HISTORY
OF
PRICES,
AND OF
THE STATE OF THE CIRCULATION,
FROM 1793 TO 1837;
PRECEDED BY
A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE STATE OF THE CORN TRADE
IN THE LAST TWO CENTURIES.
BY
THOMAS TOOKE, ESQ. F.R.S.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. II.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR
LONGMAN, ORME, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS,
PATERNOSTER-ROW.
1838.
LONDON :
Printed by A. SPOTTISWOODE,
New- Street- Square.
CONTENTS
OF
THE SECOND VOLUME.
PART IV.
HISTORICAL SKETCH OF PRICES, AND OF THE STATE OF THE
CIRCULATION, FROM 1792 tO. 1837-
CHAPTER VI.
State of prices and of the circulation, from 1814* to 1818 -
SECT. 1. Fall of thp prices of corn from the close of 1813 to the com-
mencement of 1816 - -2
SECT. 2. High prices of expoi table commodities in nit spring of ]814 5
SECT. 3. Fall of prices between 1814 and 1817 of productions other
than those of corn - - 8
SECT. 4. Rise of the prices of coia in this country and on the Conti-
nent, from 1815 to the summer of 1817 - - 13
SECT. 5. Fall of prices of corn in this country and in France in the
summer of 1817, and the state of the corn trade till the close of 1818 19
SECT. 6. Prices of commod-'ties from 1816 to the close of 1818 - 23
SECT. 7. State of the circulation from 1814 to 1818 -28
SECT. 8. Summary of the preceding survey - -55
CHAPTER VII.
State of prices and of the circulation, from the commence-
ment of 1819 to the close of 1822 - 60
SECT. 1. State of the question at the commencement of 1819, with a
view to determine upon the future footing of the currency - 60
SRCT. 2. Markets for commodities from 1819 to 1822 - - 77
SECT. 3. Prices of agricultural produce from 1819 to 1822 - 79
SECT. 4. State of prices on the continent of Europe - - 86
SECT. 5. State of the circulation from 1819 to 1822 - - 94
SECT. 6. Summary of the preceding survey - - - - - 1 1 6
CHAPTER VIII.
State of prices and of the circulation, from the commence-
ment of 1823 to the close of 1827 - - 120
IV CONTENTS.
Page
SECT. I. Variations of the c?rn trade in 1823, with reference to the as-
serted influence of an enlarged circulation of paper in that year - 120
SECT. 2. Prices of agricultural produce from 1824 to 1827, examined
in connection with the circulation - - 1 32
SECT. 3. State of markets for produce and commodities other than
corn, from 1823 to 1825 - - 140
SECT. 4. Speculations in foreign loans and in shares in 1824 and 1825 148
SECT. 5. Fall of the prices of goods after the spring of 1825 - - 154
SECT. 6. Recoil of markets for loans and shares after the spring of
1825 - 158
SECT. 7. Commercial discredit and pressure on the money market
following the spring of 1825 - - 160
SECT. 8. State of the circulation from 1823 to 1827 - 172
SECT. 9. Summary of the preceding survey - - 190
CHAPTER IX.
State of the prices and of the circulation from the com-
mencement of 1828 to the close of 1832 - 193
SECT. 1. Prices of corn from 1828 to 1832 - - 194
SECT. 2. State of markets for produce and commodities other than
corn from 1828 to 1832 - - - 209
SECT. 3. State of the circulation from 1828 to 1832 - 214
SECT. 4. Summary of the preceding survey - - - 223
CHAPTER X.
State of prices and of the circulation, from the commence-
ment of 1833 to the close of 1837 - 225
SECT. 1. Fall of the prices of wheat from the harvest of 1832 to the
close of 1835 - 226
SECT. 2. State of trade and manufactures, and prices of commodities,
from the commencement of 1833 to the close of 1835 - 240
SECT. 3. Prices of agricultural produce in 1836 and 1837 - - 257
SECT. 4. State of markets for produce other than those of agricultural
produce, in the years 1836 and 1837 - 264
SECT. 5. Joint-stock banks, and other joint-stock companies, and the
speculations in the shares of these from 1833 to 1837 - 274
SECT. 6. State of the circulation from the commencement of 1833 to
the close of 1 837 - - 279
SECT. 7. Summary of the preceding survey - - 342
CHAPTER XI.
General view of conclusions to be derived from the pre-
ceding historical sketch of prices ; and concluding re-
marks on the currency - 346
SECT. 1. General view of the causes of the high prices from 1793 to
1814 - 346
SECT. 2. General view of the causes of the decline and comparatively
low range of prices from 1814 to 1837 - . - 348
SECT. 3. Concluding remarks - 349
APPENDIX ._.---- 355
PART IV.
HISTORICAL SKETCH OF PRICES, AND OF THE
STATE OF THE CIRCULATION, FROM 1792 TO
1837.
(Continued from Vol. I.)
CHAPTER VI.
STATE OF PRICES AND OF THE CIRCULATION,
FROM 1814 TO 1818.
THE epoch which is now to come under con-
sideration, embraces nearly the whole interval be-
tween the close of the war and the termination of
the Bank restriction. And this interval, with that
which has just passed under review, comprises
nearly all the debateable ground of the imputed
effects of the suspension of cash payments in raising
prices beyond the difference between paper and
gold.
As in the instance of the epoch which has just
passed, it will be found convenient in the present
to make a subdivision of the interval about to be
examined into two periods ; namely, the one em-
bracing the fall of prices from 1813 and 1814, to
1816 and 1817 ; and the other, the rise of prices
from 1816 and 181? to 1818.
VOL. II.
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 1.— Fall of the Prices of Corn from the
Close of 1813 to the Commencement of 1816.
The prices of corn, which had fallen rapidly,
while transatlantic produce had been as rapidly
rising in the last six months of 1813, continued,
but more slowly, to fall in the early part of 1814,
the average having declined by the end of July,
for
s. d.
Wheat to - - 66 5
Barley — - - 33 0
Oats — - - 23 3
The fall would probably have been more rapid,
in consequence of the great stock on hand, had it
not been for the character of the season, which
was remarkably backward and unpromising. The
winter of 1813-14 is still known as the severest
and the longest of any in the present century ;
and the spring, as in all cases, when following a
winter of unusual severity, was cold and ungenial.
The wheat in consequence bore an unpromising
appearance ; and the harvest being very late, and
attended in its progress by variable, and, upon the
whole, inclement weather, some speculation arose,
and the prices experienced a momentary advance
before the completion of the harvest, of nearly
10*. the quarter. The apprehensions that had been
entertained of injury to the crops were, to a con-
siderable extent, confirmed ; for it turned out that
the wheat generally had been much affected with
blight and mildew, and was considered, upon the
whole, inferior in quality, and much below the
former year in quantity. But the increased breadth
of cultivation, the large surplus from the super-
abundance of the produce of 1813, and an unex-
pectedly large importation of foreign corn (about
800,000 quarters of wheat, and a like quantity of
1814—1818. 3
oats), overpowered the markets, and the prices
thenceforward declined again to the close of the
year, when the average for wheat was 65s. 8d.
The following winter was a very open one, and
the spring of 1815 rather wet, but forward *, and
the appearances of the crops promising. These
were depressing causes, but prices were' prevented
from falling so much as they would have done in
the first six months of 1815, by two causes,
1. The renewal of the war on the return of Na-
poleon from Elba, there being then a prevailing
opinion connecting war with high prices.
2, The discussion upon, and the eventual pass-
ing of the Corn Bill, which prohibited the admis-
sion of foreign grain for consumption, till the price
of wheat should reach 80.9., and other grain in that
proportion, giving an impression that the price would
not for any length of time fall below that rate, and
probably imparted a temporary confidence in the
recovery of the markets.
But these causes of a slight rally gave way to
the continued abundance of the supplies, of which
a part still consisted of the crop of 1813.t And as
the harvest was forward, the crops abundant, and
the weather for the securing of them (subject to
* In a meteorological report for the month, from the 24th of May
to the 24-th of June, 1815, is the following remark : — " The spring
itself is, in almost all respects, much forwarder than any one
since the year 1794. The best guide to this is the price of
vegetables. In 1794, peas were, on the 19th of May, Is. 6d. the
peck; a price for which they were sold about the 31st of the
same month this year: whereas we have known them in the in-
tervening twenty years, frequently from three or four to eight
or ten times that price, in the early days of June."
•f- Mr. David Hodgson, on being asked by the Agricultural
Committee, in 1821, " When you say you have every reason
to believe that 1813 was the greatest crop you have ever known,
you have other reasons for that opinion ? " answered, " We
have other reasons, and general observation from the time that
the grain of that season remained in considerable quantity, I
think two or three years afterwards." — Page 264.
B 2
4 PRICES AND CIHCULATION,
some few casualties), on the whole propitious, the
markets resumed their tendency downwards, and
the averages at the end of the year 1815 were for
s. d.
Wheat - 53 7
Barley 25 11
"Oats 19 9
In the few weeks following there was a further
trifling decline, the average in January 1816 having
been for
s. d.
Wheat 52 6
Barley 24 8
Oats 18 7
This was a lower point of depression than had
occurred in the prices of corn since 1804.
The prices of cattle and sheep had risen con-
siderably in 1813 and 1814, and were higher in
1814* than they had been during any previous
period, with the exception of a few months after
the great scarcity of 1800; but in the course of
1815, a considerable fall took place, and the spe-
culations of cattle dealers turned out very ruin-
ously at the close of that year and in 181 6. t
* The quotations of Smithfield market were, in March 1814,
Beef - 6s. to 7*. per stone.
Mutton - 7*. to 8s. 6d.
Veal 6s. to 8*.
Pork 7*. to 105.
This was partly owing to the high prices of provender in
1811 and 1812, while meat had been comparatively low; and
partly to the extreme severity of the winter of 1813 and 1814,
which had caused considerable mortality among the sheep, and
generally reduced the quality of the cattle.
t On this occasion of the great fall in prices, Mr. (now
Lord) Western called upon the legislature, as he had before
done upon a similar great fall of prices, and consequent agri-
cultural distress in 1804, for a remedy ; and as on that occa-
sion, he, on this, gave a very rational account of the fall of
prices, and the consequent distress of farmers and landlords.
" The full effect (he said, on moving in the House of Commons
1814—1818.
SECTION 2. — High Prices of exportable Commo-
dities in the Spring o/"1814.
While the events were in progress which led to
the restoration of the Bourbons and the peace of
Europe, in the spring of 1814, the speculation in
exportable commodities which had its first rise in
the dawning prospects of the emancipation of the
Continent, at the close of 1812 and the beginning
of 1813, reached its height. The prices of all
colonial produce, and of other articles of export,
including native productions, such as alum, lead,
and tin, and many descriptions of manufactures,
which had long been waiting a market, advanced
very considerably, some beyond all precedent, as
has been seen by the table inserted in the last
Chapter. The extraordinary demand arising out of
that speculation for the manufactures of this coun-
try, occasioned such an extra employment of work-
men in the manufacturing districts, as entitled and
for a committee on agricultural distress, in March 1816,) of
all our improvements has just been completely realised, and two
or three good harvests, from this extended and improved agri-
culture, together with continued import, and demand reduced,
has occasioned such a surplus in the market as very obviously
accounts for the first depression of price." But singularly
enough, Mr. Western, ten years afterwards, discovered that the
fall of prices was owing to the currency. In a letter addressed
by him in 1826, to Lord Liverpool, there is, among others to
the same effect, the following passage : — " Can there be a doubt,
I repeat, now, that the very first commencement of our diffi-
culties, the first depression of agriculture and commerce in 1815
and 1816, were caused altogether by the contraction of the
currency ? "
In this, as in similar instances, the landed interests having
had the full benefit of a rise of prices beyond the ratio of
deficiency, have sought, at the expense of the rest of the
community, to be exempted by legislative interference from the
consequences of restored abundance.
6 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
enabled them to command a considerable advance of
wages.* And as while wages were thus advanced,
there had been a considerable fall in the prices of
provisions, the manufacturing population were in a
more satisfactory state than they had been in during
any part of the twenty years preceding.
But that rise of the prices of exportable produce
and manufactures which proved to be so ephemeral,
as being founded upon the most unwarranted ex-
pectations of demand in consequence of the peace,
and of the renewal of commercial intercourse with
the Continent, has been the occasion of the most
absurd conclusions conceivable.
Tables of those extravagant prices, constituting
the declared value, as contradistinguished from the
official value of the Custom-house returns of ex-
ports, have been referred to as proofs of the de-
preciation of the currency up to that time; and the
subsequent fall of prices of those same articles, as
compared with the prices of the spring of 1814,
has been considered as affording undeniable grounds
for the inference of an increased value of money.
The late Alderman Waithman, and Mr. (now Lord)
Western, brought forward statements to that effect
in the House of Commons, upon occasion of dis-
cussions on the currency, as being illustrative of
their views of the effect of the Bank restriction in
depreciating, and of the resumption of cash pay-
ments in restoring, the value of money ; assuming,
* In the evidence of Richard Needham, an operative hand-
loom weaver, examined by a Select Committee of the House of
Commons, on Manufactures, Commerce, and Shipping, in 1833,
he is asked (11,889), " Can you remember what the reason
was that the price of weaving sixty-reed cambrics was so high in
181 4-? " Answered, " It was in consequence of the battles of
Leipsic and Dresden. A general opinion prevailed that if we
could succeed in destroying the power of Bonaparte, wages
would get up, and prices would be confirmed to this country
for ever ; and prices got up to an enormous height, and they
came down as fast."
1814—1818. 7
as they seem to have done, that the Bank began
to prepare by a contraction of its issues in 1814,
for a resumption of cash payments. The late Mr.
Mundell brought forward similar tables in support
equally of the doctrine of depreciation and appre-
ciation, but as arising from a cause distinct from
the alterations in the system of our currency. He,
and some other writers with him, have ascribed the
high range of prices of that period to the pro-
gressive increase of the produce of the American
mines up to a certain time *, and the subsequent
decline of prices to the falling off of the supply
since that time.
But the facts of the case will not accommodate
themselves to either theory. If the Bank restric-
tion, or the increasing produce of the mines, is
to account for the high prices of exportable pro-
duce and manufactures in 1814, how happened it
that the prices should have been so low in 1810
and 1811, when both these causes of depreciation
were at their height ? and how happened it that
while exportable productions were rising, corn and
other European produce were falling ? The causes
of the rise of articles of export have been suffi-
ciently shown in the extravagance of the spirit of
speculation, which prevailed on the opening of the
markets of the Continent of Europe by the peace.
And we have now to see what were the causes of
the great fall, between 1814 and 1817, of all the
articles that had so risen.
* The rate of increase terminates in 1810, but the theory
supposes that the full effect of the increase had not been felt
till 181 4-, and that we have since felt the effects of the falling
off of the supply. At the same time the remark that has
before been made may here be repeated, namely, that whatever
may be the influence ascribed to variations in the produce of
the mines, they have not necessarily a bearing on the question
of the effects of the Bank restriction.
B 4
8 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTIONS. — Fall of Prices between 1814 and
1817 of Productions other than those of Corn.
A slight consideration will serve to show, that
a reverse, from speculations so entered into and
conducted as those which have been described ; was
inevitable.
The shippers found to their cost, when it was
too late, that the effective demand on the Con-
tinent for colonial produce and British manufac-
tures had been greatly over-rated; for whatever
might be the desire of the foreign consumers to
possess articles so long out of their reach, they
were limited in their means of purchase ; and ac-
cordingly the bulk of the commodities exported
brought very inadequate returns. The low prices,
which alone the consumers abroad were able to
pay, were still further reduced in value by the ad-
vance in our exchanges, which was accelerated
by the very extent of those shipments. And it is
a well known fact, that the losses upon a large
proportion of the goods shipped to the Continent,
in the spring and summer of 1814, were very great;
not less, I have reason to believe, from what I
heard at that time of the result of many of them,
than 50 per cent. In some few instances, by rare
good fortune, there might be a gain, but in as
many there was a total loss. Cases of more aggra-
vated loss occurred where the shippers, unwilling
to incur so heavy a sacrifice as would be entailed
by remittances at an exchange becoming daily
more unfavourable for them, were induced to re-
ceive returns in goods which, from this and other
causes, coming in excessive quantities, could not
be sold here within 30, 40, and sometimes 50 per
cent, of the cost ; a process by which, including
loss of interest, it may easily be conceived that the
whole value of the original investment might be
nearly absorbed. The disastrous effects of these
ill-judged and extravagantly extensive speculations
1814—1818. 9
began to manifest themselves in the numerous
failures which took place towards the close of
1814 ; these continued increasing in number, as
the several losses were ascertained, through 1815
and the early part of 1816.
Among the articles that figured most in point
of importance and value, in the tables which have
been referred to, as exhibiting the prices of 1814
in contrast with the reduced rates which have since
prevailed, were cotton goods. Now, as the price
of raw cotton had risen between 1812 and 1814,
on a twofold ground, namely, the war in which we
had become involved with the United States of
America, and the speculations on the opening of
the Continental markets ; so the return of peace witli
America, and the recoil of the speculations in ex-
ports, account for a great part of the subsequent
fall. And a further fall is accounted for by the
diminution, which was progressive for some time
after, in the cost of production in the United
States ; the indisputable proof of which is in the
great extension of the growth at the reduced
prices. But the manufactured article has fallen,
not only in its former ordinary proportion of value
to the raw material, but in a much greater ratio in
consequence of the wonderful progressive improve-
ment of the machinery applicable to cotton goods.*
Indeed, the progressive improvement of machi-
nery applicable to every description of manufac-
tures, accounts for all the reduction of the declared
value in those tables, beyond that which is attri-
butable to the difference in the cost of production
of the raw material. t
* See Mr. Baines's History of the Cotton Trade ; Mr. M'Cul-
loch's Commercial Dictionary ; also his Statistics of the British
Empire ; Dr. Ure's Philosophy of Manufactures ; and Mr. G. R.
Porter's Progress of the Nation.
f Mr. Babbage, in his extensively useful, and deservedly
popular work on " The Economy of Manufactures," gives a
variety of examples of the extraordinary reduction of cost in
10 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
It was not of cotton only, that there had been
an increased supply. In the greater part of other
raw materials, there was in 1814 and 1815, a transi-
tion from comparative scarcity to abundance.
The excess of the importations in those two
years, as compared with 1811 and 1812 (the Cus-
tom-house returns of 1813 were destroyed by fire),
will appear from the following statement of the
official values which represent quantities : —
£ £
1811 28,626,580 1814 36,559,788
1812 28,595,426 1815 35,989,650
£ 57,222,006 £ 72,549,438
being an increase of supply much beyond the
utmost probable increase of the rate of consump-
tion within so short a period.
This excess of importation, accompanied as it
was by a general impression, that in consequence
of the peace, not only was the cost of production
by the lowered freights and insurance greatly
diminished, but that fresh sources of supply, at a
further reduction of cost, would be opened, ren-
dered a fall of prices inevitable. There was not only
an actual temporary excess at a reduced cost, but
an anticipation of contingent supplies from extended
sources, at a probably further reduction of cost.
the production of several articles, 'and more especially of some
descriptions of hardware.
After enumerating several causes to account for the general
fall of prices, he remarks : " The result of my own observation
leads me to believe, that by far the most influential of the
causes has been the invention of cheaper modes of manufac-
turing. The extent to which this can be carried, while a profit
can yet be realised at the reduced price, is truly astonishing,
as the following fact, which rests on good authority, will prove.
Twenty years since, a brass knob for the locks of doors was
made at Birmingham; the price at that time being 13*. 4?d.
per dozen. The same article is now manufactured, having the
same weight of metal, and an equal, or in fact a slightly supe-
rior finish, at 1*. $\d, per dozen." — 3d Edition, 1832, p. 158.
1814—1818. 11
The following are specimens of the fall experi-
enced in the markets for transatlantic produce : —
Highest prices in Lowest prices in
1813-14. 1815-16.
Coffee, Jamaica, per cwt. - 118s. 142s. 77s. 104s.
St. Domingo - - 116s. 126s. 62s. 66s.
Sugar, Gazette account - 97s. 2d. 45s.
Havannah, white - 110s. 134s. 44s. 50*.
Cotton, bowed Georgia, per Ib. 2s. 4tf. 2s.6e?. Is. 2d. ls.4c?.
Cochineal - - - 47s. 52s. 23s. 28s.
Indigo, East India, superior - 12s. 16s. 8s. 9d. 10s.
Pepper, black - - 20e?. 21c?. 7d. l\d.
Tobacco, Virginia - Is. lOd. 5s. 6d. 5$d. lOd.
Logwood, per ton - 22/. 23/. 61. 61. 10s.
In the recoil from the speculations of 1813 and
1814, in articles of export, copper, lead, and tin,
which had then risen considerably, experienced a
great decline in 1816, thus: —
1813-14. 1816.
Copper, per ton - 140/. 85/.
Lead - 33/. 34/. 18/.
Tin — - 174/. 102/.
Of Baltic produce the fall had commenced when
exportable productions were rising; the decline
continued through 1815 and 1816.
The fall of prices of the different descriptions
of produce here referred to was irregular ; but in
the greater number of instances the lowest point
of depression in the interval between 1814 and
1817 was in 1816 and the early part of 1817 (when,
as will be seen, the prices of corn had already ex-
perienced their greatest advance).
The shipping interest, too, was, in this interval
between 1814 and 1817, undergoing a very con-
siderable depression. There was, indeed, in con-
sequence of the peace, a more extended sphere of
employment of tonnage, inasmuch as the inter-
course with the whole of the north of Europe,
which had been carried on between 1807 and
1814 exclusively by foreign vessels, was now
thrown open to British shipping. But this addi-
tional employment was more than compensated by —
12 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
1. The quicker voyages in consequence of the
discontinuance of the detention of convoys and
other impediments arising out of the war, thus
rendering the same amount of tonnage equal to
extended functions.
2. The large amount of tonnage discharged
from the transport service.
3. The reduced cost of shipbuilding materials,
which naturally reduced the value of all the ex-
isting shipping.
In the value of house property there was also a
great decline, in consequence of the reduction of
the cost of building materials.
Thus there was, from 1814 to 1816, a very
general depression in the prices of nearly all pro-
ductions, and in the value of all fixed property,
entailing a convergence of losses and failures
among the agricultural, and commercial, and ma-
nufacturing, and mining, and shipping, and build-
ing interests, which marked that period as one of
most extensive suffering and distress. Of that
great and memorable fall of prices, the principal
part beyond that which was the effect of the
seasons, and a recoil from the extravagant spe-
culations in exportable commodities, is clearly
attributable to the transition from war to peace ;
not from war, as having caused extra demand, but
as having obstructed supply and increased the cost
of production ; nor to peace, as having been attended
with diminished consumption, but as having ex-
tended the sources of supply, and reduced the cost
of production.
In what sense, if in any sense, or in what
degree, if in any degree, this fall of prices, as
well as the subsequent rise can be connected with
the state of the currency, will be the subject
of a separate examination. In the mean time, it
remains to examine the phenomena of the great
risk of prices, which occurred from 1816 to the
1814—1818. 13
close of 1818. Of this rise it is to be observed,
as of the preceding fall, that it began variously, as
applied to distinct articles at different times in
1817 and 1818. Indeed, several of the articles
which are about to be alluded to, did not begin to
rise till late in 1817, when corn had already fallen
considerably, and nearly all of them continued in
a very depressed state throughout 1816, while, as
we are about to see, the prices of provisions were
experiencing a very great rise.
Before however quitting the consideration of the
circumstances which attended the fall of prices,
and the state of agricultural and commercial dis-
tress which prevailed as the consequence of that
fall, it is to be observed, that the labouring classes
were in 1814 and 1815, and until the renewed rise
in the price of provisions, in a comparatively satis-
factory state ; as the price of labour had not fallen
in any thing like the proportion of the fall of the
. J n ^ rr-, • 1 j
prices of necessaries. I/here were indeed com-
plaints of workmen thrown out of employ, in con-
sequence of the depressed state of so many branches
of industry ; and the reduction of the numbers of
men in the army and navy created further a tem-
porary surplus ; but, notwithstanding these draw-
backs, there is every reason to believe — indeed all
the evidence of which the subject is susceptible,
proves — that the great bulk of the working popu-
lation were in an improved state, compared with
that which they experienced in 1811 and 1812.
SECTION 5.— Rise of the Prices of Corn in this
Country and on the Continent, from 1815 to the
Summer o/*1817.
The first observable tendency to an advance in
the prices of corn, after their great depression at
the close of 1815, was in the early part of 1816,
when there arose a partial demand for export of
14 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
British wheat, there being no foreign then in bond,
to the Continent of Europe, chiefly for the Medi-
terranean. But soon after this manifestation of
foreign demand, which occurred in January and
February 1816, there was a fresh cause of advance
in the extraordinary severity of the spring. The
winter generally had not been remarkably severe ;
but in February there was a frost of uncommon
degree and duration, accompanied on the 6th and
7th of that month by a very heavy fall of snow,
and thenceforward the weather was cold, and in
every respect throughout the spring inclement.
This circumstance producing apprehensions for the
coming crops in this country, being combined
moreover with accounts of scarcity and rising
prices in France and Germany, occasioned a pro-
gressive rise of prices here, insomuch that in May
the average of wheat had reached 74s., being a
rise of upwards of 20s. from the average price of
January preceding. At about which rate it con-
tinued for a few weeks in the uncertainty of pro-
spects, the weather occasionally relaxing of its
inclemency, although constantly of a low temper-
ature for the season, and chiefly dry, till the
beginning of July, when heavy rains set in, accom-
panied by cold stormy winds. The wet, boisterous,
and cold weather continued almost incessantly
thenceforward during the entire progress of the
harvest throughout the United Kingdom ; and
thus completed the character of the season as the
most inclement of any that had occurred since 1799.
The result of the corn harvest was, as might
from such a season be expected, a lamentable de-
ficiency in quantity, and a miserable inferiority of
quality. Indeed, nearly all that had been saved
of the crops was in so damp a condition, as to be
unfit for immediate use; and if it had not been for
a large surplus from former seasons, the rise of
prices, great and rapid as it was, viz. to 103s. per
1814—1818. 15
quarter before the close of the year, would have
been much greater : for, high as the prices were, and
certain as was the prospect early in the autumn,
that the average price of wheat would soon exceed
80s., and thus open the ports, the balance of our
imports for the whole year did not exceed about
100,000 quarters.
If there were not direct evidence that the
same inclemency of the season as was experi-
enced in this country, prevailed over the greater
part of the Continent of Europe, the strongest
presumption to that effect would be afforded
by the circumstance of only so insignificant a
supply having been obtained from abroad. But
further and decisive proof exists, that great as was
the deficiency of the harvest of 1816 in this country,
a still greater scarcity existed in Germany and
France, and in the South of Europe. The prices
in those densely peopled portions of the Continent
rose, in the spring of 1817, as a consequence of the
deficiency of the preceding harvest, above the level
of the prices in this country, and it was a foreign
demand alone which caused the only advance that
occurred in our markets after the close of 1816.
This fact is so important in its bearings on the
question, how far the great rise in the price of corn
between the commencement of 1816 and the sum-
mer of 1817 was caused by the state of our cur-
rency, as resulting from the Bank restriction, and
so inconsistent with the supposition of any increase
of local circulation, as having been the principal
if not the only cause of the advance of prices, that
all reference to it has been studiously, if not in
ignorance, avoided by the partisans of the doctrine
of depreciation. And for that reason it becomes
essential to dwell upon it somewhat fully. The
harvest of 1815 had not been generally on the Con-
tinent so productive as it was in this country, and
prices had begun to rise there in the autumn of
16 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
that year. In Germany, and more especially in
the south of it, and in France, the rise in the course
of that year and in 1816 was very great.*
In August, 1816, the ports of France were de-
clared to be open to importation free of duty. In
November following, the French government, by
an ordonnance, announced a bounty to be given on
importation. And although by these measures
considerable supplies were attracted from abroad,
they proved to be insufficient to allay the alarm
which seems to have been felt throughout France,
but more especially in Paris t, at the prospect of
famine, or rather at the existence of it ; for the
year 1816-17 is characterised by the French writers
as a period of actual famine. The government,
therefore, sent direct orders for purchases abroad,
* Of the great rise of prices in Germany the subjoined
quotations furnish striking specimens : —
per Winch, qr.
s. d.
At Vienna, 3d March, 1815, 43 10
23d Sept. 1815, 73 9
12th March, 1816, 75 2
and 14th Sept. 1816, 116 10
At Munich, March, 1816, 57 2
Sept. 127 2
Sept. 1817, 141 2
At Stuttgard, June, 1816, 82 9
Sept. . — 127 1
March, 1817, 138 7
(From Mr. Jacob's Report, 1826.)
Mr. J. B. Say gives the following as the average prices of
wheat in the market of Roye, in Picardy : —
liv. so. dens.
1814 7 8 0"| for the measure
1815 1112 7 I equal to 52 litres
1816 20 5 3J 2 centimes.
f The following statement, which I received from a channel
that I can rely upon, of the weekly prices of wheat in the Paris
market, shows how great and rapid was the advance in May,
and in the early part of June, 1817, and how great consequently
must have been the alarm of the French government at the
prospect of increased scarcity : —
1814— 1818. 17
through agents, for its account.* And as, in the
spring of 1817, the growing crops in that country
presented an unfavourable appearance, those orders
were extended, and became more urgent ; inso-
much that, this country being the nearest from which
immediate supplies could be obtained, orders were
received here in May of that year, by some of the
principal houses in the corn trade, to buy and ship
forthwith large quantities of wheat, which accord-
ingly were exported chiefly from London to Havre,
and others of the nearest ports of France. There
were orders also for a quantity of American flour,
which was lying at Liverpool, and which was pur-
chased for account of the French government, at
prices as high as 80s. per barrel and upwards. Pur-
chases of wheat were likewise made for account of
individuals for export to France. The whole quan-
tity shipped thither from this country, in the spring
Per Scptier.
Per Winch. Qr.
fr-
cs.
S.
d.
1817. Jan. 1. -
- 52
0
77
7
Feb. 5. -
- 57
0
84
9
Mar. 5. -
- 55
50
82
10
April 2. -
- 57
0
84
9
23. -
- 60
0
89
7
May 14. -
- 63
0
93
10
21. -
- 66
0
98
6
28. -
- 75
0
- 112
0
June 4. -
- 82
0
. 122
5
11. -
- 92
0
- 137
6
* The purchases of wheat and flour by the government of
France, in 1816 and 1817, both abroad, and in such of the de-
partments of that country as were better provided than others,
were computed to have cost, including the expenses of holding and
of resale, a sum of seventy millions of francs, about 2,800,000/.
sterling. The bounties on importation, in 1816 and 1817, were
stated by the Custom-house returns to have amounted to
10,209,243 francs. (De la Disette et de la Surabondance en
France, par P. Labouliniere, vol. ii. p. 414.)
Mr. J. B. Say also estimates the expenses incurred by the
government of France, in measures of precaution against the
famine of 1816 and 1817, as exceeding seventy millions of francs.
VOL. II. C
18 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
of 1817, is computed to have amounted to nearly,
if not quite, 300,000 quarters. This casual and
extra demand, leading to an expectation of further
orders, and occurring coincidentally with appre-
hensions of another failing harvest in this country,
in consequence of the unfavourable appearance of
our own crops, naturally gave an impulse to the
markets, which, by the middle of June, reached
an average price of 117s. per quarter for wheat.
Here, then, is not only the notorious deficiency
of the harvest of 1816 in this country, which was
calculated of itself to raise the prices of provisions
enormously, but also an unusual sudden and great
demand for corn to be exported. This export too,
be it observed, not being in the way of returns for
previous imports, or as payment for an unfavourable
balance of trade due from this country, was paid
for by France, chiefly in gold transmitted to this
country. And is it conceivable that, under such
circumstances, the rise in our prices of corn can be
ascribed simply and exclusively to operations be-
tween our government and the Bank on the cur-
rency, with a view to the increase of the issues of
Bank notes, which by the way did not come out
in time to perform the work which is supposed to
have been designed for them ? By what possible
process can such a conclusion be come to, con-
sistently with a knowledge of the facts which are
here stated, and which do not admit of being con-
troverted ? According to what definition can it be
contended, that this rise in the prices of corn,
between the spring of 1816 and the summer
of 1817, being coincident with an influx of up-
wards of seven millions of bullion into the coffers
of the Bank, raising the amount of it to a sum of
11,668,260/., — an amount beyond any that the
Bank had ever before possessed, — should be con-
sidered as resulting from a depreciation of Bank
paper ; the trifling increase of notes, up to the
1814—1818. 19
time of the utmost rise, having been in a very small
proportion to the bullion purchased ? Or could it
be said, that the existence of the Bank restriction
in this country deranged the currency of France,
and compelled her to import very large quantities
of corn, and to send gold hither in payment for the
wheat and flour shipped thither from hence at a
cost exceeding 115,9. per quarter?
In truth, the actual state of the case was an inver-
sion of the received hypothesis, namely, that, by the
export from this country of the gold which was not
necessary for our circulation, we diminished the value
of gold abroad. In the present instance, as France
sent her gold in payment to this country, and could
not replace it with paper, she cannot have had
more money, nor consequently a diminished value
of her currency, so as to account for the prices of
corn being higher there than here. Besides, in
what sense could it by possibility be contended,
that it was in consequence of the currency of France
having been deranged by alterations in our cur-
rency, that, having exported corn in 1814 and 1815,
she required a large importation in 1816 and 1817 ?
The quantity of wheat imported into France, between
the summer of 1816 and the spring of 1818, was
no less than 1,935,566 quarters. In short, turn the
theory which ascribes the rise of corn in 1816 and
1817 to the local influence of our currency in every
way possible, consistently with the facts, and it will
be found to fail wholly and in all its parts.
SECTION 6. — Fall of Prices of Corn in this Country
and in France in the Summer of 1817, and the
State of the Com Trade till the Close of 1818.
Immediately after the middle of June, 1817,
the weather, both in France and in this country,
became fine and favourable in the highest degree
to the growing crops, so that, from having a back-
c 2
20 PRICES AND CIRCULATION
ward and sickly appearance, they became luxuriant
and promising. Prices consequently declined in
both countries ; but in France more rapidly than
here, because the French government, as soon as
it was relieved from its apprehensions for the
coming harvest, let out its stores of warehoused
corn, and thus added to the natural causes of de-
pression of the markets. Accordingly, the fall in
the Paris markets, between June and September,
1817? was nearly 50 per cent. viz. from 92 fs.
the septier (1875. the quarter) on the llth of
June, to 48 fs. (71*« 9^0 on the 17th of Septem-
ber. While the markets of this country, as they
had followed the rise in France, so they likewise
followed the fall : the highest price was on the
14th of June, when wheat, in Mark-lane, sold as
high as 135,9. ; and the Gazette averages for grain
at the end of June, 1817, were, for
Wheat Ills. 6d.
Bailey 55s. 4d.
Oats 39.9. 3d.
On the 27th of September the price in Mark-
lane was as low as 74tf. 4o?. ; and the average for
the month of September was 77*« Id.
Of the produce of the crops of 1817, various
estimates were made, the prevailing opinion being
that they were somewhat deficient. The weather,
with the exception of some brilliant and very hot
days in June and the beginning of July, till harvest,
was wet and unfavourable, and the harvest itself
was late ; but the weather cleared up in the last
few days of August, and it continued favourable
through a great part of September. The prices,
in consequence, then fell, as we have seen, and the
fall of the averages was sufficient to close the ports
in November of that year. But as the weather,
during the greater part of the harvesting, though
favourable in the main, was calm and foggy, with
only short intervals in the day, of brilliant sun-
1814—1818. 21
shine, and as the rains again set in before the
harvest was fully completed, the samples of new
wheat, when brought to market, were found to be
damp and cold, and unfit for immediate use.
There being at the same time very little old corn
of good quality remaining, the few samples of the
new, which were fit for use, were in great demand,
and fetched high prices. The ports opened again
in February following : and as the surplus of the
old stock, at the harvest of 1816, had prevented
prices from rising so much as, upon such a scarcity,
they otherwise would have done ; so the want of a
surplus after so bad a harvest as that of 1816, pre-
vented so great a fall of prices as might otherwise
have been the consequence of a crop so little, if
at all, below an average, as that of 1817. The
averages at the close of 1817 were, for
Wheat - 85s. 4<d.
Barley - 45,9. lid.
Oats - - ZJs. Wd.
The season of 1818 was of an extraordinary
character, and in some respects a contrast in the
extreme to that of 1816. After a rather wet
spring, dry weather commenced about the middle
of May, and continued almost uninterruptedly,
throughout the country south of the Trent, till
the middle of September. * This drought of four
* Mr. Joseph Sandars, of Liverpool, has obligingly communi-
cated to me a description of the season of 1818, from a memo-
randum book, in \\hich he had, at the time of its occurrence,
recorded his observations on it with reference to the corn
trade, with which he was and is extensively connected. The
following is an extract from it, which, with his permission,
I insert: —
" The harvest of 1818 was rather a singular one ; the in-
tensely hot and dry weather caused reaping to commence in
July in the southern counties. Wheat was computed to be an
average crop; but oats, barley, beans, and peas were supposed
to be more than one half deficient. Beans were not one fourth
of a crop. In the beginning of September there was neither
c 3
22 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
months' continuance, was more severe than any
that had been experienced in this country since
1794. Apprehensions were in consequence enter-
tained of stunted crops of every description of
vegetation. Hay got up to 9^ and 10/. the load.
Beans, peas, turnips, and potatoes were supposed
to have totally failed. It was on the ground of
anticipations of scarcity, in consequence of this
character of the season, that British corn was
bought freely on speculation, and that many farmers
were induced to hold back their stocks : many per-
sons, likewise, importers as well as dealers and
farmers, reasoned erroneously on the operation of
the corn laws, and supposed that, when once the
ports were shut, having the monopoly of the home
market, they would be secure of obtaining, at
worst, within a trifle of the opening price of 80s.
When, however, towards the latter part of 1818,
the importation of foreign wheat was found be so
large, amounting, as it did, by the end of the year,
to upwards of one million rive hundred thousand
quarters, and at the same time the yield of our own
crop was reported to be better than, from the small-
ness of the bulk of straw, had been expected, the
markets for this description of corn gave way ; the
grass nor turnips, and very few potatoes. In the south, it was
computed that potatoes would not be one fourth of a crop.
About the first week of September some rain fell, and suddenly
the face of the country was changed ; the fields, which had
been perfectly white and brown, became green. Potatoes grew
very fast. Turnips sprang up where none had appeared ; and
even spring corn began to come up. Great preparations had,
however, been made to ward off famine. Immense quantities
of barley, oats, and rye came from the Baltic; large quantities
of Indian corn from America; and beans and Indian corn from
Italy and Egypt. Hay came from New York, and barley from
Constantinople. In October, oats were worth 5s. to 5s. 6d. per
bushel of 45 Ib. ; barley, 8s, to 10s. per bushel of 60 Ib. ; wheat,
12s. to 12s. 9d. per bushel of 70 Ib.; beans, 70s. to 80s. per
quarter. The winter, however, was the mildest ever known,
and there was plenty of grass all winter."
1814—1818. 23
average price at the close of 1818 being 78*. Wd.
per quarter. But, while wheat had thus fallen,
although still at a scarcity price, all other descrip-
tions of grain were considerably higher at the close
of 1818 than they had been at the close of 1817:
for instance —
Dec. 1817. Dec. 1818.
Barley - 45s. 11^. 63s. 6d,
Oats - 27s. Wd. 35s. Id.
Beans 54,9. lOd. 76,9. Od.
Peas 5<2s, lid. 70s. Od.
It is clear, therefore, that the relative prices
were under the influence of the season, and that
they were indicative of a general deficiency of
produce ; a circumstance which is to be specially
borne in mind, when the subsequent fall of prices
comes under consideration.
SECTION 7. — Prices of Commodities from 1816 to
the Close of 1818.
The commonly received notion of the rise of
prices, which is imputed to the temporary abandon-
ment, in 1816, of the supposed preparations for
cash payments, is, that the rise was a nearly simul-
taneous one, not only of wheat, but of most other
articles, immediately following a great enlargement
of the Bank issues. The impression to this effect
is, however, altogether erroneous. The rise in
the price of wheat, it has been seen, began early in
1816, and reached, by the end of that year, nearly
its greatest height ; the only advance after that
time being confined to a very short period in the
following spring, under the influence of a foreign
demand. But in most other articles, the greatest
depression of markets prevailed throughout the
greater part of 1816, and many, indeed most,
c 4
Q4< PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
articles were falling, while the prices of provisions
were rising. It was not till towards the close of
1816 that many important articles of consumption,
which had been greatly depressed, experienced an
improved demand with an evident tendency to
higher prices. The very low prices of 1815 and
1816 had induced a greatly increased consump-
tion. The stocks of importers, dealers, and ma-
nufacturers had become greatly reduced ; and a
general confidence began to prevail among the
best informed persons in the several branches of
trade, that prices had, for that period, seen their
lowest, inasmuch as the stock in hand of most of
the leading articles had become manifestly be-
low the average rate of consumption.
The causes of the falling off of supply were various.
The following may be enumerated as some among
them. The discouragement and despondency con-
sequent on the great fall of prices in the interval
between 1813 and 1816, had induced a general
disinclination in 1816 to embark to the accustomed
extent in fresh importations. But this state of
depression and despondency, which would of itself
have led to diminished supplies in 1816, happened
to coincide with a very unpropitious season,
which occasioned a great deficiency of many de-
scriptions of produce besides corn, not only in this
country, but over a great part of Europe. The in-
clemency of the season occasioned a failure of the
vintage in France, and of the crops of silk and oil in
Italy, besides directly or indirectly affecting flax, tal-
low, wool, hops, and numerous other articles. There
occurred about the same time a nearly total failure
of the whale fishery. Accordingly, the scarcity
was very general. There are, indeed, no instances,
except those of 1808 and 1811, of a scarcity or
falling off so great and so general, of imported
commodities, as in 1816 and 1817. The falling
off of the importations of 1816, compared with
1814—1818.
those of 1814 and 1815, is, indeed, quite striking,
as will appear by the following statement : —
Imports into Great Britain.
Years.
Silk.
Wool.
Coffee.
Hemp.
Tallow.
Flax.
Linseed.
1814
1815
1816*
Ib.
2,280,223
1,800,333
1,137,922
ft.
15,712,517
14,991,713
8,117,864
Cwt.
1,029,556
815,440
499,075
Tons.
27,264
36,575
18,473
Tons.
29,445
32,082
20,858
Tons.
26,238
17,550
12,371
Bush.
1,364,959
766,983
567,138
Such a falling off of supply was naturally calcu-
lated to attract attention during the progress of
the importations ; and when these were ascertained
to be deficient in so great a degree, a general dis-
position among dealers to lay in stocks became
evident : such a state of things is usually the pre-
cursor of a spirit of speculation. This, therefore,
although not yet developed at the close of 1816,
was then on the eve of displaying itself, and the
full effect was exhibited in the great rise of prices,
which took place in 1817 and in 1818, of some of
the articles of which there was so marked a defici-
ency of supply. The most striking instances of
advance were silks, coffee, tallow, linseed, and oils,
which, in the course of 1817 and 1818, experienced
a rise of 50 to 100 per cent, from their lowest
point of previous depression. With the ex-
ception of coffee, the articles which were most
distinctly the subjects of speculation, were those
of which the scarcity was attributable to the effects
of the extreme of wet in 1816, and of drought in
1818. This was particularly the case with linseed,
tallow, and spring corn. And the price of oils
advanced, not only from the same general cause,
but also from the failure, in the two successive
seasons of 1816 and 1817, of the northern whale
fishery.
In 1815 and the early part of 1816, the exports
* Of cotton there was no falling off in the import, and no
advance, worth mentioning, of the price.
26 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
from this country had been made with great for-
bearance and prudence, because almost every class
of merchants was at that time suffering from the
effects of the too great eagerness of adventure of the
two preceding years : this general forbearance was,
of course, attended by a large profit to those who
adventured ; and the consequence of the favour-
able result of shipments on a small scale was, as
usual on such occasions, not only that the houses
regularly in the trade extended their shipments,
but that fresh adventurers embarked in^them to a
considerable extent.
Under these circumstances, all indicating re-
vived confidence, there arose inevitably a tend-
ency to speculation ; and it is quite clear, that
there must, in consequence, have been an advance
of prices, and a considerable enlargement of the
circulation, through the medium of private paper,
and of transactions on credit, independently of
any increase of the Bank issues.
The extraordinary character of the season of
1818 has already been noticed, as having given
rise to extensive speculations on the apprehended
scarcity of several descriptions of produce, such
as spring corn and the leguminous tribes, which
were supposed to be irretrievably destroyed by the
great drought, which prevailed from May till the
middle of September of that year. This circum-
stance is to be borne in mind, as contributing, with
the deficiency of imported produce, greatly to
extend the sphere of speculation. Accordingly
there prevailed, during a part of 1817 and a part
of 1818, that sort of excitement which charac-
terises periods of speculation. And that period
is, therefore, referred to by the partisans of de-
preciation, as one of great prosperity, produced
simply, as they assert, by an extension of the paper
circulation, which alone had caused that rise of
prises. A state of prosperity, it doubtless was,
1814—1818. 27
as long as it lasted, to those who were gain-
ing, or appeared to be gaining, by the rising
markets ; but, to the bulk of the population, those
rising markets were the occasion of privation and
suffering : witness the disturbed state of the popu-
lation at that time. And with regard to the degree
in which that prosperity, as it is called, arose out of
the state of the Bank circulation, we shall, in the
next few pages, have occasion to see how little found-
ation there is for the imputed connection between
the Bank issues, or the circulation generally, with
the high prices of 1817 and 1818, in the relation of
cause and effect. In the mean time it is to be ob-
served, that the causes of casual scarcity of supply,
which, as has been seen, had been the occasion of
the high prices, had ceased to operate, and a
change was thenceforward in progress, tending
to the restoration of abundance, and to the con-
sequent subsidence of prices. This tendency had
already become manifest in most articles, at the
close of 1818. But as the extent of the increased
importations of 1818, both of corn and of other ar-
ticles of consumption, was not ascertained, nor
its full effect appreciated, till the commencement
of 1819, a statement of them, and of the conse-
quences which they were calculated to produce,
arid did produce, will be reserved for consideration
in the next epocha. Suffice it here to say, in gene-
ral terms, and in anticipation of the comparative
statement which will appear at the commencement
of the ensuing epocha, that the importations, which
were in progress at the close of 1818, were, with
reference to the previous state of markets and of
prices, of overwhelming magnitude, and such as
must, under a uniform state of the currency, in-
evitably have entailed very great depression of
prices.
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 8. — State of the Circulation from 1814
to 1818.
Having thus seen how fully the variations in the
prices of corn and of other commodities, in the
interval which has passed under review, namely,
from the commencement of 1814 to the close of
1818, admit of being accounted for by circum-
stances affecting the supply and demand, without
reference to the circulation, we shall proceed to
take a survey of the manner in which the issues
of the Bank were regulated, in order to be enabled
to judge how far they may be inferred to have ex-
ercised a direct influence on prices.
The position of the Bank of England, on the
28th of February, 1814, was —
Circulation. £ Securities. £
Notes of 51. and upwards 16,455-54-0 Fublic 23,630,317
Under 51. - - 8,34.5,540 Private 18,359,593
24,801,080 41,989,810
Deposits 12,455,460 Bullion 2,204,430
Liabilities 37,256,540 Assets 44,194,340
The price of gold was at that time 5l. 8.v., of
standard silver 6,9. ll^d. ; the exchange on Ham-
burg 29s., and on Paris 21 fs — It is perfectly clear,
therefore, that, with the exchanges in that state,
if the Bank had at that time been called upon to
make immediate preparations for cash payments,
that amount of paper could not have been retained
in circulation. A great and violent contraction
of its issues must have been resorted to. And
the effect of the contraction would have been to
have accelerated the fall, which was already in
progress, of the prices of corn and of other Euro-
pean produce, and to have terminated more abruptly
the speculations which were then going forward
1814—1818. 29
in exportable commodities. But the contraction
would have been rendered necessary ; not because
the amount existing was greater than could have
been maintained in a convertible state of the
paper, provided that there had been no extraordi-
nary foreign expenditure pressing upon the ex-
changes ; but that the foreign expenditure then
going forward, was on so enormous a scale, as could
only be counteracted, and that perhaps not effec-
tually, by the utmost practicable reduction of the
issues. It may, indeed, be argued, that, as the
Continent had ceased to be shut against us, and
as the exports were so large at the close of 1813,
and the early part of 1814, they should have gone
a considerable way towards answering the demands
for foreign payment. And so they did to a great
extent, but not far enough ; for, in the first place,
a large proportion of the exports on that occasion
were speculative, for account of the shippers on
this side, and, therefore, did not bring immediate
returns ; and, in the next place, the concluding
efforts of this country, in pecuniary aid to the allied
armies in the North of Europe, and in the pay
of our own armies, and fleets, and transports in the
South of Europe, and in winding up the arrears of
the commissariat accounts, were, in a financial
point of view, of a magnitude that is almost pass-
ing belief. The importations of corn were at the
same time considerable. The extra foreign ex-
penditure, under these two heads, was —
1813. Government expenditure .€21,817,313
Corn imported 2,192,592
£ 24,099,905
1814. Government 26,945,027
Corn imported 2,815,319
29,310,346
a£ 53,320,251
It is to be observed, moreover, that of this
30 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
enormous extra expenditure in 1814, the greater
part was crowded into the first three or four
months of that year. And the importations, be-
sides those of corn, were on a greatly extended
scale, compared with those of the two years pre-
ceding.
A decisive proof, however, that although the
amount of the circulation was excessive, with re-
ference to the maintenance of the paper on a level
with its standard under such extraordinary circum-
stances, it was not so when the operation of those
circumstances had abated and eventually ceased,
is to be derived from the fact, that, not only with-
out any reduction of the amount of Bank notes,
but positively in the face of an increase, the ex-
changes rose, and the price of gold fell rapidly. The
preliminaries of peace between the allied powers
and France were signed in April, 1814 ; and within
the six months following, the price of gold had
fallen to 4/. 56'., and the exchanges had risen to
33s. on Hamburgh, and to 23 fs. 30 cents, on Paris.
The prices of commodities, too, in that interval,
fell considerably. And yet, in that interval, the
circulation of the Bank had been greatly extended,
as will appear by the following statement of its posi-
tion on 31st of August, 1814 : —
Circulation. £ Securities. sS
Notes of 51. and upwards 18,703,210 Public 34,982,485
Notes under 51. - 9,665,080 Private 13,363,475
28,368,290 48,345,960
Deposits 14,849,940 Bullion 2,097,680
Liabilities 43,218,230 Assets 50,443,640
Here, by the miserable policy of the govern-
ment, and by the weak compliance of the Bank,
inconsistent with the professions of the directors, —
there being no urgent plea of state necessity, — an
addition was made of upwards of ten millions to
their public securities, an increase of more than
1814—1818. 31
two millions to the circulation of notes of 51. and
upwards, and of nearly three millions and a half,
including notes under 5l. And if these issues are
compared with those of February, 1813, they will
be found to have increased by upwards of five
millions !
And yet, in the greater part of the innumerable
speeches and pamphlets, to which the interminable
controversy on the currency has given rise, the
Bank is confidently stated, or obviously assumed,
to have begun, in 1814, its preparations for cash
payments !
But, injudicious and impolitic as was, in every
point of view, that enlargement of the Bank circu-
lation at this time, the only effect of it seems' to
have been that of arresting the improvement of
the exchanges, and the further fall in the price of
gold. If, therefore, notwithstanding this ill-ad-
vised large addition to the Bank issues, which was
entirely in advances to government, the exchanges
were upwards of 30 per cent, higher, and the price
gold nearly 20 per cent, lower, than they had been,
and the prices of corn and of all other commodities
falling, the presumption is the strongest possible,
that, had the amount of the Bank circulation been
simply confined to what it had been in February,
1814, being a larger amount than it had ever be-
fore attained, the value of the paper would have
been completely restored, and bullion would have
been flowing into the coffers of the Bank. And the
conclusion, moreover, is hence all but irresistible,
that, during the whole of the preceding interval of
five years, the amount of the circulation, such as
it was, would not have been in excess, but for the
extraordinary circumstances of the times, which
necessarily created an unusual and increasing de-
mand for and absorption of gold, and consequently
conferred on it a greatly increased value.
This enlargement of the Bank issues in 1814,
32 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
so much at variance with the received notion with
respect to that period, as being the commencement
of preparation for cash payments, did not prevent,
although it may possibly have broken, the fall of
prices of corn and other commodities. The extent
of the general fall of prices, and the circumstances
connected with it, independently of any reference
to the currency, have already been described ; and
it here only remains to place in juxtaposition the
average circulation of the Bank in the last quarter
of 1814, and of the two preceding years, with the
average price of wheat at the close of each of those
years.
The comparison will stand thus : —
Bank notes of 51. ™71 L . ,-.
and upwards. Wheat in Dec.
£ per Qr.
Last quarter of 1812 - 15,647,350
1813 - 16,092,590 - 73s.
1814 - 18,502,690 - 65s. 8d.
And in January, 1815, the price had further de-
clined to 62s.
It is here particularly to be observed, that the
increased issue in 1813 and 1814, coincident with
so great a fall of prices, was through the medium
of advances to government.
There was in the course of 1815, a reduction of
the Bank circulation, to the extent, however, of
only about five hundred thousand pounds, in the
first six months of that year, during which, as has
been seen, there was a temporary rise of 7s. to 8*.
in the price of wheat, under the influence of a
speculative opinion on the probable effects of the
renewal of the war on the Continent, in conse-
quence of the return of Bonaparte from Elba.
The event here alluded to, namely, the landing
of Napoleon in France, had the effect of instantly
depressing the exchanges, and raising the price of
1814—1818. 33
gold in an extraordinary deegre * ; and as this
effect took place at a time, and under circum-
stances in which it was clear, beyond the possibi-
lity of doubt, that our internal circulation had
undergone no corresponding alteration, it has
served as a striking illustration in proof of the posi-
tion, that an exchange adverse, beyond the mere
expenses of transmission of the metals, does not
necessarily imply a preceding increase of the quan-
tity of money, nor consequently, in an incon-
vertible state of the paper, a depreciation of the
currency, in any other sense than that of a mere
reference to its standard. After the battle of
Waterloo the exchanges rose, and the price of gold
fell as rapidly as they had just before tended in
an opposite direction.! There was, in the last six
* The exchanges which immediately previous to the intel-
ligence of that event had been, on Hamburg - 32. 3.
and on Paris - 22. 10.
suddenly fell to 285. on Hamburg, and 18fs. 80 cs. on Paris,
and the price of gold rose from 47. 9s. the ounce to 51. 7s.
+ The inference to be derived from this circumstance against
the ultra doctrine of depreciation is so clearly and forcibly put
by Mr. Blake, that justice cannot be so well done to the argu-
ment as by here introducing the following extract from his
work already quoted : —
" It was the want of connection between the amount of
Bank notes and the price of bullion, that first led me to suspect
the accuracy of the theory, that attributed the high price of
gold to the over issues of the Bank ; and the suspicion gave
way to absolute conviction, upon the events that took place
on the peace in 1814, and the return of Bonaparte from Elba
in 1815.
" When the war ceased in 1814, the price of gold bullion
was five guineas per ounce, that is nearly 30 per cent, above
the Mint price, and it had been at that price, upon an average,
ever since the latter end of the year 1812. From May, 1814,
it fell gradually, and was at 4/. 9s. per ounce before the follow-
ing March, the exchange experiencing, pari passu, a corres-
ponding improvement: on the arrival of the news of Bonaparte's
landing in France from Elba, the exchange varied at once 10
per cent., and continued falling, whilst the price of gold
mounted as rapidly to 51. 6s. per ounce. All the symp-
toms that had been considered as indicating a depreciation of
VOL. II. D
34) PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
months of 1815, a further reduction of the Bank
circulation ; but still leaving the amount higher
than it had been in 1813, and in the first six months
of 1814.
the currency, previously to the peace of 1814, immediately
manifested themselves, and continued during the one hundred
days of Bonaparte's power. The battle of Waterloo again put
an end to the war, and, from that moment the exchange gra-
dually recovered. The price of gold fell back proportionably,
and in the course of the following year was at C6l. 18s. 6d. per
ounce, that is, within l^d. of the Mint price.
" During the whole of this period there was but little vari-
ation in the Bank issues, the numerical account of the notes,
in the beginning of 1814, and the end of 1815, being about
twenty-five millions. They had been, at one time, in the course
of two years, as high as twenty-eight millions ; but, by a perver-
sity most unfortunate for the theory of depreciation, the issues
of notes were continually augmenting, whilst the exchanges
were improving, and the price of gold falling : these events
speak volumes. In the midst of peace, when all the symptoms
of depreciation were gradually subsiding, when commodities
were selling at prices corresponding with the amount then in
circulation, a great political event occurs, entailing the probabi-
lity of a new war, and of a great foreign expenditure. In an
instant, without any change in the amount of circulation, or of
consumable produce, the exchanges fall between 20 and 30 per
cent., and the price of gold mounts in the same proportion
above the Mint price. This state continues for one hundred
days, and at the expiration of that period, when the battle of
Waterloo, and the march of the allies to Paris, put an end to
all further expectation of a continuance of the war, the cur-
rency still maintaining its relative proportion to commodities,
all the movements begin to retrograde, and every thing returns
to its former state of quiescence.
" If the symptoms that occurred during this short interval, are
to be considered as proofs of an alteration in the value of the
currency, it is in vain to continue the argument. To my mind,
they demonstrate incontestably, that the anticipation of a large
foreign expenditure acted suddenly and powerfully on the
exchanges, and as suddenly, through the intervention of the
exchanges, on the price of gold.
" If alterations in the amount of the currency had been the
moving force, the price of gold, instead of rising, ought to
have fallen. Can there be a doubt then, that in this case the
gold was raised for a time above the level of the currency, and
afterwards fell back to it ? And if in this case, why not in
1814—1818. 35
If, therefore, the further decline, which took
place in the price of wheat, at the close of 18 J 5,
viz. to 55s. 6oL be ascribed exclusively to the
reduction of the Bank circulation, why, with a
much lower state of the circulation, should the
prices in 1812 and 1813 have been so much higher?
But in the first three months of 1816 there was
an increase of about five hundred thousand pounds,
compared with the preceding quarter ; and yet
the prices of grain, including spring corn, rather
gave way ; the averages standing thus : —
Wheat. Barley. Oats.
1816. January 52s. 6d. - 24*. Sd. - 18*. Id.
February 56s. 6d. - 24*. Sd. - 18*. 5d.
March " 54*. Sd. - 23s. 6d. - 17*. Sd.
And in further proof of the absence of the im-
puted connection, the average circulation under-
went a small reduction in the second quarter of
1816, while the price of wheat rose upwards of
20s. the quarter; thus in the three months ending
Bank Notes of 51. Price of Wheat
and upwards. in March,
31 March .^17,484,520 54*. Sd.
in June,
30 June 17,311,280 J5s. 4<d.
But it may be, as it has been argued, that be-
tween the last six months of 1814 and the first
six months of 1816 the amount of the Bank issues
formed no criterion of the amount of the circulat-
ing medium, inasmuch as in that interval there had
been so great a chasm in the general circulation by
the failure of country banks, and by the other nu-
others that occurred previously to the peace of 1814, when
the same disturbed forces were in action ?
" This fact alone throws all the onus probandi on the advo-
cates for depreciation." p. 21.
D 2
36 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
merous failures, and the consequent commercial
discredit, as was very inadequately supplied by the
increase which had taken place in the Bank circu-
lation. This is very true, and there can be no
question that the mere returns of the Bank circu-
lation do not at all times furnish a criterion of the
relative amount of the circulating medium. But
if this be so, what becomes of the innumerable
statements which implicitly proceed upon the as-
sumption that the Bank issues did furnish such
criterion ? And what is of more importance in the
argument, what becomes of the assertion, that the
Bank contracted its circulation in the interval above
alluded to, in preparation for cash payments, and
that it was the contraction of the Bank circulation
that caused the failures of the country banks, and
the general discredit which prevailed at that time?
assumptions to this effect being essential to the
currency theory.
It is quite clear that so great a fall of prices as
took place between 1813 and 1816 could not fail
of producing failures and general discredit, and a
great reduction of the credit part of the circulation.
But it is a fact susceptible of the fullest proofs,
that prices fell before any reduction of the circu-
lation of the country banks had taken place. The
reduction of that part of the circulating medium
was an inevitable consequence, and not the cause
of the fall of prices ; as the previous growth of it had
been the consequence of the tendency of markets
from causes distinctly affecting the supply and de-
mand to a rise of prices, so a contraction ne-
cessarily followed the fall of prices. As there had
been an expansion * to admit of the operation of
* As the state of bullion prices in this country in 1816, and
the earlier part of 1817, was below its usual level, compared with
other countries ; if there had been no expansion of credit, there
must have been a still greater influx of bullion than that which
occurred, great as it was, at the period above-mentioned.
1814—1818. 37
the elevating causes, there was necessarily a collapse
upon the occurrence of those of an opposite tend-
ency. The extraordinary circumstances prevailing
in the interval from 1811 to 1814 were calculated
to raise prices, and consequently to promote a
growth of private paper and credit, and the change
or simply the withdrawal of the operation of those
causes between 1814 and 1816, was naturally fol-
by a cessation and removal of that excrescent
growth.* But as the upward tendency of prices,
and the consequent extended use of credit impart
the appearance of prosperity to the period in which
they prevail, so is the opposite state of falling
prices and collapsing credit invariably character-
ised as one of adversity and distress : and in the
interval here alluded to, the fall (and a great fall
it was) of prices, having extended to nearly all
descriptions of produce, the distress was great in
degree, and very widely spread. t
It may be doubted, however, whether, with the
exception of the agricultural classes, the distresses
* The great destruction of country paper, and the consequent
reduction of the circulating medium, as having originated in the
previous fall of prices of agricultural produce, was noticed by
Mr. Horner on his motion in the House of Commons respecting
cash payments, on May 1. 1816, in the following terms : —
" From inquiries which he had made, and from the accounts
on the table, he was convinced that a greater and more sudden
reduction of the circulating medium had never taken place in
any country, than had taken place in this country, with the
exception of those reductions which had happened in France,
after the Mississippi scheme, and after the destruction of the
assignats. He should not go into the question how this reduc-
tion had been effected, though it was a very curious one, and
abounded in illustration of the principles which had been so
much disputed in that House. The reduction of the currency
had originated in the previous fall of the prices of agricultural
produce. This fall had produced a destruction of the country
bank paper to an extent which would not have been thought
possible without more ruin than had ensued."
-f- It is to be specially observed that the greater part of the
rise in the price of corn in 1816, took place during the severest
pressure of both agricultural and commercial distress.
D 3
38 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
consequent on the great fall of prices, and the
commercial discredit, were so great between 1814
and 1816, as they had been between 1810 and
1812. In as far as the number of commissions of
bankruptcy can be considered as any criterion,
those issued in 1810 to 1812, indicate a greater
number of failures than in 1814 to 1816. The
comparison stands thus : —
Number of Commissions Against Bankers
in each year. in each year.
1810, - 2314 26
1811, - 2500 4
1812, 2228 17
7042 — 47
1814, - 1612 29
1815, 2284 26
1816, - 2731 37
6627 — 92
The greater number of commissions against
bankers, chiefly country bankers, in the latter period,
may be naturally accounted for by the circum-
stance, that although in the former interval there
had been considerable losses among the agricul-
turists, and in the corn trade, they bore but a small
proportion to the losses sustained by these in the
latter period, and as a large part of the advances
by country bankers at that time was upon farming
stock, and upon the personal security of farmers
and cattle dealers, the more extensive failure of
these would entail that of an increased number of
the country bankers.
But the most important consideration arising out
of the comparison of the two periods is, that it
tends to throw additional light on the question of
the degree of influence to be ascribed to the circu-
lation of the Bank of England in producing the
distress that prevailed from 1814 to 1816.
There is so great a similarity of the state of the
circulation and of credit between those two periods,
and the inferences resulting from that similarity are
so important, that it may be worth while to notice
1814—1818. 39
some of the most striking features of resemblance,
more especially as the partisans both of the agri-
cultural claims, and of the doctrine of depreciation,
refer to the period between 1808 and 1814, as being
one of transcendent and uninterrupted prosperity.
In both cases the speculations in the two
years preceding the revulsion had originated in the
great political and commercial changes which then
occurred, without any coincident enlargement of
the circulation of the Bank of England. In both
cases an increase of country bank notes, and a great
extension of credit, appear to have attended the
progress of the advance of prices, while the amount
of circulation of the Bank of England was nearly
stationary. In both cases, some enlargement of the
Bank circulation accompanied the first fall of
prices. In both cases a great and sudden increase
of Bank of England notes was issued to supply the
chasm caused in the circulation by the shock to
general credit, from the failures consequent upon
the sudden fall of prices. In both cases, although
the death-blow had been struck by the first revulsion,
the parties lingered for many months after : thus
the number of bankruptcies on the average of 1811
and 1812, was greater than it had been in 1810 ;
as in 1815 and 1816 it was greater than in 1814.
In both cases, after the sudden enlargement of the
Bank issues which had been made to meet the first
great shock to credit, a part of the enlarged issues
was withdrawn.*
* The average of Bank notes of 5l. and upwards, was,
a£
Two last quarters of 1810 - 16,974,850
Ditto 1811 - - 15,565,315
Decrease 1,409,535
Two last quarters of 1814 - 18,785,305
Ditto 1815 - - 17,313,875
Decrease 1,471,430
D 4
40 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
From a comparison, therefore, of these two pe-
riods so singularly analogous, it seems to be just as
reasonable to conclude, that the great fall of prices,
the failures of the country bankers, the state of
commercial discredit, and the consequent great
contraction of the circulation at the close of 1811,
was caused by the Bank of England and the country
banks preparing for cash payments, as that such
preparation was the cause of the contraction of the
general circulation at the close of 1815, when the
lowest point of depression of the latter period oc-
curred. And as if in order to complete the ana-
logy, it may be observed, that the rise of 50 per
cent, in the price of wheat which occurred in the
first six months of 1812, was coincident with a
state of the Bank circulation, lower than that of
the corresponding six months of 1811, so likewise
there was in the first six months of 1816 a rise in
the price of wheat of 50 per cent., coincident with
a similar decrease of the Bank circulation, as com-
pared with the corresponding six months of 1815.*
And if the average of the whole twelve months of
each of those years be taken, there will still appear to
have been a decrease in 1812 and in 1816, as com-
pared respectively with 1811 and 1815, although
the decrease would not be quite so striking, still
* The comparison stands thus : —
Average of notes of
5l. and upwards.
eS
Two first quarters of 1811 16,185,380
Ditto 1812 15,637,505
Decrease 54-7,875
Two first quarters of 1815 18,016,020
Ditto 1816 17,397,900
Decrease 620,120
1814—1818. 41
leaving, however, the analogy between the two
periods complete.
But the assignment of a designed contraction of
the circulation, as a cause of the fall of prices, and
consequent distress in 1815 and 1816 is so material
to the currency theory, that in order to supply the
insufficiency of the alleged diminution of the
amount of the circulation, the supporters of that
theory have recourse to the very gratuitous suppo-
sition that the mode by which the Bank notes come
into circulation makes an important difference in
the effects. And accordingly it is asserted that a
reduction of the Bank advances to government,
which took place between August 1815 and Fe-
bruary 1816, to the amount of nearly five millions,
must have been productive of peculiar influence
on the value of the currency. Now, in the first
place, the Bank directors, who were examined in
1819, and again in 1832, were of opinion from
their experience, that it was the amount and not
the mode of their issue that was of importance in
the effects on the money market* The chief ob-
jection to have a large proportion in advances to
government being, that it was not sufficiently
within their control. In the next place, it might
be shown, on general grounds, that the difference
of the mode of issue, supposing the amount the
same, is not calculated to produce the effect im-
* Mr. Henry Thornton, on Paper Credit, p. 97.. states an
opinion to the same effect.
" The government is only one large borrower from the Bank ;
the merchants are a number of similar though smaller borrowers.
Whether therefore the Bank lent more to individuals, and less
to government, or less to government and more to individuals, the
effect as to the number of notes allowed to be in circulation must
have been equal. The exchequer, after receiving notes from the
Bank, almost as quickly pays them away, and thus sends them into
the common circulation as the merchant does ; and it is the total
quantity of circulating notes, and not the manner in which they
come into circulation that is the material point."
42 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
puted. But a discussion of the general grounds
would lead to an inconvenient length, and it is
superfluous to enter upon them, because, thirdly,
the facts of the case are quite decisive upon the
point. If it was the part of the circulation so is-
sued that produced the alleged great influence on
prices, how happened it that during the fourteen
years immediately following the Bank restriction,
viz. till the close of the year 1810, the real cash
advances to government were of smaller positive
amount, and bore a smaller proportion to the whole
of the circulation, than the investments by the Bank
in government securities at any subsequent period.
Yet in that interval of comparatively small advances
to government occurred the phenomena of as high
prices as any that marked the remaining term of
the Bank restriction * ; while on the other hand
the greatest increase of advances was coincident
with the fall of prices in 1813 and 1814.
The advances were —
Wheat.
In Aug. 1812 - - ^21,165,190 156*. Od.
Aug. 1813 25,591,336 112*. 6d.
Aug. 1814 34,982,485 73*. Sd.
The inference, however, apparently intended to
be drawn from the fact of the repayment by go-
vernment to the Bank between August 1815 and
February following, on which so much stress is
laid as to its influence on prices of the reduction
of the public securities of the Bank is, that it en-
tailed a corresponding, or at least a considerable
* A striking instance of a very great relative reduction of the
Bank advances to government, followed by a very great rise in
the price of wheat in 1805, has already been noticed, but is so
material a point as to be worth here repeating.
Advances. Wheat.
In August 1804 j£!4,993,395 59s. 9d.
Ditto 1805 11,413,266 98s. 4d.
1814—1818.
reduction of issues.* But the following compara-
tive statement of the position of the Bank in
August 1815 and February 1816 will show that the
total amount of the circulation was not materially
affected by that repayment, while of 5L notes and
upwards it was rather larger at the latter date : —
1815.
Securities.
Notes of 51 and
upwards
Notes under 5/.
31 August,
Circulation.
£
17,766,140
9,482,530
Public
Private
£
24,194,086
20,660,094
27,248,670
Deposits 12,696,000
44,854,180
Bullion 3,409,040
Liabilities 39,944,670
Assets 48,263,220
Circulation.
Notes of 51. and £
upwards 18,012,220
Notes under 51 f 9,001 ,400
29 February, 1816.
Securities.
£
Public 19,425,780
Private 23,975,530
27,013,620
Deposits 1 2,388,890
43,401,310
Bullion, 4,640,880
Liabilities 39,402,510
Assets, 48,042,190
Rest 8,639,680?.
* Extract from Mr. M. Attwood's speech in the House of
Commons, p. 387., June 12. 1822: —
" The House will recollect that the question of the return to
payments in cash by the Bank in money of the old value was
f The reduction of the amount of small notes was probably
compensated by the guineas which were then beginning to come
out of private hoards ; and this circumstance will account for
a further reduction of small notes which was thenceforward in
progress.
£ The difference between the liabilities and the assets is in
the Bank accounts termed the rest. In the previous references
which I have thus far had occasion to make to the position of
the Bank at particular periods, I have not taken any notice of
the rest, because it does not appear to have had any direct bear-
ing on the points under discussion. It is here only introduced
for the purpose of observing that the above amount is about the
highest which it ever reached, and it was in the spring of 1816
that an addition of 25 per cent, was made to the capital stock
of the proprietors, out of this surplus profit, without any further
call.
44 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
But if the partisans of the currency doctrine
have most egregiously misconceived, or at any
rate misstated and perverted, the order of time in
which the fall of prices and the contraction of the
Bank circulation took place, in their account of
the causes of the agricultural and commercial dis-
tress which prevailed in 1815 and 1816, they have
equally done so in their explanation of the rise of
prices, and the renewed appearances of prosperity
in the interval from 1816 to 1818, They contend
that the experiment * (which is gratuitously as-
never discussed by parliament, without that other question of
the repayment to the Bank of its advances to government com-
ing under consideration at the same time, as undoubtedly and
essentially connected with it. What then was the nature of the
connection between the resumption of cash payments by the
Bank, and the amount of its advances to government? It was,
that the resumption of cash payments in money of the old
standard required that a reduction of the amount of Bank
notes, and an increase in their value, should be previously ef-
fected ; and that as it was in advances to government that these
notes had been principally issued and circulated, so the repay-
ment of those advances afforded the most convenient and the
only practicable mode by which they could be withdrawn ; and
on these transactions it is, connected with this debt, and lost
sight of altogether by the Right Honourable Gentleman, on
which the alterations experienced since the war in the value of
money do almost entirely depend ; on which the rise in the
value of money in 1815 and 1816, and its subsequent depreci-
ation in the two succeeding years entirely turn ; and mainly the
second rise in the value of money commencing in 1818."
A reference is then made to the reduction of the debt to the
Bank, which took place between the month of August 1815
and the month of February 1816.
* In a further passage of the speech of Mr. Attwood, of the 12th
of June, 1822, " It (the experiment with a view to cash payments)
has," he said, " been twice made. It was made in the years 1815
and 1816. It was the cause of all the calamities, never to be for-
gotten, which then befel the country. The fall of prices then ex-
perienced was its necessary consequence. It was abandoned, at
the commencement of 1816, by the administration, alarmed by
the consequences of its own measures. The debt which had been
repaid was again advanced. The money which had been with-
drawn was again and in haste returned to the circulation. The
1814—1818. 45
sumed to have been made of preparing for cash
payments, by a contraction of the Bank circulation),
was abandoned at the commencement of 1816, that
the debt was again advanced, that the money which
had been withdrawn was returned to the circula-
tion, and that the prices of the war and universal
prosperity followed it.t
standard of the war was again restored. The prices of the war
accompanied it. The burthens of the country were seen once
more to be no more than commensurate with its resources. All
the difficulties of the people ceased ; one universal scene of ge-
neral prosperity was restored. But that prosperity had scarcely
been established, before that fatal experiment was a second
time commenced. It has continued to the present time ; it is
now in process."
" The Right Honourable Secretary said that I should tell
him of the failure of the country banks in 1815 and 1816, and
account by that for the fall of prices and the rise in the value
of money which produced effects so disastrous at that time. I
shall be guilty of no such absurdity. I shall refer him to the
year 1810, when nearly as great a proportion of the country
bankers failed as in 1815 ; and when no fall of prices* or in-
crease in the value of money accompanied those failures." —
" And with respect to the fall of prices, and the rise of money
in 1815 and 1816, I refer him to this operation before as carried
into effect for the express purpose of lessening the quantity
and raising the value of money, and of necessarily producing
these effects. Will it be thought that this is ascribing too great
importance to the effect of this last referred to operation ? It
was in its advances to government that those notes were issued
by the Bank, which, protected in circulation by the restriction
bill, and becoming excessive in quantity, became also depreci-
ated in their value. It was by the repayment of those advances
that those notes were again lessened in quantity, and their value
raised."
-j- How far the supposition of such a state of things as the con-
sequence of the renewed advances by the Bank to government at
the commencement of 1816 is consistent with facts, may be col-
* It is not easy to imagine an attempt at the illustration of a
theory by an assumption of facts, or of a state of things more
remote from the truth, than is exhibited in the assertion that
there was no fall of prices, or increase in the value of money,
accompanying the failures in 1810.
46 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
The rise of prices in 1816 and 1817 is here
expressly ascribed to the enlargement of the circu-
lation of the Bank, and to the renewed depreciation
of its paper, in consequence of the asserted aban-
donment of the supposed preparation for cash pay-
ments. And as the fall of prices subsequent to
1818 is ascribed wholly to a contraction of the
circulation, rendered necessary as a measure of
renewed preparation for cash payments, it is essen-
tial, with a view to a just conclusion, to examine
how far, in point of fact, there was such an increase
of the Bank circulation in amount, or in order of
time, and such a depreciation of it as to justify the
inference of that increase as the cause of the rise
of the price of wheat in 1816.
The fact is, that there was no enlargement of
the Bank circulation, either in the first six months
of 1816, as compared with the last six months of
1815, or in the whole twelve months of 1816, as
lected from the following extracts of the Prince Regent's speech
on the opening of parliament on the 28th January 1817 : —
" I regret to be under the necessity of informing you that
there has been a deficiency in the produce of the revenue in the
last year; but I trust that it is to be ascribed to temporary causes."
" The distresses consequent upon the termination of a war of
such unusual extent and duration, have been felt with greater
or less severity throughout all the nations of Europe ; and have
been considerably aggravated by the unfavourable state of the
season." — " Deeply as I lament the pressure of these evils upon
the country, I am sensible that they are of a nature not to ad-
mit of an immediate remedy ; but while I observe with peculiar
satisfaction the fortitude with which so many privations have
been borne, and the active benevolence which has been em-
ployed to mitigate them, I am persuaded that the great sources
of our national prosperity are essentially unimpaired ; and I en-
tertain a confident expectation that the native energy of the
country will, at no distant period, surmount all the difficulties in
which we are involved." — " In considering our internal situation
you will, I doubt not, feel a just indignation at the attempts
which have been made to take advantage of the distresses of
the country for the purpose of exciting a spirit of sedition and
violence."
1814—1818. 47
compared with that of the year 1815 ; and that so
far from any indication of depreciation, the ex-
changes rose, and the prices of gold and silver fell
progressively and considerably through the whole
of 1816, while the price of wheat advanced nearly
100 per cent. The comparison stands thus : —
Average of Bank
Notes of 51. and upwards. Wheat.
&
6 months, ending Dec. 1815, 17,313,875 54s. 8d.
Ditto, ditto, June 1816, 17,397,900 74*. Od.
12 months, ending Dec. 1815, 17,659,947 54s. Sd.
Ditto, ditto, Dec. 1816, 17,582,937 103,v. 7d.
But as this comparison does not answer the pur-
pose of the theory, the year 1817 is especially fixed
upon as that in which the increase of Bank notes
accounts for the rise, and with which the asserted
contraction subsequently is compared, in order to
bring out the conclusion of its paramount influence
on prices.
There was indeed a marked increase of the Bank
issues in 1817, and as there was during a part of
that year a further rise in the price of wheat, that
enlargement of the circulation has the credit of tjie
whole of the advance of prices subsequent to the
close of 1815. Accordingly there being^or a very
short time in 1817, an enlargement of the Bank
circulation to 30 millions, including notes under
5/., that amount is commonly taken as the standard
up to which prices are considered to have been
rising, andjfrom which they are said to have been
falling.*
* In many, if not in most, of the instances in which state-
ments have been put forward of the amount of the Bank issues,
during and subsequent to the restriction , the notes under 51.
are included, without any reference to the circumstance that
the withdrawal of these was attended with a substitution of at
least an equal amount of sovereigns.
48 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
But how stands the fact ? The price of wheat,
which was stationary, or, if any thing, rather de-
clining, in the first quarter of 1817, experienced a
sudden advance, from an extraordinary demand for
exportation to France, in May and the early part
of June. If therefore the comparison be confined,
as in strictness it ought to be (with reference to
the argument built on the enlarged issue to the
amount of 30 millions in that year), to the precise
dates of the issue, with the price of wheat, it would
stand thus :—
Bank Notes, including Price of
those under 51. Wheat.
June 7. to 14. 1817. ^26,450,000 112s.
July 12. to Aug. 26. 1817. 30,700,000 86s.
The price further fell in September to J4s.
If the average of the six months ending in June
1817, be taken with reference to the corresponding
period of the two preceding years, the comparison
will stand thus : —
January to June, 1815, j£27,155,814
Ditto, ditto, 1816, 26,468,283
Ditto, ditto, 1817, 27,339,768
showing an increase not worth mentioning, as
compared with 1815, and inconsiderable as com-
pared with 1816. But the principal increase was
in the last six months of 1817, the amount being
29,210,035, or nearly two millions beyond that of
the preceding six months. And yet this augment-
ation of' issues was accompanied by a fall of nearly
40.9. in the price.
If the increase in the last six months, compared
with that in the first half of 1817, be taken upon
the notes of 5/. and upwards, it will appear to be
greater than if the small notes be included; thus:—
Wheat.
Jan. to June 1817 ^19,272,890 June 112*.
July to Dec. — 21,342,610 Dec. 85s.
1814—1818. 49
But as it has been seen that the increased issue
did not prevent the fall, so it will appear, that when
the circulation was reduced in the first six months
of 1818, the reduction was accompanied by a rise
in the price of wheat ; for instance,
£ Wheat.
July to Dec. 1817, 21,34-2,610 80*. to 84s. Nov. and Dec.
Jan. to June, 1818, 20,535,4-15 845. to 87s. May and June.
And, although there was a further reduction of
the circulation in the last six months of 1818, it
was still considerably higher than it had been in the
corresponding six months of 1816 ; thus,
£ Wheat.
July to Dec. 1816, 17,718,975 Dec. 103*. 6d. pr. Qr.
July to Dec. 1818, 18,939,740 — 80*. 8d.
The task of going through these instances of
discrepancy has been tedious and irksome, but ab-
solutely necessary, in order to prove the utter
groundlessness, as far at least as relates to corn, of
the assertions so confidently made, that the rise of
prices was caused by the abandonment in 1816 of
the preparations for cash payment, and by the con-
sequent enlargement of the circulation.
There may still however be a question, with re-
ference to the increased issues of the Bank in 1817
and 1818, how far there is reason to believe that
the regulation of the issues materially differed on
that occasion from what it would have been if the
paper had then been convertible ; for in that degree
only could it be inferred, that prices, if they were
materially influenced by the currency, were so in
consequence of the restriction, differently from
what they would have been under cash payments.
The principal increase which took place in the cir-
culation, was from August, 1816, to August, 1817;
and the relative position of the Bank on the
VOL. n. E
50 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
31st August in each of those two years as fol-
lows : —
Liabilities.
Circulation. Deposits.
Aug. 31. 1816, e£26,758,720 11,856,380
— 1817, 29,54-3,780 9,084,590
Assets.
Securities. Bullion.
Aug. 31. 1816, s£37,279,540 7,562,780
— 1817, 32,605,630 11,668,260
Total.
38,615,300
38,628,370
Total.
44,842,320
44,273,870
It hence appears, that there was no increase of
the liabilities, the diminution of the deposits almost
exactly compensating the increase of the circula-
tion. But the more immediate object of this com-
parative statement is to show that the augmentation
of the circulation was, between August, 1816, and
August, 1817» not nearly commensurate with the in-
crease of bullion.* Supposing, therefore, that, from
a wish to keep down the numerical amount of cir-
culation, the Bank had refused to buy gold at any
price, and supposing the mint at the same time to
have been open to the public, so as to have returned
it immediately in coin, the gold might, and pro-
bably would, have been taken to the mint, and the
same amount would have been added to the circu-
lation in the shape of sovereigns, with the same
effect on the money market and on prices as ac-
tually occurred, although the amount of Bank notes
v/ould have been diminished rather than increased,
as compared with 1815, or the commencement of
1816.
It is quite clear, from this statement, that the
value of the paper had been virtually restored, and
that the Bank was in 1817 in a position looking only
to the amount of its treasure relatively to its circula-
tion, extended as this was, to resume cash payments.
And the directors, so far from taking advantage of
the prolonged term of the restriction, were adopt-
* The amount of bullion reached its maximum on the llth
of Oct. 1817, being then 11,914,000/.
1814—1818. 51
ing measures for anticipating it ; for in the months
of April and September, 1817, they actually under-
took by public notice to pay, and did pay, a large
proportion of their notes in coin.* Instead there-
fore of their preparation for cash payments having
been, as is stated, the cause of their contracting
their issues, the only preparation which they did
make in the interval between 1814 and the termi-
nation of 1817, was actually accompanied by an
extension of the circulation ; an extension how-
ever which would equally have been made accord-
ing to their ordinary rules, if they had been paying
in cash, seeing that the extension was only against
a corresponding increase of their treasure, which
had become very considerable.
But although, looking only to the actual position
of the Bank, the amount of its issues in 1817 might
appear to be justified, and was not greater than it
would have been according to the ordinary rules or
routine of the Bank, if it had then been paying in
specie, the directors neglected, according to their
system, to attend to the " signs of the times," to
the indications as soon as they became manifest, of
circumstances in progress which would inevitably
create a drain on their treasure. The circumstances
here alluded to were the negotiations then noto-
riously going forward for loans to a very large
amount to France, and some of the other conti-
nental states. This was surely an occasion for
vigilance and caution, more especially as the ex-
changes, early in 1817, manifested a decided ten-
dency to fall, and the prices of gold and silver to
rise. Of all other measures to have been avoided,
under such circumstances, should have been that
of contributing to reduce the rate of interest in
this country, such reduction being calculated pe-
* It was computed that in pursuance of these notices the
Bank had paid upwards of five millions of gold.
E 2
52 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
culiarly to favour those operations. And yet it
was just at such a time that the government, by a
very shortsighted policy, with the co-operation of
the Bank, reduced the rate of interest on ex-
chequer bills. This was the very reverse of the
policy which both the government and the Bank
ought to have adopted. The government ought
to have taken the opportunity of the comparatively
high price of stocks in the summer of 1817, to have
diminished instead of increasing the unfunded debt;
and the Bank, instead of extending its advances
upon exchequer bills, at a reduced interest, ought,
with a view to counteract the effect, which would
otherwise be inevitable, of the tendency of British
capital to investment in foreign loans, not only not
to have extended its advances, but to have dimi-
nished its existing securities. By the earlier rise
of the rate of interest which would have attended
such measures, the disposition to investment in
foreign loans would have been abated ; the further
decline of the exchanges might have been pre-
vented ; a good deal of the overtrading checked ;
the necessity for applying to parliament in February,
1819, for a prolongation of the restriction might
have been avoided ; and the question of the oper-
ation of Peel's bill would never have arisen. But
the Bank directors of that time, in neglecting such
precaution, and on the contrary in creating facilities
for the foreign financial operations, and for the
various speculations then in progress, were not
more to blame than those of a subsequent and more
enlightened period, who committed precisely the
same error.
The material point however to be considered
with reference to the immediate question is, that
the value of the currency had been restored in the
first six months of 1817, consistently with an en-
largement of the Bank issues, as compared with
any former period, thus proving that the previous
depression of the exchanges, and the consequent
;
1814—1818. 53
high price of gold, had been reasonably accounted
for by the extraordinary amount of the foreign
expenditure arising out of the war, without sup-
posing any depreciation, except in as far as the
paper had not adhered to the increased value of
the gold.
We have now to see that a fresh set of dis-
turbing causes operated in a depression of the
exchanges, between the latter part of 1817 and
the commencement of 1819, coincidently with a
diminution of the circulation. Foremost among
these causes doubtless were the large loans nego-
tiated for the French and Russian governments,
the high rate of interest granted by them, and the
comparatively low rate in this country, holding out
a great inducement for the transmission of British
capital to the Continent. The importations of corn
in the latter part of 1817, and through the whole
of 1818, were on a large scale, and at high prices,
our ports being then open without duty. And
there was at the same time, as has before been
noticed, a very great increase of our general im-
ports ; while a great part of the exports of 1817
and 1818 were speculative, and on long credits, the
returns for which therefore would not be forth-
coming till 1819 and 1820. Under these circum-
stances it is rather matter of surprise that the ex-
changes were not more depressed, than that they
were so much depressed in 1818.
But the diminution of the circulation which ac-
companied the fall of the exchanges in 1818, was
not, as has been so commonly imagined and so
gratuitously asserted, the effect of design on the
part of the Bank directors, with a view either to
counteract the fall of the exchanges or to prepare
for cash payments. Mr. Harman, in his evidence
before the Lords' Committee on cash payments, in
1819, p. 217-, in answer to the question, " Did
the Bank, during any part of that period (1818),
E 3
54f PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
on perceiving that these large demands were made
upon them for exportation, deem it necessary to
make any effort for counteracting that drain of their
treasure previously accumulated, by any reduction
of the issues of their paper?" replied, " No ; we
did not make any reduction, with a view of check-
ing the export of gold and silver." The directors,
as they repeatedly declared in and out of parliament,
and as the facts fully show, continued to regulate
their issues exactly as they had done throughout
the period of the restriction.*
As the increase of Bank notes in 1817 had
been simply against, but short of, the amount of
bullion coming in, so the diminution of notes in
1818, was merely against, but not equal to, the
amount of bullion going out. This will appear by
the following comparative statement of the position
of the Bank in February and August, 1818.
Liabilities.
Circulation. Deposits. Total.
Feb. 28. 1818, ^27,770,970 7,997,550 35,768,520
Aug. 31. 1818, 26,202,150 7,927,730 34,129,880
Assets.
Securities. Bullion. Total.
Feb. 28. 1818, ^'30,905,330 10,055,460 40,960,790
Aug. 31.1818, 32,370,760 6,363,160 38,733,920
It will be observed, that the securities had been
increased by nearly 1,500,000/. in August, as com-
pared with February, 1818. There was between
August, 1818, and February, 1819, a repayment by
* Of the inefficacy of any regulation of their issues upon the
exchanges, the directors recorded their conviction as late as
1819, when, in a resolution of the 25th of March, they state,
" This Court cannot refrain from adverting to an opinion, strongly
insisted on by some, that the Bank has only to reduce its issues
to obtain a favourable turn in the exchanges, and a consequent
influx of the precious metals. The Court conceives it to be its
duty to declare that it is unable to discover any solid foundation
for such a sentiment."
In 1827 a motion was made, and I believe carried, in the
Court of Directors, to rescind the above resolution. See Evi-
dence of William Ward, Esq., Bank Charter Committee, p. 143.
1814—1818. 55
government to the Bank of about five millions * ;
but the discounts were increased by a nearly similar
amount ; and the securities, public and private,
were, in February, 1819, higher by 500, OOO/, than
in February, 1818, while the bullion was less by
nearly six millions ; and the amount of the circu-
lation was higher than it had been during any
period of the war.
It should seem therefore that there is no ground
for imputing any contraction of the issues of the
Bank of England, or of the circulation generally,
to preparations before 1819, for the resumption of
cash payments. Whether there are any better
grounds for ascribing any such effect to the legis-
lative measures in 1819, will be considered in the
examination which we are about to enter upon of
the next epoch.
SECTION 9. — Summary of the preceding Survey.
The following are among the more prominent of
the points resulting from a survey of the interval
which has passed under review.
1. That in the spring of 1814, while colonial
and other exportable produce and manufactures
* This repayment constitutes what Mr. Attwood, in the ex-
tract quoted from his speech (p. 44.), designated as the second
experiment, with a view to cash payments. But as the dimi-
nution of the public securities held by the Bank was compen-
sated by an increase of the private securities ; and as it has
been shown that it is the amount of the circulation, and not the
mode in which it is issued, that affects the value of the currency,
the mere change in the nature of the securities cannot be con-
sidered as having caused any contraction in the present instance.
And it cannot be too often repeated, with reference to the import-
ance attached by the currency theory to such repayments by
government, that as a repayment of five millions out of sixteen
millions in 1805 did not prevent a rise of 100 per cent, in the
price of corn, so an increase of upwards of ten millions of ad-
vances in 1814 did not prevent a great fall of prices.
E 4
66 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
had risen extravagantly on the prospect of peace,
the prices of corn and of European produce gene-
rally were falling.
2. That the Bank of England, instead of pre-
paring, by a contraction of its issues in 1814, for
the resumption of cash payments, as has been as-
sumed and asserted, actually enlarged its circula-
tion to an amount beyond any that it had attained
in any former period.
3. That coincidently with the enlargement of
the Bank circulation in 1814, the exchanges were
rising, and the prices of gold and of commodities
were falling.
4. That in 1815, upon the landing of Napoleon
in France from the island of Elba, the exchanges
fell, and the price of gold rose rapidly, without the
possibility of assigning any part of those effects to
any alteration in the amount of our currency ; and
that, immediately after the peace which followed
the battle of Waterloo, the exchanges and the price
of gold resumed their tendency to par, without
any material contraction of the Bank circulation.
5. That the prices of corn, the fall of which had
been partially arrested by reported deficiency of
the crops in 1814, fell rapidly as a consequence
of the favourable harvest of 1815, and reached
their lowest price in the first quarter of 1816.
6. That in consequence of a fall of prices, from
restored abundance, not only of corn, but of all
other commodities, between 1813 and 1816, there
had been such an accumulation of losses in nearly
all the branches of industry, as entailed failures to
an unprecedented extent.
7. That the country bank and general credit
circulation were contracted in an extraordinary
degree in 1816, as an inevitable effect of the heavy
losses and numerous failures which had then oc-
curred ; and that the circulation of the Bank of
England had undergone no such variation as could
1814—1818. 57
be assigned in the nature of an aggravating cause
of the failures and discredit
8. That, while the greatest depression of almost
all branches of industry, and the most general dis-
credit, prevailed in 1816, a rise to the extent of
100 per cent, and upwards took place in the prices
of provisions. Of this rise, one half, or about
50 per cent., occurred before July, the further
rise having been the effect of the wet harvest of
that year.
9. That the great rise of the prices of corn in
1816 and 1817, in this country, had been preceded
and exceeded by a rise of prices from great scarcity
and apprehended famine throughout Germany,
France, and Italy; and that in the spring of 1817
a great demand suddenly took place in the markets
of this country, by extensive purchases of corn
and flour for immediate shipment to France, at
prices exceeding 115s. the quarter for wheat, those
purchases being mostly paid for by remittances
in gold * hither.
10. That the highest prices of corn, and of all
other commodities which were not under prohi-
bitory restrictions in this country in 18179 were
the bullion prices of Europe.
11. That before the end of June 1817, the ap-
prehensions which had prevailed in France, and in
this country, for the coming crops, having been
dispelled by improved appearances, the prices of
corn rapidly gave way in both countries, and by
September following had fallen 40s. per quarter*
12. That the great advance in the price of pro-
visions from the spring of 1816 to the summer of
1817, had not been preceded by any enlargement
worth mentioning, of the circulation of the Bank
* By this is not meant that the shippers of the corn actually
received remittances in gold, but that in point of fact the coin-
cident shipments of gold from France to this country equalled
or exceeded the amount of corn exported from hence to France.
58 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
of England. But a sudden increase of issue took
place in July, 1817, after a rapid fall had begun in
the prices of corn ; the farther fall of prices, to the
extent of 40s. per quarter, being coincident with
a further increase of issues. There is therefore no
foundation for the commonly received opinion that
the highest amount of the Bank circulation coin-
cided with the highest prices of corn in 1817, and
that a contraction of the circulation after 181? was
the originating and sole or main cause of the fall
of the prices of provisions.
13. That a general and great falling off in the
imports of the raw materials of our principal manu-
factures, and of foreign articles of consumption, in
1816 and 1817, followed by an extraordinary re-
duction of stocks, compared with the ordinary rate
of consumption, caused a great advance of prices
in 1817 and 1818, and, as usual in such cases, an
exaggeration of demand, and a state of excitement
and speculation, which went beyond the occasion,
not only in a rise of prices on the spot, but in en-
gagements for importations on a large scale, and at
high prices. This state of excitement and specu-
lation having been increased and extended by the
effects of the extraordinary drought of 1818, which
gave rise to apprehensions of a deficiency of the
wheat crops, but more especially of a total failure
of all spring corn and pulse in this country, led
to very extensive engagements for importations of
grain as well as of other descriptions of produce.
14. That during the greater part of 1817, the
Bank of England, whether with reference to the
state of the exchanges, the bullion in its coffers, or
the state of general prices in Europe, was, in point
of fact, in a condition to have resumed cash pay-
ments, and was considered so to be by the directors,
who had announced the payment of particular de-
scriptions of their notes. That therefore virtually,
and to all practical intents and purposes, there had
1814^-1818. 59
been in 1817, till nearly the close of that year, a
complete readjustment of the relative value between
the paper and gold.
15. That at the close of 1817, in consequence
of large loans negotiated for France and Russia in
this country (the negotiation of which loans was
much favoured by the unfortunate policy of our
government, aided by the weak compliance of the
Bank, in financial operations, which had the effect
of temporarily depressing the rate of interest when
it ought to have been raised), combined with the
effect of the large importations of grain and other
produce, which were then in progress, caused a
depression of the exchanges, and a consequent
efflux of bullion in 1818.
16. That the increase of the Bank circulation in
1817 was not quite commensurate with the influx
of bullion into its coffers, and the contraction of
its issues in 1818 was not quite equal to the re-
duction of its treasure. The variations therefore
of the amount of the currency between 1816 and
1819, as depending on the Bank of England,
were in the same direction, but not quite equal
in degree, to those which would have been expe-
rienced with a purely metallic basis of the cur-
rency ; for if the gold imported in 1817 had passed
direct from the mint to the public, the quantity of
money would have been as great, with a larger pro-
portion only of coin, and the subsequent efflux of
the coin in 1818 would have left the circulation of
the Bank paper unaltered.
17. That at the close of 1818, importations of
grain and other produce had arrived, and were
arriving, on a scale of enormous magnitude, which
had the natural effect of causing stagnation, the
usual precursor of a fall of the markets, which
had previously been raised by scarcity.
60 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
CHAPTER VII.
STATE OF PRICES AND OF THE CIRCULATION, FROM
THE COMMENCEMENT OF 1819 TO THE CLOSE OF
HAVING now arrived at the time when the legis-
lature were called upon to determine what should
be the footing on which the currency should be
permanently placed, it is peculiarly desirable to ap-
preciate the exact state in which the question then
presented itself for consideration.
SECTION 1. — State of the Question at the Com-
mencement of 1819, with a View to determine
upon the future Footing of the Currency.
It is of importance here to bear in mind the prin-
cipal points which were recapitulated at the close
of the last chapter, as resulting from the survey of
prices, and of the circulation, from 1814 to the
close 1818. Of these the most material to be
kept in view are, —
1st. That there had been in 1817 a spontaneous
readjustment of the value between paper and gold
to a perfect equality, there having been a large
influx of gold, accompanying an increase of the
amount of Bank notes ; and that the level of the
currency had been disturbed at the close of 1817,
and through 1818, by the large loans negotiated
in this country for the French and Russian govern-
ments, which, combined with large importations,
had the effect of depressing the exchanges to 33*8
!
1819—1822.
61
on Hamburgh, and to 23 '50 on Paris, and
of raising the price of gold to 4/. 3s, The ex-
changes, it may here be observed, were not lower
than they had, on several occasions, and for con-
siderable intervals, been previously to the Bank
restriction.
2. That the rise of prices in 1816 and 1817 had
been indisputably the effect of scarcity of corn and of
nearly all the leading articles of consumption ; that
the prices of those years, high as they were in this
country, were the bullion prices of Europe ; and
that the effect of those high prices, and the usually
exaggerated speculations connected with them,
which continued through the greater part of 1818,
was to bring forward importations of enormous
magnitude.
The extent of the importations of 1818 could
not be ascertained till after the close of that year ;
nor would their depressing effects be fully deve-
loped till 1819- It is, therefore, that the following
statement of the comparative excess may be con-
sidered as more properly introduced at the com-
mencement of a view of the epocha now coming
under examination, than at the close of the last.
Imports into Great Britain.
Years.
Silk.
Wool.
Cotton.
Hemp.
Tallow.
Linseed.
1816
1817
1818
Ib.
1,137,922
1,177,693
2,101,618
Ib.
8,117,864
14,715,843
26,405,486
Ib.
93,920,055
124,912,968
177,282,158
Tons.
18,473
22,863
33,020
Tons.
20,858
19,298
27,149
Qrs.
70,892
162,759
237,141
And the extent of the increase of the supply of
all imported commodities, will strikingly appear
by the following comparative statement, from the
Custom-house returns of official values.
62 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
Total of Colonial and Foreign productions imported into Great
Britain, from all parts of the world (except Ireland) stated
at the official rates of valuation, which implies quantity and
not value.
1816. £26,374,920
Re-exported - - - 13,441,665
Refined sugar exported 1,626,321
— — 15,067,986
11,306,934
1817. £29,916,320
Re-exported - - - 10,269,271
Refined sugar exported 1,942,573
12,211,844
17,704,476
1818. £35,819,798
Re-exported - - - 10,835,800
Refined sugar exported 1,964,225
12,800,025
. 23,019,773
Here is a doubling of the whole quantities of im-
ported colonial and foreign produce, after deduct-
ing the quantities exported. Now, can any one
acquainted with the course of markets hesitate for
a moment to pronounce what must be the effects of
such an excess of supply ? And what, indeed, can
be more legitimate or simple than the inference,
that if the scantiness of supply in 1816 and 1817 was
a sufficient ground for a considerable advance, the
restoration of abundance would fully account for
the fall ?
