon regards as verm inductionis sripjyellex sive 
Sylva) and to the explanation of natural phenomena, as also to the work of furnishing 
a catalogue of inventions already made and directions for the discovery of new ones. 
Bacon only made isolated and incomplete contributions. The Sylva Sylvarum (collec- 
tion of collections of materials) sive Histmia Naturnlis^ first published after his 
death, is his most important work on Natural History, as is, in the department of 
the Interpretation of nature, his theory that heat is a species of motion (namely, 
expansive motion, whose tendency is to ascend, which extends through the more 
diminutive parts of bodies, is checked and driven back, and takes place with a cer- 
tain rapidity). 

History, according to Bacon, rests on the faculty of memory, poetry on the imagination, 
and philosophy or science proper on the understanding. Bacon divides history into His- 
toria Cimlis and Naturalis. In connection with the former he mentions especially, as 
desiderata, the history of literature and the history of philosophy. Poetry he divides 
into epic, dramatic, and allegorico-didactic. Philosophy has for its objects God, man, 
and nature {PMlosophice objectum triplex : Deus, natura et homo ; percutit autem natura 
intellectum vx)strum radio directo^ Deiis autem propter medium incequale radio tantum 
refracto^ ipse vero homo sibimet ipsi monstratur et exhibetur radio reflexo). In so far as 
our knowledge of God is derived from revelation, it is not knowledge, but faith ; but 
natural or philosophical theology is incompetent to ground any afiirmative knowledge, 
although it is sufiicient for iiie refutation of atheism, since the explanation of nature 
by physical causes is incomplete without recourse to divine providence. Says Bacon: 
" Slight tastes of philosophy may perchance move one to atheism, but fuller draughts 
lead back to religion " {leves gusttis in philosophia movere f&rtasse ad atheismum, sed 


pleniores haustus ad religionem reducere). As Ls God, so also, according to Bacon, is the 
spirit {spiraculum) ^ which God has breathed into man, scientifically incognizable ; only 
the physical soul, which is a thin, warm, material substance, is an object of scientific 
knowledge. Philosophia prima or scientia univeisalis develops the conceptions and 
principles which lie equally at the foundation of all parts of philosophy, such as the 
conceptions of being and non-being, similarity and difference, or the axiom of the 
equality of two magnitudes which are each equal to a third. The object of natural 
philosophy is either the knowledge, or the application of the knowledge of the laws of 
nature, and is accordingly either speculative or operative. Speculative natural philoso- 
phy, in so far as it considers efiicient causes, is physics ; in so far as it considers ends, 
it is metaphysics. Operative natural philosophy, considered as the application of 
physics, is mechanics; as the application of metaphysics, it is natural magic. Mathe- 
matics is a science auxiliary to physics. Astronomy should not only construe phe- 
nomena and their laws mathematically, but explain them physically. (But by his re- 
jection of the Copemican system, which he regarded as an extravagant fancy, and by 
undervaluing mathematics, Bacon closed the way against the fulfilment by astronomy 
of the latter requirement.) The philosophical doctrine of man considers man either in 
his isolation, or as a member of society; it includes, therefore, anthropology {philosophia 
Jmmana) and politics {philosophia civilis). Anthropology is concerned with the human 
body and the human soul. Psychology relates, first of all, to sensations and motions, 
and to their mutual relation. Bacon ascribes to all the elements of bodies perceptions, 
which manifest themselves by attractions and repulsions. The (conscious) sensations 
of the soul are, according to Bacon, to be distinguished from mere perceptions, and he 
demands that the nature and ground of this difference be more precisely investigated. 
After anthropology follows logic, or the doctrine of knowledge, whose end is truth, 
and ethics, or the doctrine of the wiU, whose object is the good (the welfare of the 
individual and of the community ; logica ad illuminationis puritatem, ethica ad liber cb 
voluntatis directionem servit). As the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the 
human soul the form of forms, so these two sciences are the keys of all others. The 
object of ethics is " internal goodness " {bonitas interim), that of politics {phUosojMa 
civilis) is "external goodness in intercourse, business, and government" {bonitas externa 
in canversationibus, negotiis et regimine sive iniperio). Bacon demands that politics 
should not be treated of by mere school-philosophers, nor by partial jurists, but by 

Bacon develops the doctrine of method in the Novum Organon. He desires to 
show how we may attain that knowledge of the laws of nature, the practical ap- 
phcation of which augments the power of man over nature {Ambitio {sapientis) 
rdiquis sanior atque augustior est: Jmmani generis ipsius potentiam et impenum 
in rerum univerdtatem instaurare et amplificare eonari artibus et sdentiis, cujus qui- 
dem potentice et imperii usum sana deinde religio gubemet. Physici est, non dis- 
putando adversarium, sed naturam operando mncere). Science is the image of 
reality {Scientia nihil aliud est, guam veritatis imago ; nam Veritas essendi et Veritas 
cognoscendi idem, sunt, nee plus a se invicem differimt, quam radius direetus et 
radius reflexus. Ea demum est vera philosophia, gum mundi ipsius voces quam fide- 
lissime reddit et veluti dictante mundo conscripta est, nee quidquam de propria addit, 
sed tantum Herat et resanat). 

In order faithfully to interpret nature, man must first of all rid himself of the 
Idols (phantoms), i. e. of the false notions, which flow, not from the nature of the 
objects to be known, but from man's own nature. The deceptive modes of mental 


representation (in particular the anthropomorphisms), which are founded in every 
man's nature, c. g. the substitution in physics of final causes for efficient causes, 
are called by Bacon "idols of the tribe," those arising from individual peciiliarities, 
" idols of the cave," those caused by human intercourse through the aid of language, 
"idols of the forum," and those which are the result of tradition, "idols of the 
theatre." The doctrine of the idols in Bacon's New Organon has a similar significance 
to that of the doctrine of fallacies in Aristotle's logic ; in the doctrine of the " idols of 
the tribe" the fundamental idea of Kant's Critique of the Reason is, in a certain 
measure, anticipated. 

The mind purified from idola must, in order to arrive at the knowledge of nature, 
take its stand on experience, yet should not confine itself to mere experiences, but 
should combine them methodically. We should not, like the spiders, which draw their 
threads from themselves, derive our ideas merely from ourselves, nor should we, like the 
ants, merely collect, but we should, like the bees, collect and elaborate. First, facts must 
be established by observation and experiment ; then these facts must be clearly arranged ; 
and finally, by legitimate and true induction, we must advance from experiments to 
axioms, from the knowledge of facts to the knowledge of laws. That induction which 
Aristotle and the Scholastics taught. Bacon describes as inductio per emimerationem 
simplicem; and adds that it lacks the methodical character (which Bacon himself rather 
seeks, than really attains). Together with the positive instances, the negative in- 
stances must be considered, and differences of degree should be marked and defined ; 
cases of decisive importance are as prerogative instances to receive especial attention ; 
from the particular we should not at once hurry on, as if on wings, to the most gen- 
eral, but should advance first to the intermediate propositions, those of inferior general- 
ity, which are the most fruitful of all. Although Bacon demands also the regress from 
axioms to new experiments, especially to inventions, he yet holds the syllogism, in 
which Aristotle recognized the methodical instrument of deduction, in light esteem ; 
the syllogism, he says, cannot come down to the dehcacy of nature, and is useful as an 
organon of disputation rather than of science. This erroneous estimate of the scientific 
value of the syllogism coheres most intimately with Bacon's low appreciation of mathe- 
matics. The theory of induction was materially advanced by Bacon, although not 
completely and purely developed ; but the doctrine of deduction did not receive from 
him its dues. In his high estimation of the value of experiments. Bacon followed 
especially Telesius. 

Bacon held that upon the methodical basis furnished by him not only natural, but also 
moral and political science must be established. But to these latter sciences his only 
contributions were in the form of pregnant aphorisms imitated frequently from Mon- 
taigne but not in the form of a coherent development of doctrine. An attempt to 
explain civil government from the point of view of natural law was made by Bacon's 
younger contemporary and friend, Thomas Hobbes. 

Bom on the 5th of April, 1588, at Malmesbury, and the son of a country clergyman, 
Thomas Hobbes studied, at Oxford, especially the Aristotehan logic and physics, and 
adopted the nominalistic doctrine. In his twentieth year he became a tutor and com- 
panion in the house of Lord Cavendish, the subsequent Earl of Devonshire, with whom 
he travelled in France and Italy. After his return he became a personal friend of 
Bacon. In the year 1628 he translated Thucydides into English, with the expressed 
intention of producing a dread of democracy. Soon afterwards he studied at Paris mathe- 
matics and the natural sciences, in which he subsequently instructed King Charles II. ; 
at Paris he was in constant intercourse with Gassendi and the Franciscan monk, Mer- 


Benne. Ilobbcs appreciated in their full worth the doctrines of Copernicus, Kepler, 
Galileo, and Harvey. Not long before the opening of the Long Parliament (1G40), he 
wrote in England the works entitled 0)i Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, but did 
not at once publish them. At Paris he wrote his chief works : Elementa philos. lU 
Give (first published at Paris, 1642, then enlarged and republished, Amst., 1647, and in 
the French translation of Sorbi' "re, 1049), and Leviathan^ or the Matter, Form, and Author- 
ity of Government (London, 1651 , in Latin, Amst. , 1068, in German, Halle, 1794 and 1795). 
In 1652 Hobbes returned to England, having by his Leviathan made enemies of both Cath- 
olics and Protestants. At London appeared the works : Human Nature, or the Fundamen- 
tal Elements of Policy (1650), De corpore politico, or the Elements of Law, Moral and 
Political (1650), Qucestiones delibertate, necessitate etca^u{\Q^ii), and Elementorum philoso- 
phicB sectio prima : de corpore (in English, London, 1655), Sectio secunda: de Iwmine (in 
English, London, 1658; both sections in Latin, Amst., 1668, in Hobbes' own collection 
of his Works) ; Sectio tertia was the De Give. Hobbes died at Hardwicke, December 
4, 1679. 

Hobbes defines philosophy as the knowledge of effects or phenomena by their causes, 
and of causes from their observed effects by means of legitimate inferences ; its end is 
that we may foresee effects, and make a practical use of this foresight in our 
lives. Hobbes thus agrees with Bacon in assigning to philosophy a practical end, but 
has, however, rather its political application than technical inventions in view. He 
shares Bacon's mechanical conception of the world. He defines reasoning as but a 
method of addition and subtraction. He differs, however, from Bacon, in recom- 
mending the employment in philosophy not only of the 7nethodus resolutiva sive analy- 
tica, but also of the metlwdus compositiva sive synthetica, of whose value his mathe- 
matical studies especially had made him cognizant. Hobbes declares that philosophy 
has to do only with bodies ; but with him whatever is bodily is substantial : the two 
conceptions are identical ; a substance not a body is nothing. Bodies are natural or 
artificial, and of the latter the political body (the organism of the State) is the most 
important. Philosophy is accordingly either natural or cicil. Hobbes begins with 
philosophic prima, which reduces itself for him to a complex of definitions of funda- 
mental conceptions, such as space and time, thing and quality, cause and effect. This 
is followed by physics and anthropology. Bodies are composed of small parts, which 
are yet not to be conceived as absolutely indivisible. Of matter absolutely unde- 
termined there is none ; the universal conception of matter is a mere abstraction from 
definitely determined bodies. Hobbes reduces all real processes to motions. That 
which moves another thing must itself be moved, at least m. its diminutive parts, 
whose motion can be communicated to distant bodies only through media; no 
direct effects are produced at a distance. The senses of animals and men are 
affected by motions, which are transmitted inwards to the brain, and from there 
to the heart ; a reaction then sets in from the heart, expressing itself in a re- 
gressive motion and in sensation. The qualities apprehended by the senses 
(colors, sensations of sound, etc.) exist consequently only in the sensitive being; 
in the bodies which, through their motions, occasion these sensations, the like 
qualities do not exist ; matter, however, is not incapable of sensation and thought. 
All knowledge grows out of sensations. After sensation, there remains behind the 
memory of it, which may reappear in consciousness. The memory of objects once 
perceived is aided and the communication of the same to others made possible by 
signs, which we connect with our mental representation of these objects; for this 
purpose words are especially useful. The same word serves as a sign for numerous 


similar objects, and thereby acquires that character of generality which belongs only 
to words, and never to things. It depends on us to decide what objects we wUl 
always designate by the same word ; we announce our decision by means of the 
definition. All thinking is a combining and separating, an adding and subtracting of 
mental representations ; to think is to reckon. 

Hobbes does not regard man as (like the bee, ant, etc.) a social being by natural 
instinct (Cuov ttoAjt^/cov), but describes the natural state of men as one in which all are 
at war with each other. But so unsatisfactory is this state, that it becomes necessary 
to emerge from it through a stipulated submission of all to the authority of an 
absolute ruler, to whom all render unconditional obedience, and from whom in return 
all receive protection, thereby, and thus alone, insuring the possibility of a really 
human existence. Outside of the State is found only the dominion of the pas- 
sions, war, fear, poverty, filth, isolation, barbarism, ignorance, savagery; while in 
the State is found the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, ornament, so- 
ciability, elegance, science, and good-will. (This shows that the assertion is false, 
that Hobbes' State is "without all ideal and ethical elements," and aims only at 
security of life and sensual weU-being.) The ruler may be a monarch or an assem- 
bly ; but monarchy, as involving the stricter unity, is the more perfect form. 
With the social life of the State are connected the distinctions of right and wrong, 
nrtue and vice, the good and the bad. What the absolute power in the State sanc- 
tions is good, the opposite is bad. The right of the State to punish flows from its 
right of self -conservation. Punishment should be inflicted, not for past wrong, but 
with a view to future good ; the fear of punishment should be such as to outweigh 
the pleasure which may be expected from an act forbidden by the State, and by this 
principle the degree of punishment should be determined. Religion and superstition 
are the same in this respect, that they are both the fear of invisible powers, whether 
imaginary, or believed in on the faith of tradition. The fear of those invisible powers, 
which the State recognizes, is religion ; that of powers not thus recognized, is super- 
stition. To oppose one's private religious convictions to the faith sanctioned by the 
State is a revolutionary act, tending to dissolve the bands of the State. Conscientious- 
ness consists in obedience to the ruler. 

From the contract- theory (which, indeed, not so much describes the historical ori- 
gin of the State as proposes an ideal norm for the appreciation of existing conditions), 
opposite results could be deduced with equal and even greater consistency, as shown 
by the doctrines subsequently propounded by Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau, and 

Other thinkers in this and the next-following period did not go so far as to deny 
(with Hobbes) the intrinsic justification of all religion, but stopped at the idea of a 
religion which was to be founded on reason alone. The most notable of these was 
Hobbes' elder contemporary, Lord Edward Herbert of Cherbury (1581-1648), who as 
a politician stood on the side of the Parliamentary opposition. His principal work is 
entitled : Tractatus de veritnte prout distinguitur a revdatione, a verisimili, apossibili et 
a f also (Paris, 1624, etc.) ; he also wrote Be rdigione gmtUium errorumque wpud eos causis^ 
(Part I., London, 1645; the completed work London, 1663, and Amst., 1670), De re- 
Ugione Laid, and historical works. He assumes that all men agree in certain common 
notions {communes notltm), and demands that these should serve as criteria in aU 
religious disputes. His doctrine, as also that of later free-thinkers (of whom, in par- 
ticular, Victor Lechler treats in detail in his Oesch. desengl. Demnus, Stuttg. and Tiib., 
1841) [cf . John Leland, View of Deistical writers. Lend. , 2d ed. , 1755] , is of more import- 


ance for the history of religion than for the history of philosophy. Cf. Ch. de 
Rcmusat, Lord Herbert de Chcrburi/, Revue des dcuxmondeH VII., Uvr. 4, 1854. 

Until the time of Locke, Empiricism had not won the supremacy in the English 
schools ; Scholasticism was confined within narrower limits, but chiefly in the interest 
either of Skepticism, or of a renewed Platonism, Neo-Platonism, or Mysticism. The 
philosophy of Skepticism was supported by Joseph Glanville (Court Chaplain to Charles 
the Second; died 1680), who in his works, Scepsis Seientijica, or Confest Ignorance the 
Way to Science, an Essay of the Vanity of Dogmatizing and Confident Opinion (London, 
1665), and De Incrementis Scientiarum (London, 1670), opposed, particularly, Aristo- 
telian and Cartesian dogmatism ; he observes that we do not experience, but only infer 
causahty, and that not with certainty {nam non scquitur necessario, Ivoc est post iUud, 
ergo propter iUiid). The most distinguished of the Platonists of this period was Ralph 
Cudworth (1617-1688), who combated the atheism which Hobbes' doctrine had favored, 
vindicated the right of final causes to a place in physics, and assumed in explanation 
of organic growth a formative energy, a plastic nature. His principal work is, The 
True Intellectual System of the Universe, wJierein aU the Reason and tlte Philosophy of 
Atheism is Confuted (London, 1678 and 1743 ; translated into Latin by Joh. Laur. 
Mosheim, Jena, 1733, and Leyden, 1773). Sam. Parker (died 1688) also combated 
the atomistic physics, and in his Tentamina physico-theohgica (Lond., 1669, 1678) and 
other works founded the beUef in God's existence chiefly on the marks of design mani- 
fest in the structure of natural objects. Henry More (1614-87 ; Opera pMlosophica, 
London, 1679) combined Platonism with Cabalism. TheopWlus Gale (1628-77; 
PhUosophia universalis, and Aula deorum gentilium, Lond., 1676) derived aU knowledge 
of God from revelation, and his son, Thomas Gale {Opuscida mytJiologica, etc., Cam- 
bridge, 1682), edited documents of theological poetry and i^hilosophy. John Pordage 
(1625-98), Thomas Bromley (died 1691), pupU of the former, and others followed the 
line of speculation marked out by Jacob Boehme. 

114. At the head of the dogmatic (or rationalistic) development- 
series in modern philosophy stands the Cartesian doctrine. Rene Des- 
cartes (1596-1650) was educated in a Jesuits' school, was led by com- 
paring the different notions and customs of different nations and parties, 
by general philosophical meditations, and more especially by his observa- 
tion of the great remoteness of all demonstrations in philosophy and other 
disciplines from mathematical certainty, to doubt the truth of all pro- 
positions received at second hand. He accordingly conceived the re- 
solution to set aside all presuppositions, and to seek, with no aid but 
that of his own independent thought, for assured con\dctions. The only 
thing, reasoned Descartes, which, though all else be questioned, can- 
not be doubted, is doubt itself, and, in general, thought viewed in its 
widest sense as the complex of all conscious psychical processes. But 
my thinking presupposes my existence : cogito, ergo sum. I find in 
me the notion of God, which I cannot have formed by my own power, 
since it involves a higher degree of reality than belongs to me ; it must 
l^.a-^^e for its author God himself, who stamped it upon my mind, just 


w8 the architect impresses his stamp on his work. God's existence 
follows also from the very idea of God, since the essence of God in- 
volves existence eternal and necessary existence. Among the attri- 
butes of God belongs truthfulness {veincitas). God cannot wish to 
deceive me ; therefore, all that which I know clearly and distinctly 
must be true. All error arises from my misuse of the freedom of my 
Avill, in that I prematurely judge of that which I have not yet clearly and 
distinctly apprehended. I can clearly and distinctly apprehend the 
."Oul as a thinking substance, without representing it to myself as ex- 
;ended ; thought involves no predicates that are connected with ex- 
tension. I must, on the other hand, conceive all bodies as extended 
substances, and as such believe them to be real, because I can by the 
aid of mathematics obtain a clear and distinct knowledge of extension 
and am at the same time clearly conscious of the dependence of my sen- 
sations on external, corporeal causes. Figure, magnitude, and motion 
belong, as modes of extension, to external things ; but the sensations of 
color, sound, heat, etc., like pleasure and pain, exist only in the soul and 
not in material objects. The soul and the body are connected and they 
interact, the one upon the other, only at a single point, a point within 
the brain, the pineal gland. Descartes considered body and spirit 
as constituting a dualism of perfectly heterogeneous entities, separated 
in nature by an absolute and unfilled interval. Hence the interaction 
between soul and body, as asserted by him, was inconceivable, although 
supported, in his theory, by the postulate of divine assistance. Hence 
Geuliiix, the Cartesian, developed the theory of occasionalism, or the 
doctrine that on the occasion of each psychical process God effects the 
corresponding motion in the body, and vice versa, while Malebranche 
propounded the mystical doctrine, that we see all things in God, who 
is the place of spirits. 

Of the Works which Descartes published the earliest was the Discours de la methode potir hien condiiire 
sa raison et chercher la write dans les sciences, which appeared together with the Dioptriqiie, the Meteores and 
the Geomctrie under the title of Essais Philosophiques, Leyden, 1637, and in a Latin translation executed by 
the Abb6 Etienne de Courcelles and reviewed by Descartes, with the title : SpecimiJUi Philosopfiica, Amst, 
1W4. (The Geom., which was not contained in the latter edition, was translated by van Schooten, Leyden, 
1649). In Latin, Descartes published, Meditationes de prima pfiilosophia, ubi de Dei existentia et animce im- 
mortalitate ; his adjtinctce sunt varice objeciiones doctorum virorum in islas de Deo et anima demonstra- 
tiones (namely : 1. by Catenas of Antwerp [a Jesuit, who died in 1657] ; 2. by various scholars at Paris col- 
lected by Mersenne ; 3. by Hobbes ; 4. by Amauld ; 5. by Gasscndi ; 6. by various theologians and philosophers), 
cum responsionibus auctoris, Paris, 1641 ; the second edition appeared at Amsterdam in 1642 with the title : 
Meditationes de prima pMlosophia, i7i quibns Dei existentia et animce humance a corpore distinctio demour 
ttralur ; in this edition are added to the objectiones et resporistoiies of the first, as objectiones septimce, the ob- 
jections of the Jesuit Bourdin, together with Descartes' answers ; a French translation of the Meditatioiis, by 
the Duke of Luynes, and of the objections and repUes, by Clerselier, revised by Descartes, appeared in 1647 
and 1661, and another ti-anslation by Ren6 Fed6, in 1673 and 1724. The systematic presentation of the whol 


doctrine of Descartes appeared under the title : Renati Dexcartes Prineipkt PhilosophUe, at Amrterdam, in 
1644, and the French translation by Picot in 1647, 1651, 1658, 1681. The controversial work : Epistola Renati 
Descartes ad Gisbertum Voetium was published, Amst., 1643, and the psychological monograph : Les pasnoru 
de Fdme, Anist., 1050. Several treatises and letters, loft by DoHcartcs, were jjublished after his death, among 
which were, notably, fragments of a work which D. withheld from publication, on account of the condem. 
nation of O-alileo, and entitled; Le monde, ou traite de la Lumiere, ed. by Claude de Clerselier and pub- 
lished first at Paris, 1()64, and again a better edition Paris, 1677 ; ftirther also cd. by Clerselier the TYaiU 
de rhomrne et de la formation du fietus. Par., 1664, and in Latin, with Notes by Louis do la Forge, 1677 ; 
Letters, Par., 165767, in Lat., Amst., 1668 and 1692; subsequently were published also the Regulm ad 
directionem ingenii {Regies pour la direction de resprit), and, Inquisitio veritatis per lumen natwaU 
(Recherche de la vfrite par les lumieres naturelles), first in the Opiiscicla posthuma Cartesii, Amst., 1701. 
Baumann is of the opinion (sec Zeitschr. /. Philos., new series. Vol. 53, 1868, pp. 189-205), that the Riglei 
pour la direction de Fesprit (which are published in Vol. XI. of Cousin's edition of Descartes's Works) were written 
in the period between the twenty-third and thirty-second years of D.'s life, and finds in them evidence of the 
course of Descartes's own philosophical development. Complete editions, in Latin, of the philos. works of 
D. were published at Amst., 1650, etc. His complete works, in French, at Paris, 1701, ibid., 1724, and 
edited by Victor Cousin, ibid., 1824-26, and his philosophical Works, ed. by Gamier, Paris, 18.35 ; some 
works previously inedited have been published by Foucher de Careil, (Euvres inedites de Descartes, prece- 
dees d'une preface et publiees par le comte F. d. C, Paris, 185&-1860. Single works and collections of 
the principal philosophical works of D. have been published very frequently down to the most recent 
times. Among these publications may be mentioned that of the Discours sur la methode, ed. by Em. Le- 
franc, Paris, 1866 ; the Meditaiiories, ed. by S. Barach, Vienna, 1866 ; (Euvres de Descartes, nouvelle edi- 
tion precedee d'une introduction par Jules Simon, Paris, 1868. Kimo Fischer has recently translated D.'s 
principal philosophical works into German, and accompanied them with a preface, Mannheim, 1863. 

The principal facts relating to the Ufe and mental development of Descartes are given by himself, 
principally in his Discours sur la Methode. Short biographies appeared soon after his death, one of 
them, written by A. Baillet, being quite full and bearing the title : La Vie de Mr. des Cartes, (Paris, 1691, 
abridged, ibid., 1693). Eloge de Rene Descartes, par Thomas, Par., 1765 {couronne by the Academy of Paris). 
Eloge de Rene Descartes par Gaillard, Par., 1765 ; par Mercier, Geneva and Paris 1765. In the works on the 
history of modern philosophy and in many of the editions of works of Descortes are found sketches of his life 
and intellectual history ; so, among other works, in the first vol. of the Hist, de la Philos. Cartesienne par 
Francisque BouilUer, Par., 1854, in the (Euvres morales et philosophiques de Descartes, precidees d'une 
notice sur sa vie et ses ouvrages par Amedee Prevost, Paris, 1855, etc. An attractive picture of his 
career is given by Kuno Fischer in his Oesch. der netieren Philosophie, I. 1, 2d ed., Mannheim, 1865, 
pp. 121-278 ; cf . also J. MUlet, Descartes sa vie, ses travaux, ses decouvertes avant 1637, Paris, 1867 ; 
P. Janet, Descartes, in the Revue des deux mondes. Vol. 73, 1868, pp. 345-369 ; Jeaimel, Desc. et la prin- 
cesse palatine, Paris, 1869. 

The chief work on the history of Cai-tesianism is the Histoire de la Philosophie Cartesienne par Francisque 
BouilUer, Paris and Lyons 1854 (an enlargement of the prize essay crowned by the Academic des Sciences 
Morales et Politiques, and published in 1843 miderthe title : Histoire et Critique de la Revolution Cartesienne); 
cf. the sections relative to the same subject in Damiron's Histoire de la Philosophie du XVII. Steele, and in 
E. Saisset, Precurseurs et disciples de Desc, Paris, 1862. Among the numerous recent essays and works on 
Cartesianism belong the following : Heinr. Ritter, Veber den Einjluss des Cart, auf die Ausbildiing des Spino- 
eismus, Leips., 1816 ; H. C. W. Sigwart. Ueber den Zusammenhang des Spiriozisnius mit der Cartesianischen 
Philosophie, Tiibingen, 1816 ; H. G. Hotho, De philos. Cart, diss., Berl., 1826 ; Carl Schaarschmidt, Des Cartes 
Hiid Spinoza, urkundliche Darstellung der Philosophie Beider, Bonn, 1850 ; J. N. Huber, Die Cartesian. Be- 
weise vom Dasein Gfottes Augsb., 1854; J. H. LiJwe, Das speculative System des Rene Descartes, seine Vorziige 
und Mangel, Vienna, 1855, (from the Transact, of the Akad., phil.-hist. CI., Vol. XIV., 1854); X. Schmidt of 
Schwarzenberg, Rene Descartes und seine Reform der Philosophie, NiirdUngen, 1859 ; Chr. A. ThUo, Die Re- 
ligionsphilosophie des Descartes, in the Zeitschr. f. ex. Ph., Leips., 1862, pp. 121-182 ; E. Saisset, Preairseurs 
et disciples de Descartes, Paris, 1862 ; Jul. Baumann, Doctrina Cartesiana de vero etfalso expUcata atque exa^ 
minata {diss, inaug.), Berl., 1863; Ludw. Gerkrath, De connexione, qutr, intercedit inter Cart, et Pascalium, 
(Progr. des Lyceum Hoa.), Braunsberg, 1863; Gust. Theod. Schedin, dr Occasionalismen en Icoruequejit ut- 
veckling of Cartesianismenf {Akademisk Afha?idl.),Vpsa\a, 1864; Jac. Guttman, De Cartesii Spinozceque 
philosophiis et qum inter eos intercedat ratio {Diss, ijiaug., Breslau, 1868; T. J. Elvenich, Die Beiceisefur da* 
Dasein Gottes nach Cartesius, Breslau, 18C8 ; Charles Waddington, Desc. et le spirittialism^, Paris, 1868. Cf . the 
accounts of the doctrine of De-scartes in the historical works of Buhle, Tenncmann, Ritter, Feuerbach, Erd- 
mann, Fischer, and others. 

Blaise Pascal, Lettres provinciales, Cologne, 1657, etc. ; Pemees sur la religion, 1669, Amst., 16Pr, Pai., 
1790, etc., ed. by Faugere, Par., 1844 ; with Preface by J. F. Asti6, Paris and Lausanme, 1857, in Germaa 


translation 1y Friedr. Meerschmann, Halle, 1865 ; CEuvres, The Hague, 1779, ed. by Bossut in 6 Vols., Par., 
1819; Opuscules philos., Paris, 1864, 65, 66; of him treat, among others, Herm. Keuchlin (P.'* Leben vHd 
der Geist seiner Schriften, Stuttgard and Tvib., 1840), A. Neandcr (in N."s Wiss. Abh., ed. by J. L. Jacobi, 
Berl., 1851, p. 58seq.), Cousin ( Etudes sur P., 5th. ed., Pai-., 1857), Havet {Pensees publ. dans leur texte au- 
thentique avec une introduction, des notes et des remarques, par M. E. Havet, Par., 1866), Maynard ( Pascal, 
sa Vie et son Caractere, Paris, 1850), Marcker (in Der Gedanke, Vol. IV., Berlin, 186.3, pp. 149-160), Oscai 
Ulbrich (De Pascalis Vita, diss, inmig., Bonn, 1866), J. Tissot (Pascal, reflexions sur ses pensecs, Dijon and 
Paris. 1869), and J. G. Dreydorff (Pascal, sein Leben und seine Edmpfe, Leipsic, 1870). 

Pierre Poiret, Cogitattones rationales de Deo, aninia et malo, Amst., 1677, etc. ; CEcon. divina, Amst., 
1687; De eruditione triplici : solida, superflciaria cJ /a/.sa, Amst., 1692, etc. ; Fides et ratio collate ac sua 
utraque loco redditm adversus principia Jo. Lockii. Amst., 1707 ; Opera posthuma, Amst., 1721. 

On Huet, compare C. Bartholmess, Iftiet, eveque WAvranches ou le scepticisme theologique, Paris, 1850 ; 
A. Plottes, Etude sur Dan. Huet, Montpellier, 1857 ; Karl Sigmund Barach, Pierre Dan. Huet als Philosoph, 
Vienna and Leipsic. 1862. On Pierre Bayle cf. Des Maizeaux, La vie de P. B., Amst., 17.30, etc. ; L. Feuer- 
bach, P. B. nach seinen filr die Oesch. der Philos. und Menschheit interessantesten Mumenten, Ansbach, 
18.38, 2d ed., Leips., 1844. 

Anioldi Geulinx Logica fuyidamentis suis, a guibus hactenus collapsa fuerat, restituta, Leyden, 1660, 
Amst., 1698 ; Metaphysica vera et ad mentein Peripateticorum, Aroist., 1695 ; Pi/wOi o-eavTOf, s. Elhica, 
Amst., 1665, Leyden, 1675 ; Physica vera, 1698 ; also, Commentaries on Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, 
Dordrecht, 1690 and 1691. Nic. Malebranche, De la recherche de la verite ou ton traite de la nature, de 
t esprit de Thomme et de Vusage qu'il doit f aire pour eviter Ferretirdans les sciences. Par., 1675, etc., completest 
ed., 1712 ; Conversations nietaphysiques et chretiennes, 1677 ; Traite de la nature et de la grAce, Amst., 1680 ; 
Traite de morale, Eotterd., 1684 ; Meditations metaph. el chretiennes, 1684 ; Entretiens sur la metaphysique 
et sur la religion (a compendious exposition of his doctrine), 1688 ; Traite de Vamour de Dieu, 1697 ; Entre- 
tiens d/un philosophe Chretien et d'lm plnlosophe chinois sur la nature de Dieu, Par., 1708; CEuvres, Par., 
1712 [CEuvres Completes, Par., 1837] ; cf. the sections on Malebranche in Bouillier, Hist, de la Philos. 
Cartesienne, and in other historical works ; further, Blampignon, Etude sur Mai. aaprcs des docunients 
manuscrits. suivie <tune correspondance inedite, Paris, 1862 ; Ch. A. Thilo, Ueber M.\s religions-philos. An- 
sichten, in the Zeitschr.f. ex. Philos., IV. ; 18&3, pp. 181-198 and 209-224; Aug. Damien, Etude sur la 
Bruyire et Malebranche, Paris, 1866 ; B. Bonieux, Expenditur Malebranchii sententia de causis occasioiux- 
libus (Diss. Lugdmiensi litt. fac. propos.), Clermont, 1866. 

Bom on the 31st of March, 1596, at Lahaye in Touraine, Rene Descartes (changed 
from the earlier form, de Quartis ; Lat. Benatus Cartesim) received his early educa- 
tion at the Jesuits' School at La Fleche in Anjou (1604-12), upon leaving which he lived 
for a number of years mostly at Paris, engaged chiefly with mathematical studies. He 
served (1617-31) as a volunteer, first under Maurice of Nassau, the son of Prince Wil- 
liam of Orange, and then (from 1619 on) under Tilly and Boucquoi, and was vnth the 
army which won the battle at Prague against the King of Bohemia, Frederic V. of the 
Palatinate, whose daughter Elisabeth subsequently became Descartes's pupil. The 
next years were passed by Descartes in travelling. In 1624 he made a pilgrimage to 
Loretto, in esecution of a vow which he had made four years before, on condition that 
his doubts should be solved ; he also took part in the siege of La Rochelle (1628). 
Occupied in the elaboration of his system and the composition of his works, Descartes 
lived from 1629 to 1G49 at various places in the Netherlands, until, in compliance with 
a summons from the Queen of Sweden, he removed to Stockholm, where he gave in- 
struction to the Queen and was to found an Academy of Sciences. But the climate 
was too severe for him, and his death followed, February 11, 1650. 

Descartes was the child of an epoch, when the interests of religious confessions, 
though stUl asserting their power over the popular masses and over a portion of the 
educated classes, were yet not only treated almost without exception by princes and 
statesmen as of decidedly secondary importance in comparison with political ends, but 
were also in the regards of many giving way before the influence of independent 
scientific knowlege. The distinguishing doctrines of the different parties were the 
product of the preceding generations, which in developing them had rejoiced in a new 


spiritual freedom. But in the time of Descartes the transmitted results had already 
become scholastically fixed ; the contest of religious parties had long since ceased to 
be conducted with the original vigor, and yet was continued with all the more bitter- 
ness, and turned more and more on mere subtleties ; the cleft had become an abyss 
and was beyond remedy. At the same time it was of necessity that the evil of the 
rupture should be felt more than in the preceding period in incessant wars, destnictive 
of the welfare and freedom of the lands over which they raged, and favorable to bar- 
barity and crimes of every sort. In the midst of this state of affairs there arose a 
class of men who indeed looked up with timid reverence to the Church, fearing and, 
so far as possible, avoiding collisions with its representatives, but who had no positive 
interest in the dogmas of the Church, and who found satisfaction for mind and heart 
not in them, but partly in general theorems of rational theology and partly in mathe- 
matics, in the investigation of nature, and in the psychological and ethical study of 
human life. To those occupying this stand-poiut, differences of religious confessions, 
occasioned by birth and outward circumstances, offered no obstacle to intimate iDcrsonal 
friendships, founded on community in essential living interests, in studies, and in ef- 
forts for the extension of the sciences. Whether military service was accepted under 
Catholics or Protestants depended less on the confession of the individual than on exter- 
nal, political, and exclusively military considerations. Their accustomed religious usages 
adhered more closely to men than did their religious dogmas ; but they determined 
only the exterior aspect of life, whose spiritual content was essentially a new one. 
The philosophy of Descartes is neither a Catholic nor a Protestant philosophy ; it is the 
expression of an independent effort to attain to truth on the ground and under the in- 
spiration of that apodictical certainty which is illustrated in mathematics and in ma- 
thematical physics. To the '' mrites rev^lees'''' he makes his bow, but guards himself 
carefully from any nearer contact with them. Bossuet says : " Descartes was always 
afraid of being branded by the church, and accordingly we see him taking precautions 
which reached even to excess." The conversion of the daughter of Gustavus Adolphua 
to Catholicism is said to have had for its first occasioning cause the intercourse of 
this princess ^vith Descartes. That no direct influence, in the sense of " proselj-ting," 
was exercised, should need no mention. But the inference which followed directly 
from Descartes's new philosophy, that the distinctive doctrines of the different con- 
fessions were indifferent in themselves, and perhaps, positively, the emphasis laid by 
Descartes on human freedom a doctrine harmonizing better with Catholic than with 
Protestant dogmas may indeed be reasonably supposed to have exerted an essential 
influence on the mind of the princess in favor of the step taken by her. 

Descartes occupies, not only as a philosopher, but also as a mathematician and phy- 
sicist, a place of conspicuous importance. His principal merit in mathematics is that 
he founded analytical geometry, which, by determining the distances of all points 
from fixed lines (coordinates), reduces spatial relations to their arithmetical expres- 
sion, and by the use of (algebraic) equations solves geometrical problems and demon- 
strates geometrical propositions. The practice of representing powers by exponents 
is also due to him. As a physicist his merits are founded on contributions to the doc- 
trine of the refraction of light, the explanation of the rainbow, and the determination 
of the weight of the air. The fundamental error of Descartes, in conceiving matter 
as moved only by pressure and impulsion, and not by internal forces, was corrected by 
Newton's theory of gravitation ; on the other hand, Descartes's doctrine of light and of 
the origin of the cosmical bodies contained many foreshadowings of the truth, which 
were ignored by the Newtonians, but which, through the undulatory theory of Huy- 


gens and Enler, and the theory proposed by Kant and Laplace of the origin of the 
present state of the world, have again come into repute. Descartes also worked with 
success in the department of anatomy. 

The Discours de la Mtthode is divided into six parts : 1. Considerations relating to 
the sciences ; 2. Principal rules of method ; 3. Some rules of ethics, drawn from this 
method ; 4. Reasons which prove the existence of God and the human soul, or foun- 
dation of metaphysics ; 5. Order of questions in physics ; 6. What things are neces- 
sary in order that man may advance further in the study of nature. In the first 
section Descartes relates how in his youth all sciences except mathematics left him 
dissatisfied. Of the philosophy which he learned in the college of the Jesuits, he can 
only say in its praise, that it "gives one the means of talking plausibly of all things, 
and of extorting the admiration of those less learned than one's self ; " he holds all 
that it contained to be doubtful. He is astonished that on so firm a basis as that of 
mathematics no more elevated structure had been raised than the mechanic arts. The 
sciences handed down from the past, says Descartes in the second section, are for the 
most part only conglomerates of opinions, as Hi-shaped as cities not built according to 
any one plan. That which one person does, foDowing a regular plan, is, as a rule, 
far better than that which without plan or order has taken historic shape. It were 
indeed not weU done to reform the state from the bottom, " overthrowing it in order 
to buUd it up again." Habit enables us to bear with imperfections more easily than 
we otherwise could, whUe the work of subversion demands violence, and rebuilding is 
difficult. To reject aU his own opinions, in order aftern'ards to rise raethodically to 
well-grounded knowledge, this is what Descartes sets before himself for his life's work. 
The method which Descartes here proposes to follow is formed upon the model furnished 
by the mathematics. He lays down four principles of method, which, in his opinion, 
are superior both to the Aristotelian logic and especially to that part which treats of 
the syllogism, and which (says Descartes) is of more use for purposes of instruction 
than for investigation and, much more, to the Lullian art of prating. These four 
methodical principles are : 1. To receive nothing as true which is not evidently known 
to be such, by its presenting itself to the mind with a clearness and distinctness which 
exclude all doubt {si dalrement et si distinctement, que je u'eusse aucune occasion de le 
mettre en doute) ; 3. To divide, as far as possible, every difficult problem into its natu- 
ral parts ; 3. To conduct one's thoughts in due order, advancing gradually from the 
more simple and easy to the more complex and difficult, and to suppose a definite 
order, for the sake of the orderly progress of the investigation, even where none such 
is supplied in the nature of the subject investigated; 4. By completeness in enumer- 
ations and completeness in reviews to make it sure that nothing has been over- 
looked. * In the third section of the Discours de la Methode Descartes enumerates cer- 
tain ethical rules adopted by him provisionally (so long as a satisfactory moral phi- 

* These rules relate to the subjective conduct of the reasoner or investigator as such, and not to those 
forms and laws of thought which depend on the relation of thought to the objective world, and which the 
Aristotelian logic attempts to arrive at by an analysis of thought. They are, therefore, however judicious 
they may be in their kind, not in the least adapted to take the place of the Aristotelian logic ; and even the 
work which originated in Descartes' school, La Logique ou rArt de Peiiser (Paris, 1662, etc.), combined these 
Cartesian rules with a modified Aristotelian logic. The distinction, borrowed by Descartes fi-om the Aristote. 
lian school, between the analytical method, which proceeds from the conditioned to the conditioning, and the 
synthetic method, proceeding, inversely, from the conditioning to the conditioned, relates to the processes of 
thought considered in relation to the objects of thought ; yet Descartes also gives to this distinction a more 
subjective turn, by regarding the analytical method as that of invention, and the synthetic as that of dialecti- 
cal exposition a view which is, at the most, only a potiori, but by no means absolutely correct. 


losophy should remain unfounded). The first of these is, to follow the laws and cus- 
toms of his country, to hold fast to the religion in which he has been educated, and 
always in practical life to follow the most moderate and most generally received max- 
ims. The second requires consistency in action, and the third moderateness in his 
demands, in respect of external goods. By the fourth he resolves to dedicate his life 
to the cultivation of his reason, and to the discovery of scientific truths. In the 
fourth and fifth sections of his Discours Descartes presents the outlines of the doctrine 
which he subsequently developed in the Meditatioiies and Princ. Philos., while in the 
sixth he enlarges on the line of procedure necessary for the advancement of physics 
and for its further application to the healing art. 

In the Meditatmies de Pnma PMlosopMa Descartes seeks to demonstrate the exis- 
tence of God, and the existence of the soul as an independent entity, separable from 
the body. In the first meditation Descartes shows that all things may be doubted 
except the fact that we doubt, or, since doubting is a species of thinking, except the 
fact that we think. From my youth up, says the author (following, in part, Charron 
and other skeptics), I have accepted as true a multitude of received opinions and have 
made them the basis of further beliefs and opinions. But that which rests on so 
insecure a basis can only be very uncertain ; it is therefore necessary, at some time in 
my life, to rid myself of all traditional opinions and to rebmld from the foundation. 
The senses often deceive. I can therefore in no case trust them implicitly. Dreams 
deceive me by false images ; but I find no sure criterion by -which to determine 
whether at this instant I am asleep or awake. Perhaps our bodies are not such as 
they appear to our senses. That there is such a thing as extension, seems indeed to 
be beyond doubt ; yet I know not whether some all-powerful being has not cawsed 
that there should exist in reality neither earth nor heavens, nor any extended object, 
nor figure, nor magnitude, nor place, and that nevertheless I should possess notions 
which represent to me as in a mirror all these objects as existing ; or that in the addi- 
tion of two and three, in the counting of the sides of a square, in the easiest reason- 
ings, I should be deceived. My imperfection may be so great that I am always 
deceived. As Archimedes, says Descartes in the second Meditation, demanded only 
one fixed point in order to move the world, so I may justly indulge in great hopes, if 
I am fortunate enough to find but one proposition which is fully certain and beyond 
doubt. In fact one thing in the midst of my universal doubt is certain, namely, that 
I do really doubt and think, and therefore that I do exist. Admitting the exist- 
ence of a powerful being bent on deceiving me, yet I must exist in order to be able 
to be deceived. When I think that I exist, this very act of thinking proves that I 
really exist. The proposition, "I am," "I exist," is always and necessarily true, 
whenever I express or think it. Gogito. ergo sum. I am certain only that I think ; I am 
a " thinking thing " {res cogitans, id est mens sive animus sive intellectus sive ratio). The 
res cogitans is a res dubitans, inteUigens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginaris 
quoque et sentiens. (Namely, as ^'' cogitandi modos^'' I have certainly also sensations, 
although their relation to external objects and to the affection of the senses may be 
doubtful.) Nonne ego ipse sum qui jam dubito fere de omnibus, qui nonnihil tamen 
inteUigo, qui hoc unum verum esse affirmo, nego ccetera, cupio plura nosse, nolo 
deeipi, multa vel invitiis imaginor, midta etiam tamquam a sensibus venientia animad- 
tertof I know myself as a thinking being better than I know external things.* In 

The similarity of Descartes' point of departure with that of Augustine in his philosophizing, and with 
Bome of the theses of Occam (see above, Vol. I. 86 and 105) and CampaneUa, is obvious. Descartes intro- 
luos the ren oogitatva aad heuce the conceptiou of substance and the ego and hcuca the cuuception of 


the third Meditation Descartes advances to the subject of our knowledge of God. 1 
am sure, he says, of this : that I am a thinking being ; but do I not also know what 
is requisite to make me certain of anything? In the case of the first knowledge 
which I have acquired, nothing but the clear and distinct perception of that which I 
assert assured me of its truth, and this could not so have assured me if it were pos- 
sible that anything, which I should conceive with the same clearness and distinctness, 
should be false ; hence it seems to me that I may adopt it as a general rule, that aU 
things which I conceive very clearly and distinctly are true {jam videor pro regula 
gener all posse statuere, illud omne esse verum, quod valde dare et distincte percipio). Only 
the possibility that a being, with power superior to my own, deceives me in all things, 
could limit the application of this rule. I have, therefore, first of all, occasion to inves- 
tigate the q'.'estion of God's existence. * Of my thoughts says Descartes in commenc- 
ing this investigation some are representations (ideas, i. e. forms of things received 
into my soul, elfSrj), some are acts of will and feehngs, and some are judgments. Truth 
and error are only in the judgments. The judgment that a representation is in con- 
formity with an object external to me may be erroneous, but the representation taken 
alone is not. Among my ideas, some appear to me to be innate, others to have come 
from without, and stiU others to have been formed by myself {idecB aUcB innatcB, 
alice adve/ititiai, alice a me ipso factm mihi videntur). Among those of the first 
class I am inclined to reckon the ideas of thing, truth, thought, which I derive 
from my own nature {ah ipsamet mea natura ; here Descartes does not distin- 
guish between the innateness of an idea as such, and the origin of an idea, 
through abstraction, in the act of internal perception, the result of psychical func- 
tions, the capacity for which is innate). To the second class seem to belong all sensu- 
ous perceptions, and to the third, such fictitious ideas as that of a siren, a winged horse, 
etc. There exists a way by which to conclude from the psychical character of an idea, 

individuality, the imity of consciousness in itself and its distinction from other things without previous de- 
duction into his fundamental proposition. Lichtenberg judged that Descartes should only have concluded ; 
cogitat, ergo est. Further, it can be questioned (with Kant) whether in the consciousness which we have of 
our thinking, our willing, our sensations, and, in general, of all our psychical functions, we apprehend these 
functions just as they are in themselves, and whether our apprehension of them is not subjected to forms 
which belong only to the act of self -apprehension and not to that which is to be apprehended itself ; in which 
case the phenomena of self-consciousness, as known through the "internal sense," would, like those of exter- 
nal objects known through the external senses, be different in form and nature from their real occasioning 
causes e. g., the reports of our consciousness respecting our doubting, thinking, or willing, would not cor- 
rectly represent the real internal processes designated by those names. (This latter question, however, would 
indeed have to be decided in Descartes's favor. See my Systejn der Logik, 3d ed., Bonn, 1SG8, pp. 71-76.) 

* In making the clearness of knowledge the criterion of its truth, Descartes overlooks the relativity of 
these conceptions. I must, indeed, in all ca-ses accept as true that of which I am convinced that I have 
clear and distinct knowledge, but I should also be mindful that an apparently clear knowledge may, upon 
more profound consideration, evince itself as insufficient and erroneous; just as the truth of a clear, sensuoui 
perception, e. g. of the sky, may be limited or disproved by clear scientific insight, bo the validity of any 
stadium of thought may be limited and disproved by a higher one in particular, the validity of thought 
immediately and unquestioningly directed to its objects, by thought regulated by a correct theory of cognition. 
It is wrong to claim for a lower stadium which, so long as no higher one has been reached, by a natural self- 
deception is regarded as the highest, that fuller verity which belongs to a higher one, and, in case such fuller 
verity proves in the end really wanting, to talk of malicious deception, of base imposture. The Cartesian 
ci-iterion, formally considered, is ambiguous, since it may be interpreted as referring to the distinctness of the 
idea as such, or to the distinctness of the judgment by which it is affirmed that certain ideas, either in them- 
selves or in their mutual relations, are objectively ti-ue. Understood in the former sense, the criterion woul'' 
be false : understood in the latter sense, it only throws the question farther hack, since it is left undecided 
whence the distinctness of our conviction of the objective reahty of the object of the idea arises. 


wii"; her it comes from a recOl object external to me. Different ideas have, namely, 
a diU erent measure of realitas objectivai i. e. , they participate as representative images 
in higher or inferior degrees of being or perfection. (By the objective Descartes, pre- 
cisely like the Scholastics, understands that which is ideally in the mind, not the exter- 
nal object, the res externa; by the subject he understands any substratum, viroKfl/xtyoy.) 
Ideas through which I think of substances are more perfect than those which represent 
only modes or accidents ; the idea of an infinite, eternal, unchangeable, omniscient, 
omnipotent being, the creator of all finite things, has more ideal reality than the ideas 
which represent finite substances. But there can be no more reality in an eflEect than 
in the complete cause ; the cause must contain eitheT foT^uiUter or eminenter all that 
is real in the effect (i. e., either the same realities, or others that are superior to them). 
Therefore, if the representative reality of any one of my ideas is so great that it exceeds 
the measure of my own reality, I can conclude that I am not the only being existing^ 
but that there must exist something else which is the cause of that idea. Since I am 
finite, the idea of an infinite substance could not be in me, if this idea did not come 
from a really existing infinite substance. I may not regai'd the idea of the infinite as 
a mere negation of finiteness, like rest and darkness, the perception of which is only 
possible through the negation of motion and light ; for the infinite includes more 
reality than the finite. * To this argument for the existence of God Descartes adds 
the following : I myself, who have the idea of God, could not exist without God. If 
I had been the author of my own being, I should have given myself all possible perfec- 
tions which yet, as matter of fact, I do not possess. If I owe my existence to others, 
to parents, ancestors, etc., yet there must be a first cause, which is God ; a regrcssus 
in infinitum is all the less to be assumed, since even my continued existence from one 
instant to another cannot depend on myself, nor on finite causes of my existence, but 
only on the first cause. The idea of God is in the same way iimate in me, as is the 
idea which I have of myself. (The kind of innateness Descartes leaves rather indefi- 
nite ; he says : Et sane 7wn mirum est, Deum me creando ideam illam mild indidisse, ut 
asset tamquam nota artificis operi suo impressa^ nee etiam opus est, ut nota ilia sit aliqua 
res ab opere ipso diversa, sed ex hoc uno quod Deus me creavit, valde credibile est me 
quodammodo ad iinaginem et similitudinem ejus factum esse, iUamque simititudinem, in 
qua Dei idea continetur, a me perdpi per eandem facultatem, per quam ego ipse a me 
percipior, Iioc est, dum in me ipsum mentis aciem convert/), non m/)do intelligo me esse rem 
incompletam et ab cdio dependentem remque ad majora et majora sive meliora indefinite 
aspirantem, sed simul etiam intelligo iUum a quo pendeo, nuijora ista omnia non indefinite 
et potentia tantum, sed reipsa infinite in se habere, atque ita Deum esse, totaque vis argu- 
mentiin eo est, quod agnovcam fieri non posse ut existam talis naturce, quaiis sum, nempe 
ideam, Dei in me habens nisi re vera Deus etiam existeret. ) Among the necessary attri- 
butes of God belongs the love of truth. God cannot wish to deceive. ( Vdle fallere vei 
malitiam vel imbedUitatem testatur nee proinde in Deum cadit. ) From this attribute of 
veracity, Descartes draws conclusions in the subsequent Meditations. The cause of all 
my errors, says D., in the fourth Meditation, arises from the fact that my power of 
willing reaches farther than my understanding, and that I do not confine the exertion 
of the former within the limits demanded by the latter, but that, instead of withhold- 

Descartes, whUe justly denying that the idea of the infinite is a mere negation, does not attend suffi- 
ciently to the gradual process of idealization by which the positive content of this idea is acquired, nor con.side 
whether, when the measure of representative perfection thus attainable is transcended, a positive addition is 
really made to the content of the idea, or the mind merely tends towards a negation of all limits through 
iimple abstraction. 



lug my judgment, I presume to judge also of that which I do not understand. To 
that which I know clearly and distinctly I may assent, for that clear and distinct 
knowledge must be true, follows from God's veracity.* Among things distinctly 
known Descartes reckons, in the fifth Meditation, the facts of extension in space, 
together with all mathematical propositions. But just as it follows from the essence 
of a triangle, that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles, so it follows from 
the nature of God, that he exists ; for by God we are to understand the absolutely 
perfect being ; but existence is a perfection ; hence existence is inseparable from God'a 
essence, and hence God exists, f In the sixth Meditation Descartes concludes from the 
clear and distinct knowledge which we have of extension and of bodies, and from oui 
distinct consciousness of ideas determined by an external and material cause, that 
bodies (i. e., extended substances) really exist, and that we are not deceived in our 
idea of a material world, since, were it otherwise, the ground of our deception must 
lie in God ; but the sensations of color, sound, taste, etc., as well as pain and pleasure, 
are viewed by him as merely subjective. But from the fact that we have a clear and 
distinct idea of thought in the widest sense (including sensation and willing), and that 
in this idea no representation of anything material is contained, Descartes infers the 
ihdependent existence of our souls apart from the body.:}: 

The development of ideas in the Meditations is designated by Descartes himself as 
analytical (that which is given as fact being analyzed with a view to the discovery of 
principles), conformably to the method of invention ; a synthetic order of presentation 
(setting out from the most general or fundamental concepts and principles) is, he says, 
less adapted for metaphysical than for mathematical speculations. Descartes makes 
an attempt at synthetic exposition in an addendum to his reply to the second series of 
objections, but lays no great weight upon it. 

The systematic and important work, Prindpia PJiilosophicp, treats in successive 
sections of the principles of human knowledge, of the principles of material things, of 
the visible world, and of the earth. After a recapitulation of the principles laid down 
in the Meditations, follows the philosophical system, and especially the natural philos- 
ophy of Descartes, synthetically developed. In the preliminary considerations it is 
to be observed that the order of the proofs of God's existence is changed, the ontolo- 

By the aid of this same criterion, founded on the veracity of God, we have seen Descartes obliged to 
help out his proof of God's existence ; if the certainty of God's existence depends on a knowledge whose cer- 
tainty, in turn, depends on the existence of God, the argument moves undeniably in a circle. This was cor- 
rectly pointed out and censured by Hobbes. 

t Descartes here commits the same fault which Anselm committed he forgets that it is a condition of 
every categorical inference from definitions, that the reality of the subject of definition be previously ascer- 
tained ; this objection is rightly urged against him in the Objectiones Prima by Caterus, who turns against 
him the Thomistic refutation of the Anselmic argument ; and Descartes's defence does not meet the point at 
issue. Descartes's premises conduct logically only to the insignificant conclusion, that if God is, existence 
belongs to him, and if God imagined, he must be imagined as existing. Besides, the Cartesian form of the 
ontological proof has a defect from which the Anselmic is free, namely, that the premise, " being is a perfec- 
tion," involves a very questionable conception of being as a predicate among other predicates, while Ansehn 
had indicated a definite kind of being, viz. : being, not merely in our minds, but also outside of them, as that 
In which superior perfection was involved. 

X Here, however, it remains quite questionable, whether a<fiaCpf<ni and x^pic^o^i abstractio and realia 
4i8tinctio, have not been confounded ; Gassendi and others have justly censured, in their Objections, Deecar- 
tes'8 confusion of two propositions : a) I can think of thought without thinking of extension ; 6) I can show 
that thought actually continues when the extended substance in connection ^vith which it is manifested ceases 
to exist. Gassendi further objects, that it does not appear how images of that which is extended can exist in 
n unextended being ; in reply to this objection Descartes denies, indeed, the corporeality of the images, but 
leaves unnoticed the fact of their being extended in three dimensiona. 


gical argument (as also in the synthetic exposition in the answer to the Obj. seeundce) 
being placed before the others ; in the conception of God, Descartes here says, is con- 
tained necessary, eternal, and perfect existence, whereas the conception of finite things 
includes only accidental existence. * The definitions, which appear in greater number 
and precision in the Priiic. Philos. than in the Meditatians, are worthy of notice. The 
definitions of clearness and distinctness and substance, are of fundamental importance. 
Descartes says {Princ. Ph., I. 45) : "In order that upon a perception a certain and 
incontestable judgment may be founded, it is necessary that the former be not only 
clear, but also distinct. I term a perception clear when it is present and manifest to 
the attentive mind, just as we say that we see a thing clearly when, being presented 
to the gazing eye, it affects the latter with sufficient power and plainness ; and I term 
it distinct when it is not only clear, but is so separated and distinguished from all 
others that it plainly contains nothing but what is clear." (Claram voco illam, quae 
menti attendenti prce^tis et a-perta est, sicut ea cl/ire a nobis videri dicimus, quas oculo 
intuenti prcBsentia satis fortiter et aperte iUutn movent ; distinctam autem illam, qua 
quum dara sit, ab omnibus altis ita sejuncta est et pracisa, ut nihil plane aliud, qumn 
quod darum est, in se contineat. ) In illustration Descartes cites the example of pain : 
" Thus when one feels any great pain, the perception of pain is most clear to him, but 
it is not always distinct ; for commonly men confound the perception with an obscure 
mental judgment concerning the nature of something in the part affected, which they 
imagine to resemble the sense of pain, which sense alone is all that they clearly per- 
ceive. " The things which we perceive, says Descartes, are either things and affections 
{sive modi) of things, or eternal truths, having no existence external to our thoughts. 

Among the eternal truths Descartes reckons such principles as the following : Nothing 
can originate from nothing {ex nihilo nihil fit) ; It is impossible that the same thing 
should at the same time exist and not exist ; Whatever is done cannot be undone ; He 
who thinks cannot be non-existent so long as he thinks. He divides "things" (res) 
into two highest genera : " The one of intellectual or thought-things, i. e., things per- 
taining to mind or thinking substance, and the other of material things, or things per- 
taining to extended substance, i. e., to bodies." (Unum est rerum inteUectuaUum sive 
cogitatimrum, hoc est ad mentem sive ad substantiam cogitantem pertinentium ; aliud 
rerum materialium sive quce pertinent ad substantiam extensam, hoc est ad corpus.) 
To thinking substance belong perception, volition, and aU the modes of perception and 
volition ; and to extended substance, magnitude or extension itself in length, breadth, 
and thickness, figure, motion, position, divisibility, and the like. From the union of 
the mind with the body arise the sensitive desires, emotions , and sensations, which 
belong to the thinking substance in its union with the body. After this classification 
{Princ. Ph., I., 48-50) Descartes places the definition of substance {ib. 51) : "By sub- 
stance we can only understand that which so exists that it needs nothing else in order 
to its existence " {per substantiam nihil aliud inteUigere possumus, quam rem quce ita 
existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad exutendmn). He adds {ib. 51-52), that indeed only 
one substance can be conceived as plainly needing nothing else in order to its existence, 
namely, God ; for we plainly perceive that all others cannot exist without God's assist- 
ance ; hence, he continues, the term substance cannot be applied to God and to them 
unlvocally in the language of the schools - that is, no meaning of the term substance 
oan be distinctly apprehended, which is at once applicable alike to God and to created 

* This, of course, is only true upon the condition that objective necessity be strictly distinguished from 
Bubjeetive certainty of existence in which case, however, we can only conclude : if there is a God, his exiijt- 
enoe is eternal, necessary, per se, and independent of all beside him. 


things ; but corporeal substance and mind, or created thinking substance, can be appr^ 
hended as falling under this common definition, that they are things needing only tht 
aid of God for their existence. From the existence of any attribute we can conclude 
to an existing thing or substance to which it belongs ; but every substance has a ' ' pre- 
eminent attribute, which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all others 
relate ; thus extension in three dimensions constitutes the nature of corporeal sub- 
stance, and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance ; for everything else 
which can be ascribed to bodies presupposes extension, and is only some mode of an 
extended thing, just as also all things which we find in the mind are simply diverse 
modes of thought." Figure and motion are modes of extension, and imagination, sen- 
sation, and will are modes of thought {ib. 53). The modes can change in the same 
substance ; the quality of a substance is only actual or present, not permanent ; that 
which does not change is not properly mode or quality, but is to be designated only by 
bhe more general term of attribute {ib. 56). These definitions were of controlling 
influence, especially on the doctrine of Spinoza. Most of the details of the doctrine 
exposed in the Princ. Philos. are rather of scientific than of philosophical interest. 
Excluding all consideration of ends {causes finales), Descartes seeks only to discover 
working causes {caitsm efficientes, Pr. Ph. I. 28). He attributes to matter nothing 
but extension and modes of extension, no internal states, no forces ; pressure and im- 
pulsion must suffice for the explanation of all material phenomena. The quantity of 
matter and motion in the universe remains unchanged {Princ. Philos., II. 36). Des- 
cartes assumes the quantity of motion as equal to the product of mass and velocity 
(??ic). His proof of the constancy of this product in the universe is founded on the 
theological inference, that from God's attribute of invariability follows the invariability 
of the sum of his effects. * The soul can determine only the direction of motions, but 
can neither increase nor diminish their quantity. The cosmical bodies can be regarded 
as having first arisen from vortical motions in an original mass of chaotic matter. 
Where space is, there is also matter ; the latter is, Like space, infinitely divisible, and 
extends, if not in infinitum, at least in indefi?iitum. That with the overthrow of the 
notion of a spherically limited universe the theory of the periodical rotation of the 
same around the earth is also overthrown, is obvious ; still, Descartes hesitated openly 
to confess his adhesion to the Copernican doctrine (cf. above, pp. 17 et seq.) for which 
Galileo had been condemned ; he avoids the difficulty by saying that the earth, like all 
the planets, rests in the moving ether, as a sleeping traveller is at rest in a moving ship, 
or a ship carried along by the current is at rest in the current. Descartes seeks, by the 
laws of pressure and impulsion alone, not only to explain all physical phenomena, but 
also to accoimt for plants and animals. He denies to plants the vital principle (ascribed 
to them by the Aristotelians), since, as he says, the order and motion of their parts are 
the sole cause of vegetation, and he is also indisposed to allow souls to animals. What- 
ever, in the Ufe of the human soul, concerns the relation of the soul to the material 
world, is explained by Descartes altogether mechanically ; he accounts, for example, 
for the association of ideas by the theory of permanent material changes produced in 
the brain when the senses are acted upon, and that these changes influence the subse- 
quent development of ideas. As an unextended being, the soul can be in contact with 
the body only at one point, which point is in the brain {Princ. PhUos., IV. 189, 196, 

It is true that the quantitj' of matter in the universe remains unchanged. The like is not necessarily 
true ol the quantity of motion, but only of the sum of what is now termed "living force" and "elaatdoity." 
See on this subject, in particular, Helmholtz, Ueber die Erhaltung der Kraft, Berlin, 1S47. 


197), or, more precisely {Dioptr., IV. 1 seq. ; P<iss. Anim., I. 31 seq.), in the pineal 
gland {glatis pinealis), since the latter is that organ within the brain which is simple, 
and not, like most of the parts, double, existing on the right side and on the left. * The 
action of the soul on the body and of the body on the soul demands the concourse of 
God {concursus or assistentia Dei). (That the possibility of interaction was not excluded 
by the complete unlikeness in nature of the body and the soul, had already been asserted 
by Descartes in his answers to the objections of Gassendi against his Meditations. ) 

The treatise on the Passions of the Soul {Passiones Animm) is a physiologico-psycho- 
logical attempt to explain the passions, taken in their widest sense, according to the 
principles developed in the Princvpia Philos. From six primitive passions or emotions : 
admiration, love, hate, desire, joy, and sadness, Descartes seeks to deduce all others. 
The most perfect of all emotions is intellectual love to God- It is only occasionally that 
Descartes expresses himself on ethical subjects. The views thus expressed agree largely 
with the ethical doctrines of Aristotle. Descartes affirms that all pleasure arises from the 
consciousness of some perfection ; virtue depends on the control of the passions by 
wisdom, which prefers to all inferior pleasure the pleasure arising from rational ac- 

Among the disciples of Descartes were Reneri and Regius, at Utrecht ; Raey, Heere- 
bord, and Heidanus, at Leyden, and other Dutch scholars ; and in France, many 
Oratorians and Jansenists, whose Augustinianism rendered them susceptible to the 
influence of the new doctrine. Among the Jansenists of the Abbey of Port-Royal (on 
whom cf. Herm. Reuchlin, Gesck. van Port-Royal., Hamb. and Gotha 1839-44, and St.- 
Beuve, Port-Royal.^ 3d ed., Paris, 1867), the most noteworthy friend of the Cartesian 
tendency was Anton Amauld (1612-94; (Euvres CamjMtes., Lausanne, 1775-83), the 
author of the Ohjectiones Quartce. Amauld raised numerous questions in reference to 
the details of Descartes's doctrines, and confined the Cartesian rule of certainty to the 
objects of cognition. Among the more notable Cartesians belong also Pierre Sylvain 
Regis (1632-1707; Cours entier de la philos., Paris, 1690, Amst. , 1691), Pierre Nicole 
(1625-95 ; Bssais de morale, Par., 1671-74, etc. ; CEuvres Mar., Par., 1718), and others ; 
among the German Cartesians should be named Balthasar Bekker (1634-98 ; De philos. 
Cartesiana admonitio Candida et sincera, Wesel, 1668), who especially distinguished 
himself by his opposition to the absurdity of trials for witchcraft (in his work, Betoverde 
Weereld The World Bewitched Leuwarden, 1690, and Amst. , 1691-98) ; also Johann 
Clauberg (1625-65), teacher at Duisburg (Logica vetuset nova, etc., Duisb. , 1656 ; Opera 
philos., Amst., 1691), Sturm, of Altdorf, and others. 

Among the opponents of Descartes, Hobbes and Gassendi occupied the naturalistic 
stand-point. (Among the numerous, and some of them extremely acute and pertinent 
objections of Gassendi, that particular one is not found, which alone is often men- 
tioned as his, but which is only ascribed by Descartes in his answer to Gassendi, 
namely: that existence could be concluded from the going to walk; Gassendi says 
only, that existence can be concluded from any action, and he disapproves the 
Cartesian identification of all psychical actions as modes of thought. We become, 
indeed, sooner conscious of our existence through reflection on our acts of will, than 
through reflection oa our acts of thought.) From the stand-point of theological 

* To this doctrine, that the soul is located at a given single point, the doctrine of Spinoza is directly 
opposed, while the Leibnitzian doctrine of the soul as a monad is founded ui)on it. With the Cartesian 
assumption, that the pineal gland is the seat of the soul, conflicts the fact, that when this organ ia destroyed, 
I^ychical life continues. 


orthodoxy and Axistotfilian philosophy, Cartesianiani was combated especially by tha 
Protestant GiBbertas Voetiois and the JesaitB Bourdin (author of the Objectionea .'<epti- 
mcB), Daniel ( Voyage du nufrule de Dearjirtei, Par., 1691, Lat., Amst., 1694; Nmivelle* 
difficilte^ jrrf)foeea par ua I'eripateticien, Amst., 1094, Lat., i^nd., 1694;, and others. 
The Synod of Dortrecht, in the year IO-jO, forbade theologians to adopt it. At Rome 
Descartes's writings were in 166^3 placed in the Index Lif/ronxm FrohPjiUjrum, and in 
1671 the exposition of the Cartesian doctrine at the University of Paris was by royal 
order prohibited. 

Partly friendly, partly opposed to Cartesianism were such myfitiail phUosophern as 
Blaise Pascal (1623-62 ; the fundamental thought in Pascal's philosophy is : ' Nature 
confounds the Pyrrhonists, and reason the dogmatists. Our inability to prore any- 
thing Ls such as no dogmatism can overcome, and we have an idea of the truth which 
no P^-rrhonism can overcome, Pens e,'" Art. XXI.), Pierre Poiret (1640-1719;, Ralph 
Cudworth (see above at the end of 7;, and other Platonists, and especially Henry More, 
the Platonist and Cabalist, who in the year VAH exchanged correspondence with Descartes 
himself (printed in vol. xi. of Cousin's edition of Descartes;, in which, among other things, 
he affirmed, in opposition to Descartes, the conception of immaterial extension as apjjlying 
to God and souls, and combated Descartes's purely mechanical doctrine of nature. The 
theologically orthodox, but philosophically skeptical bishop Huet fl6:i()-1721) wrote 
a (Jemanira phQ/jv/phifs. (Jarttnuiri/x 'Paris, 1689, etc.;, which called forth several replies 
from Cartesians ; also (anonymou-sly; Nouvomx Memrnren paunterviT d Vhigtmre du Canr- 
thtianiitme. (Paris, 1692, etc.;. The skeptic, Pierre Bayle (1647-1766 ; Dictum, see above, 
Vol. I. 5 4, p. 8; CEhxvres Diverse*, The Hague, 172.>-31;, also, though not unfavora- 
ble to the Cartesian philosophy, yet directed against it, as against all dogmatism. hLs 
skeptical arguments. He asserted of human reason in general, what was true of his 
own in particular, that it was powerful in the discovery of errors, but weak in positive 
knowledge. He made use of the early Protestant principle of the contradiction be- 
tween reason and faith, to show up various absurdities in the orthodox system of faith. 

The Cartesian Dualism co-ordinated mind and body as two wholly heterogeneous 
sabstances. It denied to the soul the vegetative functions ascribed to it by Aristotle, 
aligning them to the body, and esi>ecially to the vital spirits 'spiritus viVjies) s-upposed 
to pervade the body. On the other hand, it denied to matter all internal state*. In 
this manner the active relation actually subsisting between psychical and somatic 
processes was made incomprehensible. A natural influence (influxiMS physicus) of the 
body on the soul and of the soul on the body could not consistently be ass-umed even 
upon the hypothesis of divine assistance. No explanation remained possible, except 
such as was derivable from the theory of divine agency, or the theory that on the 
fKxiasion of the iKKlily change, Gwl calls forth the corresponding idea in the soul, and 
that on the occasion of our willing, God moves the body in accordance with our will 
(doctrine of Occasionalism;. This consequence of Cartesianism, which was partially 
perceived by Claul^erg, Louis de la Forge, and Cordemoy, was expressly and theo- 
retically enounced by Am. Geulinx (162.>-^i9; and Nic. Malebranche (16:38-1715; 
Father of the Oratory; ; the latter teaches, that we see all things in God, who is the 
place of spirits, through participation in his knowledge. This sort of divine agency 
was. indeed, itself absolutely incomprehensible ; but this incomprehensibleness gave 
no offence to these philosophers. Spinoza, on the contrary, being unable to admit s-uch 
a doctrine, undertook to replace the dualism of soul and bo<ly, as also that of God 
and the world, by the doctrine of the unity of substance (monism). Leibnitz, again, 
in his theory of monads, sought to avoid the extremes of dualism and monism, by 


recognizing the harmonious gradation of substances. In Leibnitz culminates the 
series of dogmatic philosophers, who aimed at the union of religious convictions \s-ith 
the scientific results of modern investigation. To this series Spinoza, in view of the 
theological character of his monistic doctrine, derived by deduction from the concep- 
tion of substance, undoubtedly belongs. 

115. Baruch Despinoza (Benedictus de Spinoza) was born at Am- 
sterdam in 1632, and died at the Hague in 1677. Unsatisfied by his 
Tahnudic education, he turned liis attention to the philosophy of 
Descartes, but transformed the Cartesian dualism into a pantheism, 
whose fundamental conception was the unity of substance. By sub- 
stance Spinoza understands that which is in itself and is to be con- 
ceived by itself. There is only one substance, and that is God. This 
substance has two fundamental qualities or attributes cognizable by us, 
namely, thought and extension ; there is no extended substance as dis- 
tinct from thinking substance. Among the unessential, changing 
forms or modes of these attributes is included indi^-idual existence. 
Such existence does not belong to God, since, were it otherwise, he 
would be finite, and not absolute ; all determination is negation. God 
is the immanent cause (a cause not passing out of itself) of the totality 
of finite thincTs or the world. God works accordinsr to the inner 
necessity of his natiu*e ; in this consists his freedom.- G(xi produces 
all finite effects only indirectly, through finite causes ; there is no such 
thing as a direct working of God in view of ends, nor as human 
freedom independent of causality. It can only be said that one mode 
of extension works upon another mode of extension, and one mode of 
thought on another mode of thought. Between thought and exten- 
sion, on the contrary, there exists, not a causal nexus, but a perfect 
agreement. The order and connection of thought is identical with 
the order and connection of tilings, each thought being in all cases 
only the idea of the corresponding mode of extension. Human ideas 
vary in clearness and value from the confused representations of the 
imagination to the adequate knowledge of tlie intellect, which con- 
ceives all that is particular from the point of view of the whole which 
contains it, and comprehends all things under the form of eternity 
{sub specie CBteniitatis), not as accidental, but as necessary. From 
confused mental representations, wliich cannot rise above the finite, 
arise passions and the bondage of the will, while intellectual knowl- 
edge gives rise to intellectual love to God, in which our happiness 
and our freedom consist. Beatitude is not a reward of virtue, but 
virtue itself. 

56 epmozA. 

Of the works of Spinoza the earliest was his exposition, according to the geometrical method, of 
the Cartesian doctrines. The work had its origin partly in the oral instruction which Spinoza hd 
occasion to give to a private pupil, and was entitled : Renati den Cartes P7'incipiorum philosophice pars 
I. et II., more geometrico demonstraUx, per Benedictum de Spinoza Amstelodameyisem, accesserunt ejus- 
dem Cogitata metapht/sica, in quibus difflciliore'^ quae tarn tn parte Metaphysices geiierali quam speciali 
occurrunt, qucestione-s breviter expllcnntur, Ajnstelodami apud Joliannem Hieutwertnz, 1663. Next ap- 
peared his Tractatun theolngico-politicus, continena dissertationes aliquot, quibus ostenditur libertaiem phi- 
losophandi non tantum salva pietate et reipublicce pace posse concedi, sed eandem nisi cum pace reipublic/e 
ipsaque pietate telli non posse, with the following motto from I. John : per hoc oognoscimus quod in 
Deo manemus et Deus manet in jiobis, quod de spinlu suo dedit nobis. Haniburgi apud Ilenricum 
Kilnraht {Amst., Christoph Conrad), 1670. (There exists a second impression, of the same year, nominally 
published also at Hamburg '^aptul Uenr. Kilnrath,'" in which the errata indicated upon the last page of the 
first impression are for the most part corrected, but which contains some new mistakes some of them 
obscuring the sense. This work is printed in Paulus' edition from a third edition, which Paulus appears to 
have supposed to be the first ; in this edition the Hebrew text of passages cited from the Bible is omitted. ) 
The same Tractatus theologico-politiciis, having been interdicted, was in 1673 twice printed at Amsterdam 
and once at Leyden with false titles, and again, sine loco, 1674, with the name Tractattis theologico-politicus, 
together with a reprint of the following work, written by Spinoza's friend, Ludwig Meyer, the physician, and 
first published at '' Eleutheropolis''' (Amst.), 1666: Philosophia Scripturce Interpres. Spinoza's marginal 
notes to the Tractatus theologico-politicus have been frequently published, a part of them having been given 
in the French translation of this Tractatus by St. Glain (1678), and the rest by Christoph TheophU de Miur 
(The Hague, 1802) and others. In a copy presented by Spinoza to Clefmann, and now at Konigsberg, are 
contained notes, which Dorow has edited (Berlin, 1835). These notes do not vary essentially from those 
already published. The Ethics, Spinoza's chief philosophical work, appeared in print first after his death, 
together with some shorter treatises, with the title : B. d. S. Opera posthuma, Amst., 1677. (Contents : 
PrafaXio, written in Dutch by Jarrig JeUis, the Mennonite, and translated into Latin by Ludwig Meyer. 
Ethica, o^'dine geometrico demonstrata, et in quinque partes distincta, in quibus agitur I. de Deo, IT. de 
fiatura et origine mentis. III. de origiiie et natura affectuum, IV. de scrvitute humana seu de affectuum viri- 
bus, V. d^potentia intellectus seu de libertaie hunuum. Tractatus politicus, in quo demonstralur, quomodo 
societas, ubi imperium moiuirchicum locum habet, sicut et ea, ubi Optimi imperant, debet institui, tie in tyran- 
nidem labatur, et ut pax Ubertasque civium inviolata maneat. Tractatus de intellectus emendatione, et de 
via, qua optime in veram rerum cognitionem dirigiiur. Episiolce doctorumquorundarn virorum ad B. d. iS. 
et auctoris respon'Hoiies, ad aliorum ejus operum elucidationem non parum facientes. Compendium gram- 
maticce lingiUB Hebrcece.) A complete edition of the Works was edited by Paulus : Benedicti de Spinoza 
opera qv/x. supersunt om.nia, Uerum edenda curavit, prce/ationes, vitani auctoris nee non 7iotitias, qitce ad 
historiam scriptorum pertinent, addidit Henr. Eberh. Gottlob Paulus, Jena, 1802-3. Later editions are: 
Benedicti de Spinoza opera philosophica omnia edidit et prcefationem adjecit A. Gfrorer, Stuttgard, 1830. 
Renati des Cartes et Benedicti de Spinoza pi-cecipua opera philosophica recognovit, notitias historico-philoso- 
phicas adjecit Carolus Riedel, Leipsic, 1843 (Carte^i Medit., Spinozcp. diss, philos., Spinoz<e Eth.). Benedicti 
de Spinoza opera qtue supersunt omnia ex editionibus princ. denuo ed. etprcefatus est Carol. Herm. Bruder, 
Leips., 1843-46. Newly discovered writings of Spinoza have been published by Bohmer and Vloten: Bene- 
dicti de Spinoza tractatus de Deo et homine ejusque felicitate linearaenta atque adnotationes ad tracSatum 
theologico-politicum ed. et illustr. Ed. Boehmer, Halle, 1852, and Ad Benedicti de Spinoza opera qum super- 
sunt omnia supplementum,, contin. tractatum hue n.'ique de Deo et homine, tractatulum de inde, epistolas 
nonnullas ineditas et ad eas vitamque philosophi Collectanea {ed. J. van Vloten), Amst, 1862. Cf. on these 
works, Heinr. Ritter, in Gott. gel. Anz., 1862, No. 47 ; Christoph Sigwart, Sp.'s neuentdeckter Tractatvon Gott, 
dem McTischen und dessen GliickseligkeU, erlautert und in seiner Bedeutung fiir das Verstdndniss des Spinozis- 
inxLSuntersucht, Gotha, 1866; Trendelenburg, Ueber die aufgefundenen Erg anzuiigenzu Spinoza^ sWerken und 
deren Ertragfur Sp.'s Leben und Lehre, in Vol. III. of Trendelenburg's UlU. Beitr. eur Philos., Berlin, 1867, pp. 
277-398 ; Richard Avenarius, Ueber die beiden ersten Phasen des Sp.'schen Pajitheismvs (see below). The Trac- 
tatus de Deo et homine ejusque felicitate wa.s not discovered in the Latin original, but in a Dutch translation 
(Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch, en deszelfs Welstand). Van Vloten has published this work in 
Dutch (in the above-mentioned Supplementum) from a more recent MS., and Schaarschmidt (Amsterdam, 
1869) from an earlier one ; S. adds a preface " de Sp. philos. fontibus." This Tractate, translated into Ger- 
man by Schaarschmidt, is published in Kirchmann's Philos. Bibliothek, Vol. XVIII., Berlin, 1869. At the 
ame time with this translation by Schaarschmidt, appeared the following : Christoph Sigwart, Benedict de 
SpinoxCs kurzer Tractat von Gott, dem Menschen und des-'ten Gluckseligkeit, auf Grund einer von Dr. Anto- 
nius van der Linde vorgenommenen Vergleichung der Handschriften in\t Deutsche ilbersetzt, tnit einer Ein- 
leitung, kritischen und siichlichen Erlduteru?igen begleitet, Tiibingen, 1870. The posthumous works were 
translated into Dutch (by Jarrig Jellis) in 1677. A translation of the Tractatus theologico-politicus, made in 


Spinoza's lifetime, bnt, in accordance with his wish, not then made public, was afterwards published under 
the title : Z) rechtzinnige Theologant^ Uamburg by Henricus Koenraad (Amsterdam), 1693. A French 
translation of the Tractatus theol.-pol. (probably by St. Glain) was published under various disg:uising titles 
in 1678 ; in modem times Emile Saisset has translated the works of Spinoza into French (CEuvresde Spitioza, 
Par. 1842) ; a new edition of this translation appeared at Paris in 1861 (and of the Iniroduction Critique, 
which accompanied it, at Paris in 1860). The Tractatxis politiciis (to be distinguished from the Tract, theol.- 
polU. ) has been translated into French by J. G. Prat : TmiCe politique deB.de Spinoza, Paris, 1860. CEuvrea 
Computes, traduUes et annotees par J. G. Prat, Paris, 1863 seq. The Ethics of Spinoza, translated into 
German, was published, together with Chr. Wolfs refutation, at Frankfort and Leipsic in 1744. His treatises 
on the Cultivation of the Human Understanding, and on Aristocracy and Democracy, were translated [into 
German] by S. H. Ewald (Leipsic, 1785), as also were his " Philosophical Writings : " VoL I. : B. v. S. uberfi. 
Schrift, Judenthum, Recht der hbchsten Getoalt in geistlichen Diwjen und Frei/ieit zu philosopldren {TYact. 
Theol.-Polit.), Gera, 1787; Vols. II. and III. : Sp.'s Ethik, Gera, 1791-93. The Tract, theol.-polit. has also 
been translated into German by C. Ph. Conz, Stuttg., 1806, and J. A. Kalb, Munich, 1826, the Ethics by F. 
W. V. Schmidt, Berlin, 1812, and recently by v. Kirchmann, Philos. Bibl., VoL IV., Berlin, 1868, and the 
complete works by Berthold Auerbach, 5 vols., Stuttgard, 1841. [An English anonymus translation of th 
Tra(.-t. Theol.-Polit. appeared in the year 1689. A new one was published also anonymously London, 1862 (?), 
2d ed., 1868. On the latter cf. Matthew Arnold, A Word more about Spinoza, in MacMillan's Magazine, Vol. 
9, pp. 136-148. Benedictus de Spinoza; Sis Ethics, Life, and Injluence on Moriern Religiom Tliought, by R 
Willis, M.D., London (Triibner), 1870 (?). Spinoza's Letter Expostulatory to a Convert, ibid.Tr.] 

The principal source of our knowledge of the Ufe of Spinoza is, next to Spinoza's own works and letters, 
the Biography written by a Lutheran pa.'tor, Johannes Golerus, which appeared iu Dutch in 1705, in French 
at The Hague in 1706 and 17^3 (also in the Opera, Ed. Paulus), in German at Frankf. and Leipsic in 1733, 
and translated by Kahler, 1734. Less trustworthy are the statements in La Vie et C Esprit de Mr BenoU de 
5j5W0sa(Amst.)1719 (by Lucas, a physician at The Hague; new ed. of the first part: La Vie de Splnosa, 
par un de ses disciple.^, Hamb., 17.35), as also those in Christian Kortholfs De Tribus Impostoribus Magnis 
(Herbert of Cherburj-, Hobbas, and Spinoza), Hamburg, 1700. Still earlier (1696) Bayle's Dictionary had 
contained some notices respecting Spinoza's life, which appeared in a Dutch translation with additional essays 
at Utrecht, 1698 (with new title-page, 1711). The biography by Colerus, together with notices from 2k Vie dA 
Spinosa written by a friend of Spinoza (Lucas), were included in the volume entitled Refutation des Erreurs 
de BenoU de Spinosa par Mr. de Fenelon, par le P. Lami Benedictin et par le Comte Bouillainvilliers, 
Brussels, 1731. H. F. v. Dietz, Ben. vo?i Spinosa nach Leben und Lehren, Dessau and Leipsic, 1783. M. 
Philipson, Leben B.'s von Spinosa, Leips., 1790. 

Of the later works on Spinoza's life and work-s, the Histoire de la vie et des ouvrage^ de B. de Spinosa, fon- 
dateur de Texegise et de la philosophie modernes, par Armand Saintes (Paris, 1842), should be specially 
mentioned. The scanty accounts transmitted to us respecting Spinoza's life, Berthold Auerbach has sought 
to supplement and complete artistically, in "Spinoza, ein historisc/ier Roman," Stuttgard, 1837; second 
revised and stereotj-ped edition : Spinoza, ein Denkerleben, Mannheim, 1855, and in the collected writings, 
Stuttgard, 1863, 1864, Vols. 10 and 11 (a work fuU of profound poetic truth in the parts which portray the 
order of Spinoza's intellectual development). Conr. von OreUi, Spinoza's Leben und Lehre, 2d ed., Aarau, 
1850. A counterpart to the eulogistic accounts of Spinoza is found in the Introduction of Antonius van der 
Linde to his work : Spinoza, seine Lehre und deren erste N'achicirkungen in Holland, Giittingen, 1862; the 
author not only shows himself disinclined to aU poetic idealization of the retired life of Spinoza, but judges 
disparagingly concerning the life and doctrine of the philosopher. The following work is valuable on account 
of newly discovered material employed in it : J. van Vloten, Baruch WEspinoza, zyn leven en schriften, Amst., 
1862. Cf. Ed. Biihmer, Spinozana, in Zeitschr.f. Philos., Vol. 36, 1860, pp. 121-166, J6. Vol. 42, 186;:5, pp. 76-121 ; 
Ant. V. d. Linde, zur Litt. des Spinozi.^mus, ib. Vol. 45, 1864, pp. 301-305. J. B. Lehmans, Sp., sein Lebens- 
bild und seine Philosophie (Inaug. Diss.), Wiirzburg, 1864. An historical "character-picture," drawn with a 
loving hand, is furnished by Kimo Fischer in Baruch Spinoza's Leben und Charakter, ein Vorti-ag, Mann- 
heim, 1865, and in Fischer's Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, 1st ed., 1854, Vol. I. p. 235 seq. ; 2d ed.. 
Vol. I. Part 2d, 1865, pp. 98-138. 

Immediately after its publication, the doctrine of Spinoza was combated in various works. Jacob Vateler, 
the Remonstrant [Arminian] preacher at the Hague, composed against the Tractatus Theol.-Polit. the work : 
Vindicice miraculorum, per quce divina religionis et fidei Christiancs Veritas olim conflrmata fuit, adversus 
pro/anum auctorem tractatus theol.-polit. B. Spinosam (Amst., 1674). Johannes Bredenborg wrote an 
Enervatio tracMitu-^ theol.-pol., una cumdemonstratione geometrico ordine disposita, naturam non eise Deuni, 
Rotterdam, 1675. The Arcana atfiei.imi revelata, philosophice et parodoxe refuta examine trai:t. theol.-poL 
per Franciscicm Cuperum, Am.Helodamensem (Rotterdam, 1676), is based on Socinian ideas and asserts 
the complete agreement between the Bible and reason. But the revolutionary ideas of Tract. T/ieolog.-Poltt. 
in historical criticism ilso acquired an early positive influence over the Scriptural investigations of Christian 


theologians, s is evidenced in the writings of Richard Simon, a Catholic, especially in his HUtoire critiqua du 
Vieux Testament, Paris, 1678. Among the early opponents of Spinozlsm were also Poiret, the Mystic {Fun- 
damenta atfieisrni eversa, in his Cogit. de Deo, anima et malo, Amst., 1677, etc.), and Bayle, the Skeptic. ^ 
Christoph Wittich, the Cartesian, wrote against the Ethics in Anti-Spinoza, sive examen Et/itces Ben. de 
Spinoza, Amst., 1690. By some (such as Aubert de Vers6, in L'lmpie Containcu, Amst., 1681, 1685) Carte- 
sianism was combated, at the same time with Spinozism, as the source of the latter ; others, on the contrary 
(like Ruardus Andala, in a work published at Franeker in 1717), published works in which Descartes was 
honored as " verus Spinozismi evertor." On Spinoza's doctrine is founded the work published anony- 
mously of Abraham Johann CufEelaer (or Cuileler) : Specimen artis ratiocinandi naturalis et artijicialis, ad 
pantosophia principia vmnitdiicens. Hamburgi apitd Benr. Kunrath {Amst.), 1684, and Principiorum pan 
tosophicep. II., III., ib., 1684. That the doctrines contained in the Ethics of Spinoza agree with those of the 
Cabala, is what Johann Georg Wachter sought to demonstrate first in the work : Der SpinozLimtes ijn Jitden- 
thum Oder die von demheutigen Judenthumtmd dessen geheinier Cabbala vergotterteWelt, ton Mose Germane, 
sonsten J oh. Peter Speeth, von Atigaburg gebiirtig, befunden und widerlegt von J. G. Wachter, Amsterdam, 
1699 ; the argument was followed up in Wachter's subsequent work : Elucidaritis Cabbalisticua, Rome, 1706. 
Leibnitz wrote in reply to this latter work Animadversiones ad J. G. Wachteri libitim de recondita Hebrce- 
orum philosophia (a critique of Spinozistic doctrines from the stand-point of the Leibnitzian Monadology) : 
these Ammadtersiones remained unprinted until their discovery, a few years since, in the Archives of the R. 
Library at Hannover by A. Foucher de CareU, who published them under the title : Refutation inedite de 
Spinozapar Leibniz, Paris, 1854. (Cf. Leibnitz, Theodicie, II., 173, 188, and III., 37i, 373.) Christian 
Wolf argued against Spinozism in one part of his Ttieologia Naturalis (Pars poster., 672-716) ; this argu- 
ment, translated into German, was published, together with Spinoza's Ethics, at Frankf . and Leipsic, in 1744. 
The system of Spinoza, and Bayle's objections to the same, are discussed by De Jariges in the HUtoire de 
FAcademie Royale des Scieiices et Belles Lettres de Berlin, annee 1745, Vols. I. and II. (translated into Ger- 
man, in Hissman's Magaziii fur die Philos. und ihre Geschichte, Vol. V., Gottingen and Lemgo, 1782, pp. 3- 
72). In G.rmany attention was directed to Spinozism, especially by t he controversy between Jacobi and 
Mendelssohn as to Lessing's relation to that doctrine. Fr. H. Jacobi, Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza, in Briefen 
an Moses Mendelssohn, Leipsic, 1785, 2d edit., Breslau, 1789; Werke, Vol. IV., Abth. 1. Moses Mendelssohn, 
An die Freunde Lessings, BerUn, 1786. F. H. JacobL Wider Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen, betreffend die 
Briefe ilber die Lehre des Spinoza, Leips., 1786. Cf. also Moses Mendelssohn, Mo7'genstu?iden Oder Vorlesung- 
en iiber das Dasein Gottes, Berlin, 1785, etc. Werke, Leipsic, 184.3, Vol. II., p. 340 seq. Herder, Gott, 
etnige Gesprdche iiber Spinoza's System, nebst Shaftesbury's Naturhymnus, Gotha, 1787, 2d edit., 1800 ; in 
Cotta's complete edition. Vol. XXXI., 1853, pp. 73-218 (an attempt to interpret Spinozism, not with Jacobi as 
a form of pantheism or atheism, but as a form of theism). Goethe, Aus meinem Leben, Dichtung zind WaAr- 
heit. Works, Pts. III. and IV. (cf. WQh. Danzel, Ueber Gothe's Spinozismtis, Hamburg, 1843, Karl Heyder, 
Ueber das VerhUltniss Gothe's zit Spinoza, in the Zeitschrift f. d. gesaminte luth. Thxol. u. Kirche, founded by 
Rudelbach, Leips., 1866, pp. 261-283, and E. Caro, La Pkilosophie de Goethe, Paris, 1866). G. S. Francke, 
Ueber die neueren SchicksaU des Spinozismus und seinen Einjluss avf die Pkilosophie iiberhaupt und die 
Vernnnftt/ieologie insbesondere, Prize Essay, Schleswig, 1808, 1812. The influence of the philosophy of Des- 
cartes on the development of Spinoza's philosophy has been discussed by Heinr. Ritter ( Welchen Einfluss hat 
d. Philos. des Cai'tesius auf d. Ausbildung der des Spinoza gehabt, etc. Leips. and Altenburg, 1817), and the 
connection of Spinozism with the Cartesian philosophy, by H. C. W. Sigwart ( Ueber den Zusammenkang des 
Spinozismu.% mit der Cartesian. Philos., Tubing., 1816) ; cf. Sigwart's Beitrdge zur Erlaiiterung des SpiTiozis- 
mus, Tiib., 1838: Der Spin, histwisch und philosophisch erlautert, Tiib., 1839; and Vergleichung der Rechts- 
und Staatstheorle des B. Spinoza und des Th. Hobbes, Tiib., 1842. Lud. Boumann. Explic. Spinozisnii, 
diss. Berol, 1828. Car. Rosenkranz, De Sp. Philosophia, Halle and Leips., 1828. C. B. Schliiter, Die Lehre 
des Spinosa in ihren Haupt-Momenten geprilft und dargeatellt, Miinster, 1836. Karl Thomas, Spinoza als 
Metaphysiker, Konigsberg, 1840 (brings into prominence the nominalistic and individualistic elements which 
are indeed contained in Spinoza's doctrine, but only incidentally and in relative subordination to the predomi- 
nant pantheistic Monism of that doctrine). J. A. Voigtlander, Spinoza nicht PantheUt. sondern Theist, in 
the Theol. Stud. u. Kritiken, 1841, No. 3. Franz Baader. Ueber eine Nothwendigkelt der Revision der Wissen- 
achaft in Berug auf Splnozistische Systeme, Erlaneen. 1841. E. Saisset, Maimonide et Sp., in the Revue des 
deuxmondes. 37, 1862, pp. 296-334. Cf. also the chapters on Spinozism in BouiUier, Hist, de la philosophic 
Cartesienne. and in Damiron, Hist, de la philosophic dii XVII. siMe. Ad. Helfferich, Spinoza und Leibnita 
Oder das Wesen des IdenlUmiis und des Realismus, Hamburg and Gotha, 1846. Franz Keller, Spinoza tmd 
Leibnitz ilber die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens, Erlangen, 1847. J. B. Erdmann, Die Grundbegriffe des 
Spinoeismus, in his Verm. Aufs., Leips., 1848, pp. 118-192. C. Schaarschmidt, Des Cartes und Spinoza^ 
urkiindliche Darstellung der Pkilosophie Beider, nebst einer Abhandlung von Jac. Benuiys iiber Spinoza's 
hebraische Grammatik, Bonn, 1850. C. H(eble)r, Spinoza's Lehre vom VerhUltyiiss der Substanz zu ihren 
B4tandtheile7i, Bern, 1850 ; Hebler, Lessing-Studien, Bern, 1862, p. 116 seq. R. Zimmermann, Ueber einig* 


logtuche FehUr der npinozistiscfi^n EtMk, reprinted from the Sitsungsherichte der phlln^.-hUt. CI. der >aU. 
Akad. d. Kiss., for October, 1850, and April, 1851. J. E. Horn, Spinoza'* Staatsle/ire, Dessau, 1851. Adolf 
Trendelenburg, Ueber Spinoza's Grundgedanken und dessen Erfolg, from the Transac. of the R. Acad, of 
Sciences, Berlin, 1850, reprinted in Vol. II. of T.'s Hist. Beitrage zur Philonophie, Berlin, 1855, pp. 31-111 ; 
of. T.'s essay Ueber den letzten Unterscliied der phiios. Systeme, in the Abfiandlungen der k. Akad. d. Wixs. 
philos.-kist. CI., 1847, p. 249 seq., and in the Hist. Jieitrtige, II., l-'M ;* also Ueber die aiifgefxindenen Ergiin- 
zungeii, etc. (see above, p. 56). Alphons v. Raesfeld, Symbola ad penitiorem notitiam doctrinee, qnani Sp. 
de substantia propos., diss. lionn., 1858. Theod. Hub. Weber, Sp. atque Leibnitii phiios., comm. Bonn., 1856. 
F. E. Bader, B. de Sp. de rebus singukDibus doctrina, Berl., 1858. Joh Heinr. Liiwe, Ueber den Gottesbegriff 
Spinoza's und dessen Schicksale (as a supplement to Lo\ve"s work on the philosophy of Fichte). Stuttgard, 
1862).t Spinoza et la Kabbale, par le rabbin Elie Beitamozegh, Paris, 1864 {Extrait de r Univers Israelite) ; 
cf. on this essay T. Isaac Mises, in the Zeitschrifl filr exacte Phiios., Vol. VIII., 18C9, pp. .369-367. N. A. 
Forsberg, Jemforande Betraktelse of Spinoza's och Malebranche's metafysiska pri7wip., Akad. A/handl., 
Upsala, 1864. P. Kramer, Ve doctr. Sp. de mente hurnana (Diss. Iiuxug.), HaUe, 1865. Chr. A. Thilo, 
Ueber Sp.'s Eeligionsphilosophie, in the Zeitschr . fiir exacte Philosophie, Vol. VI., No. 2, Leipsic, 1865, pp. 
113-145 : VI., 4, 1866, 389-409 ; VII., I., 1866, 00-99. A. v. Oettingen, Sp.'K Ethik und der moderne Materia- 
lismus, in the Dorpater Zeitschr. fiir Theol. ii. Kirche, Vol. VII., No. 3. Nourrisson, Sp. et le luUuraliismt 
coTiiemporain, Pari.s 1866. M. Joel. Don Chasdai Creska's religion.sphilos. Lehren in ihrem gesch. Einjiitsse 
dargestellt. (In Joel's work, among other things, certain points of contact between Spinoza and this Talmud- 
ist, named in the title, who is mentioned by Sp. in Epist. 29 pr. Jin., ]ived about A.D. 1400, and who 
belonged to the period and school of the Nominalists, are brought to light, although they are, according to 
Sigwart's judgment, of no very deep significance). Paul Janet, Sp. et le Spinozisme dapris les travaux recent, 
in the Revue des deux mondes. Vol. 70, 1867, pp. 470-498. Carl Siegfried, Sp. als KrUiker und Amleger des 
alien Testaments {Tortenser Programm), Naumburg, 1867. Waldemar Hayduck, De Sp. riatura Tiaturante 
et tuitura naturata {Diss, inaug.), Breslau, 1867. Moritz Dessauer, Spinoza und Hobbes {Inxiug. Diss.), 
Breslau, 1868. Richard Avenarius, Ueber die beiden ersten Pfuxsen dea Spin. Pantheismus und das Verhdlt- 
niss der zweiien zur dritten Phase, nebst einem Ankang fiber Reihenfolge und Abfassungszeit der aUeren 
Schriften Spinoza's, Leipsic, 1868. (Avenarius considers it probable that the dialogues contained in the 
Traclatus de Deo et homine were already written about 1651, and that this Tractatus itself was written in 
1654-55, the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione in 1655-56, and the Tractatus theologico-politicus in 1657- 
61. Avenarius assumes, in agreement with Sigwart, that the Synthetic Appendix to the Tractatus de Dto et 
homine was written in the year 1661. The " phases," which he distinguishes in the history of Sp.'s doctrine, 
are termed by him "the naturalistic, the theistic, and the pantheistic") P. Schmidt, Sp. und Schleier- 
macher, Berlin, 1868. F. Urtel, Sp. devoluntate doctrina, HaUe, 1868. J. H. von Kirchmann, Erlduterungen 
eu Sp.''s Ethik (as supplement to the translation of the Ethics a criticism of the Ethics from Von Kirch- 
mann's realistic stand-point), in the Phiios. 3ibl., Vol. V., Berlin, 1869. Jos. Hartwig, Ueber das Verhdlt- 
niss def Spinozimius zur Cai'tesianischen Doctrin {Inaug. -Dissert.), Breslau, 1869. The works or articles on 

* "Either force is anterior to efficient cause and is the superior of thought, or thought is anterior to force 
and is its superior, or, finally, thought and force are at bottom the same ; with Spinoza the distinction 
between thought and blind force assumes the form of the distinction between thought and extension, cogitatio 
et extensio ; he includes both in one, giving to neither of them the precedence before the other," so Trende- 
lenburg expresses the fimdamental conception of Spinoza. It is, however, very questionable whether the 
interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine as an identification of extension and "blind force " is correct, and whether 
we are not rather required by Spinoza to distinguish within the sphere of cogitatio itself not only " blind " 
force, but also higher, conscious, and, in its highest form, spiritual force, as constituting respectively the 
lower and higher degrees of psychical endowment (cf. Eth. II., Prop. 13 : " omnia, quamvis diversis gradibu-s, 
animata siitU"), with which correspond, in the sphere of extension, form and motion, in their elementary and 
their more complicated forms (the latter especially in the brain). It is not true that "where thought cannot 
work upon extension and direct it, in view of a preconceived effect, design is impossible : " it is not " on exten- 
sion " that thought works, but on the force subordinate to thought, and the motion belonging to thought 
works upon the motion which corresponds to that force ; the Intellectus inflnUu.'i precedes and determines 
the finite intellect, and the latter precedes and determines the lower conscious and unconscious forces in the 
world in general and in the moral world in particular, and in this sense man but not, indeed, God, who ag 
the infinite substance cannot be a person has power to work in view of ends. 

t Liiwe seeks, by emphasizing the difference between ''cogitatio,''' as an impersonal attribute of substance, 
and the ''injinitus intellectus Dei.'' as an immediate effect of the substance, to justify the attribution to this 
infinite intellect of an absolute self-consciousnes.s a personal unity, and so to reduce the distance between the 
Spinozistic and theistic conceptions of God. On the same question cf., among others, Ed. Bohmer, Spino- 
mma ni., in Z.f. Ph., Vol. 42, 1863, p. 92 seq., and Lehmans, see above pp. 120-125. 


newly discovered additions to Sp.'s worlcs have already been mentioned (p. 56) along with the list oi Sp.ii 
works. Cf . the judgments expressed concerning Spinoza in the works of Schleiermacher, J. G. Fichte, ScheUing, 
Baader, Hegel, Herbart, and other philosophers ; further, the presentation and critique of his doctrine in the 
histories of (modem) philosophy by Brucker, Buhle, Tennemann, Hitter, Feuerbach, Erdmann, Kuno Fischer, 
and others, and also in special works on the history of Pantheism e. g. in Buhle, De ortu et progressu pan- 
Iheismi i7ide a Xenoph/me xisque ad Spinozam, in Comm. soc. sc. GoU., Vol. X., 1791, Jasche, Der Pantheis- 
mus nach seinen versckiedenen Hauptformen, Berlin, 1826-32 (cf . Heinr. Eitter, Die HalbkaTUianer und der 
Pantheismus, Berlin, 1827), J. Volkmuth, Der dreieinige Pantheiimus von Tholes bis Hegel (Zeno, Spinoza, 
ScheUing), Cologne, 18.37, in the works and articles devoted to the critique of philosophical stand-points by 
I. Herm. Fichte, Ulrici, Sengler, Weisse, Hanne, and others, and in many other works on religious phi- 

Baruch Despinoza, bom at Amsterdam on the 24th of November, 1633, was de- 
scended from one of the Jewish families, who, in order to avoid the persecutions di- 
rected against them in Spain and Portugal, had emigrated to the Netherlands. He 
received his first training under the celebrated Talmudist, Saul Levi Morteira, and 
became acquainted, among other works, with those of Maimonides, of whom he had a 
high opinion, and with cabalistic works, of which, however, he speaks rarely and al- 
ways disparagingly. On the 6th of August, 1656, he was fully expelled from the Jew- 
ish communion, on account of his " frightful heresies." Before this time he had been 
instructed in Latin by Franz van den Ende (not by the daughter of the latter, who, in 
the year 1656, was only twelve years old), a learned physician, of naturalistic sympa- 
thies. From 1656 to 1660 or 1661, Spinoza resided in the vicinity of Amsterdam, in 
the family of an Arminian friend, being occupied with the study of the Cartesian and 
the development of his own philosophy. He lived next at Rhynsburg, the headquar- 
ters of the sect of Collegiants (who regarded the dogmatic element in religion as in- 
ferior in importance to the edifying and the moral), then, from 1664 to 1669, at Voor- 
burg, near the Hague ; then at the Hague, where he boarded first with the widow 
Van Velden, and afterwards, from 1671 till his death, which occurred on the 21st of 
February, 1677, with Van der Spyck, the painter. He supported himself by grinding 
lenses. He declined, in the year 1673, a call to Heidelberg where Ludwig, the Elec- 
tor Palatine, offered him a professorship of philosophy that the liberty of philoso- 
phizing, which he enjoyed as a private man, and which, indeed, was promised him for 
the future in the letter calling him to Heidelberg, might not be prejudiced by una- 
voidable collisions with critics and opponents. 