It is well known, however, that the resistance to
a change, whether from a low to a high, or from a
high to a low range of prices, is at first very con-
siderable, and that there is generally a pause of
greater or less duration before the turn becomes
manifest ; in the interval, while sales are dif-
ficult or impracticable, unless at a difference in
price, which the buyer, in the one case, and the
seller, in the other, are not yet prepared to submit
to, the quotations are regulated by the last trans-
actions, but are said to be, and are, in fact, nomi-
nal. A struggle of this kind prevailed more or
1819—1822. 63
less, according as the articles were in greater or
less abundance, through the autumn, and into the
winter of 1818-19, when many articles which had
become unsaleable from excess were still quoted
at nearly as high prices as they had attained at any
time in 1818.*
If in this state of comparative excess of supply,
at the commencement of 1819, there had been
no immediate question of the termination of the
Bank restriction, and if the regulation of the issues
of the Bank had proceeded (as, in fact, it did) on
exactly the same footing as that on which it had
been conducted during the war, and down to
1819, what ground is there for supposing that
there would not have been a fall of prices exactly
analogous to that which occurred from 1810 to
1812; or, again, from 1813 to 1815? Accord-
ing to what previous instance of the regulation of
the Bank issues, coincidently with such compara-
tive excess of the supply of commodities, can it be
contended, that the fall of prices would or could
have been averted ? And yet a fall of prices,
which was so clearly inevitable under the system
pursued by the Bank under the restriction, is
gravely imputed to the measures taken for the
termination of the restriction.
Such, then, as has been here described, being the
state of things in the commencement of 1819, what
was the course incumbent upon the legislature to
pursue? Would they have been justified, if, being ac-
quainted (whether they were so or not is a distinct
question) with the state and prospects of the markets
as to supply and demand, and foreseeing the impend-
* It may be right to bear this remark in mind, because it has
been customary for the opponents of Peel's bill to bring for-
ward price currents of February, 1819 (being the time when
the committees of enquiry into the state of the currency were
appointed), for the purpose of contrasting the quotations of
that date with those of the subsequent time.
64) PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
ing fall under the system of the currency, as it had
existed, they had attempted to intercept that fall,
or to counteract the tendency to it ? And if they
had been so weakly or nefariously minded, how
would they have set about averting the fall, which,
without some forcible intervention was inevitable ?
Only one of two modes could be considered as by
possibility likely to be effectual with that view, viz.
either a forcible issue of a greatly increased amount
of Bank notes, or a degradation of the standard.
But any attempt on the part of the Bank to
extend its issues by investments in additional se-
curities, beyond those which, by the rules and
routine of their management, they would other-
wise have taken, would not have insured the
object of extended circulation. The increase of
their public securities might, and probably would,
be compensated by a diminished application for
discounts. And in the absence of inducement,
from the state of markets, to speculate in goods,
if extra notes were issued, they would either have
returned in the shape of deposits into the hands of
the Bank, or have remained inert in the drawers of
bankers. That this would have been the case in such
a state of markets as existed in 1819> if the Bank
had attempted forcibly to extend its circulation,
there is every reason to believe. The grounds for
that belief will appear more fully, when the state
of the circulation comes to be distinctly examined,
towards the close of the present chapter.
Assuming, then, that this mode of averting
the fall of prices, in 1819, would have failed of
its proposed effect, there remained only the
alternative of a degradation of the standard.
And granting that a course so flagrantly unjusti-
fiable could have been resorted to, or for a mo-
ment entertained, as that of forcibly intervening,
with a view to intercept the return of cheapness,
as the consequence of the transition from scarcity
1819—1822. 65
to abundance, and to bolster the markets by arti-
ficially keeping prices, in the face of an excessive
supply, up to the rates to which they had been
raised by casual dearth, and by the exaggeration
of demand usually attendant upon deficiency of
supply, the further question would occur, what
is the standard by which such intervention should
have been guided and determined? If the differ-
ence between gold and paper had been taken as it
existed at the time, namely, 4/. 1*. the ounce, or
between 3 and 4 per cent, the measure of debase-
ment, however palpably unjust, would at least
have, been intelligible ; and the difference being
so trifling, and at the same time the change being
referable to something like a principle, namely,
the actual depreciation of the paper, by nori-
adherence to its standard, there would have been
no perceptible disturbance of markets $ but nei-
ther would it have been tanti for so gross an
injustice, nor, above all, for a precedent so de-
structive of all security, as that of altering the
denomination of the coin, because it had not suited
the issuers of the paper so to regulate the amount
as to make it adhere to the value of the coin in
which it professed to be payable. But, quitting
even that variable landmark (for while the subject
was under discussion the value of gold was ap-
proximating to that of the paper), those legislators
to whose wisdom it appeared, that prices raised
by scarcity and speculation should be maintained
by debasement of the standard, seemed to be quite
at fault, and to differ most widely from each other,
as to the measure of debasement which, in their
peculiar views, it would be just and expedient to
adopt. This difficulty is well illustrated by the
following quotation from the speech of Mr. Deni-
son, in the debate in the House of Commons, on the
Scottish Bank Note bill, in the session of 1828 : —
" What would have been the proper course to take in 1819?
VOL. II. F
66 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
To have altered the standard. Such a measure would have
prevented the ruin of the farmer, the tradesman, and the artisan ;
or, at least, it would have diminished the pressure upon them.
The cause of all the evils which we had endured, and which
we are still enduring, was the fatal policy of contracting a large
debt in one description of currency, and trying to pay it in
another. I may be asked, why, if I felt this so strong'y, if I
was convinced of this expediency of altering the standard, I
did not myself bring forward such a proposition ? The truth
is, that the question was one of such difficulty, that I may well
be pardoned for having shrunk from it. But it is well known to
many Hon. Members, that my Hon. friend, the late Member
for Coventry, and myself, did, in 1819, bestow great attention
on the subject, with a reference to bringing it under the consi-
deration of the House ; but that we found it a matter of such dif-
ficulty that we shrunk from it. I will also candidly admit, that
we could not exactly agree, as to what ought to be the amount
of the standard. I was of opinion that it ought to be 4/. 10s.,
or 4/. 15*., while my Hon. friend, concurring with a noble Lord
in the other House, thought that it ought to be 51. 5s. or 5l. 10s.
The current appeared to run so strong, however, against either
proposition, that it was abandoned." — See Mirror of Parlia-
ment, part xvii. pp. 1775-6.
Well indeed might they shrink from the task,
and finally abandon it, seeing that they differed so
widely as that while one of the parties was of opi-
nion that the standard should be degraded to the
extent of 20 per cent., another would have gone
as far as 40 per cent. That opinions so wild, so
extravagant in their practical application, should
have been entertained by persons otherwise well
informed, and most undoubtedly well intentioned
as these were, would be hardly credible, but that
we now find opinions to the same effect, and some
going still greater lengths, promulgated by consi-
derable authorities.* That such opinions could be
* Lord Folkestone, in the House of Commons, in a debate
on the Bullion Question, 25th of May, 1819, is reported to
have said : — " It appeared to him most desirable, that in place
of reverting to the ancient standard of value, the present
rate of depreciation should be taken, and the standard fixed, in
place of '61. 17*. W{d., at 4/. 0*. 6d" His lordship (now Earl
of Radnor) has since stated his altered opinion in his evidence
1819—1822. 67
entertained at all by persons not having sinister
intentions can only be accounted for by the very
before the Agricultural Committee of the House of Commons,
in 1836, page 4-15.
" Upon the whole, what should you say, after all the ex-
perience we have had, was the full effect of the Bill of 1819
upon prices generally, and what was the fall that it occa-
sioned?"
"I cannot estimate, but I apprehend very considerable in-
deed ; and, from rough guess, 1 should say, cent, per cent,
or nearly so."
" Do you think that the prices have fallen half in conse-
quence ?
" I should say very nearly so."
" What measure do you think would have been just and equit-
able in 1819, in the place of the Bill which really did pass ? "
" I really think that it would have been just to have altered
the standard to an extent equal to the depreciation that had
been prevailing before the passing of the Bill ; but, as that de-
preciation was not uniform in consequence of the various
amounts of issues of paper at different times, it would have
been necessary to have had some measure to meet the cases of
contracts formed at different times, as I apprehend."
Lord Ashburton, in his evidence before the same Committee,
page 4-78., delivered the following opinion : —
" If the feeling of Parliament and the country had gone
with it, I should have thought that much might have been
said in favour of a depreciation, by bringing the pound to
15s., if the mind of the country had been so disposed; but the
strong opinion, and the moral feeling, being both the other way,
I thought there was much to be said for coming back to the
standard. It was to my mind a very doubtful question ; es-
sentially it rested on a consideration of degree. If, as was
the case in Russia, the depreciation had gone to the extent of
four to one, it would clearly be the grossest injustice, under
those circumstances, to return to the original standard. A question
on that subject was proposed by the government of Russia some
years ago, to persons in whose opinions they had confidence,
and the opinion was unanimous, that it would be a greater in-
justice to endeavour to return to the old standard, than to sanc-
tion the depreciation by law."
And further, '• I believe that the rouble, which was about
four to one, is now three and three quarters to one, and that
the government of Russia have watched the variations of value,
and endeavoured to keep it nearly where it was."
On these opinions of Lord Ashburton I have to offer th 3 fol-
lowing remarks: — The case of the paper money of Russia,
F 2
()8 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
confined view taken of the interests which would
be affected by the degradation proposed of the
and its depreciation, bears no analogy, in its origin or progress,
to that of this country ; nor, if it did, would the conclusionwhich
might be warranted in the one case be applicable in the other.
The first issue of paper money in Russia, was at the close
of 1768, when bank notes, or assignats, to the amount of
40,000.000 of roubles, were put into circulation in direct pay-
ments by the government, on the commencement of a war with
Turkey. The manifesto accompanying the issue of the paper,
left it in doubt whether the payment to bearer (a promise of
which the notes bore on the face of them), was to be in copper,
or in silver ; and, according to Storch, opinions on that point
were still divided when he wrote in 1815. From 1769 till
1787, the amount in circulation remained uniform at about
40,000,000, and the agio in favour of silver varied only from
one to three per cent, in that interval, while there was an agio
of from one to five per cent, in favour of the paper against cop-
per. The exchange on London during that interval varied be-
tween 40rf, and 48 d. for the paper rouble. In 1787, a sudden
addition was made of 60,000,000, accompanied with a promise
that no further quantity should be issued ; but a succession of
wars with Turkey, Sweden, Poland, and Persia, and finally with
France, caused the transgression of that promise, and further
progressive issues were made till 1810, when they amounted in
the whole to 577,000,000. An increasing agio on silver was
the consequence, till it reached 400; that is, that a silver
rouble (of the intrinsic value of 39d. sterling) exchanged
for four roubles in paper. During the progress of this
depreciation of the paper, the Custom House duties, which
were fixed at certain rates in silver money, were col-
lected in paper, at an agio settled periodically upon a
reference to the market rates. It is now many years ago
that the paper rouble was received in payment of Customs
by an order of government in the proportion of four to one, the
exchange on London being then between 9d, and lOd. for the
paper rouble ; and the paper was so received in all cases in
which the rates had been calculated in silver. This was to
all intents and purposes a degradation of the standard, although
from motives of policy the government did not think it expedient
to alter the denomination of the silver rouble ; and when this
avowed depreciation had taken place, there can have been no
ground for hesitation among the persons who are said to have been
consulted upon the question of restoring the paper to the former
value of the silver rouble. The raising of the value 300 per
cent, would, independently of the inexpediency of the measure,
have involved the commission of a double injustice. But it is
not a little curious, that, after the regulation of the proportion
1819— 1822. 69
standard. They seem to have imagined that it
would only be mulcting to that extent all creditors,
of four to one had subsisted for some time, the foreign ex-
changes having improved, that on London ranging at between
lOd. and lie?, instead of between 9d. and I0c?., the govern-
ment, upon the promulgation of a new tariff, raised the standard
from 4< roul\ to 3 roub. 60 copeaks, or exactly 10 per cent., in
favour of the paper rouble. Whether, however, in adjusting
the standard at four to one, or in afterwards raising it to 3.60
to one, the Russian government seems to have taken, as the
guide and measure of the adjustment of the standard, the
actual relative value of the paper to the silver, as indi-
cated, whether by the agio, or by the foreign exchange,
and was not influenced by a fanciful or arbitrary theory
of depreciation beyond the indication of the ordinary tests.
There was enough of weakness, and impolicy, and injustice in
having suffered, or rather caused, the depreciation to take place
to the extent that it did ; an extent which precluded the possi-
bilty of return. But what would or might have been said, and
justly said, if, when the agio and the state of the exchanges
indicated a relative difference of four to one, the government
had thought proper, not from any motive of gain to the public
treasure, but from some fancied theory of adjustment, to have
fixed the standard at five to one, thus at once gratuitously dis-
turbing all pending engagements to the extent of twenty-five
per cent. ? And yet this is what some of our legislators
have proposed ; for in what respect, either as to the justice
or policy of such a measure, would the suggestion con-
templated by Lord Ashburton, of reducing the standard in this
country to fifteen shillings for the pound, or twenty-five per
cent, in 1819 (when, whether by the exchanges or the price
of goM, the utmost indication of the depreciation of Bank
notes did not exceed four to five per cent.), have differed from
an arbitrary alteration of the standard in Russia, to the pro-
portion of five to one, when the agio and the exchanges indi-
cated a proportion of four to one ? If the example of the
Russian paper is to be held forth as a model, it should be
consistently followed out by not degrading the standard be-
yond the depreciation indicated by the usual tests, and by
raising it when the exchanges took a favourable turn. In
every point of view, however, the imputed analogy of the
Russian bank notes to the Bank of England notes fails : the
mode and channels of issue differ widely in principle and re-
gulation ; the one was indisputably depreciated by increased
quantity, independently of any extraneous pressure on the ex-
changes ; the other was in quantity not more than would have
been consistent with the maintenance of its metallic value,
F 3
70 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
whether of the state or of individuals, in favour of
the debtors, while the good to be attained would
be that of " preventing the ruin of the farmer,
the tradesman, and the artisan, or at least of di-
minishing the pressure upon them." That it would
have had the effect of preventing or diminishing
the losses of the farmer, who was under a lease
calculated upon the prices of scarcity, and of the
tradesman who had, unfortunately for himself, laid
in his stock when markets had been driven up by
scarcity and speculation, may be readily admitted,
although why they should be so preserved from the
consequences of their own acts, simply because the
result would otherwise be unfavourable, does not
very clearly appear. But that the artisan should
be supposed to be among those who were to be
benefited by such an alteration of the standard, is
not the least surprising part of that extraordinary
theory. For if there is any class that has benefited
more than another by the return of abundance and
cheapness, which have more or less prevailed since
1819, it is that of the artisan. There is no fact
which admits of being more fully proved, if the
notoriety of it were not such as to render detailed
proofs superfluous, than that the wages of artisan
labour are in most cases as high as they were before
1819, in some instances higher, and in none so
much lower as the difference in the prices of pro-
visions and other necessaries. But a much more
important consideration, inasmuch as it is one that
affects the great bulk of the community, is, that
wages, not of artisans only, but of labour generally,
had it not been for the enormous extent of foreign payments ;
and whereas no definite time was assigned for the payment of
the former, a solemn assurance was repeatedly held out by the
government of this country, in repeated instances of specific
contracts, that the suspension of cash payments was a temporary
state, which would, at any rate, terminate as soon as might be
after the return of peace.
— 1822. 71
have not fallen in proportion to the reduced prices
of necessaries.*
Now, the effect of a debasement of the standard,
if it had been determined on in 1819, would have
prevented, and at any rate would have retarded, the
enjoyment of the benefit of comparative abundance
by the working- classes, until, upon the recurrence
of periods of long-continued dearth, the workmen
should succeed, after much suffering and severe
struggles, in obtaining an advance in some, al-
though an inadequate, proportion to the advanced
prices of necessaries.
According to all experience, whether within
modern observation, or recorded by history, it may
be laid down as an established maxim, that labour
is the last of the objects of exchange to rise in
consequence of dearth or depreciation, and that
conversely the price of labour is last to fall in con-
sequence of increased abundance of commodities,
or of increased value of money t ; and not only
* Even in the case of the agricultural labourers, whose
wages have fallen in a greater proportion than those of
other classes, the hand-loom weavers, perhaps, only excepted,
there is concurrent testimony of the most unexceptionable
description, in the reports of the parliamentary committees
on agricultural distress in 1833, and again in 1836, that the
condition of the agricultural labourer has been greatly im-
proved, compared with the period of high prices. The evidence
to that effect is the more decisive, because, from the bias of the
examiners and the occupations of the witnesses, the tendency
might be supposed to be the reverse of representing the improve-
ment in an exaggerated point of view.
f The distinguished author of a publication, entitled " A
Letter to the Right Honourable Robert Peel, by one of his Con-
stituents, 1819," after quoting the following passage from the
Quarterly Review, vol. xv. p. 192., —
" The great and rapid increase of national wealth has always
been attended by a corresponding pressure of distress upon the
peasantry. It was thus in Portugal, when Joam III. succeeded
his father Emanuel, the most fortunate prince that ever sat
upon an European throne : he was master of Ormuz, of Goa,
and of Malacca in the East, thus commanding the whole trade
of the Indian seas ; the gold mines of Africa sent in rich returns
F 4
72 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
all the working classes, strictly so called, but those
classes immediately above them, not being owners
or occupiers of land, and other fixed property, or
debtors, would have been sufferers by a degrada-
tion of the standard. It is in evidence in the agri-
cultural reports that retail prices had not fallen in
to him, and the greater part of Morocco paid him tribute. To
these treasures JoarrTIII. succeeded ; and never was there a
period of greater national distress, arising from poverty, than at
the commencement of his reign. It was thus in Spain, when
ships came laden with silver and gold from Mexico and Peru.
The fact was distinctly seen, and the cause distinctly stated
by a contemporary writer.* The influx of specie produced a
diminution in the value of money, and habits of lavish expendi-
ture in the rich ; rents were raised, all the necessaries of life
advanced in price ; the burden fell upon the poor, and of the
wealth poured into the country in full streams, all that reached
them was in the shape of more abundant alms, which made
them more dependent than they were before, without prevent-
ing them from being more miserable," — proceeds to observe : —
" A diligent enquiry into the state of society in the reign of
Elizabeth, which, in the depreciation of money, corresponds
remarkably with the present reign, would corroberate this po-
sition, by showing how ill the wages of labour kept pace with
the increasing prices of provisions. It is, I believe, allowed by
all who have made minute researches into those times, that at
no period of our history, till the present, was the condition of
the labourer so bad. Hence sprung the great, and almost
sudden, growth of the poor-law system, sometimes absurdly
ascribed to the suppression of monasteries, A violent disturb-
ance of the established relations, as measured by the common
standard of money, had taken place ; and the lower classes,
being the last to obtain redress, sunk into that state of abject
dependence, from which they slowly emerged, through the
natural corrective of a diminished population, aided by the
general improvement of the next century, and the greater
steadiness of our currency ; but into which they are now
plunged by the operation of a similar cause." p. 33.
I need here hardly add, that agreeing, as I do, in the obser-
vation of the deterioration of the condition of the working
classes, by a rise in the price of necessaries, I differ from the
author in his opinion of the cause of the rise in the more recent
instances.
* The Inca Garcilasso, vol. ii. book i. c. 7.
1819 — 1822. 73
proportion to those in wholesale trade. This is
said particularly of the blacksmiths, the wheel-
wrights, the collarmakers, &c. What then is the
inference, but that they were benefited by the fall
in the prices of provisions and of raw materials ?
That the great mass of the community was
greatly benefited by the transition from dearth to
abundance, there is not, there cannot be, any rea-
sonable doubt. Indeed, to call it in question, and
to suppose that war and dearth can be blessings,
and peace and plenty curses, never entered into
any imaginations but those which have bewildered
themselves in the mazes of the currency theory,
which supposes high prices and general prosperity
to be convertible terms. What but the privations
and sufferings of the great bulk of the community led
to the popular discontents and commotions which
prevailed, and were with difficulty repressed, in the
great dearths at the close of the last and the be-
ginning of the present century, and again in 1812,
in 1817, and 1819 ? * dearths which, after their
* Mr. Huskisson, in the following extract from his speech on
Mr. Western's motion, on the resumption of cash payments,
June 11. 1822, after very happily exposing the inconceivable ab-
surdity of considering that the fall in the price of corn added to
the weight of taxation, describes in eloquent terms the suffer-
ings of the bulk of the people, in the periods of high prices
(which the advocates cf agricultural claims, and of the currency
theory, characterise as periods of general prosperity), when
contrasted with the ease and comfort and contented state of
the population in the periods of low prices and agricultural
distress.
" There is one theory, however, which I cannot help advert-
ing to, because it is a point to which the honourable member
seemed to attach much importance, and to illustrate by many
calculations. That point, if I understand the honourable member,
is this, that we ought to measure the pressure of taxation by
the price of corn. In 1813, says the honourable member, the
price of wheat being 108s. 9c/., and the taxes 74,64<7,798/., —
13,733,296 quarters of wheat were sufficient for the payment
thereof; in the present year, the price of wheat being 45s.,
very nearly double that amount of quarters are necessary to
74 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
natural cessation, these legislators would, as far
as in them lay, have artificially perpetuated * ;
while, on the other hand, the contented state of
the working classes in 1821 and 1822, and not to
mention the great increase of the revenue in those
years, attest the comparative well-being of the bulk
of the community in periods of what those who
are interested in high prices and high rents are
pleased to characterise as agricultural distress.
But independently of the grounds here stated for
reprobating the policy which would have sought in
1819 to perpetuate the effects of dearth, the "advo-
cates of a debasement seem not to have been aware
of the extraordinary disturbance which such a mea-
pay the taxes thereof." I wonder, when he was making these
comparisons, that he did not extend them to a few other years.
If he had, he would have found in 1812, for instance, that, the
taxes being 70,435, 6791., and wheat at the moderate price of
125^. 5d.) 11,224,809 quarters of wheat were sufficient for the
payment. In 1815, that the taxes being 79,94*8,670/., and the
price of wheat only 64-5. 4?d., 24<,854s508 quarters were requi-
site for the payment thereof. But then, 1817 was again a
prosperous year ; for the taxes being reduced to 55,836,259/.,
and wheat having risen to 94-5. 9<£, 11,786,017 were sufficient
for the payment thereof. Now, according to this statement,
the years 1812 and 1817 must have been those of the lightest
pressure, and 1815 and 1821 those in which that pressure was
most severe. If distress, bordering on famine, — if misery, burst-
ing forth in insurrection, and all the other symptoms of wretch-
edness, discontent, and difficulty, are to be4 taken as symptoms
of pressure upon the people, then I should say, that 181 2 and 1817
were two years of which no good man can ever wish to witness
the like again. But, if all the usual consequences of general
ease, in the great masses of our condensed population, and all
the habitual concomitants of contented industry are indica-
tions of a better state of things, then, I should say, that 1815 and
1821, periods of the severest pressure of taxation, according to
this new measure of its pressure, are among those years in which,
judging from their conduct, the labouring parts of the com-
munity have had least reason to complain of their situation."
* An object which, to some extent, the sinister interests of
the landowners in parliament, have succeeded in accomplishing
by the corn laws.
1819—1822. 75
sure would have created in all the multifarious
transactions of markets, not only by contracts for
time, but in the most ordinary purchases and sales.
In the case of nearly all articles of merchandise,
there is a customary prompt, or interval between
the making of the bargain and the completion of
the delivery and payment. This interval varies
from one week to three months, which is inde-
pendent of credit commencing from the delivery.
Now, in all such cases, the seller would, supposing
the alteration of the standard to be declared pend-
ing the prompt, receive less in intrinsic value by
C20 or 40 per cent, than he considered himself as
having bargained for. All claims upon or by per-
sons abroad would be affected to the extent of the
whole difference of the standard, as the foreign
exchanges would immediately adjust themselves to
that alteration. In short, the proposed settling
or adjusting of contracts, by an alteration of the
standard, would have been the unsettling and vio-
lent disturbance, not only of all fixed monied in-
comes, and of debts and credits, but of all the
innumerable transactions that might have been
pending at the time when the alteration was an-
nounced. And as to an equitable adjustment under
such circumstances, it is hardly conceivable how
any person of sane mind could entertain the idea
for a moment, without perceiving the monstrous
injustice, and the enormous incongruities, which
would attend such an attempt.*
* But there would have been, moreover, if the standard had
been altered, some curious and perplexing anomalies, arising
in such a case from our protective system. Thus, supposing
that agricultural produce had, in the first instance, advanced in
price to the full extent of the alteration, and supposing this to
have been 40 or only 20 per cent., the price of wheat, which in
1819 was 72s., would, on this supposition, have reached up-
wards of 805., which would have opened the ports ; and as prices
abroad had fallen much more than they had done here, we should
have imported and admitted for consumption a very large foreign
76 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
Never indeed was there a measure dictated by a
sounder policy than that by which parliament de-
termined in 1819 that the trifling divergence which
then existed between the paper and the gold should,
as speedily as was conveniently practicable, be re-
medied, and the convertibility restored with the
strongest sanction against its being again suspended.
So loudly was that measure called for by every
consideration of justice and good faith, and of
the most comprehensive view of the public in-
terest, that if, for the purpose of carrying it into
effect, some actual derangement of prices and of
credit had been distinctly contemplated, the effort
would have been amply justified by the object.
But there is not the vestige of a ground for sup-
posing, that the smallest part of the fall of prices,
or of the derangement of credit, in 1819, or from
1819 to 1822, can, according to any evidence of
facts, or any consistent reasoning, be traced to the
operation, direct or indirect, of that measure. The
sufficiency of the causes, without reference to
Peel's bill, of the fall of prices between 1818 and
1822, can hardly, it is presumed, admit of a doubt
in the mind of any person who, unbiassed by a pre-
conceived theory, will examine carefully the facts
as they will appear in evidence in connection with
the fall of prices.
As the fail of the prices of commodities was
more immediate and rapid, and more directly pro-
ductive of the derangement of credit in 1819, than
the fall of the prices of provisions, the former will
here more properly, in the present instance, come
first under consideration.
supply, which, as our own produce was becoming abundant,
might eventually have reduced prices below the rate at which
they actually ranged ; and so perhaps still more strikingly in
the case of some other articles, subject to a duty not advalorum.
1819— 1822. 77
SECTION 2. — Markets for Commodities from 1819
to 1822.
The largest in point of amount of the articles of
which there was so great an excess of the import-
ation, was cotton ; and it was in this article that the
fall in price was the greatest, and the failures among
those concerned in it, consequently, the most ex-
tensive. The error usual on such occasions had
been committed ; the stocks on the spot had been,
as we have seen, greatly reduced in 1816, and a
rise of price of this reduced stock was perfectly
justified ; but then, as in more recent instances, the
advanced price was not confined to the small stocks
on the spot, but was paid for large quantities in the
countries of growth, to be shipped hither. Could
it be imagined that the importation at the close of
1818, being within a trifle of double of what it
had been in 1816, —
1816, - - 93,920,055 IBs.
1818, 177,282, 158 Its.
could be sold at near the prices to which the
scarcity had raised it ? Or what more natural, ac-
cording to the ordinary rules which govern markets,
than that the price (of bowed Georgia) should have
fallen from 1.9. 10c/., which it had reached between
1816 and 1818, to 1,9. in 1819? The result of
overtrading on so large a scale, was experienced in
numerous and extensive failures, which began in
the latter part of 1818, and continued more or less
through the earlier part of 1819- Importers, specu-
lators, and manufacturers were successively ruined
by having embarked too largely upon the anticipa-
tion of the maintenance of the former range of
high prices. There were also very extensive fail-
ures in New York, but more especially in Charles-
town, and other southern ports of the United States,
78 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
at the close of 1818, and at the commencement of
1819.
Of silks, the importation of 1818 was also within
a trifle of double of what it had been in the two
preceding years. Of foreign wool, the excess was
still more remarkable ; thus —
1816, - - 8,117,864 IBs.
1818, - - 26,405,486 Ibs.
And, as has been seen by the comparative state-
ment of the official value of imports, there was an
excess of them not only beyond that of the two
immediately preceding years, but beyond any single
year, or any average number of years preceding.
It was the early part chiefly of 1819 that was
marked by a considerable degree of commercial
discredit and distress, originating clearly in great
previous overtrading, and in the natural and ne-
cessary consequence of the transition from casual
scarcity, and speculation on prospective scarcity, to
excess of supply, and the dull and drooping markets
incidental to excess of supply : an excess not rela-
tively, as has, by the advocates of the theory of
war-demand, and by the opponents of Peel's bill,
been referred to a diminished consumption, but
relatively to an increased and increasing consump-
tion.* Before the autumn of 1819, however, every
vestige of discredit had disappeared ; and it was
not, as the consequence of either discredit or dis-
tress, that prices of most commodities continued to
* It may be observed in further proof of the absence of so
general a cause as that of mere difference in the quantity of
money, as a cause of the fall, that among the few articles of
which there was not an excessive supply, the prices in 1819
were higher than they had been in 1817. This was the case
with lead and English iron. The fall of the prices of these
articles subsequent to 1819, admits of being accounted for on
distinct grounds.
1819—1822. 79
decline, with few exceptions, to the close of
The sources of supply of all the raw materials of
our principal manufactures, were experiencing a
progressive extension, at a diminished cost of pro-
duction ; and, although there had been in the two
or three years immediately following 1818, a slight
falling off in the amount of imports of some of the
articles, from the great excess of that particular
year, there was a progressive increase on the aver-
age of three years, compared with the average of
any preceding three years. This was shown in
some statements brought forward by the late Lord
Liverpool in the House of Lords, with a view to
prove that, although the consumption was greatly
increased, the supplies had outrun it.
Is it necessary then to call in the aid of Peel's
bill to account for the fall of markets so circum-
stanced ? and in what possible sense of the words
could it be deemed just or expedient on the part
of the legislature to seek to avert the otherwise
inevitable fall of prices by a degradation of the
standard ?
But if the evidence of an excess beyond the or-
dinary average rate of supply is quite conclusive
in the case of commodities, little if at all less con-
clusive will it be found to be in the case of agricul-
tural produce.
SECTION 3. — Prices of Agricultural Produce from
1819 to 1822.
In the markets for agricultural produce there
was, at the commencement of 1819, a tendency to
* At the close of 1822, the movements of the French armies
on the frontiers of Spain, and the measures of the French go-
government with reference to Spain, which were thought to
endanger the peace of Europe, gave occasion to a speculative
rise in the prices of colonial produce. But upon its being found
that a general war, which had been apprehended, did not ensue,
the markets relapsed to their former state.
80 TRICES AND CIRCULATION,
dulness and decline of prices. The importations
of corn had evidently been large beyond the occa-
sion ; the winter had been mild, and the spring was
very forward, appearances of the corn promising,
and the pastures luxuriant. Under these circum-
stances, it is hardly to be wondered at, that in the
spring of 1819, the markets should be dull and
drooping. Indeed, the wonder, if any, should
rather be, that the fall was not more rapid and de-
cided ; and that it was not more decided and rapid
is one among other proofs how utterly devoid of
influence on opinion, as affecting the corn markets,
was the agitation of the question respecting the
return to cash payments. Nothing can show
how little was either the direct or the moral
influence — that is, the influence on opinion — of
Peel's bill in the corn trade, than that the average
price of wheat, after an intermediate depression,
rose in August, 1819, to 7«5s., the average price
for the whole year 1819 being J^s. And that, in
August, 1820, the price, after some fluctuation,
arising from varying appearances of the weather,
should have been still so high as JQs.
There is some difficulty indeed in accounting for
the prices in this country having been kept so high
till the harvest of 1820, ranging between 65s. and
72,9., seeing that the importation of 1818 had
proved beyond the occasion, and that the harvest
of 1819, although in the southern division of the
island there were complaints of injury from pre-
vious weather, was in the result considered to have
yielded a full average produce. And, at any rate,
the produce of it, with whatever may have been the
stock on hand, proved to be more than sufficient for
the consumption without any fresh foreign supply.
The explanation of the maintenance of so high
a price, under such circumstances, seems to ue
this : — There was still a lingering of opinion among
farmers, and persons generally in the corn trade,
1819—1822. 81
that upon the shutting of the ports, although the
prices might decline somewhat below the import
rate, they could not fall very much, nor continue
for any considerable length of time much lower.
And the grounds for this opinion seem to have
been, that it was, in the first place, taken for
granted, that in ordinary seasons we did not grow
enough for our own consumption ; and, in the
next place, there was a strong impression, founded
upon the experience of the preceding thirty years,
that no long interval was likely to elapse without
the occurrence of a season of decided deficiency.
There was, on the whole therefore, under the in-
fluence of these opinions, a considerable degree of
buoyancy in the corn markets upon every occasion
of adverse weather, or of unfavourable appearances
of the coming crops.
The winter of 1819-20 was rather a rigorous
one. The frosts set in with some severity in
December, and continued, with intermissions,
till the latter part of February, when the win-
ter terminated with a heavy fall of snow. The
spring was variable, but mostly cold, and vegeta-
tion backward, till about the 18th June, when a
sudden change to a high temperature and brilliant
clearness succeeded, and lasted for several days
during the critical period of the blooming process
of the wheats. Apprehensions had previously been
entertained of injury to the crops, and the average
price, which in January had fallen to 64,9., advanced
in April and May to 70s. After an intermediate
depression, upon the favourable change in June,
the weather having become unsettled, and at-
tended with heavy showers in July, the markets
rallied a little till the harvest, when the average
price of wheat rose to J2s. But the weather be-
came brilliantly fine at the commencement of
August, and thenceforward continued to be most
propitious for the ripening and gathering of the
VOL. ir. G
82 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
whole of the crops. And the result of the harvest
of 1820, proved to be decisive of a great impending
fall of prices. The crops of nearly all kinds turned
out beyond expectation, both in bulk and in yield.
It was a harvest of undoubted and general abun-
dance.
Mr. Wakefield, an eminent land surveyor, in his
evidence before the Agricultural Committee, in
1821, says, " The last harvest has been one of the
finest ever known in England ;" and he afterwards
adds, " I think there is a wonderful quantity of
corn in the country. I now (April, 1821) think
that there is as much corn left in the country as
generally in common years there is after harvest."
Mr. David Hodgson, in his evidence before the
same Committee, stated the result of the syste-
matic examination by his firm of the crop of 1820,
to be denoted by the figure 38, the average being
32. But Mr. Hodgson has subsequently stated,
that an error had been discovered in the process, by
which that result had been obtained, and that the
correction of the error gave a result not under 40.
According to this estimate, the produce was at
least one fourth above an average per acre : and it
is highly probable, at the same time, from the great
encouragement of the recent high prices, that the
number of acres under cultivation must have been
considerably extended.
Mr. Jacob * computes the excess of the crop of
1820, beyond an average to have been in the ratio
of 320 to 240, or one third, which, if intended to
include extended cultivation, may be near the
truth.t
It was not till the following two or three years,
during which wheat of the harvest of 1820 con-
* Second Report, April 1828, page 35.
t The annual production of wheat at that time has been com-
monly estimated at about twelve millions of quarters. A crop
then exceeding an ordinary or average produce by one third,
would constitute an excess of not less than four millions of
quarters.
1819— 1822. 83
tinued to appear in the markets, that the exuberant
produce of that season became generally known.
Instead, therefore, of seeking in the state of the
currency, for the cause of the fall of price, imme-
diately after that harvest, it is a matter of more
difficulty to explain how or why the real and suffi-
cient cause, namely, the great excess of quantity,
did not sooner and more powerfully operate. If
the holders generally had then been aware, that in
addition to a stock at the commencement of harvest,
equal to what had usually been held, there was an
excess of three to four millions of quarters in the
produce of that single crop, the fall must inevitably
have been much more rapid. As it was, the aver-
age price fell from 72s. 5d. in August 1820, pro-
gressively till July 1821, when it got down to 51,9.
The winter of 1820-1 was mild, and attended
with little or no snow, and the spring was rather
forward than otherwise, the month of April having
been warm for the season. But May and June were
remarkably cold. July was showery and cold, and
during the harvest, which was late, there were heavy
rains till its conclusion, which was greatly protracted
by the prevalence of wet weather. There was in
consequence a speculative rise in price from 51s. in
July, to 62s. in September ; but, although the
condition of the wheat suffered greatly, the bulk
was large, and the produce considerable. Accord-
ingly, when it was found that there was no defi-
ciency in the produce of that harvest, and that there
were still large quantities of old corn coming for-
ward, the price fell below 60s. by the end of 1821,
and to 42s. by the August following. The quality
of all the wheat of 1821 was very inferior ; and
this inferiority of quality is to be taken into con-
sideration in the comparative view of the low
averages in the following year.*
* Evidence of Joseph Sandars, Esq. before the Lords' Com-
mittee on Agriculture in 1836. Question, " To what do you attri-
G 2
84. PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
The season of 1822 was throughout remarkably
fine ; — a mild winter, a genial spring, and a hot
summer. The spring crops suffered from drought,
but the wheats were universally good in quality,
and proved to be of full average produce ; and as
they were secured early, and in condition for im-
mediate use, the markets were very largely supplied
with new corn, while there was still a great bulk
of old of inferior quality pressing for sale.
And while there was thus a great pressure on the
markets of the supplies of the growth of Britain,
the imports from Ireland had acquired an extension
beyond all expectation : thus in 1820 and 1821,
the importation of wheat alone amounted to nearly
one million of quarters, whereas in 1817 there had
been a balance of export to Ireland, and in 1818
the balance of imports was only 100,638 quarters.*
Most assuredly then a fall of prices to the extent
to which it took place down to the close of 1822,
viz. to an average price of 38,9. for wheat, might
reasonably enough be expected by any one con-
versant with markets, and more especially with the
corn markets, as the effect of continued excess of
supply ; without having recourse to the supposition
that there was any diminution of the quantity of
money j or, in other words, that the gold was dear
bute the fall of corn in 1822 ? " Answer, " To the very extraor-
dinary crop in the year 1820, and to the very singular crop in
the year 1821 : 1821 was a crop on the largest scale: I hardly
ever knew a larger crop, but it was very much damaged in qua-
lity by rain ; the quality was injured, and the value was lowered
in the market."
* The imports from Ireland in 1819, 1820, and 1821 were as
follows : —
Wheat and Flour. Grain and Meal
of all sorts,
qrs. qrs.
1819 - - 151,864 - - 967,861
1820 - - 404,747 - - 1,417,120
1821 - - 566,004 - - 1,822,816
1819—1822. 85
and not that the corn was cheap, that the gold was
scarce, and not the corn in plenty.* In truth, the
depression of the average price of wheat at the
close of 1822, is fully accounted for —
First, by the produce of that harvest coming
early to market, and being ascertained to be above
an average in point of quantity, so that there was
no relief nor any immediate prospect of it, from
the pressure of the large surplus which was then
ascertained to be on hand from former years.
Secondly, by the circumstance of the quality of
the wheat of 1820, having been only middling, and
that of 1821 very inferior, which made the holders
of the old stock press sales at the greatest sacrifices.
The average prices therefore of the last four months
of 1822 are to be taken with a large allowance,
not less perhaps than 5s. the quarter, for mere in-
feriority of quality.
So far then there can hardly, it is presumed,
remain a doubt on the mind of any one who has
followed the description here given, of the pro-
ductiveness of the seasons, and of the transition
from extreme scarcity to superabundance, that the
fall of the prices of agricultural produce from 1818
to the close of 1822, is fully accounted for, with-
out supposing that a diminution of the quantity of
* The extremely low price of cattle in 1822 attracted so
much attention, that I insert a statement of the numbers sold
at Smithfield for the four years ending 1822.
Neat Cattle. Sheep and Lambs.
1819 - - 135,226 - - 949,900
1820 - - - 132,933 - 947,990
1821 - - 142,133 1,107,230
1822 - - 142,043 1,340,160
The comparative increase was equally great at Liverpool and
Hull ; and the supplies at the other markets in England were
no less superabundant. How, then, can there be any difficulty
in accounting for the very low prices of meat at that time ?
G 3
86 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
money must have been, or was, the originating
or accessary cause.*
SECTION 4. — State of Prices on the Continent of
Europe.
If the facts in proof of the transition from scarcity
to abundance of productions both of home growth
and imported, be held to be insufficient to account
for the fall of prices, without calling in the aid of
the hypothesis of a diminished quantity of money
under the operation of Peel's bill, it must be on
the ground of something local, or peculiar to this
country, and not common to us with other coun-
* The fall of the prices of provisions in 1821 and 1822 had
the usual effect of calling forth complaints of agricultural dis-
tress, in consequence of which a Committee of the House of
Commons was appointed in 1821 ; and again in 1822, to inquire
into the causes and the means of remedy of the distress. A
very able report from the former led to no practical conclusion.
But the result of the report of the latter was an act passed in
the session of 1822, which materially altered the law of 1815.
The law of 1822 bore, upon the face of it, the false pretence of
a relaxation of the then existing law, inasmuch as the limit of
total prohibition was reduced from 80s. to 70s. per quarter for
wheat, and in that proportion for other grain. But a duty of
12s. attached, if the price was under 80s., and a further duty
of 5s. for the first three months, making 17s. duty on wheat,
during the first three months after the price should have ranged
between 70s. and 80s. And at a price above 80s., and under 85s.,
the duty was to be 5*., and an additional 5s. for the first three
months, making a duty of 10s. on wheat, during the first three
months after the price should have ranged between 80s. and
85s. At or above 85s. the duty to be Is. But the act was not
to come into operation until the ports should be open under the
law of 1815, by the average price of wheat reaching 80s. ; and
as that contingency did not arrive before the passing of the act
of 1828, which is now in force, the law of 1822 became extinct
without having ever been called into effect. If the act of 1822
had come into operation, its effects, as might easily be shown,
would have been to inflict upon the community a much more
oppressive monopoly than that of the act which it was meant
to supersede.
1819—1822. 87
tries, unless upon the further hypothesis, that the
effect of that measure deranged the currencies of
other countries, as it is said to have deranged our
own. Not only, however, is the fact of abundance
as the sufficient cause of the fall of prices in this
country denied, or superciliously doubted, but the
fact of a fluctuation of prices on the Continent of
Europe, and especially in France, corresponding
in any degree with that which had taken place in
this country, down to the period under consider-
ation, has been either expressly denied, or passed
over without notice, or, if in any degree admitted,
has been summarily disposed of, by referring it to
the all-powerful agency of the asserted alterations
in the system of the currency of this country.
Mr. Matthias Attwood must be considered as
being not only the most eloquent, but one of the
most able and best informed of the expounders of
the doctrine, which refers all the great fluctuations
of prices to alterations in the system of our cur-
rency. It would not therefore be doing justice to
that doctrine to withhold his view of the state of
things at the period which we are now considering,
with reference to the several points here alluded to,
as conveyed in the following extract from the re-
port of a speech of his in the House of Com-
mons, on the 10th July, 1822, on a motion of Mr.
Western's to take into consideration the state of the
currency : —
" The question as to foreign prices, was one on which much
mis-statement had taken place, and on which it was of import-
ance to have the real facts before them, as they threw light
on our own situation. But first he desired the House to con-
sider to what extent, and how universal the fall of prices in this
country had been, and, to exhibit that, he would refer again to
that paper, which had been delivered to the Agricultural Com-
mittee of the last Session of Parliament, by Mr. Tooke, and
which contained a list of the prices of thirty of the most im-
portant articles of commerce and manufactures, selected as ex-
hibiting the extent of fall of prices which had taken place on all
commercial commodities generally. If these prices were con-
G 4
88 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
tinned down to the present time, the result which the list would
exhibit was this, -—that from the month of May 1818 to May
1822, the first of these periods being that when the second ex-
periment for altering the standard of value had commenced,
the prices of all those commodities had fallen to the extent of
40/. in 100/., and that was nearly equal to the fall of agricultural
prices since the same time. Let this fact, then, be applied to
the question as to foreign prices. Was it asserted that a fall of
prices as sudden, as great, and universal, as this had taken place
on the Continent at large ? If so, it led necessarily to one of
these two conclusions]: — either that all productions had every
where suddenly increased, in quantity ; or that money had been
reduced in its quantity ; for the proportion between money and
commodities had altered, and one of these two conclusions must
therefore be of necessity admitted. Either all the productions
of all industry, all climates, and all countries, had suddenly
increased (which it was impossible to believe), or otherwise,
from whatever cause, a reduction in the amount of money ge-
nerally in circulation had taken place. With respect to this
country, where, beyond any question, the fall of prices which
had taken place, was to the extent of nearly one half on all
property and commodities, the reduction which we had forcibly
made in the amount of money in circulation, was fully adequate
to occasion that fall : it was, in fact, impossible, that such a
reduction could be effected without such a fall of prices follow-
ing ; and doubtless these operations on English currency must
have materially deranged the monied system of Europe, and
have affected more particularly those countries more exclusively
connected with England, and which formed the channels through
which the bullion of England had at one period been dispersed,
on the Continent, and at another period been drawn back.
" But the real fact was, that no such fall of prices as that
experienced here, had taken place generally on the Continent ;
and he referred individually to France, which the Honourable
Member for Portarlington had particularly referred to, as ex-
hibiting a fall of prices as great as in this country, and this fact
he distinctly contradicted ; and asserted, that no material de-
pression in agricultural produce or in property generally existed
in France. He maintained that no material rise, in the monied
price of agricultural productions, had taken place in France
during the whole period of the war, during that period which
had been distinguished by so great a rise of prices in this
country ; and that no material depression had taken place since
the peace ; and as this must be of necessity well known to many
members present, and as he saw that honourable gentlemen op-
posite assented to that fact, he would not therefore go into the
proof of it from tables and authorities which he possessed. But it
followed from thence, that the rise and fall of prices which had
been experienced here, had arisen from causes peculiar to this
1819— 1822. 89
country, and not common to us with the Continent at large, as
had been so repeatedly asserted.
" It appeared, however, that there was one part of the Con-
tinent, which was Flanders, where, whether from its more inti-
mate connexion with England, from a derangement at one time
of its own currency, which there was, he understood, some
reason to believe had existed, or from whatever cause, a rise
and fall of prices nearly equivalent to our own had taken place."
— Hansards Parliamentary Debates, vol. vii. p. 1615.
The fact of general abundance, about which
such wonder and incredulity are expressed, may
be strange, but it is not more strange than true ;
and the more minutely the evidence of the fact
is investigated, the more indisputably will the con-
clusion be established. Nor is the fact of general
abundance, between 1819 and 1822, more strange
than the fact equally well attested of general scar-
city between 1815 and 1818. At the same time the
wonder, as to the existence of general abundance,
might, perhaps, be abated by expressing the fact
in different terms ; namely, as a cessation of the
previous scarcity, with the further cause of plenty
and cheapness, by a diminished cost of production.
Enough, to that effect, has been shown in the
foregoing sections. But in the extract here given,
the importance of a reference to the state of prices
on the Continent of Europe, and especially in
France, is expressly admitted : the fact of such
a great rise and fall of prices, as had recently been
experienced in this country, having its counter-
part on the Continent, is, with the single excep-
tion of the case of Flanders, distinctly denied.
At the same time, a resource is provided against the
event of proof of such coincidence being offered,
by the simple assertion that, " the operations on
English currency must have materially deranged
the monied system of Europe." It has already
been seen, that the prices of corn in France had
fluctuated in a still greater degree, between 1808
and 1814, than they had done in this country, and
90 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
that in 1817 a large quantity, at the highest of
our quotations, had been exported from hence to
France. Of the previous existence of dearth,
and of the transition from that dearth to great
abundance, and consequent distress of the agricul-
tural interests, there cannot be more authentic
proof, or unequivocal evidence, than is afforded
by the following extracts from an address of the
Chamber of Deputies to the King of France, on
the 26th of November, 1821, and of his an-
swer: —
" Organs of the gratitude and filial piety of your subjects,
we do not fear that we shall diminish a joy so pure, by causing
to be heard at the foot of your throne, the respectful com-
plaints of the agricultural interests, the fruitful nurse of France.
Their continually increasing distress in the departments of the
East, West, and South, proves the inefficacy of the tardy
precautions, which are opposed to the fatal introduction of
foreign corn."
Answer. — "I know the difficulties which attend the sales of
corn. Notwithstanding the recollection of a recent dearth, I
have, for the first time, restrained the importation of foreign
grain. The laws have been executed ; but no law can prevent
the inconvenience which arises from a superabundant harvest.
The whole of Europe experiences it at this moment."
As the rise of prices in France, in 1817,
been greater than in this country, so likewise was
the fall more rapid, and to a lower level than
here.
Thus, for instance, while the price in this coun-
try, by the Gazette returns, was, on an average,
for the year 1819, 7&?., the average price in
France had fallen in 1819 to 4Tjfs. %d., and fell
eventually below 40s.
Not only were the fluctuations in the price of corn
in France as great as they had been in this country,
and in some instances greater ; but those of many
other, indeed of most other, articles of consump-
tion, had been on a larger scale of variation be-
tween 1808 and 1822, than they had been here.
Coffee and sugar, for instance, which were at 4rf.
1819—1822. 91
to 6d. the pound in this country in 1811, were at
4s, to 6s. the pound in France. Indigo, cotton,
and tobacco were equally out of all ordinary pro-
portion there to the prices in this country, and the
fall had since been more than 50 per cent. On
what grounds therefore the tables referred to in
Mr. Att wood's speech, as proving the negative of
such variations, were constructed, it is not easy to
conceive.
A similar fall of prices to that which occurred
in France between 1817 and 1822, was experi-
enced throughout the greater part of the Continent
of Europe, and, in some instances, the transition
was still more striking. We have seen to what a
height the price of corn had reached during 1816
and 1817, in the South of Germany. The fall in
the two following years was great and rapid ; for
instance,
Vienna, - March, 1817, -
September, 1819, - 19s. 6d.
Munich, - September, 1817, - 151*.
September, 1820, - 24s. 5d.
In the North of Germany the fall, although not
so great as in the South, was to less than one
half.
At Christiana in Norway, the fall was from 81s.
Wd. in 1817, to 26*. Sd. in 1822.
Mr. Blake, in his work, " Observations on the
Effect of Government Expenditure," which has
already been quoted, says, —
" A gentleman from Piedmont informs me, that the same
measure of corn, raised upon his own estate, which, during the
war, sold at 9 francs, now (1822) sells at 3, and has done so
ever since the peace *, although, during the whole period, the
circulating medium of Piedmont has consisted of coined money
in its most perfect state. A letter was shown to me, written
* This must mean after 1817, because in that year the prices
of grain in Italy had been nearly as high as in any period of
the war.
92 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
by a merchant in Holland to his correspondent here, stating,
that the rent of land about Utrecht had sunk to one third, owing
to the great fall of prices."
At Udine, the great mart for grain in the Vene-
tian provinces, the price fell from 99$. 6fe?. in
1816 to 31*. J±d. per quarter, in 1819. At Fiume,
from 88.9. lid. to 29,9. 9d. And in the Papal do-
minions the prices were,
1816. 1819.
Ancona, - 72s. - 29s. ^d.
Senegallia, 76s. lOd. - 285. lOd.
Pesaro, - 73s. 3d. 29s. 3d.
At Lisbon, the fall was from 117$. 6d. in 1817*
to 54fS. 2d. in 1819. — See Consular Returns laid
before Parliament.
Here surely is abundant proof, that the fall had
not been confined to this country, or to this coun-
try and Flanders only. And it is to be observed,
that these were prices not acted upon by any
influence from hence, inasmuch as the principal
rise of them had not been preceded by any de-
mand for export hither, and the fall was so much
greater and more rapid than that which had oc-
curred here ; besides that, the places were few of
them in direct communication for the purposes of
the corn trade with this country.
In none of the states in which this great transition
from high to low prices took place, does it seem to
have occurred to the governments, or to their sub-
jects, that it had its origin in any, but the very ob-
vious causes ; namely, the change from bad to plen-
tiful seasons, and the removal of obstructions to
foreign supplies. Accordingly, in the address of the
French Chambers, it was not the currency, but the
foreign importations that were the subject of com-
plaint.
It was reserved for the opponents of Peel's bill, in
this country, to discover, " that the operations on
English currency must have materially deranged
1819—1822. 93
the monied system of Europe." And these oper-
ations on English currency are said to have been
" such a reduction, forcibly made in the amount of
money in circulation, as was fully adequate to occa-
sion that fall of prices."
The constantly reiterated remark is in the
foregoing extract urged, of the effect of " the bul-
lion dispersed on the Continent from England at
one time, and at another period drawn back."
The utter insignificance of the utmost possible
effect from this last mentioned circumstance, has al-
ready been shown, upon grounds that it is presumed
must satisfy any unbiassed reasoner. But if the
influence of such a cause could have the effects
ascribed to it, its operation would, in the cases
cited, of the fluctuation of prices, between 1815
and 1820, have been in an exactly opposite direction
to that which is inferred. For it has been seen, that
bullion was flowing largely into this country, co-
incidently with the great rise of prices on the
Continent in 1816 and 1817 ; and that it flowed out
of this country in 1818 and 1819, coincidently with
the great and rapid fall of prices on the Continent,
the fall being, in some instances, below the level
from which they had risen ; the stock of bullion
in this country, during that fall of Continental
prices, being as low as, according to all grounds of
computation, it had been on an average, during
the restriction.
How far there are grounds for the asserted de-
rangement of the monied system of Europe by
" operations on English currency" as accounting for
the fall of Continental prices, which for extent and
rapidity was most observable in 1819, will appear
in the examination now to be entered upon, of the
state of the circulation, in the interval from the
commencement of 1819 to the close of 1822.
94 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 5. — State of the Circulation from 1819
to 1822.
Among other instances incidental to the cur-
rency theory, of transposing facts in the as-
sumed relation of causes and effects, in a manner
the very reverse of their actual occurrence,
there is none more striking than the asser-
tion, that the operations of the English currency
deranged the monied system of Europe, in the
period now under consideration. This is not only
not true, but the very reverse of the truth. It
was the financial operations of the principal states of
the Continent of Europe, by large loans negotiated
in 1817 and 1818* that deranged the English cur-
rency. Had it not been for those financial opera-
tions of the Continental states, the resumption of
cash payments, in this country, would have taken
place as a matter of course in 1818.
It is well known, that soon after the negociation
of the loan, which was raised in 1818, by the
Erench government, for the purpose of enabling
it to fulfil its engagements with the allied powers,
as a condition of their army of occupation quitting
the territories of France, and upon the approach
of the period for the departure of the allied
troops, a sudden and great fall of the French funds
occurred. The contractors for the loan applied
for and obtained an extension of the time, for the
fulfilment of their engagements ; but many indi-
viduals and firms, who had speculated largely in
* Loans raised in Europe in the years 1817 and 1818, exclu-
sive of England: —
4
27,700,000 - France.
2,800,000 - - Prussia.
3,600,000 - Austria.
4,500,000 - Russia.
e£38,600,000 Total.
(Append, to Lords' Com. on Cash Payments, p. 424, 1819.)
1819—1822. 95
the same view in the French funds, were ruined
by the very great fall which those funds had ex-
perienced. In consequence of this great fall in
the French funds, combined with the great and
sudden fall of the prices of grain on the Con-
tinent, extensive failures occurred in Paris, Mar-
seilles, and other parts of France, as also in Holland,
and in Hamburg, in 1818, before any indication
had appeared of discredit, or of any material pres-
sure on the money market in this country. Those
failures on the Continent entailed heavy losses on
their connections here, and contributed to the
commercial discredit which soon after began to
manifest itself on this side, in aggravation of the
reaction from the overtrading in this country, as
also in the United States of America. A loan had
also been negociated in the course of 1818 for the
Russian government, the payments for a large
proportion of which, as our importations from Rus-
sia of corn and other produce were, in that year,
on a scale of unusual magnitude, were made by
exports of bullion thither ; thus adding greatly
to the pressure on the money market, and at the
same time exhibiting the phenomenon of prices
falling rapidly on the Continent of Europe, much
more rapidly than here, while bullion was flowing
thither from hence, and calculated, therefore, ac-
cording to the theory in question, to improve their
monied system, and to raise their prices.
These facts, which rest on indisputable evidence,
prove, beyond the possibility of question, that
whatever there might be of derangement of the
currency in 1818, and the commencement of 1819,
originated on the Continent of Europe, being the
very reverse of the state of things supposed and
asserted in support of the currency doctrine.
And equally remote from the truth will be
found to be the hypothesis of a forced reduction,
by the Bank of England, of the amount of the
96 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
currency, with a view to the resumption of cash
payments.
That the directors did not make an effort during
any part of 1818, to counteract the drain on their
treasure, by a reduction of their issues, has al-
ready been shown. And how stands the fact,
as to 1819 ? Why, that in August of that year the
amount of Bank notes was actually higher than
it had been in February preceding, when the bul-
lion committee was first moved for ; and that a
renewed advance to the extent of three millions had
been made in that interval, by the Bank to govern-
ment. The comparison of the position of the Bank
in February and August 1819, may be collected
from the following statement : —
27th February, 1819.
Circulation. Securities.
Notes of 5/.& upwards s£ 17,772, 740 Public s£22,355,115
Under 51 7,354,230 Private 9,099,885
25,126,970 31,455,000
Deposits 6,413,370 Bullion 4,184,620
Liabilities 31,540,240 Assets 35,639,620
31st August, 1819.
Circulation. Securities.
Notes of 51. and upwards 18,017,450 Public 25,419,148
Under 51. 7,285,340 Private 6,321,402
25,252,790 31,740,550
Deposits 6,304,160 Bullion 3,595,360
Liabilities 31,556,950 Assets] 35,335,910
There are few instances, in which the situation
of the Bank has undergone so little alteration, in
an interval of six months, the only difference,
worth notice, being an addition of somewhat more
than three millions to the public securities, and a
diminution of nearly that amount of discounts.
But this difference is material in a double point of
view. According to the opinion which has been
1819—1822. 97
referred to, of the ultra currency doctrine, the
paper issued in advances to the government has
a greater influence on prices than when issued
through other channels, and, therefore, in this in-
stance, ought to have raised prices. On the other
hand, the diminution of discounts proves, in the
first place, that the rate of interest was falling,
and what is of more importance, that whatever
had existed of commercial distress, as the con-
sequence of the overtrading, which had prevailed
in 1818, had abated, if it had not altogether
ceased.
It was, however, in this very interval, ending in
August 1819, in which there is not the vestige of
preparation for cash payments, by a contraction
of the circulation, that the principal part of the
fall of prices, resulting from the large importations,
had taken place. And yet it is to the operation
of Peel's bill, which, as relates to the regulation of
the Bank issues, or of any part of the position of
the Bank, was utterly without effect, that the fall
of prices of many of the leading articles of mer-
chandise, cotton especially, has been ascribed,
while as regards the cotton trade more distinctly
than any other branch of trade, it has been seen,
that the reverses experienced had their origin in
circumstances anterior to the possibility of the
operation of that measure. As to agricultural pro-
duce the fall of prices in the interval here alluded
to was, as we have seen, and may again have oc-
casion to observe, not to any important extent.
In truth, although from such large importations
alternating with previously scanty supplies, the
fluctuations of price had been considerable between
1817 and 1819, the pressure on the money market,
as may be clearly inferred from the amount of dis-
counts at the Bank, and as admits of being proved
by historical evidence, if it were worth while (which
it is not where the grounds of inference are so
VOL. II. H
98 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
clear), was very far short of what it was on many
occasions before, and has been on two memorable
occasions since. The pressure, such as it was, is
so distinctly referable to the effects of overtrading,
which is not, as modern experience abundantly
shows, the exclusive growth of the Bank restric-
tion, that it is the mere casual coincidence in point
of time, with the introduction and passing of Peel's
bill, that gives even the shadow of a pretence for
connecting this measure in the relation of cause and
effect with the necessary reaction from the over-ex-
citement of the immediately preceding period, and
for the inference, that because prices fell after the
passing of Peel's bill the fall was caused by, or, as
it is more speciously said, was the consequence of
that measure.
It was distinctly assumed, as well in the evi-
dence before the Bullion Committee, as in the
debates in Parliament upon the bill in 1819,
that the amount of Bank of England notes then
in circulation was about twenty-five millions ; and
it was with reference to that amount that Mr.
Ricardo gave it as his opinion (and the opinion
which 1 had occasion to give was to the same effect),
that for the purpose of the restoration of the value
of the paper, little, if any, contraction would be
found necessary.
Now, it has been seen, that no reduction had
occurred in the circulation of the Bank of Eng-
land at the end of August 1819 ; and yet in the in-
terval from February 1819 to the August following,
the price of gold had fallen from 4/. Is. to 31. 18,9.,
or, in other words, to the Mint price, the differ-
ence not being worth mentioning ; and the ex-
changes had risen on Hamburgh from 33. 11. to
35. 11., and on Paris from 23. 85. to 25. 10. In this
interval not one of the ingots which had been pro-
vided by the Bank, and which the holders of Bank
notes were entitled to demand at the rate of 4/. 2s.
1819—1822. 99
the ounce, was called for as a matter of business,
although it is said, that one or two were applied for
as a matter of curiosity. And as from the state
of the exchanges, which were already at par, and
were still rising, there could be no doubt of an
approaching influx of bullion in the actual state of
the circulation, it was perfectly clear, that no re-
duction of the amount of Bank notes was at that
time necessary, with a view to compliance with
the provisions of Peel's bill. No part of those
provisions had influenced in the slightest degree,
the operations of the Bank, since the passing of
the bill, or even since the appointment of the
committee, — no repayments by government in that
interval — no refusal or limitation of discounts —
no call upon the Bank for gold at the prices of the
scale fixed by Peel's bill. In what conceivable
way then can it be maintained that that measure
operated in obliging the Bank to curtail its issues,
with a view to prepare for cash payments ? After
the rapid rise of the exchanges, to, and above
Ear, what rational motive could the Bank of Eng-
md have to reduce its issues ? None, certainly.
And that no designed contraction did take place
is clear from unquestionable testimonies. The
following is an extract from a publication in 1822,
by S. Turner, Esq., an ex-bank director : —
« With regard to the effect of Mr. Peel's bill on the Bank of
England, I can state, from having been in the direction during
the last two years, that it has been altogether a dead letter.
It has neither accelerated nor retarded the return to cash pay-
ments, except as, by ordering the repayment of ten millions of
exchequer bills to the Bank, it enabled it to expend those ten mil-
lions in the purchase of bullion without in any way curtailing its
other advances. The directors of the Bank of England, as plain
practical men, have pursued plain practicable means, without
turning to the right hand or to the left, as converts to the new-
doctrines promulgated by the Bullion Committee, and by so
doing, have already thrown into general circulation within the
last twelve months, more than eight millions of sovereigns,
without having diminished, except in the most trifling degree,
the usual average of its notes of five pounds and upwards."
H 2
100 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
In the House of Commons, upon a discussion
on the subject of the currency, 12th June, 1822.
Mr. Pearse, one of the senior directors of the Bank,
said that
" The honourable member for Portarlington (Mr. Ricardo) had
charged the Bank with error and indiscretion, in having become
too extensive purchasers of gold, in consequence of the passing
of the act of 1819. The fact was, that the Bank were quite
passive in taking the gold from the merchants who offered it for
their purchase. The consequence, however, had been, that
bullion had been paid whenever it had been demanded ; that
an issue often or eleven millions of sovereigns had taken place.
Ever since he had been connected with the establishment, he
had been invariably against all forced or artificial measures."
The question whether, in point of fact, the cir-
culation as depending on the Bank of England,
was contracted after August 1819, when the paper
had been already restored in value to a par with
gold, without any reduction, is complicated and
subject to controversy, by the issue of gold coin.
Before the close of the interval now under con-
sideration, a large amount of gold coin came into
circulation, and served as a substitution not only
for the small notes of the Bank of England, but for
some of those of 5l. and upwards.
There has been occasion to observe, that in
the discussions on the increase of the Bank
circulation, during the restriction, it was the
practice in support of the charge of depreciation
from undue enlargement to swell the relative
amount, by including the notes under 5/., although
these were clearly in substitution for, but not
fully supplying the room of the guineas, which
had been displaced. So in support of the doc-
trine, that to the contraction of the currency is
attributable the fall of prices subsequent to 1817,
it has not been unusual to compare the relative
amount of the Bank circulation, including the
small notes, but making no allowance for the
substitution of sovereigns ; and accordingly, there
1819—1822. 101
is no extravagance of conclusion to which this mode
of comparison has not been made subservient.
The amount of gold coin issued by the
Bank in exchange for the notes which they
engaged to pay in cash, by their notices of
the 17th of April and 1st of October, 1817,
was 4,308,833/.* Of this amount the greater
part was probably exported, as the exchanges in
1818 were such as to make the exportation profit-
able. But there is reason to believe that some
part remained in circulation, "because the notes
under 5/., which in 1815 and 1816 amounted to
upwards of nine millions, did not, in 1817, exceed
seven millions five hundred thousand pounds ; and
as there is no ground for supposing that there
were fewer interchanges requiring a one pound
Bank of England note, or a sovereign, the infer-
ence is, that the reduced amount of the small
notes was made up by sovereigns. There was a
further reduction of Bank of England small notes
in 1820 below seven millions, and as the exchanges
were then such as greatly to favour the influx of
gold, it is highly probable, that in the quantity of
gold imported, there were sovereigns which came
directly into circulation, so as not only to displace
some of the small notes, but to form an addition
to the whole circulation. According to this view,
the amount of the circulation in 1820 would not
vary materially from what it had been 1819.
But although there are no means of ascertaining
whether the Bank notes and sovereigns together
made up for the difference of the Bank paper in 1820,
as compared with 1819, there is no doubt, that in
1821, and still more in 1822, the basis of the cur-
rency, as consisting of Bank of England notes and
gold coin, exceeded in amount what it had been
in 1819. The comparison will stand thus: —
* Appendix to Lords' Bullion Report, 1819, p. 374.
H 3
102 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
1821. Average of Notes of 51. and upwards, 17,428,842
Lowest amount of Notes under 51. - 1,950,000
Sovereigns issued - 7,484,501
26,863,343
1822. Average of Notes of 51. and upwards 16,824,605
Lowest amount of Notes under 51. - 750,000
* Sovereigns issued, - 1821, 7,484,501
1822, 4,364,085
11,949,798
^29,524,403
There can be no hesitation in pronouncing these
sums to be representations as correct of the amount
of the basis of the currency as if the sums had
consisted altogether of Bank of England notes,
instead of being partly notes and partly gold
coin, because from the state of the exchanges it
was utterly impossible that there should have been
any inducement to export the coin, unless in a
few instances, as pocket pieces. According to
this statement then, there was a considerable in-
crease of the basis of the currency in 1821 and
1822, as compared with the amount at the time of
the passing of Peel's bill ; and this interval of two
years includes the principal phenomena of the fall
of prices, and of the general depression ascribed
to that measure.
The restoration, therefore, of the value of the
paper to its metallic standard, having taken place
within six months after the appointment of the
Bullion Committee, and within three months
after the passing of Peel's bill, no reduction of
the amount of Bank notes having taken place
in the interval, and the final resumption of cash
payments having taken place in 1821 and 1822,
after a substitution of sovereigns for the small
notes of the Bank of England, coincident with
* Appendix to Report of the Committee on the Bank Charter,
1832, p. 72.
1819— -1822. 103
an increase of the issues, paper and coin together
from the Bank, Peel's bill must be pronounced to
have been wholly inoperative in producing any
contraction, none having occurred in the basis of
the currency.
But it has been urged that the provisions of Peel's
bill, by directing a repayment to the Bank of a certain
amount of its advances to government, necessarily
occasioned the withdrawal of Bank notes from
circulation to that extent. It is evident, however,
by the fact of an increased issue, after such repay-
ment, that there were other channels through
which the sums repaid by government were re-
issued ; and the main question is, as to the quantity
of money, and not as to the manner in which it
came into circulation.
In February, 1822, in consequence of the com-
plaints of agricultural distress, which are invariably
attendant upon the cessation of a dearth of provi-
sions, although the bulk of the community was
deriving the benefit of abundance and cheapness*,
the ministers in deference to the parties urging
* The following extracts from the speech (26th February,
1822,) of Lord Liverpool, in which he introduced the measure
in the House of Lords, exhibits in a very striking point of view,
the most decisive proof of the general prosperity of the country,
while the landed interest was suffering from the fall and low
prices of provisions.
" In the course of the last year the revenue exceeded the re-
venue of the preceding year by more than a million sterling; an
increase calculated on those articles, subject to the same amount
of taxation in both years. This increase is not only a material
fact in itself, but becomes still more so as connected with other
important considerations. Your Lordships may naturally ask,
But how has this revenue been collected ? with what degree of
pressure upon the people ? In answer, I can positively assert,
that there never was any year's revenue collected with less
difficulty or arrear. Out of about twenty-seven millions of
excise duties, to be collected in the year, there is not a de-
ficiency of more than 5000/., and even of that residue there
is a prospect that the greater part will be collected. So that,
not only has the revenue increased, not only does it continue
H 4
104 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
those complaints, proposed to parliament certain
resolutions, authorising an issue of four millions of
exchequer bills, for the purpose of being advanced
by government in loans to parishes, and generally
for the promotion of public works. This notable
scheme was with a view, as it was intimated, of en-
larging the circulation and stimulating speculation,
or in other words, raising prices : the resolutions
were passed, and the powers were granted ; but
they failed egregiously of the proposed effect. The
circulation of Bank notes, an increase of which
was the professed object of the measure, was dimi-
nished instead of being enlarged, between February
and August, 1822; and although the securities of the
Bank were increased by one million two hundred
thousand pounds in August, as compared with Febru-
ary 1822, that increase was more than compensated
by an increase, on the other hand, of the deposits
to the amount of one million seven hundred thou-
sand pounds. But the main purpose, namely, that
of raising prices, was so far from being accom-
to increase, but it appears to press more lightly on the people,
than at many former periods."
And in a subsequent part of his speech, Lord Liverpool
added : —
" When the Noble Earl (Stanhope) says, that the low prices,
incident to the distress which agriculture suffers, benefit no
man, I answer, that although I sincerely wish the distress did
not exist, I cannot be blind to the fact, that they certainly do
benefit a great majority of the people. Do they not benefit
the annuitant and mortgagee, who were, during the war, the
principal and almost the only sufferers. In all large towns they
have occasioned considerable benefit by the fall of the poor
rates. I have been at some trouble, my Lords, to ascertain the
real state of the case, and I can pledge myself to the accuracy of
this statement. In this metropolis, in which your Lordships are
now sitting, never were the lower orders of the people in a better
condition than they are at the present moment. So that when
the noble earl says, that the low prices, incident to the distress
of the agriculturist, have not been beneficial to anybody, he
certainly labours under a great mistake, for that distress, how-
ever much to be lamented in itself, is accompanied by a con-
siderable benefit to a great proportion of the people."
1819—1822. 105
plished, that they fell progressively to the end of
the year, and a twelvemonth elapsed before, from
totally distinct causes, the prices of provisions ex-
perienced the so much desired advance.
It may still be contended, however, that if the re-
payments had not been made, the circulation of the
Bank of England might have been larger by that
amount. This does not follow, inasmuch as there
would, in all probability, have been a diminution, on
the one hand, of private securities, and an increase, on
the other, of the amount of deposits. But if the re-
payment were supposed to have the effect, which,
under the circumstances it had not, of diminishing
the circulation, PeePs bill cannot in fairness be
charged with having rendered necessary any part
of such repayment (taking the advances as they
stood in February 1819) beyond what would, in all
probability, have been made by 1822, if that bill
had not passed.
The repayments which took place subsequently
to 1819, were clearly not necessary or desirable to
the Bank. The rapid rise of the exchanges in-
sured a great influx of gold, and proved that the
circulation required no reduction. It would, there-
fore, have argued great mismanagement on the
part of the Bank directors, if they had, under such
circumstances, urged the repayment from govern-
ment, as the means of enabling them to pay in
gold ; and the promoters of Peel's bill would not
have been accountable for the consequences of
such mismanagement.
But there does not appear to be sufficient reason
for imputing to the Bank directors of that time
such ignorance of their position. The state of the
money market had become such as made it highly
expedient for the government, in its financial ar-
rangements, to reduce the amount of the unfunded
debt, which was inconveniently and dangerously
large ; and the opportunity for such reduction
106 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
presented itself in the great fall in the market rate
of interest and the rise of the funds, which oc-
curred between 1820 and 1822, in which interval
the repayment was completed. Whether, there-
fore, the repayments by government had produced
an actual diminution of the Bank issues (which they
did not), or whether they prevented such an en-
largement of the circulation as might otherwise
have taken place (which they probably did), in
neither case could the effect be imputed to Peel's
bill, as it is highly probable that such repayments
were regulated mainly by the financial views of
government, and it would be a new and somewhat
dangerous doctrine, to contend that government
ought to enlarge or diminish the unfunded debt,
not according to views'strictly financial, but accord-
ing to their notions of the proper amount of the
circulating medium.
It is perfectly clear, therefore, that there is not
the shadow of a pretence for imputing to the oper-
ation of Peel's bill any thing like a forcible reduc-
tion of the issues of the Bank; for that, in point
of fact, it had no influence whatever on the amount
of the circulation.
This opinion of the inoperativeness of Peel's
bill, on the amount of the circulation, supposes,
however, that it was not in the alternative of
a debasement of the standard, or of an unlimited
and irredeemable compulsory paper currency. The
former of these alternatives was entertained and
suggested by a small number only, who, as has
been observed, had no definite plan ; the latter
was not contemplated, or, if contemplated, was
not ventured to be avowed by any one, except
here and there by some wild projector. There
were, in point of fact, only two alternatives
that came properly under consideration of the le-
gislature in 1819, namely, to continue the restric-
tion, as it had from time to time been extended
1819—1822. 107
for one, two, or three years further, without any
intermediate payment in gold at a fixed price ; or,
to leave the continuance of the restriction to the
convenience and discretion of the Bank directors ;
they engaging according to their own suggestion,
in the meantime to pay their notes in gold, if re-
quired, at the market price.
The debates upon Peel's bill turned chiefly upon
the compulsory clauses, enforcing the payment of
bullion according to the scale. These clauses
were considered objectionable, as being calculated
to oblige the Bank forcibly to contract its circula-
tion, for the purpose of paying in bullion at the
prescribed periods, and any very strict limitation
of time, for the eventual resumption was ob-
jected to by the friends of the paper system on the
same ground. But to the principle of the eventual
restoration of the value of paper to gold at 31. 17s.
W^d., there was a pretty general assent, the chief
exceptions being those already mentioned. But
whichever of the alternatives here referred to had
been adopted, the same result, as relates to the
amount of the circulation of Bank paper, the time
of the restoration of its value, and the final re-
sumption of cash payments, would have occurred
as the inevitable consequence of the state of things
which existed in 1819 and 1820.
I refer to the fall in the market rate of interest,
and the consequent contraction of the channel for
the issue of Bank notes through the discount of
mercantile bills — the improved state of the finances,
which enabled and induced government to diminish
the unfunded debt — the large sums due from
abroad, for the unusually extensive exports of 1818,
the means of returns, excepting in gold, being at
the same time abridged by the shutting of our ports
against the importation of corn, and by the glut
which prevailed here of other foreign products, in
consequence of the large importations of 1818 —
108 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
these circumstances combined to determine the
tide of the metals so strongly into this country,
that nothing but a very unusual effort on the part
of the Bank, involving a departure from its ordinary
rules, in extending its securities at a greatly re-
duced rate of interest, which might have had the
effect of hastening the direction of capital to foreign
investments, could have prevented, or even mate-
rially have retarded, such influx. Instead, there-
fore, of any effort being requisite on the part of
the Bank to comply with the provisions of Peel's
bill, it would have required an extraordinary effort
to render them operative.*
But if Peel's bill was thus inoperative, and
therefore innocent of all the evils which have been
so abundantly, and with so much superfluous elo-
quence laid to its charge, it may be asked, what
was the merit of the bill, and what was the ground
of the importance attached to it by its promoters ?
— seeing that the same result would have attended
any of the alternatives proposed, an alteration of
the standard, or a permanently irredeemable and
unlimited paper currency excepted.
The merit of the measure was, as it has since
turned out, independent of the event. That merit
consisted in the sanction which it afforded to the
* Mr. Ricardo does not appear to me to have sufficiently
appreciated this state of things, when he charged the Bank di-
rectors with mismanagement, in having prematurely and un-
necessarily enhanced the value of the currency by their large
purchases of gold after the passing of Mr. Peel's bill. His mode
of expression conveys the dea that the directors made an
effort to buy gold; that they created a demand for it by a
designed reduction of their issues for that specific purpose.
Now, the truth is, that they were perfectly passive, and moved
only in the ordinary routine of their business : they bought
gold simply as it was brought to them at or below the Mint
price ; and it was a matter of indifference, as concerned the
amount of the currency, whether the gold were taken by the
importers to the Mint, and thence brought directly into cir-
culation as coin, or were taken in the shape of bullion to the
Bank in return for its notes.
1819— 1822. 109
principle, that the Bank has the power, by the
regulation of its issues, to preserve the value of its
paper on a level with that of gold : and the im-
portance attached to the bill by its promoters is
fully justified by the consideration that, at the time
when it was under discussion, there was fair ground
for contemplating circumstances under which the
compulsory clauses of the act would come into
operation.
Among the numerous contingencies which might
have rendered Peel's bill operative in contracting
the circulation, a few, involving no very great im-
probability, may be noticed. The harvest in 1820,
proving deficient by more than a fourth, (instead
of being, as it was, productive by more than a
fourth above an average,) and the consequent
opening of the ports to a very large importation of
corn — speculations upon deficiency of cotton or of
other imported commodities — any great financial
operation of the French government, — or an earlier
direction of capital in mining schemes, and loans to
South America.
Some of these separately, but more especially if
combined, would, in an advanced state of their
progress, have created such a mass of mercantile
paper, and such a demand for the employment of
borrowed capital, as materially to raise the rate of
interest. The applications for discount at the
Bank would have been greatly increased ; and the
same cause, viz. a rise in the rate of interest, would
have made it difficult, or at any rate very incon-
venient, for government to make any repayment of
its advances ; or the government might, under such
circumstances, have been induced to ask for further
accommodation. But while in this state of things
there would have been an increased demand for
Bank notes, a tendency to an efflux of the metals
to answer the sudden call for payments abroad, be-
fore any return for increased exports of commodi-
110 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
ties could meet that call, would have indicated the
expediency of contracting the circulation.
In such case it is that Peel's bill would have
been operative. The Bank directors could not
then, without putting themselves out of condition
to conform to its enactments, have granted accom-
modation in the way of discounts to the extent
of the applications for it; and instead of making
further advances to government, the early repay-
ment of the amount contemplated by the act of
1819 must have been rigidly insisted on.
The limitation of discounts below the sums ap-
plied for, and the necessity which government
would be under of raising a loan, or of issuing
exchequer bills at a higher rate of interest to en-
able it to make the repayment, would have pro-
duced a great deal of mercantile pressure and
distress. This state of things would have been
compatible as it was in the spring of 1796, with
a high price of corn. Although, under such cir-
cumstances, Peel's bill would have been strictly
and severely operative upon other classes : the
landed interest, so long as the prices of agricultural
produce were maintained, would not have made
the discovery, that it was a measure calculated to
diminish the value of all property.
It is curious to remark, that the state of things
which really rendered Peel's bill inoperative for
the first few years after its enactment, should have
been taken as the specific ground for the clamours
against it, while, under the opposite circumstances,
when it would have been strictly coercive, there
would not have been the slightest pretence for the
complaints of those who have been most violently
opposed to it.
As regards then the issues of the Bank of Eng-
land, there appears to be no ground whatever for
the assertion that .they were contracted by the oper-
ation of Peel's bill. But it is contended by some
1819—1822. Ill
of the opponents of that measure, that although
it had not the effect of reducing the issues of the
Bank of England, it greatly contracted the issues
of the country banks, and thus occasioned the fall
of prices. That a considerable contraction (al-
though not nearly to the extent generally supposed)
of country bank notes took place subsequent to the
passing of Peel's bill, I am perfectly willing to
admit ; and that this contraction accompanied the
fall of prices which occurred between 1818 and
1822, may be equally conceded. But it admits of
being abundantly shown, that the contraction (ex-
aggerated as it has been) of the country circulation,
was the necessary consequence of the fall of prices.
Of the circumstances which favour an extension
of the country Bank circulation on the one hand,
or repress it on the other, abundant explanation
and illustration have already been given in the
course of this work. It has been seen, that it is
of the nature of the circulation of the country
banks, to be extended under circumstances favour-
able to speculation, upon the prospect of an ad-
vance of prices, or upon the opening of new fields
of enterprise, and to be diminished under the op-
posite circumstances. During the period of ad-
vancing prices, and of speculation and general
excitement, which prevailed from 1816 to 1818,
there must accordingly have been, as there is the
strongest presumptive evidence that there was, a
considerable enlargement of the country circu-
lation. But at the time immediately preceding the
passing of Peel's bill, there was a cessation, from
causes totally independent of that measure, of
obvious grounds for speculation of any kind. The
excess of supply of nearly all imported commodi-
ties in. 1819, which continued more or less through
the two following years, was calculated to dis-
courage all anticipation of a speedy advance of
prices, at the same time that the fall of prices and
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
commercial failures narrowed the range, within
which accommodation from the bankers could be
sought or granted; and after the summer of 1820,
when the extraordinary productiveness of that
harvest began to be appreciated, there was not
only no reasonable ground for speculating on an
advance of the price of corn, but a well-founded
apprehension of a fall. There was accordingly a
greatly diminished inducement to farmers and to
cattle dealers, and corn dealers, and millers, with a
view of being enabled to keep up or increase their
stock to seek advances from the country banks.* And
what was of still more importance, where the in-
ducement to borrow existed, the credit necessary
for the purpose was impaired. Whether in the
trading and manufacturing towns, therefore, or in
the agricultural districts, there did not exist the in-
ducement, or the means for putting out or keeping
out the same quantity of paper : a reduction of the
amount was consequently inevitable, even if the
Bank of England had coincidently made a forced
enlargement of its issues.
If Peel's bill could be shown to have directly
or even indirectly caused such a derangement of
the country circulation as had occurred in failures
of bankers in 1793, and again in 1810 to 1812,
and in 1814 to 1816, so as to have disabled
them from accommodating applicants, who had
adequate security to offer, or to induce them
to call in the advances already made, then, in-
indeed, some effect might be ascribed to that mea-
sure, in the contraction of the circulation which
* Mr. Hudson Gurney, on being asked by the Bullion Com-
mittee of 1819 — " What determines, in your opinion, the fluc-
tuations in the amount of country bank paper ?" answers :
" The price at which the staple commodity of each district is
selling : for example, I consider that our circulation would in-
crease with a high price of corn, and would decrease with a
low price of corn : corn being the staple of Norfolk."
1819—1822. 113
took place ; but there is not the shadow of a pre-
tence for ascribing to it any such effect. The
commercial failures in 1819 were not upon the
whole either so numerous or extensive as might
have been expected from the alteration of prices ;
and of those mercantile and manufacturing esta-
blishments which failed, the greater number had
been embarrassed by the general stagnation, which
occurred at the close of 1 8 18, in consequence of the
over- trading of that and the preceding year. The
total number of bankruptcies, in the three years
ending in 1821, were four thousand one hundred
and eighteen, while those in the three years ending
in 1816 had been six thousand six hundred and
twenty-seven, and those in the three years ending
in 1812 had been seven thousand and forty- two.
Of country banks the failures were still fewer in pro-
portion, the whole number of commissions against
them, in 1819, 1820, and 1821, having been only
twenty-seven, namely, 1819 thirteen, 1820 four,
1821 ten, while they had been nearly treble that
number in the three years ending in 1816.*
In truth, although there had been in 1819, as
in all cases of re-action from over-trading, a pres-
sure on the money market, that is, a diminished
facility, and an increased rate of interest in the
discount of ordinary paper, there was nothing like
so great a pressure as had, in several previous in-
stances during the restriction, been experienced.
And the duration of the pressure, comparatively
light as it was, proved to be very short ; the clear
evidence of which is in the fact of a great falling
off of the discounts at the Bank, namely, from
* This comparative stability of commercial, but more espe-
cially of banking, credit may be ascribed to the circumstance
that the great failures which had occurred in 1814-15-16 were
still recent, and had cleared away the greater part, if not the
whole, of what had been rotten or unsound in trade and banking,
so that the losses arising from the overtrading of 1818 fell on
establishments that could bear them.
VOL. II. I
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
nine millions, in February 1819, to about six mil-
lions, in August following ; at which latter date,
not a vestige of pressure on the money market or
of commercial discredit remained.
It may, however, be contended, that though the
general provisions of Peel's bill for the resumption
of cash payments had not any material influence
in the reduction which took place in the circula-
tion of the country banks from 1819 to 1822, yet
that the particular part of the enactment which
enjoined the suppression of the \L country notes
in 1823 was calculated to produce a considerable
effect, by inducing country bankers to make pre-
parations for withdrawing that portion of their
paper.
The importance of the country I/, note circu-
lation upon the value of the whole of the cur-
rency, or, in other words, its influence on prices,
has been, and is, in my opinion, extravagantly, and
I would almost say ludicrously, over-rated. But
whatever may be the importance of that part of
the circulation, the provisions which related to it in
Peel's bill did not practically come into operation,
inasmuch as that clause of the act which directed
the suppression in 1823 was repealed in June, 1822.
It has often been said, and is still constantly re-
peated, that government, alarmed at the fall of
prices, tampered afresh with the currency, by re-
pealing so much of the act of 1819 as provided for
the cessation of the small note country circulation
in 1823, and extending the term of the privilege of
issuing them for ten years longer. And that, in
consequence of this prolongation of term, there was
an increased issue of paper and a renewed rise of
prices. This is only one of innumerable specimens
of total disregard of dates and attendant circum-
stances, in referring to the operation of particular
measures. That it was a tampering with the cur-
rency, and that it was very weak and foolish on the
1819-1822. 115
part of government to have yielded in that, as in
other instances, to the influence of the country gen-
tlemen, who thought that they would be mar-
vellously benefited by that measure, may be readily
admitted. But that it had the so much desired
effect of raising prices is not only not to be ad-
mitted, but admits of being distinctly denied and
disproved.
It was in reference to this measure that the late
W. Cobbett used to ring the changes of " out came
the paper, and up went the prices." Now the fact
was, that the paper did not come out, and the prices
did not get up, but, on the contrary, continued to go
down, for many months after the bringing in of the
bill in question. It was in April 1822 that minis-
ters announced their very unwise intention of pro-
posing the prolongation of the small note country
circulation. And there was not a doubt that the
measure would pass. If, therefore, the country
bankers had contracted their circulation, merely in
contemplation of the impending termination of the
privilege of issue, what should have prevented
their extending their issues now that they were
secure of the continuance of the permission for ten
years longer ? But, in truth, there was no exten-
sion, but rather a diminution, of their issues to the
close of 1822, following the fall of the price of
wheat, which in the commencement of that year
had been at 48s. 6d., and declined before the close
of it to 38s. Wd,, being a fall of 20 per cent. The
subsequent rise in the price of corn, which is so
commonly ascribed to the supposed influence of the
prolongation, (the bill for which was passed in the
early part of 1822,) did not take place till a twelve-
month after the notice of that prolongation had
been given. That rise of prices, and the accom-
panying state of the circulation, will be noticed in
the examination which we are about to enter upon
of the next epoch.
j 2
116 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
The only imaginable remaining ground upon
which Peel's bill can be connected, in the relation of
cause and effect, with the low range of prices in 1822
is that, assuming the influx of bullion between 1819
and 1822 to have been a consequence, and not, as it
was, a mere sequence of that measure, the absorption
of so much of the metals from the circulation of the
rest of the world may be supposed to have caused
a sensible increase of their value. But not to
repeat the arguments of reasoning and fact which
have been before adduced, to show how little per-
ceptible effect upon prices is likely to be produced
by variations of a few millions of the precious
metals, absorbed from, or dispersed among, the
nations of the world, it may be sufficient here to
mention, by anticipation of what will properly come
under distinct notice in the next chapter, the fact,
that the accumulation of bullion in the coffers of
the Bank was greater, by no less an amount than
four millions, in January 1824 than it had been in
at the close of 1822, while the prices of corn, and
of agricultural produce generally, had risen upwards
of 50 per cent., coincidently with that large addi-
tional influx of bullion.
SECTION 6. — Summary of the preceding Survey.
The facts and reasonings which have been ad-
duced in this chapter appear to establish irresistibly
the following conclusions : —
1. That the very great increase of the importa-
tions at the close of 1818, and the very high prices
which then prevailed, and which could only be
justified by the previous scarcity, led inevitably,
supposing a perfectly uniform state of the currency,
to a great fall of prices in 1819 ; and the continued
abundance of supplies accounts fully for a low range,
1819— 1822. 117
with a tendency to a continued fall, to the close of
2. That, as relates to agricultural produce espe-
cially, an importation of corn beyond the occasion
at the close of 1818 formed an excess of supply,
which, concurring with a succession of productive
crops of our own growth, could not fail of causing
that reduction of the value of wheat, and of other
agricultural produce, from 1817 to 1822, which has
so unaccountably and gratuitously been ascribed to
other causes.
3. That if it had been an object with the legis-
lature, when the state of the currency was brought
before it in 1819,' to maintain the prices which had
been the consequence of scarcity and speculation, no
means were open to it but to degrade the standard
by between 30 and 50 per cent, at a time when, by
the ordinary tests of the price of gold and the ex-
changes, the utmost depreciation of the paper did
not exceed between 3 and 5 per cent. It being to
be borne in mind that a degradation of the standard
to the extent supposed would have virtually de-
feated the operation of the corn laws, which, there-
fore, in the proposed view of keeping up prices,
would have required a corresponding alteration.
4. That as the price of corn in France, and on
the Continent of Europe generally, had, in 1816
and 1817, risen beyond the ordinary relative pro-
portion to the prices in this country, so the fall of
prices on the Continent, between 1817 and 1822,
was more rapid, and to a much lower level, than
ours. If, therefore, the fall of prices in this coun-
try formed sufficient ground for calling upon the
legislature to degrade the standard, there would
have been at least equal reason why the landed
interests, and debtors generally, in Germany, Hol-
land, France, and Italy, should have called upon
their respective governments for a similar degrada-
tion of the standard of their currencies.
i 3
118
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
5. That the fall of prices on the Continent of
Europe in 1818, which had preceded and gone
beyond ours, was accompanied by an efflux of bul-
lion from this country ; a circumstance which, ac-
cording to the currency theory, ought to have had
the effect of raising prices on the Continent.
6. That not only were the causes connected with
the supply and demand sufficient to account for the
fall of prices in this interval, without inferring a
contraction of the Bank circulation as an originating
or moving cause of that fall, but that, in point of
fact, the issues of Bank notes and coin together,
constituting the basis of the currency, were in-
creased coincidently with the fall of prices.
7- That as an increase of the country circulation
had been a consequence of the rise of prices from
1816 to 1818, so a reduction necessarily followed
the fall of prices between 1818 and 1822.
8. That the prolongation, in the spring of 1822,
of the term for the issue of country small notes to
ten years from that time had not the effect ascribed
to it of an immediate increase of the country cir-
culation, and of a consequent rise of prices, inas-
much as all accounts agree in computing that the
country circulation was rather reduced than ex-
tended during the twelvemonth following that
measure, and inasmuch as the prices of corn con-
tinued to decline till the spring of 1823, a twelve-
month afterwards, when distinct grounds for an
advance of prices occurred.
9. That whether looking to the state of supply
and demand as regards production, or to the state
of the circulation, whether of the Bank of Eng-
land or of the country banks, or to the corre-
sponding variation of bullion prices in the rest of
the commercial world, the conclusion is irre-
sistible that the act of 1819, for the resumption
of cash payments, was perfectly inoperative upon
the amount of the circulating medium, and upon
I
1819—1822. 119
the state of prices in this country to the close of
10. That the accumulation of bullion in the cof-
fers of the Bank in 1822 cannot be assigned as a
cause of the low range of prices of agricultural
produce at the close of that year, inasmuch as it
will be seen in the next chapter that prices rose
upwards of 50 per cent., coincidently with a further
accumulation of no less than four millions in the
year following.
The interval which has here passed under re-
view has been confined to the four years ending
in 1822, because the close of that year witnessed
the depression of almost all articles to nearly
as low a point as they have since again reached.
Immediately after the close of 1822 there arose a
fresh set of disturbing causes, the nature and ex-
tent of the operation of which we shall now proceed
to examine.
I 4
120 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
CHAPTER VIII.
STATE OF PRICES AND OF THE CIRCULATION, FROM
THE COMMENCEMENT OF 1823 TO THE CLOSE
OF 1827.
THE epoch, upon the consideration of which we
are now about to enter, comprises the memorable
speculations of 1824-5, and the lamentable recoil
from them, attended by an extraordinary derange-
ment of the circulation, in 1825-6.
An advance in the prices of corn having occurred
in the interval from 1822 to 1827 has been ascribed
to the same general causes. But it will be seen,
that although the prices of corn and of other
provisions rose considerably, and were at a much
higher range in that interval, than they had been in
1821 and 1822, the advance was not so coincident
in point of time with the speculative rise in the
prices of other produce and of shares, and of fo-
reign loans, which characterised the speculations
of 1824-5, as to admit of being brought within
the same supposed influence.
SECTION 1. — Variations of the Corn Trade in
1823, with reference to the asserted Influence of
an enlarged Circulation of Paper in that Year.
A rise in the price of wheat of upwards of 50 per
cent, which occurred in 1823, has been laid parti-
cular stress upon by the partisans of the currency
theory, as being illustrative of the effects of an
1823—1827.
enlargement of the circulation of the Bank of
England, and of the country banks, such enlarge-
ment being confidently asserted to have been the
originating and the chief, if not the only, cause of
that rise. Assertions to this effect are to be found
in nearly all the pamphlets and speeches of the.
supporters of that doctrine. In the minutes of
evidence appended to the reports of the Lords' and
Commons' committees, of 1836, on agricultural
distress, the leading questions, and the general
tenor of the answers imply a full persuasion on the
part both of the examiners and the examined, that
an increase of paper was the main, if not the sole,
cause of the rise in the prices of corn in 1823.
Seeing therefore the importance that is attached
to the state of the corn trade in this particular year,
it is desirable to enter into a separate examination
of the causes of the advance of the prices of pro-
visions in 1823, with a view of being enabled to
judge how far the variations of price admit of being
accounted for by circumstances peculiar to that
branch of trade, and then to examine the grounds
for the alleged influence of the currency.
The rise which is observable in the average price
of wheat, in the two first months of 1823, namely,
to 40s. 8d. in February, was mainly the effect of
the necessarily increasing proportion of the superior
new to the very inferior old coming to market. And
a part of the further advance was ascribed in the
contemporary accounts, and with great probability,
to the circumstance of purchases by persons who
had previously sold their old wheat, with a view to
reinvestment in the new. Some speculative pur-
chases were also made at that time, in pursuance
of an opinion which had become prevalent, that
prices had seen their lowest ; and the excellent
quality and condition of the wheat of 1822, afforded
additional inducements to act upon that opinion.
The winter of 1822-3, although not memorable for
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
severity and duration of frost, was rather a rigorous
one, and the spring of 1823 was very backward,
with a prevalence of cold dry weather till the latter
end of June. From these combined circumstances^
the average prices had risen in June, for
Wheat - - to 62-?. 5d.
Barley - 33,9. 9d.
Oats Q6s, Wd.
The weather, however, afterwards improved, and
as the recent rise had induced large supplies from
the farmers, the old stock being found to be more
considerable than had been supposed, the markets
gave way. Although the weather at harvest was
unsettled, with a considerable proportion of wet,
accompanied, with reports of injury to the crops,
prices still continued to decline, and in October of
that year the averages were, for
Wheat 46s. 5d.
Barley 25s. 4<d.
Oats 20s. 6d.
The fall in the price of wheat being thus no less
than 16.9. the quarter.
But as it had been found on threshing, that the
produce of the crops was really deficient, while the
old stock had been materially reduced, there was a
rally of the markets at the close of the year, the
averages in December being, for
Wheat 50s. 8d.
Barley 27,9. 6d.
Oats 20,9. 7d.
As the circumstances under which these fluctu-
ations occurred must be still distinctly within the
recollection of many persons who were then, as
they are at present, extensively concerned in the
corn trade, I can confidently appeal to them for
the correctness of this description.
But supposing these circumstances insufficient,
we shall now proceed to see how far the issues of
1823 -—1 827. 123
the Bank of England, or the country banks, were
to such an extent, or at such times as can bring
them into the relation of cause and effect, with
those fluctuations.
In the reference which is commonly made to an
increase of the circulation of Bank of England,
and of country bank notes, as the cause of the rise
of the price of corn in 1823, it is clearly implied that
it was an increase of paper beyond the due proportion
to the metallic basis of the currency. That such is
the meaning of those who assign an increase of paper
as the cause of the rise of prices may be clearly
inferred from their imputing that increase to the
design of government to give relief to the suffering
agricultural interests, not only by the prolongation
of the term for the country small note circulation,
but by the plan proposed by ministers, and sanc-
tioned by parliament, in the spring of 1822, for an
issue of four millions of exchequer bills *, in aid
of public works. Now, a reference to the facts of
the case will show,
1 . That the increased issue of notes by the Bank
of England in 1823 was less than the increase of
bullion in its coffers.
2. That the increase of Bank of England notes
in 1823, was not in amount or order of time, such
as to admit of its being connected in the relation
* In the examination of evidence by the Committee of the
House of Commons, on the Bank Charter, in 1832, it is as-
sumed in some of the questions, that this proposed advance of
four millions of exchequer bills was tantamount in its influence
on the currency, and thence on prices to an additional issue of
Bank notes to that amount. : thus confounding the creation of
marketable securities with the issue of so much paper money.
And as, taking some extreme points of the state of the Bank
issues in 1822 and 1825, there was an increase of about four
millions of notes, the inference is implied, that the increase was
entirely caused by that measure, while in truth, these ex-
chequer bills do not appear to have had the slightest effect
upon the Bank issues, the whole increase of which, in 1823, was, as
appears in the text, considerably short of the increase of bullion.
124 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
of cause and effect, with the variations of the price
of wheat.
3. That there was no such increase in the amount
of public securities held by the Bank in 1823 as to
justify the supposition that the issue of exchequer
bills had added to the circulation.
4. That the country bank circulation does not
appear to have experienced in 1823 any enlarge-
ment corresponding even with that which had
taken place in the circulation of the Bank of Eng-
land, and still less in proportion to the increase of
the amount of bullion in the coffers of the Bank.
1. The comparison of the circulation of the Bank
of England with the amount of its treasure stands
thus : —
Average amount of Bank Notes.
1822 - a£ 17,862,890
1823 - - - 18,629,540
Increase, - ^766,650
Average amount of Bullion in the years ending
Gold. Silver. Total.
28 Feb. 1823* e£8,135,629 s£2,l 19,069 10,254,698
28 Feb. 1824 10,805,780 1,801,183 12,606,963
Increase - ^2,352,268
* The only returns of the yearly average amount of bullion,
are for the years ending in February of each year. The returns
here given comprise ten months of 1822, and ten months of
] 823, thus answering the purpose proposed by the compari-
son with the circulation. But it may serve as an amusing
instance of the manner in which the conclusion from this com-
parison is sought to be eluded, to cite the following questions
and answers in the examination of Mr. Harman, by the Com-
mittee on the Bank Charter, p. 151 ., the questions being evidently
by a partisan of the ultra-currency doctrine. " The amount of
bullion, as appears from the paper before the Committee held
by the Bank in February 1822, for the average of the year up
to that period, was 1 1 ,600,000/. ; and for the average of the
year ending February 1825, li,800,GOO/., so that there could
only have been 200,000/. of notes issued on bullion deposited at
the Bank ? " Answer. — " In the years 1 824 and 1 825, there
1823—1827.
By this statement it appears that the accumula-
tion of treasure in the coffers of the Bank, on an
average of the year ending February 1823, having
already amounted to the large sum of upwards of
ten millions, and a further increase having taken
place in the following twelve months, to an amount
was a very considerable reduction of the amount of bullion,
but also a very considerable reduction of our floating govern-
ment securities, to the amount, I should think, of four millions
and a half." — " With respect to the issues prior to February 1825,
does not it appear, according to the figures that have been
quoted, that those issues could not have been issues upon bul-
lion, but that they must have been either on government
securities or advances on mortgages, or advances on stock, or
upon advances of a similar description ?" * — " Yes."
Now, here the inference proposed by sinking the comparative
amount between February 1822 and February 1825 is, that the
increase of Bank notes, during the whole of that interval had
been issued on securities, and that the securities must have
been the exchequer bills voted in 1822: whereas, it is clear
beyond question, that from February 1823 to February 1824,
the whole increase of issues was considerably short of the in-
crease of bullion ; and it is in that interval that the great
improvement took place in the prices of corn, which is so gra-
tuitously ascribed to an issue of exchequer bills, converted by an
unfounded supposition into Bank notes.
* It is to be borne in mind, that Mr. Harman disclaimed being
able to speak with accuracy on points of detail. At the outset
of his examination he said, " Having been out of the Bank so
long, and having no intercourse whatever with it, I did not
come prepared to enter into detail." And when asked, " Did
you take any measures in order to increase the circulating
medium in 1821 and 1822, for the purpose of relieving the
country from the low prices which then existed ? " he answered,
" I must plead want of recollection of particular periods."
" About that time, did you take any measures for the purpose of
increasing the circulation of the country ? " " if I had known
that these questions would have been put to me, I would have
refreshed my memory with documents which are not in my
possession." After this very proper disclaimer it must be quite
clear, that if Mr. Harman could have refreshed his memory by
documents, he could not have given an unqualified affirmative
to the question above quoted.
126 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
of no less than two millions three hundred thousand
pounds, the enlargement of the Bank circulation
of about seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds,
was actually less than one third of the increase of
bullion in the corresponding period. And yet this
increase of paper in so small a proportion to the
influx of bullion has been asserted, and repeated
from speech to speech, from pamphlet to pamphlet,
and from examiner to examined, as a designed and
forced issue of paper, a tampering with the currency
in order to raise prices, with the express view of
assuaging the discontents of the lantled interests,
at the low price of corn, and as the principal if
not the only cause of the rise of prices in 1823.
2. If the enlargement of the Bank issues had not
been in a small proportion only to the influx of bul-
lion in 1823, the periods and the amount of issues
were not such as to admit of the relation of cause
and effect with the price of corn. The average
amount of Bank notes was, in the quarter ending
Price of Wheat.
30th Sept. 1822 ^18,379,440 Sept. 1822 39*.
31st Mar. 1823 17,993,270 Mar. 1825 48s.
But there was an increase of the Bank circulation
in the last six months, as compared with the first
six months of 1283. The comparison will stand
thus : — Average amount of Bank notes in the six
months ending
Price of Wheat.
30th June, 1 823, a£l 7,41 6,650 June, 1823, 62*. 5d.
31st Dec. 18,606,115 {g£ **' «*
Here, with an increase of issues to the extent
of 1,200,000/., we have a fall in the price of wheat
of upwards of 20 per cent.
And if the monthly averages of Bank notes and
of the price of wheat be taken from June to the
end of the year, being the interval during which
1823—1827.
the increase was most observable, the discrepancy
will be found to be still more striking ; thus : —
Average of Bank Notes. Price of Wheat.
June, 1823, e£l7,050,414 62s. 5d.
July 19,700,494 59s. 6d.
Aug. - 17,743,656 - 58s. lOd.
Sept. - 18,234,628 53*. lOd.
Oct. 18,681,588 465. 5d.
Nov. - 20,406,564 50s. 3d.
Dec. - 17,955,778 50s. 8d.
It must be an extraordinary sort of logic that
would infer a connection between these variations
of the amount of Bank notes and the prices of
wheat, and yet it is a settled article of faith in the
currency doctrine, that the price of corn in 1823,
was mainly, if not solely, governed by the amount
of the Bank circulation, which is assumed to have
been increased by four millions in immediate and
necessary consequence of the plan of ministers for
issuing that amount of exchequer bills to parishes
and other parties in aid of public works.*
3. If however the proofs derived from the com-
parative circulation were not sufficient in the ne-
* Thus Mr. (now Lord") Western, in a debate on the currency
in the House of Commons, 3d April 1827, said, " Let them
compare the price of 1824, 1825, and 1826 with that of 1822,
and consider the cause of it. Did not Lord Londonderry in
the House of Commons, and Lord Liverpool in the House of
Lords, declare, that the financial measures then taking place were
not a consequence of want of money for the service of the
state, but simply to enlarge the circulation ? The circulation
was accordingly enlarged, and the prices of 1824, 1825, and 1826
were owing to that cause."
And Sir James Graham, in a debate, 3d June 1828, on the
bill for preventing the circulation of Scotch small notes in
England, expressed himself to the same effect.
" In 1822," he said, "wheat had got down to 42s.; lower,
absolutely, than at any period since the revolution. What had
been the conduct of the minister of that day ? The Marquis
of Londonderry, with a statesmanlike courage and decision,
had met the evil upon its real merits. He had not treated it
as an effect of a fluctuation of prices, of want of means of
consumption, or of superabundant harvests. The noble Mar-
quis had said plainly and directly, « This is a question of cur-
128 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
gative of the hypothesis, that the issue of the four
millions of exchequer bills had not the effect of
adding by that or any perceptible amount to the
circulation, a single fact may be adduced, which,
of itself would be quite decisive, viz. that the
public securities held by the Bank in August 1823
were lower in amount than they had been in Fe-
bruary 1822, as may be seen by the following com-
parative statement : —
28 Feb. 1822 - ^£12, 4/78, 133
31 Aug. — 13,668,359
28 Feb. 1823 13,658,829
30 Aug. — - - 11,842,677
this last amount being lower than it had before
been since 1805.
4. But failing of even the semblance of any
influence from the Bank of England issues, or from
the issues of exchequer bills on the price of corn
in 1823, and relying on the vagueness and obscurity
which prevail with respect to the country bank cir-
culation, the partisans of the currency doctrine
must be driven to resort to the latter description of
circulating medium as operating most powerfully
on prices.
Vague, however, and unsatisfactory as are the
means of judging of the amount of the country
circulation, it may be worth while to refer to such
computations as rest upon any authority whatever.
The attempts at computation most commonly made
have been by a reference to the number of stamps
issued in a particular year. These are all issued
rency. The currency of the country is too contracted for its
wants, and our business is to apply a remedy.' He had then
forced an addition to the circulation of four million pounds
upon exchequer bills, in the shape of an advance from the
Bank to Government, and had postponed the operation of the
small note repeal bill from 1825 to 1833 ; and again as before,
in the year 1826, the price of wheat had risen to 685., and com-
parative prosperity had ensued."
1823— 1827-
on the 10th October of each year, and the numbers
for the four years ending in 1823 stand thus : —
1820 - - - 3,574,894
1821 - - - 3,987,582
1822 - - 4,217,241
1823 - 4,657,589
If, therefore, the stamps issued were the criterion
of the amount, it would appear that the circulation
in 1822 was larger, while the price of wheat was
considerably lower, than in 1820. But the com-
putation by Mr. Sedgwick, of the Stamp-office,
supposes the amount in circulation to have been —
1820 - - - ^11,767,391
1821 - - 8,414,281
1822 - 8,067,260
1823 - - 8,798,277
This computation, however, founded on the
stamps issued, besides being, for reasons before
stated, not at all to be relied upon *, does not give
the period of each year in which the alteration in
the amount took place. If it is assumed to have
taken place at about the period of the issue of
new stamps, viz. 10th October, it will follow that
the first increase was in October, 1823, consequently
after the rise in the price of wheat, which took
place in the early part of that year.
And, independently of this computation, it might
be inferred, that the .improvement of the markets
for grain, and consequently of the condition of the
* Mr. Samuel Gurney, in his evidence before the Bank Char-
ter Committee, was asked, " Do you think, that from the
amount of stamps any accurate calculation can be formed ? " —
Answer. " I think it is a fallacious guide." — " Why fallacious ? "
" Because there is a continual waste upon them. A country
banker may have a large amount of notes that are stamped,
and a small proportion of them only in circulation."
Of the extravagance of exaggeration of the amount of coun-
try notes, at particular periods, derived from the computation
founded on the stamps, the extreme variation between particu-
lar years would of itself afford a very strong presumption ; and
if it were worth following out into all its consequences, would
lead to the most glaring incongruities.
VOL. II. K
130
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
farmers, the causes of which have been described,
would be followed by an increase of the country
circulation. But, according to the best authority
extant, it appears doubtful whether there was any
increase at all in the issues of the country banks
in 1823, as compared with 1822.
Mr. Henry Burgess, who, as secretary to the
committee of country bankers, was one of the wit-
nesses examined by the Committee of the House
of Commons on the Bank Charter in 1832, gave a
statement of the relative increase or decrease of
the circulation of 122 banks in England and Wales,
from the year 1818 to 1825, showing the compara-
tive amount in each year, assuming the amount in
1818 to be designated as 100.
* The general result is thus stated : —
ag Difference. £ s. d.
1818
12,200
1819
11,991
209 being 1
15
0 ]
1820
11,487
713
5
16
101
1821
11,352
848
6
19
0
per cent.
decrease
1822
10,778
1422
11
13
U
from
1818.
1823
10,74-8
1452
11
18
Ok
1824
11,640
560
4
11
9 .
1825
A . 1
12,478
278
2
/-»
5
6| increase over 1818.
As the means of information possessed by Mr.
Burgess on this point were the best probably that
the nature of the subject admitted of, the above
statement is entitled to carry great weight. Ac-
cording to that statement, the lowest period of the
country circulation was in 1823.
But the statement of Mr. Burgess, independently
of the strong presumption which it affords in the
* Mr. Burgess was asked, " What proportion do you think
the 122 bear to the principal banks in England and Wales ? "
" I should think, one third." — " Have you any idea what pro-
portion of the whole issues belong to those 122 banks?" " I
should think much more than one third." — " Should you think
that the account of these 122 bankers gives a fair view of the
operations of the whole body of the country bankers of Eng-
land and Wales?" " Perfectly fair." — " And you think the
general result, drawn from this scale, would correspond with the
result of all the bankers of England and Wales, if you had
returns from them ? " " I think it would with great accuracy."
1823—1827. 131
negative of the supposed increase of country bank
notes in 1823, is of importance as corroborative of
other grounds for believing that all the computa-
tions hitherto made of the country circulation from
the stamps issued, have enormously overrated both
the amounts in particular years, and the variations
from one year to another.
Indeed, the discrepancy in the latter point be-
tween Mr. Sedgwick's computation and Mr. Bur-
gess's is most striking; for, according to Mr.
Sedgwick's statement, the reduction in 1822, com-
pared with 1820, is upwards of 30 per cent., while
Mr. Burgess, upon data infinitely more probable,
makes the difference little more than 6 per cent.
There can hardly be a question, it is presumed,
after this statement, that there was no such enlarge-
ment of the country circulation as to have caused
the rise of corn in 1823.
Not only, however, are the facts here stated
decisive against the hypothesis of an enlarged
issue of paper as a principal if not the only cause
of the rise of the price of corn in 1823, but,
if the direct proofs to that effect had not been
so clear as they are, a strong presumption
against the imputed influence of an enlarged cir-
culation would be afforded by the circumstance,
which will be more distinctly noticed a few pages
hence, that while corn was rising in 1823, and in
the early part of 1824, most other descriptions of
produce were falling. And having seen, at the
same time, that the circumstances immediately af-
fecting the actual and prospective supply of corn
were such as fully to account for the variations of
prices in 1823, we may safely pronounce the cur-
rency theory of those variations to be wholly and,
in every part of it, utterly unfounded. We shall
now proceed to examine the causes of the varia-
tions of the prices of corn during the remainder of
the epoch proposed for consideration.
K 2
132 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 2. — Prices of agricultural Produce from
1824 to 1827) examined in Connection with the
Circulation.
In the commencement of 1824, a considerable
advance took place in the price of corn, wheat
especially, of which the crop of 1823, having been
found to be deficient in quality and in quantity, in
a degree beyond^ the previous estimates*, rose ra-
pidly, the average price having advanced to «59#. 8c?.
in January, and to 65s. Wd. in February, J 824.
And as this advance was accompanied by an in-
crease of Bank notes, the rise is as usual, according
to the received theory, ascribed to that increase.
The average of Bank notes of 5l. and upwards
was, for the quarters ending
£ Price of Wheat.
31st Dec. 1823, 18,603,210 52*. 8d.
31st March 1824, 19,174,890 65s. Wd.
Here then again it may be said is a clear case of
cause and effect.
But in this, as in former instances, the facts of
the case, if pursued, are destructive of the theory
in question. If the increase of Bank notes raised
the prices, a farther increase ought to have sus-
tained, if not farther to have advanced them. But
there was an increase of Bank notes in the follow- .
ing six months, during which the price fell upwards
* As a proof how inferior the crop of 1823 had proved in
quality as well as quantity, it may be sufficient to refer to the
quotations in Mark Lane, in January, 1824, namely, for
New Wheat, - 48s. to 63s.
Old ditto, 55*. to 78s.
And, according to Messrs. Cropper, Benson, and Co.'s survey,
the yield of that crop was computed to be short of an average
in the proportion of 27 to 32, which, estimating an average
crop to be about twelve millions of quarters, would make the
deficiency nearly two millions of quarters.
1823—1827. 133
of 10s. the quarter, the average for September
being 55s. 4<d. Thus, for the quarter ending
Bank Notes. Price of Wheat.
30th June 1824, a£l9,442,730 62s. 5d.
30th Sept. — 20,177,820 54-5. 6d.
At the same time, even admitting that the rise
in January and February, 1824, had been the effect
exclusively of an increase of Bank paper, that in-
crease was not commensurate with the increase of
bullion, which in January, 1824, had reached the
enormous amount of 14,200,000/. If the act of
1822, for prolonging the circulation of the country
small notes, had not been passed, and sovereigns
had been substituted for those notes, the .Bank
treasure would still have been in a fair proportion
to its liabilities, there would have been the same
quantity of money in circulation, prices would
have been just as they were, and w>e should have
heard nothing of the tampering with the currency
in 1822 (objectionable as that measure was on
other grounds), as the cause of the rise in the
price of provisions in 1823 and 1824. It is clear,
therefore, that the same argument by which the
negative has been established, of the supposed in-
fluence of a designed enlargement of paper in pro-
ducing the rise in the price of corn in 1823, is
equally applicable to the renewed rise here noticed
in the first quarter of 1824.
After the rise of the price of wheat to 65s. Wd.
in the early part of 1824, it was discovered, by the
large supplies from the farmers, that, although the
crops of 1823 had on all hands been allowed to be
deficient, yet, with the old stock from previous
years, it was adequate to supply the consumption at
its ordinary rate till after the ensuing harvest. A
conviction of this kind, when there is no ground
for speculation upon the coming crops, is always
attended with dull and drooping markets ; and there
was, as we have seen, a progressive fall of upwards
K 3
134 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
of 10.9. per quarter in the six months following,
namely, to 55s. 4d. in September, 1824.
The weather, however, during the harvest of
1824, was unsettled; and the latter part of it, in the
more northern districts especially, "was remarkably
wet. The produce was, according to all reports,
again deficient.* The stock on hand had in the
interval been further reduced, there being no longer,
as heretofore, samples of wheat of three or four
years old at market. Under these circumstances,
an advance of price, after the harvest of 1824, pro-
ceeded upon perfectly reasonable and adequate
grounds. And it is a very strong presumption that
the corn market at that time was not influenced
by the prevailing spirit of speculation, that the
rise was so moderate in the spring of 1825, viz. to
67,?. 6d. for wheat, being only 2s. higher than it
had been a twelvemonth before, when there had
been still a considerable old stock, and when the mar-
kets for commodities had been in a quiescent state.
The agitation of the question of the corn laws,
in the spring of 1825, contributed probably among
other causes to preserve the corn market from the
effects of the spirit of speculation which then pre-
vailed in other branches of trade. But such was
the general impression of the progressive reduction
of the old stock of grain, and of our consequent
increasing dependence on the produce of the forth-
coming harvest, that, notwithstanding the admission
in April of 525,231 quarters of foreign wheat for home
consumption, at a duty of 10s. the quarter, the price
did not fall below 68s. the quarter till the com-
mencement of an unusually early and a promising
harvest.t It was not till after the crops in the
* Independently of the injury sustained by the wet weather in
harvesting, the crops were supposed to have suffered from very
heavy rains, followed by cold winds, in the latter part of May.
•f- The season of 1825 presented nothing remarkable in the
winter and spring of either severity or mildness ; but the sum-
mer proved to be very fine, dry and hot, and so continued, except-
1823—1827.
135
great corn districts were secured in good condition,
and found to be productive, that the price gave
way at all, and then very slowly. But while, after
the harvest of 1825, wheat fell, although slowly,
all other grain, of which the produce was com-
paratively deficient, rose in price, as will be seen
by the following statement. Aggregate average of
the six weeks ending
Dec. 1824. Mar. 1825. Dec. 1825.
Wheat
Barley
Oats
Rye
Beans
Peas
s. d.
63 6
40 3
23 4
38 4
40
47
s. d.
69 1
38 11
24 8
39 7
37 2
39 9
s. d.
64 4
41 2
26 8
44 1
45 9
48 10
Hence it will appear that, notwithstanding the
great contraction of the circulation of the whole
kingdom during the last six weeks of 1825, the
price of all grain, wheat excepted (of which there
had been a large admission of foreign), was higher
than it had been during the excitement and specu-
lations of the first three months of that year. The
prices of meat, too, appear to have been uninfluenced
by the state of discredit, and the great pressure on
the money market, at the close of 1825, inasmuch
as the quotations were then within the merest trifle
as high as they had been in the spring of that year.*
In the first three months of 1826, the price of
ing a few beneficial showers in August, till the securing of the .
crops in good order throughout the kingdom. The wheat har-
vest was general in the home districts, in the latter part of
July.
* The following prices of the best meat in Smithfield Market
are from the " Farmer's Journal."
Be
Highest.
3f per Stc
Lowest.
ne.
Mean.
Mutt
Highest.
on per St
Lowest.
3iie.
Mean.
Last Quarter of 1824
First Quarter of 1825
Last Quarter of 1825
s. d.
4 10
5 2
5 4
s. d.
4 0
4 10
4 8
s. d.
4 5
5 0
5 0
s. d.
5 0
6 0
5 4
s. d.
4 2
5 0
5 0
s. d.
4 7
5 6
5 2
K
136 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
wheat fell from an average of 60s. in January, to
55s. t)d. in March. This decline might be owing,
in some degree, to the state of discredit, and to the
great pressure for money which was then felt; but
it was in a greater degree apparently owing to the
apprehension which was then generally entertained,
that the wheat in bond would be liberated, as had
been done in the spring before, at a low duty.
There is reason to believe that the latter was the
preponderating cause, inasmuch as, upon a declara-
tion made by ministers in parliament, in the early
part of the session, that there was no intention of
admitting the wheat then in bond, the average price
rose in April to 60s. This, in the distressed state
of the manufacturing population, was a high price ;
and other descriptions of food were still higher in
proportion. But, under the uncertain prospect of
the coming crops, the appearance of which in the
spring was not promising, and the conviction of a
greatly diminished stock on hand, apprehensions
were entertained of a further advance. As a
measure therefore of immediate relief, as well as
with a view to allay the complaints of the working
classes, which were becoming very loud, and were
breaking out into acts of violence in some of the
manufacturing districts, government, contrary to
its former expressed determination, proposed to
parliament, on the 1st of May, 1826, the release of
all the corn then in bond. And ministers further
proposed, as a precaution against the contingency
of an unfavourable harvest, to be invested with dis-
cretionary powers to admit, during the recess of
parliament, such additional quantity, not exceeding
500,000 quarters, as circumstances might dictate.
An intimation was at the same time given of the
intention of government to propose early in the
following session of parliament an essential change
in the corn laws, involving a great relaxation of the
prohibitory part of the system.
1823—1827- 137
These measures coinciding with a depressed
state of credit, and followed as they were by a re-
markably early harvest *, of which the wheat crops
were computed to be somewhat above an average
in quantity, and secured in the best condition, had
the effect of keeping down the price of wheat,
which ranged from 58s. to 55s. during the remainder
of 1826. But, while the wheat crop had been
favoured by the hot and burning summer of that
year, all other grain and the leguminous products
had suffered from the drought, and were greatly
deficient ; insomuch that government authorised,
by an order in council, 1st September, 1826, the
admission of oats, at a duty of 2s. per quarter, and
of rye, peas, and beans, at a duty of 3s. 6d., the
order to continue in force for forty days from the
next meeting of parliament. The averages at the
close of the year were, for
s. d.
Wheat - - 58 1
Barley - - 38 0
Oats - 31 4
Beans - - 52 8
Peas - 54 6
Here we have the prices of oats and beans and
peas higher in 1826, during a restricted state of the
general circulation, and after notice of the ap-
proaching suppression of the country small notes,
and after the admission of a large foreign supply,
than they had been during the enlarged circulation
of the spring of 1825.
And, even with regard to wheat, notwithstanding
the depressing circumstances of the times — not-
* The winter of 1825-6 was rather colder than the preced-
ing one, but, with the exception of ten days of sharp frost
in January, not very severely so. The spring following was
rather ungenial, being cold and dry till the latter end of May,
when there were some heavy warm rains, followed by brilliantly
fine weather, which set in early in June, and continued unin-
terruptedly hot and dry till the first week in September.
138 TRICES AND CIRCULATION,
withstanding the approaching suppression of the
small note country circulation, and the prospect,
amounting almost to a certainty, that the stock in
bond, which had been imported in 1826, to an
extent of upwards of 500,000 quarters, would be
admitted for home consumption before the follow-
ing harvest, the price rose to 60,9. in July, 1827.
The crops of 1827 * were computed to have
yielded a full average of all grain, in point of quan-
tity ; but the wheat, in condition and quality, was
greatly inferior to the crop of the preceding year.
As soon as it was ascertained that the produce
of 1827 was not decidedly deficient, and that there
was consequently no probability of any immediate
advance of price, the greater part of the wheat and
flour which was in bond, amounting to ,572,733
quarters, was entered for home consumption, under
the provisions of Mr. Canning's bill, at a duty ex-
ceeding 20,9. per quarter. This admission of a fo-
reign supply at a time when our own crops had
been secured in sufficient quantity, as it was esti-
mated, to meet the ordinary rate of consumption
till the following harvest, was naturally calculated
to depress the markets. The average price ac-
cordingly then declined progressively, till it reached
its lowest point of depression in December follow-
ing, namely, 49s. the Winchester quarter. But
this fall took place, not only without any coincident
* The winter of 1826-7 was rather colder than either of the
two preceding winters, but still not of a character of remark-
able severity. The spring following presented nothing unusual.
The summer was cold and dry ; the harvest backwarder than
in the two preceding seasons, and in its progress was attended
with unsettled weather, especially in the northern division of
the island.
In consequence of the succession of two seasons marked by
a prevalence of drought, the price of meat in the spring of
1827 was relatively high, the quotations in Smithfield being —
Beef, 4*. 4e?. to 5s. 6d. per stone.
Mutton, - - 4*. 5d to 6*. do.
1823—1827. 139
contraction of Bank issues*, but was accompanied
by an increase of them. Credit had been restored,
and the general circulation had been consequently
greatly enlarged, more especially as compared with
the autumn of 1825, when the prices of wheat, and
of corn generally, were from 20 to 30 per cent,
higher than in the last six months of 1827. If the
facts here adduced should not be deemed sufficient,
they might be multiplied without end, in proof of
the utter want of connection, in the relation of cause
and effect, between the state of the corn markets
and the state of the circulation, from the com-
mencement of 1823 to the close of 1827.
While, however, in these variations so little in-
fluence of the currency is perceptible, we may dis-
tinctly trace the operation of the corn laws. If the
law of 1815 had been rigidly enforced, and if the
relaxation of it, by the admission of foreign corn
into consumption in 1825, 1826, and 1827, had not
taken place, the price of wheat in 1826 and 1827 t
must inevitably have ranged from 70s. to 80s., sup-
posing the public to have submitted to so grievous a
monopoly price. Thus, while all other productions
were at greatly reduced prices, and still falling, we
should have seen the prices of corn rising, so as to
constitute a severe dearth. And no possible in-
genuity could, in that case, have reconciled the
state of the corn markets with the state of the cir-
culation consistently with the operation ascribed
by the currency doctrine to Peel's bill.
On the other hand, as the crops on the Continent,
in the period under consideration, appear to have
been more abundant than they were in this country,
* Notes in circulation, average of the months —
Dec. 1825, - ^19,748,840
1827, - - 20,762,380
f The total quantities of foreign grain and meal admitted
for home consumption, in the two years, 1826 and 1827,
amounted to no less than 5,083,659 quarters.
140 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
those of 1823 and 1824 more especially, there
would, if our ports had then been open at a low
fixed duty, have been large importations, which
would have been attended with important conse-
quences in a two-fold point of view. The prices
of grain would not have risen as they did between
1822 and 1827, and there would not have been
such an accumulation of gold in the coffers of the
Bank in 1823 and 1824, as induced and emboldened
the directors to enter into engagements for enlarg-
ing their securities to such an extent as brought
that establishment into the critical position in which
it stood at the close of 1825. It is, indeed, clear,
almost to demonstration, that it was by the corn
laws, combined with the state of the crops, and not
at all by the circulation, that the prices of grain
were influenced in the interval from 1822 to 1827.
Nay, farther, that not only was the circulation not
the cause of the variations in the prices of corn in
that interval, but that the prices of corn under our
monopoly system exercised a considerable influence,
in that interval, on the state of the circulation.
SECTIONS. — State of Markets for Produce and
Commodities other than Corn, from 1823 to
1825.
In the early part of 1823 the entrance of the
armies of France into Spain, giving rise to the ap-
prehension of a general war in Europe, caused a
speculative advance in the prices of colonial pro-
duce, and of some other commodities of which the
cost of production was likely to be raised, or the
supplies obstructed, by such an event. Coffee and
sugar, and several other articles, were supposed to
be likely to be so affected, and experienced there-
fore a considerable rise of price in the three first
1823—1827-
months of 1823. But, when it was found that the
government of this country did not interfere to
prevent the occupation of Spain by the armies of
France, and that consequently there was no longer
any ground for apprehension of a general war, the
markets for those articles relapsed to their former
state.
Later in the season, a speculation in cotton, and
consequent advance of prices, occurred, on the
ground that the reduced stock on hand, with the
computed probable importation, was likely, accord-
ing to the estimates then formed, to fall short of
the rate of consumption. But the importations
proved to be beyond the estimated quantity, while
the consumption appeared to have been checked,
and prices soon subsided to the state from which
they had been speculatively raised.
With these exceptions, and other isolated specu-
lations of less note, attended by the same result,
the prices of goods generally were either stationary
or dull and drooping through the first six months,
and in some cases (the important article of coffee
for instance), till the close of 1824. This dull
and drooping state of markets for nearly all de-
scriptions of goods, which prevailed more or less
in the last six months of 1823, and the first six
months of 1824, while the corn markets, although
fluctuating, were at a comparatively high range,
appears to have been lost sight of in all the speeches
and pamphlets referring to that period. The im-
pression universally prevalent seems to be, that an
excited and generally speculative tendency existed
in the markets for all other kinds of produce as
well as corn, commencing in 1823, and proceeding
with only occasional oscillations till the summer of
1825. And this impression is calculated to favour
the theory which ascribes to an enlargement of the
currency the whole of that rise of prices. But the real
stateof factsiswholly at variance with this impression.
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
In most of the great branches of trade there
prevailed, in the latter part of 1823, and the greater
part of 1824, a general character of prudence
and sobriety, without any apparent resort to an
undue extension of credit. There was still at this
time a prevalence of the caution which had been
taught and enforced among the commercial classes
by the reverses and losses which had been sustained
by the great fall of prices since 1818. Due atten-
tion was still paid to the most obvious elements of
mercantile calculation ; and, although there was an
evident tendency to increased speculation, the ob-
jects for the exercise of it were selected with a
considerable degree of care and sobriety. Goods
had been imported or bought in the home market
at the lowest prices, and with a practical knowledge
of the grounds for estimating the actual and con-
tingent supply, compared with the probable con-
sumption ; and manufacturers had laid in their raw
materials, and erected their machinery, on such
terms as enabled them to supply both the foreign
and the home market with wrought goods, which,
although comparatively cheap, left a fair profit.
The low prices of the raw materials, and the im-
provements of machinery, which had in a still
greater proportion reduced the cost to the con-
sumer, had greatly extended the consumption of
most descriptions of manufactured articles both at
home and abroad. And the trade and manufactures
of the country had never before been in a more
regular, sound, and satisfactory state than in the
interval from 1821 to 1824.
At different periods in 1824, but chiefly towards
the close of it, according as attention had been
drawn to the actual and forthcoming supplies, it
was observed that, in some of the leading articles,
the rate of consumption was outrunning the actual
and (as far as could be calculated) the contingent
supply. An incentive was thus afforded to the
1
1823— 1827- 143
spirit of speculation, and as, on some former
memorable occasions (such, more especially, as in
1808 and 1809, and in 1816 and 1817, when from
casual scarcity or under-supply, occurring coinci-
dently in several branches of trade, the markets
assumed a decided upward tendency), the example
of successful early purchases attracted general at-
tention, and induced extensive imitation.
The closing months of the year are those in which,
by annual custom, the stocks of goods on hand, and
the prospects of supply and probable consumption
for the coming season, are stated and reasoned upon
by merchants and brokers in circular letters ad-
dressed to their correspondents and employers. By
these circulars it appeared that, of some important
articles, the stock on hand fell short of what it had
been at the close of the preceding year. From this
the conclusion was more or less plausibly deduced,
that the rate of the annual consumption of those
articles was outrunning the utmost actual and pro-
bable supply, and that an advance of price must
necessarily be the consequence ; not, however, con-
sidering that a great part of the increased consump-
tion had been owing to the reduced price. At the
same time there were, on the present occasion, in
the case of some leading articles, such as cotton
and silk, confident reports of failure of crops, or
other causes which would infajlibly diminish the
forthcoming supply. Expectation of scarcity was
thus combined with actual deficiency, in further
exciting the spirit of speculation, which had been
already roused, and to which, as will hereafter be
seen, the state of the money market, or, in other
words, the low rate of interest, afforded great facility.
The impulse to a rise of prices being thus given,
and every succeeding purchaser having realised,
or appearing to have the power of realising, a
profit, a fresh inducement appeared, at every step
of the advance, to bring forward new speculative
144 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
buyers. Accordingly, at the close of 1824, and
the commencement of 1825, the example of early
successful speculation had become infectious. The
purchasers were no longer such only as were con-
versant with the market : many persons were in-
duced to go out of their own line, and to embark
their funds, or stretch their credit, with a view to
engage in what was represented to them by the
brokers as a certain means of realising great and
immediate gains.
Cotton, from its importance, and from its afford-
ing, in the first instance, the fairest grounds for
investment, became a prominent object of specula-
tion, on the most extensive scale, and at exorbitant
prices. Silk, wool, flax, and other articles, in which
some advance was justified by the state of supply
relatively to the consumption, became successively
the subjects of a speculative anticipation, and ad-
vanced much beyond any reasonable bounds.
There then arose an impression that all pur-
chases of goods were likely to answer. This
impression was encouraged, if not produced, by
the recommendations of the brokers to those to
whom they had access. The following extract,
from one of the commercial circulars in the latter
part of 1824, will serve as a specimen of the in-
ducements then held forth to speculation : —
" Commercial affairs have lately improved, and the following
articles have advanced 10 to 25 per cent., viz. indigo, rice, gum,
nutmegs, pepper, pimento, and other spices, &c., as noted in the
value affixed to each respective article in the columns of prices.
Speculators have shown an eager inclination to invest exten-
sively in such articles as are low in price, or where the stocks
have been reduced by regular deliveries for shipping or con-
sumption ; and the following we think deserving the attention
of our speculative friends, as possessing some claims, either to
the one character or the other, namely, safflower, saffron, pot
and pearl ashes, resin, linseed, oil, coffee, cochineal, tallow,
sugar, and opium ; other articles equally favourable may be re-
commended ; but the above occur to us at the moment as likely
to afford a remunerative profit."
1823—1827. 145
All the articles here enumerated, besides many
others, became objects of speculative purchase.
Recommendations and incitements like these
were aided by a reference to the following con-
siderations. The steps in progress, preparatory to
a recognition by our government of the South
American states, had given rise to the most exag-
gerated expectations of an immediate extension of
exports to those countries, while the chief returns
from thence were looked for in the shape of the
precious metals ; the production of which, it was
expected, would be rapidly extended by the appli-
cation of improved machinery, and by the great
outlay of British capital which was about being
made in the American mines. From the various
extensive projects for working those mines, the
most brilliant results were anticipated. So sanguine
on this head, indeed, were the views of persons
otherwise well informed, that they believed and
acted upon the belief of a diminished value of gold
and silver, in consequence of the vast additional
quantity which was speedily thus about to be raised.
At the same time, independent of these anticipa-
tions, the remittances to South America of the
very capital for the mining projects then afloat, as
also for the loans raised in this country for those
states, were made, in large part, in manufactures,
besides mere stores and machinery ; thus forming
a great temporary increase of demand for manu-
factures. The flourishing accounts which, at the
meeting of parliament, were officially announced of
the finances, and of the general prosperity of the
country, afforded scope for the most exaggerated
views of rapid increase of consumption beyond
what the production could keep pace with, unless
at progressively advancing prices.
From these concurrent causes, the speculations
in goods proceeded with extraordinary activity from
the close of 1824 till an advanced period of the
VOL. II. L
146 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
spring following. The speculative anticipation of
an advance was not confined to articles which
presented a plausible ground for some rise, how-
ever small ; it extended itself to articles which
were not only not deficient in quantity, but which
were actually in excess. Thus coffee, of which
the stock was increased compared with former
years, advanced 70 to 80 per cent. Spices rose,
in some instances, 100 to 200 per cent, without
any reason whatever, and with a total ignorance on
the part of the operators of every thing connected
with the relation of the supply to the consumption.
In short, there was hardly any article of merchan-
dise which did not participate in the rise ; for it
had become the business of the speculators, or the
brokers who were interested in raising and keeping
up prices, to look minutely through the general
price currents, with a view to discover any article
which had not advanced, in order to make it the
subject of exaggerated demand. The extent of the
rise of the articles which were the principal objects
of speculation, will be seen by the statement, a few
pages forward, of the fluctuation between 1824 and
1826.
The excitement here described reached its maxi-
mum in the first four months of 1825, there being
few, if any, of the articles which had been the
subject of speculation that had not attained their
highest price before the end of April of that year.
It has been already observed, that the advance
of prices, in its origin, was in a considerable degree
justified by the reduced quantities, relatively to the
estimated rate of consumption, of the principal
commodities which had become the subject of
speculation. And, if the speculations had been
confined to the purchases with a view to re-sale at
advanced prices of the goods on the spot, there
would not have been anything like the extent of
engagements that was eventually found to have
1823—1827. 147
arisen out of them, nor the great revulsion of
credit and the commercial failures which followed
the turn of markets. The fact is, that in this case,
as in 1808-9, and 1816-17, and in a recent and
memorable instance in which the spirit of specula-
tion had been, in the first instance, excited by a
view of the reduction of stocks below the estimated
rate of consumption, an exaggerated opinion of an
increased rate of consumption and of a limitation
of supply, induced engagements for purchases
abroad, with a view to importations on a greatly
enlarged scale ; and the high prices, which could
only be justified by their effect in eking out small
stocks on the spot by a reduced rate of consump-
tion, were extended to the forthcoming supplies,
which were increased in quantity by those very
prices which reduced the consumption.
Not only was this exaggeration of demand, com-
pared with the supply, at high prices, the cause of
increased importations, but it also operated tempo-
rarily in inducing increased exports. The reduced
stocks of raw materials in this country, and the spe-
culations thereupon, would, in most cases, be at-
tended, in the first instance, with improved markets
abroad for the manufactured goods into which those
raw materials extend ; and the improved markets
abroad would give an impulse both to orders from
thence, and to speculative shipments thither, beyond
what would be found to be eventually carried off*
by consumption at the advanced prices. The
transactions hence arising, and the engagements
consequent upon them, might be, as, in fact, they
were, entered into to a vast extent, long before any
effect of them could be felt in the exchanges, or in
the rate of interest, or in prices, or in the state
of credit.
148 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 4. — Speculations in Foreign Loans and
in Shares in 1824 and 1825.
The speculations in foreign loans and in shares,
which constituted so large a part in the general
excitement which prevailed in 1824 and 1825, had,
in their origin and progress, preceded, and, in point
of extravagance, outrun those which have here been
noticed as having taken place in the markets for
goods. Various loans to the continental states of
Europe had been negotiated in this country be-
tween 1817 and 1823; and all of these (with the
exception of one to the Spanish government under
the Cortes, which proved very ruinous to the sub-
scribers) turned out eventually to be on a solid
footing, the stipulated dividends being regularly
paid. The stocks created by those loans partici-
pated only with our own government securities in
the fluctuations incidental to all funded property
whose estimation was not impaired by any appre-
hension of breach of faith or inability on the part
of the government to pay the dividends.
The fall in the rate of interest in this country*
had contributed to render all those investments in
foreign stocks, with the exception of the Spanish,
highly beneficial to the subscribers, and thus at-
tracted attention and afforded inducements to that
description of investment, which, accordingly, was
* The fall in the rate of interest is exemplified in the follow-
ing comparative statement of the prices of the 3 per cent,
consols (exclusive of the accruing dividend), and of the pre-
mium on exchequer bills : —
3 per cent. Consols. Premium on Exchequer Bills.
Aprils. 1823, 73 j 10s. to 12*.
July 1. — 80J - 21s. to 24s.
Oct. 3. — 82£ - 37s. to 40s.
Jan. 1. 1824, 86 - 51s. to 53s.
April 2. 94£ - 56s. to 58s.
Nov. — 964 60s-
Jan. 1825, 94£ 68*.
entered into on a large scale. But the continued
fall in the rate of interest had a further and more
marked effect in determining capital to investment
in foreign funds. *
The five per cents had, towards the close of
1822, been reduced to a four per cent, stock ; and,
early in 1824, the old four per cents were reduced
to a three and a half per cent, stock. ' These
financial operations were strictly in accordance
with the conditions on which the loans were
originally contracted, and the government would
not have been justified in withholding from the
public the benefit of that mode of reduction of
charge for the public debt. But, by the individuals
whose income was thus reduced, it was felt as a
case of hardship ; and those among them, more
especially, whose mode of living was likely to be
affected by such reduction, would naturally be
more disposed than they otherwise would have
been to resort to modes of investment attended
with increased hazard, in return for the prospect of
a much larger interest than that afforded by the
funds of this country. It was a restlessness of
feeling of -this kind, combined with the facilities
of the money market, or, in other words, with the
fall in the general rate of interest, and with the too
highly-coloured accounts of the resources and good
faith of the states of South America, which gave
occasion to the projects for loans to those states,
and, at the same time, enabled the contractors to
fill their lists. A considerable impulse to those
projects, and to the eagerness with which they
were entered into by the public, was given by the
steps announced on the part of the government of
this country, as preliminary to the formal recogni-
tion of the independence of the South American
* In the summer of 1822 the Bank reduced its rate of dis-
count from 5 to 4? per cent.
L 3
150 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
states. Specious statements were held forth of the
great resources and capabilities of revenue of those
states ; and assurances were held out, and believed,
of the good faith and the power of the several
governments to raise and appropriate the sums
requisite for the payment of the dividends. The
most sanguine expectations were entertained of
the unbounded resources of those states, now that,
being relieved from the trammels of the old Spanish
government, those resources were about to be de-
veloped by a free commercial intercourse with this
country.
The most flaming accounts were at the same
time brought before the public of the productive-
ness of some of the principal mines of Mexico
and South America, which had been temporarily
abandoned during the civil wars in those countries,
and which required, as was supposed, only the ap-
plication of British capital and skill to render them
more productive than ever.
In the early part of 1824, a very great variety
of other projects were launched, all more or less
favoured by the state of the money market. Of
the several insurance companies which were started
about this time, the Alliance British and Foreign
Assurance Company, which had been brought out
under the auspices of the late Mr. Rothschild,
created the most sensation. No sooner had the
prospectus been issued, than the shares rose to a
very high premium.
The high premiums to which this and some of
the earlier projects, whether for loans, for mining,
insurance, or other joint stock companies, reached,
served as incentives for the formation of new ones ;
and, provided the names of the directors were at
all known, the subscriptions tendered were greatly
beyond the amount which was professedly re-
quired.*
* The following extract from the Annual Register for 1824-
gives a very detailed and correct account of the state of things
1823—1827. 151
It is particularly worthy of remark, that this state
of things existed in the early part of 1824, because
it will have an important bearing on the question,
which will be separately examined, how far the
of that year, arising out of the disposition, on the part of the pub-
lic, to enter into new schemes for the employment of capital : —
" The abundance of capital led to the formation of numer-
ous joint-stock companies, directed, some of them, towards
schemes of internal industry ; others of them, towards specula-
tions in distant countries. The mines of Mexico was a phrase
which suggested to every imagination unbounded wealth ; and
these companies, — the Real del Monte Association, the
United Mexican, and the Anglo-Mexican, — were formed for
the purpose of extracting wealth from their bowels by English
capital, machinery, and skill. Similar companies were formed, in
the course of the year, for working the mines of Chili, of
Brazil, of Peru, and of the provinces of the Rio de la Plata,
and for prosecuting the pearl fishery on the coast of Columbia.
So great was the rage for speculation, that, in the course of a
very few weeks, in the early part of the year, the following
undertakings, among others, were brought forward in Lon-
don, and found subscriptions courting their acceptance : —
The Alliance Fire and Life Insurance Company, with a
capital of four millions; — The Palladium Fire and Life Insur-
ance Company, with a capital of two millions; — The British
Annuity Company, whose capital was three millions ; — The
Metropolitan Investment Company, with a capital of one mil-
lion ; — The Thames and Isis Navigation Company, with a capi-
tal of one hundred and twenty thousand pounds ; — An Ale
Brewery Association, with a capital of two hundred thousand
pounds ; — A Company for obtaining from Government a Grant
of a Million of Acres of Land in New South Wales, and for im-
proving the Growth of Wool ; — An Association for the cutting
a Canal across the Isthmus of Darien ; — A Company for Navi-
gating the Thames and Isis by Steam ; — A New Dock Com-
pany, for Coals only. Many of the companies which were thus
set on foot, were able, or conceived that they were able, to pro-
secute their objects effectually without deriving any sanction
or special powers from the legislature. Others of them, and par-
ticularly such as were to have their sphere'of operation at home,
found it prudent or necessary to apply for private acts of par-
liament ; so that, in the month of March, there were upwards
of thirty bills before the House of Commons, for the purpose of
giving legal existence to different companies of this kind.
In all these speculations, only a small instalment, seldom ex-
ceeding 5 per cent., was paid at first ; so that a very moderate
rise on the prices of the shares produced a large profit on the
L 4
152 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
currency, as connected with the regulation of the
issues of the Bank of England, was an originating
or accessary cause of that state of things. Divested
of any reference to the state of the circulation, the
peculiar circumstances which have been detailed, as
presenting fresh fields of enterprise, so tempting
to the restless spirit of adventure which then pre-
vailed, will go far to account for the eagerness with
which new schemes of every kind were entered
into. The same feverish state of the public mind,
with a still increasing activity, prevailed, subject
only to occasional intervals of abatement, or rather
pauses, through the whole of 1824. The excite-
ment reached its height in the first four months of
1825.
It was then that speculations in goods came in
aid of speculations in foreign loans, and in shares
of joint stock companies. And although, for the
reasons stated, the markets for agricultural produce
had not participated in the spirit of speculation
which prevailed in the markets for other produce
and for shares, the prices of provisions were, from
the combined effect of the season and the corn
laws, at a high range compared with what they had
been at~three years before.
There was accordingly, in the spring of 1825,
an almost universal activity pervading nearly all
sum actually invested. If, for instance, shares of 100/., on
which 5L had been paid, rose to a premium of 40/., this yielded
on every share a profit equal to eight times the amount of the
money which had been paid. This possibility of enormous profit
by risking a small sum, was a bait too tempting to be resisted ;
all the gambling propensities of human nature were constantly
solicited into action ; and crowds of individuals of every de-
scription,— the credulous and the suspicious, — the crafty and
the bold,— the raw and the experienced, — the intelligent and the
ignorant,— princes, nobles, politicians, placemen, patriots, lawyers,
physicians, divines, philosophers, poets, intermingled with wo-
men of all ranks and degrees — spinsters, wives, and widows —
hastened to venture some portion of their property in schemes
of which scarcely any thing was known except the name."
18^3—1827. 153
branches of industry, accompanied by all the out-
ward and visible signs of prosperity which invari-
ably mark periods of general excitement.* But
* The consummation of the effects of that excitement is de-
scribed in the subjoined extract, from the Annual Register,
which refers to the early part of 1825 : —
" Nearly all property had risen greatly in pecuniary value,
and every branch of internal industry was thriving. Agricul-
tural distress had disappeared; the persons employed in the
cotton and woollen manufactures were in full employment ; the
various departments of the iron trade were flourishing ; on all
sides new buildings were in the progress of erection ; and money
was so abundant, that men of enterprise, though without capital,
found no difficulty in commanding funds for any plausible
undertaking. This substantial and solid prosperity was stimu-
lated to an additional extent, and was, in appearance, still
further magnified, by the operation of the many joint-stock
companies which had sprung into sudden existence in the
former year. Some of these had put in motion a considerable
quantity of industry, and increased the demand for various
articles ; and all of them, at their commencement, and for some
time afterwards, tended to throw a certain sum of money into
more active circulation, and to multiply the transfers of pro-
perty from one hand to another. As these speculations still
retained their popularity, the apparent prosperity arising from
their artificial stimulus presented an imposing aspect. New
companies were formed ; day after day teemed with successive
projects ; and the shares of joint-stock companies not only sus-
tained the absurdly high prices which they reached in the latter
end of 1824, but even rose far higher. The madness which
prevailed at this time cannot be shown more fairly or more
conclusively than by the following statement, which specifies
the amount of the instalments paid on each share, in five of the
principal mining companies, and the market prices of these
shares on the 10th of December, 1824, and the llth of January
respectively.
Dec. 10. Jan. 11.
Anglo-Mexican, 1007. 10Z. paid. 331. pr. 1581. 1151. 1251.
Brazilian, 1001. 101. do. 10s. dis. 66/. 70/. 44/. pr.
Colombian, 100/. 10/. do. 19/.pr. 82/. 62/. 591.
Real del Monte, 400/. 70Z. do. 5501 1350/.
United Mexican, 40/. 10/. do. 351. — 1551. 1151. 1251.
" Some of these projects derived fresh popularity, and the ge-
neral satisfaction with the measures of government was much
increased, by an important step which was taken in fixing the
foreign relations of the country.
" Mr. Canning made a formal communication to the foreign
154) PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
the grounds for the great rise of prices in the
markets, both for shares and for goods, were un-
sound, proceeding as they did upon incorrect in-
formation and exaggerated views, which had been
allowed full scope by an undue enlargement and
abuse of credit. The appearances, therefore, of
prosperity proved to be delusive ; and we have now
to see the disastrous results of the overtrading
which so remarkably distinguished the close of
1824, and the first few months of 1825.
SECTION 5. — Fall of the Prices of Goods after the
Spring of '1825.
The speculations both in purchases of goods on
the spot, and in overtrading in imports and ex-
ports, which had their origin mostly at the close
of 1824, and continued through the greater part
of the spring of 1825, terminated, in the course of
the summer and autumn of that year, as such spe-
culations commonly do terminate. The usual ef-
fects of prices driven up beyond the occasion soon
manifested themselves in diminished demand *, and
minister accredited to our court, in which he stated, * That, in
consequence of the repeated failures of the applications of his
Majesty's government to the court of Spain, relative to the recog-
nition of the independent states of South America, his Majesty
has come to a determination to appoint charge's d'affaires to the
states of Colombia, Mexico, and Buenos Ayres ; and to enter
into treaties of commerce with those respective states on the
basis of the recognition of their independence.' This measure,
beneficial and popular in itself, was the more acceptable, be-
cause it was justly deemed prophetic of the course which would
be adopted with regard to Chili, Peru, and Guatimala* as
soon as stable governments should be created in those coun-
tries."
* The demand, on such occasions, is diminished in a greater
degree than the actual consumption. When the conviction is
once established, that there is an approaching relief, by a fresh
importation, from the existing deficiency of supply, the manu-
1823—1827-
155
in advices of forthcoming supplies, large beyond
the utmost previous computations. In the instance
of several descriptions of produce, not only was
the importation larger than on any former occasion,
but supplies came in considerable quantities from
new sources ; or comparatively insignificant sources
were greatly enlarged.*
Thus, to small stocks of goods had succeeded
overwhelming importations, some of them from
unusual sources ; and a consequent accumulation
beyond the utmost computed rate of consumption.
At the same time there was a diminished export,
most articles having risen beyond the price which
the foreign consumer could or would afford to pay
for them. But, as has been remarked, with refer-
facturers and the dealers, both wholesale 'and retail, limit their
purchases to merely what is absolutely necessary. The manu-
facturers work up, and the dealers and shopkeepers run off, their
previously accumulated stocks, before they buy afresh ; and this
they do only, as it is termed, from hand to mouth. There is, in
such cases, a postponement of demand, as, under the opposite
circumstances of apprehended scarcity and rising markets, an
anticipation of demand. And the difference between a post-
poned and anticipated demand, ought to be taken into account
in all statements of quantities on hand, as compared with the
rate of consumption.
* Thus, in the instance of cotton, the quantity which previously
to 1824? had been imported from Egypt into this country was
perfectly insignificant, reached in 1825 to 20,000,000 Ibs. And
the effect on opinion of the sudden increase from this source, was
greater than the mere quantity relatively to the total supply,
inasmuch as it operated on the minds of buyers, as opening a great
and indefinitejsource of supply at a reduced cost. The excess of
supply in 1825, of this and other raw materials of our principal
manufactures, will be seen by the following comparative state-
ment : —
Years.
Cotton.
Wool.
Raw Silk.
Flax. Tallow.
Linseed.
1822
1823
1824
1825
ibs.
142,837,628
191,402,503
149,380,122
228,005,291
ibs.
19,058,080
19,366,725
22,564,485
43,816,966
Ibs.
2,060,292
2,453,166
3,051,979
2,855,792
cwt.
610,106
553,937
742,531
1,055,233
cwt.
805,238
830,271
680,382
1,164,037
bushels.
1,413,450
1,662,456
2,195,093
2,888,247
156 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
ence to former instances of a recoil of markets,
from speculation and overtrading, there was a pause,
and a resistance, of greater or less duration, to the
fall ; the greater or less resistance depending upon
the nature of the articles, and the time in which the
engagements for payment fell due.
The tendency downwards of most articles was
manifest before the summer of 1 82.5. The principal
overtrading in goods, combining the extent of en-
gagements with advance of prices, had occurred in
the article of cotton, which is the most important of
all others, as regards the magnitude of the capital
embarked, and the interests involved in it. And in
this article the reaction was first felt. Considerable
failures, connected with the cotton trade, occurred
in the United States, in the latter end of 1825.
These were felt chiefly in Liverpool, where the
commercial discredit preceded that of the metro-
polis. But the full effect of the depressing causes
was not experienced till the spring of 1826; and
it was not till then that failures and discredit of
mercantile establishments became extensive and
important.
The whole of the great fluctuations of the prices
of goods were confined to the interval from the last
few weeks of 1824 to June, 1826.
It may be requisite here to repeat, being a cir-
cumstance which will be found to be of impor-
tance in considering the question of the influence
of the amount of the circulation on these fluctua-
tions of prices, that the markets for almost every
description of produce were dull and drooping till
the summer, and, in several instances, till the au-
tumn, of 1824 ; and that it was not till the close
of that year that anything like a spirit of general
speculation in produce of various kinds arose.
\
1823—18^7.
157
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158 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 6.-— Recoil of Markets for Loans and
Shares after the Spring of 1825.
The recoil from speculations in loans and shares
so entered into, and from premiums so extravagantly
run up, as they had been in the spring of 1825,
was inevitable. The process by which the fall took
place is simple and obvious : — As regarded the
schemes, a more accurate appreciation of a greater
outlay, and of smaller returns, than had been before
anticipated ; and a limitation of the demand for
investment in them, to such persons only as could
afford to depend upon remote contingencies for an
income, where any income was to be expected :
above all, a general deficiency of means among the
subscribers to pay up the succeeding instalments,
as they had relied for the most part upon a con-
tinued rise, to enable them to realise a profit before
another instalment should be called for, or upon
the same facility as had before existed, of raising
money for the purpose at a low rate of interest ; —
and, as applied to foreign loans, the absence of
security for some of them, and the rise of the rate
of interest in this country, which had the same de-
pressing effect upon all of them. It is to be con-
sidered that the greater part of the transfers of the
original shares in the foreign loans, and in the new
schemes, while the payments on them were light,
and while confidence was still entire, were carried
on by a medium engendered in a great degree by
those very transactions ; and that the profits real-
ised or anticipated by the successive shareholders,
afforded a fund of additional credit, as well as of
nominal capital, with which they might and did
appear as purchasers of other objects of exchange.
But as new loans and schemes were successively
brought forward on grounds more or less specious,
all tending to the additional absorption of capital,
1823—1827- 159
while the increasing calls, with the high premium
payable on the former loans and schemes, were be-
ginning to press upon the shareholders, the weakest,
in the first instance, would endeavour to realise
without any longer finding ready buyers. A pause
naturally ensued : and, under such circumstances,
a pause is generally fatal to projects that do not
proceed on solid grounds.
As regarded the majority of the. loans and
schemes here alluded to, it was soon discovered,
that while the calls for payments were immediate
and pressing, the prospect of returns was become
more remote and uncertain ; doubts too began soon
to arise as to there being sufficient security for any
income. Accordingly, after the greatest elevation
in January and February, 1825, there was a pause
in the first instance, then a slight decline, and, after
a few weeks, namely, in the May and June follow-
ing, a rapid decline.
The South American loans entailed a loss of
nearly the whole of the sums subscribed, there
having been no dividends beyond a small part re-
tained and paid back under the name of dividends.
And the Mexican and South American mining
subscriptions, with only one or two exceptions,
proved to be a total loss of the capital paid. Of
the other schemes, some few, which were undertaken
on fair and solid grounds, survived ; but a large pro-
portion were abandoned, at a sacrifice of the greater
part, if not the whole, of the deposits and first pay-
ments. The losses thus sustained were severely
felt in the fortunes of individuals unconnected with
trade ; but they likewise entered largely into the
causes of the banking and commercial failures which
followed.
160 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 7. — Commercial Discredit and Pressure
on the Money Market following the Spring of
1825.
From the combined effects of the great fall which
thus took place in the markets for goods, and in
the value of shares in the various loans and schemes,
there was a rapid transition, from unbounded credit
and confidence to general discredit and distrust.
In a pamphlet of mine on the currency, in
January, 1826, a description was given, while the
impression was fresh, of some of the phenomena of
the state of credit at that time. Referring to the
contraction of the circulation, in consequence of
the failures of country banks, the following remarks
occurred : —
" The issues of many of these banks had been
greatly extended, without any adequate reserve of
available funds to meet such sudden demands as it
is of the very essence of the principles of banking
to contemplate and provide for. It appears, by the
disclosures arising out of the late disastrous and
unprecedentedly numerous failures, that several of
the banks had been, for some time before, insolvent,
and had been kept afloat merely by the confidence
of their customers, and the facilities of the money
market, which had accompanied the increase of the
Bank of England issues during the high prices.
The first breath of suspicion, and the smallest re-
duction of their accustomed accommodation, were
sufficient to sweep away this description of circu-
lation of paper. It has been discovered, moreover,
that several of the country banks, which were sol-
vent, as far as related to the power of eventually
liquidating their engagements *, had not been con-
* The number of those that were eventually found to be sol-
vent, proved to be in a larger proportion than was supposed when
the above was written.
1823—1827. 161
ducted on correct banking principles, having a very
inadequate reserve in an available and immediately
convertible form.
" Some, too, of the London banks had carried on
an extensive business with very insufficient available
resources, and were, therefore, liable to be run
upon on the occurrence of any general discredit.
One of the most considerable of these (the house
of Pole and Co.), after struggling through diffi-
culties for upwards of a week, stopped payment
early in December (1825). The notoriety of these
difficulties m the first instance, and the eventual
failure, diminished the resources of the country
connexions of this firm ; and such of them as had
not independent, ample, and immediately con-
vertible funds, were under the necessity of sus-
pending their payments ; thus adding to the alarm
which was already prevalent. The consternation
now became general, not only among the holders
of local notes, but among depositors, as well in the
metropolis as in the country. There was, in con-
sequence, a severe run upon several of the London
bankers, of whom three or four, besides the one
before alluded to, suspended their payments. The
panic was then at its height ; nearly seventy banks,
in town and country, suspended their payments in
the course of the single month of December last
(1825). Bank of England notes and gold were
almost the only medium which would then be ac-
cepted in payment throughout the country ; but
Sir M. W. Ridley said in the House of Commons, 3d June,
1828, that "in 1825 and 1826 there were 770 country bankers,
and of these sixty-three had stopped payment. Out of the
sixty-three, twenty-three had subsequently resumed their pay-
ments, and paid 20*. in the pound ; and of the remainder,
thirty-one were making arrangements for the payment of their
debts, and there was a great hope that every farthing would be
paid. The country bankers who had failed in 1826, had paid,
on an average, 17*. 6d. in the pound."
VOL. II. M
16C2 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
Bank of England notes, where even they were
taken as readily as gold, could not supply the chasm
created by the discredit of the local paper, since
the Bank had ceased to issue one pound notes ;
gold, therefore, was required specifically for this as
well as for the more general purposes of meeting
the demand from want of confidence in the paper.
The drain upon the Bank coffers for gold, for in-
ternal purposes, was, from these causes, so great,
that, following a previous drain for exportation,
doubts were entertained whether cash payments
could be continued. Happily, the public escaped
the calamity of a second suspension. The con-
traction which had taken place in the circulating
medium, by the destruction of nearly all the country
paper, and the cessation of almost all transactions
on credit, and the detention of sums for the pur-
pose of increased reserves by bankers and others,
was greater, perhaps, than had ever before occurred,
notwithstanding that an enlarged issue of Bank of
England notes had been made through the medium
of extended discounts of mercantile bills ; and this
contraction was at length effectual in occasioning
an influx of gold sufficient to place the Bank out of
immediate danger. In the mean time, it had issued
a few one pound notes, to supply the urgent wants
of the country circulation.*
" Under the circumstances which have here been
very hastily and imperfectly sketched, a melancholy
* A box containing about 600,000/. or 700,0007. of one pound
notes, which had been put aside unused, had been discovered, by
an accident, it is said, in the possession of the Bank; and these were
immediately issued, in the week ending the 24th December,
1825. The relief afforded by this issue was very seasonable;
but it may be doubted whether it was so essential as has been
supposed, in preserving the Bank from suspension, because the
severest part of the run for gold seems to have beeri over in the
week preceding the issue. At the same time, if it was essential,
it makes the position of the Bank only the more humiliating,
inasmuch as its preservation was owing to an accident, which
partakes of the nature of the marvellous or miraculous.
1823—4827. 163
exemplification has been afforded of the mode in
which extremes produce their opposites ; in which
unbounded confidence, and all the delusion of un-
founded anticipation, have been succeeded by dis-
trust and dismay.
" To the great facility which only a few months
before had been experienced by speculators, pro-
jectors, and adventurers of every kind, in raising
whatever sums they might require at the shortest
notice, and at a low rate of interest, on securities
of goods, on mortgages, or on bills of whatever
length of date, or on mere personal credit, the most
signal contrast was exhibited, of an utter inability
to raise money upon any but the best and most
convertible securities. Goods became unsaleable,
beyond the immediate and urgent wants of the
consumers, so that the stocks which are usually
held in anticipation of demand, were wholly un-
available to meet the pecuniary engagements of the
holders. Thus, many merchants having accepted
bills for only half the invoice amount of wool, cot-
ton, and silk, coming to their consignment, were
unable to realise even that half by sales, or by ad-
vances on the security of the bill of lading ; and
not only no further advances could be obtained by
way of loan on the security of goods, but the ad-
vances already made were peremptorily called in.
Advances on mortgage, owing to the usury law *,
* The operation of the usury law may be distinctly traced
in a great aggravation of the distress among merchants and
bankers during that critical period. Had it not been for that
preposterous law, many individuals would, in all probability,
have been enabled to obtain immediate relief, by getting bills,
which were not within the bank time, discounted at 7 or 8
per cent. ; but those who would have lent on that kind of
security, if not limited to 5 per cent., naturally directed their
disposable capital to such modes of investment as admitted of
their realising a larger interest without coming under the opera-
tion of that law. Thus numbers, who would gladly have given
an advanced rate of 8 or 10 per cent., were driven, by an
enactment which was absurdly intended as a protection to them,
164 TRICES AND CIRCULATION,
were wholly out of the question. From the same
cause, viz., the value of the use of monied capital
having risen beyond the rate of 5 per cent., which
has been imposed by law as the maximum, no bills,
however good in point of security, were convertible,
which had longer to run than ninety-five days, and
which did not come within the forms prescribed
by the Bank, as the rule of its discounts. The
different shopkeepers, retail tradesmen, and small
farmers, having taken in payment, in the course of
their dealings, the notes of the country banks which
subsequently failed, were prevented from making,
their payments within the stipulated periods to the
manufacturers and wholesale dealers ; and these,
consequently, were unable to fulfil their engage-
ments, or discharge their acceptances to the im-
porting merchants.
" It would be an endless task to attempt to fol-
low all the steps by which disappointment and loss
and insolvency, have, at the close of 1825, followed
the brilliant hopes, the reputed gains, and the un-
limited credit, which characterised the early part
of the year. Suffice it to say, that these contrasts,
inadequately as they are here exhibited, serve to
illustrate the process by which the factitious in-
crease of a medium of paper and credit, raising
the prices of commodities and of the public funds
above the level which the metallic basis of the cur-
rency can support, must be succeeded, not only by
a destruction of all that artificial medium, but by
a temporary contraction of the circulation below
the level from which that enlargement took place."
And a few weeks later, that is, at the end of
to sell stock or goods at a loss of 20 or 30 per cent, for cash,
compared with the price for time. For it is a matter of
notoriety that extensive sales were actually made of stock, at
that difference ; and it is within my own knowledge that sales of
goods for immediate money were made at a still greater
sacrifice.
1823—1827. 165
February, in a postscript to a subsequent edition,
the following remarks were added : —
" After the great panic which prevailed in the
money market in December last (1825), and which
was characterised by a run upon nearly all the
bankers, both in town and country, there was a
pause and an abatement of the alarm. It was then
a matter of remark and surprise that, in the midst
of so much distress, by the failure of bankers, and
by the disturbance of the country circulation, and
while so many small traders were unable to fulfil
their engagements, there were, down to the middle,
or nearly the end of January, comparatively few
failures of mercantile establishments of any extent
or importance in the metropolis. The answer,
however, which then presented itself to that remark
was, that while bankers were liable, upon the
slightest breath of suspicion, to be run upon, and
their solvency immediately put to the test, mercan-
tile houses might go on for some length of time,
under more or less of discredit and difficulty. The
essential difference is, that the engagements of
bankers are to pay on demand, while those of
merchants are payable only after a certain date.
A merchant may therefore have very large engage-
ments which, in consequence of a fall of markets,
or loss from other causes, it may become evident
to himself, and suspected by others, that he will
not be able to discharge when due : but till they
are due, he may take the chapter of accidents in
his favour, and not declare his inability. Under
such circumstances, too, his earliest acceptances
may be renewed by creditors who may think
favourably of his chance of overcoming his diffi-
culties.
" Among the accessary causes of the overtrad-
ing, was the facility with which merchants obtained
discounts of long paper, at 'six, nine, and twelve
months, not only from town bankers, but from the
M 3
166 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
country banks, and particularly from the Scotch
banks ; such bills being readily renewed, while the
money market continued to be abundant, and while
the solvency of the parties was unquestioned.
These long-dated bills contributed to the difficulties
of the banks, from not being readily available when
the banking panic occurred, while they account
for the delay in the appearance of mercantile de-
rangement. There is another large class of bills
which have been, and are about, failing due during
January, the present, and the next month, having
been drawn from abroad, against the unusually
large shipments of produce which have been made
to this country.
" A large proportion of this mass of both inland
and foreign bills was discounted by the Bank of
England in December, and the early part of Janu-
ary last; and the extent to which this accommoda-
tion was afforded gave relief in a double point of
view, both by enabling the holders of those bills
to make their immediate payments, and by serving
as the medium for an extended issue of banknotes,
which went some way towards supplying the chasm
occasioned by the failure of private credit.
'* But when the bills become due, and there is
no longer a facility of renewing them, the acceptors
are unable to meet their payments, either because
they have not received the remittances which they
expected from abroad, and although possessed of
property, cannot immediately convert it by sale
or pledge, or because, although solvent when they
gave their acceptance, they have ceased to be so
by the further fall of prices, or by the failure of
their debtors. The failures of mercantile firms
have accordingly, for some weeks past, occurred
to a great and alarming extent. Many, if not
most, of these houses have been large shippers of
goods, for which they had given their acceptances
to the manufacturers. The losses thus sustained
1823—1827- 167
by the manufacturers are aggravated by the great
fall in the price, and the stagnation of demand for
their goods, resulting from the over-importation
of the raw material, and from the previous exces-
sive speculative exports of the manufactured articles
with which the foreign markets have been glutted.
The speculative demand, too, in last spring, occa-
sioned our own shopkeepers, both in town and
country, to stock themselves more largely than
usual. Many of these have contributed of late to
swell the lists of bankrupts ; and such of them as
have not failed are, both from necessity, and from the
opinion of future cheapness, going in the opposite
extreme of running their stocks to the lowest amount
consistent with the preservation of their business.
" The reduced demand experienced by the ma-
nufacturers from these combined causes, disables
them from employing the same quantity of labour,
and either the wages are reduced, or smaller num-
bers of workmen are employed. And this reduc-
tion of employment and wages of the labouring
classes (the price of food continuing relatively
high) forms a great aggravation of the sufferings
which the labouring classes have sustained from
losses by the failures of the country banks, and by
the discredit of the local notes, of which they have,
in too many instances, been holders.
" This last feature of the present distress is dis-
tinct from and over and above that which existed
in 1793. Until within the last two or three weeks,
it seemed to be a matter of doubt whether the extent
of commercial distress and discredit in the crisis
through which we are passing was equal to what
prevailed in that period. But I am now inclined
to think that the present derangement will be
found to exceed that of 1793, both in extent and
intensity, independently of the aggravation which
is now experienced from the losses sustained by
the discredit of the small country notes.
M 4
168 TRICES AND CIRCULATION,
" For the alleviation of this wide-spreading dis-
tress, the most obvious expedient, certainly, is to
extend the issues by the Bank of England as far
as can be done without incurring the danger of a
renewed drain upon their coffers, and a consequent
risk of suspension : an event which, both in its
immediate and remote consequences, would be
pregnant with evils infinitely outweighing the
consideration of the mere temporary relief to be
derived from an extra issue of notes."
The derangement of the circulation arising out
of the failures of bankers was, according to the
foregoing view, at its height in December, 1825*;
whereas the mercantile embarrassments were more
heavily felt in the two following months.
Applications were made to government by depu-
tations on behalf of the mercantile interests, which
were then in a state of great distress, for relief, by
an issue of exchequer bills in the way of loans, to
be advanced on securities under a commission, on
* A meeting of merchants and traders of the city of London
was held at the Mansion House, on the 14-th December, when
the following resolutions were moved and adopted : —
" 1 . That the unprecedented embarrassments and difficulties
under which the circulation of the country at present labours
are mainly to be attributed to a general panic, for which there
are no reasonable grounds ; that this meeting has the fullest
confidence in the means and substance of the banking establish-
ments of the capital and the country, and they believe that the
acting generally upon that confidence would relieve all those
symptoms of distress which now show themselves in a shape so
alarming to the timid, and so fatal to those who are forced to
sacrifice their property to meet sudden demands upon them,
which it is no imputation upon their judgment and prudence
not to have expected.
"2. That it having been stated to this meeting that the
directors of the Bank of England are occupied with a remedy
for a state of things so extraordinary, this meeting will refrain
from any interference with the measures of the directors of the
Bank, who, they are satisfied, will do their duty towards the
public.
" 3. That, having the firmest confidence in the stability of
the public credit of the country, we declare our determination
to support it to the utmost of our power."
1823—1827- 169
the same footing as in 1793 and 1811. To these
applications the ministers gave a decided negative.
Failing of relief in that quarter, a petition, exten-
sively and respectably signed by merchants and
traders, was presented to the House of Commons
on the 23d of February, 1826, praying that the
state of commercial disorder and discredit should
be taken into consideration, and suggesting, as the
most effectual remedy, an issue of exchequer bills
under a commission. The remedy prayed for was
strongly supported in the House of Commons by
Mr. Baring, and other members of considerable
weight. Some of these were habitually adherents
of the government ; and among them were Mr.
Pearse and Mr. Manning, directors of the Bank.
Notwithstanding this formidable array in favour of
the measure, and notwithstanding the insinuations,
disingenuously thrown out, that the objections to
it argued the want of a due sense of the degree of
the prevailing distress, the ministers, to their in-
finite credit, because they could have no motive
but that of public principle, every motive of interest
lying the opposite way, persisted and prevailed in
their resistance. But, by way of proving their
wish to contribute, by any mode short of direct
interference on the part of the government, to the
relief of the existing distress, ministers urged upon
the Bank, and at length succeeded in inducing the
directors to. consent, very reluctantly, however, to
make advances on the security of goods, in certain
places specified, to an extent not exceeding three
millions.
The measure was much lauded, as tending to
restore confidence ; but the confidence that was
most required by the holders of goods, namely,
the confidence on the part of buyers, that prices
were no longer upheld by undue credit, had been
restored, and markets and the state of credit were
improving, and the distress abating, before the
170 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
plan was adopted. And there cannot be a better
proof how little such a measure was wanted, than
the fact that, with all the apparatus of local boards
appointed for the purpose, the whole amount of
the advances so made by the Bank in 1826 was
short of 400,000/.* If the assistance had been
sooner held out, it would doubtless have gone to
a greater extent; but in proportion as it would
have had the effect of keeping doubtful paper
longer afloat, and of bolstering the markets, it
would have retarded the return of real confidence.
After the clearance which had been effected in
the latter part of 1825, and in the early months of
1826, of the unsound part of the banking and
commercial credits, which had been engendered
by an undue degree of confidence, and of the
spirit of enterprise, in the immediately preceding
period, trade and manufactures resumed their
wonted course, and hardly any trace remained, at
the close of 1826, of their having been disturbed
in their progress. In 1827 the range of prices
was low, and, in many instances, declining, in
consequence of continued abundance of supplies,
and progressive reduction of the cost of production
of several articles ; but the markets for goods
were no longer under the influence of discredit or
distress, and the money market was remarkably
* An account of the places at which boards were established
for advances on goods by the Bank of England, and the amounts
of such advances, in the year 1826.
Manchester
Glasgow -
Sheffield
Liverpool -
Huddersfield
115,490
81,700
59,500
41,450
30,300
19,600
Birmingham -
Dundee - 16,500
Norwich .... 2,400
Bank of England, 9th June, 1832.
Appendix to Report on Bank Charter, p. 43.
1823—1827. 171
easy, the Bank having reduced its rate of discount
again to 4 per cent.
In the United States of America, a process was
gone through nearly corresponding with that which
occurred in this country, of great facility of credit,
and of extensive speculations, more especially in
cotton, attended with a great rise of prices in the
early part of 1825*, and followed by a great fall of
prices, and a severe pressure in the money market t,
in the summer and autumn of that year.
* The prices of cotton had advanced considerably in America
in the spring of 1825, in consequence of the rising markets in
this country ; but, in July, the intelligence was received there
of a decline of 3c?. a pound in Liverpool, and the further fall
naturally followed the decline on this side.
•J- The following is an extract from a New York newspaper,
dated in July, 1825 : —
" The scarcity of money is probably greater in Wall Street at
this moment than it has been for many years ; the full explana-
tion whereof, it would, perhaps, be difficult to ascertain. Some
of the causes may, however, be assigned. Among the most
prominent, we should be disposed to place that of the many
new companies incorporated by the last legislature. It was
assumed as a fact, both by the petitions for these companies,
and by the legislature itself, that a great mass of unemployed
capital was lying idle in New York, to which these companies
would afford the means of profitable investment and employ-
ment. This assumption was, in our judgment, unfounded. We
do not believe there was any excess or superabundance of capi-
tal; and all calculations, therefore, made on the existence of
such were erroneous. New companies, however, were char,
tered, and great demand was created for these stocks : a spirit
of speculation was engendered, and men, of all descriptions and
degrees, were seen striving to get shares in this or that bubble ;
not with any view to (for most of them had not the means of)
a permanent investment, but, calculating that, by good manage-
ment on the part of the directors, and from the craving of the
superabundant capital for employment, these shares must rise.
Hence, persons without any means, or any judgment or know-
ledge in such matters, became subscribers ; borrowing, on the
pledge of their shares, the money to pay for them, until, by a
repetition of this process, one and the same sum was often
made to represent as many times its value as there were new
companies. All of a sudden, however, in the natural course of
trade, that capital which was deemed superabundant, but which
was, in fact, only awaiting its usual and accustomed modes of
172 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 8. — State of the Circulation from 1823
to 1827.
In considering the influence of alterations in the
amount of the circulating medium on the fluctu-
ations of prices, and on the speculations in shares
employment, is called for — the purchaser of cotton has to pay for
it — the importer of goods has to remit, the projector of distant
voyages has to prepare his funds. Moreover, receipts from foreign
shipments have fallen short of expectation. The adventures
round Cape Horn and to the Brazils, in flour, &c., have brought
back few or no returns ; the markets are glutted — the ship-
ments to the Spanish Main, of dry goods, have been overdone.
The pause in cotton abroad has interrupted sales. Hence, from
all these combined causes, the merchant is thrown upon his
resources at home, and the money that had been lent on
pledges of stock is recalled to its natural and proper vocation.
But how is it to be repaid ? The borrowers of it must sell the
stock given to secure the loans. But the very demand for
money, for the purposes above enumerated, dampens the spirit
and means of speculating in the stocks, and sales cannot be
made, therefore, without great sacrifices. What is the conse-
quence ? The holders for the rise make every possible effort to
avoid the necessity of selling ; they borrow anywhere and every-
where, and at every rate of interest. They besiege the banks,
the insurance companies, and individuals ; for they must, at
some sacrifice or other, repay what they have borrowed, or
their career is up ; and it is precisely, as we are informed, among
this class of speculators that the distress for money is most
severely felt.
" Another cause, perhaps, of the scarcity of money, and of
the extreme unwillingness of the banks to discount, is the dis-
proportion between the specie in bank, and the paper in circu-
lation. It is very — we should say, if censure could be made
to bear where it ought — inexcusably great. How this has
happened, it would, at this moment, carry us too far to inquire,
though we may attempt it hereafter. The fact, however, is
indisputable."
In a letter from an eminent merchant in New York, dated
23d November, 1825, the writer observes —
" No bill of exchange can be sold here but on credit of two,
three, and four months; and, such is the precarious state of
commerce, that such payments are hazardous in the extreme,
and paper discounted at from l£ to 3 per cent, per month.
Failures are consequently daily occurring, and numerous ; some
to a considerable amount."
1823—1827- 173
and loans in this interval, it is of importance to
distinguish between those alterations in the quan-
tity of money which were merely dependent upon
and coincident with, the influx and efflux of bullion,
from those which were the result of a regulation
of the Bank issues at variance with the movement
of the metals.
When an accumulation of bullion in the coffers
of the Bank has taken place to an amount exceed-
ing that which should, upon the largest allowance,
constitute a full proportion to its liabilities, the
further influx ought clearly to form a basis for
a further issue of notes (whether to the full extent
of such excess of bullion, or somewhat short of it,
according as securities might, or might not, be ob-
tainable without a violent operation on the money
market), will be admitted on all hands. An addition
to that extent of the circulation would take place
under similar circumstances if the currency were
wholly metallic. Now, it appears, that the position
of the Bank was, on the 28th February, 1823 —
Circulation. Securities.
Notes of 51. and upwards s£l7,7lO,740 Public ^13,658,829
under 51. - - 681,500 Private 4,660,901
Deposits -
Liabilities
18,392,240
7,181,100
Bullion
Assets
18,319,730
10,384,230
25,573,340
28,703,960
And the following is a passage in a Boston paper of the 4th
November, 1825: —
te We have seen several private letters from New York, which
mention that several failures, growing out of the late cotton
speculations, were daily occurring in that city ; the Bank had
positively stopped discounting, and confidence was impaired,
and a general gloom prevailed in the mercantile community.
One letter from a commercial gentleman says — ' The mer-
chants along Trint and Pearl Streets are cracking like parched
corn.' It is stated that the debts of five of the mercantile
houses which have recently failed in New York were estimated
at 2,500,000 dollars, and that the available funds would not
exceed 75,000 dollars."
174 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
Here, whether we look at the positive magnitude
of the amount of bullion, or its proportion either
to the circulation or to the liabilities, being con-
siderably more than one half of the former, or one
third of the latter, it cannot be doubted but that,
as the exchanges were still insuring a further influx,
the Bank would, under the dictates of the soundest
policy, seek to invest in securities so much at least
of the excess of monied capital forced upon it as
could find employment without creating any con-
siderable disturbance of the money market. That
the Bank did seek so to employ it is well known,
inasmuch as it not only lowered its public rate of
discount to 4 per cent, but announced a departure
so far from its former practice as to offer to advance
sums by way of mortgage ; thus proving the diffi-
culty of finding an adequate amount of securities
within its ordinary rules. Notwithstanding these
efforts, such was the force of the tide of the metals
into this country, and so great the tendency to a
fall of the rate of interest, that the Bank could
not find a sufficient amount of securities to allow
of an extension of its issue at all commensurate
with the accumulation of treasure throughout the
whole of 1823 ; the bullion in the coffers of the
Bank having reached, in January, 1824, the enor-
mous and unprecedented amount of 14,200,000/. ;
and having been still, in April, 1824, so high as
13,800,000^. ; while the circulation in April, 1824,
was 1 9,300, OOO/., or only one million higher than
it had been in February, 1823.*
* In a note, inserted in the Appendix to the Report on the
Bank Charter, explanatory on the part of the Bank to its pro-
prietors of the unfavourable position in which it stood by the
low amount of its securities, and the high state of its treasure,
in the early part of 1824, that position is thus accounted for: —
" The loss and difficulty which the Bank sustained during that
period was owing, in a great degree, to the government having
authorised the continuance of the circulation of the country
small notes until 1833, without any previous communication
1823—1827.
Surely, then, till April, 1824, the circulation of
paper, according to any received doctrine of cur-
with the Bank, after the provision of bullion was made for their
withdrawal.
"The consequence of that measure, on the part of government,
was, to leave the Bank with upwards of 14- millions of bullion
in January, 1824, and their securities diminished to between 17
and 18 millions."
Now, this statement, which was also made verbally by the
governor and the directors in their evidence before the Bank
Charter Committee, does not, in my opinion, give a correct view
of the case.
In February, 1822, the Bank was in possession of an amount
of treasure, namely, Il,000j000/., which, in the then state of
trade and the exchanges, was deemed sufficient preparation for
the contemplated cessation of the country small note circula-
tion ; and it was very soon after that date, namely, in April
following, that the government announced the very weak and
injudicious measure of extending that very objectionable de- *
scription of paper circulation till 1833. That measure, it seems,
was adopted without previous notice to the Bank ; and this cir-
cumstance is dwelt upon as of importance. But the only
inconvenience that the want of previous notice could have
entailed upon the Bank, was its having so large an amount of
treasure, and so small an amount of securities, as it had in the
spring of 1822, Being then, however, although without previous
notice, apprised of the measure which rendered any further
preparation for that purpose unnecessary, it is not easy to see
how or why the Bank should not have added to its securities,
and reduced, or, at any rate, kept down, the amount of its
treasure. Indeed, between February and August, 1822, there
was a diminution of about one million of its bullion, and an
addition of near a million and a half to its securities. But this
rather adds to the difficulty attending the explanation ; because
the amount of bullion, having been reduced to 10,000,000/. in
August, 1822, and so continued till February, 1823, why was it
allowed to accumulate to 14<,200,000/. in the twelvemonth fol-
lowing ? and how can this further accumulation be by possibility
ascribed to the abandonment of the intended suppression of the
country small notes ? And, what is still more remarkable is,
that the public securities in the hands of the Bank in August,
1823, were actually less, by nearly 2,000,OOOA, than they had
been in the February preceding; and, indeed, lower than they
had been at all for many years before. There is, therefore, a
palpable inconsistency in the explanation. The more probable
explanation is, that the Bank, in consequence of the great re-
176 TRICES AND CIRCULATION,
rency, must be considered to have been in a con-
tracted, and, most assuredly, not in an artificially
enlarged state. And yet, before April, 1824, the
price of wheat had reached 65,9. Wd. ; being an
advance of upwards of 50 per cent, upon the prices
of 1822, and within the merest trifle of the highest
rate which it attained for some years afterwards.
And it was during this contracted state of the cir-
culation that a considerable proportion of the
speculations in foreign loans, and mines, and in
insurance and other joint-stock projects, had their
origin. This fact cannot be too strongly recom-
mended to the attention of such persons as, not
being committed to a theory (for of those there is
no hope), may have been predisposed, by the con-
fident assertions of the partisans of the currency
duction of the market rate of interest, found a difficulty, if not
an impossibility, of investment in adequate securities without
such a violent operation on the money market as, involving, as
it would do; a departure from its routine, the directors shrunk
from.
It would be a curious, but, perhaps, not a very profitable,
speculation to consider what would have been the state of
things if, with a view to keep down the amount of bullion in
1823, the Bank had attempted forcibly to extend its securities
by 3 or 4 millions. The rate of interest would probably, in
such case, have fallen so much while the competition for secu-
rities was in progress, that the deposits (increased as these had
been) would have been further raised, and, with the increased
reserves in the hands of private bankers, might have neutralised
all effect of the securities on the circulation. If, however, the
addition to the securities had entailed an equal addition to the
amount of Bank of England notes, I doubt, for reasons which
would lead to too much length to explain, whether, in 1823,
and the early part of 1824, the prices of provisions and of com-
modities would have been higher than they were ; but the
speculations in loans and shares would have begun earlier than
they did, and there would have been an earlier transmission of
capital abroad, so as sooner to have brought on the reaction.
But the currency theory would have had an apparently trium-
phant case, in referring to so large an addition to the circulation
on securities, as an irrefragable proof of its having been the
exclusive cause of the rise of prices.
1823—1827. 177
doctrine, to refer every tendency to speculation,
and every considerable rise of prices to an enlarge-
ment of the circulation of paper beyond the clue
proportion to its metallic basis.
At the commencement of October, 1824, the
stock of bullion was 11,600,000/.* But, although
the bullion had thus been reducedby between 2and3
millions since January, it was still in the proportion
of more than one third to the liabilities. Thus far,
then, there is no charge of an undue enlargement
of Bank notes, the amount of which did not, at the
commencement of October, 1824, exceed about
19 millions ; and yet it was at this period of a cur-
rency, which, looking only at the position of the
Bank, was in a perfectly sound state, that the spirit
of speculation, which had several months before
been running riot in the share market, had extended
to the markets for goods. The exchanges had
indeed given way, but it was only in such a degree
as had allowed of reducing the treasure, which had
been of inconvenient magnitude.
But with the early part of October, 1824, the
justification of the conduct of the Bank ends.
The drain upon its coffers became about that time
more marked, and the signs of the times had become
such as should have induced caution on the part of
the Bank, and should have inculcated the propriety
of a limitation, if not of an immediate contraction,
of its issues. Yet, notwithstanding a further fall
of the exchanges, and so decided a drain on the
coffers of the Bank, that the bullion, in February,
1825, had been reduced by nearly three millions,
since the commencement of October preceding,
and by five millions as compared with February,
1824, the circulation was enlarged by about a
million, and the securities were increased by no
* Evidence of W. Ward, Esq Report on Bank Charter.
p. 128.
VOL. II. N
178
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
less an amount than six millions*; and the circu-
lation would, of necessity, have been still more
enlarged by that great increase of the securities,
had it not been for a great increase of the reve-
nue, which reduced the amount of the deficiency
bills.
This increase of the circulation, at the precise
time when the urgent necessity of a reduction of
the issues, or, at any rate, of a limitation of them,
was so strongly indicated, could not fail of pro-
moting, although it had not excited, the tendency
which then existed to extravagance of speculation.
It is very possible that, by the utmost practicable
contraction, the Bank might not have been able
effectually to repress the spirit of speculation, the
motives to which were then so powerful ; but the
misfortune was, that not only did the Bank not do
what was practicable to check, but it did the very
reverse, it actually added to the existing facilities.
The Bank had not kindled the fire, but, instead of
attempting to stop the progress of the flames, it
* 28th Feb. 1824.
Circulation. Securities.
Bank Notes 51. and upwards ^19,250,860 Public ^14,341,127
under 51. - 486,130 Private 4,530,873
Deposits
19,736,990
10,097,850 Bullion
18,872,000
13,810,060
Liabilities
29,834,840 Assets 32,682,060
28th Feb. 1825.
Circulation. Securities.
Bank Notes 51. and upwards ^20,337,030 Public £\ 9,447,588
under 51. - 416,730 Private 5,503,742
Deposits
20,753,760 24,951,330
10,168,780 Bullion 8,779,100
30,922,540
33,730,430
The circulation was further increased in the spring of 1825
to 21 millions.
1823—1827. 179
supplied fuel for maintaining and extending the
conflagration.
The explanations which have been given, on the
part of the Bank, of its conduct on that occasion,
although they account for the deviation from correct
principle, do not amount to a justification. One
ground stated* is, that the promise of assistance
by the Bank to government, for the financial mea-
sure of reducing the 4 per cents to 3^, was given
in January, 1824, whereas it was not till October
of that year that the advance for paying off the
dissentients was called for. Another ground is,
that the bargain for the purchase by the Bank of
the naval and military pensions, technically known
as the dead weight t, had been made early in 1823,
so that it was only in pursuance of that contract,
that the payments upon it in 1824 and 1825 con-
tributed unduly to swell the circulation.
The Bank, doubtless, was bound to carry through,
although under altered circumstances, its pledge of
paying off the dissentient 4 per cents. But that
forms no excuse for not having made a reduction
through other channels. And as to the dead weight,
why, if the progressive payments upon it endan-
gered an excess of the circulation, as was evidently
the case with the payment in January, 1825, was a
portion of it not sold as it might have been ? In-
deed, in the reluctance of the Bank to part with
any of the dead weight, there was a manifest incon-
sistency. The directors had, in the first instance,
objected to make the purchase t; and it is well known
* See evidence of William Ward, Esq. — Appendix to Report
on Bank Charter, 1832, p. 127.
f The dead weight consisted of the naval and military pen-
sions converted into an annuity of 585,740/. per annum, for
forty-four years, which the Bank purchased in March, 1823, for
the sum of 13,089,4<24*/., payable by instalments, up to April,
1828.
£ Mr. W. Ward, in his evidence before the committee on the
Bank charter, page 129., said, "tl think the dead weight existed
N 2
180 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
that, upon their declining it, an offer of treating for
it, in whole or in part, was made to some of the
other great public companies, who, likewise, de-
clined it. Subsequently, when the treaty was
renewed with the Bank, the directors would have
preferred taking one half only of the amount ; and
yet, having taken the whole, they could not be
induced, by the consideration of its being on the
occasion here noticed a certain means, and the
least objectionable, of reducing the circulation at
a time when it had become evidently redundant, to
part with any of it. And there could be no pre-
tence of any difficulty of disposing of it at that
time ; the prices of the public securities were still
high, and annuities, such as the dead weight, were
perfectly marketable. Mr. W. Ward, on being
asked by the committee on the Bank charter, " Do
you consider that annuity a marketable security ?"
answered, " I never knew the long annuity unsale-
able, while perpetuities were saleable ; and the
Bank, or dead weight annuity, is within a few
years of the same term. The long annuities are
not quite so marketable as the consols, and reduced ;
but still the annuities are perfectly marketable, and
indeed they are preferred ; for, when the new
plan came into operation, it rather lowered the
long annuities than raised them, which showed that
the public had given rather more than their just
value for them."
A reduction of the circulation at the close of
1824, to the extent of one or two millions, would
inevitably have tended to prevent some part of the
extravagance of speculation which prevailed during
some months following, and would in so far likewise
one year before the Bank took it. The Bank was reluctant to
take it ; they declined it in the first instance, and took it the
succeeding year." — See also the evidence of J. Baker Richards,
Esq., to the same effect, page 396.
1823—1827- 181
have obviated a great part of the pressure on the
exchanges. The transmission of capital abroad,
in payment of the foreign loans and the mining
projects, would not have been on so large a scale ;
nor would the engagements for importations, to be
forthcoming in 1825, have been ef such magnitude
as they proved to be ; nor would there, conse-
quently, have been the same pressure on the ex-
changes, and a good deal of the subsequent mis-
chief might have been averted. The difference on
such occasions, of the effects of an increase, how-
ever apparently moderate, when the indications,
more especially that of a drain of bullion for export,
point clearly to a reduction, is very much greater
than might be inferred from the mere sums.
* Of the great error committed by the Bank, in
having extended its circulation in the interval, from
the summer and autumn of 1824, to the end of
April, 1825, instead of contracting it, there can, it
is presumed, be no reasonable doubt. But in the
position of difficulty in which the Bank became
involved, by the consequences of that great error,
there was presented to it a choice only of evils.
And it may fairly be questioned whether, in being
passive, or nearly so, as it was, or, in other words,
in preserving the securities nearly uniform, as
was the case in the interval from April till the
autumn of 1825, and allowing the public to operate
on the bullion and deposits, the Bank did not adopt
the lesser evil.
If, upon the discovery of its error, and finding
that the drain was proceeding so rapidly, as to
endanger its establishment, the Bank had, in
May, 1825, taken immediate measures for retracing
its steps by a forcible contraction of the circula-
tion, and a consequent violent pressure on the
money market, the fall of prices of shares, and
foreign loans, which had already begun, and of goods
which was on the eve of taking place, would have
N 3
182 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
been hastened, and the ultimate discredit and de-
rangement of the circulation would have been
precipitated. The main difference would probably
have been that the Bank would not have been run
so nearly to the verge of suspension. But, on the
other hand, the evidently forcible action of the
Bank, before the natural reaction of the specula-
tions had developed itself, would have afforded a
plausible ground for the theory which supposes that
the termination of those speculations was exclusively
owing to a contraction of the Bank issues. Such a
pretence afforded to that theory would of itself be
no small evil. As it is, an attempt has been made,
by an exaggeration of the small contraction which
did take place in the Bank issues in 1825, to place
to the account of that contraction the greater part,
if not the whole, of the recoil of prices of shares and
goods, and the whole of the subsequent derange-
ment of the circulation.
By a forcible contraction on the part of the
Bank is understood to be a reduction of, its securi-
ties, whether public, by forced sales, or private, by
an advance in the rate of discount. How innocent
of such measures, or, in other words, how passive
the Bank was in its management through the sum-
mer of 1 825, will appear by the following statement
of its position on the 31st August, 1825 : —
Circulation. Securities.
Notes of 51. & upwards a£l 9,002,500 Public ^17,414,566
under 51. - - 396,340 Private 7,691,464
19,398,840 25,106,030
Deposits 6,410,560 Bullion 3,634,320
Liabilities - - 25,809,400 Assets 28,740,350
On a comparison of this statement with that of
the position of the Bank in February preceding,
it appears that the deposits had been reduced by
about three millions and a half, which, with the
1853—1827. 183
reduction of the circulation by about a million and
a half, diminished the liabilities by about the same
amount as the diminution of bullion within the
same period, while the securities remained nearly
uniform. There had, in this interval, been no
pressure whatever in the money market ; no refusal
on the part of the Bank to discount at 4 per cent,
any paper coming within its ordinary rules ; no
appearance of general discredit. But it was during
this passive state of the Bank that, in the markets
for shares and foreign loans, a very great and
ruinous depression of prices had taken place j and
in the markets for goods, there was already that
stagnation, resulting from the prospect of large
forthcoming supplies, w7hich usually betokens an
impending fall.
The smallness of the reduction which the circu-
lation had undergone till after the summer of 1825,
will appear by the following statement of the aver-
age amount in each of the three^ first quarters of
that year, namely,
Quarter ending 31st March - - ^21,084?,4«70
30th June 19,837,770
30th September ~ 19,776,360
According to this statement, the reduction was,
throughout the summer, little more than a million,
compared with the quarter ending 31st March,
which embraced the period of the highest specula-
tive mania ; and the average, in the two quarters
ending in June and September, was only by about
half a million less than it had been in the last
quarter of 1824, which was 20,344,970/. But in
the last quarter of 1824, a considerable rise of
prices, and a general spirit of speculation, were
already prevailing ; and, if this last-mentioned
amount was to be considered as sufficient to account
for advancing prices, and a high range of them, an
amount less only by about half a million can hardly
be considered as the cause of a fall. Indeed, it is
N 4
181' PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
quite preposterous to suppose that anything in the
regulation by the Bank of its issues, before October,
1825, can have exercised any influence worth
mentioning in the great adverse turn which, during
the summer preceding, had taken place in the
aspect of commercial affairs. But in October and
November following, there was a reduction of
between two and three millions, compared with the
corresponding spring months, namely, April and
May ; and this diminution, although it was inef-
fectual in stopping the drain, yet, coinciding as it
did with a tendency from other causes to discredit,
and a fall of prices, had, probably, some effect in
increasing that tendency.
There is reason to believe that the drain upon
the Bank after the summer of 1825, as the ex-
changes thenceforward progressively improved, was
mainly for the purpose of supplying to the country
banks, which were then beginning to experience a
severe run, the means of meeting the demand for
gold in exchange for their small notes.* When the
* Mr. J. Horsley Palmer's Evidence before the Committee
on the Bank Charter, 1832, page 22.
" Will you explain in what way the state of the small
note circulation operated so as to interfere in the management
of the Bank ? " " It rendered the Bank liable to a very great
sudden demand ; for instance, in the end of the year 1825 the
demand upon the Bank was nearly two millions and a half ster-
ling, for the support of the country circulation, when the ex-
changes were nearly at par, if not entirely so, and which placed
the Bank in a very peculiar state of difficulty. The whole dif-
ficulty of that period, with regard to bullion, arose from that
demand."
" You conceive the magnitude of that demand was very
much increased by the small note circulation of the country ? "
" I consider the demand was almost entirely to uphold the small
note circulation."
" Will you explain why you are of that opinion ?." " Because
the holders of small notes are the lower orders of the
people, whose fears are more extensively acted upon in times
of distrust; and there having been no exchange for the II. note
but the sovereign, the demand upon the Bank became inevitable."
1823—1827* 185
discredit and alarm arising from the numerous fail-
ures of banking establishments in December, 1825,
were at their height, and when the treasure of the
Bank was on the point of being exhausted *, the di-
* The lowest state of the treasure was on the 24th Dec. 1825.
Coin e£426,000
Bullion 601,000
1,027,000
which is a trifle lower than it had been on the 28th February,
1797, when it was 1,086,170/. But the severest pressure on the
Bank, and the greatest alarm and excitement of the public mind,
were in the week ending the 17th December.
Mr. Richards, who had been deputy governor of the Bank in
1825, in his evidence before the committee on the Bank charter
(1832), page 405, referring to the state of alarm in that week,
1, " Upon that Saturday nig
tually expecting gold on the Monday ; but what was much
added, "Upon that Saturday night (17th Dec.), we were ac-
more important, whether from fatigue, or whether from being
satisfied, the public mind had yielded to circumstances, and the
tide turned at the moment on that Saturday night."
Mr. Richards had been previously asked, " In that week of
great pressure in 1825, did the directors of the Bank apply to
the government for a cash restriction ? " " It was mentioned
to his Majesty's government that we thought we were likely to
be run dry." " What was the answer you received ? " " They
declined it." " Absolutely, or conditionally ? " " Absolutely,
I conceive." " Do you recollect what day that was ?" " I can-
not recollect the day, but it was during that week ending the
17th." " Although government would not by anticipation au-
thorise a restriction, have you any doubt that, if the Bank had
been actually exhausted, the government were prepared by a
legislative measure immediately to authorise a restriction for a
limited period ? " "I mean to say that the government de-
clined absolutely a restriction ; and government never held out
to the Bank, as far as my knowledge goes, any intention of ac-
ceding to it."
" Was the turn which took place in the public mind after the
17th sufficient to save the Bank from being drained, if it had
not been for the fresh arrival on Monday morning ? " " During
the week ending on the 24th there was a demand ; but the sup-
plies that came in fully equalised it, if it did not do more ; and
the confidence had become as nearly as possible perfect by the
evening of the 24th."
With reference to this critical period, a remark by Mr. Hus-
kisson, " that we were within a few hours of a state of barter,"
has often been quoted, as proving the imminence of a general
derangement of all pecuniary transactions and great national
distress as a necessary consequence of a suspension of cash pay-
186 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
rectors adopted the bold and somewhat empirical,
but (as it turned out to be successful) the salutary
measure of enlarging their issues by discounting
freely at 5 per cent, (to which the rate had been re-
cently increased) all mercantile paper that had any
pretensions to security. As the exchanges had, be-
fore this determination of the Bank, taken a decidedly
favourable turn, so as apparently to insure a large
influx of bullion; and as it was a paramount object
to allay the existing alarm, by the substitution of
paper of undoubted credit for so much of the
country notes, which had proved to be insecure ;
the operation was, when all the reasons for it be-
came manifest, justifiable upon grounds of sound
policy. But the precedent is dangerous, as it may
ments by the Bank. The remark in question conveys a very
exaggerated view* of the consequences likely to result from a
suspension, and the " state of barter " must have been a mere
hyperbolical expression. There can be no doubt, judging by
all analogy, that Bank of England notes, and the notes of those
private bankers whose solvency was beyond all question, would
have passed currently, preceded probably by public meetings and
resolutions, declaratory of confidence in such paper ; and the
rapid return, which had already begun, of the precious metals,
would have enabled the Bank to resume cash payments in a very
few months afterwards. But, although " the state of barter " was
an exaggeration, there would have been enough of evil attending a
suspension to make it a matter of congratulation that we escaped
it. It would have been disgraceful to the Bank, and discreditable
to the nation, the Bank of England being considered abroad
as a national institution. But the great evil would have been
in the doubts to which it would have given rise, as to the pos-
sibility of maintaining a convertible state of the paper circulation,
and in the pretence which it would have afforded, for tam-
pering with the currency, to the advocates for a permanently
inconvertible paper money, or, if not to these, to the projectors
of an alteration of the standard, either by direct debasement,
or by the indirect and clumsy, and ineffectual, attempt at the
same object by the substitution of what has been called a double
standard. And, supposing no other evil, the suspension would,
as it entailed no forfeiture of the charter of the Bank, have
come to be considered by it as an innocent measure of relief,
whenever, as the consequence of mismanagement, the treasure
had been suffered to run to exhaustion.
1823—1827- 187
be followed under circumstances which may not
cany with them, as in this instance, their justifica-
tion. It is the more dangerous, from the merit
ascribed to the Bank directors in coming forward,
on so critical an occasion, in support of commercial
credit. But against this merit ought to be set the
blame of having, a twelvemonth before, enlarged,
instead of contracting, the circulation, and of having
thus contributed as much as in them lay to bring
their establishment to the very verge of a suspen-
sion of payment; from which state of jeopardy it
was only rescued by a measure partaking of the
nature of desperation. And the praise which is
often in so exaggerated a manner bestowed upon
that measure, has the tendency to confirm the di-
rectors in a persuasion to which they were previ-
ously too prone, that it is a part of their functions to
promote and uphold the commerce of the country;
whereas, in truth, the trade of the country can
never be in a satisfactory state if it is in any way
made to depend upon the patronage or protection
of the Bank. All that is required, all that can be
desired of the Bank is, that, as a source of the
issue of paper money, it should strictly preserve
its paper in a sound state ; that is, that it should
be regulated in such a way as to preserve under all
circumstances a due proportion of bullion to its lia-
bilities. With a due attention to that point, the
directors might safely leave the trade of the country
to its own resources.
The increased issues by the Bank, in the last
three weeks of December, were to the extent of
between seven and eight millions (including about
800,000/. to 900, OOO/. of small notes), as compared
with the first fortnight : thus in the week ending
3 Dec. - - - ,£17,477,290
10 — - - 18,037,960
17 — - 23,942,810
24 — 25,611,800
31 — 25,709,410
188 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
This enlargement of the circulation of Bank of
England paper was effected by purchases of ex-
chequer bills in the market to the extent of two
or three millions, and by increased discounts of
four or five millions.
On the 28th February, 1826, the following was
the position of the Bank : —
Circulation. Securities.
Notes of 51. & upwards ^£24,092,660 Public ^£20,573,258
under 51. - 1,375,250 Private 12,34-5,322
25,467,910 32,918,580
Dposits 6,935,940 Bullion 2,459,510
Liabilities 32,403,850 Assets 35,378,090
It is perfectly within general recollection (and
it has been seen by the statement at page 157.) that
this great enlargement of the Bank issues had not
the effect of arresting the fall of prices. The reason
too why it had not that effect is generally under-
stood, namely, that it served to fill in part, and in
part only, the vacuum caused by the discredit of
the country bank notes, and of other means of cir-
culation. But it has not been so well recollected,
nor understood, that a similar enlargement in 1810,
which has been represented as an inundation of
paper, causing an advance of prices, and a depre-
ciation of the currency beyond the difference
between paper and gold, was issued under circum-
stances singularly analogous, having been in fact
coincident with a great fall of prices, and a great
failure of private credit.