In the Compendium grammatices lingum Hebrcem the predilection of the teacher of the 
doctrine of substance for the Substantive has been remarked. Cf . especially the article 
by Jac. Bemays, in the Supplement to Schaarschmidt's work, Bonn, 1850 (cited above, 
p. 58), and Ad. Chajes, Die hebr. Oramm. Sp. S., Breslau, 1869. 

In the Principles of the Philosophy of Descartes, together with the annexed Cogitata 
Metaphysica, written in the winter of 1662-63, Spinoza does not expose his own doc- 
trine, as he expressly aSirms in the preface (through the editor, his friend Ludwig 
Meyer) ; at the time of writing the work he had already arrived substantially at the 
doctrines developed in his later works. 

The plan of the Tractatns Theologico-Politk,us was conceived at an early date, and 
executed between the years 1665-70. The work is an eloquent defence of liberty of 
thought and speech in matters of religion (" quando quidem rdigio non tarn in actioni- 
hus exterriis, qiiam in animi simplicitate ac veritate consistit, nuUius juris neque auctori- 
tatis publicce ee^'), and contains the fruits of Spinoza's personal experience. The fun- 
damental idea in it is that of the e&sential difference of the missions of positive religion 
and philosophy. Neither of them should serve {ancillari) the other ; each has ita 



peculiar office. In the development of his own thoughts Spinoza appears to have 
been guided by hw. study of Maimonides, and yet not to have followed the latter un- 
critically. For while the earlier philosopher, with a view to the excitation of philo- 
sophic thought, had taught that the law was given to the Jews not merely to train 
them to obedience, but also as a revelation of the highest truths, Spinoza at a time 
when the interest in philosophic thought was fully assured, and when the latter needed, 
therefore, to be freed from a subordination to religious dogma, which could only have 
been temporarily advantageous to it taught, on the contrary, that the end of religion 
is not the cognition of truth as such, but obedience. This is the idea which underlies 
the Trnctatus Theol.-Polit. (Thus, later, and from a like motive, Moses jNIendelssohn 
claimed for Judaism freedom from binding dogmas, and so Schleiermacher treated re- 
ligion and philosophy as separate and co-ordinate, the former having its basis in feel- 
ing, while the latter was the outcome of the endeavor to acquire objectively valid 
knowledge.) Spinoza affirms accordingly, in opposition to Maimonides, that the Bible 
is not to be interpreted so as to agree with human reason, nor is reason to be made 
subject to the teaching of the Bible ; the Bible pretends not to reveal natural laws, but ., 
to exhibit laws of ethics. By the adoption of this principle he makes it possible for 
him to treat of the Bible, and especially the Old Testament, historically and critically, 
xmhampered by dogmatic conditions, and this he proceeds to do in detail. A notice- 
able feature of the work is the pre-eminence which is ascribed (ch. 1) to Christ over 
Moses and the prophets, from the fact that he did not receive the revelation of God 
through the hearing of words (like Moses), nor through visions, but discovered it im- 
mediately present in his own consciousness ; in this sense, says Spinoza, it is true that " 
the divine wisdom took on human nature. The philosophical system of Spinoza is but 
partially suggested, and not developed, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicm. The 
seventh chapter of the work treats of the interpretation of Scripture. In it Spinoza 
adopts, on the one hand, the views of a number of Jewish scholars, some of whom, 
like Abraham Ebn-Esra (mentioned by Spinoza), and also Isaac Israeli (see above, vol. 
i., 97), had doubted at least the authenticity of single passages in the Pentateuch; 
and, on the other, in his general exegetical stand-point, those of Hobbes's Leviathaii'i 
(although in opposition to Hobbes he opposes energetically the doctrine of ecclesias-i 
tical absolutism). Spinoza agrees with Hobbes in the conviction that Scripture 
should be interpreted according to the same method by which nature must be com- 
prehended. It is probable that Spinoza had already previously combated the Scrip- 
tural exegis of the Rabbis in his " Ajwlogia pro Spinozae ajudaismo npostasia " (written, 
it is likely, in the year 1656). 

In the Tractatus Politicus (of later composition than the preceding), which gives 
evidence of familiarity with the doctrine of Hobbes, Spinoza nevertheless comes out 
in sharp opposition to the theory of civil absolutism. Governments are to bring the 
actions, but not the convictions of men into harmony. By doing violence to convic- 
tions, they provoke insurrection. Men from the people, but chosen by the govern- 
ment, should be associated with the government in legislation and administration. 

The Tractatus de Deo et homine ejusque felicitate, which was written before 1661, and 
perhaps as early as 1654 or 1655, and is followed by a synthetic appendix, written in 
1661, is a sketch of the System and an evident forerunner and herald of the Ethics. 
God's existence, it is here argued, belongs to his essence. Further, the idea of God 
also, which is in us, pre-supposes God as its cause. God is the most perfect being 
{ens perfectimmmn) . God is a being of whom infinite attributes are predicated, each 
of which is in its kind infinitely perfect. Every substance must (at least in its kind) 


be infinitely perfect, because it can neither by iteelf nor by anything other than itself 
be determined to finiteness. There are not two substances equal to each other, since 
such substances would limit each other. One substance cannot produce another sub- 
stance or be produced by it. Every substance, which is in God's infinite understand- 
mg, is also really in natuxe. In nature, however, there are not different substances ; 
nature is one in essence and identical with God, as the latter is above defined. Thus 
Spinoza in this treatise sets out, not with a definition of the conception of substance 
in order thence to advance to the conception of God ; but the idea that God is, and 
that he combines in himself all reality, is here already employed to prove the doctrine 
that there exists but one substance, and that thought and extension are not substances 
but attributes. Spinoza points to the fact that we see unity in nature, and that, in 
particular, in us thought and extension are united ; but since thought and extension 
have by nature nothing in common, and each can be clearly conceived without the 
! other (which Spinoza allows to Descartes), it follows that their actual union in us is 
only possible on condition that they are both attributes of the same substance. In 
addition to Spinoza's Jewish education, in consequence of which a religious conviction 
of the strict unity of God became firmly rooted in his nature, we may ascribe the 
genesis of his doctrine of the unity of substance in a very considerable degree to the 
particular zeal with which psychological speculations respecting the mutual relation 
between soul and body were in his time carried on in the Cartesian school, and more 
particularly to the unmistakable conflict of Occasionalism the doctrine which 
resulted with necessity from the Cartesian principles, and which had been specially 
developed by Geulrox with natural law. To these causes should be added, on the 
other hand, Spinoza's acquatatance with Neo-Platonic doctrines, whether through the 
Cabala or through the works of Giordano Bruno, or, what is most probable, through 
both. Spinoza, undertaking to translate the poetico-philosophical notions issuing 
from Neo-Platonism into scientific conceptions, blended them with the results of his 
critique of Cartesianism. The Tractatus de Deo, etc. , represents a stadium in the his- 
tory of Spinoza's philosophical development antecedent to the Ethics (see Sigwart, p. 
131 seq.) Spinoza's study of the Cartesian philosophy falls within the period included 
between the composition of the two dialogues which are included in the Tractatus de 
Deo, etc. , and of which at least the first rests on the doctrine of Giordano Bruno, and 
the composition of the Tractatus itself, and his study of the doctrine of Bacon falls 
within the time between the composition of the Tractatus de Deo and the Tractatus de 
inteUestm emcndatione. The most important of the differences between the Tractatus 
de Deo and the Etliics are, that in the former the conception of God as the most per- 
fect being, but in the latter the conception of substance, as of that which is in and 
through itself, precedes, and that in the Tractatus an objective causal relation is 
assumed as connecting thought and extension, notwithstanding their alleged absolute 
unlikeness an unlikeness so great that the conceptions of thought and extension are 
affirmed to have nothing in common while in the Ethics it is asserted that the causal 
relation cannot exist between dissimilar things, and that therefore no such relation exists 
between thought and extension. The dialogues contained in the Tractatus are a devel- 
opment of the conception of nature regarded as infinite. 

The Tractatus de InteUectus Ernendatione (a fragment, written probably before 1661, 
and perhaps as early as 1655 or 1656) is a development of ideas concerning method, of 
which the fundamental features are contained in Spinoza's principal work, the Ethics. 
The goods of the world, we are here told, are unsatisfying; the knowledge of truth 
ie the noblest good. 



The Ethics was \vTitten in the years 16G2-65, but appears to have been undergoing 
constant revision until the time of Spinoza's death. Spinoza in this work adopts as his 
point of departure the Cartesian definition of substance, the consequences of which are 
developed by him with greater logical consistency than they had been by Descartes. 
Descartes had defined substance, taken absolutely, as "that which so exists that it 
needs nothing else for its existence" [res qua ita existit, ut nulla alia re indiQcnt ad 
exist end um), while "created substance" was, accordiug to him, "that which needs 
only the concourse of God for its existence " {res, qtioe solo Dei concursu eget ad exis- 
tmdum). Spinoza defines substance (Eth., p. I., def. 3) as "that which exists in 
itself and is conceived by itself, i. e. , the conception of which can be formed without 
the aid of the conception of anything else " {per substantiam iiiteUiyo id, quod in se 
est et per se concipitur, hoc est id, ciijus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, 
a quo formari debeut). Descartes and Spinoza have alike neglected in their defi- 
nitions of substance to separate the two categories, which Kant distinguishes as 
subsistence (of which the correlate is the inherence of predicates) and causality 
(whose correlate is the dependence of effects). The oixria (substance) of Aristotle 
is identified by them with the efficient cause of existence. But since God is recog- 
nized by both as the only cause of all that is (though not demonstrated by fault- 
less arguments to be such), it follows at once, that he must be viewed by both as also 
the only substance. That Descartes admits the existence of substances which cannot 
be included under his definition of substance is an inconsequence which is avoided by 
Spinoza, who proclaims God as the only substance, and denies that anything which is 
not God is substantial. Let non-inherence and non-dependence be included in the 
definition of substance as among the essential marks of the latter, and yet it will by no 
means follow from this definition that that which is conditioned, even though it may 
not properly be called substantial, can only exist as inherent in something other than 
itself ; it only follows, that another term is required to denote that which at once is 
the substratum of the inhering, and which yet, as conditioned, depends on something 
else. Without such another term the definition of substance must be so framed as 
not to confound the two essentially different relations : inherence and dependence ; 
otherwise the supposed demonstration is a subreption. 

Spinoza opens his Ethics with a number of definitions and axioms after the manner 
of Euclid, intending therefrom, by strictly syllogistic procedures, "in accordance with 
the method of geometry," to deduce the theorems of his system. By this means he 
expected to secure for his doctrine mathematical certainty. But the undertaking waa 
illusory. Euclid's definitions are, indeed, given at the outset as merely nominal expla- 
nations of what is to be understood by the terms employed. But they are shown in 
the end to be real definitions, i. e., definitions of real, mathematical objects. Spinoza, 
on the contrary, has not actually proved the reality of the subjects of his definitions. 
Euclid's definitions are clear and may be easily followed by the imagination qualities 
which are almost entirely wanting in the definitions of Spinoza, or which, where figu- 
rative expressions are employed (like in se esse, etc.), are only simulated; some of the 
definitions of Spinoza (like that of cnicsa sui, etc.) involve contradictions. Euclid em- 
ploys his terms throughout only in the sense fixed upon in the definitions ; Spinoza 
sometimes presents an argumentation, the first part of which is rendered plausible by 
the employment of expressions in their ordinary acceptation, whUe in the second 
part the same expressions are repeated in the senses given them by his (arbitrary) defi- 
nitions, so that the conclusion is obtained through a paralogism, the quuiernio tcnnl- 
norum, a " synthetic" definition being interchanged with an " analytical " (cf. my Sys- 


tem of Logic, 61 and 126). (Proofs of this will appear below, e. g., in connection 
with the doctrines of substance and causa sui and of love. ) Spinoza's Ethics is by no 
means (as, notably, F. H. Jacobi among others supposed) theoretically irrefutable, but 
rather (as Leibnitz, Herbart, and others have rightly judged) replete with paralogisms.* 

The first Definition of Part I. of the Ethics is the following : " By that which is the 
cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that, whose 
nature can only be conceived as existent " (per causam sui inteUigo id, cttjus essentia 
involvit existentiam sive id, ciijus natura non potest concipi nvd existens. )\ 

The second Definition is : " That thing is said to be finite in its kind which can be 
limited by another of the same nature " {Ea res dicitur in suo genei-e finita, guce alia 
ejusdem nnluros, terminari potest). By way of illustration, Spinoza adds that a 
body is finite when it is possible to conceive another still larger ; in like manner, a 
thought is finite when limited by another thought; but bodies are not limited by 
thoughts, nor thoughts by bodies. J 

* The exposure of the paralogisms involved in the fundamental positions is a necessary part of an expo 
sition of Spinoza's system, for any one who would acquire a thorough insight into that system. But in order 
not to obscure the sequence of doctrines in the positive exposition of Spinoza's teachings, wo shall ofier our 
remarks upon the paralogisms contained in them in the following notes under the text. Spinoza's philoeophi- 
cal importance arises from the fundamental opinion maintained by him, that the psychical, taken in the widest 
sense (the mental, the animate, force), is substantially identical with the extended, which is perceived aa 
material and follows the laws of mechanics ; this Monism (like Dualism, Spiritualism, Materialism, Criticism) 
is one of the great and noteworthy philosophical hyjxjtheses. So, too, the tendency towards rigid demonstration 
is worthy of attention and respect ; but the idea that Spinoza has realized this tendency and has advanced 
real proofs of his doctrine is a mere prejudice, which deserves not to be respected, but to be swept away. 
False reasonings should be corrected by exposing their faults ; this and nothing else is due to them. What- 
ever in Spinoza was genuinely great, has maintained itself against every assault, and ottained to permanent 
influence in the historical development of philosophy ; but veneration misses its end when it desires that the 
nimbus of the "holy, rejected Spinoza" should cover his blunders. To the "holy" in him (with Schleier- 
macher) an "offering of ringlets," but to his paralogisms, dissecting criticism ; thus each will receive its dues. 

t The conception of a "cawsa jtij" is, if taken literally, an irrational one; for, in order that an object 
cause itself, it is necessary that it exist before itself : without existing it can cause nothing, and it must exist 
before itself, since by hypothesis it is yet to be caused. The expression implies, according to Spinoza's inten- 
tion, the dependence of existence en essence ; but the latter of these cannot cause the former, unless it already 
exists itself, i. e. w^hat was to be caused exists already before being caused. Spinoza surreptitiously objecti- 
fies, after the manner of medifeval Realists, a distinction which is only possible in abstraction, the distinction 
namely, between essence and existence. He treats these latter as objectively distinct, the latter presupposing 
the former, and the former conditioning or causing the latter. The expression causa sui could only be justified 
as, say, an inexact designation for the causeless the latter negative but only adequate expression being thus 
changed into the former positive but inadequate one. (The case of a being already existing, being raised by 
its own action to a higher plane, furnishes no analogy competent to justify the irrational idea of existence 
through self-causation, and to say that "cau.n t" is only an absurdity when predicated of the finite, and 
not when affirmed of the infinite, were a speculative assertion, which would make of the infinite the "sewer" 
mentioned by Hegel in his criticism of Berkeley, into which all contradictions flow together.) The expressions 
employed by Spinoza in defining "causa sui," namely, '' essentia involvens existentiam" or ''non posse con- 
cipi nisi existens,'' imply the Kime fault, which is involved in the ontological argument (see above, on 
Ansehn and Descartes), and they are employed by Spinoza in a like faulty sense in the following demonstra- 
tions. That every argument from definitions presupposes the previously established existence of the thing 
defined, is a logical postulate, against which Spinoza sins as naively as Ansehn, and much more so than Des- 
cartes. By appealing to the pretended implication of existence in essentia, that which in his arbitrary defi- 
nitions is conceived, in part, in a manner repugnant to nature, is covered with the deceptive semblance of 
reality, and the actually real is in many instances concealed from view. 

t This definition of that which is finite in its kind is only appUcable to objects (res), side by side with 
which others can exist and for which co-existence implies mutual limitation ; it loses all its significance wheq 
applied not to such res, but to natures or attributes, as o. g., if the question were asked, whether the quadrati 
nature or the essence of the square, i. e., the limitation of a plane figure by four equal straight lines forming 
enly right angles with each other, ia finite or infinite \b its Jdnd, or whether human nature, aquiline nature, 

BPmozA 65 

As third, fourth, and fifth definitions, follow the statements of what Spinoza under- 
stands by substance, attribute, and mode. " By substance I understand that which is 
in itself and is conceived by itself, i. e., the conception of which can be formed with- 
out the aid of the conception of any other thing." '' By attribute I understand that 
which the mind perceives as constituting the essence of substance." " By mode I 
understand the accidents of substance, or that which is in something else, through the 
aid of which also it is conceived." (Per substantiam intelUgo id, quod in se est et per se 
cancipitur, hoc est id, cujus caticeptics non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo farmari de- 
beat. Per attributum inteUigo id, quod intellectus de substantia perdpit tainquam ejus 
essentiam constituens ['' constituens" here is neuter, and qualifies quod, cf. Def VI.]. 
Per modum inteUigo subst-antice affectiones sive id, quod in alio est, per qriod etiam concipi- 
tur.) It thus appears that the expressions in se esse and in alio esse mark the difference 
between substance and affections or modes, while the attributes together constitute 
the substance. In each case Spinoza tells how the thing defined is and how it is con- 
ceived {i. <e., when adequately conceived, in which case the conception agrees with the 
reality.) The attempt has been made to interpret his definition of attribute in a way 
which would obliterate the difference between Spinozism and Kantianism, namely, by 
supposing Spinoza to mean that the distinction of attributes is due only to a mental 
act on our part, and that we then objectify the distinction, as though it were founded 
in the nature of substance ; so, it is added, a really white surface appears to the 
eye blue or green when viewed through a blue or green glass. But this interpretation, 
which would make of Spinoza a Subjectivist, is not in harmony with the general 
character of his philosophy, which is much rather objective, nor with his express lan- 
guage (e. g. in Def. VI. : substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, etc.) The attri- 
butes axe, according to Spinoza, in reality, not indeed separated from each other in the 

leonine nature, etc., are limited or unlimited. And yet Spinoza, when the definition, in view of the examples 
cited by him to the first of which, at least, it is appropriate has once been granted, afterwards makes of it 
that illicit use, in which the Umit of its meaning and truth as above given is forgotten, and commits, besides, 
the second, still worse fault, of making the criterion of finiteness to consist, not in the possibility of a 
" nature " or an " attribute " being limited by another (generically similar, but specifically different) nature, 
but really in the possibility of a nature being limited by itself as a second nature which is absurd. He says, 
namely (in the demonstration to Prop. VII. : omnia substantia est necessaiHo inflnita) of that substance which 
has but a single attribute, that it is not finite, since otherwise (according to the second definition) it must be 
limited by another substance of the same nature, which is impossible, because no two substances with the 
same attribute can exist ; but this latter af&rmation he has proved by identifying substance with the totality 
of its attributes, whence it inevitably follows that the substance of one attribute or one nature is to be con- 
ceived as absolutely identical with this attribute or nature ; the limitation, therefore, of this substance by 
another of the same nature, would be the limitation of the same nature by itself as a second nature. The ab- 
surdity of this conclusion, however, cannot prove the non-limitation of the nature or substance, because it is 
an absurdity arising not from the hypothesis of limitation, but Crom Spinoza's absurd mode of procedure. 
The quadratic nature, the aquiline nature, etc., or a substance identical with any such nature, cannot be 
limited by itself as another nature or substance ; this, however, is not because it is unlimited or infinite, but 
because it is not different from itself 1 is not equal to 2 and also because the idea of the limitation o* ona 
thing by another homogeneous thing is clearly and fully applicable only to objects existing side by side, res, 
and not to " natures." The deceptive appearance of demonstration is founded in the misleading expression : 
tubstantia unitis nalnrce, "substance of one nature," which summons up the idea of a concrete existence 
distinct from the nature or attribute itself, which idea, after being employed in the paralogism, is again set 
aside by Spinoza through recourse to his definitions and the propositions derived from them. But the para- 
logism has provided, meanwhile, a principle, by which a show of justification is secured for Spinoza's proce- 
dure in admitting only that which is without limit (extension), or that which at any rate can be regarded as 
unlimited (cogitatio), to be an attribute or a natura, and in relegating all else to the class of affections or 
modes. (To the same result, also, leads the subsequent definition of affection or mode a definition cloeely 
related to that of finiteness by the expressioQ : " <n alio esst ; " see below.) 


substance to whicli they belong, but they are different, and the mind in distingTiishing 
them does but recognize their intrinsic diversity ; the verj' existence of the mind im- 
plies of itself the existence of the attribute of thought, and the real distinction of the 
latter from extension. It is only the act of isolating the single attribute, of separating 
it for the time from the really unseparated unity in which all the attributes are com- 
bined, for the purpose of considering it apart (i. e., it is only the " quatenus consider a - 
tur''''), that is due solely to the action of the mind. The comparison of the mind to a 
prism which analyzes the white ray of light may be allowed, but the comparison of it 
to a spectator who varies the color by using now a blue, and now a green glass is at 
least liable to mislead, and suggests a false interpretation. The distuactiou of attri- 
butes by Spinoza, which may seem to justify a subjectivistic interpretation of his 
doctrine of attributes, is but a distinction of various inseparable phases of the sub- 
stance which the attributes constitute, a distinction which repeats itself in our concep- 
tion of substance. But each of these attributes or phases, like different definitions of 
the circle, etc., is a complete expression of the substance, because they are all insep- 
arably connected with each other. (Cf . Spinoza's comparison of the attributes in sub- 
stance to smoothness and whiteness in one surface, or to Israel, who wrestled with 
God, and Jacob, who seized upon the heel of his brother ; see Epist. 27, and cf. Tren- 
delenburg. Hist. Beitr. , III. p. 368. ) The substance is the totality of the attributes 
themselves ; the modes, on the contrary, are something other, secondary ; for which 
reason, also, Spinoza can say (in the corollary to Prop. VI.) that there exists nothing 
but substance and affections, not as though the attributes as such had no existence, or 
as though they were not realiter different from each other, but because their existence, 
in the mentioning of substance, has already been indicated. The modes of substance 
do not constitute a positive addition to it. They are, on the contrary, mere limita- 
tions of it, determinations, hence negations (" omiiis detenninatio," says Si^inoza, " est 
negatio^^), just as every mathematical body, in virtue of its limitation, is a determina- 
tion of the realm of infinite extension (negation of that portion of space which is ex- 
ternal tc the body). 

The modes, or accidents, are not constituent parts of substance ; substance is by 
nature prior to its accidents (according to Prop. I. , which is deduced directly from the 
definitions), and must, in order to be viewed in its true nature, be con.sidered apart 
from its accidents and in se (Demonstr. of Prop. V. : dejwsitis ajfectionibus et in se con- 
siderata). Hence Spinoza cannot mean hj substance a concrete thing, for the latter 
can never exist without individual determinations (which Si)tnoza reckons among 
" affections" or accident*), nor be considered '' apart from its accidents," or as it truly 
and really exists. By substance, Ln Spinoza's language, we can only understand an 
Abstractum, to which he yet (after the manner of media;val realists) attributes inde- 
pendent existence.* 

* In marking the difference between substance and its accidents, Spinoza ignores the figurative character 
of he expressions employed by him : in ae esse and in alio esse ("existence in self" and "existence in some- 
thing else"), and their incompetence to serve ai criteria of the attributive or modal character of any of the 
elements of an object. Extension and thought are viewed by him as attributes ; if, therefore, substance is in 
itself, so are extension and thought in extension and thought a statement with which no clear idea can be 
connected. Every particular thought and act of will is ^dewod by him as a mode ; but that these are in the 
general attribute termed thought can, at the most, be said only in a figurative sense, since the expression 
being in has no proper meaning except in connection with the attribute of extension. If, moreover, we ex- 
tend the application of this distinction between substance or attribute and modes, and of this phraseology, 
to other cases than those mentioned by Si)inoza (which must be allowable, since Spinoza's affirmation that 
thought and extension are the only knowable attributes is arbitraiy, and founded only on a series of paralo- 

spmozA. 67 

The next definition is : By God I understand the absolutely infinite being, i. e. , the 
substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and in- 
finite essence. {Per Deum intMigo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est substantiam constantem 
infinitis attribittis, qiiorinn unumqiMcique a'ternam et infinitam essentinm exjmmlt.) The 
expression '' absolutely infinite" is explained in the ErpUccitio, by contrasting it with 
the expression ' ' infinite in its kind " {in suo genere infinitum) ; that which is imlimited 
or infinite in its kind only, is not such in respect of all possible attributes ; but the ab- 
solutely infinite is infinite in respect of all attributes. * 

The seventh Definition relates to freedom : That thing is called free which exists by 
the sole necessity of its nature and the determining cause of whose activity is in 
itself alone. But that is called necessary, or rather constrained, which owes its existence 
to another, and whose activity is the result of fixed and determinate causes (ea res libera 
dicitur, quce ex sola sum Jiat^irce necessitate existit et a se sda ad agendum determinatur. 
Necessaria autem vd potius coacta quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum 
certa ac determinata ratione).] 

gisms), and if we afflrro, accordingly, that the accidents (affectiones) of any essence or nature that may be 
defined are in that essence, we are conducted necessarily to the assertion that, for example, the specific length 
of the side of any particular square and the position of the square are immanent in the quadratic nature, or 
that the individual man, eagle, lion, exists in human, aquiline, or leonine nature. Thus we are landed at 
once in a crude Realism (in the mediaeval sense of the term), whose scientific legitimacy is simply pre- 
supposed, but not demonstrated by Spinoza. The counter-arguments of Nominalism are nowhere confuted 
by Spinoza, who, on the contrary, admits their justice in theory, while he indicates the contrary by his prac- 

He proceeds here, as, in logical respects, everywhere, in a manner altogether naive. Inense (en/Tropxen') 
is, indeed, also an Aristotelian expression ; but, as employed by Aristotle, it has an intelligible and legitimate 
meaning, since for Aristotle the siibstances to which, as he says, the name of substance pre-eminently be- 
longs {irfHorai ovaiai) are aU individual objects, i)i which whatever can be predicated of them may be said 
to be. Of individual objects it cannot be said that they are considered " rere,"' . ., as they really are, " de- 
positis affectionibus^' (hence, after making abstraction, e. g., of figure and limitation, and retaining in mind 
only the attribute of extension, and after making abstraction of all that which distinguishes one thinking 
being from another, and retaining only the attribute of thought) ; to say so presupposes that other significa- 
tion of substance and the substantial, according to which the words stand for essentia and the essential. In 
order to establish by universal criteria the difference between the substantial, in the sense of the essential, 
and the unessential, a profound and thorough logical investigation is requisite. This investigation Spinoza 
has not made, but makes up for its lack by retaining expressions which have a relative propriety only in con- 
nection with the first signification of substance, the one in which Spinoza does not employ the term. These 
expressions are "in e" and " in alio e.sse," and this uncritical blimdering is then necessarily followed by an 
utter confusion of ideas. The first signification of substance is given up, and the second is corrupted, in that 
only that is allowed to be substantial, in connection with which the expression "to be in" has a real sense 
(i. e., extension), or is susceptible, in case of emergency, of ha-sing such a sense interpreted into it (i. ., 
cogiiaiio), while all else (e. (/., that which in the square is essential to its being a square, or in man, to his 
being man, etc.) is classed among accidents and modes, as being unessential. The supposed rigorous en- 
chainment of ideas, which has been unjustly praised in the "El/lies'" of Spinoza, is based, in by far the 
greater number of cases, on defects of clearness and on paralogisms. A good part of his theorems are far 
better than his argumentations. 

* Spinoza admits that there exist numberless other attributes beside thought and extension, but he slips 
over this point ; as to what these attributes can be, we are left in the dark. But with this definition ol 
"God," it is not difficult for Spinoza who, as soon as the exigencies of the demonstration demand it, is pre- 
pared, by means of the irrational conception of " essence invoh-ing existence," to prove, through the onto- 
logical paralogism, that the definition is objectively correct^-to include in the unity of sub^tiince all that ac- 
tually exists. In doing this, however, as in all his paralogisms, it need not be said that he is not at all to be 
eonsidered as actuated by a sophistical intention, but simply as under the influence of an unconscious self- 

+ The first part of the definition of re.? libera involves the same error as the positive use of the expres- 
sion causa sui, namely, the confounding of uncausedness in the eternal and primitive being with self- 
cauaation, t. e., with an existence caused by its own nature (ae if the latter even making abstraction of 

68 BPmozA. 

The eighth Definition links the conception of eternity with the ontological Paralo- 
gism : By eternity I understand existence itself, in as far as it is conceived necessarily 
to follow from the sole definition of an eternal thing [per (Pternitatem intdligo ipsam 
exMentiam, quatenus ex sola rei (EterncB definitione necessario sequi concipitur). 

To the eight definitions Spinoza adds seven axioms. The first Axiom is : Every- 
thing which is, is either in itself or in some other thing. ( Omnia, gtue sunt, vd in 
ae vel in alio sunt)* 

The second Axiom is : That which cannot be conceived through another, must be 
conceived through itself {id quod per aliud non potest condpi, per se eoncipi debet). \ 

The third Axiom is : A determinate cause being given, the effect necessarily fol- 
lows, and per contra : if no determinate cause be given, it is impossible that the effect 
should foUow. {Ex data caiisa determinata necessario sequitur effectus, et contra : si 
nulla detur determinata causa, impossibile est, ut effe^ctus sequatur.)X 

The knowledge of the effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the 
cause. {Effectus cognitio a cognitione causce dependet et eandem involvit.) This is the 
fourth Axiom, which expresses, in its (subjective) relation to human knowledge, the 
same which in the third was expressed objectively. 

The fifth Axiom affirms that things which have nothing in common with each other 
cannot be understood by means of each other, or the conception of the one does not in- 
volve the conception of the other {qucB nihil co^nmune cum se invicem fiabent, etiam per 

time could in any real sense be the prius of existence). The second part comes more nearly to the point, 
since in fact freedom belongs to action, and not to enti-ance into existence ; yet it diverts attention from 
what is alone the real state of the case in the whole sphere of exp)erience, or from the fact that every event 
depends on the co-operation of several factors, and that freedom means only the prevalence of the internal 
factors over the external. But the definitions of necessity and compulsion should have been separated from 
each other, and not by a "pei potius" amalgamated. For the rest, Spinoza rightly seeks for the proper op- 
posite of freedom, not in necessity taken generally, but in a distinct kind of necessity, namely, constraint, 
which is to be defined as a necessity having its source not in the nature of the subject of constraint, but in 
something foreign to that nature (whether in the internal or the external world), and overruling the endeavors 
(and frustrating the wishes) to which that nature itself gives rise. 

* This axiom, combined with the third and fourth definitions, is employed (in the DemoTistrcUio to the 
fourth and the corollary to the sixth Proposition) to establish the doctrine that in reality nothing exists 
but substances and their accidents. The demonstration is illusory on account of the figurative use made 
of the expressions in se esse and in alio esse in the Definitions ; whUe, on the contrary, such plausibility 
as the axiom retains, after the necessary deductions have been made on account of the obscurity of the words 
in se esse, depends on the expressions being taken literally. 

t Two things are here left out of consideration : 1. That since conceiving (or comprehending) implies 
the perception of a causal nexus, and since every causal relation subsists between two or more related ele- 
ments, not the disjimctives ' either, or," either eoncipi per aliud or coiidpiper se, but rather the coUigativea 
" as weU, as " are in place, i. e., it should be affirmed that whatever is conceived is conceived in and by means of 
its relation to its causal correlate, greater weight being laid on the one or the other of these conelates ac- 
cording to the circumstances of the case. 2. That the conceivableness of all things may not be presup- 
posed without farther question, but that the inquiry should first be raised, whether there exist limits to our 
knowledge, which question again resolves itself into the (Kantian) question, whether there are no absolute or 
nniversal limits to human knowledge, and into the question (of controlling importance for the determina- 
tion of the immediate problems of science) as to what at any given time is the actual limit of conceivable- 
ness, and what are the next steps necessary to enlarge the sphere of things conceivable. 

X This axiom is only true when the conception of cause is rightly understood, and when the cause is not 
conceived as something simple, rather than composite. 

It is characteristic of Spinoza that, of the double relation mentioned by Aristotle as subsisting between 
oar knowledge and the objective causal nexus, he here attends only to one aspect, namely, to that knowl- 
edge which advances from the nporepov <^i;crt to the va-repov <j>vaei (a priori ad poaterius), but leaves the 
other unmentioned, namely, the regressive inference from the effect to the cause, a posteriori ad prius, from 
the vcTepov <(>vtTft, which yet is the irp6repov irphi >);u.a; or the rjixlv yvutpiixuTtpoy, to the irporepov <j>vatt. 
which is the uoTcpoj' npbt ^ftav. 


te invicem intelUgi non po^.tunt, sive conceptus unites alterius concoptum nan involmt), from 
which, in combination ^v^th the preceding axioms, the conclusion is drawn (in Prop. 
III.), that, of two things having nothing in common, the one cannot be the cause of 
the other.* 

In the sixth Axiom Spinoza affirms that the true representation must agree with the 
object represented {idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire).\ 

The seventh and last Axiom asserts that if anything can be conceived as not exist- 
ing, its essence does not involve existence {quidquid ut non exiateiis potest concipi, ejus 
essentia non involvit existentiam) . % 

The Definitions and Axioms are followed by Propositions, to which proofs are joined 
that have indeed only the appearance of proofs, since the definitions and postulates 
on which they depend involve logical faults. 

The first Proposition, deduced immediately from Definitions III. and V., is as fol- 
lows : Substance is prior to its accidents. The second Proposition affirms that two 
substances, with different attributes, have nothing in. common with each other, and it 
is derived from the Definition of substance ; from this it is concluded that one sub- 
stance cannot be the cause of another substance having attributes different from its 
own ; but Spinoza asserts farther (in Prop. V.) that there are not two or more substances 
with the same attribute (because for him, as above remarked, the substance is identical 
with its attributes, and consequently, in all individuals of the same kind, the substance 
is the same), so that neither can one substance be the cause of another substance hav- 
ing an attribute the same as its own ; therefore, he concludes, no substance can be 
the cause of another substance (Prop. VI.). One substance cannot be produced by an- 
other substance, and therefore, since in reality nothing exists but substances and their 
affections, not by anything else whatsoever (Corollary to Prop. VI.). Since one sub- 
stance cannot be produced by another, it must, says Spinoza (in the demonstration to 
Prop. VII.), be the cause of itself, i. e., according to the first definition, its essence in- 
volves its existence, or existence belongs to its nature (Prop. VII. : Ad naturam sub- 
stantia pertinet existere). \ 

* To this axiom the above remarks on the relation of causality are applicable. In the fourth of his 
Letters Spinoza seeks (with apparent justice) to e-stablish the proposition, that the causal relation presup- 
poses something common to the terms of the relation, on the ground that, if the reverse were true, the effect 
most have all which it has from nothing. 

+ No axiom was needed here, but only a definition of truth. Undoubtedly truth, in the literal, theoreti- 
cal signification of this word, is the agreement between thought and that portion of reality to which 
thought is directed. But it is not the isolated representation {idea) which is true or false, but only the 
combination of representations in a judgment (an aflirmation) ; when a representation does not enter Into 
some form of assertion, there subsists neither the relation of truth nor of falsehood. This just observation 
of Aristotle Spinoza has here left unnoticed. 

{ This axiom involves the idea on which the ontological paralogism is founded, the idea that there is 
a form of being, from the definition of which we can infer its existence. Evei7 real ensentia implies, of 
course, the being of the objects whose essence it is ; but this proposition is a mere tautology. No essenoo 
can be a cause before it exists ; but it exists only in the objects whose essence it is. That form of thought 
which respects the essentia, 1. e., the (subjective) concept (coTiceptus), may indeed, if the reality of the 
object of the concept be presupposed, justify us in attributing, (i priori, definite predicates to that object, 
but not without this presupposition, and it can therefore in no case demonstrate the truth of this presuppo- 
ition itself. 

The argumentation is coixect only in the case of totally different attributes, but not in the case, which 
Spinoza excludes as impossible, of different attributes generically the same and only specifically different 

I In this ontological demonstration, (1) the fact is overlooked that the first proposition needs to be sup- 
plemented by the clause : provided that the substance exists ; (2) the negative aflirmation : it must be 
without a cause, has been Illegitimately converted into the positive one : It must be the cause of itself ; (3) 
kx the inference : it must, since it is not caused by anj^thing else, be caused by itself, the term causa ha* 

70 spmozA. 

The proof of Prop. VIII. : " All substance is necessarily infinite," rests on the aj- 
sertion (in Prop. V.) that there cannot be more than one substance having the sanie 

From the definition of Attribute Spinoza deduces the ninth Proposition : The more 
reaHty or being a thing has, the more attributes does it possess {quo plus realitatis 
aut esse UTiaqumque res habet, eoplura attributa ipsi competunt), and from the same defi- 
nition, together with the definition of Substance, the tenth Proposition : Every attri- 
bute of one substance must be conceived by itself {unumquodque u/iius substantia: 
attributum per se concipi debet). \ 

been taken in the sense sanctioned by universal usage, while in the conjoined premise ("its essence ne- 
cessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to its nature" id est [per Def. /.] tpsius essentia involvit 
necessaiHo existerUiam .five ad ejus naturam pertinet existere) the same term in the expression "cause of it- 
self" is explained in accordance with Spinoza's arbitrary definition, without even an attempt to show the 
coincidence of the two significations; m other words, the fallacy above indicated (p. 64) of a quaternio 
tenninorum is committed by the confounding of a "definition formed sjTitheticaDy " with one "formed 

* That this proof is fallacious, because the second Definition, on which also it rests, involves a false 
supposition, has been remarked above. That a substance is alone in its kind and cannot be limited by a 
duplicate of itself (since no such duplicate can exist) determines nothing respecting the magnitude and 
extension of the "substance." Grant, for example, that each thought is homogeneous with every other 
thought, i. e., that " thought generally" is one, and it no more follows that thought is imbounded and ubi- 
quitous than that, because every eagle participates in the one aquiline nature (or, to express it in Spino- 
zistic phraseology, is in the aquiline nature), the aquiline nature is unbounded and ubiquitous, or that, 
supposing our sun to be the only one in existence, it must therefore be infinite. A shorter proof is sub- 
joined by Spinoza in the first Scholium, founded simply on Propos. VII. {ad iiaturani substantiat pertinet 
existere). He here argues that all substance must be infinite, because the finite is in reality a partial ne- 
gation {ex parte negatio) and the infinite is an absolute afllrmation of existence {ahsoluta ajffirmatio exis- 
teniice alicujus naturce). But the terms of this argument which agrees with Spinoza's theorem, '^ omnia 
determinatio est negatio " involve a petitio principii, since the infinity of all that is primitive must be 
presupposed, in order justly to affirm that finitenes.s is a partial negation of this primitive reality ; one who 
should adopt the theory of atoms, or of finite monads, or perchance of a finite world as the primitive /aciM?n, 
would not be compelled to admit this argument of Spinoza, and could not be refuted by it. (Leibnitz, in his 
Co7ui<lerations sur la doctrine dun Esprit universel, in Erdmann's Extracts from his Philos. Works, p. 
179. declares Spinoza's demonstrations concerning substance to be '' pitoyables ou non intelUgibles.'"') 

+ The latter Proposition stands in a doubtful relation to the Definition of substance as that which "is 
in itself and is conceived by itself." (That substance must be conceived by itself is not intended by Spinoza 
to be viewed as constituting a second mark of substance distinct from that expressed in the words : is in 
itself; on the contrary, since thought and being are conceived as congruent, the two marks are essentially 
identical.) All that can lawfully be inferred is that the attribute, since it too must be conceived by itself, 
must also be substantial, or that no substance can have more than one attribute. In a Scholion Spinoza 
repudiates this conclusion as inadmissible, because it would conflict with the substance of the ninth Propo- 
sition, but he does not succeed in overthrowing its formal truth and necessity. The difference between attri- 
bute and substance cannot consi.st with the ascription to every attribute of per se concijii, and in the ninth 
Proposition the presupposition that one substance can have more reality and being than another is itself 
left undemonstrated. Either the so-called attribute possesses independent existence in which case it is a 
ubstance or, with other so-called attributes, it must be affirmed as a predicate of substance, in which 
case it is in the substance and can be conceived or thought only through the substance, and it is, there- 
fore, not an attribute, but a mode. It would be logically more consistent to assume the existence of one 
substance with one attribute, or even of numerous, perhaps infinitely nvimerous substances, each having one 
attribute (substance and attribute thus being identical), than to assume the existence of a plurality of at- 
tributes. Then, of course, no distinction between substances of greater and less reality, nor between infinity 
in kind and absolute infinity, would be admissible. But Spinoza makes and maintains these distinctions 
in order, evidently however far he may be from confessing it that his theory may not conflict with the 
objective fact of the actual connection and mutual relation of "thought" and "extension," or with his 
monistic convictions, and all scruples are brushed away by the easy means of including aU attributes in 
the definition of God as the " ens absolute infinitum,'''' and of vindicating the real validity of this defini- 
tion by means of the conception of existence as involved in essence. Thus Proposition XI. is baaed on 
the ontological Paralogism. 

spmozA. 71 

Prop. XI. : God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which ex- 
presses an eternal and infinite essence, exists by necessity (because being belongs to hia 
essentia. Spinoza's words are : Deus sive substantia constans injinitis attributis^ quorum 
unumqiwdque ceteiiiam et infinitam essentiam exprimit, necessario existit). With the 
argument for the existence of an infinite substance, drawn from the definition, and 
which Spinoza designates as Demonstratio a j)viori., he combines (like Descartes) an- 
other, founded on the fact of our own existence, whereby God's necessary existence is 
established posteriori. It is impossible that only finite beings should exist, for then 
they would, as necessary beings, be more powerfid than the absolutely infinite being, 
since the ability not to exist {posse non existere) is an i7npotentia, while the ability to 
exist {posse existere) is a potentia. * 

Substance is, as such, indivisible, for by a portion of substance nothing else could be 
understood but a lunited substance, which would be a contradiction in terms. Besides 
God there exists no other substance ; for every attribute by which a substance can be 
determined is included in God, and there is never more than one substance having the 
same attribute. There is only one God ; for only one absolutely infinite substance can 
exist. Not only do all attributes belong to God (since a substance consists of its attri- 
butes), but all modes, as affections of substance, are also in God : Whatever is, is in 
God, and nothing can either be, or be conceived, without God {quidquid est, in Deo est, 
et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi jjotest, Prop. XV.). Spinoza justifies at length (in 
the Scholium to Prop. XV. ) the iaclusion of extension ia the definition of the essence 
of God. From the necessity of the divine nature follow an infinite number of things 
ia an infinite number of ways ; God is, therefore, the efficient cause of all which can 
fall within the sphere of the infinite intellect, and he is the absolutely first cause. 
(' Cause," surely, only in a very figurative sense, since he was never without modes.) 
God acts only according to the laws of his nature, constrained by no one, and hence 
nath absolute freedom, and he is the only free cause. God, as the cause of all things, 
is their immanent (''indwelling") cause, not transcendent (passing over into that which 
is other than himself). {Deus est omnium rerum causa inmia?ie7is, non vero transiens, 
Propos. XVIII. ; cf. Epist. XXI., ad Oldenburgium : Deum omnium rerum causam ttw- 
manentem., ut ajunt, non vero transeuntem statuo. Omnia., inquam., in Deo esse et in 
Deo moveri cum Paulo affirmo et forte etiam cum omnibus antiquis philosojihis, licet 
alio modo, et auderem etiam dicere, cum antiquis omnibus Hebraeis., quantum ex quibus- 

* That in this latter argumentation our (subjective) uncertainty as to the reality or non-reality of ob- 
jective existence is uncritically confounded with the "impotence" of such existence (whose reality is by 
this very act presumed beforehand), is at once evident ; here again Spinoza, as is his wont, leaves entirely 
unnoticed the diversity (pointed out by Nominalism, and still more emphasized by the Kantian Criticism) 
of the subjective and objective elements in our knowledge (in the manner of one-sided "Realism" and 
cf "Dogmatism," although, in other respects, Siiinoza's doctrine contains also nominalistic elements). 
That the argument drawn from the definition involves a paralogism, which is natural to "Realism" (in 
the medieeval sense of this word), though not necessarily confined to the stand-point of Realism alone, has 
been already above mentioned (Vol. I., 9.3). After that Spinoza, by means of the ontological Paralogism, 
has established for his definition, which includes all reality in " Grod," an appearance of objective truth, it 
is not difficult for him to conclude that nothing at all exists except God alone and the modes which are 
in him. 

It would lead us far beyond the limits within which our exposition in this compendium must be confined, 
if we were to continue everjwhere to point out, as we have done thus far, the logical fallaciee of which, 
mosUy in the first steps, but occasionally also in the later ones of the " Ethics," Spinoza is guilty ; the 
minuteness with which we have done this thus far may find its justification in the importance of an exact 
estimate of the foundations of the Spinozistic doctrine, and In the comparative rareness of exact criticismi 
of the details of his demonstrations. From this point forward a mere review of the further progreae i* 
the development of the ideas in Spinoza's system my suffice. 


dam traditionibits, t/vmetsi multts modis adulteratts, conjicere licet. On the distinction 
between the different kinds of causes, as made by Spinoza, and by Dutch logicians, 
such as Burgersdik and Heerebord, whom Spinoza here more immediately follows, see 
Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. III., p. 316 seq. ; still earlier, however, had the Aristote- 
lian division of causes into four kinds been modified, and we find Petrus Hispanus and 
others, under the head of " Logica Modernarum,'''' treating " de causa mnteriali 2yeinna- 
nente'''' and '' de causa mater iali transeunte ;'''' the former is described as retaining ite 
nature in the effect, as the iron in the sword, and the latter as losing it, as the grain 
in the bread.) God's existence is identical with his essence. All his attributes are in- 
variable. Whatever follows from the absolute nature of any of the divine attributes 
is likewise eternal and infinite. The essence of the things produced by God does not 
involve existence ; God is the cause of their essence, of their entrance into existence, 
and of their continuance in existence. Individual objects are nothing but affections of 
the attributes of God, or modes, by which God's attributes are in a determinate manner 
expressed (GoroUary to Prop. XXV. : res particulates nihil sunt, nisi Dei attributorum 
affectiones, sive modi, quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur) . All 
events, including all acts of volition, are determined by God. All particular things 
which have a finite and Umited existence can be determined to existence and to ac- 
tion only through finite causes, and not immediately by God. since all the effects of 
God's direct agency are infinite and eternal (so that, according to Spinozistic teach- 
ing, the possibility of miracles in the sense of a direct interference of God with the 
order of nature is excluded). God, considered in his attributes, or as a free cause, 
is called by Spinoza (after the example partly of Scholastics who termed God natura 
naturans, and created existence natura ruiturata, and partly, and more especially, of 
Giordano Bruno) natura TMturans. By natura naturata, on the contrary, Spinoza un- 
derstands all that which follows from the necessity of the divine nature, or of either 
of his attributes, i. e. , all modes of the attributes of God, regarded as things which are 
in God, and which, without God, can neither be nor be conceived. The intellect, 
which, in distinction from absolute thought {absoluta cogitatio), is a definite mode of 
thought {modus cogitandi), distinct from other modes, such as will, desire, love, belongs, 
whether infinite or finite, to the natura naturata, and not to the natura naturans. 
(The infinite intellect is to be conceived only as the immanent unity, and hence not as 
the sum, but only as the jrrius of finite intellects, but in distinction from cogitatio ab- 
soluta, is it an explicit or actual unity ; every intdlectus is something actual, an inteHec- 
tio. Will and intellect are related to thought, just as are motion and rest to ex- 
tension. Of. aiso Eth. W., Proposition AO, ScJwlion : ''Mens nostra, quatenus intdli- 
git, (eternus cogitandi modus est, qui alio atemo cogitandi modo determinatur et hie 
iterum ab alio et sic in infinitum, ita ut omnes nrnul Dei CBternum et infinitum 
inteUcctum con.stitimnt." In the Tractatus de Deo, etc., Spinoza terms the infinite 
intellect of God, God's only-begotten Son, in whom the essence of all things is 
known by God in an eternal and unchangeable manner ; this is the Plotinic doc- 
trine which was itself suggested by the PhQonic Logos-doctrine of the voix, in 
which were the ideas. From a Jewish modification of this Plotinic teaching, 
coupled with a Christian element, arose the doctrine of the Adam Cadmon. whom 
the Cabalists termed the only-begotten Son of God, and the sum and substance of the 
ideas. Spinoza, perhaps, took these conceptions from Cabalistic writings, although his 
doctrine, in other respects, is not to be explained as derived from the Cabala. The im- 
mediate source of his Cabalistic knowledge may have been the " Oate of Heaven" of 
Abraham Cohen Irira, who emigrated from Portugal and died in Holland in 1631 ; of. 


sriNozA. 73 

Sigwart, p. 96 seq.) The world of things could have been created by God in no other 
manner and in no other order than the manner and order in which they were created, 
since they followed necessarily from God's unchangeable nature, and were not arbitra- 
rily produced with a view to particular ends. God's power is identical with his essence. 
\\Tiatever is in his power, necessarily is. Nothing exists, from whoso nature some ef- 
fect does not follow, since everything that exists is a determinate mode of the active 
power of God. 

In the second part of his Ethics Spinoza treats of the nature and origin of the hu- 
man mind (de luitura et origine mentis). He begins again with definitions and axioms. 
Body he defines as the mode, which expresses in a determinate manner the essence of 
God, in so far as he is considered as an extended thing. Spinoza defines as belonging 
to the essence of a thing all that which being given, the thing is necessarily given, 
and which being wanting, the thing necessarily ceases to exist, or that without which 
the thing, and which itself without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived. By 
idea (to which term Spinoza gives only a subjective sense) Spinoza understands the 
concept {conceptus) which is formed by the mind {mens) as a thinking thing ; he pre- 
fers the term coneeptus to perceptio, because conceptus, as he says, seems to express an 
activity, but perceptio a passivity of the mind. (The term idea signifies originally 
shape, form of an object, and in this sense it was first applied to denote the image of 
perception, or the form of the perceived object as received into consciousness. But 
Spinoza wholly disconnects from the term this its original signification, a procedure 
the more easy for Spinoza, since he was not restrained by regard for Greek linguistic 

By an "adequate idea" Spinoza understands an idea which has all the intrinsio 
marks of a true one (in distinction from the external mark, namely, the convenientia 
ideas cum suo ideato). Duration is defined as the indefinite continuation of existence. 
Reality is identified by Spinoza with perfection. By particular objects {^res singvlares) 
he understands all finite things. These definitions are followed by axioms and postu- 
lates. The first axiom aflorms that the essence of man does not involve necessary ex- 
istence. Then follow several empirical dicta under the title of " axioms." Man 
thinks. Love, desire, and, in general, all modes of thought depend on the presence 
in the mind of a representation (idea) of an object ; but the representation can be 
present without the other modes. We perceive that a certain body is affected in nu- 
merous ways {nos Cjorpus quoddam multismodis affici sentimtis). We feel and perceive 
no other individual things beside bodies and modes of thought. Farther on are added 
empirical propositions relating to bodies, and especially to the fact that bodies consist 
of parts, which themselves are likewise composite, and to the relations of bodies to 
each other ; these are called " Postulates." Among the Propositions of this Part, the 
most noticeable are the following : God is a thinking thing {res cogitans) and an ex- 
tended thing ; thought and extension are attributes of God. In God there is necessa- 
rily an idea as well of his essence, as of aU, which necessarily follows from his es- 
sence. All particular thoughts have God, as thinking being, just as all particular 
bodies have God, as an extended being, for their cause ; ideas are not caused by their 
ideata or by the perceived things, and things are not caused by thoughts. But the 
things of which we have ideas follow in the same way and with the same necessity 
from their attribute as do our ideas from the attribute of thought ; the order and con- 
nection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (Prop. VII. : ordo 
et comiexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio remm) ; for the attributes from which 
the former and the latter respectively follow express the essence of one substance 

74 . 8PIN0ZA. 

That which follows from the infinite nature of God in the world of external reality 
{formaliter) follows without exception iu the same order and connection from the 
idea of God in thought {objective). A mode of extension and the idea of the same are 
one and the same thing, but expressed in two different ways {Eth. II. 7, ScJiol., 
where Spiaoza adds : guod quidam Hebrce&rum quaiiper nebulam vidisse videntur, Deum 
Dei inteUectum resque db ipso intdLectas unum et idem esse ; Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitr. , 
III., p. 395, compares with this Moses Maimon., More Nevochim I., ch. 68, and Arist., 
De Anima, III., 4, and MetapJi.^ XII., 7 and 9.) The idea of any manner in which the 
human body is affected by external bodies must involve chiefly, indeed, an idea of the 
nature of the human body (brain ?), but also, ia addition, an idea of the nature of the 
external, affecting body, because all the ways in which a body is affected result at the 
same time from the nature of the affected and of the affecting bodies. Hence the 
human mind perceives the nature of very many other bodies, at the same time that it 
perceives the nature of its own body. * In consequence of the continuance of the im- 
pressions received by the body from without, other bodies, even though no longer 
present, can be mentally represented in the same manner as if they were present. If 
the human body is simultaneously acted upon by two other bodies, and if after\vards 
one of these is called up ia imagination, the order and concatenation of the impres- 
sions received by the body is such that the other must also be called up. With the 
mind is united an idea of the mind (self-consciousness) in the same way in which the 
mind is united with the body. The idea of the mind or the idea of the idea is nothing 

* Correctly as this theory is developed from Spinoza's fundamental postulates, the ground of the neces- 
sity of the agi-eement between the modes of thought and of extension is by no means made really clear by 
Spinoza's fundamental conceptions; for how conformity in duality follows from the "unity of substance" ia 
left undetermined. Either the modes of thought are realiter different from those of extension, and then 
their conformity is not explained by their merely inhering in the same substance ; or they are simply different 
ways of apprehending the same real mode, which in itself is only one, although appearing to us as twofold 
and then this twofold manner of apprehending remains itself unintelligible ; for there does not exist, dis- 
tinct from the one all-comprehending substance, a second factor, the agent of apprehension. On the con- 
trary, the cause of this duality of apprehension must be founded in the nature of substance itself, which yet 
is scarcely possible, unless in it the modes of thought are realiter different from those of extension. The 
first of the above alternatives was aflinned by Spinoza most decidedly in the earlier period of his philoso- 
phizing, when he held that thought and extension could act upon each other, and especially that thought 
could be determined by external causes (as appears from the newly-discovered Tractatun) ; but subse- 
quently, when he had ceased to believe in a causal nexus as laniting the attributes, he approached through the 
theorems and comparisons examined above (p. 66 secj. ) towards the second alternative. Logically developed, 
the first, provided that no causal relation subsists among the attributes, results in the doctrine of a pre-es- 
tablished harmony, the second in a form of subjective Idealism. Moreover, in accordance with the conse- 
quence admitted by Spinoza (S/t. //., prnpos. 13, Schol. : "iiidividica omnia, quamvis diversis gradibm, 
animatn tamen sunt'% all things, down to minerals even, and gases, must participate directly at the 
places where they renlUer are. and not merely by means of their images in the human brain, m the attribute 
of thought, in which every thought is alleged to be immanent. But if such a theory of universal animation 
(which must be conceived as involving various degrees) be admitted, it remains obscure, in what sense and by 
what right the lower forms, by which doubtless only the vegetative and physical forces can be understood, can 
be subsumed under the attribute of thought, since in them very essential marks of that conscious thought, of 
which alone we have direct knowledge in ourselves, are wanting, and since, besides, the subsumption (by 
Schoijenhauer) of the same under the "^vill," although liable to the same objection, can yet at least assert 
the same claim to acceptance. When we are "affected," it is our bodies that are affected from without, 
and the process can be explained by reference to mathematical and mechanical laws. Now, in logical con- 
sistency with Spinoza's doctrine, there should exist, parallel with this mechanical nexus, which pertains to 
the attribute of extension, another nexus pertaining to the attribute of thought and synchronously imiting 
our mindE w^th other minds. But the existence of such a nexus is indemonstrable, and the alleged par- 
allelism is consequently purely hypothetical. The fact is that Spinoza here falls involuntarily into the theorj 
which he formally repudiates, the theory that the modes ol extension may act upon the modes of thought. 


other than the form of the idea, when the latter is considered as a mode of thought 
without relation to the corporeal object which it represents. He who knows an^-thing, 
knows also, by that very fact, that he knows it. The mind knows itself only in so far 
as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body. Since the parts of the human 
body are extremely complex individuals, which belong to the essence of the human 
body only in a certain respect, whUe in other respects they are controlled by the uni- 
versal order of nature, the human mind has not in itself an adequate knowledge of the 
parts which constitute its body, and still less has it an adequate knowledge of external 
things, which it knows only through their effects on its body ; nor is its knowledge of 
itself, which it acquires through the idea of the idea of each affection of the human 
body, adequate. All ideas are true so far as they are referable to God ; for all ideas, 
which are in God, agree perfectly with their objects {cum suis ideatis omnino canve- 
niunt). Every idea, which is in us as an absolute or adequate idea, is true ; for every 
such idea is in God, in so far as the latter constitutes the essence of the human mind. 
Falsehood is nothing positive in our ideas, but consists in a certain, not absolute, pri- 
vation {in cognitionis privations, quam idecB inadaqtiatm sive mutilcB et mnfmm invd- 
vunt). Inadequate and confused ideas, as well as those which are adequate or clear 
and distract, are subject to the law of causation. Of that which is common to the 
human body and the bodies that affect it, and is equally iu all parts of each, the mind 
has an adequate conception ; the mind is the more capable of forming numerous ade- 
quate ideas the more its body has in common with other bodies ; ideas which follow 
from adequate ideas are themselves also adequate. More precisely, Spinoza distin- 
guishes three kinds of cognition. By the first, which he calls opinio or imaginatio, he 
understands the development of perceptions and of iiniversal notions derived from 
them, out of the impressions of the senses through unregulated experience {experientin 
vaga), or out of signs, particularly words, which, through the memory, call forth im- 
aginations. The second kind of cognition, called by Spinoza ratio, consists in adc' 
quate ideas of the peculiarities of things, or tiotiones communes. The third and 
highest kind of cognition is the intuitive knowledge {scientia intuitiva) which the in- 
tellect has of God. This kind of cognition advances from the adequate idea of the 
essence of some of the attributes of God, to the adequate knowledge of the essence 
of things. Cognition of the first kind is the only source of deception ; that of the 
second and third kinds teaches us to distinguish the true from the false. He who has 
a true idea is at the same time certain of its truth {sicut lux se ipsam et tenebras mani- 
festat, sic Veritas norma sui et falsi est). The human mtud, in so far as it knows things 
truly, is a part of the infinite divine intellect {pars est infiniti Dei inteUectus), and its 
clear and distinct ideas must therefore be as necessarily true as are the ideas of God. 
Reason {ratio), since it considers things as they really are, considers them not as con- 
tingent, but as necessary ; it is only imagination that presents them as contingent, 
when the recollection of diverse instances causes different ideas to arise in the mind 
and our expectation wavers. Reason apprehends things under a certain form of eter- 
nity ("s7/5 qnadam ceternitatis specie'") because the necessity of things is the necessity 
of the eternal nature of God. Every idea of a particular concrete object involves 
necessarily the eternal and infinite essence of God, which is present alike in all, and 
therefore is adequately known by the human mind. Since the human mind is a 
" certain and determinate mode of thought" {certns et determinatus modus cogi(andi), 
there is no absolute freedom of the will. The will to afiirm or deny ideas is not s 
causeless, arbitrary act ; it is the necessary consequence of the ideas, and just as dia- 
tinct volitions and ideae are identical, so also ar will and intellect, which ar' mere 


abstractions aaving no real signification apart from single volitional or intellectual 
acts. (The Jartesian explanation of error as arising from an unlimited freedom of 
the will, transcending the limitations of the representative faculty, is thus made im- 

The third Part of the Ethics treats of the origin and natiire of the emotions and 
passions. By emotions and passions Spinoza understands those affections of the body 
by which its power to act is increased or diminished, furthered or hindered, together 
with the ideas of these affections. The idea of anything which increases or diminishes 
the power of the body to act, increases or diminishes the cogitative power of the miad. 
The transition of the mind from a less to a greater degree of perfection is the cause 
of joyful emotion ; a change in the opposite sense causes sadness. Desire or longing 
(cupiditas) is conscious appetite, and appetite is the essence of man itself, so far as 
the latter is moved by its very nature to the doing of those things which subserve its 
conservation {ipsa hominis essentia^ quatenus deter miruita est ad en, agendum, qxim ipsius 
conservationi inserviunt) . The three emotions or passions of desire, joy, and sadness 
are regarded by Spinoza as the only primitive ones from which all others are derived. 
(Descartes had enumerated as primitive emotions the following six : admiration, love, 
hate, desire, joy, and sadness.) Love, for example, is joy accompanied by the idea of 
its external cause {amor est Icetitia concomitaide idea caus(S externa'). Hate is sadness 
with the like accompaniment. Hope is an uncertain joy, arising from the image in 
the mind of something future or past, of the result of which we are in doubt {incon- 
stans Icetitia. orta ex imagine rei futurm vd proeteritm, de cujus eventu dubitamus), 
and fear is a like uncertain sadness, arising from the image of something which 
is doubtful. Admiration is defined by Spinoza as that mental image of anything 
which fixes the attention of the mind, because it has no connection with other images ; 
and contempt as an image which affects the mind so little that the mind is moved by 
the presence of the thing imagined, to think rather of what docs not belong to the 
thing, than of that which does belong to it ; both, however, are viewed as not properly 
passions. Besides the passions of joy and desire there are other emotions of joy and 
desire which relate to us in so far as we act, and are therefore actions ; but emotions 
of sadness are never actions. All actions resulting from emotions, which belong to the 
mind as an intelligent being, are subsumed by Spinoza under the conception oifortitudo, 
and fortitndo is divided into animositas and generodtas ; the former is defined as prompt- 
ing the endeavor to conserve one's own being according to the dictates of reason, and 
the latter as leading to the endeavor rationally to assist other men, and to join them to 
one's self in friendship. Spinoza remarks in general, that the names of the emotions 
and passions have been invented rather in accordance with ordinary experience than 
on the basis of an exact knowledge of the things named. * 

*In regard to some of these definitions, e. g., that of love, which includes no reference to the personal 
feelings of the object of love, it may be questioned whether they are formed "analytically," i. e., by analysis 
of the conception as given in the universal consciousness of man and in accordance with universal lin- 
guistic usage, or "synthetically," i. e., by arbitrarily connecting a conception framed to meet the wants of 
the system, with a given name ; and whether, in the latter case, that which is true of love, etc., only as 
defined, has not sometimes been paralogistically ascribed to love, etc., in the meaning assigned to them by 
ordinary linguistic usage. Yet, in the attentive and delicate investigation of the nature of the passions, 
and of their mutual relations, consists, undeniably, one of the greatest merits of Spinoza's work. Johannes 
MMler has incorporated into his " Phytfinlogie des Meimchen " (Vol. II., Coblenz, 1840, pp. 54^-548) the 
principal definitions of the third Part of the "Ethics," under the title: " Lehnatze von Spinoza uber die 
Statik der Gemilthsbewegungen," with the remark (in consonance with Spinoza's own doctrine), that this 
Statics is only so far produced by necessary law, as man is conceived as moved by passions alone ; it being 
tKjMble of modifications by man's reason. 

spmozA. 77 

The fourth Part of the Ethics treats of human servitude {De ServituU Humana), by 
wliich Spinoza means human impotence in the direction and restraint of the passions. 
The man v.'ho is subject to his passions has not power over himself, but is under the 
control of external circumstances or of fortune, and is often compelled, while seeing 
the better, to do the worse. The speculations in this Part are founded especially on 
the following definitions of good and evil ; By the good, he says, I understand that 
which wc loiow with certainty to be useful to us, and by evil, that of which we know 
with like certainty that it will hinder us from the attainment of any good {per bonum 
id intcUiffam, quod certo scimus nobis esse utile, per inaluiu autem id, quod certo scimua 
i/npeJire, quv iniiius botii alicujus simus compiotcs), and the useful is defined as the means 
by which we gradually approach towards that ideal of human nature which we pro 
pose to ourselves {medium, ut ad exemplar humance naturee, quod nobis proponimus, 
magis mngisque accedamus). The terms good and e\il, we are told, denote nothing ab- 
solute, nothing which exists in things considered in themselves ; they are the names of 
relative conceptions which result from our reflection on the relation of things to each 
other. From the axiom : Xo single thing exists in nature, than which another, more 
powerful, does not exist, it follows that man, who, as an individual being, is a part of 
the whole complex of nature, and whose power is a finite part of the infinite power of 
God or of nature, is necessarily subject to passions, i. e., that he is thrown into condi- 
tions, of which he is not himself the full cause, and whose power and increase are de- 
termined by the relation of the power of the external cause to his own power. One 
passion or emotion can only be overcome by a stronger one, hence not simply by the 
true knowledge of the good and the evU, but only by that knowledge in so far as it is 
at the same time identified with an emotion of pleasure or sadness, and as such is more 
powcrfid than the opposing passion or emotion. Every one strives necessarily after 
that which is useful to him, and since reason demands nothing that is really contrary to 
nature, it demands that each should strive for that which is really useful for the cous 
servation of his being and the attainment of greater perfection ; but nothing is more 
useful to man than man himself, and hence men who are guided by reason, i. e., who 
seek their good according to reason, strive to obtain nothing for themselves which they 
do not also desire for other men, and are therefore just, true, and honorable. The 
man who is guided by reason is freer in a civil community where he lives according to 
laws made for all the citizens, than in a condition of isolation, where he obeys only 

In the fifth Part of the Ethics Spinoza treats of the power of the intellect or of hu- 
man freedom, showing what is the power of reason or of adequate ideas over the bluid 
energy of the passions. A passion is as such a confused idea ; but as soon as we form 
a clear and distinct idea of it, as we always may, it ceases to be a passion. In the true 
knowledge of the passions, therefore, is found the best remedy against them. The 
more the mind recognizes all things as necessary, the less does it suffer from the pas- 
sions. He who has a clear and distinct knowledge of his passions rejoices in this knowl- 
edge, and this joy is accompanied by the idea of God, since all clear knowledge involves 
this idea. Joy, accomp:\nied with the idea of its cause, is love ; hence he who has 
clear knowledge of himself and of his passions, loves God, and loves him all the more, 
the more perfect his knowledge is. This love to God, since it accompanies the knowl- 
edge of aU passions and emotions, must, in a pre-eminent degree, fill the mind. God is 
free from all passions, becavise all ideas in God are true, and hence adequate, and be- 
cause with God no change in point of perfection is possible. God is, therefore, not af' 
fected with joy and sadness, and hence, also, not with love and hatred. No one can 

78 spmozA. 

hate God, because the idea of God, as an adequate idea, cannot be accompanied wit\ 
sadness. He who loves God cannot desire God's love in return, for, so desirinj^, he 
would desire that God should not be God. The power of the mind to imagine and re- 
member depends on the duration of the body. But there is in God, since he is the 
cause, not only of the existence, but also of the essence of the body, an idea which ex- 
presses the essence of the human body under the form of eternity {sub specie cBternita- 
tis). Consequently the human mind cannot be wholly destroyed with the body ; there 
is something that survives it. The idea which expresses the essence of the body under 
the form of eternity, is a distinct mode of thought, belonging to the essence of the 
mind {nd mentis essentiam) and necessarily eternal. But this eternity cannot be deter- 
mined by reference to duration in time ; hence we caimot remember to have existed 
before our bodies. But we feel and experience none the less that we are eternal, the 
organ of this feeling and this experience being logical demonstration. Duration Avithin 
certain limits of time can only in so far be ascribed to the mind, as the latter involves 
the actual existence of the body ; and only in so far is the mind able to apprehend 
things under the form of time. The highest endeavor of the mind, and its highest vir- 
tue, are to know things with that most perfect kind of knowledge (designated by Spi- 
noza in the second Part of the Ethics tertivm cognitionis genus), which proceeds from the 
adequate idea of certain divine attributes to the adequate knowledge of the essence of 
things. The more we comprehend things in this way, the more do we comprehend 
God. The greater the capacity of the mind to know in this way, the greater is its de- 
sire for such knowledge, and from such knowledge springs the highest satisfaction of 
the mind. So far as the mind apprehends itself and its body under the form of eternity, 
it has necessarily the knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is thought by 
God. Such knowledge is impossible for the mind, except in so far as it is eternal, and 
the intellectual love to God {amor Dei intellectualis) that springs from it is eternal ; aU 
other love, on the contrary, and all emotions which are passions, are, like the imagina- 
tion, inseparable from the body and not eternal. God loves himself vdth infinite intel- 
lectual love ; for the divine nature rejoices in infinite perfection, the idea of which is 
accompanied by the idea of the divine nature as its cause. (In this utterance of Spinoza 
those who construed the Christian Trinity as denoting the distinction and union in God 
of causative being, self-consciousness, and love, were able to find for their doctrine a 
speculative point d'appui.) The intellectual love of the mind to God is itself that love 
whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be ex- 
plained by the essence of the human mind considered under the form of eternity, i. e. , 
the intellectual love of the mind to God is a part of the infinite love with which God 
loves himself (as the human intellect is a part of the infinite divine intellect). In so 
far as God loves himself, he loves men also ; the love of God to men and the inteUec- 
tuai love of the mind to God are identical. Our salvation, or happiness, or freedom 
consists in constant and eternal love to God, or in God's love to man. This love is in- 
destructible. The more the mind is filled with it, the greater is the portion of immor- 
tality with which it is also filled. The eternal part of the mind is the intellect, in the 
use of which only we are active ; the perishable part is the imagination, through which 
we are subject to passions ; the eternal part is therefore the more excellent. Even 
though we did not know our minds to be eternal, we shoiild yet be compelled to esteem 
most highly of all things piety and conscientiousness and all other noble qualities. Not 
happiness, but virtue itself is the reward of virtue, nor do we rejoice in it becaus* it 
enables us to govern our lusts, but, on the contrary, because we rejoice in it, therefor 
are we able to govern our lusts. 


116. Jolm Locke (1632-1704) sought in his principal work, the 
" Essay concerning Human Understanding^'' to ascertain tlie origin 
of human knowledge, in order by this means to determine the limits 
and measure of its objective truth. Locke denies the existence of 
innate ideas and principles. The mind resembles originally a blank 
tablet. Nothing is in the intellect, which was not previously in the 
senses. The sources of all our knowledge are partly sensation or 
sensuous perception, and partly reflection or internal perception ; the 
former is the apprehension of external objects through tlie external 
senses, while the latter is the apprehension of psychical phenomena 
through the internal sense. The different elements of sensuous per- 
ception are variously related to objective reality. Extension, figure, 
motion, and, in general, all spatial properties belong to the external 
objects themselves. Color and sound, on the contrary, and all other 
sensible qualities, are only in the perceiving subject and not properly 
in the things perceived ; they are simply signs, and not copies of 
changes which take place in external things. Through internal ex- 
perience or reflection we know the actions of our thinking and walling 
faculties. Tlirough the external senses and the internal sense to- 
gether we obtain the ideas of power and unity, and other ideas. From 
simple ideas the mind forms by combination compound (complex) 
ideas. These are ideas either of modes, or of substances, or of rela- 
tions. "Wlien we flnd several modes always united with each other, 
we suppose a substance or substratum, in which they inhere and which 
supports them ; but this conception is obscure and of little use. The 
principle of individuation is existence itself. The so-called " second 
substances" of the Aristotelians, or genera, are purely ideal or 
subjective, being the result of the act of combination by which we 
unite many similar individuals in one class, and give to them the 
same name. Knowledge is the perception of the connection and 
agreement, or of the disagreement and repugnancy of several ideas, 
viewed with reference to either of the four relations of identity or 
diversity, relation, coexistence, and real existence. Those are rational 
judgments, whose tnitli we can discover by the investigation and 
development of conceptions which arise from sensation and reflection, 
as, for example, that a God exists; judgments transcending reason are 
those whose truth or probability we cannot discover in this way, as, 
for example, that the dead will be raised. Judgments of the latter 
kind are the object of faith. Those judgments are contrary to reason, 


which involve a contradiction in themselves, or are incompatible with 
clear and distinct conceptions, as, for example, that there are more 
Gods than one ; such judgments can neither be revealed nor believed. 
For the existence of God Locke adduces the cosmological argument. 
He regards the inunateriality of tlie soul as probable, but the contrary 
as not inconceivable. His ethical principle is happiness. 

Under the influence of Locke's principles Berkeley (1685-1783), 
asserting that only minds and their ideas (representations and voli- 
tions) exist, developed a form of Idealism or " Phenomenalism ; " 
Hartley and Priestley, on the contrary, founded a materialistic Psy- 
chology, with which they nevertheless succeeded in combining theo- 
logical convictions. Samuel Clarke who defended Newtonian (and 
Lockian) doctrines in opposition to Leibnitz the younger Shaftesbm-y, 
Hutcheson, and others contributed in various senses, and more or 
less under the influence of Locke's doctrine, to the advancement of 
Moral Philosophy. 

Locke'8 principal work, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, in four books, appeared first at 
London in 1690, then in 1694, 1697, 1700, 1705, etc., and in French, translated, with the co-operation of the 
author, from the fourth edition by Coste, Amst., 1700, 1729, etc. ; 30th ed. in English, London, 1856, again, 
Lond., 1860; in Latin, translated by Burridge, Lend., 1701, etc.; Latin translation by G. H. Thiele, Leips., 
1731; in Dutch, Amst., 1736; in German, translated by H. B. Foley, Altenburg, 1757, tnmslated by G. A. 
Tittel (extracts), Mannheim, 1791, by W. G. Tennemann (complete, together with an Essay on Empiricism in 
Philosophy), Leipsic, 1795-97. [Several editions of Locke's essay have also been published in America, e. g. 
New York, 1825; Philadelphia, etc. T/.] Locke's " Thoughts on Education' appeared first in London in 
1693 [New York: Schermerhom, 1869 Tn], in French, transl. by Coste, Amst., 1705, etc.; in German, 
transl. by Eudolphi, Brunswick, 1788. Posthumous Works, Loud., 1706; CEuvres Diverses de Locke, 
Rotterdam, 1710; Amst., 1732. The Complete Works were published at London in 1714, 1722, etc., and a 
supplement to them, under the title : Collection of Several Pieces of J. Locke, London, 1720. More recently 
Locke's complete works have been published in 9 vols., London, 1853, and his philosophical works, edited by 
St. John, London, 1854. 

Locke's friend, Jean Le Clerc, wrote of Locke's life in his Eloge ffistoriqiie in the sixth volume of his Biblio- 
thique choisie (reproduced in the first vol. of the (Envies Diverses de Locke, in Heumann's Acta Philos. VI., p. 
976, et ai. ), his work being founded on facts furnished him by Locke, the Earl of Shaftesbury, and Lady Masham. 
A biography of Locke by Lord King was pubUshed at London in 1829. Numerous works were written in 
opposition to his doctrine, immediately after its publication, but its influence increased in Great Britain, 
'France, HoUand, Germany, and elsewhere, tiU near the end of the eighteenth century. The most impor- 
tant reply to the Essay coitcerning Human U)iderstanding was Leibnitz's extended critique, entitled 
Nouveaux essais stir Tentendement humain (see below, 117). Of the more recent works on Locke, the 
following may here be mentioned : Tagart, Locke's Writings and Philosophy, London, 1855 ; Th. E. Webb, 
77<. IiUellectualism of Locke, London, 1858; Benj. P. Smart, ThouglU and Language, an Essay having in 
view the revival, correction, and exclusive establishment of Locke'i philosophy, Lond. 1855; J. Brown, 
Locke and Sydenham, London and Edinburgh, 2d ed. 1859, 3d ed. 1866 ; Victor Cousin, La Philos. de Locke, 
4th ed., Paris, 1861 ; John Locke, Seine Verstandestheorie und seine Lehren ilber Religion, Stoat und Erzie- 
hung, psychologisch dargestellt von Emanuel Schilrer, Leipsic, 1860; Locke's Lehre von der meiischl. 
Erkenntniss in Vergleichzmg mil Leibnitz's Kritik derselben dargestellt von G. JLartenstein (from the 4th 
Tol. of the Philol.-hist. CI. der K. Sdchs. Ges. der Wiss.), Leipsic, 1861, and now published also in Harten- 
stein's Hi-H.-philos. Abhandlungen, Leipsic, 1870 ; M. W. Drobisch, Veber L., den Vorldufer Kani's, in the 
Zeitschr.f. ex. Ph., II. 1, Leips. 1861, pp. 1-32 ; E. Fritsche, John Locke's Ansichten ilber Ersiehung, Naum- 
burg, 1866 : S. Turbiglio, AnaliH storica delle fllos. di Locke e di Leibniz, Turin, 1867 ; Richard Quabicker, 
Lockiiet LiebnUii de cognUione humance ftenUntKe {Diss. Inaug.), Halle, 1868; Emil Strotzell, Zur KrUik der 
Erkenntnisslefire von John Locke {Diit. Berl.), Berlin, 1869. 


G. Berkeley, Theory of Vision, Dublin, 1709, also London, 1711 ami 17:H, and in B.'s Works. TVeatise on tf-A 
Prtnciples of Human Knowledge, Dublin, 1710, etc. ; Goruiaii translation by F. Uuberweg, in Philos. litblio- 
thek. Vol. XII., Berlin, 1869. Three Dialogues between. JJi/ius una PliUoiiuiui, London, 1713, etc. ; in FrenctL, 
Amst., 1750 ; in German (as Part I. of an intended translation of his works, of which, however, only this wan 
published), Leipeic, 1781 (also, previously, Rostock, 175tJ, see below). Alciphron, or the Minute J'/ulosoplier, 
London, 1732 ; French transl. <i la Uaye, 1734, German transl. by W. Kahler, Lemgo. 1737. (In this work B. 
combats the doctrines of the free-thinkers, and among others the work of Mandeville, entitled. Fable of tlie 
Bees, or Private Vices made Public Benejlts, Lond., 171-1 and 1729; Mandeville defended himself in. '^ A 
Letter to Dion, occasioned by his Book called Alciphron, Lond., 1732). Miscellanies, London, 1752. Sammhtng 
der vomehmsten Schriftstetler, die die Wirklichkeit Vires eigenen K'Orpers u/td der ganzen Kiji-perwelt leugneu, 
eiUhaltemi Berkeley's Gesprdclie zwischen Ilylas wui Philonous (German translation from the French) und 
des Collier allgemeinen Schlussel (Clavis universaUt, or a neio inquiry after truth, by Collier, Lend., 1713), 
iibei's. u. widerlegt von Jon. Christ. EsckenbacU, liostock, 1756. The \y\n-ks of G. Berkeley (with a Biography 
by Arbuthnot), London, 1784, reprinted 1820 and 1843. The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., including many 
of his writings hitherto unpublished. With Pr^ctces, AnnoUUions, his Life and Letters, and an account uf hi* 
Philosophy. By Alexander Campbell Fraser, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of 
Edinburgh. 4 vols., London, Cambridge, and New York ; MacmUlan, 1871. For elucidations of Berkeley'i 
doctrines see Lectures on Greek Philosophy and other Philos. Remains of J. F. Ferrier, ed. by Grant and 
Lushington, London, 1866, and Thorn. Collyns Simon, On the Nature and Elements of the External World, 
or Universal Immaterialism fully explained and demonstrated, London, 1862. 

Arthtir Collier, Clavis Universalis, or a New Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non- 
Existence or Impossibility of an External World, London, 1713, German translation by Eschenbach, Roe- 
tock. 1756 [see above]. Engl. ed. also in the collection edited by Sam. Parr, entitled Metaph. Tracts by Eng- 
lish Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century, London, 1837. [Memoirs of tlie Life and Writings of the Eec. 
Arthur Collier, etc., by Robert Benson, London, 1837; Hamilton, Discussions.^ 

David Hartley, Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations, London, 1749. Joseph 
Priestley, Theory of Human Mind, Lond., 1775 : Di.'iquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit, Lond., 1777 ; Tfte 
Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, Lond., 1777; opposed by Richard Price, the Platonist (1723-1791), in hia 
Letters on Materialism and Philos. Necessity, Lond., 1778. Isaac Newton, Naturalis Philosophiie Principia 
Mathematica, Lond., 1687; also 171.3, 1726, etc.; Treatise of Optic, Lond., 1704, etc.; Opera, ed. Horsley, Lond., 
1779; onhimcf. David Brewster, Edinb., 1831 (German translation by Goldberg, Leips., 1&33); Memoirs of 
t/ie Life, Writing-% and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Neicton, Edinb., 1855; cf. also Karl Snell, Newton und die 
mechan. Natmicissenschaft, Dresden and Leipsic, 1843. and A. Struve, Newtons naiurphilos. Ansichten, 
Sorau, 1869. Anthony Ashley Cooper (Earl of Shaftesbury), An Inquiry CoTicerning Virtue and Merit, 1699, 
translated into Gorman from the French of Diderot in 1780 ; CharacteiHstics of Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times, London, 1711, 1714, etc., German ti-anslation, Leipsic, 1776. Samuel Clarke, Demonstration of the Being 
and Attributes of God, London, 1705-1706 ; Opera, London, 1738-42. William WoUaston, The Religion of Na- 
ture Delineated, London. 1724, etc. ; cf. J. M. Drechsler, Ueber W.''s Moralphilosophie, Erlangen, 1801. Francis 
Hutcheson, Inquiry in'o the Origiiuxl of our Ideas of Beauty and Virttte, Lond., 1725, etc., German tranal., 
Frankf., 1762; Philosophic^ moralis institutio compendiaria, ethices et junspnulentice naturalis principia 
contineyi.% Glasgow, 1745. Henry Home, Es.iays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, Edinb., 
1751, in German, Brunswick, 1768; Elements of Criticism, Lond., 1762, German, Leipsic, 1705. Adam 
Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiment, Lond., 1759, etc. ; Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, London, 1776 ; cf . on his life and writings Dugald Stewart in the edition of Smith's Essays, Lon- 
don, 1795. Adam Ferguson, Instil, of Moral Philosophy, London, 1769, German transl. by Garve, Leips., 

John Toland, Cliristianity not Mysterious, Lond., 1696 (in this work Toland rivals Locke's Reasonableneta 
of the Scriptures, which was pubUshed in 1695) ; Letters to Serena, addressed to the Princess Sophia of Han- 
over ; Nazaremis or Jewish, Gentile, and Mohametan Christianity: Pantheisticon, London, 1710 ; cf. article 
on Toland by John Hunt in the Contemporary Review for June, 1868, pp. 178-198. 

John Locke, son of a lawyer of the same name, was bom at Wrington (16 miles 
from Bristol) on the 29th of Augnst, 1632. He studied at the College of Westminster, 
and subsequently (beginning in the year 1651) at Christ Church College, Oxford. He 
pursued with special interest the study of natural science and medicine. The scholastic 
philosophy left him unsatisfied ; the works of Descartes pleased him by their cleamesa 
and precision, and by their close connection with modem and independent investigations. 
In the year 1664 he accompanied the English ambassador, Sir William Swan, as Secre 


tary of Legation to the Brandenburg court, and resided a year in Berlin. Returning 
to England, he occupied himself with investigations in natural science, and especially 
in meteorology. At Oxford, in 1667, he became acquainted with Lord Ashley, after- 
wards Earl of Shaftesbury, in whose house he resided for a number of years as physi- 
cian and friend of the EarL In the year 1668 he accompanied the Earl of Northum- 
berland on a journey through France and Italy. He then directed in the house of the 
Earl of Shaftesbury the education of the latter's son (then sixteen years old). The 
outlines of his Essay concerning Human Understanding were drawn up by Locke in 
1670, but the work was not published until it had been repeatedly revised. His patron 
having become, in 1672, Lord Chancellor, Locke received from him the office of Secre- 
tary of the Presentation of Benefices, which, however, in the following year, when the 
Lord Chancellor fell into disfavor, he lost. In the years 1675-1679 Locke lived in 
France, chiefly at Montpellier, in the society of Herbert, the subsequent Earl of Pem- 
broke, to whom he dedicated his Essay, and also at Paris, in intercourse with men of 
scientific eminence. In 1679 Shaftesbury, having become President of the Council, 
recalled Locke to England. Shaftesbury, however, on account of his opposition to 
the despotic tendencies of the king, was again deprived of his office, thrown into the 
Tower, and subsequently tried on charges preferred against him by the Court. Acquit- 
ted by his jury, he repaired to Holland, where he was favorably received by the Stadt- 
holder, Prince William of Orange. Thither Locke followed him toward the end of the 
year 1683, and lived first at Amsterdam, and afterwards, the EngUsh government hav- 
ing demanded his extradition, by turns at Utrecht, Cleves, and Amsterdam, until the 
year 1688, when, in consequence of the revolution through which William of Orange 
received the English throne, he was able to return to England, where he received the 
position of Commissioner of Appeals, and afterwards that of a Commissioner of Trade 
and Plantations. In the year 1685 he published (anonymously) his first Letter Concern- 
ing Toleratwn, and in 1689 the second and third. The Essay concerning Human Un- 
derstanding was finished in 1687 ; in the following year an abridgment of it, prepared 
by Locke, was translated into French by Le Clerc (Clericus), and published in the trans- 
lator's Bibl. Univers., viii, pp. 49-142 ; in 1690 the work itself was printed. In 1689 
Locke published anonymously two treatises On Civil Government, in opposition to the 
doctrine of Robert FUmer, that the king inherits from Adam patriarchal and unlimited 
power, and in justification of the revolution just accomplished. Three small works on 
money and coinage appeared likewise in the year 1689. The work on Education ap- 
peared in 1693. The work on the ''Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the 
Scriptures " was published in 1695. Locke passed the last years of his life mostly at 
Oates, in the county of Essex, in the house of Sir Francis Masham, whose wife was a 
daughter of Cudworth. He died there in the seventy-third year of his Life, October 
28, 1704. 

Locke defines it as the subject and aim of his Essay concerning Human Under- 
standing (I. 1, 2, and 3) "to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human 
knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent." He 
proposes to explain how ' ' our understandings come to attain those notions of things we 
have," to determine the "measures of the certainty of our knowledge," "to search 
out the bounds between opinion and knowledge, and examine by what measures, in 
things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent and 
moderate our persuasions." He relates (in the ''Epistle to the Reader'''') that several of 
iiis friends having engaged in a philosophical discussion, and being unable to arrive at 
ny definite result, it came into hia thoughts that an inquiry into the scope of the un- 



derstanding, what objects lie within its sphere, and what beyond it, must precede all 
other philosophical iuquixies. 

In the first Book of the Essay Locke seeks to demonstrate that there are no innate 

There are in the mind ideas (which term Locke explains that he will employ as synony- 
mous with notion). Every man is conscious of them in himself ; and men's words and 
actions will satisfy him that they are in others. How, now, do these ideas come 
into the mind ? 

It is an established opinion amongst some men that there are in the understanding 
certain innate principles, primary notions {Koiyal evvotai), characters stamped on the 
mind, which the sovil brings with it into the world. This opinion coixld, indeed, be 
sufficiently refuted for the imprejudiced reader by merely showing how, by the use of 
our natural faculties, aU the kinds of our ideas really arise ; but since the opinion ia 
very widely extended, it is necessary also to examine the grounds alleged in its defence, 
and to exhibit the counter-arguments. 

The weightiest argument of the defenders of the doctrine of innate ideas is founded 
on the assumption that certain theoretical and practical principles are universally 
accepted as true. Locke disputes both the truth and the force of this argument. The 
alleged agreement respecting such principles is not a fact, and if it were, it would not 
prove their innateness, if another way can be pointed out by which the agreement could 

Among the speculative principles which it is affirmed are innate, belong the cele- 
brated principles of demonstration : Whatever is, is (Principle of Identity), and. It is 
imposs-ible tfiat the same thing slimdd be and rwt be (Principle of Contradiction). But 
these principles are vmknown to children and to aU who are without scientific education, 
and it seems almost a contradiction to aflirm that truths are impressed on the soul, of 
which it has no consciousness and no knowledge. ' ' To say a notion is imprinted on 
the mind, and yet at the same time to say that the mind is ignorant of it, and never 
yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing." If anything is in the soul 
which it has not yet known, it can only be there in this sense, that the soul has the 
power to know it ; but this is tme of all truths that can be known, including those 
which many persons never really know during their whole lives. It is true not only of 
some, but also of all kinds of knowledge, that the faculty to know is innate, but the 
actual knowledge is acquired. Now, he who adopts the hypothesis of innate ideas 
must of course distinguish these from other ideas which are not iimiite ; according to 
him, therefore, it is not the mere capacity that is innate ; and so he must also beUeve 
that innate knowledge is, from the beginning, conscious knowledge ; for to be in the 
understanding means, " to be understood." If it be said that these principles are known 
and assented to by all men when they come to the use of reason, this is neither true 
nor conclusive, whether understood in the sense that we know them deductively by 
the use of the reason, or in the sense that we think them as soon as we arrive at the 
use of reason ; we know many other things before them. That the bitter is not sweet, 
that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing, are known by the child long before he 
understands and assents to the universal proposition that it is impossible for the same 
thing to be and not to be. If our immediate assent to a proposition were a sure mark of 
its innateness, then the proposition that one and two are equal to three, together with 
numberless others, must be innate. What is true of speculative is also true of practi- 
cal principles : none of them are innate. No practical principles are so clear, and none 
are so universally received, as the above-named speculative onea Moral principles are 


as true, but not so evident as speculative principles. The fundamental moral principle, 
to do as one would be done to, and all other moral rules, require to be proved, and are 
therefore not innate. In reply to the question, why men should keep their compacts, 
the Christian will appeal to the will of God, the follower of Hobbes to the will of society, 
and the heathen philosopher to the dignity of man. The desire of happiness and dread 
of misery are indeed innate ; but these motives of all our actions are only directions 
taken by the faculty of desire, not impressions on the understanding. It is only these 
motives that are universally operative ; the practical principles of single individuals and 
of whole nations are not only different, but even opposite ; whatever of agreement is 
observable in them arises from the facts that the following of certain moral rules ia 
recognized as the necessary condition of the permanence of society and of general hap- 
piness, and that education, intercourse with one's fellows, and custom produce shnilarity 
in moral principles. This latter result is all the more easily produced since the un 
heeding and unprejudiced minds of children receive indisciiminately all principles 
which are impressed upon them as truths, just as a piece of blank paper will receive 
any characters which one may choose to write upon it, and principles thus instilled are 
accustomed subsequently, when their origin has been forgotten, to be held as sacred, 
and are accepted without examination. Principles cannot be innate ttnless the idea* 
contained in them are innate ; the most general principles contain the most abstract-, 
ideas, which are the most remote from the thoughts of children and most unintelligible 
to them, and which can be rightly formed only after one has attained a considerablei 
power of reflection and attention ; the conceptions of identity and difference, possibility 
and impossibility, and the like, are not only not in the child's consciousness at birth, 
but they are the farthest removed in the time of their development and in nature from 
the sensations of hunger and thirst, heat and cold, pleasure and pain, which in reality 
are the child's earliest conscious experiences. Nor is the idea of God innate. Not all 
nations have this idea ; not only the ideas of God held by Polytheists and Monotheists, 
but also those held by different persons of the same religion and country, are very dif^ 
ferent. The marks of wisdom and power are so clearly revealed in the works of crea- 
tion, that no rational being, who attentively considers them, can fail to perceive in them 
the evidence of God's existence ; and when through reflection on the causes of things 
the conception of God had once been formed, it could not but be so evident to all that 
it could never be lost. 

In the second book of his Essay, Locke seeks to show positively whence the under- 
standing receives its ideas. He assumes that the soul is originally hke a piece of white 
and blank paper, having no ideas. These, however, it acquires through expenence. All 
our knowledge has its basis in experience, and springs from it. But experience is two- 
fold, being external and internal, or taking the form of sensation or of refiection, accord- 
ing as its object is the world of external, sensible objects, or the internal operatioiis 
of our minds. The senses convey from external objects into the mind that which in 
the latter is the source of the ideas of yellowness, whiteness, heat, cold, softness, hard- 
ness, sweetness, bitterness, and, in general, of all so-called sensible qualities. The 
mind, employed about the ideas already acquired, is the seat of operations, in some of 
which it is active, in others passive. When the mind considers these acti\ities and 
states, and reflects on them, the understanding receives another set of ideas, which 
cannot arise from the things without ; such activities are perception, thinking, doubt- 
ing, believing, reasoning, knowing, and willing. From one of these two sources spring 
all our ideas. 
Man begins to have ideas when the first impression is made on his semses ; even bef or 


birth he may have had the seus^itious of hunger and warmth. But previous to the first 
sensible impression, the soul no more thinks than it does subsequently in dreamless 
sleep. That the soul always thinks is as arbitrary an assertion as that aU bodies are 
continually in motion. 

Some of our ideas are simple, and some are complex. Of simple ideas, some come 
into our minds by one sense, some by more senses than one, and some by reflection, 
while some come by both ways, through the senses and through reflection. By the sense 
of touch we receive the ideas of heat, cold, and solidity, and, further, those of smooth- 
ness and roughness, hardness and softness, and others ; by the sense of sight, the idea 
of light and colors, etc. The ideas which we acquire through more senses than one, 
namely, through sight and touch, are those of space or extension, figure, rest, and 
motion. The mind, by reflection, becomes conscious in itself of its perceptions, or 
thinking, and willing. (Locke dissents from the Cartesian doctrine which co-ordinates 
thought and volition as forms of coyitatio. ) The thinking power Is called the under- 
standing, and the willing power, the will. The ideas of pleasure or delight, of pain or 
uneasiness, and of existence, unity, power, and succession are conveyed to the soul 
both through the senses and through reflection. 

Most of the ideas of sensation ai'e no more the likeness of anything existing exter- 
nally to ourselves than are words the likeness of the ideas for which they stand, and 
which they serve to call up in the mind. The qualities which are really in bodies them- 
selves, and are inseparable from them in whatever condition, are the following : bulk, 
figure, number, situation, and motion or rest, of their solid (space-filling) parts. These 
are caUed by Locke primary or original qualities, and he would doubtless also term 
them real qualities. ^Mien we perceive primary qualities, our ideas of them are copies 
of these qualities themselves ; we so represent the thing mentally as it is in itself. But 
bodies have, further, the power, by means of certain primitive qualities, which are not 
as such perceptible, to work upon our senses in such a manner as to bring forth in us 
the sensations of colore, sounds, smells, etc. Colors, sounds, etc., are not in bodies 
themselves, but only iu our minds. ' ' Take away the sensation of them ; let not the eyes 
see light or colors, nor the ears hear sounds ; let the palate not taste, nor the nose 
smell ; and all colors, tastes, odors, and soimds . . . vanish and cease, and are reduced 
to their causes, i. e., bulk, figure, and motion of parts." Locke terms colors, sounds, 
etc. , derived or secondary qualities. Ideas of this class are not copies of similar quali- 
ties in real objects ; they do not more resemble anything in bodies than does the feeling 
of pain resemble the motion of a piece of steel through any of the sensitive parts of an 
animal body ; they are produced in us by the impulse transmitted from bodies through 
our nerves to the brain, which is the seat of consciousness and, as it were, the audience- 
chamber of the soul. How ideas are thus produced iu the brain Locke does not inquire, 
but says only that no contradiction is involved in supposing that God has aimexed to 
certain motions ideas which bear no resemblance to them. Finally, Locke names a 
third class of qualities in bodies, namely, the powers of certain bodies, by reason of the 
peculiar constitution of their primary qualities, to make such changes in the bulk, figure, 
texture, and motion of other bodies as to cause them to operate on our senses differently 
from what they did before ; among these he reckons, e. g. , the power of the sun to 
make wax white, and of fire to melt lead ; these qualities are called pre-eminently 
powers. * 

* Locke makes unjustifiably a partial concession to the vulgar belief that colors, sounds, etc., as such, are 
in th bodies which aifect our senses, when he calls them " secondary qualities ; '" for sensations which are 
nut ic those bodies, but only in sensitive beings, can in no sense be qualities of those bodies, hence aol 


In hifl diBcussion of the simple ideas which are acquired through reflection, Locka 
makes many suggestive and fruitful psychological observations. He investigates par- 
ticularly, under this head, the faculties of perception, retention, discerning, compound- 
ing, abstracting, etc. In the faculty of perception Locke recognizes the mark by which 
animal and man are distinguished from plant. The faculty of retention is the power of 
preserving ideas, either by continued contemplation or by reviving them after their 
temporary disappearance from the mind, which is too limited to keep in view at the 
same time many ideas. This faculty belongs to animals, and belongs to them partly 
in the same measure as to men. Locke considers it probable that the state of the body 
exerts a great influence on the memory, since the heat of a fever often effaces images 
that were apparently firmly fixed in the memory. The comparison of ideas with each 
other is not effected by animals in so perfect a manner as by man. The power of com- 
pounding ideas belongs only in a slight degree to animals. Peculiar to man is the 
facility of abstraction, by which the ideas of single objects, separated from all accidental 
qualities of real existence, such as time and space, and from aU accompanying ideas, 
are raised to the rank and character of universal conceptions of the genera to which 
they belong, and by which their names become applicable to whatever is included 
within the number of things agreeing with these conceptions. 

The simple ideas are the constituent parts of the complex. Locke reduces complex 
ideas to three classes : modes, substances, and relations. Modes are complex ideas 
which do not contain the supposition of subsisting by themselves; they are simple 
modes or modifications of simple ideas when their elements are similar, and they are 
mixed modes when their elements are dissimilar. Ideas of substances are such combi- 
nations of simple ideas as are used to represent things subsisting by themselves. The 
ideas of relation arise from the comparison of one idea with another. Among the 
purely modal ideas belong the modifications of space, time, thought, etc. ; as also the 
idea of power. Our daily experience of alterations in external things, the observation 
that here a thing ceases to be while another comes into its place, the observation 
of the constant change of ideas in the mind, depending partly on the impressions of 
external objects, partly on our own choice, aU this leads the human understanding to 
the conclusion that the same changes which have already been observed will also con- 
tinue in the future to take place in the same objects, through the same causes and in 
the same manner ; it conceives, accordingly, in one being or object a liability to change 
in its marks, and in another the possibility of being the agent of that change, and thus 
it comes upon the idea of a power. The possibility of receiving any change is passive 
power ; that of producing it is active power. We derive the clearest idea of power 
from attending to the activities of our minds. Internal experience teaches us that by 
a mere volition we can set in motion parts of the body which were previously at rest. 
If a substance possessing a power manifests that power by an action, it is called a 

secondary qualities, and it can only confuse the reader when Locke, while seeking to demonstrate this, sanc- 
tions a mode of expression that implies the error which he aims to destroy, and creates a terminology which, 
in both the terms chosen, unnaturally blends correct insight with prejudice. As to the substance of Locke's 
investigation, it has the two special defects, that it assumes without proof the objective reaUty of extension, 
nd that the question, how sensations are connected with motions in the brain, is dismissed with an appeal to 
Gtod's omnipotence. Locke regards the eoul too much as passive in perception. The inquiry itself respecting 
the relation of sensuous perception to the objective world of things which affect the senses, in which Locke 
in large measure follows Descartes, is of fundamental interest ; its importance was appreciated by Leibniti 
and Kant, but was completely misapprehended by Hegel, who took a distorted view of the Locldan philosophy 
in general, as also of Kant's Critical Philosophy, because he confounded the distinction between being per t 
nd being as modified by our conception of it with that between the essential and the accidental in objecta- 


cause ; that which it brings to pass is called its effect. A cause is that through which 
something else begins to be ; an effect is that whose existence is due to the agency of 
something other than itself. The mind, being furnished with a great number of simpls 
ideas conveyed to it by sensation and reflection, remarks that a certain number of them 
always go together ; and since we cannot imagine that which is represented by them aa 
subsisting by itself, we accustom ourselves to suppose a substratum in which it subsists 
and from which it arises ; this substratum we call a substance. The idea of substance 
contains nothing but the supposition of an unknown something serving as a support for 
qualities. We have no clear idea of substance, nor is our idea of material substance 
more definite than our idea of spiritual substance. We have no ground for supposing 
that spiritual substances cannot exist ; yet, on the other hand, it is not inconceivable 
that God should endow matter with the power of thought. Besides complex ideas of 
single substances, the mind has also complex collective ideas of substances, such as 
army, fleet, city, world ; these collective ideas are formed by the soul through its power 
of combination. Ideas of relation arise from the comparison of several things with one 
another ; among them are the ideas of cause and effect, of relations of time and place, 
of identity and diversity, of degrees, of moral relations, etc. 

In the third book of the Essay concerning Human Understanding Locke treats of 
language, and in the fourth book of knowledge and opinion. Words are signs ; common 
names are common signs for the objects of our ideas. Truth and falsehood are, strictly 
speaking, only in judgments, and not in single ideas. The principle of contradiction, 
and others of the like kind, are usefid for the art of disputation, but not for knowledge. 
Propositions that are wholly or in part identical, are uninstructive. We know ourselves 
by internal perception and God by inference ; we infer, namely, from the fact of finite 
existence that there is a first cause of existence, and from the existence of thinking beings 
(and at least our own thinking is indubitably certain to us) that there exists a primitive 
and aai eternal thinking being. We thus know our own and God's existence with com- 
plete clearness, but our knowledge of the existence of the external world is less clear. 
Transcendrag rational knowledge is faith in divine revelations ; yet nothing can be 
regarded as a revelation which is ia contradiction with well-ascertained rational knowl- 

The utterances of Locke on ethical, pedagogical, and political questions give evidence 
of a noble and humane spirit, and they contributed essentially to the mitigation of 
many of the rigors which tradition had sanctioned. Yet Locke inconsistently denied 
freedom of conscience to Atheists, and thus himself broke the force of his philosophical 
arguments for toleration. 

Locke's philosophical importance arises chiefly from his investigation of the human 
understanding, which became the starting-point of the empirical philosophy of the 
eighteenth century in England, France, and Germany, and was victorious over Scholas- 
ticism and Cartesianism, but which was limited in its inroads in Germany chiefly by the 
Leibnitzian philosophy. Spinoza's Objectivism, which affirmed the order of thoughts 
to be directly one with the order of things, received, in Locke's inquiry concerning 
the limits of knowledge in the Subject, its necessary complement. Leibnitz, who wrote 
in reply to Locke the Nouveaux Essais sur V Entendement Humain. recognized none the 
less the importance of Locke's inquiry, although he held the examination of the human 
faculty of knowledge to be not the first problem of philosophy, on the resolution of 
which all other philosophical inquiries depend, but rather one which could not be 
treated with success until many other subjects should have been previously disposed of ; 
similar, in the post-Kantian period, was the judgment of Herbart. Kant, on the con 


trary, as the founder of the Critical Philosophy, went back to the persuasion of Locke, 
that the investigation of the origin and limits of our knowledge is of fundamental con- 
sequence for philosophy, but in the conduct of this investigation, although largely 
influenced by Locke's example, he pursued a course and arrived at results essentially 
different. Hegel assigned to the investigation of the origin of knowledge only a subor- 
dinate importance, denied, in principle, that philosophical knowledge has any limit, 
held the human reason to be essentially identical with the reason immanent in all 
reality, and sought not psychologically to discover the origin of ideas, but dialectically 
to arrive at their meaning and system ; that one should not stop with the mere defini- 
tion of single conceptions, but seek for a connection between them, was a doctrine 
approved by him, but he held the psychological investigation of the genesis of concep- 
tions in the thinking subject to be but an extrinsic substitute for the true and intrinsic 
work of philosophy, which consisted in the dialectical development of conceptions. 
Hegel's judgment would be correct if there were only agreement and not also as there 
is in essential respects discrepancy between (objective) existence and (subjective) con- 
sciousness. If agreement in this case is something to be reached by a gradual approach, 
then the critique of the human faculty of knowledge is of essential philosophical im- 
portance, and Locke is unjustly reproached with having substituted an unphilosophical 
or but slightly philosophical speculation for one truly philosophical ; but it can justly 
be said that he undertook to solve not the whole, but only a part of the problem of 
philosophy. Against the content of his theory of knowledge it has been especially 
objected (by Leibnitz and Kant) that experience does not lead to the universal and 
necessary, whence Leibnitz returned to the theory of innate ideas, and Kant taught the 
immanence in the Ego of forms of intuition and thought independent of all experience 
(or " priori''''). But it may be questioned whether that which is intended to be 
explained by these "ideas" and "forms" may not be explained in a truer and more 
satisfactory manner by the logical laws, according to which the mind arranges and 
elaborates the material given it by external and internal perception. 

Among those who developed farther the theoretical philosophy of Locke in England, 
George Berkeley (who was bom at KiUcrin, near Thomastown, in Ireland, on the 12th 
of March, 1684, appointed Bishop of Cloyne in 1734, and died at Oxford Jan. 14, 1753) 
stands in the front rank. Berkeley was the founder of a doctrine of universal Imma- 
terialism (Idealism, or Phenomenalism). He not only (after the example of Augustine 
and of Locke himself) regarded the supposition that a material world really exists as 
not strictly demonstrable, but as false. There exist, says Berkeley, only spirits and 
their functions (ideas and volitions). There are no abstract ideas ; there is, for example, 
no notion of extension without an extended body, a definite magnitude, etc. A single 
or particular notion becomes general by representing all other particular notions of the 
same kind : thus, for example, in a geometrical demonstration a given particular 
straight line represents all other straight lines. We are immediately certain of the 
existence of our thoughts. We infer also that bodies different from our ideas exist. 
But this inference is deceptive ; it is not supported by conclusive evidence, and it is 
refuted by the fact of the impossibility of explaining the co-working of substances 
completely heterogeneous. The esse of non-thinking things is percipi. God calls forth 
in us our ideas in regular order. That which we call the law of nature is in fact only the 
order of the succession of our ideas. * Of similar import, but based especially on the 

Near the end of the third dialogue between Hylas and PhUonous, Berkeley resumes the substance of his 
doctrine respecting the nature of the sensible world in the two following propositions, of which he afllrms that 
the one expresses (> correct belief of the ordinanr human mind, while the other is a scientific propodtian. The 


doctrine of Malebranche, was the teaching of Ai-thur Collier (1680-1732). CollieT 
affirms that in 170;) he had already arrived at his theory. The theory is found in an 
essay existing in MS., and written by him in the year 1708. But the detailed presenta- 
tion of it ia the Glavis Universalis appears to give evidence of a considerable influence 
of Berkeley's Principles on the author and his doctrine. Less removed from the doc- 
trine of Locke is that of Bishop Peter Brown ( The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Hu- 
vuin Understnnding, London, 1738). Among the opponents of Locke was John Norris, 
who, in his Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (1701), follows Malebranche. Colliei 
makes frequent reference to him. [Also Henry Lee, Anti- Scepticism, etc., Lond., 1703.] 

Locke's investigations were farther developed in a materialistic sense, especially by 
David Hartley (1704-1757) and Joseph Priestley, who combined with his materialism 
the Christian faith (1733-1804). 

Locke's younger contemporary, the great mathematician and physicist Isaac New 
ton (1643-1737), was less associated with specifically philosophical inquiries. His 
warning to Physics was : ' ' Beware of metaphysics ! " Newton applauds the banish- 
ment of the ' substantial forms " and ' ' occult qualities " of the Scholastics, recom- 
mends the mathematico-mechanical explanation of phenomena, and says: '' Omnis 
philosophic difficultas in eo versari videtur, ut a phmnomenis motuum investigemus vires 
natures, deinde ah his viribus demonstremus plumwmena reliqua.'''' Newton demands 
that analysis always precede synthesis ; he expresses the belief that the Cartesians have 
not sufficiently observed this order, and have thus deluded themselves with mere hypo- 
theses. The analytical method, he explains, proceeds from experiments and observa- 
tions to general conclusions ; it concludes from the compound to the simple, from 
motions to moving forces, and, in general, from effects to causes, from the particular 
causes to the more general, and so on to the most general ; the synthetic method, on 
the contrary, pronounces from an investigation of causes the phenomena which will flow 
from them. Newton censured the formation of hypotheses, but was not able altogether 
to do without them in his actual investigations. He formded on observed phenomena 
the doctrine of universal gravitation, its action being proportional to the masses and 
inversely proportional to the squares of the distances. He taught that the attraction 
of the planets toward the sun was made up of the sum of degrees of attraction exerted 
by the parts of the sun. The cause of gravitation was not investigated by Newton. 
Disciples of Newton reckoned gravity among the primary qualities of bodies ; so, for 
example, Rogerus Cotes, who says, in the preface to the second edition of Newton's 

first proposition (that which the ordinary mind correctly affirms) is that the real table, and all real, unthinking 
objects generally, are the table and the objects which we see and feel. The second (or scientific) one is, that 
what we see and feel consists entirely of phenomena, i. e., of certain qualities, such as hardness, weight, 
shape, magnitude, which inhere in our sensations, and consequently that what we see and feel is nothing but 
sensation. From the combination of these two propositions it follows that real objects are phenomena of the 
kind just mentioned, and that consequently there exists in the world nothing beside these objects, whose eirne 
is percipi, and the percipient subjects. It is, however, very questionable whether the truth of the fii-st two 
propositions does not depend upon the attribution of two different meanings to the expression : "what we see 
and feel." If by this expression we understand our sensuous perceptions themselves, then the second propo- 
sition is true, but the first not. If, on the contrary, we understand by it the transcendental objects (or things- 
in-themsclvcs), which so act upon our senses that in consequence of this action perceptions arise in us, then 
the first proposition Is true, but the second false, and it is only by a change of meaning that both are true, 
whence the syllogism is faulty on account of a '' qwUernio terminorrtm.^'' Our sensations depend upon a pre- 
vious ailection of the organs of sensation, and this afi'ection depends on the existence of intrinsically reui 
external objects. As there exist other thinking beings beside myself, the active relations between tho 
multitude of thinking beings must be rendered possible by the existence of objectively real, unthinkiDg 


Prindpia (1713), that gravity is as much one of the primary qualities of all bodies as 
extension, mobility, and impenetrability (Leibnitz censures this view, Lettred Bourguet, 
in Erdmann's edition, p. 733). Neveton himself, on the contrary, says (in the preface 
to the second edition of his Optics, 1717) that no one must suppose that he considers 
gravity as one of the essential properties of bodies ; he has simply introduced one ques- 
tion bearing on the investigation of the cause of gravity, but only a question, for he has 
not yet examined the subject in the light of experiments. The " question " alluded to is 
Qw^stio XXI. in Book III. of the Optics, in which Newton proposes, as an hypotheti- 
cal explanation of gravitation, the elasticity of the ether, which he supposes to increase 
in density as its distance from the cosmical bodies increases. Newton rejects in optics 
the theory of vibration supported by Huygens, on the ground that it is inadequate to 
explain certain phenomena, and because, in particular, if it were true, it would follow 
that light could be propagated in the same manner as sound, and consequently one 
could see as well as hear around a comer. (The answer to this objection is given by A. 
Helmholtz in his Physiol. Optik.) Yet Newton assumes that vibrations are connected 
with the material rays which are emitted from shining bodies; in particalar, such 
vibrations take place in the organs of sensation themselves. By means of them the 
forms {species) of things are conducted to the brain and into the sensorium, where the 
substance which perceives is located, and where it perceives the images of things intro- 
duced into its presence. The omnipresent God perceives things themselves directly, 
and without needing the intervention of senses; the world of things is in Him, and 
infinite space is, as it were, the sensorium of the Deity. (In this latter doctrine New- 
ton adopts Plato's teachiag concerning the extension of the world-soul through the 
whole of the world, substituting, however, with Henry More and other Platonists, God 
for the soul of the world. God cannot, according to N., be termed the soul of the 
world, because the world does not stand in the same relation to him as does the human 
body to the human soul, but is rather to him what a penes in the human sensorium is 
to man.) The proof of God's existence is found by Newton in the exquisite art and 
intelligence which are exhibited to us in the construction of the world, and particularly 
in the organism of every living being. 

Moral Philosophy, in the period succeeding the time of Locke, and chiefly owing to 
the interest excited by him, was extensively cultivated in England and Scotland. Before 
Locke's appearance as a philosophical author, his contemporary, Richard Cumberland 
(1632-1719), had already combated the doctrine of Hobbes, and founded a theory of 
morals on the basis of good-wiU, in the work : De legibus natura disquisitio philosophica, 
in qua elementa pMlosopJiim Hobbesianm quum inoralis, twn civilis considerantur el refu- 
tantur, Lond., 1672. 

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury (grandson of the elder Sh., 1671-1713), 
a friend of Locke, defined the essence of morality as consisting in the proper balancing 
of the social and selfish propensities. To be good or virtuous means to have directed 
all one's inclinations toward the good of the species or system of which one is a part. 
Morality is love of goodness for its own sake, so that the good of the system, to which 
the moral agent belongs, is the immediate object of his inclination ; there is no virtue 
in conduct regulated only by motives founded on the hope of reward or the fear of 
punishment. The pure love of goodness and virtue is independent in its origin and 
nature. It is strengthened by a religious belief in the goodness and beauty of the 
universe, and in the existence of a good and just director of the world ; but it degen- 
erates when its possessor begins to court divine favor. (The influence of Shaftesbury's 
doctrine on the Thiodicee of Leibnitz and on Kant's doctrine of the relation between 


Morals and Religion was considerable). Samuel Clarke, the divine (1675-1729), a 
disciple of Newton and Locke and defender of their doctrines especially against Leib- 
nitz, taught that the essence of virtue consisted in treating things conformably to 
their peculiar qualities (according to the "fitness of things," aptitudo rerum), so tha* 
each shall be employed in its proper place in the harmony of the universe, and so in 
conformity with the will of God. In contradistinction to Clarke and Shaftesbury, J. 
Butler (169^1752) asserted in his Sermons (1726) that moral approval or disapproval 
wa,B not determined by the preponderance of happiness or misery in the consequences 
of any action. We disapprove falsehood and injustice, says Butler, independently of 
any consideration or balancing of consequences ; man's happiness in his present state 
is not the final end to be aimed at. William WoUaston (1659-1724) laid down the prin- 
ciple that every action is good which is the expression of a true thought. Francis 
Hutcheson (bom in Lreland, 1694, and from 1729 a Professor at Glasgow, ob. 1747) 
defined moral goodness as consisting in the right relation of the various propensities 
to each other, and argued that it had its basis in a moral sense or feeling peculiar to 
man. Of the later Scottish moralists, Henry Home, the aesthetic writer (1696-1782), 
and Adam Ferguson (1724-1816), who defined virtue as the progressive development 
of human nature into spiritual perfection, are worthy of especial mention. Man is by 
nature a member of society ; his perfection consists in his being a worthy part of the 
whole to which he belongs. To esteem virtue is to love men. Thus Ferguson seeks 
to combine the principles of self -conservation (self-love), sociability (benevolence), and 
perfection (self-esteem). Adam Smith (who may be mentioned at this stage on 
account of the relation of his ethics to that of the other moralists just mentioned ; 
1723-1790), a friend of David Hume, and especially celebrated as a political econo- 
mist, is also of importance in the history of moral philosophy. He regards sympathy 
as the principle of morals (in this agreeing with Hume). Man has a natural disposi- 
tion to sympathize with the states, feeUngs, and actions of others. Whenever the 
unprejudiced spectator, reflecting on the motives of another, is able to approve his 
conduct, then that conduct is to be regarded as morally good, otherwise as morally 
faulty. The fimdamental requirement of Morals is : Act in such a manner that the 
unprejudiced observer can sympathize with thee. (Smith has rather analyzed the 
cases in which we can approve or disapprove of an action, than ascertained the ulti- 
mate grounds of sympathy or antipathy.) William Paley (1743-1805) belongs also 
among the noteworthy English Moralists. (His Principles of Moral and Political Phi- 
hsophy [London, 1785, etc.] have been translated into German by Garve, Frankf. and 
Leips., 1788.) Duty, according to Paley, implies in all cases a command issuing from 
a superior, who has attached to obedience or disobedience pleasure or pain, and the 
supreme law-giver, whose commands are the basis of duty, is God. But what is duty 
is determined by the principle of universal happiness. In order to recognize by the 
light of reason whether an action is agreeable to the wiU of God or not, we need only 
inquire whether it increases or diminishes the general happiness. Whatever is on the 
whole advantageous, is right. 

John Toland (1670-1722), originally a believer in revelation, approximated in his 
writings more and more toward Pantheism. His Letters to Seneca are accompanied 
by a Confutation of iSjnnoza, ui which he asserts the substantial diversity of soul and 
body. In his Nazarenus he terms the earliest Christians Jewish Christians, who ob- 
served the law, and were consequently similar to the later Nazarenes [Nazarieans] or 
Ebionites, who were excluded from the Church as heretics. The Gentile Christitms 
are charged with a partial introduction of their heathenish superstitions into Chri*- 


tianity. Tolaud, Anthony Collins, the free-thinker (^1676-1739), Tindal, the Ration 
alist (1656-1733), and other deists (of whom Lechler treats fully in the Oesch. des 
engl. Bewmis, Stuttg. and Tiib., 1841, and Leland in his View of the Principal Deistlcal 
Wnters) rejected the biblical Christianity of Locke, and maintained the faith founded 
on reason. 

IIY. The founder of the German philosophy of the eighteenth 
century is Gottfried Wilhehn von Leibnitz (1646-1Y16). With Des- 
cartes and Spinoza, but in opposition to Locke, Leibnitz adopts the 
dogmatic form of philosophizing, i. e., he has an immediate faith in 
the power of human thought to transcend, by the aid of perfect clear- 
ness and distinctness in its ideas, the limits of experience and attain to 
truth. But he oversteps as well the dualism of Descartes as the mon- 
ism of Spinoza through the recognition in his Monadology of a grada- 
tion of beings. Monad is the name given by Leibnitz to simple unex- 
tended substance, that is, a substance which has the power of action ; 
active force (like to the force of the strained bow) is the essence of 
substance. The monads are what may truly be called atoms ; they are 
distinguished from the atoms of Democritus, partly by the fact of 
their being only mere points, and partly by their active forces, which 
consist in ideas. The atoms of the ancients differed from one another 
in magnitude, figure, and position, but not qualitatively or in internal 
character ; the monads of Leibnitz, on the contrary, are qualitatively 
differentiated by their ideas. All monads have ideas, but the ideas of 
the different monads are of different degrees of clearness. Ideas are 
clear when they render it possible to distinguish their objects ; other- 
wise they are obscure. They are plain or distinct when they enable 
us to distinguish the parts of their objects ; otherwise they are indis- 
tinct or confused. They are adequate, finally, when they are absolute- 
ly distinct, i. 6., when through them we can cognize the ultimate or 
absolutely simple parts of their objects. God is the primitive monad, 
the primitive substance ; all other monads are its f ulgurations. God 
has none but adequate ideas. The monads which are thinking 
beings or spirits, like human souls, are capable of clear and distinct 
ideas, and can also have single adequate ideas ; as rational beings, 
they have the consciousness of themselves and of God. The souls of 
animals have sensation and memory. Every soul is a monad, for the 
power possessed by every soul to act on itself proves its substantiality, 
and all substances are monads. That which appears to us as a body is 
in reality an aggregate of many monads ; it is only in consequence of 
the confusion in our sensuous perceptions that this plurality presents 


1 itself to US as a continuous whole. Plants and minerals are, as it were, 
sleeping monads with unconscious ideas ; in plants these ideas are 
formative vital forces. Every finite monad has the clearest percep- 
tions of those parts of the universe to which it is most nearly related ; 
from its stand-point it is a mirror of the universe. To our sensuous 
apprehension the order of the monads appears as the spatial and tem- 
poral order of things ; space is the order of co-existing phenomena, 
and time is the order of the succession of phenomena. The succes- 
sion of ideas in each monad is determined by an immanent causal- 
ity ; the monads have no windows through which to receive in influ- 
ences from without. On the other hand, the variation in the relations 
of monads to each other, their motion, combination, and separation, 
depend on purely mechanical causes. But between the succession of 
ideas and the motions of the monad there subsists a harmony pre-de- 
' termined (pre-established) by God. The soul and body of man agree, 
like two clocks, originally set together and moving at exactly the same 
rate. The existing world is the best of all possible worlds. The 
moral world, or the divinely governed kingdom of spirits, is in con- 
stant harmony with the physical world. Christian Wolf (1679-1754), 
adopting the theories of Leibnitz, combined them with ideas derived 
particularly from Aristotle, modified them partially, systematized 
them, and provided them with demonstrations, whereby he founded a 
comprehensive system of philosophy. The Leibnitzo-AVolfian philoso- 
phy became more and more spread over Germany during the eigh- 
teenth century until Kant's time, and in connection with other philoso- 
phemes, especially those of Locke, ruled the schools and subserved the 
ends of popular enlightenment. 

Of the philosophical writings of Leibnitz, excepting his earliest dissertations (De principio individui, 
Leipsic, 1663, republished with a critical introduction by G. E. Guhrauer, Berlin, 1837 ; Specimen qucestio- 
ntim philosopMcarum ex jure collectarvm, ib., 1664; Tractattis de arte combinaioria, cut subnexa est demon- 
stratio existeniUe Dei ad math, certititdinem exacta, Leips., 1666, Frankf. on the M., 1690), only the Theodt- 
cee (Amst., 1710, etc., in Lat., Cologne, 1716, Frankf., 1719, etc., in C^erman, with Fontenelle's Eloge, Hanover, 
1720, etc., German transl. by Gottsched, 5th ed., Han. and Leips., 1763) appeared during his lifetime as an 
Independent work ; all the more numerous, however, were the papers which Leibnitz published, from the 
year 1684 on, in the journal begun by Otto Mencken in the year 1682 : Acta ErudUwum Lipsien.'Hum, 
and, from 1691 on, in the Journal des Savans. The correspondence of Leibnitz was very extensive, and in it 
he developed many sides of his doctiine, which, in the works published by him, had not been discussed. 
Soon after his death various letters and papers, till then unprinted, were pubUsheil, in particular : A Collection 
of papers, which passed between the laie learned ifr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in the years 1715 and 1716, relating 
to the principlf^ of natural philosophy and religion, by Sam. Clarke, London, 1717 ; the same in French " 
Recueil de direrses piices sur la philomphie, la religion, etc., par Mr. Leibnitz, Clarke, Newton (par del 
Maizeatix), Arast., 1719, 2. 6d. 1740, and in German, with a preface by Wolf, ed. by Joh. Heinr. Kiililer, 
Frankf., 1720. LeihnUii otium Hannoveranum sive Miscellanea G. W. Leibnitii, ed. Joach. Fr. Feller, Lcipa. 
1718, and as a second collection: Monumenta varia inedita, Leips., 1724. In the journal, "L'Europe Sa- 
vanie," Nov. 1718, Art. vi., p. 101 soq., was first published the essay (written probably in 1714): Principe* 


de la nature et dela grAce, fondes en raison, which was afterwards included by Des Maizeaux, in 1719, ia 
the decond volume of the Recueil above named, and by Dutens, in 1768, in the collection which will be men- 
tioned below. With this essay is not to be confounded L.'b sketeh of his system, which he wrote for Prince 
Eugene of Savoy, in 1T14, and which was first published, in a Grman translation by Joh. Heinr. Kohiet, 
under the title : De-i Iltriu GuUfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz Lehrsiltze ilberdie Monadologie, imgleichen von GoU, 
seiner Existejiz, seinen Eigenschaften, und von der Seeledes Menschen, Frankfort, 1720 (new edition by J. C. 
Huth, ib. 1740) ; the same sketeh, taunslated from German into Latin, was pnnted in the Act. Erud., Suppl., 
vol. vii., Leips., 1721, and again, with comments and remarks by Mich. Gottl. Hansche, at Frankf . and Leips., 
1728, and in Dutens' collection, under the title : Principia philusophice seu ilieses in gratiam ftrincipis Eugenii 
coTVscriptCB, The original French text was first published by Erdmann, from the MS. preserved in the Eoyal 
Library at Hanover, in his edition of L.'s Opera Philosop/iica, 1840. Leibnitii epist. ad diversos, ed. Chr. 
KorthoU, Leips., 1734-42. Commercium epistolicum Leibnitianum ed. Joh. Dan. Gruber, Han. and Gott, 
1745, as an introduction to which Gruber had published in 1737 a Prodromus commei'cii epistolid Leibniti- 
ani, consisting of the correspondence between Boineburg and Couring, which contains many statements con- 
cerning L."s education and youthful writings. (Euvres philosophiques latUies etfran(;aiscs defeu Mr. Leibniz, 
tirees de ses nuimiscrits qui se conservent daiis la bibliothique royale d IIa7inov7'e. et publiees par R. E. 
Raspe, avec une preface de Kdstner, Amst. and Leips., 1765 ; the same in German, with additions and notee 
by J. H. F. Ulrich, Halle, 1778-80. Of especial importance among the contents of this collection of Raspe's are 
the previously unpublished iVouceaMa; fes.fais ?ir Centendement humain, an extended polemical work against 
Locke, written in 1704 ; this collection contains further : Remargues sur le sentiment du P. Malebranche qui 
parte que nous voyotis tout en Lieu, cmicemant rexamen que Mr. Locke en a fait ; Dialogus de connexione 
inler res et verba ; Dijiicultaies qttcedam logica : Discours touchant la methode de la certitude et tart d'inven- 
ter ; Historia et commentatio characteristics universalis, quce simul sit ars inveniendi. Soon after the publi- 
cation of this collection followed the Dutens edition of Leibnitz' works which, however, did not include the 
pieces published by Raspe : Gothofredi Guilielmi Leibnitii opera omnia, nunc primum collecta, in classe* 
distributa, prcefationibus et indicibus ornata studio Ludovici Dutens, torn. VI., Geneva. 1768, vol. I. : Opera 
theologica, II. : Log., Melaph., Phys. gener., Chym., Medic, Botan., ffistor. natur., Artes, III. : Opera 
mathematica, IV. : Philos. in genere et opuscula Sinenses attingentia, V. : Opera philologica, VI. : Philolo- 
gicorum continual, et collectanea etymologica. Several pubUcations complementary to the above have since 
been made : Commercii epistolici Leibnitiani typis nondum evulgati selecta specitnina, ed. J. G. H. Feder, 
Hanov., 1805. Leibnitii systema theologicum (written in a conciliatory spirit, perhaps about the year 1686X 
with a French translation, fir.st published at Paris in 1819, in Lat. and Germ., 2d ed., Mayence, 1820, in Lat. 
and Germ, by Carl Haas, Tubingen, 1860. Leibnitz' German writings have been edited by G. E. Guhrauer, 
Berlin, 1838-40. A new complete edition of L.'s philosophical writings has been set on foot by Joh. Ed. Erd- 
mann, in which much unedited matter from MSS. in the Royal Library at Hanover is included, together 
with notices concerning the date of particular letters, shorter treatises and works : Godofr. Guil. Leibnitii 
opera philos. qum exstant Latina, Gallica, Germanica omnia, Berlin, 1840. (Euvres de Leibniz, nouvelle 
edition, par M. A. Jacques, 2 vols., Paris, 1842. A complete edition of aU of the vmtings of Leibnitz haa 
been begun by Georg Heinrich Pertz: first series. Hist., Vols. I. -IV., Hanover, 1843-47; second series, Phi- 
los., Vol. I. : Correspondence between Leibnitz, Amauld, and the Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, 
edited from the MSS. of the R. Libr. at Hanover by C. L. Grotefend, Hanover, 1846 ; third series. Math., 
ed. by C. J. Gerhardt, Vols. I.-VII., Berlin and (from Vol. III. on) Halle, 1849-63. The mathematical works 
also contain considerable philosophical matter, e. g., in Vol. V. : In Euclidis npuira., and in Vol. VII. : Iniiia 
rerum mathematicarum metaphysica. Gerhardt also published in 1846 the short work, written by L. not 
long before his death : Historia et origo calculi differentialis. The Refutation inedite de Spinoza par Leib- 
niz, cited above (in the literature relating to Spinoza), has been published by A. Fouoher de Careil in Lettrea 
et opiiscules inedits de Leibniz, Paris, 1851-57. The same editor is now publishing the CEuvres de Leibniz 
publiees pour la pr.fois d''apris les ni.scr. originaux, Paris, 1859 seq., 2d ed.. Vol. I. seq., 1867 seq. (Vols. I. 
and II. : Lettres de L., Bossuet, Pelisson, Molanus et Spinola, Ulricli, etc., pour la reunion des protestants 
et des catholiques ; Vols. III. and IV. : Historical and political writings ; Vol. V. : Plan of an Egyptian expe- 
dition; Vol. VI., Par. 1865: Minor polit. writings). The correspondence between Leibnitz and Christian 
Wolf has been edited by C. J. Gerhardt, HaUe, 1860. A selection of the shorter philos. papers, translated 
into German and accompanied with introductions, has been published under the direction of Gustav Schil 
Ung, and bearing the title : L. als Denker, Leips., 1863. A new edition of works by Leibnitz, based on his 
remains in MS. in the R. Libr. at Hanover, has been started by Onno KJopp, Hanover, 1864, seq. (first 
series: Hist. -polit. and poUt. writings, Vols. I.-IV., 1864-66). A recent publication is the (Euvres pkiloso- 
phiqties de L., avec une introduction et des notes, pur P. Janet, 2 vols., Paris and St. Cloud, 1866. 

With respect to the history of the philosophical development of Leibnitz, the most instruction is to be 
derived from hiB own utterances, especially as contained in the introduction to his Sptcimena Pacidii (Op. 
jifi., ed. Erdm. p. 91), and in letters to Remoud de Montfort and others. Of his life, writings, and doctrin* 


tttjat in particular : Jo. Geo. von Eckhart (Leibnitz's secretary and afterwards his colleague in preparing th 
hi-^riography of the House of Brunswick), whose biographical notices were first published by Von Murr in 
the Journal zur Kutistgegc/i. it. allg. lAtt., VII., Nuremberg, 1779, but which, communicated to Fontenelle in 
MS., were employed by the latter in preparing his Eloge de Mr. de Leibniz (read in the Paris Acad, of 
Sciences, 1717, printed in the Hist, de Facad. dea sc. de Pans and in the collection of Eloges by Fontenelle ; 
published in German translation by Eckhart in the German cd. of the Thiodicee of the year 1720, and, with 
notes by Baring, in the edition of 17.35 ; cf. Schleiermacher, Ueber Lobreden im AUgemeinen und die Fonte- 
nelle'ache auf Leibniz insbesondere, in Schleiermacher's Wa-ke, III., 3, p. 66seq.). Elogium Leibnitii (by 
Chr. Wolf, based on reports by Eckhart), in the AcUi Erud., July, 1717, to which, in 1718, there appeared in 
the " Otium Hannoveranum" a " Suppleinentum viUe Lelbn. in actis erud." by Feller. Jlistoire de la vie et 
des ouvrages de Mr. Leibniz par iS.. L. de Neufville (Jancourt), in the Amsterdam edition of the Tfieodicee, 
1734. Karl Gunther Ludovici, Aii^Uhrlicher Eatwurf einer vollstandigen historie der Leibnizi.<ichen Philo- 
tophie, Leipsic, 17.37. Lamprecht, Leben den Hemi von L., Berlin. 17-10, translated into Italian and 
enlarged with notes relating especially to L.'s sojourn in Rome in 1089, by Joseph Barsotti. Geschichte dea 
Herm von L., atts Oarn Prang, des Hitters von Jancourt, Leips., 1757. Eloge de Z-., gut a remporte le prix 
de Facad. de Berlin, par Bailly, Bcrl., 1769. Lobsc/irift auf Gottfr. Willi. Freih. v. L. in der K. deutschen 
Oes. zu OiJttingen vorget. von Abr. Gotthelf Kastner, Altenburg, 1709. Mich. Hissman, Versuch iiber das 
Leben i.'s, Miinster, 1783. Also Uehberg, in the JJannoverscfie Magazla for 1787, and Eberhard, in the Pan- 
theon der Deutschen, II., 1795, have presented accounts of the lite of Leibnitz. In more recent times Edward 
Guhrauer has furnished a full biography : O. W. Freih. v. L., 2 vols., Breslau, 18-12, with additions, 1846; in 
English by Mackie, Boston, 1845. Cf., among others, several addresses and papers by Boeckh {Ueber Leibnie 
. d. deutschen Akademien, uber L.^8 Ansichten von der philologischen Kritik, iiber L. in s. Verhdltniss zur 
positiven Theol., etc., in Boeckh's Kl. Schr., hrsg. v. Ferd. Ascherson, Vol. II., Leipsic, 1859, and Vol. III., 
ib., 1866), Trendelenburg (in the MojuUsber. der Akad. der Wiss. and in Tr.'s Ilist. Beitr. zur Philos., VoL 
II., Berlin, 1855, and Vol. III., ib., 1867), Onno Klopp (Das Verhdltniss von L. zu deti kirchl. Heunionsver- 
mcAen in der zweiten Hdlfte des 17. Jahrh., in the Zeitschr. des hist. Vereins filr Niedersachsen, 1860 ; 
Leibn. als Stifter gelehrter Oesellschajten, Vortrag bei der Philologen- Versammlung zu Hannover, G^itt., 
1864 ; X.'s Plan zur Griindung einer Societdt der Wiss. in Wien, in the Archiv filr Kunde osterreich. Ge- 
schi/:hisquellen, and also published separately, Vienna, 1868 ; Z.'s Vorschlag einer fra7iz. E:tpedition nach 
Aegypten, Hanover, 1864; the works relating to this subject have been edited by Foucher de Careil, in 
(Euvres de L. : Projet (Texpedition d'Egypte, present^ par L. it Louis XIV., Paris, 1864, and Klopp, Han- 
over, 1864), and K. G. Blumstengel (i.'i dgyptischer Plan, Leipsic, 1869). 

Works on the Leibnitzian doctrine are in aidition to the larger historical works, in which this is dis- 
cussed, and among which the presentations of Erdmann ( Versuch einer wiss. Darsiellung der Gesch. der neu- 
esren Philosophie, Vol. II., Part 2d : Leibniz u. die Entwickelung des Idealismus vor Kant, Leip.sic, 1842) and 
of Kuno Fischer ( Gesch. der neueTm Philosophie, Vol. II. : Leibniz u. seine Schule, 9d revised edition, Heidel- 
berg, 1867) deserve especial mention the following : Ludwig Feuerbach, Darstellung, Entwicklung und 
Kritik der L.''schen Philosophie, Ansbach, 1837, 2d Ed., 1844; Nourrifson, La philosophie de L., Paris, 1860, 
and many earlier and more recent works, which treat of single phases of the Leibnitzian philosophy, such as ; 
Georg Bemhard Bilfinger, Comm. de harmonia animi et corporis humani pne.'stabilita, ex mente Leibnitii, 
Frkf., 172.3, 2ded., 1735, De origine et permissione mali, prcecipue moralis, Frkf., 1724. Fr. Ch. Baumeister, 
Hist. doctriiuB de optima mundo, Gorlitz. 1741. G. Ploucquet, Primaria monadologice capita, Berl., 1748. 
De Justi, Diss, qui a remporte le prix proposl par Facad. des sc. de Prusse sur le s-ystime des monades, 
Berl., 1748. (Reinhard), Diss, qui a remporte leprixprop. par Facad. des sc. de Prusse sur Foptimisme, Berl., 
17.55. Kant, Ueber den OptimUtmus, Kdnigsbcrg, 1759 (with which, however, should be compared Kant's 
later work on the Failure of all Attempts to found a Theodicy, written from the critical stand-point). Ancil- 
lon, Essai sur Fesprit du Leibn Itianisme, in the Transactions of the ph. cl. of the Acad, of Sciences, Berlin, 
1816. Maine de Biran, Exposition de la doctrine philos. de L., composie pour la Biographie U?iiverselle, 
Paris, 1819. H. C. W. Sigwart, Die L.''sche Lehre von der prdstabilirten Harmonie in ihretn Zusammen- 
hange mil frUheren Philosophemen betrachtet, Tubingen, 1822. G. E. Guhrauer, Leibnitii doctrina de 
uniime aninue et corporis (In&ug. Diss.), Berlin, 1837. Karl Moritz Kahle, L.'s vinculum substanttale, Ber- 
lin, 1839. G. Hartensteinii comnientatio de materite apud Leibnitium notione et ad monadas relatione (on 
the occasion of the celebration of the 21st of June, 1846, the second centennial anniversary of the birth of 
Leibnitz), Leipsic, 1846. R. Zimmermann, L. und Herbart, eine Vergleichung ihrer Mo7iadologien, Vienna, 
1849; Das Rechtsprincip bei L., Vienna, 1852: Ueber L.''s Conreptualismus, ib., 1854 (from the Reports of the 
Vienna Academy). F. B. Kvet, .' Logik ; L. und Comenius, lYague, 1857. C. A. Thilo treats of the 
religious philosophy of L. in the Zeitschr. f. ex. Philos., VoL V., 1864, pp. 167-204. Trendelenburg, Ueber 
L.'s Entwurf einer allgemein. Charakteristik, and Veber das Element der Dejinition in L.'s Philosophie, In 
ihe Papers of the Berlin Acail. of Sa, and in Vol. III. of Tr.'s Hist. Beitr. zur Philos., Berlin, 1867, pp. 1-4? 
and 48-62. Emile Saiaset Discours s^tr la philos. de L., Paris, 1857. A. Foucher de Careil, L., la pkiloi. 



juive ei la cahbale, Paris, 1861 ; Z., Descartes et Spinoza, <wec. un rapport par Victor Cousin, Paris, 1863 
J. Bonifas, Ettide sttr la theodicee de L., Paris, 1863. Oscar Svahn, Akad. Ahh. iiber die Monadenlehre, 
Lund, 1863. Hugo Sommer, De doctrina, quam de harmonia prce-tlabiliUt Leibnitius propon., Guttingen, 

1866. Dan. Jacoby, De Leibiiitii studiis Arlitoteleics {inent iiieditam Leibnilianum. Inaug. Dissert.), Berl., 

1867. A. PicWer, Die Tlieologie des Leibnitz, Munich, 1869. Jos. Durdik, Leibii. u. Xewtou, HaUe, 1869. 
Otto Caspari, Leibniz'' Philosophie, Leipsic, 1870. 

Concerning L. and the Leibnitzian school, with special reference to Kant's Critique, W. L. G. Frhr. von 
Eberstein, a disciple of Leibnitz, treats in his Vermch einer Oeschichte der Logik und Metaphysik bei den 
Deutschen ton Leibnitzbis auf diegegenwartige Zeit, Halle, 1794-99. 

On the earlier period in the history of the fortunes of the Leibnitzian philosophy compare the above-cited 
(p. 95) work by C. G. Ludovici: Au.%fAhrliher Entwurf einer vollstiindigen Historie der LeUmUzischen 
Philosophie, 2d ed., Leips., 1737, and also the Sammlung und Auszilge der sdmmthchen Streitschnften 
wegen der Wolff'schen Philosophie (Leips., 1737), and Neueste MerkwiirdigkeUen der Leibnitz- WolfTschen 
Philosophie (Leips., 1738), by the same author ; and on the period extending till near the end of the 18th 
century cf. the prize essays which will be again referred to below, and which relate especially to the contest 
between Leibnitzianism and Kantianism by Joh. Christoph Schwab, C. L. Reinhold, and Joh. Heinr. Abicht, 
on the question, and published under the title : Welche Fartschritte hat die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens wid 
WolfTs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht ? Berlin, 1796. Besides the discussions of the subject in works specially 
relating to the history of philosophy, many of the histories of the national literature of Germany may be 
consulted in reference to the relation of i)hilosophy in the 18th century to general culture, and also especially 
Schlosser's Gesch. des 18 Jahrhunderts, and Frank's Gesch. der protest. Theologie (2d Part, Leips., 1865), 
and other similar works. 

On the life of Christian Wolff compare Joh. Chr. Gottsched, Histor. Lobschrift auf Christian Freiherm 
von Wolff, Halle, 1755, and others ; an autobiography of W. was published by Wuttke at Leipsic iu 1841. Ed. 
Zeller writes of W.'s expulsion from HaUe in the Preuss. Jahrb. X., 1862, p. 47 seq., reprinted in Zeller'a 
Vortr. u. Abh. ge^ckichtlichen Inhalts, Leips., 1865, pp. 108-139. 

Moses Mendelssohn, Briefe fiber die Empfiudungen, Berlin, 1755 ; Abh. iiber die Ecidenz i7i den meta- 
physischen Wlsse?ischaften, Berlin, 1764, 2. Aufl. 1786 ; PhUdon Oder Tiber die Unsterblichkeit der Seele (a 
modernization of the Phado of Plato), BerUn, 1767, etc. ; Jerusalem Oder iiber religiose Macht und Juden- 
thum, Berlin, 1783; Morgenstunden Oder iiber das Dasein Qottes, Berlin, 1785, etc. ; Mos. Mend, an die 
Freunde Lesswgs, Berlin, 1786 (in reply to F. H. Jacobi's work, " L'eber die Lehre des Spinoza," in which it 
was asserted that Lessing was a Spinozist), and other works. His complete works were pubUshed by his 
grandson, George Benjamin M., in 7 vols., Leipsic, 1843-45. On his philosophical and religious principles 
Kayserling has written (Leips., 1856); on his attitude with reference to Chri-stianity, C. Avenfeld (Erlangen, 
1867) ; on his place in the history of .Esthetics, Gustav Kanngies8er(Frankfurt on the M., 1868) ; on his Ufe, 
his works, and his influence on modem Judaism, Moses Schwab (Pari.s, 1868) ; cf. also the article by R. Q. 
(Quiibicker?) on Moses 3fe?idelssohn und die deutsrlie Aufklarungsphilos. des 18. Jahrh., in G^lzer'a 
Monatsbl. fur innere Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1869. 

On Lessing and his times compare, in addition to works akeady cited, ad 115 and 117, especially the 
works on the Ufe and works of Lessing by Danzel and Guhrauer (Leips., 1850-54), and Adolf Stahr (Berlin, 
1859). [English translation of Stahr's Lessing by E. P. Evans, Boston (Spencer), 2 vols., 1866; cf. J. R. 
LoweU, in the North Am. Review, Vol. 104, April, 1867, pp. 541-585. T/-.] Cf. also Sohwarz, Gotthold 
Ephraini Lessing als Theolog dargestellt, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Tlieuing. im 18 Jahrh., HaUe, 1854; 
Rob. Zimmermann, Leibniz und Lessing (from the Reports of the Vienna Acad, of Sciences), Vienna, 1855 ; 
Eberhard Zimgiebl, Der Jacobt-MendelssohTi'sche Streit iiber Lessing'' s Spinozi67nus {Inaug.-Diss.), Munich, 
1861 ; Joh. Jacoby, Lessing der Philosoph, Berlin, 1863, and. in reply to Jacoby, Lessing's Christenthuyn und 
Philosophie (anonymous publication), Berlin, 1863 ; Wilh. DUthey, Ueber Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, in the 
Preuss. Jahrb. Vol. 19, Nos. 2 and 3, 1867 ; Constantin Bossier, Neue Le-ising-Studien : die Erziehung dea 
Menschengeschlechts, in the Preuss. Jahrb., XX., 3, Sept., 1867 ; WUh. Dilthey, Zur Seelenioandemngslehre 
Lessing's, ib., October, 1867 ; E. Fontanes, Le Christianisme modeme, etude sur Lessing, Paris, 1867 ; J. F. 
T. Gravemann, Ueber Lessing's Laokoon (Promotionsschrift), Rostock, 1867. 

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (Lubeniecz) was bom at Leipsic on the 21st of June 
(old style ; = July tst, new style), 1646. His father, Friedrich L., a jurist, and from 
1640 on Professor of Jloral Philosophy at Leipsic, died in 1652. At the Nicolai School 
and at the University of Leipsic, which he entered at Easter in 1661, Jacob Thomasiua 
(bom at Leipsic in 1622, ob., 1684, father of Christian Thomasius, the celebrated 
jurist and legal philosopher), who was versed especially in the history of ancient 


philosophy, was the most distinguished professor. Without holding Aristotle and the 
Scholastics, as also Plato and Plotinus, in low estimation, he yet found more complete 
satisfaction in Descartes ; but at a later period he borrowed more from the former. 
Leibnitz defended, in May, 1663, under the presidency of Jacob Thomasius, a disquisi- 
tion wTritten by him on the principle of individuation {Be princlpCo i/idividui), in which 
he had declared for the nominalistic doctrine. In the summer of 1663 he studied at 
Jena, devoting his attention especially to mathematics under Erhard Weigel. Toward 
the end of the year 1664 appeared at Leipsic his Speeimen difficidtatls in jure seu quaa- 
tiones pJulosapJiic<B amamiores ex jure coUectce^ and in 1666 his Ars combinatoria. The 
degree of a doctor of law, which he sought to obtain at Leipsic in 1666, was denied 
him at that time on account of his youth ; in order not to g^ve him the precedence 
before older suitors for the doctorate and for the right therewith connected to positions 
as assessors, he was put off for a later graduation ; but the degree was given him at 
Altdorf, where, on the 5th of November, 1666, he defended his thesis, entitled De 
casibus perplexis in jure ; in this paper he demands that, where the positive laws are 
indefinite, decisions be made according to the principles of natural justice. Having 
no inclination for the work of an academical instructor, which he might have entered 
upon at Altdorf, he sought in the next succeeding period farther to educate himself by 
intercourse with distinguished scholars and statesmen. In Nuremberg he came in 
contact with alchemists. Of greatest importance for him was his association with 
Baron Johann Christian von Boineburg, who up to the year 1664 had been first privy 
councillor (minister) of Johann Philipp, Elector of Mayence, and still possessed great 
influence. Leibnitz dedicated to the Elector the work (written by him during the 
journey from Leipsic to Altdorf in 1666, and) entitled : MetJwdus nova discendcB docen- 
dceque jurisprudeMia, cum subjuncto catalogo desideratm'um in jurisprudentia, Frank., 
1667. In the Catalogus Desideratorum he followed the lead of Bacon in the De Aug- 
mentis Scientiaru7n. A treatise against Atheism, composed by Leibnitz in 1668, ap- 
peared under the title : Confessio naturcB contra atheistas, with Spizelius' Epistola ad 
Ant. Reiserum de eradicando atheismo^ Augsburg, 1669. With Herm. Andreas Lasser, 
councillor at Mayence, Leibnitz labored in 1668 and '69, for the improvement of the 
Corpus Juris. At the instance of Boineburg, Leibnitz prepared a new edition of 
Nizolius' De Veris Principiis et Vera Ratione pJdlosopJiandi contra pseudo-phOosopJios 
(Parma, 1553, see above, 3, p. 11), with notes and essays (in particular, a Diss, de 
stilo pJiilosopJiico Marii Nizolii), which was printed at Frankfort in 1670 and in 1674. 
By Boineburg, who, himself a Protestant convert to Catholicism, had been active at 
Kome as early as 1660 for a reunion of the Protestants with the Catholics, Leibnitz, 
during his stay at Mayence, had already been induced to favor the efforts for reunion, 
in which Royas de Spinola {ob. 1695) was especially zealous, but it was not till later 
that Leibnitz took an important part in them. At the wish of Boineburg, Leibnitz 
wrote in 1669 his Defensio Trinitatis per nova reperta logica contra epistdam Ariani, in 
which he sought rather to refute the arguments of Wissowatius, the Socinian, than to 
develop a positive counter-proof. In the summer of 1670, L. became a councillor in 
the superior court of revision, the highest tribunal of the Electorate. In March, 1672, 
he commenced a journey to Paris and London. He went to London in 1673, and 
returned in March of the same year to Paris, where he tarried until October, 1676, a 
part of the time as the tutor of Boineburg's son. In the year 1676, while in Paris, L. 
received from Duke Johann Friedrich von Braunschweig-Liineburg and Hanover an 
appointment as librarian at Hanover. He jovimeyed from Paris by way of London and 
Amsterdam to Hanover, where in December, 1676, he entered upon the duties of hii 


oflBce. Among the scholars with whom his sojourn abroad brought him into commu 
nication the most important were, at Paris, Amauld, the Cartesian; Huygens, the 
Dutch mathematician and physicist ; Tschimhausen, the German mathematician and 
logician, through whom he became acquainted with some of the philosophical doctrines 
gf Spinoza, and provided that Tsch. did really communicate to him Newton's letter 
of Dec. 10, 1672, to Collins concerning Barrow's method with tangents with mathe- 
matical theorems of Newton relative to the calculus of Auctions ; and, at London, 
Oldenburg, secretary of the Academy of Sciences, also a friend of Spinoza, Boyle the 
chemist, and Collins the mathematician (whom he first saw, however, only in 1676). 
Through Oldenburg's intervention Leibnitz also exchanged letters with Newton, who 
was then in Cambridge. On the occasion of his passage through Holland, Leibnitz 
visited Spinoza, with whom he had already corresponded, in October, 1671, concerning 
an optical question. During his first residence at Paris, in the year 1672, Leibnitz 
laid before Louis XIV. his plan for the conquest of Egypt, whereby the power of 
France was to be increased, but at the same time the attention of France was to be 
diverted from German affairs, and also the power of the Turks, which was still by no 
means inconsiderable, was to be broken. A short sketch of this plan (which originated 
with Boineburg) was sent to Paris towards the end of the year 1671, drawn up by 
Leibnitz, under the title : Specimen demonstratiotiis poUticce : de eo, qiiod Francice 
intersit imprcesentiarum seu de optimo consilio, qxu>d potentissimo Begi dari potest ; con- 
duditur eafpeditio in HoUandiam Orientis seu ^gyptum (published by Onno Klopp in 
his edition of the works of Leibnitz, 1st series. Vol. II., p. 100 seq.) ; this was followed 
by L. 's principal work respecting this matter : De expeditione ^gyptiaca regi Francice 
proponenda justa dissertatio, and by the more concise presentation of the same views in 
the Consilium ^gyptiacuin. (Of the "' Justa Dissertatio " the English ministry procured 
in 1799 a copy from Hanover, and an abstract oi it was published in an English pam- 
phlet in 1803 ; of the Consilium ^gyptiaeum, the French General Mortier caused a 
copy to be given him at Hanover in 1803, and sent it to Paris, from which it was 
copied into Guhrauer's '^Kurmaim in der Epoclie von 1672 ; " parts of the larger memo- 
rial were published by Foucher de Careil in Vol. V. of his edition, but the whole was 
first published by Onno Klopp, in his ed. of works of Leibnitz, in 1864). 

Newton had, in 1665 and 1666, been in possession of the "Arithmetic of Flux- 
ions," discovered and so named by him, and had soon afterwards communicated it, in its 
fundamental features and in its application to the problem of tangents, to a few indi- 
viduals. This he did partly through an opuscule written by him in 1671, and partly 
and especially through a letter to J. CoUins, dated Dec. 10, 1672. But he first pub- 
lished the theory in his Principia matfiematica philosophicB, which was finished in 1686, 
and appeared in print in 1687. In the year 1676 Leibnitz (perhaps not altogether inde- 
pendently of suggestions derived from Newton) had developed his ' ' Differential calcu- 
lus," which agreed in substance with Newton's Calculus of Fluxions, but was more per- 
fect in form ; he published his discovery first in Nov. , 1684, in the ^'Acta Eruditorum,^'' in 
a paper entitled Nova Methodus pro maximis et minimis. With Newton as well as with 
Leibnitz the problem was, substantially, to determine the Umiting value to which the 
ratio of the increments of two variable quantities, of which the one is dependent on or is a 
' ' function " of the other, constantly approaches, the smaller these increments become, and 
conversely (in the so-caUed " Integral Calculus "), when this limiting value is given, to 
conclude backwards to the nature of the dependence of the one quantity on the other. 
Newton termed the constantly changing quantities flowing (fluentes) quantities; to the 
infinitesimal differences he gave the name of momenta (or '^ principia jam^ am nascentia 


finitarum magnitudinum), and to the limiting values of the ratios of the variations 
{'^ prima Tia^ceiitiumproportio^^) the nmnie of " iluxions." Leibnitz called the differ- 
ence of two successive values of a variable quantity, when these differences were con- 
ceived as iutinitely small or vanishing (decreasing in infinitum), differentials, and the 
limiting value, which the relation between the differences of the one quantity and those 
of the other constantly approaches, when these differences are infinitely small, the dif- 
ferential quotient. By a letter of Newton's to Oldenburg, dated June 13th, 1070, 
Leibnitz learned that Newton had discovered a method of solving certain mathematical 
problems, and wrote, on the 37th of August in the same year, that he, too, had done 
the same thing; he then received, through a communication from Newton, dated Octo- 
ber 24th, more definite information respecting several analytical discoveries made by 
the latter, together with an intimation respecting the fluxional calculus through an 
anagram of the sentence : ^^ data cequatione quotcunque fiuentes quantitates involvente 
fluxiones invenire et vice versa.^'' Leibnitz thereupon, in a letter to Newton dated Jxine 
21st, 1077 (and sent through Oldenburg), communicated to him his method, not merely 
by intimation, but in detail, and remarked that this method might perhaps agree with 
that intimated by Newton (" arbitror quoB cdare voluit Newtonus de tangentibus ducen- 
dis, ab his non abludere '). On the publication of his method in the Act. Erud., 1684, 
Leibnitz did not mention this correspondence, but Newton, who had not replied to the 
last letter of Leibnitz, mentioned it in 1687 in a Scholium to Book II., Sect. II., Lem- 
ma II. (p. 253 seq. ; 2d ed., p. 226 seq.), of his " Principia^^ (which, however, he sup- 
pressed in the third edition, of the year 1726, and replaced by another, relative to his 
letter to J. CoULns, of Dec. 10, 1672, because the first Scholion had been otherwise in- 
terpreted by Leibnitz than Newton wished it to be understood). He says in this scho- 
lion, that in reply to his communication of the fact that he was in possession of a 
method for determining Maxima and Minima, drawing tangents, etc., even when the 
equations contained irrational expressions, Leibnitz answered that he had fallen upon a 
like method [one accomplishing the same results], and had communicated it to him, 
and that in fact it was but slightly different from his [Newton's] . (When and how 
Leibnitz discovered his method, Newton here leaves undetermined. Leibnitz thought 
himself authorized in regarding the Scholium as containing a recognition of the inde- 
pendence of his own discovery, which interpretation Newton, at a later period, disal- 
lowed. ) In the sequel there arose a controversy as to which first made the discovery, 
Newton or Leibnitz. The controversy was decided in favor of Newton by a committee 
appointed by the Royal Academy of Sciences, whose report was read on the 24th of 
April, 1713, and published in the same year. This decision was partly just, and partly 
unjust. It was just, in so far as the two methods are identical, since Newton actually 
made his discovery before Leibnitz, while Leibnitz, not, perhaps, altogether indepen- 
dently of Newton, made the same discovery again after Newton, and only preceded him 
in gi\'ing the method to the public. But the decision was unjust, in so far as the 
methods are not identical, the method of Leibnitz being more perfect and finished 
than that of Newton ; in particular, the terminology adopted by Leibnitz ia more per- 
tinent to the subjects in hand and better adapted for use than Newton's, while the 
most fruitful development of the fundamental idea of the method was discovered, not 
by Newton, but partly by Leibnitz, and partly by the brothers Jacob and Johann Bar- 
douiUi (with especial reference to transcendent functions), who adopted Leibnitz* 
method. (The germs of this idea were contained in the ' ' method of exhaustion ** 
employed by the ancients, in Cavallieri's "Method of Indivisibilia " [1635], in Fer- 
mat's method for determining the maxima and m inim a of ordinatea which sufficed ia 


the case of rational expressions in Wallis' ''Arithmetica Infaiitorum" with the study 
of which Newton's own investigations began, and in Barrow's method with tangents). 
Such, in substance, has been the judgment of Euler, Lagrange, Laplace, Biot, and 
other mathematicians (cf., among other sources, the brief collection of their opinions 
in the appendix to the German translation of Brewster's Life of Newton, Leipsic, 1833, 
pp. 333-336) ; Biot says : " The Differential Calculus would still be a wonderful crea- 
tion, if we merely possessed the fluxional calculus, in the form in which it is exposed 
in Newton's works." (Cf. Montucla, Gesch. der Math. III. p. 109; C. J. Gerhardt, Die 
Entdeckimg der Differentialrechnung, Halle, 1848, Die Entdeckung der Mheren Analysis, 
Halle, 1855 ; H.Weissenbom, Die Principien der hoheren Analysis, als hM.-krit. Beitrag 
zur Gesch. der Math. , Halle, 1856 ; H. Sloman, Z.'s Anspruch auf die Erfindting der Dif- 
fer entialrechnung , Leipsic, 1857 ; the same in English, London, 1860.) To Leibnitz be- 
longs the glory of an ingenious and relatively independent discovery, subsequent to that 
of Newton, but to which his own earlier investigations respecting series of differences 
were also influential in leading him, and which conducted him to a form of the Infini 
tesimal Calculus materially superior to that discovered by Newton. But in casting on 
Newton the suspicion of plagiarism, he conducted the priority controversy (which ii\ 
itself, in the interest of historical truth, was necessaiy and unobjectionable), in the later 
period of that controversy, with means which scarcely admit of excuse. 

At Hanover Leibnitz was charged with the superiutendence of the ducal library, 
and was commissioned to write the history of the family of the reigning prince ; sub- 
sequently (1691 seq.) he was also charged by Anton Ulrich of Braunschweig -Wolf en- 
biittel with the superintendence of the Wolfenbiittel Library. From 1678 on, he was, 
in his quality of ducal Hofrath, and afterwards in that of privy councillor of justice, a 
member of the office of justice {Kanzlei fur Jmtizsachen), over which the Vice-Chan- 
ceUor Ludolph Hugo presided. Commissioned by Dnke Ernst August, who in 1679 
succeeded his brother Johann Friedrich in the government, Leibnitz, in a journey 
undertaken in the years 1687-90 through Germany and Italy (which led him in 1688 
to Vienna, and in 1689 to Rome), instituted researches relative to the history of the 
House of Braunschweig-Liineburg. He published, among other things, the following 
compOations : Codex juris gentium diploniaticus, with an appended Mantissa, 1693- 
1700, Aocessiones Historicce, 1698, Scriptores rerum Brunsoicensium iUustrationi inservi- 
entes, 1701-11, and he labored on the work (never fully completed, first published by 
Pertz) : Annates Brunsvicenses. Leibnitz was also engaged in the transactions relative 
to the elevation of Hanover to the rank of an Electorate (1692). As their counsellor 
and friend Leibiritz was personally intimate with Dukes Johann Friedrich and 
Ernst August ; he was less so with the son and successor (in 1698) of Ernst August, 
Georg Ludwig, but more so with his mother {ob. 1714), the Princess Sophie (a 
daughter of Friedrich V. of the Palatinate and sister of the Princess Elizabeth, to 
whom Descartes dedicated his Princ. Ph.) ; her daughter Sophie Charlotte {ob. 1705), 
who revered in Leibnitz her teacher, entered with the fullest and for himself the most 
stimulating sympathy into his philosophico-theological speculations, even after her 
marriage (in 1684) with Frederick of Brandenburg (who became in 1688 Elector 
Frederick III., and in 1701 King Frederick I. of Prussia). Supported by her influ- 
ence, Leibnitz induced the latter to found (on the 11th of June, 1700) the Society of 
Sciences at Berlin (which afterwards, on the occasion of its being remodelled under 
Friedrich II. in 1744, was designated as the Academy of Sciences). (Cf. Christian 
Bartholmess, Ilistoire philosophique de Vacademie de Prusse depuis Leibn., Paris, 1850- 
51 ; Adolf Trendelenbvirg, Leibn. und die pfiilos. Thdtigkeit der Akademie im vorigen 


Jahrkundert {akad. Vortrag), Berlin, 1852, Art. VIII. in the 2d vol. of Tr.'s Hist. 
Bc4tr. zur PIdLs.). Leibnitz also sought, but without immediate result, to found 
Academies ut Dresden and Vienna. Nothing was accomplished by the efforts, which 
were zealously made iu the last decennia of the 17th century, to bring about a reunion 
of the Protestant and Cathohc Churches, and ia which, on the part of the Protestants, 
Leibnitz and Molanus, the Hanoverian theologian, and, on the part of the Catholics, 
Spinola, in the beginning, took part. Spinola employed in this connection, as a dog- 
matic basis, the ^'Exposition de la Fm^'''' written by Bossuet in 1G76; Leibnitz wrote 
(probably about the year 1686), with conciliatory intent, the '^ St/ste/na Theologicum" 
(first published in 1819), attempting to present the doctrines of faith in a manner 
which Protestants as well as Catholics could accept. With reference to this subject, Leib- 
nitz corresponded (in 1691 and 1G92) with Pelisson, the Huguenot converted to Catholi- 
cism, and with Bossuet, who sought for a reunion through the return of the Protestants 
to Catholicism, and repudiated the idea of it under any other form ; Bossuet's refusal to 
treat the question, whether the Tridentine Council was an Qicumenical Council, as an 
open question, frustrated the efforts of Leibnitz. In the years 1697-1706 Leibnitz took 
part in negotiations, which were carried on particidarly between Hanover and Berlin, 
relative to a union of the Lutheran and Reformed confessions, but with Uttle immediate 
result. The philosophical and theological doubts expressed by Bayle in his Dictionnaire 
and other works, concerning which Leibnitz had often conversed with Queen Sophie 
Charlotte, led Leibnitz to the pubUcation, in 1710, of his Essais de Thiodicie sur la 
bonte de Dieu, la liberie de Vhojnme et Vangine du mal^ preceded by a Discours de la con- 
fonnite de la foi avec la raison^ directed against Bayle's doctrine, that the teachings of 
faith were incompatible with those of reason. In the year 1711 Leibnitz met Peter 
the Great of Russia, at Torgau, as also again in 1712 at Carlsbad, and in 1716 at Pyr- 
mont and Herrenhausen. This monarch esteemed Leibnitz highly, appointed him a 
privy councillor of justice, and called upon him for advice concerning the best means for 
promoting the advancement of science and civilization in Russia. Leibnitz also ori- 
ginated the idea of founding an Academy of Sciences at St. Petersburg, which, how- 
ever, did not take place till after Peter's death. Leibnitz lived in Vienna from 
December, 1712, till the end of August, 1714. On the 2d of January, 1712, he was 
appointed an Imperial Councillor, having still earlier (before 1692, perhaps in 1690) 
been elevated into the ranks of the nobility ; he is said also to have received the dig- 
nity of a baron of the empire. (Joseph Bergmann, Leibniz in Wien, in the Transac- 
tions of the Vienna Academy, pMl.-hist. Class. XIII., 1854, pp. 40-61 ; L. als ReicJis- 
hofrath und dessen Besoldimg, ib. XXVI., 1858, pp. 187-204.) In 1714, while residing 
at Vienna, Leibnitz wrote for Prince Eugene of Savoy, in French, the summary of his 
system, which was first published after his death (first in German, by Kohler, with the 
title : L.^s Lehrsiltze iiber die Mo/iadolvgie, etc., see above). Leibnitz returned to Han- 
over in September, 1714. He found the Elector Georg Ludwig no longer there, he 
having already gone to England, where he ascended the throne as George I. Leibnitz 
worked in 1715 and 1716 mainly on his Anncdes Bninsvicenses. In the same yeara 
Leibnitz became involved in a controversy (carried on by letter, through the agency of 
the Princess of Wales, WUhelmine Charlotte of Ansbach, who held the TModicee of 
Leibnitz in especial admiration) with Clarke, a disciple of Newton and partly also of 
Locke, respecting the fundamental doctrines of his philosophy, before the close 
of which he died, November 14, 1716. 

Leibnitz never developed his philosophical doctrine in complete systematic order ; a 
summary of it is given in the exposition of his monadology, which he prejjared at tha 


request of Prince Eugene of Savoy. In his own mind it was only by a gradual devel- 
opment that his system assumed definite form, and he likewise deemed it advisable, in 
those papers of his which were destined for publicity, to separate himself only gradu- 
ally, in ideas and terminology, from the schools of philosophy then dominant, the Aris- 
totelian and the Cartesian. 

In a letter, of the year 1714, to Remond de Montmort (in Erdman'a edition of the 
Philos. Works, p. 701 seq. ) Leibnitz relates the following concerning his philosophical 
development : " After I had left the lower school, I fell in with the modem philoso- 
phers, and I remember walking alone in a little piece of woods called the Rosenthal, 
near Leipsic, at the age of fifteen years, in order to deliberate with myself, whether I 
should adhere to the doctrine of substantial forms. The doctrine of Mechanism won 
finally the upper hand with me and conducted me to mathematics. But when I came 
to seek for the ultimate grounds of Mechanism and of the laws of motion, I turned 
back to metaphysics and the theory of entelechies, and from the material to the for- 
mal, and at last I conceived, after having many times revised and farther developed 
my conceptions, that the monads or simple substances were the only real substances, 
and that material things were merely phenomena, but phenomena having their good 
and proper foundation, and connected with each other." (Cf. the letter to Thomas 
Burnet of May 8 (18), 1697, in Guhrauer (see above) I., Supplement, p. 29 : " Za plupart 
de mes sentiments ont ite enfin arriUes apresune diUbiratioii de 20 ans" (hence from 
about 1660 to 1680), " car fai commence Men jeune a miditer et je n'' avals pas encore 
15 ans que je we promenais des joumees entieres dans un bais pour piendre parti en- 
tre Aristote et Democrite. Cependant fai changi et recJiange sur de nouveUes Imnieres, et 
ce n'est que depuis environ 12 ar^s" {i. e., since about 1685) '^ que je me trouve satis- 

Leibnitz says that he wholly despises only that whose object is pure deception, 
like the astrological art of divination, but that he finds even in the LuUian art some 
things worthy of respect and serviceable. Truth, he holds, is more widely possessed 
than is generally supposed ; the majority of sects are right in a great part of their 
afiBrmations, but not in the most of their negations. Teleologists and Mechanists are 
both right in the positive part of their assertions ; for although mechanical laws are 
universal in their spheres of operation, they serve to realize ends. It is possible, says 
Leibnitz, to remark a progress in philosophical knowledge. The Orientals had beautiful 
and sublime ideas of Deity. The Greeks added reasoning and, in general, the scientific 
form. The Church Fathers removed the evil which they found in the Greek philoso- 
phy ; whUe the Scholastics sought to make the true in it serviceable to Christianity. 
The philosophy of Descartes is, as it were, the ante-chamber of the truth ; he per- 
ceived that in nature the quantum of force is constant ; had he also known that its aggre- 
gate direction remains unchanged, he would necessarily have been led to the system of 
pre-estabUshed harmony {ap. Erdm. p. 702, cf. pp. 133 and 108). Yet, adds Leibnitz 
modestly in reply to a playful question, whether he himself thought to lead man out 
of the ante-chamber into the cabinet of nature between the ante-chamber and the 
cabinet is situated the audience-chamber, and it will be sufiicient if we obtain 
audience, without pretending to enter into the interior {''sans pretendre de pinetrer 
dans rinterieur, Erdmann, XXXV., p. 123; similarly, though with a different turn, 
runs the well-known expression of Haller, which became the subject of Goethe's 
persiflage: Iros Innere der Natur dringt kein erscMffner Oeist "No created spirit 
penetrates into the interior of nature "). 

In the " Disputatio metapJiysica deprincipio individui" Leibnitz affirms the nominal- 


istic thesis : omne individuum sun tota entitate uidividuatur, as the first supporters of 
which he names Petrus Aureolus, and Durandus (see Vol. I., 105, p. 465 seq.). Were 
the entitas tota not the principle of individuation, then this principle must either be 
negation or a positio, and in the latter case either a physical part more especially deter- 
mining the essence, namely : existence, or a metaphysical part, more especially deter- 
mining the species, namely : the Juecceitas. That the individualizing principle is a 
negation oan, as Leibnitz rightly remarks, only be assumed on the ground of the realis- 
tic postulate that the universal has more of being than the singular (universale magis 
esse ens, quam singuhire). (In reality, the dictum of Spinoza : omnis determinatio est 
negatio, presupposes that being, in the most complete sense, is predicable of substance, 
which is the most universal thing.) Leibnitz, however, convinced that the individuum 
is an ens positivum, declares it impossible to conceive how it can be constituted by any- 
thing negative. Negation cannot produce the individual marks {negatio non potest pro- 
ducer e accidentia individualia) . The opinion that existence is the principle of indivi- 
duality either agrees with the thesis, that the entitas is that principle (namely, when 
the distinction between essentia and existentia is regarded as only a rational distinction, 
in which sense Leibnitz interprets the doctrine of Scherzer, his teacher), or it leads 
(namely, when the distinction is regarded as a real one) to the absurd supposition that 
existence is separable from essence, so that the latter must exist even after the re- 
moval of existence. Leibnitz examines finally the hcecceitas, which Scotus (Sent., II., 
3, 6, et al.) affirmed as the principle in question, and to the defence of which the 
Scotists were accustomed to bind themselves by oath. To the assertion, that the 
species is " contracted " into the individual by the differentia individualis or Iwcceitas, 
as the genus into the species by the specific difference, Leibnitz opposes the nominalis- 
tic doctrine, that the genus is not contracted by arything into the species, nor the 
species into the individual, because genus and species are nothing outside of the intel- 
lect ; there exist in reality only individuals ; whatever exists is by its very existence 
individual. Among the contents of the Corollaries, appended by Leibnitz to his Dis- 
sertation, the psychological thesis is especially noticeable, in which he confesses his 
adhesion to the early Scholastic modification of the Aristotelian doctrine that the Jf ous 
alone, as a substance, is separable from the body, and to the doctrine that the sensi- 
tive and also (what Descartes denied) the vegetative soul belong to the same soul to 
which the thinking power belongs {hominis solum una est anima, qum vegctativam et 
sensitivam virtualiter indudnt). This doctrine had received the official sanction of the 
Catholic church most distinctly at the Council of Vienne, in 1311 but was rejected 
by many of the Nominalists. Not uninteresting is also the philological thesis, by which 
it is held that the letters ascribed to Phalaris are spurious. 

In the philosophical works of the next succeeding period in the Uf e of Leibnitz, the 
Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria, the Cojifessio Naturce contra Atheistas (so entitled by 
Spizelius), the Epistola ad Jacobum Tfurmasium which, together with the Diss, de 
Stilo philosophico Nizolii, is prefixed to the edition of the work of Nizolius, entitled, De 
Veris Principiis et Vera Batione Philos(^handi- Leibnitz declares himself for the 
opinion, in which the reformers of philosophy. Bacon, Hobbes, Gassendi, Descartes, 
and others, in opposition to the Scholastics, aU agreed, that the only attributes of 
, bodies are magnitude, figure, and motion, and that they contain no occult qualities or 
forces, nor anything incapable of a purely mechanical explanation. Yet he refuses to 
be caUed for this reason a Cartesian ; he holds that the Aristotelian physics containa 
more truths than the Cartesian ; that what Aristotle teaches concerning matter, form, 
privation, nature, place, infini ty, time, and motion, is, for the most part, immovably 


established ; that Aristotle was right in looking for the ultimate ground of all motion 
in the divine mind ; that the existence or non-existence of vacant space is uncertain ; 
that by the substantial form only the difference of the substance of one body from the 
substance of another body is to be understood ; and that Aristotle's abstract statements 
respecting matter, form, and motion can be interpreted ia a way which accords with 
modem teachings respecting bodies. Leibnitz approves in Nizolius his war on Scholas- 
ticism, which, owing to the lack of experience and of mathematical knowledge, was 
iinable to comprehend nature, but censures his opijosition to Aristotle himself as being 
carried too far, as also his extreme nomiaalistic doctrine, that the genus is only a col- 
lection of individuals by which doctrine the possibility of scientific demonstration or 
the basis of universal propositions is destroyed, and only induction, as the mere colla- 
tion of similar experiences, is left remaining as an organon of method. 

The autographic manuscript, De Vita Beata, published by Erdmann, contains Car- 
tesian doctrines, taken especially from letters written by Descartes in the year 1645 to 
Princess Elizabeth of the Palatinate, concerrung the moral philosophy of Seneca (see 
Trendelenburg, HiM. Beitr. zur Philos.^ II., 1855, Art. 5, pp. 192-333). In Ethics, 
Leibnitz conceded to Descartes higher authority than in Physics. Yet it is doubtful 
whether and to what extent Leibnitz adopted the doctrines cited from Descartes, or 
whether he merely brought them together as Cartesian opinions (as in the case of his 
excerpts from Plato, Spinoza, and others). 

In the Meditationes de Cognitione Ventate et Idm, which were published in 1684 in 
the Acta Eruditorum Lipsiensiuvi^ Leibnitz presents modified Cartesian conceptions. 
Knowledge (pognitio) is either obscure or clear {vd obscura, vel clara) ; clear knowledge 
may be either confused or distinct {vd ccnfusa^ vd distincta), and distinct knowledge 
either inadequate or adequate {vel inadaquata, vel admquata), and also symbolic or 
intuitive ; knowledge which is adequate and also intuitive is the most perfect know- 
ledere. Leibnitz here defines these terms as follows : "A notion is obscure when it is 
impossible for us to recognize what it represents, whence a proposition is obscure into 
which such a notion enters ; my knowledge is clear, therefore, when I have the means 
of recognizing what my notions represent. It is confused when I am unable and dis- 
tinct when I am able to enumerate separately the marks which suffice to distinguish 
the thing represented from other things, provided that the thing possess such marks 
and elements into which the notion of it may be resolved ; such enumeration is nom- 
inal definition ; distinct knowledge of an indefinable notion is possible, when that 
notion is primitive or is its own mark. Knowledge is adequate when everything 
which enters into a distinct conception is again distinctly known, or when the analysis 
is carried to the very end. When a notion has been rightly formed, we are not able to 
think all the elementary notions which enter into it at once ; but when this is possible, 
or in so far as it is possible. I term our knowledge tntiiitive." Leibnitz makes an ap- 
plication of these definitions to the ontological argument for the existence of God, in 
its following (Cartesian) form : "Whatever follows from the definition of anything can 
be predicated of this thing ; existence follows from the definition of God as the most 
perfect being, than whom no greater can be conceived {Ens perfectusimum vel qva 
ma^ns cogitari nan potest, for existence is a perfection) ; therefore, existence can be 
predicated of God. He argues that it only follows that God exists, provided that his 
existence be possible ; for the inference from definition presupposes that the defini- 
tion is a " real " definition, i. e. , that it involves no contradiction ; the nominal defini- 
tion, namely, contains only the distinguishing marks, while the real definition estab- 
lishes the possibility of the thing defined ; this possibility is known a priori if al/ 



the predicates are compatible with each other, i. e., if a complete analysis discloses no 
contradiction between them. But no such contradiction is possible in the idea of God, 
because this idea includes only realities. * 

Leibnitz warns against the misuse of the Cartesian principle, that whatever we 
clearly and distinctly perceive concerning anything is true, and may be predicated 
concerning it {quidqitid dare et distincte de re aUgrm percipio, id est verwn sou de 
ea enunciabile) ; often that appears to us as clear and distinct, which is obscure and 
confused ; the principle in question is then only sufficient, when the criteria of clear- 
ness and distinctness above laid down have been applied, and when the ideas involve no 
contradiction and the propositions have been made certain according to the rules of 
the ordinary (Aristotelian) logic, by exact observation and faultless demonstra- 
tion, f 

Leibnitz believed it possible to reduce all thinking to reckoning, and all correctness 
in the conduct of thought to correctness in reckoning, if there could be found for the 
simplest ideas and for the modes of combining them signs as adequate as those employed 
in mathematics, and, especially, as those introduced by Vieta in his method of represent- 
ing all numbers by letters (Vieta, In Artetn Analytimm Isagoge seu Algebra Nova, 1635, 
which contains, p. 8, the following affirmation : logistiee numerosa est, quce per numeros, 
speciosa, qucf per species seu rerwn farmas exhibetur, xitpote per alphabetica dementa, see 
Trendelenburg, Uist. Beitr., III., p. 6). This was the object of the plan elaborated 
by Leibnitz in his early years, defended by him in his later years, and which he mentions 
in many of his works and letters of a Character istlca Universalis {Specieuse genirale), 
which, however, remained a mere project. (What Leibnitz intended, to what extent, in 
particular,he followed George Dalgam's Ars signorum,v^ulgo character universalis et lingua 
phUosophica, London, 1661, and also John Wilkins' Essay toward a Real, Clmract&r and 
a Philosophical Language, London, 1668, how far his own numerous but sporadic and 
hesitating attempts conducted him, what was accomplished towards the partial execution 
of the project of Leibnitz on the basis, however, of the Kantian doctrine of oategories 
by Ludwig Benedict Trede, the author of an anonymous work, published at Hamburg, 
in 1811, and entitled : "Yorschldge zu einer nothvoendigen Sprachlekre,'''' all this is shown 

* But the categorical inference from definition takes not merely the possibility, but the reality of the 
object defined for granted ; the definition only shows the necessity of our connecting the predicate with the 
subject, not that of supposing the subject to exist, and it leads, therefore, by itself to a hypothetical conclu- 
sion, which only then, when the reality and not merely the possibility of the subject has been otherwise de- 
monstrated, passes over into a categorical conclusion. Kant justly disputed the correctness of the Cartesian 
argument, together with that of the Leibnitzian addition to it. 

+ Leibnitz correctly observes that the criterion of truth which is found in the clearness and distinctness 
of our knowledge cannot be applied without great danger of self-deception, and that it must be reduced to 
that other criterion which is founded on the necessities of thought, which are controlled by the norms of logric. 
Yet here, too, he does not go far enough, since he expects from complete clearness, distinctness, and logical 
correctness, complete and immediate agreement of the idea vrith the reality, or of thought with being, and does 
not inquire whether and to what extent human knowledge contains elements of a subjective character, which 
all the clearness and logical correctness of thought directed solely to the Object can never remove, and which 
cannot be separated from the objectively vaUd elements, but can only be known in their subjective character 
through thought directed to knowledge itself a condition which Kant, at a later epoch, undertook to meet by 
his critique of the reason ; supposing the separation of the subjective from the objective elements effected, it 
would then remain to inquire, whether by the aid of it the question, how and what things are in themselves, 
is susceptible of a gradual, positive solution which Kant held to be impossible and in case the afllrmative 
should prove true the criterion of clearness and logical correctness would acquire new significance and au- 
thority, not in a dogmatic sense, or as dispensing with criticism, but in a sense implying criticism as an antece- 
dent step. Cf. my Art. : Der IdealUimxis, ReaiUmua, und IdecUrealismus, in the Zeitschr.f. Ph., new aerie^ 
Vol. 34, 19, p. 63 seq. 


by Trendelenburg in the paper above cited. Whatever of truth is contained in the fun- 
damental idea of this plan is realized in the signs of mathematics, chemistry, etc. ) 

To the collection of public acts and treaties, published by Leibnitz at Hanover, in 
1693, and entitled, " Codex juris gentium diplomaticus,'''' Leibnitz prefixed a number of 
definitions of ethical and juridical conceptions. The controverted question, whether 
there was such a thing as disinterested love {am&r Tion mercenarius^ ab omni utilitatis 
resfiectu separatus), he seeks to answer by the definition of love as delight in the happi- 
ness of others {cvmare sive diligere est felieiUxte alterius delectari), in which definition, on 
the one hand, the element of personal satisfaction is not lost sight of, and, on the other 
hand, the source of this satisfaction is found in the happiness of others (which latter 
qualification is wanting in the definition of Spinoza : " Love is joy accompanied by the 
idea of its external cause.") Love is a passion which must be guided by reason, in 
order that justice may grow from it. Leibnitz defines benevolence as the habit (habi- 
tus) of loving or esteeming (a habit or ability, e|i5, arising from the frequent exercise 
of the faculty, hvvafxis, according to the AristoteHan terminology, see above. Vol. I. , 
50). Charity {caritas) is universal benevolence. Justice is the charity of the wise, i. 
e. , which follows the dictates of wisdom. The good man is he who loves all men, so 
far as reason permits ; justice is the virtue which controls this love. Leibnitz distin- 
guishes three degrees of natural justice : strict justice {jus strictum), in commutative 
justice {justitia commutativa), equity, or love in the narrower sense of the word {aqui- 
tas vel angtcstiore vocis sensu caritas), in distributive justice {justitia distributiva), and 
piety or probity {pietas vd probitas) which is universal justice {justitia universalis). 
Commutative justice, says Leibnitz, following Aristotle (see above. Vol. I., 50), re- 
spects only those differences among men which arise from commercial intercourse {gum 
ex ipso negotio nascuntur), and considers men in other respects as equal to each other. 
Distributive justice takes the deserts of individuals into consideration, in order, accord- 
ing to the measure of the same, to determine the reward (or punishment) due. Strict 
justice may be enforced ; it sen/es for the prevention of injurious acts and the mainte- 
nance of peace ; but equity or love, in distributive justice, aims also at the positive 
furtherance of happiness, though only of earthly happiness. Submission to tht. eternal 
laws of the divine monarchy is justice in the universal sense, in which (according to 
Aristotle) it includes all virtues in itself. Leibnitz attempts also (as he had also done 
in his Method of Jurisprudence) to reduce ^'m5 strictum, (pquitas, and pietas to the three 
principles of justice expressed by the phrases : neminem ladere, suum cuique tribuere, 
hoiieste vivere, or : Injure no one, give to each his due, and live honestly. In this inter- 
pretation Leibnitz was controlled more by his own conception of justice than by that 
of the Roman jurists. 

The philosophical system of Leibnitz is founded on the fundamental belief, that the 
theologico-teleological and physico-mechanical conceptions of the world should not 
exclude each other, but should be in all cases united. The particular phenomena Oi.' 
nature can and must be mechanically explained, but we should not, at the same time, 
be unmindful of their designs, which Providence is able to accomplish by the very use 
of mechanical means ; the principles of physics and mechanics themselves depend on 
the direction of a supreme intelligence, and can only be explained when we take into 
consideration this intelligence ; the true principles of physics must be deduced from 
the divine perfections ; thus must piety be combined with reason. By way of illustra- 
tion, Leibnitz concludes from the divine wisdom, that order in the causes will be fol- 
lowed by order in the effects, and hence that continuous variations in ihe given 
eonditions wUl be followed by continuous variations in whatever depends on those ccm- 


ditions. (He says, for example : Lorsque la difference de deux cos pent etre diminuee au 
dessoii^i de toute grandeur donnee, in datis ou duns ce qui est pose, il fnut qrCfXLe se puisst 
trouver aitssi diminuee au dessous de toute f/randeur donnee dans ce qui en resulte.) This 
is the "law of continuity," which Leibnitz first laid down in a letter to Bayle, in the 
NouveUcs de la Ilepublique des Lettres, par Bayle, Amst. , 1(587. Leibnitz admits that in 
" thinj^s composed" a slight variation sometimes produces a very great eflFect ; but 
affirms that this cannot be so in the case of principles or simple things, since otherwise 
nature could not be the work of infinite wisdom. (Yet even in the field of mathe- 
matics it is possible for a quantity, which depends on a continuously variable one, in 
certain cases to vary discontinuously at particular times. ) Between all the principal 
divisions of beings {e. g., between plants and animals), there must exist a continuous 
series of intermediate beings, whereby the ' ' con nexion- gradudle " of species is secured. 
''Everything goes by steps in nature, and nothing by leaps ; this law of change is 
a part of my law of continuity." {Nouv. Ess., IV., 16, ed. Erdm. p. 392). 