It may serve to show how quickly credit was
restored if we here refer to the two half-yearly
statements of the position of the Bank following
that which we have just had occasion to remark
upon.
1823—1827- 189
31st August, 1826.
Circulation. Securities.
Notes of 5J.& upwards s£ 20,402, 300 Public s£ 17,71 3,881
under 51. - 1,161,260 Private 7,369,749
21,563,560 25,083,630
Deposits - 7,199,860 Bullion , 6,754,230
Liabilities 28,763,420 Assets 31,837,860
28th February, 1827.
Circulation. Securities.
Notes of 51. & upwards ^21,229,220. Public £\ 8,685,015
under 51. - 661,390 Private 4,844,515
21,890,610 23,529,530
Deposits - - 8,801,660 Bullion 10,159,020
Liabilities 30,692,270 Assets 33,688,550
Thus, with a circulation larger than it had been
at its highest period in 1825, there was, in little
more than twelve months from the nearly com-
plete exhaustion of the coffers of the Bank in
December, 1825, such a state of the exchanges as
raised the treasure to upwards often millions, which,
although the deposits had likewise been increased,
reached to the proportion of one third of the lia-
bilities. And these effects seem to have been pro-
duced in a state as nearly as possible passive on the
part of the Bank. The reduction of the amount
of private securities, combined with the increase of
deposits, proves the entire restoration of credit in
that interval, and forms an additional illustration of
the mode in which the rate of interest operates
upon the position of the Bank.
During the remainder of the epoch under con-
sideration, there was no change of importance.
The securities continued nearly uniform to the
close of 1827, the discounts having been reduced
by upwards of one million, and the public securi-
ties increased by a like amount, and the bullion
continued to be in the proportion of one third of
the liabilities.
190 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 9. — Summary of the preceding Survey.
Upon a review of the period that has passed
under examination, it appears, —
1. That the rise in the price of corn in 1823
was not preceded by any such increase of either
the Bank of England or the country bank circula-
tion, as to justify the assignment of an enlargement
of the issues as the cause of that rise ; and that the
subsequent fluctuations of the price of corn, com-
pared with the variations in the amount of the
circulation, exhibit so striking a discrepancy as is
quite destructive of the alleged connection.
2. That the increase of four millions in the cir-
culation of Bank notes, assumed and alleged to
have been the consequence of the measure pro-
posed by government, and adopted by parliament
in February, 1822, for issuing that amount of ex-
chequer bills, is a pure fiction, involving the gross
error of confounding the creation of a given amount
of securities with an addition of so much money to
the circulation.
3. That the prices of corn did not vary coinci-
dently in point of time, nor proportionately in de-
gree, with the variations in the prices of commo-
dities. A very considerable elevation of the prices
of all provisions, including corn, had taken place
in May and June, 1823, while nearly all other
articles were falling. And again, the prices of corn,
notwithstanding a large admission of foreign grain
for con sumption, were rising in the summer of 1825,
coincidently with a decline which had then com-
menced in most other descriptions of produce.
4. That, instead of ascribing to the circulation
an influence on the price of corn in the interval
between 1822 and 1826, there are strong grounds
for believing that the prices of corn, under the
operation of the corn laws, combined with the
1823—1827- 191
seasons, exercised considerable influence on the
state of the circulation.
5. That the markets for commodities, as contra-
distinguished from the prices of provisions, were
dull and, in some instances, drooping in the spring
and summer of 1824, and did not experience any
considerable or general improvement till an ad-
vanced period of that year, when it was discovered
that the stocks on hand of most articles were
reduced below the average rate of consumption.
6. That the speculations in South American
loans and mines, and in the shares of a very con-
siderable number of other joint-stock companies,
had their origin in the early part of 1824, while
the markets for commodities were dull and droop-
ing, and when, although the circulation of the
Bank had been enlarged, the bullion in its coifers
had increased in a still greater proportion, and
exceeded the amount of any former period ;
whence the conclusion is, that the same tend-
ency to speculation in those loans and shares
would equally have existed if the basis of the
currency had been purely metallic.
7- That one of the predisposing causes of the
speculations in foreign loans and in shares in 1824
had been the fall in the rate of interest, and the
reduction of it upon some of the funds of this
country ; such reduction having excited, among
persons whose incomes were in consequence
diminished, a restless feeling, and a disposition
to hazardous investment.
8. That the Bank of England, by not only main-
taining but extending its circulation after the sum-
mer of 1824, when the state of the exchanges and
the efflux of bullion indicated the propriety of an
opposite course, and by unduly continuing the
facilities of the money market, had extended the
range and duration of the speculations ; thus adding
to the causes which were already in operation to
192 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
depress the exchanges, and consequently to increase
the drain on its coffers.
9. That the extensive failures of country banks,
and of some of the London banking houses, and
the general derangement of the circulation in the
autumn of 1825, were clearly the consequence of
their overtrading by issues of paper, and by ad-
vances on securities, either inadequate or not suffi-
ciently convertible, in an undue proportion to the
capitals possessed by them, and to the deposits in
their hands.
10. That the empirical and hazardous, but suc-
cessful, measure adopted by the Bank, at the close
of 1825, of extending its circulation in the face of
a run which had reduced its treasure to the lowest
ebb, would not have been called for but to coun-
teract the consequences of a previous great error
in the regulation of the issues in the autumn of
1824 and the spring of 1825.
11. That the fall of prices of shares and com-
modities after the summer of 1825 was the effect
of the cessation or abatement of the causes of the
rise, in each particular instance, accelerated and
aggravated by the state of discredit and the de-
rangement of the circulation at the close of that
year.
12. That the prices of provisions, as they had
been little influenced by the spirit of speculation
which raised the markets for other produce, and
the shares in foreign loans and joint-stock com-
panies, so they were little affected by the causes of
reaction which operated on those other markets.
193
CHAPTER IX.
STATE OF PRICES AND OF THE CIRCULATION FROM
THE COMMENCEMENT OF 1828 TO THE CLOSE
OF 1832.
AFTER the violent changes that characterised the
period which has recently passed under consider-
ation, the trade and manufactures of the country
had, in 1827, resumed their usual and steady course
at the reduced prices to which the increased sup-
plies and diminished cost of production had ine-
ivtably led.
The corn trade, and the prices of provisions ge-
nerally, were, in the last chapter, shown to have
been distinctly under the combined influence of the
seasons and the corn laws, and not to have parti-
cipated in the great changes which the state of com-
merce and of credit underwent in the interval from
1823 to 1827-
In the period which is now to come under con-
sideration, we shall have occasion to see, that while
the prices of provisions underwent very consider-
able variations, but were for the most part at a re-
latively high range, the trade and manufactures of
the country, although proceeding in progressive
extension, were, for the most part, undisturbed by
any great fluctuations, the general tendency being
to a decline of prices from causes which will be
separately examined.
The price of provisions will, according to the
order hitherto observed, come first to be considered.
VOL. II. O
194 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 1.— Prices of Corn from 1828 to 1832.
We have seen that, at the close of 1827, the
corn markets had fallen, although not to their lowest
rate, yet to about the prices to which they had on
several former occasions subsided, when not under
the influence of deficiency or superabundance.
The winter of 1827-8 was open and mild, and
the spring following, although occasionally cold and
inclement, was not remarkably so. But there was
a good deal of rain in June 1828, at the critical
time of the blooming of the wheat, and the appear-
ances of the crop were unpromising. Prices had
accordingly experienced a slight improvement as
the season advanced. About the second wTeek in
July, the rains set in heavily, and the weather
continued thenceforward till the middle of August
to be very wet and stormy. The crops in the
home district, and in the great corn-growing coun-
ties, being rather forward, were exposed to great
injury by the prevalence of such weather during
the progress of the harvest, and were in conse-
quence mostly carried in very bad condition. In-
dependently, however, of the condition, the produce
was found to be deficient ; the wheat crop espe-
cially, the grain being coarse and shrivelled, and
consequently light and unproductive : this descrip-
tion applied chiefly to the southern and eastern
counties. As the weather had cleared up in the
third week of August, and thenceforward continued
fine, all the crops in the more northerly districts
were secured in good order, although even in those
the produce was considered to be below an average,
and the quality indifferent. Upon the occurrence
of the fine weather at the end of August,' the
markets receded rapidly ; but when it was ascer-
tained, upon the conclusion of the harvest, that the
yield upon the whole was greatly deficient, the
1828—1832. 195
markets resumed their tendency upwards, and the
average price in November reached *75s. 3d, for
wheat. The ports then became open at the lowest
duty.*
This instance is a specimen among many others
of the little direct influence of the circulation in
counteracting the force of opinion on prices ; for,
as we shall have occasion to see, there was coinci-
dently with this great rise of the price of corn, a
reduction by the Bank of its issues.
The rise and high range of the prices of corn
during this contracted state of the circulation, was
not from the pressure of immediate scarcity, and
consequent urgent demand for consumption, but the
effect of opinion of eventual scarcity. The advance
at that season of the year, namely, in the three
months immediately following the harvest, which,
after the middle of August was secured in perfectly
dry condition, and a great part of the wheats,
therefore, although inferior in quality, were fit for
immediate use, necessarily involved more or less of
speculation ; thus proving that as soon as grounds
existed for entertaining a favourable opinion of the
future course of markets, the circulation, however
contracted, did not prevent a great speculative rise.
The speculation, however, went on the prospect of
a greater rise, and a higher range of prices than
were eventually realised. And the rise would have
been greater, had it not been for circumstances
which were subsequently developed.
1. The surplus of the old stock proved to be
beyond what had been reckoned upon.
2. The crops, though decidedly defective, were
rather less so than had been anticipated, those in
the north having been well secured, and not so
* But, as during the fall of the prices of corn in 1827, the
prices of meat had ranged comparatively high, the advance of
the prices of corn in the autumn of 1828 was accompanied by ti
fall in the prices of meat.
O 2
196 TRICES AND CIRCULATION,
deficient in point of acreable produce as they had
been in the south.
. 3. A great increase of the importation from Ire-
land, for instance :
Wheat. Flour.
1827 - - 307,646 qrs. - - 341,630 cwt.
1828 - - 474,993 - - 621,568
4. A large foreign importation, of which a con-
siderable proportion came from a quarter that had
not at all been looked to as a source of supply,
namely, Spain, which in our former scarcities had
been a competitor with us in purchasing corn in
the north of Europe, and on some occasions re-
quiring supplies from this country. No less than
from 200,000 to 300,000 quarters were received
from thence in the winter of 1828-9-
If it had not been for these unlocked for circum-
stances, but more especially if the harvest had
proved as calamitous as that of 1816, and if the
scarcity had extended, as it did in that year, to the
whole of the Continent of Europe, the prices of
1829 would probably have reached at least the
elevation of those of 1817. In the examination of
Mr. David Hodgson before the Agricultural Com-
mittee of 1833, he is asked, " Do you not conceive
that if any one of the years to which you allude,
from the year 1828 to the present period, had been
of a similar character to that of 1816, the deficiency
which occurred during that period would have been
felt with greater pressure in this country ? " An-
swer, " I should think there cannot be a question
of it."
But the supply, including the quantity of foreign
admitted for home consumption, about 850,000
quarters of wheat, between the harvest of 1828,
and that of 1829, having with the surplus from the
former year proved to be more than sufficient at
the advanced prices, the markets gave way as the
harvest of 1829 approached.
1828—1832. 197
The winter of 1828-9 was colder than the pre-
ceding winter, but was not marked by any character
of severity. The spring following was rather back-
ward, but not remarkably so ; the summer and
autumn, however, were wet and cold, and the
harvest was much protracted by the unsettled
weather which prevailed during the whole progress
of it. The crops, although ill got in, and as the
event proved, deficient in quantity, and inferior in
quality, were hurried to market at the close of
1829, and the averages were in consequence much
depressed, having at the close of the year got down to
55s. per quarter for wheat. This depression of the
corn markets between the close of 1828, and the
winter of 1829-30, to the extent of upwards of 206*.
per quarter on wheat, short as was the duration of
the fall, was, while the depression lasted, felt very se-
verely by the farmers, more especially those of the
heavy clay lands. The produce of these was very de-
ficient in quantity, and very inferior in quality, and
got in at a very heavy expense. And those farmers
who, whether under the influence of necessity, or
of opinion, hurried their corn soon after harvest to
market, were obliged to submit to ruinous sales ; a
large proportion of the wheat so hurried to market
being damp and in bad condition, as well as inferior
in quality, was, at the close of 1829, and through
January and February 1830, sold mostly under 50*.,
while the very small proportion that came to market
in a dry condition, and of good quality, fetched
from 70s. to 75*., and fine foreign was worth 80*.
It was with reference to this short interval of de-
pression of the corn markets, that notice was taken
in the King's speech, delivered by commission, on
the meeting of parliament, 4th February 1830, of
the existence of distress among the agricultural and
manufacturing classes in some parts of the United
Kingdom, in the following terms : —
" His Majesty commands us to inform you that the export
o 3
PRICES AND CIRCULATION",
in the last year of British produce and manufactures has ex-
ceeded that of any former year.
" His Majesty laments, that notwithstanding this indication
of active commerce, distress should prevail among the agricul-
tural and manufacturing classes in some parts of the United
Kingdom. It would be most gratifying to the paternal feelings
of His Majesty to be enabled to propose for your consideration,
measures calculated to remove the difficulties of any portion of
his subjects, and at the same time compatible with the general
and permanent interests of his people. It is from deep solici-
tude for those interests that His Majesty is impressed with the
necessity of acting with extreme caution in reference to this
important subject."
" His Majesty feels assured that you will concur with him in
assigning due weight to the effect of unfavourable seasons, and
to the operation of other causes which are beyond the reach
of legislative control or remedy."
The reference here made to the effect of the
seasons in producing the alleged distress, was ex-
plained by the Duke of Wellington, in reply to
remarks in the House of Lords on the address.
" In considering," he said, " the remedies to be
applied to this state of things, you are to give due
weight to the unfavourable nature of the seasons,
which occasioned enormous expenses in collecting
the harvest, and which has in fact occasioned one
bad harvest, if not another, so that the collection
of it was excessively expensive."
There were, in fact, besides the great inferiority
of quality, two circumstances which prevented
those farmers who brought their crops quickly
to market after the harvest of 1 829 from obtaining
in the price a compensation for the deficiency of
the produce ; and these were first, the admission in
July of that year of a large quantity of foreign
corn, and the other was the enormous expense of
harvesting, which was attended with more inter-
ruption and delay and damage than in any season
since 1816. But these circumstances would not of
themselves have been sufficient to countervail to
the farmers the effect of the deficiency on the
price, had it not been that for some time after the
harvest, opinions and reports were divided as to
1828—1832. 199
the extent of the deficiency, and as the event
proved that the produce of 1828, with the stock
in hand, had been under-estimated, so it should
seem that there had been an opposite error in
over-estimating that of 1829.
The winter of 1829-30 was, although not one
of the most severe, yet of considerable severity,
the most so of any since 1813-14. The deficiency
of the harvest of 1829 became manifest in the
spring following, when the average price rose suf-
ficiently to admit of an entry of about 300,000
quarters of foreign wheat for consumption at a duty
of 20s. 8d. per quarter.
After that partial admission the prices of corn
again rose. The weather during the summer of
1830, although not so wet as the two preceding
summers, was unsettled, and as the harvest ap-
proached, prices rose, insomuch that at the end of
August the averages reached ?2.s'. and the duty fell
to 2s. 8d., at which all the wheat and flour that
was in bond, or had "newly arrived, amounting al-
together to about 1,400,000 quarters, was entered
for home consumption. The large foreign supply
thus admitted just at the time that our own crops
were secured, had the effect of rapidly depressing
the markets, and the average price for the week
ending 22d October, fell to 6ls. 7d. This de-
cline was of very short duration. The crops of
1830 were, at the conclusion of the harvest, esti-
mated to be decidedly below an average. Under
this impression the markets rallied.
In this instance, more strikingly even than in
1828, is the force of opinion in counteracting any
supposed influence of the circulation exhibited.
According to the result of all subsequent informa-
tion, the wheat crop of 1830 was not so deficient
as that of either of the two preceding years, and a
large foreign supply was added to it just as the
harvest was about to be completed. The circula-
o 4
'JOG PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
tion was in a very contracted state at the close of
1830, and continued to be so throughout the spring
of 1831 ; yet in what was considered and complained
of in other branches of industry, as a very cramped
state of the currency, was found to be consistent
with a considerable advance, and high range of the
prices of corn. Thus the average prices of wheat
were, —
22d October, 1830 - - 61s. 7d. per quarter
4th March, 1831 - - 73s. 5d. "
This rise was, as had been the case in the au-
tumn of 1828, but upon more doubtful grounds,
the mere effect of opinion operating at a time
when there could not be actual scarcity, and when,
as regarded the money market, there was the very
reverse of anything like facility of obtaining artifi-
cial means for speculation. There had been, in the
interval, a further reduction of Bank notes, to the
extent of nearly two millions. It was a time, too,
when the small country notes had ceased to circu-
late. And it was, moreover, a period of great
political agitation, connected with the change of
ministry, and with a very excited and disturbed
state of feeling * through the country. All these
were circumstances very adverse, as might be sup-
posed, to speculation ; and yet it was a mere specu-
lative opinion (which, in the result, proved to have
been formed on insufficient grounds) that caused
a rise of 20 per cent, in a few weeks t — a rise
* The disturbances which broke out so alarmingly among
the labourers in some of the agricultural districts, in the autumn
and winter of 1830-1, were greatly aggravated, if not produced,
by the high prices of provisions. The complaints were of the
inadequateness of wages. This, in other words, means the
diminished quantity of necessaries which they could command.
t As a further proof of the little direct influence of the state
of the circulation, administered as ours is, upon the prices of
produce, it may here be observed, that not only did the prices of
corn advance considerably in the spring of 1831, but meat and
wool, which had previously been depressed, rose also very consi-
1828—1832. 201
which was the occasion of admitting, in the spring
of 1831, 1,491>631 quarters of foreign and colonial
wheat and meal into consumption. It was the
admission of this large quantity, which thencefor-
ward, with our own increasing produce, contributed
for some time after to depress the corn markets.
The winter of 1830-31 was very variable : sharp
frosts of a day or two, alternating with rapid thaws ;
very little snow in the southern division of the
island, but heavy falls in the northern. The early
part of the spring was not marked by any par-
ticular feature of inclemency, until the month
of May. On the 6th of that month, after a
succession of very heavy rains, a frost of un-
common severity for the season occurred. The
extensive destruction caused by it, to garden
shrubs and plants, must be within distinct recollec-
tion. And it was supposed, although too early in
the growth to admit of being ascertained, that the
wheats sustained great injury from that cause, which
was developed as they approached to maturity. The
same cause of injury was notconsidered as extending
to the northern division of the island, where the
crops were backwarder. The weather, during the
summer of 1831, was variable, with a preponder-
ance of wet. While the harvest was in progress,
complaints of mildew, and other injury to the
corn crops, became very general. This applied
more especially to Essex, and some others of the
great corn-growing districts ; and the acknowledged
deficiency of the acreable produce in those districts,
led to an opinion, that prices which had been de-
derably. The rise was, doubtless, owing to the effects of a rot
which had prevailed among the sheep, as a consequence of the
preceding wet seasons. But those of the partisans of the cur-
rency theory who consider that this rise was the effect of scarcity,
are bound to give a consistent reason, why the previous low
prices, and more especially in 1822, might not fairly be ascribed
to abundance.
202 I'RICES AND CIRCULATION,
pressed by the large admission of foreign wheat in
the spring, would rally sufficiently to require and
admit a further foreign supply before the following
harvest. But it soon became apparent, that the
surplus of the foreign which had already been
admitted, with the home growth, which (whether
from an extended cultivation, or from the produce
in the western and northern districts having turned
out better than in the eastern and southern, or
what is more probable, from both these causes),
constituted a stock more than sufficient to last till
the ensuing harvest. As the impression to this
effect gained ground, the markets gave way, and
the inferiority of the wheat operated not only
in depressing the averages, but in deterring specu-
lation, the quality being of a description unfit to
hold over, at the risk of coming into competition
with a new crop of better quality. There appears,
accordingly, to have been, at the close of 1831,
sufficient cause for the decline of wheat to an
average price of 60s. 5d.*
The winter of 1 831-2 was open, and the following
spring was neither very forward nor very backward.
In the summer, and at the approach of harvest, the
weather was rather unsettled ; and this, with an im-
pression that the old stock in the country was very
much reduced, gave occasion to a little rally in the
markets in July and August, 1832, which raised
the averages to about 63s. But the weather, from
" the end of July till the last week of August, proved
to be most propitious, and the crops of nearly all
* There had been, coincidently with this decline, a reduction
of the Bank issues, and it is possible that the contraction which
prevailed, more or less, may, as it coincided with a tendency
from other causes, to a decline of the corn markets, have in-
creased or accelerated that tendency ; but it has been observed,
that in 1829, with a circulation less by nearly two millions than
in 1 827, the price of wheat was 40 per cent, higher ; and it will
be seen, that with an increased circulation in 1833, the prices
were lower than in either 1831 or 1832.
203
kinds of grain, but more especially of wheat, were
secured, in good order, in the greater part of the
country to the south of Yorkshire. In the last
week of August, there were very heavy rains,
attended with a warm close atmosphere ; and the
wheats which were exposed to them, suffered con-
siderably. But the injury from this cause was
partial ; and with this exception, the harvest was
well secured, and the yield was reported, upon
the whole, to be abundant. As, therefore, the
previous prices had been those of deficiency, so,
upon the restoration of abundance*, they naturally
* The importations from Ireland had considerably increased,
as compared with the two former years.
Of the abundance of the crop of 1832, as it militates with
the exclusive currency doctrine, some doubts jhave been ex-
pressed by the supporters of that doctrine ; I therefore subjoin
the following extracts of some of the evidence before the Agri-
cultural Committee of 1833.
Mr. Robert Hughes, steward to several gentlemen, and a land
surveyor, speaking of Wiltshire and Berkshire, with which he
was particularly acquainted, is asked, " Do you consider 1831
and 1832 to have been average seasons ? " answers, " 1831 was
a better season, but not so good as the last season." And in
answer to further questions, " I never recollect a more kind
season than the year 1832, for crops of all descriptions ; and in
the southern counties, I never knew a better crop." And
repeats, referring to the last ten years, " Generally speaking, I
never remember a better crop in those counties."
Mr. John Cramp, an occupier of land, at Garlinge, in the Isle
of Thanet, and in the habit of making valuations, says, " The
last harvest was a very good one ; I have known the Isle of
Thanet forty years, and never knew one so good." And to a
further question, by how much the produce of 1832 exceeded
an average harvest in the Isle of Thanet. answers, " I should
say one-fourth part, I may say one-fifth certainly, and I think,
as compared with 1831, the crop of 1832 was nearly in the pro-
portion of two to one."
Mr. William Simpson, farmer and land-valuer, at Doncaster
speaking of stiff lands, and of the crop of 1832, says, " It was
the best crop on the clay soils there has been since 1827, though
they complain very heavily. It would have been a fair crop, if
it could have been well cut, but it was not well got in."
'• Mr. James Comely, a farmer and land-valuer, at Compton,
near Winchester, says, with reference to the crop of 1832,
201 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
fell ; and the average, at the close of December,
1832, was 53s. Id. The circulation of the Bank of
England had undergone no material reduction in
December, 1832, as compared with December,
1831 ; thus,—
Bank Notes. Wheat.
December, 1831 — 16,890,000 60*. 5d.
" 1832—16,511,000 53s. Id.
In France, the prices of the five years which
have been under consideration, underwent nearly
the same variation as in this country, namely, a
rise, in consequence of deficient harvests, in the
four years ending with that of 1831, and a fall, as
the consequence of an abundant harvest in 1832.
But, although each of those four years was marked
with more or less of deficiency in France, as well
as in this country, none of them were of the deso-
lating character of the season of 1816.
The average price of wheat during the five years
ending in 1832, was 63s. 2^-d. per Imperial quarter,
equal to 61.9. °2±d. per Winchester quarter*, not-
" It must be considered that it was an extraordinary crop this
year."
per Imp. qr. per Win. qr.
s. d. s. d.
* 1828 - 60 5 = 58 6
1829 66 3 = 64- 2
1830 64 3 62 3
1831 66 4 := 64 2
1832 58 8 56 10
Average 63 2|- — 61 24
In the very superficial and imperfect view of the corn trade,
taken in the Agricultural Report of the House of Commons in
1833, it is considered as a tribute to the corn bill of 1828, that
the fluctuations of price in the five years following were on a
smaller scale than in any other period of five years since 1797.
And reason good why they should have been so. There had
been a general moderate degree of deficiency in each of the
consecutive years, except the last, viz. 1832, which before the
close of the year had not time to affect the average. And
under that moderate degree of deficiency, we were enabled, in
1828—1832. 205
withstanding that there had in that interval been
an admission of foreign and colonial wheat and
meal for home consumption, to no less an extent
than 5,725,221 quarters.*
consequence of all the ports of Europe (France excepted), and
of America, being open as sources of supply at low freights, to
import in those five years nearly nine millions of foreign grain.
But supposing that this country and Europe generally had been
afflicted with two seasons in succession such as 1794? and 1795,
or 1799 and 1800, or even with a single season such as 1816,
in that interval, and further supposing that the interval had also
included a season of the exuberance of 1813, 1820, or 1834,
what then would have been the boasted steadiness produced by
the corn law of 1828? But still more, if in the first two or
three years of that interval there had been a deficiency of home
growth, to be supplied by an importation from abroad, sub-
ject to at least 44s. of extra war charges, followed by a super-
abundant home growth, coincident with a return of peace, and
a consequent cessation of the extra charges, is there not reason
to conclude that the price under this same corn law might have
varied by the difference between 150s. and 35s? Indeed, if the
author of that report had waited till 1835, he would have found
that a price as low as 35s. was compatible with that corn law,
making, according to the mode of expression adopted in the
table which is inserted at page 12 of that report, a variation
of 100 per cent. And further, if seasons in Europe, such as
occurred at the close of the last and the beginning of the present
century should recur, we should, with our present dense popu-
lation, require a foreign supply of such magnitude as could not
be obtained without a rise to upwards of 100s. And such a
state of things, whenever it shall occur, will form a due com-
mentary, and probably an extinguisher, upon the present system
of corn laws.
* Foreign and Colonial Wheat, and Wheat Meal admitted
for home consumption:
Quarters.
1828 842,050
1829 - 1,364,220
1830 1,701,885
1831 . - - 1,491,631
1832 - - - 325,435
5,725,221
And the total quantities of foreign and colonial grain and
meat admitted in those five years, amounted to no less than
8,894,424 quarters.
206 PRICES AND CIRCULATION7,
There are several points of view, in which, for
the purpose of estimating the effect of the currency
on the price, the state of the corn trade in those five
years becomes a matter of important consideration,
In this interval the small-note circulation in
England had been discontinued, and the whole cir-
culation was considered to be in a contracted state.
The greater part of the interval was characterised
as exhibiting a distressed state, or a dull and stag-
nant state of trade and manufactures, The com-
paratively high range of prices, therefore, could
not be ascribed to increased consumption. The
whole of the commercial world (France only dur-
ing a part of that period excepted), was open for
this country to draw supplies from, at rates of
freight and insurance lower than they had ever
before been. Several countries (Spain more es-
pecially, which had been during the early period
of the war, a competitor with us in drawing sup-
plies from the Baltic, and in the latter years drew
supplies from this country), from whence we had
never before imported any, or only small quantities,
became the sources of unexpectedly large supplies.
The experience of the preceding ten years had
removed the impression that in ordinary seasons
this country, including of course Ireland, did not
grow enough for its own consumption. The farmers
were therefore, independently of all question of
capital or credit, less confident than they had been
of a high range of prices, and consequently less
disposed to withhold their supplies.
If then, under these depressing circumstances,
the average price of wheat was 61,9. %d. per Win-
chester quarter ; it may be worth while to consider
what would have been the addition to that price
if, requiring as we did a foreign supply, this country
had been, with reference to the sources and cost of
an importation, situated as it was in the five years
ending in 1813.
1828 — 1832. 207
The contraction and uncertainty of the sources
of a foreign supply, and the certainty that existed
in 1811 and 1812 that we could not obtain any
mppty at all worth mentioning, do not admit of
being estimated adequately in the price, although
in general terms it must be assumed and allowed
that they would cause a very great rise beyond the
mere excess of the charges of importation inci-
dental to the political obstructions which then
existed.
But, taking into consideration only the additional
charges, constituting an increased cost of produc-
tion, and of importation from such sources as were
alone accessible, of a supply of which we stood in
urgent need, the following is a very moderate com-
putation of those charges :
Difference of exchange, or the difference
between paper and gold, on an average
of the five years from 1809 to 1813, both
years included, 20 per cent, on 606*. - j£0 12
Difference of freight which, with the
licences from foreign governments, was
in some instances as much as 50s. per
quarter, but taking as the lowest of that
period, 25s. per quarter, and deduct there-
from 5s. per quarter as the average of
freights from 1828 to 1832 - £l 0
Difference of premium of insurance between
the peace rate of between 2 and 3 per
cent, on an average, and 20 to 40 per
cent., at which the premiums ranged from
1808 to 1813, but taking only 20 per
cent, on a varying amount, suppose an
average of 60s. per quarter. 0 12
This extra cost (taken at the lowest compu-
tation), incidental to the war, of 44s. per quarter,
208 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
added to 61,9, 2d., would bring the average of
the five years ending in 1832, to 105s. %d.*9
without taking into consideration the further inde-
finite but necessarily very great effect which would
be produced by the uncertainty of obtaining a suf-
ficient supply on any terms. The alarm attending
that uncertainty, does not, as before observed,
admit of a precise measure in price ; but I am
perfectly persuaded that, considering the greatly
increased density of population in the five years
ending in 1832, requiring a foreign supply of nearly
six millions of quarters of wheat, besides other
grain, to make up for the deficiency of our own
crops, if in addition to the effect on prices, of the
extra charges enumerated attending a foreign sup-
ply, there had been the certainty, as there was in
1811 and 1812, that we could not obtain a sufficient
quantity (allowing for the utmost retrenchment of
consumption) on any terms, the average price of
the five years ending in 1832 would have been
decidedly higher than that of the five years ending
in 1813 ; or, conversely, that the price in the five
years ending in 1813, would not, but for the extra
charges, and the uncertainty of any supply, have
been so high as the average prices were in the five
years ending in 1832.
The argument then seems to be complete, as
derived from the price of wheat in the period
* By the alteration in the mode of taking the averages intro-
duced by the corn bill of 1828, it has been computed that,
supposing the state of markets the same, the aggregate returns
are lower by 5*. the quarter than under the former mode. The
returns formerly were confined to corn, the produce of England
and Wales ; they now include Scotch and Irish corn. The
average price therefore of the five years ending in 1832, would,
according to the mode of making returns between 1808 and
1813, be 5s. higher, namely, 665. 2d.
to which adding - - 44s. 0^.
would make the cost, with the war charges - 110.9. 2r7.
1828—1832. 209
which has passed under review, against any in-
ference of increased value of money beyond the
difference between paper and gold, in the five
years ending in 1832, as compared with the five
years ending in 1813. Or, conversely, that in the
five years ending in 1813, the average price of
wheat affords no ground of inference of depreci-
ation beyond the difference between paper and gold.
The ground thus failing of any charge against
the operation of Peel's bill, in the interval between
1827 and 1832, from a reference to the price of
wheat, the impugners of that measure have confined
themselves to observing upon the considerable fall
of prices which occurred in a great majority of other
articles in that interval, in proof, as they allege,
of the still increasing value of money, and accord-
ing to their doctrine, of the increasing pressure,
or, in the peculiar language of their theory, the
greater stringency of the act of 1819.
SECTION 2. — State of Markets for Produce and
Commodities other than Corn from 1828 to 1832.
It will be seen, by a reference to the tables of
prices in the Appendix, that, during the greater
part of this interval, while corn had been rising,
and was at a comparatively high range, the prices
of most other descriptions of produce were falling,
and some of them experienced a lower point of
depression than is observable in any other part of
the period embraced by those tables. The follow-
ing are some of the principal instances of the
greatest depression, and the dates of the lowest
quotations : —
Cotton, bowed Georgia, per Ib. 5\d. to Q\d. in 1828-9
Tobacco, Virginia, 2$d. to 6d. 1831
Coffee, St. Domingo, per cwt. 31s. to 33s. 1829
Sugar, white Havannah — 26s. to 34*. 1831
Indigo, E. India superior — 4s. Wd. to 6s. 1832
VOL. II. P
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
Copper, British, in cakes, per ton. 86/. to 88/. 1831
Iron, British, in pigs, 47. 10s. to 51. 5s. 1832-3
Lead, do. do. -- 127. 10*. 1832
Tin, do in bars, — 73/. 10*. 1828
Many other articles, such as wool, silk, flax, tal-
low, likewise experienced their greatest depression
at different periods in this interval, while corn was
at a high range.*
* An elaborate " Statement of the prices of British staple
articles and colonial produce, showing the rise or fall in the
prices of the respective articles, for each year from 1826 to
1833," has been inserted in the Appendix to the Report of the
Committee of the House of Commons on Agricultural Distress
in 1833, having been delivered into the committee by Mr.
William Moreton Laurence. The prices purport to be the quota-
tions of the first week in January of each year, and a per-centage
of rise or fall is inserted against each article, derived from a com-
parison between the prices of the first week of January 1826, and
the first week of January 1833, sinking the per-centage of all the
intermediate fluctuations. This statement, therefore, as far as
relates to the proposed inference of a considerable fall, extend-
ing to the great majority of articles comprehended in it, is
simply a comparison of the prices at the end of 1825 and the
end of 1832, and is open to the same remark as I had occa-
sion to make on the comparative statements of prices from the
commencement of 1819 to the close of 1822, namely, that the
point of commencement included a great part of the speculative
rise of the period immediately preceding. Thus, in many in-
stances of the quotations of January 1826, the prices were
merely nominal, no actual transactions having taken place for
several weeks ; and if sales had been forced, as they were soon
afterwards, the utmost prices obtainable would not have been
within 20 or 30 per cent, or more below those quotations^
while in other instances the result would have varied greatly,
if the comparison had been made with the intermediate prices.
But this, as all other statements of mere prices, if unaccom-
panied by an explanation of the circumstances affecting the
supply and demand, as also the cost of production of each
article, affords grounds for the most fallacious inferences. And
it was evidently with a view to the most fallacious inference of
a great increase of the value of money from diminished quan-
tity, as contradistinguished from cheapness of commodities by
increased quantity and diminished cost of production, that it
was appended to the report in question. Independently however
of the fallacy of inference from that cause is another very ma-
terial one, namely, that a considerable proportion of the articles
in the list consists of drugs and chemical preparations, as if it
were not a necessary consequence of the improvements of
1828 — 1832.
In the case of every one of the descriptions of
produce which thus fell in price during this interval,
a reference to the brokers' circulars, which as we
approach to recent times are readily accessible, will
show that the quantity on hand, or supposed to be
forthcoming, was larger than any former estimate,
and beyond the previously estimated rate of con-
sumption.
Thus cotton, of which it was supposed, at dif-
ferent stages of its fall for some years before, that
the supply could not be kept up without an advance
of price, continued to increase in quantity, at less
than half of what had been then said to be its
lowest cost of production. The same, although
not in so great a degree, was the case with silk and
flax. Of indigo, the stock on hand had accumu-
lated at the close of 1830 to an extent much beyond
the estimated rate of consumption.
The increase of the supplies of coffee from Java,
Brazil, and St. Domingo, till the close of 1830,
was on such a scale as greatly to outrun the rapidly
increasing consumption of Europe. And if a proof
had been wanting, that the fall was not caused by
the currency, it might be derived from the circum-
stance, that upon an abatement of the rate of supply
relatively to the consumption, the price advanced
50 per cent, in 1830 and 1831, when, as we shall
have occasion to see, the circulation was in a more
contracted state than it had been in the tw^o years
preceding.
The fall in sugar and other colonial produce was
fully accounted for on similar grounds.
Of iron, it is notorious that during the interval
under consideration the extension of furnaces, and
science, that the cost of production of that description of com-
modities should be reduced. And among other articles figuring
in the list, are the different numbers of cotton twist, the fall Of
the price of which is the twofold effect of the reduced cost of
the raw material, and the very greatly reduced cost of manu-
facturing, by the application of improved machinery.
p 2
212 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
the application of increased powers of machinery,
had caused such an augmentation of supply, as had
greatly outrun an increasing rate of consumption.
In the case of lead, tin, and copper, there was
not only an increase in the produce of our own
mines, by the application of increased power and
improved processes, but a competition in the export
trade with foreign sources of supply ; for instance,
lead from Spain, tin from Banca, and copper not only
from Russia, but from South America and Cuba.
Other articles might be enumerated, the fall of
which might be as clearly accounted for ; but these
are sufficient for the purpose of general illustration
in support of the negative of any presumption or
inference to be derived from such fall, of an in-
creased value of money ; meaning, by increased
value of money, a diminution of its quantity, while
commodities are assumed to remain unaltered in
the proportion of supply and demand.
And, independently of other grounds of con-
clusion in the negative of any perceptible influence
from increased value, by diminished quantity of
money, in the fall of prices of so many leading
articles of consumption in this interval, the strongest
possible presumption to the same effect is afforded
by the circumstance that the lowest prices of some
of these articles occurred between 1828 and 1831,
while corn was rising and attained a high range of
prices ; and that the former description of articles
rose, in some instances very considerably, when
corn was falling. It may be said that the cause of
the rise of the prices of corn was a deficiency of
the crops. That is very true, but it is equally true,
and susceptible of proof fully as clear, that in the
case of every one of the articles that fell in price,
there was actual or prospective abundance, or in-
crease of quantity compared with the previous
ordinary rate of supply, and actual or supposed
diminution of the cost of production, to account
for such fall.
1828—1832.
The fall of prices of raw materials, and the still
greater fall of the prices of manufactured articles,
in consequence of the rapid improvements of ma-
chinery, had the effect of greatly extending the
consumption both at home and abroad, and there
was consequently a considerable extension of both
the home and foreign trade, and the revenue was
flourishing. But while the fall of prices was in
progress, the importers, and the manufacturers, and
the mining interests were, in some branches, suf-
fering severely.* And allusion was made, as we
have seen, in the King's speech at the opening of
parliament in February, 1830, to complaints of
distress among the manufacturing classes in some
parts" of the kingdom. There had, at different times
during the fall, been a rally of markets from the
influence of opinion that they had seen their lowest.
Under the influence of this opinion, the importers
and manufacturers were occasionally induced to
extend their stocks ; but fresh supplies, at a re-
duced cost, repeatedly disappointed their expect-
ations, and entailed losses upon their previous
* Among the branches of business that suffered severely in
this interval, was the private East India trade. Early in 1830,
a very extensive failure of one of the principal banking and
mercantile firms of Calcutta occurred, and was followed at in-
tervals of some months by four or five other great establishments,
which had been of long standing, and once possessed of vast
wealth. It was computed that the aggregate of the engage-
ments of the houses that failed at Calcutta between 1830 and
and 1832, amounted to little less than fifteen millions sterling.
In two or three instances their immediate connections in this
country were involved and failed also. But as the principal part
of the engagements of the Cateutta houses was confined to India,
there was not so much of loss or discredit felt here in conse-
quence of those failures, as was to have been apprehended from
the enormous scale of their business. A full account of those
extraordinary failures, and of the circumstances which led to
them, as also much very valuable information respecting the
fluctuations in the private East India trade, will be found in the
evidence of G. G. de H. Larpent, Esq., before the committee of
the House of Commons on manufactures, commerce, and ship-
ping, in 1 833.
p 3
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
purchases. The repetition of disappointments
naturally abated confidence in the maintenance of
markets, and the usual buyers became discouraged
from embarking freely, even at the reduced prices,
by a feeling of distrust, from having been before
mistaken as to the probable sources of supply, and
the lowest possible cost of production.
But as a state of rising markets, and eventually a
high range of them, in consequence of supplies hav-
ing for some length of time fallen short of expect-
ation, or of the estimated rate of consumption, is
usually followed, first by stagnation, and then by re-
verses ; so a long course of falling markets is event-
ually followed by a reduction of stocks, while the
consumption is extended ; and this state of things is
the precursor of improved markets, and of a period
of prosperity in the branches of trade to which the
previous distress from low prices had applied. Ac-
cordingly the fall and low range of prices observable
through a great part of the interval now under
consideration, laid the foundation for the activity
and generally prosperous state which, as we shall
have occasion to see, prevailed among the manu-
facturing, and mining, and trading classes, in the
three years following the present epoch.
SECTION 3. — State of the Circulation from 1828
to 1832.
The circulation, as far as related to the regula-
tion by the Bank of its issues, was, in the interval
now under consideration, in a more equable state
than in any of the preceding epochs (with the
exception of that between 1803 and 1808), not-
withstanding that in this interval the suppression
of the small note country circulation had been ac-
complished. And it should seem therefore that
1828—1832.
215
the substitution of the metals for those small notes
had served only to absorb the gold which had
flowed into the country by the balance of trade,
and which would otherwise have created an incum-
brance of treasure in the Bank of England in 1828,
such as it experienced betwreen 1821 and 1824.
The most considerable of the variations in the
position of the Bank, in this interval, were in the
amount of its treasure. These variations, however,
although considerable, did not approach in extent
to those which occurred in the interval which has
recently passed under review. From February,
1827, to August, 1828, the amount varied only
from 10,159,020/. to 10,498,880/. But in the six
months from February, 1828, to August, 1829,
there was a reduction of bullion to the extent of
upwards of three millions and a half, while the
other elements of the position of the Bank at those
two periods, had undergone a comparatively incon-
siderable variation. The following is a comparative
statement at the two periods : — .
Circulation.
Notesof5/. &upw.
— under 51.
Deposits
Liabilities
Circulation.
Notes of 51. & upw.
— under 51.
Deposits
Liabilities
30 August, 1828.
s£20,975,170
382,340
Securities.
Public a£20,682,776
Private 3,222,754
21,357,510
- 10,201,380
a£31,558,790
23,905,530
Bullion 10,498,880
Assets s£34,404,410
28 February, 1829.
Securities.
^19,514,020 Public ^19,736,665
356,830
19,870,850
9,553,960
^29,424,810
Private 5,648,085
25,384,750
Bullion 6,835,020
Assets ^32,219,770
There appear to have been, independently of the
p 4
216 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
innumerable minute causes which collectively pro-
duce considerable movements of the metals, the
following circumstances which may have operated
in this reduction.
1. The completion of the substitution of a me-
tallic for the small note country circulation, which,
however, after August, 1828, must have been a
very insignificant amount.*
2. The war in the East of Europe, between
Russia and Turkey, which distinctly drew an amount
of about one million from the treasure of the Bank.
Mr. Horsley Palmer, in his evidence before the Bank
Charter Committee in 1832, p. 14., observing upon
a demand upon the coffers of the Bank, although
the exchange was apparently favourable, said,
" There may be a temporary demand, and I may
instance the years 1828 and 1829, as periods when
there was a demand, at a high rate of exchange,
for about a million of gold for the supply of the
Russian army."
3. A considerable pressure on the money market
of the United States in 1828 and 1829, as the con-
sequence of extensive overtrading in 1827«t
* This substitution of coin for the small note circulation pro-
ceeded to its completion apparently without any perceptible
derangement of the circulation, and coincidently with a great
advance in the price of corn.
t It was with reference to the pressure on the money market
in the United States in 1828, that Mr. Biddle, president of the
United States Bank, published some observations in one of the
American newspapers in 1828. After a clear exposition of the
general principles of banking, he adds, " These simple elements
explain the present situation of the country. Its disorder is
overtrading brought on by over-banking. The remedy is to
bank less and to trade less. During the last year, money was
very abundant, that is, the demand for coin being small in pro-
portion, the banks distributed freely their discounts and notes.
This plenty concurred with other causes, especially the expect-
ation of a new tariff, to induce an increased importation of
foreign goods, and at the same time furnish great facility for
procuring them on credit." " The course of business has been
this : A merchant borrows from the banks and sends abroad
1828—1832.
4. An importation of foreign corn, to a consi-
derable extent, in consequence of the deficiency of
the harvest of 1828 in this country.
5. A drain for Ireland, in consequence of dis-
credit by the excitement prevailing in that country,
and a run against the Provincial Bank. The sums
that went for that purpose were supposed, accord-
ing to the evidence of Mr. Palmer (p. 32., Bank
Charter Report), to have amounted to about one
million in 1828.
It is probable that not any one of those causes
would alone have produced any perceptible effect
on the circulation, or in the general position of the
Bank ; but collectively they produced a consider-
able impression, although, as will be seen, they had
not the effect of reducing the Bank treasure much
below seven millions, and that only for a short in-
terval, after which a reflux to the full extent of the
original drain occurred. There was some pressure
100,000 dollars in coin, or he buys bills from one who has ship-
ped the coin. With these he imports a cargo of goods, ob-
taining a long credit for the duties — sends them to auction,
where they are sold, and the auctioneer's notes given for them.
These notes are discounted by the bank, and the merchant is
then put in possession of another 100,000 dollars, which he
again ships ; and thus he proceeds in an endless circle, as long
as the banks, by discounting his notes, enable him to send the
coin, and tempt him to do so by keeping up prices here by
their excessive issues. The banks therefore begin by diminish-
ing or withdrawing these artificial facilities, leaving the persons
directly concerned in this trade to act as they please with their
own funds, but not with the funds of the banks. The imme-
diate consequence is, that the auctioneers can no longer advance
the money for entire cargoes ; that they no longer sell for credit,
but for cash ; that the price of goods falls ; that instead of
being sold in large masses, they are sold slowly, and in small
parcels, so that the importer is not able to remit the proceeds
in large amounts. This diminishes the demand for bills and for
specie to send abroad. In the meantime the importer, finding
the price of his goods fall, imports no more ; and the shipper of
coin, finding less demand for exchange, and that he can make
more of his money by using it at home than by exporting it,
abstains from sending it abroad."
218 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
on the money market, or, in other words, a rise,
although to no inconvenient degree, in the rate of
discounts.
Neither the variation of the treasure of the Bank,
nor the pressure on the money market, in the
twelvemonth following August 1828, would have
been worthy of particular notice, but that, from the
suddenness and the strength of the tide with which
the metals were going out, apprehensions seem to
have been entertained by the directors, and in a
greater degree perhaps by the government, of
a continuance of the drain to an inconvenient
extent. It was on that occasion, accordingly, that
those who were then considered as the highest au-
thorities in money matters, endeavoured to impress
upon the ministers of the day their notions of the
impossibility of maintaining the convertibility of
paper into gold, and to urge the policy of resorting
to that most clumsy of expedients a double standard.
Such was the importunity and the weight of au-
thority of the partisans of the measure, that the
ministers were prevailed upon to institute an en-
quiry into the merits of it, and evidence was taken
upon the subject before the Board of Trade, and
printed. Fortunately, the Bank directors were, I
believe, much to their credit, opposed to the mea-
sure, and proved to the government that, in the
event of their treasure consisting of a greater pro-
portion than usual of silver, that metal, although
not available for direct payment of its notes, might
be made applicable to redressing the exchanges, by
transmission of it against bills, or against purchases
of gold abroad. And, as pending the enquiry, the
exchanges turned, and gold was coming back as
fast as it had gone out, the matter was dropped.
On the 26th June, 1830, the treasure of the
Bank had risen to the very large amount of
11,795,000/. Soon afterwards, however, circum-
stances arose creating a fresh drain, and to a
1828—1832.
219
more considerable extent, insomuch that on the
5th February, 1832, the amount was reduced to
5,088,000/., being a diminution of little short of
seven millions, since June, 1830. Of these circum-
stances the most obvious were,
1. The revolution in France, in 1830, followed
by that of Belgium, and the war between Russia and
Poland, causing a stagnation of trade and great dis-
credit, and thus creating an increased absorption
of the metals on the continent of Europe.
2. A renewed drain for Ireland in 1830, com-
puted by Mr. Palmer, in the evidence already re-
ferred to, at about a million.
3. Renewed importations of foreign corn, of
which there had been a pause during the decline
of prices after the spring of 1829.
4. And chiefly the political disquiet and distrust
which prevailed in this country from the first agi-
tation of the reform question in November, 1830,
to the final passing of the bill in the spring of 1832.
Thenceforward there was a reflux of bullion, al-
though slower than on the preceding occasion, into
the coffers of the Bank, which raised the amount
in the two following years to nearly the sum from
which it had been reduced.
A reference to the position of the Bank, as it
stood in February and August in each year from
1828 to 1832, will be found to exhibit considerable
steadiness in the amount of the circulation, and still
more in the securities, while the fluctuations of the
treasure were as considerable as those which have
been described. In the securities the variations
were very small ; and this steadiness of them under
the great fluctuations of the amount of bullion
afforded a strong prima facie ground for the argu-
ment built upon it by the directors, in favour of the
principle to be observed by the Bank, of preserving
a nearly uniform amount of securities, and leaving
the public to act upon the other elements of its
220 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
position. The circulation too, although not so
uniform as the securities, did not vary in the same
degree with the bullion. And the liabilities, in-
stead of being in the proportion of three to one of
the bullion, were in 1829 more than four to one,
and in 1832 more than five to one.
It is clear therefore that if the Bank had been
active, as it must have been in varying the amount
of its securities, in order to preserve the proportion
of one third of bullion (which has been considered
as the desideratum) to its liabilities, the circulation
must have undergone much more violent changes
than those which occurred during these five years.
And if the business of the issue of notes had been
distinct from other banking operations, and con-
fined to the exchange of paper against gold, and of
gold against paper, so that the amount of the basis
of the currency had varied exactly as it would
have done if purely metallic, then, supposing the
demand for bullion, whether for export or for in-
ternal purposes, to have been as it was, the varia-
tions in the amount of the circulation must have
been very considerable, although not so violent as
it might in some extreme cases be under the rule
of one third of bullion to the liabilities.
The question more immediately bearing upon the
purpose of this work is, how far the money market
and the markets for commodities would have been
differently affected, if the Bank had regulated its
issues strictly by the variations of its treasure, in-
stead of keeping its securities so uniform as it did.
As regards the money market, there can be no
doubt that the variations would have been much
greater than they were. During 1 829, under the very
moderate reduction which occurred in the circula-
tion, the rate of discount for first rate bills rose
from 2^ and 3 per cent, to 4 per cent., which, being
the Bank rate, formed the maximum for that de-
scription of bills ; and there was an increased resort
1828—1832.
accordingly to the Bank for discounts.* For
second class and longer dated bills, as much as
5 per cent, was occasionally required and given.
But the pressure was of very trifling duration, as
well as extent, and was not attended with any
commercial discredit, or the slightest derangement
of the general circulation, notwithstanding the
recent suppression of the country small notes.
The case, I apprehend, would have been very
different if, instead of the Bank being passive,
or nearly so, and holding a rather increased
amount of securities, as it did in 1829, it had for-
cibly reduced them, so as to have made the reduc-
tion of the circulation to correspond with the
reduction of the bullion. Upon the present footing
of the business of the Bank, a forcible reduction
of the securities would entail a withdrawal of de-
posits, and so tend to neutralise the attempt, unless
it were pushed to an extreme length. We will
suppose, therefore, the business of issue to have
been kept distinct from the other business of the
Bank, and that its circulation had been made to vary
exactly with the variations of bullion. There must
in that case have been a reduction of issues to the
extent of nearly two millions below the amount as
it stood in February, 1829. Now, as there was al-
ready some pressure on the money market at that
time, under a contraction so small as that which
had then occurred, the additional pressure from a
* The increase of discounts at the Bank, in the early part of
1829, would have been somewhat greater, had it not been that
the directors, in the exercise of a sort of censorial power which
they assumed, and professed always to act upon, of throwing out
paper, whatever might be the names attached to it, which
appeared to be connected with extensive speculation in any
particular branch of trade, rejected, at the time here alluded
to, all the bills offered for discount that appeared to be at all
connected with transactions on the Corn Exchange. The cir-
cumstance may have added to the causes of stagnation and
decline of the corn markets which then manifested themselves,
but it would otherwise have had no influence.
222 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
further reduction, to the extent of two millions,
might have proved of considerable severity ; and
the transition to an increase of the circulation in
1830, to correspond with an increase of bullion,
to the extent of four millions and a half, would
have been felt in a sudden glut of money seek-
ing employment at a greatly reduced rate of
interest. It is true that, if the reduction of the
circulation had proceeded pari passu with the
drain, the loss of treasure would not have been so
great, and the restoration of it would have been
sooner effected ; but still there can be no doubt
that the variation would, upon a strictly metallic
basis, have been greater than it was under the
actual regulation, and consequently that the fluctu-
ations of the money market would have been greater
than they actually were. The variations in the
amount of bullion between 1830 and 1833, were
on a still larger scale, and would consequently have
entailed a greater variation of the circulation, and
considerably greater fluctuations in the rate of in-
terest than those which occurred.
As relates to the markets for produce, the differ-
ence of regulation of the issues would have entailed,
in the instance of some descriptions, perhaps more
of fluctuation, but little if any difference of the
price on the average of the whole period. If in
the cases of any of the markets for goods, the ten-
dency from other causes was to a rise or fall, any
coincident enlargement or contraction might pos-
sibly, although not certainly, accelerate and increase
that tendency ; but as long as the standard was
preserved, whatever might be the fluctuations, the
point of subsidence and the average price would
be determined by the cost of production, and the
supply compared with the ordinary rate of consump-
tion. It is moreover specially to be kept in view,
as relates to the supposed influence of the currency
upon prices, that during this interval the variations
1828—1832. 223
of the prices of corn were, for the most part, in a
direction exactly opposite to the variations of the
circulation ; but, in as far as whether in its in-
fluence on the money market, or on the markets
for corn and other produce, uniformity, or a
certain equableness in the amount of the circula-
tion, is considered to be desirable, it must be ad-
mitted that the regulation of the Bank issues, in
the five years ending in 1832, presented more uni-
formity than could have been preserved if the notes
had varied as the amount of bullion varied.
SECTION 4. — Summary of the preceding Survey.
The interval that has passed under review, not
having been marked by such great changes in the
rate of interest or in prices, or in the state of
credit, and in the general circulation as character-
ised the former epochs, presents fewer prominent
points to be borne in mind. Those which it is
most desirable to keep in view, with reference to
the conclusions to be drawn as to the influence of
the currency, are,
1. That after the cessation of the circulation of
the country small notes, and during a contracted
state of the currency, the price of wheat was, on
the average of five years, ending in 1832, 61*. Qd.
the Winchester quarter, which price, adding only,
at a very moderate computation, the extra charges
which formed the condition of a foreign supply in
the interval from 1808 to 1813, namely, 44s. per
quarter, would render the average of the more
recent period, if the same political obstructions
had existed, equal to that of the last five years of
the war. And if there were superadded in the
five years ending in 1832, the apprehension which
prevailed, and indeed was realised in 1811 and
224 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
1812, of not receiving any foreign Supply at all,
there is every reason to believe that, in the more
recent instance, the prices would have been con-
siderably higher than in the closing years of the
war.
2. That the prices of imported raw materials,
and of the mining products of this country, were
mostly falling during the period under review, but
that in every instance the circumstances affecting
the cost of production, and the supply compared
with the ordinary rate of consumption, were suffi-
cient to account for the fall.
3. That in this, as in some of the former inter-
vals, the circumstance of the opposite tendencies
of the markets for provisions, to those for other
produce, is decisive against the hypothesis of the
influence of a single cause, such as that of the cur-
rency.
4. That with reference to the regulation of the
Bank issues in this interval, there were consider-
able variations in the amount of bullion, while the
securities were preserved in a considerable degree
of uniformity, and the circulation varied much less
in proportion than the treasure.
1833—1837. 225
CHAPTER X.
STATE OF PRICES AND OF THE CIRCULATION, FROM
THE COMMENCEMENT OF 1833 TO THE CLOSE
OF 1837-
IN the period which we are now about to enter upon,
and which will bring to a close the historical sketch
of prices and of the circulation which it has been
the purpose of this work to exhibit, the fluctuations
of markets, and of the circulation, and of the state
of credit, although not so striking as those which
occurred in some of the preceding periods, have
been attended with circumstances of no ordinary
interest, and have opened fresh grounds of contro-
versy on the long agitated topic of the regulation
of the currency.
We have seen in the interval which has just
passed under review, that, during the greater part
of it, while corn had been rising and had ranged at
prices which, allowing only for the difference of
the charges of importation, were as high as the
average prices of the five years from 1808 to 1813,
most other descriptions of produce had been falling,
and were at an extreme, and in some instances an
unprecedented, degree of depression. We shall
now have to see that while, in the three first years
of the epoch which we are entering upon, the prices
of wheat fell progressively, and experienced a de-
gree of depression below any that is recorded within
the last sixty years, the prices of most other de-
scriptions of produce were rising. The variations
in the markets for these different descriptions of
produce in the two last years, namely, 1836 and
VOL. II. Q
226 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
1837, have been more irregular, but not less sus-
ceptible of being accounted for on grounds distinct
from the currency theory. The explanation, how-
ever, will in each case be more conveniently and
clearly afforded by a subdivision of the interval
under examination into two periods, the one em-
bracing the fall of the price of wheat from the
close of 1832 to the close of 183,5, and the coin-
cident rise of the prices of other descriptions of
produce ; and the other, and the closing period
of the present sketch, will exhibit the variation of
markets, connected, among other causes, with the
recent derangement of credit in the commercial
intercourse between this country and the United
States of America.
SECTION 1. — Fall of the Price of Wlieatfrom the
Harvest of 1832 to the Close of 1835.
We have had occasion, in the review of the last
epoch, to observe, that the produce of the harvest
of 1832 was found to be generally abundant, and
that from the completion of that harvest till the
close of the year there had been a considerable fall
of the prices of corn. The prices of other de-
scriptions of food had likewise fallen. This transi-
tion from the comparatively high range of the
prices which had prevailed during the preceding
four years, to a state of relative cheapness of pro-
visions, while it greatly improved the condition of
the bulk of the community, gave rise, as usual on
such occasions, to complaints of agricultural distress.
In the speech from the throne, on the opening
of the session of 1833, the distressed state of agri-
culture formed one of the topics recommended to
the consideration of parliament. A select committee
of the House of Commons was in consequence ap-
pointed to inquire into the state of agriculture. In
the examinations by that committee a question to
1833—1837. 227
the following effect was put to nearly all the wit-
nesses, who, as occupiers, or surveyors, or land
agents, were supposed to be competent judges :
" Speaking of the district you are best acquainted
with, should you say that the cultivation was sta-
tionary, was improving, or going back, on a com-
parison of the last ten or twenty years?" The
answers, with very few exceptions, were to the
effect, that the cultivation of the inferior soils and
heavy clay lands was in a state of progressive -de-
terioration ; and some of the witnesses stated, that
the gross produce of such lands had undergone a
diminution to the extent of from one fifth to one
fourth. One or two instances indeed were men-
tioned, in which the cultivation in certain parishes
had been wholly abandoned. It was upon such
evidence that the committee in their report stated
as follows : — " The committee of 1821 assumed,
what they believed to be then true, ' that the
annual produce of corn, the growth of the United
Kingdom, was, upon an average crop, about equal
to the annual consumption.' Your committee,
on the contrary, is satisfied, by the strongest con-
current testimony from different parts of Great
Britain, that the occupiers of the inferior soils,
especially of heavy clay land, have of late expended
less capital and labour in their cultivation. This
neglect, arising from low profit, and prices inade-
quate to the cost of production, combined with a
series of wet seasons, peculiarly disadvantageous
to land of this description, has caused a diminution
in the gross amount of produce ; and the discon-
tinuance of the use of artificial manures, together
with a system of overcropping, has impaired the
productive power of these inferior soils ; and in
some cases, where the poor rate is heavy, their
cultivation has been entirely abandoned."
The above passage would lead to the inference,
that the wet seasons were only accessaries, and that
Q 2
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
there were more permanent causes in operation
tending to diminish the annual produce.
The committee, after quoting Mr. Jacob's evi-
dence *, as a ground for the supposition that the
stock of wheat on hand at the commencement of
harvest was very low compared with what it had
formerly been, proceed to observe, " On this
branch of the subject, after the most full enquiry,
and the most careful examination of the evidence,
your committee have formed a decided opinion,
that the stocks of home-grown wheat in the hands
of the farmer and of the dealer, at the time of
harvest, have gradually diminished ; that the pro-
duce of Great Britain is, in the average of years,
unequal to the consumption ; that the increased
supply from Ireland does not cover the deficiency ;
and that, in the present state of agriculture, the
United Kingdom is, in years of ordinary produc-
tion, partially dependent on the supply of wheat
from foreign countries."
How far these conclusions have been borne out
by subsequent experience and evidence of facts,
will be seen hereafter. There is one point, how-
ever, which the whole tenor of the evidence be-
fore the committee of 1833 tended to establish
beyond doubt, and that is the improved condition
* "Do you conceive, taking the dealers — from the great dealers
in seaport towns to the small dealers in market towns — there is
a lessening in the stocks such persons hold? " " Certainly, of
English wheat." " Can you state in what proportion to the
time the stocks were considered high ? " "I did suppose at
one time, when we had a harvest in 1816 which was so very
deficient, we had then six months' consumption (about six mil-
lions of quarters) in the country. I do not think there has
been a month's consumption in the country at the time of harvest
since 1829." " Can you form any opinion of what was the cause
of the reduced stock in the hands of the farmers ? " "I sup-
pose in some measure the reduction of capital ; they have been
paying a great deal of rent out of their capital." — Evidence
of William Jacob, Esq., Report of Agricultural Committee,
1833, p. 6.
1833—1837. 229
of the agricultural labourer ; the fact is thus no-
ticed in the report : — " Amidst the numerous diffi-
culties to which the agriculture in this country is
exposed, and amidst the distress which unhappily
exists, it is a consolation to your committee to find
that the general condition of the agricultural la-
bourer in full employment is better now than at
any former period ; his money wages giving him a
greater command over the necessaries and conve-
niences of life."
There can be the less hesitation in assuming
that this conclusion has been most completely esta-
blished by that evidence, because it came out in
defiance of the most persevering cross-examination
of witnesses, whose habitual bias accorded with
that of the examiners in favour of the theory that
the condition of the agricultural labourer is im-
proved by high prices of corn. And this admission
by the committee is the more remarkable, inasmuch
as the inference that would inevitably flow from it
is essentially at variance with that passage already
quoted of the report, wherein the committee state,
that they are " satisfied by the strongest concurrent
testimony from different parts of Great Britain,
that the occupiers of the inferior, especially of
heavy clay, land, have of late expended less capital
and labour in their cultivation."
The promulgation by that report of opinions so
confident, founded on information so extensive,
and apparently upon testimony to be relied upon,
of a deteriorated and diminished cultivation of the
land, and of the insufficiency of our own growth to
supply the annual consumption, had the effect,
combined with other circumstances, of arresting
the fall, and, for a short time, of somewhat improv-
ing the corn markets in the spring and summer of
1833.
The winter of 1832-3 had been open and wet.
The spring, likewise, of 1833, with an interval of
Q 3
230 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
about a fortnight of dry weather in March, was
wet ; more especially throughout the month of
April, and until the first two or three days of May,
1833, when it became fair, and so continued
through the greater part of May and June. The
proportion of brilliantly fine and hot days in those
months was very unusual for this climate. The
weather was so forcing and parching as to stunt the
growth of the spring corn, and to excite some
apprehension for the wheats.*
The latter half of June and the whole of July were
attended with seasonable showers. But on every oc-
casion of rain there was an impression of the danger
of a wet season succeeding to the extreme drought ;
and this impression, combined with reports, at the
approach of harvest, of thinness of the plant of
wheat, combined, also, with the opinions promul-
gated by the agricultural committee, had the
effect of sustaining, and in some instances raising,
the price of wheat ; while, as it was clear that the
spring crops were deriving great benefit, with little
comparative risk, from the rain, the prices of spring
corn fell. Thus, on the 26th of July, the average
prices were —
s. d.
Wheat 56 4
Barley 25 11
Oats 19 2
On the 15th of November, when the harvest
had been secured, the prices were —
* It may be worth here noticing that, on the llth June of
that year, there sprung up suddenly a westerly gale of wind,
amounting for a few hours, in the middle of the day, to a hur-
ricane, which had an extraordinary withering effect on all vege-
tation that was directly exposed to it. The leaves of the trees,
which had received the full force of the wind, looked literally
scorched. The flag of the wheats, then coming into bloom,
was discoloured by the blast, in the district to which it extended;
and it was apprehended by some persons that the grain must
have sustained injury from that cause ; but the apprehension
proved to be Unfounded.
1833—1837.
*. d.
Wheat 51 4
Barley - - 31 2
Oats - - 19 9
The wheat crops, although they were, from the
dry and sometimes parching character of the sum-
mer, rather thin on the ground, were found to
yield well ; and the whole of them having been
secured in good order, the markets became abun-
dantly supplied, and prices continued to fall to the
close of the year.
The winter following, viz. 1833-4, proving to be,
equally with the preceding winter, mild and open,
so as to spare the consumption of dry food, spring
corn fell more considerably than wheat. But
thenceforward, barley and oats, and peas and
beans, advanced, while wheat continued to decline.
After a mild winter, rather wet, but with little or
no snow, the spring of 1834, with the exception of
the month of April, which was cold, proved to be
forward ; and the months of May and June were,
as in the former year, brilliantly fine for the greater
part, accompanied by a high temperature. On
the light and burning soils, the spring crops suf-
fered again considerably from the dry weather.
This was relieved in some degree, however, by the
occasional showers which fell in the latter part of
June and during the subsequent part of the season,
so as to refresh and repair the spring crops, and to
give bulk to the wheat, preserving, however, the
character of a dry season. The weather for the
harvest was generally fine, and, with the excep-
tion of a district within about 20 or 30 miles of
London*, all the crops were secured in good
* On the 30th July, 1834, there was in London, and in the
direction from thence westward into Berkshire, a very heavy
rain, with a still and close atmosphere, and a high temperature,
the thermometer at 80. This description of weather, within the
extent to which it reached, namely, about thirty miles, and for
the time during which it lasted, fortunately not very long, in-
Q 4
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
order; proving the harvest of that year to have been,
upon the whole, one of the most productive upon
record.
After the conclusion of the harvest of 1834,
there not being a dissentient report, either as to
the bulk on the ground, or the great yield of the
wheat harvest, there being also still a good deal of
the old stock on hand, the markets naturally declined
thenceforward, and at the close of the year the
average price was 40s. 6d. But spring corn and
pulse, though they had recovered greatly from the
drought of the early part of the summer, main-
tained a higher relative range, the average at the
corresponding time being —
s. d.
for Barley - 31 1
Oats 22 0
Beans - - 37 1
Peas - - 4-19
The winter of 1834-5 was as open, and as much
marked by an absence of snow, as the three pre-
ceding winters. There was a good deal of rain in
March, but upon the whole, the spring of 1835
was favourable, both to farming operations and to
the progress of vegetation, but more especially of
the wheat crops ; and the early summer, that is
until the last week of June, was brilliantly fine.
The spring crops had again suffered, though not in
a severe degree, from want of rain ; but the wheats
had mostly passed their blooming, and were of
extraordinary bulk and luxuriance, and promised to
equal, if not to surpass, the crop of 1834. But in
the last few days of June, there came on very heavy
rains, accompanied by high winds, which laid the
crops more extensively than perhaps was ever
jured the condition of the wheat that came within its range
very considerably, without however materially affecting the
bulk, which was universally great.
1833—1837- 233
known to have occurred in the same space of time.
Fortunately, after three or four days' duration, this
inclement weather was succeeded by bright days
and brisk breezes, which prevented further damage.
But, from the great bulk and talness of the straw,
very few of the fields so laid ever recovered their
upright position, and the ears consequently ripening
near the ground, did not fill so well as they other-
wise would have done. It was from this cause
chiefly, that the crop of 1835, although the bulk
of straw was almost beyond precedent, and the
weather, after the end of June, was the most pro-
pitious possible for the ripening and securing of
the harvest, was decidedly inferior upon the whole
in yield to that of the preceding year, at the same
time little, if at all, short of an average. On this
point, the greater part of the witnesses before the
agricultural committee are agreed. Some few,
indeed, state their crop of wheat in 1835 to have
surpassed that of 1834 ; and this is not improbable,
of such as escaped the effects of the heavy rains
at the end of June. The crops throughout the
kingdom were secured in the best possible order,
and fit for immediate use ; and coming thus early
to market, they entailed a ruinous competition with
the old wheats, of which the stock was unusually
large, and in respect of which the holders began to
despair of benefit by keeping any longer. Under
these circumstances the markets naturally declined ;
and nothing can more clearly shew the strength of
capital still remaining among the farmers* than that
the pressure, and the consequent decline of prices,
were not greater than they proved to be.
* That much farming capital has been lost by the pertinacity
with which in many instances rents, calculated upon long periods
of dearth, were maintained after the return of abundance, and
its necessary consequence, cheapness, cannot admit of any rea-
sonable doubt. But the most gross exaggeration has prevailed
in representing the farmers as being very generally in a greatly
impoverished state. That many are so, where rents continue to
234 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
The lowest point of depression was in the last
week of December, 1835, and the first of January,
1836, when the average price of wheat was 36s.
for the imperial quarter, equal to 34s. lid. for the
Winchester quarter. This great depression of the
price of wheat gave rise to fresh complaints of agri-
cultural distress, and select committees were appoint-
ed, respectively by the Lords and Commons, early in
the session of 1836, to enquire into the nature and
causes of the alleged distress. The tenor of the in-
formation elicited by these committees was little cal-
culated to bear out the views of the persons who had
moved for them. The consequence was, that no re-
port could be agreed upon by either house ; and the
evidence only was laid upon the table of each
house, and eventually published. It seems, how-
ever, that the chairman of the Commons' committee
had prepared a report, which, not being palatable
to the promoters of the ultra-agricultural claims,
was negatived. The intended report subsequently
appeared in the form of a letter from Mr. C. Shaw
Lefevre to his constituents. It contains a very
lucid and impartial exposition of the conclusions to
be derived from the examinations by the committee.
Mr. Hutt, late M. P. for Hull, has also published a
compendium of the evidence, with a few judicious
introductory observations. To these publications,
such of my readers as may feel an interest in the
subject, but may not have the courage to wade
through the voluminous mass of evidence consti-
tuting the reports, are referred for an epitome of
the most unquestionable proofs, in refutation of
the opinions promulgated by the agricultural com-
be strained, may easily be supposed; but that they are generally
so may fairly be doubted, seeing the state of improved and im-
proving cultivation ; but more especially may it be questioned,
upon the single fact of the very large stocks of wheat held over
of the crop of 1834.
1833—1837. 235
mittee of 1833, of the deteriorated cultivation of
the land, and the consequent diminution of produce.
The whole tenor of the evidence, indeed, not only
negatives the decline, but establishes the improve-
ment and extension of cultivation, and the increase
of produce ; and it further proves, beyond dispute,
the gratifying fact, that the condition of the agri-
cultural labourer had been greatly improved, coin-
cidently with the further fall in the prices of neces-
saries, his money wages not having been reduced
in the same proportion.
The evidence, as to the deficiency of the produce
of wheat, in the seasons of 1828, 1829, 1830, and
1831, has already been stated ; and it is not only
admitted by the partisans of depreciation, but there
is, throughout the examination by the committees
on agriculture, a disposition to exaggerate the defi-
ciency, in order to bring out the conclusion that,
while the scarcity arising from the seasons is suffi-
cient to account for the comparative elevation of
prices in those years, in spite of the continued de-
pressing force of the currency, there has been no
such abundance of the produce of wheat in the
four succeeding seasons, as to account for the sub-
sequent fall of prices, except in a small degree,
otherwise than by a reference to the operations of
Peel's bill. It was very well put in the Lords'
committee on agriculture, in a question to one of
the witnesses, who considered the fall of prices to
be mainly caused by the currency: "Whenever
there happens to be a rise, you look out for some
justification in the state of the harvest ; and when-
ever there is a fall, you look out for some justifica-
tion in the state of the currency, abandoning any
argument to be drawn from wet harvests, or the
operation of the weather ? " *
* See evidence of E. S. Cayley, Esq. M. P. before the Lords'
committee on agriculture, 1836, p. 279.
236 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
The evidence contained in both the Lords' and
Commons' committees on agriculture, in 1836, as
to the fact that the four seasons ending in 1835
were, as a series, extraordinary in their produce of
wheat, is so full, and given by farmers, and survey-
ors, and corn -dealers, who were all interested in
obtaining accurate information, and most compe-
tent to form a just conclusion, as to leave hardly
the pretence for a doubt on the mind of any person
who will be at the trouble of examining it.
I will instance only the following as specimens,
taken from among the most eminently practical of
the witnesses, from different parts of the country: —
Mr. John Ellman, Glynde, near Lewes, Sussex, (one of the
most extensive, experienced, and intelligent farmers of the day,)
examined. " Has there been a great increase in the produce
of wheat in your neighbourhood in the last three years ? "
" Upon the clay lands the produce has been most extraordinary."
" Is it owing to a greater quantity being sown with wheat, or
owing to the increased fertility of the soil, in consequence of
favourable seasons ? " " Owing to the dry weather, which is
always favourable to the growth of wheat in those particular
soils." " Has the wheat been of better quality than in previous
years? ' " Much better.'' " And consequently it would pro-
duce a larger quantity of flower ? " " Yes." " Do you think
that the increased production of wheat, and the increased weight
of the wheat from its better quality, would be sufficient to ac-
count in any way for the low price of wheat at present ? " "I
think so, certainly." " Should you say there has been any de-
crease in the consumption of wheat? " " I do not think that
there has in our neighbourhood ; on the contrary I think the
consumption has increased." <( Do you consider the general
increase of which you speak is equivalent to the great fall of
price between 1833 and 1835?" "1 have no doubt of it."
" When you speak of the extraordinary crops, you speak of
other people's land, not your own ? " " It does not apply so
much to the light soils as to the clay soils in our county."
" What do you consider to have been the increase in the average
yield upon the clay soils in your county ? " " I consider upon
those clay soils twenty bushels an acre to be the average in
general, and I think for the last year they averaged at least
thirty." " You consider there was an increase of ten bushels
an acre?" " At least that."
Mr. John Ellis, Beaumont Lays, near Leicester, with re-
ference to the crops of the three years ending 1835, said, " I
1833—1837. 237
never knew three years together so abundant since I have been
a farmer, and I have been a farmer twenty-five years." " Is it
to the great productiveness of the crop that you mainly ascribe
the low prices of wheat? " " It is to the great productiveness
of the crop, and to the great increase of quantities sown the
last three years."
Mr. James Fison, Thetford, Norfolk, maltster, corn and seed
merchant, examined. « Have the crops of wheat the last three
years been greater than average crops ? " " Decidedly so. I
am inclined to estimate the crops of wheat of the last three
years at nearly equal to four average years, taking into consi-
deration all circumstances in connection with the crop ; for in-
stance, the great increase in the number of acres sown ; secondly,
the great increase of the produce per acre ; and, thirdly, the
superior quality of the grain.
Mr. Robert Hope, at Fanton Barnes, near Haddington, occu-
pier of 520 Scotch, or about 650 English acres. " What has
been the state of your crops the last three or four years ? "
" We have had very good crops the last four years ? " " Good
crops of wheat, or of every description ? " " Generally speak-
ing, all the crops have been good ; but of the wheat every crop
the last four years has been fully above an average crop."
" When did you take this farm?" " I succeeded my father. I
have been there since I was very young ; since the year 1801."
" Then you can say confidently that the crops of the last four
years have been considerably more than the average of the pre-
ceding years ? " " Decidedly superior." " Can you state what
was the average of the three preceding years ? " " The last
four years my wheat crop has averaged 607 quarters, exclusive
of the seed; it is about 657 quarters of wheat, upon 145 Scotch
acres, that is, upon 175 English acres." " What was the aver-
age of the four years preceding ? " " For the four years, 1828,
1829, 1830, and 1831, my wheat averaged, upon the same quan-
tity of land, about 385 quarters." " Has that very considerable
increase beyond the average arisen from the favourable nature of
the seasons, or from the improvement of the farm ? " " Chiefly
from the favourable seasons ; the improvement has had its effect
in a small degree, but chiefly from the favourable seasons for the
growth of wheat."
That, however, which, independent of the evi-
dence as to seasons, may be considered quite
decisive of the fact of superabundance of the
produce of wheat, is the circumstance that, not
only did the yield of it suffice for the consumption
of the country, without the aid of a foreign supply
beyond the insignificant quantity which was entered
for consumption, at a high duty, in 1832, but that
238 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
it left a very large, an unusually large surplus, at
the harvest of 1836. Now, it has been a received
opinion, sanctioned as we have seen by the report
of the agricultural committee of 1833, that in aver-
age seasons we did not grow enough for our own
consumption ; and many persons acted upon that
opinion, farmers as well as importers, who took for
granted that two, or at the utmost three, and cer-
tainly not four years could elapse, without the
necessity of a foreign supply, which necessity could
not be felt without raising the price above 60s.
It required, therefore, according to the received
computations, a series of more than average crops,
to have carried us on to the harvest of 1836, without
any surplus. But we had a large surplus, the
proof of which is not only in the evidence before
the agricultural committee of the House of Com-
mons, which is not indeed precise or conclusive,
but in the decisive fact, that the new wheat of the
crop of 1836 having been in great part in damp
condition, and unfit for use without a large admix-
ture of old, the markets were largely supplied,
those in the north almost wholly so, during some
months after the harvest of 1836, by wheats of the
three preceding harvests. And this great surplus
remained, not after a consumption diminished, as
has on some former and somewhat similar occa-
sions been asserted, by a stagnant or declining state
of trade, or by a general state of distress, but
after a consumption which is acknowledged to have
been upon a scale of extraordinary magnitude.
The consumption of wheat in 1835 was not only
on an increased scale for human food, in conse-
quence of the more general employment, at full
wages, of the population, more especially of the
manufacturing population, and in consequence also
of the comparatively high price of potatoes, and of
oatmeal, and barley meal, and of animal food ; but
it was likewise greatly increased, by having served
1833—1837. 239
for cattle feeding and pig feeding, and for malting
and distilling. All this enormous extra consump-
tion told so little in abatement of the excess of
supply, that the pressure on the markets, and the
fall of prices, were not arrested till grounds of doubt
arose, not as to the magnitude of the existing stock,
but as to the prospects of the ensuing season. The
extra consumption of wheat, so notorious in 1834
and 1835, was in part occasioned by some degree
of deficiency of the crops of barley and oats, and
beans and peas ; and among the amusing exhibi-
tions of reasoning in the examinations by the
agricultural committees, not the least so is the
constant attempt to shew that the relatively high
prices of barley and oats were the effects of defi-
ciency of produce, and not of sufficiency of cur-
rency, while the low price of wheat was not the
effect of a more than sufficient produce, but of a less
than sufficient currency. No doubt the spring
crops were more or less deficient ; and if it had not
been for the superabundance of wheat, which was
so largely substituted in consumption for them, the
prices of spring corn would have been still higher.
As, on the other hand, had it not been for the
deficiency of the spring crops, the price of wheat,
low as it was, would have been still lower. It is,
moreover, to be observed, that the casual deficiency,
and relatively high price of spring corn, not only
increased the consumption of wheat, and so far
improved the value of it, but it had the effect of
inducing, at the close of 1835, a diminished sowing
of wheat to be substituted by an extended breadth
allotted to barley and oats, the impression of which
diminished sowing of wheat was the first occasion
of the tendency to an advance of price at the com-
mencement of 1836.
Of the great fall in the price of wheat, it has
thus been seen how fully the whole is accounted
for by the excess of supply, relatively to a greatly
240 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
increased consumption ; while there exists a com-
plete negative of the perfectly gratuitous hypothe-
sis of an action of the currency, in causing that
depression, or any part of it. For, as to the
amount of the circulation, the Bank issues under-
went hardly any perceptible alteration between the
close of 1831 and that of 1835, while the circula-
tion of the joint-stock banks was greatly increased,
coincidently with the continued fall in the price of
wheat, of nearly 20s. the quarter, from the close of
December, 1832, till February, 1836; and it will
be seen, that coincidently with the great fall which
has here been noticed in the price of wheat, to the
close of 1835, there had been a great and progressive
extension of trade and manufactures, and a rise
in the price of several descriptions of produce, of
which the consumption had outrun the supply,
large as that had been.
SECTION 2. — State of Trade and Manufactures,
and Prices of Commodities, from the Commence-
ment of 1833 to the Close of 1 835.
In the closing remarks on the state of markets
and prices (exclusive of those of corn), at the ter-
mination of the last epoch, occasion was taken to
observe, that after a period of some continuance of
declining prices, the final subsidence was usually
the precursor of a sound and healthy, and generally
progressive, state of improvement. This remark is
exemplified in a striking manner, by a view of the
state of things at the commencement of the
period now under consideration. The means of
exhibiting this view in the clearest and fullest light,
is afforded by the unwearied efforts of the partisans
of the currency doctrine, to bring before the public
what they conceive to be the proofs and illustra-
tions of their theory.
1833—1837- 241
A committee of the House of Commons had
been, as we have already had occasion to ob-
serve, appointed early in the session of 1833, to
enquire into the causes, with a view to the remedy,
of the alleged agricultural distress. And as the
allegations of distress and the claims for a remedy,
were founded on the circumstance of a consider-
able fall of the prices of corn within only the
preceding six months, after a comparatively high
range during the preceding four years, a prima
facie case clearly existed in a still greater degree
for the allegation of distress among the trading,
manufacturing, and mining and shipping interests,
and for the consequent claims of those interests
to the attention and assistance of parliament. In
all these great branches of industry, the fall of
prices had been much greater, and of much longer
continuance ; indeed, in most of them, the fall
had been in full progress while the prices of
corn had been rising ; and there were necessarily
individual cases of great loss, and consequent dis-
tress, among some of the producers and holders of
the articles which had experienced so great a fall.
There was, therefore, an unanswerable argument,
furnished by the concession of a committee to con-
sider of agricultural distress, for the appointment
also of a committee to enquire into the state of
manufactures, commerce, and shipping ; and a se-
lect committee was accordingly appointed for that
purpose, on the 3d May, 1833.
Now, what was the tenour of the information
resulting from the examinations of this committee?
Instead of general distress in the trading com-
munity, bordering on universal insolvency, which
might be inferred from the statements of the
movers for the committee in the House of Com-
mons, it came out, on evidence the most unques-
tionable, that the trade and manufactures of the
country were in a remarkably sound and healthy
VOL. II. R
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
state ; that they were carried on with adequate
capital and reasonable returns ; and that there was
a general confidence in the prospect of improving
markets for all the great staple articles, both of
export and import.
The first witness examined by the committee,
14th May, 1833, was Mr. Samuel Gurney, who,
from his very extensive connections and dealings
in money, both in London and some of the great
provincial towns, has means beyond those of almost
any other individual of judging of the general state
of commerce and manufactures, while his intelli-
gence and clear good sense, and absence of any
peculiar bias, qualify him in a peculiar manner for
forming just conclusions from the extensive range
of information which his business daily places be-
fore him. The following are a few extracts of his
evidence : —
" Will you have the goodness to state to the committee what,
from your observation, you consider to be the condition of the
trading interests ? "
" From what appears at this time, I think the trading interest
is in a sound state, and moderately prosperous in most direc-
tions."
" Do you speak of their present condition, as compared with
former periods ? "
" Yes, I speak of their present condition, as compared with
previous periods ; we have had times of equal, if not greater
prosperity, certainly."
" What test would you take as a fair evidence of the prosperity
of which you speak ? "
" Remarkably few failures ; a very great number of bills of
exchange, rather small in their character, yet the aggregate
well kept up, coupled at the same time with great supplies of
money from almost every part of the kingdom. I should add, as
another feature, the great regularity with which such bills are
paid."
" Do you think the last twelvemonth, as compared with any
twelvemonth not affected by peculiar circumstances, is rather
more than one of ordinary prosperity ? "
" I consider it may truly be termed one of wholesome pros-
perity."
" Should you say that the particular feature, at the present
moment, is a disinclination to invest capital, or a tendency to-
wards speculation ? "
1833—1837.
" My own apprehension is, that there is a willingness to enter
into commercial and trading transactions, and that the tendency
of our present state is rather towards excitement, and a gradual
advance of price, which will ultimately tend to a reverse to a
certain degree."
" Is there, then, a good prospect of return for capital, if em-
barked in trade ? "
" I think that capital, generally speaking, does make a fair
return."
" Have you observed, with respect to the present time, that
the disposition of capital is to seek permanent investment, as
much as in former times ; or rather temporary investment, and
for short periods ? "
" I think there is a vast deal of money for permanent invest-
ment, as well as for temporary investment."
" Is there not less tendency, now, to borrow, and a greater
tendency to lend, wherever good security can be obtained, than
formerly ? "
" There is : I remember the time when the procuring money,
upon excellent mortgages, was very difficult, even at 5 per cent.
It is now difficult to get money well invested on mortgage at
even 4- per cent. I remember the time when it was extremely
difficult to get capital to carry on any business, whether manu-
facturing or commercial ; but at this time there is no difficulty,
provided that the parties that require it have a good concern,
that renders such advance prudent."
" You confine those observations to the loan of money, and
you do not apply them to the purchasing power of money ; that
is to say, to the use of money only, and not to the ownership of
money as principal ? "
" I speak of the comparative facility at the present day, as
compared with former periods, in procuring capital for perma-
nent investment either in trade or mortgage."
" Are you of opinion that, as matter of interest, money is
now cheaper than formerly ? "
" It is."
" You are aware that the ownership or purchase of money is
one thing, and the loan or use of money is another ? "
" I am aware of it."
" Would it not therefore follow, that if there were a state of
low prices which render trade very precarious in its profits, that
state of things must have a tendency to determine a great pro-
portion of the general money of the country into the interest
market ? "
" When trade and commercial transactions are very precari-
ous, such is the tendency; but it is the cause* of the abun-
* There is in this part of the sentence an obvious inaccuracy
R 2
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
dance of money which exists in the present day. There is a
reduction of profit, but also a reduction of risk ; such reduction
of profit, in my opinion, arises from the great mass of individuals
possessing trading intelligence and moderate capitals ; it is in
my judgment the result of our health and general well-doing,
rather than the contrary."
After a great deal more of valuable evidence
tending to the same effect, the following is the con-
cluding part of his examination : —
" Of course you know the Royal Exchange, and many of the
merchants who assemble there ? "
" I know most of the merchants in the city of London.''
" Do you think that there are as great a number of mer-
chants there in the habit of meeting daily as during the war ? "
" I think there are."
" Do you think they possess upon the average as much wealth
as they did during the war ? "
" My opinion is, that they possess more. I think we have
rather a greater number of merchants, and possessed of more
property : I cannot apply it to individual cases, but taking the
aggregate, I think there is more property."
" Do you think there are a smaller number of very wealthy
merchants ? "
" I think there are perhaps a smaller number of very wealthy
merchants than there were during the war. I think the effect of
the war was to create a few merchants of very great wealth." *
in the printing of what must have been the tenour of the an-
swer. The question involved the supposition that it was wholly
owing to the precariousness of trade, that is, the great risks
attending it, which occasioned the low interest of money. Mr.
Gurney's answer clearly imports, that although such might be
the effect of precariousness of trade, it was the abundance of
money, and the smallness of the risk, which, in the actual state
of things, caused the low rate of interest.
* This part of the examination of Mr. Gurney has a reference
apparently to the following passage of the speech of Mr. M.
Attwood, on his moving for the appointment of a committee to
inquire into the distressed state of the commerce, and manu-
factures, and shipping of the country : — " It has been said, that
a correct notion of the state of the mercantile interest of Eng-
land may be obtained by observing the number and character
of the merchants who assemble on the Royal Exchange of
London. Now, I affirm, in the presence of persons connected
with the mercantile interest, that there is not one third of the
opulence to be found amongst the merchants assembling on that
great mart of commerce which was to be seen there fifteen years
ago. If this fact be not denied — and I do not expect that it
1833—1837. 245
The next witness examined was Mr. Lewis
Lloyd, the eminent banker (and head of the firm
of Jones, Lloyd, and Co.), whose great experience
and intelligence, and whose extensive connections
with the commercial interests of the metropolis,
and with the manufacturing interests of Lancashire,
and other parts of the country, enable him to de-
rive his conclusions from a very wide range of ob-
servation, and entitle him to be considered as of
the highest authority on the points in question. The
following are a few extracts from his evidence : —
" Are you a banker in London ? "
« I am."
" You are at the same time a banker at Manchester ? "
" I am."
" From the extensive nature of your business, you are ac-
quainted with the general condition of trade in the metropolis,
and in that great manufacturing district."
" I am not a manufacturer nor a merchant. I am' a mere
dealer in money, and I only judge from the receipts and pay-
ments that come under my observation ; those are certainly to
a considerable extent, and give me some insight into the state
of trade generally."
" Will you state to the committee, from the observations
you have been enabled to make, what you consider to be the
present condition of trade, as compared with former periods ;
whether you consider it at present in a sound or in an unhealthy
state ? "
" I never knew it at any former period in so sound and healthy
a state as it is at present."
" Will you state to the committee what you consider as the
evidence of that state ? "
" There is an absence of speculation ; there is a regular de-
mand fully adequate to the supply ; there is no accumulation of
stocks on hand, and yet no forced means are resorted to for the
purpose of disposing of those stocks ; and I think that the bills
of exchange in circulation are upon sound transactions of busi-
ness, and of a more healthy character than I ever knew before."
will be — let me ask why we are to wait a little longer for the
return of prosperity. The mercantile interest has waited, year
after year, in expectation that the House would adopt measures
to remedy the distress which has diminished their wealth by
two thirds." April, 1832. (Parliamentary Mirror, p. 1360.)
R 3
246 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
<{>Have you any reason to believe that there is any want of
accommodation to be found by those parties who wish to engage
in any trade, upon good security ?"
" None whatever ; money is so abundant, that the only diffi-
culty is in finding employment for it. No man with a good
security in his hand can be at a loss to get money now; in fact,
we are glad to get applications for money upon any thing like a
reasonable security."
" Do you consider that the applications that are made to you
are generally based upon more sound transactions than for-
merly ? "
" Yes ; prices are moderate ; but the risk is reduced to very
little ; profits are small, but risks are proportionably small ; and
I think trade is also in an unusually sound and healthy state."
And, after a great deal of intermediate evidence,
instructive by the clear statement of interesting
facts and opinions elicited from the witness, and
amusing by the evident degree in which his an-
swers disconcerted the theories of some of the
questioners, the examination concludes with the
following questions and answers : —
" Do you think the general capital of the country measured
in money has increased since the war ? "
« Yes."
" Do you think that the manufacturers and merchants of this
country can now sell their goods for as much money as they
could during the war ? "
" I believe if they were weighed at this moment, that they
are now richer than they were during the war."
" Do you think that it is owing to their increase in number,
or that they are individually richer than they were during the
war ? "
" I am speaking of them collectively as the mass of trading
interest of the country."
" Do you think that in the cotton trade the command of
money possessed by the persons engaged in it is as great as it
was ten years ago ? "
" It is greater."
" You were asked whether, being a banker, you were as well
able to judge of the condition of the manufacturers of Lanca-
shire, as those manufacturers themselves : although a manu-
facturer is more conversant with the state of his own business,
is not a banker more likely than any manufacturer to draw a
just conclusion as to the general state of the commerce of the
district with which he is connected ? "
" The produce of the trade generally finds its way into the
1833—1837. 247
hands of the bankers, and they have the means of judging of
the state of trade in that way ; all the means I have had from
that way lead me to the conclusion that the trade of the country
is in a sound and prosperous state."
" And your observation extends over the receipts and pay-
ments of a large number of manufacturers of different kinds ? "
" It does."
" When you spoke of the increase of the capital of the
country, you did not refer to the circulating medium only, but
to all kinds of property, such as warehouses, buildings, mer-
chandise, and all descriptions of property ? "
" All descriptions of property put together."
Mr. James Cook, of the house of Trueman and
Cook, whose transactions as brokers in the sale and
purchase of colonial and other produce, for account
of parties both in London and in the great provin-
cial towns, are more extensive, I believe, than those
of any other firm in the kingdom, gave in the
course of his examination some very important
details, illustrative of his statements of the great
activity and general tendency to improvement of
the various branches of trade and manufactures
with which he was practically conversant.
Mr. Joshua Bates, of the house of Baring, Bro-
thers, and Co., Mr. Larpent, Mr. Gabriel Shaw,
Mr. Kirkman Finlay, besides numerous other wit-
nesses, eminent in their respective lines of business,
who were examined by that committee, concurred
in bearing testimony, illustrated by striking facts,
to the generally sound, healthy, active, and im-
proving state of trade and manufactures in the
spring of 1833.
Against this mass of evidence, proving irresistibly
the very reverse of the case upon the hypothesis
of which the committee had been appointed, the
chief witnesses who gave evidence in support of
the allegations of distress were persons in the iron
and in the brass foundry trade, and in some parti-
cular branches of manufacture, and in the shipping
trade. Of the iron trade we have had occasion to
observe, that the depression was extreme at the
it 4
24<8 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
close of 1832, and it may readily be admitted that
the interests engaged in that business must have
been suffering from the fall of prices. But as the
fall had been clearly the effect of a supply outrun-
ning an increasing demand, the legitimate remedy
had been applied of a reduction of the supply,
and the prices were consequently advancing, and
the distress disappearing in the spring of 1833.
Of the few other witnesses in particular branches
of manufacture, the evidence was chiefly of the
inadequateness of the returns in their own business,
but affording no presumption of means of observa-
tion of the general state of even their own pecu-
liar branch of industry.
As to the shipowners, their evidence went to
throw overboard the currency theory, referring the
whole of their alleged depression to the reciprocity
acts. But the further and continued extension
of British shipping, proves incontestibly that the
statements purporting to show that the business of
shipowning had constantly since the war been car-
ried on at a loss, must have been, as indeed there
would be no difficulty of showing, were it not that
it would lead beyond the limits of the present dis-
cussion, that they were and are, perfectly fallacious.
And while the trade and manufactures of the
country were thus shown to have been in a sound
and prosperous state, the condition of the working
population was manifestly improved, compared with
any former period, that of 1821 and 1822 perhaps
excepted. It has already been seen, by the ad-
mission of the agricultural report of 1833, that the
condition of the labourers in husbandry was better
than in the period of high prices. And the evi-
dence supplied both by the Report on Commerce
and Manufactures, already quoted, and by the ex-
tensive information on the state of the manufactur-
ing population, contained in the reports of the
Factory Commissioners, prove beyond question
1833—1837-
249
that, with the exception, important indeed and la-
mentable, of the hand-loom weavers, the working
classes were generally employed at wages which had
experienced little reduction, and in some instances
none, from the period of comparative dearth, so
that by the great fall of prices they were enabled
to command a much larger proportion of food and
other necessaries.
Among other proofs to the same effect, is the
following statement, which was given in to the com-
mittee : —
" Particulars of Fine Cotton Spinners' Wages at different
Periods, spinning No. 180. and No. 200. — (From the
Wages-Book of Thomas Houldsworth, Manchester.)
Quantities which
Work turned off
Prices from
a Week's Net
by one Spinner
per Week.
Wages per Week.
Hours of
Work
Greenwich Hospi-
tal Records.
Earnings would
purchase.
Years.
ibs.
Nos.
Gross.
Piecers.
Net.
wllk.
Flour
per Sack.
Flesh
perlb.
Ibs. of
Flour.
Ibs. of.
Flesh.
5. d
s. d.
s. d.
s. d.
d. d.
1804
12
180
60
27 6
32 6
74
83
6 to 7
117
62i
9
200
67 6
31
36 6
74
83
6 to 7
124
73
1814
18
180
72
27 6
44 6
74
70 6
8
175
67
13£
200
90
30
60
74
70 6
8
239
90
1833
22£
180
54 8
21
33 8
69
45
6
210
67
M
19
200
65 3
22 6
42 9
69
45
6
267
85
" The sack of flour is taken at 280 Ibs.
" The above is an average of several men's work at different
periods."
The reasons for dwelling on the evidence of a
sound and healthful state of trade and manufactures,
and upon the improved condition of the working
classes at the commencement of 1833, are,
In the first place, to shew the distortion of view
by which alone, under the influence of the currency
doctrine, it was possible that the state of things, as
it actually existed, could have been so perverted
into the supposition of the very opposite of that
state, as to have given rise to representations of the
£50 m PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
prevalence of manufacturing and commercial dis-
tress ; representations so eloquently urged as to
have induced the Legislature to appoint a commit-
tee to inquire into the alleged distressed state of
commerce and manufactures, and shipping. The
result of the evidence brought before the commit-
tee was such, that if a report had been made, it
must have been in the direct negative of the alle-
gations to inquire into which the committee had
been appointed. But the party in the committee
adverse to such a conclusion, had influence enough
to prevent the promulgation of it, and accordingly
no report beyond that of conveying the evidence
to the House was made.
The reason, in the next place, for dwelling on
this evidence is, to direct attention to the simi-
larity, in several points of view, of the state of trade
and manufactures, at the close of 1832 and the
commencement of 1833, with that which existed
at the close of 1822 and the commencement of
1823. There was the same complaint of the great
fall and low range of prices in 1822 and the early
part of 1 823. There had been the same effect of
low prices in greatly extending the consumption,
insomuch that the stocks of goods on hand were
experiencing a progressive reduction. In the early
part of 1833, there was, as there had been in the
spring of 1823, a speculative advance in the prices
of colonial produce, which advance not having
been responded to by the state of markets abroad,
was not maintained. That partial rise of prices
had, in each case, the effect of restoring the balance
of supply, and was followed by a further interval
of low prices ; the consequence of which was, that
the consumption again was extended, so as to pro-
duce a still more marked reduction of stocks in the
course of the two following years. It is not to be
supposed that the process was strictly analogous at
the two periods. All that is to be observed is, that
1833—1837.
there was some resemblance of the general circum-
stances of manufactures and commerce, each of
the great leading articles being of course more
under the influence of its own peculiarities. It is
only however as regards trade and manufactures,
that the resemblance holds at all. In the prices of
provisions the difference between the two periods
is gre'at and striking.
With the exception of the speculative rise of
colonial produce in the spring and summer of 1833,
there was no very marked feature of general ex-
citement or depression, in the markets for goods,
through the remainder of that and of the following
year. The main feature of those years was, that
while the prices of provisions were falling, in con-
sequence of the abundance of the harvest outrun-
ning the utmost increase, great as that was, of the
consumption, such was the extension of the demand
for the great staple articles of manufacture both
for the home and foreign trade, that large beyond
precedent as had been the importations of cotton,
silk, flax, and wool, the stocks of these raw ma-
terials in the hands of the dealers and manufac-
turers, instead of accumulating, were undergoing a
progressive reduction.
Among the greater number of the manufacturers,
the orders on hand exceeded what could be exe-
cuted within the time prescribed. New mills were
in the course of being constructed, but could not
come into operation fast enough to meet the great
and increasing demand for wrought goods.
And while this great activity was observable in
the manufacturing districts, there arose a very brisk
demand for the products of the mines. The greatest
advance of price was in the article of Lead. Copper
and Tin likewise experienced' a considerable im-
provement. But the advance in Iron was the most
important, as embracing the largest amount of
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
capital, and giving next to coals the greatest em-
ployment to labour.
But although the prices of raw materials, includ-
ing the metals, experienced more or less of im-
provement in that interval, there was no such
excitement in the markets for goods as entailed any
thing like an apparent wildness of speculation.
The advance of prices was, in hardly any instance
that can be pointed out, greater than was fully
warranted, on fair mercantile grounds of reasoning,
by the reduction of stock. Nor were goods to
any extent held speculatively. The immense ar-
rivals, for instance, of Cotton, were sold and de-
livered to the manufacturers as fast as they came
to hand. Such likewise was the case with Silk, and
most other of the raw materials.
This state of things led naturally to the inference
that the causes of the extension of demand were
in such progressively increasing operation, that the
ordinary sources of production, at the existing cost,
would be inadequate to keep up the required
supply. The lamentations about over-production,
which had prevailed in the epoch last under no-
tice, had now been replaced by apprehensions of
insufficient production. Accordingly there was a
general feeling of confidence in an eventual higher
range of prices than had recently prevailed ; and
engagements were entered into for extended im-
portations, whether by orders for purchases abroad,
or by advances on consignments. The arrange-
ments with this view were in either case attended
with the lodging of credits to an unusual amount.
And not only were credits to an unusual amount
granted to shippers hither, as well as to importers
from hence, but they were also granted to several
of the banking establishments abroad, in consi-
deration of the commissions to be charged. The
funds for those enlarged credits were in part sup-
1833—1837.
plied by outward shipments, and the increased de-
mand hence arising contributed to the activity
which was observable in all the principal branches
of manufacture. But of those increased exports, a
large proportion appears to have been on credit
given by the shippers from this country to the im-
porters abroad, and to those chiefly in the United
States of America.
The principal houses engaged in those enlarged
operations were known to be possessed of great
wealth, and were supposed to have resources for
the utmost business that they could be induced to
undertake. This persuasion, on the part of the
public, combined with the great facilities of the
money market, afforded the most unbounded means,
while the prospect of the markets for goods held
out every inducement, for granting credits to any
extent that might be claimed by parties abroad,
who were considered by the agents of the houses
in question as in any way entitled to confidence.
The ulterior results of the great enlargement of
the credits granted from this country will be
noticed when we come to the consideration of
the state of things in the two following years,
namely, 1836 and 1837, when those results were
developed.
In the mean time, with the exception of the
partial unsoundness (which was afterwards dis-
covered) connected with the undue enlargement
of credit in some particular branches, the trade
of the country may be considered to have been in
a healthy and progressively prosperous state down
to the close of 1835.
At the same time, the manufacturing and mining
interests were experiencing a degree and extent of
prosperity perfectly unparalleled. In the cotton,
and silk, and woollen manufactories, and in the
iron and other founderies, while the prices of the
raw materials were abundantly supplied at only
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
a moderate rise of prices, the demand for wrought
goods was such, that instead of working specula-
tively, a large proportion of the manufacturers had
orders on hand to the utmost extent of their ex-
isting powers of machinery to supply ; and it was
said that, in many instances, orders were declined,
unless much more than the usual time were al-
lowed for the execution of them.
The mining interests, which had been excessively
depressed in the epoch last under notice, by a
great reduction of the prices of the metals, in con-
sequence of the supply outrunning an increasing
demand, were, in the interval now under consider-
ation, deriving the benefit of the opposite state.
Those of the metals, which had before been most
depressed, were now experiencing the most decided
improvement, namely, lead and iron. Of the for-
mer, the supply had fallen off by the diminished
produce from the Spanish mines, while the general
demand for the article was increasing. There are
no accurate statistical accounts of the production
of iron, but, according to general statements, and
the evidence before the committee on manufactures
and commerce in 1833, there is reason to suppose
that there had been a considerable number of fur-
naces put out of blast between 1828 and 1833* ;
and while the supply had thus been diminished,
the consumption was increased, more especially by
the extension of railway undertakings which were
then in progress in America, as well as in this
country. There was, in consequence, a steady
demand, at gradually improving prices, coincidently
with an increasing supply by the restoration of the
furnaces that had been put out of blast, and by the
erection of new ones, with the application of
improved machinery. The increase of supply was,
* See evidence of Samuel Walker, Esq., page 574*. of the
Report of the Committee on Manufactures, Commerce, and
Shipping, in 1833.
1833—1837. 255
however, insufficient to meet the great increase of
demand ; and the price, which had improved very
slowly till nearly the close of 1835, thenceforward,
and for many months after, experienced a very
considerable further advance.
The extraordinary activity which prevailed in
the manufacturing and mining districts, was ne-
cessarily accompanied by a very extensive and
general employment of the working population
at full wages. At the same time, the exten-
sive works upon the lines of the great railways
which were in progress, served to employ con-
siderable numbers of agricultural labourers, and
the earnings, even in money, by the operative
classes, were, in some instances, greater than in
the periods of the highest prices of provisions.
But, while the working classes were thus exten-
sively employed at full wages, the prices of food
and other necessaries had been progressively falling,
and were, at the close of 1835, lower than they
had been since the middle of last century. The
increased means of expenditure, thus enjoyed by
the bulk of the population, were shown in the
progressive increase of the revenue.
All the indications here enumerated, of the ex-
tension of trade, and of the prosperous state of the
manufacturing and mining interests, and of the
general employment of the working population at
full wages, were more signally displayed during
the spring of 1836. But the reasons for stopping
to consider the state of things at the close of 1835,
are the following : —
1. Down to this time, the trade of the country,
although in progress of considerable extension,
exhibited no signs of undue excitement ; and prices
of commodities, although in many instances at
advanced rates, were not in any striking instance
under the influence of speculation. Nothing,
therefore, thus far, could lead to the inference of
256 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
an undue enlargement of the circulation, as ope-
rating on the state of trade or of prices.
2. The extension of trade, the general but not
speculative improvement of the prices of com-
modities, the undoubted and substantial prosperity
of the manufacturing and mining interests, the
general employment of the working classes at full
wages, and the increase of the revenue, accom-
panied a great fall of the prices of provisions, but
more especially of the price of wheat, which was
lower at the close of 1835 than it had been in the
last seventy years ; thus furnishing a fresh and
decisive negative of the often repeated, but per-
fectly unfounded assertion, put forth by parties in-
terested in the corn monopoly, that high prices of
agricultural produce tend to increased demand for
other productions, and to extended employment
and higher wages to the working population.
3. The increased consumption of food, resulting
from the general employment of the working popu-
lation at full wages, had no sensible influence in
arresting the fall of the prices of corn, and much
less any effect in raising them, which it ought to
have done, according to the theory whereby the
variations of the prices of corn are accounted for
by the more or less employment, and consequent
consumption, of the labouring classes.
Before proceeding to consider the state of prices,
and the circumstances connected with them, as they
occurred in the two next and the closing years of
the series to which this historical sketch has been
devoted, it may be requisite to observe, that in the
interval from 1833 to the close of 18 35, there was
a considerable extension of the system of joint-
stock banking. Some, too, of the most consider-
able of the railway undertakings had come into
operation, and were exciting general attention, and
some degree of speculation. The only instance,
however, of violent excitement, in the three years
1833—1837. 257
which have here passed under consideration, was in
the foreign stock exchange, where, in the spring
and summer of 1835, the market for Spanish bonds
underwent extraordinary fluctuations, and caused
ruinous losses to many individuals.
SECTION 3. — Prices of Agricultural Produce in
1836 and 1837.
The lowest point of depression of the markets
for wheat throughout the country had occurred in
the last week of December, 1835, and in the first
week of January, 1836, when the average price was
36,9. for the imperial quarter, equal to 34s. 11^. for
the Winchester quarter ; of barley, the average
price for the imperial quarter was ^TJs. Wd., and
of oats, 18s. 8d.* From this extreme depression
there occurred soon afterwards a manifest improve-
ment.
The wheat crop of 1835 was generally admitted
to have been inferior in produce as well as in quality
to the crops of the three preceding years. The
extra consumption, from the application of wheat
to malting and distilling, and to cattle-feeding and
pig-feeding, was supposed to have materially re-
duced the large surplus from former years. It ap-
peared moreover, by the concurrent testimony of
nearly all the witnesses who were examined by the
parliamentary committees on agriculture in 1836,
that much less wheat had been sown in the autumn
of 1835, than in the immediately preceding years.
The greater part of the witnesses stated the short
sowing to be to the extent of from one fifth to one
fourth. It was likewise stated by the most exten-
sive of the occupiers of land, and the most emi-
nently practical, that the appearances of the growing
* The meat markets had been at their lowest at the close of
1834-, when the quotations at Smithfield were 2s. 6d. to 3*. 6d.
per stone for both beef and mutton.
VOL. II. S
258 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
crops were extremely unfavourable. Opinions to
the same effect were prevalent in Mark Lane, and
in the corn trade generally. And it was clear from
the falling off of supplies, compared with the former
season, that the farmers generally participated in
these opinions.
Under the influence of such opinions, whether
well or ill-founded, promulgated by such authori-
ties, a rise of prices was inevitable, and they ad-
vanced accordingly, with the aid of dry and very
severely cold weather in the progress of the spring,
to an average of 50s. 4td. for the imperial quarter
of wheat, in May, and to 51s. Id. in the first week
of June. But seasonable rains came on in the
early part of June, and the weather from that time
till the harvest was favourable to the growing
crops ; and, as the harvest approached, it became
manifest that they had not sustained any essential
injury. The markets therefore declined ; and as
the harvest- time in the home counties was favour-
able, so that the wheats were mostly secured by
the third week in August, in fair condition, and
reported favourably of as to yield, prices gave way,
and ranged at about 47s. to 48,9. for some weeks.
But the further fall, which seemed otherwise in-
evitable, was arrested by the very unfavourable ac-
counts of the weather, and of the state of the crops,
in the northern division of the island.
The weather, which had been rather unsettled
through July, in this part of the country, had been
very wet and cold in the north of England and in
Scotland; and the first three weeks of August, which
in the southern counties had been almost uninter-
ruptedly dry, though cold, had, in the northern
counties, been attended with heavy rains. These con-
tinued to prevail there, with a very ungenial tempera-
ture, and occasionally a change to snow, till the close
of the year. The crops, which were all exposed to
that inclement weather, were remark ably back ward;
some never ripened at all, and none, or next to
1833—1837. 259
none, were secured in such a state as to be fit for
early use, independently of reported deficiency of
quantity. The consequence was, a great demand
for shipments from London, and from the eastern
counties, to Yorkshire and Scotland. And this
demand coming upon a diminished surplus from
former years, while the new crop was not generally
fit for immediate use, even in the most favoured
districts, at the same time that the produce, al-
though considered to be an average quantity per
acre, was supposed to be deficient from a diminished
number of acres under cultivation for wheat, had
the effect of rallying and raising the markets, inso-
much that, in the course of the autumn, the average
price of wheat reached 6U. 9d. ; and as the accounts
from the United States of America represented the
corn crops there as having failed to such an extent
that large supplies would be required from Europe,
a considerable demand for bonded wheat arose
upon the double ground of shipments to America,
and of the prospect of a low duty in this country
before the ensuing harvest. This demand for corn
from Europe to America, and the consequent rise
of the price for what was in bond in this country,
was among the minor considerations which contri-
buted to the advance of the price of free wheat,
because it narrowed the prospective supply in the
event which was then thought probable of the ports
becoming open at a low duty.
The rise of the corn markets to the height which
they reached in November and December, 1836,
being an advance of no less than 70 per cent, upon
the prices in December, 1835, is the more re-
markable, inasmuch as it occurred coincidently
with a state of commercial discredit *, and of great
* The Agricultural and Commercial Bank in Ireland stopped
payment in November, 1836 ; and the difficulties of the Northern
and Central Bank in Manchester were at the same time becom-
ing a matter of notoriety.
260 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
pressure on the money market. The rise too,
occurring as it did so soon after harvest, and be-
fore any pressure from actual scarcity could be felt,
exhibits in this, as in other instances, the predomi-
nant force of opinion over any immediate influence
of the circulation. It may, indeed, be said, that
such was the force of opinion in favour of a rise in
December, 1836, that if the spirit of speculation
had not been repressed by the very contracted
state of the circulation, prices might, and would
probably, have experienced a further advance of
from 10s. to l%s. the quarter. This, from the dis-
position which then prevailed to think well of the
grounds for a considerable rise, is not at all impro-
bable. Supposing then the state of the money
market to have been as favourable as it was adverse
to speculation, and that prices had in consequence
risen to that extent, a quantity of foreign wheat
and flour, not much short of a million of quarters,
would have been let in for home consumption.
And as the stock of our own growth proved to
be beyond expectation, and fully equal to the
consumption till after the following harvest, the
addition to that stock would have operated in a
considerable depression of markets, and instead of
a decline of from 5s. to 6s. the quarter, which oc-
curred before the harvest of 1837, the fall would
most likely have been 15s. or 16,9. the quarter.
The inference therefore is, that, if it had not been
for the pressure on the money market at the close
of 1836, the prices of corn would have been in
1837 lower than they have proved to be.
The autumn of 1836 was in all parts of Great
Britain and in Ireland very wet, so that, indepen-
dently of injury to the outstanding crops, all farm-
ing operations, with a view to the foil owing season,
were very much delayed, and in many instances
imperfectly performed. In the northern districts,
much land, it was said, that had been intended for
1833—1837-
winter wheat, was of necessity left over for spring
sowing. The winter of 1836-7 began with the
appearance of considerable rigour. On the last
days of October there occurred a fall of snow,
which was remarkably heavy for the season, at-
tended with rather a sharp frost ; and the latter
part of December, 1836, was rendered memorable
by a fall of snow exceeding in its effects, in ob-
structing the communication by the roads with the
metropolis, any thing that had been known for
many years before. More snow fell on those two
occasions, in the early part of the winter of 1836-7,
than had fallen collectively in the four preceding
winters. A frost of some severity, which had ac-
companied the fall of snow at the close of Decem-
ber, 1836, broke up in the first week of January,
1 837 ', after which, the winter, although cold and
raw, and unhealthy (for it was then that a very ex-
tensive influenza prevailed), was not marked by
any severity of frost, or any further fall of snow of
any consequence. The spring was ungenial, and
the crops were so very backward, that it was ge-
nerally supposed that the harvest would be later
by three or four weeks than that of the preceding
year, which had not been particularly early.
The corn markets, which after the close of 1836,
when the yield of the crops was found to be larger
than had been supposed, had given way, in the win-
ter, and in the early part of the spring of 1837, to
53s. , experienced a rally as the spring advanced ;
and in the first fortnight of June the average price
of wheat rose to 56s. 5d.* The comparatively high
range and rising tendency of the corn markets in
* The weekly Gazette averages were,
s. d.
May 19. 53 4
— 26. 54 4
June 2. 56 2
— 9. 56 4-
— 16. - 56 5
s 3
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
the early part of June, 1837, is the more to be re-
marked, because if was coincident with the greatest
pressure on the money market, and the most cri-
tical period of commercial discredit, of the whole
interval from the close of 1835 to that of 183?.
But after the first fortnight of June the weather
became highly propitious to the progress of vege-
tation, and so continued till the harvest, which
proved to be much forwarder than had been anti-
cipated, the reaping of wheat having become
general throughout the southern and midland coun-
ties in the second week of August. The weather,
during the progress of the harvest, was unsettled ;
and in the latter part of August, and the first few
days of September, there were heavy rains, which
gave rise to some apprehension for the fate of the
outstanding crops, of which there was a consider-
able proportion in Essex, and others of the great
corn-growing counties. The weekly average price
of wheat rose in consequence, notwithstanding the
contraction of the circulation, to 60s. Id. But the
weather thenceforth improved, and became ge-
nerally fine, so as to admit of securing the latter
part of the harvest, even in the northern counties,
in tolerable order.
This favourable change had the usual influence
on the markets, which thenceforward gave way ;
and, as it became certain that the duty on the ad-
mission of foreign wheat was about to rise from
the rate to which it had previously fallen, namely,
%8s. 8d.9 a good deal of what was in bond, or had
recently arrived, was entered for home consump-
tion. The whole quantity so entered was about
150,000 quarters. This entry of foreign wheat, at
so high a duty, was not because the importation
could afford that duty, but because the holders,
having been disappointed in their speculation on a
much lower duty, were content to submit to a
heavy loss, in the alternative of having the wheat
1833—1837- 263
wholly shut out from a market, for an indefinite
length of time. It is to be observed that this ad-
mission of foreign wheat did not occur till a great
part of the harvest had been secured ; it was not
therefore wanted, unless in as far as the yield of
the last crop may be found to be insufficient to
meet the demands upon it till next harvest. The
reason for particular notice of this circumstance
is, that this, with a trifling exception, is the only
entry of foreign wheat since 1831 *, and that this
extraneous supply was not required to make up
for any deficiency of stocks of our own growth
till the harvest of 1837 had become available.
The fact, therefore, is in full evidence, that
during six successive years the produce of the
United Kingdom has sufficed for the consump-
tion, greatly increased as that has been ; whereas
in the four immediately preceding years a quan-
tity little short of six millions of quarters had
been required to make up for the deficiency of our
own produce, to meet a consumption necessarily
somewhat reduced by the high price, as it has since
been increased by the low price ; thus proving
incontestably the large scale of difference of pro-
ductiveness, in different series of years, and the
insignificance compared with it of any possible
difference in the consumption in the equal series, t
* The only exception being that of a small quantity, viz.
165,872 quarters, entered after the harvest of 1832, under cir-
cumstances similar to those here noticed.
f It may here be remarked, with reference to the influence
of the seasons on the productiveness of the crops of corn, that
the experience of the results of the harvests from 1832 to 1837,
both inclusive, falsifies the very commonly prevailing notion of
the peculiarly fertilising effects of snow, inasmuch as the five
winters preceding that of 1836-7 were distinguished by an ex-
traordinary absence of snow, and yet they were followed by five
very abundant wheat crops. And if the spring crops were not
in some of those years equally abundant, it was not for want of
snow during the previous winter, but for want of rain in the
summer.
264- PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 4. — State of Markets for Produce other
than those of Agricultural Produce, in the Years
1836 and 1837.
We have had occasion to remark that, till nearly
the close of 1835, there was rather a slow and
steady improvement of markets, and of trade ge-
nerally, than any extraordinary activity or much
of the spirit of speculation in goods.
In the early part of 1836, it having appeared, by
the usual returns at the close of the year, that the
stocks of some articles had been reduced below the
ordinary rate of consumption, a tendency to a spe-
culative demand for them became perceptible, but
not in any very marked degree. The articles that
came more immediately under this description
were cotton, indigo, sugars, and silks ; and an ad-
vance, greater or less, took place in each of these
at different times till the summer of 1836. But,
although in each of these articles there was a brisk
demand, and consequent rise of markets, it was re-
marked at the time, that as the demand was chiefly
by the trade, and for immediate manufacture or ex-
port, and that as the advance did not appear to be
greater than according to fair reasoning on mercan-
tile grounds was perfectly legitimate, it could not
with propriety be characterised as speculation or
overtrading. And it must be admitted, that there
was nothing of the extravagance of purchases, by per-
sons out of the trade, which had marked some former
memorable periods of speculations in goods. *
* The following are notices in some of the printed circulars
of the state of markets in the early part of 1836.
" Cotton. The stocks in the ports at the close of 1835
being barely equal to three months' consumption, and prices mo-
derate, the markets opened at the commencement of the year
with a good demand, and a great deal of fluctuation was expe-
rienced, which continued until April, when prices attained their
highest, at which period, bowed Georgia had advanced \\d. to
1833—1837- 265
So low were the stocks of these articles, and so
confident the persuasion that they were not more
2d. per Ib. ; Surat and other East India sorts, \d. to Id. per Ib. ;
and Brazil and Egyptian in a still greater proportion."
et Indigo. The very reduced stock at the end of 1 835, the
comparatively low price of the article, the large deliveries, and
the shortness of the crop in India, attracted, early in the year,
the attention of the trade. Prices advanced in the January sale,
and kept progressively rising in the two following sales, espe-
cially in July, when considerable purchases were made on spe-
culation for foreign account : the advance was then Is. 6d. to
Is. 9d. on the prices at the end of 1835."
" Sugar, in the opening of the year, continued to maintain the
favourable opinion it had acquired in 1835, and several circum-
stances combined to produce further improvement in its value.
The stocks, both here and on the Continent, were very much
reduced, and an idea still prevailed that the production of our
West India colonies would go on decreasing under the new
system of working. There had likewise been a positive failure
of the crop in Louisiana, which caused the Americans to specu-
late at home, as also to be large purchasers at the place of
frowth ; even from Europe shipments were made to the United
tates for their account. These operations, and a good demand
for consumption on the Continent, caused much activity at ad-
vancing prices up to June, 1836."
Silks were among the articles of which the consumption,
down to the close of 1835, had in the greatest degree outrun
the supplies ; and of some descriptions there was an almost total
exhaustion of stock. The markets, therefore, in the early part
of 1836, were in a very animated state, and prices appear to
have reached their greatest elevation at the close of March of
that year. As the prices then attained were scarcity prices, it
was natural that the approach of fresh arrivals should occasion
a decline of prices ; but, with intervals of slight depression,
the markets continued for some time to be very buoyant, not-
withstanding an increasing pressure for money, and a rising rate
of discount. The following are extracts from an eminent
broker's circulars respecting this article : —
" 23d June, 1836. The East India Company's sale is just
concluded. Bengal silk, both there and at the public sales before
the Company's, sold steadily at an advance of 5 to 7£ per cent,
upon the sales of February, which is equal to the highest prices
that were obtained during the excitement in March." " 30th
July, 1836. Our letter of 23d inst. reported the result of the
East India Company's and public sales. The market for China
silk, relieved by the large quantity taken off by speculators and
consumers, soon began to rally, and an advance of from 7£ to
266 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
than sufficient to meet the consumption at advanced
prices, before the arrival of fresh supplies, that, al-
though public attention had been roused early in
the spring, to what appeared to be an undue eleva-
tion, and consequently precarious state of markets,
there seemed to be no corresponding distrust among
the parties immediately interested. And it was
not till the arrival, or the certain approach, of fresh
to 10 per cent, was the result, considerable parcels being sold
as the prices were improving." " 31st August, 1836. Our
market continued during the early part of the month in an in-
active state with prices firm : the consumption was, however,
proceeding to a considerable extent, although the trade were
not disposed to purchase in anticipation. For the last fortnight
business has been more current. In Bengal silks, nearly the
whole of the arrivals have found buyers, with several parcels of
Company's silks of former sales that were held by speculators.
In Turkey silk comparatively little has been done. Prices remain
about the same. The importations of Italian silk are limited,
and the prices high ; but the stock was so completely exhausted
that the arrivals have been taken off at about 5 per cent, above
previous rates."
It was not till the 30th September, 1836, that the writers
of the circulars respecting this article discovered that a de-
pression of the prices, which however to this time had been
only such as might fairly be attributed to the growing increase
of supplies, was to be ascribed to the pressure on the money
markets. And it was not till nearly the close of 1836, when the
failure of a firm that were considerable holders of silk, and the
growing embarrassments of a house which had operated largely
in the article, and which stopped payment in January, 1837,
that the article underwent such a serious decline as could fairly
be considered to have been caused by the state of discredit, or
by pressure on the money market.
It has been requisite to give these details, in order to show
that there had existed fair mercantile grounds for the rise in the
markets, and the comparatively high range of prices of the
above-mentioned articles, till an advanced period of 1836. And
in the case of each of those articles it admits of being shown that
in and after the summer of that year there was such an increase
of the supplies as must necessarily have reduced prices, even if
no particular pressure had existed in the money market, al-
though of course that pressure aggravated the effects of the
increased supplies, more especially in as far as they were im-
ported or held upon credit.
1833—1837- 267
supplies, either larger than had been estimated, or
in a greater proportion than the consumption or
export was found to take off, that the markets gave
way. Even when the fresh arrivals were taking
place, the decline was not rapid; nor in any instance,
till nearly the close of 1836, does the fall of prices
appear to have been under the influence of any
particular pressure beyond that which the mere
difference of supply would warrant. But whenever
a fall of prices since 1819 has taken place, if there
happens to have been coincidently any actual or
supposed reduction of the amount of the circula-
tion, such is the prevalence of the currency theory,
that the proceedings of the Bank are usually re-
ferred to as the moving cause of the alteration of
prices. Thus, the money crisis, as it is called, of
the latter part of 1836 is, in most of the circulars of
that period, assumed to have been the cause of the
fall of prices in those instances in which a fall did
occur, while in the instances of the large classes of
articles which experienced either no fall, or none
worth mentioning, and some indeed of the most
important of which had coincidently risen in price,
the more peculiar circumstances affecting them are
held to be sufficient to account for their not coming
under the influence of the currency.
There was, in fact, nothing like an extreme or
general depression of prices during the severest
pressure of the money market, before the end of
November, 1836. The greatest fall that occurred
in that year was in the article of tea. But it is
well known that the importation was on a scale
of unprecedented magnitude, and that the forcing
off of the East India Company's remaining stock,
in competition with individual importations, com-
bined with the operation of the duty, must have
led inevitably to a great depression under any
circumstances of the money market. Thus, in
one of the very circulars in which the sudden
268 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
contraction of the Bank of England issues, in the
summer of 1836, is assumed to have been the
principal, if not the sole cause of the fall of prices,
is the following account of the state of the tea
trade in 1836 : —
" In the early part of the year the public sales went off with
some animation, and prices were well sustained. About May
extensive arrivals took place, which were immediately brought
on the market to an extent beyond the wants of the trade : the
East India Company continued also to force off their remaining
stock. Prices have in consequence been further depressed.
The payment of so large a sum as about 1,250,000/. duty on
Bohea, at Is. 6d. per lb., anticipating nearly two years' con-
sumption, has also tended to weaken the means of supporting
the market."
Here surely is reason enough for the depression,
without calling in the aid of the money market,
although of course an increased rate of interest,
and a difficulty of discounting, might serve as an
aggravating cause. With respect to sugars, cotton
and silk, and in a smaller degree flax, the prices,
having been raised by temporary scarcity, with per-
haps some exaggeration of demand, naturally fell
in consequence of the cessation of the scarcity, and
the fall would of course be aggravated by the state
of the money market ; but the difficulty of allowing
much influence to this cause is, that in the articles
of cotton and silk, more especially the former, being
particularly connected with the incipient state of
discredit, the fall of prices, until late in the autumn
of 1836, was inconsiderable, compared with the
previous rise.
The following articles, embracing the largest
amount of value, experienced no fall, and the
greater proportion actually rose in price coincidently
with the pressure on the money market till the
close of 1836.
Corn, meat, butter, Irish provisions and bacon,
oil, tallow, hemp, iron, copper, dye-woods, rum,
besides many minor articles, were as high in No-
1833—1837. 269
vember, 1836, as in the spring of that year, and
the greater part of them higher. And, inasmuch
as those that had fallen were in no degree more
depressed than the difference of actual or approach-
ing fresh supplies warranted, the inference that
such fall was directly caused by the state of the
money market in the summer and autumn of
1836 is not legitimately drawn.
So prevalent is the theory of the paramount in-
fluence of the currency, that most of the writers
of commercial price-currents and circulars are in-
fected by it. The following concluding observa-
tions in a price-current, published at the close of
1836, exhibits a specimen of the sort of reasoning
alluded to ; and the whimsical part is, that in giving
a succinct account of the variations of each of the
articles, the decline of those which fell in price
after the spring and summer of 1836 is rationally
explained by circumstances quite independent of
the state of the money market.
" The commercial transactions of the past year require very
little comment,, the events being so fully developed as they oc-
curred. The beginning of 1836 was, without exception, one
uninterrupted season of prosperity : commerce, manufactures,
and agriculture were extended ; railroads, mines, and shares of
every kind were purchased with avidity ; and money was so
abundant that bankers and capitalists were offering to discount
bills at 2 and 3 per cent, per annum. Notwithstanding the
great temptation held out to our merchants, traders, and manu-
facturers, there was only a partial speculation ; sugar and silk
were acted on to some extent, and iron and other metals to carry
out the various contemplated railroads.
" Suddenly, however, the Bank of England drew in their
issues, in consequence of the run upon them for gold for Ame-
rica, and the joint-stock and other banks were brought into col-
lision by these means. The consequence of the scarcity of
money, and the difficulty of obtaining discounts on mercantile
bills at from 5 to 7 per cent., was speedily felt in the commercial
world, and coffee, sugar, cotton, silk, metals, rum, timber, and
other articles became exceedingly dull of sale, and prices rapidly
declined. Other articles, equally important, have maintained
the advance, and in some cases are higher at the present moment
than before the restriction on money matters took place. The
270 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
articles we allude to are, corn, hemp, tallow, oil, ashes, dye-woods,
indigo, and rum. On a close attention to the causes that produced
the rise in prices in the latter articles, it will be' found that certain
local and collateral circumstances were the real cause of the
enhancement (such as the partial failure of crop, and shortness
of stocks), which the state of the money market could not pre-
vent, though it would be difficult to surmise the extent to which
prices might have been driven up, had not the difficulties of
money affairs been thrown in the way. On the whole, however,
it would appear that the conduct of the Bank of England, whilst
it might be judicious as regards that monopoly, has been attended
with circumstances of great danger to the commerce of this
country ; for the suddenness of the measures adopted by the
Bank, and the immense influence it possesses, are sufficient to
swamp any commercial and manufacturing community, however
careful and judicious such community may have acted."
The reasoning here is exactly that of the cur-
rency doctrine ; the articles that fell in price are
supposed to have been exclusively under the in-
fluence of the contraction of the Bank issues,
which, by the way, had not then been contracted
in any degree worth mentioning; while those
articles that had not fallen, or were rising, are
stated to have been under the influence of local
or peculiar circumstances.
It was not till nearly the close of 1836 that
there was any serious fall in the prices of those
articles which had experienced the greatest ad-
vance in the early part of the year; and, although
there were sufficient causes in the state of supply
relatively to the consumption for the tendency to
dulness and decline in the case of most of the
articles, there cannot be a doubt but that the no-
toriety of the growing difficulties of the American
houses, combined with some recent failures in the
silk trade, and in the East India trade, and the in-
creasing pressure on the money market, operated
greatly in adding to the depression which might
otherwise have prevailed. The greatest degree of
depression occurred in the interval between De-
cember, 1836, and the commencement of June,
1833—1837-
1837, when three of the principal houses in the
American trade suspended their payments, besides
three or four other firms of less note, but of great
respectability. The state of markets, at that
precise period, for those articles which were
more or less connected with the branches of trade
in which those houses were engaged, would na-
turally be most affected. In the instance of cotton
more especially, there was an unusually large im-
portation at hand, under circumstances which ren-
dered it certain that a considerable proportion of
it must be immediately forced upon the market.
In the silk trade some forced sales were made,
in consequence of the failure, a few weeks before,
of a house which had been mainly instrumental in
raising the price beyond the degree which the
shortness of supply had warranted ; and this cir-
cumstance would naturally, when combined with
the state of the money market, entail an extreme
degree of depression. In the two important arti-
cles, accordingly, of cotton and silk, there was, at
different times, in the spring and summer of 1837,
and for particular descriptions, a fall of no less than
50 per cent.
The other articles that experienced a marked
decline, during the period which has been charac-
terised as one of panic, were sugars, indigo, and
iron. But these had previously been raised by
an exaggerated demand, and the fall of price
was not to so low a level as that from which they
had risen.
With these exceptions, there was nothing like
an extraordinary fall of prices that can in any
way be traced to the difficulties of the money
market, or to the discredit which prevailed in the
trade with America, and partially in the East India
trade ; and the markets for agricultural produce
were so far from being depressed by the state of
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
discredit prevailing at that time in the branches of
trade alluded to, that prices in Mark Lane were
actually rising, as we have seen, in the early part of
June, and reached an average of 60,9. per quarter
for wheat.
In some instances, on former occasions of exten-
sive overtrading, the manufacturers had participated
in the speculation, so far as to overstock themselves
with the raw material at high prices, and to be
liable to severe loss upon the subsequent fall.
Accordingly, in several memorable instances re-
corded of commercial revulsion, the manufac-
turers figured largely among the failures of those
times. But in the recent instance the manufac-
turers of cotton and silk seem to have been parti-
cularly on their guard, and so distrustful of the
high prices that they bought only what was strictly
necessary to keep their mills from an absolute
stand. Indeed, the same may be said of the manu-
facturers generally, the only exception that I am
aware of, on an extensive scale, being those of
Dundee, among whom there were very numerous
failures in the course of the past year.
After the clearance which was effected of the
excessive and unsound part of the circulation by
the consequences of the great failures, chiefly
in the American trade, which occurred in the
first week of June, 1837> and when the prices
of those articles which had been raised by an
exaggerated demand had fallen as much below
their due level as they had before been raised
above it, the confidence of buyers was restored :
there was consequently a considerable revival of de-
mand in the latter part of 1837, and the trade and
manufactures of the country, reduced, as they ne-
cessarily have been, from the swollen dimensions
which they had attained by exaggerated anticipa-
tions and an undue extension of credit, appear to
1833—1837. 273
be in a sound, although necessarily (as following a
period of overtrading) in a comparatively stagnant
and dull state.
The revenue has experienced a falling off in the
past year (1837), as compared with the preced-
ing. But, independently of the operation of
the tea duties, there is reason to believe that
the revenue of the preceding year was an inflated
one. It is quite clear that a period of speculation
must be attended with an increase of revenue ; for,
not to mention the operation of overtrading, in in-
creased imports and exports in 1835 and 1836,
on some branches of the revenue, it may be ob-
served that, when prices have been rising for some
time, the tendency to anticipation of a further
advance, in other words to speculation, extends
itself to retail dealers, who, under such circum-
stances, are induced to enlarge their stock. This
causes entries for consumption, and consequent
payment of duties, in the expectation of a conti-
nuance of the increasing ratio of demand. Such
was probably the case in 1835 and 1836. When,
however, the event proves that the demand for
actual consumption does not equal the exaggerated
expectation, the dealers are disposed to run off
their old stock before they make fresh purchases ;
and the difference between a disposition and an in-
disposition on the part of dealers, as well retail as
wholesale, and of manufacturers, to get into stock,
— or, in other words, the difference between an an-
ticipation and a postponement of demand is very
great, not only upon prices, but also upon the re-
venue.
VOL. II.
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 5. — Joint-stock Banks, and other Joint-
stock Companies, and the Speculations in the
Shares of these from 1833 to 1837.
The effects of the joint-stock banks upon the
amount and value of the currency will be matter
of distinct consideration when we come to examine
the state of the circulation at the close of the
present chapter. They are here only noticed as
among the modes of adventurous investment of
capital in which the spirit of speculation displayed
itself in a very considerable degree towards the
latter part of the period now under examination.
The formation of joint-stock banks, consequent
upon the removal of some of the exclusive pri-
vileges of the Bank of England, had proceeded
to some extent before the close of 1 835 ; but it
was not till towards the close of that year, and in
the spring of 1836, that the progress of the system,
not only by the number of new establishments,
but by the multiplication of branches, and by the
extent of their operations in the way of re-discount
through the money dealers in London, attracted
public attention. They had by that time also
become the occasion of the display of a spirit of spe-
culation strongly directed to that mode of invest-
ment. The premiums to which all, or nearly all,
the banks formed or projected up to that time had
attained, while by the sales of reserved shares they
extended the capital, and credit, and connections of
the existing establishments, contributed powerfully
to stimulate the formation and projection of new
ones. And so strong was the spirit of enterprise
directed to this mode of adventure, that, notwith-
standing the alarm which had been sounded by
the notice drawn to it in the House of Com-
mons, on occasion of Mr. Clay's motion for a
committee to inquire into the system, the form-
1833—1837- 275
ation and projection of new banks proceeded for
some time after, not only with unabated but with
increased activity.
The objects of speculative investment which, at
that time, next to joint-stock banks, occupied the
largest portion of public attention, were the nu-
merous undertakings for railway communication.
When the great lines from London to Birming-
ham*, and from Birmingham to Liverpool, were first
projected, and for some time after, while the bills
for the formation of the companies were still pend-
ing before parliament, public opinion had not been
decided in their favour, and the shares did not
command a premium ; indeed, the shares in the
former were, in some instances, sold at a discount
* The date of the earliest meeting in London, with a view
to the formation of the London and Birmingham railway, was in
the autumn of 1830 ; but the Act of Parliament for incorporat-
ing the company was not passed till May, 1833.
In the gigantic undertaking of the great line of Railway from
London to Birmingham, and from Birmingham to Liverpool, by
far the larger part of the subscriptions, and eventually of the
capital embarked, has been supplied from Lancashire. It has been
computed that the Lancashire proprietors form seven eighths
of the whole in amount. This circumstance may be accounted
for on two grounds. The one is, the greater knowledge pos-
sessed by persons resident in that neighbourhood of the nature
of such undertakings, from their having been concerned in, or
witnesses of, the progress and successful completion and results
of the Liverpool and Manchester line. The other is, that, in
consequence of the great and long-continued prosperity of the
cotton trade, and the cotton manufactures, there has been an
extraordinary accumulation of capital in that district, greatly
exceeding the amount that could be profitably re-invested in the
same business, great and increasing as that business has been and
is. The schemes for railways, therefore, coming within the neigh-
bourhood, and within the sphere of the peculiar knowledge of
the persons possessed of such overflowing capitals, presented a
most inviting mode of investment, which was eagerly adopted.
And the success attending that mode of investment in the prin-
cipal lines was calculated to excite and extend the inclination
for such projects. Liverpool and Manchester therefore have na-
turally exhibited more of a spirit of speculation in the railway
share markets than has prevailed in London.
rp Q
276 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
equal to the expenses supposed to be incurred.
But when the successful results of the Liverpool
and Manchester line were fully ascertained, and
when, with the data supplied by the experience of
that line, revised estimates were formed of the pro-
bable income, compared with the expenditure, a
confident opinion arose among the best-informed
persons of great eventual success of the undertak-
ing: the shares, accordingly, in those great com-
panies advanced to a considerable premium.
The profits thus derived and realised, or ad-
mitting of being realised, by the subscribers to
those undertakings, operated as an extraordinary
excitement to this description of adventure. New
lines were proposed to intersect almost every part
of the kingdom, and there was actually a swarm of
railway projects starting up in every direction. The
rage for undertakings of this kind was at its height
in the spring of 1836, and numerous other projects
for public companies were at the same time brought
into notice. The most considerable of these were
for mining purposes. And several of the projects
proceeded on substantial grounds with fair pro-
spects of success, along with many others that were
absolutely worthless, and served only for the indi-
vidual benefit of the projectors. But the good,
bad, and indifferent contributed to a general ac-
tivity in the share markets.*
* Of the extent and extravagance of the spirit of speculation
which was displayed in the formation and projection of joint-
stock companies, the following description was given by the
President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Poulett Thomson, in
the House of Commons, in the debate on the budget, 6th May,
1836: —
" It is impossible not to be struck with the spirit of specula-
tion which now exists in the country ; but, I believe, that there
is a great difference in the state of things and what took place
in 1825. The spirit of speculation was then turned to foreign
adventure of the most extraordinary description ; but, now,
speculation is directed to home objects, which, if pushed too
far, may be very mischievous ; though the consequences may
1833—1837- 277
We have already seen that there existed, coin-
cidently with this excited state of the share markets,
not be quite so mischievous as in 1825. But really, on turning
to any newspaper, or any price-current, and observing the ad-
vertisements of joint-stock companies upon every possible sub-
ject, however unfit to be carried on in the present state of
society, every man must be struck with astonishment at the
fever which rages at this moment for those speculations. I felt
it my duty, some time ago, to direct a register to be kept, taking
the names merely from the London and a few country news-
papers, of the different joint-stock companies, and of the nominal
amount of capital proposed to be embarked in them. The nomi-
nal capital to be raised by subscriptions amounts to nearly
200,000,0007., and the number of companies is between 300
400. I am just now reminded of the speculation for making
beet-root sugar, but that is a sound speculation compared with
some in my list. The first is the British Agricultural Loan
Company, with a capital of 2,000,0007. I have been furnished
with a blank corn note published by this company. Another
company is proposed for supplying pure spring water, capital
300,000/. Then there are the Patent Steam-paddle Company,
with a capital of 30,0007. ; the Safety Cabriolet Company, capi-
tal 100,0007. ; the British and American Intercourse Company,
capital 2,000,0007. ; the London Whale Fishery Company, capi-
tal 600,0007. ; and, again, to show the way in which these com-
panies are starting up, for objects either of the most absurd
kind, or for objects such as private individuals are perfectly
able to accomplish, I find the Liverpool British and Foreign
Trading Company, capital 250,0007. Now, it is perfectly well
known, that it is not at all an unusual thing for an individual
in Liverpool to embark 250,0007. in foreign trade ; and there are
many who have a great deal more engaged in that business. I
know that these companies have not their origin only in London.
In 1825, London was the great centre of speculation ; but I am
afraid that these companies have now their origin in other parts
of the country. Reference has been made to a Liverpool paper.
I fear that the place I represent (Manchester) can likewise fur-
nish instances of schemes for objects which can never be bene-
ficial to any one, and on which the parties will be only throwing
away their money. The fact is, that the greater part of these
companies are got up by speculators for the purpose of selling
their shares. They bring up their shares to a premium, and
then sell them, leaving the unfortunate purchasers, who are
foolish enough to vest their money in them, to shift for them-
selves.
" I have seen, also, with great regret, the extent to which
joint-stock banks have sprung up in different parts of the coun-
T 3
578 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
a very animated state of the markets for some im-
portant descriptions of foreign produce, as also for
iron and other of the metals, and that the corn
markets had experienced a great rise, the price
of wheat having advanced nearly 50 per cent,
within a few weeks after the close of 1835.
From the concurrence of these causes, the spring
of 1836 was attended with the display of a spirit
of speculation, and of general excitement, which
presented some resemblance to the spring of 1825,
although far short of that period in extravagance,
and attended with the important difference that,
whereas in 1824-5 a considerable part of the spe-
culations ran on investment in foreign loans and
foreign mines, those of 1836 were chiefly, if not
exclusively, directed to undertakings within the
United Kingdom.
But it was quite clear in the spring of 1836, as
it had been in 1825, that a considerable part of the
speculations in shares could only have admitted of
proceeding to the length that they had done by
an undue extension of credit, which allowed full
scope to the delusive prospects then held out.
Accordingly, those joint-stock companies only
which had been established on a solid foundation
stood their ground through the difficulties which
prevailed in the money market at the close of 1836,
try. I believe, indeed, that great good has arisen from joint-
stock banks ; but the observations I have made with regard to
other companies are equally applicable to many of the joint-
stock banks that are springing up in different parts of the
country, and the existence of which can only be attended with
mischief. I have a prospectus of what is called the English,
Irish, and Scotch Joint-stock Bank, with a proposed capital of
3,000,0007. in England, 2,000,000/. in Ireland, and 2,000,000/.
in Scotland ; and which holds out the greatest possible advan-
tages to the persons engaged in it. The shares, too, are of very
small amount. I may mention, on this point, that I have seen
some companies with shares as low as 10/. The great danger of
evil arising from speculations of this kind is obvious."
1833—1837- 279
and in the first six months of 1837, while the
greater part fell to a discount, and no small num-
ber were finally abandoned.
The markets for goods also, but for those de-
scriptions only which had risen in consequence of
scarcity, and of the exaggeration of demand usual
on such occasions, experienced, as we have seen,
between the close of 1836 and the summer of
1837, as the effect of large supplies and of a state
of discredit, a considerable fall.
And we have now to see to what extent the
state of the circulation could be considered as in
the relation of cause and effect, with the fluctua-
tions which have been described in general terms
as having occurred in the markets for goods, and
for shares, in the period from 1833 to the close of
1837.
SECTION 6. — State of the Circulation from the
Commencement of 1833 to the Close of 1837-
The statement, to which in the course of this
work there has been frequent occasion to refer, of
the actual position of the Bank, as to its assets
and liabilities, on the last day of February and the
last day of August in each year, reached only to
August 1832, being the period when the committee
on the Bank charter, to whose Report that state-
ment was appended, closed their labours.
The statements which have since been published
once a month, according to the condition prescribed
on the renewal of the charter, do not give the
actual position of the Bank with reference to its
liabilities, its securities, and its bullion, at any one
time, but only the average of each of these ele-
ments, without distinguishing the securities into
public and private, for the. three months preceding
the date of the monthly publication.
280 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
These materials, although leaving much to be
desired, with a view to forming a judgment of the
manner in which the regulation of the issues has
been conducted at particular times, and of some of
the consequences which directly affect the situation
of the Bank, afford at the same time fair grounds
for judging of the general management, whether
as regards its consistency with the system professed
by the directors, or its influence on the money
market and on prices.
With such light then as is afforded by these ma-
terials, and with such further light as has been
thrown upon the subject, by the explanations to
which the recent controversy respecting the causes
of the late pressure on the money market has given
rise, I shall proceed to examine the state of the
circulation, with the causes of its variations, and
the nature and degree of its influence on the great
fluctuations which have been observable in the
money market, and in the markets for goods and
for shares, in the interval between 1833 and the
close of 1837.
After the.very considerable reduction which the
treasure of the Bank had undergone in the early
part of 1832, when, namely, in February, the
amount was only 5,293, 150/. against liabilities
amounting to 26,988,880/., while the securities
amounted to 24,333,490/., there was a large reflux
of the metals for some months following.
By the Gazette return in October, 1833, the aver-
age amount of assets and liabilities in the three
months preceding had been,
Circulation - ^"19,800,000 Securities - ^24,200,000
Deposits - 13,000,000 Bullion - 10,900,000
the bullion being thus, as nearly as might be, in
proportion to one third of the liabilities.
According to the return in January following,
there had been in the interval a loss of bullion, on
the average of the three months preceding, to the
extent of about one million, accompanied by a re-
1833—1837. 281
ductionof the circulation by about 1, 200, OOO/., and of
the securities by between 600,000/. and 700,000/.,
while the deposits were unvaried. And so far the
management leaves nothing to remark upon. But
thenceforth a considerable degree of irregularity is
observable ; a progressive diminution of bullion was
going forward, and, coincidently with that drain of
the Bank coffers, a progressive augmentation of its
securities had been taking place, insomuch that,
whereas by the return at the end of September, 1834,
the bullion had been reduced by upwards of three
millions, as compared with October, 1833, and by
upwards of two millions, as compared with January,
1834, the securities had been increased by five mil-
lions*, and the circulation by about a million, com-
pared with the latter date. The comparison of the
three periods stands thus : —
1833, October. Circul. «§£ 19, 800,000
Deposits 13,000,000
1831-, Jan. 7. Circul. 18,216,000
Deposits 13,100,000
Sept. 23. Circul. 19,126,000
Deposits 14,754,000
Secur. ^24,200,000
Bullion 10,900,000
Secur. 23,576,000
Bullion 9,948,000
Secur. 28,691,000
Bullion 7,695,000
Here is surely any thing but the regularity of
action which might be expected consistently with
the professed rule of preserving the securities even,
and of allowing the liabilities and the bullion to be
acted upon by the public. The drain continued
till May, 1835, the return being on the average of
the quarter ending,
June 4. 1835. Circul. a£l 8,460,0001 f Secur. ^25,562,000
Deposits 1 0,568,000 J [Bullion 6,150,000
The bullion was, probably, in the interval of the
three months included in that return, under six
millions. The great reduction of treasure is ex-
* It has been stated that this excess of securities was occa-
sioned by an increase of deficiency bills ; but there is an end of
the rule if deviations to this extent are to be admitted on the
plea of a difference in the nature of the securities.
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
plained on the part of the Bank by a reference to
the effect alleged to have been produced by the
loans to the governments of Portugal and Spain.
"These loans were going forward from July, 1833, until
towards the end of 1834, when the profits realised upon the
daily extending engagements in the foreign stock market engen-
dered a further spirit of speculation in almost every kind of
previously neglected South American, Spanish, and Portuguese
bonds, causing an enormous advance in all, and in some nearly
100 per cent. In short, until the spring of 1835, hardly a packet
arrived from the continent which did not come loaded with
every sort of foreign securities for realisation upon our foreign
stock market. In reply, it may be stated, that not only the
demand for the silver and export of the sovereigns originated
and continued during the mania alluded to, but further, that
that demand ceased the moment the reaction took place, in
May, 1835, when a panic seized the dealers in foreign securities,
causing their prices to fall with far greater rapidity than they
had risen. In the progress of the contraction, which ensued
upon the diminution of the bullion held by the Bank, the market
rate of interest gradually advanced for first-rate commercial
paper from 2^ to 3£ per cent, per annum, which may be quoted
as having been its value in May, 1835. At that time there was
no material increase in the paper money circulation of the in-
terior ; consequently, immediately upon the discredit taking
place, the export of gold ceased, and the foreign exchanges
further advanced, bringing back the major part of the gold
which had been exported in the preceding eighteen months ;
thereby clearly showing that the currency was not redundant."
— Causes and Consequences of the Pressure on the Money
Market, from the 1st Oct. 1833, to the 21th Dec. 1836. pp. 27
—29. By J. Horsley Palmer, Esq.
Upon this explanation it is to be remarked, that
if, during the interval in which the influence of
these foreign stock speculations is supposed to have
been in progress, the securities of the Bank had
been preserved in tolerable uniformity of amount,
and if the liabilities had been reduced in any thing
like a fair proportion to the reduction of bullion,
and if the stock of bullion which had been lost, as
is alleged, in consequence of those speculations,
had, upon the reaction and discredit following,
flowed back as fast as it had gone out, and that this
reflux had taken place without any material re-
1833—1837. 283
duction from the previous enlargement of the se-
curities and liabilities of the Bank, there would
have been a primd facie case, a fair ground of
presumption that the whole or the greater part of
the fluctuation of the treasure of the Bank had
been caused by these foreign stock operations.
But as the drain, in the greater part of its pro-
gress, had been accompanied by a great increase of
the securities and liabilities, and as the cessation of
the drain in May, 1835, had been preceded by a
considerable reduction of the securities, and by a
still more considerable reduction of the liabilities,
and by a rise in the rate of interest attending the
contraction, it is impossible to exempt the ma-
nagement of the Bank from being considered as
having been itself the main cause both of the drain
and of the means of arresting it. The explanation
therefore fails of establishing the conclusion pro-
posed of the paramount influence of the foreign
stock operations in the partial disturbance of the
circulation which had occurred in that interval.*
The drain, it has been observed, was arrested in
May, 1835, and it is stated in the extract from the
work just quoted, that " immediately upon the
discredit taking place, the foreign exchanges fur-
ther advanced, bringing back the major part of the
gold which had been exported in the previous
eighteen months." But it appears by the return
of the 20th October following, that the average
amount of bullion for the three months preceding
was only 6, 186, GOO/., and had not exceeded that
amount by more than 140,000/. on the average of
any of the intermediate returns ; it cannot there-
fore be said, that the major part flowed back imme-
* Mr. Samson Ricardo, in a very able publication entitled
" Observations," &c., has clearly pointed out the inconsistencies
involved in the charge against the operations on the foreign
stock exchange in 1834, as having been the exclusive cause
of the efflux of bullion.
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
d lately upon the discredit in the foreign stock
market in May, 1835.
In the autumn of 1835, however, there was a
strong tendency of bullion to flow into the Bank ;
and if the management had been consistent with
the principle which had been professed on the part
of the directors, of keeping the securities even, the
treasure would have been restored to the amount
which it had fallen from since October, 1833,
namely, to between ten and eleven millions, con-
sequently to that which had been held out to be
a desirable proportion to its liabilities. If such
proportion of bullion to the liabilities was ever
desirable, it had become more particularly so in
the autumn and winter of 1835-6.
Independently of operations on the foreign stock
market, which a renewed tendency to a fall in the
rate of interest in this country was again exciting
to activity, there were two very important cir-
cumstances coining into operation, which were
calculated in their progress to have a very material
bearing on the position of the Bank, and on the
value of the currency.
These circumstances were, —
1. The policy announced by the American go-
vernment of introducing a larger proportion of me-
tallic currency into the circulation of the United
States, and of inducing, by an alteration of the
mint regulations, an increased proportion of gold to
silver.
2. The great extension of the joint-stock bank-
ing system in this country, and in Ireland, which
in its tendency was likely to surcharge the circula-
tion with paper and credit.
I cannot give a better description of the nature
and tendency of these circumstances than is con-
tained in the following passages of the publication
last quoted, " on the causes and consequences of
1833—1837- 285
the late pressure on the money market." pp. 29
—33.
" In order to explain the cause and origin of the American
demand, it may be proper to advert to the proceedings in
America for the two preceding years. The avowed hostility
of the president (Jackson) to the renewal of the charter of the
Bank of the United States terminated, after a violent struggle,
in compelling that institution to prepare for closing all its trans-
actions in 1836, and for repaying that portion of its capital that
belonged to government. In order, however, to increase the
embarrassment of the Bank, measures were taken for re-
moving from its custody the deposits of public money, and for
placing them in the hands of various states banks, under con-
dition that they should be prepared to pay a given portion of all
demands upon them in gold com. To facilitate this object,
Congress passed a law reducing the quantity of fine gold in the
eagle, the equivalent of ten dollars, from 246 to 232 grains.
This depreciation of the American gold coin had the effect of
raising the current value of the English sovereign from 4'44 dol-
lars to 4'87^, or 8| per cent, above its previous current value.
Simultaneously with and in aid of these measures, several of the
states were persuaded to prohibit the circulation of notes of less
amount than five dollars. In taking these measures, it was an
avowed object, on the part of the president, to endeavour to
establish a gold currency, in conjunction with silver, throughout
the Union. The hostility evinced towards the Bank of the
United States, and the refusal to renew its charter, caused an
immediate contraction of the usual accommodation granted at
the numerous branches of that establishment, and, further, en-
tailed upon the favoured states banks the necessity of procuring
an additional supply of gold to enable them to fulfil the conr
ditions under which they renewed the deposits of government
money. This combination of circumstances, having no relation
to the ordinary commercial transactions existing between this
country and America, materially reduced the rate of exchanges
with Europe, so much so as to afford a profit upon the import-
ation both of gold and silver from England and other parts of
Europe. The president, too, in order further to aid his favourite
project of increasing the metallic currency throughout the states,
directed, in the early part of last year, his agents in Europe to
remit in gold to America the whole of the indemnity money to
be received from France and Naples. About the time of that
remittance having been made, a loan for a million or 1,200,OOG/.
was negotiated in London on account of the United States
Bank, to facilitate the settlements upon the expiration of the
charter. The effect of that loan upon the currency of this
country was further increased by a much larger amount than
usual of American securities, or of States' stock, bank and canal
286 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
stock, &c., having been sent to Europe for sale, and upon which
credit had been given by some of the principal houses in
England, in anticipation of the sums they were expected to
realise ; thus throwing an inordinate amount of American paper
upon our markets. If all these circumstances be adverted to,
together with the very large amount of produce imported from
America, the surprise will be, not that some, but that so small a
portion of bullion should have been abstracted from England as
that already stated. Since the 1st September last, the demand
has entirely ceased ; and, notwithstanding the desire of the
American president to retain the bullion acquired from this
country, it is not improbable that we may soon see it return
from that quarter of the world.
"Having thus endeavoured to explain the causes which have
operated to reduce the bullion of the Bank during the last three
years, it becomes desirable to show why it is that the contraction
of the circulation of the Bank has affected private credit more
than in 1832, when a similar loss of bullion and contraction of
the Bank's engagements were exhibited. The difference be-
tween the two periods appears to have been occasioned by the
altered state of private banking in the interior of the country.
In the first, there was 'no particular excitement either in Eng-
land or Ireland, nor any excess in the issues of provincial paper.
In the second, both countries teemed with competition created
by the additional establishment as previously stated, within the
short space of two years, of not less than seventy-two joint-stock
banks in England and Wales, and ten in Ireland, with their in-
numerable branches in almost every town throughout the two
kingdoms. It is needless to attempt to describe the competition
that grew out of this excessive multiplication of banks : its
effects were exhibited in a great and undue and even rash ex-
tension of paper money and credits, accompanied by an unusual
reduction in the rate of interest in the interior of both countries,
but particularly in Ireland : the commonest observer must have
seen the gathering clouds, and dreaded the consequences."
There was assuredly, in the state of things thus
described, a sufficiency of premonitory signals, of
unerring indications, that a storm was impending,
and that it was incumbent upon those at the helm,
which governed the movements of the currency in
this country, to take more than ordinary precaution.
For the counteraction of those circumstances,
portending danger to its establishment, what was
the obvious policy of the Bank ? Most clearly to
diminish its securities, as a means of effecting some
contraction of the circulation, with a twofold view,
1833—1837. 287
namely, first, to abate the tendency of the existing
low rate of interest in this country to favour the
financial operations whether of the American go-
vernment or of the United States Bank, or opera-
tions generally in foreign stocks, entailing the
transmission of capital abroad, and consequently
an efflux of bullion ; secondly, to restrain the
joint-stock banks within due limits.
That the raising the rate of interest in this
country in 1835 would have abated the tendency
to an efflux of capital, and consequently to the
eventual demand for gold, there cannot, it is to be
presumed, be a question. But it may be, and in-
deed it has been questioned, whether it was in the
power of the Bank to restrain the joint-stock banks,
and whether a reduction of the Bank of England
circulation would not afford the means to the coun-
try banks of extending their circulation, in con-
sequence of the greater demand which might in
that case arise for country notes, as the means of
affording the accommodation to trade which was
denied by the Bank of England. It is possible
that for a short time during a small rise in the rate
of interest, while confidence was entire, and trade
and manufactures flourishing, and opinions in" fa-
vour of joint-stock companies sanguine, the dimi-
nished accommodation granted by the Bank of
England might be compensated by an enlargement
of that afforded by the country banks. But such
counteraction on the part of the country banks
could not proceed far, nor last long, under a re-
solute reduction of its securities by the Bank of
England. The reserves of the country banks must
be in gold or Bank of England notes : these they
would have an increasing difficulty to possess
themselves of, the resource of re-discounting in
London being greatly curtailed, so that the means
of making advances, as well by discounts and
by book credits, as by the issue of notes, would
288 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
be abridged, and the whole of the country circu-
lation would thus be more or less restrained, with
consequently a less eventual tendency to an efflux
of bullion. Such at least would have been the
probable effects of a reduction by the Bank of
its securities, upon the country circulation of notes
and credit. And most certainly such a measure
would, according to its extent, have counter-
acted the foreign stock operations, which the
directors so much and so fruitlessly reprobate.
But not only were the securities of the Bank
not reduced under circumstances which so obvi-
ously and imperiously enjoined a reduction, but
they were actually increased in the three months
ending in January, 1836, by no less than five mil-
lions beyond the amount in August, 1835. The
directors thus repeated the very error committed
by the Bank in 1817* and again in 1824, an error,
the exact repetition of which was hardly to have
been expected under the more enlightened manage-
ment of the present period. The consequences of
that great error have been seen in the uneasy and
precarious position experienced by the Bank, and
in the great pressure which was so severely felt in
the money market for many months afterwards.
What renders the error the more unaccount-
able and inexcusable is, that no effort, no
forcible operation, was required to avoid it.
On the contrary, the adoption of that unfor-
tunate course was attended with a considerable
effort, inasmuch as it involved a departure from
the ordinary rules or routine of the Bank ; and
it was moreover inconsistent with the principle by
which the directors in modern times have pro-
fessed to be guided. Nay, further, the very cir-
cumstances which form the main ground of the
justification put forth on the part of the Bank
(by those of the directors who are deservedly
looked up to for their great knowledge of the
1833—1837. 289
working of the system, and of, banking ge-
nerally), for their departure from the obvious
course, were such as admitted of the measures for
reducing the securities being taken with more than
usual facility, and with the least possible disturbance
of the money market, beyond the moderate increase
of the rate of interest which every dictate of policy
so strongly prescribed. The circumstances here
alluded to are the deposits arising out of the loan
for the West India compensation in the autumn of
1835, and the money borrowed by the Bank from
the East India Company, repayable after a cer-
tain time, the Bank allowing a low rate of interest
for the same. The mere retention of a part, if
not of the whole, of these sums, so opportunely
deposited with it, would have constituted the most
simple and easy means conceivable of reducing its
securities, of somewhat contracting the circulation,
of moderately raising the rate of interest, and of
replenishing the coffers of the Bank to an amount
that might have made its position at once satis-
factory and safe.
But it appears to have been considered by the
directors that these particular sums might be laid
out in productive securities, beyond the amount
usually held by the Bank, without violating their
professed rule of keeping their securities even.
These monies, so deposited, have, in the pub-
lications which have appeared, explanatory of the
conduct of the Bank, been designated as extra de-
posits, and as not coming within the same category
as the other deposits, nor amenable to the same
rule of management ; an amount of the securities
therefore, equal to the amount of these extra de-
posits, as they are called, is, in their view of the
question, to be taken out of the comparative state-
ment of securities, and the position of the Bank is
thus made out to have been consistent with the
assumed rule of keeping the securities even.
The grounds of distinction by which these par-
VOL. II. U
290 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
ticular sums have been designated as extra deposits
to be taken out of the recognised rule of manage-
ment, and the reasons which induced the directors
to avail themselves of that assumed distinction in
laying out those deposits in securities beyond their
usual amount, are stated in the following passage,
extracted from Mr. Horsley Palmer's pamphlet
before quoted.
" It may here perhaps be as well to explain the nature of
what are termed extra deposits, in order to show that they are
independent of the regular working of the Bank. They have
consisted of money belonging either to government or the East
India Company, altogether independent of their ordinary trans-
actions. The first arose out of the contract for the West India
loan, upon which a discount was allowed (by government), for
prompt payment, higher than the market rate of interest ; and
as the prompt payments thus made were not required for issue
to the West India claimants for several months afterwards, it
became necessary, in order to preserve the currency in the same state
as if the payments for the loan had not taken place, and to prevent
its undue contraction, to raise the money to the public.* This was
done by contract with the money dealers, so as to insure its re-
turn to the Bank at the time of the adjustment being made with
the claimants by the commissioners. It ought further to be
'borne in mind, that during the whole period of those loans the
foreign exchanges were high, increasing the quantity of gold in
the coffers of the Bank to a considerable extent ; a circumstance
which would have rendered it quite unjustifiable for the Bank to
have permitted a contraction of the currency by the prompt pay-
ments on account of the loan, and an advance in the rate of
interest to have been thus unnecessarily and forcibly effected to the
detriment of the commerce of the country.
" The second case was that of the East India Company real-
ising their commercial assets to an extent far exceeding their
ordinary wants for payment. Upon the commencement of the
accumulation, to the extent of 600,000/. or 700,000/. above their
ordinary balances, an application was made to the Bank to as-
certain whether it would undertake the risk of lending the
money, paying to the Company a given rate of interest ; if de-
clined, the Company were prepared to lend it themselves, having
received offers from some of the principal money dealers to take
* This and the other passages marked in italics, in this quota-
tion from Mr. Palmer's pamphlet, and in the subsequent quota-
tion from Mr. Norman's, are not so in the original ; and they
are here thus marked to draw attention to the particular parts
of the reasoning, which not only do not bear out the proposed
conclusions, but lead to the directly opposite.
1833—1837. 291
it. The question therefore simply was, whether the notes
should be paid away by the East India Company or the Bank ?
It never could be expected that the Bank should be required to pay
a rate of interest for notes or bullion belonging to others merely
for the sake of keeping them unemployed; having at the same
time no excess beyond the 24-^ millions of securities, which the
ordinary working deposits and circulation entitled that body to
hold. Hence it is evident, +that in the first case the Bank was,
for the benefit of commerce, required to re-issue the monies received
on account of the West India loan ; and that in the second, if
the Bank had not consented to advance the money, the East
India Company would have lent it themselves. The only point
therefore was one of management, namely, to keep the currency
from undue fluctuation, and to ensure the return of the notes
from the market at the periods when the government and the
Company required them for issue in the same direction, which
was effected to the letter."
And Mr. Norman, in a recent publication, en-
titled, " Remarks on Currency and Banking,"
containing many clear and just views on the general
subject treated of, endeavours, in the following
passage, to obviate the objections urged by Mr.
Loyd to Mi\ Palmer's argument in defence of the
increase of amount of securities, and to reconcile
that increase with the principles according to which
the directors, in their examinations by the Bank
Charter Committee, professed to regulate the cir-
culation.
" Mr. Loyd remarks upon the statement as given by Mr.
Palmer of securities held by the Bank, that it is an arbitrary
mode of making.up an account to produce a desired result ; im-
plying of course that the securities held against the money be-
longing to the East India Company, and that paid in on account
of the West India loan, and subsequently lent by the Bank,
ought to be considered as a portion of the securities, to which
the recognised principle of management is applicable, and that
consequently the whole or published amount of securities, as
being irregular, and often much larger than twenty-four millions,
evinced, on the part of the Bank of England, a great deviation
from this principle.
" Now it must be recollected that the sum of twenty -four
millions was assumed as the proper amount to be held in secu-
rities upon a view of an amount of circulation and deposits, of
which the deposits in question formed no part, and when their
existence was not even contemplated. Owing to the realisation
of the Company's commercial assets, its balance very greatly
U 2
PRICES AND CIRCULATION
exceeded the usual amount, and the East India directors na-
turally determined to make the excess productive. The Bank
borrowed and employed this excess for fixed periods, taking care
that the money dealers to whom it was lent should be pledged
to repayment at the precise moment when the money was
wanted by the authorities in Leadenhall Street. It was con-
sidered, and surely with reason, that by taking the entire man-
agement of this kind of transaction the Bank would insure
the least possible interference with the currency and money
market, especially as the India Company is unused to such
affairs. Had the Bank taken the money, paid interest for it,
and not re-loaned it, for the sake of apparently, but not really,
adhering to its principle of management, and the amount of
securities originally fixed in accordance with it, viz. twenty-four
millions, a sum amounting sometimes to three or four millions
would have been abstracted unnaturally from the currency of the
metropolis, to the serious inconvenience of the public.
" The reasoning applicable to the employment of the Com-
pany's money tells with increased force on that derived from
the West India loan. Had the Bank determined to hold to the
fixed amount of securities in the autumn of 1835, the conse-
quence would have been that almost the whole currency of the me-
tropolis would have been found within its coffers. We may be
told that this could not have happened ; that the notes would
have oozed out* through the discount-office to a greater or less
extent, and the amount of securities been pro tan to augmented.
This is doubtless true ; but would not such a forced action have
interfered materially with the natural play of the currency and
the ordinary affairs of business ? while hardly any inconvenience
was felt under the course pursued, viz. an offer of advances at a
rate of interest calculated to call for, and which did indeed call
for, nearly the exact amount of the loan, such advances being
repayable at the periods when the compensation was to be dis-
bursed to the proprietors of slaves. The whole transaction
thus described appears to be creditable to the Bank, rather
than deserving of blame ; and it seems equally clear that Mr.
Palmer was fully justified in omitting all reference to the West
* The notes would not have merely oozed out, they would
freely have flowed out, if the Bank continued its rate of discount
at 4 per cent. ; while, by keeping its deposits without re-
issue, a slight pressure had been kept upon the money market.
The probability is, that, in that way, nearly the same amount of
circulation might have been preserved, while, by a moderate
advance in the rate of interest, some part of the undue exten-
sion of credit might have been avoided ; and, instead of inter-
fering with the natural play of the currency, it would have
preserved it ; whereas, the course adopted was a forced action,
and was among the causes of the disturbance of the natural play
of the currency.
1833—1837- 293
India loan, as well as to the India Company's extra deposits, in
his statement of securities."
It is with the most unfeigned deference to the
high practical authorities on banking matters, by
whom the defence of the Bank on this occasion
has been put forth, that I feel bound to say that
they have, according to the best judgment which
I have been able to form, upon a review of the
controversy connected with those publications,
failed wholly in making out a case of justification,
whether according to the principle which has been
held out as guiding the Bank, or according to any
consistent view of maintaining the convertibility
of the paper with the smallest disturbance of .the
amount and value of the currency.
The classification of deposits, whether they be go-
vernment deposits, or working deposits, or bankers'
deposits, or extra deposits, may be, and doubtless
is, convenient, if not absolutely necessary, in en-
abling the directors to judge of the probable perma-
nence or fluctuation of the amount so deposited,
and to make their internal arrangements accord-
ingly. If the entire amount of the deposits were
permanent, the whole of the action, as it is called,
of the public upon the position of the Bank, would
be through the medium of bullion paid in against
notes, or of notes claimed against bullion, while
the Bank would have an entire control over the
amount of its paper beyond that which had its
exact equivalent in bullion, through the medium
of securities. On the other hand, in proportion
as the deposits are of a variable character, will be
the power of the public to modify or counteract
any effort on the part of the Bank to contract or
extend its issues of notes through the medium of
securities. But the nature of the deposits, although
it may render certain descriptions of securities *
* The circumstance which both Mr. Palmer and Mr. Norman
introduce into their explanation of the grounds on which these
U S
294 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
more or less eligible, does not in the slightest de-
gree affect the question of the amount of the se-
curities which the Bank ought, with a reference to
the due amount of the circulation and the value
of the currency, to hold.
There does not appear to be the shadow of a
ground upon which the distinction of the extra
deposits, as constituting a separate fund for invest-
ment in securities, can be maintained. The dis-
tinction attempted rests simply and solely upon
assertion ; there is nothing like an argument
offered in support of it that admits of being grap-
pled with ; and the assertion, therefore, of the
compatibility of the increase of the securities in
the autumn of 1835 and winter of 1835-6 with
the rule professed by the Bank, can be met only
by a denial of any grounds for the distinction by
which that compatibility is attempted to be main-
tained.
But if the distinction were worth any thing, and
if those deposits admitted of being applied to an
increase of the securities without a violation of
the system professed by the Bank, it would be a
further and a more important question to consider,
whether such application of those deposits was
consistent with a view to the public interest, in the
maintenance of the circulation in a sound and sa-
tisfactory state. If the increase of the securities
had been with the avowed object of improving the
means of keeping up a dividend for the proprietors,
the motive would have been intelligible. But that
is not the motive assigned, and there is every
extra deposits, as they are called, were re-issued in the shape
of loans to the money dealers, namely, that the repayments
were stipulated, and punctually fulfilled, so as to meet the
exact periods of the claims of the depositors, has nothing to
do with the question of the regulation of the currency as re-
lates to the public. It was a mere question of convenience to
the Bank.
1833—1837. 295
reason to give credit to the directors for their
having been guided only by a view to the interests
of the public. It is at least only on public grounds
that the measure of the great augmentation of the
securities in 1835-6 has been justified in the
publications alluded to. And, strangely enough,
some of the very consequences which it was de-
sirable to produce, with a view to a more satis-
factory and safe position of the Bank, seeing, as
the directors admit they did, the impending
dangers to which it was exposed, were precisely
'those which it is stated distinctly to have been the
object of the measure to counteract. The motive
expressly assigned for the re-issue of those deposits
is, that the retention of them would have caused
a contraction of the currency, and a rise of the
rate of interest. In this statement of motives, the
point in question is assumed by the terms applied.
The term undue is applied to the contraction which
it was one of the professed objects of the re- issue
to prevent. And it is asserted that an advance of
the rate of interest, which would have been the
consequence of a retention of the deposits, would
have been unnecessarily and forcibly effected to the
detriment of the commerce of the country. It is
difficult to conceive a greater misapplication of
terms ; for, upon a full view of the actual and
prospective circumstances, "the gathering clouds,"
as they then presented themselves, the very oppo-
site terms should have been applied. The reten-
tion of the deposits would have effected a due
contraction, and would have caused an advance of
the rate of interest, without an effb?*t, and almost
imperceptibly, to the great benefit of the commerce
of the country, which suffered so essentially by the
course that was unfortunately adopted.
It seems hardly to admit of a doubt, after all
the memorable experience of events in the two
years following the autumn of 1835, that a mo-
u 4 -
296 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
derate rise of the rate of interest at that time, con-
tinued with perhaps a slightly increasing pressure
for some months after, would have exercised a very
salutary influence, and would greatly have miti-
gated, although it might not have altogether pre-
vented, the subsequent fluctuations in the money
market, and in the state of credit, and in such of
the markets for produce as were connected with
the. state of credit. Such rise in the rate of interest
must infallibly, as far as it went, have diminished the
facility, consequently the extent, of negotiations of
foreign securities, and of the financial arrangements
of the banks of the United States, all tending to
the efflux of capital from this country. It would
also have tended to abate the eagerness which was
manifesting itself to adventure in joint-stock banks,
one great inducement to which was specifically the
low rate of interest. But more especially would
a moderate pressure on the money market, caused
as it would have been by the absorption of the pay-
ments from the West India loan without re-issue,
have circumscribed within much narrower limits
the power of re-discount by the joint-stock banks,
which some of them exercised so mischievously.
It is highly probable, too, that an earlier manifest-
ation of a tendency to a pressure for money, which
was felt so severely a few months later, would
have restrained the extravagance of extent to which
credits were granted in America upon this country,
and which led, at the close of 1836, and in the first
six months of 1837, to so serious a derangement
of our commercial intercourse, not only with the
United States, but also with British America.
And is it not clear that it was the inevitable tend-
ency of the course unfortunately adopted by the
Bank to produce the very opposite effects ? Is it not
notorious that the money dealers were thus fur-
nished with an unusual command of funds, which
enabled them, as they had every inducement, to
1833—1837. 297
discount almost ad libitum the vast amount of bills
which came to them with the joint-stock bank
or other undoubted indorsements ? And is it not
natural to suppose that the houses in the American
trade were, by the extraordinary facility of credit
then existing in this country, misled into entering
into engagements to an extent that they never
could have contemplated, if they had not relied
upon a continuance of the same facilities of the
money market as prevailed in the latter part of
1835 and the beginning of 1836 ? As to the state-
ment that the exchanges were high in the winter
and spring of 1835-6, increasing the quantity of
gold in the coffers of the Bank, the simple answer
is, that they were not high enough, and had not
continued so long enough, to restore the treasure
to the state from which it had fallen in the pre-
ceding two years, and to which it ought to have
been raised, looking to the liabilities, attended with
such contingencies as required a very full treasure
to face them.
As far as relates to the West India deposits, there
may perhaps be supposed to be less difficulty than
in the case of the East India loan of coming to
the conclusion that the sums so received ought
not, under the circumstances described, to have
been re-issued.
On the part of the Bank, it is contended that
the East India Company was prepared to have lent
the money to other parties, if the Bank had not
consented to take the amount on loan for a certain
time on interest, and that it could not be expected
that the Bank should be required to pay interest
for notes or bullion belonging to others, merely for
the sake of keeping them unemployed. The ex-
pectation, however, that the Bank should so have
kept them is not quite so unreasonable as seems
to be supposed. The question of the propriety of
their so doing would depend upon the degree in
PRICES AND CIRCULATION
which it might be desirable to keep down, or to con-
tract, the circulation, through the medium of the se-
curities ; and if, seeing the "gathering clouds," and
justly apprehending the consequences, it had then
been judged expedient, as a measure of precaution,
to contract the circulation, there were no means so
ready, and none so little calculated to disturb the
money market, as simply not to re-issue the amount
of the loan. For, suppose that the East India
Company had, without any previous offer to the
Bank, lent the money in the market ; if the Bank
at that time was so situated as to make the con-
traction of its circulation, by a diminution of its
securities, desirable, the opportunity would have
been considered favourable for selling exchequer
bills, or realising any other securities held by the
Bank to the same amount ; and still more favour-
able the opportunity, and more advantageous than
any sale of securities, to effect the object, would
have been the retention, instead of a re-issue, of the
amount of the loan at a low interest from the East
India Company.
The whole question of the propriety of that re-
issue turns upon the expediency, greater or less, of
a contraction of the circulation in contemplation
of the extraordinary circumstances which, by the
avowal of the directors, were such as to common
observers bore a threatening aspect as regarded the
eventual position of the Bank.
This question has not been answered on the
part of the Bank. The directors seem to have
thought it more incumbent upon them to justify
their attempt to contract the circulation, by raising
the rate of discount in July, 1836, than to account
for their not having made the effort at least six
months sooner. Thus, in the apology for the Bank
before quoted, it is observed, at page 36., with re-
ference to the advance of the rate of interest in
the summer of 1836 : '* Adverting to the excess
1833—1837. 299
of the country issues, and looking to the race run-
ning with increased violence in Ireland, as well as
England, the Bank was fully justified in arresting
the evil which might attend a continuance of the
export of bullion from the redundancy of money,
by making an advance in the rate of interest in
London, and at the branch banks. In fact, the
only question about which there can be any diffi-
culty is, whether she ought not to have taken this
step somewhat earlier." Most assuredly there can
be no difficulty in answering this question, by any
one who saw the gathering clouds ; and that answer
would be, that the step ought to have been taken
much earlier. But, it is added, " To have acted
in anticipation of events likely to occur, would
have been in direct violation of that principle upon
which the Bank professed to be guided, and which
parliament had tacitly sanctioned. It would, more-
over, have established a precedent, and imposed
future responsibilities upon the directors, which it
is questionable whether they should ever incur,
either upon their own account or that of the public."
It is, I confess, inconceivable how, seeing as they
did " the gathering clouds," their acting in anti-
cipation of the storm by taking the obvious pre-
caution of keeping down their circulation, by a
reduction, or at least a limitation of their securities,
so as to bring their stock of bullion to a nearer
proportion to their liabilities, could be considered
as a violation of the principle upon which the Bank
professed to be guided. This is as much as to say
that they sinned with their eyes open, because upon
principle they were expected to act as if their eyes
had been shut.
But, when the drain on the coffers of the
Bank was taking place to an extent and under
circumstances which could not leave a doubt as to
the urgency of the occasion for taking effectual
measures to contract the circulation, so as to stop
the drain, the steps taken were totally inadequate
300
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
£
£
17,899,000"
Securities
27,153,000
13,810,000
Bullion
7,362,000
17,940,000'
' Securities
28,315,000
1 4,495,000
Bullion
6,926,000
18,061, 000 :
Securities
29,345,000
14,796,000
Bullion
6,325,000
1 8,147,000 '
Securities
29,400,000
13,324,000
Bullion
5,719,000
to the object. The advance in the Bank rate of
discount to 4j per cent, in July, 1836, coming so
late as it did, and when the circumstances deter-
mining the efflux of the metals had acquired such
force, had not apparently the slightest effect in
reducing the securities or contracting the circula-
tion. Indeed, the securities were considerably,
and the circulation in a slight degree, actually in-
creased in the face of a continued drain from evi-
dently deep-seated causes. This will appear on a
comparison of the four following monthly returns.
1836.
June 28, Circulation
Deposits
July 26. Circulation
Deposits
Aug. 24. Circulation
Deposits
Sept. 21. Circulation
Deposits
It is utterly impossible by any analysis of the
kinds of securities, or of the nature of the deposits,
or of the proportion between the London and the
branch Bank of England issues, to explain away
the glaring inconsistency which the above compa-
rison exhibits between the state of the circulation
as it was administered, and that which ought to have
been its state, if it had been administered according
to any recognised rale for the administration of a
convertible paper currency. It is not only at va-
riance with what it would have been, if the circu-
lation had been so regulated, as to expand and
contract with the variations of the amount of bul-
lion, but is quite irreconcileable with the principle
professed by the Bank directors of keeping their
securities even. If they had been so kept, it is
clear that a considerable reduction of the liabilities
must have been the result, and consequently an earlier
pressure on the money market, and a retardation if
not a stop to the drain. Even admitting the mon-
strous assumption, founded upon the distinction of
1833—1837- 301
the deposits, by which an amount of no less than
about 44 millions is gratuitously and arbitrarily
deducted from the securities actually held by the
Bank, it appears that there was, even after deduct-
ing those 4t£ millions, an increase of the securities
precisely in the interval in which the indications
were most urgent for a reduction ; for instance,
28 June, 1836 - s£ 22,600,000
27 Sept. — 24,800,000
I must confess that the more I have endeavoured
to understand the explanations on the part of the
Bank, the more unintelligible do I find them.
Thus, after the passage already quoted, contain-
ing a disclaimer on the part of the directors of
being bound to act in anticipation of events, is the
following : —
" The large amount of money deposited at in-
terest with the Bank, by the East India Company,
for a limited period, and which was lent to the
money dealers in London, afforded considerable
facilities for rendering the rise in the rate of interest
immediately effective ; the object was not one of
profit to the Bank, but to enforce that contraction,
and to establish that general rate of interest which,
but for the undue increase of the issues of the
joint-stock banks and others in England and Ire-
land, should have followed the export of bullion."
If the large amount of money deposited at in-
terest with the Bank of England, by the East India
Company, had not been lent out by the Bank, I
can understand how it would have afforded facilities
for rendering the rise in the rate of interest imme-
diately effective ; but how, when lent out again, as
it was, it could afford such facilities, is not very
intelligible. The following passage is in immediate
continuation of that above quoted : —
" The course thus taken by the Bank was, in
the first instance, counteracted by the other issuers
of paper money in England, Ireland, and Scotland.
The demand for bullion continuing, the Bank fur-
302 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
ther advanced the rate of interest in August to 5L
per cent, per annum, which forced additional se-
curities upon many of those country banks that
adhered to a lower rate. Their surplus funds in
London being soon absorbed, they all eventually
adopted the rate of interest established in London.
There was, however, an effect created by this act
on the part of the Bank far more powerful than
the actual advance in the value of money. It was
a moral apprehension, in all prudent minds, that
there was mischief abroad ; and those who had
been promoting and applauding the action of the
joint-stock banks began to doubt the solidity of the
system."
The inferences afforded by this passage form the
strongest possible condemnation of the conduct of
the Bank prior to the advance of the rate of dis-
count to 5 per cent, in August, 1836. It is quite
clear that, if that measure had been adopted as
much earlier as it ought to have been, or if some
still more cogent measures had been taken, as they
might have been, when it was no longer a question
of anticipation, but when all the symptoms of a
circulation surcharged with paper and credit had
become manifest, some part of the subsequent
mischief might have been averted. It is ex-
pressly stated in the foregoing extract, that, al-
though the course taken by the Bank was coun-
teracted in the first instance by the other issuers of
paper money, their funds in London wrere soon
absorbed, and they all eventually adopted the rate
of interest established in London ; and that, what
was of more importance, a moral apprehension was
excited by that course, in all prudent minds, that
there was mischief abroad. This proves that the
Bank had the power of eventually controlling and
limiting the country circulation ; and it further
affords fair grounds of inference, that the Bank, by
the opposite course, which it unfortunately adopted
in the autumn of 1835, cannot have failed of
1833—1837. 303
facilitating the extension of country paper and
credit.
But the advance of the Bank rate to 5 per cent,
in August, 1836, although salutary as far as it went,
had been too long delayed to be effectual in re-
ducing the securities, thence contracting the cir-
culation, and thus stopping the drain of bullion.
The increased applications for discount at the ad-
vanced rate would, if they had been complied with
to their full extent, have greatly increased the se-
curities and the circulation, and thus have hastened
the efflux of bullion. Some accessary measures
were adopted by the Bank.* Not only were all
bills that were presented, having an indorsement'by
joint-stock banks of issue, rejected, but a large pro-
portion of the immense amount of bills drawn from
America on, and accepted by, several first-rate
establishments in this country, were thrown out
without any regard to the circumstance that the
acceptors were considered to be of the most
unquestionable solidity. This proceeding of the
Bank in London was followed by an intimation,
on the part of its branch bank in Liverpool,
that no paper drawn from America on certain
houses would be discounted. This intimation, to
* The resource of selling exchequer bills had failed by the
fall of the market for these securities to a discount, and a great
outcry was raised against the Chancellor of the Exchequer for
not having funded some portion of them, but more especially
for not raising the rate of interest upon them. One ground of
the clamour was, that the Bank, in consequence of not being
able to sell exchequer bills, was obliged to limit its accommodation
to trade, in the way of discounts, below what it might otherwise
have done. The interest on exchequer bills was eventually
raised ; but it is to be hoped that it was on financial grounds
only that it was so raised; for it would be a monstrous and most
mischievous doctrine, that as long as the paper currency is ad-
ministered independently of the direct control of government,
the arrangement of the finances should be influenced in the
slightest degree, with a view to relieve the banking or mercan-
tile interests from the consequences of overtrading.
304 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
which a good deal of publicity was given (acciden-
tally I believe), had considerable effect in extending
the feeling of apprehension, and the tendency to
commercial discredit, which were already beginning
to prevail.
After September, 1836, the state of discredit of
some of the most mismanaged of the joint-stock
banks, with the apprehension arising from the
measures taken by the Bank of England, having
had the effect of inducing both the town and the
country bankers to increase their reserves, the de-
mand for gold for export appears to have abated,
if not wholly to have ceased, and to have given
way to an internal demand which kept up the drain
of bullion from the Bank, so that the treasure was
in a state of progressive diminution.
In November, 1836, the Agricultural and Com-
mercial Bank in Ireland suspended its payments ;
and at the close of the month the embarrassments of
a very considerable joint-stock bank in Manchester,
the Northern and Central, established so recently
as 1834., with a paid-up capital of about 700? OOO/.,
and with about forty branches, had become so
pressing as to occasion an application to the Bank
of England for assistance, which was granted. If
the Bank of England had been in the position in
which it ought to have been, namely, with a due
proportion of bullion to its liabilities, there is little
doubt that its policy would have been, or ought to
have been, a refusal of interference. For, whe-
ther with a view to the interests of the Bank pro-
prietors, to whom the extension and competition
of the joint-stock bank system was most obnoxious,
or to the interests of the public who were con-
cerned in repressing some of the mischievous ten-
dencies of that system, the Bank ought not to have
interfered; and the only justification of that inter-
ference which ought to have any weight has been
that it was a measure on the part of the Bank of
self-preservation.
1833—1837- 305
The treasure of the Bank being at that time so
low, so culpably low, it became a mattei of very
serious consideration whether, if the Northern and
Central Bank were suffered to fall, as it ought to
have been, the state of discredit of the country
circulation, consequent on that failure, might not
have been such as to have created a run for gold,
which might speedily exhaust its scanty remaining
stock. There is great reason, with the benefit of
experience since derived, to doubt whether, if the
Northern and Central Bank had been suffered to
undergo the penalty which the gross mismanage-
ment of its direction so amply merited, and the
benefit of example so strongly required, the Bank
of England would have experienced any great
additional drain. There had, throughout the pres-
sure on the money market, both in town and coun-
try, during the whole period from the summer of
1836 to the autumn of 1837, not been the vestige
of any thing like discredit of Bank of England
notes ; and this being the case, the clause of the
Bank Charter Act, rendering Bank of England
notes a tender from all but the Bank itself, came
beneficially into operation.*
In Ireland, on occasion of the failure of the
Agricultural Bank, and of a run upon some of the
others, there was a great demand for gold. It was
doubted whether the legal tender clause was appli-
cable to that part of the United Kingdom ; and if
the point had been clear in the affirmative, it is
* It has been supposed by some persons whose opinions pos-
sess great weight, that the legal tender clause had been one
among other causes, of the undue extension of paper and credit
by the country bankers ; but I confess that I am quite at a loss
to conceive how it could have had the slightest tendency to that
effect, while in the critical state of the circulation, in the last
six months of 1836, it cannot but on all hands be admitted to
have operated exactly in the beneficial way which was contem-
plated when that provision was inserted in the Bank Charter
Act.
VOL. II. X
306 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
probable that there would still have been a demand
for gold, although not to the same extent. But
in the great majority of the cases of English
country banks, whether joint-stock or private, the
probability is, that any run upon them, in con-
sequence of the failure of the Northern and Cen-
tral Bank, would have been attended with more
of a demand for Bank of England notes than
for gold. In every point of view, therefore, the
interference of the Bank was detrimental to the
interests both of its proprietors and of the public.
The Bank has by that interference done more to
increase the competition of the joint-stock banks
with itself, and to perpetuate and extend whatever
of evil is attached to the system, than any legisla-
tive regulations which can be devised are likely to
counteract.
The determination of the Bank of England to
support the Northern and Central, took place on
the 1st of December, 1836. But the pressure on
the money market, notwithstanding the publicity
of that determination, went on increasing, and yet
the drain on the Bank coffers continued, chiefly
by a demand for gold in Ireland. Still, with
the exception of some failures in London, of no
great extent, nor apparently originating in the im-
mediate pressure of the money market, there had
been thus far but little of commercial discredit.
It was not till the commencement of 1837 that
doubts began to prevail of the adequateness of the
resources of the principal houses in the American
trade, vast as those resources were known to be, to
meet the enormous, the extravagant extent of their
engagements. In February, the difficulties of those
houses had become matter of notoriety, and it became
known in the beginning of March that assistance
had been applied for and given by the Bank of
England to three of the principal establishments
in the American trade. On the propriety of that
1833—1837. 307
assistance being granted, on the extent to which
it went beyond that which had been contemplated
when the application was first made, and on the
departure by the Bank from its rules, in the footing
on which its advances to these houses were made,
I will not enter, as the discussion would involve
personal feelings and considerations which I should
wish to avoid.
The advances thus made to the Northern and
Central Bank, in the first instance, and subsequently
to the American houses, had the effect of greatly
increasing the amount of the securities held by the
Bank. The greatest reduction pf treasure had
occurred in February, 1837. Thenceforward there
appears to have been a slow but progressive influx
of bullion. The circulation of the Bank under-
went comparatively very little alteration during
the remainder of the year. The state of com-
mercial discredit, however, was very great through-
out the first six months of 1837. In January
there had been a heavy failure in the silk trade.
In February and March the difficulties of the
American houses were exciting general attention,
and a distrust of consequences. And as it ap-
peared, soon after the first assistance had been given,
that further and almost indefinite advances on the
part of the Bank would be required to carry the
houses through their difficulties, a great and in-
creasing anxiety prevailed on the subject among
the commercial circles. The accounts from the
United States of America, of great and increasing
pressure on their money market, which rendered
more precarious the prospect of the speedy liquida-
tion of the sums due from thence to the embarrassed
houses on this side, added to the gloom and ap-
prehension prevailing here in the spring of that
year. By the end of May the embarrassed Ame-
rican houses were again driven to the necessity of
applying to the Bank for further assistance \ but
308 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
not having sufficient security to offer, and the pre-
vious advances already amounting to much more
than had been contemplated, the application was,
after much and anxious deliberation on the part of
the directors, finally refused, Upon the final re-
jection of the application, namely, on the 1st June,
1837, the three great houses to whom the previous
assistance had been granted, suspended their pay-
ments. These were followed within a few days
by other houses, chiefly in the same branch of
trade, but on a smaller scale of engagements. The
week immediately following the 1st June, 1837,
may be considered as that which is designated as
the period of panic ; and there was more or less of
uneasiness and pressure through the remainder of
the month. Thenceforward, or very soon after,
there was an improved tone of commercial feeling.
The great mass of doubtful paper and credit having
been removed, or much reduced, the circulation
was restored to a healthy state. Markets being no
longer supposed to be bolstered by undue credit,
became buoyant for those articles which had been
most under the influence of the previous discredit;
and the general trade of the country had, by the
autumn, and in the closing months of 1837, revived
to a considerable extent. The influx of gold, since
last summer, has been more rapid than the pre-
vious efflux ; and as only a twelvemonth ago the
Bank was encumbered with securities, and drained
of its treasure, so it has recently become bare of
securities, and its coffers overflowing.
The Bank having scrambled through its diffi-
culties into a position of safety, may naturally claim
merit from the event.
There were, however, two circumstances of pos-
sible, and not at all improbable occurrence, in the
reduced state of the Bank coffers, between the
summer of 1836 and the summer of 1837, which
might have rendered the position of the Bank still
1833—1837- 309
more critical than it was, and rendered its escape
from suspension more doubtful.
One of the contingences alluded to was that of
a bad harvest in 1836. If the weather in the south
of the kingdom had been as adverse for the secur-
ing of the crops as it had been in the north, where
^he inclemency of the season was little short of
that of 1816, the necessity for a large importation
of foreign corn, but more especially the exaggerated
apprehension of the largeness of the supplies re-
quisite, would have operated powerfully in depress-
ing the exchanges, and consequently in aggravating
the other causes of drain on the Bank coffers.
The other contingency was of a still more formid-
able description, namely, that of the banks in the
United States of America having taken all the mea-
sures of precaution which were open to them, and
which they ought to have availed themselves of, for
putting themselves into a position of security, not
only against the effects of the President's celebrated
specie circular, which was issued in July, 1836, but
also against the effects, which must have been ob-
vious to them soon after, of the tendency to a con-
traction of the currency in this country. The
clear and proper course for them to have pursued
was resolutely to contract their liabilities ; and if
they had done so to the requisite extent, the ex-
changes must have been in such degree and dura-
tion against this country as would have gone far
towards the exhaustion of the reduced treasure of
the Bank of England. To their great discredit
they did not adopt measures of due precaution,
and we have seen the consequences in their dis-
graceful suspension. It would be foreign, however,
to the purpose of this work, to enter upon the
question of the American banking system ; the
only reason for this incidental reference to it has
been to point out how narrow was the escape of
the Bank of England, and how much more than to
x 3
310 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
its own merit in the escape was owing to the de-
merit of the American banks.
In the question immediately before us, it is re-
quisite, preparatory to entering upon the examina-
tion of the connection of the state of the general
circulation with prices in the period now under
consideration, to bestow a few words upon the
degree in which the currency was affected by the
issues and credits of the joint-stock and private
country banks.
Public attention has been drawn in an especial
manner, within these two years, to the great ex-
tension which the system of joint-stock banking has
experienced, and to the abuse of credit which, in
some flagrant instances, has marked its progress.
There has been much of want of knowledge,
and of want of principle, and of recklessness of
consequences, in the management of some of those
establishments, which have acquired an unhappy
notoriety ; and there has, apparently, been a per-
vading want of prudence in the regulation of the
issues, and in the circulation and re-discount of
bills of exchange, and in the credits granted by,
perhaps, a majority of them.
As regards the issue of notes, there can be no
doubt that it comes distinctly within the province
of regulation by the state. With regard to the
other functions of the banks, they do not come
necessarily within the cognizance of the legislature;
but, in as far as they require, for the convenience
of management, certain facilities and privileges
which can only be conferred by parliament,
they become amenable to such restrictions and re-
gulations as, in the view of the public interest,
the legislature may think proper to impose as
the condition of the privileges conferred. It is
very proper therefore, seeing the abuses of credit
which have prevailed, that the whole question of
the system of joint-stock banking has become the
1833—1837. 311
subject of enquiry by a committee of the House of
Commons. That the system has been attended
with much abuse, and that it requires correction
and regulation, cannot admit of any reasonable
doubt ; but I am inclined to think that there has
been some exaggeration in the charges brought
against the joint-stock banks, as to the degree in
which they may be supposed to have interfered
with the due action of the Bank of England, and to
have been mainly instrumental in producing the
fluctuations of credit, and of prices, which have
occurred within the period now under consider-
ation.
In some instances, the increase of the issues of
notes by the joint-stock banks has been held out,
by implication, as the measure of the addition
made by them to the circulation. But the fact is,
that some of the private banks had merged into
joint-stock banks. The issues of the private banks,
probably from this cause, underwent some dimi-
nution, while those of the joint-stock banks were
extended ; and it is only the aggregate of the
issues, by the private as well as the joint-stock
banks, that is to be considered in its effects on the
value of the currency. In this view there does
not appear to be such extravagance of excess in
the country circulation as has been charged.
If the joint-stock banks only be taken, the in-
crease would appear to be very considerable : thus,
Dec. 26, 1835 - - s£2,799,551
June 25, 1836 3,588,064
Dec. 31,1836 4,258,197
being at the rate of 50 per cent, within the twelve-
month.
But if the aggregate issues of the joint-stock and
private country banks be taken, namely,
Dec. 26, 1835 - - s£ll, 134,414
June 25, 1836 12,202,196
Dec. 31, 1836 - 12,011,697
x 4
312 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
it will appear, that the total increase, at the end of
the twelvemonth, was not quite 8 per cent., while,
between June and December, there had actually
been a diminution. And on what grounds the in-
crease from December, 1835, to June, 1836, can be
charged as any very great or blameable excess,
is not very clear. The Bank of England itself,
during the greater part of the corresponding in-
terval, had been enlarging its securities, and in-
creasing its issues ; and the monthly returns indi-
cated no reduction worth mentioning of bullion at
the close of the month of May. The exchanges,
too, with the Continent of Europe, appeared to be
high. Down to June, therefore, which was the
earliest period at which the country banks could
have notice of any material change in the position
of the Bank of England, there was no obvious
ground on which they could consider themselves
called upon to contract their circulation ; sup-
posing even that they had professed themselves to
be, and had, in fact, been guided by a view to the
position of the Bank of England and the state of
the exchanges.
But, in truth, when so called upon, they appear
to have attended to the call, inasmuch as in the
quarter ending on the 24th September, 1836, they
had reduced their issues by nearly 500,000/., while
the returns of the Bank of England circulation
exhibit no corresponding reduction. Thus, taking
the nearest corresponding dates, the comparison of
the circulation will stand thus : —
1836. Bank of England. Country Banks.
July 2. ^18,315,000 June 25. ,=£12,202,196
Sept. 22. 18,240,000 Sept. 24-. 11,733,945
The Bank circulation, as above stated, is from
the Gazette returns ; but, in a comparative state-
ment, contained in Mr. Norman's pamphlet, page
77., the average circulation of the Bank is stated
to have been,
1833—1837. 313
June 25, 1836 - ^17,184,000
Sept. 20, — - 18,147,000
Here, in this most critical period, when a con-
traction was imperatively enjoined, there is an in-
crease of a million, while the issues of the country
banks had experienced a reduction of nearly half a
million.
Can there, then, be the shadow of a pretence
for the charge, that the issues of the country banks
interfered with any efforts by the bank of England
to bring within due bounds the total amount of
the currency ? The sinning party, if there were
such, down to this period, was clearly the Bank of
England.
There was an increase of the country bank is-
sues at the close of December, 1836, as compared
with September preceding, although only to the
small amount of between 2QO,000/. and 300,000/.,
while the issues of the Bank of England had been
contracted.
But this increase proves nothing as to any
counteraction, by the joint-stock banks, of the ef-
forts of the Bank of England to arrest the drain
on its treasure. All demand for bullion for ex-
port had ceased, proving that there was no longer
any redundancy of the general circulation ; while
the fact that the country bank issues had been in-
creased, in however trifling a degree, in that pe-
riod of pressure and of tendency to commercial
discredit, proves that, with the exception of the
one or two notoriously mismanaged joint-stock
banks, and two or three minor private banks, which
failed about that time, there was no general dis-
credit, nor any thing like derangement of the
country circulation ; and it was well for the Bank
of England that such was the case, because, if
there had been any derangement of the country
circulation, approaching in extent that of 1825-6,
the drain upon the coffers of the Bank, to supply
314 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
the chasm, might, notwithstanding the legal tender
clause, have been to such an extent as, with the
effects of the superadded alarm, might greatly
have increased the difficulties of its position.
There is, therefore, not the semblance of a case
made out against the country bank issues of Eng-
land and Wales, as having thwarted the Bank of
England in the regulation of the currency, be-
tween December, 1835, and December, 1836.
But both Mr. Palmer and Mr. Norman intro-
duce into the discussion (being, as far as I am aware,
the first instance of such a reference) the state of
the country circulation of Ireland, as proving the
great tendency to excess, and the consequent coun-
teraction to the Bank of England.
Mr. Palmer states, that in Ireland the average
in June, 1834, was 1,300, OOO/., and in June, 1836,
was 2,300,000/.* Now, till June, 1836, there had
* Mr. Norman also remarks upon the extravagance of issues
of the Irish joint-stock and private banks, because, comparing
the half-years ending June, 1835, and June, 1836, they increased
their circulation from 1,713,000/. to 2,291, OOO/., or about 30 per
cent. This per-centage sounds very largely, but dwindles
to very little if it be confined to the aggregate of the issues
in Ireland, as it ought to be, for it would then fall somewhat
short of 10 per cent. : thus,
June 27, 1835 - - e£5, 140,000
June 25, 1836 - 5,629,000
And if the aggregate increase be taken from the 28th Decem-
ber, 1834-, when the total issues were 5,250,000/., the per-
centage of increase in June, 1836, would be little more than
6 per cent. I mention this because it strikes me that stress
has been too exclusively laid upon the amount of issues of notes,
whereas the great excess of some of the joint-stock banks, more
especially the Agricultural and Commercial Bank, was the un-
due extent and the objectionable nature of the securities upon
which they made advances. That the excess was not so much
in the circulation of notes as in the discounts and advances, may
be shown, not only by a reference to the enormous amount of
these as compared even with its notes, but by the circumstance
of the aggregate of notes in circulation in Ireland, including
those of the Bank of Ireland, having been increased, as it was at
the close of 1836, while the mere credit part of the circulation
was then greatly reduced.
1833—183?. 315
been, as I have already had occasion to observe,
no sufficient warning by the Gazette returns, nor
by any contraction of the Bank of England issues,
of any excess in the general circulation. But,
why go back to 1834? The whole question, in
strictness, turns upon the interval between the
autumn of 1835, and that of 1836; for, at the
close of 1835, and through the first three months
of 1836, the exchanges were rising, and bullion
flowing in, and the Bank of England gave so little
intimation of apprehension of excess, that it had
greatly enlarged its securities, and had actually in-
creased its circulation by upwards of 700,000/. :
for instance, the quarterly averages were,
Dec. 17, 1835 - - *£1 7,321, 000
April 5, 1836 18,063,000
By Mr. Norman's statement, the increase of the
Bank of England circulation appears to have been
greater : thus,
Dec. 26, 1835 - - ^16,564,000
March 26, 1836 - 17,699,000
At the same time, according to Mr. Norman's
statement, the whole increase of the Irish cir-
culation, including that of the Bank of Ireland,
had been only,
Dec. 26, 1835 - - ^5,334,000
June 25, 1836 - 5,629,000
This reference, therefore, on the part of the
Bank, to the excess of the issues in Ireland, as
contributing to disturb the action of the Bank of
England, is making mountains of molehills, be-
sides the inconsistency of having enlarged its
own issues contemporaneously.