The doctrine of monads (which term was not employed by Leibnitz before 1697, and 
was probably borrowed from Giordano Bruno) and of pre-established harmony was first 
communicated by Leibnitz to a number of individuals, in particular to Amauld, in 
letters written in and after 1686, and most distinctly in one dated Venice, March 23, 
1690. It was made public in the different articles in the Journal des Savatis and the 
Acta Eruditorum Lipsiensium. Already in a mathematical paper, which appeared in 
the Acta Erud., 1686 {Brevis demonstratio erroris memorabilis Cartesii et aUorum circa 
legem naturce, secundum quam volunt a Deo eandem semper quantitatem m^tus con- 
servari), and afterwards in the Specimen dynamicum pro admirandis naturce Ugibus 
circa corporum vires et mutuas actiones detegendis et ad suas causas revocandis (published 
in 1695), Leibnitz had sought to demonstrate his assertion, that not, as Descartes 
taught, the quantity of motion, but rather the quantity of force which is determined, 
not by the product of the mass and the velocity (m x v), but by that of the mass and the 
square of the velocity (m x v'-') remains unchanged in the univerge. From this Leibnitz 
concludes, that the nature of corporeal objects cannot consist in mere extension, as 
Descartes supposed, nor as Leibnitz himself, wnth Gassendi and others, had at an 
earlier time believed, and in the letter to Jac. Thomasius in 1669 still affirmed in 
extension and impenetrability alone, but that it involves also the power of action. The 
doctrine of mere passivity could easily lead to the (theological or anti-theological) opin- 
ion of Spinoza, that God is the only substance. (Of. Leibn. Epist. d^ rebus philosophicis 
ad Fred. Hoffmann, 1669, in Erdm.'s edition, p. 161 : Pulchre notas^ in mere passico 
nullam esse matus redpiendi retinendique Jiabilitatem, et ademta rebus vi agendi, non 
posse eas a divina substantia distingui incidique in Spinosismum.) But on the other 
hand, in proportion as matter was regarded not as merely extended, but as endowed 
with force, i. e., in proportion as the Cartesian dualism between merely extended and 
merely thinking substance was removed, Spinoza's (psychological and) fundamental 
conception of the substantial unity of body and soul was rendered plausible. Leibnitz 
would have been obliged, in this respect, to assent to Spinoza's doctrine, if it had been 
possible for him to retain the belief that there exist extended substances. But he held 
that the divisibility of matter proved that it was an aggregate of substances ; that 
there can be no smallest indivisible bodies or atoms, because these must still be 
extended and would therefore be aggregates of substances ; that the real substances, 
of which bodies consist, are indivisible, cannot be generated, and are indestructible 
(that they exist only by creation, and perish only by annihilation, according as God 
wills their creation or annihilation) and in a certain respect similar to souls, which 


Leibnitz likewise considers as indivisible substances. The indivisible, xinextended Bub. 
stances were termed by Leibnitz (from 1697 on) monads. He said : Spinoza would be 
right, if there were no monads. {Lettre II. a Mr. Bourguet^ in Erdmann's edition, p. 
720 : De la manUre queje definis perception et appetit, ilfaut que toutes les monades en 
ioient douees. Car perception m'est la representation de la multitude dans le simple., et 
Vappetit est la tendance d'une perception d une autre ; or ces deux clwses sont dans toutes 
les monades, car autrement une monade n'aurait aucun rapport au reste des choses. Je 
ne sais comment vous pouvez en tirer quelque Spinosisme ; au contraire c'est justement 
par ces monades que le Spinosisme est detruit. Car Uy a autant de substances verita^les 
et pour ainsi dire de viiroirs vivans de Vunivers toujours subsistans au d'univers concentres 
qu'il y a de monades., au lieu que., selon Spinosa, U riy a qiCuneseule substance,. 11 aurait 
raison, sHl n'y avait point de monades et alors tout, hors de Dieu, serait passager, etc.) 

Li the paper entitled Systeme nouveau de la nature {Journal des Savans, 1695, in 
Erdmann's ed. of the Philos. Works, XXXVI., p. 124) Leibnitz professes after long 
meditations finally to have convinced himself that it is impossible to find the grounds 
of a true unity in matter alone, or in that which is only passive, since there every- 
thing, in infinitum, is but a conglomeration of parts. Since the composite exists there 
must also exist simple substances, which as true unities cannot be material, but only 
formal atoms, as it were "metaphysical points" {Syst. nouv. de la nature, Op. Ph., 
ed. Erdm., p. 126), which are exact points, like mathematical points, but not, like the 
latter, mere '' madalites,'''' but points possessing a real, independent existence {points d4 
substaiice). (Leibnitz early taught that the soul was a simple substance, being led to 
that assumption by the Cartesian doctrine of the seat of the soul. In a letter to Duke 
Joh. Friedr. of Brunswick, dated May 21, 1671, he writes that the mind must be lo- 
cated at a place, where aU the motions, which are impressed upon us by the objects of 
sensation, meet together, and hence at a single point ; if we assign to the mind a 
greater place we must ascribe to it partes extra partes, and it can therefore "not re- 
flect upon all its parts and actions. " It was at a later epoch, however, probably first in 
1685, that Leibnitz advanced to the analysis of matter into simple substances, having 
the nature of mere points.) 

The true unities or simple substances must be defined by the aid of the conception 
of force. (In teaching this Leibnitz followed partially Glisson an English physician, 
and the author of a Tractatus de natura s^tbstantice energetica seu de vita natures, Lon- 
don, 1672, in which motion, instinct, and ideas are attributed to all substances and 
English Platonists, such as More and Cudworth, the latter of whom assumed the exis- 
tence of a " plastic force "). Active force {vis activa) is (as Leibnitz says in the paper, 
De prinuB philosopliicB emendatione et de notione suistantiw, in Act. Erud., 1694) inter- 
mediate between mere capacity of action and action itself ; the mere capacity needs to 
be positively stimulated from without, while active force needs only to have all hin- 
drances removed in order that an action may be produced, just as the tightened string of 
the bow needs only to be loosed in order that it may manifest its force. In the Prin- 
cipes de la nature et de la grace, fondes en raison (written about 1714), in Erdmann's 
ed., p. 714, Leibnitz defines substance as being which is capable of action {La substance 
est un etre capable d^ action). Yet there is also in every finite monad a passive side, 
which Leibnitz calls viateria prima (in distinction from the aggregate or mass, called 
materia secunda) ; God alone is pure actuality {actus purics), free from all potentiality. 
Passivity manifests itself as force of resistance {antitypia), on which the impenetrabil- 
ity of the mass depends {Op. Ph., ed. Erdm., pp. 157, 678). If it is by the aid of the 
conception of force that we must conceive aU substances, it follows, says Leibnitz in 


the Syst. Ncniv., that they must contain something analogous to feeling and appetite 
{quelque chose (fanalogique au sentiment et d rappetit) ; the notion of substances must 
be formed ' ' in imitation of the notion which we have of souls. " Every substance has 
perceptions and tendencies to new perceptions. Each carries in itself the law of tho 
continuation of the series of its operations {legem c&ntinuationis seriei suarxim operntio- 
num,. Letter to Amauld, 1690, Erdmann, p. 107). Every substance possesses a repre- 
sentative nature ; each one is a representative of the imiverse ; but in some substances 
t.hiR representation is more distinct than in others, and in each it is most distinct with 
reference to those things to which each is most nearly related, and less distinct with 
reference to other things {Prindpes de la nature et de la grace, 3 seq. , Erdmann, p. 714 
seq.). He who should know perfectly one monad would in it know the world, whose 
mirror (miroir) it is ; the monad itself knows only that which it clearly represents. 
Every monad, therefore, represents the universe according to its peculiar point of view 
{selon son point de Tue ; les points inathematiques sont leur point de mie, pour exprimer 
Vunivers). By this all monads and all complexes of monads are differentiated from 
one another ; there axe not in the universe two objects perfectly alike ; things qualita- 
tively indistinguishable are absolutely identical (principium identitatis indiscernibUium, 
Monad., 9, etpass.). On this fact, that every monad from its stand-point reflects the 
universe, is founded the harmony established among all the monads from the beginning 
by God their creator (harmonia prcestabilita). Each of them reflects clearly but the 
smallest part of the universe ; the greater part of it is reflected in representations 
["perceptions"], which, though obscure, are really present and active. (Says Leib- 
nitz: C est aussi par lea perceptions insensibles que f expligue cette admirable harmonie 
preetablie de Vdme et du corps et meme de toutes les monades ou substances simples, qui 
supplee d Vinjluence insoutenable des uns sur les autres, Nouv. Ess., Erdm., p. 197 

Through the theory of monads the dissimilarity of nature, which, according to Des- 
cartes, subsisted between body and soul, was removed by the conception of an uninter- 
rupted scale of perceiving substances. This doctrine of Leibnitz occupies an interme- 
diate position between the dualism of Descartes and the monism of Spinoza. Says 
Leibnitz, supporting himself on the authority of the principle of continuity : There is 
an infinite number of degrees between any motion, however slight, and complete rest ; 
between hardness and absolute, completely unresisting fluidity; between God and 
nothing. So also there are iimumerable degrees between any activity and pure pas- 
sivity. Consequently it is not reasonable to assume the existence of one active princi- 
ple, the universal spirit (soul of the world), and one passive principle, namely, matter 
{Considerations sur la doctrine d'un esprit universd, 1702, 0pp. Ph., ed. Erdm., p. 182). 
The scale of beings descends from God, the primitive monad, down to the lowest monad 
{Epist. ad Bierlingium, 1711, Erdmann, p. 678 ; cf. Prindpes de la, nature et de la grdce, 
4, Erdmann, p. 714 eeq.). Yet, notwithstanding this denial by him of dualism, Leibnitz 
does not teach that there is a natural interaction between different monads, and, in 
particular, between body and soul ; for the succession of perceptions in the soul cannot 
modify the mechanical movements of the body, nor can the latter interfere with or 
change the succession of perceptions. It is not possible, says Leibnitz {Syst. Nouv., 14, 
Erdm., p. 127), that the soul or any other true substance should receive anything from 
without, unless through the divine omnipotence. The monads, he says in another place 
{Monad., 7, Erdm., p. 705), have no windows through which elements of any kind might 
enter or pass out. There is no influxus physicus between any created substances, hence 
not between the substance which is the soul and the substances which make up ite 


body. Further, the soul cannot exert an influence on the body, for the reason that in 
the universe, as in every system of substances acting only on each other and experien- 
cing only each other's actions, not only the same amount of (living) force, but also the 
same quantity of progress iu any particular direction is preserved unchanged {lex de 
conservanda quantitate directimiis, see Erdmann's ed., pp. 108, 133, 702) ; the soul can 
therefore not, as Descartes supposed, influence and modify the direction of the bodily 
motions. Descartes left the common optoion, that the soul exerts a natural influence 
on the body, undisturbed; a part of his disciples perceived that that influence was 
impossible, and framed the doctrine of Occasionalism, which came into acceptance 
especially through Malebranche ; but this doctrine makes miracles of the most common 
events, since it represents God as constantly interfering anew with the course of nature. 
It is the rather true that God from the beginning so created soul and body, and all 
other substances, that while each follows the law of its internal development (the 
above-mentioned lex continuationis seriei sua/rum c/perationum) with perfect indepen- 
dence (spoiita/ieite), each remains, at the same time, at every instant in complete 
agreement (conformite) with all the rest (hence that the soul, following the law of 
the association of ideas, has a painful sensation at the same instant in which the body is 
struck or wounded, and, conversely, that the arm, conforming to the law of mechanics, 
is extended at the same instant in which a particular desire arises in the soul, etc.). 
The relation of this theory of pre-established harmony to the two other possible expla- 
nations of the correspondence between soul and body is illustrated by Leibnitz (in the 
Second Uclaircissement and Troisi'eme Edairdssement du nouveau Systeme de la commu- 
nieation des substances^ Erdmann, p. 133 seq.) through the following comparison: A 
constant agreement between two clocks can be effected in either one of three ways, the 
first of which corresponds ^vith the doctrine of a physical interaction between body and 
soul, the second with the doctrine of Occasionalism, and the third with the system of 
pre-established harmony. Either both clocks may be so connected with each other, 
through some sort of mechanism, that the motion of the one shall exert a determining 
influence on the motion of the other, or some one may be charged constantly to set the 
one so that it may agree vsdth the other, or both may have been constructed in the 
beginning with such perfect exactness that their permanent agreement can be reckoned 
on without the interference of the rectifying hand of the workman. Since Leibnitz 
held the exertion of a physical influence by the soul on the body, or vice versa, to be 
impossible, it only remained for him to choose between the two last theories, and he 
decided in favor of the theory of a " consentem^nt preetabli,'''' because he considered this 
way of securing agreement more natural and worthy of God than that of occasional 
interference. The absolute artist could only create perfect works, which do not need 
a constantly renewed rectification. 

The soul may be called the governing monad or the substantial centre of the body, 
or the substance which acts on the monads of the body, in so far as it is true that the 
latter have been accommodated to it, and its state furnishes a reason for the changes in 
tie body (Syst. Nouv., 17, Erdmann, p. 128). Every monad which is a soul is enveloped 
in an organic body, which it never loses in all its parts. (But that the soul can parUaUy 
lose its body, and that the elements of the body are subject to constant material change 
{Monad., 71], while every monad is absolutely simple, is sufficient evidence of the com- 
plete untenableness of the attempt to identify the distinction between soul and body 
which latter, according to Leibnitz, as an aggregate of substances, is a complex of 
monads [or une masse composee par une infinite d'autres monades qui constituent le corps 
propre de cette monade centrale ; Principea de la nature et dela grdce, 3, Erdm., p. 714] 


with the distinction between activity and passivity in the same monad and to inter- 
pret the pre-established harmony accordingly. ) 

There exists nothing besides monads and phenomena, which are perceptions in 
monads. All extension belongs only to the phenomenal ; matter, with its continuous 
extension, exists only in the conlxised apprehension of the senses. This matter is 
merely a "well-founded phenomenon" {phtenomenon beiie fundatum), " a regulated 
and an exact phenomenon, which does not deceive him who is careful to observe the 
abstract rules of the reason." Space is the order of possible co-existing phenomena; 
time is the order of successions (Erdmann's ed., pp. 189, 745 seq., 752 et al.). That 
which is real in extension consists only of the ground of the order and regulated suc- 
cession of phenomena, which ground cannot be visibly perceived, but only conceived 
by the intellect. Leibnitz disputes the doctrine (maintained, among others, by New- 
ton) that space is a real and absolute existence (" n etre reel et absolu "), and also 
attacks Newton's theory of attraction (in Erdmann's edition, p. 733). 

The union of simple substances to form an organism is a unto realis, and forms in 
some sense a compound substance, the simple substances being joined, as if by a "sub- 
stantial bond," in one whole. 

From the monadic and spiritual nature of the soul Leibnitz infers its indestructibil- 
ity and immortality (5ys. nouv., Erdmann, p. 138 : " Tout esprit etant comme un monde 
apart, suffisant d lui-meme, independunt de tovte autre creature, envehppant Vinfini, expri- 
mant Vunivers, est aussi durable., aussi subsistant et aussi absolu que Vunivers meme des 
creatures. ") From the impossibility of explaining the actual agreement between soul and 
body by the hypothesis of physical influence, he deduces the necessity of supposing 
that God exists as the common cause of all finite substances (" car ce parfait accord de 
tant de substances qui n'ont point de communication ensemble, ne saurait venir que de la 
cause commune,'''' Syst. nouv., 1695, in Erdmann's edition, p. 128). Perhaps Leibnitz, 
when, in the year 1671, he wrote to Duke Johaim Heinrich of Bruns'w'ick, of "the ulti- 
mate reason of things or the universal harmony, i. e., God," did not conceive God as the 
author of the harmony, but as the harmony itself ; still this expression may perhaps 
be interpreted in the same sense in which a similar expression is employed by Leibnitz 
in the Prim, de la nat. et de la grace (Erd., p. 716), where he says: " Cette derniere 
raison des choses est appelee Dieu,^^ and yet recognizes God as being an " absolute, sim- 
ple substance." But in the later period of his philosophizing he taught, without hesi- 
tation or wavering, that God, the primitive substance, had so regulated every monad 
that each constantly reflected from its stand-point the universe, and that God thus pro- 
duced the universal harmony {JVouv. Ess., iv., 11). God, says Leibnitz (Monad., 47, 
Erdmann, p. 708), is the primitive unity or the original simple substance, the Monns 
primitim {Epist. ad Bierlingium, 1711, Erdm.. p. 678; "Za monade primitive,'" Lettred 
Remond de Montmort, 1715, Erdm., p. 725), whose productions are all created or deriv- 
ative monads, all of which (as Leibnitz, not indeed without infringing somewhat upon 
his postulate of the indivisibility of the monads, teaches) arise from the primitive monad 
as if by constant radiations (which yet are dynamic divisions ; par des fulgurations con- 
tinueHes de la Divinite de moment d moment, bornees par la receptivite de la creature d 
laquette il est essentiel d^etre limiUe). God has an adequate knowledge of all things, 
since he is the source of all. He is, as it were, an omnipresent centre (comme centre 
partout, maui sa circonference est nuUe. part) ; all thmgs are immediately present to 
him; nothing is far from him. Those monads which are spirits have, beyond the 
knowledge which belongs to the others, the knowledge of God, and participate, in a 
measure, in God's creative power. God governs nature aa its architect, the world of 


spirits as their monarch ; between the kingdoms of nature and grace there subsiste a 
pre-determined harmony {Principes de la nature et de la grace, 13-15, Erdm., p. 717). 

On the principle of the harmony between the kingdoms of nature and grace is 
based Leibnitz's TJieodicaa {Theodicee), or vindication of God in view of the evil in the 
world. The world, as the work of God, must be the best among all possible worlds; 
for were a better world possible than that one which actually exists, God's wisdom 
must have known. His goodness must have willed, and His omnipotence must have 
created it. The evil in the world results necessarily from the very existence of the 
world. If there was to be a world, it was necessary that it should consist of finite 
beings ; this is the justification of finiteness, or limitation and liability to suffering, 
which may be called the metaphysical eviL Physical evil or pain is salutary as punish- 
ment, or means of tuition. As to moral evil or wrong, God could not remove them 
without removing the power of self-determination, and, therewith, the possibility of 
morahty itself ; freedom, not as exemption from law, but as the power of deciding for 
one's self according to known law, belongs to the essence of the human spirit. The 
course of nature is so ordered by God as in all cases to accord with the highest inter- 
ests of the soul ; and it is in this that the harmony between the kingdoms of nature 
and grace consists. 

The substance of the objections advanced in the Nov.veaux essais mr Ventendemmt 
(written in 1704, but first published in 1765) against Locke's Essay concerning Ilunum 
Understanding (which latter work he yet recognizes as "-wre des plus beaux et des phis 
estimes ouvrages de ce temps ") is mdicated by Leibnitz himself (in a letter to Bierling) 
in the following manner : " In Locke's work certain special truths are not badly set 
forth ; but in regard to the main question he errs far from the right doctrine, and he 
has not perceived the nature of the mind and of truth. If he had rightly weighed the 
difference between necessary truths, or those which are known by demonstration, and 
those truths which we arrive at, up to a certam measure, by induction, he would have 
perceived that the necessary truths can only be demonstrated from the principles im- 
planted in the mind, the so-called innate ideas, because the senses teach, indeed, what 
takes place, but not what necessarily takes place. He has also not observed that the 
ideas of being, substance, identity, the true, the good are innate in the mind, for the 
reason that the mind itself is innate in itself, and in itself embraces all these ideas. 
Nihil est in inteUectu, guod non fuenit in sensu, nisi ipse inteUectus." * Cf. for details 

* Yet since Locke r.ssnnied, in addition to sensation, reflection, or the consciousness which the mind has 
of its own operations, as a source of ideas, and since, on the other hand, Leibnitz represents the innate ideas 
not as conscious notions, but only as "slumbering notions" or " idees innees,'" which are consequently not 
"known " C' connues"), the contrast between their doctrines is less than would appear from the words they 
employ. If the mind Ls able to apprehend the ideas of being or substance, because it is itself a being, a sub- 
stance, then it is not this idea as such, not even when conceived as an unconscious idea, that is innate, but 
only that from which this idea may be formed ; if it has the capacity for truth and goodness, and is able by 
reflection on its own acquired truth and goodness to form these ideas, then it does not obtain them vpithont 
''rejection,'' and aU that is true in the Leibnitzian theory is that the possibDity of that development, 
which leads to these ideas, is conditioned upon an activity immanent in the soul, and that therefore the com- 
parison of the soul to a tabvla rasa is inappropriate. All notions are formed through the co-operation of 
external and internal factors ; Locke laid emphasis on the former, Leibnitz on the latter. To interpret the 
"capacity" for conscious ideas as synonymous with the actual presence of these ideas in the mind as uncon- 
scious notions, so that the development of the same shall consist only in raising them gradually to clear con- 
sciousness, is to substitute for the actual process of development an imaginary one, in which the co-operation 
of the external factor is ignored. The world of external reality, which affects our senses, is, not less than the 
mind itself, a thing of order, shaped according to immanent laws, and not a conglomeration of things acci- 
dental ; hence also our ejtperience, as determined by the action of the external world upon us, is not a chaotic 
mass, into which tne mind must first, fi-om its own resources, introduce order by following "innate ideas,' 


the paper by G. Hartenstein, cited above ( 116, p. 80) : Locke's Lehre von der menscJdi- 
chen Erkenntniss in Vergleichung mit Leibnitz^ s KHtik derseWeri, in Vol. IV. , No. II. , of the 
Abh. der phUologiscli-historischen Classe der K. Sdcfis. OeseUscJMft der TFm. , Leipsic, 18G1. 

Leibnitz designates, as principles of reasoning, the principle of identity and contra- 
diction and the principle of sufficient reason. {MonadoL, 81, 33, in EIrdmann's edi- 
tion, p. 707 ; Nos raisoiinemeiis soat fondes sur deux grands prindpes, cdui de la 
contradiction, en vertu duqud nous jugeons faux ce qui en enveioppe, et irrai ce qui est 
oppose ou contradictoire aufaux, et celui de la raison sufflsante, en vertu duquel lums con- 
.fide-rons qu'aucun fait ne saurait se trouver vrai ou emtant, aucune enonciation veritable, 
sans qu'il y ait une raison sufflsante pourquoi il en soil ainsi etnonpas autrement, 
quoique ces raisons le plus sauvent ne puissent point nous etre connues.) All necessary 
truths are treated by Leibnitz as resting on the principle of contradiction, and all contin- 
gent truths or truths of fact as resting on the principle of sufficient reason ; the former, 
among which Leibnitz reckons, in particular, the truths of mathematics, can be reached 
by an analysis of ideas and principles, continued until the primitive ideas and princi- 
ples are arrived at. (In opposition to this doctrine Kant called all mathematical truths 
synthetic judgments d priori. Many Leibnitzians attempted to deduce the principle 
of sufficient reason from the principle of contradiction.) 

Leibnitz exerted an influence on the religion and general culture of the eighteenth 
century, chiefly through his attempted demonstration of the agreement of reason with 
faith (in the Theodicee), the immediate occasion of which was Bayle's extreme develop- 
ment of the early Protestant principle of their contradiction, and which, in view of 
the extension and deepening of scientific, rational knowledge in the fields of natural 
science and history, appeared as a pressing need of the times. In the measure in 
which hia principle was accepted, the violence of the antagonism between Catholics 
and Protestants, on the one hand, was diminished, while, however, on the other hand, 
the importance of all revealed doctrines (although Leibnitz himself held fast to their 
truth, and exerted himself in particular to combat Socinian objections against the doc- 
trines of the Trinity) was estimated less highly in comparison with the truths cogniza- 
ble by the reason alone ; in this latter direction the actors in the so-called period of 
" enlightenment" went far beyond the intention of Leibnitz. The Leibnitzo-Wolfian 
philosophy opened the way for the theological Rationalism, which was afterwards more 
fully developed in the school of Kant. 

Although the philosophical efforts of Leibnitz were directed pre-eminently towards 
the union of the theological and cosmological conceptions, the derivation of the world 
from God and its explanation by natural laws, yet a real harmony of the two elements 
was not attained. The theory of pre-established harmony permits only in appearance 
a conception of the world which accords with natural law, when it represents each 
monad as reflecting from its stand-point the universe ; a real admission of the con- 
formity of nature to law would involve the admission of a causal nexus. How God is 
able to determine the monads remains obscure. The diversity of the stand-points of 
the monads must either be of the same kind with that of the positions of points in 
sensible space, or not. If not, then the nature of this diversity is left altogether unde- 

which, according to Leibnitz, run through the soul like the veins in a block of marble (or, as Kant pretends, 
by following d priori forms) ; that regular order of the real world, in which the necessity of particular fact* 
finds its reason, contains in itself the signs by which its own nature and reality can be known. Isolated ex- 
periences, it is true, do not lead to this result, but the combination of experiences siccording to logical noniA 
which latter are very essentially different from purely subjective elements of knowledge does. Cf. balow 
notes to 122 [cf. T. E. Wtbb, InteliectwUism of LocJct.] 


termined ; the development of the doctrine of monads, which almost constantly pre 
supposes the analogy of spatial relations, is by the general principle, that no such rela- 
tions are predicable of the monads, not only made completely incapable of rejiresentation 
to the imagination, but loses all its clearness for thought. The Leibnitzian doctrine of 
space remains, therefore, scarcely essentially distinguished from that of Kant, according 
to which space is a mere subjective form of intuition (cf. Kant's own interpretation of 
L.'s doctrine of space, in Metaph. Anfangsgraade der JS'aturwiss. , II. Ilauptstiick, 
Lehrsatz IV., Anm. 2, where the order of simple beings corresponding with the spatial 
order is explained as belonging to a "merely intelligible and to us unknown world"). 
Further, it involves as Kant has shown as a logical consequence the doctrine that 
the forms of thought are purely subjective, while on the other hand it is open to the 
same objections which proved the Subjectivism of Kant tmtenable, and led Herbart, in 
particular, to the construction of a new system of " Realism." But if the places or 
stand-points of the monads are of a spatial nature (and that they must be such, the 
mathematical determinateness of the laws of mechanics especially forces us to assume, 
which laws undeniably point beyond the Subject to the transcendental objects on 
which the sensible intuitions of the Subject depend ; to tliis interpretation point also 
Leibnitz' definition of the points de xue as mathematical points within organized 
masses, and his affirmation that the magnitude of the effect depends on the distance, 
Pi-incipea de la nature et de la grace, Erdm., p. 714), if this alternative, then, be 
accepted, then (with Herbart) an intelligible space must be distinguished from the 
phenomenal space, but conceived as similar to it. This, however, is not the doctrine 
I of Leibnitz, who expressly restricts all spatial relations to phenomena, and denies that 
i they belong to the monads ; if they did belong to the monads, then at least the theo- 
logical side of the Leibnitzian doctrine, the doctrine of the omnipresence of God, of 
his non-confinement to any particular point, of his equally near relation to all finite 
monads, would be endangered. The punctual simplicity of the monads is incompatible 
with the multiplicity of perceptions in them, assumed in order to exclude external 
influences. Bayle called attention to this. But give up this simplicity, and the first 
consequence is the restoration of Spinozism ; Herbart, in order to rescue the doc- 
trine of punctual simplicity (whose possibility, for the rest, is also doubtful in itself, 
since the point exists only as limit and is vested with an independent character only in 
abstraction), advanced to the consequence, that the monads were simple in quality, 
whereby not only the doctrine of pre-established harmony, but also the development of 
a speculative theology of any kind is made impossible. Kantism, the renewed Spi- 
nozism (Schellingism), and Herbartism lay conjoined and undeveloped in the doctrine 
of Leibnitz; a real reconciliation of these opposing elements was not effected by 

The next problem, however, was not the refutation, but the systematization of the 
Leibnitzian conceptions. This work was undertaken with decided talent, indefatigable 
industry, and very considerable result by Christian Wolff, so that nearly all disciples of 
Leibnitz in Germany stood also under his influence, and the school was and is still 
commonly designated as the Leibnitzo-Wolffian. Still, side by side wdth the Leibnitzian 
doctrine, which had, for the most part, adopted all that was tenable in the Cartesian 
and Aristotelian philosophies, went other tendencies of thought, especially that of 
Locke ; some other thinkers contemporaneous with Leibnitz, such as Puflfendorf , the 
professor of law, Tschimhausen, the logician, and others, asserted a more or less con- 
siderable authority in particular departments of philosophy. 

A German predecessor of Leibnitz in the effort to reform philosophy was Joachim 


Jimgius (1587-1657), an excellent mathematician and investigator in natural science, 
who (in agreement with Plato) laid special stress on the importance of mathematical 
discipline as preparatory to sound philosophizing. He was the author of the Logica 
Hamburgenm, Hamb., 1638 and 1681. On him cf. G. E. Guhrauer, J. J. und ein 
Zeitalter, nebst Gothe's Fragm. liber Jimgiiis, Stuttg. and Ttib., 1850. 

The skeptical view of human knowledge expressed by Agrippa of Nettesheim in his 
Be Iiicertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum (Cologne, 1537), and represented in the seven- 
teenth century by Joseph GlanviU in England, and by Le Vayer and others in France, 
was reasserted by Hieronymus Himhaym (died at Prague in 1679) in his work, De 
typfio generic humani sive scientiarum hwnanarum inani ac ventoso tumore, written in 
the interest of the belief in revelation and of asceticism. Yet he was no enemy of 
scientific studies. Karl Sigm. Barach has written of him in H. H., ein Beitrag zur 
Gesch. der philos.-tJieohgisclieii Cidtur im 17. Jahrhundert, Vienna, 1864. 

Mysticism was renewed by Angelus Silesius (Johann Scheffler, 1624-77), among 
others, in poetic form (God has need of man, as man needs God, for the development 
of his essence). Cf. Franz Kern, Joli. Schffflc/s chcruhinischer Wandermann, Leips., 
1866 ; in this book the near relation of Scheffler to Eckhart is pointed ont. 

Walther von Tschimhausen (1651-1708), a mathematician, physicist, and logician, 
who educated himself especially by the study of the works of Descartes and Spinoza, 
and also by personal intercourse and correspondence with the latter, and who entered 
at an early age into personal relations with Leibnitz, treated of logic as the art of 
invention ra his Medicina mentis sive artis inveniendi prcecepta generalia, Amst., 1687, 
Leips., 1695, etc. 

Samuel von Puffendorf (1632-94) distinguished himself by his work, De Statu Reip. 
GemianicoB (1667, etc.), on the public law of Germany (for the author's name, the 
assumed name, Severinus a Monzambano, was substituted on the title-page), and by 
the works, De Jure Naturw et Gentium (Lond., 1672; Frankf., 1684, etc.), De Officio 
Hominis et Civis (Lond., 1673, etc.), on natural law and ethics. Puffendorf borrows 
from Grotius the principle of sociality, from Hobbes that of individual interest, and 
combines both in the proposition, that sociality is for the interest of each individual. 
The principal merit of Pufifendorf's presentation consists in his systematic arrangement 
of the doctrines of natural law. 

Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) follows substantially Puffendorf in his Institutionvm 
juri-fprudentke dicinm libri tres, in quibus fundarnenta juris nat. secundum hypotheses 
ill. Pufendorfli perspicfie de>nonstrantur, Frankf. and Leips., 1688; 7. ed., 1730. He is 
more original in the Fundamenta juris naturm et gentium ex sensu communi deducta, in 
guibus secernuntur prindpia honesti, justi ac decori, Hall., 1705, etc., in which he de- 
scribes the J m^^u/h, decorum, and honestum as three degrees of conduct conformed to 
wisdom, and lays down as the principle for the justum : "Do not to others what thou 
wouldst not that others should do to thee " {quod tibi non vis fieri., alteri nefeceris) ; for 
the decorum ; " As thou wouldst that others should do to thee, do thou even so to them " 
{quod vis ut alii tibi faciant, tu et ipsis facias) ; and for the Twnestum : "As thou wouldst 
that others should do to themselves, do also thou thyself" {quod vis ut alii sibi facia nt, 
tu et ipse facias). To secure the performance of the duties required by justice, force 
maybe employed. TschimhaiUBexC s Medicina Mentis., although combated by Thomasius, 
yet exercised an influence on the philosophy of the latter. Cf. Luden, Ghr. Thomasius 
nach .teinen Schicksalen und Schriften, Berlin, 1805. 

Heinr. v. Cocceji (.1644-1719) and his son, Samuel v. Cocceji (1679-1755) applied 
natural law to international and civil law. Cf. Trendelenburg, Fr. d. Gr. u. sein 


O-rosskander Sam. von Coccqi., in the Transactions of the Acad, for the year 1863, 
Berlin, 1864, pp. 1-74 ; Heinr. Degenkolb, in the third edition of Rotteck and Welcker'a 
Staatslexico7i, on the influence of WoliFs doctrine of natural right on our common law, 
in the article on the common law of Prussia. 

In the field of the philosophy of law and history, Giovanni Battista Vico, the Nea- 
pohtan (1668-1744), among the younger contemporaries of Leibnitz, distinguished 
himself. He wrote : De antiquisima Ittdormn sapientia, "NaTp. , 1710 ; De uno universi 
juris principio etfine utw, Nap., 1720 ; Liber alter, qui est de constantia jurisprudentis, 
ib. , 1721 ; Prindpj di una sciema nuava d''int</i'no alia commune natura deUe nasicmi, 
Naples, 1725, 1730, 1744; the same in German, translated by W. E. Weber, Leips., 
1822. A complete edition of his works was published at Naples, in 1835. More re- 
cently his Scritti Inediti have been published by G. del Giudice, Naples, 1862. 

Christian Wolff (the name is also not seldom written with one f, especially in the 
Latinized form) was bom in 1679 at Breslau. From 1707 to 1723 he was a professor at 
Halle, and when driven away from Dhere, assumed a similar position at Marburg. Li 
1740 he was recalled by Frederick II. to Halle, where he died in 1754. Wolff, by his 
systematization of philosophy, rendered it a very considerable service in the matter of 
scientific form and of thorough, didactic exposition, although that service was dimin- 
ished by his excessive and pedantic employment of the mathematical method, and by 
an insipid breadth of exposition. He appropriated the conceptions of Leibnitz, and, 
following Leibnitz' own example, sought to combine them with the AristoteUan doc- 
trine, which until then had prevailed in the schools ; he supported them in part by new 
arguments, but he also partially modified them, and brought them, by leaving out some 
of L.'s more venturesome hjT)o theses, into nearer agreement with the ordinary concept 
tions of things. In particular, he denied perception to aU monads which were not souls, 
accepted the doctrine of pre-established harmony only as a permissible hypothesis, and 
would not exclude the possibility of the natural interaction of soul and body. He held 
fast to the Optimism and Determinism of Leibnitz. He sought to reduce the principle 
of sufficient reason to the principle of contradiction, which alone (in agreement with 
Aristotle and with the earlier view of Leibnitz himself) he admitted as an absolutely 
fundamental principle of demonstration. Wolff divides metaphysics into ontology, 
rational psychology, cosmology, and theology ; ontology treats of the existent in general, 
rational psychology of the soul as a simple, non-extended substance, cosmology of the 
world as a whole, and rational theology of the existence and attributes of God. " Prac- 
tical philosophy " is divided by Wolff (in agreement with the Aristotelians) into Ethics, 
CEconomics, and Politics. His moral principle is the idea of perfection. To labor for 
our own perfection and that of others is the law of our rational nature. Wolff's German 
and (mostly later and fuller) Latin works treat of all the branches of philosophy (with 
the exception of aesthetics, which was first developed by Wolff's pupil, Baumgarten). 

Johann Joachim Lange (1670-1744), who was the cause of Wolff's expulsion from 
HaUe, sought in the works : Causa Dei et rdigionis naturalis adversus athdsmum (Hal., 
1728), Modesta disquiitio noviphilos. syst. de Deo, mundo et Jiomine etprmertim hamwnia 
commerdi inter animam et corpus prcBstabilita (Hal., 1728), etc., to demonstrate the 
Spinozistic and atheistic character of the Wolffian doctrine and the danger with which 
it was fraught for religion; he took especial offence at the doctrine of Determinism 
taught by Wolff. 

Andreas Riidiger (1678-1731), a scholar of Christian Thomasius, and an eclectic in 
philosophy, combated the Leibnitzian doctrine of the pre-established harmony between 
the body and the soxJ, maintaining the theory of physical influence, and asserting the 


extended nature of the soul and the sensible origin of all ideas. Andr. Rudigeri disp. 
de eo, quod omnes idem oriantur a sensione, Leips., 1704; De senu veri et falsi, Hal., 
1709, Leips., 1722; Philos. synthetica, Hal., 1707, etc. ; Physica divina, recta via ad 
utramque Jtominis fdicitatem tenden^, Frankf.-on-the-iL, 1716; Philos. pragmatica, 
Leips., 1733; Wolf ens Meinung von dem Wesen der Seele und Jiiidigers Oegenennner- 
mig, Leips., 1727. 

An indirect pupil of Riidiger (won over to his doctrines by Ad. Friedr. Hoffmann, 
one of R.'s hearers) was Christian August Crusius (1712-1775), the most influential 
opponent of Wolffianism, who opposed especially the doctrines of optimism and deter- 
minism, and based ethics on the will of God as a lawgiver. His works are the follow- 
tng: Anweisung, vemiinfUg zu leben, Leips., 1744; Oewisslieit und Zuverldssigkeit der 
meiisdd. Erkenntniss, Leips., 1747, etc. With Crusius agrees, in many respects, the Eclec- 
tic, Danes (1714-1772), who wrote Elemen. vietcvph., Jen., 1743-i4; Philos. JS'edenstun- 
den, Jen., 1749-52; Erste Griinde der philos. Sittenlehre, Jen., 1750; Via ad veritatem, 
Jen., 1755. 

Among the opponents of the Leibnitz-Wolffian doctrine belongs also Jean Pierre de 
Crousaz (1663-1748), who wrote a Logic (published in French, Amst., 1712; in Latin, 
Geneva, 1724), a theory of the Beautiful (Amst., 1712, 2d ed., 1724), a short work on 
Education (Hague, 1724), and other works. An eclectic philosopher. 

Among the early followers of Leibnitz, who did not come under the influence of 
Wolff, belongs Michael Gottlieb Hansch (1683-1752), the author of a work entitled ^- 
lecta Moralia (HaUe, 1720), and of an Ars Inveniendi (1727). But by far the larger 
number of the followers of the Leibnitzian doctrine were at the same time also disci- 
ples of Wolff, tUl in the later period when Wolff's authority began to dechne, and many 
returned more immediately to Leibnitz himself. 

Among the more important Wolffians were Georg Bemhard Biilffinger (or Bilfin- 
ger, 1693-1750), author of a Disput. de triplici rerum cognitione, historica, philosaphica 
et mathematioi (Tiib., 1722), a Commeatatio hypothetica de harmania animiet corporis hu- 
manimaxime prcestabilita ex mente Leibnitii (Frankf. and Leips., 1723, 2d ed., 1735), 
Commentaticnes philos. deorigine et pemiissione mali, pradpue m/yralis {ib., 1724), Di- 
lucid. philos. de Deo, anima hmnana, mundo et generdlihus rerum affectionibus (Tiib., 
1725); Ludw. Phil. Thiimming (1697-1728), author of Institutiones philosapJace Wolf.- 
aruB (Frankf. and Leips., 1725-26), etc. ; Joh. Gust. Reinbeck (1682-1741), an ecclesi- 
astical provost, who prefixed to his reflections on the truths contained in the Augsburg 
Confession a preface on the use of reason and philosophy in theology ; J. G. Heinec- 
cius, J. A. von Ickstadt, J. U. von Cramer, Dan. Nettelbladt, and other jurists ; Joh. 
Christoph Gottsched (1700-1766), the historian of literature and critic, who wrote, 
among other things, Erste Oriinde der gesammteii Weltweisfieit (Leips., 1734, 2d ed., 
1735-36; cf. Danzel, Gottsched tmd seine Zeit, Leips., 1848); Martin Knutzen {ob. 
1751), the mathematician, who wrote on the immaterial nature of the soul (Frankf., 
1744), and Syst. cauiarum efficientium (Leips., 1745), and was one of Kant's teachers; 
Fr. Chr. Baumeister (1707-1785), who wrote text-books, and also a. Historia doctrines de 
jnundo Optimo {Gor\.,\lA\); Alex. Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762), who wrote, among 
other things, Metaphysica (Halle, 1739), Ethicn PhilosopTiica (Halle, 1740), and especially 
a work entitled ^sthetica (Frankfort on the Oder, 1750-58), in which he systematically 
developed this branch of philosophy, to which he first gave the name of ./Esthetics, on 
the ground of his definition of beauty as perfection apprehended through the senses ; 
Georg Friedr. Meier (1718-1777), Baumgarten's pupU at Halle, author of Anfangi- 
griinde der schdnen Wissenscliaften (Halle, 1748, 2d ed., 1754), Vemunftlehre (ib. 1752), 


and an epitome of th3 latter {ib. , 1752 ; these text-books, among others, were used by 
Kant as the basis of his lectures on logic), MeUvpliysik (Halle, 1755-59), PhUos. Sitten' 
lehre (Halle, 1753-61), and many other works. A number of philosophical terms (and 
in particular the term ^sthetics^ as above mentioned) were first employed by Baum- 
garten in the sense now given to them. 

To substantially the same school of thinkers belonged also Herm. Sam. Reimarus 
(1694^1765) who published a Ver/mnftlehre (Hamburg and Kiel, 1756, 5th ed., 1790), 
Betrachtungen iXber die Kunsttriebe der TMere (Hamburg, 1762, 4th ed., 1798), and Ueber 
dievomeJLmstmWahrTieiten der naturlichm Rdigion (Hamburg, 1754, 6th ed., 1791), and 
who was also the author of the Wolf enbiittel Fragments, subsequently published by 
Lessin"- (directed against the positive content of the Christian religion ; cf . especially, 
on this subject, Dav. Friedr. Strauss, Heiin. Samud Bdmarv^ u. s. Schutzschrift far 
die vernunftigen Verehrer Oottes, Leipzig, 1862); Gottfried Ploucquet (1716-1790), who 
wrote, among other works, Principia de mbstanUis et phmnomenis, accedit metJiodiis cal- 
Gulandi in logids ab ipso imenta, cui prcemittiUir ammmtatw de arte cJuiracteristica 
universaU (Frankf. and Leips., 1753, ed. //., 1764; cf. Aug. Friedr. Bock, Samm- 
lung van Schriften, welche den logischen Calcul des Herm Prof. PI. betreffen, Frankf. 
and Leipsic, 1766) ; and Joh. Heinr. Lambert (1728-1777), whose Neues Organon oder 
Oedanken ilber die Erforschuiig und Bezeichnung des Wahren und dessen UnteriscJieidung 
wm IrrtJmm und Schein (Leips., 1764), Architektonik (Riga, 1771), as also his Koitmo- 
hgische Brief e (Augsburg, 1761) contain much that is original. An isolated position was 
occupied by Joh. Chr. Edelmann (1698-1767), originally a pietist, but afterwards a 
free-thinker, who inclined towards Spinozistic pantheism, and who wrote Moses mit 
aufgedecktem Angesicht (1740, etc.), Selbstbiographie (ed. Klose, Berlin, 1849) ; cf. K. 
Munckeberg, Beimarus und Edebnnnn, Hamburg, 1867. 

Of the thinkers some of them very respectable ones who were rather eclectics 
than adherents of any one system, Moses Mendelssohn, Eberhard, Platner, and others 
differed relatively little from the Leibnitz-Wolffian school. Moses Mendelssohn (bom 
at Dessau, Sept. 6th, 1729, died Jan. 4, 1786) labored especially for the cause of reli- 
gious enlighteimient. The precepts of religion were designed, according to him, to 
regulate men's practice. In respect of such specifically religious observances as were 
required by his religion (the Jewish), he was perhaps excessively afraid of reformatory 
attempts, but, on the other hand, he claimed for thought complete freedom, and un- 
dertook to demonstrate philosophically and with logical rigor the doctrines of the exist- 
ence of God and of the immortality of the human soul. Friedrich Nicolai (1733-1811), 
the friend of Mendelssohn and Lessing, and a prominent actor in the period of ' ' enlight- 
enment," labored, especially as editor of the Bibl. der schonen Wissenscliaften (Leips., 
1757-58), of the Brief e die neueste deutsclie Litt. betreffend (Berl., 1759-65), of the 
Allgem. deutsche Bibl. (1765-92), and of the NmeaUg. d. Bibl. (1793-1805) with salutary 
effect, so long as the work of purifying the public mind from the filth of superstition 
and emancipating it from prejudices remained to be done, but with imperfect success 
when the victory over traditional absurdities had been gained and the positive replen- 
ishment of the public mind with a nobler content became the main problem. The men 
who labored for the solution of this latter problem defended themselves against the 
attacks which he made upon them in a manner which should have no greater influence 
in determining our historic estimate of Nicolai than the hostile criticism, by Socrates 
and Plato, of the Greek Sophists should have in determining our judgment upon the 
latter. Joh. Aug. Eberhard (1738-1809; from 1778 on professor at Halle ; cf. on him 
F. Nicolai, Geddditnisssehrift aufj. A. E., Berlin, 1810) attempted to defen(? Leibnitz- 


ianism against Kantism ; he was the editor of the Philosoph. Magazin (Halle, 1788-92) 
and of the Philos. Arckiv (1792-95) ; the most important of his works were the Neu6 
Apologie des Socrates (Berlin, 1772, etc.), AUgenieine Theorie des Dcnkens und Empfm- 
dens (Berlin, 177G and 1786), Theorie der schonen Kiinste und WmemcJiaften (HaUe, 
1783; 3d ed., 1790), Sittenlchre der Vernunft (Berlin, 1781, 1786), Ilindhuch der Aesthe- 
tik fur gebildete Leser (HaUe, 1803-5; 2d ed., 1807 seq.), Versuch eiiier aUgemei/ien 
deutschen Syiwnymik (Halle, 1795-1802; 2d ed., 1820, continued by ]\Iaass and Gru- 
ber), Synonym. Wurterb. der deutsch. Sprache (Halle, 1802). Thomas Abbt (1738-1706) 
wrote Vom Tod fur's Vaterland (Berlin, 1761), Vo)n Verdienst (Berlin, 1765), Auszug 
aus der aUg. WeLthistorie (Halle, 1766 an expose of the gradual progress of civilization) ; 
his Vermischte Schriften were published at Berlin, 1768, etc. Ernst Platner's (1714- 
1818) Philosophische Aplvorismen (Leips., 1776-82; 2d revised edition, 1793-1800), in 
which, with the presentation and concise demonstration of the doctrines of philosophy, 
are combined retrospective glances at and historical criticisms of the teachings of 
ancient and modem philosophers, is a work stiU valuable. Christoph Meiners (1747- 
1810) wrote, besides his works on the history of ancient philosophy (see above, Vol. I., 
7), in particular, Untersuchungen uber die Denk- und Wilienskrafte, Gott. , 1806. As a 
popular moraUst, Christian Fiirchtegott Gellert (1715-1769), the poet, deserves here to 
be mentioned. His complete works were published at Leipsic in 1769-70, his moral 
lectures, Leips., 1770, edited by Ad. Schlegel and Heyer. The doctrine of Locke (on 
which G. F. Meier was led by the king to lecture at HaUe), which was favored by 
Frederick the Great (of whom Paul Hecker, among others, treats in Die relig. Entidcke- 
lung F.'s d. Gr., Augsburg, 1864), as also the moral, political, and aBsthetical inquiries 
of the English and in part also of the French, determined essentially the direction of 
thought foUowed by Garve, Sulzer, and others. Christian Garve (1742-1798) translated 
and annotated the Ethics and Politic of Aristotle, subjoining a critical review of the 
history of Morals, with an especially thorough examination of the Kantian doctrine 
( Uebersicht der vornehmsten PHncipien der SittenXehre 'von dem Zeitalter des Aristotdes 
an bis auf unsere Zeiten, Breslau, 1798) ; he translated and explained Cicero's De Officiis 
(Breslau, 1783 ; 6th ed., ^J., 1819), and wrote Vei'suche uber verscJiiedene Gegenstdnde aus 
der Moral^ Litteratur und dem gesdUchaftlichen Leben (Berl., 1792-1802 ; 2d ed., 1821), 
and other works and papers, which give evidence of extensive and appreciative obser- 
vation of human life. Of importance as psychologists are Joh. Christ. Lossius, who in 
his Physische Ursachen des Wahren (Gotha, 1775), sought to investigate the relation of 
the psychical processes to the motions of the fibres of the brain, and his opponent, Joh. 
Nic. Tetens (1736-1805), author of Philos. Versuche uber die menschl. Natur und ihre 
Entwickelung (Leipsic, 1776-77). The latter was the first to co-ordinate feeling (which 
Aristotle regarded as the passage from perception to desire) as a fundamental faculty 
with the understanding and the will, but he included in ' feeling," as the receptive facul- 
ty, not only pleasure and pain, but also the sensuous perceptions and the ' ' affections " or 
impressions which the mind produces on itself. Friedr. Carl Casimir von Creuz (1724- 
1770) denies in his Versuch Uber die Seele (Frkf. and Lps., 1753) \}a.e punctual simplicity 
of the soul, without, however, for that reason affirming it to be composite and divisible, 
and occupies in his doctrine, which is based on experience, an intermediate position 
between Locke and Leibnitz. An eclectic tendency characterizes the works of Joh. 
Georg Heinrich Feder (1740-1821), whose text-books {Gru/idriss der phihs. Wiss., Co- 
burg, 1767, Institutiones log. et metaph. , Frkf., 1777, etc.) were in their time very widely 
used; his Autobiography was published by his son (Leips., 1825). Dietrich Tiedemann 
(1748-1803), who combined Lockian elements with the Leibnitzian doctrine, deserves 


to be mentioned, not only as an historian of philosophy, but also on account of hia 
investigations in psychology and respecting the subject of cognition ( Uiitersuchungen 
iiber den Menschen, Leips. , 1777-98 ; Thedtet oder iiber das menschl. Wissen, ein Bdtrag 
zur Vernunftkritik, Frankf. on the M., 1794; Idealistische Brief e, Marburg, 1798; 
Handiuch der P.it/choloffie, ed. by Wachler, Leips., 1804). Johann Georg Sulzer (1720- 
1779) distinguished himself chiefly by his AUgemeine Theorie der schonen Kiinste (Leips., 
1771-74, also 1792-94; with additions by Blankenburg, 1796-98, and with supplements 
by Dyk and Schiitz, Leips., 1792-1808). Gotthilf Sam. Steinbart (1738-1809) wrote a 
Christian Doctrine of happiness {Glucksdigkeitslehre des Christenthums, ZiiUichau, 1778; 
4th ed., 1794) and other popular works. Johann Jacob Engel (1741-1802) exposed his 
philosophical views in a popular form, especially in the collection of essays, entitled The 
Philosopher for the World (Ber Philosaphfilr die Welt, Leips., 1775, '77, 1800 ; 2d ed., 
1801-2). Karl PhUipp Moritz (1757-93) edited a Magazine for Empirical Psychology 
{Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenlehre, 1785-93), furnished a characterization of himself in 
the work : Anton Reiser (Berlin, 1785-90), and wrote a treatise on the plastic imitation 
of the beautiful (Brunswick, 1788), and other psychological and aesthetical works. Karl 
Theod. Ant. Maria von Dalberg (1744-1817) wrote Betrachtungen uber das JJniverswn 
(Erfurt, 1776 ; 7th ed., 1821), Oedanken von der Bestimmung des moralischen Werths 
(ib., 1787), and other philosophical works. The pedagogues, Joh. Bemh. Basedow 
(1723-90), Joachim Heinr. Campe (1746-1818), and others, stood imder the influence of 
Locke and Rousseau, and Karl Friedr. Bahrdt (1741-92), one of the " enlighteners," 
was for a time the director of a Philanthropin [a sort of school conducted on what are 
termed natural principles]. Eschenburg's (1743-1820) Entwurf einer Theorie und 
Litenratur der schonen Wissenschjjften (Berlin, 1783 ; 5th ed. , 1836) and Handbuch der 
class. Litteratur (8th ed., Berlin, 1837) appertain rather to the history of literature than 
to philosophy. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, the physicist (1742-1799 ; Vermischte 
Sckriften, Gottingen, 1800-1805 and 1844-1853), following Spinoza, pronounced against 
" the infamous Two in the world, viz. : body and soul, God and the world ; " the soul 
and inert matter were, he affirmed, mere abstractions, and we could know of matter 
nothing but the forces with which it was one. 

Lessing's (Jan. 22, 1729, to Feb. 15, 1781) fruitful speculations on aesthetics and the 
philosophy of history (contained especially in his Hamburger Bramaturgie and his work 
on the Education of the Human Race) contained germs whose development was among 
the most important merits of German philosophy in the following period. The ques- 
tion, whether we should prefer the active search for truth or the actual and assured 
possession of truth by the gift of God, was decided by Lessing in a sense opposite to 
that in which Augustine (see above. Vol. I., 86, p. 338 seq.) answered it, and in favor 
of the former alternative. Lessing's philosophical conceptions grew out principally 
from his study of the Leibnitzian doctrine. The confession of " Spinozism," which 
Lessing made to Jacobi in the year 1780, had perhaps the sense that he found in it the 
basis of Leibnitzianism. Lessing affirmed that thinking, willing, and creating were 
identical in God. According to Jacobi's account, he considered "extension, motion, 
and thought as having their foundation in a superior force, which these attributes were 
far from exhausting, and which was capable of a kind of enjoyment which not only 
surpassed all actual conceptions, but was completely incapable of being represented in 
any conception." The speculative, rationalizing interpretation which Lessing gave to 
the doctrine of the Trinity might have been founded on passages in the 5th Book of 
Spinoza's Et?iics, or, also, on passages in the works of St. Augustine and Leibnitz. 
Lessing views the books of the Bible as the elementary books which served for the 


education of the human race, or, at least, of a part of it, with which God chose ts 
carry out one particular plan of tuition. Lessing distinguishes three stages in the life 
of humanity, differing essentially from each other in the motives of action pecuhar to 
them. The first stage is that of childhood, which seeks for immediate enjoyment; the 
second is that of boyhood and youth, when the thought of future goods, of honor, and 
prosperity is the guiding idea ; the third stage is that of the full man, who, even in 
the absence of these prospects of honor and prosperity, is able to do his duty. (Akin 
to this latter utterance of Lessing are, on the one hand, the Platonic principle, that 
justice and every other virtue are worthy to be sought after, not for the sake of reward, 
but on their own account, and, on the other hand, the categorical imperative of Kant ; 
on the contrary, among the earliest teachers of the Christian church many, e. g. , Lac- 
tantius, assert the opposite principle.) These stages, says Lessing, must be traversed 
in the same manner by the human race in the succession of its generations, as by each 
individual man (which thesis of Lessing was disputed by Mendelssohn). The Old Tes- 
tament was intended for the first stadium in the divine plan for the education of the 
human race, and the New Testament, which makes most reference to future reward, 
for the second ; but the time is sure to come for a new, eternal Gospel, which is prom- 
ised us in the elementary books of the New Covenant. In the elementary books truths 
are "reflected before" us (as if set before us in reflected images), which we are to 
look upon as revelations, until reason has learned to deduce them from other estab- 
lished truths belonging to her domain and to combine them with the latter. The 
development of revealed truths into truths of reason is absolutely necessary, if the 
human race is to receive real advantage from them. With reference to the doctrine of 
the Trinity, Lessing affirms it ' ' impossible that God should be one, in the sense in 
which finite things are one." God must have a complete idea of himself, i. e., an idea 
in which all is contained that is in himself, including therefore God's necessary reality, 
and hence an idea, which is an image, having the same reality as God himself, and 
which is consequently a reduplication of the divine Self ; but this idea implies, then, as 
a third element or process in the divine nature, the combination of the two already given 
in a single unity. (Kant, on the contrary, withdraws from beneath all such interpreta- 
tions the ground on which they rest. ) Lessing understands the doctrine of original sin 
in the sense, " that man, in the first and lowest stage of humanity, is not such an abso- 
lute master of his actions that he can follow moral laws." To the doctrine of satisfac- 
tion he attributes the following sense, viz. : ' ' that God, notwithstanding the original 
impotence of man, preferred to give him moral laws and to forgive him all trans- 
gressions on his Son's account i. e., on account of the absolute extent of all his 
perfections, in comparison with which and in which all individual imperfection disap- 
pears than not to give them to him and to exclude him from all moral blessedness, 
which yet without moral laws is inconceivable." (Kant's interpretation of the two 
last dogmas, in his ' ' Religion innerhalb der Oremen der blossen Vernunft " is very 
similar to that of Lessing.) To the historical question relative to the person of 
Christ, Lessing ascribes only a very subordinate importance (in which respect Kant 
and Schelling, the latter at least in his earlier period, agree with him, whereas Schleier- 
macher, to a certain extent, even in his Reden uber die Religion, and much more in 
his later works, makes the entire religious life to depend directly upon the person of 
Christ). The idea, that the same path by which the race attains to its perfection, 
must be traversed by every individual man, is not advanced by Lessing in the limited 
sense, that each, in advancing to whatever stage he may actually reach, must pass 
through the same stadia which the race passes through in advancing to the same stage ; 


on the contrary, he ascribes to that idea an unlimited truth, and argues, accordingly, 
that every individual man shall pass through those stages, which during this life he 
does not reach, in an ever-renewed existence by means of repeated re -appearances in 
this world. (This latter hypothesis, as it implies the possibility of at least a temporary 
oblivion of all previous states, and thus puts at least in the back-ground the idea of the 
conscious identity of the person, approximates toward the hypothesis of the continued 
existence of the mind in the race, of Christ in Christians, etc. , toward which later, 
when the Individualism prevalent in the 18th century began more and more to give 
place to universalistic and pantheistic views, Schleiermacher, at all events for a time, 
leaned decidedly.) 

118. The prevailing character of the French philosophy of the 
eighteenth century was that of opposition to the received dogmas and 
the actual conditions in Church and State, and the efforts of its repre- 
eentatives were chiefly directed to the establishment of a new theoreti- 
cal and practical philosophy resting on naturalistic principles. The 
way for such a development having been previously prepared by Bayle 
and his skeptical philosophy, Voltaire came forward, resting in the 
positive part of his doctrine essentially on the physics of Newton and 
on Locke's philosophy of cognition, and finding favor, especially for 
his hostile criticism of the dominant theological confession, not only 
among the educated of his own nation, but also, to a great extent, out- 
side of France. Before him, Maupertuis had already victoriously 
defended the Newtonian cosmology against the Cartesian, and Mon- 
tesquieu, particularly, had won over the educated classes to liberal 
ideas. Rousseau, offended by a degenerate civilization, pointed back 
to nature, rejected the positive and historical, and preached a rehgion 
of nature founded on the ideas of God, virtue, and immortality ; he 
demanded for men an education according to nature, and a democratic 
form of government, which should impose upon the freedom of the 
individual only such limits as the individual can concede and agree to 
without forfeitins; his inalienable rio-hts as a man. The science of 
aesthetics was successfully cultivated by Batteux, who defined art as 
consisting essentially in the imitation of tlie beautiful in nature. Sen- 
sualism was developed on the basis of Locke's doctrine, but to an 
extent to which Locke had not gone, by Condillac, who viewed all 
psychical functions as transformed sensations, and accordingly taught 
that internal perception had its basis in external or sensuous percep- 
tion. Ilelvetius sought to found moral science on the principle of 
self-interest, by affirming that the demands of this principle could not 
be fully satisfied except as they harmonized with the good of society. 
Diderot, who, in connection wath D'Alembert, superintended the pub* 


Hcation of the Encyclo^cedia of all the sciences, advanced gradually 
from deism to pantheism. Robinet, through his doctrine of a natural 
gradation of existences, or of the gradual })rogress of nature from its 
lower creations up to man, became a forerunner of Schelling. Bon- 
net, while believing in God and immortality, sought to discover the 
material conditions of the activities of the soul. Pure materialism 
was taught by the physician La Mettrie, chiefly as a psychological 
doctrine, but by Baron Ilolbach, in the Systhne de la Nature, as an 
all-inclusive, anti-theological philosophy. 

On the philo.sophy of the French in the eighteenth century the principal work is Ph. Damiron's Memoire* 
pour servir (i CMshnre cie lapMlosop/iieauXVIIIesl^cle, torn. I.-Il., Paris, 1858, tome Ill.avec utu intro- 
duction de M. C. Gouraiid, Paris, 1864. Of. Lerminier, De riiiftuetice de la philos. du X Vllle sifcle sur la 
leglilatitm et la sociabilite du XTXe, Par., 18;i3 ; Lanfrey, VEglise et les philonophes an XVIIIe siicle, 2d 
ed., Par., 1857 ; see, further, the sections on this topic in the larger works on the history of philosophy, and 
in works on general history and the history of literature, especially in Nisard's Hist, de la Lilt. Fr. (Par., 1848- 
49), Chr. Bartholniess' Emt. philos. de tacad. de Prtisse depuis Leibn. (Paris, 1850-51), and Hist. Crit. de 
doctrines religieu.\es de la p/iilosophie moderne (Strasb., 1865), A. Sayous' Is dix-huitieme {siecle) A fetraTiger, 
hist, de la litterature Jran<;aise dans les divers pays de r Europe depms la mort de Louis XTV.jusqu'd la re- 
volulionfranraise (2 vols., Paris, 1861), A. Franck's La philos. mystique en France au 18. si?cle (Paris, 1868) 
and in Schlossers Geschic/Ue des 18. Jahrhunderts, inHerm. Hettner's Litteraturgesch. des 18. Jahrhunderts, 
Part Second (on French literature), and in F. Albert Lange's Oesch. des Materialism,us, Iserlohn, 1866. 

Voltaire's works were published at Geneva in 1768, at Kehl and B^sle in 1773, at KeM, 1785-89 (with a 
biography of Voltaire by Condorcet), at Paris, 1829-34, etc. Cf. on him, besides Condorcet (whose biogra- 
phical work was also published separately, Paris, 1820), E. Bersot, La philosophie de V., Paris, 1848 ; L. J. 
Bungener, V. et son temps, Paris, 1851 ; J. B. Meyer, V. und Rousseau, Berlin, 1866; J. Janin, Le roi 
VoUaire, 3d ed., Paris, 1861 ; A. Pierson, V. et ses maltres, episode de thist. des huynanites en France, 
Paris, 1866 ; Emil du Bois-Keymond, VolUiire in seiTier Beziehurig zur Naturwiss. (discourse at the celebration 
of the birthday of Frederick the Great), Berlin, 1868 ; G. Reuschle, Parallelen aus dem 18. und 19. Jahrhun- 
dert (Kant and Voltaire, Lessing and D. F. Strauss), in the Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, 1868 ; Leouzon-le- 
Duc, Voltaire et la police, Paris, 1868. [Voltaire as a Theologian, Moralist, and Melaphyiticia7i, in Frasr' 
Magazine, Yo\. 76, November, 1867, pp. 541-568; D. F. Strauss, Voltaire (Six Lectures), 2d ed., Leipsic. 
1870 ; J. Moriey, Voltaire, London, 1872. Tr.] 

On Montesquieu, compare Bersot (Paris, 1852), and E. Buss {Montetq. und Cartesius, in the Philos. 
Monatshefte, IV. 1, Oct., 1869). 

The works of Rousseau were published at Paris in 1764, etc., also, in particular, editd by Musset^Pathay, 
22 vols., Paris. 1818-20, and ed. by A. dcLatour, Paris, 1868; material previously inedited was published by 
Streckeisen-Moulton, Par., 1861 and "65 ; biographies, to complete the coquetting Confessions, have been fur- 
nished by Musset-Pathay, Paris, 1821, Morin, Par., 1851, B. Guion, Strasb., 1860, F. Brockerhoff, Leipa., 
1863. Cf. Rousseait'sche Stndiai, by Emil Feuerlein, in Der Gedanke. 1861 seq. ; A. de Lamartine, Rousseau, 
son faux control social et le vrai contrat social, Poi.ssy, 1866. 

Charles Bonnet's (Euvres, Neufchktel, 1779. A work on him by the Duke of Caramen was published at 
Paris, 1859. 

Diderot's philosophical works were published in 6 vols, at Amsterdam, 1772. His complete works were 
published at Paris, 1798 (by Naigeon) and 1821, the latter edition being supplemented by the Correspondaiux 
philos. et critique de Grimm, in 1829, and by the Memoires. correspondance et outrages inedits de Didernt, 
in 18.30. The most comprehensive and thorough work on him is Roscnkranz's Diderot's Leben und Werke^ 
Lelps., 1866. Cf. also the article by Rosenkranz on Diderot's dialogue entitled Rameau's Nephew, in Der 
Gedanke, Vol. V., 1864, pp. 1-25. On D'Alembert compare J. Bertrand, D'Alembert, sa vie et ses travaiix, 
see Revue de<i deux mondes. 1865, Vol. 59, pp. 984-1006. 

On J. B. Robinet, cf. Damiron, as already cited, and Rosenkranz in Der Gedanke, Vol. I., 1861, p. 116 

Among the French authors of the eighteenth century who touched upon philo- 
sophical problems, by far the larger number distinguished themselves more as promoters 
of general culture and of the transformation of ecclesiastical, political, and social rela- 


tions, than as contributors to philosophy as a science. A more detailed account of the 
contest against despotism in Church and State belongs rather to the province of 
political history and the history of literature and civilization, than to the history of 
philosophy. It is particularly the development of sensualism and materialism in this 
period that is of philosophical interest. 

After that FonteneUe (1657-1757), in his Entretiens sur la pluralite des mondes 
(1686), had popularized the astronomical doctrines of Copernicus and Descartes, a like 
service was rendered to the Newtonian doctrine by Voltaire especially (Nov. 21, 1694, 
to May 30, 1778), who was perhaps led chiefly by the facts of modem astronomy to the 
conviction that the dogmatic teachings of the Church were untrue, and who made it 
his life's work to oppose those teachings. The strictly scientific refutation of the Car- 
tesian, and the establishment of the Newtonian doctrine in France was due above all to 
the labors of Maupertuis (1698-1759 ; from 1746 President of the Berlin Academy of 
Sciences) ; Maupertuis presented to the Academy of Paris in 1732 his memoirs Sur les 
his de Vattraction and Discours sur la figure des astrcs, and in 1736-37 conducted the 
expedition (ta which Clairaut was his principal coadjutor) to Lapland, for the purpose 
of deciding by measurement the controversy as to the form of the earth ; he wrote 
subsequently an Essai de PhUosopMe Morale (1749) and Systeme de la Nature {\lb\) . 
But it was pre-eminently Voltaire who sought to bring to the knowledge of educated 
men the bearings of the theory of astronomy upon our general conception of the world. 
In the years 1726-29 Voltaire resided ia London (where he changed his name, Arouet, 
to Voltaire, an anagram of Arouet I. j. , i. e. , Arouet le jeune). Mathematical physics 
and astronomy were then engaging the liveliest interest of educated men. In a letter 
written in 1728, Voltaire says : " When a Frenchman arrives in London he finds a very 
great change, in philosophy as well as in most other things. In Paris he left the world 
all full of matter ; here he finds absolute vacua. At Paris the universe is seen filled up 
with ethereal vortices, whUe here the same space is occupied with the play of the invisible 
forces of gravitation. In Paris the earth is painted for us longish like an egg, and in 
London it is oblate like a melon. At Paris the pressure of the moon causes the ebb 
and flow of tides ; in England, on the other hand, the sea gravitates towards the moon, 
so that at the same time when the Parisians demand high water of the moon, the gen 
tlemen of London require an ebb." The Lettres sur Us Anglais, written in 1728, were 
first published at London ; they appeared in France in 1734. In the year 1738, Voltaire 
published at Amsterdam his ElSmens de la philosophie de Newton, mis a la portee de tout 
le nymde (not published in France till 1741, because D'Aguesseau, the censor, who sym- 
pathized with the Cartesians, at first refused permission to print the impatriotic and 
unreasonable work, as he deemed it) ; this was followed by La Mitaphysique de Newton 
miparaUeh des sentiments de Newton et de Leibniz (Amst., 1740). But Voltaire was 
attracted not only by the natural philosophy, but also by the political institutions of 
England ; already, before seeing England, an enemy to ecclesiastical and political 
despotism, his sojourn in that country contributed especially to the more distinct 
development of his political views. He says : La liherte cmisiste d ne dependre que d^s 
his; not absolute equaUty, but only equality before the law is possible. Voltaire 
introduced, as a writer of history, the practice of paying constant reference to the 
customs and culture of nations. In the doctrine of knowledge, and in psychology, 
ethics, and theology Voltaire followed mainly Locke, whose doctrine of the soul was, 
he said, to that of Descartes and Malebranche, as history to fiction. Voltaire speaks of 
Locke as a modest man, of moderate but solid attainments (he says, in the " Phihsopht 
Ignorant,^' written in 1767: ''apres tant de courses maUieur ernes, fatigue, harasse, Iwn- 


reua (Tavoir cherche taiU de verites et trouve tant de chimeres^ je suis recenu d Locke oommt 
Venfant prodigue qui retourne chez son pere^ je me stm rejete entre les bras d'un homme 
viodesie qui ne feint jamais de savoir ce quHl ne sait pas^ qui, a la verite, ne possede pas des 
lichesses immenses, m/tis dont les fonds sont Men assures et quijouit du bien le plus solids 
tans aucune ostentation "). Voltaire emphasizes more strongly than Locke the possi- 
bility of the supposition that matter may think. He cannot make himself believe that 
there dwells within the brain an unextended substance, like a little God, and he is 
inclined to regard the substantial soul as an " abstraction realisee,^'' Uke the ancient god- 
dess Memoria, or such as a personification of the blood-forming force would be. All 
our ideas arise from the senses. Says Voltaire {Lettre XIII. sur les Anglais) : "No one 
will ever make me believe that I am always thinking, and I am no more disposed than 
Locke to imagine that several weeks after my conception I was a very learned soul, 
knowing then a thousand things which I forgot at my birth, and having quite uselessly 
possessed in the uterus knowledge which escaped me as soon as I could have need of it, 
and which I have never since been able to regain." Yet Voltaire admits that certain 
ideas, especially the moral ideas, although not innate, arise necessarily from the con- 
stitution of human nature and are not of merely conventional authority. Voltaire 
holds with Locke that the existence of God is demonstrable (by the cosmological, and 
especially by the teleological argument) . He regards the belief in a rewarding and 
avenging God as necessary, moreover, for the support of the moral order, whence he 
affirms : ' ' K God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him ; but all nature 
cries out to us that he does exist." The Leibnitzian doctrine, that the existrug world 
is the best of all possible worlds, is ridiculed by Voltaire in his Candide mi sur V Opti- 
misme (first published in 1757), although at an earlier date he had himself inclined 
toward the optimistic view ; he regards the problem of the reconciliation of evil in the 
world with the goodness, wisdom, and power of God as insoluble, but hopes for pro- 
gress towards an improved state, and demands that we seek our satisfaction rather in 
action than in untenable speculations ; in case of a conflict among the attributes of 
God, he wiU sooner believe God's power to be limited than his goodness. In his earher 
period Voltaire affirmed the freedom of the wUl, according to the doctrine of Inde- 
terminism, but afterwards admitted that the arguments for Determinism were irre- 

Charles de Secondat, baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu (bom at Brede, Jan, 18, 
1689. died at Paris, Febr. 20, 1755), first opposed absolutism in State and Church, in 
his Lettrcs Persanes (Paris, 1721), and then showed, in his Considerations sur les causes 
ie la grandeur des Bomains et de leur d'cad-ence (Paris, 1734), that the fortune of States 
and nations depends not so much on the accident of single victories or defeats, as on 
the force of public sentiment and the love of freedom, labor, and country, while in his 
principal work, the Esprit des Lois (Geneva, 1748, etc.), he investigated the bases, con- 
ditions, and guarantees of political freedom. In the first work, written before his 
sojourn in England (1728-29), the form of government prevailing in Switzerland and 
the Netherlands appears to him as the most excellent of all then existing, but in the 
later works, especially in the Esprit des Lois, that pre-eminence is assigned to the 
BngUsh constitution. In the Esprit des Lois, Montesquieu drew from the concrete 
form of the English government the abstract schematism of the constitutional mon- 
archy, and thereby made a contribution of great and indisputable merit to the theory 
and praxis of the modem State ; but, on the other hand, although he demands, as a 
principle, that the constitution should vary with tho spirit of the nation (" fc gouveme 
ment le phis conforme cL la nature est celui dont la disposition particuii^re se rapporte h 


mieux d la dhvposition du people pour lequd il est etabli "), yet as a matter of fact he indi 
rectly caused provisions, which are judicious only under definite conditions (such ax 
the complete separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, the eepa 
ration of the aristocratic and democratic elements into an Upper and a Lower House 
which should check each other by their vetoes, but might also easily cripple each other; 
to be considered as universal norms of an orderly and free State, and to be applied t 
circumstances under which they could only lead to incurable conflicts, to a mischiev- 
ous confounding of juridical fictions with facts, to the obstruction of legislation, to the 
prejudice of the security of personal rights, and to the endangering of the very exist- 
ence of the State. 

Jean Baptiste Dubos (bom 1670 at Beauvais, died at Paris, 1742), in his Reflexions 
critiques siir la poesie, la peinture et la musique (Par., 1719, etc.), argued that the 
origin of art was to be fotind in the need of an excitation of the passions, which should 
be separated from the inconveniences connected with such excitation in actual life. 
" Could not art," he asks, "find some means for separating the evil consequences of 
the majority of passions from that which is agreeable in them ? This is what poetry 
and painting have accomplished. " That the mission of art consists in rising above 
common reahty through the imitation of the beautiful in nature, is the doctrine taughl 
by Charles Batteux (1713-1780 ; Les Beaux Arts reduits a uii yneme principe, Paris, 1746), 
who failed, however, satisfactorily to define the conception of the beautiful. 

Jean Jacques Rousseau (bom at Geneva, 1712, died in 1778 at Ermenonville), deeply 
feeling the evils of a degenerate civilization, and yet not perceiving how by a positive 
progress to meet and vanquish them, preached up a return to a fancied original state 
of nature. Of all of the Coryphasi of the "illumination" of the eighteenth century, 
Rousseau has the least sense for historical development. Rousseau's political ideal is the 
freedom and equality of pure democracy. A rational faith in God, virtue, and immor- 
tality was for him all the more a need of the heart, the less his will was controlled by 
the moral ideas ; he attested this faith wdth greatest zeal after the first manifestation 
of materialism and pantheism by Diderot and other Encyclopaedists, whereas Holbach'a 
atheistical System of Nature appeared first after Rousseau's works, and in opposition 
to them. In the time of the Revolution, as Montesquieu's ideal of the State fur- 
nished the model for the constitutional monarchists, so Rousseau's doctrine controlled 
the tendencies of Robespierre. Rousseau's principal works are : Discours sur les sciences 
et les arU (occasioned by the following prize-question proposed by the Academy of Dijon 
in 1749: "Whether the restoration of the sciences and arts has contributed to the 
purification of morals? ") ; Discours sur Vorigine et les fondemens de Vinegalite parmi les 
hommes, 1753, etc. ; Du contrat social ou principes du droit politique, Amst., 1762 ; Emik, 
ou sur Vedncation, 1762. 

Julien Offroy de la Mettrie (1709-1751) was educated at Paris by the Janseniste, and 
then (in 1733) became a student of medicine vmder Boerhaave (1668-1738), who as a 
philosopher inclined towards the doctrine of Spinoza. Through observations which ho 
instituted on himself in the midst of a violent fever, respecting the influence of the 
movements of the blood on the power of thought, he arrived at the conviction that the 
psychical f imctions were to be explained by the organization of the body, and this doc- 
trine was set forth by him in his Ristoire natureUe de Fdme, a la Haye (Paris), 1745 
All thinking and willing, says La Mettrie, have their origin in sensations, and are de- 
veloped by education. A man who should grow up apart from human intercotirse, says 
La Mettrie (in agreement vrith Amobius see above, Vol. I., 84), would be mentally 
Imbecile. The " soul " increases and decreases with the body ; " hence it must be de 


stroyed with the body." From this stand-point, established in the Ilist. nat. de rdme., 
La Mettrie sets out in Z/'i/omwe ^<7<:Ame (Leyd., 1748, etc. ), (which work was written 
more under the iutluence of the mechanical psychology of Descartes than under that of 
Locke's Empiricism), UHomme Plante (Potsdam, 1748), VArt de jouir (1750), and 
other works. In opposition to the ethics of abstinence. La Mettrie, advancing to the 
opposite extreme, seeks to justify sensual enjoyment in a manner which is stUI more 
artificially exaggerated than frivolous. The power of convention and charlatanry in 
human life elicits from him the bitter denomination of life as a farce. Frederick the 
Great, who afforded him protection at his court, wrote his eulogy (given in Assezat's 
ed. of V Homme Machine, Par. , 18G5). The best account of his doctrine is given by F. 
A. Lange. Geeh. d. Mat., pp. 165-18G. 

Etienne Bonnot de CondUlac (1715-1780), in his earliest works, Essai sur Vorigine 
des connaissances humaines (Amst., 1746), and Traite des systemes (1749 the latter a 
polemical work directed against Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Spinoza), remains substan- 
tially on the philosophical ground of Locke, but goes beyond Locke in his Traite des 
sensations (London, 1754) and his subsequent works {IVaiie dss animaux, Amst, 1755, 
and a series of text-books for the Prince of Parma, whose education was intrusted to 
Condillac, etc.). In these latter works he not only no longer recognizes in internal 
experience a second, independent source of ideas in addition to sensible perception, but 
seeks to derive aU ideas from the latter as their only source. He endeavors to explain 
all psychical functions genetically, conceiving them as transformations of sensation 
(sensations transformees). To demonstrate that, without the hypothesis of innate ideas, 
all psychical processes can be deduced from mere sensation, Condillac imagines a 
marble statue, to which the different senses are given in succession, and, first of all, 
the sense of smeU. This sense furnishes perceptions, with which consciousness {con- 
science) is joined. Some are stronger than others, and are therefore more noticed, i. e., 
attention is directed to them. Traces of them are left behind, ^. e., the statue has 
memory. If the perceptions arise again in memory, we recoUect them, they become 
objects of apprehension on our part or we have ideas, i. e., mental representations of 
them. If at the same time new sense-perceptions enter, the division of sensation 
among them involves comparison and judgment. The original connection and suc- 
cession of perceptions determine their association when reproduced. The soul 
dwells on those ideas which are agreeable to it ; hence arises the separation of single 
ideas from others, or abstraction. Let the other senses be added, and let the ideas 
given be associated with words as their signs, and the mental formation becomes 
richer. The sense of touch is distinguished from the other senses by its enabling 
us to perceive the existence of external objects ; but its sensations are not first made 
ideas by memory; they are ideas from the beginning, i. e., they are immediate 
representations to the mind of something which differs in some manner from per- 
ception itself. Condillac also assumes, with Descartes and Locke, that extension is an 
attribute of things themselves, while colors, sounds, etc. , are only subjective sensations. 
From the recollection by the soul of a past sensation of pleasure arises desire. The 1 
ia the totality of sensations (le moi de cJtaque Tiomme n^est que la collection des 
sensations qii'il eprouve et de cdles que la memoire lui rajypelU, c'est tout d la foit 
la conscience de ce q-uHl est et le souvenir de ce qu''il a ete). Condillac is a sensationalist, 
but not a materialist. He holds it not possible that matter should feel and think, 
since, as extended and divisible, it is an aggregation of parts, whereas feeling and 
thought imply the unity of the siibject (substratum). 

Charles Bonnet, a Swiss (1720-93) in his Essai de psydiologie ou Considerations tur 


les operations de Vdme (projected in 1748, published Loud., 1755), which was followed in 
17G0 by his Essai analytique sur les facultes de Vdme, built up a half -materialistic sen- 
sationalism, which he (like Priestley) nevertheless tried to bring into agreement with 
religious faith by the hypothesis of the resurrection of the body. He was a friend of 
Albrecht von HaUer, to whose less liberal faith, however, his liberal views of the 
Athanasian dogmas gave oifence. 

Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and Jean d'Alembert (1717-1783) were the origmators 
and editors of the work embracing the whole field of the sciences and arts, entitled, 
Enclyelopedie ou Dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers, in 28 volumes 
(Paris, 1751-72; supplement in 5 vols., Amst., 1776-77, and Table Analytique, 2 vols., 
Paris, 1780). Contributions were made to this Encyclopaedia by Voltaire, Rousseau 
(who, however, from 1757 on, became an opponent of the Encyclopaedists), Grimm, 
Holbach, Turgot, Jaucourt, and others. The admirable iutroduction {IHscoiirs Prelim- 
inaire), which treats from the Baconian point of view of the classification and method 
of the sciences, was written by D'Alembert (who, after 1757, had no more to do with 
the editing of the Encyclopaedia). D'Alembert, the mathematician, is in metaphysics 
a skeptic. The union of parts in organized beings seems to point to a conscious intel- 
ligence ; but how this intelligence can be related to matter is inconceivable. We have 
a distinct and complete idea neither of matter nor of mind. Diderot passed from 
theism and faith in revelation to pantheism, which recognizes God in natural law and 
in truth, beauty, and goodness. By the conception of sensation as immanent in aU 
matter, he at once reached and outran the final consequence of materialism. In the 
place of the monads of Leibnitz he put atoms, in which sensations were bound up. 
The sensations become conscious in the animal organism. Out of sensations grows 
thought. In the Principes de la p7iilosop7de morale mi Essai sur le vierite et la vertu 
(1745), which is almost a mere reproduction of Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue 
and Merit, Diderot confesses his faith ta revelation, which faith, in the Pmsees Philoso- 
phiques (a la Haye, 174(J), he no longer defends, and stdl less in the Promenade d'un 
sceptique (written in 1747, but first published in Vol. 4th of the Memoires, coirespon- 
dance et ouvrages inedits de Diderot) ; after long wavering his philosophical stand-point 
becomes fixed in tlie Pensees sur T Interpretation de la Nature (Paris, 1754). The 
" Entretien entre d'Alembert et Diderot,^'' his most profound work, and one which gives 
evidence, in spite of all its lightness of form and the absence in it of the external 
apparatus of demonstration, of a deep insight into the connection of the problems of 
philosophy, together with Le reve d'Alembert (written in 1769), were likewise first 
published in the fourth volume of the Memoires, con'espondance et ouvrages inedits. Di- 
derot finds the beautiful in that which is according to nature. He wars against the 
constraint imposed by such rules of art as were set forth, in particular by Boileau, on 
the basis of the dicta of Horace and others of the ancients. 

The Abbe Morelly, caiTying to the extreme Locke's afiirmation of the pernicious 
effects of too great inequality of possessions, and probably influenced also by Plato's 
doctrine of the state, laid down in his Code de la nature (Amst., 1755) a communistic 
doctrine. Selfishness, le desir d* avoir pour soi, which is the source of the claim to 
the possession of private property, is the source of all controversies, of all barbar- 
ism, and of all misfortune. In a similar manner, Mably (1709-1783), an older brother of 
CondiUac, in his work, De la Legislation ou Principes des lots, wipes out the boundary 
between legal regulation and spontaneous benevolence. The investigations in political 
economy of the "physiocrats" (who gave one-sided prominence to the interests of 
agriculture) Quesnay (1697-1774), and others, and of Turgot (1727-1781 who avoided 


their narrowness of view, and who wrote a Lettre sur le papier monnaie, Reflexion* 
sur la formation et la distribution des richesses (1774), etc., as also of the Abbe Galiani, 
the opponent of the physiocrats, in his Dialogues sur le commerce des bles (1770), were 
directed more to matters of fact. Monopolies and slavery were combated by the Abb6 
Raynal in his Ilist. philos. du commerce des deux Indes. Baboeuf , in the time of the 
Revolution, adopted the doctrine of Morelly. Claude Adrien Helvetius (1715-1771), 
on the contrary, in his book, De V esprit (Paris, 1758), and in the posthumous works: 
De Vhomme^ de ses facultes et de son education {Londres [Amst.], 1772), and Les pro- 
gres de la raison dans la recherche du vrai (Lond., 1775), finds in self-love, which 
prompts us to seek pleasure and ward off pain, the only proper motive of human con- 
duct, holding that the right guidance of self-love by education and legislation is aU that 
is necessary to bring it into harmony with the common good. Complete suppression 
of the passions leads to stupidity ; passion fructifies the mind, but needs to be regu- 
lated. He who secures his own interests in such a manner as not to prejudice, but 
rather to further the interests of others, is the good man. Not the abolition of prop- 
erty, but the rendering it possible for every one to acquire property, restriction of the 
" exploitation " of the labor of some by others, reduction of the hours of daily labor to 
seven or eight, and the extension of culture, are the true problems for legislation. It 
is obvious that the requirements which Helvetius makes of the State, are founded on 
the idea of benevolence, while he believes individuals to be bound to foUow self-inter- 
est ; his error is in not having appreciated the gradual progress of man from his limita- 
tion to self, as an individual, to higher stages, where he is animated successively with 
the spirit of comparatively restricted and then of larger societies, and is led beyond 
motives of egoistic calculation. The substance of what he proposes is better than the 
groixnds on which his proposals rest. Charles Francois de St. Lambert (1716-1803 ; 
Catechisme universd, 1797) and Volney (Constanttn Francois de Chasseboexif , 1757-1820 ; 
Catechisme du citoyen fraru^ais, 1793, second edition, entitled. La hi natureUe ou 
principes physiques de la morale, deduits de Vorganisation de Vhmrnne et de Vunivers ; 
(Euvres computes, Paris, 1821, 2d ed., 1836), are prominent among those who followed 
Helvetius, but modified his principles so as to make them less extreme, and who em- 
phasized the idea of the indissoluble union of the happiness of the individual with the 
happiness of aU ; in the ' ' Ruins " (Les Ruines, ou meditations sur les revolutions des 
empires, 4th ed., Paris, 1808), Volney makes a historico-philosophical application of this 
ethics. The French Revolution was viewed by Volney as an attempt to realize the 
ideal of the rule of reason. On the same ideal is based Condorcet's (1743-1794) phi- 
losophy of history {Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progres de V esprit humain, 1794). 
Jean Baptiste Robinet (bom at Reimes, 1735, where he died, Jan. 24, 1820) sought in 
his principal work, De la Nature {Ai vols., Amst., 1761-66 ; vol. I., nouveUe edit. , Amst., 
1763), as also in his Considerations philosophiques de la gradation natureUe des foi-mes de 
fetre, ou des essais de la nature qui apprend d faire F/iomme (Amst., 1767), and Paral- 
tele de la condition et des facuUes de VJwmme avec cdles des autres animaua;, trad, de 
Vanglais (Bouillon, 1769), to carry out the idea of a gradual development of the forms 
of existence. Robinet recognises a single creative cause of nature, but believes it im- 
possible to ascribe to it personality without falling into a misleading anthropomor- 
phism. Influenced perhaps by Robinet's writings, Dom. Deschamps, the Benedictine 
(1716-1774), maintained a modified Spinozism in a manuscript written soon after 1770 
(the main contents have been but recently edited by Emile Beaussire under the title : 
Antecedents de Vliegelianisme dans la philosophie fran<^aise, Paris, 18G5 ; cf. Journal des 
Savants, 1866, pp. 609-634), and indirectly also in some works of somewhat earlier 

130 IIUMe's skepticism and its OrPONENTS. 

date. DcBchamps teaches that the universe {le tout universel) is a real being {un etrt 
Qui existe), and the basis (lefond) of which all perceivable things are modifications 
(nuances). Dcschamps, probably following Robinet, seeks to overthrow the Spinozis- 
tic dualism of the attributes thought and extension by a hylozoistic monism. That, in 
which he appears particularly as a predecessor of Hegel, is his assertion, that truth 
includes in itself contradictory elements. 

The systematic chef-cCoiuvre of French Materialism in the eighteenth century was the 
System of Nature of Baron Paul Heinrich Dietrich von Holbach (bom in 1723 at Hei- 
delsheim, near Bruchsal, in the Palatinate, died Feb. 21, 1789, at Paris), a friend of 
Diderot. The work was entitled : Byitteme de la nature ou des Ms du monde physique et 
du rnonde moral (Lond., in reality Amst. or Leyden, 1770; nominally by feu Mira- 
baud [died 17C0], who had been the Secretary of the Academy at Paris; the same 
translated into German, with notes, Leipsic, 1841). Holbach's system combines all those 
elements of the empirical doctrine, which till then had been cultivated rather separately 
than together, viz. : materialism (La Mettrie's), sensationalism (Condillac's), determiu' 
ism (which Diderot, too, had admitted), atheism (which this system most openly avows, 
after the example, in part, of the author of the Lettre de Thrasybule a Leucippe^ writ- 
ten in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, perhaps by the antiquarian Nic. 
Freret, who was bom 1688, and died, while Secretary of the Acad, of Inscriptions, in 
1749 and in which religious faith is defined as a confusion of the subjective ^vith the 
objective), and the ethics (Helvetius', qualified by Holbach through the emphasis laid 
by the latter on the joint interest of all) which was founded on the principle of self- 
love or of self-interest rightly understood, but which agreed substantially, in most 
points, with the doctrine of benevolence. Besides the Systeme de la Nature, Holbach 
is said to have written anonymously a number of works directed against supematural- 
istic doctrines, in particular, Lettres a Eugenie ou preservatif contre les prejurjes (1768), 
Examen critique aur la vie et les ouvrages de St. Paul (1770), Le bon sens ou idees natu- 
reUes ojyposees aux idees surnaturdles (1772), La politique naturelle ou diicmtrs stir les 
vraia prindpes du gmivernement (1773), Systeme socird (1773), Elements de la morale uni- 
verseUe (1776), Vetlujcratie ou le gouvemement fonde sur la morale universelle (1776). 
(Some other works directed expressly against Christian theology, which have often 
been attributed to Holbach, were written by other persons, such as Danulaville and 

Buffon (1707-1788), the naturalist, believed in Naturalism, without openly and 
unreservedly avowing this belief. At once following and going beyond Condillac, 
Cabanis (1757-1808 ; Rapports du physique et dumm-al de VJwrnme, 1798-1799, in the 
Mem. de VInstitut, then separately in 1802, etc.) cultivated physiology and psychology 
in a materialistic sense. Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836; Elements dHdMogie, Par., 
1801-15; Commentaire sur V esprit des lois de Montesquieu, Par., 1819), Laromiguiere 
(Le^aris de philos. ou essai sur lesfacultes de Vdme, Par., 1815-18), and others, sought in 
the first decennia of the nineteenth century either further to develop or to qualify the 
Bystem of Sensationalism, but found in philosophers devoted to the Church, and in 
Royer-CoUard and Victor Cousin who followed partly Descartes and partly Scotch 
and German philosophers and in the eclectic or spiritualistic school founded by them, 
opponents, who very considerably limited their influence. (Cf. Damiron, Essai ur 
thistoire de lapJiiloa. en France an dix-neuvieme siede, Paris, 1828.) 

119. Contemporaneously with the French " illumination," under its 

Hume's skepticism and its opponents. 131 

influence, and in turn influenciuij:; it, arose the Skepticism of Hume. 
David Iluuie (1711-1776), philosoplier, statesman, and historian, stand- 
ing on the ground of the Lockian Empiricism, transformed the latter, 
through his investigations respecting the origin and application of the 
idea of causality, into a philosophy of Skepticism. Hume finds the 
origin of the conception of cause in habit, which, he says, leads us to 
expect that under similar circumstances one event will be followed by 
another, which we have often seen joined with it, and he limits the 
application of the conception to those cases in which from given facts 
we conclude, according to analogies of experience, to others. Hume 
denies, accordingly, the possibility of our knowing the nature and 
mode of the objective connection between causes and effects, and the 
philosophical legitimacy of our attempting to transcend, by means of 
the causal idea, the whole field of experience and to conclude to the 
existence of God and the immortality of the soul. It was particularly 
the anti-theological consequences of this doctrine which awakened a 
number of Scottish philosophers, headed by Thomas Reid, to a vigorous 
polemic against it, a polemic weak in its philosophical principle (the 
appeal to the common sense of men), but which led to numerous, and, 
in many cases, valuable investigations in empirical psychology and 
ethics ; the doctrine of these Scotch philosophers was subsequently 
incorporated into the Eclecticism of Cousin and his school. In Ger- 
many it was chiefly the Skepticism of Hume which incited Immanuel 
Kant to the construction of his Critical philosophy. 

Hume's Treatise on Human NaUire appeared in 3 vols., at London, 1739-40, also Lond., 1817 ; the same 
in German, translated by Ludw. Heinr. Jakob, HaOe, 1790-91. His best>known philosophical work, Enquiry 
concerning Human Understatiding, was first published at Lond., 1748 ; in German (translated by Sulzer), 
Hamb. and Leips., 1775, and (transl. by W. G. Tennemann), published with an essay on philosophical skepti- 
cism, by Karl Leonh. Reinhold, Jena, 1793 ; a new translation of the same, by J. H. von Kirchmann, consti- 
tutes Vol. 13 of the Philos. Bibliothek, Berlin, 1869. Under the title of Essays and Treatises on Sererai 
Subject-i, Hume published together, in 1770, the Essays Moral, Political, and Literary which had first ap- 
peared in 1742 together with the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and the Essays entitled A 
Dissertation on the Passions, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (first publ. Lond., 1751), and 
The Natural History of Heligion (first publ. Lond., 1755) ; this collection has been repeatedly reprinted. 
After Hume's death appeared Dialogues concerning Natural Religion by David Hume, with the publication 
of which he had charged his friend Adam Smith; second edition, Lond., 1779; in German (by Schreiter), 
together with a Dialogue on Atheism by Ernst Plainer, Leipsic, 1781. Essays on Suicide and the fmmortalitp 
of the Soul, ascribed to the late David Hume. Lond., 1783 ; a new edition, Lond., 1789. Complete editions of 
his works have been published at Edinb., 1827, 1836, and Lond., 1856. Hume's Autobiography (written in 
1776) was published by Adam Smith, Lond., 1777; the same in Latin, 1787; of him treat J. H. Burton, Hfe 
and Correspondence of D. H, Edinb., 1846 ; Feuerlein, Hume's Leben wui Wirken, in Der Oedanke, Vols. 
lY. and V., Berlin, 1863 and 1864 ; F. Papillon, David Hume, precurseur (TAuguste Comte, Versailles, 18C8. 

Bom at Edinburgh on the 26th day of April, 1711, Hume lived from 1734 to 1737 in 
France. At Paris the supposed miracles, wrought particularly at the grave of the 
Abbe Paris, in the Cemetery of St. Medard, for the persecuted Jonsenists, were then 

132 hijme's skepticism and its opponents. 

exciting general interest, and gave occasion to disinterested thinkers for psychological 
investigations respecting the genesis of the belief in miracles. That this was true in 
Hume's case is aflirmed by himself in his essay on miracles. (Similarly the pretended 
miracles of animal magnetism incited David Friederich Strauss, whUe yet quite young, 
to psychological speculations.) During his sojourn in France Hume wrote his first 
philosophical work : A Treatise on Human Nature, being an Attempt to introduce the 
Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects, which work he published after 
hie return to England at London, 1739-40. It received, however, little notice. A 
more favorable reception was given to the Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, pub- 
lished at Edinburgh, in 1742. In the year 1746 Hume is said to have applied in vain 
for a professorship of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. Not long afterwards (1747) 
Hume accompanied General St. Clair, as secretary, on a military embassy to the 
Courts of Vienna and Turin ; at Turin Hume revised his work on Human Nature and 
divided it into several separate treatises ; of these the most important is the Enquiry 
concerning Human Understanding (London, 1748). In the year 1749 Hume journeyed 
back to Scotland. In the year 1751 he published an Enquiry concerning the Principles 
of Morals. His Political Discourses (Edinb., 1752, 2d ed. ib., 1753) were received witb 
much applause. A position as librarian, which he commenced to fill at Edinburgh i?> 
1752, and through which a mass of literary sources were made easily accessible to him. 
was the occasion of his writing the History of England, the first volume of which ap 
peared in 1754, the fifth in 1763. In the year 1755 appeared his Natural History of 
Religion, which drew upon him the enmity of many. Hume accompanied as secre- 
tary, in 1763, the Earl of Hertford on his embassy to Versailles for the conclusion of 
peace. At Paris Hume met with a brilliant reception. Returning to England (1766) he 
was accompanied by Rousseau, whose friend he had become ; but he was soon re- 
warded with ingratitude by Rousseau, to whom the sense of dependence was intcil" 
arable, and who thought himself injured by Hume, especially in certain public 
utterances which he erroneously ascribed to Hume. As Under-Secretary of State in 
the Foreign Office (at the head of which General Conway stood) Hume conducted in 
1767-68 the diplomatic correspondence of England. From 1769 Hume lived in retire- 
ment at Edinburgh until his death, on the 25th of August, 1776. 

In his principal philosophical work, the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 
after announcing as his purpose, not a mere exhortation to virtue, but a thorough- 
going examination of the powers of man and of the limits of our knowledge hence, 
not a merely popular, but a scientific philosophic investigation, in which, nevertheless, 
he proposes, as far as possible, to combine exactness with clearness Hume proceeds 
first to inquire into the origin of ideas. He distinguishes between impressions and 
ideas or thoughts ; under the former he understands the lively sensations which we 
have when we hear, see, feel, or love, hate, desire, will, and under the latter, the less 
lively ideas of memory or imagination, of which we become conscious when we reflect 
on any impression. The creative power of thought extends no further than to the 
faculty of combining, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the material furnished 
by the senses and by experience. All the materials of thought are given us through 
external or internal experience ; only their combination is the work of the under- 
standing or the win. All our ideas are copies of perceptions. The idea of God fur- 
nishes no exception to this rule ; the mind obtains that idea by magnifying the human 
attributes of wisdom and goodness beyond all limits. The joining of different ideas 
vrith each other depends on the three principles of association ; similarity, union in 
epace and time, and cause and effect. 

Hume's skepticism axd its opponents. 133 

ALl subjects of human reason or inquiry can be divided into two classes : relations 
of ideas, and facts. To the first class belong the propositions of geometry, arith- 
metic, and algebra, and, in general, all judgments the evidence of which is founded 
on intuition or demonstration. All propositions of this kind are discovered by the 
sole agency of the faculty of thought ; they are altogether independent of reality. 
Even though no circle or triangle existed in nature, the statements of geometry would 
still be true.* But propositions which relate to matters of objective fact have 
neither the same degree nor the same kind of evidence. The truth or falsity of such 
propositions is not demonstrable by ideas alone ; for if it were so the supposition of 
the contrary must involve a contradiction, which is not the case. All reasoning about 
facta appears to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. It is presupposed 
that there is a causal connection between the present fact and that which is inferred 
from it, so that the one is the cause of the other, or both are co-ordinate effects of 
the same cause. If, therefore, we would obtain a satisfactory insight into the nature 
of the certainty of inferred facts, we must inqmre in what manner we obtain the 
knowledge of cause and effect. 

We acquire, says Hume, the knowledge of the causal nexus in no case by d priori 
inferences, but solely through experience, which shows us certain objects connected ac- 
cording to a constant rule. The effect is entirely different from the cause, and can, con- 
sequently, not be discovered in the idea of the latter, nor learned inferentially by the 
understanding without the aid of experience. A stone or piece of metal left in the 
air without support falls at once to the ground. This, experience teaches us. But 
can we possibly discover by d prion reasonings the least ground for supposing that the 
stone or metal might not as weU move upwards as towards the centre of the earth ? 
StUl less, than the nature of the effect, can the xinderstanding know d jniori the 
necessary invariable connection between cause and effect. It follows, hence, that the 
highest end of human knowledge consists in summing up the empirically discovered 
causes of natural phenomena, and arranging the multitude of particular effects under 
a few general causes. But our pains are lost if we attempt to ascertain the causes of 
these general causes. The ultimate grounds of things are utterly inaccessible to the 
curiosity and investigation of man. Elasticity, gravity, the cohesion of parts, and the 
communication of motion by impulsion, are probably the most general causes to which 
we can trace back the phenomena of nature ; but even thus our ignorance of nature is 
only removed a few degrees further backwards. The hke is true in reference to 
moral philosophy and the science of knowledge. Geometry, great as is her well-de- 
served renown in respect of the conclusiveness and rigor of her demonstrations, can 
yet not help us to the knowledge of the ultimate catises in nature ; for her only use is 
in the discovery and application of natural laws ; but these laws themselves must be 
known through experience. 

* This opinion of Hume is only an assertion ; he has demonstrated nothing. It is tenable only on the 
extremely questionable hyixithesis of the mere subjectivity of space, which hypothesis, indeed, Hume, by 
kbolishing the distinction made by Locke between primitive and secondary qualities, and, later and more 
decidedly, Kant adopted, but which is by no means necessarily true, and, even supposing it to be true, does 
not furnish a real explanation of apodictical knowledge. Pure geometry contains no proposition which 
aJfinns the existence of a circle or triangle in nature, but only propositions which, assuming the existence of 
the things denoted by the subjects of the propositions, affirm the necessary connection between those sub- 
jects and the asserted predicates. But this connection is affirmed as an objective and real one, and not aa 
merely existing between our ideas, whence, in applied geometry, every circle, triangle, cylinder, cone, etc., 
which can exist in the sphere of objective reality, is recognized as possessing the predicates demonstrated Is 
pure geometry. 

134 Hume's skepticism and its opponents. 

When we perceive similar sensible qualities, we expect from them effects similar U 
those we have already experienced as arising from them. But it may further be 
asked, on what this expectation is founded. Were it, by any means, supposable that 
the course of nature might change, and that the past would furnish no rule for the 
future, then all experieuce would be useless, and no more inferences coiild be drawn 
from it. The principle which determines all our expectations of similar effects is 
not any knowledge of the hidden force, through which the one thing brings another 
into being for no such force can we observe, whether without or within us ; but this 
principle is habit ; the mind is led by habit, on the repetition of similar instances, to 
expect, with the appearance of the one event, the ordinary accompanying event, and 
to believe that it will really take place. This connection of events, which we feel in 
the mind, this habitual transition from one object to its customary accompaniment, is 
the sensation or impression from which we form the conception of a force or neces- 
sary connection. "When successive phenomena are continually perceived to be con- 
nected, we feel the accustomed connection of ideas, which feeling we transfer to the 
subjects of the perceived phenomena, just as, in general, we are wont to ascribe to 
external objects the sensations which are occasioned in us by them.* 

Hume's philosophical significance is connected principally with his speculations con- 
cerning causality. His skepticism is founded on the assertion, that the causal idea, 
owing to its origin in habit, admits of use only within the field of experience : to rea- 
son from data given empirically to that which is transcendent (or lies beyond the 
whole range of experience), like God and immortality, appears to Hume unlawful. To 
this is to be added that Hume, particularly in his earUest treatise, expresses an equally 
negative judgment concerning the idea of substance ; the I, he argues, is a complex of 
ideas, for which we have no right to posit a single substratum or underlying substance. 
Hume's ethical principle is the feeling of the happiness and misery of man. The moral 
judgment is based on the satisfaction or disapprobation which an action excites in him 
who witnesses it. Owing to the natural sympathy of man for his fellows, an action 
performed in the interest of the common welfare calls forth approbation, and one of 
an opposite nature, disapprobation. 

* Correctly as Hume here describes the commencement of experimental reasoning in animals and men, 
no less signally has he failed to appreciate and explain the progress of the same, the cessation of the habit of 
naively objectifying the subjective current of ideas and the gradual lise of the mind to knowledge which is 
objectively true. The animal which walks into the snare, the mere practitioner who only follows a rou- 
tine, and in extraordinai-y cases falls into misfortune, through his adherence to his ordinary methods, 
furnish Instances of that phenomenon, which is psychologically explained by Hume ; but it is only supple- 
mentarily (in a note subsequently added), and then not without a certain degree of inconsistency, that Hume 
has attempted to show how those series of inferences are accomphshed by which man is enabled to out- wit 
the animal, or the thinker to avoid the errors of the mere practitioner. More comprehensive inductions may 
lead to more general principles, which furnish the major premises for deductive conclusions, whereby the cor- 
rectness of the results of less comprehensive inductions are either confirmed and made certain, or disproved ; 
but in proportion as the expectations thus corrected are found in more and more universal agreement with reality, 
the conception of force, which arises from our reflecting on the sense of effort and on our willing power in 
general, and the conception of causality, reposing on that of force, acquire objective validity, and the rules, 
which were not without exceptions, are transformed into laws valid without exception. Hume himself, when 
he says, "the factor, on which the effect depends, is often involved in the midst of extraneous and external 
circumstances; the separation of them often requires great attention, exactness, and penetration," acknowl- 
edges, although only by implication, the existence of an objective basis of the causal idea. Furthermore, habit 
itself stands within the sphere of the (psychical) causal nexus, and hence implies the objectivity of the causal 
relation. In order to vindicate for the idea of causality an objective validity, Kant pronoimced it an <^ priori 
conception, just as he conceived space and time as <i priori intuitions, whereby, however, the only objectivity 
which can with full propriety be so called (distinguished by Kant as the "transcendental" from the "empiri 
cal "), is given up. See below, 122. 


The Scottish philosophers, Thomas Reid (1710-96 ; Inquiry into the Iluman Mind 
on the Principles of Common Sense, London, 1763, etc. ; On the Intellectual Poicers oj 
Man, Edinb., 1785 ; On the Active Powers of Man, Edinb., 1788 the two latter works 
often printed together as Essays on the Poicers of the Iluman Mind ; Works, ed. by 
Dugald Stewart, Edinb. , 1804, ed. by Hamilton, id. , 1827, etc. ; c. lieid and the Phi- 
losophy of Common Sense, a paper written in 1847 by J. F. Ferrier and included in his 
Lectures ed. by Grant and Lnshington, London, 1866, Vol. II., pp. 407-459), James 
Beattie (1735-1803; Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to 
Sophistry and Scepticism, Edinb., 1770, etc.), and James Oswald {Appeal to Common 
Sense in behalf of Religion, Edinb., 1766-72), were not able, by their recourse to the 
principle of "common sense," truly to refute and vanquish Hume's skeptical doctrine. 
Their doctrines, modified in a measure by independent psychological investigations, 
were taken up by later Scotch philosophers, such as Dugald Stewart (1753-1828 ; Ele- 
ments of the Philosophy of Iluman Mind, Edinb., 1792-1827, etc., Lond., 1862, 1867; 
Outlines of Moral Philosophy, 1793 [with critical notes by J. McCosh, London, 1863], 
etc.; Phihs. Works, ed. by Hamilton, 10 vols., Edinb., 1854-58), Thom. Brown (1778- 
1820 ; to be distinguished from Peter Brown, Bishop of Cork, who died in 1735, and 
was a sensationalist in philosophy, but orthodox in theology ; Thom. Brown, Lectures 
on the Philos. of Iluman Mind, 1820, 19th ed., Lond., 1856; Lectures on Ethics, ib., 
1856), James Mackintosh (1764^1832; Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, 
chiefly during the llHiand 18th Centuries, in the Encydop. Brit., also separately, Lond., 
1330, Edinb., 1836 ; 3d ed., with preface by W. ^yhcweU, London, 1863 [newed., 1872J ; 
the same in French by H. Poret, Paris, 1834), and others. 




120. The Third Division of the history of Modern Philosophy 
begins with Kant's critique of human reason. The object of this 
critique is to establish by an examination of the origin, extent, and 
limits of human knowledge the distinction between phenomena whose 
substance is given us through impressions on the senses, but whose 
form is a purely subjective product of the mind itself and real things 
or " things-in-themselves," which exist out of relation to time, space, or 
causality. Its result, on the one hand, is to vindicate for empirical in- 
vestigation complete inde])endence in the sphere of phenomena, while, 
on the other hand, it recognizes as existing, in addition to the realm of 
objects of experience, a realm of freedom, open, according to Kant, 


only to the moral consciousness, but, according to some of his succes 
sors, who expanded Kant's principle of the autonomy of the mind, 
to the speculative reason also. In Kant's doctrine of the world of 
phenomena, the subjective origin, which he assigns to the forms of 
knowledge, constitutes a (subjective-) idealistic element, while the as- 
sumption that the material of thought is given from without, is a 
realistic one. In his doctrine of things in themselves, the function 
ascribed to these things, of affecting our senses, is a realistic element, 
while the freedom claimed for them is an idealistic one. The dualism 
of these idealistic and realistic elements, which are placed by Kant, 
without mediation, side by side, and which are by no means (not even 
in the Critique of the Judging Faculty) combined in perfect harmony, 
could not but occasion the attempt to build up, in a twofold manner, 
a consequent and in all parts harmonious system of the whole of phi- 
losophy, either, namely, by sacrificing the realistic postulates of Kant in 
favor of his idealistic teachings, or, conversely, by giving up, or, at 
least, very considerably modif}ung, the latter in favor of the former. 
The former alternative was chosen by Fichte, and the latter by Her- 
bart. Fichte's subjective idealism formed the point of departure for 
Schelling's prevailingly objective idealism, and the latter served a 
similar purpose for Hegel's absolute idealism. Others (among whom 
Schleiermacher may be numbered) sought to effect the harmonious 
union of the idealistic and realistic elements in a doctrine of Ideal- 
Realism. In the period embraced in this division, the relation of phi- 
losophy to positive investigation, both natural and historical, to poetry, 
to political conditions, and to religious life, and, in short, to the gen- 
eral development of human culture, changes with the varying force of 
the motives to philosophical development inherent in the changing 
state of philosophy itself ; in the first decades philosophy exerts a de- 
termining influence on these other sides of intellectual life, while in 
the subsequent period, when the general interest is less turned towards 
philosophy, philosophy experiences more their influence. 

The illustration and demonstration of these introductory statements can only be 
accomplished in the course of the following expositions ; before the presentation of the 
systems to which reference has been made, the attempt to famish such illustration and 
demonstration would involve too great abstractness, and might easily lead to wrong 
judgments. Only to one thing may it here be allowed again to direct attention, namely, 
to the fact that the innermost soul of the whole process of development in modem 
philosophy is not a mere immanent dialectic of speculative principles, but is rather the 
struggle between religious convictions, handed down from the past and deeply rooted 

kant's life and writings. 137 

In the modem mfnd and heart, and the scientific results of modem investigations in 
the fields of nature and mind, together with the attempt to reconcile both. While 
Dogmatism had believed in the possibility of combining, in one complete system of 
philosophy, fundamental theological principles with the doctrines of natural science, 
while Empiricism had excluded the affirmations of religion from the field of science 
whether with a view to asserting for them another province or to denying them alto- 
gether and while Skepticism had doubted the possibility of solving the problems in 
question, Kant (who correctly grasped the vital point in the philosophical inquiries of 
the period immediately preceding his own) opened up, by his Criticism, a new path, 
denying, as a result of his speculations concerning the limits of the knowledge attainable 
by human reason, the dogmatic postulate of attainable harmony, adopting the Empiri- 
cists' limitation of scientific knowledge, but in an essentially altered sense (namely, by 
restricting such knowledge to the sphere of phenomena alone), and at once appropriat- 
ing the results of Skepticism and (through his doctrine of a sphere of absolute reality, 
within which man could attain to moral certainty) overstepping them. The later de- 
velopments in philosophy were, in a certain sense, modified renewals of earlier systems, 
under the influence and, in part, on the ground of Kantism. 

Works especially relating to modem philosophy, beginning with Kant, are the following (with which ar 
to be compared the parts treating of the same subject in the more general works cited above, Vol. I., 4, 
and Vol. II., 1): 

Karl Ludw. Michelet, Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deiitscfiland von Kant bis Hegel, 
3 Vols., Berlin, 1837-38, and EntwickehingsQeschichte der neuesien deutschen Philnsophie, Berlin, 1843. 

Heinr. Mor. Chalybaus, Hiator. Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis 
Begel, Dresden, 1837, 5th ed., 1860. [English translation from 4th ed. by Alfred Tulk, London, 1854. Tr.] 

Friedr. Karl Biedermann, Die deutsche Philosophie von Kant bis auf unsere Tage, Leipsic, 1842-43. 

A. Ott, Hegel et la philosophie allemande, ou expose et examen critique des principaux systimes de la 
philosophie allemande depuis Kant, Paris, 1843. 

A. S. WiUm, Histoire de la philosophie allemande depuis Kantjusgu^d Higel, Paris, 184&-49. 

L. Wocquier, Essai sur le mouvement philosophique de TAllemagiie depuis Kant jusqu''d nos Jours, 
Brussels, Ghent, and Leips., 1852. 

C. Fortlage, Genetische Geschichte der Philosophie seit Kant, Leipsic, 1852. 

H. Bitter, Versuch zur Verstandigttng fiber die neueste deutsche Philosophie seit Kant, in the Allgem. 
Wonatsschrift fiir Wiss. u. Lilt., and also published separately, Brunswick, 1853. 

G. Weigelt, Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Hamburg, 1854-65. 

Carl Herm. Kirchner, Die speculativen Systeme seit Kant und die philosophische Ait/gabe der Gegen- 
wart, Leipsic, 1860. 

A Foucher de Careil, Hegel et Schopenhauer, etudes sur la philosophie allemande depuis Kant jusqu^i 
nos jours, Paris, 1862. 

Ad. Drechsler, Charakteristik der philosophischen Systeme sett Kant, Dresden, 1863. 

O. Liebmann, Kant und die Epigonen, Stuttgart, 1865. 

121. Immanuel Kant was born on the 22d day of April, 1724, at 
Konigsberg, in Eastern Prussia, where he died, February 12, 1804. 
He received his education and taught as a University-Professor in his 
native city. On Kant's earliest philosophical opinions the philosophy 
of "Wolff and the physics of Kewtoii exerted a controlling influence ; 
it was only in a later period, beginning with 1769, that he developed 
the critical philosophy which is set forth in his principal works. Of 
the works of Kant belonging to the period preceding the critical phi- 
losophy, the most important is the General History of Nature and 

138 rant's life and writings. 

Theory of the Heavens. His principal works of the critical period are 
the Critique of the Pure Reason^ which was first published in 1781, 
and again, in revised form, in 1787, the Critique of the Practical 
Reason^ published in 1788, and the Critique of the Faculty of Judg- 
ment^ written in 1790. The Metaphysical Principles of Natural Sci- 
ence (1786), the Religion within the Limits of the Mere Reason (1793), 
and other smaller works contain the application of the principles of 
the critical philosophy to particular departments of philosophical 
inquiry. In investigation and teaching, as well as in his external life, 
Kant constantly gave evidence of strict conscientiousness and unre- 
mitting loyalty to duty. 

Works on Kant's life and character are the following : Ludwig Ernst Borowski, Darstellung des Leben 
nnd Charaktera Kants, Konigsberg, 1804 (a biography drawn up in 1792, then revised by Kant himself, com- 
pleted and published by the author after Kant's death, and containing much valuable information, especially 
on Kant's family and early Ufe), Reinhold Bemhard Jachmann, Immanuel Kant, in Brie/en an einen 
Freund, Konigsberg, 1804 (a portraiture of Kant's character, founded on knowledge acquired in personal 
intercourse with Kant in 1784-94, preceded by a biographical sketch), Ehregott Andreas Christoph Wasianski 
Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren, Kimigsberg, 1804 (a faithful account of the gradual decay of Kant's men- 
tal and bodily powers), Theodor Rink, Ansichten axis I. KanCs Leben, Konigsberg, 1805, P. Bouterwek, /. 
Kani, Hamburg, 1805, and others, especially Friedr. Wilh. Schubert, Imm. Kanfs Biographie, in Kant's 
Werke, ed. by Rosenkranz and Schubert, Vol. XI., Part 2, Leipsic, 1842 (summing up what had been written 
before and adding to it much new matter). Purther additions to the same subject have been made in Chr. 
Friedr. Reusch's Kant und seine T^schgenosnen aus d^m Nachlass denjiingsten derselben (printed separately, 
from the Keite Preuss. Provinzialbl., Vol. VI., Nos. 4 and 5, Kimigsberg, 1848), and in Kantiana, BeitrUge 
mj. Imm. KanCs Leben tind SchiHfUn, ed. by Rud. Reicke (from the N. Pr. Provimial-Bldtter), Konigsberg, 
1860 ; the latter work contains a discourse on Kant delivered by Professor Wald, Councillor of the Consistory, 
In the year 1804, together with the notices on which the same was based, and also, in particular, many valu- 
able remarks by Professor Kraus, the intimate friend of Kant, as also a few addenda to Kant's writings. 
Rrom these sources the later writers of Kant's life (among whom Kimo Fischer author of Kant a Leben und 
die Orundlagen seiner Lehre, drei Vortrdge, Mannheim, 1860, also Gesc/i. derneiieren Ph., Vol. III., Mann- 
heim and Heidelberg, 1860, pp. 42-110, 2d ed. ib., 1869 deserves distinguished mention) have drawn. 

Two complete editions of Kant's works have been published : Immanuel KaivCs Werke, edited by G. 
Hartenstein, 10 vols., Leipsic (Modes and Baumann), 18.3839, and /. KanCs .sammilicfie M'erke, edited by 
Karl Rosenkranz and Friedr. Wilh. Schubert, Leipsic (Leop. Voss), 1838-42, in 12 volumes, the last of which 
contains the "History of the Kantian Philosophy," by K. Rosenkranz. Hartenstein's edition is in part, the 
more accurate one ; the edition of Ros. and Sch. is more elegant and richer in material and in suggestive 
remarks. The general arrangement in both is systematic. In H.'s edition the logical and metaphy- 
sical works are followed first by the works on the practical reason and the faculty of judgment, and these by 
the works on natural philosophy, whUe In Ros. and Schu. the order is : Logic (including Metaphysics), Natu- 
ral Philosophy, and Philosophy of Mind. The latter arrangement is better adapted for easy over-sight ; but 
far preferable is the chronological arrangement of the whole (excepting only the letters, and, possibly, a few 
minor works), which gives the reader a view of Kant's phOosophical development. This arrangement is 
adopted in Hartenstein's new edition of Kant's works : /. Kanfs sSmmtliche Werke, in chronol. Eeiken- 
folge, 8 vols., Leips. (Leop. Voss), 1867-68. 

[Kant's Essays and Treatises, 2 vols., London, 1798. Contents of Vol. I. : (1) An Answer to the Ques- 
tion, What is Enlightening ? (2) The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. (3) The False SubtiUy oj 
the four SyllogUtic Figures Evinced. (4) On the Popular Saying, " That m.ay betruein Theory, but does not 
hold good in the Praxis.''^ (5) T7ie Injustice of Counterfeiting Books. (6) Eternal Peace. (7) The Conjectural 
Beginning of the History of Mankind. (8) An Inquiry concerning the Perspicuity of the Principles of 
Natural Theology and of Morals. (9) What means " To orient one's .self in thinking f" (10) An Idea of 
an Universal History in a Cosmopolilical View. Contents of Vol. II. : (1) Observatimis on the Feeling of 
the Beautiful and Sublime. (2) Something on the Influence oft/ie Moon on the Temperature of the Air. (S 
Hittory and Phymography of tht most Remarkable Cases of the Earthquake, which, towards the end of 17B& 

KANt's life AIJD WRITINGS. 139 

sAook a Orat Part of the Earth. (4) On the Volcanoes in the Moon. (5) Of a OentU ToneUttelvasmmedin 
Philosophy. (6) On t/ie Failure of all the Philos. Essays mthe Theodicee. (7) 77k only possible Argutneni 
for the Demonstration of the Existence of God. (8) Religion within the Sphere of Naked Reason. (9) Th 
End of All Things. 

''Metaphysical Works of the celebrated Imrnanuel Kant, translated from the German, with a Sketch of 
lUs Life and Writings, by John Richardson, many years a student of the Kantian Philosophy. Containing : 
1. Logic. 2. Prolegomena to Future Metaphysics. 3. Inquiry into the Proofs for the Ejcistence of God, 
and into the TTieodicy." London, 1836. No. 3, in the contents of this volume, is a conglomerate of citracti 
from various writings of Kant's, although the fact of its being such a conglomerate is not indicated by th 
translator. His proceeding in this matter is in so far uncritical and unfair, as he combines with extracts froa 
Kant's Critique other extracts from a work {On the Only Possible Proof for the Existence of God) belonging 
to the pre-critical period in Kant's philos. development. 

Theory of Religion, transl. by J. W. Semple, 1838. Kant's " Critick of Pure Reason, translated"' and 
" with notes and explanation of terms by Francis Heywood," London : Pickering, 1st ed., 1838, 2d ed., 1848. 
By the same author : " An Analysis of KanVs CrUick,"" etc., ib., 1844. Critique of Pure Reason, translated 
by M. D. Meiklejohn, London, Bohn, 1855. 

Other English translations of Kant's works, and works in English on Kant, are mentioned by the authm 
at the end of this, and in the literature of the following paragraph. TV.] 

The Cant family is of Scotch descent. Johann Georg Cant followed at Konige- 
berg the saddler's trade. The fourth child by his marriage -with Anna Regina Renter 
was Immanuel, who was bom on the 22d of April, 1724, and who, in order to prevent 
the mispronunciation of his name as Zant [Anglice : Tsant], wrote it Kant. One of 
his brothers, Johann Heinrich (1735-1800), became a theologian; of three sisters, the 
youngest survived her brother Immanuel. Six other children died while young. 
Kant received a strict religious education, in the spirit of the then widely-extended 
Pietism, whose principal light was Franz Albert Schulz (died 1763). Schulz became, 
in 1731, pastor of the Altstadt Church and Consistorial Coxmctllor, and in 1732 also 
an Ordinary Professor of Theology at the University, and in 1733 Director of the 
Collegium Fridericianum. From Easter in 1732 till Michaelmas in 1740, Kant studied 
at the Collegium Fridericianum in preparation for the University. Among his teach- 
ers Kant prized especially (in addition to Fr. Alb. Schulz) Joh. Friedr. Heydenreich, 
the instructor in Latin ; among his school-fellows, the most noteworthy was David 
Ruhnken (who left the Gymnasium at Easter, in 1741), subsequently Professor of 
Philology at Leyden, who says in a letter to Kant, dated March 10, 1771, speaking of 
the time when they were at the Gymnasium : tefrica iUa quidem, sed utili nee posni- 
tendn fannticorum disci2)lma continebamnr, and adds, that even then all cherished the 
greatest expectations concerning Kant. Kant was at this time especially devoted to 
the Roman classics, which he read with zeal, and was able to express himself well in 
Latin. At the University of Konigsberg, which he entered at Michaelmas in 1740, 
Kant studied philosophy, mathematics, and theology. He heard with special interest 
the lectures of Martin Knutzen, Professor Extraordinarius, on mathematics and phi- 
losophy, and familiarized himself particularly -with the ideas of Newton ; he heard also 
lectures on physics by Professor Teske, and philosophical lectures by other professors 
(who, however, acquired but little influence over him), and lectures on dogmatics by 
Franz Albert Schulz, who found means to combine the philosophy of Wolff with his 
own pietistic convictions. After the completion of his studies at the University, Kant 
filled, in the years 1746-55, positions as private tutor, first in the family of Andersch, a 
reformed pastor, near Gumbinnen, then in the family of Von Hiilsen, the proprietor of 
a manor at Arensdorf near Mohrungen, and finally in the family of Count Kayscrling 
at Rautenberg. He then qualified himself by the usual disputation to lecture at the 
University of Konigsberg, and opened with the winter semester of 1755 his lectures on 
mathematics and physics, logic, metaphysics, morals, and philosophical encyclopaedia ; 

140 rant's life and writings. 

he commenced also, in 1757, to lecture on physical geography, and in 1760 on natural 
theology and anthropology. In April, 1756, he sought to obtain the position of pro- 
fessor extraordinarius of mathematics and philosophy, a position made vacant by the 
early death of Knutzen ; but his application was unsuccessful, because the government 
had resolved to discontinue the extraordinary professorships a resolution which, 
conceived in view of impending war, effected what were in comparison extremely 
trifling savings by means of unreepecting severity toward unprovided teachers. The 
ordinary professorship of logic and metaphysics, which became vacant in the year 
1758, was given by the Russian Governor' then in office to Buck, a Decent of mathe- 
matics and philosophy, of longer standing than Kant ; it was not till twelve years later 
in 1770 that Kant was advanced to the same position, while Buck received the 
ordinary professorship of mathematics. In 1766 a position was given to the "talented, 
and, by his learned works, distinguished Magister Kant," as Sub-Librarian in the 
library of the Royal Castle, with a salary of 62 thalers, which position he relinquished 
in 1772. A call to Halle and other offers of positions were rejected by Kant. He 
taught until the autumn of 1797, when the increasing infirmities of age led him to 
give up lecturing. As an academical instructor he sought rather to excite his auditors 
to think for themselves, than to communicate to them results ; his lectures were an 
expresBion of the processes of his own thinking. Kant's hearers prized him for his 
recommendation of " simplicity in thought and naturalness in life," and because he 
himself practised upon his own recommendations {.see Reinhold Lenz, in a poem ad- 
dressed to Kant on the occasion of his entering upon his professorial duties, Aug. 21st, 
1770, communicated by Reicke in the Altpr. Monatsschr. , iv. 7, 1867). 

Kant took a lively interest in the political events of his time ; his opinions were 
those of a consistent liberalist. He sympathized with the Americans in their War of 
Independence, and with the French in their Revolution, which promised to realize the 
idea of political freedom, just as, in his theory of education, he approved the principles 
of Rousseau. Says Kant (in the Posthumous Fragments, Werke, Vol. XI., Part 1, p. 
253 seq.): "Nothing can be more terrible than that the actions of one man should be 
subject to the will of another. Hence no dread can be more natural than that of servi- 
tude. For a similar reason the child cries and becomes exasperated when he is called 
to do that which others will that he shall do, without having tried to enlist his sympa- 
thies for the work, and he desires only that he may soon be a man, that he may do as 
he likes." " Even with us, every man is held contemptible who occupies a very subor- 
dinate position. " To treat every man as an end in himself, not as a mere means, is a 
fundamental requirement of the Kantian ethics. But Kant desired human independence 
essentially in the interest of self-determination according to the spirit of the moral law. 
Cf. Schubert, Kant und seine Stellung zur Politik, in Raumer's iTi*^. Taschenbuch, 1838, 
p. 575 seq., where in particular the great power of the conservative, monarchical spirit 
in Kant, in spite of all his liberalism, is demonstrated. 

Characteristic of Kant's spirit is the following confession in a letter to Moses Men- 
delssohn, dated April 8, 1766 : " Whatever faults there may be, which the most stead- 
fast resolution is impotent at all times fully to avoid, I am sure that I shall never become 
inconstant and guilty of changing my appearances with each change in the world around 
me, after having learned through the greatest part of my life to do without and to 
despise the most of those things which usually corrupt the character ; and therefore the 
loss of that self-approval, which springs from the consciousness of an unfeigned spirit, 
would be the greatest evil that could possibly but surely never will befall me. I 
think, indeed, many things, with the clearest possible conviction of their truth, which I 

kant's life and writings. 141 

Bhall never have the courage to say ; but never shall I say anything vrhich I do not 

Intimate friendship bound Kant to the Englishman Green (died 1784), who resem- 
bled him iu love of independence and in conscientious punctuality ; and to Motherby, a 
merchant, Ruffman, a bank-director, and Wobser, the head-ranger at Moditten (near 
Konigsberg), in whose house he occasionally passed his vacations, and where, in par- 
ticular, he wrote his " Observations concerning the Beautiful and the Sublime." Kant 
was also a friend of Hippel and Hamann. Of his colleagues, John Schultz, court- 
preacher and Professor of Mathematics, who was the first to adopt and expound his 
doctrine, and Kraus, Professor of the Science of Finance, were his particular friends. 
The widest circle of venerators and friends surrounded Kant in liis old ago, when he 
was honored as the head of the widely-extending critical school ; he was most immod- 
erately praised by those to whom the new philosophy became a kind of new religion 
(by Baggesen, for example, who regarded Kant as a second Messiah). 

Baron Von Zedlitz, who was Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs under Frederick the 
Great, and retained the same office under the next king until 1788, held Kant in high 
estimation, and under the ministry of Wollner he enjoyed also at first the favor of the 
government. But when he purposed to publish the papers which together make up the 
" Religion within the Limits of the mere Reason," he came into conflict with the cen- 
sorship, which was to be exercised on the basis of the religious edict making the sym- 
bolic writings of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches an obligatory guide in doctrine. 
For the first of those papers : " On Radical Evil," in which Kant develops that side of 
his religious philosophy which harmonizes substantially with Pietism, the Imprimatur 
was allowed, although only with the observation, " that it might be printed, since only 
deep-thinking scholars read the writings of Kant." It appeared in April, 1792, in the 
''' Berliner Monatsschr if t." But for the second paper : " On the Contest between the 
Good and Evil Principles for the Control of Man," the right to print was denied by the 
College of Censors at Berlin. Kant's only alternative was to submit his work to a 
theological Faculty. The theological Faculty of his native city permitted its publica- 
tion, and the '"' Religion innerlmlh der Orcnzen der blossen Vernunft" was published at 
Easter, in 1793, by Nicolovius, at Konigsberg, and a second edition was published in 
1794. But in order to cut ofip this alternative for Kant in the future, his opponents 
procured a royal cabinet order (dated Oct. 1st, 1794), in which Kant was charged with 
" distorting and degrading many of the chief and fundamental doctrines of Holy Scrip- 
ture and of Christianity," and was required to make use of his reputation and his talents 
for the furtherance of the " paternal intention of the sovereign." All of the theological 
and philosophical instructors at the University of Konigsberg were also bound, over 
their signatures, not to lecture on Kant's "Religion within the Limits of the mere 
Reason." Kant held (as is shown by a fragment in his Remains, see Schubert, XI., 2, 
p. 138) that to recant or deny his convictions would be despicable, but that silence, as 
the case then stood, was his duty as a subject ; all which one said must be true, but it 
w.TS not necessary to say openly all that is true; he announced, therefore, in his letter 
of defence, his readiness, "as his Majesty's most loyal subject," thenceforth to abstain 
from all public discourses on religion from the chair or in writings. Since Kant's only 
motive for silence lay in his duty as a subject to King Frederick William II. , he found 
himself, after the death of this king, again possessing the right to express himself pub- 
licly. In Dtr Streit der Facnltdten. [The Conflict of the Faculties] he defended the 
right of philosophers to complete freedom of thought and expression, so long as they 
remain on their own ground and do not intermeddle with biblical theology as such, and 

Z42 rant's life ajto writings. 

gave vent to his disgust at a despotism which sought by compulsory laws to procure 
respect for that which could only be truly respected when respected freely. Yet Kant 
was unable to resume his lectures on religious philosophy ; his bodily and mental force 
was broken. He succumbed to a weakness of old age, which, gradually increasing, 
deprived him in his last months of memory and the power of thought, while his doc- 
trine was celebrating brilliant triumphs at most of the German Universities. The 
development and violation of his philosophical principle by Fichte, in his " Wissen- 
schaftslehre,^'' were disapproved by Kant, whose counter-declaration was nevertheless 
unable to check the progress of philosophical speculation in the direction of idealism. 

Kant's writings are the following : I. Works belonging to the time preceding the 
critical period, i. e., to Kant's first or genetic period, in which he occupied, in the 
main, the ground of the Leibnitzo-Wolffian Dogmatism, although in detail he, in 
many cases, and especially through the influence of Newton's and Euler's conceptions, 
passed beyond this stand-point and approached more toward Empiricism and Skepti- 
cism, and so indirectly toward his later critical philosophy : Qedanken von der wahren 
Schdtzung der lebendigen Krdfte und Beurtheilung der Beweise, deren sich Leibnitz und 
andffre Mechaniker in dieser Streitsache bedient haben^ Konigsberg, 1747 (not 1746, the 
date given on the title-page ; the dedication is dated April 22d, 1747). The question, 
whether the force of a body in motion is to be measured (with Leibnitz and others) by 
the product of the mass and the square of the velocity (mv') or (with Descartes, Euler, 
and others) by the product of the mass and the simple velocity (mv), is here termed by 
Kant the source of one of the greatest schisms existing among the geometricians of 
Europe, and he expresses the hope that he may be able to contribute to its composi- 
tion. He advances against the Leibnitzian view, then prevalent in Germany, several 
objections which tend in favor of the Cartesian, but admits, nevertheless, the former 
with a certain limitation. Kant divides, namely ( 15, 23, 118, 119), all motions into 
two classes, the one class including motions supposed to persist in the body to which 
they are communicated and to continue in infinitum, unless opposed by some obstacle, 
the other consisting of motions which cease, though opposed by nothing, as soon as 
the external force, by which they were produced, ceases to operate. (This " division," 
indeed, like many things in this earliest production, is completely erroneous.) Kant 
affirms that the Leibnitzian principle applies to the former class, and the Cartesian to 
the latter. If the conception of force be regarded, as is now customary, as merely 
an accessory conception, the controversy itself can no longer exist, since then only the 
determination of what are the phenomena of motion and their laws is directly of ob- 
jective importance, while the definition of force becomes a question of methodical con- 
venience. If by force is meant a cause proportionate to the quantity of the motion of 
a body, the Cartesian principle of course applies ; but if the power of the body in mo- 
tion to produce certain special effects, e. g., to overcome a continuous and uniform 
resistance, is what is meant by force, the Leibnitzian formula is applicable, according 
to which, the "work" performed by the "force" is equal to the difference of the 
products of half the mass multiplied by the squares of the velocity at the commence- 
ment and at the end of the motion. (At the present time, as is known, mv is used to 
designate the " quantity of motion," and mv- the "living force." In the case of a 
Dody falling freely, the final velocity after n seconds = 2 ng, and the distance traversed 
in n seconds = n^'g. One-half of the product of the mass by the square of the velocity 
i mv^ = ^m. 4 n^g- = 2 m n'g' = 2 gm. n-g, or the product of the " moving force " (2 gm) 
by the distance (n'g). The heights to which bodies rise when thrown upwards vary, 
therefore, as the squares of their initial velocities, and in like manner, generally, tha 

kant's life Airo wkitengs. 143 

"work" performed by a moving body is measured by half the product of the mass into 
the square of the velocity.) D'Alembert showed, as early as 1743, that analytical me- 
chanics can leave the disputed question one side, since it is only a dispute about words. 
From the present stand-point of science, B. W. H. Lexis (among others) expresses the 
following judgment in his De generalibus motus legibus {dm. inaug.)^ Bonn, 1859: 
' ' Nostro tempore miramur quod tot mri docti non viderint totam disceptationem verti circa 
merum verbum ^ vis,^ quod ab aliis alio sensu adhibebatur. Kantius., gravibus quidem 
erroribus laborans, tameii inultis locis, ex. gr. 88 et 89 (ia which Kant treats of the 
greater facility with which faults in demonstration are discovered after a previous 
weighing of the demonstrative force of the arguments) profundio7'em rei ostendit per- 
spicientiam. " Yet at the bottom of the discussions lay concealed by the contest of 
words the problem, how to combine the principle of the equality of cause and effect 
with facts. Cf. G. Reuschle, in the Deutsclie ViertdjaJirsscJirift for April-June, 1868, 
pp. 53-55. A characteristic affirmation is made by Kant in 19, that metaphysics, 
like many other sciences, had only reached the threshold of well-grounded knowledge. 

Untersuchung der Frage, ob die Erde in Hirer Umdrehung uin die Aclise einige Verdn- 
deningen seit den ersten Zeiten ihres Ursprungs erlitten habe, in the Konigsberger 
Nachrichten., 1754. Kant proposes to investigate this question [whether the time of 
the earth's daily rotation has changed] not historically, but only physically ; he finds in 
the ebb and flow of the tides a cause of constant retardation. Cf. Reuschle, as above 
cited, pp. 74-82. 

Die Frage^ oh die Erde veralte, physikalisch erwogen, ib., 1754. Kant does not de- 
cide, but only examines this question [whether the earth is wearing out] , criticising 
various arguments for the affirmative. Cf . Reuschle, ib. , pp. 65-66. 

AUgemeine Naturgeschichte und Themie des Himmels [General History of Nature and 
Theory of the Heavens], Konigsberg and Leipsic, 1755. This work appeared anony- 
mously. It is dedicated to Frederick II. The fundamental philosophical idea of the 
work is the compatibility of a mechanical explanation of natvire, which, without arbi- 
trary limitations, seeks in all cases a natural cause iu place of all other causes, with a 
teleology which views all nature as depending on God. Kant, therefore, sees elements 
of truth in the opposed doctrines. That the forces of nature themselves work intelli- 
gently, bears witness to the existence of an intelligent author of nature. Matter is 
subject to certain laws, left to which alone she must necessarily bring forth combina- 
tions of beauty. But this very fact compels the assumption that God exists. For how 
were it possible that things of various natures in combination with each other should 
strive to effect such exquisite accords and beauties, unless they owned a common origin 
in an infinite mind, in which the essential qualities of all things were wisely planned ? 
If their natures were determined by an intrinsic necessity, independently of each other, 
they would not, as a result of their natural tendencies, adjust themselves to each other, 
exactly as a reflecting, prudent choice would combine them. Since God works through 
the laws implanted in matter itself, the immediate cause of every result is to be sought 
in the forces of nature themselves. The original centrifugal motion which, together 
with gravitation, determines the course of the planets, is also to be explained by the 
agency of natural forces. It originated when the matter of the sun and planets, 
which was at first an extended, vaporous mass, began to shape itself into balls, the 
collision of the masses causing side motions. The genesis and stability of the system 
of fixed stars are to be conceived according to the analogy of the genesis and stability 
of the planetary system. (With Kant's theory of the stability of the system of fixed 
stars agrees, in its most essential features, the result of Herschel's investigations, 

144 K ant's life and weitings. 

and with his theory of their origin, the theory of Laplace; but what with Kant was 
but a general conjecture, rests with Herschel on an experimental basis, and the theory 
of Laplace differs from that of Kant by the assumption of a gradual separation of the 
planetary masses from the revolving mass of the sun, and by its more rigid mathe- 
matical demonstrations. The questions raised by Newton, how the different nature of 
the jiaths of the planets and comets was to be explained, and why the fixed stars do 
not collide with each other, find their answers in the theory of Kant and Laplace, who 
also attempt to explain genetically, by natural law, the tangential motion which Newton 
ascribed to the direct agency of God [a God standing, as it were, outside and simply 
giving the world a push in the language of Goethe, in Favst]). Kant holds that 
most of the planets are inhabited, and that the inhabitants of the planets farthest frour 
the sun are the most perfect. Who knows, asks Kant, that Jupiter's satellites may not 
be intended to give us light at some future time ? (Cf . Ueberweg, Utber KanVs Allg. 
Natiirg., etc., in the A/tpreuss. Mo7iats8chnft, Vol. IL , No. 4, Konigsberg, 1865, pp. 
339-353, E Hay, Ueber KanVs Kosmogonie, ib., Vol. III., No. 4, 1866, pp. 312-323, and 
Reuschle, as above cited, pp. 82-102.) 

Meditationum quarundam de igne succincta delineatio, the Dissertation which accom- 
panied Kant's application for the doctorate of philosophy, submitted to the philos. 
faculty at Konigsberg in 1755, and first published by Schubert from Kant's original 
MS., in the Werke, V., pp. 233-254, Leipz., 1839. The material elements do not 
attract each other by immediate contact, but through the medium of an interjacent 
elastic matter, which is identical with the matter of heat and light ; light, as well as 
heat, is not an efllux of material parts from luminous bodies, but according to the 
theory then newly confirmed by Euler's authority a propagation of vibratory motion 
in the all-pervading ether. Flame is " vajior igiiitnsy (A judgment of the particular 
propositions of this dissertation from the present stand-point of physics and chemistry, 
is given by Gustav Werther, AUpreuss. Monatsschrift , Konigsberg, 1866, pp. 441-447 ; 
cf. Reuschle. as above cited, pp. 55-56.) 

Princtpiorum jnimorum coguitionis metajihysicoi nova dilncidatio , Kant's habUitation 
essay, Konigsberg, 1755. Kant develops substantially only the Leibnitzian principles, 
although with certain noticeable modifications. Not the principle of contradiction, but 
that of identity is recognized by him as the absolutely first principle. The principle of 
identity, he says, includes the two propositions : " whatever is, is " {qnidqiiid est, est), 
as the principle of afl&rmative truths, and " whatever is not, is not" {quidquidnon est, 
non est), as the principle of negative truths. Of the principle of determining reason 
{ratio determinans, for which expression Kant objects to the substitution of ratio suffi- 
cient) two forms are distinguished by Kant, their difference being indicated by the ex- 
pressions ratio cur or antecedenter determinans, for the one, and ratio quod or conse- 
quenter determinans, ioT the other; the former he identifies with the ratio esscndi vel 
Jiendi, the latter with the ratio C()(jnoscendi (which is inexact, in so far as the case of a 
knowledge of effects derived from the knowledge of their objective causes is either left 
unnoticed, or is confounded [in the ratio Jiendi] with the case of the development of 
effects from such causes). Kant defends the principle of determining reason against 
the attacks which Crusius especially had directed against it, and in particular against 
the objection that it destroys human freedom, defining (in accordance with the spirit 
of Leibnitz's doctrine) as follows: Spontaneitas est actio a priricipio interna prof eeta ; 
quando hcec reprasentationi optimi conformiter dcterminatur , dicitur lihertas (which 
definition Kant himself subsequently rejected). From the principle of determining 
reason Kant deduces a number of corollaries, the most important of which is : quantitas 

kant's life and writings. 145 

realitatis absoluUr in mundo natnraliter iion mvtatur nee avgescendo nee decrescertdo, a 
proposition which Kant treats as true of spiritual forces, except when God directly 
interferes. Kant rejects the principium identitdtis indiscei-yiibilium, according to which 
there exist no two things perfectly alike in the universe, but deduces from the princi- 
ple of determining reason two other general principles: (1) the principle of succession, 
that all change depends on the combination of substances with each other (a principle 
subsequently carried out by Herbart ; both Kant and H. conclude, on the authority of 
this principle, from the variation in our ideas to the real presence of external objects) ; 
(2) the principle of co-existence : the real combination of finite substances with each 
other depends only on the union in which the common ground of their existence, the 
divine inlellect, thinks and maintains them (a proposition in which Kant approaches 
towards the Leibnitzian doctrine of pre-established harmony, without, nevertheless, as- 
senting to it ; still less does he approve the theory of Occasionalism ; it is rather true, 
he here teaches, that God has established a real " universal action of spirits on bodies 
and of bodies on spirits," not a mere consensus, but a real depcndentia ; on the other 
hand, Kant distinguishes carefully this " systmna nniversalis substantiarum commei'cii" 
thus established, from the vaere influxus pJiysicus of efficient causes). 

MetaphysiccB eum geometria ju notes uaus in p7ulosopMa naturali, ciijus specimen 1. 
continet monadoJogiam physicam, Konigsberg, 1756, a dissertation defended by Kant, as 
an applicant for an extraordinary professorship (which, however, he failed to secure 
for the reason given above). In the place of the punctual monads of Leibnitz, Kant 
assumes the existence of material elements, which are extended and yet simple, 
because not consisting of a plurality of substances, and thus (going back to the theory 
of Giordano Bruno, which, however, he seems not to have known historically) brings 
the monadic nearer to the atomistic doctrine. But his teaching is essentially distin- 
guished from atomism by the doctrine, which lie maintains, of a dynamic occupation 
of space by the force of repulsion (which may decrease, in passing from its centre, in 
proportion to the cube of the distance) and the force of attraction (which decreases in 
proportion to the square of the distance) ; there, where the effects of both are equal, 
is the limit of the body in whicli they inhere. Quodlibet corporis elementum simplex s. 
monas no7i soltim est in spatio, sed et implet spaiitim, snlva niJdlo minus ipsius simplicitate. 
Monas spatiolum proesentioi su( dejinit non pkircditnte parlium suarwn sidjstantialium, 
sed splicera actiritatis, gva externas ^itiinque sibi prasentes areet ab vlterim'i ad se invicetK 
appropinquatione. Adest alia pariter insita attractionis vis cum imjyenetrabilitale con- 
junctim limitem definiens ex'eiisionis. Kant concludes from these premises, among 
other things, that the elements of material bodies, as such, are perfectly elastic, since 
any more powerful force, which may be opposed to the force of repulsion, although it 
may and must limit the effects of the latter, can never neutralize or destroy them. 
Kant's argument that the force of attiaction on every point must diminish in propor- 
tion as the spherical surface, over which it is extended, is removed from the centre 
and consequently enlarged, belongs originally to Newton's contemporary, Halley, who 
lived from 1636 to 1724. Whether Kant received it directly or indirectly from him, or 
discovered it anew himself, is uncertain. 

Von den Ursachen der ErderschHtterungen bei Oelegenheit des Vngliicks, wtlclies die 
westl. Lander von Europa gegen das Ende, des vorigen Jahres (1755) betroffen hat, in the 
Konigsb. Nachrichten, 1756. GeschicJite und Natvrbeschreibung des Erdbebens in Jahr 
1755, Konigsberg, 1756. {History and Physioiiraphy of the most Remarkable Cases of 
the Earthquake wJiich toicards the end of 1755 sliook a Great Part of the Earth, 
translated in K.'s Essays and Treatises, II. (3), London, 1798 ; see above, p. 138. TV.] 



146 kant's life and writings. 

Betrachtung der seit einiger Zdt wahrgenommenen Erderschiitterungen, in the Kdnigso. 
Nachrichten, 175G, Nrs. 15 und 16. Short compositions, relating to questions in natural 
science, and nearly related to the ''AUg. Naturgesch. n. Theorie des Ilimmels.'^ (The 
reports, on which Kant relied in writing of the earthquake at Lisbon in 1755, are held by 
Otto Volger, in his ''Untersuchunge/i uber die PJidnoTnem der Erdbebeii in der Schweiz; 
Gotha, 1857-58, to be very inexact. Compare, however, Reuschle, in the Review 
already cited, pp. 66 seq.) 

Neue Anmerkungen zur Erlduterung der TJieorie der Winde, KOnigsb., 1756, Kant a 
" programme " for his lectures in the summer of 1756. In this composition [on the 
Theory of Winds] Kant independently propounded the correct theory of periodical winds, 
(Of the fact that Hadley had partially preceded him tu his theory, Kant appears to hav 
known nothing. Hadley explains, however, only the winds of the Tropics, while Kant 
includes tu his explanation the westerly winds outside the Tropics, which he attributes 
to the descent of the upper current from the equator toward the Poles. Cf. Dove's 
Meteorolog. Untersuchungen, and, with special reference to Kant, Reuschle, p. 68 seq.). 
Kant thus laid the true foundation for the explanation of numerous meteorological 
phenomena. At the end of this ' ' programme " Kant says that he intends, in his expo- 
sition of natural science, to follow Eberhard's hand-book ; " First Principles of Natural 
Science," to furnish instruction in mathematics, to commence the system of philosophy 
with an elucidation of Meyer's doctrine of reason, and to expound metaphysics follow- 
ing Baumgarten's hand-book, which he terms ' ' the most useful and thorough of all 
works of its kind," and whose "obscurity" he hopes to remove " by the carefulness of 
his presentation and by full explanations of the text." 

Entwurfund Ankundigung eines CoUegiiuber die pJiysiscJie Geographienebst BetracJi- 
tung uber die Frage, ob die Westwinde in unseren Oegenden darum feucht sind, well sie 
uber ein grosses Meer streichen (published, according to Hartenstein, 1st ed.. Vol. IX., 
Pref., p. vii., in 1757, and not first in 1765). A continuation of the investigations of 
the years 1755 and 1756. The question respecting the westerly winds [whether they 
are moist in the region of Konigsberg, from having passed over a large sea] is answered 
in the negative ; but the complete, positive solution of the phenomenon is not given, 
because the influence of temperature on the capacity of the air for vapor is not taken 
into consideration. 

Neuer Lehrbegriff der Bewegung und Buhe [on Motion and Rest], Konigsberg, 1758. 
Kant shows the relativity of all motion, explains by it the equality of action and reac- 
tion in the case of colliding bodies, and gives the true interpretation of phenomena 
commonly ascribed to a " is inertiw." 

Versiich einiger Betraditungen uber den Optimismus, Konigsberg, 1759. Kant ap- 
'proves here of the doctrine of optimism, being convinced that God cannot but choose 
what is best ; he holds that the existing universe is the best possible one, and that all 
its parts are good in view of the whole. His later critical phOosophy denied the legiti- 
macy of this kind of argumentation, and emphasized rather the personal freedom of 
the individual than the unity of the whole to which he belongs. 

Oedanken bei dem Ableben des Stud, von Funk, Trostschreiben an seine Mutter, 
Konigsberg, 1760. A pamphlet in meinariam. 

Biefalsche Spitzjindigkeit der mer syllogistiscTien Figuren, Konigsberg, 1762, [Trans- 
lated in Essays and Treatises, I. (3), see above, p. 138. Tr.] Kant admits only the first 
syllogistic figure as natural. (Cf. my refutation in my Syst. of Logic ad 103.) 

Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Grossen in die Weltweishcit einzufi'ihren, Konigs- 
berg, 1763. Of opposites, the one denies what the other posits. Opposition is eitho* 

rant's life and wkitinos. 147 

logical or real. The former is contradiction, and consists in at once affirming and 
denying something of the same thing ; its result is the nihil negntivum irrepraeseritabile. 
Real opposition exists where two predicates of a thing are opposed, but not as con- 
tradictories ; both predicates, though really repugnant to each other, are affirmative, 
but in opposite senses, like one motion and an equally rapid motion in an exactly 
opposite direction, or like an active obligation and an equal passive obligation ; its 
result is the niliU prioatimim reprcesentabile, which Kant would term zero ; it is to this 
real opposition that the mathematical signs + and refer. All positive and nega- 
tive real principles of the world are together equal to zero. (Already, in the Princ. 
Cogn. Met. I}iluddatio, Kant had censured the argumentation of Danes for the logical 
principle of contradiction, in which the latter made use of the mathematical formula : 
+ A A = O, affirming that this interpretation of the sign minus was arbitrary and 
involved a. petitio principii ; but in the present opuscule he marks the difference more 
precisely.) With the distinction of logical and real opposition corresponds that of 
the logical and the real ground ; whatever follows from the former, being contained 
in it as a part of its conception, follows by the rule of identity ; not so in the case of 
the real ground, whose consequence is something other than itself and new. How 
causality in this latter sense is possible, Kant confesses that he does not understand. 
(Kant continued firm in the conviction that causality could not be accounted for by 
the principle of identity and contradiction. At this stage in his philosophical career he 
derived the notion of causal relations from experience, but in hia later, or Critical 
period, he made of it a primitive conception of the understanding. ) 

Der eimig mvgliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, Koniga- 
berg, 1763. [Translated in Essays and Treatises, II. (7), see above, p. 139. TV.] 
Kant expresses already in this work the belief that ' ' Providence has not willed that 
those convictions which are most necessary for our happiness should be at the mercy of 
subtle and finely-spun reasonings, but has delivered them directly to the natural, vulgar 
understanding ; " " it is altogether necessary that we should be convinced of God's 
existence, but not so necessary that we should be able to demonstrate it." None the 
less does Kant here hold it possible to arrive at a proof of the existence of God, ' ' by 
venturing on the dark ocean of metaphysics," whereas subsequently he undertook to 
demonstrate the impossibility of any theoretical proof of God's existence. Already in 
this work he lays down the doctrine, that existence is no predicate or specific attribute 
of anything ; through the fact of existence things do not receive another predicate in 
addition to those predicates which they have without existence, as things simply possi- 
ble. In the conception of any logical subject, none but predicates of possibility are 
ever found. The existence of a thing is the absolute positing of the thing, and is 
thereby distinguished from all predicates, which as such are never posited otherwise 
than relatively to some thing. If I say, God is almighty, it is only of the logical rela- 
tion between God and omnipotence that I think, the latter being one of the marks of 
the former. It is impossible that nothing should exist ; for then the material and the 
data for all that is possible would be removed, and hence all possibility would be nega- 
tived ; but that by which all possibility is destroyed is absolutely impossible. (This 
argument is a paralogism ; the assertion of the absence of all possibility of existence is, 
indeed, identical with the assertion of the impossibility of existence, but not with the 
assertion of the impossibility of the supposed absence of all possibility. ) Hence there 
exists something in an absolutely necessary manner. Necessary being is one, because it 
contains the ultimate real ground or reason of all other possible being ; hence every other 
thing must depend upon it. It is simple, not compounded of numerous substances ; it 

148 kant's life and -vveitings. 

is unchangeable and eternal, and contains the highest reality, it is spiritual, bocanse 
the attributes of understanding and will belong to the highest reality ; therefore there 
is a God. KantaflBrms that this argumentation, since it postulates empirically no form 
of existence and is derived from the nature of absolute necessity alone, is a wholly a 
priori proof ; in this manner, he says, the existence of God is known from that which 
really constitutes the absolute necessity of God, and hence by a truly genetic deduc- 
tion ; all other proofs, even though they possessed the binding character which they 
lack, could never make clear the nature of that necessity. Kant rejects the (Anselmic 
and) Cartesian form of the ontological argument, which concludes from the pre-sup- 
posed idea of God to God's existence. Kant subjoins an (excellently reasoned) Meditd- 
tion, in which the unity perceptible in the natures of things is made the premise from 
which God's existence is inferred a ponteriori, and, in particular, develops farther the 
physico-theological principle which underlies his " General History of Nature and 
Theory of the Heavens." 

Untersuchung iiber die Deutliclikeit der Orundsclize dvr naturlichen Thedorie und 
Moral, zur Beantwortung der Frage, welclie die K. Academie der Wiss. zu Brrlin avf 
das Jahr 1763 aufgegeben hat. [Translated in Essays and IVeatises, I. (8), see above, 
p. 138. Tr.\ This essay of Kant's received the second prize, and Mendelssohn's 
(" Ueber die Evidem in den metaphysischen Wissenschaften^^) the first. Both were 
printed together (Berlin, 1764). Kant sets out with a comparison of philosophical and 
mathematical knowledge. Mathematics arrives at all its definitions synthetically, phi- 
losophy analytically. Mathematics considers the general as represented by signs m 
concreto, philosophy by means of signs in abstracto. In mathematics there are only a 
few indecomposable ideas and indemonstrable principles ; in philosophy these are in- 
numerable. The object of mathematics is easy and simple, that of philosophy difficTilt 
and complicated. " Metaphysics is without doubt the most difficult of all human sci- 
ences ; but no metaphysics has ever yet been written." The only method for attaining 
to the greatest possible certainty in metaphysics is identical with that which Newton 
introduced into physical science; it consists in the analysis of experience, the explana- 
tion of phenomena by the rules which such analysis discovers, and the employment, so 
far as possible, of the aid of mathematics. 

Baisonnement iiber den Abenteurer Jan Komarnicki (in the Kijnigsb. Zeitung, 1764). 
Jan Komarnicki was the so-called " goat-prophet," who wandered from place to place 
accompanied by a boy eight years old. Kant saw in the " little savage," whose 
robustness and ingenuousness pleased him, an interesting example of the child of 
nature as depicted by Rousseau. 

Beobachtangen ilber das Oefilhl des Schonen ttnd ErJiabenen, Konigsberg, 1764. 
[Translated in Essoys and Treatises, II. (1), see above, p. 138. Tr.] A series of the 
most acute observations upon aesthetics, morals, and psychology. A characteristic 
feature in the work is the Eesthetic founding of morals on the ' ' feeling of the beauty 
and dignity of human nature." 

Nachriclit von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie zur Anlxiin- 
digung derselben im Wintersemester 1765-66. Konigsberg, 1765. Lectures, says Kant, 
should teach, not thoughts, but how to think ; the object of the student should not 
be to learn philosophy, but how to philosophize. A finished philosophy does not 
exist; the method of philosophical instruction must be an investigating ("zetetic") 

Ueber Stcedenborg, a letter to Frafllein von Knobloch, dated August 10. 1763 not 
1758, as given by Borowski, nor, as others pretend, 17G8 ; the year 1763 is shown with 

kant's lifk and wkitings. 149 

certainty to be the correct ilate by a comparison of the historical data, since the fire at 
Stockholm occurred July 19th, 1759, the Dutch ambassador Louis de Marteville (not 
Harteville) died on the 25th of April, 17G0, and General St. Germain entered the Dan- 
ish service in Dec, 17G0, and commanded the army, which (not in 1757, but) in 1763 
the Danish ofiicer joined, who is mentioned by Kant. With this date agrees also the 
fact that the marriage of the person addressed in the letter, Charlotte Amalie von 
Knobloch (born Aug. 10, 1740), with Captain Friedrich vnn Klingspom took place on 
the 22d of July, 1764 (the fruit of which marriage was Carl Friedrich Hans von Kl., 
bom June 1st, 1765) ; see Fortgesetzte neue geneal-hist. Nadir., Part o7, Leips., 1765, p. 
384. Versucli ilber die Krankheiten des Kopfes, in the Koniysbergcr Zeitung, 1764. 
Trdume eines Odsterseheis, erldutert drtrch Trdume der Metaphi/sik, Riga, 1766 (anony- 
mously). Works half serious and half sportive, in which Kant advances more and 
more towards a skeptical attitude. The possibility of many favorite metaphysical the- 
ories is, he admits, indisputable ; but he affirms that this advantage is shared by them 
with numerous illusions of the demented ; many a speculation meets with approval, 
only because the scales of the understanding are not altogether equally weighted, one 
of them, which bears the inscription, " Hope of the Future," enjoying a mechanical 
advantage a vice, which Kant himself coufepses his impotence and indisposition to 
remove. For the rest, Kant regards it as more consonant to human nature and to 
purity of morals to found the expectation of another life on the natural sentiment of a 
well-conditioned soul, than, conversely, to make the moral character of the latter de- 
pendent on the hope of the former. Cf. Matter, Swedenborg, Paris, 1863 ; Theod. 
Weber, Kant's Dualismus von Geist rind Natur aus dem Jahre 1766 und der den posit. 
ChrUteiitJiums.1 Breslau, 1866 ; W. White, Em. Sicedenborg, Iiis Life and Writings., 2 
vols., London, 1867. [See also an article on Kant and Swedenboi'g., in Macmillan's 
Magazine, Vol. 10, pp. 74 seq. Tr.] 

Vom ersten Orunde des UuterscMedes der Gegenden im Ranme., in the Konigsb. 
Nachrichten, 1768. From the circumstance that figures like e. g. those of the right 
and left hands are perfectly equal and similar to each other, and yet cannot be enclosed 
in the same limits {e. g., the right-hand glove will not fit the left hand), Kant believes 
himself authorized to infer that the form of a material object does not depend solely 
on the position of its parts relatively to each other, but also on a relation of the same 
to universal, absolute space ; hence space is defined as not consisting merely in the 
external relation of co-existing portions of matter, but as a primitive entity, and not 
merely in thought. But Kant finds this conception surrounded with unresolved diffi- 
culties, and these difficulties led him not long afterwards to declare space a mere form 
of human intuition, and thus to take the first step towards the Critical Philosophy. 

II. Works belonging to the period of the Critical Philosophy. 

De mundi seiuibilis atqne intelUgibilli fi>rina et princijnis, dissertatio pro loco profes- 
sionis logicce et metaph. ordin. rite sibi vindicando, Konigsberg, 1770. The fundamental 
conception underlying the Critique of the Pure Reason becomes here already manifest 
in regard to space and time, but not yet in regard to substantiality, causality, and the 
other categories. To these latter Kant first extended that conception in the following 
years. The period from 1769 to 1781 can more justly, than the preceding one, be called 
the period of seeking after an altogether new system. Further, we may call atten- 
tion here to the Scholion to 22, in which is manifest an inclination that seems as if 
repressed by the consciousness of the duty of scientific clearness and rigor towards 
mystical, theosophic conceptions (the fruit of the Leibnitzian doctrine). Space is here 
defined as the divine omnipresence assuming the form of a phenomenon, and time as 

150 kant's life and writings. 

the etemitj of the universal cause under the same form. {Si pedem aliquantvium ultra 
terminos certitudinis apodictica, giue Metuphysicnm decet. p^-omovere fas esset, operm 
pretium videtur, gtuedoim, qiia pertinent ad intuitus sensitivi non solum legeSy sed 
etiam causas per intellectuiii tantum cognoscendas indagare. Nempe mens humami 
non afficitur db extemis mundusque ipsius aspectui rum potet in ivfinitum nisi qvMtenus 
ipsa cum omnibus aliis sustentatur ab endem vi infinita Unius. Ilinc non sentit externa 
nisi per prcBseiitlam ejundem causm sustentatricis communis, ideoque spatium, quod est 
conditio universalis et necessaria crnnprcBsentive omnium sensitive cognita, dici potest omni- 
prasentia phcenomenon. Causa enim universi non est omnibus atque singulis propterea 
pyrasens, quia est in ipsorum hcis, sed sunt hca, Ti. e. rdationes substuntiarum possibiles, 
quia omnibus intime prcesens e.st). But Kant adds that " it seems more prudent to cast 
along the shore of that world of knowledge which the infirmity of our intellects allows 
us to enter, than to venture upon the deep waters of these mystical inquiries, as Male- 
branche did, whose doctrine differs but slightly from that here expounded, the doc- 
trine, namely, that we see all things in God." In the Critique of the Pure Reason 
Kant no longer attempts to conceive the intuitions of space and time as phenomenal 
correlates of the divine omnipresence and eternity, but considers them as absolutely 
and only subjective forms ; he was forced to this step, because in the same work h 
treated the ideas of relation, the '' commercium^^ of substances and the idea of sub- 
stance as merely subjective, and consequently could no longer find in them (with Leib- 
nitz) an objective basis for the subjective intuition of space, nor in the " eternity of 
the universal cause " the objective basis of the subjective intuition of time, especially 
since now the absolute was viewed by him as, least of all things, scientifically know- 

Recension der ScJirift von Moseati ilber den Unterschied der Structur der TJdere und 
Mensc?ie7i, reprinted from the Kdnigsb. gelehrte u. pollt. Zeitung, 1771, in Reicke's 
Kantiana, pp. 66-68. Kant approves Moscati's anatomical demonstration of the doc- 
trine, that the animal nature of man was originally constituted with a view to quadru- 
pedal motion. 

Von den verschiedenefi Racen der Menschen, on the occasion of the announcement of 
his lectures for the Summer Semester of 1775. All men belong to one natural genus ; 
the races are the most firmly established varieties. A noticeable utterance of Kant's, 
in this opuscule, is, that a real natural history will probably reduce a great number of 
apparently different species to races of one and the same genus, and transform the 
present diffuse scholastic system of natural history into a physical system addressed 
to the tmderstanding. We must strive, says Kant, to obtain a historical knowledge of 
nature ; by this means we may expect to advance by degrees from opinion to insight. 
In the Critique of the teleological faculty of judgment Kant subsequently developed 
this idea anew. 

Articles on the ^^Philant7iropin" at Dessau, in the Kdnigsb. gel. u. pol. Ztg., 1776- 
1778. Of these three articles there is sufficient evidence only in regard to the first, 
and probably also the second, that they were written by Kant. The authorship of the 
third, which is more moderate, and also more common in thought and expression, la 
at least doubtful ; it appears to have been written by Crichton, the court preacher, in 
consequence of a request addressed to him by Kant, July 29, 1778 (in R. and Schubert's 
edition. Vol. XI., p. 72). Kant expresses in these articles a lively interest in the 
method of education which is employed in the PhUanthropin, and which is "wisely 
drawn from nature herself. " 

Kritik der reinen Vei-nunft, Riga, 1781. [Critique of Pure Reason, translations by 


Haywood and by Meiklejohn, s. above, p. 139, and below ad 122. TV.] In this work 
(according to hia statement in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn, dated Aug. 18, 1783) 
Kant embodied the result of at least twelve years of reflection, but its composition 
"was effected within four or five months, the greatest attention being paid to the sub- 
stance, but less regard being had for the form and for the interests of readers who 
would understand it easily." The second revised edition was published ibid.^ 1787; 
the subsequent editions, up to the seventh (Leips., 1828), are copies of the second, 
without alteration. In both of the complete editions of the works, the differences 
between the two editions are all given ; but Rosenkranz adopts the first edition for the 
text, and gives in an appendix the alterations made in the secoud, while Hartenstein, 
in both of his editions, gives the second edition as text, embodying the different read- 
ings of the first edition in foot-notes. This difference of arrangement is the conse- 
quence of differing judgments as to the value of the two editions. Rosenkranz prefers 
the first, believing, with Michelet, Schopenhauer, and others, that the second contains 
alterations of the thought, by which prejudice is done to the logical sequence of ideas ; 
but Hartenstein, in agreement with Kant's own statement (in the preface to the second 
ed.), sees in these alterations only changes of form, serving to prevent the renewal of 
misunderstandings which had arisen, and to facilitate the comprehension of the work. 
Perhaps the best arrangement would be to place the portions which differ side by side 
in two parallel columns. Cf . my Diss, de priore et posteiiore foi-via Kantianm Criticea 
rationis puree (Berl. , 1862), in which I attempt to show in detail the correctness of 
Kant's own judgment ; in the second edition of the Critique of the Pure Reason, as 
also in the previous ''' Prolegomena" of 1783, Kant gives greater prominence to the 
realistic side of his system, a side belonging to it from the beginning, and which he 
had also made distinct enough for the attentive reader, but which had been mistaken 
by hasty readers ; injustice is done to Kant by those who perceive in this an essential 
changing of the thought, but who affirm either that Kant himself did not perceive it, 
or even (as Schopenhauer pretends) that he hypocritically denied it. Jlichelet's re- 
joinder (in his journal, Der Gedanke, III., 1862, pp. 237-243) is defective from its 
Hegelianizing misinterpretation of the Kantian conception of the things in themselves, 
which affect us and thereby call forth in us ideas ; he interprets Kant as meaning by this 
the unity of essence in the variety of phenomena (cf. below ad % 122). Of the contents 
of the Critique of the Pure Reason, as also of the other principal works of Kant, an 
account will be given in the following exposition of the Kantian system, rather than in 
this preliminary review. 

Prolegomena zu einerjeden kunftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten 
konnen, Riga, 1783. {Prolegomena to Future Metaphysics, translated by John Rich- 
ardson, in Kant's Metaphysical Works, London, 1836. Tr.] The principal contents of 
this work were subsequently incorporated by Kant into the second edition of the Cri- 
tique of the Pure Reason. In reply to a review in the Oott. gel. Am. of Jan. 19, 1782 
written by Garve, but mutilated before publication by Feder (subsequently published 
elsewhere in its original form), and in which the realistic element in Kant's doctrine 
had been overlooked and his doctrine too nearly identified with Berkeley's idealism 
Elant brings the realistic element, which in the first ed. of the Critique had rather been 
presupposed as something universally recognized than made the subject of special 
remark, into strong relief. In the preface Kant relates how he had first been awakened 
from his " dogmatic slumber" by Hume's doubts with reference to the idea of causa- 
tion ; the spark, thrown out by the skeptic, had kindled the critical Light. 

Ueber Schuiz's (preacher at Gieladorf ) Versuch einer Anleitung zur Sittenlehre fUr aUe 

152 kant's life and writings. 

Men^chen ohne Unterschied der Religion^ in the *' Raisonnirendes BilcJierverzeichniss." 
Konigsberg, 1783, No. 7. Kant takes exception, from his critical stand-point, to a 
psychology and an ethics aiming at a consistent development of the Leibnitzian princi- 
ples of the gradations of existences and of determinism ; for Kant, determinism is now- 
identical with fatalism, and instead of a place in the scale of natural being, he now 
claims for man a freedom which " places him completely outside of the chain of natural 
causes." (On the subsequent removal of Schulz, who was a man full of character, 
from his charge, by an arbitrary act of the Wollner-Ministry, compare Volkmar, Reli- 
gionsprocesg des Predigers Schulz zu Gielsdorf, eines Lichtfreundes des 18. Jahrhunderts, 
Leips., 1845.) 

Ideen zu einer allgemeinen OeschicJite in weliburgerlicher Absicht, in the Berliner Mo- 
afocAnJ, November, 1784. Was heixst Aufkldrung ? tiid., December, 1784. [Trans- 
lated in Essays and Treatises, I. (10) and (1), see above, p. 138. 7'r.] Kant's answer 
to this question is, that "enlightenment" means issuing from the period of self-inflicted 

Recension vo7i Herder's Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichie der Menschheit, in the 
(Jena) Allg. Littztg., 1785. Writing from the stand-point of Criticism, Kant, who 
eeparates sharply from each other nature and freedom, here condemns speculations 
resting on the hypothesis of the essential unity of those elements ; Kant's criticism of 
Herder is, in a certain sense, at the same time a reaction of his later against his earlier 

Ueber die Vulcane im Monde, Berl. Monatsschr. , March, 1785. [In Essays and Trea- 
tises, II. (4), see above, p. 139. TV.] 

Von der Unrechtmmsigkeit des BiXchernacTidrucks^ ib. , May, 1785. [In Essays and 
Treatises, I. (5), see p. 138. TV.] 

Ueber die Bestimmung des Begriffs von einer Menschenrace, ib., Nov., 1785. 

Grundlegung zur MetapTiysik der Sitten, Riga, 1785, etc. [Essays and Treatises, I. 
(2), see p. 138. TV-.] 

Metaphysische AnfangsgrHnde der Naturioissenacliaft, Riga, 1786, etc. 

Muthmassliclier Anfang der MenschengescJiicMe, Berl. Monatsschr., Jan., 1786. 
[Essays and Treatises, I. (7), see p. 138. Tr.] Ueber (Gottl.) Huf eland's Grundsatz 
des Naturrechts, Allg. Litiztg., 1786. Was Jieisst sich im Denken orientiren? Berl. 
M., Oct., 1786. [In Essays and Treatises, I. (9), see p. 138. TV.] (Kant's answer to 
this question is : To be guided in one's beliefs in view of the insufficiency of the ob- 
jective principles of reason by a subjective principle of reason ; we err only when we 
confound both, and consequently take spiritual need for insight.) Einige Befinerkungen 
zu Jacob's '' Priifung der Mendelssohn'' schen Morgenstunden" (inserted in Jacob's work, 
after the preface). 

Ueber den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie, in Wieland's Deutsch. 
Mercur, January, 1788. 

Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Riga, 1788; 6th ed., Leips., 1827. 

Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Berlin and Libau, 1790, etc. 

Ueber eine Entdeckung (Eberhard's), nach der alle neue Kritik der Vernunft durch 
eine dltere entbehrlicli gemacht loerden soU, Konigsberg, 1790. Ueber Schwdrmerei und 
Mittel dagegen, in Borowski's book on Cagliostro, Konigsberg, 1790. 

Ueber das Miaslingen aller philosophisehen VersucJie in der Tlieodicee., Berl. Monatsschr. , 
Septemb., 1791. [Essays and Treatises, II. (6), see p. 139. T'r.] 

Ueber die von der K. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin fUr das Jahr 1791 aus- 
gesetzte Preisaufgabe : welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Meta/physik seit 

kant's life and writings. 153 

Leibnitz's und Wolff's Zeiten (jcmacht hat? ed. by F. Th. Rink, Konigsberg, 1804. 
Kant seeks here, without treating especially of the works of others, to show the im- 
portance of the progress from the Leibnitzo- Wolffian dogmatism to Criticism. The 
work was not sent in to compete for the prize. 

Die Rdigion inncrhalb der Orenzen der blossen Vernunft, Konigsberg, 1793; 2d ed., 
ibid., 1794. [Essays and Treatises, II. (8), see p. 139. Tr.\ The first section of this 
work, "On Radical Evil," was first published in the April number of the "-Berlin. 
Mo7iatssehrift" for 1793. 

Ueber den Oemeinspruch : das mag in der llieorie lichtig sein, passt aber nicM fUr 
die Praxis, Berl. Monatsschr., Sept., 1793. [Essays and Treatises, I. (4), see p. 138. 
Tr.] This maxim [" That may be true in theory, but will not do in practice ''], in so 
far as it is applied to moral or legal obligations, is condemned by Kant as pernicious for 
morality in individual intercourse, as also for the ends of civil and international law. 

Ueber PhilosopMe iiberhaupt, in Beck's Auszug aus Kant's kritischen Schriften, Riga, 

Eticas iiber den Einfluss des Mondes aufdie Witterung, Berl. Monatsschr., May, 1794. 
Das ende aller Binge, ib., 1794. [Essays and Treatises, II. (2) and (9), see pp. 138, 9. 

Zum eicigen Frieden, ein pJiilosopMscTier Entwurf, Konigsberg, 1795 ; 2d ed., il)., 
1796. [Essays and Treatises, I. (6), see p. 138. T^r.] 

Zu Sommering, ilber das Organ der Seele, Konigsberg, 1796. Kant expresses the 
conjecture, that the water in the cavities of the brain may be the agent for transmitting 
affections from one brain-fibre to another. 

Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Tone in der PhilosopMe, Berl. Monatsschr., 
May, 1796. [Essays and Treatises, II. (5), see p. 139. Tr.'] (Against Platonizing 
sentimental philosophers.) Aiisgleichung eines auf Missverstand beruhenden 77iathemati- 
schen Streits, ib. , Oct. , 1796. (A few words in explanation of an expression employed by 
Kant, which, taken literally, was inappropriate ; he desires the same to be understood 
in its right sense from its connection.) Verkiindigung des nahen Abschlusses eines 
Tractates zu eicigen Frieden in der PhilosopMe, Berl. Monatsschr., Dec, 1796. (Against 
Joh. Georg Schlosser.) 

Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Eechtslehre, Konigsberg, 1797 ; 2d ed., 1798. Me- 
iaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Tugendlehre, Konigsberg, 1797; 2ded., 1803. These 
two works bear in common the title: Metapliysik der Bitten (Parts I. and II.). 

Ueber ein vermeintes ReeJd, aus Menschenliebe zu lilgen, Berl. BUitter, 1797. 

Der Streit der Fandtdten, containing also the essay : Von der Macht des Gemilthes, 
durchdenblossen Vorsatz seiner krankha ft en G efiihle Meister zu werden, Konigsberg, 1798. 

Anthropologic in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Konigsberg, 1798. 

Vorrede zu Jachinann's Prufung der Kantischen Religionsphilosophie in Hinsicht avf 
die ihr beigelegte AeJinlichkeit mit dem reinen Mysticismus, Konigsberg, 1800. Na-ch- 
schrift fines Freundes zu HeUsberg's Vorrede zu Mielke's litthauischem Worterbuch, Ko- 
nigsberg, 1800. 

KanVs Logik, edited by J. B. Jiische, Konigsberg, 1800. [Transl. by J. Richardson, 
see above, p. 139. Tr.'\ 

Kant's physiscTie Oeographie, ed. by Rink, Kunigsberg, 1802-1803. (Cf. on this work 
Reuschle, in the article above cited, pp. 62-65.) 

Kant iiber Padagogik, ed. by Rink, Konigsberg, 1803. 

The complete editions of Kant's works contain, further, letters, explanations, and 
other minor written deliverances of Kant. With Kant's co-operation, his " Vermischte 

154 rant's critique on pure reason, etc. 

Schriften" were published by Tief trunk, in 3 vols., Halle, 1799, and several minor 
works, by Rink, Konigsberg, 1800. A manuscript on the Metaphysics of Nature, on 
which Kant labored in the last years of his life, has never been published ; see (Gin- 
scher?) in the Preuss. Jahrbucher^ ed. by Haym, I., 1858, pp. 80-84, Schubert, in the 
N. preuss. Provincialblatt, Konigsb., 1858, pp. 58-61, and particularly Rudolf Reicke, 
in the Altpretiss. Monatsschr., Vol. I., Konigsberg, 1864, pp. 742-749. 

Kant's critical writings were translated into Latin by F. G. Bom, 4 vols., Leipsic, 
1796-98 ; other translations are cited by Tennemann, in his Grundriss der Gesch. der PhUos. , 
5th ed., Leips., 1829, ad % 388, p. 486 seq., and in Vol. XI. of the edition of Rosenkranz 
and Schubert, p. 217 seq., and by others. An account of French translations is given 
by J. B. Meyer, in Fichte's Zeitschr., XXIX., Halle, 1856, p. 129 seq. Of English 
translations we may here mention, in addition to those cited in the following para- 
graph, J. W. Semple's translation of the Grundlegung zur MetapJi. der Sitten, together 
with extracts from others of Kant's ethical works (Edinburgh, 1836), of which a new 
edition has recently been published, bearing the title : " The Metaphysics of Ethics,'"' 
with an Introduction by H. Calderwood (but without Semple's introduction and supple- 
ment), Edinburgh, 1869. 

122. By the critique of the reason Kant understands the examina- 
tion of the origin, extent, and limits of human knowledge. Pure 
reason is his name for reason independent of all experience. The 
" Critique of the Pure Reason " subjects the pure speculative reason 
to a critical scrutiny. Kant holds that this scrutiny must precede all 
other philosophical procedures. Kant terms every philosophy, which 
transcends the sphere of experience without having previously justified 
this act by an examination of the faculty of knowledge, a form of 
" Dogmatism ; " the philosophical limitation of knowledge to expe- 
rience he calls " Empiricism ;" philosophical doubt as to all knowledge 
transcending exjjerience, in so far as this doubt is grounded on the 
insufficiency of all existing attempts at demonstration, and not on an 
examination of the human faculty of knowledge in general, is termed 
by him " Skepticism," and his own philosophy, which makes all fur- 
ther philosophizing dependent on the result of such an examination, 
" Criticism." Criticism is " transcendental philosophy " or " transcen- 
dental idealism," in so far as it inquires into and then denies the pos- 
sibility of a transcendent knowledge, i. e.. of loiowledge respecting 
what lies beyond the range of experience. 

Kant sets out in his critique of the reason with a twofold division 
of judgments (in particular, of categorical judgments). "With refer- 
ence to the relation of the predicate to the subject, he divides them 
into analytical or elucidating judgments ^ where the predicate can be 
found in the conception of the subject 1)y simple analysis of the latter 
or is identical with it (in which latter case the analytical judgment is 

rant's critique on pure reason, etc. 155 

an identical one) and synthetic or amplificative judgments where 
the predicate is not contained in the concept of the subject, but is 
added to it. The principle of analytical judgments is the principle of 
identity and contradiction ; a synthetic judgment, on the contrary, can- 
not be formed from the conception of its subject on the basis of tliis 
principle alone. Kant further discriminates, with reference to their 
origin as parts of human knowledge, between judgments a priori and 
judgments d posteriori ; by the latter he understands judgments of 
experience, but by judgments d priori, in the absolute sense, those 
which are completely independent of all experience, and in the rela- 
tive sense, those which are based indirectly on experience, or in which 
the conceptions employed, though not derived immediately from expe- 
rience, are deduced from others that were so derived. As absolute 
judgments d priori Kant regards all those which have the marks of 
necessity and strict universality, assuming (what he does not prove, but 
simply posits as self-evident, although his whole system depends upon 
it) that necessity and strict universality are derivable from no combi- 
nation of experiences, but only independently of all experience. All 
analytical judgments are judgments d ptnori ; for although the sub- 
ject-conception may have been obtained through experience, yet 
to its analysis, from which the judgment results, no further expe- 
rience is necessary. Synthetic judgments, on the contrary, fall into 
two classes. If the synthesis of the predicate with the subject is ef- 
fected by the aid of experience, the judgment is synthetic d poste- 
rio7^ ^ if it is effected apart from all experience, it is synthetic d 
priori. Kant holds the existence of judgments of the latter class to be 
undeniable ; for among the judgments which are recognized as strictly 
universal and apodictical, and which are consequently, according to 
Kant's assumption, judgments d priori, he finds judgments which 
must at the same time be admitted to be synthetic. Among these 
belong, first of all, most mathematical judgments. Some of the fun- 
damental judgments of arithmetic {e. g., a=a) are, indeed, according 
to Kant, of an analytical nature ; but the rest of them, together with 
all geometrical judgments, are, in his view, synthetic, and, since they 
have the marks of strict universality and necessity, are synthetic judg- 
ments dpAori. The same character pertains, according to Kant, to the 
most general propositions of physics, such as, for example, that in all the 
changes of the material world the quantity of matter remains unchanged. 
These propositions are known to be true apart from all experience, 

156 K ant's critique on pure reason, etc. 

since thej are universal and apodictical judgments ; and yet they are 
not obtained through a mere analysis of the conceptions of their sub- 
jects, for the predicate adds something to those conceptions. In like 
manner, finally, are all metaphysical principles, at least in their ten- 
dency, synthetic judgments d priori, e. g., the principle, that every 
event must have a cause. And if the principles of metaphysics are 
not altogether incontrovertible, yet those of mathematics at least are 
established beyond all dispute. There exist, therefore, concludes 
Kant, synthetic judgments d priori or judgments of the pure reason. 
The fundamental question of his Critique becomes, then : How are 
synthetic judgments d priori possible ? 

The answer given is : Synthetic judgments d priori are possible, 
because man brings to the material of knowledge, which he acquires 
empirically in virtue of his receptivity, certain pure forms of knowl- 
edge, which he himself creates in virtue of his spontaneity and inde- 
pendently of all experience and into which he fits all given material. 
These forms, which are the conditions of the possibility of all expe- 
rience, are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of the objects 
of experience, because whatever is to be an object for me, must take 
on the forms through which the Ego, my original consciousness, or the 
"transcendental unity of apperception," shapes all that is presented to 
it ; they have, therefore, objective validity in a synthetic judgment d 
priori. But the objects, with reference to which they possess this 
validity, are not the things-in-themselves or transcendental objects, i. e., 
objects as they are in themselves, apart from our mode of conceiving 
them ; they are only the empirical objects or the phenomena which 
exist in our consciousness in the form of mental representations. 
The things-in-themselves are unknowable for man. Only a creative, 
divine mind, that gives them reality at the same time that it thinks 
them, can have power truly to know them. Things-in-themselves do 
not conform themselves to the forms of human knowledge, because the 
human consciousness is not creative, because human perception is not 
free from subjective elements, is not " intellectual intuition." Nor do 
the forms of human knowledge conform themselves to things-in-them- 
selves ; otherwise, all our knowledge would be empirical and with- 
out necessity and strict universality. But all empirical objects, since 
they are only representations in our minds, do conform themselves to 
the forms of human knowledge. Hence we can know empirical ob- 
jects or phenomena, but only these. All valid d priori knowledge has 

rant's critique on puke keason, etc. 157 

respect only to phenomena, hence to objects of real or possible expe- 

The forms of knowledge are forms either of intnition or of thought. 
The ^^Transcendental JEsihetic'''' treats of the former, the ^'-Tran- 
scendental Logic " of the latter. 

The forms of intuition are space and time. Space is the form of 
external sensibility ; time is the form of internal and indirectly of ex- 
ternal sensibility. On the a jpriori nature of space depends the possi- 
bility of geometrical, and on the a priori nature of time depends the 
possibility of arithmetical judgments. Things-in-themselves or tran- 
scendental objects are related neither to space nor to time ; all co-ex- 
istence and succession are only in phenomenal objects, and consequently 
only in the perceiving Subject. 

The forms of thought are the twelve categories or original concep- 
tions of the understanding, on which all the forms of our judgments are 
conditioned. They are: unity, plurality, totality, reality, negation, 
limitation, substantiality, causality, reciprocal action, possibility, 
existence, necessity. On their d priori nature depends the validity of 
the most general judgments, which lie at the foundation of all empiri- 
cal knowledge. The things-in-themselves or transcendental objects 
have neither unity nor plurality ; they are not substances, nor are they 
subject to the causal relation, or to any of the categories ; the cate- 
gories are applicable only to the phenomenal objects which are in our 

The reason strives to rise above and beyond the sphere of the un- 
derstanding, which is confined to the finite and conditioned, to the 
unconditioned. It forms the idea of the soul, as a substance which 
ever endures; of the world, as an unlimited causal series; and of God, 
as the absolute substance and union of all perfections, or as the "most 
perfect being." Since these ideas relate to objects which lie beyond 
the range of all possible experience, they have no theoretic validity ; if 
the latter is claimed for them (in dogmatic metaphysics), this is simply 
the result of a misleading logic founded on appearances, or of dia- 
lectic. The psychological paralogism confounds the unity of the I 
which can never be conceived as a predicate, but only and always as a 
subject with the simplicity and absolute permanence of a psychical 
substance. Cosmology leads to antinomies, whose mutually contradic- 
tory members are each equally susceptil)le of indirect demonstration, if 
the reality of space, time, and the categories be presupposed, but 

158 kaj^t's critique on pure reason, etc. 

which, with the refutation of this supposition, cease to exist. Rational 
theology, in seeking by the ontological, cosmological, and physico-the- 
ological arguments to prove the existence of God, becomes involved in 
a series of sophistications. Still, these ideas of the reason are in two 
respects of value : (1) theoretically, when viewed not as constitutive 
principles, through which a real knowledge of things-in-themselves 
can be obtained, but as regulative principles, which affirm that, how- 
ever far empirical investigation may at any time have advanced, the 
sphere of objects of possible experience can never be regarded as fully 
exhausted, but that there will always be room for further investiga- 
tion ; (2) practically, in so far as they render conceivable suppositions, 
to which the practical reason conducts with moral necessity. 

In the " Metaphysical Princijples of Physics " Kant seeks, by 
reducing matter to forces, to justify a dynamical explanation of 

On Kant's philosophy in general and, in particular, on his theoretical philosophy there exist numberless 
works by Kantians, semi-Kantians, and anti-Kantians, the most important of which will be mentioned below ; 
compare in regard to them especially the History of Kantism, by Rosenkranz, subjoined as Vol. XII. to hii 
complete edition of Kant's works. Of the relatively recent writers on the subject, we may name, in addition 
to the authors of general histories of philosophy, and, especially, of histories of modem philosophy (Hegel, 
Michelet, Erdmann, Kuno Fischer, I. Herm. Fichte, Chalybaus, Ulrici, Biedermann, G. Weigelt, Barchou de 
Penhoen, A. Ott, Willm, and others, see above, pp. 137) the following: Charles Villers (Philosophie de Kant, 
Metz, 1801), Tissot, the translator of the Critique of Pure Reason {Critique de la liaison Pure, 3 id. en fran- 
fais, Paris, 1864), Amand Saintes {Histoire de la Vie et de la Pkilosophie de Kant, Paris and Hamburg, 1844), 
Barni (who has translated and annotated several of Kant's works), Victor Cousin {LeQons tur la philosophie 
de Kant, delivered in 1820, Par., 1842, 4th ed.. Par., 1864), E. Maurial (i Scepticisme corribaitu dans ses 
principes, analyse et discussion des principes du scepticisme de Kant, 1857), Emile Saisset(ie Scepticisme, 
^nesidime, Pascal, Kant, Paris, 1865, 2d ed., ibid., 1867), Pasquale Galuppi {Saygio JHosofico sulla critica 
delta connoscenea, Naples, 1819), F. A. Nitsch ( View of KanCs Principles, London, 1796), A. F. M. WUUch 
{Elements of the Critical Philosophy, London, 1798), Meiklejohn {Critique of Pure Heason, translated from 
the German of Imm,. Kant, London, 1855), and further, among others, Th. A. Qna.hedisscn {ResttUate der phi- 
los. Forschungen iiber die Natur der menschlichen Erkenntniss von Plato bis Kant, Marburg, 1805), Ed.Beneke, 
{Kant und die philos. Aufgabe unse.rer Zeit, Berlin, 1832), Mirbt {Kant und seine Nachfolger, Jena, 1841), J. 
C. Glaser {De priiicipiis philosophim Kantiancv, diss, inaug., Halle, 1844), Chr. H. Weisse {In welchem Sinne 
die deut'iche Philosophie jetzt icieder an KaiU sich zu orie7itiren hat, Leipsic, 1847), O. Ule {Ueber den Raum, 
und die Raumtheorie des Ariit. und Kant, Halle. 1850), Julius Rupp {fmm. Kant, iiber den Character seiner 
Philosophie und das VerhllUnUs derselben zur Gegenicart, Kiinigsberg, 1857), Joh. Jacoby {Kant und Les- 
sing, Redezu Kanfs Geburtsta.g^eier, Kiinigsberg, 1859), Theod. Strater {De principiis philos. K., diss, 
inaug., Bonn, 1859), J. B. Meyer {Ueber den Kriticismtis mit besonderer RiicksicJU avf Kant, in the Zeitschr. 
S. Ph., Vol. 37, 1860, pp. 226-2&3, and Vol. 39, 1861, pp. 46-66), L. Noack (/. Kanfs .inferstehung aus dem 
Grabe, seine Lehre urk^indlich dargestelU, Leipsic, 1861 ; Kant mit Oder ohne romantischen Kopf in Vol. IL 
of Oppenheim's Deutsch. Jahrb.fiir Pol. u. LUt., 1862), the anonymous work entitled Ein Ergebniss aus der 
Kritik der Kantische7i Freiheitslehre (by the author of Das xtnbewusste Geistesleben und die gvttliche Offen- 
barung, Leipsic, 1861), Michelis {Die Philos. Kanfs raid ihr Einfluss auf die EiUwicklung der neueren Nor 
turwissenschaft in " Katuru?id Qtfenbarung," Vol. VIII., Munster, 1862), K. F. E. TTa.hndorf{Aristotelesund 
Kant, Oder: was ist die Vernunft? in the Zeit.'schr. fiir die luth. Tlieol. u. Kirche, 1863, pp. 92-125), Joh. 
Huber {Lessing und Kant iin Verhilltniss zur relig. Bewegmig des achtzehnten Jahrhumlerts, in the Deutsche 
Vierteljahrsschrift, 1864, pp. 241-2!te), Theod. Merz {Ueber die Bedeutwig der Kantischen Philos. fiir die 
Gegenwart, in the Protest. Monatsbl, ed. by H. Gelzer, Vol. 24, No. 6, Dec., 1864, pp. 375-388), O. Liebmann 
{KaTU und die Epigonen, Stuttg., 1865), Ed. Roder {Das Wort tl priori, eine neue Kritik der Kantischen 
Philosophie, Frankf.-on-the-M., 1866), Trendelenburg ( Tefter eine Lucke in Kant's Beweis von dr a*- 

rant's critique of pure reason, 159 

achiiessetulen Snbjectlvitilt des Raumes tmd der Zelt, ein kritUc/ies und antikritischet Blatt, in Ifial. lieitr. z. 
I'hilos., III., pp. 215-276, Ku?w Fisclier und neiii Kant, eine Enlgegnung, Leipsic, 18C9), W. Pliiit^er (i'eber 
KanCa trariscendeiUale JEilhetik, Inaugural Dissertation, Marburg, 1S67), Siegmund Levy (Kantu Krit. U. 
r. Vern. i>i ihrem VerhilUiitss zur Kritik der Spnwhe, Dissertation, Bonn, 1868), Gustav Knauer {ConirSf 
uiid Contrcullctorisch, iiabst convergirenden Lelirstucken.ftuitrje.fteUt, uiul Kant's Kategorientufel bericlUigt, 
Halle, 1868), G. Thiele ( Wie stnd si/iUhet. Urt/ieile der MathnrvUlk a priori nwglich? Inaug. Dissert., Halle, 
1869), F. Ueberweg {Der Gi-xiiidgedanke des Kantisc/ien Kriticismus narJi seini'r Entsiehintgszeit und seinem 
wissenschaftUchen Werth, iii the Altpreuns. Munatssclirift, VI., 18()9, pp. 215-234), Aug. Mullt-r {Die Grund- 
lagen der Kantlschen Philosophie, voia naturwiss. Standpunkte gtse/ien, ibid., pp. 358-421), W. Bolton (Ex- 
amination of the Principles of Kant and Jlamilton, London, 1869), J. B. Meyer (KaiWa Pnychologie, Berlin, 
1870). Some other works, concerning more special problems, will be mentioned below in the course of the 
exposition. [A. E. Kroeger, A'.'s Syst. of TranscendeiUalism, in J. of Spec. Ph., 1869. Tr.] 

By the "dogmatism of metaphysics," as whose most important exponent he men- 
tions Wolff, Kant understands the universal confidence of metaphysics in its principles, 
independently of any previous critique of the rational faculty itself, merely on account 
of its success in the employment of those principles (Kant m. Eberhard, Ueber eine 
Entdeckung, etc., Ros. and Schubert's ed. of Kant's Works, I., p. 453), or the dogmatic 
procedure of the reason (arguing rigidly from philosophical conceptions) without pre- 
vious critique of its own power (Pref. to 2d orig. ed. of the Cr. of Pure B., p. xxxv). 
By skepticism, as maintained especially by David Hume, Kant understands a general 
mistnist of the pure reason, without previous critique of the same, merely on account 
of the contradictory nature of its assertions {ib., I. p. 453). Kant holds that from 
the empirical stand-point the existence of God and the immortality of the soul cannot 
be proved, since both lie completely beyond the range of experience, and sees in 
Locke's attempt to prove them an inconsequence ( Or. of tlis Pure R. , Ros. and Schu. , 
pp. 127 and 823 seq.), so that to him skepticism appears as the necessary result of em- 
piricism. The pure reason, in its dogmatic use, must appear before the critical eye of 
a higher and judicial reason {ib. p. 767) ; the critique of the pure reawn is the true 
tribunal for all controversies of the reason (p. 779) ; to proceed critically in dealing 
with everj'thing which pertains to metaphysics, is the maxim of a universal mistnist of 
all synthetic propositions of metaphysics, so long as a universal ground of their possi- 
bility in the essential conditions of our cognitive faculties has not been made patent 
(OS. Eberhard, I. p. 452). Kant defines the critique of the pure reason as meaning 
an examination of the rational faculty in general, in respect of all the directions, in 
which it may strive to attain to knowledge independently of experience ; it is there- 
fore that which decides whether any metaphysics whatever is possible, and determines 
not only the extent and limits, but also the sources of the same, but aU on the basis of 
principles (Pref. to 1st ed. of the Crit. of Pure R.). Reason is, according to Kant, 
the faculty which contains the principles of knowledge d priori., and pure reason the 
faculty of principles, by which knowledge absolutely d priori is evolved. The critique 
of the pure reason, which passes judgment on the sources and limits of the latter, is 
the pre-condition of a system of the pure reason or of all pure d priori knowl- 
edge. * 

Against the critique of the pure reason, as undertaken by Kant, it has been 
objected that thought can only be scrutinized by thought, and that to seek to examine 
the nature of thought antecedently to all real thinking, is therefore to attempt to think 
before thinking, or like attempting to learn to s^vim without going into the water 

* The Aristotelian and Wolffian theory of the faculties of the eoul was simply adopted in its fundamental 
features by Kant, and in certain particulars modified, but not made the subjex-t of a radical critique. How 
mnfortunate this was for his critique of the conditions of knowledge, Herbart, in particular, has pointed out. 

ICO kant's ckitiquk of pure reason. 

(Hegel). But this objection is refuted by the distinction between pre-critical :ind 
critico-jihilosophic thinking. The former must undoiibtedly precede the critique of 
the reason, but must finally be subjected to an examination, which is to it what optics 
is to seeing. But after that through critical reflection the origin and extent of knowl- 
edge, and the measure and kind of its validity have been ascertained, it is then pos- 
sible for philosophic thought on this basis to make further advances. (Cf. my Syst. of 
Logic, 31, and Kuno Fischer's work, cited above.) 