But, although, upon a fair investigation, it does
not appear that there was any such excess of the
country bank issues of notes either in England,
or even in Ireland, as to justify the charge
brought against them of having, by those issues,
interfered with the due regulation of the cur-
316 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
rency by the Bank of England, the joint-stock
banks appear to have been instrumental in an
undue and mischievous extension of credit, by
discounts, and re-discounts, and advances on per-
sonal security. At the same time, it is an im-
portant fact, with reference to the vast mass of
bills of exchange which were the subject of dis-
count and re-discount, with the endorsements of
the joint-stock banks, that, in the collapse of cre-
dit which has followed the late excessive expansion,
there has been so little of failure or discredit, ex-
cepting among houses connected with the Ame-
rican trade, and excepting, of course, the two fla-
grant instances of the Agricultural and Commercial
Bank in Ireland, and the Northern and Central Bank
in Manchester. It is very probable that, in other
instances less flagrant, there may have been much
mismanagement, and much loss to the proprietors
by bad debts, from the improvidence with which
the credits must, in some instances, have been
granted. But still there is no doubt of the fact,
that no derangement whatever, analogous in kind,
or approaching in degree, to that which occurred
in 179^-3, 1796, 1810 to 1812, 1814 to 1816, and,
lastly, in 1825-6, is chargeable upon the country
circulation in 1836-7* And I must here con-
fess that this is a result different from that which I
had anticipated in the spring and summer of 1836,
when I heard, on all sides, of the immense mag-
nitude of the operations of the joint-stock banks.
That those operations were too extensive to be
consistent with a due regard, on the part of the
managers, for the interests of their proprietors and
the public ; that, in short, they participated too
much in the spirit of overtrading then prevalent ;
and, perhaps, in their turn, gave additional impulse
to that spirit, cannot, with the experience which
we have had, well be questioned. But the com-
parative exemption from failures, and from con-
1833—1837. 317
sequent disturbance of the circulation, under cir-
cumstances so trying as those which occurred a
twelvemonth ago, must, in fairness, be admitted to
form no slight ground for inference in favour of
the system on which the country bank establish-
ments, both private and joint-stock, have been con-
ducted since 1825-6. The private banks seem to
have profited by the lesson, Tind by the purification
which they then received ; and the joint-stock
banks appear, upon the whole, to have justified the
policy which led government and the legislature
to promote the establishment of them. How far
the principle of unlimited responsibility, which
(with the exception of the Bank of England and
the Bank of Ireland, and two of the chartered
banks of Scotland,) pervades the whole of the
banking system of this county, may have con-
tributed to the solidity which it has been proved,
by the ordeal it has recently passed through,
to possess, I will not stop to discuss, because it is
not within the immediate scope of this enquiry :
I will only on this point observe, that the system,
such as it is, stands out in pre-eminently advan-
tageous contrast to the discreditable exhibition of
the American banks, with their state charters and
limited responsibility.
But whatever may have been the merits or de-
merits of the system under which the circulation
has been regulated, the immediate question for con-
sideration is, how far it exercised an undue influ-
ence on prices within the period under examination ;
by undue influence being meant, its having caused
variations of prices greater, and therefore more in-
jurious, than would have occurred under a system
in which the regulation of the currency should
have been conducted with more regard to any re-
cognised principle than that which has been ob-
served in the management during the last five years.
If the description which has been given of the
318 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
state of markets, from the commencement of 1833
to the close of 1835, be referred to, it will be seen
that while one large class of articles was falling in
price, and was at the commencement of 1836 lower
than it had been for many years before, many im-
portant articles, chiefly the raw materials of manu-
factures, which had been most depressed in the
preceding epoch, had risen in price. This tendency
in opposite directions of classes of articles, consti-
tuting probably nearly equal values, forms a prima
facie presumption that the currency, as regarded"
its operation on prices, was in a quiescent state.
But, independently of that ground of presumption,
it has appeared, or admits of being satisfactorily
shown, that, in the case of the important classes of
produce which fell in price, there was a sufficient
cause in the excess of supply beyond the utmost
rate of consumption ; while, in every instance of
a rise of prices, the advance was (with the excep-
tion only of occasional isolated and short-lived
speculations, which are incidental to all markets)
not more than fairly proportioned, according to the
most sober mercantile reasoning, to the reduction
of stock which was in progress by a rate of con-
sumption outrunning the ordinary rate of supply.
In fact, the only interval in which there can be
any plausible ground for inferring the possibility of
a direct influence of the currency on prices, is con-
fined to the first six months of 1836. During that
short interval the prices of corn, and of some other
articles that had been most depressed, experienced
a considerable advance, at the same time that cot-
ton, silk, and other raw materials of manufactures,
and the metals, which had before been rising, ex-
perienced a still further rise. This state of simul-
taneously rising markets of the largest proportion
of the leading articles of consumption, coincident
as it was with an extraordinary spirit of speculation
directed to joint-stock companies, has served to
1833—1837. 319
countenance the impression that the markets for
produce, as well as the share markets, were under
the direct influence of an unduly enlarged circula-
tion. That the circulation was unduly enlarged
and redundant, and that the rate of interest was
unduly kept down, looking to what was going for-
ward in the United States of America, and in the
formation of joint-stock companies in this country,
I have already had occasion to observe. And there
is reason to believe that this state of the circulation,
although it had not excited, yet allowed of a greater
extension to the spirit of speculation in shares,
than would otherwise perhaps have taken place.
But very little if any part of the rise of articles
of produce in the spring of 1836 can be referred
to the state of the currency, inasmuch as, in the
case of every article that had risen, the state and
prospects of supply were such as, upon mercantile
grounds, in the opinion of the persons best ac-
quainted with the trade, fully justified the rise.*
The best proof that the rise was so justified, as
regarded the raw materials of manufactures, is, that
even at the advanced prices, there was apparently
an insufficient check to the consumption, which, at
the rate at which the manufacturers were proceed-
ing, threatened a complete exhaustion of stock
before the period of fresh arrivals to a sufficient
extent. And many of the manufacturers, including
those of the metals, had, as has already been noticed,
more orders on hand than, in several instances, they
could execute in the ordinary time. Of the grounds
for the rise in corn an explanation has already been
given.
But if the grounds stated for the advance of
prices in the spring of 1836 were not so obviously
* Silks may perhaps be considered as an exception, the article
having been purchased largely, and held on credit, by one house
which failed in January, 1837, and the sale of whose stock con-
tributed, with the forthcoming fresh supplies, to the subsequent
depression of the market.
320 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
adequate as they are, the presumption against any
direct operation of the circulation, and of the low
rate of interest, in having produced or maintained
that advance of prices, is the strongest possible on
another and a perfectly decisive ground. If the state
of the currency and the money market had been
the originating, or even a considerably co-operating
cause of the rise, the change in the money market,
and the contraction of the credit part of the circu-
lation, must have had an immediate effect in de-
pressing prices to the level from which they had
risen. Whereas from the beginning of July, 1836,
when the Bank raised the rate of discount, till
nearly the close of the year, being an interval of
extraordinary pressure on the money market, and
of contraction of credit, there was no great or
rapid fall, even of those articles which had attained
scarcity prices, and certainly no greater fall than
the additional actual and approaching supplies
warranted j and none but the articles which had
risen in consequence of deficient supplies, or, in
other words, of scarcity, and which therefore na-
turally fell when the deficiency was about being
made up, experienced any fall.
Indeed, it must be within the recollection of
most mercantile men, as it is distinctly within my
own, that in the summer, and till a late period in
the autumn of 1836, it was a common topic of
remark, accompanied by an expression of surprise,
that, seeing the great and increasing pressure on
the money market, and the vague apprehension
then prevalent of coming mischief, there was so
little pressure on the markets for produce, some
being actually rising, and that there was thus far
so little of commercial discredit or failure. The ex-
planation that then presented itself was, that the
stocks of goods on hand were still very moderate,
while the demand from the manufacturers was
going on at the accustomed rate ; and that there
1833—1837- 321
was no ground for commercial discredit, because
there had been no such fall of prices as to entail
heavy losses. A large proportion, the largest in
amount, did not decline at all, while some of the
most considerable, corn for instance, rose progres-
sively in price through the whole of the pressure
in the money market, from July to December,
1836. This circumstance is the more to be ob-
served, because by some persons who have treated
of events connected with the pressure on the
money market in the last six months of 1836,
while denying that the regulation of the Bank
issues had any influence, the mere rise in the rate
of discount is supposed to have caused a general
fall of prices; and by other persons the fall of prices,
although admitted not to have been general, is
ascribed to a contraction of the Bank issues.
But, although so little if any of the variations
of the prices of produce before December, 1836,
can be traced to the influence of the circulation,
the extreme depression which occurred in the
markets for some important articles, in the interval
between the commencement and the autumn of
1837, m&y be considered as having been influenced
in some degree directly, but in a greater degree
indirectly, by the circulation and the state of the
money market.
The high prices in 1835 and 1836, of cotton,
silk, and other raw materials, and the prevailing
opinion that the supplies from existing sources
could not keep pace with the rate of consumption,
unless at permanently higher prices, held out strong
inducements to bring forward the utmost quantities
obtainable. And such being the strength of the
motives for making every effort to bring forward
greatly increased supplies, the low rate of interest,
and the facilities of credit in this country, allowed
of higher prices being paid abroad, and of conse-
VOL. II. Y
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
quently bringing forward larger than the usual
quantities.
It was the falling due in 1837 of a great part of
the bills drawn, upon the large credits against ship-
ments made, or to be made, which contributed to
the commercial embarrassments that marked the
commencement of that year ; and the forced sales
required to meet those engagements, in the con-
tracted state of the circulation and of credit which
then existed, would naturally create an extreme
depression. This was the case especially with
cottons and silks. And as the demand for manu-
factured goods for shipments to America, under
the influence of the overtrading which prevailed
there, contributed to the rise of prices here, in 1836,
so the suspension or great abatement of that de-
mand operated necessarily to a considerable extent
in depressing the prices of the raw materials * of
the manufactured goods calculated for the American
markets in 1837.
Thus, the facilities of the money market in
1835-6 may be considered as having contributed
to swell the importations of some particular articles
in 1836-7, at higher prices than would otherwise
have been paid, while the subsequent inevitable
pressure on the money market entailed the neces-
sity of sales of the increased quantities of those
articles at greatly reduced prices.
To this extent, therefore, the variations in the
state of the circulation, and of the money market,
may be considered as having operated upon the
prices of some particular descriptions of produce.
But it is not in this limited sense, which amounts
* The metals participated in the depression from this cause,
as some part of the previous rise had been owing to the demand
for the United States. This applies particularly to iron, the
orders for railway bars for America being then suspended, or
greatly reduced; but the fall was inconsiderable compared with
the previous rise.
1833—1837- 323
to little more than the supposition of an indirect
and partial influence on markets, that the effects of
variations in the state of the circulation, and of the
money market, are commonly supposed to have
operated. The increase of the circulation, and the
low rate of interest, are supposed to have operated
directly, independent of other grounds, in afford-
ing motives, as well as means, for raising prices,
for the rise of which there was no other cause ;
as, on the other hand, that the mere circum-
stance of a contraction of the circulation, and a
pressure on the money market, formed a sufficient
ground for a fall of prices, without any reference
to the circumstances peculiar to the article. Of
any direct or general influence of this kind by the
currency on the variations of markets for produce,
in the period under consideration, there is not, I
will venture to say, as the result of the most
minute investigation, any trace to be found, ac-
cording to any obvious understanding of the mode
in which an increase or diminution of the quantity
of money is considered to operate.*
* The error, for such I conceive it to be, of the prevailing
opinion, which ascribes to the occasional great variations in the
amount of the circulation, and in the state of credit, a direct ope-
ration on general prices, arises from not distinguishing between
those alterations in the quantity of money which — as in the case
of a permanent increase or diminution in the produce of the
mines, or in the case of an altered distribution of the precious
metals according to certain laws, or in the case of a compulsory
paper money issued by Government — enter into all the chan-
nels of circulation, and act directly upon all objects of exchange ;
from those alterations in the quantity of money which are the
consequence of the varying balance of trade, and of the disturb-
ing causes which operate on the markets for particular descrip-
tions of produce, and on particular branches of trade, and on the
money market. The movements of the precious metals for the
mere purpose of the adjustment of international balances, may
occasionally be on an extensive scale without affecting the chan-
nels of circulation, or acting therefore upon the prices of com-
modities and labour. And so, likewise, of the variations in the
amount of paper money issued on terminable securities : it de-
Y 2
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
There is, however, a point of view in which, by
a very strained construction, the state of the cir-
culation, and that of the money market, but more
properly speaking the state of credit in this country,
may be considered as having operated in raising,
or rather as having contributed to raise, the prices
of raw materials in this country in 1835, and in
the commencement of 1836.
Among the concurrent causes of the demand
which existed at that time for our manufac-
tures, were the orders from the United States
of America. As those orders were transmitted
through the medium of first-rate London and Li-
verpool houses, with confirmed credits, the ma-
nufacturers proceeded in the execution of those
orders on the best grounds possible. The em-
ployment thus given to the manufacturers was
necessarily the occasion of demand for the raw
materials ; and such was the extent of that demand,
that, as we have seen, it outran the usual supply,
and occasioned the rise of prices, which was not
greater than the reduction of stocks justified. The
event, however, has shown, that the orders from
America proceeded upon an exaggerated anticipa-
tion of consumption, and that the importers, in act-
ing upon that exaggerated anticipation, operated on
pends upon the circumstances under which the issues are made,
whether they enter into circulation at all, and whether they do
not merely add to the deposits in the hands of bankers, or of the
Bank of England. Or, if they enter into the circulation, they
may be confined to the markets for securities, or they may enter
partially into some markets for produce, or some branches of
trade, which, from circumstances specially affecting them, re-
quire and call forth an increased amount of circulating medium.
But in none of these cases would the increased amount neces-
sarily affect general prices.
It may also here be observed that variations in the balance of
foreign payments, and consequently the exchanges, are liable
to be influenced by the rate of interest and the state of credit,
as well as by the prices of commodities and the state of trade.
1833—1837. 325
credit to an extent much beyond the due propor-
tion to their capital. But speculative operations
on credit, beyond the due proportion to capital, so
that, in the event of the anticipation not being
realised, the operators are unable to fulfil their en-
gagements, are of the very essence of overtrading ;
and overtrading, in this sense, has been exemplified
on an extraordinary scale, in the state of things
in America, in the two years preceding the last.
The overtrading in imports into the United States,
which contributed to the demand for our manu-
factures, was, doubtless, ministered to by the un-
bounded credit which was given, by the eminent
houses in that branch of trade in this country, to
the importers abroad. And, as it was the extra-
ordinary facility of the money market, in other
words, the low rate of interest, and the reliance
on its continuance, which induced the granting of
such an extent of credit from this side, it may be
contended that the state of the money market in
1835 contributed to raise prices.*
This, however, is a refinement, in bringing the
state of the currency to bear upon the elevation of
prices, which, if admitted, would only introduce
more confusion of ideas than already prevails on the
subject. The overtrading in America, doubtless,
could not have gone to the extent which it did
without the credit given from this side ; but the
inducements to give the credit, and the apparent
grounds for reliance on a continuance of the low
rate of interest, and of the state of confidence
which prevailed here, might equally have existed in
a perfectly unvaried amount of the currency, as
* To some extent the same reasoning will apply to orders
received from other parts of the world for manufactures from
this country in 1835 and 1836; and there was room for suspi-
cion at the time that some part of the unexampled demand for
our manufactures might be speculative, although unconnected
with speculation on this side in the usual sense of the word.
y 3
326 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
indicated by the issues of Bank of England and
country bank notes ; and the charge against the
Bank, for adding to its securities in violation
of its rule in the autumn of 1835, is not so
much that it was the means of adding to the
amount of the currency, which, in point of fact,
it did not, or only in the most trifling degree,
but, that, by a violent effort, and a departure from
its custom, in lending a large sum to the money
dealers, below the rate to the public, it forcibly
caused a temporary reduction of the rate of in-
terest, thus facilitating and promoting those cre-
dits precisely at the time when an increase of the
rate of interest, and a contraction of the circulation,
were specially indicated.
But, although, as regards the markets for goods,
there is not a trace of any direct influence of the
amount of the currency, or of the rate of interest,
on the rise of prices of produce in 1835-6, the
case, as relates to the share markets, is different ;
both the inducement to adventure, and the means
of investment in joint-stock companies, are alike
promoted, by a low, and above all, by a falling
rate of interest * ; and there is, accordingly, every
reason to believe that the low rate of interest
in 1834 and 1835, and the reliance upon its
continuance, with a vague expectation of a further
fall, such reliance and expectation being coun-
tenanced by the operations of the Bank of England,
in the re-issue of what they call their extra de-
posits, most powerfully contributed to extend,
* The present state of excitement in the market for shares at
Paris, furnishes a proof that an almost purely metallic currency
is not a sufficient preservative from occasional extravagance of
speculation. The rate of interest is, indeed, very low there ;
but so it has been before" without giving rise to the manifest-
ation of any spirit of speculation. At the same time it is to be
observed that a moderate rate of interest, or, at all events, an
easy state of the money market, and of credit, is essential to the
extensive prevalence of such a speculative mania.
1833—1837- 327
although they may not have originated, the
system of joint-stock companies, and, more espe-
cially, of joint-stock banks. At the same time,
with reference to the joint-stock banks, and such
of the other joint-stock companies as have survived
the pressure on the money market and the shock
to credit of last year, and whose shares at this time,
when greater sobriety and caution prevail, are
saleable at a premium, the investments in them
may fairly be considered to have been originally
justified, and to be proceeding on safe grounds.
Upon the whole, looking back to the two past
years, the disturbance of credit and of prices, al-
though remarkable in some of its features, has been
much less than has been witnessed on several for-
mer instances of transition from an undue extension
of credit to a commercial revulsion. On the re-
cent occasion, it seems to have been very much
confined to the branch of trade, a very important
one indeed, in which the most notorious over-
trading prevailed. And it is a tribute to the ge-
neral soundness of the commerce and manufactures
of the country, that so violent a derangement should
have occurred, in that extensive branch, with so
little apparent mischief to any other of the great
branches of commerce. And, as to prices, with the
exception of cotton, silk, and tea, which were more
or less the clear result of overtrading, there has
been no extraordinary fluctuation ; none, indeed,
beyond those which are incidental to the ordinary
course of markets.
Before closing this view of the state of the cir-
culation, it may be right to advert to the position
of the Bank, and to the state of the country bank
issues, at the close of 1 837-
On the 14th of December last, the position of
the Bank of England was,
Circulation ^17,998,000 Securities ^22,727,000
Deposits 10,195,000 Bullion 8,172,000
Y 4
328 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
This great diminution of securities, while there
had been so great an influx of bullion, has been
the occasion of animadversion, on the manifest in-
consistency of the conduct of the Bank, with the
rules which the directors profess to act upon, of
keeping their securities uniform.
Mr. Loyd, who is deservedly looked up to, in
discussions on this subject, uniting, as he does,
clear views of general principles with great ta-
lent of exposition, and with most extensive know-
ledge of the business of banking, published in
February, 1837, "Reflections suggested by Mr.
Horsley Palmer's Pamphlet," containing strong
animadversions on the conduct of the Bank, in
having, in violation of its rules, extended its secu-
rities, in the autumn and winter of 1835-6, and
in having continued an excess of securities, beyond
its rule, in the face of a rapidly diminishing quan-
tity of bullion. In his remarks, urged with great
point and effect, on the inconsistency and the im-
policy of the conduct of the Bank on that occasion,
I fully concur.
In a recent publication, by Mr. Loyd, entitled
" Further Reflections," &c., the conduct of the
Bank is again remarked upon, for the discrepancy
of its position with that which, according to the
principle announced by the directors, it ought to
exhibit.
Mr. Loyd expresses great objections to the rule
itself, and further animadverts on the inconsistency
of the Bank, with reference to it, in the following
terms, page 18. : —
" We are not ourselves disposed to lay too much stress upon
this rule, inasmuch as we conceive that steadiness in the amount
of the securities is a principle applicable to the management of
currency only, and wholly inapplicable to the conduct of bank-
ing operations in any form. When it is applied to the combined
operations of the Bank in her double capacity, we conceive
that it is impracticable, and the published accounts seem to
verify this opinion.
1833—1837- 329
" We will, therefore, pass on to the next and far 'more im-
portant consideration to which an examination of the foregoing
table will necessarily draw our attention ; that of the relation
between the fluctuations in the amount of circulation and those
in the amount of bullion.
" It will be observed that during the year 1837 the amount
of bullion has been steadily increasing, being at the end of the
year double the amount at which it stood at the beginning of
it. Now it is clear that had the circulation been metallic, it
would, during this time, have increased to the extent to which
the bullion in the Bank has been augmented, i. e. nearly four
millions, and, consequently, if the paper circulation be made to
vary as a metallic circulation would have varied, it will during
this time have undergone an increase of nearly four millions.
But upon turning to the column of circulation, we find that it
stands now at nearly the same amount at which it stood when
the bullion was at the lowest point ; and that it has actually
undergone a large reduction during the last three months con-
comitantly with a large increase of bullion.
" But the Bank laid down other rules than this for its guid-
ance, and it has been contended that the Legislature and the
public gave an implied acquiescence in those rules. Let us,
then, try the proceedings of the Bank by them.
" One of these was steadiness in the amount of the securities,
upon which we have already made all the remarks which it seems
to require.
" The other rule was, that the fluctuations in the amount of
bullion should be met by a corresponding fluctuation in the ag-
gregate amount of circulation and deposits. Against the sound-
ness of this rule we urged, on a former occasion, what appeared
to us to be conclusive objections ; but if the conduct of the
Bank during the past year be tried by this test, the condemn-
ation of it will even be more conclusive than when tried by the
rule for which we have contended.
In March, 1837, it was maintained in Mr. Palmer's Reply
.) ' that the Bank has acted up to the principle declared in
the year 1832, before the Committee upon the Bank Charter;'
that principle being that the joint liabilities of notes and depo-
sits were to vary as the amount of bullion. Let us, therefore,
compare the account rendered by the Bank at that time with
the account last published by her.
March 7.
Circulation - ^18,178,000
Deposits 13,260,000
Joint Liabilities j§31, 438,000
Bullion - s£4,048,000
330 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
December 14.
Circulation - ,=£17,998,000
Deposits 10,196,000
e£28,194,000
Bullion - ,§£8,172,000
" By this statement it appears that the bullion has increased
4,124,0007., whilst during the same period the joint liabilities
have diminished, not increased, 3,244,000/. Therefore it is
clear that the joint liabilities have not varied as the bullion has
varied, and consequently the rule laid down by the Bank has
not been observed.
" It is equally clear by the table that the circulation has not
varied as the bullion, and therefore the rule contended for by
us has not been observed.
" Let us now contrast the amount of securities at these two
periods.
March 7. Securities - ^30,579.000
Dec. 14. Ditto - 22,727^000
Decrease of Securities £ 7,852,000
" Here we find a very large diminution in the amount of se-
curities ; what amount the Bank will contend ought to be struck
out of the account as arising out of deposits of an unusual and
extraordinary character it is impossible for us to say ; but it is
hardly possible to believe that so great a difference in the amount
of secuiities can be satisfactorily explained on such grounds."
Before charging the Bank with inconsistency in
having reduced its liabilities and securities, and
allowed the influx of bullion to take place, without
having made an addition to the circulation equal
to the addition to its treasure, something definite
should be stated as to the amount of bullion which
the Bank ought to have in view to possess, in order
to be in a safe and satisfactory position. The de-
sideratum with this view has been held by the Bank
directors to be about one third of its liabilities.
This, taking the average of the liabilities for some
years past, would make the desired amount of
treasure about ten millions ; and, as far as the
eventful experience of the last fourteen years,
namely, since 1824, can serve as a guide for judg-
1833—1837. 331
ment on this point, there appear to be good
grounds for believing that not less than ten millions
can ever be considered as a safe position of its
treasure, seeing the sudden calls to which it is
liable.
As long as the Bank of England holds the situ-
ation which it does, its coffers must of necessity
serve as the resource for all the other banks in the
kingdom, to supply any casual demand for gold
beyond their ordinary current purposes. And it
is upon the treasure of the Bank of England that
all the demand for export operates, when either
the balance of trade, or foreign financial operations,
or a temporary surcharge of our own circulation,
entail a sudden call for payments abroad, to an un-
usual extent, which can be supplied only by the
transmission of bullion.
Just before the drain on its coffers in the autumn
of 1830 was first felt, the treasure amounted to
11,150,480/., namely, on the 31st August of that
year. And the Bank, acting consistently with its
assumed rule of keeping its securities even, and
remaining otherwise in a perfectly passive state,
that is, without an effort, and without any sensible
disturbance of the money market, surmounted the
drain, which was of rather a formidable character,
having carried off from the Bank nearly seven mil-
lions of bullion in less than eighteen months. Now,
if the treasure at the commencement of the drain
had been only half the amount, or even between
seven and eight millions, very violent measures in
the way of reduction of securities, and contraction
of the issues, must have been resorted to, attended
by a great disturbance of the money market. On
the other hand, if the Bank had not arrested the
influx of bullion in the spring of 1836, or had
taken effectual measures while the tendency was
in that direction to raise its bullion to one third of
its liabilities, it would not later in the year have
332 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
found itself, as it did, in the humiliating pi
ment of being obliged to support the No
>redica-
Forthern
and Central Bank, as a measure of self-preserv-
ation, against its own interests, and that of the
public. It is not therefore very consistent, on
the part of those who blamed the Bank for having
extended its securities in the autumn of 1835, to
reproach it for not extending its securities, and
thus stopping the influx of bullion, in the autumn
of 1837, before the amount had reached to the
desideratum of one third of its liabilities.
And the propriety of the conduct of the Bank,
in being passive under the influx of bullion till it
turned the amount of ten millions, is becoming
manifest in the security which is now felt in facing
the rising demand for gold for shipment to the
United States.
It has been charged against the country banks,
that it is their tendency, while speculation is abroad
and prices rising, to over issue ; and that in periods
of stagnation and distress, their tendency is the
opposite, namely, suddenly and unduly to contract
their issues.* This may be generally true ; but,
on the recent occasion, there seems to have been
no such violence of contraction, as far as relates
to the issues. We have already seen that, taking
the aggregate of the country bank circulation, there
was no such enlargement, either in point of time or
* Mr. Norman observes, p. 90., " It is necessary to call the
reader's particular attention to an evil as completely inherent
in the present system of paper issues in this country as the ten-
dency to over issues, when a spirit of speculation is abroad,
prices rising, and the rate of interest high ; viz. a directly oppo-
site tendency, a disposition on the part of all banks to contract
their circulation in periods of stagnation, distress, and quiescence,
in a greater degree than could occur with a metallic currency,
or paper regulated on a metallic basis. The mischief above-
mentioned has been often alluded to in this pamphlet, but has
not been duly appreciated by the public ; yet its effects are,
perhaps, as disastrous, except that they do not involve insol-
vency on the part of issuers, as its opposite."
1833—1837- 333
of amount, as to justify the imputation of having
counteracted any efforts of the Bank of England,
if such had been made by it, to reduce the circula-
tion after the drain of its treasure had commenced ;
for that, when the necessity for some contraction
had become urgent, namely, in June, 1836, a re-
duction of the aggregate of the country circulation
had taken place in the quarter following, the amount
having been less by nearly half a million on the
24th September than on the 25th June ; and that
in the quarter ending the 31st December, 1836,
when the exchanges no longer caused any demand
for bullion for export, and when the pressure on
the money market had become very severe, the
aggregate of the country bank issues was somewhat
enlarged compared with the preceding quarter.
Thus far, therefore, there appears to have been
no ground for the charge. In 1837 there was a
reduction of the aggregate issues ; but consider-
ing the great fall of the share markets, and of
the cotton markets, in the great manufacturing
districts, where the prices had in the spring and
summer of 1836 been most elevated, it may be
matter of surprise that the reduction of the country
circulation was not greater in the early part of
1837 than it proved to be. For as the very ex-
tensive dealings in shares in Lancashire, and in
some of the other great manufacturing districts,
besides the extended transactions at advanced
prices, for cotton, in 1835 and 1836, entailed as
a necessary consequence an extension* of paper
* If the currency had been purely metallic, there must, under
the circumstances, such as they existed In the great manufac-
turing districts, but more especially in Lancashire, in the autumn
of 1835, and the spring of 1836, have been a considerable in-
crease of the circulation in those districts. The rise of the
prices of goods was from an external demand ; and the large
investments in shares were from real local capital. If, therefore,
the local banks had not supplied the increased amount of paper
and credit requisite to circulate the goods at the advanced
334f PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
and credit ; so a fall in the markets for shares,
and for cottons, in the spring of 1837, necessarily
caused a reduction of paper and credit. The
quarterly returns of country bank issues were,
Private. Joint- stock. Total.
Sept. 24-, 1836 ^7,765,000 ^£3,969,000 a£l 1,734,000
April 1, 1837 7,276,000 3,755,000 11,031,000
And it is to be observed, that in that interval the
circulation of the Northern and Central Bank had
been withdrawn, amounting to between 300,000/.
and 400, OOO/., which had been replaced by notes
of the Bank of England ; so that the aggregate
of the issues of the Bank of England, and of the
English country banks, on the average of the quarter
ending in April, 1837, was less by only about
400,000/., than it had been in the quarter ending
in September, 1836. A difference to this extent,
which is often exceeded by the variations of daily
payments, cannot, it is to be presumed, be magnified,
by the most violent exaggeration of the currency
theory, into such importance as to be supposed by
any possibility to have had any influence on prices ;
more especially as the diminution, trifling as it was,
followed, instead of preceding, the fall of prices
prices, and the transfers of real capital embarked in the rail-
ways and other of the more solid joint-stock undertakings, the
deficiency must have been supplied by the Bank of England, or
from the metropolitan circulation. The contraction, in that
case, of the latter, would probably have raised the exchange ;
and the influx of gold would have been somewhat greater than
it proved to be. It may be supposed that no rise of produce
and of shares could have occurred in Lancashire without the
transmission of cotton, &c., and of shares, from the metropolis,
or from other parts thither. But the Lancashire markets were
the absorbing and regulating markets for those descriptions of
goods, and for shares. In fact, the goods could hardly be said
to be interchangeable at all with the metropolis, in the sense in
which they would be supposed to restore the former proportion
of circulating medium. And the prices of railway shares in the
London market were kept up in some instances mainly by the
demand from Lancashire.
1833—1837. 335
which had occurred in that interval. Nor can the
difference in the quantity of money, as depending
on the amount of bank notes, be, by any much
nearer approach to possibility, considered as having
been the cause of the derangement of credit which
occurred in that interval. The further fall of prices
which occurred in the summer of 1837 necessarily
caused a further reduction of the country circula-
tion, which seems then to have reached its lowest
point ; the aggregate issues in the quarter ending
1st October having been 10,142,049^.
By the usual operation of increased confidence,
and improving markets, the country circulation
experienced a moderate enlargement towards the
close of 1837j having risen, on the 30th December,
to 10,870,135/. And, in order to show how little
there was of variation in the quantity of money,
as exhibited in the aggregate issues of the Bank of
England and the English country banks, to ac-
count for the great variations of credit and prices,
it may be sufficient to state the comparative amount,
according to the Gazette returns, of the quarterly
averages, at the close of each of the four last years,
namely, of
1834, - - s£28,963,828
1835, - - 28,455,414
1836, - 29,372,697
1837, - - 28,877,135
It is quite impossible, looking at these figures
(and the same, or nearly the same, result would be
exhibited by the yearly averages), without being
struck by the utter inadequateness in point of
amount, besides the discrepancy in point of time,
of these very small variations, to account for the
fluctuations of prices, divergent as these were,
and for the contrast between the extreme of confi-
dence during the first two thirds of the period, and
the great derangement of credit in the subsequent
part of that period.
336
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
A table, exhibited by Mr. Norman, of the issues,
not only of the English but also of Irish bank notes,
affords, if possible, a stronger presumption of the
negative of any influence from mere variation of
the amount of Bank notes on the fluctuations of
prices, and the vicissitudes of commerce, which
have been experienced in the last three or four
years. Thus, for instance : —
IRELAND.
Average amount
Average circula-
tion. _ Bank of
England.
ENGLAND.
Joint-stock and
private banks.
of notes half-
yearly, on which
composition is
paid by joint-
stock bank* ; and
TOTAL.
actual circula-
tion. — Bank of
Ireland.
£
£
£
£
June 28, 1834.
18,689,000
10,518,000
5,036,000
34,243,000
Dec. 28, „
17,070,000
10,659,000
5,250,000
32,979,000
Dee. 26, 1835.
16,564,000
11,134,000
5,334,000
33,032,000
Dec. 13, 1836.
17,361,000
12,011,000
5,864,000
35,265,000
I have not the return for Ireland in 1837, but
that is not material ; the inferences from the above
being sufficient. For here we have, in June, 1834,
when there was a prevalence of perfect quiet in the
markets for produce of every kind, a total of issues,
Scotland excepted, amounting to 34,243,000/. ;
while in the year and a half following, when there
was a tendency in most articles (the agricultural
produce of the United Kingdom excepted) to rise
in price, the aggregate circulation appears to have
been less by upwards of 1,200,000/. How then
is it possible to assign variations in the quantity of
money, indicated by those issues, as the causes
that originated, or even promoted, the fluctu-
ations of prices, and the viscissitudes of com-
merce, seeing that the main impulse to the rise
of such articles as experienced the greatest ad-
vance of prices (corn excepted), and to the great
extension of credit, originated and was in progres-
sive operation for several months anterior to the
1833—1837. 337
close of 1835 ; the phenomena both of prices and
of credit, in the early part of 1836, having been
but the development of the causes previously in
operation ; while, with a marked increase in the
aggregate amount in the quarter ending in Decem-
ber, 1836, there was a severe pressure on the money
market, accompanied by a fall of prices of those
articles which had been previously raised by an
exaggerated demand in particular branches of com-
merce that had been obviously under the influence
of extensive overtrading ?
The truth is, that the rise of prices and the ten-
dency to overtrading were partial, and were allowed
to proceed to the length that they did by the general
confidence and the low rate of interest which then
prevailed, and which admitted of an expansion of the
medium of credit to the full extent of the force of
opinion acting in any particular direction ; or, in
other words, gave full scope to the spirit of specu-
lation, and the tendency to overtrading which existed
in the share markets, and in the trade with the United
States, and in a smaller degree in the China trade.
That the operations of the joint-stock banks, by an
undue use of their deposits*, and of their credit,
* Col. Torrens, in his " Letter to Lord Melbourne," builds a
very ingenious argument on the hypothesis, " That deposits
with solvent banks form a component part of the general medium
of exchange, and perform the functions of money just as effec-
tually as the coin and bank notes actually in circulation ; and
that the practice of merchants and others in keeping their cash
with bankers, and the practice of bankers in employing the cash
thus placed in their hands, have the effect of increasing the
general medium of exchange by the amount of that portion of
the cash of their customers which bankers may find it prudent
to employ." In elucidating these positions, and in drawing
some extraordinary conclusions from them, Col. Torrens refers,
in support of some of his views, to a paper which had been
communicated to me by Mr. Pennington, and which was
appended to my letter to Lord Grenville, published some
years ago. In that paper, Mr. Pennington took occasion to
show that the employment by the London bankers of a portion,
VOL. II. , Z
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
in the great extension of their discounts, and of
their advances on mere personal security, allowed
of a wider and longer range to the speculations
in shares, and to the overtrading which pre-
vailed to such an extravagant length in the
American trade, cannot be doubted. But the
joint-stock banks could not have proceeded to
the length that they did, in the way of discounts
and book credits, had it not been that the Bank of
England, by its large loans to the money dealers,
in the autumn of 1835, afforded the resource of re-
discount to an enormous amount. The money
dealers acted strictly within their vocation in
taking the money offered by the Bank at a low in-
terest, and in simultaneously lending it upon what
then, according to all human means of judging,
could not but be deemed undoubted and readily
convertible securities, at the moderate additional
interest which constitutes the profit of their
business. And if blame attaches to either or
both of those parties, it must apply in a still
greater degree to the Bank of England, which,
notwithstanding its view of the existing tendency
to a dangerous excess of credit, contributed in an
extraordinary degree, and by an unusual mode, to
aggravate that tendency, if not to create that very
greater or less, of their deposits in discounts and in advances
by book credits, operated on the circulation in a manner
analogous to the issues of the promissory notes of country
bankers. On some of the points connected with this statement,
Col. Torrens appears to have misconceived the meaning of Mr.
Pennington, who has, in consequence, addressed a letter to mey
explanatory of his views on those points, taking occasion ta
make some further observations on the effect of deposits, and
the manner and extent of the employment of them, on the
amount and value of the currency. As these are points
of considerable importance, and as Mr. Pennington takes a very
scientific view of them, I, with his permission, insert his letter
(Appendix, p. 369.), and recommend it strongly to the attention
of the reader.
1833—1837. 339
excess which it apprehended ; instead of adopting
the very opposite course, the means of which so
opportunely presented themselves, of simply not
re-issuing the large casual addition to its deposits.
According to this view, if it be correct, the prin-
cipal error of the Bank, that error to which some,
although perhaps not the greater part, of the mis-
chief in 1836-7 may be ascribed, not indeed in its
origin, but to some extent in its progress, is not to
its management of its issues, but of its deposits, and
of the securities in which those deposits were in-
vested. And it does not appear very clearly that,
if the footing of the currency had been that of a
circulation of notes exactly varying as a metallic
currency would do, or if the business of the Bank
had been strictly separated into two departments,
the one confined to the issue of notes against gold,
or of gold against notes, and the other allotted to
its general banking business, the disturbance of
trade and of credit would have been less than it
was. Indeed, it would depend upon what might
be considered as the proper proportions of securi-
ties and bullion to be held against the notes,
whether it would not have been greater. If, for
instance, one third of bullion to the circulation
were deemed sufficient then, as in the quarter
ending in October, 1835, the circulation was about
eighteen millions, and the stock of bullion about
six millions, the further influx of bullion to the
extent of nearly two millions, which took place in
the following six months, would have been at-
tended with an increase of the circulation to that
extent. It is probable, however, that the further
issue of paper against gold would have prevented
the influx of a part of the additional two millions.
But still there would have been some addition to
the circulation ; and such addition would have
gone to swell the tendency to excess which already
existed in the spring of 1836. Now, all the phe-
z 2
340 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
nomena of excitement, and the extent of foreign
engagements which constituted the overtrading,
had at that time reached their utmost develop-
ment. The conclusion therefore is, that, as far as
relates to the state of things as it existed in the
spring of 1836, it would not have been prevented
by a circulation varying as a metallic one, because,
at any rate, there would have been no reason for a
diminution of bank notes while the stock of bullion
was rising to about eight millions ; and the Bank
would equally have had the motives which before
existed to re-issue its extra deposits ; while those
motives would have been strengthened if the influx
of bullion beyond six millions had been attended
with an increase of circulation, and consequently,
perhaps, of deposits.
The mischief which lay in the excitement and
overtrading would, therefore, obviously have oc-
curred, at least equally under a metallic variation.
And the only question in determining how far a
variation strictly upon the metallic basis, such as
has been recommended, would have been preferable
in its operation to the system acted upon by the
Bank is, whether a more abrupt termination of the
excitement and overtrading was desirable ; for
more abrupt the termination would doubtless have
been by a strictly metallic basis, inasmuch as, upon
the occurrence of the drain, the reduction of bank
notes would have been immediate. And suppose
that, by the coincident suppression of bank paper,
the drain had gone only to half the extent which it
did, namely, to two millions only, instead of four
millions, the pressure on the money market, severe
as it was, without any reduction of Bank of England
notes, would have been considerably aggravated
by a reduction of at least two millions. There are,
doubtless, some points of view in which a more
abrupt termination of the excitement and over-
trading, compared with the more lingering one
1833—1837. 341
which occurred, might have been beneficial on the
whole ; and the principal criticisms on the conduct
of the Bank have proceeded, on the ground that the
drain of bullion should have been met by a cor-
responding contraction of its paper. But the main
charge against the system pursued by the Bank
has been that of its having been conducive to the
great fluctuations of trade and of prices. Now, it
appears that, under a more correct system of
issue, if the use of its deposits by the Bank had been
the same, the fluctuations would have been as great,
with only the difference of a more speedy ter-
mination of them.
Whether the administration of a paper currency
would be conducted more beneficially for the public,
upon the footing of a variation in amount exactly
the same as if the basis were strictly metallic, than
upon the principle professed by the Bank, and
upon which it was conducted between 18^7 and
1833, of keeping the securities even (subject, of
course, to a periodical revision of the proper
amount to be held), and allowing the public to
act upon the other elements of the position of the
Bank, is a question upon which it would seem to
savour of presumption to entertain a doubt, seeing
such an array as is presented of justly distinguished
authorities, namely, Mr. Loyd, Mr. Norman, Mr.
Samson Ricardo, and Colonel Torrens, who ex-
press themselves unhesitatingly in favour of the
former. I cannot, however, help thinking that
there are several considerations which might
be allowed to weigh in a preference of the
latter, if there were sufficient security for its
being firmly and consistently acted upon. But
the deviation from that principle in the autumn
of 1835, and the strange reasoning in justifica-
tion of it, founded upon the arbitrary distinction
of the nature of the deposits, and the vacillat-
ing and inconsistent course subsequently pur-
z 3
PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
sued, have naturally created doubts among the
friends of the system, how far the maintenance of
it can, under the management on its present foot-
ing, be relied upon ; more especially as the old
and, as it was to be hoped, the obsolete, doctrine has
recently been revived and insisted upon, that the
Bank is bound in the regulation of its securities
and its issues to attend to the accommodation of
trade and the support of credit. Under the in-
fluence of this doctrine, there can be no security
for the maintenance of a sound administration of
the currency. There is no degree or extent of
deviation from principle to which such doctrine
may not serve as a cloak. And either the bias of
private sympathies, or the notion, sincere, though
ill-founded, of being called upon to interfere for
the accommodation of trade or the support of
credit, may, under a variety of contingencies, com-
promise the principle, which ought to be held
sacred, of the convertibility of the paper. There
is, moreover, the constant danger lest the object
of securing a certain dividend to the proprietors
should induce a greater effort to extend the securi-
ties than a clear view to the maintenance of a
sound state of the currency would justify. This
object may not have entered into the motives for
the employment of the extra deposits ; but there
is no security against an undue influence from such
object under the present system.
SECTION 7« — Summary of the preceding Survey,
1. The fall of the prices of corn, from the harvest
of 1832 to the close of 1835, was the necessary
consequence of a succession of abundant crops,
the produce of which appears to have greatly ex-
ceeded a largely increased consumption.
1833—1837. 343
2. The rise of the price of wheat in the spring
of 1836 was the consequence of reduced stocks
g>n hand, of reports of a diminished breadth of
land sown with it, and of unfavourable appearances
on the ground.
3. The prices of corn, but more especially of
wheat, continued to advance throughout the great
pressure of the money market in the last six months
of 1836, and, after an intermediate inconsiderable
depression, rose again in the summer of 1837»
during the greatest commercial discredit and dis-
tress, the price of wheat having been at that time
nearly 70 per cent, higher than in December,
1835.
4. The prices of several leading articles of con-
sumption, and the raw materials of some of the
principal manufactures, and the metals, rose in the
interval from 1833 to the close of 1835, while the
price of wheat was falling very considerably.
5. The rise of prices of produce in the spring
of 1836 applied to a very large proportion of com-
modities, and included agricultural produce ; but
in few instances did the advance of prices go be-
yond the degree which was fully warranted by the
relative reduction of stock.
6. There was no general fall of prices in the
last six months of 1836 ; nor, in the case of such
articles as did fall before December of that year,
was the depression greater than the relative increase
of stock and approaching supplies accounted for
.and justified.
7. The extreme fall in the markets for produce,
between November, J 836, and July, 1837, was con-
fined to such articles as had been the subject of
overtrading, chiefly in the American, and partially
in the China trade.
8. Both in the rise and in the fall of markets
for produce, in the interval from 1833 to 1837,
the circumstances peculiar to each article account
z 4
344 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
for the variations of price, without supposing any
direct influence on general prices from variations
in the quantity of money.
9. The aggregate issues of the Bank of England,
and the Bank of Ireland, and of the English and
Irish country banks, did not so vary in amount or
in order of time between 1833 and 1837, as to
justify the assignment of those variations of the
amount of issues as having caused the fluctuations
of prices and the vicissitudes of credit which oc-
curred in that interval.
10. Although there is no trace of any direct
influence of the state of the circulation in elevat-
ing the markets for produce in this country, there
is every reason to believe that the low rate of in-
terest and the facilities of the money market in-
duced the houses in the American trade to grant
credits and to make shipments uncovered to a
vast amount ; thus indirectly causing an increased
demand for manufactures, and consequently an
increased price, as long as the demand lasted, for
the raw materials of those manufactures.
11. The Bank of England, by enlarging its se-
curities in the autumn of 1835, in violation of the
principle of management announced by the di-
rectors in 1832, and by thus forcibly reducing or
keeping down the rate of interest, promoted the
formation and extension of joint-stock banks, and
encouraged and facilitated the system of discounts
and re-discounts, and advances on personal secu-
rities, which was carried on by those banks to a
mischievous extent. That measure, namely, of
re-issuing its extra deposits, also greatly favoured
the overtrading in America, and in the American
branch of trade in this country.
12. The enlargement by the Bank of its secu-
rities favoured the views of the American govern-
ment in the alteration of the mint regulations of
the United States, as it favoured also the financial
1833—1837. 345
operations of the United States Bank in negotiating
a loan in this country ; both measures tending to
a demand for gold from this country to America,
at a time when it was peculiarly incumbent upon
the Bank to be provided with an amount of treasure
in full proportion to its liabilities.
13. The resistance offered by the Bank to the
influx of bullion in 1835-6, occasioned the insuf-
ficiency of its treasure to meet the exigencies that
afterwards arose and reduced the directors to the
predicament of being obliged in self-defence to
support the Northern and Central Bank against the
interests of their proprietors and of the public.
14. The revulsion of credit, and the fall of prices
in 1836-7, in the branches of trade to which they
were confined, were the necessary consequence of
the previous undue extension of credit and exag-
geration of demand; and there was no derangement
of credit or important fall of prices in other branches
of trade which had not been chargeable or connected
with an undue extension of credit, or, in other
words, with overtrading.*
* If the proofs already adduced of the absence of direct
influence from the state of the money market on the prices of
produce were not sufficient, a fresh and decisive one might be
adduced in the present state (April, 1838,) of the markets for
cotton, silk, indigo, and some other important articles which are
now lower than they were in the autumn of 1837, and are dull
and drooping, notwithstanding an increase of the circulation and
a greatly reduced rate of interest. If either an increase of Bank
notes or the utmost facility of raising money on good security,
are of themselves sufficient to induce persons to borrow with a
view to buy or hold goods, how happens it that these goods do
not experience a speculative advance, or at least are not pre-
vented from falling ? And again, while cotton, silk, and colo-
nial produce have of late been declining, the prices of corn have
been rising.
346 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
CHAPTER XI.
GENERAL VIEW OF CONCLUSIONS TO BE DERIVED
FROM THE PRECEDING HISTORICAL SKETCH OF
PRICES ; AND CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE
CURRENCY.
THE general conclusions to be derived from the
detailed statements, which have been given of the
principal circumstances that have affected the prices
of each of the articles referred to, may be classed
under two heads ; the one embracing the period
from 1793 to 1814, in which the principal pheno-
mena of high prices occurred ; the other, dating
from 1814, and reaching to the present time, being
an interval during which (with the exception of the
high prices consequent on the great scarcity of
18l6-17> which extended over Europe) a much
lower range of prices has prevailed.
SECTION 1. — General Fiew of the Causes of the
High Prices from 1793 to 1814.
The relatively high prices of articles divested of
taxation, and not the objects of immediate war ex-
penditure, in the interval from 1793 to 1814, may
be ascribed to the following general circum-
stances : —
1. The frequent recurrence of seasons of an un-
favourable character, there having in that interval
been no fewer than eleven * seasons in which the
* 1794 and 1795; 1799 and 1800; 1804; 1807 to 1812,
inclusive.
1833—1837. 317
general produce of corn, but more especially of
wheat, was deficient. Of those seasons, some were
of a desolating character, extending over the greater
part of Europe ; and, during the earlier part of the
war, there were scarcities of corn also in the United
States of America.
2. The destruction of a great source of supply
of transatlantic produce by the revolution in St.
Domingo, which rendered sugar and coffee, and
most other West India produce, scarce and dear
during the earlier part of the war.
3. Obstructions and prohibitions of export from
the Continent of Europe, more especially during
the latter years of the war, of articles of which,
whether as raw materials of our manufactures, or
naval stores, or food, we stood in urgent need.
4. The increased cost of importation, by higher
freights and insurance incidental to a state of
war generally, and aggravated in an extraordinary 4
degree by the peculiar character of commercial
hostility and exclusion which marked in so striking
a manner the latter years of the war.
5. The difference of exchange, which in the last
five years of the war averaged 20 per cent., thus
adding so much to the cost of all imported pro-
ductions, and which, as it diminished the cost of
all our exportable produce by so much to the
foreign consumer, renders the depression of price
of the latter description of productions, between
1808 and 1812, in so far the more remarkable.
6. A higher rate of interest, in consequence of
the absorption by the war loans of a considerable
proportion of the savings of individuals; such
higher rate of interest constituting an increased
cost of production.
348 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
SECTION 2. — General View of the Causes of the
Decline and comparatively low Range of Prices
from 1814/0 1837.
The causes of the decline, and of the lower
range of prices, which dates from 1814, and has
continued (after an intermediate rise in conse-
quence of the great scarcity of 1S16-17> which
extended over Europe) to the present time, may
be classed under the following heads : —
1 . A succession of more favourable seasons, there
having been in the last twenty years, namely, from
1818 to the present time, only five seasons in which
the produce of wheat was decidedly deficient * ; and
in none of them was the inclemency of the season, or
the scarcity resulting therefrom, at all comparable to
some of those which occurred during the war ; nor
was there any one of them that extended over Eu-
rope. This prevalence of favourable seasons, and
the total exemption from such desolating seasons
as 1816, and some previous ones, have developed
the effects of an extended and improved cultivation
in this country, and in many other parts of the
commercial world.
2. The removal of obstacles from the several
sources of foreign supply ; a great extension of
some of them ; and the discovery of new ones.
3. A great reduction of the charges of import-
ation, by the low freights and insurances incidental
to a state of peace ; and the improved, and cheaper,
and more rapid internal communications.
4. A rise of the foreign exchanges, in conse-
quence of the cessation of the great foreign war
expenditure, and the consequent reduction of the
cost of all imported commodities.
5. Improvements in machinery, in chemistry,
* 1823, and 1828 to 1831, both years included.
1833—1837- 349
and in the arts and sciences generally, all tending
to reduce the cost of production of numerous ar-
ticles, or to provide cheaper substitutes.
6. A reduction of the general rate of interest,
and a more extensive application of individual ac-
cumulations to reproduction at a diminished cost.
SECTION 3. — Concluding Remarks.
The causes which have thus been enumerated
account for so large a proportion of the great fluc-
tuations of prices, during the period embraced by
this historical sketch, as to leave no ground for
imputing to war-demand any influence, except in
the case of articles which are the immediate objects
of government expenditure, as naval and military
stores, or to alterations in the system of our cur-
rency, any effect beyond the difference between
paper and gold, such difference, if of any con-
tinuance, constituting, through the medium of the
exchanges, an increased cost of production.
It is not only to the articles of produce speci-
fically referred to in the preceding statements,
that the explanation given of circumstances affect-
ing the production and supply is intended in this
remark to apply. There is not, as far as I have
been able to discover, any single commodity, in the
whole range of articles embraced in the most ex-
tensive list of prices, the variations of which
do not admit of being distinctly accounted for
by circumstances peculiar to it, in the relation
of supply, actual or contingent, real or appre-
hended, to the ordinary rate of consumption, without
supposing any influence from the Bank restriction
beyond the degree in which the difference of ex-
change, which could not have existed but for the
restriction, may be considered to have operated
distinctly on the cost of production. And I have
350 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
endeavoured to show that, while there existed this
ground to warrant the inference of the absence of any
influence of the currency beyond the difference of
exchange, or of the price of gold, in the great vari-
ations of markets, there was the strongest possible
confirmation in the same conclusion, by a reference
to the state of the circulation ; for that, according
to the historical view of it which has been pre-
sented, there is every reason to infer that there
was no such alteration of the quantity of money,
arising out of the manner in which the Bank issues
were regulated, during and subsequent to the re-
striction, as to justify the inference of its having
been an operative cause of the great variation of
prices.
The whole tenour of the facts and reasonings
adduced has been to establish the conclusion that
the great alterations of prices originated, and mainly
proceeded, from alterations in circumstances dis-
tinctly affecting the commodities, and not in the
quantity of money, in relation to its functions, or
in comparison of what, upon fair grounds of pre-
sumption, it might be supposed that it would have
been, if there had been no restriction, but at the
same time no pressure upon the exchanges by
extraordinary foreign payments.
If the explanation of the circumstances which
have distinctly affected the supply and consumption
of commodities, be deemed insufficient to account
for the whole of the variation of bullion prices,
there would remain only a resort to the supposition
that the variations in the quantity and uses of gold
and silver have been on such a scale in the two
periods, namely, such the increase of the quantity
of the metals relatively to their uses, as to have
sensibly diminished their value during the war and
the restriction ; and such the subsequent falling off
as to have increased their value. And as there was,
down to the time of the revolution in Spanish
1833—1837- 351
America, in 1810, a considerable progressive in-
crease, and, subsequent to that period, a great
falling off, of the supplies from the mines of that
country *, a specious ground is afforded for attribut-
ing to this cause a considerable influence on bullion
prices. Very plausible theories have, accordingly,
been constructed upon the assumed operation of
this cause ; and " in two or three very ingenious
publications, the whole of the great variations of
prices have been ascribed to it.
If this hypothesis were better founded than it
appears to be, it would not at all, as there has be-
fore been occasion to observe, affect the question of
the effects of the Bank restriction and resumption ;
because, if the restriction had not existed, there
must equally, according to this hypothesis, have
been a rise of bullion prices during the war, and
a fall subsequently; whereas the controversy upon
the effects of Peel's bill turns upon the supposition,
that the whole of the variation of bullion prices has
been produced by alterations in the system of our
currency.
The information respecting the production and
the consumption of the precious metals, although
considerable light has been thrown upon the sub-
ject by Mr. Jacob's valuable publication, is much
too vague to admit of any conclusion being drawn
from it as to any influence to be ascribed to altera-
tions in their value upon prices. Considerable as
the rate of increase was, before 1810, and great as
has been the subsequent falling off, there is reason
to doubt, whether, in the increase or the falling off,
the magnitude of the mass upon which the differ-
ence of supply, with reference to the consumption
within the periods in question, has operated, is not
such as to render the variations of imperceptible ef-
fect upon general prices j taking into consideration
* See Jacob on the Precious Metals.
352 PRICES AND CIRCULATION,
more especially the countervailing circumstances
which have been noticed in the preliminary part of this
work. And the inference against the supposition
of any considerable effect, from such variations of
the supplies from the mines, is rendered nearly con-
clusive by the manifold proofs which admit of being
adduced of the sufficiency of the means of account-
ing for the variations of prices, without resort to
any aid from a reference to any material alteration
in the value of the metals.
In favour of this view of the insufficiency of the
difference of the productiveness of the mines to
account for the great variations of prices, I am
enabled to quote the authority of Mr. M'Culloch,
which, high as it deservedly is on topics of political
economy generally, is more especially so on the
point now in question ; because his researches, for
the purposes of his eminently and extensively use-
ful Commercial Dictionary, have necessarily led
him to a view of the principal circumstances affect-
ing all the leading articles of commerce, with refer-
ence to the supply and consumption of them.
The following passage is extracted from that Dic-
tionary, under the head of " Precious Metals : " —
" Influence of the diminished Productiveness of the Mines on
Prices. — It has been customary in this country to ascribe al-
most the whole fall that has taken place in the price of most
commodities since the peace,, to the diminished supply of bullion
from the mines. But we doubt whether this circumstance has
not been fully counterbalanced by others, and whether it has had
any influence in the way now mentioned. The cessation of the
drain to the East, even admitting that M. Humboldt has some-
what over-rated its amount, would of itself have gone far to
counteract the decreased productiveness of the mines ; but we have
just seen that it has not merely ceased, but that we are, in fact,
deriving considerable supplies from that very quarter. In addi-
tion to this, the greater security and tranquillity enjoyed on the
Continent, since the peace, has not only checked that burying of
money, formerly so prevalent, but has caused the bringing to
light of a good many of the subterranean hoards. The institu-
tion of savings' banks, now so common every where, has also, no
doubt, tended to prevent hoarding, and to bring a good deal of
1833—1837. 353
coin into circulation, that would otherwise have been locked up.
These circumstances, coupled with others that might be men-
tioned, such as the cessation of the demand for military chests,
the greater employment of bills in mercantile transactions, &c.,
afford the best grounds for doubting whether the quantity of the
precious metals annually applicable to the purposes of circula-
tion be not as great at present, as in 1809 or 1810. It is further
to be observed, that the falling off in the produce of the mines
has been in silver only ; and that the supply of gold, instead of
being diminished during the last 10 years, has been very mate-
rially increased : and as gold is the standard of our currency, it
is obviously false to affirm that its value has been increased
from its being less abundant than formerly. It is contended,
indeed, that in estimating the value of the precious metals, we
cannot separate gold and silver ; and that the fall that has taken
place in the price of all commodities since 1815, proves that the
value of money has sustained a corresponding advance. But the
value of gold is in no way dependent upon, or connected with, the
value of silver The exchangeable worth of each metal is wholly
determined by the peculiar conditions under which it is sup-
plied; and the circumstance of gold falling in value when silver
is rising, is no more to be wondered at, than that lead should
fall when iron rises, or conversely. Neither is it true that the
fall in the value of commodities since 1815 has been universal.
We admit it has been very general ; but we venture to affirm that
there is not, without any exception whatever, a single com-
modity that has fallen in price since 1814, the fall of which
may not be satisfactorily accounted for without reference to the
supply of gold and silver. Multiplied proofs of what is now
stated, will be found in various articles throughout this work.
And we have little doubt that those who investigate the
matter with any degree of care, will agree with us in thinking,
that, even without distinguishing between gold and silver, were
the influence of the decreased productiveness of the mines on
prices estimated at from 3 to 5 per cent, it would be very de-
cidedly beyond the mark. We believe its influence has been
hardly perceptible."
If, however, as Mr. M'Culloch states in the fore-
going passage (and as I have endeavoured to show),
"there is not, without any exception whatever,
a single commodity that has fallen in price since
1814, the fall of which may not be satisfactorily
accounted for without reference to the supply
of gold and silver," it seems to follow that the
previous rise may be equally accounted for without
such reference j because the mere abstraction of
VOL. ii. A A
354 PRICES AND CIRCULATION.
the causes of the rise till 1814, will account for the
greater part of the subsequent fall; the fall of
some commodities, in a greater degree than the pre-
vious rise, being the effect of improvements in
machinery, in cultivation, in science, and in the
facility and comparative cheapness of communi-
cation.
But, although, upon the grounds stated, there is
reason to believe that the variations in the produc-
tiveness of the mines, considerable as those varia-
tions have been, are insufficient, taking into consi-
deration the countervailing circumstances, to have
caused any perceptible difference in the value of
the precious metals, it must be admitted that the
hypothesis which ascribes to that cause more than
its due importance, is not chargeable with the in-
consistencies, and the utter untenableness in argu-
ment, of either the theory of war-demand, or the
more generally prevalent doctrine of the paramount
influence of alterations in the system of our cur-
rency.
355
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX A. — VOL, I. p. 164.
Upon the Causes which determine the Rate of Interest.
Extracted from a Publication by the Author^ entitled
" Considerations on the State of the Currency" 1826.
THE rate of interest may be defined to be that propor-
tional sum which the lender is content to receive, and the
borrower to pay, annually, or for any longer or shorter
period, for the use of a certain amount of monied capital*,
without any consideration for trouble in the collection of
the income, or for risk as to the punctual repayment of the
interest or principal at stipulated periods. Whatever is
received by the owner of a monied capital for the loan of
it, beyond that rate, ought to be considered in the light of
a remuneration for risk or trouble.
In this view, the rate of interest is the measure of the net
profit on capital. All returns beyond this, on the employ-
ment of capital, are resolvable into compensations under
distinct heads, for risk, trouble, or skill, or for advantages
of situation or connexion. When the owner of a capital
* To distinguish, with perfect accuracy, between monied capital and
currency, is a matter of some difficulty, and, perhaps, would require
a detailed analysis of every species of mercantile transaction. In
ordinary discourse, both monied capital and currency are called money,
and the market for monied or disposable capital is called the money-
market, and hence much confusion arises from the use of the word
money, where monied capital is meant. M. Say notices this distinction
between money and disposable capital, and the errors to which the con-
founding of the two terms together has given rise, in his excellent
and justly celebrated work Traite d" 'Economic Politique, p. 112. el seq.
A A C2
356 APPENDIX.
employs it actively in reproduction, he does not come
under the head of those capitalists, the proportion of
whom, to the number of borrowers, determines the rate of
interest. It is only that class of capitals, the owners of
which are unwilling or unable to employ their money
actively themselves, which has any immediate influence on
the rate of interest.
This is the description of capitals which M. Say calls
Capitaux disponibles*
The possessors of disposable monied capitals, who
operate on the rate of interest as lenders, may be classed
under the following heads :
1. Persons, or bodies of persons, trustees, or others,
who are precluded by legal or other disability from invest-
ing any money which they have to lay out, in any security
that is attended with either risk or trouble. Banks,
whether corporate, or consisting of private individuals,
in as far as they conduct their business according to cor-
rect banking principles, may be reckoned under this head.
It is perfectly possible that, within certain limits, an in-
creasing proportion of national monied income may be
accumulated in the hands of persons or bodies coming
under this description, to such an amount that, if the bor-
rowers who have securities to offer, which involve neither
risk nor trouble to the lenders, be limited to a certain
number, the rate of interest upon such securities may be
.depressed in almost any degree.* It is clear, in this point
of view, that a fall in the rate of interest on the best secu-
rities is no criterion of the returns to capital actively
employed, which involves the necessity of risk, trouble,
and skill. If, by any financial operation, brought about
without any intermediate disturbance of property, as, for
instance, by an effective sinking fund, our national debt
were reduced to one or two hundred millions, it is not
inconceivable that any perpetual annuities offered by go-
vernment, within that amount, would fetch fifty years'
purchase, or, in other words, that the rate of interest, all
other things remaining the same, would, on such securities,
be reduced as low as 2 per cent, per annum.
* It is on this account that an increased issue of Bank of England
and other bank notes, in the way of loans to government, or of dis-
count on mercantile bills, contributes to reduce the rate of interest,
when there is no corresponding increase of borrowers having the most
undoubted security to offer.
APPENDIX. 357'
A state of war, on the other hand, may easily be sup-
posed to raise the rate of interest by creating a supply of
that description of security to a larger amount, and more
rapidly, than could be absorbed by the accumulations of
the class coming under this head. A rise in the rate of
interest is, therefore, a condition for obtaining the requisite
funds from the other classes of persons possessing monied
capitals.
Hence it may be seen why the rate of interest, as mea-
sured by securities involving no risk or trouble, should be
lower in peace than in war, without resorting to any differ-
ence in the rate of profits, to account for that difference in
the rate of interest.
2. Persons who are willing to take some trouble, with
little, if any risk, and who invest their monied capitals in
mortgages, ground-rents, or in loans on goods and other
securities involving the necessity of superintendence, and
more or less of trouble and exertion in collecting the
annual interest. In proportion to the difficulty of obtain-
ing good securities of this kind, except at a reduced rate
of interest, this class would be liable to merge into the
next class which will be mentioned.
The prevalence, however, of habits of prudence, and
the consequently increasing proportion of the national
income accumulating in the hands of this, as well as of
the first class, would enable persons possessing skill for
the active employment of capital, or enjoying advantages
of situation or connexion, and offering sufficient security,
to retain a larger portion of the returns, as a compensation
for their risk, trouble, and skill. Supposing the whole
returns to capital to remain the same, a diminishing pro-
portion might go as the net profit to the monied capitalist,
and an increasing one to mercantile, manufacturing, far,m-
ing, or other professional skill. These returns, beyond
the mere interest of money, and beyond what may arise
from rent or the monopoly of situation, connexion, &c.5
M. Say classes under the head of profits industriels, as,
contra-distinguished from profits de capitaux ; a distinction,
which our economists might adopt with advantage.
3. Persons who, in order to obtain a higher rate of
interest, or a higher price for the use of their monied
capitals, are willing to run an extra degree of risk in the
investment of them, but without bestowing personal labour,
A A 3
358 APPENDIX.
or possessing any technical knowledge or skill, to qualify
them for the active management of such investment.
This is a class, the extent of which could not have been
adequately conceived till the experience of late years, in
which the success of foreign loans, and mining schemes of
the most hazardous nature, proves how many persons there
were in this country, who, having some property, were
willing to embark it in enterprises of more or less hazard,
provided that such enterprises promised on the face of
them to yield more than the common rate of interest,
without requiring labour or skill. In proportion as the
funds of this class have been absorbed in successive pay-
ments to the loans and schemes, they must have been
withdrawn from the competition with the two first classes
of lenders, and this new mode of investment must, con-
sequently, have operated thus far in preventing a fall, if
not in occasioning a rise, in the rate of interest on the best
securities in this country. At the same time that the pro-
gressive reduction in the rate of interest, on the best secu-
rities, must have detached many monied capitalists from
the two first classes, and brought them into the third.
There can be no doubt, therefore, that the fall in the rate
of interest, an artificial one as it now appears, was, in some
degree, a necessary condition of the success of those
loans and schemes to the extent to which they were
carried.
The three classes of persons here enumerated as being
lenders of monied capital, include those who, being actively
engaged in trade, manufactures, or farming, accumulate
more than they can re-invest in their own occupation, with
the prospect of getting the ordinary rate of interest, after
allowing for a remuneration for their labour and risk.
A material consideration to be here borne in mind is,
that it is only as long as those capitals are floating, or dis-
posable, that they operate on the rate of interest. When
once they are invested, whether for a long or a short time,
they are out of the competition of lendable capitals, and
cease to affect, directly, the rate of interest. Thus, if I
have invested my monied capital in the discount of bills,
however undoubted in point of security, and at however
short a date, that sum is withdrawn from the amount of
floating or disposable capital. I may, indeed, if I have a
sudden occasion to require so much money for immediate
APPENDIX. 359
use, get the bills re-discounted for me ; but, then, this
sum must be withdrawn from the amount of floating or
disposable capital in other quarters.
These being the principal heads under which the lenders
of monied capitals may be classed, constituting one of the
conditions on which the rate of interest depends, viz., the
supply, it remains to consider what is the description of the
borrowers, who constitute the demand. These may be
classed as follows : —
1. Persons who have the prospect of being able to
employ a capital beyond their own funds, in such a
manner as to afford a return adequate to remunerate
them for their trouble, and skill, and risk, after replacing
the amount advanced, together with the sum stipulated for
the use of it.
2. Persons who, having embarked the whole of the
capital which they possessed, and having entered into
engagements which require larger advances, and afford
smaller returns than they had anticipated, call for a fur-
ther sum, of such an amount as their securities or credit
enable them to obtain, in order to make up for the de-
ficiency or temporary absence of the returns which they
had reckoned upon.
3. Persons who have occasion to borrow, in order to
supply the means of unproductive expenditure beyond
their income. This head includes a great number of
borrowers, having various kinds of securities. It em-
braces not only those who are proprietors of lands and
houses, which admit of being mortgaged, or who have
personal security to offer, but the government, which
may mortgage the revenues of the state. Under this
head may be considered the agents of foreign govern-
ments, who may raise loans in this country, or, in more
general terms, may offer foreign government securities,
which hold out adequate temptation for investment on the
part of capitalists in this country.
It is only by a classification of particulars like these,
that the causes of variation in the current rate of interest
can be extricated from the confusion in which they are in-
volved by the attempts which have been made, in discus-
sions purely scientific, to account for all such variations by
the supposition of corresponding alterations in the rate of
profit.
The simplest way, as it strikes me, on all such occasions
A A 4
360 APPENDIX.
is, where anything like an analysis can be made, to con-
sider, in the first place, the effect of an alteration in each
class of the circumstances under consideration separately,
the others remaining the same, and then to trace the influ-
ence of any variation in each class on all the others. To
do this completely, however, would require a much greater
length of discussion than would be consistent with the
immediate object of the present inquiry; and I shall con-
tent myself with pointing out the manner in which the
state of the currency affects the conditions of the rate of
interest, and in which the change of these conditions again
affects the state of the currency.
Suppose that, at a given time, all these conditions were
in their ordinary state, and that the current rate of interest
were, consequently, steady, it is very easy, then, to con-
ceive how a sudden increase in the issue of paper, by
banks of circulation, may disturb that state of things, not-
withstanding that the amount of such increase may be
apparently small, when compared with the whole of the
national capital ; for it is not with the whole, nor even
with any considerable part of the national capital, that
what I consider as a nominal addition to it, by a fresh
issue of bank promissory notes, comes in competition.
The amount of capital seeking investment, at any given
time, may easily be imagined to be so limited, that, what
might otherwise appear to be an insignificant sum, may
yet be a large proportion of that amount, and may, conse-
quently, produce a great temporary depression in the rate
of interest, on that description of security for which it
comes directly into competition.
But, in reducing the rate of interest on the best class of
securities, this competition drives the possessors of capital
seeking investment to the alternative of submitting to a
diminished income, or of running a risk which they other-
wise would not have done, in the disposal of it. And it is,
in most instances, the proprietors of the smaller capitals,
being those upon whom the reduction of income presses
hardest, who have recourse to the more hazardous invest-
ments, whether on comparatively slender private security,
or in sleeping partnerships, or in joint-stock companies, or
in foreign loans.
It must be evident that the same reduction of interest,
which leads the possessors of floating capital to incur an
extra risk in their investments, is likely to induce persons
APPENDIX. 361
who have credit, and who are in the active employment of
capita], to extend their engagements, if there be any
speculative ground for anticipating an advance of prices.
This they may do, either by purchases on credit, to a
greater extent than usual, or by borrowing at the reduced
rate of interest. If the reduction in the rate of interest,
and the facility of credit thence arising, should coincide
with a tendency from other causes, to a speculative rise of
prices, and with the opening of new fields for enterprise,
there will naturally be a great extension of the demand for
the loan of capital, by borrowers under the first head.
In the period, however, the consideration of which will
form the chief subject of the present inquiry, the increase
of borrowers under that head, in consequence of the dis-
position to speculate, and to form joint-stock companies,
had not any immediate or very sensible effect in raising
the rate of interest: it merely prevented the greater fall,
which, otherwise, must have been occasioned by the im-
mense augmentation of paper, or nominal capital i*, which
was created during that period, as will be hereafter more
particularly noticed. The supply of nominal capital was
increased, during that period, in a ratio equal to, if not
beyond, that of the immediate increase of demand, great
as it was.
In the early progress of a general speculation, the im-
mediate absorption of capital is comparatively small. The
increased demand for capital by the class of borrowers
described under the first head, may not only not outrun
* A distinction is to be made between capital in the scientific use of
the term, as applied to the actual funds destined for re-production,
consisting of raw materials, &c., and monied capital. In a settled or
uniform state of the currency, however, and in the ordinary use of
credit, these two terms may be considered as identical or convertible.
But, during the progress of increased issues of paper, there is a fac-
titious increase of monied capital; this may be called nominal, which
comes in competition with the pre-existing monied capital ; and it is
while in this state of increase that it operates upon the rate of interest.
It cannot enter into circulation otherwise than by reducing the rate of
interest, other things remaining the same ; as it must inevitably, at the
time it is issued, increase the number of lenders, or diminish the num-
ber of borrowers. When the amount of the currency has become
settled, for any length of time, at a particular level, it is immaterial, as
relates to the rate of interest, whether the level of the currency be at
one half or at double of its former value : the rate of interest will then
be governed entirely by the supply of, and demand for, capital, as
resulting from circumstances independent of the currency.
362 APPENDIX.
the increased supply of nominal capital, created by an
enlargement of the circulating medium, so as to produce
a rise in the rate paid for the use of such capital, but the
enlargement of the circulating medium may be, and, in-
deed, commonly is, under such circumstances, so large as
to produce a Jail in the rate of interest. But the case, in
the further progress and termination of a general specula-
tion, is widely different.
There is, then, an immense increase in that class of
borrowers which comes under the second head ; and, in
proportion as the facility of obtaining credit, as indicated
by a low rate of interest, has been such as to give great
latitude to speculation, there will be an increased demand
for capital, and the intensity of the demand will be indi-
cated by a great rise in the rate of interest. The demand
is no longer limited, as it was, by the prospect of advantage
to be made by the outlay of the capital, after defraying the
rate required for the use of it ; it is now limited only by
the utmost extent of the securities of every description,
which all persons who have entered into engagements
beyond their own immediately available or convertible
capital can bring forward. If, therefore, the nominal
amount of capital were the same as it had been when the
disposition to overtrade was at its height, there would, by
the rapidly increasing absorption of funds, and the conse-
quently urgent wants of the borrowers, be a considerable
rise in the rate of interest. " No complaint (observes Dr.
A. Smith, Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. p. 151-52.) is more
common than that of a scarcity of money. Money, like
wine, must always be scarce with those who have neither
wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to borrow it. Those who
have either, will seldom be in want of the money, or of the
wine, which they have occasion for. This complaint, how-
ever, of the scarcity of money, is not always confined to
improvident spendthrifts; it is sometimes general through
a whole mercantile town and the country in its neighbour-
hood : overtrading is the common cause of it. Sober men,
whose projects have been disproportioned to their capitals,
are as likely to have neither wherewithal to buy money,
nor credit to borrow it, as prodigals, whose expense has
been disproportioned to their revenue. Before their pro-
jects can be brought to bear, their stock is gone, and their
credit with it. They run about everywhere to borrow
APPENDIX. 363
money, and every body tells them that they have none to
lend." *
* Notwithstanding this very clear exposition of the manner in which
overtrading produces a scarcity of money, and a difficulty of borrowing,
or, in other words, a rise in the rate of interest, Dr. Smith has been led
by the hypothesis of the identity of a high rate of interest with high
profits, to convey, in the following passage, an erroneous impression
as to the state of things in our commercial history at the period to which
he alluded. " For some time," he observes, " after the conclusion
of the late war (1763), not only private people, of the best credit,
but some of the greatest companies in London, commonly borrowed at
5 per cent., who, before that, had not been used to pay more than 4 and
4| per cent. The great accession, both of territory and trade, by our
acquisitions in North America and the West Indies, will sufficiently
account for this, without supposing any diminution in the capital stock
of the society. So great an accession of new business to be carried
on by the old stock must necessarily have diminished the quantity em-
ployed in a great number of particular branches, in which the com-
petition being less, the profits must have been greater." (Vol. i.
chap. 9.)
Now, the real state of the facts connected with the rise in the rate
of interest at that period is, that, whether in consequence of the
transition from war to peace, or from any peculiar circumstances which
had previously favoured general overtrading, connected with an unduly
extended circulation of mercantile paper, particularly on the Continent
of Europe, a great revulsion of commercial credit occurred at the
precise period referred to. And the advance in the rate of interest
lasted only during the interval which usually elapses in cases of this
kind, before the effects of such a crisis, in diminishing the competition
of disposable monied capitals, can have subsided. If the rise in the
rate of interest had been merely the consequence of more profitable
employment of money in the new colonies, there is no reason why the
rate should have fallen as it did in a year or two after, for it would be
no difficult matter to show that the real employment, the actual outlay
and absorption of British capital in that direction, must have been
much greater in the third and fourth years, than in the two first years
after the peace.
Some notices have been inserted (vol. i. p. 150.) of the derangement
of credit which prevailed, in 1763, among the principal trading towns
of the Continent of Europef , and a derangement of such extent could
not fail of communicating its effects to this country, as, indeed, it
appears to have done. The following is a statement of the increase of
bankruptcies : — •
1762 - - -205
1763 - - 233
1764 - - 301
f George Chalmers, in his Estimate, thus notices the commercial
discredit of that period : — " The failures which happened at Berlin, at
Hambtfrg, and in Holland, during July, 1763, communicated dismay
and distrust to every commercial town on the European Continent."
(p. 134., edit, of 1802.)
364 APPENDIX.
But coincidently with, and partly arising out of, the very
circumstances which entail a recoil of the speculation, and
a consequent increase of the number of borrowers, is the
occurrence of a great diminution of the amount of dis-
posable or monied capital. All that part of the nominal
capital which arose out of the increase of the circulating
medium, beyond what the ultimate reference and necessary
subsidence to a level with the value of gold, in the rest of
the commercial world, could admit of being retained in
circulation, is swept away by the process which I have, on
former occasions, described. Not only is there a very
great diminution of the amount of disposable capital, from
this cause, but a further reduction must be allowed for,
from the large proportion of persons, bankers and others,
who having, in ordinary times, and during the general
prevalence of prudence in the conduct of business, con-
fined themselves to the safest and most convertible securi-
ties, have been tempted, if not driven by the low rate of
interest, into loans on doubtful or inconvertible securities,
and, perhaps, into engagements by which they are them-
selves brought into the class of borrowers.
Thus, while the demand for capital is increased in a
very great degree, the supply of it is diminished, not only
relatively to the increased demand, but to the former
amount of supply. There can, therefore, be no difficulty
in such cases in accounting for the great rise in the rate of
interest. And this process has been strikingly exemplified
in the recent state of the money-market.
In 1764, exchequer bills, paying 4 per cent, per annum, fell below par,
and navy bills were at 9f- per cent, discount; and 3 per cent, consols,
which, in March, 1763, had been at 96., fell, in October, 1764, to 80.
But, in 1765, exchequer bills, of which a fresh issue had been made,
bearing 3 per cent, per annum interest, were generally about, and
sometimes above, par; and the 3 per cent, consols rose to 92. (Grelleir
On the National Debt, and Sir John Sinclair's work On the Revenue.')
Here is a great fall in the interest of money, without the shadow of
any other ground for inferring that the employment of capital had
become, in a national point of view, less profitable. On the contrary,
as the increase of trade and manufactures, and of agriculture and
population, seems to have been at least as rapid in 1765-66 as in the
two preceding years ; and such increase being the only intelligible cri-
terion of the progress of national wealth, or of the power of accumu-
lation, as arising out of the surplus of national income, I consider that
both the direct and the presumptive proofs are against the inference
drawn by Adam Smith, that the high rate of interest at the period
referred to by him was the consequence of an extended field offered by
the p^ace for a more profitable employment of capital.
APPENDIX. 365
APPENDIX B. — VOL. I. p. 184.
Description of the Seasons o/^1794 and 1795, extracted from
a Publication by Mr. Burke, entitled " Thoughts and
Details on Scarcity" written in November, 1795.
" With regard to the harvest of 1 794-, in relation to the
noblest grain, wheat, it is allowed to have been somewhat
short, but not excessively, and in quality, for the seven-and-
twenty years, during which I have been a farmer, I never
remember wheat to have been so good. The world were,
however, deceived in their speculations upon it — the farmer
as well as the dealer. Accordingly, the price fluctuated
beyond any thing I can remember ; for, at one time of the
year, I sold my wheat at 14/. per load (I sold off all I had,
as I thought this a reasonable price), when, at the end of
the season, if I had then had any to sell, I might have got
thirty guineas for the same sort of grain. I sold all that I
had at a comparatively low price, because I thought it a
good price, compared with what I thought the general pro-
duce of the harvest ; but when I came to consider what my
own total was, I found that the quantity had not answered
my expectation. It must be remembered, that this year of
produce (the year 1794), short, but excellent, followed a
year, 1793, which was not extraordinary in production, nor
of a superior quality, and left but little in store. At first,
this was not felt, because the harvest came in unusually
early — earlier than common by a full month. The winter
at the end of 1794 and beginning of 1795 was more than
usually unfavourable both to corn and grass, owing to the
sudden relaxation of very rigorous frosts, followed by rains,
which were again rapidly succeeded by frosts of still greater
rigour than the first.
" Much wheat was utterly destroyed. The clover grass
suffered in many places. What I never observed before,
the rye grass, or coarse bent, suffered more than the clover.
Even the meadow-grass in some places was killed to the
very roots. In the spring, appearances were better than
we expected. All the early sown grain recovered itself
and came up with great vigour ; but that which was late
sown was feeble, and did not promise to resist any blights
in the spring, which, however, with all its unpleasant vicis-
situdes, passed off very well ; and nothing looked better than
366 APPENDIX.
the wheat at the time of blooming : but at that most critical
time of all, a cold, dry, east wind, attended with very sharp
frosts, longer and stronger -than I recollect at that time of
year, destroyed the flowers, and withered up in an astonish-
ing manner the whole side of the ear next to the wind. At
that time I brought to town some of the ears, for the pur-
pose of showing to my friends the operation of those
unnatural frosts, and according to their extent I predicted
a great scarcity. But such is the pleasure of agreeable
prospects, that my opinion was little regarded.
" On threshing, I found things as I expected — the ears
not filled, some of the capsules quite empty, and several
others containing only withered hungry grain, inferior to
the appearance of rye. My best ears and grains were not
fine ; never had I a grain of so low a quality — yet I sold
one load for 2 ll. At the same time I bought my seed
wheat (it was excellent) at 231. Since then the price has
risen, and I have sold about two load of the same sort at
231. Such was the state of the market when I left home
last Monday. Little remains in my barn. I hope some in
the rick may be better, since it was earlier sown, as far as I
can recollect. Some of my neighbours have better, some
quite as bad, or even worse. I suspect it will be found
that wherever the blighting wind and those frosts at bloom-
ing-time have prevailed, the produce of the wheat crop
will turn out very indifferent. Those parts which have
escaped will, I can hardly doubt, have a reasonable pro-
duce. As to the other grains, it is to be oberved, as the
wheat ripened very late (on account, I conceive, of the
blights), the barley got the start of it, and was ripe first.
The crop, with me and wherever my inquiry could reach,
was excellent, in some places far superior to mine. The
clover which came up with the barley was the finest I re-
member to have seen. The turnips of this year (1795) are
generally good. The clover sown last year, where not
totally destroyed, gave two good crops, or one crop and a
plentiful feed ; and, bating the loss of the rye grass, I do
not remember a better produce.
" The meadow-grass yielded but a middling crop, and
neither of the sown or natural grass was there in any
farmer's possession any remainder from the year, worth
taking into account ; in most places there was none at all.
Oats with me were not in a quantity more considerable
than in commonly good seasons. But J have never known
APPENDIX. 367
them heavier than they were in other places. The oat was
not only a heavy but an uncommonly abundant crop. My
ground under peas did not exceed an acre or thereabouts,
but the crop was great indeed. I believe it is throughout
the country exuberant. It is, however, to be remarked,
that as generally of all the grains, so particularly of the
peas, there was not the smallest quantity in reserve. The
demand of the year must depend solely on its own pro-
duce ; and the price of the spring corn is not to be ex-
pected to fall very soon, or at any time very low. Uxbridge
is a great corn market. As I came through that town I
found that at the last market day, barley was at 40s. a
quarter ; oats there were literally none, and the innkeeper
was obliged to send for them from London. I forgot to
ask about peas. Potatoes were 5s. the bushel. In the de-
bate on this subject in the House, I am told that a leading
member of great ability, little conversant in these matters,
observed, that the general uniform dearness of butcher's
meat, butter, and cheese, could not be owing to a defective
produce of wheat ; and on this ground insinuated a suspi-
cion of some unfair practice on the subject, that called for
inquiry. Unquestionably, the mere deficiency of wheat
could not cause the dearness of the other artiQles, which
extends not only to the provisions he mentioned, but to
every other, without exception.
" The cause is indeed so very plain and obvious, that the
wonder is the other way. When a properly directed in-
quiry is made, the gentlemen who are amazed at the price
of these commodities, will find, that when hay is at six
pounds a load, as they must know it is, herbage, and for
more than one year, must be scanty; and they will con-
clude, that if grass be scarce, beef, veal, mutton, butter,
milk, and cheese, must be dear.
" But, to take up the matter somewhat more in detail ;
if the wheat harvest in 1794, excellent in quality, was de-
fective in quantity, the barley harvest was in quality ordi-
nary enough, and in quantity deficient. This was soon
felt in the price of malt. Another article of produce (beans)
was not at all plentiful. The crop of peas was wholly
destroyed, so that several farmers pretty early gave up all
hopes on that head, and cut the green haulm as fodder for
the cattle, then perishing for want of food in that dry and
burning summer. I myself came off better than most — I
had about the fourth of a crop of peas. It will be recol-
368 APPENDIX.
lected that, in a manner, all the bacon and pork consumed
in this country (the far largest consumption of meat out of
towns) is, when growing, fed on grass, and on whey or
skimmed milk ; and, when fatting, partly on the latter.
This is the case in the dairy countries, all of them great
breeders, and feeders of swine ; but, for the much greater
part, and in all the corn countries, they are fattened on
beans, barley- meal, and peas. W^hen the food of the animal
is scarce, his flesh must be dear. This, one would suppose,
would require no great penetration to discover. This failure
of so very large a supply of flesh in one species, naturally
throws the whole demand of the consumer on the dimi-
nished supply of all kinds of flesh, and, indeed, on all the
matters of human sustenance. Nor, in my opinion, are we
to expect a greater cheapness in that article for this year,
even though corn should grow cheaper, as it is to be hoped
it will. The store swine, from the failure of subsistence last
year, are now at an extravagant price. Pigs, at our fairs, have
sold lately for fifty shillings, which two years ago would
not have brought more than twenty. As to sheep, none, I
thought, were strangers to the general failure of the article
of turnips last year; the early having been burned as they
came up Jay the great drought and heat ; the late, and
those of the early which had escaped, were destroyed by
the chilling frosts of the winter, and the wet and severe
weather of the spring. In many places a full fourth of the
sheep or the lambs were lost ; what remained of the lambs
were poor and ill-fed, the ewes having had no milk. The
calves came late, and they were generally an article, the
want of which was as much to be dreaded as any other.
So that article of food, formerly so abundant in the early
part of the summer, particularly in London, and which in
a great part supplied the place of mutton for near two
months, did little less than totally fail.
" All the productions of the earth link in with each
other. All the sources of plenty in all and every article
were dried or frozen up. The scarcity was not, as gentle-
men seem to suppose, in wheat only.
" As to the lesser articles, they are like the greater.
They have followed the fortune of the season. Why are
fowls dear? Was not this the farmer's or jobber's fault?
I sold from my yard to a jobber six young and lean fowls,
for four-and- twenty shillings ; fowls, for which two years
ago the same man would not have given a shilling a piece.
APPENDIX. 369
He sold them afterwards at Uxbridge, and they were
taken to London to receive the last hand.
" As to the operation of the war in causing the scarcity
of provisions, I understand that Mr. Pitt has given a par-
ticular answer to it ; but I do not think it worth powder
and shot." (Page 33.)
APPENDIX C.— VOL. II. p. 338.
Letter addressed to the Author by James Pennington, Esq.
DEAR SIR,
It was the principal object of the paper of observa-
tions, which you did me the honour to append to your
published letter to Lord Grenville, to illustrate the prin-
ciple on which the deposits of the London bankers are
formed, and the mode in .which they act ; to show that
they are susceptible of considerable increase, or diminution,
without a corresponding enlargement or contraction of the
basis on which they rest ; and that, consequently, the quan-
tity of money in the metropolis may be greater, or less, at
one time than another, although the circulation of the Bank
of England should remain uniformly the same.
I did not attempt, in that paper, to explain all the vari-
ous circumstances which tend to augment, or to lessen, the
amount of the deposits. My object was to show that the
book credits of a London banker, and the promissory notes
of a country banker, are essentially the same thing ; that
they are different forms of the same kind of credit ; and
that they are employed to perform the same functions.
It never occurred to me, as appears to have been sup-
posed by Colonel Torrens, that every million of notes
issued by the Bank of England forms the basis of five
millions of deposits ; and that every million withdrawn
from circulation, by the Bank, occasions a five-fold dimi-
nution of those deposits. On the contrary, it is perfectly
consistent with my view of the subject, to suppose that the
deposit accounts of the London bankers may be materially
diminished, while the circulation of the Bank of England
is greatly enlarged, or vice versa.
Colonel Torrens, in his published letter to Lord Mel-
bourne, appears to have fallen into some misapprehension
on this head.
VOL. II. B B
370 APPENDIX.
He thinks that if, between December, 1833, and March,
1834-, the Bank of England had contracted its circulation
to the extent of 1,447,000£., that contraction would have
occasioned a diminution of the book-credit circulation of
the metropolis of five times that amount.
In this statement he appears to have overlooked the
circumstance, that, of the outstanding notes of the Bank
of England, by far the largest portion is not in the hands
of the London bankers, but in the hands of those the
nature and routine of whose business do not require the
employment of a banker ; and that when a million of notes
are cancelled by bullion payments, it is probable that the
greatest part of that amount is finally withdrawn, not from
the hands of the bankers, but from the external circulation.
It has been objected to the views which I endeavoured
to explain, that as the amount of deposits left in the hands
of a banker depends upon the pleasure and convenience
of the depositors, the banker has no power to increase the
quantity of money in circulation, without increasing or
diminishing the fund which he reserves to meet the occa-
sional demands of the depositors.
This is true : and it is equally true that, as the amount
of notes which a bank of circulation is able to keep out
depends upon the convenience and the willingness of those
into whose hands they fall to hold them, the quantity of
outstanding paper money is necessarily limited by that cir-
cumstance.
But the question is, whether the pleasure and the con-
venience of the depositors, and the will and the disposi-
tion of the note holders, are susceptible, at different times,
of any material alteration in this respect ; and, if they are,
whether the deposit banks, and the circulating banks, can
turn that alteration to their own advantage without en-
trenching on their reserved fund.
In order to determine this question, it is necessary to
examine the circumstances that limit the amount of depo-
sits, and of outstanding notes.
It has been correctly stated, by more than one writer on
this subject, that the quantity of money in circulation is
limited by the necessity which every one feels, or the en-
deavour which every one uses, to keep at his banker's, in
his till, or in his pocket, no greater sum than he deems to
be sufficient to answer current and occasional demands.
One person keeps .5000/. for this purpose ; another 5001.
APPENDIX. 371
another 100/. ; and soon, to a few sovereigns, or a few
shillings.
The aggregate amount of the money sp kept forms the
sum total of the money in circulation.
Now, if all the circulating banks simultaneously issue a
greater amount of notes than can be absorbed in this way,
some person, or many persons, must have in their pos-
session a greater sum of money than is sufficient for cur-
rent purposes.
Of this excess the ultimate corrective is the foreign ex-
change. A considerable time may, however, elapse before
the check begins to operate. The foreign exchange is
affected only through the medium of prices, or of the rate
of interest; but an unusual abundance of money does not
always produce a general rise of prices. It is quite possible,
indeed, that contemporaneously with that abundance, the
prices of commodities may be generally low. The increased
issue of paper may fall into the hands of those who, from
habit and inclination, are averse from investing their money
savings in commodities, or services, with a view to reproduc-
tion and to profit ; but whose desire it is to employ the money
which comes into their hands, over and above their own
personal and unproductive expenditure, in such a way as
will bring to them an increased income, with as little risk
and trouble as possible. But the opportunity of so em-
ploying this surplus money may not immediately occur.
The amount of the public funds, in time of peace, is ge-
nerally stationary or diminishing. If, therefore, one person
determine, however high may be the price, to invest his
money savings in the public funds, another person must
necessarily be forced out ; and the money, in the shape of
Bank notes, or of book credits, may still remain waiting
for an investment.
In such a state of things, there frequently prevails great
dulness of demand for commodities, and a low rate of interest.
In the long run, however, it is probable that, either in
consequence of an actual or prospective rise of prices, or
in consequence of the demand of the saving class of the
community for foreign stocks and foreign investments, the
foreign exchange will become depressed, and a demand for
metallic money for exportation be created ; which demand,
the bankers will be obliged, directly or indirectly, to sa-
tisfy. A contraction of the currency will then in all pro-
bability take place, and the redundant money disappear.
B B 2
APPENDIX.
It thus appears that the promissory notes of the pro-
vincial bankers, and the book credits of the London
bankers, may be issued to a greater extent than is neces-
sary for the purpose of internal interchange ; that the sur-
plus of money, so created, may remain inert for a con-
siderable time, without raising the prices of commodities,
or affecting the foreign exchange ; and that the ultimate
corrective of the excess is a demand for, and exportation of,
metallic money.
It may perhaps be said, that although circulating banks
may occasionally issue an excessive quantity of paper, in
the manner above described, it is impossible that the Lon-
don banks, which are merely banks of deposit, can err in
this respect. They can only lend to others the money
which has been previously lent to them. They do not
create paper money ; they only employ, in discounting bills
of exchange, or in advances upon securities bearing in-
terest, the metallic or the paper money which has been
placed in their hands for the purpose of facilitating the
money transactions of the depositors. They are merely
cashiers.
But although the London bankers do not issue promis-
sory notes, is it quite certain that they do not create
" promises to pay," which perform the functions, and
serve all the purposes of promissory notes, and which may
be increased without intrenching on their reserved fund,
or diminished without adding to it ?
What takes place when a London banker, or a country
, banker, discounts a bill of exchange ?
When a London banker discounts a bill of exchange,
he gives credit for the amount of the bill, less the interest,
for the period which the bill has to run, in an account
opened in his ledger : when a country banker discounts a
bill of exchange, he pays the amount of the bill, less the
interest, in promissory notes. In both cases payment from
the banker of the amount of the bill, less the discount,
may be immediately demanded in gold, or in Bank of
England notes.
It may be said, that unless the person in whose favour
the advance is made allows the money to remain in de-
posit, the London banker will immediately be called upon
for payment ; while the notes of the country banker may
remain, for a considerable time, outstanding.
But does it necessarily follow, that if a cheque be drawn
APPENDIX. 373
upon the London banker for the amount of the advance,
he will be obliged to intrench upon his reserved fund ? The
cheque may be paid into his hands by some other depositor,
and placed at the credit of that other depositor ; in which
case, other things remaining the same, the whole amount
of the book credits of that banker will be increased to the
extent of this new advance. And even if the cheque be
paid into the hands of some other banker, the amount of
the book credits of the banker who has paid the cheque
will not be diminished, while the book credits, as well as
the reserved fund of the banker, to whom it is paid, will
be increased by its amount.
Now, precisely the same train of circumstances may
happen with regard to the notes of a country banker. In
the first instance he issues fresh notes for the amount of the
bill discounted. So long as these additional notes remain in
circulation, he is precisely in the situation of a London
banker to whom a cheque upon himself has been paid by
a depositor.
But the additional notes may fall into the hands of a
neighbouring bank ; in which case the banker who issued
them will be called upon for their discharge ; and the re-
served fund of the banker into whose hands they had fallen
will be increased by the amount of the notes.
In consequence of this accession to his reserved fund,
the second banker will be enabled to enlarge his issues ;
and thus the quantity of circulating paper may be aug-
mented.
The converse of these operations may take place. The
new advances, instead of being again deposited or circulated
in the form of notes, may be employed in the discharge of
securities previously in the possession of the bank ; in
which case there will be no augmentation of money.
Moreover, some of the deposits or notes already out-
standing may be employed in the same way ; in which
case there will be a diminution of the quantity of money,
unless the cancelled notes or cancelled deposits be rein-
stated by fresh discounts and fresh advances.
It does not appear to me that this reasoning is affected
by an observation which I have sometimes heard, that cir-
culating banks have frequently the power to force out and
extend their issues of notes, while the London bankers are
generally passive in this respect, and allow their book
credit circulation to be increased, or diminished, by some
B B 3
374* APPENDIX.
extrinsic force which they themselves have not been directly
instrumental in producing.
That there may occasionally be some difference in the
practical working of the two kinds of machinery I may
readily admit, and yet still maintain that the character
and object of both are essentially the same ; that both the
one and the other are substitutes for a metallic currency,
and are susceptible of considerable increase or diminution,
without a corresponding enlargement or contraction of the
basis on which they rest.
But is it true, in point of fact, that the one has con-
stantly and uniformly an advantage over the other in this
respect ? Has it not sometimes happened that, while the
country bankers have found it impossible to increase their
issues of notes, but on the contrary have been obliged to
curtail them, the London bankers have been able to con-
tinue their usual operations, and even to extend them ?
You, who are accurately acquainted with all the material
facts and circumstances of our past commercial history,
can answer these questions. I apprehend the truth to be,
that each mode of circulation is affected by a variety of
circumstances which do not always simultaneously affect
both.
Permit me, in this place, to notice some observations
that have been published on this subject.
With the view of explaining the principle and the oper-
ations of a bank of deposit, it has been said that the de-
posits left by individuals in the hands of a banker are
monied capital, of which the functions are performed by a
comparatively small sum of money ; and that the banker
is compensated for his trouble by employing, for his own
benefit, that portion of the deposits which is not used by
the depositor.
Of the meaning of the expression monied capital, no
explanation is given. If metallic money is not intended
by it, the expression can mean only land, houses, merchan-
dise, and other things of a like nature, in which what is
called monied capital consists; for surely it cannot mean
the parchment, or the paper, on which the right to, or the
interest in, the property referred to, is recorded. The
banker may not be able to point out a single tangible and
visible object on which any part of the written securities
in his possession finally depends. Still, those securities
(if they are good securities), whether consisting of bills,
APPENDIX. 375
bonds, mortgage deeds, or pledges of stock, have reference
to property in which the deposits left in the hands of a
banker are actually invested.
If this is a correct view of the matter, the expression,
" monied capital," in the observations referred to, means
certain muniments of title which are readily convertible,
by sale or otherwise, into metallic money at the pleasure
of the holder.
The result then is, that the deposits in the hands of a
banker consist of debts of that banker to the depositors,
against which debts he holds a small sum of money and
other debts and obligations, which are finally resolvable
into some tangible and visible object, its usufruct, or its
produce.
In this sense of the term " monied capital," it may be
admitted that the deposits in the hands of a banker are
monied capital.
In a like sense it must be admitted that the promissory
notes of a circulating bank are monied capital, which
monied capital, if traced out to the things in which it is
really invested or embodied, will be found to consist of
houses, land, merchandise, &c., into which certain debts in
the form of bankers' promissory notes are finally resolvable.
What is meant when it is said that the functions of this
capital are performed by a small sum of money, is not
quite so obvious.
The facts of the case are, however, sufficiently obvious.
A banker knows, from experience, that, although most
of the debts which he owes are payable on demand, pay-
ment of a comparatively small portion of them is likely to
be suddenly demanded. Of the funds entrusted to him he
reserves, therefore, in the form of cash, no greater sum
than he deems to be sufficient to answer that small amount
of demand. This reserved cash performs no other function
than the occasional payment of some of the debts owing by
the banker.
I must here again beg to observe, that although the
transferable book debts and the promissory notes of
bankers are employed as a substitute for metallic money,
it does not follow that every increase or diminution of their
amount will necessarily affect prices of commodities in a de-
gree commensurate with that increase or diminution. It
may, and often does, happen that a larger portion than usual
of the actual amount has fallen into the hands, or is at the
B B 4
376 APPENDIX.
disposal of, persons who are unwilling for a season to bring
their money funds to market. When this is the case, then
— given the quantity of book credit money, and of notes —
if those who are indisposed to come to market with their
money have a larger share than usual, others must have a
less share than usual.
This state of things may occur in a country of which the
currency is exclusively metallic. When it does occur,
prices are generally low, and the exchanges favourable to
an influx of the metals.
It may, moreover, be observed, that the substitution of
transferable book debts for metallic money induces, by the
facility of transfer, and the safe custody which it affords,
many persons to keep at their disposal much larger balances
of money than they would be disposed to keep if the cur-
rency were wholly metallic. These extra balances render
the quantity of money, or what answers all the purposes of
money, much greater in this country than it probably would
be if the currency consisted exclusively of coin. They are
not to be regarded as so much unemployed capital. The
capital which they represent exists in a tangible form some-
where ; they are credits available at a moment's notice by
the parties in whose favour they are given. They do not
act upon the prices of commodities, or of securities, unless
they are brought out. They are merely so much dormant
credit. The large sums lodged, at interest, in the Scotch,
and in many of the provincial banks, are of this description,
with this difference, that they are not payable on demand
without previous notice to the banker.
It remains to consider the deposits of the Bank of Eng-
land, and to enquire in what respect they differ from its note
circulation. It may be proper to consider them under the
following heads : —
1. Deposits of Government.
2. Deposits of the London bankers.
3. Drawing accounts.
The most important question that occurs with regard to
these deposits is this : — Upon which of them, and in what
degree, is a demand for gold, when it arises either from the
internal wants of the country, or from an unfavourable
balance of trade, likely to fall ; and what effect is that de-
mand likely to have upon the note circulation of the Bank ?
Let us take them in their order.
1. The Government balances.
APPENDIX. 377
Of these the aggregate amount varies; first, in consequence
of the greater or less productiveness of the public revenue
compared with the expenditure; and secondly, because,
when the income and expenditure are, on the whole, even,
the former is not, for short periods of time, commensurate
with the outgoings. From these causes, and in conse-
quence of the necessity of a strict adherence to the rules of
parliamentary appropriation, the Government balances are
subject to temporary fluctuations. But as the variations,
in the course of the year, usually compensate each other,
their effect on prices, or on the rate of interest, and, through
prices or the rate of interest, on the foreign exchange, is
too inconsiderable to deserve notice.