Kant traces the genesis of his critique of the reason to the stimulus which he 
received from Hume. He says (in the Introduction to the Prolegomena)^ that after 
Locke's and Leibnitz's essays on the human understanding, nay, more, since the 
first rise of metaphysics, nothing more important had appeared in this field of inquiry 
than the skepticism of Hume. Hume "brought no light into this species of knowl- 
edge, but he struck, nevertheless, a .'spark from which a light might well have been 
kindled, if it had fallen on susceptible tinder." "I confess freely that it was the 
exception taken by David Hume" (to the conception of causality), "which many 
years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave to my inquiries in the 
field of speculative philosophy an altogether new direction. I tried first whether 
Hume's objections might not be generalized, and soon found that the conception of the 
connection of cause and effect was far from being the only one through which the un- 
derstanding conceives d priori connections among things, but rather that metaphysics 
was filled only with the like conceptions. I sought to assure myself of their number, 
and having succeeded according to my wish, namely, on the basis of a single princi- 
ple, I proceeded to the deduction of these conceptions, of which I was now assured, 
that they were not, as Hume had apprehended, of empirical derivation, but that they 
originated in the pure understanding." 

Kant applies the epithet transcendental not to all knowledge cl priori, but only to the 
knowledge that and how certain notions (intuitions or conceptions) are applied solely 
a 'priori or are possible. In distinction from transcendental knowledge, Kant calls that 
a transcendent use of conceptions, which goes beyond all possible experience. The 
critique of the reason, which is itself transcendental, demonstrates the illegitimacy of 
all transcendent employment of the reason. 

The order of the investigation in the ' ' Cntique of the Pure Reason " is as follows : 
In the Introduction Kant seeks to demonstrate the actual existence of knowledge 
bearing the character peculiar to what he terms " synthetic judgments a priori,^' and 
raises the question, how these judgments are possible. He finds that their possibility 
depends on certain purely subjective forms of intuition, viz. : space and time, and on 
like forms of the understanding, which he terms categories ; out of the latter grow up 
the ideas of the reason. Kant divides the whole complex of his investigations into the 
Transcendental Elementary Doctrine and the Transcendental Doctrine of Method (fol- 
lowing the division of formal logic customary in his time). The Transcendental Ele- 
mentary Doctrine treats of the materials, and the Transcendental Doctrine of Method 
of the plan or formal conditions of a complete system of the cognitions of the pure 
speculative reason. The Transcendental Elementary Doctrine is divided into Transcen- 
dental .lEsthetic and Logic, the former treating of the pure intuitions of sense, space 
and time, and the latter of the pure cognitions of the understanding. The part of the 
Transcendental Logic, which sets forth the elements of the pure knowledge of the 
understanding and the principles without which no object whatever can be thought, is 
the Transcendental Analytic, and at the same time a Logic of Truth. The second part 
of the Transcendental Logic is the Transcendental Dialectic, i. e. , the critique of the 


KANt's critique of rURE REASON. 161 

understanding and the reason in respect of their hyper-physical use, a critique of the 
false dialectical semblance whicli arises when the pure cognitions of the understanding 
and reason are applied, not solely to the objects of experience, but there, where no 
object is given, beyond the limits of experience, and when, therefore, a material use is 
made of the merely formal principles of the pure understanding. The Transcendental 
Doctrine of Method contains four chapters, bearing the titles ; The Discipline of the 
Pure Reason, its Canon, its Architectonic, and its History. (The Tr. Esthetic relates 
especially to the possibility of mathematics, the Analytic to that of Physics, the Dialec- 
tic to that of all metaphysics, and the Doctrine of Method to that of metaphysics as a 

All our knowledge, says Kant in the Introduction, begins with experience, but not aU 
knowledge springs from experience. Experience is a continuous combination (syn- 
thesis) of perceptions. Experience is the first product which the understanding brings 
forth, after it has gone to work upon the raw material of sensations. But now Kant 
asserts (affirming in regard to all logical combinations of experiences what is true only 
of isolated experiences and of the most elementary form of induction, ''^ per e?iu7nera- 
tionem. simplicem ") : "Experience tells us, indeed, what is, but not that it must neces- 
sarily be so and not otherwise ; hence she gives us no true universality ; " necessity and 
strict (not merely " comparative ") universality are for Kant the sure signs of non- 
empirical cognition.* Knowledge not originating in experience is defined by Kant as 
" ct priori knowledge." f Kant distinguishes as follows: "It may be customary to 
say of much of our knowledge, derived from experimental sources, that we are capable 
of acquiring it or that we possess it d priori, because we derive it not immediately from 
experience, but from a universal rule, which itself, nevertheless, we have borrowed 
from experience ; but in what follows we shall understand by cognitions a priori those 
which take place independently, not of this or that, but of all experience whatever ; 
oppo.sed to them are empirical cognitions, or such as are possible only d posteriori, i. e., 
through experience ; of a prioi-i cognitions those are called pure with which no em- 
pirical elements whatever are mixed." \ 

* In these pre-suppositions, which Kant never questioned, although he never suojected them to a critical 
examination, is contained the irpiaTOv ipevSo^, from which, with great (although not absolute) consistency 
the whole system of "Criticism" grew up. The principle of gravitation, which is strictly universal in its 
truth, and yet, as Kant admits, Is derived from experience, is alone enough to refute him. The simpler the 
subject of a science, ro much the more certain is the universal validity of its inductively-acquired principles, 
so that from arithmetic (quantity) to geometry (quantity, together with motion and form), mechanics (quan- 
tity, form and motion, and gravity), etc., a gradation in the measure of certainty and not, as Kant affirms, an 
absolute difference between universality (here strict, there merely "comparative"), subsists. The empirical 
basis of Geometry is admitted by mathematicians of such weight as Riemann and Helmholtz. Says the former 
(B. Riemann, Ueber die Hypothesen, welche der Oeometrie zu Orunde liegen, in the Transactions of the Royal 
Scientific Association of Gottingen, 1867, p. 2; also printed separately ; written in 1854: "The qualities by 
which space isdiotinsruished from other conceivable magnitudes of three dimensions, can only be learnodfrom 
experience." (For the views of Helmholtz, see his essay on the " Facts which lie at the Basis of G<>on-,etry," 
in the Nachrichten der Kgl. Ges. der Wiss. zu Gottingen, June 3, 1808, pp. 193-291. Cf . the Supplement to 
the 3d edition of my System d. Logilc, Bonn, 1868, p. 427.) Whatever is strictly demonstrated is apodictically 
certain ; such, therefore. Is the following of a proposition in demonstration from its premises; but to term 
axioms " apodictically certain " is a misuse of the words. 

t " A priori knowledge " means, in the sense usual since the time of Aristotle, " knowledge of effects from 
their real causes," and this kind of knowledge possesses, undoubtedly, the attributes of necessity or apodictical 
truth ; Kant adopts the expression for his extravagant conception of a knowledge, whose certainty is inde- 
pendent of all experience, and claims for this knowledge likewise, or rather exclusively, the attribute of 

t But herewith the point of view of the Aristotelian division according to which, by <7 priori knowledge, 
knowledge of effects from their causes was understood, and the reverse by knowledge d posteriori ia 

162 kant's critique of puke reason. 

With the division of cognitions into d priori and empirical cognitions, Kant joins 
the second division of them into analytical and synthetic. By analytical judgments he 
understands those in which the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something 
which was already contained, but not previously observed, in this concept A ; as, for 
example, in the judgment : aU bodies (extended, impenetrable substances) are extend- 
ed. But by synthetic judgments he understands those in which the predicate B lies 
without the subject-concept A, although connected mth it ; as, for example, in the 
judgment : all bodies (extended, impenetrable substances) are heavy. In analytical 
judgments the connection of the predicate with the subject is conceived by the aid of 
the notion of identity, but in synthetic judgments, without the aid of that notion ; the 
former are based on the principle of contradiction, but for the latter another principle 
is necessary.* 

By analytical judgments our knowledge is not augmented; only a conception, 
which we already possessed, is decomposed into its parts. But in the case of synthetic 
judgments I must have, in addition to the conception of the subject, something else, 
= X, on which the understanding may rest, in order to recognize a predicate, which is 
not contained in that conception, as yet belonging to it. In the case of empirical 
judgments, or judgments of experience, all of which are, as such, synthetic, this neces- 
sity occasions no diflBculty ; for this x is my full experience of the object, which I 
t hink through the concept A, which concept covers only a part of this experience. But 

exchanged for Jinother. This Aristotelian usage was preserved by Leibnitz, who says in an Epist. ad J. 
Thomasium, 1669 {Opera Pfiilos., ed. Erdi'., p. 51) : Cotistructiones flgurarum s^int tnotus ; jam ex construc- 
ttonibus affectiones de Jiguris detnonstrantu?; ergo ex motu et per coniequena d prion et ex causa, and 
still later identifies C07i7iaitre d priori with connaltre par les causes, and only occasionally employs instead 
the phraseology "par des demoDStrationa,^'' referring, doubtless, especially to demonstrations from the real 
cause; cf. the passages cited in my Log., 3d ed., 73, p. 176 seq. Leaving out the last>mentioned qualifi 
cation (ex causa), Wolif, less exactly, identifies eruere verilutem d priori with elicere iwnduni ci/gnitit 
ex aliia cognitis ratiocinaiido, and consequently eruere veritatem d posteiHori with solo sensu. In this he 
was followed by Baumgarten, and the latter by Kant, who adds, however, the further distinction of the 
absolute and the relative d-priori, which is completely heterogeneous to the original use of the expression. 
Knowledge d priori, in the Aristotelian sense, is not knowledge proximately independent of experience, to 
which another species of knowledge, independent of all experience, could be related as pure to impure ; it is 
based, rather, on the greatest and most complete variety of logically elaborated experiences, and is only inde- 
pendent of experience in respect of the contents of the logical conclusion. So, e. g., the calculation in advance 
of any astronomical phenomenon is, indeed, independent of our experience of this phenomenon itself, but 
yet depends, partly on numerous other data empirically established, partly on the Newtonian principle of 
gravitation, which lies at the bottom of the calculation, and which, as Kant admits, was drawn from the 
experience of the fall of bodies and of the revolutions of the moon and planets. A judgment independent of 
all experience would, if such a judgment were possible, possess, not the highest degree of certainty, but no 
certainty at all, and would be a mere prejudice. Apart from all experience we can have no knowledge 
whatever, much less, what Kant pretends, apodictical knowledge. Just as machines, with which we surpass 
the results of mere manual labor, are not made without hands by magic, but only through the use of 
the hands, so the demonstrative reasoning, by which we go beyond the results of isolated experience and 
arrive at a knowledge of the necessary, is not effected independently of aU experience through subjective 
forms of incomprehensible origin, but only by the logical combination of experiences according to the induc- 
tive and deductive methods on the basis of the order immanent in things themselves. 

* This use of the terms analytical and synthetic is rightly discriminated by Kant himself from the com- 
mon usage, which denominates analytical the method proceeding through the analysis of the data given to the 
cognition of conditions and ultimately of principles, and sjmthetic the method proceeding by deduction from 
principles to the knowledge of the conditioned : Kant prefers to call these methods, respectively, regressive 
and progressive. The Kantian conception of the analjrtical judgment is an amplification of the conception of 
the identical judgment ; in the latter the whole subject-concept, in the former either the whole or some one 
element of it constitutes tlie predicate. Still the phraseology rather than the idea is new ; earlier logioiang 
had distinguished between partially identical and absolutely identical judgments. 

rant's critique of pure reason. 163 

for synthetic judgments a jtiityn this resort is altogether wanting. What ie the x, on 
which the understanding rests for its authority, when it believes itself to have found, 
outside of the conception A, a predicate foreign to the same and yet connected (and 
that, too, necessarily) with it V In other words : How are synthetic judgments a priuri 
possible ? This is the fundamental question for the critique of the pure reason (of the 
reason independent of experience). 

Kant believes himself able to point out three kinds of synthetic judgments a prion 
as actually existing, namely, mathematical, physical, and metaphysical. Mathematics 
and physics contain \indisputed examples of universal and apodictical knowledge ; the 
affirmations of metaphysics are disputed, in so far as it is a question whether any 
metaphysics is possible ; but in their tendency all properly metaphysical propositions 
are also synthetic judgments d priori. 

Mathematical judgments, says Kant, are all synthetic (although Kant admits that a 
few mathematical axioms, such as a = a, a+b 7 a, are really analytical affirmations, 
asserting, however, that they serve only as links in the chain of method, not as princi- 
ples). One would, says Kant, indeed at first think the proposition, 7+5=12, to be 
merely analytical, following, according to the principle of contradiction, from the con- 
ception of a sum of 7 and 5. But this conception contains no intimation as to what 
the particular number is, in which the two numbers raentioned are resumed. Some- 
thing in addition to these conceptions is necessary, and we must call to our aid some 
image which corresponds with one of them, say of one's five fingers or of five points, 
and so add one after the other the five unities given in this image to the conception 
of seven. * 

No more, says Kant, are any of the principles of pure geometry analytical. That 
the straight line is the shortest one between two points, is a synthetic proposition ; for 
my conception of straightness contains nothing respecting length, but only a quality ; 
the aid of intuition f must be called in, through which alone the synthesis is possible. X 

Physics, says Kant further, also contains synthetic judgments tl priori ; e. g., in all 
changes of the material world the quantity of matter remains unchanged ; in all com- 

* But in fact this didactic expedient is no scientific necessity ; it is sufficient for the case in hand, that we 
go back to the definitions : two is the sum of one and one, three the sum of two and one, etc., and to the defi- 
nition of the decadal system, and to the principle, which is derived from the conception of a sum (as the whole 
number, making abstraction of the question of order), viz. : that the order, in which the constituent parts of 
the sum are taken, is indifferent for the sum. We find given in actual experience similar objects, which can 
be included under the same conception and hence numbered ; from the fundamental conceptions of arithmetic 
follow then the fundamental principles of arithmetic, as analytical judgments, and from these the rest 
follow syllogistically. 

t [Anxc/iauungextma,l or internal preception, or Its product, incomplex representation, reprctientcMo 
out jwtio singularis. TV.] 

X Unquestionably the affirmations of geometry are synthetic. But the fundamental principles of geome- 
try, e. (/., that space has three dimensions, that there is only one straight line between two points, have asser- 
torical, not apodictical certainty ; the geometrician is aware of the three dimensions of space only as facts and 
is unable to give any reason why space must have exactly three and not two or four dimensions ; but thia 
assertorical truth is obtained by abstraction, induction, and other logical operations, founded on numerous 
experiences of spatial relations. The order of figures in space, which attains to expression in the fmidamental 
principles of geometry, and which may be reduced philosophically to the principle of the non-dependence of 
form on magnitude, confirms the truth of these principles, but is itself grounded in the objective nature of 
space itself ; nothing proves its merely subjective character. From the fundamental affirmations of geometry 
the others follow syllogistically ; the latter are apodictically, and not merely empirically, certain, in so far as 
they are demonstrated from the former and not founded on direct experience ; in this sense, but only in this, 
ie geometry an apodictical and, according to the Aristotelian, but by no meanm accordiHK to the Kantiau, om 
of this expression, an A priori science. 

104 K ant's critique of puke reason. 

mtmication of motion action and reaction n^ust always lie equal to each other ; further, 
the law of inertia, etc.* 

In Metaphysics adds Kant although this may be regarded as a science hitherto 
merely attempted, yet rendered indispensable by the nature of human reason, synthetic 
cognitions d priori are claimed to be contained ; e. g., the world must have had a begin- 
ning, and whatever is substantial in things is permanent. Metaphysics is., or at least is 
designed to be, a science made up of purely synthetic propositions a priori. Hence the 
question : How is metaphysics (naturally i. e., with reference to the nature of human 
reason and scientifically) possible ? 

In the Transcendental Esthetic, the science of the d pr/on principles of sensibility, 
Kant seeks to demonstrate the d priori character of space and time. In a " Metaphysi- 
cal Exposition of this Conception " designed to present the considerations which show 
the conception of space to be given d priori, Kant advances four theses : 1. Space is 
not an empirical conception that has been abstracted from external experience ; for all 
concrete localization depends on our previous possession of the notion of space f 
2. Space is a necessary d priori notion, lying at the basis of all external perceptions ; for 
it is impossible by any means to form a notion of the non-existence of space. % 3. Space 
is not a discursive or general conception of relations of things generally, but a pure 
intuition; for we cnn imagine space only as one, of which all so-called spaces are 
parts. 4. Our notion of space is that of an infinite, given magnitude ; but a concep- 
tion containing in itself an infinite number of ideas (representations) is impossible to 
thought ; hence the primitive notion of space is an d priori intuition and not a con- 

In the "Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space" by which Kant 
understands the explanation of that conception as a principle, by means of which the 
possibility of other synthetic cognitions d jmori is made intelligible Kant develops the 
assertion, that the notion of space must be an d priori intuition, if it is to be possible 
for geometry to determine the attributes of space synthetically and yet d priori.^ 

* But the history of physical science shows that these general principles, to which the law of the con- 
servation of force, and others, may be added, were late ab.^tractions from scientifically elaborated experiences, 
and were by no means fixed as scientific truths a priori, i)rior to all experience or independent of all experi- 
ence ; only in so far as there becomes subsequently manifest in them a certain order, which seems to render 
them susceptible of a philosophical derivation from principles still more general such. e. g., as the relativity 
of space do they acquire an (in the Aristotelian, but not, again, in the Kantian sense) a priori character. 

t This is reasoning in a circle. 

i This, however, does not prove the subjectivity and a priori character of space. 

In view of this it is remarkable that Kant should yet style space, in the heading of the chapter, a 
"conception." In the use of scientific terms, Kant is often not sufRciently exact. 

II The assertion that no conceiition can contain an infinite number of partitive representations is an arbi- 
trary one, so far as it relates to representations that may be potentially contained in the conception. But 
actually our idea of space does not contain an infinity of differentiated parts, and actually, too, the space, of 
which we have an idea, does not extend in infinitum, but only, at the farthest, to the concave limits of the 
visible heavens. The infinity of extension exists only in the reflection, that however far we may have gone in 
thought it is always possible to go further, and that, therefore, no limit is absolutely impassable ; but from this 
it by no means follows that space is a merely subjective intuition. 

IT Kant has as little shown how from the supposed d priori nature of the intuition of space the certainty 
of the fundamental principles of geometry follows, as he has shown, on the other hand, that this certainty 
cannot follow from an intuition of space resting on an objective and empirical basis. Further, Kant has not 
sufficiently justified the double use which he makes of space, time, and the categories, in that he treats them, 
on the one hand, as mere forms or ways of connecting the material given in experience, and yet undeniably, 
on the other hand, also treats them as something material, viz. : as the matter or content of thought from 
which we form synthetic judgments d priori. 


Space, then, is viewed by Kant as an a ]J, iori intuition, found in us antecedently 
to all perception of external objects and as the formal quality of the mind, in virtue of 
which we are affected by objects, or as the form of external sensiition in general.* 

Space is, according to Kant, not a form of the existence of objects in themselves. 
Since we cannot make of the special conditions of sensibility conditions of the possibility 
of things, but only of their manifestations, we can doubtless eay that space includes all 
things which may appear to us externally, but not all things-in-themselves, whether 
these be sensibly perceived or not, or by whatever Subject they may be per- 
ceived. Only from the point of view of human beings can we speak of space, extended 
beings, etc. If we make abstraction of the subjective condition, under which alone 
external intuition is possible for us, i. e., under which alone we can be affected by 
external objects, the idea of space has absolutely no signification. This predicate is 
only in so far attributed to things as they appear to us, i. e., are objects of the sensi- 
bility. Space is real, i. e. , is an objectively valid conception in respect of everytbing 
which can be presented to us as an object of external perception, but it is ideal in 
respeot of things, when they are considered by the reason, as they are in themselves, 
and without reference to the sensible nature of man. 

By an altogether analogous metaphysical and transcendental exposition of the con- 
ception of Time, Kant seeks also to demonstrate its empirical reality aud transcendental 
ideality. Time is no more than space a something subsisting for itself or so inherent 
as an objective qualification or order in things, that, if abstraction were made of all 
Bubjective conditions of perception, time would remain. Time is nothing else than the 
form of the internal sense, i. e., of our intuition or perception of ourselves and of our 
internal state ; it determines the relation of the various ideas which make up our inter- 
nal state. But since all ideas, even such as represent external objects, belong, in them- 
selves, as modifications of consciousness to our internal state, of which time is the formal 
condition, it follows that time is also indirectly a formal condition a priori of external 
phenomena. Time is in itself, out of the conscious subject, nothing; it cannot be 
reckoned among objects-in-themselves, apart from its relation to our sensible intui- 
tions, either as subsisting or as inhering. Time possesses subjective reality in respect 
of internal experience. But if I myself or any other being could regard me without 
this condition of sensibility, the same modifications of consciousness which we now 
conceive as changes would found a cognition, in which the idea of time and conse- 
quently that of change would not at all be included. To the objection that the reality 
of the change in our ideas proves the reality of time, Kant replies that the objects of 
the " internal sense," like those of the external sense, are only phenomena, having two 
aspects, the one regarding the object -in-itself, the other the form of our intuition (per- 
ception) of the object, which form must not be sought in the object-in-itself, but in the 
Subject, to which it appears, f 

* That space is only the form of the external and not of the internal sense, and that lime, per contra, is 
the form of the internal, and, indirectly, also of the external sense, are truths inferrible, in Kant's opinion, 
from the nature of external and internal experience. But in fact the relation to spiice belongs no less to the 
"phenomena of the internal sense," to the images of perception as such, to the representations of memory, to 
conceptions, in so far as the concrete representations from which they are abstracted constitnte their insepa- 
rable basis, and therefore to the judgments combined from them, in so far as th:it, to which the judgment 
relates, is also intuitively (through the sensibility) represented, etc. Even the psychical processes take place 
in a space (in the Thalamxis opticus as the sensorium commune ?). which, to be sure, as the space of con- 
iciousness is to be discriminated from the space of external objects ; of the extension in space which belongs 
to these processes, we are literally conscious as extension. 

t This distinction would avail nothing, even though an "internal sense" of the kind which Kant sup- 
poses really existed, since, in the case of psychological self-observation, the Subject, to whom the internal 

166 rant's critique of pure reason. 

Kant pronounces false the doctrine of the Leibnitzo-Wolffian philosophy, that our sen- 
sibility is but the confused representation of things, and of that which belongs to things 
in themselves. He denies that man possesses a faculty of "intellectual intuition," 
whereby, without the intervention of affections from without or from vsdthin, and apart 
from forms merely subjective (space and time), objects are known as they are in them- 

The result of the Transcendental Esthetic is summed up by Kant (in the " General 
Observations on the Transcendental Esthetic," 1st ed., p. 42; 2d ed., p. 59, ap. Eos., 
II., 49) as follows : " That the things which we perceive are not what we take them to 
be, nor their relations of such intrinsic nature as they appear to us to be ; and that if 
we make abstraction of ourselves as knowing Subjects^ or even only of the subjective 
constitution of our senses generally, aU the qualities, all the relations of objects in space 
and time, yes, and even space and time themselves, disappear, and that as phenomena 
they cannot exist really per se, but only in us ; what may be the character of things in 
themselves, and wholly separated from our receptive sensibility, remains wholly un- 
known to us." In what we caU external objects, Kant sees only mental representa- 
tions resulting from the nature of our sensibility. 

Similar is the result to which Kant arrives in reference to the forms of the under- 
standing, in the Transcendental Logic. 

The receptivity of the mind, in virtue of which it has representations whenever it is 
affected in any manner, is Sensibility ; spontaneity of cognition, on the contrary, in the 
absolute origination of ideas, is the mark of the understanding. Thoughts without 
internal or external perceptions are meaningless, but such perceptions without concep- 
tions are blind. The understanding can perceive nothing, and the senses can think 
nothing All perceptions depend on organic affections, and all conceptions on functions ; 
'"function" expresses the unity of the action by which different representations are 
arranged under one common representation. By means of these functions the under- 
standing forms judgments, which are iadirect cognitions of the objects of perception. 
On the various primal conceptions of the understanding, or Categories, depend the 
various forms of logical judgments, and, conversely from the latter, as set forth in 
general (formal) logic, the categories may be ascertained by regressive inference. (Cf . 
A. F. C. Kersten, Quo jure Kantius Arist. categ. rejecerit, Progr. of the Coin. Beal- 
Cfymn., Berl., 1853; Lud. Gerkrath, De Kantii categ. doctrina. Diss. Inaug., Bonn, 
1854.) Kant defines the categories as conceptions of objects as such, by vhich the 
perception of these objects is regarded as determined with regard to some one of the 
functions of the logical judgment (as, e. g. , body is determined by the category of sub- 
stantiality as the subject in the judgment : all bodies are divisible). Kant presents the 
following table of the forms of the logical judgment,* and of the corresponding cate- 
gories f : 

states appear, is identical with the Object to which they belong. The phenomenal succession of our ideas 
cannot be regarded as merely an unfaithful image of internal states, in themselves timeless, but which affect 
the internal sense ; on the contrary, it must also be regarded as having acquired the nature of a real result, 
through the affection produced in the soul or in the I, and as belonging to the sphere of things existent, ai 
Buch, and not merely to the Phenomenal. Besides, this doctrine of the "internal sense" is incorrect; see my 
System of Logic, 40. 

* The threefold division of forms of judgments, aimed at by Kant in each class, is not justified through- 
out ; see my System of Logic, 68-70. 

t The Categories of Relation, as they are termed by Kant, are the only ones which respect thi form of the 
"object" or of objective reality, and as such, at the same time, give rise to certain functions of the logical 
judgment. The differences of Quality and Modality are founded, not on differing forms of objective existence. 

kant's critique of pure reason. 


Logical Table of JuDOMEKxa 

Judgments are in regard to 


Particular (or plural). 




Infinite (or limit- 



Transcendental Table op Conceftions op the Undbrstandino. 
These conceptions are, under the head of 







Substantiality and 

Possibility and 





Causality and 

Existence and 





Community or 

Necessity and 




Herewith belongs a table of synthetic judgments a priori., founded on the above 
conceptions of the understanding. Kant designates it as a 

Pure Physiological Table of Universal Principles op Phtsics. 

Axioms of (sen- 
sible) Intuition. 

Anticipations of 

Analogies of 

Postulates of all em 
pirical thought. 

A complete system of transcendental philosophy, says Kant, would necessarily con- 
tain the conceptions of the understanding which are derived from the pure primal 
conceptions, and are therefore themselves likewise a priori or pure conceptions, as, 
e. g., force, action, passion, which follow from the conception of causality; to make 
out the list of them were a useful and not disagreeable, though here a superfluous task 
(whence it follows that Kant believed himself already to have given the most essential 
elements of a complete transcendental philosophy in the Critique of the Pure Reason). 

Kant observes in regard to these categories, among other things, that there are 
three of theai ia each class, whereas generally all d priori division with conceptions 
must be dichotomous {e. ^., A and non-A), and adds that the third category in each 

which are reflected in the subjective act of judgment, but on various kinds in the relation of the subjective 
to tli9 objective, i. e., of the combination of ideas in the judgment to that portion of reality which is the 
object of representation ; they have not, therefore, different categories underlying them. Logical Quantity, 
again, is founded only on the possibility of combining in one judgment several judgments, whos* subjects are 
included in the same conception, so that the predicate is affirmed (or denied) \vith reference either to the 
whole sphere of that conception or to a part of it; it involves no relation to a form of objective reality, 
peculiar to the judgment as such. Cf. my Syst. of Logic, 68-70. 

168 kant's critique of pure reason. 

class comes from the combination of the second with the first. (In the Critique of the 
Faculty of Judgment, Intr., last note, Kant terms the dichotomous division here men- 
tioned an analytical division d jyriori, founded on the principle of contradiction, but 
says that every synthetic division d priori, not based, as in mathematics, on the intui- 
tion which corresponds with the conception, but on dpi'ioH conceptions, must contain 
three things : 1 , a condition ; 2, something conditioned ; 3, the conception which arises 
from the union of the conditioned with its condition. ) Totality, he says further, is 
plurality viewed as unity ; limitation is reality combined with negation ; community is 
reciprocal causality among substances ; necessity is the existence which is given through 
possibility itself. But the combining of the first and second category in each class 
requires a special act of the understanding, whence the third conception must likewise 
be regarded as an original conception of the understanding. (In this remark of Kant is 
contained the germ of the Fichtean and Hegelian dialectic.) 

The objective validity of the categories (of which Kant treats in the " Transcenden- 
tal Deduction of the Categories") rests on the fact, that it is only through them that 
experience, in what concerns the form of thought, is possible. They relate necessarily 
and d priori to objects of experience, because it is only by means of them that any 
object of experience whatever can be thought. 

There are, saj's Kant, only two cases possible in which synthetic representation 
and its objects can coincide, can bear a necessary relation to each other and, as it were, 
meet each other, viz. : when either the object alone renders the representation possible 
or the representation the object. 

In the first case the relation is empirical, and the representation can therefore not 
be evolved a priori. Our d j5?W7^ ideas are not copied from objects, since otherwise 
they would be empirical and not a priori. Only that in phenomena which belongs to 
sensation (that which Kant terms the matter of sensible cognition, Cr. of the Pure M., 
1st ed. [in the original], pp. 20 and 50; 2ded., pp. 34 and 74) is copied from objects, 
though not perfectly agreeing with them. The things-in-themselves or transcendental 
objects affect our senses {ib., 1st ed., p. 190 ; 2d ed., p. 235 ; Proleg., 33) ; through 
this affection arises the sensation of color, or of smell, etc. , which sensations are yet not 
to be supposed similar to that unknown element in the things-in-themselves which ex- 
cites them in us. But space, time, substantiality, causality, etc. , depend, according to 
Kant, not on such affection. Otherwise all these forms would be empirical and with- 
out necessity. They pertain exclusively to the subject, which by them shapes its sen- 
sations and so generates the phenomena, which are its ideas. They do not come from 
the things-in-themselves. 

The other case cannot occur in this sense, that our ideas cause the existence of 
their objects. The will does indeed affect causally the existence of objects, but not so 
do our ideas. But it is quite possible that the cognition of an object, or that the phe- 
nomenon should take its law from our d priori ideas. Kant compares this latter suppo- 
eition to the astronomical theory of Copernicus, which explains the apparent revolu- 
tion of the heavens by the hypothesis of a real motion of the earth, giving rise to the 
appearance in question. 

But the field or whole sum of objects of possible experiences is found in our percep- 
tions. An (2 ^r/on conception, unrelated to perceptions, would be nothing more than 
the logical form of a conception, but not the conception itself, through which a thing 
is thought. Pure d prim'i conceptions can indeed contain nothing empirical, but they 
must nevertheless, if they are to possess objective validity, be purely d^?W7'J conditions 
of possible experience. 

kant's critique of puke reason. 1G9 

The receptivity of the mind is insufficient, except as combined with spontaneity, to 
render cognition possible. Spontaneity is the ground of a threefold synthesis, viz. : that 
of the apprehension of representations in perception, that of the reproduction of the 
same in imagination, and that of the recognition of them in the conception {Cr. of the 
P. E., 1st ed., p. 97seq.). 

The successive apprehension of the manifold elements given in perception 
and the combination of them into one whole is the Synthesis of Apprehen- 
sion. Without this we could not have the ideas of time and space. The Reproductive 
Synthesis of the Imagination is likewise based on d priori principles ( Cr. of the P. P., 
1st ed., p. 100 seq. ; on pp. 117 seq. and 123, and on p. 153 of the 2d ed., Kant discrim- 
inates more definitely from the reproductive imagination, which depends on conditions 
of experience, a productive imagination, which constitutes an a priori condition of the 
combination of the manifold in a cognition ; in the 2d ed., p. 152, Kant says that the 
former is of no service in explaining the possibility of d2mori cognition and belongs, 
not to the subjects of transcendental philosophy, but to those of psychology, whence in 
the 2d ed. he treats no farther of it, nor of " Recognition of ideas iu the Conception"). 
If, in the synthesis of the parts of a line, of a division of time, of a number, I were 
constantly to lose the earlier parts out of thought and not reproduce them while pro- 
ceeding to the following ones, it would never be possible for me to have a complete 
idea, or even the purest and most primary fundamental ideas of si)ace and time. But 
without the consciousness that that, which we think, i;> just the same as that which 
we thought an instant before, all reproduction in the series of ideas would be fruitless. 
The concept is that which unites the manifold elements, successively perceived and then 
reproduced, in one idea. 

In the cognition of the manifold the mind becomes conscious of the identity of the 
function, by which it performs the necessary synthesis. All combination and all unity 
in knowledge presuppose that unity of consciousness, which precedes all the data of 
perceptions, and in connection with which alone any representation of objects is possi- 
ble. To this pure, original, unchangeable self-cousciousness Kant gives the name of 
transcendental aptperception . He distinguishes it from empirical apperception, or the 
mutable empirical self- consciousness which subsists amid the succession of internal 
phenomena apprehended by the intcm.il sense. Transcendental apperception is an 
original synthetic act, while empirical self consciousness depends on an analysis, 
which presupposes this original synthesis. The synthetic unity of apperception is 
that highest point on which all use of the understanding depends. On it depends the 
consciousness that " I think," which must accompany all my ideas. Even the objec- 
tive unity of space and time is only possible through the relation of our perceptions to 
this transcendental apperception. 

The categories are the conditions of thought on which all possible experience 
depends. The possibility and necessity of the categories depend on the relation which 
the whole sphere of the sensibility and with it all possible phenomena have to the pri- 
mal function of apperception. All the manifold in perception must conform to the 
conditions of the unvarying unity of self-consciousness, the primal synthetic unity of 
apperception, and must hence be subject to universal functions of synthesis by concep- 
tions. The synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must necessarily conform to 
the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual, and is given and expressed in a 
manner wholly a pi'iori in the category. Every object, which can be given us in per- 
ception, is subject to the necessary conditions on whicli Ihc sj'ntlietic combination and 
unity of the manifold in perception depend, in all possible experience. The cate- 

170 rant's critique of puee reason. 

gories, as conditions a priori of possible experience, are therefore at the same time con- 
ditions of the possibility of the objects of experience (i. e., of phenomena), and have 
therefore objective validity in a synthetic judgment d priori. So, on the other hand, 
no d priori knowledge is possible, except of objects of possible experience. 

The conformity of things-in-themselves to law would necessarily subsist, if there 
were no mind to perceive and know it. But phenomena are only representations of 
things which are unknown to us in their intrinsic nature. As mere representations, 
however, they are subject to no law of combination, except that which the combining 
faculty may prescribe. Combination, says Kant, is not in things, and cannot be de- 
rived from them by perception, for example, and thence first transferred to the under- 
standing ; it is a work of the understanding alone, which itself is nothing more than 
the faculty of ^ /jn'on combination, the faculty by which the variety of given repre- 
sentations is brought under the unity of apperception. This principle, adds Kant, is 
the highest in all human knowledge. Since now all possible perception depends on 
the synthesis of apprehension, and since this empirical synthesis again depends on the 
transcendental synthesis, and hence on the categories, it follows that all possible per- 
ceptions, and hence everything which can exist in the empirical consciousness, i. e. , all 
phenomena of nature, are subject, in what respects their combination, to the categories, 
which are the original ground of the necessary conformity of nature considered sim- 
ply as such to law. * 

Kant mentions supplementarily (Or. of the Pure B., 2d ed., p. 167), in addition to 
the two ways in which a necessary agreement of experience with the conceptions of 
its objects is conceivable (namely, when experience makes these conceptions, or when 
these conceptions make experience possible), a third intermediate way, namely, by 
the hypothesis, that the categories are not empirical, but subjective bases of thought, 
implanted in us with our existence, but so arranged by the author of our being as 
exactly to agree in their use with the laws of nature, which underlie experience. He 
denominates this hypothesis (which agrees essentially with the Leibnitzian theory of pre- 
established harmony, but is ascribed by Kant ProL, % 37, note to Crusius) as a kind of 
si/stem of the 2yre-fo7'>nation of the pure reason, but pronounces against it, because its truth 
is inconsistent with the possession by the categories of that necessity which belongs 
essentially to the very conception of them. (A further indirect proof of the ?7iere subjec- 
tivity of all that is d priori, including the forms of sensible intuition, space and time, 
as well as the categories, is contained lor Kant in the Antinomies, of which he treats in a 

* Kant teaches that for the knowledge of the particular laws of natiire experience is necessary, since these 
laws relate to phenomena, which are empirically determined. This Kantian theory contains more than one 
intrinsic contradiction. 1. In that, whUe things-in-themselves are represented as affecting us, time and cau- 
sality, which this affection implies, are reckoned by Kant as fi priori forms, valid only within and not beyond 
the world of phenomena. 2. In that this affection must furnish to the mind, on the one hand, a material 
completely unformed and chaotic, so as not to be subject to any law incompatible with the <) priori law of com- 
bination, and yet, on the other, an orderly material, so that every particular material may not be out of relation 
to every particular form in which case all determinations in the material would be of subjective origin, and 
so the difference between the empirical and the A priori would disappear but that the particular in phenom- 
ena, and indeed every particular law may be empirically known and determined, etc. But if the reason of 
the particular forms and laws of phenomena must be found in the nature of the objects or "things-in-them- 
selves " which affect us, it is susceptible of further demonstration, that the kind and succession of affections 
are characterized by an order, which is possible only on the supposition that time, space, causality, etc., are 
objective and real functions of "things-in-themselves," whereby Kanfs docti-ine of the A priori and his Sub- 
jectivism are overthrown (cf. my Syst. of Log., 44). The same result follows also from the ideal necessity, 
that the particular should imply the universal. If particular laws must be ascribed to the sphere of objective, 
absolute reality, the universal laws, imder which they may be subsumed, cannot be foreign to the same sphere 
and cannot b of merely subjective origin. 

kant's critique of pure reason. 171 

subsequent section, Cr. of the P. R, Ist ed., p. 506 ; 2d ed., 534, Bos. and Schu., VoL 
II., 8i'9. This proof, if it were stringent, would indeed fill up the '"gap" which, 
according to Trendelenburg, exists in Kant's argument ; but it does not do this, because 
the proofs for the Antinomies are without force, unless Kant's fundamental thought be 
admitted ; cf. the works by Trendelenburg, and others, cited above, pp. 158, 159 [and 
below, ad 132], 

Pure conceptions of the understanding are entirely heterogeneous to empirical intui- 
tions, and yet in all subsumptions of an object under a conception the representation of 
the former must be homogeneous with the latter. In order to render possible the 
application of the categories to phenomena there must exist a third factor, homo- 
geneous with both. Such a mediating factor, in the form of an idea produced by the 
transcendental synthesis of the imagination, is termed by Kant a transcendental Schema 
of the understanding. Now time is as a form d priori, homogeneous with the cate- 
gories, and as a form of the sensibility, with phenomena. Therefore an application of 
the categories to phenomena is possible through the transcendental functions or quali- 
fications of time. 

The Schemata, in the order of the categories (quantity, quality, relation, modality), 
are founded on the serial nature of time, the contents of time, the order of time, and 
on time as a whole. The schema of quantity is number. The schema of reality is being 
in time, and that of negation is not-being in time. The schema of substance is the per- 
sistence of the real in time ; that of causality is regular succession in time ; that of com- 
munity, or of the reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents, is the 
simultaneous existence of the qualifications of the one substance with those of the other, 
following a universal rule. The schema of possibility is the agreement of the synthesis 
of diverse representations with the universal conditions of time, and hence the deter- 
mination of the representation of a thing as associable with some particular time ; the 
schema of actuality is existence in a definite time, and that of necessity is existence at 
all times. 

The relation of the categories to possible experience must constitute the whole of our d 
-priori knowledge by the understanding. The principles of the pure understanding are 
the rules for the objective use of the categories. From the categories of quantity and 
quality flow mathematical principles possessing intuitive certainty, while the categories 
of relation and modality give rise to djTiamic principles of discursive certainty. 

The principle of the Axioms of (sensible) Intuition is : All sensible intuitions are 
extensive magnitudes. The principle of the Anticipations of Perception is : In all 
phenomena the real object of sensation has intensive magnitude, i. e., a degree. The 
principle of the Analogies of Experience is : Experience is only possible through the 
notion of a necessary connection of perceptions ; from this principle are derived the 
principles of the persistence of substance or that in all the changes of phenomena 
the substance persists, and its quantity is neither increased nor diminiBhed ; of succes- 
sion in time by the law of causality or that all changes take place in accordance with 
the law of the connection of cause and effect ; and of simultaneity under the law of 
reciprocity or community or that all substances, in order to be perceived as co- exist- 
ing in space, must be in complete reciprocity, or must exert a reciprocal action upon 
each other. The Postulates of Empirical Thought are : "VNTiatever agrees (with refer- 
ence to perception and conception) with the formal conditions of experience is possible ; 
Whatever coheres with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is actual ; 
That whose cormection with the actual is determined by the universal conditions of expe- 
rience is necessary. 

172 kant's critique of pure reason. 

To the proof of the second postulate, relative to the evidence of reality, Kant added 
in the second edition of the Critique of the Pure Reason a " Refutation of (material) 
Idealism," based on the principle that internal experience the reality of which cannot 
be doubted is impossible without external experience, and consequently that it is only 
possible on the condition that there exist objects in space external to ourselves. Kant's 
argTiment in proof of this is, that the qualification of time involved in the empirically 
determined consciousness of our own existence implies something permanent in percep- 
tion, which something must be different from our ideas, in order that it may serve as a 
standard for the measurement of their change, and which therefore is only possible on 
the condition that there exists something external to us. (In the Ist ed., p. 376 Vol. 
II., p. 301, in Ros. and Schu. Kant had already sought to refute the doctrine of empiri- 
cal ' ' Idealism, as resting on a false scrupulousness about admitting the objective reality 
of our external perceptions," arguing that external perception proves directly that there 
are real existences in space ; that without perception even invention and dreaming would 
be impossible, and that therefore otir external senses have, so far as it relates to the data 
which are necessary for experience, their real corresponding objects in space. But 
external objects in space, as Kant is ever repeating, are not to be considered as things- 
in-themselves ; they are called external because they belong to the external sense, the 
ujoiversal form of whose intuitions is space. By the " permanent in perception" Kant 
can only mean the permanently phenomenal in space, or impenetrable, extended sub- 
stance. Cf. also the Proleg. to Metaphysics, 49.) 

Although our conceptions may be divided into sensible and intellectual conceptions, 
yet their objects cannot be divided into objects of the senses, ox pherwrncTia, and objects 
of the understanding, or noumena, in the positive sense of this term ; for the concep- 
tions of the understanding are applicable only to the objects of sensible intuition ; without 
such intuition (perception) they are objectless, and a faculty of non-sensible or intellec- 
tual intuition is not possessed by man. But the conception of a noumenmi, in the 
negative signification of the term, that is, as denoting a thing, in so far as it is not an 
object of external or internal perception for us, is a correct one. In this sense things- 
in-themselves are noumena, which, however, are not to be conceived through the 
categories of the understanding, but only as an unknown Something. * 

Through the confounding of the empirical use of the understanding with the 
transcendental arises the '^amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection.'''' These con- 
ceptions are identity and diversity, agreement and repugnance, inner and outer, the 

* The inference of subsequent philosophers, that because things-in-themselves are not in space, they 
must, exist " in the world of thoiaght," is thcref'^re, from the Kantian point of view, inadmissible. If by 
that which is in the world of thoupht is understood something immanent in human thought, i. ., a conception 
or a particular thought, the thing-in-itseU is nothing of the kind. If by it is meant a transcendental object 
of thought, then the " thing-in-itself " is only in so far in "the world of thought" as it is true that we are 
obliged to assume its existence, but not in the sense that the categories of human thought can be applied to 
it. It is unmistakably true, however, that Kant's use of the conception of noumena (a conception of Platonic 
origin) for his things-in-themselves was, notwithstanding the proviso that it should be taken only in a negative 
sense, a source of confusion to Kant himself, and the occasion of the introduction of foreign elements, 
especially of gualiflcaiions of worth into the conception of things-in-themselves. That the things-in-them- 
selves, which are without time, space, or causaUty, and which yet affect us, are better and higher in worth 
than phenomena, is at least an arbitrary supposition, which, however, receives from the Platonic term 
employed especially in the antithesis : homo noumenon, homo phenomenon an apparent support, and is thus 
introduced into the ethical domain. Kanfg doctrine of concept and perception is distinguished by its phe- 
nomenaUstic [subjective] character from the Aristotelian doctrine, that the essence which is known through 
the concept is immanent in the individual objects, which are included in the extension of the concept, and ha 
BO separate existence. 


determinable and determination (matter and form). Transcendental reflection {reflexio) 
is the act whereby I confront the comparison of ideas generally, with the cognitive 
faculty in which the comparison is instituted, and distinguish whether the ideas are 
compared with each other as belonging to the pure iinderstanding or to sensuous 
intuition. Kant finds the source of the Leibnitzian system, " which intellectuaJizes 
phenomena," in the by Leibnitz unnoticed amphiboly of the conceptions of reflec- 
tion. Leibnitz supposed that the understanding, when comparing ideas, had to do with 
representations of objects as they are in themselves, and took the conception of noumena 
in its positive sense. He held sensation to be only confused perception, and believed 
that when he was comparing all objects m the understanding, by the aid of the abstracted 
formal conceptions of human thought, he was perceiving the inner quality and nature 
of things. As a natural consequence, he found no other differences than those by which 
the understanding distinguishes its pure conceptions from each other. From these 
premises he concluded that whatever is ideally indistinguishable is absolutely imdistin- 
guished or identical ; that realities, as being mere aifirmations, cannot through their 
opposite tendencies neutralize each other, since there is no logical contradiction between 
them ; that the only internal state which can be attributed to substances is an ideal or 
conscious state, and that their community is to be conceived as a pre-established har- 
mony ; and, lastly, that space is only the order of co-existing substances, and time the 
dynamic succession of their states. Kant contends that the above-named conceptions 
of reflection should not be applied in comparing ideas drawn from the world of phe- 
nomena, without taking into consideration the nature of sensuous intuition (which has 
its peculiar forms and is not merely confused perception), and that they should not be 
applied to things-in-themselves (or noumena) at all. 

If the understanding is the faculty which by its rules introduces unity into phenom- 
ena, the Reason is the faculty which by its principles establishes unity among the rules 
of the understanding. The conceptions of the reason contain the unconditioned, and 
transcend, therefore, all the objects of experience. Kant gives the name of Ideas to those 
necessary conceptions of the reason for which no corresponding real objects can be given 
in the sphere of the senses. (Cf . Jul. Heidemann, Plat, de ideis doetrinam quomodo Kant- 
ius et intdlexerit et excduerit, Diss. Inaug. , Berl. , 1863. ) The transcendental conceptions 
of the reason imply absolute totality, or completeness, in the synthesis of conditions, 
and seek to carry the synthetic unity which is conceived in the Category up to the 
absolutely unconditioned. The pure reason is never directly conversant with objects, 
but only with the conceptions of objects, which are furnished by the understanding. 
Just as it was possible to derive the conceptions of the understanding from the various 
forms of the logical judgment, by observing and translating into conceptions the pro- 
cesses by which the synthesis of perceptions is effected in judgments, so the transcen- 
(Jental conceptions of the reason may be derived from the forms of rational inference 
These forms are three : categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. Accordingly there 
are three transcendental rational conceptions expressing the unconditioned as resulting 
(1) from a categorical synthesis in a subject, (2) from the hypothetical synthesis of the 
terms of a series, (3) from the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system. The first of 
these rational conceptions is that of the soul as the absolute unity of the thinking Sub 
ject, the second is that of the world as the absolute unity of the series of the condi- 
tions of phenomena ; and the third is that of God as the absolute unity of all objects of 
thought whatever, or as the being who includes in himself all reality {em reidisdmum). 
Corresponding with these three ideas are three dialectical inferences of the reason, which 
are sophistications, not of men, but of the pure reason itself, since they arise through 



a natui'al illusion, which is as inseparable from human reason as are certain opticaSi 
deceptions from vision, and which, like these, can be explained and rendered harmless, 
but cannot be entirely removed. The Idea of the soul as a simple substance is the sub- 
ject of the psychological paralogism ; the Idea of the universe is the subject of the cos- 
mological antinomies, and, lastly, the Idea of a moct real being, as the ideal of the pure 
reason, is the subject of the attempted proofs of the existence of God. 

Rational Psychology, says Kant, is based solely on the consciousness which the 
thinking I has of itself ; for if we were to call in the aid of our observations on the 
play of our thoughts, and on the natural laws thence derivable (as, e. g.^ Herbart subse- 
quently did, when he attempted to found a proof of the punctual simplicity of the 
soul on the mutual combination of representations), there would spring up an empiri- 
cal psychology, unable to demonstrate the reality of attributes beyond the reach of pos- 
sible experience such as the attribute of simplicity and having no possible claim to 
apodictical certainty. From the consciousness of the Ego, rational psychology seeks to 
demonstrate that the soul exists as a substance (an immaterial substance), that as a 
simple substance it is incorruptible, and that as an intellectual substance it is ever 
identical with itself or is one person, in possible commerce with the body and immortal. 
But the arguments of rational psychology (in the statement of which Kant seems chiefly 
to have adopted the form in which they are presented in Kuutzen's Von der immateriel- 
len Natur der Sede, Reimarus' Die varnehmsten Wahrhdten der naturlicJien Bdigion, 
and Moses Mendelssohn's Phcedon) involve an illegitimate application to the Ego, as a 
transcendental object, of the conception of substance, which presupposes sensuous in- 
tuition, and applies only to phenomenal objects. That I, who think, must always be 
regarded in every act of thought only as subject and as somethmg, which is not a mere 
appurtenance or predicate of thought, is an apodictical and even an identical propo- 
sition; but it does not signify that I am objectively an independent essence or sub- 
stance. So, too, it is implied in the very conception of thought that the "I" of ap- 
perception denotes a logically simple subject which is an analytical proposition ; but 
this does not signify that the thinking I is a simple substance which would be a syn- 
thetic proposition. The affirmation of my own identity in the midst of all the chang- 
ing contents of consciousness is, again, an analytical afl&rmation , but from this identity 
cannot be inferred the identity of a thinking substance, existing amid all change of 
states. Finally, that I distinguish my existence, as that of a thinking being, from the 
existence of other things external to me, including among the latter my own body, is an 
analytical proposition ; out it does not enable me to know whether this consciousness 
of myself would be possible if there were no things beside and external to me, and 
whether, therefore. I could exist without a body. 

The difficulty of explaining the mteraction between soul and body is increased by 
the assumed fact of their heterogeneity, the former being regarded as existing only in 
time, the latter in both time and space. But if we consider (says Kant, Or. of the 
Pure i?., 2d ed,, p. 427 seq.) that the two classes of existences assumed in this hypo- 
thesis are distinguished, not mteriorly, but only by the fact that the one is phenome- 
nally external to the other, and hence that that which underlies the phenomenon of 
matter as its reality, or as the thing-in itself , imay perhaps not be so unlike thesoulitsdf, 
this difficulty disappears, and the only question remainmg is how a community of sub- 
stances is in any sense possible a question which neither psychology nor any other 
form of human science can answer. The idea, here only briefly intimated, of the pos- 
sible homogeneity of the realities which underlie, respectively, the phenomena of the 
external and those of the internal sense, is more fully developed in the first edition of 


the Cr. of P. li. Empirical psychology, says Kant, since it ha* reference to phe- 
nomena only, is properly dualistic ; but transcendental psychology favors neither dual- 
ism nor pneumatism (spiritualism) nor materialism, all of which hold the diversity of 
manner in which objects whose intrinsic nature remains unknown are mentally rep- 
resented to be significant of a corresponding diversity in the nature of these things 
themselves. " The transcendental object which underlies external phenomena, as also 
that which underlies internal intuition, is in itself neither matter nor a thinking being, 
but only a (to us) unknown ground of the phenomena, from which we derive our empi- 
rical conceptions of either kind" {Cr. of the Pure Reason, 1st ed., p. 379, Ros., II., p. 
303). " I can very well suppose that the substance to which our external sense attri- 
butes extension, is in itself the subject of thoughts which can be consciously repre 
sented to itself by its own internal sense ; thus that which in one aspect is called ma- 
terial would in another aspect be also thinking being, not whose thoughts, but the signs 
of whose thoughts we can perceive in phenomena" (i6., p. 359, Ros., II., 288 seq). 
This latter supposition, here named as a possible one, borders upon the doctrine of the 
Leibnitzian monadology, which teaches that complexes of monads not single monads 
appear to our senses as extended things, and at the same time contain beings which 
have ideas (representations), and may contain beings capable of conscious representation 
and thought. It is stUl less removed from the view developed by Kant in his " Mona- 
dologia PJiysica." In another sense it contains points of contact with Spinozism, which 
ascribes to the one only substance thought and extension, but as real and not merely 
phenomenal attributes. In the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant did 
not deny the possibility thus suggested in the first edition, but rather suggested it anew in 
the passage above cited, though refraining from a more detailed development of the idea. 
The thought, therefore, is not changed in the second edition, but the critical principle 
is more strictly applied, in that Kant now prefers to give no space to the development of 
indemonstrable dogmatic theories, even as hypotheses, but to confine himself to the most 
brief suggestion of them. We may add that the meaning of the hypothesis in question 
is obviously not that the transcendental substratum of external phenomena is identical 
with the thinking Ego, or that it is only a thought of the Ego, but that it is possibly 
itself also a thinking essence, and therefore of like nature with the transcendental 
substratum of the internal sense just as, for example, in the Leibnitzian system all 
monads are mutually homogeneous, or rather, just as those physical monads are homo- 
geneous, which Kant assumes in his Monadologia PJiysica of the year 1756; only 
because, according to Kant, we have no precise knowledge whatever of the transcen- 
dental substratum, does it further follow that still other theories, such as, for example, 
the theory of the identity of subject and object, cannot, as hypotheses, be refuted. It 
would be very unjust to identify the conjecture here ventured by Kant with the sub- 
jectivism of Fichte. It is true that Kant's utterances respecting transcendental 
objects, or things-in-themselves, are, in a measure, uncertain ; but this uncertainty 
(which is a natural consequence of the contradiction inseparable from the Kantian doc- 
trine, in that the transcendental object is represented as the cause of phenomena, and 
yet, according to Kant, cannot be a cause) is observable in the first edition of the Cr. 
oj P. Reason, and not (as Schopenhauer and others have asserted) in the second only. 
Cf., for example, the passages which exist in both editions on page 235 (Vol. II., of 
Rosenkranz's edition of Kant's works), on the one hand, and, on the other, those on p. 
391, Une 9 from above and following, and Proleg., 57 {ib., III., p. 124). Though it 
be true, that in the first edition of the Critique those passages are more frequent 
in which Kant emphasizes our ignorance concerning the nature of transcendental 

176 ' kant's critique of pure reason. 

objects, while later, in the seeond edition, when he is striving, in view of mis- 
apprehensions that had arisen, to render more clear the difference between his doctrine 
and the Idealism of Berkeley, passages, in which stress is laid on the necessity of pos- 
tulating the existence of things-in-themselves as the transcendental basis of the world 
of phenomena, became somewhat more numerous, yet Kant's doctrine remained essen- 
tially the same, viz. : that we must assume that, though we know not how^ transcendental 
objects or things-in-themselves do exist. In the first ed., p. 105, Kant only says that 
these objects are nothing far vs, and on p. 109 it is only when considered as = x, 
that they are said to be nothing for us. But it would be a decidedly false interpre- 
tation of Kant dogmatically to identify the transcendental object of the external or the 
internal sense, the noumena or ' ' things-in-themselves " with which, as Kant in both 
editions of the Critique teaches, the manifold affections of the external and internal 
senses originate, and with which Kant's distinction of the empirical from the d priori 
is necessarily connnected with " the unity of the essence in the multiplicity of phe- 
nomena." * 

The Cosmological Idea is the source of four Antinomies, i. e. , pairs of mutually 
contradictory propositions, which foUow, all with equal consequence, from the supposi- 
tion of the reality of the phenomenal world, in the transcendental sense of the term 
"reality." The four antinomies correspond with the four classes of categories. (Cf. 
in addition to the critiques by Herbart, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and others, in particular, 
Reiche, I>e Kantii antinomiis guce dicuntur tlteoreticis, Gott., 1838; Jos. Eichter, Die 
Kantischen Antiiwmien, Mannheim, 1863.) 

The quantity of the world is the subject of the First Antinomy. Thesis : The world 
had a beginning in time and has limits in space. Antithesis : The world is without 
beginning and without limits in space. 

The Second Antinomy relates to the quality of the world. TJiesis : Eveiy composite 
substance in the world is made up of simple parts. Antithesis : There exists nothing simple. 

The Third Antinomy concerns the causal relation. TJiesis: Freedom, in the tran- 
scendental sense of the term, is a reality, or there may be absolute, uncaused beginnings 
of series of effects. Antithesis : All things, without exception, take place in the world 
in accordance with natural law. 

The Fourth Antinomy is one of modality. Thesis: There belongs to the world 
(whether as part or as cause) an absolutely necessary being. Antithesis : Nothing is 
absolutely necessary. 

The proofs and counterproofs given by Kant in connection with these Antinomies 
are all indirect. In the proof of each thesis, the infinite progression affirmed in the 
corresponding antithesis is disputed as impossible, whUe in proving the antithesis the 
limit assumed in the thesis is rejected as arbitrary and unreal. 

Kant solves the antinomies by his distinction between phenomena and things-in- 
themselves. In reference to the world as a transcendental object, or noumenon, or 
intelligible world, thesis and antithesis in the two first or mathematical antinomies are 
alike false. We cannot apply to the intelligible world the conceptions of space and 
time which are involved in the predicates '' limitation in space and time," and " infinite 
extension in space and time," and an analogous argument may be employed with refer- 
ence to the predicates "simplicity " and " complexity ; " hence neither the one nor the 

* This by way of complement, and, in part, for the sake of giving greater precision to the arguments in 
my work : De priore et posteriore forma Kantiance Critices Rationis Puree, Berl., 1862. and by way of re- 
joinder to Michelet's reply in his Reyiew, " Dgr Gedanke," Vol. III., Berlin, 1862, pp. 2.37-243; cf. my Sust. 
dr Log., 3d ed., Bonn, 1868, p. 43. 

rant's critique of puke KEA80N. 177 

other of the contradictory predicates can be applied to that world, and from the non- 
applicability of the one the applicability of the other cannot be inferred ; the contradic- 
tion in form between Thesis and Antithesis is in reality only an apparent one, a " dia- 
lectical opposition." But we must admit, as a regulative principle of speculative inves- 
tigation, the requirement that no limit be regarded as absolutely ultimate. In the two 
last or dynamic Antinomies the Thesis is true of the intelligible world, the Antithesis of 
the phenomenal. Every phenomenon depends necessarily upon some other phenomenon 
or phenomena, but things-in-themselves are free. Within the sphere of the phenomenal 
there exists no unconditioned cause, but outside of the whole complex of phenomena 
there exists, as their traJiscendental ground, the Unconditioned. 

The sum of all realities or perfections, conceived in cancreto and even in incUvidvo aa 
an exemplar or transcendental prototype, is the Theological Ideal. The theoretical 
proofs of God's existence are the so-caUed ontological, cosmological, and teleological 
or physico-theological arguments. 

The Ontological Argument concludes from the conception of God as the most real 
being to his existence, since existence necessary existence belongs in the class of 
reahties, and is therefore contained in the conception of the most real being. Kant 
here disputes the assumption that being is a real predicate, by adding which to other 
predicates the sum of realities may be increased. The comparison, says Kant, between 
a being possessing other predicates, but not being, and a being combining vnth these 
other predicates that of being, and hence by so much greater, more perfect, or more 
real than the former, is absurd. When being is affirmed, the object is posited with all 
its predicates. This is the meaning of being. When being is not affirmed or, what is 
the same thing, when the object is not thus posited no conclusion can be drawn from 
the conception of the object to its predicates. Hence, in reasoning to the existence of 
God, if being is to be demonstrated as a predicate, being must have been already pre- 
viously assumed, whence we arrive only at a pitiful tautology. This tautological con- 
clusion would be an identical, hence an analytical proposition, whUe the assertion that 
God is, is, like aU existential propositions, a synthetic one, and can therefore not be 
demonstrated d priori in regard to a noumenon. 

The Cosmological Argument concludes from the fact that anything exists to the 
existence of an absolutely necessary being, which being, by the aid of the ontological 
argument, is then identified with God as the most real or perfect being {ejis realissimum 
OT pe)'fectissi7nu7n). Kant, per contra, denies that the principles which regulate the use 
of the reason justify us in prolonging the chain of causes beyond the sphere of expe- 
rience ; but, he adds, if the argument did really conduct to an extramundane and abso- 
lutely necessary cause, it could not demonstrate that this cause is the absolutely per- 
fect being ; and to take refuge in the ontological argument is shown inadmissible by 
the demonstrated invalidity of the latter. 

The Teleological Argument concludes from the order and adaptation in nature to 
the absolute wisdom and power of its author. Kant speaks of this argument with 
respect, on account of its efficacy in producing conviction, but denies its scientific 
validity. The conception of finality can, according to Kant, no more than the concep- 
tion of cause, be employed in justification of conclusions which lead us beyond all the 
limits of the world of phenomena ; for it too is of egoistic or subjective origin, and is, 
like the conception of cause, transferred by man from himself to things, but it is invalid 
as applied to transcendental objects. Did, however, the teleological argument lead to 
an extramundane author of the world, it would only prove the existence of a world- 
builder of great power and wisdom, according to the degree of adaptation manifest in 

178 rant's metaphysical peingiples of natueal science. 

the world, but not that of an almighty and all-wise creator of the world. And here 
again, to supplement the argument by having recourse to the ontological argument 
would be unjustifiable. 

The Ideal of the Reason, or the Idea of God, like all transcendental conceptions of 
the reason, has theoretical validity only in so far as it, as a regidutive principle, serves 
to lead the understanding in all empirical cognition to seek for sj'stematic unity. The 
transcendental ideas are not constitutive principles through which certain objects lying 
beyond the reach of experience may be known; they simply require of the vmder- 
standing systematic unity and completeness in its comprehension of the field of 
experience. We are required by a correct maxim of natural philosophy to abstain from 
all theological and from all transcendent explanations of the arrangement of nature 
generally. But in the employment of the practical reason the Ideal of the Reason may 
serve as a form of thought for the highest object of moral and religious faith. 

In the "Doctrine of Method" Kant makes many valuable observations relating to 
metaphysics as a science dependent on the critique of the reason, but contributes 
nothing to the material development of the doctrine of the relation of human thought to 
objective reality, contenting himself with simply deducing methodological consequences 
from the doctrines previously established. It may here suffice to cite an affirmation of 
Kant's in the part of the "Doctrine of Method" relating to the "Discipline of the 
Reason in its Polemical Use " ( Or. of the Pure R.,lst ed. p. 747 ; 2d ed. p. 775, Ros. , II. , p. 
577) : " It is extremely preposterous to expect from the reason enlightenment, and yet to 
dictate to it beforehand on which side the weight of its authority must necessarily fall. " 

Kant's Physical Philosophy is closely related to the doctrine contained in the Critique 
of the Pure Reason, and especially to the Transcendental Esthetic and Analytic. * (Cf . 
Lazarus Bendavid, Vorlesungen uber die inetaph. Anfangsgr. der Naturw., and, per 
contra, Schwab, Prufung der Kantischen Begriffe von der UndurchdringlichTceit, der 

* If it is the business of physical philosophy to explain the phenomena of nature by reference to that 
which as transcendental object or thing-in-itself underlies them, then such a philosophy is impossible from the 
Critical stand-point which restricts us to the knowledge of phenomena, these phenomena being our ideas. The 
''Metaphysical Principle of Natural Science'''' can only contain a systematic collection of what Kant holds 
to be d pi'iori principles of natural philosophy. When, nevertheless, Kant goes beyond the phenomenal, and 
when, especially, matter is reduced by him to forces, these forces, which lie behind phenomena, occupy in his 
system an untenable middle position between the phenomenal and the noumenal, between the appearance and 
the thing-in-itself. According to the Critique of the Pure Reason it is the spaceless and timeless thing-in-itself 
which so affects our (in themselves likewise spaceless and timeless) senses that sensations arise in us which are 
brought by the " I " into harmony with the (I priori forms of intuition and thought. In the Met. Principles 
of Nat. Science Kant says : " It is only through motion that the external senses can be affected." In consis- 
tency with the teachings of the Critique of the Pure Reason this can only mean : when the affection itself 
becomes phenomenal (when we not simply suffer an affection, but perceive the process of the affection in the 
case of other sensitive beings or of ourselves, e. gr., when we see the blow which awakens the sense of feeling or 
perceive through the sense of sight or touch the vibration of the chord which affects our ears, etc.), then 
must the spaceless and timeless relation, on which the production of sensations really depends, appear to us as 
motion. But this limitation, under which alone, according to the principles of the Critique of the Reason, 
the doctrine of affection through motion can be received, passes in the natural philosophy built up upon it 
more and more into the back-ground, and this hovers in an uncertain medium between an d priori theory of 
phenomena (existing only in human consciousness) and a theory of real objects (which exist independently of 
the consciousness of perceiring beings, which subsisted possibly antecedently to the existence of organized 
beings, and on which the existence of sensations depends, and) which vmderlie all natural phenomena. In 
reading the ^'Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science^'' it is necessary in one regard to forget, and yet 
ia another ever to remember, that according to the Ic^cal consequence of Kant's System we have to do sim- 
ply with processes which take place only within human consciousness, and which therefore are by that faci 
pRychically conditioned, and cannot constitute conditions of the existence of beings capable of possessing 
sensations and ideas. 

Tf ant's metaphysical peinciples of natural science. 179 

Aneiefiung und der ZurucksPmung der Kdrpei\ nebnt eiiier DarsteUung der Ilypotliest 
des le Sage iiber die 7nech(iidsclie (Jrndche der allgemeiiieii Gravitation^ 1807, and Vr. 
Gottlieb Busse, Kants metaph. Anfangsgr. der JVaturw. in ihren Oriinden iDideiiegt^ 
Dresden, 1838 ; see also G. Reuschle,ir/i< und die Naturwiasemchnft, in the Deulscht 
Vierteljahrsschrift, April-Juue, 18G8, p. 50, and especially on Kant's dynamic theory of 
matter, ibid., pp. 57-02.) 

Kant divides the ' ' Metaph. Principles of Natural Science " into four principal 
parts. The first of them treats of motion as a pure quantity, and is called by Kant 
Phoronomics ; the second considers motion as belonging to the quality of matter, under 
the name of an originally moving force, and is called Dynamics ; the third, Mechanics, 
treats of the parts of matter with this quality as placed by their own motion in mutual 
relation ; while the fourth defines motion and rest in matter simply in relation to the 
mode in which we mentally represent them, or to modality, and is termed by Kant 

In the Phoronomics Kant defines matter as the movable in space, and deduces in 
particular the proposition that no motion can be neutralized except by another motion 
of the same mobile object in the opposite direction. In the Dynamics he defines matter 
as the mobile in so far as it fills any given space, and lays down the proposition : " Mat- 
ter fills a certain space, not by the mere fact of its existence, but in virtue of a special 
moving force belonging to it." He attributes to matter the force of attraction defining 
it as that moving force through which one portion of matter can be the cause of the 
approach of others to it and the force of repulsion, or the force whereby one portion 
of matter can cause other portions to recede from it, and he defines more precisely the 
force through which matter fills space as being the force of repulsion, saying : " Matter 
fills its spaces in virtue of repulsive forces belonging to all its parts, i. e., through a 
force of extension peculiar to itself, which is of definite degree, below or above which 
smaller or greater degrees can be conceived in infinitum.'''' Elasticity, in the sense of 
expansive force, belongs therefore originally to all matter. Matter is infinitely divisible 
into parts, each of which is itself matter ; this follows from the infinite divisibility of 
space, and from the repulsive force belonging to every portion of matter. The force of 
repulsion decreases in the inverse ratio of the cubes of the distances ; the force of 
attraction, on the contrary, inversely as the squares of the distances. In the part 
entitled Mechanics Kant defines matter as the mobile in so far as it, as such, possesses 
motive force, and deduces thence, in particular, the fundamental laws of mechanics : 
Amidst all the changes of the material realm of nature the whole quantity of matter 
remains the same, unaugmented and undiminished ; All change in matter has an exter- 
nal cause (law of persistence of rest and motion, or law of inertia) ; In all cases of the 
communication of motion, action and reaction are equal. In the Phenomenology Kant 
defines matter as the mobile in so far aa this, as such, can be an object of experience, 
and develops the projjositions, (1) that the rectilinear motion of a portion of matter 
with reference to an empirical portion of space, as distinguished from a conceivable 
opposite motion of the space itself (the portion of matter in the latter case remaining 
unmoved), is simply a possible predicate (but that when conceived out of aU relation to 
some portion of matter external to the portion in motion, i. e., when conceived as abso- 
lute motion, it is impossible) ; (3) that the circular motion of any portion of matter, ir,. 
distinction from the conceivable opposite motion of the space in which it moves, is a 
real i)redicate of the same (but that the apparent opposite motion of a relative space is 
a mere semblance i ; (3) that in the case of evert' motion of a body, in virtue of which 
it moves with reference to another body, an equal opposite motion of the latter is 

180 kant's ethics and religious philosophy. 

necessary. The first of these phenomenological laws determines the modality of motion 
with reference to Phoronomics, the second with reference to Dynamics, and the third 
with reference to Mechanics. 

The transition from the Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science to physics is pro- 
vided for in the ^'Metaphysics of Nature'' (a work co-ordinated with the Metaphysics 
of Ethics, which includes the doctrines of legal right and of morality), which treats of 
the motive forces of matter, and is divided by Kant into an " Elementary System " and 
a " System of the World." The manuscript was left unfinished. (Some fragments oi 
it will perhaps soon be edited by Reicke. ) 

123. As Kant, in his Critique of the Pure Reason, sets out from 
the distinction and opposition which he finds existing between empiri- 
cal and a jpriori knowledge, so the analogous opposition between sen- 
suous propensity and the law of reason forms the foundation of his 
Critique of the Practical Reason. All the ends to which desire may 
be directed are viewed by Kant as being empirical, and accordingly a 
furnishing sensuous and egoistic motives for the will, which are all 
reducible to the principle of personal happiness ; but this principle, 
says Kant, is, according to the immediate testimony of our moral con- 
sciousness, directly opposed to the principle of morality. As motive 
for the moral will Kant retains, after excluding all material motives, 
only the form of possible universality in tlie law which determines the 
will. The principle of morality is contained, for him, in the require- 
ment :" Act so that the maxim of thy will can at the same time be 
accepted as the princij3le of a universal legislation." This " funda- 
mental law of the practical reason " bears the form of a command, 
because man is not a purely rational being, but is also a sensuous 
being, and the senses are in constant active opposition to reason. It is 
not, however, a conditional command, like the maxims of prudence, 
which are only of hypothetical authority, being valid only when certain 
ends are to be attained, but it is an unconditional and the only uncondi- 
tional command, the Categorical Imperative. Consciousness of this 
fundamental law is a fact of the reason, but not an empirical one ; it 
is the only fact of the pure reason, which thus manifests itself in the 
character of an original law-giver. This command flows from the auton- 
omy of the will, while all material, eudaemonistic principles flow from 
the heteronomy of arbitrary, unregulated choice. Outward conformity 
to law is legality, but right action, prompted by regard for the moral 
law, is morality. Our moral dignity depends on our moral self-deter- 
mination. Man, in his character as a rational being or a " thing-in- 
itself ," gives law to himself as a sensuous being or a phenomenon. In 

kant's ethics and religious philosophy. 181 

this, says Kant (who here treats the theoretical difference between 
thing-in-itself and phenomenon practically as a difference of worth), is 
contained the origin of duty. On the moral consciousness are founded 
three morally necessary convictions, which Kant terms " postulates of 
the pure practical reason," viz. : the conviction of our moral freedom 
^-since the affirmation : " thou canst, for thou oughtest," forces us to 
assume that the sensuous part of our being may be determined by the 
rational part ; of our immortality since our wills can approximate 
to conformity with the moral law only in infinitum, ^ and of the 
existence of God as the ruler in the kingdoms of reason and nature, 
who will establish the harmony demanded by the moral consciousness 
between moral worth and happiness. 

The fundamental conception of Kant's philosophy of religion, 
which he develops in his " Religion within the Limits of Mere Rea- 
8on^^ is expressed in his reduction of religion to the moral con- 
sciousness. The courting of favor with God through statutory religious 
actions or observances, which are different from the moral commands, 
is mock service ; the truly religious spirit is that which recognizes all 
our duties as divine commands. Through an allegorizing interpreta- 
tion, Kant reduces the dogmas of positive theology to doctrines of 
philosophical ethics. 

In addition to the literature adduced in the preceding paragraph, and the passages in the works of P. 
H. Jacobi, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart, Beneke, Schopenhauer, and others, in which Kant's 
ethical doctrines are examined, as also Wegscheider's Vergleichung Staiscker und Kantischer Ethik (Ham- 
burg, 1797), and Garve's Darstellung und Eritik der Kantischen Sittenlehre (in the Introductory Essay to 
his translation of Aristotle's Ethics, Breslau, 1798, pp. 183-394), etc., cf. Striimpell {Die P3d. der Ph. Kant, 
Fichte, Herbart, Brunswick, 1843) and Arthur Richter {KanCs Ansichten iiber Erziehung, O.-Pr., Hal- 
berstadt, 1865) on Kant's doctrine of education ; L. Paul (Halle, 1865) on Kant's doctrine of radical evil, and 
Ch. A. Thilo (in the ZeUschr. f. exacte Philos., Vol. V., Leips., 18C5, pp. 276-312 ; 353-397) on Kant's reli- 
gious philosophy in general ; Paul (in the Jahrbilcher flir deutsche Theologle, Vol. XI., 1866, pp. 624-C39) 
on Kant's doctrine of the Son of God as an imagined ideal of humanity ; Paul (Kiel, 1869) on Kant's doctrine 
of the ideal Christ ; J. Quaatz {Diss., Halle, 1867) on Kant's doctrine of conscience ; O. Kohl (Inaug. Diisert., 
Leipsic, 1868) on Kant's doctrine of the freedom of the himian will. On the relation of the Kantian Ethics to 
the Aristotelian cf., in addition to the works cited in Vol. I., 50, by Bruckner and others, especially Tren- 
delenbiu-g, Der Widerstreit zwischen Kant und Arist. in der Ethik, in the 3d vol. of his Hist. Beitr. zur Philos., 
Berl., 1867. pp. 171-214. [Cf. further, James Edmunds, KanCs Ethics, in the Journal of Speculative Phi- 
losophy, VoL V., St. Louis, 1871, pp. 27-38, 108-118. TV.] 

To his principal work on practical philosophy Kant did not give the title : Critique 
of the Pure Practical Reason, but Critique of the Practical Reason, affirming that the 
work to be undertaken was a critique of the entire practical faculty, with a view to 
showing that there is a pure practical reason ; the latter being shown to exist, it would 
not, Kke the pure speculative reason, stand in need of a critique to hinder it from 
transcending its Umits, for it proved its own reality, and the reality of its conceptiona, 
by an argument of fact {Grit, of the Pract. Reason, Preface). 

Kant expounded the fundamental ideas of the Critique of the Practical Reason most 
fully in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (which preceded this Critiqiu). 

1 82 kant's ethics and religious philosophy 

Kant defines the word maxim as denoting a subjective principle of willing ; the ob> 
jective principle, on the contrary, which is founded in the reason itself, is termed bj 
him the practical law ; he includes both together under the conception of the practical 
pHnciple, i. e. , a principle which contains a universal determination of the will, involv- 
ing several practical rules {Groundwork of, etc., Sect. 1, Note; Crit. of the Pract. 
Reason, 1). He argues : All practical principles which presuppose an object (mat- 
ter) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are, without excep- 
tion, empirical, and can furnish no practical laws (Cr. of the Pract. Reason, 2). All 
material practical principles are, as such, wholly of one and the same kind, and be- 
long under the general principle of self-love or personal hapjjiness. By happiness 
Kant understands '' a consciousness on the part of a rational being of the agreeableness 
of life, accompanying without interruption his entire existence. " The principle which 
makes of this agreeableness the highest motive of choice is termed by him the prin- 
ciple of self-love {ib., 3). Since now Kant denies to all that is empirical that neces- 
sary character which is requisite for a law, and since all the " matter " of desire, i. e., 
every concrete object of the will, which serves as a motive, bears an empirical charac- 
ter, it follows that, if a rational being is to conceive his maxims as practical universal 
laws, he can only conceive them as principles, which, not by their matter, but only in 
view of their form, as adapted to the purposes of universal moral legislation, are fitted to 
direct the wiU {ib., 4). The wiU which is determined by the mere form of (universal) 
law, is independent of the natural law of sensible phenomena, and therefore free {ib. , 
5), as also, conversely, a free wUl can only be determined by the mere form of a maxim, 
or by its fitness to serve as a universal law {ib., 6). Now we are conscious that our 
wills owe fealty to a law which is of absolute validity ; our wills must, therefore, be 
capable of being determiued by the mere form of a law, and hence are free. Pure 
reason is by itself and iadependently practical, and gives man a universal law, which we 
term the Moral Law {ib., 7). This fundamental law of the pure practical reason, or 
the Categorical Imperative, is expressed by Kant in the Groundwork of the Metaphys. 
of Morals m a threefold formula: 1. Act according to maxims of which thou canst 
wish that they may serve as universal laws, or, as if the maxim of thy action were by 
thy win to become the universal law of nature ; 2. Act so as to use humanity, as well 
in thine own person as in the person of all others, ever as end, and never merely as 
means ; 3. Act according to the Idea of the vsdU of aU rational beings as the source of 
an \iniversal legislation. In the Critique of the Practical Reason he confines himself 
to the one formula ( 7) : Act so that the maxim of thy will can likewise be valid 
at all times as the principle of a universal legislation. 'Whenever the maxim under 
which an action would fall would, if raised to the dignity of an universal law, abso- 
lutely destroy itself by an inner contradiction, then abstinence from such action is a 
'' perfect duty ; " whenever we at least cannot wish that it should be a imiversal law. 
because then the advantage which we hoped to reap through it would be converted 
into injury, abstinence is an "imperfect duty." Kant terms self-determination in con- 
formity to the Categorical Imperative, " Autonomy of the WiU ; " but all founding of 
the practical law on any " matter of the wiU " whatever, i. e., on any ends to be sought, 
especially on the end of (one's owti or even of all men's) happiness, is simply the 
" Heteronomy of Arbitrary Choice."* 

* It is easy to see that Kant, in this argument against " Eudsemonism," first degrades the conception of 
Eudaemonism by limiting it to the gratification of sensuous and egoistic aims, and then, measuring it by the 
standard of the purer moral consciousness, finds it, naturally, insufficient and untenable. Supposing it once 
determined what duty requires, then this should be done for the very reasons which constitute it a mattar ol 

kant's ethics and rp:ligious philosophy. 183 

The Categorical Imperative senses Kant in the Critique of the Practical Reason as a 
principle for the deduction of human freedom, since in the moral law he finds a law of 
causality through freedom, and hence a law implying the possibility of a supra-sensible 
natiire. Herewith, however, according to Kant, nothing is added to the theoretical 
knowledge of the reason, but the reason is confirmed in its assurance of the reality of 

duty, and not on account of any supposabic " cudrcmonistic " side-ends ; this true proiwsition Ls quite distin- 
guishable from the false one, that the requirements of duty are not based on ends ; it is only these supposed 
sMe-ends which can lead to real heteronomy. Kanfs merit is very considerable for what he has done to 
purify and quicken the direct moral consciousness, and, especially, to incite to the pursuit of moral inde))en- 
dence ; but he errs in identifying the stage at which one first ceases the pursuit of collateral ends thruufrh 
respect for the law, with that of essential morality. In his exaltation of respect for the rishte of man, as an 
unconditional duty above "the sweet feeling of doing good" (cf. the essay of Kant on '"Lasting Peace,'' 
Ros. and Schub.'s ed., VII., 1, p. 290), of material and intellectual labor above idle enjoyment (cf. the essay 
on a "Gentle Tone in Philosophy '"Ros. and Schub, I., 622, and the essay on the "Conjectural Beginning 
of Human History," Ros. and Schub., VII., STG seq.), and in his denunciation of lawless caprice, he occupies 
perfectly justifiable ground, as opposed to those who so interpreted the ideas of personal and public welfare 
as to find in them ground for sacrificing the very noblest and highest interests of the free intellect to sensuous 
gratification, to the public welfare as interpreted from a one-sided stand-point, and to the maintenance of 
external quiet and order. But his polemics do not bear upon the true and more profound conception of 
Budaemonism, as established notably by Aristotle, who recognizes the essential relation of pleasure to activity, 
and founds ethics on the gradation of functions. In particular, Kant overlooks in his argument the fact 
that the necessity for society of universal laws, and of their being held sacred, follows also from the eudamo- 
mistic principle. The middle term or conception by moans of which Kant justifies his classification even of 
the noblest intellectual ends among the objects of egoistic desire, and hence also his exclusion of them from 
the moral principle, is the conception of their empirical character : as empirical ends they lack, he says, the 
characteristic of necessity ; they belong to the world of sensible phenomena, to mere nature, and not to the 
realm of freedom; they depend only on the principle of personal sensuous happiness ; all that is noblest and 
highest must be altogether non-empiracal. But in reality the noble as well as the ignoble, love as well 
as self-seeking, are matters of (external and internal) experience. The distinction between things in point 
of worth is specifically different from the distinction between the empirical and the non-empirical. Kant's denial 
of the origin of the moral law in real ends corresponds most exactly with his denial of the origin of apodictical 
knowledge in experience, which latter denial in the Critique of the Pure lieamn is most intimately connected 
with his new interpretation of the conception of <? prion' knowledge. Hence a twofold misfortune: 1. The 
higher is brought into abrupt and irreconcilable antagonism to the lower, and the idea of a gradation is made 
impossible ; 2. the higher is conceived only in its formal aspect, not understood in the light of the order 
immanent in itself, but represented as a form generated in some incomprehensible manner, apart from the 
category of time, by the Ego, by which it is conmiunicated to the in itself formless material furnished by 
experience. Kant confounds in his ethics the order of ends, in respect of worth, with the logical form of 
po.ssible universality ; and it is only by reference to the character of rational beings as ends to themselves that 
he. Incidentally, finds a real moral norm. But the ethical work of the individualization of action is misap- 
prehended by him, and sacrificed to the empty form of possible universality. Kant wrongly regarded the 
form of logical abstraction, on which the possibility of juridical and military order depends, as an original 
form of morality. It is true that no single simple end. viewed by itself alone, is either moral or immoral '- 
that morality demands not a sporadic well-doing, but fidelity, from a sense of duty, to a moral law, and de- 
pends on the conformity of the will with a judgment concerning the will, which is founded in the recognition 
of a moral order universally binding, just as it is true that no single simple experience, viewed by itself alone, 
involves apodicticity, but that all apoiiicticity depends on the application to experience of a complex of knowl- 
edge resting on principles. But it is not true that order in knowledge and praxis originates in the reason of 
the Subject alone, and that it is first introduced by the latter to a " matter," in itself without order ; it depends, 
on the contrary, on the reception of the order, which exists objectively, into our knowledge and praxis. The 
norms of logic flow from the relation of perception and thought in us to the spatial, temporal, and causal 
order of the natural and intellectual objects of knowledge, and the norms of ethics flow from the relation of 
our willing and praxis to the order of worth, which exists in the various natural and spiritual ends which can 
bo proposed to the will. The relation of the moral order, to the objective order of worth in natural and spirit- 
ual functions is just like that of apodicticity in knowledge to the objective necessity present in the natural 
and spiritual proces.ses known. Cf. my article Ueber das Aristotelische, Kantiscke und Herbart'.icfie Moral- 
princip, in Fichte's Zeilsclirifl fiir Philos. ujid philoa. Kritit, Vol. 24, 1854, p. 71 seq., and Systtm oj 
Logic, ad 57 and 1.37. [Cf. Lotzc Mikrokosmus.1 

184 Kant's ethics and religious philosophy. 

the conception of freedom, which was asstuned by it as possible (in the cosmological 
Antinomies), and whose objective, although only practical reality, is here made a cer- 
tainty. The conception of cause is here employed only with practical intent, the 
deter minin g motive of the win being fovmd in the intelligible order of things ; but the 
conception which the reason forms of its own causality as a noumenon is of no theo- 
retical service in increasing the knowledge of its supra-sensible existence. Causality, in 
the sense implied by freedom, belongs to man in so far as. he is a thing-in-itself (nou- 
menon) ; while causality, in the sense implied in the mechanism of nature, belongs to 
him in so far as he is a subject of the realm of appearances (phenomena). The objec- 
tive reality, which belongs practically to the conception of causality in the sphere of 
the supra-sensible, gives also to all other categories the lilie practical reality and appU- 
cability, in so far as they are necessarily related to the determining ground of the pure 
will, the moral law ; so that Kant in the Critique of the Practical Reason recovers prac- 
tically what in the Critique of the Pure (Speculative) Reason he had theoretically given 
up. Kant ascribes to the pure practical reason the primacy over the speculative reason, 
i. e. , a priority of interest ; and affirms that the speculative reason is not justified in 
following obstinately its own separate interest alone, but that it must seek to combine 
with its own conceptions the theorems of the practical reason, which lie above the 
sphere of the speculative reason (although they do not contradict it), regarding them as 
an extraneous possession transferred to it. {Crit. of the Pract. Reason, Res. and 
Schub.'s ed., VHI., p. 258 seq.*) 

As an independent being, and one not subject to the universal mechanism of nature, 
man has Personality, and belongs to the realm of things which are ends to themselves, 
or noumena. But since this freedom is the faculty of a being subject to pecuhar, 
purely practical laws, given by his own reason ; in other words, since every person, 
while belonging to the sensible world, is subject to the conditions of his own personality, 
as resulting from his citizenship in the intelligible world, there follows the fact of moral 
Duty. Kant extols duty as a sublime and great name, that covers nothing which savors 
of favoritism or insinuation, but demands submission, threatening nothing which is 
calculated to excite a natural aversion in the mind, or designed to move by fear, but 
merely presenting a law which of itself finds universal entrance into the mind of man, 
and which even against the wiU of man wins his reverence, if not always his obedience 
a law before which all inclinations grow dumb, even though they secretly work against 
it {Crit. of the Pract. R, Ros. and Schub.'s ed., VIII., 214). In like spirit he says : 
" Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the 
oftener and longer we reflect upon them : the starry heavens above and the moral law 
within" {ib.. Conclusion, VIII., 312). The moral law is holy (inviolable). Man is, 
indeed, unholy enough, but humanity, as represented in his person, must to him be 
holy. With the idea of personality is connected the feeling of respect, since it sets 
before our eyes the dignity of our nature as seen in its destination, and enables us at 
the same time to observe the deficiency of our conduct as viewed in the light of that 
destination, and so strikes down our self-conceit (ib., VIII., 215). 

The moral principle is a law, but freedom is a postulate of the pure practical reason. 
Postulates are not theoretical dogmas, but necessary practical assumptions which add 
nothing to our speculative knowledge, but, through their relation to the practical realm, 
give to the ideas of the speculative reason in general objective reality, and justify the 
reason in the use of conceptions, the possibility of which, even, it otherwise could not 

The uncertain mingling of theoretical with practical certainty is here obvious. 

kant's ethics and religious philosophy. 186 

presume to affirm ; in other words, postulates are theoretical, but not as such demon- 
Btrable propositions which are inseparably connected with an a priori, unconditional, 
practical law. In addition to freedom there aare two other postulates of the pure 
practical reason namely, the immortality of the human soul and the existence of God. 

The postulate of immortality flows from the practical necessity of a duration suffi- 
cient for the complete fulfilment of the moral law. The moral law requires holiness, 
, e perfect conformity of the wiU to the moral law. But all the moral perfection 
to which man as a rational being, belonging also to the sensible world, can attain, is at 
the best only virtue {Tugend), i. e., a legally correct spirit arising from respect for the 
law. But the consciousness of a continual bent toward transgression, or at least toward 
impurity of motive, i. e., toward the intermixture of imperfect, non-moral motives of 
obedience, accompanies this spirit in its best estate. From this conflict between what 
is morally required of man and man's moral capacity foUows the postulate of the im- 
mortality of the human soul ; for the conflict can only be brought to an end through a 
progressive approximation to complete conformity of the spirit to the requirements of 
the law, a progress that must continue in infinitum. 

The postulate of the existence of God follows from the relation of morality to hap- 
piness. The moral law, as a law of freedom, commands, by presenting motives which, 
must be perfectly independent of nature and of any supposable agreement of nature 
with the impulses of human desire ; consequently there is not in it the least ground 
for a necessary connection between morality and a degree of happiness proportioned to 
it. There exists between morality and happiness not an analytical, but only a synthetic 
coimection. The selection of the right means for assuriug the most pleasurable exist- 
ence possible is prudence, but not (as the Epicureans suppose) morality. On the other 
hand, the consciousness of morality is not (as the Stoics teach) sufficient for happiness ; 
for happiness, as the state of a rational being in the world, with whom in the whole of 
his existence things go according to his wish and wiU, depends on the agreement of 
nature with the whole end of man's being, and with the essential determintog ground 
of his will ; but man, the acting, rational being in the world, is, as a dependent being, 
not through his will the cause of nature, and cannot by his own agency bring it into 
the required harmony with his own moral nature. Nevertheless, in the practical work 
of the reason such a connection is postulated as necessary : we are bound to seek to 
further that harmony between virtue, which is the highest good {supremum bonum), 
and happiness, which is the indispensable condition of the realization of perfect good 
(summum bonum, in the sense of bonum consummatutn, or bonum perfectissimum). Hence 
we must postulate also the existence of a cause of the whole realm of nature distinct 
from nature, and which, by exerting a causality in harmony with the spirit of perfect 
morality, hence through intelligence and will, shall be able to effectuate the exact 
agreement of happiness mth morality ; in other words, we must postulate the existence 
of God. 

The assumption of the existence of a 6upreme intelligence is, in so far as the theo- 
retical reason alone is concerned, a mere hypothesis. But for the pure practical reason 
it is a belief, and since pure reason is its only source, it is a belief of the pure reason. 

The work entitled Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason contains Kant's exposi- 
tion of rational belief in its relations to the faith of the church. (In this work Kant 
gives too exclusive recognition to the moral side of the subject, placing in the back- 
ground the ajsthetic and intellectual needs peculiar to man ; but he emphasizes forciblj 
the various moral relations in all their purity, although not without exaggerating the op- 
position between nature and freedom, inclination and duty. ) This work is in four parts, 

186 rant's ethics and religious philosophy. 

treating (1) of the indwelling of an evil principle side by side with the good one in 
human nature, or of the radical evil in human nature ; (3j of the contest between the 
good and evil principles for the control of man ; {3} of the victory of the good principle 
over the evil one, and of the foundation of a kingdom of God on the earth ; (4) of true 
and false religious service under the rule of the good principle, or of religion and 
priestcraft. Kant finds in human nature a propensity to reverse the moral order of the 
motives to action, man being inclined, although accepting the moral law together with 
that of self-love among his maxims, to make the motive of self-love and its inclinations 
a condition of his obedience to the moral law. This propensity, says Kant, since its 
origin must be sought in the last resort in an unrestrained freedom, is morally bad, 
and this badness or evil is radical, because it corrupts the source of all maxims. (With 
this conception of the source of immorality in the individual may be compared Kant's 
historico-phUosophical explanation of immorality as resulting from the conflict between 
nature and culture, as given in his essay on the Conjectural Beginning of the History 
of Man (1786), in Rosenkranz and Schubert's edition of his Works, VII., 1, pp. 368-383, 
where, p. 374 seq. , he cites, as an example of the conflict between humanity striving to 
realize its moral destiny, and yet continuing to follow the laws implanted in human 
nature with reference to its rude and animal state, the discrepancy between the period 
of physical maturity and that of civil independence, the intervening space of time 
being one which in a state of nature does not exist, but which, as things now are, is 
generally filled up with vices and their consequences, in the varied forms of human 
misery. In themselves, says Kant in this work, the natural faculties and propensities 
are good, but since they were intended to meet the wants of man in his natural state 
alone, they suffer from the advance of culture, and themselves do injury to the latter 
until nature is reproduced in perfect art, in which consummation the ideal of culture 
consists. ) The good principle is humanity (the rational world in general) in its com- 
plete moral perfection, of which, as the principal condition of happiness, happiness is, 
in the will of the Supreme Being, the immediate consequence. Man thus conceived 
and only thus is he well -pleasing to God may be figuratively represented as the Son 
of God ; in this sense Kant applies to him the predicates, which in the Scriptures and 
in the teachings of the church are given to Christ. (Cf. L. Paul, as above cited.) In 
practical faith on this Son of God man may hope to become well-pleasing to God and 
so to attain to blessedness, or, in other words, he is not an unworthy object of the 
divine complacency who is conscious of such a moral disposition that he can believe, 
with a well-grounded confidence in himself, that, if subjected to temptations and suf- 
ferings like those which (in the Gospel of Christ) are made the touch-stone of the ideal 
of humanity, he would remain unalterably loyal to that ideal, faithfully following it as 
his model and retaining its likeness. This ideal is to be sought only in the reason. No 
example taken from external experience is adequate to represent it, since experience 
does not disclose the inward character, even internal experience not being sufficient to 
enable us to penetrate fully the depths of our own hearts. Still if external experience 
in so far as this can be demanded of it furnishes us with an example of a man well- 
pleasing to God, this example may be set before us for our imitation. An ethical 
society, subject to divine moral legislation, is a church. The invisible church is merely 
the idea of the union of all the just under the divine moral government of the world, 
and is the archetype of all churches humanly established. The visible church is the 
actual union of men in a whole which accords with this archetype. The constitution 
of every church is founded on some historical belief (in a revelation) ; it is owing to the 
weakness of human nature that no society can be founded on the basis of pure religious 

rant's critique of the faculty of judgment. 187 

faith alone. Mock service and priestcraft subsist where the statutory element prevails ; 
the gradual transition from ecclesiastical faith to the sole supremacy of purely religiou 
faith is the approach of the kingdom of God. 

The doctrine of Legal and Moral Duties is developed by Kant in the Metnphysical 
Principles of Law and Morals. The principle of Legal Right is, that the freedom of 
every man should be limited by the conditions under which his freedom can consist 
with, the freedom of every other man under a general law. The rightful State 
and the jural relations of States with each other constitute the end of historical de- 
velopment. The Moral Duties relate to ends, the pursuit of which may be a universal 
law for all. Such ends are : one's own perfection and others' happiness ; from the 
former arise our duties to ourselves, and from the latter our duties to others. A 
' ' perfect duty " to ourselves is that of obedience to the law prohibiting self-murder ; 
an ''imperfect duty" is obedience to the command which forbids slothfulness in the 
use of our talents. Among our duties to others, abstinence from falsehood and deceit 
is a " perfect duty," and positive care for others is an "imperfect duty." The further- 
ance of our own happiness is a matter of inclination, hence not of duty ; but the fur- 
therance of the perfection of others is a duty for others only, since they only can fulfil 

124. The Critiques of the pure speculative reason and of the 
practical reason are followed, in Kant's system, by the Critique of the 
Faculty of Judgment^ which serves as a means of connecting the 
theoretical and practical parts of philosophy in one whole. Kant defines 
the jndging faculty in general as the faculty by which the particular is 
conceived as contained under the universal. Wlien the universal (the 
rule, the principle, the law) is given, the judging faculty, subsum- 
ing the particular under the universal, becomes " determinative ; " but 
when the particular is given, for which it must find the universal, it is 
"reflective." The reflective judgment needs a principle for its guid- 
ance, in order to rise from the particular in nature to the universal. 
The universal laws of nature have, according to the Critique of the 
Pure Reason, their origin in our understanding, which prescribes 
them to nature ; but the particular laws of nature are empirical, and 
hence, to the \iew of our understandings, accidental ; and yet, in order 
to be laws, they must be viewed as following with necessity from some 
principle of unity in multiplicity, although that principle may be un- 

* This latter statement involves unmistakably an exaggeration of the conception of the moral independ- 
ence of the individual, and contains only the truth that progress toward personal perfection is only possible 
through the personal co-operation of the individual. It has been objected, and not without reason, to Kant's 
doctrine of legal right that it gives too exclusive prominence to the conception of freedom, since freedom con- 
stitutes only one of the elements of legal order ; Kant, say his critics, represents legal right, which regulatt-a 
the external order of social life, as the source of an order of unsociality. The legal order of society is to be 
understood from its relation to the whole ethical work of humanity. Kanfs separation of the form of legal 
right from its ethical end is, like his similar separation of substance from form in other fields of inquirj-, 
relatively justified, as opposed to the naive confusion of these elements, which is not unfrcquently observed, 
bat it does not disclose to us a truly satisfying comprehension of the general subject. 