When the revenue is surplus, the excess is brought into
circulation through the medium of the sinking-fund, or is
applied to the redemption of quarterly deficiency bills,
agreeably to the provisions of the Act of 10 Geo. IV.,
cap. 27.
When the revenue is deficient, the deficiency must be
made good in some other way than by a direct advance
from the Bank of England, or the general circulation will,
no doubt, be artificially enlarged.
2. Deposits of the London bankers.
These constitute part of the reserved fund of the Lon*
don bankers, which it may be presumed is kept in deposit
at the Bank solely to suit the convenience of the bankers,
the custody of the Bank being preferred to that of their own
iron chests.
The increase or diminution of these balances depends
upon the general state of the money circulation of the
metropolis. If, during the prevalence of an unfavourable
foreign exchange, the balances are reduced by cheques
drawn upon the Bank, and finally by payments in gold, for
exportation, then — unless the bankers themselves export
the gold on their own account, which seldom or never hap-
pens — the balances due to their various depositors, and
consequently the quantity of money in the metropolis, is as
effectually reduced as if the outstanding notes of the Bank
were reduced by the redemption of securities in its posses-
sion, and the bankers' deposits at the Bank to remain
unaltered.
On the other hand, during the prevalence of a favourable
foreign exchange, and the consequent influx of gold from
abroad, whether the imported gold is held by the bankers,
378 APPENDIX.
or placed by them in deposit at the Bank, the quantity of
money in the metropolis is as effectually increased as .it
would be if the Bank of England were to give notes in
exchange for the gold.
3. Drawing accounts.
These are to be regarded exactly in the same light as so
many drawing accounts kept with private bankers ; they
are transferable book-debts in a constant state of active
circulation.
The propriety and expediency of separating the deposit
department from the circulating department of the Bank,
have lately been suggested in the belief that such a separa-
tion would render the operations of the Bank more con-
formable to certain rules, the strict observance of which, it
is supposed, can alone make the currency vary exactly as
it would do if it were wholly and exclusively metallic.
It is proposed that the circulating department shall hold
a fixed amount of securities, and that its issue of notes
beyond that amount shall be confined to the exchange of
gold for notes, and notes for gold, with a few exceptions
of no essential or material importance.
It is further proposed that the deposit department shall
be free to employ its funds in whatever manner is most con-
ducive to profit, and at the same time consistent with pru-
dence and good management.
Although there is at present, I apprehend, no confusion
of accounts between the two departments, yet so complete
a separation of them as that which has been suggested,
could not wrell be effected without a more formal division
of debts and assets than mere book-keeping can accomplish.
Whether a deposit bank upon so large a scale as that of
the Bank of England could be so conducted as to prevent
considerable fluctuations in the value of the currency, I
own I have considerable doubts.
I am, dear Sir,
Very faithfully yours,
JAMES PENNINGTON.
Clapham, April 10. 1838.
STATE OF BANK OF ENGLAND.
379
An Account of the Average Market Price of Bullion in each Year, from 1800 to 1821 (taken from
official Documents), of the Average Value per Cent, of the Currency, estimated by the Market Price
of Gold for the same Period, and of the Average Depreciation per Cent.
Years.
Average Price of
Gold per oz.
Average per Cent,
of the Value of
the Currency.
Average Depre-
ciation per Cent.
Years.
Average Price of
UoW per oz.
Average perCent.
oftheVa.lueof
the Currency.
Average Depre-
ciation per Cent.
£ S. d.
£ S. d.
£ s. d.
£ s. d.
£ s. d.
£ s. d.
1800
3 17 10|
100 0 0
Nil.
1811
446
92 3 2
7 16 10
1801
5 0
91 12 4
878
1812
4 15 6
79 5 3
20 14 9
1802
4 0
92 14 2
7 5 10
1813
510
77 2 0
22 18 0
1803
0 0
97 6 10
2 13 2
1814
540
74 17 6
25 2 6
1804
0 Oj
97 6 10
2 13 2
1815
4 13 6
83 5 9
16 14 3
1805
0 0
97 6 10
2 13 2
1816
4 13 6
83 5 9
16 14 3
1806
0 0
97 6 10
2 13 2
1817
400
97 6 10
2 13 2
1807
0 0
97 6 10
2 13 2
1818
400
97 6 10
2 13 2
1808
0 0
97 6 10
2 13 2
1819
416
95 11 0
490
1809
0 0
97 6 10
2 13 2
1820
3 19 11
97 8 0
2 12 0
1810
10 0
86 10 6
13 9 6
1821
3 17 10*
100 0 0
Nil.
An Account of the Debts and Assets (exclusive of the Bank Capital) of the Bank of England j
exhibiting, on the one hand, the Amount of Bank Notes, Post Bills, &c. in Circulation, and of the
public and private Deposits in the Hands of the Bank ; and, on the other, the Amount of the various
public and private Securities, and of the Bullion htld by the Bank, on the 31st of August, in each
Year, from 1778 to 1831 inclusive. — (From the Appendix, No. 5. of Report on Bank Charter.)
31 August, 1778.
Circulation
Deposits
£
6,758,070
4,715,580
31 August, 1778. £
Secure, - {IS* : •$%}
Bullion - .
- - - Rest, 1,282,740*.
31 August, 1779.
<fe»iriti<>. C Public - 7,493,6497
Secunties - £Private . 2j356191j
Bullion
- - - Rest, 1,355,560/.
31 August, 1780.
<!0™,.i*;oa f Public - 6,740,5147
Securities - (Private . ^gQ^ej
Bullion *
. - - Rest, 1.527.510/.
31 August, 1781,
c^,,v-f;«. f Public - 6,609,4577
Securities - [^-^^ . ^JoSSJ
Bullion . . ' ' *. j
. . . Rest, 1.742.040/.
31 August, 1782.
c •*•«. f Public . 8,987,5737
Secunties - [Private . ^96^2175
Bullion - • _
. . . Rest, 1,921,580*.
SO August, 1783.
0 ... f Public - 9,566,0377
Securities . [Private . fasjBSS
Bullion ...
- - . Rest, 2,018,960*.
31 August, 1784.
c ... f Public - 8,435,7777
Securities - [Private . 4>088,603J
Bullion ....
. . . Rest, 2,204,570*.
31 August, 1785.
c .. . C Public - 6,725,891 7
Securities - [Private . 3,218,679 j
Bullion ....
- - - Rest, 2,608,930*.
31 August, 1786.
q-Piiriti.* f Public - 7,988,2417
[Private - 2,390,539 j
Bullion • •
. - - Rest, 2,638,260*.
£
9,627,970
3,128,420
31 August, 1779.
Circulation
Deposits
31 August, 1780.
Circulation
Deposits
11,473,650
12,756,390
7,276,540
5,201,040
9,849,840
3,983,300
12,477,580
13,833,140
6,341,600
6,655,800
10,345,540
4,179,370
31 August, 1781.
Circulation
Deposits
31 August, 1782.
Circulation
Deposits
30 August, 1783.
Circulation
Deposits
31 August, 1784.
Circulation
Deposits
31 August, 1785.
Circulation
Deposits
31 August, 1786.
Circulation
Deposits
12,997,400
14,524,910
6,309,430
5,921,630
11,110,510
2,862,590
12,231,060
13,973,100
6,759,310
6,759,450
13,483,790
1,956,550
13,518,760
15,440,340
6,307,270
6,105,650
13,841,800
590,080
12,412,920
14,431,880
5,592,510
6,267,130
12,524,380
1,539,830
11,859,640
14,064,210
6,570,650
6,252,030
9,944,570
5,487,040
12,822,680
15,431,610
8,184,330
5,867,240
10,378,780
6,311,050
14,051,570
16,689,830
380
PRICES OF GOLD AND
Amount of Notes in Circulation, and Deposits, and Securities held by the Bank — continue d.
SI August, 1787.
Circulation
Deposits
£
9,685,720
5,631,540
31 August, 1787. £
Sprnritipa (Public - 8,066,3037
Securities - J Privatc . 3,787357]
Bullion
£
11,853,660
6,293,000
15,317,260
. - - Rest, 2,829,400*.
18,146,660
30 August, 1788.
Circulation
Deposits
10,002,880
5,528,640
30 August, 1788.
•feoiiritlo. ("Public . 8,840,0687
Securities - £Private .. 2,73^52]
Bullion ...
11,570,320
6,899,160
15,531,520
- - . Rest, 2,937,960*.
18,469,480
31 August, 1789
Circulation
Deposits
11,121,800
6,402,450
31 August, 1789.
<WiirSH», ("Public - 9,661,8597
Securities - Jprivate . 2 035 901 j
Bullion
11,697,760
8,645,860
17,524,250
- - - Rest, 2,819,370*.
20,343,620
31 August, 1790.
Circulation
Deposits
11,453,340
6,199,200
31 August, 1790.
qpr-nritiP, f Public - 10,047,2577
? Private - 1,956,263 '
Bullion .
12,003,520
8,386,330
17,632,540
- - - Rest, 2,757,310*.
20,389,850
31 August, 1791.
Circulation -
Deposits
11,672,320
6,437,730
18,110,050~
31 August, 1791.
<?AP,,riti«a ("Public . 10,921,3007
Securities - £Private . 1,898,640 J
Bullion
- - - Rest, 2,765,400*.
12,819,940
8,055,510
20,875,450
31 August, 1792.
Circulation - -
Deposits
11,006,300
5,526,480
31 August, 1792.
<fePi,ritt«. ("Public - 10,715,0417
Securities . JPrivate . 3190869J
Bullion
13,905,910
5,357,380
16,532,780
- - - Rest, 2,730,510*.
19,263,290
31 August, 1793.
Circulation
Deposits
10,865,050
6,442,810
31 August, 1793.
<teniririM ("Public - 10,381,8387
Securities - £Private . 4,427,842 j
Bullion ....
14,809,680
5,322,010
17,307,860
- - - Rest, 2,823,830*.
20,131,690
30 August, 1794.
Circulation
Deposits - . «
10,286,780
5,935,710
30 August, 1794.
<?PP,nitiP, (Public - 8,863,0487
Secunties - JPrivate . 3,583,412 j
Bullion ....
12,446,460
6,770,110
16,222,490
- - « Rest, 2,994,080*.
19,216,570
31 August, 1795.
Circulation
Deposits
10,862,200
8,154,980
31 August, 1795.
*>m.*iH». ("Public - 15,250,9047
Securities - £Private . 3,739,016 j
Bullion ....
16,989,920
5,136,350
19,017,180
. . . Rest, 3,109,090*.
22,126,270
31 August, 1796.
Circulation
Deposits
9,246,790
6,656,320
31 August, 1796.
«^,,«t;«« ("Public - 10,875,3477.
Securities - £Private . 6,150,123 j
Bullion ...
17,025,470
2,122,950
15,903,110
. . . Rest, 3,245,310*.
19,148,420
31 August, 1797.
Circulation
Deposits
11,114,120
7,765,350
31 August, 1797.
Securities ("Public . 8,765,2247
Securities . {Private . 9,495,946 j
Bullion ....
18,261,170
4,089,620
18,879,470
. . . Rest, 3,471,320*.
22,350,790
31 August, 1798.
Circulation
Deposits
12,180,610
8,300,720
31 August, 1798.
q~..,ru;M f Public . 10,930,0387
Securities - £ Private . 6,419,602 j
Bullion ....
17,349,640
6,546,100
20,481,330
. . - Rest, 3,414,410*.
23,895,740
31 August, 1709.
Circulation
Deposits
13,389,490
7,642,240
31 August, 1799.
("Public - 9,452,9557
Securities - Jp^^ . 7)477,485 j
Bullion - - -
16,930,440
7,000,780
21,031,730
- - - Rest, 2,899,490*.
23,931,220
STATE OF BANK OF ENGLAND.
381
Amount of Notes in Circulation, and Deposits, and Securities held by the Bank — continued.
30 August, 1800.
Circulation
Deposits
£
15,047,180
8,335,060
30 August, 1800. £
«?oriiriH«i ("Public - 13,586,590}
Securities . J Private . 8 551, 830 j
Bullion
£
22,138,420
5,150,450
23,382,240
- - - Rest, 3,906,630*.
27,288,870
31 August, 1801.
Circulation
Deposits
14,556,110
8,133,830
31 August, 1801.
Spf-,,riHpa f Public - 11,926,8737
I Private - 10,282,697 J
Bullion ....
22,209,570
4,335,260
22,089,940
- - - Rest, 3,854,890*.
26,544,830
31 August, 1802.
Circulation
Deposits
17,097,630
9,739,140
31 August, 1802.
<?P«,,riti«« f Public - 13,528,5997
Securities - JPrivate . 13,584,761 j
Bullion
27,113,360
3,891,780
26,836,770
- - - Rest, 4,168,3707.
31,005,140
31 August, 1803.
Circulation
15,983,330
31 August, 1803.
<8«.,,riH« f Public - 13,336,1797
Securities - [Private . 13,582,661 j
26,918,840
25,800,570
- - . Rest, 4,710,7707.
30,511,340
31 August, 1804.
Circulation
DepositJ
17,153,890
9,715,530
SI August, 1804.
«0m,r-f50« f Public - 14,993,3957
Securities - iprivate - loJsS&SS j
Bullion - -
25,826,680
5,879,190
26,869,420
- - - Rest, 4,836,4507.
31,705,870
31 August, 1805.
Circulation
Deposits
16,388,400
14,048,080
81 August, 1805.
(toriirttiM f Public - 11,413,2667
Securities . JPrivate . i6,359,584J
Bullion -
£7,772,850
7,624,500
30,436,480
- - - Rest, 4,960,8707.
35,397,350
31 August, 1806.
Circulation
Deposits
21,027,470
9,636,330
31 August, 1806.
SernritiPs C Public - 14,167,7727
securities - £Private . 15,305,328 j
Bullion ...
29,473,100
6,215,020
30,663,800
- - - Rest, 5,024,3207.
35,688,120
31 August, 1807.
Circulation
Deposits
19,678,360
11,789,200
31 August, 1807.
c~.,,r-t-»a f Public - 13,410,0557
Securities - J Private . 16,526 895 j
Bullion ...
29,936,950
6,484,350
31,467,560
. . . Rest, 4,953,7407,
36,421,300
31 August, 1808.
Circulation
Deposits
17,111,290
15,012,510
31 August, 180&
«»M,rifiP« f Public - 14,956,3947
Securities - [Private . 14,287,696j
Bullion ....
29,244,090
6,015,940
30,123,800
- . - Rest, 5,136,2307.
35,260,030
31 August, 1809.
Circulation
Deposits
19,574,180
12,257,180
31 August, 1809.
fe»...*itsM C Public . 15,307,6737
Securities - £Private . 18,127,597J
Bullion ....
33,435,270
3,652,480
31,831,360
. . . Rest, 5,256,3907.
37,087,750
31 August, 1810.
Circulation
Deposits
24,793,990
13,617,520
31 August, 1810.
0 ... f Public - 17,198,6777
Secunties - [Private . gsfosjow j
40,973,770
3,191,850
38,411,510
- - - Rest, 5,754,1107.
44,165,620
31 August, 1811.
Circulation
Deposits
23,286,850
11,075,660
31 August, 1811
Q^nrUia. J Public - 21,884,248}
Securities - £Private . 15,199,032]
Bullion ....
37,083,280
3,243,300
34,362,510
. . . Rest, 5,964,0707.
40,326,580
31 August, 1812.
Circulation
Deposits
23,026,880
11,848,910
31 August, 1812.
0 ... f Public - 21,165,iy07
Securities . |Private . 17,010,930]
Bullion ....
38,176,120
3,099,270
34,875,7^0
- - - Rest, 6,399,6007.
41,275,390
38*
PRICES OF GOLD AND
Amount of Notes in Circulation, and Deposits, and Securities lield by the Bank — continued.
31 August, 1813.
Circulation
Deposits
£
24,828,120
11,159,730
31 August, 1813. £
«WnriHP« C Public - 25,591,3367
Securities - £Privatc . i^SM^MJ
bullion - -
£
40,106,080
2,712,270
35,987,850
- - Rest, 6,830,5007.
42,818,350
31 August, 1814.
Circulation
Deposits
28,368,290
14,849,940
31 August, 1814.
<fenirit;M f Public - 34,982,4857
Securities - £Private . 13,363,4753
Bullion ....
48,345,960
2,097,680
45,218,230
. - Rest, 7,225,410*.
50,443,640
31 August, 1815.
Circulation
Deposits
27,248,670
12,696,000
31 August, 1815.
c ... C Public - 24,194,0867
Securities . [private - 20,660|094J
Bullion ...
44,854,180
3,409,040
39,944,670
. - Rest, 8,318,5507.
48,263,220
31 August, 1816.
Circulation - •
Deposits
26,758,720
11,856,380
31 August, 1816.
c ... C Public - 26,097,4317
Securities - [Private . n'^iog j
Bullion ....
37,279,540
7,562,780
38,615,100
.. . Rest, 6,227,2207.
44,842,320
30 August, 1817.
Circulation
Deposits
29,543,780
9,084,590
30 August, 1817.
0 ... C Public - 27,098,2387
Securities - (Private . 5)501,3925
Bullion ....
32,605,630
11,668,260
38,628,370
. . . Rest, 5,645,^307.
44,273,890
31 August, 1813.
Circulation
Deposits
26,202,150
7,927,730
31 August, 1818.
C Public - 27,257,0127
Securities - [ Private . 5, 1 13,748 j
Bullion ....
32,370,760
6,363,160
34,129,880
- - - Rest, 4,604,0407.
38,733,920
31 August, 1819.
Circulation
Deposits
25,252,690
6,304,160
31,556,850
31 August, 1819.
0 ... C Public - 25,419,1487
Securities - £ Private . .'6^21,402 J
Bullion ....
- . . Rest, 3,779,0607.
31,740,550
3,595,360
35,335,910
31 August, 1820.
Circulation
Deposits
24,299,340
4,420,910
28,720,250
31 August, 1820.
f Public - 19,173,997 7
Securities - J Private . 4;672,123J
Bullion ....
. . . Rest, 3,336,9507.
23,846,120
8,211,080
32,057,200~~
31 August, 1821.
Circulation
Deposits
20,295,300
5,818,450
31 August, 1821.
C Public - 15,752,9537
Securities - [private - 2,722,587 J
Bullion - -
18,475,540
11,233,590
26,113,750
. . - Rest, 3,595,3807.
29,709,130
31 August, 1822.
Circulation
Deposits
17,464,790
6,399,440
31 August, 1822.
C Public - 13,668,359
Securities . [Private . sfe£l5l.
Bullion ....
17,290,510
10,097,960
23,864,230
. - - Rest, 3,524,2407.
27,388,470
30 August, 1823.
Circulation
Deposits
19,231,240
7,827,350
30 August, 1823.
C Public - 11,842,677
Securities - [Privatc . 5,624,693.
Bullion -
17,467,370
12,658,240
27,058,590
- - - Rest, 3,067,0207.
30,125,610
31 August, 1824.
Circulation
Deposits
20,132,120
9,679,810
31 August, 1824.
C Public - 14,649,187
Securities - [Private . 6,255,343.
Bullion
20,904,530
11,787,430
29,811,930
... Rest, 2,880,0307.
3(-',6in,9fiO
31 August, 1825.
Circulation
Deposits
19,398,840
6,410,560
31 August, 1825.
Securities . ?**& : Vfijjgli
Bullion
25,106,030
3,634,320
25,809,400
. . . Rest, 2,930,9507.
28,740,3.^0
STATE OF BANK OF ENGLAND.
383
Amount of Notes in Circulation, and Deposits, and Securities held by the Bank — continued.
31 August, 1826.
Circulation
Deposits
£
21,563,560
7,199,860
31 August, 1826. £
SwuritiM f Public - 17,713,881?
securities . Jpriyate _ 7j369 749 j
Bullion -...
£
25,083,630
6,754,230
28,763,420
- - - Rest, 3,074,440*.
31,837,860
31 August, 1827.
Circulation
Deposits
22,747,600
8,052,090
31 August, 1827.
WuririM ("Public - 19,809,595}
becunties . £Private _ 3 339,725 j
Bullion ....
23,199,320
10,463,770
.
30,799,690
- - « Rest, 2,863,400*,
33,663,090
30 August, 1828.
Circulation
Deposits
21,357,510
10,201,280
30 August, 1828.
SpriiritiM <" Public - 20,682,776?
Securities - £Private . 3222,754 j
Bullion
23,905,530
10,498,880
31,558,790
- - - Rest, 2,845,620/.
34,404,410
31 August, 1829.
Circulation
Deposits
19,547,380
9,035,070
31 August, 1829.
<feniriKM f Public - 20,072,440?
Securities - Jpriyate . 458937oj
Bullion
24,661,810
6,795,530
28,582,450
- - - Rest, 2,874,890/.
31,457,340
30 August, 1830.
Circulation
Deposits
21,464,700
11,620,840
30 August, 1830.
<fepiiriKM f Public . 20,911,616?
Securities . £Private . 3,554,074]
Bullion ....
24,565,690
11,150,480
33,085,540
- . - Rest, 2,630,630*
35,716,170
31 August, 1831.
Circulation
Deposits - •
18,538,630
9,069,310
31 August, 1831.
qpniritiM f Public - 18,056,552?
Securities . £Private . 5 848,478 j
Bullion
23,905,030
6,439,700
27,607,940
- - - Rest, 2,736,850/.
30,344,790
An Account of the Average Yearly Amounts of the Bank of England Notes in Circulation ; of the
Deposits, Public and Private, held by the Bank ; of the Investments in Securities ; and of the Bullion
held by the Bank, in the Years ending 28th February, 1829, 1830, 1831, and 1832.
Bank Notes in Circulation
Deposits, Public and Private -
£
20,953,000
10,104,000
Investments in Securities -
Gold and Silver Bullion -
£
23,834,000
9,640,000
In the Year ending 28 Feb. 1829 -
£31,057,000
.£•33,474,000
Bank Notes in Circulation
Deposits, Public and Private -
19,631,000
9,711,000
Investments in Securities
Gold and Silver Bullion -
24.424,000
7,285,000
In the Year ending 28 Feb. 1830 -
£ 29,342,000
^31,709,000
Bank Notes in Circulation
Deposits, Public and Private -
20,575,000
11,735,000
Investments in Securities -
Gold and Silver Bullion -
24,343,000
10^2^,000
In the Year ending 28 Feb. 1831 -
.£32,310,000
£ 34,665,000
Bank Notes in Circulation
Deposits, Public and Private -
18,542,000
9,489,000
Investments in Securities
Gold and Silver Bullion -
24,004,000
6,389,000
la the Year ending 29 Feb. 1832 -
^28,031,000
£ 30,393,000
384 TABLES.
Prices of Gold and Silver, and Exchanges on Hamburg and Paris.
Date.
Price of Standard
Gold in Bars
per oz.
Price of
Standard
Silver per
oz.
Price of
Spanish
Dollars pe
oz.
Exchange
on
Hamburg
^ Usance
Exchange
on Paris.
3 Days' Sight.
£ s. d.
s. d.
». d.
1797 Feb. 24
3 17 6
5 5
5 Si
36. 0
Aug. 25
3 17 6
5 2
5 0
37. 7
1798 Feb. 23
Aug. 24
3 17 101
3 17 lo|
5 1
4 11J
5 0
38, 0
37. 3
1799 Feb. 22
3 17 9
—
5 1
37. 7
Aug. 23
3 17 9
—
5 2i
34. 0
1800 Feb. 28
—
—
5 7
31. 4
Aug. 22
4 5 0 F
—
5 7
32. 2
1801 Feb. 27
4 4 0 F
mmm
5 10
31. 7
Aug. 25
—
5 10
31. 6
1802 Feb. 26
4 3 6 F
5 Hi
5 9
32. 2
Aug. 27
_
5 6
5 SJ
33. 2
23.10
1803 Feb. 25
__
5 n
5 5
34. 4
24. 8
Aug. 26
_~
32.10
23.16
1804 Feb. 24
—
_
5 7
34. 8
24.14
Aug. 31
400
5 l\
35.10
25. 4
Oct. 19
400
__
5 0
35. 8
25. 2
1805 Feb. 26
400
— .
5 4
35. 8
25.12
Aug. 27
400
—
5 3i
35. 5
25.12
Nov. 26
—
5 9i
5 7
32. 9
25. 4
1806 Feb. 25
—
—
34. 2
24.12
Aug. 26
—
—
—
34. 5
24. 7
1807 Feb. 27
—
5 8
—
34.10
24.10
Aug. 28
_
—
5 5
34. 2
24. 6
1808 Feb. 26
—
_
5 3
34. 6
23. 6
Aug. 26
«_
___
5 5
35. 2
23.16
1809 Feb. 28
4 10 OF
5 3
31. 0
20.19
Aug. 22
—
—
5 5*
29. 4
20. 1
1810 Feb. 27
—
—
5 6
29. 0
19.16
Aug. 28
__
—
5 8A
30. 9
21. 6
1811 Feb. 26
4 13 6 F
__
5 11
25. 0
17.16
Aug. 30
4 17 6 F
6 2
6 0
25. 6
18. 2
1812 Feb. 28
4 15 0
—
6 1
28. 0
19.16
Aug. 28
—
—
6 3%
28. 9
19. 5
1813 Feb. 26
__
—
6 6
30. 0
29.80
Aug. 27
—
—
7 0
26. 6
18.80
1814 Feb. 22
580
6 iii
_
29. 0
21. 0
Aug. 23
4 11 OF
5 S\
_
32. 0
22.80
1815 Feb. 28
490
5 iii
5 10
32. 2
22. 0
Aug. 25
—
—
5 7
32. 6
22. 0
1816 Feb. 27
420
5 4
5 3
34. 8
24.60
Aug. 27
3 19 0
—
4 10£
36. 9
25.80
1817 Feb. 28
3 18 6
5 1
4 11
36. 7
25.40
TABLES. 385
Prices of Gold and Silver, and Exchanges on Hamburg and Paris, continued.
Date.
Price of Standard
Gold in Bars
per oz.
Price of
Standard
Silver per
oz.
Price of
Spanish
Dollars per
oz.
Exchange
on
Hamburg.
2$ Usance.
Exchange
on Paris.
3 Days' Sight.
£ s. d.
s. d.
8. d.
1817 Aug. 22
406
5 1
5 2
35. 0
24.30
1818 Feb. 27
5 41
5 5
34. 0
24. 0
Aug. 25
—
5 5
34. 6
24.35
1819 Feb. 19
4 1 0
5 7
5 7
33.11
23.85
Aug. 3
3 18 0
5 2
—
35.11
25.10
1820 Mar. 3
3 17 10^
5 1«
. —
36. 4
25.20
Aug. 1
3 17 lo|
5 0
—
37. 6
25.80
1821 Feb. 27
Aug. 28
3 17 10£
3 17 101
4 Hi
4 11
4 10|
4 10
38. 2
38. 2
25.80
25.70
1822 Feb. 26
3 17 IQi
4 11
4 9£
37. 4
25.40
Aug. 27
3 17 6
4 11}
4 9
37.11
25. 6O
1823 Feb. 25
3 17 6
4 Hi
—
37.11
25.75
Aug. 26
3 17 6
4 11
4 8]
38. 2
25.85
1824 Feb. 24
3 17 6
4 111
4 9}
37. 5
25.80
Aug. 31
3 17 6
—
4 10
36.11
25.20'
1825 Feb. 22
3 17 9
5 Of
4 101
37. 0
25.15
Aug. 30
3 17 101
5 1
4 llj
36.10
25.25
1826 Feb. 28
3 17 6
—
37.10
25.70
Aug. 29
3 17 6
4 10|
4~8f
37. 9
25.75
1827 Feb. 27
3 17 6
4 H£
4 9}
37. 3
25.55
Aug. 28
3 17 6
36.11
25.40
M.C.S. Banco
1828 Feb. 26
3 17 6
—
4 10
13.12
25.30
Aug. 26
3 17 6
—
4 llj
13.14
25.35
1829 Feb. 24
3 17 10£
13.13
25.40
Aug. 25
3 17 9
4 llf
4 91
13.15
25.70
1830 Feb. 23
3 17 9
14. 3
25.85
Aug. 31
3 17 10£
4 11|
4~9i
13.14^
25.50
1831 Feb. 22
3 17 10|
—
13.11
25.20
Aug. 30
1832 Feb. 28
3 17 10^
3 17 10£
5 0
4 iii
4 10J
4 9}
13.11
13.15
25.20
25.60
Aug. 31
3 17 9
4 lOf
4 8J
14. 8
25.85
1833 Feb. 26
3 17 9
4 lOf
4 9£
13.141
25.85
Aug. 27
3 17 10£
4 III
4 10
13.134
25.75
1834 Feb. 25
3 17 9
4 11J
4 10|
13.11
25.35
Aug. 28
3 17 9
5 0}
4 lOf
13.11
25.321
1835 Feb. 27
3 17 9
5 0
4 10
13.101
25.40
Aug. 28
3 17 9
4 llf
95
13. 14}
25.60
1836 Feb. 27
3 17 9
5 0
10£
13.13f
25.57^
Aug. 27
3 17 \Q{
5 Of
10|
13.12
25.40
1837 Feb. 22
3 17 9
5 OJ
10?
13.11}
25.42^
Aug. 28
3 17 9
4 11§
9f
13.14
25.55
1838 Feb. 27
3 17 9
4 I!'
1S.12£
25.55
VOL. II.
C C
386
TABLES.
Average Quarterly Account of the Liabilities, Assets, and Surplus or Rest, of the Bank
England, as ordered by the Act 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 98.
Notes in Circulation.
Deposits.
Securities.
Bullion.
Rest, or Su
Capital
1834.
£
£
£
£
£
January 1.
18,216,000
13,101,000
23,596,000
9,948,000
2,907,0(
February 4. -
18,377,000
14,086,000
24,762,000
9,954,000
2,253,(l(
March 4. -
18,700,000
14,418,000
25,547,000
9,829,0i :0
2,258,0(
April I.-
19,097,000
14,011,000
25,970,000
9,431,000
V93,fX
May 6. -
18,978,000
14,081,000
26,691,000
8,884,000
2,516,0(
June 3.
18,922,000
14,539,000
27,312,000
8,645,000
2,49C,OC
July 1. -
18,895,000
15,096,000
27,593,000
8,695,000
2,'/61,0(
July 29. -
19,110,000
15,675,000
28,502,000
8,598,000
2,31 5,0(
August 26.
19,147,000
15,384,000
28,679,000
8,272,000
2,420,OC
September 23. -
19,126,000
14,754,000
28,691,000
7,695,000
2,506,0e
October 21.
18,914,000
13,514,000
27,840,000
7,123,000
2.535.0C
November 18. -
18,694,000
12,669,000
27,138,000
6,781,000
2,556,0(
December 18. -
18,304,000
12,256,000
26,362,000
G.720,000
2.522.0C
1835.
January 15.
18,012,000
12,585,000
26,390,000
6,741,000
2,534,0(
February 10. -
18,099,000
12,535,000
26,482,000
6,693,000
2,54 1,(K
March 10. - -
18,311,000
13,281,000
26,657,000
6,536,000
S,G81,Ot
April 7. -
May 5. -
18,591,000
18,542,000
11,289,000
10,726,000
26,328,000
25,764,000
6,329,000
6,197,000
2.677.0C
3,G93,(K
June 2.
18,460,000
10,568,000
25,562,000
6,150,000
2,684,OC
June 30. -
18,315,000
10,954,000
25,678,000
6,219,( (,()
2,628,OC
July 28. -
18,322,000
11,561,000
26,244,000
6,283,000
2,644,0(
August 25.
18,340,000
12,308,000
26,964,000
6,326,000
2,642,0(
September 22. -
18,240,000
13,230,000
27,888,000
6,261,000
2,679,00
October 20.
17,930,000
14,227,000
28,661,000
6,186,000
2,690,OC
November 17. -
17,549,000
1C,, 180,000
30,069,000
6,305,000
2,645,00
December 15. -
17,821,000
17,729,000
31,048,000
G,626,OCO
2,624,00
1836.
January 12.
17,262,000
19,169,000
31,954,000
7,076,000
2,599,00
February 9. -
17,427,000
18,366,000
31,022,000
7,471,000
2,700,00
March 8. -
17,439,000
16,966,000
29,806,000
7,701,000
8,802,00
April 5. -
18,0(53,000
14,751,000
27,927,000
7,801,000
2,914,00
May 3. -
18,154,000
13,747,000
27,042,000
7,782,000
2,923,00
May 31.
18,051,000
13,273,000
26,534,000
7,663,000
2,873,00
July I.-
17,899,000
13,810,000
27,153,000
7,362,000
2,806,00
July 28. -
17,940,000
14,495,000
28,315,000
6,926,000
2,806,00
August 25.
. 18,061,000
14,796,000
29,345,000
6,325,000
2,813,00
September 92.-
18,147,000
14,118,000
29,406,000
5,719,000
2,860,00
October. 21 -
17,936,000
13,324,000
28,845,000
5,257,000
2,842,0f
November 17. -
17,543,000
12,682,000
28,134,000
4,933,000
2,842,00
Deceimber 15. -
17,361,000
13,330,000
28,971,000
4,545,000
2,825,00
1837.
January 10.
17,422,000
14,354,000
30,365,000
4,287,000
2,876,00
February 7. -
17,868,000
14,230,000
31,085,000
4,032,000
3,019,00
March 7. -
18,178,000
13,260,000
30,579,000
4,048,000
3,189,00
April 4. -
18,432,000
11,192,000
28,843,000
4,071,000
3,263,00
May 2. -
18,480,000
10,472,000
28,017,000
4,190,000
3,255,00
Ma'y 30. -
18,419,0^0
10,422,000
27,572,000
4,423,000
3,154,00
June 27. -
18,202,000
10,424,000
26,932,000
4,750,000
3.056,00
July 25. -
18,261,000
10,672,000
26,727,000
6,226,000
3,020,00
August 22.
18,462,000
11,005,000
26,717,000
5,754,000
3,004,00
September 19. -
18,814,000
11,093,000
26,605,000
6,303,000
3,001,00
October 17. -
18,716,000
10,501,000
25,316,000
6,856,000
2,955,00
November 14. -
18,341,000
10,242,000
23,985,000
7,432,000
2,S31,00
December 14. -
17,998,000
10,195,000
22,727,000
8,172,000
2,706,00
1838.
January 12.
17,900,000
10,992,000
22,606,000
8,895,000
2,609,00
An Account of the aggregate Number of Notes circulated in England and Wales by P
Banks, and by Joint-Stock Banks and their Branches, distinguishing Private from Joint-
Stock Banks. From Returns directed by 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 83.
Quarters Ended
Private
Banks.
Joint-Stock
Banks.
Total.
Quarters Ended
Private
Banks.
Joint-Stock
Banks.
Tol
1833.
December 26. -
8,334,863
2,799,551
11, 13^
December 28. -
8,836,803
1,315,301
10,152,104
1836.
1834.
March 26.-
8,353,894
3,094,025
11,44'
March 29. -
8,733,400
1,458,427
10,191,827
June 25. -
8614,132
3,588,064
12,20'
June 28. -
8,875,795
1,642,887
10,518,682
September 24. -
7,764,824
3,969,121
11,73!
September 27.
8,370,423
1,783,689
. 10,154,112
December 31. -
7,753,500
4,258,197
12,01.
December 28.
8,537,655
2,122,173
10,659,828
1837.
1835.
April I.-
7,275,784
3,755.279
11,03
March 28. -
8,231,206
2,188,954
10,420,160
July 1. - * -
7,187,673
3,684,764
10,87:
June 27. -
September 26.
8,455,114
7,912,587
2,484,687
2,508,036
10,939,801
10,420,623
September 30. -
December 30. -
6,701,996
7,043,470
3,440,053
8,826,66fl
10,14'
10,871
TABLES.
387
An Account of the Prices of Wheat per Quarter, as exhibited in the
Register kept in the Audit Books of Eton College, from the year
1646 to Michaelmas 1826 ; reducing the Quarter of nine Bushels, in
which it was kept from 1646 to Michaelmas 1793, to the Winchester
Quarter of eight Bushels ; and continuing it, according to the same
measure, annually to Michaelmas, 1826.
Years.
Prices per Quarter, Winchester
Measure.
Years.
Prices per Quarter, Winchester
Measure.
Price at
Lady-day.
Price at
Michaelmas.
Mean Price
for the Year.
Price at
Lady-day.
Price at
Michaelmas.
Mean Price
for the Year.
s. d.
s. d.
s. d.
s. d.
s. d.
s. d.
1646
37 11
60 5|
49 2
1675
56 10f
47 5
52 1|
1647
59 3
71 8§
65 5|
1676
35 6|
32 0
33 9£
1648
71 1|
80 0
75 6|
1677
30 2|
44 5i
37 4
1649
g
if
71 1|
1678
48 0
56 10|
52 5|
1650
68 9
67 6|
68 l^
1679
53 4
42 8
48 0
1651
65 2|
56 10|
61 0§
1680
37 4
42 8
40 0
1652
47 5
40 Si
48 10|
1681
37 11
45 Oi
41 5|
1653
32 7
30 2|
31 4|
1682
35 6|
42 8
39 1|
1654
24 10|
21 4
22 l£
1683
39 l£
32 0
35 6i
1655
21 11
37 4
29 7i
1684
35 6|
42 8
39 1£
1656
39 1|
37 4
38 2£
1685
47 5
35 6|
41 5|
1657
36 9
46 2|
41 5|
1686
28 5|
32 0
34 2§
1658
44 5|
71 H
57 9|
1687
34 0|
29 0|
31 8§
1659
59 3
58 1
58 8
1688
24 lOf
21 4
23 1£
1660
50 Hi
51 6|
51 3
1689
23 1|
30 2|
26 8
1661
53 4
71 1$
62 2§
1690
32 7
29 0|
30 92
1662
78 2|
53 4
65 9|
1691
29 0£
SO 9£
29 11
1663
49 9|
51 6|
50 8
1692
42 8
40 lOf
41 9|
1664
49 9£
46 2|
48 0
1693
52 4
66 11£
60 If
1665
45 OJ
42 8
43 10|
1694
71 If
42 8
56 10i
1666
35 6|
28 5|
32 0
1695
33 2i
61 0|
47 !£
1667
28 5|
35 6|
32 0
1696
64 0
48 0
56 0
1668
30 9|
40 3i
35 6£
1697
40 9i
56 10|
53 4
1669
42 8
37 4
40 O
1698
62 2f
59 3
60 8|
1670
37 4
36 9
37 0£
1699
62 2|
49 9|
56 0
1671
35 6f
39 1|
37 4
1700
37 4
33 9%
35 6|
1672
36 9
37 4
37 Oi
1701
33 9|
29 7i
31 8i
1673
35 6f
47 5
41 5|
1702
26 8
25 5f
26 0|
1674
64 O
58 1
61 0£
1703
26 8
37 4
32 0
* Only one price given : the period of the year uncertain.
c c 2
388
TABLES.
Years.
Prices per Quarter, Winchester
Measure.
Years.
Prices per Quarter, Winchester
Measure.
Price at
Lady-day.
Price at
Michaelmas.
Mean Price
for the Year.
Price at
Lady-day.
Price at
Michaelmas.
Mean Price
or the Year.
s. d.
s. d.
*. d.
s. d.
s. d.
s. d.
1704
51 6f
30 9f
41 2f
1739
31 5
34 Hi
33 2|
1705
28 5|
24 lOf
26 8
1740
41 94:
56 0
48 10£
1706
23 1|
23 14:
23 1£
1741
51 6f
32 0
41 9|
1707
23 If
27 3
25 2
1742
30 2f
26 8
28 5^
1708
27 3
46 2f
36 83
1743
23 6|
20 9
22 If
1709
57 5^
81 9£
69 7£
1744
22 2f
21 11
22 Of
1710
81 94:
56 10|
69 4
1745
22 6f
26 1
24 3§
1711
44 5|
51 6f
48 0
1746
37 4
32 0
34 8
1712
48 7
33 9|
41 2
1747
32 lOf
29 Oi
30 11§
1713
S3 9£
56 lOf
45 4
1748
32 0
33 9£
32 iQi
1714
55 If
34 4§
44 8|
1749
32 0
33 94:
32 iQi
1715
32 0
44 5|
38 2§
1750
27 6f
30 23
28 103
1716
42 8
42 8
42 8
1751
29 4
39 14:
34 2§
1717
40 0
40 lOf
40 54
1752
44 If
37 4
40 8f
1718
37 4
32 0
34 8
1753
40 3|
39 14:
39 84:
1719
28 10|
33 2
31 O4:
1754
33 24:
28 54:
30 9f
1720
32 O
33 9|
32 10i
1755
27 10^
32 0
29 11
1721
35 6f
31 1|
33 4
175G
32 5|
48 0
40 2i
1722
32 0
32 0
32 0
1757
60 54
46 2f
53 4
1723
29 7£
32 0
30 9f
1758
49 94:
39 If
44 54
1724
32 0
33 9|
32 IQi
1759
37 4
33 24:
35 3
1725
37 4
48 lOf
43 1|
1760
31 1|
33 9f
32 54
1726
46 2f
35 63
40 lOf
1761
26 8
27 14:
'26 10§
1727
32 lOf
41 9|
37 4
1762
35 6f
33 9f
34 8
1728
49 24:
47 5
48 3i
1763
33 24:
39 If
36 13
1729
45 4
39 If
42 2£
1764
38 8
44 54:
41 6i
1730
32 lOf
32 0
32 54
1765
49 9f
46 2f
48 0
1731
30 2|
28 5|
29 4
1766
40 0
46 2f
43 1|
1732
24 3|
23 14:
23 84
1767
56 0
58 8
57 4
1733
25 5|
24 lOf
25 2|
1768
58 2f
49 4
53 94
1734
29 7£
37 4
33 5f
1769
41 94:
39 6f
40 8
1735
35 6f
40 lOf
38 2|
1770
38 2f
48 lOf
43 6f
1736
34 4i
37 4
35 104:
1771
49 94:
51 6|
50 8
1737
34 2;J
32 lOf
33 6f
1772
56 lOf
60 5f
58 8
1738
32 10|
30 2f
31 6f
1773
59 6f
58 8
59 14
TABLES.
389
Years.
Prices per Quarter, Winchester
Measure.
Years.
Prices per Quarter, Winchester
Measure.
Price at
Lady-day
Price at
Michaelmas.
Mean Price
for the Year.
Price at
Lady-day.
Price at
Michaelmas.
Mean Price
for the Year.
s. d.
s. d.
s. d.
s. d.
s. d.
s. d.
1774
53 4
56 lOf
55 1
1801
177 0
80 0
128 6
1775
59 If
43 6|
51 4
1802
68 0
66 6
67 3
1776
42 8
42 8
42 8
1803
60 0
60 0
60 0
1777
46 2|
51 6f
48 10|
1804
59 0
80 0
69 6
1778
49 9$
38 2f
44 0
1805
88 0
88 0
88 0
1779
36 lOf
35 6|
36 2|
1806
80 0
86 0
88 O
1780
38 2f
48 0
43 1£
1807
88 0
68 0
78 0
1781
56 lOf
48 O
52 5|
1808
74 6
96 0
85 3
1782
49 9£
57 9f
53 9|
1809
100 0
112 0
106 0
1783
58 8
49 9£
54 2£
1810
120 0
104 0
112 0
1784
55 10|
50 8
53 9|
1811
104 0
112 0
108 0
1785
49 9J
46 2f
48 0
1812
136 0
12O 0
118 0
1786
41 9J
42 8
42 2£
1813
136 0
104 0
120 O
1787
41 9J
49 9|
45 9|
1814
86 0
84 0
85 0
1788
50 8
48 0
49 4
1815
80 0
72 0
76 0
1789
55 5
56 I0f
56 If
1816
72 0
92 0
82 0
1790
55 8
53 9i
56 2£
1817
132 0
100 0
116 0
1791
54 2f
44 5£
49 4
1818
104 0
92 0
98 0
1792
40 lOf
53 4
47 1|
1819
80 O
76 0
78 0
1793
54 I
45 Oi
49 6|
1820
80 0
72 0
76 0
1794
52 0
56 0
54 0
1821
66 0
76 0
71 0
1795
71 0
92 0
81 6
1822
56 0
50 0
53 0
1796
96 0
64 6
80 3
1823
60 0
54 0
57 0
1797
70 0
54 0
62 0
1824
68 0
76 6
72 0
1798
54 0
54 0
54 0
1825
84 0
84 0
84 O
1799
58 8
92 8
75 8
1826
80 0
66 0
73 0
1800
126 0
128 0
127 0
EDW. BROWN, Registrar to Eton College.
c c 3
390
TABLES.
TABLE of the Monthly Average Price of Wheat, per Winchester Quarter,
in England and Wales, from 1793 to 1837 inclusive.
Year.
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
April.
May.
June.
July.
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
s. d.
S. d
s. d.
S. d.
s. d.
s. d.
s d.
s. d
s. d
s d.
s d
« d
1793
47 0
46 10
47 9
49 9
51 5
51 2
51 1
50 6
48 9
47 0
47 2
48 9
1794
50 1
50 7
50 TO
51 2
51 3
51 6
51 11
52 6
51 6
51 0
52 10
55 0
1795
56 8
58 3
59 11
62 1
64 10
70 1
84 5
108 4
79 0
76 9
83 9
86 3
1796
92 0
93 6
100 0
86 8
75 7
80 2
81 0
75 11
64 5
61 3
59 9
57 3
1797
55 0
52 6
49 8
49 9
49 8
50 0
50 5
52 0
58 10
60 2
56 4
52 9
1798
51 2
49 10
50 2
51 7'
51 10
51 0
50 9
51 3
50 0
48 7
47 11
48 5
1799
49 5
50 0
50 3
53 5
60 10
64 0
66 9
73 0
75 5
83 6
89 9
93 ia
1800
94 8
101 11
107 10
111 11
120 2
125 0
134 10
103 2
105 10
106 6
120 2
132 6
1801
138 1
145 9
154 4
151 9
130 4
128 11
135 2
121 9
90 4
77 5
71 1
75 5
1802
76 5
74 5
73 6
69 9
65 3
67 0
67 4
69 0
67 3
61 10
59 5
57 10
1803
56 8
56 7
56 4
56 7
57 11
61 6
58 6
55 11
55 7
54 2
54 8
53 6
1804
51 8
50 2
50 0
51 1
51 8
52 0
53 4
59 9
65 2
68 1
79 8
85 7
1805
86 4
90 1
92 8
91 5
88 4
89 10
90 6
98 4
89 2
81 10
78 3
76 0
1806
75 8
74 6
74 5
77 0
84 4
84 0
82 2
81 9
80 8
79 2
77 4
76 11
1807
76 10
76 0
76 8
76 8
75 7
74 3
73 5
74 9
71 8
68, 6
66 0
67 10
1808
69 2
69 3
69 5
71 0
73 5
79 3
81 4
81 6
84 0
86 7
92 0
90 8
1809
90 6
92 9
95 0
93 3
91 8
88 10
86 10
93 8
102 7
105 6
101 10
102 6
1810
101 11
100 4
102 5
105 2
109 4
115 6
113 9
116 0
110 5
101 10
100 2
97 1
1811
95 6
95 0
92 8
89 0
88 1
87 2
87 2
91 2
96 11
100 0
105 5
106 8-
1812
105 9
105 2
112 5
125 5
132 6
133 10
144 6
152 3
136 6
113 7
121 6
121 0
1813
119 10
120 0
121 9
120 10
117 10
117 10
116 3
112 6
100 1
93 11
86 2
74 11
1814
78 2
77 4
77 3
75 8
69 7
69 10
68 4
73 8
78 6
75 4
73 5
70 A
1815
62 1
63 2
67 3
70 1
70 4
69 2
67 10
68 10
63 7
57 9
56 6
55 7
1816
52 10
55 6
55 4
60 2
73 7
74 11
74 0
82 1
85 11
90 10
98 10
103 7
1817
1041 1
101 10
102 4
103 3
105 4
112 8
102 4
86 5
78 8
77 5
80 4
84 a
1818
84 10
84 10
84 8
89 8
87 5
83 7
86 6
81 3
81 9
81 10
82 5
80 &
1819
79 3
80 0
79 1
75 10
72 3
68 10
74 3
75 0
71 7
66 10
67 6
66 3
1820
64 0
64 10
69 0
69 4
70 0
69 10
70 0
72 5
67 10
58 9
57 6
54 6
1821
54 0
53 4
53 10
53 2
51 10
51 8
51 0
55 0
62 3
60 1
54 10
49 a
1822
48 8
48 6
46 0
44 7
46 4
43 10
43 1
41 10
39 8
39 0
38 10
38 11
1823
40 4
40 8
47 10
50 8
59 4
61 4
59 6
58 10
53 10
47 4
50 3
52 0
1824
59 8
65 10
65 6
64 10
63 1
62 9
60 2
57 10
55 4
59 2
64 8
64 3
1825
66 5
66 0
67 6
67 3
68 9
68 6
68 0
67 9
66 7
64 6
65 2
63 0
1826
60 3
59 3
55 7
59 8
58 9
57 0
56 7
56 9
55 6
54 5
55 3
55 8
1827
53 6
53 6
55 8
56 2
57 0
58 11
59 6
57 11
55 0
51 1
50 11
50 2
1828
50 0
50 6
51 9
54 8
55 3
54 9
54 o
59 2
58 1
69 7
73 0
71 8
1829
72 3
70 3
65 2
68 0
67 5
68 5
64 7
64 4
62 1
56 0
54 8
55 4
1830
54 4
55 11
59 2
63 11
63 8
64 3
68 11
70 5
60 5
60 10
61 10
64 10
1831
67 10
71 10
69 8
68 11
66 'l
65 2
62 11
61 11
61 1
58 4
60 2
58 3
1832
57 7
57 7
57 3
58 7
60 0
60 4
61 5
60 4
55 9
51 0
51 5
52 &
1833
51 1
51 0
51 0
51 9
51 11
51 6
53 2
53 5
52 6
50 4
49 5
47 10
1834
47 5
47 2
46 0
46 0
46 3
46 9
46 11
46 9
42 3
40 3
40 11
39 6
1835
39 6
39 5
38 7
37 10
38 1
S8 9
41 0
40 5
37 3
35 8
35 6
35 4
1836
36 1
39 3
43 2
46 5
47 9
48 11
48 3
47 8
46 6
46 4
55 6
57 9
1837
57 3
54 8
54 8
53 10
52 10
54 9
55 4
57 5
54 11
51 4
51 6
51 3
i
TABLES.
391
An Account of the Quantities of the following Articles imported from ALL PARTS,
from 1782 to 1838.
Year.
Cotton
Wool.
Coffee.
Flax.
Undressed
Hemp.
Sheep's
Wool.
Silk, Raw
Duty paid
from 1835.
Silk,Thrown
Duty paid
from 1835.
Sugar.
Tallow.
Ib.
cwt.
cwt.
cwt.
Ib.
Ib.
Ib.
cwt.
cwt.
1782
1 1 828 039
1783
9,735,663
1,584,275
1784
1785
1 1 ,482,083
18,400,384
I I
;
' ~
~ ~
730,150
344,251
1,782,386
2,075,909
178G
19,475,020
.
.
_
_
473,042
361,448
1,613,965
_
1787
23,250,268
_
_
_
770,989
389,537
1,926,621
_
1788
20,467,436
32,340
261,895
564,071
_
812,148
806,640
2,066,120
355,046
1789
32,576,023
35,046
139,494
472,264
2,713,114
842,865
393,259
1,936,440
260,127
1790
31,447,605
55,988
257,222
592,306
3,245,329
745,440
508,005
1,882,106
255,921
1791
28,706,675
46,102
308,101
372,813
2,776,054
976,673
470,195
1,813,193
164,863
17112
34,907,497
69,029
243,324
614,362
4,513,976
931,894
436,831
1,989,230
201,856
1793
19,040,929
123,750
271,249
553,832
1,891,385
1,020,008
241,955
2,194,726
235,009
1794
24,358,567
278,088
348,367
582,756
4,485,582
683,228
330,978
2,519,181
202,173
1795
26,401,340
360,038
225,854
574,623
4,902,500
730,998
336,995
2,151,273
180,807
1796
32,126,357
343,427
321,239
618,487
3,454,211
487,631
398,948
2,240,299
330,984
1797
23,354,371
354,477
209,682
488,177
4,653,696
266,276
401,662
2,139,887
244,042
1798
31,880,641
431,577
389,988
647,833
2,398,126
730,885
403,130
2,699,864
439,912
171)9
43,379,278
390,237
418,737
752,568
5,151,711
1,240,954
467,687
3,390,975
450,217
1800
56,010,732
599,429
416,121
596,420
8,615,284
833,618
333,717
3,164,474
415,925
1801
56,004,305
664,443
272,036
748,572
7,387,107
739,111
275,149
3,976,564
332,666
1802
60,345,600
460,544
" 277,443
488,198
7,749,112
559,729
396,210
4,297,079
556,749
1803
53,812,284
219,477
294,645
729,677
6,020,775
803,799
384,764
3,185,850
537,428
1804
61,867,329
507,433
352,920
727,320
8,157,213
1,032,381
449,182
3,248,307
533,838
J805
59,682,406
354,061
466,625
611,012
8,546,378
1,189,706
433,272
3,178,788
393,812
1806
58,176,283
528,941
354,722
729,786
7,333,993
802,623
515,218
3,815,183
536,652
1807
74,925,306
417,643
421,393
756,825
11,768,926
777,799
346,144
3,641,311
367,398
1808
43,605,982
726,831
257,729
259,687
2,353,725
637,102
139,312
3,753,485
148,282
1809
92,812,282
707,907
533,367
858,876
6,845,933
698,189
501,746
4,001,198
353,177
1810
136,488,935
828,683
511,971
955,8' 0
10,936,224
1,341,475
450,731
4,808,663
479,440
1811
91,662,344
559,596
243,899
458,548
4,739,972
60:',047
20,336
3,917,627
292,535
1813
" 63,025,936
405,745
405,304
852,016
"7,014,917
1,330,106
617,885
3,762,182
309,324
1813
Records of
his year w
ere destro
yed by fire.
1814
60,060,239
1,029,556
524,757
545,380
15,712,517
1,634,501
645,722
4,035,323
588,915
1815
99,306,343
815,440
351, 1C3
731,506
14,991,713
1,442,594
357,739
3,984,782
641,642
1816
93,920,055
499,076
247,424
369,468
8,1.17,864
945,792
192,130
3,760,549
417,170
1817
124,912,968
520,256
452,797
457,266
14,715,843
932,102
245,591
3,795,551
385,964
1818
177,282,158
427,247
458,899
660,403
26,405,486
1,644,647
456,971
3,965,948
542,983
1819
149,549,971
373,025
432,690
474,239
16,190,343
1,483,546
287,645
4,077,009
581,938
Ibs.
1820
151,672,655
48,841,626
382,389
426,163
9,775,605
2,215,691
333,636
4,209,676
812,478
1821
132,536,620
45,237,869
4!'8,554
255,798
16,622,567
2,119,744
341,154
4,373,530
643,179
1822
142,837,628
44,003,124
610,106
616,454
19,058,080
2,060,292
502,975
3,774,575
805,238
1823
191,402,503
45,053,373
553,937
667,141
19,366,725
2,453,166
368,470
4,202,953
830,271
1824
149,380,122
50,674,249
742,531
571,936
22,564,485
3,051,979
342,005
4,413,147
680,382
1825
228,605,291
52,597,518
1,055,233
595,f89
43,816,966
2,855,792
777,529
3,936,386
1,164,037
1826
177,607,401
42,017,103
688,622
489,330
15,989,112
2,487,820
177,405
4,319,094
864,962
1827
272,448,909
47,938,047
907,079
573,393
29,115,341
3,146,926
463,801
4,110,018
1,245,897
1828
227,760,642
41,069,731
876,189
504,120
30,236,059
4,256,423
508,813
4,868,019
1,049,806
1829
222,767,411
39,071,215
922,040
374,933
21,516,649
3,594,754
211,179
4,856,392
1,177,908
1830
263,961,452
40,952,163
944,096
506,771
32,305,314
3,440,638
413,840
4,916,005
1,073,833
1831
288,674,853
43,007,828
936,411
530,820
31,652,029
3,235,865
629,281
5,366,262
1,040,692
1832 286,832,525
50,225,^39 '
— 982,516
593,564
28,128,973'
"3,391,721
177,166
4,867,747
1,177,815
1833
303,656,837
34,426,109
1,129,633
527,459
38,046,087
2,785,109
229,119
4,739,292
1,115.427
1^3J
326,875,425
41,865,111
811,722
673,811
46,455,232
3,643,512
192,149
4,743,414
1, 397,407
1835
363,702,963
28,398,496
740,814
687,559
42,174,496
3,737,480
215,883
4,448,267
1,043,084
1836
406,959,057
34,054,832
1,529,116
586,032
64,239,952
4,453,081
396,660
4,649,161
1,186,364
1837
407,268,952
36,401,008
1,002,256
772,315
48,356,112
4,075,352
229,958
4,481,474
1,308,734
c 4
392
TABLES.
TABLES OF PRICES.
THE following Tables of Prices apply to the greater number
of the articles, of which the quotations were appended to a
former work of the author's, entitled " Thoughts and Details
on the high and low Prices of the 30 Years ending in 1822."
Those prices were collected with great care by Mr. Hinrichs ;
and, for the purposes of the present work, the quotations of them,
as derived chiefly from the same authority, namely, " Prince's
Price Current," have been collected and collated from that time
to the present by Mr. M. L. Merac, whose accuracy is well
known and attested by several elaborate tabular statements,
which he has had occasion to draw up. Two of the articles,
namely, Hops and Whalebone, in the following tables, have not
been referred to in the foregoing historical sketch of prices, and
they are here inserted for the purpose only of showing the pro-
digious variation to which some productions are liable from
mere casualties affecting the supply. The latter of these ar-
ticles, it will be observed, was cheaper during the war and the
restriction than it had been before, or has been since.
The quotations in the Tables date as far back as 1782, because
that is the period from which Prince's Price Current, the oldest
of any extant, in a connected series, commences ; and it ap-
peared to be desirable to give them here in the entire series,
because, commencing as the series does, in the year before the
termination of the American war, it affords some means of judg-
ing of the effects of the transition from war to peace in 1783 ;
and the information of the state of prices in the ten years of
peace, before the breaking out of the long war with France, may
be useful as exhibiting a view of the level from which the subse-
quent fluctuations took place.
391< TABLES OF PRICES.
The subjoined memorandum was appended by Mr. Hinrichs
to the quotations of prices collected by him from 1782 to 1822 ;
and Mr. Merac has added some remarks upon his own continu-
ation of the prices from that time to the present.
" The prices in the following tables are extracted from the
New London, now Prince's, and London Price Current, which
was established in 1782, and is the oldest and best authenticated
I have been able to meet with.
" In order to give as general an idea as it is possible in so small
a compass of the variations in prices for forty years, I have
selected the quotations of the first and last months of each year,
with the intermediate fluctuations where the rise or fall has not
been progressive.
" The figures on the left hand give the lowest quotation of
the article, and those on the right the highest ; the range
between the two includes, therefore, the necessary scope
for the uncertainty of price, which is sometimes observable
when the market is in an unsettled state, as well as for the dif-
ferent gradations in quality, which are very great in some
articles, as will be seen by the tables.
" In the column of ' Duties,' those only are noted which are
levied on importation by British vessels. It is hardly necessary
to observe, that whenever there is any great distinction in fa-
vour of British vessels, it operates to the exclusion of foreign
vessels, in the importation of those articles to which the dis-
tinction applies.
"The. rates of duties were obligingly furnished me by Mr.
Thomas Cope of the Long Room, Custom House ; and great
pains were taken by him to insure their correctness ; but, as
several temporary alterations, not noticed in the books of rates,
were made in the duties by orders in council and otherwise, I
have, with a view to still greater correctness, referred to them,
and made the proper allowance accordingly.
" It is, of course, not to be expected that a document of this
kind, embracing so long a series of years, and such a variety of
articles, should be entirely free from occasional errors ; but I
TABLES OF PRICES.
think, from the care and attention bestowed, I am entitled to
claim a pretty general dependence upon its accuracy.
«A. HINRICHS.
"London, April, 1823."
"The prices contained in these tables, for 1822, and subse-
quently up to the present period, I have carefully drawn from
the same source as the prices from 1782 till 1822, * Prince's
Price Current ; ' except in the cases where the * Averages of
Muscovado Sugars/ not being inserted therein, I have taken
them from other Prices Current, principally the ' New London
Mercantile.'
" I have taken the following periods as a general basis for my
prices, being those approximative^ succeeding the revenue
quarter, in each year respectively : —
from the 8th January, to about the 15th,
28th March, to about the 7th April,
10th July, to about the 16th,
8th November, to about the 15th;
unless, where any extraordinary alteration may have occurred,
when it is placed at that period nearest to the preceding or sub-
sequent one, as the case may have required ; viz. if nearest to
March quarter, I have placed it in the 2d column ; if nearest to
the July, then in the 3d column; and so forth as to the 1st or
4-th columns.
" The prices of Bengal and China raw silks I have taken from
the 'Returns' of the silkbrokers, after each sale (published in
the London Mercantile, and New London, and occasionally in
Prince's), of the lowest average price and highest average price
of each description of silk put up to public sale, and at which
they were sold by the Hon. the East India Company, at their
respective annual sales, whether three or four in the year. I have
not noticed any intermediate prices, as the higher or lower prices
of each succeeding sale may serve generally as a guide to the
greater or less demand between the two sales respectively.
" The home consumption duties on British plantation coffee,
from 1 782, include, in one amount (for simplification), all the
396 TABLES OF PRICES.
duties, warehousing, customs, and excise, while they remained
in force ; then the customs duty only, as at present.
" The returns of the imports and exports, in the quinquen-
nial table, are calculated from the Annual Parliamentary Re-
turns of Imports and Exports.
" For any other specific remark upon these tables, I must beg
to refer to such as are noted upon each table respectively, as
the case may have required.
« M. L. MERAC.
" London^ April, 1838."
TABLES OF PRICES.
397
ASHES, Barilla, Carthageua, in Bond.
ASHES, Pearl, Danzig or Russia.
Voar.
Cwt.
Duty.
Cwt.
Dut,.
5. d. a. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
*. d. s. d
S. d. S.
s. s. d.
s. s d.
s. d. s.
1782
-
22 0024 0
24 0 a 26 0
5s. 2id.
46a50 0
34«35 0
2s. I-4 d
1783
-
23 0 24 0
15 0 16 0
.
—
.
32 400
22 300
.
JiO
1784
.
16 0 17 0
33 0 35 0
_
_
_
23 260
34 360
2s. 2-l.rf.
1785
m
35 0
20 0 23 0
_
_
30 320 18 240
- - | -J.V—
1786
„
22 0 24 0
28 0 29 0
m
_
18 24 0 1 28 31 0
^
1787
_
29 0 30 0
31 0 32 0
_
5s. 3d.
28 0 31
24 280
_
260 32
2s. 3d.
1788
.
31 0 32 0
19 0 20 0
m
~
26 0 28
24 260
_
280 34
1789
19 Oa20 0
23 0 25 0
None
21 Oa22 0
30 0 34
28 320
34 36~0
None
1790
-
19 0 20 0
17 0 18 0
_
None
36 400
34 400
1791
-
15 0 16 0
18 0 19 0
.
_
None
_
1792
18 0 19 0
17 0 18 0
18 0 19 0
1793
16 0 20 0
21 0 22 0
.
15 0 16 0
-
_
28 300
22 260
_
~
1794
_
14 0 15 0
25 0 26 0
26 0 28
None
after
May
1795
29 0 30 0
35 0 37 0
.
31 0 32~ 0
_
Uncer
tain
1796
33 0 35 0
None
None
31 D 32 0
.
56 580
54 560
_
2s. 4 7- .
1797
35 0 37 0
57 0 59 0
-
54 0 56 0
5s. 94jrf.
.
51 540
.
.
1798
51 0 55 0
41 0 45 0
-
44 T) 47 0
7s. sjjjrf.
.
48 550
46 510
.
1799
.
48 0 49 0
40 0 42 0
_
_
46 520
46 480
_
_
1800
36 0 37 0
27 0 29 0
30 0 31 0
m
37 470
36 41 0
_•
1801
36 0 38 0
21 0 24 0
.
36 400
31 360
.
1802
23 0 25 0
21 0 23 0
-
260 27 0
rMay 12.
.
30 360
16 240
. -f
May 12.
1803
25 0 26 0
28 0 30 0
.
27 0 28 0
r July2!
' 8s. 7 id.
23 0 28
22 260
- -
300 31
r July V
1804
.
27 0 28 0
30 0 31 0
-
TJunel.
1 9s. 7M.
26 0 31
30 336
•- -
- -
r June 1.
1 4s. 4rf.
1805
32 0 33 0
30 0 31 0
-
35 0 37 0
'• April 5-
1 10s. 4rf.
- -
38 400
50 560
- -
'April 5.
. 4s. 5d.
1806
.
26 0 28 0
32 0 33 0
.
TMay 10.
- -
51 630
None
- ,
TMay 10.
[ 4s. Sd.
1807
_
32 0 34 0
50 0 52 0
_
.
None
51 530
_
1808
69 0 64 0
75 0 80 0
40 0 48 0
_
51 0 53-
59 610
.
53 0 55
_
1809
58 0 60 0
44 0 46 0
43 0 47 0
45 0 51 0
f July 5. 1
'Us. 4d. ]
600 61
40 550
54 590
490 54
_
1810
45 0 49 0
49 0 52 0
.
35 0 39 0
C _ J
.
59 640
None
.
1811
35 0 39 0
19 0 24 0
None
ill Nov.
24 290
.
1812
21 0 24 0
29 0 31 0
.
230 25 o
—
25 0 29
None
after
Feb.
f Sep. 1.
' 9s. 4d.
1813
..
24 0 25 0
25 0 26 0
.
.
37 380
52 550
.
11s. Id.
1814
-
26 0 27 0
16 0 19 0
.
Russia 7
Pearl J
59 620
40 420
660 68
1815
.,
17 0 21 0
25 0 26 0
_
52 0 58
47 520
.
570 59
1816
25 0 26 0
17 0 21 0
19 0 22 0
55 0 57
40 420
_
530 55
1817
30 0 32 0
32 0 33 0
•
28 0 29 0
58 0 59
61 620
49 51 0
470 50
__
1818
20 0 21 0
23 0 24 0
-
47 480
38 400
_
1819
_
22 0 23 0
19 0 20 0
_
40 0 41
26 270
29 300
260 27
11s. 2d.
flls. 4d. •)
1820
19 0 20 0
19 0 20 0
17 0 17 6
17 0 17 6
) to 30s. as f
1 per f
26 0 27
26
26 -
260 27
—
L strength )
1821
17 0 17 6
17 0 17 6
18 0 19 0
15 0 16 0
_
27 0 31
27 31 0
30
320 33
1822
15 0 16 0
16 0 17 0
15 0 16 0
14 0 15 6
33 0 36
None
39 -
350 37
_ _
1823
15 0 16 0
16 0 17 0
14 0 15 0
17 6 18 6
r 1055. per }
f ton j
35 0 38
None
34
300 31
—
1824
14 6 16 0
13 6 14 0
13 6 13 9
13 0 14 0
68s. ditto
31 0 -
30
27
260 -
._
1825
13 0 13 6
16 0 17 0
15 0 15 6
14 0 15 0
_
30 0 -
32
30 -
380 -
July 6. 6s.
1826
12 0 13 0
12 0
10 9 110
12 0 12 6
25 0 -
22 230
20
240 -
1827
12 0 12 6
11 0 11 6
10 0 11 0
9 6 10 0
26 0 -
22
21 220
220 -
1828
9 6 10 0
90 96
10 0 10 6
12 6 14 0
24 0 -
24
22
21 0 -
1829
13 0 13 3
11 0 13 0
12 0 14 0
120 126
f6s!6d.fr.7
f March j
None
28
27
220 -
—
1830
1831
14 0 14 6 , 14 0 14 6
12 0 13 0 12 0 12 6
14 0 14 6
90 96
14 0 14 6
9 0 -
5s. Feb.
2s. Mar.
None
28 0 -
36
27
32
26
290 30
236 24
—
1832
10 3 10 6
10 9
10 9
11 0 11 6
21 6 23
21
19
196 20
1833
116 11 9
11 6 11 9
12 0 12 6
12 0 12 6
21 0
21
22 226
230 25
_
1834
10 0 10 6 I 10 0 10 6
10 0 10 6
10 0 10 6
23 0 -
23 240
23 240
260 -
1835
10 0 10 6
10 0 10 6
10 0 10 6
10 0 10 6
26 0 -
26
26 290
260 30
1836
10 0 10 6
10 0 10 6
9 6 10 0
No price
36 0 38 36 380
38
386 -
1837
1838
No price
No price
No price
No price
32 0 - 30 31 0 22
25 0 28 ! 26 27 0
220 -
!
398
TABLES OF PRICES.
BRISTLES, St. Petersburg, 1st Quality. (Duty paid from 1820.)
COFFEE, St. Domingo, for
Exportation.
Year
Cwt.
Duty.
Cwt.
1782
.
Not qt
oted
_
_
None.
* • s, 1
1783
_
Di
to
1784
.
Di
to
1785
-
95 a 100
82 a 87
-
(IsA^d. per doz.
C Ib-
1786
m
89 92
105 107
m _
1787
.
107
137
m
1788
134
157
1789
_
147
197
-
1790
— _
177 197
167 172
^
__
1791
m m
167 172
187
m
1792
^ ^
187
177
187 I
1793
-
187
202
167
1794
_
167
134
167
1795
.
167
197
182
1796
182
192
f Is. 5r$d. peri
( doz. Ib. J
1797
-
192
142 147
-
fls. 5;jf)d. per i
doz. Ib. J
1798
• .
142 147
167
182
J~ Is. llifid. perj
1799
_
142
185
_
C. doz. Ib. 3
Ditto.
1800
.
187
227
.
1801
.
227
287
182 a 187
1802
177 180
f Ditto to May, ~)
1803
.
220 231
_
-
' then 2s. o|grf. 3
Do. to 5 July. ?
2s. 3d. 3
1804
-
220 231
231
226 228
Do. to 1 June, ?
, then 2s. Gd. 3
1805
-
226 228
227 235
-
Do. 5 April,]
: then 2s. 9d. 3
1806
.
227 230
218
228
> Do. to 10 May, ?
L then 2s. lid. 3
1807
.
213
200 203
260 288
i Do. to 5 July, ?
C then 3s. 3
-
.
None.
1808
.
2o7 280
520 525
450 475
Ditto.
900ol060
80 a 90
_
90allO
1809
450 a 470
470 490
310 330
330 350
.__
950 1100
90 102
_
96 105
1810
_
310 330
250 260
.
^^
96 0 105 0
106 112
_
85 95
1811
260
370 410
350 370
_
^m
_
58 68
3Ga 42
1812
350 370
390 410
330 350
.
45 66
70 78
1813
.
367
307
377
C 3s. 6f d, per \
: doz.lb. j
700 780
82 92
66 80
96 110
1814
.
397
287
337
160 1260
85 100
90 108
86 94
1815
.
360
347
_
i .
_
86 94
72 78
_
1816
.
367
257
.
,
700 780
62 66
74 77
1817
>260
2S7
227
267
x
720 750
89 97
-
_
1818
257
283
*
j
94 0 100 0
162 170
_
43 148
1819
m
283
230
- 1 3s. Id.
930 970
115 122
05 110
20 126
1820
1821
240
216
No price
No price
223
230
—
28 0 132 0
180 121 0
117 121
17 119
33 138
15 117
23 128
98 102
1822
240
228
270 275
250 256
98 0 102 0
104 110
97 107
94 100
1823
270
290
300
310
94 0 100 0
06 110
93 97
75 77
1824
310 315
300
290
295
720 750
62 64
58 61
58 60
1825
290 295
290 295
300 315
300 315
580 640
76 79
60 62
56 57
1826
330
315
280
280
570 580
53 54
45 46
48 49
1827
280
280
240 260
275 280
n
50 0 51 0
43 47
43 44
38 41
1828
250 255
240 245
245 250
2426 250
_
36 0 38 0
35 38
34 36
32 34
1829
250 255
250 255
250 255
245 250
_,_
320 330
31 33
31 33
32 35
1830
No price
No price
235 245
230 240
3s. 6d.
330 360
39 41
41 43
56 58
1831
230 240
250 260
265 270
240 250
540 560
56 59
60 63
52. 53
1832
265 270
265 270
245 255
245 250
560 570
55 56
60 61
61 65
1833
245 250
240 255
240 255
260 275
56 0 57 0
54 56
60 62
62 64
1834
290
310 320
310 320
400 500
_ _
59 0 61 0
58 60
51 ,53
46 47
1835
400 460 i 420 450
400 440
400 440
49 0 51 6
55
54 55
50 53
1836
400 440 400 440
430 450
430 450
526 536
53 -
54 55
46 52
1837
430 450 i 410 430
400 410
400 410
490 530
43 48
41 44
40 42
1838
340 380
330 340
-
-
"
420 446
42 41
1
TABLES OF I'llICES.
399
COFFEE, British Plantation, in Bond, Superior.
COFFEE, British Plantation, in Bond, Inferior.
Year
Cwt.
Duty.
Cwt.
Duty.
S. S.
s. s.
s. s.
s. s.
Cwt.
s. s.
s. s.
s. s.
s. s.
( Same
1782
76 rt 81
105 a 116
.
75 « 86
42s.
62 a 68
81 a 100
.
60 0 72
s as Su-
• '
C perior.
1783
72 83
57 «6
_ _
63 72
63 70 i 48 56
..
54 62
17H4 60 68
86 105
_
73 80
54 59
76 85
_ m
65 72
1785 i - '
73 79 71 76
..
68 72
66 a 70
70 80 87 95
_
.
65 70
78 86
.
1787
88 96
97 100
.
.
78 86
86 96
.
1788
92 102
95 105
.
_
_
86 90
90 94
_
^m
1789 1
98 106 i 95 100
_
-
92 96
88 93
» m
__
1790
_
92 . 98 i 70 76
m
.
86 90
56 66
. „
1791
71 79
95 105
m
-
59 70
85 95
_
1792
96 105
109 120
84 100
85 95
100 108
_
70 83
1793
90 107
96 115
.
94 105
__
73 88
83 95
.
78 93
.
1794
96 116
77 95
_
92 112
__
85 95
66 76
•
74 90
__
1795
94 112
122 145
118 135
113 126
112 132
72 92
98" 118
103 116
100 112
100 110
—
1796
1797
114 126
132 145
133 140
46*. Ofrf.
104 110
112 130
120 132
M
i*v(\a
128 138
158 172
120 126
146 157
_
17"H
1799 1 156 170
185 196
116 130
146 155
170 184
98 115
I
H
1800
116 130
130 165 i 118 150
126 150
98 115
115 128
95 115
110 125
1801
131 150
130 160
.
88 110
_
115 130
105 128
. «.
60 86
_mm_
1802
88 110
96 128
_
93 115
60 80
70 95
_
68 92
_
1803
92 125
142 156
53s. Oftf.
_
76 90
120 140
.
1804
133 150
156 170
142 156
585. 11W.
110 130
140 155
.
120 140
1805
144 165
165 185
_
140 170
615. M£
125 140
140 163
. _
115 136
_
1806
143 177
152 195
110 145
122 150
655. S$d.
115 142
125 150
80 100
100 120
.
1807
118 146
132 160
_
112 130
90 117
95 130
• -
70 108
._
1808
106 130
95 120
_
116 130
_._
68 105
60 94
.
90 115
t
1809
110 130
105 128
_
113 138
65s. 4d.
85 109
75 102
_
76 110
—
1810
114 136
120 146
100 120
90 105
70 112
75 115
68 94
60 85
^M
1811
75 95
54 73
38 74
25 52
m
4
1812
54 80
71 96
m
_
20 50
30 70
.
_r
1813
90 116
80 105
116 132
uly. 72s. 4d.
50 85
40 75
70 110
1814
118 142
96 118
105 125
96 115
80 114
60 96
"66 103
60 95
mm
1815
96 115
83 110
—
_
60 95
50 81
.
mlm
1816
84 110
77 104
.
~83 107
«_—
48 83'
56 72
•• -
50 82
mm
1817
82 104
80 102
_
92 112
__
.
54 80
74 96
.
,
1818
99 115
160 180
.
146 163
76 98
122 153
-
112 145
1819
148 166
102 128
124 150
116 126
June. 7
110 148
78 100
88 119
80 115
i
1820
130 155
122 144
133 140
128 143
*
90 128
86 120
110 132
100 125
^_
1821
125 138
120 136
131 148
112 132
105 124
108 130
105 120
73 110
—
1822
117 145
120 140
116 144
112 138
,
70 116
104 118
90 115
80 110
^
1823
112 136
115 140
99 126
87 122
75 110
70 108
58 90
50 82
__
1824
73 114
68 114
60 101
60 102
it_^
60 78
52 72
52 59
50 59
_-
1825
65 103
78 120
67 100
66 98
L
50 64
60 76
56 67
50 64
_
1826
66 104
60 100
52 90
54 100
____,
50 65
44 58
40 51
40 53
_
1827
58 105
56 105
55 90
47 88
40 57
40 55
40 53
35 46
1828
48 88
50 84
48 82
50 90
.
34 50
33 52
30 52
31 50
__
1829
50 88
48 88
46 78
46 84
31 48
34 46
30 45
24 44
—
1830
42 83
40 80
40 78
42 80
Gd. per Ib.
25 40
25 38
28 40
30 42
— .
1831
46 84
47 84
55 82
81 99
32 45
35 47
46 54
72 80
_^
1832
88 100
88 98
81 92
80 98
_ ,
80 87
80 87
73 80
66 79
_
1833
75 94
84 105
95 120
91 114
^
62 74
67 83
80 94
70 90
_
1834
87 112
85 100
70 105
74 116
—
65 86
63 84
50 67
56 70
1835
81 124
86 119
95 126
96 120
56 79
56 80
78 94
80 95
_
1836
96 120
91 115
83 110
96 130
w
80 95
75 90
67 82
'72 95
— .
1837
106 117
106 117
103 124
108 123
«.
60 93
60 100
60 100
65 103
—
1838
88 125
90 T24
-
~
63 86
64 83
400
TABLES OF PRICES.
COCHINEAL, Spanish Garbled.
COPPER, British, in Cakes.
Year.
Per lb.
Duty.
Per Cwt.
s d s. d.
s d $• d*
$• d* $• d*
s» d» s d
•
1782
186al9 6
19 6'o21 6
24d.
-
83 a 86
S. d. 5.
1783
19 6«21 3
21 6 23 0
.
13 6al5 6
„
83 86
1784
13 6 15 0
12 0 13 6
13 6 15 0
12 0 14 6
__
.
80 83
83 a 86
1785
12 0 14 0
13 0 14 6
,
83 -
78 -
82
1786
13~0 14 6
12 6 13 0
14 0 16 0
.
82
1787
14 6 16 6
13 0 15 0
_
17 0 19 6
82 -
80 -
72 76
80 0
1788
16 0 18 6
18 0 21 0
_
14 0 16 6
3//.
m
80
1789
14 0 16 6
12 0 14 0
_
13 0 15 0
80 -
76 -
80
84 0
1790
12 6 15 6
15 0 18 6
_
13 6 15 6
__
84
1791
13 3 15 3
12 0 14 6
14 0 16 0
13 0 15 0
__
84 -
86 -
.
90 0
1792
13 0 15 0
12 0 14 6
86 -
105
1793
12 6 14 6
13 6 15 6
_
12 0 14 0
-
_
105 110
112 114
1794
12 6 14 0
12 0 13 3
None
till Au
gust
109 6
1795
12 6 14 0
18 0 19 0
-
15 6 16" 0
Free.
.
109 6d.
1796
_
15 6 18 0
14 0 15 0
.
__
.
109 Gd.
120
1797
.
15 0 17 0
23 0 25 0
_
.
120
1798
28 0 30 0
52 0 54 0
26 0 29 0
_
10(7.
_
120
1799
29 0 30 0
45 0 46 0
.
18 0 21 0
_
120 -
140
1800
18 0 20 0
16 6 19 0
_
24 0 27 0
_
140 -
160
1801
24 0 27 0
15 0 19 0
.
m
160 -
1802
- -
14 0 19 0
16 0 18 0
-
—
160 -
f None 4 7
I Months J
130 140
130 0
1803
15 6 18 0
23 0 26 0
_
22 0 25 0
11W.
.
130 140
140
1804
22 0 25 0
18 0 20 0
" * "
26 0 29 0
Is. OM.
140 -
156 -
_
165 0
1805
.
26 0 28 0
27 0 30 0
Is. Id.
165 -
200
1806
„
26 0 30 0
22 0 27 0
_
Is. Ifd.
.
200 -
182
1807
_
23 0 29 0
19 0 30 6
.
. _,
-
162 -
147
1808
_
20 0 31 0
24 0 29 0
_
.
147 -
200
1809
32 0 36 0
26 0 32 0
34 0 36 0
30 0 37 0
2s.
Uncertain
till April
160
1810
32 0 42 0
31 0 35 0
160 -
Unce
rtain.
1811
m
31 0 35 0
29 0 31 0
_
<_
_
150 156
140 146
1812
_
30 0 32 0
29 0 31 0
_
__
.
140 146
130 135
1813
32 0 35 0
48 0 51 0
_
2s 4irf
.
130 135
1814
.
47 0 52 0
34 0 38 0
.
None till
December
140 -
120 0«130
1815
32 0 35 0
37 0 40 0
-
30 0 36 0
_
.
130 140
120 130
1816
30 0 34 0
23 0 28 0
.
28 0 33 0
_
.
120 130
[tonNoT I
85 0
1817
_
28 0 34 0
27 0 300
.
.
105 -
133 °T'
1818
1819
27 0 30 0
28 0 32 0
24 0 27 0
25 0 29 0
26 0 30 0
26 0 31 0
2s. Gd.
133 -
123 -
Nop
No price a
rice.
fter April.
1820
26 0 30 0
26 0 30 0
26 0 28 6
24~0 27~ 0
115 -
No price
No price
No price.
1821
24 0 27 0
22 6 25 0
19 0 23 0
20 0 22 0
100 104
100 102
94 95
94 0 95
1822
20 0 23 0
19 0 23 0
19 0 22 0
18 0 21 0
,
100 105
105 -
95 -
102 0 108
1823
19 0 23 0
20 0 24 0
23 0 26 0
18 0 22 0
102 108
Uncertain
105 108
105 0 108
1824
16 0 20 0
18 0 20 0
16 0 20 0
16 0 18 0
,
102 105
105 108
100 105
100 0 105
1825
16 0 19 0
21 0 24 0
17 0 21 0
16 0 20 0
Is. Nov.
95 -
95 100
97 100
100 0 105
1826
16 0 20 0
16 0 20 0
13 6 15 6
14 6 18 0
Gd. July.
105 -
110 115
115 120
126 0
1827
14 6 18 0
13 0 18 0
12 0 16 0
12 6 14 0
126 -
115 -
103 -
105 0
1828
12 6 14 0
10 0 12 6
10 0 12 6
10 6 12 9
105 -
97 -
106 112
103 0
1829
10 0 12 0
9 0 11 0
90110
9 0 11 6
103 -
96 -
96 98
90 0 93
1830
9 3 '11 0
9 3 11 0
93110
8 3 10 6
__
No price
88 90
88 90
88 0
1831
8 0 10 0
74 90
74 96
66 86
88 -
86 88
86 88
86 0 88
1832
70 86
72 8 10
70 96
68 90
__
86 88
86 88
86 88
96 0
1833
68 90
64 86
76 90
79 99
96 -
94 -
94 -
103 0
1834
83 10 6
74 90
70 90
74 93
103 -
98 -
95 98
950 98
1835
7693
8 4 10 0
7 6 10 0
70 8 10
94 98
91 -
91 -
91 0
1836
70 90
71 90
72 96
68 88
—
95 -
103 105
114 115
106 0 108
1837
69 89
66 88
60 80
60 7 10
103 -
92 -
81 82
94 0 96
1838
64 80
6 4 8 tf
"
-
—
92
91 -
TABLES OF PRICES.
401
COTTON WOOL, West India, Surinam, &c.
Demerara instead of Surinam from 1820.
COTTON WOOL, Bowed Georgia.
Year.
Per Ib.
Duty.
Perlb.
Duty.
s.d. s.d.
. d . s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s.d. s.d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s.d. s.d.
s.d. s.d.
1782
8a3 0
2 Oc3 6
Free.
None
Free.
1783
930
11 I 10
1784
0 1 10
1221
~~
"*"
19RK
2a 1 10
724
12 1 10
1 9 « 2 3
T*
™~
l/oo
1786
10 2 2
2336
n
m
.
_
.
~
1787
2036
728
2 0 210
1 .9 2 6
.
m
„ m
m
^ ^
1788
_
929
1218
-
,
_
m
m ^
m m
-—
1789
1218
0 1 7
-
1 2 110
L _
.
_
^ m
m
__
1790
.
1 1 Si
1019
„
__
.
^
m
. m
1791
-
1 1 9
1926
.
_„_
-
^
_ _
•i .
^^
1792
926
820
_
1923
*_
_
„
_ ^
^
__
1793
823
020
.
1222
t
8ol 10
1 lal 4
m
I Sal 6
^_
1794
222
1 1 110
-
1 3 111
>__i
1216
1013
_
1316
1795
1 3 111
1926
1316
1 9a2 3
179G
_
1926
1724
.
__
„
18 2510 23
_
t
1797
_
1526
2234
.
.
1023
2131
.
_
1798
- -
2134
2634
- -
f 8tooib ]
- -
110 3 0
2539
- -
C6.t. 6d.
1799
2632
3447
1626
.. _
,
2539
3650
_
1528
_^_
1800
829
2332
.
2 0 2 11
«_
630
1 4 210
.
1630
—
1801
2130
1928
__.T
1632
1 5 211
1802
9 2~9
1321
.
1 5 2~3
,
~5 3~0
010 2 8
1032
1803
1422
1223
C 16s. 8d.l
1 1 3
0810
.
1012
f16ioofb
1804
_
1021
1624
.
_
010 0
1416
_
'*
1805
1806
522
1624
1 2 1 10
1520
1 3 111
-
16s. I0$d.
1 1 3
1 5 7
1 0 1
1214
1213
IGs. lOirf.
1807
1 3 1 10
1219
_
__
1 0 2
010 1 1
1808
.
1219
2529
_
_
.
09 0
2026
_
.
1809
630
1218
.
720
r i6s. iid. 7
None
010 0
-
1416
16^. lid.
1810
_
110 2 3
1519
_
_
1 5 7
010 1 1
_
_
1811
5 1 9
0913
1215
_
^
11 1 1
07 9
1012
i
1812
2 1 6
Oil 1 4
-
0 1 6
.
Oil 1
1 0 1~2
L
1813
1018
2026
__
_
1 4 7
2 o 2 2
•
1814
328
2 6 210
110 2 3
2226
224
24 6
110 2 0
2426
1815 1924
1621
111 2 8
620
July. 8s. 7d.
7 11
1 3 4
1517
1214
Fulv8$.7rf
18161 - -
1720
1 4 1 10
.
3 5
1 7 8
.
1517
1817
1 6 111
2021
.
6 111
+m
7 9
1 5 8
„
1 6 1 10
—
1818
1620
1822
-
3 1 11
, ,
6 9
1 7 10
.
1416
mm
1819
1 3 1 11
Oil 1 3
1016
Oil 1 3
July. 6s. 3d.
4 7
Oil 3
M
1012
i t
1820
I 1 5
Oil 1 4
1114
0812
0 2
Oil 1
0 8 01U
010 1 0
^
1821 0 81 1
18220 84 0
18230 8 10
0 74 Olli
0 8i 1 Oi
080 10
0911
0 74 0 104.
0 104 1 O^
0 81 1 04
7 Oil;
11 1 0;
Free, July.
8 010
9 0104
7 0 9
o 74 o 91
0 8$ 0 10
0 7 010
0 94 01040 9 Oil
0 84 0 9f 0 7 0 84
0 74 0 9f 0 9 0104
6^ Cent.
18240 9 0
18250 9 04
0910
Oil 1 4
0 84 1 0
1 6111
8 Oil;
81 1 0;
—
71 0 9i
9 0 104
07109
0114 1 1
0 74 0 9
1 4 1 64
0 74 0 9
0 8i 0 104
—
18260 8 0
1827 0 Gf 0 101
1828 0 5f 0 8f
07 010'
0 6f 010
0 5| 0 8|
0 61 0 10i
0 6 0 9i
0 fi 0 <Ji
64 010:
5| 0 &
608^
4d. &cwt.
7f 0 9|
64 0 74
54 0 6|
0 7 0 8i
0 64 0 74
0 51 0 6i
0 64 0 7| 0 64 0 74
0 61 0 7£ 0 5f 0 4
06 0 710 6 0 71
~~
18290 6 0 8f
0 6 0 81
0 54 0 7|
5 0;8
6 0 710 6" 0 6f
050 6i;0 5 0 G|
^ _
18300 5 0 81
1831 0 6J 0 9i
1832 0 5i 0 9
18330 64. 0 9|
0 6 0 94
0 6 0 8f
0 54. 0 84
0 7i 0 10$
0 6$ 0 9f
0 51 0 9
0 64 0 84
0 8 Oil
§010
010
9 1 3
-
51 0 6$ 0 6| 0 71
64 0 74 0 5J 0 61
51 0 64 0 51 0 6f
6f 0 7f 0 7 0 7|
0 6| 0 7|,0 6f 0 7f
0 54 0 6jiO 5i 0 Gf
06 0 7 0 6f 0 7f
0 8' 0 910 9 010 ,
r&?lb.
18340 8 010-'
18351011 1 2
0 74 1 1
0912
0 84 1 1
010 1 4
8i Oil'
9 1 2
—
1\ 0 9f 0 7f 0 9J
9 01040 9 0104.
080 9J. 0 « 0 94 " —
010 1 0 K> 9 OIH
183610 9 1 2
1837,0 9 1 3
0 94 1 3
0810
010 1 4
0610$
9 1 3
51 I 0
—
9 OlOl'o 9^ Oil
> 7i OIl^|0 7^ 0 9$
010» 1 0 0 7f 01U —
060 8j 0 5$ 0 7} —
1838 0 74 1 o
06 0114
- •
-
5^ 0 y| 0 7 08
1 1
D n
402
TABLES OF PRICES.
COTTON WOOL, Bengal and Surat.
COTTON WOOL, Pernambuco.
Year
Per lb.
Duty.
Per lb.
Duty.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
. d. s. d.
.d. s.d.
. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
I. d. s. d.
1782
-
-
None
-
-
-
None
- -
Free.
1783
1784
1785
L786
-
2 i „ 2 7
1 6fl 1 9
1788
Gal 8
416
1 7«1 10
1790
_
0 SaOlO
.
_
Free.
7 1 8
8 1 10
.
1718
1791
_
0 8 0 94
1 2«1 3
_
—
—
6 1 84,
2527
-
__
1792
1 2ol 3
Oil 10
_
3 n 1 4
526
10 2 0
_
2123
1793
1314
Oil I 1
_
010 Oil
__
1 2 3
1920
_
11121
1794
010 Oil
o 9 on
„
010 onj
—
11 2 1
1618
_
19 1 11
1795
_
on i i
1 5 110
_
— .
1 9 1 11
2326
.
_
1796
_
1 7 110
Oil 1 5
.
_->
^ _
2326
1 10 2 1
_
__
1797
-
010 1 5
1 8 111
-
—
-
1 11 2 2
3235
-
—
1798
-
1 8 111
2022
-
4 ^ Cent.
-
3234
3135
-
I 100 lb.
1799
2224
2426
_
on i 2
211 3 2
4248
_
2528
1800
010 1 4
1316
2930
211 3 1
_
2 9 211
—
1801
_
1516
1215
_
__
«.
2 9 211
2830
.
1802
1 3 1 6 010 12
-
1014
.
2 8 211
2025
.
1803
010 1 2
0912
.
0910
f 16s. 8rf. 7
.
2024
2225
-
25s. do.
1804
_
0 8 010
010 1 3
_
2023
1920
_
2326
1805
_
1013
1215
.
6s. lO^d do.
_
2326
1 11 2 0
_
25s. 3|d. do.
1806
12 5 010 1 0
_
Oil 1 3
111 2 0
1819
.
1 11 2 0
1807 - - 010 1 2
on i 3
.
.
1 9 1 10
110 111
.
16s. 104/J.do.
18081 - - 0 9 1 1
1519
.
_
1 9 1 11
2 9 210
_
18091 1 5 1909 12
1014
165. lid. do.
210 211
1 8 1 10
2023
16s. lid. do.
1810
- 1 1 1 6
0609
2123
1 9 1 10
_
1811
07 0 9 iO 4 07
0 ~6 0 '8
1 9 110
1 2 3
1617
1812
0608
0 8 010
_
—
«_
1518
16 1 ~7
*
—
1813
o "9 o 11
010 1 3
_
010 1 6
__
_
111 2 0
2 8 210
_
1814
1 0 6
1115
010 10
1216
210 3 0
2225
-
2729
__
1815
010 5
0 7 Oil
010 1 2
.
July. 8s. 7s.
2224
2022
2729
110 2 1
July. 8s. Id.
1816
Oil 1 3
1015
_
2223
2425
. _
1 10 111
^
1817
010 3
0811
010 1 4
_
1 9 1 11
2021
_
111 2 0
—
1818
010 4
0 94 1 3
_ _
0611
1 11 2 0
2022
-
1 94, 1 11
— .
1819
0 «4 040 5* 010
_
0 64 Oil
-
1 9 11
1 44 1 5
.
__
1820
1821
1822
0 640 10 ,0 5 0 9£
050 84 0 5i 0 8
0 5i 0 8 0 5f 0 75
0 6 0 9f
0 5i 0 7:
0507-
0 54. 0 74
540 8;
4f 0 6^
6s. 3d.
1 5 6
1 04. 14
1 04 li
1 4 5
1 1 24.
1 0 T
1 3 1 3f
1011
010 Oil
1 0 1 14.
i oi i i;
0114 1 0,
6^ent.
1823
1824
050705 0 64. 0 5f 0 !'••
0 54 0 7 0 5f 0 6f JO 54. 0 7
52 0 6j
6 ^ Cent.
0114 Oi
on5 o*
10 1 lOllf 1 Of 0114 1 0;
on o on oii|,on i o
12 W Cent.
1825
1826
1827
0 5*0 740 74 Oil OW 1 1
0 5f 0 6¥0 4f 0 54.10 405
0 4f 0 5£ 0 44. 0 5i 0 4 0 5J
5f 0 7
0 4| 0 5|
0 34. 0 5
-
i 1 I 1
1 0 Ij
oioj on
14 & 1 8 1 114 1 0 1 14
011 01140104 0 1U OlOf OlOi
0100 104. 0 8| 0 94,0 84. 0 9
-
1828
0 34. 0 4| 0 3 0 4i 0 3f 0 4^
0 3f 0 4|
{August. 1
4d. cwt.J
0 84. 0 9
0 7| 0 8i 0 84. 0 8|'o 8 0 8j
—
182S
183C
1831
183',
0 340 41 0 3f 0 44. 0 3 0 44. 0 34, 0 4,
0 3f 0 54 0 4 054.044.0604406
0 4i 0 6 0 4 0 5^ 0 4 0 54/0 4 0 5
0 3J 0 5J 0 4 0 5410 4 0 5f 0 4f 0 6
0 7f 0 8,
0 7i 0 7^
0808
0 74. 0 8
0 74. 0 7f 0 7i 0 7|
0 7f 0 84 0 7f 0 8^
0 74 0 8 ,0 74 0 8j
0 74. 0 8iO 84, 0 9^
0 7 0 74
0 84. 0 9J
0 9§ 0 10J
Irf^lb.
183?
1834
183£
0 44 0 6 0 4f 0 6 0 5| 0 7
JO ,4 0 7 0 54 0 74 0 5| 0 U
0 6l 0 84 0 7 0 82lO 6i 0 8
0 6| 0 8=
0 5f 0 7
|0 5f 0 8
—
0 9 010
0 94, 0 10,
1112*
0 94 0104010 €11
o 92 on oiof i o
11 1 1 2 1 34 1 44
on i o
0 10f 1 0
1 1 1 2
•fad. do.
183610 54 0 7| 0 5f 0 7!
1837 0 40 74 0 34 0 &
1838 0 4 0 63.0 4£ 0 £
0 4£ 0 7*
0 2| 0 5:
0 SA 0 8,
0 3| 0 5
-
1 1 1 14.J1 1 1 2
1 0 1 2 Oil 1 0
0 8 « 0 91 0 9| 0 10j
1 2 1 3 11 0 12
0 8J 0 10 |0 84 0 flj
—
TABLES OF PRICES.
4)3
FLAX, St. Petersburg, 12 Head till 1833, then 9 Head.
HEMP, St. Petersburg, Clean.
Year.
Per Ton.
Duty.
Per Ton.
Duty.
£ £
£ £
£ £
£ £
£ £
£ £
£ £
£ £
^Cwt.
1782
36 a 38
44048
.
Free
314o33
33$o36
3s. 8d.
1783
m
46 50
40 43
.
— .
_
34 37
244 274
.
—
1784
m
40 41
45 47
_
,
_
2U 234
29* 32*
m
—
1785
m
46 48
36 40
.
.
_
22 24
21 23
m
— .
1786
m
38 42
45 47
_
— .
.
16 17
32 34
_
__
1787
41 o46
38 40
.
44 46
— .
31 34
28 30
.
33 39
,
1788
44 45
30 39
_
42 43
—
39 40
28 29
_
30 31
r__
1789
43 44
48 49
_
28 29
30 31
.
26 27
— ,
1790
45 47
47 48
.
44 45
264 27
30 31
.
23 24
_
1791
41 42
35 37
-
__,
„
25 26
20 21
.
_M
1792
•
35 37
31 32
•
—
.
23 25
24 26
.
_^
1793
31 32
36 39
uncertain
33 35
.
26 27
22 23
26 27
_
1794
33 35
28 32
_
38 42
nj_m
27 28
29 30
. „
_.
1795
38 42
54 56
-
_
.
32 33
43 45
-
1796
.
52 55
54 57
-
_
.
50 61
58 59
-
45. O&f.
1797
54 57
uncertain
44 45
48 50
. _
53 54
37 39
.
43 44
45. 2&fc.
1798
51 53
49 50
-
52 54
f 21*. Sd. 1
35 37
32 34
38 41
-
55. 2rf.
1799
52 54
62 64
uncertain
66 69
— *
.
34 37
46 47
.
1800
64 67
70 71
.
62 66
—
.
50 51
72 77
.
MM
1801
73 74
78 79
57 58
64 66
_
80 81
85 86
.
43 45
—
1802
65 66
63 64
.
76 78
—
43 45
31 32
_
50 51
1803
83 84
78 82
» »
3f rf. p cwt.
50 51
54 55
.
52 53
65. 2£rf.
1804
m
80 82
82 83
.
47 48
52 53
_
65. ioV-
1805
80 82
70 74
72 75
4d.
54 56
48 51
56 57
75.
1806
63 64
„
67 68
4 id,
'
57 58
51 52
. „
57 58
75- 54 d»
1807
68 70
72 75
65 68
75 80
62 63
57 58
.
65 66
1808
75 80
140 142
.
__
67 68
117 118
.
114 115
—
1809
140 142
Uncertain
105 107
98 100
4d.
117 118
Uncertain
94 95
71 72
75. Sd.
1810
98 100
68 70
71 72
__'
75 76
57 58
•
68 72
— .
1811
72 74
100 105
_
__
•
68 70
81 85
*.
—
1812
103 105
95 100
103 108
_ _
_
82 86
99 102
•
__
1813
100 102
75 78
96 100
83 90
4fd.
81 87
72 74
77 78
72 73
95. IJd.
1814
83 90
63 68
68 72
.
72 73
41 43
.
45 47
^ ^
1815
70 72
76 78
68 70
—
45 48
49 51
_
33 34
^—
1816
68 70
43 45
.
50 52
t
35 36
30 33
.
35 36
—
1817
52 54
69 70
_
—
33
30
-
35
_^
1818
69 70
65 66
70 72
m
38 39
39 40
.
36 37
—
1819
55 59
50 51
60 61
49 50
bd.
36 37
32 33
.
S3 34
9s. 2d.
1820
50 55
48 50
50 53
52 54
5s.
34 35
35 354
32 33
30 304
—
1821
52 53
49 50
46 47
50 52
29 30
29 30
27 274
39 41
1822
50 52
48 50
44 45
49 50
____,
414 43
28 30
27
30 31
MM
1823
50 51
58
54 55
54
8s. 4rf. Dec.
30
31
29
37
1824
48 50
46 48
43 44
47 49
374, 374
37
35 354
364
«.
1825
48 50
49 51
42 44
44 45
___
42
41 42
40 41
44
__
1826
42
33
32
36
4d.
43 4^4
41 4U
384 39
40* 41
4s. 8<f.
1827
37 374
384 39
37
35
Nov. 3. 3d.
404, 41
42 424
41
39
—
1828
1829
36 36*
36 364
35 351
37 371
34 35
34 35
33 334
35 36
394 39f
38| 39
384 38f
38 384
304 40
394 40
41
434 45
~
1830
36
374 383
45
46 48
—
45
P44
39 40
38 40
•M
1831
45 48
50 51
51 52
51
Id.
374 39
3J)A
40 42
37 374
— ,
1832
51
44 45
42 44
42 44
37-i 37—
36*
344 35
27
Id. Aug.
1833
1834
1835
1836
45
60
39
50
39
46
50
51
46
—
24 244
244 25
264 27
25f 264
254 '
2fi 2fii
274 284
24s 244
244 '
244 25
27 274
254 26
24 244
25 254
30 31
-
1837
46
46
35
38 39
__
31 314.
334
30
284 29
—
1888
35 39
35 39
~~
29 294
29 29J
401
TABLES OF PRICES.
HOPS, Kent Yearlings, including Duty.
LEAD, English, in Piga.
Year.
Cwt.
Duty.
Per Fodder, 19i Cwt.
£
£ s. £
£ s £ s
£ s. £ s.
£ s. £
1782
.
30 a 90
70 a 135
_
14,896
18 o' -'
19 o'
1783
.
120 210
90 125
m
75,717
m
'
20 5 -
17 10
1784
-
80 126
70 105
_
94,390
1C 0«175
18 0«18 5
1785
80«118
96 120
76 108
_
112,684
.
18 5
17 10
1786
70 107
50 68
_
40o 76
95,974
.
17 10
18 10
1787
.
80 105
160 200
48,227
»
18 10
22 10
1788
189 240
220 340
-
120 160
145,168
.
22 10
24 0
22 10
1789
110 155
150 170
-
115 130
104,562
.
22 10
20 5
1790
.
95 120
60 80
106,541
m m
19 5 -
18 15
1791
-
80 120
105 140
80 105
90,059
„
18 15 -
20 15
1792
80 105
50 60
„
56 105
162,113
_
20 15
5
1793
56 112
140 230
_
120 200
22,620
_
20 15 -
1794
200 252
50 80
205,063
.
20 15 -
18 0
1795
_
70 105
90 120
„
82,349
m
17 6
21 0
1796
.
84 105
56 75
_
75,224
_
21 10
20 10
1797
94 130
130 175
-
100 112
157,439
.. m
19 10
1798
90 115
164 180
_
56,032
_ „
19 10
19 0
1799
210 215
300 378
_ _
73,280
_
20 10
21 0
1800
320 353
235 300
310 360
72,928
„
22 10
25 0
1801
220 320
50 86
241,227
m
25 0 -
28 0
1802
76 110
210 252
130 180
f Old 7
15,464 j
.
28 0 '
33 10
1803
'.
205 230
90 100
_
190,205
_
33 10 ~
33 0
1804
92 126
110 130
60 84
177,617
33 0
1805
74 105
120 147
.
95 116
32,904
34 10
40 0
39 0 -
41 0
1806
116 155
86 102
153,103
_
41 0
38 0
1807
_
88 115
120 150
-
100,072
- -.
38 0
30 0
1808
. -
112 140
60 80
-
251,090
•
28 0
43 0
1809
75 115
84 135
60 110
63,952
_
43 0
38 0
1810
90 147
76 125
.
95 140
73,514
35 0
38 0 -
_
33 0
1811
115 192
130 160
w
100 147
157,086
33 0 34 0
27 10
1812
120 160
140 230
_
260 280
30,633
27 10
30 0 -
.
29 0
1813
260 360
340 420
_
200 240
131,481
29 0
29 0 31 0
29 0 30 0
1814
140 200
1(30 189
„
140 175
140,202
30 0 32
33 0 34 0
28 0 30
1815
160 215
180 280
_
168 250
123,879
m
28 0
25 0
1816
120 180
280 360
46,303
25 0
18 0
-,
19 0
1817
290 400
500 640
340 500
600 700
65,522
19 0
18 0
-
26 0
1818
540 C40
110 185
199,465
26 0
24 0
26 0
1819
-
112 180
76 100
_
242,076
27 0
23 0
-
28 0
1820
76 100
70 95
80 112
70 100
138,330
23 10
23 0 -
23 0
23 10
1821
70 110
63 90
63 90
63 105
154,610
23 10
23 0
22 10
22 10
1822
63 112
80 112
60 90
60 105
203,725
23 0
23 0 -
22 10
23 0
1823
60 100
50 100
105 160
120 155
26,058
23 0
_ .
.
23 0
1824
210 360
189 315
126 168
146 180
148,832
23 10
23 10
23 10
23 0
1825
140 180
147 189
315 357
380 400
24,317
24 0
29 0
30 0
26 0
1826
280 420
200 340
160 260
80 114
269,331
25 0
22 0
23 0
21 0
1827
84 112
90 112
105 140
84 96
140,848
21 10
21 5
20 5
19 5
1828
84 130
84 130
75 105
90 140
172,027
19 5
19 0
19 0
18 10
1829
90 147
9JO 140
126 145
147 240
39,866
18 10
17 10
17 10
15 0
1830
140 240
147 210
147 224
150 315
88,047
14 0
13 10 -
14 5
15 0
1831
150 315
150 315
150 320
75 168
174,864
14 15
14 15
15 0
14 0
1832
100 168
100 168
100 160
115 230
139,018
14 0
12 10
14 0
13 10
1833
140 230
110 240
95 140
140 210
156,905
13 0
14 0
14 0
15 5
1834
112 210
112 189
189,714
16 10
17 15
17 10
18 5
1835
_
112 189
75 140
235,207
18 15
18 15
18 10
19 0
1836
90 140
89 152
70 90
105 210
200,333
20 5
27 15
27 10
24 10
1837
1838
95 189
TO 14,0
84 168
84 140
75 130
84 120
178,578
23 10
20 0
23 5
21 15
18 5
20 0
«o Iw
TABLES OF PRICES,
405
INDIGO, East India, Superior.
INDIGO, East India, Inferior.
If ear
Perlb.
Duty.
Perlb.
Uuty.
s, d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s.d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
1782
.
6 Ga8 0
9 OalO 6
-
IJd. per Ib.
4 0 a 5 6
6 0«6 6
lid. per Ib.
1783
. .
7 0 10 0
6080
*
_
40 50
6070
-
1784
m
7690
6070
_
.
60 70
2 0 3 T)
_
1785
_ .
7080
5663
• -
_
40 63
1936
m
1786
. -
6070
5666
• .
.
26 46
3040
_
^^
1787
7 0 a 8 0
9096
6 Oa7 6
_
4 GaG 0
30 50
2 9«4 6
1788
m
6680
6379
-
Free
-
29 50
2346
„
Free
1789
_ .
7680
8 0 10 0
_
50 60
6070
_
1790
.
7690
5986
_
16 29
3046
_
m
1791
m
7 0 9 0
8 0 10 6
.
„
50 60
7080
-
1792
m
9 0 10 6
8 6 10 0
*
70 86
7080
-
__B
1793
76 3
S 6 10 6
8~ 0 9~ 6
_
6070
50 60
5966
1794
_
7696
8 6 10 6
_
_ _^
^ _
36 60
4076
-
1795
.
8 6 10 6
6979
_ .
t
m _
50 76
4069
.
__
1796
_
96110
7090
_
_ w
40 86
2666
„
a
1797
-
6 0 10 0
7 0 11 6
.
_
19 50
3966
* •
1798
•
8 6 10 6
11 0 13 6
-
m _
39 80
4 9 10 0
m m
t
1799
m _
7086
11 0 13 9
..
•
39 66
4 0 10 6
_
«
1800
•
8096
9 6 12 0
m
_
36 76
4990
_
__
1801
.
8 0 11 6
9 9 11 3
_
_
.
49 80
6990
_
-
1802
_
9 0 10 6
_
_
t
m
66 86
m •
,_.
1803
- -
9 0 10 9
9 6 11 3
- -
iperlOOlbj
- -
70 89
6090
•
flls.8id.-t
(perlOOlbj
1804
1805
806
10~0 12 0
9 6 11 3
10 0 13 3
11 D 14 0
10 0 12 0
11 0 14 6
10 6 14 0
13s. 0±d.
13 3i
14 l|
8696
60 90
66 96
8 5 10 6
7 0 9 6
4 0 10 0
8 3 10 0
13*. Ojof.
'3 3i
14 l|
1807
_
11 6 14 6
9 6 12 0
_
14 4
^ .
4 0 10 0
3090
_
14 4
1808
9 6 12 0
10 0 11 9
9 0 11 3
_
3090
4696-
3686
1809
9 6 11 2
9 3 10 1
8 9 10 0
9 6 12 0
— .
3693
40 922670
4090
_
1810
9 6 12 6
10 6 14 0
_
9 6 12 0
L
4690
6 0 10 0
4090
Mi
1811
10 0 12 0
8096
_
8 6 10 6
3696
26 76
3076
—
1812
9 6 11 6
9 0 11 0
^ _
9 6 11 6
—
3980
36 80
4090
MM
1813
9 6 11 6
12 0 16 0
'
4690
39 86
6 0 11 6
1814
1815
10" 6 12 9
12 0 16 0
10 0 12 0
11 0 13 6
9 Oil 0
2id. per Ib.
5-0 10 0
7 0 11 6
36 96
5 0 10 6
4089
2*1. per Ib.
1816
9 Oil 0
8 9 10" 6
-
—
«
40 89
2076
.
•M
1817
9~0 11 0
8 6 10 0
9 6 11 6
9 0 10 0
M
3686
36 80
5690
5389
».
1818
8 9 10 0
7390
53 86
4870
— .
1819
_
7390
7090
5d.
^
4870
3666
_
5d.
1820
70 90
56 710
64-80
6480
3666
2 10 5 0
2 10 5 0
3960
1821
64 80
638
8 0 11 9
80119
^
3960
39 60
3960
5670
^^
1822
8 0 10 9
8 0 10
8 0 11 0
9 0 12 0
—
5679
56 70
6076
5986
— .
1823
8 0 12 9
9 0 10
7690
7092
—
6076
80 90
6073
5370
,
1824
6990
8 3 11
10 9 13 0
10 0 13 6
4250
40 79
3094
3099
_^_,
1825
10 6 15 0
12 0 16
10 0 12 6
11 9 15 9
\d. July
3 6 10 0
3 6 11 6
6096
5 0 11 3
4<f. July
1826
11 0 15 0
7 6 11 0
7 0 10 6
8 4 11 10
3d. per Ib.
4 0 11 0
30 762666
3082
3d. per Ib.
1827
10 6 13 0
10 6 13 4
11 3 1310
10 0 13 0
3 0 10 4
3 0 10 43 0112
3599
1828
9 9 13 0
9 0 10 9
7 9 10 0
811 10 0
B
3590
35 802370
2 10 8 0
— .
1829
811 10 0
8 8 10 3
8398
6989
_
210 8 0
30 802276
1960
— -
1830
69 89
7 0 11 0
6680
6678
— <
1960
30 69
2663
2964
— ,
1831
6678
6076
6672
5363
.—
2964
27 5 10
3064
3052
^ —
1832
53 63
5060
5062
410 6 0
1952
20 50
2350
2249
_
1S33
410 6 0
410 6 0
4660
6080
r
2249
20 49
2844
2 10 6 0
_—
1834
6080
59 611
5 9 611
5063
B
210 510
31 59
3159
3050
^y
1835
4963
6376
6376
5963
3249
30 63
3 4 5 10
3058
— •
1836
5263
5971
6 6 7"9
6480
^
3050
30 60
4063
4064
•M
1837
64 86
6680
6076
7080
4064
36 64
3 0 5 10
3 3 6 10
,_,
1838
7486
7086
3673
36 70
D D 3
406
TABLES OF PRICES.
IRON, English, in Pigs.
IRON, Russia, in Bond*
Year.
Per Ton.
Per Ton.
Duty.
£ 3. £ s.
£ s. £ s.
£ s. £ s.
£ s. £ s.
£ s. £s.
£ s. £ s.
£ s. £ s.
£ s. £ s.
FTon.
1782
.
6 0 a 7 10
_
_
_
16 15
15 15
_
565. 2d.
1788
.
60 7 10
4 0 a 6 10
_
_
15 15
10 15
.
i
1784
_
4 10 6 10
3040
_
_
10 15 -
15 10 -
m
1785
„
3050
50 6 10
m
_
1215 -
14 15
_
1786
_
50 6 10
3050
_
_
14 0 -
14 15
_
1787
.
3050
4 10 60
_
«,
14 15 -
15 5
_
1788
m
3050
3070
.
_
15 0 -
13 15
_
,
1789
_
3070
4070
.
_
13 15 -
14 5
.
1790
_
3070
5 10 7 10
.
_
13 0 -
15 0 -
^ ^
t
1791
.
5 10 7 10
5075
_
1415 -
1410 -
.
1792
„
50 7 10
m
»
14*15 -
15 10 -
_
4 10
1793
.
50 7 10
_
„
14 0
15 0 -
.
510
,_
1794
_ _
5080
_
.
12 10 -
15 10 -
.
2 0
— .
1795
.
5080
-
.
13 0 a 15 10
6 Oal7 0
_-
1796
.
5080
-
-
16 5 17 5
21 5 22 5
-
Gh.O^jrf-
1797
.
5080
*
.
_
20 0 21 0
20 0 20 10
.
64$.7^jrf.
1798
_
5080
-
_
_
20 5 21 10
9 15 20 5
_
75s.5vnd.
1799
_
5080
_ .
_
_
20 0 21 10
-
.
-_ .
1800
_
5080
5 10 90
_
_
17 0 21 0
21 10 23 10
_
_ ,
1801
.
5 10 90
.
22 10d23 10
2310 2610
8 0^2210
1802
_
5 10 90
_ .
_
-
18 5 22 10
15 15 20 5
- .
__
1HOJ
_
5 10 90
7090
m
„
16 0 20 0
_ _
.
84s. 4id.
1801
_
7090
_
-
16 10 19 10
15 0 18 10
_
97s. id.
1805
m
7090
« -
m
-
15 0 19 0
1510 1910
-
1806
m
7090
^
_
_
1510 191ol -
-
107s.*5d.
1807
7 A Q A
15 10 20 10
14 10 19 10
1808
~_ "
u y u
7090
.
_
_
14 10 19 10
_
1809
m
7090
. -
m
. -
14 10 19 10
„
_
09s. 4d.
1810
7090
m
_
-
1410 1910
_
. m
__
1811
_
7090
m
_
.
14 10 18 10
.
.
1812
_
7090
_
_
_
14 10 18 10
1610 1910
„ .
18)3
m
7090
m
m
_
16 10 19 10
1210 1610
. m
29s. 10<f.
1814
7090
m
m
1210 1610
_
1815
_
7000
m
_
.
1210 1610
.
-
1816
--
7090
_
_
1210 1710
13 10 16 10
1210 1510
_ _
1817
ff
"090
m
.
1210 1510
16 10 21 10
_ _
.
1818
i 0 a 9 0
7 10 90
70 7~ 10
8 Oa 9 0
16 10 21 10
15 10 21 10
18 0 21 0
20 0 22 0
1819
8 10 9 10
8090
_
_
20 0 24 0
17 0 21 0
»
130s.
1820
81 0 90
7 10 8 10
17 0 21 0
16 10 20 10
16 10 20 10
14 10 19 10
1821
60 7 10
.
. «
6070
15 0 20 0]15 0 20 0
14 10 16 10 14 10 16 10
—
1822
60 6 10
6 0 6~10
60 6 10
6070
1410 16 014 0 1510
16 0 191016 0 19 10
1823
60 6 10
*
60 6 10
16 0 19 10! -
- 119 0 20 0
1824
6070
6070
6070
10 10 11 0
22 10 27 0 22 10 26 10
22 10 26 10121 0 25 0
1825
1826
11 10 12 0
10 0
10 10 11 0
10 0
11 0 11 10
8090
10 0 10 10
6 10 88
22 10 26 0 16 0 21 10
17 0 23 016 0 21 0
1G 10 22 OJ17 0 23 0
15 10 21 10ll7 10 20 C
305.
1827
7080
6 10 7 10
6 10 7 10
6 10 7 10
16 10 20 Ojl7 0 20 0
17 0 20 0 17 0 20 0
—
1828
6 10 7 10
60 6 10
60 6 10
5 10 6 10
17 0 20 016 0 19 0
16 0 19 016 0 19 0
1829
5 10 6 10
5 10 60
5060
50 5 10
16 0 19 015 10 18 10
15 10 19 0 15 0 18 10 —
1830
50 5550 55
5055
5055
15 0 181011410 1810
1410 18101410 1810
1831
4 15 55
4 15 55
4 15 55
4 15 50
1410 1910
15 0 19 10
14 0 191011410 19 0
,
1832
4 15 5 10
4 15 5 10
4 15 5 5
4 15 55
14 10 19 0
14 10 19 0
1410 19 0|14 0 19 0
1833
4055
5060
50 6 10
5070
14 0 19 0
14 0 19 Oll4 0 19 Ojl4 0 19 0
,
1834
1836
5 0 5 10
55 5 10
5 5
50 5 10
5 5
50 5 10
50 5 10
5 10
14 0 19 0
14 0 18 10
14 0 18 10J13 10 18 10 13 10 18 10
1310 18101310 1810J1310 1810
-
1836
6 5 -
8 0 -
8 0
70 7 10
14 0 18 10
14 10 18 1015 10 19 10114 0 19 0
.
1837
1838
6 10 -
6 5
6 0 -
6 5
4 10
6 0
14 15 18 5
1310 1810
14 0 18 loll4 0 18 1013 10 19 0
15 0 1910
TABLES OF PRICES.
407
'OIL, Northern Fishery, without Casks.
OIL, Gallipoli, in Bond.
Year.
Per Tun 252 Gallons.
»
P«r Tun 236 Gallons.
252 G«lk«s.
£ s. £
£ s. £
£ s. £
£ s. £
s. d.
£ s. £
£ £
£ £
£&, £
£ s. d.
1782
25 Oa26
28 0«29
12 2
36 a 37
45 a 48
795
1783
-
21 0 22
28 0 29
.
-
45 46
41 42
.
1784
-
29 0 30
19 0 20
.
_
39 40
51 53
-
—
1785
„
26 0 27
20 0 21
_ _
„
50 51
40 41
_
,
1786
_
21 0 22
17 0 20
_
_
40 41
47 48
.
_ 'i
1787
_
16 0 -
20 0 -
-
.
34 -
42
.
1788
-
17 0 18
15 0 17
_
_
_
35 36
39 40
_
.
1789
-
16 0 17
18 0 19
-
_
42 44
38 39
_
m_
1790
_
17 0 18
21 0 23
-
_
36 39
40 43
-
1791
- -
17 0 19
23 0 24
_
__
-
38 40
36 37
_
__
1792
_
23 0 24
25 0 26
_
__n
,_
36 37
41 45
-
_
1793
26 Oa27
20 0 21
_
23 0«24
Jl
42 Oa46
56 58
_
53 Oa54
m
1794
_
23 0 24
25 0 26
—
56 60
50 53
_
r _,
1795
-
25 0 27
36 0 37
-
—
-
47 48
65 66
-
—
1796
36 0 38
29 0 30
_
35 0 36
*
,_
65 67
46 48
.
7 7 9|
1797
36 0 38
28 0 29
.
31 0 32
_
51 52
65 70
_
1798
30 0 31
27 0 28
_
30 0 31
_
_
65 68
70 71
60 0 63
9 411$
1799
26 0 27
.28 0 29
_
66 68
75 77
64 0 65
1800
•
25 0 26
40 0 41
_
_
65 66
59 62
__
1801
42 0 46
49 0 50
45 0 46
__
_
59 60
61 63
_ _
L____I
1802
40 0 42
31 0 32
33 0 34
_
61 0 63
52 53
62 63
_ m
—
1803
32 0 34
38 0 40
_
13 9f
63 0 64
66 68
53 54
_ . _
10 16 6
1804
.
36 0 37
34 0 35
.
13 l|
51 52
70 73
-
12 0 7^
1805
34 0 35
38 0 40
_
31 0 32
13 4f
70" o "74
68 70
_
74 € 75
12 5 5
1806
-
27 0 28
26 0 27
14 3|
73 76
63 66
_
13 1 5$
1807
_
26 0 28
21 0 22
.
_ .
64 67
68 70
.
1808
21 0 22
28 0 30
25 0 26
36 0 37
—
69 0 70
84 85
. -
68 0 71
L.__,
1809
36 0 37
34 0 35
42 0 45
7 0
67 0 70
77 78
70 71
61 0 65
13 3 4
1810
38 0 39
43 0 44
_
40 0 41
64 66
58 59
1811
42 0 46
31 0 33
—
_
57 59
69 73
_
_^
1812
34 0 35
42 0 43
35 0 36
.
75 77
87 88
89 0 97
__
1813
44 0 45
36 0 40
_
56 0 60
8 3|
«
83 85
95 97
85 0 90
15 12 8}
1814
57 0 58
33 0 34
„
42 0 43
«
87 90
58 60
65 0 68
1815
42 0 43
32 0 33
44 0 45
34 0 35
— .
_
„
69 70
76 0 78
1816
35 0 -
22 0 -
.
37 0 -
_
75 76
60 61
82 0 83
1817
35 0 38
30 0 31
_
58 0 59
— .
_
83 85
80 81
84 0 86
[
1818
58 0 59
33 0 34
41 0 42
37 0 39
-
84 86
67 73
85 0 90
__
1819
36 0 37
32 0 33
38 0 39
33 0 34
8 3
85 0 90
57 58
66 67
59 0 60
15 13 0
1820
30 0 -
33 0 -
34 0 -
23 10 -
__
58 0 61
60 64
56 60
54 0 55
1821
25 0 -
19 0 -
19 0 -
55 0 56
No price
45
50 10 .
1822
22 0 -
_
28 0 -
26 0 -
- -r
50 10 -
39
42 0 43
_ _
1823
26 0 -
21 0 -
23 0 -
18 5 -
_ _.
42 0 43
43 44
45 47
46 0 48
__^
1824
18 0 -
18 15 -
21 15 -
25 0 -
__
46 0 48
45 46
42 43
44 0 -
_
1825
28 10 -
26 0 -
28 10 -
32 0 -
43 0 44
45
46 47
40 0 42
700
1826
36 0 -
33 0 -
26 10 -
32 0 -
1 0
43 0 -
43 41
42
36 0 39
880
1827
34 10 -
29 0 -
28 10 -
21 0 -
42 0 -
49 50
46 47
42 0 44
1828
22 0 -
24 5 -
27 0 -
30 0 -
—
43 0 44
44 45
38 40
39 0 40
1829
25 15 -
25 15 -
25 0 -
29 0 -
[
40 0 41
44 45
42
38 0 -
1830
29 0 -
31 0 -
30 15 -
54 10 -
39 0 -
41 42
40
52 0 54
_
1831
52 10 -
38 0 -
30 0 -
39 0 -
_
44 0 -
48
34 35
38 0 40
1832
33 10 -
31 10 -
30 0 -
23 10 -
— .
44 0 -
43
45
42 O -
i
1833
24 10 -
24 0 -
26 10 -
28 5 -
— _
42 0 -
51
49 50
51 0 52
— ,
1834
22 0 -
23 0 -
23 0 -
25 0 -
_, m
50 0 51
44
45
46 0 -
1835
26 0 -
26 10 -
25 10 -
42 0 -
54 0 55
54
54 55
60 0 -
4 4 OB.S.
1836
38 15 -
41 0 -
No
price
_^,
60 0 61
58 59
56 -
56 0 57
_,
1837
No
price
No
price
53 0 -
53
45 47
53 0 55
— .
1838
53 0 .
54 -
D D 4
408
TABLES OF PRICES.
PROVISIONS. — Butter, Waterford.
PROVISIONS. — Irish Mess-Beef.
Yean.
PerCwt.
Per Tierce, 304 Ib.
1782
5. *.
56 a 58
54 a 56
.*' *!
76 0 a 80 0
80 0 a 84 0
750a829
1783
57 a 58
53 54
.
60 a 61
80 0 83 0
60 0 65 0
1784
68 70
54 55
.
60 61
60 0 65 0
600
700
1785
58 59
53 54
_
63 64
66 0 70 0
70 0 72 0
1786
61 62
54 56
_
63 64
70 0 72 0
76 0 77 0
66 0 a 68 0
75 0 78 0
1787
62 64
47 50
•
52 57
75 0 78 0
76 0 80 0
Uncertain
750 820
1788
52 55
47 50
_
51 53
75 0 82 0
Uncertain
70 0 75 0
1789
„ .
46 48
50 52
70 0 75 0
65 0 73 0
1790
_
51 55
66 70
_
65 0 75 0
76 0 80 0
1791
66 70
47 49
69 70
_
74 0 78 0
76 0 82 0
70 0 75 0
1792
69 70
44 47
64 66
70 0 75 0
63 0 70 0
75 0 90 0
1793
62 65
70 75
.
68 70
75 0 90 0
100 0 105 0
1794
_
68 72
70 76
• -
1050 1150
92 0 100 0
1795
72 76
80 81
74 76
920 1000
950 1100
900 1100
1796
74 76
78 80
950 1100
1100 1250
1797
76 77
85 88
70 73
-
1100 1250
1300 1400
1798
73 74
60 63
78 80
130 0 140 0
1400 1470
1100 1300
1799
78 82
93 95
105 0 126 0
1100 1300
1800
100 105
85 90
120 125
1100 1300
1100 1200
130 0 135 0
1801
_
115 117
70 75
„
1400 1500
1000 1200
1802
79 80
65 70
88 92
m »
105 0 120 0
1500 1600
1803
_
85 94
114 115
m _
140 0 150 0
1520 1600
1804
105 113
75 80
96 98
..
150 0 155 0
1000 1100
1805
95 97
68 70
96 100
90 92
- .
127~0 130 0
135 0 140 0
1806
78 80
96 100
90 92
1350 1400
1100 1200
1300 1400
1807
90 95
108 110
_
120 122
120 0 126 0
1300 1400
1808
110 126
100 105
115 117
.
120 0 125 0
150 0 160 0
1809
116 118
82 84
114 116
104 108
145 0 150 0
1470 1520
1400 1450
1810
108 110
90 95
122 125
140 0 155 0
142 0 145 0
140 0 155 0
1811
130 132
115 118
-
120 126
160 0 165 0
175 0 190 0
1650 1700
1812
126 128
110 118
m
118 122
165 0 167 0
150 0 152 0
1600 1620
1813
117 121
84 90
125 127
115 120
1500 1600
190 0 195 0
1700 1750
1814
122 124
138 140
122 125
137 138
1780
1600 1650
1815
136 138
111 116
120 121
113 120
1400
1650 1700
1400
1816
98 114
62 68
94 96
80 85
. .
1100 1150
85 0 90 0
1817
80 82
93 94
66 70
115 116
100 0 105 0
120 0 125 0
1050 1080
181'8
115 116
130 134
126 127
117 118
1050
1106
1000
1819
108 112
74 78
98 100
74 75
1026
1250
1150
1250
1820
76 78
90 93
78 82
82 84
1250
1150 1200
130 0 135 0
1200
1821
86 88
95 97
68 72
88 90
1200
1250
1150 1270
1822
84 92
60 70
70 76
68 75
1100 1126
100 0 105 0
800
726
1823
73 75
78 80
72 74
78 80
840
107 0
976
920
1824
85 86
74
76
96 97
90 0 95 0
876
82 6 85 0
82 6 85 0
1825
96 98
98
86 88
105 -
102 6 105 0
1176
1100 1156
115 9
1826
90 92
80 82
90
92 96
1300
1300
1150
1150
1827
86 88
86 96
82 86
82 84
90 0 95 0
1126
1176 1200
1150
1828
80
70 74
76 78
79 80
1150
1100 1126
1126
1150
1829
68 70
60 66
66 68
60 64
1100
1050 1076
105 0 107 6
900
1830
63 68
100
70 74
88 90
950 976
95 0 97 6
950
97 6 100 0
1831
96
100 104
80 82
94 98
900
95 0 97 6
950
926
1832
86 90
80 86
80 82
78 84
1026
107 6 120 0
1150 1176
1176
1833
76 80
60 66
78
73 75
1150
1100
1150
1100 1150
1834
72 74
70 74
74
68 74
1100
1126
1076
960
1835
66 74
60 65
68 70
78 84
1000
1026
1026
1100
1836
90 94
70 76
84 86
100 106
1076
1176
1126 1150
1150 1176
1837
100 102
84
92 95
1126 1150
1116
1050
936 950
1838
84 92
80 90
1126 1150
1156 1176
TABLES OF PRICES.
409
RICE, Carolina.
Duty paid in 1820, and subsequent Years.
SALTPETRE, East India, Rough, in Bond.
Tear.
Per Cwt.
Duty.
Per Cwt.
Duty.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d-
d s d
Cwt.
1782
S. S.
22024 0
30031
.
7s. id.
87 o' - '
72 o' '-
67 o' '-
'. ' '. '
7s. 8&d.
1783
32033
23 25 0
-
30032
—
67 0
64 0
»
. ..
1784
26 27 0
20 21
.
__
62 0
64 0
50 0
52 0
'mm
1785
19 20
13 15 0
16 17
_,
55 0
53 0
55 0
m
__
1786
16 17
20 21 0
m
18 19
s
56 0 -
-
„
49 0
1787
17 18 6
18 19
—
48 0 -
_ _
_
39 0
Is. 9d.
1788
_
18 19 0
14 15
_ _
_
39 0040 0
_
_
33 0034 0
1789
14 15
17 19 0
.
16 17
— —
34 0 35 0
40 0
32 0033 0
*«.
—
1790
17 18 0
14 15
__,
31 0 33 0
Uncertain
46 0 50 0
42 0 45 0
mm
1791
m
14 15 0
16 17
_
_,
42 0 44 0
38 0 40 0
mm
1792
14 156
18 19
.
,
40 0
.
_
63 0
T
1793
- .
18 19 0
15 16
-
_
64 0
97 0
None
38 0 40 0
1794
_
17 18 0
22 23
_
•mm
52 0
None till
December
125 0 132 0
,
1795
41 43
36
45 -
37 -
July. Free.
135 o; -
170 0
155 0
.
Free.
1796
38 42 0
20 21
155 0
45 0 -
96 0
56 0
C3d. after.
1797
20 21
10 17 0
23 24
18 19
56 0 59 0
Uncertain
65 0 68 0
58 0 60 0
< wards
Cls. Hid.
1798
17 18
15 16 0
.
18 19
f)d<
60 0 61 0
_
_
140 0 145 0
1799
16 17 0
38 40
__
140 0 143 0
_
_
95 0 96 0
-—
1800
38 39
41 45 0
22 26
54 56
Free.
95 0 96 0
.
.
60 0 61 0
_
1801
54 56
21 24 0
.
34 36
^_
60 0 61 0
69 Oo70 0
52 0 54 0
* -
__
1802
33 36
40 42 0
29 31
30 33
July. 8s. 9^.
51 0 52 0
-
-
42 0 45 0
—
1803
31 33
34 35 0
36 37
34 35
r-8s. 9o". }
•j 9s. 5agd. (
t-5s. 1M. J
35 0 38 0
61 0 62 0
47 0 48 0
-
f 11s. 6d.
I then 3d.
1804
33 35
20 21 0
32 35
40 50
July. 4s. 8d.
47 0 48 0
_
_
58 0 60 0
,_
1805
40 45
36 41 0
30 34
40 45
f July. I
I 5s. U$d.$
58 0 59 0
85 0 95 0
78 0 80 0
-
—
1806
40 45
27 32 0
.
27 35
July. 6s. 4d.
63 0 68 0
.
.
52 0 53 0
.
1807
25 34
23 30 0
_
30 36
_
51 0 52 0
66 0 57 0
48 0 49 0
- .
_
1808
37 45
45 52 0
35 45
58 62
April. Free.
48 0 49 0
.
• *
75 0 78 0
_
1809
50 60
60 68 0
30 32
32 36
. .
74 0 75 0
m .
_
81 0 82 0
4d.
1810
30 34 0
21 25
__
80 0 82 0
.
-
76 0 80 0
L
1811
23 27 0
36 40
_
iimm
76 0 80 0
69 0 71 0
72 0 76 0
_
1812
40 42
70 77 0
66 68
80 82
70 0 72 0
64 0 68 0
75 0 78 0
68 0 70 0
_
1813
80 84
48 52 0
. .
46 52
f!6s. 4d. ~)
70 0 74 0
.
.
77 0 80 0
4%d.
1814
36 40
25 26 0
- -
56 60
C 20s. o|rf. ")
\ Free. £
C20s. Oirf.J
85 0 90 0
75 0 78 0
100 0 105 0
88 0 95 0
-
1815
45 48
20 25 0
_
25 26
90 0 95 0
69 0 70 0
102 0 105 0
80 0 85 0
1816
25 26
20 25 0
-
46 58
71 0 75 0
_
_
41 0 42 0
—
1817
42 51
40 46 0
34 36
51 52
r20s.Oio-.7
] April. (
I Free. 3
40 0 42 0
37 0 38 0
42 0 44 0
-
-
1818
45 48
42 44 0
53 54
42 47
Free.
43 0 44 0
m
•
38 0 40 0
__
1810
43 45
30 33 0
36 38
18 24
f20s. Oirf.1
I Apr. 15s. j
38 0 40 0
-
-
31 0 35 0
—
1S20
32 39
35 40 0
41 42
36 37
15s.
32 0 36 0
_
31 0 33 6
30 0 31 0
_
1821
36 -
34 35 0
30 34
33 35
. ^
27 0 28 0
.
21 0 22 0
— _
1822
33 35
29 33 0
33 35
34 36
,_
21 0 22 0
29 0 32 0
21 0 22 0
25 0 27 0
wmm
1823
33 36
39 43 0
37 42
33 41
__
25 0 27 0
29 0 30 0
22 0 24 0
22 0 23 Ov
— .
1824
33 40
28 32 0
29 32
31 34
__
21 6 22 6
20 0 21 0
20 0 21 0
22 0 23 0'
__
182")
34 37
39 40 0
34 36
3S 40
(___
23 6 24 0
33 0 34 0
24 0 25 0
23 0 24 0"
_
182G
36 40
30 35 0
32 37
35 40
23 0 24 0
23 0 24 0
20 0 21 0
21 0 22 0
—
1827
38 40
40
38 -
37 38
__
23 0 23 6
22 0 22 6
22 0 22 6
25 0 26 0
mm
1828
37 38
34 36 0
33 36
37 40
24 6 25 6
25 0 26 0
22 6 23 6
25 0 26 0
__
1829
33 38
32 35 0
32 37
32 35
24 0 25 0
25 0 25 6 i 24 0 25 0
25 6 26 0
mm
1830
32 35
32 36 0
30 35
36 -
__
25 6 26 0
35 0 36 0 38 0 39 0
41 0 42 6
mm
36 -
35 38 0
30 33
36 37
36 0 38 0
44 0 46 0
39 0 42 0
38 0 41 0
mm
[832
36 37
35 37 0
35 38
35 37
38 0 39 0
36 0 37 0
33 0
36 0 36 6
mm
1833
37 -
33 35 0
34 36
34 36
.
30 0 32 0
25 0 30 0
38 0 40 0
32 0 34 0
mm
1H34
34 36
32 34 0
28 29
29 31
.
32 0 33 0
26 0 30 0
26 0 30 0
24 0 26 6
—
1835
29 31
29 31 0
29 31
29 32
24 6 27 6
25 0 28 0
22 6 25 6
25 0 28 0
_
1836
29 31
28 31 0
28 30
32 34
__
24 6 27 6
26 6 29 6
29 0 31 0
26 0 28 0
••M
1837
32 34
30 32 0
30 32
30 32
25 6 28 0
24 0 26 0
22 0 25 6
21 0 26 6
—
1838
32 34
34 36 0
-
—
21 0 £66
22 0 25 0
"
"
""
410
TABLES OF PRICES.
SILK, Bengal, Raw.
Company's Sales in Bond, from 1820.
Private Trade in 1830.
SILK, China, Raw.
Company's Sales in Bond, from 1820.
Private Trade in 1835, and since.
Year
Per lb.
Duty.
Per lb.
Duty.
s d. s.d.
s.d. s.d.
s. d s d
s d s d
s. d. s. d.\s. d. s. d.\ s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d
1782
15 Oo24 0
Is. 4M.
- |19 Oa20 0:17 0«22 0
1783
15j 0«240
150«330
15 Oo24 0
_
7 0«22 0
180 290119 0 24 0
_
f
139A
15 0 240
150 230
15 0 25 0
12 0 26 0
r Aug. i
i 4s. 4id. j
9 0 24 0
170 240
14 023 0
- -
("August.
1785
12 0 260
160 290
_
14 0 27 0
_
4 0 23 0
20 0 29 0
17 0 26 0
_
_5 '
1786
13 0 250
180 250
_
12 0 25 0
6 0 28 0
29 0 36 0 28 0 32 0
_
1787
130 240
17 0 34 0
„
3s.
.
29 0 33 0 26 0 35 0
fc
3s.
1788
.
16 0 34 0
14 0 29 0
„ _
_._
_
25 0 35 0 17 0 23 0
^
_
1789
_
_
15 0 25 0
• •
__
_ _
15 0 24 0 -
1790
m
15 0 25 0
16 0 24 0
_ _
—
5 0 24 0
14 0 26 0 15 0 20 0
1791
m
160 24 0
13 0 28 0
. .
17 0 20 0 21 0 24 0
1792
m
140 280
18 0 32 0
m
m
21 0 24 0 20 0 21 0
1793
m
180 310
13 0 22 0
•
.
180 21 015 0 16 0
1794
_
140 220
9 0 30 0
_
.
150 160 16 0 19 0
-
1795
.
90 31 0
6 0 30 0
-
_
-
160 190
17 0 20 0
_
1796
-
60 300
9 0 27 0
-
35. !;$<*•
-
17 0 21 0
18 0 23 0
.
3,. l&f.
1797
.
90 270
6 0 20 0
-
35. Sjfrf.
-
17 0 18 0
21 0 22 0
_
3*. 3$d.
1798
_
60 200
12 0 22 °
^
35. 9^d.
„
20 0 21 6
24 0 28 0
_
3s. 93gd.
1799
14 0 210
50 280
-
12 .6 15 0
„ m
24 0 28 0
22 0 24 0
1800
126 160
11 0 23 0
.
_ ^
226 236
23 0 25 0
__
1801
-
11 0 230
5 0 20 0
. -
^ ^
23 0 24 0
21 0 22 6
1802
-
50 300
11 6 25 6
t
^
22 0 23 0
24 0 26 0
1803
10 6 246
120 286
6 0 23 0
3s. 4irf.
2 G 25 0
23 6 26 0
19 0 20 0
_
4s. 6d.
1804
6 0 220
30 200
-
6 0 25 0
f 3s. 1-Jrf. }
< June. >
( 3s. 9d. 3
I 0 22 0
20 0 21 0
20 0 25 0
-
June. 5s.
1805
- -
50 250
8 0 26 0
- -
c June. ^
1 4s.0^|d. 3
- -
22 0 24 6
24 0 27 0
-
fJune.
5s. l^gd.
1806
-
90 21 0
6 0 20 0
-
f June. \
i 4s. Id. j
-
24 0 27 0
32 0 35 0
-
June.
5s. 5id.
1807
»
70 200
9 0 22 0
_
-
31 0 36 0
23 0 25 0
_
1808
9 0 230
180 450
_
14 0 34 0
|
9 0 22 0
33 0 45 0
27 0 34 0
[809
- 140 340
18 0 36 0
_ _
4s.
27 0 34 0
33 0 37 0
5s. 8rf.
1810
18 0 360
200 390
21 0 36 0
3 0 37 0
32 0 36 0
34 0 38 0
36 Oa50 0
1811
230 390
22* 0 37* 0
- 40 0 54 0
32 0 35 0
.1812
_
22 0 37 0
12 0 30 0
_
2 0 35 0|32 0 34 0
26 0 30 0
_
1813
12 0 300
120 300
_
12 0 25 0
4s. 9rf.
6 0 30 0
22 0 27 0
25 0 29 0
20 0 22 0
Cs. 8M.
(314
120 150
11 0 26 0
-
3s. dd.
_
19 0 22 0
20 0 23 0
6s. l\d.
1815
*
11 0 260
11 0 24 6
_
_
20 0 23 0
17 0 20 0
_
1816
_ ^
11 0 240
8 0 24 0
._
_
*
17 0 20 0
14 0 19 0
1817
8 0 260
11 0 31 0
23 0 39 0
4 0 17 6 15 6 24 0
20 0 30 0
1818
230 390
16 0 20 0
—
0 0 30 0|19 0 29 0
21 0 33 0
is" o 25" o
1819
16 0 360
130 300
_
15 0 20 0
45.
7 0 25 0,22 0 28 0
19 0 23 0
55. &L
1820
18 0 262
16 1 23 4
17 1 24 6
2 8 28 7l - -
16 1 21 1
17 0 23 6
1821
1611 236
153 24 5
15 10 24 0
16 2 26 2
m^
8 2 21 l!l92 22 1
17 1 20 10
18 0 21 4
1822
15 4 24 2
15 0 25 1
16 0 27 11
17 2 28 9
8 0 21 5|177 220
16 1 24 0
17 1 25 7
1823
16 1 263
15 1 27 7
14 1 22 4
14 1 21 3
_r_
6 7 23 9 158 21 1
13 9 20 8
13 7 18 3
1324
14 3 196
14 1 20 3
14 1 23 8
March. 3d.
3 10 20 4
_
14 5 21 3
16 6 23 0
March.Sd.
825|20 7 31 0
_
12 8 21 10
14 3 20 7
8 0 27 10
17 3 24 1
17 0 24 5
182613 1 191
_
11 6 18 5
11 9 1911
July. Id.
3 0 19 0
13 3 16 Oll4 0 17 7
Jul~ Id,
182713 3 238
_
13 1 21 8
14 8 21 8
5 9 22 1
_
16 2 24 2
16 9 23 0
182815 6 236
m
15 8 22 815 2 22 11
— .
8 4 22 9
_
18 5 22 10
18 5 23 8
1829
11 4 21 8
m
10 1 19 2
10 9 1811
5 11 18 2
_
12 0 17 6
11 11 15 1
_
1830
10 6 165
11 7 18 1
12 7 18 3
2 4 16 0
_
12 2 15 9
13 2 16 11
1831
1211 182
_
11 11 16 1
11 2 16 2
3 9 17 8
.
13 2 16 0
11 9 15 6
__
1832
11 1 170
w
10 7 16 10
1011 17 7
—
2 8 16 0
_
12 0 14 10
12 3 1410
[838
11 3 181
_
12 0 1811
15 10 22 6
—
2 9 15 0
14 5 18 5
18 7 23 1
_
1834
13 5 194
_
12 11 19 5
1310 22 2
—
5 1 20 6
14 10 19 1
16 5 21 6
1835
12 ? 227
__
12 5 22 4
14 3 2211
__t_.
6 6 22 6
17 3 22 0
19 0 24 6
1836
15 5 250
.
15 5 26 1
15 8 28 2
9 0 26 0
21 0 29 6
20 0 29 6
16 0 28 0
—
1837
11 2 179
r No 7
4 June V
I sale. 5
12 9 18 4
-
4 6 26 0
11 0 18 0
12 0 20 0
11 6 21 6
-
1838
13 6 200
140 21 0
-
—
6 0 23 6
17 0 26 0
-
-
—
TABLES OF PRICES.
Year.
SILK, Reggio, Raw, till 1820, then Milan.
Raw duty paid.
SPICES Cinnamon, Ceylon, 1st Quality,
in Bond.
Perlb.
Duty.
Perlb.
Duty.
|
s d s d
s d. s d
s d. s d
s. d s d
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
5. d. s. d.
1782
20 Oa23 0
21 0«24 0
Is. 4J<f.
11 6 -
13 6 -
4s. 5d.
1783
220 -
230 260
220a230
—
-
11 6 -
16 0 -
.
1784
22 Oa23 0
21 0 22 0
>.
230 240
f 4Al^f- I
.
20 0 -
13 0 -
-
1785
230 240
200 260
_
20 0 21 0
1_3
.
14 0 -
16 0 -
m
1786
21 0 22 0
240 280
_
21 0 22 0
_
13 6al6 0
8 OalOO
13 Oal5 6
_ 9
1787
220 230
270 280
3s.
«
13 6 160
12 0 13 0
_
1788
_
240 260
200 300
m
_
130 140
14 0 160
12 0 13 0
_
1789
_
21 0 24 0
m
_
13 0 140
10 0 12 0
^
__^
1790
.
21 0 22 0
23 0 24 0
.
.
11 0 126
.
1791
.
230 240
24 0 25 0
_
_
m „
11 0 120
.
.
___
1792
.
24 0 25 0
25 0 26 0
*
__
•
10 0 110
13 0 14 0
.
_ ^
1793
_
260 266
21 0 22 0
-
^ .
_
13 0 140
10 0 11 0
-
^
1794
21 0 023
190 220
230 240
__
-
10 0 110
_
_
__
1795
230 240
230 250
_
100 no
17 0 180
15 0 16 0
.
—
1796
.
230 260
23 0 27 0
.
35. 1^ .
.
12 0 140
9 0 10 6
-
—
1797
.
230 260
250 270
.
35. 3*jcf.
.
7 0 80
9 0 10 0
.
1798
250 270
24 0 26 0
None
.
35. 9i§rf.
_
8 0 100
5060
_
4s. lOd.
1799
None
_
_
4 0 50
4656
_
1800
• -
Uncertain
170 180
_
mmm
_
4 6 50
m .
«
__
1801
160 180
None
200 21 0
.
—
.
4 9 50
5056
. .
f August.
1 Is.Qd.
1802
_
180 190
230 25 C
_
.
4 9 56
4650
_
1803
216 230
220 230
21 0 22 0
4s. 6d.
-
4 6 50
4459
_
_
1804
.
220 230
21 0 22 0
June. 5s.
.
4 6 50
- -
.
C July.
11 s. 10£d.
1805
.
21 0 22 0
180 190
.
f June. ~)
.
4 3 56
4959
.
1806
180 190
19 0 21 0
.
180 190
f June. I
i 5s. 5±d. 5
.
4959
4656
.
2s. Oid.
1807
180 190
170 180
u
None
_
m
4 6 56
7076
m
m±m
1808
None
24 0 25 0
m
19 0 21 0
_
_
7 0 76
7073
m
«_
1809
19 0 21 0
24 0 27 0
55. 6<f.
-
7 0 74
8090
.
2s.
1810
240 270
330 350
240 280
25 0 27 0
_
„
9 0 100
8090
.
1811
300 320
330 450
260 270
_
_
8 0 90
8696
. .
_^
1812
260 270
300 320
_
24 0 28 0
mm
86 -
8 0 -
9 0 -
_ „
.^
1813
240 280
27 0 31 0
_
None
_
8 0 96
10 0 10 6
„ „
2s. 4J<f.
1814
None
24 0 25 0
-
220 230
_
100 110
15 0 160
13 0 14 0
_
mm
1815
230 246
176 186
_
120 140
15 0 156
12 0 13 6
. -
__
1816
_
176 186
160 176
mm
12fi 130
9 0 106
11 0 11 6
.
_. ._,
1817
176 180
206 -
None"
11 3 11 6
9 0 110
12 0 13 3
.
mm
1818
None
27 6 30 0
150 160
236 250
133 136
15 0 163
13 0 14 0
140fll4 2
1819
24 0 26 6
160 180
17 0 19 0
—
_
12 3 126
9294
.
25. Gd.
1820
•280 300
280 300
250 260
270 290
92 94
_
7883
86 8 9
18211 270 290
270 290
270 300
280 300
__
86 89
»
•
6166
—
1-2-2 270 300
260 280
270 290
320 360
_
61 66
8 6 90
7679
72 7 4
• __
1823 290 320
28 0 30 0
260 280
230 250
70 74
7 1 74
611 7 0
68 611
^ „
1824 23 0 26 0
230 250
180 200
200 230
April. M.
67 68
7071
7276
69 7 0
mm
1825 180 21 0
230 260
21 0 23 0
21 0 24 0
__
70 73
H 6 120
7980
79 8 0
_^
18261 21 0 '24 0
1827 200 220
21 0 23 0
200 230
180 '200
19 0 21 6
200 220
19 0 22 0
July. Id.
76 79
76 79
6 6 70
610 70
6769
6 9 610
76 7 9
66 6 8
—
1828
200 230
200 230
200 226
200 280
66 68
6 7 69
6376
63 8 0
1829
20 0 23 0
200 260
170 180
150 200
_
66 83
6 9 80
6980
79 8 3
—
1830
150 190
156 190
17 6 22 0
170 21 0
__
9 0 106
9 0 11 0
80 10 0
Qd.
1831
170 21 0
166 190
156 180
156 180
...
69 9*0
8 6 96
8689
89 9 6
M
1832
156 180
156 180
156 180
156 190
89 96
8 6 93
8689
80 9 0
—
1833
156 190
180 200
180 220
230 260
__
80 90
8 0 96
8696
86 10 0
_ _
1834
230 260
230 260
230 260
230 260
— f
86 96
7 6 106
8 0 11 0
80 10 6
MM
1835
230 260
220 250
220 250
220 269
_^
80 106
8 6 106
710 9 6
78 9 6
M^
1830
220 260
22 0 27 0
26 0 30 0
300 340
78 96
8 9 93
8498
86 9 3
—
1837
24 0 30 0
21 0 26 0
180 220
21 0 24 0
_
82 94
610 86
6078
59 7 0
mm
1838
220 260
220 260
—
66 80
6 3 76
• *
"
""
TABLES OF PRICES.
SPICES Pepper, East India Black,
in Bond.
SPIRITS — Rum, Jamaica, Proof.
Years.
Perlb.
Duty.
Per Gallon.
Duty
d. d.
d. d.
d. d.
d. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. S. d.
s. d. s. d.
s.d. s.d.
{Customs
f782
- -
22
234 -
- -
4|gd.
. -
3 2a3 4
4 6a6 0
- -
and
Excise
6s. 1 lid.
1783
.
27
16
-
_
3941
2 Ort2 10 j
1784
.
14
21
m
_
2632
3644|
5s.
1785
m
17 o 18
12 a 13
^^
2838
2 2 2 10 1
1786
1787
: :
114 12
144 -
13 144
134 -
-
—
2 2a2 8
S 8 3 0
2228
- 2 Ofl2 4
3 0 3 4 '
4s.
1788
„
12 -
13* -
m
64d.
m
3043
2430
m
1789
_
13
14*
m
^
2632
2430
m
1790
_
14
§.
.
MM
m
2430
3643
m
r
1791
.
16| -
-
.
___
m
4 0 4 10
2939
4045
4s. 8d.
1792
_
234
Ib
.
__ _
m
4049
3648
1793
m
15| -
134 -
-
_
m
4854
4046
4s. 8rf.
1794
. m
13* -
144 -
_
— «
4048
2632
3 0 3~9
5s. 4rf.
1795
„ m
13
15? -
_
—
3 4 3 10
8689
Aug. 6s.
1796
1797
144 -
!!t :
134 •
15 -
94rf.
6~6 8~0
9096
4660
6080
7278
-
6s. Sd.
1799
12A
22 -
19 -
.__,
7280
4650
.
1799
.
19
13
_ _
__
4" 3 5*6
3040
-
4050
_ ,,
1800
•
14
164 -
.
—
3946
6983
.
7s. 4ef.
1801
.
18
15
- .
f May. 7
I Is. 04^. J
6983
7 6.0 0
- -
4349
—
1802
-
15
H4 -
-
4256
5669
i
3650
7s. G&d.
1803
n
12
94 •
Is. 2d.
4056
5673
^
3449
lls. l£rf.'
1804
9
.
10
f July. 7
tls. 6frf.j
3450
2939
.
5066
lls. 24rf.
1805
.
94 -
9
-
-
5066
3343
-
—
1806
_
94 -
^1 -
.
Is.' 8|1 '
_
3446
3646
.
lls. 3£<f.
1807
_
71
_
.
3446
3043
.
__
1808
-
IP "
10
-
5666
3646
3956
6069
4969
lls. 4V/.
1810
11
124 -
81 -
4660
4~9 6 9
1811
84 -
7 -
„
8 .
__
4" 6 6~0
4253
.
4" 6 63
_
1812
840 9
7 74
.
9 a 9£
—
4660
4353
-
5666
—
1813
- -
9 94
144 154
- -
[i^nfrf.]
5666
7080
-
6680
lls. Gfrf.
1814
15 154
20 21
12 134
13 14
[i/io^i 1
- -
6 0 80
4660
- -
—
1815
104 -
11
_
10 104
' 5
.
4666
3044
.
1816
9J 94
7 7£
3346
2 8 3 10
_
3950
1817
1818
l\ '-
9 9±
10
84 8|
74 8
3646
3650
2840
3856
.
3656
3343
_
1819
-
74 8
6i 64
-
f 2^ul6Jj j
-
3343
2640
-
lls. 74rf.
1820
6± 64
-
6 6*
64 7
—
2639
2243
3452
1 6 2 10
3040
—
1821
1822
7i 7*
7i 7f
6 64
~
1630
TlO 3~ 3
1*8 30
__
1823
6| 64
G| 7*
6| 6f
54 5f
mm
1830
2033
1~8 3 2
1 7 29
_
1824
5| -
51 -
5| 5|
64 6
—
1926
1 10 210
1726
1 8 26
f June.
1 10s. Gd.
1825
Gi fi^
8 84
5— 6-1
6 6|
1 11 2 9
2231
2233
2736
.__,
a 4
4 4
r8s.6rf.io
1826
54 6
5 54
44 5i
44. 5
Is.
2736
3343
2636
211 40
< ace.
C, stren.
1827
1828
1829
34 4
41 4|
3A 34
34 4
3| 4i
31 31
3i 3f
it ?
3f 4
-
3040
3449
3249
3040
3249
3044
3046
3249
2644
3649
3249
2240
=
1830
.
3| 44,
3| 44
3| 44
_
2238
2338
2038
2038
f June.9s.
i ditto.
1831
1832
34 44
3l 3*
3f 4|
II 3
3f 44
3? 4
2038
1 10 3 8
2239
2238
2138
2236
1 10 3 8
2239
2636
1 11 38
2 1 39
2436
1833
1834
Jg 3f
4 44
31 45
~
2636
2838
2536
2636
1835
4? 4A
5i 5
2736
2836
2838
2939
M
1836
5
4* 5
4I 5
4 4
2 9 310
2 9 310
3 6 410
4050
_
1837
3i 4
sl 4
3 3|
4052
3348
3043
3050
_
1838
4 4J
4 44
•
•
—
3150
3150
" "
"
I
TABLES OF PRICES.
413
SUGAR, East India, White, in Bond.
SUGAR, East India, Brown, In Bond.
year.
Per Cwt.
Duty.
Per Cwt.
Duty.
s. s. d.
s. d. s.d.
s. s. d.
s. s.
1782
1783
None
-
None.
1784
1785
1786
1787
1788
1789
1790
1791
1792
1793
- -
69072 0
54 a 71
- --
f 37/. 16s. lOd. }
< per cwt. on £
C sale price. 3
< per cwt. on >
C sale price. 3
179-1
_
52 80 0
60 78
„
38/. 5s. Gd.
38/. 5s. Gd.
1795
70 a 81
60 70 0
66 Oa78
42a65 0
4000580
_
45a60
60 70 0
68 80
__
_
400 550
43a620
_
__
1797*
^
55 78 0
60 85
_
m
300 500
30 550
m ^
•
1798
53 760
65 96
- •
"m
300 500
35 600
^ m
1799
96 115 0
56 80
_ ^
m
340 800
30 550
* •
1800
50 70 0
62 84
_
.
m
320 450
40 600
_ _
B^
1801
67 84 0
60 74
_ _
320 530
20 420
• •
1802
60 75 0
46 52
-
.
200 460
15 400
_ .
__
C 22s. & cwt. -)
C 22s. V cwt.
1803
- -
45 65 0
50 70
-
< and 12£ per >
(cent, thereon. J
-
150 400
20 450
• *
4 and 12£ per
( cent.thoreon.
1804
50 65
68 75 0
_
55 0 72
29s. lf<Z.
30 46 0
420 560
.
43 50
29s. Igd".
1805
67 77 0
62 72
29s. 8d.
51 0 62 0
41 550
. «
29s. Sd.
1806
m
62 72 0
50 65
_
31s.
.
410 550
28 450
.
31s.
1807
56 70
35 500
.
50 0 70
30 55 0
200 330
,
25 45
1808
48 56 0
54 62
_
_
240 450
42 520
_
(1809
50 54
46 50 0
55 0 65
30s.
38 48 0
300 400
_
42 50
30s.
1810
55 60
61 66 0
_
48 0 56
45 50 0
500 600
* -
37 45
1811
54 62
44 56 0
.
53 0 60
__
40 52 0
310 430
. .
40 51
1812
55 65
48 55 0
-
53 0 65
40 50 0
390 450
*
40 51
1813
55 60
56 68 0
_
64 0 75
30s. 33s. 30s.
41 52 0
460 540
.
56 60
80s. 33s. 30s.
1814
55 65
74 78 0
_
600 70
48 54 0
530 650
_
30 42
1815
60 75 0
55 57
3"7s.
„
300 480
28 400
_
37s.
1816
60 75 0
47 60
.
.
400 550
34 450
-
1817
46 61
43 55 0
58 66
51 0 60
—
36 46 0
300 420
48 560
37 52
1818
53 60
55 63 0
46 0 60
37 52 0
390 540
34 45
1819
46 59 0
35 50
340 450
21 350
.
L
1820
40 49
30 50 0
32 50
33 0 50
21 35 0
180 320
18 320
18 32
1821
32 54
•
30 0 40
mm
18 32 0
150 290
18 320
11 30
—
1822
32 40
32 45 0
_ m
30 0 39
mmm
11 30 0
140 280
14 280
15 30
_
1823
29 40
32 48 0
28 40
27 0 36
—
14 29 0
200 280
18 240
18 24
— .
1824
29 35
29 35 0
26 35
26 0 35
__
20 24 0
200 240
18 200
18 20
. T
1825
28 36
35 46 0
35 40
36 0 40
_
20 22 0
280 290
30 310
32 33
,
1820
34 40
30 36 0
32 37
34 0 39
_
30 32 0
250 270
24 260
28 29
_
1827
35 41
35 41 0
36 42
34 0 39
—-
30 31 0
300 320
32 330
30 34
_
1828
32 38
34 38 0
34 38
32 0 40
30 30 6
310 326
31 316
27 30
_
1829
32 40
30 39 0
28 36
26 0 34
t _,
28 31 0
270 290
25 270
21 22
_
1830
28 36
31 37 0
30 35
28 0 35
,
23 29 0
250 300
25 290
25 27
mmm
1831
26 33
26 32 0
23 28
23 6 29
•Ml
23 25 0
230 250
21 220
22 23
...
1832
23 29
23 30 0
26 31
26 0 30
_
20 22 0
200 220
24 250
22 25
^_
1833
25 30
24 30 0
25 30
24 0 32
__
23 24 0
220 230
22 240
22 23
— *
1831
24 32
25 35 0
25 31
26 0 32
_
22 24 0
• m
»
22 24
—
1835
26 32
27 33 0
30 34
32 0 37
_
26 28 0
_
-
27 31
_
1836
37 39
37 39 0
39 44
34 0 36
MM
34 35 0
340 350
38 386
30 33
— .
1837
30 37
30 36 6
41 43
43 0 51
March. 24s.
21 29 0
216 290
30 380
38 44
March. 24s.
1838
41 44
36 41 0
—
30 37 0
230 290
-
•
I
414
TABLES OF PRICES.
SUGAR, Havannah White, for Exportation.
SUGAR, Muscovados.
No Gazette Average till 1805, then Gazette Average.
Year.
Per Cwt.
Per Cwt.
Cut,.
&• s*
5. $•
s d s
1782
1783
None
None
None
None
-
40 0«63
29 0 46
26 Oa40
22 0 25
.
125. 32V-
1784
18 0 34
28 0 46
*
""*
1785
26 0 42
23 0 38
" "
""*
1786
29 0 40
41 0 48
" "
mm
1787
38 0 a 47
24 0 37
31 0 (Z 41
"~
1788
34 0 46
29 0 41
_
1789
31 0 43
35 0 47
*" ""
M«
1790
.
.
„
_
.
38 0 45
45 0 46
" ~
H
1791
.
.
.
.
.
47 0 59
58 0 65
.
May. 155.
1792
. .
. »
m ^
m ^
. .
63 0 76
40 0 68
„
1793
53 0 73
41 0 66
1794
40 0 67
32 0 58
1795
42 0 66
63 0 75
""""
1796
61 0 75
65 0 78
""
1797
52 0 74
57 0 75
17^ Gd
1798
59 0 77
57 0 75
62 0 83
19$ 4rf 1
1799
60 0 83
62 0 87
50 0 67
28 0 50
C Us. Gd.
"S 185 2rf 1
C 20s."
1800
_
.
_
_
32 0 54
38 0 59
34 0 54
54 0 70
1801
74 a 90
.
.
50 a 60
59 0 75
47 0 68
35 0 62
32 0 54
f May.
1 21s. lOd
1802
55 70
_
_
48 67
33 0 55
26 0 50
_
29 0 52
20s.
1803
59 69
.
„
70 85
30 0 53
40 0 60
38 0 58
41 0 60
1804
66 84
70 a 94
.
60 88
46 0 62
52 0 66
51 0 62
52 0 64
f May.
i 26s. 6d.
1805
60 80
.
_
70 90
58 71 -
49 6 -
55 0^ -
47 10 -
27s.
1806
66 87
m m
55 0«70
None
49 6* -
45 0 -
36 6 -
1807
None
* •
50 0 64
40 46
3710 -
30 9 -
m
32 0 -
___
1808
3d 46
.
50 65
31 8 -
49 9 -
.
f July.
1809
50 58
.
_
56 62
51 2 -'
35 8 -
.
50 6 -
} Scale d.
( 27s.o30s.
1810
55 66
m .
60 0 75
38 51
49 6 -
5311 -
„
42 8i -
27s.29s.28s.
1811
36 51
m
30 0 46
42 56
44 9 -
34 11 -
-
44 5 -
27s.
1812
54 66
m m
60 78
43 5 -
41 7 -
_
49 6 -
1813
66 P2
72 86
70 0 83
105 120
51 2£ -
63 8 -
54 0 -
75 44 -
3ol
1814
106 126
110 134
85 0 112
96 128
77 3| -
97 2 -
90 3 -
54 3 -
1815
94 120
74 0 90
84 95
56 84, -
63 24. -
57 04, -
1816
80 94
.
50 0 70
52 73
59 6i -
45 0 -
_
49 0§ .
27s.
1817
52 70
.
58 0 73
54 70
50 OA -
43 9i -
54 14 .
49 11£ -
1818
54 70
^ m
68 0 76
52 66
54 9f -
48 10 -
52 9| -
47 0 .
__
1819
52 66
.
42 0 58
48 60
50 94, -
38 6 -
42 5| -
35 8J -
C30s. 28s.
i27s.
1820
1821
1822
1823
42 58
~35 42
36 46
50 53
43 52
56 0 70
BO 0 37
37 0 45
46 62
35 42
40 48
37 44
34 3i -
35 4i -
31 10 -
27 2f -
35 6f -
35 Oi -
34 Of -
37 l| -
37 44 -
34 8f -
28 6* -
31 7| -
35 5f .
29 4| -
30 4| -
32 91 -
27s.
1824
35 42
34 42
33 0 40
34 40
34 51 -
33 6f .
30 2£ -
29 65 -
_
1825
37 40
47 52
49 0 55
50 57
31 104 -
41 5 -
38 94 -
38 U -
„
1826
44 50
42 46
37 0 44
38 44
39 2 -
35 6 -
30 If -
30 8, -
1827
41 45
42 48
460 48
45 51
35 0 -
32 6 -
35 6 -
36 6 -
—
1828
44 49
44 49
M 0 49
45 51
37 1 -
38 0 -
34 0 -
31 64 -
1829
43 49
41 48
42 0 50
46 48
30 84 -
30 1 -
29 44 -
25 8 -
1830
38 45
34 0 45
35 40
22 8* -
24 44 -
23 10 -
24 10? -
—
1831
30 40
31 38
29 0 36
26 34
25 3 -
25 5| -
2210J -
23 3| -
^
1832
28 34
29 36
31 0 37
32 36
23 54 -
30 6 -
29 04 -
28 4 .
_
1833
30 36
26 32
27 0 33
30 35
28 4| -
25 8| -
28114 -
31 1 -
24*.
1834
29 34
28 33
27 0 32
30 33
32 0 -
33 0 -
31 4 -
31 4| -
. .
1$35
1836
1837
1838
32 34
Uncertain
34 38
36 42
32 35
43 48
33 39
42 47
36 6 38
53 0 55
41 0 46
»
Uncertain
40 45
36 41
29 llf -
39 44 -
35 10| -
42 1J -
30 5| -
38 04 -
34 4| -
33 3 -
31 0* .
45 5| -
32 6| -
37 1U -
40 2* -
37 4j -
-
TABLES OF PRICES.
415
TALLOW, Russia Y, C.
TAR, Stockholm.
Year.
Cwt.
Duty.
Per Barrel.
Per last
12 Barrel.
Duty.
. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
S. d. *.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s.
s d. s. d.
1782
37 0040 0
36 0038 0
Free.
- 1 23 0 a 24 0
24 0025
125 4Arf
17^3
m
36 0 39 0
29 0 32 0
-
- 1 20 0 22 0
14 0 15
m
— .
1784
33 0 36 0
44 0 46 0
_
- 1 20 0 28 0
15 0 16
m
178.1
45 0047 0
42 0 43 0
47 0048 0
- 16 0 17 0
15 0 16
m
!7-s6
46 0 48 0
48 0 50 0
- -
56 0 57 0
.
- I 17 0 18 0
19 0 20
- -
__
787
56 0 57 0
47 0 48 0
15 0016 17 0 18 0
15 0016 0
—
1788
46 0 47 0
33 0 34 0 -
38 0 40 0
- i 14 0 15 0
12 0 3
mm
789
39 0 41 0
45 0 46 0
.
42 0 44 0
_ _
- j 13 0 15 0
14 0 6
- .
790
41 0 43 0
_
44 0 45 0
__
14 0 16 19 0 20 0
.
13 0 14 0
__.
1791
40 0 42 0
39 0 40 0
„ _
47 0 48 0
12 0 13! 16 0 17 0
_
13 0 15 0
—
1792
47 0 48 0
42 0 43 0
_
46 0 47 0
.
14 0 15 0
_
. _
1793
47 0 48 0
38 0 39 0
18 0 19
20 0 24 0
m
21 0 22 0
_
1794
38 0 39 0
50 0 51 0
_
22 0 23 23 0 24 0
m
21 0 23 0
mm
1795
56 0 58 0
78 0 80 0
63 0 64 0
23 0 24 '"27 o 28 0
_
23 0 24 0
__
1796
68 0 70 0
58 0 60 0
—
23 0 24 28 0 29 0
-
21 0 22 0
13s.
1797
56 0 62 0
46 0 47 0
-
49 0 50 0
_
24 0 25
21 0 22 0
-
22 0 23 0
13s. 7ssd.
': 1798
_
49 0 50 0
56 0 57 0
_
Is. 6rf.
.
22 0 23 0
27 0 28
.
16s. O&rf.
V 1799
_
56 0 57 0
65 0 66 0
_
_
30 0 31 0
27 0 28
_
[; ixoo
_
58 0 59 0
66 0 68 0
_
L
. „
27 0 28 0
32 0 34
_ m
mm}
1 1801
68 0 70 0
75 0 76 0
51 0 52 0
58 0 59 0
_
34 0 35 0 19 0 20
» _
.
63 0 64 0
59 0 60 0
64 0 66 0
.
20 0 22 0
25 0 27
_ _
—
I I1803
67 0 68 0
76 0 77 0
2s 0**tf
_
27 0 28 0
21 0 23
.
14s. lid.
1 11804
72 0 75 0
68 0 69 0
70 0 71 0
Is 34/f
23 0 24
21 0 23 0
36 0 38
_
16s. Id.
1 1805
67 0 68 0
61 0 62 0
_
68 0 70 0
>« f^j
36 0 38 26 0 28 0
_
33 0 34 0
17 A'. 10</.
| 1806
66 0 67 0
54 0 55 0
2s! 6d.
- j 33 0 36 0
26 0 27
-
19s. OfdL
| 1807
_
53 0 54 o
71 0 72 0
*
.
26 0 27 0
32 0 33
_
h 1808
_
70 0 71 0
110 0 112 0
m
—
-
34 0 35 0
48 0 50
-
t\ 1809
fi 1810
106 0 110 0
Uncertain
83 0 84 0
79 0 82 0
64 0 65 0
91 0 93 0
2s. 8d.
48 0 50 40 0 42 0
51 0 53 ; 35 0 36 0
: :
50 0 51 0
48 0 50 0
17s. 1W.
^ 811
<- •
61 0 62 0
74 0 75 0
_
_
46 0 48 0
35 0 36
.
.
1 1812
72 0 73 0
88 0 90 0
_
^
_
33 0 34 0
38 0 39
. .
—
1 1813
88 0 90 0
82 0 84 0
98 0 100 0
3s. 2d.
33 0 34 ' 30 0 31 0
48 0 54
36 0 38 0
215. 4£J.
: isu
107 0 110 0
77 0 78 0
_
87 0 88 0
36 0 38 26 0 27 0
35 0 36
32 0 34 0
—
t 1815
81 0 82 0
59 0 60 0
-
—
26 0 29 ! 35 0 37 0
-
21 0 22 0
— .
> 1816
52 0 55 0
46 0 47 0
51 0 52 0
20 0 21 14 0 15 0
.
20 0 21 0
_
1 1817
53 0 55 0
51 0 52 0
_
76 0 77 0
20 0 21 17 0 18 0
-
18 0 19 0
—
> IH18
i 1819
75 0 76 0
70 0 71 0
77 0 78 0
62 0 63 0
89 0 90 0
82 0 83 0
51 0 52 0
—
19 0 20 ! 21 0 22 0
21 0 22 16 0 17 0
18 0 19
21 0 22 0
20 0 21 0
21s. fid.
(• 1820
53 0 54 0
-
62 0 63 0
47 0 48 0
20 0 21 -
14 0 16
- M
—
[' 1821
47 0 48 0
43 0 44 0
39 0 40 0
43 0 44 0
15 0 - 14 0 15 0
15 0 16
21 0
; 1*22
41 0 42 0 i 54 0 55 0
31 0 32 0
33 0 34 0
23 0 24
. .
16 0 17
18 0 19 0
!' 1823
34 6
32 0
31 0 31 6
34 6
19 0 -
21 0 22 0
18 0
18 6
—
r1 1824
31 0 31 6
31 3 31 6
32 6 32 9
32 0 32 6
18 6 19
18 6
17 0
15 9 16 0
—
t 1825
37 6 38 0 36 6 37 0
32 0
35 0 35 3
15 6 16
18 0
15 6
16 0 16 6
[ ) »26
34 0
29 0
29 0 29 3
34 3 34 6
17 0 -
17 0
15 0
16 6
15s.
•| 1827
35 3 35 6
34 3 34 6
33 6 34 0
34 0 34 6
17 0 -
17 0
17 0
15 0
34 9 35 0
37 0 37 6 ! 33 0 33 9
36 0 36 3 ! _
14 6 -
14 6 15 0
14 6
14 6
—
, 1829
36 6 37 0
34 0 35 0
34 0 37 9
32 6 32 9
__
14 6 -
14 0 - 14 0 -
14 0
—
-. 1830
31 3 31 6
32 3 32 6
38 6 39 0
17 0 -
17 0
14 0 -
16 0
—
1831
43 0 44 6
44 0 45 0
39 0 40 0
39 0 39 3
15 0 -
16 0
16 0 -
13 9
—
?•( 11832
39 3 43 0
39 6
38 6
40 3 40 6 _
13 9 -
13 6
13 6 -
13 6
—
'I 1833
44 0 44 3
40 6
43 6 44 0
41 9 42 0 _
13 6 -
13 6 13 9
13 9 -
13 0
mm
i 1834
40 0 40 3
40 6 41 3
39 3 40 3
37 6 38 0 1 _
13 6 -
14 0
13 9 -
12 6
_—
'; 1'.835
37 3 37 6
33 0 34 0
36 0 37 6
38 6 39 0
12 6 -
12 6
12 6 -
12 0
—
! 1836
40 6 41 0
41 0
41 0
43 6
120 -
13 6
13 6 14
13 9
< 1837
41 6 46 0
41 9
37 0 37 6
38 6 39 0
14 6 -
15 6
14 9 15
15 0
—
838
42 6 -
47 0 48 0
—
15 6 -
16 6
•
*
416
TABLES OF TRICES.
TEA, Congou, in Company's Warehouse.
TEA, Hysou, in Company's Warehouse.
Year
Per Ib.
Duty.
Per Ib.
Duty.
*. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s, d.
s. d. s. d.
S. d. S. d.
*. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d
s. d. s. d
f c-
f C-
257.16.. 3(7.
257. 1 6s. 3d,
1 percent.
per cent.
1782
4 G«5 G
4 4a5 2
-
j E.
27/. per ct. >
-
7 6«13 6
6 Sail 6
'
E.
277. per ct.
and 1«. lid.
andls.J-1-d.
[ perlb!
per Ib.
277. 0*.' Wd.
C.
percent.
per cent.
1783
-
4 4 5 G
40 50
-
1 E. (
1 2S/. 3*. 4,1. f
.
7 2 12 0
6 0 11 0
-
K.
percent.
per cent.
and 1,. id.
and 1*. Id.
(. peril,. J
L per 11,.
1784
- -
4864
310 4 8
- -
f Oct. -I
i 12* per I
L cent. J
7 3 12 0
410 9 0
- -
f Oct.
i m per
L cent.
1785
-
310 5 0
2856
-
4890
5086
.
— -
1786
21005 G
3470
_
2 6aG 0
—
-
5890
410 7 6
_
_
1787
210 5 3
2948
__
_
5286
4280
.
—
1788
.
3064
2950
-
.
4696
4680
-
—
1789
m
210 5 0
2649
_
,__,
_
4690
.
_
—
1790
m
2649
2946
-
_
46 90150 96
_
—
1791
.
2949
3050
-
*M
10 «9 G
4696
-
4 Ofl9 6
_
1792
m
3050
„
-
—
7 9 G
4090
4696
«
1793
_
3050
2630
-
696
4080
-
46 910
__
1794
.
2840
3240
.
_
690
4796
4890
—
1795
_
3246
211 4 0
_
mm
4880
47 8 "o
_
—
1796
m
211 4 0
2945
-
205. pr. cent
_
4680
5080
_
20-s. pr. cent
1797
.
210 4 5
2439
-
305. pr.cent.
_
4786
4880
_
305. pr. cent
1798
.
3039
3439
_
_
4480
4682
_
—
1799
3539
2527
2731
—
682
4770
_
310 58
—
1800
210 3 4
210 3 7
_
3437
___
070
4260
-
4 2 G 6
_ _
1801
3437
3436
_
210 3 8
12 66
4256
, _
4366
_~
1802
3038
3039
_
211 3 8
3 6 6
4466
-
5060
__
1803
211 3 8
2838
_
2632
G55. pr. cent.
o 0 GO
5050
-
4 5 410
G56-. pr. cent
1804
•
2833
3136
-
—
_
4 2 410
4754
- -
—
1805
_
3136
211 3 8
-
,
.
4754
4859
_
—
1806
•
211 3 8
2437
2635
fc—
859
4958
_
410 510
_—
1807
_
210 3 9
3138
90s. pr. cent.
410 5 8
4762
.
56s. pr. cent
1808
.
3238
3037
-
.
4760
1859
_
— «
1809
.
3037
3 1 310
_
< p
_
4858
5060
-
—
1810
.
3 1 310
3036
_
—
.
411 510
4756
-
— —
1811
-
211 36
3038
-
756
4960
«.
4756
—
1812
3038
3 2 38
3038
960
4956
_
411 6 0
—
1813
211 3 7
3339
11 GO
4 9 510
_
6176
—
1814'
_
3 5 310
3339
-
_
6276
6 0 610
*
—
1815
3339
3237
- 27 311
_
6 0 610
5666
-
—
1816
2 7 311
2636
2937
963
4759
_
4660
—
1817
2935
211 3 7
660
4359
.
4660
—
1818
1819
3 "l 3 ~7
211 3 7
210 3 6
210 3 5
2436
- -
(loolp.c.)
) above 2s. f
) <J6s. p. c. f
L under2s. }
660
4 2 510
4660
4 5 G 4
5 1 610
4660
rlOOs. p. ct
£vpe.i
' under 2*.
1820
2537
24 34;*
2335
2436
1 510
_
5460
5764
1821
2 4 3 64
2636
2 74 3 3
2837
__
562
* -
5 3 511
4560
1822
2837
2639
2639
2739
360
_
311 6 0
3 7 510
1823
2 6 310
2639
2637
2738
7 5K-
1265
1 7 5 9
3860
1824
1825
2 7* 3 9
2 61 3 8
2739
2739
2 Gf 3 2
2 (ii 3 9
2638
2 7i 3 7
-
860
104 510
3 94 5 10
311 510
37 5 G
4 0 510
310 510
4460
1826
2637
2432
2 21 3 2
2 11 3 5
1 G Gil 04, 5 5
4255
4860
1827
2235
2 3| 3 5
2 2f 3 5 |2 If 3 2
7A 5 9
4755
4557
4959
1828
2 If 3 3
2 H 3 3
2 24 2 9 2 3 35
060
4156
311 5 8
3857
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
2 2i 3 5
2032
2 1-J 3 6
2 li 3 2
2 0| 3 1
2 H 3 6
2132
2134
2 Of 3 2
1 llf 3 0
2 U 3 6
2232
2 013 2
2 1* 3 2i
2 li 3 Of
2 Oi 3 4
2 H 3 6
2 US 2
2132
2 Of 3 0
-
9 511
960
950
84, 5 6
1$ 4 8
3 9 510
3 8i 510
3 9" 5 0
3 51 5 41
3 o| 5 6
3 7A 5 4
4 2' 510
3 &£ 5 6
3 3f 4 84,
3 li 5 7
3855
3950
3 84 5 6
3 31 4 8^
3 2f 5 3
1334
111 210
llOf 2 6
1 10i 2 G
1 7J4 1
CAp.2s.2d. V
If 5 3
3 Oi 5 0£
3 Oi 5 01
211$ 5 G
[ 'pcrlb. 1
1835
1836
1837
1838
I 71 3 7
1728
104 2 9
1 7| 3 4
1 7^ 3 7
1 04 3 0
11 2 7
1 C.i 3 3g
1 3 2 2i
1 H 210
9| 2 6
1128
10 2 4|
1330
-
24 5 0
2 5 4
U 5 3
3| 6 G
3 24 5 0
28 62
1 11 4 2
2357
2250
2663
1 814 0
2240
2442
2 3J 6 6
1
TABLES OF PRICES.
TIMBER — MemelFir.
TIMBER — Quebec Yellow Pine.
Year.
Per Load.
Duty.
Per Load.
Duty.
£ t. £ s.
£ s. £ s.
£s. £s.
£ s. £ s.
£s~ £ s.
£ s. £ s.
£ s. £s.
£ S. £ s
1782
35 -
3 10 -
. .
45. Id.
_ m
None
1783
_ „
3 10 -
1 12 -
» .
_
1784
m
1 15 -
210 -
• •.
^
^ m
1 10 -
2 15 - -
Free.
1785
1 15 -
2 5 -
.
1 13 -
_
» m
2 0«2 6
10 a 1 15 -
1786
1 17 -
2 0 -
1 15 -
m ^
m
1 11
18 - - .
1787
1 12 -
1 5al 10
„ m
65. 8d.
m
2025
10 2 0 -
1788
115 -
1 11 1 14
• .
—
1 11 Q> ^ 0
1 15
- J2 5 .
1789
1 7ol 8
1 11 -
.. m
__
1 15 -
2 5
10 - 1 15
1790
•»
1 10 1 15
2025
m
110 -
I 15
19 -23
1791
2 2 -
3032
211 -
_UI
2 3
16 2 0
m
1792
2 8 -
213 -
.
20-
__
.
1 17
22 -
-
1793
2829
2 3 -
m
__
_
1 17
22 -
. ^
_
1794
2~16 -
25 -
. „
2 18 -
—
30-
"210 -
to *
215 .
r
1795
215 30
4 0 -
m _
__
310 -
3 15 -
— w
3 5 -
mm
179C
-
3 2 -
2 10 2 15
„ „
__
_
3 5 -
2 15 -
_
1797
m
215 -
3 5 3 10
_ m
105.
216 217
20 -
. ^
2 15 a 2 16
mm
1798
_
210 3 0
3335
„ m
_
3 10 3 15
3 0 310
•
5 10 60
v
1799
_
3 8 310
418 5 0
•
_,_ ,
•
3 15 40
_
1800
m
5 10 5 15
5 15 6 0
_
m^m
_
410 415
415 50
m
1801
m
515 60
4 5 4 10
m
mm
•
50 5 10
4 10 4 15| -
_
1802
_
3 12 3 14
3439
*
165. 4rf-
*
4 10 4 15
315 4 OJ - -
1*. 6d*
1803
310o315
5565
315a4 5
_
3 18 4 3
5 8 518
- 15 13 ' 6 8
1804
315 40
3035
- -
Kl
655.3
418 5 8
3 18 5 15
312 4 2
Cls. Gd.
j to
fs. d.-)
C Is lOrf'
1805
3035
315 40
- -
3 10 3 15
•? 25 to Y
318 418
418 518
. _
48 513
K to
C25 65
(.!«• lid.
180G
-
3 10 3 15
6 8 G 13
• •
?s. d.)
H-
(274}
-
48 5 13
6 8 613
- -
fl5. lid.
} to
C 2s.
1807
80 810
4050
.
6 10 6 15
7 18 8 10
613 7 2
.
7 13 7 18
r
1808
610 70
15 10 17 0
.
.
7 10 7 15
10 15 16 0
mm
1809
m
14 0 14 10
1 0 11 10
„ .
27s. 4d.
_
15 0 17 0
10 0 12 0
.
— _
1810
1010 11 0
8 10 9 10
„
11 10 -
. _
_
. to
_
1811
11 0 12 10
10 0 11 10
.
11 01210
8 0 12 0
6 0 12 0
m
7 0 12 0
1812
9 10 10 0
810 9 0
54*. 8d.
1813
7 10 80
5 10 70
8090
645. lid.
1814
7 5 715
4 10 5 10
1815
_ _
50 510
3 5 3 15
.
—
1816
_
35 3 15
2535
.
1817
3 5 315
2 10 2 15
-
3 5 -
,
1818
35 310
3 10 3 15
*
,
1819
-
3 10 3 15
2 5 215
-
655.
1 load.'
1820
215 30
2 10 2 13
210 -
2 15 -
_
38 -
3 8
3 8 -
3 0 -
4 Free
1 for
[Navy.
1821
.
3 5 -
310 -
2 10 -
555.
213 215
^ ,_
.
3033
1822
25 2 10
*»
210 215
2 15 -
2 13 2 15
2 15 2 18
3033
35 3 10
1823
2 5
3 0 -
210 -
2 5 2 10
3 15
42 -
4 0 -
315 -
10*.
1824 2 15 2 17
2 15 2 17
2 5 210
2 7 2 15
3 15
3 14 3 15
310 -
3 15
1825 3 0 -
3 0 -
*
2 15 3 0
__
3 15 4 0
315 4 0
317 -
3 15 3 17
_
1826' 2 10 2 15
2025
2025
2023
_
3 10 3 12
310 -
2 15 3 012 10 2 13
mm
18271 2527
2527
2527
2527
.
2 10 2 13
2 10 2 13
210 213213 215
1828 25 2 71 20 25
1 17 1 19
2027
2 13 2 15
212 215
30 - J2 17
1829 22 2 10 2 2 2 10
2 2 2 10
2327
2 15 2 17
217 30
2 17 3 02 17 3 0
mm
1830 - - 1 17 2 7
1 15 -
1 17 2 7
— .
*.
30 -
30 -3033
, ,
1831 22 2 10 2 2 2 10
2~* 5 210
210 3 0
,
3033
30 3333 3533 35
L-_
1832! 25 2 7l 2 5 212
2027
2 2 210
— .
3335
3335
30 - 3 0
— —
1833
2 10 2 15] 2 10 -
2 3 2 10
2 5 2 10 _
3 0
30 -
2 15 3 02 15 3 0
mm
1834
25 2 10
2i2 -
2 12 -
2 7 210i —
2 15 3 0
2 15 30
30 - 13 10 3 15
_
1835
27 2 12
27 2 12
2 5 212
2 7 2 12 —
3 10 3 15
310 315
353 103 5 3 10
_,_,
1836
3 0 -
3 0 -
2 10 2 15, 2 15 3 0| _
310 -
310
3 10 - |3 10
mm
1837
2 10 2 17
2 12 2 15
2 10 2 17
2 15 2 17 —
130
3 10 -
353 10 3 5 3 10
mm
1838
210 215
2 10 2 15
- ' 1 -
3035
3035
*
*
—
VOL.11.
E E
418
TABLES OF PRICES.
TIN, English, in Bars.
TOBACCO, Virginia, in Bond.
Year.
Per Cwt.
Per Ib.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. d.
d. d.
d. d.
d.
d.
d.
d.
1782
83 0 -
83 2
..
10 a 17
11
a 20
1783
,
83 2 -
828
_
None.
51 12
2I
' 65
1784
_
82 8 -
_
-
4! gi
2,
6i
1785
_
84 8 -
m
_
-
34 54
2.
41
1786
^
84 8 -
_ ,_
_
_
2-i- 44
3
5
1787
_
84 8 -
_
_
.
2| 5
2-
4^
1788
.
84 8 -
77 6
.
-
3 4|
2i
1789
..
70 6 -
77 0
_
-
21 41
1790
_
77 0 -
_
_
^ 4$
2i
3
1791
.
77 0 -
86 0
_
24.041
2 4
2J
a 44
1792
_
92 6 -
103 6
m
2* 4i
2
41
1793
.
103 6 -
105 6
_
_
2* 41
2I
5
1794
_
103 6 -
100 6
.
_
2I 41
3
5
1795
_
100 6 -
99 6
m
„
3 5
3i
6*
1796
_
101 6 -
102 6
_
_
41 7
5-
»!
1797
_
102 6 -
m
-
6£ 9
7:
12
1798
102 6 -
98 0 -
.
100 0
.
8 13
] \\
16
1799
.
102 0 -
104 0
•
-
10 15
4
7
1800
.
104 0 -
110 0
_
-
4g 8
4
8J
1801
_
110 0 -
111 6
-
-
41 8
3i
6*
1802
114 6 -
113 6 -
115 6 -
»
3 6^
3;
7
1803
115 6 -
_
_
2t 7
4i
8
1804
_
115 6 -
_
.
.
4i 8
3!
7
1805
„
113 0 -
122 6
„
.
31 7
4^
8
1806
128 6 -
124 6 -
128 6
«
4 8
1807
128 6 -
_
„
.
4 8
4.
8
1808
•
118 6 -
120 6
.
-
41 8
16'
24
1809
-
120 6 -
128 6
.
16 24
41 10
.
.
7
13
1810
-
128 6 -
174 0
-
-
7 13
3
8
1811
174 0 -
171 6 -
155 6 -
3 8
4 9
_
»
4
7
1812
Uncer
tain
139 6
131 6 -
.
2 7
4
81.
1813
140 6 -
_
_
_
54 14i
10
26
1814
164 6 ~-
174 6 -
_
168 6
8 26
22 26
12
36
20
60
1815
148 6 -
152 0 -
. «.
136 6
»
12 28
10
21
1816
136 6 -
1026
_
.
10 17
8
14
1817
97 0 -
103 0 *
97 0 -
61 13
7 13
6,
\ 9
6,
10
1818
99 0 -
91 6 *
•
92 6 -
5i 10
9 14
7,
12
1819
77 0 -
81 0 -
.
77 6 -
6* 12
51 11
4
9
5,
11
1820
77 0 -
81 0 -
-
77 6
5 10
5 104
•
.
a
8
1821
77 6 -
80 6 -
81 6
m
31 8
2| 7
_
.
3
7*
1822
80 6 -
81 0 -
98 6
3A 71
.
.
3
8
1823
98 6 -
108 6 -
113 6 I
93 6
3' 8
3~ ^
2^
E 7*
2;
7£
1824
1825
88 6 -
108 6 -
90 6 -
103 6 -
88 6
98 6
88 6
91 6 -
I It
f74
2
S !
4
u
1826
1827
91 6 -
83 6 -
88 6 -
83 6 -
81 6
83 6
83 6 -
78 6
3* 7|
9
3 7
I: 11
3
2
p
1828
78 6 -
78 6 -
73 6
75 6
2x 6i
2 6
2
6
2
6
1829
1830
76 6 -
75 6 -
81 6 -
75 6 -
79 6
75 6
75 6
78 0
2f 5*
2| 7i
2* 64
2
2-
?
2
2
7
6
1831
79 0 -
78 0 -
77 6
74 6
21 6
2J 6
2
6
2
6
1832
74 0 -
74 0 -
77 6
74 6
21 6
2$ 6
2
6
2
6
1833
74 6 -
74 6 -
74 6
76 6
4 6
2-j 64
2
7
2
7
1834
76 0 -
77 0 -
78 6
806 -
3° 7
3 7
3
7
3
2*
1835
80 6 -
88 6 -
90 6
90 6
3 8
3$ 8
3
1 8
4
8
1836
1837
1838
102 6 -
97 0 -
89 0«89 6
107 0 -
97 0 -
94 0094 6
130 0 a 132 0
82 0 82 6
107 0
92 0 a 92 6
4 8
2f 9
2f 7$
2* 8
"ty 8£
4
2
a
4 9 I
2I 71 |
TABLES OF PRICES.
449
WHALEBONE, Northern.
WHALEBONE, South Sea.
Year.
Per Ton.
Duty.
Per Ton,
Duty.
£ £
£ £
£ £
£ £
£ £
£ £
£ £
£ £
1782
200 ct 260
220 a 265
1 50 200
200 a 260
153 a 225
Free
None
Free.
l/oo
145 200
mi fin
*
160 190
~*
—
1784
1785
ml Ert
10U
140 195
120 155
160 210
— .
- -
- -
-
-
H
1786
1787
1«X)
180 -
100 120
195 200
" ~
180 190
!Z
135 a 155
160 a 180
"
140 a 160
H
1788
170 180
140 150
120 140
130 160
m
90 110
r_l
1789
_
125 135
130 140
_
•_
80 100
70 a 85
1790
130 150
200 210
_
m
70 80
100 110
m
1791
170 180
150 180
200 220
_
90 95
ICO 110
.
1792
_
200 220
250 300
• -
— .
100 110
100 120
.
90 100
,__
1793
• *.
270 300
230 240
m _
t t
90 110
120 150
m
80 110
__
1794
•
200 230
130 140
_
_
80 110
104 120
85 105
106 120
1795
130 150
160 180
150 -
r
100 120
110 130
—
1796
150 -
115 120
100 110
85 100
m
—
1797
m
115 120
80 88
. *
(
M •
85 100
70 76
m
__
1798
.
90 105
80 96
-
3^ct.val.
.
70 78
75 90
S^ct.val.
1799
.
80 96
75 85
.
«. *•
75 80
65 70
.
—
1800
_
75 82
70 80
-
— .
•
65 70
42 52
.
,
1801
m m
80 85
65 70
_
.
-
56 60
45 50
•
__
1802
_
65 70
50 60
_
,
.
45 50
_
.
Ton.
Ton.
1803
50 60
Uncertain
35 40
30 35
33s. 9rf.
45 50
Uncertain
30 35
25 30
33s. 9d.
1804
30 35
28 30
37s. 6d.
.
20 25
20 28
37s. 6d.
1805
_ ^
28 40
25 30
.
38s. 3d.
.
20 28
_
.
38s. 3d.
1806
_
25 30
20 25
„
40*. 9d.
_
20 28
20 22
_
40s. 9d.
1807
20 25
15 23
_
30 32
_
20 22
28 29
_
— .
1808
30 32
26 28
-
35 40
__
_
28 29
20 22
_
1809
30 40
55 60
50 55
55 60
405. Od.
20 22
30 32
„
25 30
40s. Od.
1810
70 75
80 90
75 80
Uncertain
_
33 40
None
1811
.
30 40
35 40
- _
22 28
30 32
„
26 30
__
1812
«
40 45
65 70
_
26 30
30 32
.
25 30
, .
1813
.
68 70
150 160
_
475. 6d.
26 30
65 70
_
75 80
47s. 6d.
1814
_
150 160
70 85
_
70 85
110 115
-
6S 70
— .
1815
85 86
78 80
110 120
90 100
_^
40 42
50 52
_
40 42
T
1816
85 90
52 55
75 78
n
40 42
45 46
30 32
50 52
1817
70 73
55 60
80 84
75 80
(
50 -
40 -
50
40 -
T
1818
75 80
63 65
122 125
118 120
40 -
30 -
70
60 -
1819
108 110
84 86
123 125
68 70
_
40 -
55 -
30
40 -
.—
1820
72 73
92 93
58 59
63 64
L ,
40 -
60 -
40
45 -
__
1821
66 .
88 90
70 71
75 80
x ,
45 -
50
„
40 45
._-_.
1822
85 90
120 130
220 230
—
60 -
70 80
_
116 125
__
1823
220 -
200 -
210
150 -
—
120 -
100 -
130
_
__,
1824
110 120
95 100
145
200 220
75 -
100
150 -
. .
1825
210 -
250 -
210
280 -
150 -
150 .
130
180 -
, _
1826
280 .
250 -
230
260 -
205. Od.
190 -
160 -
150
180 -
20s. Od.
1827
260 -
260 -
280 300
160 -
190 -
200 -
210
120 -
—
1828
210 .
220 -
230 -
212 -
t
170 -
180 -
160
140 -
—
1829
215 .
220 -
220 240
215 -
180 -
170 -
135
135 -
~—
1830
180 200
180 200
185 -
350 400
— .
125 150
120
210 250
1831
375 -
360 -
240 250
250 -
.—
220 -
160 -
120
95 -
_ —
1832
180 -
180 -
180 -
110 -
140 -
140 -
105
70 80
__
1833
120 125
140 -
160 -
120 140
70 80
85 95
120
90 100
—
1834
140 .
135 145
130 140
140 -
90 ICO
90 95
100 -
100 105
_
1835
145 -
155 160
160 -
300 .
100 105
96 110
110 112
200 -
__
1836
270 .
240 -
260 280
280 300
175 .
145 -
120 -
180 -
_
1837
280 -
260 -
215 220
260 270
160 170
160 -
120 130
180 185
MM
1838
260 -
280 -
—
175 -
120 -
•
-
~
420
TABLES OF PRICES.
WOOL (Sheep's), Spanish Leoiiesa.
WOOD. _ Jamaica Logwood.
Year.
Perlb.
Duty.
Per Ton.
Dutj.
v. d. s d.
s. d. s. d.
s. d. s. a.
*. d. s. d.
£s. £s.
£s. £s.
£ s. £ s.
£ t. £ s.
1782
3 Oa3 6
3 1«3 8
Not stated.
11 Oall 10
9 Oa910
Free. ,
1783
m
3337
3 7 310
• -
__
. M
7 0 -
10 0 1010
m
1784
_
3839
3037
_
— _
^ .
1210 13 0
810 910
m .
_
1785
.
3039
3 2 310
» -
m+
„ .
11 0 11 10
6 0 610
m
_
1786
m
3 1 310
2939
. .
,
.
610 7 0
510 6 0
m m
_
1787
.
2 9 310
_
^
_ _
6 0 610
510 6 0
-
___
1788
m
3 4 310
. .
_ m
f_na
•
510 6 0
5 5 615
5 006 0
—
1789
m
3 4 310
.
^ w
_
•
510 6 0
4 0 410
L
1790
m
3 3 310
.
• »
_
•
410 5 0
610 7 0
_ m
—
1791
m
3639
311 -
m m
»
• -
610 -
515 -
*
1792
m
4 6 410
3 7 410
•
«
.
5 5 -
610 -
m
1793
m
4 6 410
3 9 410
* *
—
-
6 0 -
610 -
_
___
1794
3 8«4 0
3 6 310
3 8«4 0
.
8 0 -
11 0 12 0
.
13s. 4d.
1795
_
3640
-
-
—
• •
11 0 12 0
16 0 1610
. .
—
1796
_ _
3843
3840
„ .
—
• *
14 0 16 0 13 0 14 0
„. .
—
1797
.
310 4 4
. -
_
__,
.
13 0 14 Ojl2 0 1310
_
__
1798
-
310 4 4
^
.
—
•
14 0 15 040 0 41 0
.
1799
4049
5051
_
4 9 -
,
_
48 0 50 0
12 0 15 0
-
t
1800
4049
4754
.
19 0 20 0
•
1801
_
5154
5960
.
,
_ '
1810 19 0
1410 1510
_
.,
1802
m
5960
510 6 3
.
2 Oal4 0
11 0 13 0
18 0 19 0
_
1803
m
510 6 0
6366
m
—
20 0 21 0
24 0 25 0
.
12 0 14 0
15*. 6d.
1804
^
6669
„' _
•
«
23 0 24 0
17 0 18 0
m
19 0 21 0
6s. Wd.
1805
f
6669
6769
• •
^^
20 0 21 0
23 0 24 0
-
16 0 17 0
7s.
1806
m
6769
_
,
6 0 17 0
18 0 19 0
_
14 0 15 0
1807
m
6769
_
m
_
14 0 15 0
10 0 11 0
_
^
1808
6769
10 0 10 6
_
o" o if o
17 0 18 0
14 0 15 0
7s. 5£d.
1809
12 0 14 0
22 0 26 0
13 0 15 0
—
14 0 15 0
15 0 16 0
m
1810
1811
13 0 14 0
7080
7080
8096
—
27 0 28 0 37 0 38 0
- 16 0 17 0
12 0 13 0
16 0 17 0
—
1812
_
8 6 10 0
8696
-
,
2 0 13 0 13 0 14 0
10" o n" o
1813
m
8696
8090
m m
— ,
3 0 15 0
10 0 1010
15 0 -
19 0 2010
9s. IJd.
1814
8090
7080
•
—
21 0 22 0
22 0 23 0
•
15 0 16 0
—
1815
7680
6070
m „
_
_
14 0 15 0
9 0 10 0
-
,__
1816
6070
»
_
810 910
6 0 610
.
7075
—
1817
6070
_
_
_ _
80-
7 0 -
.
8 5 810
*—
1818
6070
6069
•
—
8 0 -
9 0 -
7 5 -
8 0 -
95. 2d.
1819
6069
4050
_
—
710 8 0
5060
» _
1820
5052
3050
4046
3643
6d.«?lb.
5~ 0 6 10
510 6 0
6 0 610
1821
3046
3340
2636
3046
610 615
_
_
90 915
_^_
1822
3046
3650
30 0
3346
9 5 910
10 0 1010
810 9 9
710 8 0
mm
1823
4046
4046
39 6
3946
710 8 0
910 1010
710 810| 8 0 815
1824
3643
3343
33 2
3140
,.__
9 0 -
9 0 -
710 8 0
7075
__
1825
3346
3646
33 6
3346
Id. V Ib.
8085
9 0 10 0
7 0 710
7 0 -
1826
3346
3 0 4 6| 2 9 0
2630
7 0 -
610 -
510 515
6065
3s.
1827
2636
26 3 6! 26 36
2636
515 610
610 615
6066
6066
__
1838
2636
2636
2030
2030
515 6 0
60 6 5] 6 0 610
610 615
1829
2030
2030
2029
2029
_
610 -
610 7 0 612 617
515 6 0
1830
2029
2029
2029
2630
— , .
_
517 6 2l 6 0 65
6065
....
1831
2630
2330
2330
2330
»
6065
6567
6066
6062
_
1832
2330
2029
2029
2329
»
65 610| 610 70
517 6 0
515 6 0
__
1833
1834
1835
1836
2329
2636
2630
30
2329
2640
30-
30-
2830
2639
3 0 -
2930
2636
2633
3 0 -
2932
—
515 - ! 5 10 6 0
515 - 515 -
50 - 5 2 -
50 510 5 0 55
515 6 0
5 0 510
415 5 0
5 0 512
515 -
415 5 0
410 41.r)
615 7 5
_*
1837
2932
2630
2228
2228
610 7060 610
6065
6 5 610
—
1838
2228
2328
-
-
—
70 7 5 615 70
"
•
~^_
THE END.
LONDON :
I'riiited by A. SPOITISWOOOE,
Mew-Street- Squaro.
BINDING LIST FEB 1 1938
University of Toronto
Library
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