188 kant's critique of the faculty of judgment. 

known to U6. The principle of the reflective judgment is this: that 
particular, empirical laws, in so far as they are undetermined by uni- 
versal laws, must be viewed as containing that unity which they would 
contain if they had been given by some intelligence other, it may be, 
than our own with express reference to our cognitive faculties, in 
order to render possible a system of experience according to particular 
natural laws. In the unity in multiplicity, manifest in her empirical 
laws, lies the adaptation of nature to ends, which, however, is not to 
be ascribed to the products of nature themselves, but is an d priori 
conception, having its origin solely in the reflective judgment. In 
virtue of this adaptation, the uniformity of nature, or natural law, is 
compatible with the possibility of ends to be accomplished in it by 
beings working according to the laws of freedom. The conception of 
the oneness of that supra-sensible element which underlies nature, 
with that which is practically implied in the conception of freedom, 
renders possible the transition from purely theoretical to purely prac- 
tical philosophy. 

The reflective judgment may be either aesthetic or teleological ; the 
former has to do with subjective or formal, the latter with objective or 
material adaptation. In both aspects the conception of ends (final 
causes) is only a regulative, not a constitutive principle. 

The Beautiful is that which, through the harmony of its form with 
the human faculty of knowledge, awakens a disinterested, universal, 
and necessary satisfaction. The SubUme is the absolutely great, which 
calls forth in us the idea of the infinite, and by its antagonism with the 
interest of the senses produces an immediate satisfaction. 

The teleological judgment considers organic nature in the light of the 
adaptations immanent in it. What the law of morality is for intelli- 
gible beings, that, for merely natural existences, is the organic end. 
The possibility of mechanical, as well as of teleological explanations of 
nature, is founded in the circumstance, that natural objects may be 
regarded partly as objects for the senses, and partly for the reason. An 
intuitive understanding which man, how^ever, does not possess may 
possibly perceive that mechanical and final causes are identical. 

Kant's doctrines concerning the beautiful and stiblime were further developed by Schiller in his aesthetic 
vmtings, and next to him by Schelling and others ; they were opposed by Herder in his Ealligone ; of., in particu- 
lar, Vischer's AesthetH\ Zimmermann's Gesch. der Aestheiik, Lotze's Oesch. der Aesthetik in Dentsc/ilatid, and 
Ludw. Friedlander's article on Kant in seinem VerhSUniss zur Kunst nnd schonen Nairn; in the Preuss. 
Jahbr., XX. 2, August, 1867, pp. 11.3-128. The Kantian Teleology exercised a material Influence especially oa 
the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel ; cf. Rosenkranz, in his Gesch. der Kantische?! Philosophic, and the 
works of Michelet, Erdmann, Kuuo Fisoh?r, and others. 


The Critique of tJie Faculty of Judgment forms in numerous ways a connecting link 
between the Critiques of the Pure and the Practical Reason. The Crit. of tlie Pure 
Reason concedes only constitutive principles to the understanding, while the Crit. 
of the Practical Reason recognizes ideas of the reason as of controlling authority for 
human action ; between the understanding and the reason the faculty of judging forms 
the middle term. The feeling of pleasure and dislike is psychologically intermediate be- 
tween cognition and desire, and it is to this feeling, to which it prescribes rules cl priori, 
that the judging faculty has respect in its ajsthetic use. Between the province of na- 
ture, or the sensuous, and that of freedom, or the supra-sensuous, there is fixed, accord- 
ing to Kant, an immeasurable cleft, so that from the former to the latter no passage is 
possible in thought through the theoretical employment of the reason just as if there 
were two worlds, of which the first could have no influence on the second. Neverthe- 
less, the latter is conceived as having an influence on the former, or, in other words, 
freedom is conceived as having for its mission the realization in the sensible world of 
the end indicated by the laws of freedom. Consequently nature must be so conceived 
that it may be possible for ends to be realized in it according to the laws of freedom. 
The judging faculty, through the conception of adaptations in nature, mediates the 
transition from the province of the conception of nature to that of the conception of 

Adaptation to ends, in an object given in experience, can be conceived as susceptible of 
a purely subjective explanation as being the agreement of the object, in the initial act of 
apprehension and antecedently to the formation of any conception of it, with the require- 
ments of the cognitive faculty, to the end that intuition (perception) may be combined 
with conceptions so as to form cognition or of an objective explanation as the agree- 
ment of the form of the object with the conditions of the possibility of the thing itself, 
conformably to a conception of it, which goes before and contains the ground or reason 
of this form. The idea of adaptation, in the former sense, is founded on the imme- 
diate pleasure we take in the form of the object, in merely reflecting upon it ; in the 
second sense it has to do, not with a feeling of pleasure derived from the contempla- 
tion of things, but with the understanding in its judgment of things, since in this case 
the form of the object is considered, not with reference to its adaptation to the cog- 
nitive faculties of the Subject in apprehending it, but with reference to a distinct cog- 
nition of the object under a given conception. By attributing to nature a regard, so to 
speak, for our cognitive faculties, as if she were moved by a final cause, we can view natu- 
ral beauty as the concrete manifestation (sensible illustration) of the conception of for- 
mal or merely subjective adaptation, while the ends or final causes visible in nature are 
regarded as the like manifestation of the conception of real or objective adaptation ; 
the former we judge aesthetically, by means of the feeling of pleasure, through taste ; 
the latter logically, with reference to conceptions, through the understanding and 
reason. Hence the division of the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment into the Cri- 
tique of the (Esthetic and the Critique of the teleological judgment. 

The faculty of judging of the beautiful is Taste. In order to distinguish whether 
anything is beautiful or not, we do not bring our notion of it, through the understand- 
ing, into relation with the object, with a view to knowledge, but through the faculty of 
imagination (combined, perhaps, with the understanding) in relation to the percipient 
subject, and the feeling of pleasure or aversion which it excites in the latter ; judg- 
ments of taste are, therefore, not logical, but assthetic. 

The satisfaction produced by the beautiful is, in quality, disinterested. By interest 
in an object is meant the satisfaction which accompanies the thought of its existence. 

190 kant's critique of the faculty of judgment. 

Interest always involves also a relation to the appetitive faculty, either as its determin- 
ing ground, or at least as necessarily connected with such ground. The satisfaction 
we take in the agreeable and good is combiried with interest. That is agreeable which 
pleases the senses in sensation. That is good which pleases us simply as rational 
beings, by its mere conception. That is beautiful which produces a sentiment of pleas- 
ure disconnected from aU interest, or the idea of which is accompanied in us with satis- 
faction, however indifferent we may be iu reference to the existence of the object of 
the idea. The agreeable contents ; the beautiful pleases. The good is prized (an objec- 
tive worth is attributed to it). The agreeable exists even for irrational animals, but 
beauty only for men i. e. , for beings at once animal and yet rational in their nature 
whUe the good is such for all intelligent beings, of whatever order. As weU the satis- 
faction of the senses as that of the reason compels our approval, but that derived through 
taste from the beautiful is an unconstrained pleasure. The satisfaction produced by 
the agreeable depends on iucUnation, that produced by the beautiful on favor, and that 
produced by the good on respect.* 

The satisfaction derived from the beautiful is, in quantity, universal. Since it is 
disiaterested and free, it cannot, like our satisfaction in the agreeable, rest on condi- 
tions peculiar to the individual, but only on that which each can suppose as existing in 
all others. But the universal validity of an aesthetic judgment cannot (as in the case 
of ethical judgments) be derived from conceptions ; there is hence joined with it a 
claim, not to objective, but only to subjective universality. 

With regard to the relation of the ends which are brought into consideration in 
judgments of taste, beauty is the form of adaptation in an object, as perceived without 
any accompanying conception of an end to which it is adapted. A flower, e. g., a 
ttdip, is held to be beautiful because our perception of it is found to be accompanied 
by a certain sense of adaptation, to which yet our esthetic judgment is unable to assign 
any particular end. Kant distinguishes between free and adherent beauty. Free 
beauty (jnilchritudo vaga) pre-supposes no conception of that which the object ought 
to be ; merely adherent beauty (pukJintudo adherens) implies both such a conception 
and also the perfection of the object as determined by comparison with the conception. 
The satisfaction taken in variety of means directed to some intrinsic end is intel- 
lectual, based on a logical conception. The pleasure awakened by beauty pre-supposes 
no such conception, but is immediately joined with the act of mental representation, in 
which the beautiful object is apprehended (not by which it is conceived). Is the object 
pronounced beautiful on the condition of its agreeing with a definite conception in 
other words, is the judgment of the taste respecting the beauty of the object Umited 
by the judgment of the reason concerning its perfection or inner adaptation then is it 
no longer a free and pure judgment of taste ; only in judging of free beauty is the 
judgment of taste pure. 

As regards modality, the beautiful has a necessary relation to satisfaction. This 
necessity is not theoretical and objective, nor is it practical ; it can only be called as 
being that kind of necessity which is conceived in an assthetic judgment exemplary^ 
i. e. , it is the necessity of the assent of all to a judgment which is viewed as an exam- 

* In representing the beautiful as opposed to the agreeable, Kant recognizes in the province of aesthetics, 
as in that of speculative and practical philosophy (see above, pp. 161 seq., 182 seq.), not a rising gradation from 
the sensible to the intellectual, but, rather, a dualistic separation of them, and hence reckons, e. g., in the 
theory of painting, color as a source of mere inassthetic charm, and only drawing as belonging to the province 
of the beautiful, which separation is nevertheless indefensible ; of. Friedlander, in the Art. above cited 
(p. 188). 

rant's critique of the faculty of judgment. 191 

pie of a universal rule, which nile can yet not be formulated. The general aBsthetio 
sense, as resulting from the free play of our cognitive powers, is an ideal norm, which 
being pre-supposed, any judgment that agrees with it, as also the aesthetic satisfaction 
in an object which is expressed in the judgment, may justly be regarded as a judgment 
in which all would agree, and a satisfaction which all, in like circumstances, must feel, 
because this norm, although only subjective, is subjectively imiversal, and is a necessary 
Idea for every man. 

The beautiful pleases and presents a claim to the assent of all, as a symbol of the 
morally Good, and taste is therefore, at bottom, a faculty which judges of ethical 
ideas in their sensible manifestation. 

That is sublime, which by its resistance to the interest of the senses gives an imme- 
diate pleasure. A natural object may be fitted to represent sublimity, but cannot pro- 
perly be called subUme, although many natural objects may be termed beautiful ; for 
the sublime, properly so called, can be contained in no sensible form, being confined 
solely to Ideas of the reason, which, although insusceptible of adequate embodiment, 
are yet by this very inadequateness, which is susceptible of sensible representation, 
excited and called into the mind. It is not, for example, so much the storm-lashed 
ocean that is subUme, as rather the feeling which .^e sight of it naturally excites in 
the mind, inciting the soul to quit in thought the bounds of sense, and to occupy itself 
with Ideas of higher adaptation. For the beautiful in nature we must seek for a 
ground without us, but for the sublime only within us and in the nature of thought, 
which introduces subhmity into the idea of nature. The pleasure produced by the 
sublime, like that produced by the beautiful, must be in quantity imiversal, and in 
quality disinterested ; in relation it must represent subjective adaptation, and in mo- 
dality it must present this adaptation as necessary. 

Kant distinguishes between two classes of the sublime, the mathematically, and the 
dynamically sublime. The sublime brings with it, in all instances, a certain motion of 
the mind, accompanying the act of the judgment in regard to the sublime object, while 
the gratification of taste by the beautiful presupposes and maintains in the mind a 
state of quiet contemplation. But this motion, since it is to be judged as having sub- 
jective adaptation or a purpose, is referred by the imagination either to the cognitive 
or to the appetitive facidty ; in the first case the disposition of the imagination is 
mathematical, connected with the estimation of magnitudes, in the second it is dynamic, 
resulting from the comparison of forces ; but in both cases the same character is 
attributed to the object which calls forth these dispositions. As, in the progress of our 
comparison of magnitudes when we advance, for example, from the height of a man 
to that of a mountain, from that to the diameter of the earth, to the diameter of the 
earth's orbit, and then to the diameters of the mUky way and of the systems of nebulae 
we arrive at ever greater unities, everything that is great in natvire appears in turn 
small, while, properly speaking, it is only our imagination in its entire illimitatiou, and 
with it nature, that appear to vanish in comparison with the Idea of the reason. The 
mathematically sublime, therefore, on which the imagination expends in vain all its 
power of comprehension, is great beyond every sensible standard of measurement. The 
sentiment of the sublime involves a feeling of dissatisfaction on account of the inade- 
quateness of the imagination as employed in the aesthetic estimation of magnitudes, and 
yet at the same time a feeling of pleasure consequent upon finding every sensible stan- 
dard of measurement incommensurate with the Ideas of the reason. Nature is dynam- 
ically sublime for the aesthetic judgment when viewed as a power, which yet has no 
power over us. The power of nature, although fearful to us ae sensuous beings, yet 

192 kant's critique of the faculty of judgment. 

calls into activity a force in us which does not belong to nature, and which enables us ta 
look upon all that pertains to our life in the senses, and for which we are careful and 
troubled, as trivial, and hence to regard the power of nature as not being a power 
before which we must yield, if it were a question of the assertion or renunciation of 
our highest beliefs or principles ; and thus the mind is made conscious of the exalta- 
tion of its destiny as independent of nature. The sublime, in the sense of the absolutely 
great, exists only in the individual's own destiny. 

Although immediate pleasure in natural beauty presupposes and cultivates a certain 
freedom of thought, i. e. , a non-dependence for satisfaction on the mere gi-atification of 
the senses, yet in it the action of freedom has rather the appearance of play than of 
legal business. This latter character is the genuine mark of morality, for the existence 
of which it is necessary that reason should use violence against sense. In aesthetic 
judgments concerning the sublime this violence is represented as being exercised by the 
imagination as the instrument of reason, and hence the mental tendency which is 
cormected with a feeling for the subKme in nature is similar to the moral disposition. 

Judgments of taste are not founded on definite conceptions. Their basis is, how- 
ever, a conception, although an indefinite one, namely, the conception of a supra-sen- 
sensible substratum of phenomena. 

Art is free production. Mechanical art executes those actions, which are prescribed 
by our knowledge of a possible object, as necessary to the realization of the object. 
.Esthetic art has immediately in view the feeling of pleasure, either as mere sensation 
(agreeable art) or as pleasure in the beautiful and implying judgment (fine art). While 
the product of fine art must appear as a work of human freedom, it must also appear 
as free from the constraint of arbitrary niles, as if it were a product of mere nature. 
Genius is that talent (endowment of natiire) which gives rules to art. Fine art is the 
art of genius. 

^Esthetic adaptation is subjective and formal. There is an objective and intellectual 
adaptation which is merely formal. It is illustrated in the fitness of geometrical 
figures for the solution of numerous problems by a single principle. Reason recognizes 
the figure as adequate to the generation of various intended forms. Experience con- 
ducts our judgment to the conception of an objective and material adaptation, t. e., to 
the conception of an end of nature, when we have occasion to judge of a relation of 
cause and effect, whose conformity to law we find ourselves unable to comprehend, 
except as we regard the idea of the effect as underlying the causality of the cause itself, 
and so constituting a condition of the possibility of the effect. We judge nature teleo- 
logically when we ascribe objective causality to the conception of an object, as though 
that conception were itself a part of nature, or, rather, when we conceive the possibility 
of objects as depending on a causality analogous to that which we observe in ouiselves, 
and consequently nature as producing technical or artistic results by her own power. 
If we were to fill nature with causes that work in view of intended results, we should 
be providing Teleology not merely with a regulative principle, fitted, as being a princi- 
ple to which nature in her particular laws can be conceived as subject, to guide the 
mind simply in judging of phenomena, but also with a constitutive principle for the 
derivation of the products of nature from their causes. But then the conception of a 
final cause of nature would belong no longer to the reflective but to the determinative 
judgment, or rather, in reality, it would not in any sense belong peculiarly to the judg- 
ing faculty, but, as a conception of the reason, would introduce into natural philoaophy 
a new causality, borrowed only from the analogy of ourselves and ascribed to other 
existences, to which yet we decline to attribute a nature like our owo. 

kant'p critique of the faculty of judgment. 193 

The adaptation of nature is partly internal and partly external or relative, accord- 
ing as we regard the effect either as itself an end or as a means to be employed by 
other beings for the accomplishment of their ends ; the latter kind of adaptation 
is termed usefulness (for man) or fitness (for all other creatures). That in which rela- 
tive adaptation is discoverable can be viewed as constituting an (external) end of 
nature only on condition that the existence of that, for which it is immediately or 
remotely advantageous, be itself an independent end of nature. The ends of nature are 
organized beings, i. e. , products of nature, in which all parts can be conceived not only 
as existing for their own sake and for the sake of the whole, but also as mutually pro- 
ducing each other hence products in which everything is end, and also, reciprocally, 
means. An organized being is therefore not? a mere machine, possessing, like the ma- 
chine, only moving power. It possesses in itself formative power, which is also capable 
of being communicated to portions of matter not previously possessing it, and is, there- 
fore, a self -transmitting formative force, incapable of being explained by the faculty of 
motion alone (t. e., mechanically). 

In the to us unknown inner ground or reality of nature it is possible that the phys- 
ico-mechanical and final relations of the same things may be united under one and the 
same principle ; but our reason has not the power to reduce theiu to such a principle. 
Such is the constitution of our vmderstanding, that we can only regard nature as a real 
whole when we view it as the effect of the concurrent moving forces of its parts. An 
intuitive understanding might represent to itself the possibility of ^he parts, in respect 
of their nature and union, as founded in the whole. But in the disciursive mode of 
cognition, to which our understanding is confined, it would be a c<>itradiction to con- 
ceive the whole as fixmishing the ground of the possibility of the connection of the 
parts. The discursive understanding can only think of the idea of n whole as forming 
the ground of the possibiUty of the form of that whole and of the necessary connection 
of its parts ; it can, therefore, only view the whole as a product, the idea of which is 
the cause of its possibility i. ., as an end. Hence it is but a mere "esult of the con- 
stitution of our understanding, if we look upon products of nature in tb light of another 
kind of causality than the mechanical causality of the natural laws of matter, viz. : in 
the light of the teleological causality of final causes. We can neither ussert : All pro- 
duction of material things is possible by merely mechanical laws, nor : In some cases 
the production of material things is not possible by merely mechanical laws. On the 
contrary, both principles can and must subsist side by side as regulative principles, 
thus : All production of material things and of their forms must be judged as being pos- 
sible by merely mechanical laws, and : The judgment of certain products of the mate- 
rial realm of nature requires an altogether different law of causality, namely, that of 
final causes. I am to inquire after the mechanism of nature everywhere, so far as I 
may be able, and to think of everything which belongs to nature as being also con- 
nected with it according to mechanical laws ; but this does not exclude my power and 
right to reflect upon certain natural forms, and, on the occasion of them, even upon all 
nature, under the guidance of the principle of final causes. 

In the analogy of the forms of the different classes of organisms Kant fin<3s (in 
agreement with the subsequent speculations of Lamarck and Darwin) ground for the sup- 
position that they are really related to each other through generation from a common origi- 
nal germ. The hjrpothesis that beings specifically different have sprung from each other 
e. y. , from water-animals, animals inhabiting marshes, and from these, after many 
generations, land-animals he terms "a hazardous fancy of the reason." He rejoices in 

the ray of hope, weak though it be, that here something may be accomplished with tho 


principle of the mechanism of nature, without which no science of nature is possible. 
But he calls attention to the fact, that even on this theory the form of adaptation in 
the products of the animal and vegetable kingdoms requires, for the explanation of its 
possibility, that we suppose the common original and source of all these organisms to 
have been endowed with an organization expressly adapted to their development. The 
question of the origin of the organic world has, therefore, adds Kant, only been re- 
moved a degree further back, but the generation of that world has not been proved 
independent of the condition of final causes. We are obliged by the nature of our cog- 
nitive faculty to conceive the mechanism of nature as being, so to speak, an instrument 
subservient to the ends of a designing and efficient cause. How two entirely different 
kinds of causality can be combined ; how nature, with her universal conformity to law, 
can consist with the reality of an idea which limits her to a particular form, for which 
no reason whatever can be found in nature, considered by herself alone, our reason 
does not comprehend ; the explanation lies concealed Lu the supra- sensible substratum 
of nature, of which we can affirm nothing except that it is the essence 'pefr se, of which 
we know only the phenomenal manifestations. * 

125, The Kantian doctrine was combated philosophically from 
the Lockian, Leibnitzo-Wolffian, and skeptical stand-points. Of special 
influence on the progressing development of speculation were the 
arguments for skepticism urged by Gottlob Ernst Schulze (^neside- 
mus). Of the numerous partisans of the Kantian philosophy the fol- 
lowing were the most important : Johannes Schultz, the earliest exposi- 
tor of the Critique of the Pure Reason ; Karl Leonhard Keinhold, 
the enthusiastic and successful apostle of the new doctrine ; and 
Friedrich Schiller, the poet and philosopher. Through Schiller'r 
ardent and lofty exposition of Kant's ethical and aesthetic principles 
the latter were made the common possession of the educated classes, 
while through his recognition of the possibility in morality and art of 
reconciling the antithesis of nature and mind, reality and ideality, they 
received a material additional development. Endowed with a many- 
sided susceptibility and with critical insight, but having neither the 
ability nor the inclination to frame a system of his own, Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi found in Spinozism the last consequence of all philo 
sophical thought, affirming, however, that this consequence, through 
its opposition to the interest of man as a feeling being, compelled 
the recoernition of faith as a direct conviction of God's existence and 
of the reality of divine things. Jacobi pointed out how Kant's 

* Out of the Kantian idea of the intuitive understanding, which recognizes in the supra-sensible sub- 
stratum of phenomenal nature the ground of the connection of the mechanism of nature with design, and 
comprehends the whole as the ground of the possibility of the combination of the parts, was subsequentlj 
developed the Schellingian philosophy of nature, which, however, since it did not hold co-existence and di 
tinction in time and space to be merely subjective, was obliged essentiaUy to modify the idea in question. Is 
% certain sense, Schopenhauer's doctrine agrees with this of Kant. 


philosophy destroyed itself by an intrinsic contradiction, in that it 
was impossible to iind one's way into the Critique of the Reason 
without the realistic postulate of a causal nexus uniting the thinking 
subject with the realm of (transcendental) objectivity, but that then it 
was impossible to remain in this Critique. Akin to his philosophical 
tendency was the more positively Christian tendency of his friend 
Ilamann. By a blending of Jacobian conceptions with the philosophy 
of Kant, Jacob Fries developed the doctrine that the sensible is the 
object of knowledge, the supra-sensible the object of faith (rational 
faith), and the manifestation or revelation of the supra-sensible in the 
sensible the object of presentiment. Fries attempted to establish the 
Critique of the Reason on a psychological basis. The interpretation of 
Kant's doctrine proposed by Jacob Sigismund Beck, and intended to 
dispense with Kant's " things-in-themselves," was akin to Fichte's doc- 
trine of the Ego, while Christoph Gottfried Bardili's attempted develop- 
ment of a rational Realism bore a certain analogy to the speculation of 
Schelling and Hegel. 

Concerning the followers and opponents of Kant till near the end of the eighteenth century W. L. G. 
Freiherr von Eberstein treats in the second volume of his Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik imd Metaphysik 
bei den Deutschen von Leibnitz an, Halle. 1799. Of the subsequent history of Kantism treat Rosenkranz, in 
Vol. XII. of his complete edition of Kant's Works (Leips., 1840), and Erdmann, in his above-cited GeschictiU 
Oer neueren Philosophie (III., 1, Leipsic. 1848). Cf. Kuno Fischer, Die beiden Kantischen Schulen in Jena, 
in the Deutsche Vierteljahrsschr., Vol. 25, 1862, pp. 348-366; the same published separately, Stuttg., 1802. 

Among the opponents of Kant from the Lockian Btand-point may be mentioned 
especially Christian Gottlieb Selle and Adam Weishaupt, and, as partly occupying the 
same stand-point, the eclectics Feder, G. A. Tittel. and Tiedemann, the historian of 
philosophy, who in his Theaetet (Frankf.-on-the-M., 1794) defended the doctrine of the 
objective and real validity of human knowledge ; but the arguments of those last 
named contain also Leibnitzian ideas. Among the most independent opponents of the 
Kantian Criticism was Garve, who, however, at first confounded Kant's doctrine with 
the exclusive Idealism of Berkeley ; he afterwards (in connection with his translation of 
Aristotle's EtJiics) subjected the Kantian moral philosophy to a searching examination, 
which is still very worthy of attention. Of the Leibnitzians among the opponents of 
Kant, the two following are those most worthy of mention : Eberhard, against whom 
Kant himself (in his essay " Ueber eine Entdeckung" etc.) defended himself, and Joh. 
Christoph Schwab, the author of a prize-essay, crowned by the Berlin Academy of 
Sciences, on the question : " What advance has been made in Metaphysics in Germany 
since the times of Leibnitz and Wolff ? " published, together with the prize-essays of 
the Kantians Karl Leonard Reinhold and Johann Heinrich Abicht, by the Acad, of 
Sciences, Berlin, 1796 ; the above-named historian, Eberstein, also argues against Kant- 
ism from the Leibnitzo-WolflBan stand-point. Herder's Metakritik ( Verstand und 
Erfahrung, eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vemunft, Leipsic, 1799), owing to 
the bitterness of its tone, received less attention than its contents merited. Gottlob 
Ernst Schulze (1761-1833), the skeptic, in his work entitled, Aenesidemus oder iiber die 


Fundamente der von Reinliold gdieferten Elementarphilosophie nebst einer Vei'theidigung 
des Skeptidsmus gegen die Anmassungen der Vernunftkritik (1792), made the doctrinea 
of Kant and Reinhold the object of an acute criticism ; his strongest argument is iden- 
tical with that previously advanced by Fr. H. Jacobi, namely, that the conception of 
affection of things-in-themselves as affecting or acting on our senses which is indis- 
pensable for the Kantian system, is yet according to this same system impossible. 
Subsequently G. E. Schulze approached constantly nearer in his doctrine to that of 

Of the followers of Kant and representatives of his doctrine, Johannes Schultz,* 
Court-Preacher and Professor of Mathematics at Konigsberg, published an Exposition 
of Kant's Critique {ErldiUerungeii iiber des Uerrn Prof. Kant Kritik der reinen Ver- 
nunft^ Konigsberg, 1784) which had Kant's full approval, and subsequently an Exami- 
nation of the Critique {Prilfung der Kantischen Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Konigs- 
berg, 1789-92). The Exposition has been translated into French by Tissot (Paris, 18G5). 
In Ludwig Heinrich Jakob's " Prufung der Mendelssohn^ schen Morgenstunden " (Leipsic, 
1786) Mendelssohn's theoretical proofs of God's existence are disputed from the stand- 
point of the Kantian Criticism. Karl Christian Erhard Schmid (1761-1812), who subse- 
quently wrote a series of didactic works, published in the year 1786 a compendium of 
the Critique of the Pure Reason., together with a dictionary of the Kantian terminology 
{Grundriss der Kntik der reinen Vernunft nebst einem Worterbuch zum leichteren 
Gebrauch der Kantischen Schriften) ; in the later editions of the Dictionary Schmid 
defends the Kantian doctrine against Jacobi's objection that the idea of things-in- 
themselves, as affecting our senses, was, on Kant's theory, impossible. Schmid says 
that the affection of our senses, in the case in hand, has no relation to "space or 
place;" this explanation is indeed correct, as far as it goes; but time and causality 
should also be placed in the same category, as regards the question at issue, with spade, 
which being done, the conception of "affection" is rendered whoUy impossible. Ja- 
cobi's objection remained thus unrefuted. Through Karl Leonhard Reinhold's (bom 
1758, died 1823 ; on him see the work by his son, Ernst R., entitled, Karl Leonh. Al's 
Lehren und litterarisches Wirken, Jena, 1825; cf. Rud. Reicke, De explic, qua Rein- 
Twldus gramssimum in Kantii critica rationis puree locum epistolis suis iUustraverit 
[Dissert.], Konigsberg, 1856) popular "Letters concerning Kant's Philosophy" {Brief e 
ilber die Kantische Phibsophie^ in the Deutsch. Mercur, 178()-87, new and enlarged edi- 
tion, Leipsic, 1790-92) the Critical Philosophy found entrance to wider circles. Rein- 
hold's call to a Professorship of Philosophy in Jena (1787) made Jena a central point 
for the study of Kant's philosophy; the Jena. Allg. Litteraturzeitung (founded iu 
1785, edited by Schiitz and Hufeland) soon became the most influential organ of Kant- 
ism. In his Attempt at a New Theory of the Faculty of Human Thought ( Versuch 
einer neuen Theorie des mensMichen Vorstellungsvermogens)., published in 1789 (and to 
which, as a preface, the article published shortly before in the Deutscher Mercur, " On 
the Fortunes of the Kantian Philosophy up to the Present Time,'''' was prefixed), Rein- 
hold attempted, by an examination of the conception of mental representation, ah 

* The name of this Kantian is variously written : Schultz, Schulz, and Schulze. On the title-page of th 
^^ Erlduterungen" we read Schulze. He himself made use of various orthographies. He signs himself J. 
Schultz in a letter (in the possession of Reicke) to Borowski, dated May 10th, 1799, in which he expresses his 
thanks for communications respecting the strife about Fichte's atheism, and wishes, in Fichte's behalf, that 
" our God, in whom both of us are determined henceforth alone to trust, may be pleased to assist him, for his 
God is good for nothing." In the "Album" of the University at Konigsberg students were entered by him 
in October, 1792, as matriculated " rectore acaoemice Johannt Ernesto SchuUt, theol. doclore et prof, ord 


inplying a representing Subject and a represented Object, to secure for the Kantian 
doctrine a new basis, which basis was, however, of insuificient solidity, and was after- 
wards given up by Reinhold himself. Friedr. Boutervvek (1766-1828 ; Idee einer 
Apodiktik, Halle, 1799; Aesthetik, Leips., 1806, etc. ; Gesch. der neueren Poesie und 
Beredtsamkeit, Gott., 1801-19) is chiefly of historical importance as a writer in the fielda 
of aesthetics, and, more particularly, of the history of literature. Heydenreich, Tief- 
trunk, Wegscheider, and others wrought in the department of religious philosophy ; 
Abicht, Heydenreich, Hoffbauer, Krug, Maass, and others, in the department of the phi- 
losophy of law ; Kliesewetter, Krug, Hoffbauer, Fries, Maass, and others, in that of 
logic ; Maass and Fries, in that of psychology ; and Tennemann and Buhle especially 
in that of the history of philosophy. Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770-1842) contributed 
especially to the popularization of the Kantian philosophy. From 1805 to 1809 he 
taught in Konigsberg, and afterwards in Leipsic. His Dictionary of the Philos. Sciences 
{AUgemeines Handworterbuch, etc.) was published at Leipsic in 1827 seq. ; 2d ed. 1832 
seq. (His Groundwork of a Theory of the Feelings [Grundlage zu einer Theorie^ etc.] 
is reviewed by Beneke in the Wiener Jahrb.^ XXXII., p. 127, and his Handbook of 
Philosophy [Handbuch der PhUosophie] by Herbart in the Jen. Litteraturzeitung , 1822, 
Nos. 27 and 28.) Salomon Maimon attempted, in his Essay on the Transcendental 
Philosophy ( F<?rwc7t, eto., 1790), Philosophical Dictionary (PAeZcs. Worterbuch, 1791), 
Controversies in Philosophy {Streifereien im Oebiete der Philosophic^ 1793), Attempt at 
a New Logic {Versuch einer., etc., 1794), Critical Inquiries respecting the Human Mind 
{Krit. Untersuchungen Hber den menschl. Oeist), etc., to effect, by the introduction of 
Skeptical elements, an improvement of the Critical doctrine, an improvement disowned 
by Kant, but highly esteemed by Fichte. He rejected the Kantian conception of the 
"thing-in-itself." (Cf. M. 's Autobiography, Berlin, 1782; S. Jos. y^olWa Maimoniana, 

The most gifted of all the Kantians was Friedrich Schiller, the poet, Nov. 11, 1759- 
May 9, 1805. (On his philosophy compare Wilh. Hemsen, SchiUers Ansichten Hber 
ScJiOnheit und Kunst im Zusannmenhange gewurdigt, Inaug.-Diss., Gottingen, 1854; 
Kuno Fischer, SchiUer als Philosoph, Frankf ort-on-the-M. , 1858; Drobisch, Ueber die 
Stellung SchUlers zur Kantischen Ethik, in the Ber. i'lber die Verh. der K. Sachs. Oes. 
d. TTm., Vol. XI., 1859, pp. 176-194; Rob. Zimmermann, SchiUer als Beiiker, in the 
Abh. der BoJim. Oes. d. Wiss.., Vol. XI., Prague, 1859 ; cf. also his Oesch. der Aesthetik, 
Vienna, 1858, pp. 483-544 ; Karl Tomaschek, Schiller und Kant, Vienna, 1857, Schiller 
in seinem Verhdltniss zur Wissensc/iaft, ib., 1862; Carl Twesten, SchiUer in seinem 
Verh. z. TFws., Berlin, 1863; A. Kuhn, SchUlers Geiste^gang, Berlin, 1863; cf. the 
works of Hoffmeister, Griin, Palleske, and other biographers of Schiller, and also Don- 
zel, Ueber den gegenwdrtigen Zustand der Philosophic der Kunst, and a number of dis- 
courses delivered at the Schiller-Centennial in 1859, the titles of which may be found 
in the Bibliotheca Philologica for 1859 and 1860, edited by Gustav Schmidt.) At an 
early age Schiller had already familiarized himself with philosophical writings, especially 
with those of English Moralists and of Rousseau ; the philosophical instruction given 
by Jacob Friedr. von Abel, the eclectic, in the " Karlssc7iule " at Stuttgard, was based 
chiefly on the Leibnitzo- Wolffian doctrine. In his early work, the " Theosophy of 
Julius" (Theosophie des Julius), Schiller, adopting the optimism of Leibnitz, developed 
it into a doctrine approaching toward pantheism, but not so that we may assume him 
to have received the influence of Spinoza. The last of the " Philosophical Letters" 
which manifests a Kantian influence was written, not by SchiUer, but by Komer 
(1788). In the year 1787 Schiller read in the Berlin Monthly Kant's essays on the 


philosophy of history, from which he appropriated the idea that history is to be viewed 
teleologically, an idea which materially influenced the results of his historical labors. 
It was not until 1791 that Schiller commenced to study the great works of Kant, among 
which the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment wa,s, the first to receive his attention; 
at the same time his understanding of the Kantian doctrine was furthered by discus- 
sions with zealous disciples of Kant. The speculations of Fichte won a certain though 
relatively very slight influence over him, as early as the year 1794 ; the preface to the 
" ^ri(Ze o/ Jfig**ifta " contains suggestions of Schellingian ideas. Of Schiller's philoso- 
phical essays, in his Kantian period, the most important are ' ' On Grace and Dignity " 
{Ueber Anmuth und Wi'irde, written in 1793), in which moral grace, or the harmony 
between mind and nature, duty and inclination, is set forth as the complement of 
moral dignity, or of the elevation of the miud above nature (to this Kant replied in a 
Note to the second edition of his ^'Religion within the Limits of the Merv Reason''^) ; 
"Letters on Esthetic Culture" {Brief e iiber die dsthetische Erzlehung des Menschen, 
written in 1793-1795), in which Schiller recommends aesthetic culture as the means 
best adapted to produce elevation of moral sentiment, and the essay on " Naive and 
Sentimental Poetry " ( Ueber naive und sentiment. DicJitung, 1795-1796), in which sestne- 
tics is combined with philosophy of history, the conceptions of natural harmony, and 
of elevation to the ideal and recovered unity of the ideal with the real, and of mind and 
culture with nature, being employed in characterizing not only the different forms of 
poetry in general and of schools of poets (as illustrated in Goethe and Schiller them- 
selves), but also the forms of culture peculiar to Hellenic antiquity and modem times, 
and, in particular, the differences between ancient and modem poetry. 

Friedrich Hemrich Jacobi (bom Jan. 25th, 1743, at Diisseldorf, died March 10th, 
1819, at Munich), the philosopher of faith, sought to establish the authority of natural 
and direct faith in opposition to philosophic, system-makrag thought. He himself 
confesses : ' ' Never was it my intention to set up a system for the school ; my writings 
came forth out of my most interior life, they received a historical order, and I made 
them, in a certain sense, not of myself, not at will, but drawn on by a higher power 
which I could not resist." Of Jacobi's works which appeared in a complete edition at 
Leipsic in 1812-25, and to which Jacobi's correspondence with Goethe and Bouterwek 
form a supplement those most deserving of mention are the philosophical novels : 
" AUwilVs Briefsammlung " and " Woldemar,'''' in which, besides the theoretical problem 
of the knowledge of the external world, the moral question as to the relation of indi- 
vidual right and duty to the universal rule of morals is specially discussed ; the work 
on the doctrine of Spinoza, in ^'Letters to Moses Mendelssohn"" (Berlin, 1785), where 
Jacobi relates a conversation between himself and Lessing, in which the latter is repre- 
sented as having confessed his leaning towards Spinozism (which confession, since 
Lessing, as his own works indubitably prove, always occupied substantially the Leib- 
nitzian standpoint, can have referred only to single points in speculative theology, but 
was obviously understood by Jacobi in too wide a sense) David Hume iiber den Glauben, 
Oder Idealismus und Realismus (Breslau, 1787) in which Jacobi also expresses his 
judgment of Kant's philosophy " Open Letter to Fichte" {Sendschreiben an Fichte, 
Hamburg, 1799), the essay on the "Attempt of the Critical Philosophy to explain 
Reason" {Ueber das Unternehmen des Kriticismus die Vernunftzu Verstande zu brin- 
gen, in the third number of Reinhold's Beitrage zur leichteren Uebersicht des Zustandes 
der Phihsophie beim Anfange des 19. Jalirh., Hamb., 1802), and "Of Divine Things" 
{Von den gottlichen Dingen, Leipsic, 1811), which latter work was directed against 
Schelling, whom Jacobi charged with the hypocritical use of theistic and Christian 


words in a pantheistic sense. (On Jacobi cf . Schlichte^oll, v. Weiller and Thiersch, 
JncobCs Leben unci Wirken, Munich, 1819 ; Kuhn, Jacobi und die PhUosopJiie seiner 
Zeit, Mayence, 1834; C. Roessler, De jMlosopliandi raUoiie F. U. Jac.^ Jena, 1848; 
Ferd Deycks, F. H. Jac. im VerMltniss zu seinen Zeitgenossen, besonders zu Goethe, 
Fraukf.-on-the-M., 1849; H. Fricker, Die Philosophie des F. H. Jacobi, Augsburg, 
1854; F. Ueberweg, Ueber F. II. J., in Gelzers Prot. Monatsbl, July, 1858; W. Wie- 
gand, Zur Erinnerung an den Denker F. II. J. u. s. Weltansiclit, Progr., Worms, 1863 ; 
Chr. A. Thilo, F. H. Jaeobi's Andchten von den gottl. Dingcn, in the Zeitschr. filr 
exactePhilos., Vol. VII., Leips., 1866, pp. 113-173 ; Eberhard Zimgiebl, F. II. J.'s Lebcn, 
Bidden und Denken, ein Beitrag zur Gesch. der deutschen Litteratur u. Philosophie, 
Vienna, 1867 ; cf. also the review of the latter work, by Rudolf Zoeppritz, in the GiJtt. 
gel. Anz. for June 5th, 1867, Art. 23, pp. 881-904 ; W. Mejer, F. R. Jaeobi's Briefe an 
Friedr. Bouterioek aus den Jahren 1800-1819, Gottingen, 1868.) Jacobi considers 
Spinozism as the only consistent system of philosophy, but holds that it must be rejected, 
because it is in conflict with the imperative needs of the human spirit. All demonstra- 
tion leads only to the world as a whole, not to an extra-mundane author of the world ; 
for in demonstration the understanding can only pass from the conditioned to the con- 
ditioned, and not to the unconditioned. To demonstrate God's existence would be to 
point out a ground or cause of his existence, whereby God would be made a dependent 
being. (But here Jacobi leaves unconsidered the importance of the indirect proof, 
which may lead from the knowledge of effects to the knowledge of causes. ) Near as 
this opinion of Jacobi stood to that of Kant, who conceded to the practical reason with 
its postulates the primacy over the theoretical reason, which, according to Kant, is 
unable to know any " things-in-themselves," yet Kant (in the Essay : '' Wa^s heisst sich 
im Benken orientiren ? ''' Werke, Ros. and Schub.'s edition, Vol. I., p. 386 seq.) found 
ground for replying, that it was quite possible to believe that which the theoretical 
reason could neither prove nor disprove, but not that of which it was beUeved that she 
could prove the contrary ; the critical philosophy and belief in God were compatible 
with each other, but Spinozism and belief in God were incompatible. Jacobi, on the 
other hand, was unable to assent to the Kantian demonstration of the limits of theoret- 
ical knowledge. He indicated clearly the dilemma which is fatal for the Kantian 
Criticism, namely, the affection of the senses, through which we receive the empirically 
given material of perception, must come either from phenomena or from things-in- 
themselves ; but the former hypothesis is absiu'd, because phenomena, as Kant himself 
teaches, are only representations in the mind, and hence, if this hypothesis were cor- 
rect, there must have been ideas before there were ideas ; and the latter alternative 
(which Kant actually adopts and affirms, as well in the first as in the following editions 
of the Crit. of the Pure Reason, as also in the article against Eberhard, and elsewhere) 
contradicts the critical doctrine, that the relation of cause and effect exists only 
within the world of phenomena, and has no relation to things-in-themselves ; the 
beginning and the subsequent part of the Critique destroy each other {Jacobi iiber 
Diivid Hume, Wei'ke, Vol. II., p. 301 seq.). Jacobi himself does not pretend to be able 
to demonstrate the existence of objects which affect us, but affirms that in the act of 
perception he is directly convinced of their existence. The objects of sensuous per- 
ception are, in his view, not mere phenomena, i. e., representations combined with 
each other according to certain categories, but real, although finite and dependent, 
objects. It is only such objects that are knowai by the understanding, whose range 
Jacobi accordingly, in agreement ^vith Kant, restricts to the sphere of possible experi- 
ence, although not ia the same sense as Kant. Jacobi likewise affirms, with Kant, that 


the speculative reason, as the organ of demonstration, does not conduct heyond thia 
same sphere. He criticises the empty formalism of the Kantian moral principle, claim- 
ing that to moral reflection should be added the immediate impulses of moral feeling, 
and that, in addition to the abstract rule, the particular circumstances should be con- 
sidered, by which the moral duty of each individual is determined. He censures Kant's 
argumentation in defence of the validity of the Postulates in the Critique of the Prac- 
tical Reason as being without force, since holding a thing true for merely practical rea- 
sons (believing merely because one needs to believe) is self -destructive, and holds that 
we have as well an immediate conviction of the supra-sensible, to which Kant's postu- 
lates of the practical reason relate, as of the existence of sensible objects. This conviction 
he denominates faith ; in later works he terms the facidty, by which we immediately 
apprehend and are aware of the supra-sensible, reason. On him whose spirit can be 
satisfied with Spinozism an opposite belief cannot be forced by demonstration ; hia 
reasoning is logically consequent, and philosophical justice must acquit him ; but such 
an one, in Jacobi's opinion, gives up the noblest elements of spiritual life. Jacobi 
acknowledges the philosophical correctness (as a matter of logical deduction) of Fichte's 
reduction of the belief in a God to the belief in a moral order of the world ; but he Ls 
not satisfied with this mere logical correctness of the understanding. He blames 
Schelling for seeking to conceal the Spinozistic consequence of his doctrine (Aivithout, it 
must be said, being fully just towards a stand-point which seeks to do away with this 
separation of reality and ideality, and to comprehend the finite as filled with the eternal 
substance, and which sees in the hypostatic and anthropomorphizing conception of the 
ideal, not a higher knowledge, but only a legitimate form of poetry). Jacobi seeks to 
raise himself above the sphere, to which, as he says, the understanding remains con- 
fined, through faith in God and in divine things. There lives in us, he says, a spirit 
which comes immediately from God, and constitutes man's most intimate essence. As 
this spirit is present to man in his highest, deepest, and most personal consciousness, so 
the giver of this spirit, God himself, is present to man through the heart, as nature is 
present to him through the external senses. No sensible object can so move the spirit, 
or so demonstrate itself to it as a true object, as do those absolute objects, the true, 
good, beautiftd, and sublime, which can be seen %vith the eye of the mind. We may 
even hazard the bold assertion that we believe in God because we see him, although he 
cannot be seen with the eyes of this body. It is a jewel in the crown of our race, the 
distinguishing mark of humanity, that these objects reveal themselves to the rational 
soul. With holy awe man turns his gaze toward those spheres from which alone light 
falls in upon the darkness of earth. But Jacobi also confesses : '' There is light in my 
heart, but when I seek to bring it into the understanding, it is extinguished. Which 
illumination is the true one, that of the understanding, which discloses, indeed, well- 
defined and fixed shapes, but behind them an abyss, or that of the heart, which, while 
indeed it sends rays of promise upwards, is unable to supply the want of definite 
knowledge?" In view of this antagonism, Jacobi calls himself "a heathen wdth the 
understanding, but a Christian with the spirit." 

Jacobi finds the essential elements of Christianity in theism, or the belief in a per- 
sonal God, as also in moral freedom and the eternity of human personality. ' ' Con- 
ceived thus in its purity " and based on the immediate witness of the personal con- 
sciousness, there is for him nothing greater than Christianity. In distinction from 
this rational characteristic of his "faith-philosophy," in which Friedrich Koppen, 
Cajetan von WeUler, Jak. Salat, Chr. Weiss, Job. Neeb, J. J. F. AncUlon, and others 
tubstantially agreed with him, his friend and follower, Thomas Wizenmann (cf . on him 


Al. von der Goltz, TFtz., der FreundJacohi's^ Gotha, 1859), held fast, in what concerns 
the source of faith, to the Bible, and consequently, also, in respect of the substance of 
faith, to the specific dogmas of Christianity. In these latter Johann Georg Hamann 
(bom at Konigsberg in 1730, died at Miinster in 1788), who was a friend of Kant, and 
also of Herder and Jacobi, and was called the "Magus of the North," found "the 
necessary support and consolation for an inconstant spirit, rent by its sin and its need," 
and he took particular pleasure in holding up for special honor the mysteries or 
''pudenda'''' of Christian faith, Uluminating them with flashes of thought, which, 
though original, often degenerated into the far-fetched and fanciful ; to this end he 
made use especially of the '' principium coincideiitim oppositorum " of G. Bruno. (His 
works ed. by Roth, Berl., 1821-43; cf. Gildemeister, II.'' s Leben und Schrlften,, Gotha, 
1858-60, and H. von Stein's Vortrag ilber H.). [J. Disselhoff, Wegweiser zu Hamann, 
'71.] To comprehend Christianity as the religion of humanity, man as the final 
development of nature, and human history as progressive development into human- 
ity, is the problem at whose solution Herder (bom at Morungen, East Prussia, in 1744, 
died 1803, at Weimar), a man endowed with abundant fancy and with the most deli- 
cate sense for the appreciation of the reality and poetry of the lives of different nations, 
labored with success. In opposition to the emphatic dualism, which Kant affirms be- 
tween the empirical material and the d prioii, form of thought. Herder puts forward 
the profounder idea of an essential unity and a gradual development in nature and 
mind. His cosmical philosophy culminates in a poetic Spinozism, filled with the idea 
of the personality of the divine spirit and of immortality (conceived as metempsychosis 
a form of Spinozism, therefore, similar to that exemplified in those works of Spi- 
noza's which preceded the Ethica [although this form, historically, was unknown in 
Herder's time] , and less removed from the doctrine of Bruno). This philosophy he 
developed connectedly in the work entitled " God, Dialogues concerning Spinoza's Sys- 
tem " {Qott, Oesprdche iiber Spinoza's System, 1787). Herder finds (1772) the origin of 
language in the nature of man, who, as a thinking being, is capable of contemplating 
things disinterestedly, uninfluenced by desire ; the origin of language is divine, in so 
far as it is human. The order of development illustrated in the history of language 
witnesses (as Herder, in part after Hamann, remarks in his Metakritik, 1799) against 
the " a-priorism" of Kant. Space and time, he argues, are empirical conceptions ; the 
form and matter of knowledge are not divided from each other in their origin, nor does 
the reason subsist apart from the other faculties; we need, instead of a "Critique of 
the Reason," a Physiology of the Human Faculties of Knowledge. Herder declares 
that the noblest aim of human life, and the one most difiicult to realize, is to learn 
from youth up what is one's duty, and how, in the easiest manner, and in every mo- 
ment of life, to perform it as if it were not duty. Herder's principal service to philoso- 
phy lies in his phUosophioal treatment of the history of humanity {Ideeii zur Philos. der 
Gesch. der Menschheit, Riga, 1784-91, etc.). An important influence was exerted by 
his " Letters for the Furtherance of Humanity " {Brief e zur Befardenmg der Humanitdt, 
1793-97), as indeed, in general, by his enthusiastic devotion to the grand work of col- 
lecting out of the various historically given forms of culture whatever was of xiniversal 
human worth. In his KaUigone (1800) he seeks to develop a theory of the beautiful. 
Jacobi, Hamann, and Herder are, however, names which belong rather to the history 
of the national literature of Germany than to the history of philosophy. (Cf. , H. Erd- 
mann. Herder nls Rdigionsphilosoph, Hersfeld, 1866 ; A. Werner, H. als T7ieologe, Berl. 
1871.) [H. as Theologian; J. F. Smith, Theol. Rev. Lond., '72.] 

Jacob Fries (bom Aug. 23, 1773, at Barby, died Aug. 10, 1843, at Jena) wrote a 


aeries of philosophical works, the most important of which was the " New Critique ol 
the Reason" {Neue Kritik der Vermin ft, Heidelberg, 1807, 2ded., 1828-31 ; besides 
this the following are especially to be mentioned : System der Philosophie als evidenter 
Wissenschaft, Leipsic, 1804 ; Wmen, Glaube und Ahmmg, Jena, 1805 ; System der 
Logik, Heidelberg, 1811, 2d ed., 1819, 3d ed., 1837; Handbuch der praktischen Phi- 
losaphie, Jena, 1818-32 ; Handbuch der fsyclmChen Anthropologie, Jena, 1820-21, 2d 
ed., 1837-39; Mathematische Naturphilos(yphie, Hei&eVoexg, \^22 \ Julius itnd Euagarai 
Oder die Schonheit der Sede, ein philosophischer Roman, Heidelberg, 1822 ; System der 
Metapfiysik, Heidelberg, 1824. A complete biography of him has been furnished by his 
son-in-law, Ernst Ludw. Theod. Henke : Jak. Friedr. Fries, aus scinem handschr. 
Nachlass dargesteUt, Leipsic, 1867). Fries projioses the question whether the critique 
of the reason, which inquires into the possibility of d priori knowledge, is, on its part, 
to be effected by a priori or d posteriori knowledge, and decides in favor of the latter 
alternative : we can only a posteriori, namely, through internal experience, become con- 
scious that and how we possess cognitions a priori. Psychology, based on internal 
experience, must therefore form the basis of all philosophizing. Fries argues that 
Kant partially, and Reinhold altogether, failed to apprehend this character of the 
critique of the reason, and viewed it as resting on d priori knowledge. (Kant himself 
has nowhere raised the above question ; his express exclusion of empirical psychology 
from metaphysics, logic, and ethics by no means involves its exclusion from the science 
of cognition or the "critique of the reason," which is identical with neither of these 
branches of philosophy. But since he assumes the existence of apodictical knowledge, 
at least in mathematics, as a fact, and places it at the basis of his investigations, and 
since he also deduces the categories from the empirically given forms of logical judg- 
ments, and, in moral philosophy, chooses for Ms point of departure the immediate 
moral consciousness, which is, he says, as it were a "fact of the pure reason," it can- 
not be denied that he, too, bases his critique of the reason on real or supposed facts 
of internal experience ; the question whether and why the assumption is justified, that 
every one else experiences the same things in himself, which the critical philosopher 
finds in his own internal experience, may therefore, in this view of the case, be per- 
tinently addressed to Kant. The same may also be said of the question : Whence can 
it be known that universality and necessity constitute a criterion of the a priori ? since 
it seems alike impossible to demonstrate, either a jiriori or d jwsterion, the in reality 
indemonstrable proposition, that experience and induction can furnish only a relative 
universality. But there is by no means, as some have affirmed, an intrinsic " absurd- 
ity " in the theory that we become cognizant through internal experience of our posses- 
sion of a jniori cognitions ; for an apodictical and dpriori character is ascribed to the 
mathematical and metaphysical cognitions as also to the consciousness of duty them- 
selves, while an empirical character is attributed not to these cognitions as such, but 
only to ovir consciousness that we possess them. Supposing that there were any a 
priori cognitions in the Kantian sense of this expression, it might very weU be sup- 
posed, as is done by Fries, that metaphysics, in like manner with mathematics, is spe- 
cifically distinct from all empirical science, and yet that another science, based on 
internal experience, viz. : the critique of the reason, must decide upon the claims of 
these apodictical sciences or at least of these sciences claiming to be apodictical to 
recognition, and upon the limits of their validity as such sciences. ) Fries assumes, with 
Kant, that space, time, and the categories are subjective a priori forms, which we im- 
pose upon the material furnished by experience, and teaches : Phenomena (which are 
mental representations) are the objects of empirico-mathematical knowledge, and its 


only objects ; for even the existence of things-in-themselves is not (as Kant had as- 
sumed) a matter of knowledge ; all phenomena can be reached by empirico-mathemat- 
ical cognition ; organic existences must be susceptible of a mechanical explanation, 
founded on the mutual action of their parts upon each other ; circulation is their law, 
just as counterpoise or indifference is the law of the inorganic world. (An attempt to 
carry out this idea of the possibility of explaining by mechanical laws all the processes 
of organic life, was made with principal reference to the vegetable kingdom nota- 
bly by Fries's pupU, Jak. Matthias Schleiden.) Things-in-themselves, which Fries 
terms the true, eternal essence of things, are the objects of faith. Underneath all the 
praxis of the reason lies the belief in reality and worth, and above all in the equal per- 
sonal dignity of all men , from this principle flow the requirements of morals. The 
ennobling of humanity is the highest moral duty. The mediating link between knowl- 
edge and faith is presentiment, to the sphere of which aesthetic and religious contem- 
plation belong. In the feeling of the beautiful and sublime the finite is seen as the 
manifestation of the eternal ; in religious reflection the world is interpreted in the light 
of Ideas ; in the course of the universe reason discerns by presentiment the end to 
which it tends, and in the life of beautiful natural objects the eternal goodness which 
controls all things. Religious philosophy is the science of faith and presentiment, and 
not derived from, them. The more important of Fries's disciples, besides Schleiden, 
have been E. F. Apelt (1812-1859 ; Meta/physik, Leipsic, 1857 ; Religionsphilosophie, ed. 
by S. G. Frank, Leipsic, 1860 ; Zur Theorie der Induction, Leipsic, 1854 ; Zur Ge- 
schichte der Astronomie, Ueber die Epochen der OescJiichte der Menschheit, Jena, 1845- 
46, etc.), E. S. Murbt {Was heisst philosopJdren und was ist Phihsophie? Jena, 1839 ; 
Kant und seine Nachfolger, Jena, 1841), F. van Calker {DenUehre oder Logik u. Dia- 
lektik, 1823, etc.), Ernst Hallier, Schmidt, Schlomlich, the mathematician (Abhand- 
lungen der Fries'scJien Schule, by Schleiden, Apelt, Schlomlich, and Schmidt, Jena, 
1847), and others ; De Wette, the theologian, also set out from the principles of Fries. 
On Beneke, who ended with an elaborate psychological empiricism, the doctrine of 
Fries exerted in many respects an important influence. 

In his principal work, entitled the "Only possible Stand-point from which the 
Critical Philosophy can be Judged" (Einzig moglicher Standpunkt, aus welchem die 
kritische PhibsopMe beurtheilt werden muss, Riga, 1796, which forms the third volume 
of the *' Erlduteiiider Auszug aus KanVs kritischen Sckriften" Riga, 1793-94), as 
also in his "Compendium of the Crit. PhUos." (Orundriss der krit. PhUosophie, 1796), 
and other works, Jakob Sigismund Beck (1761-1842) sought, after the example of 
Maimon, and probably, also, under the partial influence of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre 
(which appeared in 1794), to explain away the logical inconsequence of Kant in repre- 
senting things-in-themselves as affecting us, and thereby giving us the material for 
representations, and yet as existing without relation to time, space, or causality. Beck 
denies that the percipient subject is affected by the things-in-themselves, and aflBrms 
that the passages in which Kant asserts the contrary were a didactic accommodation of 
the author to the stand-point of the dogmatic reader. (A curious kind of didactics, 
indeed, that would not facilitate the correct understanding of the author, but would 
well-nigh render such understanding impossible. ) Beck disposes of the question as to 
the origin of the material of empirical representation by the theory of the affection of 
the senses by phenomena (which theory, since phenomena are themselves only repre- 
sentations, involves the absurd supposition, that the origin of our representations 
depends on the operation of our representations on our senses, hence, that our repre- 
eentations affect us before they exist) ; the relation of the individual to other individ- 


aals he leaves unexplained ; the pure forms of intuition, space and time, he refers back 
to the same original synthesis of the manifold to which the Categories are referred 
Religion is defined by him as obedience to the voice of conscience, the inward judge, 
which man conceives symbolically as external to him and as God. [At London, in 1798, 
was publighed J. S. Beck's Principles of the Critical Philosophy, translated by an audi- 
tor. Tr.] 

Christoph Gottfried Bardili (1761-1808), in his "Letters on the Origin of Meta 
physics" {Brief e uher den Ursprung der Metaphysik, pubUshed anonymously at Altona, 
in 1798), and still more in his Compendium of Logic {Grundi'iss der ersten Logik. 
gereinigt von den Irrthilmern der bisherigen Logik, besonders der Kantischen, Stuttgard, 
1800), attempted, in a form which was characterized by great abstruseness, to found a 
doctrine of "rational realism," which contained many germs of later speculations, and 
especially the germ of ScheUing's idea of the indifference of the objective and subjec- 
tive in an absolute reason, and of the (Hegelian) idea of a logic which should be at once 
logic and ontology. The same active thought, which permeates the universe, comes, 
says Bardili, in man to consciousness ; in man the feeling of life rises to personality, and 
the natural laws of phenomena become laws of the association of his ideas. 

The Bardilian Realism pre-supp"ees the reality of nature and mind, and their unity 
in the Absolute, but does not contain a complete refutation of Kant's arguments for the 
contrary. Of the two contradictory elements contained in the Kantian Criticism, Beck's 
Idealism elevates the idealistic element into prominence, arbitrarily disposing of the 
realistic one. To remove the contradiction, the opposite 4y could with equal right be 
followed, the idea of the affection of the Subject by " things-in-themselves " being 
adopted as correct, and the whole doctrine being transformed on this basis. This latter 
course was pursued by Herbart. Herbart took his point of departuie, however, not 
immediately from Kant, but from Fichte, to whose subjective idealism he opposed his 
fundamental doctrine of the plurality of simple, real essences, a doctrine akin to the 
monadological doctrine of Leibnitz. 

126. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), originally a Spinozistic 
determinist, was led to a change of opinion through the influence of 
Kant's doctrine of the limitation of causality to phenomena, and his 
assertion of the independent moral freedom of the Ego as a noumenon. 
Accepting these opinions, he carried out in theoretical philosophy the 
principle of the limitation of causality to phenomena a principle 
which he had learned to value in moral philosophy more fully than 
Kant had done, affirming that the " matter" of representations was not 
derived, as Kant had affirmed, from the action of things-in-themselves 
on the agent of representation, or the percipient subject, but that both 
matter and form were the result of the activity of the Ego, and that 
they were furnished by the same synthetic act which produces the 
forms of intuition and the categories. The manifold contents of expe- 
rience, like the a pr^iori forms of cognition, are produced by a creative 
faculty in us. It is not any given fact, but it is this action of produc- 
tion, which is the ground of all consciousness. The Ego posits both 


itself and the non-ego, and recognizes itself as one with the latter ; the 
process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis is the form of all knowledge. 
This creative Ego is not the individual, but the absolute. Ego ; but 
Fichte seeks to deduce the former from the latter, because morality 
demands the distinction of individuals. The world is the material of 
duty in the forms of sense. Fichte pronounces the rise of the original 
limits of the individual incomprehensible. God is the moral order of 
the world. As Fichte in his later speculations made the absolute his 
point of departure, his philosophizing assumed more and more a reli- 
gious character, yet without belying its original basis. His Addresses 
to the German Nation drew their inspiring influence from the energy 
of his moral consciousness. The philosophical school of Fichte in- 
cluded but few men ; 3xt his speculation became, partly through Schel- 
ling and partly through Ilerbart, of most decisive influence for the 
further development of German philosophy. 

Joh. Gottlieb Fic/ite't nachgelasseneWerke, ed. by Imman. Herm. Fichte, 3 vols., Bonn, 1834. Sdmmtliche 
Trerte,ed. by the same, 8 vols., 1845-46. [Popular Writingt of J . O. Ffc<.transl. by W. Smith. London, 184S- 
1S49 , new ed., 71. VoL 1. contains ; Memoir of Fichte ; Th^ Xature vj the Sclwlar , The Vocation of Man ; 
TheVocation of the Scholar. Vol. II. contains : CliaracterisUcxofthe Present Age ; Outlines of the Doctrine 
of Knoicledge ; Way towards the Blessed Life. Fichte's Destiny of Man, transl. by Mrs. Percy Sinnett, 
London, 1846. Several translations from the writings of Fichte have been published by A. E. Kroeger, in 
the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, edited by Wm. T. Harris and published at St. Louis, viz. : Introduc- 
tion to Fichie^s Science of Knowledge, Journ. of Specul. Philos., Vol. I., 1867, pp. 23-36; A Criticis7n oj 
Philosophical Systems, ibid.. Vol. I., pp. 79-86 and 137-159; Fichte's Sun-Clear Statement, ibid.. Vol. II., 
1868, pp. 3-15, 65-82, 129-140 ; New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge, ibid.. Vol. III., 1869, pp. 1-31, 
97-133, 193-241,289-317 (also pubUshed separately, St. Louis, 1869); Facts of Consciousness, ibid.. Vol. V., 
53-61, 130-144, 226-231. Fichte's Science of Knowledge, translated by A. E. Kroeger, Philadelphia, 1868 ; 
Scie7ice of Bights, Ibid., 1870. TV.] Fichte's Life has been written by his son, and published together with 
his literary correspondence, Sulzbach, 18.30, 2d ed. Leips., 1862. Interesting additions to the same have 
been made by Karl Hase in the Jena. Fichtebilchlein, Leipsic, 1856. Cf. William Smith, Memoir of Joh. 
O. Fichte, 2d ed., London, 1848. Of F.'s political views, Ed. ZeUer treats in Von Sybel's Bistor. Zeitschrift, 
IV., p. 1 seq., reprinted in ZeUer's Vortrdge u. Abh., Leipsic, 1865, pp. 140-177. Of the various accounts 
of his system, those of WUh. Busse (F. u. s. Beziehung zur Gegenwartdes deutschen Volkes, Halle, 1848-49), 
Lowe {Die Philosophie Fichte's nach deni Gesammtergebni.is ihrer Entwicklung und in ihrem V'erhaltniss zu 
Kant und Spinoza, Stuttgard, 1862), Ludw. Noack {J. G. F. ?iach s. Leben. Lehren und VTirken. Leips., 1862), 
and A. Lasson (</. O. Fichte im Verhilltniss zu Kirche und Stoat, Berlin, 1863), are specially to be men- 
tioned. Niunerous addresses and articles (of which v. Keichlin-Meldegg gcives a review in I. H. Fichte's 
Zttchr. f. Ph., Vol. 42, 1863, pp. 247-277) were occasioned by the Fichte-centennial of Slay 19, 1862: among 
their authors we may mention especially Heinr. Ahrens, Hubert Beckers, Karl Biedermann, Chr. Aug. Brandis, 
Mor. Carriere, O. Domeck, Ad. Drechsler, L. Eckardt, Joh. Ed. Erdmann, Kuno Fischer, L. George, Rud. 
Gott.^chaU, F. Harms, Hebler, HelfEerich, Karl Heyder, Franz Hoffmann, Karl Kostlin, A. L. Kym, Ferd. La-s- 
Balle, J. H. Lowe, Lott, .liirgen Bona Meyer (on the Reden an die D. Nat.), Monrad, L. Noack, W. A. Pas.sow, 
K. A. V. Reichlin-SIeldegg, Rud. Reicke (in the D. Mus.), Rosenkranz (in the Gedanke, V., p. 170), E. O. 
Schellenberg, Rob. ScheUwien, Ed. Schmidt-Weissenfels, Ad. Stahr, Leop. Stein, Heinr. Sternberg, H. v. 
Treitschke, Ad. Trendelenburg, Chr. H. Weisse, Tob. Wildauer, R. Zinrmaermann. Cf. Kuno Fischer's Hist, 
of Modem Philosophy, Vol. V. : Fichte and his Predecessors, Heidelberg, 1868 [German]. 

Joharm Gottlieb Fichte was bom May 19th, 1762, at Rammenau in Upper Lusatia. 
His father, a ribbon-weaver, was descended from a Swedish cavalry sergeant in the 
army of Gnsta^1ls Adolphus, who had remained in Saxony. The Baron Ton Miltiz 
interested himself in the talented boy. From 1774 to 1780 Fichte attended the 


"Princes' School" at Pforta, then studied theology at Jena, filled from 1788 to 1790 
a position as family tutor in Switzerland, and in 1791 went to Konigsberg, where 
he laid before Kant the manuscript of his first and rapidly written (between July 
13th and August 18th) work, the "Critique of All Revelation" (Versuch einer 
Kritik alter Offenbarung), and by it won Kant's respect and good-will. It was 
then only one year since Fichte had first become familiar with the Kantian philo- 
sophy ; he had previously been acquainted with the system of Spinoza, and held 
a deterministic doctrine, which he gave up as soon as the Kantian doctrine, that the 
category of causality applies only to phenomena, seemed to assure him of the 
possibility of the non-dependence of the motions of the will on the causal nexus ; it 
is especially to his choice between deterministic dogmatism and the Kantian doctrine 
of freedom that the following aphorism of his applies (First Introd. to the Wissenschafts- 
lehre^ 1797, Werke, I., p. 434): "The philosophy that one chooses depends on the 
kind of man one is." After Reinh old's departure from Jena for Kiel, Fichte became, 
in 1794, his successor in the Jena professorship, which he filled until the dispute con- 
cerning Fichte's atheism, in 1799. In an essay on the "Ground of our Faith in a 
Divine Government of the World," which he prefixed as an introduction to an opuscule 
by Forberg on the "Development of the Conception of ReUgion" (in the Philos. 
Journal^ Jena, 1798, No. 1), Fichte treated the conceptions of God and of the moral 
order of the world as equivalent, which position was censured and denounced by an 
anonymous pamphleteer in a "Letter from a Father to his Son on the Atheism of 
Fichte and Forberg." The electoral government of Saxony confiscated the essays of 
Fichte and Forberg, forbade the circulation of the Journal in Saxony and demanded 
the punishment of Fichte and Forberg, with the threat that otherwise the subjects of 
the Elector would be forbidden to attend the University of Jena. The government at 
Weimar yielded before this menace so far as to resolve to have the editors of the 
Journal censured by the Academical Senate for their imprudence. Fichte, learning 
beforehand of this, declared in a letter (which was private, but by permission was 
made pubUc), dated March 22d, 1799, and addressed to a member of the government, 
that, in the case of his receiving a " sharp admonition" from the Academical Senate, 
he should take his leave, and added the threatening intimation that in that case other 
Professors also would leave the University with him. This intimation, by which Fichte 
meant to intimidate the government and frighten it out of its purpose publicly to cen- 
sure him, but which in reality only irritated it and led to the immediate and formally 
unjustifiable dismissal of Fichte, was founded on utterances of some of his colleagues, 
in particular of Paulus, who appears to have said that Fichte might remind his perse- 
cutors that he (Paulus), too, and others would, "in case of a restraint being placed 
on the freedom of teaching," not remain in Jena. This was probably meant by Paulus 
and others to apply in the case of such a procedure against Fichte, as would tend indi- 
rectly to limit their own freedom as teachers, to render distausteful to them a longer 
stay in Jena, and to make acceptable a call to some other place, as Mayence, where an 
opening seemed likely to offer itself for them. But Fichte understood it as meaning, 
of course, much more, and as a promise, in any case, to quit the University at once 
with himself. (Such a promise Paulus and the others cannot have made, whether in 
view of their own interests, or from a friendship so enthusiastic as to make them ready 
to sacrifice all, and even to jeopardize the welfare of the University, or, finally, in 
childish thoughtlessness.) Fichte was reprimanded, and at the same time his threat 
that he would leave, which should have been resented only on account of its defiant 
tone, being unreasonably treated as a request for dismissal, he was dismissed. In vain 


did Fichte explain that the case supposed by him, of a reprimand coupled with dishonor 
and restraining the freedom of the professorial chair, had not arisen. A petition from the 
students in his favor was well meant, but could not but be unsuccessful. Fichte went 
and the other Professors remained. Not long afterwards appeared Kant's declaration 
(dated Aug. 7th, 1799, in the IiiteUigemblatt to the Allg. Litt.-Ztg., No. 109, 1799) that 
he regarded Fichte's Wmensc7iaftslehre as an altogether faulty system, and that he 
protested against any attempt to discover the doctrines of Fichte in his own Critiques, 
which latter were to be judged according to their letter, and not according to a supposed 
spirit in contradiction with the letter. In like manner Kant had previously declared 
that the construction of the world out of self -consciousness, without empirically given 
material, produced on him a ghostly impression, and that the Wissenschaftslehre was 
only an ephemeral production. Fichte repaired to Berlin, where an utterance of the 
king, in the spirit of Frederick the Great, in which fitting discrimination was made 
between religious opinion and civil right, assured him of toleration. He entered into 
relations of familiar intercourse with Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and other 
men of note, and was soon delivering public lectures before a numerous circle of edu- 
cated men. In the year 1805 a professorship in the (at that time Prussian) University 
of Erlangen was given to him ; but he lectured there only during the summer semester 
of 1805. In the summer of 1806 Fichte went, va. consequence of the advance of the 
French, to Konigsberg, where he lectured for a short time ; here he was already en- 
gaged in the preparation of his Addresses to the German Nation, which were delivered 
in the Academy -building at Berlin, in the winter of 1807-8. Appointed a Professor in 
the University of Berlin at the founding of that institution (1809), he continued 
earnestly engaged ia the duties of his profession, and constantly modifying his system, 
until his death, on the 27th of January, 1814. He died of a nervous fever, which he 
caught from his wife, who had devoted herself to the care of the sick in the hospitals 
and herself recovered from the infection. 

Fichte's principal works are the following. From the year 1790 are preserved his 
ApTiorisms on Religion and Deism which are of interest for the light which they throw 
on the history of the author's intellectual development; his Sermons, 1791. In the 
year 1792 appeared at Konigsberg (from the publishing-house of Hartung) his Critique 
of aU Revelation, which, written in the Kantian spirit, and issued by the publisher with- 
out the name of the author and without the preface, in which the latter describes him- 
self as a " beginner,' (an omission which appears from numerous coinciding indications 
to have been intentional on the part of the pubHsher and without Fichte's knowledge 
or desire), was supposed at first by the reviewer in the Jen. AUg. Litt.-Ztg., and almost 
universally by the philosophical public, to be a work of Kant ; when the error became 
known, Fichte received the honor of the authorship of a work which it had been possi- 
ble to ascribe to Kant. This circumstance contributed essentially towards procuring 
him his subsequent call to Jena. In the year 1793 appeared anonymously the following 
writings (written in Switzerland, where Fichte married a daughter of a sister of Klop- 
stock) : ' ' Reclamation of the Right to Free Thought from the Princes of Europe who 
have hitherto suppressed it," and " Contributions to the Correction of the Public Judg- 
ment concerning the French Revolution," in which Fichte develops the idea that 
although States have arisen by oppression and not by contract, yet the State rests ideally 
on a contract, and it must be constantly brought nearer to this ideal ; all that is 
positive finds its measure and law in the pure form of ourself , in the pure Ego. After 
his entrance upon his professorial duties at Jena, Fichte published the opuscule on th 
Idea of the Science of Knowledge ( Ueber den Begriff der WissenscMftsWire oder der 


sogenannten Phibsophie, Weimax, 1794), and the " Foundation of the whole Science of 
Knowledge" {Grundkige der gesammten Wissemchaftdehre, fds Handschrift fur seine 
Zuhore)', Jena and Leipsio, 1794) ; the moral lectures on the Destination of the Scholar 
{Ueber die Bestimmung dea Oelehrten) were also published in 1794, and to the same 
year belongs the paper, written for SchiUer's " Soren^'' on " Spirit and Letter in Philo 
sophy." The dates and titles of his subsequent works are as follows : 1795 : 0-rundrisi 
des Eigentkumlichen in der Wissenchaftnlehre. 179G : Oruiidlage des Naturrechts nach 
Principien der Wissenschaftslehre. 1797 : Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, and 
Versuch einer neuen DarsteUung der W.-L., in the Philos. Journal. 1798: System der 
Sittenlehre nacJi Principien der W.-L. ; Ueber den Grund unseres Olaubens an eine 
gottliche Weltregierung, in the Philos. Journal. 1799 : AppeUation an das Publicum 
gegen die AnMage des Atheismus, eine Schrift, die man zu lesen bittet, ehe man sie con- 
Jiscirt, and Der Herausgeber des philos. Journals gerichtUche Verantwortungsschreiben 
gegen die Anklage des Atheismus. 1800 : Die Bestimmung des Menschen ; Der geschhs- 
sene Handelsstaat. 1801 : Friedxich Nicolai's Leben und sonderbare Meinungen, and 
Sonnenklarer Bericht an das Publicum iiber das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philoso- 
phie, ein Versuch, den Leser zum Verstehen zu zicingen. 1806: Grundziige des gegen- 
wdrtigen Zeitalters, and Anweisung zimi sdigen Leben. 1808 : Beden an die deutsche 

In the "Review of Aenesidemus'" (the work of Gottlob Ernst Schulze " on the fun- 
damental positions of Reinhold's Elementary PhUoaophy, together with a defence of 
Skepticism against the pretensions of the Critique of the Reason"), which was written 
in 1792 and published in the Jenaer AUg. Litteratwseitung, Fichte admits, with 
Reinhold and Schulze, that the whole body of philosophical doctrine must be derived 
from one principle, but questions whether, for this purpose, Reinhold's "Principle of 
Consciousness " (which runs thus : " In consciousness the representation is distinguished 
by the Subject from the Subject and the Object, and referred to both") is suiEcient. 
For this principle of Reinhold's, he argues, can only serve for the basis of theoretical 
philosophy ; but for the whole system of philosophy there must be a higher conception 
than that of mental representation, and a higher principle than this of Reinhold's. 
Fichte finds the essential contents of the critical doctrine in the proof therein furnished, 
that the notion of a thing possessing existence and various definite qualities, indepen- 
dently of the existence in some being of a representative faculty, is a pure fancy, a 
dream, an irrational notion. Skepticism leaves open the possibility that the limits of 
the human mind may yet be transcended ; but Criticism demonstrates the absolute 
impossibility of such a progress, and is therefore negatively dogmatic. That Kant did 
not effectuate (what Reinhold first attempted, namely) the derivation of philosophy 
from a single principle, Fichte explains as resulting from his " plan, which was simply 
to prepare the way for the science of philosophy ; " Kant nevertheless, adds Fichte, 
discovered the basis for such derivation in Apperception. But in regard to the dis- 
tinction between things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves, 
Fichte expresses the opinion that it was " certainly intended to be accepted only provi- 
sionally and conditionally ; " that in this latter particular he was deceived, soon became 
clear to him from Kant's (above-mentioned) Declaration of Aug. 7th, 1799, on learning 
of which he pronounced Kant (in a letter to Reinhold) a "three-quarters man," but 
held fast to the conviction that there exist no things-in-themselves independently of 
the thinking Subject, no non-Ego which is not contradistinguished from a correlative 
Ego, and also that this doctrine alone corresponds with the spirit of the critical phi- 
losophy, and that the "holy spirit in Kant" had thought more in accordance with 


truth than Kant in his individual personality had done. For the rest, Fichte had enun- 
ciated already in the above-named review the doctrine that things are really and in 
themselves such as they must be conceived to be by every intelligent Ego, and that 
therefore logical truth is, for every intelligence which a finite intelligence can conceive, 
at the same time real truth. (This doctrine, without the qualification: ''for every 
intelligence which a finite intelligence can conceive," became subsequently the founda- 
tion of Schelling's and Hegel's docti-ines. ) 

In the "Groundwork of the Science of Knowledge" {Orundlage der Wlssenschafts- 
lehre) Fichte seeks to solve the problem of the derivation of all philosophical knowledge 
from a single principle. This principle, Fichte, setting out from Kant's doctrine of the 
transcendental unity of apperception, finds in the consciousness of the Ego. The con- 
tents of this consciousness he expresses in three principles, whose mutual logical rela- 
tion of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis is repeated in all the divisions of Fichte'a 

1. The Ego originally posits absolutely its own being. This ' ' act " is the real ground 
of the logical principle A = A, from which this act can be discovered, though not 
proved. If in the proposition : I am, abstraction be made of the definite substance, the 
I, and the mere form of the inference from position to existence be left, as for the pur- 
poses of logic must be done, we obtain as the principle of logic the proposition A = A. 
If in the proposition A = A we pay regard to the knowing subject, we have discovered 
the Ego as the pi-ius of all acts of judgment. 

2. The Ego posits in distinction from itself a non-Ego. (Non-A is not = A.) 

3. The Ego opposes to the divisible Ego a divisible non-Ego an act which is two 
fold : 

a. Theoretically : the Ego posits itself as limited or determined by the non-Ego ; 

b. Practically : the Ego posits the non-Ego as determined by the Ego. 
The corresponding logical principle is the principle of ground or reason. 

The Ego, with which the '' Science of Knowledge" begins, or the Ego of intellectual 
intuition, is the mere identity of conscious subject and of object of consciousness, the 
pure Ego-form, as yet without individuality. But the Ego as Idea is the rational 
being, when it has perfectly set forth the universal reason within and without itself. 
Reason in its practical part ends with this Ego, which it sets before us as the end 
after which our reason should strive, but which it can only approach by a progress 
prolonged in infinitum. This Ego, this ultimate rational being, is no longer indi- 
vidual, individuahty being swept away by the universal laws in accordance with which 
this Ego is developed. (Second Introduction to the WissenschafUlehre, 1797, Werke I., 
p. 515 seq. ; cf. the "Sun-Clear Statement," Sonnenkl. Bericht, 1801, TF<?r&e II., p. 

From these three principles Fichte deduces the whole of theoretical philosophy in 
respect of content and form, and also the norms of ethical praxis. In so doing Fichte 
believed that he was adding to Kant's Critiqiie the completed system of the pure 

If from the proposition: I am, we abstract all judgment, in the sense of a 
specific act of judging, and regard in it only the mode of action of the human mind 
in general, we have the category of Reality. If in like manner, in the case of the sec- 
ond principle given above, we make abstraction of the action of judging, we have 
the categoiy of Negation, and in the case of the third principle, the category of Lim- 
itation. Similarly, the other categories, as also the forms and material of perceptioii/ 
are obtained by abstraction from the activity of the Ego. 


Not in the Oroundwork of tfie Science of Knowledge, but in his Natural Eight doea 
Fichte first arrive at the deduction of the plurality of individuals. The Ego cannot con- 
ceive itself as free Subject without first having found itself determined to self-deter- 
mination by something external to itself. But it can only be soUcited to self-determina- 
tion by a rational being. It must therefore conceive not only the sensible world, but 
also other rational beings, as external to itself, and hence posit itself as one Ego among 

The ' Systematic Ethics upon the Principles of the Science of Knowledge" {System 
der Sitte/Uehre nach den Pnncipien der Wisnenschaft^lehre, 1798) finds the principle of 
morality in the idea necessarily involved in the notion of intelligence, that the freedom 
of an intelligent being, as such, must be absolutely and without exception the freedom 
of independence. The manifestation and representation of the pure Ego in the indi- 
vidual Ego is the law of morals. Through moraUty the empirical Ego returns by the 
way of an approximation in infinitum into the pure Ego. 

In the Critique of AU Revelation Fichte assumes that, on the supposition of an 
actual total degeneracy on the part of man, religion is able to awaken, by means of 
miracles and revelations addressed to the senses, his moral susceptibihties (whereas 
Kant, in his Religion within the Limits of the Mere Reason, terms aU extra-moral ele- 
ments of religion "statutory," denying that they are aids emanating immediately from 
God, and allowing them to be only human devices accessory to purely moral reUgion). 
From the stand-point of the Science of Knowledge Fichte reduces all religion to faith in 
a moral order of the world. So, in particular, in the opuscule of the year 1798 on the 
Ch'ound of our Faith in a Divine Government of the World, and in the Defence against 
the Charge of Atheism, supplementary to the former. The beUef in a God is the confi- 
dence, which he finds also practically confirmed, in the absolute power of the good. 
" The living and operative moral order," says Fichte in the above-cited opuscule, " is 
itself God ; we need no other God and can comprehend no other. There is no 
ground in reason for going outside of that moral order and assuming, as the result of an 
inference from the caused to its cause, the existence of a particular being as the cause 
of that order." " It is not at all doubtful, it is rather the most certain of all things, 
nay, more, it is the ground of aU certainty, and the only absolute, objective truth, that 
there is a moral order of the world ; that every individual has his definite place in this 
order, and that his labor is reckoned upon ; that all that befalls him, except in so far as 
it may be caused by his own conduct, is a result of this plan ; that no hair falls from 
his head and (within the sphere of its operation) no sparrow falls to the ground with- 
out it ; that every truly good action succeeds and every bad one results abortively, 
5 and that for those who only heartily love the good, all things must work together for 
their highest interest. On the other hand, to him who wiU reflect for an instant, and 
frankly confess to himself the result of his reflection, it cannot be less certain that the 
conception of God as a particular substance is impossible and contradictory, and it is 
lawful to say this plainly, and to put down the prating of the schools, in order that the 
true religion, which consists in joyously doing right, may come to honor." (Forberg, 
in the essay to which Fichte's was prefixed, declared that it was uncertain whether 
there was a God ; that polytheism, provided only the gods of mythology acted mo- 
rally, was quite as compatible with reUgion as monotheism, and, in an artistic point of 
view, was far preferable, and that rehgion should be confined to two articles of faith : 
the belief in the immortaUty of virtue, i. e. , that there always has been and will be vir< 
tue on earth, and the belief in a kingdom of God on earth, i. e., the maxim or rule, to 
work at least so long for the advancement of goodness as the impossibility of success ia 


not clearly demonstrated ; finally, Forberg had left it to the judgment of each indi- 
vidual, whether it was wiser to unite to an old tenn, " religion," a new kindred con- 
ception, and thereby to place the latter in danger of being again swamped in the former, 
or rather to lay the old term wholly aside, in which case it would be more diflBcult or 
even impossible to secure the confidence of many persons. Later, also, in a letter 
to Paulus (written at Coburg in 1821, and given in Paidus u. s. Zeit, by Reichlin- 
Meldegg, Stuttgard, 1853, Vol. II., p. 268 seq. ; cf. Hase, Fichte-Bdchlein, p. 24 seq.), 
Forberg affirmed : " In no position of my life have I had need of faith, and I expect to 
continue in my decided unbelief until the end, which will be for me a total end," etc. ; 
while Fichte, although at different times he expressed himself in different ways, enter- 
tained always more affirmative opinions respecting immortality. According to Fichte, no 
Ego that has become real can ever perish ; into those elements, or indiAddual parts, into 
which Being originally severed, it remains severed eternally ; but only that Ego be- 
comes real, in the full sense of the term, in which the life of the Idea is con- 
sciously manifested, and which therefore has developed out of itself something uni- 
versal and eternal. Cf. Lowe, Die Ph. F.'s, Stuttg., 1862, pp. 224-230.) 

The "Destination of Man" {Die Bestimmung des Meiisclien., Berlin, 1800) is a fervid 
exoteric presentation of Fichte's Idealism in its opposition to Spinozism. 

Soon aftfer the controversy respecting Fichte's atheism, Fichte came to make th& 
Absolute his point of depai-ture in philosophizing, as is seen especially in the Exposition 
of the Science of Knowledge (written in the year 1801, and first printed in his Works, 
Vol. II., 1845), into which some of Schleiermacher's ideas, in his Meden uber die Reli- 
gion, found entrance, and as is also seen in his " Way to the Blessed Life " {Anweisung 
zum seligen Leben). He defines God as the alone truly Existent, who through his abso- 
lute thought places external nature, as an unreal non-Ego, over against himself. To 
the two practical stand-points of life, which it had previously been customary (in agree- 
ment with Kant's Ethics) to distinguish, viz. : the stand-point of pleasure and that of 
the consciousness of duty in the form of the categorical imperative, Fichte now adds 
three more, which he regards as higher, namely, positive or creative morality, religious 
communion with God, and the philosophical knowledge of God. 

In the ' ' Characteristics of the Present Age " ( Grundziige des gegenwdrtigeii Zeit- 
alters, lectures delivered at Berlin in 1804^1805, printed at Berlin in 1806) Fichte dis- 
tinguishies in the philosophy of history five periods : 1. That in which human relations 
are regulated without compulsion or painful effort by the mere instinct of the reason ; 
2. That in which this instinct, having become weaker and expressing itself only in a 
few elect persons, is transformed by these few into a compulsory, external authority 
for all ; 3. That in which this authority, and with it the reason, in the only form in 
which it as yet exists, is thrown off ; 4. That in which reason enters into the race in the 
shape of science ; 5. That in which art is associated with this science, in order with 
surer and fimaer hand to mould life according to science, and in which this art freely 
completes the rational disposition of human relations, the end of all earthly living is 
reached, and our race treads the higher spheres of another world. Fichte finds his age 
in the third epoch. In the Lectures on the Science of Politics, delivered in the summer- 
semester of 1813 ( Werke, Vol. IV., p. 508), Fichte defines history as the advance from 
original inequality, resting on mere faith, toward that equality which results from the 
complete arrangement of human relations by the understanding. 

The energy of Fichte's moral character was most manifested in his Addresses to the 
Oerman Nation, the object of which was to excite a spiritual regeneration of the nation. 
" Grant that freedom has disappeared for a time from the visible world ; let us give it 


a refuge in the innermost recesses of our thoughts, until there rises and grows up 
around us the new world, having power to bring these thoughts to outward manifesta- 
tion." This end is to be reached by an altogether new mode of education, which 
shall lead to personal activity and morality, and of which Fichte finds a beginning 
in the Pestalozzian system. It is not by his particular proposals, which were to a 
great extent exaggerated in idea and fanciful, but by the ethical principle underlyirg 
his discourses, that Fichte contributed essentially to the moral elevation of the German 
nation, and especially inspired the young to engage with cheerful self-sacrifice in 
the struggle for national independence. The contrast is sharp between Fichte' s 
earlier cosmopolitanism, which led him in 1804 to see in the State which happens to 
stand at the head of civilization the true fatherland of the educated, and that warm 
love for the German nation manifest in his Addresses a love that was intensified into 
an extravagant cultus of everything German, in which the distinction between Germai* 
and foreign was almost identified with that between good and bad. 

Fichte's later doctrine is a further development of his earlier teaching in the same 
direction in which Schelling still farther advanced. The difference between Fichte'w 
earlier and later philosophy is less in its substance than in its doctrinal form, Schel 
ling, who probably overestimated his own influence on Fichte's later thinking, may 
have exaggerated the difference, and perhaps interpreted too subjectively Fichte's ear- 
lier stand-point. But on the other hand it is not to be denied that Fichte, having set 
out from Kant's doctrine of transcendental apperception, which was the pure self-con- 
sciousness of every individual, found afterwards the principle of his philosophizing 
more and more in the conception of the Absolute as comprehending in itself all indi 
viduals, and that his later system is, consequently, by no means inconsiderably differ- 
ent in matter from his earlier. 

The doctrine laid down by Fichte in the Science of Knowledge was for a time es- 
poused by Reinhold, who afterwards adopted partly the doctrines of Bardili, and partly 
those of Jacobi ; also by Friedr. Carl Forberg (1770-1848) and Friedr. Imm. Niethammer 
(1766-1848) ; the same doctrine is maintained in the writings and lectures of Johannes 
Baptista Schad and G. E. A. Mehmel. 

Inspired by Fichte, Friedrich Schlegel (1773-1829), substituting for the pure Ego 
the man of genius, became the protagonist of a cultus of genius. Opposing, with 
Jacobi, the formalism of the categorical imperative (referring to which he said, that 
with Kant " jurisprudence had struck inwards"), Schlegel sees in art the true means of 
rising above the vulgar and commonplace, the laborious and faithful performance of 
duty being no more in comparison with art than is the dried plant in comparison with 
the fresh flower. Since genius rises above all the limits of the common consciousness, 
and even above all which it recognizes itself, its conduct is ironiccd. Akin to 
Schlegel in his type of thought was Novcdis (Friedrich von Hardenberg, 1772-1801 ). 
Schlegel carried his irony and his war against morality to the extreme by his criticism 
of modesty and " praise of impudence " in the novel Lticinde (Berlin, 1799), m which, 
owing to the absence of a positive ethical content, the legitimate warfare against the 
formalism of abstraction degenerated into frivolity. (Schleiermacher, in judging of the 
novel, transferred into it his own more ideal conception of the rights of individuality.) 
F. Schlegel found subsequently in Catholicism the satisfaction which his philosophy 
was unable permanently to afford him. Notwithstanding their historical relation to 
Fichte's doctrine, the Romanticism and Irony of Schlegel, in so far as they substitu- 
ted for law in thought and volition the arbitrary pleasure of the individual, were not th 
consequence, but (as Lasson, in his work on Fichte, p. 240, justly remarks) ' ' a direct 



opposition to the Fichtean spirit." (Cf. J. H. Schlegel, Die neuere Bomantik undihre 
Beziehung zur Fichte'schen Philosophie, Rastadt, 1862.) 

127. Friedricli Willielm Joseph Schelliiig (afterwards von Schel- 
ling, born 1775, died 1854) transformed Ficbte's doctrine of the Ego, 
which formed his own starting-point, by combination with Spinozism 
into the System of Identity ; but of the two sides of that system, the 
doctrine of nature and the doctrine of spirit, he gave his attention 
chiefly to the former. Object and subject, real and ideal, nature andi 
spirit are identical in the absolute. We perceive this identity by intel- 
lectual intuition. The original undifferentiated unity or indifference 
passes into the polar opposites of positive or ideal and negative or real 
being. The negative or real pole is nature. In nature resides a vital 
principle, which, by virtue of a general continuity of aJl natural causes, 
unites all inorganic and organic existences in one complete organ- 
ism. Schelling terms this principle the soul of the world. The forces 
of inorganic nature are repeated in higher potencies in the organic 
world. The positive or ideal pole is spirit. The stages in its develop- 
ment are theory, practice, and art, or the reduction of matter to form, 
the introduction of form into matter, and the abs<^lute interpenetration 
and union of form and matter. Art is conscious imitation of the un- 
conscious ideality of nature, imitation of nature in the culminating 
points of its development ; the highest stage of art is the negation of 
form through the perfect fulness of form. 

By incorporating successively into liis system various philosopheme-. 
from Plato and Neo-Platonists, from Giordano Bruno, Jacob Boehnie, 
and others, Schelling subsequently developed a syncretistic doctrine 
which constantly approximated to mysticism, and was of far less 
influence on the course of the development of philosophy than the ori- 
ginal system of identity. After Hegel's death Schelling declared that 
the system of identity, " which Hegel had only reduced to logi^kjal 
form," though not, indeed, false, Tvas incomplete, and described it as 
negative philosophy, needing to be completed b}' the addition of a 
positive philosophy, namely, by the " Philosopliy of Mythology" anO 
the "Philosophy of Revelation." This positive philosophy, or the- 
osophy, as advocated by Schelling, was a speculation in regard to the 
potencies and persons of the Godhead, looking to the abolition (jf the 
opposition between Petri ne and Pauline Christianity, or between 
Catholicism and Protestantism, in a Johannean church of the future 
The result remained far short of Schelling's great promises. 


Schelling'B Works have been published in a complete edition, which contains, in addition to the work! 
previously published, much that tiU then had remained unpublished, and was edited by his son K. F. A. 
Schelling, 1st Div., 10 vols., 2d Div., 4 vols., Stnttpard and Augsburg, 1856 seq. To these may be added: 
Aun tickelliny's Leben, in Brk'ftn, i vols, (^cuvcring the years 1715-1820), Leips., 1869-70. A Bpecial work on 
SchellingisC. Kosenkranz's HikelUiiy, Vurlenunyen. gehnUun iiii Soiume?' liH'2 an der Universitat zti Kijniys- 
berg, Dantsic, 1843 ; cf . the accounts of his System in the historical works of Michelet, Erdmann, and others ; 
also, among earUer works, the work, especially, of Jak. Fries on Reinhold, Fichte, and Schellmg (Leips., 
1803), and among more recent works, several controversial writings which were published on the occasion of 
the opening of Schelling's lectures in Berlin, namely : SchelUny uiid die Offenbarung, Kritik des neuesten 
Reactionsversuchs gegen diefreie Philosopliie, Leijjs., 1842 ; (Glaser), Differenz der Sclielling'scheti und He- 
get. ichen PInlosophie, Leips., 1842: Marheineke, Kritik der Schelliiig'schen Offenbarungspfiilosophie, Berlin, 
1843 ; Salat, Schelling in MVmchen, Heidelb., 1845 ; L. Noack, Sc/ielling und die PMlonop/iie der Homantik, 
Berlin, 1859 ; Mignet, Notice historique sur la vie et les travaux de M. de Schelling. Paris, 1858 ; E. A. Weber, 
Exameti critique de laphilos. religieu^e de Sch., thfue, Strasb., 1860; and papers by Hubert Beckers, in the 
Transactions of the Bavarian Acad, of Sciences (On the Significance of ScheUing's Metaphysics, Transactions, 
Vol. IX., Munich, 1863, pp. o91}-540; On the true and permanent Significance of Schelling's Philos. of Nature 
ibid.. Vol. X., 2, 1865, pp. 401-449; Schelling's doctrine of Immortality, etc., ibid.. Vol. XI., 1, 1866, pp. 1- 
112), by Bhrenfeuchter, by Domer, by Hamberger, in the Jahrb. fur deuViche Theol., and in his Christen- 
thuin und modeme Cultur (1863), and by Hoffmann, in the Athenmum ; Brandis (Memorial Address), in the 
Trans, of the Berlin Acad. (1855) ; Bijckh, on Schelling's relation to Leibnitz, in the Moualnber. der Berl. 
Akad. der TITss. (1855; Kl. Schriften, Vol. II.), and others. Cf. also B. v. Hartmann, Schelling's puttitivt 
PhilOHophie als Einheit von Hegel und Schopenhauer, Berlin, 1869. 

The son of a country clergyman in Wiirtemberg, and bom at Leonberg on the 27th 
of January, 1775, Schelling, whose brilliant parts were early developed, entered in his 
sixteenth year, at Michaelmas, 1790, the theological seminary at Tiibingen. His studies 
included, however, not only theology, but also philology and philosophy, to which were 
added, at Leipsic in 1790 and 1797, natural science and mathematics. In 1798 he began 
to lecture at Jena as a colleague of Fichte, and remained there after the departure ot 
the latter. In 1803 he was appointed to a professorship of philosophy at Wiirzburg, 
which he filled till 1806, in which year he was made a member of the Academy of 
Sciences at Munich (and later its permanent secretary ). He lectured at Erlangen in 
the years 1820-1826, and in 1827, when the University at Landshut was abolished and 
that of Munich founded, he became a Professor in the latter. Thence summoned in 
1841 to Berlin, as member of the Academy of Sciences, he lectured several years at the 
University in that city, on mythology and revelation, but soon gave up his academic 
labors. He died August 20th, 1854, at the baths of Ragaz, in Switzerland. 

In his Master's Dissertation {'^ Autiquisdmi de jnima malorum origine philosophema- 
tis expUcandi tentamen cnticum''''), written in 1792, he gave to the biblical narrative of 
the fall of man an allegorical interpretation, on the basis of the ideas of Herder. 
The essay on "Myths, Historical Legends, and Philosophemes of the earliest Times," 
which appeared in 1793 in Paulus's MemorablUen (No. V., pp. 1-05), was written in the 
same spirit. To the department of New Testament criticism and the earliest history of 
the church belongs the opuscule, entitled De Mwrcwne Paulinarum epistolarum emeu- 
datore., 1795. But ScheUing's interest was directed constantly more and more to phi- 
losophy. He read Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason., Reinhold's Elementary PkilosopJiy, 
Maimon's New Theory of Thought., G. E. Schulze's Aenesidemus, and Fichte's review 
of this work, as also Fichte's opuscule on the Idea of the Science of Knowledge, and 
vvTote in 1794 the work " On the Possibility of any Form of Philosophy" (published at 
Tiibingen, 1795), in which he seeks to show that neither a material principle, like 
Reinhold's theorem of consciousness, nor a merely foi-mal one, such as the principle of 
identity, can answer for the principle of philosophy ; this principle must be contained 
in the Ego, in which positing and posited coincide. In the proposition Ego = Ego, 
form and content mutually conditionate each other. 


In the next-following work, on the " Ego as Principle of Philosophy," etc. ( Vbm 
Teh als Princip dcr Philosophic oder iiber dns Uiibediiigte ini menscMichen Wissen, Tiib., 
1795, reproduced in the Philos. SchHften, Landshut, 1809), Schelling designates the ab- 
Rolute Ego as the true principle of philosophy. The knowing subject is the Ego, con- 
ditioned by an object; the distinction between subject and object presupposes an 
absolute Ego, which does not depend upon an object, but rather excludes any object. 
The Ego is the unconditioned in human knowledge ; the whole content of knowledge 
must be determinable through the Ego itself and by contra-position to the Ego. The 
Kantian question : How are synthetic judgments a priori possible ? is, considered in its 
highest abstraction, no other than this : How comes the absolute Ego to go out of itself, 
and to posit absolutely over against itself a non-Ego ? In the finite Ego there is unity 
of consciousness, i. c, personality. But the infinite Ego knows no object whatever, 
and therefore knows no consciousness and no unity of consciousness, no personality. 
The causality of the infinite Ego cannot be conceived as morality, wisdom, etc. , but 
only as absolute power. 

In the "Philos. Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism" (in Niethammer's Philos. 
Jourval^ 179G, and in the Philos. Schriften, Landshut, 1809), ScheUing appears as an 
opponent of the Kantians, whom he found " about to buUd up, out of the trophies of 
Criticism, a new system of Dogmatism, in place of which every candid thinker would 
sooner wish the old structure back again." Schelling seeks (particularly in cormection 
with his consideration of the moral argument for the existence of God) to make out 
that Criticism, as understood by the majority of Kantians, is only a doctrine interme- 
diate between dogmatism and criticism, and full of contradictions ; and that, rightly 
understood, the Critique of the Pure Reason is designed precisely to deduce from the 
nature of the reason the possibihty of two mutually repugnant systems, both of which 
remove the antagonism between subject and object by the reduction of one to the 
other, viz. : the systems of Idealism and Realism. "There dwells in us all," says 
Schelling, "a secret, wonderful faculty, by virtue of which we can withdraw from the 
mutations of time into our innermost disrobed selves, and there behold the eternal 
under the form of immutability ; such vision is our innermost and pecuUar experience, 
on which alone depends all that we know and believe of a supra-sensible world." 
Schelling terms this "intellectual intuition." (That which he describes, however, is 
rather an abstraction than an intuition.) Spinoza, argues Schelling, dogmatically or 
realistically objectifies this intuition, and hence believes (like the mystic) that in it he 
loses himself in the absolute. But the idealist recognizes it as the intuition of himself ; 
in so far as we strive to realize the absolute in us, it is not we that are lost in the in- 
tuition of the objective world, but the world that is lost in this our intuition, in which 
time and duration disappear for us, and pure, absolute eternity is in us. 

Although Kant denies the possibility of an intellectual intuition, yet Schelling ar- 
gues (m his " AbJiandlnngen znr Erldrtteriing des Idenlismus der Wissenschaftslehre,'" 
written in 1796 and '97, first pubUshed in Fichte and Niethammer's PhiJ/JS. Journal, 
and reprinted in the Philos. Schriften) that his own doctrine agrees in spirit with that 
of Kant, since Kant himself affirms the " I," in the sentence " I think," to be a purely 
intellectual apprehension, which necessarily precedes all empirical thought. The 
question raised by Reinhold, whether Fichte iu his assertion, that the principle of men- 
tal apprehension is purely an internal one, differs from Kant, is thus answered by 
Schelling : " Both philosophers are one in the assertion, that the ground of our judg- 
ments is to be found not in the sensible but in the supersensible. This supersen- 
sible ground Kant is obliged, in his theoretical philosophy, to symbolize, and he speaks 



therefore of things-in-themsdves as of things which give the material for our representa- 
tions. With this symbolism Fichte can dispense, because he does not, like Kant, treat 
of theoretical philosophy apart from practical philosophy. For it is just in this that 
Fichte's peculiar merit consists, namely, that he extends the principle which Kant 
places at the head of practical philosophy, the principle of the autotiomy of tlie will, so 
as to make it the principle of all philosophy, and thus becomes the founder of a phi- 
losophy which can justly be called higher philosophy, since in its spirit it is neither 
theoretical nor practical alone, but both at once. " Of the literal (but historically cor- 
rect) interpretation of Kant's things -in-themselves Schelling speaks with the same 
contempt as of the (Aristotelian, and in essentials likewise historically correct) inter- 
pretation of the Platonic ideas as substances. In particular, he lays stress on the con- 
tradictions in which that interpretatior becomes involved. Most of these contradictions 
undeniably existed, and had also been pointed out by others ; but others of them were 
only supposed, and resulted from ScheUing's own misapprehension. ' ' The infinite 
world is nothing else than the creative mind of man itself in infinite productions and 
reproductions. I am not, then, Kant's scholar ! For them the world and all reality are 
something originally foreign to the human mind, having no other relation to it than the 
accidental one, that it works upon the mind. Nevertheless they govern such a world, 
which for them is accidental and which might just as weU be quite differently consti- 
tuted, by laws which, they know not how or whence, are engraved in their understand- 
ings. These conceptions and laws of the understanding they, as supreme law-givers 
for nature, having full consciousness that the world consists of things-in-themselves, do 
nevertheless transfer to these things-in-themselves, applying them where they choose 
with perfect freedom and according to their own good pleasure ; and this world, this 
eternal and necessary nature, obeys their speculative sense of propriety ? And it is 
pretended that Kant taught this ? There has never existed a system more ridiculous 
and fanciful than such a one would be." * 

In the year 1797 appeared at Leipsic the first (and only) part of the ' ' Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature" (2d ed., Landshut, 1803), and in the year 1798, at Hamburg, the 
work : " Of the World-Soul," etc. ( Von der Wdtseele, eine Hypothese der Twheren Physik 
zur Erklarung des allgeineinen Organismns ; to the second edition, Hamburg, 1806, as 
also to the third, Hamburg, 1809, was annexed an essay on the " Relation between 
the Real and the Ideal in Nature, or Development of the First Principles of Natural 

This critique is only semi-pertinent, since it is not to the things-in-themselves, but to the representa- 
tions which they call up in us, that the d priori forms and laws are represented by Kant as applying ; but 
since these representations, in so far as they depend on things-in-themselves, must also be in part determined 
by them, there remains, in reality, in the doctrines of Kant and his strict disciples, the absurdity that these 
same representations must at the same time obey without resistance, as though they were not at all deter- 
mined by the things-in-themselves, the laws which the Ego, " with perfect freedom and according to its good 
pleasure," generates out of itself. If, for the rest, Schelling himaeU holds in this connection that there exist 
no originals of our representations external to the latter, and that no difference exists between represented and 
real objects, this only proves that he like Hegel and others after him had not solved Kant's problem of the 
theory of cognition, nor even understood it; an essentially different problem, that of the real relation 
between nature and mind, took in his philosophizing, unconsciously to him, the place of this problem of cog. 
nition, and was discussed by him with originality and profundity in his next-foUowing writings, while Kant's 
problem remained unsolved, although Schelling and his followers erroneously believed that both had been 
solved at the same time. That mind, teleologically speaking, is the condition of the existence of nature, as, 
on the other hand, nature is the condition of the genesis of mind, is certainly an idea of profound and per- 
njanent truth. But it is not true that the object of knowledge, in the case of every particular act of know- 
ing, depends on that act ; on the contrary, it subsists out of human oonflciousness, but to this form of real 
absistence Schelling did not direct his attention. 


Philosophy, founded upon the Principles of Gravity and Light"). In the following 
year was published the " First Sketch of a System of Natural Philosophy" (Erster 
Entwurf eines Sp.'<tems der NatHrphilosopJiie, Jena and Leipsic, 1799), together with the 
smaller work: " Introduction to this Sketch," etc. [translated by Tom Davidson, in the 
Jcnirnalof Speculative Philosapliy, edited by W. T. Harris, Vol. I., St. Louis, 1867, pp. 
193-320. Tr.]. Then followed the " System of Transcendental Idealism" (Tiibingen, 
1800). In these works Schelling considers the subjective or ideal and the objective or 
real as two pole.i which mutually presuppose and demand each other. All knowledge, he 
argues, depends on the agreement of an objective with a subjective element or factor. 
There are accordingly (as Schelling, especially in the Introduction to his Sketch of a Sys- 
tem of Nat. Phihs. and in the System of Transcendental Idealism, goes on to show) two 
fundamental sciences. Either the objective is made the first element in order, and it is 
asked how there is added to it a subjective element which agrees with it, or the subjective 
is made first and the problem is : how an objective element is added, agreeing with it ? 
The first problem is that of speculative physics, the other of transcendental philosophy. 
Transcendental philosophy, reducing the real or unconscious activity of reason to the 
ideal or conscious, considers nature as the visible organism of our understanding ; 
physical philosophy, on the contrary, shows how also the ideal, in turn, springs from the 
real, and must be explained by it. In order to explain the progress of nature from the 
lowest to the highest formations, Schelling assumes the existence of a Soul of the 
World as an organizing principle, by which the world is reduced to system. * Schelling 
recapitulates, in his System of Transcendental Idealism, the fundamental conceptions of 
his natural philosophy (which, though mixed with erroneous and fantastical notions, 
are yet of permanent worth), as follows : " The necessary tendency of all science of 
nature is to pass from nature to intelligence. This and nothing else underlies aU 
endeavor to connect natural phenomena with theory. The perfect theory of nature 
would be that by which all nature should be resolved into intelligence. The dead and 
unconscious products of nature are but abortive attempts of nature to reflect herself ; 
but so-called dead nature, in general, is an immature iotelligence, whence the character 
of intelligence shines, though unconsciously, through all her phenomena. Her highest 
end, which is to become wholly objective to herself, is only reached by nature in her 
highest and last reflection, which is nothing else than man, or, more generally, that 
which we call reason, through which nature first returns completely into herself, 
whereby it is made evident that nature is originally identical with that which is kno-wn 
in us as intelligence or the Conscious." The office of transcendental philosophy, on the 
other hand, is to show the objective as arising from the subjective. " If the end of all 
philosophy must be either to make of nature an intelligence, or of intelligence nature, 
transcendental philosophy, which has the latter office, is the other necessary funda- 
mental science of philosophy." Schelling divides transcendental philosophy, in con- 
formity with the three Critiques of Kant, into three parts : (1) theoretical philosophy, 
(2) practical philosophy, and (o ) that branch of philosophy which relates to the unity of 
the theoretical and the practical, and which explains how ideas may be at once con- 

* Of Schelling's predecessors in the assumption of a soul of the world, Plato among the ancient philoso- 
phers, and Sal. Maimon among the thinkers incited by Kant, are the most note-worthy. Maimon treats of 
this subject ( Ueber die Weliseele, entelechia universi) in the Berlin Journal fiir Au/klclning, ed. by \. Riehm, 
Vol. VIII., Art. 1, July, 1790, pp. 47-92. He remarks correctly, that according to Kant we can no more aflRrni 
the existence of a plurality of souls or, in general, of forces than that of one soul, since plurality, unity, 
existence, etc., are forms of thought, which without a sensible " Schema " cannot be employed ; but he regards 
as an allowable hypothesis, and one useful lo natural science, the theory of a soul of the world as the ground 
er cause of inorganic and organic creations, of animal life, and of understanding and reason in man. 


ceived as governed by their objects, and the latter as being governed by their corre- 
spondent ideas, by showing the identity of unconscious and conscious activity ; in othei 
words, the doctrine of natural adaptation and of art. In the theoretical part of his 
transcendental philosophy Schelling considers the various stadia of knowledge in their 
relations to the stadia of nature. Matter is extinct mind ; the acts and epochs of self- 
consciousness are rediscoverable in the forces of matter and in the successive processes 
of their development. All the forces of the universe are reducible, in the last resort, 
to powers of ideal (mental) representation ; the idealism of Leibnitz, who regarded 
matter as the sleeping condition of monads, is, properly understood, in reality not dif- 
ferent from transcendental idealism. Organization is necessary, because intelligence 
must view itself in its productive transition from cause to efifect, or in the succession of 
its ideas, in so far as this succession returns into itself. Now it cannot do this without 
making that succession permanent, or representing it as at rest; but succession return- 
ing into itself, and represented as at rest, is organization. There must, however, be 
various degrees or stages of organization, because the succession which becomes the 
object of intelligence, is, within its limits, itself without end, so that intelligence is an 
unending effort at self -organization. Among the successive degrees of organization 
there must necessarily be one which intelligence is forced to look upon as identical 
with itself. Only a never-ceasing reciprocal action between the individual and other 
intelligences completes the whole circle of his consciousness with all its attributes. It 
is only through the fact that there are other intelligences beside myself that the world 
is made objective to me ; the idea of objects external to me cannot otherwise arise than 
through intelligences external to me ; and only through commerce with other individuals 
can I come to the consciousness of my freedom. The mutual commerce of rational 
beings through the medium of the objective world is the condition of freedom. But 
whether all rational beings shall or shall not, conformably to the requirement of rea- 
son, restrict their action within those limits which leave room for free action on the 
part of all others, cannot be left to accident ; a second and higher Nature must be 
erected, as it were, above the first, namely, the law of justice, which shall rule with all 
the inviolability of a natural law in the interests of freedom. All attempts to convert 
the legal order into a mo"al order are abortive and end in despotism. Originally the 
impulse to reaction against violence led men to a legal order, disposed in view of their 
immediate needs. The guarantee of a good constitution in each particular State must 
be sought, in the last resort, in the subordination of all States to a common law of jus- 
tice, administered by an Areopagus of nations. The gradual realization of law is the 
substance of History. History, as a whole, is a progressive and gradual revelation 
of the Absolute. No single passage in history can be pointed out where the trace of 
providence or of God himself is really visible ; it is only through history as a whole 
that the proof of God's existence can be completed. AH single intelligences may be 
regarded as integrant parts of God or of the moral order of the world ; the latter will 
exist as soon as the former establish it. To this end history approaches in virtue of a 
pre-established harmony between the objective, or that which conforms to law, and 
the determining or free. This harmony is only conceivable under the condition of the 
existence of a higher element, superior to both as being the ground of the identity 
between the absolutely subjective and the absolutely objective, the conscious and the 
unconscious, whose original separation was only to the end of the phenomenal manifes- 
tation of free action. If the phenomenal manifestation of freedom is necessarily un- 
ending, then history itself is a never fuUy completed revelation of that Absolute, which 
separates itself for the purposes of this manifestation into the conscious and the uncon- 



scions, but which is, in the inaccessible light in which it dwells, the eternal identity of 
both and the eternal ground of their harmony. Schelling distinguishes three periods 
in this revelation of the Absolute, or in history, which he characterizes as the periods, 
respectively, of fate, nature, and providence. In the first, which may be termed the 
tragical period, the ruling power, fully blind, coldly and unconsciously destroys what is 
greatest and grandest ; in this period falls the extinction of the noblest humanity which 
ever flourished, and whose return upon earth is the object of only an eternal desire. 
In the second period, what before appeared as fate now manifests itself as nature, and 
thus gradually introduces into history at least a mechanical conformity to law ; this 
period ScheUing represents as beginning with the expansion of the Roman Republic, 
whereby the nations were united together, and whatever elements of morality, law, 
art, and science had only been preserved in a state of isolation among the different 
nations, were brought into mutual contact. In the third period, that which in the 
foregoing periods appeared as fate or nature, will develop itself as providence, and it 
will become manifest that even what seemed to be the mere work of fate or nature, 
was the commencement of an imperfectly revealed providence. On the necessary har- 
mony of unconscious and conscious activity depend natural adaptation and art. Nature 
is adapted to ends, although not created in view of an end. The Ego is for itself, in 
one and the same perception, at once conscious and unconscious, namely, in artistic 
perception. The identity of the conscious and the unconscious in the Ego, and the con- 
sciousness of this identity two things which exist apart, the former in the phenomenon 
of freedom, the latter in the perception of nature's products are united in the percep- 
tion of products of art. All aesthetic production proceeds from an intrinsically infinite 
separation of the two activities (namely, conscious and unconscious activity), which are 
separated in aU free production. But since these two activities are required to be 
represented in the product as united, an infinite element must be finitely represented. 
The infinite, finitely represented, is Beauty. Where beauty is, there the infinite con- 
tradiction is removed in the object itself ; where sublimity exists, there the contradic- 
tory terms are not reconciled in the object itself, but the contradiction is intensified to 
such a degree that it involuntarily destroys itself, and disappears in our perception of 
the sublime object. Artistic production is only possible through genius, because its 
condition is an infinite opposition. That which art in its perfection brings forth is 
principle and norm for the judgment of natural beauty, which in the organic products 
of nature appears as absolutely accidental. Science, in its highest function, has one 
and the same problem to solve with art ; but the mode of solution is diflferent, since in 
science it is mechanical, the presence of genius here remaining always problematical, 
while no artistic problem can be solved except by genius. Art is the highest union of 
freedom and necessity. 

The "Journal of Speculative Physics" {ZeiUchrift filr speculative Physik, 2 voh., ed. 
by Schelling. Jena and Leipsic, 1800-1801) contains in particular, in the first volume, 
in addition to articles by Steffens, a " General Deduction of the Dynamic Process or of 
the Categories of Physics " by Schelling, at the close of which is found the noteworthy 
utterance : " We can go from nature to ourselves, or from ourselves to nature, but the 
true direction for him, to whom knowledge is of more account than all else, is that 
which nature herself adopts; " the same volume contains also a " Miscellaneous" part, 
including a short poem on natural philosophy, which deserves to be mentioned, as set- 
ting forth in a clear and forcible manner the fundamental conception of the gradual 
development of the giant-mind, that is as if petrified in nature, into consciousness in man. 
Man, we are told, can look at the world and say : "I am the God whom it cherishes 


in its bosom, the mind that moves in all things. From the first struggling of unseen 
forces to the outpouring of the first living juices of vegetation, when force grows into force 
and matter into matter, and the first buds and blossoms swell and to the first ray of 
new-bom light, which breaks through night like a second creation, and from the thou- 
sand eyes of the world by day, as by uight, illuminates the heavens, there is One force, 
One changing play, and One interweaving of forces, One bent. One impulse towards ever 
higher life." In the " Exposition of my System," in the second volume of this Jaurnaly 
Schelling founds his co-ordination of natural and transcendental philosophy on the the- 
orem that nothing is out of the absolute Reason, but that all things are in it, and adds, 
that the absolute reason must be conceived as the total indifference of the subjective 
and the objective. Reason is the time jier se ; to know things as they are in them- 
selves is to know them as they are in the reason. By a figurative employment of 
mathematical formulae Schelling shows how the stadia of nature are potencies of the 
Subject-Object. He gives no exposition of the stadia of mind. The difference which 
Schelling apprehends (hypothetically, and with the hope of subsequent agreement) as 
subsisting between his stand-point and Fichte's, is indicated by him in the formulae : 
Ego = All, All = Ego; on the former is founded the subjective idealism of Fichte, on 
the latter his own objective idealism, which he also terms the system of absolute 

In the year 1802 appeared the Dialogue : " Bruno, or on the Natural and Divine 
Principle of Things" {Bruno oder uher das natiirliche mid gotUkhe Princip der Dinge, 
Berhn, 1802, 2d ed., ibid., 1842), in which Schelling teaches a doctrine founded partly 
on Giordano Bnmo's teachings and partly on the Timwus of Plato. Here the name of 
God is given not only to the indifference of subject and object, but also occasionally to 
the Ideal. The " Further Exposition of the System of Philosophy" {Fernere Darstel- 
lungen aus dem System der Phihsaphie, contained in the Neue Zeitschrift filr speculative 
Physik, Tiib., 1802; only one volume of the Journal was published) are, in spirit and 
teaching, partly Brunoistic and partly continuative of the " Exposition of the System " 
in the second volume of the Zeitschrift fur specul. Physik. In the same year (1802) 
Schelling associated himself with Hegel for the publication of the Kniisches Journal 
der PhUosophie (Tubingen, 1802-1803. The essay in this Journal " On the Relation of 
Natural Philosophy to Philosophy in General " was not written by Hegel, who furnished 
the greater number of articles for the journal, but by ScheUing, as may be inferred 
from the fact, pointed out by Erdmann, of the absence in it of the distinction of Logic, 
as the universal part of philosophy, from natural and transcendental philosophy, a dis- 
tinction which it is demonstrable that Hegel at that time already made ; yet the contrary 
has been asserted by Michelet in his Schelling und Hegel, Berlin, 1889, and by Rosenkranz 
in his Scheming, Dantsic, 1843, pp. 190-195 ; Haym in Hegel u. s. Zeit, pp. 156 and 495, 
pronounces in favor of Schelling's authorship ; yet cf . , per contra, Rosenkranz and Jlich- 
elet in Der Oedanke, Vol. I., Berlin, 1861, p. 72 seq. The authorship of the articles 
on " Riickert and Weiss" and on " Construction in Philosophy " is also doubtful ; yet it 
would seem that both must be ascrioed to Hegel.) The outlines of his whole sj'stem 
are given by Schelling in popular form in his ' ' Lectures on the Method of Academical 
Study," which were delivered in 1802 ( Vorlesungen iiber die Methode des akademischen 
Stvdiums, Stuttgard and Tiibingen, 1803, 3d ed., ibid., 1830). Schelling here defines 
philosophy as the science of absolute identity, the science of all knowledge, having, for 
its immediate and absolute subject and basis absolute knowledge \das Urwissen]. With 
regard to its form, philosophy is a direct, rational, or intellectual intuition, which is 
absolutely identical with its object, i. e., with absolute knowledge itself. The expo- 


sition of intellectual intuition is philosophical construction. In the absolute identity, 
or the universal unity of the universal and the particular, are involved particular 
unities, on which the transition to individuals depends, and to which Schelling, 
after Plato, gives the name of Ideas. These Ideas can only be given in rational 
intuition, and philosophy is therefore the science of Ideas or of the eternal arche- 
types of things. The constitution of the State, says Schelling, is an image of the 
constitution of the realm of Ideas. In the latter the Absolute, as the power from 
which all else flows, is the monarch, the Ideas are the freemen, and individual, actual 
things are the slaves and vassals. Thus Realism (in the scholastic sense of this term), 
which since the close of the Bliddle Ages had been abandoned by all philosophers of 
note, and which is only in a certain sense contained in the doctrine of Spinoza relative 
to the absolute substance, was, by combination and blending of this latter doctrine with 
PJato's doctrine of Ideas, renewed by Schelling. Philosophy, says Schelling, becomes 
ol-jective in three positive sciences, which represent the three intrinsic aspects of the 
subject of philosophy. The first of these sciences is Theology, which, as the science of 
the absolute and divine essence, presents objectively the point of absolute indifference 
between the ideal and the real. The ideal side of philosophy, separately objectified, is 
the science of history, or, in so far as the most eminent work of history is the develop- 
ment of law, the science of law, or Jurisprudence. The real side of philosophy, taken 
by itself, is outwiirdly represented by the science of natxire, and in so far as this science 
concentrates itself in that of organic life, by Medicine. Only by their historical element 
can the positive or real sciences be separated from absolute science or philosophy. Since 
theology, as the true centre in which philosophy becomes objective, is pre-eminently 
contained in speculative ideas, it is the highest .synthesis of philosophical and historical 
knowledge. If the ideal is a higher potency of the real, it follows that the Faculty 
of Law should precede that of Medicine. The antithesis of the real and ideal is 
repeated in religious history as the antithesis of Hellenism and Christianity. As in 
the symbols of nature, so in Greek poetry the intellectual world lay closed up as in a 
bud, concealed in the Object, unuttered in the Subject. Christianity, on the contrary, 
is the revealed mystery ; in the ideal world, which is opened up in it, the divine lays 
off its mask ; this ideal world is the published mystery of the divine kingdom. The 
division of history into periods, given by Schelling in his System of Trnnscendental 
Idealism, is here modified by making the first period the time of the most beautiful 
bloom of Greek religion and poetry the period of unconscious identity with nature ; then 
introducing, with the breaking away of man from nature, the reign of fate, as the second 
period, which is followed, finally, by the period of restored unity or conscious reconcilia- 
tion ; this last period, the period of providence, is historically introduced by Christianity. 
The ideas of Christianity, which were symbolized in its dogmas, have a speculative signifi- 
cance. In the doctrine of the Trinity, which he terms the fundamental dogma of Chris- 
tianity, Schelling finds the following meaning, viz. : that the eternal Son of God, bom of 
the essence of the Father of all things, is the finite itself, as it exists in the eternal intui- 
tion of God ; and that this Finite appears phenomenally as a suffering God. a God sub- 
ject to the fatalities of time, and who, in the culmination of his manifestation in 
Christ, brings to an end the world of finiteness and opens that of infinity or of the su- 
premacy of spirit. The incarnation of God is an incarnation from eternity. Christian- 
ity, as an historical phenomenon, issued, as to its particular origin, from a single religious 
association existing among the Jews (the Essenes). Its more universal root is to be 
sought in the nature of the Oriental mind, which in the Hindoo religion created the 
intellectual system and the earliest Idealism, and which, after flowing through the 


entire Orient, found in Christianity its permanent bed ; from it was distinguished in 
earlier times that other current, which in Hellenic religion and art gave birth to the 
highest beauty, while yet, even on the soil of Hellenism, mystical elements were found 
and a philosophy the Platonic, pre-eminently opposed to the popular religion and 
prophetic of Christianity. The spread of Christianity is explained by the unhappy 
character of the times, which rendered men susceptible to the influences of a religion 
that pointed them back to the ideal, teaching self-denial and making of it a pleasure. 
The first books of the history and doctrine of Christianity are but a particular and an 
imperfect expression of Christianity, and their worth must be measured by the degree 
of perfection in which they express the idea of Christianity. Since this idea is not de- 
pendent on this particular manifestation of it, but is absolute and universal, it cannot be 
made dependent on the exegesis of these documents, weighty as they are, for the earliest 
history of Christianity. The development of the idea of Christianity is in its whole his- 
tory, and in the new world created by it. Philosophy, in recovering the truly speculative 
stand-point, has also recovered the stand-point of religion, and prepared the way for the 
regeneration of esoteric Christianity, as also for the proclamation of the absolute Gospel. 
In his remarks on the study of History and Nature, Schelling's leading idea is, that the for- 
mer expresses in the ideal what the latter expresses in the real. From the philosophical 
construction of history he distinguishes, as other methods, the empirical reception and 
ascertainment of facts, the pragmatic treatment of history in view of a definite, sub- 
jectively proposed end, and that artistic synthesis of the given and real with the ideal, 
which presents history as a mirror of the world-spirit, as an eternal poem of the divine 
understanding. The subject for history in the narrower sense is the formation of an 
objective organism of freedom, or of the State. Every State is in that measure perfect 
in which each particular part in it, while a means for the whole, is at the same time 
an end in itself. Nature is the real side of the eternal act by which the subjective is 
made objective. The being of everything in the Identity of Subject and Object, or 
in the universal soul, and the striving of everything which has been separated from it, 
and which has so lost its own unity, to become reunited with it these constitute the 
general ground of vital phenomena. The Ideas are the only mediators through which 
particular things can exist in God. The absolute science of nature, founded in Ideas, 
is the necessary condition of a methodical procedure in empirical natural science. 
Experiment and its necessary correlate, theory, are the exoteric side of natural science, 
necessary to its objective existence. Empirical science is the body of science, in so far 
as it is pure objective presentation of the phenomenal itself, and seeks to express no 
idea otherwise than through phenomena. It is the business of natural science to 
recognize in the various products of nature the monuments of a true history of natural 
production. In art the real and the ideal completely interpenetrate each other. Art, 
like philosophy, reconciles what in the phenomenal is antagonistic. But, on the other 
hand, art is in turn to philosophy, with which, in her highest form, she coincides, as 
the real to the ideal. To acquire the philosophy of art is a necessary aim of the 
philosopher, who sees in it, as in a magic symbolical mirror, the essence of his science. 
The system of identity expounded in the writings thus far mentioned was the rela- 
tively original work of Schelling. But from this time on, his own copious productivity 
constantly gave place more and more to a syncretism and mysticism, which grew, as he 
proceeded, ever more gloomy, and yet at the same time more pretentious. From the 
beginning, Schelling's philosophizing in his separate works was not a system-making 
founded on a familiarity with all previous philosophical productions, but rather a direct 
adoption and adaptation of the philosophical doctrines of individual thinlvcrs ; the 


more, therefore, he extended his study, the more did his thinking lack in point of 
principle and system. Occasionally a mystical chord is struck in his Lectures on Aca- 
demical Study. A mysticism, founded on Neo-Platonism, and afterwards also on the 
doctrines of Jacob Boehme, begins to gain ground in the work provoked by Eschen- 
mayer's ^' Phihxophie in ihrein Ueberganrje zur Nichtphilotir/phie''' (Erlangen, 1803, in 
which Eschenmayer, like Jacobi, demands an advance from philosophical think- 
ing to religious faith), viz. : '^ Philosophie und Religion" (Tubingen, 1804), in which 
Schelling affirms that finiteness and corporeality are the products of a falling away 
from the absolute, but declares that this fall, the remedying of which is the final 
aim of history, was the means of the perfect revelation of God. Yet only begin- 
nings of the later stand-point are visible in this v/ork ; the opuscule (above-mentioned, 
and affixed to the second edition of the work on the World-Soul) on the Relation of the 
Real to the Ideal m Nature, as also the "Exposition of the true Relation of the Phi- 
losophy of Nature to the improved Doctrine of Fichte " (Darlegung des xcahren Verlwdt- 
?iisses der Naturphilosophie zur verbexserten Fichte'' schen Lehre, eine Erlduterungsschrift 
der ersteren, Tiibingen, 1806), and the essays in natural philosophy, in (A. F. Marcus 
and Schelling's) '' JaJirbdcher der Medicin als Wissenschnff'' (Tiibmgen, 1800-1808), 
contain, notwithstanding the presence of certain theosophical elements, in the main 
the old order of ideas. An excellent development and extension of the ideas concern- 
ing beauty and art, expressed in earlier works, is contained in the Festrede delivered 
in 1807 and included in the Phihs. Schnften (Landshut, 1809), on the Relation of Vat, 
Plastic Arts to Nature, in which the ultimate end of art is described as the annihilation 
of form through the perfection of form ; as nature in her elementary works first tends 
towards severity and reserve, and only in her perfection appears as highest benignity, 
so the artist who emulates nature as the eternally creative and original force, and 
represents her products in accordance with their eternal idea as conceived by the infinite 
mind, and at the moment of their most perfect existence, must first be faithful and 
true in that which is limited in order to produce perfection and beauty in the whole, 
and through ever higher combination and final blending of manifold forms to attain to 
the greatest beauty in forms of the highest simplicity and of infinite meaning. 

Theosophy predominated (partly in consequence of the increasing influence on 
Schelling of Franz Baader, the follower of Jacob Bohme and St. Martin) in the " Phi- 
losophical Inquiries concerning the Nature of Human Freedom." etc. {Philosoj^hiscJie 
Untersuchungen ilber das Wesen der menscldichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenJidn- 
genden Oegenstande, first published in the Philos. Schriften, Landshut, 1809). In this 
work Schelling adheres to the principle that clear rational comprehension of the highest 
conceptions must be possible, since it is only through such comprehension that they 
can become really our own, can be taken up into ourselves and eternally grounded in 
us ; he also holds, with Lessing, that the transformation of revealed truths into truths 
of reason is absolutely necessary, if they are to be of any service to the human race. 
But the way by which Schelling seeks to reach this end leads him to mysticism. Fol- 
lowing the lead of Jacob Boehme, Schelling distinguishes in God three momenta : 1 . 
Indifference, the primordial basis or the " abyss" of the divine nature ; 2. Differentia- 
tion into ground [or cause] and existence ; 3. Identity or conciliation of the differen- 
tiated. The first momentum, in which no personality is yet present, is only the begin- 
ning of the divine nature ; it is that in God which is not God himself ; it is the incom- 
prehensible basis of reality. In it the imperfection and evil which pertain to finite 
things have their ground (a refinement on the doctrine of Boehme. who makes the 
devil, so to speak, a part of God). All njitui-al beings have a bare existence in the 



''groiind" of the divine nature, or in an original yearning not yet harmonized and 
made one with the understanding, and are therefore in relation to God merely peri- 
pheric beings. Man only is in God, a;id by virtue of this immanence in God he, and he 
alone, is capable of freedom. The freedom of man was exercised in an "intelligible 
act," done before time, and through which he made himself what he now is ; man, as 
an empirical being, is subject in his action to necessity, but this necessity rests on his 
non -temporal self-determination.* Unity of the particular will with the universal will 
is goodness ; separation of the particular will from the universal will is evil. Man is 
a central being and must therefore remain in the centre. lu him all things are created, 
just as it is only through man that God adopts nature and unites it with himself. 
Nature is the first or Old Testament, since in it things are still away from their 
centre, and are therefore under the law. Man is the beginning of the new covenant. 
the redeemer of nature, through whose mediation since he himself is united with 
God God, after the final separation, receives nature and makes it a part of himself. 

In the controversial work against Jacobi : ^' Denkmal der Schrift JacobVs von den 
gottlichen Dingen und der ihm in dersdben gemachten Besclmldigung eines abdchtlicJi 
tduschendm, Lilge redenden AthdsmK^" (Tiibingen, 1812), Schelltng repels the charge 
that his philosophy is naturalism, Sptnozism, and atheism. He says that God is for 
him both Alpha and Omega, first and last, the former as Detis iinplicitus, impersonal 
indifference ; the latter as Dens expUcitus, God as personality, as subject of existence. 
A theism not recognizing the "ground " or nature in God, argues Schelling, is impotent 
and vain. Against the identity of pure theism with the essential in Christianity, as 
asserted by Jacobi, Schelling argues bitterly, maintaining that the irrational and mys- 
tical is the truly speculative. 

The work on the " Divinities of Samothrace " ( Ueber die Oottheiten von Samothrake. 
Stuttgart and Tiibingen, 1815), which was to form a supplement to the Ages of t/u 
World (which were not, however, published with it), is an allegorical interpretation 
of those divinities as representing the different momenta in God, as described in Schel- 
ling's work on FreedorT 

After a long silence ScheUing published in 1834 a Preface to Hubert Becker's trans- 
lation of a work by Victor Cousin (on French and German Philosophy, contained in tlie 
Fragmens Philosophiques, Par., 1833). Schelling here describes the Hegelian philoso- 
phy as being merely negative, as substituting for the living and real the logical concept, 
divested of all empirical elements, and, by a most singular fiction or hypostatizatiou, 
ascribing to the concept the power of self-motion, which belongs only to that for which 
the concept is substituted. The same criticism, substantially, is made by Schelling in 
his Munich lectures on the "History of Modem Philosophy" {Zur Geschichte der 
neueren Philosophie, published posthumously in vol. 10 of the first division of his Com- 
plete Works). He censures the presentation of the most abstract conceptions (being, 
nothing, becoming, existence, etc.) before natural and mental philosophy, on the ground 
that the abstract presupposes that from which it is abstracted, and that conceptiona 
exist only in consciousness, hence only in the mind, and cannot precede nature and 
mind as their condition, nor potentiate themselves, and finally, by externalizing them- 
selves, become Nature. In his Opening Lecture at Berlin (Stuttgard and Tiibingen, 
1841), Schelling declared that he did not reject the discovery of his youth, the Sys- 
tem of Identity, which Hegel had only reduced to abstract logical form, but that he 

* Thia doctrine is in harmony with the general connection of the Kantian System, from which ScheUing 
borrows it ; it presupposes the distinction of things-in-themselves from phenomena ; Schelling's adoption dk 
it is therefore in contradiction with his previous denial of this its necesawy postulate. 


would have it, as being negative philosophy, supplemented by positive philopopby. 
This positive philosojihj', which by the aid of experience was to advance beyond merely 
rational science, was particularly the philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, i. e., of 
imperfect and perfect religion. The lectures on the Philosophy of ReUgion, delivered 
at the University of Berlin, were published after Schelling's death in the second division 
of his Complete Works. The substance of them had been previously given to the public, 
however, from notes taken in the class-room, by Frauenstadt {Schelling's Vorle*ungen 
in Berlin, Berlin, 1842), and Paulus {Die endlich offenbar gewordene positive PhUosopkie 
der Offenbnrung, der allgemeinen Prufung dargelegt von H. E. G. Paidus, Darmstadt, 
1^3). These Lectures contain, substantially, only a farther development of the specu- 
lations begun in the work on Freedom. Positive philosophy, says the author, does not 
seek to prove the existence of God from the idea of God, but rather, setting out with 
the facts of existence, to prove the divinity of the existent. Schelling distinguiuhes in 
God (a) blindly necessary or unpremeditating being; {b) the three potencies of the 
divine essence : unconscious will, the causa materialis of creation ; conscious, consider- 
ing will, the causa efficiens ; and the union of both, or the causa finalis, secundum quam 
omnia fiunt; and (c) the three persons who proceed from the three potencies by over- 
coming the element of unpremeditatiag being through the theogonic process ; these 
persons are the Father, as the absolute possibility of overcoming ; the Son, as the 
overcoming power ; and the Spirit, as completion of the overcoming. In nature work 
only potencies ; in man, personalities. Man having, in the use of his freedom, destroyed 
the unity of the potencies, the second, mediating potency was deprived of its reality, 
t. e., robbed of its control over the blindly-existing principle, and degraded to a potency 
operating in purely natural ways. This potency recovers in the consciousness of man 
its lost authority, and becomes a divine person through the theogonic process, the 
factors of which are mythology and revelation. The second potency was present in the 
mythologic consciousness in divine form (eV tiop(p^ SeoC), but divested itself of this form 
and became man, in order through obedience to become one wath the Father and a 
divine person. Schelling (carrying out the idea of Fichte, that Protestantism bears the 
Pauline character, but that the Gospel of John, with its conception of the Logos, is the 
purest expression of Christianity) divides the Christian era into the periods of Petrine 
Christianity, or Catholicism ; of Pauline Christianity, or Protestantism ; and, thirdly, 
of the " Johannean " Church of the Future.* 

128. Of Schelling's numerous disciples and kindred spirits, the 
following are those whose names are most im})ortant for the history of 
philosophy (in giving which we shall begin with those men who most 
closely followed Schelling, especially in the first form of his doctrine, 
and then go on to those whose relation to him was more independent, 
and some of whom exerted, in turn, an influence upon him) : Georg 
Michael Klein, the faithful expositor of the System of Identity ; Johami 

* This " Church of the Future" can certainly not be founded on the rerived Gnosticism of Schelling, 
which, like it-s ancient prototype, substituted phantoms in the place of the conceptions proper to reli^oua 
philosophy ; besides, the assumption is unhiBtorical, that Catholicism and Protestantism are to each other 
as Petrinism and Paulinism. The " Gospel of John," by transforming and ante-dating Pauline ideaa, pre- 
pared the way for that reconciliation which was practically illustrated in the Early Catholic Church. Th 
problems of the future cannot be solved by an actual return to the past, nor can they be oorrectl/ indicated 
by a play of analogies clad with the semblance of such a return. 



Jakob Wagner, who continued to maintain the pantheism of the Sys- 
tem of Identity in opposition to the Xeo-Platonism and mysticism of 
Schelinig's later writings, and who substituted in place of Schelling's 
trichotomy the quadripartite division ; Georg Anton Friedrich Ast, 
author of meritorious contributions to the history of philosophy, espe- 
cially of the Platonic philosophy ; Thaddeus Anselm Rixner, known 
by his Manual of the History of Philosojphy y Lorenz Oken, the na- 
turalist ; Nees von Esenbeck, who wrote upon the physiology of plants ; 
Bernhard Heinrich Blasche, the educational writer and religious phi- 
losopher ; Ignaz Paul Vital Troxler, who deserves mention for his 
services to the science of cognition, and who in many points differed 
from Schelling ; Adam Karl August Eschenmayer, who taught that 
philosophy should end in the negation of philosophy, or in religious 
faith ; Joseph Gorres, the extreme Catholic and enthusiast ; Gotthilf 
Heinrich von Schubert, the mystical, physical psychologist and cos- 
mologist ; Karl Friedrich Burdach, the physiologist and psychologist, 
who combined with Schelling's natural philosophy a temperate empiri- 
cism ; Karl Gustav Cams, the gifted psychologist and craniologist ; 
Hans Christian Oersted, the physicist ; Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Sol- 
ger, writer on aesthetics ; Heinrich Steffens, a man of many-sided cul- 
ture, who finally became an adherent of the strict confessionalism of 
the Old Lutherans ; Johann Erich von Berger, a friend of Steffens, 
and writer on astronomy and the philosophy of law ; Franz von Baa- 
der, the theosophist ; and Christian Friedrich Krause, the many-sided 
thinker. The two last-named, as also the theologian Schleiermacher 
who received his philosophical impulses especially from the study of 
Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling and Hegel, the philoso- 
pher, became the founders of new philosophical schools. Friedrich 
Julius Stahl, the anti-rationalistic theologizing philosopher of law, 
agreed in his doctrine, more especially with certain of Schelling's later 
principles (although protesting against the designation of his philosophy 
in general as " New-Schellingism "). 

For the purposes of this work it may suffice to name the principal philosophical 
works of the men named above (with the exception of Hegel and Schleiermacher, 
whose philosophies are treated of in the sections next following). Those who desire 
more particular information are referred to the works themselves and to special histor- 
ical treatises, in particular to Erdmann's General Review (in the second part of his 
'"'Eatwickelung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant,'" Oesch. d. n. Ph., Vol. III., 2d Ahth.). 

G. M. Klein's (1776-1820) principal work, based entirely on Schelling's writings and 
lectures, is entitled : Beitrdge zum Stiidium der Pliilosaphie als Wissenschaft des All. 


nebst eincr volhfdndigen und fmsUchen Darstelhmg Hirer Hauptmomente, Wuxzhurg, 
1805. Klein also treated specially of logic, ethics, and religion, according to the prin- 
ciples of the System of Identity, in the works : Verstandeslehre (Bamberg, 1810), 
re\dsed edition, entitled Anschauuiigs- luui iJenklehre (Bamberg and WUrzburg, 1818), 
Versuc/i, die Eihik als Wissejischaft zu begrunden (Rudolstadt, 1811), DarsteUuug der 
philosopMschen Religions- und Sittenlehre (Bamberg and Wiirzburg, 1818). 

A similar direction in philosophy, though one more allied to that of Fichte, was 
followed by Johann Josua Stutzmaitn (1777-181G) in his PhiloHophie des Univeraums 
(Erlangen, 1806), Philosophie der Oeschichte der MemcJiheit (Nuremberg, 1808), and 
other works. 

Joh. Jak. Wagner (1775-1821) wrote PJiilosophie der Erziehungskunst (Leipsic, 1802), 
Von der Natur der Dinge (Leipsic, 1803), System der Idealphilosophie (Leipsic, 1804), 
Orundriss der StaatswissenscMft und Politik (Leipsic, 1805), Theodicee (Bamberg, 1809), 
Math. Philosophie (Erl, 1811), Organon der menschl. Erkenntniss (Erl., 1830 and Ulm, 
1851), Nachgelassene Schriften, ed. by Ph. L. Adam (Ulm, 1853 seq.). On Wagner, see 
Leonard Rabus, J. J. Wagner's Leben, Lehre und Bedeutung, ein Beitrag sur Qesch. 
des deiitschen Geistes (Nuremberg, 1862). 

F. Ast (1778-1841) wrote Handbuch der Aesthetik (Leipsic, 1805), Ghrundlinien der 
Philosophie (Landshut, 1807; 2d ed., 1809), Orundriss einer Oeschichte der Philosophie 
(Landshut, 1807 ; 2d ed., 1825), Platon's Leben tmd Schriften (Leipsic, 1816). 

Th. Ans. Rixner (1766-1838) : Aphorismen aus der Philosophie (Landshut, 1809, 
revised edit., Sulzbach, 1818), Handbuch der Oeschichte der Philosophie (Sulzbach, 
1822-23 ; 2d ed., ib., 1829; Supplementary Volume, by Victor Philipp Gumposch, i6., 

Lor. Oken (1779-1851) wrote Die Zeugung (Bamberg and Wiirzburg, 1805 ; in 
this work the formation of seminal matter is described as taking place by the decom- 
position of the organism into infusoria, and propagation is described as the flight of the 
occupant from his falling house), Ueber das Universum (Jena, 1808), Lehrbuch der 
NatuipJtHosophie (Jena, 1809 ; 3d ed., Ziirich, 1843 ; the animal kingdom, says Oken 
in this work, is man resolved into his constituent elements ; what in the lower stages 
of animal life are independent antagonisms reappear in the higher as attributes), Isis, 
encyclopddische Zeitschrift (Jena, 1817 seq.). 

Nees von Esenbeck (1776-1858) : Das System der speeulativen P/iHosophie, Vol I. : 
Naturphilosophie (Glogau and Leipsic, 1842). 

B. H. Blasche (1776-1832) : Das Bose im Einklang mit der Wdtordnung (Leipsic, 
1827), Handbibch der ErzieJiungs^cissenschaft (Giessen, 1828), Philosophie der Offenba- 
rung (Leipsic, 1829), PhUosophische V'7isterblichkeitslehre, oder : wie offenbart sich da4 
eioige Leben? (Erfurt and Gotha, 1831). 

Troxler (1780-1866) : Naturlehre des menscUichen Erkennens (Aarau, 1828), Logik, 
die Wissenschaft des Denkens und Kritik aller Erkenntniss (Stuttgard and Tiibingen, 
1829-30), Vorlesungen ilber Philosophie, als Encyclopddie und Methodologie der philoso- 
phischen Wissenschaften (Bern, 1835). Cf. Werber, Lehre von der mensehlichen Er- 
kenntniss (Carlsruhe, 1841). 

Eschenmayer (1770-1852) : Die Philosophie in ihrem Uebergange sur Nichtphilosophie 
(Erlangen, 1803), Psychohgie (Tiibingen, 1817; 2d ed., ib., 1822), System der Maral- 
philosophie (Stuttgard and Tiibingen, 1818), Normalrecht (ib., 1819-20), Religionsphi' 
losophie (1. Theil : Rationalismus, Tiibingen, 1818; 2. Theil: Mystidsmus, ib., 1822; 3. 
Theil: Supernaturalismus, ib., 1824), Mysterien des innern Lebens, erUiutert am der 
Oeschichte der Se/ierin von Prevorst (Tiibingen, 1830), Orundriss der NaturphHosophi*, 


{ib., 1833), Die Jlegd'sche Religioiisphilosophie (Tubingen, 1834), Orundzilge einer chrisU 
lichen Philos(y}iJiie (Basel, 1841). 

G. H. Schubert (1780-1860) : Ahndungen einer allgemeinen Gesckichte des Lebern 
(Leips., 18C 6-1821), Ansichten von der NachUeite der Naturwisseiischaft (Dresden. 1808 ; 
4th ed., 1840), Die Symbolik dcs Traumes (Bamberg, 1814), Die Urwelt und die Fixsterne 
(Dresden, 1823; 2d ed., 1839), Geschichte der Seele (Tiibingen, 1830; 4th ed., 1847), 
Die Krankheiteii und Stvrungen der menschlichen Seele (Stuttg., 1845). 

K. F. Burdach (1776-1847) : Der Mensch nach den verschiedenen Seiten seiner Natur 
(Stuttgard, 1836; 2d ed., entitled: Antliropologie far das gehildete Publicum, ed. by- 
Ernst Burdach, ib.^ 1847), Blic/ce in''s Leben, comparative Psychologie (Leipsic, 1843-48). 

David Theod. Aug. Suabedissen (1773-1835, influenced as much by Kant, Reinhold, 
and Jacobi, as by Schelling) : Die Betrachtung des MenscJien (Cassel and LeipsiCy 
1815-18), Zur Einleitung in die Philosophie (Marburg, 1827), Chrundzuge der Lehre vom. 
Meiuchen {ib., 1829), Orundzuge der philos. Beligionslehre {ib., 1831), Grundziige de*^ 
Metaphysik {ib., 1836). 

Karl Gust. Carus (bom Jan. 3, 1789) : Grundziige der vergleichenden Anatomie und 
Physiologie (Dresden, 1825), Vorlesungen ilber Psychologie (Leipsic, 1831), System de^ 
Physiologic (Leipsic, 1838-40; 2d. ed., 1847-49), Grundziige der Kranioskopie (Stutt- 
gard, 1841), Psyche, zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Seele (Pforzheim, 1846 ; 3d ed,, 
Stuttgard, 1860), Physis, zur Geschichte des leiblichen Lebens (Stuttgard, 1851), Symbc- 
Ilk der menschlichen Gestalt (Leipsic, 1853 ; 2d ed., 1857), Organon der Erkenntniss der 
Natur und des Geistes (Leipsic, 1855), Vergleichende PsycJwlogie oder Geschichte der 
Seele in der Reihenfolge der Thierwelt (Vienna, 1866). Cf. Cams' Lebenserinnerungen 
und Denkwiirdigkeiten (Leips., 1865). 

Hans Christian Oersted (1777-1851) : Der Geistin der Natur (Copenhagen, 1850-51 ; 
German translation, Leipsic, 1850, etc. [The Soul in Nature, English translation ixj 
Bohn's " Scientific Library." Tr.]), Neue Beitriige zudem G. i. d. N (Gemi. Lps. '51). 
Gesammelte Schriften (Germ, trans. 6 vols., by Kannegiesser, Leipsic, 1851-53). 

K. W. Ferd. Solger (1780-1819) : Ericin, vier Gespriiche ilber das Schone und dia 
Kunst (Berlin, 1815), Philosophische Gesp-iiche (BerUn, 1817), Nachgelassene Schriften 
und Briefwechsel, ed. by Ludwig Tieck and Friedrich von Raumer (Leipsic, 1826), Vor- 
lesungen ilber Aesthetik, ed. by K. W. L. Heyse (Berlin, 1829). 

H. StefFens (1773-1845) : Recension von ScheUing's naturphilosophkchen Schriften 
(written in 1800, publ. in Schelling's Journal of Speculative Physics, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 
1-48, and No. 2, pp. 88-121), Ueber den Oxydations- und Desoxydationsprocess der Erde 
(ib.. No. 1, pp. 143-168), Beitrage zur innern Naturgeschichte der Erde (Freiberg, 1801), 
Grundziige der philosaphischen Naturwissenschaft (Berlin, 1806), Ueber die Idee der 
Universitdten (Berlm, 1809), Caricaturen des Eeiligsten (Leipsic, 1819-21), Anthropolo- 
gie (Breslau, 1822), Von der falschen Theologie und dem wahren Glauben (Breslau, 
1823), Wie ich wieder Lutheraner ward und was mir das Lutherthum ist {ib., 1831 ; 
against the union of the Calvinistic and Lutheran churches), Polemische Blutter zur 
Beforderung der speculativen Physik (Breslau, 1829, 1835), Novdlen (Breslau, 1837-38), 
Chnstl. Religiansphilosophie (Breslau, 1839), Was ich erlebte (Breslau, 1840-45 ; 2d ed., 
1844-46. LOf this work, StefFens's Autobiography, parts have been translated and pub- 
lished by W. L. Gage, under the title : The Story of my Career. Boston : Gould and 
Lincoln, 1863. T'/-.]), Nachgelassene Schriften, with a Preface by Schelling (Berlin, 
1846). StefEens exerted a great influence especially on Braniss. 

J. E. V. Berger (1772-1833) : Philosophische DarsteUung der Harmonie des Wdtalh 
iAltona, 1808), AUgemeine Grundziige der Wissenschaft (4 vols. ; 1, Analysis of the 


cognitive faculty ; 2, On the philos. comprehension of nature ; 3, Anthropology ; 4, 
Practical philosophy, Altona, 1817-27). Cf. H. Ratjen, Joh. Erich von Berger'n Leben 

(Altiona, 1835). 

Franz Baader (subsequently raised to the rank of the nobility ; bom March 27, 1765, 
at Munich, where he died May 23, 1841 ; his biography, written by Franz Hoffmann, is 
included in the 15th vol. of the complete edition of his Works, and also published sepa- 
rately, Leips., 1857), who combined with the study of medicine and mining that of 
philosophy and mathematics, and was especially familiar with Kant's works, as also, at 
a later period, with Fichte's and Schelling's, and with those of Jacob Boehme and 
Louis Claude de St. Martin (of his relation to Boehme, Bamberger treats in the 13th 
vol. of Baader's Complete W<n'ks, and of his relation to St. Martin, Fr. v. Osten-Sacken 
treats in vol. 12 of the same), exerted on the development of Schelling's natural phi- 
losophy a not inconsiderable, and on that of Schelling's theosophy an essentially deter- 
mining influence, while he, on the other hand, was himself furthered in the develop- 
ment of his own speculation by the study of Schelling's doctrine. Baader's speculation, 
like Schelling's, is characterized by the absence of rigid demonstration, and by the 
prevalence in it of the fanciful ; pupils of Baader, such as Hoffmann, have sought to 
remove these defects, in so far as they arise from Baader's aphoristic style, but have not 
been able thereby to show that his conceptions themselves axe scientifically necessary. 
Our knowledge is, according to Baader, a joint knowledge {conscientia) with the divine 
knowledge, and hence neither comprehensible apart from the latter nor yet to be iden- 
tified with it. From the immanent, esoteric, or logical vital process in God, through 
which God issues from his unrevealed state, must be distinguished the emanent or 
exoteric or real process, in which God, by overcoming the eternal nature or the princi- 
ple of selfhood, becomes tripersonal ; and, still further, from both processes must be 
distinguished the act of creation, in which God comes together in final union, not with 
himself, but with his image. In consequence of the fall of man, man was placed by 
God in time and space, in order that by accepting salvation in Christ, he might recover 
immortality and salvation ; or, in case of his non-acceptance of salvation, be subjected 
to punishment for his purification, either in this life or in Hades, or in the pit of hell. 
Souls in Hades may still be redeemed, but not souls in heU. Time and matter will 
cease; after the cessation of the "region of time," it remains still possible for the 
creature to pass from the eternal region of hell into the eternal region of heaven but 
the reverse is not true. Baader was unfriendly to the papacy, but adhered to Catholi- 
cism, and censured the founders of Protestantism for having been not reformers, but 
revolutionists. Baader's "Contributions to Elementary Physiology" (Beitrdge zur 
Mementarphydohgle^ Hamb., 1797) were drawn upon by Schelling in his works on 
natural philosophy. Schelling's work on the " World-Soul" led to the composition by 
Baader of his work on the " Pythagorean Square in Nature or the four World-Regions " 
(Tiibingen, 1798), from which, in turn, Schelling borrowed much in his Flrat Sketch of 
a System of Natxind PliihsopJiy (1799) and in his Journal of Speculative Physics. Soon 
after this, Baader, chiefly in oral intercourse with Schelling, directed the attention of 
the latter to the theosophist Jacob Boehme. A collection of articles by Baader are the 
" Contributions to Dynamical Philosophy" {Beitrdge zur dynamiticlien PhilosopJde, Ber- 
lin, 1809). In the " Fermcnta Cognitionis" (1822-25) Baader combats the philosophies 
prevalent in his time, and recommends the study of Jacob Boehme. The Lectures de- 
livered at the University in Munich on Speculative Dogmatics appeared m print, in five 
parts, in 1827-38. The works of Baader published in his lifetime and his posthumous 
temains have been collected together by Baader's most distinguished diaciple, Frana 


Hoffmann (author of Speculative Entwickelung der emgen fklbsterzeugung Gottes, am 
Baader's Schriften zmammengetragen, Amberg, 1835 ; VorhaUe zur speculativcn Put- 
losophie Baader's, Aschaffenburg, 183G ; Gruiidzilge der SooiefMxphilos'ynhie von Fram 
Baadei\ Wiirzburg, 1837 ; Franz von Baader als Begrunder der PhihsopMe der Zukvuft^ 
Leipsic, 185(j, and other works), with the aid of J. Hamberger, von Schaden, Schliiter, 
Lutterbeck, and von Ostensacken, in a complete edition, with Introductions and 
Annotations : " Franz van Baader's sammtliche Werke,'' 16 vols., Leipsic, 1851-60 ; the 
Introduction, entitled an " Apology for Baader's Natural Philosophy in reply to direct 
and indirect Attacks of Modem Philosophy and Natural Science," has also been pub- 
lished separately, Leips., 1853. Hoffmann has also published Die WeltaUer, LichMruh- 
len aus Baaders Werken, Erlangen, 1868. Cf. J. A. B. Lutterbeck, Ueber den philoso- 
phischen Stand/punkt Baader's, Mayence, 1854 (cf. also Lutterbeck's Die neiitest. Lehrbe- 
griffe, Mayence, 1852) ; Hamberger, Die Cardinalpu nkte d&r B.'schen PMlosophie, Stutt- 
gard, 1855 ; CJiristenthum und moderne Cidtur, Erlangen, 1863 ; Physica Sacra, oder 
Begriff der himmlischen Leiblichkeit, Stuttgard, 1869 ; Theod. Culman, Die Principien 
der PhOosophie Fram von B.'s und E. A. von Schaden' s, in the ZeitscJirift f. Ph., Vol. 
37, 1860, pp. 193-226, and Vol. 38, 1861, pp. 73-103 ; Franz Hoffmann, Beleuchtung 
des Angriffs auf B. in TJdlo's Schrift : ''Die theologisirende Eechts- und Staatslehre,'' 
Leipsic, 1861 ; Ueber die B.'sche und Herbarfuche PhilosopMe, in the AthencBum (philos. 
journal edited by Frohschammer), Vol. 3, No. 1, 1863 ; Ueber die B.'sche und Schopen- 
hauefsche PhUosopJiie, ibid., No. 3, 1863 ; Franz Hoffmann, Philos. Schriften, Erlangen, 
1868; K. Ph. Fischer, Zur hundertjahrigen Geburtstagsfeier B.\ : Vermch einer Cha- 
rakteristik seiner Theosophie und Hires VerMltnisses zu den Sydimen ScheUing's U7id 
HegeCs, Daub's und Schleiermachefs, Erlangen, 1865 ; Lutterbeck, Baader's Lehre vmn 

Wdtgebdude, Frankfort, 1866 ; Hamberger, Versmh einer Charakteristik der Theoso- 
phie Franz Baader's in Theol. Studien u. Kritiken, 1867, No. 1, pp. 107-133 [translated 
by G. S. Morris in the Amenean Presbyteiian and Theological Review, edited by Dr. H. 
B. Smith and others, 1869. Tr.] ; Alexander Jung, Ueber Baader's Dogmatik als He- 
form der Societdtswissenschaft, Erlangen, 1868. 

K. Chr. Fr. Krause (1781-1832), who himself limited the circulation of his philoso- 
phical writings among Gennans by his strange terminology, which was put forward as 
purely German, but was in fact un-German, sought to improve upon the pantheism of 
the System of Identity by developing a doctrine of Panentheism, or a philosophy founded 
on the notion that all things are in God. He wrote on aU the branches of philosophy. 
His works are the following : Grundlage des Naturrechts oder jJiHosopJiischer Grundriss 
des Ideales des Eechts (Jena, 1803), Entwurf des Systems des PhUosopJde (1. Abth. : 
aUgemeine PhUosopfae und Anleitung zur Naturphilosopfde, Jena, 1804), System der Sit- 
tenlehre (Leipsic, 1810), Das Urbild der Menschheit (Dresden, 1813 ; 2d ed., GGtt., 1851), 
Abriss des Systems der PhUosophie (1. Abth. : analytische Phihsophie, Gottingen, 1835), 
Abriss des Systems der Logik als philosophiscJier Wissenschaft (Gottingen, 1835 ; 8d ed., 
1838), Abriss des System.^ der Reehtsphihsophie (G<)ttingen, 1838), Varies, uber das Syst. 
der Philos. (ib. , 1828, 3d ed. , Prague, 1868), Vorlesungen Uber die Grundicahrheiten der 

Wissenschaft {ib., 1839 ; 3d ed., 1869). His Posthumous Works have been published 
by a number of his pupils (von Leonhardi, Lindemann, and others). Cf. H. S. Linde- 
mann : Ueber sichtliche DarsteUung des Lebens und der Wissenschaftslehre Karl Christian 
Friedrich Krauze's und dessen Standpunktes zur Freimaurerbruderschaft, Munich, 1839. 
His most distinguished pupils have been Henry Ahrens, philosopher of law and author 
of Caurs de Droit Naturel (Paris, 1838 ; frequently reprinted in French and German), 
Naturrecht oder Philos. des Iteclits u. Staates (6th ed., Vienna, 1870), Juristische Ency- 



OopaMe (ib., ia58), and of Cours de rhiloa. f Paris, 1836-38), and Cours de ph. de VhiAt. 
(Brus. 1840), and Tiberghinn, pupil of Ahrens and author of Essai theoriqiie et 7m- 
tnrique mr la generntinn dc^ cjmmtL'-.sanc&s Immaines dan.s .srs rapports nvec la morale, la 
politique et la religion (Paris et Leips., 1844), Esquisse de philosophie rrwrale, precedes 
duueintrod. dlametaphydqne (Brussels, 1854), La science de Vdme dans les limites d 
V observation {ib., 1863; 2d ed., 18G8), Logique, Ui ftcience de la con7mmance (Paris, 1865). 
Krause's pupil, H. S. Lindemann, has published, besides the above-mentioned work on 
Kjause, works on Anthropology' (Zurich, 1844, and Erlangen, 1848) and Logic (Solo- 
thum, 1846). Also Altmeyer, Bouchitte, Duprat, Hermann Freiherr von Leonhardi, 
Monnich, Roder {Orundzi'tge des NaturrecliU oder der Bechtsphilosojjhie, Heidelberg, 
1840; 2ded., 1863), Schliephake {Die Orxmdktgen des sittl. Lebens, Wiesbaden, I&j.j ; 
Einleitung in d<ts System der Philosophie, Wiesbaden, 1856), J. S. Del Rio, the Spaniard 
(who published in 1860, at Madrid, Krause's Ideal of Humanity, translated into Spanish 
and accompanied with explanatory notes, and Krause's Outline of tlie System of Phi- 
loso])7iy), and others belong to the school of Krause. 

Friedrich Julius Stahl (1802-1861 : Die Philosophie des RechU, nach geschiehtlicher 
Ansicht, Heidelberg, 1830-37 ; 3d ed., 1854-56 ; the first volume contains the "Genesis 
of the Current Legal Philosophy," or, according to the title of the 2d and 3d editions, 
the "History of Legal Philosophy;" the second contains the "Christian Theory of 
Right and of the State," or, as it is entitled in the second edition, " Doctrine of Right 
and the State on the Basis of the Christian Conception of the World"), the theologizing 
legal philosopher, received from New-Schellingism not unimportant impulses. To the 
Neo-Schellingian School belongs Wilh. Rosenkrantz (author of Die Wissenschaft des 
Wtsse7is, Munich, 1866-69). 

129. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), developing 
the principle of identity postulated by Schelling, and subjecting it to 
the forms of demonstration according to Fichte's method of dialectical 
development, created the System of Absolute Idealism. According to 
this system finite things are not (as in the System of Subjective Ideal- 
ism) sim]>ly phenomena for us, existing only in our consciousness, but 
ave phenomena per se by their very nature, i. e., things having the 
ground of their being not in themselves, but iu the universal divine 
Idea. The absolute reason is revealed in nature and spirit (mind), 
since it not only underlies both, as their substance, but also, as rational 
Subject, returns through them by means of a progressive develop 
ment from the lowest to the hio^hest stai^es from its state of self- 
alienation to itself. Philosophy is the science of the absolute. Since 
it is thinking consideration of the self-unfolding of the absolute reason, 
it has for its necessary form the dialectical method, which reproduces 
in the consciousness of the thinking Subject the spontaneous move 
iiient of the object (content) of thought. The absolute reason alienates, 
externalizes itself, becomes the other of itself, in nature, and returns 
from this its otherness^ or self -estrangement, into itself, in Spirit. It 

232 HEGEL. 

self-development is therefore threefold, namely : (1) in the abstract 
element of thought, (2) in nature, (3) in spirit following the order : 
thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Philosophy has, accordingly, three parts: 
(1) Logic, which considers reason in itself as the prius of nature and 
spirit, (2) the Philosophy of Nature, (3) the Philosophy of Spirit. In 
order to raise the thinking Subject to the stand-point of philosophical 
thinking, the Phenomenology of Spirit, i. e., the doctrine of the stages 
of development of consciousness as forms of the manifestation of spirit, 
can be placed propaedeutically before the system, while retaining, never- 
theless, its place as a branch of a philosophical science within the Sys- 
tem, namely, as a branch of the Philosophy of Spirit. Logic considers 
the self -movement of the Absolute from the most abstract conception, 
the conception of pure being, to the most concrete of those conceptions 
which precede its division into nature and spirit, i. ., to the absolute 
Idea. Its parts are : the doctrines of Being, of Essence, and of Concep- 
tion. The Doctrine of Being is divided into the sections: quality, 
quantity, measure ; in the first, pure being, nothing, and becoming are 
considered as factors or "momenta" of being; then definite being 
is opposed to pure being, and in being-for-self [independent being] 
is found the reconciling factor, which leads to the transition of qual- 
ity into quantity. The momenta of Quantity are: pure quantity, 
quantum, and degree ; the unity of quality and quantity is Meas- 
ure. The Doctrine of Essence treats of essence as the ground of 
existence, then of its manifestation, or of phenomena, and finally of 
reality as the unity of essence and phenomenon ; under the conception 
of reality Hegel subsumes substantiality, causality, and reciprocity. 
The Doctrine of Conception treats of the subjective conception which 
Hegel divides into the conception as such, the judgment, and the syl- 
logism of the Objective under which Hegel comprehends Mechan- 
ism, Chemism, and Teleology and of the Idea, which dialectically 
unfolds itself as life, cognition, and absolute Idea. The Idea emits 
nature from itself by passing over into its other \_A7iderssein\. Nature 
strives to recover its lost union with the Idea ; this union is recovered 
in spirit, which is the goal and end of nature. Hegel considers the 
stages of natural existence in three sections, entitled Mechanics, 
Physics, and Organ ics ; the latter treats of the organism of the earth, 
of the plant, and of the animal. That which is highest in the life of 
the plant is the process of generation, by which the indi%'idual, while 
negatived in its immediate individuality, is elevated into the genus. 

HKOEL. 233 

In the animal nature, there is not only the actual external existence of 
individuals, but this individuality is also self -reflected in itself, a self- 
contained, subjective universality. The separate being of the parts of 
space in material objects is not true of the soul, which is therefore not 
present at any one point alone, but everywhere at millions of points. But 
the subjectivity of the animal is not subjectivity for self, not pure, uni- 
versal subjectivity. It does not think itself ; it only feels itself, views 
itself; it is objective to itself only in a distinct, particular state. The 
presence of the Idea with itself \_das Beisichsein der Idee\ freedom, 
or the Idea returned from its alterity into itself, is Spirit. The Phi- 
losophy of Spirit has three parts : the doctrines of subjective, of objec- 
tive, and of absolute spirit. Subjective Spirit is spirit in the form of 
relation to self, or spirit, to which the ideal totality of its Idea, i. e., 
of its conception, has become inwardly real. Objective Spirit is 
spirit in the form of reality, reality being here understood in the sense 
of a world to be brought into being by spirit, and indeed thus brought 
forth, and in which freedom exists in the form of present necessity. 
Absolute Spirit is spirit in the absolute, independent, and eternally 
self -producing unity of its objectivity and its ideality or its conception, 
or spirit in its absolute truth. The principal stages of subjective spirit 
are natural spirit, or soul, consciousness, and spirit as such; Hegel 
terms the corresponding divisions of his doctrine Anthropology, Phe- 
nomenology, and Psychology. Objective Spirit is realized in legal 
right, morality, and ethicality \_Sittlichkeit, concrete or social morality], 
which latter unites in itself the two former, and in which the person 
recognizes the spirit of the community, the ethical substance in the 
family, in civil society, and in the State, as his own essence. Absolute 
spirit includes art which expresses the artist's concrete perception of 
the truly absolute spirit as the ideal in the concrete shape generated 
by the subjective spirit, the shape of beauty religion, which is the 
true in the form of mental representation ( Vorstellung) and philoso- 
phy, which is the true in the form of truth. 

Of Hegel's life treat Karl Rosenkranz {Georg Wilh. Fri4drich HegeVs Leben, Supplement zu HegeTn 
Werken, Berlin, 1844) and R. Haym (Hegel una aeine Zeit, Vorlemingen ither Entstehting und Entjcick- 
lung, Wesen und Werth der Hegel'schen Philosophie, Berlin, 1857), the former with affectionate attachment 
and veneration, the latter with sharp, unsparing criticism, directed notably against the anti-liberal elements 
in Hegel's character and doctrine (especially in his philosophy of law). Of., per contra, Rosenkranz's Apologie 
HegeVs gegen Haym, Berlin, 1858. 

Hegel's Works jippeared soon after his death in a complete edition, entitled O. \V. F. ffegerx Werke, 
vollstilndige Ausgabe durch eitieii Verein von Freunden des Verewigten. Vols. I. -XVIII., Berlin, 18.32 seq. ; 
single volumes have bi^-n since reissued. Vol. I. : iregcCi philos. Ah/iaudluiigeii, ed. by Karl Ludw. Miohelet, 
1832. Vol. II. : PMinomenQlogie cJm Oeiates, ed. by Joh. Schulze, 1832. Vols. III.-V. : Wissensc/ia/t <Uf 

234 HEGEL. 

Lopa; ed. by Leopold von Henning, ia33-34. Vol. VI.-VII. : Encyclopfidie der philosophisclien m*j. 
schajten im Gruvdrisse (Vol. VI. : Der Encycl. erster Theil, die Logik, edited, annotated, and supplemented, 
under the guidance of Hegel's lectures, by Leop. von Henning, 1840 ; Vol. VII., 1st Part: Vorlesungen iiber 
die KaturjihiloHophie als der Encycl. der philoa. Wissenschaflen zweiter Theil, ed. by K. L. Michelet, 1842- 
Vol. VII., 2d Part: Der Encycl. driller Tlieil, die Philosophie des Geistes, cd. by Ludw. Boumann, 1845). 
Vol. VIII. : Grimdliiiien der P/iilosophie des Rechts oder NatwrectU ttnd iStaatswissenschaft im Grundrisse 
ed. by Eduard Gans, 18.3.3. Vol. IX. : Vorlesungen iiber die P/iilosoiihie der Gescftichte, ed. by Ed. Gans, 
18;37 (sec-ond edition edited by Hegel's son, Karl Hegel). Vol. X., Parts 1-3 : Vorlesujigeji iiber die Aesthetik, 
ed. by H. G. Hotho, 1835-38. Vols. XI.-XII. : Vorlesungen iiber die PMlosophie der Religion, nebst einer 
Schrift iiber die Beweise vom Da-iein GoUes, ed. by Philipp Marheiueke, 1832 (second ed. by Bruno Bauer). 
Vols. XIII. -XV. : Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. by Karl Ludw. Michelet, 18.3.3-36. 
Vols. XVI.-XVII. : Vermischte Schriften, ed. by Friedrich Fiirster and Ludwig Boumann, 1834-36. Vol. 
XVIII. : Philosophische P)-opddeutik, ed. by Karl Rosenkranz, 1840. 

Systematic compilations of extracts from Hegel's writings have been published by Frantz and HiUert 
(HegeTs Philosophie in wortlichen AusiiXgen, Berlin, 1843), and Thaulow {HegeFs Aensserungen iiber Erzie- 
hung und UnteiTicht, Kiel, 1854), the latter accompanied with numerous notes. Kritische ErUluterungen 
des Hegel' schen Systems (Konigsberg, 1843) is a work by Rosenkranz. An end similar to that of Rosenkranz's 
work (the critical exposition of Hegel's meaning) is served by the prefaces of the editors of his Works, by 
Erdmann's and Michelefs accounts of the Hegelian system in their Histories of Modern Philosophy, and by 
many other works. Translations of several of Hegel's works have been published in different languages, 
particularly in French and lUili.in. [Translations in English : The Subjective Logic of Hegel, translated by 
H. Sloman and J. Wallon, 1855 (a part of Hegel's Logic) ; Lectures oti the Philosophy of History, by G. \V. 
F. Hegel, translated by J. Sibree, A.M. (in Bohn's Philos. Library), London, 1861. Numerous translations 
from Hegel's works have been published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, ed. by W. T. Harris, Vols. 
I.-V., St. Louis, 1867-1871, as follows : Hegefs Phenomenology of Spirit, with accompanying analysis. Vol. II., 
pp. 94-103, 165-171, 181-187, 229-241 : Outlines of HegeTs Phenomenology (transl. from H.'s Propaedeutik). 
Vol. III., pp. 166-175; Outlines of HegeVs Logic (from the same). Vol. III., pp. 267-281; Hegets First 
Principle (Exposition and Translation), Vol. III., pp. .344372; HegeVs Science of Rights, Morals, and Reli- 
gion (from the Propaedeutik), Vol. IV., pp. 38-62, 155-192; Hegel on the Philosophy of Plato (transl. from 
H.'s History of Philosophy) Vol. IV., pp. 226-268, 320-380 ; Hegel on the Philos. of Aristotle (from the same, 
with Commentary by Translator), Vol. V., pp. 61-78, 180-192, 251-274; HegeVs Philos. ofArtChivali-y 
(transl. by Miss S. A. Longwell), V., pp. 368-.373. Cf. further BenanCs Analysis and Critical Essay upon 
the .Esthetics of Hegel, translated by J. A. Merling, Journ. of Spec. Philos., I., pp. 36-52, 91-114, 169-176, 
221-224; II., 39-46, 157-165; III., 31-46, 147-166, 281-287, 317-336 ; Introduction to H.'s Encyclopedia oj 
the Philos. Sciences (translated from the German of K. Rosenkranz, by T. Davidson), Vol. V., pp. 234-251 ; 
J. E. Cabot, Hegel, in the North Am. Review, 1868, April ; Analysis of Cabot's article by Anna C. Brackett, 
in J. of Sp. Philos., V. 38-48. Tr.] A very searching criticism of the Hegelian Logic is that by Trende- 
lenburg in his Logische Uvtersuchungen ; the same subject, as also the whole doctrine of Hegel, has likewise 
been discussed from various standipoints by Hegelians and Anti-Hegelians in numerous works, some of which 
\\\X\ be mentioned below. Cf. also, among other works, Theod. Wilh. Danzel, Veber die Aesthetik der He- 
geVschen Philosophie, Hamburg, 1844; Ant. H. Springer, Die HegeCsche Geschichts'i7ischauu7ig, Tiibingcn, 
1848; Aloys Schmid (of Dillingen), Enlwickehingsgeschichle der HegeVschen Logik, Regensburg, 1858; Paul 
Janet, Etrcdes sur la dialectique dans Platon et dans Hegel, Paris, 1860 ; Friedr. Reiff, Ueber die Hegetsche 
Dialektik, Tubingen, 1866; E. von Hartmann, Ueber die dialektische Methode, Berlin, 1868. A critical 
account of the System is contained in J. H. Stirling's work : The Secret of Hegel, being the Hegelian System 
in origin, principle, form, and matter, 2 vols., London, 1865. A. Vera has translated into French and anno- 
tated Hegel's Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philos. of Mind (Paris, 1859, 1863-1866, 1867), and also 
written several works from the Hegelian stand-point, among others, an Essai de philosophie hegelienne, 
Paris, 1864. (Cf. Karl Rosenkranz. HegeTs Natxir philosophie und die Bearbeitung derselben durch den ital. 
Philos. A. Vera, Berlin, 1868). Other Italians who have written on Hegelianism are A. Galasso (Naples, 
1867), G. Prisco (Naples, 1868), and G. AUievo (Milan, 1868). Karl Rosenkranz, Hegel als dentscher Natio- 
nalphilosoph, Leipsic, 1870. [Cf. also the article, entitled Hegel, was he a Pantheist * in the Amer. Church 
Review, Vol. 21, pp. 382 seq. ; T. C. Sandars, HegeTs Philosophy of Right, in Oxford Essays, 1855, pp. 21.3- 
250; F. Harms, Z?<r JSTn'njien^iffaw iTej/ei (a discourse at University of Berlin. June 3, 1871); T. C. Simon, 5". 
and Brit. Thought, in Cont. Rev., 1870 ; Art. Hegel, in Appleton's New Am. Cycl, by Henry B. Smith. rr.] 

Georg Wilh elm Friedrich Hegel, bom at Stuttgard, August 27, 1770, was the son of 
an officer of the ducal government (Secretary of the Exchequer, afterwards "Dispatch- 
Councillor"). He studied at the national university at Tiibiugeu as a member of the 

HTIGEL. 235 

charitable foundation, going through the philosophical course in the years 1788-00, and 
the theological in 1790-93. For the degree of Magister in Philosophy he wrote essays 
on the " Judgment of the Common Understanding concerning Objectivity and Subjec- 
tivity," and on the " Study of the History of Philosophy," and defended a dissertation 
written by A. F. Boek, Professor of Philosophy and Eloquence, " Z)e limite officiorum 
hvmanorum seposita aniinorum iminortalitnte" a subject which (as appears from a 
manuscript of Hegel's of the year 1795) gave him afterwards, also, much occasion for 
thought. For the rank of Candidate in Theology he defended the dissertation of Chan- 
cellor Le Bret, " Z>e ccdesim Wirteynbergicm renascentits calamitatibu.'i." (Of Hegel's 
theological development in this and the next succeeding period Zeller has written in the 
fourth volume of the T/ieM. Jahi-biicher, Tiib., 1845, p. 205 seq.) The strictly biblical 
supranaturalist Storr was at that time Professor of Dogmatics; with him worked 
Flatt, who was of like sentiment with Storr, and also Schnurrer and Rosier, the more 
rationalizing Professors of Exegesis and Church History. The reading of the works of 
Kant, Jacobi, and other philosophers, and also of Herder, Lessing, and Schiller, hia 
friendship for Holderlin, the enthusiastic student of Hellenic antiquity, and the sympa- 
thy with which he, like Schelling and others of his fellow-students, followed the events 
of the French Revolution, seem to have occupied him more than his prescribed studies, 
as may be inferred from the certificate with which he left the University, which praised 
only his talents, not his acquirements (not even his philosophical acquirements). He 
continued his theological and philosophical studies industriously during his engagement 
as a family -tutor in Berne ; at the same time he was engaged in an animated corre- 
spondence with Schelling, who was still studying at the Tiibingen foundation. Of special 
importance for the comprehension of the course of his mental development is the Life 
of Jesus, written by him in the spring of 1795, which is preserved in manuscript, and 
from which Rosenkranz and Haym have published extracts. Lessing' s distinction be- 
tween Jesus' personal conception of religion and the dogmas of the Christian church 
underlies Hegel's work. That it was not so much motives of purely historical reference 
as rather the need and desire of finding his own stand-point at that time justified in the 
life and teachings of Jesus, that made this distinction of worth to him, appears from 
the manner in which he practically developed it. Judaism, says Hegel here, represents 
the moralism of the Kantian categorical imperative, which Jesus overcomes through 
love, the " synthesis in which the law loses its universality, the individual his particu- 
larity, and both lose their opposition, while in the Kantian conception of virtue this 
opposition remains." Yet Hegel points out at the same time the pathological element 
involved in mere love and its dangers. Fate consists in confinement to a definite spiri- 
tual direction ; Jesus, through his principle of love, worked in opposition not to single 
sides of the Jewish fate, but to this fate itself. The biblical statements respecting the 
unity of the divine and human natures in Christ are interpreted by Hegel as resting on 
the idea that only reflection, which divides life, distinguishes it into infinite and finite ; 
apart from reflection, or in truth, this separation is unreal. Hegel speaks very severely 
against this separation, which falsely objectifies the Deity ; it advances, he says, at an 
equal pace with the corruption and slavery of men, of which it is only the revelation. 
Hegel explains the victory of the dogmatized churchly Christianity, which ruled in the 
last centuries of antiquity, by reference to the bondage to which the Roman world- 
empire had reduced the previously independent States. To the citizen of the ancient 
States the republic was his "soul," was hence the eternal. But the individual, when 
no longer free, and when estranged from the universal interests of the body politic, 
looked only upon himself. The right of the citizen gave him only a right to security in 

236 HEGEL. 

his possessions, which now filled up his entire world. Death, which tore down the 
whole fabric of his aims, could not but seem frightful to him. Thus man saw himself 
compelled by his " unfreedom " and misery to save his Absolute in the Deity, and to 
seek and expect happiness in heaven ; a religion could not but be welcome which, by 
giving the name of suffering obedience to the ruling spirit of the times, to moral impo- 
tence, to disgrace, to the submissive disposition which suffered without repining the 
being trampled under foot, stamped them with the marks of honor and of the highest 
virtue. The radicalism of this youthful opposition to traditional notions is present as a 
repressed but unextirpated element in Hegel's later, more conservative religious phi- 
losophy an element which by a number of Hegel's pupils (most radically by Bruno 
Bauer) has been again brought into independent prominence and farther developed. 

After a three years' stay in Switzerland Hegel returned to Germany, and in January, 
1797, became tutor in a private family in Frankfort-on-the-Maine. Here, as to some 
extent had already been the case in Berne, political studies occupied his leisure hours, 
in addition to his studies in theology, which were also not neglected. In the year 1798 
Hegel wrote a small work, which has never been printed, on the Internal Political Con 
ditions of Wurtemberg {Ueber die neuesten inneren VerMltnisse Wirtembergs, besonders 
iiber die Oebrechen der Magistratsverfassung), as supplementary to which another, on 
the Constitution of the German Empire, was written by him after Feb. 9, 1801, hence 
during his residence in Jena, whither he removed in January, 1801. The ideal of his 
youthful age had now (as he -wrote to ScheUing on the 2d of November, 1800) taken on 
the forms of reflection and been changed into a system ; Hegel had worked up the sub- 
jects of logic and metaphysics, and in part the philosophy of nature also, in manuscript, 
intending to add a third part on ethics. It was at Jena, in 1801, that Hegel's first work 
was published, on the Difference between Fichte's and Schelling^s Systems of Philosophy. 
The system of Fichte, says Hegel here, is subjective Idealism, while that of Schelling 
is subjective-objective, and hence absolute Idealism. The fundamental thought in 
Schelling's system is that of the absolute identity of the subjective and the objective ; 
in his philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy the Absolute is construed in 
the two necessary forms of its existence. Hegel confesses his adhesion to the stand- 
point of ScheUing. After Hegel's habilitation, for which he wrote the dissertation 
De Orbitis Planetarum, he worked together mth Schelling for the propagation of the 
System of Identity, both in his position as an academical instructor and (1802-1803) as 
co-editor of the Critical Journal of Philosophy (mentioned above in the account of 
Schelling's philosophy), to which he made the greater number of contributions. At 
the same time Hegel elaborated the third part of his system, the part relating to ethics, 
or the System of Morality (System der Siltlichkeit), in manuscript, more immediately 
for use in his lectures ; this part was subsequently enlarged and became Hegel's Phi- 
losophy of Spirit. Gradually Hegel became more conscious of his divergence from 
Schelling, especially after the latter (in the summer of 1803) had left Jena and direct 
personal intercourse with him was no longer possible. He indicates sharply and inci- 
sively the details of his divergence in his " Phenomenology of Spirit" {Phaenomerwlogie 
des Oewtes)., a comprehensive work, which was completed in the year 1806. Soon [1806] 
Hegel himself left Jena in consequence of the events of the war, gi\'ing up the extra- 
ordinary professorship to which he had been appointed in February, 1805, and editing 
for a time the Bamberger Zeitung, until in November, 1808, he was appointed to the 
directorship of the Aegidiengymnasium at Nuremberg. This post he retained till the 
year 1816. While at Nuremberg he wrote for gymnasia! delivery his Phihsophische 
Propaeiieutik, and also the extensive work in which Logic and Metaphysics, previousl.T 

HEGEL. 237 ' 

distinguished by Hegel himself, were united entitled, "Science of Logic "" {Wmen-^ 
schaft der Logik, Nuremberg, 1812-16). In the autumn of 1816, after the recall ol 
Fries from Heidelberg to Jena, Hegel became a professor at the former place. 'WTiLle 
here, he published a Judgment on the I'rdnsaction^ of the Wurteinberg Diet in the Years 
1815 and 1816 (a defence of the reforms sought by the government), in the Ileidelbergcr 
Jahrbiicher, and the " Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline " {Encydo- 
pddie der jMlosophisc/ien Wissenschaften im Grundriisse, Heidelberg, 1817 ; 2d, greatly 
enlarged ed., 1827; 3d ed., 1830; reprinted, vsrith additions from Hegers lectures, in 
the complete edition of Hegel's Works, Berlin, 1840-45, and published again sepa- 
rately and without additions under the editorship of Rosenkranz, Berlin, 184') ; also, 
with notes by Rosenkranz, Berlin, 1870). On the 22d of October, 1818, Hegel opened 
his lectures at Berlin ; these lectures extended over all the parts of his philosophical 
system, and were most influential in leading to the foundation of his school. During 
the Berlin period Hegel published only his work on the philosophy of law {Grundlinien 
der PhUosophie des Eechts, oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, Berlin, 
1821), and wrote for the newly-founded literary organ of Hegelianism, the JaJirbucher 
fur wissenscJiaftliche Eritik. Through the thank-worthy editorship of his pupils, the 
lectures on the Philosophy of History, Art, and Religion, as also those on the History 
of Philosophy, after being more or less revised, were published, after the death of 
Hegel by cholera on the 14th of November, 1831. 

The philosophy of Hegel is a critical transformation and development of Schel- 
ling's System of Identity. Hegel approves in the philosophy of ScheUing this, that it 
concerns itself with a content, with true, absolute knowledge, and that for it the true 
is the concrete, the unity of the subjective and objective, in opposition to the Kantian 
doctrine of the incognoscibility of things-in-themselves, and to Fichte's subjective ideal- 
ism. But Hegel finds in Schelling a twofold defect : (1) the principle of his system, 
the absolute identity of the subjective and the objective, is not proved as something 
necessary, but is only postulated (the absolute is as if " shot from a pistol") ; and (2) 
the advance from the principle of the system to particular propositions is not established 
as scientifically necessary, so that instead of an exhibition of the successive steps in the 
self -unfolding of the absolute we find merely an arbitrary and fantastic operating with 
the two conceptions of the ideal and the real (like a painter having only the two colors, 
red and green, to employ for animals and landscapes) ; it is important, adds Hegel, 
that the absolute be apprehended not simply as the substance underlying all that is 
individual, but also as the Subject which is self -positing and which restores itself, from 
the state of alterity ("otherness") into which it falls, to renewed identity with itself. 
Hegel aims therefore, on his part, (1) to elevate consciousness to the stand -point of 
absolute knowledge, and (2) systematically to develop the entire contents of this knowl- 
edge by means of the dialectical method. The first is done in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, and (more briefly, only the last stages of philosophical knowledge being consid- 
ered) in the Introduction to the Encydopadia, and the second in the whole system of 
Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit. 

In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel sets forth the forms of development of human 
consciousness as it advances from the stage of direct, Tinreflecting, unquestioning cer- 
tainty, through the different forms of reflection and self-alienation, up to absolute 
cognition. In this phenomenological presentation of the subject Hegel interweaves 
with each other the histories of the formation of the individual and of the universal 
spirit. The principal stages are consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, ethical spirit, 
religion, absolute knowledge. The object of absolute knowledge is the movement of 

238 HEGEL. 

Bpirit iteelf. Absolute, comprehending knowledge pre-aupposes the existence of aU tli 
earlier stages through which Spirit passes in the course of its development ; it is there- 
fore comprehended history; in it all earUer forms are preserved; " from the chalice 
of this realm of spirits infinity pours foaming forth upon its view " (says Hegel at the 
end of the Phenomenology in allusion to Schiller's " Theosophy of Julius ^^). 

In the Introdw^tion to the Encyclopedia Hegel establishes the stand-point of abso- 
lute knowledge by a critique of those attitudes of philosophical thought with reference 
to objectivity which have been exemplified in modem philosophy, in particular those of 
Dogmatism and Empiricism, of Criticism and of the theory of Immediate Knowledge. 
Absolute knowledge recognizes thought and being as identical, or (as Hegel expresses 
himself in the preface to his PhilosopJiy of Right) the rational as real and the real as 

The System of Philosophy is divided into three principal parts : Logic, which is the 
science of the Idea in and for itself ; the philosophy of Nature, or the science of the 
Idea in its state of self -alienation (alterity) ; and the philosophy of Spirit, or the science 
of the Idea returning from this state into itself. The method is the dialectical, which 
considers the passing over of each conception into its opposite, and the reconciliation 
of the opposition, thus developed, in a higher unity. It involves the activity of the 
understanding, which merely distinguishes differences, and of the negative or skeptical 
reason, which simply cancels these differences. 

Logic is the Science of the pure Idea, that is, of the Idea in the abstract element of 
thought ; it is the science of God or the Logos, in so far as God is viewed simply as the 
Prius of nature and mind (as he is, so to speak, before creation). It falls into three 
parts: 1, the doctrine of being, or of immediate thought, the conception per se ; 2, 
the doctrine of essence, or of thought as reflected and mediated, the independent 
being and the a/ppearing of the conception ; and 3, the doctrine of the conception and 
the idea, or of thought returned into itself and present in developed form with itself, 
the conception in and for itself. * In the larger work on Logic Hegel terms this latter 
part Subjective Logic, and the first two parts together Objective Logic. 

The point of departure for the dialectical development in the Logic (and hence in 
the whole philosophical system) of Hegel is pure Being, as the conception which is 
most abstract, absolutely devoid of content, and therefore identical with Nothing. To 
Nothing, Being stands in the double relation of identity and difference, although the 
difference cannot be expressed or specified, f The identity (in the midst of diversity) 
of Being and Nothing, gives rise to a new and higher conception, which is the higher 
unity of both, viz. , the conception of Becoming. The species of Becoming are origi- 
nation and decay ; its result is determinate being [Dasein] , being which is identical 

Hegel incorrectly reckons this last doctrine as the third part of his fundamental science or "logic," 
since it belongs rather, as its definition sufficiently shows, to the science of spirit ; but some things which 
Hegel includes in logic would find their appropriate place in natural philosophy. The Hegelian development 
of this last part is everywhere obscured by its wavering between the character of a doctrine of forms, which 
pertain only to the thinking mind, as such, or to nature, as such, and that of a doctrine of forma belonging 
to all natural and spiritual reality. 

t But in reality this difference can be specified as follows: the conception of being is obtained by 
abstracting all difference in the objects of true conceptions, and retaining only what is identical in 
them ; while in forming the conception of nothing, the former process is carried one step farther, and abstrac- 
tion is also made of the identical itself. In like manner aU the following steps of the Hegelian dialectic may 
be refuted by sharp distinctions, firmly held fast, and the immanent onward motion or development of pure 
theught may be shown to be illusory ; but it may suffice to refer on this point to Trendelenburg and others. 
Cf. also my Syst. of Logic, 31, 76-80, 83. [TransL Lond., 1871.] 

HEGEL. 239 

with negation, or being with a determination which is immediate or which is, or, in still 
other words, being with a quality. Determinate being, as in this its determination 
reflected into itself, is a something Determinate or simply Something. The basis of 
all determination is negation (and Hegel cites with approval Spinoza's principle : 07nnis 
negatio est determinaUo). Quality, in its character as being determination determina- 
tion which w, in distinction from the negation contained in, but distinguished from it 
is Reality ; but the negation is no longer the abstract nothing, but alterity, the being 
other. The being of quality, as such, in opposition to its relation to some Other, is its 
being per se [AnsicJiseiii]. Something becomes Other-thing, because otherness is a 
moment in Something, and this other which it becomes, as a new something becomes 
in turn still other ; but this progress in infinitum is arrested by the contradiction that 
the finite is at once something, and the otJier corresponding to this something ; and the 
contradiction is removed by the consideration, that the something in passing over into 
its other only comes together with itself, or becomes the other of that other ; this rela- 
tion of something to itself in passing over into its other and in its other is the true 
infinitude, the restoration of being as negation of negation, or being-for-self [independ- 
ent being] . With being-for-self the qualification of ideality is introduced. The truth 
of the finite is its ideality. This ideality of the finite is the fundamental principle of 
philosophy, and every true philosophy is therefore Idealism. Ideality, as the true 
infinitude, is the solution of the logical antagonism between the finite and the infinite 
(of the understanding), which, placed beside the finite, is itself only one of two finites. 
The momenta of being-for-self are the one, the many, and relation (in the form of 
attraction and repulsion). Quality, owing to the lack of difference between the many 
ones, passes over into its opposite. Quantity. In the category of quantity the rela- 
tion of being, determinate being, and being-for-self, is repeated as pure quantity, quan- 
tum, and intensive magnitude, or degree. The externality of quantum to itself in its 
determinate, independent being constitutes its quality. Quantum thus posited as a 
function of itself is quantitative relation. The quantitative itself in its externality is 
relation-to-self, or, being-for-self is here united with indifference as to all determina- 
tions, and in this sense the quantitative is Measure. Measure is qualitative quajitum, 
the unity of quality and quantity. In this unity Being in its immediate (unmediated) 
form is sublated, and thereby Essence is posited. 

Essence is sublated being, or being mediated with itself, reflected into itself by 
negation. To essence belong the qualifications of pure reflection, especially identity, 
difference, and ground (or reason). The logical principles of identity and difference, as 
one-sided abstractions, through which an independent character is given to mere momenta 
of truth, are tainted with untruth ; the speculative truth is the identity of identity and 
difference, as involved in the conception of ground or reason. Essence is the ground of 
existence ; in existence the form of directness or immediacy [non-mediation] is restored, 
or existence is the restoration of being, in so far as it results from the " sublation" of 
that by which being was previously [in the logico-dialectical development] mediated. 
Totality, or the development of the qualifications of ground and existence ia one sub- 
ject, constitutes the Thing. A " thing-in-itself," according to Hegel, is an abstraction; 
it is the mere reflection of the thing into itself in distinction from its reflection into 
Other, by virtue of which it has attributes and conceived as the unqualified basis of 
these attributes. * The existence of things involves the contradiction between subsist- 

Hegel here gives to this Kantian expression an altered signification, although claiming to report the 
Kantian signification. Kant did not understand by the " thiug-in-itself " the thing without its attributes and 
wgaxt from all relatiomi whatever, bat only the thing as it is apart from a specified relation, namely, apart 

240 HEGEL, 

ence in self and reflection into other, or between matter and form ; in this contradic- 
tion existence is Manifestation or Phenomenon. Essence must manifest itself. Im- 
mediate being, as distinguished from essence, is appearance ; developed appearing i; 
manifestation, or the phenomenon. The essence is therefore not behind or transcen- 
dent to the phenomenon, but, on the contrary, because it is the essence which exists, 
existence is phenomenal. The phenomenon is the truth of being, and is a determina- 
tion of richer content than being, in so far as it contains united in itself the momenta 
of reflection into self and into other, whereas being or immediacy is the unrelated and 
defective. But the deficiency of the phenomenal is that it is so broken in itself, having 
its support not in itself, which deficiency is remedied in the next higher category, that 
of Reality. It was Kant's merit, says Hegel, that he apprehended that to which the 
common consciousness ascribes being and independence as purely phenomenal ; but he 
incorrectly conceived the phenomenal in the purely subjective sense, and distinguished 
from it " the abstract essence,"* under the name of the thing-in-itself ; Fichte, in his 
subjective idealism, erroneously confined men within an impenetrable circle of purely 
subjective representations ; it is, rather, the proper nature of the immediately objective 
world to be only phenomenal and not fixedly and independently existing. The unity 
of essence and existence, or of inner and outer, when it has become immediate, is 
reality ; to it belong the relations of substantiality, causality, and reciprocity. Reci- 
procity is infinite negative relation to self. But this reciprocal motion, which remains 
thus with itself, or essence which has returned to being, the latter considered in the 
sense of simple immediacy, is the Conception. 

The Conception is the unity of being and essence, the truth of substance, the Free, 
as independent \fiXrsichiseiende\^ substantial power. The subjective conceijtion develops 
itself (1) as the conception as such, which includes in itself the momenta of universality, 
particularity, and singularity ; (2) as the judgment in which (a) the conception is posited 
as particular, and (b) is separated into its mmnenta, and (c) the singidar is exhibited as 
related to the universal ; and, f